2471 files changed, 719214 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/.gitattributes b/openssl-1.1.0h/.gitattributes
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..15121c8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/.gitattributes
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+*.der binary
+/fuzz/corpora/** binary
+*.pfx binary
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/.gitignore b/openssl-1.1.0h/.gitignore
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7324bda
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/.gitignore
@@ -0,0 +1,174 @@
+# Ignore editor artefacts
+/.dir-locals.el
+
+# Top level excludes
+/Makefile.orig
+/MINFO
+/TABLE
+/*.a
+/*.pc
+/rehash.time
+/inc.*
+/makefile.*
+/out.*
+/tmp.*
+/configdata.pm
+
+# *all* Makefiles
+Makefile
+# ... except in demos
+!/demos/*/Makefile
+
+# Links under apps
+/apps/CA.pl
+/apps/tsget
+/apps/tsget.pl
+/apps/md4.c
+
+# Auto generated headers
+/crypto/buildinf.h
+/apps/progs.h
+/crypto/include/internal/*_conf.h
+/openssl/include/opensslconf.h
+/util/domd
+
+# Executables
+/apps/openssl
+/test/sha256t
+/test/sha512t
+/test/gost2814789t
+/test/ssltest_old
+/test/*test
+/test/fips_aesavs
+/test/fips_desmovs
+/test/fips_dhvs
+/test/fips_drbgvs
+/test/fips_dssvs
+/test/fips_ecdhvs
+/test/fips_ecdsavs
+/test/fips_rngvs
+/test/fips_test_suite
+/test/ssltest_old
+/test/x509aux
+/test/v3ext
+
+# Certain files that get created by tests on the fly
+/test/test-runs
+/test/buildtest_*
+
+# Fuzz stuff.
+# Anything without an extension is an executable on Unix, so we keep files
+# with extensions.  And we keep the corpora subddir versioned as well.
+# Anything more generic with extensions that should be ignored will be taken
+# care of by general ignores for those extensions (*.o, *.obj, *.exe, ...)
+/fuzz/*
+!/fuzz/README*
+!/fuzz/corpora
+!/fuzz/*.*
+
+# Misc auto generated files
+/include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+/tools/c_rehash
+/tools/c_rehash.pl
+/util/shlib_wrap.sh
+/tags
+/TAGS
+/crypto.map
+/ssl.map
+
+# Windows (legacy)
+/tmp32
+/tmp32.dbg
+/tmp32dll
+/tmp32dll.dbg
+/out32
+/out32.dbg
+/out32dll
+/out32dll.dbg
+/inc32
+/MINFO
+/ms/.rnd
+/ms/bcb.mak
+/ms/libeay32.def
+/ms/nt.mak
+/ms/ntdll.mak
+/ms/ssleay32.def
+/ms/version32.rc
+
+# Files created on other branches that are not held in git, and are not
+# needed on this branch
+/include/openssl/asn1_mac.h
+/include/openssl/des_old.h
+/include/openssl/fips.h
+/include/openssl/fips_rand.h
+/include/openssl/krb5_asn.h
+/include/openssl/kssl.h
+/include/openssl/pq_compat.h
+/include/openssl/ssl23.h
+/include/openssl/tmdiff.h
+/include/openssl/ui_compat.h
+/test/fips_aesavs.c
+/test/fips_desmovs.c
+/test/fips_dsatest.c
+/test/fips_dssvs.c
+/test/fips_hmactest.c
+/test/fips_randtest.c
+/test/fips_rngvs.c
+/test/fips_rsagtest.c
+/test/fips_rsastest.c
+/test/fips_rsavtest.c
+/test/fips_shatest.c
+/test/fips_test_suite.c
+/test/shatest.c
+
+##### Generic patterns
+# Auto generated assembly language source files
+*.s
+!/crypto/*/asm/*.s
+/crypto/arm*.S
+/crypto/*/*.S
+*.asm
+!/crypto/*/asm/*.asm
+
+# Object files
+*.o
+*.obj
+
+# editor artefacts
+*.swp
+.#*
+\#*#
+*~
+
+# Certificate symbolic links
+*.0
+
+# All kinds of executables
+*.so
+*.so.*
+*.dylib
+*.dylib.*
+*.dll
+*.dll.*
+*.exe
+*.pyc
+*.exp
+*.lib
+*.pdb
+*.ilk
+*.def
+*.rc
+*.res
+
+# Misc generated stuff
+Makefile.save
+/crypto/**/lib
+/engines/**/lib
+/ssl/**/lib
+*.bak
+cscope.*
+*.d
+pod2htmd.tmp
+
+# Windows manifest files
+*.manifest
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/.travis-apt-pin.preferences b/openssl-1.1.0h/.travis-apt-pin.preferences
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1797bd0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/.travis-apt-pin.preferences
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+Package: clang-3.9
+Pin: release o=Ubuntu
+Pin-Priority: -1
+
+Package: libclang-common-3.9-dev
+Pin: release o=Ubuntu
+Pin-Priority: -1
+
+Package: libclang1-3.9
+Pin: release o=Ubuntu
+Pin-Priority: -1
+
+Package: libllvm3.9v4
+Pin: release o=Ubuntu
+Pin-Priority: -1
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/.travis-create-release.sh b/openssl-1.1.0h/.travis-create-release.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..311cedd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/.travis-create-release.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+#! /bin/sh
+
+# $1 is expected to be $TRAVIS_OS_NAME
+
+./Configure dist
+if [ "$1" == osx ]; then
+    make NAME='_srcdist' TARFILE='_srcdist.tar' \
+         TAR_COMMAND='$(TAR) $(TARFLAGS) -cvf -' tar
+else
+    make TARFILE='_srcdist.tar' NAME='_srcdist' dist
+fi
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/.travis.yml b/openssl-1.1.0h/.travis.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b5fc443
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/.travis.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,204 @@
+dist: trusty
+sudo: required
+
+language: c
+cache: ccache
+
+before_install:
+    - if [ -n "$COVERALLS" ]; then
+          pip install --user cpp-coveralls;
+      fi;
+
+addons:
+    apt:
+        packages:
+            - ccache
+
+os:
+    - linux
+
+compiler:
+    - clang
+    - gcc
+
+env:
+    - CONFIG_OPTS="" DESTDIR="_install"
+    - CONFIG_OPTS="--debug no-shared enable-crypto-mdebug enable-rc5 enable-md2"
+    - CONFIG_OPTS="no-pic --strict-warnings" BUILDONLY="yes"
+    - CONFIG_OPTS="no-engine no-shared --strict-warnings" BUILDONLY="yes"
+    - CONFIG_OPTS="no-stdio --strict-warnings" BUILDONLY="yes"
+    - CONFIG_OPTS="no-ec" BUILDONLY="yes"
+    - CONFIG_OPTS="no-asm --strict-warnings" BUILDONLY="yes" CHECKDOCS="yes"
+
+matrix:
+    include:
+        - os: linux
+          compiler: clang-3.9
+          env: CONFIG_OPTS="--strict-warnings no-deprecated" BUILDONLY="yes"
+        - os: linux
+          compiler: gcc
+          env: CONFIG_OPTS="--debug --coverage no-asm enable-rc5 enable-md2 enable-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128 enable-ssl3 enable-ssl3-method enable-weak-ssl-ciphers" COVERALLS="yes"
+        - os: linux
+          compiler: clang-3.9
+          env: CONFIG_OPTS="enable-asan"
+        - os: linux
+          compiler: clang-3.9
+          env: CONFIG_OPTS="enable-msan"
+        - os: linux
+          compiler: clang-3.9
+          env: CONFIG_OPTS="no-asm enable-ubsan enable-rc5 enable-md2 enable-ssl3 enable-ssl3-method -fno-sanitize=alignment"
+        - os: linux
+          compiler: clang-3.9
+          env: CONFIG_OPTS="no-asm enable-asan enable-rc5 enable-md2"
+        - os: linux
+          compiler: clang-3.9
+          env: CONFIG_OPTS="no-stdio"
+        - os: linux
+          addons:
+              apt:
+                  packages:
+                      - gcc-5
+                  sources:
+                      - ubuntu-toolchain-r-test
+          compiler: gcc-5
+          env: CONFIG_OPTS="no-asm enable-ubsan enable-rc5 enable-md2 -DPEDANTIC"
+        - os: linux
+          addons:
+              apt:
+                  packages:
+                      - binutils-mingw-w64
+                      - gcc-mingw-w64
+          compiler: i686-w64-mingw32-gcc
+          env: CONFIG_OPTS="no-pic" TESTS="-test_fuzz"
+        - os: linux
+          addons:
+              apt:
+                  packages:
+                      - binutils-mingw-w64
+                      - gcc-mingw-w64
+          compiler: i686-w64-mingw32-gcc
+          env: CONFIG_OPTS="no-stdio" BUILDONLY="yes"
+        - os: linux
+          addons:
+              apt:
+                  packages:
+                      - binutils-mingw-w64
+                      - gcc-mingw-w64
+          compiler: x86_64-w64-mingw32-gcc
+          env: CONFIG_OPTS="no-pic" TESTS="-test_fuzz"
+        - os: linux
+          addons:
+              apt:
+                  packages:
+                      - binutils-mingw-w64
+                      - gcc-mingw-w64
+          compiler: x86_64-w64-mingw32-gcc
+          env: CONFIG_OPTS="no-stdio" BUILDONLY="yes"
+    exclude:
+        - os: linux
+          compiler: clang
+        - os: osx
+          compiler: gcc
+
+before_script:
+    - if [ -n "$DESTDIR" ]; then
+          sh .travis-create-release.sh $TRAVIS_OS_NAME;
+          tar -xvzf _srcdist.tar.gz;
+          mkdir _build;
+          cd _build;
+          srcdir=../_srcdist;
+          top=..;
+      else
+          srcdir=.;
+          top=.;
+      fi
+    - if [ "$CC" == i686-w64-mingw32-gcc ]; then
+          export CROSS_COMPILE=${CC%%gcc}; unset CC;
+          $srcdir/Configure mingw $CONFIG_OPTS -Wno-pedantic-ms-format;
+      elif [ "$CC" == x86_64-w64-mingw32-gcc ]; then
+          export CROSS_COMPILE=${CC%%gcc}; unset CC;
+          $srcdir/Configure mingw64 $CONFIG_OPTS -Wno-pedantic-ms-format;
+      else
+          if [ "$CC" == clang-3.9 ]; then
+              sudo cp .travis-apt-pin.preferences /etc/apt/preferences.d/no-ubuntu-clang;
+              curl -sSL "http://apt.llvm.org/llvm-snapshot.gpg.key" | sudo -E apt-key add -;
+              echo "deb http://apt.llvm.org/trusty/ llvm-toolchain-trusty-3.9 main" | sudo tee -a /etc/apt/sources.list > /dev/null;
+              sudo -E apt-add-repository -y "ppa:ubuntu-toolchain-r/test";
+              sudo -E apt-get -yq update;
+              sudo -E apt-get -yq --no-install-suggests --no-install-recommends --force-yes install clang-3.9;
+          elif which ccache >/dev/null; then
+              CC="ccache $CC";
+          fi;
+          $srcdir/config -v $CONFIG_OPTS;
+      fi
+    - if [ -z "$BUILDONLY" ]; then
+          if [ -n "$CROSS_COMPILE" ]; then
+              if [ "$TRAVIS_OS_NAME" == "linux" ]; then
+                  sudo dpkg --add-architecture i386;
+                  sudo apt-get update;
+              fi;
+          fi;
+      fi
+    - cd $top
+
+script:
+    - if [ -z "$BUILDONLY" ]; then
+          make="make -s";
+      else
+          make="make";
+      fi
+    - if [ -n "$DESTDIR" ]; then
+          cd _build;
+          top=..;
+      else
+          top=.;
+      fi
+    - if $make update; then
+          echo -e '+\057 MAKE UPDATE OK';
+      else
+          echo -e '+\057 MAKE UPDATE FAILED'; false;
+      fi;
+      git diff --exit-code
+    - if [ -n "$CHECKDOCS" ]; then
+          if $make doc-nits; then
+              echo -e '+\057\057 MAKE DOC-NITS OK';
+          else
+              echo -e '+\057\057 MAKE DOC-NITS FAILED'; false;
+          fi;
+      fi
+    - if $make ; then
+          echo -e '+\057\057\057 MAKE OK';
+      else
+          echo -e '+\057\057\057 MAKE FAILED'; false;
+      fi;
+    - if [ -z "$BUILDONLY" ]; then
+          if [ -n "$CROSS_COMPILE" ]; then
+              sudo apt-get -yq install wine;
+              export EXE_SHELL="wine" WINEPREFIX=`pwd`;
+          fi;
+          HARNESS_VERBOSE=yes make test;
+      else
+          if $make build_tests; then
+              echo -e '+\057\057\075 MAKE BUILD_TESTS OK';
+          else
+              echo -e '+\057\057\075 MAKE BUILD_TESTS FAILEd'; false;
+          fi;
+      fi
+    - if [ -n "$DESTDIR" ]; then
+          mkdir "../$DESTDIR";
+          if $make install install_docs DESTDIR="../$DESTDIR"; then
+              echo -e '+\057\057\057\057\057 MAKE INSTALL_DOCS OK';
+          else
+              echo -e '+\057\057\057\057\057 MAKE INSTALL_DOCS FAILED'; false;
+          fi;
+      fi
+    - cd $top
+
+after_success:
+    - if [ -n "$COVERALLS" ]; then
+          coveralls -b . --gcov-options '\-lp';
+      fi;
+
+notifications:
+    email:
+        secure: "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"
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS b/openssl-1.1.0h/ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d21dccb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+Please https://www.openssl.org/community/thanks.html for the current
+acknowledgements.
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/AUTHORS b/openssl-1.1.0h/AUTHORS
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..48211a2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/AUTHORS
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+    Andy Polyakov
+    Ben Laurie
+    Bodo Möller
+    Emilia Käsper
+    Eric Young
+    Geoff Thorpe
+    Holger Reif
+    Kurt Roeckx
+    Lutz Jänicke
+    Mark J. Cox
+    Matt Caswell
+    Nils Larsch
+    Paul C. Sutton
+    Ralf S. Engelschall
+    Rich Salz
+    Richard Levitte
+    Stephen Henson
+    Steve Marquess
+    Tim Hudson
+    Ulf Möller
+    Viktor Dukhovni
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/CHANGES b/openssl-1.1.0h/CHANGES
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0ea1ad5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/CHANGES
@@ -0,0 +1,12586 @@
+
+ OpenSSL CHANGES
+ _______________
+
+ This is a high-level summary of the most important changes.
+ For a full list of changes, see the git commit log; for example,
+ https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commits/ and pick the appropriate
+ release branch.
+
+ Changes between 1.1.0g and 1.1.0h [27 Mar 2018]
+
+  *) Constructed ASN.1 types with a recursive definition could exceed the stack
+
+     Constructed ASN.1 types with a recursive definition (such as can be found
+     in PKCS7) could eventually exceed the stack given malicious input with
+     excessive recursion. This could result in a Denial Of Service attack. There
+     are no such structures used within SSL/TLS that come from untrusted sources
+     so this is considered safe.
+
+     This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 4th January 2018 by the OSS-fuzz
+     project.
+     (CVE-2018-0739)
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
+  *) Incorrect CRYPTO_memcmp on HP-UX PA-RISC
+
+     Because of an implementation bug the PA-RISC CRYPTO_memcmp function is
+     effectively reduced to only comparing the least significant bit of each
+     byte. This allows an attacker to forge messages that would be considered as
+     authenticated in an amount of tries lower than that guaranteed by the
+     security claims of the scheme. The module can only be compiled by the
+     HP-UX assembler, so that only HP-UX PA-RISC targets are affected.
+
+     This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 2nd March 2018 by Peter Waltenberg
+     (IBM).
+     (CVE-2018-0733)
+     [Andy Polyakov]
+
+  *) Add a build target 'build_all_generated', to build all generated files
+     and only that.  This can be used to prepare everything that requires
+     things like perl for a system that lacks perl and then move everything
+     to that system and do the rest of the build there.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Backport SSL_OP_NO_RENGOTIATION
+
+     OpenSSL 1.0.2 and below had the ability to disable renegotiation using the
+     (undocumented) SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS flag. Due to the opacity
+     changes this is no longer possible in 1.1.0. Therefore the new
+     SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION option from 1.1.1-dev has been backported to
+     1.1.0 to provide equivalent functionality.
+
+     Note that if an application built against 1.1.0h headers (or above) is run
+     using an older version of 1.1.0 (prior to 1.1.0h) then the option will be
+     accepted but nothing will happen, i.e. renegotiation will not be prevented.
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
+  *) Removed the OS390-Unix config target.  It relied on a script that doesn't
+     exist.
+     [Rich Salz]
+
+  *) rsaz_1024_mul_avx2 overflow bug on x86_64
+
+     There is an overflow bug in the AVX2 Montgomery multiplication procedure
+     used in exponentiation with 1024-bit moduli. No EC algorithms are affected.
+     Analysis suggests that attacks against RSA and DSA as a result of this
+     defect would be very difficult to perform and are not believed likely.
+     Attacks against DH1024 are considered just feasible, because most of the
+     work necessary to deduce information about a private key may be performed
+     offline. The amount of resources required for such an attack would be
+     significant. However, for an attack on TLS to be meaningful, the server
+     would have to share the DH1024 private key among multiple clients, which is
+     no longer an option since CVE-2016-0701.
+
+     This only affects processors that support the AVX2 but not ADX extensions
+     like Intel Haswell (4th generation).
+
+     This issue was reported to OpenSSL by David Benjamin (Google). The issue
+     was originally found via the OSS-Fuzz project.
+     (CVE-2017-3738)
+     [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ Changes between 1.1.0f and 1.1.0g [2 Nov 2017]
+
+  *) bn_sqrx8x_internal carry bug on x86_64
+
+     There is a carry propagating bug in the x86_64 Montgomery squaring
+     procedure. No EC algorithms are affected. Analysis suggests that attacks
+     against RSA and DSA as a result of this defect would be very difficult to
+     perform and are not believed likely. Attacks against DH are considered just
+     feasible (although very difficult) because most of the work necessary to
+     deduce information about a private key may be performed offline. The amount
+     of resources required for such an attack would be very significant and
+     likely only accessible to a limited number of attackers. An attacker would
+     additionally need online access to an unpatched system using the target
+     private key in a scenario with persistent DH parameters and a private
+     key that is shared between multiple clients.
+
+     This only affects processors that support the BMI1, BMI2 and ADX extensions
+     like Intel Broadwell (5th generation) and later or AMD Ryzen.
+
+     This issue was reported to OpenSSL by the OSS-Fuzz project.
+     (CVE-2017-3736)
+     [Andy Polyakov]
+
+  *) Malformed X.509 IPAddressFamily could cause OOB read
+
+     If an X.509 certificate has a malformed IPAddressFamily extension,
+     OpenSSL could do a one-byte buffer overread. The most likely result
+     would be an erroneous display of the certificate in text format.
+
+     This issue was reported to OpenSSL by the OSS-Fuzz project.
+     (CVE-2017-3735)
+     [Rich Salz]
+
+  *) Ignore the '-named_curve auto' value for compatibility of applications
+     with OpenSSL 1.0.2.
+     [Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>]
+
+  *) Support for SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC in SSL_CONF_cmd.
+     [Emilia Käsper]
+
+ Changes between 1.1.0e and 1.1.0f [25 May 2017]
+
+  *) Have 'config' recognise 64-bit mingw and choose 'mingw64' as the target
+     platform rather than 'mingw'.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Remove the VMS-specific reimplementation of gmtime from crypto/o_times.c.
+     VMS C's RTL has a fully up to date gmtime() and gmtime_r() since V7.1,
+     which is the minimum version we support.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+ Changes between 1.1.0d and 1.1.0e [16 Feb 2017]
+
+  *) Encrypt-Then-Mac renegotiation crash
+
+     During a renegotiation handshake if the Encrypt-Then-Mac extension is
+     negotiated where it was not in the original handshake (or vice-versa) then
+     this can cause OpenSSL to crash (dependant on ciphersuite). Both clients
+     and servers are affected.
+
+     This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Joe Orton (Red Hat).
+     (CVE-2017-3733)
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
+ Changes between 1.1.0c and 1.1.0d [26 Jan 2017]
+
+  *) Truncated packet could crash via OOB read
+
+     If one side of an SSL/TLS path is running on a 32-bit host and a specific
+     cipher is being used, then a truncated packet can cause that host to
+     perform an out-of-bounds read, usually resulting in a crash.
+
+     This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Robert Święcki of Google.
+     (CVE-2017-3731)
+     [Andy Polyakov]
+
+  *) Bad (EC)DHE parameters cause a client crash
+
+     If a malicious server supplies bad parameters for a DHE or ECDHE key
+     exchange then this can result in the client attempting to dereference a
+     NULL pointer leading to a client crash. This could be exploited in a Denial
+     of Service attack.
+
+     This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Guido Vranken.
+     (CVE-2017-3730)
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
+  *) BN_mod_exp may produce incorrect results on x86_64
+
+     There is a carry propagating bug in the x86_64 Montgomery squaring
+     procedure. No EC algorithms are affected. Analysis suggests that attacks
+     against RSA and DSA as a result of this defect would be very difficult to
+     perform and are not believed likely. Attacks against DH are considered just
+     feasible (although very difficult) because most of the work necessary to
+     deduce information about a private key may be performed offline. The amount
+     of resources required for such an attack would be very significant and
+     likely only accessible to a limited number of attackers. An attacker would
+     additionally need online access to an unpatched system using the target
+     private key in a scenario with persistent DH parameters and a private
+     key that is shared between multiple clients. For example this can occur by
+     default in OpenSSL DHE based SSL/TLS ciphersuites. Note: This issue is very
+     similar to CVE-2015-3193 but must be treated as a separate problem.
+
+     This issue was reported to OpenSSL by the OSS-Fuzz project.
+     (CVE-2017-3732)
+     [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ Changes between 1.1.0b and 1.1.0c [10 Nov 2016]
+
+  *) ChaCha20/Poly1305 heap-buffer-overflow
+
+     TLS connections using *-CHACHA20-POLY1305 ciphersuites are susceptible to
+     a DoS attack by corrupting larger payloads. This can result in an OpenSSL
+     crash. This issue is not considered to be exploitable beyond a DoS.
+
+     This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Robert Święcki (Google Security Team)
+     (CVE-2016-7054)
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) CMS Null dereference
+
+     Applications parsing invalid CMS structures can crash with a NULL pointer
+     dereference. This is caused by a bug in the handling of the ASN.1 CHOICE
+     type in OpenSSL 1.1.0 which can result in a NULL value being passed to the
+     structure callback if an attempt is made to free certain invalid encodings.
+     Only CHOICE structures using a callback which do not handle NULL value are
+     affected.
+
+     This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Tyler Nighswander of ForAllSecure.
+     (CVE-2016-7053)
+     [Stephen Henson]
+
+  *) Montgomery multiplication may produce incorrect results
+
+     There is a carry propagating bug in the Broadwell-specific Montgomery
+     multiplication procedure that handles input lengths divisible by, but
+     longer than 256 bits. Analysis suggests that attacks against RSA, DSA
+     and DH private keys are impossible. This is because the subroutine in
+     question is not used in operations with the private key itself and an input
+     of the attacker's direct choice. Otherwise the bug can manifest itself as
+     transient authentication and key negotiation failures or reproducible
+     erroneous outcome of public-key operations with specially crafted input.
+     Among EC algorithms only Brainpool P-512 curves are affected and one
+     presumably can attack ECDH key negotiation. Impact was not analyzed in
+     detail, because pre-requisites for attack are considered unlikely. Namely
+     multiple clients have to choose the curve in question and the server has to
+     share the private key among them, neither of which is default behaviour.
+     Even then only clients that chose the curve will be affected.
+
+     This issue was publicly reported as transient failures and was not
+     initially recognized as a security issue. Thanks to Richard Morgan for
+     providing reproducible case.
+     (CVE-2016-7055)
+     [Andy Polyakov]
+
+  *) OpenSSL now fails if it receives an unrecognised record type in TLS1.0
+     or TLS1.1. Previously this only happened in SSLv3 and TLS1.2. This is to
+     prevent issues where no progress is being made and the peer continually
+     sends unrecognised record types, using up resources processing them.
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
+  *) Removed automatic addition of RPATH in shared libraries and executables,
+     as this was a remainder from OpenSSL 1.0.x and isn't needed any more.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+ Changes between 1.1.0a and 1.1.0b [26 Sep 2016]
+
+  *) Fix Use After Free for large message sizes
+
+     The patch applied to address CVE-2016-6307 resulted in an issue where if a
+     message larger than approx 16k is received then the underlying buffer to
+     store the incoming message is reallocated and moved. Unfortunately a
+     dangling pointer to the old location is left which results in an attempt to
+     write to the previously freed location. This is likely to result in a
+     crash, however it could potentially lead to execution of arbitrary code.
+
+     This issue only affects OpenSSL 1.1.0a.
+
+     This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Robert Święcki.
+     (CVE-2016-6309)
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
+ Changes between 1.1.0 and 1.1.0a [22 Sep 2016]
+
+  *) OCSP Status Request extension unbounded memory growth
+
+     A malicious client can send an excessively large OCSP Status Request
+     extension. If that client continually requests renegotiation, sending a
+     large OCSP Status Request extension each time, then there will be unbounded
+     memory growth on the server. This will eventually lead to a Denial Of
+     Service attack through memory exhaustion. Servers with a default
+     configuration are vulnerable even if they do not support OCSP. Builds using
+     the "no-ocsp" build time option are not affected.
+
+     This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.)
+     (CVE-2016-6304)
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
+  *) SSL_peek() hang on empty record
+
+     OpenSSL 1.1.0 SSL/TLS will hang during a call to SSL_peek() if the peer
+     sends an empty record. This could be exploited by a malicious peer in a
+     Denial Of Service attack.
+
+     This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Alex Gaynor.
+     (CVE-2016-6305)
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
+  *) Excessive allocation of memory in tls_get_message_header() and
+     dtls1_preprocess_fragment()
+
+     A (D)TLS message includes 3 bytes for its length in the header for the
+     message. This would allow for messages up to 16Mb in length. Messages of
+     this length are excessive and OpenSSL includes a check to ensure that a
+     peer is sending reasonably sized messages in order to avoid too much memory
+     being consumed to service a connection. A flaw in the logic of version
+     1.1.0 means that memory for the message is allocated too early, prior to
+     the excessive message length check. Due to way memory is allocated in
+     OpenSSL this could mean an attacker could force up to 21Mb to be allocated
+     to service a connection. This could lead to a Denial of Service through
+     memory exhaustion. However, the excessive message length check still takes
+     place, and this would cause the connection to immediately fail. Assuming
+     that the application calls SSL_free() on the failed connection in a timely
+     manner then the 21Mb of allocated memory will then be immediately freed
+     again. Therefore the excessive memory allocation will be transitory in
+     nature. This then means that there is only a security impact if:
+
+     1) The application does not call SSL_free() in a timely manner in the event
+     that the connection fails
+     or
+     2) The application is working in a constrained environment where there is
+     very little free memory
+     or
+     3) The attacker initiates multiple connection attempts such that there are
+     multiple connections in a state where memory has been allocated for the
+     connection; SSL_free() has not yet been called; and there is insufficient
+     memory to service the multiple requests.
+
+     Except in the instance of (1) above any Denial Of Service is likely to be
+     transitory because as soon as the connection fails the memory is
+     subsequently freed again in the SSL_free() call. However there is an
+     increased risk during this period of application crashes due to the lack of
+     memory - which would then mean a more serious Denial of Service.
+
+     This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.)
+     (CVE-2016-6307 and CVE-2016-6308)
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
+  *) solaris-x86-cc, i.e. 32-bit configuration with vendor compiler,
+     had to be removed. Primary reason is that vendor assembler can't
+     assemble our modules with -KPIC flag. As result it, assembly
+     support, was not even available as option. But its lack means
+     lack of side-channel resistant code, which is incompatible with
+     security by todays standards. Fortunately gcc is readily available
+     prepackaged option, which we firmly point at...
+     [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.2h and 1.1.0  [25 Aug 2016]
+
+  *) Windows command-line tool supports UTF-8 opt-in option for arguments
+     and console input. Setting OPENSSL_WIN32_UTF8 environment variable
+     (to any value) allows Windows user to access PKCS#12 file generated
+     with Windows CryptoAPI and protected with non-ASCII password, as well
+     as files generated under UTF-8 locale on Linux also protected with
+     non-ASCII password.
+     [Andy Polyakov]
+
+  *) To mitigate the SWEET32 attack (CVE-2016-2183), 3DES cipher suites
+     have been disabled by default and removed from DEFAULT, just like RC4.
+     See the RC4 item below to re-enable both.
+     [Rich Salz]
+
+  *) The method for finding the storage location for the Windows RAND seed file
+     has changed. First we check %RANDFILE%. If that is not set then we check
+     the directories %HOME%, %USERPROFILE% and %SYSTEMROOT% in that order. If
+     all else fails we fall back to C:\.
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
+  *) The EVP_EncryptUpdate() function has had its return type changed from void
+     to int. A return of 0 indicates and error while a return of 1 indicates
+     success.
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
+  *) The flags RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME, DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME and
+     DH_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME which previously provided the ability to switch
+     off the constant time implementation for RSA, DSA and DH have been made
+     no-ops and deprecated.
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
+  *) Windows RAND implementation was simplified to only get entropy by
+     calling CryptGenRandom(). Various other RAND-related tickets
+     were also closed.
+     [Joseph Wylie Yandle, Rich Salz]
+
+  *) The stack and lhash API's were renamed to start with OPENSSL_SK_
+     and OPENSSL_LH_, respectively.  The old names are available
+     with API compatibility.  They new names are now completely documented.
+     [Rich Salz]
+
+  *) Unify TYPE_up_ref(obj) methods signature.
+     SSL_CTX_up_ref(), SSL_up_ref(), X509_up_ref(), EVP_PKEY_up_ref(),
+     X509_CRL_up_ref(), X509_OBJECT_up_ref_count() methods are now returning an
+     int (instead of void) like all others TYPE_up_ref() methods.
+     So now these methods also check the return value of CRYPTO_atomic_add(),
+     and the validity of object reference counter.
+     [fdasilvayy@gmail.com]
+
+  *) With Windows Visual Studio builds, the .pdb files are installed
+     alongside the installed libraries and executables.  For a static
+     library installation, ossl_static.pdb is the associate compiler
+     generated .pdb file to be used when linking programs.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Remove openssl.spec.  Packaging files belong with the packagers.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Automatic Darwin/OSX configuration has had a refresh, it will now
+     recognise x86_64 architectures automatically.  You can still decide
+     to build for a different bitness with the environment variable
+     KERNEL_BITS (can be 32 or 64), for example:
+
+         KERNEL_BITS=32 ./config
+
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Change default algorithms in pkcs8 utility to use PKCS#5 v2.0,
+     256 bit AES and HMAC with SHA256.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Remove support for MIPS o32 ABI on IRIX (and IRIX only).
+     [Andy Polyakov]
+
+  *) Triple-DES ciphers have been moved from HIGH to MEDIUM.
+     [Rich Salz]
+
+  *) To enable users to have their own config files and build file templates,
+     Configure looks in the directory indicated by the environment variable
+     OPENSSL_LOCAL_CONFIG_DIR as well as the in-source Configurations/
+     directory.  On VMS, OPENSSL_LOCAL_CONFIG_DIR is expected to be a logical
+     name and is used as is.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) The following datatypes were made opaque: X509_OBJECT, X509_STORE_CTX,
+     X509_STORE, X509_LOOKUP, and X509_LOOKUP_METHOD.  The unused type
+     X509_CERT_FILE_CTX was removed.
+     [Rich Salz]
+
+  *) "shared" builds are now the default. To create only static libraries use
+     the "no-shared" Configure option.
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
+  *) Remove the no-aes, no-hmac, no-rsa, no-sha and no-md5 Configure options.
+     All of these option have not worked for some while and are fundamental
+     algorithms.
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
+  *) Make various cleanup routines no-ops and mark them as deprecated. Most
+     global cleanup functions are no longer required because they are handled
+     via auto-deinit (see OPENSSL_init_crypto and OPENSSL_init_ssl man pages).
+     Explicitly de-initing can cause problems (e.g. where a library that uses
+     OpenSSL de-inits, but an application is still using it). The affected
+     functions are CONF_modules_free(), ENGINE_cleanup(), OBJ_cleanup(),
+     EVP_cleanup(), BIO_sock_cleanup(), CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data(),
+     RAND_cleanup(), SSL_COMP_free_compression_methods(), ERR_free_strings() and
+     COMP_zlib_cleanup().
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
+  *) --strict-warnings no longer enables runtime debugging options
+     such as REF_DEBUG. Instead, debug options are automatically
+     enabled with '--debug' builds.
+     [Andy Polyakov, Emilia Käsper]
+
+  *) Made DH and DH_METHOD opaque. The structures for managing DH objects
+     have been moved out of the public header files. New functions for managing
+     these have been added.
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
+  *) Made RSA and RSA_METHOD opaque. The structures for managing RSA
+     objects have been moved out of the public header files. New
+     functions for managing these have been added.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Made DSA and DSA_METHOD opaque. The structures for managing DSA objects
+     have been moved out of the public header files. New functions for managing
+     these have been added.
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
+  *) Made BIO and BIO_METHOD opaque. The structures for managing BIOs have been
+     moved out of the public header files. New functions for managing these
+     have been added.
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
+  *) Removed no-rijndael as a config option. Rijndael is an old name for AES.
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
+  *) Removed the mk1mf build scripts.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Headers are now wrapped, if necessary, with OPENSSL_NO_xxx, so
+     it is always safe to #include a header now.
+     [Rich Salz]
+
+  *) Removed the aged BC-32 config and all its supporting scripts
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Removed support for Ultrix, Netware, and OS/2.
+     [Rich Salz]
+
+  *) Add support for HKDF.
+     [Alessandro Ghedini]
+
+  *) Add support for blake2b and blake2s
+     [Bill Cox]
+
+  *) Added support for "pipelining". Ciphers that have the
+     EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE flag set have a capability to process multiple
+     encryptions/decryptions simultaneously. There are currently no built-in
+     ciphers with this property but the expectation is that engines will be able
+     to offer it to significantly improve throughput. Support has been extended
+     into libssl so that multiple records for a single connection can be
+     processed in one go (for >=TLS 1.1).
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
+  *) Added the AFALG engine. This is an async capable engine which is able to
+     offload work to the Linux kernel. In this initial version it only supports
+     AES128-CBC. The kernel must be version 4.1.0 or greater.
+     [Catriona Lucey]
+
+  *) OpenSSL now uses a new threading API. It is no longer necessary to
+     set locking callbacks to use OpenSSL in a multi-threaded environment. There
+     are two supported threading models: pthreads and windows threads. It is
+     also possible to configure OpenSSL at compile time for "no-threads". The
+     old threading API should no longer be used. The functions have been
+     replaced with "no-op" compatibility macros.
+     [Alessandro Ghedini, Matt Caswell]
+
+  *) Modify behavior of ALPN to invoke callback after SNI/servername
+     callback, such that updates to the SSL_CTX affect ALPN.
+     [Todd Short]
+
+  *) Add SSL_CIPHER queries for authentication and key-exchange.
+     [Todd Short]
+
+  *) Changes to the DEFAULT cipherlist:
+       - Prefer (EC)DHE handshakes over plain RSA.
+       - Prefer AEAD ciphers over legacy ciphers.
+       - Prefer ECDSA over RSA when both certificates are available.
+       - Prefer TLSv1.2 ciphers/PRF.
+       - Remove DSS, SEED, IDEA, CAMELLIA, and AES-CCM from the
+         default cipherlist.
+     [Emilia Käsper]
+
+  *) Change the ECC default curve list to be this, in order: x25519,
+     secp256r1, secp521r1, secp384r1.
+     [Rich Salz]
+
+  *) RC4 based libssl ciphersuites are now classed as "weak" ciphers and are
+     disabled by default. They can be re-enabled using the
+     enable-weak-ssl-ciphers option to Configure.
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
+  *) If the server has ALPN configured, but supports no protocols that the
+     client advertises, send a fatal "no_application_protocol" alert.
+     This behaviour is SHALL in RFC 7301, though it isn't universally
+     implemented by other servers.
+     [Emilia Käsper]
+
+  *) Add X25519 support.
+     Add ASN.1 and EVP_PKEY methods for X25519. This includes support
+     for public and private key encoding using the format documented in
+     draft-ietf-curdle-pkix-02. The corresponding EVP_PKEY method supports
+     key generation and key derivation.
+
+     TLS support complies with draft-ietf-tls-rfc4492bis-08 and uses
+     X25519(29).
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Deprecate SRP_VBASE_get_by_user.
+     SRP_VBASE_get_by_user had inconsistent memory management behaviour.
+     In order to fix an unavoidable memory leak (CVE-2016-0798),
+     SRP_VBASE_get_by_user was changed to ignore the "fake user" SRP
+     seed, even if the seed is configured.
+
+     Users should use SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user instead. Note that in
+     SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user, caller must free the returned value. Note
+     also that even though configuring the SRP seed attempts to hide
+     invalid usernames by continuing the handshake with fake
+     credentials, this behaviour is not constant time and no strong
+     guarantees are made that the handshake is indistinguishable from
+     that of a valid user.
+     [Emilia Käsper]
+
+  *) Configuration change; it's now possible to build dynamic engines
+     without having to build shared libraries and vice versa.  This
+     only applies to the engines in engines/, those in crypto/engine/
+     will always be built into libcrypto (i.e. "static").
+
+     Building dynamic engines is enabled by default; to disable, use
+     the configuration option "disable-dynamic-engine".
+
+     The only requirements for building dynamic engines are the
+     presence of the DSO module and building with position independent
+     code, so they will also automatically be disabled if configuring
+     with "disable-dso" or "disable-pic".
+
+     The macros OPENSSL_NO_STATIC_ENGINE and OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE
+     are also taken away from openssl/opensslconf.h, as they are
+     irrelevant.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Configuration change; if there is a known flag to compile
+     position independent code, it will always be applied on the
+     libcrypto and libssl object files, and never on the application
+     object files.  This means other libraries that use routines from
+     libcrypto / libssl can be made into shared libraries regardless
+     of how OpenSSL was configured.
+
+     If this isn't desirable, the configuration options "disable-pic"
+     or "no-pic" can be used to disable the use of PIC.  This will
+     also disable building shared libraries and dynamic engines.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Removed JPAKE code.  It was experimental and has no wide use.
+     [Rich Salz]
+
+  *) The INSTALL_PREFIX Makefile variable has been renamed to
+     DESTDIR.  That makes for less confusion on what this variable
+     is for.  Also, the configuration option --install_prefix is
+     removed.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Heartbeat for TLS has been removed and is disabled by default
+     for DTLS; configure with enable-heartbeats.  Code that uses the
+     old #define's might need to be updated.
+     [Emilia Käsper, Rich Salz]
+
+  *) Rename REF_CHECK to REF_DEBUG.
+     [Rich Salz]
+
+  *) New "unified" build system
+
+     The "unified" build system is aimed to be a common system for all
+     platforms we support.  With it comes new support for VMS.
+
+     This system builds supports building in a different directory tree
+     than the source tree.  It produces one Makefile (for unix family
+     or lookalikes), or one descrip.mms (for VMS).
+
+     The source of information to make the Makefile / descrip.mms is
+     small files called 'build.info', holding the necessary
+     information for each directory with source to compile, and a
+     template in Configurations, like unix-Makefile.tmpl or
+     descrip.mms.tmpl.
+
+     With this change, the library names were also renamed on Windows
+     and on VMS.  They now have names that are closer to the standard
+     on Unix, and include the major version number, and in certain
+     cases, the architecture they are built for.  See "Notes on shared
+     libraries" in INSTALL.
+
+     We rely heavily on the perl module Text::Template.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Added support for auto-initialisation and de-initialisation of the library.
+     OpenSSL no longer requires explicit init or deinit routines to be called,
+     except in certain circumstances. See the OPENSSL_init_crypto() and
+     OPENSSL_init_ssl() man pages for further information.
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
+  *) The arguments to the DTLSv1_listen function have changed. Specifically the
+     "peer" argument is now expected to be a BIO_ADDR object.
+
+  *) Rewrite of BIO networking library. The BIO library lacked consistent
+     support of IPv6, and adding it required some more extensive
+     modifications.  This introduces the BIO_ADDR and BIO_ADDRINFO types,
+     which hold all types of addresses and chains of address information.
+     It also introduces a new API, with functions like BIO_socket,
+     BIO_connect, BIO_listen, BIO_lookup and a rewrite of BIO_accept.
+     The source/sink BIOs BIO_s_connect, BIO_s_accept and BIO_s_datagram
+     have been adapted accordingly.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1 now accepts inputs with and without
+     the leading 0-byte.
+     [Emilia Käsper]
+
+  *) CRIME protection: disable compression by default, even if OpenSSL is
+     compiled with zlib enabled. Applications can still enable compression
+     by calling SSL_CTX_clear_options(ctx, SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION), or by
+     using the SSL_CONF library to configure compression.
+     [Emilia Käsper]
+
+  *) The signature of the session callback configured with
+     SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb was changed. The read-only input buffer
+     was explicitly marked as 'const unsigned char*' instead of
+     'unsigned char*'.
+     [Emilia Käsper]
+
+  *) Always DPURIFY. Remove the use of uninitialized memory in the
+     RNG, and other conditional uses of DPURIFY. This makes -DPURIFY a no-op.
+     [Emilia Käsper]
+
+  *) Removed many obsolete configuration items, including
+        DES_PTR, DES_RISC1, DES_RISC2, DES_INT
+        MD2_CHAR, MD2_INT, MD2_LONG
+        BF_PTR, BF_PTR2
+        IDEA_SHORT, IDEA_LONG
+        RC2_SHORT, RC2_LONG, RC4_LONG, RC4_CHUNK, RC4_INDEX
+     [Rich Salz, with advice from Andy Polyakov]
+
+  *) Many BN internals have been moved to an internal header file.
+     [Rich Salz with help from Andy Polyakov]
+
+  *) Configuration and writing out the results from it has changed.
+     Files such as Makefile include/openssl/opensslconf.h and are now
+     produced through general templates, such as Makefile.in and
+     crypto/opensslconf.h.in and some help from the perl module
+     Text::Template.
+
+     Also, the center of configuration information is no longer
+     Makefile.  Instead, Configure produces a perl module in
+     configdata.pm which holds most of the config data (in the hash
+     table %config), the target data that comes from the target
+     configuration in one of the Configurations/*.conf files (in
+     %target).
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) To clarify their intended purposes, the Configure options
+     --prefix and --openssldir change their semantics, and become more
+     straightforward and less interdependent.
+
+     --prefix shall be used exclusively to give the location INSTALLTOP
+     where programs, scripts, libraries, include files and manuals are
+     going to be installed.  The default is now /usr/local.
+
+     --openssldir shall be used exclusively to give the default
+     location OPENSSLDIR where certificates, private keys, CRLs are
+     managed.  This is also where the default openssl.cnf gets
+     installed.
+     If the directory given with this option is a relative path, the
+     values of both the --prefix value and the --openssldir value will
+     be combined to become OPENSSLDIR.
+     The default for --openssldir is INSTALLTOP/ssl.
+
+     Anyone who uses --openssldir to specify where OpenSSL is to be
+     installed MUST change to use --prefix instead.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) The GOST engine was out of date and therefore it has been removed. An up
+     to date GOST engine is now being maintained in an external repository.
+     See: https://wiki.openssl.org/index.php/Binaries. Libssl still retains
+     support for GOST ciphersuites (these are only activated if a GOST engine
+     is present).
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
+  *) EGD is no longer supported by default; use enable-egd when
+     configuring.
+     [Ben Kaduk and Rich Salz]
+
+  *) The distribution now has Makefile.in files, which are used to
+     create Makefile's when Configure is run.  *Configure must be run
+     before trying to build now.*
+     [Rich Salz]
+
+  *) The return value for SSL_CIPHER_description() for error conditions
+     has changed.
+     [Rich Salz]
+
+  *) Support for RFC6698/RFC7671 DANE TLSA peer authentication.
+
+     Obtaining and performing DNSSEC validation of TLSA records is
+     the application's responsibility.  The application provides
+     the TLSA records of its choice to OpenSSL, and these are then
+     used to authenticate the peer.
+
+     The TLSA records need not even come from DNS.  They can, for
+     example, be used to implement local end-entity certificate or
+     trust-anchor "pinning", where the "pin" data takes the form
+     of TLSA records, which can augment or replace verification
+     based on the usual WebPKI public certification authorities.
+     [Viktor Dukhovni]
+
+  *) Revert default OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED setting.  Instead OpenSSL
+     continues to support deprecated interfaces in default builds.
+     However, applications are strongly advised to compile their
+     source files with -DOPENSSL_API_COMPAT=0x10100000L, which hides
+     the declarations of all interfaces deprecated in 0.9.8, 1.0.0
+     or the 1.1.0 releases.
+
+     In environments in which all applications have been ported to
+     not use any deprecated interfaces OpenSSL's Configure script
+     should be used with the --api=1.1.0 option to entirely remove
+     support for the deprecated features from the library and
+     unconditionally disable them in the installed headers.
+     Essentially the same effect can be achieved with the "no-deprecated"
+     argument to Configure, except that this will always restrict
+     the build to just the latest API, rather than a fixed API
+     version.
+
+     As applications are ported to future revisions of the API,
+     they should update their compile-time OPENSSL_API_COMPAT define
+     accordingly, but in most cases should be able to continue to
+     compile with later releases.
+
+     The OPENSSL_API_COMPAT versions for 1.0.0, and 0.9.8 are
+     0x10000000L and 0x00908000L, respectively.  However those
+     versions did not support the OPENSSL_API_COMPAT feature, and
+     so applications are not typically tested for explicit support
+     of just the undeprecated features of either release.
+     [Viktor Dukhovni]
+
+  *) Add support for setting the minimum and maximum supported protocol.
+     It can bet set via the SSL_set_min_proto_version() and
+     SSL_set_max_proto_version(), or via the SSL_CONF's MinProtocol and
+     MaxProtcol.  It's recommended to use the new APIs to disable
+     protocols instead of disabling individual protocols using
+     SSL_set_options() or SSL_CONF's Protocol.  This change also
+     removes support for disabling TLS 1.2 in the OpenSSL TLS
+     client at compile time by defining OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2_CLIENT.
+     [Kurt Roeckx]
+
+  *) Support for ChaCha20 and Poly1305 added to libcrypto and libssl.
+     [Andy Polyakov]
+
+  *) New EC_KEY_METHOD, this replaces the older ECDSA_METHOD and ECDH_METHOD
+     and integrates ECDSA and ECDH functionality into EC. Implementations can
+     now redirect key generation and no longer need to convert to or from
+     ECDSA_SIG format.
+
+     Note: the ecdsa.h and ecdh.h headers are now no longer needed and just
+     include the ec.h header file instead.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Remove support for all 40 and 56 bit ciphers.  This includes all the export
+     ciphers who are no longer supported and drops support the ephemeral RSA key
+     exchange. The LOW ciphers currently doesn't have any ciphers in it.
+     [Kurt Roeckx]
+
+  *) Made EVP_MD_CTX, EVP_MD, EVP_CIPHER_CTX, EVP_CIPHER and HMAC_CTX
+     opaque.  For HMAC_CTX, the following constructors and destructors
+     were added:
+
+        HMAC_CTX *HMAC_CTX_new(void);
+        void HMAC_CTX_free(HMAC_CTX *ctx);
+
+     For EVP_MD and EVP_CIPHER, complete APIs to create, fill and
+     destroy such methods has been added.  See EVP_MD_meth_new(3) and
+     EVP_CIPHER_meth_new(3) for documentation.
+
+     Additional changes:
+     1) EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(), EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup() and
+        HMAC_CTX_cleanup() were removed.  HMAC_CTX_reset() and
+        EVP_MD_CTX_reset() should be called instead to reinitialise
+        an already created structure.
+     2) For consistency with the majority of our object creators and
+        destructors, EVP_MD_CTX_(create|destroy) were renamed to
+        EVP_MD_CTX_(new|free).  The old names are retained as macros
+        for deprecated builds.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Added ASYNC support. Libcrypto now includes the async sub-library to enable
+     cryptographic operations to be performed asynchronously as long as an
+     asynchronous capable engine is used. See the ASYNC_start_job() man page for
+     further details. Libssl has also had this capability integrated with the
+     introduction of the new mode SSL_MODE_ASYNC and associated error
+     SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC. See the SSL_CTX_set_mode() and SSL_get_error() man
+     pages. This work was developed in partnership with Intel Corp.
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
+  *) SSL_{CTX_}set_ecdh_auto() has been removed and ECDH is support is
+     always enabled now.  If you want to disable the support you should
+     exclude it using the list of supported ciphers. This also means that the
+     "-no_ecdhe" option has been removed from s_server.
+     [Kurt Roeckx]
+
+  *) SSL_{CTX}_set_tmp_ecdh() which can set 1 EC curve now internally calls
+     SSL_{CTX_}set1_curves() which can set a list.
+     [Kurt Roeckx]
+
+  *) Remove support for SSL_{CTX_}set_tmp_ecdh_callback().  You should set the
+     curve you want to support using SSL_{CTX_}set1_curves().
+     [Kurt Roeckx]
+
+  *) State machine rewrite. The state machine code has been significantly
+     refactored in order to remove much duplication of code and solve issues
+     with the old code (see ssl/statem/README for further details). This change
+     does have some associated API changes. Notably the SSL_state() function
+     has been removed and replaced by SSL_get_state which now returns an
+     "OSSL_HANDSHAKE_STATE" instead of an int. SSL_set_state() has been removed
+     altogether. The previous handshake states defined in ssl.h and ssl3.h have
+     also been removed.
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
+  *) All instances of the string "ssleay" in the public API were replaced
+     with OpenSSL (case-matching; e.g., OPENSSL_VERSION for #define's)
+     Some error codes related to internal RSA_eay API's were renamed.
+     [Rich Salz]
+
+  *) The demo files in crypto/threads were moved to demo/threads.
+     [Rich Salz]
+
+  *) Removed obsolete engines: 4758cca, aep, atalla, cswift, nuron, gmp,
+     sureware and ubsec.
+     [Matt Caswell, Rich Salz]
+
+  *) New ASN.1 embed macro.
+
+     New ASN.1 macro ASN1_EMBED. This is the same as ASN1_SIMPLE except the
+     structure is not allocated: it is part of the parent. That is instead of
+
+     FOO *x;
+
+     it must be:
+
+     FOO x;
+
+     This reduces memory fragmentation and make it impossible to accidentally
+     set a mandatory field to NULL.
+
+     This currently only works for some fields specifically a SEQUENCE, CHOICE,
+     or ASN1_STRING type which is part of a parent SEQUENCE. Since it is
+     equivalent to ASN1_SIMPLE it cannot be tagged, OPTIONAL, SET OF or
+     SEQUENCE OF.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Remove EVP_CHECK_DES_KEY, a compile-time option that never compiled.
+     [Emilia Käsper]
+
+  *) Removed DES and RC4 ciphersuites from DEFAULT. Also removed RC2 although
+     in 1.0.2 EXPORT was already removed and the only RC2 ciphersuite is also
+     an EXPORT one. COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT has been updated accordingly to add
+     DES and RC4 ciphersuites.
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
+  *) Rewrite EVP_DecodeUpdate (base64 decoding) to fix several bugs.
+     This changes the decoding behaviour for some invalid messages,
+     though the change is mostly in the more lenient direction, and
+     legacy behaviour is preserved as much as possible.
+     [Emilia Käsper]
+
+  *) Fix no-stdio build.
+    [ David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com> and also
+      Ivan Nestlerode <ivan.nestlerode@sonos.com> ]
+
+  *) New testing framework
+     The testing framework has been largely rewritten and is now using
+     perl and the perl modules Test::Harness and an extended variant of
+     Test::More called OpenSSL::Test to do its work.  All test scripts in
+     test/ have been rewritten into test recipes, and all direct calls to
+     executables in test/Makefile have become individual recipes using the
+     simplified testing OpenSSL::Test::Simple.
+
+     For documentation on our testing modules, do:
+
+        perldoc test/testlib/OpenSSL/Test/Simple.pm
+        perldoc test/testlib/OpenSSL/Test.pm
+
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Revamped memory debug; only -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG and -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ABORT
+     are used; the latter aborts on memory leaks (usually checked on exit).
+     Some undocumented "set malloc, etc., hooks" functions were removed
+     and others were changed.  All are now documented.
+     [Rich Salz]
+
+  *) In DSA_generate_parameters_ex, if the provided seed is too short,
+     return an error
+     [Rich Salz and Ismo Puustinen <ismo.puustinen@intel.com>]
+
+  *) Rewrite PSK to support ECDHE_PSK, DHE_PSK and RSA_PSK. Add ciphersuites
+     from RFC4279, RFC4785, RFC5487, RFC5489.
+
+     Thanks to Christian J. Dietrich and Giuseppe D'Angelo for the
+     original RSA_PSK patch.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Dropped support for the SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED flag. This SSLeay
+     era flag was never set throughout the codebase (only read). Also removed
+     SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER which was only used if
+     SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED was also set.
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
+  *) Changed the default name options in the "ca", "crl", "req" and "x509"
+     to be "oneline" instead of "compat".
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Remove SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG. This is SSLeay legacy, we're
+     not aware of clients that still exhibit this bug, and the workaround
+     hasn't been working properly for a while.
+     [Emilia Käsper]
+
+  *) The return type of BIO_number_read() and BIO_number_written() as well as
+     the corresponding num_read and num_write members in the BIO structure has
+     changed from unsigned long to uint64_t. On platforms where an unsigned
+     long is 32 bits (e.g. Windows) these counters could overflow if >4Gb is
+     transferred.
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
+  *) Given the pervasive nature of TLS extensions it is inadvisable to run
+     OpenSSL without support for them. It also means that maintaining
+     the OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT option within the code is very invasive (and probably
+     not well tested). Therefore the OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT option has been removed.
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
+  *) Removed support for the two export grade static DH ciphersuites
+     EXP-DH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA and EXP-DH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA. These two ciphersuites
+     were newly added (along with a number of other static DH ciphersuites) to
+     1.0.2. However the two export ones have *never* worked since they were
+     introduced. It seems strange in any case to be adding new export
+     ciphersuites, and given "logjam" it also does not seem correct to fix them.
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
+  *) Version negotiation has been rewritten. In particular SSLv23_method(),
+     SSLv23_client_method() and SSLv23_server_method() have been deprecated,
+     and turned into macros which simply call the new preferred function names
+     TLS_method(), TLS_client_method() and TLS_server_method(). All new code
+     should use the new names instead. Also as part of this change the ssl23.h
+     header file has been removed.
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
+  *) Support for Kerberos ciphersuites in TLS (RFC2712) has been removed. This
+     code and the associated standard is no longer considered fit-for-purpose.
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
+  *) RT2547 was closed.  When generating a private key, try to make the
+     output file readable only by the owner.  This behavior change might
+     be noticeable when interacting with other software.
+
+  *) Documented all exdata functions.  Added CRYPTO_free_ex_index.
+     Added a test.
+     [Rich Salz]
+
+  *) Added HTTP GET support to the ocsp command.
+     [Rich Salz]
+
+  *) Changed default digest for the dgst and enc commands from MD5 to
+     sha256
+     [Rich Salz]
+
+  *) RAND_pseudo_bytes has been deprecated. Users should use RAND_bytes instead.
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
+  *) Added support for TLS extended master secret from
+     draft-ietf-tls-session-hash-03.txt. Thanks for Alfredo Pironti for an
+     initial patch which was a great help during development.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) All libssl internal structures have been removed from the public header
+     files, and the OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN option has been removed (since it is
+     now redundant). Users should not attempt to access internal structures
+     directly. Instead they should use the provided API functions.
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
+  *) config has been changed so that by default OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED is used.
+     Access to deprecated functions can be re-enabled by running config with
+     "enable-deprecated". In addition applications wishing to use deprecated
+     functions must define OPENSSL_USE_DEPRECATED. Note that this new behaviour
+     will, by default, disable some transitive includes that previously existed
+     in the header files (e.g. ec.h will no longer, by default, include bn.h)
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
+  *) Added support for OCB mode. OpenSSL has been granted a patent license
+     compatible with the OpenSSL license for use of OCB. Details are available
+     at https://www.openssl.org/source/OCB-patent-grant-OpenSSL.pdf. Support
+     for OCB can be removed by calling config with no-ocb.
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
+  *) SSLv2 support has been removed.  It still supports receiving a SSLv2
+     compatible client hello.
+     [Kurt Roeckx]
+
+  *) Increased the minimal RSA keysize from 256 to 512 bits [Rich Salz],
+     done while fixing the error code for the key-too-small case.
+     [Annie Yousar <a.yousar@informatik.hu-berlin.de>]
+
+  *) CA.sh has been removed; use CA.pl instead.
+     [Rich Salz]
+
+  *) Removed old DES API.
+     [Rich Salz]
+
+  *) Remove various unsupported platforms:
+        Sony NEWS4
+        BEOS and BEOS_R5
+        NeXT
+        SUNOS
+        MPE/iX
+        Sinix/ReliantUNIX RM400
+        DGUX
+        NCR
+        Tandem
+        Cray
+        16-bit platforms such as WIN16
+     [Rich Salz]
+
+  *) Clean up OPENSSL_NO_xxx #define's
+        Use setbuf() and remove OPENSSL_NO_SETVBUF_IONBF
+        Rename OPENSSL_SYSNAME_xxx to OPENSSL_SYS_xxx
+        OPENSSL_NO_EC{DH,DSA} merged into OPENSSL_NO_EC
+        OPENSSL_NO_RIPEMD160, OPENSSL_NO_RIPEMD merged into OPENSSL_NO_RMD160
+        OPENSSL_NO_FP_API merged into OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+        Remove OPENSSL_NO_BIO OPENSSL_NO_BUFFER OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
+        OPENSSL_NO_EVP OPENSSL_NO_FIPS_ERR OPENSSL_NO_HASH_COMP
+        OPENSSL_NO_LHASH OPENSSL_NO_OBJECT OPENSSL_NO_SPEED OPENSSL_NO_STACK
+        OPENSSL_NO_X509 OPENSSL_NO_X509_VERIFY
+        Remove MS_STATIC; it's a relic from platforms <32 bits.
+     [Rich Salz]
+
+  *) Cleaned up dead code
+        Remove all but one '#ifdef undef' which is to be looked at.
+     [Rich Salz]
+
+  *) Clean up calling of xxx_free routines.
+        Just like free(), fix most of the xxx_free routines to accept
+        NULL.  Remove the non-null checks from callers.  Save much code.
+     [Rich Salz]
+
+  *) Add secure heap for storage of private keys (when possible).
+     Add BIO_s_secmem(), CBIGNUM, etc.
+     Contributed by Akamai Technologies under our Corporate CLA.
+     [Rich Salz]
+
+  *) Experimental support for a new, fast, unbiased prime candidate generator,
+     bn_probable_prime_dh_coprime(). Not currently used by any prime generator.
+     [Felix Laurie von Massenbach <felix@erbridge.co.uk>]
+
+  *) New output format NSS in the sess_id command line tool. This allows
+     exporting the session id and the master key in NSS keylog format.
+     [Martin Kaiser <martin@kaiser.cx>]
+
+  *) Harmonize version and its documentation. -f flag is used to display
+     compilation flags.
+     [mancha <mancha1@zoho.com>]
+
+  *) Fix eckey_priv_encode so it immediately returns an error upon a failure
+     in i2d_ECPrivateKey.  Thanks to Ted Unangst for feedback on this issue.
+     [mancha <mancha1@zoho.com>]
+
+  *) Fix some double frees. These are not thought to be exploitable.
+     [mancha <mancha1@zoho.com>]
+
+  *) A missing bounds check in the handling of the TLS heartbeat extension
+     can be used to reveal up to 64k of memory to a connected client or
+     server.
+
+     Thanks for Neel Mehta of Google Security for discovering this bug and to
+     Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> and Bodo Moeller <bmoeller@acm.org> for
+     preparing the fix (CVE-2014-0160)
+     [Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Fix for the attack described in the paper "Recovering OpenSSL
+     ECDSA Nonces Using the FLUSH+RELOAD Cache Side-channel Attack"
+     by Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger. Details can be obtained from:
+     http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/140
+
+     Thanks to Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger for discovering this
+     flaw and to Yuval Yarom for supplying a fix (CVE-2014-0076)
+     [Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger]
+
+  *) Use algorithm specific chains in SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file():
+     this fixes a limitation in previous versions of OpenSSL.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Experimental encrypt-then-mac support.
+    
+     Experimental support for encrypt then mac from
+     draft-gutmann-tls-encrypt-then-mac-02.txt
+
+     To enable it set the appropriate extension number (0x42 for the test
+     server) using e.g. -DTLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac=0x42
+ 
+     For non-compliant peers (i.e. just about everything) this should have no
+     effect.
+
+     WARNING: EXPERIMENTAL, SUBJECT TO CHANGE.
+
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add EVP support for key wrapping algorithms, to avoid problems with
+     existing code the flag EVP_CIPHER_CTX_WRAP_ALLOW has to be set in
+     the EVP_CIPHER_CTX or an error is returned. Add AES and DES3 wrap
+     algorithms and include tests cases.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Extend CMS code to support RSA-PSS signatures and RSA-OAEP for
+     enveloped data.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Extended RSA OAEP support via EVP_PKEY API. Options to specify digest,
+     MGF1 digest and OAEP label.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Make openssl verify return errors.
+     [Chris Palmer <palmer@google.com> and Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) New function ASN1_TIME_diff to calculate the difference between two
+     ASN1_TIME structures or one structure and the current time.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Update fips_test_suite to support multiple command line options. New
+     test to induce all self test errors in sequence and check expected
+     failures.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add FIPS_{rsa,dsa,ecdsa}_{sign,verify} functions which digest and
+     sign or verify all in one operation.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add fips_algvs: a multicall fips utility incorporating all the algorithm
+     test programs and fips_test_suite. Includes functionality to parse
+     the minimal script output of fipsalgest.pl directly.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add authorisation parameter to FIPS_module_mode_set().
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add FIPS selftest for ECDH algorithm using P-224 and B-233 curves.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Use separate DRBG fields for internal and external flags. New function
+     FIPS_drbg_health_check() to perform on demand health checking. Add
+     generation tests to fips_test_suite with reduced health check interval to 
+     demonstrate periodic health checking. Add "nodh" option to
+     fips_test_suite to skip very slow DH test.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) New function FIPS_get_cipherbynid() to lookup FIPS supported ciphers
+     based on NID.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) More extensive health check for DRBG checking many more failure modes.
+     New function FIPS_selftest_drbg_all() to handle every possible DRBG
+     combination: call this in fips_test_suite.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add support for canonical generation of DSA parameter 'g'. See 
+     FIPS 186-3 A.2.3.
+
+  *) Add support for HMAC DRBG from SP800-90. Update DRBG algorithm test and
+     POST to handle HMAC cases.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add functions FIPS_module_version() and FIPS_module_version_text()
+     to return numerical and string versions of the FIPS module number.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Rename FIPS_mode_set and FIPS_mode to FIPS_module_mode_set and
+     FIPS_module_mode. FIPS_mode and FIPS_mode_set will be implemented
+     outside the validated module in the FIPS capable OpenSSL.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Minor change to DRBG entropy callback semantics. In some cases
+     there is no multiple of the block length between min_len and
+     max_len. Allow the callback to return more than max_len bytes
+     of entropy but discard any extra: it is the callback's responsibility
+     to ensure that the extra data discarded does not impact the
+     requested amount of entropy.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add PRNG security strength checks to RSA, DSA and ECDSA using 
+     information in FIPS186-3, SP800-57 and SP800-131A.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) CCM support via EVP. Interface is very similar to GCM case except we
+     must supply all data in one chunk (i.e. no update, final) and the
+     message length must be supplied if AAD is used. Add algorithm test
+     support.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Initial version of POST overhaul. Add POST callback to allow the status
+     of POST to be monitored and/or failures induced. Modify fips_test_suite
+     to use callback. Always run all selftests even if one fails.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) XTS support including algorithm test driver in the fips_gcmtest program.
+     Note: this does increase the maximum key length from 32 to 64 bytes but
+     there should be no binary compatibility issues as existing applications
+     will never use XTS mode.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Extensive reorganisation of FIPS PRNG behaviour. Remove all dependencies
+     to OpenSSL RAND code and replace with a tiny FIPS RAND API which also
+     performs algorithm blocking for unapproved PRNG types. Also do not
+     set PRNG type in FIPS_mode_set(): leave this to the application.
+     Add default OpenSSL DRBG handling: sets up FIPS PRNG and seeds with
+     the standard OpenSSL PRNG: set additional data to a date time vector.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Rename old X9.31 PRNG functions of the form FIPS_rand* to FIPS_x931*.
+     This shouldn't present any incompatibility problems because applications
+     shouldn't be using these directly and any that are will need to rethink
+     anyway as the X9.31 PRNG is now deprecated by FIPS 140-2
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Extensive self tests and health checking required by SP800-90 DRBG.
+     Remove strength parameter from FIPS_drbg_instantiate and always
+     instantiate at maximum supported strength.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add ECDH code to fips module and fips_ecdhvs for primitives only testing.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) New algorithm test program fips_dhvs to handle DH primitives only testing.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) New function DH_compute_key_padded() to compute a DH key and pad with
+     leading zeroes if needed: this complies with SP800-56A et al.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Initial implementation of SP800-90 DRBGs for Hash and CTR. Not used by
+     anything, incomplete, subject to change and largely untested at present.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Modify fipscanisteronly build option to only build the necessary object
+     files by filtering FIPS_EX_OBJ through a perl script in crypto/Makefile.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add experimental option FIPSSYMS to give all symbols in
+     fipscanister.o and FIPS or fips prefix. This will avoid
+     conflicts with future versions of OpenSSL. Add perl script
+     util/fipsas.pl to preprocess assembly language source files
+     and rename any affected symbols.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add selftest checks and algorithm block of non-fips algorithms in
+     FIPS mode. Remove DES2 from selftests.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add ECDSA code to fips module. Add tiny fips_ecdsa_check to just
+     return internal method without any ENGINE dependencies. Add new
+     tiny fips sign and verify functions.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) New build option no-ec2m to disable characteristic 2 code.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) New build option "fipscanisteronly". This only builds fipscanister.o
+     and (currently) associated fips utilities. Uses the file Makefile.fips
+     instead of Makefile.org as the prototype.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add some FIPS mode restrictions to GCM. Add internal IV generator.
+     Update fips_gcmtest to use IV generator.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Initial, experimental EVP support for AES-GCM. AAD can be input by
+     setting output buffer to NULL. The *Final function must be
+     called although it will not retrieve any additional data. The tag
+     can be set or retrieved with a ctrl. The IV length is by default 12
+     bytes (96 bits) but can be set to an alternative value. If the IV
+     length exceeds the maximum IV length (currently 16 bytes) it cannot be
+     set before the key. 
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) New flag in ciphers: EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER. This means the
+     underlying do_cipher function handles all cipher semantics itself
+     including padding and finalisation. This is useful if (for example)
+     an ENGINE cipher handles block padding itself. The behaviour of
+     do_cipher is subtly changed if this flag is set: the return value
+     is the number of characters written to the output buffer (zero is
+     no longer an error code) or a negative error code. Also if the
+     input buffer is NULL and length 0 finalisation should be performed.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) If a candidate issuer certificate is already part of the constructed
+     path ignore it: new debug notification X509_V_ERR_PATH_LOOP for this case.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Improve forward-security support: add functions
+
+       void SSL_CTX_set_not_resumable_session_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, int is_forward_secure))
+       void SSL_set_not_resumable_session_callback(SSL *ssl, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, int is_forward_secure))
+
+     for use by SSL/TLS servers; the callback function will be called whenever a
+     new session is created, and gets to decide whether the session may be
+     cached to make it resumable (return 0) or not (return 1).  (As by the
+     SSL/TLS protocol specifications, the session_id sent by the server will be
+     empty to indicate that the session is not resumable; also, the server will
+     not generate RFC 4507 (RFC 5077) session tickets.)
+
+     A simple reasonable callback implementation is to return is_forward_secure.
+     This parameter will be set to 1 or 0 depending on the ciphersuite selected
+     by the SSL/TLS server library, indicating whether it can provide forward
+     security.
+     [Emilia Käsper <emilia.kasper@esat.kuleuven.be> (Google)]
+
+  *) New -verify_name option in command line utilities to set verification
+     parameters by name.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Initial CMAC implementation. WARNING: EXPERIMENTAL, API MAY CHANGE.
+     Add CMAC pkey methods.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Experimental renegotiation in s_server -www mode. If the client 
+     browses /reneg connection is renegotiated. If /renegcert it is
+     renegotiated requesting a certificate.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add an "external" session cache for debugging purposes to s_server. This
+     should help trace issues which normally are only apparent in deployed
+     multi-process servers.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Extensive audit of libcrypto with DEBUG_UNUSED. Fix many cases where
+     return value is ignored. NB. The functions RAND_add(), RAND_seed(),
+     BIO_set_cipher() and some obscure PEM functions were changed so they
+     can now return an error. The RAND changes required a change to the
+     RAND_METHOD structure.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) New macro __owur for "OpenSSL Warn Unused Result". This makes use of
+     a gcc attribute to warn if the result of a function is ignored. This
+     is enable if DEBUG_UNUSED is set. Add to several functions in evp.h
+     whose return value is often ignored. 
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) New -noct, -requestct, -requirect and -ctlogfile options for s_client.
+     These allow SCTs (signed certificate timestamps) to be requested and
+     validated when establishing a connection.
+     [Rob Percival <robpercival@google.com>]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.2g and 1.0.2h [3 May 2016]
+
+  *) Prevent padding oracle in AES-NI CBC MAC check
+
+     A MITM attacker can use a padding oracle attack to decrypt traffic
+     when the connection uses an AES CBC cipher and the server support
+     AES-NI.
+
+     This issue was introduced as part of the fix for Lucky 13 padding
+     attack (CVE-2013-0169). The padding check was rewritten to be in
+     constant time by making sure that always the same bytes are read and
+     compared against either the MAC or padding bytes. But it no longer
+     checked that there was enough data to have both the MAC and padding
+     bytes.
+
+     This issue was reported by Juraj Somorovsky using TLS-Attacker.
+     (CVE-2016-2107)
+     [Kurt Roeckx]
+
+  *) Fix EVP_EncodeUpdate overflow
+
+     An overflow can occur in the EVP_EncodeUpdate() function which is used for
+     Base64 encoding of binary data. If an attacker is able to supply very large
+     amounts of input data then a length check can overflow resulting in a heap
+     corruption.
+
+     Internally to OpenSSL the EVP_EncodeUpdate() function is primarily used by
+     the PEM_write_bio* family of functions. These are mainly used within the
+     OpenSSL command line applications, so any application which processes data
+     from an untrusted source and outputs it as a PEM file should be considered
+     vulnerable to this issue. User applications that call these APIs directly
+     with large amounts of untrusted data may also be vulnerable.
+
+     This issue was reported by Guido Vranken.
+     (CVE-2016-2105)
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
+  *) Fix EVP_EncryptUpdate overflow
+
+     An overflow can occur in the EVP_EncryptUpdate() function. If an attacker
+     is able to supply very large amounts of input data after a previous call to
+     EVP_EncryptUpdate() with a partial block then a length check can overflow
+     resulting in a heap corruption. Following an analysis of all OpenSSL
+     internal usage of the EVP_EncryptUpdate() function all usage is one of two
+     forms. The first form is where the EVP_EncryptUpdate() call is known to be
+     the first called function after an EVP_EncryptInit(), and therefore that
+     specific call must be safe. The second form is where the length passed to
+     EVP_EncryptUpdate() can be seen from the code to be some small value and
+     therefore there is no possibility of an overflow. Since all instances are
+     one of these two forms, it is believed that there can be no overflows in
+     internal code due to this problem. It should be noted that
+     EVP_DecryptUpdate() can call EVP_EncryptUpdate() in certain code paths.
+     Also EVP_CipherUpdate() is a synonym for EVP_EncryptUpdate(). All instances
+     of these calls have also been analysed too and it is believed there are no
+     instances in internal usage where an overflow could occur.
+
+     This issue was reported by Guido Vranken.
+     (CVE-2016-2106)
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
+  *) Prevent ASN.1 BIO excessive memory allocation
+
+     When ASN.1 data is read from a BIO using functions such as d2i_CMS_bio()
+     a short invalid encoding can cause allocation of large amounts of memory
+     potentially consuming excessive resources or exhausting memory.
+
+     Any application parsing untrusted data through d2i BIO functions is
+     affected. The memory based functions such as d2i_X509() are *not* affected.
+     Since the memory based functions are used by the TLS library, TLS
+     applications are not affected.
+
+     This issue was reported by Brian Carpenter.
+     (CVE-2016-2109)
+     [Stephen Henson]
+
+  *) EBCDIC overread
+
+     ASN1 Strings that are over 1024 bytes can cause an overread in applications
+     using the X509_NAME_oneline() function on EBCDIC systems. This could result
+     in arbitrary stack data being returned in the buffer.
+
+     This issue was reported by Guido Vranken.
+     (CVE-2016-2176)
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
+  *) Modify behavior of ALPN to invoke callback after SNI/servername
+     callback, such that updates to the SSL_CTX affect ALPN.
+     [Todd Short]
+
+  *) Remove LOW from the DEFAULT cipher list.  This removes singles DES from the
+     default.
+     [Kurt Roeckx]
+
+  *) Only remove the SSLv2 methods with the no-ssl2-method option. When the
+     methods are enabled and ssl2 is disabled the methods return NULL.
+     [Kurt Roeckx]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.2f and 1.0.2g [1 Mar 2016]
+
+  * Disable weak ciphers in SSLv3 and up in default builds of OpenSSL.
+    Builds that are not configured with "enable-weak-ssl-ciphers" will not
+    provide any "EXPORT" or "LOW" strength ciphers.
+    [Viktor Dukhovni]
+
+  * Disable SSLv2 default build, default negotiation and weak ciphers.  SSLv2
+    is by default disabled at build-time.  Builds that are not configured with
+    "enable-ssl2" will not support SSLv2.  Even if "enable-ssl2" is used,
+    users who want to negotiate SSLv2 via the version-flexible SSLv23_method()
+    will need to explicitly call either of:
+
+        SSL_CTX_clear_options(ctx, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2);
+    or
+        SSL_clear_options(ssl, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2);
+
+    as appropriate.  Even if either of those is used, or the application
+    explicitly uses the version-specific SSLv2_method() or its client and
+    server variants, SSLv2 ciphers vulnerable to exhaustive search key
+    recovery have been removed.  Specifically, the SSLv2 40-bit EXPORT
+    ciphers, and SSLv2 56-bit DES are no longer available.
+    (CVE-2016-0800)
+    [Viktor Dukhovni]
+
+  *) Fix a double-free in DSA code
+
+     A double free bug was discovered when OpenSSL parses malformed DSA private
+     keys and could lead to a DoS attack or memory corruption for applications
+     that receive DSA private keys from untrusted sources.  This scenario is
+     considered rare.
+
+     This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Adam Langley(Google/BoringSSL) using
+     libFuzzer.
+     (CVE-2016-0705)
+     [Stephen Henson]
+
+  *) Disable SRP fake user seed to address a server memory leak.
+
+     Add a new method SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user that handles the seed properly.
+
+     SRP_VBASE_get_by_user had inconsistent memory management behaviour.
+     In order to fix an unavoidable memory leak, SRP_VBASE_get_by_user
+     was changed to ignore the "fake user" SRP seed, even if the seed
+     is configured.
+
+     Users should use SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user instead. Note that in
+     SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user, caller must free the returned value. Note
+     also that even though configuring the SRP seed attempts to hide
+     invalid usernames by continuing the handshake with fake
+     credentials, this behaviour is not constant time and no strong
+     guarantees are made that the handshake is indistinguishable from
+     that of a valid user.
+     (CVE-2016-0798)
+     [Emilia Käsper]
+
+  *) Fix BN_hex2bn/BN_dec2bn NULL pointer deref/heap corruption
+
+     In the BN_hex2bn function the number of hex digits is calculated using an
+     int value |i|. Later |bn_expand| is called with a value of |i * 4|. For
+     large values of |i| this can result in |bn_expand| not allocating any
+     memory because |i * 4| is negative. This can leave the internal BIGNUM data
+     field as NULL leading to a subsequent NULL ptr deref. For very large values
+     of |i|, the calculation |i * 4| could be a positive value smaller than |i|.
+     In this case memory is allocated to the internal BIGNUM data field, but it
+     is insufficiently sized leading to heap corruption. A similar issue exists
+     in BN_dec2bn. This could have security consequences if BN_hex2bn/BN_dec2bn
+     is ever called by user applications with very large untrusted hex/dec data.
+     This is anticipated to be a rare occurrence.
+
+     All OpenSSL internal usage of these functions use data that is not expected
+     to be untrusted, e.g. config file data or application command line
+     arguments. If user developed applications generate config file data based
+     on untrusted data then it is possible that this could also lead to security
+     consequences. This is also anticipated to be rare.
+
+     This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Guido Vranken.
+     (CVE-2016-0797)
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
+  *) Fix memory issues in BIO_*printf functions
+
+     The internal |fmtstr| function used in processing a "%s" format string in
+     the BIO_*printf functions could overflow while calculating the length of a
+     string and cause an OOB read when printing very long strings.
+
+     Additionally the internal |doapr_outch| function can attempt to write to an
+     OOB memory location (at an offset from the NULL pointer) in the event of a
+     memory allocation failure. In 1.0.2 and below this could be caused where
+     the size of a buffer to be allocated is greater than INT_MAX. E.g. this
+     could be in processing a very long "%s" format string. Memory leaks can
+     also occur.
+
+     The first issue may mask the second issue dependent on compiler behaviour.
+     These problems could enable attacks where large amounts of untrusted data
+     is passed to the BIO_*printf functions. If applications use these functions
+     in this way then they could be vulnerable. OpenSSL itself uses these
+     functions when printing out human-readable dumps of ASN.1 data. Therefore
+     applications that print this data could be vulnerable if the data is from
+     untrusted sources. OpenSSL command line applications could also be
+     vulnerable where they print out ASN.1 data, or if untrusted data is passed
+     as command line arguments.
+
+     Libssl is not considered directly vulnerable. Additionally certificates etc
+     received via remote connections via libssl are also unlikely to be able to
+     trigger these issues because of message size limits enforced within libssl.
+
+     This issue was reported to OpenSSL Guido Vranken.
+     (CVE-2016-0799)
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
+  *) Side channel attack on modular exponentiation
+
+     A side-channel attack was found which makes use of cache-bank conflicts on
+     the Intel Sandy-Bridge microarchitecture which could lead to the recovery
+     of RSA keys.  The ability to exploit this issue is limited as it relies on
+     an attacker who has control of code in a thread running on the same
+     hyper-threaded core as the victim thread which is performing decryptions.
+
+     This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Yuval Yarom, The University of
+     Adelaide and NICTA, Daniel Genkin, Technion and Tel Aviv University, and
+     Nadia Heninger, University of Pennsylvania with more information at
+     http://cachebleed.info.
+     (CVE-2016-0702)
+     [Andy Polyakov]
+
+  *) Change the req app to generate a 2048-bit RSA/DSA key by default,
+     if no keysize is specified with default_bits. This fixes an
+     omission in an earlier change that changed all RSA/DSA key generation
+     apps to use 2048 bits by default.
+     [Emilia Käsper]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.2e and 1.0.2f [28 Jan 2016]
+  *) DH small subgroups
+
+     Historically OpenSSL only ever generated DH parameters based on "safe"
+     primes. More recently (in version 1.0.2) support was provided for
+     generating X9.42 style parameter files such as those required for RFC 5114
+     support. The primes used in such files may not be "safe". Where an
+     application is using DH configured with parameters based on primes that are
+     not "safe" then an attacker could use this fact to find a peer's private
+     DH exponent. This attack requires that the attacker complete multiple
+     handshakes in which the peer uses the same private DH exponent. For example
+     this could be used to discover a TLS server's private DH exponent if it's
+     reusing the private DH exponent or it's using a static DH ciphersuite.
+
+     OpenSSL provides the option SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE for ephemeral DH (DHE) in
+     TLS. It is not on by default. If the option is not set then the server
+     reuses the same private DH exponent for the life of the server process and
+     would be vulnerable to this attack. It is believed that many popular
+     applications do set this option and would therefore not be at risk.
+
+     The fix for this issue adds an additional check where a "q" parameter is
+     available (as is the case in X9.42 based parameters). This detects the
+     only known attack, and is the only possible defense for static DH
+     ciphersuites. This could have some performance impact.
+
+     Additionally the SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE option has been switched on by
+     default and cannot be disabled. This could have some performance impact.
+
+     This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Antonio Sanso (Adobe).
+     (CVE-2016-0701)
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
+  *) SSLv2 doesn't block disabled ciphers
+
+     A malicious client can negotiate SSLv2 ciphers that have been disabled on
+     the server and complete SSLv2 handshakes even if all SSLv2 ciphers have
+     been disabled, provided that the SSLv2 protocol was not also disabled via
+     SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2.
+
+     This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 26th December 2015 by Nimrod Aviram
+     and Sebastian Schinzel.
+     (CVE-2015-3197)
+     [Viktor Dukhovni]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.2d and 1.0.2e [3 Dec 2015]
+
+  *) BN_mod_exp may produce incorrect results on x86_64
+
+     There is a carry propagating bug in the x86_64 Montgomery squaring
+     procedure. No EC algorithms are affected. Analysis suggests that attacks
+     against RSA and DSA as a result of this defect would be very difficult to
+     perform and are not believed likely. Attacks against DH are considered just
+     feasible (although very difficult) because most of the work necessary to
+     deduce information about a private key may be performed offline. The amount
+     of resources required for such an attack would be very significant and
+     likely only accessible to a limited number of attackers. An attacker would
+     additionally need online access to an unpatched system using the target
+     private key in a scenario with persistent DH parameters and a private
+     key that is shared between multiple clients. For example this can occur by
+     default in OpenSSL DHE based SSL/TLS ciphersuites.
+
+     This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Hanno Böck.
+     (CVE-2015-3193)
+     [Andy Polyakov]
+
+  *) Certificate verify crash with missing PSS parameter
+
+     The signature verification routines will crash with a NULL pointer
+     dereference if presented with an ASN.1 signature using the RSA PSS
+     algorithm and absent mask generation function parameter. Since these
+     routines are used to verify certificate signature algorithms this can be
+     used to crash any certificate verification operation and exploited in a
+     DoS attack. Any application which performs certificate verification is
+     vulnerable including OpenSSL clients and servers which enable client
+     authentication.
+
+     This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Loïc Jonas Etienne (Qnective AG).
+     (CVE-2015-3194)
+     [Stephen Henson]
+
+  *) X509_ATTRIBUTE memory leak
+
+     When presented with a malformed X509_ATTRIBUTE structure OpenSSL will leak
+     memory. This structure is used by the PKCS#7 and CMS routines so any
+     application which reads PKCS#7 or CMS data from untrusted sources is
+     affected. SSL/TLS is not affected.
+
+     This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Adam Langley (Google/BoringSSL) using
+     libFuzzer.
+     (CVE-2015-3195)
+     [Stephen Henson]
+
+  *) Rewrite EVP_DecodeUpdate (base64 decoding) to fix several bugs.
+     This changes the decoding behaviour for some invalid messages,
+     though the change is mostly in the more lenient direction, and
+     legacy behaviour is preserved as much as possible.
+     [Emilia Käsper]
+
+  *) In DSA_generate_parameters_ex, if the provided seed is too short,
+     return an error
+     [Rich Salz and Ismo Puustinen <ismo.puustinen@intel.com>]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.2c and 1.0.2d [9 Jul 2015]
+
+  *) Alternate chains certificate forgery
+
+     During certificate verification, OpenSSL will attempt to find an
+     alternative certificate chain if the first attempt to build such a chain
+     fails. An error in the implementation of this logic can mean that an
+     attacker could cause certain checks on untrusted certificates to be
+     bypassed, such as the CA flag, enabling them to use a valid leaf
+     certificate to act as a CA and "issue" an invalid certificate.
+
+     This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Adam Langley/David Benjamin
+     (Google/BoringSSL).
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.2b and 1.0.2c [12 Jun 2015]
+
+  *) Fix HMAC ABI incompatibility. The previous version introduced an ABI
+     incompatibility in the handling of HMAC. The previous ABI has now been
+     restored.
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.2a and 1.0.2b [11 Jun 2015]
+
+  *) Malformed ECParameters causes infinite loop
+
+     When processing an ECParameters structure OpenSSL enters an infinite loop
+     if the curve specified is over a specially malformed binary polynomial
+     field.
+
+     This can be used to perform denial of service against any
+     system which processes public keys, certificate requests or
+     certificates.  This includes TLS clients and TLS servers with
+     client authentication enabled.
+
+     This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Joseph Barr-Pixton.
+     (CVE-2015-1788)
+     [Andy Polyakov]
+
+  *) Exploitable out-of-bounds read in X509_cmp_time
+
+     X509_cmp_time does not properly check the length of the ASN1_TIME
+     string and can read a few bytes out of bounds. In addition,
+     X509_cmp_time accepts an arbitrary number of fractional seconds in the
+     time string.
+
+     An attacker can use this to craft malformed certificates and CRLs of
+     various sizes and potentially cause a segmentation fault, resulting in
+     a DoS on applications that verify certificates or CRLs. TLS clients
+     that verify CRLs are affected. TLS clients and servers with client
+     authentication enabled may be affected if they use custom verification
+     callbacks.
+
+     This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Robert Swiecki (Google), and
+     independently by Hanno Böck.
+     (CVE-2015-1789)
+     [Emilia Käsper]
+
+  *) PKCS7 crash with missing EnvelopedContent
+
+     The PKCS#7 parsing code does not handle missing inner EncryptedContent
+     correctly. An attacker can craft malformed ASN.1-encoded PKCS#7 blobs
+     with missing content and trigger a NULL pointer dereference on parsing.
+
+     Applications that decrypt PKCS#7 data or otherwise parse PKCS#7
+     structures from untrusted sources are affected. OpenSSL clients and
+     servers are not affected.
+
+     This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Michal Zalewski (Google).
+     (CVE-2015-1790)
+     [Emilia Käsper]
+
+  *) CMS verify infinite loop with unknown hash function
+
+     When verifying a signedData message the CMS code can enter an infinite loop
+     if presented with an unknown hash function OID. This can be used to perform
+     denial of service against any system which verifies signedData messages using
+     the CMS code.
+     This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Johannes Bauer.
+     (CVE-2015-1792)
+     [Stephen Henson]
+
+  *) Race condition handling NewSessionTicket
+
+     If a NewSessionTicket is received by a multi-threaded client when attempting to
+     reuse a previous ticket then a race condition can occur potentially leading to
+     a double free of the ticket data.
+     (CVE-2015-1791)
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
+  *) Only support 256-bit or stronger elliptic curves with the
+     'ecdh_auto' setting (server) or by default (client). Of supported
+     curves, prefer P-256 (both).
+     [Emilia Kasper]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.2 and 1.0.2a [19 Mar 2015]
+
+  *) ClientHello sigalgs DoS fix
+
+     If a client connects to an OpenSSL 1.0.2 server and renegotiates with an
+     invalid signature algorithms extension a NULL pointer dereference will
+     occur. This can be exploited in a DoS attack against the server.
+
+     This issue was was reported to OpenSSL by David Ramos of Stanford
+     University.
+     (CVE-2015-0291)
+     [Stephen Henson and Matt Caswell]
+
+  *) Multiblock corrupted pointer fix
+
+     OpenSSL 1.0.2 introduced the "multiblock" performance improvement. This
+     feature only applies on 64 bit x86 architecture platforms that support AES
+     NI instructions. A defect in the implementation of "multiblock" can cause
+     OpenSSL's internal write buffer to become incorrectly set to NULL when
+     using non-blocking IO. Typically, when the user application is using a
+     socket BIO for writing, this will only result in a failed connection.
+     However if some other BIO is used then it is likely that a segmentation
+     fault will be triggered, thus enabling a potential DoS attack.
+
+     This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Daniel Danner and Rainer Mueller.
+     (CVE-2015-0290)
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
+  *) Segmentation fault in DTLSv1_listen fix
+
+     The DTLSv1_listen function is intended to be stateless and processes the
+     initial ClientHello from many peers. It is common for user code to loop
+     over the call to DTLSv1_listen until a valid ClientHello is received with
+     an associated cookie. A defect in the implementation of DTLSv1_listen means
+     that state is preserved in the SSL object from one invocation to the next
+     that can lead to a segmentation fault. Errors processing the initial
+     ClientHello can trigger this scenario. An example of such an error could be
+     that a DTLS1.0 only client is attempting to connect to a DTLS1.2 only
+     server.
+
+     This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Per Allansson.
+     (CVE-2015-0207)
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
+  *) Segmentation fault in ASN1_TYPE_cmp fix
+
+     The function ASN1_TYPE_cmp will crash with an invalid read if an attempt is
+     made to compare ASN.1 boolean types. Since ASN1_TYPE_cmp is used to check
+     certificate signature algorithm consistency this can be used to crash any
+     certificate verification operation and exploited in a DoS attack. Any
+     application which performs certificate verification is vulnerable including
+     OpenSSL clients and servers which enable client authentication.
+     (CVE-2015-0286)
+     [Stephen Henson]
+
+  *) Segmentation fault for invalid PSS parameters fix
+
+     The signature verification routines will crash with a NULL pointer
+     dereference if presented with an ASN.1 signature using the RSA PSS
+     algorithm and invalid parameters. Since these routines are used to verify
+     certificate signature algorithms this can be used to crash any
+     certificate verification operation and exploited in a DoS attack. Any
+     application which performs certificate verification is vulnerable including
+     OpenSSL clients and servers which enable client authentication.
+
+     This issue was was reported to OpenSSL by Brian Carpenter.
+     (CVE-2015-0208)
+     [Stephen Henson]
+
+  *) ASN.1 structure reuse memory corruption fix
+
+     Reusing a structure in ASN.1 parsing may allow an attacker to cause
+     memory corruption via an invalid write. Such reuse is and has been
+     strongly discouraged and is believed to be rare.
+
+     Applications that parse structures containing CHOICE or ANY DEFINED BY
+     components may be affected. Certificate parsing (d2i_X509 and related
+     functions) are however not affected. OpenSSL clients and servers are
+     not affected.
+     (CVE-2015-0287)
+     [Stephen Henson]
+
+  *) PKCS7 NULL pointer dereferences fix
+
+     The PKCS#7 parsing code does not handle missing outer ContentInfo
+     correctly. An attacker can craft malformed ASN.1-encoded PKCS#7 blobs with
+     missing content and trigger a NULL pointer dereference on parsing.
+
+     Applications that verify PKCS#7 signatures, decrypt PKCS#7 data or
+     otherwise parse PKCS#7 structures from untrusted sources are
+     affected. OpenSSL clients and servers are not affected.
+
+     This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Michal Zalewski (Google).
+     (CVE-2015-0289)
+     [Emilia Käsper]
+
+  *) DoS via reachable assert in SSLv2 servers fix
+
+     A malicious client can trigger an OPENSSL_assert (i.e., an abort) in
+     servers that both support SSLv2 and enable export cipher suites by sending
+     a specially crafted SSLv2 CLIENT-MASTER-KEY message.
+
+     This issue was discovered by Sean Burford (Google) and Emilia Käsper
+     (OpenSSL development team).
+     (CVE-2015-0293)
+     [Emilia Käsper]
+
+  *) Empty CKE with client auth and DHE fix
+
+     If client auth is used then a server can seg fault in the event of a DHE
+     ciphersuite being selected and a zero length ClientKeyExchange message
+     being sent by the client. This could be exploited in a DoS attack.
+     (CVE-2015-1787)
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
+  *) Handshake with unseeded PRNG fix
+
+     Under certain conditions an OpenSSL 1.0.2 client can complete a handshake
+     with an unseeded PRNG. The conditions are:
+     - The client is on a platform where the PRNG has not been seeded
+     automatically, and the user has not seeded manually
+     - A protocol specific client method version has been used (i.e. not
+     SSL_client_methodv23)
+     - A ciphersuite is used that does not require additional random data from
+     the PRNG beyond the initial ClientHello client random (e.g. PSK-RC4-SHA).
+
+     If the handshake succeeds then the client random that has been used will
+     have been generated from a PRNG with insufficient entropy and therefore the
+     output may be predictable.
+
+     For example using the following command with an unseeded openssl will
+     succeed on an unpatched platform:
+
+     openssl s_client -psk 1a2b3c4d -tls1_2 -cipher PSK-RC4-SHA
+     (CVE-2015-0285)
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
+  *) Use After Free following d2i_ECPrivatekey error fix
+
+     A malformed EC private key file consumed via the d2i_ECPrivateKey function
+     could cause a use after free condition. This, in turn, could cause a double
+     free in several private key parsing functions (such as d2i_PrivateKey
+     or EVP_PKCS82PKEY) and could lead to a DoS attack or memory corruption
+     for applications that receive EC private keys from untrusted
+     sources. This scenario is considered rare.
+
+     This issue was discovered by the BoringSSL project and fixed in their
+     commit 517073cd4b.
+     (CVE-2015-0209)
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
+  *) X509_to_X509_REQ NULL pointer deref fix
+
+     The function X509_to_X509_REQ will crash with a NULL pointer dereference if
+     the certificate key is invalid. This function is rarely used in practice.
+
+     This issue was discovered by Brian Carpenter.
+     (CVE-2015-0288)
+     [Stephen Henson]
+
+  *) Removed the export ciphers from the DEFAULT ciphers
+     [Kurt Roeckx]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1l and 1.0.2 [22 Jan 2015]
+
+  *) Facilitate "universal" ARM builds targeting range of ARM ISAs, e.g.
+     ARMv5 through ARMv8, as opposite to "locking" it to single one.
+     So far those who have to target multiple platforms would compromise
+     and argue that binary targeting say ARMv5 would still execute on
+     ARMv8. "Universal" build resolves this compromise by providing
+     near-optimal performance even on newer platforms.
+     [Andy Polyakov]
+
+  *) Accelerated NIST P-256 elliptic curve implementation for x86_64
+     (other platforms pending).
+     [Shay Gueron & Vlad Krasnov (Intel Corp), Andy Polyakov]
+
+  *) Add support for the SignedCertificateTimestampList certificate and
+     OCSP response extensions from RFC6962.
+     [Rob Stradling]
+
+  *) Fix ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine (thus, EC_POINTs_mul etc.)
+     for corner cases. (Certain input points at infinity could lead to
+     bogus results, with non-infinity inputs mapped to infinity too.)
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Initial support for PowerISA 2.0.7, first implemented in POWER8.
+     This covers AES, SHA256/512 and GHASH. "Initial" means that most
+     common cases are optimized and there still is room for further
+     improvements. Vector Permutation AES for Altivec is also added.
+     [Andy Polyakov]
+
+  *) Add support for little-endian ppc64 Linux target.
+     [Marcelo Cerri (IBM)]
+
+  *) Initial support for AMRv8 ISA crypto extensions. This covers AES,
+     SHA1, SHA256 and GHASH. "Initial" means that most common cases
+     are optimized and there still is room for further improvements.
+     Both 32- and 64-bit modes are supported.
+     [Andy Polyakov, Ard Biesheuvel (Linaro)]
+
+  *) Improved ARMv7 NEON support.
+     [Andy Polyakov]
+
+  *) Support for SPARC Architecture 2011 crypto extensions, first
+     implemented in SPARC T4. This covers AES, DES, Camellia, SHA1,
+     SHA256/512, MD5, GHASH and modular exponentiation.
+     [Andy Polyakov, David Miller]
+
+  *) Accelerated modular exponentiation for Intel processors, a.k.a.
+     RSAZ.
+     [Shay Gueron & Vlad Krasnov (Intel Corp)]
+
+  *) Support for new and upcoming Intel processors, including AVX2,
+     BMI and SHA ISA extensions. This includes additional "stitched"
+     implementations, AESNI-SHA256 and GCM, and multi-buffer support
+     for TLS encrypt.
+
+     This work was sponsored by Intel Corp.
+     [Andy Polyakov]
+
+  *) Support for DTLS 1.2. This adds two sets of DTLS methods: DTLS_*_method()
+     supports both DTLS 1.2 and 1.0 and should use whatever version the peer
+     supports and DTLSv1_2_*_method() which supports DTLS 1.2 only.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Use algorithm specific chains in SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file():
+     this fixes a limitation in previous versions of OpenSSL.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Extended RSA OAEP support via EVP_PKEY API. Options to specify digest,
+     MGF1 digest and OAEP label.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add EVP support for key wrapping algorithms, to avoid problems with
+     existing code the flag EVP_CIPHER_CTX_WRAP_ALLOW has to be set in
+     the EVP_CIPHER_CTX or an error is returned. Add AES and DES3 wrap
+     algorithms and include tests cases.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add functions to allocate and set the fields of an ECDSA_METHOD
+     structure.
+     [Douglas E. Engert, Steve Henson]
+
+  *) New functions OPENSSL_gmtime_diff and ASN1_TIME_diff to find the
+     difference in days and seconds between two tm or ASN1_TIME structures.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add -rev test option to s_server to just reverse order of characters
+     received by client and send back to server. Also prints an abbreviated
+     summary of the connection parameters.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) New option -brief for s_client and s_server to print out a brief summary
+     of connection parameters.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add callbacks for arbitrary TLS extensions.
+     [Trevor Perrin <trevp@trevp.net> and Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) New option -crl_download in several openssl utilities to download CRLs
+     from CRLDP extension in certificates.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) New options -CRL and -CRLform for s_client and s_server for CRLs.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) New function X509_CRL_diff to generate a delta CRL from the difference
+     of two full CRLs. Add support to "crl" utility.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) New functions to set lookup_crls function and to retrieve
+     X509_STORE from X509_STORE_CTX.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Print out deprecated issuer and subject unique ID fields in
+     certificates.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Extend OCSP I/O functions so they can be used for simple general purpose
+     HTTP as well as OCSP. New wrapper function which can be used to download
+     CRLs using the OCSP API.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Delegate command line handling in s_client/s_server to SSL_CONF APIs.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) SSL_CONF* functions. These provide a common framework for application
+     configuration using configuration files or command lines.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) SSL/TLS tracing code. This parses out SSL/TLS records using the
+     message callback and prints the results. Needs compile time option
+     "enable-ssl-trace". New options to s_client and s_server to enable
+     tracing.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) New ctrl and macro to retrieve supported points extensions.
+     Print out extension in s_server and s_client.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) New functions to retrieve certificate signature and signature
+     OID NID.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add functions to retrieve and manipulate the raw cipherlist sent by a
+     client to OpenSSL.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) New Suite B modes for TLS code. These use and enforce the requirements
+     of RFC6460: restrict ciphersuites, only permit Suite B algorithms and
+     only use Suite B curves. The Suite B modes can be set by using the
+     strings "SUITEB128", "SUITEB192" or "SUITEB128ONLY" for the cipherstring.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) New chain verification flags for Suite B levels of security. Check
+     algorithms are acceptable when flags are set in X509_verify_cert.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Make tls1_check_chain return a set of flags indicating checks passed
+     by a certificate chain. Add additional tests to handle client
+     certificates: checks for matching certificate type and issuer name
+     comparison.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) If an attempt is made to use a signature algorithm not in the peer
+     preference list abort the handshake. If client has no suitable
+     signature algorithms in response to a certificate request do not
+     use the certificate.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) If server EC tmp key is not in client preference list abort handshake.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add support for certificate stores in CERT structure. This makes it
+     possible to have different stores per SSL structure or one store in
+     the parent SSL_CTX. Include distinct stores for certificate chain
+     verification and chain building. New ctrl SSL_CTRL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN
+     to build and store a certificate chain in CERT structure: returning
+     an error if the chain cannot be built: this will allow applications
+     to test if a chain is correctly configured.
+
+     Note: if the CERT based stores are not set then the parent SSL_CTX
+     store is used to retain compatibility with existing behaviour.
+
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) New function ssl_set_client_disabled to set a ciphersuite disabled
+     mask based on the current session, check mask when sending client
+     hello and checking the requested ciphersuite.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) New ctrls to retrieve and set certificate types in a certificate
+     request message. Print out received values in s_client. If certificate
+     types is not set with custom values set sensible values based on
+     supported signature algorithms.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Support for distinct client and server supported signature algorithms.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add certificate callback. If set this is called whenever a certificate
+     is required by client or server. An application can decide which
+     certificate chain to present based on arbitrary criteria: for example
+     supported signature algorithms. Add very simple example to s_server.
+     This fixes many of the problems and restrictions of the existing client
+     certificate callback: for example you can now clear an existing
+     certificate and specify the whole chain.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add new "valid_flags" field to CERT_PKEY structure which determines what
+     the certificate can be used for (if anything). Set valid_flags field 
+     in new tls1_check_chain function. Simplify ssl_set_cert_masks which used
+     to have similar checks in it.
+
+     Add new "cert_flags" field to CERT structure and include a "strict mode".
+     This enforces some TLS certificate requirements (such as only permitting
+     certificate signature algorithms contained in the supported algorithms
+     extension) which some implementations ignore: this option should be used
+     with caution as it could cause interoperability issues.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Update and tidy signature algorithm extension processing. Work out
+     shared signature algorithms based on preferences and peer algorithms
+     and print them out in s_client and s_server. Abort handshake if no
+     shared signature algorithms.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add new functions to allow customised supported signature algorithms
+     for SSL and SSL_CTX structures. Add options to s_client and s_server
+     to support them.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) New function SSL_certs_clear() to delete all references to certificates
+     from an SSL structure. Before this once a certificate had been added
+     it couldn't be removed.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Integrate hostname, email address and IP address checking with certificate
+     verification. New verify options supporting checking in openssl utility.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fixes and wildcard matching support to hostname and email checking
+     functions. Add manual page.
+     [Florian Weimer (Red Hat Product Security Team)]
+
+  *) New functions to check a hostname email or IP address against a
+     certificate. Add options x509 utility to print results of checks against
+     a certificate.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix OCSP checking.
+     [Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com> and Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) Initial experimental support for explicitly trusted non-root CAs. 
+     OpenSSL still tries to build a complete chain to a root but if an
+     intermediate CA has a trust setting included that is used. The first
+     setting is used: whether to trust (e.g., -addtrust option to the x509
+     utility) or reject.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add -trusted_first option which attempts to find certificates in the
+     trusted store even if an untrusted chain is also supplied.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) MIPS assembly pack updates: support for MIPS32r2 and SmartMIPS ASE,
+     platform support for Linux and Android.
+     [Andy Polyakov]
+
+  *) Support for linux-x32, ILP32 environment in x86_64 framework.
+     [Andy Polyakov]
+
+  *) Experimental multi-implementation support for FIPS capable OpenSSL.
+     When in FIPS mode the approved implementations are used as normal,
+     when not in FIPS mode the internal unapproved versions are used instead.
+     This means that the FIPS capable OpenSSL isn't forced to use the
+     (often lower performance) FIPS implementations outside FIPS mode.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Transparently support X9.42 DH parameters when calling
+     PEM_read_bio_DHparameters. This means existing applications can handle
+     the new parameter format automatically.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Initial experimental support for X9.42 DH parameter format: mainly
+     to support use of 'q' parameter for RFC5114 parameters.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add DH parameters from RFC5114 including test data to dhtest.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Support for automatic EC temporary key parameter selection. If enabled
+     the most preferred EC parameters are automatically used instead of
+     hardcoded fixed parameters. Now a server just has to call:
+     SSL_CTX_set_ecdh_auto(ctx, 1) and the server will automatically
+     support ECDH and use the most appropriate parameters.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Enhance and tidy EC curve and point format TLS extension code. Use
+     static structures instead of allocation if default values are used.
+     New ctrls to set curves we wish to support and to retrieve shared curves.
+     Print out shared curves in s_server. New options to s_server and s_client
+     to set list of supported curves.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) New ctrls to retrieve supported signature algorithms and 
+     supported curve values as an array of NIDs. Extend openssl utility
+     to print out received values.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add new APIs EC_curve_nist2nid and EC_curve_nid2nist which convert
+     between NIDs and the more common NIST names such as "P-256". Enhance
+     ecparam utility and ECC method to recognise the NIST names for curves.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Enhance SSL/TLS certificate chain handling to support different
+     chains for each certificate instead of one chain in the parent SSL_CTX.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Support for fixed DH ciphersuite client authentication: where both
+     server and client use DH certificates with common parameters.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Support for fixed DH ciphersuites: those requiring DH server
+     certificates.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) New function i2d_re_X509_tbs for re-encoding the TBS portion of
+     the certificate.
+     Note: Related 1.0.2-beta specific macros X509_get_cert_info,
+     X509_CINF_set_modified, X509_CINF_get_issuer, X509_CINF_get_extensions and
+     X509_CINF_get_signature were reverted post internal team review.
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1k and 1.0.1l [15 Jan 2015]
+
+  *) Build fixes for the Windows and OpenVMS platforms
+     [Matt Caswell and Richard Levitte]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1j and 1.0.1k [8 Jan 2015]
+
+  *) Fix DTLS segmentation fault in dtls1_get_record. A carefully crafted DTLS
+     message can cause a segmentation fault in OpenSSL due to a NULL pointer
+     dereference. This could lead to a Denial Of Service attack. Thanks to
+     Markus Stenberg of Cisco Systems, Inc. for reporting this issue.
+     (CVE-2014-3571)
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix DTLS memory leak in dtls1_buffer_record. A memory leak can occur in the
+     dtls1_buffer_record function under certain conditions. In particular this
+     could occur if an attacker sent repeated DTLS records with the same
+     sequence number but for the next epoch. The memory leak could be exploited
+     by an attacker in a Denial of Service attack through memory exhaustion.
+     Thanks to Chris Mueller for reporting this issue.
+     (CVE-2015-0206)
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
+  *) Fix issue where no-ssl3 configuration sets method to NULL. When openssl is
+     built with the no-ssl3 option and a SSL v3 ClientHello is received the ssl
+     method would be set to NULL which could later result in a NULL pointer
+     dereference. Thanks to Frank Schmirler for reporting this issue.
+     (CVE-2014-3569)
+     [Kurt Roeckx]
+
+  *) Abort handshake if server key exchange message is omitted for ephemeral
+     ECDH ciphersuites.
+
+     Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan of the PROSECCO team at INRIA for
+     reporting this issue.
+     (CVE-2014-3572)
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Remove non-export ephemeral RSA code on client and server. This code
+     violated the TLS standard by allowing the use of temporary RSA keys in
+     non-export ciphersuites and could be used by a server to effectively
+     downgrade the RSA key length used to a value smaller than the server
+     certificate. Thanks for Karthikeyan Bhargavan of the PROSECCO team at
+     INRIA or reporting this issue.
+     (CVE-2015-0204)
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fixed issue where DH client certificates are accepted without verification.
+     An OpenSSL server will accept a DH certificate for client authentication
+     without the certificate verify message. This effectively allows a client to
+     authenticate without the use of a private key. This only affects servers
+     which trust a client certificate authority which issues certificates
+     containing DH keys: these are extremely rare and hardly ever encountered.
+     Thanks for Karthikeyan Bhargavan of the PROSECCO team at INRIA or reporting
+     this issue.
+     (CVE-2015-0205)
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Ensure that the session ID context of an SSL is updated when its
+     SSL_CTX is updated via SSL_set_SSL_CTX.
+
+     The session ID context is typically set from the parent SSL_CTX,
+     and can vary with the CTX.
+     [Adam Langley]
+
+  *) Fix various certificate fingerprint issues.
+
+     By using non-DER or invalid encodings outside the signed portion of a
+     certificate the fingerprint can be changed without breaking the signature.
+     Although no details of the signed portion of the certificate can be changed
+     this can cause problems with some applications: e.g. those using the
+     certificate fingerprint for blacklists.
+
+     1. Reject signatures with non zero unused bits.
+
+     If the BIT STRING containing the signature has non zero unused bits reject
+     the signature. All current signature algorithms require zero unused bits.
+
+     2. Check certificate algorithm consistency.
+
+     Check the AlgorithmIdentifier inside TBS matches the one in the
+     certificate signature. NB: this will result in signature failure
+     errors for some broken certificates.
+
+     Thanks to Konrad Kraszewski from Google for reporting this issue.
+
+     3. Check DSA/ECDSA signatures use DER.
+
+     Re-encode DSA/ECDSA signatures and compare with the original received
+     signature. Return an error if there is a mismatch.
+
+     This will reject various cases including garbage after signature
+     (thanks to Antti Karjalainen and Tuomo Untinen from the Codenomicon CROSS
+     program for discovering this case) and use of BER or invalid ASN.1 INTEGERs
+     (negative or with leading zeroes).
+
+     Further analysis was conducted and fixes were developed by Stephen Henson
+     of the OpenSSL core team.
+
+     (CVE-2014-8275)
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+   *) Correct Bignum squaring. Bignum squaring (BN_sqr) may produce incorrect
+      results on some platforms, including x86_64. This bug occurs at random
+      with a very low probability, and is not known to be exploitable in any
+      way, though its exact impact is difficult to determine. Thanks to Pieter
+      Wuille (Blockstream) who reported this issue and also suggested an initial
+      fix. Further analysis was conducted by the OpenSSL development team and
+      Adam Langley of Google. The final fix was developed by Andy Polyakov of
+      the OpenSSL core team.
+      (CVE-2014-3570)
+      [Andy Polyakov]
+
+   *) Do not resume sessions on the server if the negotiated protocol
+      version does not match the session's version. Resuming with a different
+      version, while not strictly forbidden by the RFC, is of questionable
+      sanity and breaks all known clients.
+      [David Benjamin, Emilia Käsper]
+
+   *) Tighten handling of the ChangeCipherSpec (CCS) message: reject
+      early CCS messages during renegotiation. (Note that because
+      renegotiation is encrypted, this early CCS was not exploitable.)
+      [Emilia Käsper]
+
+   *) Tighten client-side session ticket handling during renegotiation:
+      ensure that the client only accepts a session ticket if the server sends
+      the extension anew in the ServerHello. Previously, a TLS client would
+      reuse the old extension state and thus accept a session ticket if one was
+      announced in the initial ServerHello.
+
+      Similarly, ensure that the client requires a session ticket if one
+      was advertised in the ServerHello. Previously, a TLS client would
+      ignore a missing NewSessionTicket message.
+      [Emilia Käsper]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1i and 1.0.1j [15 Oct 2014]
+
+  *) SRTP Memory Leak.
+
+     A flaw in the DTLS SRTP extension parsing code allows an attacker, who
+     sends a carefully crafted handshake message, to cause OpenSSL to fail
+     to free up to 64k of memory causing a memory leak. This could be
+     exploited in a Denial Of Service attack. This issue affects OpenSSL
+     1.0.1 server implementations for both SSL/TLS and DTLS regardless of
+     whether SRTP is used or configured. Implementations of OpenSSL that
+     have been compiled with OPENSSL_NO_SRTP defined are not affected.
+
+     The fix was developed by the OpenSSL team.
+     (CVE-2014-3513)
+     [OpenSSL team]
+
+  *) Session Ticket Memory Leak.
+
+     When an OpenSSL SSL/TLS/DTLS server receives a session ticket the
+     integrity of that ticket is first verified. In the event of a session
+     ticket integrity check failing, OpenSSL will fail to free memory
+     causing a memory leak. By sending a large number of invalid session
+     tickets an attacker could exploit this issue in a Denial Of Service
+     attack.
+     (CVE-2014-3567)
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Build option no-ssl3 is incomplete.
+
+     When OpenSSL is configured with "no-ssl3" as a build option, servers
+     could accept and complete a SSL 3.0 handshake, and clients could be
+     configured to send them.
+     (CVE-2014-3568)
+     [Akamai and the OpenSSL team]
+
+  *) Add support for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV.
+     Client applications doing fallback retries should call
+     SSL_set_mode(s, SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV).
+     (CVE-2014-3566)
+     [Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Add additional DigestInfo checks.
+ 
+     Re-encode DigestInto in DER and check against the original when
+     verifying RSA signature: this will reject any improperly encoded
+     DigestInfo structures.
+
+     Note: this is a precautionary measure and no attacks are currently known.
+
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1h and 1.0.1i [6 Aug 2014]
+
+  *) Fix SRP buffer overrun vulnerability. Invalid parameters passed to the
+     SRP code can be overrun an internal buffer. Add sanity check that
+     g, A, B < N to SRP code.
+
+     Thanks to Sean Devlin and Watson Ladd of Cryptography Services, NCC
+     Group for discovering this issue.
+     (CVE-2014-3512)
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) A flaw in the OpenSSL SSL/TLS server code causes the server to negotiate
+     TLS 1.0 instead of higher protocol versions when the ClientHello message
+     is badly fragmented. This allows a man-in-the-middle attacker to force a
+     downgrade to TLS 1.0 even if both the server and the client support a
+     higher protocol version, by modifying the client's TLS records.
+
+     Thanks to David Benjamin and Adam Langley (Google) for discovering and
+     researching this issue.
+     (CVE-2014-3511)
+     [David Benjamin]
+
+  *) OpenSSL DTLS clients enabling anonymous (EC)DH ciphersuites are subject
+     to a denial of service attack. A malicious server can crash the client
+     with a null pointer dereference (read) by specifying an anonymous (EC)DH
+     ciphersuite and sending carefully crafted handshake messages.
+
+     Thanks to Felix Gröbert (Google) for discovering and researching this
+     issue.
+     (CVE-2014-3510)
+     [Emilia Käsper]
+
+  *) By sending carefully crafted DTLS packets an attacker could cause openssl
+     to leak memory. This can be exploited through a Denial of Service attack.
+     Thanks to Adam Langley for discovering and researching this issue.
+     (CVE-2014-3507)
+     [Adam Langley]
+
+  *) An attacker can force openssl to consume large amounts of memory whilst
+     processing DTLS handshake messages. This can be exploited through a
+     Denial of Service attack.
+     Thanks to Adam Langley for discovering and researching this issue.
+     (CVE-2014-3506)
+     [Adam Langley]
+
+  *) An attacker can force an error condition which causes openssl to crash
+     whilst processing DTLS packets due to memory being freed twice. This
+     can be exploited through a Denial of Service attack.
+     Thanks to Adam Langley and Wan-Teh Chang for discovering and researching
+     this issue.
+     (CVE-2014-3505)
+     [Adam Langley]
+
+  *) If a multithreaded client connects to a malicious server using a resumed
+     session and the server sends an ec point format extension it could write
+     up to 255 bytes to freed memory.
+
+     Thanks to Gabor Tyukasz (LogMeIn Inc) for discovering and researching this
+     issue.
+     (CVE-2014-3509)
+     [Gabor Tyukasz]
+
+  *) A malicious server can crash an OpenSSL client with a null pointer
+     dereference (read) by specifying an SRP ciphersuite even though it was not
+     properly negotiated with the client. This can be exploited through a
+     Denial of Service attack.
+
+     Thanks to Joonas Kuorilehto and Riku Hietamäki (Codenomicon) for
+     discovering and researching this issue.
+     (CVE-2014-5139)
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) A flaw in OBJ_obj2txt may cause pretty printing functions such as
+     X509_name_oneline, X509_name_print_ex et al. to leak some information
+     from the stack. Applications may be affected if they echo pretty printing
+     output to the attacker.
+
+     Thanks to Ivan Fratric (Google) for discovering this issue.
+     (CVE-2014-3508)
+     [Emilia Käsper, and Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine (thus, EC_POINTs_mul etc.)
+     for corner cases. (Certain input points at infinity could lead to
+     bogus results, with non-infinity inputs mapped to infinity too.)
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1g and 1.0.1h [5 Jun 2014]
+
+  *) Fix for SSL/TLS MITM flaw. An attacker using a carefully crafted
+     handshake can force the use of weak keying material in OpenSSL
+     SSL/TLS clients and servers.
+
+     Thanks to KIKUCHI Masashi (Lepidum Co. Ltd.) for discovering and
+     researching this issue. (CVE-2014-0224)
+     [KIKUCHI Masashi, Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix DTLS recursion flaw. By sending an invalid DTLS handshake to an
+     OpenSSL DTLS client the code can be made to recurse eventually crashing
+     in a DoS attack.
+
+     Thanks to Imre Rad (Search-Lab Ltd.) for discovering this issue.
+     (CVE-2014-0221)
+     [Imre Rad, Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix DTLS invalid fragment vulnerability. A buffer overrun attack can
+     be triggered by sending invalid DTLS fragments to an OpenSSL DTLS
+     client or server. This is potentially exploitable to run arbitrary
+     code on a vulnerable client or server.
+
+     Thanks to Jüri Aedla for reporting this issue. (CVE-2014-0195)
+     [Jüri Aedla, Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix bug in TLS code where clients enable anonymous ECDH ciphersuites
+     are subject to a denial of service attack.
+
+     Thanks to Felix Gröbert and Ivan Fratric at Google for discovering
+     this issue. (CVE-2014-3470)
+     [Felix Gröbert, Ivan Fratric, Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Harmonize version and its documentation. -f flag is used to display
+     compilation flags.
+     [mancha <mancha1@zoho.com>]
+
+  *) Fix eckey_priv_encode so it immediately returns an error upon a failure
+     in i2d_ECPrivateKey.
+     [mancha <mancha1@zoho.com>]
+
+  *) Fix some double frees. These are not thought to be exploitable.
+     [mancha <mancha1@zoho.com>]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1f and 1.0.1g [7 Apr 2014]
+
+  *) A missing bounds check in the handling of the TLS heartbeat extension
+     can be used to reveal up to 64k of memory to a connected client or
+     server.
+
+     Thanks for Neel Mehta of Google Security for discovering this bug and to
+     Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> and Bodo Moeller <bmoeller@acm.org> for
+     preparing the fix (CVE-2014-0160)
+     [Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Fix for the attack described in the paper "Recovering OpenSSL
+     ECDSA Nonces Using the FLUSH+RELOAD Cache Side-channel Attack"
+     by Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger. Details can be obtained from:
+     http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/140
+
+     Thanks to Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger for discovering this
+     flaw and to Yuval Yarom for supplying a fix (CVE-2014-0076)
+     [Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger]
+
+  *) TLS pad extension: draft-agl-tls-padding-03
+
+     Workaround for the "TLS hang bug" (see FAQ and PR#2771): if the
+     TLS client Hello record length value would otherwise be > 255 and
+     less that 512 pad with a dummy extension containing zeroes so it
+     is at least 512 bytes long.
+
+     [Adam Langley, Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1e and 1.0.1f [6 Jan 2014]
+
+  *) Fix for TLS record tampering bug. A carefully crafted invalid 
+     handshake could crash OpenSSL with a NULL pointer exception.
+     Thanks to Anton Johansson for reporting this issues.
+     (CVE-2013-4353)
+
+  *) Keep original DTLS digest and encryption contexts in retransmission
+     structures so we can use the previous session parameters if they need
+     to be resent. (CVE-2013-6450)
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add option SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG (part of SSL_OP_ALL) which
+     avoids preferring ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers when the client appears to be
+     Safari on OS X.  Safari on OS X 10.8..10.8.3 advertises support for
+     several ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers, but fails to negotiate them.  The bug
+     is fixed in OS X 10.8.4, but Apple have ruled out both hot fixing
+     10.8..10.8.3 and forcing users to upgrade to 10.8.4 or newer.
+     [Rob Stradling, Adam Langley]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1d and 1.0.1e [11 Feb 2013]
+
+  *) Correct fix for CVE-2013-0169. The original didn't work on AES-NI
+     supporting platforms or when small records were transferred.
+     [Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1c and 1.0.1d [5 Feb 2013]
+
+  *) Make the decoding of SSLv3, TLS and DTLS CBC records constant time.
+
+     This addresses the flaw in CBC record processing discovered by 
+     Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson. Details of this attack can be found
+     at: http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/     
+
+     Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information
+     Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London
+     (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and Adam Langley and
+     Emilia Käsper for the initial patch.
+     (CVE-2013-0169)
+     [Emilia Käsper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie, Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix flaw in AESNI handling of TLS 1.2 and 1.1 records for CBC mode
+     ciphersuites which can be exploited in a denial of service attack.
+     Thanks go to and to Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> for discovering
+     and detecting this bug and to Wolfgang Ettlinger
+     <wolfgang.ettlinger@gmail.com> for independently discovering this issue.
+     (CVE-2012-2686)
+     [Adam Langley]
+
+  *) Return an error when checking OCSP signatures when key is NULL.
+     This fixes a DoS attack. (CVE-2013-0166)
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Make openssl verify return errors.
+     [Chris Palmer <palmer@google.com> and Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) Call OCSP Stapling callback after ciphersuite has been chosen, so
+     the right response is stapled. Also change SSL_get_certificate()
+     so it returns the certificate actually sent.
+     See http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2836.
+     [Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>]
+
+  *) Fix possible deadlock when decoding public keys.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Don't use TLS 1.0 record version number in initial client hello
+     if renegotiating.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1b and 1.0.1c [10 May 2012]
+
+  *) Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in TLS
+     1.2, 1.1 and DTLS to fix DoS attack.
+
+     Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic
+     fuzzing as a service testing platform.
+     (CVE-2012-2333)
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Initialise tkeylen properly when encrypting CMS messages.
+     Thanks to Solar Designer of Openwall for reporting this issue.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) In FIPS mode don't try to use composite ciphers as they are not
+     approved.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1a and 1.0.1b [26 Apr 2012]
+
+  *) OpenSSL 1.0.0 sets SSL_OP_ALL to 0x80000FFFL and OpenSSL 1.0.1 and
+     1.0.1a set SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 to 0x00000400L which would unfortunately
+     mean any application compiled against OpenSSL 1.0.0 headers setting
+     SSL_OP_ALL would also set SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1, unintentionally disablng
+     TLS 1.1 also. Fix this by changing the value of SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 to
+     0x10000000L Any application which was previously compiled against
+     OpenSSL 1.0.1 or 1.0.1a headers and which cares about SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1
+     will need to be recompiled as a result. Letting be results in
+     inability to disable specifically TLS 1.1 and in client context,
+     in unlike event, limit maximum offered version to TLS 1.0 [see below].
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) In order to ensure interoperabilty SSL_OP_NO_protocolX does not
+     disable just protocol X, but all protocols above X *if* there are
+     protocols *below* X still enabled. In more practical terms it means
+     that if application wants to disable TLS1.0 in favor of TLS1.1 and
+     above, it's not sufficient to pass SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1, one has to pass
+     SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1|SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3|SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2. This applies to
+     client side.
+     [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1 and 1.0.1a [19 Apr 2012]
+
+  *) Check for potentially exploitable overflows in asn1_d2i_read_bio
+     BUF_mem_grow and BUF_mem_grow_clean. Refuse attempts to shrink buffer
+     in CRYPTO_realloc_clean.
+
+     Thanks to Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team, for discovering this
+     issue and to Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> for fixing it.
+     (CVE-2012-2110)
+     [Adam Langley (Google), Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team]
+
+  *) Don't allow TLS 1.2 SHA-256 ciphersuites in TLS 1.0, 1.1 connections.
+     [Adam Langley]
+
+  *) Workarounds for some broken servers that "hang" if a client hello
+     record length exceeds 255 bytes.
+
+     1. Do not use record version number > TLS 1.0 in initial client
+        hello: some (but not all) hanging servers will now work.
+     2. If we set OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH this will truncate
+	the number of ciphers sent in the client hello. This should be
+        set to an even number, such as 50, for example by passing:
+        -DOPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH=50 to config or Configure.
+        Most broken servers should now work.
+     3. If all else fails setting OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2_CLIENT will disable
+	TLS 1.2 client support entirely.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix SEGV in Vector Permutation AES module observed in OpenSSH.
+     [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.0h and 1.0.1  [14 Mar 2012]
+
+  *) Add compatibility with old MDC2 signatures which use an ASN1 OCTET
+     STRING form instead of a DigestInfo.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) The format used for MDC2 RSA signatures is inconsistent between EVP
+     and the RSA_sign/RSA_verify functions. This was made more apparent when
+     OpenSSL used RSA_sign/RSA_verify for some RSA signatures in particular
+     those which went through EVP_PKEY_METHOD in 1.0.0 and later. Detect 
+     the correct format in RSA_verify so both forms transparently work.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Some servers which support TLS 1.0 can choke if we initially indicate
+     support for TLS 1.2 and later renegotiate using TLS 1.0 in the RSA
+     encrypted premaster secret. As a workaround use the maximum permitted
+     client version in client hello, this should keep such servers happy
+     and still work with previous versions of OpenSSL.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add support for TLS/DTLS heartbeats.
+     [Robin Seggelmann <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de>]
+
+  *) Add support for SCTP.
+     [Robin Seggelmann <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de>]
+
+  *) Improved PRNG seeding for VOS.
+     [Paul Green <Paul.Green@stratus.com>]
+
+  *) Extensive assembler packs updates, most notably:
+
+	- x86[_64]:     AES-NI, PCLMULQDQ, RDRAND support;
+	- x86[_64]:     SSSE3 support (SHA1, vector-permutation AES);
+	- x86_64:       bit-sliced AES implementation;
+	- ARM:          NEON support, contemporary platforms optimizations;
+	- s390x:        z196 support;
+	- *:            GHASH and GF(2^m) multiplication implementations;
+
+     [Andy Polyakov]
+
+  *) Make TLS-SRP code conformant with RFC 5054 API cleanup
+     (removal of unnecessary code)
+     [Peter Sylvester <peter.sylvester@edelweb.fr>]
+
+  *) Add TLS key material exporter from RFC 5705.
+     [Eric Rescorla]
+
+  *) Add DTLS-SRTP negotiation from RFC 5764.
+     [Eric Rescorla]
+
+  *) Add Next Protocol Negotiation,
+     http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-nextprotoneg-00. Can be
+     disabled with a no-npn flag to config or Configure. Code donated
+     by Google.
+     [Adam Langley <agl@google.com> and Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) Add optional 64-bit optimized implementations of elliptic curves NIST-P224,
+     NIST-P256, NIST-P521, with constant-time single point multiplication on
+     typical inputs. Compiler support for the nonstandard type __uint128_t is
+     required to use this (present in gcc 4.4 and later, for 64-bit builds).
+     Code made available under Apache License version 2.0.
+
+     Specify "enable-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128" on the Configure (or config) command
+     line to include this in your build of OpenSSL, and run "make depend" (or
+     "make update"). This enables the following EC_METHODs:
+
+         EC_GFp_nistp224_method()
+         EC_GFp_nistp256_method()
+         EC_GFp_nistp521_method()
+
+     EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name() will automatically use these (while
+     EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp() currently prefers the more flexible
+     implementations).
+     [Emilia Käsper, Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller (Google)]
+
+  *) Use type ossl_ssize_t instad of ssize_t which isn't available on
+     all platforms. Move ssize_t definition from e_os.h to the public
+     header file e_os2.h as it now appears in public header file cms.h
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) New -sigopt option to the ca, req and x509 utilities. Additional
+     signature parameters can be passed using this option and in
+     particular PSS. 
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add RSA PSS signing function. This will generate and set the
+     appropriate AlgorithmIdentifiers for PSS based on those in the
+     corresponding EVP_MD_CTX structure. No application support yet.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Support for companion algorithm specific ASN1 signing routines.
+     New function ASN1_item_sign_ctx() signs a pre-initialised
+     EVP_MD_CTX structure and sets AlgorithmIdentifiers based on
+     the appropriate parameters.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add new algorithm specific ASN1 verification initialisation function
+     to EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD: this is not in EVP_PKEY_METHOD since the ASN1
+     handling will be the same no matter what EVP_PKEY_METHOD is used.
+     Add a PSS handler to support verification of PSS signatures: checked
+     against a number of sample certificates.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add signature printing for PSS. Add PSS OIDs.
+     [Steve Henson, Martin Kaiser <lists@kaiser.cx>]
+
+  *) Add algorithm specific signature printing. An individual ASN1 method
+     can now print out signatures instead of the standard hex dump. 
+
+     More complex signatures (e.g. PSS) can print out more meaningful
+     information. Include DSA version that prints out the signature
+     parameters r, s.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Password based recipient info support for CMS library: implementing
+     RFC3211.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Split password based encryption into PBES2 and PBKDF2 functions. This
+     neatly separates the code into cipher and PBE sections and is required
+     for some algorithms that split PBES2 into separate pieces (such as
+     password based CMS).
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Session-handling fixes:
+     - Fix handling of connections that are resuming with a session ID,
+       but also support Session Tickets.
+     - Fix a bug that suppressed issuing of a new ticket if the client
+       presented a ticket with an expired session.
+     - Try to set the ticket lifetime hint to something reasonable.
+     - Make tickets shorter by excluding irrelevant information.
+     - On the client side, don't ignore renewed tickets.
+     [Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller (Google)]
+
+  *) Fix PSK session representation.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Add RC4-MD5 and AESNI-SHA1 "stitched" implementations.
+
+     This work was sponsored by Intel.
+     [Andy Polyakov]
+
+  *) Add GCM support to TLS library. Some custom code is needed to split
+     the IV between the fixed (from PRF) and explicit (from TLS record)
+     portions. This adds all GCM ciphersuites supported by RFC5288 and 
+     RFC5289. Generalise some AES* cipherstrings to include GCM and
+     add a special AESGCM string for GCM only.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Expand range of ctrls for AES GCM. Permit setting invocation
+     field on decrypt and retrieval of invocation field only on encrypt.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add HMAC ECC ciphersuites from RFC5289. Include SHA384 PRF support.
+     As required by RFC5289 these ciphersuites cannot be used if for
+     versions of TLS earlier than 1.2.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) For FIPS capable OpenSSL interpret a NULL default public key method
+     as unset and return the appropriate default but do *not* set the default.
+     This means we can return the appropriate method in applications that
+     switch between FIPS and non-FIPS modes.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Redirect HMAC and CMAC operations to FIPS module in FIPS mode. If an
+     ENGINE is used then we cannot handle that in the FIPS module so we
+     keep original code iff non-FIPS operations are allowed.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add -attime option to openssl utilities.
+     [Peter Eckersley <pde@eff.org>, Ben Laurie and Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Redirect DSA and DH operations to FIPS module in FIPS mode.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Redirect ECDSA and ECDH operations to FIPS module in FIPS mode. Also use
+     FIPS EC methods unconditionally for now.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) New build option no-ec2m to disable characteristic 2 code.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Backport libcrypto audit of return value checking from 1.1.0-dev; not
+     all cases can be covered as some introduce binary incompatibilities.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Redirect RSA operations to FIPS module including keygen,
+     encrypt, decrypt, sign and verify. Block use of non FIPS RSA methods.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add similar low level API blocking to ciphers.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Low level digest APIs are not approved in FIPS mode: any attempt
+     to use these will cause a fatal error. Applications that *really* want
+     to use them can use the private_* version instead.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Redirect cipher operations to FIPS module for FIPS builds. 
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Redirect digest operations to FIPS module for FIPS builds. 
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Update build system to add "fips" flag which will link in fipscanister.o
+     for static and shared library builds embedding a signature if needed.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Output TLS supported curves in preference order instead of numerical
+     order. This is currently hardcoded for the highest order curves first.
+     This should be configurable so applications can judge speed vs strength.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add TLS v1.2 server support for client authentication. 
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add support for FIPS mode in ssl library: disable SSLv3, non-FIPS ciphers
+     and enable MD5.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Functions FIPS_mode_set() and FIPS_mode() which call the underlying
+     FIPS modules versions.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add TLS v1.2 client side support for client authentication. Keep cache
+     of handshake records longer as we don't know the hash algorithm to use
+     until after the certificate request message is received.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Initial TLS v1.2 client support. Add a default signature algorithms
+     extension including all the algorithms we support. Parse new signature
+     format in client key exchange. Relax some ECC signing restrictions for
+     TLS v1.2 as indicated in RFC5246.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add server support for TLS v1.2 signature algorithms extension. Switch
+     to new signature format when needed using client digest preference.
+     All server ciphersuites should now work correctly in TLS v1.2. No client
+     support yet and no support for client certificates.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Initial TLS v1.2 support. Add new SHA256 digest to ssl code, switch
+     to SHA256 for PRF when using TLS v1.2 and later. Add new SHA256 based
+     ciphersuites. At present only RSA key exchange ciphersuites work with
+     TLS v1.2. Add new option for TLS v1.2 replacing the old and obsolete
+     SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK flags with SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2. New TLSv1.2 methods
+     and version checking.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) New option OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN. If an application can be compiled
+     with this defined it will not be affected by any changes to ssl internal
+     structures. Add several utility functions to allow openssl application
+     to work with OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN defined.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) A long standing patch to add support for SRP from EdelWeb (Peter
+     Sylvester and Christophe Renou) was integrated.
+     [Christophe Renou <christophe.renou@edelweb.fr>, Peter Sylvester
+     <peter.sylvester@edelweb.fr>, Tom Wu <tjw@cs.stanford.edu>, and
+     Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) Add functions to copy EVP_PKEY_METHOD and retrieve flags and id.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Permit abbreviated handshakes when renegotiating using the function
+     SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated().
+     [Robin Seggelmann <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de>]
+
+  *) Add call to ENGINE_register_all_complete() to
+     ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(), so some implementations get used
+     automatically instead of needing explicit application support.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add support for TLS key exporter as described in RFC5705.
+     [Robin Seggelmann <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de>, Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Initial TLSv1.1 support. Since TLSv1.1 is very similar to TLS v1.0 only
+     a few changes are required:
+
+       Add SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 flag.
+       Add TLSv1_1 methods.
+       Update version checking logic to handle version 1.1.
+       Add explicit IV handling (ported from DTLS code).
+       Add command line options to s_client/s_server.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.0g and 1.0.0h [12 Mar 2012]
+
+  *) Fix MMA (Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding) weakness
+     in CMS and PKCS7 code. When RSA decryption fails use a random key for
+     content decryption and always return the same error. Note: this attack
+     needs on average 2^20 messages so it only affects automated senders. The
+     old behaviour can be re-enabled in the CMS code by setting the
+     CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag: this is useful for debugging and testing where
+     an MMA defence is not necessary.
+     Thanks to Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode@us.ibm.com> for discovering
+     this issue. (CVE-2012-0884)
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix CVE-2011-4619: make sure we really are receiving a 
+     client hello before rejecting multiple SGC restarts. Thanks to
+     Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode@us.ibm.com> for discovering this bug.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.0f and 1.0.0g [18 Jan 2012]
+
+  *) Fix for DTLS DoS issue introduced by fix for CVE-2011-4109.
+     Thanks to Antonio Martin, Enterprise Secure Access Research and
+     Development, Cisco Systems, Inc. for discovering this bug and
+     preparing a fix. (CVE-2012-0050)
+     [Antonio Martin]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.0e and 1.0.0f [4 Jan 2012]
+
+  *) Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson have discovered an extension
+     of the Vaudenay padding oracle attack on CBC mode encryption
+     which enables an efficient plaintext recovery attack against
+     the OpenSSL implementation of DTLS. Their attack exploits timing
+     differences arising during decryption processing. A research
+     paper describing this attack can be found at:
+                  http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/~kp/dtls.pdf
+     Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information
+     Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London
+     (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and to Robin Seggelmann
+     <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de> and Michael Tuexen <tuexen@fh-muenster.de>
+     for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4108)
+     [Robin Seggelmann, Michael Tuexen]
+
+  *) Clear bytes used for block padding of SSL 3.0 records.
+     (CVE-2011-4576)
+     [Adam Langley (Google)]
+
+  *) Only allow one SGC handshake restart for SSL/TLS. Thanks to George
+     Kadianakis <desnacked@gmail.com> for discovering this issue and
+     Adam Langley for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4619)
+     [Adam Langley (Google)]
+
+  *) Check parameters are not NULL in GOST ENGINE. (CVE-2012-0027)
+     [Andrey Kulikov <amdeich@gmail.com>]
+
+  *) Prevent malformed RFC3779 data triggering an assertion failure.
+     Thanks to Andrew Chi, BBN Technologies, for discovering the flaw
+     and Rob Austein <sra@hactrn.net> for fixing it. (CVE-2011-4577)
+     [Rob Austein <sra@hactrn.net>]
+
+  *) Improved PRNG seeding for VOS.
+     [Paul Green <Paul.Green@stratus.com>]
+
+  *) Fix ssl_ciph.c set-up race.
+     [Adam Langley (Google)]
+
+  *) Fix spurious failures in ecdsatest.c.
+     [Emilia Käsper (Google)]
+
+  *) Fix the BIO_f_buffer() implementation (which was mixing different
+     interpretations of the '..._len' fields).
+     [Adam Langley (Google)]
+
+  *) Fix handling of BN_BLINDING: now BN_BLINDING_invert_ex (rather than
+     BN_BLINDING_invert_ex) calls BN_BLINDING_update, ensuring that concurrent
+     threads won't reuse the same blinding coefficients.
+
+     This also avoids the need to obtain the CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING
+     lock to call BN_BLINDING_invert_ex, and avoids one use of
+     BN_BLINDING_update for each BN_BLINDING structure (previously,
+     the last update always remained unused).
+     [Emilia Käsper (Google)]
+
+  *) In ssl3_clear, preserve s3->init_extra along with s3->rbuf.
+     [Bob Buckholz (Google)]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.0d and 1.0.0e [6 Sep 2011]
+
+  *) Fix bug where CRLs with nextUpdate in the past are sometimes accepted
+     by initialising X509_STORE_CTX properly. (CVE-2011-3207)
+     [Kaspar Brand <ossl@velox.ch>]
+
+  *) Fix SSL memory handling for (EC)DH ciphersuites, in particular
+     for multi-threaded use of ECDH. (CVE-2011-3210)
+     [Adam Langley (Google)]
+
+  *) Fix x509_name_ex_d2i memory leak on bad inputs.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Remove hard coded ecdsaWithSHA1 signature tests in ssl code and check
+     signature public key algorithm by using OID xref utilities instead.
+     Before this you could only use some ECC ciphersuites with SHA1 only.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add protection against ECDSA timing attacks as mentioned in the paper
+     by Billy Bob Brumley and Nicola Tuveri, see:
+
+	http://eprint.iacr.org/2011/232.pdf
+
+     [Billy Bob Brumley and Nicola Tuveri]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.0c and 1.0.0d [8 Feb 2011]
+
+  *) Fix parsing of OCSP stapling ClientHello extension. CVE-2011-0014
+     [Neel Mehta, Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller (Google)]
+
+  *) Fix bug in string printing code: if *any* escaping is enabled we must
+     escape the escape character (backslash) or the resulting string is
+     ambiguous.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.0b and 1.0.0c  [2 Dec 2010]
+
+  *) Disable code workaround for ancient and obsolete Netscape browsers
+     and servers: an attacker can use it in a ciphersuite downgrade attack.
+     Thanks to Martin Rex for discovering this bug. CVE-2010-4180
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fixed J-PAKE implementation error, originally discovered by
+     Sebastien Martini, further info and confirmation from Stefan
+     Arentz and Feng Hao. Note that this fix is a security fix. CVE-2010-4252
+     [Ben Laurie]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.0a and 1.0.0b  [16 Nov 2010]
+
+  *) Fix extension code to avoid race conditions which can result in a buffer
+     overrun vulnerability: resumed sessions must not be modified as they can
+     be shared by multiple threads. CVE-2010-3864
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix WIN32 build system to correctly link an ENGINE directory into
+     a DLL. 
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.0 and 1.0.0a  [01 Jun 2010]
+
+  *) Check return value of int_rsa_verify in pkey_rsa_verifyrecover 
+     (CVE-2010-1633)
+     [Steve Henson, Peter-Michael Hager <hager@dortmund.net>]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8n and 1.0.0  [29 Mar 2010]
+
+  *) Add "missing" function EVP_CIPHER_CTX_copy(). This copies a cipher
+     context. The operation can be customised via the ctrl mechanism in
+     case ENGINEs want to include additional functionality.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Tolerate yet another broken PKCS#8 key format: private key value negative.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add new -subject_hash_old and -issuer_hash_old options to x509 utility to
+     output hashes compatible with older versions of OpenSSL.
+     [Willy Weisz <weisz@vcpc.univie.ac.at>]
+
+  *) Fix compression algorithm handling: if resuming a session use the
+     compression algorithm of the resumed session instead of determining
+     it from client hello again. Don't allow server to change algorithm.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add load_crls() function to apps tidying load_certs() too. Add option
+     to verify utility to allow additional CRLs to be included.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Update OCSP request code to permit adding custom headers to the request:
+     some responders need this.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) The function EVP_PKEY_sign() returns <=0 on error: check return code
+     correctly.
+     [Julia Lawall <julia@diku.dk>]
+
+  *) Update verify callback code in apps/s_cb.c and apps/verify.c, it
+     needlessly dereferenced structures, used obsolete functions and
+     didn't handle all updated verify codes correctly.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Disable MD2 in the default configuration.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) In BIO_pop() and BIO_push() use the ctrl argument (which was NULL) to
+     indicate the initial BIO being pushed or popped. This makes it possible
+     to determine whether the BIO is the one explicitly called or as a result
+     of the ctrl being passed down the chain. Fix BIO_pop() and SSL BIOs so
+     it handles reference counts correctly and doesn't zero out the I/O bio
+     when it is not being explicitly popped. WARNING: applications which
+     included workarounds for the old buggy behaviour will need to be modified
+     or they could free up already freed BIOs.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Extend the uni2asc/asc2uni => OPENSSL_uni2asc/OPENSSL_asc2uni
+     renaming to all platforms (within the 0.9.8 branch, this was
+     done conditionally on Netware platforms to avoid a name clash).
+     [Guenter <lists@gknw.net>]
+
+  *) Add ECDHE and PSK support to DTLS.
+     [Michael Tuexen <tuexen@fh-muenster.de>]
+
+  *) Add CHECKED_STACK_OF macro to safestack.h, otherwise safestack can't
+     be used on C++.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add "missing" function EVP_MD_flags() (without this the only way to
+     retrieve a digest flags is by accessing the structure directly. Update
+     EVP_MD_do_all*() and EVP_CIPHER_do_all*() to include the name a digest
+     or cipher is registered as in the "from" argument. Print out all
+     registered digests in the dgst usage message instead of manually 
+     attempting to work them out.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) If no SSLv2 ciphers are used don't use an SSLv2 compatible client hello:
+     this allows the use of compression and extensions. Change default cipher
+     string to remove SSLv2 ciphersuites. This effectively avoids ancient SSLv2
+     by default unless an application cipher string requests it.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Alter match criteria in PKCS12_parse(). It used to try to use local
+     key ids to find matching certificates and keys but some PKCS#12 files
+     don't follow the (somewhat unwritten) rules and this strategy fails.
+     Now just gather all certificates together and the first private key
+     then look for the first certificate that matches the key.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Support use of registered digest and cipher names for dgst and cipher
+     commands instead of having to add each one as a special case. So now
+     you can do:
+
+        openssl sha256 foo
+
+     as well as:
+
+        openssl dgst -sha256 foo
+
+     and this works for ENGINE based algorithms too.
+
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Update Gost ENGINE to support parameter files.
+     [Victor B. Wagner <vitus@cryptocom.ru>]
+
+  *) Support GeneralizedTime in ca utility. 
+     [Oliver Martin <oliver@volatilevoid.net>, Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Enhance the hash format used for certificate directory links. The new
+     form uses the canonical encoding (meaning equivalent names will work
+     even if they aren't identical) and uses SHA1 instead of MD5. This form
+     is incompatible with the older format and as a result c_rehash should
+     be used to rebuild symbolic links.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Make PKCS#8 the default write format for private keys, replacing the
+     traditional format. This form is standardised, more secure and doesn't
+     include an implicit MD5 dependency.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add a $gcc_devteam_warn option to Configure. The idea is that any code
+     committed to OpenSSL should pass this lot as a minimum.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add session ticket override functionality for use by EAP-FAST.
+     [Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>]
+
+  *) Modify HMAC functions to return a value. Since these can be implemented
+     in an ENGINE errors can occur.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Type-checked OBJ_bsearch_ex.
+     [Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) Type-checked OBJ_bsearch. Also some constification necessitated
+     by type-checking.  Still to come: TXT_DB, bsearch(?),
+     OBJ_bsearch_ex, qsort, CRYPTO_EX_DATA, ASN1_VALUE, ASN1_STRING,
+     CONF_VALUE.
+     [Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) New function OPENSSL_gmtime_adj() to add a specific number of days and
+     seconds to a tm structure directly, instead of going through OS
+     specific date routines. This avoids any issues with OS routines such
+     as the year 2038 bug. New *_adj() functions for ASN1 time structures
+     and X509_time_adj_ex() to cover the extended range. The existing
+     X509_time_adj() is still usable and will no longer have any date issues.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Delta CRL support. New use deltas option which will attempt to locate
+     and search any appropriate delta CRLs available.
+
+     This work was sponsored by Google.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Support for CRLs partitioned by reason code. Reorganise CRL processing
+     code and add additional score elements. Validate alternate CRL paths
+     as part of the CRL checking and indicate a new error "CRL path validation
+     error" in this case. Applications wanting additional details can use
+     the verify callback and check the new "parent" field. If this is not
+     NULL CRL path validation is taking place. Existing applications won't
+     see this because it requires extended CRL support which is off by
+     default.
+
+     This work was sponsored by Google.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Support for freshest CRL extension.
+
+     This work was sponsored by Google.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Initial indirect CRL support. Currently only supported in the CRLs
+     passed directly and not via lookup. Process certificate issuer
+     CRL entry extension and lookup CRL entries by bother issuer name
+     and serial number. Check and process CRL issuer entry in IDP extension.
+
+     This work was sponsored by Google.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add support for distinct certificate and CRL paths. The CRL issuer
+     certificate is validated separately in this case. Only enabled if
+     an extended CRL support flag is set: this flag will enable additional
+     CRL functionality in future.
+
+     This work was sponsored by Google.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add support for policy mappings extension.
+
+     This work was sponsored by Google.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fixes to pathlength constraint, self issued certificate handling,
+     policy processing to align with RFC3280 and PKITS tests.
+
+     This work was sponsored by Google.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Support for name constraints certificate extension. DN, email, DNS
+     and URI types are currently supported.
+
+     This work was sponsored by Google.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) To cater for systems that provide a pointer-based thread ID rather
+     than numeric, deprecate the current numeric thread ID mechanism and
+     replace it with a structure and associated callback type. This
+     mechanism allows a numeric "hash" to be extracted from a thread ID in
+     either case, and on platforms where pointers are larger than 'long',
+     mixing is done to help ensure the numeric 'hash' is usable even if it
+     can't be guaranteed unique. The default mechanism is to use "&errno"
+     as a pointer-based thread ID to distinguish between threads.
+
+     Applications that want to provide their own thread IDs should now use
+     CRYPTO_THREADID_set_callback() to register a callback that will call
+     either CRYPTO_THREADID_set_numeric() or CRYPTO_THREADID_set_pointer().
+
+     Note that ERR_remove_state() is now deprecated, because it is tied
+     to the assumption that thread IDs are numeric.  ERR_remove_state(0)
+     to free the current thread's error state should be replaced by
+     ERR_remove_thread_state(NULL).
+
+     (This new approach replaces the functions CRYPTO_set_idptr_callback(),
+     CRYPTO_get_idptr_callback(), and CRYPTO_thread_idptr() that existed in
+     OpenSSL 0.9.9-dev between June 2006 and August 2008. Also, if an
+     application was previously providing a numeric thread callback that
+     was inappropriate for distinguishing threads, then uniqueness might
+     have been obtained with &errno that happened immediately in the
+     intermediate development versions of OpenSSL; this is no longer the
+     case, the numeric thread callback will now override the automatic use
+     of &errno.)
+     [Geoff Thorpe, with help from Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Initial support for different CRL issuing certificates. This covers a
+     simple case where the self issued certificates in the chain exist and
+     the real CRL issuer is higher in the existing chain.
+
+     This work was sponsored by Google.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Removed effectively defunct crypto/store from the build.
+     [Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) Revamp of STACK to provide stronger type-checking. Still to come:
+     TXT_DB, bsearch(?), OBJ_bsearch, qsort, CRYPTO_EX_DATA, ASN1_VALUE,
+     ASN1_STRING, CONF_VALUE.
+     [Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) Add a new SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS mode flag to release unused buffer
+     RAM on SSL connections.  This option can save about 34k per idle SSL.
+     [Nick Mathewson]
+
+  *) Revamp of LHASH to provide stronger type-checking. Still to come:
+     STACK, TXT_DB, bsearch, qsort.
+     [Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) Initial support for Cryptographic Message Syntax (aka CMS) based
+     on RFC3850, RFC3851 and RFC3852. New cms directory and cms utility,
+     support for data, signedData, compressedData, digestedData and
+     encryptedData, envelopedData types included. Scripts to check against
+     RFC4134 examples draft and interop and consistency checks of many
+     content types and variants.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add options to enc utility to support use of zlib compression BIO.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Extend mk1mf to support importing of options and assembly language
+     files from Configure script, currently only included in VC-WIN32.
+     The assembly language rules can now optionally generate the source
+     files from the associated perl scripts.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Implement remaining functionality needed to support GOST ciphersuites.
+     Interop testing has been performed using CryptoPro implementations.
+     [Victor B. Wagner <vitus@cryptocom.ru>]
+
+  *) s390x assembler pack.
+     [Andy Polyakov]
+
+  *) ARMv4 assembler pack. ARMv4 refers to v4 and later ISA, not CPU
+     "family."
+     [Andy Polyakov]
+
+  *) Implement Opaque PRF Input TLS extension as specified in
+     draft-rescorla-tls-opaque-prf-input-00.txt.  Since this is not an
+     official specification yet and no extension type assignment by
+     IANA exists, this extension (for now) will have to be explicitly
+     enabled when building OpenSSL by providing the extension number
+     to use.  For example, specify an option
+
+         -DTLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input=0x9527
+
+     to the "config" or "Configure" script to enable the extension,
+     assuming extension number 0x9527 (which is a completely arbitrary
+     and unofficial assignment based on the MD5 hash of the Internet
+     Draft).  Note that by doing so, you potentially lose
+     interoperability with other TLS implementations since these might
+     be using the same extension number for other purposes.
+
+     SSL_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input(ssl, src, len) is used to set the
+     opaque PRF input value to use in the handshake.  This will create
+     an interal copy of the length-'len' string at 'src', and will
+     return non-zero for success.
+
+     To get more control and flexibility, provide a callback function
+     by using
+
+          SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(ctx, cb)
+          SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg(ctx, arg)
+
+     where
+
+          int (*cb)(SSL *, void *peerinput, size_t len, void *arg);
+          void *arg;
+
+     Callback function 'cb' will be called in handshakes, and is
+     expected to use SSL_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input() as appropriate.
+     Argument 'arg' is for application purposes (the value as given to
+     SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg() will directly
+     be provided to the callback function).  The callback function
+     has to return non-zero to report success: usually 1 to use opaque
+     PRF input just if possible, or 2 to enforce use of the opaque PRF
+     input.  In the latter case, the library will abort the handshake
+     if opaque PRF input is not successfully negotiated.
+
+     Arguments 'peerinput' and 'len' given to the callback function
+     will always be NULL and 0 in the case of a client.  A server will
+     see the client's opaque PRF input through these variables if
+     available (NULL and 0 otherwise).  Note that if the server
+     provides an opaque PRF input, the length must be the same as the
+     length of the client's opaque PRF input.
+
+     Note that the callback function will only be called when creating
+     a new session (session resumption can resume whatever was
+     previously negotiated), and will not be called in SSL 2.0
+     handshakes; thus, SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2) or
+     SSL_set_options(ssl, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2) is especially recommended
+     for applications that need to enforce opaque PRF input.
+
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Update ssl code to support digests other than SHA1+MD5 for handshake
+     MAC. 
+
+     [Victor B. Wagner <vitus@cryptocom.ru>]
+
+  *) Add RFC4507 support to OpenSSL. This includes the corrections in
+     RFC4507bis. The encrypted ticket format is an encrypted encoded
+     SSL_SESSION structure, that way new session features are automatically
+     supported.
+
+     If a client application caches session in an SSL_SESSION structure
+     support is transparent because tickets are now stored in the encoded
+     SSL_SESSION.
+     
+     The SSL_CTX structure automatically generates keys for ticket
+     protection in servers so again support should be possible
+     with no application modification.
+
+     If a client or server wishes to disable RFC4507 support then the option
+     SSL_OP_NO_TICKET can be set.
+
+     Add a TLS extension debugging callback to allow the contents of any client
+     or server extensions to be examined.
+
+     This work was sponsored by Google.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Final changes to avoid use of pointer pointer casts in OpenSSL.
+     OpenSSL should now compile cleanly on gcc 4.2
+     [Peter Hartley <pdh@utter.chaos.org.uk>, Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Update SSL library to use new EVP_PKEY MAC API. Include generic MAC
+     support including streaming MAC support: this is required for GOST
+     ciphersuite support.
+     [Victor B. Wagner <vitus@cryptocom.ru>, Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add option -stream to use PKCS#7 streaming in smime utility. New
+     function i2d_PKCS7_bio_stream() and PEM_write_PKCS7_bio_stream()
+     to output in BER and PEM format.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Experimental support for use of HMAC via EVP_PKEY interface. This
+     allows HMAC to be handled via the EVP_DigestSign*() interface. The
+     EVP_PKEY "key" in this case is the HMAC key, potentially allowing
+     ENGINE support for HMAC keys which are unextractable. New -mac and
+     -macopt options to dgst utility.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) New option -sigopt to dgst utility. Update dgst to use
+     EVP_Digest{Sign,Verify}*. These two changes make it possible to use
+     alternative signing parameters such as X9.31 or PSS in the dgst 
+     utility.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Change ssl_cipher_apply_rule(), the internal function that does
+     the work each time a ciphersuite string requests enabling
+     ("foo+bar"), moving ("+foo+bar"), disabling ("-foo+bar", or
+     removing ("!foo+bar") a class of ciphersuites: Now it maintains
+     the order of disabled ciphersuites such that those ciphersuites
+     that most recently went from enabled to disabled not only stay
+     in order with respect to each other, but also have higher priority
+     than other disabled ciphersuites the next time ciphersuites are
+     enabled again.
+
+     This means that you can now say, e.g., "PSK:-PSK:HIGH" to enable
+     the same ciphersuites as with "HIGH" alone, but in a specific
+     order where the PSK ciphersuites come first (since they are the
+     most recently disabled ciphersuites when "HIGH" is parsed).
+
+     Also, change ssl_create_cipher_list() (using this new
+     funcionality) such that between otherwise identical
+     cihpersuites, ephemeral ECDH is preferred over ephemeral DH in
+     the default order.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Change ssl_create_cipher_list() so that it automatically
+     arranges the ciphersuites in reasonable order before starting
+     to process the rule string.  Thus, the definition for "DEFAULT"
+     (SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST) now is just "ALL:!aNULL:!eNULL", but
+     remains equivalent to "AES:ALL:!aNULL:!eNULL:+aECDH:+kRSA:+RC4:@STRENGTH".
+     This makes it much easier to arrive at a reasonable default order
+     in applications for which anonymous ciphers are OK (meaning
+     that you can't actually use DEFAULT).
+     [Bodo Moeller; suggested by Victor Duchovni]
+
+  *) Split the SSL/TLS algorithm mask (as used for ciphersuite string
+     processing) into multiple integers instead of setting
+     "SSL_MKEY_MASK" bits, "SSL_AUTH_MASK" bits, "SSL_ENC_MASK",
+     "SSL_MAC_MASK", and "SSL_SSL_MASK" bits all in a single integer.
+     (These masks as well as the individual bit definitions are hidden
+     away into the non-exported interface ssl/ssl_locl.h, so this
+     change to the definition of the SSL_CIPHER structure shouldn't
+     affect applications.)  This give us more bits for each of these
+     categories, so there is no longer a need to coagulate AES128 and
+     AES256 into a single algorithm bit, and to coagulate Camellia128
+     and Camellia256 into a single algorithm bit, which has led to all
+     kinds of kludges.
+
+     Thus, among other things, the kludge introduced in 0.9.7m and
+     0.9.8e for masking out AES256 independently of AES128 or masking
+     out Camellia256 independently of AES256 is not needed here in 0.9.9.
+
+     With the change, we also introduce new ciphersuite aliases that
+     so far were missing: "AES128", "AES256", "CAMELLIA128", and
+     "CAMELLIA256".
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Add support for dsa-with-SHA224 and dsa-with-SHA256.
+     Use the leftmost N bytes of the signature input if the input is
+     larger than the prime q (with N being the size in bytes of q).
+     [Nils Larsch]
+
+  *) Very *very* experimental PKCS#7 streaming encoder support. Nothing uses
+     it yet and it is largely untested.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add support for the ecdsa-with-SHA224/256/384/512 signature types.
+     [Nils Larsch]
+
+  *) Initial incomplete changes to avoid need for function casts in OpenSSL
+     some compilers (gcc 4.2 and later) reject their use. Safestack is
+     reimplemented.  Update ASN1 to avoid use of legacy functions. 
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Win32/64 targets are linked with Winsock2.
+     [Andy Polyakov]
+
+  *) Add an X509_CRL_METHOD structure to allow CRL processing to be redirected
+     to external functions. This can be used to increase CRL handling 
+     efficiency especially when CRLs are very large by (for example) storing
+     the CRL revoked certificates in a database.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Overhaul of by_dir code. Add support for dynamic loading of CRLs so
+     new CRLs added to a directory can be used. New command line option
+     -verify_return_error to s_client and s_server. This causes real errors
+     to be returned by the verify callback instead of carrying on no matter
+     what. This reflects the way a "real world" verify callback would behave.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) GOST engine, supporting several GOST algorithms and public key formats.
+     Kindly donated by Cryptocom.
+     [Cryptocom]
+
+  *) Partial support for Issuing Distribution Point CRL extension. CRLs
+     partitioned by DP are handled but no indirect CRL or reason partitioning
+     (yet). Complete overhaul of CRL handling: now the most suitable CRL is
+     selected via a scoring technique which handles IDP and AKID in CRLs.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) New X509_STORE_CTX callbacks lookup_crls() and lookup_certs() which
+     will ultimately be used for all verify operations: this will remove the
+     X509_STORE dependency on certificate verification and allow alternative
+     lookup methods.  X509_STORE based implementations of these two callbacks.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Allow multiple CRLs to exist in an X509_STORE with matching issuer names.
+     Modify get_crl() to find a valid (unexpired) CRL if possible.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) New function X509_CRL_match() to check if two CRLs are identical. Normally
+     this would be called X509_CRL_cmp() but that name is already used by
+     a function that just compares CRL issuer names. Cache several CRL 
+     extensions in X509_CRL structure and cache CRLDP in X509.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Store a "canonical" representation of X509_NAME structure (ASN1 Name)
+     this maps equivalent X509_NAME structures into a consistent structure.
+     Name comparison can then be performed rapidly using memcmp().
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Non-blocking OCSP request processing. Add -timeout option to ocsp 
+     utility.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Allow digests to supply their own micalg string for S/MIME type using
+     the ctrl EVP_MD_CTRL_MICALG.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) During PKCS7 signing pass the PKCS7 SignerInfo structure to the
+     EVP_PKEY_METHOD before and after signing via the EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN
+     ctrl. It can then customise the structure before and/or after signing
+     if necessary.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) New function OBJ_add_sigid() to allow application defined signature OIDs
+     to be added to OpenSSLs internal tables. New function OBJ_sigid_free()
+     to free up any added signature OIDs.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) New functions EVP_CIPHER_do_all(), EVP_CIPHER_do_all_sorted(),
+     EVP_MD_do_all() and EVP_MD_do_all_sorted() to enumerate internal
+     digest and cipher tables. New options added to openssl utility:
+     list-message-digest-algorithms and list-cipher-algorithms.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Change the array representation of binary polynomials: the list
+     of degrees of non-zero coefficients is now terminated with -1.
+     Previously it was terminated with 0, which was also part of the
+     value; thus, the array representation was not applicable to
+     polynomials where t^0 has coefficient zero.  This change makes
+     the array representation useful in a more general context.
+     [Douglas Stebila]
+
+  *) Various modifications and fixes to SSL/TLS cipher string
+     handling.  For ECC, the code now distinguishes between fixed ECDH
+     with RSA certificates on the one hand and with ECDSA certificates
+     on the other hand, since these are separate ciphersuites.  The
+     unused code for Fortezza ciphersuites has been removed.
+
+     For consistency with EDH, ephemeral ECDH is now called "EECDH"
+     (not "ECDHE").  For consistency with the code for DH
+     certificates, use of ECDH certificates is now considered ECDH
+     authentication, not RSA or ECDSA authentication (the latter is
+     merely the CA's signing algorithm and not actively used in the
+     protocol).
+
+     The temporary ciphersuite alias "ECCdraft" is no longer
+     available, and ECC ciphersuites are no longer excluded from "ALL"
+     and "DEFAULT".  The following aliases now exist for RFC 4492
+     ciphersuites, most of these by analogy with the DH case:
+
+         kECDHr   - ECDH cert, signed with RSA
+         kECDHe   - ECDH cert, signed with ECDSA
+         kECDH    - ECDH cert (signed with either RSA or ECDSA)
+         kEECDH   - ephemeral ECDH
+         ECDH     - ECDH cert or ephemeral ECDH
+
+         aECDH    - ECDH cert
+         aECDSA   - ECDSA cert
+         ECDSA    - ECDSA cert
+
+         AECDH    - anonymous ECDH
+         EECDH    - non-anonymous ephemeral ECDH (equivalent to "kEECDH:-AECDH")
+
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Add additional S/MIME capabilities for AES and GOST ciphers if supported.
+     Use correct micalg parameters depending on digest(s) in signed message.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add engine support for EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD. Add functions to process
+     an ENGINE asn1 method. Support ENGINE lookups in the ASN1 code.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Initial engine support for EVP_PKEY_METHOD. New functions to permit
+     an engine to register a method. Add ENGINE lookups for methods and
+     functional reference processing.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) New functions EVP_Digest{Sign,Verify)*. These are enchance versions of
+     EVP_{Sign,Verify}* which allow an application to customise the signature
+     process.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) New -resign option to smime utility. This adds one or more signers
+     to an existing PKCS#7 signedData structure. Also -md option to use an
+     alternative message digest algorithm for signing.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Tidy up PKCS#7 routines and add new functions to make it easier to
+     create PKCS7 structures containing multiple signers. Update smime
+     application to support multiple signers.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) New -macalg option to pkcs12 utility to allow setting of an alternative
+     digest MAC.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Initial support for PKCS#5 v2.0 PRFs other than default SHA1 HMAC.
+     Reorganize PBE internals to lookup from a static table using NIDs,
+     add support for HMAC PBE OID translation. Add a EVP_CIPHER ctrl:
+     EVP_CTRL_PBE_PRF_NID this allows a cipher to specify an alternative
+     PRF which will be automatically used with PBES2.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Replace the algorithm specific calls to generate keys in "req" with the
+     new API.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Update PKCS#7 enveloped data routines to use new API. This is now
+     supported by any public key method supporting the encrypt operation. A
+     ctrl is added to allow the public key algorithm to examine or modify
+     the PKCS#7 RecipientInfo structure if it needs to: for RSA this is
+     a no op.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add a ctrl to asn1 method to allow a public key algorithm to express
+     a default digest type to use. In most cases this will be SHA1 but some
+     algorithms (such as GOST) need to specify an alternative digest. The
+     return value indicates how strong the preference is 1 means optional and
+     2 is mandatory (that is it is the only supported type). Modify
+     ASN1_item_sign() to accept a NULL digest argument to indicate it should
+     use the default md. Update openssl utilities to use the default digest
+     type for signing if it is not explicitly indicated.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Use OID cross reference table in ASN1_sign() and ASN1_verify(). New 
+     EVP_MD flag EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE. This uses the relevant
+     signing method from the key type. This effectively removes the link
+     between digests and public key types.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add an OID cross reference table and utility functions. Its purpose is to
+     translate between signature OIDs such as SHA1WithrsaEncryption and SHA1,
+     rsaEncryption. This will allow some of the algorithm specific hackery
+     needed to use the correct OID to be removed. 
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Remove algorithm specific dependencies when setting PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO
+     structures for PKCS7_sign(). They are now set up by the relevant public
+     key ASN1 method.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add provisional EC pkey method with support for ECDSA and ECDH.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add support for key derivation (agreement) in the API, DH method and
+     pkeyutl.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add DSA pkey method and DH pkey methods, extend DH ASN1 method to support
+     public and private key formats. As a side effect these add additional 
+     command line functionality not previously available: DSA signatures can be
+     generated and verified using pkeyutl and DH key support and generation in
+     pkey, genpkey.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) BeOS support.
+     [Oliver Tappe <zooey@hirschkaefer.de>]
+
+  *) New make target "install_html_docs" installs HTML renditions of the
+     manual pages.
+     [Oliver Tappe <zooey@hirschkaefer.de>]
+
+  *) New utility "genpkey" this is analogous to "genrsa" etc except it can
+     generate keys for any algorithm. Extend and update EVP_PKEY_METHOD to
+     support key and parameter generation and add initial key generation
+     functionality for RSA.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add functions for main EVP_PKEY_method operations. The undocumented
+     functions EVP_PKEY_{encrypt,decrypt} have been renamed to
+     EVP_PKEY_{encrypt,decrypt}_old. 
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Initial definitions for EVP_PKEY_METHOD. This will be a high level public
+     key API, doesn't do much yet.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) New function EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info() to retrieve information about
+     public key algorithms. New option to openssl utility:
+     "list-public-key-algorithms" to print out info.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Implement the Supported Elliptic Curves Extension for
+     ECC ciphersuites from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt.
+     [Douglas Stebila]
+
+  *) Don't free up OIDs in OBJ_cleanup() if they are in use by EVP_MD or
+     EVP_CIPHER structures to avoid later problems in EVP_cleanup().
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) New utilities pkey and pkeyparam. These are similar to algorithm specific
+     utilities such as rsa, dsa, dsaparam etc except they process any key
+     type.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Transfer public key printing routines to EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD. New 
+     functions EVP_PKEY_print_public(), EVP_PKEY_print_private(),
+     EVP_PKEY_print_param() to print public key data from an EVP_PKEY
+     structure.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Initial support for pluggable public key ASN1.
+     De-spaghettify the public key ASN1 handling. Move public and private
+     key ASN1 handling to a new EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD structure. Relocate
+     algorithm specific handling to a single module within the relevant
+     algorithm directory. Add functions to allow (near) opaque processing
+     of public and private key structures.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Implement the Supported Point Formats Extension for
+     ECC ciphersuites from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt.
+     [Douglas Stebila]
+
+  *) Add initial support for RFC 4279 PSK TLS ciphersuites. Add members
+     for the psk identity [hint] and the psk callback functions to the
+     SSL_SESSION, SSL and SSL_CTX structure.
+     
+     New ciphersuites:
+         PSK-RC4-SHA, PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA, PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA,
+         PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA
+ 
+     New functions:
+         SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint
+         SSL_get_psk_identity_hint
+         SSL_get_psk_identity
+         SSL_use_psk_identity_hint
+
+     [Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of Nokia Corporation]
+
+  *) Add RFC 3161 compliant time stamp request creation, response generation
+     and response verification functionality.
+     [Zoltán Glózik <zglozik@opentsa.org>, The OpenTSA Project]
+
+  *) Add initial support for TLS extensions, specifically for the server_name
+     extension so far.  The SSL_SESSION, SSL_CTX, and SSL data structures now
+     have new members for a host name.  The SSL data structure has an
+     additional member SSL_CTX *initial_ctx so that new sessions can be
+     stored in that context to allow for session resumption, even after the
+     SSL has been switched to a new SSL_CTX in reaction to a client's
+     server_name extension.
+
+     New functions (subject to change):
+
+         SSL_get_servername()
+         SSL_get_servername_type()
+         SSL_set_SSL_CTX()
+
+     New CTRL codes and macros (subject to change):
+
+         SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_CB
+                                 - SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback()
+         SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_ARG
+                                      - SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg()
+         SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME           - SSL_set_tlsext_host_name()
+
+     openssl s_client has a new '-servername ...' option.
+
+     openssl s_server has new options '-servername_host ...', '-cert2 ...',
+     '-key2 ...', '-servername_fatal' (subject to change).  This allows
+     testing the HostName extension for a specific single host name ('-cert'
+     and '-key' remain fallbacks for handshakes without HostName
+     negotiation).  If the unrecognized_name alert has to be sent, this by
+     default is a warning; it becomes fatal with the '-servername_fatal'
+     option.
+
+     [Peter Sylvester,  Remy Allais, Christophe Renou]
+
+  *) Whirlpool hash implementation is added.
+     [Andy Polyakov]
+
+  *) BIGNUM code on 64-bit SPARCv9 targets is switched from bn(64,64) to
+     bn(64,32). Because of instruction set limitations it doesn't have
+     any negative impact on performance. This was done mostly in order
+     to make it possible to share assembler modules, such as bn_mul_mont
+     implementations, between 32- and 64-bit builds without hassle.
+     [Andy Polyakov]
+
+  *) Move code previously exiled into file crypto/ec/ec2_smpt.c
+     to ec2_smpl.c, and no longer require the OPENSSL_EC_BIN_PT_COMP
+     macro.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) New candidate for BIGNUM assembler implementation, bn_mul_mont,
+     dedicated Montgomery multiplication procedure, is introduced.
+     BN_MONT_CTX is modified to allow bn_mul_mont to reach for higher
+     "64-bit" performance on certain 32-bit targets.
+     [Andy Polyakov]
+
+  *) New option SSL_OP_NO_COMP to disable use of compression selectively
+     in SSL structures. New SSL ctrl to set maximum send fragment size. 
+     Save memory by seeting the I/O buffer sizes dynamically instead of
+     using the maximum available value.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) New option -V for 'openssl ciphers'. This prints the ciphersuite code
+     in addition to the text details.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Very, very preliminary EXPERIMENTAL support for printing of general
+     ASN1 structures. This currently produces rather ugly output and doesn't
+     handle several customised structures at all.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Integrated support for PVK file format and some related formats such
+     as MS PUBLICKEYBLOB and PRIVATEKEYBLOB. Command line switches to support
+     these in the 'rsa' and 'dsa' utilities.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Support for PKCS#1 RSAPublicKey format on rsa utility command line.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Remove the ancient ASN1_METHOD code. This was only ever used in one
+     place for the (very old) "NETSCAPE" format certificates which are now
+     handled using new ASN1 code equivalents.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Let the TLSv1_method() etc. functions return a 'const' SSL_METHOD
+     pointer and make the SSL_METHOD parameter in SSL_CTX_new,
+     SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version and SSL_set_ssl_method 'const'.
+     [Nils Larsch]
+
+  *) Modify CRL distribution points extension code to print out previously
+     unsupported fields. Enhance extension setting code to allow setting of
+     all fields.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add print and set support for Issuing Distribution Point CRL extension.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Change 'Configure' script to enable Camellia by default.
+     [NTT]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8m and 0.9.8n [24 Mar 2010]
+
+  *) When rejecting SSL/TLS records due to an incorrect version number, never
+     update s->server with a new major version number.  As of
+     - OpenSSL 0.9.8m if 'short' is a 16-bit type,
+     - OpenSSL 0.9.8f if 'short' is longer than 16 bits,
+     the previous behavior could result in a read attempt at NULL when
+     receiving specific incorrect SSL/TLS records once record payload
+     protection is active.  (CVE-2010-0740)
+     [Bodo Moeller, Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org>]
+
+  *) Fix for CVE-2010-0433 where some kerberos enabled versions of OpenSSL 
+     could be crashed if the relevant tables were not present (e.g. chrooted).
+     [Tomas Hoger <thoger@redhat.com>]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8l and 0.9.8m [25 Feb 2010]
+
+  *) Always check bn_wexpend() return values for failure.  (CVE-2009-3245)
+     [Martin Olsson, Neel Mehta]
+
+  *) Fix X509_STORE locking: Every 'objs' access requires a lock (to
+     accommodate for stack sorting, always a write lock!).
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) On some versions of WIN32 Heap32Next is very slow. This can cause
+     excessive delays in the RAND_poll(): over a minute. As a workaround
+     include a time check in the inner Heap32Next loop too.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) The code that handled flushing of data in SSL/TLS originally used the
+     BIO_CTRL_INFO ctrl to see if any data was pending first. This caused
+     the problem outlined in PR#1949. The fix suggested there however can
+     trigger problems with buggy BIO_CTRL_WPENDING (e.g. some versions
+     of Apache). So instead simplify the code to flush unconditionally.
+     This should be fine since flushing with no data to flush is a no op.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Handle TLS versions 2.0 and later properly and correctly use the
+     highest version of TLS/SSL supported. Although TLS >= 2.0 is some way
+     off ancient servers have a habit of sticking around for a while...
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Modify compression code so it frees up structures without using the
+     ex_data callbacks. This works around a problem where some applications
+     call CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data() before application exit (e.g. when
+     restarting) then use compression (e.g. SSL with compression) later.
+     This results in significant per-connection memory leaks and
+     has caused some security issues including CVE-2008-1678 and
+     CVE-2009-4355.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Constify crypto/cast (i.e., <openssl/cast.h>): a CAST_KEY doesn't
+     change when encrypting or decrypting.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Add option SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT which will allow clients to
+     connect and renegotiate with servers which do not support RI.
+     Until RI is more widely deployed this option is enabled by default.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add "missing" ssl ctrls to clear options and mode.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) If client attempts to renegotiate and doesn't support RI respond with
+     a no_renegotiation alert as required by RFC5746.  Some renegotiating
+     TLS clients will continue a connection gracefully when they receive
+     the alert. Unfortunately OpenSSL mishandled this alert and would hang
+     waiting for a server hello which it will never receive. Now we treat a
+     received no_renegotiation alert as a fatal error. This is because
+     applications requesting a renegotiation might well expect it to succeed
+     and would have no code in place to handle the server denying it so the
+     only safe thing to do is to terminate the connection.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add ctrl macro SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support() which returns 1 if
+     peer supports secure renegotiation and 0 otherwise. Print out peer
+     renegotiation support in s_client/s_server.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Replace the highly broken and deprecated SPKAC certification method with
+     the updated NID creation version. This should correctly handle UTF8.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Implement RFC5746. Re-enable renegotiation but require the extension
+     as needed. Unfortunately, SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
+     turns out to be a bad idea. It has been replaced by
+     SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION which can be set with
+     SSL_CTX_set_options(). This is really not recommended unless you
+     know what you are doing.
+     [Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com>, Ben Laurie, Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fixes to stateless session resumption handling. Use initial_ctx when
+     issuing and attempting to decrypt tickets in case it has changed during
+     servername handling. Use a non-zero length session ID when attempting
+     stateless session resumption: this makes it possible to determine if
+     a resumption has occurred immediately after receiving server hello
+     (several places in OpenSSL subtly assume this) instead of later in
+     the handshake.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) The functions ENGINE_ctrl(), OPENSSL_isservice(),
+     CMS_get1_RecipientRequest() and RAND_bytes() can return <=0 on error
+     fixes for a few places where the return code is not checked
+     correctly.
+     [Julia Lawall <julia@diku.dk>]
+
+  *) Add --strict-warnings option to Configure script to include devteam
+     warnings in other configurations.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add support for --libdir option and LIBDIR variable in makefiles. This
+     makes it possible to install openssl libraries in locations which
+     have names other than "lib", for example "/usr/lib64" which some
+     systems need.
+     [Steve Henson, based on patch from Jeremy Utley]
+
+  *) Don't allow the use of leading 0x80 in OIDs. This is a violation of
+     X690 8.9.12 and can produce some misleading textual output of OIDs.
+     [Steve Henson, reported by Dan Kaminsky]
+
+  *) Delete MD2 from algorithm tables. This follows the recommendation in
+     several standards that it is not used in new applications due to
+     several cryptographic weaknesses. For binary compatibility reasons
+     the MD2 API is still compiled in by default.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add compression id to {d2i,i2d}_SSL_SESSION so it is correctly saved
+     and restored.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Rename uni2asc and asc2uni functions to OPENSSL_uni2asc and
+     OPENSSL_asc2uni conditionally on Netware platforms to avoid a name
+     clash.
+     [Guenter <lists@gknw.net>]
+
+  *) Fix the server certificate chain building code to use X509_verify_cert(),
+     it used to have an ad-hoc builder which was unable to cope with anything
+     other than a simple chain.
+     [David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>, Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Don't check self signed certificate signatures in X509_verify_cert()
+     by default (a flag can override this): it just wastes time without
+     adding any security. As a useful side effect self signed root CAs
+     with non-FIPS digests are now usable in FIPS mode.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) In dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message() the check if the current message
+     is already buffered was missing. For every new message was memory
+     allocated, allowing an attacker to perform an denial of service attack
+     with sending out of seq handshake messages until there is no memory
+     left. Additionally every future messege was buffered, even if the
+     sequence number made no sense and would be part of another handshake.
+     So only messages with sequence numbers less than 10 in advance will be
+     buffered.  (CVE-2009-1378)
+     [Robin Seggelmann, discovered by Daniel Mentz] 	
+
+  *) Records are buffered if they arrive with a future epoch to be
+     processed after finishing the corresponding handshake. There is
+     currently no limitation to this buffer allowing an attacker to perform
+     a DOS attack with sending records with future epochs until there is no
+     memory left. This patch adds the pqueue_size() function to determine
+     the size of a buffer and limits the record buffer to 100 entries.
+     (CVE-2009-1377)
+     [Robin Seggelmann, discovered by Daniel Mentz] 	
+
+  *) Keep a copy of frag->msg_header.frag_len so it can be used after the
+     parent structure is freed.  (CVE-2009-1379)
+     [Daniel Mentz] 	
+
+  *) Handle non-blocking I/O properly in SSL_shutdown() call.
+     [Darryl Miles <darryl-mailinglists@netbauds.net>]
+
+  *) Add 2.5.4.* OIDs
+     [Ilya O. <vrghost@gmail.com>]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8k and 0.9.8l  [5 Nov 2009]
+
+  *) Disable renegotiation completely - this fixes a severe security
+     problem (CVE-2009-3555) at the cost of breaking all
+     renegotiation. Renegotiation can be re-enabled by setting
+     SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION in s3->flags at
+     run-time. This is really not recommended unless you know what
+     you're doing.
+     [Ben Laurie]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8j and 0.9.8k  [25 Mar 2009]
+
+  *) Don't set val to NULL when freeing up structures, it is freed up by
+     underlying code. If sizeof(void *) > sizeof(long) this can result in
+     zeroing past the valid field. (CVE-2009-0789)
+     [Paolo Ganci <Paolo.Ganci@AdNovum.CH>]
+
+  *) Fix bug where return value of CMS_SignerInfo_verify_content() was not
+     checked correctly. This would allow some invalid signed attributes to
+     appear to verify correctly. (CVE-2009-0591)
+     [Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode@us.ibm.com>]
+
+  *) Reject UniversalString and BMPString types with invalid lengths. This
+     prevents a crash in ASN1_STRING_print_ex() which assumes the strings have
+     a legal length. (CVE-2009-0590)
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Set S/MIME signing as the default purpose rather than setting it 
+     unconditionally. This allows applications to override it at the store
+     level.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Permit restricted recursion of ASN1 strings. This is needed in practice
+     to handle some structures.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Improve efficiency of mem_gets: don't search whole buffer each time
+     for a '\n'
+     [Jeremy Shapiro <jnshapir@us.ibm.com>]
+
+  *) New -hex option for openssl rand.
+     [Matthieu Herrb]
+
+  *) Print out UTF8String and NumericString when parsing ASN1.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Support NumericString type for name components.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Allow CC in the environment to override the automatically chosen
+     compiler. Note that nothing is done to ensure flags work with the
+     chosen compiler.
+     [Ben Laurie]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8i and 0.9.8j  [07 Jan 2009]
+
+  *) Properly check EVP_VerifyFinal() and similar return values
+     (CVE-2008-5077).
+     [Ben Laurie, Bodo Moeller, Google Security Team]
+
+  *) Enable TLS extensions by default.
+     [Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) Allow the CHIL engine to be loaded, whether the application is
+     multithreaded or not. (This does not release the developer from the
+     obligation to set up the dynamic locking callbacks.)
+     [Sander Temme <sander@temme.net>]
+
+  *) Use correct exit code if there is an error in dgst command.
+     [Steve Henson; problem pointed out by Roland Dirlewanger]
+
+  *) Tweak Configure so that you need to say "experimental-jpake" to enable
+     JPAKE, and need to use -DOPENSSL_EXPERIMENTAL_JPAKE in applications.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Add experimental JPAKE support, including demo authentication in
+     s_client and s_server.
+     [Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) Set the comparison function in v3_addr_canonize().
+     [Rob Austein <sra@hactrn.net>]
+
+  *) Add support for XMPP STARTTLS in s_client.
+     [Philip Paeps <philip@freebsd.org>]
+
+  *) Change the server-side SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG behavior
+     to ensure that even with this option, only ciphersuites in the
+     server's preference list will be accepted.  (Note that the option
+     applies only when resuming a session, so the earlier behavior was
+     just about the algorithm choice for symmetric cryptography.)
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8h and 0.9.8i  [15 Sep 2008]
+
+  *) Fix NULL pointer dereference if a DTLS server received
+     ChangeCipherSpec as first record (CVE-2009-1386).
+     [PR #1679]
+
+  *) Fix a state transition in s3_srvr.c and d1_srvr.c
+     (was using SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B, should be ..._ST_SW_SRVR_...).
+     [Nagendra Modadugu]
+
+  *) The fix in 0.9.8c that supposedly got rid of unsafe
+     double-checked locking was incomplete for RSA blinding,
+     addressing just one layer of what turns out to have been
+     doubly unsafe triple-checked locking.
+
+     So now fix this for real by retiring the MONT_HELPER macro
+     in crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c.
+
+     [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Marius Schilder]
+
+  *) Various precautionary measures:
+
+     - Avoid size_t integer overflow in HASH_UPDATE (md32_common.h).
+
+     - Avoid a buffer overflow in d2i_SSL_SESSION() (ssl_asn1.c).
+       (NB: This would require knowledge of the secret session ticket key
+       to exploit, in which case you'd be SOL either way.)
+
+     - Change bn_nist.c so that it will properly handle input BIGNUMs
+       outside the expected range.
+
+     - Enforce the 'num' check in BN_div() (bn_div.c) for non-BN_DEBUG
+       builds.
+
+     [Neel Mehta, Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Allow engines to be "soft loaded" - i.e. optionally don't die if
+     the load fails. Useful for distros.
+     [Ben Laurie and the FreeBSD team]
+
+  *) Add support for Local Machine Keyset attribute in PKCS#12 files.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix BN_GF2m_mod_arr() top-bit cleanup code.
+     [Huang Ying]
+
+  *) Expand ENGINE to support engine supplied SSL client certificate functions.
+
+     This work was sponsored by Logica.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add CryptoAPI ENGINE to support use of RSA and DSA keys held in Windows
+     keystores. Support for SSL/TLS client authentication too.
+     Not compiled unless enable-capieng specified to Configure.
+
+     This work was sponsored by Logica.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix bug in X509_ATTRIBUTE creation: don't set attribute using
+     ASN1_TYPE_set1 if MBSTRING flag set. This bug would crash certain
+     attribute creation routines such as certificate requests and PKCS#12
+     files.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8g and 0.9.8h  [28 May 2008]
+
+  *) Fix flaw if 'Server Key exchange message' is omitted from a TLS
+     handshake which could lead to a cilent crash as found using the
+     Codenomicon TLS test suite (CVE-2008-1672) 
+     [Steve Henson, Mark Cox]
+
+  *) Fix double free in TLS server name extensions which could lead to
+     a remote crash found by Codenomicon TLS test suite (CVE-2008-0891) 
+     [Joe Orton]
+
+  *) Clear error queue in SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file()
+
+     Clear the error queue to ensure that error entries left from
+     older function calls do not interfere with the correct operation.
+     [Lutz Jaenicke, Erik de Castro Lopo]
+
+  *) Remove root CA certificates of commercial CAs:
+
+     The OpenSSL project does not recommend any specific CA and does not
+     have any policy with respect to including or excluding any CA.
+     Therefore it does not make any sense to ship an arbitrary selection
+     of root CA certificates with the OpenSSL software.
+     [Lutz Jaenicke]
+
+  *) RSA OAEP patches to fix two separate invalid memory reads.
+     The first one involves inputs when 'lzero' is greater than
+     'SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH' (it would read about SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH bytes
+     before the beginning of from). The second one involves inputs where
+     the 'db' section contains nothing but zeroes (there is a one-byte
+     invalid read after the end of 'db').
+     [Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode@us.ibm.com>]
+
+  *) Partial backport from 0.9.9-dev:
+
+     Introduce bn_mul_mont (dedicated Montgomery multiplication
+     procedure) as a candidate for BIGNUM assembler implementation.
+     While 0.9.9-dev uses assembler for various architectures, only
+     x86_64 is available by default here in the 0.9.8 branch, and
+     32-bit x86 is available through a compile-time setting.
+
+     To try the 32-bit x86 assembler implementation, use Configure
+     option "enable-montasm" (which exists only for this backport).
+
+     As "enable-montasm" for 32-bit x86 disclaims code stability
+     anyway, in this constellation we activate additional code
+     backported from 0.9.9-dev for further performance improvements,
+     namely BN_from_montgomery_word.  (To enable this otherwise,
+     e.g. x86_64, try "-DMONT_FROM_WORD___NON_DEFAULT_0_9_8_BUILD".)
+
+     [Andy Polyakov (backport partially by Bodo Moeller)]
+
+  *) Add TLS session ticket callback. This allows an application to set
+     TLS ticket cipher and HMAC keys rather than relying on hardcoded fixed
+     values. This is useful for key rollover for example where several key
+     sets may exist with different names.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Reverse ENGINE-internal logic for caching default ENGINE handles.
+     This was broken until now in 0.9.8 releases, such that the only way
+     a registered ENGINE could be used (assuming it initialises
+     successfully on the host) was to explicitly set it as the default
+     for the relevant algorithms. This is in contradiction with 0.9.7
+     behaviour and the documentation. With this fix, when an ENGINE is
+     registered into a given algorithm's table of implementations, the
+     'uptodate' flag is reset so that auto-discovery will be used next
+     time a new context for that algorithm attempts to select an
+     implementation.
+     [Ian Lister (tweaked by Geoff Thorpe)]
+
+  *) Backport of CMS code to OpenSSL 0.9.8. This differs from the 0.9.9
+     implementation in the following ways:
+
+     Lack of EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD means algorithm parameters have to be
+     hard coded.
+
+     Lack of BER streaming support means one pass streaming processing is
+     only supported if data is detached: setting the streaming flag is
+     ignored for embedded content.
+
+     CMS support is disabled by default and must be explicitly enabled
+     with the enable-cms configuration option.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Update the GMP engine glue to do direct copies between BIGNUM and
+     mpz_t when openssl and GMP use the same limb size. Otherwise the
+     existing "conversion via a text string export" trick is still used.
+     [Paul Sheer <paulsheer@gmail.com>]
+
+  *) Zlib compression BIO. This is a filter BIO which compressed and
+     uncompresses any data passed through it.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add AES_wrap_key() and AES_unwrap_key() functions to implement
+     RFC3394 compatible AES key wrapping.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add utility functions to handle ASN1 structures. ASN1_STRING_set0():
+     sets string data without copying. X509_ALGOR_set0() and
+     X509_ALGOR_get0(): set and retrieve X509_ALGOR (AlgorithmIdentifier)
+     data. Attribute function X509at_get0_data_by_OBJ(): retrieves data
+     from an X509_ATTRIBUTE structure optionally checking it occurs only
+     once. ASN1_TYPE_set1(): set and ASN1_TYPE structure copying supplied
+     data.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix BN flag handling in RSA_eay_mod_exp() and BN_MONT_CTX_set()
+     to get the expected BN_FLG_CONSTTIME behavior.
+     [Bodo Moeller (Google)]
+  
+  *) Netware support:
+
+     - fixed wrong usage of ioctlsocket() when build for LIBC BSD sockets
+     - fixed do_tests.pl to run the test suite with CLIB builds too (CLIB_OPT)
+     - added some more tests to do_tests.pl
+     - fixed RunningProcess usage so that it works with newer LIBC NDKs too
+     - removed usage of BN_LLONG for CLIB builds to avoid runtime dependency
+     - added new Configure targets netware-clib-bsdsock, netware-clib-gcc,
+       netware-clib-bsdsock-gcc, netware-libc-bsdsock-gcc
+     - various changes to netware.pl to enable gcc-cross builds on Win32
+       platform
+     - changed crypto/bio/b_sock.c to work with macro functions (CLIB BSD)
+     - various changes to fix missing prototype warnings
+     - fixed x86nasm.pl to create correct asm files for NASM COFF output
+     - added AES, WHIRLPOOL and CPUID assembler code to build files
+     - added missing AES assembler make rules to mk1mf.pl
+     - fixed order of includes in apps/ocsp.c so that e_os.h settings apply
+     [Guenter Knauf <eflash@gmx.net>]
+
+  *) Implement certificate status request TLS extension defined in RFC3546.
+     A client can set the appropriate parameters and receive the encoded
+     OCSP response via a callback. A server can query the supplied parameters
+     and set the encoded OCSP response in the callback. Add simplified examples
+     to s_client and s_server.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8f and 0.9.8g  [19 Oct 2007]
+
+  *) Fix various bugs:
+     + Binary incompatibility of ssl_ctx_st structure
+     + DTLS interoperation with non-compliant servers
+     + Don't call get_session_cb() without proposed session
+     + Fix ia64 assembler code
+     [Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8e and 0.9.8f  [11 Oct 2007]
+
+  *) DTLS Handshake overhaul. There were longstanding issues with
+     OpenSSL DTLS implementation, which were making it impossible for
+     RFC 4347 compliant client to communicate with OpenSSL server.
+     Unfortunately just fixing these incompatibilities would "cut off"
+     pre-0.9.8f clients. To allow for hassle free upgrade post-0.9.8e
+     server keeps tolerating non RFC compliant syntax. The opposite is
+     not true, 0.9.8f client can not communicate with earlier server.
+     This update even addresses CVE-2007-4995.
+     [Andy Polyakov]
+
+  *) Changes to avoid need for function casts in OpenSSL: some compilers
+     (gcc 4.2 and later) reject their use.
+     [Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>, Peter Hartley <pdh@utter.chaos.org.uk>,
+      Steve Henson]
+  
+  *) Add RFC4507 support to OpenSSL. This includes the corrections in
+     RFC4507bis. The encrypted ticket format is an encrypted encoded
+     SSL_SESSION structure, that way new session features are automatically
+     supported.
+
+     If a client application caches session in an SSL_SESSION structure
+     support is transparent because tickets are now stored in the encoded
+     SSL_SESSION.
+     
+     The SSL_CTX structure automatically generates keys for ticket
+     protection in servers so again support should be possible
+     with no application modification.
+
+     If a client or server wishes to disable RFC4507 support then the option
+     SSL_OP_NO_TICKET can be set.
+
+     Add a TLS extension debugging callback to allow the contents of any client
+     or server extensions to be examined.
+
+     This work was sponsored by Google.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add initial support for TLS extensions, specifically for the server_name
+     extension so far.  The SSL_SESSION, SSL_CTX, and SSL data structures now
+     have new members for a host name.  The SSL data structure has an
+     additional member SSL_CTX *initial_ctx so that new sessions can be
+     stored in that context to allow for session resumption, even after the
+     SSL has been switched to a new SSL_CTX in reaction to a client's
+     server_name extension.
+
+     New functions (subject to change):
+
+         SSL_get_servername()
+         SSL_get_servername_type()
+         SSL_set_SSL_CTX()
+
+     New CTRL codes and macros (subject to change):
+
+         SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_CB
+                                 - SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback()
+         SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_ARG
+                                      - SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg()
+         SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME           - SSL_set_tlsext_host_name()
+
+     openssl s_client has a new '-servername ...' option.
+
+     openssl s_server has new options '-servername_host ...', '-cert2 ...',
+     '-key2 ...', '-servername_fatal' (subject to change).  This allows
+     testing the HostName extension for a specific single host name ('-cert'
+     and '-key' remain fallbacks for handshakes without HostName
+     negotiation).  If the unrecognized_name alert has to be sent, this by
+     default is a warning; it becomes fatal with the '-servername_fatal'
+     option.
+
+     [Peter Sylvester,  Remy Allais, Christophe Renou, Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add AES and SSE2 assembly language support to VC++ build.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Mitigate attack on final subtraction in Montgomery reduction.
+     [Andy Polyakov]
+
+  *) Fix crypto/ec/ec_mult.c to work properly with scalars of value 0
+     (which previously caused an internal error).
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Squeeze another 10% out of IGE mode when in != out.
+     [Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) AES IGE mode speedup.
+     [Dean Gaudet (Google)]
+
+  *) Add the Korean symmetric 128-bit cipher SEED (see
+     http://www.kisa.or.kr/kisa/seed/jsp/seed_eng.jsp) and
+     add SEED ciphersuites from RFC 4162:
+
+        TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA      =  "SEED-SHA"
+        TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA  =  "DHE-DSS-SEED-SHA"
+        TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA  =  "DHE-RSA-SEED-SHA"
+        TLS_DH_anon_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA  =  "ADH-SEED-SHA"
+
+     To minimize changes between patchlevels in the OpenSSL 0.9.8
+     series, SEED remains excluded from compilation unless OpenSSL
+     is configured with 'enable-seed'.
+     [KISA, Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Mitigate branch prediction attacks, which can be practical if a
+     single processor is shared, allowing a spy process to extract
+     information.  For detailed background information, see
+     http://eprint.iacr.org/2007/039 (O. Aciicmez, S. Gueron,
+     J.-P. Seifert, "New Branch Prediction Vulnerabilities in OpenSSL
+     and Necessary Software Countermeasures").  The core of the change
+     are new versions BN_div_no_branch() and
+     BN_mod_inverse_no_branch() of BN_div() and BN_mod_inverse(),
+     respectively, which are slower, but avoid the security-relevant
+     conditional branches.  These are automatically called by BN_div()
+     and BN_mod_inverse() if the flag BN_FLG_CONSTTIME is set for one
+     of the input BIGNUMs.  Also, BN_is_bit_set() has been changed to
+     remove a conditional branch.
+
+     BN_FLG_CONSTTIME is the new name for the previous
+     BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME flag, since it now affects more than just
+     modular exponentiation.  (Since OpenSSL 0.9.7h, setting this flag
+     in the exponent causes BN_mod_exp_mont() to use the alternative
+     implementation in BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime().)  The old name
+     remains as a deprecated alias.
+
+     Similarly, RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME is replaced by a more general
+     RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME flag since the RSA implementation now uses
+     constant-time implementations for more than just exponentiation.
+     Here too the old name is kept as a deprecated alias.
+
+     BN_BLINDING_new() will now use BN_dup() for the modulus so that
+     the BN_BLINDING structure gets an independent copy of the
+     modulus.  This means that the previous "BIGNUM *m" argument to
+     BN_BLINDING_new() and to BN_BLINDING_create_param() now
+     essentially becomes "const BIGNUM *m", although we can't actually
+     change this in the header file before 0.9.9.  It allows
+     RSA_setup_blinding() to use BN_with_flags() on the modulus to
+     enable BN_FLG_CONSTTIME.
+
+     [Matthew D Wood (Intel Corp)]
+
+  *) In the SSL/TLS server implementation, be strict about session ID
+     context matching (which matters if an application uses a single
+     external cache for different purposes).  Previously,
+     out-of-context reuse was forbidden only if SSL_VERIFY_PEER was
+     set.  This did ensure strict client verification, but meant that,
+     with applications using a single external cache for quite
+     different requirements, clients could circumvent ciphersuite
+     restrictions for a given session ID context by starting a session
+     in a different context.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Include "!eNULL" in SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST to make sure that
+     a ciphersuite string such as "DEFAULT:RSA" cannot enable
+     authentication-only ciphersuites.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Update the SSL_get_shared_ciphers() fix CVE-2006-3738 which was
+     not complete and could lead to a possible single byte overflow
+     (CVE-2007-5135) [Ben Laurie]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8d and 0.9.8e  [23 Feb 2007]
+
+  *) Since AES128 and AES256 (and similarly Camellia128 and
+     Camellia256) share a single mask bit in the logic of
+     ssl/ssl_ciph.c, the code for masking out disabled ciphers needs a
+     kludge to work properly if AES128 is available and AES256 isn't
+     (or if Camellia128 is available and Camellia256 isn't).
+     [Victor Duchovni]
+
+  *) Fix the BIT STRING encoding generated by crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c
+     (within i2d_ECPrivateKey, i2d_ECPKParameters, i2d_ECParameters):
+     When a point or a seed is encoded in a BIT STRING, we need to
+     prevent the removal of trailing zero bits to get the proper DER
+     encoding.  (By default, crypto/asn1/a_bitstr.c assumes the case
+     of a NamedBitList, for which trailing 0 bits need to be removed.)
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Have SSL/TLS server implementation tolerate "mismatched" record
+     protocol version while receiving ClientHello even if the
+     ClientHello is fragmented.  (The server can't insist on the
+     particular protocol version it has chosen before the ServerHello
+     message has informed the client about his choice.)
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Add RFC 3779 support.
+     [Rob Austein for ARIN, Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) Load error codes if they are not already present instead of using a
+     static variable. This allows them to be cleanly unloaded and reloaded.
+     Improve header file function name parsing.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) extend SMTP and IMAP protocol emulation in s_client to use EHLO
+     or CAPABILITY handshake as required by RFCs.
+     [Goetz Babin-Ebell]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8c and 0.9.8d  [28 Sep 2006]
+
+  *) Introduce limits to prevent malicious keys being able to
+     cause a denial of service.  (CVE-2006-2940)
+     [Steve Henson, Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Fix ASN.1 parsing of certain invalid structures that can result
+     in a denial of service.  (CVE-2006-2937)  [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix buffer overflow in SSL_get_shared_ciphers() function. 
+     (CVE-2006-3738) [Tavis Ormandy and Will Drewry, Google Security Team]
+
+  *) Fix SSL client code which could crash if connecting to a
+     malicious SSLv2 server.  (CVE-2006-4343)
+     [Tavis Ormandy and Will Drewry, Google Security Team]
+
+  *) Since 0.9.8b, ciphersuite strings naming explicit ciphersuites
+     match only those.  Before that, "AES256-SHA" would be interpreted
+     as a pattern and match "AES128-SHA" too (since AES128-SHA got
+     the same strength classification in 0.9.7h) as we currently only
+     have a single AES bit in the ciphersuite description bitmap.
+     That change, however, also applied to ciphersuite strings such as
+     "RC4-MD5" that intentionally matched multiple ciphersuites --
+     namely, SSL 2.0 ciphersuites in addition to the more common ones
+     from SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0.
+
+     So we change the selection algorithm again: Naming an explicit
+     ciphersuite selects this one ciphersuite, and any other similar
+     ciphersuite (same bitmap) from *other* protocol versions.
+     Thus, "RC4-MD5" again will properly select both the SSL 2.0
+     ciphersuite and the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 ciphersuite.
+
+     Since SSL 2.0 does not have any ciphersuites for which the
+     128/256 bit distinction would be relevant, this works for now.
+     The proper fix will be to use different bits for AES128 and
+     AES256, which would have avoided the problems from the beginning;
+     however, bits are scarce, so we can only do this in a new release
+     (not just a patchlevel) when we can change the SSL_CIPHER
+     definition to split the single 'unsigned long mask' bitmap into
+     multiple values to extend the available space.
+
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8b and 0.9.8c  [05 Sep 2006]
+
+  *) Avoid PKCS #1 v1.5 signature attack discovered by Daniel Bleichenbacher
+     (CVE-2006-4339)  [Ben Laurie and Google Security Team]
+
+  *) Add AES IGE and biIGE modes.
+     [Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) Change the Unix randomness entropy gathering to use poll() when
+     possible instead of select(), since the latter has some
+     undesirable limitations.
+     [Darryl Miles via Richard Levitte and Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Disable "ECCdraft" ciphersuites more thoroughly.  Now special
+     treatment in ssl/ssl_ciph.s makes sure that these ciphersuites
+     cannot be implicitly activated as part of, e.g., the "AES" alias.
+     However, please upgrade to OpenSSL 0.9.9[-dev] for
+     non-experimental use of the ECC ciphersuites to get TLS extension
+     support, which is required for curve and point format negotiation
+     to avoid potential handshake problems.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Disable rogue ciphersuites:
+
+      - SSLv2 0x08 0x00 0x80 ("RC4-64-MD5")
+      - SSLv3/TLSv1 0x00 0x61 ("EXP1024-RC2-CBC-MD5")
+      - SSLv3/TLSv1 0x00 0x60 ("EXP1024-RC4-MD5")
+
+     The latter two were purportedly from
+     draft-ietf-tls-56-bit-ciphersuites-0[01].txt, but do not really
+     appear there.
+
+     Also deactivate the remaining ciphersuites from
+     draft-ietf-tls-56-bit-ciphersuites-01.txt.  These are just as
+     unofficial, and the ID has long expired.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Fix RSA blinding Heisenbug (problems sometimes occurred on
+     dual-core machines) and other potential thread-safety issues.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Add the symmetric cipher Camellia (128-bit, 192-bit, 256-bit key
+     versions), which is now available for royalty-free use
+     (see http://info.isl.ntt.co.jp/crypt/eng/info/chiteki.html).
+     Also, add Camellia TLS ciphersuites from RFC 4132.
+
+     To minimize changes between patchlevels in the OpenSSL 0.9.8
+     series, Camellia remains excluded from compilation unless OpenSSL
+     is configured with 'enable-camellia'.
+     [NTT]
+
+  *) Disable the padding bug check when compression is in use. The padding
+     bug check assumes the first packet is of even length, this is not
+     necessarily true if compresssion is enabled and can result in false
+     positives causing handshake failure. The actual bug test is ancient
+     code so it is hoped that implementations will either have fixed it by
+     now or any which still have the bug do not support compression.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8a and 0.9.8b  [04 May 2006]
+
+  *) When applying a cipher rule check to see if string match is an explicit
+     cipher suite and only match that one cipher suite if it is.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Link in manifests for VC++ if needed.
+     [Austin Ziegler <halostatue@gmail.com>]
+
+  *) Update support for ECC-based TLS ciphersuites according to
+     draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt with proposed changes (but without
+     TLS extensions, which are supported starting with the 0.9.9
+     branch, not in the OpenSSL 0.9.8 branch).
+     [Douglas Stebila]
+
+  *) New functions EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new() and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free() to support
+     opaque EVP_CIPHER_CTX handling.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fixes and enhancements to zlib compression code. We now only use
+     "zlib1.dll" and use the default __cdecl calling convention on Win32
+     to conform with the standards mentioned here:
+           http://www.zlib.net/DLL_FAQ.txt
+     Static zlib linking now works on Windows and the new --with-zlib-include
+     --with-zlib-lib options to Configure can be used to supply the location
+     of the headers and library. Gracefully handle case where zlib library
+     can't be loaded.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Several fixes and enhancements to the OID generation code. The old code
+     sometimes allowed invalid OIDs (1.X for X >= 40 for example), couldn't
+     handle numbers larger than ULONG_MAX, truncated printing and had a
+     non standard OBJ_obj2txt() behaviour.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add support for building of engines under engine/ as shared libraries
+     under VC++ build system.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Corrected the numerous bugs in the Win32 path splitter in DSO.
+     Hopefully, we will not see any false combination of paths any more.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8 and 0.9.8a  [11 Oct 2005]
+
+  *) Remove the functionality of SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING
+     (part of SSL_OP_ALL).  This option used to disable the
+     countermeasure against man-in-the-middle protocol-version
+     rollback in the SSL 2.0 server implementation, which is a bad
+     idea.  (CVE-2005-2969)
+
+     [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Yutaka Oiwa (Research Center
+     for Information Security, National Institute of Advanced Industrial
+     Science and Technology [AIST], Japan)]
+
+  *) Add two function to clear and return the verify parameter flags.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Keep cipherlists sorted in the source instead of sorting them at
+     runtime, thus removing the need for a lock.
+     [Nils Larsch]
+
+  *) Avoid some small subgroup attacks in Diffie-Hellman.
+     [Nick Mathewson and Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) Add functions for well-known primes.
+     [Nick Mathewson]
+
+  *) Extended Windows CE support.
+     [Satoshi Nakamura and Andy Polyakov]
+
+  *) Initialize SSL_METHOD structures at compile time instead of during
+     runtime, thus removing the need for a lock.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Make PKCS7_decrypt() work even if no certificate is supplied by
+     attempting to decrypt each encrypted key in turn. Add support to
+     smime utility.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.7h and 0.9.8  [05 Jul 2005]
+
+  [NB: OpenSSL 0.9.7i and later 0.9.7 patch levels were released after
+  OpenSSL 0.9.8.]
+
+  *) Add libcrypto.pc and libssl.pc for those who feel they need them.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Change CA.sh and CA.pl so they don't bundle the CSR and the private
+     key into the same file any more.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Add initial support for Win64, both IA64 and AMD64/x64 flavors.
+     [Andy Polyakov]
+
+  *) Add -utf8 command line and config file option to 'ca'.
+     [Stefan <stf@udoma.org]
+
+  *) Removed the macro des_crypt(), as it seems to conflict with some
+     libraries.  Use DES_crypt().
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Correct naming of the 'chil' and '4758cca' ENGINEs. This
+     involves renaming the source and generated shared-libs for
+     both. The engines will accept the corrected or legacy ids
+     ('ncipher' and '4758_cca' respectively) when binding. NB,
+     this only applies when building 'shared'.
+     [Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com> and Geoff Thorpe]
+
+  *) Add attribute functions to EVP_PKEY structure. Modify
+     PKCS12_create() to recognize a CSP name attribute and
+     use it. Make -CSP option work again in pkcs12 utility.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add new functionality to the bn blinding code:
+     - automatic re-creation of the BN_BLINDING parameters after
+       a fixed number of uses (currently 32)
+     - add new function for parameter creation
+     - introduce flags to control the update behaviour of the
+       BN_BLINDING parameters
+     - hide BN_BLINDING structure
+     Add a second BN_BLINDING slot to the RSA structure to improve
+     performance when a single RSA object is shared among several
+     threads.
+     [Nils Larsch]
+
+  *) Add support for DTLS.
+     [Nagendra Modadugu <nagendra@cs.stanford.edu> and Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) Add support for DER encoded private keys (SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1)
+     to SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file() and SSL_use_PrivateKey_file()
+     [Walter Goulet]
+
+  *) Remove buggy and incomplete DH cert support from
+     ssl/ssl_rsa.c and ssl/s3_both.c
+     [Nils Larsch]
+
+  *) Use SHA-1 instead of MD5 as the default digest algorithm for
+     the apps/openssl applications.
+     [Nils Larsch]
+
+  *) Compile clean with "-Wall -Wmissing-prototypes
+     -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-declarations -Werror". Currently
+     DEBUG_SAFESTACK must also be set.
+     [Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) Change ./Configure so that certain algorithms can be disabled by default.
+     The new counterpiece to "no-xxx" is "enable-xxx".
+
+     The patented RC5 and MDC2 algorithms will now be disabled unless
+     "enable-rc5" and "enable-mdc2", respectively, are specified.
+
+     (IDEA remains enabled despite being patented.  This is because IDEA
+     is frequently required for interoperability, and there is no license
+     fee for non-commercial use.  As before, "no-idea" can be used to
+     avoid this algorithm.)
+
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Add processing of proxy certificates (see RFC 3820).  This work was
+     sponsored by KTH (The Royal Institute of Technology in Stockholm) and
+     EGEE (Enabling Grids for E-science in Europe).
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) RC4 performance overhaul on modern architectures/implementations, such
+     as Intel P4, IA-64 and AMD64.
+     [Andy Polyakov]
+
+  *) New utility extract-section.pl. This can be used specify an alternative
+     section number in a pod file instead of having to treat each file as
+     a separate case in Makefile. This can be done by adding two lines to the
+     pod file:
+
+     =for comment openssl_section:XXX
+
+     The blank line is mandatory.
+
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) New arguments -certform, -keyform and -pass for s_client and s_server
+     to allow alternative format key and certificate files and passphrase
+     sources.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) New structure X509_VERIFY_PARAM which combines current verify parameters,
+     update associated structures and add various utility functions.
+
+     Add new policy related verify parameters, include policy checking in 
+     standard verify code. Enhance 'smime' application with extra parameters
+     to support policy checking and print out.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add a new engine to support VIA PadLock ACE extensions in the VIA C3
+     Nehemiah processors. These extensions support AES encryption in hardware
+     as well as RNG (though RNG support is currently disabled).
+     [Michal Ludvig <michal@logix.cz>, with help from Andy Polyakov]
+
+  *) Deprecate BN_[get|set]_params() functions (they were ignored internally).
+     [Geoff Thorpe]
+
+  *) New FIPS 180-2 algorithms, SHA-224/-256/-384/-512 are implemented.
+     [Andy Polyakov and a number of other people]
+
+  *) Improved PowerPC platform support. Most notably BIGNUM assembler
+     implementation contributed by IBM.
+     [Suresh Chari, Peter Waltenberg, Andy Polyakov]
+
+  *) The new 'RSA_generate_key_ex' function now takes a BIGNUM for the public
+     exponent rather than 'unsigned long'. There is a corresponding change to
+     the new 'rsa_keygen' element of the RSA_METHOD structure.
+     [Jelte Jansen, Geoff Thorpe]
+
+  *) Functionality for creating the initial serial number file is now
+     moved from CA.pl to the 'ca' utility with a new option -create_serial.
+
+     (Before OpenSSL 0.9.7e, CA.pl used to initialize the serial
+     number file to 1, which is bound to cause problems.  To avoid
+     the problems while respecting compatibility between different 0.9.7
+     patchlevels, 0.9.7e  employed 'openssl x509 -next_serial' in
+     CA.pl for serial number initialization.  With the new release 0.9.8,
+     we can fix the problem directly in the 'ca' utility.)
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Reduced header interdepencies by declaring more opaque objects in
+     ossl_typ.h. As a consequence, including some headers (eg. engine.h) will
+     give fewer recursive includes, which could break lazy source code - so
+     this change is covered by the OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED symbol. As always,
+     developers should define this symbol when building and using openssl to
+     ensure they track the recommended behaviour, interfaces, [etc], but
+     backwards-compatible behaviour prevails when this isn't defined.
+     [Geoff Thorpe]
+
+  *) New function X509_POLICY_NODE_print() which prints out policy nodes.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add new EVP function EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key and associated functionality.
+     This will generate a random key of the appropriate length based on the 
+     cipher context. The EVP_CIPHER can provide its own random key generation
+     routine to support keys of a specific form. This is used in the des and 
+     3des routines to generate a key of the correct parity. Update S/MIME
+     code to use new functions and hence generate correct parity DES keys.
+     Add EVP_CHECK_DES_KEY #define to return an error if the key is not 
+     valid (weak or incorrect parity).
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add a local set of CRLs that can be used by X509_verify_cert() as well
+     as looking them up. This is useful when the verified structure may contain
+     CRLs, for example PKCS#7 signedData. Modify PKCS7_verify() to use any CRLs
+     present unless the new PKCS7_NO_CRL flag is asserted.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Extend ASN1 oid configuration module. It now additionally accepts the
+     syntax:
+
+     shortName = some long name, 1.2.3.4
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Reimplemented the BN_CTX implementation. There is now no more static
+     limitation on the number of variables it can handle nor the depth of the
+     "stack" handling for BN_CTX_start()/BN_CTX_end() pairs. The stack
+     information can now expand as required, and rather than having a single
+     static array of bignums, BN_CTX now uses a linked-list of such arrays
+     allowing it to expand on demand whilst maintaining the usefulness of
+     BN_CTX's "bundling".
+     [Geoff Thorpe]
+
+  *) Add a missing BN_CTX parameter to the 'rsa_mod_exp' callback in RSA_METHOD
+     to allow all RSA operations to function using a single BN_CTX.
+     [Geoff Thorpe]
+
+  *) Preliminary support for certificate policy evaluation and checking. This
+     is initially intended to pass the tests outlined in "Conformance Testing
+     of Relying Party Client Certificate Path Processing Logic" v1.07.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) bn_dup_expand() has been deprecated, it was introduced in 0.9.7 and
+     remained unused and not that useful. A variety of other little bignum
+     tweaks and fixes have also been made continuing on from the audit (see
+     below).
+     [Geoff Thorpe]
+
+  *) Constify all or almost all d2i, c2i, s2i and r2i functions, along with
+     associated ASN1, EVP and SSL functions and old ASN1 macros.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) BN_zero() only needs to set 'top' and 'neg' to zero for correct results,
+     and this should never fail. So the return value from the use of
+     BN_set_word() (which can fail due to needless expansion) is now deprecated;
+     if OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED is defined, BN_zero() is a void macro.
+     [Geoff Thorpe]
+
+  *) BN_CTX_get() should return zero-valued bignums, providing the same
+     initialised value as BN_new().
+     [Geoff Thorpe, suggested by Ulf Möller]
+
+  *) Support for inhibitAnyPolicy certificate extension.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) An audit of the BIGNUM code is underway, for which debugging code is
+     enabled when BN_DEBUG is defined. This makes stricter enforcements on what
+     is considered valid when processing BIGNUMs, and causes execution to
+     assert() when a problem is discovered. If BN_DEBUG_RAND is defined,
+     further steps are taken to deliberately pollute unused data in BIGNUM
+     structures to try and expose faulty code further on. For now, openssl will
+     (in its default mode of operation) continue to tolerate the inconsistent
+     forms that it has tolerated in the past, but authors and packagers should
+     consider trying openssl and their own applications when compiled with
+     these debugging symbols defined. It will help highlight potential bugs in
+     their own code, and will improve the test coverage for OpenSSL itself. At
+     some point, these tighter rules will become openssl's default to improve
+     maintainability, though the assert()s and other overheads will remain only
+     in debugging configurations. See bn.h for more details.
+     [Geoff Thorpe, Nils Larsch, Ulf Möller]
+
+  *) BN_CTX_init() has been deprecated, as BN_CTX is an opaque structure
+     that can only be obtained through BN_CTX_new() (which implicitly
+     initialises it). The presence of this function only made it possible
+     to overwrite an existing structure (and cause memory leaks).
+     [Geoff Thorpe]
+
+  *) Because of the callback-based approach for implementing LHASH as a
+     template type, lh_insert() adds opaque objects to hash-tables and
+     lh_doall() or lh_doall_arg() are typically used with a destructor callback
+     to clean up those corresponding objects before destroying the hash table
+     (and losing the object pointers). So some over-zealous constifications in
+     LHASH have been relaxed so that lh_insert() does not take (nor store) the
+     objects as "const" and the lh_doall[_arg] callback wrappers are not
+     prototyped to have "const" restrictions on the object pointers they are
+     given (and so aren't required to cast them away any more).
+     [Geoff Thorpe]
+
+  *) The tmdiff.h API was so ugly and minimal that our own timing utility
+     (speed) prefers to use its own implementation. The two implementations
+     haven't been consolidated as yet (volunteers?) but the tmdiff API has had
+     its object type properly exposed (MS_TM) instead of casting to/from "char
+     *". This may still change yet if someone realises MS_TM and "ms_time_***"
+     aren't necessarily the greatest nomenclatures - but this is what was used
+     internally to the implementation so I've used that for now.
+     [Geoff Thorpe]
+
+  *) Ensure that deprecated functions do not get compiled when
+     OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED is defined. Some "openssl" subcommands and a few of
+     the self-tests were still using deprecated key-generation functions so
+     these have been updated also.
+     [Geoff Thorpe]
+
+  *) Reorganise PKCS#7 code to separate the digest location functionality
+     into PKCS7_find_digest(), digest addition into PKCS7_bio_add_digest().
+     New function PKCS7_set_digest() to set the digest type for PKCS#7
+     digestedData type. Add additional code to correctly generate the
+     digestedData type and add support for this type in PKCS7 initialization
+     functions.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) New function PKCS7_set0_type_other() this initializes a PKCS7 
+     structure of type "other".
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix prime generation loop in crypto/bn/bn_prime.pl by making
+     sure the loop does correctly stop and breaking ("division by zero")
+     modulus operations are not performed. The (pre-generated) prime
+     table crypto/bn/bn_prime.h was already correct, but it could not be
+     re-generated on some platforms because of the "division by zero"
+     situation in the script.
+     [Ralf S. Engelschall]
+
+  *) Update support for ECC-based TLS ciphersuites according to
+     draft-ietf-tls-ecc-03.txt: the KDF1 key derivation function with
+     SHA-1 now is only used for "small" curves (where the
+     representation of a field element takes up to 24 bytes); for
+     larger curves, the field element resulting from ECDH is directly
+     used as premaster secret.
+     [Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)]
+
+  *) Add code for kP+lQ timings to crypto/ec/ectest.c, and add SEC2
+     curve secp160r1 to the tests.
+     [Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)]
+
+  *) Add the possibility to load symbols globally with DSO.
+     [Götz Babin-Ebell <babin-ebell@trustcenter.de> via Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Add the functions ERR_set_mark() and ERR_pop_to_mark() for better
+     control of the error stack.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Add support for STORE in ENGINE.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Add the STORE type.  The intention is to provide a common interface
+     to certificate and key stores, be they simple file-based stores, or
+     HSM-type store, or LDAP stores, or...
+     NOTE: The code is currently UNTESTED and isn't really used anywhere.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Add a generic structure called OPENSSL_ITEM.  This can be used to
+     pass a list of arguments to any function as well as provide a way
+     for a function to pass data back to the caller.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Add the functions BUF_strndup() and BUF_memdup().  BUF_strndup()
+     works like BUF_strdup() but can be used to duplicate a portion of
+     a string.  The copy gets NUL-terminated.  BUF_memdup() duplicates
+     a memory area.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Add the function sk_find_ex() which works like sk_find(), but will
+     return an index to an element even if an exact match couldn't be
+     found.  The index is guaranteed to point at the element where the
+     searched-for key would be inserted to preserve sorting order.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Add the function OBJ_bsearch_ex() which works like OBJ_bsearch() but
+     takes an extra flags argument for optional functionality.  Currently,
+     the following flags are defined:
+
+	OBJ_BSEARCH_VALUE_ON_NOMATCH
+	This one gets OBJ_bsearch_ex() to return a pointer to the first
+	element where the comparing function returns a negative or zero
+	number.
+
+	OBJ_BSEARCH_FIRST_VALUE_ON_MATCH
+	This one gets OBJ_bsearch_ex() to return a pointer to the first
+	element where the comparing function returns zero.  This is useful
+	if there are more than one element where the comparing function
+	returns zero.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Make it possible to create self-signed certificates with 'openssl ca'
+     in such a way that the self-signed certificate becomes part of the
+     CA database and uses the same mechanisms for serial number generation
+     as all other certificate signing.  The new flag '-selfsign' enables
+     this functionality.  Adapt CA.sh and CA.pl.in.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Add functionality to check the public key of a certificate request
+     against a given private.  This is useful to check that a certificate
+     request can be signed by that key (self-signing).
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Make it possible to have multiple active certificates with the same
+     subject in the CA index file.  This is done only if the keyword
+     'unique_subject' is set to 'no' in the main CA section (default
+     if 'CA_default') of the configuration file.  The value is saved
+     with the database itself in a separate index attribute file,
+     named like the index file with '.attr' appended to the name.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Generate muti valued AVAs using '+' notation in config files for
+     req and dirName.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Support for nameConstraints certificate extension.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Support for policyConstraints certificate extension.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Support for policyMappings certificate extension.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Make sure the default DSA_METHOD implementation only uses its
+     dsa_mod_exp() and/or bn_mod_exp() handlers if they are non-NULL,
+     and change its own handlers to be NULL so as to remove unnecessary
+     indirection. This lets alternative implementations fallback to the
+     default implementation more easily.
+     [Geoff Thorpe]
+
+  *) Support for directoryName in GeneralName related extensions
+     in config files.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Make it possible to link applications using Makefile.shared.
+     Make that possible even when linking against static libraries!
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Support for single pass processing for S/MIME signing. This now
+     means that S/MIME signing can be done from a pipe, in addition
+     cleartext signing (multipart/signed type) is effectively streaming
+     and the signed data does not need to be all held in memory.
+
+     This is done with a new flag PKCS7_STREAM. When this flag is set
+     PKCS7_sign() only initializes the PKCS7 structure and the actual signing
+     is done after the data is output (and digests calculated) in
+     SMIME_write_PKCS7().
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add full support for -rpath/-R, both in shared libraries and
+     applications, at least on the platforms where it's known how
+     to do it.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) In crypto/ec/ec_mult.c, implement fast point multiplication with
+     precomputation, based on wNAF splitting: EC_GROUP_precompute_mult()
+     will now compute a table of multiples of the generator that
+     makes subsequent invocations of EC_POINTs_mul() or EC_POINT_mul()
+     faster (notably in the case of a single point multiplication,
+     scalar * generator).
+     [Nils Larsch, Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) IPv6 support for certificate extensions. The various extensions
+     which use the IP:a.b.c.d can now take IPv6 addresses using the
+     formats of RFC1884 2.2 . IPv6 addresses are now also displayed
+     correctly.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Added an ENGINE that implements RSA by performing private key
+     exponentiations with the GMP library. The conversions to and from
+     GMP's mpz_t format aren't optimised nor are any montgomery forms
+     cached, and on x86 it appears OpenSSL's own performance has caught up.
+     However there are likely to be other architectures where GMP could
+     provide a boost. This ENGINE is not built in by default, but it can be
+     specified at Configure time and should be accompanied by the necessary
+     linker additions, eg;
+         ./config -DOPENSSL_USE_GMP -lgmp
+     [Geoff Thorpe]
+
+  *) "openssl engine" will not display ENGINE/DSO load failure errors when
+     testing availability of engines with "-t" - the old behaviour is
+     produced by increasing the feature's verbosity with "-tt".
+     [Geoff Thorpe]
+
+  *) ECDSA routines: under certain error conditions uninitialized BN objects
+     could be freed. Solution: make sure initialization is performed early
+     enough. (Reported and fix supplied by Nils Larsch <nla@trustcenter.de>
+     via PR#459)
+     [Lutz Jaenicke]
+
+  *) Key-generation can now be implemented in RSA_METHOD, DSA_METHOD
+     and DH_METHOD (eg. by ENGINE implementations) to override the normal
+     software implementations. For DSA and DH, parameter generation can
+     also be overridden by providing the appropriate method callbacks.
+     [Geoff Thorpe]
+
+  *) Change the "progress" mechanism used in key-generation and
+     primality testing to functions that take a new BN_GENCB pointer in
+     place of callback/argument pairs. The new API functions have "_ex"
+     postfixes and the older functions are reimplemented as wrappers for
+     the new ones. The OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED symbol can be used to hide
+     declarations of the old functions to help (graceful) attempts to
+     migrate to the new functions. Also, the new key-generation API
+     functions operate on a caller-supplied key-structure and return
+     success/failure rather than returning a key or NULL - this is to
+     help make "keygen" another member function of RSA_METHOD etc.
+
+     Example for using the new callback interface:
+
+          int (*my_callback)(int a, int b, BN_GENCB *cb) = ...;
+          void *my_arg = ...;
+          BN_GENCB my_cb;
+
+          BN_GENCB_set(&my_cb, my_callback, my_arg);
+
+          return BN_is_prime_ex(some_bignum, BN_prime_checks, NULL, &cb);
+          /* For the meaning of a, b in calls to my_callback(), see the
+           * documentation of the function that calls the callback.
+           * cb will point to my_cb; my_arg can be retrieved as cb->arg.
+           * my_callback should return 1 if it wants BN_is_prime_ex()
+           * to continue, or 0 to stop.
+           */
+
+     [Geoff Thorpe]
+
+  *) Change the ZLIB compression method to be stateful, and make it
+     available to TLS with the number defined in 
+     draft-ietf-tls-compression-04.txt.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Add the ASN.1 structures and functions for CertificatePair, which
+     is defined as follows (according to X.509_4thEditionDraftV6.pdf):
+
+     CertificatePair ::= SEQUENCE {
+        forward		[0]	Certificate OPTIONAL,
+        reverse		[1]	Certificate OPTIONAL,
+        -- at least one of the pair shall be present -- }
+
+     Also implement the PEM functions to read and write certificate
+     pairs, and defined the PEM tag as "CERTIFICATE PAIR".
+
+     This needed to be defined, mostly for the sake of the LDAP
+     attribute crossCertificatePair, but may prove useful elsewhere as
+     well.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Make it possible to inhibit symlinking of shared libraries in
+     Makefile.shared, for Cygwin's sake.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Extend the BIGNUM API by creating a function 
+          void BN_set_negative(BIGNUM *a, int neg);
+     and a macro that behave like
+          int  BN_is_negative(const BIGNUM *a);
+
+     to avoid the need to access 'a->neg' directly in applications.
+     [Nils Larsch]
+
+  *) Implement fast modular reduction for pseudo-Mersenne primes
+     used in NIST curves (crypto/bn/bn_nist.c, crypto/ec/ecp_nist.c).
+     EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp() will now automatically use this
+     if applicable.
+     [Nils Larsch <nla@trustcenter.de>]
+
+  *) Add new lock type (CRYPTO_LOCK_BN).
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Change the ENGINE framework to automatically load engines
+     dynamically from specific directories unless they could be
+     found to already be built in or loaded.  Move all the
+     current engines except for the cryptodev one to a new
+     directory engines/.
+     The engines in engines/ are built as shared libraries if
+     the "shared" options was given to ./Configure or ./config.
+     Otherwise, they are inserted in libcrypto.a.
+     /usr/local/ssl/engines is the default directory for dynamic
+     engines, but that can be overridden at configure time through
+     the usual use of --prefix and/or --openssldir, and at run
+     time with the environment variable OPENSSL_ENGINES.
+     [Geoff Thorpe and Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Add Makefile.shared, a helper makefile to build shared
+     libraries.  Adapt Makefile.org.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Add version info to Win32 DLLs.
+     [Peter 'Luna' Runestig" <peter@runestig.com>]
+
+  *) Add new 'medium level' PKCS#12 API. Certificates and keys
+     can be added using this API to created arbitrary PKCS#12
+     files while avoiding the low level API.
+
+     New options to PKCS12_create(), key or cert can be NULL and
+     will then be omitted from the output file. The encryption
+     algorithm NIDs can be set to -1 for no encryption, the mac
+     iteration count can be set to 0 to omit the mac.
+
+     Enhance pkcs12 utility by making the -nokeys and -nocerts
+     options work when creating a PKCS#12 file. New option -nomac
+     to omit the mac, NONE can be set for an encryption algorithm.
+     New code is modified to use the enhanced PKCS12_create()
+     instead of the low level API.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Extend ASN1 encoder to support indefinite length constructed
+     encoding. This can output sequences tags and octet strings in
+     this form. Modify pk7_asn1.c to support indefinite length
+     encoding. This is experimental and needs additional code to
+     be useful, such as an ASN1 bio and some enhanced streaming
+     PKCS#7 code.
+
+     Extend template encode functionality so that tagging is passed
+     down to the template encoder.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Let 'openssl req' fail if an argument to '-newkey' is not
+     recognized instead of using RSA as a default.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Add support for ECC-based ciphersuites from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-01.txt.
+     As these are not official, they are not included in "ALL";
+     the "ECCdraft" ciphersuite group alias can be used to select them.
+     [Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)]
+
+  *) Add ECDH engine support.
+     [Nils Gura and Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)]
+
+  *) Add ECDH in new directory crypto/ecdh/.
+     [Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)]
+
+  *) Let BN_rand_range() abort with an error after 100 iterations
+     without success (which indicates a broken PRNG).
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Change BN_mod_sqrt() so that it verifies that the input value
+     is really the square of the return value.  (Previously,
+     BN_mod_sqrt would show GIGO behaviour.)
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Add named elliptic curves over binary fields from X9.62, SECG,
+     and WAP/WTLS; add OIDs that were still missing.
+
+     [Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila
+     (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)]
+
+  *) Extend the EC library for elliptic curves over binary fields
+     (new files ec2_smpl.c, ec2_smpt.c, ec2_mult.c in crypto/ec/).
+     New EC_METHOD:
+
+          EC_GF2m_simple_method
+
+     New API functions:
+
+          EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m
+          EC_GROUP_set_curve_GF2m
+          EC_GROUP_get_curve_GF2m
+          EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m
+          EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m
+          EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GF2m
+
+     Point compression for binary fields is disabled by default for
+     patent reasons (compile with OPENSSL_EC_BIN_PT_COMP defined to
+     enable it).
+
+     As binary polynomials are represented as BIGNUMs, various members
+     of the EC_GROUP and EC_POINT data structures can be shared
+     between the implementations for prime fields and binary fields;
+     the above ..._GF2m functions (except for EX_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m)
+     are essentially identical to their ..._GFp counterparts.
+     (For simplicity, the '..._GFp' prefix has been dropped from
+     various internal method names.)
+
+     An internal 'field_div' method (similar to 'field_mul' and
+     'field_sqr') has been added; this is used only for binary fields.
+
+     [Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila
+     (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)]
+
+  *) Optionally dispatch EC_POINT_mul(), EC_POINT_precompute_mult()
+     through methods ('mul', 'precompute_mult').
+
+     The generic implementations (now internally called 'ec_wNAF_mul'
+     and 'ec_wNAF_precomputed_mult') remain the default if these
+     methods are undefined.
+
+     [Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila
+     (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)]
+
+  *) New function EC_GROUP_get_degree, which is defined through
+     EC_METHOD.  For curves over prime fields, this returns the bit
+     length of the modulus.
+
+     [Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila
+     (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)]
+
+  *) New functions EC_GROUP_dup, EC_POINT_dup.
+     (These simply call ..._new  and ..._copy).
+
+     [Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila
+     (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)]
+
+  *) Add binary polynomial arithmetic software in crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c.
+     Polynomials are represented as BIGNUMs (where the sign bit is not
+     used) in the following functions [macros]:  
+
+          BN_GF2m_add
+          BN_GF2m_sub             [= BN_GF2m_add]
+          BN_GF2m_mod             [wrapper for BN_GF2m_mod_arr]
+          BN_GF2m_mod_mul         [wrapper for BN_GF2m_mod_mul_arr]
+          BN_GF2m_mod_sqr         [wrapper for BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr]
+          BN_GF2m_mod_inv
+          BN_GF2m_mod_exp         [wrapper for BN_GF2m_mod_exp_arr]
+          BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt        [wrapper for BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt_arr]
+          BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad  [wrapper for BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad_arr]
+          BN_GF2m_cmp             [= BN_ucmp]
+
+     (Note that only the 'mod' functions are actually for fields GF(2^m).
+     BN_GF2m_add() is misnomer, but this is for the sake of consistency.)
+
+     For some functions, an the irreducible polynomial defining a
+     field can be given as an 'unsigned int[]' with strictly
+     decreasing elements giving the indices of those bits that are set;
+     i.e., p[] represents the polynomial
+          f(t) = t^p[0] + t^p[1] + ... + t^p[k]
+     where
+          p[0] > p[1] > ... > p[k] = 0.
+     This applies to the following functions:
+
+          BN_GF2m_mod_arr
+          BN_GF2m_mod_mul_arr
+          BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr
+          BN_GF2m_mod_inv_arr        [wrapper for BN_GF2m_mod_inv]
+          BN_GF2m_mod_div_arr        [wrapper for BN_GF2m_mod_div]
+          BN_GF2m_mod_exp_arr
+          BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt_arr
+          BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad_arr
+          BN_GF2m_poly2arr
+          BN_GF2m_arr2poly
+
+     Conversion can be performed by the following functions:
+
+          BN_GF2m_poly2arr
+          BN_GF2m_arr2poly
+
+     bntest.c has additional tests for binary polynomial arithmetic.
+
+     Two implementations for BN_GF2m_mod_div() are available.
+     The default algorithm simply uses BN_GF2m_mod_inv() and
+     BN_GF2m_mod_mul().  The alternative algorithm is compiled in only
+     if OPENSSL_SUN_GF2M_DIV is defined (patent pending; read the
+     copyright notice in crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c before enabling it).
+
+     [Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila
+     (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)]
+
+  *) Add new error code 'ERR_R_DISABLED' that can be used when some
+     functionality is disabled at compile-time.
+     [Douglas Stebila <douglas.stebila@sun.com>]
+
+  *) Change default behaviour of 'openssl asn1parse' so that more
+     information is visible when viewing, e.g., a certificate:
+
+     Modify asn1_parse2 (crypto/asn1/asn1_par.c) so that in non-'dump'
+     mode the content of non-printable OCTET STRINGs is output in a
+     style similar to INTEGERs, but with '[HEX DUMP]' prepended to
+     avoid the appearance of a printable string.
+     [Nils Larsch <nla@trustcenter.de>]
+
+  *) Add 'asn1_flag' and 'asn1_form' member to EC_GROUP with access
+     functions
+          EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag()
+          EC_GROUP_get_asn1_flag()
+          EC_GROUP_set_point_conversion_form()
+          EC_GROUP_get_point_conversion_form()
+     These control ASN1 encoding details:
+     - Curves (i.e., groups) are encoded explicitly unless asn1_flag
+       has been set to OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE.
+     - Points are encoded in uncompressed form by default; options for
+       asn1_for are as for point2oct, namely
+          POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED
+          POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
+          POINT_CONVERSION_HYBRID
+
+     Also add 'seed' and 'seed_len' members to EC_GROUP with access
+     functions
+          EC_GROUP_set_seed()
+          EC_GROUP_get0_seed()
+          EC_GROUP_get_seed_len()
+     This is used only for ASN1 purposes (so far).
+     [Nils Larsch <nla@trustcenter.de>]
+
+  *) Add 'field_type' member to EC_METHOD, which holds the NID
+     of the appropriate field type OID.  The new function
+     EC_METHOD_get_field_type() returns this value.
+     [Nils Larsch <nla@trustcenter.de>]
+
+  *) Add functions 
+          EC_POINT_point2bn()
+          EC_POINT_bn2point()
+          EC_POINT_point2hex()
+          EC_POINT_hex2point()
+     providing useful interfaces to EC_POINT_point2oct() and
+     EC_POINT_oct2point().
+     [Nils Larsch <nla@trustcenter.de>]
+
+  *) Change internals of the EC library so that the functions
+          EC_GROUP_set_generator()
+          EC_GROUP_get_generator()
+          EC_GROUP_get_order()
+          EC_GROUP_get_cofactor()
+     are implemented directly in crypto/ec/ec_lib.c and not dispatched
+     to methods, which would lead to unnecessary code duplication when
+     adding different types of curves.
+     [Nils Larsch <nla@trustcenter.de> with input by Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Implement compute_wNAF (crypto/ec/ec_mult.c) without BIGNUM
+     arithmetic, and such that modified wNAFs are generated
+     (which avoid length expansion in many cases).
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Add a function EC_GROUP_check_discriminant() (defined via
+     EC_METHOD) that verifies that the curve discriminant is non-zero.
+
+     Add a function EC_GROUP_check() that makes some sanity tests
+     on a EC_GROUP, its generator and order.  This includes
+     EC_GROUP_check_discriminant().
+     [Nils Larsch <nla@trustcenter.de>]
+
+  *) Add ECDSA in new directory crypto/ecdsa/.
+
+     Add applications 'openssl ecparam' and 'openssl ecdsa'
+     (these are based on 'openssl dsaparam' and 'openssl dsa').
+
+     ECDSA support is also included in various other files across the
+     library.  Most notably,
+     - 'openssl req' now has a '-newkey ecdsa:file' option;
+     - EVP_PKCS82PKEY (crypto/evp/evp_pkey.c) now can handle ECDSA;
+     - X509_PUBKEY_get (crypto/asn1/x_pubkey.c) and
+       d2i_PublicKey (crypto/asn1/d2i_pu.c) have been modified to make
+       them suitable for ECDSA where domain parameters must be
+       extracted before the specific public key;
+     - ECDSA engine support has been added.
+     [Nils Larsch <nla@trustcenter.de>]
+
+  *) Include some named elliptic curves, and add OIDs from X9.62,
+     SECG, and WAP/WTLS.  Each curve can be obtained from the new
+     function
+          EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(),
+     and the list of available named curves can be obtained with
+          EC_get_builtin_curves().
+     Also add a 'curve_name' member to EC_GROUP objects, which can be
+     accessed via
+         EC_GROUP_set_curve_name()
+         EC_GROUP_get_curve_name()
+     [Nils Larsch <larsch@trustcenter.de, Bodo Moeller]
+ 
+  *) Remove a few calls to bn_wexpand() in BN_sqr() (the one in there
+     was actually never needed) and in BN_mul().  The removal in BN_mul()
+     required a small change in bn_mul_part_recursive() and the addition
+     of the functions bn_cmp_part_words(), bn_sub_part_words() and
+     bn_add_part_words(), which do the same thing as bn_cmp_words(),
+     bn_sub_words() and bn_add_words() except they take arrays with
+     differing sizes.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.7l and 0.9.7m  [23 Feb 2007]
+
+  *) Cleanse PEM buffers before freeing them since they may contain 
+     sensitive data.
+     [Benjamin Bennett <ben@psc.edu>]
+
+  *) Include "!eNULL" in SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST to make sure that
+     a ciphersuite string such as "DEFAULT:RSA" cannot enable
+     authentication-only ciphersuites.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Since AES128 and AES256 share a single mask bit in the logic of
+     ssl/ssl_ciph.c, the code for masking out disabled ciphers needs a
+     kludge to work properly if AES128 is available and AES256 isn't.
+     [Victor Duchovni]
+
+  *) Expand security boundary to match 1.1.1 module.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Remove redundant features: hash file source, editing of test vectors
+     modify fipsld to use external fips_premain.c signature.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) New perl script mkfipsscr.pl to create shell scripts or batch files to
+     run algorithm test programs.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Make algorithm test programs more tolerant of whitespace.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Have SSL/TLS server implementation tolerate "mismatched" record
+     protocol version while receiving ClientHello even if the
+     ClientHello is fragmented.  (The server can't insist on the
+     particular protocol version it has chosen before the ServerHello
+     message has informed the client about his choice.)
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Load error codes if they are not already present instead of using a
+     static variable. This allows them to be cleanly unloaded and reloaded.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.7k and 0.9.7l  [28 Sep 2006]
+
+  *) Introduce limits to prevent malicious keys being able to
+     cause a denial of service.  (CVE-2006-2940)
+     [Steve Henson, Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Fix ASN.1 parsing of certain invalid structures that can result
+     in a denial of service.  (CVE-2006-2937)  [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix buffer overflow in SSL_get_shared_ciphers() function. 
+     (CVE-2006-3738) [Tavis Ormandy and Will Drewry, Google Security Team]
+
+  *) Fix SSL client code which could crash if connecting to a
+     malicious SSLv2 server.  (CVE-2006-4343)
+     [Tavis Ormandy and Will Drewry, Google Security Team]
+
+  *) Change ciphersuite string processing so that an explicit
+     ciphersuite selects this one ciphersuite (so that "AES256-SHA"
+     will no longer include "AES128-SHA"), and any other similar
+     ciphersuite (same bitmap) from *other* protocol versions (so that
+     "RC4-MD5" will still include both the SSL 2.0 ciphersuite and the
+     SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 ciphersuite).  This is a backport combining
+     changes from 0.9.8b and 0.9.8d.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.7j and 0.9.7k  [05 Sep 2006]
+
+  *) Avoid PKCS #1 v1.5 signature attack discovered by Daniel Bleichenbacher
+     (CVE-2006-4339)  [Ben Laurie and Google Security Team]
+
+  *) Change the Unix randomness entropy gathering to use poll() when
+     possible instead of select(), since the latter has some
+     undesirable limitations.
+     [Darryl Miles via Richard Levitte and Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Disable rogue ciphersuites:
+
+      - SSLv2 0x08 0x00 0x80 ("RC4-64-MD5")
+      - SSLv3/TLSv1 0x00 0x61 ("EXP1024-RC2-CBC-MD5")
+      - SSLv3/TLSv1 0x00 0x60 ("EXP1024-RC4-MD5")
+
+     The latter two were purportedly from
+     draft-ietf-tls-56-bit-ciphersuites-0[01].txt, but do not really
+     appear there.
+
+     Also deactive the remaining ciphersuites from
+     draft-ietf-tls-56-bit-ciphersuites-01.txt.  These are just as
+     unofficial, and the ID has long expired.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Fix RSA blinding Heisenbug (problems sometimes occurred on
+     dual-core machines) and other potential thread-safety issues.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.7i and 0.9.7j  [04 May 2006]
+
+  *) Adapt fipsld and the build system to link against the validated FIPS
+     module in FIPS mode.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fixes for VC++ 2005 build under Windows.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add new Windows build target VC-32-GMAKE for VC++. This uses GNU make 
+     from a Windows bash shell such as MSYS. It is autodetected from the
+     "config" script when run from a VC++ environment. Modify standard VC++
+     build to use fipscanister.o from the GNU make build. 
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.7h and 0.9.7i  [14 Oct 2005]
+
+  *) Wrapped the definition of EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE in a #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS.
+     The value now differs depending on if you build for FIPS or not.
+     BEWARE!  A program linked with a shared FIPSed libcrypto can't be
+     safely run with a non-FIPSed libcrypto, as it may crash because of
+     the difference induced by this change.
+     [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.7g and 0.9.7h  [11 Oct 2005]
+
+  *) Remove the functionality of SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING
+     (part of SSL_OP_ALL).  This option used to disable the
+     countermeasure against man-in-the-middle protocol-version
+     rollback in the SSL 2.0 server implementation, which is a bad
+     idea.  (CVE-2005-2969)
+
+     [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Yutaka Oiwa (Research Center
+     for Information Security, National Institute of Advanced Industrial
+     Science and Technology [AIST], Japan)]
+
+  *) Minimal support for X9.31 signatures and PSS padding modes. This is
+     mainly for FIPS compliance and not fully integrated at this stage.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) For DSA signing, unless DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME is set, perform
+     the exponentiation using a fixed-length exponent.  (Otherwise,
+     the information leaked through timing could expose the secret key
+     after many signatures; cf. Bleichenbacher's attack on DSA with
+     biased k.)
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Make a new fixed-window mod_exp implementation the default for
+     RSA, DSA, and DH private-key operations so that the sequence of
+     squares and multiplies and the memory access pattern are
+     independent of the particular secret key.  This will mitigate
+     cache-timing and potential related attacks.
+
+     BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime() is the new exponentiation implementation,
+     and this is automatically used by BN_mod_exp_mont() if the new flag
+     BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME is set for the exponent.  RSA, DSA, and DH
+     will use this BN flag for private exponents unless the flag
+     RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME, DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME, or
+     DH_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME, respectively, is set.
+
+     [Matthew D Wood (Intel Corp), with some changes by Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Change the client implementation for SSLv23_method() and
+     SSLv23_client_method() so that is uses the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0
+     Client Hello message format if the SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2 option is set.
+     (Previously, the SSL 2.0 backwards compatible Client Hello
+     message format would be used even with SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2.)
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Add support for smime-type MIME parameter in S/MIME messages which some
+     clients need.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) New function BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked() to set montgomery parameters in
+     a threadsafe manner. Modify rsa code to use new function and add calls
+     to dsa and dh code (which had race conditions before).
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Include the fixed error library code in the C error file definitions
+     instead of fixing them up at runtime. This keeps the error code
+     structures constant.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.7f and 0.9.7g  [11 Apr 2005]
+
+  [NB: OpenSSL 0.9.7h and later 0.9.7 patch levels were released after
+  OpenSSL 0.9.8.]
+
+  *) Fixes for newer kerberos headers. NB: the casts are needed because
+     the 'length' field is signed on one version and unsigned on another
+     with no (?) obvious way to tell the difference, without these VC++
+     complains. Also the "definition" of FAR (blank) is no longer included
+     nor is the error ENOMEM. KRB5_PRIVATE has to be set to 1 to pick up
+     some needed definitions.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Undo Cygwin change.
+     [Ulf Möller]
+
+  *) Added support for proxy certificates according to RFC 3820.
+     Because they may be a security thread to unaware applications,
+     they must be explicitly allowed in run-time.  See
+     docs/HOWTO/proxy_certificates.txt for further information.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.7e and 0.9.7f  [22 Mar 2005]
+
+  *) Use (SSL_RANDOM_VALUE - 4) bytes of pseudo random data when generating
+     server and client random values. Previously
+     (SSL_RANDOM_VALUE - sizeof(time_t)) would be used which would result in
+     less random data when sizeof(time_t) > 4 (some 64 bit platforms).
+
+     This change has negligible security impact because:
+
+     1. Server and client random values still have 24 bytes of pseudo random
+        data.
+
+     2. Server and client random values are sent in the clear in the initial
+        handshake.
+
+     3. The master secret is derived using the premaster secret (48 bytes in
+        size for static RSA ciphersuites) as well as client server and random
+        values.
+
+     The OpenSSL team would like to thank the UK NISCC for bringing this issue
+     to our attention. 
+
+     [Stephen Henson, reported by UK NISCC]
+
+  *) Use Windows randomness collection on Cygwin.
+     [Ulf Möller]
+
+  *) Fix hang in EGD/PRNGD query when communication socket is closed
+     prematurely by EGD/PRNGD.
+     [Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> via Lutz Jänicke, resolves #1014]
+
+  *) Prompt for pass phrases when appropriate for PKCS12 input format.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Back-port of selected performance improvements from development
+     branch, as well as improved support for PowerPC platforms.
+     [Andy Polyakov]
+
+  *) Add lots of checks for memory allocation failure, error codes to indicate
+     failure and freeing up memory if a failure occurs.
+     [Nauticus Networks SSL Team <openssl@nauticusnet.com>, Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add new -passin argument to dgst.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Perform some character comparisons of different types in X509_NAME_cmp:
+     this is needed for some certificates that re-encode DNs into UTF8Strings
+     (in violation of RFC3280) and can't or won't issue name rollover
+     certificates.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Make an explicit check during certificate validation to see that
+     the CA setting in each certificate on the chain is correct.  As a
+     side effect always do the following basic checks on extensions,
+     not just when there's an associated purpose to the check:
+
+      - if there is an unhandled critical extension (unless the user
+        has chosen to ignore this fault)
+      - if the path length has been exceeded (if one is set at all)
+      - that certain extensions fit the associated purpose (if one has
+        been given)
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.7d and 0.9.7e  [25 Oct 2004]
+
+  *) Avoid a race condition when CRLs are checked in a multi threaded 
+     environment. This would happen due to the reordering of the revoked
+     entries during signature checking and serial number lookup. Now the
+     encoding is cached and the serial number sort performed under a lock.
+     Add new STACK function sk_is_sorted().
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add Delta CRL to the extension code.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Various fixes to s3_pkt.c so alerts are sent properly.
+     [David Holmes <d.holmes@f5.com>]
+
+  *) Reduce the chances of duplicate issuer name and serial numbers (in
+     violation of RFC3280) using the OpenSSL certificate creation utilities.
+     This is done by creating a random 64 bit value for the initial serial
+     number when a serial number file is created or when a self signed
+     certificate is created using 'openssl req -x509'. The initial serial
+     number file is created using 'openssl x509 -next_serial' in CA.pl
+     rather than being initialized to 1.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.7c and 0.9.7d  [17 Mar 2004]
+
+  *) Fix null-pointer assignment in do_change_cipher_spec() revealed           
+     by using the Codenomicon TLS Test Tool (CVE-2004-0079)                    
+     [Joe Orton, Steve Henson]   
+
+  *) Fix flaw in SSL/TLS handshaking when using Kerberos ciphersuites
+     (CVE-2004-0112)
+     [Joe Orton, Steve Henson]   
+
+  *) Make it possible to have multiple active certificates with the same
+     subject in the CA index file.  This is done only if the keyword
+     'unique_subject' is set to 'no' in the main CA section (default
+     if 'CA_default') of the configuration file.  The value is saved
+     with the database itself in a separate index attribute file,
+     named like the index file with '.attr' appended to the name.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) X509 verify fixes. Disable broken certificate workarounds when 
+     X509_V_FLAGS_X509_STRICT is set. Check CRL issuer has cRLSign set if
+     keyUsage extension present. Don't accept CRLs with unhandled critical
+     extensions: since verify currently doesn't process CRL extensions this
+     rejects a CRL with *any* critical extensions. Add new verify error codes
+     for these cases.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) When creating an OCSP nonce use an OCTET STRING inside the extnValue.
+     A clarification of RFC2560 will require the use of OCTET STRINGs and 
+     some implementations cannot handle the current raw format. Since OpenSSL
+     copies and compares OCSP nonces as opaque blobs without any attempt at
+     parsing them this should not create any compatibility issues.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) New md flag EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_REUSE this allows md_data to be reused when
+     calling EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex() to avoid calling OPENSSL_malloc(). Without
+     this HMAC (and other) operations are several times slower than OpenSSL
+     < 0.9.7.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Print out GeneralizedTime and UTCTime in ASN1_STRING_print_ex().
+     [Peter Sylvester <Peter.Sylvester@EdelWeb.fr>]
+
+  *) Use the correct content when signing type "other".
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.7b and 0.9.7c  [30 Sep 2003]
+
+  *) Fix various bugs revealed by running the NISCC test suite:
+
+     Stop out of bounds reads in the ASN1 code when presented with
+     invalid tags (CVE-2003-0543 and CVE-2003-0544).
+     
+     Free up ASN1_TYPE correctly if ANY type is invalid (CVE-2003-0545).
+
+     If verify callback ignores invalid public key errors don't try to check
+     certificate signature with the NULL public key.
+
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) New -ignore_err option in ocsp application to stop the server
+     exiting on the first error in a request.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) In ssl3_accept() (ssl/s3_srvr.c) only accept a client certificate
+     if the server requested one: as stated in TLS 1.0 and SSL 3.0
+     specifications.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) In ssl3_get_client_hello() (ssl/s3_srvr.c), tolerate additional
+     extra data after the compression methods not only for TLS 1.0
+     but also for SSL 3.0 (as required by the specification).
+     [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Matthias Loepfe]
+
+  *) Change X509_certificate_type() to mark the key as exported/exportable
+     when it's 512 *bits* long, not 512 bytes.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Change AES_cbc_encrypt() so it outputs exact multiple of
+     blocks during encryption.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Various fixes to base64 BIO and non blocking I/O. On write 
+     flushes were not handled properly if the BIO retried. On read
+     data was not being buffered properly and had various logic bugs.
+     This also affects blocking I/O when the data being decoded is a
+     certain size.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Various S/MIME bugfixes and compatibility changes:
+     output correct application/pkcs7 MIME type if
+     PKCS7_NOOLDMIMETYPE is set. Tolerate some broken signatures.
+     Output CR+LF for EOL if PKCS7_CRLFEOL is set (this makes opening
+     of files as .eml work). Correctly handle very long lines in MIME
+     parser.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.7a and 0.9.7b  [10 Apr 2003]
+
+  *) Countermeasure against the Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of
+     Bleichbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 padding: treat
+     a protocol version number mismatch like a decryption error
+     in ssl3_get_client_key_exchange (ssl/s3_srvr.c).
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Turn on RSA blinding by default in the default implementation
+     to avoid a timing attack. Applications that don't want it can call
+     RSA_blinding_off() or use the new flag RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING.
+     They would be ill-advised to do so in most cases.
+     [Ben Laurie, Steve Henson, Geoff Thorpe, Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Change RSA blinding code so that it works when the PRNG is not
+     seeded (in this case, the secret RSA exponent is abused as
+     an unpredictable seed -- if it is not unpredictable, there
+     is no point in blinding anyway).  Make RSA blinding thread-safe
+     by remembering the creator's thread ID in rsa->blinding and
+     having all other threads use local one-time blinding factors
+     (this requires more computation than sharing rsa->blinding, but
+     avoids excessive locking; and if an RSA object is not shared
+     between threads, blinding will still be very fast).
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Fixed a typo bug that would cause ENGINE_set_default() to set an
+     ENGINE as defaults for all supported algorithms irrespective of
+     the 'flags' parameter. 'flags' is now honoured, so applications
+     should make sure they are passing it correctly.
+     [Geoff Thorpe]
+
+  *) Target "mingw" now allows native Windows code to be generated in
+     the Cygwin environment as well as with the MinGW compiler.
+     [Ulf Moeller] 
+
+ Changes between 0.9.7 and 0.9.7a  [19 Feb 2003]
+
+  *) In ssl3_get_record (ssl/s3_pkt.c), minimize information leaked
+     via timing by performing a MAC computation even if incorrect
+     block cipher padding has been found.  This is a countermeasure
+     against active attacks where the attacker has to distinguish
+     between bad padding and a MAC verification error. (CVE-2003-0078)
+
+     [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Brice Canvel (EPFL),
+     Alain Hiltgen (UBS), Serge Vaudenay (EPFL), and
+     Martin Vuagnoux (EPFL, Ilion)]
+
+  *) Make the no-err option work as intended.  The intention with no-err
+     is not to have the whole error stack handling routines removed from
+     libcrypto, it's only intended to remove all the function name and
+     reason texts, thereby removing some of the footprint that may not
+     be interesting if those errors aren't displayed anyway.
+
+     NOTE: it's still possible for any application or module to have it's
+     own set of error texts inserted.  The routines are there, just not
+     used by default when no-err is given.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Add support for FreeBSD on IA64.
+     [dirk.meyer@dinoex.sub.org via Richard Levitte, resolves #454]
+
+  *) Adjust DES_cbc_cksum() so it returns the same value as the MIT
+     Kerberos function mit_des_cbc_cksum().  Before this change,
+     the value returned by DES_cbc_cksum() was like the one from
+     mit_des_cbc_cksum(), except the bytes were swapped.
+     [Kevin Greaney <Kevin.Greaney@hp.com> and Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Allow an application to disable the automatic SSL chain building.
+     Before this a rather primitive chain build was always performed in
+     ssl3_output_cert_chain(): an application had no way to send the 
+     correct chain if the automatic operation produced an incorrect result.
+
+     Now the chain builder is disabled if either:
+
+     1. Extra certificates are added via SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert().
+
+     2. The mode flag SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN is set.
+
+     The reasoning behind this is that an application would not want the
+     auto chain building to take place if extra chain certificates are
+     present and it might also want a means of sending no additional
+     certificates (for example the chain has two certificates and the
+     root is omitted).
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add the possibility to build without the ENGINE framework.
+     [Steven Reddie <smr@essemer.com.au> via Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Under Win32 gmtime() can return NULL: check return value in
+     OPENSSL_gmtime(). Add error code for case where gmtime() fails.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) DSA routines: under certain error conditions uninitialized BN objects
+     could be freed. Solution: make sure initialization is performed early
+     enough. (Reported and fix supplied by Ivan D Nestlerode <nestler@MIT.EDU>,
+     Nils Larsch <nla@trustcenter.de> via PR#459)
+     [Lutz Jaenicke]
+
+  *) Another fix for SSLv2 session ID handling: the session ID was incorrectly
+     checked on reconnect on the client side, therefore session resumption
+     could still fail with a "ssl session id is different" error. This
+     behaviour is masked when SSL_OP_ALL is used due to
+     SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_SESS_ID_BUG being set.
+     Behaviour observed by Crispin Flowerday <crispin@flowerday.cx> as
+     followup to PR #377.
+     [Lutz Jaenicke]
+
+  *) IA-32 assembler support enhancements: unified ELF targets, support
+     for SCO/Caldera platforms, fix for Cygwin shared build.
+     [Andy Polyakov]
+
+  *) Add support for FreeBSD on sparc64.  As a consequence, support for
+     FreeBSD on non-x86 processors is separate from x86 processors on
+     the config script, much like the NetBSD support.
+     [Richard Levitte & Kris Kennaway <kris@obsecurity.org>]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.6h and 0.9.7  [31 Dec 2002]
+
+  [NB: OpenSSL 0.9.6i and later 0.9.6 patch levels were released after
+  OpenSSL 0.9.7.]
+
+  *) Fix session ID handling in SSLv2 client code: the SERVER FINISHED
+     code (06) was taken as the first octet of the session ID and the last
+     octet was ignored consequently. As a result SSLv2 client side session
+     caching could not have worked due to the session ID mismatch between
+     client and server.
+     Behaviour observed by Crispin Flowerday <crispin@flowerday.cx> as
+     PR #377.
+     [Lutz Jaenicke]
+
+  *) Change the declaration of needed Kerberos libraries to use EX_LIBS
+     instead of the special (and badly supported) LIBKRB5.  LIBKRB5 is
+     removed entirely.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) The hw_ncipher.c engine requires dynamic locks.  Unfortunately, it
+     seems that in spite of existing for more than a year, many application
+     author have done nothing to provide the necessary callbacks, which
+     means that this particular engine will not work properly anywhere.
+     This is a very unfortunate situation which forces us, in the name
+     of usability, to give the hw_ncipher.c a static lock, which is part
+     of libcrypto.
+     NOTE: This is for the 0.9.7 series ONLY.  This hack will never
+     appear in 0.9.8 or later.  We EXPECT application authors to have
+     dealt properly with this when 0.9.8 is released (unless we actually
+     make such changes in the libcrypto locking code that changes will
+     have to be made anyway).
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) In asn1_d2i_read_bio() repeatedly call BIO_read() until all content
+     octets have been read, EOF or an error occurs. Without this change
+     some truncated ASN1 structures will not produce an error.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Disable Heimdal support, since it hasn't been fully implemented.
+     Still give the possibility to force the use of Heimdal, but with
+     warnings and a request that patches get sent to openssl-dev.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Add the VC-CE target, introduce the WINCE sysname, and add
+     INSTALL.WCE and appropriate conditionals to make it build.
+     [Steven Reddie <smr@essemer.com.au> via Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Change the DLL names for Cygwin to cygcrypto-x.y.z.dll and
+     cygssl-x.y.z.dll, where x, y and z are the major, minor and
+     edit numbers of the version.
+     [Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com> and Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Introduce safe string copy and catenation functions
+     (BUF_strlcpy() and BUF_strlcat()).
+     [Ben Laurie (CHATS) and Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Avoid using fixed-size buffers for one-line DNs.
+     [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
+
+  *) Add BUF_MEM_grow_clean() to avoid information leakage when
+     resizing buffers containing secrets, and use where appropriate.
+     [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
+
+  *) Avoid using fixed size buffers for configuration file location.
+     [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
+
+  *) Avoid filename truncation for various CA files.
+     [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
+
+  *) Use sizeof in preference to magic numbers.
+     [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
+
+  *) Avoid filename truncation in cert requests.
+     [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
+
+  *) Add assertions to check for (supposedly impossible) buffer
+     overflows.
+     [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
+
+  *) Don't cache truncated DNS entries in the local cache (this could
+     potentially lead to a spoofing attack).
+     [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
+
+  *) Fix various buffers to be large enough for hex/decimal
+     representations in a platform independent manner.
+     [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
+
+  *) Add CRYPTO_realloc_clean() to avoid information leakage when
+     resizing buffers containing secrets, and use where appropriate.
+     [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
+
+  *) Add BIO_indent() to avoid much slightly worrying code to do
+     indents.
+     [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
+
+  *) Convert sprintf()/BIO_puts() to BIO_printf().
+     [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
+
+  *) buffer_gets() could terminate with the buffer only half
+     full. Fixed.
+     [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
+
+  *) Add assertions to prevent user-supplied crypto functions from
+     overflowing internal buffers by having large block sizes, etc.
+     [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
+
+  *) New OPENSSL_assert() macro (similar to assert(), but enabled
+     unconditionally).
+     [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
+
+  *) Eliminate unused copy of key in RC4.
+     [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
+
+  *) Eliminate unused and incorrectly sized buffers for IV in pem.h.
+     [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
+
+  *) Fix off-by-one error in EGD path.
+     [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
+
+  *) If RANDFILE path is too long, ignore instead of truncating.
+     [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
+
+  *) Eliminate unused and incorrectly sized X.509 structure
+     CBCParameter.
+     [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
+
+  *) Eliminate unused and dangerous function knumber().
+     [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
+
+  *) Eliminate unused and dangerous structure, KSSL_ERR.
+     [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
+
+  *) Protect against overlong session ID context length in an encoded
+     session object. Since these are local, this does not appear to be
+     exploitable.
+     [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
+
+  *) Change from security patch (see 0.9.6e below) that did not affect
+     the 0.9.6 release series:
+
+     Remote buffer overflow in SSL3 protocol - an attacker could
+     supply an oversized master key in Kerberos-enabled versions.
+     (CVE-2002-0657)
+     [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
+
+  *) Change the SSL kerb5 codes to match RFC 2712.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Make -nameopt work fully for req and add -reqopt switch.
+     [Michael Bell <michael.bell@rz.hu-berlin.de>, Steve Henson]
+
+  *) The "block size" for block ciphers in CFB and OFB mode should be 1.
+     [Steve Henson, reported by Yngve Nysaeter Pettersen <yngve@opera.com>]
+
+  *) Make sure tests can be performed even if the corresponding algorithms
+     have been removed entirely.  This was also the last step to make
+     OpenSSL compilable with DJGPP under all reasonable conditions.
+     [Richard Levitte, Doug Kaufman <dkaufman@rahul.net>]
+
+  *) Add cipher selection rules COMPLEMENTOFALL and COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT
+     to allow version independent disabling of normally unselected ciphers,
+     which may be activated as a side-effect of selecting a single cipher.
+
+     (E.g., cipher list string "RSA" enables ciphersuites that are left
+     out of "ALL" because they do not provide symmetric encryption.
+     "RSA:!COMPLEMEMENTOFALL" avoids these unsafe ciphersuites.)
+     [Lutz Jaenicke, Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Add appropriate support for separate platform-dependent build
+     directories.  The recommended way to make a platform-dependent
+     build directory is the following (tested on Linux), maybe with
+     some local tweaks:
+
+	# Place yourself outside of the OpenSSL source tree.  In
+	# this example, the environment variable OPENSSL_SOURCE
+	# is assumed to contain the absolute OpenSSL source directory.
+	mkdir -p objtree/"`uname -s`-`uname -r`-`uname -m`"
+	cd objtree/"`uname -s`-`uname -r`-`uname -m`"
+	(cd $OPENSSL_SOURCE; find . -type f) | while read F; do
+		mkdir -p `dirname $F`
+		ln -s $OPENSSL_SOURCE/$F $F
+	done
+
+     To be absolutely sure not to disturb the source tree, a "make clean"
+     is a good thing.  If it isn't successful, don't worry about it,
+     it probably means the source directory is very clean.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Make sure any ENGINE control commands make local copies of string
+     pointers passed to them whenever necessary. Otherwise it is possible
+     the caller may have overwritten (or deallocated) the original string
+     data when a later ENGINE operation tries to use the stored values.
+     [Götz Babin-Ebell <babinebell@trustcenter.de>]
+
+  *) Improve diagnostics in file reading and command-line digests.
+     [Ben Laurie aided and abetted by Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>]
+
+  *) Add AES modes CFB and OFB to the object database.  Correct an
+     error in AES-CFB decryption.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Remove most calls to EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup() in evp_enc.c, this 
+     allows existing EVP_CIPHER_CTX structures to be reused after
+     calling EVP_*Final(). This behaviour is used by encryption
+     BIOs and some applications. This has the side effect that
+     applications must explicitly clean up cipher contexts with
+     EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup() or they will leak memory.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Check the values of dna and dnb in bn_mul_recursive before calling
+     bn_mul_comba (a non zero value means the a or b arrays do not contain
+     n2 elements) and fallback to bn_mul_normal if either is not zero.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix escaping of non-ASCII characters when using the -subj option
+     of the "openssl req" command line tool. (Robert Joop <joop@fokus.gmd.de>)
+     [Lutz Jaenicke]
+
+  *) Make object definitions compliant to LDAP (RFC2256): SN is the short
+     form for "surname", serialNumber has no short form.
+     Use "mail" as the short name for "rfc822Mailbox" according to RFC2798;
+     therefore remove "mail" short name for "internet 7".
+     The OID for unique identifiers in X509 certificates is
+     x500UniqueIdentifier, not uniqueIdentifier.
+     Some more OID additions. (Michael Bell <michael.bell@rz.hu-berlin.de>)
+     [Lutz Jaenicke]
+
+  *) Add an "init" command to the ENGINE config module and auto initialize
+     ENGINEs. Without any "init" command the ENGINE will be initialized 
+     after all ctrl commands have been executed on it. If init=1 the 
+     ENGINE is initailized at that point (ctrls before that point are run
+     on the uninitialized ENGINE and after on the initialized one). If
+     init=0 then the ENGINE will not be iniatialized at all.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix the 'app_verify_callback' interface so that the user-defined
+     argument is actually passed to the callback: In the
+     SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback() prototype, the callback
+     declaration has been changed from
+          int (*cb)()
+     into
+          int (*cb)(X509_STORE_CTX *,void *);
+     in ssl_verify_cert_chain (ssl/ssl_cert.c), the call
+          i=s->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx)
+     has been changed into
+          i=s->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx, s->ctx->app_verify_arg).
+
+     To update applications using SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(),
+     a dummy argument can be added to their callback functions.
+     [D. K. Smetters <smetters@parc.xerox.com>]
+
+  *) Added the '4758cca' ENGINE to support IBM 4758 cards.
+     [Maurice Gittens <maurice@gittens.nl>, touchups by Geoff Thorpe]
+
+  *) Add and OPENSSL_LOAD_CONF define which will cause
+     OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms() to load the openssl.cnf config file.
+     This allows older applications to transparently support certain
+     OpenSSL features: such as crypto acceleration and dynamic ENGINE loading.
+     Two new functions OPENSSL_add_all_algorithms_noconf() which will never
+     load the config file and OPENSSL_add_all_algorithms_conf() which will
+     always load it have also been added.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add the OFB, CFB and CTR (all with 128 bit feedback) to AES.
+     Adjust NIDs and EVP layer.
+     [Stephen Sprunk <stephen@sprunk.org> and Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Config modules support in openssl utility.
+
+     Most commands now load modules from the config file,
+     though in a few (such as version) this isn't done 
+     because it couldn't be used for anything.
+
+     In the case of ca and req the config file used is
+     the same as the utility itself: that is the -config
+     command line option can be used to specify an
+     alternative file.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Move default behaviour from OPENSSL_config(). If appname is NULL
+     use "openssl_conf" if filename is NULL use default openssl config file.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add an argument to OPENSSL_config() to allow the use of an alternative
+     config section name. Add a new flag to tolerate a missing config file
+     and move code to CONF_modules_load_file().
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Support for crypto accelerator cards from Accelerated Encryption
+     Processing, www.aep.ie.  (Use engine 'aep')
+     The support was copied from 0.9.6c [engine] and adapted/corrected
+     to work with the new engine framework.
+     [AEP Inc. and Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Support for SureWare crypto accelerator cards from Baltimore
+     Technologies.  (Use engine 'sureware')
+     The support was copied from 0.9.6c [engine] and adapted
+     to work with the new engine framework.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Have the CHIL engine fork-safe (as defined by nCipher) and actually
+     make the newer ENGINE framework commands for the CHIL engine work.
+     [Toomas Kiisk <vix@cyber.ee> and Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Make it possible to produce shared libraries on ReliantUNIX.
+     [Robert Dahlem <Robert.Dahlem@ffm2.siemens.de> via Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Add the configuration target debug-linux-ppro.
+     Make 'openssl rsa' use the general key loading routines
+     implemented in apps.c, and make those routines able to
+     handle the key format FORMAT_NETSCAPE and the variant
+     FORMAT_IISSGC.
+     [Toomas Kiisk <vix@cyber.ee> via Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Fix a crashbug and a logic bug in hwcrhk_load_pubkey().
+     [Toomas Kiisk <vix@cyber.ee> via Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Add -keyform to rsautl, and document -engine.
+     [Richard Levitte, inspired by Toomas Kiisk <vix@cyber.ee>]
+
+  *) Change BIO_new_file (crypto/bio/bss_file.c) to use new
+     BIO_R_NO_SUCH_FILE error code rather than the generic
+     ERR_R_SYS_LIB error code if fopen() fails with ENOENT.
+     [Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) Add new functions
+          ERR_peek_last_error
+          ERR_peek_last_error_line
+          ERR_peek_last_error_line_data.
+     These are similar to
+          ERR_peek_error
+          ERR_peek_error_line
+          ERR_peek_error_line_data,
+     but report on the latest error recorded rather than the first one
+     still in the error queue.
+     [Ben Laurie, Bodo Moeller]
+        
+  *) default_algorithms option in ENGINE config module. This allows things
+     like:
+     default_algorithms = ALL
+     default_algorithms = RSA, DSA, RAND, CIPHERS, DIGESTS
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Preliminary ENGINE config module.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) New experimental application configuration code.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Change the AES code to follow the same name structure as all other
+     symmetric ciphers, and behave the same way.  Move everything to
+     the directory crypto/aes, thereby obsoleting crypto/rijndael.
+     [Stephen Sprunk <stephen@sprunk.org> and Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) SECURITY: remove unsafe setjmp/signal interaction from ui_openssl.c.
+     [Ben Laurie and Theo de Raadt]
+
+  *) Add option to output public keys in req command.
+     [Massimiliano Pala madwolf@openca.org]
+
+  *) Use wNAFs in EC_POINTs_mul() for improved efficiency
+     (up to about 10% better than before for P-192 and P-224).
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) New functions/macros
+
+          SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(ctx, cb)
+          SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback_arg(ctx, arg)
+          SSL_set_msg_callback(ssl, cb)
+          SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(ssl, arg)
+
+     to request calling a callback function
+
+          void cb(int write_p, int version, int content_type,
+                  const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg)
+
+     whenever a protocol message has been completely received
+     (write_p == 0) or sent (write_p == 1).  Here 'version' is the
+     protocol version  according to which the SSL library interprets
+     the current protocol message (SSL2_VERSION, SSL3_VERSION, or
+     TLS1_VERSION).  'content_type' is 0 in the case of SSL 2.0, or
+     the content type as defined in the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 protocol
+     specification (change_cipher_spec(20), alert(21), handshake(22)).
+     'buf' and 'len' point to the actual message, 'ssl' to the
+     SSL object, and 'arg' is the application-defined value set by
+     SSL[_CTX]_set_msg_callback_arg().
+
+     'openssl s_client' and 'openssl s_server' have new '-msg' options
+     to enable a callback that displays all protocol messages.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Change the shared library support so shared libraries are built as
+     soon as the corresponding static library is finished, and thereby get
+     openssl and the test programs linked against the shared library.
+     This still only happens when the keyword "shard" has been given to
+     the configuration scripts.
+
+     NOTE: shared library support is still an experimental thing, and
+     backward binary compatibility is still not guaranteed.
+     ["Maciej W. Rozycki" <macro@ds2.pg.gda.pl> and Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Add support for Subject Information Access extension.
+     [Peter Sylvester <Peter.Sylvester@EdelWeb.fr>]
+
+  *) Make BUF_MEM_grow() behaviour more consistent: Initialise to zero
+     additional bytes when new memory had to be allocated, not just
+     when reusing an existing buffer.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) New command line and configuration option 'utf8' for the req command.
+     This allows field values to be specified as UTF8 strings.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add -multi and -mr options to "openssl speed" - giving multiple parallel
+     runs for the former and machine-readable output for the latter.
+     [Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) Add '-noemailDN' option to 'openssl ca'.  This prevents inclusion
+     of the e-mail address in the DN (i.e., it will go into a certificate
+     extension only).  The new configuration file option 'email_in_dn = no'
+     has the same effect.
+     [Massimiliano Pala madwolf@openca.org]
+
+  *) Change all functions with names starting with des_ to be starting
+     with DES_ instead.  Add wrappers that are compatible with libdes,
+     but are named _ossl_old_des_*.  Finally, add macros that map the
+     des_* symbols to the corresponding _ossl_old_des_* if libdes
+     compatibility is desired.  If OpenSSL 0.9.6c compatibility is
+     desired, the des_* symbols will be mapped to DES_*, with one
+     exception.
+
+     Since we provide two compatibility mappings, the user needs to
+     define the macro OPENSSL_DES_LIBDES_COMPATIBILITY if libdes
+     compatibility is desired.  The default (i.e., when that macro
+     isn't defined) is OpenSSL 0.9.6c compatibility.
+
+     There are also macros that enable and disable the support of old
+     des functions altogether.  Those are OPENSSL_ENABLE_OLD_DES_SUPPORT
+     and OPENSSL_DISABLE_OLD_DES_SUPPORT.  If none or both of those
+     are defined, the default will apply: to support the old des routines.
+
+     In either case, one must include openssl/des.h to get the correct
+     definitions.  Do not try to just include openssl/des_old.h, that
+     won't work.
+
+     NOTE: This is a major break of an old API into a new one.  Software
+     authors are encouraged to switch to the DES_ style functions.  Some
+     time in the future, des_old.h and the libdes compatibility functions
+     will be disable (i.e. OPENSSL_DISABLE_OLD_DES_SUPPORT will be the
+     default), and then completely removed.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Test for certificates which contain unsupported critical extensions.
+     If such a certificate is found during a verify operation it is 
+     rejected by default: this behaviour can be overridden by either
+     handling the new error X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION or
+     by setting the verify flag X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL. A new function
+     X509_supported_extension() has also been added which returns 1 if a
+     particular extension is supported.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Modify the behaviour of EVP cipher functions in similar way to digests
+     to retain compatibility with existing code.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Modify the behaviour of EVP_DigestInit() and EVP_DigestFinal() to retain
+     compatibility with existing code. In particular the 'ctx' parameter does
+     not have to be to be initialized before the call to EVP_DigestInit() and
+     it is tidied up after a call to EVP_DigestFinal(). New function
+     EVP_DigestFinal_ex() which does not tidy up the ctx. Similarly function
+     EVP_MD_CTX_copy() changed to not require the destination to be
+     initialized valid and new function EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex() added which
+     requires the destination to be valid.
+
+     Modify all the OpenSSL digest calls to use EVP_DigestInit_ex(),
+     EVP_DigestFinal_ex() and EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex().
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Change ssl3_get_message (ssl/s3_both.c) and the functions using it
+     so that complete 'Handshake' protocol structures are kept in memory
+     instead of overwriting 'msg_type' and 'length' with 'body' data.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Add an implementation of SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack for Win32.
+     [Massimo Santin via Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Major restructuring to the underlying ENGINE code. This includes
+     reduction of linker bloat, separation of pure "ENGINE" manipulation
+     (initialisation, etc) from functionality dealing with implementations
+     of specific crypto iterfaces. This change also introduces integrated
+     support for symmetric ciphers and digest implementations - so ENGINEs
+     can now accelerate these by providing EVP_CIPHER and EVP_MD
+     implementations of their own. This is detailed in crypto/engine/README
+     as it couldn't be adequately described here. However, there are a few
+     API changes worth noting - some RSA, DSA, DH, and RAND functions that
+     were changed in the original introduction of ENGINE code have now
+     reverted back - the hooking from this code to ENGINE is now a good
+     deal more passive and at run-time, operations deal directly with
+     RSA_METHODs, DSA_METHODs (etc) as they did before, rather than
+     dereferencing through an ENGINE pointer any more. Also, the ENGINE
+     functions dealing with BN_MOD_EXP[_CRT] handlers have been removed -
+     they were not being used by the framework as there is no concept of a
+     BIGNUM_METHOD and they could not be generalised to the new
+     'ENGINE_TABLE' mechanism that underlies the new code. Similarly,
+     ENGINE_cpy() has been removed as it cannot be consistently defined in
+     the new code.
+     [Geoff Thorpe]
+
+  *) Change ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_check() to allow fractional seconds.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Change mkdef.pl to sort symbols that get the same entry number,
+     and make sure the automatically generated functions ERR_load_*
+     become part of libeay.num as well.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) New function SSL_renegotiate_pending().  This returns true once
+     renegotiation has been requested (either SSL_renegotiate() call
+     or HelloRequest/ClientHello received from the peer) and becomes
+     false once a handshake has been completed.
+     (For servers, SSL_renegotiate() followed by SSL_do_handshake()
+     sends a HelloRequest, but does not ensure that a handshake takes
+     place.  SSL_renegotiate_pending() is useful for checking if the
+     client has followed the request.)
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) New SSL option SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION.
+     By default, clients may request session resumption even during
+     renegotiation (if session ID contexts permit); with this option,
+     session resumption is possible only in the first handshake.
+
+     SSL_OP_ALL is now 0x00000FFFL instead of 0x000FFFFFL.  This makes
+     more bits available for options that should not be part of
+     SSL_OP_ALL (such as SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION).
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Add some demos for certificate and certificate request creation.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Make maximum certificate chain size accepted from the peer application
+     settable (SSL*_get/set_max_cert_list()), as proposed by
+     "Douglas E. Engert" <deengert@anl.gov>.
+     [Lutz Jaenicke]
+
+  *) Add support for shared libraries for Unixware-7
+     (Boyd Lynn Gerber <gerberb@zenez.com>).
+     [Lutz Jaenicke]
+
+  *) Add a "destroy" handler to ENGINEs that allows structural cleanup to
+     be done prior to destruction. Use this to unload error strings from
+     ENGINEs that load their own error strings. NB: This adds two new API
+     functions to "get" and "set" this destroy handler in an ENGINE.
+     [Geoff Thorpe]
+
+  *) Alter all existing ENGINE implementations (except "openssl" and
+     "openbsd") to dynamically instantiate their own error strings. This
+     makes them more flexible to be built both as statically-linked ENGINEs
+     and self-contained shared-libraries loadable via the "dynamic" ENGINE.
+     Also, add stub code to each that makes building them as self-contained
+     shared-libraries easier (see README.ENGINE).
+     [Geoff Thorpe]
+
+  *) Add a "dynamic" ENGINE that provides a mechanism for binding ENGINE
+     implementations into applications that are completely implemented in
+     self-contained shared-libraries. The "dynamic" ENGINE exposes control
+     commands that can be used to configure what shared-library to load and
+     to control aspects of the way it is handled. Also, made an update to
+     the README.ENGINE file that brings its information up-to-date and
+     provides some information and instructions on the "dynamic" ENGINE
+     (ie. how to use it, how to build "dynamic"-loadable ENGINEs, etc).
+     [Geoff Thorpe]
+
+  *) Make it possible to unload ranges of ERR strings with a new
+     "ERR_unload_strings" function.
+     [Geoff Thorpe]
+
+  *) Add a copy() function to EVP_MD.
+     [Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) Make EVP_MD routines take a context pointer instead of just the
+     md_data void pointer.
+     [Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) Add flags to EVP_MD and EVP_MD_CTX. EVP_MD_FLAG_ONESHOT indicates
+     that the digest can only process a single chunk of data
+     (typically because it is provided by a piece of
+     hardware). EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_ONESHOT indicates that the application
+     is only going to provide a single chunk of data, and hence the
+     framework needn't accumulate the data for oneshot drivers.
+     [Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) As with "ERR", make it possible to replace the underlying "ex_data"
+     functions. This change also alters the storage and management of global
+     ex_data state - it's now all inside ex_data.c and all "class" code (eg.
+     RSA, BIO, SSL_CTX, etc) no longer stores its own STACKS and per-class
+     index counters. The API functions that use this state have been changed
+     to take a "class_index" rather than pointers to the class's local STACK
+     and counter, and there is now an API function to dynamically create new
+     classes. This centralisation allows us to (a) plug a lot of the
+     thread-safety problems that existed, and (b) makes it possible to clean
+     up all allocated state using "CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data()". W.r.t. (b)
+     such data would previously have always leaked in application code and
+     workarounds were in place to make the memory debugging turn a blind eye
+     to it. Application code that doesn't use this new function will still
+     leak as before, but their memory debugging output will announce it now
+     rather than letting it slide.
+
+     Besides the addition of CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data(), another API change
+     induced by the "ex_data" overhaul is that X509_STORE_CTX_init() now
+     has a return value to indicate success or failure.
+     [Geoff Thorpe]
+
+  *) Make it possible to replace the underlying "ERR" functions such that the
+     global state (2 LHASH tables and 2 locks) is only used by the "default"
+     implementation. This change also adds two functions to "get" and "set"
+     the implementation prior to it being automatically set the first time
+     any other ERR function takes place. Ie. an application can call "get",
+     pass the return value to a module it has just loaded, and that module
+     can call its own "set" function using that value. This means the
+     module's "ERR" operations will use (and modify) the error state in the
+     application and not in its own statically linked copy of OpenSSL code.
+     [Geoff Thorpe]
+
+  *) Give DH, DSA, and RSA types their own "**_up_ref()" function to increment
+     reference counts. This performs normal REF_PRINT/REF_CHECK macros on
+     the operation, and provides a more encapsulated way for external code
+     (crypto/evp/ and ssl/) to do this. Also changed the evp and ssl code
+     to use these functions rather than manually incrementing the counts.
+
+     Also rename "DSO_up()" function to more descriptive "DSO_up_ref()".
+     [Geoff Thorpe]
+
+  *) Add EVP test program.
+     [Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) Add symmetric cipher support to ENGINE. Expect the API to change!
+     [Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) New CRL functions: X509_CRL_set_version(), X509_CRL_set_issuer_name()
+     X509_CRL_set_lastUpdate(), X509_CRL_set_nextUpdate(), X509_CRL_sort(),
+     X509_REVOKED_set_serialNumber(), and X509_REVOKED_set_revocationDate().
+     These allow a CRL to be built without having to access X509_CRL fields
+     directly. Modify 'ca' application to use new functions.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Move SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG out of the SSL_OP_ALL list of recommended
+     bug workarounds. Rollback attack detection is a security feature.
+     The problem will only arise on OpenSSL servers when TLSv1 is not
+     available (sslv3_server_method() or SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1).
+     Software authors not wanting to support TLSv1 will have special reasons
+     for their choice and can explicitly enable this option.
+     [Bodo Moeller, Lutz Jaenicke]
+
+  *) Rationalise EVP so it can be extended: don't include a union of
+     cipher/digest structures, add init/cleanup functions for EVP_MD_CTX
+     (similar to those existing for EVP_CIPHER_CTX).
+     Usage example:
+
+         EVP_MD_CTX md;
+
+         EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md);             /* new function call */
+         EVP_DigestInit(&md, EVP_sha1());
+         EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, in, len);
+         EVP_DigestFinal(&md, out, NULL);
+         EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md);          /* new function call */
+
+     [Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) Make DES key schedule conform to the usual scheme, as well as
+     correcting its structure. This means that calls to DES functions
+     now have to pass a pointer to a des_key_schedule instead of a
+     plain des_key_schedule (which was actually always a pointer
+     anyway): E.g.,
+
+         des_key_schedule ks;
+
+	 des_set_key_checked(..., &ks);
+	 des_ncbc_encrypt(..., &ks, ...);
+
+     (Note that a later change renames 'des_...' into 'DES_...'.)
+     [Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) Initial reduction of linker bloat: the use of some functions, such as
+     PEM causes large amounts of unused functions to be linked in due to
+     poor organisation. For example pem_all.c contains every PEM function
+     which has a knock on effect of linking in large amounts of (unused)
+     ASN1 code. Grouping together similar functions and splitting unrelated
+     functions prevents this.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Cleanup of EVP macros.
+     [Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) Change historical references to {NID,SN,LN}_des_ede and ede3 to add the
+     correct _ecb suffix.
+     [Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) Add initial OCSP responder support to ocsp application. The
+     revocation information is handled using the text based index
+     use by the ca application. The responder can either handle
+     requests generated internally, supplied in files (for example
+     via a CGI script) or using an internal minimal server.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add configuration choices to get zlib compression for TLS.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Changes to Kerberos SSL for RFC 2712 compliance:
+     1.  Implemented real KerberosWrapper, instead of just using
+         KRB5 AP_REQ message.  [Thanks to Simon Wilkinson <sxw@sxw.org.uk>]
+     2.  Implemented optional authenticator field of KerberosWrapper.
+
+     Added openssl-style ASN.1 macros for Kerberos ticket, ap_req,
+     and authenticator structs; see crypto/krb5/.
+
+     Generalized Kerberos calls to support multiple Kerberos libraries.
+     [Vern Staats <staatsvr@asc.hpc.mil>,
+      Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@columbia.edu>
+      via Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Cause 'openssl speed' to use fully hard-coded DSA keys as it
+     already does with RSA. testdsa.h now has 'priv_key/pub_key'
+     values for each of the key sizes rather than having just
+     parameters (and 'speed' generating keys each time).
+     [Geoff Thorpe]
+
+  *) Speed up EVP routines.
+     Before:
+encrypt
+type              8 bytes     64 bytes    256 bytes   1024 bytes   8192 bytes
+des-cbc           4408.85k     5560.51k     5778.46k     5862.20k     5825.16k
+des-cbc           4389.55k     5571.17k     5792.23k     5846.91k     5832.11k
+des-cbc           4394.32k     5575.92k     5807.44k     5848.37k     5841.30k
+decrypt
+des-cbc           3482.66k     5069.49k     5496.39k     5614.16k     5639.28k
+des-cbc           3480.74k     5068.76k     5510.34k     5609.87k     5635.52k
+des-cbc           3483.72k     5067.62k     5504.60k     5708.01k     5724.80k
+     After:
+encrypt
+des-cbc           4660.16k     5650.19k     5807.19k     5827.13k     5783.32k
+decrypt
+des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
+     [Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) Added the OS2-EMX target.
+     ["Brian Havard" <brianh@kheldar.apana.org.au> and Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Rewrite apps to use NCONF routines instead of the old CONF. New functions
+     to support NCONF routines in extension code. New function CONF_set_nconf()
+     to allow functions which take an NCONF to also handle the old LHASH
+     structure: this means that the old CONF compatible routines can be
+     retained (in particular wrt extensions) without having to duplicate the
+     code. New function X509V3_add_ext_nconf_sk to add extensions to a stack.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Enhance the general user interface with mechanisms for inner control
+     and with possibilities to have yes/no kind of prompts.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Change all calls to low level digest routines in the library and
+     applications to use EVP. Add missing calls to HMAC_cleanup() and
+     don't assume HMAC_CTX can be copied using memcpy().
+     [Verdon Walker <VWalker@novell.com>, Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add the possibility to control engines through control names but with
+     arbitrary arguments instead of just a string.
+     Change the key loaders to take a UI_METHOD instead of a callback
+     function pointer.  NOTE: this breaks binary compatibility with earlier
+     versions of OpenSSL [engine].
+     Adapt the nCipher code for these new conditions and add a card insertion
+     callback.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Enhance the general user interface with mechanisms to better support
+     dialog box interfaces, application-defined prompts, the possibility
+     to use defaults (for example default passwords from somewhere else)
+     and interrupts/cancellations.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Tidy up PKCS#12 attribute handling. Add support for the CSP name
+     attribute in PKCS#12 files, add new -CSP option to pkcs12 utility.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix a memory leak in 'sk_dup()' in the case reallocation fails. (Also
+     tidy up some unnecessarily weird code in 'sk_new()').
+     [Geoff, reported by Diego Tartara <dtartara@novamens.com>]
+
+  *) Change the key loading routines for ENGINEs to use the same kind
+     callback (pem_password_cb) as all other routines that need this
+     kind of callback.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Increase ENTROPY_NEEDED to 32 bytes, as Rijndael can operate with
+     256 bit (=32 byte) keys. Of course seeding with more entropy bytes
+     than this minimum value is recommended.
+     [Lutz Jaenicke]
+
+  *) New random seeder for OpenVMS, using the system process statistics
+     that are easily reachable.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Windows apparently can't transparently handle global
+     variables defined in DLLs. Initialisations such as:
+
+        const ASN1_ITEM *it = &ASN1_INTEGER_it;
+
+     won't compile. This is used by the any applications that need to
+     declare their own ASN1 modules. This was fixed by adding the option
+     EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN to all Win32 platforms, although this isn't strictly
+     needed for static libraries under Win32.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) New functions X509_PURPOSE_set() and X509_TRUST_set() to handle
+     setting of purpose and trust fields. New X509_STORE trust and
+     purpose functions and tidy up setting in other SSL functions.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add copies of X509_STORE_CTX fields and callbacks to X509_STORE
+     structure. These are inherited by X509_STORE_CTX when it is 
+     initialised. This allows various defaults to be set in the
+     X509_STORE structure (such as flags for CRL checking and custom
+     purpose or trust settings) for functions which only use X509_STORE_CTX
+     internally such as S/MIME.
+
+     Modify X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit() so it only sets purposes and
+     trust settings if they are not set in X509_STORE. This allows X509_STORE
+     purposes and trust (in S/MIME for example) to override any set by default.
+
+     Add command line options for CRL checking to smime, s_client and s_server
+     applications.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Initial CRL based revocation checking. If the CRL checking flag(s)
+     are set then the CRL is looked up in the X509_STORE structure and
+     its validity and signature checked, then if the certificate is found
+     in the CRL the verify fails with a revoked error.
+
+     Various new CRL related callbacks added to X509_STORE_CTX structure.
+
+     Command line options added to 'verify' application to support this.
+
+     This needs some additional work, such as being able to handle multiple
+     CRLs with different times, extension based lookup (rather than just
+     by subject name) and ultimately more complete V2 CRL extension
+     handling.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add a general user interface API (crypto/ui/).  This is designed
+     to replace things like des_read_password and friends (backward
+     compatibility functions using this new API are provided).
+     The purpose is to remove prompting functions from the DES code
+     section as well as provide for prompting through dialog boxes in
+     a window system and the like.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Add "ex_data" support to ENGINE so implementations can add state at a
+     per-structure level rather than having to store it globally.
+     [Geoff]
+
+  *) Make it possible for ENGINE structures to be copied when retrieved by
+     ENGINE_by_id() if the ENGINE specifies a new flag: ENGINE_FLAGS_BY_ID_COPY.
+     This causes the "original" ENGINE structure to act like a template,
+     analogous to the RSA vs. RSA_METHOD type of separation. Because of this
+     operational state can be localised to each ENGINE structure, despite the
+     fact they all share the same "methods". New ENGINE structures returned in
+     this case have no functional references and the return value is the single
+     structural reference. This matches the single structural reference returned
+     by ENGINE_by_id() normally, when it is incremented on the pre-existing
+     ENGINE structure.
+     [Geoff]
+
+  *) Fix ASN1 decoder when decoding type ANY and V_ASN1_OTHER: since this
+     needs to match any other type at all we need to manually clear the
+     tag cache.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Changes to the "openssl engine" utility to include;
+     - verbosity levels ('-v', '-vv', and '-vvv') that provide information
+       about an ENGINE's available control commands.
+     - executing control commands from command line arguments using the
+       '-pre' and '-post' switches. '-post' is only used if '-t' is
+       specified and the ENGINE is successfully initialised. The syntax for
+       the individual commands are colon-separated, for example;
+	 openssl engine chil -pre FORK_CHECK:0 -pre SO_PATH:/lib/test.so
+     [Geoff]
+
+  *) New dynamic control command support for ENGINEs. ENGINEs can now
+     declare their own commands (numbers), names (strings), descriptions,
+     and input types for run-time discovery by calling applications. A
+     subset of these commands are implicitly classed as "executable"
+     depending on their input type, and only these can be invoked through
+     the new string-based API function ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(). (Eg. this
+     can be based on user input, config files, etc). The distinction is
+     that "executable" commands cannot return anything other than a boolean
+     result and can only support numeric or string input, whereas some
+     discoverable commands may only be for direct use through
+     ENGINE_ctrl(), eg. supporting the exchange of binary data, function
+     pointers, or other custom uses. The "executable" commands are to
+     support parameterisations of ENGINE behaviour that can be
+     unambiguously defined by ENGINEs and used consistently across any
+     OpenSSL-based application. Commands have been added to all the
+     existing hardware-supporting ENGINEs, noticeably "SO_PATH" to allow
+     control over shared-library paths without source code alterations.
+     [Geoff]
+
+  *) Changed all ENGINE implementations to dynamically allocate their
+     ENGINEs rather than declaring them statically. Apart from this being
+     necessary with the removal of the ENGINE_FLAGS_MALLOCED distinction,
+     this also allows the implementations to compile without using the
+     internal engine_int.h header.
+     [Geoff]
+
+  *) Minor adjustment to "rand" code. RAND_get_rand_method() now returns a
+     'const' value. Any code that should be able to modify a RAND_METHOD
+     should already have non-const pointers to it (ie. they should only
+     modify their own ones).
+     [Geoff]
+
+  *) Made a variety of little tweaks to the ENGINE code.
+     - "atalla" and "ubsec" string definitions were moved from header files
+       to C code. "nuron" string definitions were placed in variables
+       rather than hard-coded - allowing parameterisation of these values
+       later on via ctrl() commands.
+     - Removed unused "#if 0"'d code.
+     - Fixed engine list iteration code so it uses ENGINE_free() to release
+       structural references.
+     - Constified the RAND_METHOD element of ENGINE structures.
+     - Constified various get/set functions as appropriate and added
+       missing functions (including a catch-all ENGINE_cpy that duplicates
+       all ENGINE values onto a new ENGINE except reference counts/state).
+     - Removed NULL parameter checks in get/set functions. Setting a method
+       or function to NULL is a way of cancelling out a previously set
+       value.  Passing a NULL ENGINE parameter is just plain stupid anyway
+       and doesn't justify the extra error symbols and code.
+     - Deprecate the ENGINE_FLAGS_MALLOCED define and move the area for
+       flags from engine_int.h to engine.h.
+     - Changed prototypes for ENGINE handler functions (init(), finish(),
+       ctrl(), key-load functions, etc) to take an (ENGINE*) parameter.
+     [Geoff]
+
+  *) Implement binary inversion algorithm for BN_mod_inverse in addition
+     to the algorithm using long division.  The binary algorithm can be
+     used only if the modulus is odd.  On 32-bit systems, it is faster
+     only for relatively small moduli (roughly 20-30% for 128-bit moduli,
+     roughly 5-15% for 256-bit moduli), so we use it only for moduli
+     up to 450 bits.  In 64-bit environments, the binary algorithm
+     appears to be advantageous for much longer moduli; here we use it
+     for moduli up to 2048 bits.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Rewrite CHOICE field setting in ASN1_item_ex_d2i(). The old code
+     could not support the combine flag in choice fields.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add a 'copy_extensions' option to the 'ca' utility. This copies
+     extensions from a certificate request to the certificate.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Allow multiple 'certopt' and 'nameopt' options to be separated
+     by commas. Add 'namopt' and 'certopt' options to the 'ca' config
+     file: this allows the display of the certificate about to be
+     signed to be customised, to allow certain fields to be included
+     or excluded and extension details. The old system didn't display
+     multicharacter strings properly, omitted fields not in the policy
+     and couldn't display additional details such as extensions.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Function EC_POINTs_mul for multiple scalar multiplication
+     of an arbitrary number of elliptic curve points
+          \sum scalars[i]*points[i],
+     optionally including the generator defined for the EC_GROUP:
+          scalar*generator +  \sum scalars[i]*points[i].
+
+     EC_POINT_mul is a simple wrapper function for the typical case
+     that the point list has just one item (besides the optional
+     generator).
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) First EC_METHODs for curves over GF(p):
+
+     EC_GFp_simple_method() uses the basic BN_mod_mul and BN_mod_sqr
+     operations and provides various method functions that can also
+     operate with faster implementations of modular arithmetic.     
+
+     EC_GFp_mont_method() reuses most functions that are part of
+     EC_GFp_simple_method, but uses Montgomery arithmetic.
+
+     [Bodo Moeller; point addition and point doubling
+     implementation directly derived from source code provided by
+     Lenka Fibikova <fibikova@exp-math.uni-essen.de>]
+
+  *) Framework for elliptic curves (crypto/ec/ec.h, crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h,
+     crypto/ec/ec_lib.c):
+
+     Curves are EC_GROUP objects (with an optional group generator)
+     based on EC_METHODs that are built into the library.
+
+     Points are EC_POINT objects based on EC_GROUP objects.
+
+     Most of the framework would be able to handle curves over arbitrary
+     finite fields, but as there are no obvious types for fields other
+     than GF(p), some functions are limited to that for now.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Add the -HTTP option to s_server.  It is similar to -WWW, but requires
+     that the file contains a complete HTTP response.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Add the ec directory to mkdef.pl and mkfiles.pl. In mkdef.pl
+     change the def and num file printf format specifier from "%-40sXXX"
+     to "%-39s XXX". The latter will always guarantee a space after the
+     field while the former will cause them to run together if the field
+     is 40 of more characters long.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Constify the cipher and digest 'method' functions and structures
+     and modify related functions to take constant EVP_MD and EVP_CIPHER
+     pointers.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Hide BN_CTX structure details in bn_lcl.h instead of publishing them
+     in <openssl/bn.h>.  Also further increase BN_CTX_NUM to 32.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Modify EVP_Digest*() routines so they now return values. Although the
+     internal software routines can never fail additional hardware versions
+     might.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Clean up crypto/err/err.h and change some error codes to avoid conflicts:
+
+     Previously ERR_R_FATAL was too small and coincided with ERR_LIB_PKCS7
+     (= ERR_R_PKCS7_LIB); it is now 64 instead of 32.
+
+     ASN1 error codes
+          ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR
+          ...
+          ERR_R_MISSING_ASN1_EOS
+     were 4 .. 9, conflicting with
+          ERR_LIB_RSA (= ERR_R_RSA_LIB)
+          ...
+          ERR_LIB_PEM (= ERR_R_PEM_LIB).
+     They are now 58 .. 63 (i.e., just below ERR_R_FATAL).
+
+     Add new error code 'ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR'.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Don't overuse locks in crypto/err/err.c: For data retrieval, CRYPTO_r_lock
+     suffices.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) New option '-subj arg' for 'openssl req' and 'openssl ca'.  This
+     sets the subject name for a new request or supersedes the
+     subject name in a given request. Formats that can be parsed are
+          'CN=Some Name, OU=myOU, C=IT'
+     and
+          'CN=Some Name/OU=myOU/C=IT'.
+
+     Add options '-batch' and '-verbose' to 'openssl req'.
+     [Massimiliano Pala <madwolf@hackmasters.net>]
+
+  *) Introduce the possibility to access global variables through
+     functions on platform were that's the best way to handle exporting
+     global variables in shared libraries.  To enable this functionality,
+     one must configure with "EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN" or defined the C macro
+     "OPENSSL_EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION" in crypto/opensslconf.h (the latter
+     is normally done by Configure or something similar).
+
+     To implement a global variable, use the macro OPENSSL_IMPLEMENT_GLOBAL
+     in the source file (foo.c) like this:
+
+	OPENSSL_IMPLEMENT_GLOBAL(int,foo)=1;
+	OPENSSL_IMPLEMENT_GLOBAL(double,bar);
+
+     To declare a global variable, use the macros OPENSSL_DECLARE_GLOBAL
+     and OPENSSL_GLOBAL_REF in the header file (foo.h) like this:
+
+	OPENSSL_DECLARE_GLOBAL(int,foo);
+	#define foo OPENSSL_GLOBAL_REF(foo)
+	OPENSSL_DECLARE_GLOBAL(double,bar);
+	#define bar OPENSSL_GLOBAL_REF(bar)
+
+     The #defines are very important, and therefore so is including the
+     header file everywhere where the defined globals are used.
+
+     The macro OPENSSL_EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION also affects the definition
+     of ASN.1 items, but that structure is a bit different.
+
+     The largest change is in util/mkdef.pl which has been enhanced with
+     better and easier to understand logic to choose which symbols should
+     go into the Windows .def files as well as a number of fixes and code
+     cleanup (among others, algorithm keywords are now sorted
+     lexicographically to avoid constant rewrites).
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) In BN_div() keep a copy of the sign of 'num' before writing the
+     result to 'rm' because if rm==num the value will be overwritten
+     and produce the wrong result if 'num' is negative: this caused
+     problems with BN_mod() and BN_nnmod().
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Function OCSP_request_verify(). This checks the signature on an
+     OCSP request and verifies the signer certificate. The signer
+     certificate is just checked for a generic purpose and OCSP request
+     trust settings.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add OCSP_check_validity() function to check the validity of OCSP
+     responses. OCSP responses are prepared in real time and may only
+     be a few seconds old. Simply checking that the current time lies
+     between thisUpdate and nextUpdate max reject otherwise valid responses
+     caused by either OCSP responder or client clock inaccuracy. Instead
+     we allow thisUpdate and nextUpdate to fall within a certain period of
+     the current time. The age of the response can also optionally be
+     checked. Two new options -validity_period and -status_age added to
+     ocsp utility.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) If signature or public key algorithm is unrecognized print out its
+     OID rather that just UNKNOWN.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Change OCSP_cert_to_id() to tolerate a NULL subject certificate and
+     OCSP_cert_id_new() a NULL serialNumber. This allows a partial certificate
+     ID to be generated from the issuer certificate alone which can then be
+     passed to OCSP_id_issuer_cmp().
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) New compilation option ASN1_ITEM_FUNCTIONS. This causes the new
+     ASN1 modules to export functions returning ASN1_ITEM pointers
+     instead of the ASN1_ITEM structures themselves. This adds several
+     new macros which allow the underlying ASN1 function/structure to
+     be accessed transparently. As a result code should not use ASN1_ITEM
+     references directly (such as &X509_it) but instead use the relevant
+     macros (such as ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509)). This option is to allow
+     use of the new ASN1 code on platforms where exporting structures
+     is problematical (for example in shared libraries) but exporting
+     functions returning pointers to structures is not.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add support for overriding the generation of SSL/TLS session IDs.
+     These callbacks can be registered either in an SSL_CTX or per SSL.
+     The purpose of this is to allow applications to control, if they wish,
+     the arbitrary values chosen for use as session IDs, particularly as it
+     can be useful for session caching in multiple-server environments. A
+     command-line switch for testing this (and any client code that wishes
+     to use such a feature) has been added to "s_server".
+     [Geoff Thorpe, Lutz Jaenicke]
+
+  *) Modify mkdef.pl to recognise and parse preprocessor conditionals
+     of the form '#if defined(...) || defined(...) || ...' and
+     '#if !defined(...) && !defined(...) && ...'.  This also avoids
+     the growing number of special cases it was previously handling.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Make all configuration macros available for application by making
+     sure they are available in opensslconf.h, by giving them names starting
+     with "OPENSSL_" to avoid conflicts with other packages and by making
+     sure e_os2.h will cover all platform-specific cases together with
+     opensslconf.h.
+     Additionally, it is now possible to define configuration/platform-
+     specific names (called "system identities").  In the C code, these
+     are prefixed with "OPENSSL_SYSNAME_".  e_os2.h will create another
+     macro with the name beginning with "OPENSSL_SYS_", which is determined
+     from "OPENSSL_SYSNAME_*" or compiler-specific macros depending on
+     what is available.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) New option -set_serial to 'req' and 'x509' this allows the serial
+     number to use to be specified on the command line. Previously self
+     signed certificates were hard coded with serial number 0 and the 
+     CA options of 'x509' had to use a serial number in a file which was
+     auto incremented.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) New options to 'ca' utility to support V2 CRL entry extensions.
+     Currently CRL reason, invalidity date and hold instruction are
+     supported. Add new CRL extensions to V3 code and some new objects.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) New function EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding() this is used to
+     disable standard block padding (aka PKCS#5 padding) in the EVP
+     API, which was previously mandatory. This means that the data is
+     not padded in any way and so the total length much be a multiple
+     of the block size, otherwise an error occurs.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Initial (incomplete) OCSP SSL support.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) New function OCSP_parse_url(). This splits up a URL into its host,
+     port and path components: primarily to parse OCSP URLs. New -url
+     option to ocsp utility.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) New nonce behavior. The return value of OCSP_check_nonce() now 
+     reflects the various checks performed. Applications can decide
+     whether to tolerate certain situations such as an absent nonce
+     in a response when one was present in a request: the ocsp application
+     just prints out a warning. New function OCSP_add1_basic_nonce()
+     this is to allow responders to include a nonce in a response even if
+     the request is nonce-less.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Disable stdin buffering in load_cert (apps/apps.c) so that no certs are
+     skipped when using openssl x509 multiple times on a single input file,
+     e.g. "(openssl x509 -out cert1; openssl x509 -out cert2) <certs".
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Make ASN1_UTCTIME_set_string() and ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set_string()
+     set string type: to handle setting ASN1_TIME structures. Fix ca
+     utility to correctly initialize revocation date of CRLs.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) New option SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE allows the server to override
+     the clients preferred ciphersuites and rather use its own preferences.
+     Should help to work around M$ SGC (Server Gated Cryptography) bug in
+     Internet Explorer by ensuring unchanged hash method during stepup.
+     (Also replaces the broken/deactivated SSL_OP_NON_EXPORT_FIRST option.)
+     [Lutz Jaenicke]
+
+  *) Make mkdef.pl recognise all DECLARE_ASN1 macros, change rijndael
+     to aes and add a new 'exist' option to print out symbols that don't
+     appear to exist.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Additional options to ocsp utility to allow flags to be set and
+     additional certificates supplied.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add the option -VAfile to 'openssl ocsp', so the user can give the
+     OCSP client a number of certificate to only verify the response
+     signature against.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Update Rijndael code to version 3.0 and change EVP AES ciphers to
+     handle the new API. Currently only ECB, CBC modes supported. Add new
+     AES OIDs.
+
+     Add TLS AES ciphersuites as described in RFC3268, "Advanced
+     Encryption Standard (AES) Ciphersuites for Transport Layer
+     Security (TLS)".  (In beta versions of OpenSSL 0.9.7, these were
+     not enabled by default and were not part of the "ALL" ciphersuite
+     alias because they were not yet official; they could be
+     explicitly requested by specifying the "AESdraft" ciphersuite
+     group alias.  In the final release of OpenSSL 0.9.7, the group
+     alias is called "AES" and is part of "ALL".)
+     [Ben Laurie, Steve  Henson, Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) New function OCSP_copy_nonce() to copy nonce value (if present) from
+     request to response.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Functions for OCSP responders. OCSP_request_onereq_count(),
+     OCSP_request_onereq_get0(), OCSP_onereq_get0_id() and OCSP_id_get0_info()
+     extract information from a certificate request. OCSP_response_create()
+     creates a response and optionally adds a basic response structure.
+     OCSP_basic_add1_status() adds a complete single response to a basic
+     response and returns the OCSP_SINGLERESP structure just added (to allow
+     extensions to be included for example). OCSP_basic_add1_cert() adds a
+     certificate to a basic response and OCSP_basic_sign() signs a basic
+     response with various flags. New helper functions ASN1_TIME_check()
+     (checks validity of ASN1_TIME structure) and ASN1_TIME_to_generalizedtime()
+     (converts ASN1_TIME to GeneralizedTime).
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Various new functions. EVP_Digest() combines EVP_Digest{Init,Update,Final}()
+     in a single operation. X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr() extracts the public_key
+     structure from a certificate. X509_pubkey_digest() digests the public_key
+     contents: this is used in various key identifiers. 
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Make sk_sort() tolerate a NULL argument.
+     [Steve Henson reported by Massimiliano Pala <madwolf@comune.modena.it>]
+
+  *) New OCSP verify flag OCSP_TRUSTOTHER. When set the "other" certificates
+     passed by the function are trusted implicitly. If any of them signed the
+     response then it is assumed to be valid and is not verified.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) In PKCS7_set_type() initialise content_type in PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT
+     to data. This was previously part of the PKCS7 ASN1 code. This
+     was causing problems with OpenSSL created PKCS#12 and PKCS#7 structures.
+     [Steve Henson, reported by Kenneth R. Robinette
+				<support@securenetterm.com>]
+
+  *) Add CRYPTO_push_info() and CRYPTO_pop_info() calls to new ASN1
+     routines: without these tracing memory leaks is very painful.
+     Fix leaks in PKCS12 and PKCS7 routines.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Make X509_time_adj() cope with the new behaviour of ASN1_TIME_new().
+     Previously it initialised the 'type' argument to V_ASN1_UTCTIME which
+     effectively meant GeneralizedTime would never be used. Now it
+     is initialised to -1 but X509_time_adj() now has to check the value
+     and use ASN1_TIME_set() if the value is not V_ASN1_UTCTIME or
+     V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME, without this it always uses GeneralizedTime.
+     [Steve Henson, reported by Kenneth R. Robinette
+				<support@securenetterm.com>]
+
+  *) Fixes to BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER when bn is zero. This would previously
+     result in a zero length in the ASN1_INTEGER structure which was
+     not consistent with the structure when d2i_ASN1_INTEGER() was used
+     and would cause ASN1_INTEGER_cmp() to fail. Enhance s2i_ASN1_INTEGER()
+     to cope with hex and negative integers. Fix bug in i2a_ASN1_INTEGER()
+     where it did not print out a minus for negative ASN1_INTEGER.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add summary printout to ocsp utility. The various functions which
+     convert status values to strings have been renamed to:
+     OCSP_response_status_str(), OCSP_cert_status_str() and
+     OCSP_crl_reason_str() and are no longer static. New options
+     to verify nonce values and to disable verification. OCSP response
+     printout format cleaned up.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add additional OCSP certificate checks. These are those specified
+     in RFC2560. This consists of two separate checks: the CA of the
+     certificate being checked must either be the OCSP signer certificate
+     or the issuer of the OCSP signer certificate. In the latter case the
+     OCSP signer certificate must contain the OCSP signing extended key
+     usage. This check is performed by attempting to match the OCSP
+     signer or the OCSP signer CA to the issuerNameHash and issuerKeyHash
+     in the OCSP_CERTID structures of the response.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Initial OCSP certificate verification added to OCSP_basic_verify()
+     and related routines. This uses the standard OpenSSL certificate
+     verify routines to perform initial checks (just CA validity) and
+     to obtain the certificate chain. Then additional checks will be
+     performed on the chain. Currently the root CA is checked to see
+     if it is explicitly trusted for OCSP signing. This is used to set
+     a root CA as a global signing root: that is any certificate that
+     chains to that CA is an acceptable OCSP signing certificate.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) New '-extfile ...' option to 'openssl ca' for reading X.509v3
+     extensions from a separate configuration file.
+     As when reading extensions from the main configuration file,
+     the '-extensions ...' option may be used for specifying the
+     section to use.
+     [Massimiliano Pala <madwolf@comune.modena.it>]
+
+  *) New OCSP utility. Allows OCSP requests to be generated or
+     read. The request can be sent to a responder and the output
+     parsed, outputed or printed in text form. Not complete yet:
+     still needs to check the OCSP response validity.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) New subcommands for 'openssl ca':
+     'openssl ca -status <serial>' prints the status of the cert with
+     the given serial number (according to the index file).
+     'openssl ca -updatedb' updates the expiry status of certificates
+     in the index file.
+     [Massimiliano Pala <madwolf@comune.modena.it>]
+
+  *) New '-newreq-nodes' command option to CA.pl.  This is like
+     '-newreq', but calls 'openssl req' with the '-nodes' option
+     so that the resulting key is not encrypted.
+     [Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>]
+
+  *) New configuration for the GNU Hurd.
+     [Jonathan Bartlett <johnnyb@wolfram.com> via Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Initial code to implement OCSP basic response verify. This
+     is currently incomplete. Currently just finds the signer's
+     certificate and verifies the signature on the response.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) New SSLeay_version code SSLEAY_DIR to determine the compiled-in
+     value of OPENSSLDIR.  This is available via the new '-d' option
+     to 'openssl version', and is also included in 'openssl version -a'.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Allowing defining memory allocation callbacks that will be given
+     file name and line number information in additional arguments
+     (a const char* and an int).  The basic functionality remains, as
+     well as the original possibility to just replace malloc(),
+     realloc() and free() by functions that do not know about these
+     additional arguments.  To register and find out the current
+     settings for extended allocation functions, the following
+     functions are provided:
+
+	CRYPTO_set_mem_ex_functions
+	CRYPTO_set_locked_mem_ex_functions
+	CRYPTO_get_mem_ex_functions
+	CRYPTO_get_locked_mem_ex_functions
+
+     These work the same way as CRYPTO_set_mem_functions and friends.
+     CRYPTO_get_[locked_]mem_functions now writes 0 where such an
+     extended allocation function is enabled.
+     Similarly, CRYPTO_get_[locked_]mem_ex_functions writes 0 where
+     a conventional allocation function is enabled.
+     [Richard Levitte, Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Finish off removing the remaining LHASH function pointer casts.
+     There should no longer be any prototype-casting required when using
+     the LHASH abstraction, and any casts that remain are "bugs". See
+     the callback types and macros at the head of lhash.h for details
+     (and "OBJ_cleanup" in crypto/objects/obj_dat.c as an example).
+     [Geoff Thorpe]
+
+  *) Add automatic query of EGD sockets in RAND_poll() for the unix variant.
+     If /dev/[u]random devices are not available or do not return enough
+     entropy, EGD style sockets (served by EGD or PRNGD) will automatically
+     be queried.
+     The locations /var/run/egd-pool, /dev/egd-pool, /etc/egd-pool, and
+     /etc/entropy will be queried once each in this sequence, querying stops
+     when enough entropy was collected without querying more sockets.
+     [Lutz Jaenicke]
+
+  *) Change the Unix RAND_poll() variant to be able to poll several
+     random devices, as specified by DEVRANDOM, until a sufficient amount
+     of data has been collected.   We spend at most 10 ms on each file
+     (select timeout) and read in non-blocking mode.  DEVRANDOM now
+     defaults to the list "/dev/urandom", "/dev/random", "/dev/srandom"
+     (previously it was just the string "/dev/urandom"), so on typical
+     platforms the 10 ms delay will never occur.
+     Also separate out the Unix variant to its own file, rand_unix.c.
+     For VMS, there's a currently-empty rand_vms.c.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Move OCSP client related routines to ocsp_cl.c. These
+     provide utility functions which an application needing
+     to issue a request to an OCSP responder and analyse the
+     response will typically need: as opposed to those which an
+     OCSP responder itself would need which will be added later.
+
+     OCSP_request_sign() signs an OCSP request with an API similar
+     to PKCS7_sign(). OCSP_response_status() returns status of OCSP
+     response. OCSP_response_get1_basic() extracts basic response
+     from response. OCSP_resp_find_status(): finds and extracts status
+     information from an OCSP_CERTID structure (which will be created
+     when the request structure is built). These are built from lower
+     level functions which work on OCSP_SINGLERESP structures but
+     won't normally be used unless the application wishes to examine
+     extensions in the OCSP response for example.
+
+     Replace nonce routines with a pair of functions.
+     OCSP_request_add1_nonce() adds a nonce value and optionally
+     generates a random value. OCSP_check_nonce() checks the
+     validity of the nonce in an OCSP response.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Change function OCSP_request_add() to OCSP_request_add0_id().
+     This doesn't copy the supplied OCSP_CERTID and avoids the
+     need to free up the newly created id. Change return type
+     to OCSP_ONEREQ to return the internal OCSP_ONEREQ structure.
+     This can then be used to add extensions to the request.
+     Deleted OCSP_request_new(), since most of its functionality
+     is now in OCSP_REQUEST_new() (and the case insensitive name
+     clash) apart from the ability to set the request name which
+     will be added elsewhere.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Update OCSP API. Remove obsolete extensions argument from
+     various functions. Extensions are now handled using the new
+     OCSP extension code. New simple OCSP HTTP function which 
+     can be used to send requests and parse the response.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix the PKCS#7 (S/MIME) code to work with new ASN1. Two new
+     ASN1_ITEM structures help with sign and verify. PKCS7_ATTR_SIGN
+     uses the special reorder version of SET OF to sort the attributes
+     and reorder them to match the encoded order. This resolves a long
+     standing problem: a verify on a PKCS7 structure just after signing
+     it used to fail because the attribute order did not match the
+     encoded order. PKCS7_ATTR_VERIFY does not reorder the attributes:
+     it uses the received order. This is necessary to tolerate some broken
+     software that does not order SET OF. This is handled by encoding
+     as a SEQUENCE OF but using implicit tagging (with UNIVERSAL class)
+     to produce the required SET OF.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Have mk1mf.pl generate the macros OPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBCRYPTO and
+     OPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL and use them appropriately in the header
+     files to get correct declarations of the ASN.1 item variables.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Rewrite of PKCS#12 code to use new ASN1 functionality. Replace many
+     PKCS#12 macros with real functions. Fix two unrelated ASN1 bugs:
+     asn1_check_tlen() would sometimes attempt to use 'ctx' when it was
+     NULL and ASN1_TYPE was not dereferenced properly in asn1_ex_c2i().
+     New ASN1 macro: DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM() which just declares the relevant
+     ASN1_ITEM and no wrapper functions.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) New functions or ASN1_item_d2i_fp() and ASN1_item_d2i_bio(). These
+     replace the old function pointer based I/O routines. Change most of
+     the *_d2i_bio() and *_d2i_fp() functions to use these.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Enhance mkdef.pl to be more accepting about spacing in C preprocessor
+     lines, recognice more "algorithms" that can be deselected, and make
+     it complain about algorithm deselection that isn't recognised.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) New ASN1 functions to handle dup, sign, verify, digest, pack and
+     unpack operations in terms of ASN1_ITEM. Modify existing wrappers
+     to use new functions. Add NO_ASN1_OLD which can be set to remove
+     some old style ASN1 functions: this can be used to determine if old
+     code will still work when these eventually go away.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) New extension functions for OCSP structures, these follow the
+     same conventions as certificates and CRLs.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) New function X509V3_add1_i2d(). This automatically encodes and
+     adds an extension. Its behaviour can be customised with various
+     flags to append, replace or delete. Various wrappers added for
+     certificates and CRLs.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix to avoid calling the underlying ASN1 print routine when
+     an extension cannot be parsed. Correct a typo in the
+     OCSP_SERVICELOC extension. Tidy up print OCSP format.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Make mkdef.pl parse some of the ASN1 macros and add appropriate
+     entries for variables.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add functionality to apps/openssl.c for detecting locking
+     problems: As the program is single-threaded, all we have
+     to do is register a locking callback using an array for
+     storing which locks are currently held by the program.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Use a lock around the call to CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index() in
+     SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_idx(), which is used in
+     ssl_verify_cert_chain() and thus can be called at any time
+     during TLS/SSL handshakes so that thread-safety is essential.
+     Unfortunately, the ex_data design is not at all suited
+     for multi-threaded use, so it probably should be abolished.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Added Broadcom "ubsec" ENGINE to OpenSSL.
+     [Broadcom, tweaked and integrated by Geoff Thorpe]
+
+  *) Move common extension printing code to new function
+     X509V3_print_extensions(). Reorganise OCSP print routines and
+     implement some needed OCSP ASN1 functions. Add OCSP extensions.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) New function X509_signature_print() to remove duplication in some
+     print routines.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add a special meaning when SET OF and SEQUENCE OF flags are both
+     set (this was treated exactly the same as SET OF previously). This
+     is used to reorder the STACK representing the structure to match the
+     encoding. This will be used to get round a problem where a PKCS7
+     structure which was signed could not be verified because the STACK
+     order did not reflect the encoded order.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Reimplement the OCSP ASN1 module using the new code.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Update the X509V3 code to permit the use of an ASN1_ITEM structure
+     for its ASN1 operations. The old style function pointers still exist
+     for now but they will eventually go away.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Merge in replacement ASN1 code from the ASN1 branch. This almost
+     completely replaces the old ASN1 functionality with a table driven
+     encoder and decoder which interprets an ASN1_ITEM structure describing
+     the ASN1 module. Compatibility with the existing ASN1 API (i2d,d2i) is
+     largely maintained. Almost all of the old asn1_mac.h macro based ASN1
+     has also been converted to the new form.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Change BN_mod_exp_recp so that negative moduli are tolerated
+     (the sign is ignored).  Similarly, ignore the sign in BN_MONT_CTX_set
+     so that BN_mod_exp_mont and BN_mod_exp_mont_word work
+     for negative moduli.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Fix BN_uadd and BN_usub: Always return non-negative results instead
+     of not touching the result's sign bit.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) BN_div bugfix: If the result is 0, the sign (res->neg) must not be
+     set.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Changed the LHASH code to use prototypes for callbacks, and created
+     macros to declare and implement thin (optionally static) functions
+     that provide type-safety and avoid function pointer casting for the
+     type-specific callbacks.
+     [Geoff Thorpe]
+
+  *) Added Kerberos Cipher Suites to be used with TLS, as written in
+     RFC 2712.
+     [Veers Staats <staatsvr@asc.hpc.mil>,
+      Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@columbia.edu>, via Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Reformat the FAQ so the different questions and answers can be divided
+     in sections depending on the subject.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Have the zlib compression code load ZLIB.DLL dynamically under
+     Windows.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) New function BN_mod_sqrt for computing square roots modulo a prime
+     (using the probabilistic Tonelli-Shanks algorithm unless
+     p == 3 (mod 4)  or  p == 5 (mod 8),  which are cases that can
+     be handled deterministically).
+     [Lenka Fibikova <fibikova@exp-math.uni-essen.de>, Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Make BN_mod_inverse faster by explicitly handling small quotients
+     in the Euclid loop. (Speed gain about 20% for small moduli [256 or
+     512 bits], about 30% for larger ones [1024 or 2048 bits].)
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) New function BN_kronecker.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Fix BN_gcd so that it works on negative inputs; the result is
+     positive unless both parameters are zero.
+     Previously something reasonably close to an infinite loop was
+     possible because numbers could be growing instead of shrinking
+     in the implementation of Euclid's algorithm.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Fix BN_is_word() and BN_is_one() macros to take into account the
+     sign of the number in question.
+
+     Fix BN_is_word(a,w) to work correctly for w == 0.
+
+     The old BN_is_word(a,w) macro is now called BN_abs_is_word(a,w)
+     because its test if the absolute value of 'a' equals 'w'.
+     Note that BN_abs_is_word does *not* handle w == 0 reliably;
+     it exists mostly for use in the implementations of BN_is_zero(),
+     BN_is_one(), and BN_is_word().
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) New function BN_swap.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Use BN_nnmod instead of BN_mod in crypto/bn/bn_exp.c so that
+     the exponentiation functions are more likely to produce reasonable
+     results on negative inputs.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Change BN_mod_mul so that the result is always non-negative.
+     Previously, it could be negative if one of the factors was negative;
+     I don't think anyone really wanted that behaviour.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Move BN_mod_... functions into new file crypto/bn/bn_mod.c
+     (except for exponentiation, which stays in crypto/bn/bn_exp.c,
+     and BN_mod_mul_reciprocal, which stays in crypto/bn/bn_recp.c)
+     and add new functions:
+
+          BN_nnmod
+          BN_mod_sqr
+          BN_mod_add
+          BN_mod_add_quick
+          BN_mod_sub
+          BN_mod_sub_quick
+          BN_mod_lshift1
+          BN_mod_lshift1_quick
+          BN_mod_lshift
+          BN_mod_lshift_quick
+
+     These functions always generate non-negative results.
+
+     BN_nnmod otherwise is like BN_mod (if BN_mod computes a remainder  r
+     such that  |m| < r < 0,  BN_nnmod will output  rem + |m|  instead).
+
+     BN_mod_XXX_quick(r, a, [b,] m) generates the same result as
+     BN_mod_XXX(r, a, [b,] m, ctx), but requires that  a  [and  b]
+     be reduced modulo  m.
+     [Lenka Fibikova <fibikova@exp-math.uni-essen.de>, Bodo Moeller]
+
+#if 0
+     The following entry accidentally appeared in the CHANGES file
+     distributed with OpenSSL 0.9.7.  The modifications described in
+     it do *not* apply to OpenSSL 0.9.7.
+
+  *) Remove a few calls to bn_wexpand() in BN_sqr() (the one in there
+     was actually never needed) and in BN_mul().  The removal in BN_mul()
+     required a small change in bn_mul_part_recursive() and the addition
+     of the functions bn_cmp_part_words(), bn_sub_part_words() and
+     bn_add_part_words(), which do the same thing as bn_cmp_words(),
+     bn_sub_words() and bn_add_words() except they take arrays with
+     differing sizes.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+#endif
+
+  *) In 'openssl passwd', verify passwords read from the terminal
+     unless the '-salt' option is used (which usually means that
+     verification would just waste user's time since the resulting
+     hash is going to be compared with some given password hash)
+     or the new '-noverify' option is used.
+
+     This is an incompatible change, but it does not affect
+     non-interactive use of 'openssl passwd' (passwords on the command
+     line, '-stdin' option, '-in ...' option) and thus should not
+     cause any problems.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Remove all references to RSAref, since there's no more need for it.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Make DSO load along a path given through an environment variable
+     (SHLIB_PATH) with shl_load().
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Constify the ENGINE code as a result of BIGNUM constification.
+     Also constify the RSA code and most things related to it.  In a
+     few places, most notable in the depth of the ASN.1 code, ugly
+     casts back to non-const were required (to be solved at a later
+     time)
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Make it so the openssl application has all engines loaded by default.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Constify the BIGNUM routines a little more.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Add the following functions:
+
+	ENGINE_load_cswift()
+	ENGINE_load_chil()
+	ENGINE_load_atalla()
+	ENGINE_load_nuron()
+	ENGINE_load_builtin_engines()
+
+     That way, an application can itself choose if external engines that
+     are built-in in OpenSSL shall ever be used or not.  The benefit is
+     that applications won't have to be linked with libdl or other dso
+     libraries unless it's really needed.
+
+     Changed 'openssl engine' to load all engines on demand.
+     Changed the engine header files to avoid the duplication of some
+     declarations (they differed!).
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) 'openssl engine' can now list capabilities.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Better error reporting in 'openssl engine'.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Never call load_dh_param(NULL) in s_server.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Add engine application.  It can currently list engines by name and
+     identity, and test if they are actually available.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Improve RPM specification file by forcing symbolic linking and making
+     sure the installed documentation is also owned by root.root.
+     [Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>]
+
+  *) Give the OpenSSL applications more possibilities to make use of
+     keys (public as well as private) handled by engines.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Add OCSP code that comes from CertCo.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Add VMS support for the Rijndael code.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Added untested support for Nuron crypto accelerator.
+     [Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) Add support for external cryptographic devices.  This code was
+     previously distributed separately as the "engine" branch.
+     [Geoff Thorpe, Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Rework the filename-translation in the DSO code. It is now possible to
+     have far greater control over how a "name" is turned into a filename
+     depending on the operating environment and any oddities about the
+     different shared library filenames on each system.
+     [Geoff Thorpe]
+
+  *) Support threads on FreeBSD-elf in Configure.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Fix for SHA1 assembly problem with MASM: it produces
+     warnings about corrupt line number information when assembling
+     with debugging information. This is caused by the overlapping
+     of two sections.
+     [Bernd Matthes <mainbug@celocom.de>, Steve Henson]
+
+  *) NCONF changes.
+     NCONF_get_number() has no error checking at all.  As a replacement,
+     NCONF_get_number_e() is defined (_e for "error checking") and is
+     promoted strongly.  The old NCONF_get_number is kept around for
+     binary backward compatibility.
+     Make it possible for methods to load from something other than a BIO,
+     by providing a function pointer that is given a name instead of a BIO.
+     For example, this could be used to load configuration data from an
+     LDAP server.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Fix for non blocking accept BIOs. Added new I/O special reason
+     BIO_RR_ACCEPT to cover this case. Previously use of accept BIOs
+     with non blocking I/O was not possible because no retry code was
+     implemented. Also added new SSL code SSL_WANT_ACCEPT to cover
+     this case.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Added the beginnings of Rijndael support.
+     [Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) Fix for bug in DirectoryString mask setting. Add support for
+     X509_NAME_print_ex() in 'req' and X509_print_ex() function
+     to allow certificate printing to more controllable, additional
+     'certopt' option to 'x509' to allow new printing options to be
+     set.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Clean old EAY MD5 hack from e_os.h.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.6l and 0.9.6m  [17 Mar 2004]
+
+  *) Fix null-pointer assignment in do_change_cipher_spec() revealed
+     by using the Codenomicon TLS Test Tool (CVE-2004-0079)
+     [Joe Orton, Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.6k and 0.9.6l  [04 Nov 2003]
+
+  *) Fix additional bug revealed by the NISCC test suite:
+
+     Stop bug triggering large recursion when presented with
+     certain ASN.1 tags (CVE-2003-0851)
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.6j and 0.9.6k  [30 Sep 2003]
+
+  *) Fix various bugs revealed by running the NISCC test suite:
+
+     Stop out of bounds reads in the ASN1 code when presented with
+     invalid tags (CVE-2003-0543 and CVE-2003-0544).
+     
+     If verify callback ignores invalid public key errors don't try to check
+     certificate signature with the NULL public key.
+
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) In ssl3_accept() (ssl/s3_srvr.c) only accept a client certificate
+     if the server requested one: as stated in TLS 1.0 and SSL 3.0
+     specifications.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) In ssl3_get_client_hello() (ssl/s3_srvr.c), tolerate additional
+     extra data after the compression methods not only for TLS 1.0
+     but also for SSL 3.0 (as required by the specification).
+     [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Matthias Loepfe]
+
+  *) Change X509_certificate_type() to mark the key as exported/exportable
+     when it's 512 *bits* long, not 512 bytes.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.6i and 0.9.6j  [10 Apr 2003]
+
+  *) Countermeasure against the Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of
+     Bleichbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 padding: treat
+     a protocol version number mismatch like a decryption error
+     in ssl3_get_client_key_exchange (ssl/s3_srvr.c).
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Turn on RSA blinding by default in the default implementation
+     to avoid a timing attack. Applications that don't want it can call
+     RSA_blinding_off() or use the new flag RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING.
+     They would be ill-advised to do so in most cases.
+     [Ben Laurie, Steve Henson, Geoff Thorpe, Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Change RSA blinding code so that it works when the PRNG is not
+     seeded (in this case, the secret RSA exponent is abused as
+     an unpredictable seed -- if it is not unpredictable, there
+     is no point in blinding anyway).  Make RSA blinding thread-safe
+     by remembering the creator's thread ID in rsa->blinding and
+     having all other threads use local one-time blinding factors
+     (this requires more computation than sharing rsa->blinding, but
+     avoids excessive locking; and if an RSA object is not shared
+     between threads, blinding will still be very fast).
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.6h and 0.9.6i  [19 Feb 2003]
+
+  *) In ssl3_get_record (ssl/s3_pkt.c), minimize information leaked
+     via timing by performing a MAC computation even if incorrrect
+     block cipher padding has been found.  This is a countermeasure
+     against active attacks where the attacker has to distinguish
+     between bad padding and a MAC verification error. (CVE-2003-0078)
+
+     [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Brice Canvel (EPFL),
+     Alain Hiltgen (UBS), Serge Vaudenay (EPFL), and
+     Martin Vuagnoux (EPFL, Ilion)]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.6g and 0.9.6h  [5 Dec 2002]
+
+  *) New function OPENSSL_cleanse(), which is used to cleanse a section of
+     memory from it's contents.  This is done with a counter that will
+     place alternating values in each byte.  This can be used to solve
+     two issues: 1) the removal of calls to memset() by highly optimizing
+     compilers, and 2) cleansing with other values than 0, since those can
+     be read through on certain media, for example a swap space on disk.
+     [Geoff Thorpe]
+
+  *) Bugfix: client side session caching did not work with external caching,
+     because the session->cipher setting was not restored when reloading
+     from the external cache. This problem was masked, when
+     SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG (part of SSL_OP_ALL) was set.
+     (Found by Steve Haslam <steve@araqnid.ddts.net>.)
+     [Lutz Jaenicke]
+
+  *) Fix client_certificate (ssl/s2_clnt.c): The permissible total
+     length of the REQUEST-CERTIFICATE message is 18 .. 34, not 17 .. 33.
+     [Zeev Lieber <zeev-l@yahoo.com>]
+
+  *) Undo an undocumented change introduced in 0.9.6e which caused
+     repeated calls to OpenSSL_add_all_ciphers() and 
+     OpenSSL_add_all_digests() to be ignored, even after calling
+     EVP_cleanup().
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Change the default configuration reader to deal with last line not
+     being properly terminated.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Change X509_NAME_cmp() so it applies the special rules on handling
+     DN values that are of type PrintableString, as well as RDNs of type
+     emailAddress where the value has the type ia5String.
+     [stefank@valicert.com via Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Add a SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE flag to take over half
+     the job SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP was inconsistently
+     doing, define a new flag (SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL) to be
+     the bitwise-OR of the two for use by the majority of applications
+     wanting this behaviour, and update the docs. The documented
+     behaviour and actual behaviour were inconsistent and had been
+     changing anyway, so this is more a bug-fix than a behavioural
+     change.
+     [Geoff Thorpe, diagnosed by Nadav Har'El]
+
+  *) Don't impose a 16-byte length minimum on session IDs in ssl/s3_clnt.c
+     (the SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0 specifications allow any length up to 32 bytes).
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Fix initialization code race conditions in
+        SSLv23_method(),  SSLv23_client_method(),   SSLv23_server_method(),
+        SSLv2_method(),   SSLv2_client_method(),    SSLv2_server_method(),
+        SSLv3_method(),   SSLv3_client_method(),    SSLv3_server_method(),
+        TLSv1_method(),   TLSv1_client_method(),    TLSv1_server_method(),
+        ssl2_get_cipher_by_char(),
+        ssl3_get_cipher_by_char().
+     [Patrick McCormick <patrick@tellme.com>, Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Reorder cleanup sequence in SSL_CTX_free(): only remove the ex_data after
+     the cached sessions are flushed, as the remove_cb() might use ex_data
+     contents. Bug found by Sam Varshavchik <mrsam@courier-mta.com>
+     (see [openssl.org #212]).
+     [Geoff Thorpe, Lutz Jaenicke]
+
+  *) Fix typo in OBJ_txt2obj which incorrectly passed the content
+     length, instead of the encoding length to d2i_ASN1_OBJECT.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.6f and 0.9.6g  [9 Aug 2002]
+
+  *) [In 0.9.6g-engine release:]
+     Fix crypto/engine/vendor_defns/cswift.h for WIN32 (use '_stdcall').
+     [Lynn Gazis <lgazis@rainbow.com>]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.6e and 0.9.6f  [8 Aug 2002]
+
+  *) Fix ASN1 checks. Check for overflow by comparing with LONG_MAX
+     and get fix the header length calculation.
+     [Florian Weimer <Weimer@CERT.Uni-Stuttgart.DE>,
+	Alon Kantor <alonk@checkpoint.com> (and others),
+	Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Use proper error handling instead of 'assertions' in buffer
+     overflow checks added in 0.9.6e.  This prevents DoS (the
+     assertions could call abort()).
+     [Arne Ansper <arne@ats.cyber.ee>, Bodo Moeller]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.6d and 0.9.6e  [30 Jul 2002]
+
+  *) Add various sanity checks to asn1_get_length() to reject
+     the ASN1 length bytes if they exceed sizeof(long), will appear
+     negative or the content length exceeds the length of the
+     supplied buffer.
+     [Steve Henson, Adi Stav <stav@mercury.co.il>, James Yonan <jim@ntlp.com>]
+
+  *) Fix cipher selection routines: ciphers without encryption had no flags
+     for the cipher strength set and where therefore not handled correctly
+     by the selection routines (PR #130).
+     [Lutz Jaenicke]
+
+  *) Fix EVP_dsa_sha macro.
+     [Nils Larsch]
+
+  *) New option
+          SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS
+     for disabling the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 CBC vulnerability countermeasure
+     that was added in OpenSSL 0.9.6d.
+
+     As the countermeasure turned out to be incompatible with some
+     broken SSL implementations, the new option is part of SSL_OP_ALL.
+     SSL_OP_ALL is usually employed when compatibility with weird SSL
+     implementations is desired (e.g. '-bugs' option to 's_client' and
+     's_server'), so the new option is automatically set in many
+     applications.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Changes in security patch:
+
+     Changes marked "(CHATS)" were sponsored by the Defense Advanced
+     Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and Air Force Research Laboratory,
+     Air Force Materiel Command, USAF, under agreement number
+     F30602-01-2-0537.
+
+  *) Add various sanity checks to asn1_get_length() to reject
+     the ASN1 length bytes if they exceed sizeof(long), will appear
+     negative or the content length exceeds the length of the
+     supplied buffer. (CVE-2002-0659)
+     [Steve Henson, Adi Stav <stav@mercury.co.il>, James Yonan <jim@ntlp.com>]
+
+  *) Assertions for various potential buffer overflows, not known to
+     happen in practice.
+     [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
+
+  *) Various temporary buffers to hold ASCII versions of integers were
+     too small for 64 bit platforms. (CVE-2002-0655)
+     [Matthew Byng-Maddick <mbm@aldigital.co.uk> and Ben Laurie (CHATS)>
+
+  *) Remote buffer overflow in SSL3 protocol - an attacker could
+     supply an oversized session ID to a client. (CVE-2002-0656)
+     [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
+
+  *) Remote buffer overflow in SSL2 protocol - an attacker could
+     supply an oversized client master key. (CVE-2002-0656)
+     [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.6c and 0.9.6d  [9 May 2002]
+
+  *) Fix crypto/asn1/a_sign.c so that 'parameters' is omitted (not
+     encoded as NULL) with id-dsa-with-sha1.
+     [Nils Larsch <nla@trustcenter.de>; problem pointed out by Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Check various X509_...() return values in apps/req.c.
+     [Nils Larsch <nla@trustcenter.de>]
+
+  *) Fix BASE64 decode (EVP_DecodeUpdate) for data with CR/LF ended lines:
+     an end-of-file condition would erroneously be flagged, when the CRLF
+     was just at the end of a processed block. The bug was discovered when
+     processing data through a buffering memory BIO handing the data to a
+     BASE64-decoding BIO. Bug fund and patch submitted by Pavel Tsekov
+     <ptsekov@syntrex.com> and Nedelcho Stanev.
+     [Lutz Jaenicke]
+
+  *) Implement a countermeasure against a vulnerability recently found
+     in CBC ciphersuites in SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0: Send an empty fragment
+     before application data chunks to avoid the use of known IVs
+     with data potentially chosen by the attacker.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Fix length checks in ssl3_get_client_hello().
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) TLS/SSL library bugfix: use s->s3->in_read_app_data differently
+     to prevent ssl3_read_internal() from incorrectly assuming that
+     ssl3_read_bytes() found application data while handshake
+     processing was enabled when in fact s->s3->in_read_app_data was
+     merely automatically cleared during the initial handshake.
+     [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Arne Ansper <arne@ats.cyber.ee>]
+
+  *) Fix object definitions for Private and Enterprise: they were not
+     recognized in their shortname (=lowercase) representation. Extend
+     obj_dat.pl to issue an error when using undefined keywords instead
+     of silently ignoring the problem (Svenning Sorensen
+     <sss@sss.dnsalias.net>).
+     [Lutz Jaenicke]
+
+  *) Fix DH_generate_parameters() so that it works for 'non-standard'
+     generators, i.e. generators other than 2 and 5.  (Previously, the
+     code did not properly initialise the 'add' and 'rem' values to
+     BN_generate_prime().)
+
+     In the new general case, we do not insist that 'generator' is
+     actually a primitive root: This requirement is rather pointless;
+     a generator of the order-q subgroup is just as good, if not
+     better.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+ 
+  *) Map new X509 verification errors to alerts. Discovered and submitted by
+     Tom Wu <tom@arcot.com>.
+     [Lutz Jaenicke]
+
+  *) Fix ssl3_pending() (ssl/s3_lib.c) to prevent SSL_pending() from
+     returning non-zero before the data has been completely received
+     when using non-blocking I/O.
+     [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by John Hughes]
+
+  *) Some of the ciphers missed the strength entry (SSL_LOW etc).
+     [Ben Laurie, Lutz Jaenicke]
+
+  *) Fix bug in SSL_clear(): bad sessions were not removed (found by
+     Yoram Zahavi <YoramZ@gilian.com>).
+     [Lutz Jaenicke]
+
+  *) Add information about CygWin 1.3 and on, and preserve proper
+     configuration for the versions before that.
+     [Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com> and Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Make removal from session cache (SSL_CTX_remove_session()) more robust:
+     check whether we deal with a copy of a session and do not delete from
+     the cache in this case. Problem reported by "Izhar Shoshani Levi"
+     <izhar@checkpoint.com>.
+     [Lutz Jaenicke]
+
+  *) Do not store session data into the internal session cache, if it
+     is never intended to be looked up (SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP
+     flag is set). Proposed by Aslam <aslam@funk.com>.
+     [Lutz Jaenicke]
+
+  *) Have ASN1_BIT_STRING_set_bit() really clear a bit when the requested
+     value is 0.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) [In 0.9.6d-engine release:]
+     Fix a crashbug and a logic bug in hwcrhk_load_pubkey().
+     [Toomas Kiisk <vix@cyber.ee> via Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Add the configuration target linux-s390x.
+     [Neale Ferguson <Neale.Ferguson@SoftwareAG-USA.com> via Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) The earlier bugfix for the SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C case of
+     ssl3_accept (ssl/s3_srvr.c) incorrectly used a local flag
+     variable as an indication that a ClientHello message has been
+     received.  As the flag value will be lost between multiple
+     invocations of ssl3_accept when using non-blocking I/O, the
+     function may not be aware that a handshake has actually taken
+     place, thus preventing a new session from being added to the
+     session cache.
+
+     To avoid this problem, we now set s->new_session to 2 instead of
+     using a local variable.
+     [Lutz Jaenicke, Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Bugfix: Return -1 from ssl3_get_server_done (ssl3/s3_clnt.c)
+     if the SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH error is detected.
+     [Geoff Thorpe, Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) New 'shared_ldflag' column in Configure platform table.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Fix EVP_CIPHER_mode macro.
+     ["Dan S. Camper" <dan@bti.net>]
+
+  *) Fix ssl3_read_bytes (ssl/s3_pkt.c): To ignore messages of unknown
+     type, we must throw them away by setting rr->length to 0.
+     [D P Chang <dpc@qualys.com>]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.6b and 0.9.6c  [21 dec 2001]
+
+  *) Fix BN_rand_range bug pointed out by Dominikus Scherkl
+     <Dominikus.Scherkl@biodata.com>.  (The previous implementation
+     worked incorrectly for those cases where  range = 10..._2  and
+     3*range  is two bits longer than  range.)
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Only add signing time to PKCS7 structures if it is not already
+     present.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix crypto/objects/objects.h: "ld-ce" should be "id-ce",
+     OBJ_ld_ce should be OBJ_id_ce.
+     Also some ip-pda OIDs in crypto/objects/objects.txt were
+     incorrect (cf. RFC 3039).
+     [Matt Cooper, Frederic Giudicelli, Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Release CRYPTO_LOCK_DYNLOCK when CRYPTO_destroy_dynlockid()
+     returns early because it has nothing to do.
+     [Andy Schneider <andy.schneider@bjss.co.uk>]
+
+  *) [In 0.9.6c-engine release:]
+     Fix mutex callback return values in crypto/engine/hw_ncipher.c.
+     [Andy Schneider <andy.schneider@bjss.co.uk>]
+
+  *) [In 0.9.6c-engine release:]
+     Add support for Cryptographic Appliance's keyserver technology.
+     (Use engine 'keyclient')
+     [Cryptographic Appliances and Geoff Thorpe]
+
+  *) Add a configuration entry for OS/390 Unix.  The C compiler 'c89'
+     is called via tools/c89.sh because arguments have to be
+     rearranged (all '-L' options must appear before the first object
+     modules).
+     [Richard Shapiro <rshapiro@abinitio.com>]
+
+  *) [In 0.9.6c-engine release:]
+     Add support for Broadcom crypto accelerator cards, backported
+     from 0.9.7.
+     [Broadcom, Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>, Mark Cox]
+
+  *) [In 0.9.6c-engine release:]
+     Add support for SureWare crypto accelerator cards from 
+     Baltimore Technologies.  (Use engine 'sureware')
+     [Baltimore Technologies and Mark Cox]
+
+  *) [In 0.9.6c-engine release:]
+     Add support for crypto accelerator cards from Accelerated
+     Encryption Processing, www.aep.ie.  (Use engine 'aep')
+     [AEP Inc. and Mark Cox]
+
+  *) Add a configuration entry for gcc on UnixWare.
+     [Gary Benson <gbenson@redhat.com>]
+
+  *) Change ssl/s2_clnt.c and ssl/s2_srvr.c so that received handshake
+     messages are stored in a single piece (fixed-length part and
+     variable-length part combined) and fix various bugs found on the way.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Disable caching in BIO_gethostbyname(), directly use gethostbyname()
+     instead.  BIO_gethostbyname() does not know what timeouts are
+     appropriate, so entries would stay in cache even when they have
+     become invalid.
+     [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Rich Salz <rsalz@zolera.com>
+
+  *) Change ssl23_get_client_hello (ssl/s23_srvr.c) behaviour when
+     faced with a pathologically small ClientHello fragment that does
+     not contain client_version: Instead of aborting with an error,
+     simply choose the highest available protocol version (i.e.,
+     TLS 1.0 unless it is disabled).  In practice, ClientHello
+     messages are never sent like this, but this change gives us
+     strictly correct behaviour at least for TLS.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Fix SSL handshake functions and SSL_clear() such that SSL_clear()
+     never resets s->method to s->ctx->method when called from within
+     one of the SSL handshake functions.
+     [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Niko Baric]
+
+  *) In ssl3_get_client_hello (ssl/s3_srvr.c), generate a fatal alert
+     (sent using the client's version number) if client_version is
+     smaller than the protocol version in use.  Also change
+     ssl23_get_client_hello (ssl/s23_srvr.c) to select TLS 1.0 if
+     the client demanded SSL 3.0 but only TLS 1.0 is enabled; then
+     the client will at least see that alert.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Fix ssl3_get_message (ssl/s3_both.c) to handle message fragmentation
+     correctly.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Avoid infinite loop in ssl3_get_message (ssl/s3_both.c) if a
+     client receives HelloRequest while in a handshake.
+     [Bodo Moeller; bug noticed by Andy Schneider <andy.schneider@bjss.co.uk>]
+
+  *) Bugfix in ssl3_accept (ssl/s3_srvr.c): Case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C
+     should end in 'break', not 'goto end' which circumvents various
+     cleanups done in state SSL_ST_OK.   But session related stuff
+     must be disabled for SSL_ST_OK in the case that we just sent a
+     HelloRequest.
+
+     Also avoid some overhead by not calling ssl_init_wbio_buffer()
+     before just sending a HelloRequest.
+     [Bodo Moeller, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>]
+
+  *) Fix ssl/s3_enc.c, ssl/t1_enc.c and ssl/s3_pkt.c so that we don't
+     reveal whether illegal block cipher padding was found or a MAC
+     verification error occurred.  (Neither SSLerr() codes nor alerts
+     are directly visible to potential attackers, but the information
+     may leak via logfiles.)
+
+     Similar changes are not required for the SSL 2.0 implementation
+     because the number of padding bytes is sent in clear for SSL 2.0,
+     and the extra bytes are just ignored.  However ssl/s2_pkt.c
+     failed to verify that the purported number of padding bytes is in
+     the legal range.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Add OpenUNIX-8 support including shared libraries
+     (Boyd Lynn Gerber <gerberb@zenez.com>).
+     [Lutz Jaenicke]
+
+  *) Improve RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP() check again to avoid
+     'wristwatch attack' using huge encoding parameters (cf.
+     James H. Manger's CRYPTO 2001 paper).  Note that the
+     RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING case of RSA_private_decrypt() does not use
+     encoding parameters and hence was not vulnerable.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) BN_sqr() bug fix.
+     [Ulf Möller, reported by Jim Ellis <jim.ellis@cavium.com>]
+
+  *) Rabin-Miller test analyses assume uniformly distributed witnesses,
+     so use BN_pseudo_rand_range() instead of using BN_pseudo_rand()
+     followed by modular reduction.
+     [Bodo Moeller; pointed out by Adam Young <AYoung1@NCSUS.JNJ.COM>]
+
+  *) Add BN_pseudo_rand_range() with obvious functionality: BN_rand_range()
+     equivalent based on BN_pseudo_rand() instead of BN_rand().
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) s3_srvr.c: allow sending of large client certificate lists (> 16 kB).
+     This function was broken, as the check for a new client hello message
+     to handle SGC did not allow these large messages.
+     (Tracked down by "Douglas E. Engert" <deengert@anl.gov>.)
+     [Lutz Jaenicke]
+
+  *) Add alert descriptions for TLSv1 to SSL_alert_desc_string[_long]().
+     [Lutz Jaenicke]
+
+  *) Fix buggy behaviour of BIO_get_num_renegotiates() and BIO_ctrl()
+     for BIO_C_GET_WRITE_BUF_SIZE ("Stephen Hinton" <shinton@netopia.com>).
+     [Lutz Jaenicke]
+
+  *) Rework the configuration and shared library support for Tru64 Unix.
+     The configuration part makes use of modern compiler features and
+     still retains old compiler behavior for those that run older versions
+     of the OS.  The shared library support part includes a variant that
+     uses the RPATH feature, and is available through the special
+     configuration target "alpha-cc-rpath", which will never be selected
+     automatically.
+     [Tim Mooney <mooney@dogbert.cc.ndsu.NoDak.edu> via Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) In ssl3_get_key_exchange (ssl/s3_clnt.c), call ssl3_get_message()
+     with the same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request().
+     Otherwise, if no ServerKeyExchange message occurs, CertificateRequest
+     messages might inadvertently be reject as too long.
+     [Petr Lampa <lampa@fee.vutbr.cz>]
+
+  *) Enhanced support for IA-64 Unix platforms (well, Linux and HP-UX).
+     [Andy Polyakov]
+
+  *) Modified SSL library such that the verify_callback that has been set
+     specificly for an SSL object with SSL_set_verify() is actually being
+     used. Before the change, a verify_callback set with this function was
+     ignored and the verify_callback() set in the SSL_CTX at the time of
+     the call was used. New function X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb() introduced
+     to allow the necessary settings.
+     [Lutz Jaenicke]
+
+  *) Initialize static variable in crypto/dsa/dsa_lib.c and crypto/dh/dh_lib.c
+     explicitly to NULL, as at least on Solaris 8 this seems not always to be
+     done automatically (in contradiction to the requirements of the C
+     standard). This made problems when used from OpenSSH.
+     [Lutz Jaenicke]
+
+  *) In OpenSSL 0.9.6a and 0.9.6b, crypto/dh/dh_key.c ignored
+     dh->length and always used
+
+          BN_rand_range(priv_key, dh->p).
+
+     BN_rand_range() is not necessary for Diffie-Hellman, and this
+     specific range makes Diffie-Hellman unnecessarily inefficient if
+     dh->length (recommended exponent length) is much smaller than the
+     length of dh->p.  We could use BN_rand_range() if the order of
+     the subgroup was stored in the DH structure, but we only have
+     dh->length.
+
+     So switch back to
+
+          BN_rand(priv_key, l, ...)
+
+     where 'l' is dh->length if this is defined, or BN_num_bits(dh->p)-1
+     otherwise.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) In
+
+          RSA_eay_public_encrypt
+          RSA_eay_private_decrypt
+          RSA_eay_private_encrypt (signing)
+          RSA_eay_public_decrypt (signature verification)
+
+     (default implementations for RSA_public_encrypt,
+     RSA_private_decrypt, RSA_private_encrypt, RSA_public_decrypt),
+     always reject numbers >= n.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) In crypto/rand/md_rand.c, use a new short-time lock CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2
+     to synchronize access to 'locking_thread'.  This is necessary on
+     systems where access to 'locking_thread' (an 'unsigned long'
+     variable) is not atomic.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) In crypto/rand/md_rand.c, set 'locking_thread' to current thread's ID
+     *before* setting the 'crypto_lock_rand' flag.  The previous code had
+     a race condition if 0 is a valid thread ID.
+     [Travis Vitek <vitek@roguewave.com>]
+
+  *) Add support for shared libraries under Irix.
+     [Albert Chin-A-Young <china@thewrittenword.com>]
+
+  *) Add configuration option to build on Linux on both big-endian and
+     little-endian MIPS.
+     [Ralf Baechle <ralf@uni-koblenz.de>]
+
+  *) Add the possibility to create shared libraries on HP-UX.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.6a and 0.9.6b  [9 Jul 2001]
+
+  *) Change ssleay_rand_bytes (crypto/rand/md_rand.c)
+     to avoid a SSLeay/OpenSSL PRNG weakness pointed out by
+     Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen <markku-juhani.saarinen@nokia.com>:
+     PRNG state recovery was possible based on the output of
+     one PRNG request appropriately sized to gain knowledge on
+     'md' followed by enough consecutive 1-byte PRNG requests
+     to traverse all of 'state'.
+
+     1. When updating 'md_local' (the current thread's copy of 'md')
+        during PRNG output generation, hash all of the previous
+        'md_local' value, not just the half used for PRNG output.
+
+     2. Make the number of bytes from 'state' included into the hash
+        independent from the number of PRNG bytes requested.
+
+     The first measure alone would be sufficient to avoid
+     Markku-Juhani's attack.  (Actually it had never occurred
+     to me that the half of 'md_local' used for chaining was the
+     half from which PRNG output bytes were taken -- I had always
+     assumed that the secret half would be used.)  The second
+     measure makes sure that additional data from 'state' is never
+     mixed into 'md_local' in small portions; this heuristically
+     further strengthens the PRNG.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Fix crypto/bn/asm/mips3.s.
+     [Andy Polyakov]
+
+  *) When only the key is given to "enc", the IV is undefined. Print out
+     an error message in this case.
+     [Lutz Jaenicke]
+
+  *) Handle special case when X509_NAME is empty in X509 printing routines.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) In dsa_do_verify (crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c), verify that r and s are
+     positive and less than q.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Don't change *pointer in CRYPTO_add_lock() is add_lock_callback is
+     used: it isn't thread safe and the add_lock_callback should handle
+     that itself.
+     [Paul Rose <Paul.Rose@bridge.com>]
+
+  *) Verify that incoming data obeys the block size in
+     ssl3_enc (ssl/s3_enc.c) and tls1_enc (ssl/t1_enc.c).
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Fix OAEP check.
+     [Ulf Möller, Bodo Möller]
+
+  *) The countermeasure against Bleichbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5
+     RSA encryption was accidentally removed in s3_srvr.c in OpenSSL 0.9.5
+     when fixing the server behaviour for backwards-compatible 'client
+     hello' messages.  (Note that the attack is impractical against
+     SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0 anyway because length and version checking
+     means that the probability of guessing a valid ciphertext is
+     around 2^-40; see section 5 in Bleichenbacher's CRYPTO '98
+     paper.)
+
+     Before 0.9.5, the countermeasure (hide the error by generating a
+     random 'decryption result') did not work properly because
+     ERR_clear_error() was missing, meaning that SSL_get_error() would
+     detect the supposedly ignored error.
+
+     Both problems are now fixed.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) In crypto/bio/bf_buff.c, increase DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE to 4096
+     (previously it was 1024).
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Fix for compatibility mode trust settings: ignore trust settings
+     unless some valid trust or reject settings are present.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix for blowfish EVP: its a variable length cipher.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix various bugs related to DSA S/MIME verification. Handle missing
+     parameters in DSA public key structures and return an error in the
+     DSA routines if parameters are absent.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) In versions up to 0.9.6, RAND_file_name() resorted to file ".rnd"
+     in the current directory if neither $RANDFILE nor $HOME was set.
+     RAND_file_name() in 0.9.6a returned NULL in this case.  This has
+     caused some confusion to Windows users who haven't defined $HOME.
+     Thus RAND_file_name() is changed again: e_os.h can define a
+     DEFAULT_HOME, which will be used if $HOME is not set.
+     For Windows, we use "C:"; on other platforms, we still require
+     environment variables.
+
+  *) Move 'if (!initialized) RAND_poll()' into regions protected by
+     CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND.  This is not strictly necessary, but avoids
+     having multiple threads call RAND_poll() concurrently.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) In crypto/rand/md_rand.c, replace 'add_do_not_lock' flag by a
+     combination of a flag and a thread ID variable.
+     Otherwise while one thread is in ssleay_rand_bytes (which sets the
+     flag), *other* threads can enter ssleay_add_bytes without obeying
+     the CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND lock (and may even illegally release the lock
+     that they do not hold after the first thread unsets add_do_not_lock).
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Change bctest again: '-x' expressions are not available in all
+     versions of 'test'.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.6 and 0.9.6a  [5 Apr 2001]
+
+  *) Fix a couple of memory leaks in PKCS7_dataDecode()
+     [Steve Henson, reported by Heyun Zheng <hzheng@atdsprint.com>]
+
+  *) Change Configure and Makefiles to provide EXE_EXT, which will contain
+     the default extension for executables, if any.  Also, make the perl
+     scripts that use symlink() to test if it really exists and use "cp"
+     if it doesn't.  All this made OpenSSL compilable and installable in
+     CygWin.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Fix for asn1_GetSequence() for indefinite length constructed data.
+     If SEQUENCE is length is indefinite just set c->slen to the total
+     amount of data available.
+     [Steve Henson, reported by shige@FreeBSD.org]
+     [This change does not apply to 0.9.7.]
+
+  *) Change bctest to avoid here-documents inside command substitution
+     (workaround for FreeBSD /bin/sh bug).
+     For compatibility with Ultrix, avoid shell functions (introduced
+     in the bctest version that searches along $PATH).
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Rename 'des_encrypt' to 'des_encrypt1'.  This avoids the clashes
+     with des_encrypt() defined on some operating systems, like Solaris
+     and UnixWare.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Check the result of RSA-CRT (see D. Boneh, R. DeMillo, R. Lipton:
+     On the Importance of Eliminating Errors in Cryptographic
+     Computations, J. Cryptology 14 (2001) 2, 101-119,
+     http://theory.stanford.edu/~dabo/papers/faults.ps.gz).
+     [Ulf Moeller]
+  
+  *) MIPS assembler BIGNUM division bug fix. 
+     [Andy Polyakov]
+
+  *) Disabled incorrect Alpha assembler code.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Fix PKCS#7 decode routines so they correctly update the length
+     after reading an EOC for the EXPLICIT tag.
+     [Steve Henson]
+     [This change does not apply to 0.9.7.]
+
+  *) Fix bug in PKCS#12 key generation routines. This was triggered
+     if a 3DES key was generated with a 0 initial byte. Include
+     PKCS12_BROKEN_KEYGEN compilation option to retain the old
+     (but broken) behaviour.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Enhance bctest to search for a working bc along $PATH and print
+     it when found.
+     [Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net> via Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Fix memory leaks in err.c: free err_data string if necessary;
+     don't write to the wrong index in ERR_set_error_data.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Implement ssl23_peek (analogous to ssl23_read), which previously
+     did not exist.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Replace rdtsc with _emit statements for VC++ version 5.
+     [Jeremy Cooper <jeremy@baymoo.org>]
+
+  *) Make it possible to reuse SSLv2 sessions.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) In copy_email() check for >= 0 as a return value for
+     X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID() since 0 is a valid index.
+     [Steve Henson reported by Massimiliano Pala <madwolf@opensca.org>]
+
+  *) Avoid coredump with unsupported or invalid public keys by checking if
+     X509_get_pubkey() fails in PKCS7_verify(). Fix memory leak when
+     PKCS7_verify() fails with non detached data.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Don't use getenv in library functions when run as setuid/setgid.
+     New function OPENSSL_issetugid().
+     [Ulf Moeller]
+
+  *) Avoid false positives in memory leak detection code (crypto/mem_dbg.c)
+     due to incorrect handling of multi-threading:
+
+     1. Fix timing glitch in the MemCheck_off() portion of CRYPTO_mem_ctrl().
+
+     2. Fix logical glitch in is_MemCheck_on() aka CRYPTO_is_mem_check_on().
+
+     3. Count how many times MemCheck_off() has been called so that
+        nested use can be treated correctly.  This also avoids 
+        inband-signalling in the previous code (which relied on the
+        assumption that thread ID 0 is impossible).
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Add "-rand" option also to s_client and s_server.
+     [Lutz Jaenicke]
+
+  *) Fix CPU detection on Irix 6.x.
+     [Kurt Hockenbury <khockenb@stevens-tech.edu> and
+      "Bruce W. Forsberg" <bruce.forsberg@baesystems.com>]
+
+  *) Fix X509_NAME bug which produced incorrect encoding if X509_NAME
+     was empty.
+     [Steve Henson]
+     [This change does not apply to 0.9.7.]
+
+  *) Use the cached encoding of an X509_NAME structure rather than
+     copying it. This is apparently the reason for the libsafe "errors"
+     but the code is actually correct.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add new function BN_rand_range(), and fix DSA_sign_setup() to prevent
+     Bleichenbacher's DSA attack.
+     Extend BN_[pseudo_]rand: As before, top=1 forces the highest two bits
+     to be set and top=0 forces the highest bit to be set; top=-1 is new
+     and leaves the highest bit random.
+     [Ulf Moeller, Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) In the NCONF_...-based implementations for CONF_... queries
+     (crypto/conf/conf_lib.c), if the input LHASH is NULL, avoid using
+     a temporary CONF structure with the data component set to NULL
+     (which gives segmentation faults in lh_retrieve).
+     Instead, use NULL for the CONF pointer in CONF_get_string and
+     CONF_get_number (which may use environment variables) and directly
+     return NULL from CONF_get_section.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Fix potential buffer overrun for EBCDIC.
+     [Ulf Moeller]
+
+  *) Tolerate nonRepudiation as being valid for S/MIME signing and certSign
+     keyUsage if basicConstraints absent for a CA.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Make SMIME_write_PKCS7() write mail header values with a format that
+     is more generally accepted (no spaces before the semicolon), since
+     some programs can't parse those values properly otherwise.  Also make
+     sure BIO's that break lines after each write do not create invalid
+     headers.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Make the CRL encoding routines work with empty SEQUENCE OF. The
+     macros previously used would not encode an empty SEQUENCE OF
+     and break the signature.
+     [Steve Henson]
+     [This change does not apply to 0.9.7.]
+
+  *) Zero the premaster secret after deriving the master secret in
+     DH ciphersuites.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add some EVP_add_digest_alias registrations (as found in
+     OpenSSL_add_all_digests()) to SSL_library_init()
+     aka OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms().  This provides improved
+     compatibility with peers using X.509 certificates
+     with unconventional AlgorithmIdentifier OIDs.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Fix for Irix with NO_ASM.
+     ["Bruce W. Forsberg" <bruce.forsberg@baesystems.com>]
+
+  *) ./config script fixes.
+     [Ulf Moeller, Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Fix 'openssl passwd -1'.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Change PKCS12_key_gen_asc() so it can cope with non null
+     terminated strings whose length is passed in the passlen
+     parameter, for example from PEM callbacks. This was done
+     by adding an extra length parameter to asc2uni().
+     [Steve Henson, reported by <oddissey@samsung.co.kr>]
+
+  *) Fix C code generated by 'openssl dsaparam -C': If a BN_bin2bn
+     call failed, free the DSA structure.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Fix to uni2asc() to cope with zero length Unicode strings.
+     These are present in some PKCS#12 files.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Increase s2->wbuf allocation by one byte in ssl2_new (ssl/s2_lib.c).
+     Otherwise do_ssl_write (ssl/s2_pkt.c) will write beyond buffer limits
+     when writing a 32767 byte record.
+     [Bodo Moeller; problem reported by Eric Day <eday@concentric.net>]
+
+  *) In RSA_eay_public_{en,ed}crypt and RSA_eay_mod_exp (rsa_eay.c),
+     obtain lock CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA before setting rsa->_method_mod_{n,p,q}.
+
+     (RSA objects have a reference count access to which is protected
+     by CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA [see rsa_lib.c, s3_srvr.c, ssl_cert.c, ssl_rsa.c],
+     so they are meant to be shared between threads.)
+     [Bodo Moeller, Geoff Thorpe; original patch submitted by
+     "Reddie, Steven" <Steven.Reddie@ca.com>]
+
+  *) Fix a deadlock in CRYPTO_mem_leaks().
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Use better test patterns in bntest.
+     [Ulf Möller]
+
+  *) rand_win.c fix for Borland C.
+     [Ulf Möller]
+ 
+  *) BN_rshift bugfix for n == 0.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Add a 'bctest' script that checks for some known 'bc' bugs
+     so that 'make test' does not abort just because 'bc' is broken.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Store verify_result within SSL_SESSION also for client side to
+     avoid potential security hole. (Re-used sessions on the client side
+     always resulted in verify_result==X509_V_OK, not using the original
+     result of the server certificate verification.)
+     [Lutz Jaenicke]
+
+  *) Fix ssl3_pending: If the record in s->s3->rrec is not of type
+     SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA, return 0.
+     Similarly, change ssl2_pending to return 0 if SSL_in_init(s) is true.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Fix SSL_peek:
+     Both ssl2_peek and ssl3_peek, which were totally broken in earlier
+     releases, have been re-implemented by renaming the previous
+     implementations of ssl2_read and ssl3_read to ssl2_read_internal
+     and ssl3_read_internal, respectively, and adding 'peek' parameters
+     to them.  The new ssl[23]_{read,peek} functions are calls to
+     ssl[23]_read_internal with the 'peek' flag set appropriately.
+     A 'peek' parameter has also been added to ssl3_read_bytes, which
+     does the actual work for ssl3_read_internal.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Initialise "ex_data" member of RSA/DSA/DH structures prior to calling
+     the method-specific "init()" handler. Also clean up ex_data after
+     calling the method-specific "finish()" handler. Previously, this was
+     happening the other way round.
+     [Geoff Thorpe]
+
+  *) Increase BN_CTX_NUM (the number of BIGNUMs in a BN_CTX) to 16.
+     The previous value, 12, was not always sufficient for BN_mod_exp().
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Make sure that shared libraries get the internal name engine with
+     the full version number and not just 0.  This should mark the
+     shared libraries as not backward compatible.  Of course, this should
+     be changed again when we can guarantee backward binary compatibility.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Fix typo in get_cert_by_subject() in by_dir.c
+     [Jean-Marc Desperrier <jean-marc.desperrier@certplus.com>]
+
+  *) Rework the system to generate shared libraries:
+
+     - Make note of the expected extension for the shared libraries and
+       if there is a need for symbolic links from for example libcrypto.so.0
+       to libcrypto.so.0.9.7.  There is extended info in Configure for
+       that.
+
+     - Make as few rebuilds of the shared libraries as possible.
+
+     - Still avoid linking the OpenSSL programs with the shared libraries.
+
+     - When installing, install the shared libraries separately from the
+       static ones.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Fix SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead macro to actually use its argument.
+
+     Copy SSL_CTX's read_ahead flag to SSL object directly in SSL_new
+     and not in SSL_clear because the latter is also used by the
+     accept/connect functions; previously, the settings made by
+     SSL_set_read_ahead would be lost during the handshake.
+     [Bodo Moeller; problems reported by Anders Gertz <gertz@epact.se>]     
+
+  *) Correct util/mkdef.pl to be selective about disabled algorithms.
+     Previously, it would create entries for disabled algorithms no
+     matter what.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Added several new manual pages for SSL_* function.
+     [Lutz Jaenicke]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.5a and 0.9.6  [24 Sep 2000]
+
+  *) In ssl23_get_client_hello, generate an error message when faced
+     with an initial SSL 3.0/TLS record that is too small to contain the
+     first two bytes of the ClientHello message, i.e. client_version.
+     (Note that this is a pathologic case that probably has never happened
+     in real life.)  The previous approach was to use the version number
+     from the record header as a substitute; but our protocol choice
+     should not depend on that one because it is not authenticated
+     by the Finished messages.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) More robust randomness gathering functions for Windows.
+     [Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@columbia.edu>]
+
+  *) For compatibility reasons if the flag X509_V_FLAG_ISSUER_CHECK is
+     not set then we don't setup the error code for issuer check errors
+     to avoid possibly overwriting other errors which the callback does
+     handle. If an application does set the flag then we assume it knows
+     what it is doing and can handle the new informational codes
+     appropriately.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix for a nasty bug in ASN1_TYPE handling. ASN1_TYPE is used for
+     a general "ANY" type, as such it should be able to decode anything
+     including tagged types. However it didn't check the class so it would
+     wrongly interpret tagged types in the same way as their universal
+     counterpart and unknown types were just rejected. Changed so that the
+     tagged and unknown types are handled in the same way as a SEQUENCE:
+     that is the encoding is stored intact. There is also a new type
+     "V_ASN1_OTHER" which is used when the class is not universal, in this
+     case we have no idea what the actual type is so we just lump them all
+     together.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) On VMS, stdout may very well lead to a file that is written to
+     in a record-oriented fashion.  That means that every write() will
+     write a separate record, which will be read separately by the
+     programs trying to read from it.  This can be very confusing.
+
+     The solution is to put a BIO filter in the way that will buffer
+     text until a linefeed is reached, and then write everything a
+     line at a time, so every record written will be an actual line,
+     not chunks of lines and not (usually doesn't happen, but I've
+     seen it once) several lines in one record.  BIO_f_linebuffer() is
+     the answer.
+
+     Currently, it's a VMS-only method, because that's where it has
+     been tested well enough.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Remove 'optimized' squaring variant in BN_mod_mul_montgomery,
+     it can return incorrect results.
+     (Note: The buggy variant was not enabled in OpenSSL 0.9.5a,
+     but it was in 0.9.6-beta[12].)
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Disable the check for content being present when verifying detached
+     signatures in pk7_smime.c. Some versions of Netscape (wrongly)
+     include zero length content when signing messages.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) New BIO_shutdown_wr macro, which invokes the BIO_C_SHUTDOWN_WR
+     BIO_ctrl (for BIO pairs).
+     [Bodo Möller]
+
+  *) Add DSO method for VMS.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Bug fix: Montgomery multiplication could produce results with the
+     wrong sign.
+     [Ulf Möller]
+
+  *) Add RPM specification openssl.spec and modify it to build three
+     packages.  The default package contains applications, application
+     documentation and run-time libraries.  The devel package contains
+     include files, static libraries and function documentation.  The
+     doc package contains the contents of the doc directory.  The original
+     openssl.spec was provided by Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+     
+  *) Add a large number of documentation files for many SSL routines.
+     [Lutz Jaenicke <Lutz.Jaenicke@aet.TU-Cottbus.DE>]
+
+  *) Add a configuration entry for Sony News 4.
+     [NAKAJI Hiroyuki <nakaji@tutrp.tut.ac.jp>]
+
+  *) Don't set the two most significant bits to one when generating a
+     random number < q in the DSA library.
+     [Ulf Möller]
+
+  *) New SSL API mode 'SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY'.  This disables the default
+     behaviour that SSL_read may result in SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ (even if
+     the underlying transport is blocking) if a handshake took place.
+     (The default behaviour is needed by applications such as s_client
+     and s_server that use select() to determine when to use SSL_read;
+     but for applications that know in advance when to expect data, it
+     just makes things more complicated.)
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Add RAND_egd_bytes(), which gives control over the number of bytes read
+     from EGD.
+     [Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) Add a few more EBCDIC conditionals that make `req' and `x509'
+     work better on such systems.
+     [Martin Kraemer <Martin.Kraemer@MchP.Siemens.De>]
+
+  *) Add two demo programs for PKCS12_parse() and PKCS12_create().
+     Update PKCS12_parse() so it copies the friendlyName and the
+     keyid to the certificates aux info.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix bug in PKCS7_verify() which caused an infinite loop
+     if there was more than one signature.
+     [Sven Uszpelkat <su@celocom.de>]
+
+  *) Major change in util/mkdef.pl to include extra information
+     about each symbol, as well as presenting variables as well
+     as functions.  This change means that there's n more need
+     to rebuild the .num files when some algorithms are excluded.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Allow the verify time to be set by an application,
+     rather than always using the current time.
+     [Steve Henson]
+  
+  *) Phase 2 verify code reorganisation. The certificate
+     verify code now looks up an issuer certificate by a
+     number of criteria: subject name, authority key id
+     and key usage. It also verifies self signed certificates
+     by the same criteria. The main comparison function is
+     X509_check_issued() which performs these checks.
+ 
+     Lot of changes were necessary in order to support this
+     without completely rewriting the lookup code.
+ 
+     Authority and subject key identifier are now cached.
+ 
+     The LHASH 'certs' is X509_STORE has now been replaced
+     by a STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT). This is mainly because an
+     LHASH can't store or retrieve multiple objects with
+     the same hash value.
+
+     As a result various functions (which were all internal
+     use only) have changed to handle the new X509_STORE
+     structure. This will break anything that messed round
+     with X509_STORE internally.
+ 
+     The functions X509_STORE_add_cert() now checks for an
+     exact match, rather than just subject name.
+ 
+     The X509_STORE API doesn't directly support the retrieval
+     of multiple certificates matching a given criteria, however
+     this can be worked round by performing a lookup first
+     (which will fill the cache with candidate certificates)
+     and then examining the cache for matches. This is probably
+     the best we can do without throwing out X509_LOOKUP
+     entirely (maybe later...).
+ 
+     The X509_VERIFY_CTX structure has been enhanced considerably.
+ 
+     All certificate lookup operations now go via a get_issuer()
+     callback. Although this currently uses an X509_STORE it
+     can be replaced by custom lookups. This is a simple way
+     to bypass the X509_STORE hackery necessary to make this
+     work and makes it possible to use more efficient techniques
+     in future. A very simple version which uses a simple
+     STACK for its trusted certificate store is also provided
+     using X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack().
+ 
+     The verify_cb() and verify() callbacks now have equivalents
+     in the X509_STORE_CTX structure.
+ 
+     X509_STORE_CTX also has a 'flags' field which can be used
+     to customise the verify behaviour.
+     [Steve Henson]
+ 
+  *) Add new PKCS#7 signing option PKCS7_NOSMIMECAP which 
+     excludes S/MIME capabilities.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) When a certificate request is read in keep a copy of the
+     original encoding of the signed data and use it when outputting
+     again. Signatures then use the original encoding rather than
+     a decoded, encoded version which may cause problems if the
+     request is improperly encoded.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) For consistency with other BIO_puts implementations, call
+     buffer_write(b, ...) directly in buffer_puts instead of calling
+     BIO_write(b, ...).
+
+     In BIO_puts, increment b->num_write as in BIO_write.
+     [Peter.Sylvester@EdelWeb.fr]
+
+  *) Fix BN_mul_word for the case where the word is 0. (We have to use
+     BN_zero, we may not return a BIGNUM with an array consisting of
+     words set to zero.)
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Avoid calling abort() from within the library when problems are
+     detected, except if preprocessor symbols have been defined
+     (such as REF_CHECK, BN_DEBUG etc.).
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) New openssl application 'rsautl'. This utility can be
+     used for low level RSA operations. DER public key
+     BIO/fp routines also added.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) New Configure entry and patches for compiling on QNX 4.
+     [Andreas Schneider <andreas@ds3.etech.fh-hamburg.de>]
+
+  *) A demo state-machine implementation was sponsored by
+     Nuron (http://www.nuron.com/) and is now available in
+     demos/state_machine.
+     [Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) New options added to the 'dgst' utility for signature
+     generation and verification.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Unrecognized PKCS#7 content types are now handled via a
+     catch all ASN1_TYPE structure. This allows unsupported
+     types to be stored as a "blob" and an application can
+     encode and decode it manually.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix various signed/unsigned issues to make a_strex.c
+     compile under VC++.
+     [Oscar Jacobsson <oscar.jacobsson@celocom.com>]
+
+  *) ASN1 fixes. i2d_ASN1_OBJECT was not returning the correct
+     length if passed a buffer. ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN failed
+     if passed a NULL BN and its argument was negative.
+     [Steve Henson, pointed out by Sven Heiberg <sven@tartu.cyber.ee>]
+
+  *) Modification to PKCS#7 encoding routines to output definite
+     length encoding. Since currently the whole structures are in
+     memory there's not real point in using indefinite length 
+     constructed encoding. However if OpenSSL is compiled with
+     the flag PKCS7_INDEFINITE_ENCODING the old form is used.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Added BIO_vprintf() and BIO_vsnprintf().
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Added more prefixes to parse for in the the strings written
+     through a logging bio, to cover all the levels that are available
+     through syslog.  The prefixes are now:
+
+	PANIC, EMERG, EMR	=>	LOG_EMERG
+	ALERT, ALR		=>	LOG_ALERT
+	CRIT, CRI		=>	LOG_CRIT
+	ERROR, ERR		=>	LOG_ERR
+	WARNING, WARN, WAR	=>	LOG_WARNING
+	NOTICE, NOTE, NOT	=>	LOG_NOTICE
+	INFO, INF		=>	LOG_INFO
+	DEBUG, DBG		=>	LOG_DEBUG
+
+     and as before, if none of those prefixes are present at the
+     beginning of the string, LOG_ERR is chosen.
+
+     On Win32, the LOG_* levels are mapped according to this:
+
+	LOG_EMERG, LOG_ALERT, LOG_CRIT, LOG_ERR	=> EVENTLOG_ERROR_TYPE
+	LOG_WARNING				=> EVENTLOG_WARNING_TYPE
+	LOG_NOTICE, LOG_INFO, LOG_DEBUG		=> EVENTLOG_INFORMATION_TYPE
+
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Made it possible to reconfigure with just the configuration
+     argument "reconf" or "reconfigure".  The command line arguments
+     are stored in Makefile.ssl in the variable CONFIGURE_ARGS,
+     and are retrieved from there when reconfiguring.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) MD4 implemented.
+     [Assar Westerlund <assar@sics.se>, Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Add the arguments -CAfile and -CApath to the pkcs12 utility.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) The obj_dat.pl script was messing up the sorting of object
+     names. The reason was that it compared the quoted version
+     of strings as a result "OCSP" > "OCSP Signing" because
+     " > SPACE. Changed script to store unquoted versions of
+     names and add quotes on output. It was also omitting some
+     names from the lookup table if they were given a default
+     value (that is if SN is missing it is given the same
+     value as LN and vice versa), these are now added on the
+     grounds that if an object has a name we should be able to
+     look it up. Finally added warning output when duplicate
+     short or long names are found.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Changes needed for Tandem NSK.
+     [Scott Uroff <scott@xypro.com>]
+
+  *) Fix SSL 2.0 rollback checking: Due to an off-by-one error in
+     RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(), special padding was never detected
+     and thus the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 countermeasure against protocol
+     version rollback attacks was not effective.
+
+     In s23_clnt.c, don't use special rollback-attack detection padding
+     (RSA_SSLV23_PADDING) if SSL 2.0 is the only protocol enabled in the
+     client; similarly, in s23_srvr.c, don't do the rollback check if
+     SSL 2.0 is the only protocol enabled in the server.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Make it possible to get hexdumps of unprintable data with 'openssl
+     asn1parse'.  By implication, the functions ASN1_parse_dump() and
+     BIO_dump_indent() are added.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) New functions ASN1_STRING_print_ex() and X509_NAME_print_ex()
+     these print out strings and name structures based on various
+     flags including RFC2253 support and proper handling of
+     multibyte characters. Added options to the 'x509' utility 
+     to allow the various flags to be set.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Various fixes to use ASN1_TIME instead of ASN1_UTCTIME.
+     Also change the functions X509_cmp_current_time() and
+     X509_gmtime_adj() work with an ASN1_TIME structure,
+     this will enable certificates using GeneralizedTime in validity
+     dates to be checked.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Make the NEG_PUBKEY_BUG code (which tolerates invalid
+     negative public key encodings) on by default,
+     NO_NEG_PUBKEY_BUG can be set to disable it.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) New function c2i_ASN1_OBJECT() which acts on ASN1_OBJECT
+     content octets. An i2c_ASN1_OBJECT is unnecessary because
+     the encoding can be trivially obtained from the structure.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) crypto/err.c locking bugfix: Use write locks (CRYPTO_w_[un]lock),
+     not read locks (CRYPTO_r_[un]lock).
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) A first attempt at creating official support for shared
+     libraries through configuration.  I've kept it so the
+     default is static libraries only, and the OpenSSL programs
+     are always statically linked for now, but there are
+     preparations for dynamic linking in place.
+     This has been tested on Linux and Tru64.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Randomness polling function for Win9x, as described in:
+     Peter Gutmann, Software Generation of Practically Strong
+     Random Numbers.
+     [Ulf Möller]
+
+  *) Fix so PRNG is seeded in req if using an already existing
+     DSA key.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) New options to smime application. -inform and -outform
+     allow alternative formats for the S/MIME message including
+     PEM and DER. The -content option allows the content to be
+     specified separately. This should allow things like Netscape
+     form signing output easier to verify.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix the ASN1 encoding of tags using the 'long form'.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) New ASN1 functions, i2c_* and c2i_* for INTEGER and BIT
+     STRING types. These convert content octets to and from the
+     underlying type. The actual tag and length octets are
+     already assumed to have been read in and checked. These
+     are needed because all other string types have virtually
+     identical handling apart from the tag. By having versions
+     of the ASN1 functions that just operate on content octets
+     IMPLICIT tagging can be handled properly. It also allows
+     the ASN1_ENUMERATED code to be cut down because ASN1_ENUMERATED
+     and ASN1_INTEGER are identical apart from the tag.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Change the handling of OID objects as follows:
+
+     - New object identifiers are inserted in objects.txt, following
+       the syntax given in objects.README.
+     - objects.pl is used to process obj_mac.num and create a new
+       obj_mac.h.
+     - obj_dat.pl is used to create a new obj_dat.h, using the data in
+       obj_mac.h.
+
+     This is currently kind of a hack, and the perl code in objects.pl
+     isn't very elegant, but it works as I intended.  The simplest way
+     to check that it worked correctly is to look in obj_dat.h and
+     check the array nid_objs and make sure the objects haven't moved
+     around (this is important!).  Additions are OK, as well as
+     consistent name changes. 
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Add BSD-style MD5-based passwords to 'openssl passwd' (option '-1').
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Addition of the command line parameter '-rand file' to 'openssl req'.
+     The given file adds to whatever has already been seeded into the
+     random pool through the RANDFILE configuration file option or
+     environment variable, or the default random state file.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) mkstack.pl now sorts each macro group into lexical order.
+     Previously the output order depended on the order the files
+     appeared in the directory, resulting in needless rewriting
+     of safestack.h .
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Patches to make OpenSSL compile under Win32 again. Mostly
+     work arounds for the VC++ problem that it treats func() as
+     func(void). Also stripped out the parts of mkdef.pl that
+     added extra typesafe functions: these no longer exist.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Reorganisation of the stack code. The macros are now all 
+     collected in safestack.h . Each macro is defined in terms of
+     a "stack macro" of the form SKM_<name>(type, a, b). The 
+     DEBUG_SAFESTACK is now handled in terms of function casts,
+     this has the advantage of retaining type safety without the
+     use of additional functions. If DEBUG_SAFESTACK is not defined
+     then the non typesafe macros are used instead. Also modified the
+     mkstack.pl script to handle the new form. Needs testing to see
+     if which (if any) compilers it chokes and maybe make DEBUG_SAFESTACK
+     the default if no major problems. Similar behaviour for ASN1_SET_OF
+     and PKCS12_STACK_OF.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) When some versions of IIS use the 'NET' form of private key the
+     key derivation algorithm is different. Normally MD5(password) is
+     used as a 128 bit RC4 key. In the modified case
+     MD5(MD5(password) + "SGCKEYSALT")  is used instead. Added some
+     new functions i2d_RSA_NET(), d2i_RSA_NET() etc which are the same
+     as the old Netscape_RSA functions except they have an additional
+     'sgckey' parameter which uses the modified algorithm. Also added
+     an -sgckey command line option to the rsa utility. Thanks to 
+     Adrian Peck <bertie@ncipher.com> for posting details of the modified
+     algorithm to openssl-dev.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) The evp_local.h macros were using 'c.##kname' which resulted in
+     invalid expansion on some systems (SCO 5.0.5 for example).
+     Corrected to 'c.kname'.
+     [Phillip Porch <root@theporch.com>]
+
+  *) New X509_get1_email() and X509_REQ_get1_email() functions that return
+     a STACK of email addresses from a certificate or request, these look
+     in the subject name and the subject alternative name extensions and 
+     omit any duplicate addresses.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Re-implement BN_mod_exp2_mont using independent (and larger) windows.
+     This makes DSA verification about 2 % faster.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Increase maximum window size in BN_mod_exp_... to 6 bits instead of 5
+     (meaning that now 2^5 values will be precomputed, which is only 4 KB
+     plus overhead for 1024 bit moduli).
+     This makes exponentiations about 0.5 % faster for 1024 bit
+     exponents (as measured by "openssl speed rsa2048").
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Rename memory handling macros to avoid conflicts with other
+     software:
+          Malloc         =>  OPENSSL_malloc
+          Malloc_locked  =>  OPENSSL_malloc_locked
+          Realloc        =>  OPENSSL_realloc
+          Free           =>  OPENSSL_free
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) New function BN_mod_exp_mont_word for small bases (roughly 15%
+     faster than BN_mod_exp_mont, i.e. 7% for a full DH exchange).
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) CygWin32 support.
+     [John Jarvie <jjarvie@newsguy.com>]
+
+  *) The type-safe stack code has been rejigged. It is now only compiled
+     in when OpenSSL is configured with the DEBUG_SAFESTACK option and
+     by default all type-specific stack functions are "#define"d back to
+     standard stack functions. This results in more streamlined output
+     but retains the type-safety checking possibilities of the original
+     approach.
+     [Geoff Thorpe]
+
+  *) The STACK code has been cleaned up, and certain type declarations
+     that didn't make a lot of sense have been brought in line. This has
+     also involved a cleanup of sorts in safestack.h to more correctly
+     map type-safe stack functions onto their plain stack counterparts.
+     This work has also resulted in a variety of "const"ifications of
+     lots of the code, especially "_cmp" operations which should normally
+     be prototyped with "const" parameters anyway.
+     [Geoff Thorpe]
+
+  *) When generating bytes for the first time in md_rand.c, 'stir the pool'
+     by seeding with STATE_SIZE dummy bytes (with zero entropy count).
+     (The PRNG state consists of two parts, the large pool 'state' and 'md',
+     where all of 'md' is used each time the PRNG is used, but 'state'
+     is used only indexed by a cyclic counter. As entropy may not be
+     well distributed from the beginning, 'md' is important as a
+     chaining variable. However, the output function chains only half
+     of 'md', i.e. 80 bits.  ssleay_rand_add, on the other hand, chains
+     all of 'md', and seeding with STATE_SIZE dummy bytes will result
+     in all of 'state' being rewritten, with the new values depending
+     on virtually all of 'md'.  This overcomes the 80 bit limitation.)
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) In ssl/s2_clnt.c and ssl/s3_clnt.c, call ERR_clear_error() when
+     the handshake is continued after ssl_verify_cert_chain();
+     otherwise, if SSL_VERIFY_NONE is set, remaining error codes
+     can lead to 'unexplainable' connection aborts later.
+     [Bodo Moeller; problem tracked down by Lutz Jaenicke]
+
+  *) Major EVP API cipher revision.
+     Add hooks for extra EVP features. This allows various cipher
+     parameters to be set in the EVP interface. Support added for variable
+     key length ciphers via the EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length() function and
+     setting of RC2 and RC5 parameters.
+
+     Modify EVP_OpenInit() and EVP_SealInit() to cope with variable key length
+     ciphers.
+
+     Remove lots of duplicated code from the EVP library. For example *every*
+     cipher init() function handles the 'iv' in the same way according to the
+     cipher mode. They also all do nothing if the 'key' parameter is NULL and
+     for CFB and OFB modes they zero ctx->num.
+
+     New functionality allows removal of S/MIME code RC2 hack.
+
+     Most of the routines have the same form and so can be declared in terms
+     of macros.
+
+     By shifting this to the top level EVP_CipherInit() it can be removed from
+     all individual ciphers. If the cipher wants to handle IVs or keys
+     differently it can set the EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV or EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT
+     flags.
+
+     Change lots of functions like EVP_EncryptUpdate() to now return a
+     value: although software versions of the algorithms cannot fail
+     any installed hardware versions can.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Implement SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG: In ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, if
+     this option is set, tolerate broken clients that send the negotiated
+     protocol version number instead of the requested protocol version
+     number.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Call dh_tmp_cb (set by ..._TMP_DH_CB) with correct 'is_export' flag;
+     i.e. non-zero for export ciphersuites, zero otherwise.
+     Previous versions had this flag inverted, inconsistent with
+     rsa_tmp_cb (..._TMP_RSA_CB).
+     [Bodo Moeller; problem reported by Amit Chopra]
+
+  *) Add missing DSA library text string. Work around for some IIS
+     key files with invalid SEQUENCE encoding.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add a document (doc/standards.txt) that list all kinds of standards
+     and so on that are implemented in OpenSSL.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Enhance c_rehash script. Old version would mishandle certificates
+     with the same subject name hash and wouldn't handle CRLs at all.
+     Added -fingerprint option to crl utility, to support new c_rehash
+     features.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Eliminate non-ANSI declarations in crypto.h and stack.h.
+     [Ulf Möller]
+
+  *) Fix for SSL server purpose checking. Server checking was
+     rejecting certificates which had extended key usage present
+     but no ssl client purpose.
+     [Steve Henson, reported by Rene Grosser <grosser@hisolutions.com>]
+
+  *) Make PKCS#12 code work with no password. The PKCS#12 spec
+     is a little unclear about how a blank password is handled.
+     Since the password in encoded as a BMPString with terminating
+     double NULL a zero length password would end up as just the
+     double NULL. However no password at all is different and is
+     handled differently in the PKCS#12 key generation code. NS
+     treats a blank password as zero length. MSIE treats it as no
+     password on export: but it will try both on import. We now do
+     the same: PKCS12_parse() tries zero length and no password if
+     the password is set to "" or NULL (NULL is now a valid password:
+     it wasn't before) as does the pkcs12 application.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Bugfixes in apps/x509.c: Avoid a memory leak; and don't use
+     perror when PEM_read_bio_X509_REQ fails, the error message must
+     be obtained from the error queue.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Avoid 'thread_hash' memory leak in crypto/err/err.c by freeing
+     it in ERR_remove_state if appropriate, and change ERR_get_state
+     accordingly to avoid race conditions (this is necessary because
+     thread_hash is no longer constant once set).
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Bugfix for linux-elf makefile.one.
+     [Ulf Möller]
+
+  *) RSA_get_default_method() will now cause a default
+     RSA_METHOD to be chosen if one doesn't exist already.
+     Previously this was only set during a call to RSA_new()
+     or RSA_new_method(NULL) meaning it was possible for
+     RSA_get_default_method() to return NULL.
+     [Geoff Thorpe]
+
+  *) Added native name translation to the existing DSO code
+     that will convert (if the flag to do so is set) filenames
+     that are sufficiently small and have no path information
+     into a canonical native form. Eg. "blah" converted to
+     "libblah.so" or "blah.dll" etc.
+     [Geoff Thorpe]
+
+  *) New function ERR_error_string_n(e, buf, len) which is like
+     ERR_error_string(e, buf), but writes at most 'len' bytes
+     including the 0 terminator.  For ERR_error_string_n, 'buf'
+     may not be NULL.
+     [Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>, Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) CONF library reworked to become more general.  A new CONF
+     configuration file reader "class" is implemented as well as a
+     new functions (NCONF_*, for "New CONF") to handle it.  The now
+     old CONF_* functions are still there, but are reimplemented to
+     work in terms of the new functions.  Also, a set of functions
+     to handle the internal storage of the configuration data is
+     provided to make it easier to write new configuration file
+     reader "classes" (I can definitely see something reading a
+     configuration file in XML format, for example), called _CONF_*,
+     or "the configuration storage API"...
+
+     The new configuration file reading functions are:
+
+        NCONF_new, NCONF_free, NCONF_load, NCONF_load_fp, NCONF_load_bio,
+        NCONF_get_section, NCONF_get_string, NCONF_get_numbre
+
+        NCONF_default, NCONF_WIN32
+
+        NCONF_dump_fp, NCONF_dump_bio
+
+     NCONF_default and NCONF_WIN32 are method (or "class") choosers,
+     NCONF_new creates a new CONF object.  This works in the same way
+     as other interfaces in OpenSSL, like the BIO interface.
+     NCONF_dump_* dump the internal storage of the configuration file,
+     which is useful for debugging.  All other functions take the same
+     arguments as the old CONF_* functions wth the exception of the
+     first that must be a `CONF *' instead of a `LHASH *'.
+
+     To make it easer to use the new classes with the old CONF_* functions,
+     the function CONF_set_default_method is provided.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Add '-tls1' option to 'openssl ciphers', which was already
+     mentioned in the documentation but had not been implemented.
+     (This option is not yet really useful because even the additional
+     experimental TLS 1.0 ciphers are currently treated as SSL 3.0 ciphers.)
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Initial DSO code added into libcrypto for letting OpenSSL (and
+     OpenSSL-based applications) load shared libraries and bind to
+     them in a portable way.
+     [Geoff Thorpe, with contributions from Richard Levitte]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.5 and 0.9.5a  [1 Apr 2000]
+
+  *) Make sure _lrotl and _lrotr are only used with MSVC.
+
+  *) Use lock CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND correctly in ssleay_rand_status
+     (the default implementation of RAND_status).
+
+  *) Rename openssl x509 option '-crlext', which was added in 0.9.5,
+     to '-clrext' (= clear extensions), as intended and documented.
+     [Bodo Moeller; inconsistency pointed out by Michael Attili
+     <attili@amaxo.com>]
+
+  *) Fix for HMAC. It wasn't zeroing the rest of the block if the key length
+     was larger than the MD block size.      
+     [Steve Henson, pointed out by Yost William <YostW@tce.com>]
+
+  *) Modernise PKCS12_parse() so it uses STACK_OF(X509) for its ca argument
+     fix a leak when the ca argument was passed as NULL. Stop X509_PUBKEY_set()
+     using the passed key: if the passed key was a private key the result
+     of X509_print(), for example, would be to print out all the private key
+     components.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) des_quad_cksum() byte order bug fix.
+     [Ulf Möller, using the problem description in krb4-0.9.7, where
+      the solution is attributed to Derrick J Brashear <shadow@DEMENTIA.ORG>]
+
+  *) Fix so V_ASN1_APP_CHOOSE works again: however its use is strongly
+     discouraged.
+     [Steve Henson, pointed out by Brian Korver <briank@cs.stanford.edu>]
+
+  *) For easily testing in shell scripts whether some command
+     'openssl XXX' exists, the new pseudo-command 'openssl no-XXX'
+     returns with exit code 0 iff no command of the given name is available.
+     'no-XXX' is printed in this case, 'XXX' otherwise.  In both cases,
+     the output goes to stdout and nothing is printed to stderr.
+     Additional arguments are always ignored.
+
+     Since for each cipher there is a command of the same name,
+     the 'no-cipher' compilation switches can be tested this way.
+
+     ('openssl no-XXX' is not able to detect pseudo-commands such
+     as 'quit', 'list-XXX-commands', or 'no-XXX' itself.)
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Update test suite so that 'make test' succeeds in 'no-rsa' configuration.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) For SSL_[CTX_]set_tmp_dh, don't create a DH key if SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE
+     is set; it will be thrown away anyway because each handshake creates
+     its own key.
+     ssl_cert_dup, which is used by SSL_new, now copies DH keys in addition
+     to parameters -- in previous versions (since OpenSSL 0.9.3) the
+     'default key' from SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh would always be lost, meaning
+     you effectivly got SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE when using this macro.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) New s_client option -ign_eof: EOF at stdin is ignored, and
+     'Q' and 'R' lose their special meanings (quit/renegotiate).
+     This is part of what -quiet does; unlike -quiet, -ign_eof
+     does not suppress any output.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Add compatibility options to the purpose and trust code. The
+     purpose X509_PURPOSE_ANY is "any purpose" which automatically
+     accepts a certificate or CA, this was the previous behaviour,
+     with all the associated security issues.
+
+     X509_TRUST_COMPAT is the old trust behaviour: only and
+     automatically trust self signed roots in certificate store. A
+     new trust setting X509_TRUST_DEFAULT is used to specify that
+     a purpose has no associated trust setting and it should instead
+     use the value in the default purpose.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix the PKCS#8 DSA private key code so it decodes keys again
+     and fix a memory leak.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) In util/mkerr.pl (which implements 'make errors'), preserve
+     reason strings from the previous version of the .c file, as
+     the default to have only downcase letters (and digits) in
+     automatically generated reasons codes is not always appropriate.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) In ERR_load_ERR_strings(), build an ERR_LIB_SYS error reason table
+     using strerror.  Previously, ERR_reason_error_string() returned
+     library names as reason strings for SYSerr; but SYSerr is a special
+     case where small numbers are errno values, not library numbers.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Add '-dsaparam' option to 'openssl dhparam' application.  This
+     converts DSA parameters into DH parameters. (When creating parameters,
+     DSA_generate_parameters is used.)
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Include 'length' (recommended exponent length) in C code generated
+     by 'openssl dhparam -C'.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) The second argument to set_label in perlasm was already being used
+     so couldn't be used as a "file scope" flag. Moved to third argument
+     which was free.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) In PEM_ASN1_write_bio and some other functions, use RAND_pseudo_bytes
+     instead of RAND_bytes for encryption IVs and salts.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Include RAND_status() into RAND_METHOD instead of implementing
+     it only for md_rand.c  Otherwise replacing the PRNG by calling
+     RAND_set_rand_method would be impossible.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Don't let DSA_generate_key() enter an infinite loop if the random
+     number generation fails.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) New 'rand' application for creating pseudo-random output.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Added configuration support for Linux/IA64
+     [Rolf Haberrecker <rolf@suse.de>]
+
+  *) Assembler module support for Mingw32.
+     [Ulf Möller]
+
+  *) Shared library support for HPUX (in shlib/).
+     [Lutz Jaenicke <Lutz.Jaenicke@aet.TU-Cottbus.DE> and Anonymous]
+
+  *) Shared library support for Solaris gcc.
+     [Lutz Behnke <behnke@trustcenter.de>]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.4 and 0.9.5  [28 Feb 2000]
+
+  *) PKCS7_encrypt() was adding text MIME headers twice because they
+     were added manually and by SMIME_crlf_copy().
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) In bntest.c don't call BN_rand with zero bits argument.
+     [Steve Henson, pointed out by Andrew W. Gray <agray@iconsinc.com>]
+
+  *) BN_mul bugfix: In bn_mul_part_recursion() only the a>a[n] && b>b[n]
+     case was implemented. This caused BN_div_recp() to fail occasionally.
+     [Ulf Möller]
+
+  *) Add an optional second argument to the set_label() in the perl
+     assembly language builder. If this argument exists and is set
+     to 1 it signals that the assembler should use a symbol whose 
+     scope is the entire file, not just the current function. This
+     is needed with MASM which uses the format label:: for this scope.
+     [Steve Henson, pointed out by Peter Runestig <peter@runestig.com>]
+
+  *) Change the ASN1 types so they are typedefs by default. Before
+     almost all types were #define'd to ASN1_STRING which was causing
+     STACK_OF() problems: you couldn't declare STACK_OF(ASN1_UTF8STRING)
+     for example.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Change names of new functions to the new get1/get0 naming
+     convention: After 'get1', the caller owns a reference count
+     and has to call ..._free; 'get0' returns a pointer to some
+     data structure without incrementing reference counters.
+     (Some of the existing 'get' functions increment a reference
+     counter, some don't.)
+     Similarly, 'set1' and 'add1' functions increase reference
+     counters or duplicate objects.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Allow for the possibility of temp RSA key generation failure:
+     the code used to assume it always worked and crashed on failure.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix potential buffer overrun problem in BIO_printf().
+     [Ulf Möller, using public domain code by Patrick Powell; problem
+      pointed out by David Sacerdote <das33@cornell.edu>]
+
+  *) Support EGD <http://www.lothar.com/tech/crypto/>.  New functions
+     RAND_egd() and RAND_status().  In the command line application,
+     the EGD socket can be specified like a seed file using RANDFILE
+     or -rand.
+     [Ulf Möller]
+
+  *) Allow the string CERTIFICATE to be tolerated in PKCS#7 structures.
+     Some CAs (e.g. Verisign) distribute certificates in this form.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Remove the SSL_ALLOW_ADH compile option and set the default cipher
+     list to exclude them. This means that no special compilation option
+     is needed to use anonymous DH: it just needs to be included in the
+     cipher list.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Change the EVP_MD_CTX_type macro so its meaning consistent with
+     EVP_MD_type. The old functionality is available in a new macro called
+     EVP_MD_md(). Change code that uses it and update docs.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) ..._ctrl functions now have corresponding ..._callback_ctrl functions
+     where the 'void *' argument is replaced by a function pointer argument.
+     Previously 'void *' was abused to point to functions, which works on
+     many platforms, but is not correct.  As these functions are usually
+     called by macros defined in OpenSSL header files, most source code
+     should work without changes.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) <openssl/opensslconf.h> (which is created by Configure) now contains
+     sections with information on -D... compiler switches used for
+     compiling the library so that applications can see them.  To enable
+     one of these sections, a pre-processor symbol OPENSSL_..._DEFINES
+     must be defined.  E.g.,
+        #define OPENSSL_ALGORITHM_DEFINES
+        #include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+     defines all pertinent NO_<algo> symbols, such as NO_IDEA, NO_RSA, etc.
+     [Richard Levitte, Ulf and Bodo Möller]
+
+  *) Bugfix: Tolerate fragmentation and interleaving in the SSL 3/TLS
+     record layer.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Change the 'other' type in certificate aux info to a STACK_OF
+     X509_ALGOR. Although not an AlgorithmIdentifier as such it has
+     the required ASN1 format: arbitrary types determined by an OID.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add some PEM_write_X509_REQ_NEW() functions and a command line
+     argument to 'req'. This is not because the function is newer or
+     better than others it just uses the work 'NEW' in the certificate
+     request header lines. Some software needs this.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Reorganise password command line arguments: now passwords can be
+     obtained from various sources. Delete the PEM_cb function and make
+     it the default behaviour: i.e. if the callback is NULL and the
+     usrdata argument is not NULL interpret it as a null terminated pass
+     phrase. If usrdata and the callback are NULL then the pass phrase
+     is prompted for as usual.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add support for the Compaq Atalla crypto accelerator. If it is installed,
+     the support is automatically enabled. The resulting binaries will
+     autodetect the card and use it if present.
+     [Ben Laurie and Compaq Inc.]
+
+  *) Work around for Netscape hang bug. This sends certificate request
+     and server done in one record. Since this is perfectly legal in the
+     SSL/TLS protocol it isn't a "bug" option and is on by default. See
+     the bugs/SSLv3 entry for more info.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) HP-UX tune-up: new unified configs, HP C compiler bug workaround.
+     [Andy Polyakov]
+
+  *) Add -rand argument to smime and pkcs12 applications and read/write
+     of seed file.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) New 'passwd' tool for crypt(3) and apr1 password hashes.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Add command line password options to the remaining applications.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Bug fix for BN_div_recp() for numerators with an even number of
+     bits.
+     [Ulf Möller]
+
+  *) More tests in bntest.c, and changed test_bn output.
+     [Ulf Möller]
+
+  *) ./config recognizes MacOS X now.
+     [Andy Polyakov]
+
+  *) Bug fix for BN_div() when the first words of num and divsor are
+     equal (it gave wrong results if (rem=(n1-q*d0)&BN_MASK2) < d0).
+     [Ulf Möller]
+
+  *) Add support for various broken PKCS#8 formats, and command line
+     options to produce them.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) New functions BN_CTX_start(), BN_CTX_get() and BT_CTX_end() to
+     get temporary BIGNUMs from a BN_CTX.
+     [Ulf Möller]
+
+  *) Correct return values in BN_mod_exp_mont() and BN_mod_exp2_mont()
+     for p == 0.
+     [Ulf Möller]
+
+  *) Change the SSLeay_add_all_*() functions to OpenSSL_add_all_*() and
+     include a #define from the old name to the new. The original intent
+     was that statically linked binaries could for example just call
+     SSLeay_add_all_ciphers() to just add ciphers to the table and not
+     link with digests. This never worked because SSLeay_add_all_digests()
+     and SSLeay_add_all_ciphers() were in the same source file so calling
+     one would link with the other. They are now in separate source files.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add a new -notext option to 'ca' and a -pubkey option to 'spkac'.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Use a less unusual form of the Miller-Rabin primality test (it used
+     a binary algorithm for exponentiation integrated into the Miller-Rabin
+     loop, our standard modexp algorithms are faster).
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Support for the EBCDIC character set completed.
+     [Martin Kraemer <Martin.Kraemer@Mch.SNI.De>]
+
+  *) Source code cleanups: use const where appropriate, eliminate casts,
+     use void * instead of char * in lhash.
+     [Ulf Möller] 
+
+  *) Bugfix: ssl3_send_server_key_exchange was not restartable
+     (the state was not changed to SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B, and because of
+     this the server could overwrite ephemeral keys that the client
+     has already seen).
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Turn DSA_is_prime into a macro that calls BN_is_prime,
+     using 50 iterations of the Rabin-Miller test.
+
+     DSA_generate_parameters now uses BN_is_prime_fasttest (with 50
+     iterations of the Rabin-Miller test as required by the appendix
+     to FIPS PUB 186[-1]) instead of DSA_is_prime.
+     As BN_is_prime_fasttest includes trial division, DSA parameter
+     generation becomes much faster.
+
+     This implies a change for the callback functions in DSA_is_prime
+     and DSA_generate_parameters: The callback function is called once
+     for each positive witness in the Rabin-Miller test, not just
+     occasionally in the inner loop; and the parameters to the
+     callback function now provide an iteration count for the outer
+     loop rather than for the current invocation of the inner loop.
+     DSA_generate_parameters additionally can call the callback
+     function with an 'iteration count' of -1, meaning that a
+     candidate has passed the trial division test (when q is generated 
+     from an application-provided seed, trial division is skipped).
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) New function BN_is_prime_fasttest that optionally does trial
+     division before starting the Rabin-Miller test and has
+     an additional BN_CTX * argument (whereas BN_is_prime always
+     has to allocate at least one BN_CTX).
+     'callback(1, -1, cb_arg)' is called when a number has passed the
+     trial division stage.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Fix for bug in CRL encoding. The validity dates weren't being handled
+     as ASN1_TIME.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) New -pkcs12 option to CA.pl script to write out a PKCS#12 file.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) New function BN_pseudo_rand().
+     [Ulf Möller]
+
+  *) Clean up BN_mod_mul_montgomery(): replace the broken (and unreadable)
+     bignum version of BN_from_montgomery() with the working code from
+     SSLeay 0.9.0 (the word based version is faster anyway), and clean up
+     the comments.
+     [Ulf Möller]
+
+  *) Avoid a race condition in s2_clnt.c (function get_server_hello) that
+     made it impossible to use the same SSL_SESSION data structure in
+     SSL2 clients in multiple threads.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) The return value of RAND_load_file() no longer counts bytes obtained
+     by stat().  RAND_load_file(..., -1) is new and uses the complete file
+     to seed the PRNG (previously an explicit byte count was required).
+     [Ulf Möller, Bodo Möller]
+
+  *) Clean up CRYPTO_EX_DATA functions, some of these didn't have prototypes
+     used (char *) instead of (void *) and had casts all over the place.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Make BN_generate_prime() return NULL on error if ret!=NULL.
+     [Ulf Möller]
+
+  *) Retain source code compatibility for BN_prime_checks macro:
+     BN_is_prime(..., BN_prime_checks, ...) now uses
+     BN_prime_checks_for_size to determine the appropriate number of
+     Rabin-Miller iterations.
+     [Ulf Möller]
+
+  *) Diffie-Hellman uses "safe" primes: DH_check() return code renamed to
+     DH_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME.
+     (Check if this is true? OpenPGP calls them "strong".)
+     [Ulf Möller]
+
+  *) Merge the functionality of "dh" and "gendh" programs into a new program
+     "dhparam". The old programs are retained for now but will handle DH keys
+     (instead of parameters) in future.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Make the ciphers, s_server and s_client programs check the return values
+     when a new cipher list is set.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Enhance the SSL/TLS cipher mechanism to correctly handle the TLS 56bit
+     ciphers. Before when the 56bit ciphers were enabled the sorting was
+     wrong.
+
+     The syntax for the cipher sorting has been extended to support sorting by
+     cipher-strength (using the strength_bits hard coded in the tables).
+     The new command is "@STRENGTH" (see also doc/apps/ciphers.pod).
+
+     Fix a bug in the cipher-command parser: when supplying a cipher command
+     string with an "undefined" symbol (neither command nor alphanumeric
+     [A-Za-z0-9], ssl_set_cipher_list used to hang in an endless loop. Now
+     an error is flagged.
+
+     Due to the strength-sorting extension, the code of the
+     ssl_create_cipher_list() function was completely rearranged. I hope that
+     the readability was also increased :-)
+     [Lutz Jaenicke <Lutz.Jaenicke@aet.TU-Cottbus.DE>]
+
+  *) Minor change to 'x509' utility. The -CAcreateserial option now uses 1
+     for the first serial number and places 2 in the serial number file. This
+     avoids problems when the root CA is created with serial number zero and
+     the first user certificate has the same issuer name and serial number
+     as the root CA.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fixes to X509_ATTRIBUTE utilities, change the 'req' program so it uses
+     the new code. Add documentation for this stuff.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Changes to X509_ATTRIBUTE utilities. These have been renamed from
+     X509_*() to X509at_*() on the grounds that they don't handle X509
+     structures and behave in an analogous way to the X509v3 functions:
+     they shouldn't be called directly but wrapper functions should be used
+     instead.
+
+     So we also now have some wrapper functions that call the X509at functions
+     when passed certificate requests. (TO DO: similar things can be done with
+     PKCS#7 signed and unsigned attributes, PKCS#12 attributes and a few other
+     things. Some of these need some d2i or i2d and print functionality
+     because they handle more complex structures.)
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add missing #ifndefs that caused missing symbols when building libssl
+     as a shared library without RSA.  Use #ifndef NO_SSL2 instead of
+     NO_RSA in ssl/s2*.c. 
+     [Kris Kennaway <kris@hub.freebsd.org>, modified by Ulf Möller]
+
+  *) Precautions against using the PRNG uninitialized: RAND_bytes() now
+     has a return value which indicates the quality of the random data
+     (1 = ok, 0 = not seeded).  Also an error is recorded on the thread's
+     error queue. New function RAND_pseudo_bytes() generates output that is
+     guaranteed to be unique but not unpredictable. RAND_add is like
+     RAND_seed, but takes an extra argument for an entropy estimate
+     (RAND_seed always assumes full entropy).
+     [Ulf Möller]
+
+  *) Do more iterations of Rabin-Miller probable prime test (specifically,
+     3 for 1024-bit primes, 6 for 512-bit primes, 12 for 256-bit primes
+     instead of only 2 for all lengths; see BN_prime_checks_for_size definition
+     in crypto/bn/bn_prime.c for the complete table).  This guarantees a
+     false-positive rate of at most 2^-80 for random input.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Rewrite ssl3_read_n (ssl/s3_pkt.c) avoiding a couple of bugs.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) New function X509_CTX_rget_chain() (renamed to X509_CTX_get1_chain
+     in the 0.9.5 release), this returns the chain
+     from an X509_CTX structure with a dup of the stack and all
+     the X509 reference counts upped: so the stack will exist
+     after X509_CTX_cleanup() has been called. Modify pkcs12.c
+     to use this.
+
+     Also make SSL_SESSION_print() print out the verify return
+     code.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add manpage for the pkcs12 command. Also change the default
+     behaviour so MAC iteration counts are used unless the new
+     -nomaciter option is used. This improves file security and
+     only older versions of MSIE (4.0 for example) need it.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Honor the no-xxx Configure options when creating .DEF files.
+     [Ulf Möller]
+
+  *) Add PKCS#10 attributes to field table: challengePassword, 
+     unstructuredName and unstructuredAddress. These are taken from
+     draft PKCS#9 v2.0 but are compatible with v1.2 provided no 
+     international characters are used.
+
+     More changes to X509_ATTRIBUTE code: allow the setting of types
+     based on strings. Remove the 'loc' parameter when adding
+     attributes because these will be a SET OF encoding which is sorted
+     in ASN1 order.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Initial changes to the 'req' utility to allow request generation
+     automation. This will allow an application to just generate a template
+     file containing all the field values and have req construct the
+     request.
+
+     Initial support for X509_ATTRIBUTE handling. Stacks of these are
+     used all over the place including certificate requests and PKCS#7
+     structures. They are currently handled manually where necessary with
+     some primitive wrappers for PKCS#7. The new functions behave in a
+     manner analogous to the X509 extension functions: they allow
+     attributes to be looked up by NID and added.
+
+     Later something similar to the X509V3 code would be desirable to
+     automatically handle the encoding, decoding and printing of the
+     more complex types. The string types like challengePassword can
+     be handled by the string table functions.
+
+     Also modified the multi byte string table handling. Now there is
+     a 'global mask' which masks out certain types. The table itself
+     can use the flag STABLE_NO_MASK to ignore the mask setting: this
+     is useful when for example there is only one permissible type
+     (as in countryName) and using the mask might result in no valid
+     types at all.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Clean up 'Finished' handling, and add functions SSL_get_finished and
+     SSL_get_peer_finished to allow applications to obtain the latest
+     Finished messages sent to the peer or expected from the peer,
+     respectively.  (SSL_get_peer_finished is usually the Finished message
+     actually received from the peer, otherwise the protocol will be aborted.)
+
+     As the Finished message are message digests of the complete handshake
+     (with a total of 192 bits for TLS 1.0 and more for SSL 3.0), they can
+     be used for external authentication procedures when the authentication
+     provided by SSL/TLS is not desired or is not enough.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Enhanced support for Alpha Linux is added. Now ./config checks if
+     the host supports BWX extension and if Compaq C is present on the
+     $PATH. Just exploiting of the BWX extension results in 20-30%
+     performance kick for some algorithms, e.g. DES and RC4 to mention
+     a couple. Compaq C in turn generates ~20% faster code for MD5 and
+     SHA1.
+     [Andy Polyakov]
+
+  *) Add support for MS "fast SGC". This is arguably a violation of the
+     SSL3/TLS protocol. Netscape SGC does two handshakes: the first with
+     weak crypto and after checking the certificate is SGC a second one
+     with strong crypto. MS SGC stops the first handshake after receiving
+     the server certificate message and sends a second client hello. Since
+     a server will typically do all the time consuming operations before
+     expecting any further messages from the client (server key exchange
+     is the most expensive) there is little difference between the two.
+
+     To get OpenSSL to support MS SGC we have to permit a second client
+     hello message after we have sent server done. In addition we have to
+     reset the MAC if we do get this second client hello.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add a function 'd2i_AutoPrivateKey()' this will automatically decide
+     if a DER encoded private key is RSA or DSA traditional format. Changed
+     d2i_PrivateKey_bio() to use it. This is only needed for the "traditional"
+     format DER encoded private key. Newer code should use PKCS#8 format which
+     has the key type encoded in the ASN1 structure. Added DER private key
+     support to pkcs8 application.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) SSL 3/TLS 1 servers now don't request certificates when an anonymous
+     ciphersuites has been selected (as required by the SSL 3/TLS 1
+     specifications).  Exception: When SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
+     is set, we interpret this as a request to violate the specification
+     (the worst that can happen is a handshake failure, and 'correct'
+     behaviour would result in a handshake failure anyway).
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) In SSL_CTX_add_session, take into account that there might be multiple
+     SSL_SESSION structures with the same session ID (e.g. when two threads
+     concurrently obtain them from an external cache).
+     The internal cache can handle only one SSL_SESSION with a given ID,
+     so if there's a conflict, we now throw out the old one to achieve
+     consistency.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Add OIDs for idea and blowfish in CBC mode. This will allow both
+     to be used in PKCS#5 v2.0 and S/MIME.  Also add checking to
+     some routines that use cipher OIDs: some ciphers do not have OIDs
+     defined and so they cannot be used for S/MIME and PKCS#5 v2.0 for
+     example.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Simplify the trust setting structure and code. Now we just have
+     two sequences of OIDs for trusted and rejected settings. These will
+     typically have values the same as the extended key usage extension
+     and any application specific purposes.
+
+     The trust checking code now has a default behaviour: it will just
+     check for an object with the same NID as the passed id. Functions can
+     be provided to override either the default behaviour or the behaviour
+     for a given id. SSL client, server and email already have functions
+     in place for compatibility: they check the NID and also return "trusted"
+     if the certificate is self signed.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add d2i,i2d bio/fp functions for PrivateKey: these convert the
+     traditional format into an EVP_PKEY structure.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add a password callback function PEM_cb() which either prompts for
+     a password if usr_data is NULL or otherwise assumes it is a null
+     terminated password. Allow passwords to be passed on command line
+     environment or config files in a few more utilities.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add a bunch of DER and PEM functions to handle PKCS#8 format private
+     keys. Add some short names for PKCS#8 PBE algorithms and allow them
+     to be specified on the command line for the pkcs8 and pkcs12 utilities.
+     Update documentation.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Support for ASN1 "NULL" type. This could be handled before by using
+     ASN1_TYPE but there wasn't any function that would try to read a NULL
+     and produce an error if it couldn't. For compatibility we also have
+     ASN1_NULL_new() and ASN1_NULL_free() functions but these are faked and
+     don't allocate anything because they don't need to.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Initial support for MacOS is now provided. Examine INSTALL.MacOS
+     for details.
+     [Andy Polyakov, Roy Woods <roy@centicsystems.ca>]
+
+  *) Rebuild of the memory allocation routines used by OpenSSL code and
+     possibly others as well.  The purpose is to make an interface that
+     provide hooks so anyone can build a separate set of allocation and
+     deallocation routines to be used by OpenSSL, for example memory
+     pool implementations, or something else, which was previously hard
+     since Malloc(), Realloc() and Free() were defined as macros having
+     the values malloc, realloc and free, respectively (except for Win32
+     compilations).  The same is provided for memory debugging code.
+     OpenSSL already comes with functionality to find memory leaks, but
+     this gives people a chance to debug other memory problems.
+
+     With these changes, a new set of functions and macros have appeared:
+
+       CRYPTO_set_mem_debug_functions()	        [F]
+       CRYPTO_get_mem_debug_functions()         [F]
+       CRYPTO_dbg_set_options()	                [F]
+       CRYPTO_dbg_get_options()                 [F]
+       CRYPTO_malloc_debug_init()               [M]
+
+     The memory debug functions are NULL by default, unless the library
+     is compiled with CRYPTO_MDEBUG or friends is defined.  If someone
+     wants to debug memory anyway, CRYPTO_malloc_debug_init() (which
+     gives the standard debugging functions that come with OpenSSL) or
+     CRYPTO_set_mem_debug_functions() (tells OpenSSL to use functions
+     provided by the library user) must be used.  When the standard
+     debugging functions are used, CRYPTO_dbg_set_options can be used to
+     request additional information:
+     CRYPTO_dbg_set_options(V_CYRPTO_MDEBUG_xxx) corresponds to setting
+     the CRYPTO_MDEBUG_xxx macro when compiling the library.   
+
+     Also, things like CRYPTO_set_mem_functions will always give the
+     expected result (the new set of functions is used for allocation
+     and deallocation) at all times, regardless of platform and compiler
+     options.
+
+     To finish it up, some functions that were never use in any other
+     way than through macros have a new API and new semantic:
+
+       CRYPTO_dbg_malloc()
+       CRYPTO_dbg_realloc()
+       CRYPTO_dbg_free()
+
+     All macros of value have retained their old syntax.
+     [Richard Levitte and Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Some S/MIME fixes. The OID for SMIMECapabilities was wrong, the
+     ordering of SMIMECapabilities wasn't in "strength order" and there
+     was a missing NULL in the AlgorithmIdentifier for the SHA1 signature
+     algorithm.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Some ASN1 types with illegal zero length encoding (INTEGER,
+     ENUMERATED and OBJECT IDENTIFIER) choked the ASN1 routines.
+     [Frans Heymans <fheymans@isaserver.be>, modified by Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Merge in my S/MIME library for OpenSSL. This provides a simple
+     S/MIME API on top of the PKCS#7 code, a MIME parser (with enough
+     functionality to handle multipart/signed properly) and a utility
+     called 'smime' to call all this stuff. This is based on code I
+     originally wrote for Celo who have kindly allowed it to be
+     included in OpenSSL.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add variants des_set_key_checked and des_set_key_unchecked of
+     des_set_key (aka des_key_sched).  Global variable des_check_key
+     decides which of these is called by des_set_key; this way
+     des_check_key behaves as it always did, but applications and
+     the library itself, which was buggy for des_check_key == 1,
+     have a cleaner way to pick the version they need.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) New function PKCS12_newpass() which changes the password of a
+     PKCS12 structure.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Modify X509_TRUST and X509_PURPOSE so it also uses a static and
+     dynamic mix. In both cases the ids can be used as an index into the
+     table. Also modified the X509_TRUST_add() and X509_PURPOSE_add()
+     functions so they accept a list of the field values and the
+     application doesn't need to directly manipulate the X509_TRUST
+     structure.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Modify the ASN1_STRING_TABLE stuff so it also uses bsearch and doesn't
+     need initialising.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Modify the way the V3 extension code looks up extensions. This now
+     works in a similar way to the object code: we have some "standard"
+     extensions in a static table which is searched with OBJ_bsearch()
+     and the application can add dynamic ones if needed. The file
+     crypto/x509v3/ext_dat.h now has the info: this file needs to be
+     updated whenever a new extension is added to the core code and kept
+     in ext_nid order. There is a simple program 'tabtest.c' which checks
+     this. New extensions are not added too often so this file can readily
+     be maintained manually.
+
+     There are two big advantages in doing things this way. The extensions
+     can be looked up immediately and no longer need to be "added" using
+     X509V3_add_standard_extensions(): this function now does nothing.
+     [Side note: I get *lots* of email saying the extension code doesn't
+      work because people forget to call this function]
+     Also no dynamic allocation is done unless new extensions are added:
+     so if we don't add custom extensions there is no need to call
+     X509V3_EXT_cleanup().
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Modify enc utility's salting as follows: make salting the default. Add a
+     magic header, so unsalted files fail gracefully instead of just decrypting
+     to garbage. This is because not salting is a big security hole, so people
+     should be discouraged from doing it.
+     [Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) Fixes and enhancements to the 'x509' utility. It allowed a message
+     digest to be passed on the command line but it only used this
+     parameter when signing a certificate. Modified so all relevant
+     operations are affected by the digest parameter including the
+     -fingerprint and -x509toreq options. Also -x509toreq choked if a
+     DSA key was used because it didn't fix the digest.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Initial certificate chain verify code. Currently tests the untrusted
+     certificates for consistency with the verify purpose (which is set
+     when the X509_STORE_CTX structure is set up) and checks the pathlength.
+
+     There is a NO_CHAIN_VERIFY compilation option to keep the old behaviour:
+     this is because it will reject chains with invalid extensions whereas
+     every previous version of OpenSSL and SSLeay made no checks at all.
+
+     Trust code: checks the root CA for the relevant trust settings. Trust
+     settings have an initial value consistent with the verify purpose: e.g.
+     if the verify purpose is for SSL client use it expects the CA to be
+     trusted for SSL client use. However the default value can be changed to
+     permit custom trust settings: one example of this would be to only trust
+     certificates from a specific "secure" set of CAs.
+
+     Also added X509_STORE_CTX_new() and X509_STORE_CTX_free() functions
+     which should be used for version portability: especially since the
+     verify structure is likely to change more often now.
+
+     SSL integration. Add purpose and trust to SSL_CTX and SSL and functions
+     to set them. If not set then assume SSL clients will verify SSL servers
+     and vice versa.
+
+     Two new options to the verify program: -untrusted allows a set of
+     untrusted certificates to be passed in and -purpose which sets the
+     intended purpose of the certificate. If a purpose is set then the
+     new chain verify code is used to check extension consistency.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Support for the authority information access extension.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Modify RSA and DSA PEM read routines to transparently handle
+     PKCS#8 format private keys. New *_PUBKEY_* functions that handle
+     public keys in a format compatible with certificate
+     SubjectPublicKeyInfo structures. Unfortunately there were already
+     functions called *_PublicKey_* which used various odd formats so
+     these are retained for compatibility: however the DSA variants were
+     never in a public release so they have been deleted. Changed dsa/rsa
+     utilities to handle the new format: note no releases ever handled public
+     keys so we should be OK.
+
+     The primary motivation for this change is to avoid the same fiasco
+     that dogs private keys: there are several incompatible private key
+     formats some of which are standard and some OpenSSL specific and
+     require various evil hacks to allow partial transparent handling and
+     even then it doesn't work with DER formats. Given the option anything
+     other than PKCS#8 should be dumped: but the other formats have to
+     stay in the name of compatibility.
+
+     With public keys and the benefit of hindsight one standard format 
+     is used which works with EVP_PKEY, RSA or DSA structures: though
+     it clearly returns an error if you try to read the wrong kind of key.
+
+     Added a -pubkey option to the 'x509' utility to output the public key.
+     Also rename the EVP_PKEY_get_*() to EVP_PKEY_rget_*()
+     (renamed to EVP_PKEY_get1_*() in the OpenSSL 0.9.5 release) and add
+     EVP_PKEY_rset_*() functions (renamed to EVP_PKEY_set1_*())
+     that do the same as the EVP_PKEY_assign_*() except they up the
+     reference count of the added key (they don't "swallow" the
+     supplied key).
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fixes to crypto/x509/by_file.c the code to read in certificates and
+     CRLs would fail if the file contained no certificates or no CRLs:
+     added a new function to read in both types and return the number
+     read: this means that if none are read it will be an error. The
+     DER versions of the certificate and CRL reader would always fail
+     because it isn't possible to mix certificates and CRLs in DER format
+     without choking one or the other routine. Changed this to just read
+     a certificate: this is the best we can do. Also modified the code
+     in apps/verify.c to take notice of return codes: it was previously
+     attempting to read in certificates from NULL pointers and ignoring
+     any errors: this is one reason why the cert and CRL reader seemed
+     to work. It doesn't check return codes from the default certificate
+     routines: these may well fail if the certificates aren't installed.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Code to support otherName option in GeneralName.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) First update to verify code. Change the verify utility
+     so it warns if it is passed a self signed certificate:
+     for consistency with the normal behaviour. X509_verify
+     has been modified to it will now verify a self signed
+     certificate if *exactly* the same certificate appears
+     in the store: it was previously impossible to trust a
+     single self signed certificate. This means that:
+     openssl verify ss.pem
+     now gives a warning about a self signed certificate but
+     openssl verify -CAfile ss.pem ss.pem
+     is OK.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) For servers, store verify_result in SSL_SESSION data structure
+     (and add it to external session representation).
+     This is needed when client certificate verifications fails,
+     but an application-provided verification callback (set by
+     SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback) allows accepting the session
+     anyway (i.e. leaves x509_store_ctx->error != X509_V_OK
+     but returns 1): When the session is reused, we have to set
+     ssl->verify_result to the appropriate error code to avoid
+     security holes.
+     [Bodo Moeller, problem pointed out by Lutz Jaenicke]
+
+  *) Fix a bug in the new PKCS#7 code: it didn't consider the
+     case in PKCS7_dataInit() where the signed PKCS7 structure
+     didn't contain any existing data because it was being created.
+     [Po-Cheng Chen <pocheng@nst.com.tw>, slightly modified by Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add a salt to the key derivation routines in enc.c. This
+     forms the first 8 bytes of the encrypted file. Also add a
+     -S option to allow a salt to be input on the command line.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) New function X509_cmp(). Oddly enough there wasn't a function
+     to compare two certificates. We do this by working out the SHA1
+     hash and comparing that. X509_cmp() will be needed by the trust
+     code.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) SSL_get1_session() is like SSL_get_session(), but increments
+     the reference count in the SSL_SESSION returned.
+     [Geoff Thorpe <geoff@eu.c2.net>]
+
+  *) Fix for 'req': it was adding a null to request attributes.
+     Also change the X509_LOOKUP and X509_INFO code to handle
+     certificate auxiliary information.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add support for 40 and 64 bit RC2 and RC4 algorithms: document
+     the 'enc' command.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add the possibility to add extra information to the memory leak
+     detecting output, to form tracebacks, showing from where each
+     allocation was originated: CRYPTO_push_info("constant string") adds
+     the string plus current file name and line number to a per-thread
+     stack, CRYPTO_pop_info() does the obvious, CRYPTO_remove_all_info()
+     is like calling CYRPTO_pop_info() until the stack is empty.
+     Also updated memory leak detection code to be multi-thread-safe.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Add options -text and -noout to pkcs7 utility and delete the
+     encryption options which never did anything. Update docs.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add options to some of the utilities to allow the pass phrase
+     to be included on either the command line (not recommended on
+     OSes like Unix) or read from the environment. Update the
+     manpages and fix a few bugs.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add a few manpages for some of the openssl commands.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix the -revoke option in ca. It was freeing up memory twice,
+     leaking and not finding already revoked certificates.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Extensive changes to support certificate auxiliary information.
+     This involves the use of X509_CERT_AUX structure and X509_AUX
+     functions. An X509_AUX function such as PEM_read_X509_AUX()
+     can still read in a certificate file in the usual way but it
+     will also read in any additional "auxiliary information". By
+     doing things this way a fair degree of compatibility can be
+     retained: existing certificates can have this information added
+     using the new 'x509' options. 
+
+     Current auxiliary information includes an "alias" and some trust
+     settings. The trust settings will ultimately be used in enhanced
+     certificate chain verification routines: currently a certificate
+     can only be trusted if it is self signed and then it is trusted
+     for all purposes.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix assembler for Alpha (tested only on DEC OSF not Linux or *BSD).
+     The problem was that one of the replacement routines had not been working
+     since SSLeay releases.  For now the offending routine has been replaced
+     with non-optimised assembler.  Even so, this now gives around 95%
+     performance improvement for 1024 bit RSA signs.
+     [Mark Cox]
+
+  *) Hack to fix PKCS#7 decryption when used with some unorthodox RC2 
+     handling. Most clients have the effective key size in bits equal to
+     the key length in bits: so a 40 bit RC2 key uses a 40 bit (5 byte) key.
+     A few however don't do this and instead use the size of the decrypted key
+     to determine the RC2 key length and the AlgorithmIdentifier to determine
+     the effective key length. In this case the effective key length can still
+     be 40 bits but the key length can be 168 bits for example. This is fixed
+     by manually forcing an RC2 key into the EVP_PKEY structure because the
+     EVP code can't currently handle unusual RC2 key sizes: it always assumes
+     the key length and effective key length are equal.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add a bunch of functions that should simplify the creation of 
+     X509_NAME structures. Now you should be able to do:
+     X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(nm, "CN", MBSTRING_ASC, "Steve", -1, -1, 0);
+     and have it automatically work out the correct field type and fill in
+     the structures. The more adventurous can try:
+     X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(nm, field, MBSTRING_UTF8, str, -1, -1, 0);
+     and it will (hopefully) work out the correct multibyte encoding.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Change the 'req' utility to use the new field handling and multibyte
+     copy routines. Before the DN field creation was handled in an ad hoc
+     way in req, ca, and x509 which was rather broken and didn't support
+     BMPStrings or UTF8Strings. Since some software doesn't implement
+     BMPStrings or UTF8Strings yet, they can be enabled using the config file
+     using the dirstring_type option. See the new comment in the default
+     openssl.cnf for more info.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Make crypto/rand/md_rand.c more robust:
+     - Assure unique random numbers after fork().
+     - Make sure that concurrent threads access the global counter and
+       md serializably so that we never lose entropy in them
+       or use exactly the same state in multiple threads.
+       Access to the large state is not always serializable because
+       the additional locking could be a performance killer, and
+       md should be large enough anyway.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) New file apps/app_rand.c with commonly needed functionality
+     for handling the random seed file.
+
+     Use the random seed file in some applications that previously did not:
+          ca,
+          dsaparam -genkey (which also ignored its '-rand' option), 
+          s_client,
+          s_server,
+          x509 (when signing).
+     Except on systems with /dev/urandom, it is crucial to have a random
+     seed file at least for key creation, DSA signing, and for DH exchanges;
+     for RSA signatures we could do without one.
+
+     gendh and gendsa (unlike genrsa) used to read only the first byte
+     of each file listed in the '-rand' option.  The function as previously
+     found in genrsa is now in app_rand.c and is used by all programs
+     that support '-rand'.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) In RAND_write_file, use mode 0600 for creating files;
+     don't just chmod when it may be too late.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Report an error from X509_STORE_load_locations
+     when X509_LOOKUP_load_file or X509_LOOKUP_add_dir failed.
+     [Bill Perry]
+
+  *) New function ASN1_mbstring_copy() this copies a string in either
+     ASCII, Unicode, Universal (4 bytes per character) or UTF8 format
+     into an ASN1_STRING type. A mask of permissible types is passed
+     and it chooses the "minimal" type to use or an error if not type
+     is suitable.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add function equivalents to the various macros in asn1.h. The old
+     macros are retained with an M_ prefix. Code inside the library can
+     use the M_ macros. External code (including the openssl utility)
+     should *NOT* in order to be "shared library friendly".
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add various functions that can check a certificate's extensions
+     to see if it usable for various purposes such as SSL client,
+     server or S/MIME and CAs of these types. This is currently 
+     VERY EXPERIMENTAL but will ultimately be used for certificate chain
+     verification. Also added a -purpose flag to x509 utility to
+     print out all the purposes.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add a CRYPTO_EX_DATA to X509 certificate structure and associated
+     functions.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) New X509V3_{X509,CRL,REVOKED}_get_d2i() functions. These will search
+     for, obtain and decode and extension and obtain its critical flag.
+     This allows all the necessary extension code to be handled in a
+     single function call.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) RC4 tune-up featuring 30-40% performance improvement on most RISC
+     platforms. See crypto/rc4/rc4_enc.c for further details.
+     [Andy Polyakov]
+
+  *) New -noout option to asn1parse. This causes no output to be produced
+     its main use is when combined with -strparse and -out to extract data
+     from a file (which may not be in ASN.1 format).
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix for pkcs12 program. It was hashing an invalid certificate pointer
+     when producing the local key id.
+     [Richard Levitte <levitte@stacken.kth.se>]
+
+  *) New option -dhparam in s_server. This allows a DH parameter file to be
+     stated explicitly. If it is not stated then it tries the first server
+     certificate file. The previous behaviour hard coded the filename
+     "server.pem".
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add -pubin and -pubout options to the rsa and dsa commands. These allow
+     a public key to be input or output. For example:
+     openssl rsa -in key.pem -pubout -out pubkey.pem
+     Also added necessary DSA public key functions to handle this.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix so PKCS7_dataVerify() doesn't crash if no certificates are contained
+     in the message. This was handled by allowing
+     X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial() to tolerate a NULL passed to it.
+     [Steve Henson, reported by Sampo Kellomaki <sampo@mail.neuronio.pt>]
+
+  *) Fix for bug in d2i_ASN1_bytes(): other ASN1 functions add an extra null
+     to the end of the strings whereas this didn't. This would cause problems
+     if strings read with d2i_ASN1_bytes() were later modified.
+     [Steve Henson, reported by Arne Ansper <arne@ats.cyber.ee>]
+
+  *) Fix for base64 decode bug. When a base64 bio reads only one line of
+     data and it contains EOF it will end up returning an error. This is
+     caused by input 46 bytes long. The cause is due to the way base64
+     BIOs find the start of base64 encoded data. They do this by trying a
+     trial decode on each line until they find one that works. When they
+     do a flag is set and it starts again knowing it can pass all the
+     data directly through the decoder. Unfortunately it doesn't reset
+     the context it uses. This means that if EOF is reached an attempt
+     is made to pass two EOFs through the context and this causes the
+     resulting error. This can also cause other problems as well. As is
+     usual with these problems it takes *ages* to find and the fix is
+     trivial: move one line.
+     [Steve Henson, reported by ian@uns.ns.ac.yu (Ivan Nejgebauer) ]
+
+  *) Ugly workaround to get s_client and s_server working under Windows. The
+     old code wouldn't work because it needed to select() on sockets and the
+     tty (for keypresses and to see if data could be written). Win32 only
+     supports select() on sockets so we select() with a 1s timeout on the
+     sockets and then see if any characters are waiting to be read, if none
+     are present then we retry, we also assume we can always write data to
+     the tty. This isn't nice because the code then blocks until we've
+     received a complete line of data and it is effectively polling the
+     keyboard at 1s intervals: however it's quite a bit better than not
+     working at all :-) A dedicated Windows application might handle this
+     with an event loop for example.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Enhance RSA_METHOD structure. Now there are two extra methods, rsa_sign
+     and rsa_verify. When the RSA_FLAGS_SIGN_VER option is set these functions
+     will be called when RSA_sign() and RSA_verify() are used. This is useful
+     if rsa_pub_dec() and rsa_priv_enc() equivalents are not available.
+     For this to work properly RSA_public_decrypt() and RSA_private_encrypt()
+     should *not* be used: RSA_sign() and RSA_verify() must be used instead.
+     This necessitated the support of an extra signature type NID_md5_sha1
+     for SSL signatures and modifications to the SSL library to use it instead
+     of calling RSA_public_decrypt() and RSA_private_encrypt().
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add new -verify -CAfile and -CApath options to the crl program, these
+     will lookup a CRL issuers certificate and verify the signature in a
+     similar way to the verify program. Tidy up the crl program so it
+     no longer accesses structures directly. Make the ASN1 CRL parsing a bit
+     less strict. It will now permit CRL extensions even if it is not
+     a V2 CRL: this will allow it to tolerate some broken CRLs.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Initialize all non-automatic variables each time one of the openssl
+     sub-programs is started (this is necessary as they may be started
+     multiple times from the "OpenSSL>" prompt).
+     [Lennart Bang, Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Preliminary compilation option RSA_NULL which disables RSA crypto without
+     removing all other RSA functionality (this is what NO_RSA does). This
+     is so (for example) those in the US can disable those operations covered
+     by the RSA patent while allowing storage and parsing of RSA keys and RSA
+     key generation.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Non-copying interface to BIO pairs.
+     (still largely untested)
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) New function ANS1_tag2str() to convert an ASN1 tag to a descriptive
+     ASCII string. This was handled independently in various places before.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) New functions UTF8_getc() and UTF8_putc() that parse and generate
+     UTF8 strings a character at a time.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Use client_version from client hello to select the protocol
+     (s23_srvr.c) and for RSA client key exchange verification
+     (s3_srvr.c), as required by the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 specifications.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Add various utility functions to handle SPKACs, these were previously
+     handled by poking round in the structure internals. Added new function
+     NETSCAPE_SPKI_print() to print out SPKAC and a new utility 'spkac' to
+     print, verify and generate SPKACs. Based on an original idea from
+     Massimiliano Pala <madwolf@comune.modena.it> but extensively modified.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) RIPEMD160 is operational on all platforms and is back in 'make test'.
+     [Andy Polyakov]
+
+  *) Allow the config file extension section to be overwritten on the
+     command line. Based on an original idea from Massimiliano Pala
+     <madwolf@comune.modena.it>. The new option is called -extensions
+     and can be applied to ca, req and x509. Also -reqexts to override
+     the request extensions in req and -crlexts to override the crl extensions
+     in ca.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add new feature to the SPKAC handling in ca.  Now you can include
+     the same field multiple times by preceding it by "XXXX." for example:
+     1.OU="Unit name 1"
+     2.OU="Unit name 2"
+     this is the same syntax as used in the req config file.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Allow certificate extensions to be added to certificate requests. These
+     are specified in a 'req_extensions' option of the req section of the
+     config file. They can be printed out with the -text option to req but
+     are otherwise ignored at present.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix a horrible bug in enc_read() in crypto/evp/bio_enc.c: if the first
+     data read consists of only the final block it would not decrypted because
+     EVP_CipherUpdate() would correctly report zero bytes had been decrypted.
+     A misplaced 'break' also meant the decrypted final block might not be
+     copied until the next read.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Initial support for DH_METHOD. Again based on RSA_METHOD. Also added
+     a few extra parameters to the DH structure: these will be useful if
+     for example we want the value of 'q' or implement X9.42 DH.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Initial support for DSA_METHOD. This is based on the RSA_METHOD and
+     provides hooks that allow the default DSA functions or functions on a
+     "per key" basis to be replaced. This allows hardware acceleration and
+     hardware key storage to be handled without major modification to the
+     library. Also added low level modexp hooks and CRYPTO_EX structure and 
+     associated functions.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add a new flag to memory BIOs, BIO_FLAG_MEM_RDONLY. This marks the BIO
+     as "read only": it can't be written to and the buffer it points to will
+     not be freed. Reading from a read only BIO is much more efficient than
+     a normal memory BIO. This was added because there are several times when
+     an area of memory needs to be read from a BIO. The previous method was
+     to create a memory BIO and write the data to it, this results in two
+     copies of the data and an O(n^2) reading algorithm. There is a new
+     function BIO_new_mem_buf() which creates a read only memory BIO from
+     an area of memory. Also modified the PKCS#7 routines to use read only
+     memory BIOs.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Bugfix: ssl23_get_client_hello did not work properly when called in
+     state SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B, i.e. when the first 7 bytes of
+     a SSLv2-compatible client hello for SSLv3 or TLSv1 could be read,
+     but a retry condition occurred while trying to read the rest.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) The PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT_new() function was setting the content type as
+     NID_pkcs7_encrypted by default: this was wrong since this should almost
+     always be NID_pkcs7_data. Also modified the PKCS7_set_type() to handle
+     the encrypted data type: this is a more sensible place to put it and it
+     allows the PKCS#12 code to be tidied up that duplicated this
+     functionality.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Changed obj_dat.pl script so it takes its input and output files on
+     the command line. This should avoid shell escape redirection problems
+     under Win32.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Initial support for certificate extension requests, these are included
+     in things like Xenroll certificate requests. Included functions to allow
+     extensions to be obtained and added.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) -crlf option to s_client and s_server for sending newlines as
+     CRLF (as required by many protocols).
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.3a and 0.9.4  [09 Aug 1999]
+  
+  *) Install libRSAglue.a when OpenSSL is built with RSAref.
+     [Ralf S. Engelschall]
+
+  *) A few more ``#ifndef NO_FP_API / #endif'' pairs for consistency.
+     [Andrija Antonijevic <TheAntony2@bigfoot.com>]
+
+  *) Fix -startdate and -enddate (which was missing) arguments to 'ca'
+     program.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) New function DSA_dup_DH, which duplicates DSA parameters/keys as
+     DH parameters/keys (q is lost during that conversion, but the resulting
+     DH parameters contain its length).
+
+     For 1024-bit p, DSA_generate_parameters followed by DSA_dup_DH is
+     much faster than DH_generate_parameters (which creates parameters
+     where p = 2*q + 1), and also the smaller q makes DH computations
+     much more efficient (160-bit exponentiation instead of 1024-bit
+     exponentiation); so this provides a convenient way to support DHE
+     ciphersuites in SSL/TLS servers (see ssl/ssltest.c).  It is of
+     utter importance to use
+         SSL_CTX_set_options(s_ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE);
+     or
+         SSL_set_options(s_ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE);
+     when such DH parameters are used, because otherwise small subgroup
+     attacks may become possible!
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Avoid memory leak in i2d_DHparams.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Allow the -k option to be used more than once in the enc program:
+     this allows the same encrypted message to be read by multiple recipients.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) New function OBJ_obj2txt(buf, buf_len, a, no_name), this converts
+     an ASN1_OBJECT to a text string. If the "no_name" parameter is set then
+     it will always use the numerical form of the OID, even if it has a short
+     or long name.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Added an extra RSA flag: RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY. Previously the rsa_mod_exp
+     method only got called if p,q,dmp1,dmq1,iqmp components were present,
+     otherwise bn_mod_exp was called. In the case of hardware keys for example
+     no private key components need be present and it might store extra data
+     in the RSA structure, which cannot be accessed from bn_mod_exp.
+     By setting RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY rsa_mod_exp will always be called for
+     private key operations.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Added support for SPARC Linux.
+     [Andy Polyakov]
+
+  *) pem_password_cb function type incompatibly changed from
+          typedef int pem_password_cb(char *buf, int size, int rwflag);
+     to
+          ....(char *buf, int size, int rwflag, void *userdata);
+     so that applications can pass data to their callbacks:
+     The PEM[_ASN1]_{read,write}... functions and macros now take an
+     additional void * argument, which is just handed through whenever
+     the password callback is called.
+     [Damien Miller <dmiller@ilogic.com.au>; tiny changes by Bodo Moeller]
+
+     New function SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata.
+
+     Compatibility note: As many C implementations push function arguments
+     onto the stack in reverse order, the new library version is likely to
+     interoperate with programs that have been compiled with the old
+     pem_password_cb definition (PEM_whatever takes some data that
+     happens to be on the stack as its last argument, and the callback
+     just ignores this garbage); but there is no guarantee whatsoever that
+     this will work.
+
+  *) The -DPLATFORM="\"$(PLATFORM)\"" definition and the similar -DCFLAGS=...
+     (both in crypto/Makefile.ssl for use by crypto/cversion.c) caused
+     problems not only on Windows, but also on some Unix platforms.
+     To avoid problematic command lines, these definitions are now in an
+     auto-generated file crypto/buildinf.h (created by crypto/Makefile.ssl
+     for standard "make" builds, by util/mk1mf.pl for "mk1mf" builds).
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) MIPS III/IV assembler module is reimplemented.
+     [Andy Polyakov]
+
+  *) More DES library cleanups: remove references to srand/rand and
+     delete an unused file.
+     [Ulf Möller]
+
+  *) Add support for the the free Netwide assembler (NASM) under Win32,
+     since not many people have MASM (ml) and it can be hard to obtain.
+     This is currently experimental but it seems to work OK and pass all
+     the tests. Check out INSTALL.W32 for info.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix memory leaks in s3_clnt.c: All non-anonymous SSL3/TLS1 connections
+     without temporary keys kept an extra copy of the server key,
+     and connections with temporary keys did not free everything in case
+     of an error.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) New function RSA_check_key and new openssl rsa option -check
+     for verifying the consistency of RSA keys.
+     [Ulf Moeller, Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Various changes to make Win32 compile work: 
+     1. Casts to avoid "loss of data" warnings in p5_crpt2.c
+     2. Change unsigned int to int in b_dump.c to avoid "signed/unsigned
+        comparison" warnings.
+     3. Add sk_<TYPE>_sort to DEF file generator and do make update.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add a debugging option to PKCS#5 v2 key generation function: when
+     you #define DEBUG_PKCS5V2 passwords, salts, iteration counts and
+     derived keys are printed to stderr.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Copy the flags in ASN1_STRING_dup().
+     [Roman E. Pavlov <pre@mo.msk.ru>]
+
+  *) The x509 application mishandled signing requests containing DSA
+     keys when the signing key was also DSA and the parameters didn't match.
+
+     It was supposed to omit the parameters when they matched the signing key:
+     the verifying software was then supposed to automatically use the CA's
+     parameters if they were absent from the end user certificate.
+
+     Omitting parameters is no longer recommended. The test was also
+     the wrong way round! This was probably due to unusual behaviour in
+     EVP_cmp_parameters() which returns 1 if the parameters match. 
+     This meant that parameters were omitted when they *didn't* match and
+     the certificate was useless. Certificates signed with 'ca' didn't have
+     this bug.
+     [Steve Henson, reported by Doug Erickson <Doug.Erickson@Part.NET>]
+
+  *) Memory leak checking (-DCRYPTO_MDEBUG) had some problems.
+     The interface is as follows:
+     Applications can use
+         CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON) aka MemCheck_start(),
+         CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_OFF) aka MemCheck_stop();
+     "off" is now the default.
+     The library internally uses
+         CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_DISABLE) aka MemCheck_off(),
+         CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE) aka MemCheck_on()
+     to disable memory-checking temporarily.
+
+     Some inconsistent states that previously were possible (and were
+     even the default) are now avoided.
+
+     -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_TIME is new and additionally stores the current time
+     with each memory chunk allocated; this is occasionally more helpful
+     than just having a counter.
+
+     -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_THREAD is also new and adds the thread ID.
+
+     -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL enables all of the above, plus any future
+     extensions.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Introduce "mode" for SSL structures (with defaults in SSL_CTX),
+     which largely parallels "options", but is for changing API behaviour,
+     whereas "options" are about protocol behaviour.
+     Initial "mode" flags are:
+
+     SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE   Allow SSL_write to report success when
+                                     a single record has been written.
+     SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER  Don't insist that SSL_write
+                                     retries use the same buffer location.
+                                     (But all of the contents must be
+                                     copied!)
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Bugfix: SSL_set_options ignored its parameter, only SSL_CTX_set_options
+     worked.
+
+  *) Fix problems with no-hmac etc.
+     [Ulf Möller, pointed out by Brian Wellington <bwelling@tislabs.com>]
+
+  *) New functions RSA_get_default_method(), RSA_set_method() and
+     RSA_get_method(). These allows replacement of RSA_METHODs without having
+     to mess around with the internals of an RSA structure.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix memory leaks in DSA_do_sign and DSA_is_prime.
+     Also really enable memory leak checks in openssl.c and in some
+     test programs.
+     [Chad C. Mulligan, Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Fix a bug in d2i_ASN1_INTEGER() and i2d_ASN1_INTEGER() which can mess
+     up the length of negative integers. This has now been simplified to just
+     store the length when it is first determined and use it later, rather
+     than trying to keep track of where data is copied and updating it to
+     point to the end.
+     [Steve Henson, reported by Brien Wheeler
+      <bwheeler@authentica-security.com>]
+
+  *) Add a new function PKCS7_signatureVerify. This allows the verification
+     of a PKCS#7 signature but with the signing certificate passed to the
+     function itself. This contrasts with PKCS7_dataVerify which assumes the
+     certificate is present in the PKCS#7 structure. This isn't always the
+     case: certificates can be omitted from a PKCS#7 structure and be
+     distributed by "out of band" means (such as a certificate database).
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Complete the PEM_* macros with DECLARE_PEM versions to replace the
+     function prototypes in pem.h, also change util/mkdef.pl to add the
+     necessary function names. 
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) mk1mf.pl (used by Windows builds) did not properly read the
+     options set by Configure in the top level Makefile, and Configure
+     was not even able to write more than one option correctly.
+     Fixed, now "no-idea no-rc5 -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG" etc. works as intended.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) New functions CONF_load_bio() and CONF_load_fp() to allow a config
+     file to be loaded from a BIO or FILE pointer. The BIO version will
+     for example allow memory BIOs to contain config info.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) New function "CRYPTO_num_locks" that returns CRYPTO_NUM_LOCKS.
+     Whoever hopes to achieve shared-library compatibility across versions
+     must use this, not the compile-time macro.
+     (Exercise 0.9.4: Which is the minimum library version required by
+     such programs?)
+     Note: All this applies only to multi-threaded programs, others don't
+     need locks.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Add missing case to s3_clnt.c state machine -- one of the new SSL tests
+     through a BIO pair triggered the default case, i.e.
+     SSLerr(...,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE).
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) New "BIO pair" concept (crypto/bio/bss_bio.c) so that applications
+     can use the SSL library even if none of the specific BIOs is
+     appropriate.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Fix a bug in i2d_DSAPublicKey() which meant it returned the wrong value
+     for the encoded length.
+     [Jeon KyoungHo <khjeon@sds.samsung.co.kr>]
+
+  *) Add initial documentation of the X509V3 functions.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add a new pair of functions PEM_write_PKCS8PrivateKey() and 
+     PEM_write_bio_PKCS8PrivateKey() that are equivalent to
+     PEM_write_PrivateKey() and PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey() but use the more
+     secure PKCS#8 private key format with a high iteration count.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix determination of Perl interpreter: A perl or perl5
+     _directory_ in $PATH was also accepted as the interpreter.
+     [Ralf S. Engelschall]
+
+  *) Fix demos/sign/sign.c: well there wasn't anything strictly speaking
+     wrong with it but it was very old and did things like calling
+     PEM_ASN1_read() directly and used MD5 for the hash not to mention some
+     unusual formatting.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix demos/selfsign.c: it used obsolete and deleted functions, changed
+     to use the new extension code.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Implement the PEM_read/PEM_write functions in crypto/pem/pem_all.c
+     with macros. This should make it easier to change their form, add extra
+     arguments etc. Fix a few PEM prototypes which didn't have cipher as a
+     constant.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add to configuration table a new entry that can specify an alternative
+     name for unistd.h (for pre-POSIX systems); we need this for NeXTstep,
+     according to Mark Crispin <MRC@Panda.COM>.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+#if 0
+  *) DES CBC did not update the IV. Weird.
+     [Ben Laurie]
+#else
+     des_cbc_encrypt does not update the IV, but des_ncbc_encrypt does.
+     Changing the behaviour of the former might break existing programs --
+     where IV updating is needed, des_ncbc_encrypt can be used.
+#endif
+
+  *) When bntest is run from "make test" it drives bc to check its
+     calculations, as well as internally checking them. If an internal check
+     fails, it needs to cause bc to give a non-zero result or make test carries
+     on without noticing the failure. Fixed.
+     [Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) DES library cleanups.
+     [Ulf Möller]
+
+  *) Add support for PKCS#5 v2.0 PBE algorithms. This will permit PKCS#8 to be
+     used with any cipher unlike PKCS#5 v1.5 which can at most handle 64 bit
+     ciphers. NOTE: although the key derivation function has been verified
+     against some published test vectors it has not been extensively tested
+     yet. Added a -v2 "cipher" option to pkcs8 application to allow the use
+     of v2.0.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Instead of "mkdir -p", which is not fully portable, use new
+     Perl script "util/mkdir-p.pl".
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Rewrite the way password based encryption (PBE) is handled. It used to
+     assume that the ASN1 AlgorithmIdentifier parameter was a PBEParameter
+     structure. This was true for the PKCS#5 v1.5 and PKCS#12 PBE algorithms
+     but doesn't apply to PKCS#5 v2.0 where it can be something else. Now
+     the 'parameter' field of the AlgorithmIdentifier is passed to the
+     underlying key generation function so it must do its own ASN1 parsing.
+     This has also changed the EVP_PBE_CipherInit() function which now has a
+     'parameter' argument instead of literal salt and iteration count values
+     and the function EVP_PBE_ALGOR_CipherInit() has been deleted.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Support for PKCS#5 v1.5 compatible password based encryption algorithms
+     and PKCS#8 functionality. New 'pkcs8' application linked to openssl.
+     Needed to change the PEM_STRING_EVP_PKEY value which was just "PRIVATE
+     KEY" because this clashed with PKCS#8 unencrypted string. Since this
+     value was just used as a "magic string" and not used directly its
+     value doesn't matter.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Introduce some semblance of const correctness to BN. Shame C doesn't
+     support mutable.
+     [Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) "linux-sparc64" configuration (ultrapenguin).
+     [Ray Miller <ray.miller@oucs.ox.ac.uk>]
+     "linux-sparc" configuration.
+     [Christian Forster <fo@hawo.stw.uni-erlangen.de>]
+
+  *) config now generates no-xxx options for missing ciphers.
+     [Ulf Möller]
+
+  *) Support the EBCDIC character set (work in progress).
+     File ebcdic.c not yet included because it has a different license.
+     [Martin Kraemer <Martin.Kraemer@MchP.Siemens.De>]
+
+  *) Support BS2000/OSD-POSIX.
+     [Martin Kraemer <Martin.Kraemer@MchP.Siemens.De>]
+
+  *) Make callbacks for key generation use void * instead of char *.
+     [Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) Make S/MIME samples compile (not yet tested).
+     [Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) Additional typesafe stacks.
+     [Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) New configuration variants "bsdi-elf-gcc" (BSD/OS 4.x).
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+
+ Changes between 0.9.3 and 0.9.3a  [29 May 1999]
+
+  *) New configuration variant "sco5-gcc".
+
+  *) Updated some demos.
+     [Sean O Riordain, Wade Scholine]
+
+  *) Add missing BIO_free at exit of pkcs12 application.
+     [Wu Zhigang]
+
+  *) Fix memory leak in conf.c.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Updates for Win32 to assembler version of MD5.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Set #! path to perl in apps/der_chop to where we found it
+     instead of using a fixed path.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) SHA library changes for irix64-mips4-cc.
+     [Andy Polyakov]
+
+  *) Improvements for VMS support.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+
+ Changes between 0.9.2b and 0.9.3  [24 May 1999]
+
+  *) Bignum library bug fix. IRIX 6 passes "make test" now!
+     This also avoids the problems with SC4.2 and unpatched SC5.  
+     [Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se>]
+
+  *) New functions sk_num, sk_value and sk_set to replace the previous macros.
+     These are required because of the typesafe stack would otherwise break 
+     existing code. If old code used a structure member which used to be STACK
+     and is now STACK_OF (for example cert in a PKCS7_SIGNED structure) with
+     sk_num or sk_value it would produce an error because the num, data members
+     are not present in STACK_OF. Now it just produces a warning. sk_set
+     replaces the old method of assigning a value to sk_value
+     (e.g. sk_value(x, i) = y) which the library used in a few cases. Any code
+     that does this will no longer work (and should use sk_set instead) but
+     this could be regarded as a "questionable" behaviour anyway.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix most of the other PKCS#7 bugs. The "experimental" code can now
+     correctly handle encrypted S/MIME data.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Change type of various DES function arguments from des_cblock
+     (which means, in function argument declarations, pointer to char)
+     to des_cblock * (meaning pointer to array with 8 char elements),
+     which allows the compiler to do more typechecking; it was like
+     that back in SSLeay, but with lots of ugly casts.
+
+     Introduce new type const_des_cblock.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Reorganise the PKCS#7 library and get rid of some of the more obvious
+     problems: find RecipientInfo structure that matches recipient certificate
+     and initialise the ASN1 structures properly based on passed cipher.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Belatedly make the BN tests actually check the results.
+     [Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) Fix the encoding and decoding of negative ASN1 INTEGERS and conversion
+     to and from BNs: it was completely broken. New compilation option
+     NEG_PUBKEY_BUG to allow for some broken certificates that encode public
+     key elements as negative integers.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Reorganize and speed up MD5.
+     [Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se>]
+
+  *) VMS support.
+     [Richard Levitte <richard@levitte.org>]
+
+  *) New option -out to asn1parse to allow the parsed structure to be
+     output to a file. This is most useful when combined with the -strparse
+     option to examine the output of things like OCTET STRINGS.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Make SSL library a little more fool-proof by not requiring any longer
+     that SSL_set_{accept,connect}_state be called before
+     SSL_{accept,connect} may be used (SSL_set_..._state is omitted
+     in many applications because usually everything *appeared* to work as
+     intended anyway -- now it really works as intended).
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Move openssl.cnf out of lib/.
+     [Ulf Möller]
+
+  *) Fix various things to let OpenSSL even pass ``egcc -pipe -O2 -Wall
+     -Wshadow -Wpointer-arith -Wcast-align -Wmissing-prototypes
+     -Wmissing-declarations -Wnested-externs -Winline'' with EGCS 1.1.2+ 
+     [Ralf S. Engelschall]
+
+  *) Various fixes to the EVP and PKCS#7 code. It may now be able to
+     handle PKCS#7 enveloped data properly.
+     [Sebastian Akerman <sak@parallelconsulting.com>, modified by Steve]
+
+  *) Create a duplicate of the SSL_CTX's CERT in SSL_new instead of
+     copying pointers.  The cert_st handling is changed by this in
+     various ways (and thus what used to be known as ctx->default_cert
+     is now called ctx->cert, since we don't resort to s->ctx->[default_]cert
+     any longer when s->cert does not give us what we need).
+     ssl_cert_instantiate becomes obsolete by this change.
+     As soon as we've got the new code right (possibly it already is?),
+     we have solved a couple of bugs of the earlier code where s->cert
+     was used as if it could not have been shared with other SSL structures.
+
+     Note that using the SSL API in certain dirty ways now will result
+     in different behaviour than observed with earlier library versions:
+     Changing settings for an SSL_CTX *ctx after having done s = SSL_new(ctx)
+     does not influence s as it used to.
+     
+     In order to clean up things more thoroughly, inside SSL_SESSION
+     we don't use CERT any longer, but a new structure SESS_CERT
+     that holds per-session data (if available); currently, this is
+     the peer's certificate chain and, for clients, the server's certificate
+     and temporary key.  CERT holds only those values that can have
+     meaningful defaults in an SSL_CTX.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) New function X509V3_EXT_i2d() to create an X509_EXTENSION structure
+     from the internal representation. Various PKCS#7 fixes: remove some
+     evil casts and set the enc_dig_alg field properly based on the signing
+     key type.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Allow PKCS#12 password to be set from the command line or the
+     environment. Let 'ca' get its config file name from the environment
+     variables "OPENSSL_CONF" or "SSLEAY_CONF" (for consistency with 'req'
+     and 'x509').
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Allow certificate policies extension to use an IA5STRING for the
+     organization field. This is contrary to the PKIX definition but
+     VeriSign uses it and IE5 only recognises this form. Document 'x509'
+     extension option.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add PEDANTIC compiler flag to allow compilation with gcc -pedantic,
+     without disallowing inline assembler and the like for non-pedantic builds.
+     [Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) Support Borland C++ builder.
+     [Janez Jere <jj@void.si>, modified by Ulf Möller]
+
+  *) Support Mingw32.
+     [Ulf Möller]
+
+  *) SHA-1 cleanups and performance enhancements.
+     [Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se>]
+
+  *) Sparc v8plus assembler for the bignum library.
+     [Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se>]
+
+  *) Accept any -xxx and +xxx compiler options in Configure.
+     [Ulf Möller]
+
+  *) Update HPUX configuration.
+     [Anonymous]
+  
+  *) Add missing sk_<type>_unshift() function to safestack.h
+     [Ralf S. Engelschall]
+
+  *) New function SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file that sets the
+     "extra_cert"s in addition to the certificate.  (This makes sense
+     only for "PEM" format files, as chains as a whole are not
+     DER-encoded.)
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Support verify_depth from the SSL API.
+     x509_vfy.c had what can be considered an off-by-one-error:
+     Its depth (which was not part of the external interface)
+     was actually counting the number of certificates in a chain;
+     now it really counts the depth.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Bugfix in crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c: The SSLerr macro was used
+     instead of X509err, which often resulted in confusing error
+     messages since the error codes are not globally unique
+     (e.g. an alleged error in ssl3_accept when a certificate
+     didn't match the private key).
+
+  *) New function SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context that allows to set a default
+     value (so that you don't need SSL_set_session_id_context for each
+     connection using the SSL_CTX).
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) OAEP decoding bug fix.
+     [Ulf Möller]
+
+  *) Support INSTALL_PREFIX for package builders, as proposed by
+     David Harris.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) New Configure options "threads" and "no-threads".  For systems
+     where the proper compiler options are known (currently Solaris
+     and Linux), "threads" is the default.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) New script util/mklink.pl as a faster substitute for util/mklink.sh.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Install various scripts to $(OPENSSLDIR)/misc, not to
+     $(INSTALLTOP)/bin -- they shouldn't clutter directories
+     such as /usr/local/bin.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) "make linux-shared" to build shared libraries.
+     [Niels Poppe <niels@netbox.org>]
+
+  *) New Configure option no-<cipher> (rsa, idea, rc5, ...).
+     [Ulf Möller]
+
+  *) Add the PKCS#12 API documentation to openssl.txt. Preliminary support for
+     extension adding in x509 utility.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Remove NOPROTO sections and error code comments.
+     [Ulf Möller]
+
+  *) Partial rewrite of the DEF file generator to now parse the ANSI
+     prototypes.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) New Configure options --prefix=DIR and --openssldir=DIR.
+     [Ulf Möller]
+
+  *) Complete rewrite of the error code script(s). It is all now handled
+     by one script at the top level which handles error code gathering,
+     header rewriting and C source file generation. It should be much better
+     than the old method: it now uses a modified version of Ulf's parser to
+     read the ANSI prototypes in all header files (thus the old K&R definitions
+     aren't needed for error creation any more) and do a better job of
+     translating function codes into names. The old 'ASN1 error code imbedded
+     in a comment' is no longer necessary and it doesn't use .err files which
+     have now been deleted. Also the error code call doesn't have to appear all
+     on one line (which resulted in some large lines...).
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Change #include filenames from <foo.h> to <openssl/foo.h>.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Change behaviour of ssl2_read when facing length-0 packets: Don't return
+     0 (which usually indicates a closed connection), but continue reading.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Fix some race conditions.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Add support for CRL distribution points extension. Add Certificate
+     Policies and CRL distribution points documentation.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Move the autogenerated header file parts to crypto/opensslconf.h.
+     [Ulf Möller]
+
+  *) Fix new 56-bit DES export ciphersuites: they were using 7 bytes instead of
+     8 of keying material. Merlin has also confirmed interop with this fix
+     between OpenSSL and Baltimore C/SSL 2.0 and J/SSL 2.0.
+     [Merlin Hughes <merlin@baltimore.ie>]
+
+  *) Fix lots of warnings.
+     [Richard Levitte <levitte@stacken.kth.se>]
+ 
+  *) In add_cert_dir() in crypto/x509/by_dir.c, break out of the loop if
+     the directory spec didn't end with a LIST_SEPARATOR_CHAR.
+     [Richard Levitte <levitte@stacken.kth.se>]
+ 
+  *) Fix problems with sizeof(long) == 8.
+     [Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se>]
+
+  *) Change functions to ANSI C.
+     [Ulf Möller]
+
+  *) Fix typos in error codes.
+     [Martin Kraemer <Martin.Kraemer@MchP.Siemens.De>, Ulf Möller]
+
+  *) Remove defunct assembler files from Configure.
+     [Ulf Möller]
+
+  *) SPARC v8 assembler BIGNUM implementation.
+     [Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se>]
+
+  *) Support for Certificate Policies extension: both print and set.
+     Various additions to support the r2i method this uses.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) A lot of constification, and fix a bug in X509_NAME_oneline() that could
+     return a const string when you are expecting an allocated buffer.
+     [Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) Add support for ASN1 types UTF8String and VISIBLESTRING, also the CHOICE
+     types DirectoryString and DisplayText.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add code to allow r2i extensions to access the configuration database,
+     add an LHASH database driver and add several ctx helper functions.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix an evil bug in bn_expand2() which caused various BN functions to
+     fail when they extended the size of a BIGNUM.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Various utility functions to handle SXNet extension. Modify mkdef.pl to
+     support typesafe stack.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix typo in SSL_[gs]et_options().
+     [Nils Frostberg <nils@medcom.se>]
+
+  *) Delete various functions and files that belonged to the (now obsolete)
+     old X509V3 handling code.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) New Configure option "rsaref".
+     [Ulf Möller]
+
+  *) Don't auto-generate pem.h.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Introduce type-safe ASN.1 SETs.
+     [Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) Convert various additional casted stacks to type-safe STACK_OF() variants.
+     [Ben Laurie, Ralf S. Engelschall, Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Introduce type-safe STACKs. This will almost certainly break lots of code
+     that links with OpenSSL (well at least cause lots of warnings), but fear
+     not: the conversion is trivial, and it eliminates loads of evil casts. A
+     few STACKed things have been converted already. Feel free to convert more.
+     In the fullness of time, I'll do away with the STACK type altogether.
+     [Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) Add `openssl ca -revoke <certfile>' facility which revokes a certificate
+     specified in <certfile> by updating the entry in the index.txt file.
+     This way one no longer has to edit the index.txt file manually for
+     revoking a certificate. The -revoke option does the gory details now.
+     [Massimiliano Pala <madwolf@openca.org>, Ralf S. Engelschall]
+
+  *) Fix `openssl crl -noout -text' combination where `-noout' killed the
+     `-text' option at all and this way the `-noout -text' combination was
+     inconsistent in `openssl crl' with the friends in `openssl x509|rsa|dsa'.
+     [Ralf S. Engelschall]
+
+  *) Make sure a corresponding plain text error message exists for the
+     X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED/23 error number which can occur when a
+     verify callback function determined that a certificate was revoked.
+     [Ralf S. Engelschall]
+
+  *) Bugfix: In test/testenc, don't test "openssl <cipher>" for
+     ciphers that were excluded, e.g. by -DNO_IDEA.  Also, test
+     all available cipers including rc5, which was forgotten until now.
+     In order to let the testing shell script know which algorithms
+     are available, a new (up to now undocumented) command
+     "openssl list-cipher-commands" is used.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Bugfix: s_client occasionally would sleep in select() when
+     it should have checked SSL_pending() first.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) New functions DSA_do_sign and DSA_do_verify to provide access to
+     the raw DSA values prior to ASN.1 encoding.
+     [Ulf Möller]
+
+  *) Tweaks to Configure
+     [Niels Poppe <niels@netbox.org>]
+
+  *) Add support for PKCS#5 v2.0 ASN1 PBES2 structures. No other support,
+     yet...
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) New variables $(RANLIB) and $(PERL) in the Makefiles.
+     [Ulf Möller]
+
+  *) New config option to avoid instructions that are illegal on the 80386.
+     The default code is faster, but requires at least a 486.
+     [Ulf Möller]
+  
+  *) Got rid of old SSL2_CLIENT_VERSION (inconsistently used) and
+     SSL2_SERVER_VERSION (not used at all) macros, which are now the
+     same as SSL2_VERSION anyway.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) New "-showcerts" option for s_client.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Still more PKCS#12 integration. Add pkcs12 application to openssl
+     application. Various cleanups and fixes.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) More PKCS#12 integration. Add new pkcs12 directory with Makefile.ssl and
+     modify error routines to work internally. Add error codes and PBE init
+     to library startup routines.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Further PKCS#12 integration. Added password based encryption, PKCS#8 and
+     packing functions to asn1 and evp. Changed function names and error
+     codes along the way.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) PKCS12 integration: and so it begins... First of several patches to
+     slowly integrate PKCS#12 functionality into OpenSSL. Add PKCS#12
+     objects to objects.h
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add a new 'indent' option to some X509V3 extension code. Initial ASN1
+     and display support for Thawte strong extranet extension.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add LinuxPPC support.
+     [Jeff Dubrule <igor@pobox.org>]
+
+  *) Get rid of redundant BN file bn_mulw.c, and rename bn_div64 to
+     bn_div_words in alpha.s.
+     [Hannes Reinecke <H.Reinecke@hw.ac.uk> and Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) Make sure the RSA OAEP test is skipped under -DRSAref because
+     OAEP isn't supported when OpenSSL is built with RSAref.
+     [Ulf Moeller <ulf@fitug.de>]
+
+  *) Move definitions of IS_SET/IS_SEQUENCE inside crypto/asn1/asn1.h 
+     so they no longer are missing under -DNOPROTO. 
+     [Soren S. Jorvang <soren@t.dk>]
+
+
+ Changes between 0.9.1c and 0.9.2b  [22 Mar 1999]
+
+  *) Make SSL_get_peer_cert_chain() work in servers. Unfortunately, it still
+     doesn't work when the session is reused. Coming soon!
+     [Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) Fix a security hole, that allows sessions to be reused in the wrong
+     context thus bypassing client cert protection! All software that uses
+     client certs and session caches in multiple contexts NEEDS PATCHING to
+     allow session reuse! A fuller solution is in the works.
+     [Ben Laurie, problem pointed out by Holger Reif, Bodo Moeller (and ???)]
+
+  *) Some more source tree cleanups (removed obsolete files
+     crypto/bf/asm/bf586.pl, test/test.txt and crypto/sha/asm/f.s; changed
+     permission on "config" script to be executable) and a fix for the INSTALL
+     document.
+     [Ulf Moeller <ulf@fitug.de>]
+
+  *) Remove some legacy and erroneous uses of malloc, free instead of
+     Malloc, Free.
+     [Lennart Bang <lob@netstream.se>, with minor changes by Steve]
+
+  *) Make rsa_oaep_test return non-zero on error.
+     [Ulf Moeller <ulf@fitug.de>]
+
+  *) Add support for native Solaris shared libraries. Configure
+     solaris-sparc-sc4-pic, make, then run shlib/solaris-sc4.sh. It'd be nice
+     if someone would make that last step automatic.
+     [Matthias Loepfe <Matthias.Loepfe@AdNovum.CH>]
+
+  *) ctx_size was not built with the right compiler during "make links". Fixed.
+     [Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) Change the meaning of 'ALL' in the cipher list. It now means "everything
+     except NULL ciphers". This means the default cipher list will no longer
+     enable NULL ciphers. They need to be specifically enabled e.g. with
+     the string "DEFAULT:eNULL".
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix to RSA private encryption routines: if p < q then it would
+     occasionally produce an invalid result. This will only happen with
+     externally generated keys because OpenSSL (and SSLeay) ensure p > q.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Be less restrictive and allow also `perl util/perlpath.pl
+     /path/to/bin/perl' in addition to `perl util/perlpath.pl /path/to/bin',
+     because this way one can also use an interpreter named `perl5' (which is
+     usually the name of Perl 5.xxx on platforms where an Perl 4.x is still
+     installed as `perl').
+     [Matthias Loepfe <Matthias.Loepfe@adnovum.ch>]
+
+  *) Let util/clean-depend.pl work also with older Perl 5.00x versions.
+     [Matthias Loepfe <Matthias.Loepfe@adnovum.ch>]
+
+  *) Fix Makefile.org so CC,CFLAG etc are passed to 'make links' add
+     advapi32.lib to Win32 build and change the pem test comparison
+     to fc.exe (thanks to Ulrich Kroener <kroneru@yahoo.com> for the
+     suggestion). Fix misplaced ASNI prototypes and declarations in evp.h
+     and crypto/des/ede_cbcm_enc.c.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) DES quad checksum was broken on big-endian architectures. Fixed.
+     [Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) Comment out two functions in bio.h that aren't implemented. Fix up the
+     Win32 test batch file so it (might) work again. The Win32 test batch file
+     is horrible: I feel ill....
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Move various #ifdefs around so NO_SYSLOG, NO_DIRENT etc are now selected
+     in e_os.h. Audit of header files to check ANSI and non ANSI
+     sections: 10 functions were absent from non ANSI section and not exported
+     from Windows DLLs. Fixed up libeay.num for new functions.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Make `openssl version' output lines consistent.
+     [Ralf S. Engelschall]
+
+  *) Fix Win32 symbol export lists for BIO functions: Added
+     BIO_get_ex_new_index, BIO_get_ex_num, BIO_get_ex_data and BIO_set_ex_data
+     to ms/libeay{16,32}.def.
+     [Ralf S. Engelschall]
+
+  *) Second round of fixing the OpenSSL perl/ stuff. It now at least compiled
+     fine under Unix and passes some trivial tests I've now added. But the
+     whole stuff is horribly incomplete, so a README.1ST with a disclaimer was
+     added to make sure no one expects that this stuff really works in the
+     OpenSSL 0.9.2 release.  Additionally I've started to clean the XS sources
+     up and fixed a few little bugs and inconsistencies in OpenSSL.{pm,xs} and
+     openssl_bio.xs.
+     [Ralf S. Engelschall]
+
+  *) Fix the generation of two part addresses in perl.
+     [Kenji Miyake <kenji@miyake.org>, integrated by Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) Add config entry for Linux on MIPS.
+     [John Tobey <jtobey@channel1.com>]
+
+  *) Make links whenever Configure is run, unless we are on Windoze.
+     [Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) Permit extensions to be added to CRLs using crl_section in openssl.cnf.
+     Currently only issuerAltName and AuthorityKeyIdentifier make any sense
+     in CRLs.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add a useful kludge to allow package maintainers to specify compiler and
+     other platforms details on the command line without having to patch the
+     Configure script everytime: One now can use ``perl Configure
+     <id>:<details>'', i.e. platform ids are allowed to have details appended
+     to them (separated by colons). This is treated as there would be a static
+     pre-configured entry in Configure's %table under key <id> with value
+     <details> and ``perl Configure <id>'' is called.  So, when you want to
+     perform a quick test-compile under FreeBSD 3.1 with pgcc and without
+     assembler stuff you can use ``perl Configure "FreeBSD-elf:pgcc:-O6:::"''
+     now, which overrides the FreeBSD-elf entry on-the-fly.
+     [Ralf S. Engelschall]
+
+  *) Disable new TLS1 ciphersuites by default: they aren't official yet.
+     [Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) Allow DSO flags like -fpic, -fPIC, -KPIC etc. to be specified
+     on the `perl Configure ...' command line. This way one can compile
+     OpenSSL libraries with Position Independent Code (PIC) which is needed
+     for linking it into DSOs.
+     [Ralf S. Engelschall]
+
+  *) Remarkably, export ciphers were totally broken and no-one had noticed!
+     Fixed.
+     [Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) Cleaned up the LICENSE document: The official contact for any license
+     questions now is the OpenSSL core team under openssl-core@openssl.org.
+     And add a paragraph about the dual-license situation to make sure people
+     recognize that _BOTH_ the OpenSSL license _AND_ the SSLeay license apply
+     to the OpenSSL toolkit.
+     [Ralf S. Engelschall]
+
+  *) General source tree makefile cleanups: Made `making xxx in yyy...'
+     display consistent in the source tree and replaced `/bin/rm' by `rm'.
+     Additionally cleaned up the `make links' target: Remove unnecessary
+     semicolons, subsequent redundant removes, inline point.sh into mklink.sh
+     to speed processing and no longer clutter the display with confusing
+     stuff. Instead only the actually done links are displayed.
+     [Ralf S. Engelschall]
+
+  *) Permit null encryption ciphersuites, used for authentication only. It used
+     to be necessary to set the preprocessor define SSL_ALLOW_ENULL to do this.
+     It is now necessary to set SSL_FORBID_ENULL to prevent the use of null
+     encryption.
+     [Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) Add a bunch of fixes to the PKCS#7 stuff. It used to sometimes reorder
+     signed attributes when verifying signatures (this would break them), 
+     the detached data encoding was wrong and public keys obtained using
+     X509_get_pubkey() weren't freed.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add text documentation for the BUFFER functions. Also added a work around
+     to a Win95 console bug. This was triggered by the password read stuff: the
+     last character typed gets carried over to the next fread(). If you were 
+     generating a new cert request using 'req' for example then the last
+     character of the passphrase would be CR which would then enter the first
+     field as blank.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Added the new `Includes OpenSSL Cryptography Software' button as
+     doc/openssl_button.{gif,html} which is similar in style to the old SSLeay
+     button and can be used by applications based on OpenSSL to show the
+     relationship to the OpenSSL project.  
+     [Ralf S. Engelschall]
+
+  *) Remove confusing variables in function signatures in files
+     ssl/ssl_lib.c and ssl/ssl.h.
+     [Lennart Bong <lob@kulthea.stacken.kth.se>]
+
+  *) Don't install bss_file.c under PREFIX/include/
+     [Lennart Bong <lob@kulthea.stacken.kth.se>]
+
+  *) Get the Win32 compile working again. Modify mkdef.pl so it can handle
+     functions that return function pointers and has support for NT specific
+     stuff. Fix mk1mf.pl and VC-32.pl to support NT differences also. Various
+     #ifdef WIN32 and WINNTs sprinkled about the place and some changes from
+     unsigned to signed types: this was killing the Win32 compile.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add new certificate file to stack functions,
+     SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack() and
+     SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack().  These largely supplant
+     SSL_load_client_CA_file(), and can be used to add multiple certs easily
+     to a stack (usually this is then handed to SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list()).
+     This means that Apache-SSL and similar packages don't have to mess around
+     to add as many CAs as they want to the preferred list.
+     [Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) Experiment with doxygen documentation. Currently only partially applied to
+     ssl/ssl_lib.c.
+     See http://www.stack.nl/~dimitri/doxygen/index.html, and run doxygen with
+     openssl.doxy as the configuration file.
+     [Ben Laurie]
+  
+  *) Get rid of remaining C++-style comments which strict C compilers hate.
+     [Ralf S. Engelschall, pointed out by Carlos Amengual]
+
+  *) Changed BN_RECURSION in bn_mont.c to BN_RECURSION_MONT so it is not
+     compiled in by default: it has problems with large keys.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add a bunch of SSL_xxx() functions for configuring the temporary RSA and
+     DH private keys and/or callback functions which directly correspond to
+     their SSL_CTX_xxx() counterparts but work on a per-connection basis. This
+     is needed for applications which have to configure certificates on a
+     per-connection basis (e.g. Apache+mod_ssl) instead of a per-context basis
+     (e.g. s_server). 
+        For the RSA certificate situation is makes no difference, but
+     for the DSA certificate situation this fixes the "no shared cipher"
+     problem where the OpenSSL cipher selection procedure failed because the
+     temporary keys were not overtaken from the context and the API provided
+     no way to reconfigure them. 
+        The new functions now let applications reconfigure the stuff and they
+     are in detail: SSL_need_tmp_RSA, SSL_set_tmp_rsa, SSL_set_tmp_dh,
+     SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback and SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback.  Additionally a new
+     non-public-API function ssl_cert_instantiate() is used as a helper
+     function and also to reduce code redundancy inside ssl_rsa.c.
+     [Ralf S. Engelschall]
+
+  *) Move s_server -dcert and -dkey options out of the undocumented feature
+     area because they are useful for the DSA situation and should be
+     recognized by the users.
+     [Ralf S. Engelschall]
+
+  *) Fix the cipher decision scheme for export ciphers: the export bits are
+     *not* within SSL_MKEY_MASK or SSL_AUTH_MASK, they are within
+     SSL_EXP_MASK.  So, the original variable has to be used instead of the
+     already masked variable.
+     [Richard Levitte <levitte@stacken.kth.se>]
+
+  *) Fix 'port' variable from `int' to `unsigned int' in crypto/bio/b_sock.c
+     [Richard Levitte <levitte@stacken.kth.se>]
+
+  *) Change type of another md_len variable in pk7_doit.c:PKCS7_dataFinal()
+     from `int' to `unsigned int' because it's a length and initialized by
+     EVP_DigestFinal() which expects an `unsigned int *'.
+     [Richard Levitte <levitte@stacken.kth.se>]
+
+  *) Don't hard-code path to Perl interpreter on shebang line of Configure
+     script. Instead use the usual Shell->Perl transition trick.
+     [Ralf S. Engelschall]
+
+  *) Make `openssl x509 -noout -modulus' functional also for DSA certificates
+     (in addition to RSA certificates) to match the behaviour of `openssl dsa
+     -noout -modulus' as it's already the case for `openssl rsa -noout
+     -modulus'.  For RSA the -modulus is the real "modulus" while for DSA
+     currently the public key is printed (a decision which was already done by
+     `openssl dsa -modulus' in the past) which serves a similar purpose.
+     Additionally the NO_RSA no longer completely removes the whole -modulus
+     option; it now only avoids using the RSA stuff. Same applies to NO_DSA
+     now, too.
+     [Ralf S.  Engelschall]
+
+  *) Add Arne Ansper's reliable BIO - this is an encrypted, block-digested
+     BIO. See the source (crypto/evp/bio_ok.c) for more info.
+     [Arne Ansper <arne@ats.cyber.ee>]
+
+  *) Dump the old yucky req code that tried (and failed) to allow raw OIDs
+     to be added. Now both 'req' and 'ca' can use new objects defined in the
+     config file.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add cool BIO that does syslog (or event log on NT).
+     [Arne Ansper <arne@ats.cyber.ee>, integrated by Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) Add support for new TLS ciphersuites, TLS_RSA_EXPORT56_WITH_RC4_56_MD5,
+     TLS_RSA_EXPORT56_WITH_RC2_CBC_56_MD5 and
+     TLS_RSA_EXPORT56_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, as specified in "56-bit Export Cipher
+     Suites For TLS", draft-ietf-tls-56-bit-ciphersuites-00.txt.
+     [Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) Add preliminary config info for new extension code.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Make RSA_NO_PADDING really use no padding.
+     [Ulf Moeller <ulf@fitug.de>]
+
+  *) Generate errors when private/public key check is done.
+     [Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) Overhaul for 'crl' utility. New function X509_CRL_print. Partial support
+     for some CRL extensions and new objects added.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Really fix the ASN1 IMPLICIT bug this time... Partial support for private
+     key usage extension and fuller support for authority key id.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add OAEP encryption for the OpenSSL crypto library. OAEP is the improved
+     padding method for RSA, which is recommended for new applications in PKCS
+     #1 v2.0 (RFC 2437, October 1998).
+     OAEP (Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding) has better theoretical
+     foundations than the ad-hoc padding used in PKCS #1 v1.5. It is secure
+     against Bleichbacher's attack on RSA.
+     [Ulf Moeller <ulf@fitug.de>, reformatted, corrected and integrated by
+      Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) Updates to the new SSL compression code
+     [Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
+
+  *) Fix so that the version number in the master secret, when passed
+     via RSA, checks that if TLS was proposed, but we roll back to SSLv3
+     (because the server will not accept higher), that the version number
+     is 0x03,0x01, not 0x03,0x00
+     [Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
+
+  *) Run extensive memory leak checks on SSL apps. Fixed *lots* of memory
+     leaks in ssl/ relating to new X509_get_pubkey() behaviour. Also fixes
+     in apps/ and an unrelated leak in crypto/dsa/dsa_vrf.c
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Support for RAW extensions where an arbitrary extension can be
+     created by including its DER encoding. See apps/openssl.cnf for
+     an example.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Make sure latest Perl versions don't interpret some generated C array
+     code as Perl array code in the crypto/err/err_genc.pl script.
+     [Lars Weber <3weber@informatik.uni-hamburg.de>]
+
+  *) Modify ms/do_ms.bat to not generate assembly language makefiles since
+     not many people have the assembler. Various Win32 compilation fixes and
+     update to the INSTALL.W32 file with (hopefully) more accurate Win32
+     build instructions.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Modify configure script 'Configure' to automatically create crypto/date.h
+     file under Win32 and also build pem.h from pem.org. New script
+     util/mkfiles.pl to create the MINFO file on environments that can't do a
+     'make files': perl util/mkfiles.pl >MINFO should work.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Major rework of DES function declarations, in the pursuit of correctness
+     and purity. As a result, many evil casts evaporated, and some weirdness,
+     too. You may find this causes warnings in your code. Zapping your evil
+     casts will probably fix them. Mostly.
+     [Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) Fix for a typo in asn1.h. Bug fix to object creation script
+     obj_dat.pl. It considered a zero in an object definition to mean
+     "end of object": none of the objects in objects.h have any zeros
+     so it wasn't spotted.
+     [Steve Henson, reported by Erwann ABALEA <eabalea@certplus.com>]
+
+  *) Add support for Triple DES Cipher Block Chaining with Output Feedback
+     Masking (CBCM). In the absence of test vectors, the best I have been able
+     to do is check that the decrypt undoes the encrypt, so far. Send me test
+     vectors if you have them.
+     [Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) Correct calculation of key length for export ciphers (too much space was
+     allocated for null ciphers). This has not been tested!
+     [Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) Modifications to the mkdef.pl for Win32 DEF file creation. The usage
+     message is now correct (it understands "crypto" and "ssl" on its
+     command line). There is also now an "update" option. This will update
+     the util/ssleay.num and util/libeay.num files with any new functions.
+     If you do a: 
+     perl util/mkdef.pl crypto ssl update
+     it will update them.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Overhauled the Perl interface (perl/*):
+     - ported BN stuff to OpenSSL's different BN library
+     - made the perl/ source tree CVS-aware
+     - renamed the package from SSLeay to OpenSSL (the files still contain
+       their history because I've copied them in the repository)
+     - removed obsolete files (the test scripts will be replaced
+       by better Test::Harness variants in the future)
+     [Ralf S. Engelschall]
+
+  *) First cut for a very conservative source tree cleanup:
+     1. merge various obsolete readme texts into doc/ssleay.txt
+     where we collect the old documents and readme texts.
+     2. remove the first part of files where I'm already sure that we no
+     longer need them because of three reasons: either they are just temporary
+     files which were left by Eric or they are preserved original files where
+     I've verified that the diff is also available in the CVS via "cvs diff
+     -rSSLeay_0_8_1b" or they were renamed (as it was definitely the case for
+     the crypto/md/ stuff).
+     [Ralf S. Engelschall]
+
+  *) More extension code. Incomplete support for subject and issuer alt
+     name, issuer and authority key id. Change the i2v function parameters
+     and add an extra 'crl' parameter in the X509V3_CTX structure: guess
+     what that's for :-) Fix to ASN1 macro which messed up
+     IMPLICIT tag and add f_enum.c which adds a2i, i2a for ENUMERATED.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Preliminary support for ENUMERATED type. This is largely copied from the
+     INTEGER code.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add new function, EVP_MD_CTX_copy() to replace frequent use of memcpy.
+     [Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
+
+  *) Make sure `make rehash' target really finds the `openssl' program.
+     [Ralf S. Engelschall, Matthias Loepfe <Matthias.Loepfe@adnovum.ch>]
+
+  *) Squeeze another 7% of speed out of MD5 assembler, at least on a P2. I'd
+     like to hear about it if this slows down other processors.
+     [Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) Add CygWin32 platform information to Configure script.
+     [Alan Batie <batie@aahz.jf.intel.com>]
+
+  *) Fixed ms/32all.bat script: `no_asm' -> `no-asm'
+     [Rainer W. Gerling <gerling@mpg-gv.mpg.de>]
+  
+  *) New program nseq to manipulate netscape certificate sequences
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Modify crl2pkcs7 so it supports multiple -certfile arguments. Fix a
+     few typos.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fixes to BN code.  Previously the default was to define BN_RECURSION
+     but the BN code had some problems that would cause failures when
+     doing certificate verification and some other functions.
+     [Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
+
+  *) Add ASN1 and PEM code to support netscape certificate sequences.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add ASN1 and PEM code to support netscape certificate sequences.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add several PKIX and private extended key usage OIDs.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Modify the 'ca' program to handle the new extension code. Modify
+     openssl.cnf for new extension format, add comments.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) More X509 V3 changes. Fix typo in v3_bitstr.c. Add support to 'req'
+     and add a sample to openssl.cnf so req -x509 now adds appropriate
+     CA extensions.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Continued X509 V3 changes. Add to other makefiles, integrate with the
+     error code, add initial support to X509_print() and x509 application.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Takes a deep breath and start adding X509 V3 extension support code. Add
+     files in crypto/x509v3. Move original stuff to crypto/x509v3/old. All this
+     stuff is currently isolated and isn't even compiled yet.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Continuing patches for GeneralizedTime. Fix up certificate and CRL
+     ASN1 to use ASN1_TIME and modify print routines to use ASN1_TIME_print.
+     Removed the versions check from X509 routines when loading extensions:
+     this allows certain broken certificates that don't set the version
+     properly to be processed.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Deal with irritating shit to do with dependencies, in YAAHW (Yet Another
+     Ad Hoc Way) - Makefile.ssls now all contain local dependencies, which
+     can still be regenerated with "make depend".
+     [Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) Spelling mistake in C version of CAST-128.
+     [Ben Laurie, reported by Jeremy Hylton <jeremy@cnri.reston.va.us>]
+
+  *) Changes to the error generation code. The perl script err-code.pl 
+     now reads in the old error codes and retains the old numbers, only
+     adding new ones if necessary. It also only changes the .err files if new
+     codes are added. The makefiles have been modified to only insert errors
+     when needed (to avoid needlessly modifying header files). This is done
+     by only inserting errors if the .err file is newer than the auto generated
+     C file. To rebuild all the error codes from scratch (the old behaviour)
+     either modify crypto/Makefile.ssl to pass the -regen flag to err_code.pl
+     or delete all the .err files.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) CAST-128 was incorrectly implemented for short keys. The C version has
+     been fixed, but is untested. The assembler versions are also fixed, but
+     new assembler HAS NOT BEEN GENERATED FOR WIN32 - the Makefile needs fixing
+     to regenerate it if needed.
+     [Ben Laurie, reported (with fix for C version) by Jun-ichiro itojun
+      Hagino <itojun@kame.net>]
+
+  *) File was opened incorrectly in randfile.c.
+     [Ulf Möller <ulf@fitug.de>]
+
+  *) Beginning of support for GeneralizedTime. d2i, i2d, check and print
+     functions. Also ASN1_TIME suite which is a CHOICE of UTCTime or
+     GeneralizedTime. ASN1_TIME is the proper type used in certificates et
+     al: it's just almost always a UTCTime. Note this patch adds new error
+     codes so do a "make errors" if there are problems.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Correct Linux 1 recognition in config.
+     [Ulf Möller <ulf@fitug.de>]
+
+  *) Remove pointless MD5 hash when using DSA keys in ca.
+     [Anonymous <nobody@replay.com>]
+
+  *) Generate an error if given an empty string as a cert directory. Also
+     generate an error if handed NULL (previously returned 0 to indicate an
+     error, but didn't set one).
+     [Ben Laurie, reported by Anonymous <nobody@replay.com>]
+
+  *) Add prototypes to SSL methods. Make SSL_write's buffer const, at last.
+     [Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) Fix the dummy function BN_ref_mod_exp() in rsaref.c to have the correct
+     parameters. This was causing a warning which killed off the Win32 compile.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Remove C++ style comments from crypto/bn/bn_local.h.
+     [Neil Costigan <neil.costigan@celocom.com>]
+
+  *) The function OBJ_txt2nid was broken. It was supposed to return a nid
+     based on a text string, looking up short and long names and finally
+     "dot" format. The "dot" format stuff didn't work. Added new function
+     OBJ_txt2obj to do the same but return an ASN1_OBJECT and rewrote 
+     OBJ_txt2nid to use it. OBJ_txt2obj can also return objects even if the
+     OID is not part of the table.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add prototypes to X509 lookup/verify methods, fixing a bug in
+     X509_LOOKUP_by_alias().
+     [Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) Sort openssl functions by name.
+     [Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) Get the gendsa program working (hopefully) and add it to app list. Remove
+     encryption from sample DSA keys (in case anyone is interested the password
+     was "1234").
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Make _all_ *_free functions accept a NULL pointer.
+     [Frans Heymans <fheymans@isaserver.be>]
+
+  *) If a DH key is generated in s3_srvr.c, don't blow it by trying to use
+     NULL pointers.
+     [Anonymous <nobody@replay.com>]
+
+  *) s_server should send the CAfile as acceptable CAs, not its own cert.
+     [Bodo Moeller <3moeller@informatik.uni-hamburg.de>]
+
+  *) Don't blow it for numeric -newkey arguments to apps/req.
+     [Bodo Moeller <3moeller@informatik.uni-hamburg.de>]
+
+  *) Temp key "for export" tests were wrong in s3_srvr.c.
+     [Anonymous <nobody@replay.com>]
+
+  *) Add prototype for temp key callback functions
+     SSL_CTX_set_tmp_{rsa,dh}_callback().
+     [Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) Make DH_free() tolerate being passed a NULL pointer (like RSA_free() and
+     DSA_free()). Make X509_PUBKEY_set() check for errors in d2i_PublicKey().
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) X509_name_add_entry() freed the wrong thing after an error.
+     [Arne Ansper <arne@ats.cyber.ee>]
+
+  *) rsa_eay.c would attempt to free a NULL context.
+     [Arne Ansper <arne@ats.cyber.ee>]
+
+  *) BIO_s_socket() had a broken should_retry() on Windoze.
+     [Arne Ansper <arne@ats.cyber.ee>]
+
+  *) BIO_f_buffer() didn't pass on BIO_CTRL_FLUSH.
+     [Arne Ansper <arne@ats.cyber.ee>]
+
+  *) Make sure the already existing X509_STORE->depth variable is initialized
+     in X509_STORE_new(), but document the fact that this variable is still
+     unused in the certificate verification process.
+     [Ralf S. Engelschall]
+
+  *) Fix the various library and apps files to free up pkeys obtained from
+     X509_PUBKEY_get() et al. Also allow x509.c to handle netscape extensions.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix reference counting in X509_PUBKEY_get(). This makes
+     demos/maurice/example2.c work, amongst others, probably.
+     [Steve Henson and Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) First cut of a cleanup for apps/. First the `ssleay' program is now named
+     `openssl' and second, the shortcut symlinks for the `openssl <command>'
+     are no longer created. This way we have a single and consistent command
+     line interface `openssl <command>', similar to `cvs <command>'.
+     [Ralf S. Engelschall, Paul Sutton and Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) ca.c: move test for DSA keys inside #ifndef NO_DSA. Make pubkey
+     BIT STRING wrapper always have zero unused bits.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add CA.pl, perl version of CA.sh, add extended key usage OID.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Make the top-level INSTALL documentation easier to understand.
+     [Paul Sutton]
+
+  *) Makefiles updated to exit if an error occurs in a sub-directory
+     make (including if user presses ^C) [Paul Sutton]
+
+  *) Make Montgomery context stuff explicit in RSA data structure.
+     [Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) Fix build order of pem and err to allow for generated pem.h.
+     [Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) Fix renumbering bug in X509_NAME_delete_entry().
+     [Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) Enhanced the err-ins.pl script so it makes the error library number 
+     global and can add a library name. This is needed for external ASN1 and
+     other error libraries.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fixed sk_insert which never worked properly.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix ASN1 macros so they can handle indefinite length constructed 
+     EXPLICIT tags. Some non standard certificates use these: they can now
+     be read in.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Merged the various old/obsolete SSLeay documentation files (doc/xxx.doc)
+     into a single doc/ssleay.txt bundle. This way the information is still
+     preserved but no longer messes up this directory. Now it's new room for
+     the new set of documentation files.
+     [Ralf S. Engelschall]
+
+  *) SETs were incorrectly DER encoded. This was a major pain, because they
+     shared code with SEQUENCEs, which aren't coded the same. This means that
+     almost everything to do with SETs or SEQUENCEs has either changed name or
+     number of arguments.
+     [Ben Laurie, based on a partial fix by GP Jayan <gp@nsj.co.jp>]
+
+  *) Fix test data to work with the above.
+     [Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) Fix the RSA header declarations that hid a bug I fixed in 0.9.0b but
+     was already fixed by Eric for 0.9.1 it seems.
+     [Ben Laurie - pointed out by Ulf Möller <ulf@fitug.de>]
+
+  *) Autodetect FreeBSD3.
+     [Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) Fix various bugs in Configure. This affects the following platforms:
+     nextstep
+     ncr-scde
+     unixware-2.0
+     unixware-2.0-pentium
+     sco5-cc.
+     [Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) Eliminate generated files from CVS. Reorder tests to regenerate files
+     before they are needed.
+     [Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) Generate Makefile.ssl from Makefile.org (to keep CVS happy).
+     [Ben Laurie]
+
+
+ Changes between 0.9.1b and 0.9.1c  [23-Dec-1998]
+
+  *) Added OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER to crypto/crypto.h and 
+     changed SSLeay to OpenSSL in version strings.
+     [Ralf S. Engelschall]
+  
+  *) Some fixups to the top-level documents.
+     [Paul Sutton]
+
+  *) Fixed the nasty bug where rsaref.h was not found under compile-time
+     because the symlink to include/ was missing.
+     [Ralf S. Engelschall]
+
+  *) Incorporated the popular no-RSA/DSA-only patches 
+     which allow to compile a RSA-free SSLeay.
+     [Andrew Cooke / Interrader Ldt., Ralf S. Engelschall]
+
+  *) Fixed nasty rehash problem under `make -f Makefile.ssl links'
+     when "ssleay" is still not found.
+     [Ralf S. Engelschall]
+
+  *) Added more platforms to Configure: Cray T3E, HPUX 11, 
+     [Ralf S. Engelschall, Beckmann <beckman@acl.lanl.gov>]
+
+  *) Updated the README file.
+     [Ralf S. Engelschall]
+
+  *) Added various .cvsignore files in the CVS repository subdirs
+     to make a "cvs update" really silent.
+     [Ralf S. Engelschall]
+
+  *) Recompiled the error-definition header files and added
+     missing symbols to the Win32 linker tables.
+     [Ralf S. Engelschall]
+
+  *) Cleaned up the top-level documents;
+     o new files: CHANGES and LICENSE
+     o merged VERSION, HISTORY* and README* files a CHANGES.SSLeay 
+     o merged COPYRIGHT into LICENSE
+     o removed obsolete TODO file
+     o renamed MICROSOFT to INSTALL.W32
+     [Ralf S. Engelschall]
+
+  *) Removed dummy files from the 0.9.1b source tree: 
+     crypto/asn1/x crypto/bio/cd crypto/bio/fg crypto/bio/grep crypto/bio/vi
+     crypto/bn/asm/......add.c crypto/bn/asm/a.out crypto/dsa/f crypto/md5/f
+     crypto/pem/gmon.out crypto/perlasm/f crypto/pkcs7/build crypto/rsa/f
+     crypto/sha/asm/f crypto/threads/f ms/zzz ssl/f ssl/f.mak test/f
+     util/f.mak util/pl/f util/pl/f.mak crypto/bf/bf_locl.old apps/f
+     [Ralf S. Engelschall]
+
+  *) Added various platform portability fixes.
+     [Mark J. Cox]
+
+  *) The Genesis of the OpenSSL rpject:
+     We start with the latest (unreleased) SSLeay version 0.9.1b which Eric A.
+     Young and Tim J. Hudson created while they were working for C2Net until
+     summer 1998.
+     [The OpenSSL Project]
+ 
+
+ Changes between 0.9.0b and 0.9.1b  [not released]
+
+  *) Updated a few CA certificates under certs/
+     [Eric A. Young]
+
+  *) Changed some BIGNUM api stuff.
+     [Eric A. Young]
+
+  *) Various platform ports: OpenBSD, Ultrix, IRIX 64bit, NetBSD, 
+     DGUX x86, Linux Alpha, etc.
+     [Eric A. Young]
+
+  *) New COMP library [crypto/comp/] for SSL Record Layer Compression: 
+     RLE (dummy implemented) and ZLIB (really implemented when ZLIB is
+     available).
+     [Eric A. Young]
+
+  *) Add -strparse option to asn1pars program which parses nested 
+     binary structures 
+     [Dr Stephen Henson <shenson@bigfoot.com>]
+
+  *) Added "oid_file" to ssleay.cnf for "ca" and "req" programs.
+     [Eric A. Young]
+
+  *) DSA fix for "ca" program.
+     [Eric A. Young]
+
+  *) Added "-genkey" option to "dsaparam" program.
+     [Eric A. Young]
+
+  *) Added RIPE MD160 (rmd160) message digest.
+     [Eric A. Young]
+
+  *) Added -a (all) option to "ssleay version" command.
+     [Eric A. Young]
+
+  *) Added PLATFORM define which is the id given to Configure.
+     [Eric A. Young]
+
+  *) Added MemCheck_XXXX functions to crypto/mem.c for memory checking.
+     [Eric A. Young]
+
+  *) Extended the ASN.1 parser routines.
+     [Eric A. Young]
+
+  *) Extended BIO routines to support REUSEADDR, seek, tell, etc.
+     [Eric A. Young]
+
+  *) Added a BN_CTX to the BN library.
+     [Eric A. Young]
+
+  *) Fixed the weak key values in DES library
+     [Eric A. Young]
+
+  *) Changed API in EVP library for cipher aliases.
+     [Eric A. Young]
+
+  *) Added support for RC2/64bit cipher.
+     [Eric A. Young]
+
+  *) Converted the lhash library to the crypto/mem.c functions.
+     [Eric A. Young]
+
+  *) Added more recognized ASN.1 object ids.
+     [Eric A. Young]
+
+  *) Added more RSA padding checks for SSL/TLS.
+     [Eric A. Young]
+
+  *) Added BIO proxy/filter functionality.
+     [Eric A. Young]
+
+  *) Added extra_certs to SSL_CTX which can be used
+     send extra CA certificates to the client in the CA cert chain sending
+     process. It can be configured with SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert().
+     [Eric A. Young]
+
+  *) Now Fortezza is denied in the authentication phase because
+     this is key exchange mechanism is not supported by SSLeay at all.
+     [Eric A. Young]
+
+  *) Additional PKCS1 checks.
+     [Eric A. Young]
+
+  *) Support the string "TLSv1" for all TLS v1 ciphers.
+     [Eric A. Young]
+
+  *) Added function SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx() which gives the
+     ex_data index of the SSL context in the X509_STORE_CTX ex_data.
+     [Eric A. Young]
+
+  *) Fixed a few memory leaks.
+     [Eric A. Young]
+
+  *) Fixed various code and comment typos.
+     [Eric A. Young]
+
+  *) A minor bug in ssl/s3_clnt.c where there would always be 4 0 
+     bytes sent in the client random.
+     [Edward Bishop <ebishop@spyglass.com>]
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/CONTRIBUTING b/openssl-1.1.0h/CONTRIBUTING
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1eebaf3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/CONTRIBUTING
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+HOW TO CONTRIBUTE PATCHES TO OpenSSL
+------------------------------------
+
+(Please visit https://www.openssl.org/community/getting-started.html for
+other ideas about how to contribute.)
+
+Development is coordinated on the openssl-dev mailing list (see the
+above link or https://mta.openssl.org for information on subscribing).
+If you are unsure as to whether a feature will be useful for the general
+OpenSSL community you might want to discuss it on the openssl-dev mailing
+list first.  Someone may be already working on the same thing or there
+may be a good reason as to why that feature isn't implemented.
+
+To submit a patch, make a pull request on GitHub.  If you think the patch
+could use feedback from the community, please start a thread on openssl-dev
+to discuss it.
+
+Having addressed the following items before the PR will help make the
+acceptance and review process faster:
+
+    1. Anything other than trivial contributions will require a contributor
+    licensing agreement, giving us permission to use your code. See
+    https://www.openssl.org/policies/cla.html for details.
+
+    2.  All source files should start with the following text (with
+    appropriate comment characters at the start of each line and the
+    year(s) updated):
+
+        Copyright 20xx-20yy The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+        Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+        this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+        in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+        https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+    3.  Patches should be as current as possible; expect to have to rebase
+    often. We do not accept merge commits; You will be asked to remove
+    them before a patch is considered acceptable.
+
+    4.  Patches should follow our coding style (see
+    https://www.openssl.org/policies/codingstyle.html) and compile without
+    warnings. Where gcc or clang is available you should use the
+    --strict-warnings Configure option.  OpenSSL compiles on many varied
+    platforms: try to ensure you only use portable features.
+    Clean builds via Travis and AppVeyor are expected, and done whenever
+    a PR is created or updated.
+
+    5.  When at all possible, patches should include tests. These can
+    either be added to an existing test, or completely new.  Please see
+    test/README for information on the test framework.
+
+    6.  New features or changed functionality must include
+    documentation. Please look at the "pod" files in doc/apps, doc/crypto
+    and doc/ssl for examples of our style.
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/Configurations/00-base-templates.conf b/openssl-1.1.0h/Configurations/00-base-templates.conf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3455b3a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/Configurations/00-base-templates.conf
@@ -0,0 +1,293 @@
+# -*- Mode: perl -*-
+%targets=(
+    DEFAULTS => {
+	template	=> 1,
+
+	cflags		=> "",
+	defines		=> [],
+	thread_scheme	=> "(unknown)", # Assume we don't know
+	thread_defines	=> [],
+
+	apps_aux_src	=> "",
+	cpuid_asm_src	=> "mem_clr.c",
+	uplink_aux_src	=> "",
+	bn_asm_src	=> "bn_asm.c",
+	ec_asm_src	=> "",
+	des_asm_src	=> "des_enc.c fcrypt_b.c",
+	aes_asm_src	=> "aes_core.c aes_cbc.c",
+	bf_asm_src	=> "bf_enc.c",
+	md5_asm_src	=> "",
+	cast_asm_src	=> "c_enc.c",
+	rc4_asm_src	=> "rc4_enc.c rc4_skey.c",
+	rmd160_asm_src	=> "",
+	rc5_asm_src	=> "rc5_enc.c",
+	wp_asm_src	=> "wp_block.c",
+	cmll_asm_src	=> "camellia.c cmll_misc.c cmll_cbc.c",
+	modes_asm_src	=> "",
+	padlock_asm_src	=> "",
+	chacha_asm_src	=> "chacha_enc.c",
+	poly1305_asm_src	=> "",
+
+	unistd		=> "<unistd.h>",
+	shared_target	=> "",
+	shared_cflag	=> "",
+	shared_defines	=> [],
+	shared_ldflag	=> "",
+	shared_rcflag	=> "",
+	shared_extension	=> "",
+
+        build_scheme    => [ "unified", "unix" ],
+        build_file      => "Makefile",
+    },
+
+    BASE_common => {
+	template	=> 1,
+	defines		=>
+	    sub {
+                my @defs = ();
+                push @defs, "ZLIB" unless $disabled{zlib};
+                push @defs, "ZLIB_SHARED" unless $disabled{"zlib-dynamic"};
+                return [ @defs ];
+            },
+    },
+
+    BASE_unix => {
+        inherit_from    => [ "BASE_common" ],
+        template        => 1,
+
+        ex_libs         =>
+            sub {
+                unless ($disabled{zlib}) {
+                    if (defined($disabled{"zlib-dynamic"})) {
+                        if (defined($withargs{zlib_lib})) {
+                            return "-L".$withargs{zlib_lib}." -lz";
+                        } else {
+                            return "-lz";
+                        }
+                    }
+                }
+                return (); },
+
+        build_scheme    => [ "unified", "unix" ],
+        build_file      => "Makefile",
+    },
+
+    BASE_Windows => {
+        inherit_from    => [ "BASE_common" ],
+        template        => 1,
+
+        ex_libs         =>
+            sub {
+                unless ($disabled{zlib}) {
+                    if (defined($disabled{"zlib-dynamic"})) {
+                        return $withargs{zlib_lib} // "ZLIB1";
+                    }
+                }
+                return ();
+            },
+
+        ld              => "link",
+        lflags          => "/nologo",
+        loutflag        => "/out:",
+        ar              => "lib",
+        arflags         => "/nologo",
+        aroutflag       => "/out:",
+        rc               => "rc",
+        rcoutflag        => "/fo",
+        mt              => "mt",
+        mtflags         => "-nologo",
+        mtinflag        => "-manifest ",
+        mtoutflag       => "-outputresource:",
+
+        build_file      => "makefile",
+        build_scheme    => [ "unified", "windows" ],
+    },
+
+    BASE_VMS => {
+        inherit_from    => [ "BASE_common" ],
+        template        => 1,
+
+        build_file       => "descrip.mms",
+        build_scheme     => [ "unified", "VMS" ],
+    },
+
+    uplink_common => {
+	template	=> 1,
+	apps_aux_src	=> add("../ms/applink.c"),
+	uplink_aux_src	=> add("../ms/uplink.c"),
+	defines		=> add("OPENSSL_USE_APPLINK"),
+    },
+    x86_uplink => {
+	inherit_from	=> [ "uplink_common" ],
+	template	=> 1,
+	uplink_aux_src	=> add("uplink-x86.s"),
+    },
+    x86_64_uplink => {
+	inherit_from	=> [ "uplink_common" ],
+	template	=> 1,
+	uplink_aux_src	=> add("uplink-x86_64.s"),
+    },
+    ia64_uplink => {
+	inherit_from	=> [ "uplink_common" ],
+	template	=> 1,
+	uplink_aux_src	=> add("uplink-ia64.s"),
+    },
+
+    x86_asm => {
+	template	=> 1,
+	cpuid_asm_src	=> "x86cpuid.s",
+	bn_asm_src	=> "bn-586.s co-586.s x86-mont.s x86-gf2m.s",
+	ec_asm_src	=> "ecp_nistz256.c ecp_nistz256-x86.s",
+	des_asm_src	=> "des-586.s crypt586.s",
+	aes_asm_src	=> "aes-586.s vpaes-x86.s aesni-x86.s",
+	bf_asm_src	=> "bf-586.s",
+	md5_asm_src	=> "md5-586.s",
+	cast_asm_src	=> "cast-586.s",
+	sha1_asm_src	=> "sha1-586.s sha256-586.s sha512-586.s",
+	rc4_asm_src	=> "rc4-586.s",
+	rmd160_asm_src	=> "rmd-586.s",
+	rc5_asm_src	=> "rc5-586.s",
+	wp_asm_src	=> "wp_block.c wp-mmx.s",
+	cmll_asm_src	=> "cmll-x86.s",
+	modes_asm_src	=> "ghash-x86.s",
+	padlock_asm_src	=> "e_padlock-x86.s",
+	chacha_asm_src	=> "chacha-x86.s",
+	poly1305_asm_src=> "poly1305-x86.s",
+    },
+    x86_elf_asm => {
+	template	=> 1,
+	inherit_from	=> [ "x86_asm" ],
+	perlasm_scheme	=> "elf"
+    },
+    x86_64_asm => {
+	template	=> 1,
+	cpuid_asm_src   => "x86_64cpuid.s",
+	bn_asm_src      => "asm/x86_64-gcc.c x86_64-mont.s x86_64-mont5.s x86_64-gf2m.s rsaz_exp.c rsaz-x86_64.s rsaz-avx2.s",
+	ec_asm_src      => "ecp_nistz256.c ecp_nistz256-x86_64.s",
+	aes_asm_src     => "aes-x86_64.s vpaes-x86_64.s bsaes-x86_64.s aesni-x86_64.s aesni-sha1-x86_64.s aesni-sha256-x86_64.s aesni-mb-x86_64.s",
+	md5_asm_src     => "md5-x86_64.s",
+	sha1_asm_src    => "sha1-x86_64.s sha256-x86_64.s sha512-x86_64.s sha1-mb-x86_64.s sha256-mb-x86_64.s",
+	rc4_asm_src     => "rc4-x86_64.s rc4-md5-x86_64.s",
+	wp_asm_src      => "wp-x86_64.s",
+	cmll_asm_src    => "cmll-x86_64.s cmll_misc.c",
+	modes_asm_src   => "ghash-x86_64.s aesni-gcm-x86_64.s",
+	padlock_asm_src => "e_padlock-x86_64.s",
+	chacha_asm_src	=> "chacha-x86_64.s",
+	poly1305_asm_src=> "poly1305-x86_64.s",
+    },
+    ia64_asm => {
+	template	=> 1,
+	cpuid_asm_src   => "ia64cpuid.s",
+	bn_asm_src      => "bn-ia64.s ia64-mont.s",
+	aes_asm_src     => "aes_core.c aes_cbc.c aes-ia64.s",
+	md5_asm_src     => "md5-ia64.s",
+	sha1_asm_src    => "sha1-ia64.s sha256-ia64.s sha512-ia64.s",
+	rc4_asm_src     => "rc4-ia64.s rc4_skey.c",
+	modes_asm_src   => "ghash-ia64.s",
+	perlasm_scheme	=> "void"
+    },
+    sparcv9_asm => {
+	template	=> 1,
+	cpuid_asm_src   => "sparcv9cap.c sparccpuid.S",
+	bn_asm_src      => "asm/sparcv8plus.S sparcv9-mont.S sparcv9a-mont.S vis3-mont.S sparct4-mont.S sparcv9-gf2m.S",
+	ec_asm_src      => "ecp_nistz256.c ecp_nistz256-sparcv9.S",
+	des_asm_src     => "des_enc-sparc.S fcrypt_b.c dest4-sparcv9.S",
+	aes_asm_src     => "aes_core.c aes_cbc.c aes-sparcv9.S aest4-sparcv9.S aesfx-sparcv9.S",
+	md5_asm_src     => "md5-sparcv9.S",
+	sha1_asm_src    => "sha1-sparcv9.S sha256-sparcv9.S sha512-sparcv9.S",
+	cmll_asm_src    => "camellia.c cmll_misc.c cmll_cbc.c cmllt4-sparcv9.S",
+	modes_asm_src   => "ghash-sparcv9.S",
+	poly1305_asm_src=> "poly1305-sparcv9.S",
+	perlasm_scheme	=> "void"
+    },
+    sparcv8_asm => {
+	template	=> 1,
+	cpuid_asm_src   => "",
+	bn_asm_src      => "asm/sparcv8.S",
+	des_asm_src     => "des_enc-sparc.S fcrypt_b.c",
+	perlasm_scheme	=> "void"
+    },
+    alpha_asm => {
+	template	=> 1,
+	cpuid_asm_src   => "alphacpuid.s",
+	bn_asm_src      => "bn_asm.c alpha-mont.S",
+	sha1_asm_src    => "sha1-alpha.S",
+	modes_asm_src   => "ghash-alpha.S",
+	perlasm_scheme	=> "void"
+    },
+    mips32_asm => {
+	template	=> 1,
+	bn_asm_src      => "bn-mips.s mips-mont.s",
+	aes_asm_src     => "aes_cbc.c aes-mips.S",
+	sha1_asm_src    => "sha1-mips.S sha256-mips.S",
+    },
+    mips64_asm => {
+	inherit_from	=> [ "mips32_asm" ],
+	template	=> 1,
+	sha1_asm_src    => add("sha512-mips.S"),
+	poly1305_asm_src=> "poly1305-mips.S",
+    },
+    s390x_asm => {
+	template	=> 1,
+	cpuid_asm_src   => "s390xcap.c s390xcpuid.S",
+	bn_asm_src      => "asm/s390x.S s390x-mont.S s390x-gf2m.s",
+	aes_asm_src     => "aes-s390x.S aes-ctr.fake aes-xts.fake",
+	sha1_asm_src    => "sha1-s390x.S sha256-s390x.S sha512-s390x.S",
+	rc4_asm_src     => "rc4-s390x.s",
+	modes_asm_src   => "ghash-s390x.S",
+	chacha_asm_src  => "chacha-s390x.S",
+	poly1305_asm_src=> "poly1305-s390x.S",
+    },
+    armv4_asm => {
+	template	=> 1,
+	cpuid_asm_src   => "armcap.c armv4cpuid.S",
+	bn_asm_src      => "bn_asm.c armv4-mont.S armv4-gf2m.S",
+	ec_asm_src      => "ecp_nistz256.c ecp_nistz256-armv4.S",
+	aes_asm_src     => "aes_cbc.c aes-armv4.S bsaes-armv7.S aesv8-armx.S",
+	sha1_asm_src    => "sha1-armv4-large.S sha256-armv4.S sha512-armv4.S",
+	modes_asm_src   => "ghash-armv4.S ghashv8-armx.S",
+	chacha_asm_src  => "chacha-armv4.S",
+	poly1305_asm_src=> "poly1305-armv4.S", 
+	perlasm_scheme	=> "void"
+    },
+    aarch64_asm => {
+	template	=> 1,
+	cpuid_asm_src   => "armcap.c arm64cpuid.S",
+	ec_asm_src      => "ecp_nistz256.c ecp_nistz256-armv8.S",
+	bn_asm_src      => "bn_asm.c armv8-mont.S",
+	aes_asm_src     => "aes_core.c aes_cbc.c aesv8-armx.S vpaes-armv8.S",
+	sha1_asm_src    => "sha1-armv8.S sha256-armv8.S sha512-armv8.S",
+	modes_asm_src   => "ghashv8-armx.S",
+	chacha_asm_src  => "chacha-armv8.S",
+	poly1305_asm_src=> "poly1305-armv8.S",
+    },
+    parisc11_asm => {
+	template	=> 1,
+	cpuid_asm_src   => "pariscid.s",
+	bn_asm_src      => "bn_asm.c parisc-mont.s",
+	aes_asm_src     => "aes_core.c aes_cbc.c aes-parisc.s",
+	sha1_asm_src    => "sha1-parisc.s sha256-parisc.s sha512-parisc.s",
+	rc4_asm_src     => "rc4-parisc.s",
+	modes_asm_src   => "ghash-parisc.s",
+	perlasm_scheme	=> "32"
+    },
+    parisc20_64_asm => {
+	template	=> 1,
+	inherit_from	=> [ "parisc11_asm" ],
+	perlasm_scheme	=> "64",
+    },
+    ppc64_asm => {
+	template	=> 1,
+	cpuid_asm_src   => "ppccpuid.s ppccap.c",
+	bn_asm_src      => "bn-ppc.s ppc-mont.s ppc64-mont.s",
+	aes_asm_src     => "aes_core.c aes_cbc.c aes-ppc.s vpaes-ppc.s aesp8-ppc.s",
+	sha1_asm_src    => "sha1-ppc.s sha256-ppc.s sha512-ppc.s sha256p8-ppc.s sha512p8-ppc.s",
+	modes_asm_src   => "ghashp8-ppc.s",
+	chacha_asm_src	=> "chacha-ppc.s",
+	poly1305_asm_src=> "poly1305-ppc.s poly1305-ppcfp.s",
+    },
+    ppc32_asm => {
+	inherit_from	=> [ "ppc64_asm" ],
+	template	=> 1
+    },
+);
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/Configurations/10-main.conf b/openssl-1.1.0h/Configurations/10-main.conf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b49f04b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/Configurations/10-main.conf
@@ -0,0 +1,1884 @@
+## -*- mode: perl; -*-
+## Standard openssl configuration targets.
+
+# Helper functions for the Windows configs
+my $vc_win64a_info = {};
+sub vc_win64a_info {
+    unless (%$vc_win64a_info) {
+        if (`nasm -v 2>NUL` =~ /NASM version ([0-9]+\.[0-9]+)/ && $1 >= 2.0) {
+            $vc_win64a_info = { as        => "nasm",
+                                asflags   => "-f win64 -DNEAR -Ox -g",
+                                asoutflag => "-o" };
+        } elsif ($disabled{asm}) {
+            $vc_win64a_info = { as        => "ml64",
+                                asflags   => "/c /Cp /Cx /Zi",
+                                asoutflag => "/Fo" };
+        } else {
+            $die->("NASM not found - please read INSTALL and NOTES.WIN for further details\n");
+            $vc_win64a_info = { as        => "{unknown}",
+                                asflags   => "",
+                                asoutflag => "" };
+        }
+    }
+    return $vc_win64a_info;
+}
+
+my $vc_win32_info = {};
+sub vc_win32_info {
+    unless (%$vc_win32_info) {
+        my $ver=`nasm -v 2>NUL`;
+        my $vew=`nasmw -v 2>NUL`;
+        if ($ver ne "" || $vew ne "") {
+            $vc_win32_info = { as        => $ver ge $vew ? "nasm" : "nasmw",
+                               asflags   => "-f win32",
+                               asoutflag => "-o",
+                               perlasm_scheme => "win32n" };
+        } elsif ($disabled{asm}) {
+            $vc_win32_info = { as        => "ml",
+                               asflags   => "/nologo /Cp /coff /c /Cx /Zi",
+                               asoutflag => "/Fo",
+                               perlasm_scheme => "win32" };
+        } else {
+            $die->("NASM not found - please read INSTALL and NOTES.WIN for further details\n");
+            $vc_win32_info = { as        => "{unknown}",
+                               asflags   => "",
+                               asoutflag => "",
+                               perlasm_scheme => "win32" };
+        }
+    }
+    return $vc_win32_info;
+}
+
+my $vc_wince_info = {};
+sub vc_wince_info {
+    unless (%$vc_wince_info) {
+        # sanity check
+        $die->('%OSVERSION% is not defined') if (!defined($ENV{'OSVERSION'}));
+        $die->('%PLATFORM% is not defined')  if (!defined($ENV{'PLATFORM'}));
+        $die->('%TARGETCPU% is not defined') if (!defined($ENV{'TARGETCPU'}));
+
+        #
+        # Idea behind this is to mimic flags set by eVC++ IDE...
+        #
+        my $wcevers = $ENV{'OSVERSION'};                    # WCENNN
+	my $wcevernum;
+	my $wceverdotnum;
+	if ($wcevers =~ /^WCE([1-9])([0-9]{2})$/) {
+	    $wcevernum = "$1$2";
+	    $wceverdotnum = "$1.$2";
+	} else {
+	    $die->('%OSVERSION% value is insane');
+	    $wcevernum = "{unknown}";
+	    $wceverdotnum = "{unknown}";
+	}
+        my $wcecdefs = "-D_WIN32_WCE=$wcevernum -DUNDER_CE=$wcevernum"; # -D_WIN32_WCE=NNN
+        my $wcelflag = "/subsystem:windowsce,$wceverdotnum";        # ...,N.NN
+
+        my $wceplatf =  $ENV{'PLATFORM'};
+
+        $wceplatf =~ tr/a-z0-9 /A-Z0-9_/;
+        $wcecdefs .= " -DWCE_PLATFORM_$wceplatf";
+
+        my $wcetgt = $ENV{'TARGETCPU'};                     # just shorter name...
+      SWITCH: for($wcetgt) {
+          /^X86/        && do { $wcecdefs.=" -Dx86 -D_X86_ -D_i386_ -Di_386_";
+                                $wcelflag.=" /machine:X86";     last; };
+          /^ARMV4[IT]/  && do { $wcecdefs.=" -DARM -D_ARM_ -D$wcetgt";
+                                $wcecdefs.=" -DTHUMB -D_THUMB_" if($wcetgt=~/T$/);
+                                $wcecdefs.=" -QRarch4T -QRinterwork-return";
+                                $wcelflag.=" /machine:THUMB";   last; };
+          /^ARM/        && do { $wcecdefs.=" -DARM -D_ARM_ -D$wcetgt";
+                                $wcelflag.=" /machine:ARM";     last; };
+          /^MIPSIV/     && do { $wcecdefs.=" -DMIPS -D_MIPS_ -DR4000 -D$wcetgt";
+                                $wcecdefs.=" -D_MIPS64 -QMmips4 -QMn32";
+                                $wcelflag.=" /machine:MIPSFPU"; last; };
+          /^MIPS16/     && do { $wcecdefs.=" -DMIPS -D_MIPS_ -DR4000 -D$wcetgt";
+                                $wcecdefs.=" -DMIPSII -QMmips16";
+                                $wcelflag.=" /machine:MIPS16";  last; };
+          /^MIPSII/     && do { $wcecdefs.=" -DMIPS -D_MIPS_ -DR4000 -D$wcetgt";
+                                $wcecdefs.=" -QMmips2";
+                                $wcelflag.=" /machine:MIPS";    last; };
+          /^R4[0-9]{3}/ && do { $wcecdefs.=" -DMIPS -D_MIPS_ -DR4000";
+                                $wcelflag.=" /machine:MIPS";    last; };
+          /^SH[0-9]/    && do { $wcecdefs.=" -D$wcetgt -D_${wcetgt}_ -DSHx";
+                                $wcecdefs.=" -Qsh4" if ($wcetgt =~ /^SH4/);
+                                $wcelflag.=" /machine:$wcetgt"; last; };
+          { $wcecdefs.=" -D$wcetgt -D_${wcetgt}_";
+            $wcelflag.=" /machine:$wcetgt";                     last; };
+      }
+
+        $vc_wince_info = { cflags => $wcecdefs,
+                           lflags => $wcelflag };
+    }
+    return $vc_wince_info;
+}
+
+# Helper functions for the VMS configs
+my $vms_info = {};
+sub vms_info {
+    unless (%$vms_info) {
+        my $pointer_size = shift;
+        my $pointer_size_str = $pointer_size == 0 ? "" : "$pointer_size";
+
+        $vms_info->{disable_warns} = [ ];
+        $vms_info->{pointer_size} = $pointer_size_str;
+        if ($pointer_size == 64) {
+            `PIPE CC /NOCROSS_REFERENCE /NOLIST /NOOBJECT /WARNINGS = DISABLE = ( MAYLOSEDATA3, EMPTYFILE ) NL: 2> NL:`;
+            if ($? == 0) {
+                push @{$vms_info->{disable_warns}}, "MAYLOSEDATA3";
+            }
+        }
+
+        unless ($disabled{zlib}) {
+            my $default_zlib = 'GNV$LIBZSHR' . $pointer_size_str;
+            if (defined($disabled{"zlib-dynamic"})) {
+                $vms_info->{zlib} = $withargs{zlib_lib} || "$default_zlib/SHARE";
+            } else {
+                $vms_info->{def_zlib} = $withargs{zlib_lib} || $default_zlib;
+                # In case the --with-zlib-lib value contains something like
+                # /SHARE or /LIB or so at the end, remove it.
+                $vms_info->{def_zlib} =~ s|/.*$||g;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    return $vms_info;
+}
+
+%targets = (
+
+#### Basic configs that should work on any 32-bit box
+    "gcc" => {
+        cc               => "gcc",
+        cflags           => picker(debug   => "-O0 -g",
+                                   release => "-O3"),
+        thread_scheme    => "(unknown)",
+        bn_ops           => "BN_LLONG",
+    },
+    "cc" => {
+        cc               => "cc",
+        cflags           => "-O",
+        thread_scheme    => "(unknown)",
+    },
+
+#### VOS Configurations
+    "vos-gcc" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "BASE_unix" ],
+        cc               => "gcc",
+        cflags           => picker(default => "-Wall -DOPENSSL_SYS_VOS -D_POSIX_C_SOURCE=200112L -D_BSD -D_VOS_EXTENDED_NAMES -DB_ENDIAN",
+                                   debug   => "-O0 -g",
+                                   release => "-O3"),
+        thread_scheme    => "(unknown)",
+        sys_id           => "VOS",
+        lflags           => "-Wl,-map",
+        bn_ops           => "BN_LLONG",
+        shared_extension => ".so",
+    },
+
+#### Solaris configurations
+    "solaris-common" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "BASE_unix" ],
+        template         => 1,
+        cflags           => "-DFILIO_H",
+        ex_libs          => add("-lsocket -lnsl -ldl"),
+        dso_scheme       => "dlfcn",
+        thread_scheme    => "pthreads",
+        shared_target    => "solaris-shared",
+        shared_extension => ".so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+    },
+#### Solaris x86 with GNU C setups
+    "solaris-x86-gcc" => {
+        # NB. GNU C has to be configured to use GNU assembler, and not
+        # /usr/ccs/bin/as. Failure to comply will result in compile
+        # failures [at least] in 32-bit build.
+        # [Above statement is in direct contradition with one below.
+        #  Latter is kept, because it's formally inappropriate to
+        #  modify compile flags in letter release.]
+        # -DOPENSSL_NO_INLINE_ASM switches off inline assembler. We have
+        # to do it here because whenever GNU C instantiates an assembler
+        # template it surrounds it with #APP #NO_APP comment pair which
+        # (at least Solaris 7_x86) /usr/ccs/bin/as fails to assemble
+        # with "Illegal mnemonic" error message.
+        inherit_from     => [ "solaris-common", asm("x86_elf_asm") ],
+        cc               => "gcc",
+        cflags           => add_before(picker(default => "-Wall -DL_ENDIAN -DOPENSSL_NO_INLINE_ASM",
+                                              debug   => "-O0 -g",
+                                              release => "-O3 -fomit-frame-pointer"),
+                                       threads("-pthread")),
+        ex_libs          => add(threads("-pthread")),
+        bn_ops           => "BN_LLONG",
+        shared_cflag     => "-fPIC",
+        shared_ldflag    => "-shared -static-libgcc",
+    },
+    "solaris64-x86_64-gcc" => {
+        # -shared -static-libgcc might appear controversial, but modules
+        # taken from static libgcc do not have relocations and linking
+        # them into our shared objects doesn't have any negative side
+        # effects. On the contrary, doing so makes it possible to use
+        # gcc shared build with Sun C. Given that gcc generates faster
+        # code [thanks to inline assembler], I would actually recommend
+        # to consider using gcc shared build even with vendor compiler:-)
+        #					<appro@fy.chalmers.se>
+        inherit_from     => [ "solaris-common", asm("x86_64_asm") ],
+        cc               => "gcc",
+        cflags           => add_before(picker(default => "-m64 -Wall -DL_ENDIAN",
+                                              debug   => "-O0 -g",
+                                              release => "-O3"),
+                                       threads("-pthread")),
+        ex_libs          => add(threads("-pthread")),
+        bn_ops           => "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG",
+        perlasm_scheme   => "elf",
+        shared_cflag     => "-fPIC",
+        shared_ldflag    => "-m64 -shared -static-libgcc",
+        multilib         => "/64",
+    },
+
+#### Solaris x86 with Sun C setups
+    # There used to be solaris-x86-cc target, but it was removed,
+    # primarily because vendor assembler can't assemble our modules
+    # with -KPIC flag. As result it, assembly support, was not even
+    # available as option. But its lack means lack of side-channel
+    # resistant code, which is incompatible with security by todays
+    # standards. Fortunately gcc is readily available prepackaged
+    # option, which we can firmly point at...
+    #
+    # On related note, solaris64-x86_64-cc target won't compile code
+    # paths utilizing AVX and post-Haswell instruction extensions.
+    # Consider switching to solaris64-x86_64-gcc even here...
+    #
+    "solaris64-x86_64-cc" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "solaris-common", asm("x86_64_asm") ],
+        cc               => "cc",
+        cflags           => add_before(picker(default => "-xarch=generic64 -xstrconst -Xa -DL_ENDIAN",
+                                              debug   => "-g",
+                                              release => "-xO5 -xdepend -xbuiltin"),
+                                       threads("-D_REENTRANT")),
+        thread_scheme    => "pthreads",
+        lflags           => add("-xarch=generic64",threads("-mt")),
+        ex_libs          => add(threads("-lpthread")),
+        bn_ops           => "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG",
+        perlasm_scheme   => "elf",
+        shared_cflag     => "-KPIC",
+        shared_ldflag    => "-xarch=generic64 -G -dy -z text",
+        multilib         => "/64",
+    },
+
+#### SPARC Solaris with GNU C setups
+    "solaris-sparcv7-gcc" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "solaris-common" ],
+        cc               => "gcc",
+        cflags           => add_before(picker(default => "-Wall -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W",
+                                              debug   => "-O0 -g",
+                                              release => "-O3"),
+                                       threads("-pthread")),
+        ex_libs          => add(threads("-pthread")),
+        bn_ops           => "BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR",
+        shared_cflag     => "-fPIC",
+        shared_ldflag    => "-shared",
+    },
+    "solaris-sparcv8-gcc" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "solaris-sparcv7-gcc", asm("sparcv8_asm") ],
+        cflags           => add_before("-mcpu=v8"),
+    },
+    "solaris-sparcv9-gcc" => {
+        # -m32 should be safe to add as long as driver recognizes
+        # -mcpu=ultrasparc
+        inherit_from     => [ "solaris-sparcv7-gcc", asm("sparcv9_asm") ],
+        cflags           => add_before("-m32 -mcpu=ultrasparc"),
+    },
+    "solaris64-sparcv9-gcc" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "solaris-sparcv9-gcc" ],
+        cflags           => sub { my $f=join(" ",@_); $f =~ s/\-m32/-m64/; $f; },
+        bn_ops           => "BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR",
+        shared_ldflag    => "-m64 -shared",
+        multilib         => "/64",
+    },
+
+#### SPARC Solaris with Sun C setups
+# SC4.0 doesn't pass 'make test', upgrade to SC5.0 or SC4.2.
+# SC4.2 is ok, better than gcc even on bn as long as you tell it -xarch=v8
+# SC5.0 note: Compiler common patch 107357-01 or later is required!
+    "solaris-sparcv7-cc" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "solaris-common" ],
+        cc               => "cc",
+        cflags           => add_before(picker(default => "-xstrconst -Xa -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W",
+                                              debug   => "-g",
+                                              release => "-xO5 -xdepend"),
+                                       threads("-D_REENTRANT")),
+        lflags           => add(threads("-mt")),
+        ex_libs          => add(threads("-lpthread")),
+        bn_ops           => "BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR",
+        shared_cflag     => "-KPIC",
+        shared_ldflag    => "-G -dy -z text",
+    },
+####
+    "solaris-sparcv8-cc" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "solaris-sparcv7-cc", asm("sparcv8_asm") ],
+        cflags           => add_before("-xarch=v8"),
+    },
+    "solaris-sparcv9-cc" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "solaris-sparcv7-cc", asm("sparcv9_asm") ],
+        cflags           => add_before("-xarch=v8plus"),
+    },
+    "solaris64-sparcv9-cc" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "solaris-sparcv7-cc", asm("sparcv9_asm") ],
+        cflags           => add_before("-xarch=v9"),
+        lflags           => add_before("-xarch=v9"),
+        bn_ops           => "BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR",
+        shared_ldflag    => "-xarch=v9 -G -dy -z text",
+        multilib         => "/64",
+    },
+
+#### IRIX 6.x configs
+# Only N32 and N64 ABIs are supported.
+    "irix-mips3-gcc" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "BASE_unix", asm("mips64_asm") ],
+        cc               => "gcc",
+        cflags           => combine(picker(default => "-mabi=n32 -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV3W",
+                                           debug   => "-g -O0",
+                                           release => "-O3"),
+                                    threads("-D_SGI_MP_SOURCE")),
+        ex_libs          => add(threads("-lpthread")),
+        bn_ops           => "RC4_CHAR SIXTY_FOUR_BIT",
+        thread_scheme    => "pthreads",
+        perlasm_scheme   => "n32",
+        dso_scheme       => "dlfcn",
+        shared_target    => "irix-shared",
+        shared_ldflag    => "-mabi=n32",
+        shared_extension => ".so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+        multilib         => "32",
+    },
+    "irix-mips3-cc" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "BASE_unix", asm("mips64_asm") ],
+        cc               => "cc",
+        cflags           => combine(picker(default => "-n32 -mips3 -use_readonly_const -G0 -rdata_shared -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV3W",
+                                           debug   => "-g -O0",
+                                           release => "-O2"),
+                                    threads("-D_SGI_MP_SOURCE")),
+        ex_libs          => add(threads("-lpthread")),
+        bn_ops           => "RC4_CHAR SIXTY_FOUR_BIT",
+        thread_scheme    => "pthreads",
+        perlasm_scheme   => "n32",
+        dso_scheme       => "dlfcn",
+        shared_target    => "irix-shared",
+        shared_ldflag    => "-n32",
+        shared_extension => ".so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+        multilib         => "32",
+    },
+    # N64 ABI builds.
+    "irix64-mips4-gcc" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "BASE_unix", asm("mips64_asm") ],
+        cc               => "gcc",
+        cflags           => combine(picker(default => "-mabi=64 -mips4 -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV3W",
+                                           debug   => "-g -O0",
+                                           release => "-O3"),
+                                    threads("-D_SGI_MP_SOURCE")),
+        ex_libs          => add(threads("-lpthread")),
+        bn_ops           => "RC4_CHAR SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG",
+        thread_scheme    => "pthreads",
+        perlasm_scheme   => "64",
+        dso_scheme       => "dlfcn",
+        shared_target    => "irix-shared",
+        shared_ldflag    => "-mabi=64",
+        shared_extension => ".so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+        multilib         => "64",
+    },
+    "irix64-mips4-cc" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "BASE_unix", asm("mips64_asm") ],
+        cc               => "cc",
+        cflags           => combine(picker(default => "-64 -mips4 -use_readonly_const -G0 -rdata_shared -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV3W",
+                                           debug   => "-g -O0",
+                                           release => "-O2"),
+                                    threads("-D_SGI_MP_SOURCE")),
+        ex_libs          => add(threads("-lpthread")),
+        bn_ops           => "RC4_CHAR SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG",
+        thread_scheme    => "pthreads",
+        perlasm_scheme   => "64",
+        dso_scheme       => "dlfcn",
+        shared_target    => "irix-shared",
+        shared_ldflag    => "-64",
+        shared_extension => ".so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+        multilib         => "64",
+    },
+
+#### Unified HP-UX ANSI C configs.
+# Special notes:
+# - Originally we were optimizing at +O4 level. It should be noted
+#   that the only difference between +O3 and +O4 is global inter-
+#   procedural analysis. As it has to be performed during the link
+#   stage the compiler leaves behind certain pseudo-code in lib*.a
+#   which might be release or even patch level specific. Generating
+#   the machine code for and analyzing the *whole* program appears
+#   to be *extremely* memory demanding while the performance gain is
+#   actually questionable. The situation is intensified by the default
+#   HP-UX data set size limit (infamous 'maxdsiz' tunable) of 64MB
+#   which is way too low for +O4. In other words, doesn't +O3 make
+#   more sense?
+# - Keep in mind that the HP compiler by default generates code
+#   suitable for execution on the host you're currently compiling at.
+#   If the toolkit is meant to be used on various PA-RISC processors
+#   consider './Configure hpux-parisc-[g]cc +DAportable'.
+# - -DMD32_XARRAY triggers workaround for compiler bug we ran into in
+#   32-bit message digests. (For the moment of this writing) HP C
+#   doesn't seem to "digest" too many local variables (they make "him"
+#   chew forever:-). For more details look-up MD32_XARRAY comment in
+#   crypto/sha/sha_lcl.h.
+# - originally there were 32-bit hpux-parisc2-* targets. They were
+#   scrapped, because a) they were not interchangeable with other 32-bit
+#   targets; b) performance-critical 32-bit assembly modules implement
+#   even PA-RISC 2.0-specific code paths, which are chosen at run-time,
+#   thus adequate performance is provided even with PA-RISC 1.1 build.
+#					<appro@fy.chalmers.se>
+    "hpux-parisc-gcc" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "BASE_unix" ],
+        cc               => "gcc",
+        cflags           => combine(picker(default => "-DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W",
+                                           debug   => "-O0 -g",
+                                           release => "-O3"),
+                                    threads("-pthread")),
+        ex_libs          => add("-Wl,+s -ldld", threads("-pthread")),
+        bn_ops           => "BN_LLONG",
+        thread_scheme    => "pthreads",
+        dso_scheme       => "dl",
+        shared_target    => "hpux-shared",
+        shared_cflag     => "-fPIC",
+        shared_ldflag    => "-shared",
+        shared_extension => ".sl.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+    },
+    "hpux-parisc1_1-gcc" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "hpux-parisc-gcc", asm("parisc11_asm") ],
+        multilib         => "/pa1.1",
+    },
+    "hpux64-parisc2-gcc" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "BASE_unix", asm("parisc20_64_asm") ],
+        cc               => "gcc",
+        cflags           => combine(picker(default => "-DB_ENDIAN",
+                                           debug   => "-O0 -g",
+                                           release => "-O3"),
+                                    threads("-D_REENTRANT")),
+        ex_libs          => add("-ldl"),
+        bn_ops           => "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR",
+        thread_scheme    => "pthreads",
+        dso_scheme       => "dlfcn",
+        shared_target    => "hpux-shared",
+        shared_cflag     => "-fpic",
+        shared_ldflag    => "-shared",
+        shared_extension => ".sl.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+        multilib         => "/pa20_64",
+    },
+
+    # More attempts at unified 10.X and 11.X targets for HP C compiler.
+    #
+    # Chris Ruemmler <ruemmler@cup.hp.com>
+    # Kevin Steves <ks@hp.se>
+    "hpux-parisc-cc" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "BASE_unix" ],
+        cc               => "cc",
+        cflags           => combine(picker(default => "+Optrs_strongly_typed -Ae +ESlit -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W -DMD32_XARRAY",
+                                           debug   => "+O0 +d -g",
+                                           release => "+O3"),
+                                    threads("-D_REENTRANT")),
+        ex_libs          => add("-Wl,+s -ldld",threads("-lpthread")),
+        bn_ops           => "RC4_CHAR",
+        thread_scheme    => "pthreads",
+        dso_scheme       => "dl",
+        shared_target    => "hpux-shared",
+        shared_cflag     => "+Z",
+        shared_ldflag    => "-b",
+        shared_extension => ".sl.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+    },
+    "hpux-parisc1_1-cc" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "hpux-parisc-cc", asm("parisc11_asm") ],
+        cflags           => add_before("+DA1.1"),
+        multilib         => "/pa1.1",
+    },
+    "hpux64-parisc2-cc" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "BASE_unix", asm("parisc20_64_asm") ],
+        cc               => "cc",
+        cflags           => combine(picker(default => "+DD64 +Optrs_strongly_typed -Ae +ESlit -DB_ENDIAN -DMD32_XARRAY",
+                                           debug   => "+O0 +d -g",
+                                           release => "+O3"),
+                                    threads("-D_REENTRANT")),
+        ex_libs          => add("-ldl",threads("-lpthread")),
+        bn_ops           => "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR",
+        thread_scheme    => "pthreads",
+        dso_scheme       => "dlfcn",
+        shared_target    => "hpux-shared",
+        shared_cflag     => "+Z",
+        shared_ldflag    => "+DD64 -b",
+        shared_extension => ".sl.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+        multilib         => "/pa20_64",
+    },
+
+    # HP/UX IA-64 targets
+    "hpux-ia64-cc" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "BASE_unix", asm("ia64_asm") ],
+        cc               => "cc",
+        cflags           => combine(picker(default => "-Ae +DD32 +Olit=all -z -DB_ENDIAN",
+                                           debug   => "+O0 +d -g",
+                                           release => "+O2"),
+                                    threads("-D_REENTRANT")),
+        ex_libs          => add("-ldl",threads("-lpthread")),
+        bn_ops           => "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT",
+        thread_scheme    => "pthreads",
+        dso_scheme       => "dlfcn",
+        shared_target    => "hpux-shared",
+        shared_cflag     => "+Z",
+        shared_ldflag    => "+DD32 -b",
+        shared_extension => ".so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+        multilib         => "/hpux32",
+    },
+    # Frank Geurts <frank.geurts@nl.abnamro.com> has patiently assisted
+    # with debugging of the following config.
+    "hpux64-ia64-cc" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "BASE_unix", asm("ia64_asm") ],
+        cc               => "cc",
+        cflags           => combine(picker(default => "-Ae +DD64 +Olit=all -z -DB_ENDIAN",
+                                           debug   => "+O0 +d -g",
+                                           release => "+O3"),
+                                    threads("-D_REENTRANT")),
+        ex_libs          => add("-ldl", threads("-lpthread")),
+        bn_ops           => "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG",
+        thread_scheme    => "pthreads",
+        dso_scheme       => "dlfcn",
+        shared_target    => "hpux-shared",
+        shared_cflag     => "+Z",
+        shared_ldflag    => "+DD64 -b",
+        shared_extension => ".so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+        multilib         => "/hpux64",
+    },
+    # GCC builds...
+    "hpux-ia64-gcc" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "BASE_unix", asm("ia64_asm") ],
+        cc               => "gcc",
+        cflags           => combine(picker(default => "-DB_ENDIAN",
+                                           debug   => "-O0 -g",
+                                           release => "-O3"),
+                                    threads("-pthread")),
+        ex_libs          => add("-ldl", threads("-pthread")),
+        bn_ops           => "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT",
+        thread_scheme    => "pthreads",
+        dso_scheme       => "dlfcn",
+        shared_target    => "hpux-shared",
+        shared_cflag     => "-fpic",
+        shared_ldflag    => "-shared",
+        shared_extension => ".so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+        multilib         => "/hpux32",
+    },
+    "hpux64-ia64-gcc" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "BASE_unix", asm("ia64_asm") ],
+        cc               => "gcc",
+        cflags           => combine(picker(default => "-mlp64 -DB_ENDIAN",
+                                           debug   => "-O0 -g",
+                                           release => "-O3"),
+                                    threads("-pthread")),
+        ex_libs          => add("-ldl", threads("-pthread")),
+        bn_ops           => "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG",
+        thread_scheme    => "pthreads",
+        dso_scheme       => "dlfcn",
+        shared_target    => "hpux-shared",
+        shared_cflag     => "-fpic",
+        shared_ldflag    => "-mlp64 -shared",
+        shared_extension => ".so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+        multilib         => "/hpux64",
+    },
+
+#### HP MPE/iX http://jazz.external.hp.com/src/openssl/
+    "MPE/iX-gcc" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "BASE_unix" ],
+        cc               => "gcc",
+        cflags           => "-DBN_DIV2W -O3 -D_POSIX_SOURCE -D_SOCKET_SOURCE -I/SYSLOG/PUB",
+        sys_id           => "MPE",
+        ex_libs          => add("-L/SYSLOG/PUB -lsyslog -lsocket -lcurses"),
+        thread_scheme    => "(unknown)",
+        bn_ops           => "BN_LLONG",
+    },
+
+#### DEC Alpha Tru64 targets. Tru64 is marketing name for OSF/1 version 4
+#### and forward. In reality 'uname -s' still returns "OSF1". Originally
+#### there were even osf1-* configs targeting prior versions provided,
+#### but not anymore...
+    "tru64-alpha-gcc" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "BASE_unix", asm("alpha_asm") ],
+        cc               => "gcc",
+        cflags           => combine("-std=c9x -D_XOPEN_SOURCE=500 -D_OSF_SOURCE -O3",
+                                    threads("-pthread")),
+        ex_libs          => add("-lrt", threads("-pthread")), # for mlock(2)
+        bn_ops           => "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG",
+        thread_scheme    => "pthreads",
+        dso_scheme       => "dlfcn",
+        shared_target    => "alpha-osf1-shared",
+        shared_extension => ".so",
+    },
+    "tru64-alpha-cc" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "BASE_unix", asm("alpha_asm") ],
+        cc               => "cc",
+        cflags           => combine("-std1 -D_XOPEN_SOURCE=500 -D_OSF_SOURCE -tune host -fast -readonly_strings",
+                                    threads("-pthread")),
+        ex_libs          => add("-lrt", threads("-pthread")), # for mlock(2)
+        bn_ops           => "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG",
+        thread_scheme    => "pthreads",
+        dso_scheme       => "dlfcn",
+        shared_target    => "alpha-osf1-shared",
+        shared_ldflag    => "-msym",
+        shared_extension => ".so",
+    },
+
+####
+#### Variety of LINUX:-)
+####
+# *-generic* is endian-neutral target, but ./config is free to
+# throw in -D[BL]_ENDIAN, whichever appropriate...
+    "linux-generic32" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "BASE_unix" ],
+        cc               => "gcc",
+        cflags           => combine(picker(default => "-Wall",
+                                           debug   => "-O0 -g",
+                                           release => "-O3"),
+                                    threads("-pthread")),
+        ex_libs          => add("-ldl", threads("-pthread")),
+        bn_ops           => "BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR",
+        thread_scheme    => "pthreads",
+        dso_scheme       => "dlfcn",
+        shared_target    => "linux-shared",
+        shared_cflag     => "-fPIC -DOPENSSL_USE_NODELETE",
+        shared_ldflag    => "-Wl,-znodelete",
+        shared_extension => ".so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+    },
+    "linux-generic64" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "linux-generic32" ],
+        bn_ops           => "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR",
+    },
+
+    "linux-ppc" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "linux-generic32", asm("ppc32_asm") ],
+        perlasm_scheme   => "linux32",
+    },
+    "linux-ppc64" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "linux-generic64", asm("ppc64_asm") ],
+        cflags           => add("-m64 -DB_ENDIAN"),
+        perlasm_scheme   => "linux64",
+        shared_ldflag    => add("-m64"),
+        multilib         => "64",
+    },
+    "linux-ppc64le" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "linux-generic64", asm("ppc64_asm") ],
+        cflags           => add("-m64 -DL_ENDIAN"),
+        perlasm_scheme   => "linux64le",
+        shared_ldflag    => add("-m64"),
+    },
+
+    "linux-armv4" => {
+        ################################################################
+        # Note that -march is not among compiler options in linux-armv4
+        # target description. Not specifying one is intentional to give
+        # you choice to:
+        #
+        # a) rely on your compiler default by not specifying one;
+        # b) specify your target platform explicitly for optimal
+        # performance, e.g. -march=armv6 or -march=armv7-a;
+        # c) build "universal" binary that targets *range* of platforms
+        # by specifying minimum and maximum supported architecture;
+        #
+        # As for c) option. It actually makes no sense to specify
+        # maximum to be less than ARMv7, because it's the least
+        # requirement for run-time switch between platform-specific
+        # code paths. And without run-time switch performance would be
+        # equivalent to one for minimum. Secondly, there are some
+        # natural limitations that you'd have to accept and respect.
+        # Most notably you can *not* build "universal" binary for
+        # big-endian platform. This is because ARMv7 processor always
+        # picks instructions in little-endian order. Another similar
+        # limitation is that -mthumb can't "cross" -march=armv6t2
+        # boundary, because that's where it became Thumb-2. Well, this
+        # limitation is a bit artificial, because it's not really
+        # impossible, but it's deemed too tricky to support. And of
+        # course you have to be sure that your binutils are actually
+        # up to the task of handling maximum target platform. With all
+        # this in mind here is an example of how to configure
+        # "universal" build:
+        #
+        # ./Configure linux-armv4 -march=armv6 -D__ARM_MAX_ARCH__=8
+        #
+        inherit_from     => [ "linux-generic32", asm("armv4_asm") ],
+        perlasm_scheme   => "linux32",
+    },
+    "linux-aarch64" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "linux-generic64", asm("aarch64_asm") ],
+        perlasm_scheme   => "linux64",
+    },
+    "linux-arm64ilp32" => {  # https://wiki.linaro.org/Platform/arm64-ilp32
+        inherit_from     => [ "linux-generic32", asm("aarch64_asm") ],
+        cflags           => add("-mabi=ilp32"),
+        bn_ops           => "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT RC4_CHAR",
+        perlasm_scheme   => "linux64",
+        shared_ldflag    => add("-mabi=ilp32"),
+    },
+
+    "linux-mips32" => {
+        # Configure script adds minimally required -march for assembly
+        # support, if no -march was specified at command line.
+        inherit_from     => [ "linux-generic32", asm("mips32_asm") ],
+        cflags           => add("-mabi=32 -DBN_DIV3W"),
+        perlasm_scheme   => "o32",
+        shared_ldflag    => add("-mabi=32"),
+    },
+    # mips32 and mips64 below refer to contemporary MIPS Architecture
+    # specifications, MIPS32 and MIPS64, rather than to kernel bitness.
+    "linux-mips64" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "linux-generic32", asm("mips64_asm") ],
+        cflags           => add("-mabi=n32 -DBN_DIV3W"),
+        bn_ops           => "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT RC4_CHAR",
+        perlasm_scheme   => "n32",
+        shared_ldflag    => add("-mabi=n32"),
+        multilib         => "32",
+    },
+    "linux64-mips64" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "linux-generic64", asm("mips64_asm") ],
+        cflags           => add("-mabi=64 -DBN_DIV3W"),
+        perlasm_scheme   => "64",
+        shared_ldflag    => add("-mabi=64"),
+        multilib         => "64",
+    },
+
+    #### IA-32 targets...
+    #### These two targets are a bit aged and are to be used on older Linux
+    #### machines where gcc doesn't understand -m32 and -m64
+    "linux-elf" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "linux-generic32", asm("x86_elf_asm") ],
+        cflags           => add(picker(default => "-DL_ENDIAN",
+                                       release => "-fomit-frame-pointer")),
+        bn_ops           => "BN_LLONG",
+    },
+    "linux-aout" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "BASE_unix", asm("x86_asm") ],
+        cc               => "gcc",
+        cflags           => add(picker(default => "-DL_ENDIAN -Wall",
+                                       debug   => "-O0 -g",
+                                       release => "-O3 -fomit-frame-pointer")),
+        bn_ops           => "BN_LLONG",
+        thread_scheme    => "(unknown)",
+        perlasm_scheme   => "a.out",
+    },
+
+    #### X86 / X86_64 targets
+    "linux-x86" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "linux-generic32", asm("x86_asm") ],
+        cflags           => add(picker(default => "-m32 -DL_ENDIAN",
+                                       release => "-fomit-frame-pointer")),
+        bn_ops           => "BN_LLONG",
+        perlasm_scheme   => "elf",
+        shared_ldflag    => add("-m32"),
+    },
+    "linux-x86-clang" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "linux-x86" ],
+        cc               => "clang",
+        cxx              => "clang++",
+        cflags           => add("-Wextra -Qunused-arguments"),
+    },
+    "linux-x86_64" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "linux-generic64", asm("x86_64_asm") ],
+        cflags           => add("-m64 -DL_ENDIAN"),
+        bn_ops           => "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG",
+        perlasm_scheme   => "elf",
+        shared_ldflag    => add("-m64"),
+        multilib         => "64",
+    },
+    "linux-x86_64-clang" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "linux-x86_64" ],
+        cc               => "clang",
+        cflags           => add("-Wextra -Qunused-arguments"),
+    },
+    "linux-x32" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "linux-generic32", asm("x86_64_asm") ],
+        cflags           => add("-mx32 -DL_ENDIAN"),
+        bn_ops           => "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT",
+        perlasm_scheme   => "elf32",
+        shared_ldflag    => add("-mx32"),
+        multilib         => "x32",
+    },
+
+    "linux-ia64" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "linux-generic64", asm("ia64_asm") ],
+        bn_ops           => "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG",
+    },
+
+    "linux64-s390x" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "linux-generic64", asm("s390x_asm") ],
+        cflags           => add("-m64 -DB_ENDIAN"),
+        perlasm_scheme   => "64",
+        shared_ldflag    => add("-m64"),
+        multilib         => "64",
+    },
+    "linux32-s390x" => {
+        #### So called "highgprs" target for z/Architecture CPUs
+        # "Highgprs" is kernel feature first implemented in Linux
+        # 2.6.32, see /proc/cpuinfo. The idea is to preserve most
+        # significant bits of general purpose registers not only
+        # upon 32-bit process context switch, but even on
+        # asynchronous signal delivery to such process. This makes
+        # it possible to deploy 64-bit instructions even in legacy
+        # application context and achieve better [or should we say
+        # adequate] performance. The build is binary compatible with
+        # linux-generic32, and the idea is to be able to install the
+        # resulting libcrypto.so alongside generic one, e.g. as
+        # /lib/highgprs/libcrypto.so.x.y, for ldconfig and run-time
+        # linker to autodiscover. Unfortunately it doesn't work just
+        # yet, because of couple of bugs in glibc
+        # sysdeps/s390/dl-procinfo.c affecting ldconfig and ld.so.1...
+        #
+        inherit_from     => [ "linux-generic32", asm("s390x_asm") ],
+        cflags           => add("-m31 -Wa,-mzarch -DB_ENDIAN"),
+        bn_asm_src       => sub { my $r=join(" ",@_); $r=~s|asm/s390x\.S|bn_asm.c|; $r; },
+        perlasm_scheme   => "31",
+        shared_ldflag    => add("-m31"),
+        multilib         => "/highgprs",
+    },
+
+    #### SPARC Linux setups
+    # Ray Miller <ray.miller@computing-services.oxford.ac.uk> has
+    # patiently assisted with debugging of following two configs.
+    "linux-sparcv8" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "linux-generic32", asm("sparcv8_asm") ],
+        cflags           => add("-mcpu=v8 -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W"),
+    },
+    "linux-sparcv9" => {
+        # it's a real mess with -mcpu=ultrasparc option under Linux,
+        # but -Wa,-Av8plus should do the trick no matter what.
+        inherit_from     => [ "linux-generic32", asm("sparcv9_asm") ],
+        cflags           => add("-m32 -mcpu=ultrasparc -Wa,-Av8plus -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W"),
+        shared_ldflag    => add("-m32"),
+    },
+    "linux64-sparcv9" => {
+        # GCC 3.1 is a requirement
+        inherit_from     => [ "linux-generic64", asm("sparcv9_asm") ],
+        cflags           => add("-m64 -mcpu=ultrasparc -DB_ENDIAN"),
+        bn_ops           => "BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR",
+        shared_ldflag    => add("-m64"),
+        multilib         => "64",
+    },
+
+    "linux-alpha-gcc" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "linux-generic64", asm("alpha_asm") ],
+        cflags           => add("-DL_ENDIAN"),
+        bn_ops           => "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG",
+    },
+    "linux-c64xplus" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "BASE_unix" ],
+        # TI_CGT_C6000_7.3.x is a requirement
+        cc               => "cl6x",
+        cflags           => combine("--linux -ea=.s -eo=.o -mv6400+ -o2 -ox -ms -pden -DOPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT",
+                                    threads("-D_REENTRANT")),
+        bn_ops           => "BN_LLONG",
+        cpuid_asm_src    => "c64xpluscpuid.s",
+        bn_asm_src       => "asm/bn-c64xplus.asm c64xplus-gf2m.s",
+        aes_asm_src      => "aes-c64xplus.s aes_cbc.c aes-ctr.fake",
+        sha1_asm_src     => "sha1-c64xplus.s sha256-c64xplus.s sha512-c64xplus.s",
+        rc4_asm_src      => "rc4-c64xplus.s",
+        modes_asm_src    => "ghash-c64xplus.s",
+        chacha_asm_src   => "chacha-c64xplus.s",
+        poly1305_asm_src => "poly1305-c64xplus.s",
+        thread_scheme    => "pthreads",
+        perlasm_scheme   => "void",
+        dso_scheme       => "dlfcn",
+        shared_target    => "linux-shared",
+        shared_cflag     => "--pic",
+        shared_ldflag    => add("-z --sysv --shared"),
+        shared_extension => ".so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+        ranlib           => "true",
+    },
+
+#### Android: linux-* but without pointers to headers and libs.
+    #
+    # It takes pair of prior-set environment variables to make it work:
+    #
+    # CROSS_SYSROOT=/some/where/android-ndk-<ver>/platforms/android-<apiver>/arch-<arch>
+    # CROSS_COMPILE=<prefix>
+    #
+    # As well as PATH adjusted to cover ${CROSS_COMPILE}gcc and company.
+    # For example to compile for ICS and ARM with NDK 10d, you'd:
+    #
+    # ANDROID_NDK=/some/where/android-ndk-10d
+    # CROSS_SYSROOT=$ANDROID_NDK/platforms/android-14/arch-arm
+    # CROSS_COMPILE=arm-linux-androideabi-
+    # PATH=$ANDROID_NDK/toolchains/arm-linux-androideabi-4.8/prebuild/linux-x86_64/bin
+    #
+    "android" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "linux-generic32" ],
+        # Special note about unconditional -fPIC and -pie. The underlying
+        # reason is that Lollipop refuses to run non-PIE. But what about
+        # older systems and NDKs? -fPIC was never problem, so the only
+        # concern is -pie. Older toolchains, e.g. r4, appear to handle it
+        # and binaries turn mostly functional. "Mostly" means that oldest
+        # Androids, such as Froyo, fail to handle executable, but newer
+        # systems are perfectly capable of executing binaries targeting
+        # Froyo. Keep in mind that in the nutshell Android builds are
+        # about JNI, i.e. shared libraries, not applications.
+        cflags           => add(picker(default => "-mandroid -fPIC --sysroot=\$(CROSS_SYSROOT) -Wa,--noexecstack")),
+        bin_cflags       => "-pie",
+    },
+    "android-x86" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "android", asm("x86_asm") ],
+        cflags           => add(picker(release => "-fomit-frame-pointer")),
+        bn_ops           => "BN_LLONG",
+        perlasm_scheme   => "android",
+    },
+    ################################################################
+    # Contemporary Android applications can provide multiple JNI
+    # providers in .apk, targeting multiple architectures. Among
+    # them there is "place" for two ARM flavours: generic eabi and
+    # armv7-a/hard-float. However, it should be noted that OpenSSL's
+    # ability to engage NEON is not constrained by ABI choice, nor
+    # is your ability to call OpenSSL from your application code
+    # compiled with floating-point ABI other than default 'soft'.
+    # [Latter thanks to __attribute__((pcs("aapcs"))) declaration.]
+    # This means that choice of ARM libraries you provide in .apk
+    # is driven by application needs. For example if application
+    # itself benefits from NEON or is floating-point intensive, then
+    # it might be appropriate to provide both libraries. Otherwise
+    # just generic eabi would do. But in latter case it would be
+    # appropriate to
+    #
+    #   ./Configure android-armeabi -D__ARM_MAX_ARCH__=8
+    #
+    # in order to build "universal" binary and allow OpenSSL take
+    # advantage of NEON when it's available.
+    #
+    "android-armeabi" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "android", asm("armv4_asm") ],
+    },
+    "android-mips" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "android", asm("mips32_asm") ],
+        perlasm_scheme   => "o32",
+    },
+
+    "android64" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "linux-generic64" ],
+        cflags           => add(picker(default => "-mandroid -fPIC --sysroot=\$(CROSS_SYSROOT) -Wa,--noexecstack")),
+        bin_cflags       => "-pie",
+    },
+    "android64-aarch64" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "android64", asm("aarch64_asm") ],
+        perlasm_scheme   => "linux64",
+    },
+
+#### *BSD
+    "BSD-generic32" => {
+        # As for thread cflag. Idea is to maintain "collective" set of
+        # flags, which would cover all BSD flavors. -pthread applies
+        # to them all, but is treated differently. OpenBSD expands is
+        # as -D_POSIX_THREAD -lc_r, which is sufficient. FreeBSD 4.x
+        # expands it as -lc_r, which has to be accompanied by explicit
+        # -D_THREAD_SAFE and sometimes -D_REENTRANT. FreeBSD 5.x
+        # expands it as -lc_r, which seems to be sufficient?
+        inherit_from     => [ "BASE_unix" ],
+        cc               => "cc",
+        cflags           => combine(picker(default => "-Wall",
+                                           debug   => "-O0 -g",
+                                           release => "-O3"),
+                                    threads("-pthread -D_THREAD_SAFE -D_REENTRANT")),
+        bn_ops           => "BN_LLONG",
+        thread_scheme    => "pthreads",
+        dso_scheme       => "dlfcn",
+        shared_target    => "bsd-gcc-shared",
+        shared_cflag     => "-fPIC",
+        shared_extension => ".so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+    },
+    "BSD-generic64" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "BSD-generic32" ],
+        bn_ops           => "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG",
+    },
+
+    "BSD-x86" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "BSD-generic32", asm("x86_asm") ],
+        cflags           => add(picker(default => "-DL_ENDIAN",
+                                       release => "-fomit-frame-pointer")),
+        bn_ops           => "BN_LLONG",
+        shared_target    => "bsd-shared",
+        perlasm_scheme   => "a.out",
+    },
+    "BSD-x86-elf" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "BSD-x86" ],
+        perlasm_scheme   => "elf",
+    },
+
+    "BSD-sparcv8" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "BSD-generic32", asm("sparcv8_asm") ],
+        cflags           => add("-mcpu=v8 -DB_ENDIAN"),
+    },
+    "BSD-sparc64" => {
+        # -DMD32_REG_T=int doesn't actually belong in sparc64 target, it
+        # simply *happens* to work around a compiler bug in gcc 3.3.3,
+        # triggered by RIPEMD160 code.
+        inherit_from     => [ "BSD-generic64", asm("sparcv9_asm") ],
+        cflags           => add("-DB_ENDIAN -DMD32_REG_T=int"),
+        bn_ops           => "BN_LLONG",
+    },
+
+    "BSD-ia64" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "BSD-generic64", asm("ia64_asm") ],
+        cflags           => add_before("-DL_ENDIAN"),
+        bn_ops           => "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG",
+    },
+
+    "BSD-x86_64" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "BSD-generic64", asm("x86_64_asm") ],
+        cflags           => add_before("-DL_ENDIAN"),
+        bn_ops           => "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG",
+        perlasm_scheme   => "elf",
+    },
+
+    "bsdi-elf-gcc" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "BASE_unix", asm("x86_elf_asm") ],
+        cc               => "gcc",
+        cflags           => "-DPERL5 -DL_ENDIAN -fomit-frame-pointer -O3 -Wall",
+        ex_libs          => add("-ldl"),
+        bn_ops           => "BN_LLONG",
+        thread_scheme    => "(unknown)",
+        dso_scheme       => "dlfcn",
+        shared_target    => "bsd-gcc-shared",
+        shared_cflag     => "-fPIC",
+        shared_extension => ".so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+    },
+
+    "nextstep" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "BASE_unix" ],
+        cc               => "cc",
+        cflags           => "-O -Wall",
+        unistd           => "<libc.h>",
+        bn_ops           => "BN_LLONG",
+        thread_scheme    => "(unknown)",
+    },
+    "nextstep3.3" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "BASE_unix" ],
+        cc               => "cc",
+        cflags           => "-O3 -Wall",
+        unistd           => "<libc.h>",
+        bn_ops           => "BN_LLONG",
+        thread_scheme    => "(unknown)",
+    },
+
+# QNX
+    "qnx4" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "BASE_unix" ],
+        cc               => "cc",
+        cflags           => "-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO",
+        thread_scheme    => "(unknown)",
+    },
+    "QNX6" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "BASE_unix" ],
+        cc               => "gcc",
+        ex_libs          => add("-lsocket"),
+        dso_scheme       => "dlfcn",
+        shared_target    => "bsd-gcc-shared",
+        shared_cflag     => "-fPIC",
+        shared_extension => ".so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+    },
+    "QNX6-i386" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "BASE_unix", asm("x86_elf_asm") ],
+        cc               => "gcc",
+        cflags           => "-DL_ENDIAN -O2 -Wall",
+        ex_libs          => add("-lsocket"),
+        dso_scheme       => "dlfcn",
+        shared_target    => "bsd-gcc-shared",
+        shared_cflag     => "-fPIC",
+        shared_extension => ".so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+    },
+
+#### SCO/Caldera targets.
+#
+# Originally we had like unixware-*, unixware-*-pentium, unixware-*-p6, etc.
+# Now we only have blended unixware-* as it's the only one used by ./config.
+# If you want to optimize for particular microarchitecture, bypass ./config
+# and './Configure unixware-7 -Kpentium_pro' or whatever appropriate.
+# Note that not all targets include assembler support. Mostly because of
+# lack of motivation to support out-of-date platforms with out-of-date
+# compiler drivers and assemblers. Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net> has
+# patiently assisted to debug most of it.
+#
+# UnixWare 2.0x fails destest with -O.
+    "unixware-2.0" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "BASE_unix" ],
+        cc               => "cc",
+        cflags           => combine("-DFILIO_H -DNO_STRINGS_H",
+                                    threads("-Kthread")),
+        ex_libs          => add("-lsocket -lnsl -lresolv -lx"),
+        thread_scheme    => "uithreads",
+    },
+    "unixware-2.1" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "BASE_unix" ],
+        cc               => "cc",
+        cflags           => combine("-O -DFILIO_H",
+                                    threads("-Kthread")),
+        ex_libs          => add("-lsocket -lnsl -lresolv -lx"),
+        thread_scheme    => "uithreads",
+    },
+    "unixware-7" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "BASE_unix", asm("x86_elf_asm") ],
+        cc               => "cc",
+        cflags           => combine("-O -DFILIO_H -Kalloca",
+                                    threads("-Kthread")),
+        ex_libs          => add("-lsocket -lnsl"),
+        thread_scheme    => "uithreads",
+        bn_ops           => "BN_LLONG",
+        perlasm_scheme   => "elf-1",
+        dso_scheme       => "dlfcn",
+        shared_target    => "svr5-shared",
+        shared_cflag     => "-Kpic",
+        shared_extension => ".so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+    },
+    "unixware-7-gcc" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "BASE_unix", asm("x86_elf_asm") ],
+        cc               => "gcc",
+        cflags           => combine("-DL_ENDIAN -DFILIO_H -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall",
+                                    threads("-D_REENTRANT")),
+        ex_libs          => add("-lsocket -lnsl"),
+        bn_ops           => "BN_LLONG",
+        thread_scheme    => "pthreads",
+        perlasm_scheme   => "elf-1",
+        dso_scheme       => "dlfcn",
+        shared_target    => "gnu-shared",
+        shared_cflag     => "-fPIC",
+        shared_extension => ".so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+    },
+# SCO 5 - Ben Laurie <ben@algroup.co.uk> says the -O breaks the SCO cc.
+    "sco5-cc" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "BASE_unix", asm("x86_elf_asm") ],
+        cc               => "cc",
+        cflags           => "-belf",
+        ex_libs          => add("-lsocket -lnsl"),
+        thread_scheme    => "(unknown)",
+        perlasm_scheme   => "elf-1",
+        dso_scheme       => "dlfcn",
+        shared_target    => "svr3-shared",
+        shared_cflag     => "-Kpic",
+        shared_extension => ".so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+    },
+    "sco5-gcc" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "BASE_unix", asm("x86_elf_asm") ],
+        cc               => "gcc",
+        cflags           => "-O3 -fomit-frame-pointer",
+        ex_libs          => add("-lsocket -lnsl"),
+        bn_ops           => "BN_LLONG",
+        thread_scheme    => "(unknown)",
+        perlasm_scheme   => "elf-1",
+        dso_scheme       => "dlfcn",
+        shared_target    => "svr3-shared",
+        shared_cflag     => "-fPIC",
+        shared_extension => ".so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+    },
+
+#### IBM's AIX.
+    # Below targets assume AIX >=5. Caveat lector. If you are accustomed
+    # to control compilation "bitness" by setting $OBJECT_MODE environment
+    # variable, then you should know that in OpenSSL case it's considered
+    # only in ./config. Once configured, build procedure remains "deaf" to
+    # current value of $OBJECT_MODE.
+    "aix-gcc" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "BASE_unix", asm("ppc32_asm") ],
+        cc               => "gcc",
+        cflags           => combine(picker(default => "-DB_ENDIAN",
+                                           debug   => "-O0 -g",
+                                           release => "-O"),
+                                    threads("-pthread")),
+        ex_libs          => add(threads("-pthread")),
+        sys_id           => "AIX",
+        bn_ops           => "BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR",
+        thread_scheme    => "pthreads",
+        perlasm_scheme   => "aix32",
+        dso_scheme       => "dlfcn",
+        shared_target    => "aix-shared",
+        shared_ldflag    => "-shared -static-libgcc -Wl,-G",
+        shared_extension => ".so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+        arflags          => "-X32",
+    },
+    "aix64-gcc" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "BASE_unix", asm("ppc64_asm") ],
+        cc               => "gcc",
+        cflags           => combine(picker(default => "-maix64 -DB_ENDIAN",
+                                           debug   => "-O0 -g",
+                                           release => "-O"),
+                                    threads("-pthread")),
+        ex_libs          => add(threads("-pthread")),
+        sys_id           => "AIX",
+        bn_ops           => "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR",
+        thread_scheme    => "pthreads",
+        perlasm_scheme   => "aix64",
+        dso_scheme       => "dlfcn",
+        shared_target    => "aix-shared",
+        shared_ldflag    => "-maix64 -shared -static-libgcc -Wl,-G",
+        shared_extension => ".so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+        arflags          => "-X64",
+    },
+    "aix-cc" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "BASE_unix", asm("ppc32_asm") ],
+        cc               => "cc",
+        cflags           => combine(picker(default => "-q32 -DB_ENDIAN -qmaxmem=16384 -qro -qroconst",
+                                           debug   => "-O0 -g",
+                                           release => "-O"),
+                                    threads("-qthreaded -D_THREAD_SAFE")),
+        sys_id           => "AIX",
+        bn_ops           => "BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR",
+        thread_scheme    => "pthreads",
+        ex_libs          => threads("-lpthreads"),
+        perlasm_scheme   => "aix32",
+        dso_scheme       => "dlfcn",
+        shared_target    => "aix-shared",
+        shared_ldflag    => "-q32 -G",
+        shared_extension => ".so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+        arflags          => "-X 32",
+    },
+    "aix64-cc" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "BASE_unix", asm("ppc64_asm") ],
+        cc               => "cc",
+        cflags           => combine(picker(default => "-q64 -DB_ENDIAN -qmaxmem=16384 -qro -qroconst",
+                                           debug   => "-O0 -g",
+                                           release => "-O"),
+                                    threads("-qthreaded -D_THREAD_SAFE")),
+        sys_id           => "AIX",
+        bn_ops           => "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR",
+        thread_scheme    => "pthreads",
+        ex_libs          => threads("-lpthreads"),
+        perlasm_scheme   => "aix64",
+        dso_scheme       => "dlfcn",
+        shared_target    => "aix-shared",
+        shared_ldflag    => "-q64 -G",
+        shared_extension => ".so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+        arflags          => "-X 64",
+    },
+
+# SIEMENS BS2000/OSD: an EBCDIC-based mainframe
+    "BS2000-OSD" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "BASE_unix" ],
+        cc               => "c89",
+        cflags           => "-O -XLLML -XLLMK -XL -DB_ENDIAN -DCHARSET_EBCDIC",
+        ex_libs          => add("-lsocket -lnsl"),
+        bn_ops           => "THIRTY_TWO_BIT RC4_CHAR",
+        thread_scheme    => "(unknown)",
+    },
+
+#### Visual C targets
+#
+# Win64 targets, WIN64I denotes IA-64 and WIN64A - AMD64
+#
+# Note about -wd4090, disable warning C4090. This warning returns false
+# positives in some situations. Disabling it altogether masks both
+# legitimate and false cases, but as we compile on multiple platforms,
+# we rely on other compilers to catch legitimate cases.
+#
+# Also note that we force threads no matter what.  Configuring "no-threads"
+# is ignored.
+    "VC-common" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "BASE_Windows" ],
+        template         => 1,
+        cc               => "cl",
+        cflags           => "-W3 -wd4090 -Gs0 -GF -Gy -nologo -DOPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 -DWIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN -DL_ENDIAN -D_CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE",
+        defines          => add(sub { my @defs = ();
+                                      unless ($disabled{"zlib-dynamic"}) {
+                                          my $zlib =
+                                              $withargs{zlib_lib} // "ZLIB1";
+                                          push @defs,
+                                              quotify("perl",
+                                                      'LIBZ="' . $zlib . '"');
+                                      }
+                                      return [ @defs ];
+                                    }),
+        coutflag         => "/Fo",
+        lib_cflags       => add("/Zi /Fdossl_static"),
+        dso_cflags       => "/Zi /Fddso",
+        bin_cflags       => "/Zi /Fdapp",
+        lflags           => add("/debug"),
+        shared_ldflag    => "/dll",
+        shared_target    => "win-shared", # meaningless except it gives Configure a hint
+        thread_scheme    => "winthreads",
+        dso_scheme       => "win32",
+        apps_aux_src     => add("win32_init.c"),
+    },
+    "VC-noCE-common" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "VC-common" ],
+        template         => 1,
+        cflags           => add(picker(default => "-DUNICODE -D_UNICODE",
+                                       debug   =>
+                                       sub {
+                                           ($disabled{shared} ? "" : "/MDd")
+                                               ." /Od -DDEBUG -D_DEBUG";
+                                       },
+                                       release =>
+                                       sub {
+                                           ($disabled{shared} ? "" : "/MD")
+                                               ." /O2";
+                                       })),
+        lib_cflags       => add(sub { $disabled{shared} ? "/MT /Zl" : () }),
+        # Following might/should appears controversial, i.e. defining
+        # /MDd without evaluating $disabled{shared}. It works in
+        # non-shared build because static library is compiled with /Zl
+        # and bares no reference to specific RTL. And it works in
+        # shared build because multiple /MDd options are not prohibited.
+        # But why /MDd in static build? Well, basically this is just a
+        # reference point, which allows to catch eventual errors that
+        # would prevent those who want to wrap OpenSSL into own .DLL.
+        # Why not /MD in release build then? Well, some are likely to
+        # prefer [non-debug] openssl.exe to be free from Micorosoft RTL
+        # redistributable.
+        bin_cflags       => add(picker(debug   => "/MDd",
+                                       release => sub { $disabled{shared} ? "/MT" : () },
+                                      )),
+        bin_lflags       => add("/subsystem:console /opt:ref"),
+        ex_libs          => add(sub {
+            my @ex_libs = ();
+            push @ex_libs, 'ws2_32.lib' unless $disabled{sock};
+            push @ex_libs, 'gdi32.lib advapi32.lib crypt32.lib user32.lib';
+            return join(" ", @ex_libs);
+        }),
+    },
+    "VC-WIN64-common" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "VC-noCE-common" ],
+        template         => 1,
+        ex_libs          => add(sub {
+            my @ex_libs = ();
+            push @ex_libs, 'bufferoverflowu.lib' if (`cl 2>&1` =~ /14\.00\.4[0-9]{4}\./);
+            return join(" ", @_, @ex_libs);
+        }),
+        bn_ops           => "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN",
+        build_scheme     => add("VC-W64", { separator => undef }),
+    },
+    "VC-WIN64I" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "VC-WIN64-common", asm("ia64_asm"),
+                              sub { $disabled{shared} ? () : "ia64_uplink" } ],
+        as               => "ias",
+        asflags          => "-d debug",
+        asoutflag        => "-o",
+        sys_id           => "WIN64I",
+        bn_asm_src       => sub { return undef unless @_;
+                                  my $r=join(" ",@_); $r=~s|bn-ia64.s|bn_asm.c|; $r; },
+        perlasm_scheme   => "ias",
+        multilib         => "-ia64",
+    },
+    "VC-WIN64A" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "VC-WIN64-common", asm("x86_64_asm"),
+                              sub { $disabled{shared} ? () : "x86_64_uplink" } ],
+        as               => sub { vc_win64a_info()->{as} },
+        asflags          => sub { vc_win64a_info()->{asflags} },
+        asoutflag        => sub { vc_win64a_info()->{asoutflag} },
+        sys_id           => "WIN64A",
+        bn_asm_src       => sub { return undef unless @_;
+                                  my $r=join(" ",@_); $r=~s|asm/x86_64-gcc|bn_asm|; $r; },
+        perlasm_scheme   => "auto",
+        multilib         => "-x64",
+    },
+    "VC-WIN32" => {
+        # x86 Win32 target defaults to ANSI API, if you want UNICODE,
+        # configure with 'perl Configure VC-WIN32 -DUNICODE -D_UNICODE'
+        inherit_from     => [ "VC-noCE-common", asm("x86_asm"),
+                              sub { $disabled{shared} ? () : "uplink_common" } ],
+        as               => sub { vc_win32_info()->{as} },
+        asflags          => sub { vc_win32_info()->{asflags} },
+        asoutflag        => sub { vc_win32_info()->{asoutflag} },
+        ex_libs          => add(sub {
+            my @ex_libs = ();
+            # WIN32 UNICODE build gets linked with unicows.lib for
+            # backward compatibility with Win9x.
+            push @ex_libs, 'unicows.lib'
+                if (grep { $_ eq "UNICODE" } @user_defines);
+            return join(" ", @ex_libs, @_);
+        }),
+        sys_id           => "WIN32",
+        bn_ops           => "BN_LLONG EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN",
+        perlasm_scheme   => sub { vc_win32_info()->{perlasm_scheme} },
+        build_scheme     => add("VC-W32", { separator => undef }),
+    },
+    "VC-CE" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "VC-common" ],
+        as               => "ml",
+        asflags          => "/nologo /Cp /coff /c /Cx /Zi",
+        asoutflag        => "/Fo",
+        cc               => "cl",
+        cflags           =>
+            picker(default =>
+                   combine('/W3 /WX /GF /Gy /nologo -DUNICODE -D_UNICODE -DOPENSSL_SYS_WINCE -DWIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN -DL_ENDIAN -DDSO_WIN32 -DNO_CHMOD -DOPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT',
+                           sub { vc_wince_info()->{cflags}; },
+                           sub { defined($ENV{'WCECOMPAT'})
+                                     ? '-I$(WCECOMPAT)/include' : (); },
+                           sub { defined($ENV{'PORTSDK_LIBPATH'})
+                                     ? '-I$(PORTSDK_LIBPATH)/../../include' : (); },
+                           sub { `cl 2>&1` =~ /Version ([0-9]+)\./ && $1>=14
+                                     ? ($disabled{shared} ? " /MT" : " /MD")
+                                     : " /MC"; }),
+                   debug   => "/Od -DDEBUG -D_DEBUG",
+                   release => "/O1i"),
+        lflags           => combine("/nologo /opt:ref",
+                                    sub { vc_wince_info()->{lflags}; },
+                                    sub { defined($ENV{PORTSDK_LIBPATH})
+                                              ? "/entry:mainCRTstartup" : (); }),
+        sys_id           => "WINCE",
+        bn_ops           => "BN_LLONG EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN",
+        ex_libs          => add(sub {
+            my @ex_libs = ();
+            push @ex_libs, 'ws2.lib' unless $disabled{sock};
+            push @ex_libs, 'crypt32.lib';
+            if (defined($ENV{WCECOMPAT})) {
+                my $x = '$(WCECOMPAT)/lib';
+                if (-f "$x/$ENV{TARGETCPU}/wcecompatex.lib") {
+                    $x .= '/$(TARGETCPU)/wcecompatex.lib';
+                } else {
+                    $x .= '/wcecompatex.lib';
+                }
+                push @ex_libs, $x;
+            }
+            push @ex_libs, '$(PORTSDK_LIBPATH)/portlib.lib'
+                if (defined($ENV{'PORTSDK_LIBPATH'}));
+            push @ex_libs, ' /nodefaultlib coredll.lib corelibc.lib'
+                if ($ENV{'TARGETCPU'} eq "X86");
+            return @ex_libs;
+        }),
+        build_scheme     => add("VC-WCE", { separator => undef }),
+    },
+
+#### MinGW
+    "mingw" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "BASE_unix", asm("x86_asm"),
+                              sub { $disabled{shared} ? () : "x86_uplink" } ],
+        cc               => "gcc",
+        cflags           => combine(picker(default => "-DL_ENDIAN -DWIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN -DUNICODE -D_UNICODE -m32 -Wall",
+                                           debug   => "-g -O0",
+                                           release => "-O3 -fomit-frame-pointer"),
+                                    threads("-D_MT")),
+        sys_id           => "MINGW32",
+        ex_libs          => add("-lws2_32 -lgdi32 -lcrypt32"),
+        bn_ops           => "BN_LLONG EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN",
+        thread_scheme    => "winthreads",
+        perlasm_scheme   => "coff",
+        dso_scheme       => "win32",
+        shared_target    => "mingw-shared",
+        shared_cflag     => add("-D_WINDLL"),
+        shared_ldflag    => "-static-libgcc",
+        shared_rcflag    => "--target=pe-i386",
+        shared_extension => ".dll",
+        multilib         => "",
+        apps_aux_src     => add("win32_init.c"),
+    },
+    "mingw64" => {
+        # As for OPENSSL_USE_APPLINK. Applink makes it possible to use
+        # .dll compiled with one compiler with application compiled with
+        # another compiler. It's possible to engage Applink support in
+        # mingw64 build, but it's not done, because till mingw64
+        # supports structured exception handling, one can't seriously
+        # consider its binaries for using with non-mingw64 run-time
+        # environment. And as mingw64 is always consistent with itself,
+        # Applink is never engaged and can as well be omitted.
+        inherit_from     => [ "BASE_unix", asm("x86_64_asm") ],
+        cc               => "gcc",
+        cflags           => combine(picker(default => "-DL_ENDIAN -DWIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN -DUNICODE -D_UNICODE -m64 -Wall",
+                                           debug   => "-g -O0",
+                                           release => "-O3"),
+                                    threads("-D_MT")),
+        sys_id           => "MINGW64",
+        ex_libs          => add("-lws2_32 -lgdi32 -lcrypt32"),
+        bn_ops           => "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN",
+        thread_scheme    => "winthreads",
+        perlasm_scheme   => "mingw64",
+        dso_scheme       => "win32",
+        shared_target    => "mingw-shared",
+        shared_cflag     => add("-D_WINDLL"),
+        shared_ldflag    => "-static-libgcc",
+        shared_rcflag    => "--target=pe-x86-64",
+        shared_extension => ".dll",
+        multilib         => "64",
+        apps_aux_src     => add("win32_init.c"),
+    },
+
+#### UEFI
+    "UEFI" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "BASE_unix" ],
+        cc               => "cc",
+        cflags           => "-DL_ENDIAN -O",
+        sys_id           => "UEFI",
+    },
+
+#### UWIN
+    "UWIN" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "BASE_unix" ],
+        cc               => "cc",
+        cflags           => "-DTERMIOS -DL_ENDIAN -O -Wall",
+        sys_id           => "UWIN",
+        bn_ops           => "BN_LLONG",
+        dso_scheme       => "win32",
+    },
+
+#### Cygwin
+    "Cygwin-x86" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "BASE_unix", asm("x86_asm") ],
+        cc               => "gcc",
+        cflags           => picker(default => "-DTERMIOS -DL_ENDIAN -Wall",
+                                   debug   => "-g -O0",
+                                   release => "-O3 -fomit-frame-pointer"),
+        sys_id           => "CYGWIN",
+        bn_ops           => "BN_LLONG",
+        thread_scheme    => "pthread",
+        perlasm_scheme   => "coff",
+        dso_scheme       => "dlfcn",
+        shared_target    => "cygwin-shared",
+        shared_cflag     => "-D_WINDLL",
+        shared_ldflag    => "-shared",
+        shared_extension => ".dll",
+    },
+    "Cygwin-x86_64" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "BASE_unix", asm("x86_64_asm") ],
+        cc               => "gcc",
+        cflags           => picker(default => "-DTERMIOS -DL_ENDIAN -Wall",
+                                   debug   => "-g -O0",
+                                   release => "-O3"),
+        sys_id           => "CYGWIN",
+        bn_ops           => "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG",
+        thread_scheme    => "pthread",
+        perlasm_scheme   => "mingw64",
+        dso_scheme       => "dlfcn",
+        shared_target    => "cygwin-shared",
+        shared_cflag     => "-D_WINDLL",
+        shared_ldflag    => "-shared",
+        shared_extension => ".dll",
+    },
+    # Backward compatibility for those using this target
+    "Cygwin" => {
+	inherit_from     => [ "Cygwin-x86" ]
+    },
+    # In case someone constructs the Cygwin target name themself
+    "Cygwin-i386" => {
+	inherit_from     => [ "Cygwin-x86" ]
+    },
+    "Cygwin-i486" => {
+	inherit_from     => [ "Cygwin-x86" ]
+    },
+    "Cygwin-i586" => {
+	inherit_from     => [ "Cygwin-x86" ]
+    },
+    "Cygwin-i686" => {
+	inherit_from     => [ "Cygwin-x86" ]
+    },
+
+##### MacOS X (a.k.a. Darwin) setup
+    "darwin-common" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "BASE_unix" ],
+        template         => 1,
+        cc               => "cc",
+        cflags           => combine(picker(default => "",
+                                           debug   => "-g -O0",
+                                           release => "-O3"),
+                                   threads("-D_REENTRANT")),
+        sys_id           => "MACOSX",
+        plib_lflags      => "-Wl,-search_paths_first",
+        bn_ops           => "BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR",
+        thread_scheme    => "pthreads",
+        perlasm_scheme   => "osx32",
+        dso_scheme       => "dlfcn",
+        ranlib           => "ranlib -c",
+        shared_target    => "darwin-shared",
+        shared_cflag     => "-fPIC",
+        shared_ldflag    => "-dynamiclib",
+        shared_extension => ".\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR).dylib",
+    },
+    # Option "freeze" such as -std=gnu9x can't negatively interfere
+    # with future defaults for below two targets, because MacOS X
+    # for PPC has no future, it was discontinued by vendor in 2009.
+    "darwin-ppc-cc" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "darwin-common", asm("ppc32_asm") ],
+        cflags           => add("-arch ppc -std=gnu9x -DB_ENDIAN -Wa,-force_cpusubtype_ALL"),
+        perlasm_scheme   => "osx32",
+        shared_cflag     => add("-fno-common"),
+        shared_ldflag    => "-arch ppc -dynamiclib",
+    },
+    "darwin64-ppc-cc" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "darwin-common", asm("ppc64_asm") ],
+        cflags           => add("-arch ppc64 -std=gnu9x -DB_ENDIAN"),
+        bn_ops           => "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR",
+        perlasm_scheme   => "osx64",
+        shared_ldflag    => "-arch ppc64 -dynamiclib",
+    },
+    "darwin-i386-cc" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "darwin-common", asm("x86_asm") ],
+        cflags           => add(picker(default => "-arch i386 -DL_ENDIAN",
+                                       release => "-fomit-frame-pointer")),
+        bn_ops           => "BN_LLONG RC4_INT",
+        perlasm_scheme   => "macosx",
+        shared_ldflag    => "-arch i386 -dynamiclib",
+    },
+    "darwin64-x86_64-cc" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "darwin-common", asm("x86_64_asm") ],
+        cflags           => add("-arch x86_64 -DL_ENDIAN -Wall"),
+        bn_ops           => "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG",
+        perlasm_scheme   => "macosx",
+        shared_ldflag    => "-arch x86_64 -dynamiclib",
+    },
+
+#### iPhoneOS/iOS
+#
+# It takes three prior-set environment variables to make it work:
+#
+# CROSS_COMPILE=/where/toolchain/is/usr/bin/ [note ending slash]
+# CROSS_TOP=/where/SDKs/are
+# CROSS_SDK=iPhoneOSx.y.sdk
+#
+# Exact paths vary with Xcode releases, but for couple of last ones
+# they would look like this:
+#
+# CROSS_COMPILE=`xcode-select --print-path`/Toolchains/XcodeDefault.xctoolchain/usr/bin/
+# CROSS_TOP=`xcode-select --print-path`/Platforms/iPhoneOS.platform/Developer
+# CROSS_SDK=iPhoneOS.sdk
+#
+    "iphoneos-cross" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "darwin-common" ],
+        cflags           => add("-isysroot \$(CROSS_TOP)/SDKs/\$(CROSS_SDK) -fno-common"),
+        sys_id           => "iOS",
+    },
+    "ios-cross" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "darwin-common", asm("armv4_asm") ],
+        # It should be possible to go below iOS 6 and even add -arch armv6,
+        # thus targeting iPhone pre-3GS, but it's assumed to be irrelevant
+        # at this point.
+        cflags           => add("-arch armv7 -mios-version-min=6.0.0 -isysroot \$(CROSS_TOP)/SDKs/\$(CROSS_SDK) -fno-common"),
+        sys_id           => "iOS",
+        perlasm_scheme   => "ios32",
+    },
+    "ios64-cross" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "darwin-common", asm("aarch64_asm") ],
+        cflags           => add("-arch arm64 -mios-version-min=7.0.0 -isysroot \$(CROSS_TOP)/SDKs/\$(CROSS_SDK) -fno-common"),
+        sys_id           => "iOS",
+        bn_ops           => "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR",
+        perlasm_scheme   => "ios64",
+    },
+
+##### GNU Hurd
+    "hurd-x86" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "BASE_unix" ],
+        inherit_from     => [ asm("x86_elf_asm") ],
+        cc               => "gcc",
+        cflags           => combine("-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall",
+                                    threads("-pthread")),
+        ex_libs          => add("-ldl", threads("-pthread")),
+        bn_ops           => "BN_LLONG",
+        thread_scheme    => "pthreads",
+        dso_scheme       => "dlfcn",
+        shared_target    => "linux-shared",
+        shared_cflag     => "-fPIC",
+        shared_extension => ".so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+    },
+
+##### VxWorks for various targets
+    "vxworks-ppc60x" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "BASE_unix" ],
+        cc               => "ccppc",
+        cflags           => "-D_REENTRANT -mrtp -mhard-float -mstrict-align -fno-implicit-fp -DPPC32_fp60x -O2 -fstrength-reduce -fno-builtin -fno-strict-aliasing -Wall -DCPU=PPC32 -DTOOL_FAMILY=gnu -DTOOL=gnu -I\$(WIND_BASE)/target/usr/h -I\$(WIND_BASE)/target/usr/h/wrn/coreip",
+        sys_id           => "VXWORKS",
+        ex_libs          => add("-Wl,--defsym,__wrs_rtp_base=0xe0000000 -L \$(WIND_BASE)/target/usr/lib/ppc/PPC32/common"),
+    },
+    "vxworks-ppcgen" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "BASE_unix" ],
+        cc               => "ccppc",
+        cflags           => "-D_REENTRANT -mrtp -msoft-float -mstrict-align -O1 -fno-builtin -fno-strict-aliasing -Wall -DCPU=PPC32 -DTOOL_FAMILY=gnu -DTOOL=gnu -I\$(WIND_BASE)/target/usr/h -I\$(WIND_BASE)/target/usr/h/wrn/coreip",
+        sys_id           => "VXWORKS",
+        ex_libs          => add("-Wl,--defsym,__wrs_rtp_base=0xe0000000 -L \$(WIND_BASE)/target/usr/lib/ppc/PPC32/sfcommon"),
+    },
+    "vxworks-ppc405" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "BASE_unix" ],
+        cc               => "ccppc",
+        cflags           => "-g -msoft-float -mlongcall -DCPU=PPC405 -I\$(WIND_BASE)/target/h",
+        sys_id           => "VXWORKS",
+        lflags           => "-r",
+    },
+    "vxworks-ppc750" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "BASE_unix" ],
+        cc               => "ccppc",
+        cflags           => "-ansi -nostdinc -DPPC750 -D_REENTRANT -fvolatile -fno-builtin -fno-for-scope -fsigned-char -Wall -msoft-float -mlongcall -DCPU=PPC604 -I\$(WIND_BASE)/target/h \$(DEBUG_FLAG)",
+        sys_id           => "VXWORKS",
+        lflags           => "-r",
+    },
+    "vxworks-ppc750-debug" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "BASE_unix" ],
+        cc               => "ccppc",
+        cflags           => "-ansi -nostdinc -DPPC750 -D_REENTRANT -fvolatile -fno-builtin -fno-for-scope -fsigned-char -Wall -msoft-float -mlongcall -DCPU=PPC604 -I\$(WIND_BASE)/target/h -DPEDANTIC -DDEBUG -g",
+        sys_id           => "VXWORKS",
+        lflags           => "-r",
+    },
+    "vxworks-ppc860" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "BASE_unix" ],
+        cc               => "ccppc",
+        cflags           => "-nostdinc -msoft-float -DCPU=PPC860 -DNO_STRINGS_H -I\$(WIND_BASE)/target/h",
+        sys_id           => "VXWORKS",
+        lflags           => "-r",
+    },
+    "vxworks-simlinux" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "BASE_unix" ],
+        cc               => "ccpentium",
+        cflags           => "-B\$(WIND_BASE)/host/\$(WIND_HOST_TYPE)/lib/gcc-lib/ -D_VSB_CONFIG_FILE=\"\$(WIND_BASE)/target/lib/h/config/vsbConfig.h\" -DL_ENDIAN -DCPU=SIMLINUX -DTOOL_FAMILY=gnu -DTOOL=gnu -fno-builtin -fno-defer-pop -DNO_STRINGS_H -I\$(WIND_BASE)/target/h -I\$(WIND_BASE)/target/h/wrn/coreip -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PADLOCK",
+        sys_id           => "VXWORKS",
+        lflags           => "-r",
+        ranlib           => "ranlibpentium",
+    },
+    "vxworks-mips" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "BASE_unix", asm("mips32_asm") ],
+        cc               => "ccmips",
+        cflags           => combine("-mrtp -mips2 -O -G 0 -B\$(WIND_BASE)/host/\$(WIND_HOST_TYPE)/lib/gcc-lib/ -D_VSB_CONFIG_FILE=\"\$(WIND_BASE)/target/lib/h/config/vsbConfig.h\" -DCPU=MIPS32 -msoft-float -mno-branch-likely -DTOOL_FAMILY=gnu -DTOOL=gnu -fno-builtin -fno-defer-pop -DNO_STRINGS_H -I\$(WIND_BASE)/target/usr/h -I\$(WIND_BASE)/target/h/wrn/coreip",
+                                    threads("-D_REENTRANT")),
+        sys_id           => "VXWORKS",
+        ex_libs          => add("-Wl,--defsym,__wrs_rtp_base=0xe0000000 -L \$(WIND_BASE)/target/usr/lib/mips/MIPSI32/sfcommon"),
+        thread_scheme    => "pthreads",
+        perlasm_scheme   => "o32",
+        ranlib           => "ranlibmips",
+    },
+
+#### uClinux
+    "uClinux-dist" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "BASE_unix" ],
+        cc               => "$ENV{'CC'}",
+        cflags           => combine(threads("-D_REENTRANT")),
+        ex_libs          => add("\$(LDLIBS)"),
+        bn_ops           => "BN_LLONG",
+        thread_scheme    => "pthreads",
+        dso_scheme       => "$ENV{'LIBSSL_dlfcn'}",
+        shared_target    => "linux-shared",
+        shared_cflag     => "-fPIC",
+        shared_ldflag    => "-shared",
+        shared_extension => ".so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+        ranlib           => "$ENV{'RANLIB'}",
+    },
+    "uClinux-dist64" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "BASE_unix" ],
+        cc               => "$ENV{'CC'}",
+        cflags           => combine(threads("-D_REENTRANT")),
+        ex_libs          => add("\$(LDLIBS)"),
+        bn_ops           => "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG",
+        thread_scheme    => "pthreads",
+        dso_scheme       => "$ENV{'LIBSSL_dlfcn'}",
+        shared_target    => "linux-shared",
+        shared_cflag     => "-fPIC",
+        shared_ldflag    => "-shared",
+        shared_extension => ".so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+        ranlib           => "$ENV{'RANLIB'}",
+    },
+
+    ##### VMS
+    "vms-generic" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "BASE_VMS" ],
+        template         => 1,
+        cc               => "CC/DECC",
+        cflags           => picker(default => "/STANDARD=(ISOC94,RELAXED)/NOLIST/PREFIX=ALL",
+                                   debug   => "/NOOPTIMIZE/DEBUG",
+                                   release => "/OPTIMIZE/NODEBUG"),
+        defines          => add("OPENSSL_USE_NODELETE"),
+        lflags           => picker(default => "/MAP",
+                                   debug   => "/DEBUG/TRACEBACK",
+                                   release => "/NODEBUG/NOTRACEBACK"),
+        lib_cflags       => add("/NAMES=(AS_IS,SHORTENED)/EXTERN_MODEL=STRICT_REFDEF"),
+        dso_cflags       => add("/NAMES=(AS_IS,SHORTENED)"),
+        shared_target    => "vms-shared",
+        dso_scheme       => "vms",
+        thread_scheme    => "pthreads",
+
+        apps_aux_src     => "vms_decc_init.c vms_term_sock.c",
+    },
+
+    "vms-alpha" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "vms-generic" ],
+        cflags           => add(sub { my @warnings =
+                                          @{vms_info(0)->{disable_warns}};
+                                      @warnings
+                                          ? "/WARNINGS=DISABLE=(".join(",",@warnings).")" : (); }),
+        defines          =>
+                    add(sub {
+                            return vms_info(0)->{def_zlib}
+                                ? "LIBZ=\"\"\"".vms_info(0)->{def_zlib}."\"\"\"" : ();
+                            }),
+        ex_libs          => add(sub { return vms_info(0)->{zlib} || (); }),
+        pointer_size     => sub { return vms_info(0)->{pointer_size} },
+        #as               => "???",
+        #debug_aflags     => "/NOOPTIMIZE/DEBUG",
+        #release_aflags   => "/OPTIMIZE/NODEBUG",
+        bn_opts          => "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT RC4_INT",
+    },
+    "vms-alpha-p32" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "vms-generic" ],
+        cflags           =>
+            add("/POINTER_SIZE=32",
+                sub { my @warnings =
+                          @{vms_info(32)->{disable_warns}};
+                      @warnings
+                          ? "/WARNINGS=DISABLE=(".join(",",@warnings).")" : ();
+                } ),
+        defines          =>
+                    add(sub {
+                            return vms_info(32)->{def_zlib}
+                                ? "LIBZ=\"\"\"".vms_info(32)->{def_zlib}."\"\"\"" : ();
+                            }),
+        ex_libs          => add(sub { return vms_info(32)->{zlib} || (); }),
+        pointer_size     => sub { return vms_info(32)->{pointer_size} },
+    },
+    "vms-alpha-p64" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "vms-generic" ],
+        cflags           =>
+            add("/POINTER_SIZE=64=ARGV",
+                sub { my @warnings =
+                          @{vms_info(64)->{disable_warns}};
+                      @warnings
+                          ? "/WARNINGS=DISABLE=(".join(",",@warnings).")" : ();
+                } ),
+        defines          =>
+                    add(sub {
+                            return vms_info(64)->{def_zlib}
+                                ? "LIBZ=\"\"\"".vms_info(64)->{def_zlib}."\"\"\"" : ();
+                            }),
+        ex_libs          => add(sub { return vms_info(64)->{zlib} || (); }),
+        pointer_size     => sub { return vms_info(64)->{pointer_size} },
+    },
+    "vms-ia64" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "vms-generic" ],
+        cflags           => add(sub { my @warnings =
+                                          @{vms_info(0)->{disable_warns}};
+                                      @warnings
+                                          ? "/WARNINGS=DISABLE=(".join(",",@warnings).")" : (); }),
+        defines          =>
+                    add(sub {
+                            return vms_info(0)->{def_zlib}
+                                ? "LIBZ=\"\"\"".vms_info(0)->{def_zlib}."\"\"\"" : ();
+                            }),
+        ex_libs          => add(sub { return vms_info(0)->{zlib} || (); }),
+        pointer_size     => sub { return vms_info(0)->{pointer_size} },
+        #as               => "I4S",
+        #debug_aflags     => "/NOOPTIMIZE/DEBUG",
+        #release_aflags   => "/OPTIMIZE/NODEBUG",
+        bn_opts          => "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT RC4_INT",
+    },
+    "vms-ia64-p32" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "vms-generic" ],
+        cflags           =>
+            add("/POINTER_SIZE=32",
+                sub { my @warnings =
+                          @{vms_info(32)->{disable_warns}};
+                      @warnings
+                          ? "/WARNINGS=DISABLE=(".join(",",@warnings).")" : ();
+                } ),
+        defines          =>
+                    add(sub {
+                            return vms_info(32)->{def_zlib}
+                                ? "LIBZ=\"\"\"".vms_info(32)->{def_zlib}."\"\"\"" : ();
+                            }),
+        ex_libs          => add(sub { return vms_info(32)->{zlib} || (); }),
+        pointer_size     => sub { return vms_info(32)->{pointer_size} },
+    },
+    "vms-ia64-p64" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "vms-generic" ],
+        cflags           =>
+            add("/POINTER_SIZE=64=ARGV",
+                sub { my @warnings =
+                          @{vms_info(64)->{disable_warns}};
+                      @warnings
+                          ? "/WARNINGS=DISABLE=(".join(",",@warnings).")" : ();
+                } ),
+        defines          =>
+                    add(sub {
+                            return vms_info(64)->{def_zlib}
+                                ? "LIBZ=\"\"\"".vms_info(64)->{def_zlib}."\"\"\"" : ();
+                            }),
+        ex_libs          => add(sub { return vms_info(64)->{zlib} || (); }),
+        pointer_size     => sub { return vms_info(64)->{pointer_size} },
+    },
+
+);
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/Configurations/50-djgpp.conf b/openssl-1.1.0h/Configurations/50-djgpp.conf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f532bd1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/Configurations/50-djgpp.conf
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+# We can't make any commitment to support the DJGPP platform,
+# and rely entirely on the OpenSSL community to help is fine
+# tune and test.
+
+%targets = (
+    "DJGPP" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ asm("x86_asm") ],
+        cc               => "gcc",
+        cflags           => "-I/dev/env/WATT_ROOT/inc -DTERMIOS -DL_ENDIAN -fomit-frame-pointer -O2 -Wall",
+        sys_id           => "MSDOS",
+        ex_libs          => add("-L/dev/env/WATT_ROOT/lib -lwatt"),
+        bn_ops           => "BN_LLONG",
+        perlasm_scheme   => "a.out",
+    },
+);
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/Configurations/50-haiku.conf b/openssl-1.1.0h/Configurations/50-haiku.conf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f114666
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/Configurations/50-haiku.conf
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+%targets = (
+    "haiku-common" => {
+        template         => 1,
+        cc               => "cc",
+        cflags           => add_before(picker(default => "-DL_ENDIAN -Wall -include \$(SRCDIR)/os-dep/haiku.h",
+                                              debug   => "-g -O0",
+                                              release => "-O2"),
+                                       threads("-D_REENTRANT")),
+        sys_id           => "HAIKU",
+        ex_libs          => "-lnetwork",
+        perlasm_scheme   => "elf",
+        thread_scheme    => "pthreads",
+        dso_scheme       => "dlfcn",
+        shared_target    => "gnu-shared",
+        shared_cflag     => "-fPIC",
+        shared_ldflag    => "-shared",
+        shared_extension => ".so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+    },
+    "haiku-x86" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "haiku-common", asm("x86_elf_asm") ],
+        cflags           => add(picker(release => "-fomit-frame-pointer")),
+        bn_ops           => "BN_LLONG",
+    },
+    "haiku-x86_64" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "haiku-common" ],
+        cflags           => add("-m64"),
+        bn_ops           => "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG",
+    },
+);
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/Configurations/50-masm.conf b/openssl-1.1.0h/Configurations/50-masm.conf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..60a5507
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/Configurations/50-masm.conf
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+# We can't make commitment to supporting Microsoft assembler,
+# because it would mean supporting all masm versions. This in
+# in turn is because masm is not really an interchangeable option,
+# while users tend to have reasons to stick with specific Visual
+# Studio versions. It's usually lesser hassle to make it work
+# with latest assembler, but tweaking for older versions had
+# proven to be daunting task. This is experimental target, for
+# production builds stick with [up-to-date version of] nasm.
+
+%targets = (
+    "VC-WIN64A-masm" => {
+        inherit_from    => [ "VC-WIN64A" ],
+        as              => "ml64",
+        asflags         => "/c /Cp /Cx /Zi",
+        asoutflag       => "/Fo",
+    },
+);
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/Configurations/90-team.conf b/openssl-1.1.0h/Configurations/90-team.conf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0a83c22
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/Configurations/90-team.conf
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+## -*- mode: perl; -*-
+## Build configuration targets for openssl-team members
+
+%targets = (
+    "purify" => {
+        cc               => "purify gcc",
+        cflags           => "-g -Wall",
+        thread_scheme    => "(unknown)",
+        ex_libs          => add(" ","-lsocket -lnsl"),
+    },
+    "debug" => {
+        cc               => "gcc",
+        cflags           => "-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_DEBUG -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -ggdb -g2 -Wformat -Wshadow -Wmissing-prototypes -Wmissing-declarations -Werror",
+        thread_scheme    => "(unknown)",
+    },
+    "debug-erbridge" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "x86_64_asm" ],
+        cc               => "gcc",
+        cflags           => combine("$gcc_devteam_warn -DBN_DEBUG -DCONF_DEBUG -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -g",
+                                    threads("-D_REENTRANT")),
+        ex_libs          => add(" ","-ldl"),
+        bn_ops           => "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG",
+        thread_scheme    => "pthreads",
+        perlasm_scheme   => "elf",
+        dso_scheme       => "dlfcn",
+        shared_target    => "linux-shared",
+        shared_cflag     => "-fPIC",
+        shared_ldflag    => "-m64",
+        shared_extension => ".so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+        multilib         => "64",
+    },
+    "debug-linux-pentium" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "x86_elf_asm" ],
+        cc               => "gcc",
+        cflags           => combine("-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_DEBUG -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -g -mcpu=pentium -Wall",
+                                    threads("-D_REENTRANT")),
+        ex_libs          => add(" ","-ldl"),
+        bn_ops           => "BN_LLONG",
+        thread_scheme    => "pthreads",
+        dso_scheme       => "dlfcn",
+    },
+    "debug-linux-ppro" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "x86_elf_asm" ],
+        cc               => "gcc",
+        cflags           => combine("-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_DEBUG -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -g -mcpu=pentiumpro -Wall",
+                                    threads("-D_REENTRANT")),
+        ex_libs          => add(" ","-ldl"),
+        bn_ops           => "BN_LLONG",
+        thread_scheme    => "pthreads",
+        dso_scheme       => "dlfcn",
+    },
+    "debug-linux-ia32-aes" => {
+        cc               => "gcc",
+        cflags           => combine("-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall",
+                                    threads("-D_REENTRANT")),
+        ex_libs          => add(" ","-ldl"),
+        bn_ops           => "BN_LLONG",
+        cpuid_asm_src    => "x86cpuid.s",
+        bn_asm_src       => "bn-586.s co-586.s x86-mont.s",
+        des_asm_src      => "des-586.s crypt586.s",
+        aes_asm_src      => "aes_x86core.s aes_cbc.s aesni-x86.s",
+        bf_asm_src       => "bf-586.s",
+        md5_asm_src      => "md5-586.s",
+        sha1_asm_src     => "sha1-586.s sha256-586.s sha512-586.s",
+        cast_asm_src     => "cast-586.s",
+        rc4_asm_src      => "rc4-586.s",
+        rmd160_asm_src   => "rmd-586.s",
+        rc5_asm_src      => "rc5-586.s",
+        wp_asm_src       => "wp_block.s wp-mmx.s",
+        modes_asm_src    => "ghash-x86.s",
+        padlock_asm_src  => "e_padlock-x86.s",
+        thread_scheme    => "pthreads",
+        perlasm_scheme   => "elf",
+        dso_scheme       => "dlfcn",
+        shared_target    => "linux-shared",
+        shared_cflag     => "-fPIC",
+        shared_extension => ".so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+    },
+    "dist" => {
+        cc               => "cc",
+        cflags           => "-O",
+        thread_scheme    => "(unknown)",
+    },
+    "debug-test-64-clang" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "x86_64_asm" ],
+        cc               => "clang",
+        cflags           => combine("$gcc_devteam_warn -Wno-error=overlength-strings -Wno-error=extended-offsetof -Wno-error=language-extension-token -Wno-error=unused-const-variable -Wstrict-overflow -Qunused-arguments -DBN_DEBUG -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DDEBUG_UNUSED -g3 -O3 -pipe",
+                                    threads("${BSDthreads}")),
+        bn_ops           => "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG",
+        thread_scheme    => "pthreads",
+        perlasm_scheme   => "elf",
+        dso_scheme       => "dlfcn",
+        shared_target    => "bsd-gcc-shared",
+        shared_cflag     => "-fPIC",
+        shared_extension => ".so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+    },
+    "darwin64-debug-test-64-clang" => {
+        inherit_from     => [ "x86_64_asm" ],
+        cc               => "clang",
+        cflags           => combine("-arch x86_64 -DL_ENDIAN $gcc_devteam_warn -Wno-error=overlength-strings -Wno-error=extended-offsetof -Wno-error=language-extension-token -Wno-error=unused-const-variable -Wstrict-overflow -Qunused-arguments -DBN_DEBUG -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DDEBUG_UNUSED -g3 -O3 -pipe",
+                                    threads("${BSDthreads}")),
+        sys_id           => "MACOSX",
+        bn_ops           => "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG",
+        thread_scheme    => "pthreads",
+        perlasm_scheme   => "macosx",
+        dso_scheme       => "dlfcn",
+        shared_target    => "darwin-shared",
+        shared_cflag     => "-fPIC -fno-common",
+        shared_ldflag    => "-arch x86_64 -dynamiclib",
+        shared_extension => ".\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR).dylib",
+    },
+);
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/Configurations/INTERNALS.Configure b/openssl-1.1.0h/Configurations/INTERNALS.Configure
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b28305d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/Configurations/INTERNALS.Configure
@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
+Configure Internals
+===================
+
+[ note: this file uses markdown for formatting ]
+
+Intro
+-----
+
+This is a collection of notes that are hopefully of interest to those
+who decide to dive into Configure and what it does.  This is a living
+document and anyone is encouraged to add to it and submit changes.
+There's no claim for this document to be complete at any time, but it
+will hopefully reach such a point in time.
+
+
+----------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+Parsing build.info files, processing conditions
+-----------------------------------------------
+
+Processing conditions in build.info files is done with the help of a
+condition stack that tell if a build.info should be processed or if it
+should just be skipped over.  The possible states of the stack top are
+expressed in the following comment from Configure:
+
+    # The top item of this stack has the following values
+    # -2 positive already run and we found ELSE (following ELSIF should fail)
+    # -1 positive already run (skip until ENDIF)
+    # 0 negatives so far (if we're at a condition, check it)
+    # 1 last was positive (don't skip lines until next ELSE, ELSIF or ENDIF)
+    # 2 positive ELSE (following ELSIF should fail)
+
+Ground rule is that non-condition lines are skipped over if the
+stack top is > 0.  Condition lines (IF, ELSIF, ELSE and ENDIF
+statements) need to be processed either way to keep track of the skip
+stack states, so they are a little more intricate.
+
+Instead of trying to describe in words, here are some example of what
+the skip stack should look like after each line is processed:
+
+Example 1:
+
+| IF[1]                     |  1        |                               |
+|   ... whatever ...        |           | this line is processed        |
+|   IF[1]                   |  1  1     |                               |
+|     ... whatever ...      |           | this line is processed        |
+|   ELSIF[1]                |  1 -1     |                               |
+|     ... whatever ...      |           | this line is skipped over     |
+|   ELSE                    |  1 -2     |                               |
+|     ... whatever ...      |           | this line is skipped over     |
+|   ENDIF                   |  1        |                               |
+|   ... whatever ...        |           | this line is processed        |
+| ELSIF[1]                  | -1        |                               |
+|   ... whatever ...        |           | this line is skipped over     |
+|   IF[1]                   | -1 -1     |                               |
+|     ... whatever ...      |           | this line is skipped over     |
+|   ELSIF[1]                | -1 -1     |                               |
+|     ... whatever ...      |           | this line is skipped over     |
+|   ELSE                    | -1 -2     |                               |
+|     ... whatever ...      |           | this line is skipped over     |
+|   ENDIF                   | -1        |                               |
+|   ... whatever ...        |           | this line is skipped over     |
+| ENDIF                     |           |                               |
+
+Example 2:
+
+| IF[0]                     |  0        |                               |
+|   ... whatever ...        |           | this line is skipped over     |
+|   IF[1]                   |  0 -1     |                               |
+|     ... whatever ...      |           | this line is skipped over     |
+|   ELSIF[1]                |  0 -1     |                               |
+|     ... whatever ...      |           | this line is skipped over     |
+|   ELSE                    |  0 -2     |                               |
+|     ... whatever ...      |           | this line is skipped over     |
+|   ENDIF                   |  0        |                               |
+|   ... whatever ...        |           | this line is skipped over     |
+| ELSIF[1]                  |  1        |                               |
+|   ... whatever ...        |           | this line is processed        |
+|   IF[1]                   |  1  1     |                               |
+|     ... whatever ...      |           | this line is processed        |
+|   ELSIF[1]                |  1 -1     |                               |
+|     ... whatever ...      |           | this line is skipped over     |
+|   ELSE                    |  1 -2     |                               |
+|     ... whatever ...      |           | this line is skipped over     |
+|   ENDIF                   |  1        |                               |
+|   ... whatever ...        |           | this line is processed        |
+| ENDIF                     |           |                               |
+
+Example 3:
+
+| IF[0]                     |  0        |                               |
+|   ... whatever ...        |           | this line is skipped over     |
+|   IF[0]                   |  0 -1     |                               |
+|     ... whatever ...      |           | this line is skipped over     |
+|   ELSIF[1]                |  0 -1     |                               |
+|     ... whatever ...      |           | this line is skipped over     |
+|   ELSE                    |  0 -2     |                               |
+|     ... whatever ...      |           | this line is skipped over     |
+|   ENDIF                   |  0        |                               |
+|   ... whatever ...        |           | this line is skipped over     |
+| ELSIF[1]                  |  1        |                               |
+|   ... whatever ...        |           | this line is processed        |
+|   IF[0]                   |  1  0     |                               |
+|     ... whatever ...      |           | this line is skipped over     |
+|   ELSIF[1]                |  1  1     |                               |
+|     ... whatever ...      |           | this line is processed        |
+|   ELSE                    |  1 -2     |                               |
+|     ... whatever ...      |           | this line is skipped over     |
+|   ENDIF                   |  1        |                               |
+|   ... whatever ...        |           | this line is processed        |
+| ENDIF                     |           |                               |
+
+Example 4:
+
+| IF[0]                     |  0        |                               |
+|   ... whatever ...        |           | this line is skipped over     |
+|   IF[0]                   |  0 -1     |                               |
+|     ... whatever ...      |           | this line is skipped over     |
+|   ELSIF[0]                |  0 -1     |                               |
+|     ... whatever ...      |           | this line is skipped over     |
+|   ELSE                    |  0 -2     |                               |
+|     ... whatever ...      |           | this line is skipped over     |
+|   ENDIF                   |  0        |                               |
+|   ... whatever ...        |           | this line is skipped over     |
+| ELSIF[1]                  |  1        |                               |
+|   ... whatever ...        |           | this line is processed        |
+|   IF[0]                   |  1  0     |                               |
+|     ... whatever ...      |           | this line is skipped over     |
+|   ELSIF[0]                |  1  0     |                               |
+|     ... whatever ...      |           | this line is skipped over     |
+|   ELSE                    |  1  2     |                               |
+|     ... whatever ...      |           | this line is processed        |
+|   ENDIF                   |  1        |                               |
+|   ... whatever ...        |           | this line is processed        |
+| ENDIF                     |           |                               |
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/Configurations/README b/openssl-1.1.0h/Configurations/README
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6e13645
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/Configurations/README
@@ -0,0 +1,721 @@
+Intro
+=====
+
+This directory contains a few sets of files that are used for
+configuration in diverse ways:
+
+    *.conf      Target platform configurations, please read
+                'Configurations of OpenSSL target platforms' for more
+                information.
+    *.tmpl      Build file templates, please read 'Build-file
+                programming with the "unified" build system' as well
+                as 'Build info files' for more information.
+    *.pm        Helper scripts / modules for the main `Configure`
+                script.  See 'Configure helper scripts for more
+                information.
+
+
+Configurations of OpenSSL target platforms
+==========================================
+
+Configuration targets are a collection of facts that we know about
+different platforms and their capabilities.  We organise them in a
+hash table, where each entry represent a specific target.
+
+Note that configuration target names must be unique across all config
+files.  The Configure script does check that a config file doesn't
+have config targets that shadow config targets from other files.
+
+In each table entry, the following keys are significant:
+
+        inherit_from    => Other targets to inherit values from.
+                           Explained further below. [1]
+        template        => Set to 1 if this isn't really a platform
+                           target.  Instead, this target is a template
+                           upon which other targets can be built.
+                           Explained further below.  [1]
+
+        sys_id          => System identity for systems where that
+                           is difficult to determine automatically.
+
+        cc              => The compiler command, usually one of "cc",
+                           "gcc" or "clang".  This command is normally
+                           also used to link object files and
+                           libraries into the final program.
+        cflags          => Flags that are used at all times when
+                           compiling.
+        defines         => As an alternative, macro definitions may be
+                           present here instead of in `cflags'.  If
+                           given here, they MUST be as an array of the
+                           string such as "MACRO=value", or just
+                           "MACRO" for definitions without value.
+        shared_cflag    => Extra compilation flags used when
+                           compiling for shared libraries, typically
+                           something like "-fPIC".
+
+        (linking is a complex thing, see [3] below)
+        ld              => Linker command, usually not defined
+                           (meaning the compiler command is used
+                           instead).
+                           (NOTE: this is here for future use, it's
+                           not implemented yet)
+        lflags          => Flags that are used when linking apps.
+        shared_ldflag   => Flags that are used when linking shared
+                           or dynamic libraries.
+        plib_lflags     => Extra linking flags to appear just before
+                           the libraries on the command line.
+        ex_libs         => Extra libraries that are needed when
+                           linking.
+
+        ar              => The library archive command, the default is
+                           "ar".
+                           (NOTE: this is here for future use, it's
+                           not implemented yet)
+        arflags         => Flags to be used with the library archive
+                           command.
+
+        ranlib          => The library archive indexing command, the
+                           default is 'ranlib' it it exists.
+
+        unistd          => An alternative header to the typical
+                           '<unistd.h>'.  This is very rarely needed.
+
+        shared_extension => File name extension used for shared
+                            libraries. 
+        obj_extension   => File name extension used for object files.
+                           On unix, this defaults to ".o" (NOTE: this
+                           is here for future use, it's not
+                           implemented yet)
+        exe_extension   => File name extension used for executable
+                           files.  On unix, this defaults to "" (NOTE:
+                           this is here for future use, it's not
+                           implemented yet)
+        shlib_variant   => A "variant" identifier inserted between the base
+                           shared library name and the extension.  On "unixy"
+                           platforms (BSD, Linux, Solaris, MacOS/X, ...) this
+                           supports installation of custom OpenSSL libraries
+                           that don't conflict with other builds of OpenSSL
+                           installed on the system.  The variant identifier
+                           becomes part of the SONAME of the library and also
+                           any symbol versions (symbol versions are not used or
+                           needed with MacOS/X).  For example, on a system
+                           where a default build would normally create the SSL
+                           shared library as 'libssl.so -> libssl.so.1.1' with
+                           the value of the symlink as the SONAME, a target
+                           definition that sets 'shlib_variant => "-abc"' will
+                           create 'libssl.so -> libssl-abc.so.1.1', again with
+                           an SONAME equal to the value of the symlink.  The
+                           symbol versions associated with the variant library
+                           would then be 'OPENSSL_ABC_<version>' rather than
+                           the default 'OPENSSL_<version>'. The string inserted
+                           into symbol versions is obtained by mapping all
+                           letters in the "variant" identifier to upper case
+                           and all non-alphanumeric characters to '_'.
+
+        thread_scheme   => The type of threads is used on the
+                           configured platform.  Currently known
+                           values are "(unknown)", "pthreads",
+                           "uithreads" (a.k.a solaris threads) and
+                           "winthreads".  Except for "(unknown)", the
+                           actual value is currently ignored but may
+                           be used in the future.  See further notes
+                           below [2].
+        dso_scheme      => The type of dynamic shared objects to build
+                           for.  This mostly comes into play with
+                           engines, but can be used for other purposes
+                           as well.  Valid values are "DLFCN"
+                           (dlopen() et al), "DLFCN_NO_H" (for systems
+                           that use dlopen() et al but do not have
+                           fcntl.h), "DL" (shl_load() et al), "WIN32"
+                           and "VMS".
+        perlasm_scheme  => The perlasm method used to created the
+                           assembler files used when compiling with
+                           assembler implementations.
+        shared_target   => The shared library building method used.
+                           This is a target found in Makefile.shared.
+        build_scheme    => The scheme used to build up a Makefile.
+                           In its simplest form, the value is a string
+                           with the name of the build scheme.
+                           The value may also take the form of a list
+                           of strings, if the build_scheme is to have
+                           some options.  In this case, the first
+                           string in the list is the name of the build
+                           scheme.
+                           Currently recognised build scheme is "unified".
+                           For the "unified" build scheme, this item
+                           *must* be an array with the first being the
+                           word "unified" and the second being a word
+                           to identify the platform family.
+
+        multilib        => On systems that support having multiple
+                           implementations of a library (typically a
+                           32-bit and a 64-bit variant), this is used
+                           to have the different variants in different
+                           directories.
+
+        bn_ops          => Building options (was just bignum options in
+                           the earlier history of this option, hence the
+                           name). This is a string of words that describe
+                           algorithms' implementation parameters that
+                           are optimal for the designated target platform,
+                           such as the type of integers used to build up
+                           the bignum, different ways to implement certain
+                           ciphers and so on. To fully comprehend the
+                           meaning, the best is to read the affected
+                           source.
+                           The valid words are:
+
+                           THIRTY_TWO_BIT       bignum limbs are 32 bits,
+                                                this is default if no
+                                                option is specified, it
+                                                works on any supported
+                                                system [unless "wider"
+                                                limb size is implied in
+                                                assembly code];
+                           BN_LLONG             bignum limbs are 32 bits,
+                                                but 64-bit 'unsigned long
+                                                long' is used internally
+                                                in calculations;
+                           SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG  bignum limbs are 64 bits
+                                                and sizeof(long) is 8;
+                           SIXTY_FOUR_BIT       bignums limbs are 64 bits,
+                                                but execution environment
+                                                is ILP32;
+                           RC4_CHAR             RC4 key schedule is made
+                                                up of 'unsigned char's;
+                           RC4_INT              RC4 key schedule is made
+                                                up of 'unsigned int's;
+                           EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN     for shared libraries,
+                                                export vars as
+                                                accessor functions.
+
+        apps_extra_src  => Extra source to build apps/openssl, as
+                           needed by the target.
+        cpuid_asm_src   => assembler implementation of cpuid code as
+                           well as OPENSSL_cleanse().
+                           Default to mem_clr.c
+        bn_asm_src      => Assembler implementation of core bignum
+                           functions.
+                           Defaults to bn_asm.c
+        ec_asm_src      => Assembler implementation of core EC
+                           functions.
+        des_asm_src     => Assembler implementation of core DES
+                           encryption functions.
+                           Defaults to 'des_enc.c fcrypt_b.c'
+        aes_asm_src     => Assembler implementation of core AES
+                           functions.
+                           Defaults to 'aes_core.c aes_cbc.c'
+        bf_asm_src      => Assembler implementation of core BlowFish
+                           functions.
+                           Defaults to 'bf_enc.c'
+        md5_asm_src     => Assembler implementation of core MD5
+                           functions.
+        sha1_asm_src    => Assembler implementation of core SHA1,
+                           functions, and also possibly SHA256 and
+                           SHA512 ones.
+        cast_asm_src    => Assembler implementation of core CAST
+                           functions.
+                           Defaults to 'c_enc.c'
+        rc4_asm_src     => Assembler implementation of core RC4
+                           functions.
+                           Defaults to 'rc4_enc.c rc4_skey.c'
+        rmd160_asm_src  => Assembler implementation of core RMD160
+                           functions.
+        rc5_asm_src     => Assembler implementation of core RC5
+                           functions.
+                           Defaults to 'rc5_enc.c'
+        wp_asm_src      => Assembler implementation of core WHIRLPOOL
+                           functions.
+        cmll_asm_src    => Assembler implementation of core CAMELLIA
+                           functions.
+                           Defaults to 'camellia.c cmll_misc.c cmll_cbc.c'
+        modes_asm_src   => Assembler implementation of cipher modes,
+                           currently the functions gcm_gmult_4bit and
+                           gcm_ghash_4bit.
+        padlock_asm_src => Assembler implementation of core parts of
+                           the padlock engine.  This is mandatory on
+                           any platform where the padlock engine might
+                           actually be built.
+
+
+[1] as part of the target configuration, one can have a key called
+    'inherit_from' that indicate what other configurations to inherit
+    data from.  These are resolved recursively.
+
+    Inheritance works as a set of default values that can be overridden
+    by corresponding key values in the inheriting configuration.
+
+    Note 1: any configuration table can be used as a template.
+    Note 2: pure templates have the attribute 'template => 1' and
+            cannot be used as build targets.
+
+    If several configurations are given in the 'inherit_from' array,
+    the values of same attribute are concatenated with space
+    separation.  With this, it's possible to have several smaller
+    templates for different configuration aspects that can be combined
+    into a complete configuration.
+
+    instead of a scalar value or an array, a value can be a code block
+    of the form 'sub { /* your code here */ }'.  This code block will
+    be called with the list of inherited values for that key as
+    arguments.  In fact, the concatenation of strings is really done
+    by using 'sub { join(" ",@_) }' on the list of inherited values.
+
+    An example:
+
+        "foo" => {
+                template => 1,
+                haha => "ha ha",
+                hoho => "ho",
+                ignored => "This should not appear in the end result",
+        },
+        "bar" => {
+                template => 1,
+                haha => "ah",
+                hoho => "haho",
+                hehe => "hehe"
+        },
+        "laughter" => {
+                inherit_from => [ "foo", "bar" ],
+                hehe => sub { join(" ",(@_,"!!!")) },
+                ignored => "",
+        }
+
+        The entry for "laughter" will become as follows after processing:
+
+        "laughter" => {
+                haha => "ha ha ah",
+                hoho => "ho haho",
+                hehe => "hehe !!!",
+                ignored => ""
+        }
+
+[2] OpenSSL is built with threading capabilities unless the user
+    specifies 'no-threads'.  The value of the key 'thread_scheme' may
+    be "(unknown)", in which case the user MUST give some compilation
+    flags to Configure.
+
+[3] OpenSSL has three types of things to link from object files or
+    static libraries:
+
+    - shared libraries; that would be libcrypto and libssl.
+    - shared objects (sometimes called dynamic libraries);  that would
+      be the engines.
+    - applications; those are apps/openssl and all the test apps.
+
+    Very roughly speaking, linking is done like this (words in braces
+    represent the configuration settings documented at the beginning
+    of this file):
+
+    shared libraries:
+        {ld} $(CFLAGS) {shared_ldflag} -shared -o libfoo.so \
+            -Wl,--whole-archive libfoo.a -Wl,--no-whole-archive \
+            {plib_lflags} -lcrypto {ex_libs}
+
+    shared objects:
+        {ld} $(CFLAGS) {shared_ldflag} -shared -o libeng.so \
+            blah1.o blah2.o {plib_lflags} -lcrypto {ex_libs}
+
+    applications:
+        {ld} $(CFLAGS) {lflags} -o app \
+            app1.o utils.o {plib_lflags} -lssl -lcrypto {ex_libs}
+
+
+Historically, the target configurations came in form of a string with
+values separated by colons.  This use is deprecated.  The string form
+looked like this:
+
+   "target" => "{cc}:{cflags}:{unistd}:{thread_cflag}:{sys_id}:{lflags}:{bn_ops}:{cpuid_obj}:{bn_obj}:{ec_obj}:{des_obj}:{aes_obj}:{bf_obj}:{md5_obj}:{sha1_obj}:{cast_obj}:{rc4_obj}:{rmd160_obj}:{rc5_obj}:{wp_obj}:{cmll_obj}:{modes_obj}:{padlock_obj}:{perlasm_scheme}:{dso_scheme}:{shared_target}:{shared_cflag}:{shared_ldflag}:{shared_extension}:{ranlib}:{arflags}:{multilib}"
+
+
+Build info files
+================
+
+The build.info files that are spread over the source tree contain the
+minimum information needed to build and distribute OpenSSL.  It uses a
+simple and yet fairly powerful language to determine what needs to be
+built, from what sources, and other relationships between files.
+
+For every build.info file, all file references are relative to the
+directory of the build.info file for source files, and the
+corresponding build directory for built files if the build tree
+differs from the source tree.
+
+When processed, every line is processed with the perl module
+Text::Template, using the delimiters "{-" and "-}".  The hashes
+%config and %target are passed to the perl fragments, along with
+$sourcedir and $builddir, which are the locations of the source
+directory for the current build.info file and the corresponding build
+directory, all relative to the top of the build tree.
+
+To begin with, things to be built are declared by setting specific
+variables:
+
+    PROGRAMS=foo bar
+    LIBS=libsomething
+    ENGINES=libeng
+    SCRIPTS=myhack
+    EXTRA=file1 file2
+
+Note that the files mentioned for PROGRAMS, LIBS and ENGINES *must* be
+without extensions.  The build file templates will figure them out.
+
+For each thing to be built, it is then possible to say what sources
+they are built from:
+
+    PROGRAMS=foo bar
+    SOURCE[foo]=foo.c common.c
+    SOURCE[bar]=bar.c extra.c common.c
+
+It's also possible to tell some other dependencies:
+
+    DEPEND[foo]=libsomething
+    DEPEND[libbar]=libsomethingelse
+
+(it could be argued that 'libsomething' and 'libsomethingelse' are
+source as well.  However, the files given through SOURCE are expected
+to be located in the source tree while files given through DEPEND are
+expected to be located in the build tree)
+
+For some libraries, we maintain files with public symbols and their
+slot in a transfer vector (important on some platforms).  It can be
+declared like this:
+
+    ORDINALS[libcrypto]=crypto
+
+The value is not the name of the file in question, but rather the
+argument to util/mkdef.pl that indicates which file to use.
+
+One some platforms, shared libraries come with a name that's different
+from their static counterpart.  That's declared as follows:
+
+    SHARED_NAME[libfoo]=cygfoo-{- $config{shlibver} -}
+
+The example is from Cygwin, which has a required naming convention.
+
+Sometimes, it makes sense to rename an output file, for example a
+library:
+
+    RENAME[libfoo]=libbar
+
+That lines has "libfoo" get renamed to "libbar".  While it makes no
+sense at all to just have a rename like that (why not just use
+"libbar" everywhere?), it does make sense when it can be used
+conditionally.  See a little further below for an example.
+
+In some cases, it's desirable to include some source files in the
+shared form of a library only:
+
+    SHARED_SOURCE[libfoo]=dllmain.c
+
+For any file to be built, it's also possible to tell what extra
+include paths the build of their source files should use:
+
+    INCLUDE[foo]=include
+
+In some cases, one might want to generate some source files from
+others, that's done as follows:
+
+    GENERATE[foo.s]=asm/something.pl $(CFLAGS)
+    GENERATE[bar.s]=asm/bar.S
+
+The value of each GENERATE line is a command line or part of it.
+Configure places no rules on the command line, except the the first
+item muct be the generator file.  It is, however, entirely up to the
+build file template to define exactly how those command lines should
+be handled, how the output is captured and so on.
+
+Sometimes, the generator file itself depends on other files, for
+example if it is a perl script that depends on other perl modules.
+This can be expressed using DEPEND like this:
+
+    DEPEND[asm/something.pl]=../perlasm/Foo.pm
+
+There may also be cases where the exact file isn't easily specified,
+but an inclusion directory still needs to be specified.  INCLUDE can
+be used in that case:
+
+    INCLUDE[asm/something.pl]=../perlasm
+
+NOTE: GENERATE lines are limited to one command only per GENERATE.
+
+As a last resort, it's possible to have raw build file lines, between
+BEGINRAW and ENDRAW lines as follows:
+
+    BEGINRAW[Makefile(unix)]
+    haha.h: {- $builddir -}/Makefile
+        echo "/* haha */" > haha.h
+    ENDRAW[Makefile(unix)]
+
+The word within square brackets is the build_file configuration item
+or the build_file configuration item followed by the second word in the
+build_scheme configuration item for the configured target within
+parenthesis as shown above.  For example, with the following relevant
+configuration items:
+
+   build_file   => "build.ninja"
+   build_scheme => [ "unified", "unix" ]
+
+... these lines will be considered:
+
+   BEGINRAW[build.ninja]
+   build haha.h: echo "/* haha */" > haha.h
+   ENDRAW[build.ninja]
+
+   BEGINRAW[build.ninja(unix)]
+   build hoho.h: echo "/* hoho */" > hoho.h
+   ENDRAW[build.ninja(unix)]
+
+Should it be needed because the recipes within a RAW section might
+clash with those generated by Configure, it's possible to tell it
+not to generate them with the use of OVERRIDES, for example:
+
+    SOURCE[libfoo]=foo.c bar.c
+    
+    OVERRIDES=bar.o
+    BEGINRAW[Makefile(unix)]
+    bar.o: bar.c
+    	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) -DSPECIAL -c -o $@ $<
+    ENDRAW[Makefile(unix)]
+
+See the documentation further up for more information on configuration
+items.
+
+Finally, you can have some simple conditional use of the build.info
+information, looking like this:
+
+    IF[1]
+     something
+    ELSIF[2]
+     something other
+    ELSE
+     something else
+    ENDIF
+
+The expression in square brackets is interpreted as a string in perl,
+and will be seen as true if perl thinks it is, otherwise false.  For
+example, the above would have "something" used, since 1 is true.
+
+Together with the use of Text::Template, this can be used as
+conditions based on something in the passed variables, for example:
+
+    IF[{- $disabled{shared} -}]
+      LIBS=libcrypto
+      SOURCE[libcrypto]=...
+    ELSE
+      LIBS=libfoo
+      SOURCE[libfoo]=...
+    ENDIF
+
+or:
+
+    # VMS has a cultural standard where all libraries are prefixed.
+    # For OpenSSL, the choice is 'ossl_'
+    IF[{- $config{target} =~ /^vms/ -}]
+     RENAME[libcrypto]=ossl_libcrypto
+     RENAME[libssl]=ossl_libssl
+    ENDIF
+
+
+Build-file programming with the "unified" build system
+======================================================
+
+"Build files" are called "Makefile" on Unix-like operating systems,
+"descrip.mms" for MMS on VMS, "makefile" for nmake on Windows, etc.
+
+To use the "unified" build system, the target configuration needs to
+set the three items 'build_scheme', 'build_file' and 'build_command'.
+In the rest of this section, we will assume that 'build_scheme' is set
+to "unified" (see the configurations documentation above for the
+details).
+
+For any name given by 'build_file', the "unified" system expects a
+template file in Configurations/ named like the build file, with
+".tmpl" appended, or in case of possible ambiguity, a combination of
+the second 'build_scheme' list item and the 'build_file' name.  For
+example, if 'build_file' is set to "Makefile", the template could be
+Configurations/Makefile.tmpl or Configurations/unix-Makefile.tmpl.
+In case both Configurations/unix-Makefile.tmpl and
+Configurations/Makefile.tmpl are present, the former takes
+precedence.
+
+The build-file template is processed with the perl module
+Text::Template, using "{-" and "-}" as delimiters that enclose the
+perl code fragments that generate configuration-dependent content.
+Those perl fragments have access to all the hash variables from
+configdata.pem.
+
+The build-file template is expected to define at least the following
+perl functions in a perl code fragment enclosed with "{-" and "-}".
+They are all expected to return a string with the lines they produce.
+
+    generatesrc - function that produces build file lines to generate
+                  a source file from some input.
+
+                  It's called like this:
+
+                        generatesrc(src => "PATH/TO/tobegenerated",
+                                    generator => [ "generatingfile", ... ]
+                                    generator_incs => [ "INCL/PATH", ... ]
+                                    generator_deps => [ "dep1", ... ]
+                                    generator => [ "generatingfile", ... ]
+                                    incs => [ "INCL/PATH", ... ],
+                                    deps => [ "dep1", ... ],
+                                    intent => one of "libs", "dso", "bin" );
+
+                  'src' has the name of the file to be generated.
+                  'generator' is the command or part of command to
+                  generate the file, of which the first item is
+                  expected to be the file to generate from.
+                  generatesrc() is expected to analyse and figure out
+                  exactly how to apply that file and how to capture
+                  the result.  'generator_incs' and 'generator_deps'
+                  are include directories and files that the generator
+                  file itself depends on.  'incs' and 'deps' are
+                  include directories and files that are used if $(CC)
+                  is used as an intermediary step when generating the
+                  end product (the file indicated by 'src').  'intent'
+                  indicates what the generated file is going to be
+                  used for.
+
+    src2obj     - function that produces build file lines to build an
+                  object file from source files and associated data.
+
+                  It's called like this:
+
+                        src2obj(obj => "PATH/TO/objectfile",
+                                srcs => [ "PATH/TO/sourcefile", ... ],
+                                deps => [ "dep1", ... ],
+                                incs => [ "INCL/PATH", ... ]
+                                intent => one of "lib", "dso", "bin" );
+
+                  'obj' has the intended object file *without*
+                  extension, src2obj() is expected to add that.
+                  'srcs' has the list of source files to build the
+                  object file, with the first item being the source
+                  file that directly corresponds to the object file.
+                  'deps' is a list of explicit dependencies.  'incs'
+                  is a list of include file directories.  Finally,
+                  'intent' indicates what this object file is going
+                  to be used for.
+
+    obj2lib     - function that produces build file lines to build a
+                  static library file ("libfoo.a" in Unix terms) from
+                  object files.
+
+                  called like this:
+
+                        obj2lib(lib => "PATH/TO/libfile",
+                                objs => [ "PATH/TO/objectfile", ... ]);
+
+                  'lib' has the intended library file name *without*
+                  extension, obj2lib is expected to add that.  'objs'
+                  has the list of object files (also *without*
+                  extension) to build this library.
+
+    libobj2shlib - function that produces build file lines to build a
+                  shareable object library file ("libfoo.so" in Unix
+                  terms) from the corresponding static library file
+                  or object files.
+
+                  called like this:
+
+                        libobj2shlib(shlib => "PATH/TO/shlibfile",
+                                     lib => "PATH/TO/libfile",
+                                     objs => [ "PATH/TO/objectfile", ... ],
+                                     deps => [ "PATH/TO/otherlibfile", ... ],
+                                     ordinals => [ "word", "/PATH/TO/ordfile" ]);
+
+                  'lib' has the intended library file name *without*
+                  extension, libobj2shlib is expected to add that.
+                  'shlib' has the corresponding shared library name
+                  *without* extension.  'deps' has the list of other
+                  libraries (also *without* extension) this library
+                  needs to be linked with.  'objs' has the list of
+                  object files (also *without* extension) to build
+                  this library.  'ordinals' MAY be present, and when
+                  it is, its value is an array where the word is
+                  "crypto" or "ssl" and the file is one of the ordinal
+                  files util/libeay.num or util/ssleay.num in the
+                  source directory.
+
+                  This function has a choice; it can use the
+                  corresponding static library as input to make the
+                  shared library, or the list of object files.
+
+    obj2dso     - function that produces build file lines to build a
+                  dynamic shared object file from object files.
+
+                  called like this:
+
+                        obj2dso(lib => "PATH/TO/libfile",
+                                objs => [ "PATH/TO/objectfile", ... ],
+                                deps => [ "PATH/TO/otherlibfile",
+                                ... ]);
+
+                  This is almost the same as libobj2shlib, but the
+                  intent is to build a shareable library that can be
+                  loaded in runtime (a "plugin"...).  The differences
+                  are subtle, one of the most visible ones is that the
+                  resulting shareable library is produced from object
+                  files only.
+
+    obj2bin     - function that produces build file lines to build an
+                  executable file from object files.
+
+                  called like this:
+
+                        obj2bin(bin => "PATH/TO/binfile",
+                                objs => [ "PATH/TO/objectfile", ... ],
+                                deps => [ "PATH/TO/libfile", ... ]);
+
+                  'bin' has the intended executable file name
+                  *without* extension, obj2bin is expected to add
+                  that.  'objs' has the list of object files (also
+                  *without* extension) to build this library.  'deps'
+                  has the list of library files (also *without*
+                  extension) that the programs needs to be linked
+                  with.
+
+    in2script   - function that produces build file lines to build a
+                  script file from some input.
+
+                  called like this:
+
+                        in2script(script => "PATH/TO/scriptfile",
+                                  sources => [ "PATH/TO/infile", ... ]);
+
+                  'script' has the intended script file name.
+                  'sources' has the list of source files to build the
+                  resulting script from.
+
+In all cases, file file paths are relative to the build tree top, and
+the build file actions run with the build tree top as current working
+directory.
+
+Make sure to end the section with these functions with a string that
+you thing is appropriate for the resulting build file.  If nothing
+else, end it like this:
+
+      "";       # Make sure no lingering values end up in the Makefile
+    -}
+
+
+Configure helper scripts
+========================
+
+Configure uses helper scripts in this directory:
+
+Checker scripts
+---------------
+
+These scripts are per platform family, to check the integrity of the
+tools used for configuration and building.  The checker script used is
+either {build_platform}-{build_file}-checker.pm or
+{build_platform}-checker.pm, where {build_platform} is the second
+'build_scheme' list element from the configuration target data, and
+{build_file} is 'build_file' from the same target data.
+
+If the check succeeds, the script is expected to end with a non-zero
+expression.  If the check fails, the script can end with a zero, or
+with a `die`.
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/Configurations/README.design b/openssl-1.1.0h/Configurations/README.design
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bea9790
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/Configurations/README.design
@@ -0,0 +1,641 @@
+Design document for the unified scheme data
+===========================================
+
+How are things connected?
+-------------------------
+
+The unified scheme takes all its data from the build.info files seen
+throughout the source tree.  These files hold the minimum information
+needed to build end product files from diverse sources.  See the
+section on build.info files below.
+
+From the information in build.info files, Configure builds up an
+information database as a hash table called %unified_info, which is
+stored in configdata.pm, found at the top of the build tree (which may
+or may not be the same as the source tree).
+
+Configurations/common.tmpl uses the data from %unified_info to
+generate the rules for building end product files as well as
+intermediary files with the help of a few functions found in the
+build-file templates.  See the section on build-file templates further
+down for more information.
+
+build.info files
+----------------
+
+As mentioned earlier, build.info files are meant to hold the minimum
+information needed to build output files, and therefore only (with a
+few possible exceptions [1]) have information about end products (such
+as scripts, library files and programs) and source files (such as C
+files, C header files, assembler files, etc).  Intermediate files such
+as object files are rarely directly referred to in build.info files (and
+when they are, it's always with the file name extension .o), they are
+inferred by Configure.  By the same rule of minimalism, end product
+file name extensions (such as .so, .a, .exe, etc) are never mentioned
+in build.info.  Their file name extensions will be inferred by the
+build-file templates, adapted for the platform they are meant for (see
+sections on %unified_info and build-file templates further down).
+
+The variables PROGRAMS, LIBS, ENGINES and SCRIPTS are used to declare
+end products.  There are variants for them with '_NO_INST' as suffix
+(PROGRAM_NO_INST etc) to specify end products that shouldn't get
+installed.
+
+The variables SOURCE, DEPEND, INCLUDE and ORDINALS are indexed by a
+produced file, and their values are the source used to produce that
+particular produced file, extra dependencies, include directories
+needed, and ordinal files (explained further below.
+
+All their values in all the build.info throughout the source tree are
+collected together and form a set of programs, libraries, engines and
+scripts to be produced, source files, dependencies, etc etc etc.
+
+Let's have a pretend example, a very limited contraption of OpenSSL,
+composed of the program 'apps/openssl', the libraries 'libssl' and
+'libcrypto', an engine 'engines/ossltest' and their sources and
+dependencies.
+
+    # build.info
+    LIBS=libcrypto libssl
+    ORDINALS[libcrypto]=crypto
+    ORDINALS[libssl]=ssl
+    INCLUDE[libcrypto]=include
+    INCLUDE[libssl]=include
+    DEPEND[libssl]=libcrypto
+
+This is the top directory build.info file, and it tells us that two
+libraries are to be built, there are some ordinals to be used to
+declare what symbols in those libraries are seen as public, the
+include directory 'include/' shall be used throughout when building
+anything that will end up in each library, and that the library
+'libssl' depend on the library 'libcrypto' to function properly.
+
+    # apps/build.info
+    PROGRAMS=openssl
+    SOURCE[openssl]=openssl.c
+    INCLUDE[openssl]=.. ../include
+    DEPEND[openssl]=../libssl
+
+This is the build.info file in 'apps/', one may notice that all file
+paths mentioned are relative to the directory the build.info file is
+located in.  This one tells us that there's a program to be built
+called 'apps/openssl' (the file name extension will depend on the
+platform and is therefore not mentioned in the build.info file).  It's
+built from one source file, 'apps/openssl.c', and building it requires
+the use of '.' and 'include' include directories (both are declared
+from the point of view of the 'apps/' directory), and that the program
+depends on the library 'libssl' to function properly.
+
+    # crypto/build.info
+    LIBS=../libcrypto
+    SOURCE[../libcrypto]=aes.c evp.c cversion.c
+    DEPEND[cversion.o]=buildinf.h
+    
+    GENERATE[buildinf.h]=../util/mkbuildinf.pl "$(CC) $(CFLAGS)" "$(PLATFORM)"
+    DEPEND[buildinf.h]=../Makefile
+    DEPEND[../util/mkbuildinf.pl]=../util/Foo.pm
+
+This is the build.info file in 'crypto', and it tells us a little more
+about what's needed to produce 'libcrypto'.  LIBS is used again to
+declare that 'libcrypto' is to be produced.  This declaration is
+really unnecessary as it's already mentioned in the top build.info
+file, but can make the info file easier to understand.  This is to
+show that duplicate information isn't an issue.
+
+This build.info file informs us that 'libcrypto' is built from a few
+source files, 'crypto/aes.c', 'crypto/evp.c' and 'crypto/cversion.c'.
+It also shows us that building the object file inferred from
+'crypto/cversion.c' depends on 'crypto/buildinf.h'.  Finally, it 
+also shows the possibility to declare how some files are generated
+using some script, in this case a perl script, and how such scripts
+can be declared to depend on other files, in this case a perl module.
+
+Two things are worth an extra note:
+
+'DEPEND[cversion.o]' mentions an object file.  DEPEND indexes is the
+only location where it's valid to mention them
+
+Lines in 'BEGINRAW'..'ENDRAW' sections must always mention files as
+seen from the top directory, no exception.
+
+    # ssl/build.info
+    LIBS=../libssl
+    SOURCE[../libssl]=tls.c
+
+This is the build.info file in 'ssl/', and it tells us that the
+library 'libssl' is built from the source file 'ssl/tls.c'.
+
+    # engines/build.info
+    ENGINES=dasync
+    SOURCE[dasync]=e_dasync.c
+    DEPEND[dasync]=../libcrypto
+    INCLUDE[dasync]=../include
+
+    ENGINES_NO_INST=ossltest
+    SOURCE[ossltest]=e_ossltest.c
+    DEPEND[ossltest]=../libcrypto
+    INCLUDE[ossltest]=../include
+
+This is the build.info file in 'engines/', telling us that two engines
+called 'engines/dasync' and 'engines/ossltest' shall be built, that
+dasync's source is 'engines/e_dasync.c' and ossltest's source is
+'engines/e_ossltest.c' and that the include directory 'include/' may
+be used when building anything that will be part of these engines.
+Also, both engines depend on the library 'libcrypto' to function
+properly.  Finally, only dasync is being installed, as ossltest is
+only for internal testing.
+
+When Configure digests these build.info files, the accumulated
+information comes down to this:
+
+    LIBS=libcrypto libssl
+    ORDINALS[libcrypto]=crypto
+    SOURCE[libcrypto]=crypto/aes.c crypto/evp.c crypto/cversion.c
+    DEPEND[crypto/cversion.o]=crypto/buildinf.h
+    INCLUDE[libcrypto]=include
+    ORDINALS[libssl]=ssl
+    SOURCE[libssl]=ssl/tls.c
+    INCLUDE[libssl]=include
+    DEPEND[libssl]=libcrypto
+    
+    PROGRAMS=apps/openssl
+    SOURCE[apps/openssl]=apps/openssl.c
+    INCLUDE[apps/openssl]=. include
+    DEPEND[apps/openssl]=libssl
+
+    ENGINES=engines/dasync
+    SOURCE[engines/dasync]=engines/e_dasync.c
+    DEPEND[engines/dasync]=libcrypto
+    INCLUDE[engines/dasync]=include
+
+    ENGINES_NO_INST=engines/ossltest
+    SOURCE[engines/ossltest]=engines/e_ossltest.c
+    DEPEND[engines/ossltest]=libcrypto
+    INCLUDE[engines/ossltest]=include
+    
+    GENERATE[crypto/buildinf.h]=util/mkbuildinf.pl "$(CC) $(CFLAGS)" "$(PLATFORM)"
+    DEPEND[crypto/buildinf.h]=Makefile
+    DEPEND[util/mkbuildinf.pl]=util/Foo.pm
+
+
+A few notes worth mentioning:
+
+LIBS may be used to declare routine libraries only.
+
+PROGRAMS may be used to declare programs only.
+
+ENGINES may be used to declare engines only.
+
+The indexes for SOURCE and ORDINALS must only be end product files,
+such as libraries, programs or engines.  The values of SOURCE
+variables must only be source files (possibly generated)
+
+INCLUDE and DEPEND shows a relationship between different files
+(usually produced files) or between files and directories, such as a
+program depending on a library, or between an object file and some
+extra source file.
+
+When Configure processes the build.info files, it will take it as
+truth without question, and will therefore perform very few checks.
+If the build tree is separate from the source tree, it will assume
+that all built files and up in the build directory and that all source
+files are to be found in the source tree, if they can be found there.
+Configure will assume that source files that can't be found in the
+source tree (such as 'crypto/bildinf.h' in the example above) are
+generated and will be found in the build tree.
+
+
+The %unified_info database
+--------------------------
+
+The information in all the build.info get digested by Configure and
+collected into the %unified_info database, divided into the following
+indexes:
+
+  depends   => a hash table containing 'file' => [ 'dependency' ... ]
+               pairs.  These are directly inferred from the DEPEND
+               variables in build.info files.
+
+  engines   => a list of engines.  These are directly inferred from
+               the ENGINES variable in build.info files.
+
+  generate  => a hash table containing 'file' => [ 'generator' ... ]
+               pairs.  These are directly inferred from the GENERATE
+               variables in build.info files.
+
+  includes  => a hash table containing 'file' => [ 'include' ... ]
+               pairs.  These are directly inferred from the INCLUDE
+               variables in build.info files.
+
+  install   => a hash table containing 'type' => [ 'file' ... ] pairs.
+               The types are 'programs', 'libraries', 'engines' and
+               'scripts', and the array of files list the files of
+               that type that should be installed.
+
+  libraries => a list of libraries.  These are directly inferred from
+               the LIBS variable in build.info files.
+
+  ordinals  => a hash table containing 'file' => [ 'word', 'ordfile' ]
+               pairs.  'file' and 'word' are directly inferred from
+               the ORDINALS variables in build.info files, while the
+               file 'ofile' comes from internal knowledge in
+               Configure.
+
+  programs  => a list of programs.  These are directly inferred from
+               the PROGRAMS variable in build.info files.
+
+  rawlines  => a list of build-file lines.  These are a direct copy of
+               the BEGINRAW..ENDRAW lines in build.info files.  Note:
+               only the BEGINRAW..ENDRAW section for the current
+               platform are copied, the rest are ignored.
+
+  scripts   => a list of scripts.  There are directly inferred from
+               the SCRIPTS variable in build.info files.
+
+  sources   => a hash table containing 'file' => [ 'sourcefile' ... ]
+               pairs.  These are indirectly inferred from the SOURCE
+               variables in build.info files.  Object files are
+               mentioned in this hash table, with source files from
+               SOURCE variables, and AS source files for programs and
+               libraries.
+
+  shared_sources =>
+               a hash table just like 'sources', but only as source
+               files (object files) for building shared libraries.
+
+As an example, here is how the build.info files example from the
+section above would be digested into a %unified_info table:
+
+    our %unified_info = (
+        "depends" =>
+            {
+                "apps/openssl" =>
+                    [
+                        "libssl",
+                    ],
+                "crypto/buildinf.h" =>
+                    [
+                        "Makefile",
+                    ],
+                "crypto/cversion.o" =>
+                    [
+                        "crypto/buildinf.h",
+                    ],
+                "engines/ossltest" =>
+                    [
+                        "libcrypto",
+                    ],
+                "libssl" =>
+                    [
+                        "libcrypto",
+                    ],
+                "util/mkbuildinf.pl" =>
+                    [
+                        "util/Foo.pm",
+                    ],
+            },
+        "engines" =>
+            [
+                "engines/dasync",
+                "engines/ossltest",
+            ],
+        "generate" =>
+            {
+                "crypto/buildinf.h" =>
+                    [
+                        "util/mkbuildinf.pl",
+                        "\"\$(CC)",
+                        "\$(CFLAGS)\"",
+                        "\"$(PLATFORM)\"",
+                    ],
+            },
+        "includes" =>
+            {
+                "apps/openssl" =>
+                    [
+                        ".",
+                        "include",
+                    ],
+                "engines/ossltest" =>
+                    [
+                        "include"
+                    ],
+                "libcrypto" =>
+                    [
+                        "include",
+                    ],
+                "libssl" =>
+                    [
+                        "include",
+                    ],
+                "util/mkbuildinf.pl" =>
+                    [
+                        "util",
+                    ],
+            }
+        "install" =>
+            {
+                "engines" =>
+                    [
+                        "engines/dasync",
+                    ],
+                "libraries" =>
+                    [
+                        "libcrypto",
+                        "libssl",
+                    ],
+                "programs" =>
+                    [
+                        "apps/openssl",
+                    ],
+           },
+        "libraries" =>
+            [
+                "libcrypto",
+                "libssl",
+            ],
+        "ordinals" =>
+            {
+                "libcrypto" =>
+                    [
+                        "crypto",
+                        "util/libcrypto.num",
+                    ],
+                "libssl" =>
+                    [
+                        "ssl",
+                        "util/libssl.num",
+                    ],
+            },
+        "programs" =>
+            [
+                "apps/openssl",
+            ],
+        "rawlines" =>
+            [
+            ],
+        "sources" =>
+            {
+                "apps/openssl" =>
+                    [
+                        "apps/openssl.o",
+                    ],
+                "apps/openssl.o" =>
+                    [
+                        "apps/openssl.c",
+                    ],
+                "crypto/aes.o" =>
+                    [
+                        "crypto/aes.c",
+                    ],
+                "crypto/cversion.o" =>
+                    [
+                        "crypto/cversion.c",
+                    ],
+                "crypto/evp.o" =>
+                    [
+                        "crypto/evp.c",
+                    ],
+                "engines/e_ossltest.o" =>
+                    [
+                        "engines/e_ossltest.c",
+                    ],
+                "engines/ossltest" =>
+                    [
+                        "engines/e_ossltest.o",
+                    ],
+                "libcrypto" =>
+                    [
+                        "crypto/aes.c",
+                        "crypto/cversion.c",
+                        "crypto/evp.c",
+                    ],
+                "libssl" =>
+                    [
+                        "ssl/tls.c",
+                    ],
+                "ssl/tls.o" =>
+                    [
+                        "ssl/tls.c",
+                    ],
+            },
+    );
+
+As can be seen, everything in %unified_info is fairly simple suggest
+of information.  Still, it tells us that to build all programs, we
+must build 'apps/openssl', and to build the latter, we will need to
+build all its sources ('apps/openssl.o' in this case) and all the
+other things it depends on (such as 'libssl').  All those dependencies
+need to be built as well, using the same logic, so to build 'libssl',
+we need to build 'ssl/tls.o' as well as 'libcrypto', and to build the
+latter...
+
+
+Build-file templates
+--------------------
+
+Build-file templates are essentially build-files (such as Makefile on
+Unix) with perl code fragments mixed in.  Those perl code fragment
+will generate all the configuration dependent data, including all the
+rules needed to build end product files and intermediary files alike.
+At a minimum, there must be a perl code fragment that defines a set of
+functions that are used to generates specific build-file rules, to
+build static libraries from object files, to build shared libraries
+from static libraries, to programs from object files and libraries,
+etc.
+
+    generatesrc - function that produces build file lines to generate
+                  a source file from some input.
+
+                  It's called like this:
+
+                        generatesrc(src => "PATH/TO/tobegenerated",
+                                    generator => [ "generatingfile", ... ]
+                                    generator_incs => [ "INCL/PATH", ... ]
+                                    generator_deps => [ "dep1", ... ]
+                                    incs => [ "INCL/PATH", ... ],
+                                    deps => [ "dep1", ... ],
+                                    intent => one of "libs", "dso", "bin" );
+
+                  'src' has the name of the file to be generated.
+                  'generator' is the command or part of command to
+                  generate the file, of which the first item is
+                  expected to be the file to generate from.
+                  generatesrc() is expected to analyse and figure out
+                  exactly how to apply that file and how to capture
+                  the result.  'generator_incs' and 'generator_deps'
+                  are include directories and files that the generator
+                  file itself depends on.  'incs' and 'deps' are
+                  include directories and files that are used if $(CC)
+                  is used as an intermediary step when generating the
+                  end product (the file indicated by 'src').  'intent'
+                  indicates what the generated file is going to be
+                  used for.
+
+    src2obj     - function that produces build file lines to build an
+                  object file from source files and associated data.
+
+                  It's called like this:
+
+                        src2obj(obj => "PATH/TO/objectfile",
+                                srcs => [ "PATH/TO/sourcefile", ... ],
+                                deps => [ "dep1", ... ],
+                                incs => [ "INCL/PATH", ... ]
+                                intent => one of "lib", "dso", "bin" );
+
+                  'obj' has the intended object file *without*
+                  extension, src2obj() is expected to add that.
+                  'srcs' has the list of source files to build the
+                  object file, with the first item being the source
+                  file that directly corresponds to the object file.
+                  'deps' is a list of explicit dependencies.  'incs'
+                  is a list of include file directories.  Finally,
+                  'intent' indicates what this object file is going
+                  to be used for.
+
+    obj2lib     - function that produces build file lines to build a
+                  static library file ("libfoo.a" in Unix terms) from
+                  object files.
+
+                  called like this:
+
+                        obj2lib(lib => "PATH/TO/libfile",
+                                objs => [ "PATH/TO/objectfile", ... ]);
+
+                  'lib' has the intended library file name *without*
+                  extension, obj2lib is expected to add that.  'objs'
+                  has the list of object files (also *without*
+                  extension) to build this library.
+
+    libobj2shlib - function that produces build file lines to build a
+                  shareable object library file ("libfoo.so" in Unix
+                  terms) from the corresponding static library file
+                  or object files.
+
+                  called like this:
+
+                        libobj2shlib(shlib => "PATH/TO/shlibfile",
+                                     lib => "PATH/TO/libfile",
+                                     objs => [ "PATH/TO/objectfile", ... ],
+                                     deps => [ "PATH/TO/otherlibfile", ... ],
+                                     ordinals => [ "word", "/PATH/TO/ordfile" ]);
+
+                  'lib' has the intended library file name *without*
+                  extension, libobj2shlib is expected to add that.
+                  'shlib' has the corresponding shared library name
+                  *without* extension.  'deps' has the list of other
+                  libraries (also *without* extension) this library
+                  needs to be linked with.  'objs' has the list of
+                  object files (also *without* extension) to build
+                  this library.  'ordinals' MAY be present, and when
+                  it is, its value is an array where the word is
+                  "crypto" or "ssl" and the file is one of the ordinal
+                  files util/libcrypto.num or util/libssl.num in the
+                  source directory.
+
+                  This function has a choice; it can use the
+                  corresponding static library as input to make the
+                  shared library, or the list of object files.
+
+    obj2dynlib  - function that produces build file lines to build a
+                  dynamically loadable library file ("libfoo.so" on
+                  Unix) from object files.
+
+                  called like this:
+
+                        obj2dynlib(lib => "PATH/TO/libfile",
+                                   objs => [ "PATH/TO/objectfile", ... ],
+                                   deps => [ "PATH/TO/otherlibfile",
+                                   ... ]);
+
+                  This is almost the same as libobj2shlib, but the
+                  intent is to build a shareable library that can be
+                  loaded in runtime (a "plugin"...).  The differences
+                  are subtle, one of the most visible ones is that the
+                  resulting shareable library is produced from object
+                  files only.
+
+    obj2bin     - function that produces build file lines to build an
+                  executable file from object files.
+
+                  called like this:
+
+                        obj2bin(bin => "PATH/TO/binfile",
+                                objs => [ "PATH/TO/objectfile", ... ],
+                                deps => [ "PATH/TO/libfile", ... ]);
+
+                  'bin' has the intended executable file name
+                  *without* extension, obj2bin is expected to add
+                  that.  'objs' has the list of object files (also
+                  *without* extension) to build this library.  'deps'
+                  has the list of library files (also *without*
+                  extension) that the programs needs to be linked
+                  with.
+
+    in2script   - function that produces build file lines to build a
+                  script file from some input.
+
+                  called like this:
+
+                        in2script(script => "PATH/TO/scriptfile",
+                                  sources => [ "PATH/TO/infile", ... ]);
+
+                  'script' has the intended script file name.
+                  'sources' has the list of source files to build the
+                  resulting script from.
+
+Along with the build-file templates is the driving engine
+Configurations/common.tmpl, which looks through all the information in
+%unified_info and generates all the rulesets to build libraries,
+programs and all intermediate files, using the rule generating
+functions defined in the build-file template.
+
+As an example with the smaller build.info set we've seen as an
+example, producing the rules to build 'libcrypto' would result in the
+following calls:
+
+    # Note: libobj2shlib will only be called if shared libraries are
+    # to be produced.
+    # Note 2: libobj2shlib gets both the name of the static library
+    # and the names of all the object files that go into it.  It's up
+    # to the implementation to decide which to use as input.
+    # Note 3: common.tmpl peals off the ".o" extension from all object
+    # files, as the platform at hand may have a different one.
+    libobj2shlib(shlib => "libcrypto",
+                 lib => "libcrypto",
+                 objs => [ "crypto/aes", "crypto/evp", "crypto/cversion" ],
+                 deps => [  ]
+                 ordinals => [ "crypto", "util/libcrypto.num" ]);
+
+    obj2lib(lib => "libcrypto"
+            objs => [ "crypto/aes", "crypto/evp", "crypto/cversion" ]);
+
+    src2obj(obj => "crypto/aes"
+            srcs => [ "crypto/aes.c" ],
+            deps => [ ],
+            incs => [ "include" ],
+            intent => "lib");
+
+    src2obj(obj => "crypto/evp"
+            srcs => [ "crypto/evp.c" ],
+            deps => [ ],
+            incs => [ "include" ],
+            intent => "lib");
+
+    src2obj(obj => "crypto/cversion"
+            srcs => [ "crypto/cversion.c" ],
+            deps => [ "crypto/buildinf.h" ],
+            incs => [ "include" ],
+            intent => "lib");
+
+    generatesrc(src => "crypto/buildinf.h",
+                generator => [ "util/mkbuildinf.pl", "\"$(CC)",
+                               "$(CFLAGS)\"", "\"$(PLATFORM)\"" ],
+                generator_incs => [ "util" ],
+                generator_deps => [ "util/Foo.pm" ],
+                incs => [ ],
+                deps => [ ],
+                intent => "lib");
+
+The returned strings from all those calls are then concatenated
+together and written to the resulting build-file.
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/Configurations/common.tmpl b/openssl-1.1.0h/Configurations/common.tmpl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..13ffe94
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/Configurations/common.tmpl
@@ -0,0 +1,229 @@
+{- # -*- Mode: perl -*-
+
+ use File::Basename;
+
+ # A cache of objects for which a recipe has already been generated
+ my %cache;
+
+ # resolvedepends and reducedepends work in tandem to make sure
+ # there are no duplicate dependencies and that they are in the
+ # right order.  This is especially used to sort the list of
+ # libraries that a build depends on.
+ sub resolvedepends {
+     my $thing = shift;
+     my @listsofar = @_;    # to check if we're looping
+     my @list = @{$unified_info{depends}->{$thing}};
+     my @newlist = ();
+     if (scalar @list) {
+         foreach my $item (@list) {
+             # It's time to break off when the dependency list starts looping
+             next if grep { $_ eq $item } @listsofar;
+             push @newlist, $item, resolvedepends($item, @listsofar, $item);
+         }
+     }
+     @newlist;
+ }
+ sub reducedepends {
+     my @list = @_;
+     my @newlist = ();
+     while (@list) {
+         my $item = shift @list;
+         push @newlist, $item
+             unless grep { $item eq $_ } @list;
+     }
+     @newlist;
+ }
+
+ # dogenerate is responsible for producing all the recipes that build
+ # generated source files.  It recurses in case a dependency is also a
+ # generated source file.
+ sub dogenerate {
+     my $src = shift;
+     return "" if $cache{$src};
+     my $obj = shift;
+     my $bin = shift;
+     my %opts = @_;
+     if ($unified_info{generate}->{$src}) {
+         die "$src is generated by Configure, should not appear in build file\n"
+             if ref $unified_info{generate}->{$src} eq "";
+         my $script = $unified_info{generate}->{$src}->[0];
+         $OUT .= generatesrc(src => $src,
+                             generator => $unified_info{generate}->{$src},
+                             generator_incs => $unified_info{includes}->{$script},
+                             generator_deps => $unified_info{depends}->{$script},
+                             deps => $unified_info{depends}->{$src},
+                             incs => $unified_info{includes}->{$obj},
+                             %opts);
+         foreach (@{$unified_info{depends}->{$src}}) {
+             dogenerate($_, $obj, $bin, %opts);
+         }
+     }
+     $cache{$src} = 1;
+ }
+
+ # doobj is responsible for producing all the recipes that build
+ # object files as well as dependency files.
+ sub doobj {
+     my $obj = shift;
+     return "" if $cache{$obj};
+     (my $obj_no_o = $obj) =~ s|\.o$||;
+     my $bin = shift;
+     my %opts = @_;
+     if (@{$unified_info{sources}->{$obj}}) {
+         $OUT .= src2obj(obj => $obj_no_o,
+                         srcs => $unified_info{sources}->{$obj},
+                         deps => $unified_info{depends}->{$obj},
+                         incs => $unified_info{includes}->{$obj},
+                         %opts);
+         foreach ((@{$unified_info{sources}->{$obj}},
+                   @{$unified_info{depends}->{$obj}})) {
+             dogenerate($_, $obj, $bin, %opts);
+         }
+     }
+     $cache{$obj} = 1;
+ }
+
+ # dolib is responsible for building libraries.  It will call
+ # libobj2shlib is shared libraries are produced, and obj2lib in all
+ # cases.  It also makes sure all object files for the library are
+ # built.
+ sub dolib {
+     my $lib = shift;
+     return "" if $cache{$lib};
+     unless ($disabled{shared}) {
+         my %ordinals =
+             $unified_info{ordinals}->{$lib}
+             ? (ordinals => $unified_info{ordinals}->{$lib}) : ();
+         $OUT .= libobj2shlib(shlib => $unified_info{sharednames}->{$lib},
+                              lib => $lib,
+                              objs => [ map { (my $x = $_) =~ s|\.o$||; $x }
+                                        (@{$unified_info{sources}->{$lib}},
+                                         @{$unified_info{shared_sources}->{$lib}}) ],
+                              deps => [ reducedepends(resolvedepends($lib)) ],
+                              %ordinals);
+         foreach (@{$unified_info{shared_sources}->{$lib}}) {
+             doobj($_, $lib, intent => "lib");
+         }
+     }
+     $OUT .= obj2lib(lib => $lib,
+                     objs => [ map { (my $x = $_) =~ s|\.o$||; $x }
+                               @{$unified_info{sources}->{$lib}} ]);
+     foreach (@{$unified_info{sources}->{$lib}}) {
+         doobj($_, $lib, intent => "lib");
+     }
+     $cache{$lib} = 1;
+ }
+
+ # doengine is responsible for building engines.  It will call
+ # obj2dso, and also makes sure all object files for the library
+ # are built.
+ sub doengine {
+     my $lib = shift;
+     return "" if $cache{$lib};
+     $OUT .= obj2dso(lib => $lib,
+                     objs => [ map { (my $x = $_) =~ s|\.o$||; $x }
+                               (@{$unified_info{sources}->{$lib}},
+                                @{$unified_info{shared_sources}->{$lib}}) ],
+                     deps => [ resolvedepends($lib) ]);
+     foreach ((@{$unified_info{sources}->{$lib}},
+               @{$unified_info{shared_sources}->{$lib}})) {
+         doobj($_, $lib, intent => "dso");
+     }
+     $cache{$lib} = 1;
+ }
+
+ # dobin is responsible for building programs.  It will call obj2bin,
+ # and also makes sure all object files for the library are built.
+ sub dobin {
+     my $bin = shift;
+     return "" if $cache{$bin};
+     my $deps = [ reducedepends(resolvedepends($bin)) ];
+     $OUT .= obj2bin(bin => $bin,
+                     objs => [ map { (my $x = $_) =~ s|\.o$||; $x }
+                               @{$unified_info{sources}->{$bin}} ],
+                     deps => $deps);
+     foreach (@{$unified_info{sources}->{$bin}}) {
+         doobj($_, $bin, intent => "bin");
+     }
+     $cache{$bin} = 1;
+ }
+
+ # dobin is responsible for building scripts from templates.  It will
+ # call in2script.
+ sub doscript {
+     my $script = shift;
+     return "" if $cache{$script};
+     $OUT .= in2script(script => $script,
+                       sources => $unified_info{sources}->{$script});
+     $cache{$script} = 1;
+ }
+
+ sub dodir {
+     my $dir = shift;
+     return "" if !exists(&generatedir) or $cache{$dir};
+     $OUT .= generatedir(dir => $dir,
+                         deps => $unified_info{dirinfo}->{$dir}->{deps},
+                         %{$unified_info{dirinfo}->{$_}->{products}});
+     $cache{$dir} = 1;
+ }
+
+ # Start with populating the cache with all the overrides
+ %cache = map { $_ => 1 } @{$unified_info{overrides}};
+
+ # For convenience collect information regarding directories where
+ # files are generated, those generated files and the end product
+ # they end up in where applicable.  Then, add build rules for those
+ # directories
+ if (exists &generatedir) {
+     my %loopinfo = ( "dso" => [ @{$unified_info{engines}} ],
+                      "lib" => [ @{$unified_info{libraries}} ],
+                      "bin" => [ @{$unified_info{programs}} ],
+                      "script" => [ @{$unified_info{scripts}} ] );
+     foreach my $type (keys %loopinfo) {
+         foreach my $product (@{$loopinfo{$type}}) {
+             my %dirs = ();
+             my $pd = dirname($product);
+
+             # We already have a "test" target, and the current directory
+             # is just silly to make a target for
+             $dirs{$pd} = 1 unless $pd eq "test" || $pd eq ".";
+
+             foreach (@{$unified_info{sources}->{$product}}) {
+                 my $d = dirname($_);
+
+                 # We don't want to create targets for source directories
+                 # when building out of source
+                 next if ($config{sourcedir} ne $config{builddir}
+                          && $d =~ m|^\Q$config{sourcedir}\E|);
+                 # We already have a "test" target, and the current directory
+                 # is just silly to make a target for
+                 next if $d eq "test" || $d eq ".";
+
+                 $dirs{$d} = 1;
+                 push @{$unified_info{dirinfo}->{$d}->{deps}}, $_
+                     if $d ne $pd;
+             }
+             foreach (keys %dirs) {
+                 push @{$unified_info{dirinfo}->{$_}->{products}->{$type}},
+                 $product;
+             }
+         }
+     }
+ }
+
+ # Build mandatory generated headers
+ foreach (@{$unified_info{depends}->{""}}) { dogenerate($_); }
+
+ # Build all known libraries, engines, programs and scripts.
+ # Everything else will be handled as a consequence.
+ foreach (@{$unified_info{libraries}}) { dolib($_);    }
+ foreach (@{$unified_info{engines}})   { doengine($_); }
+ foreach (@{$unified_info{programs}})  { dobin($_);    }
+ foreach (@{$unified_info{scripts}})   { doscript($_); }
+
+ foreach (sort keys %{$unified_info{dirinfo}})  { dodir($_); }
+
+ # Finally, should there be any applicable BEGINRAW/ENDRAW sections,
+ # they are added here.
+ $OUT .= $_."\n" foreach @{$unified_info{rawlines}};
+-}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/Configurations/descrip.mms.tmpl b/openssl-1.1.0h/Configurations/descrip.mms.tmpl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7e3356f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/Configurations/descrip.mms.tmpl
@@ -0,0 +1,780 @@
+## descrip.mms to build OpenSSL on OpenVMS
+##
+## {- join("\n## ", @autowarntext) -}
+{-
+  use File::Spec::Functions qw/:DEFAULT abs2rel rel2abs/;
+
+  # Our prefix, claimed when speaking with the VSI folks Tuesday
+  # January 26th 2016
+  our $osslprefix = 'OSSL$';
+  (our $osslprefix_q = $osslprefix) =~ s/\$/\\\$/;
+
+  our $sover = sprintf "%02d%02d", $config{shlib_major}, $config{shlib_minor};
+  our $osslver = sprintf "%02d%02d", split(/\./, $config{version});
+
+  our $sourcedir = $config{sourcedir};
+  our $builddir = $config{builddir};
+  sub sourcefile {
+      catfile($sourcedir, @_);
+  }
+  sub buildfile {
+      catfile($builddir, @_);
+  }
+  sub sourcedir {
+      catdir($sourcedir, @_);
+  }
+  sub builddir {
+      catdir($builddir, @_);
+  }
+  sub tree {
+      (my $x = shift) =~ s|\]$|...]|;
+      $x
+  }
+  sub move {
+      my $f = catdir(@_);
+      my $b = abs2rel(rel2abs("."),rel2abs($f));
+      $sourcedir = catdir($b,$sourcedir)
+          if !file_name_is_absolute($sourcedir);
+      $builddir = catdir($b,$builddir)
+          if !file_name_is_absolute($builddir);
+      "";
+  }
+
+  # Because we need to make two computations of these data,
+  # we store them in arrays for reuse
+  our @shlibs = map { $unified_info{sharednames}->{$_} || () } @{$unified_info{libraries}};
+  our @install_shlibs = map { $unified_info{sharednames}->{$_} || () } @{$unified_info{install}->{libraries}};
+  our @generated = ( ( map { (my $x = $_) =~ s|\.S$|\.s|; $x }
+                       grep { defined $unified_info{generate}->{$_} }
+                       map { @{$unified_info{sources}->{$_}} }
+                       grep { /\.o$/ } keys %{$unified_info{sources}} ),
+                     ( grep { /\.h$/ } keys %{$unified_info{generate}} ) );
+
+  # This is a horrible hack, but is needed because recursive inclusion of files
+  # in different directories does not work well with HP C.
+  my $sd = sourcedir("crypto", "async", "arch");
+  foreach (grep /\[\.crypto\.async\.arch\].*\.o$/, keys %{$unified_info{sources}}) {
+      (my $x = $_) =~ s|\.o$|.OBJ|;
+      $unified_info{before}->{$x}
+          = qq(arch_include = F\$PARSE("$sd","A.;",,,"SYNTAX_ONLY") - "A.;"
+        define arch 'arch_include');
+      $unified_info{after}->{$x}
+          = qq(deassign arch);
+  }
+  my $sd1 = sourcedir("ssl","record");
+  my $sd2 = sourcedir("ssl","statem");
+  $unified_info{before}->{"[.test]heartbeat_test.OBJ"}
+      = $unified_info{before}->{"[.test]ssltest_old.OBJ"}
+      = qq(record_include = F\$PARSE("$sd1","A.;",,,"SYNTAX_ONLY") - "A.;"
+        define record 'record_include'
+        statem_include = F\$PARSE("$sd2","A.;",,,"SYNTAX_ONLY") - "A.;"
+        define statem 'statem_include');
+  $unified_info{after}->{"[.test]heartbeat_test.OBJ"}
+      = $unified_info{after}->{"[.test]ssltest.OBJ"}
+      = qq(deassign statem
+        deassign record);
+  foreach (grep /^\[\.ssl\.(?:record|statem)\].*\.o$/, keys %{$unified_info{sources}}) {
+      (my $x = $_) =~ s|\.o$|.OBJ|;
+      $unified_info{before}->{$x}
+          = qq(record_include = F\$PARSE("$sd1","A.;",,,"SYNTAX_ONLY") - "A.;"
+        define record 'record_include'
+        statem_include = F\$PARSE("$sd2","A.;",,,"SYNTAX_ONLY") - "A.;"
+        define statem 'statem_include');
+      $unified_info{after}->{$x}
+          = qq(deassign statem
+        deassign record);
+  }
+  # This makes sure things get built in the order they need
+  # to. You're welcome.
+  sub dependmagic {
+      my $target = shift;
+
+      return "$target : build_generated\n\t\pipe \$(MMS) \$(MMSQUALIFIERS) depend && \$(MMS) \$(MMSQUALIFIERS) _$target\n_$target";
+  }
+  #use Data::Dumper;
+  #print STDERR "DEBUG: before:\n", Dumper($unified_info{before});
+  #print STDERR "DEBUG: after:\n", Dumper($unified_info{after});
+  "";
+-}
+PLATFORM={- $config{target} -}
+OPTIONS={- $config{options} -}
+CONFIGURE_ARGS=({- join(", ",quotify_l(@{$config{perlargv}})) -})
+SRCDIR={- $config{sourcedir} -}
+BLDDIR={- $config{builddir} -}
+
+# Allow both V and VERBOSE to indicate verbosity.  This only applies
+# to testing.
+VERBOSE=$(V)
+
+VERSION={- $config{version} -}
+MAJOR={- $config{major} -}
+MINOR={- $config{minor} -}
+SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER={- $config{shlib_version_number} -}
+SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY={- $config{shlib_version_history} -}
+SHLIB_MAJOR={- $config{shlib_major} -}
+SHLIB_MINOR={- $config{shlib_minor} -}
+SHLIB_TARGET={- $target{shared_target} -}
+
+EXE_EXT=.EXE
+LIB_EXT=.OLB
+SHLIB_EXT=.EXE
+OBJ_EXT=.OBJ
+DEP_EXT=.D
+
+LIBS={- join(", ", map { "-\n\t".$_.".OLB" } @{$unified_info{libraries}}) -}
+SHLIBS={- join(", ", map { "-\n\t".$_.".EXE" } @shlibs) -}
+ENGINES={- join(", ", map { "-\n\t".$_.".EXE" } @{$unified_info{engines}}) -}
+PROGRAMS={- join(", ", map { "-\n\t".$_.".EXE" } @{$unified_info{programs}}) -}
+SCRIPTS={- join(", ", map { "-\n\t".$_ } @{$unified_info{scripts}}) -}
+{- output_off() if $disabled{makedepend}; "" -}
+DEPS={- our @deps = map { (my $x = $_) =~ s|\.o$|\$(DEP_EXT)|; $x; }
+                    grep { $unified_info{sources}->{$_}->[0] =~ /\.c$/ }
+                    keys %{$unified_info{sources}};
+        join(", ", map { "-\n\t".$_ } @deps); -}
+{- output_on() if $disabled{makedepend}; "" -}
+GENERATED_MANDATORY={- join(", ", map { "-\n\t".$_ } @{$unified_info{depends}->{""}} ) -}
+GENERATED={- join(", ", map { "-\n\t".$_ } @generated) -}
+
+INSTALL_LIBS={- join(", ", map { "-\n\t".$_.".OLB" } @{$unified_info{install}->{libraries}}) -}
+INSTALL_SHLIBS={- join(", ", map { "-\n\t".$_.".EXE" } @install_shlibs) -}
+INSTALL_ENGINES={- join(", ", map { "-\n\t".$_.".EXE" } @{$unified_info{install}->{engines}}) -}
+INSTALL_PROGRAMS={- join(", ", map { "-\n\t".$_.".EXE" } @{$unified_info{install}->{programs}}) -}
+{- output_off() if $disabled{apps}; "" -}
+BIN_SCRIPTS=[.tools]c_rehash.pl
+MISC_SCRIPTS=[.apps]CA.pl, [.apps]tsget.pl
+{- output_on() if $disabled{apps}; "" -}
+
+APPS_OPENSSL={- use File::Spec::Functions;
+                catfile("apps","openssl") -}
+
+# DESTDIR is for package builders so that they can configure for, say,
+# SYS$COMMON:[OPENSSL] and yet have everything installed in STAGING:[USER].
+# In that case, configure with --prefix=SYS$COMMON:[OPENSSL] and then run
+# MMS with /MACROS=(DESTDIR=STAGING:[USER]).  The result will end up in
+# STAGING:[USER.OPENSSL].
+# Normally it is left empty.
+DESTDIR=
+
+# Do not edit this manually. Use Configure --prefix=DIR to change this!
+INSTALLTOP={- our $installtop =
+                  catdir($config{prefix}) || "SYS\$COMMON:[OPENSSL]";
+              $installtop -}
+SYSTARTUP={- catdir($installtop, '[.SYS$STARTUP]'); -}
+# This is the standard central area to store certificates, private keys...
+OPENSSLDIR={- catdir($config{openssldir}) or
+              $config{prefix} ? catdir($config{prefix},"COMMON")
+                              : "SYS\$COMMON:[OPENSSL-COMMON]" -}
+# The same, but for C
+OPENSSLDIR_C={- $osslprefix -}DATAROOT:[000000]
+# Where installed engines reside, for C
+ENGINESDIR_C={- $osslprefix -}ENGINES{- $sover.$target{pointer_size} -}:
+
+CC= {- $target{cc} -}
+CFLAGS= /DEFINE=({- join(",", @{$target{defines}}, @{$config{defines}},"OPENSSLDIR=\"\"\"\$(OPENSSLDIR_C)\"\"\"","ENGINESDIR=\"\"\"\$(ENGINESDIR_C)\"\"\"") -}) {- $target{cflags} -} {- $config{cflags} -}
+CFLAGS_Q=$(CFLAGS)
+DEPFLAG= /DEFINE=({- join(",", @{$config{depdefines}}) -})
+LDFLAGS= {- $target{lflags} -}
+EX_LIBS= {- $target{ex_libs} ? ",".$target{ex_libs} : "" -}{- $config{ex_libs} ? ",".$config{ex_libs} : "" -}
+LIB_CFLAGS={- $target{lib_cflags} || "" -}
+DSO_CFLAGS={- $target{dso_cflags} || "" -}
+BIN_CFLAGS={- $target{bin_cflags} || "" -}
+
+PERL={- $config{perl} -}
+
+# We let the C compiler driver to take care of .s files. This is done in
+# order to be excused from maintaining a separate set of architecture
+# dependent assembler flags. E.g. if you throw -mcpu=ultrasparc at SPARC
+# gcc, then the driver will automatically translate it to -xarch=v8plus
+# and pass it down to assembler.
+AS={- $target{as} -}
+ASFLAG={- $target{asflags} -}
+
+# .FIRST and .LAST are special targets with MMS and MMK.
+# The defines in there are for C.  includes that look like
+# this:
+#
+#    #include <openssl/foo.h>
+#    #include "internal/bar.h"
+#
+# will use the logical names to find the files.  Expecting
+# DECompHP C to find files in subdirectories of whatever was
+# given with /INCLUDE is a fantasy, unfortunately.
+NODEBUG=@
+.FIRST :
+        $(NODEBUG) openssl_inc1 = F$PARSE("[.include.openssl]","A.;",,,"syntax_only") - "A.;"
+        $(NODEBUG) openssl_inc2 = F$PARSE("{- catdir($config{sourcedir},"[.include.openssl]") -}","A.;",,,"SYNTAX_ONLY") - "A.;"
+        $(NODEBUG) internal_inc1 = F$PARSE("[.crypto.include.internal]","A.;",,,"SYNTAX_ONLY") - "A.;"
+        $(NODEBUG) internal_inc2 = F$PARSE("{- catdir($config{sourcedir},"[.include.internal]") -}","A.;",,,"SYNTAX_ONLY") - "A.;"
+        $(NODEBUG) internal_inc3 = F$PARSE("{- catdir($config{sourcedir},"[.crypto.include.internal]") -}","A.;",,,"SYNTAX_ONLY") - "A.;"
+        $(NODEBUG) DEFINE openssl 'openssl_inc1','openssl_inc2'
+        $(NODEBUG) DEFINE internal 'internal_inc1','internal_inc2','internal_inc3'
+        $(NODEBUG) staging_dir = "$(DESTDIR)"
+        $(NODEBUG) staging_instdir = ""
+        $(NODEBUG) staging_datadir = ""
+        $(NODEBUG) IF staging_dir .NES. "" THEN -
+                staging_instdir = F$PARSE("A.;",staging_dir,"[]",,"SYNTAX_ONLY")
+        $(NODEBUG) IF staging_instdir - "]A.;" .NES. staging_instdir THEN -
+                staging_instdir = staging_instdir - "]A.;" + ".OPENSSL-INSTALL]"
+        $(NODEBUG) IF staging_instdir - "A.;" .NES. staging_instdir THEN -
+                staging_instdir = staging_instdir - "A.;" + "[OPENSSL-INSTALL]"
+        $(NODEBUG) IF staging_dir .NES. "" THEN -
+                staging_datadir = F$PARSE("A.;",staging_dir,"[]",,"SYNTAX_ONLY")
+        $(NODEBUG) IF staging_datadir - "]A.;" .NES. staging_datadir THEN -
+                staging_datadir = staging_datadir - "]A.;" + ".OPENSSL-COMMON]"
+        $(NODEBUG) IF staging_datadir - "A.;" .NES. staging_datadir THEN -
+                staging_datadir = staging_datadir - "A.;" + "[OPENSSL-COMMON]"
+        $(NODEBUG) !
+        $(NODEBUG) ! Installation logical names
+        $(NODEBUG) !
+        $(NODEBUG) installtop = F$PARSE(staging_instdir,"$(INSTALLTOP)","[]A.;",,"SYNTAX_ONLY,NO_CONCEAL") - ".][000000" - "[000000." - "][" - "]A.;" + ".]"
+        $(NODEBUG) datatop = F$PARSE(staging_datadir,"$(OPENSSLDIR)","[]A.;",,"SYNTAX_ONLY,NO_CONCEAL") - ".][000000" - "[000000." - "][" - "]A.;" + ".]"
+        $(NODEBUG) DEFINE ossl_installroot 'installtop'
+        $(NODEBUG) DEFINE ossl_dataroot 'datatop'
+        $(NODEBUG) !
+        $(NODEBUG) ! Figure out the architecture
+        $(NODEBUG) !
+        $(NODEBUG) arch = f$edit( f$getsyi( "arch_name"), "upcase")
+        $(NODEBUG) !
+        $(NODEBUG) ! Set up logical names for the libraries, so LINK and
+        $(NODEBUG) ! running programs can use them.
+        $(NODEBUG) !
+        $(NODEBUG) {- join("\n\t\$(NODEBUG) ", map { "DEFINE ".uc($_)." 'F\$ENV(\"DEFAULT\")'".uc($_)."\$(SHLIB_EXT)" } map { $unified_info{sharednames}->{$_} || () } @{$unified_info{libraries}}) || "!" -}
+
+.LAST :
+        $(NODEBUG) {- join("\n\t\$(NODEBUG) ", map { "DEASSIGN ".uc($_) } map { $unified_info{sharednames}->{$_} || () } @{$unified_info{libraries}}) || "!" -}
+        $(NODEBUG) DEASSIGN ossl_dataroot
+        $(NODEBUG) DEASSIGN ossl_installroot
+        $(NODEBUG) DEASSIGN internal
+        $(NODEBUG) DEASSIGN openssl
+.DEFAULT :
+        @ ! MMS cannot handle no actions...
+
+# The main targets ###################################################
+
+{- dependmagic('all'); -} : build_libs_nodep, build_engines_nodep, build_programs_nodep
+{- dependmagic('build_libs'); -} : build_libs_nodep
+{- dependmagic('build_engines'); -} : build_engines_nodep
+{- dependmagic('build_programs'); -} : build_programs_nodep
+
+build_generated : $(GENERATED_MANDATORY)
+build_libs_nodep : $(LIBS), $(SHLIBS)
+build_engines_nodep : $(ENGINES)
+build_programs_nodep : $(PROGRAMS), $(SCRIPTS)
+
+# Kept around for backward compatibility
+build_apps build_tests : build_programs
+
+# Convenience target to prebuild all generated files, not just the mandatory
+# ones
+build_all_generated : $(GENERATED_MANDATORY) $(GENERATED)
+
+test : tests
+{- dependmagic('tests'); -} : build_programs_nodep, build_engines_nodep
+        @ ! {- output_off() if $disabled{tests}; "" -}
+        SET DEFAULT [.test]{- move("test") -}
+        CREATE/DIR [.test-runs]
+        DEFINE SRCTOP {- sourcedir() -}
+        DEFINE BLDTOP {- builddir() -}
+        DEFINE RESULT_D {- builddir(qw(test test-runs)) -}
+        DEFINE OPENSSL_ENGINES {- builddir("engines") -}
+        DEFINE OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY "on"
+        IF "$(VERBOSE)" .NES. "" THEN DEFINE VERBOSE "$(VERBOSE)"
+        $(PERL) {- sourcefile("test", "run_tests.pl") -} $(TESTS)
+        DEASSIGN OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY
+        DEASSIGN OPENSSL_ENGINES
+        DEASSIGN BLDTOP
+        DEASSIGN SRCTOP
+        SET DEFAULT [-]{- move("..") -}
+        @ ! {- if ($disabled{tests}) { output_on(); } else { output_off(); } "" -}
+        @ WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "Tests are not supported with your chosen Configure options"
+        @ ! {- output_on() if !$disabled{tests}; "" -}
+
+list-tests :
+        @ ! {- output_off() if $disabled{tests}; "" -}
+        @ DEFINE SRCTOP {- sourcedir() -}
+        @ $(PERL) {- sourcefile("test", "run_tests.pl") -} list
+        @ DEASSIGN SRCTOP
+        @ ! {- if ($disabled{tests}) { output_on(); } else { output_off(); } "" -}
+        @ WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "Tests are not supported with your chosen Configure options"
+        @ ! {- output_on() if !$disabled{tests}; "" -}
+
+install : install_sw install_ssldirs install_docs
+        @ WRITE SYS$OUTPUT ""
+        @ WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "######################################################################"
+        @ WRITE SYS$OUTPUT ""
+        @ IF "$(DESTDIR)" .EQS. "" THEN -
+             PIPE ( WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "Installation complete" ; -
+                    WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "" ; -
+                    WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "Run @$(SYSTARTUP)openssl_startup{- $osslver -} to set up logical names" ; -
+                    WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "then run @$(SYSTARTUP)openssl_utils{- $osslver -} to define commands" ; -
+                    WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "" )
+        @ IF "$(DESTDIR)" .NES. "" THEN -
+             PIPE ( WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "Staging installation complete" ; -
+                    WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "" ; -
+                    WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "Finish or package in such a way that the contents of the directory tree" ; -
+                    WRITE SYS$OUTPUT staging_instdir ; -
+                    WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "ends up in $(INSTALLTOP)," ; -
+                    WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "and that the contents of the contents of the directory tree" ; -
+                    WRITE SYS$OUTPUT staging_datadir ; -
+                    WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "ends up in $(OPENSSLDIR)" ; -
+                    WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "" ; -
+                    WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "When in its final destination," ; -
+                    WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "Run @$(SYSTARTUP)openssl_startup{- $osslver -} to set up logical names" ; -
+                    WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "then run @$(SYSTARTUP)openssl_utils{- $osslver -} to define commands" ; -
+                    WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "" )
+
+check_install :
+        spawn/nolog @ossl_installroot:[SYSTEST]openssl_ivp{- $osslver -}.com
+
+uninstall : uninstall_docs uninstall_sw
+
+# Because VMS wants the generation number (or *) to delete files, we can't
+# use $(LIBS), $(PROGRAMS), $(GENERATED) and $(ENGINES)directly.
+libclean :
+        {- join("\n\t", map { "- DELETE $_.OLB;*" } @{$unified_info{libraries}}) || "@ !" -}
+        {- join("\n\t", map { "- DELETE $_.EXE;*,$_.MAP;*,$_.OPT;*" } @shlibs) || "@ !" -}
+
+clean : libclean
+        {- join("\n\t", map { "- DELETE $_.EXE;*,$_.OPT;*" } @{$unified_info{programs}}) || "@ !" -}
+        {- join("\n\t", map { "- DELETE $_.EXE;*,$_.OPT;*" } @{$unified_info{engines}}) || "@ !" -}
+        {- join("\n\t", map { "- DELETE $_;*" } @{$unified_info{scripts}}) || "@ !" -}
+        {- join("\n\t", map { "- DELETE $_;*" } @generated) || "@ !" -}
+        - DELETE [...]*.MAP;*
+        - DELETE [...]*.D;*
+        - DELETE [...]*.OBJ;*,*.LIS;*
+        - DELETE []CXX$DEMANGLER_DB.;*
+        - DELETE [.VMS]openssl_startup.com;*
+        - DELETE [.VMS]openssl_shutdown.com;*
+        - DELETE []vmsconfig.pm;*
+
+distclean : clean
+        - DELETE configdata.pm;*
+        - DELETE descrip.mms;*
+
+depend : descrip.mms
+descrip.mms : FORCE
+	@ ! {- output_off() if $disabled{makedepend}; "" -}
+        @ $(PERL) -pe "if (/^# DO NOT DELETE.*/) { exit(0); }" -
+                < descrip.mms > descrip.mms-new
+        @ OPEN/APPEND DESCRIP descrip.mms-new
+        @ WRITE DESCRIP "# DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE -- make depend depends on it."
+        {- join("\n\t", map { "\@ IF F\$SEARCH(\"$_\") .NES. \"\" THEN TYPE $_ /OUTPUT=DESCRIP:" } @deps); -}
+        @ CLOSE DESCRIP
+        @ PIPE ( $(PERL) -e "use File::Compare qw/compare_text/; my $x = compare_text(""descrip.mms"",""descrip.mms-new""); exit(0x10000000 + ($x == 0));" || -
+                 RENAME descrip.mms-new descrip.mms )
+        @ IF F$SEARCH("descrip.mms-new") .NES. "" THEN DELETE descrip.mms-new;*
+        -@ SPAWN/OUTPUT=NLA0: PURGE/NOLOG descrip.mms
+	@ ! {- output_on() if $disabled{makedepend}; "" -}
+
+# Install helper targets #############################################
+
+install_sw : all install_shared _install_dev_ns -
+             install_engines _install_runtime_ns -
+             install_startup install_ivp
+
+uninstall_sw : uninstall_shared _uninstall_dev_ns -
+               uninstall_engines _uninstall_runtime_ns -
+               uninstall_startup uninstall_ivp
+
+install_docs : install_html_docs
+
+uninstall_docs : uninstall_html_docs
+
+install_ssldirs : check_INSTALLTOP
+        - CREATE/DIR/PROT=(S:RWED,O:RWE,G:RE,W:RE) OSSL_DATAROOT:[000000]
+        IF F$SEARCH("OSSL_DATAROOT:[000000]CERTS.DIR;1") .EQS. "" THEN -
+                CREATE/DIR/PROT=(S:RWED,O:RWE,G:RE,W:RE) OSSL_DATAROOT:[CERTS]
+        IF F$SEARCH("OSSL_DATAROOT:[000000]PRIVATE.DIR;1") .EQS. "" THEN -
+                CREATE/DIR/PROT=(S:RWED,O:RWE,G,W) OSSL_DATAROOT:[PRIVATE]
+        IF F$SEARCH("OSSL_DATAROOT:[000000]MISC.DIR;1") .EQS. "" THEN -
+                CREATE/DIR/PROT=(S:RWED,O:RWE,G,W) OSSL_DATAROOT:[MISC]
+        COPY/PROT=W:RE $(MISC_SCRIPTS) OSSL_DATAROOT:[MISC]
+        @ ! Install configuration file
+        COPY/PROT=W:R {- sourcefile("apps", "openssl-vms.cnf") -} -
+                ossl_dataroot:[000000]openssl.cnf-dist
+        IF F$SEARCH("OSSL_DATAROOT:[000000]openssl.cnf") .EQS. "" THEN -
+                COPY/PROT=W:R {- sourcefile("apps", "openssl-vms.cnf") -} -
+                        ossl_dataroot:[000000]openssl.cnf
+
+install_shared : check_INSTALLTOP
+        @ {- output_off() if $disabled{shared}; "" -} !
+        @ WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "*** Installing shareable images"
+        @ ! Install shared (runtime) libraries
+        - CREATE/DIR ossl_installroot:[LIB.'arch']
+        {- join("\n        ",
+                map { "COPY/PROT=W:R $_.EXE ossl_installroot:[LIB.'arch']" }
+                @install_shlibs) -}
+        @ {- output_on() if $disabled{shared}; "" -} !
+
+_install_dev_ns : check_INSTALLTOP
+        @ WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "*** Installing development files"
+        @ ! Install header files
+        - CREATE/DIR ossl_installroot:[include.openssl]
+        COPY/PROT=W:R openssl:*.h ossl_installroot:[include.openssl]
+        @ ! Install static (development) libraries
+        - CREATE/DIR ossl_installroot:[LIB.'arch']
+        {- join("\n        ",
+                map { "COPY/PROT=W:R $_.OLB ossl_installroot:[LIB.'arch']" }
+                @{$unified_info{install}->{libraries}}) -}
+
+install_dev : install_shared _install_dev_ns
+
+_install_runtime_ns : check_INSTALLTOP
+        @ ! Install the main program
+        - CREATE/DIR ossl_installroot:[EXE.'arch']
+        COPY/PROT=W:RE [.APPS]openssl.EXE -
+                ossl_installroot:[EXE.'arch']openssl{- $osslver -}.EXE
+        @ ! Install scripts
+        COPY/PROT=W:RE $(BIN_SCRIPTS) ossl_installroot:[EXE]
+        @ ! {- output_on() if $disabled{apps}; "" -}
+
+install_runtime : install_shared _install_runtime_ns
+
+install_engines : check_INSTALLTOP
+        @ {- output_off() unless scalar @{$unified_info{engines}}; "" -} !
+        @ WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "*** Installing engines"
+        - CREATE/DIR ossl_installroot:[ENGINES{- $sover.$target{pointer_size} -}.'arch']
+        {- join("\n        ",
+                map { "COPY/PROT=W:RE $_.EXE ossl_installroot:[ENGINES$sover$target{pointer_size}.'arch']" }
+                @{$unified_info{install}->{engines}}) -}
+        @ {- output_on() unless scalar @{$unified_info{engines}}; "" -} !
+
+install_startup : [.VMS]openssl_startup.com [.VMS]openssl_shutdown.com -
+                 [.VMS]openssl_utils.com, check_INSTALLTOP
+        - CREATE/DIR ossl_installroot:[SYS$STARTUP]
+        COPY/PROT=W:RE [.VMS]openssl_startup.com -
+                ossl_installroot:[SYS$STARTUP]openssl_startup{- $osslver -}.com
+        COPY/PROT=W:RE [.VMS]openssl_shutdown.com -
+                ossl_installroot:[SYS$STARTUP]openssl_shutdown{- $osslver -}.com
+        COPY/PROT=W:RE [.VMS]openssl_utils.com -
+                ossl_installroot:[SYS$STARTUP]openssl_utils{- $osslver -}.com
+
+install_ivp : [.VMS]openssl_ivp.com check_INSTALLTOP
+        - CREATE/DIR ossl_installroot:[SYSTEST]
+        COPY/PROT=W:RE [.VMS]openssl_ivp.com -
+                ossl_installroot:[SYSTEST]openssl_ivp{- $osslver -}.com
+
+[.VMS]openssl_startup.com : vmsconfig.pm {- sourcefile("VMS", "openssl_startup.com.in") -}
+        - CREATE/DIR [.VMS]
+        $(PERL) "-I." "-Mvmsconfig" {- sourcefile("util", "dofile.pl") -} -
+                {- sourcefile("VMS", "openssl_startup.com.in") -} -
+                > [.VMS]openssl_startup.com
+
+[.VMS]openssl_utils.com : vmsconfig.pm {- sourcefile("VMS", "openssl_utils.com.in") -}
+        - CREATE/DIR [.VMS]
+        $(PERL) "-I." "-Mvmsconfig" {- sourcefile("util", "dofile.pl") -} -
+                {- sourcefile("VMS", "openssl_utils.com.in") -} -
+                > [.VMS]openssl_utils.com
+
+[.VMS]openssl_shutdown.com : vmsconfig.pm {- sourcefile("VMS", "openssl_shutdown.com.in") -}
+        - CREATE/DIR [.VMS]
+        $(PERL) "-I." "-Mvmsconfig" {- sourcefile("util", "dofile.pl") -} -
+                {- sourcefile("VMS", "openssl_shutdown.com.in") -} -
+                > [.VMS]openssl_shutdown.com
+
+[.VMS]openssl_ivp.com : vmsconfig.pm {- sourcefile("VMS", "openssl_ivp.com.in") -}
+        - CREATE/DIR [.VMS]
+        $(PERL) "-I." "-Mvmsconfig" {- sourcefile("util", "dofile.pl") -} -
+                {- sourcefile("VMS", "openssl_ivp.com.in") -} -
+                > [.VMS]openssl_ivp.com
+
+vmsconfig.pm : configdata.pm
+        OPEN/WRITE/SHARE=READ CONFIG []vmsconfig.pm
+        WRITE CONFIG "package vmsconfig;"
+        WRITE CONFIG "use strict; use warnings;"
+        WRITE CONFIG "use Exporter;"
+        WRITE CONFIG "our @ISA = qw(Exporter);"
+        WRITE CONFIG "our @EXPORT = qw(%config %target %withargs %unified_info %disabled);"
+        WRITE CONFIG "our %config = ("
+        WRITE CONFIG "  target => '","{- $config{target} -}","',"
+        WRITE CONFIG "  version => '","{- $config{version} -}","',"
+        WRITE CONFIG "  shlib_major => '","{- $config{shlib_major} -}","',"
+        WRITE CONFIG "  shlib_minor => '","{- $config{shlib_minor} -}","',"
+        WRITE CONFIG "  no_shared => '","{- $disabled{shared} -}","',"
+        WRITE CONFIG "  INSTALLTOP => '$(INSTALLTOP)',"
+        WRITE CONFIG "  OPENSSLDIR => '$(OPENSSLDIR)',"
+        WRITE CONFIG "  pointer_size => '","{- $target{pointer_size} -}","',"
+        WRITE CONFIG ");"
+        WRITE CONFIG "our %target = ();"
+        WRITE CONFIG "our %disabled = ();"
+        WRITE CONFIG "our %withargs = ();"
+        WRITE CONFIG "our %unified_info = ();"
+        WRITE CONFIG "1;"
+        CLOSE CONFIG
+
+install_html_docs : check_INSTALLTOP
+        sourcedir = F$PARSE("{- $sourcedir -}A.;","[]") - "]A.;" + ".DOC]"
+        $(PERL) {- sourcefile("util", "process_docs.pl") -} -
+                --sourcedir='sourcedir' --destdir=ossl_installroot:[HTML] -
+                --type=html
+
+check_INSTALLTOP :
+        @ IF "$(INSTALLTOP)" .EQS. "" THEN -
+                WRITE SYS$ERROR "INSTALLTOP should not be empty"
+        @ IF "$(INSTALLTOP)" .EQS. "" THEN -
+                EXIT %x10000002
+
+# Helper targets #####################################################
+
+# Developer targets ##################################################
+
+debug_logicals :
+        SH LOGICAL/PROC openssl,internal,ossl_installroot,ossl_dataroot
+
+# Building targets ###################################################
+
+configdata.pm : $(SRCDIR)Configure $(SRCDIR)config.com {- join(" ", @{$config{build_file_templates}}, @{$config{build_infos}}, @{$config{conf_files}}) -}
+        @ WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "Reconfiguring..."
+        perl $(SRCDIR)Configure reconf
+        @ WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "*************************************************"
+        @ WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "***                                           ***"
+        @ WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "***   Please run the same mms command again   ***"
+        @ WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "***                                           ***"
+        @ WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "*************************************************"
+        @ PIPE ( EXIT %X10000000 )
+
+{-
+  use File::Basename;
+  use File::Spec::Functions qw/abs2rel rel2abs catfile catdir/;
+
+  sub generatesrc {
+      my %args = @_;
+      my $generator = join(" ", @{$args{generator}});
+      my $generator_incs = join("", map { ' "-I'.$_.'"' } @{$args{generator_incs}});
+      my $deps = join(", -\n\t\t", @{$args{generator_deps}}, @{$args{deps}});
+
+      if ($args{src} !~ /\.[sS]$/) {
+          if ($args{generator}->[0] =~ m|^.*\.in$|) {
+	      my $dofile = abs2rel(rel2abs(catfile($config{sourcedir},
+                                                   "util", "dofile.pl")),
+                                   rel2abs($config{builddir}));
+              return <<"EOF";
+$args{src} : $args{generator}->[0] $deps
+	\$(PERL) "-I\$(BLDDIR)" "-Mconfigdata" $dofile \\
+	    "-o$target{build_file}" $generator > \$@
+EOF
+	  } else {
+              return <<"EOF";
+$args{src} : $args{generator}->[0] $deps
+	\$(PERL)$generator_incs $generator > \$@
+EOF
+	  }
+      } else {
+          die "No method to generate assembler source present.\n";
+      }
+  }
+
+  sub src2obj {
+      my %args = @_;
+      my $obj = $args{obj};
+      my $deps = join(", -\n\t\t", @{$args{srcs}}, @{$args{deps}});
+
+      # Because VMS C isn't very good at combining a /INCLUDE path with
+      # #includes having a relative directory (like '#include "../foo.h"),
+      # the best choice is to move to the first source file's intended
+      # directory before compiling, and make sure to write the object file
+      # in the correct position (important when the object tree is other
+      # than the source tree).
+      my $forward = dirname($args{srcs}->[0]);
+      my $backward = abs2rel(rel2abs("."), rel2abs($forward));
+      my $objd = abs2rel(rel2abs(dirname($obj)), rel2abs($forward));
+      my $objn = basename($obj);
+      my $srcs =
+          join(", ",
+               map { abs2rel(rel2abs($_), rel2abs($forward)) } @{$args{srcs}});
+      my $ecflags = { lib => '$(LIB_CFLAGS)',
+                      dso => '$(DSO_CFLAGS)',
+                      bin => '$(BIN_CFLAGS)' } -> {$args{intent}};
+      my $incs_on = "\@ !";
+      my $incs_off = "\@ !";
+      my $incs = "";
+      my @incs = ();
+      push @incs, @{$args{incs}} if @{$args{incs}};
+      unless ($disabled{zlib}) {
+          # GNV$ZLIB_INCLUDE is the standard logical name for later zlib
+          # incarnations.
+          push @incs, ($withargs{zlib_include} || 'GNV$ZLIB_INCLUDE:');
+      }
+      if (@incs) {
+          $incs_on =
+              "DEFINE tmp_includes "
+              .join(",-\n\t\t\t", map {
+                                      file_name_is_absolute($_)
+                                      ? $_ : catdir($backward,$_)
+                                  } @incs);
+          $incs_off = "DEASSIGN tmp_includes";
+          $incs = " /INCLUDE=(tmp_includes:)";
+      }
+      my $before = $unified_info{before}->{$obj.".OBJ"} || "\@ !";
+      my $after = $unified_info{after}->{$obj.".OBJ"} || "\@ !";
+      my $depbuild = $disabled{makedepend} ? ""
+          : " /MMS=(FILE=${objd}${objn}.tmp-D,TARGET=$obj.OBJ)";
+
+      return <<"EOF";
+$obj.OBJ : $deps
+        ${before}
+        SET DEFAULT $forward
+        $incs_on
+        \$(CC) \$(CFLAGS)${ecflags}${incs}${depbuild} /OBJECT=${objd}${objn}.OBJ /REPOSITORY=$backward $srcs
+        $incs_off
+        SET DEFAULT $backward
+        ${after}
+        \@ PIPE ( \$(PERL) -e "use File::Compare qw/compare_text/; my \$x = compare_text(""$obj.D"",""$obj.tmp-D""); exit(0x10000000 + (\$x == 0));" || -
+                 RENAME $obj.tmp-D $obj.d )
+        \@ IF F\$SEARCH("$obj.tmp-D") .NES. "" THEN DELETE $obj.tmp-D;*
+        - PURGE $obj.OBJ
+EOF
+  }
+  sub libobj2shlib {
+      my %args = @_;
+      my $lib = $args{lib};
+      my $shlib = $args{shlib};
+      my $libd = dirname($lib);
+      my $libn = basename($lib);
+      (my $mkdef_key = $libn) =~ s/^${osslprefix_q}lib([^0-9]*)\d*/$1/i;
+      my @deps = map {
+          $disabled{shared} ? $_.".OLB"
+              : $unified_info{sharednames}->{$_}.".EXE"; } @{$args{deps}};
+      my $deps = join(", -\n\t\t", @deps);
+      my $shlib_target = $disabled{shared} ? "" : $target{shared_target};
+      my $ordinalsfile = defined($args{ordinals}) ? $args{ordinals}->[1] : "";
+      my $engine_opt = abs2rel(rel2abs(catfile($config{sourcedir},
+                                               "VMS", "engine.opt")),
+                               rel2abs($config{builddir}));
+      my $mkdef_pl = abs2rel(rel2abs(catfile($config{sourcedir},
+                                             "util", "mkdef.pl")),
+                             rel2abs($config{builddir}));
+      my $translatesyms_pl = abs2rel(rel2abs(catfile($config{sourcedir},
+                                                     "VMS", "translatesyms.pl")),
+                                     rel2abs($config{builddir}));
+      # The "[]" hack is because in .OPT files, each line inherits the
+      # previous line's file spec as default, so if no directory spec
+      # is present in the current line and the previous line has one that
+      # doesn't apply, you're in for a surprise.
+      my $write_opt =
+          join("\n\t", map { my $x = $_ =~ /\[/ ? $_ : "[]".$_;
+                             $x =~ s|(\.EXE)|$1/SHARE|;
+                             $x =~ s|(\.OLB)|$1/LIB|;
+                             "WRITE OPT_FILE \"$x\"" } @deps)
+          || "\@ !";
+      return <<"EOF";
+$shlib.EXE : $lib.OLB $deps $ordinalsfile
+        \$(PERL) $mkdef_pl "$mkdef_key" "VMS" > $shlib.SYMVEC-tmp
+        \$(PERL) $translatesyms_pl \$(BLDDIR)CXX\$DEMANGLER_DB. < $shlib.SYMVEC-tmp > $shlib.SYMVEC
+        DELETE $shlib.SYMVEC-tmp;*
+        OPEN/WRITE/SHARE=READ OPT_FILE $shlib.OPT
+        WRITE OPT_FILE "IDENTIFICATION=""V$config{version}"""
+        TYPE $shlib.SYMVEC /OUTPUT=OPT_FILE:
+        WRITE OPT_FILE "$lib.OLB/LIBRARY"
+        $write_opt
+        CLOSE OPT_FILE
+        LINK /MAP=$shlib.MAP /FULL/SHARE=$shlib.EXE $shlib.OPT/OPT \$(EX_LIBS)
+        DELETE $shlib.SYMVEC;*
+        PURGE $shlib.EXE,$shlib.OPT,$shlib.MAP
+EOF
+  }
+  sub obj2dso {
+      my %args = @_;
+      my $lib = $args{lib};
+      my $libd = dirname($lib);
+      my $libn = basename($lib);
+      (my $libn_nolib = $libn) =~ s/^lib//;
+      my @objs = map { "$_.OBJ" } @{$args{objs}};
+      my @deps = map {
+          $disabled{shared} ? $_.".OLB"
+              : $unified_info{sharednames}->{$_}.".EXE"; } @{$args{deps}};
+      my $deps = join(", -\n\t\t", @objs, @deps);
+      my $shlib_target = $disabled{shared} ? "" : $target{shared_target};
+      my $engine_opt = abs2rel(rel2abs(catfile($config{sourcedir},
+                                               "VMS", "engine.opt")),
+                               rel2abs($config{builddir}));
+      # The "[]" hack is because in .OPT files, each line inherits the
+      # previous line's file spec as default, so if no directory spec
+      # is present in the current line and the previous line has one that
+      # doesn't apply, you're in for a surprise.
+      my $write_opt1 =
+          join(",-\"\n\t", map { my $x = $_ =~ /\[/ ? $_ : "[]".$_;
+                                 "WRITE OPT_FILE \"$x" } @objs).
+          "\"";
+      my $write_opt2 =
+          join("\n\t", map { my $x = $_ =~ /\[/ ? $_ : "[]".$_;
+                             $x =~ s|(\.EXE)|$1/SHARE|;
+                             $x =~ s|(\.OLB)|$1/LIB|;
+                             "WRITE OPT_FILE \"$x\"" } @deps)
+          || "\@ !";
+      return <<"EOF";
+$lib.EXE : $deps
+        OPEN/WRITE/SHARE=READ OPT_FILE $lib.OPT
+        TYPE $engine_opt /OUTPUT=OPT_FILE:
+        $write_opt1
+        $write_opt2
+        CLOSE OPT_FILE
+        LINK /MAP=$lib.MAP /FULL/SHARE=$lib.EXE $lib.OPT/OPT \$(EX_LIBS)
+        - PURGE $lib.EXE,$lib.OPT,$lib.MAP
+EOF
+  }
+  sub obj2lib {
+      my %args = @_;
+      my $lib = $args{lib};
+      my $objs = join(", -\n\t\t", map { $_.".OBJ" } (@{$args{objs}}));
+      my $fill_lib = join("\n\t", (map { "LIBRARY/REPLACE $lib.OLB $_.OBJ" }
+                                    @{$args{objs}}));
+      return <<"EOF";
+$lib.OLB : $objs
+        LIBRARY/CREATE/OBJECT $lib.OLB
+        $fill_lib
+        - PURGE $lib.OLB
+EOF
+  }
+  sub obj2bin {
+      my %args = @_;
+      my $bin = $args{bin};
+      my $bind = dirname($bin);
+      my $binn = basename($bin);
+      my @objs = map { "$_.OBJ" } @{$args{objs}};
+      my @deps = map {
+          $disabled{shared} ? $_.".OLB"
+              : $unified_info{sharednames}->{$_}.".EXE"; } @{$args{deps}};
+      my $deps = join(", -\n\t\t", @objs, @deps);
+      # The "[]" hack is because in .OPT files, each line inherits the
+      # previous line's file spec as default, so if no directory spec
+      # is present in the current line and the previous line has one that
+      # doesn't apply, you're in for a surprise.
+      my $write_opt1 =
+          join(",-\"\n\t", map { my $x = $_ =~ /\[/ ? $_ : "[]".$_;
+                                 "WRITE OPT_FILE \"$x" } @objs).
+          "\"";
+      my $write_opt2 =
+          join("\n\t", map { my $x = $_ =~ /\[/ ? $_ : "[]".$_;
+                             $x =~ s|(\.EXE)|$1/SHARE|;
+                             $x =~ s|(\.OLB)|$1/LIB|;
+                             "WRITE OPT_FILE \"$x\"" } @deps)
+          || "\@ !";
+      return <<"EOF";
+$bin.EXE : $deps
+        OPEN/WRITE/SHARE=READ OPT_FILE $bin.OPT
+        $write_opt1
+        $write_opt2
+        CLOSE OPT_FILE
+        LINK/EXEC=$bin.EXE \$(LDFLAGS) $bin.OPT/OPT \$(EX_LIBS)
+        - PURGE $bin.EXE,$bin.OPT
+EOF
+  }
+  sub in2script {
+      my %args = @_;
+      my $script = $args{script};
+      return "" if grep { $_ eq $script } @{$args{sources}}; # No overwrite!
+      my $sources = join(" ", @{$args{sources}});
+      my $dofile = abs2rel(rel2abs(catfile($config{sourcedir},
+                                           "util", "dofile.pl")),
+                           rel2abs($config{builddir}));
+      return <<"EOF";
+$script : $sources
+        \$(PERL) "-I\$(BLDDIR)" "-Mconfigdata" $dofile -
+	    "-o$target{build_file}" $sources > $script
+        SET FILE/PROT=(S:RWED,O:RWED,G:RE,W:RE) $script
+        PURGE $script
+EOF
+  }
+  ""    # Important!  This becomes part of the template result.
+-}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/Configurations/unix-Makefile.tmpl b/openssl-1.1.0h/Configurations/unix-Makefile.tmpl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..40cf2c3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/Configurations/unix-Makefile.tmpl
@@ -0,0 +1,1044 @@
+##
+## Makefile for OpenSSL
+##
+## {- join("\n## ", @autowarntext) -}
+{-
+     our $objext = $target{obj_extension} || ".o";
+     our $depext = $target{dep_extension} || ".d";
+     our $exeext = $target{exe_extension} || "";
+     our $libext = $target{lib_extension} || ".a";
+     our $shlibext = $target{shared_extension} || ".so";
+     our $shlibvariant = $target{shlib_variant} || "";
+     our $shlibextsimple = $target{shared_extension_simple} || ".so";
+     our $shlibextimport = $target{shared_import_extension} || "";
+     our $dsoext = $target{dso_extension} || ".so";
+
+     sub windowsdll { $config{target} =~ /^(?:Cygwin|mingw)/ }
+
+     our $sover = $config{target} =~ /^mingw/
+         ? $config{shlib_major}."_".$config{shlib_minor}
+         : $config{shlib_major}.".".$config{shlib_minor};
+
+     # shlib and shlib_simple both take a static library name and figure
+     # out what the shlib name should be.
+     #
+     # When OpenSSL is configured "no-shared", these functions will just
+     # return empty lists, making them suitable to join().
+     #
+     # With Windows DLL producers, shlib($libname) will return the shared
+     # library name (which usually is different from the static library
+     # name) with the default shared extension appended to it, while
+     # shlib_simple($libname) will return the static library name with
+     # the shared extension followed by ".a" appended to it.  The former
+     # result is used as the runtime shared library while the latter is
+     # used as the DLL import library.
+     #
+     # On all Unix systems, shlib($libname) will return the library name
+     # with the default shared extension, while shlib_simple($libname)
+     # will return the name from shlib($libname) with any SO version number
+     # removed.  On some systems, they may therefore return the exact same
+     # string.
+     sub shlib {
+         return () if $disabled{shared};
+         my $lib = shift;
+         return $unified_info{sharednames}->{$lib}. $shlibvariant. $shlibext;
+     }
+     sub shlib_simple {
+         return () if $disabled{shared};
+
+         my $lib = shift;
+         if (windowsdll()) {
+             return $lib . $shlibextimport;
+         }
+         return $lib .  $shlibextsimple;
+     }
+
+     # dso is a complement to shlib / shlib_simple that returns the
+     # given libname with the simple shared extension (possible SO version
+     # removed).  This differs from shlib_simple() by being unconditional.
+     sub dso {
+         my $engine = shift;
+
+         return $engine . $dsoext;
+     }
+     # This makes sure things get built in the order they need
+     # to. You're welcome.
+     sub dependmagic {
+         my $target = shift;
+
+         return "$target: build_generated\n\t\$(MAKE) depend && \$(MAKE) _$target\n_$target";
+     }
+     '';
+-}
+PLATFORM={- $config{target} -}
+OPTIONS={- $config{options} -}
+CONFIGURE_ARGS=({- join(", ",quotify_l(@{$config{perlargv}})) -})
+SRCDIR={- $config{sourcedir} -}
+BLDDIR={- $config{builddir} -}
+
+VERSION={- $config{version} -}
+MAJOR={- $config{major} -}
+MINOR={- $config{minor} -}
+SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER={- $config{shlib_version_number} -}
+SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY={- $config{shlib_version_history} -}
+SHLIB_MAJOR={- $config{shlib_major} -}
+SHLIB_MINOR={- $config{shlib_minor} -}
+SHLIB_TARGET={- $target{shared_target} -}
+
+LIBS={- join(" ", map { $_.$libext } @{$unified_info{libraries}}) -}
+SHLIBS={- join(" ", map { shlib($_) } @{$unified_info{libraries}}) -}
+SHLIB_INFO={- join(" ", map { "\"".shlib($_).";".shlib_simple($_)."\"" } @{$unified_info{libraries}}) -}
+ENGINES={- join(" ", map { dso($_) } @{$unified_info{engines}}) -}
+PROGRAMS={- join(" ", map { $_.$exeext } @{$unified_info{programs}}) -}
+SCRIPTS={- join(" ", @{$unified_info{scripts}}) -}
+{- output_off() if $disabled{makedepend}; "" -}
+DEPS={- join(" ", map { (my $x = $_) =~ s|\.o$|$depext|; $x; }
+                  grep { $unified_info{sources}->{$_}->[0] =~ /\.c$/ }
+                  keys %{$unified_info{sources}}); -}
+{- output_on() if $disabled{makedepend}; "" -}
+GENERATED_MANDATORY={- join(" ", @{$unified_info{depends}->{""}} ) -}
+GENERATED={- join(" ",
+                  ( grep { defined $unified_info{generate}->{$_} }
+                    map { @{$unified_info{sources}->{$_}} }
+                    grep { /\.o$/ } keys %{$unified_info{sources}} ),
+                  ( grep { /\.h$/ } keys %{$unified_info{generate}} )) -}
+
+INSTALL_LIBS={- join(" ", map { $_.$libext } @{$unified_info{install}->{libraries}}) -}
+INSTALL_SHLIBS={- join(" ", map { shlib($_) } @{$unified_info{install}->{libraries}}) -}
+INSTALL_SHLIB_INFO={- join(" ", map { "\"".shlib($_).";".shlib_simple($_)."\"" } @{$unified_info{install}->{libraries}}) -}
+INSTALL_ENGINES={- join(" ", map { dso($_) } @{$unified_info{install}->{engines}}) -}
+INSTALL_PROGRAMS={- join(" ", map { $_.$exeext } @{$unified_info{install}->{programs}}) -}
+{- output_off() if $disabled{apps}; "" -}
+BIN_SCRIPTS=$(BLDDIR)/tools/c_rehash
+MISC_SCRIPTS=$(BLDDIR)/apps/CA.pl $(BLDDIR)/apps/tsget
+{- output_on() if $disabled{apps}; "" -}
+
+APPS_OPENSSL={- use File::Spec::Functions;
+                catfile("apps","openssl") -}
+
+# DESTDIR is for package builders so that they can configure for, say,
+# /usr/ and yet have everything installed to /tmp/somedir/usr/.
+# Normally it is left empty.
+DESTDIR=
+
+# Do not edit these manually. Use Configure with --prefix or --openssldir
+# to change this!  Short explanation in the top comment in Configure
+INSTALLTOP={- # $prefix is used in the OPENSSLDIR perl snippet
+	      #
+	      our $prefix = $config{prefix} || "/usr/local";
+              $prefix -}
+OPENSSLDIR={- #
+	      # The logic here is that if no --openssldir was given,
+	      # OPENSSLDIR will get the value from $prefix plus "/ssl".
+	      # If --openssldir was given and the value is an absolute
+	      # path, OPENSSLDIR will get its value without change.
+	      # If the value from --openssldir is a relative path,
+	      # OPENSSLDIR will get $prefix with the --openssldir
+	      # value appended as a subdirectory.
+	      #
+              use File::Spec::Functions;
+              our $openssldir =
+                  $config{openssldir} ?
+                      (file_name_is_absolute($config{openssldir}) ?
+                           $config{openssldir}
+                           : catdir($prefix, $config{openssldir}))
+                      : catdir($prefix, "ssl");
+              $openssldir -}
+LIBDIR={- #
+          # if $prefix/lib$target{multilib} is not an existing
+          # directory, then assume that it's not searched by linker
+          # automatically, in which case adding $target{multilib} suffix
+          # causes more grief than we're ready to tolerate, so don't...
+          our $multilib =
+              -d "$prefix/lib$target{multilib}" ? $target{multilib} : "";
+          our $libdir = $config{libdir} || "lib$multilib";
+          $libdir -}
+ENGINESDIR={- use File::Spec::Functions;
+              catdir($prefix,$libdir,"engines-$sover") -}
+
+# Convenience variable for those who want to set the rpath in shared
+# libraries and applications
+LIBRPATH=$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)
+
+MANDIR=$(INSTALLTOP)/share/man
+DOCDIR=$(INSTALLTOP)/share/doc/$(BASENAME)
+HTMLDIR=$(DOCDIR)/html
+
+# MANSUFFIX is for the benefit of anyone who may want to have a suffix
+# appended after the manpage file section number.  "ssl" is popular,
+# resulting in files such as config.5ssl rather than config.5.
+MANSUFFIX=
+HTMLSUFFIX=html
+
+
+
+CROSS_COMPILE= {- $config{cross_compile_prefix} -}
+CC= $(CROSS_COMPILE){- $target{cc} -}
+CFLAGS={- our $cflags2 = join(" ",(map { "-D".$_} @{$target{defines}}, @{$config{defines}}),"-DOPENSSLDIR=\"\\\"\$(OPENSSLDIR)\\\"\"","-DENGINESDIR=\"\\\"\$(ENGINESDIR)\\\"\"") -} {- $target{cflags} -} {- $config{cflags} -}
+CFLAGS_Q={- $cflags2 =~ s|([\\"])|\\$1|g; $cflags2 -} {- $config{cflags} -}
+LDFLAGS= {- $target{lflags} -}
+PLIB_LDFLAGS= {- $target{plib_lflags} -}
+EX_LIBS= {- $target{ex_libs} -} {- $config{ex_libs} -}
+LIB_CFLAGS={- $target{shared_cflag} || "" -}
+LIB_LDFLAGS={- $target{shared_ldflag}." ".$config{shared_ldflag} -}
+DSO_CFLAGS={- $target{shared_cflag} || "" -}
+DSO_LDFLAGS=$(LIB_LDFLAGS)
+BIN_CFLAGS={- $target{bin_cflags} -}
+
+PERL={- $config{perl} -}
+
+ARFLAGS= {- $target{arflags} -}
+AR=$(CROSS_COMPILE){- $target{ar} || "ar" -} $(ARFLAGS) r
+RANLIB= {- $target{ranlib} -}
+NM= $(CROSS_COMPILE){- $target{nm} || "nm" -}
+RCFLAGS={- $target{shared_rcflag} -}
+RC= $(CROSS_COMPILE){- $target{rc} || "windres" -}
+RM= rm -f
+RMDIR= rmdir
+TAR= {- $target{tar} || "tar" -}
+TARFLAGS= {- $target{tarflags} -}
+MAKEDEPEND={- $config{makedepprog} -}
+
+BASENAME=       openssl
+NAME=           $(BASENAME)-$(VERSION)
+TARFILE=        ../$(NAME).tar
+
+# We let the C compiler driver to take care of .s files. This is done in
+# order to be excused from maintaining a separate set of architecture
+# dependent assembler flags. E.g. if you throw -mcpu=ultrasparc at SPARC
+# gcc, then the driver will automatically translate it to -xarch=v8plus
+# and pass it down to assembler.  In any case, we do not define AS or
+# ASFLAGS for this reason.
+PERLASM_SCHEME= {- $target{perlasm_scheme} -}
+
+# For x86 assembler: Set PROCESSOR to 386 if you want to support
+# the 80386.
+PROCESSOR= {- $config{processor} -}
+
+# We want error [and other] messages in English. Trouble is that make(1)
+# doesn't pass macros down as environment variables unless there already
+# was corresponding variable originally set. In other words we can only
+# reassign environment variables, but not set new ones, not in portable
+# manner that is. That's why we reassign several, just to be sure...
+LC_ALL=C
+LC_MESSAGES=C
+LANG=C
+
+# The main targets ###################################################
+
+{- dependmagic('all'); -}: build_libs_nodep build_engines_nodep build_programs_nodep link-utils
+{- dependmagic('build_libs'); -}: build_libs_nodep
+{- dependmagic('build_engines'); -}: build_engines_nodep
+{- dependmagic('build_programs'); -}: build_programs_nodep
+
+build_generated: $(GENERATED_MANDATORY)
+build_libs_nodep: libcrypto.pc libssl.pc openssl.pc
+build_engines_nodep: $(ENGINES)
+build_programs_nodep: $(PROGRAMS) $(SCRIPTS)
+
+# Kept around for backward compatibility
+build_apps build_tests: build_programs
+
+# Convenience target to prebuild all generated files, not just the mandatory
+# ones
+build_all_generated: $(GENERATED_MANDATORY) $(GENERATED)
+
+test: tests
+{- dependmagic('tests'); -}: build_programs_nodep build_engines_nodep link-utils
+	@ : {- output_off() if $disabled{tests}; "" -}
+	( cd test; \
+	  mkdir -p test-runs; \
+	  SRCTOP=../$(SRCDIR) \
+	  BLDTOP=../$(BLDDIR) \
+	  RESULT_D=test-runs \
+	  PERL="$(PERL)" \
+	  EXE_EXT={- $exeext -} \
+	  OPENSSL_ENGINES=`cd ../$(BLDDIR)/engines; pwd` \
+	  OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY=on \
+	    $(PERL) ../$(SRCDIR)/test/run_tests.pl $(TESTS) )
+	@ : {- if ($disabled{tests}) { output_on(); } else { output_off(); } "" -}
+	@echo "Tests are not supported with your chosen Configure options"
+	@ : {- output_on() if !$disabled{tests}; "" -}
+
+list-tests:
+	@ : {- output_off() if $disabled{tests}; "" -}
+	@SRCTOP="$(SRCDIR)" \
+	 $(PERL) $(SRCDIR)/test/run_tests.pl list
+	@ : {- if ($disabled{tests}) { output_on(); } else { output_off(); } "" -}
+	@echo "Tests are not supported with your chosen Configure options"
+	@ : {- output_on() if !$disabled{tests}; "" -}
+
+install: install_sw install_ssldirs install_docs
+
+uninstall: uninstall_docs uninstall_sw
+
+libclean:
+	@set -e; for s in $(SHLIB_INFO); do \
+		s1=`echo "$$s" | cut -f1 -d";"`; \
+		s2=`echo "$$s" | cut -f2 -d";"`; \
+		echo $(RM) $$s1; \
+		$(RM) $$s1; \
+		if [ "$$s1" != "$$s2" ]; then \
+			echo $(RM) $$s2; \
+			$(RM) $$s2; \
+		fi; \
+	done
+	$(RM) $(LIBS)
+	$(RM) *.map
+
+clean: libclean
+	$(RM) $(PROGRAMS) $(TESTPROGS) $(ENGINES) $(SCRIPTS)
+	$(RM) $(GENERATED)
+	-$(RM) `find . -name '*{- $depext -}' -a \! -path "./.git/*"`
+	-$(RM) `find . -name '*{- $objext -}' -a \! -path "./.git/*"`
+	$(RM) core
+	$(RM) tags TAGS doc-nits
+	$(RM) -r test/test-runs
+	$(RM) openssl.pc libcrypto.pc libssl.pc
+	-$(RM) `find . -type l -a \! -path "./.git/*"`
+	$(RM) $(TARFILE)
+
+distclean: clean
+	$(RM) configdata.pm
+	$(RM) Makefile
+
+# We check if any depfile is newer than Makefile and decide to
+# concatenate only if that is true.
+depend:
+	@: {- output_off() if $disabled{makedepend}; "" -}
+	@if egrep "^# DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE" Makefile >/dev/null && [ -z "`find $(DEPS) -newer Makefile 2>/dev/null; exit 0`" ]; then :; else \
+	  ( $(PERL) -pe 'exit 0 if /^# DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE.*/' < Makefile; \
+	    echo '# DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE -- make depend depends on it.'; \
+	    echo; \
+	    for f in $(DEPS); do \
+	      if [ -f $$f ]; then cat $$f; fi; \
+	    done ) > Makefile.new; \
+	  if cmp Makefile.new Makefile >/dev/null 2>&1; then \
+	    rm -f Makefile.new; \
+	  else \
+	    mv -f Makefile.new Makefile; \
+	  fi; \
+	fi
+	@: {- output_on() if $disabled{makedepend}; "" -}
+
+# Install helper targets #############################################
+
+install_sw: all install_dev install_engines install_runtime
+
+uninstall_sw: uninstall_runtime uninstall_engines uninstall_dev
+
+install_docs: install_man_docs install_html_docs
+
+uninstall_docs: uninstall_man_docs uninstall_html_docs
+	$(RM) -r -v $(DESTDIR)$(DOCDIR)
+
+install_ssldirs:
+	@$(PERL) $(SRCDIR)/util/mkdir-p.pl $(DESTDIR)$(OPENSSLDIR)/certs
+	@$(PERL) $(SRCDIR)/util/mkdir-p.pl $(DESTDIR)$(OPENSSLDIR)/private
+	@$(PERL) $(SRCDIR)/util/mkdir-p.pl $(DESTDIR)$(OPENSSLDIR)/misc
+	@set -e; for x in dummy $(MISC_SCRIPTS); do \
+		if [ "$$x" = "dummy" ]; then continue; fi; \
+		fn=`basename $$x`; \
+		echo "install $$x -> $(DESTDIR)$(OPENSSLDIR)/misc/$$fn"; \
+		cp $$x $(DESTDIR)$(OPENSSLDIR)/misc/$$fn.new; \
+		chmod 755 $(DESTDIR)$(OPENSSLDIR)/misc/$$fn.new; \
+		mv -f $(DESTDIR)$(OPENSSLDIR)/misc/$$fn.new \
+		      $(DESTDIR)$(OPENSSLDIR)/misc/$$fn; \
+	done
+	@echo "install $(SRCDIR)/apps/openssl.cnf -> $(DESTDIR)$(OPENSSLDIR)/openssl.cnf.dist"
+	@cp $(SRCDIR)/apps/openssl.cnf $(DESTDIR)$(OPENSSLDIR)/openssl.cnf.new
+	@chmod 644 $(DESTDIR)$(OPENSSLDIR)/openssl.cnf.new
+	@mv -f  $(DESTDIR)$(OPENSSLDIR)/openssl.cnf.new $(DESTDIR)$(OPENSSLDIR)/openssl.cnf.dist
+	@if ! [ -f "$(DESTDIR)$(OPENSSLDIR)/openssl.cnf" ]; then \
+		echo "install $(SRCDIR)/apps/openssl.cnf -> $(DESTDIR)$(OPENSSLDIR)/openssl.cnf"; \
+		cp $(SRCDIR)/apps/openssl.cnf $(DESTDIR)$(OPENSSLDIR)/openssl.cnf; \
+		chmod 644 $(DESTDIR)$(OPENSSLDIR)/openssl.cnf; \
+	fi
+
+install_dev:
+	@[ -n "$(INSTALLTOP)" ] || (echo INSTALLTOP should not be empty; exit 1)
+	@echo "*** Installing development files"
+	@$(PERL) $(SRCDIR)/util/mkdir-p.pl $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl
+	@ : {- output_off() unless grep { $_ eq "OPENSSL_USE_APPLINK" } @{$target{defines}}; "" -}
+	@echo "install $(SRCDIR)/ms/applink.c -> $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl/applink.c"
+	@cp $(SRCDIR)/ms/applink.c $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl/applink.c
+	@chmod 644 $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl/applink.c
+	@ : {- output_on() unless grep { $_ eq "OPENSSL_USE_APPLINK" } @{$target{defines}}; "" -}
+	@set -e; for i in $(SRCDIR)/include/openssl/*.h \
+			  $(BLDDIR)/include/openssl/*.h; do \
+		fn=`basename $$i`; \
+		echo "install $$i -> $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl/$$fn"; \
+		cp $$i $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl/$$fn; \
+		chmod 644 $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl/$$fn; \
+	done
+	@$(PERL) $(SRCDIR)/util/mkdir-p.pl $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)
+	@set -e; for l in $(INSTALL_LIBS); do \
+		fn=`basename $$l`; \
+		echo "install $$l -> $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$fn"; \
+		cp $$l $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$fn.new; \
+		$(RANLIB) $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$fn.new; \
+		chmod 644 $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$fn.new; \
+		mv -f $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$fn.new \
+		      $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$fn; \
+	done
+	@ : {- output_off() if $disabled{shared}; "" -}
+	@set -e; for s in $(INSTALL_SHLIB_INFO); do \
+		s1=`echo "$$s" | cut -f1 -d";"`; \
+		s2=`echo "$$s" | cut -f2 -d";"`; \
+		fn1=`basename $$s1`; \
+		fn2=`basename $$s2`; \
+		: {- output_off() if windowsdll(); "" -}; \
+		echo "install $$s1 -> $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$fn1"; \
+		cp $$s1 $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$fn1.new; \
+		chmod 755 $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$fn1.new; \
+		mv -f $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$fn1.new \
+		      $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$fn1; \
+		if [ "$$fn1" != "$$fn2" ]; then \
+			echo "link $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$fn2 -> $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$fn1"; \
+			ln -sf $$fn1 $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$fn2; \
+		fi; \
+		: {- output_on() if windowsdll(); "" -}{- output_off() unless windowsdll(); "" -}; \
+		echo "install $$s2 -> $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$fn2"; \
+		cp $$s2 $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$fn2.new; \
+		chmod 755 $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$fn2.new; \
+		mv -f $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$fn2.new \
+		      $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$fn2; \
+		: {- output_on() unless windowsdll(); "" -}; \
+	done
+	@ : {- output_on() if $disabled{shared}; "" -}
+	@$(PERL) $(SRCDIR)/util/mkdir-p.pl $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig
+	@echo "install libcrypto.pc -> $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig/libcrypto.pc"
+	@cp libcrypto.pc $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig
+	@chmod 644 $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig/libcrypto.pc
+	@echo "install libssl.pc -> $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig/libssl.pc"
+	@cp libssl.pc $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig
+	@chmod 644 $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig/libssl.pc
+	@echo "install openssl.pc -> $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig/openssl.pc"
+	@cp openssl.pc $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig
+	@chmod 644 $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig/openssl.pc
+
+uninstall_dev:
+	@echo "*** Uninstalling development files"
+	@ : {- output_off() unless grep { $_ eq "OPENSSL_USE_APPLINK" } @{$target{defines}}; "" -}
+	@echo "$(RM) $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl/applink.c"
+	@$(RM) $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl/applink.c
+	@ : {- output_on() unless grep { $_ eq "OPENSSL_USE_APPLINK" } @{$target{defines}}; "" -}
+	@set -e; for i in $(SRCDIR)/include/openssl/*.h \
+			  $(BLDDIR)/include/openssl/*.h; do \
+		fn=`basename $$i`; \
+		echo "$(RM) $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl/$$fn"; \
+		$(RM) $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl/$$fn; \
+	done
+	-$(RMDIR) $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl
+	-$(RMDIR) $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/include
+	@set -e; for l in $(INSTALL_LIBS); do \
+		fn=`basename $$l`; \
+		echo "$(RM) $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$fn"; \
+		$(RM) $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$fn; \
+	done
+	@ : {- output_off() if $disabled{shared}; "" -}
+	@set -e; for s in $(INSTALL_SHLIB_INFO); do \
+		s1=`echo "$$s" | cut -f1 -d";"`; \
+		s2=`echo "$$s" | cut -f2 -d";"`; \
+		fn1=`basename $$s1`; \
+		fn2=`basename $$s2`; \
+		: {- output_off() if windowsdll(); "" -}; \
+		echo "$(RM) $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$fn1"; \
+		$(RM) $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$fn1; \
+		if [ "$$fn1" != "$$fn2" ]; then \
+			echo "$(RM) $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$fn2"; \
+			$(RM) $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$fn2; \
+		fi; \
+		: {- output_on() if windowsdll(); "" -}{- output_off() unless windowsdll(); "" -}; \
+		echo "$(RM) $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$fn2"; \
+		$(RM) $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$fn2; \
+		: {- output_on() unless windowsdll(); "" -}; \
+	done
+	@ : {- output_on() if $disabled{shared}; "" -}
+	$(RM) $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig/libcrypto.pc
+	$(RM) $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig/libssl.pc
+	$(RM) $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig/openssl.pc
+	-$(RMDIR) $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig
+	-$(RMDIR) $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)
+
+install_engines:
+	@[ -n "$(INSTALLTOP)" ] || (echo INSTALLTOP should not be empty; exit 1)
+	@$(PERL) $(SRCDIR)/util/mkdir-p.pl $(DESTDIR)$(ENGINESDIR)/
+	@echo "*** Installing engines"
+	@set -e; for e in dummy $(INSTALL_ENGINES); do \
+		if [ "$$e" = "dummy" ]; then continue; fi; \
+		fn=`basename $$e`; \
+		echo "install $$e -> $(DESTDIR)$(ENGINESDIR)/$$fn"; \
+		cp $$e $(DESTDIR)$(ENGINESDIR)/$$fn.new; \
+		chmod 755 $(DESTDIR)$(ENGINESDIR)/$$fn.new; \
+		mv -f $(DESTDIR)$(ENGINESDIR)/$$fn.new \
+		      $(DESTDIR)$(ENGINESDIR)/$$fn; \
+	done
+
+uninstall_engines:
+	@echo "*** Uninstalling engines"
+	@set -e; for e in dummy $(INSTALL_ENGINES); do \
+		if [ "$$e" = "dummy" ]; then continue; fi; \
+		fn=`basename $$e`; \
+		if [ "$$fn" = '{- dso("ossltest") -}' ]; then \
+			continue; \
+		fi; \
+		echo "$(RM) $(DESTDIR)$(ENGINESDIR)/$$fn"; \
+		$(RM) $(DESTDIR)$(ENGINESDIR)/$$fn; \
+	done
+	-$(RMDIR) $(DESTDIR)$(ENGINESDIR)
+
+install_runtime:
+	@[ -n "$(INSTALLTOP)" ] || (echo INSTALLTOP should not be empty; exit 1)
+	@$(PERL) $(SRCDIR)/util/mkdir-p.pl $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin
+	@ : {- output_off() if windowsdll(); "" -}
+	@$(PERL) $(SRCDIR)/util/mkdir-p.pl $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)
+	@ : {- output_on() if windowsdll(); "" -}
+	@echo "*** Installing runtime files"
+	@set -e; for s in dummy $(INSTALL_SHLIBS); do \
+		if [ "$$s" = "dummy" ]; then continue; fi; \
+		fn=`basename $$s`; \
+		: {- output_off() unless windowsdll(); "" -}; \
+		echo "install $$s -> $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$fn"; \
+		cp $$s $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$fn.new; \
+		chmod 644 $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$fn.new; \
+		mv -f $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$fn.new \
+		      $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$fn; \
+		: {- output_on() unless windowsdll(); "" -}{- output_off() if windowsdll(); "" -}; \
+		echo "install $$s -> $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$fn"; \
+		cp $$s $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$fn.new; \
+		chmod 755 $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$fn.new; \
+		mv -f $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$fn.new \
+		      $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$fn; \
+		: {- output_on() if windowsdll(); "" -}; \
+	done
+	@set -e; for x in dummy $(INSTALL_PROGRAMS); do \
+		if [ "$$x" = "dummy" ]; then continue; fi; \
+		fn=`basename $$x`; \
+		echo "install $$x -> $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$fn"; \
+		cp $$x $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$fn.new; \
+		chmod 755 $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$fn.new; \
+		mv -f $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$fn.new \
+		      $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$fn; \
+	done
+	@set -e; for x in dummy $(BIN_SCRIPTS); do \
+		if [ "$$x" = "dummy" ]; then continue; fi; \
+		fn=`basename $$x`; \
+		echo "install $$x -> $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$fn"; \
+		cp $$x $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$fn.new; \
+		chmod 755 $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$fn.new; \
+		mv -f $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$fn.new \
+		      $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$fn; \
+	done
+
+uninstall_runtime:
+	@echo "*** Uninstalling runtime files"
+	@set -e; for x in dummy $(INSTALL_PROGRAMS); \
+	do  \
+		if [ "$$x" = "dummy" ]; then continue; fi; \
+		fn=`basename $$x`; \
+		echo "$(RM) $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$fn"; \
+		$(RM) $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$fn; \
+	done;
+	@set -e; for x in dummy $(BIN_SCRIPTS); \
+	do  \
+		if [ "$$x" = "dummy" ]; then continue; fi; \
+		fn=`basename $$x`; \
+		echo "$(RM) $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$fn"; \
+		$(RM) $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$fn; \
+	done
+	@ : {- output_off() unless windowsdll(); "" -}
+	@set -e; for s in dummy $(INSTALL_SHLIBS); do \
+		if [ "$$s" = "dummy" ]; then continue; fi; \
+		fn=`basename $$s`; \
+		echo "$(RM) $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$fn"; \
+		$(RM) $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$fn; \
+	done
+	@ : {- output_on() unless windowsdll(); "" -}
+	-$(RMDIR) $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin
+
+
+install_man_docs:
+	@[ -n "$(INSTALLTOP)" ] || (echo INSTALLTOP should not be empty; exit 1)
+	@echo "*** Installing manpages"
+	$(PERL) $(SRCDIR)/util/process_docs.pl \
+		--destdir=$(DESTDIR)$(MANDIR) --type=man --suffix=$(MANSUFFIX)
+
+uninstall_man_docs:
+	@echo "*** Uninstalling manpages"
+	$(PERL) $(SRCDIR)/util/process_docs.pl \
+		--destdir=$(DESTDIR)$(MANDIR) --type=man --suffix=$(MANSUFFIX) \
+		--remove
+
+install_html_docs:
+	@[ -n "$(INSTALLTOP)" ] || (echo INSTALLTOP should not be empty; exit 1)
+	@echo "*** Installing HTML manpages"
+	$(PERL) $(SRCDIR)/util/process_docs.pl \
+		--destdir=$(DESTDIR)$(HTMLDIR) --type=html
+
+uninstall_html_docs:
+	@echo "*** Uninstalling manpages"
+	$(PERL) $(SRCDIR)/util/process_docs.pl \
+		--destdir=$(DESTDIR)$(HTMLDIR) --type=html --remove
+
+
+# Developer targets (note: these are only available on Unix) #########
+
+update: generate errors ordinals
+
+generate: generate_apps generate_crypto_bn generate_crypto_objects \
+          generate_crypto_conf generate_crypto_asn1
+
+doc-nits:
+	(cd $(SRCDIR); $(PERL) util/find-doc-nits -n ) >doc-nits
+	if [ -s doc-nits ] ; then cat doc-nits; rm doc-nits ; exit 1; fi
+
+# Test coverage is a good idea for the future
+#coverage: $(PROGRAMS) $(TESTPROGRAMS)
+#	...
+
+lint:
+	lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRCS)
+
+generate_apps:
+	( cd $(SRCDIR); $(PERL) VMS/VMSify-conf.pl \
+				< apps/openssl.cnf > apps/openssl-vms.cnf )
+
+generate_crypto_bn:
+	( cd $(SRCDIR); $(PERL) crypto/bn/bn_prime.pl > crypto/bn/bn_prime.h )
+
+generate_crypto_objects:
+	( cd $(SRCDIR); $(PERL) crypto/objects/objects.pl \
+				crypto/objects/objects.txt \
+				crypto/objects/obj_mac.num \
+				include/openssl/obj_mac.h )
+	( cd $(SRCDIR); $(PERL) crypto/objects/obj_dat.pl \
+				include/openssl/obj_mac.h \
+				crypto/objects/obj_dat.h )
+	( cd $(SRCDIR); $(PERL) crypto/objects/objxref.pl \
+				crypto/objects/obj_mac.num \
+				crypto/objects/obj_xref.txt \
+				> crypto/objects/obj_xref.h )
+
+generate_crypto_conf:
+	( cd $(SRCDIR); $(PERL) crypto/conf/keysets.pl \
+			        > crypto/conf/conf_def.h )
+
+generate_crypto_asn1:
+	( cd $(SRCDIR); $(PERL) crypto/asn1/charmap.pl \
+			        > crypto/asn1/charmap.h )
+
+errors:
+	( cd $(SRCDIR); $(PERL) util/ck_errf.pl -strict */*.c */*/*.c )
+	( cd $(SRCDIR); $(PERL) util/mkerr.pl -recurse -write )
+	( cd $(SRCDIR)/engines; \
+	  for e in *.ec; do \
+	      $(PERL) ../util/mkerr.pl -conf $$e \
+		      -nostatic -staticloader -write *.c; \
+	  done )
+
+ordinals:
+	( b=`pwd`; cd $(SRCDIR); $(PERL) -I$$b util/mkdef.pl crypto update )
+	( b=`pwd`; cd $(SRCDIR); $(PERL) -I$$b util/mkdef.pl ssl update )
+
+test_ordinals:
+	( cd test; \
+	  SRCTOP=../$(SRCDIR) \
+	  BLDTOP=../$(BLDDIR) \
+	    $(PERL) ../$(SRCDIR)/test/run_tests.pl test_ordinals )
+
+tags TAGS: FORCE
+	rm -f TAGS tags
+	-ctags -R .
+	-etags `find . -name '*.[ch]' -o -name '*.pm'`
+
+# Release targets (note: only available on Unix) #####################
+
+# If your tar command doesn't support --owner and --group, make sure to
+# use one that does, for example GNU tar
+TAR_COMMAND=$(TAR) $(TARFLAGS) --owner 0 --group 0 -cvf -
+PREPARE_CMD=:
+tar:
+	set -e; \
+	TMPDIR=/var/tmp/openssl-copy.$$$$; \
+	DISTDIR=$(NAME); \
+	mkdir -p $$TMPDIR/$$DISTDIR; \
+	(cd $(SRCDIR); \
+	 git ls-tree -r --name-only --full-tree HEAD \
+         | grep -v '^fuzz/corpora' \
+	 | while read F; do \
+	       mkdir -p $$TMPDIR/$$DISTDIR/`dirname $$F`; \
+	       cp $$F $$TMPDIR/$$DISTDIR/$$F; \
+	   done); \
+	(cd $$TMPDIR/$$DISTDIR; \
+	 $(PREPARE_CMD); \
+	 find . -type d -print | xargs chmod 755; \
+	 find . -type f -print | xargs chmod a+r; \
+	 find . -type f -perm -0100 -print | xargs chmod a+x); \
+	(cd $$TMPDIR; $(TAR_COMMAND) $$DISTDIR) \
+	| (cd $(SRCDIR); gzip --best > $(TARFILE).gz); \
+	rm -rf $$TMPDIR
+	cd $(SRCDIR); ls -l $(TARFILE).gz
+
+dist:
+	@$(MAKE) PREPARE_CMD='$(PERL) ./Configure dist' tar
+
+# Helper targets #####################################################
+
+link-utils: $(BLDDIR)/util/opensslwrap.sh
+
+$(BLDDIR)/util/opensslwrap.sh: configdata.pm
+	@if [ "$(SRCDIR)" != "$(BLDDIR)" ]; then \
+	    mkdir -p "$(BLDDIR)/util"; \
+	    ln -sf "../$(SRCDIR)/util/opensslwrap.sh" "$(BLDDIR)/util"; \
+	fi
+
+FORCE:
+
+# Building targets ###################################################
+
+libcrypto.pc libssl.pc openssl.pc: configdata.pm $(LIBS) {- join(" ",map { shlib_simple($_) } @{$unified_info{libraries}}) -}
+libcrypto.pc:
+	@ ( echo 'prefix=$(INSTALLTOP)'; \
+	    echo 'exec_prefix=$${prefix}'; \
+	    echo 'libdir=$${exec_prefix}/$(LIBDIR)'; \
+	    echo 'includedir=$${prefix}/include'; \
+	    echo 'enginesdir=$${libdir}/engines-{- $sover -}'; \
+	    echo ''; \
+	    echo 'Name: OpenSSL-libcrypto'; \
+	    echo 'Description: OpenSSL cryptography library'; \
+	    echo 'Version: '$(VERSION); \
+	    echo 'Libs: -L$${libdir} -lcrypto'; \
+	    echo 'Libs.private: $(EX_LIBS)'; \
+	    echo 'Cflags: -I$${includedir}' ) > libcrypto.pc
+
+libssl.pc:
+	@ ( echo 'prefix=$(INSTALLTOP)'; \
+	    echo 'exec_prefix=$${prefix}'; \
+	    echo 'libdir=$${exec_prefix}/$(LIBDIR)'; \
+	    echo 'includedir=$${prefix}/include'; \
+	    echo ''; \
+	    echo 'Name: OpenSSL-libssl'; \
+	    echo 'Description: Secure Sockets Layer and cryptography libraries'; \
+	    echo 'Version: '$(VERSION); \
+	    echo 'Requires.private: libcrypto'; \
+	    echo 'Libs: -L$${libdir} -lssl'; \
+	    echo 'Cflags: -I$${includedir}' ) > libssl.pc
+
+openssl.pc:
+	@ ( echo 'prefix=$(INSTALLTOP)'; \
+	    echo 'exec_prefix=$${prefix}'; \
+	    echo 'libdir=$${exec_prefix}/$(LIBDIR)'; \
+	    echo 'includedir=$${prefix}/include'; \
+	    echo ''; \
+	    echo 'Name: OpenSSL'; \
+	    echo 'Description: Secure Sockets Layer and cryptography libraries and tools'; \
+	    echo 'Version: '$(VERSION); \
+	    echo 'Requires: libssl libcrypto' ) > openssl.pc
+
+configdata.pm: $(SRCDIR)/Configure $(SRCDIR)/config {- join(" ", @{$config{build_file_templates}}, @{$config{build_infos}}, @{$config{conf_files}}) -}
+	@echo "Detected changed: $?"
+	@echo "Reconfiguring..."
+	$(PERL) $(SRCDIR)/Configure reconf
+	@echo "**************************************************"
+	@echo "***                                            ***"
+	@echo "***   Please run the same make command again   ***"
+	@echo "***                                            ***"
+	@echo "**************************************************"
+	@false
+
+{-
+  use File::Basename;
+  use File::Spec::Functions qw/:DEFAULT abs2rel rel2abs/;
+
+  # Helper function to figure out dependencies on libraries
+  # It takes a list of library names and outputs a list of dependencies
+  sub compute_lib_depends {
+      if ($disabled{shared}) {
+          return map { $_.$libext } @_;
+      }
+
+      # Depending on shared libraries:
+      # On Windows POSIX layers, we depend on {libname}.dll.a
+      # On Unix platforms, we depend on {shlibname}.so
+      return map { shlib_simple($_) } @_;
+  }
+
+  sub generatesrc {
+      my %args = @_;
+      my $generator = join(" ", @{$args{generator}});
+      my $generator_incs = join("", map { " -I".$_ } @{$args{generator_incs}});
+      my $incs = join("", map { " -I".$_ } @{$args{incs}});
+      my $deps = join(" ", @{$args{generator_deps}}, @{$args{deps}});
+
+      if ($args{src} !~ /\.[sS]$/) {
+          if ($args{generator}->[0] =~ m|^.*\.in$|) {
+              my $dofile = abs2rel(rel2abs(catfile($config{sourcedir},
+                                                   "util", "dofile.pl")),
+                                   rel2abs($config{builddir}));
+              return <<"EOF";
+$args{src}: $args{generator}->[0] $deps
+	\$(PERL) "-I\$(BLDDIR)" -Mconfigdata "$dofile" \\
+	    "-o$target{build_file}" $generator > \$@
+EOF
+	  } else {
+              return <<"EOF";
+$args{src}: $args{generator}->[0] $deps
+	\$(PERL)$generator_incs $generator > \$@
+EOF
+	  }
+      } else {
+          if ($args{generator}->[0] =~ /\.pl$/) {
+              $generator = 'CC="$(CC)" $(PERL)'.$generator_incs.' '.$generator;
+          } elsif ($args{generator}->[0] =~ /\.m4$/) {
+              $generator = 'm4 -B 8192'.$generator_incs.' '.$generator.' >'
+          } elsif ($args{generator}->[0] =~ /\.S$/) {
+              $generator = undef;
+          } else {
+              die "Generator type for $args{src} unknown: $generator\n";
+          }
+
+          if (defined($generator)) {
+              return <<"EOF";
+$args{src}: $args{generator}->[0] $deps
+	$generator \$@
+EOF
+          }
+          return <<"EOF";
+$args{src}: $args{generator}->[0] $deps
+	\$(CC) $incs \$(CFLAGS) -E $args{generator}->[0] | \\
+	\$(PERL) -ne '/^#(line)?\\s*[0-9]+/ or print' > \$@
+EOF
+      }
+  }
+
+  # Should one wonder about the end of the Perl snippet, it's because this
+  # second regexp eats up line endings as well, if the removed path is the
+  # last in the line.  We may therefore need to put back a line ending.
+  sub src2obj {
+      my %args = @_;
+      my $obj = $args{obj};
+      my @srcs = @{$args{srcs}};
+      my $srcs = join(" ",  @srcs);
+      my $deps = join(" ", @srcs, @{$args{deps}});
+      my $incs = join("", map { " -I".$_ } @{$args{incs}});
+      unless ($disabled{zlib}) {
+          if ($withargs{zlib_include}) {
+              $incs .= " -I".$withargs{zlib_include};
+          }
+      }
+      my $ecflags = { lib => '$(LIB_CFLAGS)',
+                      dso => '$(DSO_CFLAGS)',
+                      bin => '$(BIN_CFLAGS)' } -> {$args{intent}};
+      my $makedepprog = $config{makedepprog};
+      my $recipe;
+      # extension-specific rules
+      if (grep /\.s$/, @srcs) {
+          $recipe .= <<"EOF";
+$obj$objext: $deps
+	\$(CC) \$(CFLAGS) $ecflags -c -o \$\@ $srcs
+EOF
+      } elsif (grep /\.S$/, @srcs) {
+          # In case one wonders why not just $(CC) -c file.S. While it
+          # does work with contemporary compilers, there are some legacy
+          # ones that get it wrong. Hence the elaborate scheme... We
+          # don't care to maintain dependecy lists, because dependency
+          # is rather weak, at most one header file that lists constants
+          # which are assigned in ascending order.
+          $recipe .= <<"EOF";
+$obj$objext: $deps
+	( trap "rm -f \$@.*" INT 0; \\
+	  \$(CPP) $incs \$(CFLAGS) $ecflags $srcs | \\
+	  \$(PERL) -ne '/^#(line)?\\s*[0-9]+/ or print' > \$@.s && \\
+	  \$(CC) \$(CFLAGS) $ecflags -c -o \$\@ \$@.s )
+EOF
+      } elsif (!$disabled{makedepend} && $makedepprog !~ /\/makedepend/) {
+          $recipe .= <<"EOF";
+$obj$objext: $deps
+	\$(CC) $incs \$(CFLAGS) $ecflags -MMD -MF $obj$depext.tmp -MT \$\@ -c -o \$\@ $srcs
+	\@touch $obj$depext.tmp
+	\@if cmp $obj$depext.tmp $obj$depext > /dev/null 2> /dev/null; then \\
+		rm -f $obj$depext.tmp; \\
+	else \\
+		mv $obj$depext.tmp $obj$depext; \\
+	fi
+EOF
+      } else {
+          $recipe .= <<"EOF";
+$obj$objext: $deps
+	\$(CC) $incs \$(CFLAGS) $ecflags -c -o \$\@ $srcs
+EOF
+          if (!$disabled{makedepend} && $makedepprog =~ /\/makedepend/) {
+              $recipe .= <<"EOF";
+	-\$(MAKEDEPEND) -f- -o"|\$\@" -- $incs \$(CFLAGS) $ecflags -- $srcs \\
+	    >$obj$depext.tmp 2>/dev/null
+	-\$(PERL) -i -pe 's/^.*\\|//; s/ \\/(\\\\.|[^ ])*//; \$\$_ = undef if (/: *\$\$/ || /^(#.*| *)\$\$/); \$\$_.="\\n" unless !defined(\$\$_) or /\\R\$\$/g;' $obj$depext.tmp
+	\@if cmp $obj$depext.tmp $obj$depext > /dev/null 2> /dev/null; then \\
+		rm -f $obj$depext.tmp; \\
+	else \\
+		mv $obj$depext.tmp $obj$depext; \\
+	fi
+EOF
+          }
+      }
+      return $recipe;
+  }
+  # On Unix, we build shlibs from static libs, so we're ignoring the
+  # object file array.  We *know* this routine is only called when we've
+  # configure 'shared'.
+  sub libobj2shlib {
+      my %args = @_;
+      my $lib = $args{lib};
+      my $shlib = $args{shlib};
+      my $libd = dirname($lib);
+      my $libn = basename($lib);
+      (my $libname = $libn) =~ s/^lib//;
+      my $linklibs = join("", map { my $d = dirname($_);
+                                    my $f = basename($_);
+                                    (my $l = $f) =~ s/^lib//;
+                                    " -L$d -l$l" } @{$args{deps}});
+      my $deps = join(" ",compute_lib_depends(@{$args{deps}}));
+      my $shlib_target = $target{shared_target};
+      my $ordinalsfile = defined($args{ordinals}) ? $args{ordinals}->[1] : "";
+      my $target = shlib_simple($lib);
+      my $target_full = shlib($lib);
+      return <<"EOF"
+# With a build on a Windows POSIX layer (Cygwin or Mingw), we know for a fact
+# that two files get produced, {shlibname}.dll and {libname}.dll.a.
+# With all other Unix platforms, we often build a shared library with the
+# SO version built into the file name and a symlink without the SO version
+# It's not necessary to have both as targets.  The choice falls on the
+# simplest, {libname}$shlibextimport for Windows POSIX layers and
+# {libname}$shlibextsimple for the Unix platforms.
+$target: $lib$libext $deps $ordinalsfile
+	\$(MAKE) -f \$(SRCDIR)/Makefile.shared -e \\
+		PLATFORM=\$(PLATFORM) \\
+		PERL="\$(PERL)" SRCDIR='\$(SRCDIR)' DSTDIR="$libd" \\
+		INSTALLTOP='\$(INSTALLTOP)' LIBDIR='\$(LIBDIR)' \\
+		LIBDEPS='\$(PLIB_LDFLAGS) '"$linklibs"' \$(EX_LIBS)' \\
+		LIBNAME=$libname SHLIBVERSION=\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR) \\
+		STLIBNAME=$lib$libext \\
+		SHLIBNAME=$target SHLIBNAME_FULL=$target_full \\
+		CC='\$(CC)' CFLAGS='\$(CFLAGS) \$(LIB_CFLAGS)' \\
+		LDFLAGS='\$(LDFLAGS)' SHARED_LDFLAGS='\$(LIB_LDFLAGS)' \\
+		RC='\$(RC)' SHARED_RCFLAGS='\$(RCFLAGS)' \\
+		link_shlib.$shlib_target
+EOF
+	  . (windowsdll() ? <<"EOF" : "");
+	rm -f apps/$shlib$shlibext
+	rm -f test/$shlib$shlibext
+	rm -f fuzz/$shlib$shlibext
+	cp -p $shlib$shlibext apps/
+	cp -p $shlib$shlibext test/
+	cp -p $shlib$shlibext fuzz/
+EOF
+  }
+  sub obj2dso {
+      my %args = @_;
+      my $dso = $args{lib};
+      my $dsod = dirname($dso);
+      my $dson = basename($dso);
+      my $shlibdeps = join("", map { my $d = dirname($_);
+                                     my $f = basename($_);
+                                     (my $l = $f) =~ s/^lib//;
+                                     " -L$d -l$l" } @{$args{deps}});
+      my $deps = join(" ",compute_lib_depends(@{$args{deps}}));
+      my $shlib_target = $target{shared_target};
+      my $objs = join(" ", map { $_.$objext } @{$args{objs}});
+      my $target = dso($dso);
+      return <<"EOF";
+$target: $objs $deps
+	\$(MAKE) -f \$(SRCDIR)/Makefile.shared -e \\
+		PLATFORM=\$(PLATFORM) \\
+		PERL="\$(PERL)" SRCDIR='\$(SRCDIR)' DSTDIR="$dsod" \\
+		LIBDEPS='\$(PLIB_LDFLAGS) '"$shlibdeps"' \$(EX_LIBS)' \\
+		SHLIBNAME_FULL=$target LDFLAGS='\$(LDFLAGS)' \\
+		CC='\$(CC)' CFLAGS='\$(CFLAGS) \$(DSO_CFLAGS)' \\
+		SHARED_LDFLAGS='\$(DSO_LDFLAGS)' \\
+		LIBEXTRAS="$objs" \\
+		link_dso.$shlib_target
+EOF
+  }
+  sub obj2lib {
+      my %args = @_;
+      my $lib = $args{lib};
+      my $objs = join(" ", map { $_.$objext } @{$args{objs}});
+      return <<"EOF";
+$lib$libext: $objs
+	\$(AR) \$\@ \$\?
+	\$(RANLIB) \$\@ || echo Never mind.
+EOF
+  }
+  sub obj2bin {
+      my %args = @_;
+      my $bin = $args{bin};
+      my $bind = dirname($bin);
+      my $binn = basename($bin);
+      my $objs = join(" ", map { $_.$objext } @{$args{objs}});
+      my $deps = join(" ",compute_lib_depends(@{$args{deps}}));
+      my $linklibs = join("", map { my $d = dirname($_);
+                                    my $f = basename($_);
+                                    $d = "." if $d eq $f;
+                                    (my $l = $f) =~ s/^lib//;
+                                    " -L$d -l$l" } @{$args{deps}});
+      my $shlib_target = $disabled{shared} ? "" : $target{shared_target};
+      return <<"EOF";
+$bin$exeext: $objs $deps
+	\$(RM) $bin$exeext
+	\$(MAKE) -f \$(SRCDIR)/Makefile.shared -e \\
+		PERL="\$(PERL)" SRCDIR=\$(SRCDIR) \\
+		APPNAME=$bin$exeext OBJECTS="$objs" \\
+		LIBDEPS='\$(PLIB_LDFLAGS) '"$linklibs"' \$(EX_LIBS)' \\
+		CC='\$(CC)' CFLAGS='\$(CFLAGS) \$(BIN_CFLAGS)' \\
+		LDFLAGS='\$(LDFLAGS)' \\
+		link_app.$shlib_target
+EOF
+  }
+  sub in2script {
+      my %args = @_;
+      my $script = $args{script};
+      my $sources = join(" ", @{$args{sources}});
+      my $dofile = abs2rel(rel2abs(catfile($config{sourcedir},
+                                           "util", "dofile.pl")),
+                           rel2abs($config{builddir}));
+      return <<"EOF";
+$script: $sources
+	\$(PERL) "-I\$(BLDDIR)" -Mconfigdata "$dofile" \\
+	    "-o$target{build_file}" $sources > "$script"
+	chmod a+x $script
+EOF
+  }
+  sub generatedir {
+      my %args = @_;
+      my $dir = $args{dir};
+      my @deps = map { s|\.o$|$objext|; $_ } @{$args{deps}};
+      my @actions = ();
+      my %extinfo = ( dso => $dsoext,
+                      lib => $libext,
+                      bin => $exeext );
+
+      foreach my $type (("dso", "lib", "bin", "script")) {
+          next unless defined($unified_info{dirinfo}->{$dir}->{products}->{$type});
+          # For lib object files, we could update the library.  However, it
+          # was decided that it's enough to build the directory local object
+          # files, so we don't need to add any actions, and the dependencies
+          # are already taken care of.
+          if ($type ne "lib") {
+              foreach my $prod (@{$unified_info{dirinfo}->{$dir}->{products}->{$type}}) {
+                  if (dirname($prod) eq $dir) {
+                      push @deps, $prod.$extinfo{$type};
+                  } else {
+                      push @actions, "\t@ : No support to produce $type ".join(", ", @{$unified_info{dirinfo}->{$dir}->{products}->{$type}});
+                  }
+              }
+          }
+      }
+
+      my $deps = join(" ", @deps);
+      my $actions = join("\n", "", @actions);
+      return <<"EOF";
+$args{dir} $args{dir}/: $deps$actions
+EOF
+  }
+  ""    # Important!  This becomes part of the template result.
+-}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/Configurations/unix-checker.pm b/openssl-1.1.0h/Configurations/unix-checker.pm
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b39b0eb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/Configurations/unix-checker.pm
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+#! /usr/bin/perl
+
+use Config;
+
+# Check that the perl implementation file modules generate paths that
+# we expect for the platform
+use File::Spec::Functions qw(:DEFAULT rel2abs);
+
+if (rel2abs('.') !~ m|/|) {
+    die <<EOF;
+
+******************************************************************************
+This perl implementation doesn't produce Unix like paths (with forward slash
+directory separators).  Please use an implementation that matches your
+building platform.
+
+This Perl version: $Config{version} for $Config{archname}
+******************************************************************************
+EOF
+}
+
+1;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/Configurations/windows-checker.pm b/openssl-1.1.0h/Configurations/windows-checker.pm
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..de46fbc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/Configurations/windows-checker.pm
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+#! /usr/bin/perl
+
+use Config;
+
+# Check that the perl implementation file modules generate paths that
+# we expect for the platform
+use File::Spec::Functions qw(:DEFAULT rel2abs);
+
+if (rel2abs('.') !~ m|\\|) {
+    die <<EOF;
+
+******************************************************************************
+This perl implementation doesn't produce Windows like paths (with backward
+slash directory separators).  Please use an implementation that matches your
+building platform.
+
+This Perl version: $Config{version} for $Config{archname}
+******************************************************************************
+EOF
+}
+
+1;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/Configurations/windows-makefile.tmpl b/openssl-1.1.0h/Configurations/windows-makefile.tmpl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e3e213f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/Configurations/windows-makefile.tmpl
@@ -0,0 +1,621 @@
+##
+## Makefile for OpenSSL
+##
+## {- join("\n## ", @autowarntext) -}
+{-
+ our $objext = $target{obj_extension} || ".obj";
+ our $depext = $target{dep_extension} || ".d";
+ our $exeext = $target{exe_extension} || ".exe";
+ our $libext = $target{lib_extension} || ".lib";
+ our $shlibext = $target{shared_extension} || ".dll";
+ our $shlibextimport = $target{shared_import_extension} || ".lib";
+ our $dsoext = $target{dso_extension} || ".dll";
+
+ our $sover = $config{shlib_major}."_".$config{shlib_minor};
+
+ my $win_installenv =
+     $target{build_scheme}->[2] eq "VC-W32" ?
+     "ProgramFiles(x86)" : "ProgramW6432";
+ my $win_commonenv =
+     $target{build_scheme}->[2] eq "VC-W32"
+     ? "CommonProgramFiles(x86)" : "CommonProgramW6432";
+ our $win_installroot =
+     defined($ENV{$win_installenv})
+     ? $win_installenv : 'ProgramFiles';
+ our $win_commonroot =
+     defined($ENV{$win_commonenv})
+     ? $win_commonenv : 'CommonProgramFiles';
+
+ # expand variables early
+ $win_installroot = $ENV{$win_installroot};
+ $win_commonroot = $ENV{$win_commonroot};
+
+ sub shlib {
+     return () if $disabled{shared};
+     my $lib = shift;
+     return $unified_info{sharednames}->{$lib} . $shlibext;
+ }
+
+ sub shlib_import {
+     return () if $disabled{shared};
+     my $lib = shift;
+     return $lib . $shlibextimport;
+ }
+
+ sub dso {
+     my $dso = shift;
+
+     return $dso . $dsoext;
+ }
+ # This makes sure things get built in the order they need
+ # to. You're welcome.
+ sub dependmagic {
+     my $target = shift;
+
+     return "$target: build_generated\n\t\$(MAKE) depend && \$(MAKE) _$target\n_$target";
+ }
+ '';
+-}
+
+PLATFORM={- $config{target} -}
+SRCDIR={- $config{sourcedir} -}
+BLDDIR={- $config{builddir} -}
+
+VERSION={- $config{version} -}
+MAJOR={- $config{major} -}
+MINOR={- $config{minor} -}
+
+SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER={- $config{shlib_version_number} -}
+
+LIBS={- join(" ", map { $_.$libext } @{$unified_info{libraries}}) -}
+SHLIBS={- join(" ", map { shlib($_) } @{$unified_info{libraries}}) -}
+SHLIBPDBS={- join(" ", map { local $shlibext = ".pdb"; shlib($_) } @{$unified_info{libraries}}) -}
+ENGINES={- join(" ", map { dso($_) } @{$unified_info{engines}}) -}
+ENGINEPDBS={- join(" ", map { local $dsoext = ".pdb"; dso($_) } @{$unified_info{engines}}) -}
+PROGRAMS={- our @PROGRAMS = map { $_.$exeext } @{$unified_info{programs}}; join(" ", @PROGRAMS) -}
+PROGRAMPDBS={- join(" ", map { $_.".pdb" } @{$unified_info{programs}}) -}
+SCRIPTS={- join(" ", @{$unified_info{scripts}}) -}
+{- output_off() if $disabled{makedepend}; "" -}
+DEPS={- join(" ", map { (my $x = $_) =~ s|\.o$|$depext|; $x; }
+                  grep { $unified_info{sources}->{$_}->[0] =~ /\.c$/ }
+                  keys %{$unified_info{sources}}); -}
+{- output_on() if $disabled{makedepend}; "" -}
+GENERATED_MANDATORY={- join(" ", @{$unified_info{depends}->{""}} ) -}
+GENERATED={- join(" ",
+                  ( map { (my $x = $_) =~ s|\.[sS]$|\.asm|; $x }
+                    grep { defined $unified_info{generate}->{$_} }
+                    map { @{$unified_info{sources}->{$_}} }
+                    grep { /\.o$/ } keys %{$unified_info{sources}} ),
+                  ( grep { /\.h$/ } keys %{$unified_info{generate}} )) -}
+
+INSTALL_LIBS={- join(" ", map { $_.$libext } @{$unified_info{install}->{libraries}}) -}
+INSTALL_SHLIBS={- join(" ", map { shlib($_) } @{$unified_info{install}->{libraries}}) -}
+INSTALL_SHLIBPDBS={- join(" ", map { local $shlibext = ".pdb"; shlib($_) } @{$unified_info{install}->{libraries}}) -}
+INSTALL_ENGINES={- join(" ", map { dso($_) } @{$unified_info{install}->{engines}}) -}
+INSTALL_ENGINEPDBS={- join(" ", map { local $dsoext = ".pdb"; dso($_) } @{$unified_info{install}->{engines}}) -}
+INSTALL_PROGRAMS={- join(" ", map { $_.$exeext } grep { !m|^test\\| } @{$unified_info{install}->{programs}}) -}
+INSTALL_PROGRAMPDBS={- join(" ", map { $_.".pdb" } grep { !m|^test\\| } @{$unified_info{install}->{programs}}) -}
+{- output_off() if $disabled{apps}; "" -}
+BIN_SCRIPTS=$(BLDDIR)\tools\c_rehash.pl
+MISC_SCRIPTS=$(BLDDIR)\apps\CA.pl $(BLDDIR)\apps\tsget.pl
+{- output_on() if $disabled{apps}; "" -}
+
+APPS_OPENSSL={- use File::Spec::Functions;
+                catfile("apps","openssl") -}
+
+# Do not edit these manually. Use Configure with --prefix or --openssldir
+# to change this!  Short explanation in the top comment in Configure
+INSTALLTOP_dev={- # $prefix is used in the OPENSSLDIR perl snippet
+                  #
+                  use File::Spec::Functions qw(:DEFAULT splitpath);
+                  our $prefix = canonpath($config{prefix}
+                                          || "$win_installroot\\OpenSSL");
+                  our ($prefix_dev, $prefix_dir, $prefix_file) =
+                      splitpath($prefix, 1);
+                  $prefix_dev -}
+INSTALLTOP_dir={- canonpath($prefix_dir) -}
+OPENSSLDIR_dev={- #
+                  # The logic here is that if no --openssldir was given,
+                  # OPENSSLDIR will get the value from $prefix plus "/ssl".
+                  # If --openssldir was given and the value is an absolute
+                  # path, OPENSSLDIR will get its value without change.
+                  # If the value from --openssldir is a relative path,
+                  # OPENSSLDIR will get $prefix with the --openssldir
+                  # value appended as a subdirectory.
+                  #
+                  use File::Spec::Functions qw(:DEFAULT splitpath);
+                  our $openssldir =
+                      $config{openssldir} ?
+                          (file_name_is_absolute($config{openssldir}) ?
+                               canonpath($config{openssldir})
+                               : catdir($prefix, $config{openssldir}))
+                          : canonpath("$win_commonroot\\SSL");
+                  our ($openssldir_dev, $openssldir_dir, $openssldir_file) =
+                      splitpath($openssldir, 1);
+                  $openssldir_dev -}
+OPENSSLDIR_dir={- canonpath($openssldir_dir) -}
+LIBDIR={- our $libdir = $config{libdir} || "lib";
+          $libdir -}
+ENGINESDIR_dev={- use File::Spec::Functions qw(:DEFAULT splitpath);
+                  our $enginesdir = catdir($prefix,$libdir,"engines-$sover");
+                  our ($enginesdir_dev, $enginesdir_dir, $enginesdir_file) =
+                      splitpath($enginesdir, 1);
+                  $enginesdir_dev -}
+ENGINESDIR_dir={- canonpath($enginesdir_dir) -}
+!IF "$(DESTDIR)" != ""
+INSTALLTOP=$(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP_dir)
+OPENSSLDIR=$(DESTDIR)$(OPENSSLDIR_dir)
+ENGINESDIR=$(DESTDIR)$(ENGINESDIR_dir)
+!ELSE
+INSTALLTOP=$(INSTALLTOP_dev)$(INSTALLTOP_dir)
+OPENSSLDIR=$(OPENSSLDIR_dev)$(OPENSSLDIR_dir)
+ENGINESDIR=$(ENGINESDIR_dev)$(ENGINESDIR_dir)
+!ENDIF
+
+CC={- $target{cc} -}
+CFLAGS={- join(" ",(map { "-D".$_} @{$target{defines}}, @{$config{defines}})) -} {- join(" ", quotify_l("-DENGINESDIR=\"$enginesdir\"", "-DOPENSSLDIR=\"$openssldir\"")) -} {- $target{cflags} -} {- $config{cflags} -}
+COUTFLAG={- $target{coutflag} || "/Fo" -}$(OSSL_EMPTY)
+RC={- $target{rc} || "rc" -}
+RCOUTFLAG={- $target{rcoutflag} || "/fo" -}$(OSSL_EMPTY)
+LD={- $target{ld} || "link" -}
+LDFLAGS={- $target{lflags} -}
+LDOUTFLAG={- $target{loutflag} || "/out:" -}$(OSSL_EMPTY)
+EX_LIBS={- $target{ex_libs} -}
+LIB_CFLAGS={- join(" ", $target{lib_cflags}, $target{shared_cflag}) || "" -}
+LIB_LDFLAGS={- $target{shared_ldflag} || "" -}
+DSO_CFLAGS={- join(" ", $target{dso_cflags}, $target{shared_cflag}) || "" -}
+DSO_LDFLAGS={- join(" ", $target{dso_lflags}, $target{shared_ldflag}) || "" -}
+BIN_CFLAGS={- $target{bin_cflags} -}
+BIN_LDFLAGS={- $target{bin_lflags} -}
+
+PERL={- $config{perl} -}
+
+AR={- $target{ar} -}
+ARFLAGS= {- $target{arflags} -}
+AROUTFLAG={- $target{aroutflag} || "/out:" -}$(OSSL_EMPTY)
+
+MT={- $target{mt} -}
+MTFLAGS= {- $target{mtflags} -}
+MTINFLAG={- $target{mtinflag} || "-manifest " -}$(OSSL_EMPTY)
+MTOUTFLAG={- $target{mtoutflag} || "-outputresource:" -}$(OSSL_EMPTY)
+
+AS={- $target{as} -}
+ASFLAGS={- $target{asflags} -}
+ASOUTFLAG={- $target{asoutflag} -}$(OSSL_EMPTY)
+PERLASM_SCHEME= {- $target{perlasm_scheme} -}
+
+PROCESSOR= {- $config{processor} -}
+
+# The main targets ###################################################
+
+{- dependmagic('all'); -}: build_libs_nodep build_engines_nodep build_programs_nodep
+{- dependmagic('build_libs'); -}: build_libs_nodep
+{- dependmagic('build_engines'); -}: build_engines_nodep
+{- dependmagic('build_programs'); -}: build_programs_nodep
+
+build_generated: $(GENERATED_MANDATORY)
+build_libs_nodep: $(LIBS) {- join(" ",map { shlib_import($_) } @{$unified_info{libraries}}) -}
+build_engines_nodep: $(ENGINES)
+build_programs_nodep: $(PROGRAMS) $(SCRIPTS)
+
+# Kept around for backward compatibility
+build_apps build_tests: build_programs
+
+# Convenience target to prebuild all generated files, not just the mandatory
+# ones
+build_all_generated: $(GENERATED_MANDATORY) $(GENERATED)
+
+test: tests
+{- dependmagic('tests'); -}: build_programs_nodep build_engines_nodep
+	@rem {- output_off() if $disabled{tests}; "" -}
+	-mkdir $(BLDDIR)\test\test-runs
+	set SRCTOP=$(SRCDIR)
+	set BLDTOP=$(BLDDIR)
+	set RESULT_D=$(BLDDIR)\test\test-runs
+	set PERL=$(PERL)
+	set OPENSSL_ENGINES=$(MAKEDIR)\engines
+	set OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY=on
+	"$(PERL)" "$(SRCDIR)\test\run_tests.pl" $(TESTS)
+	@rem {- if ($disabled{tests}) { output_on(); } else { output_off(); } "" -}
+	@echo "Tests are not supported with your chosen Configure options"
+	@rem {- output_on() if !$disabled{tests}; "" -}
+
+list-tests:
+	@rem {- output_off() if $disabled{tests}; "" -}
+	@set SRCTOP=$(SRCDIR)
+	@"$(PERL)" "$(SRCDIR)\test\run_tests.pl" list
+	@rem {- if ($disabled{tests}) { output_on(); } else { output_off(); } "" -}
+	@echo "Tests are not supported with your chosen Configure options"
+	@rem {- output_on() if !$disabled{tests}; "" -}
+
+install: install_sw install_ssldirs install_docs
+
+uninstall: uninstall_docs uninstall_sw
+
+libclean:
+	"$(PERL)" -e "map { m/(.*)\.dll$$/; unlink glob """$$1.*"""; } @ARGV" $(SHLIBS)
+	"$(PERL)" -e "map { m/(.*)\.dll$$/; unlink glob """apps/$$1.*"""; } @ARGV" $(SHLIBS)
+	"$(PERL)" -e "map { m/(.*)\.dll$$/; unlink glob """test/$$1.*"""; } @ARGV" $(SHLIBS)
+	"$(PERL)" -e "map { m/(.*)\.dll$$/; unlink glob """fuzz/$$1.*"""; } @ARGV" $(SHLIBS)
+	-del /Q /F $(LIBS)
+	-del /Q ossl_static.pdb
+
+clean: libclean
+	{- join("\n\t", map { "-del /Q /F $_" } @PROGRAMS) -}
+	-del /Q /F $(ENGINES)
+	-del /Q /F $(SCRIPTS)
+	-del /Q /F $(GENERATED)
+	-del /Q /S /F *.d
+	-del /Q /S /F *.obj
+	-del /Q /S /F *.pdb
+	-del /Q /S /F *.exp
+	-del /Q /S /F engines\*.ilk
+	-del /Q /S /F engines\*.lib
+	-del /Q /S /F apps\*.lib
+	-del /Q /S /F engines\*.manifest
+	-del /Q /S /F apps\*.manifest
+	-del /Q /S /F test\*.manifest
+
+distclean: clean
+	-del /Q /F configdata.pm
+	-del /Q /F makefile
+
+depend:
+
+# Install helper targets #############################################
+
+install_sw: all install_dev install_engines install_runtime
+
+uninstall_sw: uninstall_runtime uninstall_engines uninstall_dev
+
+install_docs: install_html_docs
+
+uninstall_docs: uninstall_html_docs
+
+install_ssldirs:
+	@"$(PERL)" "$(SRCDIR)\util\mkdir-p.pl" "$(OPENSSLDIR)\certs"
+	@"$(PERL)" "$(SRCDIR)\util\mkdir-p.pl" "$(OPENSSLDIR)\private"
+	@"$(PERL)" "$(SRCDIR)\util\mkdir-p.pl" "$(OPENSSLDIR)\misc"
+	@"$(PERL)" "$(SRCDIR)\util\copy.pl" "$(SRCDIR)\apps\openssl.cnf" \
+                                        "$(OPENSSLDIR)\openssl.cnf.dist"
+	@IF NOT EXIST "$(OPENSSLDIR)\openssl.cnf" \
+         "$(PERL)" "$(SRCDIR)\util\copy.pl" "$(SRCDIR)\apps\openssl.cnf" \
+                                        "$(OPENSSLDIR)\openssl.cnf"
+	@"$(PERL)" "$(SRCDIR)\util\copy.pl" $(MISC_SCRIPTS) \
+                                        "$(OPENSSLDIR)\misc"
+
+install_dev:
+	@if "$(INSTALLTOP)"=="" ( echo INSTALLTOP should not be empty & exit 1 )
+	@echo *** Installing development files
+	@"$(PERL)" "$(SRCDIR)\util\mkdir-p.pl" "$(INSTALLTOP)\include\openssl"
+	@rem {- output_off() unless grep { $_ eq "OPENSSL_USE_APPLINK" } @{$target{defines}}; "" -}
+	@"$(PERL)" "$(SRCDIR)\util\copy.pl" "$(SRCDIR)\ms\applink.c" \
+				       "$(INSTALLTOP)\include\openssl"
+	@rem {- output_on() unless grep { $_ eq "OPENSSL_USE_APPLINK" } @{$target{defines}}; "" -}
+	@"$(PERL)" "$(SRCDIR)\util\copy.pl" "$(SRCDIR)\include\openssl\*.h" \
+				       "$(INSTALLTOP)\include\openssl"
+	@"$(PERL)" "$(SRCDIR)\util\copy.pl" $(BLDDIR)\include\openssl\*.h \
+				       "$(INSTALLTOP)\include\openssl"
+	@"$(PERL)" "$(SRCDIR)\util\mkdir-p.pl" "$(INSTALLTOP)\$(LIBDIR)"
+	@"$(PERL)" "$(SRCDIR)\util\copy.pl" $(INSTALL_LIBS) \
+				       "$(INSTALLTOP)\$(LIBDIR)"
+	@if "$(SHLIBS)"=="" \
+	 "$(PERL)" "$(SRCDIR)\util\copy.pl" ossl_static.pdb \
+                                       "$(INSTALLTOP)\$(LIBDIR)"
+
+uninstall_dev:
+
+install_engines:
+	@if "$(INSTALLTOP)"=="" ( echo INSTALLTOP should not be empty & exit 1 )
+	@echo *** Installing engines
+	@"$(PERL)" "$(SRCDIR)\util\mkdir-p.pl" "$(ENGINESDIR)"
+	@if not "$(ENGINES)"=="" \
+	 "$(PERL)" "$(SRCDIR)\util\copy.pl" $(INSTALL_ENGINES) "$(ENGINESDIR)"
+	@if not "$(ENGINES)"=="" \
+	 "$(PERL)" "$(SRCDIR)\util\copy.pl" $(INSTALL_ENGINEPDBS) "$(ENGINESDIR)"
+
+uninstall_engines:
+
+install_runtime:
+	@if "$(INSTALLTOP)"=="" ( echo INSTALLTOP should not be empty & exit 1 )
+	@echo *** Installing runtime files
+	@"$(PERL)" "$(SRCDIR)\util\mkdir-p.pl" "$(INSTALLTOP)\bin"
+	@if not "$(SHLIBS)"=="" \
+	 "$(PERL)" "$(SRCDIR)\util\copy.pl" $(INSTALL_SHLIBS) "$(INSTALLTOP)\bin"
+	@if not "$(SHLIBS)"=="" \
+	 "$(PERL)" "$(SRCDIR)\util\copy.pl" $(INSTALL_SHLIBPDBS) \
+                                        "$(INSTALLTOP)\bin"
+	@"$(PERL)" "$(SRCDIR)\util\copy.pl" $(INSTALL_PROGRAMS) \
+                                        "$(INSTALLTOP)\bin"
+	@"$(PERL)" "$(SRCDIR)\util\copy.pl" $(INSTALL_PROGRAMPDBS) \
+                                        "$(INSTALLTOP)\bin"
+	@"$(PERL)" "$(SRCDIR)\util\copy.pl" $(BIN_SCRIPTS) \
+                                        "$(INSTALLTOP)\bin"
+
+uninstall_runtime:
+
+install_html_docs:
+        "$(PERL)" "$(SRCDIR)\util\process_docs.pl" \
+                "--destdir=$(INSTALLTOP)\html" --type=html
+
+uninstall_html_docs:
+
+# Building targets ###################################################
+
+configdata.pm: "$(SRCDIR)\Configure" {- join(" ", map { '"'.$_.'"' } @{$config{build_file_templates}}, @{$config{build_infos}}, @{$config{conf_files}}) -}
+	@echo "Detected changed: $?"
+	@echo "Reconfiguring..."
+	"$(PERL)" "$(SRCDIR)\Configure" reconf
+	@echo "**************************************************"
+	@echo "***                                            ***"
+	@echo "***   Please run the same make command again   ***"
+	@echo "***                                            ***"
+	@echo "**************************************************"
+	@exit 1
+
+{-
+ use File::Basename;
+ use File::Spec::Functions qw/:DEFAULT abs2rel rel2abs/;
+
+ # Helper function to figure out dependencies on libraries
+ # It takes a list of library names and outputs a list of dependencies
+ sub compute_lib_depends {
+     if ($disabled{shared}) {
+	 return map { $_.$libext } @_;
+     }
+     return map { shlib_import($_) } @_;
+ }
+
+  sub generatesrc {
+      my %args = @_;
+      (my $target = $args{src}) =~ s/\.[sS]$/.asm/;
+      my ($gen0, @gens) = @{$args{generator}};
+      my $generator = '"'.$gen0.'"'.join('', map { " $_" } @gens);
+      my $generator_incs = join("", map { " -I \"$_\"" } @{$args{generator_incs}});
+      my $incs = join("", map { " /I \"$_\"" } @{$args{incs}});
+      my $deps = @{$args{deps}} ?
+          '"'.join('" "', @{$args{generator_deps}}, @{$args{deps}}).'"' : '';
+
+      if ($target !~ /\.asm$/) {
+          if ($args{generator}->[0] =~ m|^.*\.in$|) {
+              my $dofile = abs2rel(rel2abs(catfile($config{sourcedir},
+                                                   "util", "dofile.pl")),
+                                   rel2abs($config{builddir}));
+              return <<"EOF";
+$target: "$args{generator}->[0]" $deps
+	"\$(PERL)" "-I\$(BLDDIR)" -Mconfigdata "$dofile" \\
+	    "-o$target{build_file}" $generator > \$@
+EOF
+	  } else {
+              return <<"EOF";
+$target: "$args{generator}->[0]" $deps
+	"\$(PERL)"$generator_incs $generator > \$@
+EOF
+	  }
+      } else {
+          if ($args{generator}->[0] =~ /\.pl$/) {
+              $generator = '"$(PERL)"'.$generator_incs.' '.$generator;
+          } elsif ($args{generator}->[0] =~ /\.S$/) {
+              $generator = undef;
+          } else {
+              die "Generator type for $src unknown: $generator\n";
+          }
+
+          if (defined($generator)) {
+              # If the target is named foo.S in build.info, we want to
+              # end up generating foo.s in two steps.
+              if ($args{src} =~ /\.S$/) {
+                   return <<"EOF";
+$target: "$args{generator}->[0]" $deps
+	set ASM=\$(AS)
+	$generator \$@.S
+	\$(CC) $incs \$(CFLAGS) /EP /C \$@.S > \$@.i && move /Y \$@.i \$@
+        del /Q \$@.S
+EOF
+              }
+              # Otherwise....
+              return <<"EOF";
+$target: "$args{generator}->[0]" $deps
+	set ASM=\$(AS)
+	$generator \$@
+EOF
+          }
+          return <<"EOF";
+$target: "$args{generator}->[0]" $deps
+	\$(CC) $incs \$(CFLAGS) /EP /C "$args{generator}->[0]" > \$@.i && move /Y \$@.i \$@
+EOF
+      }
+  }
+
+ sub src2obj {
+     my %args = @_;
+     my $obj = $args{obj};
+     my @srcs = map { (my $x = $_) =~ s/\.s$/.asm/; $x
+                    } ( @{$args{srcs}} );
+     my $srcs = '"'.join('" "',  @srcs).'"';
+     my $deps = '"'.join('" "', @srcs, @{$args{deps}}).'"';
+     my $incs = join("", map { ' /I "'.$_.'"' } @{$args{incs}});
+     unless ($disabled{zlib}) {
+         if ($withargs{zlib_include}) {
+             $incs .= ' /I "'.$withargs{zlib_include}.'"';
+         }
+     }
+     my $ecflags = { lib => '$(LIB_CFLAGS)',
+		     dso => '$(DSO_CFLAGS)',
+		     bin => '$(BIN_CFLAGS)' } -> {$args{intent}};
+     my $makedepprog = $config{makedepprog};
+     if ($srcs[0] =~ /\.asm$/) {
+         return <<"EOF";
+$obj$objext: $deps
+	\$(AS) \$(ASFLAGS) \$(ASOUTFLAG)\$\@ $srcs
+EOF
+     }
+     return <<"EOF"	if (!$disabled{makedepend});
+$obj$depext: $deps
+	\$(CC) \$(CFLAGS) $ecflags$inc /Zs /showIncludes $srcs 2>&1 | \\
+	    "\$(PERL)" -n << > $obj$depext
+chomp;
+s/^Note: including file: *//;
+\$\$collect{\$\$_} = 1;
+END { print '$obj$objext: ',join(" ", sort keys \%collect),"\\n" }
+<<
+$obj$objext: $obj$depext
+	\$(CC) $incs \$(CFLAGS) $ecflags -c \$(COUTFLAG)\$\@ $srcs
+EOF
+    return <<"EOF"	if ($disabled{makedepend});
+$obj$objext: $deps
+	\$(CC) $incs \$(CFLAGS) $ecflags -c \$(COUTFLAG)\$\@ $srcs
+EOF
+ }
+
+ # On Unix, we build shlibs from static libs, so we're ignoring the
+ # object file array.  We *know* this routine is only called when we've
+ # configure 'shared'.
+ sub libobj2shlib {
+     my %args = @_;
+     my $lib = $args{lib};
+     my $shlib = $args{shlib};
+     (my $mkdef_key = $lib) =~ s/^lib//i;
+     my $objs = join("\n", map { $_.$objext } @{$args{objs}});
+     my $linklibs = join("",
+			 map { "\n$_" } compute_lib_depends(@{$args{deps}}));
+     my $deps = join(" ",
+		     (map { $_.$objext } @{$args{objs}}),
+		     compute_lib_depends(@{$args{deps}}));
+     my $ordinalsfile = defined($args{ordinals}) ? $args{ordinals}->[1] : "";
+     my $mkdef_pl = abs2rel(rel2abs(catfile($config{sourcedir},
+					    "util", "mkdef.pl")),
+			    rel2abs($config{builddir}));
+     my $mkrc_pl = abs2rel(rel2abs(catfile($config{sourcedir},
+					   "util", "mkrc.pl")),
+			   rel2abs($config{builddir}));
+     my $target = shlib_import($lib);
+     return <<"EOF"
+$target: $deps "$ordinalsfile" "$mkdef_pl"
+	"\$(PERL)" "$mkdef_pl" "$mkdef_key" 32 > $shlib.def
+	"\$(PERL)" -i.tmp -pe "s|^LIBRARY\\s+${mkdef_key}32|LIBRARY $shlib|;" $shlib.def
+	DEL $shlib.def.tmp
+	"\$(PERL)" "$mkrc_pl" $shlib$shlibext > $shlib.rc
+	\$(RC) \$(RCOUTFLAG)$shlib.res $shlib.rc
+	IF EXIST $shlib$shlibext.manifest DEL /F /Q $shlib$shlibext.manifest
+	\$(LD) \$(LDFLAGS) \$(LIB_LDFLAGS) \\
+		/implib:\$@ \$(LDOUTFLAG)$shlib$shlibext /def:$shlib.def @<< || (DEL /Q \$(\@B).* $shlib.* && EXIT 1)
+$objs $shlib.res$linklibs \$(EX_LIBS)
+<<
+	IF EXIST $shlib$shlibext.manifest \\
+	   \$(MT) \$(MTFLAGS) \$(MTINFLAG)$shlib$shlibext.manifest \$(MTOUTFLAG)$shlib$shlibext
+	IF EXIST apps\\$shlib$shlibext DEL /Q /F apps\\$shlib$shlibext
+	IF EXIST test\\$shlib$shlibext DEL /Q /F test\\$shlib$shlibext
+	IF EXIST fuzz\\$shlib$shlibext DEL /Q /F fuzz\\$shlib$shlibext
+	COPY $shlib$shlibext apps
+	COPY $shlib$shlibext test
+	COPY $shlib$shlibext fuzz
+EOF
+ }
+ sub obj2dso {
+     my %args = @_;
+     my $dso = $args{lib};
+     my $dso_n = basename($dso);
+     my $objs = join("\n", map { $_.$objext } @{$args{objs}});
+     my $linklibs = join("",
+			 map { "\n$_" } compute_lib_depends(@{$args{deps}}));
+     my $deps = join(" ",
+		     (map { $_.$objext } @{$args{objs}}),
+		     compute_lib_depends(@{$args{deps}}));
+     return <<"EOF";
+$dso$dsoext: $deps
+	IF EXIST $dso$dsoext.manifest DEL /F /Q $dso$dsoext.manifest
+	\$(LD) \$(LDFLAGS) \$(DSO_LDFLAGS) \$(LDOUTFLAG)$dso$dsoext /def:<< @<<
+LIBRARY         $dso_n
+EXPORTS
+    bind_engine		@1
+    v_check		@2
+<<
+$objs$linklibs \$(EX_LIBS)
+<<
+	IF EXIST $dso$dsoext.manifest \\
+	   \$(MT) \$(MTFLAGS) \$(MTINFLAG)$dso$dsoext.manifest \$(MTOUTFLAG)$dso$dsoext
+EOF
+ }
+ sub obj2lib {
+     # Because static libs and import libs are both named the same in native
+     # Windows, we can't have both.  We skip the static lib in that case,
+     # as the shared libs are what we use anyway.
+     return "" unless $disabled{"shared"};
+
+     my %args = @_;
+     my $lib = $args{lib};
+     my $objs = join("\n", map { $_.$objext } @{$args{objs}});
+     my $deps = join(" ", map { $_.$objext } @{$args{objs}});
+     return <<"EOF";
+$lib$libext: $deps
+	\$(AR) \$(ARFLAGS) \$(AROUTFLAG)$lib$libext @<<
+\$**
+<<
+EOF
+ }
+ sub obj2bin {
+     my %args = @_;
+     my $bin = $args{bin};
+     my $objs = join("\n", map { $_.$objext } @{$args{objs}});
+     my $linklibs = join("",
+			 map { "\n$_" } compute_lib_depends(@{$args{deps}}));
+     my $deps = join(" ",
+		     (map { $_.$objext } @{$args{objs}}),
+		     compute_lib_depends(@{$args{deps}}));
+     return <<"EOF";
+$bin$exeext: $deps
+	IF EXIST $bin$exeext.manifest DEL /F /Q $bin$exeext.manifest
+	\$(LD) \$(LDFLAGS) \$(BIN_LDFLAGS) \$(LDOUTFLAG)$bin$exeext @<<
+$objs setargv.obj$linklibs \$(EX_LIBS)
+<<
+	IF EXIST $bin$exeext.manifest \\
+	   \$(MT) \$(MTFLAGS) \$(MTINFLAG)$bin$exeext.manifest \$(MTOUTFLAG)$bin$exeext
+EOF
+  }
+  sub in2script {
+      my %args = @_;
+      my $script = $args{script};
+      my $sources = '"'.join('" "', @{$args{sources}}).'"';
+      my $dofile = abs2rel(rel2abs(catfile($config{sourcedir},
+                                           "util", "dofile.pl")),
+                           rel2abs($config{builddir}));
+      return <<"EOF";
+$script: $sources
+	"\$(PERL)" "-I\$(BLDDIR)" -Mconfigdata "$dofile" \\
+	    "-o$target{build_file}" $sources > "$script"
+EOF
+  }
+  sub generatedir {
+      my %args = @_;
+      my $dir = $args{dir};
+      my @deps = map { s|\.o$|$objext|; $_ } @{$args{deps}};
+      my @actions = ();
+      my %extinfo = ( dso => $dsoext,
+                      lib => $libext,
+                      bin => $exeext );
+
+      foreach my $type (("dso", "lib", "bin", "script")) {
+          next unless defined($unified_info{dirinfo}->{$dir}->{products}->{$type});
+          # For lib object files, we could update the library.  However,
+          # LIB on Windows doesn't work that way, so we won't create any
+          # actions for it, and the dependencies are already taken care of.
+          if ($type ne "lib") {
+              foreach my $prod (@{$unified_info{dirinfo}->{$dir}->{products}->{$type}}) {
+                  if (dirname($prod) eq $dir) {
+                      push @deps, $prod.$extinfo{$type};
+                  } else {
+                      push @actions, "\t@rem No support to produce $type ".join(", ", @{$unified_info{dirinfo}->{$dir}->{products}->{$type}});
+                  }
+              }
+          }
+      }
+
+      my $deps = join(" ", @deps);
+      my $actions = join("\n", "", @actions);
+      return <<"EOF";
+$args{dir} $args{dir}\\ : $deps$actions
+EOF
+  }
+  ""    # Important!  This becomes part of the template result.
+-}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/Configure b/openssl-1.1.0h/Configure
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..c003364
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/Configure
@@ -0,0 +1,2806 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# -*- mode: perl; -*-
+# Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+##  Configure -- OpenSSL source tree configuration script
+
+use 5.10.0;
+use strict;
+use FindBin;
+use lib "$FindBin::Bin/util/perl";
+use File::Basename;
+use File::Spec::Functions qw/:DEFAULT abs2rel rel2abs/;
+use File::Path qw/mkpath/;
+use OpenSSL::Glob;
+
+# see INSTALL for instructions.
+
+my $usage="Usage: Configure [no-<cipher> ...] [enable-<cipher> ...] [-Dxxx] [-lxxx] [-Lxxx] [-fxxx] [-Kxxx] [no-hw-xxx|no-hw] [[no-]threads] [[no-]shared] [[no-]zlib|zlib-dynamic] [no-asm] [no-dso] [no-egd] [sctp] [386] [--prefix=DIR] [--openssldir=OPENSSLDIR] [--with-xxx[=vvv]] [--config=FILE] os/compiler[:flags]\n";
+
+# Options:
+#
+# --config      add the given configuration file, which will be read after
+#               any "Configurations*" files that are found in the same
+#               directory as this script.
+# --prefix      prefix for the OpenSSL installation, which includes the
+#               directories bin, lib, include, share/man, share/doc/openssl
+#               This becomes the value of INSTALLTOP in Makefile
+#               (Default: /usr/local)
+# --openssldir  OpenSSL data area, such as openssl.cnf, certificates and keys.
+#               If it's a relative directory, it will be added on the directory
+#               given with --prefix.
+#               This becomes the value of OPENSSLDIR in Makefile and in C.
+#               (Default: PREFIX/ssl)
+#
+# --cross-compile-prefix Add specified prefix to binutils components.
+#
+# --api         One of 0.9.8, 1.0.0 or 1.1.0.  Do not compile support for
+#               interfaces deprecated as of the specified OpenSSL version.
+#
+# no-hw-xxx     do not compile support for specific crypto hardware.
+#               Generic OpenSSL-style methods relating to this support
+#               are always compiled but return NULL if the hardware
+#               support isn't compiled.
+# no-hw         do not compile support for any crypto hardware.
+# [no-]threads  [don't] try to create a library that is suitable for
+#               multithreaded applications (default is "threads" if we
+#               know how to do it)
+# [no-]shared	[don't] try to create shared libraries when supported.
+# [no-]pic      [don't] try to build position independent code when supported.
+#               If disabled, it also disables shared and dynamic-engine.
+# no-asm        do not use assembler
+# no-dso        do not compile in any native shared-library methods. This
+#               will ensure that all methods just return NULL.
+# no-egd        do not compile support for the entropy-gathering daemon APIs
+# [no-]zlib     [don't] compile support for zlib compression.
+# zlib-dynamic	Like "zlib", but the zlib library is expected to be a shared
+#		library and will be loaded in run-time by the OpenSSL library.
+# sctp          include SCTP support
+# enable-weak-ssl-ciphers
+#               Enable weak ciphers that are disabled by default.
+# 386           generate 80386 code in assembly modules
+# no-sse2       disables IA-32 SSE2 code in assembly modules, the above
+#               mentioned '386' option implies this one
+# no-<cipher>   build without specified algorithm (rsa, idea, rc5, ...)
+# -<xxx> +<xxx> compiler options are passed through
+# -static       while -static is also a pass-through compiler option (and
+#               as such is limited to environments where it's actually
+#               meaningful), it triggers a number configuration options,
+#               namely no-dso, no-pic, no-shared and no-threads. It is
+#               argued that the only reason to produce statically linked
+#               binaries (and in context it means executables linked with
+#               -static flag, and not just executables linked with static
+#               libcrypto.a) is to eliminate dependency on specific run-time,
+#               a.k.a. libc version. The mentioned config options are meant
+#               to achieve just that. Unfortunately on Linux it's impossible
+#               to eliminate the dependency completely for openssl executable
+#               because of getaddrinfo and gethostbyname calls, which can
+#               invoke dynamically loadable library facility anyway to meet
+#               the lookup requests. For this reason on Linux statically
+#               linked openssl executable has rather debugging value than
+#               production quality.
+#
+# DEBUG_SAFESTACK use type-safe stacks to enforce type-safety on stack items
+#		provided to stack calls. Generates unique stack functions for
+#		each possible stack type.
+# BN_LLONG	use the type 'long long' in crypto/bn/bn.h
+# RC4_CHAR	use 'char' instead of 'int' for RC4_INT in crypto/rc4/rc4.h
+# Following are set automatically by this script
+#
+# MD5_ASM	use some extra md5 assembler,
+# SHA1_ASM	use some extra sha1 assembler, must define L_ENDIAN for x86
+# RMD160_ASM	use some extra ripemd160 assembler,
+# SHA256_ASM	sha256_block is implemented in assembler
+# SHA512_ASM	sha512_block is implemented in assembler
+# AES_ASM	AES_[en|de]crypt is implemented in assembler
+
+# Minimum warning options... any contributions to OpenSSL should at least get
+# past these.
+
+# DEBUG_UNUSED enables __owur (warn unused result) checks.
+my $gcc_devteam_warn = "-DDEBUG_UNUSED"
+        # -DPEDANTIC complements -pedantic and is meant to mask code that
+        # is not strictly standard-compliant and/or implementation-specific,
+        # e.g. inline assembly, disregards to alignment requirements, such
+        # that -pedantic would complain about. Incidentally -DPEDANTIC has
+        # to be used even in sanitized builds, because sanitizer too is
+        # supposed to and does take notice of non-standard behaviour. Then
+        # -pedantic with pre-C9x compiler would also complain about 'long
+        # long' not being supported. As 64-bit algorithms are common now,
+        # it grew impossible to resolve this without sizeable additional
+        # code, so we just tell compiler to be pedantic about everything
+        # but 'long long' type.
+        . " -DPEDANTIC -pedantic -Wno-long-long"
+        . " -Wall"
+        . " -Wextra"
+        . " -Wno-unused-parameter"
+        . " -Wno-missing-field-initializers"
+        . " -Wsign-compare"
+        . " -Wmissing-prototypes"
+        . " -Wshadow"
+        . " -Wformat"
+        . " -Wtype-limits"
+        . " -Wundef"
+        . " -Werror"
+        ;
+
+# These are used in addition to $gcc_devteam_warn when the compiler is clang.
+# TODO(openssl-team): fix problems and investigate if (at least) the
+# following warnings can also be enabled:
+#       -Wswitch-enum
+#       -Wcast-align
+#       -Wunreachable-code
+#       -Wlanguage-extension-token -- no, we use asm()
+#       -Wunused-macros -- no, too tricky for BN and _XOPEN_SOURCE etc
+#       -Wextended-offsetof -- no, needed in CMS ASN1 code
+my $clang_devteam_warn = ""
+        . " -Qunused-arguments"
+        . " -Wno-language-extension-token"
+        . " -Wno-extended-offsetof"
+        . " -Wconditional-uninitialized"
+        . " -Wincompatible-pointer-types-discards-qualifiers"
+        . " -Wmissing-variable-declarations"
+        ;
+
+# This adds backtrace information to the memory leak info.  Is only used
+# when crypto-mdebug-backtrace is enabled.
+my $memleak_devteam_backtrace = "-rdynamic";
+
+my $strict_warnings = 0;
+
+# As for $BSDthreads. Idea is to maintain "collective" set of flags,
+# which would cover all BSD flavors. -pthread applies to them all,
+# but is treated differently. OpenBSD expands is as -D_POSIX_THREAD
+# -lc_r, which is sufficient. FreeBSD 4.x expands it as -lc_r,
+# which has to be accompanied by explicit -D_THREAD_SAFE and
+# sometimes -D_REENTRANT. FreeBSD 5.x expands it as -lc_r, which
+# seems to be sufficient?
+our $BSDthreads="-pthread -D_THREAD_SAFE -D_REENTRANT";
+
+#
+# API compatibility name to version number mapping.
+#
+my $maxapi = "1.1.0";           # API for "no-deprecated" builds
+my $apitable = {
+    "1.1.0" => "0x10100000L",
+    "1.0.0" => "0x10000000L",
+    "0.9.8" => "0x00908000L",
+};
+
+our %table = ();
+our %config = ();
+our %withargs = ();
+
+# Forward declarations ###############################################
+
+# read_config(filename)
+#
+# Reads a configuration file and populates %table with the contents
+# (which the configuration file places in %targets).
+sub read_config;
+
+# resolve_config(target)
+#
+# Resolves all the late evaluations, inheritances and so on for the
+# chosen target and any target it inherits from.
+sub resolve_config;
+
+
+# Information collection #############################################
+
+# Unified build supports separate build dir
+my $srcdir = catdir(absolutedir(dirname($0))); # catdir ensures local syntax
+my $blddir = catdir(absolutedir("."));         # catdir ensures local syntax
+my $dofile = abs2rel(catfile($srcdir, "util/dofile.pl"));
+
+my $local_config_envname = 'OPENSSL_LOCAL_CONFIG_DIR';
+
+$config{sourcedir} = abs2rel($srcdir);
+$config{builddir} = abs2rel($blddir);
+
+# Collect reconfiguration information if needed
+my @argvcopy=@ARGV;
+
+if (grep /^reconf(igure)?$/, @argvcopy) {
+    if (-f "./configdata.pm") {
+	my $file = "./configdata.pm";
+	unless (my $return = do $file) {
+	    die "couldn't parse $file: $@" if $@;
+            die "couldn't do $file: $!"    unless defined $return;
+            die "couldn't run $file"       unless $return;
+	}
+
+	@argvcopy = defined($configdata::config{perlargv}) ?
+	    @{$configdata::config{perlargv}} : ();
+	die "Incorrect data to reconfigure, please do a normal configuration\n"
+	    if (grep(/^reconf/,@argvcopy));
+	$ENV{CROSS_COMPILE} = $configdata::config{cross_compile_prefix}
+	    if defined($configdata::config{cross_compile_prefix});
+	$ENV{CC} = $configdata::config{cc}
+	    if defined($configdata::config{cc});
+	$ENV{BUILDFILE} = $configdata::config{build_file}
+	    if defined($configdata::config{build_file});
+	$ENV{$local_config_envname} = $configdata::config{local_config_dir}
+	    if defined($configdata::config{local_config_dir});
+
+	print "Reconfiguring with: ", join(" ",@argvcopy), "\n";
+	print "    CROSS_COMPILE = ",$ENV{CROSS_COMPILE},"\n"
+	    if $ENV{CROSS_COMPILE};
+	print "    CC = ",$ENV{CC},"\n" if $ENV{CC};
+	print "    BUILDFILE = ",$ENV{BUILDFILE},"\n" if $ENV{BUILDFILE};
+	print "    $local_config_envname = ",$ENV{$local_config_envname},"\n"
+	    if $ENV{$local_config_envname};
+    } else {
+	die "Insufficient data to reconfigure, please do a normal configuration\n";
+    }
+}
+
+$config{perlargv} = [ @argvcopy ];
+
+# Collect version numbers
+$config{version} = "unknown";
+$config{version_num} = "unknown";
+$config{shlib_version_number} = "unknown";
+$config{shlib_version_history} = "unknown";
+
+collect_information(
+    collect_from_file(catfile($srcdir,'include/openssl/opensslv.h')),
+    qr/OPENSSL.VERSION.TEXT.*OpenSSL (\S+) / => sub { $config{version} = $1; },
+    qr/OPENSSL.VERSION.NUMBER.*(0x\S+)/	     => sub { $config{version_num}=$1 },
+    qr/SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER *"([^"]+)"/	     => sub { $config{shlib_version_number}=$1 },
+    qr/SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY *"([^"]*)"/     => sub { $config{shlib_version_history}=$1 }
+    );
+if ($config{shlib_version_history} ne "") { $config{shlib_version_history} .= ":"; }
+
+($config{major}, $config{minor})
+    = ($config{version} =~ /^([0-9]+)\.([0-9\.]+)/);
+($config{shlib_major}, $config{shlib_minor})
+    = ($config{shlib_version_number} =~ /^([0-9]+)\.([0-9\.]+)/);
+die "erroneous version information in opensslv.h: ",
+    "$config{major}, $config{minor}, $config{shlib_major}, $config{shlib_minor}\n"
+    if ($config{major} eq "" || $config{minor} eq ""
+	|| $config{shlib_major} eq "" ||  $config{shlib_minor} eq "");
+
+# Collect target configurations
+
+my $pattern = catfile(dirname($0), "Configurations", "*.conf");
+foreach (sort glob($pattern)) {
+    &read_config($_);
+}
+
+if (defined $ENV{$local_config_envname}) {
+    if ($^O eq 'VMS') {
+        # VMS environment variables are logical names,
+        # which can be used as is
+        $pattern = $local_config_envname . ':' . '*.conf';
+    } else {
+        $pattern = catfile($ENV{$local_config_envname}, '*.conf');
+    }
+
+    foreach (sort glob($pattern)) {
+        &read_config($_);
+    }
+}
+
+
+print "Configuring OpenSSL version $config{version} ($config{version_num})\n";
+
+$config{prefix}="";
+$config{openssldir}="";
+$config{processor}="";
+$config{libdir}="";
+$config{cross_compile_prefix}="";
+$config{fipslibdir}="/usr/local/ssl/fips-2.0/lib/";
+my $nofipscanistercheck=0;
+$config{baseaddr}="0xFB00000";
+my $auto_threads=1;    # enable threads automatically? true by default
+my $default_ranlib;
+$config{fips}=0;
+
+# Top level directories to build
+$config{dirs} = [ "crypto", "ssl", "engines", "apps", "test", "util", "tools", "fuzz" ];
+# crypto/ subdirectories to build
+$config{sdirs} = [
+    "objects",
+    "md2", "md4", "md5", "sha", "mdc2", "hmac", "ripemd", "whrlpool", "poly1305", "blake2",
+    "des", "aes", "rc2", "rc4", "rc5", "idea", "bf", "cast", "camellia", "seed", "chacha", "modes",
+    "bn", "ec", "rsa", "dsa", "dh", "dso", "engine",
+    "buffer", "bio", "stack", "lhash", "rand", "err",
+    "evp", "asn1", "pem", "x509", "x509v3", "conf", "txt_db", "pkcs7", "pkcs12", "comp", "ocsp", "ui",
+    "cms", "ts", "srp", "cmac", "ct", "async", "kdf"
+    ];
+
+# Known TLS and DTLS protocols
+my @tls = qw(ssl3 tls1 tls1_1 tls1_2);
+my @dtls = qw(dtls1 dtls1_2);
+
+# Explicitly known options that are possible to disable.  They can
+# be regexps, and will be used like this: /^no-${option}$/
+# For developers: keep it sorted alphabetically
+
+my @disablables = (
+    "afalgeng",
+    "asan",
+    "asm",
+    "async",
+    "autoalginit",
+    "autoerrinit",
+    "bf",
+    "blake2",
+    "camellia",
+    "capieng",
+    "cast",
+    "chacha",
+    "cmac",
+    "cms",
+    "comp",
+    "crypto-mdebug",
+    "crypto-mdebug-backtrace",
+    "ct",
+    "deprecated",
+    "des",
+    "dgram",
+    "dh",
+    "dsa",
+    "dso",
+    "dtls",
+    "dynamic-engine",
+    "ec",
+    "ec2m",
+    "ecdh",
+    "ecdsa",
+    "ec_nistp_64_gcc_128",
+    "egd",
+    "engine",
+    "err",
+    "filenames",
+    "fuzz-libfuzzer",
+    "fuzz-afl",
+    "gost",
+    "heartbeats",
+    "hw(-.+)?",
+    "idea",
+    "makedepend",
+    "md2",
+    "md4",
+    "mdc2",
+    "msan",
+    "multiblock",
+    "nextprotoneg",
+    "ocb",
+    "ocsp",
+    "pic",
+    "poly1305",
+    "posix-io",
+    "psk",
+    "rc2",
+    "rc4",
+    "rc5",
+    "rdrand",
+    "rfc3779",
+    "rmd160",
+    "scrypt",
+    "sctp",
+    "seed",
+    "shared",
+    "sock",
+    "srp",
+    "srtp",
+    "sse2",
+    "ssl",
+    "ssl-trace",
+    "static-engine",
+    "stdio",
+    "threads",
+    "tls",
+    "ts",
+    "ubsan",
+    "ui",
+    "unit-test",
+    "whirlpool",
+    "weak-ssl-ciphers",
+    "zlib",
+    "zlib-dynamic",
+    );
+foreach my $proto ((@tls, @dtls))
+	{
+	push(@disablables, $proto);
+	push(@disablables, "$proto-method");
+	}
+
+my %deprecated_disablables = (
+    "ssl2" => undef,
+    "buf-freelists" => undef,
+    "ripemd" => "rmd160"
+    );
+
+# All of the following is disabled by default (RC5 was enabled before 0.9.8):
+
+our %disabled = ( # "what"         => "comment"
+                  "asan"		=> "default",
+		  "crypto-mdebug"       => "default",
+		  "crypto-mdebug-backtrace" => "default",
+		  "ec_nistp_64_gcc_128" => "default",
+		  "egd"                 => "default",
+		  "fuzz-libfuzzer"	=> "default",
+		  "fuzz-afl"		=> "default",
+		  "heartbeats"          => "default",
+		  "md2"                 => "default",
+                  "msan"                => "default",
+		  "rc5"                 => "default",
+		  "sctp"                => "default",
+		  "ssl-trace"           => "default",
+		  "ssl3"                => "default",
+		  "ssl3-method"         => "default",
+                  "ubsan"		=> "default",
+		  "unit-test"           => "default",
+		  "weak-ssl-ciphers"    => "default",
+		  "zlib"                => "default",
+		  "zlib-dynamic"        => "default",
+		);
+
+# Note: => pair form used for aesthetics, not to truly make a hash table
+my @disable_cascades = (
+    # "what"		=> [ "cascade", ... ]
+    sub { $config{processor} eq "386" }
+			=> [ "sse2" ],
+    "ssl"		=> [ "ssl3" ],
+    "ssl3-method"	=> [ "ssl3" ],
+    "zlib"		=> [ "zlib-dynamic" ],
+    "des"		=> [ "mdc2" ],
+    "ec"		=> [ "ecdsa", "ecdh" ],
+
+    "dgram"		=> [ "dtls", "sctp" ],
+    "sock"		=> [ "dgram" ],
+    "dtls"		=> [ @dtls ],
+    sub { 0 == scalar grep { !$disabled{$_} } @dtls }
+			=> [ "dtls" ],
+
+    "tls"		=> [ @tls ],
+    sub { 0 == scalar grep { !$disabled{$_} } @tls }
+			=> [ "tls" ],
+
+    "crypto-mdebug"     => [ "crypto-mdebug-backtrace" ],
+
+    # Without DSO, we can't load dynamic engines, so don't build them dynamic
+    "dso"               => [ "dynamic-engine" ],
+
+    # Without position independent code, there can be no shared libraries or DSOs
+    "pic"               => [ "shared" ],
+    "shared"            => [ "dynamic-engine" ],
+    "engine"            => [ "afalgeng" ],
+
+    # no-autoalginit is only useful when building non-shared
+    "autoalginit"       => [ "shared", "apps" ],
+
+    "stdio"             => [ "apps", "capieng", "egd" ],
+    "apps"              => [ "tests" ],
+    "comp"		=> [ "zlib" ],
+    sub { !$disabled{"unit-test"} } => [ "heartbeats" ],
+
+    sub { !$disabled{"msan"} } => [ "asm" ],
+    );
+
+# Avoid protocol support holes.  Also disable all versions below N, if version
+# N is disabled while N+1 is enabled.
+#
+my @list = (reverse @tls);
+while ((my $first, my $second) = (shift @list, shift @list)) {
+    last unless @list;
+    push @disable_cascades, ( sub { !$disabled{$first} && $disabled{$second} }
+			      => [ @list ] );
+    unshift @list, $second;
+}
+my @list = (reverse @dtls);
+while ((my $first, my $second) = (shift @list, shift @list)) {
+    last unless @list;
+    push @disable_cascades, ( sub { !$disabled{$first} && $disabled{$second} }
+			      => [ @list ] );
+    unshift @list, $second;
+}
+
+# Explicit "no-..." options will be collected in %disabled along with the defaults.
+# To remove something from %disabled, use "enable-foo".
+# For symmetry, "disable-foo" is a synonym for "no-foo".
+
+&usage if ($#ARGV < 0);
+
+my $user_cflags="";
+my @user_defines=();
+$config{openssl_api_defines}=[];
+$config{openssl_algorithm_defines}=[];
+$config{openssl_thread_defines}=[];
+$config{openssl_sys_defines}=[];
+$config{openssl_other_defines}=[];
+my $libs="";
+my $target="";
+$config{options}="";
+$config{build_type} = "release";
+
+my %unsupported_options = ();
+my %deprecated_options = ();
+while (@argvcopy)
+	{
+	$_ = shift @argvcopy;
+	# VMS is a case insensitive environment, and depending on settings
+	# out of our control, we may receive options uppercased.  Let's
+	# downcase at least the part before any equal sign.
+	if ($^O eq "VMS")
+		{
+		s/^([^=]*)/lc($1)/e;
+		}
+	s /^-no-/no-/; # some people just can't read the instructions
+
+	# rewrite some options in "enable-..." form
+	s /^-?-?shared$/enable-shared/;
+	s /^sctp$/enable-sctp/;
+	s /^threads$/enable-threads/;
+	s /^zlib$/enable-zlib/;
+	s /^zlib-dynamic$/enable-zlib-dynamic/;
+
+        if (/^(no|disable|enable)-(.+)$/)
+                {
+                my $word = $2;
+                if (!exists $deprecated_disablables{$word}
+                        && !grep { $word =~ /^${_}$/ } @disablables)
+                        {
+                        $unsupported_options{$_} = 1;
+                        next;
+                        }
+                }
+        if (/^no-(.+)$/ || /^disable-(.+)$/)
+                {
+                foreach my $proto ((@tls, @dtls))
+                        {
+                        if ($1 eq "$proto-method")
+                                {
+                                $disabled{"$proto"} = "option($proto-method)";
+                                last;
+                                }
+                        }
+                if ($1 eq "dtls")
+                        {
+                        foreach my $proto (@dtls)
+                                {
+                                $disabled{$proto} = "option(dtls)";
+                                }
+                        $disabled{"dtls"} = "option(dtls)";
+                        }
+                elsif ($1 eq "ssl")
+                        {
+                        # Last one of its kind
+                        $disabled{"ssl3"} = "option(ssl)";
+                        }
+                elsif ($1 eq "tls")
+                        {
+                        # XXX: Tests will fail if all SSL/TLS
+                        # protocols are disabled.
+                        foreach my $proto (@tls)
+                                {
+                                $disabled{$proto} = "option(tls)";
+                                }
+                        }
+                elsif ($1 eq "static-engine")
+                        {
+                        delete $disabled{"dynamic-engine"};
+                        }
+                elsif ($1 eq "dynamic-engine")
+                        {
+                        $disabled{"dynamic-engine"} = "option";
+                        }
+                elsif (exists $deprecated_disablables{$1})
+                        {
+                        $deprecated_options{$_} = 1;
+                        if (defined $deprecated_disablables{$1})
+                                {
+                                $disabled{$deprecated_disablables{$1}} = "option";
+                                }
+                        }
+                else
+                        {
+                        $disabled{$1} = "option";
+                        }
+		# No longer an automatic choice
+		$auto_threads = 0 if ($1 eq "threads");
+		}
+	elsif (/^enable-(.+)$/)
+		{
+                if ($1 eq "static-engine")
+                        {
+                        $disabled{"dynamic-engine"} = "option";
+                        }
+                elsif ($1 eq "dynamic-engine")
+                        {
+                        delete $disabled{"dynamic-engine"};
+                        }
+                elsif ($1 eq "zlib-dynamic")
+                        {
+                        delete $disabled{"zlib"};
+                        }
+		my $algo = $1;
+		delete $disabled{$algo};
+
+		# No longer an automatic choice
+		$auto_threads = 0 if ($1 eq "threads");
+		}
+	elsif (/^--strict-warnings$/)
+		{
+		$strict_warnings = 1;
+		}
+	elsif (/^--debug$/)
+		{
+		$config{build_type} = "debug";
+		}
+	elsif (/^--release$/)
+		{
+		$config{build_type} = "release";
+		}
+	elsif (/^386$/)
+		{ $config{processor}=386; }
+	elsif (/^fips$/)
+		{
+		$config{fips}=1;
+		}
+	elsif (/^rsaref$/)
+		{
+		# No RSAref support any more since it's not needed.
+		# The check for the option is there so scripts aren't
+		# broken
+		}
+	elsif (/^nofipscanistercheck$/)
+		{
+		$config{fips} = 1;
+		$nofipscanistercheck = 1;
+		}
+	elsif (/^[-+]/)
+		{
+		if (/^--prefix=(.*)$/)
+			{
+			$config{prefix}=$1;
+			die "Directory given with --prefix MUST be absolute\n"
+				unless file_name_is_absolute($config{prefix});
+			}
+		elsif (/^--api=(.*)$/)
+			{
+			$config{api}=$1;
+			}
+		elsif (/^--libdir=(.*)$/)
+			{
+			$config{libdir}=$1;
+			}
+		elsif (/^--openssldir=(.*)$/)
+			{
+			$config{openssldir}=$1;
+			}
+		elsif (/^--with-zlib-lib=(.*)$/)
+			{
+			$withargs{zlib_lib}=$1;
+			}
+		elsif (/^--with-zlib-include=(.*)$/)
+			{
+			$withargs{zlib_include}=$1;
+			}
+		elsif (/^--with-fuzzer-lib=(.*)$/)
+			{
+			$withargs{fuzzer_lib}=$1;
+			}
+		elsif (/^--with-fuzzer-include=(.*)$/)
+			{
+			$withargs{fuzzer_include}=$1;
+			}
+		elsif (/^--with-fipslibdir=(.*)$/)
+			{
+			$config{fipslibdir}="$1/";
+			}
+		elsif (/^--with-baseaddr=(.*)$/)
+			{
+			$config{baseaddr}="$1";
+			}
+		elsif (/^--cross-compile-prefix=(.*)$/)
+			{
+			$config{cross_compile_prefix}=$1;
+			}
+		elsif (/^--config=(.*)$/)
+			{
+			read_config $1;
+			}
+		elsif (/^-[lL](.*)$/ or /^-Wl,/)
+			{
+			$libs.=$_." ";
+			}
+		elsif (/^-rpath$/ or /^-R$/)
+			# -rpath is the OSF1 rpath flag
+			# -R is the old Solaris rpath flag
+			{
+			my $rpath = shift(@argvcopy) || "";
+			$rpath .= " " if $rpath ne "";
+			$libs.=$_." ".$rpath;
+			}
+		elsif (/^-static$/)
+			{
+			$libs.=$_." ";
+			$disabled{"dso"} = "forced";
+			$disabled{"pic"} = "forced";
+			$disabled{"shared"} = "forced";
+			$disabled{"threads"} = "forced";
+			}
+		elsif (/^-D(.*)$/)
+			{
+			push @user_defines, $1;
+			}
+		else	# common if (/^[-+]/), just pass down...
+			{
+			$_ =~ s/%([0-9a-f]{1,2})/chr(hex($1))/gei;
+			$user_cflags.=" ".$_;
+			}
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		die "target already defined - $target (offending arg: $_)\n" if ($target ne "");
+		$target=$_;
+		}
+	unless ($_ eq $target || /^no-/ || /^disable-/)
+		{
+		# "no-..." follows later after implied disactivations
+		# have been derived.  (Don't take this too seriously,
+		# we really only write OPTIONS to the Makefile out of
+		# nostalgia.)
+
+		if ($config{options} eq "")
+			{ $config{options} = $_; }
+		else
+			{ $config{options} .= " ".$_; }
+		}
+
+        if (defined($config{api}) && !exists $apitable->{$config{api}}) {
+		die "***** Unsupported api compatibility level: $config{api}\n",
+        }
+
+	if (keys %deprecated_options)
+		{
+		warn "***** Deprecated options: ",
+			join(", ", keys %deprecated_options), "\n";
+		}
+	if (keys %unsupported_options)
+		{
+		die "***** Unsupported options: ",
+			join(", ", keys %unsupported_options), "\n";
+		}
+	}
+
+if ($libs =~ /(^|\s)-Wl,-rpath,/
+    && !$disabled{shared}
+    && !($disabled{asan} && $disabled{msan} && $disabled{ubsan})) {
+    die "***** Cannot simultaneously use -rpath, shared libraries, and\n",
+	"***** any of asan, msan or ubsan\n";
+}
+
+if ($config{fips})
+	{
+	delete $disabled{"shared"} if ($disabled{"shared"} =~ /^default/);
+	}
+else
+	{
+	@{$config{dirs}} = grep !/^fips$/, @{$config{dirs}};
+	}
+
+my @tocheckfor = (keys %disabled);
+while (@tocheckfor) {
+    my %new_tocheckfor = ();
+    my @cascade_copy = (@disable_cascades);
+    while (@cascade_copy) {
+	my ($test, $descendents) = (shift @cascade_copy, shift @cascade_copy);
+	if (ref($test) eq "CODE" ? $test->() : defined($disabled{$test})) {
+	    foreach(grep { !defined($disabled{$_}) } @$descendents) {
+		$new_tocheckfor{$_} = 1; $disabled{$_} = "forced";
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+    @tocheckfor = (keys %new_tocheckfor);
+}
+
+our $die = sub { die @_; };
+if ($target eq "TABLE") {
+    local $die = sub { warn @_; };
+    foreach (sort keys %table) {
+	print_table_entry($_, "TABLE");
+    }
+    exit 0;
+}
+
+if ($target eq "LIST") {
+    foreach (sort keys %table) {
+	print $_,"\n" unless $table{$_}->{template};
+    }
+    exit 0;
+}
+
+if ($target eq "HASH") {
+    local $die = sub { warn @_; };
+    print "%table = (\n";
+    foreach (sort keys %table) {
+	print_table_entry($_, "HASH");
+    }
+    exit 0;
+}
+
+# Backward compatibility?
+if ($target =~ m/^CygWin32(-.*)$/) {
+    $target = "Cygwin".$1;
+}
+
+foreach (sort (keys %disabled))
+	{
+	$config{options} .= " no-$_";
+
+	printf "    no-%-12s %-10s", $_, "[$disabled{$_}]";
+
+	if (/^dso$/)
+		{ }
+	elsif (/^threads$/)
+		{ }
+	elsif (/^shared$/)
+		{ }
+	elsif (/^pic$/)
+		{ }
+	elsif (/^zlib$/)
+		{ }
+	elsif (/^dynamic-engine$/)
+		{ }
+	elsif (/^makedepend$/)
+		{ }
+	elsif (/^zlib-dynamic$/)
+		{ }
+	elsif (/^sse2$/)
+		{ }
+	elsif (/^engine$/)
+		{
+		@{$config{dirs}} = grep !/^engines$/, @{$config{dirs}};
+		@{$config{sdirs}} = grep !/^engine$/, @{$config{sdirs}};
+		push @{$config{openssl_other_defines}}, "OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE";
+		print " OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE (skip engines)";
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		my ($WHAT, $what);
+
+		($WHAT = $what = $_) =~ tr/[\-a-z]/[_A-Z]/;
+
+		# Fix up C macro end names
+		$WHAT = "RMD160" if $what eq "ripemd";
+
+		# fix-up crypto/directory name(s)
+		$what = "ripemd" if $what eq "rmd160";
+		$what = "whrlpool" if $what eq "whirlpool";
+
+		if ($what ne "async" && $what ne "err"
+		    && grep { $_ eq $what } @{$config{sdirs}})
+			{
+			push @{$config{openssl_algorithm_defines}}, "OPENSSL_NO_$WHAT";
+			@{$config{sdirs}} = grep { $_ ne $what} @{$config{sdirs}};
+
+			print " OPENSSL_NO_$WHAT (skip dir)";
+			}
+		else
+			{
+			push @{$config{openssl_other_defines}}, "OPENSSL_NO_$WHAT";
+			print " OPENSSL_NO_$WHAT";
+			}
+		}
+
+	print "\n";
+	}
+
+print "Configuring for $target\n";
+
+# Support for legacy targets having a name starting with 'debug-'
+my ($d, $t) = $target =~ m/^(debug-)?(.*)$/;
+if ($d) {
+    $config{build_type} = "debug";
+
+    # If we do not find debug-foo in the table, the target is set to foo.
+    if (!$table{$target}) {
+	$target = $t;
+    }
+}
+$config{target} = $target;
+my %target = resolve_config($target);
+
+&usage if (!%target || $target{template});
+
+my %conf_files = map { $_ => 1 } (@{$target{_conf_fname_int}});
+$config{conf_files} = [ sort keys %conf_files ];
+%target = ( %{$table{DEFAULTS}}, %target );
+
+$target{exe_extension}="";
+$target{exe_extension}=".exe" if ($config{target} eq "DJGPP"
+                                  || $config{target} =~ /^(?:Cygwin|mingw)/);
+$target{exe_extension}=".pm"  if ($config{target} =~ /vos/);
+
+($target{shared_extension_simple}=$target{shared_extension})
+    =~ s|\.\$\(SHLIB_MAJOR\)\.\$\(SHLIB_MINOR\)||;
+$target{dso_extension}=$target{shared_extension_simple};
+($target{shared_import_extension}=$target{shared_extension_simple}.".a")
+    if ($config{target} =~ /^(?:Cygwin|mingw)/);
+
+
+$config{cross_compile_prefix} = $ENV{'CROSS_COMPILE'}
+    if $config{cross_compile_prefix} eq "";
+
+# Allow overriding the names of some tools.  USE WITH CARE
+# Note: only Unix cares about HASHBANGPERL...  that explains
+# the default string.
+$config{perl} =    $ENV{'PERL'}    || ($^O ne "VMS" ? $^X : "perl");
+$config{hashbangperl} =
+    $ENV{'HASHBANGPERL'}           || $ENV{'PERL'}     || "/usr/bin/env perl";
+$target{cc} =      $ENV{'CC'}      || $target{cc}      || "cc";
+$target{ranlib} =  $ENV{'RANLIB'}  || $target{ranlib}  ||
+                   (which("$config{cross_compile_prefix}ranlib") ?
+                          "\$(CROSS_COMPILE)ranlib" : "true");
+$target{ar} =      $ENV{'AR'}      || $target{ar}      || "ar";
+$target{nm} =      $ENV{'NM'}      || $target{nm}      || "nm";
+$target{rc} =
+    $ENV{'RC'}  || $ENV{'WINDRES'} || $target{rc}      || "windres";
+
+# Allow overriding the build file name
+$target{build_file} = $ENV{BUILDFILE} || $target{build_file} || "Makefile";
+
+# Cache information necessary for reconfiguration
+$config{cc} = $target{cc};
+$config{build_file} = $target{build_file};
+
+# For cflags, lflags, plib_lflags, ex_libs and defines, add the debug_
+# or release_ attributes.
+# Do it in such a way that no spurious space is appended (hence the grep).
+$config{defines} = [];
+$config{cflags} = "";
+$config{ex_libs} = "";
+$config{shared_ldflag} = "";
+
+# Make sure build_scheme is consistent.
+$target{build_scheme} = [ $target{build_scheme} ]
+    if ref($target{build_scheme}) ne "ARRAY";
+
+my ($builder, $builder_platform, @builder_opts) =
+    @{$target{build_scheme}};
+
+foreach my $checker (($builder_platform."-".$target{build_file}."-checker.pm",
+                      $builder_platform."-checker.pm")) {
+    my $checker_path = catfile($srcdir, "Configurations", $checker);
+    if (-f $checker_path) {
+        my $fn = $ENV{CONFIGURE_CHECKER_WARN}
+            ? sub { warn $@; } : sub { die $@; };
+        if (! do $checker_path) {
+            if ($@) {
+                $fn->($@);
+            } elsif ($!) {
+                $fn->($!);
+            } else {
+                $fn->("The detected tools didn't match the platform\n");
+            }
+        }
+        last;
+    }
+}
+
+push @{$config{defines}}, "NDEBUG"    if $config{build_type} eq "release";
+
+if ($target =~ /^mingw/ && `$target{cc} --target-help 2>&1` =~ m/-mno-cygwin/m)
+	{
+	$config{cflags} .= " -mno-cygwin";
+	$config{shared_ldflag} .= " -mno-cygwin";
+	}
+
+if ($target =~ /linux.*-mips/ && !$disabled{asm} && $user_cflags !~ /-m(ips|arch=)/) {
+	# minimally required architecture flags for assembly modules
+	$config{cflags}="-mips2 $config{cflags}" if ($target =~ /mips32/);
+	$config{cflags}="-mips3 $config{cflags}" if ($target =~ /mips64/);
+}
+
+my $no_shared_warn=0;
+my $no_user_cflags=0;
+my $no_user_defines=0;
+
+# The DSO code currently always implements all functions so that no
+# applications will have to worry about that from a compilation point
+# of view. However, the "method"s may return zero unless that platform
+# has support compiled in for them. Currently each method is enabled
+# by a define "DSO_<name>" ... we translate the "dso_scheme" config
+# string entry into using the following logic;
+if (!$disabled{dso} && $target{dso_scheme} ne "")
+	{
+	$target{dso_scheme} =~ tr/[a-z]/[A-Z]/;
+	if ($target{dso_scheme} eq "DLFCN")
+		{
+		unshift @{$config{defines}}, "DSO_DLFCN", "HAVE_DLFCN_H";
+		}
+	elsif ($target{dso_scheme} eq "DLFCN_NO_H")
+		{
+		unshift @{$config{defines}}, "DSO_DLFCN";
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		unshift @{$config{defines}}, "DSO_$target{dso_scheme}";
+		}
+	}
+
+$config{ex_libs}="$libs$config{ex_libs}" if ($libs ne "");
+
+if ($disabled{asm})
+	{
+	if ($config{fips})
+		{
+		@{$config{defines}} = grep !/^[BL]_ENDIAN$/, @{$config{defines}};
+		@{$target{defines}} = grep !/^[BL]_ENDIAN$/, @{$target{defines}};
+		}
+	}
+
+# If threads aren't disabled, check how possible they are
+unless ($disabled{threads}) {
+    if ($auto_threads) {
+        # Enabled by default, disable it forcibly if unavailable
+        if ($target{thread_scheme} eq "(unknown)") {
+            $disabled{threads} = "unavailable";
+        }
+    } else {
+        # The user chose to enable threads explicitly, let's see
+        # if there's a chance that's possible
+        if ($target{thread_scheme} eq "(unknown)") {
+            # If the user asked for "threads" and we don't have internal
+            # knowledge how to do it, [s]he is expected to provide any
+            # system-dependent compiler options that are necessary.  We
+            # can't truly check that the given options are correct, but
+            # we expect the user to know what [s]He is doing.
+            if ($no_user_cflags && $no_user_defines) {
+                die "You asked for multi-threading support, but didn't\n"
+                    ,"provide any system-specific compiler options\n";
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+# If threads still aren't disabled, add a C macro to ensure the source
+# code knows about it.  Any other flag is taken care of by the configs.
+unless($disabled{threads}) {
+    foreach (("defines", "openssl_thread_defines")) {
+        push @{$config{$_}}, "OPENSSL_THREADS";
+    }
+}
+
+# With "deprecated" disable all deprecated features.
+if (defined($disabled{"deprecated"})) {
+        $config{api} = $maxapi;
+}
+
+if ($target{shared_target} eq "")
+	{
+	$no_shared_warn = 1
+	    if ((!$disabled{shared} || !$disabled{"dynamic-engine"})
+		&& !$config{fips});
+	$disabled{shared} = "no-shared-target";
+	$disabled{pic} = $disabled{shared} = $disabled{"dynamic-engine"} =
+	    "no-shared-target";
+	}
+
+if ($disabled{"dynamic-engine"}) {
+        push @{$config{defines}}, "OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE";
+        $config{dynamic_engines} = 0;
+} else {
+        push @{$config{defines}}, "OPENSSL_NO_STATIC_ENGINE";
+        $config{dynamic_engines} = 1;
+}
+
+unless ($disabled{"fuzz-libfuzzer"}) {
+    $config{cflags} .= "-fsanitize-coverage=edge,indirect-calls ";
+}
+
+unless ($disabled{asan}) {
+    $config{cflags} .= "-fsanitize=address ";
+}
+
+unless ($disabled{ubsan}) {
+    # -DPEDANTIC or -fnosanitize=alignment may also be required on some
+    # platforms.
+    $config{cflags} .= "-fsanitize=undefined -fno-sanitize-recover=all ";
+}
+
+unless ($disabled{msan}) {
+  $config{cflags} .= "-fsanitize=memory ";
+}
+
+unless ($disabled{"fuzz-libfuzzer"} && $disabled{"fuzz-afl"}
+        && $disabled{asan} && $disabled{ubsan} && $disabled{msan}) {
+    $config{cflags} .= "-fno-omit-frame-pointer -g ";
+}
+#
+# Platform fix-ups
+#
+
+# This saves the build files from having to check
+if ($disabled{pic})
+	{
+	$target{shared_cflag} = $target{shared_ldflag} =
+		$target{shared_rcflag} = "";
+	}
+else
+	{
+	push @{$config{defines}}, "OPENSSL_PIC";
+	}
+
+if ($target{sys_id} ne "")
+	{
+	push @{$config{openssl_sys_defines}}, "OPENSSL_SYS_$target{sys_id}";
+	}
+
+unless ($disabled{asm}) {
+    $target{cpuid_asm_src}=$table{DEFAULTS}->{cpuid_asm_src} if ($config{processor} eq "386");
+    $target{bn_asm_src} =~ s/\w+-gf2m.c// if (defined($disabled{ec2m}));
+
+    # bn-586 is the only one implementing bn_*_part_words
+    push @{$config{defines}}, "OPENSSL_BN_ASM_PART_WORDS" if ($target{bn_asm_src} =~ /bn-586/);
+    push @{$config{defines}}, "OPENSSL_IA32_SSE2" if (!$disabled{sse2} && $target{bn_asm_src} =~ /86/);
+
+    push @{$config{defines}}, "OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT" if ($target{bn_asm_src} =~ /-mont/);
+    push @{$config{defines}}, "OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT5" if ($target{bn_asm_src} =~ /-mont5/);
+    push @{$config{defines}}, "OPENSSL_BN_ASM_GF2m" if ($target{bn_asm_src} =~ /-gf2m/);
+
+    if ($config{fips}) {
+	push @{$config{openssl_other_defines}}, "OPENSSL_FIPS";
+    }
+
+    if ($target{sha1_asm_src}) {
+	push @{$config{defines}}, "SHA1_ASM"   if ($target{sha1_asm_src} =~ /sx86/ || $target{sha1_asm_src} =~ /sha1/);
+	push @{$config{defines}}, "SHA256_ASM" if ($target{sha1_asm_src} =~ /sha256/);
+	push @{$config{defines}}, "SHA512_ASM" if ($target{sha1_asm_src} =~ /sha512/);
+    }
+    if ($target{rc4_asm_src} ne $table{DEFAULTS}->{rc4_asm_src}) {
+	push @{$config{defines}}, "RC4_ASM";
+    }
+    if ($target{md5_asm_src}) {
+	push @{$config{defines}}, "MD5_ASM";
+    }
+    $target{cast_asm_src}=$table{DEFAULTS}->{cast_asm_src} unless $disabled{pic}; # CAST assembler is not PIC
+    if ($target{rmd160_asm_src}) {
+	push @{$config{defines}}, "RMD160_ASM";
+    }
+    if ($target{aes_asm_src}) {
+	push @{$config{defines}}, "AES_ASM" if ($target{aes_asm_src} =~ m/\baes-/);;
+	# aes-ctr.fake is not a real file, only indication that assembler
+	# module implements AES_ctr32_encrypt...
+	push @{$config{defines}}, "AES_CTR_ASM" if ($target{aes_asm_src} =~ s/\s*aes-ctr\.fake//);
+	# aes-xts.fake indicates presence of AES_xts_[en|de]crypt...
+	push @{$config{defines}}, "AES_XTS_ASM" if ($target{aes_asm_src} =~ s/\s*aes-xts\.fake//);
+	$target{aes_asm_src} =~ s/\s*(vpaes|aesni)-x86\.s//g if ($disabled{sse2});
+	push @{$config{defines}}, "VPAES_ASM" if ($target{aes_asm_src} =~ m/vpaes/);
+	push @{$config{defines}}, "BSAES_ASM" if ($target{aes_asm_src} =~ m/bsaes/);
+    }
+    if ($target{wp_asm_src} =~ /mmx/) {
+        if ($config{processor} eq "386") {
+	    $target{wp_asm_src}=$table{DEFAULTS}->{wp_asm_src};
+	} elsif (!$disabled{"whirlpool"}) {
+	    push @{$config{defines}}, "WHIRLPOOL_ASM";
+	}
+    }
+    if ($target{modes_asm_src} =~ /ghash-/) {
+	push @{$config{defines}}, "GHASH_ASM";
+    }
+    if ($target{ec_asm_src} =~ /ecp_nistz256/) {
+	push @{$config{defines}}, "ECP_NISTZ256_ASM";
+    }
+    if ($target{padlock_asm_src} ne $table{DEFAULTS}->{padlock_asm_src}) {
+	push @{$config{defines}}, "PADLOCK_ASM";
+    }
+    if ($target{poly1305_asm_src} ne "") {
+	push @{$config{defines}}, "POLY1305_ASM";
+    }
+}
+
+my %predefined;
+
+if ($^O ne "VMS") {
+    my $cc = "$config{cross_compile_prefix}$target{cc}";
+
+    # collect compiler pre-defines from gcc or gcc-alike...
+    open(PIPE, "$cc -dM -E -x c /dev/null 2>&1 |");
+    while (<PIPE>) {
+	m/^#define\s+(\w+(?:\(\w+\))?)(?:\s+(.+))?/ or last;
+	$predefined{$1} = $2 // "";
+    }
+    close(PIPE);
+
+    if (!$disabled{makedepend}) {
+	# We know that GNU C version 3 and up as well as all clang
+	# versions support dependency generation
+	if ($predefined{__GNUC__} >= 3) {
+	    $config{makedepprog} = $cc;
+	} else {
+	    $config{makedepprog} = which('makedepend');
+	    $disabled{makedepend} = "unavailable" unless $config{makedepprog};
+	}
+    }
+}
+
+
+
+# Deal with bn_ops ###################################################
+
+$config{bn_ll}			=0;
+$config{export_var_as_fn}	=0;
+my $def_int="unsigned int";
+$config{rc4_int}		=$def_int;
+($config{b64l},$config{b64},$config{b32})=(0,0,1);
+
+my $count = 0;
+foreach (sort split(/\s+/,$target{bn_ops})) {
+    $count++ if /SIXTY_FOUR_BIT|SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG|THIRTY_TWO_BIT/;
+    $config{export_var_as_fn}=1                 if $_ eq 'EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN';
+    $config{bn_ll}=1				if $_ eq 'BN_LLONG';
+    $config{rc4_int}="unsigned char"		if $_ eq 'RC4_CHAR';
+    ($config{b64l},$config{b64},$config{b32})
+	=(0,1,0)				if $_ eq 'SIXTY_FOUR_BIT';
+    ($config{b64l},$config{b64},$config{b32})
+	=(1,0,0)				if $_ eq 'SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG';
+    ($config{b64l},$config{b64},$config{b32})
+	=(0,0,1)				if $_ eq 'THIRTY_TWO_BIT';
+}
+die "Exactly one of SIXTY_FOUR_BIT|SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG|THIRTY_TWO_BIT can be set in bn_ops\n"
+    if $count > 1;
+
+
+# Hack cflags for better warnings (dev option) #######################
+
+# "Stringify" the C flags string.  This permits it to be made part of a string
+# and works as well on command lines.
+$config{cflags} =~ s/([\\\"])/\\$1/g;
+
+if (defined($config{api})) {
+    $config{openssl_api_defines} = [ "OPENSSL_MIN_API=".$apitable->{$config{api}} ];
+    my $apiflag = sprintf("OPENSSL_API_COMPAT=%s", $apitable->{$config{api}});
+    push @{$config{defines}}, $apiflag;
+}
+
+if ($strict_warnings)
+	{
+	my $wopt;
+	die "ERROR --strict-warnings requires gcc or gcc-alike"
+            unless defined($predefined{__GNUC__});
+	foreach $wopt (split /\s+/, $gcc_devteam_warn)
+		{
+		$config{cflags} .= " $wopt" unless ($config{cflags} =~ /(?:^|\s)$wopt(?:\s|$)/)
+		}
+	if (defined($predefined{__clang__}))
+		{
+		foreach $wopt (split /\s+/, $clang_devteam_warn)
+			{
+			$config{cflags} .= " $wopt" unless ($config{cflags} =~ /(?:^|\s)$wopt(?:\s|$)/)
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+unless ($disabled{"crypto-mdebug-backtrace"})
+	{
+	foreach my $wopt (split /\s+/, $memleak_devteam_backtrace)
+		{
+		$config{cflags} .= " $wopt" unless ($config{cflags} =~ /(?:^|\s)$wopt(?:\s|$)/)
+		}
+	if ($target =~ /^BSD-/)
+		{
+		$config{ex_libs} .= " -lexecinfo";
+		}
+	}
+
+if ($user_cflags ne "") { $config{cflags}="$config{cflags}$user_cflags"; }
+else                    { $no_user_cflags=1;  }
+if (@user_defines) { $config{defines}=[ @{$config{defines}}, @user_defines ]; }
+else               { $no_user_defines=1;    }
+
+# ALL MODIFICATIONS TO %config and %target MUST BE DONE FROM HERE ON
+
+unless ($disabled{afalgeng}) {
+    $config{afalgeng}="";
+    if ($target =~ m/^linux/) {
+        my $minver = 4*10000 + 1*100 + 0;
+        if ($config{cross_compile_prefix} eq "") {
+            my $verstr = `uname -r`;
+            my ($ma, $mi1, $mi2) = split("\\.", $verstr);
+            ($mi2) = $mi2 =~ /(\d+)/;
+            my $ver = $ma*10000 + $mi1*100 + $mi2;
+            if ($ver < $minver) {
+                $disabled{afalgeng} = "too-old-kernel";
+            } else {
+                push @{$config{engdirs}}, "afalg";
+            }
+        } else {
+            $disabled{afalgeng} = "cross-compiling";
+        }
+    } else {
+        $disabled{afalgeng}  = "not-linux";
+    }
+}
+
+push @{$config{openssl_other_defines}}, "OPENSSL_NO_AFALGENG" if ($disabled{afalgeng});
+
+# If we use the unified build, collect information from build.info files
+my %unified_info = ();
+
+my $buildinfo_debug = defined($ENV{CONFIGURE_DEBUG_BUILDINFO});
+if ($builder eq "unified") {
+    use with_fallback qw(Text::Template);
+
+    sub cleandir {
+        my $base = shift;
+        my $dir = shift;
+        my $relativeto = shift || ".";
+
+        $dir = catdir($base,$dir) unless isabsolute($dir);
+
+        # Make sure the directories we're building in exists
+        mkpath($dir);
+
+        my $res = abs2rel(absolutedir($dir), rel2abs($relativeto));
+        #print STDERR "DEBUG[cleandir]: $dir , $base => $res\n";
+        return $res;
+    }
+
+    sub cleanfile {
+        my $base = shift;
+        my $file = shift;
+        my $relativeto = shift || ".";
+
+        $file = catfile($base,$file) unless isabsolute($file);
+
+        my $d = dirname($file);
+        my $f = basename($file);
+
+        # Make sure the directories we're building in exists
+        mkpath($d);
+
+        my $res = abs2rel(catfile(absolutedir($d), $f), rel2abs($relativeto));
+        #print STDERR "DEBUG[cleanfile]: $d , $f => $res\n";
+        return $res;
+    }
+
+    # Store the name of the template file we will build the build file from
+    # in %config.  This may be useful for the build file itself.
+    my @build_file_template_names =
+	( $builder_platform."-".$target{build_file}.".tmpl",
+	  $target{build_file}.".tmpl" );
+    my @build_file_templates = ();
+
+    # First, look in the user provided directory, if given
+    if (defined $ENV{$local_config_envname}) {
+	@build_file_templates =
+	    map {
+		if ($^O eq 'VMS') {
+		    # VMS environment variables are logical names,
+		    # which can be used as is
+		    $local_config_envname . ':' . $_;
+		} else {
+		    catfile($ENV{$local_config_envname}, $_);
+		}
+	    }
+	    @build_file_template_names;
+    }
+    # Then, look in our standard directory
+    push @build_file_templates,
+	( map { cleanfile($srcdir, catfile("Configurations", $_), $blddir) }
+	  @build_file_template_names );
+
+    my $build_file_template;
+    for $_ (@build_file_templates) {
+	$build_file_template = $_;
+        last if -f $build_file_template;
+
+        $build_file_template = undef;
+    }
+    if (!defined $build_file_template) {
+	die "*** Couldn't find any of:\n", join("\n", @build_file_templates), "\n";
+    }
+    $config{build_file_templates}
+      = [ $build_file_template,
+          cleanfile($srcdir, catfile("Configurations", "common.tmpl"),
+                    $blddir) ];
+
+    my @build_infos = ( [ ".", "build.info" ] );
+    foreach (@{$config{dirs}}) {
+        push @build_infos, [ $_, "build.info" ]
+            if (-f catfile($srcdir, $_, "build.info"));
+    }
+    foreach (@{$config{sdirs}}) {
+        push @build_infos, [ catdir("crypto", $_), "build.info" ]
+            if (-f catfile($srcdir, "crypto", $_, "build.info"));
+    }
+    foreach (@{$config{engdirs}}) {
+        push @build_infos, [ catdir("engines", $_), "build.info" ]
+            if (-f catfile($srcdir, "engines", $_, "build.info"));
+    }
+
+    $config{build_infos} = [ ];
+
+    foreach (@build_infos) {
+        my $sourced = catdir($srcdir, $_->[0]);
+        my $buildd = catdir($blddir, $_->[0]);
+
+        mkpath($buildd);
+
+        my $f = $_->[1];
+        # The basic things we're trying to build
+        my @programs = ();
+        my @programs_install = ();
+        my @libraries = ();
+        my @libraries_install = ();
+        my @engines = ();
+        my @engines_install = ();
+        my @scripts = ();
+        my @scripts_install = ();
+        my @extra = ();
+        my @overrides = ();
+        my @intermediates = ();
+        my @rawlines = ();
+
+        my %ordinals = ();
+        my %sources = ();
+        my %shared_sources = ();
+        my %includes = ();
+        my %depends = ();
+        my %renames = ();
+        my %sharednames = ();
+        my %generate = ();
+
+        # We want to detect configdata.pm in the source tree, so we
+        # don't use it if the build tree is different.
+        my $src_configdata = cleanfile($srcdir, "configdata.pm", $blddir);
+
+        push @{$config{build_infos}}, catfile(abs2rel($sourced, $blddir), $f);
+        my $template =
+            Text::Template->new(TYPE => 'FILE',
+                                SOURCE => catfile($sourced, $f),
+                                PREPEND => qq{use lib "$FindBin::Bin/util/perl";});
+        die "Something went wrong with $sourced/$f: $!\n" unless $template;
+        my @text =
+            split /^/m,
+            $template->fill_in(HASH => { config => \%config,
+                                         target => \%target,
+                                         disabled => \%disabled,
+                                         withargs => \%withargs,
+                                         builddir => abs2rel($buildd, $blddir),
+                                         sourcedir => abs2rel($sourced, $blddir),
+                                         buildtop => abs2rel($blddir, $blddir),
+                                         sourcetop => abs2rel($srcdir, $blddir) },
+                               DELIMITERS => [ "{-", "-}" ]);
+
+        # The top item of this stack has the following values
+        # -2 positive already run and we found ELSE (following ELSIF should fail)
+        # -1 positive already run (skip until ENDIF)
+        # 0 negatives so far (if we're at a condition, check it)
+        # 1 last was positive (don't skip lines until next ELSE, ELSIF or ENDIF)
+        # 2 positive ELSE (following ELSIF should fail)
+        my @skip = ();
+        collect_information(
+            collect_from_array([ @text ],
+                               qr/\\$/ => sub { my $l1 = shift; my $l2 = shift;
+                                                $l1 =~ s/\\$//; $l1.$l2 }),
+            # Info we're looking for
+            qr/^\s*IF\[((?:\\.|[^\\\]])*)\]\s*$/
+            => sub {
+                if (! @skip || $skip[$#skip] > 0) {
+                    push @skip, !! $1;
+                } else {
+                    push @skip, -1;
+                }
+            },
+            qr/^\s*ELSIF\[((?:\\.|[^\\\]])*)\]\s*$/
+            => sub { die "ELSIF out of scope" if ! @skip;
+                     die "ELSIF following ELSE" if abs($skip[$#skip]) == 2;
+                     $skip[$#skip] = -1 if $skip[$#skip] != 0;
+                     $skip[$#skip] = !! $1
+                         if $skip[$#skip] == 0; },
+            qr/^\s*ELSE\s*$/
+            => sub { die "ELSE out of scope" if ! @skip;
+                     $skip[$#skip] = -2 if $skip[$#skip] != 0;
+                     $skip[$#skip] = 2 if $skip[$#skip] == 0; },
+            qr/^\s*ENDIF\s*$/
+            => sub { die "ENDIF out of scope" if ! @skip;
+                     pop @skip; },
+            qr/^\s*PROGRAMS(_NO_INST)?\s*=\s*(.*)\s*$/
+            => sub {
+                if (!@skip || $skip[$#skip] > 0) {
+                    my $install = $1;
+                    my @x = tokenize($2);
+                    push @programs, @x;
+                    push @programs_install, @x unless $install;
+                }
+            },
+            qr/^\s*LIBS(_NO_INST)?\s*=\s*(.*)\s*$/
+            => sub {
+                if (!@skip || $skip[$#skip] > 0) {
+                    my $install = $1;
+                    my @x = tokenize($2);
+                    push @libraries, @x;
+                    push @libraries_install, @x unless $install;
+                }
+            },
+            qr/^\s*ENGINES(_NO_INST)?\s*=\s*(.*)\s*$/
+            => sub {
+                if (!@skip || $skip[$#skip] > 0) {
+                    my $install = $1;
+                    my @x = tokenize($2);
+                    push @engines, @x;
+                    push @engines_install, @x unless $install;
+                }
+            },
+            qr/^\s*SCRIPTS(_NO_INST)?\s*=\s*(.*)\s*$/
+            => sub {
+                if (!@skip || $skip[$#skip] > 0) {
+                    my $install = $1;
+                    my @x = tokenize($2);
+                    push @scripts, @x;
+                    push @scripts_install, @x unless $install;
+                }
+            },
+            qr/^\s*EXTRA\s*=\s*(.*)\s*$/
+            => sub { push @extra, tokenize($1)
+                         if !@skip || $skip[$#skip] > 0 },
+            qr/^\s*OVERRIDES\s*=\s*(.*)\s*$/
+            => sub { push @overrides, tokenize($1)
+                         if !@skip || $skip[$#skip] > 0 },
+
+            qr/^\s*ORDINALS\[((?:\\.|[^\\\]])+)\]\s*=\s*(.*)\s*$/,
+            => sub { push @{$ordinals{$1}}, tokenize($2)
+                         if !@skip || $skip[$#skip] > 0 },
+            qr/^\s*SOURCE\[((?:\\.|[^\\\]])+)\]\s*=\s*(.*)\s*$/
+            => sub { push @{$sources{$1}}, tokenize($2)
+                         if !@skip || $skip[$#skip] > 0 },
+            qr/^\s*SHARED_SOURCE\[((?:\\.|[^\\\]])+)\]\s*=\s*(.*)\s*$/
+            => sub { push @{$shared_sources{$1}}, tokenize($2)
+                         if !@skip || $skip[$#skip] > 0 },
+            qr/^\s*INCLUDE\[((?:\\.|[^\\\]])+)\]\s*=\s*(.*)\s*$/
+            => sub { push @{$includes{$1}}, tokenize($2)
+                         if !@skip || $skip[$#skip] > 0 },
+            qr/^\s*DEPEND\[((?:\\.|[^\\\]])*)\]\s*=\s*(.*)\s*$/
+            => sub { push @{$depends{$1}}, tokenize($2)
+                         if !@skip || $skip[$#skip] > 0 },
+            qr/^\s*GENERATE\[((?:\\.|[^\\\]])+)\]\s*=\s*(.*)\s*$/
+            => sub { push @{$generate{$1}}, $2
+                         if !@skip || $skip[$#skip] > 0 },
+            qr/^\s*RENAME\[((?:\\.|[^\\\]])+)\]\s*=\s*(.*)\s*$/
+            => sub { push @{$renames{$1}}, tokenize($2)
+                         if !@skip || $skip[$#skip] > 0 },
+            qr/^\s*SHARED_NAME\[((?:\\.|[^\\\]])+)\]\s*=\s*(.*)\s*$/
+            => sub { push @{$sharednames{$1}}, tokenize($2)
+                         if !@skip || $skip[$#skip] > 0 },
+            qr/^\s*BEGINRAW\[((?:\\.|[^\\\]])+)\]\s*$/
+            => sub {
+                my $lineiterator = shift;
+                my $target_kind = $1;
+                while (defined $lineiterator->()) {
+                    s|\R$||;
+                    if (/^\s*ENDRAW\[((?:\\.|[^\\\]])+)\]\s*$/) {
+                        die "ENDRAW doesn't match BEGINRAW"
+                            if $1 ne $target_kind;
+                        last;
+                    }
+                    next if @skip && $skip[$#skip] <= 0;
+                    push @rawlines,  $_
+                        if ($target_kind eq $target{build_file}
+                            || $target_kind eq $target{build_file}."(".$builder_platform.")");
+                }
+            },
+            qr/^(?:#.*|\s*)$/ => sub { },
+            "OTHERWISE" => sub { die "Something wrong with this line:\n$_\nat $sourced/$f" },
+            "BEFORE" => sub {
+                if ($buildinfo_debug) {
+                    print STDERR "DEBUG: Parsing ",join(" ", @_),"\n";
+                    print STDERR "DEBUG: ... before parsing, skip stack is ",join(" ", map { int($_) } @skip),"\n";
+                }
+            },
+            "AFTER" => sub {
+                if ($buildinfo_debug) {
+                    print STDERR "DEBUG: .... after parsing, skip stack is ",join(" ", map { int($_) } @skip),"\n";
+                }
+            },
+            );
+        die "runaway IF?" if (@skip);
+
+        foreach (keys %renames) {
+            die "$_ renamed to more than one thing: "
+                ,join(" ", @{$renames{$_}}),"\n"
+                if scalar @{$renames{$_}} > 1;
+            my $dest = cleanfile($buildd, $_, $blddir);
+            my $to = cleanfile($buildd, $renames{$_}->[0], $blddir);
+            die "$dest renamed to more than one thing: "
+                ,$unified_info{rename}->{$dest}, $to
+                unless !defined($unified_info{rename}->{$dest})
+                or $unified_info{rename}->{$dest} eq $to;
+            $unified_info{rename}->{$dest} = $to;
+        }
+
+        foreach (@programs) {
+            my $program = cleanfile($buildd, $_, $blddir);
+            if ($unified_info{rename}->{$program}) {
+                $program = $unified_info{rename}->{$program};
+            }
+            $unified_info{programs}->{$program} = 1;
+        }
+
+        foreach (@programs_install) {
+            my $program = cleanfile($buildd, $_, $blddir);
+            if ($unified_info{rename}->{$program}) {
+                $program = $unified_info{rename}->{$program};
+            }
+            $unified_info{install}->{programs}->{$program} = 1;
+        }
+
+        foreach (@libraries) {
+            my $library = cleanfile($buildd, $_, $blddir);
+            if ($unified_info{rename}->{$library}) {
+                $library = $unified_info{rename}->{$library};
+            }
+            $unified_info{libraries}->{$library} = 1;
+        }
+
+        foreach (@libraries_install) {
+            my $library = cleanfile($buildd, $_, $blddir);
+            if ($unified_info{rename}->{$library}) {
+                $library = $unified_info{rename}->{$library};
+            }
+            $unified_info{install}->{libraries}->{$library} = 1;
+        }
+
+        die <<"EOF" if scalar @engines and !$config{dynamic_engines};
+ENGINES can only be used if configured with 'dynamic-engine'.
+This is usually a fault in a build.info file.
+EOF
+        foreach (@engines) {
+            my $library = cleanfile($buildd, $_, $blddir);
+            if ($unified_info{rename}->{$library}) {
+                $library = $unified_info{rename}->{$library};
+            }
+            $unified_info{engines}->{$library} = 1;
+        }
+
+        foreach (@engines_install) {
+            my $library = cleanfile($buildd, $_, $blddir);
+            if ($unified_info{rename}->{$library}) {
+                $library = $unified_info{rename}->{$library};
+            }
+            $unified_info{install}->{engines}->{$library} = 1;
+        }
+
+        foreach (@scripts) {
+            my $script = cleanfile($buildd, $_, $blddir);
+            if ($unified_info{rename}->{$script}) {
+                $script = $unified_info{rename}->{$script};
+            }
+            $unified_info{scripts}->{$script} = 1;
+        }
+
+        foreach (@scripts_install) {
+            my $script = cleanfile($buildd, $_, $blddir);
+            if ($unified_info{rename}->{$script}) {
+                $script = $unified_info{rename}->{$script};
+            }
+            $unified_info{install}->{scripts}->{$script} = 1;
+        }
+
+        foreach (@extra) {
+            my $extra = cleanfile($buildd, $_, $blddir);
+            $unified_info{extra}->{$extra} = 1;
+        }
+
+        foreach (@overrides) {
+            my $override = cleanfile($buildd, $_, $blddir);
+            $unified_info{overrides}->{$override} = 1;
+        }
+
+        push @{$unified_info{rawlines}}, @rawlines;
+
+        unless ($disabled{shared}) {
+            # Check sharednames.
+            foreach (keys %sharednames) {
+                my $dest = cleanfile($buildd, $_, $blddir);
+                if ($unified_info{rename}->{$dest}) {
+                    $dest = $unified_info{rename}->{$dest};
+                }
+                die "shared_name for $dest with multiple values: "
+                    ,join(" ", @{$sharednames{$_}}),"\n"
+                    if scalar @{$sharednames{$_}} > 1;
+                my $to = cleanfile($buildd, $sharednames{$_}->[0], $blddir);
+                die "shared_name found for a library $dest that isn't defined\n"
+                    unless $unified_info{libraries}->{$dest};
+                die "shared_name for $dest with multiple values: "
+                    ,$unified_info{sharednames}->{$dest}, ", ", $to
+                    unless !defined($unified_info{sharednames}->{$dest})
+                    or $unified_info{sharednames}->{$dest} eq $to;
+                $unified_info{sharednames}->{$dest} = $to;
+            }
+
+            # Additionally, we set up sharednames for libraries that don't
+            # have any, as themselves.
+            foreach (keys %{$unified_info{libraries}}) {
+                if (!defined $unified_info{sharednames}->{$_}) {
+                    $unified_info{sharednames}->{$_} = $_
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
+        foreach (keys %ordinals) {
+            my $dest = $_;
+            my $ddest = cleanfile($buildd, $_, $blddir);
+            if ($unified_info{rename}->{$ddest}) {
+                $ddest = $unified_info{rename}->{$ddest};
+            }
+            foreach (@{$ordinals{$dest}}) {
+                my %known_ordinals =
+                    (
+                     crypto =>
+                     cleanfile($sourced, catfile("util", "libcrypto.num"), $blddir),
+                     ssl =>
+                     cleanfile($sourced, catfile("util", "libssl.num"), $blddir)
+                    );
+                my $o = $known_ordinals{$_};
+                die "Ordinals for $ddest defined more than once\n"
+                    if $unified_info{ordinals}->{$ddest};
+                $unified_info{ordinals}->{$ddest} = [ $_, $o ];
+            }
+        }
+
+        foreach (keys %sources) {
+            my $dest = $_;
+            my $ddest = cleanfile($buildd, $_, $blddir);
+            if ($unified_info{rename}->{$ddest}) {
+                $ddest = $unified_info{rename}->{$ddest};
+            }
+            foreach (@{$sources{$dest}}) {
+                my $s = cleanfile($sourced, $_, $blddir);
+
+                # If it isn't in the source tree, we assume it's generated
+                # in the build tree
+                if ($s eq $src_configdata || ! -f $s || $generate{$_}) {
+                    $s = cleanfile($buildd, $_, $blddir);
+                }
+                # We recognise C and asm files
+                if ($s =~ /\.[csS]\b$/) {
+                    (my $o = $_) =~ s/\.[csS]\b$/.o/;
+                    $o = cleanfile($buildd, $o, $blddir);
+                    $unified_info{sources}->{$ddest}->{$o} = 1;
+                    $unified_info{sources}->{$o}->{$s} = 1;
+                } else {
+                    $unified_info{sources}->{$ddest}->{$s} = 1;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
+        foreach (keys %shared_sources) {
+            my $dest = $_;
+            my $ddest = cleanfile($buildd, $_, $blddir);
+            if ($unified_info{rename}->{$ddest}) {
+                $ddest = $unified_info{rename}->{$ddest};
+            }
+            foreach (@{$shared_sources{$dest}}) {
+                my $s = cleanfile($sourced, $_, $blddir);
+
+                # If it isn't in the source tree, we assume it's generated
+                # in the build tree
+                if ($s eq $src_configdata || ! -f $s || $generate{$_}) {
+                    $s = cleanfile($buildd, $_, $blddir);
+                }
+                # We recognise C and asm files
+                if ($s =~ /\.[csS]\b$/) {
+                    (my $o = $_) =~ s/\.[csS]\b$/.o/;
+                    $o = cleanfile($buildd, $o, $blddir);
+                    $unified_info{shared_sources}->{$ddest}->{$o} = 1;
+                    $unified_info{sources}->{$o}->{$s} = 1;
+                } else {
+                    die "unrecognised source file type for shared library: $s\n";
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
+        foreach (keys %generate) {
+            my $dest = $_;
+            my $ddest = cleanfile($buildd, $_, $blddir);
+            if ($unified_info{rename}->{$ddest}) {
+                $ddest = $unified_info{rename}->{$ddest};
+            }
+            die "more than one generator for $dest: "
+                    ,join(" ", @{$generate{$_}}),"\n"
+                    if scalar @{$generate{$_}} > 1;
+            my @generator = split /\s+/, $generate{$dest}->[0];
+            $generator[0] = cleanfile($sourced, $generator[0], $blddir),
+            $unified_info{generate}->{$ddest} = [ @generator ];
+        }
+
+        foreach (keys %depends) {
+            my $dest = $_;
+            my $ddest = $dest eq "" ? "" : cleanfile($sourced, $_, $blddir);
+
+            # If the destination doesn't exist in source, it can only be
+            # a generated file in the build tree.
+            if ($ddest ne "" && ($ddest eq $src_configdata || ! -f $ddest)) {
+                $ddest = cleanfile($buildd, $_, $blddir);
+                if ($unified_info{rename}->{$ddest}) {
+                    $ddest = $unified_info{rename}->{$ddest};
+                }
+            }
+            foreach (@{$depends{$dest}}) {
+                my $d = cleanfile($sourced, $_, $blddir);
+
+                # If we know it's generated, or assume it is because we can't
+                # find it in the source tree, we set file we depend on to be
+                # in the build tree rather than the source tree, and assume
+                # and that there are lines to build it in a BEGINRAW..ENDRAW
+                # section or in the Makefile template.
+                if ($d eq $src_configdata
+                    || ! -f $d
+                    || (grep { $d eq $_ }
+                        map { cleanfile($srcdir, $_, $blddir) }
+                        grep { /\.h$/ } keys %{$unified_info{generate}})) {
+                    $d = cleanfile($buildd, $_, $blddir);
+                }
+                # Take note if the file to depend on is being renamed
+                if ($unified_info{rename}->{$d}) {
+                    $d = $unified_info{rename}->{$d};
+                }
+                $unified_info{depends}->{$ddest}->{$d} = 1;
+            }
+        }
+
+        foreach (keys %includes) {
+            my $dest = $_;
+            my $ddest = cleanfile($sourced, $_, $blddir);
+
+            # If the destination doesn't exist in source, it can only be
+            # a generated file in the build tree.
+            if ($ddest eq $src_configdata || ! -f $ddest) {
+                $ddest = cleanfile($buildd, $_, $blddir);
+                if ($unified_info{rename}->{$ddest}) {
+                    $ddest = $unified_info{rename}->{$ddest};
+                }
+            }
+            foreach (@{$includes{$dest}}) {
+                my $is = cleandir($sourced, $_, $blddir);
+                my $ib = cleandir($buildd, $_, $blddir);
+                push @{$unified_info{includes}->{$ddest}->{source}}, $is
+                    unless grep { $_ eq $is } @{$unified_info{includes}->{$ddest}->{source}};
+                push @{$unified_info{includes}->{$ddest}->{build}}, $ib
+                    unless grep { $_ eq $ib } @{$unified_info{includes}->{$ddest}->{build}};
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    # Massage the result
+
+    # If we depend on a header file or a perl module, add an inclusion of
+    # its directory to allow smoothe inclusion
+    foreach my $dest (keys %{$unified_info{depends}}) {
+        next if $dest eq "";
+        foreach my $d (keys %{$unified_info{depends}->{$dest}}) {
+            next unless $d =~ /\.(h|pm)$/;
+            my $i = dirname($d);
+            my $spot =
+                $d eq "configdata.pm" || defined($unified_info{generate}->{$d})
+                ? 'build' : 'source';
+            push @{$unified_info{includes}->{$dest}->{$spot}}, $i
+                unless grep { $_ eq $i } @{$unified_info{includes}->{$dest}->{$spot}};
+        }
+    }
+
+    # Trickle down includes placed on libraries, engines and programs to
+    # their sources (i.e. object files)
+    foreach my $dest (keys %{$unified_info{engines}},
+                      keys %{$unified_info{libraries}},
+                      keys %{$unified_info{programs}}) {
+        foreach my $k (("source", "build")) {
+            next unless defined($unified_info{includes}->{$dest}->{$k});
+            my @incs = reverse @{$unified_info{includes}->{$dest}->{$k}};
+            foreach my $obj (grep /\.o$/,
+                             (keys %{$unified_info{sources}->{$dest}},
+                              keys %{$unified_info{shared_sources}->{$dest}})) {
+                foreach my $inc (@incs) {
+                    unshift @{$unified_info{includes}->{$obj}->{$k}}, $inc
+                        unless grep { $_ eq $inc } @{$unified_info{includes}->{$obj}->{$k}};
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        delete $unified_info{includes}->{$dest};
+    }
+
+    ### Make unified_info a bit more efficient
+    # One level structures
+    foreach (("programs", "libraries", "engines", "scripts", "extra", "overrides")) {
+        $unified_info{$_} = [ sort keys %{$unified_info{$_}} ];
+    }
+    # Two level structures
+    foreach my $l1 (("install", "sources", "shared_sources", "ldadd", "depends")) {
+        foreach my $l2 (sort keys %{$unified_info{$l1}}) {
+            $unified_info{$l1}->{$l2} =
+                [ sort keys %{$unified_info{$l1}->{$l2}} ];
+        }
+    }
+    # Includes
+    foreach my $dest (sort keys %{$unified_info{includes}}) {
+        if (defined($unified_info{includes}->{$dest}->{build})) {
+            my @source_includes = ();
+            @source_includes = ( @{$unified_info{includes}->{$dest}->{source}} )
+                if defined($unified_info{includes}->{$dest}->{source});
+            $unified_info{includes}->{$dest} =
+                [ @{$unified_info{includes}->{$dest}->{build}} ];
+            foreach my $inc (@source_includes) {
+                push @{$unified_info{includes}->{$dest}}, $inc
+                    unless grep { $_ eq $inc } @{$unified_info{includes}->{$dest}};
+            }
+        } else {
+            $unified_info{includes}->{$dest} =
+                [ @{$unified_info{includes}->{$dest}->{source}} ];
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+# For the schemes that need it, we provide the old *_obj configs
+# from the *_asm_obj ones
+foreach (grep /_(asm|aux)_src$/, keys %target) {
+    my $src = $_;
+    (my $obj = $_) =~ s/_(asm|aux)_src$/_obj/;
+    ($target{$obj} = $target{$src}) =~ s/\.[csS]\b/.o/g;
+}
+
+# Write down our configuration where it fits #########################
+
+open(OUT,">configdata.pm") || die "unable to create configdata.pm: $!\n";
+print OUT <<"EOF";
+package configdata;
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+
+use Exporter;
+#use vars qw(\@ISA \@EXPORT);
+our \@ISA = qw(Exporter);
+our \@EXPORT = qw(\%config \%target \%disabled \%withargs \%unified_info \@disablables);
+
+EOF
+print OUT "our %config = (\n";
+foreach (sort keys %config) {
+    if (ref($config{$_}) eq "ARRAY") {
+	print OUT "  ", $_, " => [ ", join(", ",
+					   map { quotify("perl", $_) }
+					   @{$config{$_}}), " ],\n";
+    } else {
+	print OUT "  ", $_, " => ", quotify("perl", $config{$_}), ",\n"
+    }
+}
+print OUT <<"EOF";
+);
+
+EOF
+print OUT "our %target = (\n";
+foreach (sort keys %target) {
+    if (ref($target{$_}) eq "ARRAY") {
+	print OUT "  ", $_, " => [ ", join(", ",
+					   map { quotify("perl", $_) }
+					   @{$target{$_}}), " ],\n";
+    } else {
+	print OUT "  ", $_, " => ", quotify("perl", $target{$_}), ",\n"
+    }
+}
+print OUT <<"EOF";
+);
+
+EOF
+print OUT "our \%available_protocols = (\n";
+print OUT "  tls => [ ", join(", ", map { quotify("perl", $_) } @tls), " ],\n";
+print OUT "  dtls => [ ", join(", ", map { quotify("perl", $_) } @dtls), " ],\n";
+print OUT <<"EOF";
+);
+
+EOF
+print OUT "our \@disablables = (\n";
+foreach (@disablables) {
+    print OUT "  ", quotify("perl", $_), ",\n";
+}
+print OUT <<"EOF";
+);
+
+EOF
+print OUT "our \%disabled = (\n";
+foreach (sort keys %disabled) {
+    print OUT "  ", quotify("perl", $_), " => ", quotify("perl", $disabled{$_}), ",\n";
+}
+print OUT <<"EOF";
+);
+
+EOF
+print OUT "our %withargs = (\n";
+foreach (sort keys %withargs) {
+    if (ref($withargs{$_}) eq "ARRAY") {
+	print OUT "  ", $_, " => [ ", join(", ",
+					   map { quotify("perl", $_) }
+					   @{$withargs{$_}}), " ],\n";
+    } else {
+	print OUT "  ", $_, " => ", quotify("perl", $withargs{$_}), ",\n"
+    }
+}
+print OUT <<"EOF";
+);
+
+EOF
+if ($builder eq "unified") {
+    my $recurse;
+    $recurse = sub {
+        my $indent = shift;
+        foreach (@_) {
+            if (ref $_ eq "ARRAY") {
+                print OUT " "x$indent, "[\n";
+                foreach (@$_) {
+                    $recurse->($indent + 4, $_);
+                }
+                print OUT " "x$indent, "],\n";
+            } elsif (ref $_ eq "HASH") {
+                my %h = %$_;
+                print OUT " "x$indent, "{\n";
+                foreach (sort keys %h) {
+                    if (ref $h{$_} eq "") {
+                        print OUT " "x($indent + 4), quotify("perl", $_), " => ", quotify("perl", $h{$_}), ",\n";
+                    } else {
+                        print OUT " "x($indent + 4), quotify("perl", $_), " =>\n";
+                        $recurse->($indent + 8, $h{$_});
+                    }
+                }
+                print OUT " "x$indent, "},\n";
+            } else {
+                print OUT " "x$indent, quotify("perl", $_), ",\n";
+            }
+        }
+    };
+    print OUT "our %unified_info = (\n";
+    foreach (sort keys %unified_info) {
+        if (ref $unified_info{$_} eq "") {
+            print OUT " "x4, quotify("perl", $_), " => ", quotify("perl", $unified_info{$_}), ",\n";
+        } else {
+            print OUT " "x4, quotify("perl", $_), " =>\n";
+            $recurse->(8, $unified_info{$_});
+        }
+    }
+    print OUT <<"EOF";
+);
+
+EOF
+}
+print OUT "1;\n";
+close(OUT);
+
+
+print "CC            =$config{cross_compile_prefix}$target{cc}\n";
+print "CFLAG         =$target{cflags} $config{cflags}\n";
+print "SHARED_CFLAG  =$target{shared_cflag}\n";
+print "DEFINES       =",join(" ", @{$target{defines}}, @{$config{defines}}),"\n";
+print "LFLAG         =$target{lflags}\n";
+print "PLIB_LFLAG    =$target{plib_lflags}\n";
+print "EX_LIBS       =$target{ex_libs} $config{ex_libs}\n";
+print "APPS_OBJ      =$target{apps_obj}\n";
+print "CPUID_OBJ     =$target{cpuid_obj}\n";
+print "UPLINK_OBJ    =$target{uplink_obj}\n";
+print "BN_ASM        =$target{bn_obj}\n";
+print "EC_ASM        =$target{ec_obj}\n";
+print "DES_ENC       =$target{des_obj}\n";
+print "AES_ENC       =$target{aes_obj}\n";
+print "BF_ENC        =$target{bf_obj}\n";
+print "CAST_ENC      =$target{cast_obj}\n";
+print "RC4_ENC       =$target{rc4_obj}\n";
+print "RC5_ENC       =$target{rc5_obj}\n";
+print "MD5_OBJ_ASM   =$target{md5_obj}\n";
+print "SHA1_OBJ_ASM  =$target{sha1_obj}\n";
+print "RMD160_OBJ_ASM=$target{rmd160_obj}\n";
+print "CMLL_ENC      =$target{cmll_obj}\n";
+print "MODES_OBJ     =$target{modes_obj}\n";
+print "PADLOCK_OBJ   =$target{padlock_obj}\n";
+print "CHACHA_ENC    =$target{chacha_obj}\n";
+print "POLY1305_OBJ  =$target{poly1305_obj}\n";
+print "BLAKE2_OBJ    =$target{blake2_obj}\n";
+print "PROCESSOR     =$config{processor}\n";
+print "RANLIB        =", $target{ranlib} eq '$(CROSS_COMPILE)ranlib' ?
+                             "$config{cross_compile_prefix}ranlib" :
+                             "$target{ranlib}", "\n";
+print "ARFLAGS       =$target{arflags}\n";
+print "PERL          =$config{perl}\n";
+print "\n";
+print "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG mode\n" if $config{b64l};
+print "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT mode\n" if $config{b64};
+print "THIRTY_TWO_BIT mode\n" if $config{b32};
+print "BN_LLONG mode\n" if $config{bn_ll};
+print "RC4 uses $config{rc4_int}\n" if $config{rc4_int} ne $def_int;
+
+my %builders = (
+    unified => sub {
+        run_dofile(catfile($blddir, $target{build_file}),
+                   @{$config{build_file_templates}});
+    },
+    );
+
+$builders{$builder}->($builder_platform, @builder_opts);
+
+print <<"EOF";
+
+Configured for $target.
+EOF
+
+print <<"EOF" if ($disabled{threads} eq "unavailable");
+
+The library could not be configured for supporting multi-threaded
+applications as the compiler options required on this system are not known.
+See file INSTALL for details if you need multi-threading.
+EOF
+
+print <<"EOF" if ($no_shared_warn);
+
+The options 'shared', 'pic' and 'dynamic-engine' aren't supported on this
+platform, so we will pretend you gave the option 'no-pic', which also disables
+'shared' and 'dynamic-engine'.  If you know how to implement shared libraries
+or position independent code, please let us know (but please first make sure
+you have tried with a current version of OpenSSL).
+EOF
+
+exit(0);
+
+######################################################################
+#
+# Helpers and utility functions
+#
+
+# Configuration file reading #########################################
+
+# Note: All of the helper functions are for lazy evaluation.  They all
+# return a CODE ref, which will return the intended value when evaluated.
+# Thus, whenever there's mention of a returned value, it's about that
+# intended value.
+
+# Helper function to implement conditional inheritance depending on the
+# value of $disabled{asm}.  Used in inherit_from values as follows:
+#
+#      inherit_from => [ "template", asm("asm_tmpl") ]
+#
+sub asm {
+    my @x = @_;
+    sub {
+	$disabled{asm} ? () : @x;
+    }
+}
+
+# Helper function to implement conditional value variants, with a default
+# plus additional values based on the value of $config{build_type}.
+# Arguments are given in hash table form:
+#
+#       picker(default => "Basic string: ",
+#              debug   => "debug",
+#              release => "release")
+#
+# When configuring with --debug, the resulting string will be
+# "Basic string: debug", and when not, it will be "Basic string: release"
+#
+# This can be used to create variants of sets of flags according to the
+# build type:
+#
+#       cflags => picker(default => "-Wall",
+#                        debug   => "-g -O0",
+#                        release => "-O3")
+#
+sub picker {
+    my %opts = @_;
+    return sub { add($opts{default} || (),
+                     $opts{$config{build_type}} || ())->(); }
+}
+
+# Helper function to combine several values of different types into one.
+# This is useful if you want to combine a string with the result of a
+# lazy function, such as:
+#
+#       cflags => combine("-Wall", sub { $disabled{zlib} ? () : "-DZLIB" })
+#
+sub combine {
+    my @stuff = @_;
+    return sub { add(@stuff)->(); }
+}
+
+# Helper function to implement conditional values depending on the value
+# of $disabled{threads}.  Can be used as follows:
+#
+#       cflags => combine("-Wall", threads("-pthread"))
+#
+sub threads {
+    my @flags = @_;
+    return sub { add($disabled{threads} ? () : @flags)->(); }
+}
+
+
+
+our $add_called = 0;
+# Helper function to implement adding values to already existing configuration
+# values.  It handles elements that are ARRAYs, CODEs and scalars
+sub _add {
+    my $separator = shift;
+
+    # If there's any ARRAY in the collection of values OR the separator
+    # is undef, we will return an ARRAY of combined values, otherwise a
+    # string of joined values with $separator as the separator.
+    my $found_array = !defined($separator);
+
+    my @values =
+	map {
+	    my $res = $_;
+	    while (ref($res) eq "CODE") {
+		$res = $res->();
+	    }
+	    if (defined($res)) {
+		if (ref($res) eq "ARRAY") {
+		    $found_array = 1;
+		    @$res;
+		} else {
+		    $res;
+		}
+	    } else {
+		();
+	    }
+    } (@_);
+
+    $add_called = 1;
+
+    if ($found_array) {
+	[ @values ];
+    } else {
+	join($separator, grep { defined($_) && $_ ne "" } @values);
+    }
+}
+sub add_before {
+    my $separator = " ";
+    if (ref($_[$#_]) eq "HASH") {
+        my $opts = pop;
+        $separator = $opts->{separator};
+    }
+    my @x = @_;
+    sub { _add($separator, @x, @_) };
+}
+sub add {
+    my $separator = " ";
+    if (ref($_[$#_]) eq "HASH") {
+        my $opts = pop;
+        $separator = $opts->{separator};
+    }
+    my @x = @_;
+    sub { _add($separator, @_, @x) };
+}
+
+# configuration reader, evaluates the input file as a perl script and expects
+# it to fill %targets with target configurations.  Those are then added to
+# %table.
+sub read_config {
+    my $fname = shift;
+    open(CONFFILE, "< $fname")
+	or die "Can't open configuration file '$fname'!\n";
+    my $x = $/;
+    undef $/;
+    my $content = <CONFFILE>;
+    $/ = $x;
+    close(CONFFILE);
+    my %targets = ();
+    {
+	# Protect certain tables from tampering
+	local %table = %::table;
+
+	eval $content;
+	warn $@ if $@;
+    }
+    my %preexisting = ();
+    foreach (sort keys %targets) {
+        $preexisting{$_} = 1 if $table{$_};
+    }
+    die <<"EOF",
+The following config targets from $fname
+shadow pre-existing config targets with the same name:
+EOF
+        map { "  $_\n" } sort keys %preexisting
+        if %preexisting;
+
+
+    # For each target, check that it's configured with a hash table.
+    foreach (keys %targets) {
+	if (ref($targets{$_}) ne "HASH") {
+	    if (ref($targets{$_}) eq "") {
+		warn "Deprecated target configuration for $_, ignoring...\n";
+	    } else {
+		warn "Misconfigured target configuration for $_ (should be a hash table), ignoring...\n";
+	    }
+	    delete $targets{$_};
+	} else {
+            $targets{$_}->{_conf_fname_int} = add([ $fname ]);
+        }
+    }
+
+    %table = (%table, %targets);
+
+}
+
+# configuration resolver.  Will only resolve all the lazy evaluation
+# codeblocks for the chosen target and all those it inherits from,
+# recursively
+sub resolve_config {
+    my $target = shift;
+    my @breadcrumbs = @_;
+
+#    my $extra_checks = defined($ENV{CONFIGURE_EXTRA_CHECKS});
+
+    if (grep { $_ eq $target } @breadcrumbs) {
+	die "inherit_from loop!  target backtrace:\n  "
+	    ,$target,"\n  ",join("\n  ", @breadcrumbs),"\n";
+    }
+
+    if (!defined($table{$target})) {
+	warn "Warning! target $target doesn't exist!\n";
+	return ();
+    }
+    # Recurse through all inheritances.  They will be resolved on the
+    # fly, so when this operation is done, they will all just be a
+    # bunch of attributes with string values.
+    # What we get here, though, are keys with references to lists of
+    # the combined values of them all.  We will deal with lists after
+    # this stage is done.
+    my %combined_inheritance = ();
+    if ($table{$target}->{inherit_from}) {
+	my @inherit_from =
+	    map { ref($_) eq "CODE" ? $_->() : $_ } @{$table{$target}->{inherit_from}};
+	foreach (@inherit_from) {
+	    my %inherited_config = resolve_config($_, $target, @breadcrumbs);
+
+	    # 'template' is a marker that's considered private to
+	    # the config that had it.
+	    delete $inherited_config{template};
+
+	    foreach (keys %inherited_config) {
+		if (!$combined_inheritance{$_}) {
+		    $combined_inheritance{$_} = [];
+		}
+		push @{$combined_inheritance{$_}}, $inherited_config{$_};
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+
+    # We won't need inherit_from in this target any more, since we've
+    # resolved all the inheritances that lead to this
+    delete $table{$target}->{inherit_from};
+
+    # Now is the time to deal with those lists.  Here's the place to
+    # decide what shall be done with those lists, all based on the
+    # values of the target we're currently dealing with.
+    # - If a value is a coderef, it will be executed with the list of
+    #   inherited values as arguments.
+    # - If the corresponding key doesn't have a value at all or is the
+    #   empty string, the inherited value list will be run through the
+    #   default combiner (below), and the result becomes this target's
+    #   value.
+    # - Otherwise, this target's value is assumed to be a string that
+    #   will simply override the inherited list of values.
+    my $default_combiner = add();
+
+    my %all_keys =
+	map { $_ => 1 } (keys %combined_inheritance,
+			 keys %{$table{$target}});
+
+    sub process_values {
+	my $object    = shift;
+	my $inherited = shift;  # Always a [ list ]
+	my $target    = shift;
+	my $entry     = shift;
+
+        $add_called = 0;
+
+        while(ref($object) eq "CODE") {
+            $object = $object->(@$inherited);
+        }
+        if (!defined($object)) {
+            return ();
+        }
+        elsif (ref($object) eq "ARRAY") {
+            local $add_called;  # To make sure recursive calls don't affect it
+            return [ map { process_values($_, $inherited, $target, $entry) }
+                     @$object ];
+        } elsif (ref($object) eq "") {
+            return $object;
+        } else {
+            die "cannot handle reference type ",ref($object)
+                ," found in target ",$target," -> ",$entry,"\n";
+        }
+    }
+
+    foreach (sort keys %all_keys) {
+        my $previous = $combined_inheritance{$_};
+
+	# Current target doesn't have a value for the current key?
+	# Assign it the default combiner, the rest of this loop body
+	# will handle it just like any other coderef.
+	if (!exists $table{$target}->{$_}) {
+	    $table{$target}->{$_} = $default_combiner;
+	}
+
+	$table{$target}->{$_} = process_values($table{$target}->{$_},
+					       $combined_inheritance{$_},
+					       $target, $_);
+        unless(defined($table{$target}->{$_})) {
+            delete $table{$target}->{$_};
+        }
+#        if ($extra_checks &&
+#            $previous && !($add_called ||  $previous ~~ $table{$target}->{$_})) {
+#            warn "$_ got replaced in $target\n";
+#        }
+    }
+
+    # Finally done, return the result.
+    return %{$table{$target}};
+}
+
+sub usage
+	{
+	print STDERR $usage;
+	print STDERR "\npick os/compiler from:\n";
+	my $j=0;
+	my $i;
+        my $k=0;
+	foreach $i (sort keys %table)
+		{
+		next if $table{$i}->{template};
+		next if $i =~ /^debug/;
+		$k += length($i) + 1;
+		if ($k > 78)
+			{
+			print STDERR "\n";
+			$k=length($i);
+			}
+		print STDERR $i . " ";
+		}
+	foreach $i (sort keys %table)
+		{
+		next if $table{$i}->{template};
+		next if $i !~ /^debug/;
+		$k += length($i) + 1;
+		if ($k > 78)
+			{
+			print STDERR "\n";
+			$k=length($i);
+			}
+		print STDERR $i . " ";
+		}
+	print STDERR "\n\nNOTE: If in doubt, on Unix-ish systems use './config'.\n";
+	exit(1);
+	}
+
+sub run_dofile
+{
+    my $out = shift;
+    my @templates = @_;
+
+    unlink $out || warn "Can't remove $out, $!"
+        if -f $out;
+    foreach (@templates) {
+        die "Can't open $_, $!" unless -f $_;
+    }
+    my $perlcmd = (quotify("maybeshell", $config{perl}))[0];
+    my $cmd = "$perlcmd \"-I.\" \"-Mconfigdata\" \"$dofile\" -o\"Configure\" \"".join("\" \"",@templates)."\" > \"$out.new\"";
+    #print STDERR "DEBUG[run_dofile]: \$cmd = $cmd\n";
+    system($cmd);
+    exit 1 if $? != 0;
+    rename("$out.new", $out) || die "Can't rename $out.new, $!";
+}
+
+sub which
+{
+    my ($name)=@_;
+
+    if (eval { require IPC::Cmd; 1; }) {
+        IPC::Cmd->import();
+        return scalar IPC::Cmd::can_run($name);
+    } else {
+        # if there is $directories component in splitpath,
+        # then it's not something to test with $PATH...
+        return $name if (File::Spec->splitpath($name))[1];
+
+        foreach (File::Spec->path()) {
+            my $fullpath = catfile($_, "$name$target{exe_extension}");
+            if (-f $fullpath and -x $fullpath) {
+                return $fullpath;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+# Configuration printer ##############################################
+
+sub print_table_entry
+{
+    my $target = shift;
+    my %target = resolve_config($target);
+    my $type = shift;
+
+    # Don't print the templates
+    return if $target{template};
+
+    my @sequence = (
+	"sys_id",
+	"cc",
+	"cflags",
+	"defines",
+	"unistd",
+	"ld",
+	"lflags",
+	"loutflag",
+	"plib_lflags",
+	"ex_libs",
+	"bn_ops",
+	"apps_aux_src",
+	"cpuid_asm_src",
+	"uplink_aux_src",
+	"bn_asm_src",
+	"ec_asm_src",
+	"des_asm_src",
+	"aes_asm_src",
+	"bf_asm_src",
+	"md5_asm_src",
+	"cast_asm_src",
+	"sha1_asm_src",
+	"rc4_asm_src",
+	"rmd160_asm_src",
+	"rc5_asm_src",
+	"wp_asm_src",
+	"cmll_asm_src",
+	"modes_asm_src",
+	"padlock_asm_src",
+	"chacha_asm_src",
+	"poly1035_asm_src",
+	"thread_scheme",
+	"perlasm_scheme",
+	"dso_scheme",
+	"shared_target",
+	"shared_cflag",
+	"shared_defines",
+	"shared_ldflag",
+	"shared_rcflag",
+	"shared_extension",
+	"dso_extension",
+	"obj_extension",
+	"exe_extension",
+	"ranlib",
+	"ar",
+	"arflags",
+	"aroutflag",
+	"rc",
+	"rcflags",
+	"rcoutflag",
+	"mt",
+	"mtflags",
+	"mtinflag",
+	"mtoutflag",
+	"multilib",
+	"build_scheme",
+	);
+
+    if ($type eq "TABLE") {
+	print "\n";
+	print "*** $target\n";
+        foreach (@sequence) {
+            if (ref($target{$_}) eq "ARRAY") {
+                printf "\$%-12s = %s\n", $_, join(" ", @{$target{$_}});
+            } else {
+                printf "\$%-12s = %s\n", $_, $target{$_};
+            }
+        }
+    } elsif ($type eq "HASH") {
+	my $largest =
+	    length((sort { length($a) <=> length($b) } @sequence)[-1]);
+	print "    '$target' => {\n";
+	foreach (@sequence) {
+	    if ($target{$_}) {
+                if (ref($target{$_}) eq "ARRAY") {
+                    print "      '",$_,"'"," " x ($largest - length($_))," => [ ",join(", ", map { "'$_'" } @{$target{$_}})," ],\n";
+                } else {
+                    print "      '",$_,"'"," " x ($largest - length($_))," => '",$target{$_},"',\n";
+                }
+	    }
+	}
+	print "    },\n";
+    }
+}
+
+# Utility routines ###################################################
+
+# On VMS, if the given file is a logical name, File::Spec::Functions
+# will consider it an absolute path.  There are cases when we want a
+# purely syntactic check without checking the environment.
+sub isabsolute {
+    my $file = shift;
+
+    # On non-platforms, we just use file_name_is_absolute().
+    return file_name_is_absolute($file) unless $^O eq "VMS";
+
+    # If the file spec includes a device or a directory spec,
+    # file_name_is_absolute() is perfectly safe.
+    return file_name_is_absolute($file) if $file =~ m|[:\[]|;
+
+    # Here, we know the given file spec isn't absolute
+    return 0;
+}
+
+# Makes a directory absolute and cleans out /../ in paths like foo/../bar
+# On some platforms, this uses rel2abs(), while on others, realpath() is used.
+# realpath() requires that at least all path components except the last is an
+# existing directory.  On VMS, the last component of the directory spec must
+# exist.
+sub absolutedir {
+    my $dir = shift;
+
+    # realpath() is quite buggy on VMS.  It uses LIB$FID_TO_NAME, which
+    # will return the volume name for the device, no matter what.  Also,
+    # it will return an incorrect directory spec if the argument is a
+    # directory that doesn't exist.
+    if ($^O eq "VMS") {
+        return rel2abs($dir);
+    }
+
+    # We use realpath() on Unix, since no other will properly clean out
+    # a directory spec.
+    use Cwd qw/realpath/;
+
+    return realpath($dir);
+}
+
+sub quotify {
+    my %processors = (
+	perl    => sub { my $x = shift;
+			 $x =~ s/([\\\$\@"])/\\$1/g;
+			 return '"'.$x.'"'; },
+	maybeshell => sub { my $x = shift;
+			    (my $y = $x) =~ s/([\\\"])/\\$1/g;
+			    if ($x ne $y || $x =~ m|\s|) {
+				return '"'.$y.'"';
+			    } else {
+				return $x;
+			    }
+			},
+	);
+    my $for = shift;
+    my $processor =
+	defined($processors{$for}) ? $processors{$for} : sub { shift; };
+
+    return map { $processor->($_); } @_;
+}
+
+# collect_from_file($filename, $line_concat_cond_re, $line_concat)
+# $filename is a file name to read from
+# $line_concat_cond_re is a regexp detecting a line continuation ending
+# $line_concat is a CODEref that takes care of concatenating two lines
+sub collect_from_file {
+    my $filename = shift;
+    my $line_concat_cond_re = shift;
+    my $line_concat = shift;
+
+    open my $fh, $filename || die "unable to read $filename: $!\n";
+    return sub {
+        my $saved_line = "";
+        $_ = "";
+        while (<$fh>) {
+            s|\R$||;
+            if (defined $line_concat) {
+                $_ = $line_concat->($saved_line, $_);
+                $saved_line = "";
+            }
+            if (defined $line_concat_cond_re && /$line_concat_cond_re/) {
+                $saved_line = $_;
+                next;
+            }
+            return $_;
+        }
+        die "$filename ending with continuation line\n" if $_;
+        close $fh;
+        return undef;
+    }
+}
+
+# collect_from_array($array, $line_concat_cond_re, $line_concat)
+# $array is an ARRAYref of lines
+# $line_concat_cond_re is a regexp detecting a line continuation ending
+# $line_concat is a CODEref that takes care of concatenating two lines
+sub collect_from_array {
+    my $array = shift;
+    my $line_concat_cond_re = shift;
+    my $line_concat = shift;
+    my @array = (@$array);
+
+    return sub {
+        my $saved_line = "";
+        $_ = "";
+        while (defined($_ = shift @array)) {
+            s|\R$||;
+            if (defined $line_concat) {
+                $_ = $line_concat->($saved_line, $_);
+                $saved_line = "";
+            }
+            if (defined $line_concat_cond_re && /$line_concat_cond_re/) {
+                $saved_line = $_;
+                next;
+            }
+            return $_;
+        }
+        die "input text ending with continuation line\n" if $_;
+        return undef;
+    }
+}
+
+# collect_information($lineiterator, $line_continue, $regexp => $CODEref, ...)
+# $lineiterator is a CODEref that delivers one line at a time.
+# All following arguments are regex/CODEref pairs, where the regexp detects a
+# line and the CODEref does something with the result of the regexp.
+sub collect_information {
+    my $lineiterator = shift;
+    my %collectors = @_;
+
+    while(defined($_ = $lineiterator->())) {
+        s|\R$||;
+        my $found = 0;
+        if ($collectors{"BEFORE"}) {
+            $collectors{"BEFORE"}->($_);
+        }
+        foreach my $re (keys %collectors) {
+            if ($re !~ /^OTHERWISE|BEFORE|AFTER$/ && /$re/) {
+                $collectors{$re}->($lineiterator);
+                $found = 1;
+            };
+        }
+        if ($collectors{"OTHERWISE"}) {
+            $collectors{"OTHERWISE"}->($lineiterator, $_)
+                unless $found || !defined $collectors{"OTHERWISE"};
+        }
+        if ($collectors{"AFTER"}) {
+            $collectors{"AFTER"}->($_);
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+# tokenize($line)
+# $line is a line of text to split up into tokens
+# returns a list of tokens
+#
+# Tokens are divided by spaces.  If the tokens include spaces, they
+# have to be quoted with single or double quotes.  Double quotes
+# inside a double quoted token must be escaped.  Escaping is done
+# with backslash.
+# Basically, the same quoting rules apply for " and ' as in any
+# Unix shell.
+sub tokenize {
+    my $line = my $debug_line = shift;
+    my @result = ();
+
+    while ($line =~ s|^\s+||, $line ne "") {
+        my $token = "";
+        while ($line ne "" && $line !~ m|^\s|) {
+            if ($line =~ m/^"((?:[^"\\]+|\\.)*)"/) {
+                $token .= $1;
+                $line = $';
+            } elsif ($line =~ m/^'([^']*)'/) {
+                $token .= $1;
+                $line = $';
+            } elsif ($line =~ m/^(\S+)/) {
+                $token .= $1;
+                $line = $';
+            }
+        }
+        push @result, $token;
+    }
+
+    if ($ENV{CONFIGURE_DEBUG_TOKENIZE}) {
+	print STDERR "DEBUG[tokenize]: Parsed '$debug_line' into:\n";
+	print STDERR "DEBUG[tokenize]: ('", join("', '", @result), "')\n";
+    }
+    return @result;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/FAQ b/openssl-1.1.0h/FAQ
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..22c5cf7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/FAQ
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+The FAQ is now maintained on the web:
+        https://www.openssl.org/docs/faq.html
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/INSTALL b/openssl-1.1.0h/INSTALL
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3e21cc2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/INSTALL
@@ -0,0 +1,964 @@
+
+ OPENSSL INSTALLATION
+ --------------------
+
+ This document describes installation on all supported operating
+ systems (the Linux/Unix family, OpenVMS and Windows)
+
+ To install OpenSSL, you will need:
+
+  * A make implementation
+  * Perl 5 with core modules (please read NOTES.PERL)
+  * The perl module Text::Template (please read NOTES.PERL)
+  * an ANSI C compiler
+  * a development environment in the form of development libraries and C
+    header files
+  * a supported operating system
+
+ For additional platform specific requirements, solutions to specific
+ issues and other details, please read one of these:
+
+  * NOTES.UNIX (any supported Unix like system)
+  * NOTES.VMS (OpenVMS)
+  * NOTES.WIN (any supported Windows)
+  * NOTES.DJGPP (DOS platform with DJGPP)
+
+ Notational conventions in this document
+ ---------------------------------------
+
+ Throughout this document, we use the following conventions in command
+ examples:
+
+ $ command                      Any line starting with a dollar sign
+                                ($) is a command line.
+
+ { word1 | word2 | word3 }      This denotes a mandatory choice, to be
+                                replaced with one of the given words.
+                                A simple example would be this:
+
+                                $ echo { FOO | BAR | COOKIE }
+
+                                which is to be understood as one of
+                                these:
+
+                                $ echo FOO
+                                - or -
+                                $ echo BAR
+                                - or -
+                                $ echo COOKIE
+
+ [ word1 | word2 | word3 ]      Similar to { word1 | word2 | word3 }
+                                except it's optional to give any of
+                                those.  In addition to the examples
+                                above, this would also be valid:
+
+                                $ echo
+
+ {{ target }}                   This denotes a mandatory word or
+                                sequence of words of some sort.  A
+                                simple example would be this:
+
+                                $ type {{ filename }}
+
+                                which is to be understood to use the
+                                command 'type' on some file name
+                                determined by the user.
+
+ [[ options ]]                  Similar to {{ target }}, but is
+                                optional.
+
+ Note that the notation assumes spaces around {, }, [, ], {{, }} and
+ [[, ]].  This is to differentiate from OpenVMS directory
+ specifications, which also use [ and ], but without spaces.
+
+ Quick Start
+ -----------
+
+ If you want to just get on with it, do:
+
+  on Unix:
+
+    $ ./config
+    $ make
+    $ make test
+    $ make install
+
+  on OpenVMS:
+
+    $ @config
+    $ mms
+    $ mms test
+    $ mms install
+
+  on Windows (only pick one of the targets for configuration):
+
+    $ perl Configure { VC-WIN32 | VC-WIN64A | VC-WIN64I | VC-CE }
+    $ nmake
+    $ nmake test
+    $ nmake install
+
+ If any of these steps fails, see section Installation in Detail below.
+
+ This will build and install OpenSSL in the default location, which is:
+
+  Unix:    normal installation directories under /usr/local
+  OpenVMS: SYS$COMMON:[OPENSSL-'version'...], where 'version' is the
+           OpenSSL version number with underscores instead of periods.
+  Windows: C:\Program Files\OpenSSL or C:\Program Files (x86)\OpenSSL
+
+ If you want to install it anywhere else, run config like this:
+
+  On Unix:
+
+    $ ./config --prefix=/opt/openssl --openssldir=/usr/local/ssl
+
+  On OpenVMS:
+
+    $ @config --prefix=PROGRAM:[INSTALLS] --openssldir=SYS$MANAGER:[OPENSSL]
+
+ (Note: if you do add options to the configuration command, please make sure
+ you've read more than just this Quick Start, such as relevant NOTES.* files,
+ the options outline below, as configuration options may change the outcome
+ in otherwise unexpected ways)
+
+
+ Configuration Options
+ ---------------------
+
+ There are several options to ./config (or ./Configure) to customize
+ the build (note that for Windows, the defaults for --prefix and
+ --openssldir depend in what configuration is used and what Windows
+ implementation OpenSSL is built on.  More notes on this in NOTES.WIN):
+
+  --api=x.y.z
+                   Don't build with support for deprecated APIs below the
+                   specified version number. For example "--api=1.1.0" will
+                   remove support for all APIS that were deprecated in OpenSSL
+                   version 1.1.0 or below.
+
+  --cross-compile-prefix=PREFIX
+                   The PREFIX to include in front of commands for your
+                   toolchain. It's likely to have to end with dash, e.g.
+                   a-b-c- would invoke GNU compiler as a-b-c-gcc, etc.
+                   Unfortunately cross-compiling is too case-specific to
+                   put together one-size-fits-all instructions. You might
+                   have to pass more flags or set up environment variables
+                   to actually make it work. Android and iOS cases are
+                   discussed in corresponding Configurations/10-main.cf
+                   sections. But there are cases when this option alone is
+                   sufficient. For example to build the mingw64 target on
+                   Linux "--cross-compile-prefix=x86_64-w64-mingw32-"
+                   works. Naturally provided that mingw packages are
+                   installed. Today Debian and Ubuntu users have option to
+                   install a number of prepackaged cross-compilers along
+                   with corresponding run-time and development packages for
+                   "alien" hardware. To give another example
+                   "--cross-compile-prefix=mipsel-linux-gnu-" suffices
+                   in such case. Needless to mention that you have to
+                   invoke ./Configure, not ./config, and pass your target
+                   name explicitly.
+
+  --debug
+                   Build OpenSSL with debugging symbols.
+
+  --libdir=DIR
+                   The name of the directory under the top of the installation
+                   directory tree (see the --prefix option) where libraries will
+                   be installed. By default this is "lib". Note that on Windows
+                   only ".lib" files will be stored in this location. dll files
+                   will always be installed to the "bin" directory.
+
+  --openssldir=DIR
+                   Directory for OpenSSL configuration files, and also the
+                   default certificate and key store.  Defaults are:
+
+                   Unix:           /usr/local/ssl
+                   Windows:        C:\Program Files\Common Files\SSL
+                                or C:\Program Files (x86)\Common Files\SSL
+                   OpenVMS:        SYS$COMMON:[OPENSSL-COMMON]
+
+  --prefix=DIR
+                   The top of the installation directory tree.  Defaults are:
+
+                   Unix:           /usr/local
+                   Windows:        C:\Program Files\OpenSSL
+                                or C:\Program Files (x86)\OpenSSL
+                   OpenVMS:        SYS$COMMON:[OPENSSL-'version']
+
+  --release
+                   Build OpenSSL without debugging symbols. This is the default.
+
+  --strict-warnings
+                   This is a developer flag that switches on various compiler
+                   options recommended for OpenSSL development. It only works
+                   when using gcc or clang as the compiler. If you are
+                   developing a patch for OpenSSL then it is recommended that
+                   you use this option where possible.
+
+  --with-zlib-include=DIR
+                   The directory for the location of the zlib include file. This
+                   option is only necessary if enable-zlib (see below) is used
+                   and the include file is not already on the system include
+                   path.
+
+  --with-zlib-lib=LIB
+                   On Unix: this is the directory containing the zlib library.
+                   If not provided the system library path will be used.
+                   On Windows: this is the filename of the zlib library (with or
+                   without a path). This flag must be provided if the
+                   zlib-dynamic option is not also used. If zlib-dynamic is used
+                   then this flag is optional and a default value ("ZLIB1") is
+                   used if not provided. 
+                   On VMS: this is the filename of the zlib library (with or
+                   without a path). This flag is optional and if not provided
+                   then "GNV$LIBZSHR", "GNV$LIBZSHR32" or "GNV$LIBZSHR64" is
+                   used by default depending on the pointer size chosen.
+
+  no-afalgeng
+                   Don't build the AFALG engine. This option will be forced if
+                   on a platform that does not support AFALG.
+
+  enable-asan
+                   Build with the Address sanitiser. This is a developer option
+                   only. It may not work on all platforms and should never be
+                   used in production environments. It will only work when used
+                   with gcc or clang and should be used in conjunction with the
+                   no-shared option.
+
+  no-asm
+                   Do not use assembler code. On some platforms a small amount
+                   of assembler code may still be used.
+
+  no-async
+                   Do not build support for async operations.
+
+  no-autoalginit
+                   Don't automatically load all supported ciphers and digests.
+                   Typically OpenSSL will make available all of its supported
+                   ciphers and digests. For a statically linked application this
+                   may be undesirable if small executable size is an objective.
+                   This only affects libcrypto. Ciphers and digests will have to
+                   be loaded manually using EVP_add_cipher() and
+                   EVP_add_digest() if this option is used. This option will
+                   force a non-shared build.
+
+  no-autoerrinit
+                   Don't automatically load all libcrypto/libssl error strings.
+                   Typically OpenSSL will automatically load human readable
+                   error strings. For a statically linked application this may
+                   be undesirable if small executable size is an objective.
+
+
+  no-capieng
+                   Don't build the CAPI engine. This option will be forced if
+                   on a platform that does not support CAPI.
+
+  no-cms
+                   Don't build support for CMS features
+
+  no-comp
+                   Don't build support for SSL/TLS compression. If this option
+                   is left enabled (the default), then compression will only
+                   work if the zlib or zlib-dynamic options are also chosen.
+
+  enable-crypto-mdebug
+                   Build support for debugging memory allocated via
+                   OPENSSL_malloc() or OPENSSL_zalloc().
+
+  enable-crypto-mdebug-backtrace
+                   As for crypto-mdebug, but additionally provide backtrace
+                   information for allocated memory.
+                   TO BE USED WITH CARE: this uses GNU C functionality, and
+                   is therefore not usable for non-GNU config targets.  If
+                   your build complains about the use of '-rdynamic' or the
+                   lack of header file execinfo.h, this option is not for you.
+                   ALSO NOTE that even though execinfo.h is available on your
+                   system (through Gnulib), the functions might just be stubs
+                   that do nothing.
+
+  no-ct
+                   Don't build support for Certificate Transparency.
+
+  no-deprecated
+                   Don't build with support for any deprecated APIs. This is the
+                   same as using "--api" and supplying the latest version
+                   number.
+
+  no-dgram
+                   Don't build support for datagram based BIOs. Selecting this
+                   option will also force the disabling of DTLS.
+
+  no-dso
+                   Don't build support for loading Dynamic Shared Objects.
+
+  no-dynamic-engine
+                   Don't build the dynamically loaded engines. This only has an
+                   effect in a "shared" build
+
+  no-ec
+                   Don't build support for Elliptic Curves.
+
+  no-ec2m
+                   Don't build support for binary Elliptic Curves
+
+  enable-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128
+                   Enable support for optimised implementations of some commonly
+                   used NIST elliptic curves. This is only supported on some
+                   platforms.
+
+  enable-egd
+                   Build support for gathering entropy from EGD (Entropy
+                   Gathering Daemon).
+
+  no-engine
+                   Don't build support for loading engines.
+
+  no-err
+                   Don't compile in any error strings.
+
+  no-filenames
+                   Don't compile in filename and line number information (e.g.
+                   for errors and memory allocation).
+
+  enable-fuzz-libfuzzer, enable-fuzz-afl
+                   Build with support for fuzzing using either libfuzzer or AFL.
+                   These are developer options only. They may not work on all
+                   platforms and should never be used in production environments.
+                   See the file fuzz/README.md for further details.
+
+  no-gost
+                   Don't build support for GOST based ciphersuites. Note that
+                   if this feature is enabled then GOST ciphersuites are only
+                   available if the GOST algorithms are also available through
+                   loading an externally supplied engine.
+
+  enable-heartbeats
+                   Build support for DTLS heartbeats.
+
+  no-hw-padlock
+                   Don't build the padlock engine.
+
+  no-makedepend
+                   Don't generate dependencies.
+
+  no-multiblock
+                   Don't build support for writing multiple records in one
+                   go in libssl (Note: this is a different capability to the
+                   pipelining functionality).
+
+  no-nextprotoneg
+                   Don't build support for the NPN TLS extension.
+
+  no-ocsp
+                   Don't build support for OCSP.
+
+  no-pic
+                   Don't build with support for Position Independent Code.
+
+  no-posix-io
+                   Don't use POSIX IO capabilities.
+
+  no-psk
+                   Don't build support for Pre-Shared Key based ciphersuites.
+
+  no-rdrand
+                   Don't use hardware RDRAND capabilities.
+
+  no-rfc3779
+                   Don't build support for RFC3779 ("X.509 Extensions for IP
+                   Addresses and AS Identifiers")
+
+  sctp
+                   Build support for SCTP
+
+  no-shared
+                   Do not create shared libraries, only static ones.  See "Note
+                   on shared libraries" below.
+
+  no-sock
+                   Don't build support for socket BIOs
+
+  no-srp
+                   Don't build support for SRP or SRP based ciphersuites.
+
+  no-srtp
+                   Don't build SRTP support
+
+  no-sse2
+                   Exclude SSE2 code paths from 32-bit x86 assembly modules.
+                   Normally SSE2 extension is detected at run-time, but the
+                   decision whether or not the machine code will be executed
+                   is taken solely on CPU capability vector. This means that
+                   if you happen to run OS kernel which does not support SSE2
+                   extension on Intel P4 processor, then your application
+                   might be exposed to "illegal instruction" exception.
+                   There might be a way to enable support in kernel, e.g.
+                   FreeBSD kernel can  be compiled with CPU_ENABLE_SSE, and
+                   there is a way to disengage SSE2 code paths upon application
+                   start-up, but if you aim for wider "audience" running
+                   such kernel, consider no-sse2. Both the 386 and
+                   no-asm options imply no-sse2.
+
+  enable-ssl-trace
+                   Build with the SSL Trace capabilities (adds the "-trace"
+                   option to s_client and s_server).
+
+  no-static-engine
+                   Don't build the statically linked engines. This only
+                   has an impact when not built "shared".
+
+  no-stdio
+                   Don't use anything from the C header file "stdio.h" that
+                   makes use of the "FILE" type. Only libcrypto and libssl can
+                   be built in this way. Using this option will suppress
+                   building the command line applications. Additionally since
+                   the OpenSSL tests also use the command line applications the
+                   tests will also be skipped.
+
+  no-threads
+                   Don't try to build with support for multi-threaded
+                   applications.
+
+  threads
+                   Build with support for multi-threaded applications. Most
+                   platforms will enable this by default. However if on a
+                   platform where this is not the case then this will usually
+                   require additional system-dependent options! See "Note on
+                   multi-threading" below.
+
+  no-ts
+                   Don't build Time Stamping Authority support.
+
+  enable-ubsan
+                   Build with the Undefined Behaviour sanitiser. This is a
+                   developer option only. It may not work on all platforms and
+                   should never be used in production environments. It will only
+                   work when used with gcc or clang and should be used in
+                   conjunction with the "-DPEDANTIC" option (or the
+                   --strict-warnings option).
+
+  no-ui
+                   Don't build with the "UI" capability (i.e. the set of
+                   features enabling text based prompts).
+
+  enable-unit-test
+                   Enable additional unit test APIs. This should not typically
+                   be used in production deployments.
+
+  enable-weak-ssl-ciphers
+                   Build support for SSL/TLS ciphers that are considered "weak"
+                   (e.g. RC4 based ciphersuites).
+
+  zlib
+                   Build with support for zlib compression/decompression.
+
+  zlib-dynamic
+                   Like "zlib", but has OpenSSL load the zlib library
+                   dynamically when needed.  This is only supported on systems
+                   where loading of shared libraries is supported.
+
+  386
+                   In 32-bit x86 builds, when generating assembly modules,
+                   use the 80386 instruction set only (the default x86 code
+                   is more efficient, but requires at least a 486). Note:
+                   This doesn't affect code generated by compiler, you're
+                   likely to complement configuration command line with
+                   suitable compiler-specific option.
+
+  no-<prot>
+                   Don't build support for negotiating the specified SSL/TLS
+                   protocol (one of ssl, ssl3, tls, tls1, tls1_1, tls1_2, dtls,
+                   dtls1 or dtls1_2). If "no-tls" is selected then all of tls1,
+                   tls1_1 and tls1_2 are disabled. Similarly "no-dtls" will
+                   disable dtls1 and dtls1_2. The "no-ssl" option is synonymous
+                   with "no-ssl3". Note this only affects version negotiation.
+                   OpenSSL will still provide the methods for applications to
+                   explicitly select the individual protocol versions.
+
+  no-<prot>-method
+                   As for no-<prot> but in addition do not build the methods for
+                   applications to explicitly select individual protocol
+                   versions.
+
+  enable-<alg>
+                   Build with support for the specified algorithm, where <alg>
+                   is one of: md2 or rc5.
+
+  no-<alg>
+                   Build without support for the specified algorithm, where
+                   <alg> is one of: bf, blake2, camellia, cast, chacha, cmac,
+                   des, dh, dsa, ecdh, ecdsa, idea, md4, mdc2, ocb, poly1305,
+                   rc2, rc4, rmd160, scrypt, seed or whirlpool. The "ripemd"
+                   algorithm is deprecated and if used is synonymous with rmd160.
+
+  -Dxxx, lxxx, -Lxxx, -Wl, -rpath, -R, -framework, -static
+                   These system specific options will be recocognised and
+                   passed through to the compiler to allow you to define
+                   preprocessor symbols, specify additional libraries, library
+                   directories or other compiler options. It might be worth
+                   noting that some compilers generate code specifically for
+                   processor the compiler currently executes on. This is not
+                   necessarily what you might have in mind, since it might be
+                   unsuitable for execution on other, typically older,
+                   processor. Consult your compiler documentation.
+
+  -xxx, +xxx
+                   Additional options that are not otherwise recognised are
+                   passed through as they are to the compiler as well.  Again,
+                   consult your compiler documentation.
+
+
+ Installation in Detail
+ ----------------------
+
+ 1a. Configure OpenSSL for your operation system automatically:
+
+     NOTE: This is not available on Windows.
+
+       $ ./config [[ options ]]                         # Unix
+
+       or
+
+       $ @config [[ options ]]                          ! OpenVMS
+
+     For the remainder of this text, the Unix form will be used in all
+     examples, please use the appropriate form for your platform.
+
+     This guesses at your operating system (and compiler, if necessary) and
+     configures OpenSSL based on this guess. Run ./config -t to see
+     if it guessed correctly. If you want to use a different compiler, you
+     are cross-compiling for another platform, or the ./config guess was
+     wrong for other reasons, go to step 1b. Otherwise go to step 2.
+
+     On some systems, you can include debugging information as follows:
+
+       $ ./config -d [[ options ]]
+
+ 1b. Configure OpenSSL for your operating system manually
+
+     OpenSSL knows about a range of different operating system, hardware and
+     compiler combinations. To see the ones it knows about, run
+
+       $ ./Configure                                    # Unix
+
+       or
+
+       $ perl Configure                                 # All other platforms
+
+     For the remainder of this text, the Unix form will be used in all
+     examples, please use the appropriate form for your platform.
+
+     Pick a suitable name from the list that matches your system. For most
+     operating systems there is a choice between using "cc" or "gcc".  When
+     you have identified your system (and if necessary compiler) use this name
+     as the argument to Configure. For example, a "linux-elf" user would
+     run:
+
+       $ ./Configure linux-elf [[ options ]]
+
+     If your system isn't listed, you will have to create a configuration
+     file named Configurations/{{ something }}.conf and add the correct
+     configuration for your system. See the available configs as examples
+     and read Configurations/README and Configurations/README.design for
+     more information.
+
+     The generic configurations "cc" or "gcc" should usually work on 32 bit
+     Unix-like systems.
+
+     Configure creates a build file ("Makefile" on Unix, "makefile" on Windows
+     and "descrip.mms" on OpenVMS) from a suitable template in Configurations,
+     and defines various macros in include/openssl/opensslconf.h (generated from
+     include/openssl/opensslconf.h.in).
+
+ 1c. Configure OpenSSL for building outside of the source tree.
+
+     OpenSSL can be configured to build in a build directory separate from
+     the directory with the source code.  It's done by placing yourself in
+     some other directory and invoking the configuration commands from
+     there.
+
+     Unix example:
+
+       $ mkdir /var/tmp/openssl-build
+       $ cd /var/tmp/openssl-build
+       $ /PATH/TO/OPENSSL/SOURCE/config [[ options ]]
+
+       or
+
+       $ /PATH/TO/OPENSSL/SOURCE/Configure {{ target }} [[ options ]]
+
+     OpenVMS example:
+
+       $ set default sys$login:
+       $ create/dir [.tmp.openssl-build]
+       $ set default [.tmp.openssl-build]
+       $ @[PATH.TO.OPENSSL.SOURCE]config [[ options ]]
+
+       or
+
+       $ @[PATH.TO.OPENSSL.SOURCE]Configure {{ target }} [[ options ]]
+
+     Windows example:
+
+       $ C:
+       $ mkdir \temp-openssl
+       $ cd \temp-openssl
+       $ perl d:\PATH\TO\OPENSSL\SOURCE\Configure {{ target }} [[ options ]]
+
+     Paths can be relative just as well as absolute.  Configure will
+     do its best to translate them to relative paths whenever possible.
+
+  2. Build OpenSSL by running:
+
+       $ make                                           # Unix
+       $ mms                                            ! (or mmk) OpenVMS
+       $ nmake                                          # Windows
+
+     This will build the OpenSSL libraries (libcrypto.a and libssl.a on
+     Unix, corresponding on other platforms) and the OpenSSL binary
+     ("openssl"). The libraries will be built in the top-level directory,
+     and the binary will be in the "apps" subdirectory.
+
+     If the build fails, look at the output.  There may be reasons
+     for the failure that aren't problems in OpenSSL itself (like
+     missing standard headers).  If you are having problems you can
+     get help by sending an email to the openssl-users email list (see
+     https://www.openssl.org/community/mailinglists.html for details). If
+     it is a bug with OpenSSL itself, please open an issue on GitHub, at
+     https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues. Please review the existing
+     ones first; maybe the bug was already reported or has already been
+     fixed.
+
+     (If you encounter assembler error messages, try the "no-asm"
+     configuration option as an immediate fix.)
+
+     Compiling parts of OpenSSL with gcc and others with the system
+     compiler will result in unresolved symbols on some systems.
+
+  3. After a successful build, the libraries should be tested. Run:
+
+       $ make test                                      # Unix
+       $ mms test                                       ! OpenVMS
+       $ nmake test                                     # Windows
+
+     NOTE: you MUST run the tests from an unprivileged account (or
+     disable your privileges temporarily if your platform allows it).
+
+     If some tests fail, look at the output.  There may be reasons for
+     the failure that isn't a problem in OpenSSL itself (like a
+     malfunction with Perl).  You may want increased verbosity, that
+     can be accomplished like this:
+
+       $ make VERBOSE=1 test                            # Unix
+
+       $ mms /macro=(VERBOSE=1) test                    ! OpenVMS
+
+       $ nmake VERBOSE=1 test                           # Windows
+
+     If you want to run just one or a few specific tests, you can use
+     the make variable TESTS to specify them, like this:
+
+       $ make TESTS='test_rsa test_dsa' test            # Unix
+       $ mms/macro="TESTS=test_rsa test_dsa" test       ! OpenVMS
+       $ nmake TESTS='test_rsa test_dsa' test           # Windows
+
+     And of course, you can combine (Unix example shown):
+       
+       $ make VERBOSE=1 TESTS='test_rsa test_dsa' test
+
+     You can find the list of available tests like this:
+
+       $ make list-tests                                # Unix
+       $ mms list-tests                                 ! OpenVMS
+       $ nmake list-tests                               # Windows
+
+     Have a look at the manual for the perl module Test::Harness to
+     see what other HARNESS_* variables there are.
+
+     If you find a problem with OpenSSL itself, try removing any
+     compiler optimization flags from the CFLAGS line in Makefile and
+     run "make clean; make" or corresponding.
+
+     To report a bug please open an issue on GitHub, at
+     https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues.
+
+  4. If everything tests ok, install OpenSSL with
+
+       $ make install                                   # Unix
+       $ mms install                                    ! OpenVMS
+       $ nmake install                                  # Windows
+
+     This will install all the software components in this directory
+     tree under PREFIX (the directory given with --prefix or its
+     default):
+
+       Unix:
+
+         bin/           Contains the openssl binary and a few other
+                        utility scripts.
+         include/openssl
+                        Contains the header files needed if you want
+                        to build your own programs that use libcrypto
+                        or libssl.
+         lib            Contains the OpenSSL library files.
+         lib/engines    Contains the OpenSSL dynamically loadable engines.
+
+         share/man/man1 Contains the OpenSSL command line man-pages.
+         share/man/man3 Contains the OpenSSL library calls man-pages.
+         share/man/man5 Contains the OpenSSL configuration format man-pages.
+         share/man/man7 Contains the OpenSSL other misc man-pages.
+
+         share/doc/openssl/html/man1
+         share/doc/openssl/html/man3
+         share/doc/openssl/html/man5
+         share/doc/openssl/html/man7
+                        Contains the HTML rendition of the man-pages.
+
+       OpenVMS ('arch' is replaced with the architecture name, "Alpha"
+       or "ia64", 'sover' is replaced with the shared library version
+       (0101 for 1.1), and 'pz' is replaced with the pointer size
+       OpenSSL was built with):
+
+         [.EXE.'arch']  Contains the openssl binary.
+         [.EXE]         Contains a few utility scripts.
+         [.include.openssl]
+                        Contains the header files needed if you want
+                        to build your own programs that use libcrypto
+                        or libssl.
+         [.LIB.'arch']  Contains the OpenSSL library files.
+         [.ENGINES'sover''pz'.'arch']
+                        Contains the OpenSSL dynamically loadable engines.
+         [.SYS$STARTUP] Contains startup, login and shutdown scripts.
+                        These define appropriate logical names and
+                        command symbols.
+         [.SYSTEST]     Contains the installation verification procedure.
+         [.HTML]        Contains the HTML rendition of the manual pages.
+                        
+
+     Additionally, install will add the following directories under
+     OPENSSLDIR (the directory given with --openssldir or its default)
+     for you convenience:
+
+         certs          Initially empty, this is the default location
+                        for certificate files.
+         private        Initially empty, this is the default location
+                        for private key files.
+         misc           Various scripts.
+
+     Package builders who want to configure the library for standard
+     locations, but have the package installed somewhere else so that
+     it can easily be packaged, can use
+
+       $ make DESTDIR=/tmp/package-root install         # Unix
+       $ mms/macro="DESTDIR=TMP:[PACKAGE-ROOT]" install ! OpenVMS
+
+     The specified destination directory will be prepended to all
+     installation target paths.
+
+  Compatibility issues with previous OpenSSL versions:
+
+  *  COMPILING existing applications
+
+     OpenSSL 1.1.0 hides a number of structures that were previously
+     open.  This includes all internal libssl structures and a number
+     of EVP types.  Accessor functions have been added to allow
+     controlled access to the structures' data.
+
+     This means that some software needs to be rewritten to adapt to
+     the new ways of doing things.  This often amounts to allocating
+     an instance of a structure explicitly where you could previously
+     allocate them on the stack as automatic variables, and using the
+     provided accessor functions where you would previously access a
+     structure's field directly.
+
+     Some APIs have changed as well.  However, older APIs have been
+     preserved when possible.
+
+ Environment Variables
+ ---------------------
+
+ A number of environment variables can be used to provide additional control
+ over the build process. Typically these should be defined prior to running
+ config or Configure. Not all environment variables are relevant to all
+ platforms.
+
+ AR
+                The name of the ar executable to use.
+
+ BUILDFILE
+                Use a different build file name than the platform default
+                ("Makefile" on Unixly platforms, "makefile" on native Windows,
+                "descrip.mms" on OpenVMS).  This requires that there is a
+                corresponding build file template.  See Configurations/README
+                for further information.
+
+ CC
+                The compiler to use. Configure will attempt to pick a default
+                compiler for your platform but this choice can be overridden
+                using this variable. Set it to the compiler executable you wish
+                to use, e.g. "gcc" or "clang".
+
+ CROSS_COMPILE
+                This environment variable has the same meaning as for the
+                "--cross-compile-prefix" Configure flag described above. If both
+                are set then the Configure flag takes precedence.
+
+ NM
+                The name of the nm executable to use.
+
+ OPENSSL_LOCAL_CONFIG_DIR
+                OpenSSL comes with a database of information about how it
+                should be built on different platforms as well as build file
+                templates for those platforms. The database is comprised of
+                ".conf" files in the Configurations directory.  The build
+                file templates reside there as well as ".tmpl" files. See the
+                file Configurations/README for further information about the
+                format of ".conf" files as well as information on the ".tmpl"
+                files.
+                In addition to the standard ".conf" and ".tmpl" files, it is
+                possible to create your own ".conf" and ".tmpl" files and store
+                them locally, outside the OpenSSL source tree. This environment
+                variable can be set to the directory where these files are held
+                and will have Configure to consider them in addition to the
+                standard ones.
+
+ PERL
+                The name of the Perl executable to use when building OpenSSL.
+
+ HASHBANGPERL
+                The command string for the Perl executable to insert in the
+                #! line of perl scripts that will be publically installed.
+                Default: /usr/bin/env perl
+                Note: the value of this variable is added to the same scripts
+                on all platforms, but it's only relevant on Unix-like platforms.
+
+ RC
+                The name of the rc executable to use. The default will be as
+                defined for the target platform in the ".conf" file. If not
+                defined then "windres" will be used. The WINDRES environment
+                variable is synonymous to this. If both are defined then RC
+                takes precedence.
+
+ RANLIB
+                The name of the ranlib executable to use.
+
+ WINDRES
+                See RC.
+
+ Makefile targets
+ ----------------
+
+ The Configure script generates a Makefile in a format relevant to the specific
+ platform. The Makefiles provide a number of targets that can be used. Not all
+ targets may be available on all platforms. Only the most common targets are
+ described here. Examine the Makefiles themselves for the full list.
+
+ all
+                The default target to build all the software components.
+
+ clean
+                Remove all build artefacts and return the directory to a "clean"
+                state.
+
+ depend
+                Rebuild the dependencies in the Makefiles. This is a legacy
+                option that no longer needs to be used in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+ install
+                Install all OpenSSL components.
+
+ install_sw
+                Only install the OpenSSL software components.
+
+ install_docs
+                Only install the OpenSSL documentation components.
+
+ install_man_docs
+                Only install the OpenSSL man pages (Unix only).
+
+ install_html_docs
+                Only install the OpenSSL html documentation.
+
+ list-tests
+                Prints a list of all the self test names.
+
+ test
+                Build and run the OpenSSL self tests.
+
+ uninstall
+                Uninstall all OpenSSL components.
+
+ update
+                This is a developer option. If you are developing a patch for
+                OpenSSL you may need to use this if you want to update
+                automatically generated files; add new error codes or add new
+                (or change the visibility of) public API functions. (Unix only).
+
+ Note on multi-threading
+ -----------------------
+
+ For some systems, the OpenSSL Configure script knows what compiler options
+ are needed to generate a library that is suitable for multi-threaded
+ applications.  On these systems, support for multi-threading is enabled
+ by default; use the "no-threads" option to disable (this should never be
+ necessary).
+
+ On other systems, to enable support for multi-threading, you will have
+ to specify at least two options: "threads", and a system-dependent option.
+ (The latter is "-D_REENTRANT" on various systems.)  The default in this
+ case, obviously, is not to include support for multi-threading (but
+ you can still use "no-threads" to suppress an annoying warning message
+ from the Configure script.)
+
+ OpenSSL provides built-in support for two threading models: pthreads (found on
+ most UNIX/Linux systems), and Windows threads. No other threading models are
+ supported. If your platform does not provide pthreads or Windows threads then
+ you should Configure with the "no-threads" option.
+
+ Notes on shared libraries
+ -------------------------
+
+ For most systems the OpenSSL Configure script knows what is needed to
+ build shared libraries for libcrypto and libssl. On these systems
+ the shared libraries will be created by default. This can be suppressed and
+ only static libraries created by using the "no-shared" option. On systems
+ where OpenSSL does not know how to build shared libraries the "no-shared"
+ option will be forced and only static libraries will be created.
+
+ Shared libraries are named a little differently on different platforms.
+ One way or another, they all have the major OpenSSL version number as
+ part of the file name, i.e. for OpenSSL 1.1.x, 1.1 is somehow part of
+ the name.
+
+ On most POSIXly platforms, shared libraries are named libcrypto.so.1.1
+ and libssl.so.1.1.
+
+ on Cygwin, shared libraries are named cygcrypto-1.1.dll and cygssl-1.1.dll
+ with import libraries libcrypto.dll.a and libssl.dll.a.
+
+ On Windows build with MSVC or using MingW, shared libraries are named
+ libcrypto-1_1.dll and libssl-1_1.dll for 32-bit Windows, libcrypto-1_1-x64.dll
+ and libssl-1_1-x64.dll for 64-bit x86_64 Windows, and libcrypto-1_1-ia64.dll
+ and libssl-1_1-ia64.dll for IA64 Windows.  With MSVC, the import libraries
+ are named libcrypto.lib and libssl.lib, while with MingW, they are named
+ libcrypto.dll.a and libssl.dll.a.
+
+ On VMS, shareable images (VMS speak for shared libraries) are named
+ ossl$libcrypto0101_shr.exe and ossl$libssl0101_shr.exe.  However, when
+ OpenSSL is specifically built for 32-bit pointers, the shareable images
+ are named ossl$libcrypto0101_shr32.exe and ossl$libssl0101_shr32.exe
+ instead, and when built for 64-bit pointers, they are named
+ ossl$libcrypto0101_shr64.exe and ossl$libssl0101_shr64.exe.
+
+ Note on random number generation
+ --------------------------------
+
+ Availability of cryptographically secure random numbers is required for
+ secret key generation. OpenSSL provides several options to seed the
+ internal PRNG. If not properly seeded, the internal PRNG will refuse
+ to deliver random bytes and a "PRNG not seeded error" will occur.
+ On systems without /dev/urandom (or similar) device, it may be necessary
+ to install additional support software to obtain a random seed.
+ Please check out the manual pages for RAND_add(), RAND_bytes(), RAND_egd(),
+ and the FAQ for more information.
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/LICENSE b/openssl-1.1.0h/LICENSE
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e953f59
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/LICENSE
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+
+  LICENSE ISSUES
+  ==============
+
+  The OpenSSL toolkit stays under a double license, i.e. both the conditions of
+  the OpenSSL License and the original SSLeay license apply to the toolkit.
+  See below for the actual license texts.
+
+  OpenSSL License
+  ---------------
+
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+ Original SSLeay License
+ -----------------------
+
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ * 
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ * 
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ * 
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
+ *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * 
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * 
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/Makefile.shared b/openssl-1.1.0h/Makefile.shared
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4f9550a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/Makefile.shared
@@ -0,0 +1,521 @@
+#
+# Helper makefile to link shared libraries in a portable way.
+# This is much simpler than libtool, and hopefully not too error-prone.
+#
+# The following variables need to be set on the command line to build
+# properly
+
+# CC contains the current compiler.  This one MUST be defined
+CC=cc
+CFLAGS=$(CFLAG)
+# LDFLAGS contains flags to be used when temporary object files (when building
+# shared libraries) are created, or when an application is linked.
+# SHARED_LDFLAGS contains flags to be used when the shared library is created.
+LDFLAGS=$(LDFLAG)
+SHARED_LDFLAGS=$(SHARED_LDFLAG)
+
+RC=windres
+# SHARED_RCFLAGS are flags used with windres, i.e. when build for Cygwin
+# or Mingw.
+SHARED_RCFLAGS=$(SHARED_RCFLAG)
+
+NM=nm
+
+# LIBNAME contains just the name of the library, without prefix ("lib"
+# on Unix, "cyg" for certain forms under Cygwin...) or suffix (.a, .so,
+# .dll, ...).  This one MUST have a value when using this makefile to
+# build shared libraries.
+# For example, to build libfoo.so, you need to do the following:
+#LIBNAME=foo
+LIBNAME=
+
+# STLIBNAME contains the path of the static library to build the shared
+# library from, for example:
+#STLIBNAME=libfoo.a
+STLIBNAME=
+
+# On most Unix platforms, SHLIBNAME contains the path of the short name of
+# the shared library to build, for example
+#SHLIBNAME=libfoo.so
+# On Windows POSIX layers (cygwin and mingw), SHLIBNAME contains the import
+# library name for the shared library to be built, for example:
+#SHLIBNAME=libfoo.dll.a
+
+# SHLIBNAME_FULL contains the path of the full name of the shared library to
+# build, for example:
+#SHLIBNAME_FULL=libfoo.so.1.2
+# When building DSOs, SHLIBNAME_FULL contains path of the full DSO name, for
+# example:
+#SHLIBNAME_FULL=dir/dso.so
+SHLIBNAME_FULL=
+
+# SHLIBVERSION contains the current version of the shared library (not to
+# be confused with the project version)
+#SHLIBVERSION=1.2
+SHLIBVERSION=
+
+# NOTE: to build shared libraries, LIBNAME, STLIBNAME, SHLIBNAME and
+# SHLIBNAME_FULL MUST have values when using this makefile, and in some
+# cases, SHLIBVERSION as well.  To build DSOs, SHLIBNAME_FULL MUST have
+# a value, the rest can be left alone.
+
+
+# APPNAME contains just the name of the application, without suffix (""
+# on Unix, ".exe" on Windows, ...).  This one MUST have a value when using
+# this makefile to build applications.
+# For example, to build foo, you need to do the following:
+#APPNAME=foo
+APPNAME=
+
+# SRCDIR is the top directory of the source tree.
+SRCDIR=.
+
+# OBJECTS contains all the object files to link together into the application.
+# This must contain at least one object file.
+#OBJECTS=foo.o
+OBJECTS=
+
+# LIBEXTRAS contains extra modules to link together with the library.
+# For example, if a second library, say libbar.a needs to be linked into
+# libfoo.so, you need to do the following:
+#LIBEXTRAS=libbar.a
+# Note that this MUST be used when using the link_dso targets, to hold the
+# names of all object files that go into the target shared object.
+LIBEXTRAS=
+
+# LIBDEPS contains all the flags necessary to cover all necessary
+# dependencies to other libraries.
+LIBDEPS=
+
+#------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# The rest is private to this makefile.
+
+SET_X=:
+#SET_X=set -x
+
+top:
+	echo "Trying to use this makefile interactively?  Don't."
+
+LINK_APP=	\
+  ( $(SET_X);   \
+    LIBDEPS="$${LIBDEPS:-$(LIBDEPS)}"; \
+    LDCMD="$${LDCMD:-$(CC)}"; LDFLAGS="$${LDFLAGS:-$(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS)}"; \
+    LIBPATH=`for x in $$LIBDEPS; do echo $$x; done | sed -e 's/^ *-L//;t' -e d | uniq`; \
+    LIBPATH=`echo $$LIBPATH | sed -e 's/ /:/g'`; \
+    echo LD_LIBRARY_PATH=$$LIBPATH:$$LD_LIBRARY_PATH \
+        $${LDCMD} $${LDFLAGS} -o $${APPNAME:=$(APPNAME)} $(OBJECTS) $${LIBDEPS}; \
+    LD_LIBRARY_PATH=$$LIBPATH:$$LD_LIBRARY_PATH \
+    $${LDCMD} $${LDFLAGS} -o $${APPNAME:=$(APPNAME)} $(OBJECTS) $${LIBDEPS} )
+
+LINK_SO=	\
+  ( $(SET_X);   \
+    LIBDEPS="$${LIBDEPS:-$(LIBDEPS)}"; \
+    SHAREDCMD="$${SHAREDCMD:-$(CC)}"; \
+    SHAREDFLAGS="$${SHAREDFLAGS:-$(CFLAGS) $(SHARED_LDFLAGS)}"; \
+    LIBPATH=`for x in $$LIBDEPS; do echo $$x; done | sed -e 's/^ *-L//;t' -e d | uniq`; \
+    LIBPATH=`echo $$LIBPATH | sed -e 's/ /:/g'`; \
+    echo LD_LIBRARY_PATH=$$LIBPATH:$$LD_LIBRARY_PATH \
+         $${SHAREDCMD} $${SHAREDFLAGS} \
+	     -o $(SHLIBNAME_FULL) \
+	     $$ALLSYMSFLAGS $$SHOBJECTS $$NOALLSYMSFLAGS $$LIBDEPS; \
+    LD_LIBRARY_PATH=$$LIBPATH:$$LD_LIBRARY_PATH \
+    $${SHAREDCMD} $${SHAREDFLAGS} \
+	-o $(SHLIBNAME_FULL) \
+	$$ALLSYMSFLAGS $$SHOBJECTS $$NOALLSYMSFLAGS $$LIBDEPS \
+  ) && $(SYMLINK_SO)
+
+SYMLINK_SO=	\
+	if [ -n "$$INHIBIT_SYMLINKS" ]; then :; else \
+		if [ -n "$(SHLIBNAME_FULL)" -a -n "$(SHLIBNAME)" -a \
+		     "$(SHLIBNAME_FULL)" != "$(SHLIBNAME)" ]; then \
+			( $(SET_X); \
+			  rm -f $(SHLIBNAME); \
+			  ln -s $(SHLIBNAME_FULL) $(SHLIBNAME) ); \
+		fi; \
+	fi
+
+LINK_SO_SHLIB=	SHOBJECTS="$(STLIBNAME) $(LIBEXTRAS)"; $(LINK_SO)
+LINK_SO_DSO=	INHIBIT_SYMLINKS=yes; SHOBJECTS="$(LIBEXTRAS)"; $(LINK_SO)
+
+LINK_SO_SHLIB_VIA_O=	\
+  SHOBJECTS=$(STLIBNAME).o; \
+  ALL=$$ALLSYMSFLAGS; ALLSYMSFLAGS=; NOALLSYMSFLAGS=; \
+  ( echo ld $(LDFLAGS) -r -o $$SHOBJECTS $$ALL $(STLIBNAME) $(LIBEXTRAS); \
+    ld $(LDFLAGS) -r -o $$SHOBJECTS $$ALL $(STLIBNAME) $(LIBEXTRAS) ); \
+  $(LINK_SO) && ( echo rm -f $$SHOBJECTS; rm -f $$SHOBJECTS )
+
+LINK_SO_SHLIB_UNPACKED=	\
+  UNPACKDIR=link_tmp.$$$$; rm -rf $$UNPACKDIR; mkdir $$UNPACKDIR; \
+  (cd $$UNPACKDIR; ar x ../$(STLIBNAME)) && \
+  ([ -z "$(LIBEXTRAS)" ] || cp $(LIBEXTRAS) $$UNPACKDIR) && \
+  SHOBJECTS=$$UNPACKDIR/*.o; \
+  $(LINK_SO) && rm -rf $$UNPACKDIR
+
+DETECT_GNU_LD=($(CC) -Wl,-V /dev/null 2>&1 | grep '^GNU ld' )>/dev/null
+
+DO_GNU_SO_COMMON=\
+	SHAREDFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) $(SHARED_LDFLAGS) -shared -Wl,-Bsymbolic -Wl,-soname=$(SHLIBNAME_FULL)"
+DO_GNU_DSO=\
+	$(DO_GNU_SO_COMMON)
+DO_GNU_SO=\
+	ALLSYMSFLAGS='-Wl,--whole-archive'; \
+	NOALLSYMSFLAGS='-Wl,--no-whole-archive'; \
+	$(DO_GNU_SO_COMMON)
+DO_GNU_APP=LDFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS)"
+
+#This is rather special.  It's a special target with which one can link
+#applications without bothering with any features that have anything to
+#do with shared libraries, for example when linking against static
+#libraries.  It's mostly here to avoid a lot of conditionals everywhere
+#else...
+link_app.:
+	$(LINK_APP)
+
+link_dso.gnu:
+	@ $(DO_GNU_DSO); $(LINK_SO_DSO)
+link_shlib.gnu:
+	@ $(DO_GNU_SO); $(LINK_SO_SHLIB)
+link_app.gnu:
+	@ $(DO_GNU_APP); $(LINK_APP)
+
+link_shlib.linux-shared:
+	@$(PERL) $(SRCDIR)/util/mkdef.pl $(LIBNAME) linux >$(LIBNAME).map; \
+	$(DO_GNU_SO); \
+	ALLSYMSFLAGS='-Wl,--whole-archive,--version-script=$(LIBNAME).map'; \
+	$(LINK_SO_SHLIB)
+
+link_dso.bsd:
+	@if $(DETECT_GNU_LD); then $(DO_GNU_DSO); else \
+	LIBDEPS=" "; \
+	ALLSYMSFLAGS=; \
+	NOALLSYMSFLAGS=; \
+	SHAREDFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) $(SHARED_LDFLAGS) -shared -nostdlib"; \
+	fi; $(LINK_SO_DSO)
+link_shlib.bsd:
+	@if $(DETECT_GNU_LD); then $(DO_GNU_SO); else \
+	LIBDEPS=" "; \
+	ALLSYMSFLAGS="-Wl,-Bforcearchive"; \
+	NOALLSYMSFLAGS=; \
+	SHAREDFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) $(SHARED_LDFLAGS) -shared -nostdlib"; \
+	fi; $(LINK_SO_SHLIB)
+link_app.bsd:
+	@if $(DETECT_GNU_LD); then $(DO_GNU_APP); else \
+	LDFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS)"; \
+	fi; $(LINK_APP)
+
+# For Darwin AKA Mac OS/X (dyld)
+# Originally link_dso.darwin produced .so, because it was hard-coded
+# in dso_dlfcn module. At later point dso_dlfcn switched to .dylib
+# extension in order to allow for run-time linking with vendor-
+# supplied shared libraries such as libz, so that link_dso.darwin had
+# to be harmonized with it. This caused minor controversy, because
+# it was believed that dlopen can't be used to dynamically load
+# .dylib-s, only so called bundle modules (ones linked with -bundle
+# flag). The belief seems to be originating from pre-10.4 release,
+# where dlfcn functionality was emulated by dlcompat add-on. In
+# 10.4 dlopen was rewritten as native part of dyld and is documented
+# to be capable of loading both dynamic libraries and bundles. In
+# order to provide compatibility with pre-10.4 dlopen, modules are
+# linked with -bundle flag, which makes .dylib extension misleading.
+# It works, because dlopen is [and always was] extension-agnostic.
+# Alternative to this heuristic approach is to develop specific
+# MacOS X dso module relying on whichever "native" dyld interface.
+link_dso.darwin:
+	@ ALLSYMSFLAGS=''; \
+	NOALLSYMSFLAGS=''; \
+	SHAREDFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) `echo $(SHARED_LDFLAGS) | sed s/dynamiclib/bundle/`"; \
+	$(LINK_SO_DSO)
+link_shlib.darwin:
+	@ ALLSYMSFLAGS='-all_load'; \
+	NOALLSYMSFLAGS=''; \
+	SHAREDFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) $(SHARED_LDFLAGS) -current_version $(SHLIBVERSION) -compatibility_version $(SHLIBVERSION) -install_name $(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$(SHLIBNAME_FULL)"; \
+	$(LINK_SO_SHLIB)
+link_app.darwin:	# is there run-path on darwin?
+	$(LINK_APP)
+
+link_dso.cygwin:
+	@ALLSYMSFLAGS=''; \
+	NOALLSYMSFLAGS=''; \
+	base=-Wl,--enable-auto-image-base; \
+	SHAREDFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) $(SHARED_LDFLAGS) -shared $$base -Wl,-Bsymbolic"; \
+	$(LINK_SO_DSO)
+link_shlib.cygwin:
+	@ INHIBIT_SYMLINKS=yes; \
+	echo "$(PERL) $(SRCDIR)/util/mkrc.pl $(SHLIBNAME_FULL) |" \
+		     "$(RC) $(SHARED_RCFLAGS) -o rc.o"; \
+	$(PERL) $(SRCDIR)/util/mkrc.pl $(SHLIBNAME_FULL) | \
+		$(RC) $(SHARED_RCFLAGS) -o rc.o; \
+	ALLSYMSFLAGS='-Wl,--whole-archive'; \
+	NOALLSYMSFLAGS='-Wl,--no-whole-archive'; \
+	SHAREDFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) $(SHARED_LDFLAGS) -shared -Wl,--enable-auto-image-base -Wl,-Bsymbolic -Wl,--out-implib,$(SHLIBNAME) rc.o"; \
+	$(LINK_SO_SHLIB) || exit 1; \
+	rm rc.o
+link_app.cygwin:
+	$(LINK_APP)
+
+# link_dso.mingw-shared and link_app.mingw-shared are mapped to the
+# corresponding cygwin targets, as they do the exact same thing.
+link_shlib.mingw:
+	@ INHIBIT_SYMLINKS=yes; \
+	base=; [ $(LIBNAME) = "crypto" -a -n "$(FIPSCANLIB)" ] && base=-Wl,--image-base,0x63000000; \
+	$(PERL) $(SRCDIR)/util/mkdef.pl 32 $(LIBNAME) \
+		| sed -e 's|^\(LIBRARY  *\)$(LIBNAME)32|\1$(SHLIBNAME_FULL)|' \
+		> $(LIBNAME).def; \
+	echo "$(PERL) $(SRCDIR)/util/mkrc.pl $(SHLIBNAME_FULL) |" \
+		"$(RC) $(SHARED_RCFLAGS) -o rc.o"; \
+	$(PERL) $(SRCDIR)/util/mkrc.pl $(SHLIBNAME_FULL) | \
+		$(RC) $(SHARED_RCFLAGS) -o rc.o; \
+	ALLSYMSFLAGS='-Wl,--whole-archive'; \
+	NOALLSYMSFLAGS='-Wl,--no-whole-archive'; \
+	SHAREDFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) $(SHARED_LDFLAGS) -shared $$base -Wl,-Bsymbolic -Wl,--out-implib,$(SHLIBNAME) $(LIBNAME).def rc.o"; \
+	$(LINK_SO_SHLIB) || exit 1; \
+	rm $(LIBNAME).def rc.o
+
+link_dso.alpha-osf1:
+	@ if $(DETECT_GNU_LD); then \
+		$(DO_GNU_DSO); \
+	else \
+		ALLSYMSFLAGS=''; \
+		NOALLSYMSFLAGS=''; \
+		SHAREDFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) $(SHARED_LDFLAGS) -shared -Wl,-B,symbolic"; \
+	fi; \
+	$(LINK_SO_DSO)
+link_shlib.alpha-osf1:
+	@ if $(DETECT_GNU_LD); then \
+		$(DO_GNU_SO); \
+	else \
+		ALLSYMSFLAGS='-all'; \
+		NOALLSYMSFLAGS='-none'; \
+		SHAREDFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) $(SHARED_LDFLAGS) -shared -Wl,-B,symbolic -set_version $(SHLIBVERSION)"; \
+	fi; \
+	$(LINK_SO_SHLIB)
+link_app.alpha-osf1:
+	@if $(DETECT_GNU_LD); then \
+		$(DO_GNU_APP); \
+	else \
+		LDFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS)"; \
+	fi; \
+	$(LINK_APP)
+
+link_dso.solaris:
+	@ if $(DETECT_GNU_LD); then \
+		$(DO_GNU_DSO); \
+	else \
+		ALLSYMSFLAGS=""; \
+		NOALLSYMSFLAGS=""; \
+		SHAREDFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) $(SHARED_LDFLAGS) -h $(SHLIBNAME_FULL) -Wl,-Bsymbolic"; \
+	fi; \
+	$(LINK_SO_DSO)
+link_shlib.solaris:
+	@ if $(DETECT_GNU_LD); then \
+		$(DO_GNU_SO); \
+	else \
+		$(PERL) $(SRCDIR)/util/mkdef.pl $(LIBNAME) linux >$(LIBNAME).map; \
+		ALLSYMSFLAGS="-Wl,-z,allextract,-M,$(LIBNAME).map"; \
+		NOALLSYMSFLAGS="-Wl,-z,defaultextract"; \
+		SHAREDFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) $(SHARED_LDFLAGS) -h $(SHLIBNAME_FULL) -Wl,-Bsymbolic"; \
+	fi; \
+	$(LINK_SO_SHLIB)
+link_app.solaris:
+	@ if $(DETECT_GNU_LD); then \
+		$(DO_GNU_APP); \
+	else \
+		LDFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS)"; \
+	fi; \
+	$(LINK_APP)
+
+# OpenServer 5 native compilers used
+link_dso.svr3:
+	@ if $(DETECT_GNU_LD); then \
+		$(DO_GNU_DSO); \
+	else \
+		ALLSYMSFLAGS=''; \
+		NOALLSYMSFLAGS=''; \
+		SHAREDFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) -G -h $(SHLIBNAME_FULL)"; \
+	fi; \
+	$(LINK_SO_DSO)
+link_shlib.svr3:
+	@ if $(DETECT_GNU_LD); then \
+		$(DO_GNU_SO); \
+	else \
+		ALLSYMSFLAGS=''; \
+		NOALLSYMSFLAGS=''; \
+		SHAREDFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) -G -h $(SHLIBNAME_FULL)"; \
+	fi; \
+	$(LINK_SO_SHLIB_UNPACKED)
+link_app.svr3:
+	@$(DETECT_GNU_LD) && $(DO_GNU_APP); \
+	$(LINK_APP)
+
+# UnixWare 7 and OpenUNIX 8 native compilers used
+link_dso.svr5:
+	@ if $(DETECT_GNU_LD); then \
+		$(DO_GNU_DSO); \
+	else \
+		SHARE_FLAG='-G'; \
+		($(CC) -v 2>&1 | grep gcc) > /dev/null && SHARE_FLAG='-shared'; \
+		ALLSYMSFLAGS=''; \
+		NOALLSYMSFLAGS=''; \
+		SHAREDFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) $${SHARE_FLAG} -h $(SHLIBNAME_FULL)"; \
+	fi; \
+	$(LINK_SO_DSO)
+link_shlib.svr5:
+	@ if $(DETECT_GNU_LD); then \
+		$(DO_GNU_SO); \
+	else \
+		SHARE_FLAG='-G'; \
+		($(CC) -v 2>&1 | grep gcc) > /dev/null && SHARE_FLAG='-shared'; \
+		ALLSYMSFLAGS=''; \
+		NOALLSYMSFLAGS=''; \
+		SHAREDFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) $${SHARE_FLAG} -h $(SHLIBNAME_FULL)"; \
+	fi; \
+	$(LINK_SO_SHLIB_UNPACKED)
+link_app.svr5:
+	@$(DETECT_GNU_LD) && $(DO_GNU_APP); \
+	$(LINK_APP)
+
+link_dso.irix:
+	@ if $(DETECT_GNU_LD); then \
+		$(DO_GNU_DSO); \
+	else \
+		ALLSYMSFLAGS=""; \
+		NOALLSYMSFLAGS=""; \
+		SHAREDFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) $(SHARED_LDFLAGS) -shared -Wl,-soname,$(SHLIBNAME_FULL),-B,symbolic"; \
+	fi; \
+	$(LINK_SO_DSO)
+link_shlib.irix:
+	@ if $(DETECT_GNU_LD); then \
+		$(DO_GNU_SO); \
+	else \
+		MINUSWL=""; \
+		($(CC) -v 2>&1 | grep gcc) > /dev/null && MINUSWL="-Wl,"; \
+		ALLSYMSFLAGS="$${MINUSWL}-all"; \
+		NOALLSYMSFLAGS="$${MINUSWL}-none"; \
+		SHAREDFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) $(SHARED_LDFLAGS) -shared -Wl,-soname,$(SHLIBNAME_FULL),-B,symbolic"; \
+	fi; \
+	$(LINK_SO_SHLIB)
+link_app.irix:
+	@LDFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS)"; \
+	$(LINK_APP)
+
+# 32-bit PA-RISC HP-UX embeds the -L pathname of libs we link with, so
+# we compensate for it with +cdp ../: and +cdp ./:. Yes, these rewrite
+# rules imply that we can only link one level down in catalog structure,
+# but that's what takes place for the moment of this writing. +cdp option
+# was introduced in HP-UX 11.x and applies in 32-bit PA-RISC link
+# editor context only [it's simply ignored in other cases, which are all
+# ELFs by the way].
+#
+link_dso.hpux:
+	@if $(DETECT_GNU_LD); then $(DO_GNU_DSO); else \
+	ALLSYMSFLAGS=''; \
+	NOALLSYMSFLAGS=''; \
+	expr $(PLATFORM) : 'hpux64' > /dev/null && ALLSYMSFLAGS='-Wl,+forceload'; \
+	SHAREDFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) $(SHARED_LDFLAGS) -Wl,-B,symbolic,+vnocompatwarnings,-z,+s,+h,$(SHLIBNAME_FULL),+cdp,../:,+cdp,./:"; \
+	fi; \
+	rm -f $(SHLIBNAME_FULL) || :; \
+	$(LINK_SO_DSO) && chmod a=rx $(SHLIBNAME_FULL)
+link_shlib.hpux:
+	@if $(DETECT_GNU_LD); then $(DO_GNU_SO); else \
+	ALLSYMSFLAGS='-Wl,-Fl'; \
+	NOALLSYMSFLAGS=''; \
+	expr $(PLATFORM) : 'hpux64' > /dev/null && ALLSYMSFLAGS='-Wl,+forceload'; \
+	SHAREDFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) $(SHARED_LDFLAGS) -Wl,-B,symbolic,+vnocompatwarnings,-z,+s,+h,$(SHLIBNAME_FULL),+cdp,../:,+cdp,./:"; \
+	fi; \
+	rm -f $(SHLIBNAME_FULL) || :; \
+	$(LINK_SO_SHLIB) && chmod a=rx $(SHLIBNAME_FULL)
+link_app.hpux:
+	@if $(DETECT_GNU_LD); then $(DO_GNU_APP); else \
+	LDFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -Wl,+s,+cdp,../:,+cdp,./:"; \
+	fi; \
+	$(LINK_APP)
+
+link_dso.aix:
+	@OBJECT_MODE=`expr "x$(SHARED_LDFLAGS)" : 'x\-[a-z]*\(64\)'` || :; \
+	OBJECT_MODE=$${OBJECT_MODE:-32}; export OBJECT_MODE; \
+	ALLSYMSFLAGS=''; \
+	NOALLSYMSFLAGS=''; \
+	SHAREDFLAGS='$(CFLAGS) $(SHARED_LDFLAGS) -Wl,-bexpall,-bnolibpath,-bM:SRE'; \
+	rm -f $(SHLIBNAME_FULL) 2>&1 > /dev/null ; \
+	$(LINK_SO_DSO);
+link_shlib.aix:
+	@ OBJECT_MODE=`expr "x$(SHARED_LDFLAGS)" : 'x\-[a-z]*\(64\)'` || : ; \
+	OBJECT_MODE=$${OBJECT_MODE:-32}; export OBJECT_MODE; \
+	ALLSYMSFLAGS='-bnogc'; \
+	NOALLSYMSFLAGS=''; \
+	SHAREDFLAGS='$(CFLAGS) $(SHARED_LDFLAGS) -Wl,-bexpall,-bnolibpath,-bM:SRE'; \
+	rm -f $(SHLIBNAME_FULL) 2>&1 > /dev/null ; \
+	$(LINK_SO_SHLIB_VIA_O)
+link_app.aix:
+	LDFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) -Wl,-bsvr4 $(LDFLAGS)"; \
+	$(LINK_APP)
+
+
+# Targets to build symbolic links when needed
+symlink.gnu symlink.solaris symlink.svr3 symlink.svr5 symlink.irix \
+symlink.aix:
+	@ $(SYMLINK_SO)
+symlink.darwin:
+	@ $(SYMLINK_SO)
+symlink.hpux:
+	@ $(SYMLINK_SO)
+# The following lines means those specific architectures do no symlinks
+symlink.cygwin symlink.alpha-osf1 symlink.tru64 symlink.tru64-rpath:
+
+# Compatibility targets
+link_dso.bsd-gcc-shared link_dso.linux-shared link_dso.gnu-shared: link_dso.gnu
+link_shlib.bsd-gcc-shared: link_shlib.linux-shared
+link_shlib.gnu-shared: link_shlib.gnu
+link_app.bsd-gcc-shared link_app.linux-shared link_app.gnu-shared: link_app.gnu
+symlink.bsd-gcc-shared symlink.bsd-shared symlink.linux-shared symlink.gnu-shared: symlink.gnu
+link_dso.bsd-shared: link_dso.bsd
+link_shlib.bsd-shared: link_shlib.bsd
+link_app.bsd-shared: link_app.bsd
+link_dso.darwin-shared: link_dso.darwin
+link_shlib.darwin-shared: link_shlib.darwin
+link_app.darwin-shared: link_app.darwin
+symlink.darwin-shared: symlink.darwin
+link_dso.cygwin-shared: link_dso.cygwin
+link_shlib.cygwin-shared: link_shlib.cygwin
+link_app.cygwin-shared: link_app.cygwin
+symlink.cygwin-shared: symlink.cygwin
+link_dso.mingw-shared: link_dso.cygwin
+link_shlib.mingw-shared: link_shlib.mingw
+link_app.mingw-shared: link_app.cygwin
+symlink.mingw-shared: symlink.cygwin
+link_dso.alpha-osf1-shared: link_dso.alpha-osf1
+link_shlib.alpha-osf1-shared: link_shlib.alpha-osf1
+link_app.alpha-osf1-shared: link_app.alpha-osf1
+symlink.alpha-osf1-shared: symlink.alpha-osf1
+link_dso.tru64-shared: link_dso.tru64
+link_shlib.tru64-shared: link_shlib.tru64
+link_app.tru64-shared: link_app.tru64
+symlink.tru64-shared: symlink.tru64
+link_dso.tru64-shared-rpath: link_dso.tru64-rpath
+link_shlib.tru64-shared-rpath: link_shlib.tru64-rpath
+link_app.tru64-shared-rpath: link_app.tru64-rpath
+symlink.tru64-shared-rpath: symlink.tru64-rpath
+link_dso.solaris-shared: link_dso.solaris
+link_shlib.solaris-shared: link_shlib.solaris
+link_app.solaris-shared: link_app.solaris
+symlink.solaris-shared: symlink.solaris
+link_dso.svr3-shared: link_dso.svr3
+link_shlib.svr3-shared: link_shlib.svr3
+link_app.svr3-shared: link_app.svr3
+symlink.svr3-shared: symlink.svr3
+link_dso.svr5-shared: link_dso.svr5
+link_shlib.svr5-shared: link_shlib.svr5
+link_app.svr5-shared: link_app.svr5
+symlink.svr5-shared: symlink.svr5
+link_dso.irix-shared: link_dso.irix
+link_shlib.irix-shared: link_shlib.irix
+link_app.irix-shared: link_app.irix
+symlink.irix-shared: symlink.irix
+link_dso.hpux-shared: link_dso.hpux
+link_shlib.hpux-shared: link_shlib.hpux
+link_app.hpux-shared: link_app.hpux
+symlink.hpux-shared: symlink.hpux
+link_dso.aix-shared: link_dso.aix
+link_shlib.aix-shared: link_shlib.aix
+link_app.aix-shared: link_app.aix
+symlink.aix-shared: symlink.aix
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/NEWS b/openssl-1.1.0h/NEWS
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8744fe6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/NEWS
@@ -0,0 +1,868 @@
+
+  NEWS
+  ====
+
+  This file gives a brief overview of the major changes between each OpenSSL
+  release. For more details please read the CHANGES file.
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.0g and OpenSSL 1.1.0h [27 Mar 2018]
+
+      o Constructed ASN.1 types with a recursive definition could exceed the
+        stack (CVE-2018-0739)
+      o Incorrect CRYPTO_memcmp on HP-UX PA-RISC (CVE-2018-0733)
+      o rsaz_1024_mul_avx2 overflow bug on x86_64 (CVE-2017-3738)
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.0f and OpenSSL 1.1.0g [2 Nov 2017]
+
+      o bn_sqrx8x_internal carry bug on x86_64 (CVE-2017-3736)
+      o Malformed X.509 IPAddressFamily could cause OOB read (CVE-2017-3735)
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.0e and OpenSSL 1.1.0f [25 May 2017]
+
+      o config now recognises 64-bit mingw and chooses mingw64 instead of mingw
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.0d and OpenSSL 1.1.0e [16 Feb 2017]
+
+      o Encrypt-Then-Mac renegotiation crash (CVE-2017-3733)
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.0c and OpenSSL 1.1.0d [26 Jan 2017]
+
+      o Truncated packet could crash via OOB read (CVE-2017-3731)
+      o Bad (EC)DHE parameters cause a client crash (CVE-2017-3730)
+      o BN_mod_exp may produce incorrect results on x86_64 (CVE-2017-3732)
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.0b and OpenSSL 1.1.0c [10 Nov 2016]
+
+      o ChaCha20/Poly1305 heap-buffer-overflow (CVE-2016-7054)
+      o CMS Null dereference (CVE-2016-7053)
+      o Montgomery multiplication may produce incorrect results (CVE-2016-7055)
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.0a and OpenSSL 1.1.0b [26 Sep 2016]
+
+      o Fix Use After Free for large message sizes (CVE-2016-6309)
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.0 and OpenSSL 1.1.0a [22 Sep 2016]
+
+      o OCSP Status Request extension unbounded memory growth (CVE-2016-6304)
+      o SSL_peek() hang on empty record (CVE-2016-6305)
+      o Excessive allocation of memory in tls_get_message_header()
+       (CVE-2016-6307)
+      o Excessive allocation of memory in dtls1_preprocess_fragment()
+       (CVE-2016-6308)
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2h and OpenSSL 1.1.0 [25 Aug 2016]
+
+      o Copyright text was shrunk to a boilerplate that points to the license
+      o "shared" builds are now the default when possible
+      o Added support for "pipelining"
+      o Added the AFALG engine
+      o New threading API implemented
+      o Support for ChaCha20 and Poly1305 added to libcrypto and libssl
+      o Support for extended master secret
+      o CCM ciphersuites
+      o Reworked test suite, now based on perl, Test::Harness and Test::More
+      o *Most* libcrypto and libssl public structures were made opaque,
+        including:
+        BIGNUM and associated types, EC_KEY and EC_KEY_METHOD,
+        DH and DH_METHOD, DSA and DSA_METHOD, RSA and RSA_METHOD,
+        BIO and BIO_METHOD, EVP_MD_CTX, EVP_MD, EVP_CIPHER_CTX,
+        EVP_CIPHER, EVP_PKEY and associated types, HMAC_CTX,
+        X509, X509_CRL, X509_OBJECT, X509_STORE_CTX, X509_STORE,
+        X509_LOOKUP, X509_LOOKUP_METHOD
+      o libssl internal structures made opaque
+      o SSLv2 support removed
+      o Kerberos ciphersuite support removed
+      o RC4 removed from DEFAULT ciphersuites in libssl
+      o 40 and 56 bit cipher support removed from libssl
+      o All public header files moved to include/openssl, no more symlinking
+      o SSL/TLS state machine, version negotiation and record layer rewritten
+      o EC revision: now operations use new EC_KEY_METHOD.
+      o Support for OCB mode added to libcrypto
+      o Support for asynchronous crypto operations added to libcrypto and libssl
+      o Deprecated interfaces can now be disabled at build time either
+        relative to the latest release via the "no-deprecated" Configure
+        argument, or via the "--api=1.1.0|1.0.0|0.9.8" option.
+      o Application software can be compiled with -DOPENSSL_API_COMPAT=version
+        to ensure that features deprecated in that version are not exposed.
+      o Support for RFC6698/RFC7671 DANE TLSA peer authentication
+      o Change of Configure to use --prefix as the main installation
+        directory location rather than --openssldir.  The latter becomes
+        the directory for certs, private key and openssl.cnf exclusively.
+      o Reworked BIO networking library, with full support for IPv6.
+      o New "unified" build system
+      o New security levels
+      o Support for scrypt algorithm
+      o Support for X25519
+      o Extended SSL_CONF support using configuration files
+      o KDF algorithm support. Implement TLS PRF as a KDF.
+      o Support for Certificate Transparency
+      o HKDF support.
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2g and OpenSSL 1.0.2h [3 May 2016]
+
+      o Prevent padding oracle in AES-NI CBC MAC check (CVE-2016-2107)
+      o Fix EVP_EncodeUpdate overflow (CVE-2016-2105)
+      o Fix EVP_EncryptUpdate overflow (CVE-2016-2106)
+      o Prevent ASN.1 BIO excessive memory allocation (CVE-2016-2109)
+      o EBCDIC overread (CVE-2016-2176)
+      o Modify behavior of ALPN to invoke callback after SNI/servername
+        callback, such that updates to the SSL_CTX affect ALPN.
+      o Remove LOW from the DEFAULT cipher list.  This removes singles DES from
+        the default.
+      o Only remove the SSLv2 methods with the no-ssl2-method option.
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2f and OpenSSL 1.0.2g [1 Mar 2016]
+
+      o Disable weak ciphers in SSLv3 and up in default builds of OpenSSL.
+      o Disable SSLv2 default build, default negotiation and weak ciphers
+        (CVE-2016-0800)
+      o Fix a double-free in DSA code (CVE-2016-0705)
+      o Disable SRP fake user seed to address a server memory leak
+        (CVE-2016-0798)
+      o Fix BN_hex2bn/BN_dec2bn NULL pointer deref/heap corruption
+        (CVE-2016-0797)
+      o Fix memory issues in BIO_*printf functions (CVE-2016-0799)
+      o Fix side channel attack on modular exponentiation (CVE-2016-0702)
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2e and OpenSSL 1.0.2f [28 Jan 2016]
+
+      o DH small subgroups (CVE-2016-0701)
+      o SSLv2 doesn't block disabled ciphers (CVE-2015-3197)
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2d and OpenSSL 1.0.2e [3 Dec 2015]
+
+      o BN_mod_exp may produce incorrect results on x86_64 (CVE-2015-3193)
+      o Certificate verify crash with missing PSS parameter (CVE-2015-3194)
+      o X509_ATTRIBUTE memory leak (CVE-2015-3195)
+      o Rewrite EVP_DecodeUpdate (base64 decoding) to fix several bugs
+      o In DSA_generate_parameters_ex, if the provided seed is too short,
+        return an error
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2c and OpenSSL 1.0.2d [9 Jul 2015]
+
+      o Alternate chains certificate forgery (CVE-2015-1793)
+      o Race condition handling PSK identify hint (CVE-2015-3196)
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2b and OpenSSL 1.0.2c [12 Jun 2015]
+
+      o Fix HMAC ABI incompatibility
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2a and OpenSSL 1.0.2b [11 Jun 2015]
+
+      o Malformed ECParameters causes infinite loop (CVE-2015-1788)
+      o Exploitable out-of-bounds read in X509_cmp_time (CVE-2015-1789)
+      o PKCS7 crash with missing EnvelopedContent (CVE-2015-1790)
+      o CMS verify infinite loop with unknown hash function (CVE-2015-1792)
+      o Race condition handling NewSessionTicket (CVE-2015-1791)
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2 and OpenSSL 1.0.2a [19 Mar 2015]
+
+      o OpenSSL 1.0.2 ClientHello sigalgs DoS fix (CVE-2015-0291)
+      o Multiblock corrupted pointer fix (CVE-2015-0290)
+      o Segmentation fault in DTLSv1_listen fix (CVE-2015-0207)
+      o Segmentation fault in ASN1_TYPE_cmp fix (CVE-2015-0286)
+      o Segmentation fault for invalid PSS parameters fix (CVE-2015-0208)
+      o ASN.1 structure reuse memory corruption fix (CVE-2015-0287)
+      o PKCS7 NULL pointer dereferences fix (CVE-2015-0289)
+      o DoS via reachable assert in SSLv2 servers fix (CVE-2015-0293)
+      o Empty CKE with client auth and DHE fix (CVE-2015-1787)
+      o Handshake with unseeded PRNG fix (CVE-2015-0285)
+      o Use After Free following d2i_ECPrivatekey error fix (CVE-2015-0209)
+      o X509_to_X509_REQ NULL pointer deref fix (CVE-2015-0288)
+      o Removed the export ciphers from the DEFAULT ciphers
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1l and OpenSSL 1.0.2 [22 Jan 2015]:
+
+      o Suite B support for TLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.2
+      o Support for DTLS 1.2
+      o TLS automatic EC curve selection.
+      o API to set TLS supported signature algorithms and curves
+      o SSL_CONF configuration API.
+      o TLS Brainpool support.
+      o ALPN support.
+      o CMS support for RSA-PSS, RSA-OAEP, ECDH and X9.42 DH.
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1k and OpenSSL 1.0.1l [15 Jan 2015]
+
+      o Build fixes for the Windows and OpenVMS platforms
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1j and OpenSSL 1.0.1k [8 Jan 2015]
+
+      o Fix for CVE-2014-3571
+      o Fix for CVE-2015-0206
+      o Fix for CVE-2014-3569
+      o Fix for CVE-2014-3572
+      o Fix for CVE-2015-0204
+      o Fix for CVE-2015-0205
+      o Fix for CVE-2014-8275
+      o Fix for CVE-2014-3570
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1i and OpenSSL 1.0.1j [15 Oct 2014]
+
+      o Fix for CVE-2014-3513
+      o Fix for CVE-2014-3567
+      o Mitigation for CVE-2014-3566 (SSL protocol vulnerability)
+      o Fix for CVE-2014-3568
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1h and OpenSSL 1.0.1i [6 Aug 2014]
+
+      o Fix for CVE-2014-3512
+      o Fix for CVE-2014-3511
+      o Fix for CVE-2014-3510
+      o Fix for CVE-2014-3507
+      o Fix for CVE-2014-3506
+      o Fix for CVE-2014-3505
+      o Fix for CVE-2014-3509
+      o Fix for CVE-2014-5139
+      o Fix for CVE-2014-3508
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1g and OpenSSL 1.0.1h [5 Jun 2014]
+
+      o Fix for CVE-2014-0224
+      o Fix for CVE-2014-0221
+      o Fix for CVE-2014-0198
+      o Fix for CVE-2014-0195
+      o Fix for CVE-2014-3470
+      o Fix for CVE-2010-5298
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1f and OpenSSL 1.0.1g [7 Apr 2014]
+
+      o Fix for CVE-2014-0160
+      o Add TLS padding extension workaround for broken servers.
+      o Fix for CVE-2014-0076
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1e and OpenSSL 1.0.1f [6 Jan 2014]
+
+      o Don't include gmt_unix_time in TLS server and client random values
+      o Fix for TLS record tampering bug CVE-2013-4353
+      o Fix for TLS version checking bug CVE-2013-6449
+      o Fix for DTLS retransmission bug CVE-2013-6450
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1d and OpenSSL 1.0.1e [11 Feb 2013]:
+
+      o Corrected fix for CVE-2013-0169
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1c and OpenSSL 1.0.1d [4 Feb 2013]:
+
+      o Fix renegotiation in TLS 1.1, 1.2 by using the correct TLS version.
+      o Include the fips configuration module.
+      o Fix OCSP bad key DoS attack CVE-2013-0166
+      o Fix for SSL/TLS/DTLS CBC plaintext recovery attack CVE-2013-0169
+      o Fix for TLS AESNI record handling flaw CVE-2012-2686
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1b and OpenSSL 1.0.1c [10 May 2012]:
+
+      o Fix TLS/DTLS record length checking bug CVE-2012-2333
+      o Don't attempt to use non-FIPS composite ciphers in FIPS mode.
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1a and OpenSSL 1.0.1b [26 Apr 2012]:
+
+      o Fix compilation error on non-x86 platforms.
+      o Make FIPS capable OpenSSL ciphers work in non-FIPS mode.
+      o Fix SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 clash with SSL_OP_ALL in OpenSSL 1.0.0
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1 and OpenSSL 1.0.1a [19 Apr 2012]:
+
+      o Fix for ASN1 overflow bug CVE-2012-2110
+      o Workarounds for some servers that hang on long client hellos.
+      o Fix SEGV in AES code.
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0h and OpenSSL 1.0.1 [14 Mar 2012]:
+
+      o TLS/DTLS heartbeat support.
+      o SCTP support.
+      o RFC 5705 TLS key material exporter.
+      o RFC 5764 DTLS-SRTP negotiation.
+      o Next Protocol Negotiation.
+      o PSS signatures in certificates, requests and CRLs.
+      o Support for password based recipient info for CMS.
+      o Support TLS v1.2 and TLS v1.1.
+      o Preliminary FIPS capability for unvalidated 2.0 FIPS module.
+      o SRP support.
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0g and OpenSSL 1.0.0h [12 Mar 2012]:
+
+      o Fix for CMS/PKCS#7 MMA CVE-2012-0884
+      o Corrected fix for CVE-2011-4619
+      o Various DTLS fixes.
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0f and OpenSSL 1.0.0g [18 Jan 2012]:
+
+      o Fix for DTLS DoS issue CVE-2012-0050
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0e and OpenSSL 1.0.0f [4 Jan 2012]:
+
+      o Fix for DTLS plaintext recovery attack CVE-2011-4108
+      o Clear block padding bytes of SSL 3.0 records CVE-2011-4576
+      o Only allow one SGC handshake restart for SSL/TLS CVE-2011-4619
+      o Check parameters are not NULL in GOST ENGINE CVE-2012-0027
+      o Check for malformed RFC3779 data CVE-2011-4577
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0d and OpenSSL 1.0.0e [6 Sep 2011]:
+
+      o Fix for CRL vulnerability issue CVE-2011-3207
+      o Fix for ECDH crashes CVE-2011-3210
+      o Protection against EC timing attacks.
+      o Support ECDH ciphersuites for certificates using SHA2 algorithms.
+      o Various DTLS fixes.
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0c and OpenSSL 1.0.0d [8 Feb 2011]:
+
+      o Fix for security issue CVE-2011-0014
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0b and OpenSSL 1.0.0c [2 Dec 2010]:
+
+      o Fix for security issue CVE-2010-4180
+      o Fix for CVE-2010-4252
+      o Fix mishandling of absent EC point format extension.
+      o Fix various platform compilation issues.
+      o Corrected fix for security issue CVE-2010-3864.
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0a and OpenSSL 1.0.0b [16 Nov 2010]:
+
+      o Fix for security issue CVE-2010-3864.
+      o Fix for CVE-2010-2939
+      o Fix WIN32 build system for GOST ENGINE.
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0 and OpenSSL 1.0.0a [1 Jun 2010]:
+
+      o Fix for security issue CVE-2010-1633.
+      o GOST MAC and CFB fixes.
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8n and OpenSSL 1.0.0 [29 Mar 2010]:
+
+      o RFC3280 path validation: sufficient to process PKITS tests.
+      o Integrated support for PVK files and keyblobs.
+      o Change default private key format to PKCS#8.
+      o CMS support: able to process all examples in RFC4134
+      o Streaming ASN1 encode support for PKCS#7 and CMS.
+      o Multiple signer and signer add support for PKCS#7 and CMS.
+      o ASN1 printing support.
+      o Whirlpool hash algorithm added.
+      o RFC3161 time stamp support.
+      o New generalised public key API supporting ENGINE based algorithms.
+      o New generalised public key API utilities.
+      o New ENGINE supporting GOST algorithms.
+      o SSL/TLS GOST ciphersuite support.
+      o PKCS#7 and CMS GOST support.
+      o RFC4279 PSK ciphersuite support.
+      o Supported points format extension for ECC ciphersuites.
+      o ecdsa-with-SHA224/256/384/512 signature types.
+      o dsa-with-SHA224 and dsa-with-SHA256 signature types.
+      o Opaque PRF Input TLS extension support.
+      o Updated time routines to avoid OS limitations.
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8m and OpenSSL 0.9.8n [24 Mar 2010]:
+
+      o CFB cipher definition fixes.
+      o Fix security issues CVE-2010-0740 and CVE-2010-0433.
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8l and OpenSSL 0.9.8m [25 Feb 2010]:
+
+      o Cipher definition fixes.
+      o Workaround for slow RAND_poll() on some WIN32 versions.
+      o Remove MD2 from algorithm tables.
+      o SPKAC handling fixes.
+      o Support for RFC5746 TLS renegotiation extension.
+      o Compression memory leak fixed.
+      o Compression session resumption fixed.
+      o Ticket and SNI coexistence fixes.
+      o Many fixes to DTLS handling. 
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8k and OpenSSL 0.9.8l [5 Nov 2009]:
+
+      o Temporary work around for CVE-2009-3555: disable renegotiation.
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8j and OpenSSL 0.9.8k [25 Mar 2009]:
+
+      o Fix various build issues.
+      o Fix security issues (CVE-2009-0590, CVE-2009-0591, CVE-2009-0789)
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8i and OpenSSL 0.9.8j [7 Jan 2009]:
+
+      o Fix security issue (CVE-2008-5077)
+      o Merge FIPS 140-2 branch code.
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8g and OpenSSL 0.9.8h [28 May 2008]:
+
+      o CryptoAPI ENGINE support.
+      o Various precautionary measures.
+      o Fix for bugs affecting certificate request creation.
+      o Support for local machine keyset attribute in PKCS#12 files.
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8f and OpenSSL 0.9.8g [19 Oct 2007]:
+
+      o Backport of CMS functionality to 0.9.8.
+      o Fixes for bugs introduced with 0.9.8f.
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8e and OpenSSL 0.9.8f [11 Oct 2007]:
+
+      o Add gcc 4.2 support.
+      o Add support for AES and SSE2 assembly language optimization
+        for VC++ build.
+      o Support for RFC4507bis and server name extensions if explicitly 
+        selected at compile time.
+      o DTLS improvements.
+      o RFC4507bis support.
+      o TLS Extensions support.
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8d and OpenSSL 0.9.8e [23 Feb 2007]:
+
+      o Various ciphersuite selection fixes.
+      o RFC3779 support.
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8c and OpenSSL 0.9.8d [28 Sep 2006]:
+
+      o Introduce limits to prevent malicious key DoS  (CVE-2006-2940)
+      o Fix security issues (CVE-2006-2937, CVE-2006-3737, CVE-2006-4343)
+      o Changes to ciphersuite selection algorithm
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8b and OpenSSL 0.9.8c [5 Sep 2006]:
+
+      o Fix Daniel Bleichenbacher forged signature attack, CVE-2006-4339
+      o New cipher Camellia
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8a and OpenSSL 0.9.8b [4 May 2006]:
+
+      o Cipher string fixes.
+      o Fixes for VC++ 2005.
+      o Updated ECC cipher suite support.
+      o New functions EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new() and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free().
+      o Zlib compression usage fixes.
+      o Built in dynamic engine compilation support on Win32.
+      o Fixes auto dynamic engine loading in Win32.
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8 and OpenSSL 0.9.8a [11 Oct 2005]:
+
+      o Fix potential SSL 2.0 rollback, CVE-2005-2969
+      o Extended Windows CE support
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7g and OpenSSL 0.9.8 [5 Jul 2005]:
+
+      o Major work on the BIGNUM library for higher efficiency and to
+        make operations more streamlined and less contradictory.  This
+        is the result of a major audit of the BIGNUM library.
+      o Addition of BIGNUM functions for fields GF(2^m) and NIST
+        curves, to support the Elliptic Crypto functions.
+      o Major work on Elliptic Crypto; ECDH and ECDSA added, including
+        the use through EVP, X509 and ENGINE.
+      o New ASN.1 mini-compiler that's usable through the OpenSSL
+        configuration file.
+      o Added support for ASN.1 indefinite length constructed encoding.
+      o New PKCS#12 'medium level' API to manipulate PKCS#12 files.
+      o Complete rework of shared library construction and linking
+        programs with shared or static libraries, through a separate
+        Makefile.shared.
+      o Rework of the passing of parameters from one Makefile to another.
+      o Changed ENGINE framework to load dynamic engine modules
+        automatically from specifically given directories.
+      o New structure and ASN.1 functions for CertificatePair.
+      o Changed the ZLIB compression method to be stateful.
+      o Changed the key-generation and primality testing "progress"
+        mechanism to take a structure that contains the ticker
+        function and an argument.
+      o New engine module: GMP (performs private key exponentiation).
+      o New engine module: VIA PadLOck ACE extension in VIA C3
+        Nehemiah processors.
+      o Added support for IPv6 addresses in certificate extensions.
+        See RFC 1884, section 2.2.
+      o Added support for certificate policy mappings, policy
+        constraints and name constraints.
+      o Added support for multi-valued AVAs in the OpenSSL
+        configuration file.
+      o Added support for multiple certificates with the same subject
+        in the 'openssl ca' index file.
+      o Make it possible to create self-signed certificates using
+        'openssl ca -selfsign'.
+      o Make it possible to generate a serial number file with
+        'openssl ca -create_serial'.
+      o New binary search functions with extended functionality.
+      o New BUF functions.
+      o New STORE structure and library to provide an interface to all
+        sorts of data repositories.  Supports storage of public and
+        private keys, certificates, CRLs, numbers and arbitrary blobs.
+        This library is unfortunately unfinished and unused within
+        OpenSSL.
+      o New control functions for the error stack.
+      o Changed the PKCS#7 library to support one-pass S/MIME
+        processing.
+      o Added the possibility to compile without old deprecated
+        functionality with the OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED macro or the
+        'no-deprecated' argument to the config and Configure scripts.
+      o Constification of all ASN.1 conversion functions, and other
+        affected functions.
+      o Improved platform support for PowerPC.
+      o New FIPS 180-2 algorithms (SHA-224, -256, -384 and -512).
+      o New X509_VERIFY_PARAM structure to support parametrisation
+        of X.509 path validation.
+      o Major overhaul of RC4 performance on Intel P4, IA-64 and
+        AMD64.
+      o Changed the Configure script to have some algorithms disabled
+        by default.  Those can be explicitly enabled with the new
+        argument form 'enable-xxx'.
+      o Change the default digest in 'openssl' commands from MD5 to
+        SHA-1.
+      o Added support for DTLS.
+      o New BIGNUM blinding.
+      o Added support for the RSA-PSS encryption scheme
+      o Added support for the RSA X.931 padding.
+      o Added support for BSD sockets on NetWare.
+      o Added support for files larger than 2GB.
+      o Added initial support for Win64.
+      o Added alternate pkg-config files.
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7l and OpenSSL 0.9.7m [23 Feb 2007]:
+
+      o FIPS 1.1.1 module linking.
+      o Various ciphersuite selection fixes.
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7k and OpenSSL 0.9.7l [28 Sep 2006]:
+
+      o Introduce limits to prevent malicious key DoS  (CVE-2006-2940)
+      o Fix security issues (CVE-2006-2937, CVE-2006-3737, CVE-2006-4343)
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7j and OpenSSL 0.9.7k [5 Sep 2006]:
+
+      o Fix Daniel Bleichenbacher forged signature attack, CVE-2006-4339
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7i and OpenSSL 0.9.7j [4 May 2006]:
+
+      o Visual C++ 2005 fixes.
+      o Update Windows build system for FIPS.
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7h and OpenSSL 0.9.7i [14 Oct 2005]:
+
+      o Give EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE it's old value, except for a FIPS build.
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7g and OpenSSL 0.9.7h [11 Oct 2005]:
+
+      o Fix SSL 2.0 Rollback, CVE-2005-2969
+      o Allow use of fixed-length exponent on DSA signing
+      o Default fixed-window RSA, DSA, DH private-key operations
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7f and OpenSSL 0.9.7g [11 Apr 2005]:
+
+      o More compilation issues fixed.
+      o Adaptation to more modern Kerberos API.
+      o Enhanced or corrected configuration for Solaris64, Mingw and Cygwin.
+      o Enhanced x86_64 assembler BIGNUM module.
+      o More constification.
+      o Added processing of proxy certificates (RFC 3820).
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7e and OpenSSL 0.9.7f [22 Mar 2005]:
+
+      o Several compilation issues fixed.
+      o Many memory allocation failure checks added.
+      o Improved comparison of X509 Name type.
+      o Mandatory basic checks on certificates.
+      o Performance improvements.
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7d and OpenSSL 0.9.7e [25 Oct 2004]:
+
+      o Fix race condition in CRL checking code.
+      o Fixes to PKCS#7 (S/MIME) code.
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7c and OpenSSL 0.9.7d [17 Mar 2004]:
+
+      o Security: Fix Kerberos ciphersuite SSL/TLS handshaking bug
+      o Security: Fix null-pointer assignment in do_change_cipher_spec()
+      o Allow multiple active certificates with same subject in CA index
+      o Multiple X509 verification fixes
+      o Speed up HMAC and other operations
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7b and OpenSSL 0.9.7c [30 Sep 2003]:
+
+      o Security: fix various ASN1 parsing bugs.
+      o New -ignore_err option to OCSP utility.
+      o Various interop and bug fixes in S/MIME code.
+      o SSL/TLS protocol fix for unrequested client certificates.
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7a and OpenSSL 0.9.7b [10 Apr 2003]:
+
+      o Security: counter the Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of
+        Bleichbacher's attack 
+      o Security: make RSA blinding default.
+      o Configuration: Irix fixes, AIX fixes, better mingw support.
+      o Support for new platforms: linux-ia64-ecc.
+      o Build: shared library support fixes.
+      o ASN.1: treat domainComponent correctly.
+      o Documentation: fixes and additions.
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7 and OpenSSL 0.9.7a [19 Feb 2003]:
+
+      o Security: Important security related bugfixes.
+      o Enhanced compatibility with MIT Kerberos.
+      o Can be built without the ENGINE framework.
+      o IA32 assembler enhancements.
+      o Support for new platforms: FreeBSD/IA64 and FreeBSD/Sparc64.
+      o Configuration: the no-err option now works properly.
+      o SSL/TLS: now handles manual certificate chain building.
+      o SSL/TLS: certain session ID malfunctions corrected.
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6 and OpenSSL 0.9.7 [30 Dec 2002]:
+
+      o New library section OCSP.
+      o Complete rewrite of ASN1 code.
+      o CRL checking in verify code and openssl utility.
+      o Extension copying in 'ca' utility.
+      o Flexible display options in 'ca' utility.
+      o Provisional support for international characters with UTF8.
+      o Support for external crypto devices ('engine') is no longer
+        a separate distribution.
+      o New elliptic curve library section.
+      o New AES (Rijndael) library section.
+      o Support for new platforms: Windows CE, Tandem OSS, A/UX, AIX 64-bit,
+        Linux x86_64, Linux 64-bit on Sparc v9
+      o Extended support for some platforms: VxWorks
+      o Enhanced support for shared libraries.
+      o Now only builds PIC code when shared library support is requested.
+      o Support for pkg-config.
+      o Lots of new manuals.
+      o Makes symbolic links to or copies of manuals to cover all described
+        functions.
+      o Change DES API to clean up the namespace (some applications link also
+        against libdes providing similar functions having the same name).
+        Provide macros for backward compatibility (will be removed in the
+        future).
+      o Unify handling of cryptographic algorithms (software and engine)
+        to be available via EVP routines for asymmetric and symmetric ciphers.
+      o NCONF: new configuration handling routines.
+      o Change API to use more 'const' modifiers to improve error checking
+        and help optimizers.
+      o Finally remove references to RSAref.
+      o Reworked parts of the BIGNUM code.
+      o Support for new engines: Broadcom ubsec, Accelerated Encryption
+        Processing, IBM 4758.
+      o A few new engines added in the demos area.
+      o Extended and corrected OID (object identifier) table.
+      o PRNG: query at more locations for a random device, automatic query for
+        EGD style random sources at several locations.
+      o SSL/TLS: allow optional cipher choice according to server's preference.
+      o SSL/TLS: allow server to explicitly set new session ids.
+      o SSL/TLS: support Kerberos cipher suites (RFC2712).
+	Only supports MIT Kerberos for now.
+      o SSL/TLS: allow more precise control of renegotiations and sessions.
+      o SSL/TLS: add callback to retrieve SSL/TLS messages.
+      o SSL/TLS: support AES cipher suites (RFC3268).
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6j and OpenSSL 0.9.6k [30 Sep 2003]:
+
+      o Security: fix various ASN1 parsing bugs.
+      o SSL/TLS protocol fix for unrequested client certificates.
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6i and OpenSSL 0.9.6j [10 Apr 2003]:
+
+      o Security: counter the Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of
+        Bleichbacher's attack 
+      o Security: make RSA blinding default.
+      o Build: shared library support fixes.
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6h and OpenSSL 0.9.6i [19 Feb 2003]:
+
+      o Important security related bugfixes.
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6g and OpenSSL 0.9.6h [5 Dec 2002]:
+
+      o New configuration targets for Tandem OSS and A/UX.
+      o New OIDs for Microsoft attributes.
+      o Better handling of SSL session caching.
+      o Better comparison of distinguished names.
+      o Better handling of shared libraries in a mixed GNU/non-GNU environment.
+      o Support assembler code with Borland C.
+      o Fixes for length problems.
+      o Fixes for uninitialised variables.
+      o Fixes for memory leaks, some unusual crashes and some race conditions.
+      o Fixes for smaller building problems.
+      o Updates of manuals, FAQ and other instructive documents.
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6f and OpenSSL 0.9.6g [9 Aug 2002]:
+
+      o Important building fixes on Unix.
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6e and OpenSSL 0.9.6f [8 Aug 2002]:
+
+      o Various important bugfixes.
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6d and OpenSSL 0.9.6e [30 Jul 2002]:
+
+      o Important security related bugfixes.
+      o Various SSL/TLS library bugfixes.
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6c and OpenSSL 0.9.6d [9 May 2002]:
+
+      o Various SSL/TLS library bugfixes.
+      o Fix DH parameter generation for 'non-standard' generators.
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6b and OpenSSL 0.9.6c [21 Dec 2001]:
+
+      o Various SSL/TLS library bugfixes.
+      o BIGNUM library fixes.
+      o RSA OAEP and random number generation fixes.
+      o Object identifiers corrected and added.
+      o Add assembler BN routines for IA64.
+      o Add support for OS/390 Unix, UnixWare with gcc, OpenUNIX 8,
+        MIPS Linux; shared library support for Irix, HP-UX.
+      o Add crypto accelerator support for AEP, Baltimore SureWare,
+        Broadcom and Cryptographic Appliance's keyserver
+        [in 0.9.6c-engine release].
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6a and OpenSSL 0.9.6b [9 Jul 2001]:
+
+      o Security fix: PRNG improvements.
+      o Security fix: RSA OAEP check.
+      o Security fix: Reinsert and fix countermeasure to Bleichbacher's
+        attack.
+      o MIPS bug fix in BIGNUM.
+      o Bug fix in "openssl enc".
+      o Bug fix in X.509 printing routine.
+      o Bug fix in DSA verification routine and DSA S/MIME verification.
+      o Bug fix to make PRNG thread-safe.
+      o Bug fix in RAND_file_name().
+      o Bug fix in compatibility mode trust settings.
+      o Bug fix in blowfish EVP.
+      o Increase default size for BIO buffering filter.
+      o Compatibility fixes in some scripts.
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6 and OpenSSL 0.9.6a [5 Apr 2001]:
+
+      o Security fix: change behavior of OpenSSL to avoid using
+        environment variables when running as root.
+      o Security fix: check the result of RSA-CRT to reduce the
+        possibility of deducing the private key from an incorrectly
+        calculated signature.
+      o Security fix: prevent Bleichenbacher's DSA attack.
+      o Security fix: Zero the premaster secret after deriving the
+        master secret in DH ciphersuites.
+      o Reimplement SSL_peek(), which had various problems.
+      o Compatibility fix: the function des_encrypt() renamed to
+        des_encrypt1() to avoid clashes with some Unixen libc.
+      o Bug fixes for Win32, HP/UX and Irix.
+      o Bug fixes in BIGNUM, SSL, PKCS#7, PKCS#12, X.509, CONF and
+        memory checking routines.
+      o Bug fixes for RSA operations in threaded environments.
+      o Bug fixes in misc. openssl applications.
+      o Remove a few potential memory leaks.
+      o Add tighter checks of BIGNUM routines.
+      o Shared library support has been reworked for generality.
+      o More documentation.
+      o New function BN_rand_range().
+      o Add "-rand" option to openssl s_client and s_server.
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.5a and OpenSSL 0.9.6 [10 Oct 2000]:
+
+      o Some documentation for BIO and SSL libraries.
+      o Enhanced chain verification using key identifiers.
+      o New sign and verify options to 'dgst' application.
+      o Support for DER and PEM encoded messages in 'smime' application.
+      o New 'rsautl' application, low level RSA utility.
+      o MD4 now included.
+      o Bugfix for SSL rollback padding check.
+      o Support for external crypto devices [1].
+      o Enhanced EVP interface.
+
+    [1] The support for external crypto devices is currently a separate
+        distribution.  See the file README.ENGINE.
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.5 and OpenSSL 0.9.5a [1 Apr 2000]:
+
+      o Bug fixes for Win32, SuSE Linux, NeXTSTEP and FreeBSD 2.2.8 
+      o Shared library support for HPUX and Solaris-gcc
+      o Support of Linux/IA64
+      o Assembler support for Mingw32
+      o New 'rand' application
+      o New way to check for existence of algorithms from scripts
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.4 and OpenSSL 0.9.5 [25 May 2000]:
+
+      o S/MIME support in new 'smime' command
+      o Documentation for the OpenSSL command line application
+      o Automation of 'req' application
+      o Fixes to make s_client, s_server work under Windows
+      o Support for multiple fieldnames in SPKACs
+      o New SPKAC command line utilty and associated library functions
+      o Options to allow passwords to be obtained from various sources
+      o New public key PEM format and options to handle it
+      o Many other fixes and enhancements to command line utilities
+      o Usable certificate chain verification
+      o Certificate purpose checking
+      o Certificate trust settings
+      o Support of authority information access extension
+      o Extensions in certificate requests
+      o Simplified X509 name and attribute routines
+      o Initial (incomplete) support for international character sets
+      o New DH_METHOD, DSA_METHOD and enhanced RSA_METHOD
+      o Read only memory BIOs and simplified creation function
+      o TLS/SSL protocol bugfixes: Accept TLS 'client hello' in SSL 3.0
+        record; allow fragmentation and interleaving of handshake and other
+        data
+      o TLS/SSL code now "tolerates" MS SGC
+      o Work around for Netscape client certificate hang bug
+      o RSA_NULL option that removes RSA patent code but keeps other
+        RSA functionality
+      o Memory leak detection now allows applications to add extra information
+        via a per-thread stack
+      o PRNG robustness improved
+      o EGD support
+      o BIGNUM library bug fixes
+      o Faster DSA parameter generation
+      o Enhanced support for Alpha Linux
+      o Experimental MacOS support
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.3 and OpenSSL 0.9.4 [9 Aug 1999]:
+
+      o Transparent support for PKCS#8 format private keys: these are used
+        by several software packages and are more secure than the standard
+        form
+      o PKCS#5 v2.0 implementation
+      o Password callbacks have a new void * argument for application data
+      o Avoid various memory leaks
+      o New pipe-like BIO that allows using the SSL library when actual I/O
+        must be handled by the application (BIO pair)
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.2b and OpenSSL 0.9.3 [24 May 1999]:
+      o Lots of enhancements and cleanups to the Configuration mechanism
+      o RSA OEAP related fixes
+      o Added `openssl ca -revoke' option for revoking a certificate
+      o Source cleanups: const correctness, type-safe stacks and ASN.1 SETs
+      o Source tree cleanups: removed lots of obsolete files
+      o Thawte SXNet, certificate policies and CRL distribution points
+        extension support
+      o Preliminary (experimental) S/MIME support
+      o Support for ASN.1 UTF8String and VisibleString
+      o Full integration of PKCS#12 code
+      o Sparc assembler bignum implementation, optimized hash functions
+      o Option to disable selected ciphers
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.1c and OpenSSL 0.9.2b [22 Mar 1999]:
+      o Fixed a security hole related to session resumption
+      o Fixed RSA encryption routines for the p < q case
+      o "ALL" in cipher lists now means "everything except NULL ciphers"
+      o Support for Triple-DES CBCM cipher
+      o Support of Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) for RSA
+      o First support for new TLSv1 ciphers
+      o Added a few new BIOs (syslog BIO, reliable BIO)
+      o Extended support for DSA certificate/keys.
+      o Extended support for Certificate Signing Requests (CSR)
+      o Initial support for X.509v3 extensions
+      o Extended support for compression inside the SSL record layer
+      o Overhauled Win32 builds
+      o Cleanups and fixes to the Big Number (BN) library
+      o Support for ASN.1 GeneralizedTime
+      o Splitted ASN.1 SETs from SEQUENCEs
+      o ASN1 and PEM support for Netscape Certificate Sequences
+      o Overhauled Perl interface
+      o Lots of source tree cleanups.
+      o Lots of memory leak fixes.
+      o Lots of bug fixes.
+
+  Major changes between SSLeay 0.9.0b and OpenSSL 0.9.1c [23 Dec 1998]:
+      o Integration of the popular NO_RSA/NO_DSA patches
+      o Initial support for compression inside the SSL record layer
+      o Added BIO proxy and filtering functionality
+      o Extended Big Number (BN) library
+      o Added RIPE MD160 message digest
+      o Addeed support for RC2/64bit cipher
+      o Extended ASN.1 parser routines
+      o Adjustations of the source tree for CVS
+      o Support for various new platforms
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/NOTES.DJGPP b/openssl-1.1.0h/NOTES.DJGPP
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bbe63dc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/NOTES.DJGPP
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+
+ 
+ INSTALLATION ON THE DOS PLATFORM WITH DJGPP
+ -------------------------------------------
+
+ OpenSSL has been ported to DJGPP, a Unix look-alike 32-bit run-time
+ environment for 16-bit DOS, but only with long filename support.
+ If you wish to compile on native DOS with 8+3 filenames, you will
+ have to tweak the installation yourself, including renaming files
+ with illegal or duplicate names.
+
+ You should have a full DJGPP environment installed, including the
+ latest versions of DJGPP, GCC, BINUTILS, BASH, etc. This package
+ requires that PERL and the PERL module Text::Template also be
+ installed (see NOTES.PERL).
+
+ All of these can be obtained from the usual DJGPP mirror sites or
+ directly at "http://www.delorie.com/pub/djgpp". For help on which
+ files to download, see the DJGPP "ZIP PICKER" page at
+ "http://www.delorie.com/djgpp/zip-picker.html". You also need to have
+ the WATT-32 networking package installed before you try to compile
+ OpenSSL. This can be obtained from "http://www.watt-32.net/".
+ The Makefile assumes that the WATT-32 code is in the directory
+ specified by the environment variable WATT_ROOT. If you have watt-32
+ in directory "watt32" under your main DJGPP directory, specify
+ WATT_ROOT="/dev/env/DJDIR/watt32".
+
+ To compile OpenSSL, start your BASH shell, then configure for DJGPP by
+ running "./Configure" with appropriate arguments:
+
+	./Configure no-threads --prefix=/dev/env/DJDIR DJGPP
+ 
+ And finally fire up "make". You may run out of DPMI selectors when
+ running in a DOS box under Windows. If so, just close the BASH
+ shell, go back to Windows, and restart BASH. Then run "make" again.
+
+ RUN-TIME CAVEAT LECTOR
+ --------------
+
+ Quoting FAQ:
+
+  "Cryptographic software needs a source of unpredictable data to work
+   correctly.  Many open source operating systems provide a "randomness
+   device" (/dev/urandom or /dev/random) that serves this purpose."
+
+ As of version 0.9.7f DJGPP port checks upon /dev/urandom$ for a 3rd
+ party "randomness" DOS driver. One such driver, NOISE.SYS, can be
+ obtained from "http://www.rahul.net/dkaufman/index.html".
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/NOTES.PERL b/openssl-1.1.0h/NOTES.PERL
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..46d585a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/NOTES.PERL
@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+ TOC
+ ===
+
+ - Notes on Perl
+ - Notes on Perl on Windows
+ - Notes on Perl modules we use
+ - Notes on installing a perl module
+
+ Notes on Perl
+ -------------
+
+ For our scripts, we rely quite a bit on Perl, and increasingly on
+ some core Perl modules.  These Perl modules are part of the Perl
+ source, so if you build Perl on your own, you should be set.
+
+ However, if you install Perl as binary packages, the outcome might
+ differ, and you may have to check that you do get the core modules
+ installed properly.  We do not claim to know them all, but experience
+ has told us the following:
+
+ - on Linux distributions based on Debian, the package 'perl' will
+   install the core Perl modules as well, so you will be fine.
+ - on Linux distributions based on RPMs, you will need to install
+   'perl-core' rather than just 'perl'.
+
+ You MUST have at least Perl version 5.10.0 installed.  This minimum
+ requirement is due to our use of regexp backslash sequence \R among
+ other features that didn't exist in core Perl before that version.
+
+ Notes on Perl on Windows
+ ------------------------
+
+ There are a number of build targets that can be viewed as "Windows".
+ Indeed, there are VC-* configs targeting VisualStudio C, as well as
+ MinGW and Cygwin. The key recommendation is to use "matching" Perl,
+ one that matches build environment. For example, if you will build
+ on Cygwin be sure to use the Cygwin package manager to install Perl.
+ For MSYS builds use the MSYS provided Perl. For VC-* builds we
+ recommend ActiveState Perl, available from
+ http://www.activestate.com/ActivePerl.
+
+ Notes on Perl on VMS
+ --------------------
+
+ You will need to install Perl separately.  One way to do so is to
+ download the source from http://perl.org/, unpacking it, reading
+ README.vms and follow the instructions.  Another way is to download a
+ .PCSI file from http://www.vmsperl.com/ and install it using the
+ POLYCENTER install tool.
+
+ Notes on Perl modules we use
+ ----------------------------
+
+ We make increasing use of Perl modules, and do our best to limit
+ ourselves to core Perl modules to keep the requirements down.  There
+ are just a few exceptions:
+
+ Test::More         We require the minimum version to be 0.96, which
+                    appeared in Perl 5.13.4, because that version was
+                    the first to have all the features we're using.
+                    This module is required for testing only!  If you
+                    don't plan on running the tests, you don't need to
+                    bother with this one.
+
+ Text::Template     This module is not part of the core Perl modules.
+                    As a matter of fact, the core Perl modules do not
+                    include any templating module to date.
+                    This module is absolutely needed, configuration
+                    depends on it.
+
+ To avoid unnecessary initial hurdles, we have bundled a copy of the
+ following modules in our source.  They will work as fallbacks if
+ these modules aren't already installed on the system.
+
+    Text::Template
+
+ Notes on installing a perl module
+ ---------------------------------
+
+ There are a number of ways to install a perl module.  In all
+ descriptions below, Text::Template will server as an example.
+
+ 1. for Linux users, the easiest is to install with the use of your
+    favorite package manager.  Usually, all you need to do is search
+    for the module name and to install the package that comes up.
+
+    On Debian based Linux distributions, it would go like this:
+
+        $ apt-cache search Text::Template
+        ...
+        libtext-template-perl - perl module to process text templates
+        $ sudo apt-get install libtext-template-perl
+
+    Perl modules in Debian based distributions use package names like
+    the name of the module in question, with "lib" prepended and
+    "-perl" appended.
+
+ 2. Install using CPAN.  This is very easy, but usually requires root
+    access:
+
+        $ cpan -i Text::Template
+
+    Note that this runs all the tests that the module to be installed
+    comes with.  This is usually a smooth operation, but there are
+    platforms where a failure is indicated even though the actual tests
+    were successful.  Should that happen, you can force an
+    installation regardless (that should be safe since you've already
+    seen the tests succeed!):
+
+        $ cpan -f -i Text::Template
+
+    Note: on VMS, you must quote any argument that contains upper case
+    characters, so the lines above would be:
+
+        $ cpan -i "Text::Template"
+
+    and:
+
+        $ cpan -f -i "Text::Template"
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/NOTES.UNIX b/openssl-1.1.0h/NOTES.UNIX
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..43146e9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/NOTES.UNIX
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+
+ NOTES FOR UNIX LIKE PLATFORMS
+ =============================
+
+ For Unix/POSIX runtime systems on Windows, please see NOTES.WIN.
+
+
+ Shared libraries and installation in non-standard locations
+ -----------------------------------------------------------
+
+ Binaries on Unix variants expect to find shared libraries in standard
+ locations, such as /usr/lib, /usr/local/lib and some other locations
+ configured in the system (for example /etc/ld.so.conf on some systems).
+ If the libraries are installed in non-standard locations, binaries
+ will not find them and therefore fail to run unless they get a bit of
+ help from a defined RPATH or RUNPATH.  This can be applied by adding
+ the appropriate linker flags to the configuration command, such as
+ this (/usr/local/ssl was the default location for OpenSSL installation
+ in versions before 1.1.0):
+
+    $ ./config --prefix=/usr/local/ssl --openssldir=/usr/local/ssl \
+        -Wl,-rpath,/usr/local/ssl/lib
+
+ Because the actual library location may vary further (for example on
+ multilib installations), there is a convenience variable in Makefile
+ that holds the exact installation directory and that can be used like
+ this:
+
+    $ ./config --prefix=/usr/local/ssl --openssldir=/usr/local/ssl \
+        -Wl,-rpath,'$(LIBRPATH)'
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/NOTES.VMS b/openssl-1.1.0h/NOTES.VMS
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3e9a57e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/NOTES.VMS
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+
+ NOTES FOR THE OPENVMS PLATFORM
+ ==============================
+
+ Requirement details
+ -------------------
+
+ In addition to the requirements and instructions listed in INSTALL,
+ this are required as well:
+
+  * At least ODS-5 disk organization for source and build.
+    Installation can be done on any existing disk organization.
+
+
+ About ANSI C compiler
+ ---------------------
+
+ An ANSI C compiled is needed among other things.  This means that
+ VAX C is not and will not be supported.
+
+ We have only tested with DEC C (a.k.a HP VMS C / VSI C) and require
+ version 7.1 or later.  Compiling with a different ANSI C compiler may
+ require some work.
+
+ Please avoid using C RTL feature logical names DECC$* when building
+ and testing OpenSSL.  Most of all, they can be disruptive when
+ running the tests, as they affect the Perl interpreter.
+
+
+ About ODS-5 directory names and Perl
+ ------------------------------------
+
+ It seems that the perl function canonpath() in the File::Spec module
+ doesn't treat file specifications where the last directory name
+ contains periods very well.  Unfortunately, some versions of VMS tar
+ will keep the periods in the OpenSSL source directory instead of
+ converting them to underscore, thereby leaving your source in
+ something like [.openssl-1^.1^.0].  This will lead to issues when
+ configuring and building OpenSSL.
+
+ We have no replacement for Perl's canonpath(), so the best workaround
+ for now is to rename the OpenSSL source directory, as follows (please
+ adjust for the actual source directory name you have):
+
+    $ rename openssl-1^.1^.0.DIR openssl-1_1_0.DIR 
+
+
+ About MMS and DCL
+ -----------------
+
+ MMS has certain limitations when it comes to line length, and DCL has
+ certain limitations when it comes to total command length.  We do
+ what we can to mitigate, but there is the possibility that it's not
+ enough.  Should you run into issues, a very simple solution is to set
+ yourself up a few logical names for the directory trees you're going
+ to use.
+
+
+ Checking the distribution
+ -------------------------
+
+ There have been reports of places where the distribution didn't quite
+ get through, for example if you've copied the tree from a NFS-mounted
+ Unix mount point.
+
+ The easiest way to check if everything got through as it should is to
+ check for one of the following files:
+
+   [.crypto]opensslconf^.h.in
+
+ The best way to get a correct distribution is to download the gzipped
+ tar file from ftp://ftp.openssl.org/source/, use GZIP -d to uncompress
+ it and VMSTAR to unpack the resulting tar file.
+
+ Gzip and VMSTAR are available here:
+
+   http://antinode.info/dec/index.html#Software
+
+ Should you need it, you can find UnZip for VMS here:
+
+   http://www.info-zip.org/UnZip.html
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/NOTES.WIN b/openssl-1.1.0h/NOTES.WIN
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c31aed9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/NOTES.WIN
@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
+
+ NOTES FOR THE WINDOWS PLATFORMS
+ ===============================
+
+ Requirement details for native (Visual C++) builds
+ --------------------------------------------------
+
+ In addition to the requirements and instructions listed in INSTALL,
+ this are required as well:
+
+ - You need Perl.  We recommend ActiveState Perl, available from
+   https://www.activestate.com/ActivePerl. Another viable alternative
+   appears to be Strawberry Perl, http://strawberryperl.com.
+   You also need the perl module Text::Template, available on CPAN.
+   Please read NOTES.PERL for more information.
+
+ - You need a C compiler.  OpenSSL has been tested to build with these:
+
+   * Visual C++
+
+ - Netwide Assembler, a.k.a. NASM, available from http://www.nasm.us,
+   is required if you intend to utilize assembler modules. Note that NASM
+   is the only supported assembler. The Microsoft provided assembler is NOT
+   supported.
+
+
+ Visual C++ (native Windows)
+ ---------------------------
+
+ Installation directories
+
+ The default installation directories are derived from environment
+ variables.
+
+ For VC-WIN32, the following defaults are use:
+
+     PREFIX:      %ProgramFiles(86)%\OpenSSL
+     OPENSSLDIR:  %CommonProgramFiles(86)%\SSL
+
+ For VC-WIN64, the following defaults are use:
+
+     PREFIX:      %ProgramW6432%\OpenSSL
+     OPENSSLDIR:  %CommonProgramW6432%\SSL
+
+ Should those environment variables not exist (on a pure Win32
+ installation for examples), these fallbacks are used:
+
+     PREFIX:      %ProgramFiles%\OpenSSL
+     OPENSSLDIR:  %CommonProgramFiles%\SSL
+
+ ALSO NOTE that those directories are usually write protected, even if
+ your account is in the Administrators group.  To work around that,
+ start the command prompt by right-clicking on it and choosing "Run as
+ Administrator" before running 'nmake install'.  The other solution
+ is, of course, to choose a different set of directories by using
+ --prefix and --openssldir when configuring.
+
+ GNU C (Cygwin)
+ --------------
+
+ Cygwin implements a Posix/Unix runtime system (cygwin1.dll) on top of the
+ Windows subsystem and provides a bash shell and GNU tools environment.
+ Consequently, a make of OpenSSL with Cygwin is virtually identical to the
+ Unix procedure.
+
+ To build OpenSSL using Cygwin, you need to:
+
+ * Install Cygwin (see https://cygwin.com/)
+
+ * Install Cygwin Perl and ensure it is in the path. Recall that
+   as least 5.10.0 is required.
+
+ * Run the Cygwin bash shell
+
+ Apart from that, follow the Unix instructions in INSTALL.
+
+ NOTE: "make test" and normal file operations may fail in directories
+ mounted as text (i.e. mount -t c:\somewhere /home) due to Cygwin
+ stripping of carriage returns. To avoid this ensure that a binary
+ mount is used, e.g. mount -b c:\somewhere /home.
+
+ It is also possible to create "conventional" Windows binaries that use
+ the Microsoft C runtime system (msvcrt.dll or crtdll.dll) using MinGW
+ development add-on for Cygwin. MinGW is supported even as a standalone
+ setup as described in the following section. In the context you should
+ recognize that binaries targeting Cygwin itself are not interchangeable
+ with "conventional" Windows binaries you generate with/for MinGW.
+
+
+ GNU C (MinGW/MSYS)
+ ------------------
+
+ * Compiler and shell environment installation:
+
+   MinGW and MSYS are available from http://www.mingw.org/, both are
+   required. Run the installers and do whatever magic they say it takes
+   to start MSYS bash shell with GNU tools and matching Perl on its PATH.
+   "Matching Perl" refers to chosen "shell environment", i.e. if built
+   under MSYS, then Perl compiled for MSYS must be used.
+
+   Alternatively, one can use MSYS2 from https://msys2.github.io/,
+   which includes MingW (32-bit and 64-bit).
+
+ * It is also possible to cross-compile it on Linux by configuring
+   with './Configure --cross-compile-prefix=i386-mingw32- mingw ...'.
+   Other possible cross compile prefixes include x86_64-w64-mingw32-
+   and i686-w64-mingw32-.
+
+
+ Linking your application
+ ------------------------
+
+ This section applies to non-Cygwin builds.
+
+ If you link with static OpenSSL libraries then you're expected to
+ additionally link your application with WS2_32.LIB, GDI32.LIB,
+ ADVAPI32.LIB, CRYPT32.LIB and USER32.LIB. Those developing
+ non-interactive service applications might feel concerned about
+ linking with GDI32.LIB and USER32.LIB, as they are justly associated
+ with interactive desktop, which is not available to service
+ processes. The toolkit is designed to detect in which context it's
+ currently executed, GUI, console app or service, and act accordingly,
+ namely whether or not to actually make GUI calls. Additionally those
+ who wish to /DELAYLOAD:GDI32.DLL and /DELAYLOAD:USER32.DLL and
+ actually keep them off service process should consider implementing
+ and exporting from .exe image in question own _OPENSSL_isservice not
+ relying on USER32.DLL. E.g., on Windows Vista and later you could:
+
+	__declspec(dllexport) __cdecl BOOL _OPENSSL_isservice(void)
+	{   DWORD sess;
+	    if (ProcessIdToSessionId(GetCurrentProcessId(),&sess))
+	        return sess==0;
+	    return FALSE;
+	}
+
+ If you link with OpenSSL .DLLs, then you're expected to include into
+ your application code small "shim" snippet, which provides glue between
+ OpenSSL BIO layer and your compiler run-time. See the OPENSSL_Applink
+ manual page for further details.
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/README b/openssl-1.1.0h/README
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3491280
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/README
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+
+ OpenSSL 1.1.0h 27 Mar 2018
+
+ Copyright (c) 1998-2016 The OpenSSL Project
+ Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson
+ All rights reserved.
+
+ DESCRIPTION
+ -----------
+
+ The OpenSSL Project is a collaborative effort to develop a robust,
+ commercial-grade, fully featured, and Open Source toolkit implementing the
+ Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocols (including SSLv3) as well as a
+ full-strength general purpose cryptographic library.
+
+ OpenSSL is descended from the SSLeay library developed by Eric A. Young
+ and Tim J. Hudson.  The OpenSSL toolkit is licensed under a dual-license (the
+ OpenSSL license plus the SSLeay license), which means that you are free to
+ get and use it for commercial and non-commercial purposes as long as you
+ fulfill the conditions of both licenses.
+
+ OVERVIEW
+ --------
+
+ The OpenSSL toolkit includes:
+
+ libssl (with platform specific naming):
+     Provides the client and server-side implementations for SSLv3 and TLS.
+
+ libcrypto (with platform specific naming):
+     Provides general cryptographic and X.509 support needed by SSL/TLS but
+     not logically part of it.
+
+ openssl:
+     A command line tool that can be used for:
+        Creation of key parameters
+        Creation of X.509 certificates, CSRs and CRLs
+        Calculation of message digests
+        Encryption and decryption
+        SSL/TLS client and server tests
+        Handling of S/MIME signed or encrypted mail
+        And more...
+
+ INSTALLATION
+ ------------
+
+ See the appropriate file:
+        INSTALL         Linux, Unix, Windows, OpenVMS, ...
+        NOTES.*         INSTALL addendums for different platforms
+
+ SUPPORT
+ -------
+
+ See the OpenSSL website www.openssl.org for details on how to obtain
+ commercial technical support. Free community support is available through the
+ openssl-users email list (see
+ https://www.openssl.org/community/mailinglists.html for further details).
+
+ If you have any problems with OpenSSL then please take the following steps
+ first:
+
+    - Download the latest version from the repository
+      to see if the problem has already been addressed
+    - Configure with no-asm
+    - Remove compiler optimisation flags
+
+ If you wish to report a bug then please include the following information
+ and create an issue on GitHub:
+
+    - OpenSSL version: output of 'openssl version -a'
+    - Any "Configure" options that you selected during compilation of the
+      library if applicable (see INSTALL)
+    - OS Name, Version, Hardware platform
+    - Compiler Details (name, version)
+    - Application Details (name, version)
+    - Problem Description (steps that will reproduce the problem, if known)
+    - Stack Traceback (if the application dumps core)
+
+ Just because something doesn't work the way you expect does not mean it
+ is necessarily a bug in OpenSSL. Use the openssl-users email list for this type
+ of query.
+
+ HOW TO CONTRIBUTE TO OpenSSL
+ ----------------------------
+
+ See CONTRIBUTING
+
+ LEGALITIES
+ ----------
+
+ A number of nations restrict the use or export of cryptography. If you
+ are potentially subject to such restrictions you should seek competent
+ professional legal advice before attempting to develop or distribute
+ cryptographic code.
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/README.ECC b/openssl-1.1.0h/README.ECC
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fa3cad7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/README.ECC
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+NOTE: The OpenSSL Software Foundation has executed a sublicense agreement
+entitled "Elliptic Curve Cryptography Patent License Agreement" with the
+National Security Agency/ Central Security Service Commercial Solutions
+Center (NCSC) dated 2010-11-04. That agreement permits implementation and
+distribution of software containing features covered by any or all of the
+following patents:
+
+1.) U.S. Pat. No. 5,761,305 entitled "Key Agreement and Transport Protocol 
+    with Implicit Signatures" issued on June 2, 1998;
+2.) Can. Pat. Appl. Ser. No. 2176972 entitled "Key Agreement and Transport 
+    Protocol with Implicit Signature and Reduced Bandwidth" filed on May 
+    16, 1996;
+3.) U.S. Pat. No. 5,889,865 entitled "Key Agreement and Transport Protocol 
+    with Implicit Signatures" issued on March 30, 1999;
+4.) U.S. Pat. No. 5,896,455 entitled "Key Agreement and Transport Protocol 
+    with Implicit Signatures" issued on April 20, 1999;
+5.) U.S. Pat. No. 5,933,504 entitled "Strengthened Public Key Protocol" 
+    issued on August 3, 1999;
+6.) Can. Pat. Appl. Ser. No. 2176866 entitled "Strengthened Public Key 
+    Protocol" filed on May 17, 1996;
+7.) E.P. Pat. Appl. Ser. No. 96201322.3 entitled "Strengthened Public Key 
+    Protocol" filed on May 17, 1996;
+8.) U.S. Pat. No. 5,999,626 entitled "Digital Signatures on a Smartcard" 
+    issued on December 7, 1999;
+9.) Can. Pat. Appl. Ser. No. 2202566 entitled "Digital Signatures on a 
+    Smartcard" filed on April 14, 1997;
+10.) E.P. Pat. Appl. No. 97106114.8 entitled "Digital Signatures on a 
+     Smartcard" filed on April 15, 1997;
+11.) U.S Pat. No. 6,122,736 entitled "Key Agreement and Transport Protocol 
+     with Implicit Signatures" issued on September 19, 2000;
+12.) Can. Pat. Appl. Ser. No. 2174261 entitled "Key Agreement and Transport 
+     Protocol with Implicit Signatures" filed on April 16, 1996;
+13.) E.P. Pat. Appl. Ser. No. 96105920.1 entitled "Key Agreement and 
+     Transport Protocol with Implicit Signatures" filed on April 16, 1996;
+14.) U.S. Pat. No. 6,141,420 entitled "Elliptic Curve Encryption Systems" 
+     issued on October 31, 2000;
+15.) Can. Pat. Appl. Ser. No. 2155038 entitled "Elliptic Curve Encryption 
+     Systems" filed on July 31, 1995;
+16.) E.P. Pat. Appl. Ser. No. 95926348.4 entitled "Elliptic Curve Encryption 
+     Systems" filed on July 31, 1995;
+17.) U.S. Pat. No. 6,336,188 entitled "Authenticated Key Agreement" issued 
+     on January 1, 2002;
+18.) U.S. Pat. No. 6,487,661 entitled "Key Agreement and Transport Protocol" 
+     issued on November 26, 2002;
+19.) Can. Pat. Appl. Ser. No. 2174260 entitled "Key Agreement and Transport 
+     Protocol" filed on April 16, 1996;
+20.) E.P. Pat. Appl. Ser. No. 96105921.9 entitled "Key Agreement and 
+     Transport Protocol" filed on April 21, 1996;
+21.) U.S. Pat. No. 6,563,928 entitled "Strengthened Public Key Protocol" 
+     issued on May 13, 2003;
+22.) U.S. Pat. No. 6,618,483 entitled "Elliptic Curve Encryption Systems" 
+     issued September 9, 2003;
+23.) U.S. Pat. Appl. Ser. No. 09/434,247 entitled "Digital Signatures on a 
+     Smartcard" filed on November 5, 1999;
+24.) U.S. Pat. Appl. Ser. No. 09/558,256 entitled "Key Agreement and 
+     Transport Protocol with Implicit Signatures" filed on April 25, 2000;
+25.) U.S. Pat. Appl. Ser. No. 09/942,492 entitled "Digital Signatures on a 
+     Smartcard" filed on August 29, 2001 and published on July 18, 2002; and,
+26.) U.S. Pat. Appl. Ser. No. 10/185,735 entitled "Strengthened Public Key 
+     Protocol" filed on July 1, 2000.
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/README.ENGINE b/openssl-1.1.0h/README.ENGINE
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..530a4ed
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/README.ENGINE
@@ -0,0 +1,288 @@
+  ENGINE
+  ======
+
+  With OpenSSL 0.9.6, a new component was added to support alternative
+  cryptography implementations, most commonly for interfacing with external
+  crypto devices (eg. accelerator cards). This component is called ENGINE,
+  and its presence in OpenSSL 0.9.6 (and subsequent bug-fix releases)
+  caused a little confusion as 0.9.6** releases were rolled in two
+  versions, a "standard" and an "engine" version. In development for 0.9.7,
+  the ENGINE code has been merged into the main branch and will be present
+  in the standard releases from 0.9.7 forwards.
+
+  There are currently built-in ENGINE implementations for the following
+  crypto devices:
+
+      o Cryptodev
+      o Microsoft CryptoAPI
+      o VIA Padlock
+      o nCipher CHIL
+
+  In addition, dynamic binding to external ENGINE implementations is now
+  provided by a special ENGINE called "dynamic". See the "DYNAMIC ENGINE"
+  section below for details.
+
+  At this stage, a number of things are still needed and are being worked on:
+
+      1 Integration of EVP support.
+      2 Configuration support.
+      3 Documentation!
+
+1 With respect to EVP, this relates to support for ciphers and digests in
+  the ENGINE model so that alternative implementations of existing
+  algorithms/modes (or previously unimplemented ones) can be provided by
+  ENGINE implementations.
+
+2 Configuration support currently exists in the ENGINE API itself, in the
+  form of "control commands". These allow an application to expose to the
+  user/admin the set of commands and parameter types a given ENGINE
+  implementation supports, and for an application to directly feed string
+  based input to those ENGINEs, in the form of name-value pairs. This is an
+  extensible way for ENGINEs to define their own "configuration" mechanisms
+  that are specific to a given ENGINE (eg. for a particular hardware
+  device) but that should be consistent across *all* OpenSSL-based
+  applications when they use that ENGINE. Work is in progress (or at least
+  in planning) for supporting these control commands from the CONF (or
+  NCONF) code so that applications using OpenSSL's existing configuration
+  file format can have ENGINE settings specified in much the same way.
+  Presently however, applications must use the ENGINE API itself to provide
+  such functionality. To see first hand the types of commands available
+  with the various compiled-in ENGINEs (see further down for dynamic
+  ENGINEs), use the "engine" openssl utility with full verbosity, ie;
+       openssl engine -vvvv
+
+3 Documentation? Volunteers welcome! The source code is reasonably well
+  self-documenting, but some summaries and usage instructions are needed -
+  moreover, they are needed in the same POD format the existing OpenSSL
+  documentation is provided in. Any complete or incomplete contributions
+  would help make this happen.
+
+  STABILITY & BUG-REPORTS
+  =======================
+
+  What already exists is fairly stable as far as it has been tested, but
+  the test base has been a bit small most of the time. For the most part,
+  the vendors of the devices these ENGINEs support have contributed to the
+  development and/or testing of the implementations, and *usually* (with no
+  guarantees) have experience in using the ENGINE support to drive their
+  devices from common OpenSSL-based applications. Bugs and/or inexplicable
+  behaviour in using a specific ENGINE implementation should be sent to the
+  author of that implementation (if it is mentioned in the corresponding C
+  file), and in the case of implementations for commercial hardware
+  devices, also through whatever vendor support channels are available.  If
+  none of this is possible, or the problem seems to be something about the
+  ENGINE API itself (ie. not necessarily specific to a particular ENGINE
+  implementation) then you should mail complete details to the relevant
+  OpenSSL mailing list. For a definition of "complete details", refer to
+  the OpenSSL "README" file. As for which list to send it to;
+
+     openssl-users: if you are *using* the ENGINE abstraction, either in an
+          pre-compiled application or in your own application code.
+
+     openssl-dev: if you are discussing problems with OpenSSL source code.
+
+  USAGE
+  =====
+
+  The default "openssl" ENGINE is always chosen when performing crypto
+  operations unless you specify otherwise. You must actively tell the
+  openssl utility commands to use anything else through a new command line
+  switch called "-engine". Also, if you want to use the ENGINE support in
+  your own code to do something similar, you must likewise explicitly
+  select the ENGINE implementation you want.
+
+  Depending on the type of hardware, system, and configuration, "settings"
+  may need to be applied to an ENGINE for it to function as expected/hoped.
+  The recommended way of doing this is for the application to support
+  ENGINE "control commands" so that each ENGINE implementation can provide
+  whatever configuration primitives it might require and the application
+  can allow the user/admin (and thus the hardware vendor's support desk
+  also) to provide any such input directly to the ENGINE implementation.
+  This way, applications do not need to know anything specific to any
+  device, they only need to provide the means to carry such user/admin
+  input through to the ENGINE in question. Ie. this connects *you* (and
+  your helpdesk) to the specific ENGINE implementation (and device), and
+  allows application authors to not get buried in hassle supporting
+  arbitrary devices they know (and care) nothing about.
+
+  A new "openssl" utility, "openssl engine", has been added in that allows
+  for testing and examination of ENGINE implementations. Basic usage
+  instructions are available by specifying the "-?" command line switch.
+
+  DYNAMIC ENGINES
+  ===============
+
+  The new "dynamic" ENGINE provides a low-overhead way to support ENGINE
+  implementations that aren't pre-compiled and linked into OpenSSL-based
+  applications. This could be because existing compiled-in implementations
+  have known problems and you wish to use a newer version with an existing
+  application. It could equally be because the application (or OpenSSL
+  library) you are using simply doesn't have support for the ENGINE you
+  wish to use, and the ENGINE provider (eg. hardware vendor) is providing
+  you with a self-contained implementation in the form of a shared-library.
+  The other use-case for "dynamic" is with applications that wish to
+  maintain the smallest foot-print possible and so do not link in various
+  ENGINE implementations from OpenSSL, but instead leaves you to provide
+  them, if you want them, in the form of "dynamic"-loadable
+  shared-libraries. It should be possible for hardware vendors to provide
+  their own shared-libraries to support arbitrary hardware to work with
+  applications based on OpenSSL 0.9.7 or later. If you're using an
+  application based on 0.9.7 (or later) and the support you desire is only
+  announced for versions later than the one you need, ask the vendor to
+  backport their ENGINE to the version you need.
+
+  How does "dynamic" work?
+  ------------------------
+    The dynamic ENGINE has a special flag in its implementation such that
+    every time application code asks for the 'dynamic' ENGINE, it in fact
+    gets its own copy of it. As such, multi-threaded code (or code that
+    multiplexes multiple uses of 'dynamic' in a single application in any
+    way at all) does not get confused by 'dynamic' being used to do many
+    independent things. Other ENGINEs typically don't do this so there is
+    only ever 1 ENGINE structure of its type (and reference counts are used
+    to keep order). The dynamic ENGINE itself provides absolutely no
+    cryptographic functionality, and any attempt to "initialise" the ENGINE
+    automatically fails. All it does provide are a few "control commands"
+    that can be used to control how it will load an external ENGINE
+    implementation from a shared-library. To see these control commands,
+    use the command-line;
+
+       openssl engine -vvvv dynamic
+
+    The "SO_PATH" control command should be used to identify the
+    shared-library that contains the ENGINE implementation, and "NO_VCHECK"
+    might possibly be useful if there is a minor version conflict and you
+    (or a vendor helpdesk) is convinced you can safely ignore it.
+    "ID" is probably only needed if a shared-library implements
+    multiple ENGINEs, but if you know the engine id you expect to be using,
+    it doesn't hurt to specify it (and this provides a sanity check if
+    nothing else). "LIST_ADD" is only required if you actually wish the
+    loaded ENGINE to be discoverable by application code later on using the
+    ENGINE's "id". For most applications, this isn't necessary - but some
+    application authors may have nifty reasons for using it. The "LOAD"
+    command is the only one that takes no parameters and is the command
+    that uses the settings from any previous commands to actually *load*
+    the shared-library ENGINE implementation. If this command succeeds, the
+    (copy of the) 'dynamic' ENGINE will magically morph into the ENGINE
+    that has been loaded from the shared-library. As such, any control
+    commands supported by the loaded ENGINE could then be executed as per
+    normal. Eg. if ENGINE "foo" is implemented in the shared-library
+    "libfoo.so" and it supports some special control command "CMD_FOO", the
+    following code would load and use it (NB: obviously this code has no
+    error checking);
+
+       ENGINE *e = ENGINE_by_id("dynamic");
+       ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(e, "SO_PATH", "/lib/libfoo.so", 0);
+       ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(e, "ID", "foo", 0);
+       ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(e, "LOAD", NULL, 0);
+       ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(e, "CMD_FOO", "some input data", 0);
+
+    For testing, the "openssl engine" utility can be useful for this sort
+    of thing. For example the above code excerpt would achieve much the
+    same result as;
+
+       openssl engine dynamic \
+                 -pre SO_PATH:/lib/libfoo.so \
+                 -pre ID:foo \
+                 -pre LOAD \
+                 -pre "CMD_FOO:some input data"
+
+    Or to simply see the list of commands supported by the "foo" ENGINE;
+
+       openssl engine -vvvv dynamic \
+                 -pre SO_PATH:/lib/libfoo.so \
+                 -pre ID:foo \
+                 -pre LOAD
+
+    Applications that support the ENGINE API and more specifically, the
+    "control commands" mechanism, will provide some way for you to pass
+    such commands through to ENGINEs. As such, you would select "dynamic"
+    as the ENGINE to use, and the parameters/commands you pass would
+    control the *actual* ENGINE used. Each command is actually a name-value
+    pair and the value can sometimes be omitted (eg. the "LOAD" command).
+    Whilst the syntax demonstrated in "openssl engine" uses a colon to
+    separate the command name from the value, applications may provide
+    their own syntax for making that separation (eg. a win32 registry
+    key-value pair may be used by some applications). The reason for the
+    "-pre" syntax in the "openssl engine" utility is that some commands
+    might be issued to an ENGINE *after* it has been initialised for use.
+    Eg. if an ENGINE implementation requires a smart-card to be inserted
+    during initialisation (or a PIN to be typed, or whatever), there may be
+    a control command you can issue afterwards to "forget" the smart-card
+    so that additional initialisation is no longer possible. In
+    applications such as web-servers, where potentially volatile code may
+    run on the same host system, this may provide some arguable security
+    value. In such a case, the command would be passed to the ENGINE after
+    it has been initialised for use, and so the "-post" switch would be
+    used instead. Applications may provide a different syntax for
+    supporting this distinction, and some may simply not provide it at all
+    ("-pre" is almost always what you're after, in reality).
+
+  How do I build a "dynamic" ENGINE?
+  ----------------------------------
+    This question is trickier - currently OpenSSL bundles various ENGINE
+    implementations that are statically built in, and any application that
+    calls the "ENGINE_load_builtin_engines()" function will automatically
+    have all such ENGINEs available (and occupying memory). Applications
+    that don't call that function have no ENGINEs available like that and
+    would have to use "dynamic" to load any such ENGINE - but on the other
+    hand such applications would only have the memory footprint of any
+    ENGINEs explicitly loaded using user/admin provided control commands.
+    The main advantage of not statically linking ENGINEs and only using
+    "dynamic" for hardware support is that any installation using no
+    "external" ENGINE suffers no unnecessary memory footprint from unused
+    ENGINEs. Likewise, installations that do require an ENGINE incur the
+    overheads from only *that* ENGINE once it has been loaded.
+
+    Sounds good? Maybe, but currently building an ENGINE implementation as
+    a shared-library that can be loaded by "dynamic" isn't automated in
+    OpenSSL's build process. It can be done manually quite easily however.
+    Such a shared-library can either be built with any OpenSSL code it
+    needs statically linked in, or it can link dynamically against OpenSSL
+    if OpenSSL itself is built as a shared library. The instructions are
+    the same in each case, but in the former (statically linked any
+    dependencies on OpenSSL) you must ensure OpenSSL is built with
+    position-independent code ("PIC"). The default OpenSSL compilation may
+    already specify the relevant flags to do this, but you should consult
+    with your compiler documentation if you are in any doubt.
+
+    This example will show building the "atalla" ENGINE in the
+    crypto/engine/ directory as a shared-library for use via the "dynamic"
+    ENGINE.
+    1) "cd" to the crypto/engine/ directory of a pre-compiled OpenSSL
+       source tree.
+    2) Recompile at least one source file so you can see all the compiler
+       flags (and syntax) being used to build normally. Eg;
+           touch hw_atalla.c ; make
+       will rebuild "hw_atalla.o" using all such flags.
+    3) Manually enter the same compilation line to compile the
+       "hw_atalla.c" file but with the following two changes;
+         (a) add "-DENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT" to the command line switches,
+	 (b) change the output file from "hw_atalla.o" to something new,
+             eg. "tmp_atalla.o"
+    4) Link "tmp_atalla.o" into a shared-library using the top-level
+       OpenSSL libraries to resolve any dependencies. The syntax for doing
+       this depends heavily on your system/compiler and is a nightmare
+       known well to anyone who has worked with shared-library portability
+       before. 'gcc' on Linux, for example, would use the following syntax;
+          gcc -shared -o dyn_atalla.so tmp_atalla.o -L../.. -lcrypto
+    5) Test your shared library using "openssl engine" as explained in the
+       previous section. Eg. from the top-level directory, you might try;
+          apps/openssl engine -vvvv dynamic \
+              -pre SO_PATH:./crypto/engine/dyn_atalla.so -pre LOAD
+       If the shared-library loads successfully, you will see both "-pre"
+       commands marked as "SUCCESS" and the list of control commands
+       displayed (because of "-vvvv") will be the control commands for the
+       *atalla* ENGINE (ie. *not* the 'dynamic' ENGINE). You can also add
+       the "-t" switch to the utility if you want it to try and initialise
+       the atalla ENGINE for use to test any possible hardware/driver
+       issues.
+
+  PROBLEMS
+  ========
+
+  It seems like the ENGINE part doesn't work too well with CryptoSwift on Win32.
+  A quick test done right before the release showed that trying "openssl speed
+  -engine cswift" generated errors. If the DSO gets enabled, an attempt is made
+  to write at memory address 0x00000002.
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/README.FIPS b/openssl-1.1.0h/README.FIPS
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8593486
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/README.FIPS
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+This release does not support a FIPS 140-2 validated module.
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/VMS/VMSify-conf.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/VMS/VMSify-conf.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..21eff11
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/VMS/VMSify-conf.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+
+my @directory_vars = ( "dir", "certs", "crl_dir", "new_certs_dir" );
+my @file_vars = ( "database", "certificate", "serial", "crlnumber",
+		  "crl", "private_key", "RANDFILE" );
+while(<STDIN>) {
+    s|\R$||;
+    foreach my $d (@directory_vars) {
+	if (/^(\s*\#?\s*${d}\s*=\s*)\.\/([^\s\#]*)([\s\#].*)$/) {
+	    $_ = "$1sys\\\$disk:\[.$2$3";
+	} elsif (/^(\s*\#?\s*${d}\s*=\s*)(\w[^\s\#]*)([\s\#].*)$/) {
+	    $_ = "$1sys\\\$disk:\[.$2$3";
+	}
+	s/^(\s*\#?\s*${d}\s*=\s*\$\w+)\/([^\s\#]*)([\s\#].*)$/$1.$2\]$3/;
+	while(/^(\s*\#?\s*${d}\s*=\s*(\$\w+\.|sys\\\$disk:\[\.)[\w\.]+)\/([^\]]*)\](.*)$/) {
+	    $_ = "$1.$3]$4";
+	}
+    }
+    foreach my $f (@file_vars) {
+	s/^(\s*\#?\s*${f}\s*=\s*)\.\/(.*)$/$1sys\\\$disk:\[\/$2/;
+	while(/^(\s*\#?\s*${f}\s*=\s*(\$\w+|sys\\\$disk:\[)[^\/]*)\/(\w+\/[^\s\#]*)([\s\#].*)$/) {
+	    $_ = "$1.$3$4";
+	}
+	if (/^(\s*\#?\s*${f}\s*=\s*(\$\w+|sys\\\$disk:\[)[^\/]*)\/(\w+)([\s\#].*)$/) {
+	    $_ = "$1]$3.$4";
+	} elsif  (/^(\s*\#?\s*${f}\s*=\s*(\$\w+|sys\\\$disk:\[)[^\/]*)\/([^\s\#]*)([\s\#].*)$/) {
+	    $_ = "$1]$3$4";
+	}
+   }
+    print $_,"\n";
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/VMS/engine.opt b/openssl-1.1.0h/VMS/engine.opt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1c73c80
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/VMS/engine.opt
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+CASE_SENSITIVE=YES
+SYMBOL_VECTOR=(bind_engine=PROCEDURE,v_check=PROCEDURE)
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/VMS/openssl_ivp.com.in b/openssl-1.1.0h/VMS/openssl_ivp.com.in
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..825a699
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/VMS/openssl_ivp.com.in
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+$	! OpenSSL Internal Verification Procedure
+$	!
+$	! This script checks the consistency of a OpenSSL installation
+$	! It had better be spawned, as it creates process logicals
+$
+$	! Generated information
+$	INSTALLTOP := {- $config{INSTALLTOP} -}
+$	OPENSSLDIR := {- $config{OPENSSLDIR} -}
+$
+$	! Make sure that INSTALLTOP and OPENSSLDIR become something one
+$	! can use to call the startup procedure
+$	INSTALLTOP_ = F$PARSE("A.;",INSTALLTOP,,,"NO_CONCEAL") -
+		     - ".][000000" - "[000000." - "][" - "]A.;" + "."
+$	OPENSSLDIR_ = F$PARSE("A.;",OPENSSLDIR,,,"NO_CONCEAL") -
+		     - ".][000000" - "[000000." - "][" - "]A.;" + "."
+$
+$	v    := {- sprintf "%02d%02d", split(/\./, $config{version}) -}
+$	pz   := {- $config{pointer_size} -}
+$	
+$	@'INSTALLTOP_'SYS$STARTUP]openssl_startup'v'
+$	@'INSTALLTOP_'SYS$STARTUP]openssl_utils'v'
+$
+$	IF F$SEARCH("OSSL$LIBCRYPTO''pz'") .EQS. "" -
+           .OR. F$SEARCH("OSSL$LIBSSL''pz'") .EQS. "" {- output_off() if $config{no_shared}; "" -}-
+           .OR. F$SEARCH("OSSL$LIBCRYPTO_SHR''pz'") .EQS. "" -
+           .OR. F$SEARCH("OSSL$LIBSSL_SHR''pz'") .EQS. "" {- output_on() if $config{no_shared}; "" -}-
+           .OR. F$SEARCH("OSSL$INCLUDE:[OPENSSL]crypto.h") .EQS. "" -
+           .OR. F$SEARCH("OPENSSL:crypto.h") .EQS. "" -
+           .OR. F$SEARCH("OSSL$EXE:OPENSSL''v'.EXE") .EQS. ""
+$	THEN
+$	    WRITE SYS$ERROR "Installation inconsistent"
+$	    EXIT %x00018292 ! RMS$_FNF, file not found
+$	ENDIF
+$
+$	ON ERROR THEN GOTO error
+$
+$	! If something else is wrong with the installation, we're likely
+$	! to get an image activation error here
+$	openssl version -a
+$
+$	! FUTURE ENHANCEMENT: Verify that engines are where they should be.
+$	! openssl engine -c -t checker
+$
+$	WRITE SYS$ERROR "OpenSSL IVP passed"
+$	EXIT %x10000001
+$
+$ error:
+$	save_status = $STATUS
+$	WRITE SYS$ERROR "OpenSSL IVP failed"
+$	EXIT 'save_status'
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/VMS/openssl_shutdown.com.in b/openssl-1.1.0h/VMS/openssl_shutdown.com.in
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f0df1c1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/VMS/openssl_shutdown.com.in
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+$	! OpenSSL shutdown script
+$	!
+$	! This script deassigns the logical names used by the installation
+$	! of OpenSSL.  It can do so at any level, defined by P1.
+$	!
+$	! P1	Qualifier(s) for DEASSIGN.
+$	!	Default: /PROCESS
+$	!
+$	! P2	If the value is "NOALIASES", no alias logical names are
+$	!	deassigned.
+$
+$	status = %x10000001	! Generic success
+$
+$	! In case there's a problem
+$	ON CONTROL_Y THEN GOTO bailout
+$	ON ERROR THEN GOTO bailout
+$
+$	! Find the architecture
+$	IF F$GETSYI("CPU") .LT. 128
+$	THEN
+$	    arch := VAX
+$	ELSE
+$	    arch := F$EDIT(F$GETSYI("ARCH_NAME"),"UPCASE")
+$	    IF arch .EQS. "" THEN GOTO unknown_arch
+$	ENDIF
+$
+$	! Abbrevs
+$	DEAS := DEASSIGN /NOLOG 'P1'
+$	sv   := {- sprintf "%02d%02d", $config{shlib_major}, $config{shlib_minor} -}
+$	pz   := {- $config{pointer_size} -}
+$
+$	DEAS OSSL$DATAROOT
+$	DEAS OSSL$INSTROOT
+$	DEAS OSSL$INCLUDE
+$	DEAS OSSL$LIB
+$	DEAS OSSL$SHARE
+$	DEAS OSSL$ENGINES'sv'
+$	DEAS OSSL$EXE
+$	DEAS OSSL$LIBCRYPTO'pz'
+$	DEAS OSSL$LIBSSL'pz'
+${- output_off() if $config{no_shared}; "" -}
+$	DEAS OSSL$LIBCRYPTO'sv'_SHR'pz'
+$	DEAS OSSL$LIBSSL'sv'_SHR'pz'
+${- output_on() if $config{no_shared}; "" -}
+$	DEAS OPENSSL
+$
+$	IF P2 .NES. "NOALIASES"
+$	THEN
+$	    DEAS OSSL$ENGINES
+${- output_off() if $config{no_shared}; "" -}
+$	    DEAS OSSL$LIBCRYPTO_SHR'pz'
+$	    DEAS OSSL$LIBSSL_SHR'pz'
+${- output_on() if $config{no_shared}; "" -}
+$	ENDIF
+$
+$	EXIT 'status'
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/VMS/openssl_startup.com.in b/openssl-1.1.0h/VMS/openssl_startup.com.in
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9c8c09a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/VMS/openssl_startup.com.in
@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+$	! OpenSSL startup script
+$	!
+$	! This script defines the logical names used by the installation
+$	! of OpenSSL.  It can provide those logical names at any level,
+$	! defined by P1.
+$	!
+$	! The logical names created are:
+$	!
+$	!	OSSL$INSTROOT		Installation root
+$	!	OSSL$DATAROOT		Data root (common directory
+$	!				for certs etc)
+$	!	OSSL$INCLUDE		Include directory root
+$	!	OSSL$LIB		Where the static library files
+$	!				are located
+$	!	OSSL$SHARE		Where the shareable image files
+$	!				are located
+$	!	OSSL$EXE		Where the executables are located
+$	!	OSSL$ENGINESnnn		Where the shareable images are located
+$	!	OSSL$LIBCRYPTO		The static crypto library
+$	!	OSSL$LIBSSL		The static ssl library
+$	!	OSSL$LIBCRYPTOnnn_SHR	The shareable crypto image
+$	!	OSSL$LIBSSLnnn_SHR	The shareable ssl image
+$	!	OPENSSL			is OSSL$INCLUDE:[OPENSSL]
+$	!
+$	! In all these, nnn is the OpenSSL version number.  This allows
+$	! several OpenSSL versions to be installed simultaneously, which
+$	! matters for applications that are linked to the shareable images
+$	! or that depend on engines.
+$	!
+$	! In addition, unless P2 is "NOALIASES", these logical names are
+$	! created:
+$	!
+$	!	OSSL$ENGINES		Alias for OSSL$ENGINESnnn
+$	!	OSSL$LIBCRYPTO_SHR	Alias for OSSL$LIBCRYPTOnnn_SHR
+$	!	OSSL$LIBSSL_SHR		Alias for OSSL$LIBSSLnnn_SHR
+$	!
+$	! P1	Qualifier(s) for DEFINE.  "/SYSTEM" would be typical when
+$	!	calling this script from SYS$STARTUP:SYSTARTUP_VMS.COM,
+$	!	while "/PROCESS" would be typical for a personal install.
+$	!	Default: /PROCESS
+$	!
+$	! P2	If the value is "NOALIASES", no alias logical names are
+$	!	created.
+$
+$	status = %x10000001	! Generic success
+$
+$	! In case there's a problem
+$	ON CONTROL_Y THEN GOTO bailout
+$	ON ERROR THEN GOTO bailout
+$
+$	! Find the architecture
+$	IF F$GETSYI("CPU") .LT. 128
+$	THEN
+$	    arch := VAX
+$	ELSE
+$	    arch = F$EDIT(F$GETSYI("ARCH_NAME"),"UPCASE")
+$	    IF arch .EQS. "" THEN GOTO unknown_arch
+$	ENDIF
+$
+$	! Generated information
+$	INSTALLTOP := {- $config{INSTALLTOP} -}
+$	OPENSSLDIR := {- $config{OPENSSLDIR} -}
+$
+$	! Make sure that INSTALLTOP and OPENSSLDIR become something one
+$	! can build concealed logical names on
+$	INSTALLTOP_ = F$PARSE("A.;",INSTALLTOP,,,"NO_CONCEAL") -
+		     - ".][000000" - "[000000." - "][" - "]A.;" + "."
+$	OPENSSLDIR_ = F$PARSE("A.;",OPENSSLDIR,,,"NO_CONCEAL") -
+		     - ".][000000" - "[000000." - "][" - "]A.;" + "."
+$
+$	DEFINE /TRANSLATION=CONCEALED /NOLOG WRK_INSTALLTOP 'INSTALLTOP_']
+$	DEFINE /TRANSLATION=CONCEALED /NOLOG WRK_OPENSSLDIR 'OPENSSLDIR_']
+$
+$	! Check that things are in place, and specifically, the stuff
+$	! belonging to this architecture
+$	IF F$SEARCH("WRK_INSTALLTOP:[000000]INCLUDE.DIR;1") .EQS. "" -
+	   .OR. F$SEARCH("WRK_INSTALLTOP:[000000]LIB.DIR;1") .EQS. "" -
+	   .OR. F$SEARCH("WRK_INSTALLTOP:[000000]EXE.DIR;1") .EQS. "" -
+	   .OR. F$SEARCH("WRK_INSTALLTOP:[LIB]''arch'.DIR;1") .EQS. "" -
+	   .OR. F$SEARCH("WRK_INSTALLTOP:[EXE]''arch'.DIR;1") .EQS. "" -
+	   .OR. F$SEARCH("WRK_OPENSSLDIR:[000000]openssl.cnf") .EQS. ""
+$	THEN
+$	    WRITE SYS$ERROR "''INSTALLTOP' doesn't look like an OpenSSL installation for ''arch'"
+$	    status = %x00018292 ! RMS$_FNF, file not found
+$	    GOTO bailout
+$	ENDIF
+$
+$	! Abbrevs
+$	DEFT := DEFINE /TRANSLATION=CONCEALED /NOLOG 'P1'
+$	DEF  := DEFINE /NOLOG 'P1'
+$	sv   := {- sprintf "%02d%02d", $config{shlib_major}, $config{shlib_minor} -}
+$	pz   := {- $config{pointer_size} -}
+$
+$	DEFT OSSL$DATAROOT		'OPENSSLDIR_']
+$	DEFT OSSL$INSTROOT		'INSTALLTOP_']
+$	DEFT OSSL$INCLUDE		'INSTALLTOP_'INCLUDE.]
+$	DEF  OSSL$LIB			OSSL$INSTROOT:[LIB.'arch']
+$	DEF  OSSL$SHARE			OSSL$INSTROOT:[LIB.'arch']
+$	DEF  OSSL$ENGINES'sv''pz'	OSSL$INSTROOT:[ENGINES'sv''pz'.'arch']
+$	DEF  OSSL$EXE			OSSL$INSTROOT:[EXE.'arch'],-
+					OSSL$INSTROOT:[EXE]
+$	DEF  OSSL$LIBCRYPTO'pz'		OSSL$LIB:OSSL$LIBCRYPTO'pz'.OLB
+$	DEF  OSSL$LIBSSL'pz'		OSSL$LIB:OSSL$LIBSSL'pz'.OLB
+${- output_off() if $config{no_shared}; "" -}
+$	DEF  OSSL$LIBCRYPTO'sv'_SHR'pz'	OSSL$SHARE:OSSL$LIBCRYPTO'sv'_SHR'pz'.EXE
+$	DEF  OSSL$LIBSSL'sv'_SHR'pz'	OSSL$SHARE:OSSL$LIBSSL'sv'_SHR'pz'.EXE
+${- output_on() if $config{no_shared}; "" -}
+$	DEF  OPENSSL			OSSL$INCLUDE:[OPENSSL]
+$
+$	IF P2 .NES. "NOALIASES"
+$	THEN
+$	    DEF OSSL$ENGINES'pz'	OSSL$ENGINES'sv''pz'
+${- output_off() if $config{no_shared}; "" -}
+$	    DEF OSSL$LIBCRYPTO_SHR'pz'	OSSL$LIBCRYPTO'sv'_SHR'pz'
+$	    DEF OSSL$LIBSSL_SHR'pz'	OSSL$LIBSSL'sv'_SHR'pz'
+${- output_on() if $config{no_shared}; "" -}
+$	ENDIF
+$
+$ bailout:
+$	DEASSIGN WRK_INSTALLTOP
+$	DEASSIGN WRK_OPENSSLDIR
+$
+$	EXIT 'status'
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/VMS/openssl_utils.com.in b/openssl-1.1.0h/VMS/openssl_utils.com.in
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..edd733d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/VMS/openssl_utils.com.in
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+$	! OpenSSL utilities
+$	!
+$
+$	v    := {- sprintf "%02d%02d", split(/\./, $config{version}) -}
+$
+$	OPENSSL'v'	:== $OSSL$EXE:OPENSSL'v'
+$	OPENSSL		:== $OSSL$EXE:OPENSSL'v'
+$
+$	IF F$TYPE(PERL) .EQS. "STRING"
+$	THEN
+$	    C_REHASH	:== 'PERL' OSSL$EXE:c_rehash.pl
+$	ELSE
+$	    WRITE SYS$ERROR "NOTE: no perl => no C_REHASH"
+$	ENDIF
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/VMS/test-includes.com b/openssl-1.1.0h/VMS/test-includes.com
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c1d7ccd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/VMS/test-includes.com
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+$! Quick script to check how well including individual header files works
+$! on VMS, even when the VMS macro isn't defined.
+$
+$	sav_def = f$env("DEFAULT")
+$	here = f$parse("A.;0",f$ENV("PROCEDURE")) - "A.;0"
+$	set default 'here'
+$	set default [-.include.openssl]
+$	define openssl 'f$env("DEFAULT")'
+$	set default [--]
+$
+$ loop:
+$	f = f$search("openssl:*.h")
+$	if f .eqs. "" then goto loop_end
+$	write sys$output "Checking ",f
+$	open/write foo foo.c
+$	write foo "#undef VMS"
+$	write foo "#include <stdio.h>"
+$	write foo "#include <openssl/",f$parse(f,,,"NAME"),".h>"
+$	write foo "main()"
+$	write foo "{printf(""foo\n"");}"
+$	close foo
+$	cc/STANDARD=ANSI89/NOLIST/PREFIX=ALL foo.c
+$	delete foo.c;
+$	goto loop
+$ loop_end:
+$	set default 'save_def'
+$	exit
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/VMS/translatesyms.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/VMS/translatesyms.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f61d954
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/VMS/translatesyms.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+# This script will translate any SYMBOL_VECTOR item that has a translation
+# in CXX$DEMANGLER_DB.  The latter is generated by and CC/DECC command that
+# uses the qualifier /REPOSITORY with the build directory as value.  When
+# /NAMES=SHORTENED has been used, this file will hold the translations from
+# the original symbols to the shortened variants.
+#
+# CXX$DEMAGLER_DB. is an ISAM file, but with the magic of RMS, it can be
+# read as a text file, with each record as one line.
+#
+# The lines will have the following syntax for any symbol found that's longer
+# than 31 characters:
+#
+# LONG_symbol_34567890123{cksum}$LONG_symbol_34567890123_more_than_31_chars
+#
+# $ is present at the end of the shortened symbol name, and is preceded by a
+# 7 character checksum.  The $ makes it easy to separate the shortened name
+# from the original one.
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+
+usage() if scalar @ARGV < 1;
+
+my %translations = ();
+
+open DEMANGLER_DATA, $ARGV[0]
+    or die "Couldn't open $ARGV[0]: $!\n";
+while(<DEMANGLER_DATA>) {
+    s|\R$||;
+    (my $translated, my $original) = split /\$/;
+    $translations{$original} = $translated.'$';
+}
+close DEMANGLER_DATA;
+
+$| = 1;                         # Autoflush
+while(<STDIN>) {
+    s@
+      ((?:[A-Za-z0-9_]+)\/)?([A-Za-z0-9_]+)=(PROCEDURE|DATA)
+     @
+      if (defined($translations{$2})) {
+          my $trans = $translations{$2};
+          my $trans_uc = uc $trans;
+          if (defined($1) && $trans ne $trans_uc) {
+              "$trans_uc/$trans=$3"
+          } else {
+              "$trans=$3"
+          }
+      } else {
+          $&
+      }
+     @gxe;
+    print $_;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/CA.pl.in b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/CA.pl.in
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7277eec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/CA.pl.in
@@ -0,0 +1,196 @@
+#!{- $config{hashbangperl} -}
+# Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+#
+# Wrapper around the ca to make it easier to use
+#
+# {- join("\n# ", @autowarntext) -}
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+
+my $openssl = "openssl";
+if(defined $ENV{'OPENSSL'}) {
+    $openssl = $ENV{'OPENSSL'};
+} else {
+    $ENV{'OPENSSL'} = $openssl;
+}
+
+my $verbose = 1;
+
+my $OPENSSL_CONFIG = $ENV{"OPENSSL_CONFIG"} || "";
+my $DAYS = "-days 365";
+my $CADAYS = "-days 1095";	# 3 years
+my $REQ = "$openssl req $OPENSSL_CONFIG";
+my $CA = "$openssl ca $OPENSSL_CONFIG";
+my $VERIFY = "$openssl verify";
+my $X509 = "$openssl x509";
+my $PKCS12 = "$openssl pkcs12";
+
+# default openssl.cnf file has setup as per the following
+my $CATOP = "./demoCA";
+my $CAKEY = "cakey.pem";
+my $CAREQ = "careq.pem";
+my $CACERT = "cacert.pem";
+my $CACRL = "crl.pem";
+my $DIRMODE = 0777;
+
+my $NEWKEY = "newkey.pem";
+my $NEWREQ = "newreq.pem";
+my $NEWCERT = "newcert.pem";
+my $NEWP12 = "newcert.p12";
+my $RET = 0;
+my $WHAT = shift @ARGV || "";
+my $FILE;
+
+# See if reason for a CRL entry is valid; exit if not.
+sub crl_reason_ok
+{
+    my $r = shift;
+
+    if ($r eq 'unspecified' || $r eq 'keyCompromise'
+        || $r eq 'CACompromise' || $r eq 'affiliationChanged'
+        || $r eq 'superseded' || $r eq 'cessationOfOperation'
+        || $r eq 'certificateHold' || $r eq 'removeFromCRL') {
+        return 1;
+    }
+    print STDERR "Invalid CRL reason; must be one of:\n";
+    print STDERR "    unspecified, keyCompromise, CACompromise,\n";
+    print STDERR "    affiliationChanged, superseded, cessationOfOperation\n";
+    print STDERR "    certificateHold, removeFromCRL";
+    exit 1;
+}
+
+# Copy a PEM-format file; return like exit status (zero means ok)
+sub copy_pemfile
+{
+    my ($infile, $outfile, $bound) = @_;
+    my $found = 0;
+
+    open IN, $infile || die "Cannot open $infile, $!";
+    open OUT, ">$outfile" || die "Cannot write to $outfile, $!";
+    while (<IN>) {
+        $found = 1 if /^-----BEGIN.*$bound/;
+        print OUT $_ if $found;
+        $found = 2, last if /^-----END.*$bound/;
+    }
+    close IN;
+    close OUT;
+    return $found == 2 ? 0 : 1;
+}
+
+# Wrapper around system; useful for debugging.  Returns just the exit status
+sub run
+{
+    my $cmd = shift;
+    print "====\n$cmd\n" if $verbose;
+    my $status = system($cmd);
+    print "==> $status\n====\n" if $verbose;
+    return $status >> 8;
+}
+
+
+if ( $WHAT =~ /^(-\?|-h|-help)$/ ) {
+    print STDERR "usage: CA -newcert|-newreq|-newreq-nodes|-newca|-sign|-signcert|-verify\n";
+    print STDERR "       CA -pkcs12 [certname]\n";
+    print STDERR "       CA -crl|-revoke cert-filename [reason]\n";
+    exit 0;
+}
+if ($WHAT eq '-newcert' ) {
+    # create a certificate
+    $RET = run("$REQ -new -x509 -keyout $NEWKEY -out $NEWCERT $DAYS");
+    print "Cert is in $NEWCERT, private key is in $NEWKEY\n" if $RET == 0;
+} elsif ($WHAT eq '-newreq' ) {
+    # create a certificate request
+    $RET = run("$REQ -new -keyout $NEWKEY -out $NEWREQ $DAYS");
+    print "Request is in $NEWREQ, private key is in $NEWKEY\n" if $RET == 0;
+} elsif ($WHAT eq '-newreq-nodes' ) {
+    # create a certificate request
+    $RET = run("$REQ -new -nodes -keyout $NEWKEY -out $NEWREQ $DAYS");
+    print "Request is in $NEWREQ, private key is in $NEWKEY\n" if $RET == 0;
+} elsif ($WHAT eq '-newca' ) {
+    # create the directory hierarchy
+    mkdir ${CATOP}, $DIRMODE;
+    mkdir "${CATOP}/certs", $DIRMODE;
+    mkdir "${CATOP}/crl", $DIRMODE ;
+    mkdir "${CATOP}/newcerts", $DIRMODE;
+    mkdir "${CATOP}/private", $DIRMODE;
+    open OUT, ">${CATOP}/index.txt";
+    close OUT;
+    open OUT, ">${CATOP}/crlnumber";
+    print OUT "01\n";
+    close OUT;
+    # ask user for existing CA certificate
+    print "CA certificate filename (or enter to create)\n";
+    $FILE = "" unless defined($FILE = <STDIN>);
+    $FILE =~ s{\R$}{};
+    if ($FILE ne "") {
+        copy_pemfile($FILE,"${CATOP}/private/$CAKEY", "PRIVATE");
+        copy_pemfile($FILE,"${CATOP}/$CACERT", "CERTIFICATE");
+    } else {
+        print "Making CA certificate ...\n";
+        $RET = run("$REQ -new -keyout"
+                . " ${CATOP}/private/$CAKEY"
+                . " -out ${CATOP}/$CAREQ");
+        $RET = run("$CA -create_serial"
+                . " -out ${CATOP}/$CACERT $CADAYS -batch"
+                . " -keyfile ${CATOP}/private/$CAKEY -selfsign"
+                . " -extensions v3_ca"
+                . " -infiles ${CATOP}/$CAREQ") if $RET == 0;
+        print "CA certificate is in ${CATOP}/$CACERT\n" if $RET == 0;
+    }
+} elsif ($WHAT eq '-pkcs12' ) {
+    my $cname = $ARGV[0];
+    $cname = "My Certificate" unless defined $cname;
+    $RET = run("$PKCS12 -in $NEWCERT -inkey $NEWKEY"
+            . " -certfile ${CATOP}/$CACERT"
+            . " -out $NEWP12"
+            . " -export -name \"$cname\"");
+    print "PKCS #12 file is in $NEWP12\n" if $RET == 0;
+} elsif ($WHAT eq '-xsign' ) {
+    $RET = run("$CA -policy policy_anything -infiles $NEWREQ");
+} elsif ($WHAT eq '-sign' ) {
+    $RET = run("$CA -policy policy_anything -out $NEWCERT -infiles $NEWREQ");
+    print "Signed certificate is in $NEWCERT\n" if $RET == 0;
+} elsif ($WHAT eq '-signCA' ) {
+    $RET = run("$CA -policy policy_anything -out $NEWCERT"
+            . " -extensions v3_ca -infiles $NEWREQ");
+    print "Signed CA certificate is in $NEWCERT\n" if $RET == 0;
+} elsif ($WHAT eq '-signcert' ) {
+    $RET = run("$X509 -x509toreq -in $NEWREQ -signkey $NEWREQ"
+            . " -out tmp.pem");
+    $RET = run("$CA -policy policy_anything -out $NEWCERT"
+            . " -infiles tmp.pem") if $RET == 0;
+    print "Signed certificate is in $NEWCERT\n" if $RET == 0;
+} elsif ($WHAT eq '-verify' ) {
+    my @files = @ARGV ? @ARGV : ( $NEWCERT );
+    my $file;
+    foreach $file (@files) {
+        my $status = run("$VERIFY \"-CAfile\" ${CATOP}/$CACERT $file");
+        $RET = $status if $status != 0;
+    }
+} elsif ($WHAT eq '-crl' ) {
+    $RET = run("$CA -gencrl -out ${CATOP}/crl/$CACRL");
+    print "Generated CRL is in ${CATOP}/crl/$CACRL\n" if $RET == 0;
+} elsif ($WHAT eq '-revoke' ) {
+    my $cname = $ARGV[0];
+    if (!defined $cname) {
+        print "Certificate filename is required; reason optional.\n";
+        exit 1;
+    }
+    my $reason = $ARGV[1];
+    $reason = " -crl_reason $reason"
+        if defined $reason && crl_reason_ok($reason);
+    $RET = run("$CA -revoke \"$cname\"" . $reason);
+} else {
+    print STDERR "Unknown arg \"$WHAT\"\n";
+    print STDERR "Use -help for help.\n";
+    exit 1;
+}
+
+exit $RET;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/app_rand.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/app_rand.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ff0771c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/app_rand.c
@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "apps.h"
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+static int seeded = 0;
+static int egdsocket = 0;
+
+int app_RAND_load_file(const char *file, int dont_warn)
+{
+    int consider_randfile = (file == NULL);
+    char buffer[200];
+
+    if (file == NULL)
+        file = RAND_file_name(buffer, sizeof(buffer));
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EGD
+    else if (RAND_egd(file) > 0) {
+        /*
+         * we try if the given filename is an EGD socket. if it is, we don't
+         * write anything back to the file.
+         */
+        egdsocket = 1;
+        return 1;
+    }
+#endif
+    if (file == NULL || !RAND_load_file(file, -1)) {
+        if (RAND_status() == 0) {
+            if (!dont_warn) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to load 'random state'\n");
+                BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                           "This means that the random number generator has not been seeded\n");
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "with much random data.\n");
+                if (consider_randfile) { /* explanation does not apply when a
+                                          * file is explicitly named */
+                    BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                               "Consider setting the RANDFILE environment variable to point at a file that\n");
+                    BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                               "'random' data can be kept in (the file will be overwritten).\n");
+                }
+            }
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+    seeded = 1;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+long app_RAND_load_files(char *name)
+{
+    char *p, *n;
+    int last;
+    long tot = 0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EGD
+    int egd;
+#endif
+
+    for (;;) {
+        last = 0;
+        for (p = name; ((*p != '\0') && (*p != LIST_SEPARATOR_CHAR)); p++) ;
+        if (*p == '\0')
+            last = 1;
+        *p = '\0';
+        n = name;
+        name = p + 1;
+        if (*n == '\0')
+            break;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EGD
+        egd = RAND_egd(n);
+        if (egd > 0)
+            tot += egd;
+        else
+#endif
+            tot += RAND_load_file(n, -1);
+        if (last)
+            break;
+    }
+    if (tot > 512)
+        app_RAND_allow_write_file();
+    return (tot);
+}
+
+int app_RAND_write_file(const char *file)
+{
+    char buffer[200];
+
+    if (egdsocket || !seeded)
+        /*
+         * If we did not manage to read the seed file, we should not write a
+         * low-entropy seed file back -- it would suppress a crucial warning
+         * the next time we want to use it.
+         */
+        return 0;
+
+    if (file == NULL)
+        file = RAND_file_name(buffer, sizeof(buffer));
+    if (file == NULL || !RAND_write_file(file)) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to write 'random state'\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+void app_RAND_allow_write_file(void)
+{
+    seeded = 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/apps.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/apps.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8703d0c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/apps.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2650 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#if !defined(_POSIX_C_SOURCE) && defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
+/*
+ * On VMS, you need to define this to get the declaration of fileno().  The
+ * value 2 is to make sure no function defined in POSIX-2 is left undefined.
+ */
+# define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 2
+#endif
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+# include <fcntl.h>
+#endif
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
+#include <openssl/ui.h>
+#include <openssl/safestack.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+# include <openssl/engine.h>
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+# include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#endif
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+#include "s_apps.h"
+#include "apps.h"
+
+#ifdef _WIN32
+static int WIN32_rename(const char *from, const char *to);
+# define rename(from,to) WIN32_rename((from),(to))
+#endif
+
+typedef struct {
+    const char *name;
+    unsigned long flag;
+    unsigned long mask;
+} NAME_EX_TBL;
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_UI) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE)
+static UI_METHOD *ui_method = NULL;
+#endif
+
+static int set_table_opts(unsigned long *flags, const char *arg,
+                          const NAME_EX_TBL * in_tbl);
+static int set_multi_opts(unsigned long *flags, const char *arg,
+                          const NAME_EX_TBL * in_tbl);
+
+int app_init(long mesgwin);
+
+int chopup_args(ARGS *arg, char *buf)
+{
+    int quoted;
+    char c = '\0', *p = NULL;
+
+    arg->argc = 0;
+    if (arg->size == 0) {
+        arg->size = 20;
+        arg->argv = app_malloc(sizeof(*arg->argv) * arg->size, "argv space");
+    }
+
+    for (p = buf;;) {
+        /* Skip whitespace. */
+        while (*p && isspace(_UC(*p)))
+            p++;
+        if (!*p)
+            break;
+
+        /* The start of something good :-) */
+        if (arg->argc >= arg->size) {
+            char **tmp;
+            arg->size += 20;
+            tmp = OPENSSL_realloc(arg->argv, sizeof(*arg->argv) * arg->size);
+            if (tmp == NULL)
+                return 0;
+            arg->argv = tmp;
+        }
+        quoted = *p == '\'' || *p == '"';
+        if (quoted)
+            c = *p++;
+        arg->argv[arg->argc++] = p;
+
+        /* now look for the end of this */
+        if (quoted) {
+            while (*p && *p != c)
+                p++;
+            *p++ = '\0';
+        } else {
+            while (*p && !isspace(_UC(*p)))
+                p++;
+            if (*p)
+                *p++ = '\0';
+        }
+    }
+    arg->argv[arg->argc] = NULL;
+    return (1);
+}
+
+#ifndef APP_INIT
+int app_init(long mesgwin)
+{
+    return (1);
+}
+#endif
+
+int ctx_set_verify_locations(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *CAfile,
+                             const char *CApath, int noCAfile, int noCApath)
+{
+    if (CAfile == NULL && CApath == NULL) {
+        if (!noCAfile && SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_file(ctx) <= 0)
+            return 0;
+        if (!noCApath && SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_dir(ctx) <= 0)
+            return 0;
+
+        return 1;
+    }
+    return SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(ctx, CAfile, CApath);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
+
+int ctx_set_ctlog_list_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *path)
+{
+    if (path == NULL) {
+        return SSL_CTX_set_default_ctlog_list_file(ctx);
+    }
+
+    return SSL_CTX_set_ctlog_list_file(ctx, path);
+}
+
+#endif
+
+int dump_cert_text(BIO *out, X509 *x)
+{
+    char *p;
+
+    p = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(x), NULL, 0);
+    BIO_puts(out, "subject=");
+    BIO_puts(out, p);
+    OPENSSL_free(p);
+
+    p = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(x), NULL, 0);
+    BIO_puts(out, "\nissuer=");
+    BIO_puts(out, p);
+    BIO_puts(out, "\n");
+    OPENSSL_free(p);
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_UI
+static int ui_open(UI *ui)
+{
+    return UI_method_get_opener(UI_OpenSSL())(ui);
+}
+
+static int ui_read(UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis)
+{
+    if (UI_get_input_flags(uis) & UI_INPUT_FLAG_DEFAULT_PWD
+        && UI_get0_user_data(ui)) {
+        switch (UI_get_string_type(uis)) {
+        case UIT_PROMPT:
+        case UIT_VERIFY:
+            {
+                const char *password =
+                    ((PW_CB_DATA *)UI_get0_user_data(ui))->password;
+                if (password && password[0] != '\0') {
+                    UI_set_result(ui, uis, password);
+                    return 1;
+                }
+            }
+        default:
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    return UI_method_get_reader(UI_OpenSSL())(ui, uis);
+}
+
+static int ui_write(UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis)
+{
+    if (UI_get_input_flags(uis) & UI_INPUT_FLAG_DEFAULT_PWD
+        && UI_get0_user_data(ui)) {
+        switch (UI_get_string_type(uis)) {
+        case UIT_PROMPT:
+        case UIT_VERIFY:
+            {
+                const char *password =
+                    ((PW_CB_DATA *)UI_get0_user_data(ui))->password;
+                if (password && password[0] != '\0')
+                    return 1;
+            }
+        default:
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    return UI_method_get_writer(UI_OpenSSL())(ui, uis);
+}
+
+static int ui_close(UI *ui)
+{
+    return UI_method_get_closer(UI_OpenSSL())(ui);
+}
+
+int setup_ui_method(void)
+{
+    ui_method = UI_create_method("OpenSSL application user interface");
+    UI_method_set_opener(ui_method, ui_open);
+    UI_method_set_reader(ui_method, ui_read);
+    UI_method_set_writer(ui_method, ui_write);
+    UI_method_set_closer(ui_method, ui_close);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+void destroy_ui_method(void)
+{
+    if (ui_method) {
+        UI_destroy_method(ui_method);
+        ui_method = NULL;
+    }
+}
+#endif
+
+int password_callback(char *buf, int bufsiz, int verify, PW_CB_DATA *cb_tmp)
+{
+    int res = 0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_UI
+    UI *ui = NULL;
+#endif
+    PW_CB_DATA *cb_data = (PW_CB_DATA *)cb_tmp;
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_UI
+    if (cb_data != NULL && cb_data->password != NULL) {
+        res = strlen(cb_data->password);
+        if (res > bufsiz)
+            res = bufsiz;
+        memcpy(buf, cb_data->password, res);
+    }
+#else
+    ui = UI_new_method(ui_method);
+    if (ui) {
+        int ok = 0;
+        char *buff = NULL;
+        int ui_flags = 0;
+        const char *prompt_info = NULL;
+        char *prompt;
+
+        if (cb_data != NULL && cb_data->prompt_info != NULL)
+            prompt_info = cb_data->prompt_info;
+        prompt = UI_construct_prompt(ui, "pass phrase", prompt_info);
+        if (!prompt) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory\n");
+            UI_free(ui);
+            return 0;
+        }
+
+        ui_flags |= UI_INPUT_FLAG_DEFAULT_PWD;
+        UI_ctrl(ui, UI_CTRL_PRINT_ERRORS, 1, 0, 0);
+
+        /* We know that there is no previous user data to return to us */
+        (void)UI_add_user_data(ui, cb_data);
+
+        if (ok >= 0)
+            ok = UI_add_input_string(ui, prompt, ui_flags, buf,
+                                     PW_MIN_LENGTH, bufsiz - 1);
+        if (ok >= 0 && verify) {
+            buff = app_malloc(bufsiz, "password buffer");
+            ok = UI_add_verify_string(ui, prompt, ui_flags, buff,
+                                      PW_MIN_LENGTH, bufsiz - 1, buf);
+        }
+        if (ok >= 0)
+            do {
+                ok = UI_process(ui);
+            }
+            while (ok < 0 && UI_ctrl(ui, UI_CTRL_IS_REDOABLE, 0, 0, 0));
+
+        OPENSSL_clear_free(buff, (unsigned int)bufsiz);
+
+        if (ok >= 0)
+            res = strlen(buf);
+        if (ok == -1) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "User interface error\n");
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, (unsigned int)bufsiz);
+            res = 0;
+        }
+        if (ok == -2) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "aborted!\n");
+            OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, (unsigned int)bufsiz);
+            res = 0;
+        }
+        UI_free(ui);
+        OPENSSL_free(prompt);
+    }
+#endif
+    return res;
+}
+
+static char *app_get_pass(const char *arg, int keepbio);
+
+int app_passwd(const char *arg1, const char *arg2, char **pass1, char **pass2)
+{
+    int same;
+    if (!arg2 || !arg1 || strcmp(arg1, arg2))
+        same = 0;
+    else
+        same = 1;
+    if (arg1) {
+        *pass1 = app_get_pass(arg1, same);
+        if (!*pass1)
+            return 0;
+    } else if (pass1)
+        *pass1 = NULL;
+    if (arg2) {
+        *pass2 = app_get_pass(arg2, same ? 2 : 0);
+        if (!*pass2)
+            return 0;
+    } else if (pass2)
+        *pass2 = NULL;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static char *app_get_pass(const char *arg, int keepbio)
+{
+    char *tmp, tpass[APP_PASS_LEN];
+    static BIO *pwdbio = NULL;
+    int i;
+
+    if (strncmp(arg, "pass:", 5) == 0)
+        return OPENSSL_strdup(arg + 5);
+    if (strncmp(arg, "env:", 4) == 0) {
+        tmp = getenv(arg + 4);
+        if (!tmp) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't read environment variable %s\n", arg + 4);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+        return OPENSSL_strdup(tmp);
+    }
+    if (!keepbio || !pwdbio) {
+        if (strncmp(arg, "file:", 5) == 0) {
+            pwdbio = BIO_new_file(arg + 5, "r");
+            if (!pwdbio) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't open file %s\n", arg + 5);
+                return NULL;
+            }
+#if !defined(_WIN32)
+            /*
+             * Under _WIN32, which covers even Win64 and CE, file
+             * descriptors referenced by BIO_s_fd are not inherited
+             * by child process and therefore below is not an option.
+             * It could have been an option if bss_fd.c was operating
+             * on real Windows descriptors, such as those obtained
+             * with CreateFile.
+             */
+        } else if (strncmp(arg, "fd:", 3) == 0) {
+            BIO *btmp;
+            i = atoi(arg + 3);
+            if (i >= 0)
+                pwdbio = BIO_new_fd(i, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+            if ((i < 0) || !pwdbio) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't access file descriptor %s\n", arg + 3);
+                return NULL;
+            }
+            /*
+             * Can't do BIO_gets on an fd BIO so add a buffering BIO
+             */
+            btmp = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer());
+            pwdbio = BIO_push(btmp, pwdbio);
+#endif
+        } else if (strcmp(arg, "stdin") == 0) {
+            pwdbio = dup_bio_in(FORMAT_TEXT);
+            if (!pwdbio) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't open BIO for stdin\n");
+                return NULL;
+            }
+        } else {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Invalid password argument \"%s\"\n", arg);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+    }
+    i = BIO_gets(pwdbio, tpass, APP_PASS_LEN);
+    if (keepbio != 1) {
+        BIO_free_all(pwdbio);
+        pwdbio = NULL;
+    }
+    if (i <= 0) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error reading password from BIO\n");
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    tmp = strchr(tpass, '\n');
+    if (tmp)
+        *tmp = 0;
+    return OPENSSL_strdup(tpass);
+}
+
+static CONF *app_load_config_(BIO *in, const char *filename)
+{
+    long errorline = -1;
+    CONF *conf;
+    int i;
+
+    conf = NCONF_new(NULL);
+    i = NCONF_load_bio(conf, in, &errorline);
+    if (i > 0)
+        return conf;
+
+    if (errorline <= 0)
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Can't load config file \"%s\"\n",
+                   opt_getprog(), filename);
+    else
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Error on line %ld of config file \"%s\"\n",
+                   opt_getprog(), errorline, filename);
+    NCONF_free(conf);
+    return NULL;
+}
+CONF *app_load_config(const char *filename)
+{
+    BIO *in;
+    CONF *conf;
+
+    in = bio_open_default(filename, 'r', FORMAT_TEXT);
+    if (in == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+
+    conf = app_load_config_(in, filename);
+    BIO_free(in);
+    return conf;
+}
+CONF *app_load_config_quiet(const char *filename)
+{
+    BIO *in;
+    CONF *conf;
+
+    in = bio_open_default_quiet(filename, 'r', FORMAT_TEXT);
+    if (in == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+
+    conf = app_load_config_(in, filename);
+    BIO_free(in);
+    return conf;
+}
+
+int app_load_modules(const CONF *config)
+{
+    CONF *to_free = NULL;
+
+    if (config == NULL)
+        config = to_free = app_load_config_quiet(default_config_file);
+    if (config == NULL)
+        return 1;
+
+    if (CONF_modules_load(config, NULL, 0) <= 0) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error configuring OpenSSL modules\n");
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        NCONF_free(to_free);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    NCONF_free(to_free);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int add_oid_section(CONF *conf)
+{
+    char *p;
+    STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *sktmp;
+    CONF_VALUE *cnf;
+    int i;
+
+    if ((p = NCONF_get_string(conf, NULL, "oid_section")) == NULL) {
+        ERR_clear_error();
+        return 1;
+    }
+    if ((sktmp = NCONF_get_section(conf, p)) == NULL) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "problem loading oid section %s\n", p);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(sktmp); i++) {
+        cnf = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(sktmp, i);
+        if (OBJ_create(cnf->value, cnf->name, cnf->name) == NID_undef) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "problem creating object %s=%s\n",
+                       cnf->name, cnf->value);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int load_pkcs12(BIO *in, const char *desc,
+                       pem_password_cb *pem_cb, void *cb_data,
+                       EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert, STACK_OF(X509) **ca)
+{
+    const char *pass;
+    char tpass[PEM_BUFSIZE];
+    int len, ret = 0;
+    PKCS12 *p12;
+    p12 = d2i_PKCS12_bio(in, NULL);
+    if (p12 == NULL) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error loading PKCS12 file for %s\n", desc);
+        goto die;
+    }
+    /* See if an empty password will do */
+    if (PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, "", 0) || PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, NULL, 0))
+        pass = "";
+    else {
+        if (!pem_cb)
+            pem_cb = (pem_password_cb *)password_callback;
+        len = pem_cb(tpass, PEM_BUFSIZE, 0, cb_data);
+        if (len < 0) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Passphrase callback error for %s\n", desc);
+            goto die;
+        }
+        if (len < PEM_BUFSIZE)
+            tpass[len] = 0;
+        if (!PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, tpass, len)) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                       "Mac verify error (wrong password?) in PKCS12 file for %s\n",
+                       desc);
+            goto die;
+        }
+        pass = tpass;
+    }
+    ret = PKCS12_parse(p12, pass, pkey, cert, ca);
+ die:
+    PKCS12_free(p12);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_OCSP) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SOCK)
+static int load_cert_crl_http(const char *url, X509 **pcert, X509_CRL **pcrl)
+{
+    char *host = NULL, *port = NULL, *path = NULL;
+    BIO *bio = NULL;
+    OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx = NULL;
+    int use_ssl, rv = 0;
+    if (!OCSP_parse_url(url, &host, &port, &path, &use_ssl))
+        goto err;
+    if (use_ssl) {
+        BIO_puts(bio_err, "https not supported\n");
+        goto err;
+    }
+    bio = BIO_new_connect(host);
+    if (!bio || !BIO_set_conn_port(bio, port))
+        goto err;
+    rctx = OCSP_REQ_CTX_new(bio, 1024);
+    if (rctx == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (!OCSP_REQ_CTX_http(rctx, "GET", path))
+        goto err;
+    if (!OCSP_REQ_CTX_add1_header(rctx, "Host", host))
+        goto err;
+    if (pcert) {
+        do {
+            rv = X509_http_nbio(rctx, pcert);
+        } while (rv == -1);
+    } else {
+        do {
+            rv = X509_CRL_http_nbio(rctx, pcrl);
+        } while (rv == -1);
+    }
+
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_free(host);
+    OPENSSL_free(path);
+    OPENSSL_free(port);
+    if (bio)
+        BIO_free_all(bio);
+    OCSP_REQ_CTX_free(rctx);
+    if (rv != 1) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error loading %s from %s\n",
+                   pcert ? "certificate" : "CRL", url);
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+    }
+    return rv;
+}
+#endif
+
+X509 *load_cert(const char *file, int format, const char *cert_descrip)
+{
+    X509 *x = NULL;
+    BIO *cert;
+
+    if (format == FORMAT_HTTP) {
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_OCSP) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SOCK)
+        load_cert_crl_http(file, &x, NULL);
+#endif
+        return x;
+    }
+
+    if (file == NULL) {
+        unbuffer(stdin);
+        cert = dup_bio_in(format);
+    } else
+        cert = bio_open_default(file, 'r', format);
+    if (cert == NULL)
+        goto end;
+
+    if (format == FORMAT_ASN1)
+        x = d2i_X509_bio(cert, NULL);
+    else if (format == FORMAT_PEM)
+        x = PEM_read_bio_X509_AUX(cert, NULL,
+                                  (pem_password_cb *)password_callback, NULL);
+    else if (format == FORMAT_PKCS12) {
+        if (!load_pkcs12(cert, cert_descrip, NULL, NULL, NULL, &x, NULL))
+            goto end;
+    } else {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "bad input format specified for %s\n", cert_descrip);
+        goto end;
+    }
+ end:
+    if (x == NULL) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to load certificate\n");
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+    }
+    BIO_free(cert);
+    return (x);
+}
+
+X509_CRL *load_crl(const char *infile, int format)
+{
+    X509_CRL *x = NULL;
+    BIO *in = NULL;
+
+    if (format == FORMAT_HTTP) {
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_OCSP) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SOCK)
+        load_cert_crl_http(infile, NULL, &x);
+#endif
+        return x;
+    }
+
+    in = bio_open_default(infile, 'r', format);
+    if (in == NULL)
+        goto end;
+    if (format == FORMAT_ASN1)
+        x = d2i_X509_CRL_bio(in, NULL);
+    else if (format == FORMAT_PEM)
+        x = PEM_read_bio_X509_CRL(in, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+    else {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "bad input format specified for input crl\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+    if (x == NULL) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to load CRL\n");
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+ end:
+    BIO_free(in);
+    return (x);
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY *load_key(const char *file, int format, int maybe_stdin,
+                   const char *pass, ENGINE *e, const char *key_descrip)
+{
+    BIO *key = NULL;
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+    PW_CB_DATA cb_data;
+
+    cb_data.password = pass;
+    cb_data.prompt_info = file;
+
+    if (file == NULL && (!maybe_stdin || format == FORMAT_ENGINE)) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "no keyfile specified\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+    if (format == FORMAT_ENGINE) {
+        if (e == NULL)
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "no engine specified\n");
+        else {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+            if (ENGINE_init(e)) {
+                pkey = ENGINE_load_private_key(e, file, ui_method, &cb_data);
+                ENGINE_finish(e);
+            }
+            if (pkey == NULL) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "cannot load %s from engine\n", key_descrip);
+                ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            }
+#else
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "engines not supported\n");
+#endif
+        }
+        goto end;
+    }
+    if (file == NULL && maybe_stdin) {
+        unbuffer(stdin);
+        key = dup_bio_in(format);
+    } else
+        key = bio_open_default(file, 'r', format);
+    if (key == NULL)
+        goto end;
+    if (format == FORMAT_ASN1) {
+        pkey = d2i_PrivateKey_bio(key, NULL);
+    } else if (format == FORMAT_PEM) {
+        pkey = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(key, NULL,
+                                       (pem_password_cb *)password_callback,
+                                       &cb_data);
+    }
+    else if (format == FORMAT_PKCS12) {
+        if (!load_pkcs12(key, key_descrip,
+                         (pem_password_cb *)password_callback, &cb_data,
+                         &pkey, NULL, NULL))
+            goto end;
+    }
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) && !defined (OPENSSL_NO_RC4)
+    else if (format == FORMAT_MSBLOB)
+        pkey = b2i_PrivateKey_bio(key);
+    else if (format == FORMAT_PVK)
+        pkey = b2i_PVK_bio(key, (pem_password_cb *)password_callback,
+                           &cb_data);
+#endif
+    else {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "bad input format specified for key file\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+ end:
+    BIO_free(key);
+    if (pkey == NULL) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to load %s\n", key_descrip);
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+    }
+    return (pkey);
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY *load_pubkey(const char *file, int format, int maybe_stdin,
+                      const char *pass, ENGINE *e, const char *key_descrip)
+{
+    BIO *key = NULL;
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+    PW_CB_DATA cb_data;
+
+    cb_data.password = pass;
+    cb_data.prompt_info = file;
+
+    if (file == NULL && (!maybe_stdin || format == FORMAT_ENGINE)) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "no keyfile specified\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+    if (format == FORMAT_ENGINE) {
+        if (e == NULL)
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "no engine specified\n");
+        else {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+            pkey = ENGINE_load_public_key(e, file, ui_method, &cb_data);
+            if (pkey == NULL) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "cannot load %s from engine\n", key_descrip);
+                ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            }
+#else
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "engines not supported\n");
+#endif
+        }
+        goto end;
+    }
+    if (file == NULL && maybe_stdin) {
+        unbuffer(stdin);
+        key = dup_bio_in(format);
+    } else
+        key = bio_open_default(file, 'r', format);
+    if (key == NULL)
+        goto end;
+    if (format == FORMAT_ASN1) {
+        pkey = d2i_PUBKEY_bio(key, NULL);
+    }
+    else if (format == FORMAT_ASN1RSA) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+        RSA *rsa;
+        rsa = d2i_RSAPublicKey_bio(key, NULL);
+        if (rsa) {
+            pkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
+            if (pkey != NULL)
+                EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, rsa);
+            RSA_free(rsa);
+        } else
+#else
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "RSA keys not supported\n");
+#endif
+            pkey = NULL;
+    } else if (format == FORMAT_PEMRSA) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+        RSA *rsa;
+        rsa = PEM_read_bio_RSAPublicKey(key, NULL,
+                                        (pem_password_cb *)password_callback,
+                                        &cb_data);
+        if (rsa != NULL) {
+            pkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
+            if (pkey != NULL)
+                EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, rsa);
+            RSA_free(rsa);
+        } else
+#else
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "RSA keys not supported\n");
+#endif
+            pkey = NULL;
+    }
+    else if (format == FORMAT_PEM) {
+        pkey = PEM_read_bio_PUBKEY(key, NULL,
+                                   (pem_password_cb *)password_callback,
+                                   &cb_data);
+    }
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
+    else if (format == FORMAT_MSBLOB)
+        pkey = b2i_PublicKey_bio(key);
+#endif
+ end:
+    BIO_free(key);
+    if (pkey == NULL)
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to load %s\n", key_descrip);
+    return (pkey);
+}
+
+static int load_certs_crls(const char *file, int format,
+                           const char *pass, const char *desc,
+                           STACK_OF(X509) **pcerts,
+                           STACK_OF(X509_CRL) **pcrls)
+{
+    int i;
+    BIO *bio;
+    STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *xis = NULL;
+    X509_INFO *xi;
+    PW_CB_DATA cb_data;
+    int rv = 0;
+
+    cb_data.password = pass;
+    cb_data.prompt_info = file;
+
+    if (format != FORMAT_PEM) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "bad input format specified for %s\n", desc);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    bio = bio_open_default(file, 'r', FORMAT_PEM);
+    if (bio == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    xis = PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(bio, NULL,
+                                 (pem_password_cb *)password_callback,
+                                 &cb_data);
+
+    BIO_free(bio);
+
+    if (pcerts && *pcerts == NULL) {
+        *pcerts = sk_X509_new_null();
+        if (!*pcerts)
+            goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (pcrls && *pcrls == NULL) {
+        *pcrls = sk_X509_CRL_new_null();
+        if (!*pcrls)
+            goto end;
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_INFO_num(xis); i++) {
+        xi = sk_X509_INFO_value(xis, i);
+        if (xi->x509 && pcerts) {
+            if (!sk_X509_push(*pcerts, xi->x509))
+                goto end;
+            xi->x509 = NULL;
+        }
+        if (xi->crl && pcrls) {
+            if (!sk_X509_CRL_push(*pcrls, xi->crl))
+                goto end;
+            xi->crl = NULL;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (pcerts && sk_X509_num(*pcerts) > 0)
+        rv = 1;
+
+    if (pcrls && sk_X509_CRL_num(*pcrls) > 0)
+        rv = 1;
+
+ end:
+
+    sk_X509_INFO_pop_free(xis, X509_INFO_free);
+
+    if (rv == 0) {
+        if (pcerts) {
+            sk_X509_pop_free(*pcerts, X509_free);
+            *pcerts = NULL;
+        }
+        if (pcrls) {
+            sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(*pcrls, X509_CRL_free);
+            *pcrls = NULL;
+        }
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to load %s\n",
+                   pcerts ? "certificates" : "CRLs");
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+    }
+    return rv;
+}
+
+void* app_malloc(int sz, const char *what)
+{
+    void *vp = OPENSSL_malloc(sz);
+
+    if (vp == NULL) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Could not allocate %d bytes for %s\n",
+                opt_getprog(), sz, what);
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        exit(1);
+    }
+    return vp;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initialize or extend, if *certs != NULL, a certificate stack.
+ */
+int load_certs(const char *file, STACK_OF(X509) **certs, int format,
+               const char *pass, const char *desc)
+{
+    return load_certs_crls(file, format, pass, desc, certs, NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initialize or extend, if *crls != NULL, a certificate stack.
+ */
+int load_crls(const char *file, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) **crls, int format,
+              const char *pass, const char *desc)
+{
+    return load_certs_crls(file, format, pass, desc, NULL, crls);
+}
+
+#define X509V3_EXT_UNKNOWN_MASK         (0xfL << 16)
+/* Return error for unknown extensions */
+#define X509V3_EXT_DEFAULT              0
+/* Print error for unknown extensions */
+#define X509V3_EXT_ERROR_UNKNOWN        (1L << 16)
+/* ASN1 parse unknown extensions */
+#define X509V3_EXT_PARSE_UNKNOWN        (2L << 16)
+/* BIO_dump unknown extensions */
+#define X509V3_EXT_DUMP_UNKNOWN         (3L << 16)
+
+#define X509_FLAG_CA (X509_FLAG_NO_ISSUER | X509_FLAG_NO_PUBKEY | \
+                         X509_FLAG_NO_HEADER | X509_FLAG_NO_VERSION)
+
+int set_cert_ex(unsigned long *flags, const char *arg)
+{
+    static const NAME_EX_TBL cert_tbl[] = {
+        {"compatible", X509_FLAG_COMPAT, 0xffffffffl},
+        {"ca_default", X509_FLAG_CA, 0xffffffffl},
+        {"no_header", X509_FLAG_NO_HEADER, 0},
+        {"no_version", X509_FLAG_NO_VERSION, 0},
+        {"no_serial", X509_FLAG_NO_SERIAL, 0},
+        {"no_signame", X509_FLAG_NO_SIGNAME, 0},
+        {"no_validity", X509_FLAG_NO_VALIDITY, 0},
+        {"no_subject", X509_FLAG_NO_SUBJECT, 0},
+        {"no_issuer", X509_FLAG_NO_ISSUER, 0},
+        {"no_pubkey", X509_FLAG_NO_PUBKEY, 0},
+        {"no_extensions", X509_FLAG_NO_EXTENSIONS, 0},
+        {"no_sigdump", X509_FLAG_NO_SIGDUMP, 0},
+        {"no_aux", X509_FLAG_NO_AUX, 0},
+        {"no_attributes", X509_FLAG_NO_ATTRIBUTES, 0},
+        {"ext_default", X509V3_EXT_DEFAULT, X509V3_EXT_UNKNOWN_MASK},
+        {"ext_error", X509V3_EXT_ERROR_UNKNOWN, X509V3_EXT_UNKNOWN_MASK},
+        {"ext_parse", X509V3_EXT_PARSE_UNKNOWN, X509V3_EXT_UNKNOWN_MASK},
+        {"ext_dump", X509V3_EXT_DUMP_UNKNOWN, X509V3_EXT_UNKNOWN_MASK},
+        {NULL, 0, 0}
+    };
+    return set_multi_opts(flags, arg, cert_tbl);
+}
+
+int set_name_ex(unsigned long *flags, const char *arg)
+{
+    static const NAME_EX_TBL ex_tbl[] = {
+        {"esc_2253", ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_2253, 0},
+        {"esc_2254", ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_2254, 0},
+        {"esc_ctrl", ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_CTRL, 0},
+        {"esc_msb", ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_MSB, 0},
+        {"use_quote", ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_QUOTE, 0},
+        {"utf8", ASN1_STRFLGS_UTF8_CONVERT, 0},
+        {"ignore_type", ASN1_STRFLGS_IGNORE_TYPE, 0},
+        {"show_type", ASN1_STRFLGS_SHOW_TYPE, 0},
+        {"dump_all", ASN1_STRFLGS_DUMP_ALL, 0},
+        {"dump_nostr", ASN1_STRFLGS_DUMP_UNKNOWN, 0},
+        {"dump_der", ASN1_STRFLGS_DUMP_DER, 0},
+        {"compat", XN_FLAG_COMPAT, 0xffffffffL},
+        {"sep_comma_plus", XN_FLAG_SEP_COMMA_PLUS, XN_FLAG_SEP_MASK},
+        {"sep_comma_plus_space", XN_FLAG_SEP_CPLUS_SPC, XN_FLAG_SEP_MASK},
+        {"sep_semi_plus_space", XN_FLAG_SEP_SPLUS_SPC, XN_FLAG_SEP_MASK},
+        {"sep_multiline", XN_FLAG_SEP_MULTILINE, XN_FLAG_SEP_MASK},
+        {"dn_rev", XN_FLAG_DN_REV, 0},
+        {"nofname", XN_FLAG_FN_NONE, XN_FLAG_FN_MASK},
+        {"sname", XN_FLAG_FN_SN, XN_FLAG_FN_MASK},
+        {"lname", XN_FLAG_FN_LN, XN_FLAG_FN_MASK},
+        {"align", XN_FLAG_FN_ALIGN, 0},
+        {"oid", XN_FLAG_FN_OID, XN_FLAG_FN_MASK},
+        {"space_eq", XN_FLAG_SPC_EQ, 0},
+        {"dump_unknown", XN_FLAG_DUMP_UNKNOWN_FIELDS, 0},
+        {"RFC2253", XN_FLAG_RFC2253, 0xffffffffL},
+        {"oneline", XN_FLAG_ONELINE, 0xffffffffL},
+        {"multiline", XN_FLAG_MULTILINE, 0xffffffffL},
+        {"ca_default", XN_FLAG_MULTILINE, 0xffffffffL},
+        {NULL, 0, 0}
+    };
+    if (set_multi_opts(flags, arg, ex_tbl) == 0)
+        return 0;
+    if ((*flags & XN_FLAG_SEP_MASK) == 0)
+        *flags |= XN_FLAG_SEP_CPLUS_SPC;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int set_ext_copy(int *copy_type, const char *arg)
+{
+    if (strcasecmp(arg, "none") == 0)
+        *copy_type = EXT_COPY_NONE;
+    else if (strcasecmp(arg, "copy") == 0)
+        *copy_type = EXT_COPY_ADD;
+    else if (strcasecmp(arg, "copyall") == 0)
+        *copy_type = EXT_COPY_ALL;
+    else
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int copy_extensions(X509 *x, X509_REQ *req, int copy_type)
+{
+    STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts = NULL;
+    X509_EXTENSION *ext, *tmpext;
+    ASN1_OBJECT *obj;
+    int i, idx, ret = 0;
+    if (!x || !req || (copy_type == EXT_COPY_NONE))
+        return 1;
+    exts = X509_REQ_get_extensions(req);
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts); i++) {
+        ext = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(exts, i);
+        obj = X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ext);
+        idx = X509_get_ext_by_OBJ(x, obj, -1);
+        /* Does extension exist? */
+        if (idx != -1) {
+            /* If normal copy don't override existing extension */
+            if (copy_type == EXT_COPY_ADD)
+                continue;
+            /* Delete all extensions of same type */
+            do {
+                tmpext = X509_get_ext(x, idx);
+                X509_delete_ext(x, idx);
+                X509_EXTENSION_free(tmpext);
+                idx = X509_get_ext_by_OBJ(x, obj, -1);
+            } while (idx != -1);
+        }
+        if (!X509_add_ext(x, ext, -1))
+            goto end;
+    }
+
+    ret = 1;
+
+ end:
+
+    sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(exts, X509_EXTENSION_free);
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int set_multi_opts(unsigned long *flags, const char *arg,
+                          const NAME_EX_TBL * in_tbl)
+{
+    STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *vals;
+    CONF_VALUE *val;
+    int i, ret = 1;
+    if (!arg)
+        return 0;
+    vals = X509V3_parse_list(arg);
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(vals); i++) {
+        val = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(vals, i);
+        if (!set_table_opts(flags, val->name, in_tbl))
+            ret = 0;
+    }
+    sk_CONF_VALUE_pop_free(vals, X509V3_conf_free);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int set_table_opts(unsigned long *flags, const char *arg,
+                          const NAME_EX_TBL * in_tbl)
+{
+    char c;
+    const NAME_EX_TBL *ptbl;
+    c = arg[0];
+
+    if (c == '-') {
+        c = 0;
+        arg++;
+    } else if (c == '+') {
+        c = 1;
+        arg++;
+    } else
+        c = 1;
+
+    for (ptbl = in_tbl; ptbl->name; ptbl++) {
+        if (strcasecmp(arg, ptbl->name) == 0) {
+            *flags &= ~ptbl->mask;
+            if (c)
+                *flags |= ptbl->flag;
+            else
+                *flags &= ~ptbl->flag;
+            return 1;
+        }
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+void print_name(BIO *out, const char *title, X509_NAME *nm,
+                unsigned long lflags)
+{
+    char *buf;
+    char mline = 0;
+    int indent = 0;
+
+    if (title)
+        BIO_puts(out, title);
+    if ((lflags & XN_FLAG_SEP_MASK) == XN_FLAG_SEP_MULTILINE) {
+        mline = 1;
+        indent = 4;
+    }
+    if (lflags == XN_FLAG_COMPAT) {
+        buf = X509_NAME_oneline(nm, 0, 0);
+        BIO_puts(out, buf);
+        BIO_puts(out, "\n");
+        OPENSSL_free(buf);
+    } else {
+        if (mline)
+            BIO_puts(out, "\n");
+        X509_NAME_print_ex(out, nm, indent, lflags);
+        BIO_puts(out, "\n");
+    }
+}
+
+void print_bignum_var(BIO *out, const BIGNUM *in, const char *var,
+                      int len, unsigned char *buffer)
+{
+    BIO_printf(out, "    static unsigned char %s_%d[] = {", var, len);
+    if (BN_is_zero(in))
+        BIO_printf(out, "\n\t0x00");
+    else {
+        int i, l;
+
+        l = BN_bn2bin(in, buffer);
+        for (i = 0; i < l; i++) {
+            if ((i % 10) == 0)
+                BIO_printf(out, "\n\t");
+            if (i < l - 1)
+                BIO_printf(out, "0x%02X, ", buffer[i]);
+            else
+                BIO_printf(out, "0x%02X", buffer[i]);
+        }
+    }
+    BIO_printf(out, "\n    };\n");
+}
+void print_array(BIO *out, const char* title, int len, const unsigned char* d)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    BIO_printf(out, "unsigned char %s[%d] = {", title, len);
+    for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+        if ((i % 10) == 0)
+            BIO_printf(out, "\n    ");
+        if (i < len - 1)
+            BIO_printf(out, "0x%02X, ", d[i]);
+        else
+            BIO_printf(out, "0x%02X", d[i]);
+    }
+    BIO_printf(out, "\n};\n");
+}
+
+X509_STORE *setup_verify(const char *CAfile, const char *CApath, int noCAfile, int noCApath)
+{
+    X509_STORE *store = X509_STORE_new();
+    X509_LOOKUP *lookup;
+
+    if (store == NULL)
+        goto end;
+
+    if (CAfile != NULL || !noCAfile) {
+        lookup = X509_STORE_add_lookup(store, X509_LOOKUP_file());
+        if (lookup == NULL)
+            goto end;
+        if (CAfile) {
+            if (!X509_LOOKUP_load_file(lookup, CAfile, X509_FILETYPE_PEM)) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error loading file %s\n", CAfile);
+                goto end;
+            }
+        } else
+            X509_LOOKUP_load_file(lookup, NULL, X509_FILETYPE_DEFAULT);
+    }
+
+    if (CApath != NULL || !noCApath) {
+        lookup = X509_STORE_add_lookup(store, X509_LOOKUP_hash_dir());
+        if (lookup == NULL)
+            goto end;
+        if (CApath) {
+            if (!X509_LOOKUP_add_dir(lookup, CApath, X509_FILETYPE_PEM)) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error loading directory %s\n", CApath);
+                goto end;
+            }
+        } else
+            X509_LOOKUP_add_dir(lookup, NULL, X509_FILETYPE_DEFAULT);
+    }
+
+    ERR_clear_error();
+    return store;
+ end:
+    X509_STORE_free(store);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+/* Try to load an engine in a shareable library */
+static ENGINE *try_load_engine(const char *engine)
+{
+    ENGINE *e = ENGINE_by_id("dynamic");
+    if (e) {
+        if (!ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(e, "SO_PATH", engine, 0)
+            || !ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(e, "LOAD", NULL, 0)) {
+            ENGINE_free(e);
+            e = NULL;
+        }
+    }
+    return e;
+}
+#endif
+
+ENGINE *setup_engine(const char *engine, int debug)
+{
+    ENGINE *e = NULL;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    if (engine) {
+        if (strcmp(engine, "auto") == 0) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "enabling auto ENGINE support\n");
+            ENGINE_register_all_complete();
+            return NULL;
+        }
+        if ((e = ENGINE_by_id(engine)) == NULL
+            && (e = try_load_engine(engine)) == NULL) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "invalid engine \"%s\"\n", engine);
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+        if (debug) {
+            ENGINE_ctrl(e, ENGINE_CTRL_SET_LOGSTREAM, 0, bio_err, 0);
+        }
+        ENGINE_ctrl_cmd(e, "SET_USER_INTERFACE", 0, ui_method, 0, 1);
+        if (!ENGINE_set_default(e, ENGINE_METHOD_ALL)) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "can't use that engine\n");
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            ENGINE_free(e);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "engine \"%s\" set.\n", ENGINE_get_id(e));
+    }
+#endif
+    return e;
+}
+
+void release_engine(ENGINE *e)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    if (e != NULL)
+        /* Free our "structural" reference. */
+        ENGINE_free(e);
+#endif
+}
+
+static unsigned long index_serial_hash(const OPENSSL_CSTRING *a)
+{
+    const char *n;
+
+    n = a[DB_serial];
+    while (*n == '0')
+        n++;
+    return OPENSSL_LH_strhash(n);
+}
+
+static int index_serial_cmp(const OPENSSL_CSTRING *a,
+                            const OPENSSL_CSTRING *b)
+{
+    const char *aa, *bb;
+
+    for (aa = a[DB_serial]; *aa == '0'; aa++) ;
+    for (bb = b[DB_serial]; *bb == '0'; bb++) ;
+    return (strcmp(aa, bb));
+}
+
+static int index_name_qual(char **a)
+{
+    return (a[0][0] == 'V');
+}
+
+static unsigned long index_name_hash(const OPENSSL_CSTRING *a)
+{
+    return OPENSSL_LH_strhash(a[DB_name]);
+}
+
+int index_name_cmp(const OPENSSL_CSTRING *a, const OPENSSL_CSTRING *b)
+{
+    return (strcmp(a[DB_name], b[DB_name]));
+}
+
+static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_HASH_FN(index_serial, OPENSSL_CSTRING)
+static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_COMP_FN(index_serial, OPENSSL_CSTRING)
+static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_HASH_FN(index_name, OPENSSL_CSTRING)
+static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_COMP_FN(index_name, OPENSSL_CSTRING)
+#undef BSIZE
+#define BSIZE 256
+BIGNUM *load_serial(const char *serialfile, int create, ASN1_INTEGER **retai)
+{
+    BIO *in = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *ret = NULL;
+    char buf[1024];
+    ASN1_INTEGER *ai = NULL;
+
+    ai = ASN1_INTEGER_new();
+    if (ai == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    in = BIO_new_file(serialfile, "r");
+    if (in == NULL) {
+        if (!create) {
+            perror(serialfile);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        ERR_clear_error();
+        ret = BN_new();
+        if (ret == NULL || !rand_serial(ret, ai))
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory\n");
+    } else {
+        if (!a2i_ASN1_INTEGER(in, ai, buf, 1024)) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to load number from %s\n",
+                       serialfile);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        ret = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(ai, NULL);
+        if (ret == NULL) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                       "error converting number from bin to BIGNUM\n");
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (ret && retai) {
+        *retai = ai;
+        ai = NULL;
+    }
+ err:
+    BIO_free(in);
+    ASN1_INTEGER_free(ai);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+int save_serial(const char *serialfile, const char *suffix, const BIGNUM *serial,
+                ASN1_INTEGER **retai)
+{
+    char buf[1][BSIZE];
+    BIO *out = NULL;
+    int ret = 0;
+    ASN1_INTEGER *ai = NULL;
+    int j;
+
+    if (suffix == NULL)
+        j = strlen(serialfile);
+    else
+        j = strlen(serialfile) + strlen(suffix) + 1;
+    if (j >= BSIZE) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "file name too long\n");
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (suffix == NULL)
+        OPENSSL_strlcpy(buf[0], serialfile, BSIZE);
+    else {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+        j = BIO_snprintf(buf[0], sizeof(buf[0]), "%s.%s", serialfile, suffix);
+#else
+        j = BIO_snprintf(buf[0], sizeof(buf[0]), "%s-%s", serialfile, suffix);
+#endif
+    }
+    out = BIO_new_file(buf[0], "w");
+    if (out == NULL) {
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if ((ai = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(serial, NULL)) == NULL) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "error converting serial to ASN.1 format\n");
+        goto err;
+    }
+    i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(out, ai);
+    BIO_puts(out, "\n");
+    ret = 1;
+    if (retai) {
+        *retai = ai;
+        ai = NULL;
+    }
+ err:
+    BIO_free_all(out);
+    ASN1_INTEGER_free(ai);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+int rotate_serial(const char *serialfile, const char *new_suffix,
+                  const char *old_suffix)
+{
+    char buf[2][BSIZE];
+    int i, j;
+
+    i = strlen(serialfile) + strlen(old_suffix);
+    j = strlen(serialfile) + strlen(new_suffix);
+    if (i > j)
+        j = i;
+    if (j + 1 >= BSIZE) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "file name too long\n");
+        goto err;
+    }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+    j = BIO_snprintf(buf[0], sizeof(buf[0]), "%s.%s", serialfile, new_suffix);
+    j = BIO_snprintf(buf[1], sizeof(buf[1]), "%s.%s", serialfile, old_suffix);
+#else
+    j = BIO_snprintf(buf[0], sizeof(buf[0]), "%s-%s", serialfile, new_suffix);
+    j = BIO_snprintf(buf[1], sizeof(buf[1]), "%s-%s", serialfile, old_suffix);
+#endif
+    if (rename(serialfile, buf[1]) < 0 && errno != ENOENT
+#ifdef ENOTDIR
+        && errno != ENOTDIR
+#endif
+        ) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                   "unable to rename %s to %s\n", serialfile, buf[1]);
+        perror("reason");
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (rename(buf[0], serialfile) < 0) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                   "unable to rename %s to %s\n", buf[0], serialfile);
+        perror("reason");
+        rename(buf[1], serialfile);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    return 1;
+ err:
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int rand_serial(BIGNUM *b, ASN1_INTEGER *ai)
+{
+    BIGNUM *btmp;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    if (b)
+        btmp = b;
+    else
+        btmp = BN_new();
+
+    if (btmp == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    if (!BN_pseudo_rand(btmp, SERIAL_RAND_BITS, 0, 0))
+        goto error;
+    if (ai && !BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(btmp, ai))
+        goto error;
+
+    ret = 1;
+
+ error:
+
+    if (btmp != b)
+        BN_free(btmp);
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+CA_DB *load_index(const char *dbfile, DB_ATTR *db_attr)
+{
+    CA_DB *retdb = NULL;
+    TXT_DB *tmpdb = NULL;
+    BIO *in;
+    CONF *dbattr_conf = NULL;
+    char buf[BSIZE];
+
+    in = BIO_new_file(dbfile, "r");
+    if (in == NULL) {
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if ((tmpdb = TXT_DB_read(in, DB_NUMBER)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+    BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s.attr", dbfile);
+#else
+    BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s-attr", dbfile);
+#endif
+    dbattr_conf = app_load_config(buf);
+
+    retdb = app_malloc(sizeof(*retdb), "new DB");
+    retdb->db = tmpdb;
+    tmpdb = NULL;
+    if (db_attr)
+        retdb->attributes = *db_attr;
+    else {
+        retdb->attributes.unique_subject = 1;
+    }
+
+    if (dbattr_conf) {
+        char *p = NCONF_get_string(dbattr_conf, NULL, "unique_subject");
+        if (p) {
+            retdb->attributes.unique_subject = parse_yesno(p, 1);
+        }
+    }
+
+ err:
+    NCONF_free(dbattr_conf);
+    TXT_DB_free(tmpdb);
+    BIO_free_all(in);
+    return retdb;
+}
+
+int index_index(CA_DB *db)
+{
+    if (!TXT_DB_create_index(db->db, DB_serial, NULL,
+                             LHASH_HASH_FN(index_serial),
+                             LHASH_COMP_FN(index_serial))) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                   "error creating serial number index:(%ld,%ld,%ld)\n",
+                   db->db->error, db->db->arg1, db->db->arg2);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (db->attributes.unique_subject
+        && !TXT_DB_create_index(db->db, DB_name, index_name_qual,
+                                LHASH_HASH_FN(index_name),
+                                LHASH_COMP_FN(index_name))) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "error creating name index:(%ld,%ld,%ld)\n",
+                   db->db->error, db->db->arg1, db->db->arg2);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int save_index(const char *dbfile, const char *suffix, CA_DB *db)
+{
+    char buf[3][BSIZE];
+    BIO *out;
+    int j;
+
+    j = strlen(dbfile) + strlen(suffix);
+    if (j + 6 >= BSIZE) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "file name too long\n");
+        goto err;
+    }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+    j = BIO_snprintf(buf[2], sizeof(buf[2]), "%s.attr", dbfile);
+    j = BIO_snprintf(buf[1], sizeof(buf[1]), "%s.attr.%s", dbfile, suffix);
+    j = BIO_snprintf(buf[0], sizeof(buf[0]), "%s.%s", dbfile, suffix);
+#else
+    j = BIO_snprintf(buf[2], sizeof(buf[2]), "%s-attr", dbfile);
+    j = BIO_snprintf(buf[1], sizeof(buf[1]), "%s-attr-%s", dbfile, suffix);
+    j = BIO_snprintf(buf[0], sizeof(buf[0]), "%s-%s", dbfile, suffix);
+#endif
+    out = BIO_new_file(buf[0], "w");
+    if (out == NULL) {
+        perror(dbfile);
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to open '%s'\n", dbfile);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    j = TXT_DB_write(out, db->db);
+    BIO_free(out);
+    if (j <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    out = BIO_new_file(buf[1], "w");
+    if (out == NULL) {
+        perror(buf[2]);
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to open '%s'\n", buf[2]);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    BIO_printf(out, "unique_subject = %s\n",
+               db->attributes.unique_subject ? "yes" : "no");
+    BIO_free(out);
+
+    return 1;
+ err:
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int rotate_index(const char *dbfile, const char *new_suffix,
+                 const char *old_suffix)
+{
+    char buf[5][BSIZE];
+    int i, j;
+
+    i = strlen(dbfile) + strlen(old_suffix);
+    j = strlen(dbfile) + strlen(new_suffix);
+    if (i > j)
+        j = i;
+    if (j + 6 >= BSIZE) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "file name too long\n");
+        goto err;
+    }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+    j = BIO_snprintf(buf[4], sizeof(buf[4]), "%s.attr", dbfile);
+    j = BIO_snprintf(buf[3], sizeof(buf[3]), "%s.attr.%s", dbfile, old_suffix);
+    j = BIO_snprintf(buf[2], sizeof(buf[2]), "%s.attr.%s", dbfile, new_suffix);
+    j = BIO_snprintf(buf[1], sizeof(buf[1]), "%s.%s", dbfile, old_suffix);
+    j = BIO_snprintf(buf[0], sizeof(buf[0]), "%s.%s", dbfile, new_suffix);
+#else
+    j = BIO_snprintf(buf[4], sizeof(buf[4]), "%s-attr", dbfile);
+    j = BIO_snprintf(buf[3], sizeof(buf[3]), "%s-attr-%s", dbfile, old_suffix);
+    j = BIO_snprintf(buf[2], sizeof(buf[2]), "%s-attr-%s", dbfile, new_suffix);
+    j = BIO_snprintf(buf[1], sizeof(buf[1]), "%s-%s", dbfile, old_suffix);
+    j = BIO_snprintf(buf[0], sizeof(buf[0]), "%s-%s", dbfile, new_suffix);
+#endif
+    if (rename(dbfile, buf[1]) < 0 && errno != ENOENT
+#ifdef ENOTDIR
+        && errno != ENOTDIR
+#endif
+        ) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to rename %s to %s\n", dbfile, buf[1]);
+        perror("reason");
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (rename(buf[0], dbfile) < 0) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to rename %s to %s\n", buf[0], dbfile);
+        perror("reason");
+        rename(buf[1], dbfile);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (rename(buf[4], buf[3]) < 0 && errno != ENOENT
+#ifdef ENOTDIR
+        && errno != ENOTDIR
+#endif
+        ) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to rename %s to %s\n", buf[4], buf[3]);
+        perror("reason");
+        rename(dbfile, buf[0]);
+        rename(buf[1], dbfile);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (rename(buf[2], buf[4]) < 0) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to rename %s to %s\n", buf[2], buf[4]);
+        perror("reason");
+        rename(buf[3], buf[4]);
+        rename(dbfile, buf[0]);
+        rename(buf[1], dbfile);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    return 1;
+ err:
+    return 0;
+}
+
+void free_index(CA_DB *db)
+{
+    if (db) {
+        TXT_DB_free(db->db);
+        OPENSSL_free(db);
+    }
+}
+
+int parse_yesno(const char *str, int def)
+{
+    if (str) {
+        switch (*str) {
+        case 'f':              /* false */
+        case 'F':              /* FALSE */
+        case 'n':              /* no */
+        case 'N':              /* NO */
+        case '0':              /* 0 */
+            return 0;
+        case 't':              /* true */
+        case 'T':              /* TRUE */
+        case 'y':              /* yes */
+        case 'Y':              /* YES */
+        case '1':              /* 1 */
+            return 1;
+        }
+    }
+    return def;
+}
+
+/*
+ * name is expected to be in the format /type0=value0/type1=value1/type2=...
+ * where characters may be escaped by \
+ */
+X509_NAME *parse_name(const char *cp, long chtype, int canmulti)
+{
+    int nextismulti = 0;
+    char *work;
+    X509_NAME *n;
+
+    if (*cp++ != '/')
+        return NULL;
+
+    n = X509_NAME_new();
+    if (n == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    work = OPENSSL_strdup(cp);
+    if (work == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    while (*cp) {
+        char *bp = work;
+        char *typestr = bp;
+        unsigned char *valstr;
+        int nid;
+        int ismulti = nextismulti;
+        nextismulti = 0;
+
+        /* Collect the type */
+        while (*cp && *cp != '=')
+            *bp++ = *cp++;
+        if (*cp == '\0') {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                    "%s: Hit end of string before finding the equals.\n",
+                    opt_getprog());
+            goto err;
+        }
+        *bp++ = '\0';
+        ++cp;
+
+        /* Collect the value. */
+        valstr = (unsigned char *)bp;
+        for (; *cp && *cp != '/'; *bp++ = *cp++) {
+            if (canmulti && *cp == '+') {
+                nextismulti = 1;
+                break;
+            }
+            if (*cp == '\\' && *++cp == '\0') {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                        "%s: escape character at end of string\n",
+                        opt_getprog());
+                goto err;
+            }
+        }
+        *bp++ = '\0';
+
+        /* If not at EOS (must be + or /), move forward. */
+        if (*cp)
+            ++cp;
+
+        /* Parse */
+        nid = OBJ_txt2nid(typestr);
+        if (nid == NID_undef) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Skipping unknown attribute \"%s\"\n",
+                      opt_getprog(), typestr);
+            continue;
+        }
+        if (!X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID(n, nid, chtype,
+                                        valstr, strlen((char *)valstr),
+                                        -1, ismulti ? -1 : 0))
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    OPENSSL_free(work);
+    return n;
+
+ err:
+    X509_NAME_free(n);
+    OPENSSL_free(work);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read whole contents of a BIO into an allocated memory buffer and return
+ * it.
+ */
+
+int bio_to_mem(unsigned char **out, int maxlen, BIO *in)
+{
+    BIO *mem;
+    int len, ret;
+    unsigned char tbuf[1024];
+
+    mem = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+    if (mem == NULL)
+        return -1;
+    for (;;) {
+        if ((maxlen != -1) && maxlen < 1024)
+            len = maxlen;
+        else
+            len = 1024;
+        len = BIO_read(in, tbuf, len);
+        if (len < 0) {
+            BIO_free(mem);
+            return -1;
+        }
+        if (len == 0)
+            break;
+        if (BIO_write(mem, tbuf, len) != len) {
+            BIO_free(mem);
+            return -1;
+        }
+        maxlen -= len;
+
+        if (maxlen == 0)
+            break;
+    }
+    ret = BIO_get_mem_data(mem, (char **)out);
+    BIO_set_flags(mem, BIO_FLAGS_MEM_RDONLY);
+    BIO_free(mem);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int pkey_ctrl_string(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const char *value)
+{
+    int rv;
+    char *stmp, *vtmp = NULL;
+    stmp = OPENSSL_strdup(value);
+    if (!stmp)
+        return -1;
+    vtmp = strchr(stmp, ':');
+    if (vtmp) {
+        *vtmp = 0;
+        vtmp++;
+    }
+    rv = EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl_str(ctx, stmp, vtmp);
+    OPENSSL_free(stmp);
+    return rv;
+}
+
+static void nodes_print(const char *name, STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *nodes)
+{
+    X509_POLICY_NODE *node;
+    int i;
+
+    BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s Policies:", name);
+    if (nodes) {
+        BIO_puts(bio_err, "\n");
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(nodes); i++) {
+            node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(nodes, i);
+            X509_POLICY_NODE_print(bio_err, node, 2);
+        }
+    } else
+        BIO_puts(bio_err, " <empty>\n");
+}
+
+void policies_print(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    X509_POLICY_TREE *tree;
+    int explicit_policy;
+    tree = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(ctx);
+    explicit_policy = X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(ctx);
+
+    BIO_printf(bio_err, "Require explicit Policy: %s\n",
+               explicit_policy ? "True" : "False");
+
+    nodes_print("Authority", X509_policy_tree_get0_policies(tree));
+    nodes_print("User", X509_policy_tree_get0_user_policies(tree));
+}
+
+/*-
+ * next_protos_parse parses a comma separated list of strings into a string
+ * in a format suitable for passing to SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised.
+ *   outlen: (output) set to the length of the resulting buffer on success.
+ *   err: (maybe NULL) on failure, an error message line is written to this BIO.
+ *   in: a NUL terminated string like "abc,def,ghi"
+ *
+ *   returns: a malloc'd buffer or NULL on failure.
+ */
+unsigned char *next_protos_parse(size_t *outlen, const char *in)
+{
+    size_t len;
+    unsigned char *out;
+    size_t i, start = 0;
+
+    len = strlen(in);
+    if (len >= 65535)
+        return NULL;
+
+    out = app_malloc(strlen(in) + 1, "NPN buffer");
+    for (i = 0; i <= len; ++i) {
+        if (i == len || in[i] == ',') {
+            if (i - start > 255) {
+                OPENSSL_free(out);
+                return NULL;
+            }
+            out[start] = i - start;
+            start = i + 1;
+        } else
+            out[i + 1] = in[i];
+    }
+
+    *outlen = len + 1;
+    return out;
+}
+
+void print_cert_checks(BIO *bio, X509 *x,
+                       const char *checkhost,
+                       const char *checkemail, const char *checkip)
+{
+    if (x == NULL)
+        return;
+    if (checkhost) {
+        BIO_printf(bio, "Hostname %s does%s match certificate\n",
+                   checkhost,
+                   X509_check_host(x, checkhost, 0, 0, NULL) == 1
+                       ? "" : " NOT");
+    }
+
+    if (checkemail) {
+        BIO_printf(bio, "Email %s does%s match certificate\n",
+                   checkemail, X509_check_email(x, checkemail, 0, 0)
+                   ? "" : " NOT");
+    }
+
+    if (checkip) {
+        BIO_printf(bio, "IP %s does%s match certificate\n",
+                   checkip, X509_check_ip_asc(x, checkip, 0) ? "" : " NOT");
+    }
+}
+
+/* Get first http URL from a DIST_POINT structure */
+
+static const char *get_dp_url(DIST_POINT *dp)
+{
+    GENERAL_NAMES *gens;
+    GENERAL_NAME *gen;
+    int i, gtype;
+    ASN1_STRING *uri;
+    if (!dp->distpoint || dp->distpoint->type != 0)
+        return NULL;
+    gens = dp->distpoint->name.fullname;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) {
+        gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
+        uri = GENERAL_NAME_get0_value(gen, &gtype);
+        if (gtype == GEN_URI && ASN1_STRING_length(uri) > 6) {
+            const char *uptr = (const char *)ASN1_STRING_get0_data(uri);
+            if (strncmp(uptr, "http://", 7) == 0)
+                return uptr;
+        }
+    }
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Look through a CRLDP structure and attempt to find an http URL to
+ * downloads a CRL from.
+ */
+
+static X509_CRL *load_crl_crldp(STACK_OF(DIST_POINT) *crldp)
+{
+    int i;
+    const char *urlptr = NULL;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(crldp); i++) {
+        DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(crldp, i);
+        urlptr = get_dp_url(dp);
+        if (urlptr)
+            return load_crl(urlptr, FORMAT_HTTP);
+    }
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Example of downloading CRLs from CRLDP: not usable for real world as it
+ * always downloads, doesn't support non-blocking I/O and doesn't cache
+ * anything.
+ */
+
+static STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls_http_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_NAME *nm)
+{
+    X509 *x;
+    STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls = NULL;
+    X509_CRL *crl;
+    STACK_OF(DIST_POINT) *crldp;
+
+    crls = sk_X509_CRL_new_null();
+    if (!crls)
+        return NULL;
+    x = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx);
+    crldp = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_crl_distribution_points, NULL, NULL);
+    crl = load_crl_crldp(crldp);
+    sk_DIST_POINT_pop_free(crldp, DIST_POINT_free);
+    if (!crl) {
+        sk_X509_CRL_free(crls);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    sk_X509_CRL_push(crls, crl);
+    /* Try to download delta CRL */
+    crldp = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_freshest_crl, NULL, NULL);
+    crl = load_crl_crldp(crldp);
+    sk_DIST_POINT_pop_free(crldp, DIST_POINT_free);
+    if (crl)
+        sk_X509_CRL_push(crls, crl);
+    return crls;
+}
+
+void store_setup_crl_download(X509_STORE *st)
+{
+    X509_STORE_set_lookup_crls_cb(st, crls_http_cb);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Platform-specific sections
+ */
+#if defined(_WIN32)
+# ifdef fileno
+#  undef fileno
+#  define fileno(a) (int)_fileno(a)
+# endif
+
+# include <windows.h>
+# include <tchar.h>
+
+static int WIN32_rename(const char *from, const char *to)
+{
+    TCHAR *tfrom = NULL, *tto;
+    DWORD err;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    if (sizeof(TCHAR) == 1) {
+        tfrom = (TCHAR *)from;
+        tto = (TCHAR *)to;
+    } else {                    /* UNICODE path */
+
+        size_t i, flen = strlen(from) + 1, tlen = strlen(to) + 1;
+        tfrom = malloc(sizeof(*tfrom) * (flen + tlen));
+        if (tfrom == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        tto = tfrom + flen;
+# if !defined(_WIN32_WCE) || _WIN32_WCE>=101
+        if (!MultiByteToWideChar(CP_ACP, 0, from, flen, (WCHAR *)tfrom, flen))
+# endif
+            for (i = 0; i < flen; i++)
+                tfrom[i] = (TCHAR)from[i];
+# if !defined(_WIN32_WCE) || _WIN32_WCE>=101
+        if (!MultiByteToWideChar(CP_ACP, 0, to, tlen, (WCHAR *)tto, tlen))
+# endif
+            for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
+                tto[i] = (TCHAR)to[i];
+    }
+
+    if (MoveFile(tfrom, tto))
+        goto ok;
+    err = GetLastError();
+    if (err == ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS || err == ERROR_FILE_EXISTS) {
+        if (DeleteFile(tto) && MoveFile(tfrom, tto))
+            goto ok;
+        err = GetLastError();
+    }
+    if (err == ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND || err == ERROR_PATH_NOT_FOUND)
+        errno = ENOENT;
+    else if (err == ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED)
+        errno = EACCES;
+    else
+        errno = EINVAL;         /* we could map more codes... */
+ err:
+    ret = -1;
+ ok:
+    if (tfrom != NULL && tfrom != (TCHAR *)from)
+        free(tfrom);
+    return ret;
+}
+#endif
+
+/* app_tminterval section */
+#if defined(_WIN32)
+double app_tminterval(int stop, int usertime)
+{
+    FILETIME now;
+    double ret = 0;
+    static ULARGE_INTEGER tmstart;
+    static int warning = 1;
+# ifdef _WIN32_WINNT
+    static HANDLE proc = NULL;
+
+    if (proc == NULL) {
+        if (check_winnt())
+            proc = OpenProcess(PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION, FALSE,
+                               GetCurrentProcessId());
+        if (proc == NULL)
+            proc = (HANDLE) - 1;
+    }
+
+    if (usertime && proc != (HANDLE) - 1) {
+        FILETIME junk;
+        GetProcessTimes(proc, &junk, &junk, &junk, &now);
+    } else
+# endif
+    {
+        SYSTEMTIME systime;
+
+        if (usertime && warning) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "To get meaningful results, run "
+                       "this program on idle system.\n");
+            warning = 0;
+        }
+        GetSystemTime(&systime);
+        SystemTimeToFileTime(&systime, &now);
+    }
+
+    if (stop == TM_START) {
+        tmstart.u.LowPart = now.dwLowDateTime;
+        tmstart.u.HighPart = now.dwHighDateTime;
+    } else {
+        ULARGE_INTEGER tmstop;
+
+        tmstop.u.LowPart = now.dwLowDateTime;
+        tmstop.u.HighPart = now.dwHighDateTime;
+
+        ret = (__int64)(tmstop.QuadPart - tmstart.QuadPart) * 1e-7;
+    }
+
+    return (ret);
+}
+#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYSTEM_VXWORKS)
+# include <time.h>
+
+double app_tminterval(int stop, int usertime)
+{
+    double ret = 0;
+# ifdef CLOCK_REALTIME
+    static struct timespec tmstart;
+    struct timespec now;
+# else
+    static unsigned long tmstart;
+    unsigned long now;
+# endif
+    static int warning = 1;
+
+    if (usertime && warning) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "To get meaningful results, run "
+                   "this program on idle system.\n");
+        warning = 0;
+    }
+# ifdef CLOCK_REALTIME
+    clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &now);
+    if (stop == TM_START)
+        tmstart = now;
+    else
+        ret = ((now.tv_sec + now.tv_nsec * 1e-9)
+               - (tmstart.tv_sec + tmstart.tv_nsec * 1e-9));
+# else
+    now = tickGet();
+    if (stop == TM_START)
+        tmstart = now;
+    else
+        ret = (now - tmstart) / (double)sysClkRateGet();
+# endif
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYSTEM_VMS)
+# include <time.h>
+# include <times.h>
+
+double app_tminterval(int stop, int usertime)
+{
+    static clock_t tmstart;
+    double ret = 0;
+    clock_t now;
+# ifdef __TMS
+    struct tms rus;
+
+    now = times(&rus);
+    if (usertime)
+        now = rus.tms_utime;
+# else
+    if (usertime)
+        now = clock();          /* sum of user and kernel times */
+    else {
+        struct timeval tv;
+        gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
+        now = (clock_t)((unsigned long long)tv.tv_sec * CLK_TCK +
+                        (unsigned long long)tv.tv_usec * (1000000 / CLK_TCK)
+            );
+    }
+# endif
+    if (stop == TM_START)
+        tmstart = now;
+    else
+        ret = (now - tmstart) / (double)(CLK_TCK);
+
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+#elif defined(_SC_CLK_TCK)      /* by means of unistd.h */
+# include <sys/times.h>
+
+double app_tminterval(int stop, int usertime)
+{
+    double ret = 0;
+    struct tms rus;
+    clock_t now = times(&rus);
+    static clock_t tmstart;
+
+    if (usertime)
+        now = rus.tms_utime;
+
+    if (stop == TM_START)
+        tmstart = now;
+    else {
+        long int tck = sysconf(_SC_CLK_TCK);
+        ret = (now - tmstart) / (double)tck;
+    }
+
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+#else
+# include <sys/time.h>
+# include <sys/resource.h>
+
+double app_tminterval(int stop, int usertime)
+{
+    double ret = 0;
+    struct rusage rus;
+    struct timeval now;
+    static struct timeval tmstart;
+
+    if (usertime)
+        getrusage(RUSAGE_SELF, &rus), now = rus.ru_utime;
+    else
+        gettimeofday(&now, NULL);
+
+    if (stop == TM_START)
+        tmstart = now;
+    else
+        ret = ((now.tv_sec + now.tv_usec * 1e-6)
+               - (tmstart.tv_sec + tmstart.tv_usec * 1e-6));
+
+    return ret;
+}
+#endif
+
+int app_access(const char* name, int flag)
+{
+#ifdef _WIN32
+    return _access(name, flag);
+#else
+    return access(name, flag);
+#endif
+}
+
+/* app_isdir section */
+#ifdef _WIN32
+int app_isdir(const char *name)
+{
+    DWORD attr;
+# if defined(UNICODE) || defined(_UNICODE)
+    size_t i, len_0 = strlen(name) + 1;
+    WCHAR tempname[MAX_PATH];
+
+    if (len_0 > MAX_PATH)
+        return -1;
+
+#  if !defined(_WIN32_WCE) || _WIN32_WCE>=101
+    if (!MultiByteToWideChar(CP_ACP, 0, name, len_0, tempname, MAX_PATH))
+#  endif
+        for (i = 0; i < len_0; i++)
+            tempname[i] = (WCHAR)name[i];
+
+    attr = GetFileAttributes(tempname);
+# else
+    attr = GetFileAttributes(name);
+# endif
+    if (attr == INVALID_FILE_ATTRIBUTES)
+        return -1;
+    return ((attr & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY) != 0);
+}
+#else
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+# ifndef S_ISDIR
+#  if defined(_S_IFMT) && defined(_S_IFDIR)
+#   define S_ISDIR(a)   (((a) & _S_IFMT) == _S_IFDIR)
+#  else
+#   define S_ISDIR(a)   (((a) & S_IFMT) == S_IFDIR)
+#  endif
+# endif
+
+int app_isdir(const char *name)
+{
+# if defined(S_ISDIR)
+    struct stat st;
+
+    if (stat(name, &st) == 0)
+        return S_ISDIR(st.st_mode);
+    else
+        return -1;
+# else
+    return -1;
+# endif
+}
+#endif
+
+/* raw_read|write section */
+#if defined(__VMS)
+# include "vms_term_sock.h"
+static int stdin_sock = -1;
+
+static void close_stdin_sock(void)
+{
+    TerminalSocket (TERM_SOCK_DELETE, &stdin_sock);
+}
+
+int fileno_stdin(void)
+{
+    if (stdin_sock == -1) {
+        TerminalSocket(TERM_SOCK_CREATE, &stdin_sock);
+        atexit(close_stdin_sock);
+    }
+
+    return stdin_sock;
+}
+#else
+int fileno_stdin(void)
+{
+    return fileno(stdin);
+}
+#endif
+
+int fileno_stdout(void)
+{
+    return fileno(stdout);
+}
+
+#if defined(_WIN32) && defined(STD_INPUT_HANDLE)
+int raw_read_stdin(void *buf, int siz)
+{
+    DWORD n;
+    if (ReadFile(GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE), buf, siz, &n, NULL))
+        return (n);
+    else
+        return (-1);
+}
+#elif defined(__VMS)
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+int raw_read_stdin(void *buf, int siz)
+{
+    return recv(fileno_stdin(), buf, siz, 0);
+}
+#else
+int raw_read_stdin(void *buf, int siz)
+{
+    return read(fileno_stdin(), buf, siz);
+}
+#endif
+
+#if defined(_WIN32) && defined(STD_OUTPUT_HANDLE)
+int raw_write_stdout(const void *buf, int siz)
+{
+    DWORD n;
+    if (WriteFile(GetStdHandle(STD_OUTPUT_HANDLE), buf, siz, &n, NULL))
+        return (n);
+    else
+        return (-1);
+}
+#else
+int raw_write_stdout(const void *buf, int siz)
+{
+    return write(fileno_stdout(), buf, siz);
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Centralized handling if input and output files with format specification
+ * The format is meant to show what the input and output is supposed to be,
+ * and is therefore a show of intent more than anything else.  However, it
+ * does impact behavior on some platform, such as differentiating between
+ * text and binary input/output on non-Unix platforms
+ */
+static int istext(int format)
+{
+    return (format & B_FORMAT_TEXT) == B_FORMAT_TEXT;
+}
+
+BIO *dup_bio_in(int format)
+{
+    return BIO_new_fp(stdin,
+                      BIO_NOCLOSE | (istext(format) ? BIO_FP_TEXT : 0));
+}
+
+BIO *dup_bio_out(int format)
+{
+    BIO *b = BIO_new_fp(stdout,
+                        BIO_NOCLOSE | (istext(format) ? BIO_FP_TEXT : 0));
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+    if (istext(format))
+        b = BIO_push(BIO_new(BIO_f_linebuffer()), b);
+#endif
+    return b;
+}
+
+BIO *dup_bio_err(int format)
+{
+    BIO *b = BIO_new_fp(stderr,
+                        BIO_NOCLOSE | (istext(format) ? BIO_FP_TEXT : 0));
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+    if (istext(format))
+        b = BIO_push(BIO_new(BIO_f_linebuffer()), b);
+#endif
+    return b;
+}
+
+void unbuffer(FILE *fp)
+{
+/*
+ * On VMS, setbuf() will only take 32-bit pointers, and a compilation
+ * with /POINTER_SIZE=64 will give off a MAYLOSEDATA2 warning here.
+ * However, we trust that the C RTL will never give us a FILE pointer
+ * above the first 4 GB of memory, so we simply turn off the warning
+ * temporarily.
+ */
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && defined(__DECC)
+# pragma environment save
+# pragma message disable maylosedata2
+#endif
+    setbuf(fp, NULL);
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && defined(__DECC)
+# pragma environment restore
+#endif
+}
+
+static const char *modestr(char mode, int format)
+{
+    OPENSSL_assert(mode == 'a' || mode == 'r' || mode == 'w');
+
+    switch (mode) {
+    case 'a':
+        return istext(format) ? "a" : "ab";
+    case 'r':
+        return istext(format) ? "r" : "rb";
+    case 'w':
+        return istext(format) ? "w" : "wb";
+    }
+    /* The assert above should make sure we never reach this point */
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+static const char *modeverb(char mode)
+{
+    switch (mode) {
+    case 'a':
+        return "appending";
+    case 'r':
+        return "reading";
+    case 'w':
+        return "writing";
+    }
+    return "(doing something)";
+}
+
+/*
+ * Open a file for writing, owner-read-only.
+ */
+BIO *bio_open_owner(const char *filename, int format, int private)
+{
+    FILE *fp = NULL;
+    BIO *b = NULL;
+    int fd = -1, bflags, mode, textmode;
+
+    if (!private || filename == NULL || strcmp(filename, "-") == 0)
+        return bio_open_default(filename, 'w', format);
+
+    mode = O_WRONLY;
+#ifdef O_CREAT
+    mode |= O_CREAT;
+#endif
+#ifdef O_TRUNC
+    mode |= O_TRUNC;
+#endif
+    textmode = istext(format);
+    if (!textmode) {
+#ifdef O_BINARY
+        mode |= O_BINARY;
+#elif defined(_O_BINARY)
+        mode |= _O_BINARY;
+#endif
+    }
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+    /* VMS doesn't have O_BINARY, it just doesn't make sense.  But,
+     * it still needs to know that we're going binary, or fdopen()
+     * will fail with "invalid argument"...  so we tell VMS what the
+     * context is.
+     */
+    if (!textmode)
+        fd = open(filename, mode, 0600, "ctx=bin");
+    else
+#endif
+        fd = open(filename, mode, 0600);
+    if (fd < 0)
+        goto err;
+    fp = fdopen(fd, modestr('w', format));
+    if (fp == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    bflags = BIO_CLOSE;
+    if (textmode)
+        bflags |= BIO_FP_TEXT;
+    b = BIO_new_fp(fp, bflags);
+    if (b)
+        return b;
+
+ err:
+    BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Can't open \"%s\" for writing, %s\n",
+               opt_getprog(), filename, strerror(errno));
+    ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+    /* If we have fp, then fdopen took over fd, so don't close both. */
+    if (fp)
+        fclose(fp);
+    else if (fd >= 0)
+        close(fd);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+static BIO *bio_open_default_(const char *filename, char mode, int format,
+                              int quiet)
+{
+    BIO *ret;
+
+    if (filename == NULL || strcmp(filename, "-") == 0) {
+        ret = mode == 'r' ? dup_bio_in(format) : dup_bio_out(format);
+        if (quiet) {
+            ERR_clear_error();
+            return ret;
+        }
+        if (ret != NULL)
+            return ret;
+        BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                   "Can't open %s, %s\n",
+                   mode == 'r' ? "stdin" : "stdout", strerror(errno));
+    } else {
+        ret = BIO_new_file(filename, modestr(mode, format));
+        if (quiet) {
+            ERR_clear_error();
+            return ret;
+        }
+        if (ret != NULL)
+            return ret;
+        BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                   "Can't open %s for %s, %s\n",
+                   filename, modeverb(mode), strerror(errno));
+    }
+    ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+BIO *bio_open_default(const char *filename, char mode, int format)
+{
+    return bio_open_default_(filename, mode, format, 0);
+}
+
+BIO *bio_open_default_quiet(const char *filename, char mode, int format)
+{
+    return bio_open_default_(filename, mode, format, 1);
+}
+
+void wait_for_async(SSL *s)
+{
+    /* On Windows select only works for sockets, so we simply don't wait  */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS
+    int width = 0;
+    fd_set asyncfds;
+    OSSL_ASYNC_FD *fds;
+    size_t numfds;
+    size_t i;
+
+    if (!SSL_get_all_async_fds(s, NULL, &numfds))
+        return;
+    if (numfds == 0)
+        return;
+    fds = app_malloc(sizeof(OSSL_ASYNC_FD) * numfds, "allocate async fds");
+    if (!SSL_get_all_async_fds(s, fds, &numfds)) {
+        OPENSSL_free(fds);
+        return;
+    }
+
+    FD_ZERO(&asyncfds);
+    for (i = 0; i < numfds; i++) {
+        if (width <= (int)fds[i])
+            width = (int)fds[i] + 1;
+        openssl_fdset((int)fds[i], &asyncfds);
+    }
+    select(width, (void *)&asyncfds, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+    OPENSSL_free(fds);
+#endif
+}
+
+/* if OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS is defined then so is OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS */
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS)
+int has_stdin_waiting(void)
+{
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS)
+    HANDLE inhand = GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE);
+    DWORD events = 0;
+    INPUT_RECORD inputrec;
+    DWORD insize = 1;
+    BOOL peeked;
+
+    if (inhand == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    peeked = PeekConsoleInput(inhand, &inputrec, insize, &events);
+    if (!peeked) {
+        /* Probably redirected input? _kbhit() does not work in this case */
+        if (!feof(stdin)) {
+            return 1;
+        }
+        return 0;
+    }
+# endif
+    return _kbhit();
+}
+#endif
+
+/* Corrupt a signature by modifying final byte */
+void corrupt_signature(const ASN1_STRING *signature)
+{
+        unsigned char *s = signature->data;
+        s[signature->length - 1] ^= 0x1;
+}
+
+int set_cert_times(X509 *x, const char *startdate, const char *enddate,
+                   int days)
+{
+    if (startdate == NULL || strcmp(startdate, "today") == 0) {
+        if (X509_gmtime_adj(X509_getm_notBefore(x), 0) == NULL)
+            return 0;
+    } else {
+        if (!ASN1_TIME_set_string(X509_getm_notBefore(x), startdate))
+            return 0;
+    }
+    if (enddate == NULL) {
+        if (X509_time_adj_ex(X509_getm_notAfter(x), days, 0, NULL)
+            == NULL)
+            return 0;
+    } else if (!ASN1_TIME_set_string(X509_getm_notAfter(x), enddate)) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/apps.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/apps.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f91faf8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/apps.h
@@ -0,0 +1,573 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_APPS_H
+# define HEADER_APPS_H
+
+# include "e_os.h"
+# if defined(__unix) || defined(__unix__)
+#  include <sys/time.h> /* struct timeval for DTLS */
+# endif
+# include <assert.h>
+
+# include <openssl/e_os2.h>
+# include <openssl/ossl_typ.h>
+# include <openssl/bio.h>
+# include <openssl/x509.h>
+# include <openssl/lhash.h>
+# include <openssl/conf.h>
+# include <openssl/txt_db.h>
+# include <openssl/engine.h>
+# include <openssl/ocsp.h>
+# include <signal.h>
+
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE)
+#  define openssl_fdset(a,b) FD_SET((unsigned int)a, b)
+# else
+#  define openssl_fdset(a,b) FD_SET(a, b)
+# endif
+
+/*
+ * quick macro when you need to pass an unsigned char instead of a char.
+ * this is true for some implementations of the is*() functions, for
+ * example.
+ */
+#define _UC(c) ((unsigned char)(c))
+
+int app_RAND_load_file(const char *file, int dont_warn);
+int app_RAND_write_file(const char *file);
+/*
+ * When `file' is NULL, use defaults. `bio_e' is for error messages.
+ */
+void app_RAND_allow_write_file(void);
+long app_RAND_load_files(char *file); /* `file' is a list of files to read,
+                                       * separated by LIST_SEPARATOR_CHAR
+                                       * (see e_os.h).  The string is
+                                       * destroyed! */
+
+extern char *default_config_file;
+extern BIO *bio_in;
+extern BIO *bio_out;
+extern BIO *bio_err;
+BIO *dup_bio_in(int format);
+BIO *dup_bio_out(int format);
+BIO *dup_bio_err(int format);
+BIO *bio_open_owner(const char *filename, int format, int private);
+BIO *bio_open_default(const char *filename, char mode, int format);
+BIO *bio_open_default_quiet(const char *filename, char mode, int format);
+CONF *app_load_config(const char *filename);
+CONF *app_load_config_quiet(const char *filename);
+int app_load_modules(const CONF *config);
+void unbuffer(FILE *fp);
+void wait_for_async(SSL *s);
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS)
+int has_stdin_waiting(void);
+# endif
+
+void corrupt_signature(const ASN1_STRING *signature);
+int set_cert_times(X509 *x, const char *startdate, const char *enddate,
+                   int days);
+
+/*
+ * Common verification options.
+ */
+# define OPT_V_ENUM \
+        OPT_V__FIRST=2000, \
+        OPT_V_POLICY, OPT_V_PURPOSE, OPT_V_VERIFY_NAME, OPT_V_VERIFY_DEPTH, \
+        OPT_V_ATTIME, OPT_V_VERIFY_HOSTNAME, OPT_V_VERIFY_EMAIL, \
+        OPT_V_VERIFY_IP, OPT_V_IGNORE_CRITICAL, OPT_V_ISSUER_CHECKS, \
+        OPT_V_CRL_CHECK, OPT_V_CRL_CHECK_ALL, OPT_V_POLICY_CHECK, \
+        OPT_V_EXPLICIT_POLICY, OPT_V_INHIBIT_ANY, OPT_V_INHIBIT_MAP, \
+        OPT_V_X509_STRICT, OPT_V_EXTENDED_CRL, OPT_V_USE_DELTAS, \
+        OPT_V_POLICY_PRINT, OPT_V_CHECK_SS_SIG, OPT_V_TRUSTED_FIRST, \
+        OPT_V_SUITEB_128_ONLY, OPT_V_SUITEB_128, OPT_V_SUITEB_192, \
+        OPT_V_PARTIAL_CHAIN, OPT_V_NO_ALT_CHAINS, OPT_V_NO_CHECK_TIME, \
+        OPT_V_VERIFY_AUTH_LEVEL, OPT_V_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS, \
+        OPT_V__LAST
+
+# define OPT_V_OPTIONS \
+        { "policy", OPT_V_POLICY, 's', "adds policy to the acceptable policy set"}, \
+        { "purpose", OPT_V_PURPOSE, 's', \
+            "certificate chain purpose"}, \
+        { "verify_name", OPT_V_VERIFY_NAME, 's', "verification policy name"}, \
+        { "verify_depth", OPT_V_VERIFY_DEPTH, 'n', \
+            "chain depth limit" }, \
+        { "auth_level", OPT_V_VERIFY_AUTH_LEVEL, 'n', \
+            "chain authentication security level" }, \
+        { "attime", OPT_V_ATTIME, 'M', "verification epoch time" }, \
+        { "verify_hostname", OPT_V_VERIFY_HOSTNAME, 's', \
+            "expected peer hostname" }, \
+        { "verify_email", OPT_V_VERIFY_EMAIL, 's', \
+            "expected peer email" }, \
+        { "verify_ip", OPT_V_VERIFY_IP, 's', \
+            "expected peer IP address" }, \
+        { "ignore_critical", OPT_V_IGNORE_CRITICAL, '-', \
+            "permit unhandled critical extensions"}, \
+        { "issuer_checks", OPT_V_ISSUER_CHECKS, '-', "(deprecated)"}, \
+        { "crl_check", OPT_V_CRL_CHECK, '-', "check leaf certificate revocation" }, \
+        { "crl_check_all", OPT_V_CRL_CHECK_ALL, '-', "check full chain revocation" }, \
+        { "policy_check", OPT_V_POLICY_CHECK, '-', "perform rfc5280 policy checks"}, \
+        { "explicit_policy", OPT_V_EXPLICIT_POLICY, '-', \
+            "set policy variable require-explicit-policy"}, \
+        { "inhibit_any", OPT_V_INHIBIT_ANY, '-', \
+            "set policy variable inhibit-any-policy"}, \
+        { "inhibit_map", OPT_V_INHIBIT_MAP, '-', \
+            "set policy variable inhibit-policy-mapping"}, \
+        { "x509_strict", OPT_V_X509_STRICT, '-', \
+            "disable certificate compatibility work-arounds"}, \
+        { "extended_crl", OPT_V_EXTENDED_CRL, '-', \
+            "enable extended CRL features"}, \
+        { "use_deltas", OPT_V_USE_DELTAS, '-', \
+            "use delta CRLs"}, \
+        { "policy_print", OPT_V_POLICY_PRINT, '-', \
+            "print policy processing diagnostics"}, \
+        { "check_ss_sig", OPT_V_CHECK_SS_SIG, '-', \
+            "check root CA self-signatures"}, \
+        { "trusted_first", OPT_V_TRUSTED_FIRST, '-', \
+            "search trust store first (default)" }, \
+        { "suiteB_128_only", OPT_V_SUITEB_128_ONLY, '-', "Suite B 128-bit-only mode"}, \
+        { "suiteB_128", OPT_V_SUITEB_128, '-', \
+            "Suite B 128-bit mode allowing 192-bit algorithms"}, \
+        { "suiteB_192", OPT_V_SUITEB_192, '-', "Suite B 192-bit-only mode" }, \
+        { "partial_chain", OPT_V_PARTIAL_CHAIN, '-', \
+            "accept chains anchored by intermediate trust-store CAs"}, \
+        { "no_alt_chains", OPT_V_NO_ALT_CHAINS, '-', "(deprecated)" }, \
+        { "no_check_time", OPT_V_NO_CHECK_TIME, '-', "ignore certificate validity time" }, \
+        { "allow_proxy_certs", OPT_V_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS, '-', "allow the use of proxy certificates" }
+
+# define OPT_V_CASES \
+        OPT_V__FIRST: case OPT_V__LAST: break; \
+        case OPT_V_POLICY: \
+        case OPT_V_PURPOSE: \
+        case OPT_V_VERIFY_NAME: \
+        case OPT_V_VERIFY_DEPTH: \
+        case OPT_V_VERIFY_AUTH_LEVEL: \
+        case OPT_V_ATTIME: \
+        case OPT_V_VERIFY_HOSTNAME: \
+        case OPT_V_VERIFY_EMAIL: \
+        case OPT_V_VERIFY_IP: \
+        case OPT_V_IGNORE_CRITICAL: \
+        case OPT_V_ISSUER_CHECKS: \
+        case OPT_V_CRL_CHECK: \
+        case OPT_V_CRL_CHECK_ALL: \
+        case OPT_V_POLICY_CHECK: \
+        case OPT_V_EXPLICIT_POLICY: \
+        case OPT_V_INHIBIT_ANY: \
+        case OPT_V_INHIBIT_MAP: \
+        case OPT_V_X509_STRICT: \
+        case OPT_V_EXTENDED_CRL: \
+        case OPT_V_USE_DELTAS: \
+        case OPT_V_POLICY_PRINT: \
+        case OPT_V_CHECK_SS_SIG: \
+        case OPT_V_TRUSTED_FIRST: \
+        case OPT_V_SUITEB_128_ONLY: \
+        case OPT_V_SUITEB_128: \
+        case OPT_V_SUITEB_192: \
+        case OPT_V_PARTIAL_CHAIN: \
+        case OPT_V_NO_ALT_CHAINS: \
+        case OPT_V_NO_CHECK_TIME: \
+        case OPT_V_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS
+
+/*
+ * Common "extended"? options.
+ */
+# define OPT_X_ENUM \
+        OPT_X__FIRST=1000, \
+        OPT_X_KEY, OPT_X_CERT, OPT_X_CHAIN, OPT_X_CHAIN_BUILD, \
+        OPT_X_CERTFORM, OPT_X_KEYFORM, \
+        OPT_X__LAST
+
+# define OPT_X_OPTIONS \
+        { "xkey", OPT_X_KEY, '<', "key for Extended certificates"}, \
+        { "xcert", OPT_X_CERT, '<', "cert for Extended certificates"}, \
+        { "xchain", OPT_X_CHAIN, '<', "chain for Extended certificates"}, \
+        { "xchain_build", OPT_X_CHAIN_BUILD, '-', \
+            "build certificate chain for the extended certificates"}, \
+        { "xcertform", OPT_X_CERTFORM, 'F', \
+            "format of Extended certificate (PEM or DER) PEM default " }, \
+        { "xkeyform", OPT_X_KEYFORM, 'F', \
+            "format of Extended certificate's key (PEM or DER) PEM default"}
+
+# define OPT_X_CASES \
+        OPT_X__FIRST: case OPT_X__LAST: break; \
+        case OPT_X_KEY: \
+        case OPT_X_CERT: \
+        case OPT_X_CHAIN: \
+        case OPT_X_CHAIN_BUILD: \
+        case OPT_X_CERTFORM: \
+        case OPT_X_KEYFORM
+
+/*
+ * Common SSL options.
+ * Any changes here must be coordinated with ../ssl/ssl_conf.c
+ */
+# define OPT_S_ENUM \
+        OPT_S__FIRST=3000, \
+        OPT_S_NOSSL3, OPT_S_NOTLS1, OPT_S_NOTLS1_1, OPT_S_NOTLS1_2, \
+        OPT_S_BUGS, OPT_S_NO_COMP, OPT_S_NOTICKET, \
+        OPT_S_SERVERPREF, OPT_S_LEGACYRENEG, OPT_S_LEGACYCONN, \
+        OPT_S_ONRESUMP, OPT_S_NOLEGACYCONN, OPT_S_STRICT, OPT_S_SIGALGS, \
+        OPT_S_CLIENTSIGALGS, OPT_S_CURVES, OPT_S_NAMEDCURVE, OPT_S_CIPHER, \
+        OPT_S_DEBUGBROKE, OPT_S_COMP, OPT_S_MINPROTO, OPT_S_MAXPROTO, \
+        OPT_S_NO_RENEGOTIATION, OPT_S__LAST
+
+# define OPT_S_OPTIONS \
+        {"no_ssl3", OPT_S_NOSSL3, '-',"Just disable SSLv3" }, \
+        {"no_tls1", OPT_S_NOTLS1, '-', "Just disable TLSv1"}, \
+        {"no_tls1_1", OPT_S_NOTLS1_1, '-', "Just disable TLSv1.1" }, \
+        {"no_tls1_2", OPT_S_NOTLS1_2, '-', "Just disable TLSv1.2"}, \
+        {"bugs", OPT_S_BUGS, '-', "Turn on SSL bug compatibility"}, \
+        {"no_comp", OPT_S_NO_COMP, '-', "Disable SSL/TLS compression (default)" }, \
+        {"comp", OPT_S_COMP, '-', "Use SSL/TLS-level compression" }, \
+        {"no_ticket", OPT_S_NOTICKET, '-', \
+            "Disable use of TLS session tickets"}, \
+        {"serverpref", OPT_S_SERVERPREF, '-', "Use server's cipher preferences"}, \
+        {"legacy_renegotiation", OPT_S_LEGACYRENEG, '-', \
+            "Enable use of legacy renegotiation (dangerous)"}, \
+        {"no_renegotiation", OPT_S_NO_RENEGOTIATION, '-', \
+            "Disable all renegotiation."}, \
+        {"legacy_server_connect", OPT_S_LEGACYCONN, '-', \
+            "Allow initial connection to servers that don't support RI"}, \
+        {"no_resumption_on_reneg", OPT_S_ONRESUMP, '-', \
+            "Disallow session resumption on renegotiation"}, \
+        {"no_legacy_server_connect", OPT_S_NOLEGACYCONN, '-', \
+            "Disallow initial connection to servers that don't support RI"}, \
+        {"strict", OPT_S_STRICT, '-', \
+            "Enforce strict certificate checks as per TLS standard"}, \
+        {"sigalgs", OPT_S_SIGALGS, 's', \
+            "Signature algorithms to support (colon-separated list)" }, \
+        {"client_sigalgs", OPT_S_CLIENTSIGALGS, 's', \
+            "Signature algorithms to support for client certificate" \
+            " authentication (colon-separated list)" }, \
+        {"curves", OPT_S_CURVES, 's', \
+            "Elliptic curves to advertise (colon-separated list)" }, \
+        {"named_curve", OPT_S_NAMEDCURVE, 's', \
+            "Elliptic curve used for ECDHE (server-side only)" }, \
+        {"cipher", OPT_S_CIPHER, 's', "Specify cipher list to be used"}, \
+        {"min_protocol", OPT_S_MINPROTO, 's', "Specify the minimum protocol version to be used"}, \
+        {"max_protocol", OPT_S_MAXPROTO, 's', "Specify the maximum protocol version to be used"}, \
+        {"debug_broken_protocol", OPT_S_DEBUGBROKE, '-', \
+            "Perform all sorts of protocol violations for testing purposes"}
+
+# define OPT_S_CASES \
+        OPT_S__FIRST: case OPT_S__LAST: break; \
+        case OPT_S_NOSSL3: \
+        case OPT_S_NOTLS1: \
+        case OPT_S_NOTLS1_1: \
+        case OPT_S_NOTLS1_2: \
+        case OPT_S_BUGS: \
+        case OPT_S_NO_COMP: \
+        case OPT_S_COMP: \
+        case OPT_S_NOTICKET: \
+        case OPT_S_SERVERPREF: \
+        case OPT_S_LEGACYRENEG: \
+        case OPT_S_LEGACYCONN: \
+        case OPT_S_ONRESUMP: \
+        case OPT_S_NOLEGACYCONN: \
+        case OPT_S_STRICT: \
+        case OPT_S_SIGALGS: \
+        case OPT_S_CLIENTSIGALGS: \
+        case OPT_S_CURVES: \
+        case OPT_S_NAMEDCURVE: \
+        case OPT_S_CIPHER: \
+        case OPT_S_MINPROTO: \
+        case OPT_S_MAXPROTO: \
+        case OPT_S_NO_RENEGOTIATION: \
+        case OPT_S_DEBUGBROKE
+
+#define IS_NO_PROT_FLAG(o) \
+ (o == OPT_S_NOSSL3 || o == OPT_S_NOTLS1 || o == OPT_S_NOTLS1_1 \
+  || o == OPT_S_NOTLS1_2)
+
+/*
+ * Option parsing.
+ */
+extern const char OPT_HELP_STR[];
+extern const char OPT_MORE_STR[];
+typedef struct options_st {
+    const char *name;
+    int retval;
+    /*
+     * value type: - no value (also the value zero), n number, p positive
+     * number, u unsigned, l long, s string, < input file, > output file,
+     * f any format, F der/pem format , E der/pem/engine format identifier.
+     * l, n and u include zero; p does not.
+     */
+    int valtype;
+    const char *helpstr;
+} OPTIONS;
+
+/*
+ * A string/int pairing; widely use for option value lookup, hence the
+ * name OPT_PAIR. But that name is misleading in s_cb.c, so we also use
+ * the "generic" name STRINT_PAIR.
+ */
+typedef struct string_int_pair_st {
+    const char *name;
+    int retval;
+} OPT_PAIR, STRINT_PAIR;
+
+/* Flags to pass into opt_format; see FORMAT_xxx, below. */
+# define OPT_FMT_PEMDER          (1L <<  1)
+# define OPT_FMT_PKCS12          (1L <<  2)
+# define OPT_FMT_SMIME           (1L <<  3)
+# define OPT_FMT_ENGINE          (1L <<  4)
+# define OPT_FMT_MSBLOB          (1L <<  5)
+# define OPT_FMT_NETSCAPE        (1L <<  6)
+# define OPT_FMT_NSS             (1L <<  7)
+# define OPT_FMT_TEXT            (1L <<  8)
+# define OPT_FMT_HTTP            (1L <<  9)
+# define OPT_FMT_PVK             (1L << 10)
+# define OPT_FMT_PDE     (OPT_FMT_PEMDER | OPT_FMT_ENGINE)
+# define OPT_FMT_PDS     (OPT_FMT_PEMDER | OPT_FMT_SMIME)
+# define OPT_FMT_ANY     ( \
+        OPT_FMT_PEMDER | OPT_FMT_PKCS12 | OPT_FMT_SMIME | \
+        OPT_FMT_ENGINE | OPT_FMT_MSBLOB | OPT_FMT_NETSCAPE | \
+        OPT_FMT_NSS | OPT_FMT_TEXT | OPT_FMT_HTTP | OPT_FMT_PVK)
+
+char *opt_progname(const char *argv0);
+char *opt_getprog(void);
+char *opt_init(int ac, char **av, const OPTIONS * o);
+int opt_next(void);
+int opt_format(const char *s, unsigned long flags, int *result);
+int opt_int(const char *arg, int *result);
+int opt_ulong(const char *arg, unsigned long *result);
+int opt_long(const char *arg, long *result);
+#if defined(__STDC_VERSION__) && __STDC_VERSION__ >= 199901L && \
+    defined(INTMAX_MAX) && defined(UINTMAX_MAX)
+int opt_imax(const char *arg, intmax_t *result);
+int opt_umax(const char *arg, uintmax_t *result);
+#else
+# define opt_imax opt_long
+# define opt_umax opt_ulong
+# define intmax_t long
+# define uintmax_t unsigned long
+#endif
+int opt_pair(const char *arg, const OPT_PAIR * pairs, int *result);
+int opt_cipher(const char *name, const EVP_CIPHER **cipherp);
+int opt_md(const char *name, const EVP_MD **mdp);
+char *opt_arg(void);
+char *opt_flag(void);
+char *opt_unknown(void);
+char *opt_reset(void);
+char **opt_rest(void);
+int opt_num_rest(void);
+int opt_verify(int i, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm);
+void opt_help(const OPTIONS * list);
+int opt_format_error(const char *s, unsigned long flags);
+
+typedef struct args_st {
+    int size;
+    int argc;
+    char **argv;
+} ARGS;
+
+/*
+ * VMS C only for now, implemented in vms_decc_init.c
+ * If other C compilers forget to terminate argv with NULL, this function
+ * can be re-used.
+ */
+char **copy_argv(int *argc, char *argv[]);
+/*
+ * Win32-specific argv initialization that splits OS-supplied UNICODE
+ * command line string to array of UTF8-encoded strings.
+ */
+void win32_utf8argv(int *argc, char **argv[]);
+
+
+# define PW_MIN_LENGTH 4
+typedef struct pw_cb_data {
+    const void *password;
+    const char *prompt_info;
+} PW_CB_DATA;
+
+int password_callback(char *buf, int bufsiz, int verify, PW_CB_DATA *cb_data);
+
+int setup_ui_method(void);
+void destroy_ui_method(void);
+
+int chopup_args(ARGS *arg, char *buf);
+# ifdef HEADER_X509_H
+int dump_cert_text(BIO *out, X509 *x);
+void print_name(BIO *out, const char *title, X509_NAME *nm,
+                unsigned long lflags);
+# endif
+void print_bignum_var(BIO *, const BIGNUM *, const char*,
+                      int, unsigned char *);
+void print_array(BIO *, const char *, int, const unsigned char *);
+int set_cert_ex(unsigned long *flags, const char *arg);
+int set_name_ex(unsigned long *flags, const char *arg);
+int set_ext_copy(int *copy_type, const char *arg);
+int copy_extensions(X509 *x, X509_REQ *req, int copy_type);
+int app_passwd(const char *arg1, const char *arg2, char **pass1, char **pass2);
+int add_oid_section(CONF *conf);
+X509 *load_cert(const char *file, int format, const char *cert_descrip);
+X509_CRL *load_crl(const char *infile, int format);
+EVP_PKEY *load_key(const char *file, int format, int maybe_stdin,
+                   const char *pass, ENGINE *e, const char *key_descrip);
+EVP_PKEY *load_pubkey(const char *file, int format, int maybe_stdin,
+                      const char *pass, ENGINE *e, const char *key_descrip);
+int load_certs(const char *file, STACK_OF(X509) **certs, int format,
+               const char *pass, const char *cert_descrip);
+int load_crls(const char *file, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) **crls, int format,
+              const char *pass, const char *cert_descrip);
+X509_STORE *setup_verify(const char *CAfile, const char *CApath,
+                         int noCAfile, int noCApath);
+__owur int ctx_set_verify_locations(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *CAfile,
+                                    const char *CApath, int noCAfile,
+                                    int noCApath);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
+
+/*
+ * Sets the file to load the Certificate Transparency log list from.
+ * If path is NULL, loads from the default file path.
+ * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+__owur int ctx_set_ctlog_list_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *path);
+
+#endif
+
+ENGINE *setup_engine(const char *engine, int debug);
+void release_engine(ENGINE *e);
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+OCSP_RESPONSE *process_responder(OCSP_REQUEST *req,
+                                 const char *host, const char *path,
+                                 const char *port, int use_ssl,
+                                 STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *headers,
+                                 int req_timeout);
+# endif
+
+/* Functions defined in ca.c and also used in ocsp.c */
+int unpack_revinfo(ASN1_TIME **prevtm, int *preason, ASN1_OBJECT **phold,
+                   ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **pinvtm, const char *str);
+
+# define DB_type         0
+# define DB_exp_date     1
+# define DB_rev_date     2
+# define DB_serial       3      /* index - unique */
+# define DB_file         4
+# define DB_name         5      /* index - unique when active and not
+                                 * disabled */
+# define DB_NUMBER       6
+
+# define DB_TYPE_REV     'R'
+# define DB_TYPE_EXP     'E'
+# define DB_TYPE_VAL     'V'
+
+typedef struct db_attr_st {
+    int unique_subject;
+} DB_ATTR;
+typedef struct ca_db_st {
+    DB_ATTR attributes;
+    TXT_DB *db;
+} CA_DB;
+
+void* app_malloc(int sz, const char *what);
+BIGNUM *load_serial(const char *serialfile, int create, ASN1_INTEGER **retai);
+int save_serial(const char *serialfile, const char *suffix, const BIGNUM *serial,
+                ASN1_INTEGER **retai);
+int rotate_serial(const char *serialfile, const char *new_suffix,
+                  const char *old_suffix);
+int rand_serial(BIGNUM *b, ASN1_INTEGER *ai);
+CA_DB *load_index(const char *dbfile, DB_ATTR *dbattr);
+int index_index(CA_DB *db);
+int save_index(const char *dbfile, const char *suffix, CA_DB *db);
+int rotate_index(const char *dbfile, const char *new_suffix,
+                 const char *old_suffix);
+void free_index(CA_DB *db);
+# define index_name_cmp_noconst(a, b) \
+        index_name_cmp((const OPENSSL_CSTRING *)CHECKED_PTR_OF(OPENSSL_STRING, a), \
+        (const OPENSSL_CSTRING *)CHECKED_PTR_OF(OPENSSL_STRING, b))
+int index_name_cmp(const OPENSSL_CSTRING *a, const OPENSSL_CSTRING *b);
+int parse_yesno(const char *str, int def);
+
+X509_NAME *parse_name(const char *str, long chtype, int multirdn);
+int args_verify(char ***pargs, int *pargc,
+                int *badarg, X509_VERIFY_PARAM **pm);
+void policies_print(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+int bio_to_mem(unsigned char **out, int maxlen, BIO *in);
+int pkey_ctrl_string(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const char *value);
+int init_gen_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx,
+                 const char *algname, ENGINE *e, int do_param);
+int do_X509_sign(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *md,
+                 STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sigopts);
+int do_X509_REQ_sign(X509_REQ *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *md,
+                     STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sigopts);
+int do_X509_CRL_sign(X509_CRL *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *md,
+                     STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sigopts);
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+extern char *psk_key;
+# endif
+
+unsigned char *next_protos_parse(size_t *outlen, const char *in);
+
+void print_cert_checks(BIO *bio, X509 *x,
+                       const char *checkhost,
+                       const char *checkemail, const char *checkip);
+
+void store_setup_crl_download(X509_STORE *st);
+
+/* See OPT_FMT_xxx, above. */
+/* On some platforms, it's important to distinguish between text and binary
+ * files.  On some, there might even be specific file formats for different
+ * contents.  The FORMAT_xxx macros are meant to express an intent with the
+ * file being read or created.
+ */
+# define B_FORMAT_TEXT   0x8000
+# define FORMAT_UNDEF    0
+# define FORMAT_TEXT    (1 | B_FORMAT_TEXT)     /* Generic text */
+# define FORMAT_BINARY   2                      /* Generic binary */
+# define FORMAT_BASE64  (3 | B_FORMAT_TEXT)     /* Base64 */
+# define FORMAT_ASN1     4                      /* ASN.1/DER */
+# define FORMAT_PEM     (5 | B_FORMAT_TEXT)
+# define FORMAT_PKCS12   6
+# define FORMAT_SMIME   (7 | B_FORMAT_TEXT)
+# define FORMAT_ENGINE   8                      /* Not really a file format */
+# define FORMAT_PEMRSA  (9 | B_FORMAT_TEXT)     /* PEM RSAPubicKey format */
+# define FORMAT_ASN1RSA  10                     /* DER RSAPubicKey format */
+# define FORMAT_MSBLOB   11                     /* MS Key blob format */
+# define FORMAT_PVK      12                     /* MS PVK file format */
+# define FORMAT_HTTP     13                     /* Download using HTTP */
+# define FORMAT_NSS      14                     /* NSS keylog format */
+
+# define EXT_COPY_NONE   0
+# define EXT_COPY_ADD    1
+# define EXT_COPY_ALL    2
+
+# define NETSCAPE_CERT_HDR       "certificate"
+
+# define APP_PASS_LEN    1024
+
+# define SERIAL_RAND_BITS        64
+
+int app_isdir(const char *);
+int app_access(const char *, int flag);
+int fileno_stdin(void);
+int fileno_stdout(void);
+int raw_read_stdin(void *, int);
+int raw_write_stdout(const void *, int);
+
+# define TM_START        0
+# define TM_STOP         1
+double app_tminterval(int stop, int usertime);
+
+typedef struct verify_options_st {
+    int depth;
+    int quiet;
+    int error;
+    int return_error;
+} VERIFY_CB_ARGS;
+
+extern VERIFY_CB_ARGS verify_args;
+
+# include "progs.h"
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/asn1pars.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/asn1pars.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1ac261c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/asn1pars.c
@@ -0,0 +1,330 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * A nice addition from Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org> to add the
+ * -strparse option which parses nested binary structures
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include "apps.h"
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+
+typedef enum OPTION_choice {
+    OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP,
+    OPT_INFORM, OPT_IN, OPT_OUT, OPT_INDENT, OPT_NOOUT,
+    OPT_OID, OPT_OFFSET, OPT_LENGTH, OPT_DUMP, OPT_DLIMIT,
+    OPT_STRPARSE, OPT_GENSTR, OPT_GENCONF, OPT_STRICTPEM
+} OPTION_CHOICE;
+
+OPTIONS asn1parse_options[] = {
+    {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"},
+    {"inform", OPT_INFORM, 'F', "input format - one of DER PEM"},
+    {"in", OPT_IN, '<', "input file"},
+    {"out", OPT_OUT, '>', "output file (output format is always DER)"},
+    {"i", OPT_INDENT, 0, "indents the output"},
+    {"noout", OPT_NOOUT, 0, "do not produce any output"},
+    {"offset", OPT_OFFSET, 'p', "offset into file"},
+    {"length", OPT_LENGTH, 'p', "length of section in file"},
+    {"oid", OPT_OID, '<', "file of extra oid definitions"},
+    {"dump", OPT_DUMP, 0, "unknown data in hex form"},
+    {"dlimit", OPT_DLIMIT, 'p',
+     "dump the first arg bytes of unknown data in hex form"},
+    {"strparse", OPT_STRPARSE, 's',
+     "offset; a series of these can be used to 'dig'"},
+    {OPT_MORE_STR, 0, 0, "into multiple ASN1 blob wrappings"},
+    {"genstr", OPT_GENSTR, 's', "string to generate ASN1 structure from"},
+    {"genconf", OPT_GENCONF, 's', "file to generate ASN1 structure from"},
+    {OPT_MORE_STR, 0, 0, "(-inform  will be ignored)"},
+    {"strictpem", OPT_STRICTPEM, 0,
+     "do not attempt base64 decode outside PEM markers"},
+    {NULL}
+};
+
+static int do_generate(char *genstr, const char *genconf, BUF_MEM *buf);
+
+int asn1parse_main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    ASN1_TYPE *at = NULL;
+    BIO *in = NULL, *b64 = NULL, *derout = NULL;
+    BUF_MEM *buf = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *osk = NULL;
+    char *genstr = NULL, *genconf = NULL;
+    char *infile = NULL, *oidfile = NULL, *derfile = NULL;
+    unsigned char *str = NULL;
+    char *name = NULL, *header = NULL, *prog;
+    const unsigned char *ctmpbuf;
+    int indent = 0, noout = 0, dump = 0, strictpem = 0, informat = FORMAT_PEM;
+    int offset = 0, ret = 1, i, j;
+    long num, tmplen;
+    unsigned char *tmpbuf;
+    unsigned int length = 0;
+    OPTION_CHOICE o;
+
+    prog = opt_init(argc, argv, asn1parse_options);
+
+    if ((osk = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null()) == NULL) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Memory allocation failure\n", prog);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) {
+        switch (o) {
+        case OPT_EOF:
+        case OPT_ERR:
+ opthelp:
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog);
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_HELP:
+            opt_help(asn1parse_options);
+            ret = 0;
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_INFORM:
+            if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PEMDER, &informat))
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_IN:
+            infile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_OUT:
+            derfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_INDENT:
+            indent = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NOOUT:
+            noout = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_OID:
+            oidfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_OFFSET:
+            offset = strtol(opt_arg(), NULL, 0);
+            break;
+        case OPT_LENGTH:
+            length = atoi(opt_arg());
+            break;
+        case OPT_DUMP:
+            dump = -1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_DLIMIT:
+            dump = atoi(opt_arg());
+            break;
+        case OPT_STRPARSE:
+            sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(osk, opt_arg());
+            break;
+        case OPT_GENSTR:
+            genstr = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_GENCONF:
+            genconf = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_STRICTPEM:
+            strictpem = 1;
+            informat = FORMAT_PEM;
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    argc = opt_num_rest();
+    if (argc != 0)
+        goto opthelp;
+
+    if (oidfile != NULL) {
+        in = bio_open_default(oidfile, 'r', FORMAT_TEXT);
+        if (in == NULL)
+            goto end;
+        OBJ_create_objects(in);
+        BIO_free(in);
+    }
+
+    if ((in = bio_open_default(infile, 'r', informat)) == NULL)
+        goto end;
+
+    if (derfile && (derout = bio_open_default(derfile, 'w', FORMAT_ASN1)) == NULL)
+        goto end;
+
+    if (strictpem) {
+        if (PEM_read_bio(in, &name, &header, &str, &num) !=
+            1) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error reading PEM file\n");
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            goto end;
+        }
+    } else {
+
+        if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
+            goto end;
+        if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, BUFSIZ * 8))
+            goto end;           /* Pre-allocate :-) */
+
+        if (genstr || genconf) {
+            num = do_generate(genstr, genconf, buf);
+            if (num < 0) {
+                ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+                goto end;
+            }
+        }
+
+        else {
+
+            if (informat == FORMAT_PEM) {
+                BIO *tmp;
+
+                if ((b64 = BIO_new(BIO_f_base64())) == NULL)
+                    goto end;
+                BIO_push(b64, in);
+                tmp = in;
+                in = b64;
+                b64 = tmp;
+            }
+
+            num = 0;
+            for (;;) {
+                if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, (int)num + BUFSIZ))
+                    goto end;
+                i = BIO_read(in, &(buf->data[num]), BUFSIZ);
+                if (i <= 0)
+                    break;
+                num += i;
+            }
+        }
+        str = (unsigned char *)buf->data;
+
+    }
+
+    /* If any structs to parse go through in sequence */
+
+    if (sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(osk)) {
+        tmpbuf = str;
+        tmplen = num;
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(osk); i++) {
+            ASN1_TYPE *atmp;
+            int typ;
+            j = atoi(sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(osk, i));
+            if (j == 0) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "'%s' is an invalid number\n",
+                           sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(osk, i));
+                continue;
+            }
+            tmpbuf += j;
+            tmplen -= j;
+            atmp = at;
+            ctmpbuf = tmpbuf;
+            at = d2i_ASN1_TYPE(NULL, &ctmpbuf, tmplen);
+            ASN1_TYPE_free(atmp);
+            if (!at) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error parsing structure\n");
+                ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+                goto end;
+            }
+            typ = ASN1_TYPE_get(at);
+            if ((typ == V_ASN1_OBJECT)
+                || (typ == V_ASN1_BOOLEAN)
+                || (typ == V_ASN1_NULL)) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't parse %s type\n", ASN1_tag2str(typ));
+                ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+                goto end;
+            }
+            /* hmm... this is a little evil but it works */
+            tmpbuf = at->value.asn1_string->data;
+            tmplen = at->value.asn1_string->length;
+        }
+        str = tmpbuf;
+        num = tmplen;
+    }
+
+    if (offset >= num) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error: offset too large\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    num -= offset;
+
+    if ((length == 0) || ((long)length > num))
+        length = (unsigned int)num;
+    if (derout) {
+        if (BIO_write(derout, str + offset, length) != (int)length) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error writing output\n");
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+    if (!noout &&
+        !ASN1_parse_dump(bio_out, &(str[offset]), length,
+                         indent, dump)) {
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        goto end;
+    }
+    ret = 0;
+ end:
+    BIO_free(derout);
+    BIO_free(in);
+    BIO_free(b64);
+    if (ret != 0)
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+    BUF_MEM_free(buf);
+    OPENSSL_free(name);
+    OPENSSL_free(header);
+    if (strictpem)
+        OPENSSL_free(str);
+    ASN1_TYPE_free(at);
+    sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(osk);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static int do_generate(char *genstr, const char *genconf, BUF_MEM *buf)
+{
+    CONF *cnf = NULL;
+    int len;
+    unsigned char *p;
+    ASN1_TYPE *atyp = NULL;
+
+    if (genconf) {
+        if ((cnf = app_load_config(genconf)) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        if (!genstr)
+            genstr = NCONF_get_string(cnf, "default", "asn1");
+        if (!genstr) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't find 'asn1' in '%s'\n", genconf);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    atyp = ASN1_generate_nconf(genstr, cnf);
+    NCONF_free(cnf);
+    cnf = NULL;
+
+    if (!atyp)
+        return -1;
+
+    len = i2d_ASN1_TYPE(atyp, NULL);
+
+    if (len <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, len))
+        goto err;
+
+    p = (unsigned char *)buf->data;
+
+    i2d_ASN1_TYPE(atyp, &p);
+
+    ASN1_TYPE_free(atyp);
+    return len;
+
+ err:
+    NCONF_free(cnf);
+    ASN1_TYPE_free(atyp);
+    return -1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/build.info b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/build.info
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e2ddd2b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/build.info
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+{- our $tsget_name = $config{target} =~ /^(VC|vms)-/ ? "tsget.pl" : "tsget";
+   our @apps_openssl_src =
+       ( qw(openssl.c
+            asn1pars.c ca.c ciphers.c cms.c crl.c crl2p7.c dgst.c dhparam.c
+            dsa.c dsaparam.c ec.c ecparam.c enc.c engine.c errstr.c gendsa.c
+            genpkey.c genrsa.c nseq.c ocsp.c passwd.c pkcs12.c pkcs7.c pkcs8.c
+            pkey.c pkeyparam.c pkeyutl.c prime.c rand.c req.c rsa.c rsautl.c
+            s_client.c s_server.c s_time.c sess_id.c smime.c speed.c spkac.c
+            srp.c ts.c verify.c version.c x509.c rehash.c
+            apps.c opt.c s_cb.c s_socket.c
+            app_rand.c),
+          split(/\s+/, $target{apps_aux_src}) );
+   "" -}
+IF[{- !$disabled{apps} -}]
+  PROGRAMS=openssl
+  SOURCE[openssl]={- join(" ", @apps_openssl_src) -}
+  INCLUDE[openssl]=.. ../include
+  DEPEND[openssl]=../libssl
+
+  {- join("\n  ", map { (my $x = $_) =~ s|\.c$|.o|; "DEPEND[$x]=progs.h" }
+                  @apps_openssl_src) -}
+  GENERATE[progs.h]=progs.pl $(APPS_OPENSSL)
+  DEPEND[progs.h]=../configdata.pm
+
+  SCRIPTS=CA.pl {- $tsget_name -}
+  SOURCE[CA.pl]=CA.pl.in
+  SOURCE[{- $tsget_name -}]=tsget.in
+ENDIF
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/ca-cert.srl b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/ca-cert.srl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2c7456e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/ca-cert.srl
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+07
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/ca-key.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/ca-key.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4e74249
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/ca-key.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/ca-req.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/ca-req.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..84c6dbb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/ca-req.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/ca.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/ca.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d474a2b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/ca.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2593 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* The PPKI stuff has been donated by Jeff Barber <jeffb@issl.atl.hp.com> */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <openssl/conf.h>
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/txt_db.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+
+#ifndef W_OK
+# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+#  if defined(__DECC)
+#   include <unistd.h>
+#  else
+#   include <unixlib.h>
+#  endif
+# elif !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS)
+#  include <sys/file.h>
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#include "apps.h"
+
+#ifndef W_OK
+# define F_OK 0
+# define X_OK 1
+# define W_OK 2
+# define R_OK 4
+#endif
+
+#undef BSIZE
+#define BSIZE 256
+
+#define BASE_SECTION            "ca"
+
+#define ENV_DEFAULT_CA          "default_ca"
+
+#define STRING_MASK             "string_mask"
+#define UTF8_IN                 "utf8"
+
+#define ENV_NEW_CERTS_DIR       "new_certs_dir"
+#define ENV_CERTIFICATE         "certificate"
+#define ENV_SERIAL              "serial"
+#define ENV_CRLNUMBER           "crlnumber"
+#define ENV_PRIVATE_KEY         "private_key"
+#define ENV_DEFAULT_DAYS        "default_days"
+#define ENV_DEFAULT_STARTDATE   "default_startdate"
+#define ENV_DEFAULT_ENDDATE     "default_enddate"
+#define ENV_DEFAULT_CRL_DAYS    "default_crl_days"
+#define ENV_DEFAULT_CRL_HOURS   "default_crl_hours"
+#define ENV_DEFAULT_MD          "default_md"
+#define ENV_DEFAULT_EMAIL_DN    "email_in_dn"
+#define ENV_PRESERVE            "preserve"
+#define ENV_POLICY              "policy"
+#define ENV_EXTENSIONS          "x509_extensions"
+#define ENV_CRLEXT              "crl_extensions"
+#define ENV_MSIE_HACK           "msie_hack"
+#define ENV_NAMEOPT             "name_opt"
+#define ENV_CERTOPT             "cert_opt"
+#define ENV_EXTCOPY             "copy_extensions"
+#define ENV_UNIQUE_SUBJECT      "unique_subject"
+
+#define ENV_DATABASE            "database"
+
+/* Additional revocation information types */
+
+#define REV_NONE                0 /* No additional information */
+#define REV_CRL_REASON          1 /* Value is CRL reason code */
+#define REV_HOLD                2 /* Value is hold instruction */
+#define REV_KEY_COMPROMISE      3 /* Value is cert key compromise time */
+#define REV_CA_COMPROMISE       4 /* Value is CA key compromise time */
+
+static char *lookup_conf(const CONF *conf, const char *group, const char *tag);
+
+static int certify(X509 **xret, const char *infile, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *x509,
+                   const EVP_MD *dgst, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sigopts,
+                   STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *policy, CA_DB *db,
+                   BIGNUM *serial, const char *subj, unsigned long chtype,
+                   int multirdn, int email_dn, const char *startdate,
+                   const char *enddate,
+                   long days, int batch, const char *ext_sect, CONF *conf,
+                   int verbose, unsigned long certopt, unsigned long nameopt,
+                   int default_op, int ext_copy, int selfsign);
+static int certify_cert(X509 **xret, const char *infile, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *x509,
+                        const EVP_MD *dgst, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sigopts,
+                        STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *policy, CA_DB *db,
+                        BIGNUM *serial, const char *subj, unsigned long chtype,
+                        int multirdn, int email_dn, const char *startdate,
+                        const char *enddate, long days, int batch, const char *ext_sect,
+                        CONF *conf, int verbose, unsigned long certopt,
+                        unsigned long nameopt, int default_op, int ext_copy);
+static int certify_spkac(X509 **xret, const char *infile, EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+                         X509 *x509, const EVP_MD *dgst,
+                         STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sigopts,
+                         STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *policy, CA_DB *db,
+                         BIGNUM *serial, const char *subj, unsigned long chtype,
+                         int multirdn, int email_dn, const char *startdate,
+                         const char *enddate, long days, const char *ext_sect, CONF *conf,
+                         int verbose, unsigned long certopt,
+                         unsigned long nameopt, int default_op, int ext_copy);
+static void write_new_certificate(BIO *bp, X509 *x, int output_der, int notext);
+static int do_body(X509 **xret, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *x509,
+                   const EVP_MD *dgst, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sigopts,
+                   STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *policy, CA_DB *db, BIGNUM *serial,
+                   const char *subj, unsigned long chtype, int multirdn,
+                   int email_dn, const char *startdate, const char *enddate, long days,
+                   int batch, int verbose, X509_REQ *req, const char *ext_sect,
+                   CONF *conf, unsigned long certopt, unsigned long nameopt,
+                   int default_op, int ext_copy, int selfsign);
+static int do_revoke(X509 *x509, CA_DB *db, int ext, char *extval);
+static int get_certificate_status(const char *ser_status, CA_DB *db);
+static int do_updatedb(CA_DB *db);
+static int check_time_format(const char *str);
+char *make_revocation_str(int rev_type, char *rev_arg);
+int make_revoked(X509_REVOKED *rev, const char *str);
+static int old_entry_print(const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, const ASN1_STRING *str);
+
+static CONF *extconf = NULL;
+static int preserve = 0;
+static int msie_hack = 0;
+
+typedef enum OPTION_choice {
+    OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP,
+    OPT_ENGINE, OPT_VERBOSE, OPT_CONFIG, OPT_NAME, OPT_SUBJ, OPT_UTF8,
+    OPT_CREATE_SERIAL, OPT_MULTIVALUE_RDN, OPT_STARTDATE, OPT_ENDDATE,
+    OPT_DAYS, OPT_MD, OPT_POLICY, OPT_KEYFILE, OPT_KEYFORM, OPT_PASSIN,
+    OPT_KEY, OPT_CERT, OPT_SELFSIGN, OPT_IN, OPT_OUT, OPT_OUTDIR,
+    OPT_SIGOPT, OPT_NOTEXT, OPT_BATCH, OPT_PRESERVEDN, OPT_NOEMAILDN,
+    OPT_GENCRL, OPT_MSIE_HACK, OPT_CRLDAYS, OPT_CRLHOURS, OPT_CRLSEC,
+    OPT_INFILES, OPT_SS_CERT, OPT_SPKAC, OPT_REVOKE, OPT_VALID,
+    OPT_EXTENSIONS, OPT_EXTFILE, OPT_STATUS, OPT_UPDATEDB, OPT_CRLEXTS,
+    OPT_CRL_REASON, OPT_CRL_HOLD, OPT_CRL_COMPROMISE,
+    OPT_CRL_CA_COMPROMISE
+} OPTION_CHOICE;
+
+OPTIONS ca_options[] = {
+    {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"},
+    {"verbose", OPT_VERBOSE, '-', "Verbose output during processing"},
+    {"config", OPT_CONFIG, 's', "A config file"},
+    {"name", OPT_NAME, 's', "The particular CA definition to use"},
+    {"subj", OPT_SUBJ, 's', "Use arg instead of request's subject"},
+    {"utf8", OPT_UTF8, '-', "Input characters are UTF8 (default ASCII)"},
+    {"create_serial", OPT_CREATE_SERIAL, '-',
+     "If reading serial fails, create a new random serial"},
+    {"multivalue-rdn", OPT_MULTIVALUE_RDN, '-',
+     "Enable support for multivalued RDNs"},
+    {"startdate", OPT_STARTDATE, 's', "Cert notBefore, YYMMDDHHMMSSZ"},
+    {"enddate", OPT_ENDDATE, 's',
+     "YYMMDDHHMMSSZ cert notAfter (overrides -days)"},
+    {"days", OPT_DAYS, 'p', "Number of days to certify the cert for"},
+    {"md", OPT_MD, 's', "md to use; one of md2, md5, sha or sha1"},
+    {"policy", OPT_POLICY, 's', "The CA 'policy' to support"},
+    {"keyfile", OPT_KEYFILE, 's', "Private key"},
+    {"keyform", OPT_KEYFORM, 'f', "Private key file format (PEM or ENGINE)"},
+    {"passin", OPT_PASSIN, 's', "Input file pass phrase source"},
+    {"key", OPT_KEY, 's', "Key to decode the private key if it is encrypted"},
+    {"cert", OPT_CERT, '<', "The CA cert"},
+    {"selfsign", OPT_SELFSIGN, '-',
+     "Sign a cert with the key associated with it"},
+    {"in", OPT_IN, '<', "The input PEM encoded cert request(s)"},
+    {"out", OPT_OUT, '>', "Where to put the output file(s)"},
+    {"outdir", OPT_OUTDIR, '/', "Where to put output cert"},
+    {"sigopt", OPT_SIGOPT, 's', "Signature parameter in n:v form"},
+    {"notext", OPT_NOTEXT, '-', "Do not print the generated certificate"},
+    {"batch", OPT_BATCH, '-', "Don't ask questions"},
+    {"preserveDN", OPT_PRESERVEDN, '-', "Don't re-order the DN"},
+    {"noemailDN", OPT_NOEMAILDN, '-', "Don't add the EMAIL field to the DN"},
+    {"gencrl", OPT_GENCRL, '-', "Generate a new CRL"},
+    {"msie_hack", OPT_MSIE_HACK, '-',
+     "msie modifications to handle all those universal strings"},
+    {"crldays", OPT_CRLDAYS, 'p', "Days until the next CRL is due"},
+    {"crlhours", OPT_CRLHOURS, 'p', "Hours until the next CRL is due"},
+    {"crlsec", OPT_CRLSEC, 'p', "Seconds until the next CRL is due"},
+    {"infiles", OPT_INFILES, '-', "The last argument, requests to process"},
+    {"ss_cert", OPT_SS_CERT, '<', "File contains a self signed cert to sign"},
+    {"spkac", OPT_SPKAC, '<',
+     "File contains DN and signed public key and challenge"},
+    {"revoke", OPT_REVOKE, '<', "Revoke a cert (given in file)"},
+    {"valid", OPT_VALID, 's',
+     "Add a Valid(not-revoked) DB entry about a cert (given in file)"},
+    {"extensions", OPT_EXTENSIONS, 's',
+     "Extension section (override value in config file)"},
+    {"extfile", OPT_EXTFILE, '<',
+     "Configuration file with X509v3 extensions to add"},
+    {"status", OPT_STATUS, 's', "Shows cert status given the serial number"},
+    {"updatedb", OPT_UPDATEDB, '-', "Updates db for expired cert"},
+    {"crlexts", OPT_CRLEXTS, 's',
+     "CRL extension section (override value in config file)"},
+    {"crl_reason", OPT_CRL_REASON, 's', "revocation reason"},
+    {"crl_hold", OPT_CRL_HOLD, 's',
+     "the hold instruction, an OID. Sets revocation reason to certificateHold"},
+    {"crl_compromise", OPT_CRL_COMPROMISE, 's',
+     "sets compromise time to val and the revocation reason to keyCompromise"},
+    {"crl_CA_compromise", OPT_CRL_CA_COMPROMISE, 's',
+     "sets compromise time to val and the revocation reason to CACompromise"},
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine, possibly a hardware device"},
+#endif
+    {NULL}
+};
+
+int ca_main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    CONF *conf = NULL;
+    ENGINE *e = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *crlnumber = NULL, *serial = NULL;
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+    BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL, *Sout = NULL;
+    ASN1_INTEGER *tmpser;
+    ASN1_TIME *tmptm;
+    CA_DB *db = NULL;
+    DB_ATTR db_attr;
+    STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *attribs = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sigopts = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(X509) *cert_sk = NULL;
+    X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
+    const EVP_MD *dgst = NULL;
+    char *configfile = default_config_file, *section = NULL;
+    char *md = NULL, *policy = NULL, *keyfile = NULL;
+    char *certfile = NULL, *crl_ext = NULL, *crlnumberfile = NULL, *key = NULL;
+    const char *infile = NULL, *spkac_file = NULL, *ss_cert_file = NULL;
+    const char *extensions = NULL, *extfile = NULL, *passinarg = NULL;
+    char *outdir = NULL, *outfile = NULL, *rev_arg = NULL, *ser_status = NULL;
+    const char *serialfile = NULL, *subj = NULL;
+    char *prog, *startdate = NULL, *enddate = NULL;
+    char *dbfile = NULL, *f, *randfile = NULL;
+    char buf[3][BSIZE];
+    char *const *pp;
+    const char *p;
+    int create_ser = 0, free_key = 0, total = 0, total_done = 0;
+    int batch = 0, default_op = 1, doupdatedb = 0, ext_copy = EXT_COPY_NONE;
+    int keyformat = FORMAT_PEM, multirdn = 0, notext = 0, output_der = 0;
+    int ret = 1, email_dn = 1, req = 0, verbose = 0, gencrl = 0, dorevoke = 0;
+    int i, j, rev_type = REV_NONE, selfsign = 0;
+    long crldays = 0, crlhours = 0, crlsec = 0, days = 0;
+    unsigned long chtype = MBSTRING_ASC, nameopt = 0, certopt = 0;
+    X509 *x509 = NULL, *x509p = NULL, *x = NULL;
+    X509_REVOKED *r = NULL;
+    OPTION_CHOICE o;
+
+    prog = opt_init(argc, argv, ca_options);
+    while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) {
+        switch (o) {
+        case OPT_EOF:
+        case OPT_ERR:
+opthelp:
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog);
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_HELP:
+            opt_help(ca_options);
+            ret = 0;
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_IN:
+            req = 1;
+            infile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_OUT:
+            outfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_VERBOSE:
+            verbose = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_CONFIG:
+            configfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_NAME:
+            section = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_SUBJ:
+            subj = opt_arg();
+            /* preserve=1; */
+            break;
+        case OPT_UTF8:
+            chtype = MBSTRING_UTF8;
+            break;
+        case OPT_CREATE_SERIAL:
+            create_ser = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_MULTIVALUE_RDN:
+            multirdn = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_STARTDATE:
+            startdate = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_ENDDATE:
+            enddate = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_DAYS:
+            days = atoi(opt_arg());
+            break;
+        case OPT_MD:
+            md = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_POLICY:
+            policy = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_KEYFILE:
+            keyfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_KEYFORM:
+            if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_ANY, &keyformat))
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_PASSIN:
+            passinarg = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_KEY:
+            key = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_CERT:
+            certfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_SELFSIGN:
+            selfsign = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_OUTDIR:
+            outdir = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_SIGOPT:
+            if (sigopts == NULL)
+                sigopts = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null();
+            if (sigopts == NULL
+                || !sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(sigopts, opt_arg()))
+                goto end;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NOTEXT:
+            notext = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_BATCH:
+            batch = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_PRESERVEDN:
+            preserve = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NOEMAILDN:
+            email_dn = 0;
+            break;
+        case OPT_GENCRL:
+            gencrl = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_MSIE_HACK:
+            msie_hack = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_CRLDAYS:
+            crldays = atol(opt_arg());
+            break;
+        case OPT_CRLHOURS:
+            crlhours = atol(opt_arg());
+            break;
+        case OPT_CRLSEC:
+            crlsec = atol(opt_arg());
+            break;
+        case OPT_INFILES:
+            req = 1;
+            goto end_of_options;
+        case OPT_SS_CERT:
+            ss_cert_file = opt_arg();
+            req = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_SPKAC:
+            spkac_file = opt_arg();
+            req = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_REVOKE:
+            infile = opt_arg();
+            dorevoke = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_VALID:
+            infile = opt_arg();
+            dorevoke = 2;
+            break;
+        case OPT_EXTENSIONS:
+            extensions = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_EXTFILE:
+            extfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_STATUS:
+            ser_status = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_UPDATEDB:
+            doupdatedb = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_CRLEXTS:
+            crl_ext = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_CRL_REASON:
+            rev_arg = opt_arg();
+            rev_type = REV_CRL_REASON;
+            break;
+        case OPT_CRL_HOLD:
+            rev_arg = opt_arg();
+            rev_type = REV_HOLD;
+            break;
+        case OPT_CRL_COMPROMISE:
+            rev_arg = opt_arg();
+            rev_type = REV_KEY_COMPROMISE;
+            break;
+        case OPT_CRL_CA_COMPROMISE:
+            rev_arg = opt_arg();
+            rev_type = REV_CA_COMPROMISE;
+            break;
+        case OPT_ENGINE:
+            e = setup_engine(opt_arg(), 0);
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+end_of_options:
+    argc = opt_num_rest();
+    argv = opt_rest();
+
+    BIO_printf(bio_err, "Using configuration from %s\n", configfile);
+
+    if ((conf = app_load_config(configfile)) == NULL)
+        goto end;
+    if (configfile != default_config_file && !app_load_modules(conf))
+        goto end;
+
+    /* Lets get the config section we are using */
+    if (section == NULL
+        && (section = lookup_conf(conf, BASE_SECTION, ENV_DEFAULT_CA)) == NULL)
+        goto end;
+
+    p = NCONF_get_string(conf, NULL, "oid_file");
+    if (p == NULL)
+        ERR_clear_error();
+    if (p != NULL) {
+        BIO *oid_bio = BIO_new_file(p, "r");
+
+        if (oid_bio == NULL) {
+            ERR_clear_error();
+        } else {
+            OBJ_create_objects(oid_bio);
+            BIO_free(oid_bio);
+        }
+    }
+    if (!add_oid_section(conf)) {
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    randfile = NCONF_get_string(conf, BASE_SECTION, "RANDFILE");
+    if (randfile == NULL)
+        ERR_clear_error();
+    app_RAND_load_file(randfile, 0);
+
+    f = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, STRING_MASK);
+    if (!f)
+        ERR_clear_error();
+
+    if (f && !ASN1_STRING_set_default_mask_asc(f)) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Invalid global string mask setting %s\n", f);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (chtype != MBSTRING_UTF8) {
+        f = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, UTF8_IN);
+        if (!f)
+            ERR_clear_error();
+        else if (strcmp(f, "yes") == 0)
+            chtype = MBSTRING_UTF8;
+    }
+
+    db_attr.unique_subject = 1;
+    p = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_UNIQUE_SUBJECT);
+    if (p) {
+        db_attr.unique_subject = parse_yesno(p, 1);
+    } else
+        ERR_clear_error();
+
+    /*****************************************************************/
+    /* report status of cert with serial number given on command line */
+    if (ser_status) {
+        dbfile = lookup_conf(conf, section, ENV_DATABASE);
+        if (dbfile == NULL)
+            goto end;
+
+        db = load_index(dbfile, &db_attr);
+        if (db == NULL)
+            goto end;
+
+        if (!index_index(db))
+            goto end;
+
+        if (get_certificate_status(ser_status, db) != 1)
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error verifying serial %s!\n", ser_status);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    /*****************************************************************/
+    /* we definitely need a private key, so let's get it */
+
+    if (keyfile == NULL
+        && (keyfile = lookup_conf(conf, section, ENV_PRIVATE_KEY)) == NULL)
+        goto end;
+
+    if (!key) {
+        free_key = 1;
+        if (!app_passwd(passinarg, NULL, &key, NULL)) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting password\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+    pkey = load_key(keyfile, keyformat, 0, key, e, "CA private key");
+    if (key)
+        OPENSSL_cleanse(key, strlen(key));
+    if (pkey == NULL) {
+        /* load_key() has already printed an appropriate message */
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    /*****************************************************************/
+    /* we need a certificate */
+    if (!selfsign || spkac_file || ss_cert_file || gencrl) {
+        if (certfile == NULL
+            && (certfile = lookup_conf(conf, section, ENV_CERTIFICATE)) == NULL)
+            goto end;
+
+        x509 = load_cert(certfile, FORMAT_PEM, "CA certificate");
+        if (x509 == NULL)
+            goto end;
+
+        if (!X509_check_private_key(x509, pkey)) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                       "CA certificate and CA private key do not match\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+    if (!selfsign)
+        x509p = x509;
+
+    f = NCONF_get_string(conf, BASE_SECTION, ENV_PRESERVE);
+    if (f == NULL)
+        ERR_clear_error();
+    if ((f != NULL) && ((*f == 'y') || (*f == 'Y')))
+        preserve = 1;
+    f = NCONF_get_string(conf, BASE_SECTION, ENV_MSIE_HACK);
+    if (f == NULL)
+        ERR_clear_error();
+    if ((f != NULL) && ((*f == 'y') || (*f == 'Y')))
+        msie_hack = 1;
+
+    f = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_NAMEOPT);
+
+    if (f) {
+        if (!set_name_ex(&nameopt, f)) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Invalid name options: \"%s\"\n", f);
+            goto end;
+        }
+        default_op = 0;
+    } else {
+        nameopt = XN_FLAG_ONELINE;
+        ERR_clear_error();
+    }
+
+    f = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_CERTOPT);
+
+    if (f) {
+        if (!set_cert_ex(&certopt, f)) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Invalid certificate options: \"%s\"\n", f);
+            goto end;
+        }
+        default_op = 0;
+    } else
+        ERR_clear_error();
+
+    f = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_EXTCOPY);
+
+    if (f) {
+        if (!set_ext_copy(&ext_copy, f)) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Invalid extension copy option: \"%s\"\n", f);
+            goto end;
+        }
+    } else
+        ERR_clear_error();
+
+    /*****************************************************************/
+    /* lookup where to write new certificates */
+    if ((outdir == NULL) && (req)) {
+
+        outdir = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_NEW_CERTS_DIR);
+        if (outdir == NULL) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                       "there needs to be defined a directory for new certificate to be placed in\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+        /*
+         * outdir is a directory spec, but access() for VMS demands a
+         * filename.  We could use the DEC C routine to convert the
+         * directory syntax to Unixly, and give that to app_isdir,
+         * but for now the fopen will catch the error if it's not a
+         * directory
+         */
+        if (app_isdir(outdir) <= 0) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: %s is not a directory\n", prog, outdir);
+            perror(outdir);
+            goto end;
+        }
+#endif
+    }
+
+    /*****************************************************************/
+    /* we need to load the database file */
+    dbfile = lookup_conf(conf, section, ENV_DATABASE);
+    if (dbfile == NULL)
+        goto end;
+
+    db = load_index(dbfile, &db_attr);
+    if (db == NULL)
+        goto end;
+
+    /* Lets check some fields */
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_num(db->db->data); i++) {
+        pp = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, i);
+        if ((pp[DB_type][0] != DB_TYPE_REV) && (pp[DB_rev_date][0] != '\0')) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                       "entry %d: not revoked yet, but has a revocation date\n",
+                       i + 1);
+            goto end;
+        }
+        if ((pp[DB_type][0] == DB_TYPE_REV) &&
+            !make_revoked(NULL, pp[DB_rev_date])) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, " in entry %d\n", i + 1);
+            goto end;
+        }
+        if (!check_time_format((char *)pp[DB_exp_date])) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "entry %d: invalid expiry date\n", i + 1);
+            goto end;
+        }
+        p = pp[DB_serial];
+        j = strlen(p);
+        if (*p == '-') {
+            p++;
+            j--;
+        }
+        if ((j & 1) || (j < 2)) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "entry %d: bad serial number length (%d)\n",
+                       i + 1, j);
+            goto end;
+        }
+        for ( ; *p; p++) {
+            if (!isxdigit(_UC(*p))) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                           "entry %d: bad char 0%o '%c' in serial number\n",
+                           i + 1, *p, *p);
+                goto end;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    if (verbose) {
+        TXT_DB_write(bio_out, db->db);
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "%d entries loaded from the database\n",
+                   sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_num(db->db->data));
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "generating index\n");
+    }
+
+    if (!index_index(db))
+        goto end;
+
+    /*****************************************************************/
+    /* Update the db file for expired certificates */
+    if (doupdatedb) {
+        if (verbose)
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Updating %s ...\n", dbfile);
+
+        i = do_updatedb(db);
+        if (i == -1) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Malloc failure\n");
+            goto end;
+        } else if (i == 0) {
+            if (verbose)
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "No entries found to mark expired\n");
+        } else {
+            if (!save_index(dbfile, "new", db))
+                goto end;
+
+            if (!rotate_index(dbfile, "new", "old"))
+                goto end;
+
+            if (verbose)
+                BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                           "Done. %d entries marked as expired\n", i);
+        }
+    }
+
+    /*****************************************************************/
+    /* Read extensions config file                                   */
+    if (extfile) {
+        if ((extconf = app_load_config(extfile)) == NULL) {
+            ret = 1;
+            goto end;
+        }
+
+        if (verbose)
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Successfully loaded extensions file %s\n",
+                       extfile);
+
+        /* We can have sections in the ext file */
+        if (extensions == NULL) {
+            extensions = NCONF_get_string(extconf, "default", "extensions");
+            if (extensions == NULL)
+                extensions = "default";
+        }
+    }
+
+    /*****************************************************************/
+    if (req || gencrl) {
+        /* FIXME: Is it really always text? */
+        Sout = bio_open_default(outfile, 'w', FORMAT_TEXT);
+        if (Sout == NULL)
+            goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (md == NULL
+        && (md = lookup_conf(conf, section, ENV_DEFAULT_MD)) == NULL)
+        goto end;
+
+    if (strcmp(md, "default") == 0) {
+        int def_nid;
+        if (EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid(pkey, &def_nid) <= 0) {
+            BIO_puts(bio_err, "no default digest\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+        md = (char *)OBJ_nid2sn(def_nid);
+    }
+
+    if (!opt_md(md, &dgst)) {
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (req) {
+        if (email_dn == 1) {
+            char *tmp_email_dn = NULL;
+
+            tmp_email_dn = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_DEFAULT_EMAIL_DN);
+            if (tmp_email_dn != NULL && strcmp(tmp_email_dn, "no") == 0)
+                email_dn = 0;
+        }
+        if (verbose)
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "message digest is %s\n",
+                       OBJ_nid2ln(EVP_MD_type(dgst)));
+        if (policy == NULL
+            && (policy = lookup_conf(conf, section, ENV_POLICY)) == NULL)
+            goto end;
+
+        if (verbose)
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "policy is %s\n", policy);
+
+        serialfile = lookup_conf(conf, section, ENV_SERIAL);
+        if (serialfile == NULL)
+            goto end;
+
+        if (!extconf) {
+            /*
+             * no '-extfile' option, so we look for extensions in the main
+             * configuration file
+             */
+            if (!extensions) {
+                extensions = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_EXTENSIONS);
+                if (!extensions)
+                    ERR_clear_error();
+            }
+            if (extensions) {
+                /* Check syntax of file */
+                X509V3_CTX ctx;
+                X509V3_set_ctx_test(&ctx);
+                X509V3_set_nconf(&ctx, conf);
+                if (!X509V3_EXT_add_nconf(conf, &ctx, extensions, NULL)) {
+                    BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                               "Error Loading extension section %s\n",
+                               extensions);
+                    ret = 1;
+                    goto end;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
+        if (startdate == NULL) {
+            startdate = NCONF_get_string(conf, section,
+                                         ENV_DEFAULT_STARTDATE);
+            if (startdate == NULL)
+                ERR_clear_error();
+        }
+        if (startdate && !ASN1_TIME_set_string(NULL, startdate)) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                       "start date is invalid, it should be YYMMDDHHMMSSZ or YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+        if (startdate == NULL)
+            startdate = "today";
+
+        if (enddate == NULL) {
+            enddate = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_DEFAULT_ENDDATE);
+            if (enddate == NULL)
+                ERR_clear_error();
+        }
+        if (enddate && !ASN1_TIME_set_string(NULL, enddate)) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                       "end date is invalid, it should be YYMMDDHHMMSSZ or YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+
+        if (days == 0) {
+            if (!NCONF_get_number(conf, section, ENV_DEFAULT_DAYS, &days))
+                days = 0;
+        }
+        if (!enddate && (days == 0)) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                       "cannot lookup how many days to certify for\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+
+        if ((serial = load_serial(serialfile, create_ser, NULL)) == NULL) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "error while loading serial number\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+        if (verbose) {
+            if (BN_is_zero(serial))
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "next serial number is 00\n");
+            else {
+                if ((f = BN_bn2hex(serial)) == NULL)
+                    goto end;
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "next serial number is %s\n", f);
+                OPENSSL_free(f);
+            }
+        }
+
+        if ((attribs = NCONF_get_section(conf, policy)) == NULL) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to find 'section' for %s\n", policy);
+            goto end;
+        }
+
+        if ((cert_sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+        if (spkac_file != NULL) {
+            total++;
+            j = certify_spkac(&x, spkac_file, pkey, x509, dgst, sigopts,
+                              attribs, db, serial, subj, chtype, multirdn,
+                              email_dn, startdate, enddate, days, extensions,
+                              conf, verbose, certopt, nameopt, default_op,
+                              ext_copy);
+            if (j < 0)
+                goto end;
+            if (j > 0) {
+                total_done++;
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n");
+                if (!BN_add_word(serial, 1))
+                    goto end;
+                if (!sk_X509_push(cert_sk, x)) {
+                    BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n");
+                    goto end;
+                }
+                if (outfile) {
+                    output_der = 1;
+                    batch = 1;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        if (ss_cert_file != NULL) {
+            total++;
+            j = certify_cert(&x, ss_cert_file, pkey, x509, dgst, sigopts,
+                             attribs,
+                             db, serial, subj, chtype, multirdn, email_dn,
+                             startdate, enddate, days, batch, extensions,
+                             conf, verbose, certopt, nameopt, default_op,
+                             ext_copy);
+            if (j < 0)
+                goto end;
+            if (j > 0) {
+                total_done++;
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n");
+                if (!BN_add_word(serial, 1))
+                    goto end;
+                if (!sk_X509_push(cert_sk, x)) {
+                    BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n");
+                    goto end;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        if (infile != NULL) {
+            total++;
+            j = certify(&x, infile, pkey, x509p, dgst, sigopts, attribs, db,
+                        serial, subj, chtype, multirdn, email_dn, startdate,
+                        enddate, days, batch, extensions, conf, verbose,
+                        certopt, nameopt, default_op, ext_copy, selfsign);
+            if (j < 0)
+                goto end;
+            if (j > 0) {
+                total_done++;
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n");
+                if (!BN_add_word(serial, 1))
+                    goto end;
+                if (!sk_X509_push(cert_sk, x)) {
+                    BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n");
+                    goto end;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
+            total++;
+            j = certify(&x, argv[i], pkey, x509p, dgst, sigopts, attribs, db,
+                        serial, subj, chtype, multirdn, email_dn, startdate,
+                        enddate, days, batch, extensions, conf, verbose,
+                        certopt, nameopt, default_op, ext_copy, selfsign);
+            if (j < 0)
+                goto end;
+            if (j > 0) {
+                total_done++;
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n");
+                if (!BN_add_word(serial, 1))
+                    goto end;
+                if (!sk_X509_push(cert_sk, x)) {
+                    BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n");
+                    goto end;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        /*
+         * we have a stack of newly certified certificates and a data base
+         * and serial number that need updating
+         */
+
+        if (sk_X509_num(cert_sk) > 0) {
+            if (!batch) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                           "\n%d out of %d certificate requests certified, commit? [y/n]",
+                           total_done, total);
+                (void)BIO_flush(bio_err);
+                buf[0][0] = '\0';
+                if (!fgets(buf[0], 10, stdin)) {
+                    BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                               "CERTIFICATION CANCELED: I/O error\n");
+                    ret = 0;
+                    goto end;
+                }
+                if ((buf[0][0] != 'y') && (buf[0][0] != 'Y')) {
+                    BIO_printf(bio_err, "CERTIFICATION CANCELED\n");
+                    ret = 0;
+                    goto end;
+                }
+            }
+
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Write out database with %d new entries\n",
+                       sk_X509_num(cert_sk));
+
+            if (!save_serial(serialfile, "new", serial, NULL))
+                goto end;
+
+            if (!save_index(dbfile, "new", db))
+                goto end;
+        }
+
+        if (verbose)
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "writing new certificates\n");
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(cert_sk); i++) {
+            BIO *Cout = NULL;
+            X509 *xi = sk_X509_value(cert_sk, i);
+            ASN1_INTEGER *serialNumber = X509_get_serialNumber(xi);
+            int k;
+            char *n;
+
+            j = ASN1_STRING_length(serialNumber);
+            p = (const char *)ASN1_STRING_get0_data(serialNumber);
+
+            if (strlen(outdir) >= (size_t)(j ? BSIZE - j * 2 - 6 : BSIZE - 8)) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "certificate file name too long\n");
+                goto end;
+            }
+
+            strcpy(buf[2], outdir);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+            OPENSSL_strlcat(buf[2], "/", sizeof(buf[2]));
+#endif
+
+            n = (char *)&(buf[2][strlen(buf[2])]);
+            if (j > 0) {
+                for (k = 0; k < j; k++) {
+                    if (n >= &(buf[2][sizeof(buf[2])]))
+                        break;
+                    BIO_snprintf(n,
+                                 &buf[2][0] + sizeof(buf[2]) - n,
+                                 "%02X", (unsigned char)*(p++));
+                    n += 2;
+                }
+            } else {
+                *(n++) = '0';
+                *(n++) = '0';
+            }
+            *(n++) = '.';
+            *(n++) = 'p';
+            *(n++) = 'e';
+            *(n++) = 'm';
+            *n = '\0';
+            if (verbose)
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "writing %s\n", buf[2]);
+
+            Cout = BIO_new_file(buf[2], "w");
+            if (Cout == NULL) {
+                perror(buf[2]);
+                goto end;
+            }
+            write_new_certificate(Cout, xi, 0, notext);
+            write_new_certificate(Sout, xi, output_der, notext);
+            BIO_free_all(Cout);
+        }
+
+        if (sk_X509_num(cert_sk)) {
+            /* Rename the database and the serial file */
+            if (!rotate_serial(serialfile, "new", "old"))
+                goto end;
+
+            if (!rotate_index(dbfile, "new", "old"))
+                goto end;
+
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Data Base Updated\n");
+        }
+    }
+
+    /*****************************************************************/
+    if (gencrl) {
+        int crl_v2 = 0;
+        if (!crl_ext) {
+            crl_ext = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_CRLEXT);
+            if (!crl_ext)
+                ERR_clear_error();
+        }
+        if (crl_ext) {
+            /* Check syntax of file */
+            X509V3_CTX ctx;
+            X509V3_set_ctx_test(&ctx);
+            X509V3_set_nconf(&ctx, conf);
+            if (!X509V3_EXT_add_nconf(conf, &ctx, crl_ext, NULL)) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                           "Error Loading CRL extension section %s\n",
+                           crl_ext);
+                ret = 1;
+                goto end;
+            }
+        }
+
+        if ((crlnumberfile = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_CRLNUMBER))
+            != NULL)
+            if ((crlnumber = load_serial(crlnumberfile, 0, NULL)) == NULL) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "error while loading CRL number\n");
+                goto end;
+            }
+
+        if (!crldays && !crlhours && !crlsec) {
+            if (!NCONF_get_number(conf, section,
+                                  ENV_DEFAULT_CRL_DAYS, &crldays))
+                crldays = 0;
+            if (!NCONF_get_number(conf, section,
+                                  ENV_DEFAULT_CRL_HOURS, &crlhours))
+                crlhours = 0;
+            ERR_clear_error();
+        }
+        if ((crldays == 0) && (crlhours == 0) && (crlsec == 0)) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                       "cannot lookup how long until the next CRL is issued\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+
+        if (verbose)
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "making CRL\n");
+        if ((crl = X509_CRL_new()) == NULL)
+            goto end;
+        if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl, X509_get_subject_name(x509)))
+            goto end;
+
+        tmptm = ASN1_TIME_new();
+        if (tmptm == NULL
+                || X509_gmtime_adj(tmptm, 0) == NULL
+                || !X509_CRL_set1_lastUpdate(crl, tmptm)
+                || X509_time_adj_ex(tmptm, crldays, crlhours * 60 * 60 + crlsec,
+                                    NULL) == NULL) {
+            BIO_puts(bio_err, "error setting CRL nextUpdate\n");
+            ASN1_TIME_free(tmptm);
+            goto end;
+        }
+        X509_CRL_set1_nextUpdate(crl, tmptm);
+
+        ASN1_TIME_free(tmptm);
+
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_num(db->db->data); i++) {
+            pp = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, i);
+            if (pp[DB_type][0] == DB_TYPE_REV) {
+                if ((r = X509_REVOKED_new()) == NULL)
+                    goto end;
+                j = make_revoked(r, pp[DB_rev_date]);
+                if (!j)
+                    goto end;
+                if (j == 2)
+                    crl_v2 = 1;
+                if (!BN_hex2bn(&serial, pp[DB_serial]))
+                    goto end;
+                tmpser = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(serial, NULL);
+                BN_free(serial);
+                serial = NULL;
+                if (!tmpser)
+                    goto end;
+                X509_REVOKED_set_serialNumber(r, tmpser);
+                ASN1_INTEGER_free(tmpser);
+                X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, r);
+            }
+        }
+
+        /*
+         * sort the data so it will be written in serial number order
+         */
+        X509_CRL_sort(crl);
+
+        /* we now have a CRL */
+        if (verbose)
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "signing CRL\n");
+
+        /* Add any extensions asked for */
+
+        if (crl_ext || crlnumberfile != NULL) {
+            X509V3_CTX crlctx;
+            X509V3_set_ctx(&crlctx, x509, NULL, NULL, crl, 0);
+            X509V3_set_nconf(&crlctx, conf);
+
+            if (crl_ext)
+                if (!X509V3_EXT_CRL_add_nconf(conf, &crlctx, crl_ext, crl))
+                    goto end;
+            if (crlnumberfile != NULL) {
+                tmpser = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(crlnumber, NULL);
+                if (!tmpser)
+                    goto end;
+                X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_crl_number, tmpser, 0, 0);
+                ASN1_INTEGER_free(tmpser);
+                crl_v2 = 1;
+                if (!BN_add_word(crlnumber, 1))
+                    goto end;
+            }
+        }
+        if (crl_ext || crl_v2) {
+            if (!X509_CRL_set_version(crl, 1))
+                goto end;       /* version 2 CRL */
+        }
+
+        /* we have a CRL number that need updating */
+        if (crlnumberfile != NULL)
+            if (!save_serial(crlnumberfile, "new", crlnumber, NULL))
+                goto end;
+
+        BN_free(crlnumber);
+        crlnumber = NULL;
+
+        if (!do_X509_CRL_sign(crl, pkey, dgst, sigopts))
+            goto end;
+
+        PEM_write_bio_X509_CRL(Sout, crl);
+
+        if (crlnumberfile != NULL) /* Rename the crlnumber file */
+            if (!rotate_serial(crlnumberfile, "new", "old"))
+                goto end;
+
+    }
+    /*****************************************************************/
+    if (dorevoke) {
+        if (infile == NULL) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "no input files\n");
+            goto end;
+        } else {
+            X509 *revcert;
+            revcert = load_cert(infile, FORMAT_PEM, infile);
+            if (revcert == NULL)
+                goto end;
+            if (dorevoke == 2)
+                rev_type = -1;
+            j = do_revoke(revcert, db, rev_type, rev_arg);
+            if (j <= 0)
+                goto end;
+            X509_free(revcert);
+
+            if (!save_index(dbfile, "new", db))
+                goto end;
+
+            if (!rotate_index(dbfile, "new", "old"))
+                goto end;
+
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Data Base Updated\n");
+        }
+    }
+    /*****************************************************************/
+    ret = 0;
+ end:
+    BIO_free_all(Sout);
+    BIO_free_all(out);
+    BIO_free_all(in);
+    sk_X509_pop_free(cert_sk, X509_free);
+
+    if (ret)
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+    app_RAND_write_file(randfile);
+    if (free_key)
+        OPENSSL_free(key);
+    BN_free(serial);
+    BN_free(crlnumber);
+    free_index(db);
+    sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(sigopts);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+    X509_free(x509);
+    X509_CRL_free(crl);
+    NCONF_free(conf);
+    NCONF_free(extconf);
+    release_engine(e);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static char *lookup_conf(const CONF *conf, const char *section, const char *tag)
+{
+    char *entry = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, tag);
+    if (entry == NULL)
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "variable lookup failed for %s::%s\n", section, tag);
+    return entry;
+}
+
+static int certify(X509 **xret, const char *infile, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *x509,
+                   const EVP_MD *dgst, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sigopts,
+                   STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *policy, CA_DB *db,
+                   BIGNUM *serial, const char *subj, unsigned long chtype,
+                   int multirdn, int email_dn, const char *startdate,
+                   const char *enddate,
+                   long days, int batch, const char *ext_sect, CONF *lconf,
+                   int verbose, unsigned long certopt, unsigned long nameopt,
+                   int default_op, int ext_copy, int selfsign)
+{
+    X509_REQ *req = NULL;
+    BIO *in = NULL;
+    EVP_PKEY *pktmp = NULL;
+    int ok = -1, i;
+
+    in = BIO_new_file(infile, "r");
+    if (in == NULL) {
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        goto end;
+    }
+    if ((req = PEM_read_bio_X509_REQ(in, NULL, NULL, NULL)) == NULL) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error reading certificate request in %s\n",
+                   infile);
+        goto end;
+    }
+    if (verbose)
+        X509_REQ_print(bio_err, req);
+
+    BIO_printf(bio_err, "Check that the request matches the signature\n");
+
+    if (selfsign && !X509_REQ_check_private_key(req, pkey)) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                   "Certificate request and CA private key do not match\n");
+        ok = 0;
+        goto end;
+    }
+    if ((pktmp = X509_REQ_get0_pubkey(req)) == NULL) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "error unpacking public key\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+    i = X509_REQ_verify(req, pktmp);
+    pktmp = NULL;
+    if (i < 0) {
+        ok = 0;
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Signature verification problems....\n");
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        goto end;
+    }
+    if (i == 0) {
+        ok = 0;
+        BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                   "Signature did not match the certificate request\n");
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        goto end;
+    } else
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Signature ok\n");
+
+    ok = do_body(xret, pkey, x509, dgst, sigopts, policy, db, serial, subj,
+                 chtype, multirdn, email_dn, startdate, enddate, days, batch,
+                 verbose, req, ext_sect, lconf, certopt, nameopt, default_op,
+                 ext_copy, selfsign);
+
+ end:
+    X509_REQ_free(req);
+    BIO_free(in);
+    return (ok);
+}
+
+static int certify_cert(X509 **xret, const char *infile, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *x509,
+                        const EVP_MD *dgst, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sigopts,
+                        STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *policy, CA_DB *db,
+                        BIGNUM *serial, const char *subj, unsigned long chtype,
+                        int multirdn, int email_dn, const char *startdate,
+                        const char *enddate, long days, int batch, const char *ext_sect,
+                        CONF *lconf, int verbose, unsigned long certopt,
+                        unsigned long nameopt, int default_op, int ext_copy)
+{
+    X509 *req = NULL;
+    X509_REQ *rreq = NULL;
+    EVP_PKEY *pktmp = NULL;
+    int ok = -1, i;
+
+    if ((req = load_cert(infile, FORMAT_PEM, infile)) == NULL)
+        goto end;
+    if (verbose)
+        X509_print(bio_err, req);
+
+    BIO_printf(bio_err, "Check that the request matches the signature\n");
+
+    if ((pktmp = X509_get0_pubkey(req)) == NULL) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "error unpacking public key\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+    i = X509_verify(req, pktmp);
+    if (i < 0) {
+        ok = 0;
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Signature verification problems....\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+    if (i == 0) {
+        ok = 0;
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Signature did not match the certificate\n");
+        goto end;
+    } else
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Signature ok\n");
+
+    if ((rreq = X509_to_X509_REQ(req, NULL, NULL)) == NULL)
+        goto end;
+
+    ok = do_body(xret, pkey, x509, dgst, sigopts, policy, db, serial, subj,
+                 chtype, multirdn, email_dn, startdate, enddate, days, batch,
+                 verbose, rreq, ext_sect, lconf, certopt, nameopt, default_op,
+                 ext_copy, 0);
+
+ end:
+    X509_REQ_free(rreq);
+    X509_free(req);
+    return (ok);
+}
+
+static int do_body(X509 **xret, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *x509,
+                   const EVP_MD *dgst, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sigopts,
+                   STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *policy, CA_DB *db, BIGNUM *serial,
+                   const char *subj, unsigned long chtype, int multirdn,
+                   int email_dn, const char *startdate, const char *enddate, long days,
+                   int batch, int verbose, X509_REQ *req, const char *ext_sect,
+                   CONF *lconf, unsigned long certopt, unsigned long nameopt,
+                   int default_op, int ext_copy, int selfsign)
+{
+    X509_NAME *name = NULL, *CAname = NULL, *subject = NULL;
+    const ASN1_TIME *tm;
+    ASN1_STRING *str, *str2;
+    ASN1_OBJECT *obj;
+    X509 *ret = NULL;
+    X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne;
+    X509_NAME_ENTRY *tne, *push;
+    EVP_PKEY *pktmp;
+    int ok = -1, i, j, last, nid;
+    const char *p;
+    CONF_VALUE *cv;
+    OPENSSL_STRING row[DB_NUMBER];
+    OPENSSL_STRING *irow = NULL;
+    OPENSSL_STRING *rrow = NULL;
+    char buf[25];
+
+    for (i = 0; i < DB_NUMBER; i++)
+        row[i] = NULL;
+
+    if (subj) {
+        X509_NAME *n = parse_name(subj, chtype, multirdn);
+
+        if (!n) {
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            goto end;
+        }
+        X509_REQ_set_subject_name(req, n);
+        X509_NAME_free(n);
+    }
+
+    if (default_op)
+        BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                   "The Subject's Distinguished Name is as follows\n");
+
+    name = X509_REQ_get_subject_name(req);
+    for (i = 0; i < X509_NAME_entry_count(name); i++) {
+        ne = X509_NAME_get_entry(name, i);
+        str = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(ne);
+        obj = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(ne);
+
+        if (msie_hack) {
+            /* assume all type should be strings */
+            nid = OBJ_obj2nid(X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(ne));
+
+            if (str->type == V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING)
+                ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING_to_string(str);
+
+            if ((str->type == V_ASN1_IA5STRING) &&
+                (nid != NID_pkcs9_emailAddress))
+                str->type = V_ASN1_T61STRING;
+
+            if ((nid == NID_pkcs9_emailAddress) &&
+                (str->type == V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING))
+                str->type = V_ASN1_IA5STRING;
+        }
+
+        /* If no EMAIL is wanted in the subject */
+        if ((OBJ_obj2nid(obj) == NID_pkcs9_emailAddress) && (!email_dn))
+            continue;
+
+        /* check some things */
+        if ((OBJ_obj2nid(obj) == NID_pkcs9_emailAddress) &&
+            (str->type != V_ASN1_IA5STRING)) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                       "\nemailAddress type needs to be of type IA5STRING\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+        if ((str->type != V_ASN1_BMPSTRING)
+            && (str->type != V_ASN1_UTF8STRING)) {
+            j = ASN1_PRINTABLE_type(str->data, str->length);
+            if (((j == V_ASN1_T61STRING) &&
+                 (str->type != V_ASN1_T61STRING)) ||
+                ((j == V_ASN1_IA5STRING) &&
+                 (str->type == V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING))) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                           "\nThe string contains characters that are illegal for the ASN.1 type\n");
+                goto end;
+            }
+        }
+
+        if (default_op)
+            old_entry_print(obj, str);
+    }
+
+    /* Ok, now we check the 'policy' stuff. */
+    if ((subject = X509_NAME_new()) == NULL) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    /* take a copy of the issuer name before we mess with it. */
+    if (selfsign)
+        CAname = X509_NAME_dup(name);
+    else
+        CAname = X509_NAME_dup(X509_get_subject_name(x509));
+    if (CAname == NULL)
+        goto end;
+    str = str2 = NULL;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(policy); i++) {
+        cv = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(policy, i); /* get the object id */
+        if ((j = OBJ_txt2nid(cv->name)) == NID_undef) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                       "%s:unknown object type in 'policy' configuration\n",
+                       cv->name);
+            goto end;
+        }
+        obj = OBJ_nid2obj(j);
+
+        last = -1;
+        for (;;) {
+            /* lookup the object in the supplied name list */
+            j = X509_NAME_get_index_by_OBJ(name, obj, last);
+            if (j < 0) {
+                if (last != -1)
+                    break;
+                tne = NULL;
+            } else {
+                tne = X509_NAME_get_entry(name, j);
+            }
+            last = j;
+
+            /* depending on the 'policy', decide what to do. */
+            push = NULL;
+            if (strcmp(cv->value, "optional") == 0) {
+                if (tne != NULL)
+                    push = tne;
+            } else if (strcmp(cv->value, "supplied") == 0) {
+                if (tne == NULL) {
+                    BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                               "The %s field needed to be supplied and was missing\n",
+                               cv->name);
+                    goto end;
+                } else
+                    push = tne;
+            } else if (strcmp(cv->value, "match") == 0) {
+                int last2;
+
+                if (tne == NULL) {
+                    BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                               "The mandatory %s field was missing\n",
+                               cv->name);
+                    goto end;
+                }
+
+                last2 = -1;
+
+ again2:
+                j = X509_NAME_get_index_by_OBJ(CAname, obj, last2);
+                if ((j < 0) && (last2 == -1)) {
+                    BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                               "The %s field does not exist in the CA certificate,\n"
+                               "the 'policy' is misconfigured\n",
+                               cv->name);
+                    goto end;
+                }
+                if (j >= 0) {
+                    push = X509_NAME_get_entry(CAname, j);
+                    str = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(tne);
+                    str2 = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(push);
+                    last2 = j;
+                    if (ASN1_STRING_cmp(str, str2) != 0)
+                        goto again2;
+                }
+                if (j < 0) {
+                    BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                               "The %s field is different between\n"
+                               "CA certificate (%s) and the request (%s)\n",
+                               cv->name,
+                               ((str2 == NULL) ? "NULL" : (char *)str2->data),
+                               ((str == NULL) ? "NULL" : (char *)str->data));
+                    goto end;
+                }
+            } else {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                           "%s:invalid type in 'policy' configuration\n",
+                           cv->value);
+                goto end;
+            }
+
+            if (push != NULL) {
+                if (!X509_NAME_add_entry(subject, push, -1, 0)) {
+                    BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n");
+                    goto end;
+                }
+            }
+            if (j < 0)
+                break;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (preserve) {
+        X509_NAME_free(subject);
+        /* subject=X509_NAME_dup(X509_REQ_get_subject_name(req)); */
+        subject = X509_NAME_dup(name);
+        if (subject == NULL)
+            goto end;
+    }
+
+    /* We are now totally happy, lets make and sign the certificate */
+    if (verbose)
+        BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                   "Everything appears to be ok, creating and signing the certificate\n");
+
+    if ((ret = X509_new()) == NULL)
+        goto end;
+
+#ifdef X509_V3
+    /* Make it an X509 v3 certificate. */
+    if (!X509_set_version(ret, 2))
+        goto end;
+#endif
+
+    if (BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(serial, X509_get_serialNumber(ret)) == NULL)
+        goto end;
+    if (selfsign) {
+        if (!X509_set_issuer_name(ret, subject))
+            goto end;
+    } else {
+        if (!X509_set_issuer_name(ret, X509_get_subject_name(x509)))
+            goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (!set_cert_times(ret, startdate, enddate, days))
+        goto end;
+
+    if (enddate != NULL) {
+        int tdays;
+
+        if (!ASN1_TIME_diff(&tdays, NULL, NULL, X509_get0_notAfter(ret)))
+            goto end;
+        days = tdays;
+    }
+
+    if (!X509_set_subject_name(ret, subject))
+        goto end;
+
+    pktmp = X509_REQ_get0_pubkey(req);
+    i = X509_set_pubkey(ret, pktmp);
+    if (!i)
+        goto end;
+
+    /* Lets add the extensions, if there are any */
+    if (ext_sect) {
+        X509V3_CTX ctx;
+
+        /* Initialize the context structure */
+        if (selfsign)
+            X509V3_set_ctx(&ctx, ret, ret, req, NULL, 0);
+        else
+            X509V3_set_ctx(&ctx, x509, ret, req, NULL, 0);
+
+        if (extconf) {
+            if (verbose)
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "Extra configuration file found\n");
+
+            /* Use the extconf configuration db LHASH */
+            X509V3_set_nconf(&ctx, extconf);
+
+            /* Test the structure (needed?) */
+            /* X509V3_set_ctx_test(&ctx); */
+
+            /* Adds exts contained in the configuration file */
+            if (!X509V3_EXT_add_nconf(extconf, &ctx, ext_sect, ret)) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                           "ERROR: adding extensions in section %s\n",
+                           ext_sect);
+                ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+                goto end;
+            }
+            if (verbose)
+                BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                           "Successfully added extensions from file.\n");
+        } else if (ext_sect) {
+            /* We found extensions to be set from config file */
+            X509V3_set_nconf(&ctx, lconf);
+
+            if (!X509V3_EXT_add_nconf(lconf, &ctx, ext_sect, ret)) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                           "ERROR: adding extensions in section %s\n",
+                           ext_sect);
+                ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+                goto end;
+            }
+
+            if (verbose)
+                BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                           "Successfully added extensions from config\n");
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* Copy extensions from request (if any) */
+
+    if (!copy_extensions(ret, req, ext_copy)) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "ERROR: adding extensions from request\n");
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    {
+        const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts = X509_get0_extensions(ret);
+
+        if (exts != NULL && sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts) > 0)
+            /* Make it an X509 v3 certificate. */
+            if (!X509_set_version(ret, 2))
+                goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (verbose)
+        BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                   "The subject name appears to be ok, checking data base for clashes\n");
+
+    /* Build the correct Subject if no e-mail is wanted in the subject. */
+    if (!email_dn) {
+        X509_NAME_ENTRY *tmpne;
+        X509_NAME *dn_subject;
+
+        /*
+         * Its best to dup the subject DN and then delete any email addresses
+         * because this retains its structure.
+         */
+        if ((dn_subject = X509_NAME_dup(subject)) == NULL) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+        while ((i = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(dn_subject,
+                                               NID_pkcs9_emailAddress,
+                                               -1)) >= 0) {
+            tmpne = X509_NAME_get_entry(dn_subject, i);
+            X509_NAME_delete_entry(dn_subject, i);
+            X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(tmpne);
+        }
+
+        if (!X509_set_subject_name(ret, dn_subject)) {
+            X509_NAME_free(dn_subject);
+            goto end;
+        }
+        X509_NAME_free(dn_subject);
+    }
+
+    row[DB_name] = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(ret), NULL, 0);
+    if (row[DB_name] == NULL) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (BN_is_zero(serial))
+        row[DB_serial] = OPENSSL_strdup("00");
+    else
+        row[DB_serial] = BN_bn2hex(serial);
+    if (row[DB_serial] == NULL) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (row[DB_name][0] == '\0') {
+        /*
+         * An empty subject! We'll use the serial number instead. If
+         * unique_subject is in use then we don't want different entries with
+         * empty subjects matching each other.
+         */
+        OPENSSL_free(row[DB_name]);
+        row[DB_name] = OPENSSL_strdup(row[DB_serial]);
+        if (row[DB_name] == NULL) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (db->attributes.unique_subject) {
+        OPENSSL_STRING *crow = row;
+
+        rrow = TXT_DB_get_by_index(db->db, DB_name, crow);
+        if (rrow != NULL) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                       "ERROR:There is already a certificate for %s\n",
+                       row[DB_name]);
+        }
+    }
+    if (rrow == NULL) {
+        rrow = TXT_DB_get_by_index(db->db, DB_serial, row);
+        if (rrow != NULL) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                       "ERROR:Serial number %s has already been issued,\n",
+                       row[DB_serial]);
+            BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                       "      check the database/serial_file for corruption\n");
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (rrow != NULL) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "The matching entry has the following details\n");
+        if (rrow[DB_type][0] == DB_TYPE_EXP)
+            p = "Expired";
+        else if (rrow[DB_type][0] == DB_TYPE_REV)
+            p = "Revoked";
+        else if (rrow[DB_type][0] == DB_TYPE_VAL)
+            p = "Valid";
+        else
+            p = "\ninvalid type, Data base error\n";
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Type          :%s\n", p);;
+        if (rrow[DB_type][0] == DB_TYPE_REV) {
+            p = rrow[DB_exp_date];
+            if (p == NULL)
+                p = "undef";
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Was revoked on:%s\n", p);
+        }
+        p = rrow[DB_exp_date];
+        if (p == NULL)
+            p = "undef";
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Expires on    :%s\n", p);
+        p = rrow[DB_serial];
+        if (p == NULL)
+            p = "undef";
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Serial Number :%s\n", p);
+        p = rrow[DB_file];
+        if (p == NULL)
+            p = "undef";
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "File name     :%s\n", p);
+        p = rrow[DB_name];
+        if (p == NULL)
+            p = "undef";
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Subject Name  :%s\n", p);
+        ok = -1;                /* This is now a 'bad' error. */
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (!default_op) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Certificate Details:\n");
+        /*
+         * Never print signature details because signature not present
+         */
+        certopt |= X509_FLAG_NO_SIGDUMP | X509_FLAG_NO_SIGNAME;
+        X509_print_ex(bio_err, ret, nameopt, certopt);
+    }
+
+    BIO_printf(bio_err, "Certificate is to be certified until ");
+    ASN1_TIME_print(bio_err, X509_get0_notAfter(ret));
+    if (days)
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, " (%ld days)", days);
+    BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n");
+
+    if (!batch) {
+
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Sign the certificate? [y/n]:");
+        (void)BIO_flush(bio_err);
+        buf[0] = '\0';
+        if (!fgets(buf, sizeof(buf) - 1, stdin)) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                       "CERTIFICATE WILL NOT BE CERTIFIED: I/O error\n");
+            ok = 0;
+            goto end;
+        }
+        if (!((buf[0] == 'y') || (buf[0] == 'Y'))) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "CERTIFICATE WILL NOT BE CERTIFIED\n");
+            ok = 0;
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+
+    pktmp = X509_get0_pubkey(ret);
+    if (EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pktmp) &&
+        !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey))
+        EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pktmp, pkey);
+
+    if (!do_X509_sign(ret, pkey, dgst, sigopts))
+        goto end;
+
+    /* We now just add it to the database */
+    row[DB_type] = OPENSSL_strdup("V");
+    tm = X509_get0_notAfter(ret);
+    row[DB_exp_date] = app_malloc(tm->length + 1, "row expdate");
+    memcpy(row[DB_exp_date], tm->data, tm->length);
+    row[DB_exp_date][tm->length] = '\0';
+    row[DB_rev_date] = NULL;
+    row[DB_file] = OPENSSL_strdup("unknown");
+    if ((row[DB_type] == NULL) || (row[DB_exp_date] == NULL) ||
+        (row[DB_file] == NULL) || (row[DB_name] == NULL)) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    irow = app_malloc(sizeof(*irow) * (DB_NUMBER + 1), "row space");
+    for (i = 0; i < DB_NUMBER; i++)
+        irow[i] = row[i];
+    irow[DB_NUMBER] = NULL;
+
+    if (!TXT_DB_insert(db->db, irow)) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "failed to update database\n");
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "TXT_DB error number %ld\n", db->db->error);
+        goto end;
+    }
+    irow = NULL;
+    ok = 1;
+ end:
+    if (ok != 1) {
+        for (i = 0; i < DB_NUMBER; i++)
+            OPENSSL_free(row[i]);
+    }
+    OPENSSL_free(irow);
+
+    X509_NAME_free(CAname);
+    X509_NAME_free(subject);
+    if (ok <= 0)
+        X509_free(ret);
+    else
+        *xret = ret;
+    return (ok);
+}
+
+static void write_new_certificate(BIO *bp, X509 *x, int output_der,
+                                  int notext)
+{
+
+    if (output_der) {
+        (void)i2d_X509_bio(bp, x);
+        return;
+    }
+    if (!notext)
+        X509_print(bp, x);
+    PEM_write_bio_X509(bp, x);
+}
+
+static int certify_spkac(X509 **xret, const char *infile, EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+                         X509 *x509, const EVP_MD *dgst,
+                         STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sigopts,
+                         STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *policy, CA_DB *db,
+                         BIGNUM *serial, const char *subj, unsigned long chtype,
+                         int multirdn, int email_dn, const char *startdate,
+                         const char *enddate, long days, const char *ext_sect,
+                         CONF *lconf, int verbose, unsigned long certopt,
+                         unsigned long nameopt, int default_op, int ext_copy)
+{
+    STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *sk = NULL;
+    LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *parms = NULL;
+    X509_REQ *req = NULL;
+    CONF_VALUE *cv = NULL;
+    NETSCAPE_SPKI *spki = NULL;
+    char *type, *buf;
+    EVP_PKEY *pktmp = NULL;
+    X509_NAME *n = NULL;
+    X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne = NULL;
+    int ok = -1, i, j;
+    long errline;
+    int nid;
+
+    /*
+     * Load input file into a hash table.  (This is just an easy
+     * way to read and parse the file, then put it into a convenient
+     * STACK format).
+     */
+    parms = CONF_load(NULL, infile, &errline);
+    if (parms == NULL) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "error on line %ld of %s\n", errline, infile);
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    sk = CONF_get_section(parms, "default");
+    if (sk_CONF_VALUE_num(sk) == 0) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "no name/value pairs found in %s\n", infile);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Now create a dummy X509 request structure.  We don't actually
+     * have an X509 request, but we have many of the components
+     * (a public key, various DN components).  The idea is that we
+     * put these components into the right X509 request structure
+     * and we can use the same code as if you had a real X509 request.
+     */
+    req = X509_REQ_new();
+    if (req == NULL) {
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Build up the subject name set.
+     */
+    n = X509_REQ_get_subject_name(req);
+
+    for (i = 0;; i++) {
+        if (sk_CONF_VALUE_num(sk) <= i)
+            break;
+
+        cv = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(sk, i);
+        type = cv->name;
+        /*
+         * Skip past any leading X. X: X, etc to allow for multiple instances
+         */
+        for (buf = cv->name; *buf; buf++)
+            if ((*buf == ':') || (*buf == ',') || (*buf == '.')) {
+                buf++;
+                if (*buf)
+                    type = buf;
+                break;
+            }
+
+        buf = cv->value;
+        if ((nid = OBJ_txt2nid(type)) == NID_undef) {
+            if (strcmp(type, "SPKAC") == 0) {
+                spki = NETSCAPE_SPKI_b64_decode(cv->value, -1);
+                if (spki == NULL) {
+                    BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                               "unable to load Netscape SPKAC structure\n");
+                    ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+                    goto end;
+                }
+            }
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        if (!X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID(n, nid, chtype,
+                                        (unsigned char *)buf, -1, -1, 0))
+            goto end;
+    }
+    if (spki == NULL) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Netscape SPKAC structure not found in %s\n",
+                   infile);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Now extract the key from the SPKI structure.
+     */
+
+    BIO_printf(bio_err,
+               "Check that the SPKAC request matches the signature\n");
+
+    if ((pktmp = NETSCAPE_SPKI_get_pubkey(spki)) == NULL) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "error unpacking SPKAC public key\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    j = NETSCAPE_SPKI_verify(spki, pktmp);
+    if (j <= 0) {
+        EVP_PKEY_free(pktmp);
+        BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                   "signature verification failed on SPKAC public key\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+    BIO_printf(bio_err, "Signature ok\n");
+
+    X509_REQ_set_pubkey(req, pktmp);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(pktmp);
+    ok = do_body(xret, pkey, x509, dgst, sigopts, policy, db, serial, subj,
+                 chtype, multirdn, email_dn, startdate, enddate, days, 1,
+                 verbose, req, ext_sect, lconf, certopt, nameopt, default_op,
+                 ext_copy, 0);
+ end:
+    X509_REQ_free(req);
+    CONF_free(parms);
+    NETSCAPE_SPKI_free(spki);
+    X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(ne);
+
+    return (ok);
+}
+
+static int check_time_format(const char *str)
+{
+    return ASN1_TIME_set_string(NULL, str);
+}
+
+static int do_revoke(X509 *x509, CA_DB *db, int type, char *value)
+{
+    const ASN1_TIME *tm = NULL;
+    char *row[DB_NUMBER], **rrow, **irow;
+    char *rev_str = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *bn = NULL;
+    int ok = -1, i;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < DB_NUMBER; i++)
+        row[i] = NULL;
+    row[DB_name] = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(x509), NULL, 0);
+    bn = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(X509_get_serialNumber(x509), NULL);
+    if (!bn)
+        goto end;
+    if (BN_is_zero(bn))
+        row[DB_serial] = OPENSSL_strdup("00");
+    else
+        row[DB_serial] = BN_bn2hex(bn);
+    BN_free(bn);
+    if (row[DB_name] != NULL && row[DB_name][0] == '\0') {
+        /* Entries with empty Subjects actually use the serial number instead */
+        OPENSSL_free(row[DB_name]);
+        row[DB_name] = OPENSSL_strdup(row[DB_serial]);
+    }
+    if ((row[DB_name] == NULL) || (row[DB_serial] == NULL)) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+    /*
+     * We have to lookup by serial number because name lookup skips revoked
+     * certs
+     */
+    rrow = TXT_DB_get_by_index(db->db, DB_serial, row);
+    if (rrow == NULL) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                   "Adding Entry with serial number %s to DB for %s\n",
+                   row[DB_serial], row[DB_name]);
+
+        /* We now just add it to the database */
+        row[DB_type] = OPENSSL_strdup("V");
+        tm = X509_get0_notAfter(x509);
+        row[DB_exp_date] = app_malloc(tm->length + 1, "row exp_data");
+        memcpy(row[DB_exp_date], tm->data, tm->length);
+        row[DB_exp_date][tm->length] = '\0';
+        row[DB_rev_date] = NULL;
+        row[DB_file] = OPENSSL_strdup("unknown");
+
+        if (row[DB_type] == NULL || row[DB_file] == NULL) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+
+        irow = app_malloc(sizeof(*irow) * (DB_NUMBER + 1), "row ptr");
+        for (i = 0; i < DB_NUMBER; i++)
+            irow[i] = row[i];
+        irow[DB_NUMBER] = NULL;
+
+        if (!TXT_DB_insert(db->db, irow)) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "failed to update database\n");
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "TXT_DB error number %ld\n", db->db->error);
+            OPENSSL_free(irow);
+            goto end;
+        }
+
+        for (i = 0; i < DB_NUMBER; i++)
+            row[i] = NULL;
+
+        /* Revoke Certificate */
+        if (type == -1)
+            ok = 1;
+        else
+            ok = do_revoke(x509, db, type, value);
+
+        goto end;
+
+    } else if (index_name_cmp_noconst(row, rrow)) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "ERROR:name does not match %s\n", row[DB_name]);
+        goto end;
+    } else if (type == -1) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "ERROR:Already present, serial number %s\n",
+                   row[DB_serial]);
+        goto end;
+    } else if (rrow[DB_type][0] == 'R') {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "ERROR:Already revoked, serial number %s\n",
+                   row[DB_serial]);
+        goto end;
+    } else {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Revoking Certificate %s.\n", rrow[DB_serial]);
+        rev_str = make_revocation_str(type, value);
+        if (!rev_str) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error in revocation arguments\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+        rrow[DB_type][0] = 'R';
+        rrow[DB_type][1] = '\0';
+        rrow[DB_rev_date] = rev_str;
+    }
+    ok = 1;
+ end:
+    for (i = 0; i < DB_NUMBER; i++)
+        OPENSSL_free(row[i]);
+    return (ok);
+}
+
+static int get_certificate_status(const char *serial, CA_DB *db)
+{
+    char *row[DB_NUMBER], **rrow;
+    int ok = -1, i;
+    size_t serial_len = strlen(serial);
+
+    /* Free Resources */
+    for (i = 0; i < DB_NUMBER; i++)
+        row[i] = NULL;
+
+    /* Malloc needed char spaces */
+    row[DB_serial] = app_malloc(serial_len + 2, "row serial#");
+
+    if (serial_len % 2) {
+        /*
+         * Set the first char to 0
+         */ ;
+        row[DB_serial][0] = '0';
+
+        /* Copy String from serial to row[DB_serial] */
+        memcpy(row[DB_serial] + 1, serial, serial_len);
+        row[DB_serial][serial_len + 1] = '\0';
+    } else {
+        /* Copy String from serial to row[DB_serial] */
+        memcpy(row[DB_serial], serial, serial_len);
+        row[DB_serial][serial_len] = '\0';
+    }
+
+    /* Make it Upper Case */
+    for (i = 0; row[DB_serial][i] != '\0'; i++)
+        row[DB_serial][i] = toupper((unsigned char)row[DB_serial][i]);
+
+    ok = 1;
+
+    /* Search for the certificate */
+    rrow = TXT_DB_get_by_index(db->db, DB_serial, row);
+    if (rrow == NULL) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Serial %s not present in db.\n", row[DB_serial]);
+        ok = -1;
+        goto end;
+    } else if (rrow[DB_type][0] == 'V') {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s=Valid (%c)\n",
+                   row[DB_serial], rrow[DB_type][0]);
+        goto end;
+    } else if (rrow[DB_type][0] == 'R') {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s=Revoked (%c)\n",
+                   row[DB_serial], rrow[DB_type][0]);
+        goto end;
+    } else if (rrow[DB_type][0] == 'E') {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s=Expired (%c)\n",
+                   row[DB_serial], rrow[DB_type][0]);
+        goto end;
+    } else if (rrow[DB_type][0] == 'S') {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s=Suspended (%c)\n",
+                   row[DB_serial], rrow[DB_type][0]);
+        goto end;
+    } else {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s=Unknown (%c).\n",
+                   row[DB_serial], rrow[DB_type][0]);
+        ok = -1;
+    }
+ end:
+    for (i = 0; i < DB_NUMBER; i++) {
+        OPENSSL_free(row[i]);
+    }
+    return (ok);
+}
+
+static int do_updatedb(CA_DB *db)
+{
+    ASN1_UTCTIME *a_tm = NULL;
+    int i, cnt = 0;
+    int db_y2k, a_y2k;          /* flags = 1 if y >= 2000 */
+    char **rrow, *a_tm_s;
+
+    a_tm = ASN1_UTCTIME_new();
+    if (a_tm == NULL)
+        return -1;
+
+    /* get actual time and make a string */
+    if (X509_gmtime_adj(a_tm, 0) == NULL) {
+        ASN1_UTCTIME_free(a_tm);
+        return -1;
+    }
+    a_tm_s = app_malloc(a_tm->length + 1, "time string");
+
+    memcpy(a_tm_s, a_tm->data, a_tm->length);
+    a_tm_s[a_tm->length] = '\0';
+
+    if (strncmp(a_tm_s, "49", 2) <= 0)
+        a_y2k = 1;
+    else
+        a_y2k = 0;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_num(db->db->data); i++) {
+        rrow = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, i);
+
+        if (rrow[DB_type][0] == 'V') {
+            /* ignore entries that are not valid */
+            if (strncmp(rrow[DB_exp_date], "49", 2) <= 0)
+                db_y2k = 1;
+            else
+                db_y2k = 0;
+
+            if (db_y2k == a_y2k) {
+                /* all on the same y2k side */
+                if (strcmp(rrow[DB_exp_date], a_tm_s) <= 0) {
+                    rrow[DB_type][0] = 'E';
+                    rrow[DB_type][1] = '\0';
+                    cnt++;
+
+                    BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s=Expired\n", rrow[DB_serial]);
+                }
+            } else if (db_y2k < a_y2k) {
+                rrow[DB_type][0] = 'E';
+                rrow[DB_type][1] = '\0';
+                cnt++;
+
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s=Expired\n", rrow[DB_serial]);
+            }
+
+        }
+    }
+
+    ASN1_UTCTIME_free(a_tm);
+    OPENSSL_free(a_tm_s);
+    return (cnt);
+}
+
+static const char *crl_reasons[] = {
+    /* CRL reason strings */
+    "unspecified",
+    "keyCompromise",
+    "CACompromise",
+    "affiliationChanged",
+    "superseded",
+    "cessationOfOperation",
+    "certificateHold",
+    "removeFromCRL",
+    /* Additional pseudo reasons */
+    "holdInstruction",
+    "keyTime",
+    "CAkeyTime"
+};
+
+#define NUM_REASONS OSSL_NELEM(crl_reasons)
+
+/*
+ * Given revocation information convert to a DB string. The format of the
+ * string is: revtime[,reason,extra]. Where 'revtime' is the revocation time
+ * (the current time). 'reason' is the optional CRL reason and 'extra' is any
+ * additional argument
+ */
+
+char *make_revocation_str(int rev_type, char *rev_arg)
+{
+    char *str;
+    const char *other = NULL;
+    const char *reason = NULL;
+    ASN1_OBJECT *otmp;
+    ASN1_UTCTIME *revtm = NULL;
+    int i;
+    switch (rev_type) {
+    case REV_NONE:
+        break;
+
+    case REV_CRL_REASON:
+        for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+            if (strcasecmp(rev_arg, crl_reasons[i]) == 0) {
+                reason = crl_reasons[i];
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+        if (reason == NULL) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Unknown CRL reason %s\n", rev_arg);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+        break;
+
+    case REV_HOLD:
+        /* Argument is an OID */
+
+        otmp = OBJ_txt2obj(rev_arg, 0);
+        ASN1_OBJECT_free(otmp);
+
+        if (otmp == NULL) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Invalid object identifier %s\n", rev_arg);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+
+        reason = "holdInstruction";
+        other = rev_arg;
+        break;
+
+    case REV_KEY_COMPROMISE:
+    case REV_CA_COMPROMISE:
+
+        /* Argument is the key compromise time  */
+        if (!ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set_string(NULL, rev_arg)) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                       "Invalid time format %s. Need YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ\n",
+                       rev_arg);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+        other = rev_arg;
+        if (rev_type == REV_KEY_COMPROMISE)
+            reason = "keyTime";
+        else
+            reason = "CAkeyTime";
+
+        break;
+
+    }
+
+    revtm = X509_gmtime_adj(NULL, 0);
+
+    if (!revtm)
+        return NULL;
+
+    i = revtm->length + 1;
+
+    if (reason)
+        i += strlen(reason) + 1;
+    if (other)
+        i += strlen(other) + 1;
+
+    str = app_malloc(i, "revocation reason");
+    OPENSSL_strlcpy(str, (char *)revtm->data, i);
+    if (reason) {
+        OPENSSL_strlcat(str, ",", i);
+        OPENSSL_strlcat(str, reason, i);
+    }
+    if (other) {
+        OPENSSL_strlcat(str, ",", i);
+        OPENSSL_strlcat(str, other, i);
+    }
+    ASN1_UTCTIME_free(revtm);
+    return str;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Convert revocation field to X509_REVOKED entry
+ * return code:
+ * 0 error
+ * 1 OK
+ * 2 OK and some extensions added (i.e. V2 CRL)
+ */
+
+int make_revoked(X509_REVOKED *rev, const char *str)
+{
+    char *tmp = NULL;
+    int reason_code = -1;
+    int i, ret = 0;
+    ASN1_OBJECT *hold = NULL;
+    ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *comp_time = NULL;
+    ASN1_ENUMERATED *rtmp = NULL;
+
+    ASN1_TIME *revDate = NULL;
+
+    i = unpack_revinfo(&revDate, &reason_code, &hold, &comp_time, str);
+
+    if (i == 0)
+        goto end;
+
+    if (rev && !X509_REVOKED_set_revocationDate(rev, revDate))
+        goto end;
+
+    if (rev && (reason_code != OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_NOSTATUS)) {
+        rtmp = ASN1_ENUMERATED_new();
+        if (rtmp == NULL || !ASN1_ENUMERATED_set(rtmp, reason_code))
+            goto end;
+        if (!X509_REVOKED_add1_ext_i2d(rev, NID_crl_reason, rtmp, 0, 0))
+            goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (rev && comp_time) {
+        if (!X509_REVOKED_add1_ext_i2d
+            (rev, NID_invalidity_date, comp_time, 0, 0))
+            goto end;
+    }
+    if (rev && hold) {
+        if (!X509_REVOKED_add1_ext_i2d
+            (rev, NID_hold_instruction_code, hold, 0, 0))
+            goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (reason_code != OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_NOSTATUS)
+        ret = 2;
+    else
+        ret = 1;
+
+ end:
+
+    OPENSSL_free(tmp);
+    ASN1_OBJECT_free(hold);
+    ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_free(comp_time);
+    ASN1_ENUMERATED_free(rtmp);
+    ASN1_TIME_free(revDate);
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int old_entry_print(const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, const ASN1_STRING *str)
+{
+    char buf[25], *pbuf;
+    const char *p;
+    int j;
+
+    j = i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bio_err, obj);
+    pbuf = buf;
+    for (j = 22 - j; j > 0; j--)
+        *(pbuf++) = ' ';
+    *(pbuf++) = ':';
+    *(pbuf++) = '\0';
+    BIO_puts(bio_err, buf);
+
+    if (str->type == V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING)
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "PRINTABLE:'");
+    else if (str->type == V_ASN1_T61STRING)
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "T61STRING:'");
+    else if (str->type == V_ASN1_IA5STRING)
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "IA5STRING:'");
+    else if (str->type == V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING)
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "UNIVERSALSTRING:'");
+    else
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "ASN.1 %2d:'", str->type);
+
+    p = (const char *)str->data;
+    for (j = str->length; j > 0; j--) {
+        if ((*p >= ' ') && (*p <= '~'))
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "%c", *p);
+        else if (*p & 0x80)
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "\\0x%02X", *p);
+        else if ((unsigned char)*p == 0xf7)
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "^?");
+        else
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "^%c", *p + '@');
+        p++;
+    }
+    BIO_printf(bio_err, "'\n");
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int unpack_revinfo(ASN1_TIME **prevtm, int *preason, ASN1_OBJECT **phold,
+                   ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **pinvtm, const char *str)
+{
+    char *tmp;
+    char *rtime_str, *reason_str = NULL, *arg_str = NULL, *p;
+    int reason_code = -1;
+    int ret = 0;
+    unsigned int i;
+    ASN1_OBJECT *hold = NULL;
+    ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *comp_time = NULL;
+
+    tmp = OPENSSL_strdup(str);
+    if (!tmp) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "memory allocation failure\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    p = strchr(tmp, ',');
+
+    rtime_str = tmp;
+
+    if (p) {
+        *p = '\0';
+        p++;
+        reason_str = p;
+        p = strchr(p, ',');
+        if (p) {
+            *p = '\0';
+            arg_str = p + 1;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (prevtm) {
+        *prevtm = ASN1_UTCTIME_new();
+        if (*prevtm == NULL) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "memory allocation failure\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+        if (!ASN1_UTCTIME_set_string(*prevtm, rtime_str)) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "invalid revocation date %s\n", rtime_str);
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+    if (reason_str) {
+        for (i = 0; i < NUM_REASONS; i++) {
+            if (strcasecmp(reason_str, crl_reasons[i]) == 0) {
+                reason_code = i;
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+        if (reason_code == OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_NOSTATUS) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "invalid reason code %s\n", reason_str);
+            goto end;
+        }
+
+        if (reason_code == 7)
+            reason_code = OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_REMOVEFROMCRL;
+        else if (reason_code == 8) { /* Hold instruction */
+            if (!arg_str) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "missing hold instruction\n");
+                goto end;
+            }
+            reason_code = OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_CERTIFICATEHOLD;
+            hold = OBJ_txt2obj(arg_str, 0);
+
+            if (!hold) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "invalid object identifier %s\n",
+                           arg_str);
+                goto end;
+            }
+            if (phold)
+                *phold = hold;
+            else
+                ASN1_OBJECT_free(hold);
+        } else if ((reason_code == 9) || (reason_code == 10)) {
+            if (!arg_str) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "missing compromised time\n");
+                goto end;
+            }
+            comp_time = ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_new();
+            if (comp_time == NULL) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "memory allocation failure\n");
+                goto end;
+            }
+            if (!ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set_string(comp_time, arg_str)) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "invalid compromised time %s\n", arg_str);
+                goto end;
+            }
+            if (reason_code == 9)
+                reason_code = OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_KEYCOMPROMISE;
+            else
+                reason_code = OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_CACOMPROMISE;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (preason)
+        *preason = reason_code;
+    if (pinvtm) {
+        *pinvtm = comp_time;
+        comp_time = NULL;
+    }
+
+    ret = 1;
+
+ end:
+
+    OPENSSL_free(tmp);
+    ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_free(comp_time);
+
+    return ret;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/cert.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/cert.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..de4a77a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/cert.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/ciphers.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/ciphers.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e1b5b25
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/ciphers.c
@@ -0,0 +1,242 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include "apps.h"
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+typedef enum OPTION_choice {
+    OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP,
+    OPT_STDNAME,
+    OPT_SSL3,
+    OPT_TLS1,
+    OPT_TLS1_1,
+    OPT_TLS1_2,
+    OPT_PSK,
+    OPT_SRP,
+    OPT_V, OPT_UPPER_V, OPT_S
+} OPTION_CHOICE;
+
+OPTIONS ciphers_options[] = {
+    {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"},
+    {"v", OPT_V, '-', "Verbose listing of the SSL/TLS ciphers"},
+    {"V", OPT_UPPER_V, '-', "Even more verbose"},
+    {"s", OPT_S, '-', "Only supported ciphers"},
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
+    {"ssl3", OPT_SSL3, '-', "SSL3 mode"},
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
+    {"tls1", OPT_TLS1, '-', "TLS1 mode"},
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1
+    {"tls1_1", OPT_TLS1_1, '-', "TLS1.1 mode"},
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2
+    {"tls1_2", OPT_TLS1_2, '-', "TLS1.2 mode"},
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE
+    {"stdname", OPT_STDNAME, '-', "Show standard cipher names"},
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+    {"psk", OPT_PSK, '-', "include ciphersuites requiring PSK"},
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+    {"srp", OPT_SRP, '-', "include ciphersuites requiring SRP"},
+#endif
+    {NULL}
+};
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+static unsigned int dummy_psk(SSL *ssl, const char *hint, char *identity,
+                              unsigned int max_identity_len,
+                              unsigned char *psk,
+                              unsigned int max_psk_len)
+{
+    return 0;
+}
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+static char *dummy_srp(SSL *ssl, void *arg)
+{
+    return "";
+}
+#endif
+
+int ciphers_main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    SSL_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+    SSL *ssl = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk = NULL;
+    const SSL_METHOD *meth = TLS_server_method();
+    int ret = 1, i, verbose = 0, Verbose = 0, use_supported = 0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE
+    int stdname = 0;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+    int psk = 0;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+    int srp = 0;
+#endif
+    const char *p;
+    char *ciphers = NULL, *prog;
+    char buf[512];
+    OPTION_CHOICE o;
+    int min_version = 0, max_version = 0;
+
+    prog = opt_init(argc, argv, ciphers_options);
+    while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) {
+        switch (o) {
+        case OPT_EOF:
+        case OPT_ERR:
+ opthelp:
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog);
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_HELP:
+            opt_help(ciphers_options);
+            ret = 0;
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_V:
+            verbose = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_UPPER_V:
+            verbose = Verbose = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_S:
+            use_supported = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_STDNAME:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE
+            stdname = verbose = 1;
+#endif
+            break;
+        case OPT_SSL3:
+            min_version = SSL3_VERSION;
+            max_version = SSL3_VERSION;
+            break;
+        case OPT_TLS1:
+            min_version = TLS1_VERSION;
+            max_version = TLS1_VERSION;
+            break;
+        case OPT_TLS1_1:
+            min_version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
+            max_version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
+            break;
+        case OPT_TLS1_2:
+            min_version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
+            max_version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
+            break;
+        case OPT_PSK:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+            psk = 1;
+#endif
+            break;
+        case OPT_SRP:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+            srp = 1;
+#endif
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    argv = opt_rest();
+    argc = opt_num_rest();
+
+    if (argc == 1)
+        ciphers = *argv;
+    else if (argc != 0)
+        goto opthelp;
+
+    ctx = SSL_CTX_new(meth);
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(ctx, min_version) == 0)
+        goto err;
+    if (SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(ctx, max_version) == 0)
+        goto err;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+    if (psk)
+        SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback(ctx, dummy_psk);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+    if (srp)
+        SSL_CTX_set_srp_client_pwd_callback(ctx, dummy_srp);
+#endif
+    if (ciphers != NULL) {
+        if (!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(ctx, ciphers)) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error in cipher list\n");
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+    ssl = SSL_new(ctx);
+    if (ssl == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (use_supported)
+        sk = SSL_get1_supported_ciphers(ssl);
+    else
+        sk = SSL_get_ciphers(ssl);
+
+    if (!verbose) {
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) {
+            const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
+            p = SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c);
+            if (p == NULL)
+                break;
+            if (i != 0)
+                BIO_printf(bio_out, ":");
+            BIO_printf(bio_out, "%s", p);
+        }
+        BIO_printf(bio_out, "\n");
+    } else {
+
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) {
+            const SSL_CIPHER *c;
+
+            c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
+
+            if (Verbose) {
+                unsigned long id = SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c);
+                int id0 = (int)(id >> 24);
+                int id1 = (int)((id >> 16) & 0xffL);
+                int id2 = (int)((id >> 8) & 0xffL);
+                int id3 = (int)(id & 0xffL);
+
+                if ((id & 0xff000000L) == 0x03000000L)
+                    BIO_printf(bio_out, "          0x%02X,0x%02X - ", id2, id3); /* SSL3
+                                                                                  * cipher */
+                else
+                    BIO_printf(bio_out, "0x%02X,0x%02X,0x%02X,0x%02X - ", id0, id1, id2, id3); /* whatever */
+            }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE
+            if (stdname) {
+                const char *nm = SSL_CIPHER_standard_name(c);
+                if (nm == NULL)
+                    nm = "UNKNOWN";
+                BIO_printf(bio_out, "%s - ", nm);
+            }
+#endif
+            BIO_puts(bio_out, SSL_CIPHER_description(c, buf, sizeof(buf)));
+        }
+    }
+
+    ret = 0;
+    goto end;
+ err:
+    ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ end:
+    if (use_supported)
+        sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk);
+    SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
+    SSL_free(ssl);
+    return (ret);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/client.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/client.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e7a47a7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/client.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+subject= C = UK, O = OpenSSL Group, OU = FOR TESTING PURPOSES ONLY, CN = Test Client Cert
+issuer= C = UK, O = OpenSSL Group, OU = FOR TESTING PURPOSES ONLY, CN = OpenSSL Test Intermediate CA
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/cms.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/cms.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..640f92e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/cms.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1298 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2008-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* CMS utility function */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include "apps.h"
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
+
+# include <openssl/crypto.h>
+# include <openssl/pem.h>
+# include <openssl/err.h>
+# include <openssl/x509_vfy.h>
+# include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+# include <openssl/cms.h>
+
+static int save_certs(char *signerfile, STACK_OF(X509) *signers);
+static int cms_cb(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+static void receipt_request_print(CMS_ContentInfo *cms);
+static CMS_ReceiptRequest *make_receipt_request(STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING)
+                                                *rr_to, int rr_allorfirst, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING)
+                                                *rr_from);
+static int cms_set_pkey_param(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx,
+                              STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *param);
+
+# define SMIME_OP        0x10
+# define SMIME_IP        0x20
+# define SMIME_SIGNERS   0x40
+# define SMIME_ENCRYPT           (1 | SMIME_OP)
+# define SMIME_DECRYPT           (2 | SMIME_IP)
+# define SMIME_SIGN              (3 | SMIME_OP | SMIME_SIGNERS)
+# define SMIME_VERIFY            (4 | SMIME_IP)
+# define SMIME_CMSOUT            (5 | SMIME_IP | SMIME_OP)
+# define SMIME_RESIGN            (6 | SMIME_IP | SMIME_OP | SMIME_SIGNERS)
+# define SMIME_DATAOUT           (7 | SMIME_IP)
+# define SMIME_DATA_CREATE       (8 | SMIME_OP)
+# define SMIME_DIGEST_VERIFY     (9 | SMIME_IP)
+# define SMIME_DIGEST_CREATE     (10 | SMIME_OP)
+# define SMIME_UNCOMPRESS        (11 | SMIME_IP)
+# define SMIME_COMPRESS          (12 | SMIME_OP)
+# define SMIME_ENCRYPTED_DECRYPT (13 | SMIME_IP)
+# define SMIME_ENCRYPTED_ENCRYPT (14 | SMIME_OP)
+# define SMIME_SIGN_RECEIPT      (15 | SMIME_IP | SMIME_OP)
+# define SMIME_VERIFY_RECEIPT    (16 | SMIME_IP)
+
+static int verify_err = 0;
+
+typedef struct cms_key_param_st cms_key_param;
+
+struct cms_key_param_st {
+    int idx;
+    STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *param;
+    cms_key_param *next;
+};
+
+typedef enum OPTION_choice {
+    OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP,
+    OPT_INFORM, OPT_OUTFORM, OPT_IN, OPT_OUT, OPT_ENCRYPT,
+    OPT_DECRYPT, OPT_SIGN, OPT_SIGN_RECEIPT, OPT_RESIGN,
+    OPT_VERIFY, OPT_VERIFY_RETCODE, OPT_VERIFY_RECEIPT,
+    OPT_CMSOUT, OPT_DATA_OUT, OPT_DATA_CREATE, OPT_DIGEST_VERIFY,
+    OPT_DIGEST_CREATE, OPT_COMPRESS, OPT_UNCOMPRESS,
+    OPT_ED_DECRYPT, OPT_ED_ENCRYPT, OPT_DEBUG_DECRYPT, OPT_TEXT,
+    OPT_ASCIICRLF, OPT_NOINTERN, OPT_NOVERIFY, OPT_NOCERTS,
+    OPT_NOATTR, OPT_NODETACH, OPT_NOSMIMECAP, OPT_BINARY, OPT_KEYID,
+    OPT_NOSIGS, OPT_NO_CONTENT_VERIFY, OPT_NO_ATTR_VERIFY, OPT_INDEF,
+    OPT_NOINDEF, OPT_CRLFEOL, OPT_NOOUT, OPT_RR_PRINT,
+    OPT_RR_ALL, OPT_RR_FIRST, OPT_RCTFORM, OPT_CERTFILE, OPT_CAFILE,
+    OPT_CAPATH, OPT_NOCAPATH, OPT_NOCAFILE,OPT_CONTENT, OPT_PRINT,
+    OPT_SECRETKEY, OPT_SECRETKEYID, OPT_PWRI_PASSWORD, OPT_ECONTENT_TYPE,
+    OPT_RAND, OPT_PASSIN, OPT_TO, OPT_FROM, OPT_SUBJECT, OPT_SIGNER, OPT_RECIP,
+    OPT_CERTSOUT, OPT_MD, OPT_INKEY, OPT_KEYFORM, OPT_KEYOPT, OPT_RR_FROM,
+    OPT_RR_TO, OPT_AES128_WRAP, OPT_AES192_WRAP, OPT_AES256_WRAP,
+    OPT_3DES_WRAP, OPT_ENGINE,
+    OPT_V_ENUM,
+    OPT_CIPHER
+} OPTION_CHOICE;
+
+OPTIONS cms_options[] = {
+    {OPT_HELP_STR, 1, '-', "Usage: %s [options] cert.pem...\n"},
+    {OPT_HELP_STR, 1, '-',
+        "  cert.pem... recipient certs for encryption\n"},
+    {OPT_HELP_STR, 1, '-', "Valid options are:\n"},
+    {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"},
+    {"inform", OPT_INFORM, 'c', "Input format SMIME (default), PEM or DER"},
+    {"outform", OPT_OUTFORM, 'c',
+     "Output format SMIME (default), PEM or DER"},
+    {"in", OPT_IN, '<', "Input file"},
+    {"out", OPT_OUT, '>', "Output file"},
+    {"encrypt", OPT_ENCRYPT, '-', "Encrypt message"},
+    {"decrypt", OPT_DECRYPT, '-', "Decrypt encrypted message"},
+    {"sign", OPT_SIGN, '-', "Sign message"},
+    {"sign_receipt", OPT_SIGN_RECEIPT, '-', "Generate a signed receipt for the message"},
+    {"resign", OPT_RESIGN, '-', "Resign a signed message"},
+    {"verify", OPT_VERIFY, '-', "Verify signed message"},
+    {"verify_retcode", OPT_VERIFY_RETCODE, '-'},
+    {"verify_receipt", OPT_VERIFY_RECEIPT, '<'},
+    {"cmsout", OPT_CMSOUT, '-', "Output CMS structure"},
+    {"data_out", OPT_DATA_OUT, '-'},
+    {"data_create", OPT_DATA_CREATE, '-'},
+    {"digest_verify", OPT_DIGEST_VERIFY, '-'},
+    {"digest_create", OPT_DIGEST_CREATE, '-'},
+    {"compress", OPT_COMPRESS, '-'},
+    {"uncompress", OPT_UNCOMPRESS, '-'},
+    {"EncryptedData_decrypt", OPT_ED_DECRYPT, '-'},
+    {"EncryptedData_encrypt", OPT_ED_ENCRYPT, '-'},
+    {"debug_decrypt", OPT_DEBUG_DECRYPT, '-'},
+    {"text", OPT_TEXT, '-', "Include or delete text MIME headers"},
+    {"asciicrlf", OPT_ASCIICRLF, '-'},
+    {"nointern", OPT_NOINTERN, '-',
+     "Don't search certificates in message for signer"},
+    {"noverify", OPT_NOVERIFY, '-', "Don't verify signers certificate"},
+    {"nocerts", OPT_NOCERTS, '-',
+     "Don't include signers certificate when signing"},
+    {"noattr", OPT_NOATTR, '-', "Don't include any signed attributes"},
+    {"nodetach", OPT_NODETACH, '-', "Use opaque signing"},
+    {"nosmimecap", OPT_NOSMIMECAP, '-', "Omit the SMIMECapabilities attribute"},
+    {"binary", OPT_BINARY, '-', "Don't translate message to text"},
+    {"keyid", OPT_KEYID, '-', "Use subject key identifier"},
+    {"nosigs", OPT_NOSIGS, '-', "Don't verify message signature"},
+    {"no_content_verify", OPT_NO_CONTENT_VERIFY, '-'},
+    {"no_attr_verify", OPT_NO_ATTR_VERIFY, '-'},
+    {"stream", OPT_INDEF, '-', "Enable CMS streaming"},
+    {"indef", OPT_INDEF, '-', "Same as -stream"},
+    {"noindef", OPT_NOINDEF, '-', "Disable CMS streaming"},
+    {"crlfeol", OPT_CRLFEOL, '-', "Use CRLF as EOL termination instead of CR only" },
+    {"noout", OPT_NOOUT, '-', "For the -cmsout operation do not output the parsed CMS structure"},
+    {"receipt_request_print", OPT_RR_PRINT, '-', "Print CMS Receipt Request" },
+    {"receipt_request_all", OPT_RR_ALL, '-'},
+    {"receipt_request_first", OPT_RR_FIRST, '-'},
+    {"rctform", OPT_RCTFORM, 'F', "Receipt file format"},
+    {"certfile", OPT_CERTFILE, '<', "Other certificates file"},
+    {"CAfile", OPT_CAFILE, '<', "Trusted certificates file"},
+    {"CApath", OPT_CAPATH, '/', "trusted certificates directory"},
+    {"no-CAfile", OPT_NOCAFILE, '-',
+     "Do not load the default certificates file"},
+    {"no-CApath", OPT_NOCAPATH, '-',
+     "Do not load certificates from the default certificates directory"},
+    {"content", OPT_CONTENT, '<',
+     "Supply or override content for detached signature"},
+    {"print", OPT_PRINT, '-', 
+     "For the -cmsout operation print out all fields of the CMS structure"},
+    {"secretkey", OPT_SECRETKEY, 's'},
+    {"secretkeyid", OPT_SECRETKEYID, 's'},
+    {"pwri_password", OPT_PWRI_PASSWORD, 's'},
+    {"econtent_type", OPT_ECONTENT_TYPE, 's'},
+    {"rand", OPT_RAND, 's',
+     "Load the file(s) into the random number generator"},
+    {"passin", OPT_PASSIN, 's', "Input file pass phrase source"},
+    {"to", OPT_TO, 's', "To address"},
+    {"from", OPT_FROM, 's', "From address"},
+    {"subject", OPT_SUBJECT, 's', "Subject"},
+    {"signer", OPT_SIGNER, 's', "Signer certificate file"},
+    {"recip", OPT_RECIP, '<', "Recipient cert file for decryption"},
+    {"certsout", OPT_CERTSOUT, '>', "Certificate output file"},
+    {"md", OPT_MD, 's', "Digest algorithm to use when signing or resigning"},
+    {"inkey", OPT_INKEY, 's',
+     "Input private key (if not signer or recipient)"},
+    {"keyform", OPT_KEYFORM, 'f', "Input private key format (PEM or ENGINE)"},
+    {"keyopt", OPT_KEYOPT, 's', "Set public key parameters as n:v pairs"},
+    {"receipt_request_from", OPT_RR_FROM, 's'},
+    {"receipt_request_to", OPT_RR_TO, 's'},
+    {"", OPT_CIPHER, '-', "Any supported cipher"},
+    OPT_V_OPTIONS,
+    {"aes128-wrap", OPT_AES128_WRAP, '-', "Use AES128 to wrap key"},
+    {"aes192-wrap", OPT_AES192_WRAP, '-', "Use AES192 to wrap key"},
+    {"aes256-wrap", OPT_AES256_WRAP, '-', "Use AES256 to wrap key"},
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
+    {"des3-wrap", OPT_3DES_WRAP, '-', "Use 3DES-EDE to wrap key"},
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine e, possibly a hardware device"},
+# endif
+    {NULL}
+};
+
+int cms_main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    ASN1_OBJECT *econtent_type = NULL;
+    BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL, *indata = NULL, *rctin = NULL;
+    CMS_ContentInfo *cms = NULL, *rcms = NULL;
+    CMS_ReceiptRequest *rr = NULL;
+    ENGINE *e = NULL;
+    EVP_PKEY *key = NULL;
+    const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL, *wrap_cipher = NULL;
+    const EVP_MD *sign_md = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *rr_to = NULL, *rr_from = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sksigners = NULL, *skkeys = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(X509) *encerts = NULL, *other = NULL;
+    X509 *cert = NULL, *recip = NULL, *signer = NULL;
+    X509_STORE *store = NULL;
+    X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = NULL;
+    char *certfile = NULL, *keyfile = NULL, *contfile = NULL;
+    const char *CAfile = NULL, *CApath = NULL;
+    char *certsoutfile = NULL;
+    int noCAfile = 0, noCApath = 0;
+    char *infile = NULL, *outfile = NULL, *rctfile = NULL, *inrand = NULL;
+    char *passinarg = NULL, *passin = NULL, *signerfile = NULL, *recipfile =
+        NULL;
+    char *to = NULL, *from = NULL, *subject = NULL, *prog;
+    cms_key_param *key_first = NULL, *key_param = NULL;
+    int flags = CMS_DETACHED, noout = 0, print = 0, keyidx = -1, vpmtouched =
+        0;
+    int informat = FORMAT_SMIME, outformat = FORMAT_SMIME;
+    int need_rand = 0, operation = 0, ret = 1, rr_print = 0, rr_allorfirst =
+        -1;
+    int verify_retcode = 0, rctformat = FORMAT_SMIME, keyform = FORMAT_PEM;
+    size_t secret_keylen = 0, secret_keyidlen = 0;
+    unsigned char *pwri_pass = NULL, *pwri_tmp = NULL;
+    unsigned char *secret_key = NULL, *secret_keyid = NULL;
+    long ltmp;
+    const char *mime_eol = "\n";
+    OPTION_CHOICE o;
+
+    if ((vpm = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new()) == NULL)
+        return 1;
+
+    prog = opt_init(argc, argv, cms_options);
+    while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) {
+        switch (o) {
+        case OPT_EOF:
+        case OPT_ERR:
+ opthelp:
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog);
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_HELP:
+            opt_help(cms_options);
+            ret = 0;
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_INFORM:
+            if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PDS, &informat))
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_OUTFORM:
+            if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PDS, &outformat))
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_OUT:
+            outfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_ENCRYPT:
+            operation = SMIME_ENCRYPT;
+            break;
+        case OPT_DECRYPT:
+            operation = SMIME_DECRYPT;
+            break;
+        case OPT_SIGN:
+            operation = SMIME_SIGN;
+            break;
+        case OPT_SIGN_RECEIPT:
+            operation = SMIME_SIGN_RECEIPT;
+            break;
+        case OPT_RESIGN:
+            operation = SMIME_RESIGN;
+            break;
+        case OPT_VERIFY:
+            operation = SMIME_VERIFY;
+            break;
+        case OPT_VERIFY_RETCODE:
+            verify_retcode = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_VERIFY_RECEIPT:
+            operation = SMIME_VERIFY_RECEIPT;
+            rctfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_CMSOUT:
+            operation = SMIME_CMSOUT;
+            break;
+        case OPT_DATA_OUT:
+            operation = SMIME_DATAOUT;
+            break;
+        case OPT_DATA_CREATE:
+            operation = SMIME_DATA_CREATE;
+            break;
+        case OPT_DIGEST_VERIFY:
+            operation = SMIME_DIGEST_VERIFY;
+            break;
+        case OPT_DIGEST_CREATE:
+            operation = SMIME_DIGEST_CREATE;
+            break;
+        case OPT_COMPRESS:
+            operation = SMIME_COMPRESS;
+            break;
+        case OPT_UNCOMPRESS:
+            operation = SMIME_UNCOMPRESS;
+            break;
+        case OPT_ED_DECRYPT:
+            operation = SMIME_ENCRYPTED_DECRYPT;
+            break;
+        case OPT_ED_ENCRYPT:
+            operation = SMIME_ENCRYPTED_ENCRYPT;
+            break;
+        case OPT_DEBUG_DECRYPT:
+            flags |= CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT;
+            break;
+        case OPT_TEXT:
+            flags |= CMS_TEXT;
+            break;
+        case OPT_ASCIICRLF:
+            flags |= CMS_ASCIICRLF;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NOINTERN:
+            flags |= CMS_NOINTERN;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NOVERIFY:
+            flags |= CMS_NO_SIGNER_CERT_VERIFY;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NOCERTS:
+            flags |= CMS_NOCERTS;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NOATTR:
+            flags |= CMS_NOATTR;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NODETACH:
+            flags &= ~CMS_DETACHED;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NOSMIMECAP:
+            flags |= CMS_NOSMIMECAP;
+            break;
+        case OPT_BINARY:
+            flags |= CMS_BINARY;
+            break;
+        case OPT_KEYID:
+            flags |= CMS_USE_KEYID;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NOSIGS:
+            flags |= CMS_NOSIGS;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NO_CONTENT_VERIFY:
+            flags |= CMS_NO_CONTENT_VERIFY;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NO_ATTR_VERIFY:
+            flags |= CMS_NO_ATTR_VERIFY;
+            break;
+        case OPT_INDEF:
+            flags |= CMS_STREAM;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NOINDEF:
+            flags &= ~CMS_STREAM;
+            break;
+        case OPT_CRLFEOL:
+            mime_eol = "\r\n";
+            flags |= CMS_CRLFEOL;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NOOUT:
+            noout = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_RR_PRINT:
+            rr_print = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_RR_ALL:
+            rr_allorfirst = 0;
+            break;
+        case OPT_RR_FIRST:
+            rr_allorfirst = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_RCTFORM:
+            if (rctformat == FORMAT_SMIME)
+                rcms = SMIME_read_CMS(rctin, NULL);
+            else if (rctformat == FORMAT_PEM)
+                rcms = PEM_read_bio_CMS(rctin, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+            else if (rctformat == FORMAT_ASN1)
+                if (!opt_format(opt_arg(),
+                                OPT_FMT_PEMDER | OPT_FMT_SMIME, &rctformat))
+                    goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_CERTFILE:
+            certfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_CAFILE:
+            CAfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_CAPATH:
+            CApath = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_NOCAFILE:
+            noCAfile = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NOCAPATH:
+            noCApath = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_IN:
+            infile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_CONTENT:
+            contfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_RR_FROM:
+            if (rr_from == NULL
+                && (rr_from = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null()) == NULL)
+                goto end;
+            sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(rr_from, opt_arg());
+            break;
+        case OPT_RR_TO:
+            if (rr_to == NULL
+                && (rr_to = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null()) == NULL)
+                goto end;
+            sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(rr_to, opt_arg());
+            break;
+        case OPT_PRINT:
+            noout = print = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_SECRETKEY:
+            if (secret_key != NULL) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "Invalid key (supplied twice) %s\n",
+                           opt_arg());
+                goto opthelp;
+            }
+            secret_key = OPENSSL_hexstr2buf(opt_arg(), &ltmp);
+            if (secret_key == NULL) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "Invalid key %s\n", opt_arg());
+                goto end;
+            }
+            secret_keylen = (size_t)ltmp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_SECRETKEYID:
+            if (secret_keyid != NULL) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "Invalid id (supplied twice) %s\n",
+                           opt_arg());
+                goto opthelp;
+            }
+            secret_keyid = OPENSSL_hexstr2buf(opt_arg(), &ltmp);
+            if (secret_keyid == NULL) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "Invalid id %s\n", opt_arg());
+                goto opthelp;
+            }
+            secret_keyidlen = (size_t)ltmp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_PWRI_PASSWORD:
+            pwri_pass = (unsigned char *)opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_ECONTENT_TYPE:
+            if (econtent_type != NULL) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "Invalid OID (supplied twice) %s\n",
+                           opt_arg());
+                goto opthelp;
+            }
+            econtent_type = OBJ_txt2obj(opt_arg(), 0);
+            if (econtent_type == NULL) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "Invalid OID %s\n", opt_arg());
+                goto opthelp;
+            }
+            break;
+        case OPT_RAND:
+            inrand = opt_arg();
+            need_rand = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_ENGINE:
+            e = setup_engine(opt_arg(), 0);
+            break;
+        case OPT_PASSIN:
+            passinarg = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_TO:
+            to = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_FROM:
+            from = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_SUBJECT:
+            subject = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_CERTSOUT:
+            certsoutfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_MD:
+            if (!opt_md(opt_arg(), &sign_md))
+                goto end;
+            break;
+        case OPT_SIGNER:
+            /* If previous -signer argument add signer to list */
+            if (signerfile) {
+                if (sksigners == NULL
+                    && (sksigners = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null()) == NULL)
+                    goto end;
+                sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(sksigners, signerfile);
+                if (keyfile == NULL)
+                    keyfile = signerfile;
+                if (skkeys == NULL
+                    && (skkeys = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null()) == NULL)
+                    goto end;
+                sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(skkeys, keyfile);
+                keyfile = NULL;
+            }
+            signerfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_INKEY:
+            /* If previous -inkey argument add signer to list */
+            if (keyfile) {
+                if (signerfile == NULL) {
+                    BIO_puts(bio_err, "Illegal -inkey without -signer\n");
+                    goto end;
+                }
+                if (sksigners == NULL
+                    && (sksigners = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null()) == NULL)
+                    goto end;
+                sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(sksigners, signerfile);
+                signerfile = NULL;
+                if (skkeys == NULL
+                    && (skkeys = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null()) == NULL)
+                    goto end;
+                sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(skkeys, keyfile);
+            }
+            keyfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_KEYFORM:
+            if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_ANY, &keyform))
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_RECIP:
+            if (operation == SMIME_ENCRYPT) {
+                if (encerts == NULL && (encerts = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
+                    goto end;
+                cert = load_cert(opt_arg(), FORMAT_PEM,
+                                 "recipient certificate file");
+                if (cert == NULL)
+                    goto end;
+                sk_X509_push(encerts, cert);
+                cert = NULL;
+            } else
+                recipfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_CIPHER:
+            if (!opt_cipher(opt_unknown(), &cipher))
+                goto end;
+            break;
+        case OPT_KEYOPT:
+            keyidx = -1;
+            if (operation == SMIME_ENCRYPT) {
+                if (encerts)
+                    keyidx += sk_X509_num(encerts);
+            } else {
+                if (keyfile || signerfile)
+                    keyidx++;
+                if (skkeys)
+                    keyidx += sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(skkeys);
+            }
+            if (keyidx < 0) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "No key specified\n");
+                goto opthelp;
+            }
+            if (key_param == NULL || key_param->idx != keyidx) {
+                cms_key_param *nparam;
+                nparam = app_malloc(sizeof(*nparam), "key param buffer");
+                nparam->idx = keyidx;
+                if ((nparam->param = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null()) == NULL)
+                    goto end;
+                nparam->next = NULL;
+                if (key_first == NULL)
+                    key_first = nparam;
+                else
+                    key_param->next = nparam;
+                key_param = nparam;
+            }
+            sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(key_param->param, opt_arg());
+            break;
+        case OPT_V_CASES:
+            if (!opt_verify(o, vpm))
+                goto end;
+            vpmtouched++;
+            break;
+        case OPT_3DES_WRAP:
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
+            wrap_cipher = EVP_des_ede3_wrap();
+# endif
+            break;
+        case OPT_AES128_WRAP:
+            wrap_cipher = EVP_aes_128_wrap();
+            break;
+        case OPT_AES192_WRAP:
+            wrap_cipher = EVP_aes_192_wrap();
+            break;
+        case OPT_AES256_WRAP:
+            wrap_cipher = EVP_aes_256_wrap();
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    argc = opt_num_rest();
+    argv = opt_rest();
+
+    if (((rr_allorfirst != -1) || rr_from) && !rr_to) {
+        BIO_puts(bio_err, "No Signed Receipts Recipients\n");
+        goto opthelp;
+    }
+
+    if (!(operation & SMIME_SIGNERS) && (rr_to || rr_from)) {
+        BIO_puts(bio_err, "Signed receipts only allowed with -sign\n");
+        goto opthelp;
+    }
+    if (!(operation & SMIME_SIGNERS) && (skkeys || sksigners)) {
+        BIO_puts(bio_err, "Multiple signers or keys not allowed\n");
+        goto opthelp;
+    }
+
+    if (operation & SMIME_SIGNERS) {
+        if (keyfile && !signerfile) {
+            BIO_puts(bio_err, "Illegal -inkey without -signer\n");
+            goto opthelp;
+        }
+        /* Check to see if any final signer needs to be appended */
+        if (signerfile) {
+            if (!sksigners
+                && (sksigners = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null()) == NULL)
+                goto end;
+            sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(sksigners, signerfile);
+            if (!skkeys && (skkeys = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null()) == NULL)
+                goto end;
+            if (!keyfile)
+                keyfile = signerfile;
+            sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(skkeys, keyfile);
+        }
+        if (!sksigners) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "No signer certificate specified\n");
+            goto opthelp;
+        }
+        signerfile = NULL;
+        keyfile = NULL;
+        need_rand = 1;
+    }
+
+    else if (operation == SMIME_DECRYPT) {
+        if (!recipfile && !keyfile && !secret_key && !pwri_pass) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                       "No recipient certificate or key specified\n");
+            goto opthelp;
+        }
+    } else if (operation == SMIME_ENCRYPT) {
+        if (*argv == NULL && !secret_key && !pwri_pass && !encerts) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "No recipient(s) certificate(s) specified\n");
+            goto opthelp;
+        }
+        need_rand = 1;
+    } else if (!operation)
+        goto opthelp;
+
+    if (!app_passwd(passinarg, NULL, &passin, NULL)) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting password\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (need_rand) {
+        app_RAND_load_file(NULL, (inrand != NULL));
+        if (inrand != NULL)
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "%ld semi-random bytes loaded\n",
+                       app_RAND_load_files(inrand));
+    }
+
+    ret = 2;
+
+    if (!(operation & SMIME_SIGNERS))
+        flags &= ~CMS_DETACHED;
+
+    if (!(operation & SMIME_OP)) {
+        if (flags & CMS_BINARY)
+            outformat = FORMAT_BINARY;
+    }
+
+    if (!(operation & SMIME_IP)) {
+        if (flags & CMS_BINARY)
+            informat = FORMAT_BINARY;
+    }
+
+    if (operation == SMIME_ENCRYPT) {
+        if (!cipher) {
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
+            cipher = EVP_des_ede3_cbc();
+# else
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "No cipher selected\n");
+            goto end;
+# endif
+        }
+
+        if (secret_key && !secret_keyid) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "No secret key id\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+
+        if (*argv && !encerts)
+            if ((encerts = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
+                goto end;
+        while (*argv) {
+            if ((cert = load_cert(*argv, FORMAT_PEM,
+                                  "recipient certificate file")) == NULL)
+                goto end;
+            sk_X509_push(encerts, cert);
+            cert = NULL;
+            argv++;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (certfile) {
+        if (!load_certs(certfile, &other, FORMAT_PEM, NULL,
+                        "certificate file")) {
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (recipfile && (operation == SMIME_DECRYPT)) {
+        if ((recip = load_cert(recipfile, FORMAT_PEM,
+                               "recipient certificate file")) == NULL) {
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (operation == SMIME_SIGN_RECEIPT) {
+        if ((signer = load_cert(signerfile, FORMAT_PEM,
+                                "receipt signer certificate file")) == NULL) {
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (operation == SMIME_DECRYPT) {
+        if (!keyfile)
+            keyfile = recipfile;
+    } else if ((operation == SMIME_SIGN) || (operation == SMIME_SIGN_RECEIPT)) {
+        if (!keyfile)
+            keyfile = signerfile;
+    } else
+        keyfile = NULL;
+
+    if (keyfile) {
+        key = load_key(keyfile, keyform, 0, passin, e, "signing key file");
+        if (!key)
+            goto end;
+    }
+
+    in = bio_open_default(infile, 'r', informat);
+    if (in == NULL)
+        goto end;
+
+    if (operation & SMIME_IP) {
+        if (informat == FORMAT_SMIME)
+            cms = SMIME_read_CMS(in, &indata);
+        else if (informat == FORMAT_PEM)
+            cms = PEM_read_bio_CMS(in, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+        else if (informat == FORMAT_ASN1)
+            cms = d2i_CMS_bio(in, NULL);
+        else {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Bad input format for CMS file\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+
+        if (!cms) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error reading S/MIME message\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+        if (contfile) {
+            BIO_free(indata);
+            if ((indata = BIO_new_file(contfile, "rb")) == NULL) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't read content file %s\n", contfile);
+                goto end;
+            }
+        }
+        if (certsoutfile) {
+            STACK_OF(X509) *allcerts;
+            allcerts = CMS_get1_certs(cms);
+            if (!save_certs(certsoutfile, allcerts)) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                           "Error writing certs to %s\n", certsoutfile);
+                ret = 5;
+                goto end;
+            }
+            sk_X509_pop_free(allcerts, X509_free);
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (rctfile) {
+        char *rctmode = (rctformat == FORMAT_ASN1) ? "rb" : "r";
+        if ((rctin = BIO_new_file(rctfile, rctmode)) == NULL) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't open receipt file %s\n", rctfile);
+            goto end;
+        }
+
+        if (rctformat == FORMAT_SMIME)
+            rcms = SMIME_read_CMS(rctin, NULL);
+        else if (rctformat == FORMAT_PEM)
+            rcms = PEM_read_bio_CMS(rctin, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+        else if (rctformat == FORMAT_ASN1)
+            rcms = d2i_CMS_bio(rctin, NULL);
+        else {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Bad input format for receipt\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+
+        if (!rcms) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error reading receipt\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+
+    out = bio_open_default(outfile, 'w', outformat);
+    if (out == NULL)
+        goto end;
+
+    if ((operation == SMIME_VERIFY) || (operation == SMIME_VERIFY_RECEIPT)) {
+        if ((store = setup_verify(CAfile, CApath, noCAfile, noCApath)) == NULL)
+            goto end;
+        X509_STORE_set_verify_cb(store, cms_cb);
+        if (vpmtouched)
+            X509_STORE_set1_param(store, vpm);
+    }
+
+    ret = 3;
+
+    if (operation == SMIME_DATA_CREATE) {
+        cms = CMS_data_create(in, flags);
+    } else if (operation == SMIME_DIGEST_CREATE) {
+        cms = CMS_digest_create(in, sign_md, flags);
+    } else if (operation == SMIME_COMPRESS) {
+        cms = CMS_compress(in, -1, flags);
+    } else if (operation == SMIME_ENCRYPT) {
+        int i;
+        flags |= CMS_PARTIAL;
+        cms = CMS_encrypt(NULL, in, cipher, flags);
+        if (!cms)
+            goto end;
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(encerts); i++) {
+            CMS_RecipientInfo *ri;
+            cms_key_param *kparam;
+            int tflags = flags;
+            X509 *x = sk_X509_value(encerts, i);
+            for (kparam = key_first; kparam; kparam = kparam->next) {
+                if (kparam->idx == i) {
+                    tflags |= CMS_KEY_PARAM;
+                    break;
+                }
+            }
+            ri = CMS_add1_recipient_cert(cms, x, tflags);
+            if (!ri)
+                goto end;
+            if (kparam) {
+                EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx;
+                pctx = CMS_RecipientInfo_get0_pkey_ctx(ri);
+                if (!cms_set_pkey_param(pctx, kparam->param))
+                    goto end;
+            }
+            if (CMS_RecipientInfo_type(ri) == CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE
+                && wrap_cipher) {
+                EVP_CIPHER_CTX *wctx;
+                wctx = CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_ctx(ri);
+                EVP_EncryptInit_ex(wctx, wrap_cipher, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+            }
+        }
+
+        if (secret_key) {
+            if (!CMS_add0_recipient_key(cms, NID_undef,
+                                        secret_key, secret_keylen,
+                                        secret_keyid, secret_keyidlen,
+                                        NULL, NULL, NULL))
+                goto end;
+            /* NULL these because call absorbs them */
+            secret_key = NULL;
+            secret_keyid = NULL;
+        }
+        if (pwri_pass) {
+            pwri_tmp = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_strdup((char *)pwri_pass);
+            if (!pwri_tmp)
+                goto end;
+            if (!CMS_add0_recipient_password(cms,
+                                             -1, NID_undef, NID_undef,
+                                             pwri_tmp, -1, NULL))
+                goto end;
+            pwri_tmp = NULL;
+        }
+        if (!(flags & CMS_STREAM)) {
+            if (!CMS_final(cms, in, NULL, flags))
+                goto end;
+        }
+    } else if (operation == SMIME_ENCRYPTED_ENCRYPT) {
+        cms = CMS_EncryptedData_encrypt(in, cipher,
+                                        secret_key, secret_keylen, flags);
+
+    } else if (operation == SMIME_SIGN_RECEIPT) {
+        CMS_ContentInfo *srcms = NULL;
+        STACK_OF(CMS_SignerInfo) *sis;
+        CMS_SignerInfo *si;
+        sis = CMS_get0_SignerInfos(cms);
+        if (!sis)
+            goto end;
+        si = sk_CMS_SignerInfo_value(sis, 0);
+        srcms = CMS_sign_receipt(si, signer, key, other, flags);
+        if (!srcms)
+            goto end;
+        CMS_ContentInfo_free(cms);
+        cms = srcms;
+    } else if (operation & SMIME_SIGNERS) {
+        int i;
+        /*
+         * If detached data content we enable streaming if S/MIME output
+         * format.
+         */
+        if (operation == SMIME_SIGN) {
+
+            if (flags & CMS_DETACHED) {
+                if (outformat == FORMAT_SMIME)
+                    flags |= CMS_STREAM;
+            }
+            flags |= CMS_PARTIAL;
+            cms = CMS_sign(NULL, NULL, other, in, flags);
+            if (!cms)
+                goto end;
+            if (econtent_type)
+                CMS_set1_eContentType(cms, econtent_type);
+
+            if (rr_to) {
+                rr = make_receipt_request(rr_to, rr_allorfirst, rr_from);
+                if (!rr) {
+                    BIO_puts(bio_err,
+                             "Signed Receipt Request Creation Error\n");
+                    goto end;
+                }
+            }
+        } else
+            flags |= CMS_REUSE_DIGEST;
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(sksigners); i++) {
+            CMS_SignerInfo *si;
+            cms_key_param *kparam;
+            int tflags = flags;
+            signerfile = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(sksigners, i);
+            keyfile = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(skkeys, i);
+
+            signer = load_cert(signerfile, FORMAT_PEM, "signer certificate");
+            if (!signer) {
+                ret = 2;
+                goto end;
+            }
+            key = load_key(keyfile, keyform, 0, passin, e, "signing key file");
+            if (!key) {
+                ret = 2;
+                goto end;
+            }
+            for (kparam = key_first; kparam; kparam = kparam->next) {
+                if (kparam->idx == i) {
+                    tflags |= CMS_KEY_PARAM;
+                    break;
+                }
+            }
+            si = CMS_add1_signer(cms, signer, key, sign_md, tflags);
+            if (!si)
+                goto end;
+            if (kparam) {
+                EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx;
+                pctx = CMS_SignerInfo_get0_pkey_ctx(si);
+                if (!cms_set_pkey_param(pctx, kparam->param))
+                    goto end;
+            }
+            if (rr && !CMS_add1_ReceiptRequest(si, rr))
+                goto end;
+            X509_free(signer);
+            signer = NULL;
+            EVP_PKEY_free(key);
+            key = NULL;
+        }
+        /* If not streaming or resigning finalize structure */
+        if ((operation == SMIME_SIGN) && !(flags & CMS_STREAM)) {
+            if (!CMS_final(cms, in, NULL, flags))
+                goto end;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (!cms) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error creating CMS structure\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    ret = 4;
+    if (operation == SMIME_DECRYPT) {
+        if (flags & CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT)
+            CMS_decrypt(cms, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, flags);
+
+        if (secret_key) {
+            if (!CMS_decrypt_set1_key(cms,
+                                      secret_key, secret_keylen,
+                                      secret_keyid, secret_keyidlen)) {
+                BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error decrypting CMS using secret key\n");
+                goto end;
+            }
+        }
+
+        if (key) {
+            if (!CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey(cms, key, recip)) {
+                BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error decrypting CMS using private key\n");
+                goto end;
+            }
+        }
+
+        if (pwri_pass) {
+            if (!CMS_decrypt_set1_password(cms, pwri_pass, -1)) {
+                BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error decrypting CMS using password\n");
+                goto end;
+            }
+        }
+
+        if (!CMS_decrypt(cms, NULL, NULL, indata, out, flags)) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error decrypting CMS structure\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+    } else if (operation == SMIME_DATAOUT) {
+        if (!CMS_data(cms, out, flags))
+            goto end;
+    } else if (operation == SMIME_UNCOMPRESS) {
+        if (!CMS_uncompress(cms, indata, out, flags))
+            goto end;
+    } else if (operation == SMIME_DIGEST_VERIFY) {
+        if (CMS_digest_verify(cms, indata, out, flags) > 0)
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Verification successful\n");
+        else {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Verification failure\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+    } else if (operation == SMIME_ENCRYPTED_DECRYPT) {
+        if (!CMS_EncryptedData_decrypt(cms, secret_key, secret_keylen,
+                                       indata, out, flags))
+            goto end;
+    } else if (operation == SMIME_VERIFY) {
+        if (CMS_verify(cms, other, store, indata, out, flags) > 0)
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Verification successful\n");
+        else {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Verification failure\n");
+            if (verify_retcode)
+                ret = verify_err + 32;
+            goto end;
+        }
+        if (signerfile) {
+            STACK_OF(X509) *signers;
+            signers = CMS_get0_signers(cms);
+            if (!save_certs(signerfile, signers)) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                           "Error writing signers to %s\n", signerfile);
+                ret = 5;
+                goto end;
+            }
+            sk_X509_free(signers);
+        }
+        if (rr_print)
+            receipt_request_print(cms);
+
+    } else if (operation == SMIME_VERIFY_RECEIPT) {
+        if (CMS_verify_receipt(rcms, cms, other, store, flags) > 0)
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Verification successful\n");
+        else {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Verification failure\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+    } else {
+        if (noout) {
+            if (print)
+                CMS_ContentInfo_print_ctx(out, cms, 0, NULL);
+        } else if (outformat == FORMAT_SMIME) {
+            if (to)
+                BIO_printf(out, "To: %s%s", to, mime_eol);
+            if (from)
+                BIO_printf(out, "From: %s%s", from, mime_eol);
+            if (subject)
+                BIO_printf(out, "Subject: %s%s", subject, mime_eol);
+            if (operation == SMIME_RESIGN)
+                ret = SMIME_write_CMS(out, cms, indata, flags);
+            else
+                ret = SMIME_write_CMS(out, cms, in, flags);
+        } else if (outformat == FORMAT_PEM)
+            ret = PEM_write_bio_CMS_stream(out, cms, in, flags);
+        else if (outformat == FORMAT_ASN1)
+            ret = i2d_CMS_bio_stream(out, cms, in, flags);
+        else {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Bad output format for CMS file\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+        if (ret <= 0) {
+            ret = 6;
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+    ret = 0;
+ end:
+    if (ret)
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+    if (need_rand)
+        app_RAND_write_file(NULL);
+    sk_X509_pop_free(encerts, X509_free);
+    sk_X509_pop_free(other, X509_free);
+    X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(vpm);
+    sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(sksigners);
+    sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(skkeys);
+    OPENSSL_free(secret_key);
+    OPENSSL_free(secret_keyid);
+    OPENSSL_free(pwri_tmp);
+    ASN1_OBJECT_free(econtent_type);
+    CMS_ReceiptRequest_free(rr);
+    sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(rr_to);
+    sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(rr_from);
+    for (key_param = key_first; key_param;) {
+        cms_key_param *tparam;
+        sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(key_param->param);
+        tparam = key_param->next;
+        OPENSSL_free(key_param);
+        key_param = tparam;
+    }
+    X509_STORE_free(store);
+    X509_free(cert);
+    X509_free(recip);
+    X509_free(signer);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(key);
+    CMS_ContentInfo_free(cms);
+    CMS_ContentInfo_free(rcms);
+    release_engine(e);
+    BIO_free(rctin);
+    BIO_free(in);
+    BIO_free(indata);
+    BIO_free_all(out);
+    OPENSSL_free(passin);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static int save_certs(char *signerfile, STACK_OF(X509) *signers)
+{
+    int i;
+    BIO *tmp;
+    if (!signerfile)
+        return 1;
+    tmp = BIO_new_file(signerfile, "w");
+    if (!tmp)
+        return 0;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(signers); i++)
+        PEM_write_bio_X509(tmp, sk_X509_value(signers, i));
+    BIO_free(tmp);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Minimal callback just to output policy info (if any) */
+
+static int cms_cb(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int error;
+
+    error = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
+
+    verify_err = error;
+
+    if ((error != X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY)
+        && ((error != X509_V_OK) || (ok != 2)))
+        return ok;
+
+    policies_print(ctx);
+
+    return ok;
+
+}
+
+static void gnames_stack_print(STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAMES) *gns)
+{
+    STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *gens;
+    GENERAL_NAME *gen;
+    int i, j;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAMES_num(gns); i++) {
+        gens = sk_GENERAL_NAMES_value(gns, i);
+        for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); j++) {
+            gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, j);
+            BIO_puts(bio_err, "    ");
+            GENERAL_NAME_print(bio_err, gen);
+            BIO_puts(bio_err, "\n");
+        }
+    }
+    return;
+}
+
+static void receipt_request_print(CMS_ContentInfo *cms)
+{
+    STACK_OF(CMS_SignerInfo) *sis;
+    CMS_SignerInfo *si;
+    CMS_ReceiptRequest *rr;
+    int allorfirst;
+    STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAMES) *rto, *rlist;
+    ASN1_STRING *scid;
+    int i, rv;
+    sis = CMS_get0_SignerInfos(cms);
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_SignerInfo_num(sis); i++) {
+        si = sk_CMS_SignerInfo_value(sis, i);
+        rv = CMS_get1_ReceiptRequest(si, &rr);
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Signer %d:\n", i + 1);
+        if (rv == 0)
+            BIO_puts(bio_err, "  No Receipt Request\n");
+        else if (rv < 0) {
+            BIO_puts(bio_err, "  Receipt Request Parse Error\n");
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        } else {
+            const char *id;
+            int idlen;
+            CMS_ReceiptRequest_get0_values(rr, &scid, &allorfirst,
+                                           &rlist, &rto);
+            BIO_puts(bio_err, "  Signed Content ID:\n");
+            idlen = ASN1_STRING_length(scid);
+            id = (const char *)ASN1_STRING_get0_data(scid);
+            BIO_dump_indent(bio_err, id, idlen, 4);
+            BIO_puts(bio_err, "  Receipts From");
+            if (rlist) {
+                BIO_puts(bio_err, " List:\n");
+                gnames_stack_print(rlist);
+            } else if (allorfirst == 1)
+                BIO_puts(bio_err, ": First Tier\n");
+            else if (allorfirst == 0)
+                BIO_puts(bio_err, ": All\n");
+            else
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, " Unknown (%d)\n", allorfirst);
+            BIO_puts(bio_err, "  Receipts To:\n");
+            gnames_stack_print(rto);
+        }
+        CMS_ReceiptRequest_free(rr);
+    }
+}
+
+static STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAMES) *make_names_stack(STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *ns)
+{
+    int i;
+    STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAMES) *ret;
+    GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
+    GENERAL_NAME *gen = NULL;
+    ret = sk_GENERAL_NAMES_new_null();
+    if (!ret)
+        goto err;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(ns); i++) {
+        char *str = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(ns, i);
+        gen = a2i_GENERAL_NAME(NULL, NULL, NULL, GEN_EMAIL, str, 0);
+        if (!gen)
+            goto err;
+        gens = GENERAL_NAMES_new();
+        if (gens == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        if (!sk_GENERAL_NAME_push(gens, gen))
+            goto err;
+        gen = NULL;
+        if (!sk_GENERAL_NAMES_push(ret, gens))
+            goto err;
+        gens = NULL;
+    }
+
+    return ret;
+
+ err:
+    sk_GENERAL_NAMES_pop_free(ret, GENERAL_NAMES_free);
+    GENERAL_NAMES_free(gens);
+    GENERAL_NAME_free(gen);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+static CMS_ReceiptRequest *make_receipt_request(STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING)
+                                                *rr_to, int rr_allorfirst, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING)
+                                                *rr_from)
+{
+    STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAMES) *rct_to = NULL, *rct_from = NULL;
+    CMS_ReceiptRequest *rr;
+    rct_to = make_names_stack(rr_to);
+    if (!rct_to)
+        goto err;
+    if (rr_from) {
+        rct_from = make_names_stack(rr_from);
+        if (!rct_from)
+            goto err;
+    } else
+        rct_from = NULL;
+    rr = CMS_ReceiptRequest_create0(NULL, -1, rr_allorfirst, rct_from,
+                                    rct_to);
+    return rr;
+ err:
+    sk_GENERAL_NAMES_pop_free(rct_to, GENERAL_NAMES_free);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+static int cms_set_pkey_param(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx,
+                              STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *param)
+{
+    char *keyopt;
+    int i;
+    if (sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(param) <= 0)
+        return 1;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(param); i++) {
+        keyopt = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(param, i);
+        if (pkey_ctrl_string(pctx, keyopt) <= 0) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "parameter error \"%s\"\n", keyopt);
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/crl.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/crl.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..06b6e5b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/crl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,347 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include "apps.h"
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+
+typedef enum OPTION_choice {
+    OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP,
+    OPT_INFORM, OPT_IN, OPT_OUTFORM, OPT_OUT, OPT_KEYFORM, OPT_KEY,
+    OPT_ISSUER, OPT_LASTUPDATE, OPT_NEXTUPDATE, OPT_FINGERPRINT,
+    OPT_CRLNUMBER, OPT_BADSIG, OPT_GENDELTA, OPT_CAPATH, OPT_CAFILE,
+    OPT_NOCAPATH, OPT_NOCAFILE, OPT_VERIFY, OPT_TEXT, OPT_HASH, OPT_HASH_OLD,
+    OPT_NOOUT, OPT_NAMEOPT, OPT_MD
+} OPTION_CHOICE;
+
+OPTIONS crl_options[] = {
+    {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"},
+    {"inform", OPT_INFORM, 'F', "Input format; default PEM"},
+    {"in", OPT_IN, '<', "Input file - default stdin"},
+    {"outform", OPT_OUTFORM, 'F', "Output format - default PEM"},
+    {"out", OPT_OUT, '>', "output file - default stdout"},
+    {"keyform", OPT_KEYFORM, 'F', "Private key file format (PEM or ENGINE)"},
+    {"key", OPT_KEY, '<', "CRL signing Private key to use"},
+    {"issuer", OPT_ISSUER, '-', "Print issuer DN"},
+    {"lastupdate", OPT_LASTUPDATE, '-', "Set lastUpdate field"},
+    {"nextupdate", OPT_NEXTUPDATE, '-', "Set nextUpdate field"},
+    {"noout", OPT_NOOUT, '-', "No CRL output"},
+    {"fingerprint", OPT_FINGERPRINT, '-', "Print the crl fingerprint"},
+    {"crlnumber", OPT_CRLNUMBER, '-', "Print CRL number"},
+    {"badsig", OPT_BADSIG, '-', "Corrupt last byte of loaded CRL signature (for test)" },
+    {"gendelta", OPT_GENDELTA, '<', "Other CRL to compare/diff to the Input one"},
+    {"CApath", OPT_CAPATH, '/', "Verify CRL using certificates in dir"},
+    {"CAfile", OPT_CAFILE, '<', "Verify CRL using certificates in file name"},
+    {"no-CAfile", OPT_NOCAFILE, '-',
+     "Do not load the default certificates file"},
+    {"no-CApath", OPT_NOCAPATH, '-',
+     "Do not load certificates from the default certificates directory"},
+    {"verify", OPT_VERIFY, '-', "Verify CRL signature"},
+    {"text", OPT_TEXT, '-', "Print out a text format version"},
+    {"hash", OPT_HASH, '-', "Print hash value"},
+    {"nameopt", OPT_NAMEOPT, 's', "Various certificate name options"},
+    {"", OPT_MD, '-', "Any supported digest"},
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+    {"hash_old", OPT_HASH_OLD, '-', "Print old-style (MD5) hash value"},
+#endif
+    {NULL}
+};
+
+int crl_main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    X509_CRL *x = NULL;
+    BIO *out = NULL;
+    X509_STORE *store = NULL;
+    X509_STORE_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+    X509_LOOKUP *lookup = NULL;
+    X509_OBJECT *xobj = NULL;
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+    const EVP_MD *digest = EVP_sha1();
+    unsigned long nmflag = 0;
+    char nmflag_set = 0;
+    char *infile = NULL, *outfile = NULL, *crldiff = NULL, *keyfile = NULL;
+    const char *CAfile = NULL, *CApath = NULL, *prog;
+    OPTION_CHOICE o;
+    int hash = 0, issuer = 0, lastupdate = 0, nextupdate = 0, noout = 0;
+    int informat = FORMAT_PEM, outformat = FORMAT_PEM, keyformat = FORMAT_PEM;
+    int ret = 1, num = 0, badsig = 0, fingerprint = 0, crlnumber = 0;
+    int text = 0, do_ver = 0, noCAfile = 0, noCApath = 0;
+    int i;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+    int hash_old = 0;
+#endif
+
+    prog = opt_init(argc, argv, crl_options);
+    while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) {
+        switch (o) {
+        case OPT_EOF:
+        case OPT_ERR:
+ opthelp:
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog);
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_HELP:
+            opt_help(crl_options);
+            ret = 0;
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_INFORM:
+            if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PEMDER, &informat))
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_IN:
+            infile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_OUTFORM:
+            if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PEMDER, &outformat))
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_OUT:
+            outfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_KEYFORM:
+            if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PEMDER, &keyformat))
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_KEY:
+            keyfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_GENDELTA:
+            crldiff = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_CAPATH:
+            CApath = opt_arg();
+            do_ver = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_CAFILE:
+            CAfile = opt_arg();
+            do_ver = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NOCAPATH:
+            noCApath =  1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NOCAFILE:
+            noCAfile =  1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_HASH_OLD:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+            hash_old = ++num;
+#endif
+            break;
+        case OPT_VERIFY:
+            do_ver = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_TEXT:
+            text = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_HASH:
+            hash = ++num;
+            break;
+        case OPT_ISSUER:
+            issuer = ++num;
+            break;
+        case OPT_LASTUPDATE:
+            lastupdate = ++num;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NEXTUPDATE:
+            nextupdate = ++num;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NOOUT:
+            noout = ++num;
+            break;
+        case OPT_FINGERPRINT:
+            fingerprint = ++num;
+            break;
+        case OPT_CRLNUMBER:
+            crlnumber = ++num;
+            break;
+        case OPT_BADSIG:
+            badsig = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NAMEOPT:
+            nmflag_set = 1;
+            if (!set_name_ex(&nmflag, opt_arg()))
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_MD:
+            if (!opt_md(opt_unknown(), &digest))
+                goto opthelp;
+        }
+    }
+    argc = opt_num_rest();
+    if (argc != 0)
+        goto opthelp;
+
+    if (!nmflag_set)
+        nmflag = XN_FLAG_ONELINE;
+
+    x = load_crl(infile, informat);
+    if (x == NULL)
+        goto end;
+
+    if (do_ver) {
+        if ((store = setup_verify(CAfile, CApath, noCAfile, noCApath)) == NULL)
+            goto end;
+        lookup = X509_STORE_add_lookup(store, X509_LOOKUP_file());
+        if (lookup == NULL)
+            goto end;
+        ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
+        if (ctx == NULL || !X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, store, NULL, NULL)) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error initialising X509 store\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+
+        xobj = X509_STORE_CTX_get_obj_by_subject(ctx, X509_LU_X509,
+                                                 X509_CRL_get_issuer(x));
+        if (xobj == NULL) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting CRL issuer certificate\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+        pkey = X509_get_pubkey(X509_OBJECT_get0_X509(xobj));
+        X509_OBJECT_free(xobj);
+        if (!pkey) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting CRL issuer public key\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+        i = X509_CRL_verify(x, pkey);
+        EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+        if (i < 0)
+            goto end;
+        if (i == 0)
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "verify failure\n");
+        else
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "verify OK\n");
+    }
+
+    if (crldiff) {
+        X509_CRL *newcrl, *delta;
+        if (!keyfile) {
+            BIO_puts(bio_err, "Missing CRL signing key\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+        newcrl = load_crl(crldiff, informat);
+        if (!newcrl)
+            goto end;
+        pkey = load_key(keyfile, keyformat, 0, NULL, NULL, "CRL signing key");
+        if (!pkey) {
+            X509_CRL_free(newcrl);
+            goto end;
+        }
+        delta = X509_CRL_diff(x, newcrl, pkey, digest, 0);
+        X509_CRL_free(newcrl);
+        EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+        if (delta) {
+            X509_CRL_free(x);
+            x = delta;
+        } else {
+            BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error creating delta CRL\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (badsig) {
+        const ASN1_BIT_STRING *sig;
+
+        X509_CRL_get0_signature(x, &sig, NULL);
+        corrupt_signature(sig);
+    }
+
+    if (num) {
+        for (i = 1; i <= num; i++) {
+            if (issuer == i) {
+                print_name(bio_out, "issuer=", X509_CRL_get_issuer(x),
+                           nmflag);
+            }
+            if (crlnumber == i) {
+                ASN1_INTEGER *crlnum;
+                crlnum = X509_CRL_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_crl_number, NULL, NULL);
+                BIO_printf(bio_out, "crlNumber=");
+                if (crlnum) {
+                    i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(bio_out, crlnum);
+                    ASN1_INTEGER_free(crlnum);
+                } else
+                    BIO_puts(bio_out, "<NONE>");
+                BIO_printf(bio_out, "\n");
+            }
+            if (hash == i) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_out, "%08lx\n",
+                           X509_NAME_hash(X509_CRL_get_issuer(x)));
+            }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+            if (hash_old == i) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_out, "%08lx\n",
+                           X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_CRL_get_issuer(x)));
+            }
+#endif
+            if (lastupdate == i) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_out, "lastUpdate=");
+                ASN1_TIME_print(bio_out, X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(x));
+                BIO_printf(bio_out, "\n");
+            }
+            if (nextupdate == i) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_out, "nextUpdate=");
+                if (X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(x))
+                    ASN1_TIME_print(bio_out, X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(x));
+                else
+                    BIO_printf(bio_out, "NONE");
+                BIO_printf(bio_out, "\n");
+            }
+            if (fingerprint == i) {
+                int j;
+                unsigned int n;
+                unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+
+                if (!X509_CRL_digest(x, digest, md, &n)) {
+                    BIO_printf(bio_err, "out of memory\n");
+                    goto end;
+                }
+                BIO_printf(bio_out, "%s Fingerprint=",
+                           OBJ_nid2sn(EVP_MD_type(digest)));
+                for (j = 0; j < (int)n; j++) {
+                    BIO_printf(bio_out, "%02X%c", md[j], (j + 1 == (int)n)
+                               ? '\n' : ':');
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    out = bio_open_default(outfile, 'w', outformat);
+    if (out == NULL)
+        goto end;
+
+    if (text)
+        X509_CRL_print(out, x);
+
+    if (noout) {
+        ret = 0;
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (outformat == FORMAT_ASN1)
+        i = (int)i2d_X509_CRL_bio(out, x);
+    else
+        i = PEM_write_bio_X509_CRL(out, x);
+    if (!i) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to write CRL\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+    ret = 0;
+
+ end:
+    if (ret != 0)
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+    BIO_free_all(out);
+    X509_CRL_free(x);
+    X509_STORE_CTX_free(ctx);
+    X509_STORE_free(store);
+    return (ret);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/crl2p7.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/crl2p7.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9c5f79f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/crl2p7.c
@@ -0,0 +1,216 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include "apps.h"
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/pkcs7.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+
+static int add_certs_from_file(STACK_OF(X509) *stack, char *certfile);
+
+typedef enum OPTION_choice {
+    OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP,
+    OPT_INFORM, OPT_OUTFORM, OPT_IN, OPT_OUT, OPT_NOCRL, OPT_CERTFILE
+} OPTION_CHOICE;
+
+OPTIONS crl2pkcs7_options[] = {
+    {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"},
+    {"inform", OPT_INFORM, 'F', "Input format - DER or PEM"},
+    {"outform", OPT_OUTFORM, 'F', "Output format - DER or PEM"},
+    {"in", OPT_IN, '<', "Input file"},
+    {"out", OPT_OUT, '>', "Output file"},
+    {"nocrl", OPT_NOCRL, '-', "No crl to load, just certs from '-certfile'"},
+    {"certfile", OPT_CERTFILE, '<',
+     "File of chain of certs to a trusted CA; can be repeated"},
+    {NULL}
+};
+
+int crl2pkcs7_main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL;
+    PKCS7 *p7 = NULL;
+    PKCS7_SIGNED *p7s = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *certflst = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(X509) *cert_stack = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crl_stack = NULL;
+    X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
+    char *infile = NULL, *outfile = NULL, *prog, *certfile;
+    int i = 0, informat = FORMAT_PEM, outformat = FORMAT_PEM, ret = 1, nocrl =
+        0;
+    OPTION_CHOICE o;
+
+    prog = opt_init(argc, argv, crl2pkcs7_options);
+    while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) {
+        switch (o) {
+        case OPT_EOF:
+        case OPT_ERR:
+ opthelp:
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog);
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_HELP:
+            opt_help(crl2pkcs7_options);
+            ret = 0;
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_INFORM:
+            if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PEMDER, &informat))
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_OUTFORM:
+            if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PEMDER, &outformat))
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_IN:
+            infile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_OUT:
+            outfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_NOCRL:
+            nocrl = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_CERTFILE:
+            if ((certflst == NULL)
+                && (certflst = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null()) == NULL)
+                goto end;
+            if (!sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(certflst, opt_arg()))
+                goto end;
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    argc = opt_num_rest();
+    if (argc != 0)
+        goto opthelp;
+
+    if (!nocrl) {
+        in = bio_open_default(infile, 'r', informat);
+        if (in == NULL)
+            goto end;
+
+        if (informat == FORMAT_ASN1)
+            crl = d2i_X509_CRL_bio(in, NULL);
+        else if (informat == FORMAT_PEM)
+            crl = PEM_read_bio_X509_CRL(in, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+        if (crl == NULL) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to load CRL\n");
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if ((p7 = PKCS7_new()) == NULL)
+        goto end;
+    if ((p7s = PKCS7_SIGNED_new()) == NULL)
+        goto end;
+    p7->type = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs7_signed);
+    p7->d.sign = p7s;
+    p7s->contents->type = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs7_data);
+
+    if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(p7s->version, 1))
+        goto end;
+    if ((crl_stack = sk_X509_CRL_new_null()) == NULL)
+        goto end;
+    p7s->crl = crl_stack;
+    if (crl != NULL) {
+        sk_X509_CRL_push(crl_stack, crl);
+        crl = NULL;             /* now part of p7 for OPENSSL_freeing */
+    }
+
+    if ((cert_stack = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
+        goto end;
+    p7s->cert = cert_stack;
+
+    if (certflst)
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(certflst); i++) {
+            certfile = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(certflst, i);
+            if (add_certs_from_file(cert_stack, certfile) < 0) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "error loading certificates\n");
+                ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+                goto end;
+            }
+        }
+
+    out = bio_open_default(outfile, 'w', outformat);
+    if (out == NULL)
+        goto end;
+
+    if (outformat == FORMAT_ASN1)
+        i = i2d_PKCS7_bio(out, p7);
+    else if (outformat == FORMAT_PEM)
+        i = PEM_write_bio_PKCS7(out, p7);
+    if (!i) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to write pkcs7 object\n");
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        goto end;
+    }
+    ret = 0;
+ end:
+    sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(certflst);
+    BIO_free(in);
+    BIO_free_all(out);
+    PKCS7_free(p7);
+    X509_CRL_free(crl);
+
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+/*-
+ *----------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * int add_certs_from_file
+ *
+ *      Read a list of certificates to be checked from a file.
+ *
+ * Results:
+ *      number of certs added if successful, -1 if not.
+ *----------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+static int add_certs_from_file(STACK_OF(X509) *stack, char *certfile)
+{
+    BIO *in = NULL;
+    int count = 0;
+    int ret = -1;
+    STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *sk = NULL;
+    X509_INFO *xi;
+
+    in = BIO_new_file(certfile, "r");
+    if (in == NULL) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "error opening the file, %s\n", certfile);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    /* This loads from a file, a stack of x509/crl/pkey sets */
+    sk = PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(in, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+    if (sk == NULL) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "error reading the file, %s\n", certfile);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    /* scan over it and pull out the CRL's */
+    while (sk_X509_INFO_num(sk)) {
+        xi = sk_X509_INFO_shift(sk);
+        if (xi->x509 != NULL) {
+            sk_X509_push(stack, xi->x509);
+            xi->x509 = NULL;
+            count++;
+        }
+        X509_INFO_free(xi);
+    }
+
+    ret = count;
+ end:
+    /* never need to OPENSSL_free x */
+    BIO_free(in);
+    sk_X509_INFO_free(sk);
+    return (ret);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/ct_log_list.cnf b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/ct_log_list.cnf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2434874
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/ct_log_list.cnf
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+enabled_logs=pilot,aviator,rocketeer,digicert,certly,izempe,symantec,venafi
+
+[pilot]
+description = Google Pilot Log
+key = MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEfahLEimAoz2t01p3uMziiLOl/fHTDM0YDOhBRuiBARsV4UvxG2LdNgoIGLrtCzWE0J5APC2em4JlvR8EEEFMoA==
+
+[aviator]
+description = Google Aviator log
+key = MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE1/TMabLkDpCjiupacAlP7xNi0I1JYP8bQFAHDG1xhtolSY1l4QgNRzRrvSe8liE+NPWHdjGxfx3JhTsN9x8/6Q==
+
+[rocketeer]
+description = Google Rocketeer log
+key = MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEIFsYyDzBi7MxCAC/oJBXK7dHjG+1aLCOkHjpoHPqTyghLpzA9BYbqvnV16mAw04vUjyYASVGJCUoI3ctBcJAeg==
+
+[digicert]
+description = DigiCert Log Server
+key = MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEAkbFvhu7gkAW6MHSrBlpE1n4+HCFRkC5OLAjgqhkTH+/uzSfSl8ois8ZxAD2NgaTZe1M9akhYlrYkes4JECs6A==
+
+[certly]
+description = Certly.IO log
+key = MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAECyPLhWKYYUgEc+tUXfPQB4wtGS2MNvXrjwFCCnyYJifBtd2Sk7Cu+Js9DNhMTh35FftHaHu6ZrclnNBKwmbbSA==
+
+[izempe]
+description = Izempe log
+key = MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEJ2Q5DC3cUBj4IQCiDu0s6j51up+TZAkAEcQRF6tczw90rLWXkJMAW7jr9yc92bIKgV8vDXU4lDeZHvYHduDuvg==
+
+[symantec]
+description = Symantec log
+key = MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEluqsHEYMG1XcDfy1lCdGV0JwOmkY4r87xNuroPS2bMBTP01CEDPwWJePa75y9CrsHEKqAy8afig1dpkIPSEUhg==
+
+[venafi]
+description = Venafi log
+key = MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAolpIHxdSlTXLo1s6H1OCdpSj/4DyHDc8wLG9wVmLqy1lk9fz4ATVmm+/1iN2Nk8jmctUKK2MFUtlWXZBSpym97M7frGlSaQXUWyA3CqQUEuIJOmlEjKTBEiQAvpfDjCHjlV2Be4qTM6jamkJbiWtgnYPhJL6ONaGTiSPm7Byy57iaz/hbckldSOIoRhYBiMzeNoA0DiRZ9KmfSeXZ1rB8y8X5urSW+iBzf2SaOfzBvDpcoTuAaWx2DPazoOl28fP1hZ+kHUYvxbcMjttjauCFx+JII0dmuZNIwjfeG/GBb9frpSX219k1O4Wi6OEbHEr8at/XQ0y7gTikOxBn/s5wQIDAQAB
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/demoCA/cacert.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/demoCA/cacert.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..affbce3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/demoCA/cacert.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+subject=/C=AU/SOP=QLD/O=Mincom Pty. Ltd./OU=CS/CN=SSLeay demo server
+issuer= /C=AU/SOP=QLD/O=Mincom Pty. Ltd./OU=CS/CN=CA
+-----BEGIN X509 CERTIFICATE-----
+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+-----END X509 CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/demoCA/index.txt b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/demoCA/index.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2cdd252
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/demoCA/index.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+R	980705233205Z	951009233205Z	01	certs/00000001	/CN=Eric Young
+E	951009233205Z		02	certs/00000002	/CN=Duncan Young
+R	980705233205Z	951201010000Z	03	certs/00000003	/CN=Tim Hudson
+V	980705233205Z		04	certs/00000004	/CN=Eric Young4
+V	980705233205Z		05	certs/00000004	/CN=Eric Young5
+V	980705233205Z		06	certs/00000004	/CN=Eric Young6
+V	980705233205Z		07	certs/00000004	/CN=Eric Young7
+V	980705233205Z		08	certs/00000004	/CN=Eric Young8
+V	980705233205Z		09	certs/00000004	/CN=Eric Young9
+V	980705233205Z		0A	certs/00000004	/CN=Eric YoungA
+V	980705233205Z		0B	certs/00000004	/CN=Eric YoungB
+V	980705233205Z		0C	certs/00000004	/CN=Eric YoungC
+V	980705233205Z		0D	certs/00000004	/CN=Eric YoungD
+V	980705233205Z		0E	certs/00000004	/CN=Eric YoungE
+V	980705233205Z		0F	certs/00000004	/CN=Eric YoungF
+V	980705233205Z		10	certs/00000004	/CN=Eric Young10
+V	980705233205Z		11	certs/00000004	/CN=Eric Young11
+V	980705233205Z		12	certs/00000004	/CN=Eric Young12
+V	980705233205Z		13	certs/00000004	/CN=Eric Young13
+V	980705233205Z		14	certs/00000004	/CN=Eric Young14
+V	980705233205Z		15	certs/00000004	/CN=Eric Young15
+V	980705233205Z		16	certs/00000004	/CN=Eric Young16
+V	980705233205Z		17	certs/00000004	/CN=Eric Young17
+V	961206150305Z		010C	unknown	/C=AU/SP=QLD/O=Mincom Pty. Ltd./OU=MTR/CN=Eric Young/Email=eay@mincom.oz.au
+V	961206153245Z		010D	unknown	/C=AU/SP=Queensland/O=Mincom Pty Ltd/OU=MTR/CN=Eric Young/Email=eay@mincom.oz.au
+V	970322074816Z		010E	unknown	/CN=Eric Young/Email=eay@mincom.oz.au
+V	970322075152Z		010F	unknown	/CN=Eric Young
+V	970322075906Z		0110	unknown	/CN=Eric Youngg
+V	970324092238Z		0111	unknown	/C=AU/SP=Queensland/CN=Eric Young
+V	970324221931Z		0112	unknown	/CN=Fred
+V	970324224934Z		0113	unknown	/C=AU/CN=eay
+V	971001005237Z		0114	unknown	/C=AU/SP=QLD/O=Mincom Pty Ltd/OU=MTR/CN=x509v3 test
+V	971001010331Z		0115	unknown	/C=AU/SP=Queensland/O=Mincom Pty Ltd/OU=MTR/CN=test again - x509v3
+V	971001013945Z		0117	unknown	/C=AU/SP=Queensland/O=Mincom Pty Ltd/OU=MTR/CN=x509v3 test
+V	971014225415Z		0118	unknown	/C=AU/SP=Queensland/CN=test
+V	971015004448Z		0119	unknown	/C=AU/SP=Queensland/O=Mincom Pty Ltd/OU=MTR/CN=test2
+V	971016035001Z		011A	unknown	/C=AU/SP=Queensland/O=Mincom Pty Ltd/OU=MTR/CN=test64
+V	971016080129Z		011B	unknown	/C=FR/O=ALCATEL/OU=Alcatel Mobile Phones/CN=bourque/Email=bourque@art.alcatel.fr
+V	971016224000Z		011D	unknown	/L=Bedford/O=Cranfield University/OU=Computer Centre/CN=Peter R Lister/Email=P.Lister@cranfield.ac.uk
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/demoCA/private/cakey.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/demoCA/private/cakey.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..48fb18c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/demoCA/private/cakey.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+issuer= /C=AU/SOP=QLD/O=Mincom Pty. Ltd./OU=CS/CN=CA
+subject=/C=AU/SOP=QLD/O=Mincom Pty. Ltd./OU=CS/CN=SSLeay demo server
+-----BEGIN X509 CERTIFICATE-----
+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+-----END X509 CERTIFICATE-----
+-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+MIIBPAIBAAJBALcsJdxJxa5rQ8UuQcEubZV6OqkDUXhFDyrRWNGI9p+PH9n9pYfe
+Kl0xW+4kZr/AVdv+cMUsOV9an6gI/CEG1U8CAwEAAQJAXJMBZ34ZXHd1vtgL/3hZ
+hexKbVTx/djZO4imXO/dxPGRzG2ylYZpHmG32/T1kaHpZlCHoEPgHoSzmxYXfxjG
+sQIhAPmZ/bQOjmRUHM/VM2X5zrjjM6z18R1P6l3ObFwt9FGdAiEAu943Yh9SqMRw
+tL0xHGxKmM/YJueUw1gB6sLkETN71NsCIQCeT3RhoqXfrpXDoEcEU+gwzjI1bpxq
+agiNTOLfqGoA5QIhAIQFYjgzONxex7FLrsKBm16N2SFl5pXsN9SpRqqL2n63AiEA
+g9VNIQ3xwpw7og3IbONifeku+J9qGMGQJMKwSTwrFtI=
+-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/demoCA/serial b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/demoCA/serial
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..69fa0ff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/demoCA/serial
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+011E
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/demoSRP/srp_verifier.txt b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/demoSRP/srp_verifier.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ccae629
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/demoSRP/srp_verifier.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+# This is a file that will be filled by the openssl srp routine.
+# You can initialize the file with additional groups, these are
+# records starting with a I followed by the g and N values and the id.
+# The exact values ... you have to dig this out from the source of srp.c
+# or srp_vfy.c
+# The last value of an I is used as the default group for new users.  
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/demoSRP/srp_verifier.txt.attr b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/demoSRP/srp_verifier.txt.attr
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8f7e63a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/demoSRP/srp_verifier.txt.attr
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+unique_subject = yes
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/dgst.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/dgst.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..08182e2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/dgst.c
@@ -0,0 +1,480 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include "apps.h"
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+
+#undef BUFSIZE
+#define BUFSIZE 1024*8
+
+int do_fp(BIO *out, unsigned char *buf, BIO *bp, int sep, int binout,
+          EVP_PKEY *key, unsigned char *sigin, int siglen,
+          const char *sig_name, const char *md_name,
+          const char *file);
+
+typedef enum OPTION_choice {
+    OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP,
+    OPT_C, OPT_R, OPT_RAND, OPT_OUT, OPT_SIGN, OPT_PASSIN, OPT_VERIFY,
+    OPT_PRVERIFY, OPT_SIGNATURE, OPT_KEYFORM, OPT_ENGINE, OPT_ENGINE_IMPL,
+    OPT_HEX, OPT_BINARY, OPT_DEBUG, OPT_FIPS_FINGERPRINT,
+    OPT_HMAC, OPT_MAC, OPT_SIGOPT, OPT_MACOPT,
+    OPT_DIGEST
+} OPTION_CHOICE;
+
+OPTIONS dgst_options[] = {
+    {OPT_HELP_STR, 1, '-', "Usage: %s [options] [file...]\n"},
+    {OPT_HELP_STR, 1, '-',
+        "  file... files to digest (default is stdin)\n"},
+    {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"},
+    {"c", OPT_C, '-', "Print the digest with separating colons"},
+    {"r", OPT_R, '-', "Print the digest in coreutils format"},
+    {"rand", OPT_RAND, 's',
+     "Use file(s) containing random data to seed RNG or an EGD sock"},
+    {"out", OPT_OUT, '>', "Output to filename rather than stdout"},
+    {"passin", OPT_PASSIN, 's', "Input file pass phrase source"},
+    {"sign", OPT_SIGN, 's', "Sign digest using private key"},
+    {"verify", OPT_VERIFY, 's',
+     "Verify a signature using public key"},
+    {"prverify", OPT_PRVERIFY, 's',
+     "Verify a signature using private key"},
+    {"signature", OPT_SIGNATURE, '<', "File with signature to verify"},
+    {"keyform", OPT_KEYFORM, 'f', "Key file format (PEM or ENGINE)"},
+    {"hex", OPT_HEX, '-', "Print as hex dump"},
+    {"binary", OPT_BINARY, '-', "Print in binary form"},
+    {"d", OPT_DEBUG, '-', "Print debug info"},
+    {"debug", OPT_DEBUG, '-', "Print debug info"},
+    {"fips-fingerprint", OPT_FIPS_FINGERPRINT, '-',
+     "Compute HMAC with the key used in OpenSSL-FIPS fingerprint"},
+    {"hmac", OPT_HMAC, 's', "Create hashed MAC with key"},
+    {"mac", OPT_MAC, 's', "Create MAC (not necessarily HMAC)"},
+    {"sigopt", OPT_SIGOPT, 's', "Signature parameter in n:v form"},
+    {"macopt", OPT_MACOPT, 's', "MAC algorithm parameters in n:v form or key"},
+    {"", OPT_DIGEST, '-', "Any supported digest"},
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine e, possibly a hardware device"},
+    {"engine_impl", OPT_ENGINE_IMPL, '-',
+     "Also use engine given by -engine for digest operations"},
+#endif
+    {NULL}
+};
+
+int dgst_main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    BIO *in = NULL, *inp, *bmd = NULL, *out = NULL;
+    ENGINE *e = NULL, *impl = NULL;
+    EVP_PKEY *sigkey = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sigopts = NULL, *macopts = NULL;
+    char *hmac_key = NULL;
+    char *mac_name = NULL;
+    char *passinarg = NULL, *passin = NULL;
+    const EVP_MD *md = NULL, *m;
+    const char *outfile = NULL, *keyfile = NULL, *prog = NULL;
+    const char *sigfile = NULL, *randfile = NULL;
+    OPTION_CHOICE o;
+    int separator = 0, debug = 0, keyform = FORMAT_PEM, siglen = 0;
+    int i, ret = 1, out_bin = -1, want_pub = 0, do_verify = 0;
+    unsigned char *buf = NULL, *sigbuf = NULL;
+    int engine_impl = 0;
+
+    prog = opt_progname(argv[0]);
+    buf = app_malloc(BUFSIZE, "I/O buffer");
+    md = EVP_get_digestbyname(prog);
+
+    prog = opt_init(argc, argv, dgst_options);
+    while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) {
+        switch (o) {
+        case OPT_EOF:
+        case OPT_ERR:
+ opthelp:
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog);
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_HELP:
+            opt_help(dgst_options);
+            ret = 0;
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_C:
+            separator = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_R:
+            separator = 2;
+            break;
+        case OPT_RAND:
+            randfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_OUT:
+            outfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_SIGN:
+            keyfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_PASSIN:
+            passinarg = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_VERIFY:
+            keyfile = opt_arg();
+            want_pub = do_verify = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_PRVERIFY:
+            keyfile = opt_arg();
+            do_verify = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_SIGNATURE:
+            sigfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_KEYFORM:
+            if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_ANY, &keyform))
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_ENGINE:
+            e = setup_engine(opt_arg(), 0);
+            break;
+        case OPT_ENGINE_IMPL:
+            engine_impl = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_HEX:
+            out_bin = 0;
+            break;
+        case OPT_BINARY:
+            out_bin = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_DEBUG:
+            debug = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_FIPS_FINGERPRINT:
+            hmac_key = "etaonrishdlcupfm";
+            break;
+        case OPT_HMAC:
+            hmac_key = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_MAC:
+            mac_name = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_SIGOPT:
+            if (!sigopts)
+                sigopts = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null();
+            if (!sigopts || !sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(sigopts, opt_arg()))
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_MACOPT:
+            if (!macopts)
+                macopts = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null();
+            if (!macopts || !sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(macopts, opt_arg()))
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_DIGEST:
+            if (!opt_md(opt_unknown(), &m))
+                goto opthelp;
+            md = m;
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    argc = opt_num_rest();
+    argv = opt_rest();
+    if (keyfile != NULL && argc > 1) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Can only sign or verify one file.\n", prog);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (do_verify && !sigfile) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                   "No signature to verify: use the -signature option\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+    if (engine_impl)
+        impl = e;
+
+    in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
+    bmd = BIO_new(BIO_f_md());
+    if ((in == NULL) || (bmd == NULL)) {
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (debug) {
+        BIO_set_callback(in, BIO_debug_callback);
+        /* needed for windows 3.1 */
+        BIO_set_callback_arg(in, (char *)bio_err);
+    }
+
+    if (!app_passwd(passinarg, NULL, &passin, NULL)) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting password\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (out_bin == -1) {
+        if (keyfile)
+            out_bin = 1;
+        else
+            out_bin = 0;
+    }
+
+    if (randfile)
+        app_RAND_load_file(randfile, 0);
+
+    out = bio_open_default(outfile, 'w', out_bin ? FORMAT_BINARY : FORMAT_TEXT);
+    if (out == NULL)
+        goto end;
+
+    if ((! !mac_name + ! !keyfile + ! !hmac_key) > 1) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "MAC and Signing key cannot both be specified\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (keyfile) {
+        if (want_pub)
+            sigkey = load_pubkey(keyfile, keyform, 0, NULL, e, "key file");
+        else
+            sigkey = load_key(keyfile, keyform, 0, passin, e, "key file");
+        if (!sigkey) {
+            /*
+             * load_[pub]key() has already printed an appropriate message
+             */
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (mac_name) {
+        EVP_PKEY_CTX *mac_ctx = NULL;
+        int r = 0;
+        if (!init_gen_str(&mac_ctx, mac_name, impl, 0))
+            goto mac_end;
+        if (macopts) {
+            char *macopt;
+            for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(macopts); i++) {
+                macopt = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(macopts, i);
+                if (pkey_ctrl_string(mac_ctx, macopt) <= 0) {
+                    BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                               "MAC parameter error \"%s\"\n", macopt);
+                    ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+                    goto mac_end;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        if (EVP_PKEY_keygen(mac_ctx, &sigkey) <= 0) {
+            BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error generating key\n");
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            goto mac_end;
+        }
+        r = 1;
+ mac_end:
+        EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(mac_ctx);
+        if (r == 0)
+            goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (hmac_key) {
+        sigkey = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, impl,
+                                      (unsigned char *)hmac_key, -1);
+        if (!sigkey)
+            goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (sigkey) {
+        EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL;
+        EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
+        int r;
+        if (!BIO_get_md_ctx(bmd, &mctx)) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting context\n");
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            goto end;
+        }
+        if (do_verify)
+            r = EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, &pctx, md, impl, sigkey);
+        else
+            r = EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx, &pctx, md, impl, sigkey);
+        if (!r) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error setting context\n");
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            goto end;
+        }
+        if (sigopts) {
+            char *sigopt;
+            for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(sigopts); i++) {
+                sigopt = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(sigopts, i);
+                if (pkey_ctrl_string(pctx, sigopt) <= 0) {
+                    BIO_printf(bio_err, "parameter error \"%s\"\n", sigopt);
+                    ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+                    goto end;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    /* we use md as a filter, reading from 'in' */
+    else {
+        EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL;
+        if (!BIO_get_md_ctx(bmd, &mctx)) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting context\n");
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            goto end;
+        }
+        if (md == NULL)
+            md = EVP_sha256();
+        if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(mctx, md, impl)) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error setting digest\n");
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (sigfile && sigkey) {
+        BIO *sigbio = BIO_new_file(sigfile, "rb");
+        if (!sigbio) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error opening signature file %s\n", sigfile);
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            goto end;
+        }
+        siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(sigkey);
+        sigbuf = app_malloc(siglen, "signature buffer");
+        siglen = BIO_read(sigbio, sigbuf, siglen);
+        BIO_free(sigbio);
+        if (siglen <= 0) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error reading signature file %s\n", sigfile);
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+    inp = BIO_push(bmd, in);
+
+    if (md == NULL) {
+        EVP_MD_CTX *tctx;
+        BIO_get_md_ctx(bmd, &tctx);
+        md = EVP_MD_CTX_md(tctx);
+    }
+
+    if (argc == 0) {
+        BIO_set_fp(in, stdin, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+        ret = do_fp(out, buf, inp, separator, out_bin, sigkey, sigbuf,
+                    siglen, NULL, NULL, "stdin");
+    } else {
+        const char *md_name = NULL, *sig_name = NULL;
+        if (!out_bin) {
+            if (sigkey) {
+                const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth;
+                ameth = EVP_PKEY_get0_asn1(sigkey);
+                if (ameth)
+                    EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(NULL, NULL,
+                                            NULL, NULL, &sig_name, ameth);
+            }
+            if (md)
+                md_name = EVP_MD_name(md);
+        }
+        ret = 0;
+        for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
+            int r;
+            if (BIO_read_filename(in, argv[i]) <= 0) {
+                perror(argv[i]);
+                ret++;
+                continue;
+            } else
+                r = do_fp(out, buf, inp, separator, out_bin, sigkey, sigbuf,
+                          siglen, sig_name, md_name, argv[i]);
+            if (r)
+                ret = r;
+            (void)BIO_reset(bmd);
+        }
+    }
+ end:
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(buf, BUFSIZE);
+    BIO_free(in);
+    OPENSSL_free(passin);
+    BIO_free_all(out);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(sigkey);
+    sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(sigopts);
+    sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(macopts);
+    OPENSSL_free(sigbuf);
+    BIO_free(bmd);
+    release_engine(e);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+int do_fp(BIO *out, unsigned char *buf, BIO *bp, int sep, int binout,
+          EVP_PKEY *key, unsigned char *sigin, int siglen,
+          const char *sig_name, const char *md_name,
+          const char *file)
+{
+    size_t len;
+    int i;
+
+    for (;;) {
+        i = BIO_read(bp, (char *)buf, BUFSIZE);
+        if (i < 0) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Read Error in %s\n", file);
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            return 1;
+        }
+        if (i == 0)
+            break;
+    }
+    if (sigin) {
+        EVP_MD_CTX *ctx;
+        BIO_get_md_ctx(bp, &ctx);
+        i = EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(ctx, sigin, (unsigned int)siglen);
+        if (i > 0)
+            BIO_printf(out, "Verified OK\n");
+        else if (i == 0) {
+            BIO_printf(out, "Verification Failure\n");
+            return 1;
+        } else {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error Verifying Data\n");
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            return 1;
+        }
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (key) {
+        EVP_MD_CTX *ctx;
+        BIO_get_md_ctx(bp, &ctx);
+        len = BUFSIZE;
+        if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(ctx, buf, &len)) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error Signing Data\n");
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            return 1;
+        }
+    } else {
+        len = BIO_gets(bp, (char *)buf, BUFSIZE);
+        if ((int)len < 0) {
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            return 1;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (binout)
+        BIO_write(out, buf, len);
+    else if (sep == 2) {
+        for (i = 0; i < (int)len; i++)
+            BIO_printf(out, "%02x", buf[i]);
+        BIO_printf(out, " *%s\n", file);
+    } else {
+        if (sig_name) {
+            BIO_puts(out, sig_name);
+            if (md_name)
+                BIO_printf(out, "-%s", md_name);
+            BIO_printf(out, "(%s)= ", file);
+        } else if (md_name)
+            BIO_printf(out, "%s(%s)= ", md_name, file);
+        else
+            BIO_printf(out, "(%s)= ", file);
+        for (i = 0; i < (int)len; i++) {
+            if (sep && (i != 0))
+                BIO_printf(out, ":");
+            BIO_printf(out, "%02x", buf[i]);
+        }
+        BIO_printf(out, "\n");
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/dh1024.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/dh1024.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f1a5e18
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/dh1024.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+-----BEGIN DH PARAMETERS-----
+MIGHAoGBAP//////////yQ/aoiFowjTExmKLgNwc0SkCTgiKZ8x0Agu+pjsTmyJR
+Sgh5jjQE3e+VGbPNOkMbMCsKbfJfFDdP4TVtbVHCReSFtXZiXn7G9ExC6aY37WsL
+/1y29Aa37e44a/taiZ+lrp8kEXxLH+ZJKGZR7OZTgf//////////AgEC
+-----END DH PARAMETERS-----
+
+These are the 1024-bit DH parameters from "Internet Key Exchange 
+Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)": https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5996
+
+See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2412 for how they were generated.
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/dh2048.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/dh2048.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e899f2e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/dh2048.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+-----BEGIN DH PARAMETERS-----
+MIIBCAKCAQEA///////////JD9qiIWjCNMTGYouA3BzRKQJOCIpnzHQCC76mOxOb
+IlFKCHmONATd75UZs806QxswKwpt8l8UN0/hNW1tUcJF5IW1dmJefsb0TELppjft
+awv/XLb0Brft7jhr+1qJn6WunyQRfEsf5kkoZlHs5Fs9wgB8uKFjvwWY2kg2HFXT
+mmkWP6j9JM9fg2VdI9yjrZYcYvNWIIVSu57VKQdwlpZtZww1Tkq8mATxdGwIyhgh
+fDKQXkYuNs474553LBgOhgObJ4Oi7Aeij7XFXfBvTFLJ3ivL9pVYFxg5lUl86pVq
+5RXSJhiY+gUQFXKOWoqsqmj//////////wIBAg==
+-----END DH PARAMETERS-----
+
+These are the 2048-bit DH parameters from "More Modular Exponential 
+(MODP) Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE)": 
+https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3526
+
+See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2412 for how they were generated.
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/dh4096.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/dh4096.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..adada2b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/dh4096.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+-----BEGIN DH PARAMETERS-----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=
+-----END DH PARAMETERS-----
+
+These are the 4096-bit DH parameters from "More Modular Exponential 
+(MODP) Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE)": 
+https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3526
+
+See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2412 for how they were generated.
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/dhparam.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/dhparam.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..94322e3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/dhparam.c
@@ -0,0 +1,392 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT
+#else
+
+# include <stdio.h>
+# include <stdlib.h>
+# include <time.h>
+# include <string.h>
+# include "apps.h"
+# include <openssl/bio.h>
+# include <openssl/err.h>
+# include <openssl/bn.h>
+# include <openssl/dh.h>
+# include <openssl/x509.h>
+# include <openssl/pem.h>
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+#  include <openssl/dsa.h>
+# endif
+
+# define DEFBITS 2048
+
+static int dh_cb(int p, int n, BN_GENCB *cb);
+
+typedef enum OPTION_choice {
+    OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP,
+    OPT_INFORM, OPT_OUTFORM, OPT_IN, OPT_OUT,
+    OPT_ENGINE, OPT_CHECK, OPT_TEXT, OPT_NOOUT,
+    OPT_RAND, OPT_DSAPARAM, OPT_C, OPT_2, OPT_5
+} OPTION_CHOICE;
+
+OPTIONS dhparam_options[] = {
+    {OPT_HELP_STR, 1, '-', "Usage: %s [flags] [numbits]\n"},
+    {OPT_HELP_STR, 1, '-', "Valid options are:\n"},
+    {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"},
+    {"in", OPT_IN, '<', "Input file"},
+    {"inform", OPT_INFORM, 'F', "Input format, DER or PEM"},
+    {"outform", OPT_OUTFORM, 'F', "Output format, DER or PEM"},
+    {"out", OPT_OUT, '>', "Output file"},
+    {"check", OPT_CHECK, '-', "Check the DH parameters"},
+    {"text", OPT_TEXT, '-', "Print a text form of the DH parameters"},
+    {"noout", OPT_NOOUT, '-', "Don't output any DH parameters"},
+    {"rand", OPT_RAND, 's',
+     "Load the file(s) into the random number generator"},
+    {"C", OPT_C, '-', "Print C code"},
+    {"2", OPT_2, '-', "Generate parameters using 2 as the generator value"},
+    {"5", OPT_5, '-', "Generate parameters using 5 as the generator value"},
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+    {"dsaparam", OPT_DSAPARAM, '-',
+     "Read or generate DSA parameters, convert to DH"},
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine e, possibly a hardware device"},
+# endif
+    {NULL}
+};
+
+int dhparam_main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL;
+    DH *dh = NULL;
+    char *infile = NULL, *outfile = NULL, *prog, *inrand = NULL;
+    ENGINE *e = NULL;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+    int dsaparam = 0;
+#endif
+    int i, text = 0, C = 0, ret = 1, num = 0, g = 0;
+    int informat = FORMAT_PEM, outformat = FORMAT_PEM, check = 0, noout = 0;
+    OPTION_CHOICE o;
+
+    prog = opt_init(argc, argv, dhparam_options);
+    while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) {
+        switch (o) {
+        case OPT_EOF:
+        case OPT_ERR:
+ opthelp:
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog);
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_HELP:
+            opt_help(dhparam_options);
+            ret = 0;
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_INFORM:
+            if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PEMDER, &informat))
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_OUTFORM:
+            if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PEMDER, &outformat))
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_IN:
+            infile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_OUT:
+            outfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_ENGINE:
+            e = setup_engine(opt_arg(), 0);
+            break;
+        case OPT_CHECK:
+            check = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_TEXT:
+            text = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_DSAPARAM:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+            dsaparam = 1;
+#endif
+            break;
+        case OPT_C:
+            C = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_2:
+            g = 2;
+            break;
+        case OPT_5:
+            g = 5;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NOOUT:
+            noout = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_RAND:
+            inrand = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    argc = opt_num_rest();
+    argv = opt_rest();
+
+    if (argv[0] && (!opt_int(argv[0], &num) || num <= 0))
+        goto end;
+
+    if (g && !num)
+        num = DEFBITS;
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+    if (dsaparam && g) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                   "generator may not be chosen for DSA parameters\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+# endif
+    /* DH parameters */
+    if (num && !g)
+        g = 2;
+
+    if (num) {
+
+        BN_GENCB *cb;
+        cb = BN_GENCB_new();
+        if (cb == NULL) {
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            goto end;
+        }
+
+        BN_GENCB_set(cb, dh_cb, bio_err);
+        if (!app_RAND_load_file(NULL, 1) && inrand == NULL) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                       "warning, not much extra random data, consider using the -rand option\n");
+        }
+        if (inrand != NULL)
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "%ld semi-random bytes loaded\n",
+                       app_RAND_load_files(inrand));
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+        if (dsaparam) {
+            DSA *dsa = DSA_new();
+
+            BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                       "Generating DSA parameters, %d bit long prime\n", num);
+            if (dsa == NULL
+                || !DSA_generate_parameters_ex(dsa, num, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL,
+                                               cb)) {
+                DSA_free(dsa);
+                BN_GENCB_free(cb);
+                ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+                goto end;
+            }
+
+            dh = DSA_dup_DH(dsa);
+            DSA_free(dsa);
+            if (dh == NULL) {
+                BN_GENCB_free(cb);
+                ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+                goto end;
+            }
+        } else
+# endif
+        {
+            dh = DH_new();
+            BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                       "Generating DH parameters, %d bit long safe prime, generator %d\n",
+                       num, g);
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "This is going to take a long time\n");
+            if (dh == NULL || !DH_generate_parameters_ex(dh, num, g, cb)) {
+                BN_GENCB_free(cb);
+                ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+                goto end;
+            }
+        }
+
+        BN_GENCB_free(cb);
+        app_RAND_write_file(NULL);
+    } else {
+
+        in = bio_open_default(infile, 'r', informat);
+        if (in == NULL)
+            goto end;
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+        if (dsaparam) {
+            DSA *dsa;
+
+            if (informat == FORMAT_ASN1)
+                dsa = d2i_DSAparams_bio(in, NULL);
+            else                /* informat == FORMAT_PEM */
+                dsa = PEM_read_bio_DSAparams(in, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+
+            if (dsa == NULL) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to load DSA parameters\n");
+                ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+                goto end;
+            }
+
+            dh = DSA_dup_DH(dsa);
+            DSA_free(dsa);
+            if (dh == NULL) {
+                ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+                goto end;
+            }
+        } else
+# endif
+        {
+            if (informat == FORMAT_ASN1) {
+                /*
+                 * We have no PEM header to determine what type of DH params it
+                 * is. We'll just try both.
+                 */
+                dh = d2i_DHparams_bio(in, NULL);
+                /* BIO_reset() returns 0 for success for file BIOs only!!! */
+                if (dh == NULL && BIO_reset(in) == 0)
+                    dh = d2i_DHxparams_bio(in, NULL);
+            } else {
+                /* informat == FORMAT_PEM */
+                dh = PEM_read_bio_DHparams(in, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+            }
+
+            if (dh == NULL) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to load DH parameters\n");
+                ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+                goto end;
+            }
+        }
+
+        /* dh != NULL */
+    }
+
+    out = bio_open_default(outfile, 'w', outformat);
+    if (out == NULL)
+        goto end;
+
+    if (text) {
+        DHparams_print(out, dh);
+    }
+
+    if (check) {
+        if (!DH_check(dh, &i)) {
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            goto end;
+        }
+        if (i & DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME)
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "WARNING: p value is not prime\n");
+        if (i & DH_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME)
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "WARNING: p value is not a safe prime\n");
+        if (i & DH_CHECK_Q_NOT_PRIME)
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "WARNING: q value is not a prime\n");
+        if (i & DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE)
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "WARNING: q value is invalid\n");
+        if (i & DH_CHECK_INVALID_J_VALUE)
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "WARNING: j value is invalid\n");
+        if (i & DH_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR)
+            BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                       "WARNING: unable to check the generator value\n");
+        if (i & DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR)
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "WARNING: the g value is not a generator\n");
+        if (i == 0)
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "DH parameters appear to be ok.\n");
+        if (num != 0 && i != 0) {
+            /*
+             * We have generated parameters but DH_check() indicates they are
+             * invalid! This should never happen!
+             */
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "ERROR: Invalid parameters generated\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+    if (C) {
+        unsigned char *data;
+        int len, bits;
+        const BIGNUM *pbn, *gbn;
+
+        len = DH_size(dh);
+        bits = DH_bits(dh);
+        DH_get0_pqg(dh, &pbn, NULL, &gbn);
+        data = app_malloc(len, "print a BN");
+        BIO_printf(out, "#ifndef HEADER_DH_H\n"
+                        "# include <openssl/dh.h>\n"
+                        "#endif\n"
+                        "\n");
+        BIO_printf(out, "DH *get_dh%d()\n{\n", bits);
+        print_bignum_var(out, pbn, "dhp", bits, data);
+        print_bignum_var(out, gbn, "dhg", bits, data);
+        BIO_printf(out, "    DH *dh = DH_new();\n"
+                        "    BIGNUM *dhp_bn, *dhg_bn;\n"
+                        "\n"
+                        "    if (dh == NULL)\n"
+                        "        return NULL;\n");
+        BIO_printf(out, "    dhp_bn = BN_bin2bn(dhp_%d, sizeof(dhp_%d), NULL);\n",
+                   bits, bits);
+        BIO_printf(out, "    dhg_bn = BN_bin2bn(dhg_%d, sizeof(dhg_%d), NULL);\n",
+                   bits, bits);
+        BIO_printf(out, "    if (dhp_bn == NULL || dhg_bn == NULL\n"
+                        "            || !DH_set0_pqg(dh, dhp_bn, NULL, dhg_bn)) {\n"
+                        "        DH_free(dh);\n"
+                        "        BN_free(dhp_bn);\n"
+                        "        BN_free(dhg_bn);\n"
+                        "        return NULL;\n"
+                        "    }\n");
+        if (DH_get_length(dh) > 0)
+            BIO_printf(out,
+                        "    if (!DH_set_length(dh, %ld)) {\n"
+                        "        DH_free(dh);\n"
+                        "    }\n", DH_get_length(dh));
+        BIO_printf(out, "    return dh;\n}\n");
+        OPENSSL_free(data);
+    }
+
+    if (!noout) {
+        const BIGNUM *q;
+        DH_get0_pqg(dh, NULL, &q, NULL);
+        if (outformat == FORMAT_ASN1) {
+            if (q != NULL)
+                i = i2d_DHxparams_bio(out, dh);
+            else
+                i = i2d_DHparams_bio(out, dh);
+        } else if (q != NULL)
+            i = PEM_write_bio_DHxparams(out, dh);
+        else
+            i = PEM_write_bio_DHparams(out, dh);
+        if (!i) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to write DH parameters\n");
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+    ret = 0;
+ end:
+    BIO_free(in);
+    BIO_free_all(out);
+    DH_free(dh);
+    release_engine(e);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static int dh_cb(int p, int n, BN_GENCB *cb)
+{
+    char c = '*';
+
+    if (p == 0)
+        c = '.';
+    if (p == 1)
+        c = '+';
+    if (p == 2)
+        c = '*';
+    if (p == 3)
+        c = '\n';
+    BIO_write(BN_GENCB_get_arg(cb), &c, 1);
+    (void)BIO_flush(BN_GENCB_get_arg(cb));
+    return 1;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/dsa-ca.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/dsa-ca.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3ce8dc6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/dsa-ca.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/dsa-pca.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/dsa-pca.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a51a06e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/dsa-pca.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/dsa.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/dsa.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8454b2e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/dsa.c
@@ -0,0 +1,265 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT
+#else
+
+# include <stdio.h>
+# include <stdlib.h>
+# include <string.h>
+# include <time.h>
+# include "apps.h"
+# include <openssl/bio.h>
+# include <openssl/err.h>
+# include <openssl/dsa.h>
+# include <openssl/evp.h>
+# include <openssl/x509.h>
+# include <openssl/pem.h>
+# include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+typedef enum OPTION_choice {
+    OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP,
+    OPT_INFORM, OPT_OUTFORM, OPT_IN, OPT_OUT, OPT_ENGINE,
+    /* Do not change the order here; see case statements below */
+    OPT_PVK_NONE, OPT_PVK_WEAK, OPT_PVK_STRONG,
+    OPT_NOOUT, OPT_TEXT, OPT_MODULUS, OPT_PUBIN,
+    OPT_PUBOUT, OPT_CIPHER, OPT_PASSIN, OPT_PASSOUT
+} OPTION_CHOICE;
+
+OPTIONS dsa_options[] = {
+    {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"},
+    {"inform", OPT_INFORM, 'f', "Input format, DER PEM PVK"},
+    {"outform", OPT_OUTFORM, 'f', "Output format, DER PEM PVK"},
+    {"in", OPT_IN, 's', "Input key"},
+    {"out", OPT_OUT, '>', "Output file"},
+    {"noout", OPT_NOOUT, '-', "Don't print key out"},
+    {"text", OPT_TEXT, '-', "Print the key in text"},
+    {"modulus", OPT_MODULUS, '-', "Print the DSA public value"},
+    {"pubin", OPT_PUBIN, '-', "Expect a public key in input file"},
+    {"pubout", OPT_PUBOUT, '-', "Output public key, not private"},
+    {"passin", OPT_PASSIN, 's', "Input file pass phrase source"},
+    {"passout", OPT_PASSOUT, 's', "Output file pass phrase source"},
+    {"", OPT_CIPHER, '-', "Any supported cipher"},
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
+    {"pvk-strong", OPT_PVK_STRONG, '-', "Enable 'Strong' PVK encoding level (default)"},
+    {"pvk-weak", OPT_PVK_WEAK, '-', "Enable 'Weak' PVK encoding level"},
+    {"pvk-none", OPT_PVK_NONE, '-', "Don't enforce PVK encoding"},
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine e, possibly a hardware device"},
+# endif
+    {NULL}
+};
+
+int dsa_main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    BIO *out = NULL;
+    DSA *dsa = NULL;
+    ENGINE *e = NULL;
+    const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
+    char *infile = NULL, *outfile = NULL, *prog;
+    char *passin = NULL, *passout = NULL, *passinarg = NULL, *passoutarg = NULL;
+    OPTION_CHOICE o;
+    int informat = FORMAT_PEM, outformat = FORMAT_PEM, text = 0, noout = 0;
+    int i, modulus = 0, pubin = 0, pubout = 0, ret = 1;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
+    int pvk_encr = 2;
+# endif
+    int private = 0;
+
+    prog = opt_init(argc, argv, dsa_options);
+    while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) {
+        switch (o) {
+        case OPT_EOF:
+        case OPT_ERR:
+ opthelp:
+            ret = 0;
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog);
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_HELP:
+            opt_help(dsa_options);
+            ret = 0;
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_INFORM:
+            if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_ANY, &informat))
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_IN:
+            infile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_OUTFORM:
+            if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_ANY, &outformat))
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_OUT:
+            outfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_ENGINE:
+            e = setup_engine(opt_arg(), 0);
+            break;
+        case OPT_PASSIN:
+            passinarg = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_PASSOUT:
+            passoutarg = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_PVK_STRONG:    /* pvk_encr:= 2 */
+        case OPT_PVK_WEAK:      /* pvk_encr:= 1 */
+        case OPT_PVK_NONE:      /* pvk_encr:= 0 */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
+            pvk_encr = (o - OPT_PVK_NONE);
+#endif
+            break;
+        case OPT_NOOUT:
+            noout = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_TEXT:
+            text = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_MODULUS:
+            modulus = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_PUBIN:
+            pubin = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_PUBOUT:
+            pubout = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_CIPHER:
+            if (!opt_cipher(opt_unknown(), &enc))
+                goto end;
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    argc = opt_num_rest();
+    if (argc != 0)
+        goto opthelp;
+
+    private = pubin || pubout ? 0 : 1;
+    if (text && !pubin)
+        private = 1;
+
+    if (!app_passwd(passinarg, passoutarg, &passin, &passout)) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting passwords\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    BIO_printf(bio_err, "read DSA key\n");
+    {
+        EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+
+        if (pubin)
+            pkey = load_pubkey(infile, informat, 1, passin, e, "Public Key");
+        else
+            pkey = load_key(infile, informat, 1, passin, e, "Private Key");
+
+        if (pkey) {
+            dsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA(pkey);
+            EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+        }
+    }
+    if (dsa == NULL) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to load Key\n");
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    out = bio_open_owner(outfile, outformat, private);
+    if (out == NULL)
+        goto end;
+
+    if (text) {
+        assert(pubin || private);
+        if (!DSA_print(out, dsa, 0)) {
+            perror(outfile);
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (modulus) {
+        const BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL;
+        DSA_get0_key(dsa, &pub_key, NULL);
+        BIO_printf(out, "Public Key=");
+        BN_print(out, pub_key);
+        BIO_printf(out, "\n");
+    }
+
+    if (noout) {
+        ret = 0;
+        goto end;
+    }
+    BIO_printf(bio_err, "writing DSA key\n");
+    if (outformat == FORMAT_ASN1) {
+        if (pubin || pubout)
+            i = i2d_DSA_PUBKEY_bio(out, dsa);
+        else {
+            assert(private);
+            i = i2d_DSAPrivateKey_bio(out, dsa);
+        }
+    } else if (outformat == FORMAT_PEM) {
+        if (pubin || pubout)
+            i = PEM_write_bio_DSA_PUBKEY(out, dsa);
+        else {
+            assert(private);
+            i = PEM_write_bio_DSAPrivateKey(out, dsa, enc,
+                                            NULL, 0, NULL, passout);
+        }
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+    } else if (outformat == FORMAT_MSBLOB || outformat == FORMAT_PVK) {
+        EVP_PKEY *pk;
+        pk = EVP_PKEY_new();
+        if (pk == NULL)
+           goto end;
+
+        EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(pk, dsa);
+        if (outformat == FORMAT_PVK) {
+            if (pubin) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "PVK form impossible with public key input\n");
+                EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
+                goto end;
+            }
+            assert(private);
+#  ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "PVK format not supported\n");
+            EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
+            goto end;
+#  else
+            i = i2b_PVK_bio(out, pk, pvk_encr, 0, passout);
+#  endif
+        }
+        else if (pubin || pubout)
+            i = i2b_PublicKey_bio(out, pk);
+        else {
+            assert(private);
+            i = i2b_PrivateKey_bio(out, pk);
+        }
+        EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
+# endif
+    } else {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "bad output format specified for outfile\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+    if (i <= 0) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to write private key\n");
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        goto end;
+    }
+    ret = 0;
+ end:
+    BIO_free_all(out);
+    DSA_free(dsa);
+    release_engine(e);
+    OPENSSL_free(passin);
+    OPENSSL_free(passout);
+    return (ret);
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/dsa1024.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/dsa1024.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..082dec3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/dsa1024.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+-----BEGIN DSA PARAMETERS-----
+MIIBHgKBgQCnP26Fv0FqKX3wn0cZMJCaCR3aajMexT2GlrMV4FMuj+BZgnOQPnUx
+mUd6UvuF5NmmezibaIqEm4fGHrV+hktTW1nPcWUZiG7OZq5riDb77Cjcwtelu+Us
+OSZL2ppwGJU3lRBWI/YV7boEXt45T/23Qx+1pGVvzYAR5HCVW1DNSQIVAPcHMe36
+bAYD1YWKHKycZedQZmVvAoGATd9MA6aRivUZb1BGJZnlaG8w42nh5bNdmLsohkj8
+3pkEP1+IDJxzJA0gXbkqmj8YlifkYofBe3RiU/xhJ6h6kQmdtvFNnFQPWAbuSXQH
+zlV+I84W9srcWmEBfslxtU323DQph2j2XiCTs9v15AlsQReVkusBtXOlan7YMu0O
+Arg=
+-----END DSA PARAMETERS-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/dsa512.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/dsa512.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5f86d1a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/dsa512.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+-----BEGIN DSA PARAMETERS-----
+MIGdAkEAnRtpjibb8isRcBmG9hnI+BnyGFOURgbQYlAzSwI8UjADizv5X9EkBk97
+TLqqQJv9luQ3M7stWtdaEUBmonZ9MQIVAPtT71C0QJIxVoZTeuiLIppJ+3GPAkEA
+gz6I5cWJc847bAFJv7PHnwrqRJHlMKrZvltftxDXibeOdPvPKR7rqCxUUbgQ3qDO
+L8wka5B33qJoplISogOdIA==
+-----END DSA PARAMETERS-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/dsap.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/dsap.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d4dfdb3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/dsap.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+-----BEGIN DSA PARAMETERS-----
+MIGcAkEA+ZiKEvZmc9MtnaFZh4NiZ3oZS4J1PHvPrm9MXj5ntVheDPkdmBDTncya
+GAJcMjwsyB/GvLDGd6yGCw/8eF+09wIVAK3VagOxGd/Q4Af5NbxR5FB7CXEjAkA2
+t/q7HgVLi0KeKvcDG8BRl3wuy7bCvpjgtWiJc/tpvcuzeuAayH89UofjAGueKjXD
+ADiRffvSdhrNw5dkqdql
+-----END DSA PARAMETERS-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/dsaparam.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/dsaparam.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5c3c8f8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/dsaparam.c
@@ -0,0 +1,316 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT
+#else
+
+# include <stdio.h>
+# include <stdlib.h>
+# include <time.h>
+# include <string.h>
+# include "apps.h"
+# include <openssl/bio.h>
+# include <openssl/err.h>
+# include <openssl/bn.h>
+# include <openssl/dsa.h>
+# include <openssl/x509.h>
+# include <openssl/pem.h>
+
+# ifdef GENCB_TEST
+
+static int stop_keygen_flag = 0;
+
+static void timebomb_sigalarm(int foo)
+{
+    stop_keygen_flag = 1;
+}
+
+# endif
+
+static int dsa_cb(int p, int n, BN_GENCB *cb);
+
+typedef enum OPTION_choice {
+    OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP,
+    OPT_INFORM, OPT_OUTFORM, OPT_IN, OPT_OUT, OPT_TEXT, OPT_C,
+    OPT_NOOUT, OPT_GENKEY, OPT_RAND, OPT_ENGINE,
+    OPT_TIMEBOMB
+} OPTION_CHOICE;
+
+OPTIONS dsaparam_options[] = {
+    {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"},
+    {"inform", OPT_INFORM, 'F', "Input format - DER or PEM"},
+    {"in", OPT_IN, '<', "Input file"},
+    {"outform", OPT_OUTFORM, 'F', "Output format - DER or PEM"},
+    {"out", OPT_OUT, '>', "Output file"},
+    {"text", OPT_TEXT, '-', "Print as text"},
+    {"C", OPT_C, '-', "Output C code"},
+    {"noout", OPT_NOOUT, '-', "No output"},
+    {"genkey", OPT_GENKEY, '-', "Generate a DSA key"},
+    {"rand", OPT_RAND, 's', "Files to use for random number input"},
+# ifdef GENCB_TEST
+    {"timebomb", OPT_TIMEBOMB, 'p', "Interrupt keygen after 'pnum' seconds"},
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine e, possibly a hardware device"},
+# endif
+    {NULL}
+};
+
+int dsaparam_main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    ENGINE *e = NULL;
+    DSA *dsa = NULL;
+    BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL;
+    BN_GENCB *cb = NULL;
+    int numbits = -1, num = 0, genkey = 0, need_rand = 0;
+    int informat = FORMAT_PEM, outformat = FORMAT_PEM, noout = 0, C = 0;
+    int ret = 1, i, text = 0, private = 0;
+# ifdef GENCB_TEST
+    int timebomb = 0;
+# endif
+    char *infile = NULL, *outfile = NULL, *prog, *inrand = NULL;
+    OPTION_CHOICE o;
+
+    prog = opt_init(argc, argv, dsaparam_options);
+    while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) {
+        switch (o) {
+        case OPT_EOF:
+        case OPT_ERR:
+ opthelp:
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog);
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_HELP:
+            opt_help(dsaparam_options);
+            ret = 0;
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_INFORM:
+            if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PEMDER, &informat))
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_IN:
+            infile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_OUTFORM:
+            if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PEMDER, &outformat))
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_OUT:
+            outfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_ENGINE:
+            e = setup_engine(opt_arg(), 0);
+            break;
+        case OPT_TIMEBOMB:
+# ifdef GENCB_TEST
+            timebomb = atoi(opt_arg());
+            break;
+# endif
+        case OPT_TEXT:
+            text = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_C:
+            C = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_GENKEY:
+            genkey = need_rand = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_RAND:
+            inrand = opt_arg();
+            need_rand = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NOOUT:
+            noout = 1;
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    argc = opt_num_rest();
+    argv = opt_rest();
+
+    if (argc == 1) {
+        if (!opt_int(argv[0], &num) || num < 0)
+            goto end;
+        /* generate a key */
+        numbits = num;
+        need_rand = 1;
+    }
+    private = genkey ? 1 : 0;
+
+    in = bio_open_default(infile, 'r', informat);
+    if (in == NULL)
+        goto end;
+    out = bio_open_owner(outfile, outformat, private);
+    if (out == NULL)
+        goto end;
+
+    if (need_rand) {
+        app_RAND_load_file(NULL, (inrand != NULL));
+        if (inrand != NULL)
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "%ld semi-random bytes loaded\n",
+                       app_RAND_load_files(inrand));
+    }
+
+    if (numbits > 0) {
+        cb = BN_GENCB_new();
+        if (cb == NULL) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error allocating BN_GENCB object\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+        BN_GENCB_set(cb, dsa_cb, bio_err);
+        assert(need_rand);
+        dsa = DSA_new();
+        if (dsa == NULL) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error allocating DSA object\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Generating DSA parameters, %d bit long prime\n",
+                   num);
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "This could take some time\n");
+# ifdef GENCB_TEST
+        if (timebomb > 0) {
+            struct sigaction act;
+            act.sa_handler = timebomb_sigalarm;
+            act.sa_flags = 0;
+            BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                       "(though I'll stop it if not done within %d secs)\n",
+                       timebomb);
+            if (sigaction(SIGALRM, &act, NULL) != 0) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error, couldn't set SIGALRM handler\n");
+                goto end;
+            }
+            alarm(timebomb);
+        }
+# endif
+        if (!DSA_generate_parameters_ex(dsa, num, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, cb)) {
+# ifdef GENCB_TEST
+            if (stop_keygen_flag) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "DSA key generation time-stopped\n");
+                /* This is an asked-for behaviour! */
+                ret = 0;
+                goto end;
+            }
+# endif
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error, DSA key generation failed\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+    } else if (informat == FORMAT_ASN1)
+        dsa = d2i_DSAparams_bio(in, NULL);
+    else
+        dsa = PEM_read_bio_DSAparams(in, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+    if (dsa == NULL) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to load DSA parameters\n");
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (text) {
+        DSAparams_print(out, dsa);
+    }
+
+    if (C) {
+        const BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL, *g = NULL;
+        unsigned char *data;
+        int len, bits_p;
+
+        DSA_get0_pqg(dsa, &p, &q, &g);
+        len = BN_num_bytes(p);
+        bits_p = BN_num_bits(p);
+
+        data = app_malloc(len + 20, "BN space");
+
+        BIO_printf(bio_out, "DSA *get_dsa%d()\n{\n", bits_p);
+        print_bignum_var(bio_out, p, "dsap", len, data);
+        print_bignum_var(bio_out, q, "dsaq", len, data);
+        print_bignum_var(bio_out, g, "dsag", len, data);
+        BIO_printf(bio_out, "    DSA *dsa = DSA_new();\n"
+                            "\n");
+        BIO_printf(bio_out, "    if (dsa == NULL)\n"
+                            "        return NULL;\n");
+        BIO_printf(bio_out, "    dsa->p = BN_bin2bn(dsap_%d, sizeof(dsap_%d), NULL);\n",
+               bits_p, bits_p);
+        BIO_printf(bio_out, "    dsa->q = BN_bin2bn(dsaq_%d, sizeof(dsaq_%d), NULL);\n",
+               bits_p, bits_p);
+        BIO_printf(bio_out, "    dsa->g = BN_bin2bn(dsag_%d, sizeof(dsag_%d), NULL);\n",
+               bits_p, bits_p);
+        BIO_printf(bio_out, "    if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g) {\n"
+                            "        DSA_free(dsa);\n"
+                            "        return NULL;\n"
+                            "    }\n"
+                            "    return(dsa);\n}\n");
+        OPENSSL_free(data);
+    }
+
+    if (outformat == FORMAT_ASN1 && genkey)
+        noout = 1;
+
+    if (!noout) {
+        if (outformat == FORMAT_ASN1)
+            i = i2d_DSAparams_bio(out, dsa);
+        else
+            i = PEM_write_bio_DSAparams(out, dsa);
+        if (!i) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to write DSA parameters\n");
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+    if (genkey) {
+        DSA *dsakey;
+
+        assert(need_rand);
+        if ((dsakey = DSAparams_dup(dsa)) == NULL)
+            goto end;
+        if (!DSA_generate_key(dsakey)) {
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            DSA_free(dsakey);
+            goto end;
+        }
+        assert(private);
+        if (outformat == FORMAT_ASN1)
+            i = i2d_DSAPrivateKey_bio(out, dsakey);
+        else
+            i = PEM_write_bio_DSAPrivateKey(out, dsakey, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL,
+                                            NULL);
+        DSA_free(dsakey);
+    }
+    if (need_rand)
+        app_RAND_write_file(NULL);
+    ret = 0;
+ end:
+    BN_GENCB_free(cb);
+    BIO_free(in);
+    BIO_free_all(out);
+    DSA_free(dsa);
+    release_engine(e);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static int dsa_cb(int p, int n, BN_GENCB *cb)
+{
+    char c = '*';
+
+    if (p == 0)
+        c = '.';
+    if (p == 1)
+        c = '+';
+    if (p == 2)
+        c = '*';
+    if (p == 3)
+        c = '\n';
+    BIO_write(BN_GENCB_get_arg(cb), &c, 1);
+    (void)BIO_flush(BN_GENCB_get_arg(cb));
+# ifdef GENCB_TEST
+    if (stop_keygen_flag)
+        return 0;
+# endif
+    return 1;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/ec.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/ec.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2516c03
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/ec.c
@@ -0,0 +1,281 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT
+#else
+
+# include <stdio.h>
+# include <stdlib.h>
+# include <string.h>
+# include "apps.h"
+# include <openssl/bio.h>
+# include <openssl/err.h>
+# include <openssl/evp.h>
+# include <openssl/pem.h>
+
+static OPT_PAIR conv_forms[] = {
+    {"compressed", POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED},
+    {"uncompressed", POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED},
+    {"hybrid", POINT_CONVERSION_HYBRID},
+    {NULL}
+};
+
+static OPT_PAIR param_enc[] = {
+    {"named_curve", OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE},
+    {"explicit", 0},
+    {NULL}
+};
+
+typedef enum OPTION_choice {
+    OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP,
+    OPT_INFORM, OPT_OUTFORM, OPT_ENGINE, OPT_IN, OPT_OUT,
+    OPT_NOOUT, OPT_TEXT, OPT_PARAM_OUT, OPT_PUBIN, OPT_PUBOUT,
+    OPT_PASSIN, OPT_PASSOUT, OPT_PARAM_ENC, OPT_CONV_FORM, OPT_CIPHER,
+    OPT_NO_PUBLIC, OPT_CHECK
+} OPTION_CHOICE;
+
+OPTIONS ec_options[] = {
+    {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"},
+    {"in", OPT_IN, 's', "Input file"},
+    {"inform", OPT_INFORM, 'f', "Input format - DER or PEM"},
+    {"out", OPT_OUT, '>', "Output file"},
+    {"outform", OPT_OUTFORM, 'F', "Output format - DER or PEM"},
+    {"noout", OPT_NOOUT, '-', "Don't print key out"},
+    {"text", OPT_TEXT, '-', "Print the key"},
+    {"param_out", OPT_PARAM_OUT, '-', "Print the elliptic curve parameters"},
+    {"pubin", OPT_PUBIN, '-', "Expect a public key in input file"},
+    {"pubout", OPT_PUBOUT, '-', "Output public key, not private"},
+    {"no_public", OPT_NO_PUBLIC, '-', "exclude public key from private key"},
+    {"check", OPT_CHECK, '-', "check key consistency"},
+    {"passin", OPT_PASSIN, 's', "Input file pass phrase source"},
+    {"passout", OPT_PASSOUT, 's', "Output file pass phrase source"},
+    {"param_enc", OPT_PARAM_ENC, 's',
+     "Specifies the way the ec parameters are encoded"},
+    {"conv_form", OPT_CONV_FORM, 's', "Specifies the point conversion form "},
+    {"", OPT_CIPHER, '-', "Any supported cipher"},
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine, possibly a hardware device"},
+# endif
+    {NULL}
+};
+
+int ec_main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL;
+    ENGINE *e = NULL;
+    EC_KEY *eckey = NULL;
+    const EC_GROUP *group;
+    const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
+    point_conversion_form_t form = POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED;
+    char *infile = NULL, *outfile = NULL, *prog;
+    char *passin = NULL, *passout = NULL, *passinarg = NULL, *passoutarg = NULL;
+    OPTION_CHOICE o;
+    int asn1_flag = OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE, new_form = 0, new_asn1_flag = 0;
+    int informat = FORMAT_PEM, outformat = FORMAT_PEM, text = 0, noout = 0;
+    int pubin = 0, pubout = 0, param_out = 0, i, ret = 1, private = 0;
+    int no_public = 0, check = 0;
+
+    prog = opt_init(argc, argv, ec_options);
+    while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) {
+        switch (o) {
+        case OPT_EOF:
+        case OPT_ERR:
+ opthelp:
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog);
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_HELP:
+            opt_help(ec_options);
+            ret = 0;
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_INFORM:
+            if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_ANY, &informat))
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_IN:
+            infile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_OUTFORM:
+            if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PEMDER, &outformat))
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_OUT:
+            outfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_NOOUT:
+            noout = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_TEXT:
+            text = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_PARAM_OUT:
+            param_out = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_PUBIN:
+            pubin = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_PUBOUT:
+            pubout = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_PASSIN:
+            passinarg = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_PASSOUT:
+            passoutarg = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_ENGINE:
+            e = setup_engine(opt_arg(), 0);
+            break;
+        case OPT_CIPHER:
+            if (!opt_cipher(opt_unknown(), &enc))
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_CONV_FORM:
+            if (!opt_pair(opt_arg(), conv_forms, &i))
+                goto opthelp;
+            new_form = 1;
+            form = i;
+            break;
+        case OPT_PARAM_ENC:
+            if (!opt_pair(opt_arg(), param_enc, &i))
+                goto opthelp;
+            new_asn1_flag = 1;
+            asn1_flag = i;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NO_PUBLIC:
+            no_public = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_CHECK:
+            check = 1;
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    argc = opt_num_rest();
+    if (argc != 0)
+        goto opthelp;
+
+    private = param_out || pubin || pubout ? 0 : 1;
+    if (text && !pubin)
+        private = 1;
+
+    if (!app_passwd(passinarg, passoutarg, &passin, &passout)) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting passwords\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (informat != FORMAT_ENGINE) {
+        in = bio_open_default(infile, 'r', informat);
+        if (in == NULL)
+            goto end;
+    }
+
+    BIO_printf(bio_err, "read EC key\n");
+    if (informat == FORMAT_ASN1) {
+        if (pubin)
+            eckey = d2i_EC_PUBKEY_bio(in, NULL);
+        else
+            eckey = d2i_ECPrivateKey_bio(in, NULL);
+    } else if (informat == FORMAT_ENGINE) {
+        EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+        if (pubin)
+            pkey = load_pubkey(infile, informat , 1, passin, e, "Public Key");
+        else
+            pkey = load_key(infile, informat, 1, passin, e, "Private Key");
+        if (pkey != NULL) {
+            eckey = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pkey);
+            EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+        }
+    } else {
+        if (pubin)
+            eckey = PEM_read_bio_EC_PUBKEY(in, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+        else
+            eckey = PEM_read_bio_ECPrivateKey(in, NULL, NULL, passin);
+    }
+    if (eckey == NULL) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to load Key\n");
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    out = bio_open_owner(outfile, outformat, private);
+    if (out == NULL)
+        goto end;
+
+    group = EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey);
+
+    if (new_form)
+        EC_KEY_set_conv_form(eckey, form);
+
+    if (new_asn1_flag)
+        EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag(eckey, asn1_flag);
+
+    if (no_public)
+        EC_KEY_set_enc_flags(eckey, EC_PKEY_NO_PUBKEY);
+
+    if (text) {
+        assert(pubin || private);
+        if (!EC_KEY_print(out, eckey, 0)) {
+            perror(outfile);
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (check) {
+        if (EC_KEY_check_key(eckey) == 1) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "EC Key valid.\n");
+        } else {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "EC Key Invalid!\n");
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (noout) {
+        ret = 0;
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    BIO_printf(bio_err, "writing EC key\n");
+    if (outformat == FORMAT_ASN1) {
+        if (param_out)
+            i = i2d_ECPKParameters_bio(out, group);
+        else if (pubin || pubout)
+            i = i2d_EC_PUBKEY_bio(out, eckey);
+        else {
+            assert(private);
+            i = i2d_ECPrivateKey_bio(out, eckey);
+        }
+    } else {
+        if (param_out)
+            i = PEM_write_bio_ECPKParameters(out, group);
+        else if (pubin || pubout)
+            i = PEM_write_bio_EC_PUBKEY(out, eckey);
+        else {
+            assert(private);
+            i = PEM_write_bio_ECPrivateKey(out, eckey, enc,
+                                           NULL, 0, NULL, passout);
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (!i) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to write private key\n");
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+    } else
+        ret = 0;
+ end:
+    BIO_free(in);
+    BIO_free_all(out);
+    EC_KEY_free(eckey);
+    release_engine(e);
+    OPENSSL_free(passin);
+    OPENSSL_free(passout);
+    return (ret);
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/ecparam.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/ecparam.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..999f748
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/ecparam.c
@@ -0,0 +1,471 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ *
+ * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ *
+ * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license provided above.
+ *
+ * The elliptic curve binary polynomial software is originally written by
+ * Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT
+#else
+
+# include <stdio.h>
+# include <stdlib.h>
+# include <time.h>
+# include <string.h>
+# include "apps.h"
+# include <openssl/bio.h>
+# include <openssl/err.h>
+# include <openssl/bn.h>
+# include <openssl/ec.h>
+# include <openssl/x509.h>
+# include <openssl/pem.h>
+
+typedef enum OPTION_choice {
+    OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP,
+    OPT_INFORM, OPT_OUTFORM, OPT_IN, OPT_OUT, OPT_TEXT, OPT_C,
+    OPT_CHECK, OPT_LIST_CURVES, OPT_NO_SEED, OPT_NOOUT, OPT_NAME,
+    OPT_CONV_FORM, OPT_PARAM_ENC, OPT_GENKEY, OPT_RAND, OPT_ENGINE
+} OPTION_CHOICE;
+
+OPTIONS ecparam_options[] = {
+    {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"},
+    {"inform", OPT_INFORM, 'F', "Input format - default PEM (DER or PEM)"},
+    {"outform", OPT_OUTFORM, 'F', "Output format - default PEM"},
+    {"in", OPT_IN, '<', "Input file  - default stdin"},
+    {"out", OPT_OUT, '>', "Output file - default stdout"},
+    {"text", OPT_TEXT, '-', "Print the ec parameters in text form"},
+    {"C", OPT_C, '-', "Print a 'C' function creating the parameters"},
+    {"check", OPT_CHECK, '-', "Validate the ec parameters"},
+    {"list_curves", OPT_LIST_CURVES, '-',
+     "Prints a list of all curve 'short names'"},
+    {"no_seed", OPT_NO_SEED, '-',
+     "If 'explicit' parameters are chosen do not use the seed"},
+    {"noout", OPT_NOOUT, '-', "Do not print the ec parameter"},
+    {"name", OPT_NAME, 's',
+     "Use the ec parameters with specified 'short name'"},
+    {"conv_form", OPT_CONV_FORM, 's', "Specifies the point conversion form "},
+    {"param_enc", OPT_PARAM_ENC, 's',
+     "Specifies the way the ec parameters are encoded"},
+    {"genkey", OPT_GENKEY, '-', "Generate ec key"},
+    {"rand", OPT_RAND, 's', "Files to use for random number input"},
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine, possibly a hardware device"},
+# endif
+    {NULL}
+};
+
+static OPT_PAIR forms[] = {
+    {"compressed", POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED},
+    {"uncompressed", POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED},
+    {"hybrid", POINT_CONVERSION_HYBRID},
+    {NULL}
+};
+
+static OPT_PAIR encodings[] = {
+    {"named_curve", OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE},
+    {"explicit", 0},
+    {NULL}
+};
+
+int ecparam_main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    ENGINE *e = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *ec_gen = NULL, *ec_order = NULL, *ec_cofactor = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *ec_p = NULL, *ec_a = NULL, *ec_b = NULL;
+    BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL;
+    EC_GROUP *group = NULL;
+    point_conversion_form_t form = POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED;
+    char *curve_name = NULL, *inrand = NULL;
+    char *infile = NULL, *outfile = NULL, *prog;
+    unsigned char *buffer = NULL;
+    OPTION_CHOICE o;
+    int asn1_flag = OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE, new_asn1_flag = 0;
+    int informat = FORMAT_PEM, outformat = FORMAT_PEM, noout = 0, C = 0;
+    int ret = 1, private = 0;
+    int list_curves = 0, no_seed = 0, check = 0, new_form = 0;
+    int text = 0, i, need_rand = 0, genkey = 0;
+
+    prog = opt_init(argc, argv, ecparam_options);
+    while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) {
+        switch (o) {
+        case OPT_EOF:
+        case OPT_ERR:
+ opthelp:
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog);
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_HELP:
+            opt_help(ecparam_options);
+            ret = 0;
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_INFORM:
+            if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PEMDER, &informat))
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_IN:
+            infile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_OUTFORM:
+            if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PEMDER, &outformat))
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_OUT:
+            outfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_TEXT:
+            text = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_C:
+            C = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_CHECK:
+            check = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_LIST_CURVES:
+            list_curves = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NO_SEED:
+            no_seed = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NOOUT:
+            noout = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NAME:
+            curve_name = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_CONV_FORM:
+            if (!opt_pair(opt_arg(), forms, &new_form))
+                goto opthelp;
+            form = new_form;
+            new_form = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_PARAM_ENC:
+            if (!opt_pair(opt_arg(), encodings, &asn1_flag))
+                goto opthelp;
+            new_asn1_flag = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_GENKEY:
+            genkey = need_rand = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_RAND:
+            inrand = opt_arg();
+            need_rand = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_ENGINE:
+            e = setup_engine(opt_arg(), 0);
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    argc = opt_num_rest();
+    if (argc != 0)
+        goto opthelp;
+
+    private = genkey ? 1 : 0;
+
+    in = bio_open_default(infile, 'r', informat);
+    if (in == NULL)
+        goto end;
+    out = bio_open_owner(outfile, outformat, private);
+    if (out == NULL)
+        goto end;
+
+    if (list_curves) {
+        EC_builtin_curve *curves = NULL;
+        size_t crv_len = EC_get_builtin_curves(NULL, 0);
+        size_t n;
+
+        curves = app_malloc((int)sizeof(*curves) * crv_len, "list curves");
+        if (!EC_get_builtin_curves(curves, crv_len)) {
+            OPENSSL_free(curves);
+            goto end;
+        }
+
+        for (n = 0; n < crv_len; n++) {
+            const char *comment;
+            const char *sname;
+            comment = curves[n].comment;
+            sname = OBJ_nid2sn(curves[n].nid);
+            if (comment == NULL)
+                comment = "CURVE DESCRIPTION NOT AVAILABLE";
+            if (sname == NULL)
+                sname = "";
+
+            BIO_printf(out, "  %-10s: ", sname);
+            BIO_printf(out, "%s\n", comment);
+        }
+
+        OPENSSL_free(curves);
+        ret = 0;
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (curve_name != NULL) {
+        int nid;
+
+        /*
+         * workaround for the SECG curve names secp192r1 and secp256r1 (which
+         * are the same as the curves prime192v1 and prime256v1 defined in
+         * X9.62)
+         */
+        if (strcmp(curve_name, "secp192r1") == 0) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "using curve name prime192v1 "
+                       "instead of secp192r1\n");
+            nid = NID_X9_62_prime192v1;
+        } else if (strcmp(curve_name, "secp256r1") == 0) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "using curve name prime256v1 "
+                       "instead of secp256r1\n");
+            nid = NID_X9_62_prime256v1;
+        } else
+            nid = OBJ_sn2nid(curve_name);
+
+        if (nid == 0)
+            nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(curve_name);
+
+        if (nid == 0) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "unknown curve name (%s)\n", curve_name);
+            goto end;
+        }
+
+        group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(nid);
+        if (group == NULL) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to create curve (%s)\n", curve_name);
+            goto end;
+        }
+        EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(group, asn1_flag);
+        EC_GROUP_set_point_conversion_form(group, form);
+    } else if (informat == FORMAT_ASN1)
+        group = d2i_ECPKParameters_bio(in, NULL);
+    else
+        group = PEM_read_bio_ECPKParameters(in, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+    if (group == NULL) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to load elliptic curve parameters\n");
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (new_form)
+        EC_GROUP_set_point_conversion_form(group, form);
+
+    if (new_asn1_flag)
+        EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(group, asn1_flag);
+
+    if (no_seed) {
+        EC_GROUP_set_seed(group, NULL, 0);
+    }
+
+    if (text) {
+        if (!ECPKParameters_print(out, group, 0))
+            goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (check) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "checking elliptic curve parameters: ");
+        if (!EC_GROUP_check(group, NULL)) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "failed\n");
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            goto end;
+        }
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "ok\n");
+
+    }
+
+    if (C) {
+        size_t buf_len = 0, tmp_len = 0;
+        const EC_POINT *point;
+        int is_prime, len = 0;
+        const EC_METHOD *meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(group);
+
+        if ((ec_p = BN_new()) == NULL
+                || (ec_a = BN_new()) == NULL
+                || (ec_b = BN_new()) == NULL
+                || (ec_gen = BN_new()) == NULL
+                || (ec_order = BN_new()) == NULL
+                || (ec_cofactor = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+            perror("Can't allocate BN");
+            goto end;
+        }
+
+        is_prime = (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field);
+        if (!is_prime) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can only handle X9.62 prime fields\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+
+        if (!EC_GROUP_get_curve_GFp(group, ec_p, ec_a, ec_b, NULL))
+            goto end;
+
+        if ((point = EC_GROUP_get0_generator(group)) == NULL)
+            goto end;
+        if (!EC_POINT_point2bn(group, point,
+                               EC_GROUP_get_point_conversion_form(group),
+                               ec_gen, NULL))
+            goto end;
+        if (!EC_GROUP_get_order(group, ec_order, NULL))
+            goto end;
+        if (!EC_GROUP_get_cofactor(group, ec_cofactor, NULL))
+            goto end;
+
+        if (!ec_p || !ec_a || !ec_b || !ec_gen || !ec_order || !ec_cofactor)
+            goto end;
+
+        len = BN_num_bits(ec_order);
+
+        if ((tmp_len = (size_t)BN_num_bytes(ec_p)) > buf_len)
+            buf_len = tmp_len;
+        if ((tmp_len = (size_t)BN_num_bytes(ec_a)) > buf_len)
+            buf_len = tmp_len;
+        if ((tmp_len = (size_t)BN_num_bytes(ec_b)) > buf_len)
+            buf_len = tmp_len;
+        if ((tmp_len = (size_t)BN_num_bytes(ec_gen)) > buf_len)
+            buf_len = tmp_len;
+        if ((tmp_len = (size_t)BN_num_bytes(ec_order)) > buf_len)
+            buf_len = tmp_len;
+        if ((tmp_len = (size_t)BN_num_bytes(ec_cofactor)) > buf_len)
+            buf_len = tmp_len;
+
+        buffer = app_malloc(buf_len, "BN buffer");
+
+        BIO_printf(out, "EC_GROUP *get_ec_group_%d(void)\n{\n", len);
+        print_bignum_var(out, ec_p, "ec_p", len, buffer);
+        print_bignum_var(out, ec_a, "ec_a", len, buffer);
+        print_bignum_var(out, ec_b, "ec_b", len, buffer);
+        print_bignum_var(out, ec_gen, "ec_gen", len, buffer);
+        print_bignum_var(out, ec_order, "ec_order", len, buffer);
+        print_bignum_var(out, ec_cofactor, "ec_cofactor", len, buffer);
+        BIO_printf(out, "    int ok = 0;\n"
+                        "    EC_GROUP *group = NULL;\n"
+                        "    EC_POINT *point = NULL;\n"
+                        "    BIGNUM *tmp_1 = NULL;\n"
+                        "    BIGNUM *tmp_2 = NULL;\n"
+                        "    BIGNUM *tmp_3 = NULL;\n"
+                        "\n");
+
+        BIO_printf(out, "    if ((tmp_1 = BN_bin2bn(ec_p_%d, sizeof(ec_p_%d), NULL)) == NULL)\n"
+                        "        goto err;\n", len, len);
+        BIO_printf(out, "    if ((tmp_2 = BN_bin2bn(ec_a_%d, sizeof(ec_a_%d), NULL)) == NULL)\n"
+                        "        goto err;\n", len, len);
+        BIO_printf(out, "    if ((tmp_3 = BN_bin2bn(ec_b_%d, sizeof(ec_b_%d), NULL)) == NULL)\n"
+                        "        goto err;\n", len, len);
+        BIO_printf(out, "    if ((group = EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp(tmp_1, tmp_2, tmp_3, NULL)) == NULL)\n"
+                        "        goto err;\n"
+                        "\n");
+        BIO_printf(out, "    /* build generator */\n");
+        BIO_printf(out, "    if ((tmp_1 = BN_bin2bn(ec_gen_%d, sizeof(ec_gen_%d), tmp_1)) == NULL)\n"
+                        "        goto err;\n", len, len);
+        BIO_printf(out, "    point = EC_POINT_bn2point(group, tmp_1, NULL, NULL);\n");
+        BIO_printf(out, "    if (point == NULL)\n"
+                        "        goto err;\n");
+        BIO_printf(out, "    if ((tmp_2 = BN_bin2bn(ec_order_%d, sizeof(ec_order_%d), tmp_2)) == NULL)\n"
+                        "        goto err;\n", len, len);
+        BIO_printf(out, "    if ((tmp_3 = BN_bin2bn(ec_cofactor_%d, sizeof(ec_cofactor_%d), tmp_3)) == NULL)\n"
+                        "        goto err;\n", len, len);
+        BIO_printf(out, "    if (!EC_GROUP_set_generator(group, point, tmp_2, tmp_3))\n"
+                        "        goto err;\n"
+                        "ok = 1;"
+                        "\n");
+        BIO_printf(out, "err:\n"
+                        "    BN_free(tmp_1);\n"
+                        "    BN_free(tmp_2);\n"
+                        "    BN_free(tmp_3);\n"
+                        "    EC_POINT_free(point);\n"
+                        "    if (!ok) {\n"
+                        "        EC_GROUP_free(group);\n"
+                        "        return NULL;\n"
+                        "    }\n"
+                        "    return (group);\n"
+                        "}\n");
+    }
+
+    if (outformat == FORMAT_ASN1 && genkey)
+        noout = 1;
+
+    if (!noout) {
+        if (outformat == FORMAT_ASN1)
+            i = i2d_ECPKParameters_bio(out, group);
+        else
+            i = PEM_write_bio_ECPKParameters(out, group);
+        if (!i) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to write elliptic "
+                       "curve parameters\n");
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (need_rand) {
+        app_RAND_load_file(NULL, (inrand != NULL));
+        if (inrand != NULL)
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "%ld semi-random bytes loaded\n",
+                       app_RAND_load_files(inrand));
+    }
+
+    if (genkey) {
+        EC_KEY *eckey = EC_KEY_new();
+
+        if (eckey == NULL)
+            goto end;
+
+        assert(need_rand);
+
+        if (EC_KEY_set_group(eckey, group) == 0) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to set group when generating key\n");
+            EC_KEY_free(eckey);
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            goto end;
+        }
+
+        if (new_form)
+            EC_KEY_set_conv_form(eckey, form);
+
+        if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(eckey)) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to generate key\n");
+            EC_KEY_free(eckey);
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            goto end;
+        }
+        assert(private);
+        if (outformat == FORMAT_ASN1)
+            i = i2d_ECPrivateKey_bio(out, eckey);
+        else
+            i = PEM_write_bio_ECPrivateKey(out, eckey, NULL,
+                                           NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
+        EC_KEY_free(eckey);
+    }
+
+    if (need_rand)
+        app_RAND_write_file(NULL);
+
+    ret = 0;
+ end:
+    BN_free(ec_p);
+    BN_free(ec_a);
+    BN_free(ec_b);
+    BN_free(ec_gen);
+    BN_free(ec_order);
+    BN_free(ec_cofactor);
+    OPENSSL_free(buffer);
+    EC_GROUP_free(group);
+    release_engine(e);
+    BIO_free(in);
+    BIO_free_all(out);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/enc.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/enc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..df55381
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/enc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,623 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include "apps.h"
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+# include <openssl/comp.h>
+#endif
+#include <ctype.h>
+
+#undef SIZE
+#undef BSIZE
+#define SIZE    (512)
+#define BSIZE   (8*1024)
+
+static int set_hex(char *in, unsigned char *out, int size);
+static void show_ciphers(const OBJ_NAME *name, void *bio_);
+
+struct doall_enc_ciphers {
+    BIO *bio;
+    int n;
+};
+
+typedef enum OPTION_choice {
+    OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP,
+    OPT_LIST,
+    OPT_E, OPT_IN, OPT_OUT, OPT_PASS, OPT_ENGINE, OPT_D, OPT_P, OPT_V,
+    OPT_NOPAD, OPT_SALT, OPT_NOSALT, OPT_DEBUG, OPT_UPPER_P, OPT_UPPER_A,
+    OPT_A, OPT_Z, OPT_BUFSIZE, OPT_K, OPT_KFILE, OPT_UPPER_K, OPT_NONE,
+    OPT_UPPER_S, OPT_IV, OPT_MD, OPT_CIPHER
+} OPTION_CHOICE;
+
+OPTIONS enc_options[] = {
+    {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"},
+    {"ciphers", OPT_LIST, '-', "List ciphers"},
+    {"in", OPT_IN, '<', "Input file"},
+    {"out", OPT_OUT, '>', "Output file"},
+    {"pass", OPT_PASS, 's', "Passphrase source"},
+    {"e", OPT_E, '-', "Encrypt"},
+    {"d", OPT_D, '-', "Decrypt"},
+    {"p", OPT_P, '-', "Print the iv/key"},
+    {"P", OPT_UPPER_P, '-', "Print the iv/key and exit"},
+    {"v", OPT_V, '-', "Verbose output"},
+    {"nopad", OPT_NOPAD, '-', "Disable standard block padding"},
+    {"salt", OPT_SALT, '-', "Use salt in the KDF (default)"},
+    {"nosalt", OPT_NOSALT, '-', "Do not use salt in the KDF"},
+    {"debug", OPT_DEBUG, '-', "Print debug info"},
+    {"a", OPT_A, '-', "Base64 encode/decode, depending on encryption flag"},
+    {"base64", OPT_A, '-', "Same as option -a"},
+    {"A", OPT_UPPER_A, '-',
+     "Used with -[base64|a] to specify base64 buffer as a single line"},
+    {"bufsize", OPT_BUFSIZE, 's', "Buffer size"},
+    {"k", OPT_K, 's', "Passphrase"},
+    {"kfile", OPT_KFILE, '<', "Read passphrase from file"},
+    {"K", OPT_UPPER_K, 's', "Raw key, in hex"},
+    {"S", OPT_UPPER_S, 's', "Salt, in hex"},
+    {"iv", OPT_IV, 's', "IV in hex"},
+    {"md", OPT_MD, 's', "Use specified digest to create a key from the passphrase"},
+    {"none", OPT_NONE, '-', "Don't encrypt"},
+    {"", OPT_CIPHER, '-', "Any supported cipher"},
+#ifdef ZLIB
+    {"z", OPT_Z, '-', "Use zlib as the 'encryption'"},
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine, possibly a hardware device"},
+#endif
+    {NULL}
+};
+
+int enc_main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    static char buf[128];
+    static const char magic[] = "Salted__";
+    ENGINE *e = NULL;
+    BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL, *b64 = NULL, *benc = NULL, *rbio =
+        NULL, *wbio = NULL;
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+    const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL, *c;
+    const EVP_MD *dgst = NULL;
+    char *hkey = NULL, *hiv = NULL, *hsalt = NULL, *p;
+    char *infile = NULL, *outfile = NULL, *prog;
+    char *str = NULL, *passarg = NULL, *pass = NULL, *strbuf = NULL;
+    char mbuf[sizeof(magic) - 1];
+    OPTION_CHOICE o;
+    int bsize = BSIZE, verbose = 0, debug = 0, olb64 = 0, nosalt = 0;
+    int enc = 1, printkey = 0, i, k;
+    int base64 = 0, informat = FORMAT_BINARY, outformat = FORMAT_BINARY;
+    int ret = 1, inl, nopad = 0;
+    unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH], iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+    unsigned char *buff = NULL, salt[PKCS5_SALT_LEN];
+    long n;
+    struct doall_enc_ciphers dec;
+#ifdef ZLIB
+    int do_zlib = 0;
+    BIO *bzl = NULL;
+#endif
+
+    /* first check the program name */
+    prog = opt_progname(argv[0]);
+    if (strcmp(prog, "base64") == 0)
+        base64 = 1;
+#ifdef ZLIB
+    else if (strcmp(prog, "zlib") == 0)
+        do_zlib = 1;
+#endif
+    else {
+        cipher = EVP_get_cipherbyname(prog);
+        if (cipher == NULL && strcmp(prog, "enc") != 0) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s is not a known cipher\n", prog);
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+
+    prog = opt_init(argc, argv, enc_options);
+    while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) {
+        switch (o) {
+        case OPT_EOF:
+        case OPT_ERR:
+ opthelp:
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog);
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_HELP:
+            opt_help(enc_options);
+            ret = 0;
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_LIST:
+            BIO_printf(bio_out, "Supported ciphers:\n");
+            dec.bio = bio_out;
+            dec.n = 0;
+            OBJ_NAME_do_all_sorted(OBJ_NAME_TYPE_CIPHER_METH,
+                                   show_ciphers, &dec);
+            BIO_printf(bio_out, "\n");
+            ret = 0;
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_E:
+            enc = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_IN:
+            infile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_OUT:
+            outfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_PASS:
+            passarg = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_ENGINE:
+            e = setup_engine(opt_arg(), 0);
+            break;
+        case OPT_D:
+            enc = 0;
+            break;
+        case OPT_P:
+            printkey = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_V:
+            verbose = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NOPAD:
+            nopad = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_SALT:
+            nosalt = 0;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NOSALT:
+            nosalt = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_DEBUG:
+            debug = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_UPPER_P:
+            printkey = 2;
+            break;
+        case OPT_UPPER_A:
+            olb64 = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_A:
+            base64 = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_Z:
+#ifdef ZLIB
+            do_zlib = 1;
+#endif
+            break;
+        case OPT_BUFSIZE:
+            p = opt_arg();
+            i = (int)strlen(p) - 1;
+            k = i >= 1 && p[i] == 'k';
+            if (k)
+                p[i] = '\0';
+            if (!opt_long(opt_arg(), &n)
+                    || n < 0 || (k && n >= LONG_MAX / 1024))
+                goto opthelp;
+            if (k)
+                n *= 1024;
+            bsize = (int)n;
+            break;
+        case OPT_K:
+            str = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_KFILE:
+            in = bio_open_default(opt_arg(), 'r', FORMAT_TEXT);
+            if (in == NULL)
+                goto opthelp;
+            i = BIO_gets(in, buf, sizeof(buf));
+            BIO_free(in);
+            in = NULL;
+            if (i <= 0) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                           "%s Can't read key from %s\n", prog, opt_arg());
+                goto opthelp;
+            }
+            while (--i > 0 && (buf[i] == '\r' || buf[i] == '\n'))
+                buf[i] = '\0';
+            if (i <= 0) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: zero length password\n", prog);
+                goto opthelp;
+            }
+            str = buf;
+            break;
+        case OPT_UPPER_K:
+            hkey = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_UPPER_S:
+            hsalt = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_IV:
+            hiv = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_MD:
+            if (!opt_md(opt_arg(), &dgst))
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_CIPHER:
+            if (!opt_cipher(opt_unknown(), &c))
+                goto opthelp;
+            cipher = c;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NONE:
+            cipher = NULL;
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    if (opt_num_rest() != 0) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Extra arguments given.\n");
+        goto opthelp;
+    }
+
+    if (cipher && EVP_CIPHER_flags(cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: AEAD ciphers not supported\n", prog);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (cipher && (EVP_CIPHER_mode(cipher) == EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE)) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s XTS ciphers not supported\n", prog);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (dgst == NULL)
+        dgst = EVP_sha256();
+
+    /* It must be large enough for a base64 encoded line */
+    if (base64 && bsize < 80)
+        bsize = 80;
+    if (verbose)
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "bufsize=%d\n", bsize);
+
+#ifdef ZLIB
+    if (!do_zlib)
+#endif
+        if (base64) {
+            if (enc)
+                outformat = FORMAT_BASE64;
+            else
+                informat = FORMAT_BASE64;
+        }
+
+    strbuf = app_malloc(SIZE, "strbuf");
+    buff = app_malloc(EVP_ENCODE_LENGTH(bsize), "evp buffer");
+
+    if (infile == NULL) {
+        in = dup_bio_in(informat);
+    } else
+        in = bio_open_default(infile, 'r', informat);
+    if (in == NULL)
+        goto end;
+
+    if (!str && passarg) {
+        if (!app_passwd(passarg, NULL, &pass, NULL)) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting password\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+        str = pass;
+    }
+
+    if ((str == NULL) && (cipher != NULL) && (hkey == NULL)) {
+        if (1) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_UI
+            for (;;) {
+                char prompt[200];
+
+                BIO_snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "enter %s %s password:",
+                             OBJ_nid2ln(EVP_CIPHER_nid(cipher)),
+                             (enc) ? "encryption" : "decryption");
+                strbuf[0] = '\0';
+                i = EVP_read_pw_string((char *)strbuf, SIZE, prompt, enc);
+                if (i == 0) {
+                    if (strbuf[0] == '\0') {
+                        ret = 1;
+                        goto end;
+                    }
+                    str = strbuf;
+                    break;
+                }
+                if (i < 0) {
+                    BIO_printf(bio_err, "bad password read\n");
+                    goto end;
+                }
+            }
+        } else {
+#endif
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "password required\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+
+    out = bio_open_default(outfile, 'w', outformat);
+    if (out == NULL)
+        goto end;
+
+    if (debug) {
+        BIO_set_callback(in, BIO_debug_callback);
+        BIO_set_callback(out, BIO_debug_callback);
+        BIO_set_callback_arg(in, (char *)bio_err);
+        BIO_set_callback_arg(out, (char *)bio_err);
+    }
+
+    rbio = in;
+    wbio = out;
+
+#ifdef ZLIB
+    if (do_zlib) {
+        if ((bzl = BIO_new(BIO_f_zlib())) == NULL)
+            goto end;
+        if (debug) {
+            BIO_set_callback(bzl, BIO_debug_callback);
+            BIO_set_callback_arg(bzl, (char *)bio_err);
+        }
+        if (enc)
+            wbio = BIO_push(bzl, wbio);
+        else
+            rbio = BIO_push(bzl, rbio);
+    }
+#endif
+
+    if (base64) {
+        if ((b64 = BIO_new(BIO_f_base64())) == NULL)
+            goto end;
+        if (debug) {
+            BIO_set_callback(b64, BIO_debug_callback);
+            BIO_set_callback_arg(b64, (char *)bio_err);
+        }
+        if (olb64)
+            BIO_set_flags(b64, BIO_FLAGS_BASE64_NO_NL);
+        if (enc)
+            wbio = BIO_push(b64, wbio);
+        else
+            rbio = BIO_push(b64, rbio);
+    }
+
+    if (cipher != NULL) {
+        /*
+         * Note that str is NULL if a key was passed on the command line, so
+         * we get no salt in that case. Is this a bug?
+         */
+        if (str != NULL) {
+            /*
+             * Salt handling: if encrypting generate a salt and write to
+             * output BIO. If decrypting read salt from input BIO.
+             */
+            unsigned char *sptr;
+            size_t str_len = strlen(str);
+
+            if (nosalt)
+                sptr = NULL;
+            else {
+                if (enc) {
+                    if (hsalt) {
+                        if (!set_hex(hsalt, salt, sizeof(salt))) {
+                            BIO_printf(bio_err, "invalid hex salt value\n");
+                            goto end;
+                        }
+                    } else if (RAND_bytes(salt, sizeof(salt)) <= 0)
+                        goto end;
+                    /*
+                     * If -P option then don't bother writing
+                     */
+                    if ((printkey != 2)
+                        && (BIO_write(wbio, magic,
+                                      sizeof(magic) - 1) != sizeof(magic) - 1
+                            || BIO_write(wbio,
+                                         (char *)salt,
+                                         sizeof(salt)) != sizeof(salt))) {
+                        BIO_printf(bio_err, "error writing output file\n");
+                        goto end;
+                    }
+                } else if (BIO_read(rbio, mbuf, sizeof(mbuf)) != sizeof(mbuf)
+                           || BIO_read(rbio,
+                                       (unsigned char *)salt,
+                                       sizeof(salt)) != sizeof(salt)) {
+                    BIO_printf(bio_err, "error reading input file\n");
+                    goto end;
+                } else if (memcmp(mbuf, magic, sizeof(magic) - 1)) {
+                    BIO_printf(bio_err, "bad magic number\n");
+                    goto end;
+                }
+
+                sptr = salt;
+            }
+
+            if (!EVP_BytesToKey(cipher, dgst, sptr,
+                                (unsigned char *)str,
+                                str_len, 1, key, iv)) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "EVP_BytesToKey failed\n");
+                goto end;
+            }
+            /*
+             * zero the complete buffer or the string passed from the command
+             * line bug picked up by Larry J. Hughes Jr. <hughes@indiana.edu>
+             */
+            if (str == strbuf)
+                OPENSSL_cleanse(str, SIZE);
+            else
+                OPENSSL_cleanse(str, str_len);
+        }
+        if (hiv != NULL) {
+            int siz = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
+            if (siz == 0) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "warning: iv not use by this cipher\n");
+            } else if (!set_hex(hiv, iv, sizeof(iv))) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "invalid hex iv value\n");
+                goto end;
+            }
+        }
+        if ((hiv == NULL) && (str == NULL)
+            && EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher) != 0) {
+            /*
+             * No IV was explicitly set and no IV was generated during
+             * EVP_BytesToKey. Hence the IV is undefined, making correct
+             * decryption impossible.
+             */
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "iv undefined\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+        if ((hkey != NULL) && !set_hex(hkey, key, EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher))) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "invalid hex key value\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+
+        if ((benc = BIO_new(BIO_f_cipher())) == NULL)
+            goto end;
+
+        /*
+         * Since we may be changing parameters work on the encryption context
+         * rather than calling BIO_set_cipher().
+         */
+
+        BIO_get_cipher_ctx(benc, &ctx);
+
+        if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, NULL, NULL, enc)) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error setting cipher %s\n",
+                       EVP_CIPHER_name(cipher));
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            goto end;
+        }
+
+        if (nopad)
+            EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0);
+
+        if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, key, iv, enc)) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error setting cipher %s\n",
+                       EVP_CIPHER_name(cipher));
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            goto end;
+        }
+
+        if (debug) {
+            BIO_set_callback(benc, BIO_debug_callback);
+            BIO_set_callback_arg(benc, (char *)bio_err);
+        }
+
+        if (printkey) {
+            if (!nosalt) {
+                printf("salt=");
+                for (i = 0; i < (int)sizeof(salt); i++)
+                    printf("%02X", salt[i]);
+                printf("\n");
+            }
+            if (EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher) > 0) {
+                printf("key=");
+                for (i = 0; i < EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher); i++)
+                    printf("%02X", key[i]);
+                printf("\n");
+            }
+            if (EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher) > 0) {
+                printf("iv =");
+                for (i = 0; i < EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher); i++)
+                    printf("%02X", iv[i]);
+                printf("\n");
+            }
+            if (printkey == 2) {
+                ret = 0;
+                goto end;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* Only encrypt/decrypt as we write the file */
+    if (benc != NULL)
+        wbio = BIO_push(benc, wbio);
+
+    for (;;) {
+        inl = BIO_read(rbio, (char *)buff, bsize);
+        if (inl <= 0)
+            break;
+        if (BIO_write(wbio, (char *)buff, inl) != inl) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "error writing output file\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+    if (!BIO_flush(wbio)) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "bad decrypt\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    ret = 0;
+    if (verbose) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "bytes read   :%8"BIO_PRI64"u\n", BIO_number_read(in));
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "bytes written:%8"BIO_PRI64"u\n", BIO_number_written(out));
+    }
+ end:
+    ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+    OPENSSL_free(strbuf);
+    OPENSSL_free(buff);
+    BIO_free(in);
+    BIO_free_all(out);
+    BIO_free(benc);
+    BIO_free(b64);
+#ifdef ZLIB
+    BIO_free(bzl);
+#endif
+    release_engine(e);
+    OPENSSL_free(pass);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static void show_ciphers(const OBJ_NAME *name, void *arg)
+{
+    struct doall_enc_ciphers *dec = (struct doall_enc_ciphers *)arg;
+    const EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
+
+    if (!islower((unsigned char)*name->name))
+        return;
+
+    /* Filter out ciphers that we cannot use */
+    cipher = EVP_get_cipherbyname(name->name);
+    if (cipher == NULL ||
+            (EVP_CIPHER_flags(cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) != 0 ||
+            EVP_CIPHER_mode(cipher) == EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE)
+        return;
+
+    BIO_printf(dec->bio, "-%-25s", name->name);
+    if (++dec->n == 3) {
+        BIO_printf(dec->bio, "\n");
+        dec->n = 0;
+    } else
+        BIO_printf(dec->bio, " ");
+}
+
+static int set_hex(char *in, unsigned char *out, int size)
+{
+    int i, n;
+    unsigned char j;
+
+    n = strlen(in);
+    if (n > (size * 2)) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "hex string is too long\n");
+        return (0);
+    }
+    memset(out, 0, size);
+    for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+        j = (unsigned char)*in;
+        *(in++) = '\0';
+        if (j == 0)
+            break;
+        if (!isxdigit(j)) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "non-hex digit\n");
+            return (0);
+        }
+        j = (unsigned char)OPENSSL_hexchar2int(j);
+        if (i & 1)
+            out[i / 2] |= j;
+        else
+            out[i / 2] = (j << 4);
+    }
+    return (1);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/engine.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/engine.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4eeb642
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/engine.c
@@ -0,0 +1,446 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT
+#else
+
+# include "apps.h"
+# include <stdio.h>
+# include <stdlib.h>
+# include <string.h>
+# include <openssl/err.h>
+# include <openssl/engine.h>
+# include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+typedef enum OPTION_choice {
+    OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP,
+    OPT_C, OPT_T, OPT_TT, OPT_PRE, OPT_POST,
+    OPT_V = 100, OPT_VV, OPT_VVV, OPT_VVVV
+} OPTION_CHOICE;
+
+OPTIONS engine_options[] = {
+    {OPT_HELP_STR, 1, '-', "Usage: %s [options] engine...\n"},
+    {OPT_HELP_STR, 1, '-',
+        "  engine... Engines to load\n"},
+    {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"},
+    {"v", OPT_V, '-', "List 'control commands' For each specified engine"},
+    {"vv", OPT_VV, '-', "Also display each command's description"},
+    {"vvv", OPT_VVV, '-', "Also add the input flags for each command"},
+    {"vvvv", OPT_VVVV, '-', "Also show internal input flags"},
+    {"c", OPT_C, '-', "List the capabilities of specified engine"},
+    {"t", OPT_T, '-', "Check that specified engine is available"},
+    {"tt", OPT_TT, '-', "Display error trace for unavailable engines"},
+    {"pre", OPT_PRE, 's', "Run command against the ENGINE before loading it"},
+    {"post", OPT_POST, 's', "Run command against the ENGINE after loading it"},
+    {OPT_MORE_STR, OPT_EOF, 1,
+     "Commands are like \"SO_PATH:/lib/libdriver.so\""},
+    {NULL}
+};
+
+static int append_buf(char **buf, int *size, const char *s)
+{
+    if (*buf == NULL) {
+        *size = 256;
+        *buf = app_malloc(*size, "engine buffer");
+        **buf = '\0';
+    }
+
+    if (strlen(*buf) + strlen(s) >= (unsigned int)*size) {
+        char *tmp;
+        *size += 256;
+        tmp = OPENSSL_realloc(*buf, *size);
+        if (tmp == NULL) {
+            OPENSSL_free(*buf);
+            *buf = NULL;
+            return 0;
+        }
+        *buf = tmp;
+    }
+
+    if (**buf != '\0')
+        OPENSSL_strlcat(*buf, ", ", *size);
+    OPENSSL_strlcat(*buf, s, *size);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int util_flags(BIO *out, unsigned int flags, const char *indent)
+{
+    int started = 0, err = 0;
+    /* Indent before displaying input flags */
+    BIO_printf(out, "%s%s(input flags): ", indent, indent);
+    if (flags == 0) {
+        BIO_printf(out, "<no flags>\n");
+        return 1;
+    }
+    /*
+     * If the object is internal, mark it in a way that shows instead of
+     * having it part of all the other flags, even if it really is.
+     */
+    if (flags & ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_INTERNAL) {
+        BIO_printf(out, "[Internal] ");
+    }
+
+    if (flags & ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NUMERIC) {
+        BIO_printf(out, "NUMERIC");
+        started = 1;
+    }
+    /*
+     * Now we check that no combinations of the mutually exclusive NUMERIC,
+     * STRING, and NO_INPUT flags have been used. Future flags that can be
+     * OR'd together with these would need to added after these to preserve
+     * the testing logic.
+     */
+    if (flags & ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING) {
+        if (started) {
+            BIO_printf(out, "|");
+            err = 1;
+        }
+        BIO_printf(out, "STRING");
+        started = 1;
+    }
+    if (flags & ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NO_INPUT) {
+        if (started) {
+            BIO_printf(out, "|");
+            err = 1;
+        }
+        BIO_printf(out, "NO_INPUT");
+        started = 1;
+    }
+    /* Check for unknown flags */
+    flags = flags & ~ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NUMERIC &
+        ~ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING &
+        ~ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NO_INPUT & ~ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_INTERNAL;
+    if (flags) {
+        if (started)
+            BIO_printf(out, "|");
+        BIO_printf(out, "<0x%04X>", flags);
+    }
+    if (err)
+        BIO_printf(out, "  <illegal flags!>");
+    BIO_printf(out, "\n");
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int util_verbose(ENGINE *e, int verbose, BIO *out, const char *indent)
+{
+    static const int line_wrap = 78;
+    int num;
+    int ret = 0;
+    char *name = NULL;
+    char *desc = NULL;
+    int flags;
+    int xpos = 0;
+    STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *cmds = NULL;
+    if (!ENGINE_ctrl(e, ENGINE_CTRL_HAS_CTRL_FUNCTION, 0, NULL, NULL) ||
+        ((num = ENGINE_ctrl(e, ENGINE_CTRL_GET_FIRST_CMD_TYPE,
+                            0, NULL, NULL)) <= 0)) {
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    cmds = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null();
+    if (!cmds)
+        goto err;
+
+    do {
+        int len;
+        /* Get the command input flags */
+        if ((flags = ENGINE_ctrl(e, ENGINE_CTRL_GET_CMD_FLAGS, num,
+                                 NULL, NULL)) < 0)
+            goto err;
+        if (!(flags & ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_INTERNAL) || verbose >= 4) {
+            /* Get the command name */
+            if ((len = ENGINE_ctrl(e, ENGINE_CTRL_GET_NAME_LEN_FROM_CMD, num,
+                                   NULL, NULL)) <= 0)
+                goto err;
+            name = app_malloc(len + 1, "name buffer");
+            if (ENGINE_ctrl(e, ENGINE_CTRL_GET_NAME_FROM_CMD, num, name,
+                            NULL) <= 0)
+                goto err;
+            /* Get the command description */
+            if ((len = ENGINE_ctrl(e, ENGINE_CTRL_GET_DESC_LEN_FROM_CMD, num,
+                                   NULL, NULL)) < 0)
+                goto err;
+            if (len > 0) {
+                desc = app_malloc(len + 1, "description buffer");
+                if (ENGINE_ctrl(e, ENGINE_CTRL_GET_DESC_FROM_CMD, num, desc,
+                                NULL) <= 0)
+                    goto err;
+            }
+            /* Now decide on the output */
+            if (xpos == 0)
+                /* Do an indent */
+                xpos = BIO_puts(out, indent);
+            else
+                /* Otherwise prepend a ", " */
+                xpos += BIO_printf(out, ", ");
+            if (verbose == 1) {
+                /*
+                 * We're just listing names, comma-delimited
+                 */
+                if ((xpos > (int)strlen(indent)) &&
+                    (xpos + (int)strlen(name) > line_wrap)) {
+                    BIO_printf(out, "\n");
+                    xpos = BIO_puts(out, indent);
+                }
+                xpos += BIO_printf(out, "%s", name);
+            } else {
+                /* We're listing names plus descriptions */
+                BIO_printf(out, "%s: %s\n", name,
+                           (desc == NULL) ? "<no description>" : desc);
+                /* ... and sometimes input flags */
+                if ((verbose >= 3) && !util_flags(out, flags, indent))
+                    goto err;
+                xpos = 0;
+            }
+        }
+        OPENSSL_free(name);
+        name = NULL;
+        OPENSSL_free(desc);
+        desc = NULL;
+        /* Move to the next command */
+        num = ENGINE_ctrl(e, ENGINE_CTRL_GET_NEXT_CMD_TYPE, num, NULL, NULL);
+    } while (num > 0);
+    if (xpos > 0)
+        BIO_printf(out, "\n");
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(cmds);
+    OPENSSL_free(name);
+    OPENSSL_free(desc);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static void util_do_cmds(ENGINE *e, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *cmds,
+                         BIO *out, const char *indent)
+{
+    int loop, res, num = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(cmds);
+
+    if (num < 0) {
+        BIO_printf(out, "[Error]: internal stack error\n");
+        return;
+    }
+    for (loop = 0; loop < num; loop++) {
+        char buf[256];
+        const char *cmd, *arg;
+        cmd = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(cmds, loop);
+        res = 1;                /* assume success */
+        /* Check if this command has no ":arg" */
+        if ((arg = strstr(cmd, ":")) == NULL) {
+            if (!ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(e, cmd, NULL, 0))
+                res = 0;
+        } else {
+            if ((int)(arg - cmd) > 254) {
+                BIO_printf(out, "[Error]: command name too long\n");
+                return;
+            }
+            memcpy(buf, cmd, (int)(arg - cmd));
+            buf[arg - cmd] = '\0';
+            arg++;              /* Move past the ":" */
+            /* Call the command with the argument */
+            if (!ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(e, buf, arg, 0))
+                res = 0;
+        }
+        if (res)
+            BIO_printf(out, "[Success]: %s\n", cmd);
+        else {
+            BIO_printf(out, "[Failure]: %s\n", cmd);
+            ERR_print_errors(out);
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+int engine_main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    int ret = 1, i;
+    int verbose = 0, list_cap = 0, test_avail = 0, test_avail_noise = 0;
+    ENGINE *e;
+    STACK_OF(OPENSSL_CSTRING) *engines = sk_OPENSSL_CSTRING_new_null();
+    STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *pre_cmds = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null();
+    STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *post_cmds = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null();
+    BIO *out;
+    const char *indent = "     ";
+    OPTION_CHOICE o;
+    char *prog;
+    char *argv1;
+
+    out = dup_bio_out(FORMAT_TEXT);
+    if (engines == NULL || pre_cmds == NULL || post_cmds == NULL)
+        goto end;
+
+    /* Remember the original command name, parse/skip any leading engine
+     * names, and then setup to parse the rest of the line as flags. */
+    prog = argv[0];
+    while ((argv1 = argv[1]) != NULL && *argv1 != '-') {
+        sk_OPENSSL_CSTRING_push(engines, argv1);
+        argc--;
+        argv++;
+    }
+    argv[0] = prog;
+    opt_init(argc, argv, engine_options);
+
+    while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) {
+        switch (o) {
+        case OPT_EOF:
+        case OPT_ERR:
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog);
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_HELP:
+            opt_help(engine_options);
+            ret = 0;
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_VVVV:
+        case OPT_VVV:
+        case OPT_VV:
+        case OPT_V:
+            /* Convert to an integer from one to four. */
+            i = (int)(o - OPT_V) + 1;
+            if (verbose < i)
+                verbose = i;
+            break;
+        case OPT_C:
+            list_cap = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_TT:
+            test_avail_noise++;
+            /* fall thru */
+        case OPT_T:
+            test_avail++;
+            break;
+        case OPT_PRE:
+            sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(pre_cmds, opt_arg());
+            break;
+        case OPT_POST:
+            sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(post_cmds, opt_arg());
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* Allow any trailing parameters as engine names. */
+    argc = opt_num_rest();
+    argv = opt_rest();
+    for ( ; *argv; argv++) {
+        if (**argv == '-') {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Cannot mix flags and engine names.\n",
+                       prog);
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog);
+            goto end;
+        }
+        sk_OPENSSL_CSTRING_push(engines, *argv);
+    }
+
+    if (sk_OPENSSL_CSTRING_num(engines) == 0) {
+        for (e = ENGINE_get_first(); e != NULL; e = ENGINE_get_next(e)) {
+            sk_OPENSSL_CSTRING_push(engines, ENGINE_get_id(e));
+        }
+    }
+
+    ret = 0;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_CSTRING_num(engines); i++) {
+        const char *id = sk_OPENSSL_CSTRING_value(engines, i);
+        if ((e = ENGINE_by_id(id)) != NULL) {
+            const char *name = ENGINE_get_name(e);
+            /*
+             * Do "id" first, then "name". Easier to auto-parse.
+             */
+            BIO_printf(out, "(%s) %s\n", id, name);
+            util_do_cmds(e, pre_cmds, out, indent);
+            if (strcmp(ENGINE_get_id(e), id) != 0) {
+                BIO_printf(out, "Loaded: (%s) %s\n",
+                           ENGINE_get_id(e), ENGINE_get_name(e));
+            }
+            if (list_cap) {
+                int cap_size = 256;
+                char *cap_buf = NULL;
+                int k, n;
+                const int *nids;
+                ENGINE_CIPHERS_PTR fn_c;
+                ENGINE_DIGESTS_PTR fn_d;
+                ENGINE_PKEY_METHS_PTR fn_pk;
+
+                if (ENGINE_get_RSA(e) != NULL
+                    && !append_buf(&cap_buf, &cap_size, "RSA"))
+                    goto end;
+                if (ENGINE_get_DSA(e) != NULL
+                    && !append_buf(&cap_buf, &cap_size, "DSA"))
+                    goto end;
+                if (ENGINE_get_DH(e) != NULL
+                    && !append_buf(&cap_buf, &cap_size, "DH"))
+                    goto end;
+                if (ENGINE_get_RAND(e) != NULL
+                    && !append_buf(&cap_buf, &cap_size, "RAND"))
+                    goto end;
+
+                fn_c = ENGINE_get_ciphers(e);
+                if (!fn_c)
+                    goto skip_ciphers;
+                n = fn_c(e, NULL, &nids, 0);
+                for (k = 0; k < n; ++k)
+                    if (!append_buf(&cap_buf, &cap_size, OBJ_nid2sn(nids[k])))
+                        goto end;
+
+ skip_ciphers:
+                fn_d = ENGINE_get_digests(e);
+                if (!fn_d)
+                    goto skip_digests;
+                n = fn_d(e, NULL, &nids, 0);
+                for (k = 0; k < n; ++k)
+                    if (!append_buf(&cap_buf, &cap_size, OBJ_nid2sn(nids[k])))
+                        goto end;
+
+ skip_digests:
+                fn_pk = ENGINE_get_pkey_meths(e);
+                if (!fn_pk)
+                    goto skip_pmeths;
+                n = fn_pk(e, NULL, &nids, 0);
+                for (k = 0; k < n; ++k)
+                    if (!append_buf(&cap_buf, &cap_size, OBJ_nid2sn(nids[k])))
+                        goto end;
+ skip_pmeths:
+                if (cap_buf && (*cap_buf != '\0'))
+                    BIO_printf(out, " [%s]\n", cap_buf);
+
+                OPENSSL_free(cap_buf);
+            }
+            if (test_avail) {
+                BIO_printf(out, "%s", indent);
+                if (ENGINE_init(e)) {
+                    BIO_printf(out, "[ available ]\n");
+                    util_do_cmds(e, post_cmds, out, indent);
+                    ENGINE_finish(e);
+                } else {
+                    BIO_printf(out, "[ unavailable ]\n");
+                    if (test_avail_noise)
+                        ERR_print_errors_fp(stdout);
+                    ERR_clear_error();
+                }
+            }
+            if ((verbose > 0) && !util_verbose(e, verbose, out, indent))
+                goto end;
+            ENGINE_free(e);
+        } else {
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            /* because exit codes above 127 have special meaning on Unix */
+            if (++ret > 127)
+                ret = 127;
+        }
+    }
+
+ end:
+
+    ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+    sk_OPENSSL_CSTRING_free(engines);
+    sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(pre_cmds);
+    sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(post_cmds);
+    BIO_free_all(out);
+    return (ret);
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/errstr.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/errstr.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..79d83ee
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/errstr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include "apps.h"
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/lhash.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+typedef enum OPTION_choice {
+    OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP
+} OPTION_CHOICE;
+
+OPTIONS errstr_options[] = {
+    {OPT_HELP_STR, 1, '-', "Usage: %s [options] errnum...\n"},
+    {OPT_HELP_STR, 1, '-', "  errnum  Error number\n"},
+    {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"},
+    {NULL}
+};
+
+int errstr_main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    OPTION_CHOICE o;
+    char buf[256], *prog;
+    int ret = 1;
+    unsigned long l;
+
+    prog = opt_init(argc, argv, errstr_options);
+    while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) {
+        switch (o) {
+        case OPT_EOF:
+        case OPT_ERR:
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog);
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_HELP:
+            opt_help(errstr_options);
+            ret = 0;
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+
+    ret = 0;
+    for (argv = opt_rest(); *argv; argv++) {
+        if (sscanf(*argv, "%lx", &l) == 0)
+            ret++;
+        else {
+            /* We're not really an SSL application so this won't auto-init, but
+             * we're still interested in SSL error strings
+             */
+            OPENSSL_init_ssl(OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_SSL_STRINGS
+                             | OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_CRYPTO_STRINGS, NULL);
+            ERR_error_string_n(l, buf, sizeof(buf));
+            BIO_printf(bio_out, "%s\n", buf);
+        }
+    }
+ end:
+    return (ret);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/gendsa.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/gendsa.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bdef022
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/gendsa.c
@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT
+#else
+
+# include <stdio.h>
+# include <string.h>
+# include <sys/types.h>
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+# include "apps.h"
+# include <openssl/bio.h>
+# include <openssl/err.h>
+# include <openssl/bn.h>
+# include <openssl/dsa.h>
+# include <openssl/x509.h>
+# include <openssl/pem.h>
+
+typedef enum OPTION_choice {
+    OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP,
+    OPT_OUT, OPT_PASSOUT, OPT_ENGINE, OPT_RAND, OPT_CIPHER
+} OPTION_CHOICE;
+
+OPTIONS gendsa_options[] = {
+    {OPT_HELP_STR, 1, '-', "Usage: %s [args] dsaparam-file\n"},
+    {OPT_HELP_STR, 1, '-', "Valid options are:\n"},
+    {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"},
+    {"out", OPT_OUT, '>', "Output the key to the specified file"},
+    {"passout", OPT_PASSOUT, 's', "Output file pass phrase source"},
+    {"rand", OPT_RAND, 's',
+     "Load the file(s) into the random number generator"},
+    {"", OPT_CIPHER, '-', "Encrypt the output with any supported cipher"},
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine, possibly a hardware device"},
+# endif
+    {NULL}
+};
+
+int gendsa_main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    ENGINE *e = NULL;
+    BIO *out = NULL, *in = NULL;
+    DSA *dsa = NULL;
+    const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
+    char *inrand = NULL, *dsaparams = NULL;
+    char *outfile = NULL, *passoutarg = NULL, *passout = NULL, *prog;
+    OPTION_CHOICE o;
+    int ret = 1, private = 0;
+    const BIGNUM *p = NULL;
+
+    prog = opt_init(argc, argv, gendsa_options);
+    while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) {
+        switch (o) {
+        case OPT_EOF:
+        case OPT_ERR:
+ opthelp:
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog);
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_HELP:
+            ret = 0;
+            opt_help(gendsa_options);
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_OUT:
+            outfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_PASSOUT:
+            passoutarg = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_ENGINE:
+            e = setup_engine(opt_arg(), 0);
+            break;
+        case OPT_RAND:
+            inrand = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_CIPHER:
+            if (!opt_cipher(opt_unknown(), &enc))
+                goto end;
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    argc = opt_num_rest();
+    argv = opt_rest();
+    private = 1;
+
+    if (argc != 1)
+        goto opthelp;
+    dsaparams = *argv;
+
+    if (!app_passwd(NULL, passoutarg, NULL, &passout)) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting password\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    in = bio_open_default(dsaparams, 'r', FORMAT_PEM);
+    if (in == NULL)
+        goto end2;
+
+    if ((dsa = PEM_read_bio_DSAparams(in, NULL, NULL, NULL)) == NULL) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to load DSA parameter file\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+    BIO_free(in);
+    in = NULL;
+
+    out = bio_open_owner(outfile, FORMAT_PEM, private);
+    if (out == NULL)
+        goto end2;
+
+    if (!app_RAND_load_file(NULL, 1) && inrand == NULL) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                   "warning, not much extra random data, consider using the -rand option\n");
+    }
+    if (inrand != NULL)
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "%ld semi-random bytes loaded\n",
+                   app_RAND_load_files(inrand));
+
+    DSA_get0_pqg(dsa, &p, NULL, NULL);
+    BIO_printf(bio_err, "Generating DSA key, %d bits\n", BN_num_bits(p));
+    if (!DSA_generate_key(dsa))
+        goto end;
+
+    app_RAND_write_file(NULL);
+
+    assert(private);
+    if (!PEM_write_bio_DSAPrivateKey(out, dsa, enc, NULL, 0, NULL, passout))
+        goto end;
+    ret = 0;
+ end:
+    if (ret != 0)
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ end2:
+    BIO_free(in);
+    BIO_free_all(out);
+    DSA_free(dsa);
+    release_engine(e);
+    OPENSSL_free(passout);
+    return (ret);
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/genpkey.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/genpkey.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9e37977
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/genpkey.c
@@ -0,0 +1,314 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include "apps.h"
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+# include <openssl/engine.h>
+#endif
+
+static int init_keygen_file(EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx, const char *file, ENGINE *e);
+static int genpkey_cb(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);
+
+typedef enum OPTION_choice {
+    OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP,
+    OPT_ENGINE, OPT_OUTFORM, OPT_OUT, OPT_PASS, OPT_PARAMFILE,
+    OPT_ALGORITHM, OPT_PKEYOPT, OPT_GENPARAM, OPT_TEXT, OPT_CIPHER
+} OPTION_CHOICE;
+
+OPTIONS genpkey_options[] = {
+    {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"},
+    {"out", OPT_OUT, '>', "Output file"},
+    {"outform", OPT_OUTFORM, 'F', "output format (DER or PEM)"},
+    {"pass", OPT_PASS, 's', "Output file pass phrase source"},
+    {"paramfile", OPT_PARAMFILE, '<', "Parameters file"},
+    {"algorithm", OPT_ALGORITHM, 's', "The public key algorithm"},
+    {"pkeyopt", OPT_PKEYOPT, 's',
+     "Set the public key algorithm option as opt:value"},
+    {"genparam", OPT_GENPARAM, '-', "Generate parameters, not key"},
+    {"text", OPT_TEXT, '-', "Print the in text"},
+    {"", OPT_CIPHER, '-', "Cipher to use to encrypt the key"},
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine, possibly a hardware device"},
+#endif
+    /* This is deliberately last. */
+    {OPT_HELP_STR, 1, 1,
+     "Order of options may be important!  See the documentation.\n"},
+    {NULL}
+};
+
+int genpkey_main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL;
+    ENGINE *e = NULL;
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+    char *outfile = NULL, *passarg = NULL, *pass = NULL, *prog;
+    const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL;
+    OPTION_CHOICE o;
+    int outformat = FORMAT_PEM, text = 0, ret = 1, rv, do_param = 0;
+    int private = 0;
+
+    prog = opt_init(argc, argv, genpkey_options);
+    while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) {
+        switch (o) {
+        case OPT_EOF:
+        case OPT_ERR:
+ opthelp:
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog);
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_HELP:
+            ret = 0;
+            opt_help(genpkey_options);
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_OUTFORM:
+            if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PEMDER, &outformat))
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_OUT:
+            outfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_PASS:
+            passarg = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_ENGINE:
+            e = setup_engine(opt_arg(), 0);
+            break;
+        case OPT_PARAMFILE:
+            if (do_param == 1)
+                goto opthelp;
+            if (!init_keygen_file(&ctx, opt_arg(), e))
+                goto end;
+            break;
+        case OPT_ALGORITHM:
+            if (!init_gen_str(&ctx, opt_arg(), e, do_param))
+                goto end;
+            break;
+        case OPT_PKEYOPT:
+            if (ctx == NULL) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: No keytype specified.\n", prog);
+                goto opthelp;
+            }
+            if (pkey_ctrl_string(ctx, opt_arg()) <= 0) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                           "%s: Error setting %s parameter:\n",
+                           prog, opt_arg());
+                ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+                goto end;
+            }
+            break;
+        case OPT_GENPARAM:
+            if (ctx != NULL)
+                goto opthelp;
+            do_param = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_TEXT:
+            text = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_CIPHER:
+            if (!opt_cipher(opt_unknown(), &cipher)
+                || do_param == 1)
+                goto opthelp;
+        }
+    }
+    argc = opt_num_rest();
+    if (argc != 0)
+        goto opthelp;
+
+    private = do_param ? 0 : 1;
+
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        goto opthelp;
+
+    if (!app_passwd(passarg, NULL, &pass, NULL)) {
+        BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error getting password\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    out = bio_open_owner(outfile, outformat, private);
+    if (out == NULL)
+        goto end;
+
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_cb(ctx, genpkey_cb);
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, bio_err);
+
+    if (do_param) {
+        if (EVP_PKEY_paramgen(ctx, &pkey) <= 0) {
+            BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error generating parameters\n");
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            goto end;
+        }
+    } else {
+        if (EVP_PKEY_keygen(ctx, &pkey) <= 0) {
+            BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error generating key\n");
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (do_param)
+        rv = PEM_write_bio_Parameters(out, pkey);
+    else if (outformat == FORMAT_PEM) {
+        assert(private);
+        rv = PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey(out, pkey, cipher, NULL, 0, NULL, pass);
+    } else if (outformat == FORMAT_ASN1) {
+        assert(private);
+        rv = i2d_PrivateKey_bio(out, pkey);
+    } else {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Bad format specified for key\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (rv <= 0) {
+        BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error writing key\n");
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+    }
+
+    if (text) {
+        if (do_param)
+            rv = EVP_PKEY_print_params(out, pkey, 0, NULL);
+        else
+            rv = EVP_PKEY_print_private(out, pkey, 0, NULL);
+
+        if (rv <= 0) {
+            BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error printing key\n");
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        }
+    }
+
+    ret = 0;
+
+ end:
+    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
+    BIO_free_all(out);
+    BIO_free(in);
+    release_engine(e);
+    OPENSSL_free(pass);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int init_keygen_file(EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx, const char *file, ENGINE *e)
+{
+    BIO *pbio;
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+    if (*pctx) {
+        BIO_puts(bio_err, "Parameters already set!\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    pbio = BIO_new_file(file, "r");
+    if (!pbio) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't open parameter file %s\n", file);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    pkey = PEM_read_bio_Parameters(pbio, NULL);
+    BIO_free(pbio);
+
+    if (!pkey) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error reading parameter file %s\n", file);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, e);
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(ctx) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+    *pctx = ctx;
+    return 1;
+
+ err:
+    BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error initializing context\n");
+    ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+    return 0;
+
+}
+
+int init_gen_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx,
+                 const char *algname, ENGINE *e, int do_param)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+    const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth;
+    ENGINE *tmpeng = NULL;
+    int pkey_id;
+
+    if (*pctx) {
+        BIO_puts(bio_err, "Algorithm already set!\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str(&tmpeng, algname, -1);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    if (!ameth && e)
+        ameth = ENGINE_get_pkey_asn1_meth_str(e, algname, -1);
+#endif
+
+    if (!ameth) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Algorithm %s not found\n", algname);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    ERR_clear_error();
+
+    EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(&pkey_id, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, ameth);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    ENGINE_finish(tmpeng);
+#endif
+    ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(pkey_id, e);
+
+    if (!ctx)
+        goto err;
+    if (do_param) {
+        if (EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(ctx) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+    } else {
+        if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(ctx) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    *pctx = ctx;
+    return 1;
+
+ err:
+    BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error initializing %s context\n", algname);
+    ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
+    return 0;
+
+}
+
+static int genpkey_cb(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    char c = '*';
+    BIO *b = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_app_data(ctx);
+    int p;
+    p = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_keygen_info(ctx, 0);
+    if (p == 0)
+        c = '.';
+    if (p == 1)
+        c = '+';
+    if (p == 2)
+        c = '*';
+    if (p == 3)
+        c = '\n';
+    BIO_write(b, &c, 1);
+    (void)BIO_flush(b);
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/genrsa.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/genrsa.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..19bc753
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/genrsa.c
@@ -0,0 +1,198 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT
+#else
+
+# include <stdio.h>
+# include <string.h>
+# include <sys/types.h>
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+# include "apps.h"
+# include <openssl/bio.h>
+# include <openssl/err.h>
+# include <openssl/bn.h>
+# include <openssl/rsa.h>
+# include <openssl/evp.h>
+# include <openssl/x509.h>
+# include <openssl/pem.h>
+# include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+# define DEFBITS 2048
+
+static int genrsa_cb(int p, int n, BN_GENCB *cb);
+
+typedef enum OPTION_choice {
+    OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP,
+    OPT_3, OPT_F4, OPT_ENGINE,
+    OPT_OUT, OPT_RAND, OPT_PASSOUT, OPT_CIPHER
+} OPTION_CHOICE;
+
+OPTIONS genrsa_options[] = {
+    {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"},
+    {"3", OPT_3, '-', "Use 3 for the E value"},
+    {"F4", OPT_F4, '-', "Use F4 (0x10001) for the E value"},
+    {"f4", OPT_F4, '-', "Use F4 (0x10001) for the E value"},
+    {"out", OPT_OUT, 's', "Output the key to specified file"},
+    {"rand", OPT_RAND, 's',
+     "Load the file(s) into the random number generator"},
+    {"passout", OPT_PASSOUT, 's', "Output file pass phrase source"},
+    {"", OPT_CIPHER, '-', "Encrypt the output with any supported cipher"},
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine, possibly a hardware device"},
+# endif
+    {NULL}
+};
+
+int genrsa_main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    BN_GENCB *cb = BN_GENCB_new();
+    PW_CB_DATA cb_data;
+    ENGINE *eng = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *bn = BN_new();
+    BIO *out = NULL;
+    const BIGNUM *e;
+    RSA *rsa = NULL;
+    const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
+    int ret = 1, num = DEFBITS, private = 0;
+    unsigned long f4 = RSA_F4;
+    char *outfile = NULL, *passoutarg = NULL, *passout = NULL;
+    char *inrand = NULL, *prog, *hexe, *dece;
+    OPTION_CHOICE o;
+
+    if (bn == NULL || cb == NULL)
+        goto end;
+
+    BN_GENCB_set(cb, genrsa_cb, bio_err);
+
+    prog = opt_init(argc, argv, genrsa_options);
+    while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) {
+        switch (o) {
+        case OPT_EOF:
+        case OPT_ERR:
+opthelp:
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog);
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_HELP:
+            ret = 0;
+            opt_help(genrsa_options);
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_3:
+            f4 = 3;
+            break;
+        case OPT_F4:
+            f4 = RSA_F4;
+            break;
+        case OPT_OUT:
+            outfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_ENGINE:
+            eng = setup_engine(opt_arg(), 0);
+            break;
+        case OPT_RAND:
+            inrand = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_PASSOUT:
+            passoutarg = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_CIPHER:
+            if (!opt_cipher(opt_unknown(), &enc))
+                goto end;
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    argc = opt_num_rest();
+    argv = opt_rest();
+
+    if (argc == 1) {
+        if (!opt_int(argv[0], &num) || num <= 0)
+            goto end;
+    } else if (argc > 0) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Extra arguments given.\n");
+        goto opthelp;
+    }
+
+    private = 1;
+    if (!app_passwd(NULL, passoutarg, NULL, &passout)) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting password\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    out = bio_open_owner(outfile, FORMAT_PEM, private);
+    if (out == NULL)
+        goto end;
+
+    if (!app_RAND_load_file(NULL, 1) && inrand == NULL
+        && !RAND_status()) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                   "warning, not much extra random data, consider using the -rand option\n");
+    }
+    if (inrand != NULL)
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "%ld semi-random bytes loaded\n",
+                   app_RAND_load_files(inrand));
+
+    BIO_printf(bio_err, "Generating RSA private key, %d bit long modulus\n",
+               num);
+    rsa = eng ? RSA_new_method(eng) : RSA_new();
+    if (rsa == NULL)
+        goto end;
+
+    if (!BN_set_word(bn, f4) || !RSA_generate_key_ex(rsa, num, bn, cb))
+        goto end;
+
+    app_RAND_write_file(NULL);
+
+    RSA_get0_key(rsa, NULL, &e, NULL);
+    hexe = BN_bn2hex(e);
+    dece = BN_bn2dec(e);
+    if (hexe && dece) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "e is %s (0x%s)\n", dece, hexe);
+    }
+    OPENSSL_free(hexe);
+    OPENSSL_free(dece);
+    cb_data.password = passout;
+    cb_data.prompt_info = outfile;
+    assert(private);
+    if (!PEM_write_bio_RSAPrivateKey(out, rsa, enc, NULL, 0,
+                                     (pem_password_cb *)password_callback,
+                                     &cb_data))
+        goto end;
+
+    ret = 0;
+ end:
+    BN_free(bn);
+    BN_GENCB_free(cb);
+    RSA_free(rsa);
+    BIO_free_all(out);
+    release_engine(eng);
+    OPENSSL_free(passout);
+    if (ret != 0)
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static int genrsa_cb(int p, int n, BN_GENCB *cb)
+{
+    char c = '*';
+
+    if (p == 0)
+        c = '.';
+    if (p == 1)
+        c = '+';
+    if (p == 2)
+        c = '*';
+    if (p == 3)
+        c = '\n';
+    BIO_write(BN_GENCB_get_arg(cb), &c, 1);
+    (void)BIO_flush(BN_GENCB_get_arg(cb));
+    return 1;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/nseq.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/nseq.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..018d5eb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/nseq.c
@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include "apps.h"
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+typedef enum OPTION_choice {
+    OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP,
+    OPT_TOSEQ, OPT_IN, OPT_OUT
+} OPTION_CHOICE;
+
+OPTIONS nseq_options[] = {
+    {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"},
+    {"toseq", OPT_TOSEQ, '-', "Output NS Sequence file"},
+    {"in", OPT_IN, '<', "Input file"},
+    {"out", OPT_OUT, '>', "Output file"},
+    {NULL}
+};
+
+int nseq_main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL;
+    X509 *x509 = NULL;
+    NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE *seq = NULL;
+    OPTION_CHOICE o;
+    int toseq = 0, ret = 1, i;
+    char *infile = NULL, *outfile = NULL, *prog;
+
+    prog = opt_init(argc, argv, nseq_options);
+    while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) {
+        switch (o) {
+        case OPT_EOF:
+        case OPT_ERR:
+ opthelp:
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog);
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_HELP:
+            ret = 0;
+            opt_help(nseq_options);
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_TOSEQ:
+            toseq = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_IN:
+            infile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_OUT:
+            outfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    argc = opt_num_rest();
+    if (argc != 0)
+        goto opthelp;
+
+    in = bio_open_default(infile, 'r', FORMAT_PEM);
+    if (in == NULL)
+        goto end;
+    out = bio_open_default(outfile, 'w', FORMAT_PEM);
+    if (out == NULL)
+        goto end;
+
+    if (toseq) {
+        seq = NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE_new();
+        if (seq == NULL)
+            goto end;
+        seq->certs = sk_X509_new_null();
+        if (seq->certs == NULL)
+            goto end;
+        while ((x509 = PEM_read_bio_X509(in, NULL, NULL, NULL)))
+            sk_X509_push(seq->certs, x509);
+
+        if (!sk_X509_num(seq->certs)) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Error reading certs file %s\n",
+                       prog, infile);
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            goto end;
+        }
+        PEM_write_bio_NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE(out, seq);
+        ret = 0;
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    seq = PEM_read_bio_NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE(in, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+    if (seq == NULL) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Error reading sequence file %s\n",
+                   prog, infile);
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(seq->certs); i++) {
+        x509 = sk_X509_value(seq->certs, i);
+        dump_cert_text(out, x509);
+        PEM_write_bio_X509(out, x509);
+    }
+    ret = 0;
+ end:
+    BIO_free(in);
+    BIO_free_all(out);
+    NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE_free(seq);
+
+    return (ret);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/ocsp.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/ocsp.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4b53334
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/ocsp.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1290 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT
+#else
+# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+#  define _XOPEN_SOURCE_EXTENDED/* So fd_set and friends get properly defined
+                                 * on OpenVMS */
+# endif
+
+# define USE_SOCKETS
+
+# include <stdio.h>
+# include <stdlib.h>
+# include <string.h>
+# include <time.h>
+# include <ctype.h>
+
+/* Needs to be included before the openssl headers */
+# include "apps.h"
+# include <openssl/e_os2.h>
+# include <openssl/crypto.h>
+# include <openssl/err.h>
+# include <openssl/ssl.h>
+# include <openssl/evp.h>
+# include <openssl/bn.h>
+# include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+
+# if defined(NETWARE_CLIB)
+#  ifdef NETWARE_BSDSOCK
+#   include <sys/socket.h>
+#   include <sys/bsdskt.h>
+#  else
+#   include <novsock2.h>
+#  endif
+# elif defined(NETWARE_LIBC)
+#  ifdef NETWARE_BSDSOCK
+#   include <sys/select.h>
+#  else
+#   include <novsock2.h>
+#  endif
+# endif
+
+/* Maximum leeway in validity period: default 5 minutes */
+# define MAX_VALIDITY_PERIOD    (5 * 60)
+
+static int add_ocsp_cert(OCSP_REQUEST **req, X509 *cert,
+                         const EVP_MD *cert_id_md, X509 *issuer,
+                         STACK_OF(OCSP_CERTID) *ids);
+static int add_ocsp_serial(OCSP_REQUEST **req, char *serial,
+                           const EVP_MD *cert_id_md, X509 *issuer,
+                           STACK_OF(OCSP_CERTID) *ids);
+static void print_ocsp_summary(BIO *out, OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, OCSP_REQUEST *req,
+                              STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *names,
+                              STACK_OF(OCSP_CERTID) *ids, long nsec,
+                              long maxage);
+static void make_ocsp_response(OCSP_RESPONSE **resp, OCSP_REQUEST *req,
+                              CA_DB *db, X509 *ca, X509 *rcert,
+                              EVP_PKEY *rkey, const EVP_MD *md,
+                              STACK_OF(X509) *rother, unsigned long flags,
+                              int nmin, int ndays, int badsig);
+
+static char **lookup_serial(CA_DB *db, ASN1_INTEGER *ser);
+static BIO *init_responder(const char *port);
+static int do_responder(OCSP_REQUEST **preq, BIO **pcbio, BIO *acbio);
+static int send_ocsp_response(BIO *cbio, OCSP_RESPONSE *resp);
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
+static OCSP_RESPONSE *query_responder(BIO *cbio, const char *host,
+                                      const char *path,
+                                      const STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *headers,
+                                      OCSP_REQUEST *req, int req_timeout);
+# endif
+
+typedef enum OPTION_choice {
+    OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP,
+    OPT_OUTFILE, OPT_TIMEOUT, OPT_URL, OPT_HOST, OPT_PORT,
+    OPT_IGNORE_ERR, OPT_NOVERIFY, OPT_NONCE, OPT_NO_NONCE,
+    OPT_RESP_NO_CERTS, OPT_RESP_KEY_ID, OPT_NO_CERTS,
+    OPT_NO_SIGNATURE_VERIFY, OPT_NO_CERT_VERIFY, OPT_NO_CHAIN,
+    OPT_NO_CERT_CHECKS, OPT_NO_EXPLICIT, OPT_TRUST_OTHER,
+    OPT_NO_INTERN, OPT_BADSIG, OPT_TEXT, OPT_REQ_TEXT, OPT_RESP_TEXT,
+    OPT_REQIN, OPT_RESPIN, OPT_SIGNER, OPT_VAFILE, OPT_SIGN_OTHER,
+    OPT_VERIFY_OTHER, OPT_CAFILE, OPT_CAPATH, OPT_NOCAFILE, OPT_NOCAPATH,
+    OPT_VALIDITY_PERIOD, OPT_STATUS_AGE, OPT_SIGNKEY, OPT_REQOUT,
+    OPT_RESPOUT, OPT_PATH, OPT_ISSUER, OPT_CERT, OPT_SERIAL,
+    OPT_INDEX, OPT_CA, OPT_NMIN, OPT_REQUEST, OPT_NDAYS, OPT_RSIGNER,
+    OPT_RKEY, OPT_ROTHER, OPT_RMD, OPT_HEADER,
+    OPT_V_ENUM,
+    OPT_MD
+} OPTION_CHOICE;
+
+OPTIONS ocsp_options[] = {
+    {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"},
+    {"out", OPT_OUTFILE, '>', "Output filename"},
+    {"timeout", OPT_TIMEOUT, 'p',
+     "Connection timeout (in seconds) to the OCSP responder"},
+    {"url", OPT_URL, 's', "Responder URL"},
+    {"host", OPT_HOST, 's', "TCP/IP hostname:port to connect to"},
+    {"port", OPT_PORT, 'p', "Port to run responder on"},
+    {"ignore_err", OPT_IGNORE_ERR, '-',
+     "Ignore Error response from OCSP responder, and retry "},
+    {"noverify", OPT_NOVERIFY, '-', "Don't verify response at all"},
+    {"nonce", OPT_NONCE, '-', "Add OCSP nonce to request"},
+    {"no_nonce", OPT_NO_NONCE, '-', "Don't add OCSP nonce to request"},
+    {"resp_no_certs", OPT_RESP_NO_CERTS, '-',
+     "Don't include any certificates in response"},
+    {"resp_key_id", OPT_RESP_KEY_ID, '-',
+     "Identify response by signing certificate key ID"},
+    {"no_certs", OPT_NO_CERTS, '-',
+     "Don't include any certificates in signed request"},
+    {"no_signature_verify", OPT_NO_SIGNATURE_VERIFY, '-',
+     "Don't check signature on response"},
+    {"no_cert_verify", OPT_NO_CERT_VERIFY, '-',
+     "Don't check signing certificate"},
+    {"no_chain", OPT_NO_CHAIN, '-', "Don't chain verify response"},
+    {"no_cert_checks", OPT_NO_CERT_CHECKS, '-',
+     "Don't do additional checks on signing certificate"},
+    {"no_explicit", OPT_NO_EXPLICIT, '-',
+     "Do not explicitly check the chain, just verify the root"},
+    {"trust_other", OPT_TRUST_OTHER, '-',
+     "Don't verify additional certificates"},
+    {"no_intern", OPT_NO_INTERN, '-',
+     "Don't search certificates contained in response for signer"},
+    {"badsig", OPT_BADSIG, '-',
+        "Corrupt last byte of loaded OSCP response signature (for test)"},
+    {"text", OPT_TEXT, '-', "Print text form of request and response"},
+    {"req_text", OPT_REQ_TEXT, '-', "Print text form of request"},
+    {"resp_text", OPT_RESP_TEXT, '-', "Print text form of response"},
+    {"reqin", OPT_REQIN, 's', "File with the DER-encoded request"},
+    {"respin", OPT_RESPIN, 's', "File with the DER-encoded response"},
+    {"signer", OPT_SIGNER, '<', "Certificate to sign OCSP request with"},
+    {"VAfile", OPT_VAFILE, '<', "Validator certificates file"},
+    {"sign_other", OPT_SIGN_OTHER, '<',
+     "Additional certificates to include in signed request"},
+    {"verify_other", OPT_VERIFY_OTHER, '<',
+     "Additional certificates to search for signer"},
+    {"CAfile", OPT_CAFILE, '<', "Trusted certificates file"},
+    {"CApath", OPT_CAPATH, '<', "Trusted certificates directory"},
+    {"no-CAfile", OPT_NOCAFILE, '-',
+     "Do not load the default certificates file"},
+    {"no-CApath", OPT_NOCAPATH, '-',
+     "Do not load certificates from the default certificates directory"},
+    {"validity_period", OPT_VALIDITY_PERIOD, 'u',
+     "Maximum validity discrepancy in seconds"},
+    {"status_age", OPT_STATUS_AGE, 'p', "Maximum status age in seconds"},
+    {"signkey", OPT_SIGNKEY, 's', "Private key to sign OCSP request with"},
+    {"reqout", OPT_REQOUT, 's', "Output file for the DER-encoded request"},
+    {"respout", OPT_RESPOUT, 's', "Output file for the DER-encoded response"},
+    {"path", OPT_PATH, 's', "Path to use in OCSP request"},
+    {"issuer", OPT_ISSUER, '<', "Issuer certificate"},
+    {"cert", OPT_CERT, '<', "Certificate to check"},
+    {"serial", OPT_SERIAL, 's', "Serial number to check"},
+    {"index", OPT_INDEX, '<', "Certificate status index file"},
+    {"CA", OPT_CA, '<', "CA certificate"},
+    {"nmin", OPT_NMIN, 'p', "Number of minutes before next update"},
+    {"nrequest", OPT_REQUEST, 'p',
+     "Number of requests to accept (default unlimited)"},
+    {"ndays", OPT_NDAYS, 'p', "Number of days before next update"},
+    {"rsigner", OPT_RSIGNER, '<',
+     "Responder certificate to sign responses with"},
+    {"rkey", OPT_RKEY, '<', "Responder key to sign responses with"},
+    {"rother", OPT_ROTHER, '<', "Other certificates to include in response"},
+    {"rmd", OPT_RMD, 's', "Digest Algorithm to use in signature of OCSP response"},
+    {"header", OPT_HEADER, 's', "key=value header to add"},
+    {"", OPT_MD, '-', "Any supported digest algorithm (sha1,sha256, ... )"},
+    OPT_V_OPTIONS,
+    {NULL}
+};
+
+int ocsp_main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    BIO *acbio = NULL, *cbio = NULL, *derbio = NULL, *out = NULL;
+    const EVP_MD *cert_id_md = NULL, *rsign_md = NULL;
+    int trailing_md = 0;
+    CA_DB *rdb = NULL;
+    EVP_PKEY *key = NULL, *rkey = NULL;
+    OCSP_BASICRESP *bs = NULL;
+    OCSP_REQUEST *req = NULL;
+    OCSP_RESPONSE *resp = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *headers = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(OCSP_CERTID) *ids = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *reqnames = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(X509) *sign_other = NULL, *verify_other = NULL, *rother = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(X509) *issuers = NULL;
+    X509 *issuer = NULL, *cert = NULL, *rca_cert = NULL;
+    X509 *signer = NULL, *rsigner = NULL;
+    X509_STORE *store = NULL;
+    X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = NULL;
+    const char *CAfile = NULL, *CApath = NULL;
+    char *header, *value;
+    char *host = NULL, *port = NULL, *path = "/", *outfile = NULL;
+    char *rca_filename = NULL, *reqin = NULL, *respin = NULL;
+    char *reqout = NULL, *respout = NULL, *ridx_filename = NULL;
+    char *rsignfile = NULL, *rkeyfile = NULL;
+    char *sign_certfile = NULL, *verify_certfile = NULL, *rcertfile = NULL;
+    char *signfile = NULL, *keyfile = NULL;
+    char *thost = NULL, *tport = NULL, *tpath = NULL;
+    int noCAfile = 0, noCApath = 0;
+    int accept_count = -1, add_nonce = 1, noverify = 0, use_ssl = -1;
+    int vpmtouched = 0, badsig = 0, i, ignore_err = 0, nmin = 0, ndays = -1;
+    int req_text = 0, resp_text = 0, ret = 1;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
+    int req_timeout = -1;
+#endif
+    long nsec = MAX_VALIDITY_PERIOD, maxage = -1;
+    unsigned long sign_flags = 0, verify_flags = 0, rflags = 0;
+    OPTION_CHOICE o;
+    char *prog;
+
+    reqnames = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null();
+    if (!reqnames)
+        goto end;
+    ids = sk_OCSP_CERTID_new_null();
+    if (!ids)
+        goto end;
+    if ((vpm = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new()) == NULL)
+        return 1;
+
+    prog = opt_init(argc, argv, ocsp_options);
+    while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) {
+        switch (o) {
+        case OPT_EOF:
+        case OPT_ERR:
+ opthelp:
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog);
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_HELP:
+            ret = 0;
+            opt_help(ocsp_options);
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_OUTFILE:
+            outfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_TIMEOUT:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
+            req_timeout = atoi(opt_arg());
+#endif
+            break;
+        case OPT_URL:
+            OPENSSL_free(thost);
+            OPENSSL_free(tport);
+            OPENSSL_free(tpath);
+            thost = tport = tpath = NULL;
+            if (!OCSP_parse_url(opt_arg(), &host, &port, &path, &use_ssl)) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s Error parsing URL\n", prog);
+                goto end;
+            }
+            thost = host;
+            tport = port;
+            tpath = path;
+            break;
+        case OPT_HOST:
+            host = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_PORT:
+            port = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_IGNORE_ERR:
+            ignore_err = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NOVERIFY:
+            noverify = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NONCE:
+            add_nonce = 2;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NO_NONCE:
+            add_nonce = 0;
+            break;
+        case OPT_RESP_NO_CERTS:
+            rflags |= OCSP_NOCERTS;
+            break;
+        case OPT_RESP_KEY_ID:
+            rflags |= OCSP_RESPID_KEY;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NO_CERTS:
+            sign_flags |= OCSP_NOCERTS;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NO_SIGNATURE_VERIFY:
+            verify_flags |= OCSP_NOSIGS;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NO_CERT_VERIFY:
+            verify_flags |= OCSP_NOVERIFY;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NO_CHAIN:
+            verify_flags |= OCSP_NOCHAIN;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NO_CERT_CHECKS:
+            verify_flags |= OCSP_NOCHECKS;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NO_EXPLICIT:
+            verify_flags |= OCSP_NOEXPLICIT;
+            break;
+        case OPT_TRUST_OTHER:
+            verify_flags |= OCSP_TRUSTOTHER;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NO_INTERN:
+            verify_flags |= OCSP_NOINTERN;
+            break;
+        case OPT_BADSIG:
+            badsig = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_TEXT:
+            req_text = resp_text = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_REQ_TEXT:
+            req_text = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_RESP_TEXT:
+            resp_text = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_REQIN:
+            reqin = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_RESPIN:
+            respin = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_SIGNER:
+            signfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_VAFILE:
+            verify_certfile = opt_arg();
+            verify_flags |= OCSP_TRUSTOTHER;
+            break;
+        case OPT_SIGN_OTHER:
+            sign_certfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_VERIFY_OTHER:
+            verify_certfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_CAFILE:
+            CAfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_CAPATH:
+            CApath = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_NOCAFILE:
+            noCAfile = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NOCAPATH:
+            noCApath = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_V_CASES:
+            if (!opt_verify(o, vpm))
+                goto end;
+            vpmtouched++;
+            break;
+        case OPT_VALIDITY_PERIOD:
+            opt_long(opt_arg(), &nsec);
+            break;
+        case OPT_STATUS_AGE:
+            opt_long(opt_arg(), &maxage);
+            break;
+        case OPT_SIGNKEY:
+            keyfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_REQOUT:
+            reqout = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_RESPOUT:
+            respout = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_PATH:
+            path = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_ISSUER:
+            issuer = load_cert(opt_arg(), FORMAT_PEM, "issuer certificate");
+            if (issuer == NULL)
+                goto end;
+            if (issuers == NULL) {
+                if ((issuers = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
+                    goto end;
+            }
+            sk_X509_push(issuers, issuer);
+            break;
+        case OPT_CERT:
+            X509_free(cert);
+            cert = load_cert(opt_arg(), FORMAT_PEM, "certificate");
+            if (cert == NULL)
+                goto end;
+            if (cert_id_md == NULL)
+                cert_id_md = EVP_sha1();
+            if (!add_ocsp_cert(&req, cert, cert_id_md, issuer, ids))
+                goto end;
+            if (!sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(reqnames, opt_arg()))
+                goto end;
+            trailing_md = 0;
+            break;
+        case OPT_SERIAL:
+            if (cert_id_md == NULL)
+                cert_id_md = EVP_sha1();
+            if (!add_ocsp_serial(&req, opt_arg(), cert_id_md, issuer, ids))
+                goto end;
+            if (!sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(reqnames, opt_arg()))
+                goto end;
+            trailing_md = 0;
+            break;
+        case OPT_INDEX:
+            ridx_filename = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_CA:
+            rca_filename = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_NMIN:
+            opt_int(opt_arg(), &nmin);
+            if (ndays == -1)
+                ndays = 0;
+            break;
+        case OPT_REQUEST:
+            opt_int(opt_arg(), &accept_count);
+            break;
+        case OPT_NDAYS:
+            ndays = atoi(opt_arg());
+            break;
+        case OPT_RSIGNER:
+            rsignfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_RKEY:
+            rkeyfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_ROTHER:
+            rcertfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_RMD:   /* Response MessageDigest */
+            if (!opt_md(opt_arg(), &rsign_md))
+                goto end;
+            break;
+        case OPT_HEADER:
+            header = opt_arg();
+            value = strchr(header, '=');
+            if (value == NULL) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "Missing = in header key=value\n");
+                goto opthelp;
+            }
+            *value++ = '\0';
+            if (!X509V3_add_value(header, value, &headers))
+                goto end;
+            break;
+        case OPT_MD:
+            if (trailing_md) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                           "%s: Digest must be before -cert or -serial\n",
+                           prog);
+                goto opthelp;
+            }
+            if (!opt_md(opt_unknown(), &cert_id_md))
+                goto opthelp;
+            trailing_md = 1;
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (trailing_md) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Digest must be before -cert or -serial\n",
+                   prog);
+        goto opthelp;
+    }
+    argc = opt_num_rest();
+    if (argc != 0)
+        goto opthelp;
+
+    /* Have we anything to do? */
+    if (!req && !reqin && !respin && !(port && ridx_filename))
+        goto opthelp;
+
+    out = bio_open_default(outfile, 'w', FORMAT_TEXT);
+    if (out == NULL)
+        goto end;
+
+    if (!req && (add_nonce != 2))
+        add_nonce = 0;
+
+    if (!req && reqin) {
+        derbio = bio_open_default(reqin, 'r', FORMAT_ASN1);
+        if (derbio == NULL)
+            goto end;
+        req = d2i_OCSP_REQUEST_bio(derbio, NULL);
+        BIO_free(derbio);
+        if (!req) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error reading OCSP request\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (!req && port) {
+        acbio = init_responder(port);
+        if (!acbio)
+            goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (rsignfile) {
+        if (!rkeyfile)
+            rkeyfile = rsignfile;
+        rsigner = load_cert(rsignfile, FORMAT_PEM, "responder certificate");
+        if (!rsigner) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error loading responder certificate\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+        rca_cert = load_cert(rca_filename, FORMAT_PEM, "CA certificate");
+        if (rcertfile) {
+            if (!load_certs(rcertfile, &rother, FORMAT_PEM, NULL,
+                            "responder other certificates"))
+                goto end;
+        }
+        rkey = load_key(rkeyfile, FORMAT_PEM, 0, NULL, NULL,
+                        "responder private key");
+        if (!rkey)
+            goto end;
+    }
+    if (acbio)
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Waiting for OCSP client connections...\n");
+
+ redo_accept:
+
+    if (acbio) {
+        if (!do_responder(&req, &cbio, acbio))
+            goto end;
+        if (!req) {
+            resp =
+                OCSP_response_create(OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_MALFORMEDREQUEST,
+                                     NULL);
+            send_ocsp_response(cbio, resp);
+            goto done_resp;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (!req && (signfile || reqout || host || add_nonce || ridx_filename)) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Need an OCSP request for this operation!\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (req && add_nonce)
+        OCSP_request_add1_nonce(req, NULL, -1);
+
+    if (signfile) {
+        if (!keyfile)
+            keyfile = signfile;
+        signer = load_cert(signfile, FORMAT_PEM, "signer certificate");
+        if (!signer) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error loading signer certificate\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+        if (sign_certfile) {
+            if (!load_certs(sign_certfile, &sign_other, FORMAT_PEM, NULL,
+                            "signer certificates"))
+                goto end;
+        }
+        key = load_key(keyfile, FORMAT_PEM, 0, NULL, NULL,
+                       "signer private key");
+        if (!key)
+            goto end;
+
+        if (!OCSP_request_sign
+            (req, signer, key, NULL, sign_other, sign_flags)) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error signing OCSP request\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (req_text && req)
+        OCSP_REQUEST_print(out, req, 0);
+
+    if (reqout) {
+        derbio = bio_open_default(reqout, 'w', FORMAT_ASN1);
+        if (derbio == NULL)
+            goto end;
+        i2d_OCSP_REQUEST_bio(derbio, req);
+        BIO_free(derbio);
+    }
+
+    if (ridx_filename && (!rkey || !rsigner || !rca_cert)) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                   "Need a responder certificate, key and CA for this operation!\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (ridx_filename && !rdb) {
+        rdb = load_index(ridx_filename, NULL);
+        if (!rdb)
+            goto end;
+        if (!index_index(rdb))
+            goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (rdb) {
+        make_ocsp_response(&resp, req, rdb, rca_cert, rsigner, rkey,
+                               rsign_md, rother, rflags, nmin, ndays, badsig);
+        if (cbio)
+            send_ocsp_response(cbio, resp);
+    } else if (host) {
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
+        resp = process_responder(req, host, path,
+                                 port, use_ssl, headers, req_timeout);
+        if (!resp)
+            goto end;
+# else
+        BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                   "Error creating connect BIO - sockets not supported.\n");
+        goto end;
+# endif
+    } else if (respin) {
+        derbio = bio_open_default(respin, 'r', FORMAT_ASN1);
+        if (derbio == NULL)
+            goto end;
+        resp = d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE_bio(derbio, NULL);
+        BIO_free(derbio);
+        if (!resp) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error reading OCSP response\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+    } else {
+        ret = 0;
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+ done_resp:
+
+    if (respout) {
+        derbio = bio_open_default(respout, 'w', FORMAT_ASN1);
+        if (derbio == NULL)
+            goto end;
+        i2d_OCSP_RESPONSE_bio(derbio, resp);
+        BIO_free(derbio);
+    }
+
+    i = OCSP_response_status(resp);
+    if (i != OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_SUCCESSFUL) {
+        BIO_printf(out, "Responder Error: %s (%d)\n",
+                   OCSP_response_status_str(i), i);
+        if (ignore_err)
+            goto redo_accept;
+        ret = 0;
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (resp_text)
+        OCSP_RESPONSE_print(out, resp, 0);
+
+    /* If running as responder don't verify our own response */
+    if (cbio) {
+        /* If not unlimited, see if we took all we should. */
+        if (accept_count != -1 && --accept_count <= 0) {
+            ret = 0;
+            goto end;
+        }
+        BIO_free_all(cbio);
+        cbio = NULL;
+        OCSP_REQUEST_free(req);
+        req = NULL;
+        OCSP_RESPONSE_free(resp);
+        resp = NULL;
+        goto redo_accept;
+    }
+    if (ridx_filename) {
+        ret = 0;
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (!store) {
+        store = setup_verify(CAfile, CApath, noCAfile, noCApath);
+        if (!store)
+            goto end;
+    }
+    if (vpmtouched)
+        X509_STORE_set1_param(store, vpm);
+    if (verify_certfile) {
+        if (!load_certs(verify_certfile, &verify_other, FORMAT_PEM, NULL,
+                        "validator certificate"))
+            goto end;
+    }
+
+    bs = OCSP_response_get1_basic(resp);
+    if (!bs) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error parsing response\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    ret = 0;
+
+    if (!noverify) {
+        if (req && ((i = OCSP_check_nonce(req, bs)) <= 0)) {
+            if (i == -1)
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "WARNING: no nonce in response\n");
+            else {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "Nonce Verify error\n");
+                ret = 1;
+                goto end;
+            }
+        }
+
+        i = OCSP_basic_verify(bs, verify_other, store, verify_flags);
+        if (i <= 0 && issuers) {
+            i = OCSP_basic_verify(bs, issuers, store, OCSP_TRUSTOTHER);
+            if (i > 0)
+                ERR_clear_error();
+        }
+        if (i <= 0) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Response Verify Failure\n");
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            ret = 1;
+        } else
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Response verify OK\n");
+
+    }
+
+    print_ocsp_summary(out, bs, req, reqnames, ids, nsec, maxage);
+
+ end:
+    ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+    X509_free(signer);
+    X509_STORE_free(store);
+    X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(vpm);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(key);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(rkey);
+    X509_free(cert);
+    sk_X509_pop_free(issuers, X509_free);
+    X509_free(rsigner);
+    X509_free(rca_cert);
+    free_index(rdb);
+    BIO_free_all(cbio);
+    BIO_free_all(acbio);
+    BIO_free(out);
+    OCSP_REQUEST_free(req);
+    OCSP_RESPONSE_free(resp);
+    OCSP_BASICRESP_free(bs);
+    sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(reqnames);
+    sk_OCSP_CERTID_free(ids);
+    sk_X509_pop_free(sign_other, X509_free);
+    sk_X509_pop_free(verify_other, X509_free);
+    sk_CONF_VALUE_pop_free(headers, X509V3_conf_free);
+    OPENSSL_free(thost);
+    OPENSSL_free(tport);
+    OPENSSL_free(tpath);
+
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static int add_ocsp_cert(OCSP_REQUEST **req, X509 *cert,
+                         const EVP_MD *cert_id_md, X509 *issuer,
+                         STACK_OF(OCSP_CERTID) *ids)
+{
+    OCSP_CERTID *id;
+    if (!issuer) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "No issuer certificate specified\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (*req == NULL)
+        *req = OCSP_REQUEST_new();
+    if (*req == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    id = OCSP_cert_to_id(cert_id_md, cert, issuer);
+    if (!id || !sk_OCSP_CERTID_push(ids, id))
+        goto err;
+    if (!OCSP_request_add0_id(*req, id))
+        goto err;
+    return 1;
+
+ err:
+    BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error Creating OCSP request\n");
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int add_ocsp_serial(OCSP_REQUEST **req, char *serial,
+                           const EVP_MD *cert_id_md, X509 *issuer,
+                           STACK_OF(OCSP_CERTID) *ids)
+{
+    OCSP_CERTID *id;
+    X509_NAME *iname;
+    ASN1_BIT_STRING *ikey;
+    ASN1_INTEGER *sno;
+    if (!issuer) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "No issuer certificate specified\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (*req == NULL)
+        *req = OCSP_REQUEST_new();
+    if (*req == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    iname = X509_get_subject_name(issuer);
+    ikey = X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(issuer);
+    sno = s2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, serial);
+    if (!sno) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error converting serial number %s\n", serial);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    id = OCSP_cert_id_new(cert_id_md, iname, ikey, sno);
+    ASN1_INTEGER_free(sno);
+    if (id == NULL || !sk_OCSP_CERTID_push(ids, id))
+        goto err;
+    if (!OCSP_request_add0_id(*req, id))
+        goto err;
+    return 1;
+
+ err:
+    BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error Creating OCSP request\n");
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static void print_ocsp_summary(BIO *out, OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, OCSP_REQUEST *req,
+                              STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *names,
+                              STACK_OF(OCSP_CERTID) *ids, long nsec,
+                              long maxage)
+{
+    OCSP_CERTID *id;
+    const char *name;
+    int i, status, reason;
+    ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *rev, *thisupd, *nextupd;
+
+    if (!bs || !req || !sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(names)
+        || !sk_OCSP_CERTID_num(ids))
+        return;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_CERTID_num(ids); i++) {
+        id = sk_OCSP_CERTID_value(ids, i);
+        name = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(names, i);
+        BIO_printf(out, "%s: ", name);
+
+        if (!OCSP_resp_find_status(bs, id, &status, &reason,
+                                   &rev, &thisupd, &nextupd)) {
+            BIO_puts(out, "ERROR: No Status found.\n");
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        /*
+         * Check validity: if invalid write to output BIO so we know which
+         * response this refers to.
+         */
+        if (!OCSP_check_validity(thisupd, nextupd, nsec, maxage)) {
+            BIO_puts(out, "WARNING: Status times invalid.\n");
+            ERR_print_errors(out);
+        }
+        BIO_printf(out, "%s\n", OCSP_cert_status_str(status));
+
+        BIO_puts(out, "\tThis Update: ");
+        ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(out, thisupd);
+        BIO_puts(out, "\n");
+
+        if (nextupd) {
+            BIO_puts(out, "\tNext Update: ");
+            ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(out, nextupd);
+            BIO_puts(out, "\n");
+        }
+
+        if (status != V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_REVOKED)
+            continue;
+
+        if (reason != -1)
+            BIO_printf(out, "\tReason: %s\n", OCSP_crl_reason_str(reason));
+
+        BIO_puts(out, "\tRevocation Time: ");
+        ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(out, rev);
+        BIO_puts(out, "\n");
+    }
+}
+
+static void make_ocsp_response(OCSP_RESPONSE **resp, OCSP_REQUEST *req,
+                              CA_DB *db, X509 *ca, X509 *rcert,
+                              EVP_PKEY *rkey, const EVP_MD *rmd,
+                              STACK_OF(X509) *rother, unsigned long flags,
+                              int nmin, int ndays, int badsig)
+{
+    ASN1_TIME *thisupd = NULL, *nextupd = NULL;
+    OCSP_CERTID *cid, *ca_id = NULL;
+    OCSP_BASICRESP *bs = NULL;
+    int i, id_count;
+
+    id_count = OCSP_request_onereq_count(req);
+
+    if (id_count <= 0) {
+        *resp =
+            OCSP_response_create(OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_MALFORMEDREQUEST, NULL);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    bs = OCSP_BASICRESP_new();
+    thisupd = X509_gmtime_adj(NULL, 0);
+    if (ndays != -1)
+        nextupd = X509_time_adj_ex(NULL, ndays, nmin * 60, NULL);
+
+    /* Examine each certificate id in the request */
+    for (i = 0; i < id_count; i++) {
+        OCSP_ONEREQ *one;
+        ASN1_INTEGER *serial;
+        char **inf;
+        ASN1_OBJECT *cert_id_md_oid;
+        const EVP_MD *cert_id_md;
+        one = OCSP_request_onereq_get0(req, i);
+        cid = OCSP_onereq_get0_id(one);
+
+        OCSP_id_get0_info(NULL, &cert_id_md_oid, NULL, NULL, cid);
+
+        cert_id_md = EVP_get_digestbyobj(cert_id_md_oid);
+        if (!cert_id_md) {
+            *resp = OCSP_response_create(OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_INTERNALERROR,
+                                         NULL);
+            goto end;
+        }
+        OCSP_CERTID_free(ca_id);
+        ca_id = OCSP_cert_to_id(cert_id_md, NULL, ca);
+
+        /* Is this request about our CA? */
+        if (OCSP_id_issuer_cmp(ca_id, cid)) {
+            OCSP_basic_add1_status(bs, cid,
+                                   V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_UNKNOWN,
+                                   0, NULL, thisupd, nextupd);
+            continue;
+        }
+        OCSP_id_get0_info(NULL, NULL, NULL, &serial, cid);
+        inf = lookup_serial(db, serial);
+        if (!inf)
+            OCSP_basic_add1_status(bs, cid,
+                                   V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_UNKNOWN,
+                                   0, NULL, thisupd, nextupd);
+        else if (inf[DB_type][0] == DB_TYPE_VAL)
+            OCSP_basic_add1_status(bs, cid,
+                                   V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_GOOD,
+                                   0, NULL, thisupd, nextupd);
+        else if (inf[DB_type][0] == DB_TYPE_REV) {
+            ASN1_OBJECT *inst = NULL;
+            ASN1_TIME *revtm = NULL;
+            ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *invtm = NULL;
+            OCSP_SINGLERESP *single;
+            int reason = -1;
+            unpack_revinfo(&revtm, &reason, &inst, &invtm, inf[DB_rev_date]);
+            single = OCSP_basic_add1_status(bs, cid,
+                                            V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_REVOKED,
+                                            reason, revtm, thisupd, nextupd);
+            if (invtm)
+                OCSP_SINGLERESP_add1_ext_i2d(single, NID_invalidity_date,
+                                             invtm, 0, 0);
+            else if (inst)
+                OCSP_SINGLERESP_add1_ext_i2d(single,
+                                             NID_hold_instruction_code, inst,
+                                             0, 0);
+            ASN1_OBJECT_free(inst);
+            ASN1_TIME_free(revtm);
+            ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_free(invtm);
+        }
+    }
+
+    OCSP_copy_nonce(bs, req);
+
+    OCSP_basic_sign(bs, rcert, rkey, rmd, rother, flags);
+
+    if (badsig) {
+        const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *sig = OCSP_resp_get0_signature(bs);
+        corrupt_signature(sig);
+    }
+
+    *resp = OCSP_response_create(OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_SUCCESSFUL, bs);
+
+ end:
+    ASN1_TIME_free(thisupd);
+    ASN1_TIME_free(nextupd);
+    OCSP_CERTID_free(ca_id);
+    OCSP_BASICRESP_free(bs);
+}
+
+static char **lookup_serial(CA_DB *db, ASN1_INTEGER *ser)
+{
+    int i;
+    BIGNUM *bn = NULL;
+    char *itmp, *row[DB_NUMBER], **rrow;
+    for (i = 0; i < DB_NUMBER; i++)
+        row[i] = NULL;
+    bn = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(ser, NULL);
+    OPENSSL_assert(bn);         /* FIXME: should report an error at this
+                                 * point and abort */
+    if (BN_is_zero(bn))
+        itmp = OPENSSL_strdup("00");
+    else
+        itmp = BN_bn2hex(bn);
+    row[DB_serial] = itmp;
+    BN_free(bn);
+    rrow = TXT_DB_get_by_index(db->db, DB_serial, row);
+    OPENSSL_free(itmp);
+    return rrow;
+}
+
+/* Quick and dirty OCSP server: read in and parse input request */
+
+static BIO *init_responder(const char *port)
+{
+# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
+    BIO_printf(bio_err,
+               "Error setting up accept BIO - sockets not supported.\n");
+    return NULL;
+# else
+    BIO *acbio = NULL, *bufbio = NULL;
+
+    bufbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer());
+    if (bufbio == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    acbio = BIO_new(BIO_s_accept());
+    if (acbio == NULL
+        || BIO_set_bind_mode(acbio, BIO_BIND_REUSEADDR) < 0
+        || BIO_set_accept_port(acbio, port) < 0) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error setting up accept BIO\n");
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    BIO_set_accept_bios(acbio, bufbio);
+    bufbio = NULL;
+    if (BIO_do_accept(acbio) <= 0) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error starting accept\n");
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    return acbio;
+
+ err:
+    BIO_free_all(acbio);
+    BIO_free(bufbio);
+    return NULL;
+# endif
+}
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
+/*
+ * Decode %xx URL-decoding in-place. Ignores mal-formed sequences.
+ */
+static int urldecode(char *p)
+{
+    unsigned char *out = (unsigned char *)p;
+    unsigned char *save = out;
+
+    for (; *p; p++) {
+        if (*p != '%')
+            *out++ = *p;
+        else if (isxdigit(_UC(p[1])) && isxdigit(_UC(p[2]))) {
+            /* Don't check, can't fail because of ixdigit() call. */
+            *out++ = (OPENSSL_hexchar2int(p[1]) << 4)
+                   | OPENSSL_hexchar2int(p[2]);
+            p += 2;
+        }
+        else
+            return -1;
+    }
+    *out = '\0';
+    return (int)(out - save);
+}
+# endif
+
+static int do_responder(OCSP_REQUEST **preq, BIO **pcbio, BIO *acbio)
+{
+# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
+    return 0;
+# else
+    int len;
+    OCSP_REQUEST *req = NULL;
+    char inbuf[2048], reqbuf[2048];
+    char *p, *q;
+    BIO *cbio = NULL, *getbio = NULL, *b64 = NULL;
+
+    if (BIO_do_accept(acbio) <= 0) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error accepting connection\n");
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    cbio = BIO_pop(acbio);
+    *pcbio = cbio;
+
+    /* Read the request line. */
+    len = BIO_gets(cbio, reqbuf, sizeof(reqbuf));
+    if (len <= 0)
+        return 1;
+    if (strncmp(reqbuf, "GET ", 4) == 0) {
+        /* Expecting GET {sp} /URL {sp} HTTP/1.x */
+        for (p = reqbuf + 4; *p == ' '; ++p)
+            continue;
+        if (*p != '/') {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Invalid request -- bad URL\n");
+            return 1;
+        }
+        p++;
+
+        /* Splice off the HTTP version identifier. */
+        for (q = p; *q; q++)
+            if (*q == ' ')
+                break;
+        if (strncmp(q, " HTTP/1.", 8) != 0) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Invalid request -- bad HTTP vesion\n");
+            return 1;
+        }
+        *q = '\0';
+        len = urldecode(p);
+        if (len <= 0) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Invalid request -- bad URL encoding\n");
+            return 1;
+        }
+        if ((getbio = BIO_new_mem_buf(p, len)) == NULL
+            || (b64 = BIO_new(BIO_f_base64())) == NULL) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Could not allocate memory\n");
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            return 1;
+        }
+        BIO_set_flags(b64, BIO_FLAGS_BASE64_NO_NL);
+        getbio = BIO_push(b64, getbio);
+    } else if (strncmp(reqbuf, "POST ", 5) != 0) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Invalid request -- bad HTTP verb\n");
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    /* Read and skip past the headers. */
+    for (;;) {
+        len = BIO_gets(cbio, inbuf, sizeof(inbuf));
+        if (len <= 0)
+            return 1;
+        if ((inbuf[0] == '\r') || (inbuf[0] == '\n'))
+            break;
+    }
+
+    /* Try to read OCSP request */
+    if (getbio) {
+        req = d2i_OCSP_REQUEST_bio(getbio, NULL);
+        BIO_free_all(getbio);
+    } else
+        req = d2i_OCSP_REQUEST_bio(cbio, NULL);
+
+    if (!req) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error parsing OCSP request\n");
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+    }
+
+    *preq = req;
+
+    return 1;
+# endif
+}
+
+static int send_ocsp_response(BIO *cbio, OCSP_RESPONSE *resp)
+{
+    char http_resp[] =
+        "HTTP/1.0 200 OK\r\nContent-type: application/ocsp-response\r\n"
+        "Content-Length: %d\r\n\r\n";
+    if (!cbio)
+        return 0;
+    BIO_printf(cbio, http_resp, i2d_OCSP_RESPONSE(resp, NULL));
+    i2d_OCSP_RESPONSE_bio(cbio, resp);
+    (void)BIO_flush(cbio);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
+static OCSP_RESPONSE *query_responder(BIO *cbio, const char *host,
+                                      const char *path,
+                                      const STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *headers,
+                                      OCSP_REQUEST *req, int req_timeout)
+{
+    int fd;
+    int rv;
+    int i;
+    int add_host = 1;
+    OCSP_REQ_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+    OCSP_RESPONSE *rsp = NULL;
+    fd_set confds;
+    struct timeval tv;
+
+    if (req_timeout != -1)
+        BIO_set_nbio(cbio, 1);
+
+    rv = BIO_do_connect(cbio);
+
+    if ((rv <= 0) && ((req_timeout == -1) || !BIO_should_retry(cbio))) {
+        BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error connecting BIO\n");
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    if (BIO_get_fd(cbio, &fd) < 0) {
+        BIO_puts(bio_err, "Can't get connection fd\n");
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (req_timeout != -1 && rv <= 0) {
+        FD_ZERO(&confds);
+        openssl_fdset(fd, &confds);
+        tv.tv_usec = 0;
+        tv.tv_sec = req_timeout;
+        rv = select(fd + 1, NULL, (void *)&confds, NULL, &tv);
+        if (rv == 0) {
+            BIO_puts(bio_err, "Timeout on connect\n");
+            return NULL;
+        }
+    }
+
+    ctx = OCSP_sendreq_new(cbio, path, NULL, -1);
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(headers); i++) {
+        CONF_VALUE *hdr = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(headers, i);
+        if (add_host == 1 && strcasecmp("host", hdr->name) == 0)
+            add_host = 0;
+        if (!OCSP_REQ_CTX_add1_header(ctx, hdr->name, hdr->value))
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (add_host == 1 && OCSP_REQ_CTX_add1_header(ctx, "Host", host) == 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!OCSP_REQ_CTX_set1_req(ctx, req))
+        goto err;
+
+    for (;;) {
+        rv = OCSP_sendreq_nbio(&rsp, ctx);
+        if (rv != -1)
+            break;
+        if (req_timeout == -1)
+            continue;
+        FD_ZERO(&confds);
+        openssl_fdset(fd, &confds);
+        tv.tv_usec = 0;
+        tv.tv_sec = req_timeout;
+        if (BIO_should_read(cbio))
+            rv = select(fd + 1, (void *)&confds, NULL, NULL, &tv);
+        else if (BIO_should_write(cbio))
+            rv = select(fd + 1, NULL, (void *)&confds, NULL, &tv);
+        else {
+            BIO_puts(bio_err, "Unexpected retry condition\n");
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (rv == 0) {
+            BIO_puts(bio_err, "Timeout on request\n");
+            break;
+        }
+        if (rv == -1) {
+            BIO_puts(bio_err, "Select error\n");
+            break;
+        }
+
+    }
+ err:
+    OCSP_REQ_CTX_free(ctx);
+
+    return rsp;
+}
+
+OCSP_RESPONSE *process_responder(OCSP_REQUEST *req,
+                                 const char *host, const char *path,
+                                 const char *port, int use_ssl,
+                                 STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *headers,
+                                 int req_timeout)
+{
+    BIO *cbio = NULL;
+    SSL_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+    OCSP_RESPONSE *resp = NULL;
+
+    cbio = BIO_new_connect(host);
+    if (!cbio) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error creating connect BIO\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+    if (port)
+        BIO_set_conn_port(cbio, port);
+    if (use_ssl == 1) {
+        BIO *sbio;
+        ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_client_method());
+        if (ctx == NULL) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error creating SSL context.\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+        SSL_CTX_set_mode(ctx, SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY);
+        sbio = BIO_new_ssl(ctx, 1);
+        cbio = BIO_push(sbio, cbio);
+    }
+
+    resp = query_responder(cbio, host, path, headers, req, req_timeout);
+    if (!resp)
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error querying OCSP responder\n");
+ end:
+    BIO_free_all(cbio);
+    SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
+    return resp;
+}
+# endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/openssl-vms.cnf b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/openssl-vms.cnf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0092a65
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/openssl-vms.cnf
@@ -0,0 +1,346 @@
+#
+# OpenSSL example configuration file.
+# This is mostly being used for generation of certificate requests.
+#
+
+# This definition stops the following lines choking if HOME isn't
+# defined.
+HOME			= .
+RANDFILE		= $ENV::HOME/.rnd
+
+# Extra OBJECT IDENTIFIER info:
+#oid_file		= $ENV::HOME/.oid
+oid_section		= new_oids
+
+# To use this configuration file with the "-extfile" option of the
+# "openssl x509" utility, name here the section containing the
+# X.509v3 extensions to use:
+# extensions		= 
+# (Alternatively, use a configuration file that has only
+# X.509v3 extensions in its main [= default] section.)
+
+[ new_oids ]
+
+# We can add new OIDs in here for use by 'ca', 'req' and 'ts'.
+# Add a simple OID like this:
+# testoid1=1.2.3.4
+# Or use config file substitution like this:
+# testoid2=${testoid1}.5.6
+
+# Policies used by the TSA examples.
+tsa_policy1 = 1.2.3.4.1
+tsa_policy2 = 1.2.3.4.5.6
+tsa_policy3 = 1.2.3.4.5.7
+
+####################################################################
+[ ca ]
+default_ca	= CA_default		# The default ca section
+
+####################################################################
+[ CA_default ]
+
+dir		= sys\$disk:[.demoCA		# Where everything is kept
+certs		= $dir.certs]		# Where the issued certs are kept
+crl_dir		= $dir.crl]		# Where the issued crl are kept
+database	= $dir]index.txt	# database index file.
+#unique_subject	= no			# Set to 'no' to allow creation of
+					# several certs with same subject.
+new_certs_dir	= $dir.newcerts]		# default place for new certs.
+
+certificate	= $dir]cacert.pem 	# The CA certificate
+serial		= $dir]serial. 		# The current serial number
+crlnumber	= $dir]crlnumber.	# the current crl number
+					# must be commented out to leave a V1 CRL
+crl		= $dir]crl.pem 		# The current CRL
+private_key	= $dir.private]cakey.pem# The private key
+RANDFILE	= $dir.private].rand	# private random number file
+
+x509_extensions	= usr_cert		# The extensions to add to the cert
+
+# Comment out the following two lines for the "traditional"
+# (and highly broken) format.
+name_opt 	= ca_default		# Subject Name options
+cert_opt 	= ca_default		# Certificate field options
+
+# Extension copying option: use with caution.
+# copy_extensions = copy
+
+# Extensions to add to a CRL. Note: Netscape communicator chokes on V2 CRLs
+# so this is commented out by default to leave a V1 CRL.
+# crlnumber must also be commented out to leave a V1 CRL.
+# crl_extensions	= crl_ext
+
+default_days	= 365			# how long to certify for
+default_crl_days= 30			# how long before next CRL
+default_md	= default		# use public key default MD
+preserve	= no			# keep passed DN ordering
+
+# A few difference way of specifying how similar the request should look
+# For type CA, the listed attributes must be the same, and the optional
+# and supplied fields are just that :-)
+policy		= policy_match
+
+# For the CA policy
+[ policy_match ]
+countryName		= match
+stateOrProvinceName	= match
+organizationName	= match
+organizationalUnitName	= optional
+commonName		= supplied
+emailAddress		= optional
+
+# For the 'anything' policy
+# At this point in time, you must list all acceptable 'object'
+# types.
+[ policy_anything ]
+countryName		= optional
+stateOrProvinceName	= optional
+localityName		= optional
+organizationName	= optional
+organizationalUnitName	= optional
+commonName		= supplied
+emailAddress		= optional
+
+####################################################################
+[ req ]
+default_bits		= 2048
+default_keyfile 	= privkey.pem
+distinguished_name	= req_distinguished_name
+attributes		= req_attributes
+x509_extensions	= v3_ca	# The extensions to add to the self signed cert
+
+# Passwords for private keys if not present they will be prompted for
+# input_password = secret
+# output_password = secret
+
+# This sets a mask for permitted string types. There are several options. 
+# default: PrintableString, T61String, BMPString.
+# pkix	 : PrintableString, BMPString (PKIX recommendation before 2004)
+# utf8only: only UTF8Strings (PKIX recommendation after 2004).
+# nombstr : PrintableString, T61String (no BMPStrings or UTF8Strings).
+# MASK:XXXX a literal mask value.
+# WARNING: ancient versions of Netscape crash on BMPStrings or UTF8Strings.
+string_mask = utf8only
+
+# req_extensions = v3_req # The extensions to add to a certificate request
+
+[ req_distinguished_name ]
+countryName			= Country Name (2 letter code)
+countryName_default		= AU
+countryName_min			= 2
+countryName_max			= 2
+
+stateOrProvinceName		= State or Province Name (full name)
+stateOrProvinceName_default	= Some-State
+
+localityName			= Locality Name (eg, city)
+
+0.organizationName		= Organization Name (eg, company)
+0.organizationName_default	= Internet Widgits Pty Ltd
+
+# we can do this but it is not needed normally :-)
+#1.organizationName		= Second Organization Name (eg, company)
+#1.organizationName_default	= World Wide Web Pty Ltd
+
+organizationalUnitName		= Organizational Unit Name (eg, section)
+#organizationalUnitName_default	=
+
+commonName			= Common Name (e.g. server FQDN or YOUR name)
+commonName_max			= 64
+
+emailAddress			= Email Address
+emailAddress_max		= 64
+
+# SET-ex3			= SET extension number 3
+
+[ req_attributes ]
+challengePassword		= A challenge password
+challengePassword_min		= 4
+challengePassword_max		= 20
+
+unstructuredName		= An optional company name
+
+[ usr_cert ]
+
+# These extensions are added when 'ca' signs a request.
+
+# This goes against PKIX guidelines but some CAs do it and some software
+# requires this to avoid interpreting an end user certificate as a CA.
+
+basicConstraints=CA:FALSE
+
+# Here are some examples of the usage of nsCertType. If it is omitted
+# the certificate can be used for anything *except* object signing.
+
+# This is OK for an SSL server.
+# nsCertType			= server
+
+# For an object signing certificate this would be used.
+# nsCertType = objsign
+
+# For normal client use this is typical
+# nsCertType = client, email
+
+# and for everything including object signing:
+# nsCertType = client, email, objsign
+
+# This is typical in keyUsage for a client certificate.
+# keyUsage = nonRepudiation, digitalSignature, keyEncipherment
+
+# This will be displayed in Netscape's comment listbox.
+nsComment			= "OpenSSL Generated Certificate"
+
+# PKIX recommendations harmless if included in all certificates.
+subjectKeyIdentifier=hash
+authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid,issuer
+
+# This stuff is for subjectAltName and issuerAltname.
+# Import the email address.
+# subjectAltName=email:copy
+# An alternative to produce certificates that aren't
+# deprecated according to PKIX.
+# subjectAltName=email:move
+
+# Copy subject details
+# issuerAltName=issuer:copy
+
+#nsCaRevocationUrl		= http://www.domain.dom/ca-crl.pem
+#nsBaseUrl
+#nsRevocationUrl
+#nsRenewalUrl
+#nsCaPolicyUrl
+#nsSslServerName
+
+# This is required for TSA certificates.
+# extendedKeyUsage = critical,timeStamping
+
+[ v3_req ]
+
+# Extensions to add to a certificate request
+
+basicConstraints = CA:FALSE
+keyUsage = nonRepudiation, digitalSignature, keyEncipherment
+
+[ v3_ca ]
+
+
+# Extensions for a typical CA
+
+
+# PKIX recommendation.
+
+subjectKeyIdentifier=hash
+
+authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid:always,issuer
+
+basicConstraints = critical,CA:true
+
+# Key usage: this is typical for a CA certificate. However since it will
+# prevent it being used as an test self-signed certificate it is best
+# left out by default.
+# keyUsage = cRLSign, keyCertSign
+
+# Some might want this also
+# nsCertType = sslCA, emailCA
+
+# Include email address in subject alt name: another PKIX recommendation
+# subjectAltName=email:copy
+# Copy issuer details
+# issuerAltName=issuer:copy
+
+# DER hex encoding of an extension: beware experts only!
+# obj=DER:02:03
+# Where 'obj' is a standard or added object
+# You can even override a supported extension:
+# basicConstraints= critical, DER:30:03:01:01:FF
+
+[ crl_ext ]
+
+# CRL extensions.
+# Only issuerAltName and authorityKeyIdentifier make any sense in a CRL.
+
+# issuerAltName=issuer:copy
+authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid:always
+
+[ proxy_cert_ext ]
+# These extensions should be added when creating a proxy certificate
+
+# This goes against PKIX guidelines but some CAs do it and some software
+# requires this to avoid interpreting an end user certificate as a CA.
+
+basicConstraints=CA:FALSE
+
+# Here are some examples of the usage of nsCertType. If it is omitted
+# the certificate can be used for anything *except* object signing.
+
+# This is OK for an SSL server.
+# nsCertType			= server
+
+# For an object signing certificate this would be used.
+# nsCertType = objsign
+
+# For normal client use this is typical
+# nsCertType = client, email
+
+# and for everything including object signing:
+# nsCertType = client, email, objsign
+
+# This is typical in keyUsage for a client certificate.
+# keyUsage = nonRepudiation, digitalSignature, keyEncipherment
+
+# This will be displayed in Netscape's comment listbox.
+nsComment			= "OpenSSL Generated Certificate"
+
+# PKIX recommendations harmless if included in all certificates.
+subjectKeyIdentifier=hash
+authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid,issuer
+
+# This stuff is for subjectAltName and issuerAltname.
+# Import the email address.
+# subjectAltName=email:copy
+# An alternative to produce certificates that aren't
+# deprecated according to PKIX.
+# subjectAltName=email:move
+
+# Copy subject details
+# issuerAltName=issuer:copy
+
+#nsCaRevocationUrl		= http://www.domain.dom/ca-crl.pem
+#nsBaseUrl
+#nsRevocationUrl
+#nsRenewalUrl
+#nsCaPolicyUrl
+#nsSslServerName
+
+# This really needs to be in place for it to be a proxy certificate.
+proxyCertInfo=critical,language:id-ppl-anyLanguage,pathlen:3,policy:foo
+
+####################################################################
+[ tsa ]
+
+default_tsa = tsa_config1	# the default TSA section
+
+[ tsa_config1 ]
+
+# These are used by the TSA reply generation only.
+dir		= sys\$disk:[.demoCA		# TSA root directory
+serial		= $dir]tsaserial.	# The current serial number (mandatory)
+crypto_device	= builtin		# OpenSSL engine to use for signing
+signer_cert	= $dir/tsacert.pem 	# The TSA signing certificate
+					# (optional)
+certs		= $dir.cacert.pem]	# Certificate chain to include in reply
+					# (optional)
+signer_key	= $dir/private/tsakey.pem # The TSA private key (optional)
+signer_digest  = sha256			# Signing digest to use. (Optional)
+default_policy	= tsa_policy1		# Policy if request did not specify it
+					# (optional)
+other_policies	= tsa_policy2, tsa_policy3	# acceptable policies (optional)
+digests     = sha1, sha256, sha384, sha512  # Acceptable message digests (mandatory)
+accuracy	= secs:1, millisecs:500, microsecs:100	# (optional)
+clock_precision_digits  = 0	# number of digits after dot. (optional)
+ordering		= yes	# Is ordering defined for timestamps?
+				# (optional, default: no)
+tsa_name		= yes	# Must the TSA name be included in the reply?
+				# (optional, default: no)
+ess_cert_id_chain	= no	# Must the ESS cert id chain be included?
+				# (optional, default: no)
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/openssl.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/openssl.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2607694
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/openssl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,703 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/lhash.h>
+#include <openssl/conf.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+# include <openssl/engine.h>
+#endif
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+# include <openssl/fips.h>
+#endif
+#define USE_SOCKETS /* needed for the _O_BINARY defs in the MS world */
+#include "s_apps.h"
+/* Needed to get the other O_xxx flags. */
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+# include <unixio.h>
+#endif
+#define INCLUDE_FUNCTION_TABLE
+#include "apps.h"
+
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA
+# define FORMAT "%-15s"
+# define COLUMNS 5
+#else
+# define FORMAT "%-18s"
+# define COLUMNS 4
+#endif
+
+/* Special sentinel to exit the program. */
+#define EXIT_THE_PROGRAM (-1)
+
+/*
+ * The LHASH callbacks ("hash" & "cmp") have been replaced by functions with
+ * the base prototypes (we cast each variable inside the function to the
+ * required type of "FUNCTION*"). This removes the necessity for
+ * macro-generated wrapper functions.
+ */
+static LHASH_OF(FUNCTION) *prog_init(void);
+static int do_cmd(LHASH_OF(FUNCTION) *prog, int argc, char *argv[]);
+static void list_pkey(void);
+static void list_type(FUNC_TYPE ft);
+static void list_disabled(void);
+char *default_config_file = NULL;
+
+BIO *bio_in = NULL;
+BIO *bio_out = NULL;
+BIO *bio_err = NULL;
+
+static int apps_startup()
+{
+#ifdef SIGPIPE
+    signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
+#endif
+
+    /* Set non-default library initialisation settings */
+    if (!OPENSSL_init_ssl(OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_ALL_BUILTIN
+                          | OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_CONFIG, NULL))
+        return 0;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_UI
+    setup_ui_method();
+#endif
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static void apps_shutdown()
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_UI
+    destroy_ui_method();
+#endif
+}
+
+static char *make_config_name()
+{
+    const char *t;
+    size_t len;
+    char *p;
+
+    if ((t = getenv("OPENSSL_CONF")) != NULL)
+        return OPENSSL_strdup(t);
+
+    t = X509_get_default_cert_area();
+    len = strlen(t) + 1 + strlen(OPENSSL_CONF) + 1;
+    p = app_malloc(len, "config filename buffer");
+    strcpy(p, t);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+    strcat(p, "/");
+#endif
+    strcat(p, OPENSSL_CONF);
+
+    return p;
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+    FUNCTION f, *fp;
+    LHASH_OF(FUNCTION) *prog = NULL;
+    char **copied_argv = NULL;
+    char *p, *pname;
+    char buf[1024];
+    const char *prompt;
+    ARGS arg;
+    int first, n, i, ret = 0;
+
+    arg.argv = NULL;
+    arg.size = 0;
+
+    /* Set up some of the environment. */
+    default_config_file = make_config_name();
+    bio_in = dup_bio_in(FORMAT_TEXT);
+    bio_out = dup_bio_out(FORMAT_TEXT);
+    bio_err = dup_bio_err(FORMAT_TEXT);
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && defined(__DECC)
+    copied_argv = argv = copy_argv(&argc, argv);
+#elif defined(_WIN32)
+    /*
+     * Replace argv[] with UTF-8 encoded strings.
+     */
+    win32_utf8argv(&argc, &argv);
+#endif
+
+    p = getenv("OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY");
+    if (p != NULL && strcmp(p, "on") == 0)
+        CRYPTO_set_mem_debug(1);
+    CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON);
+
+    if (getenv("OPENSSL_FIPS")) {
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+        if (!FIPS_mode_set(1)) {
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            return 1;
+        }
+#else
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "FIPS mode not supported.\n");
+        return 1;
+#endif
+    }
+
+    if (!apps_startup()) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                   "FATAL: Startup failure (dev note: apps_startup() failed)\n");
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        ret = 1;
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    prog = prog_init();
+    pname = opt_progname(argv[0]);
+
+    /* first check the program name */
+    f.name = pname;
+    fp = lh_FUNCTION_retrieve(prog, &f);
+    if (fp != NULL) {
+        argv[0] = pname;
+        ret = fp->func(argc, argv);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    /* If there is stuff on the command line, run with that. */
+    if (argc != 1) {
+        argc--;
+        argv++;
+        ret = do_cmd(prog, argc, argv);
+        if (ret < 0)
+            ret = 0;
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    /* ok, lets enter interactive mode */
+    for (;;) {
+        ret = 0;
+        /* Read a line, continue reading if line ends with \ */
+        for (p = buf, n = sizeof(buf), i = 0, first = 1; n > 0; first = 0) {
+            prompt = first ? "OpenSSL> " : "> ";
+            p[0] = '\0';
+#ifndef READLINE
+            fputs(prompt, stdout);
+            fflush(stdout);
+            if (!fgets(p, n, stdin))
+                goto end;
+            if (p[0] == '\0')
+                goto end;
+            i = strlen(p);
+            if (i <= 1)
+                break;
+            if (p[i - 2] != '\\')
+                break;
+            i -= 2;
+            p += i;
+            n -= i;
+#else
+            {
+                extern char *readline(const char *);
+                extern void add_history(const char *cp);
+                char *text;
+
+                text = readline(prompt);
+                if (text == NULL)
+                    goto end;
+                i = strlen(text);
+                if (i == 0 || i > n)
+                    break;
+                if (text[i - 1] != '\\') {
+                    p += strlen(strcpy(p, text));
+                    free(text);
+                    add_history(buf);
+                    break;
+                }
+
+                text[i - 1] = '\0';
+                p += strlen(strcpy(p, text));
+                free(text);
+                n -= i;
+            }
+#endif
+        }
+
+        if (!chopup_args(&arg, buf)) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't parse (no memory?)\n");
+            break;
+        }
+
+        ret = do_cmd(prog, arg.argc, arg.argv);
+        if (ret == EXIT_THE_PROGRAM) {
+            ret = 0;
+            goto end;
+        }
+        if (ret != 0)
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "error in %s\n", arg.argv[0]);
+        (void)BIO_flush(bio_out);
+        (void)BIO_flush(bio_err);
+    }
+    ret = 1;
+ end:
+    OPENSSL_free(copied_argv);
+    OPENSSL_free(default_config_file);
+    lh_FUNCTION_free(prog);
+    OPENSSL_free(arg.argv);
+
+    BIO_free(bio_in);
+    BIO_free_all(bio_out);
+    apps_shutdown();
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG
+    if (CRYPTO_mem_leaks(bio_err) <= 0)
+        ret = 1;
+#endif
+    BIO_free(bio_err);
+    EXIT(ret);
+}
+
+OPTIONS exit_options[] = {
+    {NULL}
+};
+
+static void list_cipher_fn(const EVP_CIPHER *c,
+                           const char *from, const char *to, void *arg)
+{
+    if (c)
+        BIO_printf(arg, "%s\n", EVP_CIPHER_name(c));
+    else {
+        if (!from)
+            from = "<undefined>";
+        if (!to)
+            to = "<undefined>";
+        BIO_printf(arg, "%s => %s\n", from, to);
+    }
+}
+
+static void list_md_fn(const EVP_MD *m,
+                       const char *from, const char *to, void *arg)
+{
+    if (m)
+        BIO_printf(arg, "%s\n", EVP_MD_name(m));
+    else {
+        if (!from)
+            from = "<undefined>";
+        if (!to)
+            to = "<undefined>";
+        BIO_printf((BIO *)arg, "%s => %s\n", from, to);
+    }
+}
+
+/* Unified enum for help and list commands. */
+typedef enum HELPLIST_CHOICE {
+    OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP,
+    OPT_COMMANDS, OPT_DIGEST_COMMANDS,
+    OPT_DIGEST_ALGORITHMS, OPT_CIPHER_COMMANDS, OPT_CIPHER_ALGORITHMS,
+    OPT_PK_ALGORITHMS, OPT_DISABLED
+} HELPLIST_CHOICE;
+
+OPTIONS list_options[] = {
+    {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"},
+    {"commands", OPT_COMMANDS, '-', "List of standard commands"},
+    {"digest-commands", OPT_DIGEST_COMMANDS, '-',
+     "List of message digest commands"},
+    {"digest-algorithms", OPT_DIGEST_ALGORITHMS, '-',
+     "List of message digest algorithms"},
+    {"cipher-commands", OPT_CIPHER_COMMANDS, '-', "List of cipher commands"},
+    {"cipher-algorithms", OPT_CIPHER_ALGORITHMS, '-',
+     "List of cipher algorithms"},
+    {"public-key-algorithms", OPT_PK_ALGORITHMS, '-',
+     "List of public key algorithms"},
+    {"disabled", OPT_DISABLED, '-',
+     "List of disabled features"},
+    {NULL}
+};
+
+int list_main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    char *prog;
+    HELPLIST_CHOICE o;
+    int done = 0;
+
+    prog = opt_init(argc, argv, list_options);
+    while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) {
+        switch (o) {
+        case OPT_EOF:  /* Never hit, but suppresses warning */
+        case OPT_ERR:
+opthelp:
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog);
+            return 1;
+        case OPT_HELP:
+            opt_help(list_options);
+            break;
+        case OPT_COMMANDS:
+            list_type(FT_general);
+            break;
+        case OPT_DIGEST_COMMANDS:
+            list_type(FT_md);
+            break;
+        case OPT_DIGEST_ALGORITHMS:
+            EVP_MD_do_all_sorted(list_md_fn, bio_out);
+            break;
+        case OPT_CIPHER_COMMANDS:
+            list_type(FT_cipher);
+            break;
+        case OPT_CIPHER_ALGORITHMS:
+            EVP_CIPHER_do_all_sorted(list_cipher_fn, bio_out);
+            break;
+        case OPT_PK_ALGORITHMS:
+            list_pkey();
+            break;
+        case OPT_DISABLED:
+            list_disabled();
+            break;
+        }
+        done = 1;
+    }
+    if (opt_num_rest() != 0) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Extra arguments given.\n");
+        goto opthelp;
+    }
+
+    if (!done)
+        goto opthelp;
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+OPTIONS help_options[] = {
+    {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"},
+    {NULL}
+};
+
+int help_main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    FUNCTION *fp;
+    int i, nl;
+    FUNC_TYPE tp;
+    char *prog;
+    HELPLIST_CHOICE o;
+
+    prog = opt_init(argc, argv, help_options);
+    while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) {
+        switch (o) {
+        default:
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog);
+            return 1;
+        case OPT_HELP:
+            opt_help(help_options);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (opt_num_rest() != 0) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Usage: %s\n", prog);
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    BIO_printf(bio_err, "\nStandard commands");
+    i = 0;
+    tp = FT_none;
+    for (fp = functions; fp->name != NULL; fp++) {
+        nl = 0;
+        if (((i++) % COLUMNS) == 0) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n");
+            nl = 1;
+        }
+        if (fp->type != tp) {
+            tp = fp->type;
+            if (!nl)
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n");
+            if (tp == FT_md) {
+                i = 1;
+                BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                           "\nMessage Digest commands (see the `dgst' command for more details)\n");
+            } else if (tp == FT_cipher) {
+                i = 1;
+                BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                           "\nCipher commands (see the `enc' command for more details)\n");
+            }
+        }
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, FORMAT, fp->name);
+    }
+    BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n\n");
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int exit_main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    return EXIT_THE_PROGRAM;
+}
+
+static void list_type(FUNC_TYPE ft)
+{
+    FUNCTION *fp;
+    int i = 0;
+
+    for (fp = functions; fp->name != NULL; fp++)
+        if (fp->type == ft) {
+            if ((i++ % COLUMNS) == 0)
+                BIO_printf(bio_out, "\n");
+            BIO_printf(bio_out, FORMAT, fp->name);
+        }
+    BIO_printf(bio_out, "\n");
+}
+
+static int do_cmd(LHASH_OF(FUNCTION) *prog, int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+    FUNCTION f, *fp;
+
+    if (argc <= 0 || argv[0] == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    f.name = argv[0];
+    fp = lh_FUNCTION_retrieve(prog, &f);
+    if (fp == NULL) {
+        if (EVP_get_digestbyname(argv[0])) {
+            f.type = FT_md;
+            f.func = dgst_main;
+            fp = &f;
+        } else if (EVP_get_cipherbyname(argv[0])) {
+            f.type = FT_cipher;
+            f.func = enc_main;
+            fp = &f;
+        }
+    }
+    if (fp != NULL) {
+        return (fp->func(argc, argv));
+    }
+    if ((strncmp(argv[0], "no-", 3)) == 0) {
+        /*
+         * User is asking if foo is unsupported, by trying to "run" the
+         * no-foo command.  Strange.
+         */
+        f.name = argv[0] + 3;
+        if (lh_FUNCTION_retrieve(prog, &f) == NULL) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_out, "%s\n", argv[0]);
+            return (0);
+        }
+        BIO_printf(bio_out, "%s\n", argv[0] + 3);
+        return 1;
+    }
+    if (strcmp(argv[0], "quit") == 0 || strcmp(argv[0], "q") == 0 ||
+        strcmp(argv[0], "exit") == 0 || strcmp(argv[0], "bye") == 0)
+        /* Special value to mean "exit the program. */
+        return EXIT_THE_PROGRAM;
+
+    BIO_printf(bio_err, "Invalid command '%s'; type \"help\" for a list.\n",
+               argv[0]);
+    return (1);
+}
+
+static void list_pkey(void)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < EVP_PKEY_asn1_get_count(); i++) {
+        const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth;
+        int pkey_id, pkey_base_id, pkey_flags;
+        const char *pinfo, *pem_str;
+        ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0(i);
+        EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(&pkey_id, &pkey_base_id, &pkey_flags,
+                                &pinfo, &pem_str, ameth);
+        if (pkey_flags & ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_out, "Name: %s\n", OBJ_nid2ln(pkey_id));
+            BIO_printf(bio_out, "\tAlias for: %s\n",
+                       OBJ_nid2ln(pkey_base_id));
+        } else {
+            BIO_printf(bio_out, "Name: %s\n", pinfo);
+            BIO_printf(bio_out, "\tType: %s Algorithm\n",
+                       pkey_flags & ASN1_PKEY_DYNAMIC ?
+                       "External" : "Builtin");
+            BIO_printf(bio_out, "\tOID: %s\n", OBJ_nid2ln(pkey_id));
+            if (pem_str == NULL)
+                pem_str = "(none)";
+            BIO_printf(bio_out, "\tPEM string: %s\n", pem_str);
+        }
+
+    }
+}
+
+static int function_cmp(const FUNCTION * a, const FUNCTION * b)
+{
+    return strncmp(a->name, b->name, 8);
+}
+
+static unsigned long function_hash(const FUNCTION * a)
+{
+    return OPENSSL_LH_strhash(a->name);
+}
+
+static int SortFnByName(const void *_f1, const void *_f2)
+{
+    const FUNCTION *f1 = _f1;
+    const FUNCTION *f2 = _f2;
+
+    if (f1->type != f2->type)
+        return f1->type - f2->type;
+    return strcmp(f1->name, f2->name);
+}
+
+static void list_disabled(void)
+{
+    BIO_puts(bio_out, "Disabled algorithms:\n");
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_BF
+    BIO_puts(bio_out, "BF\n");
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_BLAKE2
+    BIO_puts(bio_out, "BLAKE2\n");
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA
+    BIO_puts(bio_out, "CAMELLIA\n");
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CAST
+    BIO_puts(bio_out, "CAST\n");
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CMAC
+    BIO_puts(bio_out, "CMAC\n");
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
+    BIO_puts(bio_out, "CMS\n");
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+    BIO_puts(bio_out, "COMP\n");
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DES
+    BIO_puts(bio_out, "DES\n");
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DGRAM
+    BIO_puts(bio_out, "DGRAM\n");
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+    BIO_puts(bio_out, "DH\n");
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+    BIO_puts(bio_out, "DSA\n");
+#endif
+#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_DTLS)
+    BIO_puts(bio_out, "DTLS\n");
+#endif
+#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1)
+    BIO_puts(bio_out, "DTLS1\n");
+#endif
+#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2)
+    BIO_puts(bio_out, "DTLS1_2\n");
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    BIO_puts(bio_out, "EC\n");
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+    BIO_puts(bio_out, "EC2M\n");
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    BIO_puts(bio_out, "ENGINE\n");
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
+    BIO_puts(bio_out, "GOST\n");
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+    BIO_puts(bio_out, "HEARTBEATS\n");
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_IDEA
+    BIO_puts(bio_out, "IDEA\n");
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MD2
+    BIO_puts(bio_out, "MD2\n");
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MD4
+    BIO_puts(bio_out, "MD4\n");
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+    BIO_puts(bio_out, "MD5\n");
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MDC2
+    BIO_puts(bio_out, "MDC2\n");
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_OCB
+    BIO_puts(bio_out, "OCB\n");
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+    BIO_puts(bio_out, "OCSP\n");
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+    BIO_puts(bio_out, "PSK\n");
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RC2
+    BIO_puts(bio_out, "RC2\n");
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
+    BIO_puts(bio_out, "RC4\n");
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RC5
+    BIO_puts(bio_out, "RC5\n");
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RMD160
+    BIO_puts(bio_out, "RMD160\n");
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+    BIO_puts(bio_out, "RSA\n");
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SCRYPT
+    BIO_puts(bio_out, "SCRYPT\n");
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+    BIO_puts(bio_out, "SCTP\n");
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SEED
+    BIO_puts(bio_out, "SEED\n");
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
+    BIO_puts(bio_out, "SOCK\n");
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+    BIO_puts(bio_out, "SRP\n");
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
+    BIO_puts(bio_out, "SRTP\n");
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
+    BIO_puts(bio_out, "SSL3\n");
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
+    BIO_puts(bio_out, "TLS1\n");
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1
+    BIO_puts(bio_out, "TLS1_1\n");
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2
+    BIO_puts(bio_out, "TLS1_2\n");
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_WHIRLPOOL
+    BIO_puts(bio_out, "WHIRLPOOL\n");
+#endif
+#ifndef ZLIB
+    BIO_puts(bio_out, "ZLIB\n");
+#endif
+}
+
+static LHASH_OF(FUNCTION) *prog_init(void)
+{
+    LHASH_OF(FUNCTION) *ret;
+    FUNCTION *f;
+    size_t i;
+
+    /* Sort alphabetically within category. For nicer help displays. */
+    for (i = 0, f = functions; f->name != NULL; ++f, ++i) ;
+    qsort(functions, i, sizeof(*functions), SortFnByName);
+
+    if ((ret = lh_FUNCTION_new(function_hash, function_cmp)) == NULL)
+        return (NULL);
+
+    for (f = functions; f->name != NULL; f++)
+        (void)lh_FUNCTION_insert(ret, f);
+    return (ret);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/openssl.cnf b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/openssl.cnf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b3e7444
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/openssl.cnf
@@ -0,0 +1,346 @@
+#
+# OpenSSL example configuration file.
+# This is mostly being used for generation of certificate requests.
+#
+
+# This definition stops the following lines choking if HOME isn't
+# defined.
+HOME			= .
+RANDFILE		= $ENV::HOME/.rnd
+
+# Extra OBJECT IDENTIFIER info:
+#oid_file		= $ENV::HOME/.oid
+oid_section		= new_oids
+
+# To use this configuration file with the "-extfile" option of the
+# "openssl x509" utility, name here the section containing the
+# X.509v3 extensions to use:
+# extensions		= 
+# (Alternatively, use a configuration file that has only
+# X.509v3 extensions in its main [= default] section.)
+
+[ new_oids ]
+
+# We can add new OIDs in here for use by 'ca', 'req' and 'ts'.
+# Add a simple OID like this:
+# testoid1=1.2.3.4
+# Or use config file substitution like this:
+# testoid2=${testoid1}.5.6
+
+# Policies used by the TSA examples.
+tsa_policy1 = 1.2.3.4.1
+tsa_policy2 = 1.2.3.4.5.6
+tsa_policy3 = 1.2.3.4.5.7
+
+####################################################################
+[ ca ]
+default_ca	= CA_default		# The default ca section
+
+####################################################################
+[ CA_default ]
+
+dir		= ./demoCA		# Where everything is kept
+certs		= $dir/certs		# Where the issued certs are kept
+crl_dir		= $dir/crl		# Where the issued crl are kept
+database	= $dir/index.txt	# database index file.
+#unique_subject	= no			# Set to 'no' to allow creation of
+					# several certs with same subject.
+new_certs_dir	= $dir/newcerts		# default place for new certs.
+
+certificate	= $dir/cacert.pem 	# The CA certificate
+serial		= $dir/serial 		# The current serial number
+crlnumber	= $dir/crlnumber	# the current crl number
+					# must be commented out to leave a V1 CRL
+crl		= $dir/crl.pem 		# The current CRL
+private_key	= $dir/private/cakey.pem# The private key
+RANDFILE	= $dir/private/.rand	# private random number file
+
+x509_extensions	= usr_cert		# The extensions to add to the cert
+
+# Comment out the following two lines for the "traditional"
+# (and highly broken) format.
+name_opt 	= ca_default		# Subject Name options
+cert_opt 	= ca_default		# Certificate field options
+
+# Extension copying option: use with caution.
+# copy_extensions = copy
+
+# Extensions to add to a CRL. Note: Netscape communicator chokes on V2 CRLs
+# so this is commented out by default to leave a V1 CRL.
+# crlnumber must also be commented out to leave a V1 CRL.
+# crl_extensions	= crl_ext
+
+default_days	= 365			# how long to certify for
+default_crl_days= 30			# how long before next CRL
+default_md	= default		# use public key default MD
+preserve	= no			# keep passed DN ordering
+
+# A few difference way of specifying how similar the request should look
+# For type CA, the listed attributes must be the same, and the optional
+# and supplied fields are just that :-)
+policy		= policy_match
+
+# For the CA policy
+[ policy_match ]
+countryName		= match
+stateOrProvinceName	= match
+organizationName	= match
+organizationalUnitName	= optional
+commonName		= supplied
+emailAddress		= optional
+
+# For the 'anything' policy
+# At this point in time, you must list all acceptable 'object'
+# types.
+[ policy_anything ]
+countryName		= optional
+stateOrProvinceName	= optional
+localityName		= optional
+organizationName	= optional
+organizationalUnitName	= optional
+commonName		= supplied
+emailAddress		= optional
+
+####################################################################
+[ req ]
+default_bits		= 2048
+default_keyfile 	= privkey.pem
+distinguished_name	= req_distinguished_name
+attributes		= req_attributes
+x509_extensions	= v3_ca	# The extensions to add to the self signed cert
+
+# Passwords for private keys if not present they will be prompted for
+# input_password = secret
+# output_password = secret
+
+# This sets a mask for permitted string types. There are several options. 
+# default: PrintableString, T61String, BMPString.
+# pkix	 : PrintableString, BMPString (PKIX recommendation before 2004)
+# utf8only: only UTF8Strings (PKIX recommendation after 2004).
+# nombstr : PrintableString, T61String (no BMPStrings or UTF8Strings).
+# MASK:XXXX a literal mask value.
+# WARNING: ancient versions of Netscape crash on BMPStrings or UTF8Strings.
+string_mask = utf8only
+
+# req_extensions = v3_req # The extensions to add to a certificate request
+
+[ req_distinguished_name ]
+countryName			= Country Name (2 letter code)
+countryName_default		= AU
+countryName_min			= 2
+countryName_max			= 2
+
+stateOrProvinceName		= State or Province Name (full name)
+stateOrProvinceName_default	= Some-State
+
+localityName			= Locality Name (eg, city)
+
+0.organizationName		= Organization Name (eg, company)
+0.organizationName_default	= Internet Widgits Pty Ltd
+
+# we can do this but it is not needed normally :-)
+#1.organizationName		= Second Organization Name (eg, company)
+#1.organizationName_default	= World Wide Web Pty Ltd
+
+organizationalUnitName		= Organizational Unit Name (eg, section)
+#organizationalUnitName_default	=
+
+commonName			= Common Name (e.g. server FQDN or YOUR name)
+commonName_max			= 64
+
+emailAddress			= Email Address
+emailAddress_max		= 64
+
+# SET-ex3			= SET extension number 3
+
+[ req_attributes ]
+challengePassword		= A challenge password
+challengePassword_min		= 4
+challengePassword_max		= 20
+
+unstructuredName		= An optional company name
+
+[ usr_cert ]
+
+# These extensions are added when 'ca' signs a request.
+
+# This goes against PKIX guidelines but some CAs do it and some software
+# requires this to avoid interpreting an end user certificate as a CA.
+
+basicConstraints=CA:FALSE
+
+# Here are some examples of the usage of nsCertType. If it is omitted
+# the certificate can be used for anything *except* object signing.
+
+# This is OK for an SSL server.
+# nsCertType			= server
+
+# For an object signing certificate this would be used.
+# nsCertType = objsign
+
+# For normal client use this is typical
+# nsCertType = client, email
+
+# and for everything including object signing:
+# nsCertType = client, email, objsign
+
+# This is typical in keyUsage for a client certificate.
+# keyUsage = nonRepudiation, digitalSignature, keyEncipherment
+
+# This will be displayed in Netscape's comment listbox.
+nsComment			= "OpenSSL Generated Certificate"
+
+# PKIX recommendations harmless if included in all certificates.
+subjectKeyIdentifier=hash
+authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid,issuer
+
+# This stuff is for subjectAltName and issuerAltname.
+# Import the email address.
+# subjectAltName=email:copy
+# An alternative to produce certificates that aren't
+# deprecated according to PKIX.
+# subjectAltName=email:move
+
+# Copy subject details
+# issuerAltName=issuer:copy
+
+#nsCaRevocationUrl		= http://www.domain.dom/ca-crl.pem
+#nsBaseUrl
+#nsRevocationUrl
+#nsRenewalUrl
+#nsCaPolicyUrl
+#nsSslServerName
+
+# This is required for TSA certificates.
+# extendedKeyUsage = critical,timeStamping
+
+[ v3_req ]
+
+# Extensions to add to a certificate request
+
+basicConstraints = CA:FALSE
+keyUsage = nonRepudiation, digitalSignature, keyEncipherment
+
+[ v3_ca ]
+
+
+# Extensions for a typical CA
+
+
+# PKIX recommendation.
+
+subjectKeyIdentifier=hash
+
+authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid:always,issuer
+
+basicConstraints = critical,CA:true
+
+# Key usage: this is typical for a CA certificate. However since it will
+# prevent it being used as an test self-signed certificate it is best
+# left out by default.
+# keyUsage = cRLSign, keyCertSign
+
+# Some might want this also
+# nsCertType = sslCA, emailCA
+
+# Include email address in subject alt name: another PKIX recommendation
+# subjectAltName=email:copy
+# Copy issuer details
+# issuerAltName=issuer:copy
+
+# DER hex encoding of an extension: beware experts only!
+# obj=DER:02:03
+# Where 'obj' is a standard or added object
+# You can even override a supported extension:
+# basicConstraints= critical, DER:30:03:01:01:FF
+
+[ crl_ext ]
+
+# CRL extensions.
+# Only issuerAltName and authorityKeyIdentifier make any sense in a CRL.
+
+# issuerAltName=issuer:copy
+authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid:always
+
+[ proxy_cert_ext ]
+# These extensions should be added when creating a proxy certificate
+
+# This goes against PKIX guidelines but some CAs do it and some software
+# requires this to avoid interpreting an end user certificate as a CA.
+
+basicConstraints=CA:FALSE
+
+# Here are some examples of the usage of nsCertType. If it is omitted
+# the certificate can be used for anything *except* object signing.
+
+# This is OK for an SSL server.
+# nsCertType			= server
+
+# For an object signing certificate this would be used.
+# nsCertType = objsign
+
+# For normal client use this is typical
+# nsCertType = client, email
+
+# and for everything including object signing:
+# nsCertType = client, email, objsign
+
+# This is typical in keyUsage for a client certificate.
+# keyUsage = nonRepudiation, digitalSignature, keyEncipherment
+
+# This will be displayed in Netscape's comment listbox.
+nsComment			= "OpenSSL Generated Certificate"
+
+# PKIX recommendations harmless if included in all certificates.
+subjectKeyIdentifier=hash
+authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid,issuer
+
+# This stuff is for subjectAltName and issuerAltname.
+# Import the email address.
+# subjectAltName=email:copy
+# An alternative to produce certificates that aren't
+# deprecated according to PKIX.
+# subjectAltName=email:move
+
+# Copy subject details
+# issuerAltName=issuer:copy
+
+#nsCaRevocationUrl		= http://www.domain.dom/ca-crl.pem
+#nsBaseUrl
+#nsRevocationUrl
+#nsRenewalUrl
+#nsCaPolicyUrl
+#nsSslServerName
+
+# This really needs to be in place for it to be a proxy certificate.
+proxyCertInfo=critical,language:id-ppl-anyLanguage,pathlen:3,policy:foo
+
+####################################################################
+[ tsa ]
+
+default_tsa = tsa_config1	# the default TSA section
+
+[ tsa_config1 ]
+
+# These are used by the TSA reply generation only.
+dir		= ./demoCA		# TSA root directory
+serial		= $dir/tsaserial	# The current serial number (mandatory)
+crypto_device	= builtin		# OpenSSL engine to use for signing
+signer_cert	= $dir/tsacert.pem 	# The TSA signing certificate
+					# (optional)
+certs		= $dir/cacert.pem	# Certificate chain to include in reply
+					# (optional)
+signer_key	= $dir/private/tsakey.pem # The TSA private key (optional)
+signer_digest  = sha256			# Signing digest to use. (Optional)
+default_policy	= tsa_policy1		# Policy if request did not specify it
+					# (optional)
+other_policies	= tsa_policy2, tsa_policy3	# acceptable policies (optional)
+digests     = sha1, sha256, sha384, sha512  # Acceptable message digests (mandatory)
+accuracy	= secs:1, millisecs:500, microsecs:100	# (optional)
+clock_precision_digits  = 0	# number of digits after dot. (optional)
+ordering		= yes	# Is ordering defined for timestamps?
+				# (optional, default: no)
+tsa_name		= yes	# Must the TSA name be included in the reply?
+				# (optional, default: no)
+ess_cert_id_chain	= no	# Must the ESS cert id chain be included?
+				# (optional, default: no)
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/opt.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/opt.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6e40f64
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/opt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,977 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* #define COMPILE_STANDALONE_TEST_DRIVER  */
+#include "apps.h"
+#include <string.h>
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS)
+# include OPENSSL_UNISTD
+#endif
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+
+#define MAX_OPT_HELP_WIDTH 30
+const char OPT_HELP_STR[] = "--";
+const char OPT_MORE_STR[] = "---";
+
+/* Our state */
+static char **argv;
+static int argc;
+static int opt_index;
+static char *arg;
+static char *flag;
+static char *dunno;
+static const OPTIONS *unknown;
+static const OPTIONS *opts;
+static char prog[40];
+
+/*
+ * Return the simple name of the program; removing various platform gunk.
+ */
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32)
+char *opt_progname(const char *argv0)
+{
+    size_t i, n;
+    const char *p;
+    char *q;
+
+    /* find the last '/', '\' or ':' */
+    for (p = argv0 + strlen(argv0); --p > argv0;)
+        if (*p == '/' || *p == '\\' || *p == ':') {
+            p++;
+            break;
+        }
+
+    /* Strip off trailing nonsense. */
+    n = strlen(p);
+    if (n > 4 &&
+        (strcmp(&p[n - 4], ".exe") == 0 || strcmp(&p[n - 4], ".EXE") == 0))
+        n -= 4;
+
+    /* Copy over the name, in lowercase. */
+    if (n > sizeof(prog) - 1)
+        n = sizeof(prog) - 1;
+    for (q = prog, i = 0; i < n; i++, p++)
+        *q++ = tolower((unsigned char)*p);
+    *q = '\0';
+    return prog;
+}
+
+#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
+
+char *opt_progname(const char *argv0)
+{
+    const char *p, *q;
+
+    /* Find last special character sys:[foo.bar]openssl */
+    for (p = argv0 + strlen(argv0); --p > argv0;)
+        if (*p == ':' || *p == ']' || *p == '>') {
+            p++;
+            break;
+        }
+
+    q = strrchr(p, '.');
+    strncpy(prog, p, sizeof(prog) - 1);
+    prog[sizeof(prog) - 1] = '\0';
+    if (q != NULL && q - p < sizeof(prog))
+        prog[q - p] = '\0';
+    return prog;
+}
+
+#else
+
+char *opt_progname(const char *argv0)
+{
+    const char *p;
+
+    /* Could use strchr, but this is like the ones above. */
+    for (p = argv0 + strlen(argv0); --p > argv0;)
+        if (*p == '/') {
+            p++;
+            break;
+        }
+    strncpy(prog, p, sizeof(prog) - 1);
+    prog[sizeof(prog) - 1] = '\0';
+    return prog;
+}
+#endif
+
+char *opt_getprog(void)
+{
+    return prog;
+}
+
+/* Set up the arg parsing. */
+char *opt_init(int ac, char **av, const OPTIONS *o)
+{
+    /* Store state. */
+    argc = ac;
+    argv = av;
+    opt_index = 1;
+    opts = o;
+    opt_progname(av[0]);
+    unknown = NULL;
+
+    for (; o->name; ++o) {
+#ifndef NDEBUG
+        const OPTIONS *next;
+        int duplicated, i;
+#endif
+
+        if (o->name == OPT_HELP_STR || o->name == OPT_MORE_STR)
+            continue;
+#ifndef NDEBUG
+        i = o->valtype;
+
+        /* Make sure options are legit. */
+        assert(o->name[0] != '-');
+        assert(o->retval > 0);
+        switch (i) {
+        case   0: case '-': case '/': case '<': case '>': case 'E': case 'F':
+        case 'M': case 'U': case 'f': case 'l': case 'n': case 'p': case 's':
+        case 'u': case 'c':
+            break;
+        default:
+            assert(0);
+        }
+
+        /* Make sure there are no duplicates. */
+        for (next = o + 1; next->name; ++next) {
+            /*
+             * Some compilers inline strcmp and the assert string is too long.
+             */
+            duplicated = strcmp(o->name, next->name) == 0;
+            assert(!duplicated);
+        }
+#endif
+        if (o->name[0] == '\0') {
+            assert(unknown == NULL);
+            unknown = o;
+            assert(unknown->valtype == 0 || unknown->valtype == '-');
+        }
+    }
+    return prog;
+}
+
+static OPT_PAIR formats[] = {
+    {"PEM/DER", OPT_FMT_PEMDER},
+    {"pkcs12", OPT_FMT_PKCS12},
+    {"smime", OPT_FMT_SMIME},
+    {"engine", OPT_FMT_ENGINE},
+    {"msblob", OPT_FMT_MSBLOB},
+    {"netscape", OPT_FMT_NETSCAPE},
+    {"nss", OPT_FMT_NSS},
+    {"text", OPT_FMT_TEXT},
+    {"http", OPT_FMT_HTTP},
+    {"pvk", OPT_FMT_PVK},
+    {NULL}
+};
+
+/* Print an error message about a failed format parse. */
+int opt_format_error(const char *s, unsigned long flags)
+{
+    OPT_PAIR *ap;
+
+    if (flags == OPT_FMT_PEMDER)
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Bad format \"%s\"; must be pem or der\n",
+                   prog, s);
+    else {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Bad format \"%s\"; must be one of:\n",
+                   prog, s);
+        for (ap = formats; ap->name; ap++)
+            if (flags & ap->retval)
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "   %s\n", ap->name);
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/* Parse a format string, put it into *result; return 0 on failure, else 1. */
+int opt_format(const char *s, unsigned long flags, int *result)
+{
+    switch (*s) {
+    default:
+        return 0;
+    case 'D':
+    case 'd':
+        if ((flags & OPT_FMT_PEMDER) == 0)
+            return opt_format_error(s, flags);
+        *result = FORMAT_ASN1;
+        break;
+    case 'T':
+    case 't':
+        if ((flags & OPT_FMT_TEXT) == 0)
+            return opt_format_error(s, flags);
+        *result = FORMAT_TEXT;
+        break;
+    case 'N':
+    case 'n':
+        if ((flags & OPT_FMT_NSS) == 0)
+            return opt_format_error(s, flags);
+        if (strcmp(s, "NSS") != 0 && strcmp(s, "nss") != 0)
+            return opt_format_error(s, flags);
+        *result = FORMAT_NSS;
+        break;
+    case 'S':
+    case 's':
+        if ((flags & OPT_FMT_SMIME) == 0)
+            return opt_format_error(s, flags);
+        *result = FORMAT_SMIME;
+        break;
+    case 'M':
+    case 'm':
+        if ((flags & OPT_FMT_MSBLOB) == 0)
+            return opt_format_error(s, flags);
+        *result = FORMAT_MSBLOB;
+        break;
+    case 'E':
+    case 'e':
+        if ((flags & OPT_FMT_ENGINE) == 0)
+            return opt_format_error(s, flags);
+        *result = FORMAT_ENGINE;
+        break;
+    case 'H':
+    case 'h':
+        if ((flags & OPT_FMT_HTTP) == 0)
+            return opt_format_error(s, flags);
+        *result = FORMAT_HTTP;
+        break;
+    case '1':
+        if ((flags & OPT_FMT_PKCS12) == 0)
+            return opt_format_error(s, flags);
+        *result = FORMAT_PKCS12;
+        break;
+    case 'P':
+    case 'p':
+        if (s[1] == '\0' || strcmp(s, "PEM") == 0 || strcmp(s, "pem") == 0) {
+            if ((flags & OPT_FMT_PEMDER) == 0)
+                return opt_format_error(s, flags);
+            *result = FORMAT_PEM;
+        } else if (strcmp(s, "PVK") == 0 || strcmp(s, "pvk") == 0) {
+            if ((flags & OPT_FMT_PVK) == 0)
+                return opt_format_error(s, flags);
+            *result = FORMAT_PVK;
+        } else if (strcmp(s, "P12") == 0 || strcmp(s, "p12") == 0
+                   || strcmp(s, "PKCS12") == 0 || strcmp(s, "pkcs12") == 0) {
+            if ((flags & OPT_FMT_PKCS12) == 0)
+                return opt_format_error(s, flags);
+            *result = FORMAT_PKCS12;
+        } else
+            return 0;
+        break;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Parse a cipher name, put it in *EVP_CIPHER; return 0 on failure, else 1. */
+int opt_cipher(const char *name, const EVP_CIPHER **cipherp)
+{
+    *cipherp = EVP_get_cipherbyname(name);
+    if (*cipherp)
+        return 1;
+    BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Unknown cipher %s\n", prog, name);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Parse message digest name, put it in *EVP_MD; return 0 on failure, else 1.
+ */
+int opt_md(const char *name, const EVP_MD **mdp)
+{
+    *mdp = EVP_get_digestbyname(name);
+    if (*mdp)
+        return 1;
+    BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Unknown digest %s\n", prog, name);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/* Look through a list of name/value pairs. */
+int opt_pair(const char *name, const OPT_PAIR* pairs, int *result)
+{
+    const OPT_PAIR *pp;
+
+    for (pp = pairs; pp->name; pp++)
+        if (strcmp(pp->name, name) == 0) {
+            *result = pp->retval;
+            return 1;
+        }
+    BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Value must be one of:\n", prog);
+    for (pp = pairs; pp->name; pp++)
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "\t%s\n", pp->name);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/* Parse an int, put it into *result; return 0 on failure, else 1. */
+int opt_int(const char *value, int *result)
+{
+    long l;
+
+    if (!opt_long(value, &l))
+        return 0;
+    *result = (int)l;
+    if (*result != l) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Value \"%s\" outside integer range\n",
+                   prog, value);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Parse a long, put it into *result; return 0 on failure, else 1. */
+int opt_long(const char *value, long *result)
+{
+    int oerrno = errno;
+    long l;
+    char *endp;
+
+    errno = 0;
+    l = strtol(value, &endp, 0);
+    if (*endp
+            || endp == value
+            || ((l == LONG_MAX || l == LONG_MIN) && errno == ERANGE)
+            || (l == 0 && errno != 0)) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Can't parse \"%s\" as a number\n",
+                   prog, value);
+        errno = oerrno;
+        return 0;
+    }
+    *result = l;
+    errno = oerrno;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+#if defined(__STDC_VERSION__) && __STDC_VERSION__ >= 199901L && \
+    defined(INTMAX_MAX) && defined(UINTMAX_MAX)
+
+/* Parse an intmax_t, put it into *result; return 0 on failure, else 1. */
+int opt_imax(const char *value, intmax_t *result)
+{
+    int oerrno = errno;
+    intmax_t m;
+    char *endp;
+
+    errno = 0;
+    m = strtoimax(value, &endp, 0);
+    if (*endp
+            || endp == value
+            || ((m == INTMAX_MAX || m == INTMAX_MIN) && errno == ERANGE)
+            || (m == 0 && errno != 0)) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Can't parse \"%s\" as a number\n",
+                   prog, value);
+        errno = oerrno;
+        return 0;
+    }
+    *result = m;
+    errno = oerrno;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Parse a uintmax_t, put it into *result; return 0 on failure, else 1. */
+int opt_umax(const char *value, uintmax_t *result)
+{
+    int oerrno = errno;
+    uintmax_t m;
+    char *endp;
+
+    errno = 0;
+    m = strtoumax(value, &endp, 0);
+    if (*endp
+            || endp == value
+            || (m == UINTMAX_MAX && errno == ERANGE)
+            || (m == 0 && errno != 0)) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Can't parse \"%s\" as a number\n",
+                   prog, value);
+        errno = oerrno;
+        return 0;
+    }
+    *result = m;
+    errno = oerrno;
+    return 1;
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Parse an unsigned long, put it into *result; return 0 on failure, else 1.
+ */
+int opt_ulong(const char *value, unsigned long *result)
+{
+    int oerrno = errno;
+    char *endptr;
+    unsigned long l;
+
+    errno = 0;
+    l = strtoul(value, &endptr, 0);
+    if (*endptr
+            || endptr == value
+            || ((l == ULONG_MAX) && errno == ERANGE)
+            || (l == 0 && errno != 0)) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Can't parse \"%s\" as an unsigned number\n",
+                   prog, value);
+        errno = oerrno;
+        return 0;
+    }
+    *result = l;
+    errno = oerrno;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * We pass opt as an int but cast it to "enum range" so that all the
+ * items in the OPT_V_ENUM enumeration are caught; this makes -Wswitch
+ * in gcc do the right thing.
+ */
+enum range { OPT_V_ENUM };
+
+int opt_verify(int opt, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm)
+{
+    int i;
+    ossl_intmax_t t = 0;
+    ASN1_OBJECT *otmp;
+    X509_PURPOSE *xptmp;
+    const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vtmp;
+
+    assert(vpm != NULL);
+    assert(opt > OPT_V__FIRST);
+    assert(opt < OPT_V__LAST);
+
+    switch ((enum range)opt) {
+    case OPT_V__FIRST:
+    case OPT_V__LAST:
+        return 0;
+    case OPT_V_POLICY:
+        otmp = OBJ_txt2obj(opt_arg(), 0);
+        if (otmp == NULL) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Invalid Policy %s\n", prog, opt_arg());
+            return 0;
+        }
+        X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy(vpm, otmp);
+        break;
+    case OPT_V_PURPOSE:
+        /* purpose name -> purpose index */
+        i = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_sname(opt_arg());
+        if (i < 0) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Invalid purpose %s\n", prog, opt_arg());
+            return 0;
+        }
+
+        /* purpose index -> purpose object */
+        xptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(i);
+
+        /* purpose object -> purpose value */
+        i = X509_PURPOSE_get_id(xptmp);
+
+        if (!X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(vpm, i)) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                       "%s: Internal error setting purpose %s\n",
+                       prog, opt_arg());
+            return 0;
+        }
+        break;
+    case OPT_V_VERIFY_NAME:
+        vtmp = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(opt_arg());
+        if (vtmp == NULL) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Invalid verify name %s\n",
+                       prog, opt_arg());
+            return 0;
+        }
+        X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(vpm, vtmp);
+        break;
+    case OPT_V_VERIFY_DEPTH:
+        i = atoi(opt_arg());
+        if (i >= 0)
+            X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(vpm, i);
+        break;
+    case OPT_V_VERIFY_AUTH_LEVEL:
+        i = atoi(opt_arg());
+        if (i >= 0)
+            X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_auth_level(vpm, i);
+        break;
+    case OPT_V_ATTIME:
+        if (!opt_imax(opt_arg(), &t))
+            return 0;
+        if (t != (time_t)t) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: epoch time out of range %s\n",
+                       prog, opt_arg());
+            return 0;
+        }
+        X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(vpm, (time_t)t);
+        break;
+    case OPT_V_VERIFY_HOSTNAME:
+        if (!X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host(vpm, opt_arg(), 0))
+            return 0;
+        break;
+    case OPT_V_VERIFY_EMAIL:
+        if (!X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_email(vpm, opt_arg(), 0))
+            return 0;
+        break;
+    case OPT_V_VERIFY_IP:
+        if (!X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip_asc(vpm, opt_arg()))
+            return 0;
+        break;
+    case OPT_V_IGNORE_CRITICAL:
+        X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(vpm, X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL);
+        break;
+    case OPT_V_ISSUER_CHECKS:
+        /* NOP, deprecated */
+        break;
+    case OPT_V_CRL_CHECK:
+        X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(vpm, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK);
+        break;
+    case OPT_V_CRL_CHECK_ALL:
+        X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(vpm,
+                                    X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK |
+                                    X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL);
+        break;
+    case OPT_V_POLICY_CHECK:
+        X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(vpm, X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK);
+        break;
+    case OPT_V_EXPLICIT_POLICY:
+        X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(vpm, X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY);
+        break;
+    case OPT_V_INHIBIT_ANY:
+        X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(vpm, X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY);
+        break;
+    case OPT_V_INHIBIT_MAP:
+        X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(vpm, X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP);
+        break;
+    case OPT_V_X509_STRICT:
+        X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(vpm, X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT);
+        break;
+    case OPT_V_EXTENDED_CRL:
+        X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(vpm, X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT);
+        break;
+    case OPT_V_USE_DELTAS:
+        X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(vpm, X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS);
+        break;
+    case OPT_V_POLICY_PRINT:
+        X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(vpm, X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY);
+        break;
+    case OPT_V_CHECK_SS_SIG:
+        X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(vpm, X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE);
+        break;
+    case OPT_V_TRUSTED_FIRST:
+        X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(vpm, X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST);
+        break;
+    case OPT_V_SUITEB_128_ONLY:
+        X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(vpm, X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY);
+        break;
+    case OPT_V_SUITEB_128:
+        X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(vpm, X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS);
+        break;
+    case OPT_V_SUITEB_192:
+        X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(vpm, X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS);
+        break;
+    case OPT_V_PARTIAL_CHAIN:
+        X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(vpm, X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN);
+        break;
+    case OPT_V_NO_ALT_CHAINS:
+        X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(vpm, X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS);
+        break;
+    case OPT_V_NO_CHECK_TIME:
+        X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(vpm, X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME);
+        break;
+    case OPT_V_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS:
+        X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(vpm, X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
+        break;
+    }
+    return 1;
+
+}
+
+/*
+ * Parse the next flag (and value if specified), return 0 if done, -1 on
+ * error, otherwise the flag's retval.
+ */
+int opt_next(void)
+{
+    char *p;
+    const OPTIONS *o;
+    int ival;
+    long lval;
+    unsigned long ulval;
+    ossl_intmax_t imval;
+    ossl_uintmax_t umval;
+
+    /* Look at current arg; at end of the list? */
+    arg = NULL;
+    p = argv[opt_index];
+    if (p == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    /* If word doesn't start with a -, we're done. */
+    if (*p != '-')
+        return 0;
+
+    /* Hit "--" ? We're done. */
+    opt_index++;
+    if (strcmp(p, "--") == 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    /* Allow -nnn and --nnn */
+    if (*++p == '-')
+        p++;
+    flag = p - 1;
+
+    /* If we have --flag=foo, snip it off */
+    if ((arg = strchr(p, '=')) != NULL)
+        *arg++ = '\0';
+    for (o = opts; o->name; ++o) {
+        /* If not this option, move on to the next one. */
+        if (strcmp(p, o->name) != 0)
+            continue;
+
+        /* If it doesn't take a value, make sure none was given. */
+        if (o->valtype == 0 || o->valtype == '-') {
+            if (arg) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                           "%s: Option -%s does not take a value\n", prog, p);
+                return -1;
+            }
+            return o->retval;
+        }
+
+        /* Want a value; get the next param if =foo not used. */
+        if (arg == NULL) {
+            if (argv[opt_index] == NULL) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                           "%s: Option -%s needs a value\n", prog, o->name);
+                return -1;
+            }
+            arg = argv[opt_index++];
+        }
+
+        /* Syntax-check value. */
+        switch (o->valtype) {
+        default:
+        case 's':
+            /* Just a string. */
+            break;
+        case '/':
+            if (app_isdir(arg) >= 0)
+                break;
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Not a directory: %s\n", prog, arg);
+            return -1;
+        case '<':
+            /* Input file. */
+            if (strcmp(arg, "-") == 0 || app_access(arg, R_OK) >= 0)
+                break;
+            BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                       "%s: Cannot open input file %s, %s\n",
+                       prog, arg, strerror(errno));
+            return -1;
+        case '>':
+            /* Output file. */
+            if (strcmp(arg, "-") == 0 || app_access(arg, W_OK) >= 0 || errno == ENOENT)
+                break;
+            BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                       "%s: Cannot open output file %s, %s\n",
+                       prog, arg, strerror(errno));
+            return -1;
+        case 'p':
+        case 'n':
+            if (!opt_int(arg, &ival)
+                    || (o->valtype == 'p' && ival <= 0)) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                           "%s: Non-positive number \"%s\" for -%s\n",
+                           prog, arg, o->name);
+                return -1;
+            }
+            break;
+        case 'M':
+            if (!opt_imax(arg, &imval)) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                           "%s: Invalid number \"%s\" for -%s\n",
+                           prog, arg, o->name);
+                return -1;
+            }
+            break;
+        case 'U':
+            if (!opt_umax(arg, &umval)) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                           "%s: Invalid number \"%s\" for -%s\n",
+                           prog, arg, o->name);
+                return -1;
+            }
+            break;
+        case 'l':
+            if (!opt_long(arg, &lval)) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                           "%s: Invalid number \"%s\" for -%s\n",
+                           prog, arg, o->name);
+                return -1;
+            }
+            break;
+        case 'u':
+            if (!opt_ulong(arg, &ulval)) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                           "%s: Invalid number \"%s\" for -%s\n",
+                           prog, arg, o->name);
+                return -1;
+            }
+            break;
+        case 'c':
+        case 'E':
+        case 'F':
+        case 'f':
+            if (opt_format(arg,
+                           o->valtype == 'c' ? OPT_FMT_PDS :
+                           o->valtype == 'E' ? OPT_FMT_PDE :
+                           o->valtype == 'F' ? OPT_FMT_PEMDER
+                           : OPT_FMT_ANY, &ival))
+                break;
+            BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                       "%s: Invalid format \"%s\" for -%s\n",
+                       prog, arg, o->name);
+            return -1;
+        }
+
+        /* Return the flag value. */
+        return o->retval;
+    }
+    if (unknown != NULL) {
+        dunno = p;
+        return unknown->retval;
+    }
+    BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Option unknown option -%s\n", prog, p);
+    return -1;
+}
+
+/* Return the most recent flag parameter. */
+char *opt_arg(void)
+{
+    return arg;
+}
+
+/* Return the most recent flag. */
+char *opt_flag(void)
+{
+    return flag;
+}
+
+/* Return the unknown option. */
+char *opt_unknown(void)
+{
+    return dunno;
+}
+
+/* Return the rest of the arguments after parsing flags. */
+char **opt_rest(void)
+{
+    return &argv[opt_index];
+}
+
+/* How many items in remaining args? */
+int opt_num_rest(void)
+{
+    int i = 0;
+    char **pp;
+
+    for (pp = opt_rest(); *pp; pp++, i++)
+        continue;
+    return i;
+}
+
+/* Return a string describing the parameter type. */
+static const char *valtype2param(const OPTIONS *o)
+{
+    switch (o->valtype) {
+    case 0:
+    case '-':
+        return "";
+    case 's':
+        return "val";
+    case '/':
+        return "dir";
+    case '<':
+        return "infile";
+    case '>':
+        return "outfile";
+    case 'p':
+        return "+int";
+    case 'n':
+        return "int";
+    case 'l':
+        return "long";
+    case 'u':
+        return "ulong";
+    case 'E':
+        return "PEM|DER|ENGINE";
+    case 'F':
+        return "PEM|DER";
+    case 'f':
+        return "format";
+    case 'M':
+        return "intmax";
+    case 'U':
+        return "uintmax";
+    }
+    return "parm";
+}
+
+void opt_help(const OPTIONS *list)
+{
+    const OPTIONS *o;
+    int i;
+    int standard_prolog;
+    int width = 5;
+    char start[80 + 1];
+    char *p;
+    const char *help;
+
+    /* Starts with its own help message? */
+    standard_prolog = list[0].name != OPT_HELP_STR;
+
+    /* Find the widest help. */
+    for (o = list; o->name; o++) {
+        if (o->name == OPT_MORE_STR)
+            continue;
+        i = 2 + (int)strlen(o->name);
+        if (o->valtype != '-')
+            i += 1 + strlen(valtype2param(o));
+        if (i < MAX_OPT_HELP_WIDTH && i > width)
+            width = i;
+        assert(i < (int)sizeof(start));
+    }
+
+    if (standard_prolog)
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Usage: %s [options]\nValid options are:\n",
+                   prog);
+
+    /* Now let's print. */
+    for (o = list; o->name; o++) {
+        help = o->helpstr ? o->helpstr : "(No additional info)";
+        if (o->name == OPT_HELP_STR) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, help, prog);
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        /* Pad out prefix */
+        memset(start, ' ', sizeof(start) - 1);
+        start[sizeof(start) - 1] = '\0';
+
+        if (o->name == OPT_MORE_STR) {
+            /* Continuation of previous line; pad and print. */
+            start[width] = '\0';
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s  %s\n", start, help);
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        /* Build up the "-flag [param]" part. */
+        p = start;
+        *p++ = ' ';
+        *p++ = '-';
+        if (o->name[0])
+            p += strlen(strcpy(p, o->name));
+        else
+            *p++ = '*';
+        if (o->valtype != '-') {
+            *p++ = ' ';
+            p += strlen(strcpy(p, valtype2param(o)));
+        }
+        *p = ' ';
+        if ((int)(p - start) >= MAX_OPT_HELP_WIDTH) {
+            *p = '\0';
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s\n", start);
+            memset(start, ' ', sizeof(start));
+        }
+        start[width] = '\0';
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s  %s\n", start, help);
+    }
+}
+
+#ifdef COMPILE_STANDALONE_TEST_DRIVER
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+
+typedef enum OPTION_choice {
+    OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP,
+    OPT_IN, OPT_INFORM, OPT_OUT, OPT_COUNT, OPT_U, OPT_FLAG,
+    OPT_STR, OPT_NOTUSED
+} OPTION_CHOICE;
+
+static OPTIONS options[] = {
+    {OPT_HELP_STR, 1, '-', "Usage: %s flags\n"},
+    {OPT_HELP_STR, 1, '-', "Valid options are:\n"},
+    {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"},
+    {"in", OPT_IN, '<', "input file"},
+    {OPT_MORE_STR, 1, '-', "more detail about input"},
+    {"inform", OPT_INFORM, 'f', "input file format; defaults to pem"},
+    {"out", OPT_OUT, '>', "output file"},
+    {"count", OPT_COUNT, 'p', "a counter greater than zero"},
+    {"u", OPT_U, 'u', "an unsigned number"},
+    {"flag", OPT_FLAG, 0, "just some flag"},
+    {"str", OPT_STR, 's', "the magic word"},
+    {"areallyverylongoption", OPT_HELP, '-', "long way for help"},
+    {NULL}
+};
+
+BIO *bio_err;
+
+int app_isdir(const char *name)
+{
+    struct stat sb;
+
+    return name != NULL && stat(name, &sb) >= 0 && S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode);
+}
+
+int main(int ac, char **av)
+{
+    OPTION_CHOICE o;
+    char **rest;
+    char *prog;
+
+    bio_err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT);
+
+    prog = opt_init(ac, av, options);
+    while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) {
+        switch (c) {
+        case OPT_NOTUSED:
+        case OPT_EOF:
+        case OPT_ERR:
+            printf("%s: Usage error; try -help.\n", prog);
+            return 1;
+        case OPT_HELP:
+            opt_help(options);
+            return 0;
+        case OPT_IN:
+            printf("in %s\n", opt_arg());
+            break;
+        case OPT_INFORM:
+            printf("inform %s\n", opt_arg());
+            break;
+        case OPT_OUT:
+            printf("out %s\n", opt_arg());
+            break;
+        case OPT_COUNT:
+            printf("count %s\n", opt_arg());
+            break;
+        case OPT_U:
+            printf("u %s\n", opt_arg());
+            break;
+        case OPT_FLAG:
+            printf("flag\n");
+            break;
+        case OPT_STR:
+            printf("str %s\n", opt_arg());
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    argc = opt_num_rest();
+    argv = opt_rest();
+
+    printf("args = %d\n", argc);
+    if (argc)
+        while (*argv)
+            printf("  %s\n", *argv++);
+    return 0;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/passwd.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/passwd.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f2b0d9a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/passwd.c
@@ -0,0 +1,512 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#if defined OPENSSL_NO_MD5 || defined CHARSET_EBCDIC
+# define NO_MD5CRYPT_1
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DES) || !defined(NO_MD5CRYPT_1)
+
+# include <string.h>
+
+# include "apps.h"
+
+# include <openssl/bio.h>
+# include <openssl/err.h>
+# include <openssl/evp.h>
+# include <openssl/rand.h>
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
+#  include <openssl/des.h>
+# endif
+# ifndef NO_MD5CRYPT_1
+#  include <openssl/md5.h>
+# endif
+
+static unsigned const char cov_2char[64] = {
+    /* from crypto/des/fcrypt.c */
+    0x2E, 0x2F, 0x30, 0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0x34, 0x35,
+    0x36, 0x37, 0x38, 0x39, 0x41, 0x42, 0x43, 0x44,
+    0x45, 0x46, 0x47, 0x48, 0x49, 0x4A, 0x4B, 0x4C,
+    0x4D, 0x4E, 0x4F, 0x50, 0x51, 0x52, 0x53, 0x54,
+    0x55, 0x56, 0x57, 0x58, 0x59, 0x5A, 0x61, 0x62,
+    0x63, 0x64, 0x65, 0x66, 0x67, 0x68, 0x69, 0x6A,
+    0x6B, 0x6C, 0x6D, 0x6E, 0x6F, 0x70, 0x71, 0x72,
+    0x73, 0x74, 0x75, 0x76, 0x77, 0x78, 0x79, 0x7A
+};
+
+static int do_passwd(int passed_salt, char **salt_p, char **salt_malloc_p,
+                     char *passwd, BIO *out, int quiet, int table,
+                     int reverse, size_t pw_maxlen, int usecrypt, int use1,
+                     int useapr1);
+
+typedef enum OPTION_choice {
+    OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP,
+    OPT_IN,
+    OPT_NOVERIFY, OPT_QUIET, OPT_TABLE, OPT_REVERSE, OPT_APR1,
+    OPT_1, OPT_CRYPT, OPT_SALT, OPT_STDIN
+} OPTION_CHOICE;
+
+OPTIONS passwd_options[] = {
+    {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"},
+    {"in", OPT_IN, '<', "Read passwords from file"},
+    {"noverify", OPT_NOVERIFY, '-',
+     "Never verify when reading password from terminal"},
+    {"quiet", OPT_QUIET, '-', "No warnings"},
+    {"table", OPT_TABLE, '-', "Format output as table"},
+    {"reverse", OPT_REVERSE, '-', "Switch table columns"},
+    {"salt", OPT_SALT, 's', "Use provided salt"},
+    {"stdin", OPT_STDIN, '-', "Read passwords from stdin"},
+# ifndef NO_MD5CRYPT_1
+    {"apr1", OPT_APR1, '-', "MD5-based password algorithm, Apache variant"},
+    {"1", OPT_1, '-', "MD5-based password algorithm"},
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
+    {"crypt", OPT_CRYPT, '-', "Standard Unix password algorithm (default)"},
+# endif
+    {NULL}
+};
+
+int passwd_main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    BIO *in = NULL;
+    char *infile = NULL, *salt = NULL, *passwd = NULL, **passwds = NULL;
+    char *salt_malloc = NULL, *passwd_malloc = NULL, *prog;
+    OPTION_CHOICE o;
+    int in_stdin = 0, pw_source_defined = 0;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_UI
+    int in_noverify = 0;
+# endif
+    int passed_salt = 0, quiet = 0, table = 0, reverse = 0;
+    int ret = 1, usecrypt = 0, use1 = 0, useapr1 = 0;
+    size_t passwd_malloc_size = 0, pw_maxlen = 256;
+
+    prog = opt_init(argc, argv, passwd_options);
+    while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) {
+        switch (o) {
+        case OPT_EOF:
+        case OPT_ERR:
+ opthelp:
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog);
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_HELP:
+            opt_help(passwd_options);
+            ret = 0;
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_IN:
+            if (pw_source_defined)
+                goto opthelp;
+            infile = opt_arg();
+            pw_source_defined = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NOVERIFY:
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_UI
+            in_noverify = 1;
+# endif
+            break;
+        case OPT_QUIET:
+            quiet = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_TABLE:
+            table = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_REVERSE:
+            reverse = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_1:
+            use1 = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_APR1:
+            useapr1 = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_CRYPT:
+            usecrypt = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_SALT:
+            passed_salt = 1;
+            salt = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_STDIN:
+            if (pw_source_defined)
+                goto opthelp;
+            in_stdin = 1;
+            pw_source_defined = 1;
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    argc = opt_num_rest();
+    argv = opt_rest();
+
+    if (*argv) {
+        if (pw_source_defined)
+            goto opthelp;
+        pw_source_defined = 1;
+        passwds = argv;
+    }
+
+    if (!usecrypt && !use1 && !useapr1) {
+        /* use default */
+        usecrypt = 1;
+    }
+    if (usecrypt + use1 + useapr1 > 1) {
+        /* conflict */
+        goto opthelp;
+    }
+
+# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DES
+    if (usecrypt)
+        goto opthelp;
+# endif
+# ifdef NO_MD5CRYPT_1
+    if (use1 || useapr1)
+        goto opthelp;
+# endif
+
+    if (infile != NULL && in_stdin) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Can't combine -in and -stdin\n", prog);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (infile != NULL || in_stdin) {
+        /*
+         * If in_stdin is true, we know that infile is NULL, and that
+         * bio_open_default() will give us back an alias for stdin.
+         */
+        in = bio_open_default(infile, 'r', FORMAT_TEXT);
+        if (in == NULL)
+            goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (usecrypt)
+        pw_maxlen = 8;
+    else if (use1 || useapr1)
+        pw_maxlen = 256;        /* arbitrary limit, should be enough for most
+                                 * passwords */
+
+    if (passwds == NULL) {
+        /* no passwords on the command line */
+
+        passwd_malloc_size = pw_maxlen + 2;
+        /* longer than necessary so that we can warn about truncation */
+        passwd = passwd_malloc =
+            app_malloc(passwd_malloc_size, "password buffer");
+    }
+
+    if ((in == NULL) && (passwds == NULL)) {
+        /*
+         * we use the following method to make sure what
+         * in the 'else' section is always compiled, to
+         * avoid rot of not-frequently-used code.
+         */
+        if (1) {
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_UI
+            /* build a null-terminated list */
+            static char *passwds_static[2] = { NULL, NULL };
+
+            passwds = passwds_static;
+            if (in == NULL) {
+                if (EVP_read_pw_string
+                    (passwd_malloc, passwd_malloc_size, "Password: ",
+                     !(passed_salt || in_noverify)) != 0)
+                    goto end;
+            }
+            passwds[0] = passwd_malloc;
+        } else {
+# endif
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "password required\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (in == NULL) {
+        assert(passwds != NULL);
+        assert(*passwds != NULL);
+
+        do {                    /* loop over list of passwords */
+            passwd = *passwds++;
+            if (!do_passwd(passed_salt, &salt, &salt_malloc, passwd, bio_out,
+                           quiet, table, reverse, pw_maxlen, usecrypt, use1,
+                           useapr1))
+                goto end;
+        } while (*passwds != NULL);
+    } else {
+        /* in != NULL */
+        int done;
+
+        assert(passwd != NULL);
+        do {
+            int r = BIO_gets(in, passwd, pw_maxlen + 1);
+            if (r > 0) {
+                char *c = (strchr(passwd, '\n'));
+                if (c != NULL) {
+                    *c = 0;     /* truncate at newline */
+                } else {
+                    /* ignore rest of line */
+                    char trash[BUFSIZ];
+                    do
+                        r = BIO_gets(in, trash, sizeof(trash));
+                    while ((r > 0) && (!strchr(trash, '\n')));
+                }
+
+                if (!do_passwd
+                    (passed_salt, &salt, &salt_malloc, passwd, bio_out, quiet,
+                     table, reverse, pw_maxlen, usecrypt, use1, useapr1))
+                    goto end;
+            }
+            done = (r <= 0);
+        } while (!done);
+    }
+    ret = 0;
+
+ end:
+    ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+    OPENSSL_free(salt_malloc);
+    OPENSSL_free(passwd_malloc);
+    BIO_free(in);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+# ifndef NO_MD5CRYPT_1
+/*
+ * MD5-based password algorithm (should probably be available as a library
+ * function; then the static buffer would not be acceptable). For magic
+ * string "1", this should be compatible to the MD5-based BSD password
+ * algorithm. For 'magic' string "apr1", this is compatible to the MD5-based
+ * Apache password algorithm. (Apparently, the Apache password algorithm is
+ * identical except that the 'magic' string was changed -- the laziest
+ * application of the NIH principle I've ever encountered.)
+ */
+static char *md5crypt(const char *passwd, const char *magic, const char *salt)
+{
+    /* "$apr1$..salt..$.......md5hash..........\0" */
+    static char out_buf[6 + 9 + 24 + 2];
+    unsigned char buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+    char *salt_out;
+    int n;
+    unsigned int i;
+    EVP_MD_CTX *md = NULL, *md2 = NULL;
+    size_t passwd_len, salt_len, magic_len;
+
+    passwd_len = strlen(passwd);
+    out_buf[0] = '$';
+    out_buf[1] = 0;
+    magic_len = strlen(magic);
+
+    if (magic_len > 4)    /* assert it's  "1" or "apr1" */
+        return NULL;
+
+    OPENSSL_strlcat(out_buf, magic, sizeof(out_buf));
+    OPENSSL_strlcat(out_buf, "$", sizeof(out_buf));
+    OPENSSL_strlcat(out_buf, salt, sizeof(out_buf));
+
+    if (strlen(out_buf) > 6 + 8) /* assert "$apr1$..salt.." */
+        return NULL;
+
+    salt_out = out_buf + 2 + magic_len;
+    salt_len = strlen(salt_out);
+
+    if (salt_len > 8)
+        return NULL;
+
+    md = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+    if (md == NULL
+        || !EVP_DigestInit_ex(md, EVP_md5(), NULL)
+        || !EVP_DigestUpdate(md, passwd, passwd_len)
+        || !EVP_DigestUpdate(md, "$", 1)
+        || !EVP_DigestUpdate(md, magic, magic_len)
+        || !EVP_DigestUpdate(md, "$", 1)
+        || !EVP_DigestUpdate(md, salt_out, salt_len))
+        goto err;
+
+    md2 = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+    if (md2 == NULL
+        || !EVP_DigestInit_ex(md2, EVP_md5(), NULL)
+        || !EVP_DigestUpdate(md2, passwd, passwd_len)
+        || !EVP_DigestUpdate(md2, salt_out, salt_len)
+        || !EVP_DigestUpdate(md2, passwd, passwd_len)
+        || !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md2, buf, NULL))
+        goto err;
+
+    for (i = passwd_len; i > sizeof(buf); i -= sizeof(buf)) {
+        if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md, buf, sizeof(buf)))
+            goto err;
+    }
+    if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md, buf, i))
+        goto err;
+
+    n = passwd_len;
+    while (n) {
+        if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md, (n & 1) ? "\0" : passwd, 1))
+            goto err;
+        n >>= 1;
+    }
+    if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md, buf, NULL))
+        return NULL;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < 1000; i++) {
+        if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(md2, EVP_md5(), NULL))
+            goto err;
+        if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md2,
+                              (i & 1) ? (unsigned const char *)passwd : buf,
+                              (i & 1) ? passwd_len : sizeof(buf)))
+            goto err;
+        if (i % 3) {
+            if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md2, salt_out, salt_len))
+                goto err;
+        }
+        if (i % 7) {
+            if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md2, passwd, passwd_len))
+                goto err;
+        }
+        if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md2,
+                              (i & 1) ? buf : (unsigned const char *)passwd,
+                              (i & 1) ? sizeof(buf) : passwd_len))
+                goto err;
+        if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md2, buf, NULL))
+                goto err;
+    }
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(md2);
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(md);
+    md2 = NULL;
+    md = NULL;
+
+    {
+        /* transform buf into output string */
+        unsigned char buf_perm[sizeof(buf)];
+        int dest, source;
+        char *output;
+
+        /* silly output permutation */
+        for (dest = 0, source = 0; dest < 14;
+             dest++, source = (source + 6) % 17)
+            buf_perm[dest] = buf[source];
+        buf_perm[14] = buf[5];
+        buf_perm[15] = buf[11];
+#  ifndef PEDANTIC              /* Unfortunately, this generates a "no
+                                 * effect" warning */
+        assert(16 == sizeof(buf_perm));
+#  endif
+
+        output = salt_out + salt_len;
+        assert(output == out_buf + strlen(out_buf));
+
+        *output++ = '$';
+
+        for (i = 0; i < 15; i += 3) {
+            *output++ = cov_2char[buf_perm[i + 2] & 0x3f];
+            *output++ = cov_2char[((buf_perm[i + 1] & 0xf) << 2) |
+                                  (buf_perm[i + 2] >> 6)];
+            *output++ = cov_2char[((buf_perm[i] & 3) << 4) |
+                                  (buf_perm[i + 1] >> 4)];
+            *output++ = cov_2char[buf_perm[i] >> 2];
+        }
+        assert(i == 15);
+        *output++ = cov_2char[buf_perm[i] & 0x3f];
+        *output++ = cov_2char[buf_perm[i] >> 6];
+        *output = 0;
+        assert(strlen(out_buf) < sizeof(out_buf));
+    }
+
+    return out_buf;
+
+ err:
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(md2);
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(md);
+    return NULL;
+}
+# endif
+
+static int do_passwd(int passed_salt, char **salt_p, char **salt_malloc_p,
+                     char *passwd, BIO *out, int quiet, int table,
+                     int reverse, size_t pw_maxlen, int usecrypt, int use1,
+                     int useapr1)
+{
+    char *hash = NULL;
+
+    assert(salt_p != NULL);
+    assert(salt_malloc_p != NULL);
+
+    /* first make sure we have a salt */
+    if (!passed_salt) {
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
+        if (usecrypt) {
+            if (*salt_malloc_p == NULL)
+                *salt_p = *salt_malloc_p = app_malloc(3, "salt buffer");
+            if (RAND_bytes((unsigned char *)*salt_p, 2) <= 0)
+                goto end;
+            (*salt_p)[0] = cov_2char[(*salt_p)[0] & 0x3f]; /* 6 bits */
+            (*salt_p)[1] = cov_2char[(*salt_p)[1] & 0x3f]; /* 6 bits */
+            (*salt_p)[2] = 0;
+#  ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+            ascii2ebcdic(*salt_p, *salt_p, 2); /* des_crypt will convert back
+                                                * to ASCII */
+#  endif
+        }
+# endif                         /* !OPENSSL_NO_DES */
+
+# ifndef NO_MD5CRYPT_1
+        if (use1 || useapr1) {
+            int i;
+
+            if (*salt_malloc_p == NULL)
+                *salt_p = *salt_malloc_p = app_malloc(9, "salt buffer");
+            if (RAND_bytes((unsigned char *)*salt_p, 8) <= 0)
+                goto end;
+
+            for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
+                (*salt_p)[i] = cov_2char[(*salt_p)[i] & 0x3f]; /* 6 bits */
+            (*salt_p)[8] = 0;
+        }
+# endif                         /* !NO_MD5CRYPT_1 */
+    }
+
+    assert(*salt_p != NULL);
+
+    /* truncate password if necessary */
+    if ((strlen(passwd) > pw_maxlen)) {
+        if (!quiet)
+            /*
+             * XXX: really we should know how to print a size_t, not cast it
+             */
+            BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                       "Warning: truncating password to %u characters\n",
+                       (unsigned)pw_maxlen);
+        passwd[pw_maxlen] = 0;
+    }
+    assert(strlen(passwd) <= pw_maxlen);
+
+    /* now compute password hash */
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
+    if (usecrypt)
+        hash = DES_crypt(passwd, *salt_p);
+# endif
+# ifndef NO_MD5CRYPT_1
+    if (use1 || useapr1)
+        hash = md5crypt(passwd, (use1 ? "1" : "apr1"), *salt_p);
+# endif
+    assert(hash != NULL);
+
+    if (table && !reverse)
+        BIO_printf(out, "%s\t%s\n", passwd, hash);
+    else if (table && reverse)
+        BIO_printf(out, "%s\t%s\n", hash, passwd);
+    else
+        BIO_printf(out, "%s\n", hash);
+    return 1;
+
+ end:
+    return 0;
+}
+#else
+
+int passwd_main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    BIO_printf(bio_err, "Program not available.\n");
+    return (1);
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/pca-cert.srl b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/pca-cert.srl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2c7456e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/pca-cert.srl
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+07
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/pca-key.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/pca-key.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c6ad0e9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/pca-key.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/pca-req.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/pca-req.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5a8c5cb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/pca-req.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/pkcs12.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/pkcs12.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..85f649d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/pkcs12.c
@@ -0,0 +1,935 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_DES)
+NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT
+#else
+
+# include <stdio.h>
+# include <stdlib.h>
+# include <string.h>
+# include "apps.h"
+# include <openssl/crypto.h>
+# include <openssl/err.h>
+# include <openssl/pem.h>
+# include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
+
+# define NOKEYS          0x1
+# define NOCERTS         0x2
+# define INFO            0x4
+# define CLCERTS         0x8
+# define CACERTS         0x10
+
+static int get_cert_chain(X509 *cert, X509_STORE *store,
+                          STACK_OF(X509) **chain);
+int dump_certs_keys_p12(BIO *out, const PKCS12 *p12,
+                        const char *pass, int passlen, int options,
+                        char *pempass, const EVP_CIPHER *enc);
+int dump_certs_pkeys_bags(BIO *out, const STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags,
+                          const char *pass, int passlen, int options,
+                          char *pempass, const EVP_CIPHER *enc);
+int dump_certs_pkeys_bag(BIO *out, const PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bags,
+                         const char *pass, int passlen,
+                         int options, char *pempass, const EVP_CIPHER *enc);
+int print_attribs(BIO *out, const STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *attrlst,
+                  const char *name);
+void hex_prin(BIO *out, unsigned char *buf, int len);
+static int alg_print(const X509_ALGOR *alg);
+int cert_load(BIO *in, STACK_OF(X509) *sk);
+static int set_pbe(int *ppbe, const char *str);
+
+typedef enum OPTION_choice {
+    OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP,
+    OPT_CIPHER, OPT_NOKEYS, OPT_KEYEX, OPT_KEYSIG, OPT_NOCERTS, OPT_CLCERTS,
+    OPT_CACERTS, OPT_NOOUT, OPT_INFO, OPT_CHAIN, OPT_TWOPASS, OPT_NOMACVER,
+    OPT_DESCERT, OPT_EXPORT, OPT_NOITER, OPT_MACITER, OPT_NOMACITER,
+    OPT_NOMAC, OPT_LMK, OPT_NODES, OPT_MACALG, OPT_CERTPBE, OPT_KEYPBE,
+    OPT_RAND, OPT_INKEY, OPT_CERTFILE, OPT_NAME, OPT_CSP, OPT_CANAME,
+    OPT_IN, OPT_OUT, OPT_PASSIN, OPT_PASSOUT, OPT_PASSWORD, OPT_CAPATH,
+    OPT_CAFILE, OPT_NOCAPATH, OPT_NOCAFILE, OPT_ENGINE
+} OPTION_CHOICE;
+
+OPTIONS pkcs12_options[] = {
+    {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"},
+    {"nokeys", OPT_NOKEYS, '-', "Don't output private keys"},
+    {"keyex", OPT_KEYEX, '-', "Set MS key exchange type"},
+    {"keysig", OPT_KEYSIG, '-', "Set MS key signature type"},
+    {"nocerts", OPT_NOCERTS, '-', "Don't output certificates"},
+    {"clcerts", OPT_CLCERTS, '-', "Only output client certificates"},
+    {"cacerts", OPT_CACERTS, '-', "Only output CA certificates"},
+    {"noout", OPT_NOOUT, '-', "Don't output anything, just verify"},
+    {"info", OPT_INFO, '-', "Print info about PKCS#12 structure"},
+    {"chain", OPT_CHAIN, '-', "Add certificate chain"},
+    {"twopass", OPT_TWOPASS, '-', "Separate MAC, encryption passwords"},
+    {"nomacver", OPT_NOMACVER, '-', "Don't verify MAC"},
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC2
+    {"descert", OPT_DESCERT, '-',
+     "Encrypt output with 3DES (default RC2-40)"},
+    {"certpbe", OPT_CERTPBE, 's',
+     "Certificate PBE algorithm (default RC2-40)"},
+# else
+    {"descert", OPT_DESCERT, '-', "Encrypt output with 3DES (the default)"},
+    {"certpbe", OPT_CERTPBE, 's', "Certificate PBE algorithm (default 3DES)"},
+# endif
+    {"export", OPT_EXPORT, '-', "Output PKCS12 file"},
+    {"noiter", OPT_NOITER, '-', "Don't use encryption iteration"},
+    {"maciter", OPT_MACITER, '-', "Use MAC iteration"},
+    {"nomaciter", OPT_NOMACITER, '-', "Don't use MAC iteration"},
+    {"nomac", OPT_NOMAC, '-', "Don't generate MAC"},
+    {"LMK", OPT_LMK, '-',
+     "Add local machine keyset attribute to private key"},
+    {"nodes", OPT_NODES, '-', "Don't encrypt private keys"},
+    {"macalg", OPT_MACALG, 's',
+     "Digest algorithm used in MAC (default SHA1)"},
+    {"keypbe", OPT_KEYPBE, 's', "Private key PBE algorithm (default 3DES)"},
+    {"rand", OPT_RAND, 's',
+     "Load the file(s) into the random number generator"},
+    {"inkey", OPT_INKEY, 's', "Private key if not infile"},
+    {"certfile", OPT_CERTFILE, '<', "Load certs from file"},
+    {"name", OPT_NAME, 's', "Use name as friendly name"},
+    {"CSP", OPT_CSP, 's', "Microsoft CSP name"},
+    {"caname", OPT_CANAME, 's',
+     "Use name as CA friendly name (can be repeated)"},
+    {"in", OPT_IN, '<', "Input filename"},
+    {"out", OPT_OUT, '>', "Output filename"},
+    {"passin", OPT_PASSIN, 's', "Input file pass phrase source"},
+    {"passout", OPT_PASSOUT, 's', "Output file pass phrase source"},
+    {"password", OPT_PASSWORD, 's', "Set import/export password source"},
+    {"CApath", OPT_CAPATH, '/', "PEM-format directory of CA's"},
+    {"CAfile", OPT_CAFILE, '<', "PEM-format file of CA's"},
+    {"no-CAfile", OPT_NOCAFILE, '-',
+     "Do not load the default certificates file"},
+    {"no-CApath", OPT_NOCAPATH, '-',
+     "Do not load certificates from the default certificates directory"},
+    {"", OPT_CIPHER, '-', "Any supported cipher"},
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine, possibly a hardware device"},
+# endif
+    {NULL}
+};
+
+int pkcs12_main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    char *infile = NULL, *outfile = NULL, *keyname = NULL, *certfile = NULL;
+    char *name = NULL, *csp_name = NULL;
+    char pass[2048] = "", macpass[2048] = "";
+    int export_cert = 0, options = 0, chain = 0, twopass = 0, keytype = 0;
+    int iter = PKCS12_DEFAULT_ITER, maciter = PKCS12_DEFAULT_ITER;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC2
+    int cert_pbe = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC;
+# else
+    int cert_pbe = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC;
+# endif
+    int key_pbe = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC;
+    int ret = 1, macver = 1, add_lmk = 0, private = 0;
+    int noprompt = 0;
+    char *passinarg = NULL, *passoutarg = NULL, *passarg = NULL;
+    char *passin = NULL, *passout = NULL, *inrand = NULL, *macalg = NULL;
+    char *cpass = NULL, *mpass = NULL, *badpass = NULL;
+    const char *CApath = NULL, *CAfile = NULL, *prog;
+    int noCApath = 0, noCAfile = 0;
+    ENGINE *e = NULL;
+    BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL;
+    PKCS12 *p12 = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *canames = NULL;
+    const EVP_CIPHER *enc = EVP_des_ede3_cbc();
+    OPTION_CHOICE o;
+
+    prog = opt_init(argc, argv, pkcs12_options);
+    while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) {
+        switch (o) {
+        case OPT_EOF:
+        case OPT_ERR:
+ opthelp:
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog);
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_HELP:
+            opt_help(pkcs12_options);
+            ret = 0;
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_NOKEYS:
+            options |= NOKEYS;
+            break;
+        case OPT_KEYEX:
+            keytype = KEY_EX;
+            break;
+        case OPT_KEYSIG:
+            keytype = KEY_SIG;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NOCERTS:
+            options |= NOCERTS;
+            break;
+        case OPT_CLCERTS:
+            options |= CLCERTS;
+            break;
+        case OPT_CACERTS:
+            options |= CACERTS;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NOOUT:
+            options |= (NOKEYS | NOCERTS);
+            break;
+        case OPT_INFO:
+            options |= INFO;
+            break;
+        case OPT_CHAIN:
+            chain = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_TWOPASS:
+            twopass = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NOMACVER:
+            macver = 0;
+            break;
+        case OPT_DESCERT:
+            cert_pbe = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC;
+            break;
+        case OPT_EXPORT:
+            export_cert = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_CIPHER:
+            if (!opt_cipher(opt_unknown(), &enc))
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NOITER:
+            iter = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_MACITER:
+            maciter = PKCS12_DEFAULT_ITER;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NOMACITER:
+            maciter = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NOMAC:
+            maciter = -1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_MACALG:
+            macalg = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_NODES:
+            enc = NULL;
+            break;
+        case OPT_CERTPBE:
+            if (!set_pbe(&cert_pbe, opt_arg()))
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_KEYPBE:
+            if (!set_pbe(&key_pbe, opt_arg()))
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_RAND:
+            inrand = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_INKEY:
+            keyname = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_CERTFILE:
+            certfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_NAME:
+            name = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_LMK:
+            add_lmk = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_CSP:
+            csp_name = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_CANAME:
+            if (canames == NULL
+                && (canames = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null()) == NULL)
+                goto end;
+            sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(canames, opt_arg());
+            break;
+        case OPT_IN:
+            infile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_OUT:
+            outfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_PASSIN:
+            passinarg = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_PASSOUT:
+            passoutarg = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_PASSWORD:
+            passarg = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_CAPATH:
+            CApath = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_CAFILE:
+            CAfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_NOCAPATH:
+            noCApath = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NOCAFILE:
+            noCAfile = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_ENGINE:
+            e = setup_engine(opt_arg(), 0);
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    argc = opt_num_rest();
+    if (argc != 0)
+        goto opthelp;
+
+    private = 1;
+
+    if (passarg) {
+        if (export_cert)
+            passoutarg = passarg;
+        else
+            passinarg = passarg;
+    }
+
+    if (!app_passwd(passinarg, passoutarg, &passin, &passout)) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting passwords\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (!cpass) {
+        if (export_cert)
+            cpass = passout;
+        else
+            cpass = passin;
+    }
+
+    if (cpass) {
+        mpass = cpass;
+        noprompt = 1;
+    } else {
+        cpass = pass;
+        mpass = macpass;
+    }
+
+    if (export_cert || inrand) {
+        app_RAND_load_file(NULL, (inrand != NULL));
+        if (inrand != NULL)
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "%ld semi-random bytes loaded\n",
+                       app_RAND_load_files(inrand));
+    }
+
+    if (twopass) {
+        if (1) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_UI
+            if (EVP_read_pw_string
+                (macpass, sizeof(macpass), "Enter MAC Password:", export_cert)) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't read Password\n");
+                goto end;
+            }
+        } else {
+#endif
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Unsupported option -twopass\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (export_cert) {
+        EVP_PKEY *key = NULL;
+        X509 *ucert = NULL, *x = NULL;
+        STACK_OF(X509) *certs = NULL;
+        const EVP_MD *macmd = NULL;
+        unsigned char *catmp = NULL;
+        int i;
+
+        if ((options & (NOCERTS | NOKEYS)) == (NOCERTS | NOKEYS)) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Nothing to do!\n");
+            goto export_end;
+        }
+
+        if (options & NOCERTS)
+            chain = 0;
+
+        if (!(options & NOKEYS)) {
+            key = load_key(keyname ? keyname : infile,
+                           FORMAT_PEM, 1, passin, e, "private key");
+            if (!key)
+                goto export_end;
+        }
+
+        /* Load in all certs in input file */
+        if (!(options & NOCERTS)) {
+            if (!load_certs(infile, &certs, FORMAT_PEM, NULL,
+                            "certificates"))
+                goto export_end;
+
+            if (key) {
+                /* Look for matching private key */
+                for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
+                    x = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
+                    if (X509_check_private_key(x, key)) {
+                        ucert = x;
+                        /* Zero keyid and alias */
+                        X509_keyid_set1(ucert, NULL, 0);
+                        X509_alias_set1(ucert, NULL, 0);
+                        /* Remove from list */
+                        (void)sk_X509_delete(certs, i);
+                        break;
+                    }
+                }
+                if (!ucert) {
+                    BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                               "No certificate matches private key\n");
+                    goto export_end;
+                }
+            }
+
+        }
+
+        /* Add any more certificates asked for */
+        if (certfile) {
+            if (!load_certs(certfile, &certs, FORMAT_PEM, NULL,
+                            "certificates from certfile"))
+                goto export_end;
+        }
+
+        /* If chaining get chain from user cert */
+        if (chain) {
+            int vret;
+            STACK_OF(X509) *chain2;
+            X509_STORE *store;
+            if ((store = setup_verify(CAfile, CApath, noCAfile, noCApath))
+                    == NULL)
+                goto export_end;
+
+            vret = get_cert_chain(ucert, store, &chain2);
+            X509_STORE_free(store);
+
+            if (vret == X509_V_OK) {
+                /* Exclude verified certificate */
+                for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(chain2); i++)
+                    sk_X509_push(certs, sk_X509_value(chain2, i));
+                /* Free first certificate */
+                X509_free(sk_X509_value(chain2, 0));
+                sk_X509_free(chain2);
+            } else {
+                if (vret != X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED)
+                    BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error %s getting chain.\n",
+                               X509_verify_cert_error_string(vret));
+                else
+                    ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+                goto export_end;
+            }
+        }
+
+        /* Add any CA names */
+
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(canames); i++) {
+            catmp = (unsigned char *)sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(canames, i);
+            X509_alias_set1(sk_X509_value(certs, i), catmp, -1);
+        }
+
+        if (csp_name && key)
+            EVP_PKEY_add1_attr_by_NID(key, NID_ms_csp_name,
+                                      MBSTRING_ASC, (unsigned char *)csp_name,
+                                      -1);
+
+        if (add_lmk && key)
+            EVP_PKEY_add1_attr_by_NID(key, NID_LocalKeySet, 0, NULL, -1);
+
+        if (!noprompt) {
+            if (1) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_UI
+                if (EVP_read_pw_string(pass, sizeof(pass), "Enter Export Password:",
+                                       1)) {
+                    BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't read Password\n");
+                    goto export_end;
+                }
+            } else {
+#endif
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "Password required\n");
+                goto export_end;
+            }
+        }
+
+        if (!twopass)
+            OPENSSL_strlcpy(macpass, pass, sizeof(macpass));
+
+        p12 = PKCS12_create(cpass, name, key, ucert, certs,
+                            key_pbe, cert_pbe, iter, -1, keytype);
+
+        if (!p12) {
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            goto export_end;
+        }
+
+        if (macalg) {
+            if (!opt_md(macalg, &macmd))
+                goto opthelp;
+        }
+
+        if (maciter != -1)
+            PKCS12_set_mac(p12, mpass, -1, NULL, 0, maciter, macmd);
+
+        assert(private);
+
+        out = bio_open_owner(outfile, FORMAT_PKCS12, private);
+        if (out == NULL)
+            goto end;
+
+        i2d_PKCS12_bio(out, p12);
+
+        ret = 0;
+
+ export_end:
+
+        EVP_PKEY_free(key);
+        sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
+        X509_free(ucert);
+
+        goto end;
+
+    }
+
+    in = bio_open_default(infile, 'r', FORMAT_PKCS12);
+    if (in == NULL)
+        goto end;
+    out = bio_open_owner(outfile, FORMAT_PEM, private);
+    if (out == NULL)
+        goto end;
+
+    if ((p12 = d2i_PKCS12_bio(in, NULL)) == NULL) {
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (!noprompt) {
+        if (1) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_UI
+            if (EVP_read_pw_string(pass, sizeof(pass), "Enter Import Password:",
+                                   0)) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't read Password\n");
+                goto end;
+            }
+        } else {
+#endif
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Password required\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (!twopass)
+        OPENSSL_strlcpy(macpass, pass, sizeof(macpass));
+
+    if ((options & INFO) && PKCS12_mac_present(p12)) {
+        const ASN1_INTEGER *tmaciter;
+        const X509_ALGOR *macalgid;
+        const ASN1_OBJECT *macobj;
+        PKCS12_get0_mac(NULL, &macalgid, NULL, &tmaciter, p12);
+        X509_ALGOR_get0(&macobj, NULL, NULL, macalgid);
+        BIO_puts(bio_err, "MAC:");
+        i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bio_err, macobj);
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, " Iteration %ld\n",
+                   tmaciter  != NULL ? ASN1_INTEGER_get(tmaciter) : 1L);
+    }
+    if (macver) {
+        /* If we enter empty password try no password first */
+        if (!mpass[0] && PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, NULL, 0)) {
+            /* If mac and crypto pass the same set it to NULL too */
+            if (!twopass)
+                cpass = NULL;
+        } else if (!PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, mpass, -1)) {
+            /*
+             * May be UTF8 from previous version of OpenSSL:
+             * convert to a UTF8 form which will translate
+             * to the same Unicode password.
+             */
+            unsigned char *utmp;
+            int utmplen;
+            utmp = OPENSSL_asc2uni(mpass, -1, NULL, &utmplen);
+            if (utmp == NULL)
+                goto end;
+            badpass = OPENSSL_uni2utf8(utmp, utmplen);
+            OPENSSL_free(utmp);
+            if (!PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, badpass, -1)) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "Mac verify error: invalid password?\n");
+                ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+                goto end;
+            } else {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "Warning: using broken algorithm\n");
+                if (!twopass)
+                    cpass = badpass;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    assert(private);
+    if (!dump_certs_keys_p12(out, p12, cpass, -1, options, passout, enc)) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error outputting keys and certificates\n");
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        goto end;
+    }
+    ret = 0;
+ end:
+    PKCS12_free(p12);
+    if (export_cert || inrand)
+        app_RAND_write_file(NULL);
+    release_engine(e);
+    BIO_free(in);
+    BIO_free_all(out);
+    sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(canames);
+    OPENSSL_free(badpass);
+    OPENSSL_free(passin);
+    OPENSSL_free(passout);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+int dump_certs_keys_p12(BIO *out, const PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass,
+                        int passlen, int options, char *pempass,
+                        const EVP_CIPHER *enc)
+{
+    STACK_OF(PKCS7) *asafes = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags;
+    int i, bagnid;
+    int ret = 0;
+    PKCS7 *p7;
+
+    if ((asafes = PKCS12_unpack_authsafes(p12)) == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_PKCS7_num(asafes); i++) {
+        p7 = sk_PKCS7_value(asafes, i);
+        bagnid = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
+        if (bagnid == NID_pkcs7_data) {
+            bags = PKCS12_unpack_p7data(p7);
+            if (options & INFO)
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "PKCS7 Data\n");
+        } else if (bagnid == NID_pkcs7_encrypted) {
+            if (options & INFO) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "PKCS7 Encrypted data: ");
+                alg_print(p7->d.encrypted->enc_data->algorithm);
+            }
+            bags = PKCS12_unpack_p7encdata(p7, pass, passlen);
+        } else
+            continue;
+        if (!bags)
+            goto err;
+        if (!dump_certs_pkeys_bags(out, bags, pass, passlen,
+                                   options, pempass, enc)) {
+            sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_pop_free(bags, PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_pop_free(bags, PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free);
+        bags = NULL;
+    }
+    ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+    sk_PKCS7_pop_free(asafes, PKCS7_free);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int dump_certs_pkeys_bags(BIO *out, const STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags,
+                          const char *pass, int passlen, int options,
+                          char *pempass, const EVP_CIPHER *enc)
+{
+    int i;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_num(bags); i++) {
+        if (!dump_certs_pkeys_bag(out,
+                                  sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_value(bags, i),
+                                  pass, passlen, options, pempass, enc))
+            return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int dump_certs_pkeys_bag(BIO *out, const PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag,
+                         const char *pass, int passlen, int options,
+                         char *pempass, const EVP_CIPHER *enc)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+    PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8;
+    const PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8c;
+    X509 *x509;
+    const STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *attrs;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    attrs = PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get0_attrs(bag);
+
+    switch (PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get_nid(bag)) {
+    case NID_keyBag:
+        if (options & INFO)
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Key bag\n");
+        if (options & NOKEYS)
+            return 1;
+        print_attribs(out, attrs, "Bag Attributes");
+        p8c = PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get0_p8inf(bag);
+        if ((pkey = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(p8c)) == NULL)
+            return 0;
+        print_attribs(out, PKCS8_pkey_get0_attrs(p8c), "Key Attributes");
+        ret = PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey(out, pkey, enc, NULL, 0, NULL, pempass);
+        EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+        break;
+
+    case NID_pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag:
+        if (options & INFO) {
+            const X509_SIG *tp8;
+            const X509_ALGOR *tp8alg;
+
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Shrouded Keybag: ");
+            tp8 = PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get0_pkcs8(bag);
+            X509_SIG_get0(tp8, &tp8alg, NULL);
+            alg_print(tp8alg);
+        }
+        if (options & NOKEYS)
+            return 1;
+        print_attribs(out, attrs, "Bag Attributes");
+        if ((p8 = PKCS12_decrypt_skey(bag, pass, passlen)) == NULL)
+            return 0;
+        if ((pkey = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(p8)) == NULL) {
+            PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        print_attribs(out, PKCS8_pkey_get0_attrs(p8), "Key Attributes");
+        PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8);
+        ret = PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey(out, pkey, enc, NULL, 0, NULL, pempass);
+        EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+        break;
+
+    case NID_certBag:
+        if (options & INFO)
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Certificate bag\n");
+        if (options & NOCERTS)
+            return 1;
+        if (PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get0_attr(bag, NID_localKeyID)) {
+            if (options & CACERTS)
+                return 1;
+        } else if (options & CLCERTS)
+            return 1;
+        print_attribs(out, attrs, "Bag Attributes");
+        if (PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get_bag_nid(bag) != NID_x509Certificate)
+            return 1;
+        if ((x509 = PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get1_cert(bag)) == NULL)
+            return 0;
+        dump_cert_text(out, x509);
+        ret = PEM_write_bio_X509(out, x509);
+        X509_free(x509);
+        break;
+
+    case NID_safeContentsBag:
+        if (options & INFO)
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Safe Contents bag\n");
+        print_attribs(out, attrs, "Bag Attributes");
+        return dump_certs_pkeys_bags(out, PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get0_safes(bag),
+                                     pass, passlen, options, pempass, enc);
+
+    default:
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Warning unsupported bag type: ");
+        i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bio_err, PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get0_type(bag));
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n");
+        return 1;
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/* Given a single certificate return a verified chain or NULL if error */
+
+static int get_cert_chain(X509 *cert, X509_STORE *store,
+                          STACK_OF(X509) **chain)
+{
+    X509_STORE_CTX *store_ctx = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(X509) *chn = NULL;
+    int i = 0;
+
+    store_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
+    if (store_ctx == NULL) {
+        i =  X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
+        goto end;
+    }
+    if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(store_ctx, store, cert, NULL)) {
+        i =  X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+
+    if (X509_verify_cert(store_ctx) > 0)
+        chn = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(store_ctx);
+    else if ((i = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(store_ctx)) == 0)
+        i = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+end:
+    X509_STORE_CTX_free(store_ctx);
+    *chain = chn;
+    return i;
+}
+
+static int alg_print(const X509_ALGOR *alg)
+{
+    int pbenid, aparamtype;
+    const ASN1_OBJECT *aoid;
+    const void *aparam;
+    PBEPARAM *pbe = NULL;
+
+    X509_ALGOR_get0(&aoid, &aparamtype, &aparam, alg);
+
+    pbenid = OBJ_obj2nid(aoid);
+
+    BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s", OBJ_nid2ln(pbenid));
+
+    /*
+     * If PBE algorithm is PBES2 decode algorithm parameters
+     * for additional details.
+     */
+    if (pbenid == NID_pbes2) {
+        PBE2PARAM *pbe2 = NULL;
+        int encnid;
+        if (aparamtype == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
+            pbe2 = ASN1_item_unpack(aparam, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PBE2PARAM));
+        if (pbe2 == NULL) {
+            BIO_puts(bio_err, "<unsupported parameters>");
+            goto done;
+        }
+        X509_ALGOR_get0(&aoid, &aparamtype, &aparam, pbe2->keyfunc);
+        pbenid = OBJ_obj2nid(aoid);
+        X509_ALGOR_get0(&aoid, NULL, NULL, pbe2->encryption);
+        encnid = OBJ_obj2nid(aoid);
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, ", %s, %s", OBJ_nid2ln(pbenid),
+                   OBJ_nid2sn(encnid));
+        /* If KDF is PBKDF2 decode parameters */
+        if (pbenid == NID_id_pbkdf2) {
+            PBKDF2PARAM *kdf = NULL;
+            int prfnid;
+            if (aparamtype == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
+                kdf = ASN1_item_unpack(aparam, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PBKDF2PARAM));
+            if (kdf == NULL) {
+                BIO_puts(bio_err, "<unsupported parameters>");
+                goto done;
+            }
+
+            if (kdf->prf == NULL) {
+                prfnid = NID_hmacWithSHA1;
+            } else {
+                X509_ALGOR_get0(&aoid, NULL, NULL, kdf->prf);
+                prfnid = OBJ_obj2nid(aoid);
+            }
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, ", Iteration %ld, PRF %s",
+                       ASN1_INTEGER_get(kdf->iter), OBJ_nid2sn(prfnid));
+            PBKDF2PARAM_free(kdf);
+        }
+        PBE2PARAM_free(pbe2);
+    } else {
+        if (aparamtype == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
+            pbe = ASN1_item_unpack(aparam, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PBEPARAM));
+        if (pbe == NULL) {
+            BIO_puts(bio_err, "<unsupported parameters>");
+            goto done;
+        }
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, ", Iteration %ld", ASN1_INTEGER_get(pbe->iter));
+        PBEPARAM_free(pbe);
+    }
+ done:
+    BIO_puts(bio_err, "\n");
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Load all certificates from a given file */
+
+int cert_load(BIO *in, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
+{
+    int ret;
+    X509 *cert;
+    ret = 0;
+    while ((cert = PEM_read_bio_X509(in, NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
+        ret = 1;
+        sk_X509_push(sk, cert);
+    }
+    if (ret)
+        ERR_clear_error();
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/* Generalised attribute print: handle PKCS#8 and bag attributes */
+
+int print_attribs(BIO *out, const STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *attrlst,
+                  const char *name)
+{
+    X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr;
+    ASN1_TYPE *av;
+    char *value;
+    int i, attr_nid;
+    if (!attrlst) {
+        BIO_printf(out, "%s: <No Attributes>\n", name);
+        return 1;
+    }
+    if (!sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_num(attrlst)) {
+        BIO_printf(out, "%s: <Empty Attributes>\n", name);
+        return 1;
+    }
+    BIO_printf(out, "%s\n", name);
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_num(attrlst); i++) {
+        ASN1_OBJECT *attr_obj;
+        attr = sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_value(attrlst, i);
+        attr_obj = X509_ATTRIBUTE_get0_object(attr);
+        attr_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(attr_obj);
+        BIO_printf(out, "    ");
+        if (attr_nid == NID_undef) {
+            i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(out, attr_obj);
+            BIO_printf(out, ": ");
+        } else
+            BIO_printf(out, "%s: ", OBJ_nid2ln(attr_nid));
+
+        if (X509_ATTRIBUTE_count(attr)) {
+            av = X509_ATTRIBUTE_get0_type(attr, 0);
+            switch (av->type) {
+            case V_ASN1_BMPSTRING:
+                value = OPENSSL_uni2asc(av->value.bmpstring->data,
+                                        av->value.bmpstring->length);
+                BIO_printf(out, "%s\n", value);
+                OPENSSL_free(value);
+                break;
+
+            case V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING:
+                hex_prin(out, av->value.octet_string->data,
+                         av->value.octet_string->length);
+                BIO_printf(out, "\n");
+                break;
+
+            case V_ASN1_BIT_STRING:
+                hex_prin(out, av->value.bit_string->data,
+                         av->value.bit_string->length);
+                BIO_printf(out, "\n");
+                break;
+
+            default:
+                BIO_printf(out, "<Unsupported tag %d>\n", av->type);
+                break;
+            }
+        } else
+            BIO_printf(out, "<No Values>\n");
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+void hex_prin(BIO *out, unsigned char *buf, int len)
+{
+    int i;
+    for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
+        BIO_printf(out, "%02X ", buf[i]);
+}
+
+static int set_pbe(int *ppbe, const char *str)
+{
+    if (!str)
+        return 0;
+    if (strcmp(str, "NONE") == 0) {
+        *ppbe = -1;
+        return 1;
+    }
+    *ppbe = OBJ_txt2nid(str);
+    if (*ppbe == NID_undef) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Unknown PBE algorithm %s\n", str);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/pkcs7.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/pkcs7.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..209e30d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/pkcs7.c
@@ -0,0 +1,197 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include "apps.h"
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/pkcs7.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+
+typedef enum OPTION_choice {
+    OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP,
+    OPT_INFORM, OPT_OUTFORM, OPT_IN, OPT_OUT, OPT_NOOUT,
+    OPT_TEXT, OPT_PRINT, OPT_PRINT_CERTS, OPT_ENGINE
+} OPTION_CHOICE;
+
+OPTIONS pkcs7_options[] = {
+    {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"},
+    {"inform", OPT_INFORM, 'F', "Input format - DER or PEM"},
+    {"in", OPT_IN, '<', "Input file"},
+    {"outform", OPT_OUTFORM, 'F', "Output format - DER or PEM"},
+    {"out", OPT_OUT, '>', "Output file"},
+    {"noout", OPT_NOOUT, '-', "Don't output encoded data"},
+    {"text", OPT_TEXT, '-', "Print full details of certificates"},
+    {"print", OPT_PRINT, '-', "Print out all fields of the PKCS7 structure"},
+    {"print_certs", OPT_PRINT_CERTS, '-',
+     "Print_certs  print any certs or crl in the input"},
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine, possibly a hardware device"},
+#endif
+    {NULL}
+};
+
+int pkcs7_main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    ENGINE *e = NULL;
+    PKCS7 *p7 = NULL;
+    BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL;
+    int informat = FORMAT_PEM, outformat = FORMAT_PEM;
+    char *infile = NULL, *outfile = NULL, *prog;
+    int i, print_certs = 0, text = 0, noout = 0, p7_print = 0, ret = 1;
+    OPTION_CHOICE o;
+
+    prog = opt_init(argc, argv, pkcs7_options);
+    while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) {
+        switch (o) {
+        case OPT_EOF:
+        case OPT_ERR:
+ opthelp:
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog);
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_HELP:
+            opt_help(pkcs7_options);
+            ret = 0;
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_INFORM:
+            if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PEMDER, &informat))
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_OUTFORM:
+            if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PEMDER, &outformat))
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_IN:
+            infile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_OUT:
+            outfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_NOOUT:
+            noout = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_TEXT:
+            text = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_PRINT:
+            p7_print = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_PRINT_CERTS:
+            print_certs = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_ENGINE:
+            e = setup_engine(opt_arg(), 0);
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    argc = opt_num_rest();
+    if (argc != 0)
+        goto opthelp;
+
+    in = bio_open_default(infile, 'r', informat);
+    if (in == NULL)
+        goto end;
+
+    if (informat == FORMAT_ASN1)
+        p7 = d2i_PKCS7_bio(in, NULL);
+    else
+        p7 = PEM_read_bio_PKCS7(in, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+    if (p7 == NULL) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to load PKCS7 object\n");
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    out = bio_open_default(outfile, 'w', outformat);
+    if (out == NULL)
+        goto end;
+
+    if (p7_print)
+        PKCS7_print_ctx(out, p7, 0, NULL);
+
+    if (print_certs) {
+        STACK_OF(X509) *certs = NULL;
+        STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls = NULL;
+
+        i = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
+        switch (i) {
+        case NID_pkcs7_signed:
+            if (p7->d.sign != NULL) {
+                certs = p7->d.sign->cert;
+                crls = p7->d.sign->crl;
+            }
+            break;
+        case NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped:
+            if (p7->d.signed_and_enveloped != NULL) {
+                certs = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->cert;
+                crls = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->crl;
+            }
+            break;
+        default:
+            break;
+        }
+
+        if (certs != NULL) {
+            X509 *x;
+
+            for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
+                x = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
+                if (text)
+                    X509_print(out, x);
+                else
+                    dump_cert_text(out, x);
+
+                if (!noout)
+                    PEM_write_bio_X509(out, x);
+                BIO_puts(out, "\n");
+            }
+        }
+        if (crls != NULL) {
+            X509_CRL *crl;
+
+            for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
+                crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
+
+                X509_CRL_print(out, crl);
+
+                if (!noout)
+                    PEM_write_bio_X509_CRL(out, crl);
+                BIO_puts(out, "\n");
+            }
+        }
+
+        ret = 0;
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (!noout) {
+        if (outformat == FORMAT_ASN1)
+            i = i2d_PKCS7_bio(out, p7);
+        else
+            i = PEM_write_bio_PKCS7(out, p7);
+
+        if (!i) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to write pkcs7 object\n");
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+    ret = 0;
+ end:
+    PKCS7_free(p7);
+    release_engine(e);
+    BIO_free(in);
+    BIO_free_all(out);
+    return (ret);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/pkcs8.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/pkcs8.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0874370
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/pkcs8.c
@@ -0,0 +1,353 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include "apps.h"
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
+
+typedef enum OPTION_choice {
+    OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP,
+    OPT_INFORM, OPT_OUTFORM, OPT_ENGINE, OPT_IN, OPT_OUT,
+    OPT_TOPK8, OPT_NOITER, OPT_NOCRYPT,
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCRYPT
+    OPT_SCRYPT, OPT_SCRYPT_N, OPT_SCRYPT_R, OPT_SCRYPT_P,
+#endif
+    OPT_V2, OPT_V1, OPT_V2PRF, OPT_ITER, OPT_PASSIN, OPT_PASSOUT,
+    OPT_TRADITIONAL
+} OPTION_CHOICE;
+
+OPTIONS pkcs8_options[] = {
+    {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"},
+    {"inform", OPT_INFORM, 'F', "Input format (DER or PEM)"},
+    {"outform", OPT_OUTFORM, 'F', "Output format (DER or PEM)"},
+    {"in", OPT_IN, '<', "Input file"},
+    {"out", OPT_OUT, '>', "Output file"},
+    {"topk8", OPT_TOPK8, '-', "Output PKCS8 file"},
+    {"noiter", OPT_NOITER, '-', "Use 1 as iteration count"},
+    {"nocrypt", OPT_NOCRYPT, '-', "Use or expect unencrypted private key"},
+    {"v2", OPT_V2, 's', "Use PKCS#5 v2.0 and cipher"},
+    {"v1", OPT_V1, 's', "Use PKCS#5 v1.5 and cipher"},
+    {"v2prf", OPT_V2PRF, 's', "Set the PRF algorithm to use with PKCS#5 v2.0"},
+    {"iter", OPT_ITER, 'p', "Specify the iteration count"},
+    {"passin", OPT_PASSIN, 's', "Input file pass phrase source"},
+    {"passout", OPT_PASSOUT, 's', "Output file pass phrase source"},
+    {"traditional", OPT_TRADITIONAL, '-', "use traditional format private key"},
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine, possibly a hardware device"},
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCRYPT
+    {"scrypt", OPT_SCRYPT, '-', "Use scrypt algorithm"},
+    {"scrypt_N", OPT_SCRYPT_N, 's', "Set scrypt N parameter"},
+    {"scrypt_r", OPT_SCRYPT_R, 's', "Set scrypt r parameter"},
+    {"scrypt_p", OPT_SCRYPT_P, 's', "Set scrypt p parameter"},
+#endif
+    {NULL}
+};
+
+int pkcs8_main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL;
+    ENGINE *e = NULL;
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+    PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf = NULL;
+    X509_SIG *p8 = NULL;
+    const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL;
+    char *infile = NULL, *outfile = NULL;
+    char *passinarg = NULL, *passoutarg = NULL, *prog;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_UI
+    char pass[APP_PASS_LEN];
+#endif
+    char *passin = NULL, *passout = NULL, *p8pass = NULL;
+    OPTION_CHOICE o;
+    int nocrypt = 0, ret = 1, iter = PKCS12_DEFAULT_ITER;
+    int informat = FORMAT_PEM, outformat = FORMAT_PEM, topk8 = 0, pbe_nid = -1;
+    int private = 0, traditional = 0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCRYPT
+    long scrypt_N = 0, scrypt_r = 0, scrypt_p = 0;
+#endif
+
+    prog = opt_init(argc, argv, pkcs8_options);
+    while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) {
+        switch (o) {
+        case OPT_EOF:
+        case OPT_ERR:
+ opthelp:
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog);
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_HELP:
+            opt_help(pkcs8_options);
+            ret = 0;
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_INFORM:
+            if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PEMDER, &informat))
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_IN:
+            infile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_OUTFORM:
+            if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PEMDER, &outformat))
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_OUT:
+            outfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_TOPK8:
+            topk8 = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NOITER:
+            iter = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NOCRYPT:
+            nocrypt = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_TRADITIONAL:
+            traditional = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_V2:
+            if (!opt_cipher(opt_arg(), &cipher))
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_V1:
+            pbe_nid = OBJ_txt2nid(opt_arg());
+            if (pbe_nid == NID_undef) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                           "%s: Unknown PBE algorithm %s\n", prog, opt_arg());
+                goto opthelp;
+            }
+            break;
+        case OPT_V2PRF:
+            pbe_nid = OBJ_txt2nid(opt_arg());
+            if (!EVP_PBE_find(EVP_PBE_TYPE_PRF, pbe_nid, NULL, NULL, 0)) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                           "%s: Unknown PRF algorithm %s\n", prog, opt_arg());
+                goto opthelp;
+            }
+            if (cipher == NULL)
+                cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc();
+            break;
+        case OPT_ITER:
+            if (!opt_int(opt_arg(), &iter))
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_PASSIN:
+            passinarg = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_PASSOUT:
+            passoutarg = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_ENGINE:
+            e = setup_engine(opt_arg(), 0);
+            break;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCRYPT
+        case OPT_SCRYPT:
+            scrypt_N = 16384;
+            scrypt_r = 8;
+            scrypt_p = 1;
+            if (cipher == NULL)
+                cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc();
+            break;
+        case OPT_SCRYPT_N:
+            if (!opt_long(opt_arg(), &scrypt_N) || scrypt_N <= 0)
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_SCRYPT_R:
+            if (!opt_long(opt_arg(), &scrypt_r) || scrypt_r <= 0)
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_SCRYPT_P:
+            if (!opt_long(opt_arg(), &scrypt_p) || scrypt_p <= 0)
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+#endif
+        }
+    }
+    argc = opt_num_rest();
+    if (argc != 0)
+        goto opthelp;
+
+    private = 1;
+
+    if (!app_passwd(passinarg, passoutarg, &passin, &passout)) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting passwords\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if ((pbe_nid == -1) && cipher == NULL)
+        cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc();
+
+    in = bio_open_default(infile, 'r', informat);
+    if (in == NULL)
+        goto end;
+    out = bio_open_owner(outfile, outformat, private);
+    if (out == NULL)
+        goto end;
+
+    if (topk8) {
+        pkey = load_key(infile, informat, 1, passin, e, "key");
+        if (!pkey)
+            goto end;
+        if ((p8inf = EVP_PKEY2PKCS8(pkey)) == NULL) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error converting key\n");
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            goto end;
+        }
+        if (nocrypt) {
+            assert(private);
+            if (outformat == FORMAT_PEM)
+                PEM_write_bio_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO(out, p8inf);
+            else if (outformat == FORMAT_ASN1)
+                i2d_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_bio(out, p8inf);
+            else {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "Bad format specified for key\n");
+                goto end;
+            }
+        } else {
+            X509_ALGOR *pbe;
+            if (cipher) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCRYPT
+                if (scrypt_N && scrypt_r && scrypt_p)
+                    pbe = PKCS5_pbe2_set_scrypt(cipher, NULL, 0, NULL,
+                                                scrypt_N, scrypt_r, scrypt_p);
+                else
+#endif
+                    pbe = PKCS5_pbe2_set_iv(cipher, iter, NULL, 0, NULL,
+                                            pbe_nid);
+            } else {
+                pbe = PKCS5_pbe_set(pbe_nid, iter, NULL, 0);
+            }
+            if (pbe == NULL) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error setting PBE algorithm\n");
+                ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+                goto end;
+            }
+            if (passout)
+                p8pass = passout;
+            else if (1) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_UI
+                p8pass = pass;
+                if (EVP_read_pw_string
+                    (pass, sizeof(pass), "Enter Encryption Password:", 1)) {
+                    X509_ALGOR_free(pbe);
+                    goto end;
+                }
+            } else {
+#endif
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "Password required\n");
+                goto end;
+            }
+            app_RAND_load_file(NULL, 0);
+            p8 = PKCS8_set0_pbe(p8pass, strlen(p8pass), p8inf, pbe);
+            if (p8 == NULL) {
+                X509_ALGOR_free(pbe);
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error encrypting key\n");
+                ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+                goto end;
+            }
+            app_RAND_write_file(NULL);
+            assert(private);
+            if (outformat == FORMAT_PEM)
+                PEM_write_bio_PKCS8(out, p8);
+            else if (outformat == FORMAT_ASN1)
+                i2d_PKCS8_bio(out, p8);
+            else {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "Bad format specified for key\n");
+                goto end;
+            }
+        }
+
+        ret = 0;
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (nocrypt) {
+        if (informat == FORMAT_PEM)
+            p8inf = PEM_read_bio_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO(in, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+        else if (informat == FORMAT_ASN1)
+            p8inf = d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_bio(in, NULL);
+        else {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Bad format specified for key\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+    } else {
+        if (informat == FORMAT_PEM)
+            p8 = PEM_read_bio_PKCS8(in, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+        else if (informat == FORMAT_ASN1)
+            p8 = d2i_PKCS8_bio(in, NULL);
+        else {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Bad format specified for key\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+
+        if (!p8) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error reading key\n");
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            goto end;
+        }
+        if (passin)
+            p8pass = passin;
+        else if (1) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_UI
+            p8pass = pass;
+            if (EVP_read_pw_string(pass, sizeof(pass), "Enter Password:", 0)) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't read Password\n");
+                goto end;
+            }
+        } else {
+#endif
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Password required\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+        p8inf = PKCS8_decrypt(p8, p8pass, strlen(p8pass));
+    }
+
+    if (!p8inf) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error decrypting key\n");
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if ((pkey = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(p8inf)) == NULL) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error converting key\n");
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    assert(private);
+    if (outformat == FORMAT_PEM) {
+        if (traditional)
+            PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey_traditional(out, pkey, NULL, NULL, 0,
+                                                 NULL, passout);
+        else
+            PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey(out, pkey, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, passout);
+    } else if (outformat == FORMAT_ASN1) {
+        i2d_PrivateKey_bio(out, pkey);
+    } else {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Bad format specified for key\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+    ret = 0;
+
+ end:
+    X509_SIG_free(p8);
+    PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8inf);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+    release_engine(e);
+    BIO_free_all(out);
+    BIO_free(in);
+    OPENSSL_free(passin);
+    OPENSSL_free(passout);
+
+    return ret;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/pkey.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/pkey.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ad1a3b1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/pkey.c
@@ -0,0 +1,190 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include "apps.h"
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+typedef enum OPTION_choice {
+    OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP,
+    OPT_INFORM, OPT_OUTFORM, OPT_PASSIN, OPT_PASSOUT, OPT_ENGINE,
+    OPT_IN, OPT_OUT, OPT_PUBIN, OPT_PUBOUT, OPT_TEXT_PUB,
+    OPT_TEXT, OPT_NOOUT, OPT_MD, OPT_TRADITIONAL
+} OPTION_CHOICE;
+
+OPTIONS pkey_options[] = {
+    {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"},
+    {"inform", OPT_INFORM, 'f', "Input format (DER or PEM)"},
+    {"outform", OPT_OUTFORM, 'F', "Output format (DER or PEM)"},
+    {"passin", OPT_PASSIN, 's', "Input file pass phrase source"},
+    {"passout", OPT_PASSOUT, 's', "Output file pass phrase source"},
+    {"in", OPT_IN, 's', "Input key"},
+    {"out", OPT_OUT, '>', "Output file"},
+    {"pubin", OPT_PUBIN, '-',
+     "Read public key from input (default is private key)"},
+    {"pubout", OPT_PUBOUT, '-', "Output public key, not private"},
+    {"text_pub", OPT_TEXT_PUB, '-', "Only output public key components"},
+    {"text", OPT_TEXT, '-', "Output in plaintext as well"},
+    {"noout", OPT_NOOUT, '-', "Don't output the key"},
+    {"", OPT_MD, '-', "Any supported cipher"},
+    {"traditional", OPT_TRADITIONAL, '-',
+     "Use traditional format for private keys"},
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine, possibly a hardware device"},
+#endif
+    {NULL}
+};
+
+int pkey_main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL;
+    ENGINE *e = NULL;
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+    const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL;
+    char *infile = NULL, *outfile = NULL, *passin = NULL, *passout = NULL;
+    char *passinarg = NULL, *passoutarg = NULL, *prog;
+    OPTION_CHOICE o;
+    int informat = FORMAT_PEM, outformat = FORMAT_PEM;
+    int pubin = 0, pubout = 0, pubtext = 0, text = 0, noout = 0, ret = 1;
+    int private = 0, traditional = 0;
+
+    prog = opt_init(argc, argv, pkey_options);
+    while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) {
+        switch (o) {
+        case OPT_EOF:
+        case OPT_ERR:
+ opthelp:
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog);
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_HELP:
+            opt_help(pkey_options);
+            ret = 0;
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_INFORM:
+            if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_ANY, &informat))
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_OUTFORM:
+            if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PEMDER, &outformat))
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_PASSIN:
+            passinarg = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_PASSOUT:
+            passoutarg = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_ENGINE:
+            e = setup_engine(opt_arg(), 0);
+            break;
+        case OPT_IN:
+            infile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_OUT:
+            outfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_PUBIN:
+            pubin = pubout = pubtext = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_PUBOUT:
+            pubout = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_TEXT_PUB:
+            pubtext = text = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_TEXT:
+            text = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NOOUT:
+            noout = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_TRADITIONAL:
+            traditional = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_MD:
+            if (!opt_cipher(opt_unknown(), &cipher))
+                goto opthelp;
+        }
+    }
+    argc = opt_num_rest();
+    if (argc != 0)
+        goto opthelp;
+
+    private = !noout && !pubout ? 1 : 0;
+    if (text && !pubtext)
+        private = 1;
+
+    if (!app_passwd(passinarg, passoutarg, &passin, &passout)) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting passwords\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    out = bio_open_owner(outfile, outformat, private);
+    if (out == NULL)
+        goto end;
+
+    if (pubin)
+        pkey = load_pubkey(infile, informat, 1, passin, e, "Public Key");
+    else
+        pkey = load_key(infile, informat, 1, passin, e, "key");
+    if (!pkey)
+        goto end;
+
+    if (!noout) {
+        if (outformat == FORMAT_PEM) {
+            if (pubout)
+                PEM_write_bio_PUBKEY(out, pkey);
+            else {
+                assert(private);
+                if (traditional)
+                    PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey_traditional(out, pkey, cipher,
+                                                         NULL, 0, NULL,
+                                                         passout);
+                else
+                    PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey(out, pkey, cipher,
+                                             NULL, 0, NULL, passout);
+            }
+        } else if (outformat == FORMAT_ASN1) {
+            if (pubout)
+                i2d_PUBKEY_bio(out, pkey);
+            else {
+                assert(private);
+                i2d_PrivateKey_bio(out, pkey);
+            }
+        } else {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Bad format specified for key\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+
+    }
+
+    if (text) {
+        if (pubtext)
+            EVP_PKEY_print_public(out, pkey, 0, NULL);
+        else {
+            assert(private);
+            EVP_PKEY_print_private(out, pkey, 0, NULL);
+        }
+    }
+
+    ret = 0;
+
+ end:
+    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+    release_engine(e);
+    BIO_free_all(out);
+    BIO_free(in);
+    OPENSSL_free(passin);
+    OPENSSL_free(passout);
+
+    return ret;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/pkeyparam.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/pkeyparam.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0a1b2d1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/pkeyparam.c
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include "apps.h"
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+typedef enum OPTION_choice {
+    OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP,
+    OPT_IN, OPT_OUT, OPT_TEXT, OPT_NOOUT, OPT_ENGINE
+} OPTION_CHOICE;
+
+OPTIONS pkeyparam_options[] = {
+    {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"},
+    {"in", OPT_IN, '<', "Input file"},
+    {"out", OPT_OUT, '>', "Output file"},
+    {"text", OPT_TEXT, '-', "Print parameters as text"},
+    {"noout", OPT_NOOUT, '-', "Don't output encoded parameters"},
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine, possibly a hardware device"},
+#endif
+    {NULL}
+};
+
+int pkeyparam_main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    ENGINE *e = NULL;
+    BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL;
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+    int text = 0, noout = 0, ret = 1;
+    OPTION_CHOICE o;
+    char *infile = NULL, *outfile = NULL, *prog;
+
+    prog = opt_init(argc, argv, pkeyparam_options);
+    while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) {
+        switch (o) {
+        case OPT_EOF:
+        case OPT_ERR:
+ opthelp:
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog);
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_HELP:
+            opt_help(pkeyparam_options);
+            ret = 0;
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_IN:
+            infile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_OUT:
+            outfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_ENGINE:
+            e = setup_engine(opt_arg(), 0);
+            break;
+        case OPT_TEXT:
+            text = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NOOUT:
+            noout = 1;
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    argc = opt_num_rest();
+    if (argc != 0)
+        goto opthelp;
+
+    in = bio_open_default(infile, 'r', FORMAT_PEM);
+    if (in == NULL)
+        goto end;
+    out = bio_open_default(outfile, 'w', FORMAT_PEM);
+    if (out == NULL)
+        goto end;
+    pkey = PEM_read_bio_Parameters(in, NULL);
+    if (!pkey) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error reading parameters\n");
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (!noout)
+        PEM_write_bio_Parameters(out, pkey);
+
+    if (text)
+        EVP_PKEY_print_params(out, pkey, 0, NULL);
+
+    ret = 0;
+
+ end:
+    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+    release_engine(e);
+    BIO_free_all(out);
+    BIO_free(in);
+
+    return ret;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/pkeyutl.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/pkeyutl.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bbb1274
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/pkeyutl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,508 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2006-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "apps.h"
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+#define KEY_NONE        0
+#define KEY_PRIVKEY     1
+#define KEY_PUBKEY      2
+#define KEY_CERT        3
+
+static EVP_PKEY_CTX *init_ctx(const char *kdfalg, int *pkeysize,
+                              const char *keyfile, int keyform, int key_type,
+                              char *passinarg, int pkey_op, ENGINE *e,
+                              const int impl);
+
+static int setup_peer(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int peerform, const char *file,
+                      ENGINE *e);
+
+static int do_keyop(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int pkey_op,
+                    unsigned char *out, size_t *poutlen,
+                    const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen);
+
+typedef enum OPTION_choice {
+    OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP,
+    OPT_ENGINE, OPT_ENGINE_IMPL, OPT_IN, OPT_OUT,
+    OPT_PUBIN, OPT_CERTIN, OPT_ASN1PARSE, OPT_HEXDUMP, OPT_SIGN,
+    OPT_VERIFY, OPT_VERIFYRECOVER, OPT_REV, OPT_ENCRYPT, OPT_DECRYPT,
+    OPT_DERIVE, OPT_SIGFILE, OPT_INKEY, OPT_PEERKEY, OPT_PASSIN,
+    OPT_PEERFORM, OPT_KEYFORM, OPT_PKEYOPT, OPT_KDF, OPT_KDFLEN
+} OPTION_CHOICE;
+
+OPTIONS pkeyutl_options[] = {
+    {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"},
+    {"in", OPT_IN, '<', "Input file - default stdin"},
+    {"out", OPT_OUT, '>', "Output file - default stdout"},
+    {"pubin", OPT_PUBIN, '-', "Input is a public key"},
+    {"certin", OPT_CERTIN, '-', "Input is a cert with a public key"},
+    {"asn1parse", OPT_ASN1PARSE, '-', "asn1parse the output data"},
+    {"hexdump", OPT_HEXDUMP, '-', "Hex dump output"},
+    {"sign", OPT_SIGN, '-', "Sign input data with private key"},
+    {"verify", OPT_VERIFY, '-', "Verify with public key"},
+    {"verifyrecover", OPT_VERIFYRECOVER, '-',
+     "Verify with public key, recover original data"},
+    {"rev", OPT_REV, '-', "Reverse the order of the input buffer"},
+    {"encrypt", OPT_ENCRYPT, '-', "Encrypt input data with public key"},
+    {"decrypt", OPT_DECRYPT, '-', "Decrypt input data with private key"},
+    {"derive", OPT_DERIVE, '-', "Derive shared secret"},
+    {"kdf", OPT_KDF, 's', "Use KDF algorithm"},
+    {"kdflen", OPT_KDFLEN, 'p', "KDF algorithm output length"},
+    {"sigfile", OPT_SIGFILE, '<', "Signature file (verify operation only)"},
+    {"inkey", OPT_INKEY, 's', "Input private key file"},
+    {"peerkey", OPT_PEERKEY, 's', "Peer key file used in key derivation"},
+    {"passin", OPT_PASSIN, 's', "Input file pass phrase source"},
+    {"peerform", OPT_PEERFORM, 'E', "Peer key format - default PEM"},
+    {"keyform", OPT_KEYFORM, 'E', "Private key format - default PEM"},
+    {"pkeyopt", OPT_PKEYOPT, 's', "Public key options as opt:value"},
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine, possibly a hardware device"},
+    {"engine_impl", OPT_ENGINE_IMPL, '-',
+     "Also use engine given by -engine for crypto operations"},
+#endif
+    {NULL}
+};
+
+int pkeyutl_main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL;
+    ENGINE *e = NULL;
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+    char *infile = NULL, *outfile = NULL, *sigfile = NULL, *passinarg = NULL;
+    char hexdump = 0, asn1parse = 0, rev = 0, *prog;
+    unsigned char *buf_in = NULL, *buf_out = NULL, *sig = NULL;
+    OPTION_CHOICE o;
+    int buf_inlen = 0, siglen = -1, keyform = FORMAT_PEM, peerform = FORMAT_PEM;
+    int keysize = -1, pkey_op = EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN, key_type = KEY_PRIVKEY;
+    int engine_impl = 0;
+    int ret = 1, rv = -1;
+    size_t buf_outlen;
+    const char *inkey = NULL;
+    const char *peerkey = NULL;
+    const char *kdfalg = NULL;
+    int kdflen = 0;
+    STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *pkeyopts = NULL;
+
+    prog = opt_init(argc, argv, pkeyutl_options);
+    while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) {
+        switch (o) {
+        case OPT_EOF:
+        case OPT_ERR:
+ opthelp:
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog);
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_HELP:
+            opt_help(pkeyutl_options);
+            ret = 0;
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_IN:
+            infile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_OUT:
+            outfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_SIGFILE:
+            sigfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_ENGINE_IMPL:
+            engine_impl = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_INKEY:
+            inkey = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_PEERKEY:
+            peerkey = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_PASSIN:
+            passinarg = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_PEERFORM:
+            if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PDE, &peerform))
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_KEYFORM:
+            if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PDE, &keyform))
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_ENGINE:
+            e = setup_engine(opt_arg(), 0);
+            break;
+        case OPT_PUBIN:
+            key_type = KEY_PUBKEY;
+            break;
+        case OPT_CERTIN:
+            key_type = KEY_CERT;
+            break;
+        case OPT_ASN1PARSE:
+            asn1parse = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_HEXDUMP:
+            hexdump = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_SIGN:
+            pkey_op = EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN;
+            break;
+        case OPT_VERIFY:
+            pkey_op = EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY;
+            break;
+        case OPT_VERIFYRECOVER:
+            pkey_op = EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFYRECOVER;
+            break;
+        case OPT_ENCRYPT:
+            pkey_op = EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT;
+            break;
+        case OPT_DECRYPT:
+            pkey_op = EVP_PKEY_OP_DECRYPT;
+            break;
+        case OPT_DERIVE:
+            pkey_op = EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE;
+            break;
+        case OPT_KDF:
+            pkey_op = EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE;
+            key_type = KEY_NONE;
+            kdfalg = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_KDFLEN:
+            kdflen = atoi(opt_arg());
+            break;
+        case OPT_REV:
+            rev = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_PKEYOPT:
+            if ((pkeyopts == NULL &&
+                 (pkeyopts = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null()) == NULL) ||
+                sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(pkeyopts, opt_arg()) == 0) {
+                BIO_puts(bio_err, "out of memory\n");
+                goto end;
+            }
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    argc = opt_num_rest();
+    if (argc != 0)
+        goto opthelp;
+
+    if (kdfalg != NULL) {
+        if (kdflen == 0) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                       "%s: no KDF length given (-kdflen parameter).\n", prog);
+            goto opthelp;
+        }
+    } else if (inkey == NULL) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                   "%s: no private key given (-inkey parameter).\n", prog);
+        goto opthelp;
+    } else if (peerkey != NULL && pkey_op != EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                   "%s: no peer key given (-peerkey parameter).\n", prog);
+        goto opthelp;
+    }
+    ctx = init_ctx(kdfalg, &keysize, inkey, keyform, key_type,
+                   passinarg, pkey_op, e, engine_impl);
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Error initializing context\n", prog);
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        goto end;
+    }
+    if (peerkey != NULL && !setup_peer(ctx, peerform, peerkey, e)) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Error setting up peer key\n", prog);
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        goto end;
+    }
+    if (pkeyopts != NULL) {
+        int num = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(pkeyopts);
+        int i;
+
+        for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) {
+            const char *opt = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(pkeyopts, i);
+
+            if (pkey_ctrl_string(ctx, opt) <= 0) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Can't set parameter \"%s\":\n",
+                           prog, opt);
+                ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+                goto end;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (sigfile && (pkey_op != EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY)) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                   "%s: Signature file specified for non verify\n", prog);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (!sigfile && (pkey_op == EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY)) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                   "%s: No signature file specified for verify\n", prog);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+/* FIXME: seed PRNG only if needed */
+    app_RAND_load_file(NULL, 0);
+
+    if (pkey_op != EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE) {
+        in = bio_open_default(infile, 'r', FORMAT_BINARY);
+        if (in == NULL)
+            goto end;
+    }
+    out = bio_open_default(outfile, 'w', FORMAT_BINARY);
+    if (out == NULL)
+        goto end;
+
+    if (sigfile) {
+        BIO *sigbio = BIO_new_file(sigfile, "rb");
+        if (!sigbio) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't open signature file %s\n", sigfile);
+            goto end;
+        }
+        siglen = bio_to_mem(&sig, keysize * 10, sigbio);
+        BIO_free(sigbio);
+        if (siglen < 0) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error reading signature data\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (in) {
+        /* Read the input data */
+        buf_inlen = bio_to_mem(&buf_in, keysize * 10, in);
+        if (buf_inlen < 0) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error reading input Data\n");
+            exit(1);
+        }
+        if (rev) {
+            size_t i;
+            unsigned char ctmp;
+            size_t l = (size_t)buf_inlen;
+            for (i = 0; i < l / 2; i++) {
+                ctmp = buf_in[i];
+                buf_in[i] = buf_in[l - 1 - i];
+                buf_in[l - 1 - i] = ctmp;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (pkey_op == EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY) {
+        rv = EVP_PKEY_verify(ctx, sig, (size_t)siglen,
+                             buf_in, (size_t)buf_inlen);
+        if (rv == 1) {
+            BIO_puts(out, "Signature Verified Successfully\n");
+            ret = 0;
+        } else
+            BIO_puts(out, "Signature Verification Failure\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+    if (kdflen != 0) {
+        buf_outlen = kdflen;
+        rv = 1;
+    } else {
+        rv = do_keyop(ctx, pkey_op, NULL, (size_t *)&buf_outlen,
+                      buf_in, (size_t)buf_inlen);
+    }
+    if (rv > 0 && buf_outlen != 0) {
+        buf_out = app_malloc(buf_outlen, "buffer output");
+        rv = do_keyop(ctx, pkey_op,
+                      buf_out, (size_t *)&buf_outlen,
+                      buf_in, (size_t)buf_inlen);
+    }
+    if (rv <= 0) {
+        if (pkey_op != EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE) {
+            BIO_puts(bio_err, "Public Key operation error\n");
+        } else {
+            BIO_puts(bio_err, "Key derivation failed\n");
+        }
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        goto end;
+    }
+    ret = 0;
+
+    if (asn1parse) {
+        if (!ASN1_parse_dump(out, buf_out, buf_outlen, 1, -1))
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+    } else if (hexdump)
+        BIO_dump(out, (char *)buf_out, buf_outlen);
+    else
+        BIO_write(out, buf_out, buf_outlen);
+
+ end:
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
+    release_engine(e);
+    BIO_free(in);
+    BIO_free_all(out);
+    OPENSSL_free(buf_in);
+    OPENSSL_free(buf_out);
+    OPENSSL_free(sig);
+    sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(pkeyopts);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static EVP_PKEY_CTX *init_ctx(const char *kdfalg, int *pkeysize,
+                              const char *keyfile, int keyform, int key_type,
+                              char *passinarg, int pkey_op, ENGINE *e,
+                              const int engine_impl)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+    ENGINE *impl = NULL;
+    char *passin = NULL;
+    int rv = -1;
+    X509 *x;
+    if (((pkey_op == EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN) || (pkey_op == EVP_PKEY_OP_DECRYPT)
+         || (pkey_op == EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE))
+        && (key_type != KEY_PRIVKEY && kdfalg == NULL)) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "A private key is needed for this operation\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+    if (!app_passwd(passinarg, NULL, &passin, NULL)) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting password\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+    switch (key_type) {
+    case KEY_PRIVKEY:
+        pkey = load_key(keyfile, keyform, 0, passin, e, "Private Key");
+        break;
+
+    case KEY_PUBKEY:
+        pkey = load_pubkey(keyfile, keyform, 0, NULL, e, "Public Key");
+        break;
+
+    case KEY_CERT:
+        x = load_cert(keyfile, keyform, "Certificate");
+        if (x) {
+            pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
+            X509_free(x);
+        }
+        break;
+
+    case KEY_NONE:
+        break;
+
+    }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    if (engine_impl)
+        impl = e;
+#endif
+
+    if (kdfalg) {
+        int kdfnid = OBJ_sn2nid(kdfalg);
+
+        if (kdfnid == NID_undef) {
+            kdfnid = OBJ_ln2nid(kdfalg);
+            if (kdfnid == NID_undef) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "The given KDF \"%s\" is unknown.\n",
+                           kdfalg);
+                goto end;
+            }
+        }
+        ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(kdfnid, impl);
+    } else {
+        if (pkey == NULL)
+            goto end;
+        *pkeysize = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
+        ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, impl);
+        EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+    }
+
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        goto end;
+
+    switch (pkey_op) {
+    case EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN:
+        rv = EVP_PKEY_sign_init(ctx);
+        break;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY:
+        rv = EVP_PKEY_verify_init(ctx);
+        break;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFYRECOVER:
+        rv = EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init(ctx);
+        break;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT:
+        rv = EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(ctx);
+        break;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_OP_DECRYPT:
+        rv = EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(ctx);
+        break;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE:
+        rv = EVP_PKEY_derive_init(ctx);
+        break;
+    }
+
+    if (rv <= 0) {
+        EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
+        ctx = NULL;
+    }
+
+ end:
+    OPENSSL_free(passin);
+    return ctx;
+
+}
+
+static int setup_peer(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int peerform, const char *file,
+                      ENGINE *e)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY *peer = NULL;
+    ENGINE *engine = NULL;
+    int ret;
+
+    if (peerform == FORMAT_ENGINE)
+        engine = e;
+    peer = load_pubkey(file, peerform, 0, NULL, engine, "Peer Key");
+    if (!peer) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error reading peer key %s\n", file);
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    ret = EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(ctx, peer);
+
+    EVP_PKEY_free(peer);
+    if (ret <= 0)
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int do_keyop(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int pkey_op,
+                    unsigned char *out, size_t *poutlen,
+                    const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen)
+{
+    int rv = 0;
+    switch (pkey_op) {
+    case EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFYRECOVER:
+        rv = EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(ctx, out, poutlen, in, inlen);
+        break;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN:
+        rv = EVP_PKEY_sign(ctx, out, poutlen, in, inlen);
+        break;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT:
+        rv = EVP_PKEY_encrypt(ctx, out, poutlen, in, inlen);
+        break;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_OP_DECRYPT:
+        rv = EVP_PKEY_decrypt(ctx, out, poutlen, in, inlen);
+        break;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE:
+        rv = EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, out, poutlen);
+        break;
+
+    }
+    return rv;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/prime.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/prime.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c12463d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/prime.c
@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2004-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "apps.h"
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+typedef enum OPTION_choice {
+    OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP,
+    OPT_HEX, OPT_GENERATE, OPT_BITS, OPT_SAFE, OPT_CHECKS
+} OPTION_CHOICE;
+
+OPTIONS prime_options[] = {
+    {OPT_HELP_STR, 1, '-', "Usage: %s [options] [number...]\n"},
+    {OPT_HELP_STR, 1, '-',
+        "  number Number to check for primality\n"},
+    {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"},
+    {"hex", OPT_HEX, '-', "Hex output"},
+    {"generate", OPT_GENERATE, '-', "Generate a prime"},
+    {"bits", OPT_BITS, 'p', "Size of number in bits"},
+    {"safe", OPT_SAFE, '-',
+     "When used with -generate, generate a safe prime"},
+    {"checks", OPT_CHECKS, 'p', "Number of checks"},
+    {NULL}
+};
+
+int prime_main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    BIGNUM *bn = NULL;
+    int hex = 0, checks = 20, generate = 0, bits = 0, safe = 0, ret = 1;
+    char *prog;
+    OPTION_CHOICE o;
+
+    prog = opt_init(argc, argv, prime_options);
+    while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) {
+        switch (o) {
+        case OPT_EOF:
+        case OPT_ERR:
+opthelp:
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog);
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_HELP:
+            opt_help(prime_options);
+            ret = 0;
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_HEX:
+            hex = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_GENERATE:
+            generate = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_BITS:
+            bits = atoi(opt_arg());
+            break;
+        case OPT_SAFE:
+            safe = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_CHECKS:
+            checks = atoi(opt_arg());
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    argc = opt_num_rest();
+    argv = opt_rest();
+
+    if (generate) {
+        if (argc != 0) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Extra arguments given.\n");
+            goto opthelp;
+        }
+    } else if (argc == 0) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: No prime specified\n", prog);
+        goto opthelp;
+    }
+
+    if (generate) {
+        char *s;
+
+        if (!bits) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Specify the number of bits.\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+        bn = BN_new();
+        if (bn == NULL) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory.\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+        if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(bn, bits, safe, NULL, NULL, NULL)) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Failed to generate prime.\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+        s = hex ? BN_bn2hex(bn) : BN_bn2dec(bn);
+        if (s == NULL) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory.\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+        BIO_printf(bio_out, "%s\n", s);
+        OPENSSL_free(s);
+    } else {
+        for ( ; *argv; argv++) {
+            int r;
+
+            if (hex)
+                r = BN_hex2bn(&bn, argv[0]);
+            else
+                r = BN_dec2bn(&bn, argv[0]);
+
+            if(!r) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "Failed to process value (%s)\n", argv[0]);
+                goto end;
+            }
+
+            BN_print(bio_out, bn);
+            BIO_printf(bio_out, " (%s) %s prime\n",
+                       argv[0],
+                       BN_is_prime_ex(bn, checks, NULL, NULL)
+                           ? "is" : "is not");
+        }
+    }
+
+    ret = 0;
+ end:
+    BN_free(bn);
+    return ret;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/privkey.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/privkey.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..02f3498
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/privkey.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/progs.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/progs.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0d3b446
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/progs.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+# Generate progs.h file by looking for command mains in list of C files
+# passed on the command line.
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+use lib '.';
+use configdata qw/@disablables %unified_info/;
+
+my %commands = ();
+my $cmdre = qr/^\s*int\s+([a-z_][a-z0-9_]*)_main\(\s*int\s+argc\s*,/;
+
+my $apps_openssl = shift @ARGV;
+# because the program apps/openssl has object files as sources, and
+# they then have the corresponding C files as source, we need to chain
+# the lookups in %unified_info
+my @openssl_source =
+    map { @{$unified_info{sources}->{$_}} }
+    @{$unified_info{sources}->{$apps_openssl}};
+
+foreach my $filename (@openssl_source) {
+	open F, $filename or die "Couldn't open $filename: $!\n";
+	foreach (grep /$cmdre/, <F>) {
+		my @foo = /$cmdre/;
+		$commands{$1} = 1;
+	}
+	close F;
+}
+
+@ARGV = sort keys %commands;
+
+print <<'EOF';
+/*
+ * WARNING: do not edit!
+ * Generated by apps/progs.pl
+ *
+ * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+typedef enum FUNC_TYPE {
+    FT_none, FT_general, FT_md, FT_cipher, FT_pkey,
+    FT_md_alg, FT_cipher_alg
+} FUNC_TYPE;
+
+typedef struct function_st {
+    FUNC_TYPE type;
+    const char *name;
+    int (*func)(int argc, char *argv[]);
+    const OPTIONS *help;
+} FUNCTION;
+
+DEFINE_LHASH_OF(FUNCTION);
+
+EOF
+
+foreach (@ARGV) {
+	printf "extern int %s_main(int argc, char *argv[]);\n", $_;
+}
+
+print "\n";
+
+foreach (@ARGV) {
+	printf "extern OPTIONS %s_options[];\n", $_;
+}
+
+print "\n#ifdef INCLUDE_FUNCTION_TABLE\n";
+print "static FUNCTION functions[] = {\n";
+my %cmd_disabler = (
+    ciphers  => "sock",
+    genrsa   => "rsa",
+    rsautl   => "rsa",
+    gendsa   => "dsa",
+    dsaparam => "dsa",
+    gendh    => "dh",
+    dhparam  => "dh",
+    ecparam  => "ec",
+    pkcs12   => "des",
+    );
+foreach my $cmd (@ARGV) {
+	my $str="    { FT_general, \"$cmd\", ${cmd}_main, ${cmd}_options },\n";
+	if ($cmd =~ /^s_/) {
+		print "#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK\n${str}#endif\n";
+	} elsif (grep { $cmd eq $_ } @disablables) {
+		print "#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_".uc($cmd)."\n${str}#endif\n";
+	} elsif (my $disabler = $cmd_disabler{$cmd}) {
+		print "#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_".uc($disabler)."\n${str}#endif\n";
+	} else {
+		print $str;
+	}
+}
+
+my %md_disabler = (
+    blake2b512 => "blake2",
+    blake2s256 => "blake2",
+    );
+foreach my $cmd (
+	"md2", "md4", "md5",
+	"gost",
+	"sha1", "sha224", "sha256", "sha384", "sha512",
+	"mdc2", "rmd160", "blake2b512", "blake2s256"
+) {
+        my $str = "    { FT_md, \"".$cmd."\", dgst_main},\n";
+        if (grep { $cmd eq $_ } @disablables) {
+                print "#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_".uc($cmd)."\n${str}#endif\n";
+        } elsif (my $disabler = $md_disabler{$cmd}) {
+                print "#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_".uc($disabler)."\n${str}#endif\n";
+        } else {
+                print $str;
+        }
+}
+
+my %cipher_disabler = (
+    des3  => "des",
+    desx  => "des",
+    cast5 => "cast",
+    );
+foreach my $cmd (
+	"aes-128-cbc", "aes-128-ecb",
+	"aes-192-cbc", "aes-192-ecb",
+	"aes-256-cbc", "aes-256-ecb",
+	"camellia-128-cbc", "camellia-128-ecb",
+	"camellia-192-cbc", "camellia-192-ecb",
+	"camellia-256-cbc", "camellia-256-ecb",
+	"base64", "zlib",
+	"des", "des3", "desx", "idea", "seed", "rc4", "rc4-40",
+	"rc2", "bf", "cast", "rc5",
+	"des-ecb", "des-ede",    "des-ede3",
+	"des-cbc", "des-ede-cbc","des-ede3-cbc",
+	"des-cfb", "des-ede-cfb","des-ede3-cfb",
+	"des-ofb", "des-ede-ofb","des-ede3-ofb",
+	"idea-cbc","idea-ecb",    "idea-cfb", "idea-ofb",
+	"seed-cbc","seed-ecb",    "seed-cfb", "seed-ofb",
+	"rc2-cbc", "rc2-ecb", "rc2-cfb","rc2-ofb", "rc2-64-cbc", "rc2-40-cbc",
+	"bf-cbc",  "bf-ecb",     "bf-cfb",   "bf-ofb",
+	"cast5-cbc","cast5-ecb", "cast5-cfb","cast5-ofb",
+	"cast-cbc", "rc5-cbc",   "rc5-ecb",  "rc5-cfb",  "rc5-ofb"
+) {
+	my $str="    { FT_cipher, \"$cmd\", enc_main, enc_options },\n";
+	(my $algo= $cmd) =~ s/-.*//g;
+        if ($cmd eq "zlib") {
+                print "#ifdef ZLIB\n${str}#endif\n";
+        } elsif (grep { $algo eq $_ } @disablables) {
+                print "#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_".uc($algo)."\n${str}#endif\n";
+        } elsif (my $disabler = $cipher_disabler{$algo}) {
+                print "#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_".uc($disabler)."\n${str}#endif\n";
+	} else {
+		print $str;
+	}
+}
+
+print "    { 0, NULL, NULL}\n};\n";
+print "#endif\n";
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/rand.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/rand.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b3ec70a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/rand.c
@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "apps.h"
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+typedef enum OPTION_choice {
+    OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP,
+    OPT_OUT, OPT_ENGINE, OPT_RAND, OPT_BASE64, OPT_HEX
+} OPTION_CHOICE;
+
+OPTIONS rand_options[] = {
+    {OPT_HELP_STR, 1, '-', "Usage: %s [flags] num\n"},
+    {OPT_HELP_STR, 1, '-', "Valid options are:\n"},
+    {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"},
+    {"out", OPT_OUT, '>', "Output file"},
+    {"rand", OPT_RAND, 's',
+     "Load the file(s) into the random number generator"},
+    {"base64", OPT_BASE64, '-', "Base64 encode output"},
+    {"hex", OPT_HEX, '-', "Hex encode output"},
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine, possibly a hardware device"},
+#endif
+    {NULL}
+};
+
+int rand_main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    ENGINE *e = NULL;
+    BIO *out = NULL;
+    char *inrand = NULL, *outfile = NULL, *prog;
+    OPTION_CHOICE o;
+    int format = FORMAT_BINARY, i, num = -1, r, ret = 1;
+
+    prog = opt_init(argc, argv, rand_options);
+    while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) {
+        switch (o) {
+        case OPT_EOF:
+        case OPT_ERR:
+ opthelp:
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog);
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_HELP:
+            opt_help(rand_options);
+            ret = 0;
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_OUT:
+            outfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_ENGINE:
+            e = setup_engine(opt_arg(), 0);
+            break;
+        case OPT_RAND:
+            inrand = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_BASE64:
+            format = FORMAT_BASE64;
+            break;
+        case OPT_HEX:
+            format = FORMAT_TEXT;
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    argc = opt_num_rest();
+    argv = opt_rest();
+    if (argc == 1) {
+        if (!opt_int(argv[0], &num) || num <= 0)
+            goto end;
+    } else if (argc > 0) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Extra arguments given.\n");
+        goto opthelp;
+    }
+
+    app_RAND_load_file(NULL, (inrand != NULL));
+    if (inrand != NULL)
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "%ld semi-random bytes loaded\n",
+                   app_RAND_load_files(inrand));
+
+    out = bio_open_default(outfile, 'w', format);
+    if (out == NULL)
+        goto end;
+
+    if (format == FORMAT_BASE64) {
+        BIO *b64 = BIO_new(BIO_f_base64());
+        if (b64 == NULL)
+            goto end;
+        out = BIO_push(b64, out);
+    }
+
+    while (num > 0) {
+        unsigned char buf[4096];
+        int chunk;
+
+        chunk = num;
+        if (chunk > (int)sizeof(buf))
+            chunk = sizeof(buf);
+        r = RAND_bytes(buf, chunk);
+        if (r <= 0)
+            goto end;
+        if (format != FORMAT_TEXT) {
+            if (BIO_write(out, buf, chunk) != chunk)
+                goto end;
+        } else {
+            for (i = 0; i < chunk; i++)
+                if (BIO_printf(out, "%02x", buf[i]) != 2)
+                    goto end;
+        }
+        num -= chunk;
+    }
+    if (format == FORMAT_TEXT)
+        BIO_puts(out, "\n");
+    if (BIO_flush(out) <= 0 || !app_RAND_write_file(NULL))
+        goto end;
+
+    ret = 0;
+
+ end:
+    if (ret != 0)
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+    release_engine(e);
+    BIO_free_all(out);
+    return (ret);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/rehash.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/rehash.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..273ad74
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/rehash.c
@@ -0,0 +1,529 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * C implementation based on the original Perl and shell versions
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2013-2014 Timo Teräs <timo.teras@iki.fi>
+ */
+
+#include "apps.h"
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX) || defined(__APPLE__) || \
+    (defined(__VMS) && defined(__DECC) && __CRTL_VER >= 80300000)
+# include <unistd.h>
+# include <stdio.h>
+# include <limits.h>
+# include <errno.h>
+# include <string.h>
+# include <ctype.h>
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+
+/*
+ * Make sure that the processing of symbol names is treated the same as when
+ * libcrypto is built.  This is done automatically for public headers (see
+ * include/openssl/__DECC_INCLUDE_PROLOGUE.H and __DECC_INCLUDE_EPILOGUE.H),
+ * but not for internal headers.
+ */
+# ifdef __VMS
+#  pragma names save
+#  pragma names as_is,shortened
+# endif
+
+# include "internal/o_dir.h"
+
+# ifdef __VMS
+#  pragma names restore
+# endif
+
+# include <openssl/evp.h>
+# include <openssl/pem.h>
+# include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+
+# ifndef PATH_MAX
+#  define PATH_MAX 4096
+# endif
+# ifndef NAME_MAX
+#  define NAME_MAX 255
+# endif
+# define MAX_COLLISIONS  256
+
+typedef struct hentry_st {
+    struct hentry_st *next;
+    char *filename;
+    unsigned short old_id;
+    unsigned char need_symlink;
+    unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+} HENTRY;
+
+typedef struct bucket_st {
+    struct bucket_st *next;
+    HENTRY *first_entry, *last_entry;
+    unsigned int hash;
+    unsigned short type;
+    unsigned short num_needed;
+} BUCKET;
+
+enum Type {
+    /* Keep in sync with |suffixes|, below. */
+    TYPE_CERT=0, TYPE_CRL=1
+};
+
+enum Hash {
+    HASH_OLD, HASH_NEW, HASH_BOTH
+};
+
+
+static int evpmdsize;
+static const EVP_MD *evpmd;
+static int remove_links = 1;
+static int verbose = 0;
+static BUCKET *hash_table[257];
+
+static const char *suffixes[] = { "", "r" };
+static const char *extensions[] = { "pem", "crt", "cer", "crl" };
+
+
+static void bit_set(unsigned char *set, unsigned int bit)
+{
+    set[bit >> 3] |= 1 << (bit & 0x7);
+}
+
+static int bit_isset(unsigned char *set, unsigned int bit)
+{
+    return set[bit >> 3] & (1 << (bit & 0x7));
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Process an entry; return number of errors.
+ */
+static int add_entry(enum Type type, unsigned int hash, const char *filename,
+                      const unsigned char *digest, int need_symlink,
+                      unsigned short old_id)
+{
+    static BUCKET nilbucket;
+    static HENTRY nilhentry;
+    BUCKET *bp;
+    HENTRY *ep, *found = NULL;
+    unsigned int ndx = (type + hash) % OSSL_NELEM(hash_table);
+
+    for (bp = hash_table[ndx]; bp; bp = bp->next)
+        if (bp->type == type && bp->hash == hash)
+            break;
+    if (bp == NULL) {
+        bp = app_malloc(sizeof(*bp), "hash bucket");
+        *bp = nilbucket;
+        bp->next = hash_table[ndx];
+        bp->type = type;
+        bp->hash = hash;
+        hash_table[ndx] = bp;
+    }
+
+    for (ep = bp->first_entry; ep; ep = ep->next) {
+        if (digest && memcmp(digest, ep->digest, evpmdsize) == 0) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                       "%s: skipping duplicate %s in %s\n", opt_getprog(),
+                       type == TYPE_CERT ? "certificate" : "CRL", filename);
+            return 1;
+        }
+        if (strcmp(filename, ep->filename) == 0) {
+            found = ep;
+            if (digest == NULL)
+                break;
+        }
+    }
+    ep = found;
+    if (ep == NULL) {
+        if (bp->num_needed >= MAX_COLLISIONS) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                       "%s: hash table overflow for %s\n",
+                       opt_getprog(), filename);
+            return 1;
+        }
+        ep = app_malloc(sizeof(*ep), "collision bucket");
+        *ep = nilhentry;
+        ep->old_id = ~0;
+        ep->filename = OPENSSL_strdup(filename);
+        if (bp->last_entry)
+            bp->last_entry->next = ep;
+        if (bp->first_entry == NULL)
+            bp->first_entry = ep;
+        bp->last_entry = ep;
+    }
+
+    if (old_id < ep->old_id)
+        ep->old_id = old_id;
+    if (need_symlink && !ep->need_symlink) {
+        ep->need_symlink = 1;
+        bp->num_needed++;
+        memcpy(ep->digest, digest, evpmdsize);
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check if a symlink goes to the right spot; return 0 if okay.
+ * This can be -1 if bad filename, or an error count.
+ */
+static int handle_symlink(const char *filename, const char *fullpath)
+{
+    unsigned int hash = 0;
+    int i, type, id;
+    unsigned char ch;
+    char linktarget[PATH_MAX], *endptr;
+    ossl_ssize_t n;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+        ch = filename[i];
+        if (!isxdigit(ch))
+            return -1;
+        hash <<= 4;
+        hash += OPENSSL_hexchar2int(ch);
+    }
+    if (filename[i++] != '.')
+        return -1;
+    for (type = OSSL_NELEM(suffixes) - 1; type > 0; type--) {
+        const char *suffix = suffixes[type];
+        if (strncasecmp(suffix, &filename[i], strlen(suffix)) == 0)
+            break;
+    }
+    i += strlen(suffixes[type]);
+
+    id = strtoul(&filename[i], &endptr, 10);
+    if (*endptr != '\0')
+        return -1;
+
+    n = readlink(fullpath, linktarget, sizeof(linktarget));
+    if (n < 0 || n >= (int)sizeof(linktarget))
+        return -1;
+    linktarget[n] = 0;
+
+    return add_entry(type, hash, linktarget, NULL, 0, id);
+}
+
+/*
+ * process a file, return number of errors.
+ */
+static int do_file(const char *filename, const char *fullpath, enum Hash h)
+{
+    STACK_OF (X509_INFO) *inf = NULL;
+    X509_INFO *x;
+    X509_NAME *name = NULL;
+    BIO *b;
+    const char *ext;
+    unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+    int type, errs = 0;
+    size_t i;
+
+    /* Does it end with a recognized extension? */
+    if ((ext = strrchr(filename, '.')) == NULL)
+        goto end;
+    for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(extensions); i++) {
+        if (strcasecmp(extensions[i], ext + 1) == 0)
+            break;
+    }
+    if (i >= OSSL_NELEM(extensions))
+        goto end;
+
+    /* Does it have X.509 data in it? */
+    if ((b = BIO_new_file(fullpath, "r")) == NULL) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: skipping %s, cannot open file\n",
+                   opt_getprog(), filename);
+        errs++;
+        goto end;
+    }
+    inf = PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(b, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+    BIO_free(b);
+    if (inf == NULL)
+        goto end;
+
+    if (sk_X509_INFO_num(inf) != 1) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                   "%s: skipping %s,"
+                   "it does not contain exactly one certificate or CRL\n",
+                   opt_getprog(), filename);
+        /* This is not an error. */
+        goto end;
+    }
+    x = sk_X509_INFO_value(inf, 0);
+    if (x->x509) {
+        type = TYPE_CERT;
+        name = X509_get_subject_name(x->x509);
+        X509_digest(x->x509, evpmd, digest, NULL);
+    } else if (x->crl) {
+        type = TYPE_CRL;
+        name = X509_CRL_get_issuer(x->crl);
+        X509_CRL_digest(x->crl, evpmd, digest, NULL);
+    } else {
+        ++errs;
+        goto end;
+    }
+    if (name) {
+        if ((h == HASH_NEW) || (h == HASH_BOTH))
+            errs += add_entry(type, X509_NAME_hash(name), filename, digest, 1, ~0);
+        if ((h == HASH_OLD) || (h == HASH_BOTH))
+            errs += add_entry(type, X509_NAME_hash_old(name), filename, digest, 1, ~0);
+    }
+
+end:
+    sk_X509_INFO_pop_free(inf, X509_INFO_free);
+    return errs;
+}
+
+static void str_free(char *s)
+{
+    OPENSSL_free(s);
+}
+
+static int ends_with_dirsep(const char *path)
+{
+    if (*path != '\0')
+        path += strlen(path) - 1;
+# if defined __VMS
+    if (*path == ']' || *path == '>' || *path == ':')
+        return 1;
+# elif defined _WIN32
+    if (*path == '\\')
+        return 1;
+# endif
+    return *path == '/';
+}
+
+static int massage_filename(char *name)
+{
+# ifdef __VMS
+    char *p = strchr(name, ';');
+    char *q = p;
+
+    if (q != NULL) {
+        for (q++; *q != '\0'; q++) {
+            if (!isdigit((unsigned char)*q))
+                return 1;
+        }
+    }
+
+    *p = '\0';
+# endif
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Process a directory; return number of errors found.
+ */
+static int do_dir(const char *dirname, enum Hash h)
+{
+    BUCKET *bp, *nextbp;
+    HENTRY *ep, *nextep;
+    OPENSSL_DIR_CTX *d = NULL;
+    struct stat st;
+    unsigned char idmask[MAX_COLLISIONS / 8];
+    int n, numfiles, nextid, buflen, errs = 0;
+    size_t i;
+    const char *pathsep;
+    const char *filename;
+    char *buf, *copy;
+    STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *files = NULL;
+
+    if (app_access(dirname, W_OK) < 0) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Skipping %s, can't write\n", dirname);
+        return 1;
+    }
+    buflen = strlen(dirname);
+    pathsep = (buflen && !ends_with_dirsep(dirname)) ? "/": "";
+    buflen += NAME_MAX + 1 + 1;
+    buf = app_malloc(buflen, "filename buffer");
+
+    if (verbose)
+        BIO_printf(bio_out, "Doing %s\n", dirname);
+
+    if ((files = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null()) == NULL) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Skipping %s, out of memory\n", dirname);
+        exit(1);
+    }
+    while ((filename = OPENSSL_DIR_read(&d, dirname)) != NULL) {
+        if ((copy = strdup(filename)) == NULL
+                || !massage_filename(copy)
+                || sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(files, copy) == 0) {
+            BIO_puts(bio_err, "out of memory\n");
+            exit(1);
+        }
+    }
+    OPENSSL_DIR_end(&d);
+    sk_OPENSSL_STRING_sort(files);
+
+    numfiles = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(files);
+    for (n = 0; n < numfiles; ++n) {
+        filename = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(files, n);
+        if (BIO_snprintf(buf, buflen, "%s%s%s",
+                         dirname, pathsep, filename) >= buflen)
+            continue;
+        if (lstat(buf, &st) < 0)
+            continue;
+        if (S_ISLNK(st.st_mode) && handle_symlink(filename, buf) == 0)
+            continue;
+        errs += do_file(filename, buf, h);
+    }
+    sk_OPENSSL_STRING_pop_free(files, str_free);
+
+    for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(hash_table); i++) {
+        for (bp = hash_table[i]; bp; bp = nextbp) {
+            nextbp = bp->next;
+            nextid = 0;
+            memset(idmask, 0, (bp->num_needed + 7) / 8);
+            for (ep = bp->first_entry; ep; ep = ep->next)
+                if (ep->old_id < bp->num_needed)
+                    bit_set(idmask, ep->old_id);
+
+            for (ep = bp->first_entry; ep; ep = nextep) {
+                nextep = ep->next;
+                if (ep->old_id < bp->num_needed) {
+                    /* Link exists, and is used as-is */
+                    BIO_snprintf(buf, buflen, "%08x.%s%d", bp->hash,
+                                 suffixes[bp->type], ep->old_id);
+                    if (verbose)
+                        BIO_printf(bio_out, "link %s -> %s\n",
+                                   ep->filename, buf);
+                } else if (ep->need_symlink) {
+                    /* New link needed (it may replace something) */
+                    while (bit_isset(idmask, nextid))
+                        nextid++;
+
+                    BIO_snprintf(buf, buflen, "%s%s%n%08x.%s%d",
+                                 dirname, pathsep, &n, bp->hash,
+                                 suffixes[bp->type], nextid);
+                    if (verbose)
+                        BIO_printf(bio_out, "link %s -> %s\n",
+                                   ep->filename, &buf[n]);
+                    if (unlink(buf) < 0 && errno != ENOENT) {
+                        BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                                   "%s: Can't unlink %s, %s\n",
+                                   opt_getprog(), buf, strerror(errno));
+                        errs++;
+                    }
+                    if (symlink(ep->filename, buf) < 0) {
+                        BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                                   "%s: Can't symlink %s, %s\n",
+                                   opt_getprog(), ep->filename,
+                                   strerror(errno));
+                        errs++;
+                    }
+                    bit_set(idmask, nextid);
+                } else if (remove_links) {
+                    /* Link to be deleted */
+                    BIO_snprintf(buf, buflen, "%s%s%n%08x.%s%d",
+                                 dirname, pathsep, &n, bp->hash,
+                                 suffixes[bp->type], ep->old_id);
+                    if (verbose)
+                        BIO_printf(bio_out, "unlink %s\n",
+                                   &buf[n]);
+                    if (unlink(buf) < 0 && errno != ENOENT) {
+                        BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                                   "%s: Can't unlink %s, %s\n",
+                                   opt_getprog(), buf, strerror(errno));
+                        errs++;
+                    }
+                }
+                OPENSSL_free(ep->filename);
+                OPENSSL_free(ep);
+            }
+            OPENSSL_free(bp);
+        }
+        hash_table[i] = NULL;
+    }
+
+    OPENSSL_free(buf);
+    return errs;
+}
+
+typedef enum OPTION_choice {
+    OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP,
+    OPT_COMPAT, OPT_OLD, OPT_N, OPT_VERBOSE
+} OPTION_CHOICE;
+
+OPTIONS rehash_options[] = {
+    {OPT_HELP_STR, 1, '-', "Usage: %s [options] [cert-directory...]\n"},
+    {OPT_HELP_STR, 1, '-', "Valid options are:\n"},
+    {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"},
+    {"h", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"},
+    {"compat", OPT_COMPAT, '-', "Create both new- and old-style hash links"},
+    {"old", OPT_OLD, '-', "Use old-style hash to generate links"},
+    {"n", OPT_N, '-', "Do not remove existing links"},
+    {"v", OPT_VERBOSE, '-', "Verbose output"},
+    {NULL}
+};
+
+
+int rehash_main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    const char *env, *prog;
+    char *e, *m;
+    int errs = 0;
+    OPTION_CHOICE o;
+    enum Hash h = HASH_NEW;
+
+    prog = opt_init(argc, argv, rehash_options);
+    while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) {
+        switch (o) {
+        case OPT_EOF:
+        case OPT_ERR:
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog);
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_HELP:
+            opt_help(rehash_options);
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_COMPAT:
+            h = HASH_BOTH;
+            break;
+        case OPT_OLD:
+            h = HASH_OLD;
+            break;
+        case OPT_N:
+            remove_links = 0;
+            break;
+        case OPT_VERBOSE:
+            verbose = 1;
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    argc = opt_num_rest();
+    argv = opt_rest();
+
+    evpmd = EVP_sha1();
+    evpmdsize = EVP_MD_size(evpmd);
+
+    if (*argv) {
+        while (*argv)
+            errs += do_dir(*argv++, h);
+    } else if ((env = getenv("SSL_CERT_DIR")) != NULL) {
+        m = OPENSSL_strdup(env);
+        for (e = strtok(m, ":"); e != NULL; e = strtok(NULL, ":"))
+            errs += do_dir(e, h);
+        OPENSSL_free(m);
+    } else {
+        errs += do_dir("/etc/ssl/certs", h);
+    }
+
+ end:
+    return errs;
+}
+
+#else
+OPTIONS rehash_options[] = {
+    {NULL}
+};
+
+int rehash_main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    BIO_printf(bio_err, "Not available; use c_rehash script\n");
+    return (1);
+}
+
+#endif /* defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX) || defined(__APPLE__) */
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/req.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/req.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2a21569
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/req.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1510 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include "apps.h"
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/conf.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+# include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+# include <openssl/dsa.h>
+#endif
+
+#define SECTION         "req"
+
+#define BITS            "default_bits"
+#define KEYFILE         "default_keyfile"
+#define PROMPT          "prompt"
+#define DISTINGUISHED_NAME      "distinguished_name"
+#define ATTRIBUTES      "attributes"
+#define V3_EXTENSIONS   "x509_extensions"
+#define REQ_EXTENSIONS  "req_extensions"
+#define STRING_MASK     "string_mask"
+#define UTF8_IN         "utf8"
+
+#define DEFAULT_KEY_LENGTH      2048
+#define MIN_KEY_LENGTH          512
+
+static int make_REQ(X509_REQ *req, EVP_PKEY *pkey, char *dn, int mutlirdn,
+                    int attribs, unsigned long chtype);
+static int build_subject(X509_REQ *req, const char *subj, unsigned long chtype,
+                         int multirdn);
+static int prompt_info(X509_REQ *req,
+                       STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *dn_sk, const char *dn_sect,
+                       STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *attr_sk, const char *attr_sect,
+                       int attribs, unsigned long chtype);
+static int auto_info(X509_REQ *req, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *sk,
+                     STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *attr, int attribs,
+                     unsigned long chtype);
+static int add_attribute_object(X509_REQ *req, char *text, const char *def,
+                                char *value, int nid, int n_min, int n_max,
+                                unsigned long chtype);
+static int add_DN_object(X509_NAME *n, char *text, const char *def,
+                         char *value, int nid, int n_min, int n_max,
+                         unsigned long chtype, int mval);
+static int genpkey_cb(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);
+static int req_check_len(int len, int n_min, int n_max);
+static int check_end(const char *str, const char *end);
+static EVP_PKEY_CTX *set_keygen_ctx(const char *gstr,
+                                    int *pkey_type, long *pkeylen,
+                                    char **palgnam, ENGINE *keygen_engine);
+static CONF *req_conf = NULL;
+static int batch = 0;
+
+typedef enum OPTION_choice {
+    OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP,
+    OPT_INFORM, OPT_OUTFORM, OPT_ENGINE, OPT_KEYGEN_ENGINE, OPT_KEY,
+    OPT_PUBKEY, OPT_NEW, OPT_CONFIG, OPT_KEYFORM, OPT_IN, OPT_OUT,
+    OPT_KEYOUT, OPT_PASSIN, OPT_PASSOUT, OPT_RAND, OPT_NEWKEY,
+    OPT_PKEYOPT, OPT_SIGOPT, OPT_BATCH, OPT_NEWHDR, OPT_MODULUS,
+    OPT_VERIFY, OPT_NODES, OPT_NOOUT, OPT_VERBOSE, OPT_UTF8,
+    OPT_NAMEOPT, OPT_REQOPT, OPT_SUBJ, OPT_SUBJECT, OPT_TEXT, OPT_X509,
+    OPT_MULTIVALUE_RDN, OPT_DAYS, OPT_SET_SERIAL, OPT_EXTENSIONS,
+    OPT_REQEXTS, OPT_MD
+} OPTION_CHOICE;
+
+OPTIONS req_options[] = {
+    {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"},
+    {"inform", OPT_INFORM, 'F', "Input format - DER or PEM"},
+    {"outform", OPT_OUTFORM, 'F', "Output format - DER or PEM"},
+    {"in", OPT_IN, '<', "Input file"},
+    {"out", OPT_OUT, '>', "Output file"},
+    {"key", OPT_KEY, 's', "Private key to use"},
+    {"keyform", OPT_KEYFORM, 'f', "Key file format"},
+    {"pubkey", OPT_PUBKEY, '-', "Output public key"},
+    {"new", OPT_NEW, '-', "New request"},
+    {"config", OPT_CONFIG, '<', "Request template file"},
+    {"keyout", OPT_KEYOUT, '>', "File to send the key to"},
+    {"passin", OPT_PASSIN, 's', "Private key password source"},
+    {"passout", OPT_PASSOUT, 's', "Output file pass phrase source"},
+    {"rand", OPT_RAND, 's',
+     "Load the file(s) into the random number generator"},
+    {"newkey", OPT_NEWKEY, 's', "Specify as type:bits"},
+    {"pkeyopt", OPT_PKEYOPT, 's', "Public key options as opt:value"},
+    {"sigopt", OPT_SIGOPT, 's', "Signature parameter in n:v form"},
+    {"batch", OPT_BATCH, '-',
+     "Do not ask anything during request generation"},
+    {"newhdr", OPT_NEWHDR, '-', "Output \"NEW\" in the header lines"},
+    {"modulus", OPT_MODULUS, '-', "RSA modulus"},
+    {"verify", OPT_VERIFY, '-', "Verify signature on REQ"},
+    {"nodes", OPT_NODES, '-', "Don't encrypt the output key"},
+    {"noout", OPT_NOOUT, '-', "Do not output REQ"},
+    {"verbose", OPT_VERBOSE, '-', "Verbose output"},
+    {"utf8", OPT_UTF8, '-', "Input characters are UTF8 (default ASCII)"},
+    {"nameopt", OPT_NAMEOPT, 's', "Various certificate name options"},
+    {"reqopt", OPT_REQOPT, 's', "Various request text options"},
+    {"text", OPT_TEXT, '-', "Text form of request"},
+    {"x509", OPT_X509, '-',
+     "Output a x509 structure instead of a cert request"},
+    {OPT_MORE_STR, 1, 1, "(Required by some CA's)"},
+    {"subj", OPT_SUBJ, 's', "Set or modify request subject"},
+    {"subject", OPT_SUBJECT, '-', "Output the request's subject"},
+    {"multivalue-rdn", OPT_MULTIVALUE_RDN, '-',
+     "Enable support for multivalued RDNs"},
+    {"days", OPT_DAYS, 'p', "Number of days cert is valid for"},
+    {"set_serial", OPT_SET_SERIAL, 's', "Serial number to use"},
+    {"extensions", OPT_EXTENSIONS, 's',
+     "Cert extension section (override value in config file)"},
+    {"reqexts", OPT_REQEXTS, 's',
+     "Request extension section (override value in config file)"},
+    {"", OPT_MD, '-', "Any supported digest"},
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine, possibly a hardware device"},
+    {"keygen_engine", OPT_KEYGEN_ENGINE, 's',
+     "Specify engine to be used for key generation operations"},
+#endif
+    {NULL}
+};
+
+int req_main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    ASN1_INTEGER *serial = NULL;
+    BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL;
+    ENGINE *e = NULL, *gen_eng = NULL;
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX *genctx = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *pkeyopts = NULL, *sigopts = NULL;
+    X509 *x509ss = NULL;
+    X509_REQ *req = NULL;
+    const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL;
+    const EVP_MD *md_alg = NULL, *digest = NULL;
+    char *extensions = NULL, *infile = NULL;
+    char *outfile = NULL, *keyfile = NULL, *inrand = NULL;
+    char *keyalgstr = NULL, *p, *prog, *passargin = NULL, *passargout = NULL;
+    char *passin = NULL, *passout = NULL;
+    char *nofree_passin = NULL, *nofree_passout = NULL;
+    char *req_exts = NULL, *subj = NULL;
+    char *template = default_config_file, *keyout = NULL;
+    const char *keyalg = NULL;
+    OPTION_CHOICE o;
+    int ret = 1, x509 = 0, days = 30, i = 0, newreq = 0, verbose = 0;
+    int pkey_type = -1, private = 0;
+    int informat = FORMAT_PEM, outformat = FORMAT_PEM, keyform = FORMAT_PEM;
+    int modulus = 0, multirdn = 0, verify = 0, noout = 0, text = 0;
+    int nodes = 0, newhdr = 0, subject = 0, pubkey = 0;
+    long newkey = -1;
+    unsigned long chtype = MBSTRING_ASC, nmflag = 0, reqflag = 0;
+    char nmflag_set = 0;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
+    cipher = EVP_des_ede3_cbc();
+#endif
+
+    prog = opt_init(argc, argv, req_options);
+    while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) {
+        switch (o) {
+        case OPT_EOF:
+        case OPT_ERR:
+ opthelp:
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog);
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_HELP:
+            opt_help(req_options);
+            ret = 0;
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_INFORM:
+            if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PEMDER, &informat))
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_OUTFORM:
+            if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PEMDER, &outformat))
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_ENGINE:
+            e = setup_engine(opt_arg(), 0);
+            break;
+        case OPT_KEYGEN_ENGINE:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+            gen_eng = ENGINE_by_id(opt_arg());
+            if (gen_eng == NULL) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't find keygen engine %s\n", *argv);
+                goto opthelp;
+            }
+#endif
+            break;
+        case OPT_KEY:
+            keyfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_PUBKEY:
+            pubkey = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NEW:
+            newreq = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_CONFIG:
+            template = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_KEYFORM:
+            if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_ANY, &keyform))
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_IN:
+            infile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_OUT:
+            outfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_KEYOUT:
+            keyout = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_PASSIN:
+            passargin = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_PASSOUT:
+            passargout = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_RAND:
+            inrand = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_NEWKEY:
+            keyalg = opt_arg();
+            newreq = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_PKEYOPT:
+            if (!pkeyopts)
+                pkeyopts = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null();
+            if (!pkeyopts || !sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(pkeyopts, opt_arg()))
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_SIGOPT:
+            if (!sigopts)
+                sigopts = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null();
+            if (!sigopts || !sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(sigopts, opt_arg()))
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_BATCH:
+            batch = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NEWHDR:
+            newhdr = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_MODULUS:
+            modulus = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_VERIFY:
+            verify = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NODES:
+            nodes = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NOOUT:
+            noout = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_VERBOSE:
+            verbose = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_UTF8:
+            chtype = MBSTRING_UTF8;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NAMEOPT:
+            nmflag_set = 1;
+            if (!set_name_ex(&nmflag, opt_arg()))
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_REQOPT:
+            if (!set_cert_ex(&reqflag, opt_arg()))
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_TEXT:
+            text = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_X509:
+            x509 = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_DAYS:
+            days = atoi(opt_arg());
+            break;
+        case OPT_SET_SERIAL:
+            if (serial != NULL) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "Serial number supplied twice\n");
+                goto opthelp;
+            }
+            serial = s2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, opt_arg());
+            if (serial == NULL)
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_SUBJECT:
+            subject = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_SUBJ:
+            subj = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_MULTIVALUE_RDN:
+            multirdn = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_EXTENSIONS:
+            extensions = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_REQEXTS:
+            req_exts = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_MD:
+            if (!opt_md(opt_unknown(), &md_alg))
+                goto opthelp;
+            digest = md_alg;
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    argc = opt_num_rest();
+    if (argc != 0)
+        goto opthelp;
+
+    if (x509 && infile == NULL)
+        newreq = 1;
+
+    if (!nmflag_set)
+        nmflag = XN_FLAG_ONELINE;
+
+    /* TODO: simplify this as pkey is still always NULL here */
+    private = newreq && (pkey == NULL) ? 1 : 0;
+
+    if (!app_passwd(passargin, passargout, &passin, &passout)) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting passwords\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (verbose)
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Using configuration from %s\n", template);
+    req_conf = app_load_config(template);
+    if (template != default_config_file && !app_load_modules(req_conf))
+        goto end;
+
+    if (req_conf != NULL) {
+        p = NCONF_get_string(req_conf, NULL, "oid_file");
+        if (p == NULL)
+            ERR_clear_error();
+        if (p != NULL) {
+            BIO *oid_bio;
+
+            oid_bio = BIO_new_file(p, "r");
+            if (oid_bio == NULL) {
+                /*-
+                BIO_printf(bio_err,"problems opening %s for extra oid's\n",p);
+                ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+                */
+            } else {
+                OBJ_create_objects(oid_bio);
+                BIO_free(oid_bio);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    if (!add_oid_section(req_conf))
+        goto end;
+
+    if (md_alg == NULL) {
+        p = NCONF_get_string(req_conf, SECTION, "default_md");
+        if (p == NULL)
+            ERR_clear_error();
+        else {
+            if (!opt_md(p, &md_alg))
+                goto opthelp;
+            digest = md_alg;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (!extensions) {
+        extensions = NCONF_get_string(req_conf, SECTION, V3_EXTENSIONS);
+        if (!extensions)
+            ERR_clear_error();
+    }
+    if (extensions) {
+        /* Check syntax of file */
+        X509V3_CTX ctx;
+        X509V3_set_ctx_test(&ctx);
+        X509V3_set_nconf(&ctx, req_conf);
+        if (!X509V3_EXT_add_nconf(req_conf, &ctx, extensions, NULL)) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                       "Error Loading extension section %s\n", extensions);
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (passin == NULL) {
+        passin = nofree_passin =
+            NCONF_get_string(req_conf, SECTION, "input_password");
+        if (passin == NULL)
+            ERR_clear_error();
+    }
+
+    if (passout == NULL) {
+        passout = nofree_passout =
+            NCONF_get_string(req_conf, SECTION, "output_password");
+        if (passout == NULL)
+            ERR_clear_error();
+    }
+
+    p = NCONF_get_string(req_conf, SECTION, STRING_MASK);
+    if (!p)
+        ERR_clear_error();
+
+    if (p && !ASN1_STRING_set_default_mask_asc(p)) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Invalid global string mask setting %s\n", p);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (chtype != MBSTRING_UTF8) {
+        p = NCONF_get_string(req_conf, SECTION, UTF8_IN);
+        if (!p)
+            ERR_clear_error();
+        else if (strcmp(p, "yes") == 0)
+            chtype = MBSTRING_UTF8;
+    }
+
+    if (!req_exts) {
+        req_exts = NCONF_get_string(req_conf, SECTION, REQ_EXTENSIONS);
+        if (!req_exts)
+            ERR_clear_error();
+    }
+    if (req_exts) {
+        /* Check syntax of file */
+        X509V3_CTX ctx;
+        X509V3_set_ctx_test(&ctx);
+        X509V3_set_nconf(&ctx, req_conf);
+        if (!X509V3_EXT_add_nconf(req_conf, &ctx, req_exts, NULL)) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                       "Error Loading request extension section %s\n",
+                       req_exts);
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (keyfile != NULL) {
+        pkey = load_key(keyfile, keyform, 0, passin, e, "Private Key");
+        if (!pkey) {
+            /* load_key() has already printed an appropriate message */
+            goto end;
+        } else {
+            char *randfile = NCONF_get_string(req_conf, SECTION, "RANDFILE");
+            if (randfile == NULL)
+                ERR_clear_error();
+            app_RAND_load_file(randfile, 0);
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (newreq && (pkey == NULL)) {
+        char *randfile = NCONF_get_string(req_conf, SECTION, "RANDFILE");
+        if (randfile == NULL)
+            ERR_clear_error();
+        app_RAND_load_file(randfile, 0);
+        if (inrand)
+            app_RAND_load_files(inrand);
+
+        if (!NCONF_get_number(req_conf, SECTION, BITS, &newkey)) {
+            newkey = DEFAULT_KEY_LENGTH;
+        }
+
+        if (keyalg) {
+            genctx = set_keygen_ctx(keyalg, &pkey_type, &newkey,
+                                    &keyalgstr, gen_eng);
+            if (!genctx)
+                goto end;
+        }
+
+        if (newkey < MIN_KEY_LENGTH
+            && (pkey_type == EVP_PKEY_RSA || pkey_type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "private key length is too short,\n");
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "it needs to be at least %d bits, not %ld\n",
+                       MIN_KEY_LENGTH, newkey);
+            goto end;
+        }
+
+        if (!genctx) {
+            genctx = set_keygen_ctx(NULL, &pkey_type, &newkey,
+                                    &keyalgstr, gen_eng);
+            if (!genctx)
+                goto end;
+        }
+
+        if (pkeyopts) {
+            char *genopt;
+            for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(pkeyopts); i++) {
+                genopt = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(pkeyopts, i);
+                if (pkey_ctrl_string(genctx, genopt) <= 0) {
+                    BIO_printf(bio_err, "parameter error \"%s\"\n", genopt);
+                    ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+                    goto end;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
+        if (pkey_type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Generating an EC private key\n");
+        } else {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Generating a %ld bit %s private key\n",
+                       newkey, keyalgstr);
+        }
+
+        EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_cb(genctx, genpkey_cb);
+        EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_app_data(genctx, bio_err);
+
+        if (EVP_PKEY_keygen(genctx, &pkey) <= 0) {
+            BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error Generating Key\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+
+        EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(genctx);
+        genctx = NULL;
+
+        app_RAND_write_file(randfile);
+
+        if (keyout == NULL) {
+            keyout = NCONF_get_string(req_conf, SECTION, KEYFILE);
+            if (keyout == NULL)
+                ERR_clear_error();
+        }
+
+        if (keyout == NULL)
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "writing new private key to stdout\n");
+        else
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "writing new private key to '%s'\n", keyout);
+        out = bio_open_owner(keyout, outformat, private);
+        if (out == NULL)
+            goto end;
+
+        p = NCONF_get_string(req_conf, SECTION, "encrypt_rsa_key");
+        if (p == NULL) {
+            ERR_clear_error();
+            p = NCONF_get_string(req_conf, SECTION, "encrypt_key");
+            if (p == NULL)
+                ERR_clear_error();
+        }
+        if ((p != NULL) && (strcmp(p, "no") == 0))
+            cipher = NULL;
+        if (nodes)
+            cipher = NULL;
+
+        i = 0;
+ loop:
+        assert(private);
+        if (!PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey(out, pkey, cipher,
+                                      NULL, 0, NULL, passout)) {
+            if ((ERR_GET_REASON(ERR_peek_error()) ==
+                 PEM_R_PROBLEMS_GETTING_PASSWORD) && (i < 3)) {
+                ERR_clear_error();
+                i++;
+                goto loop;
+            }
+            goto end;
+        }
+        BIO_free(out);
+        out = NULL;
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "-----\n");
+    }
+
+    if (!newreq) {
+        in = bio_open_default(infile, 'r', informat);
+        if (in == NULL)
+            goto end;
+
+        if (informat == FORMAT_ASN1)
+            req = d2i_X509_REQ_bio(in, NULL);
+        else
+            req = PEM_read_bio_X509_REQ(in, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+        if (req == NULL) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to load X509 request\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (newreq || x509) {
+        if (pkey == NULL) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "you need to specify a private key\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+
+        if (req == NULL) {
+            req = X509_REQ_new();
+            if (req == NULL) {
+                goto end;
+            }
+
+            i = make_REQ(req, pkey, subj, multirdn, !x509, chtype);
+            subj = NULL;        /* done processing '-subj' option */
+            if (!i) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "problems making Certificate Request\n");
+                goto end;
+            }
+        }
+        if (x509) {
+            EVP_PKEY *tmppkey;
+            X509V3_CTX ext_ctx;
+            if ((x509ss = X509_new()) == NULL)
+                goto end;
+
+            /* Set version to V3 */
+            if (extensions && !X509_set_version(x509ss, 2))
+                goto end;
+            if (serial) {
+                if (!X509_set_serialNumber(x509ss, serial))
+                    goto end;
+            } else {
+                if (!rand_serial(NULL, X509_get_serialNumber(x509ss)))
+                    goto end;
+            }
+
+            if (!X509_set_issuer_name(x509ss, X509_REQ_get_subject_name(req)))
+                goto end;
+            if (!set_cert_times(x509ss, NULL, NULL, days))
+                goto end;
+            if (!X509_set_subject_name
+                (x509ss, X509_REQ_get_subject_name(req)))
+                goto end;
+            tmppkey = X509_REQ_get0_pubkey(req);
+            if (!tmppkey || !X509_set_pubkey(x509ss, tmppkey))
+                goto end;
+
+            /* Set up V3 context struct */
+
+            X509V3_set_ctx(&ext_ctx, x509ss, x509ss, NULL, NULL, 0);
+            X509V3_set_nconf(&ext_ctx, req_conf);
+
+            /* Add extensions */
+            if (extensions && !X509V3_EXT_add_nconf(req_conf,
+                                                    &ext_ctx, extensions,
+                                                    x509ss)) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error Loading extension section %s\n",
+                           extensions);
+                goto end;
+            }
+
+            i = do_X509_sign(x509ss, pkey, digest, sigopts);
+            if (!i) {
+                ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+                goto end;
+            }
+        } else {
+            X509V3_CTX ext_ctx;
+
+            /* Set up V3 context struct */
+
+            X509V3_set_ctx(&ext_ctx, NULL, NULL, req, NULL, 0);
+            X509V3_set_nconf(&ext_ctx, req_conf);
+
+            /* Add extensions */
+            if (req_exts && !X509V3_EXT_REQ_add_nconf(req_conf,
+                                                      &ext_ctx, req_exts,
+                                                      req)) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error Loading extension section %s\n",
+                           req_exts);
+                goto end;
+            }
+            i = do_X509_REQ_sign(req, pkey, digest, sigopts);
+            if (!i) {
+                ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+                goto end;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (subj && x509) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Cannot modify certificate subject\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (subj && !x509) {
+        if (verbose) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Modifying Request's Subject\n");
+            print_name(bio_err, "old subject=",
+                       X509_REQ_get_subject_name(req), nmflag);
+        }
+
+        if (build_subject(req, subj, chtype, multirdn) == 0) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "ERROR: cannot modify subject\n");
+            ret = 1;
+            goto end;
+        }
+
+        if (verbose) {
+            print_name(bio_err, "new subject=",
+                       X509_REQ_get_subject_name(req), nmflag);
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (verify && !x509) {
+        EVP_PKEY *tpubkey = pkey;
+
+        if (tpubkey == NULL) {
+            tpubkey = X509_REQ_get0_pubkey(req);
+            if (tpubkey == NULL)
+                goto end;
+        }
+
+        i = X509_REQ_verify(req, tpubkey);
+
+        if (i < 0) {
+            goto end;
+        } else if (i == 0) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "verify failure\n");
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        } else                  /* if (i > 0) */
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "verify OK\n");
+    }
+
+    if (noout && !text && !modulus && !subject && !pubkey) {
+        ret = 0;
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    out = bio_open_default(outfile,
+                           keyout != NULL && outfile != NULL &&
+                           strcmp(keyout, outfile) == 0 ? 'a' : 'w',
+                           outformat);
+    if (out == NULL)
+        goto end;
+
+    if (pubkey) {
+        EVP_PKEY *tpubkey = X509_REQ_get0_pubkey(req);
+
+        if (tpubkey == NULL) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting public key\n");
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            goto end;
+        }
+        PEM_write_bio_PUBKEY(out, tpubkey);
+    }
+
+    if (text) {
+        if (x509)
+            X509_print_ex(out, x509ss, nmflag, reqflag);
+        else
+            X509_REQ_print_ex(out, req, nmflag, reqflag);
+    }
+
+    if (subject) {
+        if (x509)
+            print_name(out, "subject=", X509_get_subject_name(x509ss),
+                       nmflag);
+        else
+            print_name(out, "subject=", X509_REQ_get_subject_name(req),
+                       nmflag);
+    }
+
+    if (modulus) {
+        EVP_PKEY *tpubkey;
+
+        if (x509)
+            tpubkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x509ss);
+        else
+            tpubkey = X509_REQ_get0_pubkey(req);
+        if (tpubkey == NULL) {
+            fprintf(stdout, "Modulus=unavailable\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+        fprintf(stdout, "Modulus=");
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+        if (EVP_PKEY_base_id(tpubkey) == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
+            const BIGNUM *n;
+            RSA_get0_key(EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(tpubkey), &n, NULL, NULL);
+            BN_print(out, n);
+        } else
+#endif
+            fprintf(stdout, "Wrong Algorithm type");
+        fprintf(stdout, "\n");
+    }
+
+    if (!noout && !x509) {
+        if (outformat == FORMAT_ASN1)
+            i = i2d_X509_REQ_bio(out, req);
+        else if (newhdr)
+            i = PEM_write_bio_X509_REQ_NEW(out, req);
+        else
+            i = PEM_write_bio_X509_REQ(out, req);
+        if (!i) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to write X509 request\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+    if (!noout && x509 && (x509ss != NULL)) {
+        if (outformat == FORMAT_ASN1)
+            i = i2d_X509_bio(out, x509ss);
+        else
+            i = PEM_write_bio_X509(out, x509ss);
+        if (!i) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to write X509 certificate\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+    ret = 0;
+ end:
+    if (ret) {
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+    }
+    NCONF_free(req_conf);
+    BIO_free(in);
+    BIO_free_all(out);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(genctx);
+    sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(pkeyopts);
+    sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(sigopts);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    ENGINE_free(gen_eng);
+#endif
+    OPENSSL_free(keyalgstr);
+    X509_REQ_free(req);
+    X509_free(x509ss);
+    ASN1_INTEGER_free(serial);
+    release_engine(e);
+    if (passin != nofree_passin)
+        OPENSSL_free(passin);
+    if (passout != nofree_passout)
+        OPENSSL_free(passout);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static int make_REQ(X509_REQ *req, EVP_PKEY *pkey, char *subj, int multirdn,
+                    int attribs, unsigned long chtype)
+{
+    int ret = 0, i;
+    char no_prompt = 0;
+    STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *dn_sk, *attr_sk = NULL;
+    char *tmp, *dn_sect, *attr_sect;
+
+    tmp = NCONF_get_string(req_conf, SECTION, PROMPT);
+    if (tmp == NULL)
+        ERR_clear_error();
+    if ((tmp != NULL) && strcmp(tmp, "no") == 0)
+        no_prompt = 1;
+
+    dn_sect = NCONF_get_string(req_conf, SECTION, DISTINGUISHED_NAME);
+    if (dn_sect == NULL) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to find '%s' in config\n",
+                   DISTINGUISHED_NAME);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    dn_sk = NCONF_get_section(req_conf, dn_sect);
+    if (dn_sk == NULL) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to get '%s' section\n", dn_sect);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    attr_sect = NCONF_get_string(req_conf, SECTION, ATTRIBUTES);
+    if (attr_sect == NULL) {
+        ERR_clear_error();
+        attr_sk = NULL;
+    } else {
+        attr_sk = NCONF_get_section(req_conf, attr_sect);
+        if (attr_sk == NULL) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to get '%s' section\n", attr_sect);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* setup version number */
+    if (!X509_REQ_set_version(req, 0L))
+        goto err;               /* version 1 */
+
+    if (subj)
+        i = build_subject(req, subj, chtype, multirdn);
+    else if (no_prompt)
+        i = auto_info(req, dn_sk, attr_sk, attribs, chtype);
+    else
+        i = prompt_info(req, dn_sk, dn_sect, attr_sk, attr_sect, attribs,
+                        chtype);
+    if (!i)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!X509_REQ_set_pubkey(req, pkey))
+        goto err;
+
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+/*
+ * subject is expected to be in the format /type0=value0/type1=value1/type2=...
+ * where characters may be escaped by \
+ */
+static int build_subject(X509_REQ *req, const char *subject, unsigned long chtype,
+                         int multirdn)
+{
+    X509_NAME *n;
+
+    if ((n = parse_name(subject, chtype, multirdn)) == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    if (!X509_REQ_set_subject_name(req, n)) {
+        X509_NAME_free(n);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    X509_NAME_free(n);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int prompt_info(X509_REQ *req,
+                       STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *dn_sk, const char *dn_sect,
+                       STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *attr_sk, const char *attr_sect,
+                       int attribs, unsigned long chtype)
+{
+    int i;
+    char *p, *q;
+    char buf[100];
+    int nid, mval;
+    long n_min, n_max;
+    char *type, *value;
+    const char *def;
+    CONF_VALUE *v;
+    X509_NAME *subj;
+    subj = X509_REQ_get_subject_name(req);
+
+    if (!batch) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                   "You are about to be asked to enter information that will be incorporated\n");
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "into your certificate request.\n");
+        BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                   "What you are about to enter is what is called a Distinguished Name or a DN.\n");
+        BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                   "There are quite a few fields but you can leave some blank\n");
+        BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                   "For some fields there will be a default value,\n");
+        BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                   "If you enter '.', the field will be left blank.\n");
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "-----\n");
+    }
+
+    if (sk_CONF_VALUE_num(dn_sk)) {
+        i = -1;
+ start:for (;;) {
+            i++;
+            if (sk_CONF_VALUE_num(dn_sk) <= i)
+                break;
+
+            v = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(dn_sk, i);
+            p = q = NULL;
+            type = v->name;
+            if (!check_end(type, "_min") || !check_end(type, "_max") ||
+                !check_end(type, "_default") || !check_end(type, "_value"))
+                continue;
+            /*
+             * Skip past any leading X. X: X, etc to allow for multiple
+             * instances
+             */
+            for (p = v->name; *p; p++)
+                if ((*p == ':') || (*p == ',') || (*p == '.')) {
+                    p++;
+                    if (*p)
+                        type = p;
+                    break;
+                }
+            if (*type == '+') {
+                mval = -1;
+                type++;
+            } else
+                mval = 0;
+            /* If OBJ not recognised ignore it */
+            if ((nid = OBJ_txt2nid(type)) == NID_undef)
+                goto start;
+            if (BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s_default", v->name)
+                >= (int)sizeof(buf)) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "Name '%s' too long\n", v->name);
+                return 0;
+            }
+
+            if ((def = NCONF_get_string(req_conf, dn_sect, buf)) == NULL) {
+                ERR_clear_error();
+                def = "";
+            }
+
+            BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s_value", v->name);
+            if ((value = NCONF_get_string(req_conf, dn_sect, buf)) == NULL) {
+                ERR_clear_error();
+                value = NULL;
+            }
+
+            BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s_min", v->name);
+            if (!NCONF_get_number(req_conf, dn_sect, buf, &n_min)) {
+                ERR_clear_error();
+                n_min = -1;
+            }
+
+            BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s_max", v->name);
+            if (!NCONF_get_number(req_conf, dn_sect, buf, &n_max)) {
+                ERR_clear_error();
+                n_max = -1;
+            }
+
+            if (!add_DN_object(subj, v->value, def, value, nid,
+                               n_min, n_max, chtype, mval))
+                return 0;
+        }
+        if (X509_NAME_entry_count(subj) == 0) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                       "error, no objects specified in config file\n");
+            return 0;
+        }
+
+        if (attribs) {
+            if ((attr_sk != NULL) && (sk_CONF_VALUE_num(attr_sk) > 0)
+                && (!batch)) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                           "\nPlease enter the following 'extra' attributes\n");
+                BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                           "to be sent with your certificate request\n");
+            }
+
+            i = -1;
+ start2:   for (;;) {
+                i++;
+                if ((attr_sk == NULL) || (sk_CONF_VALUE_num(attr_sk) <= i))
+                    break;
+
+                v = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(attr_sk, i);
+                type = v->name;
+                if ((nid = OBJ_txt2nid(type)) == NID_undef)
+                    goto start2;
+
+                if (BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s_default", type)
+                    >= (int)sizeof(buf)) {
+                    BIO_printf(bio_err, "Name '%s' too long\n", v->name);
+                    return 0;
+                }
+
+                if ((def = NCONF_get_string(req_conf, attr_sect, buf))
+                    == NULL) {
+                    ERR_clear_error();
+                    def = "";
+                }
+
+                BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s_value", type);
+                if ((value = NCONF_get_string(req_conf, attr_sect, buf))
+                    == NULL) {
+                    ERR_clear_error();
+                    value = NULL;
+                }
+
+                BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s_min", type);
+                if (!NCONF_get_number(req_conf, attr_sect, buf, &n_min)) {
+                    ERR_clear_error();
+                    n_min = -1;
+                }
+
+                BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s_max", type);
+                if (!NCONF_get_number(req_conf, attr_sect, buf, &n_max)) {
+                    ERR_clear_error();
+                    n_max = -1;
+                }
+
+                if (!add_attribute_object(req,
+                                          v->value, def, value, nid, n_min,
+                                          n_max, chtype))
+                    return 0;
+            }
+        }
+    } else {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "No template, please set one up.\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+
+}
+
+static int auto_info(X509_REQ *req, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *dn_sk,
+                     STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *attr_sk, int attribs,
+                     unsigned long chtype)
+{
+    int i, spec_char, plus_char;
+    char *p, *q;
+    char *type;
+    CONF_VALUE *v;
+    X509_NAME *subj;
+
+    subj = X509_REQ_get_subject_name(req);
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(dn_sk); i++) {
+        int mval;
+        v = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(dn_sk, i);
+        p = q = NULL;
+        type = v->name;
+        /*
+         * Skip past any leading X. X: X, etc to allow for multiple instances
+         */
+        for (p = v->name; *p; p++) {
+#ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+            spec_char = ((*p == ':') || (*p == ',') || (*p == '.'));
+#else
+            spec_char = ((*p == os_toascii[':']) || (*p == os_toascii[','])
+                    || (*p == os_toascii['.']));
+#endif
+            if (spec_char) {
+                p++;
+                if (*p)
+                    type = p;
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+#ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+        plus_char = (*type == '+');
+#else
+        plus_char = (*type == os_toascii['+']);
+#endif
+        if (plus_char) {
+            type++;
+            mval = -1;
+        } else
+            mval = 0;
+        if (!X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(subj, type, chtype,
+                                        (unsigned char *)v->value, -1, -1,
+                                        mval))
+            return 0;
+
+    }
+
+    if (!X509_NAME_entry_count(subj)) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "error, no objects specified in config file\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (attribs) {
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(attr_sk); i++) {
+            v = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(attr_sk, i);
+            if (!X509_REQ_add1_attr_by_txt(req, v->name, chtype,
+                                           (unsigned char *)v->value, -1))
+                return 0;
+        }
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int add_DN_object(X509_NAME *n, char *text, const char *def,
+                         char *value, int nid, int n_min, int n_max,
+                         unsigned long chtype, int mval)
+{
+    int i, ret = 0;
+    char buf[1024];
+ start:
+    if (!batch)
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s [%s]:", text, def);
+    (void)BIO_flush(bio_err);
+    if (value != NULL) {
+        OPENSSL_strlcpy(buf, value, sizeof(buf));
+        OPENSSL_strlcat(buf, "\n", sizeof(buf));
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s\n", value);
+    } else {
+        buf[0] = '\0';
+        if (!batch) {
+            if (!fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), stdin))
+                return 0;
+        } else {
+            buf[0] = '\n';
+            buf[1] = '\0';
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (buf[0] == '\0')
+        return (0);
+    else if (buf[0] == '\n') {
+        if ((def == NULL) || (def[0] == '\0'))
+            return (1);
+        OPENSSL_strlcpy(buf, def, sizeof(buf));
+        OPENSSL_strlcat(buf, "\n", sizeof(buf));
+    } else if ((buf[0] == '.') && (buf[1] == '\n'))
+        return (1);
+
+    i = strlen(buf);
+    if (buf[i - 1] != '\n') {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "weird input :-(\n");
+        return (0);
+    }
+    buf[--i] = '\0';
+#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+    ebcdic2ascii(buf, buf, i);
+#endif
+    if (!req_check_len(i, n_min, n_max)) {
+        if (batch || value)
+            return 0;
+        goto start;
+    }
+
+    if (!X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID(n, nid, chtype,
+                                    (unsigned char *)buf, -1, -1, mval))
+        goto err;
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static int add_attribute_object(X509_REQ *req, char *text, const char *def,
+                                char *value, int nid, int n_min,
+                                int n_max, unsigned long chtype)
+{
+    int i;
+    static char buf[1024];
+
+ start:
+    if (!batch)
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s [%s]:", text, def);
+    (void)BIO_flush(bio_err);
+    if (value != NULL) {
+        OPENSSL_strlcpy(buf, value, sizeof(buf));
+        OPENSSL_strlcat(buf, "\n", sizeof(buf));
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s\n", value);
+    } else {
+        buf[0] = '\0';
+        if (!batch) {
+            if (!fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), stdin))
+                return 0;
+        } else {
+            buf[0] = '\n';
+            buf[1] = '\0';
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (buf[0] == '\0')
+        return (0);
+    else if (buf[0] == '\n') {
+        if ((def == NULL) || (def[0] == '\0'))
+            return (1);
+        OPENSSL_strlcpy(buf, def, sizeof(buf));
+        OPENSSL_strlcat(buf, "\n", sizeof(buf));
+    } else if ((buf[0] == '.') && (buf[1] == '\n'))
+        return (1);
+
+    i = strlen(buf);
+    if (buf[i - 1] != '\n') {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "weird input :-(\n");
+        return (0);
+    }
+    buf[--i] = '\0';
+#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+    ebcdic2ascii(buf, buf, i);
+#endif
+    if (!req_check_len(i, n_min, n_max)) {
+        if (batch || value)
+            return 0;
+        goto start;
+    }
+
+    if (!X509_REQ_add1_attr_by_NID(req, nid, chtype,
+                                   (unsigned char *)buf, -1)) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error adding attribute\n");
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    return (1);
+ err:
+    return (0);
+}
+
+static int req_check_len(int len, int n_min, int n_max)
+{
+    if ((n_min > 0) && (len < n_min)) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                   "string is too short, it needs to be at least %d bytes long\n",
+                   n_min);
+        return (0);
+    }
+    if ((n_max >= 0) && (len > n_max)) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                   "string is too long, it needs to be no more than %d bytes long\n",
+                   n_max);
+        return (0);
+    }
+    return (1);
+}
+
+/* Check if the end of a string matches 'end' */
+static int check_end(const char *str, const char *end)
+{
+    int elen, slen;
+    const char *tmp;
+    elen = strlen(end);
+    slen = strlen(str);
+    if (elen > slen)
+        return 1;
+    tmp = str + slen - elen;
+    return strcmp(tmp, end);
+}
+
+static EVP_PKEY_CTX *set_keygen_ctx(const char *gstr,
+                                    int *pkey_type, long *pkeylen,
+                                    char **palgnam, ENGINE *keygen_engine)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX *gctx = NULL;
+    EVP_PKEY *param = NULL;
+    long keylen = -1;
+    BIO *pbio = NULL;
+    const char *paramfile = NULL;
+
+    if (gstr == NULL) {
+        *pkey_type = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
+        keylen = *pkeylen;
+    } else if (gstr[0] >= '0' && gstr[0] <= '9') {
+        *pkey_type = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
+        keylen = atol(gstr);
+        *pkeylen = keylen;
+    } else if (strncmp(gstr, "param:", 6) == 0)
+        paramfile = gstr + 6;
+    else {
+        const char *p = strchr(gstr, ':');
+        int len;
+        ENGINE *tmpeng;
+        const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth;
+
+        if (p)
+            len = p - gstr;
+        else
+            len = strlen(gstr);
+        /*
+         * The lookup of a the string will cover all engines so keep a note
+         * of the implementation.
+         */
+
+        ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str(&tmpeng, gstr, len);
+
+        if (!ameth) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Unknown algorithm %.*s\n", len, gstr);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+
+        EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(NULL, pkey_type, NULL, NULL, NULL, ameth);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+        ENGINE_finish(tmpeng);
+#endif
+        if (*pkey_type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
+            if (p) {
+                keylen = atol(p + 1);
+                *pkeylen = keylen;
+            } else
+                keylen = *pkeylen;
+        } else if (p)
+            paramfile = p + 1;
+    }
+
+    if (paramfile) {
+        pbio = BIO_new_file(paramfile, "r");
+        if (!pbio) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't open parameter file %s\n", paramfile);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+        param = PEM_read_bio_Parameters(pbio, NULL);
+
+        if (!param) {
+            X509 *x;
+            (void)BIO_reset(pbio);
+            x = PEM_read_bio_X509(pbio, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+            if (x) {
+                param = X509_get_pubkey(x);
+                X509_free(x);
+            }
+        }
+
+        BIO_free(pbio);
+
+        if (!param) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error reading parameter file %s\n", paramfile);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+        if (*pkey_type == -1)
+            *pkey_type = EVP_PKEY_id(param);
+        else if (*pkey_type != EVP_PKEY_base_id(param)) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Key Type does not match parameters\n");
+            EVP_PKEY_free(param);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (palgnam) {
+        const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth;
+        ENGINE *tmpeng;
+        const char *anam;
+        ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find(&tmpeng, *pkey_type);
+        if (!ameth) {
+            BIO_puts(bio_err, "Internal error: can't find key algorithm\n");
+            return NULL;
+        }
+        EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, &anam, ameth);
+        *palgnam = OPENSSL_strdup(anam);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+        ENGINE_finish(tmpeng);
+#endif
+    }
+
+    if (param) {
+        gctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(param, keygen_engine);
+        *pkeylen = EVP_PKEY_bits(param);
+        EVP_PKEY_free(param);
+    } else
+        gctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(*pkey_type, keygen_engine);
+
+    if (gctx == NULL) {
+        BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error allocating keygen context\n");
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(gctx) <= 0) {
+        BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error initializing keygen context\n");
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(gctx);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+    if ((*pkey_type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) && (keylen != -1)) {
+        if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_bits(gctx, keylen) <= 0) {
+            BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error setting RSA keysize\n");
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(gctx);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+    }
+#endif
+
+    return gctx;
+}
+
+static int genpkey_cb(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    char c = '*';
+    BIO *b = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_app_data(ctx);
+    int p;
+    p = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_keygen_info(ctx, 0);
+    if (p == 0)
+        c = '.';
+    if (p == 1)
+        c = '+';
+    if (p == 2)
+        c = '*';
+    if (p == 3)
+        c = '\n';
+    BIO_write(b, &c, 1);
+    (void)BIO_flush(b);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int do_sign_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+                        const EVP_MD *md, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sigopts)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx = NULL;
+    int i;
+
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(ctx, &pkctx, md, NULL, pkey))
+        return 0;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(sigopts); i++) {
+        char *sigopt = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(sigopts, i);
+        if (pkey_ctrl_string(pkctx, sigopt) <= 0) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "parameter error \"%s\"\n", sigopt);
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int do_X509_sign(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *md,
+                 STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sigopts)
+{
+    int rv;
+    EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+
+    rv = do_sign_init(mctx, pkey, md, sigopts);
+    if (rv > 0)
+        rv = X509_sign_ctx(x, mctx);
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
+    return rv > 0 ? 1 : 0;
+}
+
+int do_X509_REQ_sign(X509_REQ *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *md,
+                     STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sigopts)
+{
+    int rv;
+    EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+    rv = do_sign_init(mctx, pkey, md, sigopts);
+    if (rv > 0)
+        rv = X509_REQ_sign_ctx(x, mctx);
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
+    return rv > 0 ? 1 : 0;
+}
+
+int do_X509_CRL_sign(X509_CRL *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *md,
+                     STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sigopts)
+{
+    int rv;
+    EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+    rv = do_sign_init(mctx, pkey, md, sigopts);
+    if (rv > 0)
+        rv = X509_CRL_sign_ctx(x, mctx);
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
+    return rv > 0 ? 1 : 0;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/req.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/req.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5537df6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/req.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/rsa.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/rsa.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8b15fcb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/rsa.c
@@ -0,0 +1,310 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT
+#else
+
+# include <stdio.h>
+# include <stdlib.h>
+# include <string.h>
+# include <time.h>
+# include "apps.h"
+# include <openssl/bio.h>
+# include <openssl/err.h>
+# include <openssl/rsa.h>
+# include <openssl/evp.h>
+# include <openssl/x509.h>
+# include <openssl/pem.h>
+# include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+typedef enum OPTION_choice {
+    OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP,
+    OPT_INFORM, OPT_OUTFORM, OPT_ENGINE, OPT_IN, OPT_OUT,
+    OPT_PUBIN, OPT_PUBOUT, OPT_PASSOUT, OPT_PASSIN,
+    OPT_RSAPUBKEY_IN, OPT_RSAPUBKEY_OUT,
+    /* Do not change the order here; see case statements below */
+    OPT_PVK_NONE, OPT_PVK_WEAK, OPT_PVK_STRONG,
+    OPT_NOOUT, OPT_TEXT, OPT_MODULUS, OPT_CHECK, OPT_CIPHER
+} OPTION_CHOICE;
+
+OPTIONS rsa_options[] = {
+    {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"},
+    {"inform", OPT_INFORM, 'f', "Input format, one of DER NET PEM"},
+    {"outform", OPT_OUTFORM, 'f', "Output format, one of DER NET PEM PVK"},
+    {"in", OPT_IN, 's', "Input file"},
+    {"out", OPT_OUT, '>', "Output file"},
+    {"pubin", OPT_PUBIN, '-', "Expect a public key in input file"},
+    {"pubout", OPT_PUBOUT, '-', "Output a public key"},
+    {"passout", OPT_PASSOUT, 's', "Output file pass phrase source"},
+    {"passin", OPT_PASSIN, 's', "Input file pass phrase source"},
+    {"RSAPublicKey_in", OPT_RSAPUBKEY_IN, '-', "Input is an RSAPublicKey"},
+    {"RSAPublicKey_out", OPT_RSAPUBKEY_OUT, '-', "Output is an RSAPublicKey"},
+    {"noout", OPT_NOOUT, '-', "Don't print key out"},
+    {"text", OPT_TEXT, '-', "Print the key in text"},
+    {"modulus", OPT_MODULUS, '-', "Print the RSA key modulus"},
+    {"check", OPT_CHECK, '-', "Verify key consistency"},
+    {"", OPT_CIPHER, '-', "Any supported cipher"},
+# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RC4)
+    {"pvk-strong", OPT_PVK_STRONG, '-', "Enable 'Strong' PVK encoding level (default)"},
+    {"pvk-weak", OPT_PVK_WEAK, '-', "Enable 'Weak' PVK encoding level"},
+    {"pvk-none", OPT_PVK_NONE, '-', "Don't enforce PVK encoding"},
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine, possibly a hardware device"},
+# endif
+    {NULL}
+};
+
+int rsa_main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    ENGINE *e = NULL;
+    BIO *out = NULL;
+    RSA *rsa = NULL;
+    const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
+    char *infile = NULL, *outfile = NULL, *prog;
+    char *passin = NULL, *passout = NULL, *passinarg = NULL, *passoutarg = NULL;
+    int i, private = 0;
+    int informat = FORMAT_PEM, outformat = FORMAT_PEM, text = 0, check = 0;
+    int noout = 0, modulus = 0, pubin = 0, pubout = 0, ret = 1;
+# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RC4)
+    int pvk_encr = 2;
+# endif
+    OPTION_CHOICE o;
+
+    prog = opt_init(argc, argv, rsa_options);
+    while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) {
+        switch (o) {
+        case OPT_EOF:
+        case OPT_ERR:
+ opthelp:
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog);
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_HELP:
+            opt_help(rsa_options);
+            ret = 0;
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_INFORM:
+            if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_ANY, &informat))
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_IN:
+            infile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_OUTFORM:
+            if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_ANY, &outformat))
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_OUT:
+            outfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_PASSIN:
+            passinarg = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_PASSOUT:
+            passoutarg = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_ENGINE:
+            e = setup_engine(opt_arg(), 0);
+            break;
+        case OPT_PUBIN:
+            pubin = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_PUBOUT:
+            pubout = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_RSAPUBKEY_IN:
+            pubin = 2;
+            break;
+        case OPT_RSAPUBKEY_OUT:
+            pubout = 2;
+            break;
+        case OPT_PVK_STRONG:    /* pvk_encr:= 2 */
+        case OPT_PVK_WEAK:      /* pvk_encr:= 1 */
+        case OPT_PVK_NONE:      /* pvk_encr:= 0 */
+# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RC4)
+            pvk_encr = (o - OPT_PVK_NONE);
+# endif
+            break;
+        case OPT_NOOUT:
+            noout = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_TEXT:
+            text = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_MODULUS:
+            modulus = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_CHECK:
+            check = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_CIPHER:
+            if (!opt_cipher(opt_unknown(), &enc))
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    argc = opt_num_rest();
+    if (argc != 0)
+        goto opthelp;
+
+    private = (text && !pubin) || (!pubout && !noout) ? 1 : 0;
+
+    if (!app_passwd(passinarg, passoutarg, &passin, &passout)) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting passwords\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+    if (check && pubin) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Only private keys can be checked\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    {
+        EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+
+        if (pubin) {
+            int tmpformat = -1;
+            if (pubin == 2) {
+                if (informat == FORMAT_PEM)
+                    tmpformat = FORMAT_PEMRSA;
+                else if (informat == FORMAT_ASN1)
+                    tmpformat = FORMAT_ASN1RSA;
+            } else
+                tmpformat = informat;
+
+            pkey = load_pubkey(infile, tmpformat, 1, passin, e, "Public Key");
+        } else
+            pkey = load_key(infile, informat, 1, passin, e, "Private Key");
+
+        if (pkey != NULL)
+            rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey);
+        EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+    }
+
+    if (rsa == NULL) {
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    out = bio_open_owner(outfile, outformat, private);
+    if (out == NULL)
+        goto end;
+
+    if (text) {
+        assert(pubin || private);
+        if (!RSA_print(out, rsa, 0)) {
+            perror(outfile);
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (modulus) {
+        const BIGNUM *n;
+        RSA_get0_key(rsa, &n, NULL, NULL);
+        BIO_printf(out, "Modulus=");
+        BN_print(out, n);
+        BIO_printf(out, "\n");
+    }
+
+    if (check) {
+        int r = RSA_check_key_ex(rsa, NULL);
+
+        if (r == 1)
+            BIO_printf(out, "RSA key ok\n");
+        else if (r == 0) {
+            unsigned long err;
+
+            while ((err = ERR_peek_error()) != 0 &&
+                   ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_RSA &&
+                   ERR_GET_FUNC(err) == RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX &&
+                   ERR_GET_REASON(err) != ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE) {
+                BIO_printf(out, "RSA key error: %s\n",
+                           ERR_reason_error_string(err));
+                ERR_get_error(); /* remove e from error stack */
+            }
+        } else if (r == -1) {
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (noout) {
+        ret = 0;
+        goto end;
+    }
+    BIO_printf(bio_err, "writing RSA key\n");
+    if (outformat == FORMAT_ASN1) {
+        if (pubout || pubin) {
+            if (pubout == 2)
+                i = i2d_RSAPublicKey_bio(out, rsa);
+            else
+                i = i2d_RSA_PUBKEY_bio(out, rsa);
+        } else {
+            assert(private);
+            i = i2d_RSAPrivateKey_bio(out, rsa);
+        }
+    }
+    else if (outformat == FORMAT_PEM) {
+        if (pubout || pubin) {
+            if (pubout == 2)
+                i = PEM_write_bio_RSAPublicKey(out, rsa);
+            else
+                i = PEM_write_bio_RSA_PUBKEY(out, rsa);
+        } else {
+            assert(private);
+            i = PEM_write_bio_RSAPrivateKey(out, rsa,
+                                            enc, NULL, 0, NULL, passout);
+        }
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+    } else if (outformat == FORMAT_MSBLOB || outformat == FORMAT_PVK) {
+        EVP_PKEY *pk;
+        pk = EVP_PKEY_new();
+        EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pk, rsa);
+        if (outformat == FORMAT_PVK) {
+            if (pubin) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "PVK form impossible with public key input\n");
+                EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
+                goto end;
+            }
+            assert(private);
+#  ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "PVK format not supported\n");
+            EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
+            goto end;
+#  else
+            i = i2b_PVK_bio(out, pk, pvk_encr, 0, passout);
+#  endif
+        } else if (pubin || pubout) {
+            i = i2b_PublicKey_bio(out, pk);
+        } else {
+            assert(private);
+            i = i2b_PrivateKey_bio(out, pk);
+        }
+        EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
+# endif
+    } else {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "bad output format specified for outfile\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+    if (i <= 0) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to write key\n");
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+    } else
+        ret = 0;
+ end:
+    release_engine(e);
+    BIO_free_all(out);
+    RSA_free(rsa);
+    OPENSSL_free(passin);
+    OPENSSL_free(passout);
+    return (ret);
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/rsa8192.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/rsa8192.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..946a6e5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/rsa8192.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+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+I+/wJTNaRNPQ1M0SwtEL/zJd21y3KSPn4eL+GP3efhlDSjtlDvZqkdAUsU8=
+-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/rsautl.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/rsautl.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d527bf4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/rsautl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,278 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT
+#else
+
+# include "apps.h"
+# include <string.h>
+# include <openssl/err.h>
+# include <openssl/pem.h>
+# include <openssl/rsa.h>
+
+# define RSA_SIGN        1
+# define RSA_VERIFY      2
+# define RSA_ENCRYPT     3
+# define RSA_DECRYPT     4
+
+# define KEY_PRIVKEY     1
+# define KEY_PUBKEY      2
+# define KEY_CERT        3
+
+typedef enum OPTION_choice {
+    OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP,
+    OPT_ENGINE, OPT_IN, OPT_OUT, OPT_ASN1PARSE, OPT_HEXDUMP,
+    OPT_RAW, OPT_OAEP, OPT_SSL, OPT_PKCS, OPT_X931,
+    OPT_SIGN, OPT_VERIFY, OPT_REV, OPT_ENCRYPT, OPT_DECRYPT,
+    OPT_PUBIN, OPT_CERTIN, OPT_INKEY, OPT_PASSIN, OPT_KEYFORM
+} OPTION_CHOICE;
+
+OPTIONS rsautl_options[] = {
+    {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"},
+    {"in", OPT_IN, '<', "Input file"},
+    {"out", OPT_OUT, '>', "Output file"},
+    {"inkey", OPT_INKEY, 's', "Input key"},
+    {"keyform", OPT_KEYFORM, 'E', "Private key format - default PEM"},
+    {"pubin", OPT_PUBIN, '-', "Input is an RSA public"},
+    {"certin", OPT_CERTIN, '-', "Input is a cert carrying an RSA public key"},
+    {"ssl", OPT_SSL, '-', "Use SSL v2 padding"},
+    {"raw", OPT_RAW, '-', "Use no padding"},
+    {"pkcs", OPT_PKCS, '-', "Use PKCS#1 v1.5 padding (default)"},
+    {"oaep", OPT_OAEP, '-', "Use PKCS#1 OAEP"},
+    {"sign", OPT_SIGN, '-', "Sign with private key"},
+    {"verify", OPT_VERIFY, '-', "Verify with public key"},
+    {"asn1parse", OPT_ASN1PARSE, '-',
+     "Run output through asn1parse; useful with -verify"},
+    {"hexdump", OPT_HEXDUMP, '-', "Hex dump output"},
+    {"x931", OPT_X931, '-', "Use ANSI X9.31 padding"},
+    {"rev", OPT_REV, '-', "Reverse the order of the input buffer"},
+    {"encrypt", OPT_ENCRYPT, '-', "Encrypt with public key"},
+    {"decrypt", OPT_DECRYPT, '-', "Decrypt with private key"},
+    {"passin", OPT_PASSIN, 's', "Input file pass phrase source"},
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine, possibly a hardware device"},
+# endif
+    {NULL}
+};
+
+int rsautl_main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL;
+    ENGINE *e = NULL;
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+    RSA *rsa = NULL;
+    X509 *x;
+    char *infile = NULL, *outfile = NULL, *keyfile = NULL;
+    char *passinarg = NULL, *passin = NULL, *prog;
+    char rsa_mode = RSA_VERIFY, key_type = KEY_PRIVKEY;
+    unsigned char *rsa_in = NULL, *rsa_out = NULL, pad = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
+    int rsa_inlen, keyformat = FORMAT_PEM, keysize, ret = 1;
+    int rsa_outlen = 0, hexdump = 0, asn1parse = 0, need_priv = 0, rev = 0;
+    OPTION_CHOICE o;
+
+    prog = opt_init(argc, argv, rsautl_options);
+    while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) {
+        switch (o) {
+        case OPT_EOF:
+        case OPT_ERR:
+ opthelp:
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog);
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_HELP:
+            opt_help(rsautl_options);
+            ret = 0;
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_KEYFORM:
+            if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PDE, &keyformat))
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_IN:
+            infile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_OUT:
+            outfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_ENGINE:
+            e = setup_engine(opt_arg(), 0);
+            break;
+        case OPT_ASN1PARSE:
+            asn1parse = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_HEXDUMP:
+            hexdump = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_RAW:
+            pad = RSA_NO_PADDING;
+            break;
+        case OPT_OAEP:
+            pad = RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING;
+            break;
+        case OPT_SSL:
+            pad = RSA_SSLV23_PADDING;
+            break;
+        case OPT_PKCS:
+            pad = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
+            break;
+        case OPT_X931:
+            pad = RSA_X931_PADDING;
+            break;
+        case OPT_SIGN:
+            rsa_mode = RSA_SIGN;
+            need_priv = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_VERIFY:
+            rsa_mode = RSA_VERIFY;
+            break;
+        case OPT_REV:
+            rev = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_ENCRYPT:
+            rsa_mode = RSA_ENCRYPT;
+            break;
+        case OPT_DECRYPT:
+            rsa_mode = RSA_DECRYPT;
+            need_priv = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_PUBIN:
+            key_type = KEY_PUBKEY;
+            break;
+        case OPT_CERTIN:
+            key_type = KEY_CERT;
+            break;
+        case OPT_INKEY:
+            keyfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_PASSIN:
+            passinarg = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    argc = opt_num_rest();
+    if (argc != 0)
+        goto opthelp;
+
+    if (need_priv && (key_type != KEY_PRIVKEY)) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "A private key is needed for this operation\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (!app_passwd(passinarg, NULL, &passin, NULL)) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting password\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+/* FIXME: seed PRNG only if needed */
+    app_RAND_load_file(NULL, 0);
+
+    switch (key_type) {
+    case KEY_PRIVKEY:
+        pkey = load_key(keyfile, keyformat, 0, passin, e, "Private Key");
+        break;
+
+    case KEY_PUBKEY:
+        pkey = load_pubkey(keyfile, keyformat, 0, NULL, e, "Public Key");
+        break;
+
+    case KEY_CERT:
+        x = load_cert(keyfile, keyformat, "Certificate");
+        if (x) {
+            pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
+            X509_free(x);
+        }
+        break;
+    }
+
+    if (!pkey) {
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+
+    if (!rsa) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting RSA key\n");
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    in = bio_open_default(infile, 'r', FORMAT_BINARY);
+    if (in == NULL)
+        goto end;
+    out = bio_open_default(outfile, 'w', FORMAT_BINARY);
+    if (out == NULL)
+        goto end;
+
+    keysize = RSA_size(rsa);
+
+    rsa_in = app_malloc(keysize * 2, "hold rsa key");
+    rsa_out = app_malloc(keysize, "output rsa key");
+
+    /* Read the input data */
+    rsa_inlen = BIO_read(in, rsa_in, keysize * 2);
+    if (rsa_inlen < 0) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error reading input Data\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+    if (rev) {
+        int i;
+        unsigned char ctmp;
+        for (i = 0; i < rsa_inlen / 2; i++) {
+            ctmp = rsa_in[i];
+            rsa_in[i] = rsa_in[rsa_inlen - 1 - i];
+            rsa_in[rsa_inlen - 1 - i] = ctmp;
+        }
+    }
+    switch (rsa_mode) {
+
+    case RSA_VERIFY:
+        rsa_outlen = RSA_public_decrypt(rsa_inlen, rsa_in, rsa_out, rsa, pad);
+        break;
+
+    case RSA_SIGN:
+        rsa_outlen =
+            RSA_private_encrypt(rsa_inlen, rsa_in, rsa_out, rsa, pad);
+        break;
+
+    case RSA_ENCRYPT:
+        rsa_outlen = RSA_public_encrypt(rsa_inlen, rsa_in, rsa_out, rsa, pad);
+        break;
+
+    case RSA_DECRYPT:
+        rsa_outlen =
+            RSA_private_decrypt(rsa_inlen, rsa_in, rsa_out, rsa, pad);
+        break;
+    }
+
+    if (rsa_outlen < 0) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "RSA operation error\n");
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        goto end;
+    }
+    ret = 0;
+    if (asn1parse) {
+        if (!ASN1_parse_dump(out, rsa_out, rsa_outlen, 1, -1)) {
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        }
+    } else if (hexdump)
+        BIO_dump(out, (char *)rsa_out, rsa_outlen);
+    else
+        BIO_write(out, rsa_out, rsa_outlen);
+ end:
+    RSA_free(rsa);
+    release_engine(e);
+    BIO_free(in);
+    BIO_free_all(out);
+    OPENSSL_free(rsa_in);
+    OPENSSL_free(rsa_out);
+    OPENSSL_free(passin);
+    return ret;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/s1024key.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/s1024key.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..19e0403
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/s1024key.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/s1024req.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/s1024req.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bb75e7e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/s1024req.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/s512-key.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/s512-key.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0e3ff2d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/s512-key.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIIBPAIBAAJBAJ+zw4Qnlf8SMVIPFe9GEcStgOY2Ww/dgNdhjeD8ckUJNP5VZkVD
+TGiXav6ooKXfX3j/7tdkuD8Ey2//Kv7+ue0CAwEAAQJAN6W31vDEP2DjdqhzCDDu
+OA4NACqoiFqyblo7yc2tM4h4xMbC3Yx5UKMN9ZkCtX0gzrz6DyF47bdKcWBzNWCj
+gQIhANEoojVt7hq+SQ6MCN6FTAysGgQf56Q3TYoJMoWvdiXVAiEAw3e3rc+VJpOz
+rHuDo6bgpjUAAXM+v3fcpsfZSNO6V7kCIQCtbVjanpUwvZkMI9by02oUk9taki3b
+PzPfAfNPYAbCJQIhAJXNQDWyqwn/lGmR11cqY2y9nZ1+5w3yHGatLrcDnQHxAiEA
+vnlEGo8K85u+KwIOimM48ZG8oTk7iFdkqLJR1utT3aU=
+-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/s512-req.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/s512-req.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ea314be
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/s512-req.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----
+MIIBGzCBxgIBADBjMQswCQYDVQQGEwJBVTETMBEGA1UECBMKUXVlZW5zbGFuZDEa
+MBgGA1UEChMRQ3J5cHRTb2Z0IFB0eSBMdGQxIzAhBgNVBAMTGlNlcnZlciB0ZXN0
+IGNlcnQgKDUxMiBiaXQpMFwwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADSwAwSAJBAJ+zw4Qnlf8S
+MVIPFe9GEcStgOY2Ww/dgNdhjeD8ckUJNP5VZkVDTGiXav6ooKXfX3j/7tdkuD8E
+y2//Kv7+ue0CAwEAATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQQFAANBAAB+uQi+qwn6qRSHB8EUTvsm
+5TNTHzYDeN39nyIbZNX2s0se3Srn2Bxft5YCwD3moFZ9QoyDHxE0h6qLX5yjD+8=
+-----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/s_apps.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/s_apps.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c47932b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/s_apps.h
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS)
+# include <conio.h>
+#endif
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) && !defined(_WIN32)
+# define _kbhit kbhit
+#endif
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && !defined(FD_SET)
+/*
+ * VAX C does not defined fd_set and friends, but it's actually quite simple
+ */
+/* These definitions are borrowed from SOCKETSHR.       /Richard Levitte */
+# define MAX_NOFILE      32
+# define NBBY             8     /* number of bits in a byte */
+
+# ifndef FD_SETSIZE
+#  define FD_SETSIZE      MAX_NOFILE
+# endif                         /* FD_SETSIZE */
+
+/* How many things we'll allow select to use. 0 if unlimited */
+# define MAXSELFD        MAX_NOFILE
+typedef int fd_mask;            /* int here! VMS prototypes int, not long */
+# define NFDBITS (sizeof(fd_mask) * NBBY)/* bits per mask (power of 2!) */
+# define NFDSHIFT 5             /* Shift based on above */
+
+typedef fd_mask fd_set;
+# define FD_SET(n, p)    (*(p) |= (1 << ((n) % NFDBITS)))
+# define FD_CLR(n, p)    (*(p) &= ~(1 << ((n) % NFDBITS)))
+# define FD_ISSET(n, p)  (*(p) & (1 << ((n) % NFDBITS)))
+# define FD_ZERO(p)      memset((p), 0, sizeof(*(p)))
+#endif
+
+#define PORT            "4433"
+#define PROTOCOL        "tcp"
+
+typedef int (*do_server_cb)(int s, int stype, unsigned char *context);
+int do_server(int *accept_sock, const char *host, const char *port,
+              int family, int type,
+              do_server_cb cb,
+              unsigned char *context, int naccept);
+#ifdef HEADER_X509_H
+int verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+#endif
+#ifdef HEADER_SSL_H
+int set_cert_stuff(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *cert_file, char *key_file);
+int set_cert_key_stuff(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert, EVP_PKEY *key,
+                       STACK_OF(X509) *chain, int build_chain);
+int ssl_print_sigalgs(BIO *out, SSL *s);
+int ssl_print_point_formats(BIO *out, SSL *s);
+int ssl_print_curves(BIO *out, SSL *s, int noshared);
+#endif
+int ssl_print_tmp_key(BIO *out, SSL *s);
+int init_client(int *sock, const char *host, const char *port,
+                int family, int type);
+int should_retry(int i);
+
+long bio_dump_callback(BIO *bio, int cmd, const char *argp,
+                       int argi, long argl, long ret);
+
+#ifdef HEADER_SSL_H
+void apps_ssl_info_callback(const SSL *s, int where, int ret);
+void msg_cb(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf,
+            size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg);
+void tlsext_cb(SSL *s, int client_server, int type, const unsigned char *data,
+               int len, void *arg);
+#endif
+
+int generate_cookie_callback(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie,
+                             unsigned int *cookie_len);
+int verify_cookie_callback(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *cookie,
+                           unsigned int cookie_len);
+
+typedef struct ssl_excert_st SSL_EXCERT;
+
+void ssl_ctx_set_excert(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_EXCERT *exc);
+void ssl_excert_free(SSL_EXCERT *exc);
+int args_excert(int option, SSL_EXCERT **pexc);
+int load_excert(SSL_EXCERT **pexc);
+void print_verify_detail(SSL *s, BIO *bio);
+void print_ssl_summary(SSL *s);
+#ifdef HEADER_SSL_H
+int config_ctx(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *str, SSL_CTX *ctx);
+int ssl_ctx_add_crls(SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls,
+                     int crl_download);
+int ssl_load_stores(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *vfyCApath,
+                    const char *vfyCAfile, const char *chCApath,
+                    const char *chCAfile, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls,
+                    int crl_download);
+void ssl_ctx_security_debug(SSL_CTX *ctx, int verbose);
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/s_cb.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/s_cb.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..afa3065
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/s_cb.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1335 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* callback functions used by s_client, s_server, and s_time */
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h> /* for memcpy() and strcmp() */
+#define USE_SOCKETS
+#include "apps.h"
+#undef USE_SOCKETS
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+# include <openssl/dh.h>
+#endif
+#include "s_apps.h"
+
+#define COOKIE_SECRET_LENGTH    16
+
+VERIFY_CB_ARGS verify_args = { 0, 0, X509_V_OK, 0 };
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
+static unsigned char cookie_secret[COOKIE_SECRET_LENGTH];
+static int cookie_initialized = 0;
+#endif
+
+static const char *lookup(int val, const STRINT_PAIR* list, const char* def)
+{
+    for ( ; list->name; ++list)
+        if (list->retval == val)
+            return list->name;
+    return def;
+}
+
+int verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    X509 *err_cert;
+    int err, depth;
+
+    err_cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx);
+    err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
+    depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx);
+
+    if (!verify_args.quiet || !ok) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "depth=%d ", depth);
+        if (err_cert) {
+            X509_NAME_print_ex(bio_err,
+                               X509_get_subject_name(err_cert),
+                               0, XN_FLAG_ONELINE);
+            BIO_puts(bio_err, "\n");
+        } else
+            BIO_puts(bio_err, "<no cert>\n");
+    }
+    if (!ok) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "verify error:num=%d:%s\n", err,
+                   X509_verify_cert_error_string(err));
+        if (verify_args.depth >= depth) {
+            if (!verify_args.return_error)
+                ok = 1;
+            verify_args.error = err;
+        } else {
+            ok = 0;
+            verify_args.error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG;
+        }
+    }
+    switch (err) {
+    case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
+        BIO_puts(bio_err, "issuer= ");
+        X509_NAME_print_ex(bio_err, X509_get_issuer_name(err_cert),
+                           0, XN_FLAG_ONELINE);
+        BIO_puts(bio_err, "\n");
+        break;
+    case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID:
+    case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD:
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "notBefore=");
+        ASN1_TIME_print(bio_err, X509_get0_notBefore(err_cert));
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n");
+        break;
+    case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
+    case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD:
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "notAfter=");
+        ASN1_TIME_print(bio_err, X509_get0_notAfter(err_cert));
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n");
+        break;
+    case X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY:
+        if (!verify_args.quiet)
+            policies_print(ctx);
+        break;
+    }
+    if (err == X509_V_OK && ok == 2 && !verify_args.quiet)
+        policies_print(ctx);
+    if (ok && !verify_args.quiet)
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "verify return:%d\n", ok);
+    return (ok);
+}
+
+int set_cert_stuff(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *cert_file, char *key_file)
+{
+    if (cert_file != NULL) {
+        if (SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(ctx, cert_file,
+                                         SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) <= 0) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to get certificate from '%s'\n",
+                       cert_file);
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            return (0);
+        }
+        if (key_file == NULL)
+            key_file = cert_file;
+        if (SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(ctx, key_file, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) <= 0) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to get private key from '%s'\n",
+                       key_file);
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            return (0);
+        }
+
+        /*
+         * If we are using DSA, we can copy the parameters from the private
+         * key
+         */
+
+        /*
+         * Now we know that a key and cert have been set against the SSL
+         * context
+         */
+        if (!SSL_CTX_check_private_key(ctx)) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                       "Private key does not match the certificate public key\n");
+            return (0);
+        }
+    }
+    return (1);
+}
+
+int set_cert_key_stuff(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert, EVP_PKEY *key,
+                       STACK_OF(X509) *chain, int build_chain)
+{
+    int chflags = chain ? SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_CHECK : 0;
+    if (cert == NULL)
+        return 1;
+    if (SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx, cert) <= 0) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "error setting certificate\n");
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(ctx, key) <= 0) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "error setting private key\n");
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Now we know that a key and cert have been set against the SSL context
+     */
+    if (!SSL_CTX_check_private_key(ctx)) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                   "Private key does not match the certificate public key\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (chain && !SSL_CTX_set1_chain(ctx, chain)) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "error setting certificate chain\n");
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (build_chain && !SSL_CTX_build_cert_chain(ctx, chflags)) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "error building certificate chain\n");
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static STRINT_PAIR cert_type_list[] = {
+    {"RSA sign", TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN},
+    {"DSA sign", TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN},
+    {"RSA fixed DH", TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH},
+    {"DSS fixed DH", TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH},
+    {"ECDSA sign", TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN},
+    {"RSA fixed ECDH", TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_ECDH},
+    {"ECDSA fixed ECDH", TLS_CT_ECDSA_FIXED_ECDH},
+    {"GOST01 Sign", TLS_CT_GOST01_SIGN},
+    {NULL}
+};
+
+static void ssl_print_client_cert_types(BIO *bio, SSL *s)
+{
+    const unsigned char *p;
+    int i;
+    int cert_type_num = SSL_get0_certificate_types(s, &p);
+    if (!cert_type_num)
+        return;
+    BIO_puts(bio, "Client Certificate Types: ");
+    for (i = 0; i < cert_type_num; i++) {
+        unsigned char cert_type = p[i];
+        const char *cname = lookup((int)cert_type, cert_type_list, NULL);
+
+        if (i)
+            BIO_puts(bio, ", ");
+        if (cname)
+            BIO_puts(bio, cname);
+        else
+            BIO_printf(bio, "UNKNOWN (%d),", cert_type);
+    }
+    BIO_puts(bio, "\n");
+}
+
+static int do_print_sigalgs(BIO *out, SSL *s, int shared)
+{
+    int i, nsig, client;
+    client = SSL_is_server(s) ? 0 : 1;
+    if (shared)
+        nsig = SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(s, -1, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+    else
+        nsig = SSL_get_sigalgs(s, -1, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+    if (nsig == 0)
+        return 1;
+
+    if (shared)
+        BIO_puts(out, "Shared ");
+
+    if (client)
+        BIO_puts(out, "Requested ");
+    BIO_puts(out, "Signature Algorithms: ");
+    for (i = 0; i < nsig; i++) {
+        int hash_nid, sign_nid;
+        unsigned char rhash, rsign;
+        const char *sstr = NULL;
+        if (shared)
+            SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(s, i, &sign_nid, &hash_nid, NULL,
+                                   &rsign, &rhash);
+        else
+            SSL_get_sigalgs(s, i, &sign_nid, &hash_nid, NULL, &rsign, &rhash);
+        if (i)
+            BIO_puts(out, ":");
+        if (sign_nid == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
+            sstr = "RSA";
+        else if (sign_nid == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
+            sstr = "DSA";
+        else if (sign_nid == EVP_PKEY_EC)
+            sstr = "ECDSA";
+        if (sstr)
+            BIO_printf(out, "%s+", sstr);
+        else
+            BIO_printf(out, "0x%02X+", (int)rsign);
+        if (hash_nid != NID_undef)
+            BIO_printf(out, "%s", OBJ_nid2sn(hash_nid));
+        else
+            BIO_printf(out, "0x%02X", (int)rhash);
+    }
+    BIO_puts(out, "\n");
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_print_sigalgs(BIO *out, SSL *s)
+{
+    int mdnid;
+    if (!SSL_is_server(s))
+        ssl_print_client_cert_types(out, s);
+    do_print_sigalgs(out, s, 0);
+    do_print_sigalgs(out, s, 1);
+    if (SSL_get_peer_signature_nid(s, &mdnid))
+        BIO_printf(out, "Peer signing digest: %s\n", OBJ_nid2sn(mdnid));
+    return 1;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+int ssl_print_point_formats(BIO *out, SSL *s)
+{
+    int i, nformats;
+    const char *pformats;
+    nformats = SSL_get0_ec_point_formats(s, &pformats);
+    if (nformats <= 0)
+        return 1;
+    BIO_puts(out, "Supported Elliptic Curve Point Formats: ");
+    for (i = 0; i < nformats; i++, pformats++) {
+        if (i)
+            BIO_puts(out, ":");
+        switch (*pformats) {
+        case TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed:
+            BIO_puts(out, "uncompressed");
+            break;
+
+        case TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime:
+            BIO_puts(out, "ansiX962_compressed_prime");
+            break;
+
+        case TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2:
+            BIO_puts(out, "ansiX962_compressed_char2");
+            break;
+
+        default:
+            BIO_printf(out, "unknown(%d)", (int)*pformats);
+            break;
+
+        }
+    }
+    BIO_puts(out, "\n");
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_print_curves(BIO *out, SSL *s, int noshared)
+{
+    int i, ncurves, *curves, nid;
+    const char *cname;
+
+    ncurves = SSL_get1_curves(s, NULL);
+    if (ncurves <= 0)
+        return 1;
+    curves = app_malloc(ncurves * sizeof(int), "curves to print");
+    SSL_get1_curves(s, curves);
+
+    BIO_puts(out, "Supported Elliptic Curves: ");
+    for (i = 0; i < ncurves; i++) {
+        if (i)
+            BIO_puts(out, ":");
+        nid = curves[i];
+        /* If unrecognised print out hex version */
+        if (nid & TLSEXT_nid_unknown)
+            BIO_printf(out, "0x%04X", nid & 0xFFFF);
+        else {
+            /* Use NIST name for curve if it exists */
+            cname = EC_curve_nid2nist(nid);
+            if (!cname)
+                cname = OBJ_nid2sn(nid);
+            BIO_printf(out, "%s", cname);
+        }
+    }
+    OPENSSL_free(curves);
+    if (noshared) {
+        BIO_puts(out, "\n");
+        return 1;
+    }
+    BIO_puts(out, "\nShared Elliptic curves: ");
+    ncurves = SSL_get_shared_curve(s, -1);
+    for (i = 0; i < ncurves; i++) {
+        if (i)
+            BIO_puts(out, ":");
+        nid = SSL_get_shared_curve(s, i);
+        cname = EC_curve_nid2nist(nid);
+        if (!cname)
+            cname = OBJ_nid2sn(nid);
+        BIO_printf(out, "%s", cname);
+    }
+    if (ncurves == 0)
+        BIO_puts(out, "NONE");
+    BIO_puts(out, "\n");
+    return 1;
+}
+#endif
+int ssl_print_tmp_key(BIO *out, SSL *s)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY *key;
+    if (!SSL_get_server_tmp_key(s, &key))
+        return 1;
+    BIO_puts(out, "Server Temp Key: ");
+    switch (EVP_PKEY_id(key)) {
+    case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
+        BIO_printf(out, "RSA, %d bits\n", EVP_PKEY_bits(key));
+        break;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_DH:
+        BIO_printf(out, "DH, %d bits\n", EVP_PKEY_bits(key));
+        break;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    case EVP_PKEY_EC:
+        {
+            EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(key);
+            int nid;
+            const char *cname;
+            nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
+            EC_KEY_free(ec);
+            cname = EC_curve_nid2nist(nid);
+            if (!cname)
+                cname = OBJ_nid2sn(nid);
+            BIO_printf(out, "ECDH, %s, %d bits\n", cname, EVP_PKEY_bits(key));
+        }
+    break;
+#endif
+    default:
+        BIO_printf(out, "%s, %d bits\n", OBJ_nid2sn(EVP_PKEY_id(key)),
+                   EVP_PKEY_bits(key));
+    }
+    EVP_PKEY_free(key);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+long bio_dump_callback(BIO *bio, int cmd, const char *argp,
+                       int argi, long argl, long ret)
+{
+    BIO *out;
+
+    out = (BIO *)BIO_get_callback_arg(bio);
+    if (out == NULL)
+        return (ret);
+
+    if (cmd == (BIO_CB_READ | BIO_CB_RETURN)) {
+        BIO_printf(out, "read from %p [%p] (%lu bytes => %ld (0x%lX))\n",
+                   (void *)bio, (void *)argp, (unsigned long)argi, ret, ret);
+        BIO_dump(out, argp, (int)ret);
+        return (ret);
+    } else if (cmd == (BIO_CB_WRITE | BIO_CB_RETURN)) {
+        BIO_printf(out, "write to %p [%p] (%lu bytes => %ld (0x%lX))\n",
+                   (void *)bio, (void *)argp, (unsigned long)argi, ret, ret);
+        BIO_dump(out, argp, (int)ret);
+    }
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+void apps_ssl_info_callback(const SSL *s, int where, int ret)
+{
+    const char *str;
+    int w;
+
+    w = where & ~SSL_ST_MASK;
+
+    if (w & SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+        str = "SSL_connect";
+    else if (w & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+        str = "SSL_accept";
+    else
+        str = "undefined";
+
+    if (where & SSL_CB_LOOP) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s:%s\n", str, SSL_state_string_long(s));
+    } else if (where & SSL_CB_ALERT) {
+        str = (where & SSL_CB_READ) ? "read" : "write";
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "SSL3 alert %s:%s:%s\n",
+                   str,
+                   SSL_alert_type_string_long(ret),
+                   SSL_alert_desc_string_long(ret));
+    } else if (where & SSL_CB_EXIT) {
+        if (ret == 0)
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s:failed in %s\n",
+                       str, SSL_state_string_long(s));
+        else if (ret < 0) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s:error in %s\n",
+                       str, SSL_state_string_long(s));
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+static STRINT_PAIR ssl_versions[] = {
+    {"SSL 3.0", SSL3_VERSION},
+    {"TLS 1.0", TLS1_VERSION},
+    {"TLS 1.1", TLS1_1_VERSION},
+    {"TLS 1.2", TLS1_2_VERSION},
+    {"DTLS 1.0", DTLS1_VERSION},
+    {"DTLS 1.0 (bad)", DTLS1_BAD_VER},
+    {NULL}
+};
+static STRINT_PAIR alert_types[] = {
+    {" close_notify", 0},
+    {" unexpected_message", 10},
+    {" bad_record_mac", 20},
+    {" decryption_failed", 21},
+    {" record_overflow", 22},
+    {" decompression_failure", 30},
+    {" handshake_failure", 40},
+    {" bad_certificate", 42},
+    {" unsupported_certificate", 43},
+    {" certificate_revoked", 44},
+    {" certificate_expired", 45},
+    {" certificate_unknown", 46},
+    {" illegal_parameter", 47},
+    {" unknown_ca", 48},
+    {" access_denied", 49},
+    {" decode_error", 50},
+    {" decrypt_error", 51},
+    {" export_restriction", 60},
+    {" protocol_version", 70},
+    {" insufficient_security", 71},
+    {" internal_error", 80},
+    {" user_canceled", 90},
+    {" no_renegotiation", 100},
+    {" unsupported_extension", 110},
+    {" certificate_unobtainable", 111},
+    {" unrecognized_name", 112},
+    {" bad_certificate_status_response", 113},
+    {" bad_certificate_hash_value", 114},
+    {" unknown_psk_identity", 115},
+    {NULL}
+};
+
+static STRINT_PAIR handshakes[] = {
+    {", HelloRequest", 0},
+    {", ClientHello", 1},
+    {", ServerHello", 2},
+    {", HelloVerifyRequest", 3},
+    {", NewSessionTicket", 4},
+    {", Certificate", 11},
+    {", ServerKeyExchange", 12},
+    {", CertificateRequest", 13},
+    {", ServerHelloDone", 14},
+    {", CertificateVerify", 15},
+    {", ClientKeyExchange", 16},
+    {", Finished", 20},
+    {", CertificateUrl", 21},
+    {", CertificateStatus", 22},
+    {", SupplementalData", 23},
+    {NULL}
+};
+
+void msg_cb(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf,
+            size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg)
+{
+    BIO *bio = arg;
+    const char *str_write_p = write_p ? ">>>" : "<<<";
+    const char *str_version = lookup(version, ssl_versions, "???");
+    const char *str_content_type = "", *str_details1 = "", *str_details2 = "";
+    const unsigned char* bp = buf;
+
+    if (version == SSL3_VERSION ||
+        version == TLS1_VERSION ||
+        version == TLS1_1_VERSION ||
+        version == TLS1_2_VERSION ||
+        version == DTLS1_VERSION || version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
+        switch (content_type) {
+        case 20:
+            str_content_type = "ChangeCipherSpec";
+            break;
+        case 21:
+            str_content_type = "Alert";
+            str_details1 = ", ???";
+            if (len == 2) {
+                switch (bp[0]) {
+                case 1:
+                    str_details1 = ", warning";
+                    break;
+                case 2:
+                    str_details1 = ", fatal";
+                    break;
+                }
+                str_details2 = lookup((int)bp[1], alert_types, " ???");
+            }
+            break;
+        case 22:
+            str_content_type = "Handshake";
+            str_details1 = "???";
+            if (len > 0)
+                str_details1 = lookup((int)bp[0], handshakes, "???");
+            break;
+        case 23:
+            str_content_type = "ApplicationData";
+            break;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+        case 24:
+            str_details1 = ", Heartbeat";
+
+            if (len > 0) {
+                switch (bp[0]) {
+                case 1:
+                    str_details1 = ", HeartbeatRequest";
+                    break;
+                case 2:
+                    str_details1 = ", HeartbeatResponse";
+                    break;
+                }
+            }
+            break;
+#endif
+        }
+    }
+
+    BIO_printf(bio, "%s %s%s [length %04lx]%s%s\n", str_write_p, str_version,
+               str_content_type, (unsigned long)len, str_details1,
+               str_details2);
+
+    if (len > 0) {
+        size_t num, i;
+
+        BIO_printf(bio, "   ");
+        num = len;
+        for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
+            if (i % 16 == 0 && i > 0)
+                BIO_printf(bio, "\n   ");
+            BIO_printf(bio, " %02x", ((const unsigned char *)buf)[i]);
+        }
+        if (i < len)
+            BIO_printf(bio, " ...");
+        BIO_printf(bio, "\n");
+    }
+    (void)BIO_flush(bio);
+}
+
+static STRINT_PAIR tlsext_types[] = {
+    {"server name", TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name},
+    {"max fragment length", TLSEXT_TYPE_max_fragment_length},
+    {"client certificate URL", TLSEXT_TYPE_client_certificate_url},
+    {"trusted CA keys", TLSEXT_TYPE_trusted_ca_keys},
+    {"truncated HMAC", TLSEXT_TYPE_truncated_hmac},
+    {"status request", TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request},
+    {"user mapping", TLSEXT_TYPE_user_mapping},
+    {"client authz", TLSEXT_TYPE_client_authz},
+    {"server authz", TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz},
+    {"cert type", TLSEXT_TYPE_cert_type},
+    {"elliptic curves", TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves},
+    {"EC point formats", TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats},
+    {"SRP", TLSEXT_TYPE_srp},
+    {"signature algorithms", TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms},
+    {"use SRTP", TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp},
+    {"heartbeat", TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat},
+    {"session ticket", TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket},
+    {"renegotiation info", TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate},
+    {"signed certificate timestamps", TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp},
+    {"TLS padding", TLSEXT_TYPE_padding},
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg
+    {"next protocol", TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg},
+#endif
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
+    {"encrypt-then-mac", TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac},
+#endif
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation
+    {"application layer protocol negotiation",
+     TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation},
+#endif
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret
+    {"extended master secret", TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret},
+#endif
+    {NULL}
+};
+
+void tlsext_cb(SSL *s, int client_server, int type,
+               const unsigned char *data, int len, void *arg)
+{
+    BIO *bio = arg;
+    const char *extname = lookup(type, tlsext_types, "unknown");
+
+    BIO_printf(bio, "TLS %s extension \"%s\" (id=%d), len=%d\n",
+               client_server ? "server" : "client", extname, type, len);
+    BIO_dump(bio, (const char *)data, len);
+    (void)BIO_flush(bio);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
+int generate_cookie_callback(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie,
+                             unsigned int *cookie_len)
+{
+    unsigned char *buffer;
+    size_t length;
+    unsigned short port;
+    BIO_ADDR *peer = NULL;
+
+    /* Initialize a random secret */
+    if (!cookie_initialized) {
+        if (RAND_bytes(cookie_secret, COOKIE_SECRET_LENGTH) <= 0) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "error setting random cookie secret\n");
+            return 0;
+        }
+        cookie_initialized = 1;
+    }
+
+    peer = BIO_ADDR_new();
+    if (peer == NULL) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "memory full\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* Read peer information */
+    (void)BIO_dgram_get_peer(SSL_get_rbio(ssl), peer);
+
+    /* Create buffer with peer's address and port */
+    BIO_ADDR_rawaddress(peer, NULL, &length);
+    OPENSSL_assert(length != 0);
+    port = BIO_ADDR_rawport(peer);
+    length += sizeof(port);
+    buffer = app_malloc(length, "cookie generate buffer");
+
+    memcpy(buffer, &port, sizeof(port));
+    BIO_ADDR_rawaddress(peer, buffer + sizeof(port), NULL);
+
+    /* Calculate HMAC of buffer using the secret */
+    HMAC(EVP_sha1(), cookie_secret, COOKIE_SECRET_LENGTH,
+         buffer, length, cookie, cookie_len);
+
+    OPENSSL_free(buffer);
+    BIO_ADDR_free(peer);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int verify_cookie_callback(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *cookie,
+                           unsigned int cookie_len)
+{
+    unsigned char result[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+    unsigned int resultlength;
+
+    /* Note: we check cookie_initialized because if it's not,
+     * it cannot be valid */
+    if (cookie_initialized
+        && generate_cookie_callback(ssl, result, &resultlength)
+        && cookie_len == resultlength
+        && memcmp(result, cookie, resultlength) == 0)
+        return 1;
+
+    return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Example of extended certificate handling. Where the standard support of
+ * one certificate per algorithm is not sufficient an application can decide
+ * which certificate(s) to use at runtime based on whatever criteria it deems
+ * appropriate.
+ */
+
+/* Linked list of certificates, keys and chains */
+struct ssl_excert_st {
+    int certform;
+    const char *certfile;
+    int keyform;
+    const char *keyfile;
+    const char *chainfile;
+    X509 *cert;
+    EVP_PKEY *key;
+    STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
+    int build_chain;
+    struct ssl_excert_st *next, *prev;
+};
+
+static STRINT_PAIR chain_flags[] = {
+    {"Overall Validity", CERT_PKEY_VALID},
+    {"Sign with EE key", CERT_PKEY_SIGN},
+    {"EE signature", CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE},
+    {"CA signature", CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE},
+    {"EE key parameters", CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM},
+    {"CA key parameters", CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM},
+    {"Explicitly sign with EE key", CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN},
+    {"Issuer Name", CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME},
+    {"Certificate Type", CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE},
+    {NULL}
+};
+
+static void print_chain_flags(SSL *s, int flags)
+{
+    STRINT_PAIR *pp;
+
+    for (pp = chain_flags; pp->name; ++pp)
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "\t%s: %s\n",
+                   pp->name,
+                   (flags & pp->retval) ? "OK" : "NOT OK");
+    BIO_printf(bio_err, "\tSuite B: ");
+    if (SSL_set_cert_flags(s, 0) & SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS)
+        BIO_puts(bio_err, flags & CERT_PKEY_SUITEB ? "OK\n" : "NOT OK\n");
+    else
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "not tested\n");
+}
+
+/*
+ * Very basic selection callback: just use any certificate chain reported as
+ * valid. More sophisticated could prioritise according to local policy.
+ */
+static int set_cert_cb(SSL *ssl, void *arg)
+{
+    int i, rv;
+    SSL_EXCERT *exc = arg;
+#ifdef CERT_CB_TEST_RETRY
+    static int retry_cnt;
+    if (retry_cnt < 5) {
+        retry_cnt++;
+        BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                   "Certificate callback retry test: count %d\n",
+                   retry_cnt);
+        return -1;
+    }
+#endif
+    SSL_certs_clear(ssl);
+
+    if (!exc)
+        return 1;
+
+    /*
+     * Go to end of list and traverse backwards since we prepend newer
+     * entries this retains the original order.
+     */
+    while (exc->next)
+        exc = exc->next;
+
+    i = 0;
+
+    while (exc) {
+        i++;
+        rv = SSL_check_chain(ssl, exc->cert, exc->key, exc->chain);
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Checking cert chain %d:\nSubject: ", i);
+        X509_NAME_print_ex(bio_err, X509_get_subject_name(exc->cert), 0,
+                           XN_FLAG_ONELINE);
+        BIO_puts(bio_err, "\n");
+        print_chain_flags(ssl, rv);
+        if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID) {
+            if (!SSL_use_certificate(ssl, exc->cert)
+                    || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(ssl, exc->key)) {
+                return 0;
+            }
+            /*
+             * NB: we wouldn't normally do this as it is not efficient
+             * building chains on each connection better to cache the chain
+             * in advance.
+             */
+            if (exc->build_chain) {
+                if (!SSL_build_cert_chain(ssl, 0))
+                    return 0;
+            } else if (exc->chain)
+                SSL_set1_chain(ssl, exc->chain);
+        }
+        exc = exc->prev;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+void ssl_ctx_set_excert(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_EXCERT *exc)
+{
+    SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb(ctx, set_cert_cb, exc);
+}
+
+static int ssl_excert_prepend(SSL_EXCERT **pexc)
+{
+    SSL_EXCERT *exc = app_malloc(sizeof(*exc), "prepend cert");
+
+    memset(exc, 0, sizeof(*exc));
+
+    exc->next = *pexc;
+    *pexc = exc;
+
+    if (exc->next) {
+        exc->certform = exc->next->certform;
+        exc->keyform = exc->next->keyform;
+        exc->next->prev = exc;
+    } else {
+        exc->certform = FORMAT_PEM;
+        exc->keyform = FORMAT_PEM;
+    }
+    return 1;
+
+}
+
+void ssl_excert_free(SSL_EXCERT *exc)
+{
+    SSL_EXCERT *curr;
+
+    if (!exc)
+        return;
+    while (exc) {
+        X509_free(exc->cert);
+        EVP_PKEY_free(exc->key);
+        sk_X509_pop_free(exc->chain, X509_free);
+        curr = exc;
+        exc = exc->next;
+        OPENSSL_free(curr);
+    }
+}
+
+int load_excert(SSL_EXCERT **pexc)
+{
+    SSL_EXCERT *exc = *pexc;
+    if (!exc)
+        return 1;
+    /* If nothing in list, free and set to NULL */
+    if (!exc->certfile && !exc->next) {
+        ssl_excert_free(exc);
+        *pexc = NULL;
+        return 1;
+    }
+    for (; exc; exc = exc->next) {
+        if (!exc->certfile) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Missing filename\n");
+            return 0;
+        }
+        exc->cert = load_cert(exc->certfile, exc->certform,
+                              "Server Certificate");
+        if (!exc->cert)
+            return 0;
+        if (exc->keyfile) {
+            exc->key = load_key(exc->keyfile, exc->keyform,
+                                0, NULL, NULL, "Server Key");
+        } else {
+            exc->key = load_key(exc->certfile, exc->certform,
+                                0, NULL, NULL, "Server Key");
+        }
+        if (!exc->key)
+            return 0;
+        if (exc->chainfile) {
+            if (!load_certs(exc->chainfile, &exc->chain, FORMAT_PEM, NULL,
+                            "Server Chain"))
+                return 0;
+        }
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+enum range { OPT_X_ENUM };
+
+int args_excert(int opt, SSL_EXCERT **pexc)
+{
+    SSL_EXCERT *exc = *pexc;
+
+    assert(opt > OPT_X__FIRST);
+    assert(opt < OPT_X__LAST);
+
+    if (exc == NULL) {
+        if (!ssl_excert_prepend(&exc)) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, " %s: Error initialising xcert\n",
+                       opt_getprog());
+            goto err;
+        }
+        *pexc = exc;
+    }
+
+    switch ((enum range)opt) {
+    case OPT_X__FIRST:
+    case OPT_X__LAST:
+        return 0;
+    case OPT_X_CERT:
+        if (exc->certfile && !ssl_excert_prepend(&exc)) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Error adding xcert\n", opt_getprog());
+            goto err;
+        }
+        *pexc = exc;
+        exc->certfile = opt_arg();
+        break;
+    case OPT_X_KEY:
+        if (exc->keyfile) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Key already specified\n", opt_getprog());
+            goto err;
+        }
+        exc->keyfile = opt_arg();
+        break;
+    case OPT_X_CHAIN:
+        if (exc->chainfile) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Chain already specified\n",
+                       opt_getprog());
+            goto err;
+        }
+        exc->chainfile = opt_arg();
+        break;
+    case OPT_X_CHAIN_BUILD:
+        exc->build_chain = 1;
+        break;
+    case OPT_X_CERTFORM:
+        if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PEMDER, &exc->certform))
+            return 0;
+        break;
+    case OPT_X_KEYFORM:
+        if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PEMDER, &exc->keyform))
+            return 0;
+        break;
+    }
+    return 1;
+
+ err:
+    ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+    ssl_excert_free(exc);
+    *pexc = NULL;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static void print_raw_cipherlist(SSL *s)
+{
+    const unsigned char *rlist;
+    static const unsigned char scsv_id[] = { 0, 0xFF };
+    size_t i, rlistlen, num;
+    if (!SSL_is_server(s))
+        return;
+    num = SSL_get0_raw_cipherlist(s, NULL);
+    OPENSSL_assert(num == 2);
+    rlistlen = SSL_get0_raw_cipherlist(s, &rlist);
+    BIO_puts(bio_err, "Client cipher list: ");
+    for (i = 0; i < rlistlen; i += num, rlist += num) {
+        const SSL_CIPHER *c = SSL_CIPHER_find(s, rlist);
+        if (i)
+            BIO_puts(bio_err, ":");
+        if (c)
+            BIO_puts(bio_err, SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
+        else if (!memcmp(rlist, scsv_id, num))
+            BIO_puts(bio_err, "SCSV");
+        else {
+            size_t j;
+            BIO_puts(bio_err, "0x");
+            for (j = 0; j < num; j++)
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "%02X", rlist[j]);
+        }
+    }
+    BIO_puts(bio_err, "\n");
+}
+
+/*
+ * Hex encoder for TLSA RRdata, not ':' delimited.
+ */
+static char *hexencode(const unsigned char *data, size_t len)
+{
+    static const char *hex = "0123456789abcdef";
+    char *out;
+    char *cp;
+    size_t outlen = 2 * len + 1;
+    int ilen = (int) outlen;
+
+    if (outlen < len || ilen < 0 || outlen != (size_t)ilen) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: %"BIO_PRI64"u-byte buffer too large to hexencode\n",
+                   opt_getprog(), (uint64_t)len);
+        exit(1);
+    }
+    cp = out = app_malloc(ilen, "TLSA hex data buffer");
+
+    while (len-- > 0) {
+        *cp++ = hex[(*data >> 4) & 0x0f];
+        *cp++ = hex[*data++ & 0x0f];
+    }
+    *cp = '\0';
+    return out;
+}
+
+void print_verify_detail(SSL *s, BIO *bio)
+{
+    int mdpth;
+    EVP_PKEY *mspki;
+    long verify_err = SSL_get_verify_result(s);
+
+    if (verify_err == X509_V_OK) {
+        const char *peername = SSL_get0_peername(s);
+
+        BIO_printf(bio, "Verification: OK\n");
+        if (peername != NULL)
+            BIO_printf(bio, "Verified peername: %s\n", peername);
+    } else {
+        const char *reason = X509_verify_cert_error_string(verify_err);
+
+        BIO_printf(bio, "Verification error: %s\n", reason);
+    }
+
+    if ((mdpth = SSL_get0_dane_authority(s, NULL, &mspki)) >= 0) {
+        uint8_t usage, selector, mtype;
+        const unsigned char *data = NULL;
+        size_t dlen = 0;
+        char *hexdata;
+
+        mdpth = SSL_get0_dane_tlsa(s, &usage, &selector, &mtype, &data, &dlen);
+
+        /*
+         * The TLSA data field can be quite long when it is a certificate,
+         * public key or even a SHA2-512 digest.  Because the initial octets of
+         * ASN.1 certificates and public keys contain mostly boilerplate OIDs
+         * and lengths, we show the last 12 bytes of the data instead, as these
+         * are more likely to distinguish distinct TLSA records.
+         */
+#define TLSA_TAIL_SIZE 12
+        if (dlen > TLSA_TAIL_SIZE)
+            hexdata = hexencode(data + dlen - TLSA_TAIL_SIZE, TLSA_TAIL_SIZE);
+        else
+            hexdata = hexencode(data, dlen);
+        BIO_printf(bio, "DANE TLSA %d %d %d %s%s %s at depth %d\n",
+                   usage, selector, mtype,
+                   (dlen > TLSA_TAIL_SIZE) ? "..." : "", hexdata,
+                   (mspki != NULL) ? "signed the certificate" :
+                   mdpth ? "matched TA certificate" : "matched EE certificate",
+                   mdpth);
+        OPENSSL_free(hexdata);
+    }
+}
+
+void print_ssl_summary(SSL *s)
+{
+    const SSL_CIPHER *c;
+    X509 *peer;
+    /* const char *pnam = SSL_is_server(s) ? "client" : "server"; */
+
+    BIO_printf(bio_err, "Protocol version: %s\n", SSL_get_version(s));
+    print_raw_cipherlist(s);
+    c = SSL_get_current_cipher(s);
+    BIO_printf(bio_err, "Ciphersuite: %s\n", SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
+    do_print_sigalgs(bio_err, s, 0);
+    peer = SSL_get_peer_certificate(s);
+    if (peer) {
+        int nid;
+
+        BIO_puts(bio_err, "Peer certificate: ");
+        X509_NAME_print_ex(bio_err, X509_get_subject_name(peer),
+                           0, XN_FLAG_ONELINE);
+        BIO_puts(bio_err, "\n");
+        if (SSL_get_peer_signature_nid(s, &nid))
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Hash used: %s\n", OBJ_nid2sn(nid));
+        print_verify_detail(s, bio_err);
+    } else
+        BIO_puts(bio_err, "No peer certificate\n");
+    X509_free(peer);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    ssl_print_point_formats(bio_err, s);
+    if (SSL_is_server(s))
+        ssl_print_curves(bio_err, s, 1);
+    else
+        ssl_print_tmp_key(bio_err, s);
+#else
+    if (!SSL_is_server(s))
+        ssl_print_tmp_key(bio_err, s);
+#endif
+}
+
+int config_ctx(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *str,
+               SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    SSL_CONF_CTX_set_ssl_ctx(cctx, ctx);
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(str); i += 2) {
+        const char *flag = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(str, i);
+        const char *arg = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(str, i + 1);
+        if (SSL_CONF_cmd(cctx, flag, arg) <= 0) {
+            if (arg)
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error with command: \"%s %s\"\n",
+                           flag, arg);
+            else
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error with command: \"%s\"\n", flag);
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+    if (!SSL_CONF_CTX_finish(cctx)) {
+        BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error finishing context\n");
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int add_crls_store(X509_STORE *st, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
+{
+    X509_CRL *crl;
+    int i;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
+        crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
+        X509_STORE_add_crl(st, crl);
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_ctx_add_crls(SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls, int crl_download)
+{
+    X509_STORE *st;
+    st = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(ctx);
+    add_crls_store(st, crls);
+    if (crl_download)
+        store_setup_crl_download(st);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_load_stores(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                    const char *vfyCApath, const char *vfyCAfile,
+                    const char *chCApath, const char *chCAfile,
+                    STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls, int crl_download)
+{
+    X509_STORE *vfy = NULL, *ch = NULL;
+    int rv = 0;
+    if (vfyCApath != NULL || vfyCAfile != NULL) {
+        vfy = X509_STORE_new();
+        if (vfy == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        if (!X509_STORE_load_locations(vfy, vfyCAfile, vfyCApath))
+            goto err;
+        add_crls_store(vfy, crls);
+        SSL_CTX_set1_verify_cert_store(ctx, vfy);
+        if (crl_download)
+            store_setup_crl_download(vfy);
+    }
+    if (chCApath != NULL || chCAfile != NULL) {
+        ch = X509_STORE_new();
+        if (ch == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        if (!X509_STORE_load_locations(ch, chCAfile, chCApath))
+            goto err;
+        SSL_CTX_set1_chain_cert_store(ctx, ch);
+    }
+    rv = 1;
+ err:
+    X509_STORE_free(vfy);
+    X509_STORE_free(ch);
+    return rv;
+}
+
+/* Verbose print out of security callback */
+
+typedef struct {
+    BIO *out;
+    int verbose;
+    int (*old_cb) (const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, int bits, int nid,
+                   void *other, void *ex);
+} security_debug_ex;
+
+static STRINT_PAIR callback_types[] = {
+    {"Supported Ciphersuite", SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED},
+    {"Shared Ciphersuite", SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SHARED},
+    {"Check Ciphersuite", SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK},
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+    {"Temp DH key bits", SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH},
+#endif
+    {"Supported Curve", SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED},
+    {"Shared Curve", SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED},
+    {"Check Curve", SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK},
+    {"Supported Signature Algorithm digest", SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED},
+    {"Shared Signature Algorithm digest", SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED},
+    {"Check Signature Algorithm digest", SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK},
+    {"Signature Algorithm mask", SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK},
+    {"Certificate chain EE key", SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY},
+    {"Certificate chain CA key", SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY},
+    {"Peer Chain EE key", SSL_SECOP_PEER_EE_KEY},
+    {"Peer Chain CA key", SSL_SECOP_PEER_CA_KEY},
+    {"Certificate chain CA digest", SSL_SECOP_CA_MD},
+    {"Peer chain CA digest", SSL_SECOP_PEER_CA_MD},
+    {"SSL compression", SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION},
+    {"Session ticket", SSL_SECOP_TICKET},
+    {NULL}
+};
+
+static int security_callback_debug(const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                   int op, int bits, int nid,
+                                   void *other, void *ex)
+{
+    security_debug_ex *sdb = ex;
+    int rv, show_bits = 1, cert_md = 0;
+    const char *nm;
+    rv = sdb->old_cb(s, ctx, op, bits, nid, other, ex);
+    if (rv == 1 && sdb->verbose < 2)
+        return 1;
+    BIO_puts(sdb->out, "Security callback: ");
+
+    nm = lookup(op, callback_types, NULL);
+    switch (op) {
+    case SSL_SECOP_TICKET:
+    case SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION:
+        show_bits = 0;
+        nm = NULL;
+        break;
+    case SSL_SECOP_VERSION:
+        BIO_printf(sdb->out, "Version=%s", lookup(nid, ssl_versions, "???"));
+        show_bits = 0;
+        nm = NULL;
+        break;
+    case SSL_SECOP_CA_MD:
+    case SSL_SECOP_PEER_CA_MD:
+        cert_md = 1;
+        break;
+    }
+    if (nm)
+        BIO_printf(sdb->out, "%s=", nm);
+
+    switch (op & SSL_SECOP_OTHER_TYPE) {
+
+    case SSL_SECOP_OTHER_CIPHER:
+        BIO_puts(sdb->out, SSL_CIPHER_get_name(other));
+        break;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    case SSL_SECOP_OTHER_CURVE:
+        {
+            const char *cname;
+            cname = EC_curve_nid2nist(nid);
+            if (cname == NULL)
+                cname = OBJ_nid2sn(nid);
+            BIO_puts(sdb->out, cname);
+        }
+        break;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+    case SSL_SECOP_OTHER_DH:
+        {
+            DH *dh = other;
+            BIO_printf(sdb->out, "%d", DH_bits(dh));
+            break;
+        }
+#endif
+    case SSL_SECOP_OTHER_CERT:
+        {
+            if (cert_md) {
+                int sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(other);
+                BIO_puts(sdb->out, OBJ_nid2sn(sig_nid));
+            } else {
+                EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(other);
+                const char *algname = "";
+                EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
+                                        &algname, EVP_PKEY_get0_asn1(pkey));
+                BIO_printf(sdb->out, "%s, bits=%d",
+                           algname, EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey));
+            }
+            break;
+        }
+    case SSL_SECOP_OTHER_SIGALG:
+        {
+            const unsigned char *salg = other;
+            const char *sname = NULL;
+            switch (salg[1]) {
+            case TLSEXT_signature_anonymous:
+                sname = "anonymous";
+                break;
+            case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
+                sname = "RSA";
+                break;
+            case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
+                sname = "DSA";
+                break;
+            case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
+                sname = "ECDSA";
+                break;
+            }
+
+            BIO_puts(sdb->out, OBJ_nid2sn(nid));
+            if (sname)
+                BIO_printf(sdb->out, ", algorithm=%s", sname);
+            else
+                BIO_printf(sdb->out, ", algid=%d", salg[1]);
+            break;
+        }
+
+    }
+
+    if (show_bits)
+        BIO_printf(sdb->out, ", security bits=%d", bits);
+    BIO_printf(sdb->out, ": %s\n", rv ? "yes" : "no");
+    return rv;
+}
+
+void ssl_ctx_security_debug(SSL_CTX *ctx, int verbose)
+{
+    static security_debug_ex sdb;
+
+    sdb.out = bio_err;
+    sdb.verbose = verbose;
+    sdb.old_cb = SSL_CTX_get_security_callback(ctx);
+    SSL_CTX_set_security_callback(ctx, security_callback_debug);
+    SSL_CTX_set0_security_ex_data(ctx, &sdb);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/s_client.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/s_client.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fb89f0c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/s_client.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2760 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE.
+ */
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <openssl/e_os2.h>
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
+
+/*
+ * With IPv6, it looks like Digital has mixed up the proper order of
+ * recursive header file inclusion, resulting in the compiler complaining
+ * that u_int isn't defined, but only if _POSIX_C_SOURCE is defined, which is
+ * needed to have fileno() declared correctly...  So let's define u_int
+ */
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS_DECC) && !defined(__U_INT)
+# define __U_INT
+typedef unsigned int u_int;
+#endif
+
+#define USE_SOCKETS
+#include "apps.h"
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/async.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+# include <openssl/srp.h>
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
+# include <openssl/ct.h>
+#endif
+#include "s_apps.h"
+#include "timeouts.h"
+
+#if defined(__has_feature)
+# if __has_feature(memory_sanitizer)
+#  include <sanitizer/msan_interface.h>
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#undef BUFSIZZ
+#define BUFSIZZ 1024*8
+#define S_CLIENT_IRC_READ_TIMEOUT 8
+
+static char *prog;
+static int c_debug = 0;
+static int c_showcerts = 0;
+static char *keymatexportlabel = NULL;
+static int keymatexportlen = 20;
+static BIO *bio_c_out = NULL;
+static int c_quiet = 0;
+
+static void print_stuff(BIO *berr, SSL *con, int full);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+static int ocsp_resp_cb(SSL *s, void *arg);
+#endif
+
+static int saved_errno;
+
+static void save_errno(void)
+{
+    saved_errno = errno;
+    errno = 0;
+}
+
+static int restore_errno(void)
+{
+    int ret = errno;
+    errno = saved_errno;
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static void do_ssl_shutdown(SSL *ssl)
+{
+    int ret;
+
+    do {
+        /* We only do unidirectional shutdown */
+        ret = SSL_shutdown(ssl);
+        if (ret < 0) {
+            switch (SSL_get_error(ssl, ret)) {
+            case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
+            case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
+            case SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC:
+            case SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC_JOB:
+                /* We just do busy waiting. Nothing clever */
+                continue;
+            }
+            ret = 0;
+        }
+    } while (ret < 0);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+/* Default PSK identity and key */
+static char *psk_identity = "Client_identity";
+/*
+ * char *psk_key=NULL; by default PSK is not used
+ */
+
+static unsigned int psk_client_cb(SSL *ssl, const char *hint, char *identity,
+                                  unsigned int max_identity_len,
+                                  unsigned char *psk,
+                                  unsigned int max_psk_len)
+{
+    int ret;
+    long key_len;
+    unsigned char *key;
+
+    if (c_debug)
+        BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "psk_client_cb\n");
+    if (!hint) {
+        /* no ServerKeyExchange message */
+        if (c_debug)
+            BIO_printf(bio_c_out,
+                       "NULL received PSK identity hint, continuing anyway\n");
+    } else if (c_debug)
+        BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "Received PSK identity hint '%s'\n", hint);
+
+    /*
+     * lookup PSK identity and PSK key based on the given identity hint here
+     */
+    ret = BIO_snprintf(identity, max_identity_len, "%s", psk_identity);
+    if (ret < 0 || (unsigned int)ret > max_identity_len)
+        goto out_err;
+    if (c_debug)
+        BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "created identity '%s' len=%d\n", identity,
+                   ret);
+
+    /* convert the PSK key to binary */
+    key = OPENSSL_hexstr2buf(psk_key, &key_len);
+    if (key == NULL) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Could not convert PSK key '%s' to buffer\n",
+                   psk_key);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (max_psk_len > INT_MAX || key_len > (long)max_psk_len) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                   "psk buffer of callback is too small (%d) for key (%ld)\n",
+                   max_psk_len, key_len);
+        OPENSSL_free(key);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    memcpy(psk, key, key_len);
+    OPENSSL_free(key);
+
+    if (c_debug)
+        BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "created PSK len=%ld\n", key_len);
+
+    return key_len;
+ out_err:
+    if (c_debug)
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error in PSK client callback\n");
+    return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+/* This is a context that we pass to callbacks */
+typedef struct tlsextctx_st {
+    BIO *biodebug;
+    int ack;
+} tlsextctx;
+
+static int ssl_servername_cb(SSL *s, int *ad, void *arg)
+{
+    tlsextctx *p = (tlsextctx *) arg;
+    const char *hn = SSL_get_servername(s, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name);
+    if (SSL_get_servername_type(s) != -1)
+        p->ack = !SSL_session_reused(s) && hn != NULL;
+    else
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't use SSL_get_servername\n");
+
+    return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+
+/* This is a context that we pass to all callbacks */
+typedef struct srp_arg_st {
+    char *srppassin;
+    char *srplogin;
+    int msg;                    /* copy from c_msg */
+    int debug;                  /* copy from c_debug */
+    int amp;                    /* allow more groups */
+    int strength;               /* minimal size for N */
+} SRP_ARG;
+
+# define SRP_NUMBER_ITERATIONS_FOR_PRIME 64
+
+static int srp_Verify_N_and_g(const BIGNUM *N, const BIGNUM *g)
+{
+    BN_CTX *bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+    BIGNUM *p = BN_new();
+    BIGNUM *r = BN_new();
+    int ret =
+        g != NULL && N != NULL && bn_ctx != NULL && BN_is_odd(N) &&
+        BN_is_prime_ex(N, SRP_NUMBER_ITERATIONS_FOR_PRIME, bn_ctx, NULL) == 1 &&
+        p != NULL && BN_rshift1(p, N) &&
+        /* p = (N-1)/2 */
+        BN_is_prime_ex(p, SRP_NUMBER_ITERATIONS_FOR_PRIME, bn_ctx, NULL) == 1 &&
+        r != NULL &&
+        /* verify g^((N-1)/2) == -1 (mod N) */
+        BN_mod_exp(r, g, p, N, bn_ctx) &&
+        BN_add_word(r, 1) && BN_cmp(r, N) == 0;
+
+    BN_free(r);
+    BN_free(p);
+    BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * This callback is used here for two purposes:
+ * - extended debugging
+ * - making some primality tests for unknown groups
+ * The callback is only called for a non default group.
+ *
+ * An application does not need the call back at all if
+ * only the standard groups are used.  In real life situations,
+ * client and server already share well known groups,
+ * thus there is no need to verify them.
+ * Furthermore, in case that a server actually proposes a group that
+ * is not one of those defined in RFC 5054, it is more appropriate
+ * to add the group to a static list and then compare since
+ * primality tests are rather cpu consuming.
+ */
+
+static int ssl_srp_verify_param_cb(SSL *s, void *arg)
+{
+    SRP_ARG *srp_arg = (SRP_ARG *)arg;
+    BIGNUM *N = NULL, *g = NULL;
+
+    if (((N = SSL_get_srp_N(s)) == NULL) || ((g = SSL_get_srp_g(s)) == NULL))
+        return 0;
+    if (srp_arg->debug || srp_arg->msg || srp_arg->amp == 1) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "SRP parameters:\n");
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "\tN=");
+        BN_print(bio_err, N);
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n\tg=");
+        BN_print(bio_err, g);
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n");
+    }
+
+    if (SRP_check_known_gN_param(g, N))
+        return 1;
+
+    if (srp_arg->amp == 1) {
+        if (srp_arg->debug)
+            BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                       "SRP param N and g are not known params, going to check deeper.\n");
+
+        /*
+         * The srp_moregroups is a real debugging feature. Implementors
+         * should rather add the value to the known ones. The minimal size
+         * has already been tested.
+         */
+        if (BN_num_bits(g) <= BN_BITS && srp_Verify_N_and_g(N, g))
+            return 1;
+    }
+    BIO_printf(bio_err, "SRP param N and g rejected.\n");
+    return 0;
+}
+
+# define PWD_STRLEN 1024
+
+static char *ssl_give_srp_client_pwd_cb(SSL *s, void *arg)
+{
+    SRP_ARG *srp_arg = (SRP_ARG *)arg;
+    char *pass = app_malloc(PWD_STRLEN + 1, "SRP password buffer");
+    PW_CB_DATA cb_tmp;
+    int l;
+
+    cb_tmp.password = (char *)srp_arg->srppassin;
+    cb_tmp.prompt_info = "SRP user";
+    if ((l = password_callback(pass, PWD_STRLEN, 0, &cb_tmp)) < 0) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't read Password\n");
+        OPENSSL_free(pass);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    *(pass + l) = '\0';
+
+    return pass;
+}
+
+#endif
+
+static char *srtp_profiles = NULL;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+/* This the context that we pass to next_proto_cb */
+typedef struct tlsextnextprotoctx_st {
+    unsigned char *data;
+    size_t len;
+    int status;
+} tlsextnextprotoctx;
+
+static tlsextnextprotoctx next_proto;
+
+static int next_proto_cb(SSL *s, unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen,
+                         const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen,
+                         void *arg)
+{
+    tlsextnextprotoctx *ctx = arg;
+
+    if (!c_quiet) {
+        /* We can assume that |in| is syntactically valid. */
+        unsigned i;
+        BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "Protocols advertised by server: ");
+        for (i = 0; i < inlen;) {
+            if (i)
+                BIO_write(bio_c_out, ", ", 2);
+            BIO_write(bio_c_out, &in[i + 1], in[i]);
+            i += in[i] + 1;
+        }
+        BIO_write(bio_c_out, "\n", 1);
+    }
+
+    ctx->status =
+        SSL_select_next_proto(out, outlen, in, inlen, ctx->data, ctx->len);
+    return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+}
+#endif                         /* ndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG */
+
+static int serverinfo_cli_parse_cb(SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type,
+                                   const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen,
+                                   int *al, void *arg)
+{
+    char pem_name[100];
+    unsigned char ext_buf[4 + 65536];
+
+    /* Reconstruct the type/len fields prior to extension data */
+    ext_buf[0] = ext_type >> 8;
+    ext_buf[1] = ext_type & 0xFF;
+    ext_buf[2] = inlen >> 8;
+    ext_buf[3] = inlen & 0xFF;
+    memcpy(ext_buf + 4, in, inlen);
+
+    BIO_snprintf(pem_name, sizeof(pem_name), "SERVERINFO FOR EXTENSION %d",
+                 ext_type);
+    PEM_write_bio(bio_c_out, pem_name, "", ext_buf, 4 + inlen);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Hex decoder that tolerates optional whitespace.  Returns number of bytes
+ * produced, advances inptr to end of input string.
+ */
+static ossl_ssize_t hexdecode(const char **inptr, void *result)
+{
+    unsigned char **out = (unsigned char **)result;
+    const char *in = *inptr;
+    unsigned char *ret = app_malloc(strlen(in) / 2, "hexdecode");
+    unsigned char *cp = ret;
+    uint8_t byte;
+    int nibble = 0;
+
+    if (ret == NULL)
+        return -1;
+
+    for (byte = 0; *in; ++in) {
+        int x;
+
+        if (isspace(_UC(*in)))
+            continue;
+        x = OPENSSL_hexchar2int(*in);
+        if (x < 0) {
+            OPENSSL_free(ret);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        byte |= (char)x;
+        if ((nibble ^= 1) == 0) {
+            *cp++ = byte;
+            byte = 0;
+        } else {
+            byte <<= 4;
+        }
+    }
+    if (nibble != 0) {
+        OPENSSL_free(ret);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    *inptr = in;
+
+    return cp - (*out = ret);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Decode unsigned 0..255, returns 1 on success, <= 0 on failure. Advances
+ * inptr to next field skipping leading whitespace.
+ */
+static ossl_ssize_t checked_uint8(const char **inptr, void *out)
+{
+    uint8_t *result = (uint8_t *)out;
+    const char *in = *inptr;
+    char *endp;
+    long v;
+    int e;
+
+    save_errno();
+    v = strtol(in, &endp, 10);
+    e = restore_errno();
+
+    if (((v == LONG_MIN || v == LONG_MAX) && e == ERANGE) ||
+        endp == in || !isspace(_UC(*endp)) ||
+        v != (*result = (uint8_t) v)) {
+        return -1;
+    }
+    for (in = endp; isspace(_UC(*in)); ++in)
+        continue;
+
+    *inptr = in;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+struct tlsa_field {
+    void *var;
+    const char *name;
+    ossl_ssize_t (*parser)(const char **, void *);
+};
+
+static int tlsa_import_rr(SSL *con, const char *rrdata)
+{
+    /* Not necessary to re-init these values; the "parsers" do that. */
+    static uint8_t usage;
+    static uint8_t selector;
+    static uint8_t mtype;
+    static unsigned char *data;
+    static struct tlsa_field tlsa_fields[] = {
+        { &usage, "usage", checked_uint8 },
+        { &selector, "selector", checked_uint8 },
+        { &mtype, "mtype", checked_uint8 },
+        { &data, "data", hexdecode },
+        { NULL, }
+    };
+    struct tlsa_field *f;
+    int ret;
+    const char *cp = rrdata;
+    ossl_ssize_t len = 0;
+
+    for (f = tlsa_fields; f->var; ++f) {
+        /* Returns number of bytes produced, advances cp to next field */
+        if ((len = f->parser(&cp, f->var)) <= 0) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: warning: bad TLSA %s field in: %s\n",
+                       prog, f->name, rrdata);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+    /* The data field is last, so len is its length */
+    ret = SSL_dane_tlsa_add(con, usage, selector, mtype, data, len);
+    OPENSSL_free(data);
+
+    if (ret == 0) {
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: warning: unusable TLSA rrdata: %s\n",
+                   prog, rrdata);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (ret < 0) {
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: warning: error loading TLSA rrdata: %s\n",
+                   prog, rrdata);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int tlsa_import_rrset(SSL *con, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *rrset)
+{
+    int num = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(rrset);
+    int count = 0;
+    int i;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) {
+        char *rrdata = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(rrset, i);
+        if (tlsa_import_rr(con, rrdata) > 0)
+            ++count;
+    }
+    return count > 0;
+}
+
+typedef enum OPTION_choice {
+    OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP,
+    OPT_4, OPT_6, OPT_HOST, OPT_PORT, OPT_CONNECT, OPT_UNIX,
+    OPT_XMPPHOST, OPT_VERIFY,
+    OPT_CERT, OPT_CRL, OPT_CRL_DOWNLOAD, OPT_SESS_OUT, OPT_SESS_IN,
+    OPT_CERTFORM, OPT_CRLFORM, OPT_VERIFY_RET_ERROR, OPT_VERIFY_QUIET,
+    OPT_BRIEF, OPT_PREXIT, OPT_CRLF, OPT_QUIET, OPT_NBIO,
+    OPT_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE, OPT_RAND, OPT_IGN_EOF, OPT_NO_IGN_EOF,
+    OPT_DEBUG, OPT_TLSEXTDEBUG, OPT_STATUS, OPT_WDEBUG,
+    OPT_MSG, OPT_MSGFILE, OPT_ENGINE, OPT_TRACE, OPT_SECURITY_DEBUG,
+    OPT_SECURITY_DEBUG_VERBOSE, OPT_SHOWCERTS, OPT_NBIO_TEST, OPT_STATE,
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+    OPT_PSK_IDENTITY, OPT_PSK,
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+    OPT_SRPUSER, OPT_SRPPASS, OPT_SRP_STRENGTH, OPT_SRP_LATEUSER,
+    OPT_SRP_MOREGROUPS,
+#endif
+    OPT_SSL3, OPT_SSL_CONFIG,
+    OPT_TLS1_2, OPT_TLS1_1, OPT_TLS1, OPT_DTLS, OPT_DTLS1,
+    OPT_DTLS1_2, OPT_TIMEOUT, OPT_MTU, OPT_KEYFORM, OPT_PASS,
+    OPT_CERT_CHAIN, OPT_CAPATH, OPT_NOCAPATH, OPT_CHAINCAPATH,
+        OPT_VERIFYCAPATH,
+    OPT_KEY, OPT_RECONNECT, OPT_BUILD_CHAIN, OPT_CAFILE, OPT_NOCAFILE,
+    OPT_CHAINCAFILE, OPT_VERIFYCAFILE, OPT_NEXTPROTONEG, OPT_ALPN,
+    OPT_SERVERINFO, OPT_STARTTLS, OPT_SERVERNAME,
+    OPT_USE_SRTP, OPT_KEYMATEXPORT, OPT_KEYMATEXPORTLEN, OPT_SMTPHOST,
+    OPT_ASYNC, OPT_SPLIT_SEND_FRAG, OPT_MAX_PIPELINES, OPT_READ_BUF,
+    OPT_V_ENUM,
+    OPT_X_ENUM,
+    OPT_S_ENUM,
+    OPT_FALLBACKSCSV, OPT_NOCMDS, OPT_PROXY, OPT_DANE_TLSA_DOMAIN,
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
+    OPT_CT, OPT_NOCT, OPT_CTLOG_FILE,
+#endif
+    OPT_DANE_TLSA_RRDATA, OPT_DANE_EE_NO_NAME
+} OPTION_CHOICE;
+
+OPTIONS s_client_options[] = {
+    {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"},
+    {"host", OPT_HOST, 's', "Use -connect instead"},
+    {"port", OPT_PORT, 'p', "Use -connect instead"},
+    {"connect", OPT_CONNECT, 's',
+     "TCP/IP where to connect (default is :" PORT ")"},
+    {"proxy", OPT_PROXY, 's',
+     "Connect to via specified proxy to the real server"},
+#ifdef AF_UNIX
+    {"unix", OPT_UNIX, 's', "Connect over the specified Unix-domain socket"},
+#endif
+    {"4", OPT_4, '-', "Use IPv4 only"},
+#ifdef AF_INET6
+    {"6", OPT_6, '-', "Use IPv6 only"},
+#endif
+    {"verify", OPT_VERIFY, 'p', "Turn on peer certificate verification"},
+    {"cert", OPT_CERT, '<', "Certificate file to use, PEM format assumed"},
+    {"certform", OPT_CERTFORM, 'F',
+     "Certificate format (PEM or DER) PEM default"},
+    {"key", OPT_KEY, 's', "Private key file to use, if not in -cert file"},
+    {"keyform", OPT_KEYFORM, 'E', "Key format (PEM, DER or engine) PEM default"},
+    {"pass", OPT_PASS, 's', "Private key file pass phrase source"},
+    {"CApath", OPT_CAPATH, '/', "PEM format directory of CA's"},
+    {"CAfile", OPT_CAFILE, '<', "PEM format file of CA's"},
+    {"no-CAfile", OPT_NOCAFILE, '-',
+     "Do not load the default certificates file"},
+    {"no-CApath", OPT_NOCAPATH, '-',
+     "Do not load certificates from the default certificates directory"},
+    {"dane_tlsa_domain", OPT_DANE_TLSA_DOMAIN, 's', "DANE TLSA base domain"},
+    {"dane_tlsa_rrdata", OPT_DANE_TLSA_RRDATA, 's',
+     "DANE TLSA rrdata presentation form"},
+    {"dane_ee_no_namechecks", OPT_DANE_EE_NO_NAME, '-',
+     "Disable name checks when matching DANE-EE(3) TLSA records"},
+    {"reconnect", OPT_RECONNECT, '-',
+     "Drop and re-make the connection with the same Session-ID"},
+    {"showcerts", OPT_SHOWCERTS, '-', "Show all certificates in the chain"},
+    {"debug", OPT_DEBUG, '-', "Extra output"},
+    {"msg", OPT_MSG, '-', "Show protocol messages"},
+    {"msgfile", OPT_MSGFILE, '>',
+     "File to send output of -msg or -trace, instead of stdout"},
+    {"nbio_test", OPT_NBIO_TEST, '-', "More ssl protocol testing"},
+    {"state", OPT_STATE, '-', "Print the ssl states"},
+    {"crlf", OPT_CRLF, '-', "Convert LF from terminal into CRLF"},
+    {"quiet", OPT_QUIET, '-', "No s_client output"},
+    {"ign_eof", OPT_IGN_EOF, '-', "Ignore input eof (default when -quiet)"},
+    {"no_ign_eof", OPT_NO_IGN_EOF, '-', "Don't ignore input eof"},
+    {"starttls", OPT_STARTTLS, 's',
+     "Use the appropriate STARTTLS command before starting TLS"},
+    {"xmpphost", OPT_XMPPHOST, 's',
+     "Host to use with \"-starttls xmpp[-server]\""},
+    {"rand", OPT_RAND, 's',
+     "Load the file(s) into the random number generator"},
+    {"sess_out", OPT_SESS_OUT, '>', "File to write SSL session to"},
+    {"sess_in", OPT_SESS_IN, '<', "File to read SSL session from"},
+    {"use_srtp", OPT_USE_SRTP, 's',
+     "Offer SRTP key management with a colon-separated profile list"},
+    {"keymatexport", OPT_KEYMATEXPORT, 's',
+     "Export keying material using label"},
+    {"keymatexportlen", OPT_KEYMATEXPORTLEN, 'p',
+     "Export len bytes of keying material (default 20)"},
+    {"fallback_scsv", OPT_FALLBACKSCSV, '-', "Send the fallback SCSV"},
+    {"name", OPT_SMTPHOST, 's', "Hostname to use for \"-starttls smtp\""},
+    {"CRL", OPT_CRL, '<', "CRL file to use"},
+    {"crl_download", OPT_CRL_DOWNLOAD, '-', "Download CRL from distribution points"},
+    {"CRLform", OPT_CRLFORM, 'F', "CRL format (PEM or DER) PEM is default"},
+    {"verify_return_error", OPT_VERIFY_RET_ERROR, '-',
+     "Close connection on verification error"},
+    {"verify_quiet", OPT_VERIFY_QUIET, '-', "Restrict verify output to errors"},
+    {"brief", OPT_BRIEF, '-',
+     "Restrict output to brief summary of connection parameters"},
+    {"prexit", OPT_PREXIT, '-',
+     "Print session information when the program exits"},
+    {"security_debug", OPT_SECURITY_DEBUG, '-',
+     "Enable security debug messages"},
+    {"security_debug_verbose", OPT_SECURITY_DEBUG_VERBOSE, '-',
+     "Output more security debug output"},
+    {"cert_chain", OPT_CERT_CHAIN, '<',
+     "Certificate chain file (in PEM format)"},
+    {"chainCApath", OPT_CHAINCAPATH, '/',
+     "Use dir as certificate store path to build CA certificate chain"},
+    {"verifyCApath", OPT_VERIFYCAPATH, '/',
+     "Use dir as certificate store path to verify CA certificate"},
+    {"build_chain", OPT_BUILD_CHAIN, '-', "Build certificate chain"},
+    {"chainCAfile", OPT_CHAINCAFILE, '<',
+     "CA file for certificate chain (PEM format)"},
+    {"verifyCAfile", OPT_VERIFYCAFILE, '<',
+     "CA file for certificate verification (PEM format)"},
+    {"nocommands", OPT_NOCMDS, '-', "Do not use interactive command letters"},
+    {"servername", OPT_SERVERNAME, 's',
+     "Set TLS extension servername in ClientHello"},
+    {"tlsextdebug", OPT_TLSEXTDEBUG, '-',
+     "Hex dump of all TLS extensions received"},
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+    {"status", OPT_STATUS, '-', "Request certificate status from server"},
+#endif
+    {"serverinfo", OPT_SERVERINFO, 's',
+     "types  Send empty ClientHello extensions (comma-separated numbers)"},
+    {"alpn", OPT_ALPN, 's',
+     "Enable ALPN extension, considering named protocols supported (comma-separated list)"},
+    {"async", OPT_ASYNC, '-', "Support asynchronous operation"},
+    {"ssl_config", OPT_SSL_CONFIG, 's', "Use specified configuration file"},
+    {"split_send_frag", OPT_SPLIT_SEND_FRAG, 'n',
+     "Size used to split data for encrypt pipelines"},
+    {"max_pipelines", OPT_MAX_PIPELINES, 'n',
+     "Maximum number of encrypt/decrypt pipelines to be used"},
+    {"read_buf", OPT_READ_BUF, 'n',
+     "Default read buffer size to be used for connections"},
+    OPT_S_OPTIONS,
+    OPT_V_OPTIONS,
+    OPT_X_OPTIONS,
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
+    {"ssl3", OPT_SSL3, '-', "Just use SSLv3"},
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
+    {"tls1", OPT_TLS1, '-', "Just use TLSv1"},
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1
+    {"tls1_1", OPT_TLS1_1, '-', "Just use TLSv1.1"},
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2
+    {"tls1_2", OPT_TLS1_2, '-', "Just use TLSv1.2"},
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS
+    {"dtls", OPT_DTLS, '-', "Use any version of DTLS"},
+    {"timeout", OPT_TIMEOUT, '-',
+     "Enable send/receive timeout on DTLS connections"},
+    {"mtu", OPT_MTU, 'p', "Set the link layer MTU"},
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
+    {"dtls1", OPT_DTLS1, '-', "Just use DTLSv1"},
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2
+    {"dtls1_2", OPT_DTLS1_2, '-', "Just use DTLSv1.2"},
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE
+    {"trace", OPT_TRACE, '-', "Show trace output of protocol messages"},
+#endif
+#ifdef WATT32
+    {"wdebug", OPT_WDEBUG, '-', "WATT-32 tcp debugging"},
+#endif
+    {"nbio", OPT_NBIO, '-', "Use non-blocking IO"},
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+    {"psk_identity", OPT_PSK_IDENTITY, 's', "PSK identity"},
+    {"psk", OPT_PSK, 's', "PSK in hex (without 0x)"},
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+    {"srpuser", OPT_SRPUSER, 's', "SRP authentication for 'user'"},
+    {"srppass", OPT_SRPPASS, 's', "Password for 'user'"},
+    {"srp_lateuser", OPT_SRP_LATEUSER, '-',
+     "SRP username into second ClientHello message"},
+    {"srp_moregroups", OPT_SRP_MOREGROUPS, '-',
+     "Tolerate other than the known g N values."},
+    {"srp_strength", OPT_SRP_STRENGTH, 'p', "Minimal length in bits for N"},
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+    {"nextprotoneg", OPT_NEXTPROTONEG, 's',
+     "Enable NPN extension, considering named protocols supported (comma-separated list)"},
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine, possibly a hardware device"},
+    {"ssl_client_engine", OPT_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE, 's',
+     "Specify engine to be used for client certificate operations"},
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
+    {"ct", OPT_CT, '-', "Request and parse SCTs (also enables OCSP stapling)"},
+    {"noct", OPT_NOCT, '-', "Do not request or parse SCTs (default)"},
+    {"ctlogfile", OPT_CTLOG_FILE, '<', "CT log list CONF file"},
+#endif
+    {NULL, OPT_EOF, 0x00, NULL}
+};
+
+typedef enum PROTOCOL_choice {
+    PROTO_OFF,
+    PROTO_SMTP,
+    PROTO_POP3,
+    PROTO_IMAP,
+    PROTO_FTP,
+    PROTO_TELNET,
+    PROTO_XMPP,
+    PROTO_XMPP_SERVER,
+    PROTO_CONNECT,
+    PROTO_IRC
+} PROTOCOL_CHOICE;
+
+static const OPT_PAIR services[] = {
+    {"smtp", PROTO_SMTP},
+    {"pop3", PROTO_POP3},
+    {"imap", PROTO_IMAP},
+    {"ftp", PROTO_FTP},
+    {"xmpp", PROTO_XMPP},
+    {"xmpp-server", PROTO_XMPP_SERVER},
+    {"telnet", PROTO_TELNET},
+    {"irc", PROTO_IRC},
+    {NULL, 0}
+};
+
+#define IS_INET_FLAG(o) \
+ (o == OPT_4 || o == OPT_6 || o == OPT_HOST || o == OPT_PORT || o == OPT_CONNECT)
+#define IS_UNIX_FLAG(o) (o == OPT_UNIX)
+
+#define IS_PROT_FLAG(o) \
+ (o == OPT_SSL3 || o == OPT_TLS1 || o == OPT_TLS1_1 || o == OPT_TLS1_2 \
+  || o == OPT_DTLS || o == OPT_DTLS1 || o == OPT_DTLS1_2)
+
+/* Free |*dest| and optionally set it to a copy of |source|. */
+static void freeandcopy(char **dest, const char *source)
+{
+    OPENSSL_free(*dest);
+    *dest = NULL;
+    if (source != NULL)
+        *dest = OPENSSL_strdup(source);
+}
+
+int s_client_main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    BIO *sbio;
+    EVP_PKEY *key = NULL;
+    SSL *con = NULL;
+    SSL_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
+    X509 *cert = NULL;
+    X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = NULL;
+    SSL_EXCERT *exc = NULL;
+    SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *ssl_args = NULL;
+    char *dane_tlsa_domain = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *dane_tlsa_rrset = NULL;
+    int dane_ee_no_name = 0;
+    STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls = NULL;
+    const SSL_METHOD *meth = TLS_client_method();
+    const char *CApath = NULL, *CAfile = NULL;
+    char *cbuf = NULL, *sbuf = NULL;
+    char *mbuf = NULL, *proxystr = NULL, *connectstr = NULL;
+    char *cert_file = NULL, *key_file = NULL, *chain_file = NULL;
+    char *chCApath = NULL, *chCAfile = NULL, *host = NULL;
+    char *port = OPENSSL_strdup(PORT);
+    char *inrand = NULL;
+    char *passarg = NULL, *pass = NULL, *vfyCApath = NULL, *vfyCAfile = NULL;
+    char *sess_in = NULL, *sess_out = NULL, *crl_file = NULL, *p;
+    char *xmpphost = NULL;
+    const char *ehlo = "mail.example.com";
+    struct timeval timeout, *timeoutp;
+    fd_set readfds, writefds;
+    int noCApath = 0, noCAfile = 0;
+    int build_chain = 0, cbuf_len, cbuf_off, cert_format = FORMAT_PEM;
+    int key_format = FORMAT_PEM, crlf = 0, full_log = 1, mbuf_len = 0;
+    int prexit = 0;
+    int sdebug = 0;
+    int reconnect = 0, verify = SSL_VERIFY_NONE, vpmtouched = 0;
+    int ret = 1, in_init = 1, i, nbio_test = 0, s = -1, k, width, state = 0;
+    int sbuf_len, sbuf_off, cmdletters = 1;
+    int socket_family = AF_UNSPEC, socket_type = SOCK_STREAM;
+    int starttls_proto = PROTO_OFF, crl_format = FORMAT_PEM, crl_download = 0;
+    int write_tty, read_tty, write_ssl, read_ssl, tty_on, ssl_pending;
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS)
+    int at_eof = 0;
+#endif
+    int read_buf_len = 0;
+    int fallback_scsv = 0;
+    long randamt = 0;
+    OPTION_CHOICE o;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS
+    int enable_timeouts = 0;
+    long socket_mtu = 0;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    ENGINE *ssl_client_engine = NULL;
+#endif
+    ENGINE *e = NULL;
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS)
+    struct timeval tv;
+#endif
+    char *servername = NULL;
+    const char *alpn_in = NULL;
+    tlsextctx tlsextcbp = { NULL, 0 };
+    const char *ssl_config = NULL;
+#define MAX_SI_TYPES 100
+    unsigned short serverinfo_types[MAX_SI_TYPES];
+    int serverinfo_count = 0, start = 0, len;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+    const char *next_proto_neg_in = NULL;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+    char *srppass = NULL;
+    int srp_lateuser = 0;
+    SRP_ARG srp_arg = { NULL, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 1024 };
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
+    char *ctlog_file = NULL;
+    int ct_validation = 0;
+#endif
+    int min_version = 0, max_version = 0, prot_opt = 0, no_prot_opt = 0;
+    int async = 0;
+    unsigned int split_send_fragment = 0;
+    unsigned int max_pipelines = 0;
+    enum { use_inet, use_unix, use_unknown } connect_type = use_unknown;
+    int count4or6 = 0;
+    int c_nbio = 0, c_msg = 0, c_ign_eof = 0, c_brief = 0;
+    int c_tlsextdebug = 0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+    int c_status_req = 0;
+#endif
+    BIO *bio_c_msg = NULL;
+
+    FD_ZERO(&readfds);
+    FD_ZERO(&writefds);
+/* Known false-positive of MemorySanitizer. */
+#if defined(__has_feature)
+# if __has_feature(memory_sanitizer)
+    __msan_unpoison(&readfds, sizeof(readfds));
+    __msan_unpoison(&writefds, sizeof(writefds));
+# endif
+#endif
+
+    prog = opt_progname(argv[0]);
+    c_quiet = 0;
+    c_debug = 0;
+    c_showcerts = 0;
+    c_nbio = 0;
+    vpm = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
+    cctx = SSL_CONF_CTX_new();
+
+    if (vpm == NULL || cctx == NULL) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: out of memory\n", prog);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    cbuf = app_malloc(BUFSIZZ, "cbuf");
+    sbuf = app_malloc(BUFSIZZ, "sbuf");
+    mbuf = app_malloc(BUFSIZZ, "mbuf");
+
+    SSL_CONF_CTX_set_flags(cctx, SSL_CONF_FLAG_CLIENT | SSL_CONF_FLAG_CMDLINE);
+
+    prog = opt_init(argc, argv, s_client_options);
+    while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) {
+        /* Check for intermixing flags. */
+        if (connect_type == use_unix && IS_INET_FLAG(o)) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                       "%s: Intermixed protocol flags (unix and internet domains)\n",
+                       prog);
+            goto end;
+        }
+        if (connect_type == use_inet && IS_UNIX_FLAG(o)) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                       "%s: Intermixed protocol flags (internet and unix domains)\n",
+                       prog);
+            goto end;
+        }
+
+        if (IS_PROT_FLAG(o) && ++prot_opt > 1) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Cannot supply multiple protocol flags\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+        if (IS_NO_PROT_FLAG(o))
+            no_prot_opt++;
+        if (prot_opt == 1 && no_prot_opt) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                       "Cannot supply both a protocol flag and '-no_<prot>'\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+
+        switch (o) {
+        case OPT_EOF:
+        case OPT_ERR:
+ opthelp:
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog);
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_HELP:
+            opt_help(s_client_options);
+            ret = 0;
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_4:
+            connect_type = use_inet;
+            socket_family = AF_INET;
+            count4or6++;
+            break;
+#ifdef AF_INET6
+        case OPT_6:
+            connect_type = use_inet;
+            socket_family = AF_INET6;
+            count4or6++;
+            break;
+#endif
+        case OPT_HOST:
+            connect_type = use_inet;
+            freeandcopy(&host, opt_arg());
+            break;
+        case OPT_PORT:
+            connect_type = use_inet;
+            freeandcopy(&port, opt_arg());
+            break;
+        case OPT_CONNECT:
+            connect_type = use_inet;
+            freeandcopy(&connectstr, opt_arg());
+            break;
+        case OPT_PROXY:
+            proxystr = opt_arg();
+            starttls_proto = PROTO_CONNECT;
+            break;
+#ifdef AF_UNIX
+        case OPT_UNIX:
+            connect_type = use_unix;
+            socket_family = AF_UNIX;
+            freeandcopy(&host, opt_arg());
+            break;
+#endif
+        case OPT_XMPPHOST:
+            xmpphost = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_SMTPHOST:
+            ehlo = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_VERIFY:
+            verify = SSL_VERIFY_PEER;
+            verify_args.depth = atoi(opt_arg());
+            if (!c_quiet)
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "verify depth is %d\n", verify_args.depth);
+            break;
+        case OPT_CERT:
+            cert_file = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_CRL:
+            crl_file = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_CRL_DOWNLOAD:
+            crl_download = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_SESS_OUT:
+            sess_out = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_SESS_IN:
+            sess_in = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_CERTFORM:
+            if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PEMDER, &cert_format))
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_CRLFORM:
+            if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PEMDER, &crl_format))
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_VERIFY_RET_ERROR:
+            verify_args.return_error = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_VERIFY_QUIET:
+            verify_args.quiet = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_BRIEF:
+            c_brief = verify_args.quiet = c_quiet = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_S_CASES:
+            if (ssl_args == NULL)
+                ssl_args = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null();
+            if (ssl_args == NULL
+                || !sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(ssl_args, opt_flag())
+                || !sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(ssl_args, opt_arg())) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Memory allocation failure\n", prog);
+                goto end;
+            }
+            break;
+        case OPT_V_CASES:
+            if (!opt_verify(o, vpm))
+                goto end;
+            vpmtouched++;
+            break;
+        case OPT_X_CASES:
+            if (!args_excert(o, &exc))
+                goto end;
+            break;
+        case OPT_PREXIT:
+            prexit = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_CRLF:
+            crlf = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_QUIET:
+            c_quiet = c_ign_eof = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NBIO:
+            c_nbio = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NOCMDS:
+            cmdletters = 0;
+            break;
+        case OPT_ENGINE:
+            e = setup_engine(opt_arg(), 1);
+            break;
+        case OPT_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+            ssl_client_engine = ENGINE_by_id(opt_arg());
+            if (ssl_client_engine == NULL) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting client auth engine\n");
+                goto opthelp;
+            }
+#endif
+            break;
+        case OPT_RAND:
+            inrand = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_IGN_EOF:
+            c_ign_eof = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NO_IGN_EOF:
+            c_ign_eof = 0;
+            break;
+        case OPT_DEBUG:
+            c_debug = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_TLSEXTDEBUG:
+            c_tlsextdebug = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_STATUS:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+            c_status_req = 1;
+#endif
+            break;
+        case OPT_WDEBUG:
+#ifdef WATT32
+            dbug_init();
+#endif
+            break;
+        case OPT_MSG:
+            c_msg = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_MSGFILE:
+            bio_c_msg = BIO_new_file(opt_arg(), "w");
+            break;
+        case OPT_TRACE:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE
+            c_msg = 2;
+#endif
+            break;
+        case OPT_SECURITY_DEBUG:
+            sdebug = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_SECURITY_DEBUG_VERBOSE:
+            sdebug = 2;
+            break;
+        case OPT_SHOWCERTS:
+            c_showcerts = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NBIO_TEST:
+            nbio_test = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_STATE:
+            state = 1;
+            break;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+        case OPT_PSK_IDENTITY:
+            psk_identity = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_PSK:
+            for (p = psk_key = opt_arg(); *p; p++) {
+                if (isxdigit(_UC(*p)))
+                    continue;
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "Not a hex number '%s'\n", psk_key);
+                goto end;
+            }
+            break;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+        case OPT_SRPUSER:
+            srp_arg.srplogin = opt_arg();
+            if (min_version < TLS1_VERSION)
+                min_version = TLS1_VERSION;
+            break;
+        case OPT_SRPPASS:
+            srppass = opt_arg();
+            if (min_version < TLS1_VERSION)
+                min_version = TLS1_VERSION;
+            break;
+        case OPT_SRP_STRENGTH:
+            srp_arg.strength = atoi(opt_arg());
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "SRP minimal length for N is %d\n",
+                       srp_arg.strength);
+            if (min_version < TLS1_VERSION)
+                min_version = TLS1_VERSION;
+            break;
+        case OPT_SRP_LATEUSER:
+            srp_lateuser = 1;
+            if (min_version < TLS1_VERSION)
+                min_version = TLS1_VERSION;
+            break;
+        case OPT_SRP_MOREGROUPS:
+            srp_arg.amp = 1;
+            if (min_version < TLS1_VERSION)
+                min_version = TLS1_VERSION;
+            break;
+#endif
+        case OPT_SSL_CONFIG:
+            ssl_config = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_SSL3:
+            min_version = SSL3_VERSION;
+            max_version = SSL3_VERSION;
+            break;
+        case OPT_TLS1_2:
+            min_version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
+            max_version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
+            break;
+        case OPT_TLS1_1:
+            min_version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
+            max_version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
+            break;
+        case OPT_TLS1:
+            min_version = TLS1_VERSION;
+            max_version = TLS1_VERSION;
+            break;
+        case OPT_DTLS:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS
+            meth = DTLS_client_method();
+            socket_type = SOCK_DGRAM;
+#endif
+            break;
+        case OPT_DTLS1:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
+            meth = DTLS_client_method();
+            min_version = DTLS1_VERSION;
+            max_version = DTLS1_VERSION;
+            socket_type = SOCK_DGRAM;
+#endif
+            break;
+        case OPT_DTLS1_2:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2
+            meth = DTLS_client_method();
+            min_version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
+            max_version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
+            socket_type = SOCK_DGRAM;
+#endif
+            break;
+        case OPT_TIMEOUT:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS
+            enable_timeouts = 1;
+#endif
+            break;
+        case OPT_MTU:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS
+            socket_mtu = atol(opt_arg());
+#endif
+            break;
+        case OPT_FALLBACKSCSV:
+            fallback_scsv = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_KEYFORM:
+            if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PDE, &key_format))
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_PASS:
+            passarg = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_CERT_CHAIN:
+            chain_file = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_KEY:
+            key_file = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_RECONNECT:
+            reconnect = 5;
+            break;
+        case OPT_CAPATH:
+            CApath = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_NOCAPATH:
+            noCApath = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_CHAINCAPATH:
+            chCApath = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_VERIFYCAPATH:
+            vfyCApath = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_BUILD_CHAIN:
+            build_chain = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_CAFILE:
+            CAfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_NOCAFILE:
+            noCAfile = 1;
+            break;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
+        case OPT_NOCT:
+            ct_validation = 0;
+            break;
+        case OPT_CT:
+            ct_validation = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_CTLOG_FILE:
+            ctlog_file = opt_arg();
+            break;
+#endif
+        case OPT_CHAINCAFILE:
+            chCAfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_VERIFYCAFILE:
+            vfyCAfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_DANE_TLSA_DOMAIN:
+            dane_tlsa_domain = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_DANE_TLSA_RRDATA:
+            if (dane_tlsa_rrset == NULL)
+                dane_tlsa_rrset = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null();
+            if (dane_tlsa_rrset == NULL ||
+                !sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(dane_tlsa_rrset, opt_arg())) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Memory allocation failure\n", prog);
+                goto end;
+            }
+            break;
+        case OPT_DANE_EE_NO_NAME:
+            dane_ee_no_name = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NEXTPROTONEG:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+            next_proto_neg_in = opt_arg();
+#endif
+            break;
+        case OPT_ALPN:
+            alpn_in = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_SERVERINFO:
+            p = opt_arg();
+            len = strlen(p);
+            for (start = 0, i = 0; i <= len; ++i) {
+                if (i == len || p[i] == ',') {
+                    serverinfo_types[serverinfo_count] = atoi(p + start);
+                    if (++serverinfo_count == MAX_SI_TYPES)
+                        break;
+                    start = i + 1;
+                }
+            }
+            break;
+        case OPT_STARTTLS:
+            if (!opt_pair(opt_arg(), services, &starttls_proto))
+                goto end;
+            break;
+        case OPT_SERVERNAME:
+            servername = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_USE_SRTP:
+            srtp_profiles = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_KEYMATEXPORT:
+            keymatexportlabel = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_KEYMATEXPORTLEN:
+            keymatexportlen = atoi(opt_arg());
+            break;
+        case OPT_ASYNC:
+            async = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_SPLIT_SEND_FRAG:
+            split_send_fragment = atoi(opt_arg());
+            if (split_send_fragment == 0) {
+                /*
+                 * Not allowed - set to a deliberately bad value so we get an
+                 * error message below
+                 */
+                split_send_fragment = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH + 1;
+            }
+            break;
+        case OPT_MAX_PIPELINES:
+            max_pipelines = atoi(opt_arg());
+            break;
+        case OPT_READ_BUF:
+            read_buf_len = atoi(opt_arg());
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    if (count4or6 >= 2) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Can't use both -4 and -6\n", prog);
+        goto opthelp;
+    }
+    argc = opt_num_rest();
+    if (argc != 0)
+        goto opthelp;
+
+    if (proxystr) {
+        int res;
+        char *tmp_host = host, *tmp_port = port;
+        if (connectstr == NULL) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: -proxy requires use of -connect\n", prog);
+            goto opthelp;
+        }
+        res = BIO_parse_hostserv(proxystr, &host, &port, BIO_PARSE_PRIO_HOST);
+        if (tmp_host != host)
+            OPENSSL_free(tmp_host);
+        if (tmp_port != port)
+            OPENSSL_free(tmp_port);
+        if (!res) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                       "%s: -proxy argument malformed or ambiguous\n", prog);
+            goto end;
+        }
+    } else {
+        int res = 1;
+        char *tmp_host = host, *tmp_port = port;
+        if (connectstr != NULL)
+            res = BIO_parse_hostserv(connectstr, &host, &port,
+                                     BIO_PARSE_PRIO_HOST);
+        if (tmp_host != host)
+            OPENSSL_free(tmp_host);
+        if (tmp_port != port)
+            OPENSSL_free(tmp_port);
+        if (!res) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                       "%s: -connect argument malformed or ambiguous\n",
+                       prog);
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+
+#ifdef AF_UNIX
+    if (socket_family == AF_UNIX && socket_type != SOCK_STREAM) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                   "Can't use unix sockets and datagrams together\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+#endif
+
+    if (split_send_fragment > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Bad split send fragment size\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (max_pipelines > SSL_MAX_PIPELINES) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Bad max pipelines value\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
+    next_proto.status = -1;
+    if (next_proto_neg_in) {
+        next_proto.data =
+            next_protos_parse(&next_proto.len, next_proto_neg_in);
+        if (next_proto.data == NULL) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error parsing -nextprotoneg argument\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+    } else
+        next_proto.data = NULL;
+#endif
+
+    if (!app_passwd(passarg, NULL, &pass, NULL)) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting password\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (key_file == NULL)
+        key_file = cert_file;
+
+    if (key_file) {
+        key = load_key(key_file, key_format, 0, pass, e,
+                       "client certificate private key file");
+        if (key == NULL) {
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (cert_file) {
+        cert = load_cert(cert_file, cert_format, "client certificate file");
+        if (cert == NULL) {
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (chain_file) {
+        if (!load_certs(chain_file, &chain, FORMAT_PEM, NULL,
+                        "client certificate chain"))
+            goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (crl_file) {
+        X509_CRL *crl;
+        crl = load_crl(crl_file, crl_format);
+        if (crl == NULL) {
+            BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error loading CRL\n");
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            goto end;
+        }
+        crls = sk_X509_CRL_new_null();
+        if (crls == NULL || !sk_X509_CRL_push(crls, crl)) {
+            BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error adding CRL\n");
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            X509_CRL_free(crl);
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (!load_excert(&exc))
+        goto end;
+
+    if (!app_RAND_load_file(NULL, 1) && inrand == NULL
+        && !RAND_status()) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                   "warning, not much extra random data, consider using the -rand option\n");
+    }
+    if (inrand != NULL) {
+        randamt = app_RAND_load_files(inrand);
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "%ld semi-random bytes loaded\n", randamt);
+    }
+
+    if (bio_c_out == NULL) {
+        if (c_quiet && !c_debug) {
+            bio_c_out = BIO_new(BIO_s_null());
+            if (c_msg && !bio_c_msg)
+                bio_c_msg = dup_bio_out(FORMAT_TEXT);
+        } else if (bio_c_out == NULL)
+            bio_c_out = dup_bio_out(FORMAT_TEXT);
+    }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+    if (!app_passwd(srppass, NULL, &srp_arg.srppassin, NULL)) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting password\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+#endif
+
+    ctx = SSL_CTX_new(meth);
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (sdebug)
+        ssl_ctx_security_debug(ctx, sdebug);
+
+    if (!config_ctx(cctx, ssl_args, ctx))
+        goto end;
+
+    if (ssl_config) {
+        if (SSL_CTX_config(ctx, ssl_config) == 0) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error using configuration \"%s\"\n",
+                       ssl_config);
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (min_version != 0
+        && SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(ctx, min_version) == 0)
+        goto end;
+    if (max_version != 0
+        && SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(ctx, max_version) == 0)
+        goto end;
+
+    if (vpmtouched && !SSL_CTX_set1_param(ctx, vpm)) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error setting verify params\n");
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (async) {
+        SSL_CTX_set_mode(ctx, SSL_MODE_ASYNC);
+    }
+    if (split_send_fragment > 0) {
+        SSL_CTX_set_split_send_fragment(ctx, split_send_fragment);
+    }
+    if (max_pipelines > 0) {
+        SSL_CTX_set_max_pipelines(ctx, max_pipelines);
+    }
+
+    if (read_buf_len > 0) {
+        SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(ctx, read_buf_len);
+    }
+
+    if (!ssl_load_stores(ctx, vfyCApath, vfyCAfile, chCApath, chCAfile,
+                         crls, crl_download)) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error loading store locations\n");
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        goto end;
+    }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    if (ssl_client_engine) {
+        if (!SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine(ctx, ssl_client_engine)) {
+            BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error setting client auth engine\n");
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            ENGINE_free(ssl_client_engine);
+            goto end;
+        }
+        ENGINE_free(ssl_client_engine);
+    }
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+    if (psk_key != NULL) {
+        if (c_debug)
+            BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "PSK key given, setting client callback\n");
+        SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback(ctx, psk_client_cb);
+    }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
+    if (srtp_profiles != NULL) {
+        /* Returns 0 on success! */
+        if (SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_use_srtp(ctx, srtp_profiles) != 0) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error setting SRTP profile\n");
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+#endif
+
+    if (exc)
+        ssl_ctx_set_excert(ctx, exc);
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
+    if (next_proto.data)
+        SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(ctx, next_proto_cb, &next_proto);
+#endif
+    if (alpn_in) {
+        size_t alpn_len;
+        unsigned char *alpn = next_protos_parse(&alpn_len, alpn_in);
+
+        if (alpn == NULL) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error parsing -alpn argument\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+        /* Returns 0 on success! */
+        if (SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos(ctx, alpn, alpn_len) != 0) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error setting ALPN\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+        OPENSSL_free(alpn);
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0; i < serverinfo_count; i++) {
+        if (!SSL_CTX_add_client_custom_ext(ctx,
+                                           serverinfo_types[i],
+                                           NULL, NULL, NULL,
+                                           serverinfo_cli_parse_cb, NULL)) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                       "Warning: Unable to add custom extension %u, skipping\n",
+                       serverinfo_types[i]);
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (state)
+        SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(ctx, apps_ssl_info_callback);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
+    /* Enable SCT processing, without early connection termination */
+    if (ct_validation &&
+        !SSL_CTX_enable_ct(ctx, SSL_CT_VALIDATION_PERMISSIVE)) {
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (!ctx_set_ctlog_list_file(ctx, ctlog_file)) {
+        if (ct_validation) {
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            goto end;
+        }
+
+        /*
+         * If CT validation is not enabled, the log list isn't needed so don't
+         * show errors or abort. We try to load it regardless because then we
+         * can show the names of the logs any SCTs came from (SCTs may be seen
+         * even with validation disabled).
+         */
+        ERR_clear_error();
+    }
+#endif
+
+    SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx, verify, verify_callback);
+
+    if (!ctx_set_verify_locations(ctx, CAfile, CApath, noCAfile, noCApath)) {
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    ssl_ctx_add_crls(ctx, crls, crl_download);
+
+    if (!set_cert_key_stuff(ctx, cert, key, chain, build_chain))
+        goto end;
+
+    if (servername != NULL) {
+        tlsextcbp.biodebug = bio_err;
+        SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(ctx, ssl_servername_cb);
+        SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(ctx, &tlsextcbp);
+    }
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+    if (srp_arg.srplogin) {
+        if (!srp_lateuser && !SSL_CTX_set_srp_username(ctx, srp_arg.srplogin)) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Unable to set SRP username\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+        srp_arg.msg = c_msg;
+        srp_arg.debug = c_debug;
+        SSL_CTX_set_srp_cb_arg(ctx, &srp_arg);
+        SSL_CTX_set_srp_client_pwd_callback(ctx, ssl_give_srp_client_pwd_cb);
+        SSL_CTX_set_srp_strength(ctx, srp_arg.strength);
+        if (c_msg || c_debug || srp_arg.amp == 0)
+            SSL_CTX_set_srp_verify_param_callback(ctx,
+                                                  ssl_srp_verify_param_cb);
+    }
+# endif
+
+    if (dane_tlsa_domain != NULL) {
+        if (SSL_CTX_dane_enable(ctx) <= 0) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                       "%s: Error enabling DANE TLSA authentication.\n",
+                       prog);
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+
+    con = SSL_new(ctx);
+    if (sess_in) {
+        SSL_SESSION *sess;
+        BIO *stmp = BIO_new_file(sess_in, "r");
+        if (!stmp) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't open session file %s\n", sess_in);
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            goto end;
+        }
+        sess = PEM_read_bio_SSL_SESSION(stmp, NULL, 0, NULL);
+        BIO_free(stmp);
+        if (!sess) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't open session file %s\n", sess_in);
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            goto end;
+        }
+        if (!SSL_set_session(con, sess)) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't set session\n");
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            goto end;
+        }
+        SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
+    }
+
+    if (fallback_scsv)
+        SSL_set_mode(con, SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV);
+
+    if (servername != NULL) {
+        if (!SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(con, servername)) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Unable to set TLS servername extension.\n");
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (dane_tlsa_domain != NULL) {
+        if (SSL_dane_enable(con, dane_tlsa_domain) <= 0) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Error enabling DANE TLSA "
+                       "authentication.\n", prog);
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            goto end;
+        }
+        if (dane_tlsa_rrset == NULL) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: DANE TLSA authentication requires at "
+                       "least one -dane_tlsa_rrdata option.\n", prog);
+            goto end;
+        }
+        if (tlsa_import_rrset(con, dane_tlsa_rrset) <= 0) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Failed to import any TLSA "
+                       "records.\n", prog);
+            goto end;
+        }
+        if (dane_ee_no_name)
+            SSL_dane_set_flags(con, DANE_FLAG_NO_DANE_EE_NAMECHECKS);
+    } else if (dane_tlsa_rrset != NULL) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: DANE TLSA authentication requires the "
+                   "-dane_tlsa_domain option.\n", prog);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+ re_start:
+    if (init_client(&s, host, port, socket_family, socket_type) == 0) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "connect:errno=%d\n", get_last_socket_error());
+        BIO_closesocket(s);
+        goto end;
+    }
+    BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "CONNECTED(%08X)\n", s);
+
+    if (c_nbio) {
+        if (!BIO_socket_nbio(s, 1)) {
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            goto end;
+        }
+        BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "Turned on non blocking io\n");
+    }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS
+    if (socket_type == SOCK_DGRAM) {
+        union BIO_sock_info_u peer_info;
+
+        sbio = BIO_new_dgram(s, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+        if ((peer_info.addr = BIO_ADDR_new()) == NULL) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "memory allocation failure\n");
+            BIO_closesocket(s);
+            goto end;
+        }
+        if (!BIO_sock_info(s, BIO_SOCK_INFO_ADDRESS, &peer_info)) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "getsockname:errno=%d\n",
+                       get_last_socket_error());
+            BIO_ADDR_free(peer_info.addr);
+            BIO_closesocket(s);
+            goto end;
+        }
+
+        (void)BIO_ctrl_set_connected(sbio, peer_info.addr);
+        BIO_ADDR_free(peer_info.addr);
+        peer_info.addr = NULL;
+
+        if (enable_timeouts) {
+            timeout.tv_sec = 0;
+            timeout.tv_usec = DGRAM_RCV_TIMEOUT;
+            BIO_ctrl(sbio, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_RECV_TIMEOUT, 0, &timeout);
+
+            timeout.tv_sec = 0;
+            timeout.tv_usec = DGRAM_SND_TIMEOUT;
+            BIO_ctrl(sbio, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_SEND_TIMEOUT, 0, &timeout);
+        }
+
+        if (socket_mtu) {
+            if (socket_mtu < DTLS_get_link_min_mtu(con)) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "MTU too small. Must be at least %ld\n",
+                           DTLS_get_link_min_mtu(con));
+                BIO_free(sbio);
+                goto shut;
+            }
+            SSL_set_options(con, SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU);
+            if (!DTLS_set_link_mtu(con, socket_mtu)) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "Failed to set MTU\n");
+                BIO_free(sbio);
+                goto shut;
+            }
+        } else
+            /* want to do MTU discovery */
+            BIO_ctrl(sbio, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_MTU_DISCOVER, 0, NULL);
+    } else
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DTLS */
+        sbio = BIO_new_socket(s, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+
+    if (nbio_test) {
+        BIO *test;
+
+        test = BIO_new(BIO_f_nbio_test());
+        sbio = BIO_push(test, sbio);
+    }
+
+    if (c_debug) {
+        BIO_set_callback(sbio, bio_dump_callback);
+        BIO_set_callback_arg(sbio, (char *)bio_c_out);
+    }
+    if (c_msg) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE
+        if (c_msg == 2)
+            SSL_set_msg_callback(con, SSL_trace);
+        else
+#endif
+            SSL_set_msg_callback(con, msg_cb);
+        SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(con, bio_c_msg ? bio_c_msg : bio_c_out);
+    }
+
+    if (c_tlsextdebug) {
+        SSL_set_tlsext_debug_callback(con, tlsext_cb);
+        SSL_set_tlsext_debug_arg(con, bio_c_out);
+    }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+    if (c_status_req) {
+        SSL_set_tlsext_status_type(con, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp);
+        SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(ctx, ocsp_resp_cb);
+        SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(ctx, bio_c_out);
+    }
+#endif
+
+    SSL_set_bio(con, sbio, sbio);
+    SSL_set_connect_state(con);
+
+    /* ok, lets connect */
+    if (fileno_stdin() > SSL_get_fd(con))
+        width = fileno_stdin() + 1;
+    else
+        width = SSL_get_fd(con) + 1;
+
+    read_tty = 1;
+    write_tty = 0;
+    tty_on = 0;
+    read_ssl = 1;
+    write_ssl = 1;
+
+    cbuf_len = 0;
+    cbuf_off = 0;
+    sbuf_len = 0;
+    sbuf_off = 0;
+
+    switch ((PROTOCOL_CHOICE) starttls_proto) {
+    case PROTO_OFF:
+        break;
+    case PROTO_SMTP:
+        {
+            /*
+             * This is an ugly hack that does a lot of assumptions. We do
+             * have to handle multi-line responses which may come in a single
+             * packet or not. We therefore have to use BIO_gets() which does
+             * need a buffering BIO. So during the initial chitchat we do
+             * push a buffering BIO into the chain that is removed again
+             * later on to not disturb the rest of the s_client operation.
+             */
+            int foundit = 0;
+            BIO *fbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer());
+            BIO_push(fbio, sbio);
+            /* wait for multi-line response to end from SMTP */
+            do {
+                mbuf_len = BIO_gets(fbio, mbuf, BUFSIZZ);
+            }
+            while (mbuf_len > 3 && mbuf[3] == '-');
+            BIO_printf(fbio, "EHLO %s\r\n", ehlo);
+            (void)BIO_flush(fbio);
+            /* wait for multi-line response to end EHLO SMTP response */
+            do {
+                mbuf_len = BIO_gets(fbio, mbuf, BUFSIZZ);
+                if (strstr(mbuf, "STARTTLS"))
+                    foundit = 1;
+            }
+            while (mbuf_len > 3 && mbuf[3] == '-');
+            (void)BIO_flush(fbio);
+            BIO_pop(fbio);
+            BIO_free(fbio);
+            if (!foundit)
+                BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                           "didn't find starttls in server response,"
+                           " trying anyway...\n");
+            BIO_printf(sbio, "STARTTLS\r\n");
+            BIO_read(sbio, sbuf, BUFSIZZ);
+        }
+        break;
+    case PROTO_POP3:
+        {
+            BIO_read(sbio, mbuf, BUFSIZZ);
+            BIO_printf(sbio, "STLS\r\n");
+            mbuf_len = BIO_read(sbio, sbuf, BUFSIZZ);
+            if (mbuf_len < 0) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "BIO_read failed\n");
+                goto end;
+            }
+        }
+        break;
+    case PROTO_IMAP:
+        {
+            int foundit = 0;
+            BIO *fbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer());
+            BIO_push(fbio, sbio);
+            BIO_gets(fbio, mbuf, BUFSIZZ);
+            /* STARTTLS command requires CAPABILITY... */
+            BIO_printf(fbio, ". CAPABILITY\r\n");
+            (void)BIO_flush(fbio);
+            /* wait for multi-line CAPABILITY response */
+            do {
+                mbuf_len = BIO_gets(fbio, mbuf, BUFSIZZ);
+                if (strstr(mbuf, "STARTTLS"))
+                    foundit = 1;
+            }
+            while (mbuf_len > 3 && mbuf[0] != '.');
+            (void)BIO_flush(fbio);
+            BIO_pop(fbio);
+            BIO_free(fbio);
+            if (!foundit)
+                BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                           "didn't find STARTTLS in server response,"
+                           " trying anyway...\n");
+            BIO_printf(sbio, ". STARTTLS\r\n");
+            BIO_read(sbio, sbuf, BUFSIZZ);
+        }
+        break;
+    case PROTO_FTP:
+        {
+            BIO *fbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer());
+            BIO_push(fbio, sbio);
+            /* wait for multi-line response to end from FTP */
+            do {
+                mbuf_len = BIO_gets(fbio, mbuf, BUFSIZZ);
+            }
+            while (mbuf_len > 3 && mbuf[3] == '-');
+            (void)BIO_flush(fbio);
+            BIO_pop(fbio);
+            BIO_free(fbio);
+            BIO_printf(sbio, "AUTH TLS\r\n");
+            BIO_read(sbio, sbuf, BUFSIZZ);
+        }
+        break;
+    case PROTO_XMPP:
+    case PROTO_XMPP_SERVER:
+        {
+            int seen = 0;
+            BIO_printf(sbio, "<stream:stream "
+                       "xmlns:stream='http://etherx.jabber.org/streams' "
+                       "xmlns='jabber:%s' to='%s' version='1.0'>",
+                       starttls_proto == PROTO_XMPP ? "client" : "server",
+                       xmpphost ? xmpphost : host);
+            seen = BIO_read(sbio, mbuf, BUFSIZZ);
+            mbuf[seen] = 0;
+            while (!strstr
+                   (mbuf, "<starttls xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-tls'")
+                   && !strstr(mbuf,
+                              "<starttls xmlns=\"urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-tls\""))
+            {
+                seen = BIO_read(sbio, mbuf, BUFSIZZ);
+
+                if (seen <= 0)
+                    goto shut;
+
+                mbuf[seen] = 0;
+            }
+            BIO_printf(sbio,
+                       "<starttls xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-tls'/>");
+            seen = BIO_read(sbio, sbuf, BUFSIZZ);
+            sbuf[seen] = 0;
+            if (!strstr(sbuf, "<proceed"))
+                goto shut;
+            mbuf[0] = 0;
+        }
+        break;
+    case PROTO_TELNET:
+        {
+            static const unsigned char tls_do[] = {
+                /* IAC    DO   START_TLS */
+                   255,   253, 46
+            };
+            static const unsigned char tls_will[] = {
+                /* IAC  WILL START_TLS */
+                   255, 251, 46
+            };
+            static const unsigned char tls_follows[] = {
+                /* IAC  SB   START_TLS FOLLOWS IAC  SE */
+                   255, 250, 46,       1,      255, 240
+            };
+            int bytes;
+
+            /* Telnet server should demand we issue START_TLS */
+            bytes = BIO_read(sbio, mbuf, BUFSIZZ);
+            if (bytes != 3 || memcmp(mbuf, tls_do, 3) != 0)
+                goto shut;
+            /* Agree to issue START_TLS and send the FOLLOWS sub-command */
+            BIO_write(sbio, tls_will, 3);
+            BIO_write(sbio, tls_follows, 6);
+            (void)BIO_flush(sbio);
+            /* Telnet server also sent the FOLLOWS sub-command */
+            bytes = BIO_read(sbio, mbuf, BUFSIZZ);
+            if (bytes != 6 || memcmp(mbuf, tls_follows, 6) != 0)
+                goto shut;
+        }
+        break;
+    case PROTO_CONNECT:
+        {
+            enum {
+                error_proto,     /* Wrong protocol, not even HTTP */
+                error_connect,   /* CONNECT failed */
+                success
+            } foundit = error_connect;
+            BIO *fbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer());
+
+            BIO_push(fbio, sbio);
+            BIO_printf(fbio, "CONNECT %s HTTP/1.0\r\n\r\n", connectstr);
+            (void)BIO_flush(fbio);
+            /*
+             * The first line is the HTTP response.  According to RFC 7230,
+             * it's formated exactly like this:
+             *
+             * HTTP/d.d ddd Reason text\r\n
+             */
+            mbuf_len = BIO_gets(fbio, mbuf, BUFSIZZ);
+            if (mbuf[8] != ' ') {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                           "%s: HTTP CONNECT failed, incorrect response "
+                           "from proxy\n", prog);
+                foundit = error_proto;
+            } else if (mbuf[9] != '2') {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: HTTP CONNECT failed: %s ", prog,
+                           &mbuf[9]);
+            } else {
+                foundit = success;
+            }
+            if (foundit != error_proto) {
+                /* Read past all following headers */
+                do {
+                    mbuf_len = BIO_gets(fbio, mbuf, BUFSIZZ);
+                } while (mbuf_len > 2);
+            }
+            (void)BIO_flush(fbio);
+            BIO_pop(fbio);
+            BIO_free(fbio);
+            if (foundit != success) {
+                goto shut;
+            }
+        }
+        break;
+    case PROTO_IRC:
+        {
+            int numeric;
+            BIO *fbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer());
+
+            BIO_push(fbio, sbio);
+            BIO_printf(fbio, "STARTTLS\r\n");
+            (void)BIO_flush(fbio);
+            width = SSL_get_fd(con) + 1;
+
+            do {
+                numeric = 0;
+
+                FD_ZERO(&readfds);
+                openssl_fdset(SSL_get_fd(con), &readfds);
+                timeout.tv_sec = S_CLIENT_IRC_READ_TIMEOUT;
+                timeout.tv_usec = 0;
+                /*
+                 * If the IRCd doesn't respond within
+                 * S_CLIENT_IRC_READ_TIMEOUT seconds, assume
+                 * it doesn't support STARTTLS. Many IRCds
+                 * will not give _any_ sort of response to a
+                 * STARTTLS command when it's not supported.
+                 */
+                if (!BIO_get_buffer_num_lines(fbio)
+                    && !BIO_pending(fbio)
+                    && !BIO_pending(sbio)
+                    && select(width, (void *)&readfds, NULL, NULL,
+                              &timeout) < 1) {
+                    BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                               "Timeout waiting for response (%d seconds).\n",
+                               S_CLIENT_IRC_READ_TIMEOUT);
+                    break;
+                }
+
+                mbuf_len = BIO_gets(fbio, mbuf, BUFSIZZ);
+                if (mbuf_len < 1 || sscanf(mbuf, "%*s %d", &numeric) != 1)
+                    break;
+                /* :example.net 451 STARTTLS :You have not registered */
+                /* :example.net 421 STARTTLS :Unknown command */
+                if ((numeric == 451 || numeric == 421)
+                    && strstr(mbuf, "STARTTLS") != NULL) {
+                    BIO_printf(bio_err, "STARTTLS not supported: %s", mbuf);
+                    break;
+                }
+                if (numeric == 691) {
+                    BIO_printf(bio_err, "STARTTLS negotiation failed: ");
+                    ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+                    break;
+                }
+            } while (numeric != 670);
+
+            (void)BIO_flush(fbio);
+            BIO_pop(fbio);
+            BIO_free(fbio);
+            if (numeric != 670) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "Server does not support STARTTLS.\n");
+                ret = 1;
+                goto shut;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    for (;;) {
+        FD_ZERO(&readfds);
+        FD_ZERO(&writefds);
+
+        if ((SSL_version(con) == DTLS1_VERSION) &&
+            DTLSv1_get_timeout(con, &timeout))
+            timeoutp = &timeout;
+        else
+            timeoutp = NULL;
+
+        if (SSL_in_init(con) && !SSL_total_renegotiations(con)) {
+            in_init = 1;
+            tty_on = 0;
+        } else {
+            tty_on = 1;
+            if (in_init) {
+                in_init = 0;
+
+                if (sess_out) {
+                    BIO *stmp = BIO_new_file(sess_out, "w");
+                    if (stmp) {
+                        PEM_write_bio_SSL_SESSION(stmp, SSL_get_session(con));
+                        BIO_free(stmp);
+                    } else
+                        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error writing session file %s\n",
+                                   sess_out);
+                }
+                if (c_brief) {
+                    BIO_puts(bio_err, "CONNECTION ESTABLISHED\n");
+                    print_ssl_summary(con);
+                }
+
+                print_stuff(bio_c_out, con, full_log);
+                if (full_log > 0)
+                    full_log--;
+
+                if (starttls_proto) {
+                    BIO_write(bio_err, mbuf, mbuf_len);
+                    /* We don't need to know any more */
+                    if (!reconnect)
+                        starttls_proto = PROTO_OFF;
+                }
+
+                if (reconnect) {
+                    reconnect--;
+                    BIO_printf(bio_c_out,
+                               "drop connection and then reconnect\n");
+                    do_ssl_shutdown(con);
+                    SSL_set_connect_state(con);
+                    BIO_closesocket(SSL_get_fd(con));
+                    goto re_start;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
+        ssl_pending = read_ssl && SSL_has_pending(con);
+
+        if (!ssl_pending) {
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS)
+            if (tty_on) {
+                /*
+                 * Note that select() returns when read _would not block_,
+                 * and EOF satisfies that.  To avoid a CPU-hogging loop,
+                 * set the flag so we exit.
+                 */
+                if (read_tty && !at_eof)
+                    openssl_fdset(fileno_stdin(), &readfds);
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
+                if (write_tty)
+                    openssl_fdset(fileno_stdout(), &writefds);
+#endif
+            }
+            if (read_ssl)
+                openssl_fdset(SSL_get_fd(con), &readfds);
+            if (write_ssl)
+                openssl_fdset(SSL_get_fd(con), &writefds);
+#else
+            if (!tty_on || !write_tty) {
+                if (read_ssl)
+                    openssl_fdset(SSL_get_fd(con), &readfds);
+                if (write_ssl)
+                    openssl_fdset(SSL_get_fd(con), &writefds);
+            }
+#endif
+
+            /*
+             * Note: under VMS with SOCKETSHR the second parameter is
+             * currently of type (int *) whereas under other systems it is
+             * (void *) if you don't have a cast it will choke the compiler:
+             * if you do have a cast then you can either go for (int *) or
+             * (void *).
+             */
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS)
+            /*
+             * Under Windows/DOS we make the assumption that we can always
+             * write to the tty: therefore if we need to write to the tty we
+             * just fall through. Otherwise we timeout the select every
+             * second and see if there are any keypresses. Note: this is a
+             * hack, in a proper Windows application we wouldn't do this.
+             */
+            i = 0;
+            if (!write_tty) {
+                if (read_tty) {
+                    tv.tv_sec = 1;
+                    tv.tv_usec = 0;
+                    i = select(width, (void *)&readfds, (void *)&writefds,
+                               NULL, &tv);
+                    if (!i && (!has_stdin_waiting() || !read_tty))
+                        continue;
+                } else
+                    i = select(width, (void *)&readfds, (void *)&writefds,
+                               NULL, timeoutp);
+            }
+#else
+            i = select(width, (void *)&readfds, (void *)&writefds,
+                       NULL, timeoutp);
+#endif
+            if (i < 0) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "bad select %d\n",
+                           get_last_socket_error());
+                goto shut;
+                /* goto end; */
+            }
+        }
+
+        if ((SSL_version(con) == DTLS1_VERSION)
+            && DTLSv1_handle_timeout(con) > 0) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "TIMEOUT occurred\n");
+        }
+
+        if (!ssl_pending && FD_ISSET(SSL_get_fd(con), &writefds)) {
+            k = SSL_write(con, &(cbuf[cbuf_off]), (unsigned int)cbuf_len);
+            switch (SSL_get_error(con, k)) {
+            case SSL_ERROR_NONE:
+                cbuf_off += k;
+                cbuf_len -= k;
+                if (k <= 0)
+                    goto end;
+                /* we have done a  write(con,NULL,0); */
+                if (cbuf_len <= 0) {
+                    read_tty = 1;
+                    write_ssl = 0;
+                } else {        /* if (cbuf_len > 0) */
+
+                    read_tty = 0;
+                    write_ssl = 1;
+                }
+                break;
+            case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
+                BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "write W BLOCK\n");
+                write_ssl = 1;
+                read_tty = 0;
+                break;
+            case SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC:
+                BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "write A BLOCK\n");
+                wait_for_async(con);
+                write_ssl = 1;
+                read_tty = 0;
+                break;
+            case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
+                BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "write R BLOCK\n");
+                write_tty = 0;
+                read_ssl = 1;
+                write_ssl = 0;
+                break;
+            case SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP:
+                BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "write X BLOCK\n");
+                break;
+            case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN:
+                if (cbuf_len != 0) {
+                    BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "shutdown\n");
+                    ret = 0;
+                    goto shut;
+                } else {
+                    read_tty = 1;
+                    write_ssl = 0;
+                    break;
+                }
+
+            case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
+                if ((k != 0) || (cbuf_len != 0)) {
+                    BIO_printf(bio_err, "write:errno=%d\n",
+                               get_last_socket_error());
+                    goto shut;
+                } else {
+                    read_tty = 1;
+                    write_ssl = 0;
+                }
+                break;
+            case SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC_JOB:
+                /* This shouldn't ever happen in s_client - treat as an error */
+            case SSL_ERROR_SSL:
+                ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+                goto shut;
+            }
+        }
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
+        /* Assume Windows/DOS/BeOS can always write */
+        else if (!ssl_pending && write_tty)
+#else
+        else if (!ssl_pending && FD_ISSET(fileno_stdout(), &writefds))
+#endif
+        {
+#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+            ascii2ebcdic(&(sbuf[sbuf_off]), &(sbuf[sbuf_off]), sbuf_len);
+#endif
+            i = raw_write_stdout(&(sbuf[sbuf_off]), sbuf_len);
+
+            if (i <= 0) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "DONE\n");
+                ret = 0;
+                goto shut;
+                /* goto end; */
+            }
+
+            sbuf_len -= i;;
+            sbuf_off += i;
+            if (sbuf_len <= 0) {
+                read_ssl = 1;
+                write_tty = 0;
+            }
+        } else if (ssl_pending || FD_ISSET(SSL_get_fd(con), &readfds)) {
+#ifdef RENEG
+            {
+                static int iiii;
+                if (++iiii == 52) {
+                    SSL_renegotiate(con);
+                    iiii = 0;
+                }
+            }
+#endif
+            k = SSL_read(con, sbuf, 1024 /* BUFSIZZ */ );
+
+            switch (SSL_get_error(con, k)) {
+            case SSL_ERROR_NONE:
+                if (k <= 0)
+                    goto end;
+                sbuf_off = 0;
+                sbuf_len = k;
+
+                read_ssl = 0;
+                write_tty = 1;
+                break;
+            case SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC:
+                BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "read A BLOCK\n");
+                wait_for_async(con);
+                write_tty = 0;
+                read_ssl = 1;
+                if ((read_tty == 0) && (write_ssl == 0))
+                    write_ssl = 1;
+                break;
+            case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
+                BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "read W BLOCK\n");
+                write_ssl = 1;
+                read_tty = 0;
+                break;
+            case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
+                BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "read R BLOCK\n");
+                write_tty = 0;
+                read_ssl = 1;
+                if ((read_tty == 0) && (write_ssl == 0))
+                    write_ssl = 1;
+                break;
+            case SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP:
+                BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "read X BLOCK\n");
+                break;
+            case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
+                ret = get_last_socket_error();
+                if (c_brief)
+                    BIO_puts(bio_err, "CONNECTION CLOSED BY SERVER\n");
+                else
+                    BIO_printf(bio_err, "read:errno=%d\n", ret);
+                goto shut;
+            case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN:
+                BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "closed\n");
+                ret = 0;
+                goto shut;
+            case SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC_JOB:
+                /* This shouldn't ever happen in s_client. Treat as an error */
+            case SSL_ERROR_SSL:
+                ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+                goto shut;
+                /* break; */
+            }
+        }
+/* OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS includes OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS */
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS)
+        else if (has_stdin_waiting())
+#else
+        else if (FD_ISSET(fileno_stdin(), &readfds))
+#endif
+        {
+            if (crlf) {
+                int j, lf_num;
+
+                i = raw_read_stdin(cbuf, BUFSIZZ / 2);
+                lf_num = 0;
+                /* both loops are skipped when i <= 0 */
+                for (j = 0; j < i; j++)
+                    if (cbuf[j] == '\n')
+                        lf_num++;
+                for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--) {
+                    cbuf[j + lf_num] = cbuf[j];
+                    if (cbuf[j] == '\n') {
+                        lf_num--;
+                        i++;
+                        cbuf[j + lf_num] = '\r';
+                    }
+                }
+                assert(lf_num == 0);
+            } else
+                i = raw_read_stdin(cbuf, BUFSIZZ);
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS)
+            if (i == 0)
+                at_eof = 1;
+#endif
+
+            if ((!c_ign_eof) && ((i <= 0) || (cbuf[0] == 'Q' && cmdletters))) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "DONE\n");
+                ret = 0;
+                goto shut;
+            }
+
+            if ((!c_ign_eof) && (cbuf[0] == 'R' && cmdletters)) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "RENEGOTIATING\n");
+                SSL_renegotiate(con);
+                cbuf_len = 0;
+            }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+            else if ((!c_ign_eof) && (cbuf[0] == 'B' && cmdletters)) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "HEARTBEATING\n");
+                SSL_heartbeat(con);
+                cbuf_len = 0;
+            }
+#endif
+            else {
+                cbuf_len = i;
+                cbuf_off = 0;
+#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+                ebcdic2ascii(cbuf, cbuf, i);
+#endif
+            }
+
+            write_ssl = 1;
+            read_tty = 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    ret = 0;
+ shut:
+    if (in_init)
+        print_stuff(bio_c_out, con, full_log);
+    do_ssl_shutdown(con);
+
+    /*
+     * Give the socket time to send its last data before we close it.
+     * No amount of setting SO_LINGER etc on the socket seems to persuade
+     * Windows to send the data before closing the socket...but sleeping
+     * for a short time seems to do it (units in ms)
+     * TODO: Find a better way to do this
+     */
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS)
+    Sleep(50);
+#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_CYGWIN)
+    usleep(50000);
+#endif
+
+    /*
+     * If we ended with an alert being sent, but still with data in the
+     * network buffer to be read, then calling BIO_closesocket() will
+     * result in a TCP-RST being sent. On some platforms (notably
+     * Windows) then this will result in the peer immediately abandoning
+     * the connection including any buffered alert data before it has
+     * had a chance to be read. Shutting down the sending side first,
+     * and then closing the socket sends TCP-FIN first followed by
+     * TCP-RST. This seems to allow the peer to read the alert data.
+     */
+    shutdown(SSL_get_fd(con), 1); /* SHUT_WR */
+    BIO_closesocket(SSL_get_fd(con));
+ end:
+    if (con != NULL) {
+        if (prexit != 0)
+            print_stuff(bio_c_out, con, 1);
+        SSL_free(con);
+    }
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
+    OPENSSL_free(next_proto.data);
+#endif
+    SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
+    X509_free(cert);
+    sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(crls, X509_CRL_free);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(key);
+    sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free);
+    OPENSSL_free(pass);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+    OPENSSL_free(srp_arg.srppassin);
+#endif
+    OPENSSL_free(connectstr);
+    OPENSSL_free(host);
+    OPENSSL_free(port);
+    X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(vpm);
+    ssl_excert_free(exc);
+    sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(ssl_args);
+    sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(dane_tlsa_rrset);
+    SSL_CONF_CTX_free(cctx);
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(cbuf, BUFSIZZ);
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(sbuf, BUFSIZZ);
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(mbuf, BUFSIZZ);
+    release_engine(e);
+    BIO_free(bio_c_out);
+    bio_c_out = NULL;
+    BIO_free(bio_c_msg);
+    bio_c_msg = NULL;
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static void print_stuff(BIO *bio, SSL *s, int full)
+{
+    X509 *peer = NULL;
+    char buf[BUFSIZ];
+    STACK_OF(X509) *sk;
+    STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk2;
+    const SSL_CIPHER *c;
+    X509_NAME *xn;
+    int i;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+    const COMP_METHOD *comp, *expansion;
+#endif
+    unsigned char *exportedkeymat;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
+    const SSL_CTX *ctx = SSL_get_SSL_CTX(s);
+#endif
+
+    if (full) {
+        int got_a_chain = 0;
+
+        sk = SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(s);
+        if (sk != NULL) {
+            got_a_chain = 1;
+
+            BIO_printf(bio, "---\nCertificate chain\n");
+            for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
+                X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(sk_X509_value(sk, i)),
+                                  buf, sizeof(buf));
+                BIO_printf(bio, "%2d s:%s\n", i, buf);
+                X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(sk_X509_value(sk, i)),
+                                  buf, sizeof(buf));
+                BIO_printf(bio, "   i:%s\n", buf);
+                if (c_showcerts)
+                    PEM_write_bio_X509(bio, sk_X509_value(sk, i));
+            }
+        }
+
+        BIO_printf(bio, "---\n");
+        peer = SSL_get_peer_certificate(s);
+        if (peer != NULL) {
+            BIO_printf(bio, "Server certificate\n");
+
+            /* Redundant if we showed the whole chain */
+            if (!(c_showcerts && got_a_chain))
+                PEM_write_bio_X509(bio, peer);
+            X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(peer), buf, sizeof(buf));
+            BIO_printf(bio, "subject=%s\n", buf);
+            X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(peer), buf, sizeof(buf));
+            BIO_printf(bio, "issuer=%s\n", buf);
+        } else
+            BIO_printf(bio, "no peer certificate available\n");
+
+        sk2 = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
+        if ((sk2 != NULL) && (sk_X509_NAME_num(sk2) > 0)) {
+            BIO_printf(bio, "---\nAcceptable client certificate CA names\n");
+            for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk2); i++) {
+                xn = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk2, i);
+                X509_NAME_oneline(xn, buf, sizeof(buf));
+                BIO_write(bio, buf, strlen(buf));
+                BIO_write(bio, "\n", 1);
+            }
+        } else {
+            BIO_printf(bio, "---\nNo client certificate CA names sent\n");
+        }
+
+        ssl_print_sigalgs(bio, s);
+        ssl_print_tmp_key(bio, s);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
+        /*
+         * When the SSL session is anonymous, or resumed via an abbreviated
+         * handshake, no SCTs are provided as part of the handshake.  While in
+         * a resumed session SCTs may be present in the session's certificate,
+         * no callbacks are invoked to revalidate these, and in any case that
+         * set of SCTs may be incomplete.  Thus it makes little sense to
+         * attempt to display SCTs from a resumed session's certificate, and of
+         * course none are associated with an anonymous peer.
+         */
+        if (peer != NULL && !SSL_session_reused(s) && SSL_ct_is_enabled(s)) {
+            const STACK_OF(SCT) *scts = SSL_get0_peer_scts(s);
+            int sct_count = scts != NULL ? sk_SCT_num(scts) : 0;
+
+            BIO_printf(bio, "---\nSCTs present (%i)\n", sct_count);
+            if (sct_count > 0) {
+                const CTLOG_STORE *log_store = SSL_CTX_get0_ctlog_store(ctx);
+
+                BIO_printf(bio, "---\n");
+                for (i = 0; i < sct_count; ++i) {
+                    SCT *sct = sk_SCT_value(scts, i);
+
+                    BIO_printf(bio, "SCT validation status: %s\n",
+                               SCT_validation_status_string(sct));
+                    SCT_print(sct, bio, 0, log_store);
+                    if (i < sct_count - 1)
+                        BIO_printf(bio, "\n---\n");
+                }
+                BIO_printf(bio, "\n");
+            }
+        }
+#endif
+
+        BIO_printf(bio,
+                   "---\nSSL handshake has read %"BIO_PRI64"u"
+                   " bytes and written %"BIO_PRI64"u bytes\n",
+                   BIO_number_read(SSL_get_rbio(s)),
+                   BIO_number_written(SSL_get_wbio(s)));
+    }
+    print_verify_detail(s, bio);
+    BIO_printf(bio, (SSL_session_reused(s) ? "---\nReused, " : "---\nNew, "));
+    c = SSL_get_current_cipher(s);
+    BIO_printf(bio, "%s, Cipher is %s\n",
+               SSL_CIPHER_get_version(c), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
+    if (peer != NULL) {
+        EVP_PKEY *pktmp;
+
+        pktmp = X509_get0_pubkey(peer);
+        BIO_printf(bio, "Server public key is %d bit\n",
+                   EVP_PKEY_bits(pktmp));
+    }
+    BIO_printf(bio, "Secure Renegotiation IS%s supported\n",
+               SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support(s) ? "" : " NOT");
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+    comp = SSL_get_current_compression(s);
+    expansion = SSL_get_current_expansion(s);
+    BIO_printf(bio, "Compression: %s\n",
+               comp ? SSL_COMP_get_name(comp) : "NONE");
+    BIO_printf(bio, "Expansion: %s\n",
+               expansion ? SSL_COMP_get_name(expansion) : "NONE");
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
+    {
+        /* Print out local port of connection: useful for debugging */
+        int sock;
+        union BIO_sock_info_u info;
+
+        sock = SSL_get_fd(s);
+        if ((info.addr = BIO_ADDR_new()) != NULL
+            && BIO_sock_info(sock, BIO_SOCK_INFO_ADDRESS, &info)) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "LOCAL PORT is %u\n",
+                       ntohs(BIO_ADDR_rawport(info.addr)));
+        }
+        BIO_ADDR_free(info.addr);
+    }
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
+    if (next_proto.status != -1) {
+        const unsigned char *proto;
+        unsigned int proto_len;
+        SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(s, &proto, &proto_len);
+        BIO_printf(bio, "Next protocol: (%d) ", next_proto.status);
+        BIO_write(bio, proto, proto_len);
+        BIO_write(bio, "\n", 1);
+    }
+#endif
+    {
+        const unsigned char *proto;
+        unsigned int proto_len;
+        SSL_get0_alpn_selected(s, &proto, &proto_len);
+        if (proto_len > 0) {
+            BIO_printf(bio, "ALPN protocol: ");
+            BIO_write(bio, proto, proto_len);
+            BIO_write(bio, "\n", 1);
+        } else
+            BIO_printf(bio, "No ALPN negotiated\n");
+    }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
+    {
+        SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *srtp_profile =
+            SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile(s);
+
+        if (srtp_profile)
+            BIO_printf(bio, "SRTP Extension negotiated, profile=%s\n",
+                       srtp_profile->name);
+    }
+#endif
+
+    SSL_SESSION_print(bio, SSL_get_session(s));
+    if (SSL_get_session(s) != NULL && keymatexportlabel != NULL) {
+        BIO_printf(bio, "Keying material exporter:\n");
+        BIO_printf(bio, "    Label: '%s'\n", keymatexportlabel);
+        BIO_printf(bio, "    Length: %i bytes\n", keymatexportlen);
+        exportedkeymat = app_malloc(keymatexportlen, "export key");
+        if (!SSL_export_keying_material(s, exportedkeymat,
+                                        keymatexportlen,
+                                        keymatexportlabel,
+                                        strlen(keymatexportlabel),
+                                        NULL, 0, 0)) {
+            BIO_printf(bio, "    Error\n");
+        } else {
+            BIO_printf(bio, "    Keying material: ");
+            for (i = 0; i < keymatexportlen; i++)
+                BIO_printf(bio, "%02X", exportedkeymat[i]);
+            BIO_printf(bio, "\n");
+        }
+        OPENSSL_free(exportedkeymat);
+    }
+    BIO_printf(bio, "---\n");
+    X509_free(peer);
+    /* flush, or debugging output gets mixed with http response */
+    (void)BIO_flush(bio);
+}
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+static int ocsp_resp_cb(SSL *s, void *arg)
+{
+    const unsigned char *p;
+    int len;
+    OCSP_RESPONSE *rsp;
+    len = SSL_get_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(s, &p);
+    BIO_puts(arg, "OCSP response: ");
+    if (!p) {
+        BIO_puts(arg, "no response sent\n");
+        return 1;
+    }
+    rsp = d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE(NULL, &p, len);
+    if (!rsp) {
+        BIO_puts(arg, "response parse error\n");
+        BIO_dump_indent(arg, (char *)p, len, 4);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    BIO_puts(arg, "\n======================================\n");
+    OCSP_RESPONSE_print(arg, rsp, 0);
+    BIO_puts(arg, "======================================\n");
+    OCSP_RESPONSE_free(rsp);
+    return 1;
+}
+# endif
+
+#endif                          /* OPENSSL_NO_SOCK */
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/s_server.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/s_server.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..31c90fd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/s_server.c
@@ -0,0 +1,3305 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE.
+ */
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#if defined(_WIN32)
+/* Included before async.h to avoid some warnings */
+# include <windows.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <openssl/e_os2.h>
+#include <openssl/async.h>
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
+
+/*
+ * With IPv6, it looks like Digital has mixed up the proper order of
+ * recursive header file inclusion, resulting in the compiler complaining
+ * that u_int isn't defined, but only if _POSIX_C_SOURCE is defined, which is
+ * needed to have fileno() declared correctly...  So let's define u_int
+ */
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS_DECC) && !defined(__U_INT)
+# define __U_INT
+typedef unsigned int u_int;
+#endif
+
+#include <openssl/lhash.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#define USE_SOCKETS
+#include "apps.h"
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+# include <openssl/dh.h>
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+# include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+# include <openssl/srp.h>
+#endif
+#include "s_apps.h"
+#include "timeouts.h"
+#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+#include <openssl/ebcdic.h>
+#endif
+
+static int not_resumable_sess_cb(SSL *s, int is_forward_secure);
+static int sv_body(int s, int stype, unsigned char *context);
+static int www_body(int s, int stype, unsigned char *context);
+static int rev_body(int s, int stype, unsigned char *context);
+static void close_accept_socket(void);
+static int init_ssl_connection(SSL *s);
+static void print_stats(BIO *bp, SSL_CTX *ctx);
+static int generate_session_id(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *id,
+                               unsigned int *id_len);
+static void init_session_cache_ctx(SSL_CTX *sctx);
+static void free_sessions(void);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+static DH *load_dh_param(const char *dhfile);
+#endif
+
+static const int bufsize = 16 * 1024;
+static int accept_socket = -1;
+
+#define TEST_CERT       "server.pem"
+#define TEST_CERT2      "server2.pem"
+
+static int s_nbio = 0;
+static int s_nbio_test = 0;
+static int s_crlf = 0;
+static SSL_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+static SSL_CTX *ctx2 = NULL;
+static int www = 0;
+
+static BIO *bio_s_out = NULL;
+static BIO *bio_s_msg = NULL;
+static int s_debug = 0;
+static int s_tlsextdebug = 0;
+static int s_msg = 0;
+static int s_quiet = 0;
+static int s_ign_eof = 0;
+static int s_brief = 0;
+
+static char *keymatexportlabel = NULL;
+static int keymatexportlen = 20;
+
+static int async = 0;
+
+static const char *session_id_prefix = NULL;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS
+static int enable_timeouts = 0;
+static long socket_mtu;
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * We define this but make it always be 0 in no-dtls builds to simplify the
+ * code.
+ */
+static int dtlslisten = 0;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+static const char psk_identity[] = "Client_identity";
+char *psk_key = NULL;           /* by default PSK is not used */
+
+static unsigned int psk_server_cb(SSL *ssl, const char *identity,
+                                  unsigned char *psk,
+                                  unsigned int max_psk_len)
+{
+    long key_len = 0;
+    unsigned char *key;
+
+    if (s_debug)
+        BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "psk_server_cb\n");
+    if (!identity) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error: client did not send PSK identity\n");
+        goto out_err;
+    }
+    if (s_debug)
+        BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "identity_len=%d identity=%s\n",
+                   (int)strlen(identity), identity);
+
+    /* here we could lookup the given identity e.g. from a database */
+    if (strcmp(identity, psk_identity) != 0) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "PSK error: client identity not found"
+                   " (got '%s' expected '%s')\n", identity, psk_identity);
+        goto out_err;
+    }
+    if (s_debug)
+        BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "PSK client identity found\n");
+
+    /* convert the PSK key to binary */
+    key = OPENSSL_hexstr2buf(psk_key, &key_len);
+    if (key == NULL) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Could not convert PSK key '%s' to buffer\n",
+                   psk_key);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (key_len > (int)max_psk_len) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                   "psk buffer of callback is too small (%d) for key (%ld)\n",
+                   max_psk_len, key_len);
+        OPENSSL_free(key);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    memcpy(psk, key, key_len);
+    OPENSSL_free(key);
+
+    if (s_debug)
+        BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "fetched PSK len=%ld\n", key_len);
+    return key_len;
+ out_err:
+    if (s_debug)
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error in PSK server callback\n");
+    (void)BIO_flush(bio_err);
+    (void)BIO_flush(bio_s_out);
+    return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+/* This is a context that we pass to callbacks */
+typedef struct srpsrvparm_st {
+    char *login;
+    SRP_VBASE *vb;
+    SRP_user_pwd *user;
+} srpsrvparm;
+
+/*
+ * This callback pretends to require some asynchronous logic in order to
+ * obtain a verifier. When the callback is called for a new connection we
+ * return with a negative value. This will provoke the accept etc to return
+ * with an LOOKUP_X509. The main logic of the reinvokes the suspended call
+ * (which would normally occur after a worker has finished) and we set the
+ * user parameters.
+ */
+static int ssl_srp_server_param_cb(SSL *s, int *ad, void *arg)
+{
+    srpsrvparm *p = (srpsrvparm *) arg;
+    int ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
+
+    if (p->login == NULL && p->user == NULL) {
+        p->login = SSL_get_srp_username(s);
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "SRP username = \"%s\"\n", p->login);
+        return (-1);
+    }
+
+    if (p->user == NULL) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "User %s doesn't exist\n", p->login);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (SSL_set_srp_server_param
+        (s, p->user->N, p->user->g, p->user->s, p->user->v,
+         p->user->info) < 0) {
+        *ad = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        goto err;
+    }
+    BIO_printf(bio_err,
+               "SRP parameters set: username = \"%s\" info=\"%s\" \n",
+               p->login, p->user->info);
+    ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
+
+ err:
+    SRP_user_pwd_free(p->user);
+    p->user = NULL;
+    p->login = NULL;
+    return ret;
+}
+
+#endif
+
+static int local_argc = 0;
+static char **local_argv;
+
+#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+static int ebcdic_new(BIO *bi);
+static int ebcdic_free(BIO *a);
+static int ebcdic_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl);
+static int ebcdic_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl);
+static long ebcdic_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr);
+static int ebcdic_gets(BIO *bp, char *buf, int size);
+static int ebcdic_puts(BIO *bp, const char *str);
+
+# define BIO_TYPE_EBCDIC_FILTER  (18|0x0200)
+static BIO_METHOD *methods_ebcdic = NULL;
+
+/* This struct is "unwarranted chumminess with the compiler." */
+typedef struct {
+    size_t alloced;
+    char buff[1];
+} EBCDIC_OUTBUFF;
+
+static const BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_ebcdic_filter()
+{
+    if (methods_ebcdic == NULL) {
+        methods_ebcdic = BIO_meth_new(BIO_TYPE_EBCDIC_FILTER,
+                                      "EBCDIC/ASCII filter");
+        if (methods_ebcdic == NULL
+            || !BIO_meth_set_write(methods_ebcdic, ebcdic_write)
+            || !BIO_meth_set_read(methods_ebcdic, ebcdic_read)
+            || !BIO_meth_set_puts(methods_ebcdic, ebcdic_puts)
+            || !BIO_meth_set_gets(methods_ebcdic, ebcdic_gets)
+            || !BIO_meth_set_ctrl(methods_ebcdic, ebcdic_ctrl)
+            || !BIO_meth_set_create(methods_ebcdic, ebcdic_new)
+            || !BIO_meth_set_destroy(methods_ebcdic, ebcdic_free))
+            return NULL;
+    }
+    return methods_ebcdic;
+}
+
+static int ebcdic_new(BIO *bi)
+{
+    EBCDIC_OUTBUFF *wbuf;
+
+    wbuf = app_malloc(sizeof(*wbuf) + 1024, "ebcdic wbuf");
+    wbuf->alloced = 1024;
+    wbuf->buff[0] = '\0';
+
+    BIO_set_data(bi, wbuf);
+    BIO_set_init(bi, 1);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int ebcdic_free(BIO *a)
+{
+    EBCDIC_OUTBUFF *wbuf;
+
+    if (a == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    wbuf = BIO_get_data(a);
+    OPENSSL_free(wbuf);
+    BIO_set_data(a, NULL);
+    BIO_set_init(a, 0);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int ebcdic_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    BIO *next = BIO_next(b);
+
+    if (out == NULL || outl == 0)
+        return (0);
+    if (next == NULL)
+        return (0);
+
+    ret = BIO_read(next, out, outl);
+    if (ret > 0)
+        ascii2ebcdic(out, out, ret);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int ebcdic_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl)
+{
+    EBCDIC_OUTBUFF *wbuf;
+    BIO *next = BIO_next(b);
+    int ret = 0;
+    int num;
+
+    if ((in == NULL) || (inl <= 0))
+        return (0);
+    if (next == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    wbuf = (EBCDIC_OUTBUFF *) BIO_get_data(b);
+
+    if (inl > (num = wbuf->alloced)) {
+        num = num + num;        /* double the size */
+        if (num < inl)
+            num = inl;
+        OPENSSL_free(wbuf);
+        wbuf = app_malloc(sizeof(*wbuf) + num, "grow ebcdic wbuf");
+
+        wbuf->alloced = num;
+        wbuf->buff[0] = '\0';
+
+        BIO_set_data(b, wbuf);
+    }
+
+    ebcdic2ascii(wbuf->buff, in, inl);
+
+    ret = BIO_write(next, wbuf->buff, inl);
+
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static long ebcdic_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
+{
+    long ret;
+    BIO *next = BIO_next(b);
+
+    if (next == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    switch (cmd) {
+    case BIO_CTRL_DUP:
+        ret = 0L;
+        break;
+    default:
+        ret = BIO_ctrl(next, cmd, num, ptr);
+        break;
+    }
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static int ebcdic_gets(BIO *bp, char *buf, int size)
+{
+    int i, ret = 0;
+    BIO *next = BIO_next(bp);
+
+    if (next == NULL)
+        return 0;
+/*      return(BIO_gets(bp->next_bio,buf,size));*/
+    for (i = 0; i < size - 1; ++i) {
+        ret = ebcdic_read(bp, &buf[i], 1);
+        if (ret <= 0)
+            break;
+        else if (buf[i] == '\n') {
+            ++i;
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    if (i < size)
+        buf[i] = '\0';
+    return (ret < 0 && i == 0) ? ret : i;
+}
+
+static int ebcdic_puts(BIO *bp, const char *str)
+{
+    if (BIO_next(bp) == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    return ebcdic_write(bp, str, strlen(str));
+}
+#endif
+
+/* This is a context that we pass to callbacks */
+typedef struct tlsextctx_st {
+    char *servername;
+    BIO *biodebug;
+    int extension_error;
+} tlsextctx;
+
+static int ssl_servername_cb(SSL *s, int *ad, void *arg)
+{
+    tlsextctx *p = (tlsextctx *) arg;
+    const char *servername = SSL_get_servername(s, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name);
+    if (servername && p->biodebug)
+        BIO_printf(p->biodebug, "Hostname in TLS extension: \"%s\"\n",
+                   servername);
+
+    if (!p->servername)
+        return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
+
+    if (servername) {
+        if (strcasecmp(servername, p->servername))
+            return p->extension_error;
+        if (ctx2) {
+            BIO_printf(p->biodebug, "Switching server context.\n");
+            SSL_set_SSL_CTX(s, ctx2);
+        }
+    }
+    return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+}
+
+/* Structure passed to cert status callback */
+typedef struct tlsextstatusctx_st {
+    /* Default responder to use */
+    char *host, *path, *port;
+    int use_ssl;
+    int timeout;
+    int verbose;
+} tlsextstatusctx;
+
+static tlsextstatusctx tlscstatp = { NULL, NULL, NULL, 0, -1, 0 };
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+/*
+ * Certificate Status callback. This is called when a client includes a
+ * certificate status request extension. This is a simplified version. It
+ * examines certificates each time and makes one OCSP responder query for
+ * each request. A full version would store details such as the OCSP
+ * certificate IDs and minimise the number of OCSP responses by caching them
+ * until they were considered "expired".
+ */
+
+static int cert_status_cb(SSL *s, void *arg)
+{
+    tlsextstatusctx *srctx = arg;
+    char *host = NULL, *port = NULL, *path = NULL;
+    int use_ssl;
+    unsigned char *rspder = NULL;
+    int rspderlen;
+    STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *aia = NULL;
+    X509 *x = NULL;
+    X509_STORE_CTX *inctx = NULL;
+    X509_OBJECT *obj;
+    OCSP_REQUEST *req = NULL;
+    OCSP_RESPONSE *resp = NULL;
+    OCSP_CERTID *id = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts;
+    int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
+    int i;
+
+    if (srctx->verbose)
+        BIO_puts(bio_err, "cert_status: callback called\n");
+    /* Build up OCSP query from server certificate */
+    x = SSL_get_certificate(s);
+    aia = X509_get1_ocsp(x);
+    if (aia) {
+        if (!OCSP_parse_url(sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(aia, 0),
+                            &host, &port, &path, &use_ssl)) {
+            BIO_puts(bio_err, "cert_status: can't parse AIA URL\n");
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (srctx->verbose)
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "cert_status: AIA URL: %s\n",
+                       sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(aia, 0));
+    } else {
+        if (!srctx->host) {
+            BIO_puts(bio_err,
+                     "cert_status: no AIA and no default responder URL\n");
+            goto done;
+        }
+        host = srctx->host;
+        path = srctx->path;
+        port = srctx->port;
+        use_ssl = srctx->use_ssl;
+    }
+
+    inctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
+    if (inctx == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(inctx,
+                             SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(SSL_get_SSL_CTX(s)),
+                             NULL, NULL))
+        goto err;
+    obj = X509_STORE_CTX_get_obj_by_subject(inctx, X509_LU_X509,
+                                            X509_get_issuer_name(x));
+    if (obj == NULL) {
+        BIO_puts(bio_err, "cert_status: Can't retrieve issuer certificate.\n");
+        goto done;
+    }
+    id = OCSP_cert_to_id(NULL, x, X509_OBJECT_get0_X509(obj));
+    X509_OBJECT_free(obj);
+    if (!id)
+        goto err;
+    req = OCSP_REQUEST_new();
+    if (req == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (!OCSP_request_add0_id(req, id))
+        goto err;
+    id = NULL;
+    /* Add any extensions to the request */
+    SSL_get_tlsext_status_exts(s, &exts);
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts); i++) {
+        X509_EXTENSION *ext = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(exts, i);
+        if (!OCSP_REQUEST_add_ext(req, ext, -1))
+            goto err;
+    }
+    resp = process_responder(req, host, path, port, use_ssl, NULL,
+                             srctx->timeout);
+    if (!resp) {
+        BIO_puts(bio_err, "cert_status: error querying responder\n");
+        goto done;
+    }
+    rspderlen = i2d_OCSP_RESPONSE(resp, &rspder);
+    if (rspderlen <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    SSL_set_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(s, rspder, rspderlen);
+    if (srctx->verbose) {
+        BIO_puts(bio_err, "cert_status: ocsp response sent:\n");
+        OCSP_RESPONSE_print(bio_err, resp, 2);
+    }
+    ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+    goto done;
+
+ err:
+    ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+ done:
+    if (ret != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+    if (aia) {
+        OPENSSL_free(host);
+        OPENSSL_free(path);
+        OPENSSL_free(port);
+        X509_email_free(aia);
+    }
+    OCSP_CERTID_free(id);
+    OCSP_REQUEST_free(req);
+    OCSP_RESPONSE_free(resp);
+    X509_STORE_CTX_free(inctx);
+    return ret;
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+/* This is the context that we pass to next_proto_cb */
+typedef struct tlsextnextprotoctx_st {
+    unsigned char *data;
+    size_t len;
+} tlsextnextprotoctx;
+
+static int next_proto_cb(SSL *s, const unsigned char **data,
+                         unsigned int *len, void *arg)
+{
+    tlsextnextprotoctx *next_proto = arg;
+
+    *data = next_proto->data;
+    *len = next_proto->len;
+
+    return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+}
+#endif                         /* ndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG */
+
+/* This the context that we pass to alpn_cb */
+typedef struct tlsextalpnctx_st {
+    unsigned char *data;
+    size_t len;
+} tlsextalpnctx;
+
+static int alpn_cb(SSL *s, const unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen,
+                   const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, void *arg)
+{
+    tlsextalpnctx *alpn_ctx = arg;
+
+    if (!s_quiet) {
+        /* We can assume that |in| is syntactically valid. */
+        unsigned int i;
+        BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "ALPN protocols advertised by the client: ");
+        for (i = 0; i < inlen;) {
+            if (i)
+                BIO_write(bio_s_out, ", ", 2);
+            BIO_write(bio_s_out, &in[i + 1], in[i]);
+            i += in[i] + 1;
+        }
+        BIO_write(bio_s_out, "\n", 1);
+    }
+
+    if (SSL_select_next_proto
+        ((unsigned char **)out, outlen, alpn_ctx->data, alpn_ctx->len, in,
+         inlen) != OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED) {
+        return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
+    }
+
+    if (!s_quiet) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "ALPN protocols selected: ");
+        BIO_write(bio_s_out, *out, *outlen);
+        BIO_write(bio_s_out, "\n", 1);
+    }
+
+    return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+}
+
+static int not_resumable_sess_cb(SSL *s, int is_forward_secure)
+{
+    /* disable resumption for sessions with forward secure ciphers */
+    return is_forward_secure;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+static srpsrvparm srp_callback_parm;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
+static char *srtp_profiles = NULL;
+#endif
+
+typedef enum OPTION_choice {
+    OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP, OPT_ENGINE,
+    OPT_4, OPT_6, OPT_ACCEPT, OPT_PORT, OPT_UNIX, OPT_UNLINK, OPT_NACCEPT,
+    OPT_VERIFY, OPT_UPPER_V_VERIFY, OPT_CONTEXT, OPT_CERT, OPT_CRL,
+    OPT_CRL_DOWNLOAD, OPT_SERVERINFO, OPT_CERTFORM, OPT_KEY, OPT_KEYFORM,
+    OPT_PASS, OPT_CERT_CHAIN, OPT_DHPARAM, OPT_DCERTFORM, OPT_DCERT,
+    OPT_DKEYFORM, OPT_DPASS, OPT_DKEY, OPT_DCERT_CHAIN, OPT_NOCERT,
+    OPT_CAPATH, OPT_NOCAPATH, OPT_CHAINCAPATH, OPT_VERIFYCAPATH, OPT_NO_CACHE,
+    OPT_EXT_CACHE, OPT_CRLFORM, OPT_VERIFY_RET_ERROR, OPT_VERIFY_QUIET,
+    OPT_BUILD_CHAIN, OPT_CAFILE, OPT_NOCAFILE, OPT_CHAINCAFILE,
+    OPT_VERIFYCAFILE, OPT_NBIO, OPT_NBIO_TEST, OPT_IGN_EOF, OPT_NO_IGN_EOF,
+    OPT_DEBUG, OPT_TLSEXTDEBUG, OPT_STATUS, OPT_STATUS_VERBOSE,
+    OPT_STATUS_TIMEOUT, OPT_STATUS_URL, OPT_MSG, OPT_MSGFILE, OPT_TRACE,
+    OPT_SECURITY_DEBUG, OPT_SECURITY_DEBUG_VERBOSE, OPT_STATE, OPT_CRLF,
+    OPT_QUIET, OPT_BRIEF, OPT_NO_DHE,
+    OPT_NO_RESUME_EPHEMERAL, OPT_PSK_HINT, OPT_PSK, OPT_SRPVFILE,
+    OPT_SRPUSERSEED, OPT_REV, OPT_WWW, OPT_UPPER_WWW, OPT_HTTP, OPT_ASYNC,
+    OPT_SSL_CONFIG, OPT_SPLIT_SEND_FRAG, OPT_MAX_PIPELINES, OPT_READ_BUF,
+    OPT_SSL3, OPT_TLS1_2, OPT_TLS1_1, OPT_TLS1, OPT_DTLS, OPT_DTLS1,
+    OPT_DTLS1_2, OPT_TIMEOUT, OPT_MTU, OPT_LISTEN,
+    OPT_ID_PREFIX, OPT_RAND, OPT_SERVERNAME, OPT_SERVERNAME_FATAL,
+    OPT_CERT2, OPT_KEY2, OPT_NEXTPROTONEG, OPT_ALPN,
+    OPT_SRTP_PROFILES, OPT_KEYMATEXPORT, OPT_KEYMATEXPORTLEN,
+    OPT_S_ENUM,
+    OPT_V_ENUM,
+    OPT_X_ENUM
+} OPTION_CHOICE;
+
+OPTIONS s_server_options[] = {
+    {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"},
+    {"port", OPT_PORT, 'p',
+     "TCP/IP port to listen on for connections (default is " PORT ")"},
+    {"accept", OPT_ACCEPT, 's',
+     "TCP/IP optional host and port to listen on for connections (default is *:" PORT ")"},
+#ifdef AF_UNIX
+    {"unix", OPT_UNIX, 's', "Unix domain socket to accept on"},
+#endif
+    {"4", OPT_4, '-', "Use IPv4 only"},
+    {"6", OPT_6, '-', "Use IPv6 only"},
+#ifdef AF_UNIX
+    {"unlink", OPT_UNLINK, '-', "For -unix, unlink existing socket first"},
+#endif
+    {"context", OPT_CONTEXT, 's', "Set session ID context"},
+    {"verify", OPT_VERIFY, 'n', "Turn on peer certificate verification"},
+    {"Verify", OPT_UPPER_V_VERIFY, 'n',
+     "Turn on peer certificate verification, must have a cert"},
+    {"cert", OPT_CERT, '<', "Certificate file to use; default is " TEST_CERT},
+    {"naccept", OPT_NACCEPT, 'p', "Terminate after #num connections"},
+    {"serverinfo", OPT_SERVERINFO, 's',
+     "PEM serverinfo file for certificate"},
+    {"certform", OPT_CERTFORM, 'F',
+     "Certificate format (PEM or DER) PEM default"},
+    {"key", OPT_KEY, 's',
+     "Private Key if not in -cert; default is " TEST_CERT},
+    {"keyform", OPT_KEYFORM, 'f',
+     "Key format (PEM, DER or ENGINE) PEM default"},
+    {"pass", OPT_PASS, 's', "Private key file pass phrase source"},
+    {"dcert", OPT_DCERT, '<',
+     "Second certificate file to use (usually for DSA)"},
+    {"dhparam", OPT_DHPARAM, '<', "DH parameters file to use"},
+    {"dcertform", OPT_DCERTFORM, 'F',
+     "Second certificate format (PEM or DER) PEM default"},
+    {"dkey", OPT_DKEY, '<',
+     "Second private key file to use (usually for DSA)"},
+    {"dkeyform", OPT_DKEYFORM, 'F',
+     "Second key format (PEM, DER or ENGINE) PEM default"},
+    {"dpass", OPT_DPASS, 's', "Second private key file pass phrase source"},
+    {"nbio_test", OPT_NBIO_TEST, '-', "Test with the non-blocking test bio"},
+    {"crlf", OPT_CRLF, '-', "Convert LF from terminal into CRLF"},
+    {"debug", OPT_DEBUG, '-', "Print more output"},
+    {"msg", OPT_MSG, '-', "Show protocol messages"},
+    {"msgfile", OPT_MSGFILE, '>',
+     "File to send output of -msg or -trace, instead of stdout"},
+    {"state", OPT_STATE, '-', "Print the SSL states"},
+    {"CAfile", OPT_CAFILE, '<', "PEM format file of CA's"},
+    {"CApath", OPT_CAPATH, '/', "PEM format directory of CA's"},
+    {"no-CAfile", OPT_NOCAFILE, '-',
+     "Do not load the default certificates file"},
+    {"no-CApath", OPT_NOCAPATH, '-',
+     "Do not load certificates from the default certificates directory"},
+    {"nocert", OPT_NOCERT, '-', "Don't use any certificates (Anon-DH)"},
+    {"quiet", OPT_QUIET, '-', "No server output"},
+    {"no_resume_ephemeral", OPT_NO_RESUME_EPHEMERAL, '-',
+     "Disable caching and tickets if ephemeral (EC)DH is used"},
+    {"www", OPT_WWW, '-', "Respond to a 'GET /' with a status page"},
+    {"WWW", OPT_UPPER_WWW, '-', "Respond to a 'GET with the file ./path"},
+    {"servername", OPT_SERVERNAME, 's',
+     "Servername for HostName TLS extension"},
+    {"servername_fatal", OPT_SERVERNAME_FATAL, '-',
+     "mismatch send fatal alert (default warning alert)"},
+    {"cert2", OPT_CERT2, '<',
+     "Certificate file to use for servername; default is" TEST_CERT2},
+    {"key2", OPT_KEY2, '<',
+     "-Private Key file to use for servername if not in -cert2"},
+    {"tlsextdebug", OPT_TLSEXTDEBUG, '-',
+     "Hex dump of all TLS extensions received"},
+    {"HTTP", OPT_HTTP, '-', "Like -WWW but ./path includes HTTP headers"},
+    {"id_prefix", OPT_ID_PREFIX, 's',
+     "Generate SSL/TLS session IDs prefixed by arg"},
+    {"rand", OPT_RAND, 's',
+     "Load the file(s) into the random number generator"},
+    {"keymatexport", OPT_KEYMATEXPORT, 's',
+     "Export keying material using label"},
+    {"keymatexportlen", OPT_KEYMATEXPORTLEN, 'p',
+     "Export len bytes of keying material (default 20)"},
+    {"CRL", OPT_CRL, '<', "CRL file to use"},
+    {"crl_download", OPT_CRL_DOWNLOAD, '-',
+     "Download CRL from distribution points"},
+    {"cert_chain", OPT_CERT_CHAIN, '<',
+     "certificate chain file in PEM format"},
+    {"dcert_chain", OPT_DCERT_CHAIN, '<',
+     "second certificate chain file in PEM format"},
+    {"chainCApath", OPT_CHAINCAPATH, '/',
+     "use dir as certificate store path to build CA certificate chain"},
+    {"verifyCApath", OPT_VERIFYCAPATH, '/',
+     "use dir as certificate store path to verify CA certificate"},
+    {"no_cache", OPT_NO_CACHE, '-', "Disable session cache"},
+    {"ext_cache", OPT_EXT_CACHE, '-',
+     "Disable internal cache, setup and use external cache"},
+    {"CRLform", OPT_CRLFORM, 'F', "CRL format (PEM or DER) PEM is default"},
+    {"verify_return_error", OPT_VERIFY_RET_ERROR, '-',
+     "Close connection on verification error"},
+    {"verify_quiet", OPT_VERIFY_QUIET, '-',
+     "No verify output except verify errors"},
+    {"build_chain", OPT_BUILD_CHAIN, '-', "Build certificate chain"},
+    {"chainCAfile", OPT_CHAINCAFILE, '<',
+     "CA file for certificate chain (PEM format)"},
+    {"verifyCAfile", OPT_VERIFYCAFILE, '<',
+     "CA file for certificate verification (PEM format)"},
+    {"ign_eof", OPT_IGN_EOF, '-', "ignore input eof (default when -quiet)"},
+    {"no_ign_eof", OPT_NO_IGN_EOF, '-', "Do not ignore input eof"},
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+    {"status", OPT_STATUS, '-', "Request certificate status from server"},
+    {"status_verbose", OPT_STATUS_VERBOSE, '-',
+     "Print more output in certificate status callback"},
+    {"status_timeout", OPT_STATUS_TIMEOUT, 'n',
+     "Status request responder timeout"},
+    {"status_url", OPT_STATUS_URL, 's', "Status request fallback URL"},
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE
+    {"trace", OPT_TRACE, '-', "trace protocol messages"},
+#endif
+    {"security_debug", OPT_SECURITY_DEBUG, '-',
+     "Print output from SSL/TLS security framework"},
+    {"security_debug_verbose", OPT_SECURITY_DEBUG_VERBOSE, '-',
+     "Print more output from SSL/TLS security framework"},
+    {"brief", OPT_BRIEF, '-',
+     "Restrict output to brief summary of connection parameters"},
+    {"rev", OPT_REV, '-',
+     "act as a simple test server which just sends back with the received text reversed"},
+    {"async", OPT_ASYNC, '-', "Operate in asynchronous mode"},
+    {"ssl_config", OPT_SSL_CONFIG, 's',
+     "Configure SSL_CTX using the configuration 'val'"},
+    {"split_send_frag", OPT_SPLIT_SEND_FRAG, 'n',
+     "Size used to split data for encrypt pipelines"},
+    {"max_pipelines", OPT_MAX_PIPELINES, 'n',
+     "Maximum number of encrypt/decrypt pipelines to be used"},
+    {"read_buf", OPT_READ_BUF, 'n',
+     "Default read buffer size to be used for connections"},
+    OPT_S_OPTIONS,
+    OPT_V_OPTIONS,
+    OPT_X_OPTIONS,
+    {"nbio", OPT_NBIO, '-', "Use non-blocking IO"},
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+    {"psk_hint", OPT_PSK_HINT, 's', "PSK identity hint to use"},
+    {"psk", OPT_PSK, 's', "PSK in hex (without 0x)"},
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+    {"srpvfile", OPT_SRPVFILE, '<', "The verifier file for SRP"},
+    {"srpuserseed", OPT_SRPUSERSEED, 's',
+     "A seed string for a default user salt"},
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
+    {"ssl3", OPT_SSL3, '-', "Just talk SSLv3"},
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
+    {"tls1", OPT_TLS1, '-', "Just talk TLSv1"},
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1
+    {"tls1_1", OPT_TLS1_1, '-', "Just talk TLSv1.1"},
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2
+    {"tls1_2", OPT_TLS1_2, '-', "just talk TLSv1.2"},
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS
+    {"dtls", OPT_DTLS, '-', "Use any DTLS version"},
+    {"timeout", OPT_TIMEOUT, '-', "Enable timeouts"},
+    {"mtu", OPT_MTU, 'p', "Set link layer MTU"},
+    {"listen", OPT_LISTEN, '-',
+     "Listen for a DTLS ClientHello with a cookie and then connect"},
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
+    {"dtls1", OPT_DTLS1, '-', "Just talk DTLSv1"},
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2
+    {"dtls1_2", OPT_DTLS1_2, '-', "Just talk DTLSv1.2"},
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+    {"no_dhe", OPT_NO_DHE, '-', "Disable ephemeral DH"},
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+    {"nextprotoneg", OPT_NEXTPROTONEG, 's',
+     "Set the advertised protocols for the NPN extension (comma-separated list)"},
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
+    {"use_srtp", OPT_SRTP_PROFILES, 's',
+     "Offer SRTP key management with a colon-separated profile list"},
+#endif
+    {"alpn", OPT_ALPN, 's',
+     "Set the advertised protocols for the ALPN extension (comma-separated list)"},
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine, possibly a hardware device"},
+#endif
+    {NULL, OPT_EOF, 0, NULL}
+};
+
+#define IS_PROT_FLAG(o) \
+ (o == OPT_SSL3 || o == OPT_TLS1 || o == OPT_TLS1_1 || o == OPT_TLS1_2 \
+  || o == OPT_DTLS || o == OPT_DTLS1 || o == OPT_DTLS1_2)
+
+int s_server_main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+    ENGINE *engine = NULL;
+    EVP_PKEY *s_key = NULL, *s_dkey = NULL;
+    SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx = NULL;
+    const SSL_METHOD *meth = TLS_server_method();
+    SSL_EXCERT *exc = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *ssl_args = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(X509) *s_chain = NULL, *s_dchain = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls = NULL;
+    X509 *s_cert = NULL, *s_dcert = NULL;
+    X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = NULL;
+    const char *CApath = NULL, *CAfile = NULL, *chCApath = NULL, *chCAfile = NULL;
+    char *dpassarg = NULL, *dpass = NULL, *inrand = NULL;
+    char *passarg = NULL, *pass = NULL, *vfyCApath = NULL, *vfyCAfile = NULL;
+    char *crl_file = NULL, *prog;
+#ifdef AF_UNIX
+    int unlink_unix_path = 0;
+#endif
+    do_server_cb server_cb;
+    int vpmtouched = 0, build_chain = 0, no_cache = 0, ext_cache = 0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+    char *dhfile = NULL;
+    int no_dhe = 0;
+#endif
+    int nocert = 0, ret = 1;
+    int noCApath = 0, noCAfile = 0;
+    int s_cert_format = FORMAT_PEM, s_key_format = FORMAT_PEM;
+    int s_dcert_format = FORMAT_PEM, s_dkey_format = FORMAT_PEM;
+    int rev = 0, naccept = -1, sdebug = 0;
+    int socket_family = AF_UNSPEC, socket_type = SOCK_STREAM;
+    int state = 0, crl_format = FORMAT_PEM, crl_download = 0;
+    char *host = NULL;
+    char *port = BUF_strdup(PORT);
+    unsigned char *context = NULL;
+    OPTION_CHOICE o;
+    EVP_PKEY *s_key2 = NULL;
+    X509 *s_cert2 = NULL;
+    tlsextctx tlsextcbp = { NULL, NULL, SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING };
+    const char *ssl_config = NULL;
+    int read_buf_len = 0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+    const char *next_proto_neg_in = NULL;
+    tlsextnextprotoctx next_proto = { NULL, 0 };
+#endif
+    const char *alpn_in = NULL;
+    tlsextalpnctx alpn_ctx = { NULL, 0 };
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+    /* by default do not send a PSK identity hint */
+    char *psk_identity_hint = NULL;
+    char *p;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+    char *srpuserseed = NULL;
+    char *srp_verifier_file = NULL;
+#endif
+    int min_version = 0, max_version = 0, prot_opt = 0, no_prot_opt = 0;
+    int s_server_verify = SSL_VERIFY_NONE;
+    int s_server_session_id_context = 1; /* anything will do */
+    const char *s_cert_file = TEST_CERT, *s_key_file = NULL, *s_chain_file = NULL;
+    const char *s_cert_file2 = TEST_CERT2, *s_key_file2 = NULL;
+    char *s_dcert_file = NULL, *s_dkey_file = NULL, *s_dchain_file = NULL;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+    int s_tlsextstatus = 0;
+#endif
+    int no_resume_ephemeral = 0;
+    unsigned int split_send_fragment = 0, max_pipelines = 0;
+    const char *s_serverinfo_file = NULL;
+
+    /* Init of few remaining global variables */
+    local_argc = argc;
+    local_argv = argv;
+
+    ctx = ctx2 = NULL;
+    s_nbio = s_nbio_test = 0;
+    www = 0;
+    bio_s_out = NULL;
+    s_debug = 0;
+    s_msg = 0;
+    s_quiet = 0;
+    s_brief = 0;
+    async = 0;
+
+    cctx = SSL_CONF_CTX_new();
+    vpm = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
+    if (cctx == NULL || vpm == NULL)
+        goto end;
+    SSL_CONF_CTX_set_flags(cctx,
+                           SSL_CONF_FLAG_SERVER | SSL_CONF_FLAG_CMDLINE);
+
+    prog = opt_init(argc, argv, s_server_options);
+    while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) {
+        if (IS_PROT_FLAG(o) && ++prot_opt > 1) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Cannot supply multiple protocol flags\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+        if (IS_NO_PROT_FLAG(o))
+            no_prot_opt++;
+        if (prot_opt == 1 && no_prot_opt) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                       "Cannot supply both a protocol flag and '-no_<prot>'\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+        switch (o) {
+        case OPT_EOF:
+        case OPT_ERR:
+ opthelp:
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog);
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_HELP:
+            opt_help(s_server_options);
+            ret = 0;
+            goto end;
+
+        case OPT_4:
+#ifdef AF_UNIX
+            if (socket_family == AF_UNIX) {
+                OPENSSL_free(host); host = NULL;
+                OPENSSL_free(port); port = NULL;
+            }
+#endif
+            socket_family = AF_INET;
+            break;
+        case OPT_6:
+            if (1) {
+#ifdef AF_INET6
+#ifdef AF_UNIX
+                if (socket_family == AF_UNIX) {
+                    OPENSSL_free(host); host = NULL;
+                    OPENSSL_free(port); port = NULL;
+                }
+#endif
+                socket_family = AF_INET6;
+            } else {
+#endif
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: IPv6 domain sockets unsupported\n", prog);
+                goto end;
+            }
+            break;
+        case OPT_PORT:
+#ifdef AF_UNIX
+            if (socket_family == AF_UNIX) {
+                socket_family = AF_UNSPEC;
+            }
+#endif
+            OPENSSL_free(port); port = NULL;
+            OPENSSL_free(host); host = NULL;
+            if (BIO_parse_hostserv(opt_arg(), NULL, &port, BIO_PARSE_PRIO_SERV) < 1) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                           "%s: -port argument malformed or ambiguous\n",
+                           port);
+                goto end;
+            }
+            break;
+        case OPT_ACCEPT:
+#ifdef AF_UNIX
+            if (socket_family == AF_UNIX) {
+                socket_family = AF_UNSPEC;
+            }
+#endif
+            OPENSSL_free(port); port = NULL;
+            OPENSSL_free(host); host = NULL;
+            if (BIO_parse_hostserv(opt_arg(), &host, &port, BIO_PARSE_PRIO_SERV) < 1) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                           "%s: -accept argument malformed or ambiguous\n",
+                           port);
+                goto end;
+            }
+            break;
+#ifdef AF_UNIX
+        case OPT_UNIX:
+            socket_family = AF_UNIX;
+            OPENSSL_free(host); host = BUF_strdup(opt_arg());
+            OPENSSL_free(port); port = NULL;
+            break;
+        case OPT_UNLINK:
+            unlink_unix_path = 1;
+            break;
+#endif
+        case OPT_NACCEPT:
+            naccept = atol(opt_arg());
+            break;
+        case OPT_VERIFY:
+            s_server_verify = SSL_VERIFY_PEER | SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE;
+            verify_args.depth = atoi(opt_arg());
+            if (!s_quiet)
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "verify depth is %d\n", verify_args.depth);
+            break;
+        case OPT_UPPER_V_VERIFY:
+            s_server_verify =
+                SSL_VERIFY_PEER | SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT |
+                SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE;
+            verify_args.depth = atoi(opt_arg());
+            if (!s_quiet)
+                BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                           "verify depth is %d, must return a certificate\n",
+                           verify_args.depth);
+            break;
+        case OPT_CONTEXT:
+            context = (unsigned char *)opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_CERT:
+            s_cert_file = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_CRL:
+            crl_file = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_CRL_DOWNLOAD:
+            crl_download = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_SERVERINFO:
+            s_serverinfo_file = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_CERTFORM:
+            if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PEMDER, &s_cert_format))
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_KEY:
+            s_key_file = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_KEYFORM:
+            if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_ANY, &s_key_format))
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_PASS:
+            passarg = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_CERT_CHAIN:
+            s_chain_file = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_DHPARAM:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+            dhfile = opt_arg();
+#endif
+            break;
+        case OPT_DCERTFORM:
+            if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PEMDER, &s_dcert_format))
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_DCERT:
+            s_dcert_file = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_DKEYFORM:
+            if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PEMDER, &s_dkey_format))
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_DPASS:
+            dpassarg = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_DKEY:
+            s_dkey_file = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_DCERT_CHAIN:
+            s_dchain_file = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_NOCERT:
+            nocert = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_CAPATH:
+            CApath = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_NOCAPATH:
+            noCApath = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_CHAINCAPATH:
+            chCApath = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_VERIFYCAPATH:
+            vfyCApath = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_NO_CACHE:
+            no_cache = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_EXT_CACHE:
+            ext_cache = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_CRLFORM:
+            if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PEMDER, &crl_format))
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_S_CASES:
+            if (ssl_args == NULL)
+                ssl_args = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null();
+            if (ssl_args == NULL
+                || !sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(ssl_args, opt_flag())
+                || !sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(ssl_args, opt_arg())) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Memory allocation failure\n", prog);
+                goto end;
+            }
+            break;
+        case OPT_V_CASES:
+            if (!opt_verify(o, vpm))
+                goto end;
+            vpmtouched++;
+            break;
+        case OPT_X_CASES:
+            if (!args_excert(o, &exc))
+                goto end;
+            break;
+        case OPT_VERIFY_RET_ERROR:
+            verify_args.return_error = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_VERIFY_QUIET:
+            verify_args.quiet = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_BUILD_CHAIN:
+            build_chain = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_CAFILE:
+            CAfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_NOCAFILE:
+            noCAfile = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_CHAINCAFILE:
+            chCAfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_VERIFYCAFILE:
+            vfyCAfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_NBIO:
+            s_nbio = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NBIO_TEST:
+            s_nbio = s_nbio_test = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_IGN_EOF:
+            s_ign_eof = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NO_IGN_EOF:
+            s_ign_eof = 0;
+            break;
+        case OPT_DEBUG:
+            s_debug = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_TLSEXTDEBUG:
+            s_tlsextdebug = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_STATUS:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+            s_tlsextstatus = 1;
+#endif
+            break;
+        case OPT_STATUS_VERBOSE:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+            s_tlsextstatus = tlscstatp.verbose = 1;
+#endif
+            break;
+        case OPT_STATUS_TIMEOUT:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+            s_tlsextstatus = 1;
+            tlscstatp.timeout = atoi(opt_arg());
+#endif
+            break;
+        case OPT_STATUS_URL:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+            s_tlsextstatus = 1;
+            if (!OCSP_parse_url(opt_arg(),
+                                &tlscstatp.host,
+                                &tlscstatp.port,
+                                &tlscstatp.path, &tlscstatp.use_ssl)) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error parsing URL\n");
+                goto end;
+            }
+#endif
+            break;
+        case OPT_MSG:
+            s_msg = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_MSGFILE:
+            bio_s_msg = BIO_new_file(opt_arg(), "w");
+            break;
+        case OPT_TRACE:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE
+            s_msg = 2;
+#endif
+            break;
+        case OPT_SECURITY_DEBUG:
+            sdebug = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_SECURITY_DEBUG_VERBOSE:
+            sdebug = 2;
+            break;
+        case OPT_STATE:
+            state = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_CRLF:
+            s_crlf = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_QUIET:
+            s_quiet = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_BRIEF:
+            s_quiet = s_brief = verify_args.quiet = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NO_DHE:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+            no_dhe = 1;
+#endif
+            break;
+        case OPT_NO_RESUME_EPHEMERAL:
+            no_resume_ephemeral = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_PSK_HINT:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+            psk_identity_hint = opt_arg();
+#endif
+            break;
+        case OPT_PSK:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+            for (p = psk_key = opt_arg(); *p; p++) {
+                if (isxdigit(_UC(*p)))
+                    continue;
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "Not a hex number '%s'\n", *argv);
+                goto end;
+            }
+#endif
+            break;
+        case OPT_SRPVFILE:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+            srp_verifier_file = opt_arg();
+            if (min_version < TLS1_VERSION)
+                min_version = TLS1_VERSION;
+#endif
+            break;
+        case OPT_SRPUSERSEED:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+            srpuserseed = opt_arg();
+            if (min_version < TLS1_VERSION)
+                min_version = TLS1_VERSION;
+#endif
+            break;
+        case OPT_REV:
+            rev = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_WWW:
+            www = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_UPPER_WWW:
+            www = 2;
+            break;
+        case OPT_HTTP:
+            www = 3;
+            break;
+        case OPT_SSL_CONFIG:
+            ssl_config = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_SSL3:
+            min_version = SSL3_VERSION;
+            max_version = SSL3_VERSION;
+            break;
+        case OPT_TLS1_2:
+            min_version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
+            max_version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
+            break;
+        case OPT_TLS1_1:
+            min_version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
+            max_version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
+            break;
+        case OPT_TLS1:
+            min_version = TLS1_VERSION;
+            max_version = TLS1_VERSION;
+            break;
+        case OPT_DTLS:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS
+            meth = DTLS_server_method();
+            socket_type = SOCK_DGRAM;
+#endif
+            break;
+        case OPT_DTLS1:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS
+            meth = DTLS_server_method();
+            min_version = DTLS1_VERSION;
+            max_version = DTLS1_VERSION;
+            socket_type = SOCK_DGRAM;
+#endif
+            break;
+        case OPT_DTLS1_2:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS
+            meth = DTLS_server_method();
+            min_version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
+            max_version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
+            socket_type = SOCK_DGRAM;
+#endif
+            break;
+        case OPT_TIMEOUT:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS
+            enable_timeouts = 1;
+#endif
+            break;
+        case OPT_MTU:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS
+            socket_mtu = atol(opt_arg());
+#endif
+            break;
+        case OPT_LISTEN:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS
+            dtlslisten = 1;
+#endif
+            break;
+        case OPT_ID_PREFIX:
+            session_id_prefix = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_ENGINE:
+            engine = setup_engine(opt_arg(), 1);
+            break;
+        case OPT_RAND:
+            inrand = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_SERVERNAME:
+            tlsextcbp.servername = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_SERVERNAME_FATAL:
+            tlsextcbp.extension_error = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+            break;
+        case OPT_CERT2:
+            s_cert_file2 = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_KEY2:
+            s_key_file2 = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_NEXTPROTONEG:
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+            next_proto_neg_in = opt_arg();
+#endif
+            break;
+        case OPT_ALPN:
+            alpn_in = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_SRTP_PROFILES:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
+            srtp_profiles = opt_arg();
+#endif
+            break;
+        case OPT_KEYMATEXPORT:
+            keymatexportlabel = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_KEYMATEXPORTLEN:
+            keymatexportlen = atoi(opt_arg());
+            break;
+        case OPT_ASYNC:
+            async = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_SPLIT_SEND_FRAG:
+            split_send_fragment = atoi(opt_arg());
+            if (split_send_fragment == 0) {
+                /*
+                 * Not allowed - set to a deliberately bad value so we get an
+                 * error message below
+                 */
+                split_send_fragment = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH + 1;
+            }
+            break;
+        case OPT_MAX_PIPELINES:
+            max_pipelines = atoi(opt_arg());
+            break;
+        case OPT_READ_BUF:
+            read_buf_len = atoi(opt_arg());
+            break;
+
+        }
+    }
+    argc = opt_num_rest();
+    argv = opt_rest();
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS
+    if (www && socket_type == SOCK_DGRAM) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't use -HTTP, -www or -WWW with DTLS\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (dtlslisten && socket_type != SOCK_DGRAM) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can only use -listen with DTLS\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+#endif
+
+#ifdef AF_UNIX
+    if (socket_family == AF_UNIX && socket_type != SOCK_STREAM) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                   "Can't use unix sockets and datagrams together\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+#endif
+
+    if (split_send_fragment > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Bad split send fragment size\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (max_pipelines > SSL_MAX_PIPELINES) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Bad max pipelines value\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (!app_passwd(passarg, dpassarg, &pass, &dpass)) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting password\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (s_key_file == NULL)
+        s_key_file = s_cert_file;
+
+    if (s_key_file2 == NULL)
+        s_key_file2 = s_cert_file2;
+
+    if (!load_excert(&exc))
+        goto end;
+
+    if (nocert == 0) {
+        s_key = load_key(s_key_file, s_key_format, 0, pass, engine,
+                         "server certificate private key file");
+        if (!s_key) {
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            goto end;
+        }
+
+        s_cert = load_cert(s_cert_file, s_cert_format,
+                           "server certificate file");
+
+        if (!s_cert) {
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            goto end;
+        }
+        if (s_chain_file) {
+            if (!load_certs(s_chain_file, &s_chain, FORMAT_PEM, NULL,
+                            "server certificate chain"))
+                goto end;
+        }
+
+        if (tlsextcbp.servername) {
+            s_key2 = load_key(s_key_file2, s_key_format, 0, pass, engine,
+                              "second server certificate private key file");
+            if (!s_key2) {
+                ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+                goto end;
+            }
+
+            s_cert2 = load_cert(s_cert_file2, s_cert_format,
+                                "second server certificate file");
+
+            if (!s_cert2) {
+                ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+                goto end;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
+    if (next_proto_neg_in) {
+        next_proto.data = next_protos_parse(&next_proto.len, next_proto_neg_in);
+        if (next_proto.data == NULL)
+            goto end;
+    }
+#endif
+    alpn_ctx.data = NULL;
+    if (alpn_in) {
+        alpn_ctx.data = next_protos_parse(&alpn_ctx.len, alpn_in);
+        if (alpn_ctx.data == NULL)
+            goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (crl_file) {
+        X509_CRL *crl;
+        crl = load_crl(crl_file, crl_format);
+        if (!crl) {
+            BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error loading CRL\n");
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            goto end;
+        }
+        crls = sk_X509_CRL_new_null();
+        if (!crls || !sk_X509_CRL_push(crls, crl)) {
+            BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error adding CRL\n");
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            X509_CRL_free(crl);
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (s_dcert_file) {
+
+        if (s_dkey_file == NULL)
+            s_dkey_file = s_dcert_file;
+
+        s_dkey = load_key(s_dkey_file, s_dkey_format,
+                          0, dpass, engine, "second certificate private key file");
+        if (!s_dkey) {
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            goto end;
+        }
+
+        s_dcert = load_cert(s_dcert_file, s_dcert_format,
+                            "second server certificate file");
+
+        if (!s_dcert) {
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            goto end;
+        }
+        if (s_dchain_file) {
+            if (!load_certs(s_dchain_file, &s_dchain, FORMAT_PEM, NULL,
+                            "second server certificate chain"))
+                goto end;
+        }
+
+    }
+
+    if (!app_RAND_load_file(NULL, 1) && inrand == NULL
+        && !RAND_status()) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                   "warning, not much extra random data, consider using the -rand option\n");
+    }
+    if (inrand != NULL)
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "%ld semi-random bytes loaded\n",
+                   app_RAND_load_files(inrand));
+
+    if (bio_s_out == NULL) {
+        if (s_quiet && !s_debug) {
+            bio_s_out = BIO_new(BIO_s_null());
+            if (s_msg && !bio_s_msg)
+                bio_s_msg = dup_bio_out(FORMAT_TEXT);
+        } else {
+            if (bio_s_out == NULL)
+                bio_s_out = dup_bio_out(FORMAT_TEXT);
+        }
+    }
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
+    if (nocert)
+#endif
+    {
+        s_cert_file = NULL;
+        s_key_file = NULL;
+        s_dcert_file = NULL;
+        s_dkey_file = NULL;
+        s_cert_file2 = NULL;
+        s_key_file2 = NULL;
+    }
+
+    ctx = SSL_CTX_new(meth);
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        goto end;
+    }
+    if (sdebug)
+        ssl_ctx_security_debug(ctx, sdebug);
+
+    if (!config_ctx(cctx, ssl_args, ctx))
+        goto end;
+
+    if (ssl_config) {
+        if (SSL_CTX_config(ctx, ssl_config) == 0) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error using configuration \"%s\"\n",
+                       ssl_config);
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+    if (min_version != 0
+        && SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(ctx, min_version) == 0)
+        goto end;
+    if (max_version != 0
+        && SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(ctx, max_version) == 0)
+        goto end;
+
+    if (session_id_prefix) {
+        if (strlen(session_id_prefix) >= 32)
+            BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                       "warning: id_prefix is too long, only one new session will be possible\n");
+        if (!SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id(ctx, generate_session_id)) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "error setting 'id_prefix'\n");
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            goto end;
+        }
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "id_prefix '%s' set.\n", session_id_prefix);
+    }
+    SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(ctx, 1);
+    if (exc)
+        ssl_ctx_set_excert(ctx, exc);
+
+    if (state)
+        SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(ctx, apps_ssl_info_callback);
+    if (no_cache)
+        SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(ctx, SSL_SESS_CACHE_OFF);
+    else if (ext_cache)
+        init_session_cache_ctx(ctx);
+    else
+        SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size(ctx, 128);
+
+    if (async) {
+        SSL_CTX_set_mode(ctx, SSL_MODE_ASYNC);
+    }
+    if (split_send_fragment > 0) {
+        SSL_CTX_set_split_send_fragment(ctx, split_send_fragment);
+    }
+    if (max_pipelines > 0) {
+        SSL_CTX_set_max_pipelines(ctx, max_pipelines);
+    }
+
+    if (read_buf_len > 0) {
+        SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(ctx, read_buf_len);
+    }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
+    if (srtp_profiles != NULL) {
+        /* Returns 0 on success! */
+        if (SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_use_srtp(ctx, srtp_profiles) != 0) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error setting SRTP profile\n");
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+#endif
+
+    if (!ctx_set_verify_locations(ctx, CAfile, CApath, noCAfile, noCApath)) {
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        goto end;
+    }
+    if (vpmtouched && !SSL_CTX_set1_param(ctx, vpm)) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error setting verify params\n");
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    ssl_ctx_add_crls(ctx, crls, 0);
+
+    if (!ssl_load_stores(ctx, vfyCApath, vfyCAfile, chCApath, chCAfile,
+                         crls, crl_download)) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error loading store locations\n");
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (s_cert2) {
+        ctx2 = SSL_CTX_new(meth);
+        if (ctx2 == NULL) {
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (ctx2) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Setting secondary ctx parameters\n");
+
+        if (sdebug)
+            ssl_ctx_security_debug(ctx, sdebug);
+
+        if (session_id_prefix) {
+            if (strlen(session_id_prefix) >= 32)
+                BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                           "warning: id_prefix is too long, only one new session will be possible\n");
+            if (!SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id(ctx2, generate_session_id)) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "error setting 'id_prefix'\n");
+                ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+                goto end;
+            }
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "id_prefix '%s' set.\n", session_id_prefix);
+        }
+        SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(ctx2, 1);
+        if (exc)
+            ssl_ctx_set_excert(ctx2, exc);
+
+        if (state)
+            SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(ctx2, apps_ssl_info_callback);
+
+        if (no_cache)
+            SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(ctx2, SSL_SESS_CACHE_OFF);
+        else if (ext_cache)
+            init_session_cache_ctx(ctx2);
+        else
+            SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size(ctx2, 128);
+
+        if (async)
+            SSL_CTX_set_mode(ctx2, SSL_MODE_ASYNC);
+
+        if (!ctx_set_verify_locations(ctx2, CAfile, CApath, noCAfile,
+                                      noCApath)) {
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            goto end;
+        }
+        if (vpmtouched && !SSL_CTX_set1_param(ctx2, vpm)) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error setting verify params\n");
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            goto end;
+        }
+
+        ssl_ctx_add_crls(ctx2, crls, 0);
+        if (!config_ctx(cctx, ssl_args, ctx2))
+            goto end;
+    }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+    if (next_proto.data)
+        SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(ctx, next_proto_cb,
+                                              &next_proto);
+#endif
+    if (alpn_ctx.data)
+        SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb(ctx, alpn_cb, &alpn_ctx);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+    if (!no_dhe) {
+        DH *dh = NULL;
+
+        if (dhfile)
+            dh = load_dh_param(dhfile);
+        else if (s_cert_file)
+            dh = load_dh_param(s_cert_file);
+
+        if (dh != NULL) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Setting temp DH parameters\n");
+        } else {
+            BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Using default temp DH parameters\n");
+        }
+        (void)BIO_flush(bio_s_out);
+
+        if (dh == NULL)
+            SSL_CTX_set_dh_auto(ctx, 1);
+        else if (!SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(ctx, dh)) {
+            BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error setting temp DH parameters\n");
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            DH_free(dh);
+            goto end;
+        }
+
+        if (ctx2) {
+            if (!dhfile) {
+                DH *dh2 = load_dh_param(s_cert_file2);
+                if (dh2 != NULL) {
+                    BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Setting temp DH parameters\n");
+                    (void)BIO_flush(bio_s_out);
+
+                    DH_free(dh);
+                    dh = dh2;
+                }
+            }
+            if (dh == NULL)
+                SSL_CTX_set_dh_auto(ctx2, 1);
+            else if (!SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(ctx2, dh)) {
+                BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error setting temp DH parameters\n");
+                ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+                DH_free(dh);
+                goto end;
+            }
+        }
+        DH_free(dh);
+    }
+#endif
+
+    if (!set_cert_key_stuff(ctx, s_cert, s_key, s_chain, build_chain))
+        goto end;
+
+    if (s_serverinfo_file != NULL
+        && !SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo_file(ctx, s_serverinfo_file)) {
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (ctx2 && !set_cert_key_stuff(ctx2, s_cert2, s_key2, NULL, build_chain))
+        goto end;
+
+    if (s_dcert != NULL) {
+        if (!set_cert_key_stuff(ctx, s_dcert, s_dkey, s_dchain, build_chain))
+            goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (no_resume_ephemeral) {
+        SSL_CTX_set_not_resumable_session_callback(ctx,
+                                                   not_resumable_sess_cb);
+
+        if (ctx2)
+            SSL_CTX_set_not_resumable_session_callback(ctx2,
+                                                       not_resumable_sess_cb);
+    }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+    if (psk_key != NULL) {
+        if (s_debug)
+            BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "PSK key given, setting server callback\n");
+        SSL_CTX_set_psk_server_callback(ctx, psk_server_cb);
+    }
+
+    if (!SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint(ctx, psk_identity_hint)) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "error setting PSK identity hint to context\n");
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        goto end;
+    }
+#endif
+
+    SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx, s_server_verify, verify_callback);
+    if (!SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(ctx,
+                                        (void *)&s_server_session_id_context,
+                                        sizeof(s_server_session_id_context))) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "error setting session id context\n");
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    /* Set DTLS cookie generation and verification callbacks */
+    SSL_CTX_set_cookie_generate_cb(ctx, generate_cookie_callback);
+    SSL_CTX_set_cookie_verify_cb(ctx, verify_cookie_callback);
+
+    if (ctx2) {
+        SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx2, s_server_verify, verify_callback);
+        if (!SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(ctx2,
+                    (void *)&s_server_session_id_context,
+                    sizeof(s_server_session_id_context))) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "error setting session id context\n");
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            goto end;
+        }
+        tlsextcbp.biodebug = bio_s_out;
+        SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(ctx2, ssl_servername_cb);
+        SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(ctx2, &tlsextcbp);
+        SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(ctx, ssl_servername_cb);
+        SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(ctx, &tlsextcbp);
+    }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+    if (srp_verifier_file != NULL) {
+        srp_callback_parm.vb = SRP_VBASE_new(srpuserseed);
+        srp_callback_parm.user = NULL;
+        srp_callback_parm.login = NULL;
+        if ((ret =
+             SRP_VBASE_init(srp_callback_parm.vb,
+                            srp_verifier_file)) != SRP_NO_ERROR) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                       "Cannot initialize SRP verifier file \"%s\":ret=%d\n",
+                       srp_verifier_file, ret);
+            goto end;
+        }
+        SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx, SSL_VERIFY_NONE, verify_callback);
+        SSL_CTX_set_srp_cb_arg(ctx, &srp_callback_parm);
+        SSL_CTX_set_srp_username_callback(ctx, ssl_srp_server_param_cb);
+    } else
+#endif
+    if (CAfile != NULL) {
+        SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(ctx, SSL_load_client_CA_file(CAfile));
+
+        if (ctx2)
+            SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(ctx2, SSL_load_client_CA_file(CAfile));
+    }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+    if (s_tlsextstatus) {
+        SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(ctx, cert_status_cb);
+        SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(ctx, &tlscstatp);
+        if (ctx2) {
+            SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(ctx2, cert_status_cb);
+            SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(ctx2, &tlscstatp);
+        }
+    }
+#endif
+
+    BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "ACCEPT\n");
+    (void)BIO_flush(bio_s_out);
+    if (rev)
+        server_cb = rev_body;
+    else if (www)
+        server_cb = www_body;
+    else
+        server_cb = sv_body;
+#ifdef AF_UNIX
+    if (socket_family == AF_UNIX
+        && unlink_unix_path)
+        unlink(host);
+#endif
+    do_server(&accept_socket, host, port, socket_family, socket_type,
+              server_cb, context, naccept);
+    print_stats(bio_s_out, ctx);
+    ret = 0;
+ end:
+    SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
+    X509_free(s_cert);
+    sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(crls, X509_CRL_free);
+    X509_free(s_dcert);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(s_key);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(s_dkey);
+    sk_X509_pop_free(s_chain, X509_free);
+    sk_X509_pop_free(s_dchain, X509_free);
+    OPENSSL_free(pass);
+    OPENSSL_free(dpass);
+    OPENSSL_free(host);
+    OPENSSL_free(port);
+    X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(vpm);
+    free_sessions();
+    OPENSSL_free(tlscstatp.host);
+    OPENSSL_free(tlscstatp.port);
+    OPENSSL_free(tlscstatp.path);
+    SSL_CTX_free(ctx2);
+    X509_free(s_cert2);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(s_key2);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+    OPENSSL_free(next_proto.data);
+#endif
+    OPENSSL_free(alpn_ctx.data);
+    ssl_excert_free(exc);
+    sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(ssl_args);
+    SSL_CONF_CTX_free(cctx);
+    release_engine(engine);
+    BIO_free(bio_s_out);
+    bio_s_out = NULL;
+    BIO_free(bio_s_msg);
+    bio_s_msg = NULL;
+#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+    BIO_meth_free(methods_ebcdic);
+#endif
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static void print_stats(BIO *bio, SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx)
+{
+    BIO_printf(bio, "%4ld items in the session cache\n",
+               SSL_CTX_sess_number(ssl_ctx));
+    BIO_printf(bio, "%4ld client connects (SSL_connect())\n",
+               SSL_CTX_sess_connect(ssl_ctx));
+    BIO_printf(bio, "%4ld client renegotiates (SSL_connect())\n",
+               SSL_CTX_sess_connect_renegotiate(ssl_ctx));
+    BIO_printf(bio, "%4ld client connects that finished\n",
+               SSL_CTX_sess_connect_good(ssl_ctx));
+    BIO_printf(bio, "%4ld server accepts (SSL_accept())\n",
+               SSL_CTX_sess_accept(ssl_ctx));
+    BIO_printf(bio, "%4ld server renegotiates (SSL_accept())\n",
+               SSL_CTX_sess_accept_renegotiate(ssl_ctx));
+    BIO_printf(bio, "%4ld server accepts that finished\n",
+               SSL_CTX_sess_accept_good(ssl_ctx));
+    BIO_printf(bio, "%4ld session cache hits\n", SSL_CTX_sess_hits(ssl_ctx));
+    BIO_printf(bio, "%4ld session cache misses\n",
+               SSL_CTX_sess_misses(ssl_ctx));
+    BIO_printf(bio, "%4ld session cache timeouts\n",
+               SSL_CTX_sess_timeouts(ssl_ctx));
+    BIO_printf(bio, "%4ld callback cache hits\n",
+               SSL_CTX_sess_cb_hits(ssl_ctx));
+    BIO_printf(bio, "%4ld cache full overflows (%ld allowed)\n",
+               SSL_CTX_sess_cache_full(ssl_ctx),
+               SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ssl_ctx));
+}
+
+static int sv_body(int s, int stype, unsigned char *context)
+{
+    char *buf = NULL;
+    fd_set readfds;
+    int ret = 1, width;
+    int k, i;
+    unsigned long l;
+    SSL *con = NULL;
+    BIO *sbio;
+    struct timeval timeout;
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS)
+    struct timeval tv;
+#else
+    struct timeval *timeoutp;
+#endif
+
+    buf = app_malloc(bufsize, "server buffer");
+    if (s_nbio) {
+        if (!BIO_socket_nbio(s, 1))
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        else if (!s_quiet)
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Turned on non blocking io\n");
+    }
+
+    if (con == NULL) {
+        con = SSL_new(ctx);
+
+        if (s_tlsextdebug) {
+            SSL_set_tlsext_debug_callback(con, tlsext_cb);
+            SSL_set_tlsext_debug_arg(con, bio_s_out);
+        }
+
+        if (context
+            && !SSL_set_session_id_context(con,
+                                           context, strlen((char *)context))) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error setting session id context\n");
+            ret = -1;
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+    if (!SSL_clear(con)) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error clearing SSL connection\n");
+        ret = -1;
+        goto err;
+    }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS
+    if (stype == SOCK_DGRAM) {
+
+        sbio = BIO_new_dgram(s, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+
+        if (enable_timeouts) {
+            timeout.tv_sec = 0;
+            timeout.tv_usec = DGRAM_RCV_TIMEOUT;
+            BIO_ctrl(sbio, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_RECV_TIMEOUT, 0, &timeout);
+
+            timeout.tv_sec = 0;
+            timeout.tv_usec = DGRAM_SND_TIMEOUT;
+            BIO_ctrl(sbio, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_SEND_TIMEOUT, 0, &timeout);
+        }
+
+        if (socket_mtu) {
+            if (socket_mtu < DTLS_get_link_min_mtu(con)) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "MTU too small. Must be at least %ld\n",
+                           DTLS_get_link_min_mtu(con));
+                ret = -1;
+                BIO_free(sbio);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            SSL_set_options(con, SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU);
+            if (!DTLS_set_link_mtu(con, socket_mtu)) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "Failed to set MTU\n");
+                ret = -1;
+                BIO_free(sbio);
+                goto err;
+            }
+        } else
+            /* want to do MTU discovery */
+            BIO_ctrl(sbio, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_MTU_DISCOVER, 0, NULL);
+
+        /* turn on cookie exchange */
+        SSL_set_options(con, SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE);
+    } else
+#endif
+        sbio = BIO_new_socket(s, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+
+    if (s_nbio_test) {
+        BIO *test;
+
+        test = BIO_new(BIO_f_nbio_test());
+        sbio = BIO_push(test, sbio);
+    }
+
+    SSL_set_bio(con, sbio, sbio);
+    SSL_set_accept_state(con);
+    /* SSL_set_fd(con,s); */
+
+    if (s_debug) {
+        BIO_set_callback(SSL_get_rbio(con), bio_dump_callback);
+        BIO_set_callback_arg(SSL_get_rbio(con), (char *)bio_s_out);
+    }
+    if (s_msg) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE
+        if (s_msg == 2)
+            SSL_set_msg_callback(con, SSL_trace);
+        else
+#endif
+            SSL_set_msg_callback(con, msg_cb);
+        SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(con, bio_s_msg ? bio_s_msg : bio_s_out);
+    }
+
+    if (s_tlsextdebug) {
+        SSL_set_tlsext_debug_callback(con, tlsext_cb);
+        SSL_set_tlsext_debug_arg(con, bio_s_out);
+    }
+
+    if (fileno_stdin() > s)
+        width = fileno_stdin() + 1;
+    else
+        width = s + 1;
+    for (;;) {
+        int read_from_terminal;
+        int read_from_sslcon;
+
+        read_from_terminal = 0;
+        read_from_sslcon = SSL_has_pending(con)
+                           || (async && SSL_waiting_for_async(con));
+
+        if (!read_from_sslcon) {
+            FD_ZERO(&readfds);
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS)
+            openssl_fdset(fileno_stdin(), &readfds);
+#endif
+            openssl_fdset(s, &readfds);
+            /*
+             * Note: under VMS with SOCKETSHR the second parameter is
+             * currently of type (int *) whereas under other systems it is
+             * (void *) if you don't have a cast it will choke the compiler:
+             * if you do have a cast then you can either go for (int *) or
+             * (void *).
+             */
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS)
+            /*
+             * Under DOS (non-djgpp) and Windows we can't select on stdin:
+             * only on sockets. As a workaround we timeout the select every
+             * second and check for any keypress. In a proper Windows
+             * application we wouldn't do this because it is inefficient.
+             */
+            tv.tv_sec = 1;
+            tv.tv_usec = 0;
+            i = select(width, (void *)&readfds, NULL, NULL, &tv);
+            if (has_stdin_waiting())
+                read_from_terminal = 1;
+            if ((i < 0) || (!i && !read_from_terminal))
+                continue;
+#else
+            if ((SSL_version(con) == DTLS1_VERSION) &&
+                DTLSv1_get_timeout(con, &timeout))
+                timeoutp = &timeout;
+            else
+                timeoutp = NULL;
+
+            i = select(width, (void *)&readfds, NULL, NULL, timeoutp);
+
+            if ((SSL_version(con) == DTLS1_VERSION)
+                && DTLSv1_handle_timeout(con) > 0) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "TIMEOUT occurred\n");
+            }
+
+            if (i <= 0)
+                continue;
+            if (FD_ISSET(fileno_stdin(), &readfds))
+                read_from_terminal = 1;
+#endif
+            if (FD_ISSET(s, &readfds))
+                read_from_sslcon = 1;
+        }
+        if (read_from_terminal) {
+            if (s_crlf) {
+                int j, lf_num;
+
+                i = raw_read_stdin(buf, bufsize / 2);
+                lf_num = 0;
+                /* both loops are skipped when i <= 0 */
+                for (j = 0; j < i; j++)
+                    if (buf[j] == '\n')
+                        lf_num++;
+                for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--) {
+                    buf[j + lf_num] = buf[j];
+                    if (buf[j] == '\n') {
+                        lf_num--;
+                        i++;
+                        buf[j + lf_num] = '\r';
+                    }
+                }
+                assert(lf_num == 0);
+            } else
+                i = raw_read_stdin(buf, bufsize);
+
+            if (!s_quiet && !s_brief) {
+                if ((i <= 0) || (buf[0] == 'Q')) {
+                    BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "DONE\n");
+                    (void)BIO_flush(bio_s_out);
+                    BIO_closesocket(s);
+                    close_accept_socket();
+                    ret = -11;
+                    goto err;
+                }
+                if ((i <= 0) || (buf[0] == 'q')) {
+                    BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "DONE\n");
+                    (void)BIO_flush(bio_s_out);
+                    if (SSL_version(con) != DTLS1_VERSION)
+                        BIO_closesocket(s);
+                    /*
+                     * close_accept_socket(); ret= -11;
+                     */
+                    goto err;
+                }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+                if ((buf[0] == 'B') && ((buf[1] == '\n') || (buf[1] == '\r'))) {
+                    BIO_printf(bio_err, "HEARTBEATING\n");
+                    SSL_heartbeat(con);
+                    i = 0;
+                    continue;
+                }
+#endif
+                if ((buf[0] == 'r') && ((buf[1] == '\n') || (buf[1] == '\r'))) {
+                    SSL_renegotiate(con);
+                    i = SSL_do_handshake(con);
+                    printf("SSL_do_handshake -> %d\n", i);
+                    i = 0;      /* 13; */
+                    continue;
+                    /*
+                     * strcpy(buf,"server side RE-NEGOTIATE\n");
+                     */
+                }
+                if ((buf[0] == 'R') && ((buf[1] == '\n') || (buf[1] == '\r'))) {
+                    SSL_set_verify(con,
+                                   SSL_VERIFY_PEER | SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE,
+                                   NULL);
+                    SSL_renegotiate(con);
+                    i = SSL_do_handshake(con);
+                    printf("SSL_do_handshake -> %d\n", i);
+                    i = 0;      /* 13; */
+                    continue;
+                    /*
+                     * strcpy(buf,"server side RE-NEGOTIATE asking for client
+                     * cert\n");
+                     */
+                }
+                if (buf[0] == 'P') {
+                    static const char *str = "Lets print some clear text\n";
+                    BIO_write(SSL_get_wbio(con), str, strlen(str));
+                }
+                if (buf[0] == 'S') {
+                    print_stats(bio_s_out, SSL_get_SSL_CTX(con));
+                }
+            }
+#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+            ebcdic2ascii(buf, buf, i);
+#endif
+            l = k = 0;
+            for (;;) {
+                /* should do a select for the write */
+#ifdef RENEG
+                static count = 0;
+                if (++count == 100) {
+                    count = 0;
+                    SSL_renegotiate(con);
+                }
+#endif
+                k = SSL_write(con, &(buf[l]), (unsigned int)i);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+                while (SSL_get_error(con, k) == SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP) {
+                    BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP renego during write\n");
+                    SRP_user_pwd_free(srp_callback_parm.user);
+                    srp_callback_parm.user =
+                        SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb,
+                                               srp_callback_parm.login);
+                    if (srp_callback_parm.user)
+                        BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP done %s\n",
+                                   srp_callback_parm.user->info);
+                    else
+                        BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP not successful\n");
+                    k = SSL_write(con, &(buf[l]), (unsigned int)i);
+                }
+#endif
+                switch (SSL_get_error(con, k)) {
+                case SSL_ERROR_NONE:
+                    break;
+                case SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC:
+                    BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Write BLOCK (Async)\n");
+                    (void)BIO_flush(bio_s_out);
+                    wait_for_async(con);
+                    break;
+                case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
+                case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
+                case SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP:
+                    BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Write BLOCK\n");
+                    (void)BIO_flush(bio_s_out);
+                    break;
+                case SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC_JOB:
+                    /*
+                     * This shouldn't ever happen in s_server. Treat as an error
+                     */
+                case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
+                case SSL_ERROR_SSL:
+                    BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "ERROR\n");
+                    (void)BIO_flush(bio_s_out);
+                    ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+                    ret = 1;
+                    goto err;
+                    /* break; */
+                case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN:
+                    BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "DONE\n");
+                    (void)BIO_flush(bio_s_out);
+                    ret = 1;
+                    goto err;
+                }
+                if (k > 0) {
+                    l += k;
+                    i -= k;
+                }
+                if (i <= 0)
+                    break;
+            }
+        }
+        if (read_from_sslcon) {
+            /*
+             * init_ssl_connection handles all async events itself so if we're
+             * waiting for async then we shouldn't go back into
+             * init_ssl_connection
+             */
+            if ((!async || !SSL_waiting_for_async(con))
+                    && !SSL_is_init_finished(con)) {
+                i = init_ssl_connection(con);
+
+                if (i < 0) {
+                    ret = 0;
+                    goto err;
+                } else if (i == 0) {
+                    ret = 1;
+                    goto err;
+                }
+            } else {
+ again:
+                i = SSL_read(con, (char *)buf, bufsize);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+                while (SSL_get_error(con, i) == SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP) {
+                    BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP renego during read\n");
+                    SRP_user_pwd_free(srp_callback_parm.user);
+                    srp_callback_parm.user =
+                        SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb,
+                                               srp_callback_parm.login);
+                    if (srp_callback_parm.user)
+                        BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP done %s\n",
+                                   srp_callback_parm.user->info);
+                    else
+                        BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP not successful\n");
+                    i = SSL_read(con, (char *)buf, bufsize);
+                }
+#endif
+                switch (SSL_get_error(con, i)) {
+                case SSL_ERROR_NONE:
+#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+                    ascii2ebcdic(buf, buf, i);
+#endif
+                    raw_write_stdout(buf, (unsigned int)i);
+                    (void)BIO_flush(bio_s_out);
+                    if (SSL_has_pending(con))
+                        goto again;
+                    break;
+                case SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC:
+                    BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Read BLOCK (Async)\n");
+                    (void)BIO_flush(bio_s_out);
+                    wait_for_async(con);
+                    break;
+                case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
+                case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
+                    BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Read BLOCK\n");
+                    (void)BIO_flush(bio_s_out);
+                    break;
+                case SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC_JOB:
+                    /*
+                     * This shouldn't ever happen in s_server. Treat as an error
+                     */
+                case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
+                case SSL_ERROR_SSL:
+                    BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "ERROR\n");
+                    (void)BIO_flush(bio_s_out);
+                    ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+                    ret = 1;
+                    goto err;
+                case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN:
+                    BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "DONE\n");
+                    (void)BIO_flush(bio_s_out);
+                    ret = 1;
+                    goto err;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+ err:
+    if (con != NULL) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "shutting down SSL\n");
+        SSL_set_shutdown(con, SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN | SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN);
+        SSL_free(con);
+    }
+    BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "CONNECTION CLOSED\n");
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(buf, bufsize);
+    if (ret >= 0)
+        BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "ACCEPT\n");
+    (void)BIO_flush(bio_s_out);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static void close_accept_socket(void)
+{
+    BIO_printf(bio_err, "shutdown accept socket\n");
+    if (accept_socket >= 0) {
+        BIO_closesocket(accept_socket);
+    }
+}
+
+static int init_ssl_connection(SSL *con)
+{
+    int i;
+    const char *str;
+    X509 *peer;
+    long verify_err;
+    char buf[BUFSIZ];
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
+    const unsigned char *next_proto_neg;
+    unsigned next_proto_neg_len;
+#endif
+    unsigned char *exportedkeymat;
+    int retry = 0;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS
+    if (dtlslisten) {
+        BIO_ADDR *client = NULL;
+
+        if ((client = BIO_ADDR_new()) == NULL) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "ERROR - memory\n");
+            return 0;
+        }
+        i = DTLSv1_listen(con, client);
+        if (i > 0) {
+            BIO *wbio;
+            int fd = -1;
+
+            wbio = SSL_get_wbio(con);
+            if (wbio) {
+                BIO_get_fd(wbio, &fd);
+            }
+
+            if (!wbio || BIO_connect(fd, client, 0) == 0) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "ERROR - unable to connect\n");
+                BIO_ADDR_free(client);
+                return 0;
+            }
+            BIO_ADDR_free(client);
+            dtlslisten = 0;
+            i = SSL_accept(con);
+        } else {
+            BIO_ADDR_free(client);
+        }
+    } else
+#endif
+
+    do {
+        i = SSL_accept(con);
+
+        if (i <= 0)
+            retry = BIO_sock_should_retry(i);
+#ifdef CERT_CB_TEST_RETRY
+        {
+            while (i <= 0
+                    && SSL_get_error(con, i) == SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP
+                    && SSL_get_state(con) == TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                           "LOOKUP from certificate callback during accept\n");
+                i = SSL_accept(con);
+                if (i <= 0)
+                    retry = BIO_sock_should_retry(i);
+            }
+        }
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+        while (i <= 0
+               && SSL_get_error(con, i) == SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP during accept %s\n",
+                       srp_callback_parm.login);
+            SRP_user_pwd_free(srp_callback_parm.user);
+            srp_callback_parm.user =
+                SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb,
+                                       srp_callback_parm.login);
+            if (srp_callback_parm.user)
+                BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP done %s\n",
+                           srp_callback_parm.user->info);
+            else
+                BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP not successful\n");
+            i = SSL_accept(con);
+            if (i <= 0)
+                retry = BIO_sock_should_retry(i);
+        }
+#endif
+    } while (i < 0 && SSL_waiting_for_async(con));
+
+    if (i <= 0) {
+        if ((dtlslisten && i == 0)
+                || (!dtlslisten && retry)) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "DELAY\n");
+            return (1);
+        }
+
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "ERROR\n");
+
+        verify_err = SSL_get_verify_result(con);
+        if (verify_err != X509_V_OK) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "verify error:%s\n",
+                       X509_verify_cert_error_string(verify_err));
+        }
+        /* Always print any error messages */
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        return (0);
+    }
+
+    if (s_brief)
+        print_ssl_summary(con);
+
+    PEM_write_bio_SSL_SESSION(bio_s_out, SSL_get_session(con));
+
+    peer = SSL_get_peer_certificate(con);
+    if (peer != NULL) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Client certificate\n");
+        PEM_write_bio_X509(bio_s_out, peer);
+        X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(peer), buf, sizeof(buf));
+        BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "subject=%s\n", buf);
+        X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(peer), buf, sizeof(buf));
+        BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "issuer=%s\n", buf);
+        X509_free(peer);
+        peer = NULL;
+    }
+
+    if (SSL_get_shared_ciphers(con, buf, sizeof(buf)) != NULL)
+        BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Shared ciphers:%s\n", buf);
+    str = SSL_CIPHER_get_name(SSL_get_current_cipher(con));
+    ssl_print_sigalgs(bio_s_out, con);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    ssl_print_point_formats(bio_s_out, con);
+    ssl_print_curves(bio_s_out, con, 0);
+#endif
+    BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "CIPHER is %s\n", (str != NULL) ? str : "(NONE)");
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
+    SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(con, &next_proto_neg, &next_proto_neg_len);
+    if (next_proto_neg) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "NEXTPROTO is ");
+        BIO_write(bio_s_out, next_proto_neg, next_proto_neg_len);
+        BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "\n");
+    }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
+    {
+        SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *srtp_profile
+            = SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile(con);
+
+        if (srtp_profile)
+            BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "SRTP Extension negotiated, profile=%s\n",
+                       srtp_profile->name);
+    }
+#endif
+    if (SSL_session_reused(con))
+        BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Reused session-id\n");
+    BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Secure Renegotiation IS%s supported\n",
+               SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support(con) ? "" : " NOT");
+    if ((SSL_get_options(con) & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION))
+        BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Renegotiation is DISABLED\n");
+
+    if (keymatexportlabel != NULL) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Keying material exporter:\n");
+        BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "    Label: '%s'\n", keymatexportlabel);
+        BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "    Length: %i bytes\n", keymatexportlen);
+        exportedkeymat = app_malloc(keymatexportlen, "export key");
+        if (!SSL_export_keying_material(con, exportedkeymat,
+                                        keymatexportlen,
+                                        keymatexportlabel,
+                                        strlen(keymatexportlabel),
+                                        NULL, 0, 0)) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "    Error\n");
+        } else {
+            BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "    Keying material: ");
+            for (i = 0; i < keymatexportlen; i++)
+                BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "%02X", exportedkeymat[i]);
+            BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "\n");
+        }
+        OPENSSL_free(exportedkeymat);
+    }
+
+    (void)BIO_flush(bio_s_out);
+    return (1);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+static DH *load_dh_param(const char *dhfile)
+{
+    DH *ret = NULL;
+    BIO *bio;
+
+    if ((bio = BIO_new_file(dhfile, "r")) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    ret = PEM_read_bio_DHparams(bio, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ err:
+    BIO_free(bio);
+    return (ret);
+}
+#endif
+
+static int www_body(int s, int stype, unsigned char *context)
+{
+    char *buf = NULL;
+    int ret = 1;
+    int i, j, k, dot;
+    SSL *con;
+    const SSL_CIPHER *c;
+    BIO *io, *ssl_bio, *sbio;
+#ifdef RENEG
+    int total_bytes = 0;
+#endif
+    int width;
+    fd_set readfds;
+
+    /* Set width for a select call if needed */
+    width = s + 1;
+
+    buf = app_malloc(bufsize, "server www buffer");
+    io = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer());
+    ssl_bio = BIO_new(BIO_f_ssl());
+    if ((io == NULL) || (ssl_bio == NULL))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (s_nbio) {
+        if (!BIO_socket_nbio(s, 1))
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        else if (!s_quiet)
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Turned on non blocking io\n");
+    }
+
+    /* lets make the output buffer a reasonable size */
+    if (!BIO_set_write_buffer_size(io, bufsize))
+        goto err;
+
+    if ((con = SSL_new(ctx)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (s_tlsextdebug) {
+        SSL_set_tlsext_debug_callback(con, tlsext_cb);
+        SSL_set_tlsext_debug_arg(con, bio_s_out);
+    }
+
+    if (context
+        && !SSL_set_session_id_context(con, context,
+                                       strlen((char *)context)))
+        goto err;
+
+    sbio = BIO_new_socket(s, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+    if (s_nbio_test) {
+        BIO *test;
+
+        test = BIO_new(BIO_f_nbio_test());
+        sbio = BIO_push(test, sbio);
+    }
+    SSL_set_bio(con, sbio, sbio);
+    SSL_set_accept_state(con);
+
+    /* SSL_set_fd(con,s); */
+    BIO_set_ssl(ssl_bio, con, BIO_CLOSE);
+    BIO_push(io, ssl_bio);
+#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+    io = BIO_push(BIO_new(BIO_f_ebcdic_filter()), io);
+#endif
+
+    if (s_debug) {
+        BIO_set_callback(SSL_get_rbio(con), bio_dump_callback);
+        BIO_set_callback_arg(SSL_get_rbio(con), (char *)bio_s_out);
+    }
+    if (s_msg) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE
+        if (s_msg == 2)
+            SSL_set_msg_callback(con, SSL_trace);
+        else
+#endif
+            SSL_set_msg_callback(con, msg_cb);
+        SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(con, bio_s_msg ? bio_s_msg : bio_s_out);
+    }
+
+    for (;;) {
+        i = BIO_gets(io, buf, bufsize - 1);
+        if (i < 0) {            /* error */
+            if (!BIO_should_retry(io) && !SSL_waiting_for_async(con)) {
+                if (!s_quiet)
+                    ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+                goto err;
+            } else {
+                BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "read R BLOCK\n");
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+                if (BIO_should_io_special(io)
+                    && BIO_get_retry_reason(io) == BIO_RR_SSL_X509_LOOKUP) {
+                    BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP renego during read\n");
+                    SRP_user_pwd_free(srp_callback_parm.user);
+                    srp_callback_parm.user =
+                        SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb,
+                                               srp_callback_parm.login);
+                    if (srp_callback_parm.user)
+                        BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP done %s\n",
+                                   srp_callback_parm.user->info);
+                    else
+                        BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP not successful\n");
+                    continue;
+                }
+#endif
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS)
+                sleep(1);
+#endif
+                continue;
+            }
+        } else if (i == 0) {    /* end of input */
+            ret = 1;
+            goto end;
+        }
+
+        /* else we have data */
+        if (((www == 1) && (strncmp("GET ", buf, 4) == 0)) ||
+            ((www == 2) && (strncmp("GET /stats ", buf, 11) == 0))) {
+            char *p;
+            X509 *peer = NULL;
+            STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
+            static const char *space = "                          ";
+
+            if (www == 1 && strncmp("GET /reneg", buf, 10) == 0) {
+                if (strncmp("GET /renegcert", buf, 14) == 0)
+                    SSL_set_verify(con,
+                                   SSL_VERIFY_PEER | SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE,
+                                   NULL);
+                i = SSL_renegotiate(con);
+                BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "SSL_renegotiate -> %d\n", i);
+                /* Send the HelloRequest */
+                i = SSL_do_handshake(con);
+                if (i <= 0) {
+                    BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "SSL_do_handshake() Retval %d\n",
+                               SSL_get_error(con, i));
+                    ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+                    goto err;
+                }
+                /* Wait for a ClientHello to come back */
+                FD_ZERO(&readfds);
+                openssl_fdset(s, &readfds);
+                i = select(width, (void *)&readfds, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+                if (i <= 0 || !FD_ISSET(s, &readfds)) {
+                    BIO_printf(bio_s_out,
+                               "Error waiting for client response\n");
+                    ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+                    goto err;
+                }
+                /*
+                 * We're not actually expecting any data here and we ignore
+                 * any that is sent. This is just to force the handshake that
+                 * we're expecting to come from the client. If they haven't
+                 * sent one there's not much we can do.
+                 */
+                BIO_gets(io, buf, bufsize - 1);
+            }
+
+            BIO_puts(io,
+                     "HTTP/1.0 200 ok\r\nContent-type: text/html\r\n\r\n");
+            BIO_puts(io, "<HTML><BODY BGCOLOR=\"#ffffff\">\n");
+            BIO_puts(io, "<pre>\n");
+            /* BIO_puts(io, OpenSSL_version(OPENSSL_VERSION)); */
+            BIO_puts(io, "\n");
+            for (i = 0; i < local_argc; i++) {
+                const char *myp;
+                for (myp = local_argv[i]; *myp; myp++)
+                    switch (*myp) {
+                    case '<':
+                        BIO_puts(io, "&lt;");
+                        break;
+                    case '>':
+                        BIO_puts(io, "&gt;");
+                        break;
+                    case '&':
+                        BIO_puts(io, "&amp;");
+                        break;
+                    default:
+                        BIO_write(io, myp, 1);
+                        break;
+                    }
+                BIO_write(io, " ", 1);
+            }
+            BIO_puts(io, "\n");
+
+            BIO_printf(io,
+                       "Secure Renegotiation IS%s supported\n",
+                       SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support(con) ?
+                       "" : " NOT");
+
+            /*
+             * The following is evil and should not really be done
+             */
+            BIO_printf(io, "Ciphers supported in s_server binary\n");
+            sk = SSL_get_ciphers(con);
+            j = sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk);
+            for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
+                c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
+                BIO_printf(io, "%-11s:%-25s ",
+                           SSL_CIPHER_get_version(c), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
+                if ((((i + 1) % 2) == 0) && (i + 1 != j))
+                    BIO_puts(io, "\n");
+            }
+            BIO_puts(io, "\n");
+            p = SSL_get_shared_ciphers(con, buf, bufsize);
+            if (p != NULL) {
+                BIO_printf(io,
+                           "---\nCiphers common between both SSL end points:\n");
+                j = i = 0;
+                while (*p) {
+                    if (*p == ':') {
+                        BIO_write(io, space, 26 - j);
+                        i++;
+                        j = 0;
+                        BIO_write(io, ((i % 3) ? " " : "\n"), 1);
+                    } else {
+                        BIO_write(io, p, 1);
+                        j++;
+                    }
+                    p++;
+                }
+                BIO_puts(io, "\n");
+            }
+            ssl_print_sigalgs(io, con);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+            ssl_print_curves(io, con, 0);
+#endif
+            BIO_printf(io, (SSL_session_reused(con)
+                            ? "---\nReused, " : "---\nNew, "));
+            c = SSL_get_current_cipher(con);
+            BIO_printf(io, "%s, Cipher is %s\n",
+                       SSL_CIPHER_get_version(c), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
+            SSL_SESSION_print(io, SSL_get_session(con));
+            BIO_printf(io, "---\n");
+            print_stats(io, SSL_get_SSL_CTX(con));
+            BIO_printf(io, "---\n");
+            peer = SSL_get_peer_certificate(con);
+            if (peer != NULL) {
+                BIO_printf(io, "Client certificate\n");
+                X509_print(io, peer);
+                PEM_write_bio_X509(io, peer);
+                X509_free(peer);
+                peer = NULL;
+            } else {
+                BIO_puts(io, "no client certificate available\n");
+            }
+            BIO_puts(io, "</pre></BODY></HTML>\r\n\r\n");
+            break;
+        } else if ((www == 2 || www == 3)
+                   && (strncmp("GET /", buf, 5) == 0)) {
+            BIO *file;
+            char *p, *e;
+            static const char *text =
+                "HTTP/1.0 200 ok\r\nContent-type: text/plain\r\n\r\n";
+
+            /* skip the '/' */
+            p = &(buf[5]);
+
+            dot = 1;
+            for (e = p; *e != '\0'; e++) {
+                if (e[0] == ' ')
+                    break;
+
+                switch (dot) {
+                case 1:
+                    dot = (e[0] == '.') ? 2 : 0;
+                    break;
+                case 2:
+                    dot = (e[0] == '.') ? 3 : 0;
+                    break;
+                case 3:
+                    dot = (e[0] == '/') ? -1 : 0;
+                    break;
+                }
+                if (dot == 0)
+                    dot = (e[0] == '/') ? 1 : 0;
+            }
+            dot = (dot == 3) || (dot == -1); /* filename contains ".."
+                                              * component */
+
+            if (*e == '\0') {
+                BIO_puts(io, text);
+                BIO_printf(io, "'%s' is an invalid file name\r\n", p);
+                break;
+            }
+            *e = '\0';
+
+            if (dot) {
+                BIO_puts(io, text);
+                BIO_printf(io, "'%s' contains '..' reference\r\n", p);
+                break;
+            }
+
+            if (*p == '/') {
+                BIO_puts(io, text);
+                BIO_printf(io, "'%s' is an invalid path\r\n", p);
+                break;
+            }
+
+            /* if a directory, do the index thang */
+            if (app_isdir(p) > 0) {
+                BIO_puts(io, text);
+                BIO_printf(io, "'%s' is a directory\r\n", p);
+                break;
+            }
+
+            if ((file = BIO_new_file(p, "r")) == NULL) {
+                BIO_puts(io, text);
+                BIO_printf(io, "Error opening '%s'\r\n", p);
+                ERR_print_errors(io);
+                break;
+            }
+
+            if (!s_quiet)
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "FILE:%s\n", p);
+
+            if (www == 2) {
+                i = strlen(p);
+                if (((i > 5) && (strcmp(&(p[i - 5]), ".html") == 0)) ||
+                    ((i > 4) && (strcmp(&(p[i - 4]), ".php") == 0)) ||
+                    ((i > 4) && (strcmp(&(p[i - 4]), ".htm") == 0)))
+                    BIO_puts(io,
+                             "HTTP/1.0 200 ok\r\nContent-type: text/html\r\n\r\n");
+                else
+                    BIO_puts(io,
+                             "HTTP/1.0 200 ok\r\nContent-type: text/plain\r\n\r\n");
+            }
+            /* send the file */
+            for (;;) {
+                i = BIO_read(file, buf, bufsize);
+                if (i <= 0)
+                    break;
+
+#ifdef RENEG
+                total_bytes += i;
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "%d\n", i);
+                if (total_bytes > 3 * 1024) {
+                    total_bytes = 0;
+                    BIO_printf(bio_err, "RENEGOTIATE\n");
+                    SSL_renegotiate(con);
+                }
+#endif
+
+                for (j = 0; j < i;) {
+#ifdef RENEG
+                    static count = 0;
+                    if (++count == 13) {
+                        SSL_renegotiate(con);
+                    }
+#endif
+                    k = BIO_write(io, &(buf[j]), i - j);
+                    if (k <= 0) {
+                        if (!BIO_should_retry(io)
+                            && !SSL_waiting_for_async(con))
+                            goto write_error;
+                        else {
+                            BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "rwrite W BLOCK\n");
+                        }
+                    } else {
+                        j += k;
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+ write_error:
+            BIO_free(file);
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+
+    for (;;) {
+        i = (int)BIO_flush(io);
+        if (i <= 0) {
+            if (!BIO_should_retry(io))
+                break;
+        } else
+            break;
+    }
+ end:
+    /* make sure we re-use sessions */
+    SSL_set_shutdown(con, SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN | SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN);
+
+ err:
+    if (ret >= 0)
+        BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "ACCEPT\n");
+    OPENSSL_free(buf);
+    BIO_free_all(io);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static int rev_body(int s, int stype, unsigned char *context)
+{
+    char *buf = NULL;
+    int i;
+    int ret = 1;
+    SSL *con;
+    BIO *io, *ssl_bio, *sbio;
+
+    buf = app_malloc(bufsize, "server rev buffer");
+    io = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer());
+    ssl_bio = BIO_new(BIO_f_ssl());
+    if ((io == NULL) || (ssl_bio == NULL))
+        goto err;
+
+    /* lets make the output buffer a reasonable size */
+    if (!BIO_set_write_buffer_size(io, bufsize))
+        goto err;
+
+    if ((con = SSL_new(ctx)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (s_tlsextdebug) {
+        SSL_set_tlsext_debug_callback(con, tlsext_cb);
+        SSL_set_tlsext_debug_arg(con, bio_s_out);
+    }
+    if (context
+        && !SSL_set_session_id_context(con, context,
+                                       strlen((char *)context))) {
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    sbio = BIO_new_socket(s, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+    SSL_set_bio(con, sbio, sbio);
+    SSL_set_accept_state(con);
+
+    BIO_set_ssl(ssl_bio, con, BIO_CLOSE);
+    BIO_push(io, ssl_bio);
+#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+    io = BIO_push(BIO_new(BIO_f_ebcdic_filter()), io);
+#endif
+
+    if (s_debug) {
+        BIO_set_callback(SSL_get_rbio(con), bio_dump_callback);
+        BIO_set_callback_arg(SSL_get_rbio(con), (char *)bio_s_out);
+    }
+    if (s_msg) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE
+        if (s_msg == 2)
+            SSL_set_msg_callback(con, SSL_trace);
+        else
+#endif
+            SSL_set_msg_callback(con, msg_cb);
+        SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(con, bio_s_msg ? bio_s_msg : bio_s_out);
+    }
+
+    for (;;) {
+        i = BIO_do_handshake(io);
+        if (i > 0)
+            break;
+        if (!BIO_should_retry(io)) {
+            BIO_puts(bio_err, "CONNECTION FAILURE\n");
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            goto end;
+        }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+        if (BIO_should_io_special(io)
+            && BIO_get_retry_reason(io) == BIO_RR_SSL_X509_LOOKUP) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP renego during accept\n");
+            SRP_user_pwd_free(srp_callback_parm.user);
+            srp_callback_parm.user =
+                SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb,
+                                       srp_callback_parm.login);
+            if (srp_callback_parm.user)
+                BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP done %s\n",
+                           srp_callback_parm.user->info);
+            else
+                BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP not successful\n");
+            continue;
+        }
+#endif
+    }
+    BIO_printf(bio_err, "CONNECTION ESTABLISHED\n");
+    print_ssl_summary(con);
+
+    for (;;) {
+        i = BIO_gets(io, buf, bufsize - 1);
+        if (i < 0) {            /* error */
+            if (!BIO_should_retry(io)) {
+                if (!s_quiet)
+                    ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+                goto err;
+            } else {
+                BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "read R BLOCK\n");
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+                if (BIO_should_io_special(io)
+                    && BIO_get_retry_reason(io) == BIO_RR_SSL_X509_LOOKUP) {
+                    BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP renego during read\n");
+                    SRP_user_pwd_free(srp_callback_parm.user);
+                    srp_callback_parm.user =
+                        SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb,
+                                               srp_callback_parm.login);
+                    if (srp_callback_parm.user)
+                        BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP done %s\n",
+                                   srp_callback_parm.user->info);
+                    else
+                        BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP not successful\n");
+                    continue;
+                }
+#endif
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS)
+                sleep(1);
+#endif
+                continue;
+            }
+        } else if (i == 0) {    /* end of input */
+            ret = 1;
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "CONNECTION CLOSED\n");
+            goto end;
+        } else {
+            char *p = buf + i - 1;
+            while (i && (*p == '\n' || *p == '\r')) {
+                p--;
+                i--;
+            }
+            if (!s_ign_eof && (i == 5) && (strncmp(buf, "CLOSE", 5) == 0)) {
+                ret = 1;
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "CONNECTION CLOSED\n");
+                goto end;
+            }
+            BUF_reverse((unsigned char *)buf, NULL, i);
+            buf[i] = '\n';
+            BIO_write(io, buf, i + 1);
+            for (;;) {
+                i = BIO_flush(io);
+                if (i > 0)
+                    break;
+                if (!BIO_should_retry(io))
+                    goto end;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+ end:
+    /* make sure we re-use sessions */
+    SSL_set_shutdown(con, SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN | SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN);
+
+ err:
+
+    OPENSSL_free(buf);
+    BIO_free_all(io);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+#define MAX_SESSION_ID_ATTEMPTS 10
+static int generate_session_id(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *id,
+                               unsigned int *id_len)
+{
+    unsigned int count = 0;
+    do {
+        if (RAND_bytes(id, *id_len) <= 0)
+            return 0;
+        /*
+         * Prefix the session_id with the required prefix. NB: If our prefix
+         * is too long, clip it - but there will be worse effects anyway, eg.
+         * the server could only possibly create 1 session ID (ie. the
+         * prefix!) so all future session negotiations will fail due to
+         * conflicts.
+         */
+        memcpy(id, session_id_prefix,
+               (strlen(session_id_prefix) < *id_len) ?
+               strlen(session_id_prefix) : *id_len);
+    }
+    while (SSL_has_matching_session_id(ssl, id, *id_len) &&
+           (++count < MAX_SESSION_ID_ATTEMPTS));
+    if (count >= MAX_SESSION_ID_ATTEMPTS)
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * By default s_server uses an in-memory cache which caches SSL_SESSION
+ * structures without any serialisation. This hides some bugs which only
+ * become apparent in deployed servers. By implementing a basic external
+ * session cache some issues can be debugged using s_server.
+ */
+
+typedef struct simple_ssl_session_st {
+    unsigned char *id;
+    unsigned int idlen;
+    unsigned char *der;
+    int derlen;
+    struct simple_ssl_session_st *next;
+} simple_ssl_session;
+
+static simple_ssl_session *first = NULL;
+
+static int add_session(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *session)
+{
+    simple_ssl_session *sess = app_malloc(sizeof(*sess), "get session");
+    unsigned char *p;
+
+    SSL_SESSION_get_id(session, &sess->idlen);
+    sess->derlen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(session, NULL);
+    if (sess->derlen < 0) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error encoding session\n");
+        OPENSSL_free(sess);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    sess->id = OPENSSL_memdup(SSL_SESSION_get_id(session, NULL), sess->idlen);
+    sess->der = app_malloc(sess->derlen, "get session buffer");
+    if (!sess->id) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory adding to external cache\n");
+        OPENSSL_free(sess->id);
+        OPENSSL_free(sess->der);
+        OPENSSL_free(sess);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    p = sess->der;
+
+    /* Assume it still works. */
+    if (i2d_SSL_SESSION(session, &p) != sess->derlen) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Unexpected session encoding length\n");
+        OPENSSL_free(sess->id);
+        OPENSSL_free(sess->der);
+        OPENSSL_free(sess);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    sess->next = first;
+    first = sess;
+    BIO_printf(bio_err, "New session added to external cache\n");
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static SSL_SESSION *get_session(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *id, int idlen,
+                                int *do_copy)
+{
+    simple_ssl_session *sess;
+    *do_copy = 0;
+    for (sess = first; sess; sess = sess->next) {
+        if (idlen == (int)sess->idlen && !memcmp(sess->id, id, idlen)) {
+            const unsigned char *p = sess->der;
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Lookup session: cache hit\n");
+            return d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, sess->derlen);
+        }
+    }
+    BIO_printf(bio_err, "Lookup session: cache miss\n");
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+static void del_session(SSL_CTX *sctx, SSL_SESSION *session)
+{
+    simple_ssl_session *sess, *prev = NULL;
+    const unsigned char *id;
+    unsigned int idlen;
+    id = SSL_SESSION_get_id(session, &idlen);
+    for (sess = first; sess; sess = sess->next) {
+        if (idlen == sess->idlen && !memcmp(sess->id, id, idlen)) {
+            if (prev)
+                prev->next = sess->next;
+            else
+                first = sess->next;
+            OPENSSL_free(sess->id);
+            OPENSSL_free(sess->der);
+            OPENSSL_free(sess);
+            return;
+        }
+        prev = sess;
+    }
+}
+
+static void init_session_cache_ctx(SSL_CTX *sctx)
+{
+    SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(sctx,
+                                   SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL |
+                                   SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
+    SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(sctx, add_session);
+    SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(sctx, get_session);
+    SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb(sctx, del_session);
+}
+
+static void free_sessions(void)
+{
+    simple_ssl_session *sess, *tsess;
+    for (sess = first; sess;) {
+        OPENSSL_free(sess->id);
+        OPENSSL_free(sess->der);
+        tsess = sess;
+        sess = sess->next;
+        OPENSSL_free(tsess);
+    }
+    first = NULL;
+}
+
+#endif                          /* OPENSSL_NO_SOCK */
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/s_socket.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/s_socket.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..458aa86
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/s_socket.c
@@ -0,0 +1,250 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* socket-related functions used by s_client and s_server */
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+
+/*
+ * With IPv6, it looks like Digital has mixed up the proper order of
+ * recursive header file inclusion, resulting in the compiler complaining
+ * that u_int isn't defined, but only if _POSIX_C_SOURCE is defined, which is
+ * needed to have fileno() declared correctly...  So let's define u_int
+ */
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS_DECC) && !defined(__U_INT)
+# define __U_INT
+typedef unsigned int u_int;
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
+
+# define USE_SOCKETS
+# include "apps.h"
+# undef USE_SOCKETS
+# include "s_apps.h"
+
+# include <openssl/bio.h>
+# include <openssl/err.h>
+
+/*
+ * init_client - helper routine to set up socket communication
+ * @sock: pointer to storage of resulting socket.
+ * @host: the host name or path (for AF_UNIX) to connect to.
+ * @port: the port to connect to (ignored for AF_UNIX).
+ * @family: desired socket family, may be AF_INET, AF_INET6, AF_UNIX or
+ *  AF_UNSPEC
+ * @type: socket type, must be SOCK_STREAM or SOCK_DGRAM
+ *
+ * This will create a socket and use it to connect to a host:port, or if
+ * family == AF_UNIX, to the path found in host.
+ *
+ * If the host has more than one address, it will try them one by one until
+ * a successful connection is established.  The resulting socket will be
+ * found in *sock on success, it will be given INVALID_SOCKET otherwise.
+ *
+ * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
+ */
+int init_client(int *sock, const char *host, const char *port,
+                int family, int type)
+{
+    BIO_ADDRINFO *res = NULL;
+    const BIO_ADDRINFO *ai = NULL;
+    int ret;
+
+    if (!BIO_sock_init())
+        return 0;
+
+    ret = BIO_lookup(host, port, BIO_LOOKUP_CLIENT, family, type, &res);
+    if (ret == 0) {
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    ret = 0;
+    for (ai = res; ai != NULL; ai = BIO_ADDRINFO_next(ai)) {
+        /* Admittedly, these checks are quite paranoid, we should not get
+         * anything in the BIO_ADDRINFO chain that we haven't
+         * asked for. */
+        OPENSSL_assert((family == AF_UNSPEC
+                        || family == BIO_ADDRINFO_family(ai))
+                       && (type == 0 || type == BIO_ADDRINFO_socktype(ai)));
+
+        *sock = BIO_socket(BIO_ADDRINFO_family(ai), BIO_ADDRINFO_socktype(ai),
+                           BIO_ADDRINFO_protocol(ai), 0);
+        if (*sock == INVALID_SOCKET) {
+            /* Maybe the kernel doesn't support the socket family, even if
+             * BIO_lookup() added it in the returned result...
+             */
+            continue;
+        }
+        if (!BIO_connect(*sock, BIO_ADDRINFO_address(ai), 0)) {
+            BIO_closesocket(*sock);
+            *sock = INVALID_SOCKET;
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        /* Success, don't try any more addresses */
+        break;
+    }
+
+    if (*sock == INVALID_SOCKET) {
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+    } else {
+        /* Remove any stale errors from previous connection attempts */
+        ERR_clear_error();
+        ret = 1;
+    }
+    BIO_ADDRINFO_free(res);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * do_server - helper routine to perform a server operation
+ * @accept_sock: pointer to storage of resulting socket.
+ * @host: the host name or path (for AF_UNIX) to connect to.
+ * @port: the port to connect to (ignored for AF_UNIX).
+ * @family: desired socket family, may be AF_INET, AF_INET6, AF_UNIX or
+ *  AF_UNSPEC
+ * @type: socket type, must be SOCK_STREAM or SOCK_DGRAM
+ * @cb: pointer to a function that receives the accepted socket and
+ *  should perform the communication with the connecting client.
+ * @context: pointer to memory that's passed verbatim to the cb function.
+ * @naccept: number of times an incoming connect should be accepted.  If -1,
+ *  unlimited number.
+ *
+ * This will create a socket and use it to listen to a host:port, or if
+ * family == AF_UNIX, to the path found in host, then start accepting
+ * incoming connections and run cb on the resulting socket.
+ *
+ * 0 on failure, something other on success.
+ */
+int do_server(int *accept_sock, const char *host, const char *port,
+              int family, int type, do_server_cb cb,
+              unsigned char *context, int naccept)
+{
+    int asock = 0;
+    int sock;
+    int i;
+    BIO_ADDRINFO *res = NULL;
+    const BIO_ADDRINFO *next;
+    int sock_family, sock_type, sock_protocol;
+    const BIO_ADDR *sock_address;
+    int sock_options = BIO_SOCK_REUSEADDR;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    if (!BIO_sock_init())
+        return 0;
+
+    if (!BIO_lookup(host, port, BIO_LOOKUP_SERVER, family, type, &res)) {
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* Admittedly, these checks are quite paranoid, we should not get
+     * anything in the BIO_ADDRINFO chain that we haven't asked for */
+    OPENSSL_assert((family == AF_UNSPEC || family == BIO_ADDRINFO_family(res))
+                   && (type == 0 || type == BIO_ADDRINFO_socktype(res)));
+
+    sock_family = BIO_ADDRINFO_family(res);
+    sock_type = BIO_ADDRINFO_socktype(res);
+    sock_protocol = BIO_ADDRINFO_protocol(res);
+    sock_address = BIO_ADDRINFO_address(res);
+    next = BIO_ADDRINFO_next(res);
+    if (sock_family == AF_INET6)
+        sock_options |= BIO_SOCK_V6_ONLY;
+    if (next != NULL
+            && BIO_ADDRINFO_socktype(next) == sock_type
+            && BIO_ADDRINFO_protocol(next) == sock_protocol) {
+        if (sock_family == AF_INET
+                && BIO_ADDRINFO_family(next) == AF_INET6) {
+            sock_family = AF_INET6;
+            sock_address = BIO_ADDRINFO_address(next);
+        } else if (sock_family == AF_INET6
+                   && BIO_ADDRINFO_family(next) == AF_INET) {
+            sock_options &= ~BIO_SOCK_V6_ONLY;
+        }
+    }
+
+    asock = BIO_socket(sock_family, sock_type, sock_protocol, 0);
+    if (asock == INVALID_SOCKET
+        || !BIO_listen(asock, sock_address, sock_options)) {
+        BIO_ADDRINFO_free(res);
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        if (asock != INVALID_SOCKET)
+            BIO_closesocket(asock);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    BIO_ADDRINFO_free(res);
+    res = NULL;
+
+    if (accept_sock != NULL)
+        *accept_sock = asock;
+    for (;;) {
+        if (type == SOCK_STREAM) {
+            do {
+                sock = BIO_accept_ex(asock, NULL, 0);
+            } while (sock < 0 && BIO_sock_should_retry(sock));
+            if (sock < 0) {
+                ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+                BIO_closesocket(asock);
+                break;
+            }
+            i = (*cb)(sock, type, context);
+
+            /*
+             * Give the socket time to send its last data before we close it.
+             * No amount of setting SO_LINGER etc on the socket seems to
+             * persuade Windows to send the data before closing the socket...
+             * but sleeping for a short time seems to do it (units in ms)
+             * TODO: Find a better way to do this
+             */
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS)
+            Sleep(50);
+#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_CYGWIN)
+            usleep(50000);
+#endif
+
+            /*
+             * If we ended with an alert being sent, but still with data in the
+             * network buffer to be read, then calling BIO_closesocket() will
+             * result in a TCP-RST being sent. On some platforms (notably
+             * Windows) then this will result in the peer immediately abandoning
+             * the connection including any buffered alert data before it has
+             * had a chance to be read. Shutting down the sending side first,
+             * and then closing the socket sends TCP-FIN first followed by
+             * TCP-RST. This seems to allow the peer to read the alert data.
+             */
+            shutdown(sock, 1); /* SHUT_WR */
+            BIO_closesocket(sock);
+        } else {
+            i = (*cb)(asock, type, context);
+        }
+
+        if (naccept != -1)
+            naccept--;
+        if (i < 0 || naccept == 0) {
+            BIO_closesocket(asock);
+            ret = i;
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+ end:
+# ifdef AF_UNIX
+    if (family == AF_UNIX)
+        unlink(host);
+# endif
+    return ret;
+}
+
+#endif  /* OPENSSL_NO_SOCK */
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/s_time.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/s_time.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dc0ec4a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/s_time.c
@@ -0,0 +1,385 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
+
+#define USE_SOCKETS
+#include "apps.h"
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include "s_apps.h"
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS)
+# include OPENSSL_UNISTD
+#endif
+
+#define SSL_CONNECT_NAME        "localhost:4433"
+
+#define SECONDS 30
+#define SECONDSSTR "30"
+
+static SSL *doConnection(SSL *scon, const char *host, SSL_CTX *ctx);
+
+static const char fmt_http_get_cmd[] = "GET %s HTTP/1.0\r\n\r\n";
+
+typedef enum OPTION_choice {
+    OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP,
+    OPT_CONNECT, OPT_CIPHER, OPT_CERT, OPT_KEY, OPT_CAPATH,
+    OPT_CAFILE, OPT_NOCAPATH, OPT_NOCAFILE, OPT_NEW, OPT_REUSE, OPT_BUGS,
+    OPT_VERIFY, OPT_TIME, OPT_SSL3,
+    OPT_WWW
+} OPTION_CHOICE;
+
+OPTIONS s_time_options[] = {
+    {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"},
+    {"connect", OPT_CONNECT, 's',
+     "Where to connect as post:port (default is " SSL_CONNECT_NAME ")"},
+    {"cipher", OPT_CIPHER, 's', "Cipher to use, see 'openssl ciphers'"},
+    {"cert", OPT_CERT, '<', "Cert file to use, PEM format assumed"},
+    {"key", OPT_KEY, '<', "File with key, PEM; default is -cert file"},
+    {"CApath", OPT_CAPATH, '/', "PEM format directory of CA's"},
+    {"cafile", OPT_CAFILE, '<', "PEM format file of CA's"},
+    {"no-CAfile", OPT_NOCAFILE, '-',
+     "Do not load the default certificates file"},
+    {"no-CApath", OPT_NOCAPATH, '-',
+     "Do not load certificates from the default certificates directory"},
+    {"new", OPT_NEW, '-', "Just time new connections"},
+    {"reuse", OPT_REUSE, '-', "Just time connection reuse"},
+    {"bugs", OPT_BUGS, '-', "Turn on SSL bug compatibility"},
+    {"verify", OPT_VERIFY, 'p',
+     "Turn on peer certificate verification, set depth"},
+    {"time", OPT_TIME, 'p', "Seconds to collect data, default " SECONDSSTR},
+    {"www", OPT_WWW, 's', "Fetch specified page from the site"},
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
+    {"ssl3", OPT_SSL3, '-', "Just use SSLv3"},
+#endif
+    {NULL}
+};
+
+#define START   0
+#define STOP    1
+
+static double tm_Time_F(int s)
+{
+    return app_tminterval(s, 1);
+}
+
+int s_time_main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    char buf[1024 * 8];
+    SSL *scon = NULL;
+    SSL_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+    const SSL_METHOD *meth = NULL;
+    char *CApath = NULL, *CAfile = NULL, *cipher = NULL, *www_path = NULL;
+    char *host = SSL_CONNECT_NAME, *certfile = NULL, *keyfile = NULL, *prog;
+    double totalTime = 0.0;
+    int noCApath = 0, noCAfile = 0;
+    int maxtime = SECONDS, nConn = 0, perform = 3, ret = 1, i, st_bugs = 0;
+    long bytes_read = 0, finishtime = 0;
+    OPTION_CHOICE o;
+    int max_version = 0, ver, buf_len;
+    size_t buf_size;
+
+    meth = TLS_client_method();
+
+    prog = opt_init(argc, argv, s_time_options);
+    while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) {
+        switch (o) {
+        case OPT_EOF:
+        case OPT_ERR:
+ opthelp:
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog);
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_HELP:
+            opt_help(s_time_options);
+            ret = 0;
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_CONNECT:
+            host = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_REUSE:
+            perform = 2;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NEW:
+            perform = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_VERIFY:
+            if (!opt_int(opt_arg(), &verify_args.depth))
+                goto opthelp;
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: verify depth is %d\n",
+                       prog, verify_args.depth);
+            break;
+        case OPT_CERT:
+            certfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_KEY:
+            keyfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_CAPATH:
+            CApath = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_CAFILE:
+            CAfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_NOCAPATH:
+            noCApath = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NOCAFILE:
+            noCAfile = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_CIPHER:
+            cipher = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_BUGS:
+            st_bugs = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_TIME:
+            if (!opt_int(opt_arg(), &maxtime))
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_WWW:
+            www_path = opt_arg();
+            buf_size = strlen(www_path) + sizeof(fmt_http_get_cmd) - 2;  /* 2 is for %s */
+            if (buf_size > sizeof(buf)) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: -www option is too long\n", prog);
+                goto end;
+            }
+            break;
+        case OPT_SSL3:
+            max_version = SSL3_VERSION;
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    argc = opt_num_rest();
+    if (argc != 0)
+        goto opthelp;
+
+    if (cipher == NULL)
+        cipher = getenv("SSL_CIPHER");
+    if (cipher == NULL)
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "No CIPHER specified\n");
+
+    if ((ctx = SSL_CTX_new(meth)) == NULL)
+        goto end;
+
+    SSL_CTX_set_mode(ctx, SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY);
+    SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(ctx, 1);
+    if (SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(ctx, max_version) == 0)
+        goto end;
+
+    if (st_bugs)
+        SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, SSL_OP_ALL);
+    if (cipher != NULL && !SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(ctx, cipher))
+        goto end;
+    if (!set_cert_stuff(ctx, certfile, keyfile))
+        goto end;
+
+    if (!ctx_set_verify_locations(ctx, CAfile, CApath, noCAfile, noCApath)) {
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        goto end;
+    }
+    if (!(perform & 1))
+        goto next;
+    printf("Collecting connection statistics for %d seconds\n", maxtime);
+
+    /* Loop and time how long it takes to make connections */
+
+    bytes_read = 0;
+    finishtime = (long)time(NULL) + maxtime;
+    tm_Time_F(START);
+    for (;;) {
+        if (finishtime < (long)time(NULL))
+            break;
+
+        if ((scon = doConnection(NULL, host, ctx)) == NULL)
+            goto end;
+
+        if (www_path != NULL) {
+            buf_len = BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
+                                   fmt_http_get_cmd, www_path);
+            if (SSL_write(scon, buf, buf_len) <= 0)
+                goto end;
+            while ((i = SSL_read(scon, buf, sizeof(buf))) > 0)
+                bytes_read += i;
+        }
+        SSL_set_shutdown(scon, SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN | SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN);
+        BIO_closesocket(SSL_get_fd(scon));
+
+        nConn += 1;
+        if (SSL_session_reused(scon))
+            ver = 'r';
+        else {
+            ver = SSL_version(scon);
+            if (ver == TLS1_VERSION)
+                ver = 't';
+            else if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
+                ver = '3';
+            else
+                ver = '*';
+        }
+        fputc(ver, stdout);
+        fflush(stdout);
+
+        SSL_free(scon);
+        scon = NULL;
+    }
+    totalTime += tm_Time_F(STOP); /* Add the time for this iteration */
+
+    i = (int)((long)time(NULL) - finishtime + maxtime);
+    printf
+        ("\n\n%d connections in %.2fs; %.2f connections/user sec, bytes read %ld\n",
+         nConn, totalTime, ((double)nConn / totalTime), bytes_read);
+    printf
+        ("%d connections in %ld real seconds, %ld bytes read per connection\n",
+         nConn, (long)time(NULL) - finishtime + maxtime, bytes_read / nConn);
+
+    /*
+     * Now loop and time connections using the same session id over and over
+     */
+
+ next:
+    if (!(perform & 2))
+        goto end;
+    printf("\n\nNow timing with session id reuse.\n");
+
+    /* Get an SSL object so we can reuse the session id */
+    if ((scon = doConnection(NULL, host, ctx)) == NULL) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Unable to get connection\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (www_path != NULL) {
+        buf_len = BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
+                               fmt_http_get_cmd, www_path);
+        if (SSL_write(scon, buf, buf_len) <= 0)
+            goto end;
+        while ((i = SSL_read(scon, buf, sizeof(buf))) > 0)
+            continue;
+    }
+    SSL_set_shutdown(scon, SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN | SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN);
+    BIO_closesocket(SSL_get_fd(scon));
+
+    nConn = 0;
+    totalTime = 0.0;
+
+    finishtime = (long)time(NULL) + maxtime;
+
+    printf("starting\n");
+    bytes_read = 0;
+    tm_Time_F(START);
+
+    for (;;) {
+        if (finishtime < (long)time(NULL))
+            break;
+
+        if ((doConnection(scon, host, ctx)) == NULL)
+            goto end;
+
+        if (www_path) {
+            BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "GET %s HTTP/1.0\r\n\r\n",
+                         www_path);
+            if (SSL_write(scon, buf, strlen(buf)) <= 0)
+                goto end;
+            while ((i = SSL_read(scon, buf, sizeof(buf))) > 0)
+                bytes_read += i;
+        }
+        SSL_set_shutdown(scon, SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN | SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN);
+        BIO_closesocket(SSL_get_fd(scon));
+
+        nConn += 1;
+        if (SSL_session_reused(scon))
+            ver = 'r';
+        else {
+            ver = SSL_version(scon);
+            if (ver == TLS1_VERSION)
+                ver = 't';
+            else if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
+                ver = '3';
+            else
+                ver = '*';
+        }
+        fputc(ver, stdout);
+        fflush(stdout);
+    }
+    totalTime += tm_Time_F(STOP); /* Add the time for this iteration */
+
+    printf
+        ("\n\n%d connections in %.2fs; %.2f connections/user sec, bytes read %ld\n",
+         nConn, totalTime, ((double)nConn / totalTime), bytes_read);
+    printf
+        ("%d connections in %ld real seconds, %ld bytes read per connection\n",
+         nConn, (long)time(NULL) - finishtime + maxtime, bytes_read / nConn);
+
+    ret = 0;
+
+ end:
+    SSL_free(scon);
+    SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+/*-
+ * doConnection - make a connection
+ */
+static SSL *doConnection(SSL *scon, const char *host, SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    BIO *conn;
+    SSL *serverCon;
+    int i;
+
+    if ((conn = BIO_new(BIO_s_connect())) == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+
+    BIO_set_conn_hostname(conn, host);
+    BIO_set_conn_mode(conn, BIO_SOCK_NODELAY);
+
+    if (scon == NULL)
+        serverCon = SSL_new(ctx);
+    else {
+        serverCon = scon;
+        SSL_set_connect_state(serverCon);
+    }
+
+    SSL_set_bio(serverCon, conn, conn);
+
+    /* ok, lets connect */
+    i = SSL_connect(serverCon);
+    if (i <= 0) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "ERROR\n");
+        if (verify_args.error != X509_V_OK)
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "verify error:%s\n",
+                       X509_verify_cert_error_string(verify_args.error));
+        else
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        if (scon == NULL)
+            SSL_free(serverCon);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+#if defined(SOL_SOCKET) && defined(SO_LINGER)
+    {
+        struct linger no_linger;
+
+        no_linger.l_onoff  = 1;
+        no_linger.l_linger = 0;
+        (void) setsockopt(SSL_get_fd(serverCon), SOL_SOCKET, SO_LINGER,
+                          (char*)&no_linger, sizeof(no_linger));
+    }
+#endif
+
+    return serverCon;
+}
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SOCK */
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/server.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/server.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d0fc265
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/server.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+subject= C = UK, O = OpenSSL Group, OU = FOR TESTING PURPOSES ONLY, CN = Test Server Cert
+issuer= C = UK, O = OpenSSL Group, OU = FOR TESTING PURPOSES ONLY, CN = OpenSSL Test Intermediate CA
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIIEpAIBAAKCAQEA84TzkjbcskbKZnrlKcXzSSgi07n+4N7kOM7uIhzpkTuU0HIv
+h4VZS2axxfV6hV3CD9MuKVg2zEhroqK1Js5n4ke230nSP/qiELfCl0R+hzRtbfKL
+tFUr1iHeU0uQ6v3q+Tg1K/Tmmg72uxKrhyHDL7z0BriPjhAHJ5XlQsvR1RCMkqzu
+D9wjSInJxpMMIgLndOclAKv4D1wQtYU7ZpTw+01XBlUhIiXb86qpYL9NqnnRq5JI
+uhmOEuxo2ca63+xaHNhD/udSyc8C0Md/yX6wlONTRFgLLv0pdLUGm1xEjfsydaQ6
+qGd7hzIKUI3hohNKJa/mHLElv7SZolPTogK/EQIDAQABAoIBAADq9FwNtuE5IRQn
+zGtO4q7Y5uCzZ8GDNYr9RKp+P2cbuWDbvVAecYq2NV9QoIiWJOAYZKklOvekIju3
+r0UZLA0PRiIrTg6NrESx3JrjWDK8QNlUO7CPTZ39/K+FrmMkV9lem9yxjJjyC34D
+AQB+YRTx+l14HppjdxNwHjAVQpIx/uO2F5xAMuk32+3K+pq9CZUtrofe1q4Agj9R
+5s8mSy9pbRo9kW9wl5xdEotz1LivFOEiqPUJTUq5J5PeMKao3vdK726XI4Z455Nm
+W2/MA0YV0ug2FYinHcZdvKM6dimH8GLfa3X8xKRfzjGjTiMSwsdjgMa4awY3tEHH
+674jhAECgYEA/zqMrc0zsbNk83sjgaYIug5kzEpN4ic020rSZsmQxSCerJTgNhmg
+utKSCt0Re09Jt3LqG48msahX8ycqDsHNvlEGPQSbMu9IYeO3Wr3fAm75GEtFWePY
+BhM73I7gkRt4s8bUiUepMG/wY45c5tRF23xi8foReHFFe9MDzh8fJFECgYEA9EFX
+4qAik1pOJGNei9BMwmx0I0gfVEIgu0tzeVqT45vcxbxr7RkTEaDoAG6PlbWP6D9a
+WQNLp4gsgRM90ZXOJ4up5DsAWDluvaF4/omabMA+MJJ5kGZ0gCj5rbZbKqUws7x8
+bp+6iBfUPJUbcqNqFmi/08Yt7vrDnMnyMw2A/sECgYEAiiuRMxnuzVm34hQcsbhH
+6ymVqf7j0PW2qK0F4H1ocT9qhzWFd+RB3kHWrCjnqODQoI6GbGr/4JepHUpre1ex
+4UEN5oSS3G0ru0rC3U4C59dZ5KwDHFm7ffZ1pr52ljfQDUsrjjIMRtuiwNK2OoRa
+WSsqiaL+SDzSB+nBmpnAizECgYBdt/y6rerWUx4MhDwwtTnel7JwHyo2MDFS6/5g
+n8qC2Lj6/fMDRE22w+CA2esp7EJNQJGv+b27iFpbJEDh+/Lf5YzIT4MwVskQ5bYB
+JFcmRxUVmf4e09D7o705U/DjCgMH09iCsbLmqQ38ONIRSHZaJtMDtNTHD1yi+jF+
+OT43gQKBgQC/2OHZoko6iRlNOAQ/tMVFNq7fL81GivoQ9F1U0Qr+DH3ZfaH8eIkX
+xT0ToMPJUzWAn8pZv0snA0um6SIgvkCuxO84OkANCVbttzXImIsL7pFzfcwV/ERK
+UM6j0ZuSMFOCr/lGPAoOQU0fskidGEHi1/kW+suSr28TqsyYZpwBDQ==
+-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/server.srl b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/server.srl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8a0f05e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/server.srl
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+01
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/server2.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/server2.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a3927cf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/server2.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+subject= C = UK, O = OpenSSL Group, OU = FOR TESTING PURPOSES ONLY, CN = Test Server Cert #2
+issuer= C = UK, O = OpenSSL Group, OU = FOR TESTING PURPOSES ONLY, CN = OpenSSL Test Intermediate CA
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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==
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/sess_id.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/sess_id.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2b63e69
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/sess_id.c
@@ -0,0 +1,190 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include "apps.h"
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+typedef enum OPTION_choice {
+    OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP,
+    OPT_INFORM, OPT_OUTFORM, OPT_IN, OPT_OUT,
+    OPT_TEXT, OPT_CERT, OPT_NOOUT, OPT_CONTEXT
+} OPTION_CHOICE;
+
+OPTIONS sess_id_options[] = {
+    {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"},
+    {"inform", OPT_INFORM, 'F', "Input format - default PEM (DER or PEM)"},
+    {"outform", OPT_OUTFORM, 'f',
+     "Output format - default PEM (PEM, DER or NSS)"},
+    {"in", OPT_IN, 's', "Input file - default stdin"},
+    {"out", OPT_OUT, 's', "Output file - default stdout"},
+    {"text", OPT_TEXT, '-', "Print ssl session id details"},
+    {"cert", OPT_CERT, '-', "Output certificate "},
+    {"noout", OPT_NOOUT, '-', "Don't output the encoded session info"},
+    {"context", OPT_CONTEXT, 's', "Set the session ID context"},
+    {NULL}
+};
+
+static SSL_SESSION *load_sess_id(char *file, int format);
+
+int sess_id_main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    SSL_SESSION *x = NULL;
+    X509 *peer = NULL;
+    BIO *out = NULL;
+    char *infile = NULL, *outfile = NULL, *context = NULL, *prog;
+    int informat = FORMAT_PEM, outformat = FORMAT_PEM;
+    int cert = 0, noout = 0, text = 0, ret = 1, i, num = 0;
+    OPTION_CHOICE o;
+
+    prog = opt_init(argc, argv, sess_id_options);
+    while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) {
+        switch (o) {
+        case OPT_EOF:
+        case OPT_ERR:
+ opthelp:
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog);
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_HELP:
+            opt_help(sess_id_options);
+            ret = 0;
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_INFORM:
+            if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PEMDER, &informat))
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_OUTFORM:
+            if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PEMDER | OPT_FMT_NSS,
+                            &outformat))
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_IN:
+            infile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_OUT:
+            outfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_TEXT:
+            text = ++num;
+            break;
+        case OPT_CERT:
+            cert = ++num;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NOOUT:
+            noout = ++num;
+            break;
+        case OPT_CONTEXT:
+            context = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    argc = opt_num_rest();
+    if (argc != 0)
+        goto opthelp;
+
+    x = load_sess_id(infile, informat);
+    if (x == NULL) {
+        goto end;
+    }
+    peer = SSL_SESSION_get0_peer(x);
+
+    if (context) {
+        size_t ctx_len = strlen(context);
+        if (ctx_len > SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Context too long\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+        if (!SSL_SESSION_set1_id_context(x, (unsigned char *)context,
+                    ctx_len)) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error setting id context\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (!noout || text) {
+        out = bio_open_default(outfile, 'w', outformat);
+        if (out == NULL)
+            goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (text) {
+        SSL_SESSION_print(out, x);
+
+        if (cert) {
+            if (peer == NULL)
+                BIO_puts(out, "No certificate present\n");
+            else
+                X509_print(out, peer);
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (!noout && !cert) {
+        if (outformat == FORMAT_ASN1)
+            i = i2d_SSL_SESSION_bio(out, x);
+        else if (outformat == FORMAT_PEM)
+            i = PEM_write_bio_SSL_SESSION(out, x);
+        else if (outformat == FORMAT_NSS)
+            i = SSL_SESSION_print_keylog(out, x);
+        else {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "bad output format specified for outfile\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+        if (!i) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to write SSL_SESSION\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+    } else if (!noout && (peer != NULL)) { /* just print the certificate */
+        if (outformat == FORMAT_ASN1)
+            i = (int)i2d_X509_bio(out, peer);
+        else if (outformat == FORMAT_PEM)
+            i = PEM_write_bio_X509(out, peer);
+        else {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "bad output format specified for outfile\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+        if (!i) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to write X509\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+    ret = 0;
+ end:
+    BIO_free_all(out);
+    SSL_SESSION_free(x);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static SSL_SESSION *load_sess_id(char *infile, int format)
+{
+    SSL_SESSION *x = NULL;
+    BIO *in = NULL;
+
+    in = bio_open_default(infile, 'r', format);
+    if (in == NULL)
+        goto end;
+    if (format == FORMAT_ASN1)
+        x = d2i_SSL_SESSION_bio(in, NULL);
+    else
+        x = PEM_read_bio_SSL_SESSION(in, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+    if (x == NULL) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to load SSL_SESSION\n");
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+ end:
+    BIO_free(in);
+    return (x);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/smime.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/smime.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e18d7de
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/smime.c
@@ -0,0 +1,656 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* S/MIME utility function */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include "apps.h"
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/x509_vfy.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+
+static int save_certs(char *signerfile, STACK_OF(X509) *signers);
+static int smime_cb(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+
+#define SMIME_OP        0x10
+#define SMIME_IP        0x20
+#define SMIME_SIGNERS   0x40
+#define SMIME_ENCRYPT   (1 | SMIME_OP)
+#define SMIME_DECRYPT   (2 | SMIME_IP)
+#define SMIME_SIGN      (3 | SMIME_OP | SMIME_SIGNERS)
+#define SMIME_VERIFY    (4 | SMIME_IP)
+#define SMIME_PK7OUT    (5 | SMIME_IP | SMIME_OP)
+#define SMIME_RESIGN    (6 | SMIME_IP | SMIME_OP | SMIME_SIGNERS)
+
+typedef enum OPTION_choice {
+    OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP,
+    OPT_ENCRYPT, OPT_DECRYPT, OPT_SIGN, OPT_RESIGN, OPT_VERIFY,
+    OPT_PK7OUT, OPT_TEXT, OPT_NOINTERN, OPT_NOVERIFY, OPT_NOCHAIN,
+    OPT_NOCERTS, OPT_NOATTR, OPT_NODETACH, OPT_NOSMIMECAP,
+    OPT_BINARY, OPT_NOSIGS, OPT_STREAM, OPT_INDEF, OPT_NOINDEF,
+    OPT_CRLFEOL, OPT_RAND, OPT_ENGINE, OPT_PASSIN,
+    OPT_TO, OPT_FROM, OPT_SUBJECT, OPT_SIGNER, OPT_RECIP, OPT_MD,
+    OPT_CIPHER, OPT_INKEY, OPT_KEYFORM, OPT_CERTFILE, OPT_CAFILE,
+    OPT_V_ENUM,
+    OPT_CAPATH, OPT_NOCAFILE, OPT_NOCAPATH, OPT_IN, OPT_INFORM, OPT_OUT,
+    OPT_OUTFORM, OPT_CONTENT
+} OPTION_CHOICE;
+
+OPTIONS smime_options[] = {
+    {OPT_HELP_STR, 1, '-', "Usage: %s [options] cert.pem...\n"},
+    {OPT_HELP_STR, 1, '-',
+        "  cert.pem... recipient certs for encryption\n"},
+    {OPT_HELP_STR, 1, '-', "Valid options are:\n"},
+    {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"},
+    {"encrypt", OPT_ENCRYPT, '-', "Encrypt message"},
+    {"decrypt", OPT_DECRYPT, '-', "Decrypt encrypted message"},
+    {"sign", OPT_SIGN, '-', "Sign message"},
+    {"verify", OPT_VERIFY, '-', "Verify signed message"},
+    {"pk7out", OPT_PK7OUT, '-', "Output PKCS#7 structure"},
+    {"nointern", OPT_NOINTERN, '-',
+     "Don't search certificates in message for signer"},
+    {"nosigs", OPT_NOSIGS, '-', "Don't verify message signature"},
+    {"noverify", OPT_NOVERIFY, '-', "Don't verify signers certificate"},
+    {"nocerts", OPT_NOCERTS, '-',
+     "Don't include signers certificate when signing"},
+    {"nodetach", OPT_NODETACH, '-', "Use opaque signing"},
+    {"noattr", OPT_NOATTR, '-', "Don't include any signed attributes"},
+    {"binary", OPT_BINARY, '-', "Don't translate message to text"},
+    {"certfile", OPT_CERTFILE, '<', "Other certificates file"},
+    {"signer", OPT_SIGNER, 's', "Signer certificate file"},
+    {"recip", OPT_RECIP, '<', "Recipient certificate file for decryption"},
+    {"in", OPT_IN, '<', "Input file"},
+    {"inform", OPT_INFORM, 'c', "Input format SMIME (default), PEM or DER"},
+    {"inkey", OPT_INKEY, 's',
+     "Input private key (if not signer or recipient)"},
+    {"keyform", OPT_KEYFORM, 'f', "Input private key format (PEM or ENGINE)"},
+    {"out", OPT_OUT, '>', "Output file"},
+    {"outform", OPT_OUTFORM, 'c',
+     "Output format SMIME (default), PEM or DER"},
+    {"content", OPT_CONTENT, '<',
+     "Supply or override content for detached signature"},
+    {"to", OPT_TO, 's', "To address"},
+    {"from", OPT_FROM, 's', "From address"},
+    {"subject", OPT_SUBJECT, 's', "Subject"},
+    {"text", OPT_TEXT, '-', "Include or delete text MIME headers"},
+    {"CApath", OPT_CAPATH, '/', "Trusted certificates directory"},
+    {"CAfile", OPT_CAFILE, '<', "Trusted certificates file"},
+    {"no-CAfile", OPT_NOCAFILE, '-',
+     "Do not load the default certificates file"},
+    {"no-CApath", OPT_NOCAPATH, '-',
+     "Do not load certificates from the default certificates directory"},
+    {"resign", OPT_RESIGN, '-', "Resign a signed message"},
+    {"nochain", OPT_NOCHAIN, '-', 
+     "set PKCS7_NOCHAIN so certificates contained in the message are not used as untrusted CAs" },
+    {"nosmimecap", OPT_NOSMIMECAP, '-', "Omit the SMIMECapabilities attribute"},
+    {"stream", OPT_STREAM, '-', "Enable CMS streaming" },
+    {"indef", OPT_INDEF, '-', "Same as -stream" },
+    {"noindef", OPT_NOINDEF, '-', "Disable CMS streaming"},
+    {"crlfeol", OPT_CRLFEOL, '-', "Use CRLF as EOL termination instead of CR only"},
+    {"rand", OPT_RAND, 's',
+     "Load the file(s) into the random number generator"},
+    {"passin", OPT_PASSIN, 's', "Input file pass phrase source"},
+    {"md", OPT_MD, 's', "Digest algorithm to use when signing or resigning"},
+    {"", OPT_CIPHER, '-', "Any supported cipher"},
+    OPT_V_OPTIONS,
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine, possibly a hardware device"},
+#endif
+    {NULL}
+};
+
+int smime_main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL, *indata = NULL;
+    EVP_PKEY *key = NULL;
+    PKCS7 *p7 = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sksigners = NULL, *skkeys = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(X509) *encerts = NULL, *other = NULL;
+    X509 *cert = NULL, *recip = NULL, *signer = NULL;
+    X509_STORE *store = NULL;
+    X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = NULL;
+    const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL;
+    const EVP_MD *sign_md = NULL;
+    const char *CAfile = NULL, *CApath = NULL, *prog = NULL;
+    char *certfile = NULL, *keyfile = NULL, *contfile = NULL, *inrand = NULL;
+    char *infile = NULL, *outfile = NULL, *signerfile = NULL, *recipfile =
+        NULL;
+    char *passinarg = NULL, *passin = NULL, *to = NULL, *from =
+        NULL, *subject = NULL;
+    OPTION_CHOICE o;
+    int noCApath = 0, noCAfile = 0;
+    int flags = PKCS7_DETACHED, operation = 0, ret = 0, need_rand = 0, indef =
+        0;
+    int informat = FORMAT_SMIME, outformat = FORMAT_SMIME, keyform =
+        FORMAT_PEM;
+    int vpmtouched = 0, rv = 0;
+    ENGINE *e = NULL;
+    const char *mime_eol = "\n";
+
+    if ((vpm = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new()) == NULL)
+        return 1;
+
+    prog = opt_init(argc, argv, smime_options);
+    while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) {
+        switch (o) {
+        case OPT_EOF:
+        case OPT_ERR:
+ opthelp:
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog);
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_HELP:
+            opt_help(smime_options);
+            ret = 0;
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_INFORM:
+            if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PDS, &informat))
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_IN:
+            infile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_OUTFORM:
+            if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PDS, &outformat))
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_OUT:
+            outfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_ENCRYPT:
+            operation = SMIME_ENCRYPT;
+            break;
+        case OPT_DECRYPT:
+            operation = SMIME_DECRYPT;
+            break;
+        case OPT_SIGN:
+            operation = SMIME_SIGN;
+            break;
+        case OPT_RESIGN:
+            operation = SMIME_RESIGN;
+            break;
+        case OPT_VERIFY:
+            operation = SMIME_VERIFY;
+            break;
+        case OPT_PK7OUT:
+            operation = SMIME_PK7OUT;
+            break;
+        case OPT_TEXT:
+            flags |= PKCS7_TEXT;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NOINTERN:
+            flags |= PKCS7_NOINTERN;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NOVERIFY:
+            flags |= PKCS7_NOVERIFY;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NOCHAIN:
+            flags |= PKCS7_NOCHAIN;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NOCERTS:
+            flags |= PKCS7_NOCERTS;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NOATTR:
+            flags |= PKCS7_NOATTR;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NODETACH:
+            flags &= ~PKCS7_DETACHED;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NOSMIMECAP:
+            flags |= PKCS7_NOSMIMECAP;
+            break;
+        case OPT_BINARY:
+            flags |= PKCS7_BINARY;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NOSIGS:
+            flags |= PKCS7_NOSIGS;
+            break;
+        case OPT_STREAM:
+        case OPT_INDEF:
+            indef = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NOINDEF:
+            indef = 0;
+            break;
+        case OPT_CRLFEOL:
+            flags |= PKCS7_CRLFEOL;
+            mime_eol = "\r\n";
+            break;
+        case OPT_RAND:
+            inrand = opt_arg();
+            need_rand = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_ENGINE:
+            e = setup_engine(opt_arg(), 0);
+            break;
+        case OPT_PASSIN:
+            passinarg = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_TO:
+            to = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_FROM:
+            from = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_SUBJECT:
+            subject = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_SIGNER:
+            /* If previous -signer argument add signer to list */
+            if (signerfile) {
+                if (sksigners == NULL
+                    && (sksigners = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null()) == NULL)
+                    goto end;
+                sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(sksigners, signerfile);
+                if (keyfile == NULL)
+                    keyfile = signerfile;
+                if (skkeys == NULL
+                    && (skkeys = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null()) == NULL)
+                    goto end;
+                sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(skkeys, keyfile);
+                keyfile = NULL;
+            }
+            signerfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_RECIP:
+            recipfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_MD:
+            if (!opt_md(opt_arg(), &sign_md))
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_CIPHER:
+            if (!opt_cipher(opt_unknown(), &cipher))
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_INKEY:
+            /* If previous -inkey argument add signer to list */
+            if (keyfile) {
+                if (signerfile == NULL) {
+                    BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                               "%s: Must have -signer before -inkey\n", prog);
+                    goto opthelp;
+                }
+                if (sksigners == NULL
+                    && (sksigners = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null()) == NULL)
+                    goto end;
+                sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(sksigners, signerfile);
+                signerfile = NULL;
+                if (skkeys == NULL
+                    && (skkeys = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null()) == NULL)
+                    goto end;
+                sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(skkeys, keyfile);
+            }
+            keyfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_KEYFORM:
+            if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_ANY, &keyform))
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_CERTFILE:
+            certfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_CAFILE:
+            CAfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_CAPATH:
+            CApath = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_NOCAFILE:
+            noCAfile = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NOCAPATH:
+            noCApath = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_CONTENT:
+            contfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_V_CASES:
+            if (!opt_verify(o, vpm))
+                goto opthelp;
+            vpmtouched++;
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    argc = opt_num_rest();
+    argv = opt_rest();
+
+    if (!(operation & SMIME_SIGNERS) && (skkeys || sksigners)) {
+        BIO_puts(bio_err, "Multiple signers or keys not allowed\n");
+        goto opthelp;
+    }
+
+    if (operation & SMIME_SIGNERS) {
+        /* Check to see if any final signer needs to be appended */
+        if (keyfile && !signerfile) {
+            BIO_puts(bio_err, "Illegal -inkey without -signer\n");
+            goto opthelp;
+        }
+        if (signerfile) {
+            if (!sksigners
+                && (sksigners = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null()) == NULL)
+                goto end;
+            sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(sksigners, signerfile);
+            if (!skkeys && (skkeys = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null()) == NULL)
+                goto end;
+            if (!keyfile)
+                keyfile = signerfile;
+            sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(skkeys, keyfile);
+        }
+        if (!sksigners) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "No signer certificate specified\n");
+            goto opthelp;
+        }
+        signerfile = NULL;
+        keyfile = NULL;
+        need_rand = 1;
+    } else if (operation == SMIME_DECRYPT) {
+        if (!recipfile && !keyfile) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                       "No recipient certificate or key specified\n");
+            goto opthelp;
+        }
+    } else if (operation == SMIME_ENCRYPT) {
+        if (argc == 0) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "No recipient(s) certificate(s) specified\n");
+            goto opthelp;
+        }
+        need_rand = 1;
+    } else if (!operation)
+        goto opthelp;
+
+    if (!app_passwd(passinarg, NULL, &passin, NULL)) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting password\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (need_rand) {
+        app_RAND_load_file(NULL, (inrand != NULL));
+        if (inrand != NULL)
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "%ld semi-random bytes loaded\n",
+                       app_RAND_load_files(inrand));
+    }
+
+    ret = 2;
+
+    if (!(operation & SMIME_SIGNERS))
+        flags &= ~PKCS7_DETACHED;
+
+    if (!(operation & SMIME_OP)) {
+        if (flags & PKCS7_BINARY)
+            outformat = FORMAT_BINARY;
+    }
+
+    if (!(operation & SMIME_IP)) {
+        if (flags & PKCS7_BINARY)
+            informat = FORMAT_BINARY;
+    }
+
+    if (operation == SMIME_ENCRYPT) {
+        if (!cipher) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
+            cipher = EVP_des_ede3_cbc();
+#else
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "No cipher selected\n");
+            goto end;
+#endif
+        }
+        encerts = sk_X509_new_null();
+        if (!encerts)
+            goto end;
+        while (*argv) {
+            cert = load_cert(*argv, FORMAT_PEM,
+                             "recipient certificate file");
+            if (cert == NULL)
+                goto end;
+            sk_X509_push(encerts, cert);
+            cert = NULL;
+            argv++;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (certfile) {
+        if (!load_certs(certfile, &other, FORMAT_PEM, NULL,
+                        "certificate file")) {
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (recipfile && (operation == SMIME_DECRYPT)) {
+        if ((recip = load_cert(recipfile, FORMAT_PEM,
+                               "recipient certificate file")) == NULL) {
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (operation == SMIME_DECRYPT) {
+        if (!keyfile)
+            keyfile = recipfile;
+    } else if (operation == SMIME_SIGN) {
+        if (!keyfile)
+            keyfile = signerfile;
+    } else
+        keyfile = NULL;
+
+    if (keyfile) {
+        key = load_key(keyfile, keyform, 0, passin, e, "signing key file");
+        if (!key)
+            goto end;
+    }
+
+    in = bio_open_default(infile, 'r', informat);
+    if (in == NULL)
+        goto end;
+
+    if (operation & SMIME_IP) {
+        if (informat == FORMAT_SMIME)
+            p7 = SMIME_read_PKCS7(in, &indata);
+        else if (informat == FORMAT_PEM)
+            p7 = PEM_read_bio_PKCS7(in, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+        else if (informat == FORMAT_ASN1)
+            p7 = d2i_PKCS7_bio(in, NULL);
+        else {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Bad input format for PKCS#7 file\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+
+        if (!p7) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error reading S/MIME message\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+        if (contfile) {
+            BIO_free(indata);
+            if ((indata = BIO_new_file(contfile, "rb")) == NULL) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't read content file %s\n", contfile);
+                goto end;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    out = bio_open_default(outfile, 'w', outformat);
+    if (out == NULL)
+        goto end;
+
+    if (operation == SMIME_VERIFY) {
+        if ((store = setup_verify(CAfile, CApath, noCAfile, noCApath)) == NULL)
+            goto end;
+        X509_STORE_set_verify_cb(store, smime_cb);
+        if (vpmtouched)
+            X509_STORE_set1_param(store, vpm);
+    }
+
+    ret = 3;
+
+    if (operation == SMIME_ENCRYPT) {
+        if (indef)
+            flags |= PKCS7_STREAM;
+        p7 = PKCS7_encrypt(encerts, in, cipher, flags);
+    } else if (operation & SMIME_SIGNERS) {
+        int i;
+        /*
+         * If detached data content we only enable streaming if S/MIME output
+         * format.
+         */
+        if (operation == SMIME_SIGN) {
+            if (flags & PKCS7_DETACHED) {
+                if (outformat == FORMAT_SMIME)
+                    flags |= PKCS7_STREAM;
+            } else if (indef)
+                flags |= PKCS7_STREAM;
+            flags |= PKCS7_PARTIAL;
+            p7 = PKCS7_sign(NULL, NULL, other, in, flags);
+            if (!p7)
+                goto end;
+            if (flags & PKCS7_NOCERTS) {
+                for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(other); i++) {
+                    X509 *x = sk_X509_value(other, i);
+                    PKCS7_add_certificate(p7, x);
+                }
+            }
+        } else
+            flags |= PKCS7_REUSE_DIGEST;
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(sksigners); i++) {
+            signerfile = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(sksigners, i);
+            keyfile = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(skkeys, i);
+            signer = load_cert(signerfile, FORMAT_PEM,
+                               "signer certificate");
+            if (!signer)
+                goto end;
+            key = load_key(keyfile, keyform, 0, passin, e, "signing key file");
+            if (!key)
+                goto end;
+            if (!PKCS7_sign_add_signer(p7, signer, key, sign_md, flags))
+                goto end;
+            X509_free(signer);
+            signer = NULL;
+            EVP_PKEY_free(key);
+            key = NULL;
+        }
+        /* If not streaming or resigning finalize structure */
+        if ((operation == SMIME_SIGN) && !(flags & PKCS7_STREAM)) {
+            if (!PKCS7_final(p7, in, flags))
+                goto end;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (!p7) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error creating PKCS#7 structure\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    ret = 4;
+    if (operation == SMIME_DECRYPT) {
+        if (!PKCS7_decrypt(p7, key, recip, out, flags)) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error decrypting PKCS#7 structure\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+    } else if (operation == SMIME_VERIFY) {
+        STACK_OF(X509) *signers;
+        if (PKCS7_verify(p7, other, store, indata, out, flags))
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Verification successful\n");
+        else {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Verification failure\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+        signers = PKCS7_get0_signers(p7, other, flags);
+        if (!save_certs(signerfile, signers)) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error writing signers to %s\n", signerfile);
+            ret = 5;
+            goto end;
+        }
+        sk_X509_free(signers);
+    } else if (operation == SMIME_PK7OUT)
+        PEM_write_bio_PKCS7(out, p7);
+    else {
+        if (to)
+            BIO_printf(out, "To: %s%s", to, mime_eol);
+        if (from)
+            BIO_printf(out, "From: %s%s", from, mime_eol);
+        if (subject)
+            BIO_printf(out, "Subject: %s%s", subject, mime_eol);
+        if (outformat == FORMAT_SMIME) {
+            if (operation == SMIME_RESIGN)
+                rv = SMIME_write_PKCS7(out, p7, indata, flags);
+            else
+                rv = SMIME_write_PKCS7(out, p7, in, flags);
+        } else if (outformat == FORMAT_PEM)
+            rv = PEM_write_bio_PKCS7_stream(out, p7, in, flags);
+        else if (outformat == FORMAT_ASN1)
+            rv = i2d_PKCS7_bio_stream(out, p7, in, flags);
+        else {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Bad output format for PKCS#7 file\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+        if (rv == 0) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error writing output\n");
+            ret = 3;
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+    ret = 0;
+ end:
+    if (need_rand)
+        app_RAND_write_file(NULL);
+    if (ret)
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+    sk_X509_pop_free(encerts, X509_free);
+    sk_X509_pop_free(other, X509_free);
+    X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(vpm);
+    sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(sksigners);
+    sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(skkeys);
+    X509_STORE_free(store);
+    X509_free(cert);
+    X509_free(recip);
+    X509_free(signer);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(key);
+    PKCS7_free(p7);
+    release_engine(e);
+    BIO_free(in);
+    BIO_free(indata);
+    BIO_free_all(out);
+    OPENSSL_free(passin);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static int save_certs(char *signerfile, STACK_OF(X509) *signers)
+{
+    int i;
+    BIO *tmp;
+    if (!signerfile)
+        return 1;
+    tmp = BIO_new_file(signerfile, "w");
+    if (!tmp)
+        return 0;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(signers); i++)
+        PEM_write_bio_X509(tmp, sk_X509_value(signers, i));
+    BIO_free(tmp);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Minimal callback just to output policy info (if any) */
+
+static int smime_cb(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int error;
+
+    error = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
+
+    if ((error != X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY)
+        && ((error != X509_V_OK) || (ok != 2)))
+        return ok;
+
+    policies_print(ctx);
+
+    return ok;
+
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/speed.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/speed.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b0a7b6e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/speed.c
@@ -0,0 +1,3149 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ *
+ * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ *
+ * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license provided above.
+ *
+ * The ECDH and ECDSA speed test software is originally written by
+ * Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
+ *
+ */
+
+#undef SECONDS
+#define SECONDS                 3
+#define PRIME_SECONDS   10
+#define RSA_SECONDS             10
+#define DSA_SECONDS             10
+#define ECDSA_SECONDS   10
+#define ECDH_SECONDS    10
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <math.h>
+#include "apps.h"
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/async.h>
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS)
+# include OPENSSL_UNISTD
+#endif
+
+#if defined(_WIN32)
+# include <windows.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
+# include <openssl/des.h>
+#endif
+#include <openssl/aes.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA
+# include <openssl/camellia.h>
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD2
+# include <openssl/md2.h>
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MDC2
+# include <openssl/mdc2.h>
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD4
+# include <openssl/md4.h>
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+# include <openssl/md5.h>
+#endif
+#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RMD160
+# include <openssl/ripemd.h>
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WHIRLPOOL
+# include <openssl/whrlpool.h>
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
+# include <openssl/rc4.h>
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC5
+# include <openssl/rc5.h>
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC2
+# include <openssl/rc2.h>
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_IDEA
+# include <openssl/idea.h>
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SEED
+# include <openssl/seed.h>
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BF
+# include <openssl/blowfish.h>
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAST
+# include <openssl/cast.h>
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+# include <openssl/rsa.h>
+# include "./testrsa.h"
+#endif
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+# include <openssl/dsa.h>
+# include "./testdsa.h"
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+# include <openssl/ec.h>
+#endif
+#include <openssl/modes.h>
+
+#ifndef HAVE_FORK
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS)
+#  define HAVE_FORK 0
+# else
+#  define HAVE_FORK 1
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#if HAVE_FORK
+# undef NO_FORK
+#else
+# define NO_FORK
+#endif
+
+#undef BUFSIZE
+#define BUFSIZE (1024*16+1)
+#define MAX_MISALIGNMENT 63
+
+#define ALGOR_NUM       30
+#define SIZE_NUM        6
+#define PRIME_NUM       3
+#define RSA_NUM         7
+#define DSA_NUM         3
+
+#define EC_NUM          17
+#define MAX_ECDH_SIZE   256
+#define MISALIGN        64
+
+static volatile int run = 0;
+
+static int mr = 0;
+static int usertime = 1;
+
+typedef void *(*kdf_fn) (
+        const void *in, size_t inlen, void *out, size_t *xoutlen);
+
+typedef struct loopargs_st {
+    ASYNC_JOB *inprogress_job;
+    ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *wait_ctx;
+    unsigned char *buf;
+    unsigned char *buf2;
+    unsigned char *buf_malloc;
+    unsigned char *buf2_malloc;
+    unsigned int siglen;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+    RSA *rsa_key[RSA_NUM];
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+    DSA *dsa_key[DSA_NUM];
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    EC_KEY *ecdsa[EC_NUM];
+    EC_KEY *ecdh_a[EC_NUM];
+    EC_KEY *ecdh_b[EC_NUM];
+    unsigned char *secret_a;
+    unsigned char *secret_b;
+    size_t      outlen;
+    kdf_fn      kdf;
+#endif
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
+    HMAC_CTX *hctx;
+    GCM128_CONTEXT *gcm_ctx;
+} loopargs_t;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD2
+static int EVP_Digest_MD2_loop(void *args);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MDC2
+static int EVP_Digest_MDC2_loop(void *args);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD4
+static int EVP_Digest_MD4_loop(void *args);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+static int MD5_loop(void *args);
+static int HMAC_loop(void *args);
+#endif
+static int SHA1_loop(void *args);
+static int SHA256_loop(void *args);
+static int SHA512_loop(void *args);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WHIRLPOOL
+static int WHIRLPOOL_loop(void *args);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RMD160
+static int EVP_Digest_RMD160_loop(void *args);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
+static int RC4_loop(void *args);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
+static int DES_ncbc_encrypt_loop(void *args);
+static int DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt_loop(void *args);
+#endif
+static int AES_cbc_128_encrypt_loop(void *args);
+static int AES_cbc_192_encrypt_loop(void *args);
+static int AES_ige_128_encrypt_loop(void *args);
+static int AES_cbc_256_encrypt_loop(void *args);
+static int AES_ige_192_encrypt_loop(void *args);
+static int AES_ige_256_encrypt_loop(void *args);
+static int CRYPTO_gcm128_aad_loop(void *args);
+static int EVP_Update_loop(void *args);
+static int EVP_Digest_loop(void *args);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+static int RSA_sign_loop(void *args);
+static int RSA_verify_loop(void *args);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+static int DSA_sign_loop(void *args);
+static int DSA_verify_loop(void *args);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+static int ECDSA_sign_loop(void *args);
+static int ECDSA_verify_loop(void *args);
+static int ECDH_compute_key_loop(void *args);
+#endif
+static int run_benchmark(int async_jobs, int (*loop_function)(void *), loopargs_t *loopargs);
+
+static double Time_F(int s);
+static void print_message(const char *s, long num, int length);
+static void pkey_print_message(const char *str, const char *str2,
+                               long num, int bits, int sec);
+static void print_result(int alg, int run_no, int count, double time_used);
+#ifndef NO_FORK
+static int do_multi(int multi);
+#endif
+
+static const char *names[ALGOR_NUM] = {
+    "md2", "mdc2", "md4", "md5", "hmac(md5)", "sha1", "rmd160", "rc4",
+    "des cbc", "des ede3", "idea cbc", "seed cbc",
+    "rc2 cbc", "rc5-32/12 cbc", "blowfish cbc", "cast cbc",
+    "aes-128 cbc", "aes-192 cbc", "aes-256 cbc",
+    "camellia-128 cbc", "camellia-192 cbc", "camellia-256 cbc",
+    "evp", "sha256", "sha512", "whirlpool",
+    "aes-128 ige", "aes-192 ige", "aes-256 ige", "ghash"
+};
+
+static double results[ALGOR_NUM][SIZE_NUM];
+
+static const int lengths[SIZE_NUM] = {
+    16, 64, 256, 1024, 8 * 1024, 16 * 1024
+};
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+static double rsa_results[RSA_NUM][2];
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+static double dsa_results[DSA_NUM][2];
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+static double ecdsa_results[EC_NUM][2];
+static double ecdh_results[EC_NUM][1];
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
+static const char rnd_seed[] =
+    "string to make the random number generator think it has entropy";
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SIGALRM
+# if defined(__STDC__) || defined(sgi) || defined(_AIX)
+#  define SIGRETTYPE void
+# else
+#  define SIGRETTYPE int
+# endif
+
+static SIGRETTYPE sig_done(int sig);
+static SIGRETTYPE sig_done(int sig)
+{
+    signal(SIGALRM, sig_done);
+    run = 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+#define START   0
+#define STOP    1
+
+#if defined(_WIN32)
+
+# if !defined(SIGALRM)
+#  define SIGALRM
+# endif
+static unsigned int lapse;
+static volatile unsigned int schlock;
+static void alarm_win32(unsigned int secs)
+{
+    lapse = secs * 1000;
+}
+
+# define alarm alarm_win32
+
+static DWORD WINAPI sleepy(VOID * arg)
+{
+    schlock = 1;
+    Sleep(lapse);
+    run = 0;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static double Time_F(int s)
+{
+    double ret;
+    static HANDLE thr;
+
+    if (s == START) {
+        schlock = 0;
+        thr = CreateThread(NULL, 4096, sleepy, NULL, 0, NULL);
+        if (thr == NULL) {
+            DWORD err = GetLastError();
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to CreateThread (%lu)", err);
+            ExitProcess(err);
+        }
+        while (!schlock)
+            Sleep(0);           /* scheduler spinlock */
+        ret = app_tminterval(s, usertime);
+    } else {
+        ret = app_tminterval(s, usertime);
+        if (run)
+            TerminateThread(thr, 0);
+        CloseHandle(thr);
+    }
+
+    return ret;
+}
+#else
+
+static double Time_F(int s)
+{
+    double ret = app_tminterval(s, usertime);
+    if (s == STOP)
+        alarm(0);
+    return ret;
+}
+#endif
+
+static void multiblock_speed(const EVP_CIPHER *evp_cipher);
+
+static int found(const char *name, const OPT_PAIR *pairs, int *result)
+{
+    for (; pairs->name; pairs++)
+        if (strcmp(name, pairs->name) == 0) {
+            *result = pairs->retval;
+            return 1;
+        }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+typedef enum OPTION_choice {
+    OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP,
+    OPT_ELAPSED, OPT_EVP, OPT_DECRYPT, OPT_ENGINE, OPT_MULTI,
+    OPT_MR, OPT_MB, OPT_MISALIGN, OPT_ASYNCJOBS
+} OPTION_CHOICE;
+
+OPTIONS speed_options[] = {
+    {OPT_HELP_STR, 1, '-', "Usage: %s [options] ciphers...\n"},
+    {OPT_HELP_STR, 1, '-', "Valid options are:\n"},
+    {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"},
+    {"evp", OPT_EVP, 's', "Use specified EVP cipher"},
+    {"decrypt", OPT_DECRYPT, '-',
+     "Time decryption instead of encryption (only EVP)"},
+    {"mr", OPT_MR, '-', "Produce machine readable output"},
+    {"mb", OPT_MB, '-',
+     "Enable (tls1.1) multi-block mode on evp_cipher requested with -evp"},
+    {"misalign", OPT_MISALIGN, 'n', "Amount to mis-align buffers"},
+    {"elapsed", OPT_ELAPSED, '-',
+     "Measure time in real time instead of CPU user time"},
+#ifndef NO_FORK
+    {"multi", OPT_MULTI, 'p', "Run benchmarks in parallel"},
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ASYNC
+    {"async_jobs", OPT_ASYNCJOBS, 'p',
+     "Enable async mode and start pnum jobs"},
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine, possibly a hardware device"},
+#endif
+    {NULL},
+};
+
+#define D_MD2           0
+#define D_MDC2          1
+#define D_MD4           2
+#define D_MD5           3
+#define D_HMAC          4
+#define D_SHA1          5
+#define D_RMD160        6
+#define D_RC4           7
+#define D_CBC_DES       8
+#define D_EDE3_DES      9
+#define D_CBC_IDEA      10
+#define D_CBC_SEED      11
+#define D_CBC_RC2       12
+#define D_CBC_RC5       13
+#define D_CBC_BF        14
+#define D_CBC_CAST      15
+#define D_CBC_128_AES   16
+#define D_CBC_192_AES   17
+#define D_CBC_256_AES   18
+#define D_CBC_128_CML   19
+#define D_CBC_192_CML   20
+#define D_CBC_256_CML   21
+#define D_EVP           22
+#define D_SHA256        23
+#define D_SHA512        24
+#define D_WHIRLPOOL     25
+#define D_IGE_128_AES   26
+#define D_IGE_192_AES   27
+#define D_IGE_256_AES   28
+#define D_GHASH         29
+static OPT_PAIR doit_choices[] = {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD2
+    {"md2", D_MD2},
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MDC2
+    {"mdc2", D_MDC2},
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD4
+    {"md4", D_MD4},
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+    {"md5", D_MD5},
+    {"hmac", D_HMAC},
+#endif
+    {"sha1", D_SHA1},
+    {"sha256", D_SHA256},
+    {"sha512", D_SHA512},
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WHIRLPOOL
+    {"whirlpool", D_WHIRLPOOL},
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RMD160
+    {"ripemd", D_RMD160},
+    {"rmd160", D_RMD160},
+    {"ripemd160", D_RMD160},
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
+    {"rc4", D_RC4},
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
+    {"des-cbc", D_CBC_DES},
+    {"des-ede3", D_EDE3_DES},
+#endif
+    {"aes-128-cbc", D_CBC_128_AES},
+    {"aes-192-cbc", D_CBC_192_AES},
+    {"aes-256-cbc", D_CBC_256_AES},
+    {"aes-128-ige", D_IGE_128_AES},
+    {"aes-192-ige", D_IGE_192_AES},
+    {"aes-256-ige", D_IGE_256_AES},
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC2
+    {"rc2-cbc", D_CBC_RC2},
+    {"rc2", D_CBC_RC2},
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC5
+    {"rc5-cbc", D_CBC_RC5},
+    {"rc5", D_CBC_RC5},
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_IDEA
+    {"idea-cbc", D_CBC_IDEA},
+    {"idea", D_CBC_IDEA},
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SEED
+    {"seed-cbc", D_CBC_SEED},
+    {"seed", D_CBC_SEED},
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BF
+    {"bf-cbc", D_CBC_BF},
+    {"blowfish", D_CBC_BF},
+    {"bf", D_CBC_BF},
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAST
+    {"cast-cbc", D_CBC_CAST},
+    {"cast", D_CBC_CAST},
+    {"cast5", D_CBC_CAST},
+#endif
+    {"ghash", D_GHASH},
+    {NULL}
+};
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+# define R_DSA_512       0
+# define R_DSA_1024      1
+# define R_DSA_2048      2
+static OPT_PAIR dsa_choices[] = {
+    {"dsa512", R_DSA_512},
+    {"dsa1024", R_DSA_1024},
+    {"dsa2048", R_DSA_2048},
+    {NULL},
+};
+#endif
+
+#define R_RSA_512       0
+#define R_RSA_1024      1
+#define R_RSA_2048      2
+#define R_RSA_3072      3
+#define R_RSA_4096      4
+#define R_RSA_7680      5
+#define R_RSA_15360     6
+static OPT_PAIR rsa_choices[] = {
+    {"rsa512", R_RSA_512},
+    {"rsa1024", R_RSA_1024},
+    {"rsa2048", R_RSA_2048},
+    {"rsa3072", R_RSA_3072},
+    {"rsa4096", R_RSA_4096},
+    {"rsa7680", R_RSA_7680},
+    {"rsa15360", R_RSA_15360},
+    {NULL}
+};
+
+#define R_EC_P160    0
+#define R_EC_P192    1
+#define R_EC_P224    2
+#define R_EC_P256    3
+#define R_EC_P384    4
+#define R_EC_P521    5
+#define R_EC_K163    6
+#define R_EC_K233    7
+#define R_EC_K283    8
+#define R_EC_K409    9
+#define R_EC_K571    10
+#define R_EC_B163    11
+#define R_EC_B233    12
+#define R_EC_B283    13
+#define R_EC_B409    14
+#define R_EC_B571    15
+#define R_EC_X25519  16
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+static OPT_PAIR ecdsa_choices[] = {
+    {"ecdsap160", R_EC_P160},
+    {"ecdsap192", R_EC_P192},
+    {"ecdsap224", R_EC_P224},
+    {"ecdsap256", R_EC_P256},
+    {"ecdsap384", R_EC_P384},
+    {"ecdsap521", R_EC_P521},
+    {"ecdsak163", R_EC_K163},
+    {"ecdsak233", R_EC_K233},
+    {"ecdsak283", R_EC_K283},
+    {"ecdsak409", R_EC_K409},
+    {"ecdsak571", R_EC_K571},
+    {"ecdsab163", R_EC_B163},
+    {"ecdsab233", R_EC_B233},
+    {"ecdsab283", R_EC_B283},
+    {"ecdsab409", R_EC_B409},
+    {"ecdsab571", R_EC_B571},
+    {NULL}
+};
+
+static OPT_PAIR ecdh_choices[] = {
+    {"ecdhp160", R_EC_P160},
+    {"ecdhp192", R_EC_P192},
+    {"ecdhp224", R_EC_P224},
+    {"ecdhp256", R_EC_P256},
+    {"ecdhp384", R_EC_P384},
+    {"ecdhp521", R_EC_P521},
+    {"ecdhk163", R_EC_K163},
+    {"ecdhk233", R_EC_K233},
+    {"ecdhk283", R_EC_K283},
+    {"ecdhk409", R_EC_K409},
+    {"ecdhk571", R_EC_K571},
+    {"ecdhb163", R_EC_B163},
+    {"ecdhb233", R_EC_B233},
+    {"ecdhb283", R_EC_B283},
+    {"ecdhb409", R_EC_B409},
+    {"ecdhb571", R_EC_B571},
+    {"ecdhx25519", R_EC_X25519},
+    {NULL}
+};
+#endif
+
+#ifndef SIGALRM
+# define COND(d) (count < (d))
+# define COUNT(d) (d)
+#else
+# define COND(unused_cond) (run && count<0x7fffffff)
+# define COUNT(d) (count)
+#endif                         /* SIGALRM */
+
+static int testnum;
+
+/* Nb of iterations to do per algorithm and key-size */
+static long c[ALGOR_NUM][SIZE_NUM];
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD2
+static int EVP_Digest_MD2_loop(void *args)
+{
+    loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **)args;
+    unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf;
+    unsigned char md2[MD2_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+    int count;
+
+    for (count = 0; COND(c[D_MD2][testnum]); count++) {
+        if (!EVP_Digest(buf, (size_t)lengths[testnum], md2, NULL, EVP_md2(),
+                NULL))
+            return -1;
+    }
+    return count;
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MDC2
+static int EVP_Digest_MDC2_loop(void *args)
+{
+    loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **)args;
+    unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf;
+    unsigned char mdc2[MDC2_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+    int count;
+
+    for (count = 0; COND(c[D_MDC2][testnum]); count++) {
+        if (!EVP_Digest(buf, (size_t)lengths[testnum], mdc2, NULL, EVP_mdc2(),
+                NULL))
+            return -1;
+    }
+    return count;
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD4
+static int EVP_Digest_MD4_loop(void *args)
+{
+    loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **)args;
+    unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf;
+    unsigned char md4[MD4_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+    int count;
+
+    for (count = 0; COND(c[D_MD4][testnum]); count++) {
+        if (!EVP_Digest(buf, (size_t)lengths[testnum], md4, NULL, EVP_md4(),
+                NULL))
+            return -1;
+    }
+    return count;
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+static int MD5_loop(void *args)
+{
+    loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **)args;
+    unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf;
+    unsigned char md5[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+    int count;
+    for (count = 0; COND(c[D_MD5][testnum]); count++)
+        MD5(buf, lengths[testnum], md5);
+    return count;
+}
+
+static int HMAC_loop(void *args)
+{
+    loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **)args;
+    unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf;
+    HMAC_CTX *hctx = tempargs->hctx;
+    unsigned char hmac[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+    int count;
+
+    for (count = 0; COND(c[D_HMAC][testnum]); count++) {
+        HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
+        HMAC_Update(hctx, buf, lengths[testnum]);
+        HMAC_Final(hctx, hmac, NULL);
+    }
+    return count;
+}
+#endif
+
+static int SHA1_loop(void *args)
+{
+    loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **)args;
+    unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf;
+    unsigned char sha[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+    int count;
+    for (count = 0; COND(c[D_SHA1][testnum]); count++)
+        SHA1(buf, lengths[testnum], sha);
+    return count;
+}
+
+static int SHA256_loop(void *args)
+{
+    loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **)args;
+    unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf;
+    unsigned char sha256[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+    int count;
+    for (count = 0; COND(c[D_SHA256][testnum]); count++)
+        SHA256(buf, lengths[testnum], sha256);
+    return count;
+}
+
+static int SHA512_loop(void *args)
+{
+    loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **)args;
+    unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf;
+    unsigned char sha512[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+    int count;
+    for (count = 0; COND(c[D_SHA512][testnum]); count++)
+        SHA512(buf, lengths[testnum], sha512);
+    return count;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WHIRLPOOL
+static int WHIRLPOOL_loop(void *args)
+{
+    loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **)args;
+    unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf;
+    unsigned char whirlpool[WHIRLPOOL_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+    int count;
+    for (count = 0; COND(c[D_WHIRLPOOL][testnum]); count++)
+        WHIRLPOOL(buf, lengths[testnum], whirlpool);
+    return count;
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RMD160
+static int EVP_Digest_RMD160_loop(void *args)
+{
+    loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **)args;
+    unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf;
+    unsigned char rmd160[RIPEMD160_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+    int count;
+    for (count = 0; COND(c[D_RMD160][testnum]); count++) {
+        if (!EVP_Digest(buf, (size_t)lengths[testnum], &(rmd160[0]),
+                NULL, EVP_ripemd160(), NULL))
+            return -1;
+    }
+    return count;
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
+static RC4_KEY rc4_ks;
+static int RC4_loop(void *args)
+{
+    loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **)args;
+    unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf;
+    int count;
+    for (count = 0; COND(c[D_RC4][testnum]); count++)
+        RC4(&rc4_ks, (size_t)lengths[testnum], buf, buf);
+    return count;
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
+static unsigned char DES_iv[8];
+static DES_key_schedule sch;
+static DES_key_schedule sch2;
+static DES_key_schedule sch3;
+static int DES_ncbc_encrypt_loop(void *args)
+{
+    loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **)args;
+    unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf;
+    int count;
+    for (count = 0; COND(c[D_CBC_DES][testnum]); count++)
+        DES_ncbc_encrypt(buf, buf, lengths[testnum], &sch,
+                &DES_iv, DES_ENCRYPT);
+    return count;
+}
+
+static int DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt_loop(void *args)
+{
+    loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **)args;
+    unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf;
+    int count;
+    for (count = 0; COND(c[D_EDE3_DES][testnum]); count++)
+        DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt(buf, buf, lengths[testnum],
+                &sch, &sch2, &sch3,
+                &DES_iv, DES_ENCRYPT);
+    return count;
+}
+#endif
+
+#define MAX_BLOCK_SIZE 128
+
+static unsigned char iv[2 * MAX_BLOCK_SIZE / 8];
+static AES_KEY aes_ks1, aes_ks2, aes_ks3;
+static int AES_cbc_128_encrypt_loop(void *args)
+{
+    loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **)args;
+    unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf;
+    int count;
+    for (count = 0; COND(c[D_CBC_128_AES][testnum]); count++)
+        AES_cbc_encrypt(buf, buf,
+                (size_t)lengths[testnum], &aes_ks1,
+                iv, AES_ENCRYPT);
+    return count;
+}
+
+static int AES_cbc_192_encrypt_loop(void *args)
+{
+    loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **)args;
+    unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf;
+    int count;
+    for (count = 0; COND(c[D_CBC_192_AES][testnum]); count++)
+        AES_cbc_encrypt(buf, buf,
+                (size_t)lengths[testnum], &aes_ks2,
+                iv, AES_ENCRYPT);
+    return count;
+}
+
+static int AES_cbc_256_encrypt_loop(void *args)
+{
+    loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **)args;
+    unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf;
+    int count;
+    for (count = 0; COND(c[D_CBC_256_AES][testnum]); count++)
+        AES_cbc_encrypt(buf, buf,
+                (size_t)lengths[testnum], &aes_ks3,
+                iv, AES_ENCRYPT);
+    return count;
+}
+
+static int AES_ige_128_encrypt_loop(void *args)
+{
+    loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **)args;
+    unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf;
+    unsigned char *buf2 = tempargs->buf2;
+    int count;
+    for (count = 0; COND(c[D_IGE_128_AES][testnum]); count++)
+        AES_ige_encrypt(buf, buf2,
+                (size_t)lengths[testnum], &aes_ks1,
+                iv, AES_ENCRYPT);
+    return count;
+}
+
+static int AES_ige_192_encrypt_loop(void *args)
+{
+    loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **)args;
+    unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf;
+    unsigned char *buf2 = tempargs->buf2;
+    int count;
+    for (count = 0; COND(c[D_IGE_192_AES][testnum]); count++)
+        AES_ige_encrypt(buf, buf2,
+                (size_t)lengths[testnum], &aes_ks2,
+                iv, AES_ENCRYPT);
+    return count;
+}
+
+static int AES_ige_256_encrypt_loop(void *args)
+{
+    loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **)args;
+    unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf;
+    unsigned char *buf2 = tempargs->buf2;
+    int count;
+    for (count = 0; COND(c[D_IGE_256_AES][testnum]); count++)
+        AES_ige_encrypt(buf, buf2,
+                (size_t)lengths[testnum], &aes_ks3,
+                iv, AES_ENCRYPT);
+    return count;
+}
+
+static int CRYPTO_gcm128_aad_loop(void *args)
+{
+    loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **)args;
+    unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf;
+    GCM128_CONTEXT *gcm_ctx = tempargs->gcm_ctx;
+    int count;
+    for (count = 0; COND(c[D_GHASH][testnum]); count++)
+        CRYPTO_gcm128_aad(gcm_ctx, buf, lengths[testnum]);
+    return count;
+}
+
+static long save_count = 0;
+static int decrypt = 0;
+static int EVP_Update_loop(void *args)
+{
+    loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **)args;
+    unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf;
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = tempargs->ctx;
+    int outl, count;
+#ifndef SIGALRM
+    int nb_iter = save_count * 4 * lengths[0] / lengths[testnum];
+#endif
+    if (decrypt)
+        for (count = 0; COND(nb_iter); count++)
+            EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, buf, &outl, buf, lengths[testnum]);
+    else
+        for (count = 0; COND(nb_iter); count++)
+            EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, buf, &outl, buf, lengths[testnum]);
+    if (decrypt)
+        EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, buf, &outl);
+    else
+        EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, buf, &outl);
+    return count;
+}
+
+static const EVP_MD *evp_md = NULL;
+static int EVP_Digest_loop(void *args)
+{
+    loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **)args;
+    unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf;
+    unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+    int count;
+#ifndef SIGALRM
+    int nb_iter = save_count * 4 * lengths[0] / lengths[testnum];
+#endif
+
+    for (count = 0; COND(nb_iter); count++) {
+        if (!EVP_Digest(buf, lengths[testnum], md, NULL, evp_md, NULL))
+            return -1;
+    }
+    return count;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+static long rsa_c[RSA_NUM][2];  /* # RSA iteration test */
+
+static int RSA_sign_loop(void *args)
+{
+    loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **)args;
+    unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf;
+    unsigned char *buf2 = tempargs->buf2;
+    unsigned int *rsa_num = &tempargs->siglen;
+    RSA **rsa_key = tempargs->rsa_key;
+    int ret, count;
+    for (count = 0; COND(rsa_c[testnum][0]); count++) {
+        ret = RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, buf, 36, buf2, rsa_num, rsa_key[testnum]);
+        if (ret == 0) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "RSA sign failure\n");
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            count = -1;
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    return count;
+}
+
+static int RSA_verify_loop(void *args)
+{
+    loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **)args;
+    unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf;
+    unsigned char *buf2 = tempargs->buf2;
+    unsigned int rsa_num = tempargs->siglen;
+    RSA **rsa_key = tempargs->rsa_key;
+    int ret, count;
+    for (count = 0; COND(rsa_c[testnum][1]); count++) {
+        ret = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, buf, 36, buf2, rsa_num, rsa_key[testnum]);
+        if (ret <= 0) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "RSA verify failure\n");
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            count = -1;
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    return count;
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+static long dsa_c[DSA_NUM][2];
+static int DSA_sign_loop(void *args)
+{
+    loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **)args;
+    unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf;
+    unsigned char *buf2 = tempargs->buf2;
+    DSA **dsa_key = tempargs->dsa_key;
+    unsigned int *siglen = &tempargs->siglen;
+    int ret, count;
+    for (count = 0; COND(dsa_c[testnum][0]); count++) {
+        ret = DSA_sign(0, buf, 20, buf2, siglen, dsa_key[testnum]);
+        if (ret == 0) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "DSA sign failure\n");
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            count = -1;
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    return count;
+}
+
+static int DSA_verify_loop(void *args)
+{
+    loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **)args;
+    unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf;
+    unsigned char *buf2 = tempargs->buf2;
+    DSA **dsa_key = tempargs->dsa_key;
+    unsigned int siglen = tempargs->siglen;
+    int ret, count;
+    for (count = 0; COND(dsa_c[testnum][1]); count++) {
+        ret = DSA_verify(0, buf, 20, buf2, siglen, dsa_key[testnum]);
+        if (ret <= 0) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "DSA verify failure\n");
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            count = -1;
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    return count;
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+static long ecdsa_c[EC_NUM][2];
+static int ECDSA_sign_loop(void *args)
+{
+    loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **)args;
+    unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf;
+    EC_KEY **ecdsa = tempargs->ecdsa;
+    unsigned char *ecdsasig = tempargs->buf2;
+    unsigned int *ecdsasiglen = &tempargs->siglen;
+    int ret, count;
+    for (count = 0; COND(ecdsa_c[testnum][0]); count++) {
+        ret = ECDSA_sign(0, buf, 20,
+                ecdsasig, ecdsasiglen, ecdsa[testnum]);
+        if (ret == 0) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "ECDSA sign failure\n");
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            count = -1;
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    return count;
+}
+
+static int ECDSA_verify_loop(void *args)
+{
+    loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **)args;
+    unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf;
+    EC_KEY **ecdsa = tempargs->ecdsa;
+    unsigned char *ecdsasig = tempargs->buf2;
+    unsigned int ecdsasiglen = tempargs->siglen;
+    int ret, count;
+    for (count = 0; COND(ecdsa_c[testnum][1]); count++) {
+        ret = ECDSA_verify(0, buf, 20, ecdsasig, ecdsasiglen,
+                ecdsa[testnum]);
+        if (ret != 1) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "ECDSA verify failure\n");
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            count = -1;
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    return count;
+}
+
+/* ******************************************************************** */
+static long ecdh_c[EC_NUM][1];
+
+static int ECDH_compute_key_loop(void *args)
+{
+    loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **)args;
+    EC_KEY **ecdh_a = tempargs->ecdh_a;
+    EC_KEY **ecdh_b = tempargs->ecdh_b;
+    unsigned char *secret_a = tempargs->secret_a;
+    int count;
+    size_t outlen = tempargs->outlen;
+    kdf_fn kdf = tempargs->kdf;
+
+    for (count = 0; COND(ecdh_c[testnum][0]); count++) {
+        ECDH_compute_key(secret_a, outlen,
+                EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh_b[testnum]),
+                ecdh_a[testnum], kdf);
+    }
+    return count;
+}
+
+static const size_t KDF1_SHA1_len = 20;
+static void *KDF1_SHA1(const void *in, size_t inlen, void *out,
+                       size_t *outlen)
+{
+    if (*outlen < SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH)
+        return NULL;
+    *outlen = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+    return SHA1(in, inlen, out);
+}
+#endif                          /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
+static int run_benchmark(int async_jobs,
+                         int (*loop_function)(void *), loopargs_t *loopargs)
+{
+    int job_op_count = 0;
+    int total_op_count = 0;
+    int num_inprogress = 0;
+    int error = 0, i = 0, ret = 0;
+    OSSL_ASYNC_FD job_fd = 0;
+    size_t num_job_fds = 0;
+
+    run = 1;
+
+    if (async_jobs == 0) {
+        return loop_function((void *)&loopargs);
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0; i < async_jobs && !error; i++) {
+        loopargs_t *looparg_item = loopargs + i;
+
+        /* Copy pointer content (looparg_t item address) into async context */
+        ret = ASYNC_start_job(&loopargs[i].inprogress_job, loopargs[i].wait_ctx,
+                              &job_op_count, loop_function,
+                              (void *)&looparg_item, sizeof(looparg_item));
+        switch (ret) {
+        case ASYNC_PAUSE:
+            ++num_inprogress;
+            break;
+        case ASYNC_FINISH:
+            if (job_op_count == -1) {
+                error = 1;
+            } else {
+                total_op_count += job_op_count;
+            }
+            break;
+        case ASYNC_NO_JOBS:
+        case ASYNC_ERR:
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Failure in the job\n");
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            error = 1;
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+
+    while (num_inprogress > 0) {
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS)
+        DWORD avail = 0;
+#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX)
+        int select_result = 0;
+        OSSL_ASYNC_FD max_fd = 0;
+        fd_set waitfdset;
+
+        FD_ZERO(&waitfdset);
+
+        for (i = 0; i < async_jobs && num_inprogress > 0; i++) {
+            if (loopargs[i].inprogress_job == NULL)
+                continue;
+
+            if (!ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_all_fds(loopargs[i].wait_ctx, NULL, &num_job_fds)
+                    || num_job_fds > 1) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "Too many fds in ASYNC_WAIT_CTX\n");
+                ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+                error = 1;
+                break;
+            }
+            ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_all_fds(loopargs[i].wait_ctx, &job_fd, &num_job_fds);
+            FD_SET(job_fd, &waitfdset);
+            if (job_fd > max_fd)
+                max_fd = job_fd;
+        }
+
+        if (max_fd >= (OSSL_ASYNC_FD)FD_SETSIZE) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                    "Error: max_fd (%d) must be smaller than FD_SETSIZE (%d). "
+                    "Decrease the value of async_jobs\n",
+                    max_fd, FD_SETSIZE);
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            error = 1;
+            break;
+        }
+
+        select_result = select(max_fd + 1, &waitfdset, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+        if (select_result == -1 && errno == EINTR)
+            continue;
+
+        if (select_result == -1) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Failure in the select\n");
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            error = 1;
+            break;
+        }
+
+        if (select_result == 0)
+            continue;
+#endif
+
+        for (i = 0; i < async_jobs; i++) {
+            if (loopargs[i].inprogress_job == NULL)
+                continue;
+
+            if (!ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_all_fds(loopargs[i].wait_ctx, NULL, &num_job_fds)
+                    || num_job_fds > 1) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "Too many fds in ASYNC_WAIT_CTX\n");
+                ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+                error = 1;
+                break;
+            }
+            ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_all_fds(loopargs[i].wait_ctx, &job_fd, &num_job_fds);
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX)
+            if (num_job_fds == 1 && !FD_ISSET(job_fd, &waitfdset))
+                continue;
+#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS)
+            if (num_job_fds == 1
+                && !PeekNamedPipe(job_fd, NULL, 0, NULL, &avail, NULL)
+                && avail > 0)
+                continue;
+#endif
+
+            ret = ASYNC_start_job(&loopargs[i].inprogress_job, 
+                    loopargs[i].wait_ctx, &job_op_count, loop_function, 
+                    (void *)(loopargs + i), sizeof(loopargs_t));
+            switch (ret) {
+            case ASYNC_PAUSE:
+                break;
+            case ASYNC_FINISH:
+                if (job_op_count == -1) {
+                    error = 1;
+                } else {
+                    total_op_count += job_op_count;
+                }
+                --num_inprogress;
+                loopargs[i].inprogress_job = NULL;
+                break;
+            case ASYNC_NO_JOBS:
+            case ASYNC_ERR:
+                --num_inprogress;
+                loopargs[i].inprogress_job = NULL;
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "Failure in the job\n");
+                ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+                error = 1;
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    return error ? -1 : total_op_count;
+}
+
+int speed_main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    ENGINE *e = NULL;
+    loopargs_t *loopargs = NULL;
+    int async_init = 0;
+    int loopargs_len = 0;
+    char *prog;
+    const char *engine_id = NULL;
+    const EVP_CIPHER *evp_cipher = NULL;
+    double d = 0.0;
+    OPTION_CHOICE o;
+    int multiblock = 0, pr_header = 0;
+    int doit[ALGOR_NUM] = { 0 };
+    int ret = 1, i, k, misalign = 0;
+    long count = 0;
+#ifndef NO_FORK
+    int multi = 0;
+#endif
+    unsigned int async_jobs = 0;
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) \
+    || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
+    long rsa_count = 1;
+#endif
+    size_t loop;
+
+    /* What follows are the buffers and key material. */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC5
+    RC5_32_KEY rc5_ks;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC2
+    RC2_KEY rc2_ks;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_IDEA
+    IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE idea_ks;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SEED
+    SEED_KEY_SCHEDULE seed_ks;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BF
+    BF_KEY bf_ks;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAST
+    CAST_KEY cast_ks;
+#endif
+    static const unsigned char key16[16] = {
+        0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0x9a, 0xbc, 0xde, 0xf0,
+        0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0x9a, 0xbc, 0xde, 0xf0, 0x12
+    };
+    static const unsigned char key24[24] = {
+        0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0x9a, 0xbc, 0xde, 0xf0,
+        0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0x9a, 0xbc, 0xde, 0xf0, 0x12,
+        0x56, 0x78, 0x9a, 0xbc, 0xde, 0xf0, 0x12, 0x34
+    };
+    static const unsigned char key32[32] = {
+        0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0x9a, 0xbc, 0xde, 0xf0,
+        0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0x9a, 0xbc, 0xde, 0xf0, 0x12,
+        0x56, 0x78, 0x9a, 0xbc, 0xde, 0xf0, 0x12, 0x34,
+        0x78, 0x9a, 0xbc, 0xde, 0xf0, 0x12, 0x34, 0x56
+    };
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA
+    static const unsigned char ckey24[24] = {
+        0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0x9a, 0xbc, 0xde, 0xf0,
+        0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0x9a, 0xbc, 0xde, 0xf0, 0x12,
+        0x56, 0x78, 0x9a, 0xbc, 0xde, 0xf0, 0x12, 0x34
+    };
+    static const unsigned char ckey32[32] = {
+        0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0x9a, 0xbc, 0xde, 0xf0,
+        0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0x9a, 0xbc, 0xde, 0xf0, 0x12,
+        0x56, 0x78, 0x9a, 0xbc, 0xde, 0xf0, 0x12, 0x34,
+        0x78, 0x9a, 0xbc, 0xde, 0xf0, 0x12, 0x34, 0x56
+    };
+    CAMELLIA_KEY camellia_ks1, camellia_ks2, camellia_ks3;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
+    static DES_cblock key = {
+        0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0x9a, 0xbc, 0xde, 0xf0
+    };
+    static DES_cblock key2 = {
+        0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0x9a, 0xbc, 0xde, 0xf0, 0x12
+    };
+    static DES_cblock key3 = {
+        0x56, 0x78, 0x9a, 0xbc, 0xde, 0xf0, 0x12, 0x34
+    };
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+    static const unsigned int rsa_bits[RSA_NUM] = {
+        512, 1024, 2048, 3072, 4096, 7680, 15360
+    };
+    static const unsigned char *rsa_data[RSA_NUM] = {
+        test512, test1024, test2048, test3072, test4096, test7680, test15360
+    };
+    static const int rsa_data_length[RSA_NUM] = {
+        sizeof(test512), sizeof(test1024),
+        sizeof(test2048), sizeof(test3072),
+        sizeof(test4096), sizeof(test7680),
+        sizeof(test15360)
+    };
+    int rsa_doit[RSA_NUM] = { 0 };
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+    static const unsigned int dsa_bits[DSA_NUM] = { 512, 1024, 2048 };
+    int dsa_doit[DSA_NUM] = { 0 };
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    /*
+     * We only test over the following curves as they are representative, To
+     * add tests over more curves, simply add the curve NID and curve name to
+     * the following arrays and increase the EC_NUM value accordingly.
+     */
+    static const unsigned int test_curves[EC_NUM] = {
+        /* Prime Curves */
+        NID_secp160r1, NID_X9_62_prime192v1, NID_secp224r1,
+        NID_X9_62_prime256v1, NID_secp384r1, NID_secp521r1,
+        /* Binary Curves */
+        NID_sect163k1, NID_sect233k1, NID_sect283k1,
+        NID_sect409k1, NID_sect571k1, NID_sect163r2,
+        NID_sect233r1, NID_sect283r1, NID_sect409r1,
+        NID_sect571r1,
+        /* Other */
+        NID_X25519
+    };
+    static const char *test_curves_names[EC_NUM] = {
+        /* Prime Curves */
+        "secp160r1", "nistp192", "nistp224",
+        "nistp256", "nistp384", "nistp521",
+        /* Binary Curves */
+        "nistk163", "nistk233", "nistk283",
+        "nistk409", "nistk571", "nistb163",
+        "nistb233", "nistb283", "nistb409",
+        "nistb571",
+        /* Other */
+        "X25519"
+    };
+    static const int test_curves_bits[EC_NUM] = {
+        160, 192, 224,
+        256, 384, 521,
+        163, 233, 283,
+        409, 571, 163,
+        233, 283, 409,
+        571, 253 /* X25519 */
+    };
+
+    int ecdsa_doit[EC_NUM] = { 0 };
+    int ecdh_doit[EC_NUM] = { 0 };
+#endif                          /* ndef OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
+    prog = opt_init(argc, argv, speed_options);
+    while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) {
+        switch (o) {
+        case OPT_EOF:
+        case OPT_ERR:
+ opterr:
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog);
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_HELP:
+            opt_help(speed_options);
+            ret = 0;
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_ELAPSED:
+            usertime = 0;
+            break;
+        case OPT_EVP:
+            evp_md = NULL;
+            evp_cipher = EVP_get_cipherbyname(opt_arg());
+            if (evp_cipher == NULL)
+                evp_md = EVP_get_digestbyname(opt_arg());
+            if (evp_cipher == NULL && evp_md == NULL) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                           "%s: %s is an unknown cipher or digest\n",
+                           prog, opt_arg());
+                goto end;
+            }
+            doit[D_EVP] = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_DECRYPT:
+            decrypt = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_ENGINE:
+            /*
+             * In a forked execution, an engine might need to be
+             * initialised by each child process, not by the parent.
+             * So store the name here and run setup_engine() later on.
+             */
+            engine_id = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_MULTI:
+#ifndef NO_FORK
+            multi = atoi(opt_arg());
+#endif
+            break;
+        case OPT_ASYNCJOBS:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ASYNC
+            async_jobs = atoi(opt_arg());
+            if (!ASYNC_is_capable()) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                           "%s: async_jobs specified but async not supported\n",
+                           prog);
+                goto opterr;
+            }
+            if (async_jobs > 99999) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                           "%s: too many async_jobs\n",
+                           prog);
+                goto opterr;
+            }
+#endif
+            break;
+        case OPT_MISALIGN:
+            if (!opt_int(opt_arg(), &misalign))
+                goto end;
+            if (misalign > MISALIGN) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                           "%s: Maximum offset is %d\n", prog, MISALIGN);
+                goto opterr;
+            }
+            break;
+        case OPT_MR:
+            mr = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_MB:
+            multiblock = 1;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK
+            BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                       "%s: -mb specified but multi-block support is disabled\n",
+                       prog);
+            goto end;
+#endif
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    argc = opt_num_rest();
+    argv = opt_rest();
+
+    /* Remaining arguments are algorithms. */
+    for ( ; *argv; argv++) {
+        if (found(*argv, doit_choices, &i)) {
+            doit[i] = 1;
+            continue;
+        }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
+        if (strcmp(*argv, "des") == 0) {
+            doit[D_CBC_DES] = doit[D_EDE3_DES] = 1;
+            continue;
+        }
+#endif
+        if (strcmp(*argv, "sha") == 0) {
+            doit[D_SHA1] = doit[D_SHA256] = doit[D_SHA512] = 1;
+            continue;
+        }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+        if (strcmp(*argv, "openssl") == 0)
+            continue;
+        if (strcmp(*argv, "rsa") == 0) {
+            rsa_doit[R_RSA_512] = rsa_doit[R_RSA_1024] =
+                rsa_doit[R_RSA_2048] = rsa_doit[R_RSA_3072] =
+                rsa_doit[R_RSA_4096] = rsa_doit[R_RSA_7680] =
+                rsa_doit[R_RSA_15360] = 1;
+            continue;
+        }
+        if (found(*argv, rsa_choices, &i)) {
+            rsa_doit[i] = 1;
+            continue;
+        }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+        if (strcmp(*argv, "dsa") == 0) {
+            dsa_doit[R_DSA_512] = dsa_doit[R_DSA_1024] =
+                dsa_doit[R_DSA_2048] = 1;
+            continue;
+        }
+        if (found(*argv, dsa_choices, &i)) {
+            dsa_doit[i] = 2;
+            continue;
+        }
+#endif
+        if (strcmp(*argv, "aes") == 0) {
+            doit[D_CBC_128_AES] = doit[D_CBC_192_AES] =
+                doit[D_CBC_256_AES] = 1;
+            continue;
+        }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA
+        if (strcmp(*argv, "camellia") == 0) {
+            doit[D_CBC_128_CML] = doit[D_CBC_192_CML] =
+                doit[D_CBC_256_CML] = 1;
+            continue;
+        }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+        if (strcmp(*argv, "ecdsa") == 0) {
+            for (loop = 0; loop < OSSL_NELEM(ecdsa_choices); loop++)
+                ecdsa_doit[ecdsa_choices[loop].retval] = 1;
+            continue;
+        }
+        if (found(*argv, ecdsa_choices, &i)) {
+            ecdsa_doit[i] = 2;
+            continue;
+        }
+        if (strcmp(*argv, "ecdh") == 0) {
+            for (loop = 0; loop < OSSL_NELEM(ecdh_choices); loop++)
+                ecdh_doit[ecdh_choices[loop].retval] = 1;
+            continue;
+        }
+        if (found(*argv, ecdh_choices, &i)) {
+            ecdh_doit[i] = 2;
+            continue;
+        }
+#endif
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Unknown algorithm %s\n", prog, *argv);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    /* Initialize the job pool if async mode is enabled */
+    if (async_jobs > 0) {
+        async_init = ASYNC_init_thread(async_jobs, async_jobs);
+        if (!async_init) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error creating the ASYNC job pool\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+
+    loopargs_len = (async_jobs == 0 ? 1 : async_jobs);
+    loopargs = app_malloc(loopargs_len * sizeof(loopargs_t), "array of loopargs");
+    memset(loopargs, 0, loopargs_len * sizeof(loopargs_t));
+
+    for (i = 0; i < loopargs_len; i++) {
+        if (async_jobs > 0) {
+            loopargs[i].wait_ctx = ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_new();
+            if (loopargs[i].wait_ctx == NULL) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error creating the ASYNC_WAIT_CTX\n");
+                goto end;
+            }
+        }
+
+        loopargs[i].buf_malloc = app_malloc((int)BUFSIZE + MAX_MISALIGNMENT + 1, "input buffer");
+        loopargs[i].buf2_malloc = app_malloc((int)BUFSIZE + MAX_MISALIGNMENT + 1, "input buffer");
+        /* Align the start of buffers on a 64 byte boundary */
+        loopargs[i].buf = loopargs[i].buf_malloc + misalign;
+        loopargs[i].buf2 = loopargs[i].buf2_malloc + misalign;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+        loopargs[i].secret_a = app_malloc(MAX_ECDH_SIZE, "ECDH secret a");
+        loopargs[i].secret_b = app_malloc(MAX_ECDH_SIZE, "ECDH secret b");
+#endif
+    }
+
+#ifndef NO_FORK
+    if (multi && do_multi(multi))
+        goto show_res;
+#endif
+
+    /* Initialize the engine after the fork */
+    e = setup_engine(engine_id, 0);
+
+    /* No parameters; turn on everything. */
+    if ((argc == 0) && !doit[D_EVP]) {
+        for (i = 0; i < ALGOR_NUM; i++)
+            if (i != D_EVP)
+                doit[i] = 1;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+        for (i = 0; i < RSA_NUM; i++)
+            rsa_doit[i] = 1;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+        for (i = 0; i < DSA_NUM; i++)
+            dsa_doit[i] = 1;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+        for (loop = 0; loop < OSSL_NELEM(ecdsa_choices); loop++)
+            ecdsa_doit[ecdsa_choices[loop].retval] = 1;
+        for (loop = 0; loop < OSSL_NELEM(ecdh_choices); loop++)
+            ecdh_doit[ecdh_choices[loop].retval] = 1;
+#endif
+    }
+    for (i = 0; i < ALGOR_NUM; i++)
+        if (doit[i])
+            pr_header++;
+
+    if (usertime == 0 && !mr)
+        BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                   "You have chosen to measure elapsed time "
+                   "instead of user CPU time.\n");
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+    for (i = 0; i < loopargs_len; i++) {
+        for (k = 0; k < RSA_NUM; k++) {
+            const unsigned char *p;
+
+            p = rsa_data[k];
+            loopargs[i].rsa_key[k] = d2i_RSAPrivateKey(NULL, &p, rsa_data_length[k]);
+            if (loopargs[i].rsa_key[k] == NULL) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "internal error loading RSA key number %d\n",
+                        k);
+                goto end;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+    for (i = 0; i < loopargs_len; i++) {
+        loopargs[i].dsa_key[0] = get_dsa512();
+        loopargs[i].dsa_key[1] = get_dsa1024();
+        loopargs[i].dsa_key[2] = get_dsa2048();
+    }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
+    DES_set_key_unchecked(&key, &sch);
+    DES_set_key_unchecked(&key2, &sch2);
+    DES_set_key_unchecked(&key3, &sch3);
+#endif
+    AES_set_encrypt_key(key16, 128, &aes_ks1);
+    AES_set_encrypt_key(key24, 192, &aes_ks2);
+    AES_set_encrypt_key(key32, 256, &aes_ks3);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA
+    Camellia_set_key(key16, 128, &camellia_ks1);
+    Camellia_set_key(ckey24, 192, &camellia_ks2);
+    Camellia_set_key(ckey32, 256, &camellia_ks3);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_IDEA
+    IDEA_set_encrypt_key(key16, &idea_ks);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SEED
+    SEED_set_key(key16, &seed_ks);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
+    RC4_set_key(&rc4_ks, 16, key16);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC2
+    RC2_set_key(&rc2_ks, 16, key16, 128);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC5
+    RC5_32_set_key(&rc5_ks, 16, key16, 12);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BF
+    BF_set_key(&bf_ks, 16, key16);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAST
+    CAST_set_key(&cast_ks, 16, key16);
+#endif
+#ifndef SIGALRM
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
+    BIO_printf(bio_err, "First we calculate the approximate speed ...\n");
+    count = 10;
+    do {
+        long it;
+        count *= 2;
+        Time_F(START);
+        for (it = count; it; it--)
+            DES_ecb_encrypt((DES_cblock *)loopargs[0].buf,
+                            (DES_cblock *)loopargs[0].buf, &sch, DES_ENCRYPT);
+        d = Time_F(STOP);
+    } while (d < 3);
+    save_count = count;
+    c[D_MD2][0] = count / 10;
+    c[D_MDC2][0] = count / 10;
+    c[D_MD4][0] = count;
+    c[D_MD5][0] = count;
+    c[D_HMAC][0] = count;
+    c[D_SHA1][0] = count;
+    c[D_RMD160][0] = count;
+    c[D_RC4][0] = count * 5;
+    c[D_CBC_DES][0] = count;
+    c[D_EDE3_DES][0] = count / 3;
+    c[D_CBC_IDEA][0] = count;
+    c[D_CBC_SEED][0] = count;
+    c[D_CBC_RC2][0] = count;
+    c[D_CBC_RC5][0] = count;
+    c[D_CBC_BF][0] = count;
+    c[D_CBC_CAST][0] = count;
+    c[D_CBC_128_AES][0] = count;
+    c[D_CBC_192_AES][0] = count;
+    c[D_CBC_256_AES][0] = count;
+    c[D_CBC_128_CML][0] = count;
+    c[D_CBC_192_CML][0] = count;
+    c[D_CBC_256_CML][0] = count;
+    c[D_SHA256][0] = count;
+    c[D_SHA512][0] = count;
+    c[D_WHIRLPOOL][0] = count;
+    c[D_IGE_128_AES][0] = count;
+    c[D_IGE_192_AES][0] = count;
+    c[D_IGE_256_AES][0] = count;
+    c[D_GHASH][0] = count;
+
+    for (i = 1; i < SIZE_NUM; i++) {
+        long l0, l1;
+
+        l0 = (long)lengths[0];
+        l1 = (long)lengths[i];
+
+        c[D_MD2][i] = c[D_MD2][0] * 4 * l0 / l1;
+        c[D_MDC2][i] = c[D_MDC2][0] * 4 * l0 / l1;
+        c[D_MD4][i] = c[D_MD4][0] * 4 * l0 / l1;
+        c[D_MD5][i] = c[D_MD5][0] * 4 * l0 / l1;
+        c[D_HMAC][i] = c[D_HMAC][0] * 4 * l0 / l1;
+        c[D_SHA1][i] = c[D_SHA1][0] * 4 * l0 / l1;
+        c[D_RMD160][i] = c[D_RMD160][0] * 4 * l0 / l1;
+        c[D_SHA256][i] = c[D_SHA256][0] * 4 * l0 / l1;
+        c[D_SHA512][i] = c[D_SHA512][0] * 4 * l0 / l1;
+        c[D_WHIRLPOOL][i] = c[D_WHIRLPOOL][0] * 4 * l0 / l1;
+        c[D_GHASH][i] = c[D_GHASH][0] * 4 * l0 / l1;
+
+        l0 = (long)lengths[i - 1];
+
+        c[D_RC4][i] = c[D_RC4][i - 1] * l0 / l1;
+        c[D_CBC_DES][i] = c[D_CBC_DES][i - 1] * l0 / l1;
+        c[D_EDE3_DES][i] = c[D_EDE3_DES][i - 1] * l0 / l1;
+        c[D_CBC_IDEA][i] = c[D_CBC_IDEA][i - 1] * l0 / l1;
+        c[D_CBC_SEED][i] = c[D_CBC_SEED][i - 1] * l0 / l1;
+        c[D_CBC_RC2][i] = c[D_CBC_RC2][i - 1] * l0 / l1;
+        c[D_CBC_RC5][i] = c[D_CBC_RC5][i - 1] * l0 / l1;
+        c[D_CBC_BF][i] = c[D_CBC_BF][i - 1] * l0 / l1;
+        c[D_CBC_CAST][i] = c[D_CBC_CAST][i - 1] * l0 / l1;
+        c[D_CBC_128_AES][i] = c[D_CBC_128_AES][i - 1] * l0 / l1;
+        c[D_CBC_192_AES][i] = c[D_CBC_192_AES][i - 1] * l0 / l1;
+        c[D_CBC_256_AES][i] = c[D_CBC_256_AES][i - 1] * l0 / l1;
+        c[D_CBC_128_CML][i] = c[D_CBC_128_CML][i - 1] * l0 / l1;
+        c[D_CBC_192_CML][i] = c[D_CBC_192_CML][i - 1] * l0 / l1;
+        c[D_CBC_256_CML][i] = c[D_CBC_256_CML][i - 1] * l0 / l1;
+        c[D_IGE_128_AES][i] = c[D_IGE_128_AES][i - 1] * l0 / l1;
+        c[D_IGE_192_AES][i] = c[D_IGE_192_AES][i - 1] * l0 / l1;
+        c[D_IGE_256_AES][i] = c[D_IGE_256_AES][i - 1] * l0 / l1;
+    }
+
+#  ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+    rsa_c[R_RSA_512][0] = count / 2000;
+    rsa_c[R_RSA_512][1] = count / 400;
+    for (i = 1; i < RSA_NUM; i++) {
+        rsa_c[i][0] = rsa_c[i - 1][0] / 8;
+        rsa_c[i][1] = rsa_c[i - 1][1] / 4;
+        if (rsa_doit[i] <= 1 && rsa_c[i][0] == 0)
+            rsa_doit[i] = 0;
+        else {
+            if (rsa_c[i][0] == 0) {
+                rsa_c[i][0] = 1;            /* Set minimum iteration Nb to 1. */
+                rsa_c[i][1] = 20;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+#  endif
+
+#  ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+    dsa_c[R_DSA_512][0] = count / 1000;
+    dsa_c[R_DSA_512][1] = count / 1000 / 2;
+    for (i = 1; i < DSA_NUM; i++) {
+        dsa_c[i][0] = dsa_c[i - 1][0] / 4;
+        dsa_c[i][1] = dsa_c[i - 1][1] / 4;
+        if (dsa_doit[i] <= 1 && dsa_c[i][0] == 0)
+            dsa_doit[i] = 0;
+        else {
+            if (dsa_c[i][0] == 0) {
+                dsa_c[i][0] = 1;            /* Set minimum iteration Nb to 1. */
+                dsa_c[i][1] = 1;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+#  endif
+
+#  ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    ecdsa_c[R_EC_P160][0] = count / 1000;
+    ecdsa_c[R_EC_P160][1] = count / 1000 / 2;
+    for (i = R_EC_P192; i <= R_EC_P521; i++) {
+        ecdsa_c[i][0] = ecdsa_c[i - 1][0] / 2;
+        ecdsa_c[i][1] = ecdsa_c[i - 1][1] / 2;
+        if (ecdsa_doit[i] <= 1 && ecdsa_c[i][0] == 0)
+            ecdsa_doit[i] = 0;
+        else {
+            if (ecdsa_c[i][0] == 0) {
+                ecdsa_c[i][0] = 1;
+                ecdsa_c[i][1] = 1;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    ecdsa_c[R_EC_K163][0] = count / 1000;
+    ecdsa_c[R_EC_K163][1] = count / 1000 / 2;
+    for (i = R_EC_K233; i <= R_EC_K571; i++) {
+        ecdsa_c[i][0] = ecdsa_c[i - 1][0] / 2;
+        ecdsa_c[i][1] = ecdsa_c[i - 1][1] / 2;
+        if (ecdsa_doit[i] <= 1 && ecdsa_c[i][0] == 0)
+            ecdsa_doit[i] = 0;
+        else {
+            if (ecdsa_c[i][0] == 0) {
+                ecdsa_c[i][0] = 1;
+                ecdsa_c[i][1] = 1;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    ecdsa_c[R_EC_B163][0] = count / 1000;
+    ecdsa_c[R_EC_B163][1] = count / 1000 / 2;
+    for (i = R_EC_B233; i <= R_EC_B571; i++) {
+        ecdsa_c[i][0] = ecdsa_c[i - 1][0] / 2;
+        ecdsa_c[i][1] = ecdsa_c[i - 1][1] / 2;
+        if (ecdsa_doit[i] <= 1 && ecdsa_c[i][0] == 0)
+            ecdsa_doit[i] = 0;
+        else {
+            if (ecdsa_c[i][0] == 0) {
+                ecdsa_c[i][0] = 1;
+                ecdsa_c[i][1] = 1;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    ecdh_c[R_EC_P160][0] = count / 1000;
+    for (i = R_EC_P192; i <= R_EC_P521; i++) {
+        ecdh_c[i][0] = ecdh_c[i - 1][0] / 2;
+        if (ecdh_doit[i] <= 1 && ecdh_c[i][0] == 0)
+            ecdh_doit[i] = 0;
+        else {
+            if (ecdh_c[i][0] == 0) {
+                ecdh_c[i][0] = 1;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    ecdh_c[R_EC_K163][0] = count / 1000;
+    for (i = R_EC_K233; i <= R_EC_K571; i++) {
+        ecdh_c[i][0] = ecdh_c[i - 1][0] / 2;
+        if (ecdh_doit[i] <= 1 && ecdh_c[i][0] == 0)
+            ecdh_doit[i] = 0;
+        else {
+            if (ecdh_c[i][0] == 0) {
+                ecdh_c[i][0] = 1;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    ecdh_c[R_EC_B163][0] = count / 1000;
+    for (i = R_EC_B233; i <= R_EC_B571; i++) {
+        ecdh_c[i][0] = ecdh_c[i - 1][0] / 2;
+        if (ecdh_doit[i] <= 1 && ecdh_c[i][0] == 0)
+            ecdh_doit[i] = 0;
+        else {
+            if (ecdh_c[i][0] == 0) {
+                ecdh_c[i][0] = 1;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+#  endif
+
+# else
+/* not worth fixing */
+#  error "You cannot disable DES on systems without SIGALRM."
+# endif                        /* OPENSSL_NO_DES */
+#else
+# ifndef _WIN32
+    signal(SIGALRM, sig_done);
+# endif
+#endif                         /* SIGALRM */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD2
+    if (doit[D_MD2]) {
+        for (testnum = 0; testnum < SIZE_NUM; testnum++) {
+            print_message(names[D_MD2], c[D_MD2][testnum], lengths[testnum]);
+            Time_F(START);
+            count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, EVP_Digest_MD2_loop, loopargs);
+            d = Time_F(STOP);
+            print_result(D_MD2, testnum, count, d);
+        }
+    }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MDC2
+    if (doit[D_MDC2]) {
+        for (testnum = 0; testnum < SIZE_NUM; testnum++) {
+            print_message(names[D_MDC2], c[D_MDC2][testnum], lengths[testnum]);
+            Time_F(START);
+            count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, EVP_Digest_MDC2_loop, loopargs);
+            d = Time_F(STOP);
+            print_result(D_MDC2, testnum, count, d);
+        }
+    }
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD4
+    if (doit[D_MD4]) {
+        for (testnum = 0; testnum < SIZE_NUM; testnum++) {
+            print_message(names[D_MD4], c[D_MD4][testnum], lengths[testnum]);
+            Time_F(START);
+            count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, EVP_Digest_MD4_loop, loopargs);
+            d = Time_F(STOP);
+            print_result(D_MD4, testnum, count, d);
+        }
+    }
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+    if (doit[D_MD5]) {
+        for (testnum = 0; testnum < SIZE_NUM; testnum++) {
+            print_message(names[D_MD5], c[D_MD5][testnum], lengths[testnum]);
+            Time_F(START);
+            count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, MD5_loop, loopargs);
+            d = Time_F(STOP);
+            print_result(D_MD5, testnum, count, d);
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (doit[D_HMAC]) {
+        static const char hmac_key[] = "This is a key...";
+        int len = strlen(hmac_key);
+
+        for (i = 0; i < loopargs_len; i++) {
+            loopargs[i].hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
+            if (loopargs[i].hctx == NULL) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "HMAC malloc failure, exiting...");
+                exit(1);
+            }
+
+            HMAC_Init_ex(loopargs[i].hctx, hmac_key, len, EVP_md5(), NULL);
+        }
+        for (testnum = 0; testnum < SIZE_NUM; testnum++) {
+            print_message(names[D_HMAC], c[D_HMAC][testnum], lengths[testnum]);
+            Time_F(START);
+            count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, HMAC_loop, loopargs);
+            d = Time_F(STOP);
+            print_result(D_HMAC, testnum, count, d);
+        }
+        for (i = 0; i < loopargs_len; i++) {
+            HMAC_CTX_free(loopargs[i].hctx);
+        }
+    }
+#endif
+    if (doit[D_SHA1]) {
+        for (testnum = 0; testnum < SIZE_NUM; testnum++) {
+            print_message(names[D_SHA1], c[D_SHA1][testnum], lengths[testnum]);
+            Time_F(START);
+            count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, SHA1_loop, loopargs);
+            d = Time_F(STOP);
+            print_result(D_SHA1, testnum, count, d);
+        }
+    }
+    if (doit[D_SHA256]) {
+        for (testnum = 0; testnum < SIZE_NUM; testnum++) {
+            print_message(names[D_SHA256], c[D_SHA256][testnum], lengths[testnum]);
+            Time_F(START);
+            count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, SHA256_loop, loopargs);
+            d = Time_F(STOP);
+            print_result(D_SHA256, testnum, count, d);
+        }
+    }
+    if (doit[D_SHA512]) {
+        for (testnum = 0; testnum < SIZE_NUM; testnum++) {
+            print_message(names[D_SHA512], c[D_SHA512][testnum], lengths[testnum]);
+            Time_F(START);
+            count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, SHA512_loop, loopargs);
+            d = Time_F(STOP);
+            print_result(D_SHA512, testnum, count, d);
+        }
+    }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WHIRLPOOL
+    if (doit[D_WHIRLPOOL]) {
+        for (testnum = 0; testnum < SIZE_NUM; testnum++) {
+            print_message(names[D_WHIRLPOOL], c[D_WHIRLPOOL][testnum], lengths[testnum]);
+            Time_F(START);
+            count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, WHIRLPOOL_loop, loopargs);
+            d = Time_F(STOP);
+            print_result(D_WHIRLPOOL, testnum, count, d);
+        }
+    }
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RMD160
+    if (doit[D_RMD160]) {
+        for (testnum = 0; testnum < SIZE_NUM; testnum++) {
+            print_message(names[D_RMD160], c[D_RMD160][testnum], lengths[testnum]);
+            Time_F(START);
+            count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, EVP_Digest_RMD160_loop, loopargs);
+            d = Time_F(STOP);
+            print_result(D_RMD160, testnum, count, d);
+        }
+    }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
+    if (doit[D_RC4]) {
+        for (testnum = 0; testnum < SIZE_NUM; testnum++) {
+            print_message(names[D_RC4], c[D_RC4][testnum], lengths[testnum]);
+            Time_F(START);
+            count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, RC4_loop, loopargs);
+            d = Time_F(STOP);
+            print_result(D_RC4, testnum, count, d);
+        }
+    }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
+    if (doit[D_CBC_DES]) {
+        for (testnum = 0; testnum < SIZE_NUM; testnum++) {
+            print_message(names[D_CBC_DES], c[D_CBC_DES][testnum], lengths[testnum]);
+            Time_F(START);
+            count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, DES_ncbc_encrypt_loop, loopargs);
+            d = Time_F(STOP);
+            print_result(D_CBC_DES, testnum, count, d);
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (doit[D_EDE3_DES]) {
+        for (testnum = 0; testnum < SIZE_NUM; testnum++) {
+            print_message(names[D_EDE3_DES], c[D_EDE3_DES][testnum], lengths[testnum]);
+            Time_F(START);
+            count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt_loop, loopargs);
+            d = Time_F(STOP);
+            print_result(D_EDE3_DES, testnum, count, d);
+        }
+    }
+#endif
+
+    if (doit[D_CBC_128_AES]) {
+        for (testnum = 0; testnum < SIZE_NUM; testnum++) {
+            print_message(names[D_CBC_128_AES], c[D_CBC_128_AES][testnum],
+                          lengths[testnum]);
+            Time_F(START);
+            count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, AES_cbc_128_encrypt_loop, loopargs);
+            d = Time_F(STOP);
+            print_result(D_CBC_128_AES, testnum, count, d);
+        }
+    }
+    if (doit[D_CBC_192_AES]) {
+        for (testnum = 0; testnum < SIZE_NUM; testnum++) {
+            print_message(names[D_CBC_192_AES], c[D_CBC_192_AES][testnum],
+                          lengths[testnum]);
+            Time_F(START);
+            count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, AES_cbc_192_encrypt_loop, loopargs);
+            d = Time_F(STOP);
+            print_result(D_CBC_192_AES, testnum, count, d);
+        }
+    }
+    if (doit[D_CBC_256_AES]) {
+        for (testnum = 0; testnum < SIZE_NUM; testnum++) {
+            print_message(names[D_CBC_256_AES], c[D_CBC_256_AES][testnum],
+                          lengths[testnum]);
+            Time_F(START);
+            count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, AES_cbc_256_encrypt_loop, loopargs);
+            d = Time_F(STOP);
+            print_result(D_CBC_256_AES, testnum, count, d);
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (doit[D_IGE_128_AES]) {
+        for (testnum = 0; testnum < SIZE_NUM; testnum++) {
+            print_message(names[D_IGE_128_AES], c[D_IGE_128_AES][testnum],
+                          lengths[testnum]);
+            Time_F(START);
+            count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, AES_ige_128_encrypt_loop, loopargs);
+            d = Time_F(STOP);
+            print_result(D_IGE_128_AES, testnum, count, d);
+        }
+    }
+    if (doit[D_IGE_192_AES]) {
+        for (testnum = 0; testnum < SIZE_NUM; testnum++) {
+            print_message(names[D_IGE_192_AES], c[D_IGE_192_AES][testnum],
+                          lengths[testnum]);
+            Time_F(START);
+            count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, AES_ige_192_encrypt_loop, loopargs);
+            d = Time_F(STOP);
+            print_result(D_IGE_192_AES, testnum, count, d);
+        }
+    }
+    if (doit[D_IGE_256_AES]) {
+        for (testnum = 0; testnum < SIZE_NUM; testnum++) {
+            print_message(names[D_IGE_256_AES], c[D_IGE_256_AES][testnum],
+                          lengths[testnum]);
+            Time_F(START);
+            count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, AES_ige_256_encrypt_loop, loopargs);
+            d = Time_F(STOP);
+            print_result(D_IGE_256_AES, testnum, count, d);
+        }
+    }
+    if (doit[D_GHASH]) {
+        for (i = 0; i < loopargs_len; i++) {
+            loopargs[i].gcm_ctx = CRYPTO_gcm128_new(&aes_ks1, (block128_f) AES_encrypt);
+            CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(loopargs[i].gcm_ctx, (unsigned char *)"0123456789ab", 12);
+        }
+
+        for (testnum = 0; testnum < SIZE_NUM; testnum++) {
+            print_message(names[D_GHASH], c[D_GHASH][testnum], lengths[testnum]);
+            Time_F(START);
+            count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, CRYPTO_gcm128_aad_loop, loopargs);
+            d = Time_F(STOP);
+            print_result(D_GHASH, testnum, count, d);
+        }
+        for (i = 0; i < loopargs_len; i++)
+            CRYPTO_gcm128_release(loopargs[i].gcm_ctx);
+    }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA
+    if (doit[D_CBC_128_CML]) {
+        if (async_jobs > 0) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Async mode is not supported with %s\n",
+                       names[D_CBC_128_CML]);
+            doit[D_CBC_128_CML] = 0;
+        }
+        for (testnum = 0; testnum < SIZE_NUM && async_init == 0; testnum++) {
+            print_message(names[D_CBC_128_CML], c[D_CBC_128_CML][testnum],
+                          lengths[testnum]);
+            Time_F(START);
+            for (count = 0, run = 1; COND(c[D_CBC_128_CML][testnum]); count++)
+                Camellia_cbc_encrypt(loopargs[0].buf, loopargs[0].buf,
+                                     (size_t)lengths[testnum], &camellia_ks1,
+                                     iv, CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT);
+            d = Time_F(STOP);
+            print_result(D_CBC_128_CML, testnum, count, d);
+        }
+    }
+    if (doit[D_CBC_192_CML]) {
+        if (async_jobs > 0) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Async mode is not supported with %s\n",
+                       names[D_CBC_192_CML]);
+            doit[D_CBC_192_CML] = 0;
+        }
+        for (testnum = 0; testnum < SIZE_NUM && async_init == 0; testnum++) {
+            print_message(names[D_CBC_192_CML], c[D_CBC_192_CML][testnum],
+                          lengths[testnum]);
+            if (async_jobs > 0) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "Async mode is not supported, exiting...");
+                exit(1);
+            }
+            Time_F(START);
+            for (count = 0, run = 1; COND(c[D_CBC_192_CML][testnum]); count++)
+                Camellia_cbc_encrypt(loopargs[0].buf, loopargs[0].buf,
+                                     (size_t)lengths[testnum], &camellia_ks2,
+                                     iv, CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT);
+            d = Time_F(STOP);
+            print_result(D_CBC_192_CML, testnum, count, d);
+        }
+    }
+    if (doit[D_CBC_256_CML]) {
+        if (async_jobs > 0) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Async mode is not supported with %s\n",
+                       names[D_CBC_256_CML]);
+            doit[D_CBC_256_CML] = 0;
+        }
+        for (testnum = 0; testnum < SIZE_NUM && async_init == 0; testnum++) {
+            print_message(names[D_CBC_256_CML], c[D_CBC_256_CML][testnum],
+                          lengths[testnum]);
+            Time_F(START);
+            for (count = 0, run = 1; COND(c[D_CBC_256_CML][testnum]); count++)
+                Camellia_cbc_encrypt(loopargs[0].buf, loopargs[0].buf,
+                                     (size_t)lengths[testnum], &camellia_ks3,
+                                     iv, CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT);
+            d = Time_F(STOP);
+            print_result(D_CBC_256_CML, testnum, count, d);
+        }
+    }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_IDEA
+    if (doit[D_CBC_IDEA]) {
+        if (async_jobs > 0) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Async mode is not supported with %s\n",
+                       names[D_CBC_IDEA]);
+            doit[D_CBC_IDEA] = 0;
+        }
+        for (testnum = 0; testnum < SIZE_NUM && async_init == 0; testnum++) {
+            print_message(names[D_CBC_IDEA], c[D_CBC_IDEA][testnum], lengths[testnum]);
+            Time_F(START);
+            for (count = 0, run = 1; COND(c[D_CBC_IDEA][testnum]); count++)
+                IDEA_cbc_encrypt(loopargs[0].buf, loopargs[0].buf,
+                                 (size_t)lengths[testnum], &idea_ks,
+                                 iv, IDEA_ENCRYPT);
+            d = Time_F(STOP);
+            print_result(D_CBC_IDEA, testnum, count, d);
+        }
+    }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SEED
+    if (doit[D_CBC_SEED]) {
+        if (async_jobs > 0) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Async mode is not supported with %s\n",
+                       names[D_CBC_SEED]);
+            doit[D_CBC_SEED] = 0;
+        }
+        for (testnum = 0; testnum < SIZE_NUM && async_init == 0; testnum++) {
+            print_message(names[D_CBC_SEED], c[D_CBC_SEED][testnum], lengths[testnum]);
+            Time_F(START);
+            for (count = 0, run = 1; COND(c[D_CBC_SEED][testnum]); count++)
+                SEED_cbc_encrypt(loopargs[0].buf, loopargs[0].buf,
+                                 (size_t)lengths[testnum], &seed_ks, iv, 1);
+            d = Time_F(STOP);
+            print_result(D_CBC_SEED, testnum, count, d);
+        }
+    }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC2
+    if (doit[D_CBC_RC2]) {
+        if (async_jobs > 0) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Async mode is not supported with %s\n",
+                       names[D_CBC_RC2]);
+            doit[D_CBC_RC2] = 0;
+        }
+        for (testnum = 0; testnum < SIZE_NUM && async_init == 0; testnum++) {
+            print_message(names[D_CBC_RC2], c[D_CBC_RC2][testnum], lengths[testnum]);
+            if (async_jobs > 0) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "Async mode is not supported, exiting...");
+                exit(1);
+            }
+            Time_F(START);
+            for (count = 0, run = 1; COND(c[D_CBC_RC2][testnum]); count++)
+                RC2_cbc_encrypt(loopargs[0].buf, loopargs[0].buf,
+                                (size_t)lengths[testnum], &rc2_ks,
+                                iv, RC2_ENCRYPT);
+            d = Time_F(STOP);
+            print_result(D_CBC_RC2, testnum, count, d);
+        }
+    }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC5
+    if (doit[D_CBC_RC5]) {
+        if (async_jobs > 0) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Async mode is not supported with %s\n",
+                       names[D_CBC_RC5]);
+            doit[D_CBC_RC5] = 0;
+        }
+        for (testnum = 0; testnum < SIZE_NUM && async_init == 0; testnum++) {
+            print_message(names[D_CBC_RC5], c[D_CBC_RC5][testnum], lengths[testnum]);
+            if (async_jobs > 0) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "Async mode is not supported, exiting...");
+                exit(1);
+            }
+            Time_F(START);
+            for (count = 0, run = 1; COND(c[D_CBC_RC5][testnum]); count++)
+                RC5_32_cbc_encrypt(loopargs[0].buf, loopargs[0].buf,
+                                   (size_t)lengths[testnum], &rc5_ks,
+                                   iv, RC5_ENCRYPT);
+            d = Time_F(STOP);
+            print_result(D_CBC_RC5, testnum, count, d);
+        }
+    }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BF
+    if (doit[D_CBC_BF]) {
+        if (async_jobs > 0) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Async mode is not supported with %s\n",
+                       names[D_CBC_BF]);
+            doit[D_CBC_BF] = 0;
+        }
+        for (testnum = 0; testnum < SIZE_NUM && async_init == 0; testnum++) {
+            print_message(names[D_CBC_BF], c[D_CBC_BF][testnum], lengths[testnum]);
+            Time_F(START);
+            for (count = 0, run = 1; COND(c[D_CBC_BF][testnum]); count++)
+                BF_cbc_encrypt(loopargs[0].buf, loopargs[0].buf,
+                               (size_t)lengths[testnum], &bf_ks,
+                               iv, BF_ENCRYPT);
+            d = Time_F(STOP);
+            print_result(D_CBC_BF, testnum, count, d);
+        }
+    }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAST
+    if (doit[D_CBC_CAST]) {
+        if (async_jobs > 0) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Async mode is not supported with %s\n",
+                       names[D_CBC_CAST]);
+            doit[D_CBC_CAST] = 0;
+        }
+        for (testnum = 0; testnum < SIZE_NUM && async_init == 0; testnum++) {
+            print_message(names[D_CBC_CAST], c[D_CBC_CAST][testnum], lengths[testnum]);
+            Time_F(START);
+            for (count = 0, run = 1; COND(c[D_CBC_CAST][testnum]); count++)
+                CAST_cbc_encrypt(loopargs[0].buf, loopargs[0].buf,
+                                 (size_t)lengths[testnum], &cast_ks,
+                                 iv, CAST_ENCRYPT);
+            d = Time_F(STOP);
+            print_result(D_CBC_CAST, testnum, count, d);
+        }
+    }
+#endif
+
+    if (doit[D_EVP]) {
+        if (multiblock && evp_cipher) {
+            if (!
+                (EVP_CIPHER_flags(evp_cipher) &
+                 EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK)) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s is not multi-block capable\n",
+                           OBJ_nid2ln(EVP_CIPHER_nid(evp_cipher)));
+                goto end;
+            }
+            if (async_jobs > 0) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "Async mode is not supported, exiting...");
+                exit(1);
+            }
+            multiblock_speed(evp_cipher);
+            ret = 0;
+            goto end;
+        }
+        for (testnum = 0; testnum < SIZE_NUM; testnum++) {
+            if (evp_cipher) {
+
+                names[D_EVP] = OBJ_nid2ln(EVP_CIPHER_nid(evp_cipher));
+                /*
+                 * -O3 -fschedule-insns messes up an optimization here!
+                 * names[D_EVP] somehow becomes NULL
+                 */
+                print_message(names[D_EVP], save_count, lengths[testnum]);
+
+                for (k = 0; k < loopargs_len; k++) {
+                    loopargs[k].ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+                    if (decrypt)
+                        EVP_DecryptInit_ex(loopargs[k].ctx, evp_cipher, NULL, key16, iv);
+                    else
+                        EVP_EncryptInit_ex(loopargs[k].ctx, evp_cipher, NULL, key16, iv);
+                    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(loopargs[k].ctx, 0);
+                }
+
+                Time_F(START);
+                count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, EVP_Update_loop, loopargs);
+                d = Time_F(STOP);
+                for (k = 0; k < loopargs_len; k++) {
+                    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(loopargs[k].ctx);
+                }
+            }
+            if (evp_md) {
+                names[D_EVP] = OBJ_nid2ln(EVP_MD_type(evp_md));
+                print_message(names[D_EVP], save_count, lengths[testnum]);
+                Time_F(START);
+                count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, EVP_Digest_loop, loopargs);
+                d = Time_F(STOP);
+            }
+            print_result(D_EVP, testnum, count, d);
+        }
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0; i < loopargs_len; i++)
+        RAND_bytes(loopargs[i].buf, 36);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+    for (testnum = 0; testnum < RSA_NUM; testnum++) {
+        int st = 0;
+        if (!rsa_doit[testnum])
+            continue;
+        for (i = 0; i < loopargs_len; i++) {
+            st = RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, loopargs[i].buf, 36, loopargs[i].buf2,
+                          &loopargs[i].siglen, loopargs[i].rsa_key[testnum]);
+            if (st == 0)
+                break;
+        }
+        if (st == 0) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                       "RSA sign failure.  No RSA sign will be done.\n");
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            rsa_count = 1;
+        } else {
+            pkey_print_message("private", "rsa",
+                               rsa_c[testnum][0], rsa_bits[testnum], RSA_SECONDS);
+            /* RSA_blinding_on(rsa_key[testnum],NULL); */
+            Time_F(START);
+            count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, RSA_sign_loop, loopargs);
+            d = Time_F(STOP);
+            BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                       mr ? "+R1:%ld:%d:%.2f\n"
+                       : "%ld %d bit private RSA's in %.2fs\n",
+                       count, rsa_bits[testnum], d);
+            rsa_results[testnum][0] = d / (double)count;
+            rsa_count = count;
+        }
+
+        for (i = 0; i < loopargs_len; i++) {
+            st = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, loopargs[i].buf, 36, loopargs[i].buf2,
+                            loopargs[i].siglen, loopargs[i].rsa_key[testnum]);
+            if (st <= 0)
+                break;
+        }
+        if (st <= 0) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                       "RSA verify failure.  No RSA verify will be done.\n");
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            rsa_doit[testnum] = 0;
+        } else {
+            pkey_print_message("public", "rsa",
+                               rsa_c[testnum][1], rsa_bits[testnum], RSA_SECONDS);
+            Time_F(START);
+            count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, RSA_verify_loop, loopargs);
+            d = Time_F(STOP);
+            BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                       mr ? "+R2:%ld:%d:%.2f\n"
+                       : "%ld %d bit public RSA's in %.2fs\n",
+                       count, rsa_bits[testnum], d);
+            rsa_results[testnum][1] = d / (double)count;
+        }
+
+        if (rsa_count <= 1) {
+            /* if longer than 10s, don't do any more */
+            for (testnum++; testnum < RSA_NUM; testnum++)
+                rsa_doit[testnum] = 0;
+        }
+    }
+#endif                          /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+
+    for (i = 0; i < loopargs_len; i++)
+        RAND_bytes(loopargs[i].buf, 36);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+    if (RAND_status() != 1) {
+        RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof(rnd_seed));
+    }
+    for (testnum = 0; testnum < DSA_NUM; testnum++) {
+        int st = 0;
+        if (!dsa_doit[testnum])
+            continue;
+
+        /* DSA_generate_key(dsa_key[testnum]); */
+        /* DSA_sign_setup(dsa_key[testnum],NULL); */
+        for (i = 0; i < loopargs_len; i++) {
+            st = DSA_sign(0, loopargs[i].buf, 20, loopargs[i].buf2,
+                          &loopargs[i].siglen, loopargs[i].dsa_key[testnum]);
+            if (st == 0)
+                break;
+        }
+        if (st == 0) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                       "DSA sign failure.  No DSA sign will be done.\n");
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            rsa_count = 1;
+        } else {
+            pkey_print_message("sign", "dsa",
+                               dsa_c[testnum][0], dsa_bits[testnum], DSA_SECONDS);
+            Time_F(START);
+            count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, DSA_sign_loop, loopargs);
+            d = Time_F(STOP);
+            BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                       mr ? "+R3:%ld:%d:%.2f\n"
+                       : "%ld %d bit DSA signs in %.2fs\n",
+                       count, dsa_bits[testnum], d);
+            dsa_results[testnum][0] = d / (double)count;
+            rsa_count = count;
+        }
+
+        for (i = 0; i < loopargs_len; i++) {
+            st = DSA_verify(0, loopargs[i].buf, 20, loopargs[i].buf2,
+                            loopargs[i].siglen, loopargs[i].dsa_key[testnum]);
+            if (st <= 0)
+                break;
+        }
+        if (st <= 0) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                       "DSA verify failure.  No DSA verify will be done.\n");
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            dsa_doit[testnum] = 0;
+        } else {
+            pkey_print_message("verify", "dsa",
+                               dsa_c[testnum][1], dsa_bits[testnum], DSA_SECONDS);
+            Time_F(START);
+            count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, DSA_verify_loop, loopargs);
+            d = Time_F(STOP);
+            BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                       mr ? "+R4:%ld:%d:%.2f\n"
+                       : "%ld %d bit DSA verify in %.2fs\n",
+                       count, dsa_bits[testnum], d);
+            dsa_results[testnum][1] = d / (double)count;
+        }
+
+        if (rsa_count <= 1) {
+            /* if longer than 10s, don't do any more */
+            for (testnum++; testnum < DSA_NUM; testnum++)
+                dsa_doit[testnum] = 0;
+        }
+    }
+#endif                          /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    if (RAND_status() != 1) {
+        RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof(rnd_seed));
+    }
+    for (testnum = 0; testnum < EC_NUM; testnum++) {
+        int st = 1;
+
+        if (!ecdsa_doit[testnum])
+            continue;           /* Ignore Curve */
+        for (i = 0; i < loopargs_len; i++) {
+            loopargs[i].ecdsa[testnum] = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(test_curves[testnum]);
+            if (loopargs[i].ecdsa[testnum] == NULL) {
+                st = 0;
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+        if (st == 0) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "ECDSA failure.\n");
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            rsa_count = 1;
+        } else {
+            for (i = 0; i < loopargs_len; i++) {
+                EC_KEY_precompute_mult(loopargs[i].ecdsa[testnum], NULL);
+                /* Perform ECDSA signature test */
+                EC_KEY_generate_key(loopargs[i].ecdsa[testnum]);
+                st = ECDSA_sign(0, loopargs[i].buf, 20, loopargs[i].buf2,
+                                &loopargs[i].siglen, loopargs[i].ecdsa[testnum]);
+                if (st == 0)
+                    break;
+            }
+            if (st == 0) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                           "ECDSA sign failure.  No ECDSA sign will be done.\n");
+                ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+                rsa_count = 1;
+            } else {
+                pkey_print_message("sign", "ecdsa",
+                                   ecdsa_c[testnum][0],
+                                   test_curves_bits[testnum], ECDSA_SECONDS);
+                Time_F(START);
+                count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, ECDSA_sign_loop, loopargs);
+                d = Time_F(STOP);
+
+                BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                           mr ? "+R5:%ld:%d:%.2f\n" :
+                           "%ld %d bit ECDSA signs in %.2fs \n",
+                           count, test_curves_bits[testnum], d);
+                ecdsa_results[testnum][0] = d / (double)count;
+                rsa_count = count;
+            }
+
+            /* Perform ECDSA verification test */
+            for (i = 0; i < loopargs_len; i++) {
+                st = ECDSA_verify(0, loopargs[i].buf, 20, loopargs[i].buf2,
+                                  loopargs[i].siglen, loopargs[i].ecdsa[testnum]);
+                if (st != 1)
+                    break;
+            }
+            if (st != 1) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                           "ECDSA verify failure.  No ECDSA verify will be done.\n");
+                ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+                ecdsa_doit[testnum] = 0;
+            } else {
+                pkey_print_message("verify", "ecdsa",
+                                   ecdsa_c[testnum][1],
+                                   test_curves_bits[testnum], ECDSA_SECONDS);
+                Time_F(START);
+                count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, ECDSA_verify_loop, loopargs);
+                d = Time_F(STOP);
+                BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                           mr ? "+R6:%ld:%d:%.2f\n"
+                           : "%ld %d bit ECDSA verify in %.2fs\n",
+                           count, test_curves_bits[testnum], d);
+                ecdsa_results[testnum][1] = d / (double)count;
+            }
+
+            if (rsa_count <= 1) {
+                /* if longer than 10s, don't do any more */
+                for (testnum++; testnum < EC_NUM; testnum++)
+                    ecdsa_doit[testnum] = 0;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (RAND_status() != 1) {
+        RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof(rnd_seed));
+    }
+    for (testnum = 0; testnum < EC_NUM; testnum++) {
+        int ecdh_checks = 1;
+
+        if (!ecdh_doit[testnum])
+            continue;
+        for (i = 0; i < loopargs_len; i++) {
+            loopargs[i].ecdh_a[testnum] = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(test_curves[testnum]);
+            loopargs[i].ecdh_b[testnum] = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(test_curves[testnum]);
+            if (loopargs[i].ecdh_a[testnum] == NULL ||
+                loopargs[i].ecdh_b[testnum] == NULL) {
+                ecdh_checks = 0;
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+        if (ecdh_checks == 0) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "ECDH failure.\n");
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            rsa_count = 1;
+        } else {
+            for (i = 0; i < loopargs_len; i++) {
+                /* generate two ECDH key pairs */
+                if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(loopargs[i].ecdh_a[testnum]) ||
+                        !EC_KEY_generate_key(loopargs[i].ecdh_b[testnum])) {
+                    BIO_printf(bio_err, "ECDH key generation failure.\n");
+                    ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+                    ecdh_checks = 0;
+                    rsa_count = 1;
+                } else {
+                    int secret_size_a, secret_size_b;
+                    /*
+                     * If field size is not more than 24 octets, then use SHA-1
+                     * hash of result; otherwise, use result (see section 4.8 of
+                     * draft-ietf-tls-ecc-03.txt).
+                     */
+                    int field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(
+                            EC_KEY_get0_group(loopargs[i].ecdh_a[testnum]));
+
+                    if (field_size <= 24 * 8) {                 /* 192 bits */
+                        loopargs[i].outlen = KDF1_SHA1_len;
+                        loopargs[i].kdf = KDF1_SHA1;
+                    } else {
+                        loopargs[i].outlen = (field_size + 7) / 8;
+                        loopargs[i].kdf = NULL;
+                    }
+                    secret_size_a =
+                        ECDH_compute_key(loopargs[i].secret_a, loopargs[i].outlen,
+                                EC_KEY_get0_public_key(loopargs[i].ecdh_b[testnum]),
+                                loopargs[i].ecdh_a[testnum], loopargs[i].kdf);
+                    secret_size_b =
+                        ECDH_compute_key(loopargs[i].secret_b, loopargs[i].outlen,
+                                EC_KEY_get0_public_key(loopargs[i].ecdh_a[testnum]),
+                                loopargs[i].ecdh_b[testnum], loopargs[i].kdf);
+                    if (secret_size_a != secret_size_b)
+                        ecdh_checks = 0;
+                    else
+                        ecdh_checks = 1;
+
+                    for (k = 0; k < secret_size_a && ecdh_checks == 1; k++) {
+                        if (loopargs[i].secret_a[k] != loopargs[i].secret_b[k])
+                            ecdh_checks = 0;
+                    }
+
+                    if (ecdh_checks == 0) {
+                        BIO_printf(bio_err, "ECDH computations don't match.\n");
+                        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+                        rsa_count = 1;
+                        break;
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+            if (ecdh_checks != 0) {
+                pkey_print_message("", "ecdh",
+                        ecdh_c[testnum][0],
+                        test_curves_bits[testnum], ECDH_SECONDS);
+                Time_F(START);
+                count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, ECDH_compute_key_loop, loopargs);
+                d = Time_F(STOP);
+                BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                        mr ? "+R7:%ld:%d:%.2f\n" :
+                        "%ld %d-bit ECDH ops in %.2fs\n", count,
+                        test_curves_bits[testnum], d);
+                ecdh_results[testnum][0] = d / (double)count;
+                rsa_count = count;
+            }
+        }
+
+        if (rsa_count <= 1) {
+            /* if longer than 10s, don't do any more */
+            for (testnum++; testnum < EC_NUM; testnum++)
+                ecdh_doit[testnum] = 0;
+        }
+    }
+#endif                          /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+#ifndef NO_FORK
+ show_res:
+#endif
+    if (!mr) {
+        printf("%s\n", OpenSSL_version(OPENSSL_VERSION));
+        printf("%s\n", OpenSSL_version(OPENSSL_BUILT_ON));
+        printf("options:");
+        printf("%s ", BN_options());
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD2
+        printf("%s ", MD2_options());
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
+        printf("%s ", RC4_options());
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
+        printf("%s ", DES_options());
+#endif
+        printf("%s ", AES_options());
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_IDEA
+        printf("%s ", IDEA_options());
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BF
+        printf("%s ", BF_options());
+#endif
+        printf("\n%s\n", OpenSSL_version(OPENSSL_CFLAGS));
+    }
+
+    if (pr_header) {
+        if (mr)
+            printf("+H");
+        else {
+            printf
+                ("The 'numbers' are in 1000s of bytes per second processed.\n");
+            printf("type        ");
+        }
+        for (testnum = 0; testnum < SIZE_NUM; testnum++)
+            printf(mr ? ":%d" : "%7d bytes", lengths[testnum]);
+        printf("\n");
+    }
+
+    for (k = 0; k < ALGOR_NUM; k++) {
+        if (!doit[k])
+            continue;
+        if (mr)
+            printf("+F:%d:%s", k, names[k]);
+        else
+            printf("%-13s", names[k]);
+        for (testnum = 0; testnum < SIZE_NUM; testnum++) {
+            if (results[k][testnum] > 10000 && !mr)
+                printf(" %11.2fk", results[k][testnum] / 1e3);
+            else
+                printf(mr ? ":%.2f" : " %11.2f ", results[k][testnum]);
+        }
+        printf("\n");
+    }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+    testnum = 1;
+    for (k = 0; k < RSA_NUM; k++) {
+        if (!rsa_doit[k])
+            continue;
+        if (testnum && !mr) {
+            printf("%18ssign    verify    sign/s verify/s\n", " ");
+            testnum = 0;
+        }
+        if (mr)
+            printf("+F2:%u:%u:%f:%f\n",
+                   k, rsa_bits[k], rsa_results[k][0], rsa_results[k][1]);
+        else
+            printf("rsa %4u bits %8.6fs %8.6fs %8.1f %8.1f\n",
+                   rsa_bits[k], rsa_results[k][0], rsa_results[k][1],
+                   1.0 / rsa_results[k][0], 1.0 / rsa_results[k][1]);
+    }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+    testnum = 1;
+    for (k = 0; k < DSA_NUM; k++) {
+        if (!dsa_doit[k])
+            continue;
+        if (testnum && !mr) {
+            printf("%18ssign    verify    sign/s verify/s\n", " ");
+            testnum = 0;
+        }
+        if (mr)
+            printf("+F3:%u:%u:%f:%f\n",
+                   k, dsa_bits[k], dsa_results[k][0], dsa_results[k][1]);
+        else
+            printf("dsa %4u bits %8.6fs %8.6fs %8.1f %8.1f\n",
+                   dsa_bits[k], dsa_results[k][0], dsa_results[k][1],
+                   1.0 / dsa_results[k][0], 1.0 / dsa_results[k][1]);
+    }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    testnum = 1;
+    for (k = 0; k < EC_NUM; k++) {
+        if (!ecdsa_doit[k])
+            continue;
+        if (testnum && !mr) {
+            printf("%30ssign    verify    sign/s verify/s\n", " ");
+            testnum = 0;
+        }
+
+        if (mr)
+            printf("+F4:%u:%u:%f:%f\n",
+                   k, test_curves_bits[k],
+                   ecdsa_results[k][0], ecdsa_results[k][1]);
+        else
+            printf("%4u bit ecdsa (%s) %8.4fs %8.4fs %8.1f %8.1f\n",
+                   test_curves_bits[k],
+                   test_curves_names[k],
+                   ecdsa_results[k][0], ecdsa_results[k][1],
+                   1.0 / ecdsa_results[k][0], 1.0 / ecdsa_results[k][1]);
+    }
+
+    testnum = 1;
+    for (k = 0; k < EC_NUM; k++) {
+        if (!ecdh_doit[k])
+            continue;
+        if (testnum && !mr) {
+            printf("%30sop      op/s\n", " ");
+            testnum = 0;
+        }
+        if (mr)
+            printf("+F5:%u:%u:%f:%f\n",
+                   k, test_curves_bits[k],
+                   ecdh_results[k][0], 1.0 / ecdh_results[k][0]);
+
+        else
+            printf("%4u bit ecdh (%s) %8.4fs %8.1f\n",
+                   test_curves_bits[k],
+                   test_curves_names[k],
+                   ecdh_results[k][0], 1.0 / ecdh_results[k][0]);
+    }
+#endif
+
+    ret = 0;
+
+ end:
+    ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+    for (i = 0; i < loopargs_len; i++) {
+        OPENSSL_free(loopargs[i].buf_malloc);
+        OPENSSL_free(loopargs[i].buf2_malloc);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+        for (k = 0; k < RSA_NUM; k++)
+            RSA_free(loopargs[i].rsa_key[k]);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+        for (k = 0; k < DSA_NUM; k++)
+            DSA_free(loopargs[i].dsa_key[k]);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+        for (k = 0; k < EC_NUM; k++) {
+            EC_KEY_free(loopargs[i].ecdsa[k]);
+            EC_KEY_free(loopargs[i].ecdh_a[k]);
+            EC_KEY_free(loopargs[i].ecdh_b[k]);
+        }
+        OPENSSL_free(loopargs[i].secret_a);
+        OPENSSL_free(loopargs[i].secret_b);
+#endif
+    }
+
+    if (async_jobs > 0) {
+        for (i = 0; i < loopargs_len; i++)
+            ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_free(loopargs[i].wait_ctx);
+    }
+
+    if (async_init) {
+        ASYNC_cleanup_thread();
+    }
+    OPENSSL_free(loopargs);
+    release_engine(e);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static void print_message(const char *s, long num, int length)
+{
+#ifdef SIGALRM
+    BIO_printf(bio_err,
+               mr ? "+DT:%s:%d:%d\n"
+               : "Doing %s for %ds on %d size blocks: ", s, SECONDS, length);
+    (void)BIO_flush(bio_err);
+    alarm(SECONDS);
+#else
+    BIO_printf(bio_err,
+               mr ? "+DN:%s:%ld:%d\n"
+               : "Doing %s %ld times on %d size blocks: ", s, num, length);
+    (void)BIO_flush(bio_err);
+#endif
+}
+
+static void pkey_print_message(const char *str, const char *str2, long num,
+                               int bits, int tm)
+{
+#ifdef SIGALRM
+    BIO_printf(bio_err,
+               mr ? "+DTP:%d:%s:%s:%d\n"
+               : "Doing %d bit %s %s's for %ds: ", bits, str, str2, tm);
+    (void)BIO_flush(bio_err);
+    alarm(tm);
+#else
+    BIO_printf(bio_err,
+               mr ? "+DNP:%ld:%d:%s:%s\n"
+               : "Doing %ld %d bit %s %s's: ", num, bits, str, str2);
+    (void)BIO_flush(bio_err);
+#endif
+}
+
+static void print_result(int alg, int run_no, int count, double time_used)
+{
+    if (count == -1) {
+        BIO_puts(bio_err, "EVP error!\n");
+        exit(1);
+    }
+    BIO_printf(bio_err,
+               mr ? "+R:%d:%s:%f\n"
+               : "%d %s's in %.2fs\n", count, names[alg], time_used);
+    results[alg][run_no] = ((double)count) / time_used * lengths[run_no];
+}
+
+#ifndef NO_FORK
+static char *sstrsep(char **string, const char *delim)
+{
+    char isdelim[256];
+    char *token = *string;
+
+    if (**string == 0)
+        return NULL;
+
+    memset(isdelim, 0, sizeof(isdelim));
+    isdelim[0] = 1;
+
+    while (*delim) {
+        isdelim[(unsigned char)(*delim)] = 1;
+        delim++;
+    }
+
+    while (!isdelim[(unsigned char)(**string)]) {
+        (*string)++;
+    }
+
+    if (**string) {
+        **string = 0;
+        (*string)++;
+    }
+
+    return token;
+}
+
+static int do_multi(int multi)
+{
+    int n;
+    int fd[2];
+    int *fds;
+    static char sep[] = ":";
+
+    fds = malloc(sizeof(*fds) * multi);
+    for (n = 0; n < multi; ++n) {
+        if (pipe(fd) == -1) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "pipe failure\n");
+            exit(1);
+        }
+        fflush(stdout);
+        (void)BIO_flush(bio_err);
+        if (fork()) {
+            close(fd[1]);
+            fds[n] = fd[0];
+        } else {
+            close(fd[0]);
+            close(1);
+            if (dup(fd[1]) == -1) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "dup failed\n");
+                exit(1);
+            }
+            close(fd[1]);
+            mr = 1;
+            usertime = 0;
+            free(fds);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        printf("Forked child %d\n", n);
+    }
+
+    /* for now, assume the pipe is long enough to take all the output */
+    for (n = 0; n < multi; ++n) {
+        FILE *f;
+        char buf[1024];
+        char *p;
+
+        f = fdopen(fds[n], "r");
+        while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f)) {
+            p = strchr(buf, '\n');
+            if (p)
+                *p = '\0';
+            if (buf[0] != '+') {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "Don't understand line '%s' from child %d\n",
+                        buf, n);
+                continue;
+            }
+            printf("Got: %s from %d\n", buf, n);
+            if (strncmp(buf, "+F:", 3) == 0) {
+                int alg;
+                int j;
+
+                p = buf + 3;
+                alg = atoi(sstrsep(&p, sep));
+                sstrsep(&p, sep);
+                for (j = 0; j < SIZE_NUM; ++j)
+                    results[alg][j] += atof(sstrsep(&p, sep));
+            } else if (strncmp(buf, "+F2:", 4) == 0) {
+                int k;
+                double d;
+
+                p = buf + 4;
+                k = atoi(sstrsep(&p, sep));
+                sstrsep(&p, sep);
+
+                d = atof(sstrsep(&p, sep));
+                if (n)
+                    rsa_results[k][0] = 1 / (1 / rsa_results[k][0] + 1 / d);
+                else
+                    rsa_results[k][0] = d;
+
+                d = atof(sstrsep(&p, sep));
+                if (n)
+                    rsa_results[k][1] = 1 / (1 / rsa_results[k][1] + 1 / d);
+                else
+                    rsa_results[k][1] = d;
+            }
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+            else if (strncmp(buf, "+F3:", 4) == 0) {
+                int k;
+                double d;
+
+                p = buf + 4;
+                k = atoi(sstrsep(&p, sep));
+                sstrsep(&p, sep);
+
+                d = atof(sstrsep(&p, sep));
+                if (n)
+                    dsa_results[k][0] = 1 / (1 / dsa_results[k][0] + 1 / d);
+                else
+                    dsa_results[k][0] = d;
+
+                d = atof(sstrsep(&p, sep));
+                if (n)
+                    dsa_results[k][1] = 1 / (1 / dsa_results[k][1] + 1 / d);
+                else
+                    dsa_results[k][1] = d;
+            }
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+            else if (strncmp(buf, "+F4:", 4) == 0) {
+                int k;
+                double d;
+
+                p = buf + 4;
+                k = atoi(sstrsep(&p, sep));
+                sstrsep(&p, sep);
+
+                d = atof(sstrsep(&p, sep));
+                if (n)
+                    ecdsa_results[k][0] =
+                        1 / (1 / ecdsa_results[k][0] + 1 / d);
+                else
+                    ecdsa_results[k][0] = d;
+
+                d = atof(sstrsep(&p, sep));
+                if (n)
+                    ecdsa_results[k][1] =
+                        1 / (1 / ecdsa_results[k][1] + 1 / d);
+                else
+                    ecdsa_results[k][1] = d;
+            } else if (strncmp(buf, "+F5:", 4) == 0) {
+                int k;
+                double d;
+
+                p = buf + 4;
+                k = atoi(sstrsep(&p, sep));
+                sstrsep(&p, sep);
+
+                d = atof(sstrsep(&p, sep));
+                if (n)
+                    ecdh_results[k][0] = 1 / (1 / ecdh_results[k][0] + 1 / d);
+                else
+                    ecdh_results[k][0] = d;
+
+            }
+# endif
+
+            else if (strncmp(buf, "+H:", 3) == 0) {
+                ;
+            } else
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "Unknown type '%s' from child %d\n", buf, n);
+        }
+
+        fclose(f);
+    }
+    free(fds);
+    return 1;
+}
+#endif
+
+static void multiblock_speed(const EVP_CIPHER *evp_cipher)
+{
+    static int mblengths[] =
+        { 8 * 1024, 2 * 8 * 1024, 4 * 8 * 1024, 8 * 8 * 1024, 8 * 16 * 1024 };
+    int j, count, num = OSSL_NELEM(mblengths);
+    const char *alg_name;
+    unsigned char *inp, *out, no_key[32], no_iv[16];
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
+    double d = 0.0;
+
+    inp = app_malloc(mblengths[num - 1], "multiblock input buffer");
+    out = app_malloc(mblengths[num - 1] + 1024, "multiblock output buffer");
+    ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+    EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, evp_cipher, NULL, no_key, no_iv);
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY, sizeof(no_key),
+                        no_key);
+    alg_name = OBJ_nid2ln(EVP_CIPHER_nid(evp_cipher));
+
+    for (j = 0; j < num; j++) {
+        print_message(alg_name, 0, mblengths[j]);
+        Time_F(START);
+        for (count = 0, run = 1; run && count < 0x7fffffff; count++) {
+            unsigned char aad[EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN];
+            EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param;
+            size_t len = mblengths[j];
+            int packlen;
+
+            memset(aad, 0, 8);  /* avoid uninitialized values */
+            aad[8] = 23;        /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
+            aad[9] = 3;         /* version */
+            aad[10] = 2;
+            aad[11] = 0;        /* length */
+            aad[12] = 0;
+            mb_param.out = NULL;
+            mb_param.inp = aad;
+            mb_param.len = len;
+            mb_param.interleave = 8;
+
+            packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD,
+                                          sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param);
+
+            if (packlen > 0) {
+                mb_param.out = out;
+                mb_param.inp = inp;
+                mb_param.len = len;
+                EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT,
+                                    sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param);
+            } else {
+                int pad;
+
+                RAND_bytes(out, 16);
+                len += 16;
+                aad[11] = len >> 8;
+                aad[12] = len;
+                pad = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD,
+                                          EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN, aad);
+                EVP_Cipher(ctx, out, inp, len + pad);
+            }
+        }
+        d = Time_F(STOP);
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, mr ? "+R:%d:%s:%f\n"
+                   : "%d %s's in %.2fs\n", count, "evp", d);
+        results[D_EVP][j] = ((double)count) / d * mblengths[j];
+    }
+
+    if (mr) {
+        fprintf(stdout, "+H");
+        for (j = 0; j < num; j++)
+            fprintf(stdout, ":%d", mblengths[j]);
+        fprintf(stdout, "\n");
+        fprintf(stdout, "+F:%d:%s", D_EVP, alg_name);
+        for (j = 0; j < num; j++)
+            fprintf(stdout, ":%.2f", results[D_EVP][j]);
+        fprintf(stdout, "\n");
+    } else {
+        fprintf(stdout,
+                "The 'numbers' are in 1000s of bytes per second processed.\n");
+        fprintf(stdout, "type                    ");
+        for (j = 0; j < num; j++)
+            fprintf(stdout, "%7d bytes", mblengths[j]);
+        fprintf(stdout, "\n");
+        fprintf(stdout, "%-24s", alg_name);
+
+        for (j = 0; j < num; j++) {
+            if (results[D_EVP][j] > 10000)
+                fprintf(stdout, " %11.2fk", results[D_EVP][j] / 1e3);
+            else
+                fprintf(stdout, " %11.2f ", results[D_EVP][j]);
+        }
+        fprintf(stdout, "\n");
+    }
+
+    OPENSSL_free(inp);
+    OPENSSL_free(out);
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/spkac.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/spkac.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3449067
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/spkac.c
@@ -0,0 +1,196 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include "apps.h"
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/conf.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/lhash.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+
+typedef enum OPTION_choice {
+    OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP,
+    OPT_NOOUT, OPT_PUBKEY, OPT_VERIFY, OPT_IN, OPT_OUT,
+    OPT_ENGINE, OPT_KEY, OPT_CHALLENGE, OPT_PASSIN, OPT_SPKAC,
+    OPT_SPKSECT
+} OPTION_CHOICE;
+
+OPTIONS spkac_options[] = {
+    {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"},
+    {"in", OPT_IN, '<', "Input file"},
+    {"out", OPT_OUT, '>', "Output file"},
+    {"key", OPT_KEY, '<', "Create SPKAC using private key"},
+    {"passin", OPT_PASSIN, 's', "Input file pass phrase source"},
+    {"challenge", OPT_CHALLENGE, 's', "Challenge string"},
+    {"spkac", OPT_SPKAC, 's', "Alternative SPKAC name"},
+    {"noout", OPT_NOOUT, '-', "Don't print SPKAC"},
+    {"pubkey", OPT_PUBKEY, '-', "Output public key"},
+    {"verify", OPT_VERIFY, '-', "Verify SPKAC signature"},
+    {"spksect", OPT_SPKSECT, 's',
+     "Specify the name of an SPKAC-dedicated section of configuration"},
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine, possibly a hardware device"},
+#endif
+    {NULL}
+};
+
+int spkac_main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    BIO *out = NULL;
+    CONF *conf = NULL;
+    ENGINE *e = NULL;
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+    NETSCAPE_SPKI *spki = NULL;
+    char *challenge = NULL, *keyfile = NULL;
+    char *infile = NULL, *outfile = NULL, *passinarg = NULL, *passin = NULL;
+    char *spkstr = NULL, *prog;
+    const char *spkac = "SPKAC", *spksect = "default";
+    int i, ret = 1, verify = 0, noout = 0, pubkey = 0;
+    OPTION_CHOICE o;
+
+    prog = opt_init(argc, argv, spkac_options);
+    while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) {
+        switch (o) {
+        case OPT_EOF:
+        case OPT_ERR:
+ opthelp:
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog);
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_HELP:
+            opt_help(spkac_options);
+            ret = 0;
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_IN:
+            infile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_OUT:
+            outfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_NOOUT:
+            noout = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_PUBKEY:
+            pubkey = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_VERIFY:
+            verify = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_PASSIN:
+            passinarg = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_KEY:
+            keyfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_CHALLENGE:
+            challenge = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_SPKAC:
+            spkac = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_SPKSECT:
+            spksect = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_ENGINE:
+            e = setup_engine(opt_arg(), 0);
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    argc = opt_num_rest();
+    if (argc != 0)
+        goto opthelp;
+
+    if (!app_passwd(passinarg, NULL, &passin, NULL)) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting password\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (keyfile != NULL) {
+        pkey = load_key(strcmp(keyfile, "-") ? keyfile : NULL,
+                        FORMAT_PEM, 1, passin, e, "private key");
+        if (pkey == NULL)
+            goto end;
+        spki = NETSCAPE_SPKI_new();
+        if (spki == NULL)
+            goto end;
+        if (challenge != NULL)
+            ASN1_STRING_set(spki->spkac->challenge,
+                            challenge, (int)strlen(challenge));
+        NETSCAPE_SPKI_set_pubkey(spki, pkey);
+        NETSCAPE_SPKI_sign(spki, pkey, EVP_md5());
+        spkstr = NETSCAPE_SPKI_b64_encode(spki);
+        if (spkstr == NULL)
+            goto end;
+
+        out = bio_open_default(outfile, 'w', FORMAT_TEXT);
+        if (out == NULL) {
+            OPENSSL_free(spkstr);
+            goto end;
+        }
+        BIO_printf(out, "SPKAC=%s\n", spkstr);
+        OPENSSL_free(spkstr);
+        ret = 0;
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if ((conf = app_load_config(infile)) == NULL)
+        goto end;
+
+    spkstr = NCONF_get_string(conf, spksect, spkac);
+
+    if (spkstr == NULL) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't find SPKAC called \"%s\"\n", spkac);
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    spki = NETSCAPE_SPKI_b64_decode(spkstr, -1);
+
+    if (spki == NULL) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error loading SPKAC\n");
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    out = bio_open_default(outfile, 'w', FORMAT_TEXT);
+    if (out == NULL)
+        goto end;
+
+    if (!noout)
+        NETSCAPE_SPKI_print(out, spki);
+    pkey = NETSCAPE_SPKI_get_pubkey(spki);
+    if (verify) {
+        i = NETSCAPE_SPKI_verify(spki, pkey);
+        if (i > 0) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Signature OK\n");
+        } else {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Signature Failure\n");
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+    if (pubkey)
+        PEM_write_bio_PUBKEY(out, pkey);
+
+    ret = 0;
+
+ end:
+    NCONF_free(conf);
+    NETSCAPE_SPKI_free(spki);
+    BIO_free_all(out);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+    release_engine(e);
+    OPENSSL_free(passin);
+    return (ret);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/srp.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/srp.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0ead68e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/srp.c
@@ -0,0 +1,613 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2004-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT
+#else
+
+# include <stdio.h>
+# include <stdlib.h>
+# include <string.h>
+# include <openssl/conf.h>
+# include <openssl/bio.h>
+# include <openssl/err.h>
+# include <openssl/txt_db.h>
+# include <openssl/buffer.h>
+# include <openssl/srp.h>
+# include "apps.h"
+
+# define BASE_SECTION    "srp"
+# define CONFIG_FILE "openssl.cnf"
+
+# define ENV_RANDFILE            "RANDFILE"
+
+# define ENV_DATABASE            "srpvfile"
+# define ENV_DEFAULT_SRP         "default_srp"
+
+static int get_index(CA_DB *db, char *id, char type)
+{
+    char **pp;
+    int i;
+    if (id == NULL)
+        return -1;
+    if (type == DB_SRP_INDEX) {
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_num(db->db->data); i++) {
+            pp = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, i);
+            if (pp[DB_srptype][0] == DB_SRP_INDEX
+                && strcmp(id, pp[DB_srpid]) == 0)
+                return i;
+        }
+    } else {
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_num(db->db->data); i++) {
+            pp = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, i);
+
+            if (pp[DB_srptype][0] != DB_SRP_INDEX
+                && strcmp(id, pp[DB_srpid]) == 0)
+                return i;
+        }
+    }
+
+    return -1;
+}
+
+static void print_entry(CA_DB *db, int indx, int verbose, char *s)
+{
+    if (indx >= 0 && verbose) {
+        int j;
+        char **pp = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, indx);
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s \"%s\"\n", s, pp[DB_srpid]);
+        for (j = 0; j < DB_NUMBER; j++) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "  %d = \"%s\"\n", j, pp[j]);
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+static void print_index(CA_DB *db, int indexindex, int verbose)
+{
+    print_entry(db, indexindex, verbose, "g N entry");
+}
+
+static void print_user(CA_DB *db, int userindex, int verbose)
+{
+    if (verbose > 0) {
+        char **pp = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, userindex);
+
+        if (pp[DB_srptype][0] != 'I') {
+            print_entry(db, userindex, verbose, "User entry");
+            print_entry(db, get_index(db, pp[DB_srpgN], 'I'), verbose,
+                        "g N entry");
+        }
+
+    }
+}
+
+static int update_index(CA_DB *db, char **row)
+{
+    char **irow;
+    int i;
+
+    irow = app_malloc(sizeof(*irow) * (DB_NUMBER + 1), "row pointers");
+    for (i = 0; i < DB_NUMBER; i++)
+        irow[i] = row[i];
+    irow[DB_NUMBER] = NULL;
+
+    if (!TXT_DB_insert(db->db, irow)) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "failed to update srpvfile\n");
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "TXT_DB error number %ld\n", db->db->error);
+        OPENSSL_free(irow);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static char *lookup_conf(const CONF *conf, const char *section, const char *tag)
+{
+    char *entry = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, tag);
+    if (entry == NULL)
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "variable lookup failed for %s::%s\n", section, tag);
+    return entry;
+}
+
+static char *srp_verify_user(const char *user, const char *srp_verifier,
+                             char *srp_usersalt, const char *g, const char *N,
+                             const char *passin, int verbose)
+{
+    char password[1025];
+    PW_CB_DATA cb_tmp;
+    char *verifier = NULL;
+    char *gNid = NULL;
+    int len;
+
+    cb_tmp.prompt_info = user;
+    cb_tmp.password = passin;
+
+    len = password_callback(password, sizeof(password)-1, 0, &cb_tmp);
+    if (len > 0) {
+        password[len] = 0;
+        if (verbose)
+            BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                       "Validating\n   user=\"%s\"\n srp_verifier=\"%s\"\n srp_usersalt=\"%s\"\n g=\"%s\"\n N=\"%s\"\n",
+                       user, srp_verifier, srp_usersalt, g, N);
+        if (verbose > 1)
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Pass %s\n", password);
+
+        OPENSSL_assert(srp_usersalt != NULL);
+        if (!(gNid = SRP_create_verifier(user, password, &srp_usersalt,
+                                         &verifier, N, g)) ) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Internal error validating SRP verifier\n");
+        } else {
+            if (strcmp(verifier, srp_verifier))
+                gNid = NULL;
+            OPENSSL_free(verifier);
+        }
+        OPENSSL_cleanse(password, len);
+    }
+    return gNid;
+}
+
+static char *srp_create_user(char *user, char **srp_verifier,
+                             char **srp_usersalt, char *g, char *N,
+                             char *passout, int verbose)
+{
+    char password[1025];
+    PW_CB_DATA cb_tmp;
+    char *gNid = NULL;
+    char *salt = NULL;
+    int len;
+    cb_tmp.prompt_info = user;
+    cb_tmp.password = passout;
+
+    len = password_callback(password, sizeof(password)-1, 1, &cb_tmp);
+    if (len > 0) {
+        password[len] = 0;
+        if (verbose)
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Creating\n user=\"%s\"\n g=\"%s\"\n N=\"%s\"\n",
+                       user, g, N);
+        if (!(gNid = SRP_create_verifier(user, password, &salt,
+                                         srp_verifier, N, g)) ) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Internal error creating SRP verifier\n");
+        } else {
+            *srp_usersalt = salt;
+        }
+        OPENSSL_cleanse(password, len);
+        if (verbose > 1)
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "gNid=%s salt =\"%s\"\n verifier =\"%s\"\n",
+                       gNid, salt, *srp_verifier);
+
+    }
+    return gNid;
+}
+
+typedef enum OPTION_choice {
+    OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP,
+    OPT_VERBOSE, OPT_CONFIG, OPT_NAME, OPT_SRPVFILE, OPT_ADD,
+    OPT_DELETE, OPT_MODIFY, OPT_LIST, OPT_GN, OPT_USERINFO,
+    OPT_PASSIN, OPT_PASSOUT, OPT_ENGINE
+} OPTION_CHOICE;
+
+OPTIONS srp_options[] = {
+    {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"},
+    {"verbose", OPT_VERBOSE, '-', "Talk a lot while doing things"},
+    {"config", OPT_CONFIG, '<', "A config file"},
+    {"name", OPT_NAME, 's', "The particular srp definition to use"},
+    {"srpvfile", OPT_SRPVFILE, '<', "The srp verifier file name"},
+    {"add", OPT_ADD, '-', "Add a user and srp verifier"},
+    {"modify", OPT_MODIFY, '-',
+     "Modify the srp verifier of an existing user"},
+    {"delete", OPT_DELETE, '-', "Delete user from verifier file"},
+    {"list", OPT_LIST, '-', "List users"},
+    {"gn", OPT_GN, 's', "Set g and N values to be used for new verifier"},
+    {"userinfo", OPT_USERINFO, 's', "Additional info to be set for user"},
+    {"passin", OPT_PASSIN, 's', "Input file pass phrase source"},
+    {"passout", OPT_PASSOUT, 's', "Output file pass phrase source"},
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine, possibly a hardware device"},
+# endif
+    {NULL}
+};
+
+int srp_main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    ENGINE *e = NULL;
+    CA_DB *db = NULL;
+    CONF *conf = NULL;
+    int gNindex = -1, maxgN = -1, ret = 1, errors = 0, verbose = 0, i;
+    int doupdatedb = 0, mode = OPT_ERR;
+    char *user = NULL, *passinarg = NULL, *passoutarg = NULL;
+    char *passin = NULL, *passout = NULL, *gN = NULL, *userinfo = NULL;
+    char *randfile = NULL, *section = NULL;
+    char **gNrow = NULL, *configfile = NULL;
+    char *srpvfile = NULL, **pp, *prog;
+    OPTION_CHOICE o;
+
+    prog = opt_init(argc, argv, srp_options);
+    while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) {
+        switch (o) {
+        case OPT_EOF:
+        case OPT_ERR:
+ opthelp:
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog);
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_HELP:
+            opt_help(srp_options);
+            ret = 0;
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_VERBOSE:
+            verbose++;
+            break;
+        case OPT_CONFIG:
+            configfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_NAME:
+            section = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_SRPVFILE:
+            srpvfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_ADD:
+        case OPT_DELETE:
+        case OPT_MODIFY:
+        case OPT_LIST:
+            if (mode != OPT_ERR) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                           "%s: Only one of -add/-delete/-modify/-list\n",
+                           prog);
+                goto opthelp;
+            }
+            mode = o;
+            break;
+        case OPT_GN:
+            gN = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_USERINFO:
+            userinfo = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_PASSIN:
+            passinarg = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_PASSOUT:
+            passoutarg = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_ENGINE:
+            e = setup_engine(opt_arg(), 0);
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    argc = opt_num_rest();
+    argv = opt_rest();
+
+    if (srpvfile && configfile) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                   "-srpvfile and -configfile cannot be specified together.\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+    if (mode == OPT_ERR) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                   "Exactly one of the options -add, -delete, -modify -list must be specified.\n");
+        goto opthelp;
+    }
+    if (mode == OPT_DELETE || mode == OPT_MODIFY || mode == OPT_ADD) {
+        if (argc == 0) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Need at least one user.\n");
+            goto opthelp;
+        }
+        user = *argv++;
+    }
+    if ((passinarg || passoutarg) && argc != 1) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                   "-passin, -passout arguments only valid with one user.\n");
+        goto opthelp;
+    }
+
+    if (!app_passwd(passinarg, passoutarg, &passin, &passout)) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting passwords\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (!srpvfile) {
+        if (!configfile)
+            configfile = default_config_file;
+
+        if (verbose)
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Using configuration from %s\n",
+                       configfile);
+        conf = app_load_config(configfile);
+        if (conf == NULL)
+            goto end;
+        if (configfile != default_config_file && !app_load_modules(conf))
+            goto end;
+
+        /* Lets get the config section we are using */
+        if (section == NULL) {
+            if (verbose)
+                BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                           "trying to read " ENV_DEFAULT_SRP
+                           " in " BASE_SECTION "\n");
+
+            section = lookup_conf(conf, BASE_SECTION, ENV_DEFAULT_SRP);
+            if (section == NULL)
+                goto end;
+        }
+
+        if (randfile == NULL)
+            randfile = NCONF_get_string(conf, BASE_SECTION, "RANDFILE");
+
+        if (verbose)
+            BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                       "trying to read " ENV_DATABASE " in section \"%s\"\n",
+                       section);
+
+        srpvfile = lookup_conf(conf, section, ENV_DATABASE);
+        if (srpvfile == NULL)
+            goto end;
+    }
+    if (randfile == NULL)
+        ERR_clear_error();
+    else
+        app_RAND_load_file(randfile, 0);
+
+    if (verbose)
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Trying to read SRP verifier file \"%s\"\n",
+                   srpvfile);
+
+    db = load_index(srpvfile, NULL);
+    if (db == NULL)
+        goto end;
+
+    /* Lets check some fields */
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_num(db->db->data); i++) {
+        pp = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, i);
+
+        if (pp[DB_srptype][0] == DB_SRP_INDEX) {
+            maxgN = i;
+            if ((gNindex < 0) && (gN != NULL) && strcmp(gN, pp[DB_srpid]) == 0)
+                gNindex = i;
+
+            print_index(db, i, verbose > 1);
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (verbose)
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Database initialised\n");
+
+    if (gNindex >= 0) {
+        gNrow = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, gNindex);
+        print_entry(db, gNindex, verbose > 1, "Default g and N");
+    } else if (maxgN > 0 && !SRP_get_default_gN(gN)) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "No g and N value for index \"%s\"\n", gN);
+        goto end;
+    } else {
+        if (verbose)
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Database has no g N information.\n");
+        gNrow = NULL;
+    }
+
+    if (verbose > 1)
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Starting user processing\n");
+
+    while (mode == OPT_LIST || user != NULL) {
+        int userindex = -1;
+
+        if (user != NULL && verbose > 1)
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Processing user \"%s\"\n", user);
+        if ((userindex = get_index(db, user, 'U')) >= 0) {
+            print_user(db, userindex, (verbose > 0) || mode == OPT_LIST);
+        }
+
+        if (mode == OPT_LIST) {
+            if (user == NULL) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "List all users\n");
+
+                for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_num(db->db->data); i++) {
+                    print_user(db, i, 1);
+                }
+            } else if (userindex < 0) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                           "user \"%s\" does not exist, ignored. t\n", user);
+                errors++;
+            }
+        } else if (mode == OPT_ADD) {
+            if (userindex >= 0) {
+                /* reactivation of a new user */
+                char **row =
+                    sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, userindex);
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "user \"%s\" reactivated.\n", user);
+                row[DB_srptype][0] = 'V';
+
+                doupdatedb = 1;
+            } else {
+                char *row[DB_NUMBER];
+                char *gNid;
+                row[DB_srpverifier] = NULL;
+                row[DB_srpsalt] = NULL;
+                row[DB_srpinfo] = NULL;
+                if (!
+                    (gNid =
+                     srp_create_user(user, &(row[DB_srpverifier]),
+                                     &(row[DB_srpsalt]),
+                                     gNrow ? gNrow[DB_srpsalt] : gN,
+                                     gNrow ? gNrow[DB_srpverifier] : NULL,
+                                     passout, verbose))) {
+                    BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                               "Cannot create srp verifier for user \"%s\", operation abandoned .\n",
+                               user);
+                    errors++;
+                    goto end;
+                }
+                row[DB_srpid] = OPENSSL_strdup(user);
+                row[DB_srptype] = OPENSSL_strdup("v");
+                row[DB_srpgN] = OPENSSL_strdup(gNid);
+
+                if ((row[DB_srpid] == NULL)
+                    || (row[DB_srpgN] == NULL)
+                    || (row[DB_srptype] == NULL)
+                    || (row[DB_srpverifier] == NULL)
+                    || (row[DB_srpsalt] == NULL)
+                    || (userinfo
+                        && ((row[DB_srpinfo] = OPENSSL_strdup(userinfo)) == NULL))
+                    || !update_index(db, row)) {
+                    OPENSSL_free(row[DB_srpid]);
+                    OPENSSL_free(row[DB_srpgN]);
+                    OPENSSL_free(row[DB_srpinfo]);
+                    OPENSSL_free(row[DB_srptype]);
+                    OPENSSL_free(row[DB_srpverifier]);
+                    OPENSSL_free(row[DB_srpsalt]);
+                    goto end;
+                }
+                doupdatedb = 1;
+            }
+        } else if (mode == OPT_MODIFY) {
+            if (userindex < 0) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                           "user \"%s\" does not exist, operation ignored.\n",
+                           user);
+                errors++;
+            } else {
+
+                char **row =
+                    sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, userindex);
+                char type = row[DB_srptype][0];
+                if (type == 'v') {
+                    BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                               "user \"%s\" already updated, operation ignored.\n",
+                               user);
+                    errors++;
+                } else {
+                    char *gNid;
+
+                    if (row[DB_srptype][0] == 'V') {
+                        int user_gN;
+                        char **irow = NULL;
+                        if (verbose)
+                            BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                                       "Verifying password for user \"%s\"\n",
+                                       user);
+                        if ((user_gN =
+                             get_index(db, row[DB_srpgN], DB_SRP_INDEX)) >= 0)
+                            irow =
+                                sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data,
+                                                         userindex);
+
+                        if (!srp_verify_user
+                            (user, row[DB_srpverifier], row[DB_srpsalt],
+                             irow ? irow[DB_srpsalt] : row[DB_srpgN],
+                             irow ? irow[DB_srpverifier] : NULL, passin,
+                             verbose)) {
+                            BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                                       "Invalid password for user \"%s\", operation abandoned.\n",
+                                       user);
+                            errors++;
+                            goto end;
+                        }
+                    }
+                    if (verbose)
+                        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Password for user \"%s\" ok.\n",
+                                   user);
+
+                    if (!
+                        (gNid =
+                         srp_create_user(user, &(row[DB_srpverifier]),
+                                         &(row[DB_srpsalt]),
+                                         gNrow ? gNrow[DB_srpsalt] : NULL,
+                                         gNrow ? gNrow[DB_srpverifier] : NULL,
+                                         passout, verbose))) {
+                        BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                                   "Cannot create srp verifier for user \"%s\", operation abandoned.\n",
+                                   user);
+                        errors++;
+                        goto end;
+                    }
+
+                    row[DB_srptype][0] = 'v';
+                    row[DB_srpgN] = OPENSSL_strdup(gNid);
+
+                    if (row[DB_srpid] == NULL
+                        || row[DB_srpgN] == NULL
+                        || row[DB_srptype] == NULL
+                        || row[DB_srpverifier] == NULL
+                        || row[DB_srpsalt] == NULL
+                        || (userinfo
+                            && ((row[DB_srpinfo] = OPENSSL_strdup(userinfo))
+                                == NULL)))
+                        goto end;
+
+                    doupdatedb = 1;
+                }
+            }
+        } else if (mode == OPT_DELETE) {
+            if (userindex < 0) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                           "user \"%s\" does not exist, operation ignored. t\n",
+                           user);
+                errors++;
+            } else {
+                char **xpp = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, userindex);
+
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "user \"%s\" revoked. t\n", user);
+                xpp[DB_srptype][0] = 'R';
+                doupdatedb = 1;
+            }
+        }
+        user = *argv++;
+        if (user == NULL) {
+            /* no more processing in any mode if no users left */
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (verbose)
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "User procession done.\n");
+
+    if (doupdatedb) {
+        /* Lets check some fields */
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_num(db->db->data); i++) {
+            pp = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, i);
+
+            if (pp[DB_srptype][0] == 'v') {
+                pp[DB_srptype][0] = 'V';
+                print_user(db, i, verbose);
+            }
+        }
+
+        if (verbose)
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Trying to update srpvfile.\n");
+        if (!save_index(srpvfile, "new", db))
+            goto end;
+
+        if (verbose)
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Temporary srpvfile created.\n");
+        if (!rotate_index(srpvfile, "new", "old"))
+            goto end;
+
+        if (verbose)
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "srpvfile updated.\n");
+    }
+
+    ret = (errors != 0);
+ end:
+    if (errors != 0)
+        if (verbose)
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "User errors %d.\n", errors);
+
+    if (verbose)
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "SRP terminating with code %d.\n", ret);
+
+    OPENSSL_free(passin);
+    OPENSSL_free(passout);
+    if (ret)
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+    if (randfile)
+        app_RAND_write_file(randfile);
+    NCONF_free(conf);
+    free_index(db);
+    release_engine(e);
+    return (ret);
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/testCA.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/testCA.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dcb710a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/testCA.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----
+MIIBBzCBsgIBADBNMQswCQYDVQQGEwJBVTETMBEGA1UECBMKUXVlZW5zbGFuZDEX
+MBUGA1UEChMOTWluY29tIFB0eSBMdGQxEDAOBgNVBAMTB1RFU1QgQ0EwXDANBgkq
+hkiG9w0BAQEFAANLADBIAkEAzW9brgA8efT2ODB+NrsflJZj3KKqKsm4OrXTRqfL
+VETj1ws/zCXl42XJAxdWQMCP0liKfc9Ut4xi1qCVI7N07wIDAQABoAAwDQYJKoZI
+hvcNAQEEBQADQQBjZZ42Det9Uw0AFwJy4ufUEy5Cv74pxBp5SZnljgHY+Az0Hs2S
+uNkIegr2ITX5azKi9nOkg9ZmsmGG13FIjiC/
+-----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/testdsa.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/testdsa.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1e4502a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/testdsa.h
@@ -0,0 +1,290 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1998-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* used by speed.c */
+DSA *get_dsa512(void);
+DSA *get_dsa1024(void);
+DSA *get_dsa2048(void);
+
+static unsigned char dsa512_priv[] = {
+    0x65, 0xe5, 0xc7, 0x38, 0x60, 0x24, 0xb5, 0x89, 0xd4, 0x9c, 0xeb, 0x4c,
+    0x9c, 0x1d, 0x7a, 0x22, 0xbd, 0xd1, 0xc2, 0xd2,
+};
+
+static unsigned char dsa512_pub[] = {
+    0x00, 0x95, 0xa7, 0x0d, 0xec, 0x93, 0x68, 0xba, 0x5f, 0xf7, 0x5f, 0x07,
+    0xf2, 0x3b, 0xad, 0x6b, 0x01, 0xdc, 0xbe, 0xec, 0xde, 0x04, 0x7a, 0x3a,
+    0x27, 0xb3, 0xec, 0x49, 0xfd, 0x08, 0x43, 0x3d, 0x7e, 0xa8, 0x2c, 0x5e,
+    0x7b, 0xbb, 0xfc, 0xf4, 0x6e, 0xeb, 0x6c, 0xb0, 0x6e, 0xf8, 0x02, 0x12,
+    0x8c, 0x38, 0x5d, 0x83, 0x56, 0x7d, 0xee, 0x53, 0x05, 0x3e, 0x24, 0x84,
+    0xbe, 0xba, 0x0a, 0x6b, 0xc8,
+};
+
+static unsigned char dsa512_p[] = {
+    0x9D, 0x1B, 0x69, 0x8E, 0x26, 0xDB, 0xF2, 0x2B, 0x11, 0x70, 0x19, 0x86,
+    0xF6, 0x19, 0xC8, 0xF8, 0x19, 0xF2, 0x18, 0x53, 0x94, 0x46, 0x06, 0xD0,
+    0x62, 0x50, 0x33, 0x4B, 0x02, 0x3C, 0x52, 0x30, 0x03, 0x8B, 0x3B, 0xF9,
+    0x5F, 0xD1, 0x24, 0x06, 0x4F, 0x7B, 0x4C, 0xBA, 0xAA, 0x40, 0x9B, 0xFD,
+    0x96, 0xE4, 0x37, 0x33, 0xBB, 0x2D, 0x5A, 0xD7, 0x5A, 0x11, 0x40, 0x66,
+    0xA2, 0x76, 0x7D, 0x31,
+};
+
+static unsigned char dsa512_q[] = {
+    0xFB, 0x53, 0xEF, 0x50, 0xB4, 0x40, 0x92, 0x31, 0x56, 0x86, 0x53, 0x7A,
+    0xE8, 0x8B, 0x22, 0x9A, 0x49, 0xFB, 0x71, 0x8F,
+};
+
+static unsigned char dsa512_g[] = {
+    0x83, 0x3E, 0x88, 0xE5, 0xC5, 0x89, 0x73, 0xCE, 0x3B, 0x6C, 0x01, 0x49,
+    0xBF, 0xB3, 0xC7, 0x9F, 0x0A, 0xEA, 0x44, 0x91, 0xE5, 0x30, 0xAA, 0xD9,
+    0xBE, 0x5B, 0x5F, 0xB7, 0x10, 0xD7, 0x89, 0xB7, 0x8E, 0x74, 0xFB, 0xCF,
+    0x29, 0x1E, 0xEB, 0xA8, 0x2C, 0x54, 0x51, 0xB8, 0x10, 0xDE, 0xA0, 0xCE,
+    0x2F, 0xCC, 0x24, 0x6B, 0x90, 0x77, 0xDE, 0xA2, 0x68, 0xA6, 0x52, 0x12,
+    0xA2, 0x03, 0x9D, 0x20,
+};
+
+DSA *get_dsa512()
+{
+    DSA *dsa;
+    BIGNUM *priv_key, *pub_key, *p, *q, *g;
+
+    if ((dsa = DSA_new()) == NULL)
+        return (NULL);
+    priv_key = BN_bin2bn(dsa512_priv, sizeof(dsa512_priv), NULL);
+    pub_key = BN_bin2bn(dsa512_pub, sizeof(dsa512_pub), NULL);
+    p = BN_bin2bn(dsa512_p, sizeof(dsa512_p), NULL);
+    q = BN_bin2bn(dsa512_q, sizeof(dsa512_q), NULL);
+    g = BN_bin2bn(dsa512_g, sizeof(dsa512_g), NULL);
+    if ((priv_key == NULL) || (pub_key == NULL) || (p == NULL) || (q == NULL)
+            || (g == NULL)) {
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (!DSA_set0_pqg(dsa, p, q, g))
+        goto err;
+    p = q = g = NULL;
+
+    if (!DSA_set0_key(dsa, pub_key, priv_key))
+        goto err;
+
+    return dsa;
+ err:
+    DSA_free(dsa);
+    BN_free(priv_key);
+    BN_free(pub_key);
+    BN_free(p);
+    BN_free(q);
+    BN_free(g);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+static unsigned char dsa1024_priv[] = {
+    0x7d, 0x21, 0xda, 0xbb, 0x62, 0x15, 0x47, 0x36, 0x07, 0x67, 0x12, 0xe8,
+    0x8c, 0xaa, 0x1c, 0xcd, 0x38, 0x12, 0x61, 0x18,
+};
+
+static unsigned char dsa1024_pub[] = {
+    0x3c, 0x4e, 0x9c, 0x2a, 0x7f, 0x16, 0xc1, 0x25, 0xeb, 0xac, 0x78, 0x63,
+    0x90, 0x14, 0x8c, 0x8b, 0xf4, 0x68, 0x43, 0x3c, 0x2d, 0xee, 0x65, 0x50,
+    0x7d, 0x9c, 0x8f, 0x8c, 0x8a, 0x51, 0xd6, 0x11, 0x2b, 0x99, 0xaf, 0x1e,
+    0x90, 0x97, 0xb5, 0xd3, 0xa6, 0x20, 0x25, 0xd6, 0xfe, 0x43, 0x02, 0xd5,
+    0x91, 0x7d, 0xa7, 0x8c, 0xdb, 0xc9, 0x85, 0xa3, 0x36, 0x48, 0xf7, 0x68,
+    0xaa, 0x60, 0xb1, 0xf7, 0x05, 0x68, 0x3a, 0xa3, 0x3f, 0xd3, 0x19, 0x82,
+    0xd8, 0x82, 0x7a, 0x77, 0xfb, 0xef, 0xf4, 0x15, 0x0a, 0xeb, 0x06, 0x04,
+    0x7f, 0x53, 0x07, 0x0c, 0xbc, 0xcb, 0x2d, 0x83, 0xdb, 0x3e, 0xd1, 0x28,
+    0xa5, 0xa1, 0x31, 0xe0, 0x67, 0xfa, 0x50, 0xde, 0x9b, 0x07, 0x83, 0x7e,
+    0x2c, 0x0b, 0xc3, 0x13, 0x50, 0x61, 0xe5, 0xad, 0xbd, 0x36, 0xb8, 0x97,
+    0x4e, 0x40, 0x7d, 0xe8, 0x83, 0x0d, 0xbc, 0x4b
+};
+
+static unsigned char dsa1024_p[] = {
+    0xA7, 0x3F, 0x6E, 0x85, 0xBF, 0x41, 0x6A, 0x29, 0x7D, 0xF0, 0x9F, 0x47,
+    0x19, 0x30, 0x90, 0x9A, 0x09, 0x1D, 0xDA, 0x6A, 0x33, 0x1E, 0xC5, 0x3D,
+    0x86, 0x96, 0xB3, 0x15, 0xE0, 0x53, 0x2E, 0x8F, 0xE0, 0x59, 0x82, 0x73,
+    0x90, 0x3E, 0x75, 0x31, 0x99, 0x47, 0x7A, 0x52, 0xFB, 0x85, 0xE4, 0xD9,
+    0xA6, 0x7B, 0x38, 0x9B, 0x68, 0x8A, 0x84, 0x9B, 0x87, 0xC6, 0x1E, 0xB5,
+    0x7E, 0x86, 0x4B, 0x53, 0x5B, 0x59, 0xCF, 0x71, 0x65, 0x19, 0x88, 0x6E,
+    0xCE, 0x66, 0xAE, 0x6B, 0x88, 0x36, 0xFB, 0xEC, 0x28, 0xDC, 0xC2, 0xD7,
+    0xA5, 0xBB, 0xE5, 0x2C, 0x39, 0x26, 0x4B, 0xDA, 0x9A, 0x70, 0x18, 0x95,
+    0x37, 0x95, 0x10, 0x56, 0x23, 0xF6, 0x15, 0xED, 0xBA, 0x04, 0x5E, 0xDE,
+    0x39, 0x4F, 0xFD, 0xB7, 0x43, 0x1F, 0xB5, 0xA4, 0x65, 0x6F, 0xCD, 0x80,
+    0x11, 0xE4, 0x70, 0x95, 0x5B, 0x50, 0xCD, 0x49,
+};
+
+static unsigned char dsa1024_q[] = {
+    0xF7, 0x07, 0x31, 0xED, 0xFA, 0x6C, 0x06, 0x03, 0xD5, 0x85, 0x8A, 0x1C,
+    0xAC, 0x9C, 0x65, 0xE7, 0x50, 0x66, 0x65, 0x6F,
+};
+
+static unsigned char dsa1024_g[] = {
+    0x4D, 0xDF, 0x4C, 0x03, 0xA6, 0x91, 0x8A, 0xF5, 0x19, 0x6F, 0x50, 0x46,
+    0x25, 0x99, 0xE5, 0x68, 0x6F, 0x30, 0xE3, 0x69, 0xE1, 0xE5, 0xB3, 0x5D,
+    0x98, 0xBB, 0x28, 0x86, 0x48, 0xFC, 0xDE, 0x99, 0x04, 0x3F, 0x5F, 0x88,
+    0x0C, 0x9C, 0x73, 0x24, 0x0D, 0x20, 0x5D, 0xB9, 0x2A, 0x9A, 0x3F, 0x18,
+    0x96, 0x27, 0xE4, 0x62, 0x87, 0xC1, 0x7B, 0x74, 0x62, 0x53, 0xFC, 0x61,
+    0x27, 0xA8, 0x7A, 0x91, 0x09, 0x9D, 0xB6, 0xF1, 0x4D, 0x9C, 0x54, 0x0F,
+    0x58, 0x06, 0xEE, 0x49, 0x74, 0x07, 0xCE, 0x55, 0x7E, 0x23, 0xCE, 0x16,
+    0xF6, 0xCA, 0xDC, 0x5A, 0x61, 0x01, 0x7E, 0xC9, 0x71, 0xB5, 0x4D, 0xF6,
+    0xDC, 0x34, 0x29, 0x87, 0x68, 0xF6, 0x5E, 0x20, 0x93, 0xB3, 0xDB, 0xF5,
+    0xE4, 0x09, 0x6C, 0x41, 0x17, 0x95, 0x92, 0xEB, 0x01, 0xB5, 0x73, 0xA5,
+    0x6A, 0x7E, 0xD8, 0x32, 0xED, 0x0E, 0x02, 0xB8,
+};
+
+DSA *get_dsa1024()
+{
+    DSA *dsa;
+    BIGNUM *priv_key, *pub_key, *p, *q, *g;
+
+    if ((dsa = DSA_new()) == NULL)
+        return (NULL);
+    priv_key = BN_bin2bn(dsa1024_priv, sizeof(dsa1024_priv), NULL);
+    pub_key = BN_bin2bn(dsa1024_pub, sizeof(dsa1024_pub), NULL);
+    p = BN_bin2bn(dsa1024_p, sizeof(dsa1024_p), NULL);
+    q = BN_bin2bn(dsa1024_q, sizeof(dsa1024_q), NULL);
+    g = BN_bin2bn(dsa1024_g, sizeof(dsa1024_g), NULL);
+    if ((priv_key == NULL) || (pub_key == NULL) || (p == NULL) || (q == NULL)
+            || (g == NULL)) {
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (!DSA_set0_pqg(dsa, p, q, g))
+        goto err;
+    p = q = g = NULL;
+
+    if (!DSA_set0_key(dsa, pub_key, priv_key))
+        goto err;
+
+    return dsa;
+ err:
+    DSA_free(dsa);
+    BN_free(priv_key);
+    BN_free(pub_key);
+    BN_free(p);
+    BN_free(q);
+    BN_free(g);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+static unsigned char dsa2048_priv[] = {
+    0x32, 0x67, 0x92, 0xf6, 0xc4, 0xe2, 0xe2, 0xe8, 0xa0, 0x8b, 0x6b, 0x45,
+    0x0c, 0x8a, 0x76, 0xb0, 0xee, 0xcf, 0x91, 0xa7,
+};
+
+static unsigned char dsa2048_pub[] = {
+    0x17, 0x8f, 0xa8, 0x11, 0x84, 0x92, 0xec, 0x83, 0x47, 0xc7, 0x6a, 0xb0,
+    0x92, 0xaf, 0x5a, 0x20, 0x37, 0xa3, 0x64, 0x79, 0xd2, 0xd0, 0x3d, 0xcd,
+    0xe0, 0x61, 0x88, 0x88, 0x21, 0xcc, 0x74, 0x5d, 0xce, 0x4c, 0x51, 0x47,
+    0xf0, 0xc5, 0x5c, 0x4c, 0x82, 0x7a, 0xaf, 0x72, 0xad, 0xb9, 0xe0, 0x53,
+    0xf2, 0x78, 0xb7, 0xf0, 0xb5, 0x48, 0x7f, 0x8a, 0x3a, 0x18, 0xd1, 0x9f,
+    0x8b, 0x7d, 0xa5, 0x47, 0xb7, 0x95, 0xab, 0x98, 0xf8, 0x7b, 0x74, 0x50,
+    0x56, 0x8e, 0x57, 0xf0, 0xee, 0xf5, 0xb7, 0xba, 0xab, 0x85, 0x86, 0xf9,
+    0x2b, 0xef, 0x41, 0x56, 0xa0, 0xa4, 0x9f, 0xb7, 0x38, 0x00, 0x46, 0x0a,
+    0xa6, 0xf1, 0xfc, 0x1f, 0xd8, 0x4e, 0x85, 0x44, 0x92, 0x43, 0x21, 0x5d,
+    0x6e, 0xcc, 0xc2, 0xcb, 0x26, 0x31, 0x0d, 0x21, 0xc4, 0xbd, 0x8d, 0x24,
+    0xbc, 0xd9, 0x18, 0x19, 0xd7, 0xdc, 0xf1, 0xe7, 0x93, 0x50, 0x48, 0x03,
+    0x2c, 0xae, 0x2e, 0xe7, 0x49, 0x88, 0x5f, 0x93, 0x57, 0x27, 0x99, 0x36,
+    0xb4, 0x20, 0xab, 0xfc, 0xa7, 0x2b, 0xf2, 0xd9, 0x98, 0xd7, 0xd4, 0x34,
+    0x9d, 0x96, 0x50, 0x58, 0x9a, 0xea, 0x54, 0xf3, 0xee, 0xf5, 0x63, 0x14,
+    0xee, 0x85, 0x83, 0x74, 0x76, 0xe1, 0x52, 0x95, 0xc3, 0xf7, 0xeb, 0x04,
+    0x04, 0x7b, 0xa7, 0x28, 0x1b, 0xcc, 0xea, 0x4a, 0x4e, 0x84, 0xda, 0xd8,
+    0x9c, 0x79, 0xd8, 0x9b, 0x66, 0x89, 0x2f, 0xcf, 0xac, 0xd7, 0x79, 0xf9,
+    0xa9, 0xd8, 0x45, 0x13, 0x78, 0xb9, 0x00, 0x14, 0xc9, 0x7e, 0x22, 0x51,
+    0x86, 0x67, 0xb0, 0x9f, 0x26, 0x11, 0x23, 0xc8, 0x38, 0xd7, 0x70, 0x1d,
+    0x15, 0x8e, 0x4d, 0x4f, 0x95, 0x97, 0x40, 0xa1, 0xc2, 0x7e, 0x01, 0x18,
+    0x72, 0xf4, 0x10, 0xe6, 0x8d, 0x52, 0x16, 0x7f, 0xf2, 0xc9, 0xf8, 0x33,
+    0x8b, 0x33, 0xb7, 0xce,
+};
+
+static unsigned char dsa2048_p[] = {
+    0xA0, 0x25, 0xFA, 0xAD, 0xF4, 0x8E, 0xB9, 0xE5, 0x99, 0xF3, 0x5D, 0x6F,
+    0x4F, 0x83, 0x34, 0xE2, 0x7E, 0xCF, 0x6F, 0xBF, 0x30, 0xAF, 0x6F, 0x81,
+    0xEB, 0xF8, 0xC4, 0x13, 0xD9, 0xA0, 0x5D, 0x8B, 0x5C, 0x8E, 0xDC, 0xC2,
+    0x1D, 0x0B, 0x41, 0x32, 0xB0, 0x1F, 0xFE, 0xEF, 0x0C, 0xC2, 0xA2, 0x7E,
+    0x68, 0x5C, 0x28, 0x21, 0xE9, 0xF5, 0xB1, 0x58, 0x12, 0x63, 0x4C, 0x19,
+    0x4E, 0xFF, 0x02, 0x4B, 0x92, 0xED, 0xD2, 0x07, 0x11, 0x4D, 0x8C, 0x58,
+    0x16, 0x5C, 0x55, 0x8E, 0xAD, 0xA3, 0x67, 0x7D, 0xB9, 0x86, 0x6E, 0x0B,
+    0xE6, 0x54, 0x6F, 0x40, 0xAE, 0x0E, 0x67, 0x4C, 0xF9, 0x12, 0x5B, 0x3C,
+    0x08, 0x7A, 0xF7, 0xFC, 0x67, 0x86, 0x69, 0xE7, 0x0A, 0x94, 0x40, 0xBF,
+    0x8B, 0x76, 0xFE, 0x26, 0xD1, 0xF2, 0xA1, 0x1A, 0x84, 0xA1, 0x43, 0x56,
+    0x28, 0xBC, 0x9A, 0x5F, 0xD7, 0x3B, 0x69, 0x89, 0x8A, 0x36, 0x2C, 0x51,
+    0xDF, 0x12, 0x77, 0x2F, 0x57, 0x7B, 0xA0, 0xAA, 0xDD, 0x7F, 0xA1, 0x62,
+    0x3B, 0x40, 0x7B, 0x68, 0x1A, 0x8F, 0x0D, 0x38, 0xBB, 0x21, 0x5D, 0x18,
+    0xFC, 0x0F, 0x46, 0xF7, 0xA3, 0xB0, 0x1D, 0x23, 0xC3, 0xD2, 0xC7, 0x72,
+    0x51, 0x18, 0xDF, 0x46, 0x95, 0x79, 0xD9, 0xBD, 0xB5, 0x19, 0x02, 0x2C,
+    0x87, 0xDC, 0xE7, 0x57, 0x82, 0x7E, 0xF1, 0x8B, 0x06, 0x3D, 0x00, 0xA5,
+    0x7B, 0x6B, 0x26, 0x27, 0x91, 0x0F, 0x6A, 0x77, 0xE4, 0xD5, 0x04, 0xE4,
+    0x12, 0x2C, 0x42, 0xFF, 0xD2, 0x88, 0xBB, 0xD3, 0x92, 0xA0, 0xF9, 0xC8,
+    0x51, 0x64, 0x14, 0x5C, 0xD8, 0xF9, 0x6C, 0x47, 0x82, 0xB4, 0x1C, 0x7F,
+    0x09, 0xB8, 0xF0, 0x25, 0x83, 0x1D, 0x3F, 0x3F, 0x05, 0xB3, 0x21, 0x0A,
+    0x5D, 0xA7, 0xD8, 0x54, 0xC3, 0x65, 0x7D, 0xC3, 0xB0, 0x1D, 0xBF, 0xAE,
+    0xF8, 0x68, 0xCF, 0x9B,
+};
+
+static unsigned char dsa2048_q[] = {
+    0x97, 0xE7, 0x33, 0x4D, 0xD3, 0x94, 0x3E, 0x0B, 0xDB, 0x62, 0x74, 0xC6,
+    0xA1, 0x08, 0xDD, 0x19, 0xA3, 0x75, 0x17, 0x1B,
+};
+
+static unsigned char dsa2048_g[] = {
+    0x2C, 0x78, 0x16, 0x59, 0x34, 0x63, 0xF4, 0xF3, 0x92, 0xFC, 0xB5, 0xA5,
+    0x4F, 0x13, 0xDE, 0x2F, 0x1C, 0xA4, 0x3C, 0xAE, 0xAD, 0x38, 0x3F, 0x7E,
+    0x90, 0xBF, 0x96, 0xA6, 0xAE, 0x25, 0x90, 0x72, 0xF5, 0x8E, 0x80, 0x0C,
+    0x39, 0x1C, 0xD9, 0xEC, 0xBA, 0x90, 0x5B, 0x3A, 0xE8, 0x58, 0x6C, 0x9E,
+    0x30, 0x42, 0x37, 0x02, 0x31, 0x82, 0xBC, 0x6A, 0xDF, 0x6A, 0x09, 0x29,
+    0xE3, 0xC0, 0x46, 0xD1, 0xCB, 0x85, 0xEC, 0x0C, 0x30, 0x5E, 0xEA, 0xC8,
+    0x39, 0x8E, 0x22, 0x9F, 0x22, 0x10, 0xD2, 0x34, 0x61, 0x68, 0x37, 0x3D,
+    0x2E, 0x4A, 0x5B, 0x9A, 0xF5, 0xC1, 0x48, 0xC6, 0xF6, 0xDC, 0x63, 0x1A,
+    0xD3, 0x96, 0x64, 0xBA, 0x34, 0xC9, 0xD1, 0xA0, 0xD1, 0xAE, 0x6C, 0x2F,
+    0x48, 0x17, 0x93, 0x14, 0x43, 0xED, 0xF0, 0x21, 0x30, 0x19, 0xC3, 0x1B,
+    0x5F, 0xDE, 0xA3, 0xF0, 0x70, 0x78, 0x18, 0xE1, 0xA8, 0xE4, 0xEE, 0x2E,
+    0x00, 0xA5, 0xE4, 0xB3, 0x17, 0xC8, 0x0C, 0x7D, 0x6E, 0x42, 0xDC, 0xB7,
+    0x46, 0x00, 0x36, 0x4D, 0xD4, 0x46, 0xAA, 0x3D, 0x3C, 0x46, 0x89, 0x40,
+    0xBF, 0x1D, 0x84, 0x77, 0x0A, 0x75, 0xF3, 0x87, 0x1D, 0x08, 0x4C, 0xA6,
+    0xD1, 0xA9, 0x1C, 0x1E, 0x12, 0x1E, 0xE1, 0xC7, 0x30, 0x28, 0x76, 0xA5,
+    0x7F, 0x6C, 0x85, 0x96, 0x2B, 0x6F, 0xDB, 0x80, 0x66, 0x26, 0xAE, 0xF5,
+    0x93, 0xC7, 0x8E, 0xAE, 0x9A, 0xED, 0xE4, 0xCA, 0x04, 0xEA, 0x3B, 0x72,
+    0xEF, 0xDC, 0x87, 0xED, 0x0D, 0xA5, 0x4C, 0x4A, 0xDD, 0x71, 0x22, 0x64,
+    0x59, 0x69, 0x4E, 0x8E, 0xBF, 0x43, 0xDC, 0xAB, 0x8E, 0x66, 0xBB, 0x01,
+    0xB6, 0xF4, 0xE7, 0xFD, 0xD2, 0xAD, 0x9F, 0x36, 0xC1, 0xA0, 0x29, 0x99,
+    0xD1, 0x96, 0x70, 0x59, 0x06, 0x78, 0x35, 0xBD, 0x65, 0x55, 0x52, 0x9E,
+    0xF8, 0xB2, 0xE5, 0x38,
+};
+
+DSA *get_dsa2048()
+{
+    DSA *dsa;
+    BIGNUM *priv_key, *pub_key, *p, *q, *g;
+
+    if ((dsa = DSA_new()) == NULL)
+        return (NULL);
+    priv_key = BN_bin2bn(dsa2048_priv, sizeof(dsa2048_priv), NULL);
+    pub_key = BN_bin2bn(dsa2048_pub, sizeof(dsa2048_pub), NULL);
+    p = BN_bin2bn(dsa2048_p, sizeof(dsa2048_p), NULL);
+    q = BN_bin2bn(dsa2048_q, sizeof(dsa2048_q), NULL);
+    g = BN_bin2bn(dsa2048_g, sizeof(dsa2048_g), NULL);
+    if ((priv_key == NULL) || (pub_key == NULL) || (p == NULL) || (q == NULL)
+            || (g == NULL)) {
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (!DSA_set0_pqg(dsa, p, q, g))
+        goto err;
+    p = q = g = NULL;
+
+    if (!DSA_set0_key(dsa, pub_key, priv_key))
+        goto err;
+
+    return dsa;
+ err:
+    DSA_free(dsa);
+    BN_free(priv_key);
+    BN_free(pub_key);
+    BN_free(p);
+    BN_free(q);
+    BN_free(g);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/testrsa.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/testrsa.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1350ce5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/testrsa.h
@@ -0,0 +1,1960 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+static unsigned char test512[] = {
+    0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0x3a, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, 0x02, 0x41, 0x00,
+    0xd6, 0x33, 0xb9, 0xc8, 0xfb, 0x4f, 0x3c, 0x7d, 0xc0, 0x01,
+    0x86, 0xd0, 0xe7, 0xa0, 0x55, 0xf2, 0x95, 0x93, 0xcc, 0x4f,
+    0xb7, 0x5b, 0x67, 0x5b, 0x94, 0x68, 0xc9, 0x34, 0x15, 0xde,
+    0xa5, 0x2e, 0x1c, 0x33, 0xc2, 0x6e, 0xfc, 0x34, 0x5e, 0x71,
+    0x13, 0xb7, 0xd6, 0xee, 0xd8, 0xa5, 0x65, 0x05, 0x72, 0x87,
+    0xa8, 0xb0, 0x77, 0xfe, 0x57, 0xf5, 0xfc, 0x5f, 0x55, 0x83,
+    0x87, 0xdd, 0x57, 0x49, 0x02, 0x03, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0x02,
+    0x41, 0x00, 0xa7, 0xf7, 0x91, 0xc5, 0x0f, 0x84, 0x57, 0xdc,
+    0x07, 0xf7, 0x6a, 0x7f, 0x60, 0x52, 0xb3, 0x72, 0xf1, 0x66,
+    0x1f, 0x7d, 0x97, 0x3b, 0x9e, 0xb6, 0x0a, 0x8f, 0x8c, 0xcf,
+    0x42, 0x23, 0x00, 0x04, 0xd4, 0x28, 0x0e, 0x1c, 0x90, 0xc4,
+    0x11, 0x25, 0x25, 0xa5, 0x93, 0xa5, 0x2f, 0x70, 0x02, 0xdf,
+    0x81, 0x9c, 0x49, 0x03, 0xa0, 0xf8, 0x6d, 0x54, 0x2e, 0x26,
+    0xde, 0xaa, 0x85, 0x59, 0xa8, 0x31, 0x02, 0x21, 0x00, 0xeb,
+    0x47, 0xd7, 0x3b, 0xf6, 0xc3, 0xdd, 0x5a, 0x46, 0xc5, 0xb9,
+    0x2b, 0x9a, 0xa0, 0x09, 0x8f, 0xa6, 0xfb, 0xf3, 0x78, 0x7a,
+    0x33, 0x70, 0x9d, 0x0f, 0x42, 0x6b, 0x13, 0x68, 0x24, 0xd3,
+    0x15, 0x02, 0x21, 0x00, 0xe9, 0x10, 0xb0, 0xb3, 0x0d, 0xe2,
+    0x82, 0x68, 0x77, 0x8a, 0x6e, 0x7c, 0xda, 0xbc, 0x3e, 0x53,
+    0x83, 0xfb, 0xd6, 0x22, 0xe7, 0xb5, 0xae, 0x6e, 0x80, 0xda,
+    0x00, 0x55, 0x97, 0xc1, 0xd0, 0x65, 0x02, 0x20, 0x4c, 0xf8,
+    0x73, 0xb1, 0x6a, 0x49, 0x29, 0x61, 0x1f, 0x46, 0x10, 0x0d,
+    0xf3, 0xc7, 0xe7, 0x58, 0xd7, 0x88, 0x15, 0x5e, 0x94, 0x9b,
+    0xbf, 0x7b, 0xa2, 0x42, 0x58, 0x45, 0x41, 0x0c, 0xcb, 0x01,
+    0x02, 0x20, 0x12, 0x11, 0xba, 0x31, 0x57, 0x9d, 0x3d, 0x11,
+    0x0e, 0x5b, 0x8c, 0x2f, 0x5f, 0xe2, 0x02, 0x4f, 0x05, 0x47,
+    0x8c, 0x15, 0x8e, 0xb3, 0x56, 0x3f, 0xb8, 0xfb, 0xad, 0xd4,
+    0xf4, 0xfc, 0x10, 0xc5, 0x02, 0x20, 0x18, 0xa1, 0x29, 0x99,
+    0x5b, 0xd9, 0xc8, 0xd4, 0xfc, 0x49, 0x7a, 0x2a, 0x21, 0x2c,
+    0x49, 0xe4, 0x4f, 0xeb, 0xef, 0x51, 0xf1, 0xab, 0x6d, 0xfb,
+    0x4b, 0x14, 0xe9, 0x4b, 0x52, 0xb5, 0x82, 0x2c,
+};
+
+static unsigned char test1024[] = {
+    0x30, 0x82, 0x02, 0x5c, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, 0x02, 0x81, 0x81,
+    0x00, 0xdc, 0x98, 0x43, 0xe8, 0x3d, 0x43, 0x5b, 0xe4, 0x05,
+    0xcd, 0xd0, 0xa9, 0x3e, 0xcb, 0x83, 0x75, 0xf6, 0xb5, 0xa5,
+    0x9f, 0x6b, 0xe9, 0x34, 0x41, 0x29, 0x18, 0xfa, 0x6a, 0x55,
+    0x4d, 0x70, 0xfc, 0xec, 0xae, 0x87, 0x38, 0x0a, 0x20, 0xa9,
+    0xc0, 0x45, 0x77, 0x6e, 0x57, 0x60, 0x57, 0xf4, 0xed, 0x96,
+    0x22, 0xcb, 0x8f, 0xe1, 0x33, 0x3a, 0x17, 0x1f, 0xed, 0x37,
+    0xa5, 0x6f, 0xeb, 0xa6, 0xbc, 0x12, 0x80, 0x1d, 0x53, 0xbd,
+    0x70, 0xeb, 0x21, 0x76, 0x3e, 0xc9, 0x2f, 0x1a, 0x45, 0x24,
+    0x82, 0xff, 0xcd, 0x59, 0x32, 0x06, 0x2e, 0x12, 0x3b, 0x23,
+    0x78, 0xed, 0x12, 0x3d, 0xe0, 0x8d, 0xf9, 0x67, 0x4f, 0x37,
+    0x4e, 0x47, 0x02, 0x4c, 0x2d, 0xc0, 0x4f, 0x1f, 0xb3, 0x94,
+    0xe1, 0x41, 0x2e, 0x2d, 0x90, 0x10, 0xfc, 0x82, 0x91, 0x8b,
+    0x0f, 0x22, 0xd4, 0xf2, 0xfc, 0x2c, 0xab, 0x53, 0x55, 0x02,
+    0x03, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x81, 0x80, 0x2b, 0xcc, 0x3f,
+    0x8f, 0x58, 0xba, 0x8b, 0x00, 0x16, 0xf6, 0xea, 0x3a, 0xf0,
+    0x30, 0xd0, 0x05, 0x17, 0xda, 0xb0, 0xeb, 0x9a, 0x2d, 0x4f,
+    0x26, 0xb0, 0xd6, 0x38, 0xc1, 0xeb, 0xf5, 0xd8, 0x3d, 0x1f,
+    0x70, 0xf7, 0x7f, 0xf4, 0xe2, 0xcf, 0x51, 0x51, 0x79, 0x88,
+    0xfa, 0xe8, 0x32, 0x0e, 0x7b, 0x2d, 0x97, 0xf2, 0xfa, 0xba,
+    0x27, 0xc5, 0x9c, 0xd9, 0xc5, 0xeb, 0x8a, 0x79, 0x52, 0x3c,
+    0x64, 0x34, 0x7d, 0xc2, 0xcf, 0x28, 0xc7, 0x4e, 0xd5, 0x43,
+    0x0b, 0xd1, 0xa6, 0xca, 0x6d, 0x03, 0x2d, 0x72, 0x23, 0xbc,
+    0x6d, 0x05, 0xfa, 0x16, 0x09, 0x2f, 0x2e, 0x5c, 0xb6, 0xee,
+    0x74, 0xdd, 0xd2, 0x48, 0x8e, 0x36, 0x0c, 0x06, 0x3d, 0x4d,
+    0xe5, 0x10, 0x82, 0xeb, 0x6a, 0xf3, 0x4b, 0x9f, 0xd6, 0xed,
+    0x11, 0xb1, 0x6e, 0xec, 0xf4, 0xfe, 0x8e, 0x75, 0x94, 0x20,
+    0x2f, 0xcb, 0xac, 0x46, 0xf1, 0x02, 0x41, 0x00, 0xf9, 0x8c,
+    0xa3, 0x85, 0xb1, 0xdd, 0x29, 0xaf, 0x65, 0xc1, 0x33, 0xf3,
+    0x95, 0xc5, 0x52, 0x68, 0x0b, 0xd4, 0xf1, 0xe5, 0x0e, 0x02,
+    0x9f, 0x4f, 0xfa, 0x77, 0xdc, 0x46, 0x9e, 0xc7, 0xa6, 0xe4,
+    0x16, 0x29, 0xda, 0xb0, 0x07, 0xcf, 0x5b, 0xa9, 0x12, 0x8a,
+    0xdd, 0x63, 0x0a, 0xde, 0x2e, 0x8c, 0x66, 0x8b, 0x8c, 0xdc,
+    0x19, 0xa3, 0x7e, 0xf4, 0x3b, 0xd0, 0x1a, 0x8c, 0xa4, 0xc2,
+    0xe1, 0xd3, 0x02, 0x41, 0x00, 0xe2, 0x4c, 0x05, 0xf2, 0x04,
+    0x86, 0x4e, 0x61, 0x43, 0xdb, 0xb0, 0xb9, 0x96, 0x86, 0x52,
+    0x2c, 0xca, 0x8d, 0x7b, 0xab, 0x0b, 0x13, 0x0d, 0x7e, 0x38,
+    0x5b, 0xe2, 0x2e, 0x7b, 0x0e, 0xe7, 0x19, 0x99, 0x38, 0xe7,
+    0xf2, 0x21, 0xbd, 0x85, 0x85, 0xe3, 0xfd, 0x28, 0x77, 0x20,
+    0x31, 0x71, 0x2c, 0xd0, 0xff, 0xfb, 0x2e, 0xaf, 0x85, 0xb4,
+    0x86, 0xca, 0xf3, 0xbb, 0xca, 0xaa, 0x0f, 0x95, 0x37, 0x02,
+    0x40, 0x0e, 0x41, 0x9a, 0x95, 0xe8, 0xb3, 0x59, 0xce, 0x4b,
+    0x61, 0xde, 0x35, 0xec, 0x38, 0x79, 0x9c, 0xb8, 0x10, 0x52,
+    0x41, 0x63, 0xab, 0x82, 0xae, 0x6f, 0x00, 0xa9, 0xf4, 0xde,
+    0xdd, 0x49, 0x0b, 0x7e, 0xb8, 0xa5, 0x65, 0xa9, 0x0c, 0x8f,
+    0x8f, 0xf9, 0x1f, 0x35, 0xc6, 0x92, 0xb8, 0x5e, 0xb0, 0x66,
+    0xab, 0x52, 0x40, 0xc0, 0xb6, 0x36, 0x6a, 0x7d, 0x80, 0x46,
+    0x04, 0x02, 0xe5, 0x9f, 0x41, 0x02, 0x41, 0x00, 0xc0, 0xad,
+    0xcc, 0x4e, 0x21, 0xee, 0x1d, 0x24, 0x91, 0xfb, 0xa7, 0x80,
+    0x8d, 0x9a, 0xb6, 0xb3, 0x2e, 0x8f, 0xc2, 0xe1, 0x82, 0xdf,
+    0x69, 0x18, 0xb4, 0x71, 0xff, 0xa6, 0x65, 0xde, 0xed, 0x84,
+    0x8d, 0x42, 0xb7, 0xb3, 0x21, 0x69, 0x56, 0x1c, 0x07, 0x60,
+    0x51, 0x29, 0x04, 0xff, 0x34, 0x06, 0xdd, 0xb9, 0x67, 0x2c,
+    0x7c, 0x04, 0x93, 0x0e, 0x46, 0x15, 0xbb, 0x2a, 0xb7, 0x1b,
+    0xe7, 0x87, 0x02, 0x40, 0x78, 0xda, 0x5d, 0x07, 0x51, 0x0c,
+    0x16, 0x7a, 0x9f, 0x29, 0x20, 0x84, 0x0d, 0x42, 0xfa, 0xd7,
+    0x00, 0xd8, 0x77, 0x7e, 0xb0, 0xb0, 0x6b, 0xd6, 0x5b, 0x53,
+    0xb8, 0x9b, 0x7a, 0xcd, 0xc7, 0x2b, 0xb8, 0x6a, 0x63, 0xa9,
+    0xfb, 0x6f, 0xa4, 0x72, 0xbf, 0x4c, 0x5d, 0x00, 0x14, 0xba,
+    0xfa, 0x59, 0x88, 0xed, 0xe4, 0xe0, 0x8c, 0xa2, 0xec, 0x14,
+    0x7e, 0x2d, 0xe2, 0xf0, 0x46, 0x49, 0x95, 0x45,
+};
+
+static unsigned char test2048[] = {
+    0x30, 0x82, 0x04, 0xa3, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, 0x02, 0x82, 0x01,
+    0x01, 0x00, 0xc0, 0xc0, 0xce, 0x3e, 0x3c, 0x53, 0x67, 0x3f,
+    0x4f, 0xc5, 0x2f, 0xa4, 0xc2, 0x5a, 0x2f, 0x58, 0xfd, 0x27,
+    0x52, 0x6a, 0xe8, 0xcf, 0x4a, 0x73, 0x47, 0x8d, 0x25, 0x0f,
+    0x5f, 0x03, 0x26, 0x78, 0xef, 0xf0, 0x22, 0x12, 0xd3, 0xde,
+    0x47, 0xb2, 0x1c, 0x0b, 0x38, 0x63, 0x1a, 0x6c, 0x85, 0x7a,
+    0x80, 0xc6, 0x8f, 0xa0, 0x41, 0xaf, 0x62, 0xc4, 0x67, 0x32,
+    0x88, 0xf8, 0xa6, 0x9c, 0xf5, 0x23, 0x1d, 0xe4, 0xac, 0x3f,
+    0x29, 0xf9, 0xec, 0xe1, 0x8b, 0x26, 0x03, 0x2c, 0xb2, 0xab,
+    0xf3, 0x7d, 0xb5, 0xca, 0x49, 0xc0, 0x8f, 0x1c, 0xdf, 0x33,
+    0x3a, 0x60, 0xda, 0x3c, 0xb0, 0x16, 0xf8, 0xa9, 0x12, 0x8f,
+    0x64, 0xac, 0x23, 0x0c, 0x69, 0x64, 0x97, 0x5d, 0x99, 0xd4,
+    0x09, 0x83, 0x9b, 0x61, 0xd3, 0xac, 0xf0, 0xde, 0xdd, 0x5e,
+    0x9f, 0x44, 0x94, 0xdb, 0x3a, 0x4d, 0x97, 0xe8, 0x52, 0x29,
+    0xf7, 0xdb, 0x94, 0x07, 0x45, 0x90, 0x78, 0x1e, 0x31, 0x0b,
+    0x80, 0xf7, 0x57, 0xad, 0x1c, 0x79, 0xc5, 0xcb, 0x32, 0xb0,
+    0xce, 0xcd, 0x74, 0xb3, 0xe2, 0x94, 0xc5, 0x78, 0x2f, 0x34,
+    0x1a, 0x45, 0xf7, 0x8c, 0x52, 0xa5, 0xbc, 0x8d, 0xec, 0xd1,
+    0x2f, 0x31, 0x3b, 0xf0, 0x49, 0x59, 0x5e, 0x88, 0x9d, 0x15,
+    0x92, 0x35, 0x32, 0xc1, 0xe7, 0x61, 0xec, 0x50, 0x48, 0x7c,
+    0xba, 0x05, 0xf9, 0xf8, 0xf8, 0xa7, 0x8c, 0x83, 0xe8, 0x66,
+    0x5b, 0xeb, 0xfe, 0xd8, 0x4f, 0xdd, 0x6d, 0x36, 0xc0, 0xb2,
+    0x90, 0x0f, 0xb8, 0x52, 0xf9, 0x04, 0x9b, 0x40, 0x2c, 0x27,
+    0xd6, 0x36, 0x8e, 0xc2, 0x1b, 0x44, 0xf3, 0x92, 0xd5, 0x15,
+    0x9e, 0x9a, 0xbc, 0xf3, 0x7d, 0x03, 0xd7, 0x02, 0x14, 0x20,
+    0xe9, 0x10, 0x92, 0xfd, 0xf9, 0xfc, 0x8f, 0xe5, 0x18, 0xe1,
+    0x95, 0xcc, 0x9e, 0x60, 0xa6, 0xfa, 0x38, 0x4d, 0x02, 0x03,
+    0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x82, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0xc3, 0xc3,
+    0x0d, 0xb4, 0x27, 0x90, 0x8d, 0x4b, 0xbf, 0xb8, 0x84, 0xaa,
+    0xd0, 0xb8, 0xc7, 0x5d, 0x99, 0xbe, 0x55, 0xf6, 0x3e, 0x7c,
+    0x49, 0x20, 0xcb, 0x8a, 0x8e, 0x19, 0x0e, 0x66, 0x24, 0xac,
+    0xaf, 0x03, 0x33, 0x97, 0xeb, 0x95, 0xd5, 0x3b, 0x0f, 0x40,
+    0x56, 0x04, 0x50, 0xd1, 0xe6, 0xbe, 0x84, 0x0b, 0x25, 0xd3,
+    0x9c, 0xe2, 0x83, 0x6c, 0xf5, 0x62, 0x5d, 0xba, 0x2b, 0x7d,
+    0x3d, 0x7a, 0x6c, 0xe1, 0xd2, 0x0e, 0x54, 0x93, 0x80, 0x01,
+    0x91, 0x51, 0x09, 0xe8, 0x5b, 0x8e, 0x47, 0xbd, 0x64, 0xe4,
+    0x0e, 0x03, 0x83, 0x55, 0xcf, 0x5a, 0x37, 0xf0, 0x25, 0xb5,
+    0x7d, 0x21, 0xd7, 0x69, 0xdf, 0x6f, 0xc2, 0xcf, 0x10, 0xc9,
+    0x8a, 0x40, 0x9f, 0x7a, 0x70, 0xc0, 0xe8, 0xe8, 0xc0, 0xe6,
+    0x9a, 0x15, 0x0a, 0x8d, 0x4e, 0x46, 0xcb, 0x7a, 0xdb, 0xb3,
+    0xcb, 0x83, 0x02, 0xc4, 0xf0, 0xab, 0xeb, 0x02, 0x01, 0x0e,
+    0x23, 0xfc, 0x1d, 0xc4, 0xbd, 0xd4, 0xaa, 0x5d, 0x31, 0x46,
+    0x99, 0xce, 0x9e, 0xf8, 0x04, 0x75, 0x10, 0x67, 0xc4, 0x53,
+    0x47, 0x44, 0xfa, 0xc2, 0x25, 0x73, 0x7e, 0xd0, 0x8e, 0x59,
+    0xd1, 0xb2, 0x5a, 0xf4, 0xc7, 0x18, 0x92, 0x2f, 0x39, 0xab,
+    0xcd, 0xa3, 0xb5, 0xc2, 0xb9, 0xc7, 0xb9, 0x1b, 0x9f, 0x48,
+    0xfa, 0x13, 0xc6, 0x98, 0x4d, 0xca, 0x84, 0x9c, 0x06, 0xca,
+    0xe7, 0x89, 0x01, 0x04, 0xc4, 0x6c, 0xfd, 0x29, 0x59, 0x35,
+    0xe7, 0xf3, 0xdd, 0xce, 0x64, 0x59, 0xbf, 0x21, 0x13, 0xa9,
+    0x9f, 0x0e, 0xc5, 0xff, 0xbd, 0x33, 0x00, 0xec, 0xac, 0x6b,
+    0x11, 0xef, 0x51, 0x5e, 0xad, 0x07, 0x15, 0xde, 0xb8, 0x5f,
+    0xc6, 0xb9, 0xa3, 0x22, 0x65, 0x46, 0x83, 0x14, 0xdf, 0xd0,
+    0xf1, 0x44, 0x8a, 0xe1, 0x9c, 0x23, 0x33, 0xb4, 0x97, 0x33,
+    0xe6, 0x6b, 0x81, 0x02, 0x81, 0x81, 0x00, 0xec, 0x12, 0xa7,
+    0x59, 0x74, 0x6a, 0xde, 0x3e, 0xad, 0xd8, 0x36, 0x80, 0x50,
+    0xa2, 0xd5, 0x21, 0x81, 0x07, 0xf1, 0xd0, 0x91, 0xf2, 0x6c,
+    0x12, 0x2f, 0x9d, 0x1a, 0x26, 0xf8, 0x30, 0x65, 0xdf, 0xe8,
+    0xc0, 0x9b, 0x6a, 0x30, 0x98, 0x82, 0x87, 0xec, 0xa2, 0x56,
+    0x87, 0x62, 0x6f, 0xe7, 0x9f, 0xf6, 0x56, 0xe6, 0x71, 0x8f,
+    0x49, 0x86, 0x93, 0x5a, 0x4d, 0x34, 0x58, 0xfe, 0xd9, 0x04,
+    0x13, 0xaf, 0x79, 0xb7, 0xad, 0x11, 0xd1, 0x30, 0x9a, 0x14,
+    0x06, 0xa0, 0xfa, 0xb7, 0x55, 0xdc, 0x6c, 0x5a, 0x4c, 0x2c,
+    0x59, 0x56, 0xf6, 0xe8, 0x9d, 0xaf, 0x0a, 0x78, 0x99, 0x06,
+    0x06, 0x9e, 0xe7, 0x9c, 0x51, 0x55, 0x43, 0xfc, 0x3b, 0x6c,
+    0x0b, 0xbf, 0x2d, 0x41, 0xa7, 0xaf, 0xb7, 0xe0, 0xe8, 0x28,
+    0x18, 0xb4, 0x13, 0xd1, 0xe6, 0x97, 0xd0, 0x9f, 0x6a, 0x80,
+    0xca, 0xdd, 0x1a, 0x7e, 0x15, 0x02, 0x81, 0x81, 0x00, 0xd1,
+    0x06, 0x0c, 0x1f, 0xe3, 0xd0, 0xab, 0xd6, 0xca, 0x7c, 0xbc,
+    0x7d, 0x13, 0x35, 0xce, 0x27, 0xcd, 0xd8, 0x49, 0x51, 0x63,
+    0x64, 0x0f, 0xca, 0x06, 0x12, 0xfc, 0x07, 0x3e, 0xaf, 0x61,
+    0x6d, 0xe2, 0x53, 0x39, 0x27, 0xae, 0xc3, 0x11, 0x9e, 0x94,
+    0x01, 0x4f, 0xe3, 0xf3, 0x67, 0xf9, 0x77, 0xf9, 0xe7, 0x95,
+    0x3a, 0x6f, 0xe2, 0x20, 0x73, 0x3e, 0xa4, 0x7a, 0x28, 0xd4,
+    0x61, 0x97, 0xf6, 0x17, 0xa0, 0x23, 0x10, 0x2b, 0xce, 0x84,
+    0x57, 0x7e, 0x25, 0x1f, 0xf4, 0xa8, 0x54, 0xd2, 0x65, 0x94,
+    0xcc, 0x95, 0x0a, 0xab, 0x30, 0xc1, 0x59, 0x1f, 0x61, 0x8e,
+    0xb9, 0x6b, 0xd7, 0x4e, 0xb9, 0x83, 0x43, 0x79, 0x85, 0x11,
+    0xbc, 0x0f, 0xae, 0x25, 0x20, 0x05, 0xbc, 0xd2, 0x48, 0xa1,
+    0x68, 0x09, 0x84, 0xf6, 0x12, 0x9a, 0x66, 0xb9, 0x2b, 0xbb,
+    0x76, 0x03, 0x17, 0x46, 0x4e, 0x97, 0x59, 0x02, 0x81, 0x80,
+    0x09, 0x4c, 0xfa, 0xd6, 0xe5, 0x65, 0x48, 0x78, 0x43, 0xb5,
+    0x1f, 0x00, 0x93, 0x2c, 0xb7, 0x24, 0xe8, 0xc6, 0x7d, 0x5a,
+    0x70, 0x45, 0x92, 0xc8, 0x6c, 0xa3, 0xcd, 0xe1, 0xf7, 0x29,
+    0x40, 0xfa, 0x3f, 0x5b, 0x47, 0x44, 0x39, 0xc1, 0xe8, 0x72,
+    0x9e, 0x7a, 0x0e, 0xda, 0xaa, 0xa0, 0x2a, 0x09, 0xfd, 0x54,
+    0x93, 0x23, 0xaa, 0x37, 0x85, 0x5b, 0xcc, 0xd4, 0xf9, 0xd8,
+    0xff, 0xc1, 0x61, 0x0d, 0xbd, 0x7e, 0x18, 0x24, 0x73, 0x6d,
+    0x40, 0x72, 0xf1, 0x93, 0x09, 0x48, 0x97, 0x6c, 0x84, 0x90,
+    0xa8, 0x46, 0x14, 0x01, 0x39, 0x11, 0xe5, 0x3c, 0x41, 0x27,
+    0x32, 0x75, 0x24, 0xed, 0xa1, 0xd9, 0x12, 0x29, 0x8a, 0x28,
+    0x71, 0x89, 0x8d, 0xca, 0x30, 0xb0, 0x01, 0xc4, 0x2f, 0x82,
+    0x19, 0x14, 0x4c, 0x70, 0x1c, 0xb8, 0x23, 0x2e, 0xe8, 0x90,
+    0x49, 0x97, 0x92, 0x97, 0x6b, 0x7a, 0x9d, 0xb9, 0x02, 0x81,
+    0x80, 0x0f, 0x0e, 0xa1, 0x76, 0xf6, 0xa1, 0x44, 0x8f, 0xaf,
+    0x7c, 0x76, 0xd3, 0x87, 0xbb, 0xbb, 0x83, 0x10, 0x88, 0x01,
+    0x18, 0x14, 0xd1, 0xd3, 0x75, 0x59, 0x24, 0xaa, 0xf5, 0x16,
+    0xa5, 0xe9, 0x9d, 0xd1, 0xcc, 0xee, 0xf4, 0x15, 0xd9, 0xc5,
+    0x7e, 0x27, 0xe9, 0x44, 0x49, 0x06, 0x72, 0xb9, 0xfc, 0xd3,
+    0x8a, 0xc4, 0x2c, 0x36, 0x7d, 0x12, 0x9b, 0x5a, 0xaa, 0xdc,
+    0x85, 0xee, 0x6e, 0xad, 0x54, 0xb3, 0xf4, 0xfc, 0x31, 0xa1,
+    0x06, 0x3a, 0x70, 0x57, 0x0c, 0xf3, 0x95, 0x5b, 0x3e, 0xe8,
+    0xfd, 0x1a, 0x4f, 0xf6, 0x78, 0x93, 0x46, 0x6a, 0xd7, 0x31,
+    0xb4, 0x84, 0x64, 0x85, 0x09, 0x38, 0x89, 0x92, 0x94, 0x1c,
+    0xbf, 0xe2, 0x3c, 0x2a, 0xe0, 0xff, 0x99, 0xa3, 0xf0, 0x2b,
+    0x31, 0xc2, 0x36, 0xcd, 0x60, 0xbf, 0x9d, 0x2d, 0x74, 0x32,
+    0xe8, 0x9c, 0x93, 0x6e, 0xbb, 0x91, 0x7b, 0xfd, 0xd9, 0x02,
+    0x81, 0x81, 0x00, 0xa2, 0x71, 0x25, 0x38, 0xeb, 0x2a, 0xe9,
+    0x37, 0xcd, 0xfe, 0x44, 0xce, 0x90, 0x3f, 0x52, 0x87, 0x84,
+    0x52, 0x1b, 0xae, 0x8d, 0x22, 0x94, 0xce, 0x38, 0xe6, 0x04,
+    0x88, 0x76, 0x85, 0x9a, 0xd3, 0x14, 0x09, 0xe5, 0x69, 0x9a,
+    0xff, 0x58, 0x92, 0x02, 0x6a, 0x7d, 0x7c, 0x1e, 0x2c, 0xfd,
+    0xa8, 0xca, 0x32, 0x14, 0x4f, 0x0d, 0x84, 0x0d, 0x37, 0x43,
+    0xbf, 0xe4, 0x5d, 0x12, 0xc8, 0x24, 0x91, 0x27, 0x8d, 0x46,
+    0xd9, 0x54, 0x53, 0xe7, 0x62, 0x71, 0xa8, 0x2b, 0x71, 0x41,
+    0x8d, 0x75, 0xf8, 0x3a, 0xa0, 0x61, 0x29, 0x46, 0xa6, 0xe5,
+    0x82, 0xfa, 0x3a, 0xd9, 0x08, 0xfa, 0xfc, 0x63, 0xfd, 0x6b,
+    0x30, 0xbc, 0xf4, 0x4e, 0x9e, 0x8c, 0x25, 0x0c, 0xb6, 0x55,
+    0xe7, 0x3c, 0xd4, 0x4e, 0x0b, 0xfd, 0x8b, 0xc3, 0x0e, 0x1d,
+    0x9c, 0x44, 0x57, 0x8f, 0x1f, 0x86, 0xf7, 0xd5, 0x1b, 0xe4,
+    0x95,
+};
+
+static unsigned char test3072[] = {
+    0x30, 0x82, 0x06, 0xe3, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, 0x02, 0x82, 0x01,
+    0x81, 0x00, 0xbc, 0x3b, 0x23, 0xc0, 0x33, 0xa7, 0x8b, 0xaa,
+    0xca, 0xa3, 0x8c, 0x94, 0xf2, 0x4c, 0x52, 0x08, 0x85, 0x80,
+    0xfc, 0x36, 0x15, 0xfa, 0x03, 0x06, 0xb6, 0xd6, 0x3f, 0x60,
+    0x8a, 0x89, 0x0d, 0xba, 0x1a, 0x51, 0x0b, 0x12, 0xea, 0x71,
+    0x77, 0xf6, 0x3a, 0x30, 0x21, 0x3d, 0x24, 0xf8, 0x2e, 0xd0,
+    0x17, 0x3a, 0x85, 0x94, 0x25, 0x42, 0x89, 0xff, 0x6a, 0x68,
+    0xdf, 0x1f, 0x86, 0xae, 0xa5, 0xbb, 0x9a, 0x79, 0xf6, 0x69,
+    0x94, 0xfe, 0xde, 0xfe, 0xce, 0x1b, 0x2e, 0xae, 0x1d, 0x91,
+    0xcb, 0xb9, 0xf1, 0x2d, 0xd8, 0x00, 0x82, 0x51, 0x8e, 0xf9,
+    0xfd, 0xac, 0xf1, 0x0e, 0x7f, 0xb7, 0x95, 0x85, 0x35, 0xf9,
+    0xcb, 0xbe, 0x5f, 0xd3, 0x58, 0xe3, 0xa1, 0x54, 0x9e, 0x30,
+    0xb1, 0x8d, 0x01, 0x97, 0x82, 0x06, 0x8e, 0x77, 0xfb, 0xce,
+    0x50, 0x2f, 0xbf, 0xf1, 0xff, 0x57, 0x0a, 0x42, 0x03, 0xfd,
+    0x0e, 0xba, 0x1e, 0xca, 0x85, 0xc1, 0x9b, 0xa5, 0x9d, 0x09,
+    0x0e, 0xe9, 0xbb, 0xc5, 0x73, 0x47, 0x0d, 0x39, 0x3c, 0x64,
+    0x06, 0x9a, 0x79, 0x3f, 0x50, 0x87, 0x9c, 0x18, 0x2d, 0x62,
+    0x01, 0xfc, 0xed, 0xc1, 0x58, 0x28, 0x21, 0x94, 0x1e, 0xf9,
+    0x2d, 0x96, 0x4f, 0xd0, 0xbc, 0xf1, 0xe0, 0x8a, 0xfa, 0x4d,
+    0xb6, 0x78, 0x4a, 0xde, 0x17, 0x59, 0xb0, 0x22, 0xa0, 0x9a,
+    0xd3, 0x70, 0xb6, 0xc2, 0xbe, 0xbc, 0x96, 0xca, 0x41, 0x5f,
+    0x58, 0x4e, 0xce, 0xef, 0x64, 0x45, 0xdd, 0x3f, 0x81, 0x92,
+    0xcc, 0x40, 0x79, 0xfc, 0x19, 0xe2, 0xbc, 0x77, 0x2f, 0x43,
+    0xfb, 0x8e, 0xad, 0x82, 0x4a, 0x0b, 0xb1, 0xbc, 0x09, 0x8a,
+    0x80, 0xc3, 0x0f, 0xef, 0xd2, 0x06, 0xd3, 0x4b, 0x0c, 0x7f,
+    0xae, 0x60, 0x3f, 0x2e, 0x52, 0xb4, 0xe4, 0xc2, 0x5c, 0xa6,
+    0x71, 0xc0, 0x13, 0x9c, 0xca, 0xa6, 0x0d, 0x13, 0xd7, 0xb7,
+    0x14, 0x94, 0x3f, 0x0d, 0x8b, 0x06, 0x70, 0x2f, 0x15, 0x82,
+    0x8d, 0x47, 0x45, 0xa6, 0x00, 0x8a, 0x14, 0x91, 0xde, 0x2f,
+    0x50, 0x17, 0xe3, 0x1d, 0x34, 0x29, 0x8c, 0xe4, 0x57, 0x74,
+    0x2a, 0x3a, 0x82, 0x65, 0x26, 0xf7, 0x8d, 0xcc, 0x1b, 0x8f,
+    0xaf, 0xe5, 0x85, 0xe5, 0xbe, 0x85, 0xd6, 0xb7, 0x04, 0xe8,
+    0xf5, 0xd4, 0x74, 0xe2, 0x54, 0x14, 0xdd, 0x58, 0xcf, 0x1f,
+    0x11, 0x8a, 0x9f, 0x82, 0xa2, 0x01, 0xf9, 0xc2, 0xdf, 0x7b,
+    0x84, 0xb1, 0xd8, 0x5b, 0x70, 0xbb, 0x24, 0xe7, 0xd0, 0x2a,
+    0x75, 0x3d, 0x55, 0xac, 0x45, 0xe9, 0xab, 0xc6, 0x84, 0x8a,
+    0xe7, 0x6d, 0x26, 0x12, 0x89, 0xb5, 0x67, 0xe8, 0x46, 0x9d,
+    0x46, 0x1a, 0xfa, 0x2d, 0xc0, 0x5b, 0x60, 0x46, 0x8b, 0xb7,
+    0x32, 0x03, 0xff, 0x75, 0xee, 0x9f, 0x3c, 0xdd, 0xb6, 0x35,
+    0x4e, 0x82, 0xbd, 0x99, 0x73, 0x51, 0x02, 0x03, 0x01, 0x00,
+    0x01, 0x02, 0x82, 0x01, 0x80, 0x42, 0xee, 0xa4, 0x9f, 0xcb,
+    0xbe, 0x60, 0x23, 0xb3, 0x3a, 0xc4, 0xda, 0x91, 0xee, 0x21,
+    0x9d, 0x76, 0x1b, 0x8f, 0x93, 0x8b, 0xed, 0x02, 0xf6, 0x78,
+    0x3d, 0x66, 0xfb, 0xe5, 0x47, 0x26, 0xe2, 0x6e, 0x49, 0x33,
+    0x2e, 0xde, 0xbe, 0xca, 0x71, 0x7b, 0xef, 0x71, 0x62, 0x54,
+    0xab, 0x0b, 0xba, 0x63, 0x08, 0x24, 0x47, 0xb1, 0x98, 0x1f,
+    0x89, 0xfb, 0x44, 0x9f, 0x52, 0x8e, 0x89, 0xbb, 0xd5, 0x21,
+    0xf1, 0x0c, 0x76, 0x2e, 0xcd, 0x12, 0x6e, 0x78, 0xcb, 0xa1,
+    0xa5, 0xb8, 0x4e, 0x07, 0xab, 0x6e, 0xdf, 0x66, 0x57, 0x87,
+    0xff, 0x88, 0x5f, 0xcc, 0x9c, 0x9a, 0x7b, 0x15, 0x5f, 0x2a,
+    0x83, 0xdb, 0xd5, 0x9f, 0x65, 0x6a, 0x9d, 0xb4, 0x95, 0xfc,
+    0xe0, 0x22, 0x00, 0x1e, 0xa2, 0x8d, 0x56, 0x5a, 0x9e, 0x0a,
+    0x3b, 0x10, 0x07, 0x24, 0xec, 0x55, 0xcc, 0xaf, 0x87, 0x3b,
+    0xd6, 0x8d, 0xa4, 0x86, 0x80, 0x18, 0x42, 0xdb, 0x9d, 0x24,
+    0xc3, 0x97, 0x3b, 0x89, 0x5a, 0x03, 0xb3, 0x0a, 0x72, 0xd1,
+    0x78, 0xf0, 0xc8, 0x80, 0xb0, 0x9d, 0x3c, 0xae, 0x5e, 0x0a,
+    0x5b, 0x6e, 0x87, 0xd3, 0x3d, 0x25, 0x2e, 0x03, 0x33, 0x01,
+    0xfd, 0xb1, 0xa5, 0xd9, 0x58, 0x01, 0xb9, 0xaf, 0xf6, 0x32,
+    0x6a, 0x38, 0xe7, 0x39, 0x63, 0x3c, 0xfc, 0x0c, 0x41, 0x90,
+    0x28, 0x40, 0x03, 0xcd, 0xfb, 0xde, 0x80, 0x74, 0x21, 0xaa,
+    0xae, 0x58, 0xe9, 0x97, 0x18, 0x85, 0x58, 0x3d, 0x2b, 0xd6,
+    0x61, 0xf6, 0xe8, 0xbc, 0x6d, 0x2a, 0xf3, 0xb8, 0xea, 0x8c,
+    0x64, 0x44, 0xc6, 0xd3, 0x9f, 0x00, 0x7b, 0xb2, 0x52, 0x18,
+    0x11, 0x04, 0x96, 0xb7, 0x05, 0xbb, 0xc2, 0x38, 0x5b, 0xa7,
+    0x0a, 0x84, 0xb6, 0x4f, 0x02, 0x63, 0xa4, 0x57, 0x00, 0xe3,
+    0xde, 0xe4, 0xf2, 0xb3, 0x55, 0xd9, 0x00, 0xa9, 0xd2, 0x5c,
+    0x69, 0x9f, 0xe5, 0x80, 0x4f, 0x23, 0x7c, 0xd9, 0xa7, 0x77,
+    0x4a, 0xbb, 0x09, 0x6d, 0x45, 0x02, 0xcf, 0x32, 0x90, 0xfd,
+    0x10, 0xb6, 0xb3, 0x93, 0xd9, 0x3b, 0x1d, 0x57, 0x66, 0xb5,
+    0xb3, 0xb1, 0x6e, 0x53, 0x5f, 0x04, 0x60, 0x29, 0xcd, 0xe8,
+    0xb8, 0xab, 0x62, 0x82, 0x33, 0x40, 0xc7, 0xf8, 0x64, 0x60,
+    0x0e, 0xab, 0x06, 0x3e, 0xa0, 0xa3, 0x62, 0x11, 0x3f, 0x67,
+    0x5d, 0x24, 0x9e, 0x60, 0x29, 0xdc, 0x4c, 0xd5, 0x13, 0xee,
+    0x3d, 0xb7, 0x84, 0x93, 0x27, 0xb5, 0x6a, 0xf9, 0xf0, 0xdd,
+    0x50, 0xac, 0x46, 0x3c, 0xe6, 0xd5, 0xec, 0xf7, 0xb7, 0x9f,
+    0x23, 0x39, 0x9c, 0x88, 0x8c, 0x5a, 0x62, 0x3f, 0x8d, 0x4a,
+    0xd7, 0xeb, 0x5e, 0x1e, 0x49, 0xf8, 0xa9, 0x53, 0x11, 0x75,
+    0xd0, 0x43, 0x1e, 0xc7, 0x29, 0x22, 0x80, 0x1f, 0xc5, 0x83,
+    0x8d, 0x20, 0x04, 0x87, 0x7f, 0x57, 0x8c, 0xf5, 0xa1, 0x02,
+    0x81, 0xc1, 0x00, 0xf7, 0xaa, 0xf5, 0xa5, 0x00, 0xdb, 0xd6,
+    0x11, 0xfc, 0x07, 0x6d, 0x22, 0x24, 0x2b, 0x4b, 0xc5, 0x67,
+    0x0f, 0x37, 0xa5, 0xdb, 0x8f, 0x38, 0xe2, 0x05, 0x43, 0x9a,
+    0x44, 0x05, 0x3f, 0xa9, 0xac, 0x4c, 0x98, 0x3c, 0x72, 0x38,
+    0xc3, 0x89, 0x33, 0x58, 0x73, 0x51, 0xcc, 0x5d, 0x2f, 0x8f,
+    0x6d, 0x3f, 0xa1, 0x22, 0x9e, 0xfb, 0x9a, 0xb4, 0xb8, 0x79,
+    0x95, 0xaf, 0x83, 0xcf, 0x5a, 0xb7, 0x14, 0x14, 0x0c, 0x51,
+    0x8a, 0x11, 0xe6, 0xd6, 0x21, 0x1e, 0x17, 0x13, 0xd3, 0x69,
+    0x7a, 0x3a, 0xd5, 0xaf, 0x3f, 0xb8, 0x25, 0x01, 0xcb, 0x2b,
+    0xe6, 0xfc, 0x03, 0xd8, 0xd4, 0xf7, 0x20, 0xe0, 0x21, 0xef,
+    0x1a, 0xca, 0x61, 0xeb, 0x8e, 0x96, 0x45, 0x8e, 0x5c, 0xe6,
+    0x81, 0x0b, 0x2d, 0x05, 0x32, 0xf9, 0x41, 0x62, 0xb4, 0x33,
+    0x98, 0x10, 0x3a, 0xcd, 0xf0, 0x7a, 0x8b, 0x1a, 0x48, 0xd7,
+    0x3b, 0x01, 0xf5, 0x18, 0x65, 0x8f, 0x3c, 0xc2, 0x31, 0x3b,
+    0xd3, 0xa7, 0x17, 0x5f, 0x7c, 0x0c, 0xe7, 0x25, 0x18, 0x5a,
+    0x08, 0xe1, 0x09, 0x89, 0x13, 0xa7, 0xc5, 0x12, 0xab, 0x88,
+    0x30, 0xcd, 0x06, 0xf9, 0xba, 0x6f, 0xca, 0x9c, 0x8a, 0xda,
+    0x3e, 0x53, 0x90, 0xd7, 0x16, 0x2e, 0xfc, 0xbc, 0xad, 0xd6,
+    0x3d, 0xc0, 0x66, 0x4c, 0x02, 0x3d, 0x31, 0xfd, 0x6c, 0xdb,
+    0x1c, 0xdf, 0x96, 0x33, 0x23, 0x02, 0x81, 0xc1, 0x00, 0xc2,
+    0x90, 0x47, 0xc4, 0xfb, 0x59, 0xf0, 0xc5, 0x14, 0x75, 0x29,
+    0xfa, 0x77, 0xa1, 0x8d, 0xd4, 0x90, 0xa1, 0x0d, 0x3f, 0x16,
+    0x88, 0xe3, 0x4c, 0x8f, 0x8f, 0x18, 0x8c, 0x9c, 0x8a, 0xd5,
+    0xa7, 0x41, 0x99, 0xf3, 0x80, 0x8e, 0xb1, 0xb8, 0x63, 0xd8,
+    0x3f, 0x95, 0xd0, 0xd0, 0x2b, 0xf5, 0xe6, 0x93, 0xe8, 0xfe,
+    0xd0, 0x73, 0xd5, 0xbd, 0xb4, 0xee, 0x51, 0x19, 0x6a, 0x10,
+    0xca, 0xc8, 0xba, 0xa4, 0x4d, 0x84, 0x54, 0x38, 0x17, 0xb5,
+    0xd0, 0xa8, 0x75, 0x22, 0xc5, 0x1b, 0x61, 0xa6, 0x51, 0x88,
+    0x63, 0xf0, 0x4f, 0xd1, 0x88, 0xd9, 0x16, 0x49, 0x30, 0xe1,
+    0xa8, 0x47, 0xc9, 0x30, 0x1d, 0x5c, 0x75, 0xd8, 0x89, 0xb6,
+    0x1d, 0x45, 0xd8, 0x0f, 0x94, 0x89, 0xb3, 0xe4, 0x51, 0xfa,
+    0x21, 0xff, 0x6f, 0xb6, 0x30, 0x6f, 0x33, 0x24, 0xbc, 0x09,
+    0x98, 0xe9, 0x20, 0x02, 0x0b, 0xde, 0xff, 0xc5, 0x06, 0xb6,
+    0x28, 0xa3, 0xa1, 0x07, 0xe8, 0xe1, 0xd2, 0xc2, 0xf1, 0xd1,
+    0x23, 0x6b, 0x4c, 0x3a, 0xae, 0x85, 0xec, 0xf9, 0xff, 0xa7,
+    0x9b, 0x25, 0xb8, 0x95, 0x1d, 0xa8, 0x14, 0x81, 0x4f, 0x79,
+    0x4f, 0xd6, 0x39, 0x5d, 0xe6, 0x5f, 0xd2, 0x34, 0x54, 0x8b,
+    0x1e, 0x40, 0x4c, 0x15, 0x5a, 0x45, 0xce, 0x0c, 0xb0, 0xdf,
+    0xa1, 0x17, 0xb8, 0xb0, 0x6a, 0x82, 0xa5, 0x97, 0x92, 0x70,
+    0xfb, 0x02, 0x81, 0xc0, 0x77, 0x46, 0x44, 0x2b, 0x04, 0xf0,
+    0xda, 0x75, 0xaa, 0xd4, 0xc0, 0xc0, 0x32, 0x7f, 0x0f, 0x6c,
+    0xb0, 0x27, 0x69, 0xfb, 0x5c, 0x73, 0xeb, 0x47, 0x1e, 0x95,
+    0xe2, 0x13, 0x64, 0x1b, 0xb6, 0xd1, 0x1d, 0xca, 0x2b, 0x42,
+    0x2f, 0x08, 0x2c, 0x69, 0x27, 0xed, 0xd1, 0xb5, 0x04, 0x23,
+    0xc5, 0x85, 0x2d, 0xa1, 0xa2, 0x94, 0xc2, 0x43, 0x4d, 0x49,
+    0x92, 0x74, 0x7e, 0x24, 0x92, 0x95, 0xf3, 0x99, 0x9d, 0xd6,
+    0x18, 0xe6, 0xcf, 0x9c, 0x45, 0xff, 0x89, 0x08, 0x40, 0x2a,
+    0x0e, 0xa0, 0x28, 0xf9, 0x83, 0xfe, 0xc1, 0xe6, 0x40, 0xa8,
+    0xe2, 0x29, 0xc9, 0xb0, 0xe8, 0x9a, 0x17, 0xb2, 0x23, 0x7e,
+    0xf4, 0x32, 0x08, 0xc9, 0x83, 0xb2, 0x15, 0xb8, 0xc5, 0xc9,
+    0x03, 0xd1, 0x9d, 0xda, 0x3e, 0xa8, 0xbf, 0xd5, 0xb7, 0x7d,
+    0x65, 0x63, 0x94, 0x5d, 0x5d, 0x94, 0xb4, 0xcf, 0x8d, 0x07,
+    0x0b, 0x70, 0x85, 0x8e, 0xce, 0x03, 0x0b, 0x2a, 0x8d, 0xb3,
+    0x3c, 0x46, 0xc0, 0x2f, 0xc7, 0x72, 0x6c, 0x9c, 0x5d, 0x07,
+    0x0f, 0x45, 0x3b, 0x6b, 0x66, 0x32, 0xab, 0x17, 0x83, 0xd8,
+    0x4c, 0x2c, 0x84, 0x71, 0x19, 0x8f, 0xaa, 0x0a, 0xff, 0xbc,
+    0xf7, 0x42, 0x10, 0xe8, 0xae, 0x4d, 0x26, 0xaf, 0xdd, 0x06,
+    0x33, 0x29, 0x66, 0x21, 0x5d, 0xf5, 0xae, 0x17, 0x07, 0x1f,
+    0x87, 0x9e, 0xae, 0x27, 0x1d, 0xd5, 0x02, 0x81, 0xc0, 0x56,
+    0x17, 0x4f, 0x9a, 0x8a, 0xf9, 0xde, 0x3e, 0xe6, 0x71, 0x7d,
+    0x94, 0xb5, 0xb0, 0xc7, 0xb8, 0x62, 0x12, 0xd1, 0x70, 0xb4,
+    0x00, 0xf8, 0x4a, 0xdd, 0x4f, 0x1d, 0x36, 0xc2, 0xe1, 0xef,
+    0xee, 0x25, 0x6a, 0x00, 0xc4, 0x46, 0xdf, 0xbe, 0xce, 0x77,
+    0x56, 0x93, 0x6d, 0x25, 0x5f, 0xfe, 0x5b, 0xfb, 0xe0, 0xe2,
+    0x37, 0xcc, 0xb9, 0xac, 0x4a, 0xce, 0x15, 0x16, 0xa0, 0xc7,
+    0x33, 0x63, 0xa4, 0xaa, 0xa5, 0x1e, 0x43, 0xc1, 0xda, 0x43,
+    0xfa, 0x43, 0x40, 0x29, 0x95, 0x7c, 0x2b, 0x36, 0x53, 0xe7,
+    0x7d, 0x09, 0x4d, 0xd8, 0x52, 0xac, 0x74, 0x5f, 0x08, 0x81,
+    0x21, 0x5c, 0x3a, 0x5a, 0xce, 0xf3, 0x25, 0xb6, 0x1e, 0x21,
+    0x76, 0x4c, 0x7c, 0x71, 0x50, 0x71, 0xaa, 0x27, 0x02, 0x5b,
+    0x23, 0x06, 0x0b, 0x21, 0x5b, 0xc7, 0x28, 0xa3, 0x3d, 0x8d,
+    0x25, 0x9b, 0x2a, 0x2d, 0x9d, 0xa1, 0x1c, 0x1d, 0xcb, 0x7d,
+    0x78, 0xf8, 0x06, 0x7e, 0x20, 0x7f, 0x24, 0x2a, 0x5c, 0xa4,
+    0x04, 0xff, 0x2a, 0x68, 0xe0, 0xe6, 0xa3, 0xd8, 0x6f, 0x56,
+    0x73, 0xa1, 0x3a, 0x4e, 0xc9, 0x23, 0xa1, 0x87, 0x22, 0x6a,
+    0x74, 0x78, 0x3f, 0x44, 0x1c, 0x77, 0x13, 0xe5, 0x51, 0xef,
+    0x89, 0x00, 0x3c, 0x6a, 0x4a, 0x5a, 0x8e, 0xf5, 0x30, 0xa2,
+    0x93, 0x7e, 0x92, 0x9b, 0x85, 0x55, 0xaf, 0xfe, 0x24, 0xaf,
+    0x57, 0x02, 0x81, 0xc1, 0x00, 0xa4, 0xc2, 0x6a, 0x59, 0x45,
+    0xea, 0x71, 0x7d, 0x4c, 0xaf, 0xaf, 0xd6, 0x55, 0x97, 0x73,
+    0xc5, 0xa1, 0x3c, 0xf6, 0x59, 0x23, 0xb6, 0x1f, 0x5e, 0x9c,
+    0x96, 0x0f, 0x97, 0x66, 0x82, 0x91, 0x48, 0x36, 0x70, 0x02,
+    0x67, 0xde, 0x34, 0xa6, 0x95, 0x7b, 0x51, 0x43, 0x66, 0xa4,
+    0x16, 0x45, 0x59, 0x12, 0xdb, 0x35, 0x19, 0x4b, 0xbf, 0x1d,
+    0xab, 0xf3, 0x3f, 0xb4, 0xb4, 0x6f, 0x66, 0xb0, 0x67, 0xc6,
+    0x77, 0x2c, 0x46, 0xa8, 0x03, 0x64, 0x9a, 0x13, 0x9d, 0x40,
+    0x22, 0x56, 0x76, 0x1a, 0x7c, 0x1e, 0xe2, 0xda, 0x7f, 0x09,
+    0xcf, 0x10, 0xe3, 0xf2, 0xf4, 0x2a, 0x3b, 0x46, 0xc7, 0x61,
+    0x9b, 0xef, 0x4a, 0x18, 0x60, 0x8c, 0x32, 0x71, 0xb9, 0xdd,
+    0xac, 0xa0, 0xc6, 0x8d, 0x3f, 0xab, 0xc3, 0x21, 0x2c, 0xeb,
+    0x91, 0x8f, 0xc7, 0x43, 0x0d, 0x0c, 0x67, 0x9e, 0xab, 0xe6,
+    0x8d, 0xb6, 0x2d, 0x41, 0xca, 0x43, 0xd8, 0xcb, 0x30, 0xfb,
+    0x3b, 0x40, 0x0d, 0x10, 0x9b, 0xb1, 0x55, 0x93, 0x73, 0x8b,
+    0x60, 0xef, 0xc0, 0xee, 0xc0, 0xa6, 0x7a, 0x79, 0x90, 0xfd,
+    0x4c, 0x25, 0xd4, 0x4f, 0x67, 0xbe, 0xf7, 0x86, 0x3c, 0x5d,
+    0x2b, 0x7d, 0x97, 0x3d, 0xa2, 0x91, 0xa5, 0x06, 0x69, 0xf6,
+    0x7a, 0xb8, 0x77, 0xe6, 0x70, 0xa9, 0xd8, 0x86, 0x4b, 0xa6,
+    0xcf, 0x67, 0x1d, 0x33, 0xcf, 0xfe, 0x3e
+};
+
+static unsigned char test4096[] = {
+    0x30, 0x82, 0x09, 0x29, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, 0x02, 0x82, 0x02,
+    0x01, 0x00, 0xc0, 0x71, 0xac, 0x1a, 0x13, 0x88, 0x82, 0x43,
+    0x3b, 0x51, 0x57, 0x71, 0x8d, 0xb6, 0x2b, 0x82, 0x65, 0x21,
+    0x53, 0x5f, 0x28, 0x29, 0x4f, 0x8d, 0x7c, 0x8a, 0xb9, 0x44,
+    0xb3, 0x28, 0x41, 0x4f, 0xd3, 0xfa, 0x6a, 0xf8, 0xb9, 0x28,
+    0x50, 0x39, 0x67, 0x53, 0x2c, 0x3c, 0xd7, 0xcb, 0x96, 0x41,
+    0x40, 0x32, 0xbb, 0xeb, 0x70, 0xae, 0x1f, 0xb0, 0x65, 0xf7,
+    0x3a, 0xd9, 0x22, 0xfd, 0x10, 0xae, 0xbd, 0x02, 0xe2, 0xdd,
+    0xf3, 0xc2, 0x79, 0x3c, 0xc6, 0xfc, 0x75, 0xbb, 0xaf, 0x4e,
+    0x3a, 0x36, 0xc2, 0x4f, 0xea, 0x25, 0xdf, 0x13, 0x16, 0x4b,
+    0x20, 0xfe, 0x4b, 0x69, 0x16, 0xc4, 0x7f, 0x1a, 0x43, 0xa6,
+    0x17, 0x1b, 0xb9, 0x0a, 0xf3, 0x09, 0x86, 0x28, 0x89, 0xcf,
+    0x2c, 0xd0, 0xd4, 0x81, 0xaf, 0xc6, 0x6d, 0xe6, 0x21, 0x8d,
+    0xee, 0xef, 0xea, 0xdc, 0xb7, 0xc6, 0x3b, 0x63, 0x9f, 0x0e,
+    0xad, 0x89, 0x78, 0x23, 0x18, 0xbf, 0x70, 0x7e, 0x84, 0xe0,
+    0x37, 0xec, 0xdb, 0x8e, 0x9c, 0x3e, 0x6a, 0x19, 0xcc, 0x99,
+    0x72, 0xe6, 0xb5, 0x7d, 0x6d, 0xfa, 0xe5, 0xd3, 0xe4, 0x90,
+    0xb5, 0xb2, 0xb2, 0x12, 0x70, 0x4e, 0xca, 0xf8, 0x10, 0xf8,
+    0xa3, 0x14, 0xc2, 0x48, 0x19, 0xeb, 0x60, 0x99, 0xbb, 0x2a,
+    0x1f, 0xb1, 0x7a, 0xb1, 0x3d, 0x24, 0xfb, 0xa0, 0x29, 0xda,
+    0xbd, 0x1b, 0xd7, 0xa4, 0xbf, 0xef, 0x60, 0x2d, 0x22, 0xca,
+    0x65, 0x98, 0xf1, 0xc4, 0xe1, 0xc9, 0x02, 0x6b, 0x16, 0x28,
+    0x2f, 0xa1, 0xaa, 0x79, 0x00, 0xda, 0xdc, 0x7c, 0x43, 0xf7,
+    0x42, 0x3c, 0xa0, 0xef, 0x68, 0xf7, 0xdf, 0xb9, 0x69, 0xfb,
+    0x8e, 0x01, 0xed, 0x01, 0x42, 0xb5, 0x4e, 0x57, 0xa6, 0x26,
+    0xb8, 0xd0, 0x7b, 0x56, 0x6d, 0x03, 0xc6, 0x40, 0x8c, 0x8c,
+    0x2a, 0x55, 0xd7, 0x9c, 0x35, 0x00, 0x94, 0x93, 0xec, 0x03,
+    0xeb, 0x22, 0xef, 0x77, 0xbb, 0x79, 0x13, 0x3f, 0x15, 0xa1,
+    0x8f, 0xca, 0xdf, 0xfd, 0xd3, 0xb8, 0xe1, 0xd4, 0xcc, 0x09,
+    0x3f, 0x3c, 0x2c, 0xdb, 0xd1, 0x49, 0x7f, 0x38, 0x07, 0x83,
+    0x6d, 0xeb, 0x08, 0x66, 0xe9, 0x06, 0x44, 0x12, 0xac, 0x95,
+    0x22, 0x90, 0x23, 0x67, 0xd4, 0x08, 0xcc, 0xf4, 0xb7, 0xdc,
+    0xcc, 0x87, 0xd4, 0xac, 0x69, 0x35, 0x4c, 0xb5, 0x39, 0x36,
+    0xcd, 0xa4, 0xd2, 0x95, 0xca, 0x0d, 0xc5, 0xda, 0xc2, 0xc5,
+    0x22, 0x32, 0x28, 0x08, 0xe3, 0xd2, 0x8b, 0x38, 0x30, 0xdc,
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+    0x12, 0x82, 0xc4, 0x85, 0x00, 0x4e, 0x27, 0x83, 0xa5, 0x7c,
+    0x90, 0x2e, 0xe5, 0xa2, 0xa3, 0xd3, 0x4c, 0x63, 0x02, 0x82,
+    0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0x86, 0x08, 0x98, 0x98, 0xa5, 0x00, 0x05,
+    0x39, 0x77, 0xd9, 0x66, 0xb3, 0xcf, 0xca, 0xa0, 0x71, 0xb3,
+    0x50, 0xce, 0x3d, 0xb1, 0x93, 0x95, 0x35, 0xc4, 0xd4, 0x2e,
+    0x90, 0xdf, 0x0f, 0xfc, 0x60, 0xc1, 0x94, 0x68, 0x61, 0x43,
+    0xca, 0x9a, 0x23, 0x4a, 0x1e, 0x45, 0x72, 0x99, 0xb5, 0x1e,
+    0x61, 0x8d, 0x77, 0x0f, 0xa0, 0xbb, 0xd7, 0x77, 0xb4, 0x2a,
+    0x15, 0x11, 0x88, 0x2d, 0xb3, 0x56, 0x61, 0x5e, 0x6a, 0xed,
+    0xa4, 0x46, 0x4a, 0x3f, 0x50, 0x11, 0xd6, 0xba, 0xb6, 0xd7,
+    0x95, 0x65, 0x53, 0xc3, 0xa1, 0x8f, 0xe0, 0xa3, 0xf5, 0x1c,
+    0xfd, 0xaf, 0x6e, 0x43, 0xd7, 0x17, 0xa7, 0xd3, 0x81, 0x1b,
+    0xa4, 0xdf, 0xe0, 0x97, 0x8a, 0x46, 0x03, 0xd3, 0x46, 0x0e,
+    0x83, 0x48, 0x4e, 0xd2, 0x02, 0xcb, 0xc0, 0xad, 0x79, 0x95,
+    0x8c, 0x96, 0xba, 0x40, 0x34, 0x11, 0x71, 0x5e, 0xe9, 0x11,
+    0xf9, 0xc5, 0x4a, 0x5e, 0x91, 0x9d, 0xf5, 0x92, 0x4f, 0xeb,
+    0xc6, 0x70, 0x02, 0x2d, 0x3d, 0x04, 0xaa, 0xe9, 0x3a, 0x8e,
+    0xd5, 0xa8, 0xad, 0xf7, 0xce, 0x0d, 0x16, 0xb2, 0xec, 0x0a,
+    0x9c, 0xf5, 0x94, 0x39, 0xb9, 0x8a, 0xfc, 0x1e, 0xf9, 0xcc,
+    0xf2, 0x5f, 0x21, 0x31, 0x74, 0x72, 0x6b, 0x64, 0xae, 0x35,
+    0x61, 0x8d, 0x0d, 0xcb, 0xe7, 0xda, 0x39, 0xca, 0xf3, 0x21,
+    0x66, 0x0b, 0x95, 0xd7, 0x0a, 0x7c, 0xca, 0xa1, 0xa9, 0x5a,
+    0xe8, 0xac, 0xe0, 0x71, 0x54, 0xaf, 0x28, 0xcf, 0xd5, 0x70,
+    0x89, 0xe0, 0xf3, 0x9e, 0x43, 0x6c, 0x8d, 0x7b, 0x99, 0x01,
+    0x68, 0x4d, 0xa1, 0x45, 0x46, 0x0c, 0x43, 0xbc, 0xcc, 0x2c,
+    0xdd, 0xc5, 0x46, 0xc8, 0x4e, 0x0e, 0xbe, 0xed, 0xb9, 0x26,
+    0xab, 0x2e, 0xdb, 0xeb, 0x8f, 0xff, 0xdb, 0xb0, 0xc6, 0x55,
+    0xaf, 0xf8, 0x2a, 0x91, 0x9d, 0x50, 0x44, 0x21, 0x17,
+};
+
+static unsigned char test7680[] = {
+    0x30, 0x82, 0x11, 0x09, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, 0x02, 0x82, 0x03,
+    0xc1, 0x00, 0xe3, 0x27, 0x46, 0x99, 0xb5, 0x17, 0xab, 0xfa,
+    0x65, 0x05, 0x7a, 0x06, 0x81, 0x14, 0xce, 0x43, 0x21, 0x49,
+    0x0f, 0x08, 0xf1, 0x70, 0xb4, 0xc1, 0x10, 0xd1, 0x87, 0xf8,
+    0x29, 0x91, 0x36, 0x66, 0x2d, 0xbe, 0x7b, 0x1d, 0xa2, 0x0b,
+    0x20, 0x38, 0xd9, 0x8e, 0x78, 0x27, 0xcf, 0xb5, 0x45, 0x58,
+    0x3d, 0xf4, 0xda, 0xf0, 0xdc, 0x21, 0x17, 0x52, 0xcd, 0x68,
+    0xe2, 0x81, 0xac, 0x88, 0x61, 0x10, 0xbc, 0xb0, 0x7f, 0xe4,
+    0xf3, 0x78, 0xb7, 0x28, 0x6c, 0x5f, 0x5c, 0xc2, 0x8d, 0x3d,
+    0xb0, 0x87, 0x41, 0x15, 0x2e, 0x09, 0x5f, 0xea, 0x06, 0x7f,
+    0xe9, 0x35, 0x18, 0x90, 0x50, 0xad, 0xf6, 0xb9, 0xfd, 0x33,
+    0x02, 0x1a, 0x99, 0x9e, 0xa5, 0x7d, 0x2c, 0x3b, 0x24, 0xe7,
+    0x31, 0x35, 0x73, 0x9a, 0xb0, 0xfe, 0x03, 0xfc, 0xc6, 0x98,
+    0x78, 0xd9, 0x66, 0x95, 0xa5, 0x12, 0xbc, 0x1e, 0x82, 0xbc,
+    0xf1, 0xc5, 0x31, 0xcd, 0xa6, 0xb1, 0x0c, 0x02, 0xbf, 0x7f,
+    0xb7, 0xaf, 0x5f, 0xd6, 0xed, 0xf7, 0xc1, 0x59, 0x86, 0x3a,
+    0x35, 0x95, 0x54, 0x21, 0x8d, 0x6a, 0xb3, 0xd1, 0x2b, 0x71,
+    0xf5, 0xf1, 0x66, 0x00, 0xb1, 0x88, 0xee, 0x3b, 0xa4, 0x41,
+    0x52, 0x1a, 0xf5, 0x0e, 0x32, 0xb6, 0xbf, 0x52, 0xab, 0x51,
+    0x55, 0x91, 0x32, 0x4f, 0xaf, 0x91, 0xac, 0xf7, 0xff, 0x8e,
+    0x3b, 0x2b, 0x61, 0xe9, 0x6d, 0x1d, 0x68, 0x80, 0x90, 0x79,
+    0x34, 0x96, 0xca, 0x49, 0x43, 0x7c, 0x89, 0x4e, 0x5e, 0x31,
+    0xb5, 0xce, 0x01, 0x9b, 0x09, 0xaf, 0x92, 0x06, 0x24, 0xe7,
+    0x22, 0x35, 0xcc, 0xa2, 0x0b, 0xfb, 0x5b, 0x87, 0x65, 0x71,
+    0xff, 0x64, 0x3e, 0xf9, 0xe8, 0x33, 0xa0, 0xc3, 0x4e, 0xb2,
+    0x41, 0x98, 0x54, 0xeb, 0x13, 0x99, 0xfb, 0x32, 0x78, 0x7e,
+    0xda, 0x4f, 0xd3, 0x46, 0x6a, 0xb5, 0x78, 0x81, 0x3f, 0x04,
+    0x13, 0x5f, 0x67, 0xaf, 0x88, 0xa5, 0x9e, 0x0d, 0xc5, 0xf3,
+    0xe7, 0x4c, 0x51, 0xf5, 0x51, 0x4a, 0xa4, 0x58, 0x64, 0xd9,
+    0xa2, 0x32, 0x54, 0x36, 0xce, 0x38, 0xd8, 0xc2, 0x0e, 0x0d,
+    0x60, 0x8e, 0x32, 0x7f, 0x90, 0x8a, 0xbc, 0x88, 0xbe, 0x6a,
+    0xc0, 0x47, 0x0f, 0x02, 0x41, 0xff, 0x3b, 0x7e, 0xc5, 0xa6,
+    0x33, 0x1d, 0x19, 0xd1, 0xd5, 0x67, 0x6c, 0xbf, 0x16, 0xb0,
+    0x7e, 0x80, 0x10, 0xbf, 0x7f, 0xdd, 0xd0, 0xf4, 0xc3, 0x94,
+    0x2c, 0x9a, 0x2c, 0xda, 0x69, 0x4e, 0xd6, 0x7b, 0x40, 0x4d,
+    0x2a, 0x27, 0xcb, 0x5a, 0xe5, 0x2d, 0x3f, 0x7d, 0x51, 0x9d,
+    0x9f, 0x70, 0xde, 0x50, 0xb1, 0xd3, 0xd2, 0x38, 0x4d, 0x1c,
+    0xca, 0xc2, 0x1e, 0x80, 0xd0, 0x36, 0x82, 0x04, 0xe6, 0x17,
+    0x79, 0x9f, 0x2e, 0xc9, 0xed, 0x2b, 0xd5, 0x1b, 0xfa, 0x7d,
+    0x1a, 0x80, 0xb5, 0x0e, 0x2f, 0x05, 0xbe, 0x4a, 0x1b, 0xfe,
+    0x0a, 0xad, 0x01, 0xde, 0x91, 0xc8, 0xf9, 0x81, 0xbe, 0xc7,
+    0xaf, 0xe7, 0x87, 0xed, 0x9d, 0xb8, 0x6c, 0xad, 0x65, 0xed,
+    0x5e, 0xd3, 0x67, 0x8c, 0x62, 0x3a, 0xe7, 0xfd, 0x67, 0xe0,
+    0xbb, 0x57, 0xaf, 0x56, 0xeb, 0x4a, 0x58, 0x6e, 0xad, 0xf2,
+    0xbe, 0xc3, 0x70, 0x29, 0xf8, 0xeb, 0x68, 0x45, 0xa0, 0xbd,
+    0xcd, 0xa5, 0xb4, 0xd9, 0x01, 0xb7, 0x44, 0xeb, 0x97, 0xf3,
+    0x0c, 0x56, 0xe4, 0x26, 0xd0, 0xa5, 0xb1, 0xa3, 0x49, 0x6e,
+    0x88, 0xf2, 0x22, 0xe2, 0x7b, 0x58, 0x3a, 0xd9, 0x52, 0xa4,
+    0xb1, 0x4c, 0x5c, 0x7c, 0xf0, 0x88, 0x7b, 0x9f, 0x06, 0xe9,
+    0x32, 0x4e, 0xf2, 0x64, 0x83, 0x8b, 0xa2, 0xea, 0x1d, 0x25,
+    0xf1, 0x8d, 0x16, 0x8b, 0xe0, 0xab, 0xd2, 0xe9, 0xe4, 0x6b,
+    0x7d, 0x76, 0x98, 0x22, 0x53, 0x31, 0x6b, 0xcc, 0xf1, 0xe5,
+    0x1d, 0xd7, 0xa5, 0xb0, 0xea, 0x6b, 0x38, 0x14, 0x0c, 0x06,
+    0x10, 0x27, 0xd8, 0x33, 0xf3, 0x9a, 0xae, 0x94, 0xdd, 0x0b,
+    0xb4, 0x6d, 0xe5, 0x91, 0xdd, 0xf1, 0x0f, 0x27, 0xa4, 0x94,
+    0x55, 0xf0, 0xde, 0x07, 0x29, 0xe6, 0x3f, 0x26, 0x19, 0xa1,
+    0xdd, 0xd1, 0x06, 0x99, 0xda, 0x54, 0x23, 0x3c, 0xf5, 0x5c,
+    0x2e, 0x96, 0xa9, 0x21, 0x23, 0x25, 0x2e, 0x6f, 0xf1, 0xf9,
+    0x11, 0x54, 0xe5, 0x7b, 0xb9, 0x1f, 0x11, 0xe2, 0x9e, 0x6b,
+    0x61, 0x8b, 0xa3, 0x8b, 0xc1, 0x20, 0x9b, 0xfb, 0x51, 0xef,
+    0xbb, 0xb9, 0xf6, 0xaf, 0x66, 0xb3, 0x2c, 0x25, 0xef, 0x76,
+    0xcb, 0xbf, 0x7a, 0x93, 0x2f, 0xe1, 0x17, 0x56, 0xc1, 0x00,
+    0x33, 0xb5, 0xd9, 0x91, 0x05, 0x31, 0xcc, 0x72, 0xcd, 0x4a,
+    0x93, 0x9a, 0xe3, 0x21, 0x42, 0x9e, 0xb8, 0x4e, 0x6c, 0x27,
+    0x93, 0xf0, 0x7f, 0x22, 0xdb, 0xe5, 0xb3, 0xa3, 0xf7, 0xe7,
+    0x80, 0xbb, 0x91, 0xca, 0xf7, 0xe8, 0x52, 0xb8, 0x11, 0x64,
+    0x66, 0x25, 0x94, 0xf8, 0x6f, 0x0b, 0x3b, 0xb7, 0xff, 0x80,
+    0x9e, 0x36, 0xe9, 0x88, 0x2e, 0xab, 0x05, 0xbf, 0x99, 0x9f,
+    0x2b, 0x4f, 0xc6, 0xb1, 0x13, 0x5b, 0x06, 0xff, 0x0a, 0x7b,
+    0xbc, 0x7f, 0x07, 0xa0, 0x35, 0xc2, 0x2d, 0x44, 0x3e, 0xad,
+    0x44, 0xcb, 0x47, 0x18, 0x26, 0x71, 0x7b, 0x17, 0xc9, 0x6d,
+    0xb5, 0x4b, 0xcf, 0xdf, 0x14, 0x2c, 0x6c, 0xdf, 0x21, 0xce,
+    0x93, 0x49, 0x34, 0x69, 0x49, 0xfd, 0x3e, 0x71, 0x5b, 0xfa,
+    0x07, 0xc5, 0x7e, 0x5e, 0x54, 0x1a, 0x3c, 0xa6, 0x29, 0xb5,
+    0xbf, 0x0d, 0xf1, 0xc6, 0xa4, 0x61, 0xd6, 0x17, 0x1d, 0xf0,
+    0xa2, 0x78, 0x8f, 0xbc, 0x7e, 0x0c, 0xb4, 0xf0, 0x1e, 0x05,
+    0xea, 0xb5, 0xad, 0x68, 0x95, 0x0b, 0x27, 0xb4, 0x29, 0x7c,
+    0x70, 0x2a, 0x9a, 0x0a, 0x39, 0xd4, 0x76, 0xb7, 0x72, 0x30,
+    0x5e, 0xae, 0x9c, 0x4a, 0x55, 0xc7, 0x46, 0xd7, 0x5f, 0xbe,
+    0x10, 0x61, 0x25, 0x18, 0x7a, 0x9f, 0xd3, 0x05, 0x3d, 0x6f,
+    0x9a, 0x1e, 0xec, 0x2b, 0x03, 0xe0, 0x49, 0x6a, 0x9c, 0xd6,
+    0xdb, 0xc2, 0xa1, 0xe1, 0x0a, 0xbb, 0x31, 0x42, 0xc8, 0x43,
+    0x4e, 0x7c, 0xa9, 0x7c, 0x60, 0xea, 0xbe, 0xf1, 0x8b, 0xe8,
+    0xb2, 0x90, 0x83, 0x14, 0x21, 0xe4, 0xb3, 0x0d, 0x7c, 0x63,
+    0x3c, 0x98, 0x55, 0xc6, 0x44, 0xa6, 0xa8, 0x1e, 0x42, 0xb7,
+    0x89, 0xa8, 0xbd, 0xb8, 0x34, 0x3d, 0x09, 0x80, 0x99, 0x73,
+    0x9f, 0xaf, 0x17, 0x56, 0xf2, 0x73, 0x3e, 0x1e, 0x6e, 0xe9,
+    0x18, 0xa0, 0x5b, 0x69, 0xce, 0xfd, 0x3d, 0x77, 0x81, 0x95,
+    0x3b, 0xf1, 0xde, 0x26, 0xe9, 0x27, 0xef, 0x92, 0x2a, 0x97,
+    0xdc, 0x95, 0xa5, 0xa3, 0xb0, 0xfb, 0x96, 0x89, 0x4f, 0xe6,
+    0xc1, 0x42, 0x0b, 0xfd, 0xb4, 0x6d, 0x0a, 0x9f, 0x9b, 0x31,
+    0xd8, 0x21, 0x38, 0x8a, 0xee, 0xb6, 0x5c, 0x12, 0xa8, 0xb4,
+    0x07, 0x79, 0x41, 0xa7, 0x7f, 0x13, 0x74, 0xad, 0x0b, 0xee,
+    0x28, 0x52, 0xac, 0x2f, 0x4d, 0x30, 0x1c, 0xc5, 0xa6, 0xa5,
+    0x61, 0x42, 0xbd, 0xe1, 0x4f, 0xd3, 0xec, 0x66, 0xf2, 0x63,
+    0xf4, 0x93, 0xdb, 0x35, 0x2d, 0x3b, 0x71, 0x25, 0x09, 0xde,
+    0xda, 0x46, 0xda, 0xe2, 0xa7, 0xa3, 0xdf, 0xcd, 0xbf, 0x58,
+    0x05, 0x25, 0x02, 0x03, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x82, 0x03,
+    0xc0, 0x5f, 0xd5, 0x15, 0x1b, 0x09, 0xe4, 0xa7, 0xc0, 0xa6,
+    0xd8, 0x0d, 0xa8, 0x2a, 0xd3, 0x1d, 0x46, 0x03, 0x07, 0xf0,
+    0x98, 0xe4, 0x4b, 0x99, 0x66, 0x8e, 0x72, 0xe7, 0xbb, 0x51,
+    0xc6, 0x1a, 0xbe, 0x36, 0xf4, 0x52, 0xba, 0xa8, 0xbf, 0xaa,
+    0xe3, 0x71, 0x1d, 0x83, 0x21, 0xc0, 0xa6, 0x88, 0x4f, 0xf7,
+    0x2b, 0x93, 0x26, 0xe4, 0xa7, 0xed, 0x50, 0x18, 0xaa, 0xf4,
+    0x4c, 0xa2, 0xfe, 0x92, 0x7c, 0xde, 0x2e, 0x54, 0x76, 0xc2,
+    0x25, 0x1e, 0x98, 0xa6, 0x48, 0x01, 0x39, 0x6f, 0x1f, 0x24,
+    0x97, 0x9b, 0x64, 0x95, 0x1c, 0x8d, 0x63, 0x8d, 0x44, 0x6f,
+    0x9d, 0xdf, 0xf4, 0x1a, 0xa5, 0x9a, 0x1e, 0xd3, 0x6c, 0xae,
+    0xa9, 0x8c, 0x3f, 0xfb, 0x2f, 0x78, 0xf6, 0xa6, 0xd6, 0x06,
+    0xd3, 0xb7, 0x26, 0xff, 0x1e, 0xdb, 0x8d, 0xcc, 0x37, 0x4d,
+    0x5c, 0xe2, 0xc3, 0xa5, 0x75, 0xe6, 0xf9, 0xb4, 0x4c, 0x84,
+    0x6f, 0x9e, 0x58, 0x55, 0xc8, 0x01, 0xfa, 0x32, 0xd2, 0x6e,
+    0x2b, 0x45, 0xf2, 0xc6, 0x48, 0xad, 0x40, 0xd8, 0xb9, 0x3c,
+    0x1b, 0xf8, 0xf7, 0x82, 0xd3, 0x0e, 0x73, 0xe3, 0xb1, 0x5b,
+    0x82, 0x71, 0x77, 0x3f, 0x6f, 0x36, 0x9a, 0xe0, 0xec, 0x51,
+    0xf8, 0x5f, 0x84, 0x92, 0xee, 0xb8, 0x7e, 0xe7, 0x1a, 0x14,
+    0x50, 0x82, 0x7a, 0x4d, 0xe6, 0xd6, 0xa3, 0x76, 0x24, 0x8a,
+    0x5f, 0xfe, 0x19, 0xdd, 0xd7, 0xf7, 0x5b, 0xae, 0x18, 0x04,
+    0x90, 0xcd, 0x5c, 0xe5, 0x64, 0xe8, 0x04, 0xb1, 0x06, 0xa5,
+    0xdd, 0xf8, 0x9d, 0x71, 0x13, 0xaa, 0x36, 0x7f, 0x61, 0x27,
+    0xf4, 0xac, 0x95, 0x7d, 0x1a, 0x99, 0x7d, 0xe0, 0xd5, 0x9c,
+    0x5a, 0xad, 0x9a, 0xff, 0x54, 0xb0, 0xb1, 0x55, 0x45, 0x2d,
+    0x19, 0x58, 0x52, 0x28, 0xdd, 0xe0, 0xb5, 0x65, 0x52, 0x97,
+    0x45, 0xf0, 0x2b, 0x98, 0x1f, 0x61, 0x6c, 0x9d, 0xaa, 0x59,
+    0x85, 0xf9, 0x97, 0x7b, 0xbd, 0xeb, 0x95, 0x81, 0xfb, 0x29,
+    0x8c, 0xf0, 0x52, 0xdf, 0xed, 0xee, 0xb2, 0x00, 0x32, 0x35,
+    0x14, 0xa8, 0xa4, 0xca, 0x91, 0xff, 0x18, 0xb7, 0x96, 0xfb,
+    0x32, 0x62, 0xa9, 0xa0, 0xd0, 0x77, 0x43, 0xf5, 0x99, 0xd1,
+    0xee, 0xe8, 0xad, 0x1a, 0x2c, 0xd4, 0xeb, 0xe1, 0xf5, 0x01,
+    0x41, 0x78, 0xc0, 0x27, 0x19, 0x50, 0x2e, 0xba, 0x22, 0xd1,
+    0xeb, 0xb3, 0xa5, 0x27, 0x0b, 0xec, 0xf9, 0x26, 0x7e, 0x1f,
+    0xe7, 0x17, 0x9f, 0x39, 0xa8, 0x72, 0x22, 0x63, 0x79, 0x6a,
+    0x9c, 0x89, 0x55, 0x9a, 0xb4, 0x61, 0x41, 0xbc, 0xaa, 0x14,
+    0x37, 0x29, 0x03, 0xc0, 0x52, 0x4e, 0x31, 0x44, 0x8f, 0x2e,
+    0x17, 0x81, 0x88, 0xf4, 0xce, 0xda, 0x41, 0xb8, 0xd5, 0x14,
+    0x91, 0x8c, 0xca, 0xd2, 0x0d, 0x99, 0x06, 0x09, 0xc2, 0xb7,
+    0xe8, 0xae, 0xfa, 0x01, 0xea, 0x99, 0x62, 0x68, 0xb6, 0xdf,
+    0xc8, 0x27, 0xae, 0xbf, 0xb0, 0x9b, 0x5b, 0x1a, 0xa2, 0xe2,
+    0x5a, 0x7a, 0xe5, 0x4b, 0x92, 0x1f, 0xff, 0x73, 0xae, 0x16,
+    0x40, 0x78, 0x42, 0x28, 0xbb, 0x13, 0x5e, 0xbc, 0x71, 0x7a,
+    0x78, 0x3e, 0xd8, 0x1b, 0xc2, 0x2c, 0xd6, 0xdc, 0xfa, 0x39,
+    0x72, 0xf8, 0xa2, 0x2c, 0x8b, 0x1c, 0x5d, 0xab, 0xb8, 0x07,
+    0xc7, 0xae, 0x29, 0x93, 0x68, 0xbf, 0x61, 0xe9, 0xa4, 0x37,
+    0x83, 0x7d, 0x13, 0xc7, 0x18, 0xf0, 0x7d, 0xa4, 0x20, 0x47,
+    0x14, 0x68, 0x95, 0x46, 0x56, 0x6d, 0xd5, 0x7b, 0xe1, 0x51,
+    0x8f, 0x96, 0xc1, 0x7b, 0x35, 0x09, 0x7a, 0x89, 0x0e, 0xdf,
+    0x12, 0xd5, 0xe1, 0x9c, 0x2a, 0x94, 0x95, 0x43, 0x93, 0x48,
+    0xa6, 0x23, 0xe6, 0xd8, 0xf2, 0xb8, 0x0e, 0xba, 0x6d, 0x61,
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+    0xe2, 0x3b, 0xb9, 0x49, 0x35, 0x89, 0x4f, 0xb8, 0x06, 0x37,
+    0x36, 0xda, 0x75, 0x25, 0x0f, 0x0a, 0xaa, 0xc2, 0x6c, 0x3e,
+    0xb1, 0x2d, 0x16, 0xf3, 0x17, 0xdb, 0xe2, 0x16, 0x32, 0x39,
+    0x92, 0x4b, 0x5f, 0xc0, 0x5f, 0x6e, 0xd0, 0x1c, 0x7e, 0xc0,
+    0x51, 0xd9, 0xb3, 0xe2, 0x37, 0xc7, 0xe0, 0x40, 0x13, 0x7d,
+    0x06, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0x72, 0xb6, 0x53, 0x2d, 0x7e, 0x60, 0x49,
+    0xfe, 0x31, 0xe1, 0xd0, 0x0e, 0x4c, 0x98, 0x93, 0xe0, 0xf6,
+    0xf2, 0xfa, 0x99, 0x7f, 0x65, 0xd8, 0x15, 0xc6, 0x3a, 0xb8,
+    0x4d, 0x63, 0x21, 0x78, 0xe4, 0x19, 0x6b, 0xbd, 0xde, 0x40,
+    0x5b, 0x8c, 0xfa, 0x49, 0x75, 0x23, 0x8f, 0x14, 0xc2, 0x3b,
+    0xa3, 0x9b, 0xc5, 0x80, 0x1a, 0xa3, 0x60, 0xd7, 0x17, 0x27,
+    0xf0, 0x18, 0x0f, 0xba, 0x02, 0xf7, 0x7a, 0xed, 0xa4, 0x00,
+    0x77, 0xde, 0x4b, 0xdd, 0xf9, 0xd7, 0x3e, 0x75, 0xed, 0x1a,
+    0x43, 0x26, 0x71, 0x1b, 0xbc, 0x72, 0xf5, 0x70, 0x72, 0x03,
+    0x70, 0x25, 0x87, 0x81, 0x6a, 0x92, 0x2d, 0xb7, 0x02, 0xf0,
+    0x10, 0x79, 0x65, 0x9d, 0x4e, 0x11, 0x7d, 0x5c, 0x5b, 0x37,
+    0xaa, 0xb4, 0xfa, 0x43, 0x66, 0x48, 0x6c, 0x67, 0x64, 0x9e,
+    0x15, 0x75, 0x36, 0xe7, 0x25, 0x55, 0x07, 0x7f, 0x74, 0x1f,
+    0x2c, 0x28, 0x76, 0xe7, 0x9b, 0x3d, 0x91, 0x0b, 0xcd, 0x6a,
+    0x1d, 0x5a, 0xea, 0x63, 0xd0, 0xf9, 0x02, 0x82, 0x01, 0xe0,
+    0x3e, 0x31, 0xf2, 0xf4, 0x29, 0x92, 0xa2, 0x93, 0xd5, 0xda,
+    0xc9, 0x16, 0x7e, 0xf6, 0xdb, 0x33, 0x9f, 0xaf, 0x4b, 0x01,
+    0xd1, 0x28, 0x2d, 0x3a, 0xc0, 0x51, 0x91, 0x26, 0xbd, 0xa5,
+    0x1e, 0xdd, 0xd9, 0x2e, 0x11, 0x93, 0x19, 0x29, 0x47, 0x5d,
+    0x63, 0xe4, 0xb6, 0xf1, 0xea, 0x12, 0x29, 0xa1, 0x65, 0x12,
+    0x6d, 0x78, 0x8f, 0x63, 0x31, 0xec, 0x72, 0x54, 0x73, 0x72,
+    0x26, 0x48, 0x57, 0x57, 0xc8, 0xde, 0x28, 0x27, 0xf5, 0x62,
+    0xfb, 0x7f, 0x1b, 0xf3, 0xaf, 0x31, 0x01, 0xfc, 0x01, 0x58,
+    0x7a, 0x80, 0x72, 0x9d, 0x6e, 0x07, 0xcc, 0x45, 0x67, 0xc6,
+    0x26, 0xfe, 0x25, 0xa5, 0x9b, 0x64, 0xcd, 0x45, 0xe3, 0x31,
+    0x38, 0x05, 0x07, 0x36, 0x05, 0x46, 0x9c, 0xc1, 0x8e, 0xbf,
+    0x4e, 0x71, 0x5f, 0xea, 0xe5, 0x0c, 0x9a, 0x41, 0xc8, 0x94,
+    0xcc, 0xf1, 0x73, 0x06, 0x30, 0x54, 0x76, 0x23, 0xb7, 0x22,
+    0x7a, 0x8e, 0xe6, 0x42, 0xa1, 0xa0, 0x32, 0x12, 0xe9, 0x08,
+    0x1c, 0x46, 0x79, 0x0c, 0x82, 0x7a, 0x95, 0x79, 0xbf, 0x83,
+    0x80, 0xeb, 0xab, 0x3d, 0x32, 0xc5, 0xde, 0x62, 0xeb, 0x90,
+    0x29, 0x73, 0x05, 0xc8, 0x0a, 0xb1, 0x51, 0xf1, 0x23, 0xdd,
+    0x1e, 0xf5, 0x02, 0x3e, 0x74, 0xbc, 0x24, 0x0c, 0x60, 0x36,
+    0x2a, 0x28, 0x4d, 0xe6, 0x86, 0x98, 0x7c, 0xd9, 0xe1, 0xac,
+    0x21, 0x33, 0xaa, 0xa9, 0x8b, 0xb6, 0x8a, 0x1b, 0xf7, 0x54,
+    0x14, 0xf3, 0x0d, 0x4f, 0xcd, 0x7c, 0xf5, 0xc2, 0x6d, 0xc2,
+    0xf0, 0xe2, 0xfc, 0x63, 0x1e, 0xa6, 0xa9, 0xa9, 0xd9, 0x73,
+    0x2a, 0xd5, 0x0a, 0x38, 0xd8, 0xc0, 0xb7, 0xe1, 0x51, 0xe4,
+    0x23, 0x37, 0xf7, 0x85, 0x66, 0x0e, 0x3f, 0x1a, 0x8c, 0xcf,
+    0x12, 0xa2, 0x47, 0x6f, 0x73, 0x91, 0x21, 0xe3, 0x93, 0x6b,
+    0x74, 0x4f, 0xc5, 0xa1, 0xe7, 0x32, 0xf7, 0x86, 0xdd, 0x1a,
+    0x6e, 0x96, 0xda, 0x32, 0x1d, 0xdd, 0xfa, 0x42, 0xd5, 0xd4,
+    0xfd, 0xae, 0x7a, 0xa1, 0xed, 0x3d, 0x79, 0xfe, 0x88, 0x84,
+    0x43, 0xa7, 0xec, 0xf3, 0x7a, 0x13, 0xaa, 0xa1, 0x82, 0x02,
+    0x83, 0x19, 0x43, 0x0a, 0x46, 0x78, 0x07, 0xd9, 0x4d, 0xff,
+    0xac, 0x67, 0xd6, 0x29, 0x89, 0xfe, 0x2b, 0xab, 0x5f, 0x9a,
+    0x87, 0x99, 0x80, 0xaf, 0x70, 0x4a, 0x6a, 0xb9, 0x5a, 0xc2,
+    0xac, 0x7f, 0xa2, 0xc7, 0xad, 0xe2, 0x1f, 0xec, 0xc5, 0x12,
+    0x17, 0x08, 0x87, 0x8f, 0x20, 0x95, 0xbe, 0xaf, 0x62, 0x2c,
+    0xc2, 0x3f, 0x89, 0x56, 0xd8, 0x50, 0x96, 0x97, 0x72, 0xe2,
+    0x92, 0xe1, 0x2a, 0xd8, 0x84, 0x9f, 0x31, 0xe3, 0x06, 0xd8,
+    0xe5, 0x91, 0x63, 0x19, 0xe1, 0x27, 0xad, 0xe2, 0xf2, 0x0a,
+    0x5e, 0x78, 0x8b, 0x1b, 0x13, 0x31, 0x4b, 0xbd, 0x77, 0xb2,
+    0xd6, 0x5c, 0x92, 0x81, 0x50, 0x02, 0x37, 0xd2, 0xe6, 0xeb,
+    0x66, 0x6b, 0xaa, 0xfc, 0xcd, 0x54, 0x5d, 0xb8, 0x03, 0x87,
+    0xe8, 0xfa, 0xb2, 0xde, 0xcb, 0xf8, 0x6e, 0x58, 0xde, 0xcb,
+    0x09, 0x54, 0x8a, 0x9f, 0x46, 0xa3, 0x7e, 0x8d, 0x15, 0xff,
+    0x1b, 0x0d, 0x89, 0xc4, 0x1a, 0x21, 0x31, 0x5e, 0xed, 0x0b,
+    0x67, 0x3c, 0x70, 0xed, 0x92, 0x48, 0xef, 0xec, 0xf0, 0x77,
+    0xc2, 0x79, 0x6c, 0x06, 0x09, 0xaa, 0xab, 0xf6, 0x4c, 0xcd,
+    0xfa, 0x7e, 0x4a, 0x88, 0xdc, 0xa8, 0x9b, 0xd3, 0x69, 0x94,
+    0x88, 0x09, 0x1d, 0x30, 0x43, 0x9e, 0x2c, 0xcb, 0x01, 0x1d,
+    0x4a, 0x3b, 0x04, 0xec, 0x0e, 0xb1, 0xde, 0x09, 0xad, 0x29,
+    0x02, 0x82, 0x01, 0xe1, 0x00, 0x9f, 0x02, 0x13, 0x7a, 0xd0,
+    0xa9, 0x8a, 0x7a, 0xa0, 0x05, 0xbb, 0x44, 0x6f, 0xaf, 0xf7,
+    0xe3, 0xd4, 0x35, 0xef, 0x73, 0x39, 0xd5, 0xe0, 0xa2, 0x0f,
+    0x1a, 0x25, 0xa8, 0xf7, 0xc2, 0xa5, 0xec, 0x57, 0xf8, 0x0d,
+    0x2a, 0xb6, 0x64, 0x03, 0x8c, 0x22, 0x0f, 0xe7, 0x98, 0xa1,
+    0x12, 0xfe, 0x24, 0xef, 0x61, 0x28, 0x9f, 0xa7, 0x22, 0x6b,
+    0x6d, 0xab, 0x8d, 0x7d, 0x2a, 0x8b, 0xae, 0x8b, 0xfd, 0xcb,
+    0xd5, 0x0b, 0x79, 0x1b, 0x89, 0xcb, 0x5b, 0x7a, 0x8c, 0xdc,
+    0xe8, 0x8d, 0xdd, 0x35, 0x9f, 0x06, 0x69, 0x64, 0x12, 0xeb,
+    0x46, 0x79, 0xdf, 0x82, 0x2c, 0x89, 0x75, 0x9e, 0x7a, 0xec,
+    0xad, 0xe5, 0x88, 0x31, 0xfa, 0x86, 0x93, 0xca, 0xf1, 0x2d,
+    0x9b, 0x62, 0x5a, 0xe9, 0x43, 0x09, 0xf3, 0x8c, 0xe5, 0xc7,
+    0xc0, 0xce, 0x86, 0xe7, 0xdb, 0xc7, 0x4d, 0x27, 0xd5, 0xee,
+    0x76, 0xce, 0x35, 0x30, 0x47, 0xef, 0x00, 0x1b, 0x69, 0x9a,
+    0x3f, 0xa5, 0x2a, 0xc9, 0x07, 0xab, 0x99, 0xba, 0x2a, 0xe7,
+    0xfb, 0xa9, 0x4e, 0xb9, 0xae, 0x2c, 0x50, 0xfc, 0x35, 0x49,
+    0xe6, 0x97, 0x78, 0x3c, 0xb1, 0x59, 0xd7, 0x1d, 0x4e, 0x4e,
+    0xea, 0xde, 0xa0, 0xd0, 0xc4, 0x1d, 0xb1, 0xd3, 0x53, 0x1e,
+    0xf9, 0xbf, 0xb3, 0x6a, 0x17, 0xb4, 0xda, 0xcc, 0x27, 0x19,
+    0xc6, 0x35, 0xe8, 0x28, 0xd3, 0xe3, 0x76, 0x3a, 0xdc, 0xd0,
+    0x75, 0xc8, 0xb4, 0x6c, 0xbe, 0x84, 0x2a, 0x45, 0xd1, 0x43,
+    0x22, 0x54, 0xd7, 0xc5, 0xd0, 0xd7, 0x73, 0x35, 0x6b, 0xa8,
+    0xfa, 0xad, 0x60, 0xc0, 0x64, 0xc1, 0x58, 0x89, 0x09, 0x81,
+    0x0a, 0x0b, 0xea, 0x33, 0x91, 0xb0, 0xef, 0x53, 0x50, 0x41,
+    0xae, 0xd9, 0xee, 0xbe, 0x9e, 0xf0, 0x0b, 0xa0, 0x7c, 0xbf,
+    0x3f, 0xc9, 0x4b, 0xe0, 0x48, 0xd8, 0x10, 0xd5, 0x2e, 0xce,
+    0xf0, 0x7c, 0xd8, 0x05, 0xde, 0x09, 0x7e, 0x8c, 0x63, 0x4c,
+    0xdb, 0x8b, 0x91, 0xcd, 0x7f, 0xb6, 0x6b, 0xad, 0xce, 0xb1,
+    0x17, 0x6c, 0xf7, 0x08, 0x0d, 0x7c, 0xda, 0x4f, 0x0a, 0x07,
+    0xd0, 0xae, 0x72, 0x3c, 0x67, 0x4a, 0x44, 0x54, 0x47, 0xce,
+    0xe1, 0x17, 0x07, 0x12, 0xde, 0x52, 0xef, 0xef, 0x4c, 0x2b,
+    0x42, 0x7d, 0x09, 0x80, 0x36, 0x34, 0xdc, 0x45, 0x6f, 0xb0,
+    0x2d, 0xab, 0xa0, 0x0c, 0x58, 0xae, 0x35, 0xd3, 0x9b, 0x37,
+    0xc1, 0x1d, 0xeb, 0xfe, 0xc3, 0x04, 0xc9, 0x1d, 0xe7, 0x3d,
+    0x16, 0x64, 0xed, 0xf5, 0xe8, 0xdf, 0x99, 0xa4, 0xfb, 0xad,
+    0x79, 0x88, 0xd5, 0x8c, 0x62, 0x33, 0x9e, 0x35, 0xa6, 0x7f,
+    0x9d, 0xb6, 0x1a, 0x40, 0x6d, 0xc3, 0x89, 0x5d, 0x7b, 0xe2,
+    0xc8, 0xd3, 0x16, 0x13, 0x07, 0x9a, 0x38, 0x22, 0x33, 0x03,
+    0xac, 0x70, 0x3e, 0xce, 0x32, 0x56, 0x0b, 0x58, 0x56, 0xb8,
+    0xe9, 0xd8, 0x42, 0x35, 0x6c, 0xb9, 0x02, 0xb3, 0x64, 0xeb,
+    0xaa, 0x09, 0x3f, 0xac, 0x66, 0x08, 0xb4, 0x5f, 0x3e, 0xb4,
+    0xec, 0x39, 0xb1, 0x99, 0xe4, 0x5d, 0x1d, 0x32, 0x14, 0xc1,
+    0x48, 0x8f, 0x6c, 0x65, 0x87, 0x34, 0x50, 0xa4, 0xf4, 0x9b,
+    0x5b, 0x2e, 0xb5, 0x79, 0x0d, 0x11, 0x62, 0xa4, 0x35, 0x9c,
+    0x6f, 0x92, 0xd0, 0x68, 0x07, 0xdd, 0x69, 0x85, 0x48, 0xe3,
+    0x5d, 0x10, 0x34, 0xaf, 0xea, 0x41, 0x72, 0x5a, 0x71, 0x00,
+    0xf8, 0xe6, 0x47, 0x7f, 0xa0, 0x6f, 0x91, 0x96, 0x40, 0x00,
+    0x40, 0x70, 0xfb, 0x63, 0xcf, 0xc9, 0x36, 0x04, 0x1c, 0x3b,
+    0x11, 0x08, 0x29, 0x81, 0x9f
+};
+
+static unsigned char test15360[] = {
+    0x30, 0x82, 0x21, 0xe8, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, 0x02, 0x82, 0x07,
+    0x81, 0x00, 0xad, 0x3f, 0xaa, 0xdc, 0x8c, 0x85, 0xcb, 0x60,
+    0xd2, 0xf5, 0x30, 0xa1, 0x0f, 0x26, 0xec, 0xdf, 0xfc, 0x91,
+    0x39, 0xbd, 0x3e, 0x8f, 0x99, 0x64, 0x1e, 0x51, 0xd2, 0x27,
+    0x5e, 0x76, 0xcd, 0x86, 0x33, 0x07, 0xf9, 0xbd, 0x3b, 0x06,
+    0xc3, 0x3c, 0x85, 0xcb, 0x7e, 0x91, 0x14, 0xb0, 0x0b, 0x77,
+    0x22, 0x30, 0x71, 0xb8, 0xbb, 0x74, 0x30, 0x33, 0x35, 0x56,
+    0x34, 0x47, 0x10, 0x8f, 0x88, 0xe2, 0x6f, 0xdc, 0x3b, 0xe9,
+    0x58, 0x9d, 0x0c, 0xdc, 0x8f, 0x70, 0x41, 0x7a, 0x12, 0xd2,
+    0x9a, 0x35, 0xbe, 0x0a, 0x57, 0x13, 0x0c, 0xe9, 0xbf, 0x77,
+    0x54, 0x00, 0x74, 0xb7, 0x1a, 0x3e, 0xa7, 0xe9, 0xb6, 0xe7,
+    0x4f, 0x1e, 0xa4, 0xc0, 0x7c, 0x4c, 0x66, 0xc5, 0xce, 0xad,
+    0x96, 0x1b, 0xe2, 0x1a, 0xf1, 0x3d, 0x8b, 0x50, 0xcf, 0xe2,
+    0x15, 0x21, 0x6d, 0x83, 0x95, 0x00, 0xee, 0x97, 0xc4, 0xae,
+    0xc9, 0x38, 0x62, 0x6c, 0xb2, 0xe7, 0x7f, 0x15, 0x0a, 0xab,
+    0x86, 0xb9, 0xd9, 0x8a, 0xf8, 0xeb, 0x88, 0x5d, 0xdc, 0x0c,
+    0x1e, 0xc5, 0xe6, 0xa1, 0x7b, 0xbf, 0xf1, 0x02, 0xe3, 0xad,
+    0xf8, 0xed, 0x17, 0x9f, 0x83, 0x11, 0x31, 0x3b, 0xad, 0xb4,
+    0xf9, 0x8d, 0x1d, 0x56, 0x9b, 0xac, 0x68, 0x55, 0x0a, 0x74,
+    0x20, 0xee, 0x57, 0xe7, 0x1c, 0x6d, 0x05, 0xa1, 0x4e, 0xa5,
+    0x11, 0x99, 0xb4, 0x86, 0xdb, 0x58, 0xe7, 0xf6, 0xb6, 0x4f,
+    0x92, 0x58, 0x57, 0x9b, 0x74, 0x04, 0xe5, 0xd1, 0x1d, 0x7c,
+    0x4b, 0xb8, 0x1f, 0x5d, 0x0e, 0x93, 0xee, 0x44, 0x18, 0xb6,
+    0x58, 0x0e, 0xa1, 0x0b, 0x8e, 0x2e, 0x99, 0x4c, 0x72, 0x91,
+    0xfa, 0xfa, 0xe2, 0x22, 0x05, 0x5d, 0x2b, 0x2d, 0xd8, 0x60,
+    0xd5, 0x1b, 0x08, 0x56, 0x2b, 0xb5, 0x21, 0xdb, 0x1a, 0xe6,
+    0xa8, 0x39, 0xa2, 0xf4, 0x58, 0xcb, 0xd2, 0xf9, 0xce, 0xc0,
+    0x1e, 0x1b, 0xf9, 0xa7, 0x37, 0xca, 0xa3, 0x77, 0x6e, 0xb1,
+    0xaf, 0x33, 0xb5, 0x6d, 0x5f, 0x33, 0x2e, 0x1a, 0x34, 0xdb,
+    0x42, 0xbe, 0x5f, 0xf9, 0x09, 0xb7, 0x9f, 0xd4, 0x09, 0xfb,
+    0x87, 0x13, 0x3c, 0xe2, 0x27, 0xb8, 0xf3, 0x1d, 0x7e, 0x92,
+    0xdd, 0x87, 0x86, 0x55, 0x69, 0x9b, 0x55, 0xcd, 0xef, 0x7a,
+    0x71, 0x5d, 0x81, 0x3a, 0xd9, 0xf7, 0x7f, 0xde, 0xe0, 0x92,
+    0xd9, 0x78, 0x0f, 0x1d, 0x43, 0xb1, 0x1e, 0x29, 0xc1, 0x49,
+    0xb6, 0x5e, 0x85, 0x83, 0xd9, 0x04, 0xfd, 0x79, 0xd8, 0x47,
+    0x03, 0x2e, 0x85, 0x19, 0xfd, 0x63, 0xe7, 0xa4, 0x8b, 0xc0,
+    0x94, 0x0e, 0xb7, 0x54, 0x97, 0xd6, 0x44, 0x5d, 0x63, 0x12,
+    0xff, 0xdd, 0xde, 0x2c, 0x00, 0x0e, 0xc9, 0xca, 0x7e, 0xa2,
+    0x65, 0x25, 0xb0, 0x1d, 0xa9, 0x20, 0x4f, 0xdd, 0xea, 0x3a,
+    0xb5, 0xe8, 0x0f, 0xf3, 0xb2, 0xb7, 0x00, 0x4a, 0xe8, 0xa4,
+    0x83, 0x49, 0xbd, 0x78, 0xdf, 0xac, 0x2c, 0x37, 0x81, 0xb3,
+    0xf3, 0xb7, 0x13, 0x93, 0x3e, 0xb2, 0x79, 0x55, 0xf2, 0xd8,
+    0x9c, 0xf7, 0xf2, 0xf1, 0xd5, 0x6c, 0x9c, 0xff, 0xec, 0xf4,
+    0xea, 0x08, 0x3c, 0x65, 0x35, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x03, 0x6d, 0x99,
+    0x1d, 0x5b, 0x73, 0x06, 0x61, 0xb4, 0xf0, 0xc5, 0xdb, 0x3e,
+    0xe0, 0x1d, 0xa8, 0x5b, 0x7a, 0x5b, 0x5b, 0x9c, 0x11, 0x75,
+    0x83, 0x1d, 0xf4, 0x73, 0x27, 0xf3, 0x79, 0xf2, 0x82, 0xd6,
+    0x28, 0x45, 0x58, 0x23, 0x6c, 0x29, 0xd3, 0x50, 0x51, 0x1b,
+    0x38, 0xef, 0x89, 0x90, 0x84, 0xa2, 0x4c, 0x35, 0x7b, 0x30,
+    0x5e, 0xbd, 0x1a, 0xd5, 0xdf, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0x74, 0x3f, 0x2e,
+    0x01, 0xea, 0x33, 0x07, 0x74, 0xfb, 0x86, 0x75, 0x20, 0x0e,
+    0x4f, 0xbf, 0x65, 0xd4, 0x15, 0x19, 0x6f, 0x8d, 0x37, 0xcd,
+    0xb6, 0x6f, 0x50, 0x9d, 0x5e, 0x04, 0x81, 0x7d, 0xec, 0xd6,
+    0xbb, 0x40, 0x1b, 0xe0, 0xf5, 0xd5, 0x86, 0x26, 0xc5, 0x41,
+    0x84, 0x0e, 0x3e, 0x73, 0xb7, 0xa4, 0xbe, 0x2a, 0xfe, 0xd7,
+    0xe4, 0x4d, 0x5c, 0x2d, 0x6a, 0x04, 0xe6, 0xdd, 0x28, 0xa0,
+    0x75, 0x4c, 0xe0, 0x23, 0x2c, 0xad, 0xec, 0xaa, 0x72, 0xfd,
+    0x03, 0xc0, 0x65, 0xfa, 0xc4, 0x3c, 0x25, 0x10, 0xae, 0x3f,
+    0x09, 0x96, 0x4e, 0xff, 0xfe, 0xc7, 0xe4, 0x9e, 0xec, 0xb5,
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+    0xc3, 0x56, 0x33, 0x3e, 0x14, 0x1d, 0x0c, 0xd1, 0x03, 0x08,
+    0x92, 0x21, 0x2b, 0xa9, 0x6e, 0x6b, 0xf9, 0x0c, 0x1e, 0x86,
+    0xdd, 0xb5, 0xbb, 0xa4, 0xa5, 0x82, 0x99, 0x98, 0x49, 0x36,
+    0xec, 0x98, 0x98, 0x95, 0xac, 0xc2, 0xa0, 0x1f, 0xa5, 0x7e,
+    0x67, 0xd1, 0xcf, 0x6a, 0xf4, 0x16, 0x08, 0x7a, 0x8d, 0x0b,
+    0xae, 0x12, 0x51, 0xe6, 0x8e, 0xe6, 0xcd, 0xa1, 0xaa, 0x6d,
+    0xe4, 0x54, 0xd4, 0x69, 0x1b, 0x09, 0x6a, 0xba, 0x5e, 0x0b,
+    0x11, 0x9c, 0x83, 0xb3, 0x5c, 0x67, 0xbb, 0x2d, 0xf8, 0x66,
+    0x1c, 0x33, 0xb8, 0x22, 0x58, 0x10, 0x96, 0xe9, 0x99, 0xaf,
+    0x0b, 0x2a, 0xf1, 0xe0, 0xcb, 0x56, 0xfb, 0x6d, 0x04, 0x40,
+    0xec, 0x37, 0x67, 0x1e, 0x08, 0x7a, 0x1c, 0xe9, 0xd8, 0x54,
+    0xf7, 0xd4, 0xc7, 0x3c, 0x45, 0x23, 0x2b, 0x76, 0xd2, 0x62,
+    0xc2, 0x53, 0xce, 0xfe, 0x02, 0xc4, 0xd9, 0xf6, 0x3c, 0xed,
+    0x49, 0x47, 0x21, 0xf9, 0x03, 0x3a, 0xa0, 0x16, 0x3a, 0xfe,
+    0x0c, 0x2f, 0x54, 0x7e, 0x85, 0x29, 0x7b, 0xc0, 0xaf, 0xa8,
+    0x5d, 0x31, 0x25, 0xda, 0xa7, 0xe3, 0x92, 0x1b, 0x64, 0x01,
+    0x1b, 0x3f, 0x6e, 0x47, 0xc5, 0x5a, 0x84, 0x52, 0x17, 0x02,
+    0x82, 0x03, 0xc1, 0x00, 0x81, 0x99, 0x2e, 0x72, 0x41, 0x6e,
+    0x86, 0xeb, 0x6f, 0x42, 0xd1, 0x38, 0x6e, 0xaa, 0x1a, 0xd5,
+    0x0a, 0xad, 0x51, 0xb1, 0xce, 0xd6, 0x35, 0xbe, 0x34, 0xd8,
+    0xc1, 0xe4, 0x5f, 0xdf, 0x2e, 0xe4, 0x90, 0xf2, 0x61, 0x21,
+    0x46, 0xc6, 0xfe, 0xab, 0x0f, 0x6c, 0x97, 0x78, 0xcd, 0x55,
+    0x86, 0x83, 0x61, 0x99, 0x49, 0x14, 0x86, 0xc6, 0x86, 0xf1,
+    0x41, 0x66, 0xc9, 0x39, 0x52, 0x99, 0x49, 0x07, 0xd6, 0x9d,
+    0xb7, 0x40, 0x34, 0x5f, 0xe7, 0x3a, 0xfa, 0x95, 0xeb, 0xa1,
+    0x03, 0xb7, 0x52, 0x71, 0x93, 0x30, 0x0b, 0x51, 0x58, 0x82,
+    0x07, 0x2f, 0x44, 0xa9, 0x4f, 0x9b, 0x1b, 0xf3, 0xd6, 0x21,
+    0x3d, 0x68, 0xef, 0x3f, 0xaf, 0xc2, 0x6f, 0xa0, 0xd5, 0x2b,
+    0xb8, 0x73, 0x84, 0x67, 0x36, 0x8b, 0xa4, 0x25, 0xe0, 0x86,
+    0xd9, 0x14, 0x5c, 0x6c, 0xd8, 0x61, 0xe1, 0x0a, 0x6c, 0xaf,
+    0xbb, 0x9c, 0xf6, 0x74, 0xca, 0x5a, 0x04, 0xac, 0x85, 0xc1,
+    0x1b, 0x4d, 0xf2, 0x07, 0xb6, 0x1e, 0x97, 0x7b, 0x75, 0xdf,
+    0x9b, 0x8a, 0x31, 0xc6, 0x90, 0xd5, 0x8d, 0x39, 0xc2, 0x54,
+    0xf4, 0xe2, 0x83, 0x57, 0x12, 0x19, 0xf5, 0xb2, 0xd2, 0x53,
+    0x81, 0x6d, 0xf0, 0x09, 0xc9, 0x80, 0x8b, 0x07, 0x7c, 0x59,
+    0xcd, 0x78, 0x00, 0xd6, 0x44, 0x7f, 0xe4, 0xdb, 0x77, 0x02,
+    0x00, 0x25, 0x79, 0x91, 0xc9, 0xde, 0xd0, 0xed, 0x3f, 0xfc,
+    0x37, 0x36, 0xea, 0xf0, 0x56, 0x50, 0xe7, 0x38, 0xca, 0xe1,
+    0x67, 0x12, 0x96, 0x55, 0x3e, 0xff, 0x97, 0xe5, 0xa7, 0x03,
+    0x5b, 0x72, 0x80, 0xd6, 0xa5, 0x23, 0x39, 0x78, 0x07, 0xc8,
+    0x83, 0x19, 0x74, 0xfb, 0x79, 0xc2, 0x9e, 0xbd, 0xf9, 0xaf,
+    0x09, 0x0f, 0xbd, 0x3d, 0x34, 0xe8, 0x44, 0x89, 0xb1, 0xf1,
+    0x2b, 0xa5, 0xff, 0x22, 0xc9, 0x47, 0xe2, 0x31, 0xb5, 0x6b,
+    0x8a, 0x65, 0x5f, 0x81, 0x5f, 0x89, 0xb0, 0x03, 0x5d, 0x53,
+    0x0e, 0xdd, 0xfb, 0xe5, 0x70, 0xaa, 0xd2, 0x37, 0x4d, 0xa1,
+    0x7c, 0xf2, 0xe4, 0x7f, 0xf1, 0x4a, 0xaf, 0x12, 0xd1, 0x83,
+    0xdc, 0xb2, 0x9e, 0xc1, 0x95, 0x3d, 0x04, 0x9f, 0xa3, 0xad,
+    0xcc, 0x78, 0x14, 0x9a, 0xf9, 0x58, 0x39, 0x08, 0x15, 0xda,
+    0x1b, 0x94, 0x50, 0x2d, 0x44, 0xc0, 0x23, 0x1c, 0x36, 0x5f,
+    0x16, 0x08, 0xa3, 0xdf, 0x9e, 0x4f, 0xbb, 0x07, 0xcd, 0xe3,
+    0x8c, 0xbf, 0xf1, 0xc3, 0x3e, 0x98, 0xf8, 0x49, 0x79, 0x58,
+    0xc9, 0x0f, 0x47, 0xc0, 0xab, 0x2f, 0x21, 0x63, 0xf6, 0xe6,
+    0xfe, 0x8a, 0xea, 0xbc, 0x32, 0x63, 0xca, 0x75, 0xf8, 0xa4,
+    0x1b, 0x6c, 0xfe, 0x9a, 0x6e, 0x68, 0x1f, 0x48, 0x59, 0xfb,
+    0x34, 0x43, 0x10, 0xd5, 0x0d, 0x80, 0x54, 0xcb, 0x67, 0x21,
+    0xc7, 0x13, 0x85, 0x38, 0x0c, 0xf9, 0x40, 0x2e, 0x2e, 0x4a,
+    0x05, 0x9e, 0x51, 0xae, 0xdd, 0xba, 0x23, 0x83, 0x66, 0x2a,
+    0xbf, 0x7f, 0xca, 0x9c, 0x6c, 0x2d, 0x6b, 0x7d, 0x68, 0x52,
+    0x81, 0x56, 0x2f, 0xea, 0xf9, 0xe7, 0xf1, 0x55, 0x16, 0xfc,
+    0x29, 0xe2, 0xa5, 0x1e, 0x0a, 0x06, 0xe0, 0x85, 0x4e, 0xa6,
+    0x5d, 0x20, 0x9d, 0x2b, 0xa2, 0xad, 0xaa, 0xd6, 0x9b, 0xd2,
+    0x98, 0x29, 0x45, 0x5c, 0x55, 0xc0, 0x91, 0xa2, 0x65, 0xcd,
+    0xac, 0xc6, 0x1a, 0x53, 0xa1, 0x46, 0x13, 0xf9, 0xfe, 0x1a,
+    0xf6, 0xdf, 0xa5, 0x1a, 0x58, 0x7c, 0x81, 0x2e, 0x46, 0x46,
+    0xf7, 0x2f, 0xd6, 0xaa, 0x21, 0xb0, 0x0e, 0x7e, 0xac, 0xb8,
+    0xc6, 0x76, 0x62, 0x82, 0x3b, 0x0a, 0x36, 0xbe, 0x97, 0x16,
+    0xd5, 0x79, 0x55, 0x15, 0x64, 0x2a, 0xbe, 0x19, 0x4e, 0x93,
+    0x3b, 0x44, 0x7c, 0xe2, 0xfc, 0x18, 0x4e, 0x83, 0x37, 0xfb,
+    0x26, 0x78, 0x6d, 0x24, 0x6b, 0x48, 0x21, 0x67, 0xde, 0xf5,
+    0x00, 0x22, 0x9a, 0xec, 0x40, 0x16, 0x96, 0x8a, 0x3f, 0xd5,
+    0xa6, 0x5e, 0x03, 0x84, 0xbb, 0x15, 0x4d, 0x55, 0x71, 0x00,
+    0x90, 0xc2, 0x96, 0x25, 0x01, 0xab, 0xe6, 0x47, 0x44, 0x6f,
+    0xf9, 0x53, 0x80, 0x2b, 0xa8, 0x83, 0xc8, 0x14, 0x77, 0x13,
+    0x00, 0x66, 0xee, 0x7e, 0x7a, 0xa0, 0x28, 0x65, 0xf3, 0x31,
+    0xb6, 0xac, 0xd7, 0x87, 0x84, 0x29, 0xed, 0x5b, 0xcd, 0x74,
+    0xc0, 0x89, 0x51, 0x11, 0x9a, 0xd5, 0x7b, 0xe0, 0x9c, 0xd0,
+    0x8d, 0x72, 0xe3, 0x77, 0xda, 0x0a, 0xc2, 0xdc, 0x6f, 0xad,
+    0x49, 0x03, 0xfa, 0xe6, 0x7e, 0xa6, 0x24, 0x32, 0xe6, 0x8f,
+    0xd9, 0x70, 0xfa, 0x59, 0x70, 0xa9, 0xa3, 0x08, 0x7d, 0x89,
+    0xc4, 0x96, 0x61, 0xc2, 0xf5, 0xe5, 0xb5, 0x3b, 0x0d, 0xec,
+    0xb8, 0x9c, 0xee, 0x09, 0x77, 0x27, 0xbd, 0x35, 0x66, 0x90,
+    0x9e, 0x46, 0xf7, 0xbd, 0xa6, 0xc5, 0x31, 0xd4, 0x6a, 0x52,
+    0x17, 0x5d, 0x0a, 0x0e, 0x2c, 0x34, 0x7a, 0x6a, 0x21, 0xac,
+    0x42, 0xf0, 0x31, 0xde, 0x48, 0xe0, 0x27, 0xd0, 0x79, 0xc9,
+    0x06, 0x94, 0x7b, 0x51, 0x4b, 0x5b, 0x02, 0x6a, 0x19, 0xba,
+    0x71, 0x45, 0x9c, 0xdf, 0xe6, 0x30, 0x9e, 0xaa, 0xad, 0xa1,
+    0x87, 0xf6, 0x37, 0xde, 0xa2, 0x97, 0x68, 0x20, 0x2d, 0x5a,
+    0xdc, 0xdd, 0x91, 0x63, 0x5f, 0x79, 0xda, 0x99, 0x20, 0x3a,
+    0x4b, 0xe5, 0x43, 0x0e, 0x12, 0x70, 0x57, 0x91, 0xfa, 0xee,
+    0xc4, 0xb6, 0xb6, 0xb1, 0xf1, 0x06, 0xbd, 0xcf, 0x8d, 0x2a,
+    0x05, 0xc0, 0x07, 0x23, 0x84, 0x85, 0xef, 0x9c, 0xbb, 0x6f,
+    0x5f, 0x4a, 0x9a, 0x27, 0x9f, 0x9f, 0x32, 0x97, 0xe8, 0x24,
+    0xb9, 0x64, 0x2c, 0x39, 0xff, 0x2f, 0x4b, 0xc4, 0x7e, 0x65,
+    0xfe, 0xbb, 0x5c, 0xa0, 0xb2, 0x6e, 0xc4, 0xb6, 0x93, 0x2b,
+    0x51, 0x9e, 0x2e, 0x1f, 0xd8, 0xcf, 0x60, 0xe0, 0x75, 0x15,
+    0xf9, 0xa0, 0x67, 0x99, 0x88, 0x2b, 0x76, 0xce, 0x41, 0x42,
+    0x10, 0x29, 0x89, 0xbf, 0xca, 0xb7, 0x61, 0x08, 0x94, 0xee,
+    0xa0, 0xb3, 0x3a, 0x09, 0xc5, 0x6f, 0x04, 0xf9, 0x1b, 0xb5,
+    0x64, 0x99, 0x08, 0xe4, 0xcc, 0xce, 0xdf, 0x71, 0x65, 0x8a,
+    0x6d, 0x62, 0xde, 0x76, 0x1d, 0x6d, 0x6b, 0x78, 0x22, 0x32,
+    0x63, 0xdd, 0x53, 0x7d, 0xec, 0xed, 0x9d, 0x82, 0xa9, 0x2c,
+    0x5c, 0x8a, 0x17, 0xdd, 0x85, 0xf9, 0xd2, 0xac, 0x6e, 0x98,
+    0x60, 0x2e, 0x08, 0xd4, 0x06, 0x76, 0xf4, 0x97, 0xca, 0xb1,
+    0x72, 0x50, 0x5b, 0x83, 0xea, 0xbb, 0x39, 0x0f, 0x18, 0xb3,
+    0xb8, 0x03, 0xee, 0x7c, 0x84, 0xa9, 0x69, 0xcd, 0x1d, 0xbd,
+    0xe2, 0xb7, 0xce, 0xe2, 0x6f, 0x03, 0x49, 0x52, 0x67, 0xa0,
+    0x1b, 0x23, 0x43, 0x92, 0x2c, 0x7c, 0x3b, 0x65, 0xe8, 0x61,
+    0x99, 0xde, 0xb5, 0xf1, 0x63, 0x73, 0x92, 0x6c, 0x70, 0x8b,
+    0x83, 0x10, 0xb4, 0x06, 0x2c, 0x99, 0x12, 0x73, 0xec, 0x87,
+    0x92, 0x09, 0x67, 0x96, 0xd6, 0x9c, 0x9f, 0x35, 0x48, 0x48,
+    0x3b, 0x44, 0x00, 0x73, 0x1c, 0x59, 0xeb, 0x81, 0x7b, 0xd1,
+    0xda, 0x76, 0xcf, 0xc2, 0x4d, 0xf1, 0xa2, 0x5b, 0x2f, 0x5f,
+    0x91, 0x29, 0x6e, 0x08, 0x37, 0xd6, 0xaa, 0xd2, 0xf8, 0x4f,
+    0x5e, 0x00, 0x16, 0x52
+};
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/timeouts.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/timeouts.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e023b0a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/timeouts.h
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef INCLUDED_TIMEOUTS_H
+# define INCLUDED_TIMEOUTS_H
+
+/* numbers in us */
+# define DGRAM_RCV_TIMEOUT         250000
+# define DGRAM_SND_TIMEOUT         250000
+
+#endif                          /* ! INCLUDED_TIMEOUTS_H */
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/ts.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/ts.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0e07c08
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/ts.c
@@ -0,0 +1,995 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TS
+NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT
+#else
+# include <stdio.h>
+# include <stdlib.h>
+# include <string.h>
+# include "apps.h"
+# include <openssl/bio.h>
+# include <openssl/err.h>
+# include <openssl/pem.h>
+# include <openssl/rand.h>
+# include <openssl/ts.h>
+# include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+/* Request nonce length, in bits (must be a multiple of 8). */
+# define NONCE_LENGTH            64
+
+/* Name of config entry that defines the OID file. */
+# define ENV_OID_FILE            "oid_file"
+
+/* Is |EXACTLY_ONE| of three pointers set? */
+# define EXACTLY_ONE(a, b, c) \
+        (( a && !b && !c) || \
+         ( b && !a && !c) || \
+         ( c && !a && !b))
+
+static ASN1_OBJECT *txt2obj(const char *oid);
+static CONF *load_config_file(const char *configfile);
+
+/* Query related functions. */
+static int query_command(const char *data, const char *digest,
+                         const EVP_MD *md, const char *policy, int no_nonce,
+                         int cert, const char *in, const char *out, int text);
+static TS_REQ *create_query(BIO *data_bio, const char *digest, const EVP_MD *md,
+                            const char *policy, int no_nonce, int cert);
+static int create_digest(BIO *input, const char *digest,
+                         const EVP_MD *md, unsigned char **md_value);
+static ASN1_INTEGER *create_nonce(int bits);
+
+/* Reply related functions. */
+static int reply_command(CONF *conf, const char *section, const char *engine,
+                         const char *queryfile, const char *passin, const char *inkey,
+                         const EVP_MD *md, const char *signer, const char *chain,
+                         const char *policy, const char *in, int token_in,
+                         const char *out, int token_out, int text);
+static TS_RESP *read_PKCS7(BIO *in_bio);
+static TS_RESP *create_response(CONF *conf, const char *section, const char *engine,
+                                const char *queryfile, const char *passin,
+                                const char *inkey, const EVP_MD *md, const char *signer,
+                                const char *chain, const char *policy);
+static ASN1_INTEGER *serial_cb(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx, void *data);
+static ASN1_INTEGER *next_serial(const char *serialfile);
+static int save_ts_serial(const char *serialfile, ASN1_INTEGER *serial);
+
+/* Verify related functions. */
+static int verify_command(const char *data, const char *digest, const char *queryfile,
+                          const char *in, int token_in,
+                          const char *CApath, const char *CAfile, const char *untrusted,
+                          X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm);
+static TS_VERIFY_CTX *create_verify_ctx(const char *data, const char *digest,
+                                        const char *queryfile,
+                                        const char *CApath, const char *CAfile,
+                                        const char *untrusted,
+                                        X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm);
+static X509_STORE *create_cert_store(const char *CApath, const char *CAfile,
+                                     X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm);
+static int verify_cb(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+
+typedef enum OPTION_choice {
+    OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP,
+    OPT_ENGINE, OPT_CONFIG, OPT_SECTION, OPT_QUERY, OPT_DATA,
+    OPT_DIGEST, OPT_RAND, OPT_TSPOLICY, OPT_NO_NONCE, OPT_CERT,
+    OPT_IN, OPT_TOKEN_IN, OPT_OUT, OPT_TOKEN_OUT, OPT_TEXT,
+    OPT_REPLY, OPT_QUERYFILE, OPT_PASSIN, OPT_INKEY, OPT_SIGNER,
+    OPT_CHAIN, OPT_VERIFY, OPT_CAPATH, OPT_CAFILE, OPT_UNTRUSTED,
+    OPT_MD, OPT_V_ENUM
+} OPTION_CHOICE;
+
+OPTIONS ts_options[] = {
+    {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"},
+    {"config", OPT_CONFIG, '<', "Configuration file"},
+    {"section", OPT_SECTION, 's', "Section to use within config file"},
+    {"query", OPT_QUERY, '-', "Generate a TS query"},
+    {"data", OPT_DATA, '<', "File to hash"},
+    {"digest", OPT_DIGEST, 's', "Digest (as a hex string)"},
+    {"rand", OPT_RAND, 's',
+     "Load the file(s) into the random number generator"},
+    {"tspolicy", OPT_TSPOLICY, 's', "Policy OID to use"},
+    {"no_nonce", OPT_NO_NONCE, '-', "Do not include a nonce"},
+    {"cert", OPT_CERT, '-', "Put cert request into query"},
+    {"in", OPT_IN, '<', "Input file"},
+    {"token_in", OPT_TOKEN_IN, '-', "Input is a PKCS#7 file"},
+    {"out", OPT_OUT, '>', "Output file"},
+    {"token_out", OPT_TOKEN_OUT, '-', "Output is a PKCS#7 file"},
+    {"text", OPT_TEXT, '-', "Output text (not DER)"},
+    {"reply", OPT_REPLY, '-', "Generate a TS reply"},
+    {"queryfile", OPT_QUERYFILE, '<', "File containing a TS query"},
+    {"passin", OPT_PASSIN, 's', "Input file pass phrase source"},
+    {"inkey", OPT_INKEY, 's', "File with private key for reply"},
+    {"signer", OPT_SIGNER, 's', "Signer certificate file"},
+    {"chain", OPT_CHAIN, '<', "File with signer CA chain"},
+    {"verify", OPT_VERIFY, '-', "Verify a TS response"},
+    {"CApath", OPT_CAPATH, '/', "Path to trusted CA files"},
+    {"CAfile", OPT_CAFILE, '<', "File with trusted CA certs"},
+    {"untrusted", OPT_UNTRUSTED, '<', "File with untrusted certs"},
+    {"", OPT_MD, '-', "Any supported digest"},
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine, possibly a hardware device"},
+# endif
+    {OPT_HELP_STR, 1, '-', "\nOptions specific to 'ts -verify': \n"},
+    OPT_V_OPTIONS,
+    {OPT_HELP_STR, 1, '-', "\n"},
+    {NULL}
+};
+
+/*
+ * This command is so complex, special help is needed.
+ */
+static char* opt_helplist[] = {
+    "Typical uses:",
+    "ts -query [-rand file...] [-config file] [-data file]",
+    "          [-digest hexstring] [-tspolicy oid] [-no_nonce] [-cert]",
+    "          [-in file] [-out file] [-text]",
+    "  or",
+    "ts -reply [-config file] [-section tsa_section]",
+    "          [-queryfile file] [-passin password]",
+    "          [-signer tsa_cert.pem] [-inkey private_key.pem]",
+    "          [-chain certs_file.pem] [-tspolicy oid]",
+    "          [-in file] [-token_in] [-out file] [-token_out]",
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    "          [-text] [-engine id]",
+# else
+    "          [-text]",
+# endif
+    "  or",
+    "ts -verify -CApath dir -CAfile file.pem -untrusted file.pem",
+    "           [-data file] [-digest hexstring]",
+    "           [-queryfile file] -in file [-token_in]",
+    "           [[options specific to 'ts -verify']]",
+    NULL,
+};
+
+int ts_main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    CONF *conf = NULL;
+    const char *CAfile = NULL, *untrusted = NULL, *prog;
+    const char *configfile = default_config_file, *engine = NULL;
+    const char *section = NULL;
+    char **helpp;
+    char *password = NULL;
+    char *data = NULL, *digest = NULL, *rnd = NULL, *policy = NULL;
+    char *in = NULL, *out = NULL, *queryfile = NULL, *passin = NULL;
+    char *inkey = NULL, *signer = NULL, *chain = NULL, *CApath = NULL;
+    const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
+    OPTION_CHOICE o, mode = OPT_ERR;
+    int ret = 1, no_nonce = 0, cert = 0, text = 0;
+    int vpmtouched = 0;
+    X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = NULL;
+    /* Input is ContentInfo instead of TimeStampResp. */
+    int token_in = 0;
+    /* Output is ContentInfo instead of TimeStampResp. */
+    int token_out = 0;
+
+    if ((vpm = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new()) == NULL)
+        goto end;
+
+    prog = opt_init(argc, argv, ts_options);
+    while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) {
+        switch (o) {
+        case OPT_EOF:
+        case OPT_ERR:
+ opthelp:
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog);
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_HELP:
+            opt_help(ts_options);
+            for (helpp = opt_helplist; *helpp; ++helpp)
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s\n", *helpp);
+            ret = 0;
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_CONFIG:
+            configfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_SECTION:
+            section = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_QUERY:
+        case OPT_REPLY:
+        case OPT_VERIFY:
+            if (mode != OPT_ERR)
+                goto opthelp;
+            mode = o;
+            break;
+        case OPT_DATA:
+            data = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_DIGEST:
+            digest = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_RAND:
+            rnd = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_TSPOLICY:
+            policy = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_NO_NONCE:
+            no_nonce = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_CERT:
+            cert = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_IN:
+            in = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_TOKEN_IN:
+            token_in = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_OUT:
+            out = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_TOKEN_OUT:
+            token_out = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_TEXT:
+            text = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_QUERYFILE:
+            queryfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_PASSIN:
+            passin = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_INKEY:
+            inkey = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_SIGNER:
+            signer = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_CHAIN:
+            chain = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_CAPATH:
+            CApath = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_CAFILE:
+            CAfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_UNTRUSTED:
+            untrusted = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_ENGINE:
+            engine = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_MD:
+            if (!opt_md(opt_unknown(), &md))
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_V_CASES:
+            if (!opt_verify(o, vpm))
+                goto end;
+            vpmtouched++;
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    if (mode == OPT_ERR || opt_num_rest() != 0)
+        goto opthelp;
+
+    /* Seed the random number generator if it is going to be used. */
+    if (mode == OPT_QUERY && !no_nonce) {
+        if (!app_RAND_load_file(NULL, 1) && rnd == NULL)
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "warning, not much extra random "
+                       "data, consider using the -rand option\n");
+        if (rnd != NULL)
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "%ld semi-random bytes loaded\n",
+                       app_RAND_load_files(rnd));
+    }
+
+    if (mode == OPT_REPLY && passin &&
+        !app_passwd(passin, NULL, &password, NULL)) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting password.\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    conf = load_config_file(configfile);
+    if (configfile != default_config_file && !app_load_modules(conf))
+        goto end;
+
+    /* Check parameter consistency and execute the appropriate function. */
+    switch (mode) {
+    default:
+    case OPT_ERR:
+        goto opthelp;
+    case OPT_QUERY:
+        if (vpmtouched)
+            goto opthelp;
+        if ((data != NULL) && (digest != NULL))
+            goto opthelp;
+        ret = !query_command(data, digest, md, policy, no_nonce, cert,
+                             in, out, text);
+        break;
+    case OPT_REPLY:
+        if (vpmtouched)
+            goto opthelp;
+        if ((in != NULL) && (queryfile != NULL))
+            goto opthelp;
+        if (in == NULL) {
+            if ((conf == NULL) || (token_in != 0))
+                goto opthelp;
+        }
+        ret = !reply_command(conf, section, engine, queryfile,
+                             password, inkey, md, signer, chain, policy,
+                             in, token_in, out, token_out, text);
+        break;
+    case OPT_VERIFY:
+        if ((in == NULL) || !EXACTLY_ONE(queryfile, data, digest))
+            goto opthelp;
+        ret = !verify_command(data, digest, queryfile, in, token_in,
+                              CApath, CAfile, untrusted,
+                              vpmtouched ? vpm : NULL);
+    }
+
+ end:
+    X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(vpm);
+    app_RAND_write_file(NULL);
+    NCONF_free(conf);
+    OPENSSL_free(password);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Configuration file-related function definitions.
+ */
+
+static ASN1_OBJECT *txt2obj(const char *oid)
+{
+    ASN1_OBJECT *oid_obj = NULL;
+
+    if ((oid_obj = OBJ_txt2obj(oid, 0)) == NULL)
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "cannot convert %s to OID\n", oid);
+
+    return oid_obj;
+}
+
+static CONF *load_config_file(const char *configfile)
+{
+    CONF *conf = app_load_config(configfile);
+
+    if (conf != NULL) {
+        const char *p;
+
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Using configuration from %s\n", configfile);
+        p = NCONF_get_string(conf, NULL, ENV_OID_FILE);
+        if (p != NULL) {
+            BIO *oid_bio = BIO_new_file(p, "r");
+            if (!oid_bio)
+                ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            else {
+                OBJ_create_objects(oid_bio);
+                BIO_free_all(oid_bio);
+            }
+        } else
+            ERR_clear_error();
+        if (!add_oid_section(conf))
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+    }
+    return conf;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Query-related method definitions.
+ */
+static int query_command(const char *data, const char *digest, const EVP_MD *md,
+                         const char *policy, int no_nonce,
+                         int cert, const char *in, const char *out, int text)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    TS_REQ *query = NULL;
+    BIO *in_bio = NULL;
+    BIO *data_bio = NULL;
+    BIO *out_bio = NULL;
+
+    /* Build query object. */
+    if (in != NULL) {
+        if ((in_bio = bio_open_default(in, 'r', FORMAT_ASN1)) == NULL)
+            goto end;
+        query = d2i_TS_REQ_bio(in_bio, NULL);
+    } else {
+        if (digest == NULL
+            && (data_bio = bio_open_default(data, 'r', FORMAT_ASN1)) == NULL)
+            goto end;
+        query = create_query(data_bio, digest, md, policy, no_nonce, cert);
+    }
+    if (query == NULL)
+        goto end;
+
+    if (text) {
+        if ((out_bio = bio_open_default(out, 'w', FORMAT_TEXT)) == NULL)
+            goto end;
+        if (!TS_REQ_print_bio(out_bio, query))
+            goto end;
+    } else {
+        if ((out_bio = bio_open_default(out, 'w', FORMAT_ASN1)) == NULL)
+            goto end;
+        if (!i2d_TS_REQ_bio(out_bio, query))
+            goto end;
+    }
+
+    ret = 1;
+
+ end:
+    ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+    BIO_free_all(in_bio);
+    BIO_free_all(data_bio);
+    BIO_free_all(out_bio);
+    TS_REQ_free(query);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static TS_REQ *create_query(BIO *data_bio, const char *digest, const EVP_MD *md,
+                            const char *policy, int no_nonce, int cert)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    TS_REQ *ts_req = NULL;
+    int len;
+    TS_MSG_IMPRINT *msg_imprint = NULL;
+    X509_ALGOR *algo = NULL;
+    unsigned char *data = NULL;
+    ASN1_OBJECT *policy_obj = NULL;
+    ASN1_INTEGER *nonce_asn1 = NULL;
+
+    if (md == NULL && (md = EVP_get_digestbyname("sha1")) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if ((ts_req = TS_REQ_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (!TS_REQ_set_version(ts_req, 1))
+        goto err;
+    if ((msg_imprint = TS_MSG_IMPRINT_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if ((algo = X509_ALGOR_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if ((algo->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_MD_type(md))) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if ((algo->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    algo->parameter->type = V_ASN1_NULL;
+    if (!TS_MSG_IMPRINT_set_algo(msg_imprint, algo))
+        goto err;
+    if ((len = create_digest(data_bio, digest, md, &data)) == 0)
+        goto err;
+    if (!TS_MSG_IMPRINT_set_msg(msg_imprint, data, len))
+        goto err;
+    if (!TS_REQ_set_msg_imprint(ts_req, msg_imprint))
+        goto err;
+    if (policy && (policy_obj = txt2obj(policy)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (policy_obj && !TS_REQ_set_policy_id(ts_req, policy_obj))
+        goto err;
+
+    /* Setting nonce if requested. */
+    if (!no_nonce && (nonce_asn1 = create_nonce(NONCE_LENGTH)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (nonce_asn1 && !TS_REQ_set_nonce(ts_req, nonce_asn1))
+        goto err;
+    if (!TS_REQ_set_cert_req(ts_req, cert))
+        goto err;
+
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    if (!ret) {
+        TS_REQ_free(ts_req);
+        ts_req = NULL;
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "could not create query\n");
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+    }
+    TS_MSG_IMPRINT_free(msg_imprint);
+    X509_ALGOR_free(algo);
+    OPENSSL_free(data);
+    ASN1_OBJECT_free(policy_obj);
+    ASN1_INTEGER_free(nonce_asn1);
+    return ts_req;
+}
+
+static int create_digest(BIO *input, const char *digest, const EVP_MD *md,
+                         unsigned char **md_value)
+{
+    int md_value_len;
+    int rv = 0;
+    EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL;
+
+    md_value_len = EVP_MD_size(md);
+    if (md_value_len < 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    if (input) {
+        unsigned char buffer[4096];
+        int length;
+
+        md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+        if (md_ctx == NULL)
+            return 0;
+        *md_value = app_malloc(md_value_len, "digest buffer");
+        if (!EVP_DigestInit(md_ctx, md))
+            goto err;
+        while ((length = BIO_read(input, buffer, sizeof(buffer))) > 0) {
+            if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, buffer, length))
+                goto err;
+        }
+        if (!EVP_DigestFinal(md_ctx, *md_value, NULL))
+            goto err;
+        md_value_len = EVP_MD_size(md);
+    } else {
+        long digest_len;
+        *md_value = OPENSSL_hexstr2buf(digest, &digest_len);
+        if (!*md_value || md_value_len != digest_len) {
+            OPENSSL_free(*md_value);
+            *md_value = NULL;
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "bad digest, %d bytes "
+                       "must be specified\n", md_value_len);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+    rv = md_value_len;
+ err:
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
+    return rv;
+}
+
+static ASN1_INTEGER *create_nonce(int bits)
+{
+    unsigned char buf[20];
+    ASN1_INTEGER *nonce = NULL;
+    int len = (bits - 1) / 8 + 1;
+    int i;
+
+    if (len > (int)sizeof(buf))
+        goto err;
+    if (RAND_bytes(buf, len) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* Find the first non-zero byte and creating ASN1_INTEGER object. */
+    for (i = 0; i < len && !buf[i]; ++i)
+        continue;
+    if ((nonce = ASN1_INTEGER_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    OPENSSL_free(nonce->data);
+    nonce->length = len - i;
+    nonce->data = app_malloc(nonce->length + 1, "nonce buffer");
+    memcpy(nonce->data, buf + i, nonce->length);
+    return nonce;
+
+ err:
+    BIO_printf(bio_err, "could not create nonce\n");
+    ASN1_INTEGER_free(nonce);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Reply-related method definitions.
+ */
+
+static int reply_command(CONF *conf, const char *section, const char *engine,
+                         const char *queryfile, const char *passin, const char *inkey,
+                         const EVP_MD *md, const char *signer, const char *chain,
+                         const char *policy, const char *in, int token_in,
+                         const char *out, int token_out, int text)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    TS_RESP *response = NULL;
+    BIO *in_bio = NULL;
+    BIO *query_bio = NULL;
+    BIO *inkey_bio = NULL;
+    BIO *signer_bio = NULL;
+    BIO *out_bio = NULL;
+
+    if (in != NULL) {
+        if ((in_bio = BIO_new_file(in, "rb")) == NULL)
+            goto end;
+        if (token_in) {
+            response = read_PKCS7(in_bio);
+        } else {
+            response = d2i_TS_RESP_bio(in_bio, NULL);
+        }
+    } else {
+        response = create_response(conf, section, engine, queryfile,
+                                   passin, inkey, md, signer, chain, policy);
+        if (response)
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Response has been generated.\n");
+        else
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Response is not generated.\n");
+    }
+    if (response == NULL)
+        goto end;
+
+    /* Write response. */
+    if (text) {
+        if ((out_bio = bio_open_default(out, 'w', FORMAT_TEXT)) == NULL)
+        goto end;
+        if (token_out) {
+            TS_TST_INFO *tst_info = TS_RESP_get_tst_info(response);
+            if (!TS_TST_INFO_print_bio(out_bio, tst_info))
+                goto end;
+        } else {
+            if (!TS_RESP_print_bio(out_bio, response))
+                goto end;
+        }
+    } else {
+        if ((out_bio = bio_open_default(out, 'w', FORMAT_ASN1)) == NULL)
+            goto end;
+        if (token_out) {
+            PKCS7 *token = TS_RESP_get_token(response);
+            if (!i2d_PKCS7_bio(out_bio, token))
+                goto end;
+        } else {
+            if (!i2d_TS_RESP_bio(out_bio, response))
+                goto end;
+        }
+    }
+
+    ret = 1;
+
+ end:
+    ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+    BIO_free_all(in_bio);
+    BIO_free_all(query_bio);
+    BIO_free_all(inkey_bio);
+    BIO_free_all(signer_bio);
+    BIO_free_all(out_bio);
+    TS_RESP_free(response);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/* Reads a PKCS7 token and adds default 'granted' status info to it. */
+static TS_RESP *read_PKCS7(BIO *in_bio)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    PKCS7 *token = NULL;
+    TS_TST_INFO *tst_info = NULL;
+    TS_RESP *resp = NULL;
+    TS_STATUS_INFO *si = NULL;
+
+    if ((token = d2i_PKCS7_bio(in_bio, NULL)) == NULL)
+        goto end;
+    if ((tst_info = PKCS7_to_TS_TST_INFO(token)) == NULL)
+        goto end;
+    if ((resp = TS_RESP_new()) == NULL)
+        goto end;
+    if ((si = TS_STATUS_INFO_new()) == NULL)
+        goto end;
+    if (!TS_STATUS_INFO_set_status(si, TS_STATUS_GRANTED))
+        goto end;
+    if (!TS_RESP_set_status_info(resp, si))
+        goto end;
+    TS_RESP_set_tst_info(resp, token, tst_info);
+    token = NULL;               /* Ownership is lost. */
+    tst_info = NULL;            /* Ownership is lost. */
+    ret = 1;
+
+ end:
+    PKCS7_free(token);
+    TS_TST_INFO_free(tst_info);
+    if (!ret) {
+        TS_RESP_free(resp);
+        resp = NULL;
+    }
+    TS_STATUS_INFO_free(si);
+    return resp;
+}
+
+static TS_RESP *create_response(CONF *conf, const char *section, const char *engine,
+                                const char *queryfile, const char *passin,
+                                const char *inkey, const EVP_MD *md, const char *signer,
+                                const char *chain, const char *policy)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    TS_RESP *response = NULL;
+    BIO *query_bio = NULL;
+    TS_RESP_CTX *resp_ctx = NULL;
+
+    if ((query_bio = BIO_new_file(queryfile, "rb")) == NULL)
+        goto end;
+    if ((section = TS_CONF_get_tsa_section(conf, section)) == NULL)
+        goto end;
+    if ((resp_ctx = TS_RESP_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+        goto end;
+    if (!TS_CONF_set_serial(conf, section, serial_cb, resp_ctx))
+        goto end;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    if (!TS_CONF_set_crypto_device(conf, section, engine))
+        goto end;
+# endif
+    if (!TS_CONF_set_signer_cert(conf, section, signer, resp_ctx))
+        goto end;
+    if (!TS_CONF_set_certs(conf, section, chain, resp_ctx))
+        goto end;
+    if (!TS_CONF_set_signer_key(conf, section, inkey, passin, resp_ctx))
+        goto end;
+
+    if (md) {
+        if (!TS_RESP_CTX_set_signer_digest(resp_ctx, md))
+            goto end;
+    } else if (!TS_CONF_set_signer_digest(conf, section, NULL, resp_ctx)) {
+            goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (!TS_CONF_set_def_policy(conf, section, policy, resp_ctx))
+        goto end;
+    if (!TS_CONF_set_policies(conf, section, resp_ctx))
+        goto end;
+    if (!TS_CONF_set_digests(conf, section, resp_ctx))
+        goto end;
+    if (!TS_CONF_set_accuracy(conf, section, resp_ctx))
+        goto end;
+    if (!TS_CONF_set_clock_precision_digits(conf, section, resp_ctx))
+        goto end;
+    if (!TS_CONF_set_ordering(conf, section, resp_ctx))
+        goto end;
+    if (!TS_CONF_set_tsa_name(conf, section, resp_ctx))
+        goto end;
+    if (!TS_CONF_set_ess_cert_id_chain(conf, section, resp_ctx))
+        goto end;
+    if ((response = TS_RESP_create_response(resp_ctx, query_bio)) == NULL)
+        goto end;
+    ret = 1;
+
+ end:
+    if (!ret) {
+        TS_RESP_free(response);
+        response = NULL;
+    }
+    TS_RESP_CTX_free(resp_ctx);
+    BIO_free_all(query_bio);
+    return response;
+}
+
+static ASN1_INTEGER *serial_cb(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx, void *data)
+{
+    const char *serial_file = (const char *)data;
+    ASN1_INTEGER *serial = next_serial(serial_file);
+
+    if (!serial) {
+        TS_RESP_CTX_set_status_info(ctx, TS_STATUS_REJECTION,
+                                    "Error during serial number "
+                                    "generation.");
+        TS_RESP_CTX_add_failure_info(ctx, TS_INFO_ADD_INFO_NOT_AVAILABLE);
+    } else
+        save_ts_serial(serial_file, serial);
+
+    return serial;
+}
+
+static ASN1_INTEGER *next_serial(const char *serialfile)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    BIO *in = NULL;
+    ASN1_INTEGER *serial = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *bn = NULL;
+
+    if ((serial = ASN1_INTEGER_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if ((in = BIO_new_file(serialfile, "r")) == NULL) {
+        ERR_clear_error();
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Warning: could not open file %s for "
+                   "reading, using serial number: 1\n", serialfile);
+        if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(serial, 1))
+            goto err;
+    } else {
+        char buf[1024];
+        if (!a2i_ASN1_INTEGER(in, serial, buf, sizeof(buf))) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to load number from %s\n",
+                       serialfile);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if ((bn = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(serial, NULL)) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        ASN1_INTEGER_free(serial);
+        serial = NULL;
+        if (!BN_add_word(bn, 1))
+            goto err;
+        if ((serial = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(bn, NULL)) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+    }
+    ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+    if (!ret) {
+        ASN1_INTEGER_free(serial);
+        serial = NULL;
+    }
+    BIO_free_all(in);
+    BN_free(bn);
+    return serial;
+}
+
+static int save_ts_serial(const char *serialfile, ASN1_INTEGER *serial)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    BIO *out = NULL;
+
+    if ((out = BIO_new_file(serialfile, "w")) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(out, serial) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    if (BIO_puts(out, "\n") <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    if (!ret)
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "could not save serial number to %s\n",
+                   serialfile);
+    BIO_free_all(out);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Verify-related method definitions.
+ */
+
+static int verify_command(const char *data, const char *digest, const char *queryfile,
+                          const char *in, int token_in,
+                          const char *CApath, const char *CAfile, const char *untrusted,
+                          X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm)
+{
+    BIO *in_bio = NULL;
+    PKCS7 *token = NULL;
+    TS_RESP *response = NULL;
+    TS_VERIFY_CTX *verify_ctx = NULL;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    if ((in_bio = BIO_new_file(in, "rb")) == NULL)
+        goto end;
+    if (token_in) {
+        if ((token = d2i_PKCS7_bio(in_bio, NULL)) == NULL)
+            goto end;
+    } else {
+        if ((response = d2i_TS_RESP_bio(in_bio, NULL)) == NULL)
+            goto end;
+    }
+
+    if ((verify_ctx = create_verify_ctx(data, digest, queryfile,
+                                        CApath, CAfile, untrusted,
+                                        vpm)) == NULL)
+        goto end;
+
+    ret = token_in
+        ? TS_RESP_verify_token(verify_ctx, token)
+        : TS_RESP_verify_response(verify_ctx, response);
+
+ end:
+    printf("Verification: ");
+    if (ret)
+        printf("OK\n");
+    else {
+        printf("FAILED\n");
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+    }
+
+    BIO_free_all(in_bio);
+    PKCS7_free(token);
+    TS_RESP_free(response);
+    TS_VERIFY_CTX_free(verify_ctx);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static TS_VERIFY_CTX *create_verify_ctx(const char *data, const char *digest,
+                                        const char *queryfile,
+                                        const char *CApath, const char *CAfile,
+                                        const char *untrusted,
+                                        X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm)
+{
+    TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+    BIO *input = NULL;
+    TS_REQ *request = NULL;
+    int ret = 0;
+    int f = 0;
+
+    if (data != NULL || digest != NULL) {
+        if ((ctx = TS_VERIFY_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        f = TS_VFY_VERSION | TS_VFY_SIGNER;
+        if (data != NULL) {
+            BIO *out = NULL;
+
+            f |= TS_VFY_DATA;
+            if ((out = BIO_new_file(data, "rb")) == NULL)
+                goto err;
+            if (TS_VERIFY_CTX_set_data(ctx, out) == NULL) {
+                BIO_free_all(out);
+                goto err;
+            }
+        } else if (digest != NULL) {
+            long imprint_len;
+            unsigned char *hexstr = OPENSSL_hexstr2buf(digest, &imprint_len);
+            f |= TS_VFY_IMPRINT;
+            if (TS_VERIFY_CTX_set_imprint(ctx, hexstr, imprint_len) == NULL) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "invalid digest string\n");
+                goto err;
+            }
+        }
+
+    } else if (queryfile != NULL) {
+        if ((input = BIO_new_file(queryfile, "rb")) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        if ((request = d2i_TS_REQ_bio(input, NULL)) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        if ((ctx = TS_REQ_to_TS_VERIFY_CTX(request, NULL)) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+    } else
+        return NULL;
+
+    /* Add the signature verification flag and arguments. */
+    TS_VERIFY_CTX_add_flags(ctx, f | TS_VFY_SIGNATURE);
+
+    /* Initialising the X509_STORE object. */
+    if (TS_VERIFY_CTX_set_store(ctx, create_cert_store(CApath, CAfile, vpm))
+            == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* Loading untrusted certificates. */
+    if (untrusted
+        && TS_VERIFY_CTS_set_certs(ctx, TS_CONF_load_certs(untrusted)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+    if (!ret) {
+        TS_VERIFY_CTX_free(ctx);
+        ctx = NULL;
+    }
+    BIO_free_all(input);
+    TS_REQ_free(request);
+    return ctx;
+}
+
+static X509_STORE *create_cert_store(const char *CApath, const char *CAfile,
+                                     X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm)
+{
+    X509_STORE *cert_ctx = NULL;
+    X509_LOOKUP *lookup = NULL;
+    int i;
+
+    cert_ctx = X509_STORE_new();
+    X509_STORE_set_verify_cb(cert_ctx, verify_cb);
+    if (CApath != NULL) {
+        lookup = X509_STORE_add_lookup(cert_ctx, X509_LOOKUP_hash_dir());
+        if (lookup == NULL) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "memory allocation failure\n");
+            goto err;
+        }
+        i = X509_LOOKUP_add_dir(lookup, CApath, X509_FILETYPE_PEM);
+        if (!i) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error loading directory %s\n", CApath);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (CAfile != NULL) {
+        lookup = X509_STORE_add_lookup(cert_ctx, X509_LOOKUP_file());
+        if (lookup == NULL) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "memory allocation failure\n");
+            goto err;
+        }
+        i = X509_LOOKUP_load_file(lookup, CAfile, X509_FILETYPE_PEM);
+        if (!i) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error loading file %s\n", CAfile);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (vpm != NULL)
+        X509_STORE_set1_param(cert_ctx, vpm);
+
+    return cert_ctx;
+
+ err:
+    X509_STORE_free(cert_ctx);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+static int verify_cb(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ok;
+}
+#endif  /* ndef OPENSSL_NO_TS */
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/tsget.in b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/tsget.in
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c6193e5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/tsget.in
@@ -0,0 +1,200 @@
+#!{- $config{hashbangperl} -}
+# Copyright (c) 2002 The OpenTSA Project. All rights reserved.
+# Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+use strict;
+use IO::Handle;
+use Getopt::Std;
+use File::Basename;
+use WWW::Curl::Easy;
+
+use vars qw(%options);
+
+# Callback for reading the body.
+sub read_body {
+    my ($maxlength, $state) = @_;
+    my $return_data = "";
+    my $data_len = length ${$state->{data}};
+    if ($state->{bytes} < $data_len) {
+	$data_len = $data_len - $state->{bytes};
+	$data_len = $maxlength if $data_len > $maxlength;
+	$return_data = substr ${$state->{data}}, $state->{bytes}, $data_len;
+	$state->{bytes} += $data_len;
+    }
+    return $return_data;
+}
+
+# Callback for writing the body into a variable.
+sub write_body {
+    my ($data, $pointer) = @_;
+    ${$pointer} .= $data;
+    return length($data);
+}
+
+# Initialise a new Curl object.
+sub create_curl {
+    my $url = shift;
+
+    # Create Curl object.
+    my $curl = WWW::Curl::Easy::new();
+
+    # Error-handling related options.
+    $curl->setopt(CURLOPT_VERBOSE, 1) if $options{d};
+    $curl->setopt(CURLOPT_FAILONERROR, 1);
+    $curl->setopt(CURLOPT_USERAGENT,
+        "OpenTSA tsget.pl/openssl-{- $config{version} -}");
+
+    # Options for POST method.
+    $curl->setopt(CURLOPT_UPLOAD, 1);
+    $curl->setopt(CURLOPT_CUSTOMREQUEST, "POST");
+    $curl->setopt(CURLOPT_HTTPHEADER,
+		["Content-Type: application/timestamp-query",
+		"Accept: application/timestamp-reply,application/timestamp-response"]);
+    $curl->setopt(CURLOPT_READFUNCTION, \&read_body);
+    $curl->setopt(CURLOPT_HEADERFUNCTION, sub { return length($_[0]); });
+
+    # Options for getting the result.
+    $curl->setopt(CURLOPT_WRITEFUNCTION, \&write_body);
+
+    # SSL related options.
+    $curl->setopt(CURLOPT_SSLKEYTYPE, "PEM");
+    $curl->setopt(CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYPEER, 1);	# Verify server's certificate.
+    $curl->setopt(CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYHOST, 2);	# Check server's CN.
+    $curl->setopt(CURLOPT_SSLKEY, $options{k}) if defined($options{k});
+    $curl->setopt(CURLOPT_SSLKEYPASSWD, $options{p}) if defined($options{p});
+    $curl->setopt(CURLOPT_SSLCERT, $options{c}) if defined($options{c});
+    $curl->setopt(CURLOPT_CAINFO, $options{C}) if defined($options{C});
+    $curl->setopt(CURLOPT_CAPATH, $options{P}) if defined($options{P});
+    $curl->setopt(CURLOPT_RANDOM_FILE, $options{r}) if defined($options{r});
+    $curl->setopt(CURLOPT_EGDSOCKET, $options{g}) if defined($options{g});
+
+    # Setting destination.
+    $curl->setopt(CURLOPT_URL, $url);
+
+    return $curl;
+}
+
+# Send a request and returns the body back.
+sub get_timestamp {
+    my $curl = shift;
+    my $body = shift;
+    my $ts_body;
+    local $::error_buf;
+
+    # Error-handling related options.
+    $curl->setopt(CURLOPT_ERRORBUFFER, "::error_buf");
+
+    # Options for POST method.
+    $curl->setopt(CURLOPT_INFILE, {data => $body, bytes => 0});
+    $curl->setopt(CURLOPT_INFILESIZE, length(${$body}));
+
+    # Options for getting the result.
+    $curl->setopt(CURLOPT_FILE, \$ts_body);
+
+    # Send the request...
+    my $error_code = $curl->perform();
+    my $error_string;
+    if ($error_code != 0) {
+        my $http_code = $curl->getinfo(CURLINFO_HTTP_CODE);
+	$error_string = "could not get timestamp";
+	$error_string .= ", http code: $http_code" unless $http_code == 0;
+	$error_string .= ", curl code: $error_code";
+	$error_string .= " ($::error_buf)" if defined($::error_buf);
+    } else {
+        my $ct = $curl->getinfo(CURLINFO_CONTENT_TYPE);
+	if (lc($ct) ne "application/timestamp-reply"
+	    && lc($ct) ne "application/timestamp-response") {
+	    $error_string = "unexpected content type returned: $ct";
+        }
+    }
+    return ($ts_body, $error_string);
+
+}
+
+# Print usage information and exists.
+sub usage {
+
+    print STDERR "usage: $0 -h <server_url> [-e <extension>] [-o <output>] ";
+    print STDERR "[-v] [-d] [-k <private_key.pem>] [-p <key_password>] ";
+    print STDERR "[-c <client_cert.pem>] [-C <CA_certs.pem>] [-P <CA_path>] ";
+    print STDERR "[-r <file:file...>] [-g <EGD_socket>] [<request>]...\n";
+    exit 1;
+}
+
+# ----------------------------------------------------------------------
+#   Main program
+# ----------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+# Getting command-line options (default comes from TSGET environment variable).
+my $getopt_arg =  "h:e:o:vdk:p:c:C:P:r:g:";
+if (exists $ENV{TSGET}) {
+    my @old_argv = @ARGV;
+    @ARGV = split /\s+/, $ENV{TSGET};
+    getopts($getopt_arg, \%options) or usage;
+    @ARGV = @old_argv;
+}
+getopts($getopt_arg, \%options) or usage;
+
+# Checking argument consistency.
+if (!exists($options{h}) || (@ARGV == 0 && !exists($options{o}))
+    || (@ARGV > 1 && exists($options{o}))) {
+    print STDERR "Inconsistent command line options.\n";
+    usage;
+}
+# Setting defaults.
+@ARGV = ("-") unless @ARGV != 0;
+$options{e} = ".tsr" unless defined($options{e});
+
+# Processing requests.
+my $curl = create_curl $options{h};
+undef $/;   # For reading whole files.
+REQUEST: foreach (@ARGV) {
+    my $input = $_;
+    my ($base, $path) = fileparse($input, '\.[^.]*');
+    my $output_base = $base . $options{e};
+    my $output = defined($options{o}) ? $options{o} : $path . $output_base;
+
+    STDERR->printflush("$input: ") if $options{v};
+    # Read request.
+    my $body;
+    if ($input eq "-") {
+	# Read the request from STDIN;
+	$body = <STDIN>;
+    } else {
+	# Read the request from file.
+        open INPUT, "<" . $input
+	    or warn("$input: could not open input file: $!\n"), next REQUEST;
+        $body = <INPUT>;
+        close INPUT
+	    or warn("$input: could not close input file: $!\n"), next REQUEST;
+    }
+
+    # Send request.
+    STDERR->printflush("sending request") if $options{v};
+
+    my ($ts_body, $error) = get_timestamp $curl, \$body;
+    if (defined($error)) {
+	die "$input: fatal error: $error\n";
+    }
+    STDERR->printflush(", reply received") if $options{v};
+
+    # Write response.
+    if ($output eq "-") {
+	# Write to STDOUT.
+        print $ts_body;
+    } else {
+	# Write to file.
+        open OUTPUT, ">", $output
+	    or warn("$output: could not open output file: $!\n"), next REQUEST;
+        print OUTPUT $ts_body;
+        close OUTPUT
+	    or warn("$output: could not close output file: $!\n"), next REQUEST;
+    }
+    STDERR->printflush(", $output written.\n") if $options{v};
+}
+$curl->cleanup();
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/verify.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/verify.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0925ee6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/verify.c
@@ -0,0 +1,312 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include "apps.h"
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+
+static int cb(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+static int check(X509_STORE *ctx, const char *file,
+                 STACK_OF(X509) *uchain, STACK_OF(X509) *tchain,
+                 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls, int show_chain);
+static int v_verbose = 0, vflags = 0;
+
+typedef enum OPTION_choice {
+    OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP,
+    OPT_ENGINE, OPT_CAPATH, OPT_CAFILE, OPT_NOCAPATH, OPT_NOCAFILE,
+    OPT_UNTRUSTED, OPT_TRUSTED, OPT_CRLFILE, OPT_CRL_DOWNLOAD, OPT_SHOW_CHAIN,
+    OPT_V_ENUM,
+    OPT_VERBOSE
+} OPTION_CHOICE;
+
+OPTIONS verify_options[] = {
+    {OPT_HELP_STR, 1, '-', "Usage: %s [options] cert.pem...\n"},
+    {OPT_HELP_STR, 1, '-', "Valid options are:\n"},
+    {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"},
+    {"verbose", OPT_VERBOSE, '-',
+        "Print extra information about the operations being performed."},
+    {"CApath", OPT_CAPATH, '/', "A directory of trusted certificates"},
+    {"CAfile", OPT_CAFILE, '<', "A file of trusted certificates"},
+    {"no-CAfile", OPT_NOCAFILE, '-',
+     "Do not load the default certificates file"},
+    {"no-CApath", OPT_NOCAPATH, '-',
+     "Do not load certificates from the default certificates directory"},
+    {"untrusted", OPT_UNTRUSTED, '<', "A file of untrusted certificates"},
+    {"trusted", OPT_TRUSTED, '<', "A file of trusted certificates"},
+    {"CRLfile", OPT_CRLFILE, '<',
+        "File containing one or more CRL's (in PEM format) to load"},
+    {"crl_download", OPT_CRL_DOWNLOAD, '-',
+        "Attempt to download CRL information for this certificate"},
+    {"show_chain", OPT_SHOW_CHAIN, '-',
+        "Display information about the certificate chain"},
+    OPT_V_OPTIONS,
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine, possibly a hardware device"},
+#endif
+    {NULL}
+};
+
+int verify_main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    ENGINE *e = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(X509) *untrusted = NULL, *trusted = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls = NULL;
+    X509_STORE *store = NULL;
+    X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = NULL;
+    const char *prog, *CApath = NULL, *CAfile = NULL;
+    int noCApath = 0, noCAfile = 0;
+    int vpmtouched = 0, crl_download = 0, show_chain = 0, i = 0, ret = 1;
+    OPTION_CHOICE o;
+
+    if ((vpm = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new()) == NULL)
+        goto end;
+
+    prog = opt_init(argc, argv, verify_options);
+    while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) {
+        switch (o) {
+        case OPT_EOF:
+        case OPT_ERR:
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog);
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_HELP:
+            opt_help(verify_options);
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Recognized usages:\n");
+            for (i = 0; i < X509_PURPOSE_get_count(); i++) {
+                X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
+                ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(i);
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "\t%-10s\t%s\n",
+                        X509_PURPOSE_get0_sname(ptmp),
+                        X509_PURPOSE_get0_name(ptmp));
+            }
+
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Recognized verify names:\n");
+            for (i = 0; i < X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_count(); i++) {
+                const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vptmp;
+                vptmp = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0(i);
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "\t%-10s\n",
+                        X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_name(vptmp));
+            }
+            ret = 0;
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_V_CASES:
+            if (!opt_verify(o, vpm))
+                goto end;
+            vpmtouched++;
+            break;
+        case OPT_CAPATH:
+            CApath = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_CAFILE:
+            CAfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_NOCAPATH:
+            noCApath = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NOCAFILE:
+            noCAfile = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_UNTRUSTED:
+            /* Zero or more times */
+            if (!load_certs(opt_arg(), &untrusted, FORMAT_PEM, NULL,
+                            "untrusted certificates"))
+                goto end;
+            break;
+        case OPT_TRUSTED:
+            /* Zero or more times */
+            noCAfile = 1;
+            noCApath = 1;
+            if (!load_certs(opt_arg(), &trusted, FORMAT_PEM, NULL,
+                            "trusted certificates"))
+                goto end;
+            break;
+        case OPT_CRLFILE:
+            /* Zero or more times */
+            if (!load_crls(opt_arg(), &crls, FORMAT_PEM, NULL,
+                           "other CRLs"))
+                goto end;
+            break;
+        case OPT_CRL_DOWNLOAD:
+            crl_download = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_ENGINE:
+            if ((e = setup_engine(opt_arg(), 0)) == NULL) {
+                /* Failure message already displayed */
+                goto end;
+            }
+            break;
+        case OPT_SHOW_CHAIN:
+            show_chain = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_VERBOSE:
+            v_verbose = 1;
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    argc = opt_num_rest();
+    argv = opt_rest();
+    if (trusted != NULL && (CAfile || CApath)) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                   "%s: Cannot use -trusted with -CAfile or -CApath\n",
+                   prog);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if ((store = setup_verify(CAfile, CApath, noCAfile, noCApath)) == NULL)
+        goto end;
+    X509_STORE_set_verify_cb(store, cb);
+
+    if (vpmtouched)
+        X509_STORE_set1_param(store, vpm);
+
+    ERR_clear_error();
+
+    if (crl_download)
+        store_setup_crl_download(store);
+
+    ret = 0;
+    if (argc < 1) {
+        if (check(store, NULL, untrusted, trusted, crls, show_chain) != 1)
+            ret = -1;
+    } else {
+        for (i = 0; i < argc; i++)
+            if (check(store, argv[i], untrusted, trusted, crls,
+                      show_chain) != 1)
+                ret = -1;
+    }
+
+ end:
+    X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(vpm);
+    X509_STORE_free(store);
+    sk_X509_pop_free(untrusted, X509_free);
+    sk_X509_pop_free(trusted, X509_free);
+    sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(crls, X509_CRL_free);
+    release_engine(e);
+    return (ret < 0 ? 2 : ret);
+}
+
+static int check(X509_STORE *ctx, const char *file,
+                 STACK_OF(X509) *uchain, STACK_OF(X509) *tchain,
+                 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls, int show_chain)
+{
+    X509 *x = NULL;
+    int i = 0, ret = 0;
+    X509_STORE_CTX *csc;
+    STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
+    int num_untrusted;
+
+    x = load_cert(file, FORMAT_PEM, "certificate file");
+    if (x == NULL)
+        goto end;
+
+    csc = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
+    if (csc == NULL) {
+        printf("error %s: X.509 store context allocation failed\n",
+               (file == NULL) ? "stdin" : file);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    X509_STORE_set_flags(ctx, vflags);
+    if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(csc, ctx, x, uchain)) {
+        printf("error %s: X.509 store context initialization failed\n",
+               (file == NULL) ? "stdin" : file);
+        goto end;
+    }
+    if (tchain)
+        X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(csc, tchain);
+    if (crls)
+        X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(csc, crls);
+    i = X509_verify_cert(csc);
+    if (i > 0 && X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(csc) == X509_V_OK) {
+        printf("%s: OK\n", (file == NULL) ? "stdin" : file);
+        ret = 1;
+        if (show_chain) {
+            int j;
+
+            chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(csc);
+            num_untrusted = X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted(csc);
+            printf("Chain:\n");
+            for (j = 0; j < sk_X509_num(chain); j++) {
+                X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(chain, j);
+                printf("depth=%d: ", j);
+                X509_NAME_print_ex_fp(stdout,
+                                      X509_get_subject_name(cert),
+                                      0, XN_FLAG_ONELINE);
+                if (j < num_untrusted)
+                    printf(" (untrusted)");
+                printf("\n");
+            }
+            sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free);
+        }
+    } else {
+        printf("error %s: verification failed\n", (file == NULL) ? "stdin" : file);
+    }
+    X509_STORE_CTX_free(csc);
+
+ end:
+    if (i <= 0)
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+    X509_free(x);
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int cb(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int cert_error = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
+    X509 *current_cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx);
+
+    if (!ok) {
+        if (current_cert) {
+            X509_NAME_print_ex(bio_err,
+                            X509_get_subject_name(current_cert),
+                            0, XN_FLAG_ONELINE);
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n");
+        }
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "%serror %d at %d depth lookup: %s\n",
+               X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(ctx) ? "[CRL path] " : "",
+               cert_error,
+               X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx),
+               X509_verify_cert_error_string(cert_error));
+        switch (cert_error) {
+        case X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY:
+            policies_print(ctx);
+            /* fall thru */
+        case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
+
+            /*
+             * since we are just checking the certificates, it is ok if they
+             * are self signed. But we should still warn the user.
+             */
+        case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT:
+            /* Continue after extension errors too */
+        case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA:
+        case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA:
+        case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED:
+        case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE:
+        case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED:
+        case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID:
+        case X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION:
+            ok = 1;
+        }
+
+        return ok;
+
+    }
+    if (cert_error == X509_V_OK && ok == 2)
+        policies_print(ctx);
+    if (!v_verbose)
+        ERR_clear_error();
+    return (ok);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/version.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/version.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2f8be36
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/version.c
@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include "apps.h"
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD2
+# include <openssl/md2.h>
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
+# include <openssl/rc4.h>
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
+# include <openssl/des.h>
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_IDEA
+# include <openssl/idea.h>
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BF
+# include <openssl/blowfish.h>
+#endif
+
+typedef enum OPTION_choice {
+    OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP,
+    OPT_B, OPT_D, OPT_E, OPT_F, OPT_O, OPT_P, OPT_V, OPT_A
+} OPTION_CHOICE;
+
+OPTIONS version_options[] = {
+    {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"},
+    {"a", OPT_A, '-', "Show all data"},
+    {"b", OPT_B, '-', "Show build date"},
+    {"d", OPT_D, '-', "Show configuration directory"},
+    {"e", OPT_E, '-', "Show engines directory"},
+    {"f", OPT_F, '-', "Show compiler flags used"},
+    {"o", OPT_O, '-', "Show some internal datatype options"},
+    {"p", OPT_P, '-', "Show target build platform"},
+    {"v", OPT_V, '-', "Show library version"},
+    {NULL}
+};
+
+int version_main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    int ret = 1, dirty = 0;
+    int cflags = 0, version = 0, date = 0, options = 0, platform = 0, dir = 0;
+    int engdir = 0;
+    char *prog;
+    OPTION_CHOICE o;
+
+    prog = opt_init(argc, argv, version_options);
+    while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) {
+        switch (o) {
+        case OPT_EOF:
+        case OPT_ERR:
+opthelp:
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog);
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_HELP:
+            opt_help(version_options);
+            ret = 0;
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_B:
+            dirty = date = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_D:
+            dirty = dir = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_E:
+            dirty = engdir = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_F:
+            dirty = cflags = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_O:
+            dirty = options = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_P:
+            dirty = platform = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_V:
+            dirty = version = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_A:
+            options = cflags = version = date = platform = dir = engdir = 1;
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    if (opt_num_rest() != 0) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Extra parameters given.\n");
+        goto opthelp;
+    }
+    if (!dirty)
+        version = 1;
+
+    if (version) {
+        if (OpenSSL_version_num() == OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER) {
+            printf("%s\n", OpenSSL_version(OPENSSL_VERSION));
+        } else {
+            printf("%s (Library: %s)\n",
+                   OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT, OpenSSL_version(OPENSSL_VERSION));
+        }
+    }
+    if (date)
+        printf("%s\n", OpenSSL_version(OPENSSL_BUILT_ON));
+    if (platform)
+        printf("%s\n", OpenSSL_version(OPENSSL_PLATFORM));
+    if (options) {
+        printf("options:  ");
+        printf("%s ", BN_options());
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD2
+        printf("%s ", MD2_options());
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
+        printf("%s ", RC4_options());
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
+        printf("%s ", DES_options());
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_IDEA
+        printf("%s ", IDEA_options());
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BF
+        printf("%s ", BF_options());
+#endif
+        printf("\n");
+    }
+    if (cflags)
+        printf("%s\n", OpenSSL_version(OPENSSL_CFLAGS));
+    if (dir)
+        printf("%s\n", OpenSSL_version(OPENSSL_DIR));
+    if (engdir)
+        printf("%s\n", OpenSSL_version(OPENSSL_ENGINES_DIR));
+    ret = 0;
+ end:
+    return (ret);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/vms_decc_init.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/vms_decc_init.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f83f716
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/vms_decc_init.c
@@ -0,0 +1,214 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2010-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#if defined( __VMS) && !defined( OPENSSL_NO_DECC_INIT) && \
+ defined( __DECC) && !defined( __VAX) && (__CRTL_VER >= 70301000)
+# define USE_DECC_INIT 1
+#endif
+
+#ifdef USE_DECC_INIT
+
+/*
+ * ----------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * decc_init() On non-VAX systems, uses LIB$INITIALIZE to set a collection
+ * of C RTL features without using the DECC$* logical name method.
+ * ----------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+# include <stdio.h>
+# include <stdlib.h>
+# include <unixlib.h>
+
+# include "apps.h"
+
+/* Global storage. */
+
+/* Flag to sense if decc_init() was called. */
+
+int decc_init_done = -1;
+
+/* Structure to hold a DECC$* feature name and its desired value. */
+
+typedef struct {
+    char *name;
+    int value;
+} decc_feat_t;
+
+/*
+ * Array of DECC$* feature names and their desired values. Note:
+ * DECC$ARGV_PARSE_STYLE is the urgent one.
+ */
+
+decc_feat_t decc_feat_array[] = {
+    /* Preserve command-line case with SET PROCESS/PARSE_STYLE=EXTENDED */
+    {"DECC$ARGV_PARSE_STYLE", 1},
+
+    /* Preserve case for file names on ODS5 disks. */
+    {"DECC$EFS_CASE_PRESERVE", 1},
+
+    /*
+     * Enable multiple dots (and most characters) in ODS5 file names, while
+     * preserving VMS-ness of ";version".
+     */
+    {"DECC$EFS_CHARSET", 1},
+
+    /* List terminator. */
+    {(char *)NULL, 0}
+};
+
+
+char **copy_argv(int *argc, char *argv[])
+{
+    /*-
+     * The note below is for historical purpose.  On VMS now we always
+     * copy argv "safely."
+     *
+     * 2011-03-22 SMS.
+     * If we have 32-bit pointers everywhere, then we're safe, and
+     * we bypass this mess, as on non-VMS systems.
+     * Problem 1: Compaq/HP C before V7.3 always used 32-bit
+     * pointers for argv[].
+     * Fix 1: For a 32-bit argv[], when we're using 64-bit pointers
+     * everywhere else, we always allocate and use a 64-bit
+     * duplicate of argv[].
+     * Problem 2: Compaq/HP C V7.3 (Alpha, IA64) before ECO1 failed
+     * to NULL-terminate a 64-bit argv[].  (As this was written, the
+     * compiler ECO was available only on IA64.)
+     * Fix 2: Unless advised not to (VMS_TRUST_ARGV), we test a
+     * 64-bit argv[argc] for NULL, and, if necessary, use a
+     * (properly) NULL-terminated (64-bit) duplicate of argv[].
+     * The same code is used in either case to duplicate argv[].
+     * Some of these decisions could be handled in preprocessing,
+     * but the code tends to get even uglier, and the penalty for
+     * deciding at compile- or run-time is tiny.
+     */
+
+    int i, count = *argc;
+    char **newargv = app_malloc(sizeof(*newargv) * (count + 1), "argv copy");
+
+    for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
+        newargv[i] = argv[i];
+    newargv[i] = NULL;
+    *argc = i;
+    return newargv;
+}
+
+/* LIB$INITIALIZE initialization function. */
+
+static void decc_init(void)
+{
+    char *openssl_debug_decc_init;
+    int verbose = 0;
+    int feat_index;
+    int feat_value;
+    int feat_value_max;
+    int feat_value_min;
+    int i;
+    int sts;
+
+    /* Get debug option. */
+    openssl_debug_decc_init = getenv("OPENSSL_DEBUG_DECC_INIT");
+    if (openssl_debug_decc_init != NULL) {
+        verbose = strtol(openssl_debug_decc_init, NULL, 10);
+        if (verbose <= 0) {
+            verbose = 1;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* Set the global flag to indicate that LIB$INITIALIZE worked. */
+    decc_init_done = 1;
+
+    /* Loop through all items in the decc_feat_array[]. */
+
+    for (i = 0; decc_feat_array[i].name != NULL; i++) {
+        /* Get the feature index. */
+        feat_index = decc$feature_get_index(decc_feat_array[i].name);
+        if (feat_index >= 0) {
+            /* Valid item.  Collect its properties. */
+            feat_value = decc$feature_get_value(feat_index, 1);
+            feat_value_min = decc$feature_get_value(feat_index, 2);
+            feat_value_max = decc$feature_get_value(feat_index, 3);
+
+            /* Check the validity of our desired value. */
+            if ((decc_feat_array[i].value >= feat_value_min) &&
+                (decc_feat_array[i].value <= feat_value_max)) {
+                /* Valid value.  Set it if necessary. */
+                if (feat_value != decc_feat_array[i].value) {
+                    sts = decc$feature_set_value(feat_index,
+                                                 1, decc_feat_array[i].value);
+
+                    if (verbose > 1) {
+                        fprintf(stderr, " %s = %d, sts = %d.\n",
+                                decc_feat_array[i].name,
+                                decc_feat_array[i].value, sts);
+                    }
+                }
+            } else {
+                /* Invalid DECC feature value. */
+                fprintf(stderr,
+                        " INVALID DECC$FEATURE VALUE, %d: %d <= %s <= %d.\n",
+                        feat_value,
+                        feat_value_min, decc_feat_array[i].name,
+                        feat_value_max);
+            }
+        } else {
+            /* Invalid DECC feature name. */
+            fprintf(stderr,
+                    " UNKNOWN DECC$FEATURE: %s.\n", decc_feat_array[i].name);
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (verbose > 0) {
+        fprintf(stderr, " DECC_INIT complete.\n");
+    }
+}
+
+/* Get "decc_init()" into a valid, loaded LIB$INITIALIZE PSECT. */
+
+# pragma nostandard
+
+/*
+ * Establish the LIB$INITIALIZE PSECTs, with proper alignment and other
+ * attributes.  Note that "nopic" is significant only on VAX.
+ */
+# pragma extern_model save
+
+# if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64
+#  define PSECT_ALIGN 3
+# else
+#  define PSECT_ALIGN 2
+# endif
+
+# pragma extern_model strict_refdef "LIB$INITIALIZ" PSECT_ALIGN, nopic, nowrt
+const int spare[8] = { 0 };
+
+# pragma extern_model strict_refdef "LIB$INITIALIZE" PSECT_ALIGN, nopic, nowrt
+void (*const x_decc_init) () = decc_init;
+
+# pragma extern_model restore
+
+/* Fake reference to ensure loading the LIB$INITIALIZE PSECT. */
+
+# pragma extern_model save
+
+int LIB$INITIALIZE(void);
+
+# pragma extern_model strict_refdef
+int dmy_lib$initialize = (int)LIB$INITIALIZE;
+
+# pragma extern_model restore
+
+# pragma standard
+
+#else                           /* def USE_DECC_INIT */
+
+/* Dummy code to avoid a %CC-W-EMPTYFILE complaint. */
+int decc_init_dummy(void);
+
+#endif                          /* def USE_DECC_INIT */
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/vms_term_sock.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/vms_term_sock.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bc0c173
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/vms_term_sock.c
@@ -0,0 +1,590 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 VMS Software, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifdef __VMS
+# define OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+# pragma message disable DOLLARID
+
+
+# include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+
+# if !defined(_POSIX_C_SOURCE) && defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
+/*
+ * On VMS, you need to define this to get the declaration of fileno().  The
+ * value 2 is to make sure no function defined in POSIX-2 is left undefined.
+ */
+#  define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 2
+# endif
+
+# include <stdio.h>
+
+# undef _POSIX_C_SOURCE
+
+# include <sys/types.h>
+# include <sys/socket.h>
+# include <netinet/in.h>
+# include <inet.h>
+# include <unistd.h>
+# include <string.h>
+# include <errno.h>
+# include <starlet.h>
+# include <iodef.h>
+# ifdef __alpha
+#  include <iosbdef.h>
+# else
+typedef struct _iosb {           /* Copied from IOSBDEF.H for Alpha  */
+#  pragma __nomember_alignment
+    __union  {
+        __struct  {
+            unsigned short int iosb$w_status; /* Final I/O status           */
+            __union  {
+                __struct  {             /* 16-bit byte count variant        */
+                    unsigned short int iosb$w_bcnt; /* 16-bit byte count    */
+                    __union  {
+                        unsigned int iosb$l_dev_depend; /* 32-bit device dependent info */
+                        unsigned int iosb$l_pid; /* 32-bit pid              */
+                    } iosb$r_l;
+                } iosb$r_bcnt_16;
+                __struct  {             /* 32-bit byte count variant        */
+                    unsigned int iosb$l_bcnt; /* 32-bit byte count (unaligned) */
+                    unsigned short int iosb$w_dev_depend_high; /* 16-bit device dependent info */
+                } iosb$r_bcnt_32;
+            } iosb$r_devdepend;
+        } iosb$r_io_64;
+        __struct  {
+            __union  {
+                unsigned int iosb$l_getxxi_status; /* Final GETxxI status   */
+                unsigned int iosb$l_reg_status; /* Final $Registry status   */
+            } iosb$r_l_status;
+            unsigned int iosb$l_reserved; /* Reserved field                 */
+        } iosb$r_get_64;
+    } iosb$r_io_get;
+} IOSB;
+
+#  if !defined(__VAXC)
+#   define iosb$w_status iosb$r_io_get.iosb$r_io_64.iosb$w_status
+#   define iosb$w_bcnt iosb$r_io_get.iosb$r_io_64.iosb$r_devdepend.iosb$r_bcnt_16.iosb$w_bcnt
+#   define iosb$r_l        iosb$r_io_get.iosb$r_io_64.iosb$r_devdepend.iosb$r_bcnt_16.iosb$r_l
+#   define iosb$l_dev_depend iosb$r_l.iosb$l_dev_depend
+#   define iosb$l_pid iosb$r_l.iosb$l_pid
+#   define iosb$l_bcnt iosb$r_io_get.iosb$r_io_64.iosb$r_devdepend.iosb$r_bcnt_32.iosb$l_bcnt
+#   define iosb$w_dev_depend_high iosb$r_io_get.iosb$r_io_64.iosb$r_devdepend.iosb$r_bcnt_32.iosb$w_dev_depend_high
+#   define iosb$l_getxxi_status iosb$r_io_get.iosb$r_get_64.iosb$r_l_status.iosb$l_getxxi_status
+#   define iosb$l_reg_status iosb$r_io_get.iosb$r_get_64.iosb$r_l_status.iosb$l_reg_status
+#  endif          /* #if !defined(__VAXC) */
+
+# endif  /* End of IOSBDEF */
+
+# include <efndef.h>
+# include <stdlib.h>
+# include <ssdef.h>
+# include <time.h>
+# include <stdarg.h>
+# include <descrip.h>
+
+# include "vms_term_sock.h"
+
+# ifdef __alpha
+static struct _iosb TerminalDeviceIosb;
+# else
+IOSB TerminalDeviceIosb;
+# endif
+
+static char TerminalDeviceBuff[255 + 2];
+static int TerminalSocketPair[2] = {0, 0};
+static unsigned short TerminalDeviceChan = 0;
+
+static int CreateSocketPair (int, int, int, int *);
+static void SocketPairTimeoutAst (int);
+static int TerminalDeviceAst (int);
+static void LogMessage (char *, ...);
+
+/*
+** Socket Pair Timeout Value (must be 0-59 seconds)
+*/
+# define SOCKET_PAIR_TIMEOUT_VALUE 20
+
+/*
+** Socket Pair Timeout Block which is passed to timeout AST
+*/
+typedef struct _SocketPairTimeoutBlock {
+    unsigned short SockChan1;
+    unsigned short SockChan2;
+} SPTB;
+
+# ifdef TERM_SOCK_TEST
+
+/*----------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
+/*                                                                            */
+/*----------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
+int main (int argc, char *argv[], char *envp[])
+{
+    char TermBuff[80];
+    int TermSock,
+        status,
+        len;
+
+    LogMessage ("Enter 'q' or 'Q' to quit ...");
+    while (strcasecmp (TermBuff, "Q")) {
+        /*
+        ** Create the terminal socket
+        */
+        status = TerminalSocket (TERM_SOCK_CREATE, &TermSock);
+        if (status != TERM_SOCK_SUCCESS)
+            exit (1);
+
+        /*
+        ** Process the terminal input
+        */
+        LogMessage ("Waiting on terminal I/O ...\n");
+        len = recv (TermSock, TermBuff, sizeof(TermBuff), 0) ;
+        TermBuff[len] = '\0';
+        LogMessage ("Received terminal I/O [%s]", TermBuff);
+
+        /*
+        ** Delete the terminal socket
+        */
+        status = TerminalSocket (TERM_SOCK_DELETE, &TermSock);
+        if (status != TERM_SOCK_SUCCESS)
+            exit (1);
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+
+}
+# endif
+
+/*----------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
+/*                                                                            */
+/*----------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
+int TerminalSocket (int FunctionCode, int *ReturnSocket)
+{
+    int status;
+    $DESCRIPTOR (TerminalDeviceDesc, "SYS$COMMAND");
+
+    /*
+    ** Process the requested function code
+    */
+    switch (FunctionCode) {
+    case TERM_SOCK_CREATE:
+        /*
+        ** Create a socket pair
+        */
+        status = CreateSocketPair (AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0, TerminalSocketPair);
+        if (status == -1) {
+            LogMessage ("TerminalSocket: CreateSocketPair () - %08X", status);
+            if (TerminalSocketPair[0])
+                close (TerminalSocketPair[0]);
+            if (TerminalSocketPair[1])
+                close (TerminalSocketPair[1]);
+            return (TERM_SOCK_FAILURE);
+        }
+
+        /*
+        ** Assign a channel to the terminal device
+        */
+        status = sys$assign (&TerminalDeviceDesc,
+                             &TerminalDeviceChan,
+                             0, 0, 0);
+        if (! (status & 1)) {
+            LogMessage ("TerminalSocket: SYS$ASSIGN () - %08X", status);
+            close (TerminalSocketPair[0]);
+            close (TerminalSocketPair[1]);
+            return (TERM_SOCK_FAILURE);
+        }
+
+        /*
+        ** Queue an async IO to the terminal device
+        */
+        status = sys$qio (EFN$C_ENF,
+                          TerminalDeviceChan,
+                          IO$_READVBLK,
+                          &TerminalDeviceIosb,
+                          TerminalDeviceAst,
+                          0,
+                          TerminalDeviceBuff,
+                          sizeof(TerminalDeviceBuff) - 2,
+                          0, 0, 0, 0);
+        if (! (status & 1)) {
+            LogMessage ("TerminalSocket: SYS$QIO () - %08X", status);
+            close (TerminalSocketPair[0]);
+            close (TerminalSocketPair[1]);
+            return (TERM_SOCK_FAILURE);
+        }
+
+        /*
+        ** Return the input side of the socket pair
+        */
+        *ReturnSocket = TerminalSocketPair[1];
+        break;
+
+    case TERM_SOCK_DELETE:
+        /*
+        ** Cancel any pending IO on the terminal channel
+        */
+        status = sys$cancel (TerminalDeviceChan);
+        if (! (status & 1)) {
+            LogMessage ("TerminalSocket: SYS$CANCEL () - %08X", status);
+            close (TerminalSocketPair[0]);
+            close (TerminalSocketPair[1]);
+            return (TERM_SOCK_FAILURE);
+        }
+
+        /*
+	** Deassign the terminal channel
+	*/
+        status = sys$dassgn (TerminalDeviceChan);
+        if (! (status & 1)) {
+            LogMessage ("TerminalSocket: SYS$DASSGN () - %08X", status);
+            close (TerminalSocketPair[0]);
+            close (TerminalSocketPair[1]);
+            return (TERM_SOCK_FAILURE);
+        }
+
+        /*
+        ** Close the terminal socket pair
+        */
+        close (TerminalSocketPair[0]);
+        close (TerminalSocketPair[1]);
+
+        /*
+	** Return the initialized socket
+	*/
+        *ReturnSocket = 0;
+        break;
+
+    default:
+        /*
+	** Invalid function code
+	*/
+        LogMessage ("TerminalSocket: Invalid Function Code - %d", FunctionCode);
+        return (TERM_SOCK_FAILURE);
+        break;
+    }
+
+    /*
+    ** Return success
+    */
+    return (TERM_SOCK_SUCCESS);
+
+}
+
+/*----------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
+/*                                                                            */
+/*----------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
+static int CreateSocketPair (int SocketFamily,
+                             int SocketType,
+                             int SocketProtocol,
+                             int *SocketPair)
+{
+    struct dsc$descriptor AscTimeDesc = {0, DSC$K_DTYPE_T, DSC$K_CLASS_S, NULL};
+    static const char* LocalHostAddr = {"127.0.0.1"};
+    unsigned short TcpAcceptChan = 0,
+        TcpDeviceChan = 0;
+    unsigned long BinTimeBuff[2];
+    struct sockaddr_in sin;
+    char AscTimeBuff[32];
+    short LocalHostPort;
+    int status;
+    unsigned int slen;
+
+# ifdef __alpha
+    struct _iosb iosb;
+# else
+    IOSB iosb;
+# endif
+
+    int SockDesc1 = 0,
+        SockDesc2 = 0;
+    SPTB sptb;
+    $DESCRIPTOR (TcpDeviceDesc, "TCPIP$DEVICE");
+
+    /*
+    ** Create a socket
+    */
+    SockDesc1 = socket (SocketFamily, SocketType, 0);
+    if (SockDesc1 < 0) {
+        LogMessage ("CreateSocketPair: socket () - %d", errno);
+        return (-1);
+    }
+
+    /*
+    ** Initialize the socket information
+    */
+    slen = sizeof(sin);
+    memset ((char *) &sin, 0, slen);
+    sin.sin_family = SocketFamily;
+    sin.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr (LocalHostAddr);
+    sin.sin_port = 0;
+
+    /*
+    ** Bind the socket to the local IP
+    */
+    status = bind (SockDesc1, (struct sockaddr *) &sin, slen);
+    if (status < 0) {
+        LogMessage ("CreateSocketPair: bind () - %d", errno);
+        close (SockDesc1);
+        return (-1);
+    }
+
+    /*
+    ** Get the socket name so we can save the port number
+    */
+    status = getsockname (SockDesc1, (struct sockaddr *) &sin, &slen);
+    if (status < 0) {
+        LogMessage ("CreateSocketPair: getsockname () - %d", errno);
+        close (SockDesc1);
+        return (-1);
+    } else
+        LocalHostPort = sin.sin_port;
+
+    /*
+    ** Setup a listen for the socket
+    */
+    listen (SockDesc1, 5);
+
+    /*
+    ** Get the binary (64-bit) time of the specified timeout value
+    */
+    sprintf (AscTimeBuff, "0 0:0:%02d.00", SOCKET_PAIR_TIMEOUT_VALUE);
+    AscTimeDesc.dsc$w_length = strlen (AscTimeBuff);
+    AscTimeDesc.dsc$a_pointer = AscTimeBuff;
+    status = sys$bintim (&AscTimeDesc, BinTimeBuff);
+    if (! (status & 1)) {
+        LogMessage ("CreateSocketPair: SYS$BINTIM () - %08X", status);
+        close (SockDesc1);
+        return (-1);
+    }
+
+    /*
+    ** Assign another channel to the TCP/IP device for the accept.
+    ** This is the channel that ends up being connected to.
+    */
+    status = sys$assign (&TcpDeviceDesc, &TcpDeviceChan, 0, 0, 0);
+    if (! (status & 1)) {
+        LogMessage ("CreateSocketPair: SYS$ASSIGN () - %08X", status);
+        close (SockDesc1);
+        return (-1);
+    }
+
+    /*
+    ** Get the channel of the first socket for the accept
+    */
+    TcpAcceptChan = decc$get_sdc (SockDesc1);
+
+    /*
+    ** Perform the accept using $QIO so we can do this asynchronously
+    */
+    status = sys$qio (EFN$C_ENF,
+                      TcpAcceptChan,
+                      IO$_ACCESS | IO$M_ACCEPT,
+                      &iosb,
+                      0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+                      &TcpDeviceChan,
+                      0, 0);
+    if (! (status & 1)) {
+        LogMessage ("CreateSocketPair: SYS$QIO () - %08X", status);
+        close (SockDesc1);
+        sys$dassgn (TcpDeviceChan);
+        return (-1);
+    }
+
+    /*
+    ** Create the second socket to do the connect
+    */
+    SockDesc2 = socket (SocketFamily, SocketType, 0);
+    if (SockDesc2 < 0) {
+        LogMessage ("CreateSocketPair: socket () - %d", errno);
+        sys$cancel (TcpAcceptChan);
+        close (SockDesc1);
+        sys$dassgn (TcpDeviceChan);
+        return (-1) ;
+    }
+
+    /*
+    ** Setup the Socket Pair Timeout Block
+    */
+    sptb.SockChan1 = TcpAcceptChan;
+    sptb.SockChan2 = decc$get_sdc (SockDesc2);
+
+    /*
+    ** Before we block on the connect, set a timer that can cancel I/O on our
+    ** two sockets if it never connects.
+    */
+    status = sys$setimr (EFN$C_ENF,
+                         BinTimeBuff,
+                         SocketPairTimeoutAst,
+                         &sptb,
+                         0);
+    if (! (status & 1)) {
+        LogMessage ("CreateSocketPair: SYS$SETIMR () - %08X", status);
+        sys$cancel (TcpAcceptChan);
+        close (SockDesc1);
+        close (SockDesc2);
+        sys$dassgn (TcpDeviceChan);
+        return (-1);
+    }
+
+    /*
+    ** Now issue the connect
+    */
+    memset ((char *) &sin, 0, sizeof(sin)) ;
+    sin.sin_family = SocketFamily;
+    sin.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr (LocalHostAddr) ;
+    sin.sin_port = LocalHostPort ;
+
+    status = connect (SockDesc2, (struct sockaddr *) &sin, sizeof(sin));
+    if (status < 0 ) {
+        LogMessage ("CreateSocketPair: connect () - %d", errno);
+        sys$cantim (&sptb, 0);
+        sys$cancel (TcpAcceptChan);
+        close (SockDesc1);
+        close (SockDesc2);
+        sys$dassgn (TcpDeviceChan);
+        return (-1);
+    }
+
+    /*
+    ** Wait for the asynch $QIO to finish.  Note that if the I/O was aborted
+    ** (SS$_ABORT), then we probably canceled it from the AST routine - so log
+    ** a timeout.
+    */
+    status = sys$synch (EFN$C_ENF, &iosb);
+    if (! (iosb.iosb$w_status & 1)) {
+        if (iosb.iosb$w_status == SS$_ABORT)
+            LogMessage ("CreateSocketPair: SYS$QIO(iosb) timeout");
+        else {
+            LogMessage ("CreateSocketPair: SYS$QIO(iosb) - %d",
+                        iosb.iosb$w_status);
+            sys$cantim (&sptb, 0);
+        }
+        close (SockDesc1);
+        close (SockDesc2);
+        sys$dassgn (TcpDeviceChan);
+        return (-1);
+    }
+
+    /*
+    ** Here we're successfully connected, so cancel the timer, convert the
+    ** I/O channel to a socket fd, close the listener socket and return the
+    ** connected pair.
+    */
+    sys$cantim (&sptb, 0);
+
+    close (SockDesc1) ;
+    SocketPair[0] = SockDesc2 ;
+    SocketPair[1] = socket_fd (TcpDeviceChan);
+
+    return (0) ;
+
+}
+
+/*----------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
+/*                                                                            */
+/*----------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
+static void SocketPairTimeoutAst (int astparm)
+{
+    SPTB *sptb = (SPTB *) astparm;
+
+    sys$cancel (sptb->SockChan2); /* Cancel the connect() */
+    sys$cancel (sptb->SockChan1); /* Cancel the accept() */
+
+    return;
+
+}
+
+/*----------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
+/*                                                                            */
+/*----------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
+static int TerminalDeviceAst (int astparm)
+{
+    int status;
+
+    /*
+    ** Terminate the terminal buffer
+    */
+    TerminalDeviceBuff[TerminalDeviceIosb.iosb$w_bcnt] = '\0';
+    strcat (TerminalDeviceBuff, "\n");
+
+    /*
+    ** Send the data read from the terminal device throught the socket pair
+    */
+    send (TerminalSocketPair[0], TerminalDeviceBuff,
+          TerminalDeviceIosb.iosb$w_bcnt + 1, 0);
+
+    /*
+    ** Queue another async IO to the terminal device
+    */
+    status = sys$qio (EFN$C_ENF,
+                      TerminalDeviceChan,
+                      IO$_READVBLK,
+                      &TerminalDeviceIosb,
+                      TerminalDeviceAst,
+                      0,
+                      TerminalDeviceBuff,
+                      sizeof(TerminalDeviceBuff) - 1,
+                      0, 0, 0, 0);
+
+    /*
+    ** Return status
+    */
+    return status;
+
+}
+
+/*----------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
+/*                                                                            */
+/*----------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
+static void LogMessage (char *msg, ...)
+{
+    char *Month[] = {"Jan", "Feb", "Mar", "Apr", "May", "Jun",
+                     "Jul", "Aug", "Sep", "Oct", "Nov", "Dec"};
+    static unsigned int pid = 0;
+    va_list args;
+    time_t CurTime;
+    struct tm *LocTime;
+    char MsgBuff[256];
+
+    /*
+    ** Get the process pid
+    */
+    if (pid == 0)
+        pid = getpid ();
+
+    /*
+    ** Convert the current time into local time
+    */
+    CurTime = time (NULL);
+    LocTime = localtime (&CurTime);
+
+    /*
+    ** Format the message buffer
+    */
+    sprintf (MsgBuff, "%02d-%s-%04d %02d:%02d:%02d [%08X] %s\n",
+             LocTime->tm_mday, Month[LocTime->tm_mon],
+             (LocTime->tm_year + 1900), LocTime->tm_hour, LocTime->tm_min,
+             LocTime->tm_sec, pid, msg);
+
+    /*
+    ** Get any variable arguments and add them to the print of the message
+    ** buffer
+    */
+    va_start (args, msg);
+    vfprintf (stderr, MsgBuff, args);
+    va_end (args);
+
+    /*
+    ** Flush standard error output
+    */
+    fsync (fileno (stderr));
+
+    return;
+
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/vms_term_sock.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/vms_term_sock.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..662fa0a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/vms_term_sock.h
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 VMS Software, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef TERM_SOCK_H
+# define TERM_SOCK_H
+
+/*
+** Terminal Socket Function Codes
+*/
+# define TERM_SOCK_CREATE       1
+# define TERM_SOCK_DELETE       2
+
+/*
+** Terminal Socket Status Codes
+*/
+# define TERM_SOCK_FAILURE      0
+# define TERM_SOCK_SUCCESS      1
+
+/*
+** Terminal Socket Prototype
+*/
+int TerminalSocket (int FunctionCode, int *ReturnSocket);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/win32_init.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/win32_init.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ebe92bc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/win32_init.c
@@ -0,0 +1,307 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <windows.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <malloc.h>
+
+#if defined(CP_UTF8)
+
+static UINT saved_cp;
+static int newargc;
+static char **newargv;
+
+static void cleanup(void)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    SetConsoleOutputCP(saved_cp);
+
+    for (i = 0; i < newargc; i++)
+        free(newargv[i]);
+
+    free(newargv);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Incrementally [re]allocate newargv and keep it NULL-terminated.
+ */
+static int validate_argv(int argc)
+{
+    static int size = 0;
+
+    if (argc >= size) {
+        char **ptr;
+
+        while (argc >= size)
+            size += 64;
+
+        ptr = realloc(newargv, size * sizeof(newargv[0]));
+        if (ptr == NULL)
+            return 0;
+
+        (newargv = ptr)[argc] = NULL;
+    } else {
+        newargv[argc] = NULL;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int process_glob(WCHAR *wstr, int wlen)
+{
+    int i, slash, udlen;
+    WCHAR saved_char;
+    WIN32_FIND_DATAW data;
+    HANDLE h;
+
+    /*
+     * Note that we support wildcard characters only in filename part
+     * of the path, and not in directories. Windows users are used to
+     * this, that's why recursive glob processing is not implemented.
+     */
+    /*
+     * Start by looking for last slash or backslash, ...
+     */
+    for (slash = 0, i = 0; i < wlen; i++)
+        if (wstr[i] == L'/' || wstr[i] == L'\\')
+            slash = i + 1;
+    /*
+     * ... then look for asterisk or question mark in the file name.
+     */
+    for (i = slash; i < wlen; i++)
+        if (wstr[i] == L'*' || wstr[i] == L'?')
+            break;
+
+    if (i == wlen)
+        return 0;   /* definitely not a glob */
+
+    saved_char = wstr[wlen];
+    wstr[wlen] = L'\0';
+    h = FindFirstFileW(wstr, &data);
+    wstr[wlen] = saved_char;
+    if (h == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE)
+        return 0;   /* not a valid glob, just pass... */
+
+    if (slash)
+        udlen = WideCharToMultiByte(CP_UTF8, 0, wstr, slash,
+                                    NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
+    else
+        udlen = 0;
+
+    do {
+        int uflen;
+        char *arg;
+
+        /*
+         * skip over . and ..
+         */
+        if (data.cFileName[0] == L'.') {
+            if ((data.cFileName[1] == L'\0') ||
+                (data.cFileName[1] == L'.' && data.cFileName[2] == L'\0'))
+                continue;
+        }
+
+        if (!validate_argv(newargc + 1))
+            break;
+
+        /*
+         * -1 below means "scan for trailing '\0' *and* count it",
+         * so that |uflen| covers even trailing '\0'.
+         */
+        uflen = WideCharToMultiByte(CP_UTF8, 0, data.cFileName, -1,
+                                    NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
+
+        arg = malloc(udlen + uflen);
+        if (arg == NULL)
+            break;
+
+        if (udlen)
+            WideCharToMultiByte(CP_UTF8, 0, wstr, slash,
+                                arg, udlen, NULL, NULL);
+
+        WideCharToMultiByte(CP_UTF8, 0, data.cFileName, -1,
+                            arg + udlen, uflen, NULL, NULL);
+
+        newargv[newargc++] = arg;
+    } while (FindNextFileW(h, &data));
+
+    CloseHandle(h);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+void win32_utf8argv(int *argc, char **argv[])
+{
+    const WCHAR *wcmdline;
+    WCHAR *warg, *wend, *p;
+    int wlen, ulen, valid = 1;
+    char *arg;
+
+    if (GetEnvironmentVariableW(L"OPENSSL_WIN32_UTF8", NULL, 0) == 0)
+        return;
+
+    newargc = 0;
+    newargv = NULL;
+    if (!validate_argv(newargc))
+        return;
+
+    wcmdline = GetCommandLineW();
+    if (wcmdline == NULL) return;
+
+    /*
+     * make a copy of the command line, since we might have to modify it...
+     */
+    wlen = wcslen(wcmdline);
+    p = _alloca((wlen + 1) * sizeof(WCHAR));
+    wcscpy(p, wcmdline);
+
+    while (*p != L'\0') {
+        int in_quote = 0;
+
+        if (*p == L' ' || *p == L'\t') {
+            p++; /* skip over white spaces */
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        /*
+         * Note: because we may need to fiddle with the number of backslashes,
+         * the argument string is copied into itself.  This is safe because
+         * the number of characters will never expand.
+         */
+        warg = wend = p;
+        while (*p != L'\0'
+               && (in_quote || (*p != L' ' && *p != L'\t'))) {
+            switch (*p) {
+            case L'\\':
+                /*
+                 * Microsoft documentation on how backslashes are treated
+                 * is:
+                 *
+                 * + Backslashes are interpreted literally, unless they
+                 *   immediately precede a double quotation mark.
+                 * + If an even number of backslashes is followed by a double
+                 *   quotation mark, one backslash is placed in the argv array
+                 *   for every pair of backslashes, and the double quotation
+                 *   mark is interpreted as a string delimiter.
+                 * + If an odd number of backslashes is followed by a double
+                 *   quotation mark, one backslash is placed in the argv array
+                 *   for every pair of backslashes, and the double quotation
+                 *   mark is "escaped" by the remaining backslash, causing a
+                 *   literal double quotation mark (") to be placed in argv.
+                 *
+                 * Ref: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/17w5ykft.aspx
+                 *
+                 * Though referred page doesn't mention it, multiple qouble
+                 * quotes are also special. Pair of double quotes in quoted
+                 * string is counted as single double quote.
+                 */
+                {
+                    const WCHAR *q = p;
+                    int i;
+
+                    while (*p == L'\\')
+                        p++;
+
+                    if (*p == L'"') {
+                        int i;
+
+                        for (i = (p - q) / 2; i > 0; i--)
+                            *wend++ = L'\\';
+
+                        /*
+                         * if odd amount of backslashes before the quote,
+                         * said quote is part of the argument, not a delimiter
+                         */
+                        if ((p - q) % 2 == 1)
+                            *wend++ = *p++;
+                    } else {
+                        for (i = p - q; i > 0; i--)
+                            *wend++ = L'\\';
+                    }
+                }
+                break;
+            case L'"':
+                /*
+                 * Without the preceding backslash (or when preceded with an
+                 * even number of backslashes), the double quote is a simple
+                 * string delimiter and just slightly change the parsing state
+                 */
+                if (in_quote && p[1] == L'"')
+                    *wend++ = *p++;
+                else
+                    in_quote = !in_quote;
+                p++;
+                break;
+            default:
+                /*
+                 * Any other non-delimiter character is just taken verbatim
+                 */
+                *wend++ = *p++;
+            }
+        }
+
+        wlen = wend - warg;
+
+        if (wlen == 0 || !process_glob(warg, wlen)) {
+            if (!validate_argv(newargc + 1)) {
+                valid = 0;
+                break;
+            }
+
+            ulen = 0;
+            if (wlen > 0) {
+                ulen = WideCharToMultiByte(CP_UTF8, 0, warg, wlen,
+                                           NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
+                if (ulen <= 0)
+                    continue;
+            }
+
+            arg = malloc(ulen + 1);
+            if (arg == NULL) {
+                valid = 0;
+                break;
+            }
+
+            if (wlen > 0)
+                WideCharToMultiByte(CP_UTF8, 0, warg, wlen,
+                                    arg, ulen, NULL, NULL);
+            arg[ulen] = '\0';
+
+            newargv[newargc++] = arg;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (valid) {
+        saved_cp = GetConsoleOutputCP();
+        SetConsoleOutputCP(CP_UTF8);
+
+        *argc = newargc;
+        *argv = newargv;
+
+        atexit(cleanup);
+    } else if (newargv != NULL) {
+        int i;
+
+        for (i = 0; i < newargc; i++)
+            free(newargv[i]);
+
+        free(newargv);
+
+        newargc = 0;
+        newargv = NULL;
+    }
+
+    return;
+}
+#else
+void win32_utf8argv(int &argc, char **argv[])
+{   return;   }
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/x509.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/x509.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7a66ea6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/apps/x509.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1099 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include "apps.h"
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+# include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+# include <openssl/dsa.h>
+#endif
+
+#undef POSTFIX
+#define POSTFIX ".srl"
+#define DEF_DAYS        30
+
+static int callb(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+static int sign(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, int days, int clrext,
+                const EVP_MD *digest, CONF *conf, const char *section);
+static int x509_certify(X509_STORE *ctx, const char *CAfile, const EVP_MD *digest,
+                        X509 *x, X509 *xca, EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+                        STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sigopts, const char *serialfile,
+                        int create, int days, int clrext, CONF *conf,
+                        const char *section, ASN1_INTEGER *sno, int reqfile);
+static int purpose_print(BIO *bio, X509 *cert, X509_PURPOSE *pt);
+
+typedef enum OPTION_choice {
+    OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP,
+    OPT_INFORM, OPT_OUTFORM, OPT_KEYFORM, OPT_REQ, OPT_CAFORM,
+    OPT_CAKEYFORM, OPT_SIGOPT, OPT_DAYS, OPT_PASSIN, OPT_EXTFILE,
+    OPT_EXTENSIONS, OPT_IN, OPT_OUT, OPT_SIGNKEY, OPT_CA,
+    OPT_CAKEY, OPT_CASERIAL, OPT_SET_SERIAL, OPT_FORCE_PUBKEY,
+    OPT_ADDTRUST, OPT_ADDREJECT, OPT_SETALIAS, OPT_CERTOPT, OPT_NAMEOPT,
+    OPT_C, OPT_EMAIL, OPT_OCSP_URI, OPT_SERIAL, OPT_NEXT_SERIAL,
+    OPT_MODULUS, OPT_PUBKEY, OPT_X509TOREQ, OPT_TEXT, OPT_HASH,
+    OPT_ISSUER_HASH, OPT_SUBJECT, OPT_ISSUER, OPT_FINGERPRINT, OPT_DATES,
+    OPT_PURPOSE, OPT_STARTDATE, OPT_ENDDATE, OPT_CHECKEND, OPT_CHECKHOST,
+    OPT_CHECKEMAIL, OPT_CHECKIP, OPT_NOOUT, OPT_TRUSTOUT, OPT_CLRTRUST,
+    OPT_CLRREJECT, OPT_ALIAS, OPT_CACREATESERIAL, OPT_CLREXT, OPT_OCSPID,
+    OPT_SUBJECT_HASH_OLD,
+    OPT_ISSUER_HASH_OLD,
+    OPT_BADSIG, OPT_MD, OPT_ENGINE, OPT_NOCERT
+} OPTION_CHOICE;
+
+OPTIONS x509_options[] = {
+    {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"},
+    {"inform", OPT_INFORM, 'f',
+     "Input format - default PEM (one of DER, NET or PEM)"},
+    {"in", OPT_IN, '<', "Input file - default stdin"},
+    {"outform", OPT_OUTFORM, 'f',
+     "Output format - default PEM (one of DER, NET or PEM)"},
+    {"out", OPT_OUT, '>', "Output file - default stdout"},
+    {"keyform", OPT_KEYFORM, 'F', "Private key format - default PEM"},
+    {"passin", OPT_PASSIN, 's', "Private key password/pass-phrase source"},
+    {"serial", OPT_SERIAL, '-', "Print serial number value"},
+    {"subject_hash", OPT_HASH, '-', "Print subject hash value"},
+    {"issuer_hash", OPT_ISSUER_HASH, '-', "Print issuer hash value"},
+    {"hash", OPT_HASH, '-', "Synonym for -subject_hash"},
+    {"subject", OPT_SUBJECT, '-', "Print subject DN"},
+    {"issuer", OPT_ISSUER, '-', "Print issuer DN"},
+    {"email", OPT_EMAIL, '-', "Print email address(es)"},
+    {"startdate", OPT_STARTDATE, '-', "Set notBefore field"},
+    {"enddate", OPT_ENDDATE, '-', "Set notAfter field"},
+    {"purpose", OPT_PURPOSE, '-', "Print out certificate purposes"},
+    {"dates", OPT_DATES, '-', "Both Before and After dates"},
+    {"modulus", OPT_MODULUS, '-', "Print the RSA key modulus"},
+    {"pubkey", OPT_PUBKEY, '-', "Output the public key"},
+    {"fingerprint", OPT_FINGERPRINT, '-',
+     "Print the certificate fingerprint"},
+    {"alias", OPT_ALIAS, '-', "Output certificate alias"},
+    {"noout", OPT_NOOUT, '-', "No output, just status"},
+    {"nocert", OPT_NOCERT, '-', "No certificate output"},
+    {"ocspid", OPT_OCSPID, '-',
+     "Print OCSP hash values for the subject name and public key"},
+    {"ocsp_uri", OPT_OCSP_URI, '-', "Print OCSP Responder URL(s)"},
+    {"trustout", OPT_TRUSTOUT, '-', "Output a trusted certificate"},
+    {"clrtrust", OPT_CLRTRUST, '-', "Clear all trusted purposes"},
+    {"clrext", OPT_CLREXT, '-', "Clear all certificate extensions"},
+    {"addtrust", OPT_ADDTRUST, 's', "Trust certificate for a given purpose"},
+    {"addreject", OPT_ADDREJECT, 's',
+     "Reject certificate for a given purpose"},
+    {"setalias", OPT_SETALIAS, 's', "Set certificate alias"},
+    {"days", OPT_DAYS, 'n',
+     "How long till expiry of a signed certificate - def 30 days"},
+    {"checkend", OPT_CHECKEND, 'M',
+     "Check whether the cert expires in the next arg seconds"},
+    {OPT_MORE_STR, 1, 1, "Exit 1 if so, 0 if not"},
+    {"signkey", OPT_SIGNKEY, '<', "Self sign cert with arg"},
+    {"x509toreq", OPT_X509TOREQ, '-',
+     "Output a certification request object"},
+    {"req", OPT_REQ, '-', "Input is a certificate request, sign and output"},
+    {"CA", OPT_CA, '<', "Set the CA certificate, must be PEM format"},
+    {"CAkey", OPT_CAKEY, 's',
+     "The CA key, must be PEM format; if not in CAfile"},
+    {"CAcreateserial", OPT_CACREATESERIAL, '-',
+     "Create serial number file if it does not exist"},
+    {"CAserial", OPT_CASERIAL, 's', "Serial file"},
+    {"set_serial", OPT_SET_SERIAL, 's', "Serial number to use"},
+    {"text", OPT_TEXT, '-', "Print the certificate in text form"},
+    {"C", OPT_C, '-', "Print out C code forms"},
+    {"extfile", OPT_EXTFILE, '<', "File with X509V3 extensions to add"},
+    {"extensions", OPT_EXTENSIONS, 's', "Section from config file to use"},
+    {"nameopt", OPT_NAMEOPT, 's', "Various certificate name options"},
+    {"certopt", OPT_CERTOPT, 's', "Various certificate text options"},
+    {"checkhost", OPT_CHECKHOST, 's', "Check certificate matches host"},
+    {"checkemail", OPT_CHECKEMAIL, 's', "Check certificate matches email"},
+    {"checkip", OPT_CHECKIP, 's', "Check certificate matches ipaddr"},
+    {"CAform", OPT_CAFORM, 'F', "CA format - default PEM"},
+    {"CAkeyform", OPT_CAKEYFORM, 'f', "CA key format - default PEM"},
+    {"sigopt", OPT_SIGOPT, 's', "Signature parameter in n:v form"},
+    {"force_pubkey", OPT_FORCE_PUBKEY, '<', "Force the Key to put inside certificate"},
+    {"next_serial", OPT_NEXT_SERIAL, '-', "Increment current certificate serial number"},
+    {"clrreject", OPT_CLRREJECT, '-',
+     "Clears all the prohibited or rejected uses of the certificate"},
+    {"badsig", OPT_BADSIG, '-', "Corrupt last byte of certificate signature (for test)"},
+    {"", OPT_MD, '-', "Any supported digest"},
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+    {"subject_hash_old", OPT_SUBJECT_HASH_OLD, '-',
+     "Print old-style (MD5) issuer hash value"},
+    {"issuer_hash_old", OPT_ISSUER_HASH_OLD, '-',
+     "Print old-style (MD5) subject hash value"},
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine, possibly a hardware device"},
+#endif
+    {NULL}
+};
+
+int x509_main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    ASN1_INTEGER *sno = NULL;
+    ASN1_OBJECT *objtmp = NULL;
+    BIO *out = NULL;
+    CONF *extconf = NULL;
+    EVP_PKEY *Upkey = NULL, *CApkey = NULL, *fkey = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *trust = NULL, *reject = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sigopts = NULL;
+    X509 *x = NULL, *xca = NULL;
+    X509_REQ *req = NULL, *rq = NULL;
+    X509_STORE *ctx = NULL;
+    const EVP_MD *digest = NULL;
+    char *CAkeyfile = NULL, *CAserial = NULL, *fkeyfile = NULL, *alias = NULL;
+    char *checkhost = NULL, *checkemail = NULL, *checkip = NULL;
+    char *extsect = NULL, *extfile = NULL, *passin = NULL, *passinarg = NULL;
+    char *infile = NULL, *outfile = NULL, *keyfile = NULL, *CAfile = NULL;
+    char buf[256], *prog;
+    int x509req = 0, days = DEF_DAYS, modulus = 0, pubkey = 0, pprint = 0;
+    int C = 0, CAformat = FORMAT_PEM, CAkeyformat = FORMAT_PEM;
+    int fingerprint = 0, reqfile = 0, need_rand = 0, checkend = 0;
+    int informat = FORMAT_PEM, outformat = FORMAT_PEM, keyformat = FORMAT_PEM;
+    int next_serial = 0, subject_hash = 0, issuer_hash = 0, ocspid = 0;
+    int noout = 0, sign_flag = 0, CA_flag = 0, CA_createserial = 0, email = 0;
+    int ocsp_uri = 0, trustout = 0, clrtrust = 0, clrreject = 0, aliasout = 0;
+    int ret = 1, i, num = 0, badsig = 0, clrext = 0, nocert = 0;
+    int text = 0, serial = 0, subject = 0, issuer = 0, startdate = 0;
+    int enddate = 0;
+    time_t checkoffset = 0;
+    unsigned long nmflag = 0, certflag = 0;
+    char nmflag_set = 0;
+    OPTION_CHOICE o;
+    ENGINE *e = NULL;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+    int subject_hash_old = 0, issuer_hash_old = 0;
+#endif
+
+    ctx = X509_STORE_new();
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        goto end;
+    X509_STORE_set_verify_cb(ctx, callb);
+
+    prog = opt_init(argc, argv, x509_options);
+    while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) {
+        switch (o) {
+        case OPT_EOF:
+        case OPT_ERR:
+ opthelp:
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog);
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_HELP:
+            opt_help(x509_options);
+            ret = 0;
+            goto end;
+        case OPT_INFORM:
+            if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_ANY, &informat))
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_IN:
+            infile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_OUTFORM:
+            if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_ANY, &outformat))
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_KEYFORM:
+            if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PEMDER, &keyformat))
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_CAFORM:
+            if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PEMDER, &CAformat))
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_CAKEYFORM:
+            if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_ANY, &CAkeyformat))
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_OUT:
+            outfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_REQ:
+            reqfile = need_rand = 1;
+            break;
+
+        case OPT_SIGOPT:
+            if (!sigopts)
+                sigopts = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null();
+            if (!sigopts || !sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(sigopts, opt_arg()))
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_DAYS:
+            days = atoi(opt_arg());
+            break;
+        case OPT_PASSIN:
+            passinarg = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_EXTFILE:
+            extfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_EXTENSIONS:
+            extsect = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_SIGNKEY:
+            keyfile = opt_arg();
+            sign_flag = ++num;
+            need_rand = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_CA:
+            CAfile = opt_arg();
+            CA_flag = ++num;
+            need_rand = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_CAKEY:
+            CAkeyfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_CASERIAL:
+            CAserial = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_SET_SERIAL:
+            if (sno != NULL) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "Serial number supplied twice\n");
+                goto opthelp;
+            }
+            if ((sno = s2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, opt_arg())) == NULL)
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_FORCE_PUBKEY:
+            fkeyfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_ADDTRUST:
+            if ((objtmp = OBJ_txt2obj(opt_arg(), 0)) == NULL) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                           "%s: Invalid trust object value %s\n",
+                           prog, opt_arg());
+                goto opthelp;
+            }
+            if (trust == NULL && (trust = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_new_null()) == NULL)
+                goto end;
+            sk_ASN1_OBJECT_push(trust, objtmp);
+            objtmp = NULL;
+            trustout = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_ADDREJECT:
+            if ((objtmp = OBJ_txt2obj(opt_arg(), 0)) == NULL) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                           "%s: Invalid reject object value %s\n",
+                           prog, opt_arg());
+                goto opthelp;
+            }
+            if (reject == NULL
+                && (reject = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_new_null()) == NULL)
+                goto end;
+            sk_ASN1_OBJECT_push(reject, objtmp);
+            objtmp = NULL;
+            trustout = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_SETALIAS:
+            alias = opt_arg();
+            trustout = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_CERTOPT:
+            if (!set_cert_ex(&certflag, opt_arg()))
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NAMEOPT:
+            nmflag_set = 1;
+            if (!set_name_ex(&nmflag, opt_arg()))
+                goto opthelp;
+            break;
+        case OPT_ENGINE:
+            e = setup_engine(opt_arg(), 0);
+            break;
+        case OPT_C:
+            C = ++num;
+            break;
+        case OPT_EMAIL:
+            email = ++num;
+            break;
+        case OPT_OCSP_URI:
+            ocsp_uri = ++num;
+            break;
+        case OPT_SERIAL:
+            serial = ++num;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NEXT_SERIAL:
+            next_serial = ++num;
+            break;
+        case OPT_MODULUS:
+            modulus = ++num;
+            break;
+        case OPT_PUBKEY:
+            pubkey = ++num;
+            break;
+        case OPT_X509TOREQ:
+            x509req = ++num;
+            break;
+        case OPT_TEXT:
+            text = ++num;
+            break;
+        case OPT_SUBJECT:
+            subject = ++num;
+            break;
+        case OPT_ISSUER:
+            issuer = ++num;
+            break;
+        case OPT_FINGERPRINT:
+            fingerprint = ++num;
+            break;
+        case OPT_HASH:
+            subject_hash = ++num;
+            break;
+        case OPT_ISSUER_HASH:
+            issuer_hash = ++num;
+            break;
+        case OPT_PURPOSE:
+            pprint = ++num;
+            break;
+        case OPT_STARTDATE:
+            startdate = ++num;
+            break;
+        case OPT_ENDDATE:
+            enddate = ++num;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NOOUT:
+            noout = ++num;
+            break;
+        case OPT_NOCERT:
+            nocert = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_TRUSTOUT:
+            trustout = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_CLRTRUST:
+            clrtrust = ++num;
+            break;
+        case OPT_CLRREJECT:
+            clrreject = ++num;
+            break;
+        case OPT_ALIAS:
+            aliasout = ++num;
+            break;
+        case OPT_CACREATESERIAL:
+            CA_createserial = ++num;
+            break;
+        case OPT_CLREXT:
+            clrext = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_OCSPID:
+            ocspid = ++num;
+            break;
+        case OPT_BADSIG:
+            badsig = 1;
+            break;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+        case OPT_SUBJECT_HASH_OLD:
+            subject_hash_old = ++num;
+            break;
+        case OPT_ISSUER_HASH_OLD:
+            issuer_hash_old = ++num;
+            break;
+#else
+        case OPT_SUBJECT_HASH_OLD:
+        case OPT_ISSUER_HASH_OLD:
+            break;
+#endif
+        case OPT_DATES:
+            startdate = ++num;
+            enddate = ++num;
+            break;
+        case OPT_CHECKEND:
+            checkend = 1;
+            {
+                intmax_t temp = 0;
+                if (!opt_imax(opt_arg(), &temp))
+                    goto opthelp;
+                checkoffset = (time_t)temp;
+                if ((intmax_t)checkoffset != temp) {
+                    BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: checkend time out of range %s\n",
+                               prog, opt_arg());
+                    goto opthelp;
+                }
+            }
+            break;
+        case OPT_CHECKHOST:
+            checkhost = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_CHECKEMAIL:
+            checkemail = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_CHECKIP:
+            checkip = opt_arg();
+            break;
+        case OPT_MD:
+            if (!opt_md(opt_unknown(), &digest))
+                goto opthelp;
+        }
+    }
+    argc = opt_num_rest();
+    argv = opt_rest();
+    if (argc != 0) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Unknown parameter %s\n", prog, argv[0]);
+        goto opthelp;
+    }
+
+    if (!nmflag_set)
+        nmflag = XN_FLAG_ONELINE;
+
+    if (need_rand)
+        app_RAND_load_file(NULL, 0);
+
+    if (!app_passwd(passinarg, NULL, &passin, NULL)) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting password\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (!X509_STORE_set_default_paths(ctx)) {
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (fkeyfile) {
+        fkey = load_pubkey(fkeyfile, keyformat, 0, NULL, e, "Forced key");
+        if (fkey == NULL)
+            goto end;
+    }
+
+    if ((CAkeyfile == NULL) && (CA_flag) && (CAformat == FORMAT_PEM)) {
+        CAkeyfile = CAfile;
+    } else if ((CA_flag) && (CAkeyfile == NULL)) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                   "need to specify a CAkey if using the CA command\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (extfile) {
+        X509V3_CTX ctx2;
+        if ((extconf = app_load_config(extfile)) == NULL)
+            goto end;
+        if (!extsect) {
+            extsect = NCONF_get_string(extconf, "default", "extensions");
+            if (!extsect) {
+                ERR_clear_error();
+                extsect = "default";
+            }
+        }
+        X509V3_set_ctx_test(&ctx2);
+        X509V3_set_nconf(&ctx2, extconf);
+        if (!X509V3_EXT_add_nconf(extconf, &ctx2, extsect, NULL)) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                       "Error Loading extension section %s\n", extsect);
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (reqfile) {
+        EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+        BIO *in;
+
+        if (!sign_flag && !CA_flag) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "We need a private key to sign with\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+        in = bio_open_default(infile, 'r', informat);
+        if (in == NULL)
+            goto end;
+        req = PEM_read_bio_X509_REQ(in, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+        BIO_free(in);
+
+        if (req == NULL) {
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            goto end;
+        }
+
+        if ((pkey = X509_REQ_get0_pubkey(req)) == NULL) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "error unpacking public key\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+        i = X509_REQ_verify(req, pkey);
+        if (i < 0) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Signature verification error\n");
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            goto end;
+        }
+        if (i == 0) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                       "Signature did not match the certificate request\n");
+            goto end;
+        } else
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Signature ok\n");
+
+        print_name(bio_err, "subject=", X509_REQ_get_subject_name(req),
+                   nmflag);
+
+        if ((x = X509_new()) == NULL)
+            goto end;
+
+        if (sno == NULL) {
+            sno = ASN1_INTEGER_new();
+            if (sno == NULL || !rand_serial(NULL, sno))
+                goto end;
+            if (!X509_set_serialNumber(x, sno))
+                goto end;
+            ASN1_INTEGER_free(sno);
+            sno = NULL;
+        } else if (!X509_set_serialNumber(x, sno))
+            goto end;
+
+        if (!X509_set_issuer_name(x, X509_REQ_get_subject_name(req)))
+            goto end;
+        if (!X509_set_subject_name(x, X509_REQ_get_subject_name(req)))
+            goto end;
+        if (!set_cert_times(x, NULL, NULL, days))
+            goto end;
+
+        if (fkey)
+            X509_set_pubkey(x, fkey);
+        else {
+            pkey = X509_REQ_get0_pubkey(req);
+            X509_set_pubkey(x, pkey);
+        }
+    } else
+        x = load_cert(infile, informat, "Certificate");
+
+    if (x == NULL)
+        goto end;
+    if (CA_flag) {
+        xca = load_cert(CAfile, CAformat, "CA Certificate");
+        if (xca == NULL)
+            goto end;
+    }
+
+    out = bio_open_default(outfile, 'w', outformat);
+    if (out == NULL)
+        goto end;
+
+    if (!noout || text || next_serial)
+        OBJ_create("2.99999.3", "SET.ex3", "SET x509v3 extension 3");
+
+    if (alias)
+        X509_alias_set1(x, (unsigned char *)alias, -1);
+
+    if (clrtrust)
+        X509_trust_clear(x);
+    if (clrreject)
+        X509_reject_clear(x);
+
+    if (trust) {
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(trust); i++) {
+            objtmp = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(trust, i);
+            X509_add1_trust_object(x, objtmp);
+        }
+        objtmp = NULL;
+    }
+
+    if (reject) {
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(reject); i++) {
+            objtmp = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(reject, i);
+            X509_add1_reject_object(x, objtmp);
+        }
+        objtmp = NULL;
+    }
+
+    if (badsig) {
+        const ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature;
+
+        X509_get0_signature(&signature, NULL, x);
+        corrupt_signature(signature);
+    }
+
+    if (num) {
+        for (i = 1; i <= num; i++) {
+            if (issuer == i) {
+                print_name(out, "issuer=", X509_get_issuer_name(x), nmflag);
+            } else if (subject == i) {
+                print_name(out, "subject=",
+                           X509_get_subject_name(x), nmflag);
+            } else if (serial == i) {
+                BIO_printf(out, "serial=");
+                i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(out, X509_get_serialNumber(x));
+                BIO_printf(out, "\n");
+            } else if (next_serial == i) {
+                ASN1_INTEGER *ser = X509_get_serialNumber(x);
+                BIGNUM *bnser = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(ser, NULL);
+
+                if (!bnser)
+                    goto end;
+                if (!BN_add_word(bnser, 1))
+                    goto end;
+                ser = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(bnser, NULL);
+                if (!ser)
+                    goto end;
+                BN_free(bnser);
+                i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(out, ser);
+                ASN1_INTEGER_free(ser);
+                BIO_puts(out, "\n");
+            } else if ((email == i) || (ocsp_uri == i)) {
+                int j;
+                STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *emlst;
+                if (email == i)
+                    emlst = X509_get1_email(x);
+                else
+                    emlst = X509_get1_ocsp(x);
+                for (j = 0; j < sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(emlst); j++)
+                    BIO_printf(out, "%s\n",
+                               sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(emlst, j));
+                X509_email_free(emlst);
+            } else if (aliasout == i) {
+                unsigned char *alstr;
+                alstr = X509_alias_get0(x, NULL);
+                if (alstr)
+                    BIO_printf(out, "%s\n", alstr);
+                else
+                    BIO_puts(out, "<No Alias>\n");
+            } else if (subject_hash == i) {
+                BIO_printf(out, "%08lx\n", X509_subject_name_hash(x));
+            }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+            else if (subject_hash_old == i) {
+                BIO_printf(out, "%08lx\n", X509_subject_name_hash_old(x));
+            }
+#endif
+            else if (issuer_hash == i) {
+                BIO_printf(out, "%08lx\n", X509_issuer_name_hash(x));
+            }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+            else if (issuer_hash_old == i) {
+                BIO_printf(out, "%08lx\n", X509_issuer_name_hash_old(x));
+            }
+#endif
+            else if (pprint == i) {
+                X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
+                int j;
+                BIO_printf(out, "Certificate purposes:\n");
+                for (j = 0; j < X509_PURPOSE_get_count(); j++) {
+                    ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(j);
+                    purpose_print(out, x, ptmp);
+                }
+            } else if (modulus == i) {
+                EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+
+                pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
+                if (pkey == NULL) {
+                    BIO_printf(bio_err, "Modulus=unavailable\n");
+                    ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+                    goto end;
+                }
+                BIO_printf(out, "Modulus=");
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+                if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
+                    const BIGNUM *n;
+                    RSA_get0_key(EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey), &n, NULL, NULL);
+                    BN_print(out, n);
+                } else
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+                if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
+                    const BIGNUM *dsapub = NULL;
+                    DSA_get0_key(EVP_PKEY_get0_DSA(pkey), &dsapub, NULL);
+                    BN_print(out, dsapub);
+                } else
+#endif
+                {
+                    BIO_printf(out, "Wrong Algorithm type");
+                }
+                BIO_printf(out, "\n");
+            } else if (pubkey == i) {
+                EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+
+                pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
+                if (pkey == NULL) {
+                    BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting public key\n");
+                    ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+                    goto end;
+                }
+                PEM_write_bio_PUBKEY(out, pkey);
+            } else if (C == i) {
+                unsigned char *d;
+                char *m;
+                int len;
+
+                X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(x), buf, sizeof(buf));
+                BIO_printf(out, "/*\n"
+                                " * Subject: %s\n", buf);
+
+                X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(x), buf, sizeof(buf));
+                BIO_printf(out, " * Issuer:  %s\n"
+                                " */\n", buf);
+
+                len = i2d_X509(x, NULL);
+                m = app_malloc(len, "x509 name buffer");
+                d = (unsigned char *)m;
+                len = i2d_X509_NAME(X509_get_subject_name(x), &d);
+                print_array(out, "the_subject_name", len, (unsigned char *)m);
+                d = (unsigned char *)m;
+                len = i2d_X509_PUBKEY(X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(x), &d);
+                print_array(out, "the_public_key", len, (unsigned char *)m);
+                d = (unsigned char *)m;
+                len = i2d_X509(x, &d);
+                print_array(out, "the_certificate", len, (unsigned char *)m);
+                OPENSSL_free(m);
+            } else if (text == i) {
+                X509_print_ex(out, x, nmflag, certflag);
+            } else if (startdate == i) {
+                BIO_puts(out, "notBefore=");
+                ASN1_TIME_print(out, X509_get0_notBefore(x));
+                BIO_puts(out, "\n");
+            } else if (enddate == i) {
+                BIO_puts(out, "notAfter=");
+                ASN1_TIME_print(out, X509_get0_notAfter(x));
+                BIO_puts(out, "\n");
+            } else if (fingerprint == i) {
+                int j;
+                unsigned int n;
+                unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+                const EVP_MD *fdig = digest;
+
+                if (!fdig)
+                    fdig = EVP_sha1();
+
+                if (!X509_digest(x, fdig, md, &n)) {
+                    BIO_printf(bio_err, "out of memory\n");
+                    goto end;
+                }
+                BIO_printf(out, "%s Fingerprint=",
+                           OBJ_nid2sn(EVP_MD_type(fdig)));
+                for (j = 0; j < (int)n; j++) {
+                    BIO_printf(out, "%02X%c", md[j], (j + 1 == (int)n)
+                               ? '\n' : ':');
+                }
+            }
+
+            /* should be in the library */
+            else if ((sign_flag == i) && (x509req == 0)) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "Getting Private key\n");
+                if (Upkey == NULL) {
+                    Upkey = load_key(keyfile, keyformat, 0,
+                                     passin, e, "Private key");
+                    if (Upkey == NULL)
+                        goto end;
+                }
+
+                assert(need_rand);
+                if (!sign(x, Upkey, days, clrext, digest, extconf, extsect))
+                    goto end;
+            } else if (CA_flag == i) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "Getting CA Private Key\n");
+                if (CAkeyfile != NULL) {
+                    CApkey = load_key(CAkeyfile, CAkeyformat,
+                                      0, passin, e, "CA Private Key");
+                    if (CApkey == NULL)
+                        goto end;
+                }
+
+                assert(need_rand);
+                if (!x509_certify(ctx, CAfile, digest, x, xca,
+                                  CApkey, sigopts,
+                                  CAserial, CA_createserial, days, clrext,
+                                  extconf, extsect, sno, reqfile))
+                    goto end;
+            } else if (x509req == i) {
+                EVP_PKEY *pk;
+
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "Getting request Private Key\n");
+                if (keyfile == NULL) {
+                    BIO_printf(bio_err, "no request key file specified\n");
+                    goto end;
+                } else {
+                    pk = load_key(keyfile, keyformat, 0,
+                                  passin, e, "request key");
+                    if (pk == NULL)
+                        goto end;
+                }
+
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "Generating certificate request\n");
+
+                rq = X509_to_X509_REQ(x, pk, digest);
+                EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
+                if (rq == NULL) {
+                    ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+                    goto end;
+                }
+                if (!noout) {
+                    X509_REQ_print(out, rq);
+                    PEM_write_bio_X509_REQ(out, rq);
+                }
+                noout = 1;
+            } else if (ocspid == i) {
+                X509_ocspid_print(out, x);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (checkend) {
+        time_t tcheck = time(NULL) + checkoffset;
+
+        if (X509_cmp_time(X509_get0_notAfter(x), &tcheck) < 0) {
+            BIO_printf(out, "Certificate will expire\n");
+            ret = 1;
+        } else {
+            BIO_printf(out, "Certificate will not expire\n");
+            ret = 0;
+        }
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    print_cert_checks(out, x, checkhost, checkemail, checkip);
+
+    if (noout || nocert) {
+        ret = 0;
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (outformat == FORMAT_ASN1)
+        i = i2d_X509_bio(out, x);
+    else if (outformat == FORMAT_PEM) {
+        if (trustout)
+            i = PEM_write_bio_X509_AUX(out, x);
+        else
+            i = PEM_write_bio_X509(out, x);
+    } else {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "bad output format specified for outfile\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+    if (!i) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to write certificate\n");
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        goto end;
+    }
+    ret = 0;
+ end:
+    if (need_rand)
+        app_RAND_write_file(NULL);
+    NCONF_free(extconf);
+    BIO_free_all(out);
+    X509_STORE_free(ctx);
+    X509_REQ_free(req);
+    X509_free(x);
+    X509_free(xca);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(Upkey);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(CApkey);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(fkey);
+    sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(sigopts);
+    X509_REQ_free(rq);
+    ASN1_INTEGER_free(sno);
+    sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(trust, ASN1_OBJECT_free);
+    sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(reject, ASN1_OBJECT_free);
+    ASN1_OBJECT_free(objtmp);
+    release_engine(e);
+    OPENSSL_free(passin);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static ASN1_INTEGER *x509_load_serial(const char *CAfile, const char *serialfile,
+                                      int create)
+{
+    char *buf = NULL, *p;
+    ASN1_INTEGER *bs = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *serial = NULL;
+    size_t len;
+
+    len = ((serialfile == NULL)
+           ? (strlen(CAfile) + strlen(POSTFIX) + 1)
+           : (strlen(serialfile))) + 1;
+    buf = app_malloc(len, "serial# buffer");
+    if (serialfile == NULL) {
+        OPENSSL_strlcpy(buf, CAfile, len);
+        for (p = buf; *p; p++)
+            if (*p == '.') {
+                *p = '\0';
+                break;
+            }
+        OPENSSL_strlcat(buf, POSTFIX, len);
+    } else
+        OPENSSL_strlcpy(buf, serialfile, len);
+
+    serial = load_serial(buf, create, NULL);
+    if (serial == NULL)
+        goto end;
+
+    if (!BN_add_word(serial, 1)) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "add_word failure\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (!save_serial(buf, NULL, serial, &bs))
+        goto end;
+
+ end:
+    OPENSSL_free(buf);
+    BN_free(serial);
+    return bs;
+}
+
+static int x509_certify(X509_STORE *ctx, const char *CAfile, const EVP_MD *digest,
+                        X509 *x, X509 *xca, EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+                        STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sigopts,
+                        const char *serialfile, int create,
+                        int days, int clrext, CONF *conf, const char *section,
+                        ASN1_INTEGER *sno, int reqfile)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    ASN1_INTEGER *bs = NULL;
+    X509_STORE_CTX *xsc = NULL;
+    EVP_PKEY *upkey;
+
+    upkey = X509_get0_pubkey(xca);
+    if (upkey == NULL) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error obtaining CA X509 public key\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+    EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(upkey, pkey);
+
+    xsc = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
+    if (xsc == NULL || !X509_STORE_CTX_init(xsc, ctx, x, NULL)) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error initialising X509 store\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+    if (sno)
+        bs = sno;
+    else if ((bs = x509_load_serial(CAfile, serialfile, create)) == NULL)
+        goto end;
+
+    /*
+     * NOTE: this certificate can/should be self signed, unless it was a
+     * certificate request in which case it is not.
+     */
+    X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(xsc, x);
+    X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(xsc, X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE);
+    if (!reqfile && X509_verify_cert(xsc) <= 0)
+        goto end;
+
+    if (!X509_check_private_key(xca, pkey)) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                   "CA certificate and CA private key do not match\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (!X509_set_issuer_name(x, X509_get_subject_name(xca)))
+        goto end;
+    if (!X509_set_serialNumber(x, bs))
+        goto end;
+
+    if (!set_cert_times(x, NULL, NULL, days))
+        goto end;
+
+    if (clrext) {
+        while (X509_get_ext_count(x) > 0)
+            X509_delete_ext(x, 0);
+    }
+
+    if (conf) {
+        X509V3_CTX ctx2;
+        X509_set_version(x, 2); /* version 3 certificate */
+        X509V3_set_ctx(&ctx2, xca, x, NULL, NULL, 0);
+        X509V3_set_nconf(&ctx2, conf);
+        if (!X509V3_EXT_add_nconf(conf, &ctx2, section, x))
+            goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (!do_X509_sign(x, pkey, digest, sigopts))
+        goto end;
+    ret = 1;
+ end:
+    X509_STORE_CTX_free(xsc);
+    if (!ret)
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+    if (!sno)
+        ASN1_INTEGER_free(bs);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int callb(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int err;
+    X509 *err_cert;
+
+    /*
+     * it is ok to use a self signed certificate This case will catch both
+     * the initial ok == 0 and the final ok == 1 calls to this function
+     */
+    err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
+    if (err == X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT)
+        return 1;
+
+    /*
+     * BAD we should have gotten an error.  Normally if everything worked
+     * X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx) will still be set to
+     * DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_....
+     */
+    if (ok) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                   "error with certificate to be certified - should be self signed\n");
+        return 0;
+    } else {
+        err_cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx);
+        print_name(bio_err, NULL, X509_get_subject_name(err_cert), 0);
+        BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                   "error with certificate - error %d at depth %d\n%s\n", err,
+                   X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx),
+                   X509_verify_cert_error_string(err));
+        return 1;
+    }
+}
+
+/* self sign */
+static int sign(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, int days, int clrext,
+                const EVP_MD *digest, CONF *conf, const char *section)
+{
+
+    if (!X509_set_issuer_name(x, X509_get_subject_name(x)))
+        goto err;
+    if (!set_cert_times(x, NULL, NULL, days))
+        goto err;
+    if (!X509_set_pubkey(x, pkey))
+        goto err;
+    if (clrext) {
+        while (X509_get_ext_count(x) > 0)
+            X509_delete_ext(x, 0);
+    }
+    if (conf) {
+        X509V3_CTX ctx;
+        X509_set_version(x, 2); /* version 3 certificate */
+        X509V3_set_ctx(&ctx, x, x, NULL, NULL, 0);
+        X509V3_set_nconf(&ctx, conf);
+        if (!X509V3_EXT_add_nconf(conf, &ctx, section, x))
+            goto err;
+    }
+    if (!X509_sign(x, pkey, digest))
+        goto err;
+    return 1;
+ err:
+    ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int purpose_print(BIO *bio, X509 *cert, X509_PURPOSE *pt)
+{
+    int id, i, idret;
+    const char *pname;
+    id = X509_PURPOSE_get_id(pt);
+    pname = X509_PURPOSE_get0_name(pt);
+    for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
+        idret = X509_check_purpose(cert, id, i);
+        BIO_printf(bio, "%s%s : ", pname, i ? " CA" : "");
+        if (idret == 1)
+            BIO_printf(bio, "Yes\n");
+        else if (idret == 0)
+            BIO_printf(bio, "No\n");
+        else
+            BIO_printf(bio, "Yes (WARNING code=%d)\n", idret);
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/appveyor.yml b/openssl-1.1.0h/appveyor.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8dd6cb6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/appveyor.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+platform:
+    - x86
+    - x64
+
+environment:
+    matrix:
+        - VSVER: 14
+
+configuration:
+    - plain
+    - shared
+
+before_build:
+    - ps: >-
+        If ($env:Platform -Match "x86") {
+            $env:VCVARS_PLATFORM="x86"
+            $env:TARGET="VC-WIN32"
+        } Else {
+            $env:VCVARS_PLATFORM="amd64"
+            $env:TARGET="VC-WIN64A"
+        }
+    - ps: >-
+        If ($env:Configuration -Match "shared") {
+            $env:SHARED=""
+        } Else {
+            $env:SHARED="no-shared"
+        }
+    - ps: $env:VSCOMNTOOLS=(Get-Content ("env:VS" + "$env:VSVER" + "0COMNTOOLS"))
+    - call "%VSCOMNTOOLS%\..\..\VC\vcvarsall.bat" %VCVARS_PLATFORM%
+    - mkdir _build
+    - cd _build
+    - perl ..\Configure %TARGET% no-asm %SHARED%
+    - cd ..
+
+build_script:
+    - cd _build
+    - nmake
+    - cd ..
+
+test_script:
+    - cd _build
+    - nmake test
+    - mkdir ..\_install
+    - nmake install install_docs DESTDIR=..\_install
+    - cd ..
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/build.info b/openssl-1.1.0h/build.info
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fa136dc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/build.info
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+LIBS=libcrypto libssl
+ORDINALS[libcrypto]=crypto
+ORDINALS[libssl]=ssl
+INCLUDE[libcrypto]=. crypto/include include
+INCLUDE[libssl]=. include
+DEPEND[libssl]=libcrypto
+
+# Empty DEPEND "indices" means the dependencies are expected to be built
+# unconditionally before anything else.
+DEPEND[]=include/openssl/opensslconf.h crypto/include/internal/bn_conf.h \
+         crypto/include/internal/dso_conf.h
+DEPEND[include/openssl/opensslconf.h]=configdata.pm
+GENERATE[include/openssl/opensslconf.h]=include/openssl/opensslconf.h.in
+DEPEND[crypto/include/internal/bn_conf.h]=configdata.pm
+GENERATE[crypto/include/internal/bn_conf.h]=crypto/include/internal/bn_conf.h.in
+DEPEND[crypto/include/internal/dso_conf.h]=configdata.pm
+GENERATE[crypto/include/internal/dso_conf.h]=crypto/include/internal/dso_conf.h.in
+
+
+IF[{- $config{target} =~ /^Cygwin/ -}]
+ SHARED_NAME[libcrypto]=cygcrypto-{- $config{shlib_major}.".".$config{shlib_minor} -}
+ SHARED_NAME[libssl]=cygssl-{- $config{shlib_major}.".".$config{shlib_minor} -}
+ELSIF[{- $config{target} =~ /^mingw/ -}]
+ SHARED_NAME[libcrypto]=libcrypto-{- $config{shlib_major}."_".$config{shlib_minor} -}{- $config{target} eq "mingw64" ? "-x64" : "" -}
+ SHARED_NAME[libssl]=libssl-{- $config{shlib_major}."_".$config{shlib_minor} -}{- $config{target} eq "mingw64" ? "-x64" : "" -}
+ELSIF[{- $config{target} =~ /^VC-/ -}]
+ SHARED_NAME[libcrypto]=libcrypto-{- $config{shlib_major}."_".$config{shlib_minor} -}{- $target{multilib} -}
+ SHARED_NAME[libssl]=libssl-{- $config{shlib_major}."_".$config{shlib_minor} -}{- $target{multilib} -}
+ENDIF
+
+# VMS has a cultural standard where all libraries are prefixed.
+# For OpenSSL, the choice is 'ossl$' (this prefix was claimed in a
+# conversation with VSI, Tuesday January 26 2016)
+# Also, it seems it's usual to have the pointer size the libraries
+# were built for as part of the name.
+IF[{- $config{target} =~ /^vms/ -}]
+ RENAME[libcrypto]=ossl$libcrypto{- $target{pointer_size} -}
+ RENAME[libssl]=ossl$libssl{- $target{pointer_size} -}
+ SHARED_NAME[libcrypto]=ossl$libcrypto{- sprintf "%02d%02d", $config{shlib_major}, $config{shlib_minor} -}_shr{- $target{pointer_size} -}
+ SHARED_NAME[libssl]=ossl$libssl{- sprintf "%02d%02d", $config{shlib_major}, $config{shlib_minor} -}_shr{- $target{pointer_size} -}
+ENDIF
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/config b/openssl-1.1.0h/config
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..35e849a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/config
@@ -0,0 +1,933 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# Copyright 1998-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+# OpenSSL config: determine the operating system and run ./Configure
+# Derived from minarch and GuessOS from Apache.
+#
+# Do "config -h" for usage information.
+SUFFIX=""
+DRYRUN="false"
+VERBOSE="false"
+EXE=""
+THERE=`dirname $0`
+
+# pick up any command line args to config
+for i
+do
+case "$i" in 
+-d*) options=$options" --debug";;
+-t*) DRYRUN="true" VERBOSE="true";;
+-v*) VERBOSE="true";;
+-h*) DRYRUN="true"; cat <<EOF
+Usage: config [options]
+ -d	Build with debugging when possible.
+ -t	Test mode, do not run the Configure perl script.
+ -v	Verbose mode, show the exact Configure call that is being made.
+ -h	This help.
+
+Any other text will be passed to the Configure perl script.
+See INSTALL for instructions.
+
+EOF
+;;
+*) options=$options" $i" ;;
+esac
+done
+
+# First get uname entries that we use below
+
+[ "$MACHINE" ] || MACHINE=`(uname -m) 2>/dev/null` || MACHINE="unknown"
+[ "$RELEASE" ] || RELEASE=`(uname -r) 2>/dev/null` || RELEASE="unknown"
+[ "$SYSTEM" ] || SYSTEM=`(uname -s) 2>/dev/null`  || SYSTEM="unknown"
+[ "$BUILD" ] || VERSION=`(uname -v) 2>/dev/null` || VERSION="unknown"
+
+
+# Now test for ISC and SCO, since it is has a braindamaged uname.
+#
+# We need to work around FreeBSD 1.1.5.1 
+(
+XREL=`uname -X 2>/dev/null | grep "^Release" | awk '{print $3}'`
+if [ "x$XREL" != "x" ]; then
+    if [ -f /etc/kconfig ]; then
+	case "$XREL" in
+	    4.0|4.1)
+		    echo "${MACHINE}-whatever-isc4"; exit 0
+		;;
+	esac
+    else
+	case "$XREL" in
+	    3.2v4.2)
+		echo "whatever-whatever-sco3"; exit 0
+		;;
+	    3.2v5.0*)
+		echo "whatever-whatever-sco5"; exit 0
+		;;
+	    4.2MP)
+		case "x${VERSION}" in
+		    x2.0*) echo "whatever-whatever-unixware20"; exit 0 ;;
+		    x2.1*) echo "whatever-whatever-unixware21"; exit 0 ;;
+		    x2*)   echo "whatever-whatever-unixware2";  exit 0 ;;
+		esac
+		;;
+	    4.2)
+		echo "whatever-whatever-unixware1"; exit 0
+		;;
+	    5*)
+		case "x${VERSION}" in
+		    # We hardcode i586 in place of ${MACHINE} for the
+		    # following reason. The catch is that even though Pentium
+		    # is minimum requirement for platforms in question,
+		    # ${MACHINE} gets always assigned to i386. Now, problem
+		    # with i386 is that it makes ./config pass 386 to
+		    # ./Configure, which in turn makes make generate
+		    # inefficient SHA-1 (for this moment) code.
+		    x[678]*)  echo "i586-sco-unixware7"; exit 0 ;;
+		esac
+		;;
+	esac
+    fi
+fi
+# Now we simply scan though... In most cases, the SYSTEM info is enough
+#
+case "${SYSTEM}:${RELEASE}:${VERSION}:${MACHINE}" in
+    A/UX:*)
+	echo "m68k-apple-aux3"; exit 0
+	;;
+
+    AIX:[3-9]:4:*)
+	echo "${MACHINE}-ibm-aix"; exit 0
+	;;
+
+    AIX:*:[5-9]:*)
+	echo "${MACHINE}-ibm-aix"; exit 0
+	;;
+
+    AIX:*)
+	echo "${MACHINE}-ibm-aix3"; exit 0
+	;;
+
+    HI-UX:*)
+	echo "${MACHINE}-hi-hiux"; exit 0
+	;;
+
+    HP-UX:*)
+	HPUXVER=`echo ${RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*.[0B]*//'`
+	case "$HPUXVER" in
+	    1[0-9].*)	# HPUX 10 and 11 targets are unified
+		echo "${MACHINE}-hp-hpux1x"; exit 0
+		;;
+	    *)
+		echo "${MACHINE}-hp-hpux"; exit 0
+		;;
+	esac
+	;;
+
+    IRIX:6.*)
+	echo "mips3-sgi-irix"; exit 0
+	;;
+
+    IRIX64:*)
+	echo "mips4-sgi-irix64"; exit 0
+	;;
+
+    Linux:[2-9].*)
+	echo "${MACHINE}-whatever-linux2"; exit 0
+	;;
+
+    Linux:1.*)
+	echo "${MACHINE}-whatever-linux1"; exit 0
+	;;
+
+    GNU*)
+	echo "hurd-x86"; exit 0;
+	;;
+
+    LynxOS:*)
+	echo "${MACHINE}-lynx-lynxos"; exit 0
+	;;
+
+    BSD/OS:4.*)  # BSD/OS always says 386
+	echo "i486-whatever-bsdi4"; exit 0
+	;;
+
+    BSD/386:*:*:*486*|BSD/OS:*:*:*:*486*)
+        case `/sbin/sysctl -n hw.model` in
+	    Pentium*)
+                echo "i586-whatever-bsdi"; exit 0
+                ;;
+            *)
+                echo "i386-whatever-bsdi"; exit 0
+                ;;
+            esac;
+	;;
+
+    BSD/386:*|BSD/OS:*)
+	echo "${MACHINE}-whatever-bsdi"; exit 0
+	;;
+
+    FreeBSD:*:*:*386*)
+        VERS=`echo ${RELEASE} | sed -e 's/[-(].*//'`
+        MACH=`sysctl -n hw.model`
+        ARCH='whatever'
+        case ${MACH} in
+           *386*       ) MACH="i386"     ;;
+           *486*       ) MACH="i486"     ;;
+           Pentium\ II*) MACH="i686"     ;;
+           Pentium*    ) MACH="i586"     ;;
+           *           ) MACH="$MACHINE" ;;
+        esac
+        case ${MACH} in
+           i[0-9]86 ) ARCH="pc" ;;
+        esac
+        echo "${MACH}-${ARCH}-freebsd${VERS}"; exit 0
+        ;;
+
+    FreeBSD:*)
+	echo "${MACHINE}-whatever-freebsd"; exit 0
+	;;
+
+    Haiku:*)
+	echo "${MACHINE}-whatever-haiku"; exit 0
+	;;
+
+    NetBSD:*:*:*386*)
+        echo "`(/usr/sbin/sysctl -n hw.model || /sbin/sysctl -n hw.model) | sed 's,.*\(.\)86-class.*,i\186,'`-whatever-netbsd"; exit 0
+	;;
+
+    NetBSD:*)
+	echo "${MACHINE}-whatever-netbsd"; exit 0
+	;;
+
+    OpenBSD:*)
+	echo "${MACHINE}-whatever-openbsd"; exit 0
+	;;
+
+    OpenUNIX:*)
+	echo "${MACHINE}-unknown-OpenUNIX${VERSION}"; exit 0
+	;;
+
+    OSF1:*:*:*alpha*)
+	OSFMAJOR=`echo ${RELEASE}| sed -e 's/^V\([0-9]*\)\..*$/\1/'`
+	case "$OSFMAJOR" in
+	    4|5)
+		echo "${MACHINE}-dec-tru64"; exit 0
+		;;
+	    1|2|3)
+		echo "${MACHINE}-dec-osf"; exit 0
+		;;
+	    *)
+		echo "${MACHINE}-dec-osf"; exit 0
+		;;
+	esac
+	;;
+
+    QNX:*)
+	case "$RELEASE" in
+	    4*)
+		echo "${MACHINE}-whatever-qnx4"
+		;;
+	    6*)
+		echo "${MACHINE}-whatever-qnx6"
+		;;
+	    *)
+		echo "${MACHINE}-whatever-qnx"
+		;;
+	esac
+	exit 0
+	;;
+
+    Paragon*:*:*:*)
+	echo "i860-intel-osf1"; exit 0
+	;;
+
+    Rhapsody:*)
+	echo "ppc-apple-rhapsody"; exit 0
+	;;
+
+    Darwin:*)
+	case "$MACHINE" in
+	    Power*)
+		echo "ppc-apple-darwin${VERSION}"
+		;;
+	    x86_64)
+		echo "x86_64-apple-darwin${VERSION}"
+		;;
+	    *)
+		echo "i686-apple-darwin${VERSION}"
+		;;
+	esac
+	exit 0
+	;;
+
+    SunOS:5.*)
+	echo "${MACHINE}-whatever-solaris2"; exit 0
+	;;
+
+    SunOS:*)
+	echo "${MACHINE}-sun-sunos4"; exit 0
+	;;
+
+    UNIX_System_V:4.*:*)
+	echo "${MACHINE}-whatever-sysv4"; exit 0
+	;;
+
+    VOS:*:*:i786)
+     echo "i386-stratus-vos"; exit 0
+     ;;
+
+    VOS:*:*:*)
+     echo "hppa1.1-stratus-vos"; exit 0
+     ;;
+
+    *:4*:R4*:m88k)
+	echo "${MACHINE}-whatever-sysv4"; exit 0
+	;;
+
+    DYNIX/ptx:4*:*)
+	echo "${MACHINE}-whatever-sysv4"; exit 0
+	;;
+
+    *:4.0:3.0:3[34]?? | *:4.0:3.0:3[34]??,*)
+	echo "i486-ncr-sysv4"; exit 0
+	;;
+
+    ULTRIX:*)
+	echo "${MACHINE}-unknown-ultrix"; exit 0
+	;;
+
+    POSIX-BC*)
+	echo "${MACHINE}-siemens-sysv4"; exit 0   # Here, $MACHINE == "BS2000"
+	;;
+
+    machten:*)
+       echo "${MACHINE}-tenon-${SYSTEM}"; exit 0;
+       ;;
+
+    library:*)
+	echo "${MACHINE}-ncr-sysv4"; exit 0
+	;;
+
+    ConvexOS:*:11.0:*)
+	echo "${MACHINE}-v11-${SYSTEM}"; exit 0;
+	;;
+
+    # The following combinations are supported
+    # MINGW64* on x86_64 => mingw64
+    # MINGW32* on x86_64 => mingw
+    # MINGW32* on i?86 => mingw
+    #
+    # MINGW64* on i?86 isn't expected to work...
+    MINGW64*:*:*:x86_64)
+	echo "${MACHINE}-whatever-mingw64"; exit 0;
+	;;
+    MINGW*)
+	echo "${MACHINE}-whatever-mingw"; exit 0;
+	;;
+    CYGWIN*)
+	echo "${MACHINE}-pc-cygwin"; exit 0
+	;;
+
+    vxworks*)
+       echo "${MACHINE}-whatever-vxworks"; exit 0;
+       ;;
+esac
+
+#
+# Ugg. These are all we can determine by what we know about
+# the output of uname. Be more creative:
+#
+
+# Do the Apollo stuff first. Here, we just simply assume
+# that the existence of the /usr/apollo directory is proof
+# enough
+if [ -d /usr/apollo ]; then
+    echo "whatever-apollo-whatever"
+    exit 0
+fi
+
+# Now NeXT
+ISNEXT=`hostinfo 2>/dev/null`
+case "$ISNEXT" in
+    *'NeXT Mach 3.3'*)
+	echo "whatever-next-nextstep3.3"; exit 0
+	;;
+    *NeXT*)
+	echo "whatever-next-nextstep"; exit 0
+	;;
+esac
+
+# At this point we gone through all the one's
+# we know of: Punt
+
+echo "${MACHINE}-whatever-${SYSTEM}" 
+exit 0
+) 2>/dev/null | (
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# this is where the translation occurs into SSLeay terms
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+# Only set CC if not supplied already
+if [ -z "$CROSS_COMPILE$CC" ]; then
+  GCCVER=`sh -c "gcc -dumpversion" 2>/dev/null`
+  if [ "$GCCVER" != "" ]; then
+    # then strip off whatever prefix egcs prepends the number with...
+    # Hopefully, this will work for any future prefixes as well.
+    GCCVER=`echo $GCCVER | LC_ALL=C sed 's/^[a-zA-Z]*\-//'`
+    # Since gcc 3.1 gcc --version behaviour has changed.  gcc -dumpversion
+    # does give us what we want though, so we use that.  We just just the
+    # major and minor version numbers.
+    # peak single digit before and after first dot, e.g. 2.95.1 gives 29
+    GCCVER=`echo $GCCVER | sed 's/\([0-9]\)\.\([0-9]\).*/\1\2/'`
+    CC=gcc
+  else
+    CC=cc
+  fi
+fi
+GCCVER=${GCCVER:-0}
+if [ "$SYSTEM" = "HP-UX" ];then
+  # By default gcc is a ILP32 compiler (with long long == 64).
+  GCC_BITS="32"
+  if [ $GCCVER -ge 30 ]; then
+    # PA64 support only came in with gcc 3.0.x.
+    # We check if the preprocessor symbol __LP64__ is defined...
+    if echo "__LP64__" | gcc -v -E -x c - 2>/dev/null | grep "^__LP64__" 2>&1 > /dev/null; then
+      : # __LP64__ has slipped through, it therefore is not defined
+    else
+      GCC_BITS="64"
+    fi
+  fi
+fi
+if [ "$SYSTEM" = "SunOS" ]; then
+  if [ $GCCVER -ge 30 ]; then
+    # 64-bit ABI isn't officially supported in gcc 3.0, but it appears
+    # to be working, at the very least 'make test' passes...
+    if gcc -v -E -x c /dev/null 2>&1 | grep __arch64__ > /dev/null; then
+      GCC_ARCH="-m64"
+    else
+      GCC_ARCH="-m32"
+    fi
+  fi
+  # check for WorkShop C, expected output is "cc: blah-blah C x.x"
+  CCVER=`(cc -V 2>&1) 2>/dev/null | \
+  	egrep -e '^cc: .* C [0-9]\.[0-9]' | \
+	sed 's/.* C \([0-9]\)\.\([0-9]\).*/\1\2/'`
+  CCVER=${CCVER:-0}
+  if [ $MACHINE != i86pc -a $CCVER -gt 40 ]; then
+    CC=cc	# overrides gcc!!!
+    if [ $CCVER -eq 50 ]; then
+      echo "WARNING! Detected WorkShop C 5.0. Do make sure you have"
+      echo "         patch #107357-01 or later applied."
+      sleep 5
+    fi
+  fi
+fi
+
+if [ "${SYSTEM}" = "AIX" ]; then	# favor vendor cc over gcc
+    (cc) 2>&1 | grep -iv "not found" > /dev/null && CC=cc
+fi
+
+CCVER=${CCVER:-0}
+
+# read the output of the embedded GuessOS 
+read GUESSOS
+
+echo Operating system: $GUESSOS
+
+# now map the output into SSLeay terms ... really should hack into the
+# script above so we end up with values in vars but that would take
+# more time that I want to waste at the moment
+case "$GUESSOS" in
+  uClinux*64*)
+    OUT=uClinux-dist64
+	;;
+  uClinux*)
+    OUT=uClinux-dist
+	;;
+  mips3-sgi-irix)
+	#CPU=`(hinv -t cpu) 2>/dev/null | head -1 | sed 's/^CPU:[^R]*R\([0-9]*\).*/\1/'`
+	#CPU=${CPU:-0}
+	#if [ $CPU -ge 5000 ]; then
+	#	options="$options -mips4"
+	#else
+	#	options="$options -mips3"
+	#fi
+	OUT="irix-mips3-$CC"
+	;;
+  mips4-sgi-irix64)
+	echo "WARNING! If you wish to build 64-bit library, then you have to"
+	echo "         invoke '$THERE/Configure irix64-mips4-$CC' *manually*."
+	if [ "$DRYRUN" = "false" -a -t 1 ]; then
+	  echo "         You have about 5 seconds to press Ctrl-C to abort."
+	  (trap "stty `stty -g`; exit 0" 2 0; stty -icanon min 0 time 50; read waste) <&1
+	fi
+        #CPU=`(hinv -t cpu) 2>/dev/null | head -1 | sed 's/^CPU:[^R]*R\([0-9]*\).*/\1/'`
+        #CPU=${CPU:-0}
+        #if [ $CPU -ge 5000 ]; then
+        #        options="$options -mips4"
+        #else
+        #        options="$options -mips3"
+        #fi
+	OUT="irix-mips3-$CC"
+	;;
+  ppc-apple-rhapsody) OUT="rhapsody-ppc-cc" ;;
+  ppc-apple-darwin*)
+	ISA64=`(sysctl -n hw.optional.64bitops) 2>/dev/null`
+	if [ "$ISA64" = "1" -a -z "$KERNEL_BITS" ]; then
+	    echo "WARNING! If you wish to build 64-bit library, then you have to"
+	    echo "         invoke '$THERE/Configure darwin64-ppc-cc' *manually*."
+	    if [ "$DRYRUN" = "false" -a -t 1 ]; then
+	      echo "         You have about 5 seconds to press Ctrl-C to abort."
+	      (trap "stty `stty -g`; exit 0" 2 0; stty -icanon min 0 time 50; read waste) <&1
+	    fi
+	fi
+	if [ "$ISA64" = "1" -a "$KERNEL_BITS" = "64" ]; then
+	    OUT="darwin64-ppc-cc"
+	else
+	    OUT="darwin-ppc-cc"
+	fi ;;
+  i?86-apple-darwin*)
+	ISA64=`(sysctl -n hw.optional.x86_64) 2>/dev/null`
+	if [ "$ISA64" = "1" -a -z "$KERNEL_BITS" ]; then
+	    echo "WARNING! If you wish to build 64-bit library, then you have to"
+	    echo "         invoke 'KERNEL_BITS=64 $THERE/config $options'."
+	    if [ "$DRYRUN" = "false" -a -t 1 ]; then
+	      echo "         You have about 5 seconds to press Ctrl-C to abort."
+	      # The stty technique used elsewhere doesn't work on
+	      # MacOS. At least, right now on this Mac.
+	      sleep 5
+	    fi
+	fi
+	if [ "$ISA64" = "1" -a "$KERNEL_BITS" = "64" ]; then
+	    OUT="darwin64-x86_64-cc"
+	else
+	    OUT="darwin-i386-cc"
+	fi ;;
+  x86_64-apple-darwin*)
+	if [ -z "$KERNEL_BITS" ]; then
+	    echo "WARNING! If you wish to build 32-bit library, then you have to"
+	    echo "         invoke 'KERNEL_BITS=32 $THERE/config $options'."
+	    if [ "$DRYRUN" = "false" -a -t 1 ]; then
+	      echo "         You have about 5 seconds to press Ctrl-C to abort."
+	      # The stty technique used elsewhere doesn't work on
+	      # MacOS. At least, right now on this Mac.
+	      sleep 5
+	    fi
+	fi
+	if [ "$KERNEL_BITS" = "32" ]; then
+	    OUT="darwin-i386-cc"
+	else
+	    OUT="darwin64-x86_64-cc"
+	fi ;;
+  armv6+7-*-iphoneos)
+	options="$options -arch%20armv6 -arch%20armv7"
+	OUT="iphoneos-cross" ;;
+  *-*-iphoneos)
+	options="$options -arch%20${MACHINE}"
+	OUT="iphoneos-cross" ;;
+  arm64-*-iphoneos|*-*-ios64)
+	OUT="ios64-cross" ;;
+  alpha-*-linux2)
+        ISA=`awk '/cpu model/{print$4;exit(0);}' /proc/cpuinfo`
+	case ${ISA:-generic} in
+	*[678])	OUT="linux-alpha+bwx-$CC" ;;
+	*)	OUT="linux-alpha-$CC" ;;
+	esac
+	if [ "$CC" = "gcc" ]; then
+	    case ${ISA:-generic} in
+	    EV5|EV45)		options="$options -mcpu=ev5";;
+	    EV56|PCA56)		options="$options -mcpu=ev56";;
+	    *)			options="$options -mcpu=ev6";;
+	    esac
+	fi
+	;;
+  ppc64-*-linux2)
+	if [ -z "$KERNEL_BITS" ]; then
+	    echo "WARNING! If you wish to build 64-bit library, then you have to"
+	    echo "         invoke '$THERE/Configure linux-ppc64' *manually*."
+	    if [ "$DRYRUN" = "false" -a -t 1 ]; then
+		echo "         You have about 5 seconds to press Ctrl-C to abort."
+		(trap "stty `stty -g`; exit 0" 2 0; stty -icanon min 0 time 50; read waste) <&1
+	    fi
+	fi
+	if [ "$KERNEL_BITS" = "64" ]; then
+	    OUT="linux-ppc64"
+	else
+	    OUT="linux-ppc"
+	    (echo "__LP64__" | gcc -E -x c - 2>/dev/null | grep "^__LP64__" 2>&1 > /dev/null) || options="$options -m32"
+	fi
+	;;
+  ppc64le-*-linux2) OUT="linux-ppc64le" ;;
+  ppc-*-linux2) OUT="linux-ppc" ;;
+  mips64*-*-linux2)
+	echo "WARNING! If you wish to build 64-bit library, then you have to"
+	echo "         invoke '$THERE/Configure linux64-mips64' *manually*."
+	if [ "$DRYRUN" = "false" -a -t 1 ]; then
+	    echo "         You have about 5 seconds to press Ctrl-C to abort."
+	    (trap "stty `stty -g`; exit 0" 2 0; stty -icanon min 0 time 50; read waste) <&1
+	fi
+	OUT="linux-mips64"
+	;;
+  mips*-*-linux2) OUT="linux-mips32" ;;
+  ppc60x-*-vxworks*) OUT="vxworks-ppc60x" ;;
+  ppcgen-*-vxworks*) OUT="vxworks-ppcgen" ;;
+  pentium-*-vxworks*) OUT="vxworks-pentium" ;;
+  simlinux-*-vxworks*) OUT="vxworks-simlinux" ;;
+  mips-*-vxworks*) OUT="vxworks-mips";;
+  ia64-*-linux?) OUT="linux-ia64" ;;
+  sparc64-*-linux2)
+	echo "WARNING! If you *know* that your GNU C supports 64-bit/V9 ABI"
+	echo "         and wish to build 64-bit library, then you have to"
+	echo "         invoke '$THERE/Configure linux64-sparcv9' *manually*."
+	if [ "$DRYRUN" = "false" -a -t 1 ]; then
+	  echo "          You have about 5 seconds to press Ctrl-C to abort."
+	  (trap "stty `stty -g`; exit 0" 2 0; stty -icanon min 0 time 50; read waste) <&1
+	fi
+	OUT="linux-sparcv9" ;;
+  sparc-*-linux2)
+	KARCH=`awk '/^type/{print$3;exit(0);}' /proc/cpuinfo`
+	case ${KARCH:-sun4} in
+	sun4u*)	OUT="linux-sparcv9" ;;
+	sun4m)	OUT="linux-sparcv8" ;;
+	sun4d)	OUT="linux-sparcv8" ;;
+	*)	OUT="linux-generic32"; options="$options -DB_ENDIAN" ;;
+	esac ;;
+  parisc*-*-linux2)
+	# 64-bit builds under parisc64 linux are not supported and
+	# compiler is expected to generate 32-bit objects...
+	CPUARCH=`awk '/cpu family/{print substr($5,1,3); exit(0);}' /proc/cpuinfo`
+	CPUSCHEDULE=`awk '/^cpu.[ 	]*: PA/{print substr($3,3); exit(0);}' /proc/cpuinfo`
+
+	# ??TODO ??  Model transformations
+	# 0. CPU Architecture for the 1.1 processor has letter suffixes. We strip that off
+	#    assuming no further arch. identification will ever be used by GCC.
+	# 1. I'm most concerned about whether is a 7300LC is closer to a 7100 versus a 7100LC.
+	# 2. The variant 64-bit processors cause concern should GCC support explicit schedulers
+	#    for these chips in the future.
+	#         PA7300LC -> 7100LC (1.1)
+	#         PA8200   -> 8000   (2.0)
+	#         PA8500   -> 8000   (2.0)
+	#         PA8600   -> 8000   (2.0)
+
+	CPUSCHEDULE=`echo $CPUSCHEDULE|sed -e 's/7300LC/7100LC/' -e 's/8.00/8000/'`
+	# Finish Model transformations
+
+	options="$options -DB_ENDIAN -mschedule=$CPUSCHEDULE -march=$CPUARCH"
+	OUT="linux-generic32" ;;
+  armv[1-3]*-*-linux2) OUT="linux-generic32" ;;
+  armv[7-9]*-*-linux2) OUT="linux-armv4"; options="$options -march=armv7-a" ;;
+  arm*-*-linux2) OUT="linux-armv4" ;;
+  aarch64-*-linux2) OUT="linux-aarch64" ;;
+  sh*b-*-linux2) OUT="linux-generic32"; options="$options -DB_ENDIAN" ;;
+  sh*-*-linux2)  OUT="linux-generic32"; options="$options -DL_ENDIAN" ;;
+  m68k*-*-linux2) OUT="linux-generic32"; options="$options -DB_ENDIAN" ;;
+  s390-*-linux2) OUT="linux-generic32"; options="$options -DB_ENDIAN" ;;
+  s390x-*-linux2)
+	# To be uncommented when glibc bug is fixed, see Configure...
+	#if egrep -e '^features.* highgprs' /proc/cpuinfo >/dev/null ; then
+	#  echo "WARNING! If you wish to build \"highgprs\" 32-bit library, then you"
+	#  echo "         have to invoke './Configure linux32-s390x' *manually*."
+	#  if [ "$DRYRUN" = "false" -a -t -1 ]; then
+	#    echo "         You have about 5 seconds to press Ctrl-C to abort."
+	#    (trap "stty `stty -g`; exit 0" 2 0; stty -icanon min 0 time 50; read waste) <&1
+	#  fi
+	#fi
+	OUT="linux64-s390x"
+	;;
+  x86_64-*-linux?)
+	if $CC -dM -E -x c /dev/null 2>&1 | grep -q ILP32 > /dev/null; then
+	    OUT="linux-x32"
+	else
+	    OUT="linux-x86_64"
+	fi ;;
+  *86-*-linux2)
+        # On machines where the compiler understands -m32, prefer a
+        # config target that uses it
+        if $CC -m32 -E -x c /dev/null > /dev/null 2>&1; then
+            OUT="linux-x86"
+        else
+            OUT="linux-elf"
+        fi ;;
+  *86-*-linux1) OUT="linux-aout" ;;
+  *-*-linux?) OUT="linux-generic32" ;;
+  sun4[uv]*-*-solaris2)
+	OUT="solaris-sparcv9-$CC"
+	ISA64=`(isainfo) 2>/dev/null | grep sparcv9`
+	if [ "$ISA64" != "" -a "$KERNEL_BITS" = "" ]; then
+	    if [ "$CC" = "cc" -a $CCVER -ge 50 ]; then
+		echo "WARNING! If you wish to build 64-bit library, then you have to"
+		echo "         invoke '$THERE/Configure solaris64-sparcv9-cc' *manually*."
+		if [ "$DRYRUN" = "false" -a -t 1 ]; then
+		  echo "         You have about 5 seconds to press Ctrl-C to abort."
+		  (trap "stty `stty -g`; exit 0" 2 0; stty -icanon min 0 time 50; read waste) <&1
+		fi
+	    elif [ "$CC" = "gcc" -a "$GCC_ARCH" = "-m64" ]; then
+		# $GCC_ARCH denotes default ABI chosen by compiler driver
+		# (first one found on the $PATH). I assume that user
+		# expects certain consistency with the rest of his builds
+		# and therefore switch over to 64-bit. <appro>
+		OUT="solaris64-sparcv9-gcc"
+		echo "WARNING! If you wish to build 32-bit library, then you have to"
+		echo "         invoke '$THERE/Configure solaris-sparcv9-gcc' *manually*."
+		if [ "$DRYRUN" = "false" -a -t 1 ]; then
+		  echo "         You have about 5 seconds to press Ctrl-C to abort."
+		  (trap "stty `stty -g`; exit 0" 2 0; stty -icanon min 0 time 50; read waste) <&1
+		fi
+	    elif [ "$GCC_ARCH" = "-m32" ]; then
+		echo "NOTICE! If you *know* that your GNU C supports 64-bit/V9 ABI"
+		echo "        and wish to build 64-bit library, then you have to"
+		echo "        invoke '$THERE/Configure solaris64-sparcv9-gcc' *manually*."
+		if [ "$DRYRUN" = "false" -a -t 1 ]; then
+		  echo "         You have about 5 seconds to press Ctrl-C to abort."
+		  (trap "stty `stty -g`; exit 0" 2 0; stty -icanon min 0 time 50; read waste) <&1
+		fi
+	    fi
+	fi
+	if [ "$ISA64" != "" -a "$KERNEL_BITS" = "64" ]; then
+	    OUT="solaris64-sparcv9-$CC"
+	fi
+	;;
+  sun4m-*-solaris2)	OUT="solaris-sparcv8-$CC" ;;
+  sun4d-*-solaris2)	OUT="solaris-sparcv8-$CC" ;;
+  sun4*-*-solaris2)	OUT="solaris-sparcv7-$CC" ;;
+  *86*-*-solaris2)
+	ISA64=`(isainfo) 2>/dev/null | grep amd64`
+	if [ "$ISA64" != "" -a ${KERNEL_BITS:-64} -eq 64 ]; then
+	    OUT="solaris64-x86_64-$CC"
+	else
+	    OUT="solaris-x86-$CC"
+	    if [ `uname -r | sed -e 's/5\.//'` -lt 10 ]; then
+		options="$options no-sse2"
+	    fi
+	fi
+	;;
+  *-*-sunos4)		OUT="sunos-$CC" ;;
+
+  *86*-*-bsdi4)		OUT="BSD-x86-elf"; options="$options no-sse2 -ldl" ;;
+  alpha*-*-*bsd*)	OUT="BSD-generic64"; options="$options -DL_ENDIAN" ;;
+  powerpc64-*-*bsd*)	OUT="BSD-generic64"; options="$options -DB_ENDIAN" ;;
+  sparc64-*-*bsd*)	OUT="BSD-sparc64" ;;
+  ia64-*-*bsd*)		OUT="BSD-ia64" ;;
+  amd64-*-*bsd*)	OUT="BSD-x86_64" ;;
+  *86*-*-*bsd*)		# mimic ld behaviour when it's looking for libc...
+			if [ -L /usr/lib/libc.so ]; then	# [Free|Net]BSD
+			    libc=/usr/lib/libc.so
+			else					# OpenBSD
+			    # ld searches for highest libc.so.* and so do we
+			    libc=`(ls /usr/lib/libc.so.* /lib/libc.so.* | tail -1) 2>/dev/null`
+			fi
+			case "`(file -L $libc) 2>/dev/null`" in
+			*ELF*)	OUT="BSD-x86-elf" ;;
+			*)	OUT="BSD-x86"; options="$options no-sse2" ;;
+			esac ;;
+  *-*-*bsd*)		OUT="BSD-generic32" ;;
+
+  x86_64-*-haiku)	OUT="haiku-x86_64" ;;
+  *-*-haiku)		OUT="haiku-x86" ;;
+
+  *-*-osf)		OUT="osf1-alpha-cc" ;;
+  *-*-tru64)		OUT="tru64-alpha-cc" ;;
+  *-*-[Uu]nix[Ww]are7)
+	if [ "$CC" = "gcc" ]; then
+	  OUT="unixware-7-gcc" ; options="$options no-sse2"
+	else    
+	  OUT="unixware-7" ; options="$options no-sse2 -D__i386__"
+	fi
+	;;
+  *-*-[Uu]nix[Ww]are20*) OUT="unixware-2.0"; options="$options no-sse2 no-sha512" ;;
+  *-*-[Uu]nix[Ww]are21*) OUT="unixware-2.1"; options="$options no-sse2 no-sha512" ;;
+  *-*-vos)
+	options="$options no-threads no-shared no-asm no-dso"
+	EXE=".pm"
+	OUT="vos-$CC" ;;
+  BS2000-siemens-sysv4) OUT="BS2000-OSD" ;;
+  *-hpux1*)
+	if [ $CC = "gcc" -a $GCC_BITS = "64" ]; then
+	    OUT="hpux64-parisc2-gcc"
+	fi
+	[ "$KERNEL_BITS" ] || KERNEL_BITS=`(getconf KERNEL_BITS) 2>/dev/null`
+	KERNEL_BITS=${KERNEL_BITS:-32}
+	CPU_VERSION=`(getconf CPU_VERSION) 2>/dev/null`
+	CPU_VERSION=${CPU_VERSION:-0}
+	# See <sys/unistd.h> for further info on CPU_VERSION.
+	if   [ $CPU_VERSION -ge 768 ]; then	# IA-64 CPU
+	     if [ $KERNEL_BITS -eq 64 -a "$CC" = "cc" ]; then
+	        OUT="hpux64-ia64-cc"
+             else
+	        OUT="hpux-ia64-cc"
+             fi
+	elif [ $CPU_VERSION -ge 532 ]; then	# PA-RISC 2.x CPU
+	     OUT=${OUT:-"hpux-parisc2-${CC}"}
+	     if [ $KERNEL_BITS -eq 64 -a "$CC" = "cc" ]; then
+		echo "WARNING! If you wish to build 64-bit library then you have to"
+		echo "         invoke '$THERE/Configure hpux64-parisc2-cc' *manually*."
+		if [ "$DRYRUN" = "false" -a -t 1 ]; then
+		  echo "         You have about 5 seconds to press Ctrl-C to abort."
+		  (trap "stty `stty -g`; exit 0" 2 0; stty -icanon min 0 time 50; read waste) <&1
+		fi
+	     fi
+	     # PA-RISC 2.0 is no longer supported as separate 32-bit
+	     # target. This is compensated for by run-time detection
+	     # in most critical assembly modules and taking advantage
+	     # of 2.0 architecture in PA-RISC 1.1 build.
+	     OUT="hpux-parisc1_1-${CC}"
+	elif [ $CPU_VERSION -ge 528 ]; then	# PA-RISC 1.1+ CPU
+	     OUT="hpux-parisc1_1-${CC}"
+	elif [ $CPU_VERSION -ge 523 ]; then	# PA-RISC 1.0 CPU
+	     OUT="hpux-parisc-${CC}"
+	else					# Motorola(?) CPU
+	     OUT="hpux-$CC"
+	fi
+	options="$options -D_REENTRANT" ;;
+  *-hpux)	OUT="hpux-parisc-$CC" ;;
+  *-aix)
+	[ "$KERNEL_BITS" ] || KERNEL_BITS=`(getconf KERNEL_BITMODE) 2>/dev/null`
+	KERNEL_BITS=${KERNEL_BITS:-32}
+	OBJECT_MODE=${OBJECT_MODE:-32}
+	if [ "$CC" = "gcc" ]; then
+	    OUT="aix-gcc"
+          if [ $OBJECT_MODE -eq 64 ]; then
+            echo 'Your $OBJECT_MODE was found to be set to 64'
+            OUT="aix64-gcc"
+          fi
+	elif [ $OBJECT_MODE -eq 64 ]; then
+	    echo 'Your $OBJECT_MODE was found to be set to 64' 
+	    OUT="aix64-cc"
+	else
+	    OUT="aix-cc"
+	    if [ $KERNEL_BITS -eq 64 ]; then
+		echo "WARNING! If you wish to build 64-bit kit, then you have to"
+		echo "         invoke '$THERE/Configure aix64-cc' *manually*."
+		if [ "$DRYRUN" = "false" -a -t 1 ]; then
+		    echo "         You have ~5 seconds to press Ctrl-C to abort."
+		    (trap "stty `stty -g`; exit 0" 2 0; stty -icanon min 0 time 50; read waste) <&1
+		fi
+	    fi
+	fi
+	if (lsattr -E -O -l `lsdev -c processor|awk '{print$1;exit}'` | grep -i powerpc) >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+	    :	# this applies even to Power3 and later, as they return PowerPC_POWER[345]
+	else
+	    options="$options no-asm"
+	fi
+	;;
+  # these are all covered by the catchall below
+  i[3456]86-*-cygwin) OUT="Cygwin-x86" ;;
+  *-*-cygwin) OUT="Cygwin-${MACHINE}" ;;
+  x86pc-*-qnx6) OUT="QNX6-i386" ;;
+  *-*-qnx6) OUT="QNX6" ;;
+  x86-*-android|i?86-*-android) OUT="android-x86" ;;
+  armv[7-9]*-*-android)
+      OUT="android-armeabi"; options="$options -march=armv7-a" ;;
+  arm*-*-android) OUT="android-armeabi" ;;
+  *) OUT=`echo $GUESSOS | awk -F- '{print $3}'`;;
+esac
+
+# NB: This atalla support has been superseded by the ENGINE support
+# That contains its own header and definitions anyway. Support can
+# be enabled or disabled on any supported platform without external
+# headers, eg. by adding the "hw-atalla" switch to ./config or
+# perl Configure
+#
+# See whether we can compile Atalla support
+#if [ -f /usr/include/atasi.h ]
+#then
+#  options="$options -DATALLA"
+#fi
+
+if [ -n "$CONFIG_OPTIONS" ]; then
+  options="$options $CONFIG_OPTIONS"
+fi
+
+if expr "$options" : '.*no\-asm' > /dev/null; then :; else
+  sh -c "$CROSS_COMPILE${CC:-gcc} -Wa,--help -c -o /tmp/null.$$.o -x assembler /dev/null && rm /tmp/null.$$.o" 2>&1 | \
+  grep \\--noexecstack >/dev/null && \
+  options="$options -Wa,--noexecstack"
+fi
+
+# gcc < 2.8 does not support -march=ultrasparc
+if [ "$OUT" = solaris-sparcv9-gcc -a $GCCVER -lt 28 ]
+then
+  echo "WARNING! Falling down to 'solaris-sparcv8-gcc'."
+  echo "         Upgrade to gcc-2.8 or later."
+  sleep 5
+  OUT=solaris-sparcv8-gcc
+fi
+if [ "$OUT" = "linux-sparcv9" -a $GCCVER -lt 28 ]
+then
+  echo "WARNING! Falling down to 'linux-sparcv8'."
+  echo "         Upgrade to gcc-2.8 or later."
+  sleep 5
+  OUT=linux-sparcv8
+fi
+
+case "$GUESSOS" in
+  i386-*) options="$options 386" ;;
+esac
+
+for i in aes bf camellia cast des dh dsa ec hmac idea md2 md5 mdc2 rc2 rc4 rc5 ripemd rsa seed sha
+do
+  if [ ! -d $THERE/crypto/$i ]
+  then
+    options="$options no-$i"
+  fi
+done
+
+if [ -z "$OUT" ]; then
+  OUT="$CC"
+fi
+
+if [ ".$PERL" = . ] ; then
+	for i in . `echo $PATH | sed 's/:/ /g'`; do
+		if [ -f "$i/perl5$EXE" ] ; then
+			PERL="$i/perl5$EXE"
+			break;
+		fi;
+	done
+fi
+
+if [ ".$PERL" = . ] ; then
+	for i in . `echo $PATH | sed 's/:/ /g'`; do
+		if [ -f "$i/perl$EXE" ] ; then
+			if "$i/perl$EXE" -e 'exit($]<5.0)'; then
+				PERL="$i/perl$EXE"
+				break;
+			fi;
+		fi;
+	done
+fi
+
+if [ ".$PERL" = . ] ; then
+	echo "You need Perl 5."
+	exit 1
+fi
+
+# run Configure to check to see if we need to specify the 
+# compiler for the platform ... in which case we add it on
+# the end ... otherwise we leave it off
+
+$PERL $THERE/Configure LIST | grep "$OUT-$CC" > /dev/null
+if [ $? = "0" ]; then
+  OUT="$OUT-$CC"
+fi
+
+OUT="$OUT"
+
+$PERL $THERE/Configure LIST | grep "$OUT" > /dev/null
+if [ $? = "0" ]; then
+  echo Configuring for $OUT
+
+  if [ "$VERBOSE" = "true" ]; then
+    echo $PERL $THERE/Configure $OUT $options
+  fi  
+  if [ "$DRYRUN" = "false" ]; then
+    $PERL $THERE/Configure $OUT $options
+  fi
+else
+  echo "This system ($OUT) is not supported. See file INSTALL for details."
+fi
+)
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/config.com b/openssl-1.1.0h/config.com
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..46ccaa2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/config.com
@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+$	! OpenSSL config: determine the architecture and run Configure
+$	! Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+$	!
+$	! Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+$	! this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a
+$	! copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+$	! https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+$	!
+$	! Very simple for the moment, it will take the following arguments:
+$	!
+$	! -32 or 32	sets /POINTER_SIZE=32
+$	! -64 or 64	sets /POINTER_SIZE=64
+$	! -d		sets debugging
+$	! -h		prints a usage and exits
+$	! -t		test mode, doesn't run Configure
+$
+$	arch = f$edit( f$getsyi( "arch_name"), "lowercase")
+$	pointer_size = ""
+$	dryrun = 0
+$	verbose = 0
+$	here = F$PARSE("A.;",F$ENVIRONMENT("PROCEDURE"),,,"SYNTAX_ONLY") - "A.;"
+$
+$	collected_args = ""
+$	P_index = 0
+$	LOOP1:
+$	    P_index = P_index + 1
+$	    IF P_index .GT. 8 THEN GOTO ENDLOOP1
+$	    P = F$EDIT(P1,"TRIM,LOWERCASE")
+$	    IF P .EQS. "-h"
+$           THEN
+$               dryrun = 1
+$               P = ""
+$               TYPE SYS$INPUT
+$               DECK
+Usage: @config [options]
+
+  -32 or 32	Build with 32-bit pointer size.
+  -64 or 64	Build with 64-bit pointer size.
+  -d		Build with debugging.
+  -t            Test mode, do not run the Configure perl script.
+  -v            Verbose mode, show the exact Configure call that is being made.
+  -h		This help.
+
+Any other text will be passed to the Configure perl script.
+See INSTALL for instructions.
+
+$               EOD
+$           ENDIF
+$	    IF P .EQS. "-t"
+$	    THEN
+$		dryrun = 1
+$		verbose = 1
+$		P = ""
+$	    ENDIF
+$	    IF P .EQS. "-v"
+$	    THEN
+$		verbose = 1
+$		P = ""
+$	    ENDIF
+$	    IF P .EQS. "-32" .OR. P .EQS. "32"
+$	    THEN
+$		pointer_size = "-P32"
+$		P = ""
+$	    ENDIF
+$	    IF P .EQS. "-64" .OR. P .EQS. "64"
+$	    THEN
+$		pointer_size = "-P64"
+$		P = ""
+$	    ENDIF
+$	    IF P .EQS. "-d"
+$	    THEN
+$               collected_args = collected_args + " --debug"
+$		P = ""
+$	    ENDIF
+$	    IF P .NES. "" THEN -
+	       collected_args = collected_args + " """ + P1 + """"
+$	    P1 = P2
+$	    P2 = P3
+$	    P3 = P4
+$	    P4 = P5
+$	    P5 = P6
+$	    P6 = P7
+$	    P7 = P8
+$	    P8 = ""
+$	    GOTO LOOP1
+$	ENDLOOP1:
+$
+$	target = "vms-''arch'''pointer_size'"
+$       IF verbose THEN -
+           WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "PERL ''here'Configure ""''target'""",collected_args
+$       IF .not. dryrun THEN -
+           PERL 'here'Configure "''target'"'collected_args'
+$       EXIT $STATUS
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/LPdir_nyi.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/LPdir_nyi.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..049044c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/LPdir_nyi.c
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2004, Richard Levitte <richard@levitte.org>
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef LPDIR_H
+# include "LPdir.h"
+#endif
+
+struct LP_dir_context_st {
+    void *dummy;
+};
+const char *LP_find_file(LP_DIR_CTX **ctx, const char *directory)
+{
+    errno = EINVAL;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int LP_find_file_end(LP_DIR_CTX **ctx)
+{
+    errno = EINVAL;
+    return 0;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/LPdir_unix.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/LPdir_unix.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1bb2940
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/LPdir_unix.c
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2004, Richard Levitte <richard@levitte.org>
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
+ * ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+ * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR
+ * A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
+ * OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+ * LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
+ * OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <dirent.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#ifndef LPDIR_H
+# include "LPdir.h"
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * The POSIXly macro for the maximum number of characters in a file path is
+ * NAME_MAX.  However, some operating systems use PATH_MAX instead.
+ * Therefore, it seems natural to first check for PATH_MAX and use that, and
+ * if it doesn't exist, use NAME_MAX.
+ */
+#if defined(PATH_MAX)
+# define LP_ENTRY_SIZE PATH_MAX
+#elif defined(NAME_MAX)
+# define LP_ENTRY_SIZE NAME_MAX
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Of course, there's the possibility that neither PATH_MAX nor NAME_MAX
+ * exist.  It's also possible that NAME_MAX exists but is define to a very
+ * small value (HP-UX offers 14), so we need to check if we got a result, and
+ * if it meets a minimum standard, and create or change it if not.
+ */
+#if !defined(LP_ENTRY_SIZE) || LP_ENTRY_SIZE<255
+# undef LP_ENTRY_SIZE
+# define LP_ENTRY_SIZE 255
+#endif
+
+struct LP_dir_context_st {
+    DIR *dir;
+    char entry_name[LP_ENTRY_SIZE + 1];
+};
+
+const char *LP_find_file(LP_DIR_CTX **ctx, const char *directory)
+{
+    struct dirent *direntry = NULL;
+
+    if (ctx == NULL || directory == NULL) {
+        errno = EINVAL;
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    errno = 0;
+    if (*ctx == NULL) {
+        *ctx = malloc(sizeof(**ctx));
+        if (*ctx == NULL) {
+            errno = ENOMEM;
+            return 0;
+        }
+        memset(*ctx, 0, sizeof(**ctx));
+
+        (*ctx)->dir = opendir(directory);
+        if ((*ctx)->dir == NULL) {
+            int save_errno = errno; /* Probably not needed, but I'm paranoid */
+            free(*ctx);
+            *ctx = NULL;
+            errno = save_errno;
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    direntry = readdir((*ctx)->dir);
+    if (direntry == NULL) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    strncpy((*ctx)->entry_name, direntry->d_name,
+            sizeof((*ctx)->entry_name) - 1);
+    (*ctx)->entry_name[sizeof((*ctx)->entry_name) - 1] = '\0';
+    return (*ctx)->entry_name;
+}
+
+int LP_find_file_end(LP_DIR_CTX **ctx)
+{
+    if (ctx != NULL && *ctx != NULL) {
+        int ret = closedir((*ctx)->dir);
+
+        free(*ctx);
+        switch (ret) {
+        case 0:
+            return 1;
+        case -1:
+            return 0;
+        default:
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    errno = EINVAL;
+    return 0;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/LPdir_vms.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/LPdir_vms.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1a5b60f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/LPdir_vms.c
@@ -0,0 +1,204 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2004, Richard Levitte <richard@levitte.org>
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
+ * ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+ * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR
+ * A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
+ * OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+ * LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
+ * OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <descrip.h>
+#include <namdef.h>
+#include <rmsdef.h>
+#include <libfildef.h>
+#include <lib$routines.h>
+#include <strdef.h>
+#include <str$routines.h>
+#include <stsdef.h>
+#ifndef LPDIR_H
+# include "LPdir.h"
+#endif
+#include "vms_rms.h"
+
+/* Some compiler options hide EVMSERR. */
+#ifndef EVMSERR
+# define EVMSERR        65535   /* error for non-translatable VMS errors */
+#endif
+
+struct LP_dir_context_st {
+    unsigned long VMS_context;
+    char filespec[NAMX_MAXRSS + 1];
+    char result[NAMX_MAXRSS + 1];
+    struct dsc$descriptor_d filespec_dsc;
+    struct dsc$descriptor_d result_dsc;
+};
+
+const char *LP_find_file(LP_DIR_CTX **ctx, const char *directory)
+{
+    int status;
+    char *p, *r;
+    size_t l;
+    unsigned long flags = 0;
+
+/* Arrange 32-bit pointer to (copied) string storage, if needed. */
+#if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64
+# pragma pointer_size save
+# pragma pointer_size 32
+    char *ctx_filespec_32p;
+# pragma pointer_size restore
+    char ctx_filespec_32[NAMX_MAXRSS + 1];
+#endif                          /* __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 */
+
+#ifdef NAML$C_MAXRSS
+    flags |= LIB$M_FIL_LONG_NAMES;
+#endif
+
+    if (ctx == NULL || directory == NULL) {
+        errno = EINVAL;
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    errno = 0;
+    if (*ctx == NULL) {
+        size_t filespeclen = strlen(directory);
+        char *filespec = NULL;
+
+        if (filespeclen == 0) {
+            errno = ENOENT;
+            return 0;
+        }
+
+        /* MUST be a VMS directory specification!  Let's estimate if it is. */
+        if (directory[filespeclen - 1] != ']'
+            && directory[filespeclen - 1] != '>'
+            && directory[filespeclen - 1] != ':') {
+            errno = EINVAL;
+            return 0;
+        }
+
+        filespeclen += 4;       /* "*.*;" */
+
+        if (filespeclen > NAMX_MAXRSS) {
+            errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
+            return 0;
+        }
+
+        *ctx = malloc(sizeof(**ctx));
+        if (*ctx == NULL) {
+            errno = ENOMEM;
+            return 0;
+        }
+        memset(*ctx, 0, sizeof(**ctx));
+
+        strcpy((*ctx)->filespec, directory);
+        strcat((*ctx)->filespec, "*.*;");
+
+/* Arrange 32-bit pointer to (copied) string storage, if needed. */
+#if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64
+# define CTX_FILESPEC ctx_filespec_32p
+        /* Copy the file name to storage with a 32-bit pointer. */
+        ctx_filespec_32p = ctx_filespec_32;
+        strcpy(ctx_filespec_32p, (*ctx)->filespec);
+#else                           /* __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 */
+# define CTX_FILESPEC (*ctx)->filespec
+#endif                          /* __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 [else] */
+
+        (*ctx)->filespec_dsc.dsc$w_length = filespeclen;
+        (*ctx)->filespec_dsc.dsc$b_dtype = DSC$K_DTYPE_T;
+        (*ctx)->filespec_dsc.dsc$b_class = DSC$K_CLASS_S;
+        (*ctx)->filespec_dsc.dsc$a_pointer = CTX_FILESPEC;
+    }
+
+    (*ctx)->result_dsc.dsc$w_length = 0;
+    (*ctx)->result_dsc.dsc$b_dtype = DSC$K_DTYPE_T;
+    (*ctx)->result_dsc.dsc$b_class = DSC$K_CLASS_D;
+    (*ctx)->result_dsc.dsc$a_pointer = 0;
+
+    status = lib$find_file(&(*ctx)->filespec_dsc, &(*ctx)->result_dsc,
+                           &(*ctx)->VMS_context, 0, 0, 0, &flags);
+
+    if (status == RMS$_NMF) {
+        errno = 0;
+        vaxc$errno = status;
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    if (!$VMS_STATUS_SUCCESS(status)) {
+        errno = EVMSERR;
+        vaxc$errno = status;
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Quick, cheap and dirty way to discard any device and directory, since
+     * we only want file names
+     */
+    l = (*ctx)->result_dsc.dsc$w_length;
+    p = (*ctx)->result_dsc.dsc$a_pointer;
+    r = p;
+    for (; *p; p++) {
+        if (*p == '^' && p[1] != '\0') { /* Take care of ODS-5 escapes */
+            p++;
+        } else if (*p == ':' || *p == '>' || *p == ']') {
+            l -= p + 1 - r;
+            r = p + 1;
+        } else if (*p == ';') {
+            l = p - r;
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+
+    strncpy((*ctx)->result, r, l);
+    (*ctx)->result[l] = '\0';
+    str$free1_dx(&(*ctx)->result_dsc);
+
+    return (*ctx)->result;
+}
+
+int LP_find_file_end(LP_DIR_CTX **ctx)
+{
+    if (ctx != NULL && *ctx != NULL) {
+        int status = lib$find_file_end(&(*ctx)->VMS_context);
+
+        free(*ctx);
+
+        if (!$VMS_STATUS_SUCCESS(status)) {
+            errno = EVMSERR;
+            vaxc$errno = status;
+            return 0;
+        }
+        return 1;
+    }
+    errno = EINVAL;
+    return 0;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/LPdir_win.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/LPdir_win.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8f674d3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/LPdir_win.c
@@ -0,0 +1,211 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2004, Richard Levitte <richard@levitte.org>
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
+ * ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+ * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR
+ * A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
+ * OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+ * LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
+ * OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include <windows.h>
+#include <tchar.h>
+#include "internal/numbers.h"
+#ifndef LPDIR_H
+# include "LPdir.h"
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * We're most likely overcautious here, but let's reserve for broken WinCE
+ * headers and explicitly opt for UNICODE call. Keep in mind that our WinCE
+ * builds are compiled with -DUNICODE [as well as -D_UNICODE].
+ */
+#if defined(LP_SYS_WINCE) && !defined(FindFirstFile)
+# define FindFirstFile FindFirstFileW
+#endif
+#if defined(LP_SYS_WINCE) && !defined(FindNextFile)
+# define FindNextFile FindNextFileW
+#endif
+
+#ifndef NAME_MAX
+# define NAME_MAX 255
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CP_UTF8
+# define CP_DEFAULT CP_UTF8
+#else
+# define CP_DEFAULT CP_ACP
+#endif
+
+struct LP_dir_context_st {
+    WIN32_FIND_DATA ctx;
+    HANDLE handle;
+    char entry_name[NAME_MAX + 1];
+};
+
+const char *LP_find_file(LP_DIR_CTX **ctx, const char *directory)
+{
+    if (ctx == NULL || directory == NULL) {
+        errno = EINVAL;
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    errno = 0;
+    if (*ctx == NULL) {
+        size_t dirlen = strlen(directory);
+
+        if (dirlen == 0 || dirlen > INT_MAX - 3) {
+            errno = ENOENT;
+            return 0;
+        }
+
+        *ctx = malloc(sizeof(**ctx));
+        if (*ctx == NULL) {
+            errno = ENOMEM;
+            return 0;
+        }
+        memset(*ctx, 0, sizeof(**ctx));
+
+        if (sizeof(TCHAR) != sizeof(char)) {
+            TCHAR *wdir = NULL;
+            /* len_0 denotes string length *with* trailing 0 */
+            size_t index = 0, len_0 = dirlen + 1;
+#ifdef LP_MULTIBYTE_AVAILABLE
+            int sz = 0;
+            UINT cp;
+
+            do {
+# ifdef CP_UTF8
+                if ((sz = MultiByteToWideChar((cp = CP_UTF8), 0,
+                                              directory, len_0,
+                                              NULL, 0)) > 0 ||
+                    GetLastError() != ERROR_NO_UNICODE_TRANSLATION)
+                    break;
+# endif
+                sz = MultiByteToWideChar((cp = CP_ACP), 0,
+                                         directory, len_0,
+                                         NULL, 0);
+            } while (0);
+
+            if (sz > 0) {
+                /*
+                 * allocate two additional characters in case we need to
+                 * concatenate asterisk, |sz| covers trailing '\0'!
+                 */
+                wdir = _alloca((sz + 2) * sizeof(TCHAR));
+                if (!MultiByteToWideChar(cp, 0, directory, len_0,
+                                         (WCHAR *)wdir, sz)) {
+                    free(*ctx);
+                    *ctx = NULL;
+                    errno = EINVAL;
+                    return 0;
+                }
+            } else
+#endif
+            {
+                sz = len_0;
+                /*
+                 * allocate two additional characters in case we need to
+                 * concatenate asterisk, |sz| covers trailing '\0'!
+                 */
+                wdir = _alloca((sz + 2) * sizeof(TCHAR));
+                for (index = 0; index < len_0; index++)
+                    wdir[index] = (TCHAR)directory[index];
+            }
+
+            sz--; /* wdir[sz] is trailing '\0' now */
+            if (wdir[sz - 1] != TEXT('*')) {
+                if (wdir[sz - 1] != TEXT('/') && wdir[sz - 1] != TEXT('\\'))
+                    _tcscpy(wdir + sz, TEXT("/*"));
+                else
+                    _tcscpy(wdir + sz, TEXT("*"));
+            }
+
+            (*ctx)->handle = FindFirstFile(wdir, &(*ctx)->ctx);
+        } else {
+            if (directory[dirlen - 1] != '*') {
+                char *buf = _alloca(dirlen + 3);
+
+                strcpy(buf, directory);
+                if (buf[dirlen - 1] != '/' && buf[dirlen - 1] != '\\')
+                    strcpy(buf + dirlen, "/*");
+                else
+                    strcpy(buf + dirlen, "*");
+
+                directory = buf;
+            }
+
+            (*ctx)->handle = FindFirstFile((TCHAR *)directory, &(*ctx)->ctx);
+        }
+
+        if ((*ctx)->handle == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
+            free(*ctx);
+            *ctx = NULL;
+            errno = EINVAL;
+            return 0;
+        }
+    } else {
+        if (FindNextFile((*ctx)->handle, &(*ctx)->ctx) == FALSE) {
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+    if (sizeof(TCHAR) != sizeof(char)) {
+        TCHAR *wdir = (*ctx)->ctx.cFileName;
+        size_t index, len_0 = 0;
+
+        while (wdir[len_0] && len_0 < (sizeof((*ctx)->entry_name) - 1))
+            len_0++;
+        len_0++;
+
+#ifdef LP_MULTIBYTE_AVAILABLE
+        if (!WideCharToMultiByte(CP_DEFAULT, 0, (WCHAR *)wdir, len_0,
+                                 (*ctx)->entry_name,
+                                 sizeof((*ctx)->entry_name), NULL, 0))
+#endif
+            for (index = 0; index < len_0; index++)
+                (*ctx)->entry_name[index] = (char)wdir[index];
+    } else
+        strncpy((*ctx)->entry_name, (const char *)(*ctx)->ctx.cFileName,
+                sizeof((*ctx)->entry_name) - 1);
+
+    (*ctx)->entry_name[sizeof((*ctx)->entry_name) - 1] = '\0';
+
+    return (*ctx)->entry_name;
+}
+
+int LP_find_file_end(LP_DIR_CTX **ctx)
+{
+    if (ctx != NULL && *ctx != NULL) {
+        FindClose((*ctx)->handle);
+        free(*ctx);
+        *ctx = NULL;
+        return 1;
+    }
+    errno = EINVAL;
+    return 0;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/LPdir_win32.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/LPdir_win32.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..59ed485
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/LPdir_win32.c
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2004, Richard Levitte <richard@levitte.org>
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
+ * ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+ * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR
+ * A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
+ * OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+ * LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
+ * OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#define LP_SYS_WIN32
+#define LP_MULTIBYTE_AVAILABLE
+#include "LPdir_win.c"
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/LPdir_wince.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/LPdir_wince.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dbc1052
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/LPdir_wince.c
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2004, Richard Levitte <richard@levitte.org>
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
+ * ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+ * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR
+ * A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
+ * OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+ * LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
+ * OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#define LP_SYS_WINCE
+/*
+ * We might want to define LP_MULTIBYTE_AVAILABLE here.  It's currently under
+ * investigation what the exact conditions would be
+ */
+#include "LPdir_win.c"
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/aes_cbc.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/aes_cbc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..342841f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/aes_cbc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/aes.h>
+#include <openssl/modes.h>
+
+void AES_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                     size_t len, const AES_KEY *key,
+                     unsigned char *ivec, const int enc)
+{
+
+    if (enc)
+        CRYPTO_cbc128_encrypt(in, out, len, key, ivec,
+                              (block128_f) AES_encrypt);
+    else
+        CRYPTO_cbc128_decrypt(in, out, len, key, ivec,
+                              (block128_f) AES_decrypt);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/aes_cfb.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/aes_cfb.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f010e3c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/aes_cfb.c
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/aes.h>
+#include <openssl/modes.h>
+
+/*
+ * The input and output encrypted as though 128bit cfb mode is being used.
+ * The extra state information to record how much of the 128bit block we have
+ * used is contained in *num;
+ */
+
+void AES_cfb128_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                        size_t length, const AES_KEY *key,
+                        unsigned char *ivec, int *num, const int enc)
+{
+
+    CRYPTO_cfb128_encrypt(in, out, length, key, ivec, num, enc,
+                          (block128_f) AES_encrypt);
+}
+
+/* N.B. This expects the input to be packed, MS bit first */
+void AES_cfb1_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                      size_t length, const AES_KEY *key,
+                      unsigned char *ivec, int *num, const int enc)
+{
+    CRYPTO_cfb128_1_encrypt(in, out, length, key, ivec, num, enc,
+                            (block128_f) AES_encrypt);
+}
+
+void AES_cfb8_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                      size_t length, const AES_KEY *key,
+                      unsigned char *ivec, int *num, const int enc)
+{
+    CRYPTO_cfb128_8_encrypt(in, out, length, key, ivec, num, enc,
+                            (block128_f) AES_encrypt);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/aes_core.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/aes_core.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bd5c779
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/aes_core.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1367 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/**
+ * rijndael-alg-fst.c
+ *
+ * @version 3.0 (December 2000)
+ *
+ * Optimised ANSI C code for the Rijndael cipher (now AES)
+ *
+ * @author Vincent Rijmen <vincent.rijmen@esat.kuleuven.ac.be>
+ * @author Antoon Bosselaers <antoon.bosselaers@esat.kuleuven.ac.be>
+ * @author Paulo Barreto <paulo.barreto@terra.com.br>
+ *
+ * This code is hereby placed in the public domain.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHORS ''AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS
+ * OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE
+ * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
+ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
+ * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR
+ * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY,
+ * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE
+ * OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE,
+ * EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* Note: rewritten a little bit to provide error control and an OpenSSL-
+   compatible API */
+
+#include <assert.h>
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/aes.h>
+#include "aes_locl.h"
+
+#ifndef AES_ASM
+/*-
+Te0[x] = S [x].[02, 01, 01, 03];
+Te1[x] = S [x].[03, 02, 01, 01];
+Te2[x] = S [x].[01, 03, 02, 01];
+Te3[x] = S [x].[01, 01, 03, 02];
+
+Td0[x] = Si[x].[0e, 09, 0d, 0b];
+Td1[x] = Si[x].[0b, 0e, 09, 0d];
+Td2[x] = Si[x].[0d, 0b, 0e, 09];
+Td3[x] = Si[x].[09, 0d, 0b, 0e];
+Td4[x] = Si[x].[01];
+*/
+
+static const u32 Te0[256] = {
+    0xc66363a5U, 0xf87c7c84U, 0xee777799U, 0xf67b7b8dU,
+    0xfff2f20dU, 0xd66b6bbdU, 0xde6f6fb1U, 0x91c5c554U,
+    0x60303050U, 0x02010103U, 0xce6767a9U, 0x562b2b7dU,
+    0xe7fefe19U, 0xb5d7d762U, 0x4dababe6U, 0xec76769aU,
+    0x8fcaca45U, 0x1f82829dU, 0x89c9c940U, 0xfa7d7d87U,
+    0xeffafa15U, 0xb25959ebU, 0x8e4747c9U, 0xfbf0f00bU,
+    0x41adadecU, 0xb3d4d467U, 0x5fa2a2fdU, 0x45afafeaU,
+    0x239c9cbfU, 0x53a4a4f7U, 0xe4727296U, 0x9bc0c05bU,
+    0x75b7b7c2U, 0xe1fdfd1cU, 0x3d9393aeU, 0x4c26266aU,
+    0x6c36365aU, 0x7e3f3f41U, 0xf5f7f702U, 0x83cccc4fU,
+    0x6834345cU, 0x51a5a5f4U, 0xd1e5e534U, 0xf9f1f108U,
+    0xe2717193U, 0xabd8d873U, 0x62313153U, 0x2a15153fU,
+    0x0804040cU, 0x95c7c752U, 0x46232365U, 0x9dc3c35eU,
+    0x30181828U, 0x379696a1U, 0x0a05050fU, 0x2f9a9ab5U,
+    0x0e070709U, 0x24121236U, 0x1b80809bU, 0xdfe2e23dU,
+    0xcdebeb26U, 0x4e272769U, 0x7fb2b2cdU, 0xea75759fU,
+    0x1209091bU, 0x1d83839eU, 0x582c2c74U, 0x341a1a2eU,
+    0x361b1b2dU, 0xdc6e6eb2U, 0xb45a5aeeU, 0x5ba0a0fbU,
+    0xa45252f6U, 0x763b3b4dU, 0xb7d6d661U, 0x7db3b3ceU,
+    0x5229297bU, 0xdde3e33eU, 0x5e2f2f71U, 0x13848497U,
+    0xa65353f5U, 0xb9d1d168U, 0x00000000U, 0xc1eded2cU,
+    0x40202060U, 0xe3fcfc1fU, 0x79b1b1c8U, 0xb65b5bedU,
+    0xd46a6abeU, 0x8dcbcb46U, 0x67bebed9U, 0x7239394bU,
+    0x944a4adeU, 0x984c4cd4U, 0xb05858e8U, 0x85cfcf4aU,
+    0xbbd0d06bU, 0xc5efef2aU, 0x4faaaae5U, 0xedfbfb16U,
+    0x864343c5U, 0x9a4d4dd7U, 0x66333355U, 0x11858594U,
+    0x8a4545cfU, 0xe9f9f910U, 0x04020206U, 0xfe7f7f81U,
+    0xa05050f0U, 0x783c3c44U, 0x259f9fbaU, 0x4ba8a8e3U,
+    0xa25151f3U, 0x5da3a3feU, 0x804040c0U, 0x058f8f8aU,
+    0x3f9292adU, 0x219d9dbcU, 0x70383848U, 0xf1f5f504U,
+    0x63bcbcdfU, 0x77b6b6c1U, 0xafdada75U, 0x42212163U,
+    0x20101030U, 0xe5ffff1aU, 0xfdf3f30eU, 0xbfd2d26dU,
+    0x81cdcd4cU, 0x180c0c14U, 0x26131335U, 0xc3ecec2fU,
+    0xbe5f5fe1U, 0x359797a2U, 0x884444ccU, 0x2e171739U,
+    0x93c4c457U, 0x55a7a7f2U, 0xfc7e7e82U, 0x7a3d3d47U,
+    0xc86464acU, 0xba5d5de7U, 0x3219192bU, 0xe6737395U,
+    0xc06060a0U, 0x19818198U, 0x9e4f4fd1U, 0xa3dcdc7fU,
+    0x44222266U, 0x542a2a7eU, 0x3b9090abU, 0x0b888883U,
+    0x8c4646caU, 0xc7eeee29U, 0x6bb8b8d3U, 0x2814143cU,
+    0xa7dede79U, 0xbc5e5ee2U, 0x160b0b1dU, 0xaddbdb76U,
+    0xdbe0e03bU, 0x64323256U, 0x743a3a4eU, 0x140a0a1eU,
+    0x924949dbU, 0x0c06060aU, 0x4824246cU, 0xb85c5ce4U,
+    0x9fc2c25dU, 0xbdd3d36eU, 0x43acacefU, 0xc46262a6U,
+    0x399191a8U, 0x319595a4U, 0xd3e4e437U, 0xf279798bU,
+    0xd5e7e732U, 0x8bc8c843U, 0x6e373759U, 0xda6d6db7U,
+    0x018d8d8cU, 0xb1d5d564U, 0x9c4e4ed2U, 0x49a9a9e0U,
+    0xd86c6cb4U, 0xac5656faU, 0xf3f4f407U, 0xcfeaea25U,
+    0xca6565afU, 0xf47a7a8eU, 0x47aeaee9U, 0x10080818U,
+    0x6fbabad5U, 0xf0787888U, 0x4a25256fU, 0x5c2e2e72U,
+    0x381c1c24U, 0x57a6a6f1U, 0x73b4b4c7U, 0x97c6c651U,
+    0xcbe8e823U, 0xa1dddd7cU, 0xe874749cU, 0x3e1f1f21U,
+    0x964b4bddU, 0x61bdbddcU, 0x0d8b8b86U, 0x0f8a8a85U,
+    0xe0707090U, 0x7c3e3e42U, 0x71b5b5c4U, 0xcc6666aaU,
+    0x904848d8U, 0x06030305U, 0xf7f6f601U, 0x1c0e0e12U,
+    0xc26161a3U, 0x6a35355fU, 0xae5757f9U, 0x69b9b9d0U,
+    0x17868691U, 0x99c1c158U, 0x3a1d1d27U, 0x279e9eb9U,
+    0xd9e1e138U, 0xebf8f813U, 0x2b9898b3U, 0x22111133U,
+    0xd26969bbU, 0xa9d9d970U, 0x078e8e89U, 0x339494a7U,
+    0x2d9b9bb6U, 0x3c1e1e22U, 0x15878792U, 0xc9e9e920U,
+    0x87cece49U, 0xaa5555ffU, 0x50282878U, 0xa5dfdf7aU,
+    0x038c8c8fU, 0x59a1a1f8U, 0x09898980U, 0x1a0d0d17U,
+    0x65bfbfdaU, 0xd7e6e631U, 0x844242c6U, 0xd06868b8U,
+    0x824141c3U, 0x299999b0U, 0x5a2d2d77U, 0x1e0f0f11U,
+    0x7bb0b0cbU, 0xa85454fcU, 0x6dbbbbd6U, 0x2c16163aU,
+};
+static const u32 Te1[256] = {
+    0xa5c66363U, 0x84f87c7cU, 0x99ee7777U, 0x8df67b7bU,
+    0x0dfff2f2U, 0xbdd66b6bU, 0xb1de6f6fU, 0x5491c5c5U,
+    0x50603030U, 0x03020101U, 0xa9ce6767U, 0x7d562b2bU,
+    0x19e7fefeU, 0x62b5d7d7U, 0xe64dababU, 0x9aec7676U,
+    0x458fcacaU, 0x9d1f8282U, 0x4089c9c9U, 0x87fa7d7dU,
+    0x15effafaU, 0xebb25959U, 0xc98e4747U, 0x0bfbf0f0U,
+    0xec41adadU, 0x67b3d4d4U, 0xfd5fa2a2U, 0xea45afafU,
+    0xbf239c9cU, 0xf753a4a4U, 0x96e47272U, 0x5b9bc0c0U,
+    0xc275b7b7U, 0x1ce1fdfdU, 0xae3d9393U, 0x6a4c2626U,
+    0x5a6c3636U, 0x417e3f3fU, 0x02f5f7f7U, 0x4f83ccccU,
+    0x5c683434U, 0xf451a5a5U, 0x34d1e5e5U, 0x08f9f1f1U,
+    0x93e27171U, 0x73abd8d8U, 0x53623131U, 0x3f2a1515U,
+    0x0c080404U, 0x5295c7c7U, 0x65462323U, 0x5e9dc3c3U,
+    0x28301818U, 0xa1379696U, 0x0f0a0505U, 0xb52f9a9aU,
+    0x090e0707U, 0x36241212U, 0x9b1b8080U, 0x3ddfe2e2U,
+    0x26cdebebU, 0x694e2727U, 0xcd7fb2b2U, 0x9fea7575U,
+    0x1b120909U, 0x9e1d8383U, 0x74582c2cU, 0x2e341a1aU,
+    0x2d361b1bU, 0xb2dc6e6eU, 0xeeb45a5aU, 0xfb5ba0a0U,
+    0xf6a45252U, 0x4d763b3bU, 0x61b7d6d6U, 0xce7db3b3U,
+    0x7b522929U, 0x3edde3e3U, 0x715e2f2fU, 0x97138484U,
+    0xf5a65353U, 0x68b9d1d1U, 0x00000000U, 0x2cc1ededU,
+    0x60402020U, 0x1fe3fcfcU, 0xc879b1b1U, 0xedb65b5bU,
+    0xbed46a6aU, 0x468dcbcbU, 0xd967bebeU, 0x4b723939U,
+    0xde944a4aU, 0xd4984c4cU, 0xe8b05858U, 0x4a85cfcfU,
+    0x6bbbd0d0U, 0x2ac5efefU, 0xe54faaaaU, 0x16edfbfbU,
+    0xc5864343U, 0xd79a4d4dU, 0x55663333U, 0x94118585U,
+    0xcf8a4545U, 0x10e9f9f9U, 0x06040202U, 0x81fe7f7fU,
+    0xf0a05050U, 0x44783c3cU, 0xba259f9fU, 0xe34ba8a8U,
+    0xf3a25151U, 0xfe5da3a3U, 0xc0804040U, 0x8a058f8fU,
+    0xad3f9292U, 0xbc219d9dU, 0x48703838U, 0x04f1f5f5U,
+    0xdf63bcbcU, 0xc177b6b6U, 0x75afdadaU, 0x63422121U,
+    0x30201010U, 0x1ae5ffffU, 0x0efdf3f3U, 0x6dbfd2d2U,
+    0x4c81cdcdU, 0x14180c0cU, 0x35261313U, 0x2fc3ececU,
+    0xe1be5f5fU, 0xa2359797U, 0xcc884444U, 0x392e1717U,
+    0x5793c4c4U, 0xf255a7a7U, 0x82fc7e7eU, 0x477a3d3dU,
+    0xacc86464U, 0xe7ba5d5dU, 0x2b321919U, 0x95e67373U,
+    0xa0c06060U, 0x98198181U, 0xd19e4f4fU, 0x7fa3dcdcU,
+    0x66442222U, 0x7e542a2aU, 0xab3b9090U, 0x830b8888U,
+    0xca8c4646U, 0x29c7eeeeU, 0xd36bb8b8U, 0x3c281414U,
+    0x79a7dedeU, 0xe2bc5e5eU, 0x1d160b0bU, 0x76addbdbU,
+    0x3bdbe0e0U, 0x56643232U, 0x4e743a3aU, 0x1e140a0aU,
+    0xdb924949U, 0x0a0c0606U, 0x6c482424U, 0xe4b85c5cU,
+    0x5d9fc2c2U, 0x6ebdd3d3U, 0xef43acacU, 0xa6c46262U,
+    0xa8399191U, 0xa4319595U, 0x37d3e4e4U, 0x8bf27979U,
+    0x32d5e7e7U, 0x438bc8c8U, 0x596e3737U, 0xb7da6d6dU,
+    0x8c018d8dU, 0x64b1d5d5U, 0xd29c4e4eU, 0xe049a9a9U,
+    0xb4d86c6cU, 0xfaac5656U, 0x07f3f4f4U, 0x25cfeaeaU,
+    0xafca6565U, 0x8ef47a7aU, 0xe947aeaeU, 0x18100808U,
+    0xd56fbabaU, 0x88f07878U, 0x6f4a2525U, 0x725c2e2eU,
+    0x24381c1cU, 0xf157a6a6U, 0xc773b4b4U, 0x5197c6c6U,
+    0x23cbe8e8U, 0x7ca1ddddU, 0x9ce87474U, 0x213e1f1fU,
+    0xdd964b4bU, 0xdc61bdbdU, 0x860d8b8bU, 0x850f8a8aU,
+    0x90e07070U, 0x427c3e3eU, 0xc471b5b5U, 0xaacc6666U,
+    0xd8904848U, 0x05060303U, 0x01f7f6f6U, 0x121c0e0eU,
+    0xa3c26161U, 0x5f6a3535U, 0xf9ae5757U, 0xd069b9b9U,
+    0x91178686U, 0x5899c1c1U, 0x273a1d1dU, 0xb9279e9eU,
+    0x38d9e1e1U, 0x13ebf8f8U, 0xb32b9898U, 0x33221111U,
+    0xbbd26969U, 0x70a9d9d9U, 0x89078e8eU, 0xa7339494U,
+    0xb62d9b9bU, 0x223c1e1eU, 0x92158787U, 0x20c9e9e9U,
+    0x4987ceceU, 0xffaa5555U, 0x78502828U, 0x7aa5dfdfU,
+    0x8f038c8cU, 0xf859a1a1U, 0x80098989U, 0x171a0d0dU,
+    0xda65bfbfU, 0x31d7e6e6U, 0xc6844242U, 0xb8d06868U,
+    0xc3824141U, 0xb0299999U, 0x775a2d2dU, 0x111e0f0fU,
+    0xcb7bb0b0U, 0xfca85454U, 0xd66dbbbbU, 0x3a2c1616U,
+};
+static const u32 Te2[256] = {
+    0x63a5c663U, 0x7c84f87cU, 0x7799ee77U, 0x7b8df67bU,
+    0xf20dfff2U, 0x6bbdd66bU, 0x6fb1de6fU, 0xc55491c5U,
+    0x30506030U, 0x01030201U, 0x67a9ce67U, 0x2b7d562bU,
+    0xfe19e7feU, 0xd762b5d7U, 0xabe64dabU, 0x769aec76U,
+    0xca458fcaU, 0x829d1f82U, 0xc94089c9U, 0x7d87fa7dU,
+    0xfa15effaU, 0x59ebb259U, 0x47c98e47U, 0xf00bfbf0U,
+    0xadec41adU, 0xd467b3d4U, 0xa2fd5fa2U, 0xafea45afU,
+    0x9cbf239cU, 0xa4f753a4U, 0x7296e472U, 0xc05b9bc0U,
+    0xb7c275b7U, 0xfd1ce1fdU, 0x93ae3d93U, 0x266a4c26U,
+    0x365a6c36U, 0x3f417e3fU, 0xf702f5f7U, 0xcc4f83ccU,
+    0x345c6834U, 0xa5f451a5U, 0xe534d1e5U, 0xf108f9f1U,
+    0x7193e271U, 0xd873abd8U, 0x31536231U, 0x153f2a15U,
+    0x040c0804U, 0xc75295c7U, 0x23654623U, 0xc35e9dc3U,
+    0x18283018U, 0x96a13796U, 0x050f0a05U, 0x9ab52f9aU,
+    0x07090e07U, 0x12362412U, 0x809b1b80U, 0xe23ddfe2U,
+    0xeb26cdebU, 0x27694e27U, 0xb2cd7fb2U, 0x759fea75U,
+    0x091b1209U, 0x839e1d83U, 0x2c74582cU, 0x1a2e341aU,
+    0x1b2d361bU, 0x6eb2dc6eU, 0x5aeeb45aU, 0xa0fb5ba0U,
+    0x52f6a452U, 0x3b4d763bU, 0xd661b7d6U, 0xb3ce7db3U,
+    0x297b5229U, 0xe33edde3U, 0x2f715e2fU, 0x84971384U,
+    0x53f5a653U, 0xd168b9d1U, 0x00000000U, 0xed2cc1edU,
+    0x20604020U, 0xfc1fe3fcU, 0xb1c879b1U, 0x5bedb65bU,
+    0x6abed46aU, 0xcb468dcbU, 0xbed967beU, 0x394b7239U,
+    0x4ade944aU, 0x4cd4984cU, 0x58e8b058U, 0xcf4a85cfU,
+    0xd06bbbd0U, 0xef2ac5efU, 0xaae54faaU, 0xfb16edfbU,
+    0x43c58643U, 0x4dd79a4dU, 0x33556633U, 0x85941185U,
+    0x45cf8a45U, 0xf910e9f9U, 0x02060402U, 0x7f81fe7fU,
+    0x50f0a050U, 0x3c44783cU, 0x9fba259fU, 0xa8e34ba8U,
+    0x51f3a251U, 0xa3fe5da3U, 0x40c08040U, 0x8f8a058fU,
+    0x92ad3f92U, 0x9dbc219dU, 0x38487038U, 0xf504f1f5U,
+    0xbcdf63bcU, 0xb6c177b6U, 0xda75afdaU, 0x21634221U,
+    0x10302010U, 0xff1ae5ffU, 0xf30efdf3U, 0xd26dbfd2U,
+    0xcd4c81cdU, 0x0c14180cU, 0x13352613U, 0xec2fc3ecU,
+    0x5fe1be5fU, 0x97a23597U, 0x44cc8844U, 0x17392e17U,
+    0xc45793c4U, 0xa7f255a7U, 0x7e82fc7eU, 0x3d477a3dU,
+    0x64acc864U, 0x5de7ba5dU, 0x192b3219U, 0x7395e673U,
+    0x60a0c060U, 0x81981981U, 0x4fd19e4fU, 0xdc7fa3dcU,
+    0x22664422U, 0x2a7e542aU, 0x90ab3b90U, 0x88830b88U,
+    0x46ca8c46U, 0xee29c7eeU, 0xb8d36bb8U, 0x143c2814U,
+    0xde79a7deU, 0x5ee2bc5eU, 0x0b1d160bU, 0xdb76addbU,
+    0xe03bdbe0U, 0x32566432U, 0x3a4e743aU, 0x0a1e140aU,
+    0x49db9249U, 0x060a0c06U, 0x246c4824U, 0x5ce4b85cU,
+    0xc25d9fc2U, 0xd36ebdd3U, 0xacef43acU, 0x62a6c462U,
+    0x91a83991U, 0x95a43195U, 0xe437d3e4U, 0x798bf279U,
+    0xe732d5e7U, 0xc8438bc8U, 0x37596e37U, 0x6db7da6dU,
+    0x8d8c018dU, 0xd564b1d5U, 0x4ed29c4eU, 0xa9e049a9U,
+    0x6cb4d86cU, 0x56faac56U, 0xf407f3f4U, 0xea25cfeaU,
+    0x65afca65U, 0x7a8ef47aU, 0xaee947aeU, 0x08181008U,
+    0xbad56fbaU, 0x7888f078U, 0x256f4a25U, 0x2e725c2eU,
+    0x1c24381cU, 0xa6f157a6U, 0xb4c773b4U, 0xc65197c6U,
+    0xe823cbe8U, 0xdd7ca1ddU, 0x749ce874U, 0x1f213e1fU,
+    0x4bdd964bU, 0xbddc61bdU, 0x8b860d8bU, 0x8a850f8aU,
+    0x7090e070U, 0x3e427c3eU, 0xb5c471b5U, 0x66aacc66U,
+    0x48d89048U, 0x03050603U, 0xf601f7f6U, 0x0e121c0eU,
+    0x61a3c261U, 0x355f6a35U, 0x57f9ae57U, 0xb9d069b9U,
+    0x86911786U, 0xc15899c1U, 0x1d273a1dU, 0x9eb9279eU,
+    0xe138d9e1U, 0xf813ebf8U, 0x98b32b98U, 0x11332211U,
+    0x69bbd269U, 0xd970a9d9U, 0x8e89078eU, 0x94a73394U,
+    0x9bb62d9bU, 0x1e223c1eU, 0x87921587U, 0xe920c9e9U,
+    0xce4987ceU, 0x55ffaa55U, 0x28785028U, 0xdf7aa5dfU,
+    0x8c8f038cU, 0xa1f859a1U, 0x89800989U, 0x0d171a0dU,
+    0xbfda65bfU, 0xe631d7e6U, 0x42c68442U, 0x68b8d068U,
+    0x41c38241U, 0x99b02999U, 0x2d775a2dU, 0x0f111e0fU,
+    0xb0cb7bb0U, 0x54fca854U, 0xbbd66dbbU, 0x163a2c16U,
+};
+static const u32 Te3[256] = {
+    0x6363a5c6U, 0x7c7c84f8U, 0x777799eeU, 0x7b7b8df6U,
+    0xf2f20dffU, 0x6b6bbdd6U, 0x6f6fb1deU, 0xc5c55491U,
+    0x30305060U, 0x01010302U, 0x6767a9ceU, 0x2b2b7d56U,
+    0xfefe19e7U, 0xd7d762b5U, 0xababe64dU, 0x76769aecU,
+    0xcaca458fU, 0x82829d1fU, 0xc9c94089U, 0x7d7d87faU,
+    0xfafa15efU, 0x5959ebb2U, 0x4747c98eU, 0xf0f00bfbU,
+    0xadadec41U, 0xd4d467b3U, 0xa2a2fd5fU, 0xafafea45U,
+    0x9c9cbf23U, 0xa4a4f753U, 0x727296e4U, 0xc0c05b9bU,
+    0xb7b7c275U, 0xfdfd1ce1U, 0x9393ae3dU, 0x26266a4cU,
+    0x36365a6cU, 0x3f3f417eU, 0xf7f702f5U, 0xcccc4f83U,
+    0x34345c68U, 0xa5a5f451U, 0xe5e534d1U, 0xf1f108f9U,
+    0x717193e2U, 0xd8d873abU, 0x31315362U, 0x15153f2aU,
+    0x04040c08U, 0xc7c75295U, 0x23236546U, 0xc3c35e9dU,
+    0x18182830U, 0x9696a137U, 0x05050f0aU, 0x9a9ab52fU,
+    0x0707090eU, 0x12123624U, 0x80809b1bU, 0xe2e23ddfU,
+    0xebeb26cdU, 0x2727694eU, 0xb2b2cd7fU, 0x75759feaU,
+    0x09091b12U, 0x83839e1dU, 0x2c2c7458U, 0x1a1a2e34U,
+    0x1b1b2d36U, 0x6e6eb2dcU, 0x5a5aeeb4U, 0xa0a0fb5bU,
+    0x5252f6a4U, 0x3b3b4d76U, 0xd6d661b7U, 0xb3b3ce7dU,
+    0x29297b52U, 0xe3e33eddU, 0x2f2f715eU, 0x84849713U,
+    0x5353f5a6U, 0xd1d168b9U, 0x00000000U, 0xeded2cc1U,
+    0x20206040U, 0xfcfc1fe3U, 0xb1b1c879U, 0x5b5bedb6U,
+    0x6a6abed4U, 0xcbcb468dU, 0xbebed967U, 0x39394b72U,
+    0x4a4ade94U, 0x4c4cd498U, 0x5858e8b0U, 0xcfcf4a85U,
+    0xd0d06bbbU, 0xefef2ac5U, 0xaaaae54fU, 0xfbfb16edU,
+    0x4343c586U, 0x4d4dd79aU, 0x33335566U, 0x85859411U,
+    0x4545cf8aU, 0xf9f910e9U, 0x02020604U, 0x7f7f81feU,
+    0x5050f0a0U, 0x3c3c4478U, 0x9f9fba25U, 0xa8a8e34bU,
+    0x5151f3a2U, 0xa3a3fe5dU, 0x4040c080U, 0x8f8f8a05U,
+    0x9292ad3fU, 0x9d9dbc21U, 0x38384870U, 0xf5f504f1U,
+    0xbcbcdf63U, 0xb6b6c177U, 0xdada75afU, 0x21216342U,
+    0x10103020U, 0xffff1ae5U, 0xf3f30efdU, 0xd2d26dbfU,
+    0xcdcd4c81U, 0x0c0c1418U, 0x13133526U, 0xecec2fc3U,
+    0x5f5fe1beU, 0x9797a235U, 0x4444cc88U, 0x1717392eU,
+    0xc4c45793U, 0xa7a7f255U, 0x7e7e82fcU, 0x3d3d477aU,
+    0x6464acc8U, 0x5d5de7baU, 0x19192b32U, 0x737395e6U,
+    0x6060a0c0U, 0x81819819U, 0x4f4fd19eU, 0xdcdc7fa3U,
+    0x22226644U, 0x2a2a7e54U, 0x9090ab3bU, 0x8888830bU,
+    0x4646ca8cU, 0xeeee29c7U, 0xb8b8d36bU, 0x14143c28U,
+    0xdede79a7U, 0x5e5ee2bcU, 0x0b0b1d16U, 0xdbdb76adU,
+    0xe0e03bdbU, 0x32325664U, 0x3a3a4e74U, 0x0a0a1e14U,
+    0x4949db92U, 0x06060a0cU, 0x24246c48U, 0x5c5ce4b8U,
+    0xc2c25d9fU, 0xd3d36ebdU, 0xacacef43U, 0x6262a6c4U,
+    0x9191a839U, 0x9595a431U, 0xe4e437d3U, 0x79798bf2U,
+    0xe7e732d5U, 0xc8c8438bU, 0x3737596eU, 0x6d6db7daU,
+    0x8d8d8c01U, 0xd5d564b1U, 0x4e4ed29cU, 0xa9a9e049U,
+    0x6c6cb4d8U, 0x5656faacU, 0xf4f407f3U, 0xeaea25cfU,
+    0x6565afcaU, 0x7a7a8ef4U, 0xaeaee947U, 0x08081810U,
+    0xbabad56fU, 0x787888f0U, 0x25256f4aU, 0x2e2e725cU,
+    0x1c1c2438U, 0xa6a6f157U, 0xb4b4c773U, 0xc6c65197U,
+    0xe8e823cbU, 0xdddd7ca1U, 0x74749ce8U, 0x1f1f213eU,
+    0x4b4bdd96U, 0xbdbddc61U, 0x8b8b860dU, 0x8a8a850fU,
+    0x707090e0U, 0x3e3e427cU, 0xb5b5c471U, 0x6666aaccU,
+    0x4848d890U, 0x03030506U, 0xf6f601f7U, 0x0e0e121cU,
+    0x6161a3c2U, 0x35355f6aU, 0x5757f9aeU, 0xb9b9d069U,
+    0x86869117U, 0xc1c15899U, 0x1d1d273aU, 0x9e9eb927U,
+    0xe1e138d9U, 0xf8f813ebU, 0x9898b32bU, 0x11113322U,
+    0x6969bbd2U, 0xd9d970a9U, 0x8e8e8907U, 0x9494a733U,
+    0x9b9bb62dU, 0x1e1e223cU, 0x87879215U, 0xe9e920c9U,
+    0xcece4987U, 0x5555ffaaU, 0x28287850U, 0xdfdf7aa5U,
+    0x8c8c8f03U, 0xa1a1f859U, 0x89898009U, 0x0d0d171aU,
+    0xbfbfda65U, 0xe6e631d7U, 0x4242c684U, 0x6868b8d0U,
+    0x4141c382U, 0x9999b029U, 0x2d2d775aU, 0x0f0f111eU,
+    0xb0b0cb7bU, 0x5454fca8U, 0xbbbbd66dU, 0x16163a2cU,
+};
+
+static const u32 Td0[256] = {
+    0x51f4a750U, 0x7e416553U, 0x1a17a4c3U, 0x3a275e96U,
+    0x3bab6bcbU, 0x1f9d45f1U, 0xacfa58abU, 0x4be30393U,
+    0x2030fa55U, 0xad766df6U, 0x88cc7691U, 0xf5024c25U,
+    0x4fe5d7fcU, 0xc52acbd7U, 0x26354480U, 0xb562a38fU,
+    0xdeb15a49U, 0x25ba1b67U, 0x45ea0e98U, 0x5dfec0e1U,
+    0xc32f7502U, 0x814cf012U, 0x8d4697a3U, 0x6bd3f9c6U,
+    0x038f5fe7U, 0x15929c95U, 0xbf6d7aebU, 0x955259daU,
+    0xd4be832dU, 0x587421d3U, 0x49e06929U, 0x8ec9c844U,
+    0x75c2896aU, 0xf48e7978U, 0x99583e6bU, 0x27b971ddU,
+    0xbee14fb6U, 0xf088ad17U, 0xc920ac66U, 0x7dce3ab4U,
+    0x63df4a18U, 0xe51a3182U, 0x97513360U, 0x62537f45U,
+    0xb16477e0U, 0xbb6bae84U, 0xfe81a01cU, 0xf9082b94U,
+    0x70486858U, 0x8f45fd19U, 0x94de6c87U, 0x527bf8b7U,
+    0xab73d323U, 0x724b02e2U, 0xe31f8f57U, 0x6655ab2aU,
+    0xb2eb2807U, 0x2fb5c203U, 0x86c57b9aU, 0xd33708a5U,
+    0x302887f2U, 0x23bfa5b2U, 0x02036abaU, 0xed16825cU,
+    0x8acf1c2bU, 0xa779b492U, 0xf307f2f0U, 0x4e69e2a1U,
+    0x65daf4cdU, 0x0605bed5U, 0xd134621fU, 0xc4a6fe8aU,
+    0x342e539dU, 0xa2f355a0U, 0x058ae132U, 0xa4f6eb75U,
+    0x0b83ec39U, 0x4060efaaU, 0x5e719f06U, 0xbd6e1051U,
+    0x3e218af9U, 0x96dd063dU, 0xdd3e05aeU, 0x4de6bd46U,
+    0x91548db5U, 0x71c45d05U, 0x0406d46fU, 0x605015ffU,
+    0x1998fb24U, 0xd6bde997U, 0x894043ccU, 0x67d99e77U,
+    0xb0e842bdU, 0x07898b88U, 0xe7195b38U, 0x79c8eedbU,
+    0xa17c0a47U, 0x7c420fe9U, 0xf8841ec9U, 0x00000000U,
+    0x09808683U, 0x322bed48U, 0x1e1170acU, 0x6c5a724eU,
+    0xfd0efffbU, 0x0f853856U, 0x3daed51eU, 0x362d3927U,
+    0x0a0fd964U, 0x685ca621U, 0x9b5b54d1U, 0x24362e3aU,
+    0x0c0a67b1U, 0x9357e70fU, 0xb4ee96d2U, 0x1b9b919eU,
+    0x80c0c54fU, 0x61dc20a2U, 0x5a774b69U, 0x1c121a16U,
+    0xe293ba0aU, 0xc0a02ae5U, 0x3c22e043U, 0x121b171dU,
+    0x0e090d0bU, 0xf28bc7adU, 0x2db6a8b9U, 0x141ea9c8U,
+    0x57f11985U, 0xaf75074cU, 0xee99ddbbU, 0xa37f60fdU,
+    0xf701269fU, 0x5c72f5bcU, 0x44663bc5U, 0x5bfb7e34U,
+    0x8b432976U, 0xcb23c6dcU, 0xb6edfc68U, 0xb8e4f163U,
+    0xd731dccaU, 0x42638510U, 0x13972240U, 0x84c61120U,
+    0x854a247dU, 0xd2bb3df8U, 0xaef93211U, 0xc729a16dU,
+    0x1d9e2f4bU, 0xdcb230f3U, 0x0d8652ecU, 0x77c1e3d0U,
+    0x2bb3166cU, 0xa970b999U, 0x119448faU, 0x47e96422U,
+    0xa8fc8cc4U, 0xa0f03f1aU, 0x567d2cd8U, 0x223390efU,
+    0x87494ec7U, 0xd938d1c1U, 0x8ccaa2feU, 0x98d40b36U,
+    0xa6f581cfU, 0xa57ade28U, 0xdab78e26U, 0x3fadbfa4U,
+    0x2c3a9de4U, 0x5078920dU, 0x6a5fcc9bU, 0x547e4662U,
+    0xf68d13c2U, 0x90d8b8e8U, 0x2e39f75eU, 0x82c3aff5U,
+    0x9f5d80beU, 0x69d0937cU, 0x6fd52da9U, 0xcf2512b3U,
+    0xc8ac993bU, 0x10187da7U, 0xe89c636eU, 0xdb3bbb7bU,
+    0xcd267809U, 0x6e5918f4U, 0xec9ab701U, 0x834f9aa8U,
+    0xe6956e65U, 0xaaffe67eU, 0x21bccf08U, 0xef15e8e6U,
+    0xbae79bd9U, 0x4a6f36ceU, 0xea9f09d4U, 0x29b07cd6U,
+    0x31a4b2afU, 0x2a3f2331U, 0xc6a59430U, 0x35a266c0U,
+    0x744ebc37U, 0xfc82caa6U, 0xe090d0b0U, 0x33a7d815U,
+    0xf104984aU, 0x41ecdaf7U, 0x7fcd500eU, 0x1791f62fU,
+    0x764dd68dU, 0x43efb04dU, 0xccaa4d54U, 0xe49604dfU,
+    0x9ed1b5e3U, 0x4c6a881bU, 0xc12c1fb8U, 0x4665517fU,
+    0x9d5eea04U, 0x018c355dU, 0xfa877473U, 0xfb0b412eU,
+    0xb3671d5aU, 0x92dbd252U, 0xe9105633U, 0x6dd64713U,
+    0x9ad7618cU, 0x37a10c7aU, 0x59f8148eU, 0xeb133c89U,
+    0xcea927eeU, 0xb761c935U, 0xe11ce5edU, 0x7a47b13cU,
+    0x9cd2df59U, 0x55f2733fU, 0x1814ce79U, 0x73c737bfU,
+    0x53f7cdeaU, 0x5ffdaa5bU, 0xdf3d6f14U, 0x7844db86U,
+    0xcaaff381U, 0xb968c43eU, 0x3824342cU, 0xc2a3405fU,
+    0x161dc372U, 0xbce2250cU, 0x283c498bU, 0xff0d9541U,
+    0x39a80171U, 0x080cb3deU, 0xd8b4e49cU, 0x6456c190U,
+    0x7bcb8461U, 0xd532b670U, 0x486c5c74U, 0xd0b85742U,
+};
+static const u32 Td1[256] = {
+    0x5051f4a7U, 0x537e4165U, 0xc31a17a4U, 0x963a275eU,
+    0xcb3bab6bU, 0xf11f9d45U, 0xabacfa58U, 0x934be303U,
+    0x552030faU, 0xf6ad766dU, 0x9188cc76U, 0x25f5024cU,
+    0xfc4fe5d7U, 0xd7c52acbU, 0x80263544U, 0x8fb562a3U,
+    0x49deb15aU, 0x6725ba1bU, 0x9845ea0eU, 0xe15dfec0U,
+    0x02c32f75U, 0x12814cf0U, 0xa38d4697U, 0xc66bd3f9U,
+    0xe7038f5fU, 0x9515929cU, 0xebbf6d7aU, 0xda955259U,
+    0x2dd4be83U, 0xd3587421U, 0x2949e069U, 0x448ec9c8U,
+    0x6a75c289U, 0x78f48e79U, 0x6b99583eU, 0xdd27b971U,
+    0xb6bee14fU, 0x17f088adU, 0x66c920acU, 0xb47dce3aU,
+    0x1863df4aU, 0x82e51a31U, 0x60975133U, 0x4562537fU,
+    0xe0b16477U, 0x84bb6baeU, 0x1cfe81a0U, 0x94f9082bU,
+    0x58704868U, 0x198f45fdU, 0x8794de6cU, 0xb7527bf8U,
+    0x23ab73d3U, 0xe2724b02U, 0x57e31f8fU, 0x2a6655abU,
+    0x07b2eb28U, 0x032fb5c2U, 0x9a86c57bU, 0xa5d33708U,
+    0xf2302887U, 0xb223bfa5U, 0xba02036aU, 0x5ced1682U,
+    0x2b8acf1cU, 0x92a779b4U, 0xf0f307f2U, 0xa14e69e2U,
+    0xcd65daf4U, 0xd50605beU, 0x1fd13462U, 0x8ac4a6feU,
+    0x9d342e53U, 0xa0a2f355U, 0x32058ae1U, 0x75a4f6ebU,
+    0x390b83ecU, 0xaa4060efU, 0x065e719fU, 0x51bd6e10U,
+    0xf93e218aU, 0x3d96dd06U, 0xaedd3e05U, 0x464de6bdU,
+    0xb591548dU, 0x0571c45dU, 0x6f0406d4U, 0xff605015U,
+    0x241998fbU, 0x97d6bde9U, 0xcc894043U, 0x7767d99eU,
+    0xbdb0e842U, 0x8807898bU, 0x38e7195bU, 0xdb79c8eeU,
+    0x47a17c0aU, 0xe97c420fU, 0xc9f8841eU, 0x00000000U,
+    0x83098086U, 0x48322bedU, 0xac1e1170U, 0x4e6c5a72U,
+    0xfbfd0effU, 0x560f8538U, 0x1e3daed5U, 0x27362d39U,
+    0x640a0fd9U, 0x21685ca6U, 0xd19b5b54U, 0x3a24362eU,
+    0xb10c0a67U, 0x0f9357e7U, 0xd2b4ee96U, 0x9e1b9b91U,
+    0x4f80c0c5U, 0xa261dc20U, 0x695a774bU, 0x161c121aU,
+    0x0ae293baU, 0xe5c0a02aU, 0x433c22e0U, 0x1d121b17U,
+    0x0b0e090dU, 0xadf28bc7U, 0xb92db6a8U, 0xc8141ea9U,
+    0x8557f119U, 0x4caf7507U, 0xbbee99ddU, 0xfda37f60U,
+    0x9ff70126U, 0xbc5c72f5U, 0xc544663bU, 0x345bfb7eU,
+    0x768b4329U, 0xdccb23c6U, 0x68b6edfcU, 0x63b8e4f1U,
+    0xcad731dcU, 0x10426385U, 0x40139722U, 0x2084c611U,
+    0x7d854a24U, 0xf8d2bb3dU, 0x11aef932U, 0x6dc729a1U,
+    0x4b1d9e2fU, 0xf3dcb230U, 0xec0d8652U, 0xd077c1e3U,
+    0x6c2bb316U, 0x99a970b9U, 0xfa119448U, 0x2247e964U,
+    0xc4a8fc8cU, 0x1aa0f03fU, 0xd8567d2cU, 0xef223390U,
+    0xc787494eU, 0xc1d938d1U, 0xfe8ccaa2U, 0x3698d40bU,
+    0xcfa6f581U, 0x28a57adeU, 0x26dab78eU, 0xa43fadbfU,
+    0xe42c3a9dU, 0x0d507892U, 0x9b6a5fccU, 0x62547e46U,
+    0xc2f68d13U, 0xe890d8b8U, 0x5e2e39f7U, 0xf582c3afU,
+    0xbe9f5d80U, 0x7c69d093U, 0xa96fd52dU, 0xb3cf2512U,
+    0x3bc8ac99U, 0xa710187dU, 0x6ee89c63U, 0x7bdb3bbbU,
+    0x09cd2678U, 0xf46e5918U, 0x01ec9ab7U, 0xa8834f9aU,
+    0x65e6956eU, 0x7eaaffe6U, 0x0821bccfU, 0xe6ef15e8U,
+    0xd9bae79bU, 0xce4a6f36U, 0xd4ea9f09U, 0xd629b07cU,
+    0xaf31a4b2U, 0x312a3f23U, 0x30c6a594U, 0xc035a266U,
+    0x37744ebcU, 0xa6fc82caU, 0xb0e090d0U, 0x1533a7d8U,
+    0x4af10498U, 0xf741ecdaU, 0x0e7fcd50U, 0x2f1791f6U,
+    0x8d764dd6U, 0x4d43efb0U, 0x54ccaa4dU, 0xdfe49604U,
+    0xe39ed1b5U, 0x1b4c6a88U, 0xb8c12c1fU, 0x7f466551U,
+    0x049d5eeaU, 0x5d018c35U, 0x73fa8774U, 0x2efb0b41U,
+    0x5ab3671dU, 0x5292dbd2U, 0x33e91056U, 0x136dd647U,
+    0x8c9ad761U, 0x7a37a10cU, 0x8e59f814U, 0x89eb133cU,
+    0xeecea927U, 0x35b761c9U, 0xede11ce5U, 0x3c7a47b1U,
+    0x599cd2dfU, 0x3f55f273U, 0x791814ceU, 0xbf73c737U,
+    0xea53f7cdU, 0x5b5ffdaaU, 0x14df3d6fU, 0x867844dbU,
+    0x81caaff3U, 0x3eb968c4U, 0x2c382434U, 0x5fc2a340U,
+    0x72161dc3U, 0x0cbce225U, 0x8b283c49U, 0x41ff0d95U,
+    0x7139a801U, 0xde080cb3U, 0x9cd8b4e4U, 0x906456c1U,
+    0x617bcb84U, 0x70d532b6U, 0x74486c5cU, 0x42d0b857U,
+};
+static const u32 Td2[256] = {
+    0xa75051f4U, 0x65537e41U, 0xa4c31a17U, 0x5e963a27U,
+    0x6bcb3babU, 0x45f11f9dU, 0x58abacfaU, 0x03934be3U,
+    0xfa552030U, 0x6df6ad76U, 0x769188ccU, 0x4c25f502U,
+    0xd7fc4fe5U, 0xcbd7c52aU, 0x44802635U, 0xa38fb562U,
+    0x5a49deb1U, 0x1b6725baU, 0x0e9845eaU, 0xc0e15dfeU,
+    0x7502c32fU, 0xf012814cU, 0x97a38d46U, 0xf9c66bd3U,
+    0x5fe7038fU, 0x9c951592U, 0x7aebbf6dU, 0x59da9552U,
+    0x832dd4beU, 0x21d35874U, 0x692949e0U, 0xc8448ec9U,
+    0x896a75c2U, 0x7978f48eU, 0x3e6b9958U, 0x71dd27b9U,
+    0x4fb6bee1U, 0xad17f088U, 0xac66c920U, 0x3ab47dceU,
+    0x4a1863dfU, 0x3182e51aU, 0x33609751U, 0x7f456253U,
+    0x77e0b164U, 0xae84bb6bU, 0xa01cfe81U, 0x2b94f908U,
+    0x68587048U, 0xfd198f45U, 0x6c8794deU, 0xf8b7527bU,
+    0xd323ab73U, 0x02e2724bU, 0x8f57e31fU, 0xab2a6655U,
+    0x2807b2ebU, 0xc2032fb5U, 0x7b9a86c5U, 0x08a5d337U,
+    0x87f23028U, 0xa5b223bfU, 0x6aba0203U, 0x825ced16U,
+    0x1c2b8acfU, 0xb492a779U, 0xf2f0f307U, 0xe2a14e69U,
+    0xf4cd65daU, 0xbed50605U, 0x621fd134U, 0xfe8ac4a6U,
+    0x539d342eU, 0x55a0a2f3U, 0xe132058aU, 0xeb75a4f6U,
+    0xec390b83U, 0xefaa4060U, 0x9f065e71U, 0x1051bd6eU,
+    0x8af93e21U, 0x063d96ddU, 0x05aedd3eU, 0xbd464de6U,
+    0x8db59154U, 0x5d0571c4U, 0xd46f0406U, 0x15ff6050U,
+    0xfb241998U, 0xe997d6bdU, 0x43cc8940U, 0x9e7767d9U,
+    0x42bdb0e8U, 0x8b880789U, 0x5b38e719U, 0xeedb79c8U,
+    0x0a47a17cU, 0x0fe97c42U, 0x1ec9f884U, 0x00000000U,
+    0x86830980U, 0xed48322bU, 0x70ac1e11U, 0x724e6c5aU,
+    0xfffbfd0eU, 0x38560f85U, 0xd51e3daeU, 0x3927362dU,
+    0xd9640a0fU, 0xa621685cU, 0x54d19b5bU, 0x2e3a2436U,
+    0x67b10c0aU, 0xe70f9357U, 0x96d2b4eeU, 0x919e1b9bU,
+    0xc54f80c0U, 0x20a261dcU, 0x4b695a77U, 0x1a161c12U,
+    0xba0ae293U, 0x2ae5c0a0U, 0xe0433c22U, 0x171d121bU,
+    0x0d0b0e09U, 0xc7adf28bU, 0xa8b92db6U, 0xa9c8141eU,
+    0x198557f1U, 0x074caf75U, 0xddbbee99U, 0x60fda37fU,
+    0x269ff701U, 0xf5bc5c72U, 0x3bc54466U, 0x7e345bfbU,
+    0x29768b43U, 0xc6dccb23U, 0xfc68b6edU, 0xf163b8e4U,
+    0xdccad731U, 0x85104263U, 0x22401397U, 0x112084c6U,
+    0x247d854aU, 0x3df8d2bbU, 0x3211aef9U, 0xa16dc729U,
+    0x2f4b1d9eU, 0x30f3dcb2U, 0x52ec0d86U, 0xe3d077c1U,
+    0x166c2bb3U, 0xb999a970U, 0x48fa1194U, 0x642247e9U,
+    0x8cc4a8fcU, 0x3f1aa0f0U, 0x2cd8567dU, 0x90ef2233U,
+    0x4ec78749U, 0xd1c1d938U, 0xa2fe8ccaU, 0x0b3698d4U,
+    0x81cfa6f5U, 0xde28a57aU, 0x8e26dab7U, 0xbfa43fadU,
+    0x9de42c3aU, 0x920d5078U, 0xcc9b6a5fU, 0x4662547eU,
+    0x13c2f68dU, 0xb8e890d8U, 0xf75e2e39U, 0xaff582c3U,
+    0x80be9f5dU, 0x937c69d0U, 0x2da96fd5U, 0x12b3cf25U,
+    0x993bc8acU, 0x7da71018U, 0x636ee89cU, 0xbb7bdb3bU,
+    0x7809cd26U, 0x18f46e59U, 0xb701ec9aU, 0x9aa8834fU,
+    0x6e65e695U, 0xe67eaaffU, 0xcf0821bcU, 0xe8e6ef15U,
+    0x9bd9bae7U, 0x36ce4a6fU, 0x09d4ea9fU, 0x7cd629b0U,
+    0xb2af31a4U, 0x23312a3fU, 0x9430c6a5U, 0x66c035a2U,
+    0xbc37744eU, 0xcaa6fc82U, 0xd0b0e090U, 0xd81533a7U,
+    0x984af104U, 0xdaf741ecU, 0x500e7fcdU, 0xf62f1791U,
+    0xd68d764dU, 0xb04d43efU, 0x4d54ccaaU, 0x04dfe496U,
+    0xb5e39ed1U, 0x881b4c6aU, 0x1fb8c12cU, 0x517f4665U,
+    0xea049d5eU, 0x355d018cU, 0x7473fa87U, 0x412efb0bU,
+    0x1d5ab367U, 0xd25292dbU, 0x5633e910U, 0x47136dd6U,
+    0x618c9ad7U, 0x0c7a37a1U, 0x148e59f8U, 0x3c89eb13U,
+    0x27eecea9U, 0xc935b761U, 0xe5ede11cU, 0xb13c7a47U,
+    0xdf599cd2U, 0x733f55f2U, 0xce791814U, 0x37bf73c7U,
+    0xcdea53f7U, 0xaa5b5ffdU, 0x6f14df3dU, 0xdb867844U,
+    0xf381caafU, 0xc43eb968U, 0x342c3824U, 0x405fc2a3U,
+    0xc372161dU, 0x250cbce2U, 0x498b283cU, 0x9541ff0dU,
+    0x017139a8U, 0xb3de080cU, 0xe49cd8b4U, 0xc1906456U,
+    0x84617bcbU, 0xb670d532U, 0x5c74486cU, 0x5742d0b8U,
+};
+static const u32 Td3[256] = {
+    0xf4a75051U, 0x4165537eU, 0x17a4c31aU, 0x275e963aU,
+    0xab6bcb3bU, 0x9d45f11fU, 0xfa58abacU, 0xe303934bU,
+    0x30fa5520U, 0x766df6adU, 0xcc769188U, 0x024c25f5U,
+    0xe5d7fc4fU, 0x2acbd7c5U, 0x35448026U, 0x62a38fb5U,
+    0xb15a49deU, 0xba1b6725U, 0xea0e9845U, 0xfec0e15dU,
+    0x2f7502c3U, 0x4cf01281U, 0x4697a38dU, 0xd3f9c66bU,
+    0x8f5fe703U, 0x929c9515U, 0x6d7aebbfU, 0x5259da95U,
+    0xbe832dd4U, 0x7421d358U, 0xe0692949U, 0xc9c8448eU,
+    0xc2896a75U, 0x8e7978f4U, 0x583e6b99U, 0xb971dd27U,
+    0xe14fb6beU, 0x88ad17f0U, 0x20ac66c9U, 0xce3ab47dU,
+    0xdf4a1863U, 0x1a3182e5U, 0x51336097U, 0x537f4562U,
+    0x6477e0b1U, 0x6bae84bbU, 0x81a01cfeU, 0x082b94f9U,
+    0x48685870U, 0x45fd198fU, 0xde6c8794U, 0x7bf8b752U,
+    0x73d323abU, 0x4b02e272U, 0x1f8f57e3U, 0x55ab2a66U,
+    0xeb2807b2U, 0xb5c2032fU, 0xc57b9a86U, 0x3708a5d3U,
+    0x2887f230U, 0xbfa5b223U, 0x036aba02U, 0x16825cedU,
+    0xcf1c2b8aU, 0x79b492a7U, 0x07f2f0f3U, 0x69e2a14eU,
+    0xdaf4cd65U, 0x05bed506U, 0x34621fd1U, 0xa6fe8ac4U,
+    0x2e539d34U, 0xf355a0a2U, 0x8ae13205U, 0xf6eb75a4U,
+    0x83ec390bU, 0x60efaa40U, 0x719f065eU, 0x6e1051bdU,
+    0x218af93eU, 0xdd063d96U, 0x3e05aeddU, 0xe6bd464dU,
+    0x548db591U, 0xc45d0571U, 0x06d46f04U, 0x5015ff60U,
+    0x98fb2419U, 0xbde997d6U, 0x4043cc89U, 0xd99e7767U,
+    0xe842bdb0U, 0x898b8807U, 0x195b38e7U, 0xc8eedb79U,
+    0x7c0a47a1U, 0x420fe97cU, 0x841ec9f8U, 0x00000000U,
+    0x80868309U, 0x2bed4832U, 0x1170ac1eU, 0x5a724e6cU,
+    0x0efffbfdU, 0x8538560fU, 0xaed51e3dU, 0x2d392736U,
+    0x0fd9640aU, 0x5ca62168U, 0x5b54d19bU, 0x362e3a24U,
+    0x0a67b10cU, 0x57e70f93U, 0xee96d2b4U, 0x9b919e1bU,
+    0xc0c54f80U, 0xdc20a261U, 0x774b695aU, 0x121a161cU,
+    0x93ba0ae2U, 0xa02ae5c0U, 0x22e0433cU, 0x1b171d12U,
+    0x090d0b0eU, 0x8bc7adf2U, 0xb6a8b92dU, 0x1ea9c814U,
+    0xf1198557U, 0x75074cafU, 0x99ddbbeeU, 0x7f60fda3U,
+    0x01269ff7U, 0x72f5bc5cU, 0x663bc544U, 0xfb7e345bU,
+    0x4329768bU, 0x23c6dccbU, 0xedfc68b6U, 0xe4f163b8U,
+    0x31dccad7U, 0x63851042U, 0x97224013U, 0xc6112084U,
+    0x4a247d85U, 0xbb3df8d2U, 0xf93211aeU, 0x29a16dc7U,
+    0x9e2f4b1dU, 0xb230f3dcU, 0x8652ec0dU, 0xc1e3d077U,
+    0xb3166c2bU, 0x70b999a9U, 0x9448fa11U, 0xe9642247U,
+    0xfc8cc4a8U, 0xf03f1aa0U, 0x7d2cd856U, 0x3390ef22U,
+    0x494ec787U, 0x38d1c1d9U, 0xcaa2fe8cU, 0xd40b3698U,
+    0xf581cfa6U, 0x7ade28a5U, 0xb78e26daU, 0xadbfa43fU,
+    0x3a9de42cU, 0x78920d50U, 0x5fcc9b6aU, 0x7e466254U,
+    0x8d13c2f6U, 0xd8b8e890U, 0x39f75e2eU, 0xc3aff582U,
+    0x5d80be9fU, 0xd0937c69U, 0xd52da96fU, 0x2512b3cfU,
+    0xac993bc8U, 0x187da710U, 0x9c636ee8U, 0x3bbb7bdbU,
+    0x267809cdU, 0x5918f46eU, 0x9ab701ecU, 0x4f9aa883U,
+    0x956e65e6U, 0xffe67eaaU, 0xbccf0821U, 0x15e8e6efU,
+    0xe79bd9baU, 0x6f36ce4aU, 0x9f09d4eaU, 0xb07cd629U,
+    0xa4b2af31U, 0x3f23312aU, 0xa59430c6U, 0xa266c035U,
+    0x4ebc3774U, 0x82caa6fcU, 0x90d0b0e0U, 0xa7d81533U,
+    0x04984af1U, 0xecdaf741U, 0xcd500e7fU, 0x91f62f17U,
+    0x4dd68d76U, 0xefb04d43U, 0xaa4d54ccU, 0x9604dfe4U,
+    0xd1b5e39eU, 0x6a881b4cU, 0x2c1fb8c1U, 0x65517f46U,
+    0x5eea049dU, 0x8c355d01U, 0x877473faU, 0x0b412efbU,
+    0x671d5ab3U, 0xdbd25292U, 0x105633e9U, 0xd647136dU,
+    0xd7618c9aU, 0xa10c7a37U, 0xf8148e59U, 0x133c89ebU,
+    0xa927eeceU, 0x61c935b7U, 0x1ce5ede1U, 0x47b13c7aU,
+    0xd2df599cU, 0xf2733f55U, 0x14ce7918U, 0xc737bf73U,
+    0xf7cdea53U, 0xfdaa5b5fU, 0x3d6f14dfU, 0x44db8678U,
+    0xaff381caU, 0x68c43eb9U, 0x24342c38U, 0xa3405fc2U,
+    0x1dc37216U, 0xe2250cbcU, 0x3c498b28U, 0x0d9541ffU,
+    0xa8017139U, 0x0cb3de08U, 0xb4e49cd8U, 0x56c19064U,
+    0xcb84617bU, 0x32b670d5U, 0x6c5c7448U, 0xb85742d0U,
+};
+static const u8 Td4[256] = {
+    0x52U, 0x09U, 0x6aU, 0xd5U, 0x30U, 0x36U, 0xa5U, 0x38U,
+    0xbfU, 0x40U, 0xa3U, 0x9eU, 0x81U, 0xf3U, 0xd7U, 0xfbU,
+    0x7cU, 0xe3U, 0x39U, 0x82U, 0x9bU, 0x2fU, 0xffU, 0x87U,
+    0x34U, 0x8eU, 0x43U, 0x44U, 0xc4U, 0xdeU, 0xe9U, 0xcbU,
+    0x54U, 0x7bU, 0x94U, 0x32U, 0xa6U, 0xc2U, 0x23U, 0x3dU,
+    0xeeU, 0x4cU, 0x95U, 0x0bU, 0x42U, 0xfaU, 0xc3U, 0x4eU,
+    0x08U, 0x2eU, 0xa1U, 0x66U, 0x28U, 0xd9U, 0x24U, 0xb2U,
+    0x76U, 0x5bU, 0xa2U, 0x49U, 0x6dU, 0x8bU, 0xd1U, 0x25U,
+    0x72U, 0xf8U, 0xf6U, 0x64U, 0x86U, 0x68U, 0x98U, 0x16U,
+    0xd4U, 0xa4U, 0x5cU, 0xccU, 0x5dU, 0x65U, 0xb6U, 0x92U,
+    0x6cU, 0x70U, 0x48U, 0x50U, 0xfdU, 0xedU, 0xb9U, 0xdaU,
+    0x5eU, 0x15U, 0x46U, 0x57U, 0xa7U, 0x8dU, 0x9dU, 0x84U,
+    0x90U, 0xd8U, 0xabU, 0x00U, 0x8cU, 0xbcU, 0xd3U, 0x0aU,
+    0xf7U, 0xe4U, 0x58U, 0x05U, 0xb8U, 0xb3U, 0x45U, 0x06U,
+    0xd0U, 0x2cU, 0x1eU, 0x8fU, 0xcaU, 0x3fU, 0x0fU, 0x02U,
+    0xc1U, 0xafU, 0xbdU, 0x03U, 0x01U, 0x13U, 0x8aU, 0x6bU,
+    0x3aU, 0x91U, 0x11U, 0x41U, 0x4fU, 0x67U, 0xdcU, 0xeaU,
+    0x97U, 0xf2U, 0xcfU, 0xceU, 0xf0U, 0xb4U, 0xe6U, 0x73U,
+    0x96U, 0xacU, 0x74U, 0x22U, 0xe7U, 0xadU, 0x35U, 0x85U,
+    0xe2U, 0xf9U, 0x37U, 0xe8U, 0x1cU, 0x75U, 0xdfU, 0x6eU,
+    0x47U, 0xf1U, 0x1aU, 0x71U, 0x1dU, 0x29U, 0xc5U, 0x89U,
+    0x6fU, 0xb7U, 0x62U, 0x0eU, 0xaaU, 0x18U, 0xbeU, 0x1bU,
+    0xfcU, 0x56U, 0x3eU, 0x4bU, 0xc6U, 0xd2U, 0x79U, 0x20U,
+    0x9aU, 0xdbU, 0xc0U, 0xfeU, 0x78U, 0xcdU, 0x5aU, 0xf4U,
+    0x1fU, 0xddU, 0xa8U, 0x33U, 0x88U, 0x07U, 0xc7U, 0x31U,
+    0xb1U, 0x12U, 0x10U, 0x59U, 0x27U, 0x80U, 0xecU, 0x5fU,
+    0x60U, 0x51U, 0x7fU, 0xa9U, 0x19U, 0xb5U, 0x4aU, 0x0dU,
+    0x2dU, 0xe5U, 0x7aU, 0x9fU, 0x93U, 0xc9U, 0x9cU, 0xefU,
+    0xa0U, 0xe0U, 0x3bU, 0x4dU, 0xaeU, 0x2aU, 0xf5U, 0xb0U,
+    0xc8U, 0xebU, 0xbbU, 0x3cU, 0x83U, 0x53U, 0x99U, 0x61U,
+    0x17U, 0x2bU, 0x04U, 0x7eU, 0xbaU, 0x77U, 0xd6U, 0x26U,
+    0xe1U, 0x69U, 0x14U, 0x63U, 0x55U, 0x21U, 0x0cU, 0x7dU,
+};
+static const u32 rcon[] = {
+    0x01000000, 0x02000000, 0x04000000, 0x08000000,
+    0x10000000, 0x20000000, 0x40000000, 0x80000000,
+    0x1B000000, 0x36000000, /* for 128-bit blocks, Rijndael never uses more than 10 rcon values */
+};
+
+/**
+ * Expand the cipher key into the encryption key schedule.
+ */
+int AES_set_encrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, const int bits,
+                        AES_KEY *key)
+{
+
+    u32 *rk;
+    int i = 0;
+    u32 temp;
+
+    if (!userKey || !key)
+        return -1;
+    if (bits != 128 && bits != 192 && bits != 256)
+        return -2;
+
+    rk = key->rd_key;
+
+    if (bits == 128)
+        key->rounds = 10;
+    else if (bits == 192)
+        key->rounds = 12;
+    else
+        key->rounds = 14;
+
+    rk[0] = GETU32(userKey     );
+    rk[1] = GETU32(userKey +  4);
+    rk[2] = GETU32(userKey +  8);
+    rk[3] = GETU32(userKey + 12);
+    if (bits == 128) {
+        while (1) {
+            temp  = rk[3];
+            rk[4] = rk[0] ^
+                (Te2[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff000000) ^
+                (Te3[(temp >>  8) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
+                (Te0[(temp      ) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
+                (Te1[(temp >> 24)       ] & 0x000000ff) ^
+                rcon[i];
+            rk[5] = rk[1] ^ rk[4];
+            rk[6] = rk[2] ^ rk[5];
+            rk[7] = rk[3] ^ rk[6];
+            if (++i == 10) {
+                return 0;
+            }
+            rk += 4;
+        }
+    }
+    rk[4] = GETU32(userKey + 16);
+    rk[5] = GETU32(userKey + 20);
+    if (bits == 192) {
+        while (1) {
+            temp = rk[ 5];
+            rk[ 6] = rk[ 0] ^
+                (Te2[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff000000) ^
+                (Te3[(temp >>  8) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
+                (Te0[(temp      ) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
+                (Te1[(temp >> 24)       ] & 0x000000ff) ^
+                rcon[i];
+            rk[ 7] = rk[ 1] ^ rk[ 6];
+            rk[ 8] = rk[ 2] ^ rk[ 7];
+            rk[ 9] = rk[ 3] ^ rk[ 8];
+            if (++i == 8) {
+                return 0;
+            }
+            rk[10] = rk[ 4] ^ rk[ 9];
+            rk[11] = rk[ 5] ^ rk[10];
+            rk += 6;
+        }
+    }
+    rk[6] = GETU32(userKey + 24);
+    rk[7] = GETU32(userKey + 28);
+    if (bits == 256) {
+        while (1) {
+            temp = rk[ 7];
+            rk[ 8] = rk[ 0] ^
+                (Te2[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff000000) ^
+                (Te3[(temp >>  8) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
+                (Te0[(temp      ) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
+                (Te1[(temp >> 24)       ] & 0x000000ff) ^
+                rcon[i];
+            rk[ 9] = rk[ 1] ^ rk[ 8];
+            rk[10] = rk[ 2] ^ rk[ 9];
+            rk[11] = rk[ 3] ^ rk[10];
+            if (++i == 7) {
+                return 0;
+            }
+            temp = rk[11];
+            rk[12] = rk[ 4] ^
+                (Te2[(temp >> 24)       ] & 0xff000000) ^
+                (Te3[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
+                (Te0[(temp >>  8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
+                (Te1[(temp      ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff);
+            rk[13] = rk[ 5] ^ rk[12];
+            rk[14] = rk[ 6] ^ rk[13];
+            rk[15] = rk[ 7] ^ rk[14];
+
+            rk += 8;
+            }
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Expand the cipher key into the decryption key schedule.
+ */
+int AES_set_decrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, const int bits,
+                        AES_KEY *key)
+{
+
+    u32 *rk;
+    int i, j, status;
+    u32 temp;
+
+    /* first, start with an encryption schedule */
+    status = AES_set_encrypt_key(userKey, bits, key);
+    if (status < 0)
+        return status;
+
+    rk = key->rd_key;
+
+    /* invert the order of the round keys: */
+    for (i = 0, j = 4*(key->rounds); i < j; i += 4, j -= 4) {
+        temp = rk[i    ]; rk[i    ] = rk[j    ]; rk[j    ] = temp;
+        temp = rk[i + 1]; rk[i + 1] = rk[j + 1]; rk[j + 1] = temp;
+        temp = rk[i + 2]; rk[i + 2] = rk[j + 2]; rk[j + 2] = temp;
+        temp = rk[i + 3]; rk[i + 3] = rk[j + 3]; rk[j + 3] = temp;
+    }
+    /* apply the inverse MixColumn transform to all round keys but the first and the last: */
+    for (i = 1; i < (key->rounds); i++) {
+        rk += 4;
+        rk[0] =
+            Td0[Te1[(rk[0] >> 24)       ] & 0xff] ^
+            Td1[Te1[(rk[0] >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
+            Td2[Te1[(rk[0] >>  8) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
+            Td3[Te1[(rk[0]      ) & 0xff] & 0xff];
+        rk[1] =
+            Td0[Te1[(rk[1] >> 24)       ] & 0xff] ^
+            Td1[Te1[(rk[1] >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
+            Td2[Te1[(rk[1] >>  8) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
+            Td3[Te1[(rk[1]      ) & 0xff] & 0xff];
+        rk[2] =
+            Td0[Te1[(rk[2] >> 24)       ] & 0xff] ^
+            Td1[Te1[(rk[2] >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
+            Td2[Te1[(rk[2] >>  8) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
+            Td3[Te1[(rk[2]      ) & 0xff] & 0xff];
+        rk[3] =
+            Td0[Te1[(rk[3] >> 24)       ] & 0xff] ^
+            Td1[Te1[(rk[3] >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
+            Td2[Te1[(rk[3] >>  8) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
+            Td3[Te1[(rk[3]      ) & 0xff] & 0xff];
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Encrypt a single block
+ * in and out can overlap
+ */
+void AES_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                 const AES_KEY *key) {
+
+    const u32 *rk;
+    u32 s0, s1, s2, s3, t0, t1, t2, t3;
+#ifndef FULL_UNROLL
+    int r;
+#endif /* ?FULL_UNROLL */
+
+    assert(in && out && key);
+    rk = key->rd_key;
+
+    /*
+     * map byte array block to cipher state
+     * and add initial round key:
+     */
+    s0 = GETU32(in     ) ^ rk[0];
+    s1 = GETU32(in +  4) ^ rk[1];
+    s2 = GETU32(in +  8) ^ rk[2];
+    s3 = GETU32(in + 12) ^ rk[3];
+#ifdef FULL_UNROLL
+    /* round 1: */
+    t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 4];
+    t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 5];
+    t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 6];
+    t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 7];
+    /* round 2: */
+    s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 8];
+    s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 9];
+    s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[10];
+    s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[11];
+    /* round 3: */
+    t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[12];
+    t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[13];
+    t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[14];
+    t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[15];
+    /* round 4: */
+    s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[16];
+    s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[17];
+    s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[18];
+    s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[19];
+    /* round 5: */
+    t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[20];
+    t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[21];
+    t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[22];
+    t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[23];
+    /* round 6: */
+    s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[24];
+    s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[25];
+    s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[26];
+    s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[27];
+    /* round 7: */
+    t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[28];
+    t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[29];
+    t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[30];
+    t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[31];
+    /* round 8: */
+    s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[32];
+    s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[33];
+    s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[34];
+    s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[35];
+    /* round 9: */
+    t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[36];
+    t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[37];
+    t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[38];
+    t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[39];
+    if (key->rounds > 10) {
+        /* round 10: */
+        s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[40];
+        s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[41];
+        s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[42];
+        s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[43];
+        /* round 11: */
+        t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[44];
+        t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[45];
+        t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[46];
+        t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[47];
+        if (key->rounds > 12) {
+            /* round 12: */
+            s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[48];
+            s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[49];
+            s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[50];
+            s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[51];
+            /* round 13: */
+            t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[52];
+            t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[53];
+            t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[54];
+            t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[55];
+        }
+    }
+    rk += key->rounds << 2;
+#else  /* !FULL_UNROLL */
+    /*
+     * Nr - 1 full rounds:
+     */
+    r = key->rounds >> 1;
+    for (;;) {
+        t0 =
+            Te0[(s0 >> 24)       ] ^
+            Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+            Te2[(s2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^
+            Te3[(s3      ) & 0xff] ^
+            rk[4];
+        t1 =
+            Te0[(s1 >> 24)       ] ^
+            Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+            Te2[(s3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^
+            Te3[(s0      ) & 0xff] ^
+            rk[5];
+        t2 =
+            Te0[(s2 >> 24)       ] ^
+            Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+            Te2[(s0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^
+            Te3[(s1      ) & 0xff] ^
+            rk[6];
+        t3 =
+            Te0[(s3 >> 24)       ] ^
+            Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+            Te2[(s1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^
+            Te3[(s2      ) & 0xff] ^
+            rk[7];
+
+        rk += 8;
+        if (--r == 0) {
+            break;
+        }
+
+        s0 =
+            Te0[(t0 >> 24)       ] ^
+            Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+            Te2[(t2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^
+            Te3[(t3      ) & 0xff] ^
+            rk[0];
+        s1 =
+            Te0[(t1 >> 24)       ] ^
+            Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+            Te2[(t3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^
+            Te3[(t0      ) & 0xff] ^
+            rk[1];
+        s2 =
+            Te0[(t2 >> 24)       ] ^
+            Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+            Te2[(t0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^
+            Te3[(t1      ) & 0xff] ^
+            rk[2];
+        s3 =
+            Te0[(t3 >> 24)       ] ^
+            Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+            Te2[(t1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^
+            Te3[(t2      ) & 0xff] ^
+            rk[3];
+    }
+#endif /* ?FULL_UNROLL */
+    /*
+     * apply last round and
+     * map cipher state to byte array block:
+     */
+    s0 =
+        (Te2[(t0 >> 24)       ] & 0xff000000) ^
+        (Te3[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
+        (Te0[(t2 >>  8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
+        (Te1[(t3      ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^
+        rk[0];
+    PUTU32(out     , s0);
+    s1 =
+        (Te2[(t1 >> 24)       ] & 0xff000000) ^
+        (Te3[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
+        (Te0[(t3 >>  8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
+        (Te1[(t0      ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^
+        rk[1];
+    PUTU32(out +  4, s1);
+    s2 =
+        (Te2[(t2 >> 24)       ] & 0xff000000) ^
+        (Te3[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
+        (Te0[(t0 >>  8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
+        (Te1[(t1      ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^
+        rk[2];
+    PUTU32(out +  8, s2);
+    s3 =
+        (Te2[(t3 >> 24)       ] & 0xff000000) ^
+        (Te3[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
+        (Te0[(t1 >>  8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
+        (Te1[(t2      ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^
+        rk[3];
+    PUTU32(out + 12, s3);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Decrypt a single block
+ * in and out can overlap
+ */
+void AES_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                 const AES_KEY *key)
+{
+
+    const u32 *rk;
+    u32 s0, s1, s2, s3, t0, t1, t2, t3;
+#ifndef FULL_UNROLL
+    int r;
+#endif /* ?FULL_UNROLL */
+
+    assert(in && out && key);
+    rk = key->rd_key;
+
+    /*
+     * map byte array block to cipher state
+     * and add initial round key:
+     */
+    s0 = GETU32(in     ) ^ rk[0];
+    s1 = GETU32(in +  4) ^ rk[1];
+    s2 = GETU32(in +  8) ^ rk[2];
+    s3 = GETU32(in + 12) ^ rk[3];
+#ifdef FULL_UNROLL
+    /* round 1: */
+    t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 4];
+    t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 5];
+    t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 6];
+    t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 7];
+    /* round 2: */
+    s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 8];
+    s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 9];
+    s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[10];
+    s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[11];
+    /* round 3: */
+    t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[12];
+    t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[13];
+    t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[14];
+    t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[15];
+    /* round 4: */
+    s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[16];
+    s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[17];
+    s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[18];
+    s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[19];
+    /* round 5: */
+    t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[20];
+    t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[21];
+    t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[22];
+    t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[23];
+    /* round 6: */
+    s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[24];
+    s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[25];
+    s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[26];
+    s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[27];
+    /* round 7: */
+    t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[28];
+    t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[29];
+    t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[30];
+    t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[31];
+    /* round 8: */
+    s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[32];
+    s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[33];
+    s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[34];
+    s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[35];
+    /* round 9: */
+    t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[36];
+    t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[37];
+    t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[38];
+    t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[39];
+    if (key->rounds > 10) {
+        /* round 10: */
+        s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[40];
+        s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[41];
+        s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[42];
+        s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[43];
+        /* round 11: */
+        t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[44];
+        t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[45];
+        t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[46];
+        t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[47];
+        if (key->rounds > 12) {
+            /* round 12: */
+            s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[48];
+            s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[49];
+            s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[50];
+            s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[51];
+            /* round 13: */
+            t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[52];
+            t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[53];
+            t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[54];
+            t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[55];
+        }
+    }
+    rk += key->rounds << 2;
+#else  /* !FULL_UNROLL */
+    /*
+     * Nr - 1 full rounds:
+     */
+    r = key->rounds >> 1;
+    for (;;) {
+        t0 =
+            Td0[(s0 >> 24)       ] ^
+            Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+            Td2[(s2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^
+            Td3[(s1      ) & 0xff] ^
+            rk[4];
+        t1 =
+            Td0[(s1 >> 24)       ] ^
+            Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+            Td2[(s3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^
+            Td3[(s2      ) & 0xff] ^
+            rk[5];
+        t2 =
+            Td0[(s2 >> 24)       ] ^
+            Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+            Td2[(s0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^
+            Td3[(s3      ) & 0xff] ^
+            rk[6];
+        t3 =
+            Td0[(s3 >> 24)       ] ^
+            Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+            Td2[(s1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^
+            Td3[(s0      ) & 0xff] ^
+            rk[7];
+
+        rk += 8;
+        if (--r == 0) {
+            break;
+        }
+
+        s0 =
+            Td0[(t0 >> 24)       ] ^
+            Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+            Td2[(t2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^
+            Td3[(t1      ) & 0xff] ^
+            rk[0];
+        s1 =
+            Td0[(t1 >> 24)       ] ^
+            Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+            Td2[(t3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^
+            Td3[(t2      ) & 0xff] ^
+            rk[1];
+        s2 =
+            Td0[(t2 >> 24)       ] ^
+            Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+            Td2[(t0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^
+            Td3[(t3      ) & 0xff] ^
+            rk[2];
+        s3 =
+            Td0[(t3 >> 24)       ] ^
+            Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+            Td2[(t1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^
+            Td3[(t0      ) & 0xff] ^
+            rk[3];
+    }
+#endif /* ?FULL_UNROLL */
+    /*
+     * apply last round and
+     * map cipher state to byte array block:
+     */
+    s0 =
+        ((u32)Td4[(t0 >> 24)       ] << 24) ^
+        ((u32)Td4[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^
+        ((u32)Td4[(t2 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8) ^
+        ((u32)Td4[(t1      ) & 0xff])       ^
+        rk[0];
+    PUTU32(out     , s0);
+    s1 =
+        ((u32)Td4[(t1 >> 24)       ] << 24) ^
+        ((u32)Td4[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^
+        ((u32)Td4[(t3 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8) ^
+        ((u32)Td4[(t2      ) & 0xff])       ^
+        rk[1];
+    PUTU32(out +  4, s1);
+    s2 =
+        ((u32)Td4[(t2 >> 24)       ] << 24) ^
+        ((u32)Td4[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^
+        ((u32)Td4[(t0 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8) ^
+        ((u32)Td4[(t3      ) & 0xff])       ^
+        rk[2];
+    PUTU32(out +  8, s2);
+    s3 =
+        ((u32)Td4[(t3 >> 24)       ] << 24) ^
+        ((u32)Td4[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^
+        ((u32)Td4[(t1 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8) ^
+        ((u32)Td4[(t0      ) & 0xff])       ^
+        rk[3];
+    PUTU32(out + 12, s3);
+}
+
+#else /* AES_ASM */
+
+static const u8 Te4[256] = {
+    0x63U, 0x7cU, 0x77U, 0x7bU, 0xf2U, 0x6bU, 0x6fU, 0xc5U,
+    0x30U, 0x01U, 0x67U, 0x2bU, 0xfeU, 0xd7U, 0xabU, 0x76U,
+    0xcaU, 0x82U, 0xc9U, 0x7dU, 0xfaU, 0x59U, 0x47U, 0xf0U,
+    0xadU, 0xd4U, 0xa2U, 0xafU, 0x9cU, 0xa4U, 0x72U, 0xc0U,
+    0xb7U, 0xfdU, 0x93U, 0x26U, 0x36U, 0x3fU, 0xf7U, 0xccU,
+    0x34U, 0xa5U, 0xe5U, 0xf1U, 0x71U, 0xd8U, 0x31U, 0x15U,
+    0x04U, 0xc7U, 0x23U, 0xc3U, 0x18U, 0x96U, 0x05U, 0x9aU,
+    0x07U, 0x12U, 0x80U, 0xe2U, 0xebU, 0x27U, 0xb2U, 0x75U,
+    0x09U, 0x83U, 0x2cU, 0x1aU, 0x1bU, 0x6eU, 0x5aU, 0xa0U,
+    0x52U, 0x3bU, 0xd6U, 0xb3U, 0x29U, 0xe3U, 0x2fU, 0x84U,
+    0x53U, 0xd1U, 0x00U, 0xedU, 0x20U, 0xfcU, 0xb1U, 0x5bU,
+    0x6aU, 0xcbU, 0xbeU, 0x39U, 0x4aU, 0x4cU, 0x58U, 0xcfU,
+    0xd0U, 0xefU, 0xaaU, 0xfbU, 0x43U, 0x4dU, 0x33U, 0x85U,
+    0x45U, 0xf9U, 0x02U, 0x7fU, 0x50U, 0x3cU, 0x9fU, 0xa8U,
+    0x51U, 0xa3U, 0x40U, 0x8fU, 0x92U, 0x9dU, 0x38U, 0xf5U,
+    0xbcU, 0xb6U, 0xdaU, 0x21U, 0x10U, 0xffU, 0xf3U, 0xd2U,
+    0xcdU, 0x0cU, 0x13U, 0xecU, 0x5fU, 0x97U, 0x44U, 0x17U,
+    0xc4U, 0xa7U, 0x7eU, 0x3dU, 0x64U, 0x5dU, 0x19U, 0x73U,
+    0x60U, 0x81U, 0x4fU, 0xdcU, 0x22U, 0x2aU, 0x90U, 0x88U,
+    0x46U, 0xeeU, 0xb8U, 0x14U, 0xdeU, 0x5eU, 0x0bU, 0xdbU,
+    0xe0U, 0x32U, 0x3aU, 0x0aU, 0x49U, 0x06U, 0x24U, 0x5cU,
+    0xc2U, 0xd3U, 0xacU, 0x62U, 0x91U, 0x95U, 0xe4U, 0x79U,
+    0xe7U, 0xc8U, 0x37U, 0x6dU, 0x8dU, 0xd5U, 0x4eU, 0xa9U,
+    0x6cU, 0x56U, 0xf4U, 0xeaU, 0x65U, 0x7aU, 0xaeU, 0x08U,
+    0xbaU, 0x78U, 0x25U, 0x2eU, 0x1cU, 0xa6U, 0xb4U, 0xc6U,
+    0xe8U, 0xddU, 0x74U, 0x1fU, 0x4bU, 0xbdU, 0x8bU, 0x8aU,
+    0x70U, 0x3eU, 0xb5U, 0x66U, 0x48U, 0x03U, 0xf6U, 0x0eU,
+    0x61U, 0x35U, 0x57U, 0xb9U, 0x86U, 0xc1U, 0x1dU, 0x9eU,
+    0xe1U, 0xf8U, 0x98U, 0x11U, 0x69U, 0xd9U, 0x8eU, 0x94U,
+    0x9bU, 0x1eU, 0x87U, 0xe9U, 0xceU, 0x55U, 0x28U, 0xdfU,
+    0x8cU, 0xa1U, 0x89U, 0x0dU, 0xbfU, 0xe6U, 0x42U, 0x68U,
+    0x41U, 0x99U, 0x2dU, 0x0fU, 0xb0U, 0x54U, 0xbbU, 0x16U
+};
+static const u32 rcon[] = {
+    0x01000000, 0x02000000, 0x04000000, 0x08000000,
+    0x10000000, 0x20000000, 0x40000000, 0x80000000,
+    0x1B000000, 0x36000000, /* for 128-bit blocks, Rijndael never uses more than 10 rcon values */
+};
+
+/**
+ * Expand the cipher key into the encryption key schedule.
+ */
+int AES_set_encrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, const int bits,
+                        AES_KEY *key)
+{
+    u32 *rk;
+    int i = 0;
+    u32 temp;
+
+    if (!userKey || !key)
+        return -1;
+    if (bits != 128 && bits != 192 && bits != 256)
+        return -2;
+
+    rk = key->rd_key;
+
+    if (bits == 128)
+        key->rounds = 10;
+    else if (bits == 192)
+        key->rounds = 12;
+    else
+        key->rounds = 14;
+
+    rk[0] = GETU32(userKey     );
+    rk[1] = GETU32(userKey +  4);
+    rk[2] = GETU32(userKey +  8);
+    rk[3] = GETU32(userKey + 12);
+    if (bits == 128) {
+        while (1) {
+            temp  = rk[3];
+            rk[4] = rk[0] ^
+                ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] << 24) ^
+                ((u32)Te4[(temp >>  8) & 0xff] << 16) ^
+                ((u32)Te4[(temp      ) & 0xff] << 8) ^
+                ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 24)       ]) ^
+                rcon[i];
+            rk[5] = rk[1] ^ rk[4];
+            rk[6] = rk[2] ^ rk[5];
+            rk[7] = rk[3] ^ rk[6];
+            if (++i == 10) {
+                return 0;
+            }
+            rk += 4;
+        }
+    }
+    rk[4] = GETU32(userKey + 16);
+    rk[5] = GETU32(userKey + 20);
+    if (bits == 192) {
+        while (1) {
+            temp = rk[ 5];
+            rk[ 6] = rk[ 0] ^
+                ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] << 24) ^
+                ((u32)Te4[(temp >>  8) & 0xff] << 16) ^
+                ((u32)Te4[(temp      ) & 0xff] << 8) ^
+                ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 24)       ]) ^
+                rcon[i];
+            rk[ 7] = rk[ 1] ^ rk[ 6];
+            rk[ 8] = rk[ 2] ^ rk[ 7];
+            rk[ 9] = rk[ 3] ^ rk[ 8];
+            if (++i == 8) {
+                return 0;
+            }
+            rk[10] = rk[ 4] ^ rk[ 9];
+            rk[11] = rk[ 5] ^ rk[10];
+            rk += 6;
+        }
+    }
+    rk[6] = GETU32(userKey + 24);
+    rk[7] = GETU32(userKey + 28);
+    if (bits == 256) {
+        while (1) {
+            temp = rk[ 7];
+            rk[ 8] = rk[ 0] ^
+                ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] << 24) ^
+                ((u32)Te4[(temp >>  8) & 0xff] << 16) ^
+                ((u32)Te4[(temp      ) & 0xff] << 8) ^
+                ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 24)       ]) ^
+                rcon[i];
+            rk[ 9] = rk[ 1] ^ rk[ 8];
+            rk[10] = rk[ 2] ^ rk[ 9];
+            rk[11] = rk[ 3] ^ rk[10];
+            if (++i == 7) {
+                return 0;
+            }
+            temp = rk[11];
+            rk[12] = rk[ 4] ^
+                ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 24)       ] << 24) ^
+                ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^
+                ((u32)Te4[(temp >>  8) & 0xff] << 8) ^
+                ((u32)Te4[(temp      ) & 0xff]);
+            rk[13] = rk[ 5] ^ rk[12];
+            rk[14] = rk[ 6] ^ rk[13];
+            rk[15] = rk[ 7] ^ rk[14];
+
+            rk += 8;
+        }
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Expand the cipher key into the decryption key schedule.
+ */
+int AES_set_decrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, const int bits,
+                        AES_KEY *key)
+{
+
+    u32 *rk;
+    int i, j, status;
+    u32 temp;
+
+    /* first, start with an encryption schedule */
+    status = AES_set_encrypt_key(userKey, bits, key);
+    if (status < 0)
+        return status;
+
+    rk = key->rd_key;
+
+    /* invert the order of the round keys: */
+    for (i = 0, j = 4*(key->rounds); i < j; i += 4, j -= 4) {
+        temp = rk[i    ]; rk[i    ] = rk[j    ]; rk[j    ] = temp;
+        temp = rk[i + 1]; rk[i + 1] = rk[j + 1]; rk[j + 1] = temp;
+        temp = rk[i + 2]; rk[i + 2] = rk[j + 2]; rk[j + 2] = temp;
+        temp = rk[i + 3]; rk[i + 3] = rk[j + 3]; rk[j + 3] = temp;
+    }
+    /* apply the inverse MixColumn transform to all round keys but the first and the last: */
+    for (i = 1; i < (key->rounds); i++) {
+        rk += 4;
+        for (j = 0; j < 4; j++) {
+            u32 tp1, tp2, tp4, tp8, tp9, tpb, tpd, tpe, m;
+
+            tp1 = rk[j];
+            m = tp1 & 0x80808080;
+            tp2 = ((tp1 & 0x7f7f7f7f) << 1) ^
+                ((m - (m >> 7)) & 0x1b1b1b1b);
+            m = tp2 & 0x80808080;
+            tp4 = ((tp2 & 0x7f7f7f7f) << 1) ^
+                ((m - (m >> 7)) & 0x1b1b1b1b);
+            m = tp4 & 0x80808080;
+            tp8 = ((tp4 & 0x7f7f7f7f) << 1) ^
+                ((m - (m >> 7)) & 0x1b1b1b1b);
+            tp9 = tp8 ^ tp1;
+            tpb = tp9 ^ tp2;
+            tpd = tp9 ^ tp4;
+            tpe = tp8 ^ tp4 ^ tp2;
+#if defined(ROTATE)
+            rk[j] = tpe ^ ROTATE(tpd,16) ^
+                ROTATE(tp9,24) ^ ROTATE(tpb,8);
+#else
+            rk[j] = tpe ^ (tpd >> 16) ^ (tpd << 16) ^
+                (tp9 >> 8) ^ (tp9 << 24) ^
+                (tpb >> 24) ^ (tpb << 8);
+#endif
+        }
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+#endif /* AES_ASM */
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/aes_ecb.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/aes_ecb.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..29bfc1a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/aes_ecb.c
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <assert.h>
+
+#include <openssl/aes.h>
+#include "aes_locl.h"
+
+void AES_ecb_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                     const AES_KEY *key, const int enc)
+{
+
+    assert(in && out && key);
+    assert((AES_ENCRYPT == enc) || (AES_DECRYPT == enc));
+
+    if (AES_ENCRYPT == enc)
+        AES_encrypt(in, out, key);
+    else
+        AES_decrypt(in, out, key);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/aes_ige.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/aes_ige.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..75f796c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/aes_ige.c
@@ -0,0 +1,284 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+
+#include <openssl/aes.h>
+#include "aes_locl.h"
+
+#define N_WORDS (AES_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(unsigned long))
+typedef struct {
+    unsigned long data[N_WORDS];
+} aes_block_t;
+
+/* XXX: probably some better way to do this */
+#if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__)
+# define UNALIGNED_MEMOPS_ARE_FAST 1
+#else
+# define UNALIGNED_MEMOPS_ARE_FAST 0
+#endif
+
+#if UNALIGNED_MEMOPS_ARE_FAST
+# define load_block(d, s)        (d) = *(const aes_block_t *)(s)
+# define store_block(d, s)       *(aes_block_t *)(d) = (s)
+#else
+# define load_block(d, s)        memcpy((d).data, (s), AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
+# define store_block(d, s)       memcpy((d), (s).data, AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
+#endif
+
+/* N.B. The IV for this mode is _twice_ the block size */
+
+void AES_ige_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                     size_t length, const AES_KEY *key,
+                     unsigned char *ivec, const int enc)
+{
+    size_t n;
+    size_t len = length;
+
+    if (length == 0)
+        return;
+
+    OPENSSL_assert(in && out && key && ivec);
+    OPENSSL_assert((AES_ENCRYPT == enc) || (AES_DECRYPT == enc));
+    OPENSSL_assert((length % AES_BLOCK_SIZE) == 0);
+
+    len = length / AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+
+    if (AES_ENCRYPT == enc) {
+        if (in != out &&
+            (UNALIGNED_MEMOPS_ARE_FAST
+             || ((size_t)in | (size_t)out | (size_t)ivec) % sizeof(long) ==
+             0)) {
+            aes_block_t *ivp = (aes_block_t *) ivec;
+            aes_block_t *iv2p = (aes_block_t *) (ivec + AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+
+            while (len) {
+                aes_block_t *inp = (aes_block_t *) in;
+                aes_block_t *outp = (aes_block_t *) out;
+
+                for (n = 0; n < N_WORDS; ++n)
+                    outp->data[n] = inp->data[n] ^ ivp->data[n];
+                AES_encrypt((unsigned char *)outp->data,
+                            (unsigned char *)outp->data, key);
+                for (n = 0; n < N_WORDS; ++n)
+                    outp->data[n] ^= iv2p->data[n];
+                ivp = outp;
+                iv2p = inp;
+                --len;
+                in += AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+                out += AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+            }
+            memcpy(ivec, ivp->data, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+            memcpy(ivec + AES_BLOCK_SIZE, iv2p->data, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+        } else {
+            aes_block_t tmp, tmp2;
+            aes_block_t iv;
+            aes_block_t iv2;
+
+            load_block(iv, ivec);
+            load_block(iv2, ivec + AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+
+            while (len) {
+                load_block(tmp, in);
+                for (n = 0; n < N_WORDS; ++n)
+                    tmp2.data[n] = tmp.data[n] ^ iv.data[n];
+                AES_encrypt((unsigned char *)tmp2.data,
+                            (unsigned char *)tmp2.data, key);
+                for (n = 0; n < N_WORDS; ++n)
+                    tmp2.data[n] ^= iv2.data[n];
+                store_block(out, tmp2);
+                iv = tmp2;
+                iv2 = tmp;
+                --len;
+                in += AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+                out += AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+            }
+            memcpy(ivec, iv.data, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+            memcpy(ivec + AES_BLOCK_SIZE, iv2.data, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+        }
+    } else {
+        if (in != out &&
+            (UNALIGNED_MEMOPS_ARE_FAST
+             || ((size_t)in | (size_t)out | (size_t)ivec) % sizeof(long) ==
+             0)) {
+            aes_block_t *ivp = (aes_block_t *) ivec;
+            aes_block_t *iv2p = (aes_block_t *) (ivec + AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+
+            while (len) {
+                aes_block_t tmp;
+                aes_block_t *inp = (aes_block_t *) in;
+                aes_block_t *outp = (aes_block_t *) out;
+
+                for (n = 0; n < N_WORDS; ++n)
+                    tmp.data[n] = inp->data[n] ^ iv2p->data[n];
+                AES_decrypt((unsigned char *)tmp.data,
+                            (unsigned char *)outp->data, key);
+                for (n = 0; n < N_WORDS; ++n)
+                    outp->data[n] ^= ivp->data[n];
+                ivp = inp;
+                iv2p = outp;
+                --len;
+                in += AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+                out += AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+            }
+            memcpy(ivec, ivp->data, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+            memcpy(ivec + AES_BLOCK_SIZE, iv2p->data, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+        } else {
+            aes_block_t tmp, tmp2;
+            aes_block_t iv;
+            aes_block_t iv2;
+
+            load_block(iv, ivec);
+            load_block(iv2, ivec + AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+
+            while (len) {
+                load_block(tmp, in);
+                tmp2 = tmp;
+                for (n = 0; n < N_WORDS; ++n)
+                    tmp.data[n] ^= iv2.data[n];
+                AES_decrypt((unsigned char *)tmp.data,
+                            (unsigned char *)tmp.data, key);
+                for (n = 0; n < N_WORDS; ++n)
+                    tmp.data[n] ^= iv.data[n];
+                store_block(out, tmp);
+                iv = tmp2;
+                iv2 = tmp;
+                --len;
+                in += AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+                out += AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+            }
+            memcpy(ivec, iv.data, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+            memcpy(ivec + AES_BLOCK_SIZE, iv2.data, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note that its effectively impossible to do biIGE in anything other
+ * than a single pass, so no provision is made for chaining.
+ */
+
+/* N.B. The IV for this mode is _four times_ the block size */
+
+void AES_bi_ige_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                        size_t length, const AES_KEY *key,
+                        const AES_KEY *key2, const unsigned char *ivec,
+                        const int enc)
+{
+    size_t n;
+    size_t len = length;
+    unsigned char tmp[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+    unsigned char tmp2[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+    unsigned char tmp3[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+    unsigned char prev[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+    const unsigned char *iv;
+    const unsigned char *iv2;
+
+    OPENSSL_assert(in && out && key && ivec);
+    OPENSSL_assert((AES_ENCRYPT == enc) || (AES_DECRYPT == enc));
+    OPENSSL_assert((length % AES_BLOCK_SIZE) == 0);
+
+    if (AES_ENCRYPT == enc) {
+        /*
+         * XXX: Do a separate case for when in != out (strictly should check
+         * for overlap, too)
+         */
+
+        /* First the forward pass */
+        iv = ivec;
+        iv2 = ivec + AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+        while (len >= AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+            for (n = 0; n < AES_BLOCK_SIZE; ++n)
+                out[n] = in[n] ^ iv[n];
+            AES_encrypt(out, out, key);
+            for (n = 0; n < AES_BLOCK_SIZE; ++n)
+                out[n] ^= iv2[n];
+            iv = out;
+            memcpy(prev, in, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+            iv2 = prev;
+            len -= AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+            in += AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+            out += AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+        }
+
+        /* And now backwards */
+        iv = ivec + AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 2;
+        iv2 = ivec + AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 3;
+        len = length;
+        while (len >= AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+            out -= AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+            /*
+             * XXX: reduce copies by alternating between buffers
+             */
+            memcpy(tmp, out, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+            for (n = 0; n < AES_BLOCK_SIZE; ++n)
+                out[n] ^= iv[n];
+            /*
+             * hexdump(stdout, "out ^ iv", out, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+             */
+            AES_encrypt(out, out, key);
+            /*
+             * hexdump(stdout,"enc", out, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+             */
+            /*
+             * hexdump(stdout,"iv2", iv2, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+             */
+            for (n = 0; n < AES_BLOCK_SIZE; ++n)
+                out[n] ^= iv2[n];
+            /*
+             * hexdump(stdout,"out", out, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+             */
+            iv = out;
+            memcpy(prev, tmp, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+            iv2 = prev;
+            len -= AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+        }
+    } else {
+        /* First backwards */
+        iv = ivec + AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 2;
+        iv2 = ivec + AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 3;
+        in += length;
+        out += length;
+        while (len >= AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+            in -= AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+            out -= AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+            memcpy(tmp, in, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+            memcpy(tmp2, in, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+            for (n = 0; n < AES_BLOCK_SIZE; ++n)
+                tmp[n] ^= iv2[n];
+            AES_decrypt(tmp, out, key);
+            for (n = 0; n < AES_BLOCK_SIZE; ++n)
+                out[n] ^= iv[n];
+            memcpy(tmp3, tmp2, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+            iv = tmp3;
+            iv2 = out;
+            len -= AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+        }
+
+        /* And now forwards */
+        iv = ivec;
+        iv2 = ivec + AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+        len = length;
+        while (len >= AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+            memcpy(tmp, out, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+            memcpy(tmp2, out, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+            for (n = 0; n < AES_BLOCK_SIZE; ++n)
+                tmp[n] ^= iv2[n];
+            AES_decrypt(tmp, out, key);
+            for (n = 0; n < AES_BLOCK_SIZE; ++n)
+                out[n] ^= iv[n];
+            memcpy(tmp3, tmp2, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+            iv = tmp3;
+            iv2 = out;
+            len -= AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+            in += AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+            out += AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+        }
+    }
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/aes_locl.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/aes_locl.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..adee29d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/aes_locl.h
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_AES_LOCL_H
+# define HEADER_AES_LOCL_H
+
+# include <openssl/e_os2.h>
+# include <stdio.h>
+# include <stdlib.h>
+# include <string.h>
+
+# if defined(_MSC_VER) && (defined(_M_IX86) || defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64))
+#  define SWAP(x) (_lrotl(x, 8) & 0x00ff00ff | _lrotr(x, 8) & 0xff00ff00)
+#  define GETU32(p) SWAP(*((u32 *)(p)))
+#  define PUTU32(ct, st) { *((u32 *)(ct)) = SWAP((st)); }
+# else
+#  define GETU32(pt) (((u32)(pt)[0] << 24) ^ ((u32)(pt)[1] << 16) ^ ((u32)(pt)[2] <<  8) ^ ((u32)(pt)[3]))
+#  define PUTU32(ct, st) { (ct)[0] = (u8)((st) >> 24); (ct)[1] = (u8)((st) >> 16); (ct)[2] = (u8)((st) >>  8); (ct)[3] = (u8)(st); }
+# endif
+
+# ifdef AES_LONG
+typedef unsigned long u32;
+# else
+typedef unsigned int u32;
+# endif
+typedef unsigned short u16;
+typedef unsigned char u8;
+
+# define MAXKC   (256/32)
+# define MAXKB   (256/8)
+# define MAXNR   14
+
+/* This controls loop-unrolling in aes_core.c */
+# undef FULL_UNROLL
+
+#endif                          /* !HEADER_AES_LOCL_H */
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/aes_misc.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/aes_misc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7403c84
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/aes_misc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+#include <openssl/aes.h>
+#include "aes_locl.h"
+
+const char *AES_options(void)
+{
+#ifdef FULL_UNROLL
+    return "aes(full)";
+#else
+    return "aes(partial)";
+#endif
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/aes_ofb.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/aes_ofb.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..215b538
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/aes_ofb.c
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/aes.h>
+#include <openssl/modes.h>
+
+void AES_ofb128_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                        size_t length, const AES_KEY *key,
+                        unsigned char *ivec, int *num)
+{
+    CRYPTO_ofb128_encrypt(in, out, length, key, ivec, num,
+                          (block128_f) AES_encrypt);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/aes_wrap.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/aes_wrap.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cae0b21
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/aes_wrap.c
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/aes.h>
+#include <openssl/modes.h>
+
+int AES_wrap_key(AES_KEY *key, const unsigned char *iv,
+                 unsigned char *out,
+                 const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen)
+{
+    return CRYPTO_128_wrap(key, iv, out, in, inlen, (block128_f) AES_encrypt);
+}
+
+int AES_unwrap_key(AES_KEY *key, const unsigned char *iv,
+                   unsigned char *out,
+                   const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen)
+{
+    return CRYPTO_128_unwrap(key, iv, out, in, inlen,
+                             (block128_f) AES_decrypt);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/aes_x86core.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/aes_x86core.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..95b49bb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/aes_x86core.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1075 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/**
+ * rijndael-alg-fst.c
+ *
+ * @version 3.0 (December 2000)
+ *
+ * Optimised ANSI C code for the Rijndael cipher (now AES)
+ *
+ * @author Vincent Rijmen <vincent.rijmen@esat.kuleuven.ac.be>
+ * @author Antoon Bosselaers <antoon.bosselaers@esat.kuleuven.ac.be>
+ * @author Paulo Barreto <paulo.barreto@terra.com.br>
+ *
+ * This code is hereby placed in the public domain.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHORS ''AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS
+ * OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE
+ * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
+ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
+ * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR
+ * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY,
+ * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE
+ * OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE,
+ * EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * This is experimental x86[_64] derivative. It assumes little-endian
+ * byte order and expects CPU to sustain unaligned memory references.
+ * It is used as playground for cache-time attack mitigations and
+ * serves as reference C implementation for x86[_64] assembler.
+ *
+ *                  <appro@fy.chalmers.se>
+ */
+
+
+#include <assert.h>
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <openssl/aes.h>
+#include "aes_locl.h"
+
+/*
+ * These two parameters control which table, 256-byte or 2KB, is
+ * referenced in outer and respectively inner rounds.
+ */
+#define AES_COMPACT_IN_OUTER_ROUNDS
+#ifdef  AES_COMPACT_IN_OUTER_ROUNDS
+/* AES_COMPACT_IN_OUTER_ROUNDS costs ~30% in performance, while
+ * adding AES_COMPACT_IN_INNER_ROUNDS reduces benchmark *further*
+ * by factor of ~2. */
+# undef  AES_COMPACT_IN_INNER_ROUNDS
+#endif
+
+#if 1
+static void prefetch256(const void *table)
+{
+    volatile unsigned long *t=(void *)table,ret;
+    unsigned long sum;
+    int i;
+
+    /* 32 is common least cache-line size */
+    for (sum=0,i=0;i<256/sizeof(t[0]);i+=32/sizeof(t[0]))   sum ^= t[i];
+
+    ret = sum;
+}
+#else
+# define prefetch256(t)
+#endif
+
+#undef GETU32
+#define GETU32(p) (*((u32*)(p)))
+
+#if (defined(_WIN32) || defined(_WIN64)) && !defined(__MINGW32__)
+typedef unsigned __int64 u64;
+#define U64(C)  C##UI64
+#elif defined(__arch64__)
+typedef unsigned long u64;
+#define U64(C)  C##UL
+#else
+typedef unsigned long long u64;
+#define U64(C)  C##ULL
+#endif
+
+#undef ROTATE
+#if defined(_MSC_VER)
+# define ROTATE(a,n)    _lrotl(a,n)
+#elif defined(__ICC)
+# define ROTATE(a,n)    _rotl(a,n)
+#elif defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2
+# if defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__)
+#   define ROTATE(a,n)  ({ register unsigned int ret;   \
+                asm (           \
+                "roll %1,%0"        \
+                : "=r"(ret)     \
+                : "I"(n), "0"(a)    \
+                : "cc");        \
+               ret;             \
+            })
+# endif
+#endif
+/*-
+Te [x] = S [x].[02, 01, 01, 03, 02, 01, 01, 03];
+Te0[x] = S [x].[02, 01, 01, 03];
+Te1[x] = S [x].[03, 02, 01, 01];
+Te2[x] = S [x].[01, 03, 02, 01];
+Te3[x] = S [x].[01, 01, 03, 02];
+*/
+#define Te0 (u32)((u64*)((u8*)Te+0))
+#define Te1 (u32)((u64*)((u8*)Te+3))
+#define Te2 (u32)((u64*)((u8*)Te+2))
+#define Te3 (u32)((u64*)((u8*)Te+1))
+/*-
+Td [x] = Si[x].[0e, 09, 0d, 0b, 0e, 09, 0d, 0b];
+Td0[x] = Si[x].[0e, 09, 0d, 0b];
+Td1[x] = Si[x].[0b, 0e, 09, 0d];
+Td2[x] = Si[x].[0d, 0b, 0e, 09];
+Td3[x] = Si[x].[09, 0d, 0b, 0e];
+Td4[x] = Si[x].[01];
+*/
+#define Td0 (u32)((u64*)((u8*)Td+0))
+#define Td1 (u32)((u64*)((u8*)Td+3))
+#define Td2 (u32)((u64*)((u8*)Td+2))
+#define Td3 (u32)((u64*)((u8*)Td+1))
+
+static const u64 Te[256] = {
+    U64(0xa56363c6a56363c6), U64(0x847c7cf8847c7cf8),
+    U64(0x997777ee997777ee), U64(0x8d7b7bf68d7b7bf6),
+    U64(0x0df2f2ff0df2f2ff), U64(0xbd6b6bd6bd6b6bd6),
+    U64(0xb16f6fdeb16f6fde), U64(0x54c5c59154c5c591),
+    U64(0x5030306050303060), U64(0x0301010203010102),
+    U64(0xa96767cea96767ce), U64(0x7d2b2b567d2b2b56),
+    U64(0x19fefee719fefee7), U64(0x62d7d7b562d7d7b5),
+    U64(0xe6abab4de6abab4d), U64(0x9a7676ec9a7676ec),
+    U64(0x45caca8f45caca8f), U64(0x9d82821f9d82821f),
+    U64(0x40c9c98940c9c989), U64(0x877d7dfa877d7dfa),
+    U64(0x15fafaef15fafaef), U64(0xeb5959b2eb5959b2),
+    U64(0xc947478ec947478e), U64(0x0bf0f0fb0bf0f0fb),
+    U64(0xecadad41ecadad41), U64(0x67d4d4b367d4d4b3),
+    U64(0xfda2a25ffda2a25f), U64(0xeaafaf45eaafaf45),
+    U64(0xbf9c9c23bf9c9c23), U64(0xf7a4a453f7a4a453),
+    U64(0x967272e4967272e4), U64(0x5bc0c09b5bc0c09b),
+    U64(0xc2b7b775c2b7b775), U64(0x1cfdfde11cfdfde1),
+    U64(0xae93933dae93933d), U64(0x6a26264c6a26264c),
+    U64(0x5a36366c5a36366c), U64(0x413f3f7e413f3f7e),
+    U64(0x02f7f7f502f7f7f5), U64(0x4fcccc834fcccc83),
+    U64(0x5c3434685c343468), U64(0xf4a5a551f4a5a551),
+    U64(0x34e5e5d134e5e5d1), U64(0x08f1f1f908f1f1f9),
+    U64(0x937171e2937171e2), U64(0x73d8d8ab73d8d8ab),
+    U64(0x5331316253313162), U64(0x3f15152a3f15152a),
+    U64(0x0c0404080c040408), U64(0x52c7c79552c7c795),
+    U64(0x6523234665232346), U64(0x5ec3c39d5ec3c39d),
+    U64(0x2818183028181830), U64(0xa1969637a1969637),
+    U64(0x0f05050a0f05050a), U64(0xb59a9a2fb59a9a2f),
+    U64(0x0907070e0907070e), U64(0x3612122436121224),
+    U64(0x9b80801b9b80801b), U64(0x3de2e2df3de2e2df),
+    U64(0x26ebebcd26ebebcd), U64(0x6927274e6927274e),
+    U64(0xcdb2b27fcdb2b27f), U64(0x9f7575ea9f7575ea),
+    U64(0x1b0909121b090912), U64(0x9e83831d9e83831d),
+    U64(0x742c2c58742c2c58), U64(0x2e1a1a342e1a1a34),
+    U64(0x2d1b1b362d1b1b36), U64(0xb26e6edcb26e6edc),
+    U64(0xee5a5ab4ee5a5ab4), U64(0xfba0a05bfba0a05b),
+    U64(0xf65252a4f65252a4), U64(0x4d3b3b764d3b3b76),
+    U64(0x61d6d6b761d6d6b7), U64(0xceb3b37dceb3b37d),
+    U64(0x7b2929527b292952), U64(0x3ee3e3dd3ee3e3dd),
+    U64(0x712f2f5e712f2f5e), U64(0x9784841397848413),
+    U64(0xf55353a6f55353a6), U64(0x68d1d1b968d1d1b9),
+    U64(0x0000000000000000), U64(0x2cededc12cededc1),
+    U64(0x6020204060202040), U64(0x1ffcfce31ffcfce3),
+    U64(0xc8b1b179c8b1b179), U64(0xed5b5bb6ed5b5bb6),
+    U64(0xbe6a6ad4be6a6ad4), U64(0x46cbcb8d46cbcb8d),
+    U64(0xd9bebe67d9bebe67), U64(0x4b3939724b393972),
+    U64(0xde4a4a94de4a4a94), U64(0xd44c4c98d44c4c98),
+    U64(0xe85858b0e85858b0), U64(0x4acfcf854acfcf85),
+    U64(0x6bd0d0bb6bd0d0bb), U64(0x2aefefc52aefefc5),
+    U64(0xe5aaaa4fe5aaaa4f), U64(0x16fbfbed16fbfbed),
+    U64(0xc5434386c5434386), U64(0xd74d4d9ad74d4d9a),
+    U64(0x5533336655333366), U64(0x9485851194858511),
+    U64(0xcf45458acf45458a), U64(0x10f9f9e910f9f9e9),
+    U64(0x0602020406020204), U64(0x817f7ffe817f7ffe),
+    U64(0xf05050a0f05050a0), U64(0x443c3c78443c3c78),
+    U64(0xba9f9f25ba9f9f25), U64(0xe3a8a84be3a8a84b),
+    U64(0xf35151a2f35151a2), U64(0xfea3a35dfea3a35d),
+    U64(0xc0404080c0404080), U64(0x8a8f8f058a8f8f05),
+    U64(0xad92923fad92923f), U64(0xbc9d9d21bc9d9d21),
+    U64(0x4838387048383870), U64(0x04f5f5f104f5f5f1),
+    U64(0xdfbcbc63dfbcbc63), U64(0xc1b6b677c1b6b677),
+    U64(0x75dadaaf75dadaaf), U64(0x6321214263212142),
+    U64(0x3010102030101020), U64(0x1affffe51affffe5),
+    U64(0x0ef3f3fd0ef3f3fd), U64(0x6dd2d2bf6dd2d2bf),
+    U64(0x4ccdcd814ccdcd81), U64(0x140c0c18140c0c18),
+    U64(0x3513132635131326), U64(0x2fececc32fececc3),
+    U64(0xe15f5fbee15f5fbe), U64(0xa2979735a2979735),
+    U64(0xcc444488cc444488), U64(0x3917172e3917172e),
+    U64(0x57c4c49357c4c493), U64(0xf2a7a755f2a7a755),
+    U64(0x827e7efc827e7efc), U64(0x473d3d7a473d3d7a),
+    U64(0xac6464c8ac6464c8), U64(0xe75d5dbae75d5dba),
+    U64(0x2b1919322b191932), U64(0x957373e6957373e6),
+    U64(0xa06060c0a06060c0), U64(0x9881811998818119),
+    U64(0xd14f4f9ed14f4f9e), U64(0x7fdcdca37fdcdca3),
+    U64(0x6622224466222244), U64(0x7e2a2a547e2a2a54),
+    U64(0xab90903bab90903b), U64(0x8388880b8388880b),
+    U64(0xca46468cca46468c), U64(0x29eeeec729eeeec7),
+    U64(0xd3b8b86bd3b8b86b), U64(0x3c1414283c141428),
+    U64(0x79dedea779dedea7), U64(0xe25e5ebce25e5ebc),
+    U64(0x1d0b0b161d0b0b16), U64(0x76dbdbad76dbdbad),
+    U64(0x3be0e0db3be0e0db), U64(0x5632326456323264),
+    U64(0x4e3a3a744e3a3a74), U64(0x1e0a0a141e0a0a14),
+    U64(0xdb494992db494992), U64(0x0a06060c0a06060c),
+    U64(0x6c2424486c242448), U64(0xe45c5cb8e45c5cb8),
+    U64(0x5dc2c29f5dc2c29f), U64(0x6ed3d3bd6ed3d3bd),
+    U64(0xefacac43efacac43), U64(0xa66262c4a66262c4),
+    U64(0xa8919139a8919139), U64(0xa4959531a4959531),
+    U64(0x37e4e4d337e4e4d3), U64(0x8b7979f28b7979f2),
+    U64(0x32e7e7d532e7e7d5), U64(0x43c8c88b43c8c88b),
+    U64(0x5937376e5937376e), U64(0xb76d6ddab76d6dda),
+    U64(0x8c8d8d018c8d8d01), U64(0x64d5d5b164d5d5b1),
+    U64(0xd24e4e9cd24e4e9c), U64(0xe0a9a949e0a9a949),
+    U64(0xb46c6cd8b46c6cd8), U64(0xfa5656acfa5656ac),
+    U64(0x07f4f4f307f4f4f3), U64(0x25eaeacf25eaeacf),
+    U64(0xaf6565caaf6565ca), U64(0x8e7a7af48e7a7af4),
+    U64(0xe9aeae47e9aeae47), U64(0x1808081018080810),
+    U64(0xd5baba6fd5baba6f), U64(0x887878f0887878f0),
+    U64(0x6f25254a6f25254a), U64(0x722e2e5c722e2e5c),
+    U64(0x241c1c38241c1c38), U64(0xf1a6a657f1a6a657),
+    U64(0xc7b4b473c7b4b473), U64(0x51c6c69751c6c697),
+    U64(0x23e8e8cb23e8e8cb), U64(0x7cdddda17cdddda1),
+    U64(0x9c7474e89c7474e8), U64(0x211f1f3e211f1f3e),
+    U64(0xdd4b4b96dd4b4b96), U64(0xdcbdbd61dcbdbd61),
+    U64(0x868b8b0d868b8b0d), U64(0x858a8a0f858a8a0f),
+    U64(0x907070e0907070e0), U64(0x423e3e7c423e3e7c),
+    U64(0xc4b5b571c4b5b571), U64(0xaa6666ccaa6666cc),
+    U64(0xd8484890d8484890), U64(0x0503030605030306),
+    U64(0x01f6f6f701f6f6f7), U64(0x120e0e1c120e0e1c),
+    U64(0xa36161c2a36161c2), U64(0x5f35356a5f35356a),
+    U64(0xf95757aef95757ae), U64(0xd0b9b969d0b9b969),
+    U64(0x9186861791868617), U64(0x58c1c19958c1c199),
+    U64(0x271d1d3a271d1d3a), U64(0xb99e9e27b99e9e27),
+    U64(0x38e1e1d938e1e1d9), U64(0x13f8f8eb13f8f8eb),
+    U64(0xb398982bb398982b), U64(0x3311112233111122),
+    U64(0xbb6969d2bb6969d2), U64(0x70d9d9a970d9d9a9),
+    U64(0x898e8e07898e8e07), U64(0xa7949433a7949433),
+    U64(0xb69b9b2db69b9b2d), U64(0x221e1e3c221e1e3c),
+    U64(0x9287871592878715), U64(0x20e9e9c920e9e9c9),
+    U64(0x49cece8749cece87), U64(0xff5555aaff5555aa),
+    U64(0x7828285078282850), U64(0x7adfdfa57adfdfa5),
+    U64(0x8f8c8c038f8c8c03), U64(0xf8a1a159f8a1a159),
+    U64(0x8089890980898909), U64(0x170d0d1a170d0d1a),
+    U64(0xdabfbf65dabfbf65), U64(0x31e6e6d731e6e6d7),
+    U64(0xc6424284c6424284), U64(0xb86868d0b86868d0),
+    U64(0xc3414182c3414182), U64(0xb0999929b0999929),
+    U64(0x772d2d5a772d2d5a), U64(0x110f0f1e110f0f1e),
+    U64(0xcbb0b07bcbb0b07b), U64(0xfc5454a8fc5454a8),
+    U64(0xd6bbbb6dd6bbbb6d), U64(0x3a16162c3a16162c)
+};
+
+static const u8 Te4[256] = {
+    0x63U, 0x7cU, 0x77U, 0x7bU, 0xf2U, 0x6bU, 0x6fU, 0xc5U,
+    0x30U, 0x01U, 0x67U, 0x2bU, 0xfeU, 0xd7U, 0xabU, 0x76U,
+    0xcaU, 0x82U, 0xc9U, 0x7dU, 0xfaU, 0x59U, 0x47U, 0xf0U,
+    0xadU, 0xd4U, 0xa2U, 0xafU, 0x9cU, 0xa4U, 0x72U, 0xc0U,
+    0xb7U, 0xfdU, 0x93U, 0x26U, 0x36U, 0x3fU, 0xf7U, 0xccU,
+    0x34U, 0xa5U, 0xe5U, 0xf1U, 0x71U, 0xd8U, 0x31U, 0x15U,
+    0x04U, 0xc7U, 0x23U, 0xc3U, 0x18U, 0x96U, 0x05U, 0x9aU,
+    0x07U, 0x12U, 0x80U, 0xe2U, 0xebU, 0x27U, 0xb2U, 0x75U,
+    0x09U, 0x83U, 0x2cU, 0x1aU, 0x1bU, 0x6eU, 0x5aU, 0xa0U,
+    0x52U, 0x3bU, 0xd6U, 0xb3U, 0x29U, 0xe3U, 0x2fU, 0x84U,
+    0x53U, 0xd1U, 0x00U, 0xedU, 0x20U, 0xfcU, 0xb1U, 0x5bU,
+    0x6aU, 0xcbU, 0xbeU, 0x39U, 0x4aU, 0x4cU, 0x58U, 0xcfU,
+    0xd0U, 0xefU, 0xaaU, 0xfbU, 0x43U, 0x4dU, 0x33U, 0x85U,
+    0x45U, 0xf9U, 0x02U, 0x7fU, 0x50U, 0x3cU, 0x9fU, 0xa8U,
+    0x51U, 0xa3U, 0x40U, 0x8fU, 0x92U, 0x9dU, 0x38U, 0xf5U,
+    0xbcU, 0xb6U, 0xdaU, 0x21U, 0x10U, 0xffU, 0xf3U, 0xd2U,
+    0xcdU, 0x0cU, 0x13U, 0xecU, 0x5fU, 0x97U, 0x44U, 0x17U,
+    0xc4U, 0xa7U, 0x7eU, 0x3dU, 0x64U, 0x5dU, 0x19U, 0x73U,
+    0x60U, 0x81U, 0x4fU, 0xdcU, 0x22U, 0x2aU, 0x90U, 0x88U,
+    0x46U, 0xeeU, 0xb8U, 0x14U, 0xdeU, 0x5eU, 0x0bU, 0xdbU,
+    0xe0U, 0x32U, 0x3aU, 0x0aU, 0x49U, 0x06U, 0x24U, 0x5cU,
+    0xc2U, 0xd3U, 0xacU, 0x62U, 0x91U, 0x95U, 0xe4U, 0x79U,
+    0xe7U, 0xc8U, 0x37U, 0x6dU, 0x8dU, 0xd5U, 0x4eU, 0xa9U,
+    0x6cU, 0x56U, 0xf4U, 0xeaU, 0x65U, 0x7aU, 0xaeU, 0x08U,
+    0xbaU, 0x78U, 0x25U, 0x2eU, 0x1cU, 0xa6U, 0xb4U, 0xc6U,
+    0xe8U, 0xddU, 0x74U, 0x1fU, 0x4bU, 0xbdU, 0x8bU, 0x8aU,
+    0x70U, 0x3eU, 0xb5U, 0x66U, 0x48U, 0x03U, 0xf6U, 0x0eU,
+    0x61U, 0x35U, 0x57U, 0xb9U, 0x86U, 0xc1U, 0x1dU, 0x9eU,
+    0xe1U, 0xf8U, 0x98U, 0x11U, 0x69U, 0xd9U, 0x8eU, 0x94U,
+    0x9bU, 0x1eU, 0x87U, 0xe9U, 0xceU, 0x55U, 0x28U, 0xdfU,
+    0x8cU, 0xa1U, 0x89U, 0x0dU, 0xbfU, 0xe6U, 0x42U, 0x68U,
+    0x41U, 0x99U, 0x2dU, 0x0fU, 0xb0U, 0x54U, 0xbbU, 0x16U
+};
+
+static const u64 Td[256] = {
+    U64(0x50a7f45150a7f451), U64(0x5365417e5365417e),
+    U64(0xc3a4171ac3a4171a), U64(0x965e273a965e273a),
+    U64(0xcb6bab3bcb6bab3b), U64(0xf1459d1ff1459d1f),
+    U64(0xab58faacab58faac), U64(0x9303e34b9303e34b),
+    U64(0x55fa302055fa3020), U64(0xf66d76adf66d76ad),
+    U64(0x9176cc889176cc88), U64(0x254c02f5254c02f5),
+    U64(0xfcd7e54ffcd7e54f), U64(0xd7cb2ac5d7cb2ac5),
+    U64(0x8044352680443526), U64(0x8fa362b58fa362b5),
+    U64(0x495ab1de495ab1de), U64(0x671bba25671bba25),
+    U64(0x980eea45980eea45), U64(0xe1c0fe5de1c0fe5d),
+    U64(0x02752fc302752fc3), U64(0x12f04c8112f04c81),
+    U64(0xa397468da397468d), U64(0xc6f9d36bc6f9d36b),
+    U64(0xe75f8f03e75f8f03), U64(0x959c9215959c9215),
+    U64(0xeb7a6dbfeb7a6dbf), U64(0xda595295da595295),
+    U64(0x2d83bed42d83bed4), U64(0xd3217458d3217458),
+    U64(0x2969e0492969e049), U64(0x44c8c98e44c8c98e),
+    U64(0x6a89c2756a89c275), U64(0x78798ef478798ef4),
+    U64(0x6b3e58996b3e5899), U64(0xdd71b927dd71b927),
+    U64(0xb64fe1beb64fe1be), U64(0x17ad88f017ad88f0),
+    U64(0x66ac20c966ac20c9), U64(0xb43ace7db43ace7d),
+    U64(0x184adf63184adf63), U64(0x82311ae582311ae5),
+    U64(0x6033519760335197), U64(0x457f5362457f5362),
+    U64(0xe07764b1e07764b1), U64(0x84ae6bbb84ae6bbb),
+    U64(0x1ca081fe1ca081fe), U64(0x942b08f9942b08f9),
+    U64(0x5868487058684870), U64(0x19fd458f19fd458f),
+    U64(0x876cde94876cde94), U64(0xb7f87b52b7f87b52),
+    U64(0x23d373ab23d373ab), U64(0xe2024b72e2024b72),
+    U64(0x578f1fe3578f1fe3), U64(0x2aab55662aab5566),
+    U64(0x0728ebb20728ebb2), U64(0x03c2b52f03c2b52f),
+    U64(0x9a7bc5869a7bc586), U64(0xa50837d3a50837d3),
+    U64(0xf2872830f2872830), U64(0xb2a5bf23b2a5bf23),
+    U64(0xba6a0302ba6a0302), U64(0x5c8216ed5c8216ed),
+    U64(0x2b1ccf8a2b1ccf8a), U64(0x92b479a792b479a7),
+    U64(0xf0f207f3f0f207f3), U64(0xa1e2694ea1e2694e),
+    U64(0xcdf4da65cdf4da65), U64(0xd5be0506d5be0506),
+    U64(0x1f6234d11f6234d1), U64(0x8afea6c48afea6c4),
+    U64(0x9d532e349d532e34), U64(0xa055f3a2a055f3a2),
+    U64(0x32e18a0532e18a05), U64(0x75ebf6a475ebf6a4),
+    U64(0x39ec830b39ec830b), U64(0xaaef6040aaef6040),
+    U64(0x069f715e069f715e), U64(0x51106ebd51106ebd),
+    U64(0xf98a213ef98a213e), U64(0x3d06dd963d06dd96),
+    U64(0xae053eddae053edd), U64(0x46bde64d46bde64d),
+    U64(0xb58d5491b58d5491), U64(0x055dc471055dc471),
+    U64(0x6fd406046fd40604), U64(0xff155060ff155060),
+    U64(0x24fb981924fb9819), U64(0x97e9bdd697e9bdd6),
+    U64(0xcc434089cc434089), U64(0x779ed967779ed967),
+    U64(0xbd42e8b0bd42e8b0), U64(0x888b8907888b8907),
+    U64(0x385b19e7385b19e7), U64(0xdbeec879dbeec879),
+    U64(0x470a7ca1470a7ca1), U64(0xe90f427ce90f427c),
+    U64(0xc91e84f8c91e84f8), U64(0x0000000000000000),
+    U64(0x8386800983868009), U64(0x48ed2b3248ed2b32),
+    U64(0xac70111eac70111e), U64(0x4e725a6c4e725a6c),
+    U64(0xfbff0efdfbff0efd), U64(0x5638850f5638850f),
+    U64(0x1ed5ae3d1ed5ae3d), U64(0x27392d3627392d36),
+    U64(0x64d90f0a64d90f0a), U64(0x21a65c6821a65c68),
+    U64(0xd1545b9bd1545b9b), U64(0x3a2e36243a2e3624),
+    U64(0xb1670a0cb1670a0c), U64(0x0fe757930fe75793),
+    U64(0xd296eeb4d296eeb4), U64(0x9e919b1b9e919b1b),
+    U64(0x4fc5c0804fc5c080), U64(0xa220dc61a220dc61),
+    U64(0x694b775a694b775a), U64(0x161a121c161a121c),
+    U64(0x0aba93e20aba93e2), U64(0xe52aa0c0e52aa0c0),
+    U64(0x43e0223c43e0223c), U64(0x1d171b121d171b12),
+    U64(0x0b0d090e0b0d090e), U64(0xadc78bf2adc78bf2),
+    U64(0xb9a8b62db9a8b62d), U64(0xc8a91e14c8a91e14),
+    U64(0x8519f1578519f157), U64(0x4c0775af4c0775af),
+    U64(0xbbdd99eebbdd99ee), U64(0xfd607fa3fd607fa3),
+    U64(0x9f2601f79f2601f7), U64(0xbcf5725cbcf5725c),
+    U64(0xc53b6644c53b6644), U64(0x347efb5b347efb5b),
+    U64(0x7629438b7629438b), U64(0xdcc623cbdcc623cb),
+    U64(0x68fcedb668fcedb6), U64(0x63f1e4b863f1e4b8),
+    U64(0xcadc31d7cadc31d7), U64(0x1085634210856342),
+    U64(0x4022971340229713), U64(0x2011c6842011c684),
+    U64(0x7d244a857d244a85), U64(0xf83dbbd2f83dbbd2),
+    U64(0x1132f9ae1132f9ae), U64(0x6da129c76da129c7),
+    U64(0x4b2f9e1d4b2f9e1d), U64(0xf330b2dcf330b2dc),
+    U64(0xec52860dec52860d), U64(0xd0e3c177d0e3c177),
+    U64(0x6c16b32b6c16b32b), U64(0x99b970a999b970a9),
+    U64(0xfa489411fa489411), U64(0x2264e9472264e947),
+    U64(0xc48cfca8c48cfca8), U64(0x1a3ff0a01a3ff0a0),
+    U64(0xd82c7d56d82c7d56), U64(0xef903322ef903322),
+    U64(0xc74e4987c74e4987), U64(0xc1d138d9c1d138d9),
+    U64(0xfea2ca8cfea2ca8c), U64(0x360bd498360bd498),
+    U64(0xcf81f5a6cf81f5a6), U64(0x28de7aa528de7aa5),
+    U64(0x268eb7da268eb7da), U64(0xa4bfad3fa4bfad3f),
+    U64(0xe49d3a2ce49d3a2c), U64(0x0d9278500d927850),
+    U64(0x9bcc5f6a9bcc5f6a), U64(0x62467e5462467e54),
+    U64(0xc2138df6c2138df6), U64(0xe8b8d890e8b8d890),
+    U64(0x5ef7392e5ef7392e), U64(0xf5afc382f5afc382),
+    U64(0xbe805d9fbe805d9f), U64(0x7c93d0697c93d069),
+    U64(0xa92dd56fa92dd56f), U64(0xb31225cfb31225cf),
+    U64(0x3b99acc83b99acc8), U64(0xa77d1810a77d1810),
+    U64(0x6e639ce86e639ce8), U64(0x7bbb3bdb7bbb3bdb),
+    U64(0x097826cd097826cd), U64(0xf418596ef418596e),
+    U64(0x01b79aec01b79aec), U64(0xa89a4f83a89a4f83),
+    U64(0x656e95e6656e95e6), U64(0x7ee6ffaa7ee6ffaa),
+    U64(0x08cfbc2108cfbc21), U64(0xe6e815efe6e815ef),
+    U64(0xd99be7bad99be7ba), U64(0xce366f4ace366f4a),
+    U64(0xd4099fead4099fea), U64(0xd67cb029d67cb029),
+    U64(0xafb2a431afb2a431), U64(0x31233f2a31233f2a),
+    U64(0x3094a5c63094a5c6), U64(0xc066a235c066a235),
+    U64(0x37bc4e7437bc4e74), U64(0xa6ca82fca6ca82fc),
+    U64(0xb0d090e0b0d090e0), U64(0x15d8a73315d8a733),
+    U64(0x4a9804f14a9804f1), U64(0xf7daec41f7daec41),
+    U64(0x0e50cd7f0e50cd7f), U64(0x2ff691172ff69117),
+    U64(0x8dd64d768dd64d76), U64(0x4db0ef434db0ef43),
+    U64(0x544daacc544daacc), U64(0xdf0496e4df0496e4),
+    U64(0xe3b5d19ee3b5d19e), U64(0x1b886a4c1b886a4c),
+    U64(0xb81f2cc1b81f2cc1), U64(0x7f5165467f516546),
+    U64(0x04ea5e9d04ea5e9d), U64(0x5d358c015d358c01),
+    U64(0x737487fa737487fa), U64(0x2e410bfb2e410bfb),
+    U64(0x5a1d67b35a1d67b3), U64(0x52d2db9252d2db92),
+    U64(0x335610e9335610e9), U64(0x1347d66d1347d66d),
+    U64(0x8c61d79a8c61d79a), U64(0x7a0ca1377a0ca137),
+    U64(0x8e14f8598e14f859), U64(0x893c13eb893c13eb),
+    U64(0xee27a9ceee27a9ce), U64(0x35c961b735c961b7),
+    U64(0xede51ce1ede51ce1), U64(0x3cb1477a3cb1477a),
+    U64(0x59dfd29c59dfd29c), U64(0x3f73f2553f73f255),
+    U64(0x79ce141879ce1418), U64(0xbf37c773bf37c773),
+    U64(0xeacdf753eacdf753), U64(0x5baafd5f5baafd5f),
+    U64(0x146f3ddf146f3ddf), U64(0x86db447886db4478),
+    U64(0x81f3afca81f3afca), U64(0x3ec468b93ec468b9),
+    U64(0x2c3424382c342438), U64(0x5f40a3c25f40a3c2),
+    U64(0x72c31d1672c31d16), U64(0x0c25e2bc0c25e2bc),
+    U64(0x8b493c288b493c28), U64(0x41950dff41950dff),
+    U64(0x7101a8397101a839), U64(0xdeb30c08deb30c08),
+    U64(0x9ce4b4d89ce4b4d8), U64(0x90c1566490c15664),
+    U64(0x6184cb7b6184cb7b), U64(0x70b632d570b632d5),
+    U64(0x745c6c48745c6c48), U64(0x4257b8d04257b8d0)
+};
+static const u8 Td4[256] = {
+    0x52U, 0x09U, 0x6aU, 0xd5U, 0x30U, 0x36U, 0xa5U, 0x38U,
+    0xbfU, 0x40U, 0xa3U, 0x9eU, 0x81U, 0xf3U, 0xd7U, 0xfbU,
+    0x7cU, 0xe3U, 0x39U, 0x82U, 0x9bU, 0x2fU, 0xffU, 0x87U,
+    0x34U, 0x8eU, 0x43U, 0x44U, 0xc4U, 0xdeU, 0xe9U, 0xcbU,
+    0x54U, 0x7bU, 0x94U, 0x32U, 0xa6U, 0xc2U, 0x23U, 0x3dU,
+    0xeeU, 0x4cU, 0x95U, 0x0bU, 0x42U, 0xfaU, 0xc3U, 0x4eU,
+    0x08U, 0x2eU, 0xa1U, 0x66U, 0x28U, 0xd9U, 0x24U, 0xb2U,
+    0x76U, 0x5bU, 0xa2U, 0x49U, 0x6dU, 0x8bU, 0xd1U, 0x25U,
+    0x72U, 0xf8U, 0xf6U, 0x64U, 0x86U, 0x68U, 0x98U, 0x16U,
+    0xd4U, 0xa4U, 0x5cU, 0xccU, 0x5dU, 0x65U, 0xb6U, 0x92U,
+    0x6cU, 0x70U, 0x48U, 0x50U, 0xfdU, 0xedU, 0xb9U, 0xdaU,
+    0x5eU, 0x15U, 0x46U, 0x57U, 0xa7U, 0x8dU, 0x9dU, 0x84U,
+    0x90U, 0xd8U, 0xabU, 0x00U, 0x8cU, 0xbcU, 0xd3U, 0x0aU,
+    0xf7U, 0xe4U, 0x58U, 0x05U, 0xb8U, 0xb3U, 0x45U, 0x06U,
+    0xd0U, 0x2cU, 0x1eU, 0x8fU, 0xcaU, 0x3fU, 0x0fU, 0x02U,
+    0xc1U, 0xafU, 0xbdU, 0x03U, 0x01U, 0x13U, 0x8aU, 0x6bU,
+    0x3aU, 0x91U, 0x11U, 0x41U, 0x4fU, 0x67U, 0xdcU, 0xeaU,
+    0x97U, 0xf2U, 0xcfU, 0xceU, 0xf0U, 0xb4U, 0xe6U, 0x73U,
+    0x96U, 0xacU, 0x74U, 0x22U, 0xe7U, 0xadU, 0x35U, 0x85U,
+    0xe2U, 0xf9U, 0x37U, 0xe8U, 0x1cU, 0x75U, 0xdfU, 0x6eU,
+    0x47U, 0xf1U, 0x1aU, 0x71U, 0x1dU, 0x29U, 0xc5U, 0x89U,
+    0x6fU, 0xb7U, 0x62U, 0x0eU, 0xaaU, 0x18U, 0xbeU, 0x1bU,
+    0xfcU, 0x56U, 0x3eU, 0x4bU, 0xc6U, 0xd2U, 0x79U, 0x20U,
+    0x9aU, 0xdbU, 0xc0U, 0xfeU, 0x78U, 0xcdU, 0x5aU, 0xf4U,
+    0x1fU, 0xddU, 0xa8U, 0x33U, 0x88U, 0x07U, 0xc7U, 0x31U,
+    0xb1U, 0x12U, 0x10U, 0x59U, 0x27U, 0x80U, 0xecU, 0x5fU,
+    0x60U, 0x51U, 0x7fU, 0xa9U, 0x19U, 0xb5U, 0x4aU, 0x0dU,
+    0x2dU, 0xe5U, 0x7aU, 0x9fU, 0x93U, 0xc9U, 0x9cU, 0xefU,
+    0xa0U, 0xe0U, 0x3bU, 0x4dU, 0xaeU, 0x2aU, 0xf5U, 0xb0U,
+    0xc8U, 0xebU, 0xbbU, 0x3cU, 0x83U, 0x53U, 0x99U, 0x61U,
+    0x17U, 0x2bU, 0x04U, 0x7eU, 0xbaU, 0x77U, 0xd6U, 0x26U,
+    0xe1U, 0x69U, 0x14U, 0x63U, 0x55U, 0x21U, 0x0cU, 0x7dU
+};
+
+static const u32 rcon[] = {
+    0x00000001U, 0x00000002U, 0x00000004U, 0x00000008U,
+    0x00000010U, 0x00000020U, 0x00000040U, 0x00000080U,
+    0x0000001bU, 0x00000036U, /* for 128-bit blocks, Rijndael never uses more than 10 rcon values */
+};
+
+/**
+ * Expand the cipher key into the encryption key schedule.
+ */
+int AES_set_encrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, const int bits,
+                        AES_KEY *key)
+{
+
+    u32 *rk;
+    int i = 0;
+    u32 temp;
+
+    if (!userKey || !key)
+        return -1;
+    if (bits != 128 && bits != 192 && bits != 256)
+        return -2;
+
+    rk = key->rd_key;
+
+    if (bits==128)
+        key->rounds = 10;
+    else if (bits==192)
+        key->rounds = 12;
+    else
+        key->rounds = 14;
+
+    rk[0] = GETU32(userKey     );
+    rk[1] = GETU32(userKey +  4);
+    rk[2] = GETU32(userKey +  8);
+    rk[3] = GETU32(userKey + 12);
+    if (bits == 128) {
+        while (1) {
+            temp  = rk[3];
+            rk[4] = rk[0] ^
+                ((u32)Te4[(temp >>  8) & 0xff]      ) ^
+                ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] <<  8) ^
+                ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 24)       ] << 16) ^
+                ((u32)Te4[(temp      ) & 0xff] << 24) ^
+                rcon[i];
+            rk[5] = rk[1] ^ rk[4];
+            rk[6] = rk[2] ^ rk[5];
+            rk[7] = rk[3] ^ rk[6];
+            if (++i == 10) {
+                return 0;
+            }
+            rk += 4;
+        }
+    }
+    rk[4] = GETU32(userKey + 16);
+    rk[5] = GETU32(userKey + 20);
+    if (bits == 192) {
+        while (1) {
+            temp = rk[ 5];
+            rk[ 6] = rk[ 0] ^
+                ((u32)Te4[(temp >>  8) & 0xff]      ) ^
+                ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] <<  8) ^
+                ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 24)       ] << 16) ^
+                ((u32)Te4[(temp      ) & 0xff] << 24) ^
+                rcon[i];
+            rk[ 7] = rk[ 1] ^ rk[ 6];
+            rk[ 8] = rk[ 2] ^ rk[ 7];
+            rk[ 9] = rk[ 3] ^ rk[ 8];
+            if (++i == 8) {
+                return 0;
+            }
+            rk[10] = rk[ 4] ^ rk[ 9];
+            rk[11] = rk[ 5] ^ rk[10];
+            rk += 6;
+        }
+    }
+    rk[6] = GETU32(userKey + 24);
+    rk[7] = GETU32(userKey + 28);
+    if (bits == 256) {
+        while (1) {
+            temp = rk[ 7];
+            rk[ 8] = rk[ 0] ^
+                ((u32)Te4[(temp >>  8) & 0xff]      ) ^
+                ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] <<  8) ^
+                ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 24)       ] << 16) ^
+                ((u32)Te4[(temp      ) & 0xff] << 24) ^
+                rcon[i];
+            rk[ 9] = rk[ 1] ^ rk[ 8];
+            rk[10] = rk[ 2] ^ rk[ 9];
+            rk[11] = rk[ 3] ^ rk[10];
+            if (++i == 7) {
+                return 0;
+            }
+            temp = rk[11];
+            rk[12] = rk[ 4] ^
+                ((u32)Te4[(temp      ) & 0xff]      ) ^
+                ((u32)Te4[(temp >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8) ^
+                ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^
+                ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 24)       ] << 24);
+            rk[13] = rk[ 5] ^ rk[12];
+            rk[14] = rk[ 6] ^ rk[13];
+            rk[15] = rk[ 7] ^ rk[14];
+
+            rk += 8;
+            }
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Expand the cipher key into the decryption key schedule.
+ */
+int AES_set_decrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, const int bits,
+                        AES_KEY *key)
+{
+
+    u32 *rk;
+    int i, j, status;
+    u32 temp;
+
+    /* first, start with an encryption schedule */
+    status = AES_set_encrypt_key(userKey, bits, key);
+    if (status < 0)
+        return status;
+
+    rk = key->rd_key;
+
+    /* invert the order of the round keys: */
+    for (i = 0, j = 4*(key->rounds); i < j; i += 4, j -= 4) {
+        temp = rk[i    ]; rk[i    ] = rk[j    ]; rk[j    ] = temp;
+        temp = rk[i + 1]; rk[i + 1] = rk[j + 1]; rk[j + 1] = temp;
+        temp = rk[i + 2]; rk[i + 2] = rk[j + 2]; rk[j + 2] = temp;
+        temp = rk[i + 3]; rk[i + 3] = rk[j + 3]; rk[j + 3] = temp;
+    }
+    /* apply the inverse MixColumn transform to all round keys but the first and the last: */
+    for (i = 1; i < (key->rounds); i++) {
+        rk += 4;
+#if 1
+        for (j = 0; j < 4; j++) {
+            u32 tp1, tp2, tp4, tp8, tp9, tpb, tpd, tpe, m;
+
+            tp1 = rk[j];
+            m = tp1 & 0x80808080;
+            tp2 = ((tp1 & 0x7f7f7f7f) << 1) ^
+                ((m - (m >> 7)) & 0x1b1b1b1b);
+            m = tp2 & 0x80808080;
+            tp4 = ((tp2 & 0x7f7f7f7f) << 1) ^
+                ((m - (m >> 7)) & 0x1b1b1b1b);
+            m = tp4 & 0x80808080;
+            tp8 = ((tp4 & 0x7f7f7f7f) << 1) ^
+                ((m - (m >> 7)) & 0x1b1b1b1b);
+            tp9 = tp8 ^ tp1;
+            tpb = tp9 ^ tp2;
+            tpd = tp9 ^ tp4;
+            tpe = tp8 ^ tp4 ^ tp2;
+#if defined(ROTATE)
+            rk[j] = tpe ^ ROTATE(tpd,16) ^
+                ROTATE(tp9,8) ^ ROTATE(tpb,24);
+#else
+            rk[j] = tpe ^ (tpd >> 16) ^ (tpd << 16) ^
+                (tp9 >> 24) ^ (tp9 << 8) ^
+                (tpb >> 8) ^ (tpb << 24);
+#endif
+        }
+#else
+        rk[0] =
+            Td0[Te2[(rk[0]      ) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
+            Td1[Te2[(rk[0] >>  8) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
+            Td2[Te2[(rk[0] >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
+            Td3[Te2[(rk[0] >> 24)       ] & 0xff];
+        rk[1] =
+            Td0[Te2[(rk[1]      ) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
+            Td1[Te2[(rk[1] >>  8) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
+            Td2[Te2[(rk[1] >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
+            Td3[Te2[(rk[1] >> 24)       ] & 0xff];
+        rk[2] =
+            Td0[Te2[(rk[2]      ) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
+            Td1[Te2[(rk[2] >>  8) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
+            Td2[Te2[(rk[2] >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
+            Td3[Te2[(rk[2] >> 24)       ] & 0xff];
+        rk[3] =
+            Td0[Te2[(rk[3]      ) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
+            Td1[Te2[(rk[3] >>  8) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
+            Td2[Te2[(rk[3] >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
+            Td3[Te2[(rk[3] >> 24)       ] & 0xff];
+#endif
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Encrypt a single block
+ * in and out can overlap
+ */
+void AES_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                 const AES_KEY *key)
+{
+
+    const u32 *rk;
+    u32 s0, s1, s2, s3, t[4];
+    int r;
+
+    assert(in && out && key);
+    rk = key->rd_key;
+
+    /*
+     * map byte array block to cipher state
+     * and add initial round key:
+     */
+    s0 = GETU32(in     ) ^ rk[0];
+    s1 = GETU32(in +  4) ^ rk[1];
+    s2 = GETU32(in +  8) ^ rk[2];
+    s3 = GETU32(in + 12) ^ rk[3];
+
+#if defined(AES_COMPACT_IN_OUTER_ROUNDS)
+    prefetch256(Te4);
+
+    t[0] = (u32)Te4[(s0      ) & 0xff]       ^
+           (u32)Te4[(s1 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8 ^
+           (u32)Te4[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
+           (u32)Te4[(s3 >> 24)       ] << 24;
+    t[1] = (u32)Te4[(s1      ) & 0xff]       ^
+           (u32)Te4[(s2 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8 ^
+           (u32)Te4[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
+           (u32)Te4[(s0 >> 24)       ] << 24;
+    t[2] = (u32)Te4[(s2      ) & 0xff]       ^
+           (u32)Te4[(s3 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8 ^
+           (u32)Te4[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
+           (u32)Te4[(s1 >> 24)       ] << 24;
+    t[3] = (u32)Te4[(s3      ) & 0xff]       ^
+           (u32)Te4[(s0 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8 ^
+           (u32)Te4[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
+           (u32)Te4[(s2 >> 24)       ] << 24;
+
+    /* now do the linear transform using words */
+    {   int i;
+        u32 r0, r1, r2;
+
+        for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
+            r0 = t[i];
+            r1 = r0 & 0x80808080;
+            r2 = ((r0 & 0x7f7f7f7f) << 1) ^
+                ((r1 - (r1 >> 7)) & 0x1b1b1b1b);
+#if defined(ROTATE)
+            t[i] = r2 ^ ROTATE(r2,24) ^ ROTATE(r0,24) ^
+                ROTATE(r0,16) ^ ROTATE(r0,8);
+#else
+            t[i] = r2 ^ ((r2 ^ r0) << 24) ^ ((r2 ^ r0) >> 8) ^
+                (r0 << 16) ^ (r0 >> 16) ^
+                (r0 << 8) ^ (r0 >> 24);
+#endif
+            t[i] ^= rk[4+i];
+        }
+    }
+#else
+    t[0] =  Te0[(s0      ) & 0xff] ^
+        Te1[(s1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^
+        Te2[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+        Te3[(s3 >> 24)       ] ^
+        rk[4];
+    t[1] =  Te0[(s1      ) & 0xff] ^
+        Te1[(s2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^
+        Te2[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+        Te3[(s0 >> 24)       ] ^
+        rk[5];
+    t[2] =  Te0[(s2      ) & 0xff] ^
+        Te1[(s3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^
+        Te2[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+        Te3[(s1 >> 24)       ] ^
+        rk[6];
+    t[3] =  Te0[(s3      ) & 0xff] ^
+        Te1[(s0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^
+        Te2[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+        Te3[(s2 >> 24)       ] ^
+        rk[7];
+#endif
+    s0 = t[0]; s1 = t[1]; s2 = t[2]; s3 = t[3];
+
+    /*
+     * Nr - 2 full rounds:
+     */
+    for (rk+=8,r=key->rounds-2; r>0; rk+=4,r--) {
+#if defined(AES_COMPACT_IN_INNER_ROUNDS)
+        t[0] = (u32)Te4[(s0      ) & 0xff]       ^
+               (u32)Te4[(s1 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8 ^
+               (u32)Te4[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
+               (u32)Te4[(s3 >> 24)       ] << 24;
+        t[1] = (u32)Te4[(s1      ) & 0xff]       ^
+               (u32)Te4[(s2 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8 ^
+               (u32)Te4[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
+               (u32)Te4[(s0 >> 24)       ] << 24;
+        t[2] = (u32)Te4[(s2      ) & 0xff]       ^
+               (u32)Te4[(s3 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8 ^
+               (u32)Te4[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
+               (u32)Te4[(s1 >> 24)       ] << 24;
+        t[3] = (u32)Te4[(s3      ) & 0xff]       ^
+               (u32)Te4[(s0 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8 ^
+               (u32)Te4[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
+               (u32)Te4[(s2 >> 24)       ] << 24;
+
+        /* now do the linear transform using words */
+        {
+            int i;
+            u32 r0, r1, r2;
+
+            for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
+                r0 = t[i];
+                r1 = r0 & 0x80808080;
+                r2 = ((r0 & 0x7f7f7f7f) << 1) ^
+                    ((r1 - (r1 >> 7)) & 0x1b1b1b1b);
+#if defined(ROTATE)
+                t[i] = r2 ^ ROTATE(r2,24) ^ ROTATE(r0,24) ^
+                    ROTATE(r0,16) ^ ROTATE(r0,8);
+#else
+                t[i] = r2 ^ ((r2 ^ r0) << 24) ^ ((r2 ^ r0) >> 8) ^
+                    (r0 << 16) ^ (r0 >> 16) ^
+                    (r0 << 8) ^ (r0 >> 24);
+#endif
+                t[i] ^= rk[i];
+            }
+        }
+#else
+        t[0] =  Te0[(s0      ) & 0xff] ^
+            Te1[(s1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^
+            Te2[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+            Te3[(s3 >> 24)       ] ^
+            rk[0];
+        t[1] =  Te0[(s1      ) & 0xff] ^
+            Te1[(s2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^
+            Te2[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+            Te3[(s0 >> 24)       ] ^
+            rk[1];
+        t[2] =  Te0[(s2      ) & 0xff] ^
+            Te1[(s3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^
+            Te2[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+            Te3[(s1 >> 24)       ] ^
+            rk[2];
+        t[3] =  Te0[(s3      ) & 0xff] ^
+            Te1[(s0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^
+            Te2[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+            Te3[(s2 >> 24)       ] ^
+            rk[3];
+#endif
+        s0 = t[0]; s1 = t[1]; s2 = t[2]; s3 = t[3];
+    }
+    /*
+     * apply last round and
+     * map cipher state to byte array block:
+     */
+#if defined(AES_COMPACT_IN_OUTER_ROUNDS)
+    prefetch256(Te4);
+
+    *(u32*)(out+0) =
+           (u32)Te4[(s0      ) & 0xff]       ^
+           (u32)Te4[(s1 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8 ^
+           (u32)Te4[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
+           (u32)Te4[(s3 >> 24)       ] << 24 ^
+        rk[0];
+    *(u32*)(out+4) =
+           (u32)Te4[(s1      ) & 0xff]       ^
+           (u32)Te4[(s2 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8 ^
+           (u32)Te4[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
+           (u32)Te4[(s0 >> 24)       ] << 24 ^
+        rk[1];
+    *(u32*)(out+8) =
+           (u32)Te4[(s2      ) & 0xff]       ^
+           (u32)Te4[(s3 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8 ^
+           (u32)Te4[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
+           (u32)Te4[(s1 >> 24)       ] << 24 ^
+        rk[2];
+    *(u32*)(out+12) =
+           (u32)Te4[(s3      ) & 0xff]       ^
+           (u32)Te4[(s0 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8 ^
+           (u32)Te4[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
+           (u32)Te4[(s2 >> 24)       ] << 24 ^
+        rk[3];
+#else
+    *(u32*)(out+0) =
+        (Te2[(s0      ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ffU) ^
+        (Te3[(s1 >>  8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00U) ^
+        (Te0[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000U) ^
+        (Te1[(s3 >> 24)       ] & 0xff000000U) ^
+        rk[0];
+    *(u32*)(out+4) =
+        (Te2[(s1      ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ffU) ^
+        (Te3[(s2 >>  8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00U) ^
+        (Te0[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000U) ^
+        (Te1[(s0 >> 24)       ] & 0xff000000U) ^
+        rk[1];
+    *(u32*)(out+8) =
+        (Te2[(s2      ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ffU) ^
+        (Te3[(s3 >>  8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00U) ^
+        (Te0[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000U) ^
+        (Te1[(s1 >> 24)       ] & 0xff000000U) ^
+        rk[2];
+    *(u32*)(out+12) =
+        (Te2[(s3      ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ffU) ^
+        (Te3[(s0 >>  8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00U) ^
+        (Te0[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000U) ^
+        (Te1[(s2 >> 24)       ] & 0xff000000U) ^
+        rk[3];
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * Decrypt a single block
+ * in and out can overlap
+ */
+void AES_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                 const AES_KEY *key)
+{
+
+    const u32 *rk;
+    u32 s0, s1, s2, s3, t[4];
+    int r;
+
+    assert(in && out && key);
+    rk = key->rd_key;
+
+    /*
+     * map byte array block to cipher state
+     * and add initial round key:
+     */
+    s0 = GETU32(in     ) ^ rk[0];
+    s1 = GETU32(in +  4) ^ rk[1];
+    s2 = GETU32(in +  8) ^ rk[2];
+    s3 = GETU32(in + 12) ^ rk[3];
+
+#if defined(AES_COMPACT_IN_OUTER_ROUNDS)
+    prefetch256(Td4);
+
+    t[0] = (u32)Td4[(s0      ) & 0xff]       ^
+           (u32)Td4[(s3 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8 ^
+           (u32)Td4[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
+           (u32)Td4[(s1 >> 24)       ] << 24;
+    t[1] = (u32)Td4[(s1      ) & 0xff]       ^
+           (u32)Td4[(s0 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8 ^
+           (u32)Td4[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
+           (u32)Td4[(s2 >> 24)       ] << 24;
+    t[2] = (u32)Td4[(s2      ) & 0xff]       ^
+           (u32)Td4[(s1 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8 ^
+           (u32)Td4[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
+           (u32)Td4[(s3 >> 24)       ] << 24;
+    t[3] = (u32)Td4[(s3      ) & 0xff]       ^
+           (u32)Td4[(s2 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8 ^
+           (u32)Td4[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
+           (u32)Td4[(s0 >> 24)       ] << 24;
+
+    /* now do the linear transform using words */
+    {
+        int i;
+        u32 tp1, tp2, tp4, tp8, tp9, tpb, tpd, tpe, m;
+
+        for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
+            tp1 = t[i];
+            m = tp1 & 0x80808080;
+            tp2 = ((tp1 & 0x7f7f7f7f) << 1) ^
+                ((m - (m >> 7)) & 0x1b1b1b1b);
+            m = tp2 & 0x80808080;
+            tp4 = ((tp2 & 0x7f7f7f7f) << 1) ^
+                ((m - (m >> 7)) & 0x1b1b1b1b);
+            m = tp4 & 0x80808080;
+            tp8 = ((tp4 & 0x7f7f7f7f) << 1) ^
+                ((m - (m >> 7)) & 0x1b1b1b1b);
+            tp9 = tp8 ^ tp1;
+            tpb = tp9 ^ tp2;
+            tpd = tp9 ^ tp4;
+            tpe = tp8 ^ tp4 ^ tp2;
+#if defined(ROTATE)
+            t[i] = tpe ^ ROTATE(tpd,16) ^
+                ROTATE(tp9,8) ^ ROTATE(tpb,24);
+#else
+            t[i] = tpe ^ (tpd >> 16) ^ (tpd << 16) ^
+                (tp9 >> 24) ^ (tp9 << 8) ^
+                (tpb >> 8) ^ (tpb << 24);
+#endif
+            t[i] ^= rk[4+i];
+        }
+    }
+#else
+    t[0] =  Td0[(s0      ) & 0xff] ^
+        Td1[(s3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^
+        Td2[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+        Td3[(s1 >> 24)       ] ^
+        rk[4];
+    t[1] =  Td0[(s1      ) & 0xff] ^
+        Td1[(s0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^
+        Td2[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+        Td3[(s2 >> 24)       ] ^
+        rk[5];
+    t[2] =  Td0[(s2      ) & 0xff] ^
+        Td1[(s1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^
+        Td2[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+        Td3[(s3 >> 24)       ] ^
+        rk[6];
+    t[3] =  Td0[(s3      ) & 0xff] ^
+        Td1[(s2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^
+        Td2[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+        Td3[(s0 >> 24)       ] ^
+        rk[7];
+#endif
+    s0 = t[0]; s1 = t[1]; s2 = t[2]; s3 = t[3];
+
+    /*
+     * Nr - 2 full rounds:
+     */
+    for (rk+=8,r=key->rounds-2; r>0; rk+=4,r--) {
+#if defined(AES_COMPACT_IN_INNER_ROUNDS)
+        t[0] = (u32)Td4[(s0      ) & 0xff]       ^
+               (u32)Td4[(s3 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8 ^
+               (u32)Td4[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
+               (u32)Td4[(s1 >> 24)       ] << 24;
+        t[1] = (u32)Td4[(s1      ) & 0xff]       ^
+               (u32)Td4[(s0 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8 ^
+               (u32)Td4[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
+               (u32)Td4[(s2 >> 24)       ] << 24;
+        t[2] = (u32)Td4[(s2      ) & 0xff]       ^
+               (u32)Td4[(s1 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8 ^
+               (u32)Td4[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
+               (u32)Td4[(s3 >> 24)       ] << 24;
+        t[3] = (u32)Td4[(s3      ) & 0xff]       ^
+               (u32)Td4[(s2 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8 ^
+               (u32)Td4[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
+               (u32)Td4[(s0 >> 24)       ] << 24;
+
+    /* now do the linear transform using words */
+    {
+        int i;
+        u32 tp1, tp2, tp4, tp8, tp9, tpb, tpd, tpe, m;
+
+        for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
+            tp1 = t[i];
+            m = tp1 & 0x80808080;
+            tp2 = ((tp1 & 0x7f7f7f7f) << 1) ^
+                ((m - (m >> 7)) & 0x1b1b1b1b);
+            m = tp2 & 0x80808080;
+            tp4 = ((tp2 & 0x7f7f7f7f) << 1) ^
+                ((m - (m >> 7)) & 0x1b1b1b1b);
+            m = tp4 & 0x80808080;
+            tp8 = ((tp4 & 0x7f7f7f7f) << 1) ^
+                ((m - (m >> 7)) & 0x1b1b1b1b);
+            tp9 = tp8 ^ tp1;
+            tpb = tp9 ^ tp2;
+            tpd = tp9 ^ tp4;
+            tpe = tp8 ^ tp4 ^ tp2;
+#if defined(ROTATE)
+            t[i] = tpe ^ ROTATE(tpd,16) ^
+                ROTATE(tp9,8) ^ ROTATE(tpb,24);
+#else
+            t[i] = tpe ^ (tpd >> 16) ^ (tpd << 16) ^
+                (tp9 >> 24) ^ (tp9 << 8) ^
+                (tpb >> 8) ^ (tpb << 24);
+#endif
+            t[i] ^= rk[i];
+        }
+    }
+#else
+    t[0] =  Td0[(s0      ) & 0xff] ^
+        Td1[(s3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^
+        Td2[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+        Td3[(s1 >> 24)       ] ^
+        rk[0];
+    t[1] =  Td0[(s1      ) & 0xff] ^
+        Td1[(s0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^
+        Td2[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+        Td3[(s2 >> 24)       ] ^
+        rk[1];
+    t[2] =  Td0[(s2      ) & 0xff] ^
+        Td1[(s1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^
+        Td2[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+        Td3[(s3 >> 24)       ] ^
+        rk[2];
+    t[3] =  Td0[(s3      ) & 0xff] ^
+        Td1[(s2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^
+        Td2[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+        Td3[(s0 >> 24)       ] ^
+        rk[3];
+#endif
+    s0 = t[0]; s1 = t[1]; s2 = t[2]; s3 = t[3];
+    }
+    /*
+     * apply last round and
+     * map cipher state to byte array block:
+     */
+    prefetch256(Td4);
+
+    *(u32*)(out+0) =
+        ((u32)Td4[(s0      ) & 0xff])    ^
+        ((u32)Td4[(s3 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8) ^
+        ((u32)Td4[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^
+        ((u32)Td4[(s1 >> 24)       ] << 24) ^
+        rk[0];
+    *(u32*)(out+4) =
+        ((u32)Td4[(s1      ) & 0xff])     ^
+        ((u32)Td4[(s0 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8) ^
+        ((u32)Td4[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^
+        ((u32)Td4[(s2 >> 24)       ] << 24) ^
+        rk[1];
+    *(u32*)(out+8) =
+        ((u32)Td4[(s2      ) & 0xff])     ^
+        ((u32)Td4[(s1 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8) ^
+        ((u32)Td4[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^
+        ((u32)Td4[(s3 >> 24)       ] << 24) ^
+        rk[2];
+    *(u32*)(out+12) =
+        ((u32)Td4[(s3      ) & 0xff])     ^
+        ((u32)Td4[(s2 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8) ^
+        ((u32)Td4[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^
+        ((u32)Td4[(s0 >> 24)       ] << 24) ^
+        rk[3];
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/asm/aes-586.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/asm/aes-586.pl
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..1ba3565
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/asm/aes-586.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,3000 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# Version 4.3.
+#
+# You might fail to appreciate this module performance from the first
+# try. If compared to "vanilla" linux-ia32-icc target, i.e. considered
+# to be *the* best Intel C compiler without -KPIC, performance appears
+# to be virtually identical... But try to re-configure with shared
+# library support... Aha! Intel compiler "suddenly" lags behind by 30%
+# [on P4, more on others]:-) And if compared to position-independent
+# code generated by GNU C, this code performs *more* than *twice* as
+# fast! Yes, all this buzz about PIC means that unlike other hand-
+# coded implementations, this one was explicitly designed to be safe
+# to use even in shared library context... This also means that this
+# code isn't necessarily absolutely fastest "ever," because in order
+# to achieve position independence an extra register has to be
+# off-loaded to stack, which affects the benchmark result.
+#
+# Special note about instruction choice. Do you recall RC4_INT code
+# performing poorly on P4? It might be the time to figure out why.
+# RC4_INT code implies effective address calculations in base+offset*4
+# form. Trouble is that it seems that offset scaling turned to be
+# critical path... At least eliminating scaling resulted in 2.8x RC4
+# performance improvement [as you might recall]. As AES code is hungry
+# for scaling too, I [try to] avoid the latter by favoring off-by-2
+# shifts and masking the result with 0xFF<<2 instead of "boring" 0xFF.
+#
+# As was shown by Dean Gaudet <dean@arctic.org>, the above note turned
+# void. Performance improvement with off-by-2 shifts was observed on
+# intermediate implementation, which was spilling yet another register
+# to stack... Final offset*4 code below runs just a tad faster on P4,
+# but exhibits up to 10% improvement on other cores.
+#
+# Second version is "monolithic" replacement for aes_core.c, which in
+# addition to AES_[de|en]crypt implements AES_set_[de|en]cryption_key.
+# This made it possible to implement little-endian variant of the
+# algorithm without modifying the base C code. Motivating factor for
+# the undertaken effort was that it appeared that in tight IA-32
+# register window little-endian flavor could achieve slightly higher
+# Instruction Level Parallelism, and it indeed resulted in up to 15%
+# better performance on most recent µ-archs...
+#
+# Third version adds AES_cbc_encrypt implementation, which resulted in
+# up to 40% performance imrovement of CBC benchmark results. 40% was
+# observed on P4 core, where "overall" imrovement coefficient, i.e. if
+# compared to PIC generated by GCC and in CBC mode, was observed to be
+# as large as 4x:-) CBC performance is virtually identical to ECB now
+# and on some platforms even better, e.g. 17.6 "small" cycles/byte on
+# Opteron, because certain function prologues and epilogues are
+# effectively taken out of the loop...
+#
+# Version 3.2 implements compressed tables and prefetch of these tables
+# in CBC[!] mode. Former means that 3/4 of table references are now
+# misaligned, which unfortunately has negative impact on elder IA-32
+# implementations, Pentium suffered 30% penalty, PIII - 10%.
+#
+# Version 3.3 avoids L1 cache aliasing between stack frame and
+# S-boxes, and 3.4 - L1 cache aliasing even between key schedule. The
+# latter is achieved by copying the key schedule to controlled place in
+# stack. This unfortunately has rather strong impact on small block CBC
+# performance, ~2x deterioration on 16-byte block if compared to 3.3.
+#
+# Version 3.5 checks if there is L1 cache aliasing between user-supplied
+# key schedule and S-boxes and abstains from copying the former if
+# there is no. This allows end-user to consciously retain small block
+# performance by aligning key schedule in specific manner.
+#
+# Version 3.6 compresses Td4 to 256 bytes and prefetches it in ECB.
+#
+# Current ECB performance numbers for 128-bit key in CPU cycles per
+# processed byte [measure commonly used by AES benchmarkers] are:
+#
+#		small footprint		fully unrolled
+# P4		24			22
+# AMD K8	20			19
+# PIII		25			23
+# Pentium	81			78
+#
+# Version 3.7 reimplements outer rounds as "compact." Meaning that
+# first and last rounds reference compact 256 bytes S-box. This means
+# that first round consumes a lot more CPU cycles and that encrypt
+# and decrypt performance becomes asymmetric. Encrypt performance
+# drops by 10-12%, while decrypt - by 20-25%:-( 256 bytes S-box is
+# aggressively pre-fetched.
+#
+# Version 4.0 effectively rolls back to 3.6 and instead implements
+# additional set of functions, _[x86|sse]_AES_[en|de]crypt_compact,
+# which use exclusively 256 byte S-box. These functions are to be
+# called in modes not concealing plain text, such as ECB, or when
+# we're asked to process smaller amount of data [or unconditionally
+# on hyper-threading CPU]. Currently it's called unconditionally from
+# AES_[en|de]crypt, which affects all modes, but CBC. CBC routine
+# still needs to be modified to switch between slower and faster
+# mode when appropriate... But in either case benchmark landscape
+# changes dramatically and below numbers are CPU cycles per processed
+# byte for 128-bit key.
+#
+#		ECB encrypt	ECB decrypt	CBC large chunk
+# P4		52[54]		83[95]		23
+# AMD K8	46[41]		66[70]		18
+# PIII		41[50]		60[77]		24
+# Core 2	31[36]		45[64]		18.5
+# Atom		76[100]		96[138]		60
+# Pentium	115		150		77
+#
+# Version 4.1 switches to compact S-box even in key schedule setup.
+#
+# Version 4.2 prefetches compact S-box in every SSE round or in other
+# words every cache-line is *guaranteed* to be accessed within ~50
+# cycles window. Why just SSE? Because it's needed on hyper-threading
+# CPU! Which is also why it's prefetched with 64 byte stride. Best
+# part is that it has no negative effect on performance:-)  
+#
+# Version 4.3 implements switch between compact and non-compact block
+# functions in AES_cbc_encrypt depending on how much data was asked
+# to be processed in one stroke.
+#
+######################################################################
+# Timing attacks are classified in two classes: synchronous when
+# attacker consciously initiates cryptographic operation and collects
+# timing data of various character afterwards, and asynchronous when
+# malicious code is executed on same CPU simultaneously with AES,
+# instruments itself and performs statistical analysis of this data.
+#
+# As far as synchronous attacks go the root to the AES timing
+# vulnerability is twofold. Firstly, of 256 S-box elements at most 160
+# are referred to in single 128-bit block operation. Well, in C
+# implementation with 4 distinct tables it's actually as little as 40
+# references per 256 elements table, but anyway... Secondly, even
+# though S-box elements are clustered into smaller amount of cache-
+# lines, smaller than 160 and even 40, it turned out that for certain
+# plain-text pattern[s] or simply put chosen plain-text and given key
+# few cache-lines remain unaccessed during block operation. Now, if
+# attacker can figure out this access pattern, he can deduct the key
+# [or at least part of it]. The natural way to mitigate this kind of
+# attacks is to minimize the amount of cache-lines in S-box and/or
+# prefetch them to ensure that every one is accessed for more uniform
+# timing. But note that *if* plain-text was concealed in such way that
+# input to block function is distributed *uniformly*, then attack
+# wouldn't apply. Now note that some encryption modes, most notably
+# CBC, do mask the plain-text in this exact way [secure cipher output
+# is distributed uniformly]. Yes, one still might find input that
+# would reveal the information about given key, but if amount of
+# candidate inputs to be tried is larger than amount of possible key
+# combinations then attack becomes infeasible. This is why revised
+# AES_cbc_encrypt "dares" to switch to larger S-box when larger chunk
+# of data is to be processed in one stroke. The current size limit of
+# 512 bytes is chosen to provide same [diminishigly low] probability
+# for cache-line to remain untouched in large chunk operation with
+# large S-box as for single block operation with compact S-box and
+# surely needs more careful consideration...
+#
+# As for asynchronous attacks. There are two flavours: attacker code
+# being interleaved with AES on hyper-threading CPU at *instruction*
+# level, and two processes time sharing single core. As for latter.
+# Two vectors. 1. Given that attacker process has higher priority,
+# yield execution to process performing AES just before timer fires
+# off the scheduler, immediately regain control of CPU and analyze the
+# cache state. For this attack to be efficient attacker would have to
+# effectively slow down the operation by several *orders* of magnitute,
+# by ratio of time slice to duration of handful of AES rounds, which
+# unlikely to remain unnoticed. Not to mention that this also means
+# that he would spend correspondigly more time to collect enough
+# statistical data to mount the attack. It's probably appropriate to
+# say that if adeversary reckons that this attack is beneficial and
+# risks to be noticed, you probably have larger problems having him
+# mere opportunity. In other words suggested code design expects you
+# to preclude/mitigate this attack by overall system security design.
+# 2. Attacker manages to make his code interrupt driven. In order for
+# this kind of attack to be feasible, interrupt rate has to be high
+# enough, again comparable to duration of handful of AES rounds. But
+# is there interrupt source of such rate? Hardly, not even 1Gbps NIC
+# generates interrupts at such raging rate...
+#
+# And now back to the former, hyper-threading CPU or more specifically
+# Intel P4. Recall that asynchronous attack implies that malicious
+# code instruments itself. And naturally instrumentation granularity
+# has be noticeably lower than duration of codepath accessing S-box.
+# Given that all cache-lines are accessed during that time that is.
+# Current implementation accesses *all* cache-lines within ~50 cycles
+# window, which is actually *less* than RDTSC latency on Intel P4!
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm");
+require "x86asm.pl";
+
+$output = pop;
+open OUT,">$output";
+*STDOUT=*OUT;
+
+&asm_init($ARGV[0],"aes-586.pl",$x86only = $ARGV[$#ARGV] eq "386");
+&static_label("AES_Te");
+&static_label("AES_Td");
+
+$s0="eax";
+$s1="ebx";
+$s2="ecx";
+$s3="edx";
+$key="edi";
+$acc="esi";
+$tbl="ebp";
+
+# stack frame layout in _[x86|sse]_AES_* routines, frame is allocated
+# by caller
+$__ra=&DWP(0,"esp");	# return address
+$__s0=&DWP(4,"esp");	# s0 backing store
+$__s1=&DWP(8,"esp");	# s1 backing store
+$__s2=&DWP(12,"esp");	# s2 backing store
+$__s3=&DWP(16,"esp");	# s3 backing store
+$__key=&DWP(20,"esp");	# pointer to key schedule
+$__end=&DWP(24,"esp");	# pointer to end of key schedule
+$__tbl=&DWP(28,"esp");	# %ebp backing store
+
+# stack frame layout in AES_[en|crypt] routines, which differs from
+# above by 4 and overlaps by %ebp backing store
+$_tbl=&DWP(24,"esp");
+$_esp=&DWP(28,"esp");
+
+sub _data_word() { my $i; while(defined($i=shift)) { &data_word($i,$i); } }
+
+$speed_limit=512;	# chunks smaller than $speed_limit are
+			# processed with compact routine in CBC mode
+$small_footprint=1;	# $small_footprint=1 code is ~5% slower [on
+			# recent µ-archs], but ~5 times smaller!
+			# I favor compact code to minimize cache
+			# contention and in hope to "collect" 5% back
+			# in real-life applications...
+
+$vertical_spin=0;	# shift "verticaly" defaults to 0, because of
+			# its proof-of-concept status...
+# Note that there is no decvert(), as well as last encryption round is
+# performed with "horizontal" shifts. This is because this "vertical"
+# implementation [one which groups shifts on a given $s[i] to form a
+# "column," unlike "horizontal" one, which groups shifts on different
+# $s[i] to form a "row"] is work in progress. It was observed to run
+# few percents faster on Intel cores, but not AMD. On AMD K8 core it's
+# whole 12% slower:-( So we face a trade-off... Shall it be resolved
+# some day? Till then the code is considered experimental and by
+# default remains dormant...
+
+sub encvert()
+{ my ($te,@s) = @_;
+  my ($v0,$v1) = ($acc,$key);
+
+	&mov	($v0,$s[3]);				# copy s3
+	&mov	(&DWP(4,"esp"),$s[2]);			# save s2
+	&mov	($v1,$s[0]);				# copy s0
+	&mov	(&DWP(8,"esp"),$s[1]);			# save s1
+
+	&movz	($s[2],&HB($s[0]));
+	&and	($s[0],0xFF);
+	&mov	($s[0],&DWP(0,$te,$s[0],8));		# s0>>0
+	&shr	($v1,16);
+	&mov	($s[3],&DWP(3,$te,$s[2],8));		# s0>>8
+	&movz	($s[1],&HB($v1));
+	&and	($v1,0xFF);
+	&mov	($s[2],&DWP(2,$te,$v1,8));		# s0>>16
+	 &mov	($v1,$v0);
+	&mov	($s[1],&DWP(1,$te,$s[1],8));		# s0>>24
+
+	&and	($v0,0xFF);
+	&xor	($s[3],&DWP(0,$te,$v0,8));		# s3>>0
+	&movz	($v0,&HB($v1));
+	&shr	($v1,16);
+	&xor	($s[2],&DWP(3,$te,$v0,8));		# s3>>8
+	&movz	($v0,&HB($v1));
+	&and	($v1,0xFF);
+	&xor	($s[1],&DWP(2,$te,$v1,8));		# s3>>16
+	 &mov	($v1,&DWP(4,"esp"));			# restore s2
+	&xor	($s[0],&DWP(1,$te,$v0,8));		# s3>>24
+
+	&mov	($v0,$v1);
+	&and	($v1,0xFF);
+	&xor	($s[2],&DWP(0,$te,$v1,8));		# s2>>0
+	&movz	($v1,&HB($v0));
+	&shr	($v0,16);
+	&xor	($s[1],&DWP(3,$te,$v1,8));		# s2>>8
+	&movz	($v1,&HB($v0));
+	&and	($v0,0xFF);
+	&xor	($s[0],&DWP(2,$te,$v0,8));		# s2>>16
+	 &mov	($v0,&DWP(8,"esp"));			# restore s1
+	&xor	($s[3],&DWP(1,$te,$v1,8));		# s2>>24
+
+	&mov	($v1,$v0);
+	&and	($v0,0xFF);
+	&xor	($s[1],&DWP(0,$te,$v0,8));		# s1>>0
+	&movz	($v0,&HB($v1));
+	&shr	($v1,16);
+	&xor	($s[0],&DWP(3,$te,$v0,8));		# s1>>8
+	&movz	($v0,&HB($v1));
+	&and	($v1,0xFF);
+	&xor	($s[3],&DWP(2,$te,$v1,8));		# s1>>16
+	 &mov	($key,$__key);				# reincarnate v1 as key
+	&xor	($s[2],&DWP(1,$te,$v0,8));		# s1>>24
+}
+
+# Another experimental routine, which features "horizontal spin," but
+# eliminates one reference to stack. Strangely enough runs slower...
+sub enchoriz()
+{ my ($v0,$v1) = ($key,$acc);
+
+	&movz	($v0,&LB($s0));			#  3, 2, 1, 0*
+	&rotr	($s2,8);			#  8,11,10, 9
+	&mov	($v1,&DWP(0,$te,$v0,8));	#  0
+	&movz	($v0,&HB($s1));			#  7, 6, 5*, 4
+	&rotr	($s3,16);			# 13,12,15,14
+	&xor	($v1,&DWP(3,$te,$v0,8));	#  5
+	&movz	($v0,&HB($s2));			#  8,11,10*, 9
+	&rotr	($s0,16);			#  1, 0, 3, 2
+	&xor	($v1,&DWP(2,$te,$v0,8));	# 10
+	&movz	($v0,&HB($s3));			# 13,12,15*,14
+	&xor	($v1,&DWP(1,$te,$v0,8));	# 15, t[0] collected
+	&mov	($__s0,$v1);			# t[0] saved
+
+	&movz	($v0,&LB($s1));			#  7, 6, 5, 4*
+	&shr	($s1,16);			#  -, -, 7, 6
+	&mov	($v1,&DWP(0,$te,$v0,8));	#  4
+	&movz	($v0,&LB($s3));			# 13,12,15,14*
+	&xor	($v1,&DWP(2,$te,$v0,8));	# 14
+	&movz	($v0,&HB($s0));			#  1, 0, 3*, 2
+	&and	($s3,0xffff0000);		# 13,12, -, -
+	&xor	($v1,&DWP(1,$te,$v0,8));	#  3
+	&movz	($v0,&LB($s2));			#  8,11,10, 9*
+	&or	($s3,$s1);			# 13,12, 7, 6
+	&xor	($v1,&DWP(3,$te,$v0,8));	#  9, t[1] collected
+	&mov	($s1,$v1);			#  s[1]=t[1]
+
+	&movz	($v0,&LB($s0));			#  1, 0, 3, 2*
+	&shr	($s2,16);			#  -, -, 8,11
+	&mov	($v1,&DWP(2,$te,$v0,8));	#  2
+	&movz	($v0,&HB($s3));			# 13,12, 7*, 6
+	&xor	($v1,&DWP(1,$te,$v0,8));	#  7
+	&movz	($v0,&HB($s2));			#  -, -, 8*,11
+	&xor	($v1,&DWP(0,$te,$v0,8));	#  8
+	&mov	($v0,$s3);
+	&shr	($v0,24);			# 13
+	&xor	($v1,&DWP(3,$te,$v0,8));	# 13, t[2] collected
+
+	&movz	($v0,&LB($s2));			#  -, -, 8,11*
+	&shr	($s0,24);			#  1*
+	&mov	($s2,&DWP(1,$te,$v0,8));	# 11
+	&xor	($s2,&DWP(3,$te,$s0,8));	#  1
+	&mov	($s0,$__s0);			# s[0]=t[0]
+	&movz	($v0,&LB($s3));			# 13,12, 7, 6*
+	&shr	($s3,16);			#   ,  ,13,12
+	&xor	($s2,&DWP(2,$te,$v0,8));	#  6
+	&mov	($key,$__key);			# reincarnate v0 as key
+	&and	($s3,0xff);			#   ,  ,13,12*
+	&mov	($s3,&DWP(0,$te,$s3,8));	# 12
+	&xor	($s3,$s2);			# s[2]=t[3] collected
+	&mov	($s2,$v1);			# s[2]=t[2]
+}
+
+# More experimental code... SSE one... Even though this one eliminates
+# *all* references to stack, it's not faster...
+sub sse_encbody()
+{
+	&movz	($acc,&LB("eax"));		#  0
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(0,$tbl,$acc,8));	#  0
+	&pshufw	("mm2","mm0",0x0d);		#  7, 6, 3, 2
+	&movz	("edx",&HB("eax"));		#  1
+	&mov	("edx",&DWP(3,$tbl,"edx",8));	#  1
+	&shr	("eax",16);			#  5, 4
+
+	&movz	($acc,&LB("ebx"));		# 10
+	&xor	("ecx",&DWP(2,$tbl,$acc,8));	# 10
+	&pshufw	("mm6","mm4",0x08);		# 13,12, 9, 8
+	&movz	($acc,&HB("ebx"));		# 11
+	&xor	("edx",&DWP(1,$tbl,$acc,8));	# 11
+	&shr	("ebx",16);			# 15,14
+
+	&movz	($acc,&HB("eax"));		#  5
+	&xor	("ecx",&DWP(3,$tbl,$acc,8));	#  5
+	&movq	("mm3",QWP(16,$key));
+	&movz	($acc,&HB("ebx"));		# 15
+	&xor	("ecx",&DWP(1,$tbl,$acc,8));	# 15
+	&movd	("mm0","ecx");			# t[0] collected
+
+	&movz	($acc,&LB("eax"));		#  4
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(0,$tbl,$acc,8));	#  4
+	&movd	("eax","mm2");			#  7, 6, 3, 2
+	&movz	($acc,&LB("ebx"));		# 14
+	&xor	("ecx",&DWP(2,$tbl,$acc,8));	# 14
+	&movd	("ebx","mm6");			# 13,12, 9, 8
+
+	&movz	($acc,&HB("eax"));		#  3
+	&xor	("ecx",&DWP(1,$tbl,$acc,8));	#  3
+	&movz	($acc,&HB("ebx"));		#  9
+	&xor	("ecx",&DWP(3,$tbl,$acc,8));	#  9
+	&movd	("mm1","ecx");			# t[1] collected
+
+	&movz	($acc,&LB("eax"));		#  2
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(2,$tbl,$acc,8));	#  2
+	&shr	("eax",16);			#  7, 6
+	&punpckldq	("mm0","mm1");		# t[0,1] collected
+	&movz	($acc,&LB("ebx"));		#  8
+	&xor	("ecx",&DWP(0,$tbl,$acc,8));	#  8
+	&shr	("ebx",16);			# 13,12
+
+	&movz	($acc,&HB("eax"));		#  7
+	&xor	("ecx",&DWP(1,$tbl,$acc,8));	#  7
+	&pxor	("mm0","mm3");
+	&movz	("eax",&LB("eax"));		#  6
+	&xor	("edx",&DWP(2,$tbl,"eax",8));	#  6
+	&pshufw	("mm1","mm0",0x08);		#  5, 4, 1, 0
+	&movz	($acc,&HB("ebx"));		# 13
+	&xor	("ecx",&DWP(3,$tbl,$acc,8));	# 13
+	&xor	("ecx",&DWP(24,$key));		# t[2]
+	&movd	("mm4","ecx");			# t[2] collected
+	&movz	("ebx",&LB("ebx"));		# 12
+	&xor	("edx",&DWP(0,$tbl,"ebx",8));	# 12
+	&shr	("ecx",16);
+	&movd	("eax","mm1");			#  5, 4, 1, 0
+	&mov	("ebx",&DWP(28,$key));		# t[3]
+	&xor	("ebx","edx");
+	&movd	("mm5","ebx");			# t[3] collected
+	&and	("ebx",0xffff0000);
+	&or	("ebx","ecx");
+
+	&punpckldq	("mm4","mm5");		# t[2,3] collected
+}
+
+######################################################################
+# "Compact" block function
+######################################################################
+
+sub enccompact()
+{ my $Fn = \&mov;
+  while ($#_>5) { pop(@_); $Fn=sub{}; }
+  my ($i,$te,@s)=@_;
+  my $tmp = $key;
+  my $out = $i==3?$s[0]:$acc;
+
+	# $Fn is used in first compact round and its purpose is to
+	# void restoration of some values from stack, so that after
+	# 4xenccompact with extra argument $key value is left there...
+	if ($i==3)  {	&$Fn	($key,$__key);			}##%edx
+	else        {	&mov	($out,$s[0]);			}
+			&and	($out,0xFF);
+	if ($i==1)  {	&shr	($s[0],16);			}#%ebx[1]
+	if ($i==2)  {	&shr	($s[0],24);			}#%ecx[2]
+			&movz	($out,&BP(-128,$te,$out,1));
+
+	if ($i==3)  {	$tmp=$s[1];				}##%eax
+			&movz	($tmp,&HB($s[1]));
+			&movz	($tmp,&BP(-128,$te,$tmp,1));
+			&shl	($tmp,8);
+			&xor	($out,$tmp);
+
+	if ($i==3)  {	$tmp=$s[2]; &mov ($s[1],$__s0);		}##%ebx
+	else        {	&mov	($tmp,$s[2]);
+			&shr	($tmp,16);			}
+	if ($i==2)  {	&and	($s[1],0xFF);			}#%edx[2]
+			&and	($tmp,0xFF);
+			&movz	($tmp,&BP(-128,$te,$tmp,1));
+			&shl	($tmp,16);
+			&xor	($out,$tmp);
+
+	if ($i==3)  {	$tmp=$s[3]; &mov ($s[2],$__s1);		}##%ecx
+	elsif($i==2){	&movz	($tmp,&HB($s[3]));		}#%ebx[2]
+	else        {	&mov	($tmp,$s[3]);
+			&shr	($tmp,24);			}
+			&movz	($tmp,&BP(-128,$te,$tmp,1));
+			&shl	($tmp,24);
+			&xor	($out,$tmp);
+	if ($i<2)   {	&mov	(&DWP(4+4*$i,"esp"),$out);	}
+	if ($i==3)  {	&mov	($s[3],$acc);			}
+	&comment();
+}
+
+sub enctransform()
+{ my @s = ($s0,$s1,$s2,$s3);
+  my $i = shift;
+  my $tmp = $tbl;
+  my $r2  = $key ;
+
+	&and	($tmp,$s[$i]);
+	&lea	($r2,&DWP(0,$s[$i],$s[$i]));
+	&mov	($acc,$tmp);
+	&shr	($tmp,7);
+	&and	($r2,0xfefefefe);
+	&sub	($acc,$tmp);
+	&mov	($tmp,$s[$i]);
+	&and	($acc,0x1b1b1b1b);
+	&rotr	($tmp,16);
+	&xor	($acc,$r2);	# r2
+	&mov	($r2,$s[$i]);
+
+	&xor	($s[$i],$acc);	# r0 ^ r2
+	&rotr	($r2,16+8);
+	&xor	($acc,$tmp);
+	&rotl	($s[$i],24);
+	&xor	($acc,$r2);
+	&mov	($tmp,0x80808080)	if ($i!=1);
+	&xor	($s[$i],$acc);	# ROTATE(r2^r0,24) ^ r2
+}
+
+&function_begin_B("_x86_AES_encrypt_compact");
+	# note that caller is expected to allocate stack frame for me!
+	&mov	($__key,$key);			# save key
+
+	&xor	($s0,&DWP(0,$key));		# xor with key
+	&xor	($s1,&DWP(4,$key));
+	&xor	($s2,&DWP(8,$key));
+	&xor	($s3,&DWP(12,$key));
+
+	&mov	($acc,&DWP(240,$key));		# load key->rounds
+	&lea	($acc,&DWP(-2,$acc,$acc));
+	&lea	($acc,&DWP(0,$key,$acc,8));
+	&mov	($__end,$acc);			# end of key schedule
+
+	# prefetch Te4
+	&mov	($key,&DWP(0-128,$tbl));
+	&mov	($acc,&DWP(32-128,$tbl));
+	&mov	($key,&DWP(64-128,$tbl));
+	&mov	($acc,&DWP(96-128,$tbl));
+	&mov	($key,&DWP(128-128,$tbl));
+	&mov	($acc,&DWP(160-128,$tbl));
+	&mov	($key,&DWP(192-128,$tbl));
+	&mov	($acc,&DWP(224-128,$tbl));
+
+	&set_label("loop",16);
+
+		&enccompact(0,$tbl,$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3,1);
+		&enccompact(1,$tbl,$s1,$s2,$s3,$s0,1);
+		&enccompact(2,$tbl,$s2,$s3,$s0,$s1,1);
+		&enccompact(3,$tbl,$s3,$s0,$s1,$s2,1);
+		&mov	($tbl,0x80808080);
+		&enctransform(2);
+		&enctransform(3);
+		&enctransform(0);
+		&enctransform(1);
+		&mov 	($key,$__key);
+		&mov	($tbl,$__tbl);
+		&add	($key,16);		# advance rd_key
+		&xor	($s0,&DWP(0,$key));
+		&xor	($s1,&DWP(4,$key));
+		&xor	($s2,&DWP(8,$key));
+		&xor	($s3,&DWP(12,$key));
+
+	&cmp	($key,$__end);
+	&mov	($__key,$key);
+	&jb	(&label("loop"));
+
+	&enccompact(0,$tbl,$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3);
+	&enccompact(1,$tbl,$s1,$s2,$s3,$s0);
+	&enccompact(2,$tbl,$s2,$s3,$s0,$s1);
+	&enccompact(3,$tbl,$s3,$s0,$s1,$s2);
+
+	&xor	($s0,&DWP(16,$key));
+	&xor	($s1,&DWP(20,$key));
+	&xor	($s2,&DWP(24,$key));
+	&xor	($s3,&DWP(28,$key));
+
+	&ret	();
+&function_end_B("_x86_AES_encrypt_compact");
+
+######################################################################
+# "Compact" SSE block function.
+######################################################################
+#
+# Performance is not actually extraordinary in comparison to pure
+# x86 code. In particular encrypt performance is virtually the same.
+# Decrypt performance on the other hand is 15-20% better on newer
+# µ-archs [but we're thankful for *any* improvement here], and ~50%
+# better on PIII:-) And additionally on the pros side this code
+# eliminates redundant references to stack and thus relieves/
+# minimizes the pressure on the memory bus.
+#
+# MMX register layout                           lsb
+# +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
+# |          mm4          |          mm0          |
+# +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
+# |     s3    |     s2    |     s1    |     s0    |    
+# +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
+# |15|14|13|12|11|10| 9| 8| 7| 6| 5| 4| 3| 2| 1| 0|
+# +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
+#
+# Indexes translate as s[N/4]>>(8*(N%4)), e.g. 5 means s1>>8.
+# In this terms encryption and decryption "compact" permutation
+# matrices can be depicted as following:
+#
+# encryption              lsb	# decryption              lsb
+# +----++----+----+----+----+	# +----++----+----+----+----+
+# | t0 || 15 | 10 |  5 |  0 |	# | t0 ||  7 | 10 | 13 |  0 |
+# +----++----+----+----+----+	# +----++----+----+----+----+
+# | t1 ||  3 | 14 |  9 |  4 |	# | t1 || 11 | 14 |  1 |  4 |
+# +----++----+----+----+----+	# +----++----+----+----+----+
+# | t2 ||  7 |  2 | 13 |  8 |	# | t2 || 15 |  2 |  5 |  8 |
+# +----++----+----+----+----+	# +----++----+----+----+----+
+# | t3 || 11 |  6 |  1 | 12 |	# | t3 ||  3 |  6 |  9 | 12 |
+# +----++----+----+----+----+	# +----++----+----+----+----+
+#
+######################################################################
+# Why not xmm registers? Short answer. It was actually tested and
+# was not any faster, but *contrary*, most notably on Intel CPUs.
+# Longer answer. Main advantage of using mm registers is that movd
+# latency is lower, especially on Intel P4. While arithmetic
+# instructions are twice as many, they can be scheduled every cycle
+# and not every second one when they are operating on xmm register,
+# so that "arithmetic throughput" remains virtually the same. And
+# finally the code can be executed even on elder SSE-only CPUs:-)
+
+sub sse_enccompact()
+{
+	&pshufw	("mm1","mm0",0x08);		#  5, 4, 1, 0
+	&pshufw	("mm5","mm4",0x0d);		# 15,14,11,10
+	&movd	("eax","mm1");			#  5, 4, 1, 0
+	&movd	("ebx","mm5");			# 15,14,11,10
+	&mov	($__key,$key);
+
+	&movz	($acc,&LB("eax"));		#  0
+	&movz	("edx",&HB("eax"));		#  1
+	&pshufw	("mm2","mm0",0x0d);		#  7, 6, 3, 2
+	&movz	("ecx",&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1));	#  0
+	&movz	($key,&LB("ebx"));		# 10
+	&movz	("edx",&BP(-128,$tbl,"edx",1));	#  1
+	&shr	("eax",16);			#  5, 4
+	&shl	("edx",8);			#  1
+
+	&movz	($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1));	# 10
+	&movz	($key,&HB("ebx"));		# 11
+	&shl	($acc,16);			# 10
+	&pshufw	("mm6","mm4",0x08);		# 13,12, 9, 8
+	&or	("ecx",$acc);			# 10
+	&movz	($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1));	# 11
+	&movz	($key,&HB("eax"));		#  5
+	&shl	($acc,24);			# 11
+	&shr	("ebx",16);			# 15,14
+	&or	("edx",$acc);			# 11
+
+	&movz	($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1));	#  5
+	&movz	($key,&HB("ebx"));		# 15
+	&shl	($acc,8);			#  5
+	&or	("ecx",$acc);			#  5
+	&movz	($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1));	# 15
+	&movz	($key,&LB("eax"));		#  4
+	&shl	($acc,24);			# 15
+	&or	("ecx",$acc);			# 15
+
+	&movz	($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1));	#  4
+	&movz	($key,&LB("ebx"));		# 14
+	&movd	("eax","mm2");			#  7, 6, 3, 2
+	&movd	("mm0","ecx");			# t[0] collected
+	&movz	("ecx",&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1));	# 14
+	&movz	($key,&HB("eax"));		#  3
+	&shl	("ecx",16);			# 14
+	&movd	("ebx","mm6");			# 13,12, 9, 8
+	&or	("ecx",$acc);			# 14
+
+	&movz	($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1));	#  3
+	&movz	($key,&HB("ebx"));		#  9
+	&shl	($acc,24);			#  3
+	&or	("ecx",$acc);			#  3
+	&movz	($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1));	#  9
+	&movz	($key,&LB("ebx"));		#  8
+	&shl	($acc,8);			#  9
+	&shr	("ebx",16);			# 13,12
+	&or	("ecx",$acc);			#  9
+
+	&movz	($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1));	#  8
+	&movz	($key,&LB("eax"));		#  2
+	&shr	("eax",16);			#  7, 6
+	&movd	("mm1","ecx");			# t[1] collected
+	&movz	("ecx",&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1));	#  2
+	&movz	($key,&HB("eax"));		#  7
+	&shl	("ecx",16);			#  2
+	&and	("eax",0xff);			#  6
+	&or	("ecx",$acc);			#  2
+
+	&punpckldq	("mm0","mm1");		# t[0,1] collected
+
+	&movz	($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1));	#  7
+	&movz	($key,&HB("ebx"));		# 13
+	&shl	($acc,24);			#  7
+	&and	("ebx",0xff);			# 12
+	&movz	("eax",&BP(-128,$tbl,"eax",1));	#  6
+	&or	("ecx",$acc);			#  7
+	&shl	("eax",16);			#  6
+	&movz	($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1));	# 13
+	&or	("edx","eax");			#  6
+	&shl	($acc,8);			# 13
+	&movz	("ebx",&BP(-128,$tbl,"ebx",1));	# 12
+	&or	("ecx",$acc);			# 13
+	&or	("edx","ebx");			# 12
+	&mov	($key,$__key);
+	&movd	("mm4","ecx");			# t[2] collected
+	&movd	("mm5","edx");			# t[3] collected
+
+	&punpckldq	("mm4","mm5");		# t[2,3] collected
+}
+
+					if (!$x86only) {
+&function_begin_B("_sse_AES_encrypt_compact");
+	&pxor	("mm0",&QWP(0,$key));	#  7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 0
+	&pxor	("mm4",&QWP(8,$key));	# 15,14,13,12,11,10, 9, 8
+
+	# note that caller is expected to allocate stack frame for me!
+	&mov	($acc,&DWP(240,$key));		# load key->rounds
+	&lea	($acc,&DWP(-2,$acc,$acc));
+	&lea	($acc,&DWP(0,$key,$acc,8));
+	&mov	($__end,$acc);			# end of key schedule
+
+	&mov	($s0,0x1b1b1b1b);		# magic constant
+	&mov	(&DWP(8,"esp"),$s0);
+	&mov	(&DWP(12,"esp"),$s0);
+
+	# prefetch Te4
+	&mov	($s0,&DWP(0-128,$tbl));
+	&mov	($s1,&DWP(32-128,$tbl));
+	&mov	($s2,&DWP(64-128,$tbl));
+	&mov	($s3,&DWP(96-128,$tbl));
+	&mov	($s0,&DWP(128-128,$tbl));
+	&mov	($s1,&DWP(160-128,$tbl));
+	&mov	($s2,&DWP(192-128,$tbl));
+	&mov	($s3,&DWP(224-128,$tbl));
+
+	&set_label("loop",16);
+		&sse_enccompact();
+		&add	($key,16);
+		&cmp	($key,$__end);
+		&ja	(&label("out"));
+
+		&movq	("mm2",&QWP(8,"esp"));
+		&pxor	("mm3","mm3");		&pxor	("mm7","mm7");
+		&movq	("mm1","mm0");		&movq	("mm5","mm4");	# r0
+		&pcmpgtb("mm3","mm0");		&pcmpgtb("mm7","mm4");
+		&pand	("mm3","mm2");		&pand	("mm7","mm2");
+		&pshufw	("mm2","mm0",0xb1);	&pshufw	("mm6","mm4",0xb1);# ROTATE(r0,16)
+		&paddb	("mm0","mm0");		&paddb	("mm4","mm4");
+		&pxor	("mm0","mm3");		&pxor	("mm4","mm7");	# = r2
+		&pshufw	("mm3","mm2",0xb1);	&pshufw	("mm7","mm6",0xb1);# r0
+		&pxor	("mm1","mm0");		&pxor	("mm5","mm4");	# r0^r2
+		&pxor	("mm0","mm2");		&pxor	("mm4","mm6");	# ^= ROTATE(r0,16)
+
+		&movq	("mm2","mm3");		&movq	("mm6","mm7");
+		&pslld	("mm3",8);		&pslld	("mm7",8);
+		&psrld	("mm2",24);		&psrld	("mm6",24);
+		&pxor	("mm0","mm3");		&pxor	("mm4","mm7");	# ^= r0<<8
+		&pxor	("mm0","mm2");		&pxor	("mm4","mm6");	# ^= r0>>24
+
+		&movq	("mm3","mm1");		&movq	("mm7","mm5");
+		&movq	("mm2",&QWP(0,$key));	&movq	("mm6",&QWP(8,$key));
+		&psrld	("mm1",8);		&psrld	("mm5",8);
+		&mov	($s0,&DWP(0-128,$tbl));
+		&pslld	("mm3",24);		&pslld	("mm7",24);
+		&mov	($s1,&DWP(64-128,$tbl));
+		&pxor	("mm0","mm1");		&pxor	("mm4","mm5");	# ^= (r2^r0)<<8
+		&mov	($s2,&DWP(128-128,$tbl));
+		&pxor	("mm0","mm3");		&pxor	("mm4","mm7");	# ^= (r2^r0)>>24
+		&mov	($s3,&DWP(192-128,$tbl));
+
+		&pxor	("mm0","mm2");		&pxor	("mm4","mm6");
+	&jmp	(&label("loop"));
+
+	&set_label("out",16);
+	&pxor	("mm0",&QWP(0,$key));
+	&pxor	("mm4",&QWP(8,$key));
+
+	&ret	();
+&function_end_B("_sse_AES_encrypt_compact");
+					}
+
+######################################################################
+# Vanilla block function.
+######################################################################
+
+sub encstep()
+{ my ($i,$te,@s) = @_;
+  my $tmp = $key;
+  my $out = $i==3?$s[0]:$acc;
+
+	# lines marked with #%e?x[i] denote "reordered" instructions...
+	if ($i==3)  {	&mov	($key,$__key);			}##%edx
+	else        {	&mov	($out,$s[0]);
+			&and	($out,0xFF);			}
+	if ($i==1)  {	&shr	($s[0],16);			}#%ebx[1]
+	if ($i==2)  {	&shr	($s[0],24);			}#%ecx[2]
+			&mov	($out,&DWP(0,$te,$out,8));
+
+	if ($i==3)  {	$tmp=$s[1];				}##%eax
+			&movz	($tmp,&HB($s[1]));
+			&xor	($out,&DWP(3,$te,$tmp,8));
+
+	if ($i==3)  {	$tmp=$s[2]; &mov ($s[1],$__s0);		}##%ebx
+	else        {	&mov	($tmp,$s[2]);
+			&shr	($tmp,16);			}
+	if ($i==2)  {	&and	($s[1],0xFF);			}#%edx[2]
+			&and	($tmp,0xFF);
+			&xor	($out,&DWP(2,$te,$tmp,8));
+
+	if ($i==3)  {	$tmp=$s[3]; &mov ($s[2],$__s1);		}##%ecx
+	elsif($i==2){	&movz	($tmp,&HB($s[3]));		}#%ebx[2]
+	else        {	&mov	($tmp,$s[3]); 
+			&shr	($tmp,24)			}
+			&xor	($out,&DWP(1,$te,$tmp,8));
+	if ($i<2)   {	&mov	(&DWP(4+4*$i,"esp"),$out);	}
+	if ($i==3)  {	&mov	($s[3],$acc);			}
+			&comment();
+}
+
+sub enclast()
+{ my ($i,$te,@s)=@_;
+  my $tmp = $key;
+  my $out = $i==3?$s[0]:$acc;
+
+	if ($i==3)  {	&mov	($key,$__key);			}##%edx
+	else        {	&mov	($out,$s[0]);			}
+			&and	($out,0xFF);
+	if ($i==1)  {	&shr	($s[0],16);			}#%ebx[1]
+	if ($i==2)  {	&shr	($s[0],24);			}#%ecx[2]
+			&mov	($out,&DWP(2,$te,$out,8));
+			&and	($out,0x000000ff);
+
+	if ($i==3)  {	$tmp=$s[1];				}##%eax
+			&movz	($tmp,&HB($s[1]));
+			&mov	($tmp,&DWP(0,$te,$tmp,8));
+			&and	($tmp,0x0000ff00);
+			&xor	($out,$tmp);
+
+	if ($i==3)  {	$tmp=$s[2]; &mov ($s[1],$__s0);		}##%ebx
+	else        {	&mov	($tmp,$s[2]);
+			&shr	($tmp,16);			}
+	if ($i==2)  {	&and	($s[1],0xFF);			}#%edx[2]
+			&and	($tmp,0xFF);
+			&mov	($tmp,&DWP(0,$te,$tmp,8));
+			&and	($tmp,0x00ff0000);
+			&xor	($out,$tmp);
+
+	if ($i==3)  {	$tmp=$s[3]; &mov ($s[2],$__s1);		}##%ecx
+	elsif($i==2){	&movz	($tmp,&HB($s[3]));		}#%ebx[2]
+	else        {	&mov	($tmp,$s[3]);
+			&shr	($tmp,24);			}
+			&mov	($tmp,&DWP(2,$te,$tmp,8));
+			&and	($tmp,0xff000000);
+			&xor	($out,$tmp);
+	if ($i<2)   {	&mov	(&DWP(4+4*$i,"esp"),$out);	}
+	if ($i==3)  {	&mov	($s[3],$acc);			}
+}
+
+&function_begin_B("_x86_AES_encrypt");
+	if ($vertical_spin) {
+		# I need high parts of volatile registers to be accessible...
+		&exch	($s1="edi",$key="ebx");
+		&mov	($s2="esi",$acc="ecx");
+	}
+
+	# note that caller is expected to allocate stack frame for me!
+	&mov	($__key,$key);			# save key
+
+	&xor	($s0,&DWP(0,$key));		# xor with key
+	&xor	($s1,&DWP(4,$key));
+	&xor	($s2,&DWP(8,$key));
+	&xor	($s3,&DWP(12,$key));
+
+	&mov	($acc,&DWP(240,$key));		# load key->rounds
+
+	if ($small_footprint) {
+	    &lea	($acc,&DWP(-2,$acc,$acc));
+	    &lea	($acc,&DWP(0,$key,$acc,8));
+	    &mov	($__end,$acc);		# end of key schedule
+
+	    &set_label("loop",16);
+		if ($vertical_spin) {
+		    &encvert($tbl,$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3);
+		} else {
+		    &encstep(0,$tbl,$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3);
+		    &encstep(1,$tbl,$s1,$s2,$s3,$s0);
+		    &encstep(2,$tbl,$s2,$s3,$s0,$s1);
+		    &encstep(3,$tbl,$s3,$s0,$s1,$s2);
+		}
+		&add	($key,16);		# advance rd_key
+		&xor	($s0,&DWP(0,$key));
+		&xor	($s1,&DWP(4,$key));
+		&xor	($s2,&DWP(8,$key));
+		&xor	($s3,&DWP(12,$key));
+	    &cmp	($key,$__end);
+	    &mov	($__key,$key);
+	    &jb		(&label("loop"));
+	}
+	else {
+	    &cmp	($acc,10);
+	    &jle	(&label("10rounds"));
+	    &cmp	($acc,12);
+	    &jle	(&label("12rounds"));
+
+	&set_label("14rounds",4);
+	    for ($i=1;$i<3;$i++) {
+		if ($vertical_spin) {
+		    &encvert($tbl,$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3);
+		} else {
+		    &encstep(0,$tbl,$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3);
+		    &encstep(1,$tbl,$s1,$s2,$s3,$s0);
+		    &encstep(2,$tbl,$s2,$s3,$s0,$s1);
+		    &encstep(3,$tbl,$s3,$s0,$s1,$s2);
+		}
+		&xor	($s0,&DWP(16*$i+0,$key));
+		&xor	($s1,&DWP(16*$i+4,$key));
+		&xor	($s2,&DWP(16*$i+8,$key));
+		&xor	($s3,&DWP(16*$i+12,$key));
+	    }
+	    &add	($key,32);
+	    &mov	($__key,$key);		# advance rd_key
+	&set_label("12rounds",4);
+	    for ($i=1;$i<3;$i++) {
+		if ($vertical_spin) {
+		    &encvert($tbl,$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3);
+		} else {
+		    &encstep(0,$tbl,$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3);
+		    &encstep(1,$tbl,$s1,$s2,$s3,$s0);
+		    &encstep(2,$tbl,$s2,$s3,$s0,$s1);
+		    &encstep(3,$tbl,$s3,$s0,$s1,$s2);
+		}
+		&xor	($s0,&DWP(16*$i+0,$key));
+		&xor	($s1,&DWP(16*$i+4,$key));
+		&xor	($s2,&DWP(16*$i+8,$key));
+		&xor	($s3,&DWP(16*$i+12,$key));
+	    }
+	    &add	($key,32);
+	    &mov	($__key,$key);		# advance rd_key
+	&set_label("10rounds",4);
+	    for ($i=1;$i<10;$i++) {
+		if ($vertical_spin) {
+		    &encvert($tbl,$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3);
+		} else {
+		    &encstep(0,$tbl,$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3);
+		    &encstep(1,$tbl,$s1,$s2,$s3,$s0);
+		    &encstep(2,$tbl,$s2,$s3,$s0,$s1);
+		    &encstep(3,$tbl,$s3,$s0,$s1,$s2);
+		}
+		&xor	($s0,&DWP(16*$i+0,$key));
+		&xor	($s1,&DWP(16*$i+4,$key));
+		&xor	($s2,&DWP(16*$i+8,$key));
+		&xor	($s3,&DWP(16*$i+12,$key));
+	    }
+	}
+
+	if ($vertical_spin) {
+	    # "reincarnate" some registers for "horizontal" spin...
+	    &mov	($s1="ebx",$key="edi");
+	    &mov	($s2="ecx",$acc="esi");
+	}
+	&enclast(0,$tbl,$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3);
+	&enclast(1,$tbl,$s1,$s2,$s3,$s0);
+	&enclast(2,$tbl,$s2,$s3,$s0,$s1);
+	&enclast(3,$tbl,$s3,$s0,$s1,$s2);
+
+	&add	($key,$small_footprint?16:160);
+	&xor	($s0,&DWP(0,$key));
+	&xor	($s1,&DWP(4,$key));
+	&xor	($s2,&DWP(8,$key));
+	&xor	($s3,&DWP(12,$key));
+
+	&ret	();
+
+&set_label("AES_Te",64);	# Yes! I keep it in the code segment!
+	&_data_word(0xa56363c6, 0x847c7cf8, 0x997777ee, 0x8d7b7bf6);
+	&_data_word(0x0df2f2ff, 0xbd6b6bd6, 0xb16f6fde, 0x54c5c591);
+	&_data_word(0x50303060, 0x03010102, 0xa96767ce, 0x7d2b2b56);
+	&_data_word(0x19fefee7, 0x62d7d7b5, 0xe6abab4d, 0x9a7676ec);
+	&_data_word(0x45caca8f, 0x9d82821f, 0x40c9c989, 0x877d7dfa);
+	&_data_word(0x15fafaef, 0xeb5959b2, 0xc947478e, 0x0bf0f0fb);
+	&_data_word(0xecadad41, 0x67d4d4b3, 0xfda2a25f, 0xeaafaf45);
+	&_data_word(0xbf9c9c23, 0xf7a4a453, 0x967272e4, 0x5bc0c09b);
+	&_data_word(0xc2b7b775, 0x1cfdfde1, 0xae93933d, 0x6a26264c);
+	&_data_word(0x5a36366c, 0x413f3f7e, 0x02f7f7f5, 0x4fcccc83);
+	&_data_word(0x5c343468, 0xf4a5a551, 0x34e5e5d1, 0x08f1f1f9);
+	&_data_word(0x937171e2, 0x73d8d8ab, 0x53313162, 0x3f15152a);
+	&_data_word(0x0c040408, 0x52c7c795, 0x65232346, 0x5ec3c39d);
+	&_data_word(0x28181830, 0xa1969637, 0x0f05050a, 0xb59a9a2f);
+	&_data_word(0x0907070e, 0x36121224, 0x9b80801b, 0x3de2e2df);
+	&_data_word(0x26ebebcd, 0x6927274e, 0xcdb2b27f, 0x9f7575ea);
+	&_data_word(0x1b090912, 0x9e83831d, 0x742c2c58, 0x2e1a1a34);
+	&_data_word(0x2d1b1b36, 0xb26e6edc, 0xee5a5ab4, 0xfba0a05b);
+	&_data_word(0xf65252a4, 0x4d3b3b76, 0x61d6d6b7, 0xceb3b37d);
+	&_data_word(0x7b292952, 0x3ee3e3dd, 0x712f2f5e, 0x97848413);
+	&_data_word(0xf55353a6, 0x68d1d1b9, 0x00000000, 0x2cededc1);
+	&_data_word(0x60202040, 0x1ffcfce3, 0xc8b1b179, 0xed5b5bb6);
+	&_data_word(0xbe6a6ad4, 0x46cbcb8d, 0xd9bebe67, 0x4b393972);
+	&_data_word(0xde4a4a94, 0xd44c4c98, 0xe85858b0, 0x4acfcf85);
+	&_data_word(0x6bd0d0bb, 0x2aefefc5, 0xe5aaaa4f, 0x16fbfbed);
+	&_data_word(0xc5434386, 0xd74d4d9a, 0x55333366, 0x94858511);
+	&_data_word(0xcf45458a, 0x10f9f9e9, 0x06020204, 0x817f7ffe);
+	&_data_word(0xf05050a0, 0x443c3c78, 0xba9f9f25, 0xe3a8a84b);
+	&_data_word(0xf35151a2, 0xfea3a35d, 0xc0404080, 0x8a8f8f05);
+	&_data_word(0xad92923f, 0xbc9d9d21, 0x48383870, 0x04f5f5f1);
+	&_data_word(0xdfbcbc63, 0xc1b6b677, 0x75dadaaf, 0x63212142);
+	&_data_word(0x30101020, 0x1affffe5, 0x0ef3f3fd, 0x6dd2d2bf);
+	&_data_word(0x4ccdcd81, 0x140c0c18, 0x35131326, 0x2fececc3);
+	&_data_word(0xe15f5fbe, 0xa2979735, 0xcc444488, 0x3917172e);
+	&_data_word(0x57c4c493, 0xf2a7a755, 0x827e7efc, 0x473d3d7a);
+	&_data_word(0xac6464c8, 0xe75d5dba, 0x2b191932, 0x957373e6);
+	&_data_word(0xa06060c0, 0x98818119, 0xd14f4f9e, 0x7fdcdca3);
+	&_data_word(0x66222244, 0x7e2a2a54, 0xab90903b, 0x8388880b);
+	&_data_word(0xca46468c, 0x29eeeec7, 0xd3b8b86b, 0x3c141428);
+	&_data_word(0x79dedea7, 0xe25e5ebc, 0x1d0b0b16, 0x76dbdbad);
+	&_data_word(0x3be0e0db, 0x56323264, 0x4e3a3a74, 0x1e0a0a14);
+	&_data_word(0xdb494992, 0x0a06060c, 0x6c242448, 0xe45c5cb8);
+	&_data_word(0x5dc2c29f, 0x6ed3d3bd, 0xefacac43, 0xa66262c4);
+	&_data_word(0xa8919139, 0xa4959531, 0x37e4e4d3, 0x8b7979f2);
+	&_data_word(0x32e7e7d5, 0x43c8c88b, 0x5937376e, 0xb76d6dda);
+	&_data_word(0x8c8d8d01, 0x64d5d5b1, 0xd24e4e9c, 0xe0a9a949);
+	&_data_word(0xb46c6cd8, 0xfa5656ac, 0x07f4f4f3, 0x25eaeacf);
+	&_data_word(0xaf6565ca, 0x8e7a7af4, 0xe9aeae47, 0x18080810);
+	&_data_word(0xd5baba6f, 0x887878f0, 0x6f25254a, 0x722e2e5c);
+	&_data_word(0x241c1c38, 0xf1a6a657, 0xc7b4b473, 0x51c6c697);
+	&_data_word(0x23e8e8cb, 0x7cdddda1, 0x9c7474e8, 0x211f1f3e);
+	&_data_word(0xdd4b4b96, 0xdcbdbd61, 0x868b8b0d, 0x858a8a0f);
+	&_data_word(0x907070e0, 0x423e3e7c, 0xc4b5b571, 0xaa6666cc);
+	&_data_word(0xd8484890, 0x05030306, 0x01f6f6f7, 0x120e0e1c);
+	&_data_word(0xa36161c2, 0x5f35356a, 0xf95757ae, 0xd0b9b969);
+	&_data_word(0x91868617, 0x58c1c199, 0x271d1d3a, 0xb99e9e27);
+	&_data_word(0x38e1e1d9, 0x13f8f8eb, 0xb398982b, 0x33111122);
+	&_data_word(0xbb6969d2, 0x70d9d9a9, 0x898e8e07, 0xa7949433);
+	&_data_word(0xb69b9b2d, 0x221e1e3c, 0x92878715, 0x20e9e9c9);
+	&_data_word(0x49cece87, 0xff5555aa, 0x78282850, 0x7adfdfa5);
+	&_data_word(0x8f8c8c03, 0xf8a1a159, 0x80898909, 0x170d0d1a);
+	&_data_word(0xdabfbf65, 0x31e6e6d7, 0xc6424284, 0xb86868d0);
+	&_data_word(0xc3414182, 0xb0999929, 0x772d2d5a, 0x110f0f1e);
+	&_data_word(0xcbb0b07b, 0xfc5454a8, 0xd6bbbb6d, 0x3a16162c);
+
+#Te4	# four copies of Te4 to choose from to avoid L1 aliasing
+	&data_byte(0x63, 0x7c, 0x77, 0x7b, 0xf2, 0x6b, 0x6f, 0xc5);
+	&data_byte(0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2b, 0xfe, 0xd7, 0xab, 0x76);
+	&data_byte(0xca, 0x82, 0xc9, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0x59, 0x47, 0xf0);
+	&data_byte(0xad, 0xd4, 0xa2, 0xaf, 0x9c, 0xa4, 0x72, 0xc0);
+	&data_byte(0xb7, 0xfd, 0x93, 0x26, 0x36, 0x3f, 0xf7, 0xcc);
+	&data_byte(0x34, 0xa5, 0xe5, 0xf1, 0x71, 0xd8, 0x31, 0x15);
+	&data_byte(0x04, 0xc7, 0x23, 0xc3, 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9a);
+	&data_byte(0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xeb, 0x27, 0xb2, 0x75);
+	&data_byte(0x09, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x6e, 0x5a, 0xa0);
+	&data_byte(0x52, 0x3b, 0xd6, 0xb3, 0x29, 0xe3, 0x2f, 0x84);
+	&data_byte(0x53, 0xd1, 0x00, 0xed, 0x20, 0xfc, 0xb1, 0x5b);
+	&data_byte(0x6a, 0xcb, 0xbe, 0x39, 0x4a, 0x4c, 0x58, 0xcf);
+	&data_byte(0xd0, 0xef, 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x43, 0x4d, 0x33, 0x85);
+	&data_byte(0x45, 0xf9, 0x02, 0x7f, 0x50, 0x3c, 0x9f, 0xa8);
+	&data_byte(0x51, 0xa3, 0x40, 0x8f, 0x92, 0x9d, 0x38, 0xf5);
+	&data_byte(0xbc, 0xb6, 0xda, 0x21, 0x10, 0xff, 0xf3, 0xd2);
+	&data_byte(0xcd, 0x0c, 0x13, 0xec, 0x5f, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17);
+	&data_byte(0xc4, 0xa7, 0x7e, 0x3d, 0x64, 0x5d, 0x19, 0x73);
+	&data_byte(0x60, 0x81, 0x4f, 0xdc, 0x22, 0x2a, 0x90, 0x88);
+	&data_byte(0x46, 0xee, 0xb8, 0x14, 0xde, 0x5e, 0x0b, 0xdb);
+	&data_byte(0xe0, 0x32, 0x3a, 0x0a, 0x49, 0x06, 0x24, 0x5c);
+	&data_byte(0xc2, 0xd3, 0xac, 0x62, 0x91, 0x95, 0xe4, 0x79);
+	&data_byte(0xe7, 0xc8, 0x37, 0x6d, 0x8d, 0xd5, 0x4e, 0xa9);
+	&data_byte(0x6c, 0x56, 0xf4, 0xea, 0x65, 0x7a, 0xae, 0x08);
+	&data_byte(0xba, 0x78, 0x25, 0x2e, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xb4, 0xc6);
+	&data_byte(0xe8, 0xdd, 0x74, 0x1f, 0x4b, 0xbd, 0x8b, 0x8a);
+	&data_byte(0x70, 0x3e, 0xb5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xf6, 0x0e);
+	&data_byte(0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xb9, 0x86, 0xc1, 0x1d, 0x9e);
+	&data_byte(0xe1, 0xf8, 0x98, 0x11, 0x69, 0xd9, 0x8e, 0x94);
+	&data_byte(0x9b, 0x1e, 0x87, 0xe9, 0xce, 0x55, 0x28, 0xdf);
+	&data_byte(0x8c, 0xa1, 0x89, 0x0d, 0xbf, 0xe6, 0x42, 0x68);
+	&data_byte(0x41, 0x99, 0x2d, 0x0f, 0xb0, 0x54, 0xbb, 0x16);
+
+	&data_byte(0x63, 0x7c, 0x77, 0x7b, 0xf2, 0x6b, 0x6f, 0xc5);
+	&data_byte(0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2b, 0xfe, 0xd7, 0xab, 0x76);
+	&data_byte(0xca, 0x82, 0xc9, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0x59, 0x47, 0xf0);
+	&data_byte(0xad, 0xd4, 0xa2, 0xaf, 0x9c, 0xa4, 0x72, 0xc0);
+	&data_byte(0xb7, 0xfd, 0x93, 0x26, 0x36, 0x3f, 0xf7, 0xcc);
+	&data_byte(0x34, 0xa5, 0xe5, 0xf1, 0x71, 0xd8, 0x31, 0x15);
+	&data_byte(0x04, 0xc7, 0x23, 0xc3, 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9a);
+	&data_byte(0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xeb, 0x27, 0xb2, 0x75);
+	&data_byte(0x09, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x6e, 0x5a, 0xa0);
+	&data_byte(0x52, 0x3b, 0xd6, 0xb3, 0x29, 0xe3, 0x2f, 0x84);
+	&data_byte(0x53, 0xd1, 0x00, 0xed, 0x20, 0xfc, 0xb1, 0x5b);
+	&data_byte(0x6a, 0xcb, 0xbe, 0x39, 0x4a, 0x4c, 0x58, 0xcf);
+	&data_byte(0xd0, 0xef, 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x43, 0x4d, 0x33, 0x85);
+	&data_byte(0x45, 0xf9, 0x02, 0x7f, 0x50, 0x3c, 0x9f, 0xa8);
+	&data_byte(0x51, 0xa3, 0x40, 0x8f, 0x92, 0x9d, 0x38, 0xf5);
+	&data_byte(0xbc, 0xb6, 0xda, 0x21, 0x10, 0xff, 0xf3, 0xd2);
+	&data_byte(0xcd, 0x0c, 0x13, 0xec, 0x5f, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17);
+	&data_byte(0xc4, 0xa7, 0x7e, 0x3d, 0x64, 0x5d, 0x19, 0x73);
+	&data_byte(0x60, 0x81, 0x4f, 0xdc, 0x22, 0x2a, 0x90, 0x88);
+	&data_byte(0x46, 0xee, 0xb8, 0x14, 0xde, 0x5e, 0x0b, 0xdb);
+	&data_byte(0xe0, 0x32, 0x3a, 0x0a, 0x49, 0x06, 0x24, 0x5c);
+	&data_byte(0xc2, 0xd3, 0xac, 0x62, 0x91, 0x95, 0xe4, 0x79);
+	&data_byte(0xe7, 0xc8, 0x37, 0x6d, 0x8d, 0xd5, 0x4e, 0xa9);
+	&data_byte(0x6c, 0x56, 0xf4, 0xea, 0x65, 0x7a, 0xae, 0x08);
+	&data_byte(0xba, 0x78, 0x25, 0x2e, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xb4, 0xc6);
+	&data_byte(0xe8, 0xdd, 0x74, 0x1f, 0x4b, 0xbd, 0x8b, 0x8a);
+	&data_byte(0x70, 0x3e, 0xb5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xf6, 0x0e);
+	&data_byte(0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xb9, 0x86, 0xc1, 0x1d, 0x9e);
+	&data_byte(0xe1, 0xf8, 0x98, 0x11, 0x69, 0xd9, 0x8e, 0x94);
+	&data_byte(0x9b, 0x1e, 0x87, 0xe9, 0xce, 0x55, 0x28, 0xdf);
+	&data_byte(0x8c, 0xa1, 0x89, 0x0d, 0xbf, 0xe6, 0x42, 0x68);
+	&data_byte(0x41, 0x99, 0x2d, 0x0f, 0xb0, 0x54, 0xbb, 0x16);
+
+	&data_byte(0x63, 0x7c, 0x77, 0x7b, 0xf2, 0x6b, 0x6f, 0xc5);
+	&data_byte(0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2b, 0xfe, 0xd7, 0xab, 0x76);
+	&data_byte(0xca, 0x82, 0xc9, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0x59, 0x47, 0xf0);
+	&data_byte(0xad, 0xd4, 0xa2, 0xaf, 0x9c, 0xa4, 0x72, 0xc0);
+	&data_byte(0xb7, 0xfd, 0x93, 0x26, 0x36, 0x3f, 0xf7, 0xcc);
+	&data_byte(0x34, 0xa5, 0xe5, 0xf1, 0x71, 0xd8, 0x31, 0x15);
+	&data_byte(0x04, 0xc7, 0x23, 0xc3, 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9a);
+	&data_byte(0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xeb, 0x27, 0xb2, 0x75);
+	&data_byte(0x09, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x6e, 0x5a, 0xa0);
+	&data_byte(0x52, 0x3b, 0xd6, 0xb3, 0x29, 0xe3, 0x2f, 0x84);
+	&data_byte(0x53, 0xd1, 0x00, 0xed, 0x20, 0xfc, 0xb1, 0x5b);
+	&data_byte(0x6a, 0xcb, 0xbe, 0x39, 0x4a, 0x4c, 0x58, 0xcf);
+	&data_byte(0xd0, 0xef, 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x43, 0x4d, 0x33, 0x85);
+	&data_byte(0x45, 0xf9, 0x02, 0x7f, 0x50, 0x3c, 0x9f, 0xa8);
+	&data_byte(0x51, 0xa3, 0x40, 0x8f, 0x92, 0x9d, 0x38, 0xf5);
+	&data_byte(0xbc, 0xb6, 0xda, 0x21, 0x10, 0xff, 0xf3, 0xd2);
+	&data_byte(0xcd, 0x0c, 0x13, 0xec, 0x5f, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17);
+	&data_byte(0xc4, 0xa7, 0x7e, 0x3d, 0x64, 0x5d, 0x19, 0x73);
+	&data_byte(0x60, 0x81, 0x4f, 0xdc, 0x22, 0x2a, 0x90, 0x88);
+	&data_byte(0x46, 0xee, 0xb8, 0x14, 0xde, 0x5e, 0x0b, 0xdb);
+	&data_byte(0xe0, 0x32, 0x3a, 0x0a, 0x49, 0x06, 0x24, 0x5c);
+	&data_byte(0xc2, 0xd3, 0xac, 0x62, 0x91, 0x95, 0xe4, 0x79);
+	&data_byte(0xe7, 0xc8, 0x37, 0x6d, 0x8d, 0xd5, 0x4e, 0xa9);
+	&data_byte(0x6c, 0x56, 0xf4, 0xea, 0x65, 0x7a, 0xae, 0x08);
+	&data_byte(0xba, 0x78, 0x25, 0x2e, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xb4, 0xc6);
+	&data_byte(0xe8, 0xdd, 0x74, 0x1f, 0x4b, 0xbd, 0x8b, 0x8a);
+	&data_byte(0x70, 0x3e, 0xb5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xf6, 0x0e);
+	&data_byte(0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xb9, 0x86, 0xc1, 0x1d, 0x9e);
+	&data_byte(0xe1, 0xf8, 0x98, 0x11, 0x69, 0xd9, 0x8e, 0x94);
+	&data_byte(0x9b, 0x1e, 0x87, 0xe9, 0xce, 0x55, 0x28, 0xdf);
+	&data_byte(0x8c, 0xa1, 0x89, 0x0d, 0xbf, 0xe6, 0x42, 0x68);
+	&data_byte(0x41, 0x99, 0x2d, 0x0f, 0xb0, 0x54, 0xbb, 0x16);
+
+	&data_byte(0x63, 0x7c, 0x77, 0x7b, 0xf2, 0x6b, 0x6f, 0xc5);
+	&data_byte(0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2b, 0xfe, 0xd7, 0xab, 0x76);
+	&data_byte(0xca, 0x82, 0xc9, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0x59, 0x47, 0xf0);
+	&data_byte(0xad, 0xd4, 0xa2, 0xaf, 0x9c, 0xa4, 0x72, 0xc0);
+	&data_byte(0xb7, 0xfd, 0x93, 0x26, 0x36, 0x3f, 0xf7, 0xcc);
+	&data_byte(0x34, 0xa5, 0xe5, 0xf1, 0x71, 0xd8, 0x31, 0x15);
+	&data_byte(0x04, 0xc7, 0x23, 0xc3, 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9a);
+	&data_byte(0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xeb, 0x27, 0xb2, 0x75);
+	&data_byte(0x09, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x6e, 0x5a, 0xa0);
+	&data_byte(0x52, 0x3b, 0xd6, 0xb3, 0x29, 0xe3, 0x2f, 0x84);
+	&data_byte(0x53, 0xd1, 0x00, 0xed, 0x20, 0xfc, 0xb1, 0x5b);
+	&data_byte(0x6a, 0xcb, 0xbe, 0x39, 0x4a, 0x4c, 0x58, 0xcf);
+	&data_byte(0xd0, 0xef, 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x43, 0x4d, 0x33, 0x85);
+	&data_byte(0x45, 0xf9, 0x02, 0x7f, 0x50, 0x3c, 0x9f, 0xa8);
+	&data_byte(0x51, 0xa3, 0x40, 0x8f, 0x92, 0x9d, 0x38, 0xf5);
+	&data_byte(0xbc, 0xb6, 0xda, 0x21, 0x10, 0xff, 0xf3, 0xd2);
+	&data_byte(0xcd, 0x0c, 0x13, 0xec, 0x5f, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17);
+	&data_byte(0xc4, 0xa7, 0x7e, 0x3d, 0x64, 0x5d, 0x19, 0x73);
+	&data_byte(0x60, 0x81, 0x4f, 0xdc, 0x22, 0x2a, 0x90, 0x88);
+	&data_byte(0x46, 0xee, 0xb8, 0x14, 0xde, 0x5e, 0x0b, 0xdb);
+	&data_byte(0xe0, 0x32, 0x3a, 0x0a, 0x49, 0x06, 0x24, 0x5c);
+	&data_byte(0xc2, 0xd3, 0xac, 0x62, 0x91, 0x95, 0xe4, 0x79);
+	&data_byte(0xe7, 0xc8, 0x37, 0x6d, 0x8d, 0xd5, 0x4e, 0xa9);
+	&data_byte(0x6c, 0x56, 0xf4, 0xea, 0x65, 0x7a, 0xae, 0x08);
+	&data_byte(0xba, 0x78, 0x25, 0x2e, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xb4, 0xc6);
+	&data_byte(0xe8, 0xdd, 0x74, 0x1f, 0x4b, 0xbd, 0x8b, 0x8a);
+	&data_byte(0x70, 0x3e, 0xb5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xf6, 0x0e);
+	&data_byte(0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xb9, 0x86, 0xc1, 0x1d, 0x9e);
+	&data_byte(0xe1, 0xf8, 0x98, 0x11, 0x69, 0xd9, 0x8e, 0x94);
+	&data_byte(0x9b, 0x1e, 0x87, 0xe9, 0xce, 0x55, 0x28, 0xdf);
+	&data_byte(0x8c, 0xa1, 0x89, 0x0d, 0xbf, 0xe6, 0x42, 0x68);
+	&data_byte(0x41, 0x99, 0x2d, 0x0f, 0xb0, 0x54, 0xbb, 0x16);
+#rcon:
+	&data_word(0x00000001, 0x00000002, 0x00000004, 0x00000008);
+	&data_word(0x00000010, 0x00000020, 0x00000040, 0x00000080);
+	&data_word(0x0000001b, 0x00000036, 0x00000000, 0x00000000);
+	&data_word(0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000);
+&function_end_B("_x86_AES_encrypt");
+
+# void AES_encrypt (const void *inp,void *out,const AES_KEY *key);
+&function_begin("AES_encrypt");
+	&mov	($acc,&wparam(0));		# load inp
+	&mov	($key,&wparam(2));		# load key
+
+	&mov	($s0,"esp");
+	&sub	("esp",36);
+	&and	("esp",-64);			# align to cache-line
+
+	# place stack frame just "above" the key schedule
+	&lea	($s1,&DWP(-64-63,$key));
+	&sub	($s1,"esp");
+	&neg	($s1);
+	&and	($s1,0x3C0);	# modulo 1024, but aligned to cache-line
+	&sub	("esp",$s1);
+	&add	("esp",4);	# 4 is reserved for caller's return address
+	&mov	($_esp,$s0);			# save stack pointer
+
+	&call   (&label("pic_point"));          # make it PIC!
+	&set_label("pic_point");
+	&blindpop($tbl);
+	&picmeup($s0,"OPENSSL_ia32cap_P",$tbl,&label("pic_point")) if (!$x86only);
+	&lea    ($tbl,&DWP(&label("AES_Te")."-".&label("pic_point"),$tbl));
+
+	# pick Te4 copy which can't "overlap" with stack frame or key schedule
+	&lea	($s1,&DWP(768-4,"esp"));
+	&sub	($s1,$tbl);
+	&and	($s1,0x300);
+	&lea	($tbl,&DWP(2048+128,$tbl,$s1));
+
+					if (!$x86only) {
+	&bt	(&DWP(0,$s0),25);	# check for SSE bit
+	&jnc	(&label("x86"));
+
+	&movq	("mm0",&QWP(0,$acc));
+	&movq	("mm4",&QWP(8,$acc));
+	&call	("_sse_AES_encrypt_compact");
+	&mov	("esp",$_esp);			# restore stack pointer
+	&mov	($acc,&wparam(1));		# load out
+	&movq	(&QWP(0,$acc),"mm0");		# write output data
+	&movq	(&QWP(8,$acc),"mm4");
+	&emms	();
+	&function_end_A();
+					}
+	&set_label("x86",16);
+	&mov	($_tbl,$tbl);
+	&mov	($s0,&DWP(0,$acc));		# load input data
+	&mov	($s1,&DWP(4,$acc));
+	&mov	($s2,&DWP(8,$acc));
+	&mov	($s3,&DWP(12,$acc));
+	&call	("_x86_AES_encrypt_compact");
+	&mov	("esp",$_esp);			# restore stack pointer
+	&mov	($acc,&wparam(1));		# load out
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,$acc),$s0);		# write output data
+	&mov	(&DWP(4,$acc),$s1);
+	&mov	(&DWP(8,$acc),$s2);
+	&mov	(&DWP(12,$acc),$s3);
+&function_end("AES_encrypt");
+
+#--------------------------------------------------------------------#
+
+######################################################################
+# "Compact" block function
+######################################################################
+
+sub deccompact()
+{ my $Fn = \&mov;
+  while ($#_>5) { pop(@_); $Fn=sub{}; }
+  my ($i,$td,@s)=@_;
+  my $tmp = $key;
+  my $out = $i==3?$s[0]:$acc;
+
+	# $Fn is used in first compact round and its purpose is to
+	# void restoration of some values from stack, so that after
+	# 4xdeccompact with extra argument $key, $s0 and $s1 values
+	# are left there...
+	if($i==3)   {	&$Fn	($key,$__key);			}
+	else        {	&mov	($out,$s[0]);			}
+			&and	($out,0xFF);
+			&movz	($out,&BP(-128,$td,$out,1));
+
+	if ($i==3)  {	$tmp=$s[1];				}
+			&movz	($tmp,&HB($s[1]));
+			&movz	($tmp,&BP(-128,$td,$tmp,1));
+			&shl	($tmp,8);
+			&xor	($out,$tmp);
+
+	if ($i==3)  {	$tmp=$s[2]; &mov ($s[1],$acc);		}
+	else        {	mov	($tmp,$s[2]);			}
+			&shr	($tmp,16);
+			&and	($tmp,0xFF);
+			&movz	($tmp,&BP(-128,$td,$tmp,1));
+			&shl	($tmp,16);
+			&xor	($out,$tmp);
+
+	if ($i==3)  {	$tmp=$s[3]; &$Fn ($s[2],$__s1);		}
+	else        {	&mov	($tmp,$s[3]);			}
+			&shr	($tmp,24);
+			&movz	($tmp,&BP(-128,$td,$tmp,1));
+			&shl	($tmp,24);
+			&xor	($out,$tmp);
+	if ($i<2)   {	&mov	(&DWP(4+4*$i,"esp"),$out);	}
+	if ($i==3)  {	&$Fn	($s[3],$__s0);			}
+}
+
+# must be called with 2,3,0,1 as argument sequence!!!
+sub dectransform()
+{ my @s = ($s0,$s1,$s2,$s3);
+  my $i = shift;
+  my $tmp = $key;
+  my $tp2 = @s[($i+2)%4]; $tp2 = @s[2] if ($i==1);
+  my $tp4 = @s[($i+3)%4]; $tp4 = @s[3] if ($i==1);
+  my $tp8 = $tbl;
+
+	&mov	($tmp,0x80808080);
+	&and	($tmp,$s[$i]);
+	&mov	($acc,$tmp);
+	&shr	($tmp,7);
+	&lea	($tp2,&DWP(0,$s[$i],$s[$i]));
+	&sub	($acc,$tmp);
+	&and	($tp2,0xfefefefe);
+	&and	($acc,0x1b1b1b1b);
+	&xor	($tp2,$acc);
+	&mov	($tmp,0x80808080);
+
+	&and	($tmp,$tp2);
+	&mov	($acc,$tmp);
+	&shr	($tmp,7);
+	&lea	($tp4,&DWP(0,$tp2,$tp2));
+	&sub	($acc,$tmp);
+	&and	($tp4,0xfefefefe);
+	&and	($acc,0x1b1b1b1b);
+	 &xor	($tp2,$s[$i]);	# tp2^tp1
+	&xor	($tp4,$acc);
+	&mov	($tmp,0x80808080);
+
+	&and	($tmp,$tp4);
+	&mov	($acc,$tmp);
+	&shr	($tmp,7);
+	&lea	($tp8,&DWP(0,$tp4,$tp4));
+	&sub	($acc,$tmp);
+	&and	($tp8,0xfefefefe);
+	&and	($acc,0x1b1b1b1b);
+	 &xor	($tp4,$s[$i]);	# tp4^tp1
+	 &rotl	($s[$i],8);	# = ROTATE(tp1,8)
+	&xor	($tp8,$acc);
+
+	&xor	($s[$i],$tp2);
+	&xor	($tp2,$tp8);
+	&xor	($s[$i],$tp4);
+	&xor	($tp4,$tp8);
+	&rotl	($tp2,24);
+	&xor	($s[$i],$tp8);	# ^= tp8^(tp4^tp1)^(tp2^tp1)
+	&rotl	($tp4,16);
+	&xor	($s[$i],$tp2);	# ^= ROTATE(tp8^tp2^tp1,24)
+	&rotl	($tp8,8);
+	&xor	($s[$i],$tp4);	# ^= ROTATE(tp8^tp4^tp1,16)
+	 &mov	($s[0],$__s0)			if($i==2); #prefetch $s0
+	 &mov	($s[1],$__s1)			if($i==3); #prefetch $s1
+	 &mov	($s[2],$__s2)			if($i==1);
+	&xor	($s[$i],$tp8);	# ^= ROTATE(tp8,8)
+
+	&mov	($s[3],$__s3)			if($i==1);
+	&mov	(&DWP(4+4*$i,"esp"),$s[$i])	if($i>=2);
+}
+
+&function_begin_B("_x86_AES_decrypt_compact");
+	# note that caller is expected to allocate stack frame for me!
+	&mov	($__key,$key);			# save key
+
+	&xor	($s0,&DWP(0,$key));		# xor with key
+	&xor	($s1,&DWP(4,$key));
+	&xor	($s2,&DWP(8,$key));
+	&xor	($s3,&DWP(12,$key));
+
+	&mov	($acc,&DWP(240,$key));		# load key->rounds
+
+	&lea	($acc,&DWP(-2,$acc,$acc));
+	&lea	($acc,&DWP(0,$key,$acc,8));
+	&mov	($__end,$acc);			# end of key schedule
+
+	# prefetch Td4
+	&mov	($key,&DWP(0-128,$tbl));
+	&mov	($acc,&DWP(32-128,$tbl));
+	&mov	($key,&DWP(64-128,$tbl));
+	&mov	($acc,&DWP(96-128,$tbl));
+	&mov	($key,&DWP(128-128,$tbl));
+	&mov	($acc,&DWP(160-128,$tbl));
+	&mov	($key,&DWP(192-128,$tbl));
+	&mov	($acc,&DWP(224-128,$tbl));
+
+	&set_label("loop",16);
+
+		&deccompact(0,$tbl,$s0,$s3,$s2,$s1,1);
+		&deccompact(1,$tbl,$s1,$s0,$s3,$s2,1);
+		&deccompact(2,$tbl,$s2,$s1,$s0,$s3,1);
+		&deccompact(3,$tbl,$s3,$s2,$s1,$s0,1);
+		&dectransform(2);
+		&dectransform(3);
+		&dectransform(0);
+		&dectransform(1);
+		&mov 	($key,$__key);
+		&mov	($tbl,$__tbl);
+		&add	($key,16);		# advance rd_key
+		&xor	($s0,&DWP(0,$key));
+		&xor	($s1,&DWP(4,$key));
+		&xor	($s2,&DWP(8,$key));
+		&xor	($s3,&DWP(12,$key));
+
+	&cmp	($key,$__end);
+	&mov	($__key,$key);
+	&jb	(&label("loop"));
+
+	&deccompact(0,$tbl,$s0,$s3,$s2,$s1);
+	&deccompact(1,$tbl,$s1,$s0,$s3,$s2);
+	&deccompact(2,$tbl,$s2,$s1,$s0,$s3);
+	&deccompact(3,$tbl,$s3,$s2,$s1,$s0);
+
+	&xor	($s0,&DWP(16,$key));
+	&xor	($s1,&DWP(20,$key));
+	&xor	($s2,&DWP(24,$key));
+	&xor	($s3,&DWP(28,$key));
+
+	&ret	();
+&function_end_B("_x86_AES_decrypt_compact");
+
+######################################################################
+# "Compact" SSE block function.
+######################################################################
+
+sub sse_deccompact()
+{
+	&pshufw	("mm1","mm0",0x0c);		#  7, 6, 1, 0
+	&pshufw	("mm5","mm4",0x09);		# 13,12,11,10
+	&movd	("eax","mm1");			#  7, 6, 1, 0
+	&movd	("ebx","mm5");			# 13,12,11,10
+	&mov	($__key,$key);
+
+	&movz	($acc,&LB("eax"));		#  0
+	&movz	("edx",&HB("eax"));		#  1
+	&pshufw	("mm2","mm0",0x06);		#  3, 2, 5, 4
+	&movz	("ecx",&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1));	#  0
+	&movz	($key,&LB("ebx"));		# 10
+	&movz	("edx",&BP(-128,$tbl,"edx",1));	#  1
+	&shr	("eax",16);			#  7, 6
+	&shl	("edx",8);			#  1
+
+	&movz	($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1));	# 10
+	&movz	($key,&HB("ebx"));		# 11
+	&shl	($acc,16);			# 10
+	&pshufw	("mm6","mm4",0x03);		# 9, 8,15,14
+	&or	("ecx",$acc);			# 10
+	&movz	($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1));	# 11
+	&movz	($key,&HB("eax"));		#  7
+	&shl	($acc,24);			# 11
+	&shr	("ebx",16);			# 13,12
+	&or	("edx",$acc);			# 11
+
+	&movz	($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1));	#  7
+	&movz	($key,&HB("ebx"));		# 13
+	&shl	($acc,24);			#  7
+	&or	("ecx",$acc);			#  7
+	&movz	($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1));	# 13
+	&movz	($key,&LB("eax"));		#  6
+	&shl	($acc,8);			# 13
+	&movd	("eax","mm2");			#  3, 2, 5, 4
+	&or	("ecx",$acc);			# 13
+
+	&movz	($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1));	#  6
+	&movz	($key,&LB("ebx"));		# 12
+	&shl	($acc,16);			#  6
+	&movd	("ebx","mm6");			#  9, 8,15,14
+	&movd	("mm0","ecx");			# t[0] collected
+	&movz	("ecx",&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1));	# 12
+	&movz	($key,&LB("eax"));		#  4
+	&or	("ecx",$acc);			# 12
+
+	&movz	($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1));	#  4
+	&movz	($key,&LB("ebx"));		# 14
+	&or	("edx",$acc);			#  4
+	&movz	($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1));	# 14
+	&movz	($key,&HB("eax"));		#  5
+	&shl	($acc,16);			# 14
+	&shr	("eax",16);			#  3, 2
+	&or	("edx",$acc);			# 14
+
+	&movz	($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1));	#  5
+	&movz	($key,&HB("ebx"));		# 15
+	&shr	("ebx",16);			#  9, 8
+	&shl	($acc,8);			#  5
+	&movd	("mm1","edx");			# t[1] collected
+	&movz	("edx",&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1));	# 15
+	&movz	($key,&HB("ebx"));		#  9
+	&shl	("edx",24);			# 15
+	&and	("ebx",0xff);			#  8
+	&or	("edx",$acc);			# 15
+
+	&punpckldq	("mm0","mm1");		# t[0,1] collected
+
+	&movz	($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1));	#  9
+	&movz	($key,&LB("eax"));		#  2
+	&shl	($acc,8);			#  9
+	&movz	("eax",&HB("eax"));		#  3
+	&movz	("ebx",&BP(-128,$tbl,"ebx",1));	#  8
+	&or	("ecx",$acc);			#  9
+	&movz	($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1));	#  2
+	&or	("edx","ebx");			#  8
+	&shl	($acc,16);			#  2
+	&movz	("eax",&BP(-128,$tbl,"eax",1));	#  3
+	&or	("edx",$acc);			#  2
+	&shl	("eax",24);			#  3
+	&or	("ecx","eax");			#  3
+	&mov	($key,$__key);
+	&movd	("mm4","edx");			# t[2] collected
+	&movd	("mm5","ecx");			# t[3] collected
+
+	&punpckldq	("mm4","mm5");		# t[2,3] collected
+}
+
+					if (!$x86only) {
+&function_begin_B("_sse_AES_decrypt_compact");
+	&pxor	("mm0",&QWP(0,$key));	#  7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 0
+	&pxor	("mm4",&QWP(8,$key));	# 15,14,13,12,11,10, 9, 8
+
+	# note that caller is expected to allocate stack frame for me!
+	&mov	($acc,&DWP(240,$key));		# load key->rounds
+	&lea	($acc,&DWP(-2,$acc,$acc));
+	&lea	($acc,&DWP(0,$key,$acc,8));
+	&mov	($__end,$acc);			# end of key schedule
+
+	&mov	($s0,0x1b1b1b1b);		# magic constant
+	&mov	(&DWP(8,"esp"),$s0);
+	&mov	(&DWP(12,"esp"),$s0);
+
+	# prefetch Td4
+	&mov	($s0,&DWP(0-128,$tbl));
+	&mov	($s1,&DWP(32-128,$tbl));
+	&mov	($s2,&DWP(64-128,$tbl));
+	&mov	($s3,&DWP(96-128,$tbl));
+	&mov	($s0,&DWP(128-128,$tbl));
+	&mov	($s1,&DWP(160-128,$tbl));
+	&mov	($s2,&DWP(192-128,$tbl));
+	&mov	($s3,&DWP(224-128,$tbl));
+
+	&set_label("loop",16);
+		&sse_deccompact();
+		&add	($key,16);
+		&cmp	($key,$__end);
+		&ja	(&label("out"));
+
+		# ROTATE(x^y,N) == ROTATE(x,N)^ROTATE(y,N)
+		&movq	("mm3","mm0");		&movq	("mm7","mm4");
+		&movq	("mm2","mm0",1);	&movq	("mm6","mm4",1);
+		&movq	("mm1","mm0");		&movq	("mm5","mm4");
+		&pshufw	("mm0","mm0",0xb1);	&pshufw	("mm4","mm4",0xb1);# = ROTATE(tp0,16)
+		&pslld	("mm2",8);		&pslld	("mm6",8);
+		&psrld	("mm3",8);		&psrld	("mm7",8);
+		&pxor	("mm0","mm2");		&pxor	("mm4","mm6");	# ^= tp0<<8
+		&pxor	("mm0","mm3");		&pxor	("mm4","mm7");	# ^= tp0>>8
+		&pslld	("mm2",16);		&pslld	("mm6",16);
+		&psrld	("mm3",16);		&psrld	("mm7",16);
+		&pxor	("mm0","mm2");		&pxor	("mm4","mm6");	# ^= tp0<<24
+		&pxor	("mm0","mm3");		&pxor	("mm4","mm7");	# ^= tp0>>24
+
+		&movq	("mm3",&QWP(8,"esp"));
+		&pxor	("mm2","mm2");		&pxor	("mm6","mm6");
+		&pcmpgtb("mm2","mm1");		&pcmpgtb("mm6","mm5");
+		&pand	("mm2","mm3");		&pand	("mm6","mm3");
+		&paddb	("mm1","mm1");		&paddb	("mm5","mm5");
+		&pxor	("mm1","mm2");		&pxor	("mm5","mm6");	# tp2
+		&movq	("mm3","mm1");		&movq	("mm7","mm5");
+		&movq	("mm2","mm1");		&movq	("mm6","mm5");
+		&pxor	("mm0","mm1");		&pxor	("mm4","mm5");	# ^= tp2
+		&pslld	("mm3",24);		&pslld	("mm7",24);
+		&psrld	("mm2",8);		&psrld	("mm6",8);
+		&pxor	("mm0","mm3");		&pxor	("mm4","mm7");	# ^= tp2<<24
+		&pxor	("mm0","mm2");		&pxor	("mm4","mm6");	# ^= tp2>>8
+
+		&movq	("mm2",&QWP(8,"esp"));
+		&pxor	("mm3","mm3");		&pxor	("mm7","mm7");
+		&pcmpgtb("mm3","mm1");		&pcmpgtb("mm7","mm5");
+		&pand	("mm3","mm2");		&pand	("mm7","mm2");
+		&paddb	("mm1","mm1");		&paddb	("mm5","mm5");
+		&pxor	("mm1","mm3");		&pxor	("mm5","mm7");	# tp4
+		&pshufw	("mm3","mm1",0xb1);	&pshufw	("mm7","mm5",0xb1);
+		&pxor	("mm0","mm1");		&pxor	("mm4","mm5");	# ^= tp4
+		&pxor	("mm0","mm3");		&pxor	("mm4","mm7");	# ^= ROTATE(tp4,16)	
+
+		&pxor	("mm3","mm3");		&pxor	("mm7","mm7");
+		&pcmpgtb("mm3","mm1");		&pcmpgtb("mm7","mm5");
+		&pand	("mm3","mm2");		&pand	("mm7","mm2");
+		&paddb	("mm1","mm1");		&paddb	("mm5","mm5");
+		&pxor	("mm1","mm3");		&pxor	("mm5","mm7");	# tp8
+		&pxor	("mm0","mm1");		&pxor	("mm4","mm5");	# ^= tp8
+		&movq	("mm3","mm1");		&movq	("mm7","mm5");
+		&pshufw	("mm2","mm1",0xb1);	&pshufw	("mm6","mm5",0xb1);
+		&pxor	("mm0","mm2");		&pxor	("mm4","mm6");	# ^= ROTATE(tp8,16)
+		&pslld	("mm1",8);		&pslld	("mm5",8);
+		&psrld	("mm3",8);		&psrld	("mm7",8);
+		&movq	("mm2",&QWP(0,$key));	&movq	("mm6",&QWP(8,$key));
+		&pxor	("mm0","mm1");		&pxor	("mm4","mm5");	# ^= tp8<<8
+		&pxor	("mm0","mm3");		&pxor	("mm4","mm7");	# ^= tp8>>8
+		&mov	($s0,&DWP(0-128,$tbl));
+		&pslld	("mm1",16);		&pslld	("mm5",16);
+		&mov	($s1,&DWP(64-128,$tbl));
+		&psrld	("mm3",16);		&psrld	("mm7",16);
+		&mov	($s2,&DWP(128-128,$tbl));
+		&pxor	("mm0","mm1");		&pxor	("mm4","mm5");	# ^= tp8<<24
+		&mov	($s3,&DWP(192-128,$tbl));
+		&pxor	("mm0","mm3");		&pxor	("mm4","mm7");	# ^= tp8>>24
+
+		&pxor	("mm0","mm2");		&pxor	("mm4","mm6");
+	&jmp	(&label("loop"));
+
+	&set_label("out",16);
+	&pxor	("mm0",&QWP(0,$key));
+	&pxor	("mm4",&QWP(8,$key));
+
+	&ret	();
+&function_end_B("_sse_AES_decrypt_compact");
+					}
+
+######################################################################
+# Vanilla block function.
+######################################################################
+
+sub decstep()
+{ my ($i,$td,@s) = @_;
+  my $tmp = $key;
+  my $out = $i==3?$s[0]:$acc;
+
+	# no instructions are reordered, as performance appears
+	# optimal... or rather that all attempts to reorder didn't
+	# result in better performance [which by the way is not a
+	# bit lower than ecryption].
+	if($i==3)   {	&mov	($key,$__key);			}
+	else        {	&mov	($out,$s[0]);			}
+			&and	($out,0xFF);
+			&mov	($out,&DWP(0,$td,$out,8));
+
+	if ($i==3)  {	$tmp=$s[1];				}
+			&movz	($tmp,&HB($s[1]));
+			&xor	($out,&DWP(3,$td,$tmp,8));
+
+	if ($i==3)  {	$tmp=$s[2]; &mov ($s[1],$acc);		}
+	else        {	&mov	($tmp,$s[2]);			}
+			&shr	($tmp,16);
+			&and	($tmp,0xFF);
+			&xor	($out,&DWP(2,$td,$tmp,8));
+
+	if ($i==3)  {	$tmp=$s[3]; &mov ($s[2],$__s1);		}
+	else        {	&mov	($tmp,$s[3]);			}
+			&shr	($tmp,24);
+			&xor	($out,&DWP(1,$td,$tmp,8));
+	if ($i<2)   {	&mov	(&DWP(4+4*$i,"esp"),$out);	}
+	if ($i==3)  {	&mov	($s[3],$__s0);			}
+			&comment();
+}
+
+sub declast()
+{ my ($i,$td,@s)=@_;
+  my $tmp = $key;
+  my $out = $i==3?$s[0]:$acc;
+
+	if($i==0)   {	&lea	($td,&DWP(2048+128,$td));
+			&mov	($tmp,&DWP(0-128,$td));
+			&mov	($acc,&DWP(32-128,$td));
+			&mov	($tmp,&DWP(64-128,$td));
+			&mov	($acc,&DWP(96-128,$td));
+			&mov	($tmp,&DWP(128-128,$td));
+			&mov	($acc,&DWP(160-128,$td));
+			&mov	($tmp,&DWP(192-128,$td));
+			&mov	($acc,&DWP(224-128,$td));
+			&lea	($td,&DWP(-128,$td));		}
+	if($i==3)   {	&mov	($key,$__key);			}
+	else        {	&mov	($out,$s[0]);			}
+			&and	($out,0xFF);
+			&movz	($out,&BP(0,$td,$out,1));
+
+	if ($i==3)  {	$tmp=$s[1];				}
+			&movz	($tmp,&HB($s[1]));
+			&movz	($tmp,&BP(0,$td,$tmp,1));
+			&shl	($tmp,8);
+			&xor	($out,$tmp);
+
+	if ($i==3)  {	$tmp=$s[2]; &mov ($s[1],$acc);		}
+	else        {	mov	($tmp,$s[2]);			}
+			&shr	($tmp,16);
+			&and	($tmp,0xFF);
+			&movz	($tmp,&BP(0,$td,$tmp,1));
+			&shl	($tmp,16);
+			&xor	($out,$tmp);
+
+	if ($i==3)  {	$tmp=$s[3]; &mov ($s[2],$__s1);		}
+	else        {	&mov	($tmp,$s[3]);			}
+			&shr	($tmp,24);
+			&movz	($tmp,&BP(0,$td,$tmp,1));
+			&shl	($tmp,24);
+			&xor	($out,$tmp);
+	if ($i<2)   {	&mov	(&DWP(4+4*$i,"esp"),$out);	}
+	if ($i==3)  {	&mov	($s[3],$__s0);
+			&lea	($td,&DWP(-2048,$td));		}
+}
+
+&function_begin_B("_x86_AES_decrypt");
+	# note that caller is expected to allocate stack frame for me!
+	&mov	($__key,$key);			# save key
+
+	&xor	($s0,&DWP(0,$key));		# xor with key
+	&xor	($s1,&DWP(4,$key));
+	&xor	($s2,&DWP(8,$key));
+	&xor	($s3,&DWP(12,$key));
+
+	&mov	($acc,&DWP(240,$key));		# load key->rounds
+
+	if ($small_footprint) {
+	    &lea	($acc,&DWP(-2,$acc,$acc));
+	    &lea	($acc,&DWP(0,$key,$acc,8));
+	    &mov	($__end,$acc);		# end of key schedule
+	    &set_label("loop",16);
+		&decstep(0,$tbl,$s0,$s3,$s2,$s1);
+		&decstep(1,$tbl,$s1,$s0,$s3,$s2);
+		&decstep(2,$tbl,$s2,$s1,$s0,$s3);
+		&decstep(3,$tbl,$s3,$s2,$s1,$s0);
+		&add	($key,16);		# advance rd_key
+		&xor	($s0,&DWP(0,$key));
+		&xor	($s1,&DWP(4,$key));
+		&xor	($s2,&DWP(8,$key));
+		&xor	($s3,&DWP(12,$key));
+	    &cmp	($key,$__end);
+	    &mov	($__key,$key);
+	    &jb		(&label("loop"));
+	}
+	else {
+	    &cmp	($acc,10);
+	    &jle	(&label("10rounds"));
+	    &cmp	($acc,12);
+	    &jle	(&label("12rounds"));
+
+	&set_label("14rounds",4);
+	    for ($i=1;$i<3;$i++) {
+		&decstep(0,$tbl,$s0,$s3,$s2,$s1);
+		&decstep(1,$tbl,$s1,$s0,$s3,$s2);
+		&decstep(2,$tbl,$s2,$s1,$s0,$s3);
+		&decstep(3,$tbl,$s3,$s2,$s1,$s0);
+		&xor	($s0,&DWP(16*$i+0,$key));
+		&xor	($s1,&DWP(16*$i+4,$key));
+		&xor	($s2,&DWP(16*$i+8,$key));
+		&xor	($s3,&DWP(16*$i+12,$key));
+	    }
+	    &add	($key,32);
+	    &mov	($__key,$key);		# advance rd_key
+	&set_label("12rounds",4);
+	    for ($i=1;$i<3;$i++) {
+		&decstep(0,$tbl,$s0,$s3,$s2,$s1);
+		&decstep(1,$tbl,$s1,$s0,$s3,$s2);
+		&decstep(2,$tbl,$s2,$s1,$s0,$s3);
+		&decstep(3,$tbl,$s3,$s2,$s1,$s0);
+		&xor	($s0,&DWP(16*$i+0,$key));
+		&xor	($s1,&DWP(16*$i+4,$key));
+		&xor	($s2,&DWP(16*$i+8,$key));
+		&xor	($s3,&DWP(16*$i+12,$key));
+	    }
+	    &add	($key,32);
+	    &mov	($__key,$key);		# advance rd_key
+	&set_label("10rounds",4);
+	    for ($i=1;$i<10;$i++) {
+		&decstep(0,$tbl,$s0,$s3,$s2,$s1);
+		&decstep(1,$tbl,$s1,$s0,$s3,$s2);
+		&decstep(2,$tbl,$s2,$s1,$s0,$s3);
+		&decstep(3,$tbl,$s3,$s2,$s1,$s0);
+		&xor	($s0,&DWP(16*$i+0,$key));
+		&xor	($s1,&DWP(16*$i+4,$key));
+		&xor	($s2,&DWP(16*$i+8,$key));
+		&xor	($s3,&DWP(16*$i+12,$key));
+	    }
+	}
+
+	&declast(0,$tbl,$s0,$s3,$s2,$s1);
+	&declast(1,$tbl,$s1,$s0,$s3,$s2);
+	&declast(2,$tbl,$s2,$s1,$s0,$s3);
+	&declast(3,$tbl,$s3,$s2,$s1,$s0);
+
+	&add	($key,$small_footprint?16:160);
+	&xor	($s0,&DWP(0,$key));
+	&xor	($s1,&DWP(4,$key));
+	&xor	($s2,&DWP(8,$key));
+	&xor	($s3,&DWP(12,$key));
+
+	&ret	();
+
+&set_label("AES_Td",64);	# Yes! I keep it in the code segment!
+	&_data_word(0x50a7f451, 0x5365417e, 0xc3a4171a, 0x965e273a);
+	&_data_word(0xcb6bab3b, 0xf1459d1f, 0xab58faac, 0x9303e34b);
+	&_data_word(0x55fa3020, 0xf66d76ad, 0x9176cc88, 0x254c02f5);
+	&_data_word(0xfcd7e54f, 0xd7cb2ac5, 0x80443526, 0x8fa362b5);
+	&_data_word(0x495ab1de, 0x671bba25, 0x980eea45, 0xe1c0fe5d);
+	&_data_word(0x02752fc3, 0x12f04c81, 0xa397468d, 0xc6f9d36b);
+	&_data_word(0xe75f8f03, 0x959c9215, 0xeb7a6dbf, 0xda595295);
+	&_data_word(0x2d83bed4, 0xd3217458, 0x2969e049, 0x44c8c98e);
+	&_data_word(0x6a89c275, 0x78798ef4, 0x6b3e5899, 0xdd71b927);
+	&_data_word(0xb64fe1be, 0x17ad88f0, 0x66ac20c9, 0xb43ace7d);
+	&_data_word(0x184adf63, 0x82311ae5, 0x60335197, 0x457f5362);
+	&_data_word(0xe07764b1, 0x84ae6bbb, 0x1ca081fe, 0x942b08f9);
+	&_data_word(0x58684870, 0x19fd458f, 0x876cde94, 0xb7f87b52);
+	&_data_word(0x23d373ab, 0xe2024b72, 0x578f1fe3, 0x2aab5566);
+	&_data_word(0x0728ebb2, 0x03c2b52f, 0x9a7bc586, 0xa50837d3);
+	&_data_word(0xf2872830, 0xb2a5bf23, 0xba6a0302, 0x5c8216ed);
+	&_data_word(0x2b1ccf8a, 0x92b479a7, 0xf0f207f3, 0xa1e2694e);
+	&_data_word(0xcdf4da65, 0xd5be0506, 0x1f6234d1, 0x8afea6c4);
+	&_data_word(0x9d532e34, 0xa055f3a2, 0x32e18a05, 0x75ebf6a4);
+	&_data_word(0x39ec830b, 0xaaef6040, 0x069f715e, 0x51106ebd);
+	&_data_word(0xf98a213e, 0x3d06dd96, 0xae053edd, 0x46bde64d);
+	&_data_word(0xb58d5491, 0x055dc471, 0x6fd40604, 0xff155060);
+	&_data_word(0x24fb9819, 0x97e9bdd6, 0xcc434089, 0x779ed967);
+	&_data_word(0xbd42e8b0, 0x888b8907, 0x385b19e7, 0xdbeec879);
+	&_data_word(0x470a7ca1, 0xe90f427c, 0xc91e84f8, 0x00000000);
+	&_data_word(0x83868009, 0x48ed2b32, 0xac70111e, 0x4e725a6c);
+	&_data_word(0xfbff0efd, 0x5638850f, 0x1ed5ae3d, 0x27392d36);
+	&_data_word(0x64d90f0a, 0x21a65c68, 0xd1545b9b, 0x3a2e3624);
+	&_data_word(0xb1670a0c, 0x0fe75793, 0xd296eeb4, 0x9e919b1b);
+	&_data_word(0x4fc5c080, 0xa220dc61, 0x694b775a, 0x161a121c);
+	&_data_word(0x0aba93e2, 0xe52aa0c0, 0x43e0223c, 0x1d171b12);
+	&_data_word(0x0b0d090e, 0xadc78bf2, 0xb9a8b62d, 0xc8a91e14);
+	&_data_word(0x8519f157, 0x4c0775af, 0xbbdd99ee, 0xfd607fa3);
+	&_data_word(0x9f2601f7, 0xbcf5725c, 0xc53b6644, 0x347efb5b);
+	&_data_word(0x7629438b, 0xdcc623cb, 0x68fcedb6, 0x63f1e4b8);
+	&_data_word(0xcadc31d7, 0x10856342, 0x40229713, 0x2011c684);
+	&_data_word(0x7d244a85, 0xf83dbbd2, 0x1132f9ae, 0x6da129c7);
+	&_data_word(0x4b2f9e1d, 0xf330b2dc, 0xec52860d, 0xd0e3c177);
+	&_data_word(0x6c16b32b, 0x99b970a9, 0xfa489411, 0x2264e947);
+	&_data_word(0xc48cfca8, 0x1a3ff0a0, 0xd82c7d56, 0xef903322);
+	&_data_word(0xc74e4987, 0xc1d138d9, 0xfea2ca8c, 0x360bd498);
+	&_data_word(0xcf81f5a6, 0x28de7aa5, 0x268eb7da, 0xa4bfad3f);
+	&_data_word(0xe49d3a2c, 0x0d927850, 0x9bcc5f6a, 0x62467e54);
+	&_data_word(0xc2138df6, 0xe8b8d890, 0x5ef7392e, 0xf5afc382);
+	&_data_word(0xbe805d9f, 0x7c93d069, 0xa92dd56f, 0xb31225cf);
+	&_data_word(0x3b99acc8, 0xa77d1810, 0x6e639ce8, 0x7bbb3bdb);
+	&_data_word(0x097826cd, 0xf418596e, 0x01b79aec, 0xa89a4f83);
+	&_data_word(0x656e95e6, 0x7ee6ffaa, 0x08cfbc21, 0xe6e815ef);
+	&_data_word(0xd99be7ba, 0xce366f4a, 0xd4099fea, 0xd67cb029);
+	&_data_word(0xafb2a431, 0x31233f2a, 0x3094a5c6, 0xc066a235);
+	&_data_word(0x37bc4e74, 0xa6ca82fc, 0xb0d090e0, 0x15d8a733);
+	&_data_word(0x4a9804f1, 0xf7daec41, 0x0e50cd7f, 0x2ff69117);
+	&_data_word(0x8dd64d76, 0x4db0ef43, 0x544daacc, 0xdf0496e4);
+	&_data_word(0xe3b5d19e, 0x1b886a4c, 0xb81f2cc1, 0x7f516546);
+	&_data_word(0x04ea5e9d, 0x5d358c01, 0x737487fa, 0x2e410bfb);
+	&_data_word(0x5a1d67b3, 0x52d2db92, 0x335610e9, 0x1347d66d);
+	&_data_word(0x8c61d79a, 0x7a0ca137, 0x8e14f859, 0x893c13eb);
+	&_data_word(0xee27a9ce, 0x35c961b7, 0xede51ce1, 0x3cb1477a);
+	&_data_word(0x59dfd29c, 0x3f73f255, 0x79ce1418, 0xbf37c773);
+	&_data_word(0xeacdf753, 0x5baafd5f, 0x146f3ddf, 0x86db4478);
+	&_data_word(0x81f3afca, 0x3ec468b9, 0x2c342438, 0x5f40a3c2);
+	&_data_word(0x72c31d16, 0x0c25e2bc, 0x8b493c28, 0x41950dff);
+	&_data_word(0x7101a839, 0xdeb30c08, 0x9ce4b4d8, 0x90c15664);
+	&_data_word(0x6184cb7b, 0x70b632d5, 0x745c6c48, 0x4257b8d0);
+
+#Td4:	# four copies of Td4 to choose from to avoid L1 aliasing
+	&data_byte(0x52, 0x09, 0x6a, 0xd5, 0x30, 0x36, 0xa5, 0x38);
+	&data_byte(0xbf, 0x40, 0xa3, 0x9e, 0x81, 0xf3, 0xd7, 0xfb);
+	&data_byte(0x7c, 0xe3, 0x39, 0x82, 0x9b, 0x2f, 0xff, 0x87);
+	&data_byte(0x34, 0x8e, 0x43, 0x44, 0xc4, 0xde, 0xe9, 0xcb);
+	&data_byte(0x54, 0x7b, 0x94, 0x32, 0xa6, 0xc2, 0x23, 0x3d);
+	&data_byte(0xee, 0x4c, 0x95, 0x0b, 0x42, 0xfa, 0xc3, 0x4e);
+	&data_byte(0x08, 0x2e, 0xa1, 0x66, 0x28, 0xd9, 0x24, 0xb2);
+	&data_byte(0x76, 0x5b, 0xa2, 0x49, 0x6d, 0x8b, 0xd1, 0x25);
+	&data_byte(0x72, 0xf8, 0xf6, 0x64, 0x86, 0x68, 0x98, 0x16);
+	&data_byte(0xd4, 0xa4, 0x5c, 0xcc, 0x5d, 0x65, 0xb6, 0x92);
+	&data_byte(0x6c, 0x70, 0x48, 0x50, 0xfd, 0xed, 0xb9, 0xda);
+	&data_byte(0x5e, 0x15, 0x46, 0x57, 0xa7, 0x8d, 0x9d, 0x84);
+	&data_byte(0x90, 0xd8, 0xab, 0x00, 0x8c, 0xbc, 0xd3, 0x0a);
+	&data_byte(0xf7, 0xe4, 0x58, 0x05, 0xb8, 0xb3, 0x45, 0x06);
+	&data_byte(0xd0, 0x2c, 0x1e, 0x8f, 0xca, 0x3f, 0x0f, 0x02);
+	&data_byte(0xc1, 0xaf, 0xbd, 0x03, 0x01, 0x13, 0x8a, 0x6b);
+	&data_byte(0x3a, 0x91, 0x11, 0x41, 0x4f, 0x67, 0xdc, 0xea);
+	&data_byte(0x97, 0xf2, 0xcf, 0xce, 0xf0, 0xb4, 0xe6, 0x73);
+	&data_byte(0x96, 0xac, 0x74, 0x22, 0xe7, 0xad, 0x35, 0x85);
+	&data_byte(0xe2, 0xf9, 0x37, 0xe8, 0x1c, 0x75, 0xdf, 0x6e);
+	&data_byte(0x47, 0xf1, 0x1a, 0x71, 0x1d, 0x29, 0xc5, 0x89);
+	&data_byte(0x6f, 0xb7, 0x62, 0x0e, 0xaa, 0x18, 0xbe, 0x1b);
+	&data_byte(0xfc, 0x56, 0x3e, 0x4b, 0xc6, 0xd2, 0x79, 0x20);
+	&data_byte(0x9a, 0xdb, 0xc0, 0xfe, 0x78, 0xcd, 0x5a, 0xf4);
+	&data_byte(0x1f, 0xdd, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x88, 0x07, 0xc7, 0x31);
+	&data_byte(0xb1, 0x12, 0x10, 0x59, 0x27, 0x80, 0xec, 0x5f);
+	&data_byte(0x60, 0x51, 0x7f, 0xa9, 0x19, 0xb5, 0x4a, 0x0d);
+	&data_byte(0x2d, 0xe5, 0x7a, 0x9f, 0x93, 0xc9, 0x9c, 0xef);
+	&data_byte(0xa0, 0xe0, 0x3b, 0x4d, 0xae, 0x2a, 0xf5, 0xb0);
+	&data_byte(0xc8, 0xeb, 0xbb, 0x3c, 0x83, 0x53, 0x99, 0x61);
+	&data_byte(0x17, 0x2b, 0x04, 0x7e, 0xba, 0x77, 0xd6, 0x26);
+	&data_byte(0xe1, 0x69, 0x14, 0x63, 0x55, 0x21, 0x0c, 0x7d);
+
+	&data_byte(0x52, 0x09, 0x6a, 0xd5, 0x30, 0x36, 0xa5, 0x38);
+	&data_byte(0xbf, 0x40, 0xa3, 0x9e, 0x81, 0xf3, 0xd7, 0xfb);
+	&data_byte(0x7c, 0xe3, 0x39, 0x82, 0x9b, 0x2f, 0xff, 0x87);
+	&data_byte(0x34, 0x8e, 0x43, 0x44, 0xc4, 0xde, 0xe9, 0xcb);
+	&data_byte(0x54, 0x7b, 0x94, 0x32, 0xa6, 0xc2, 0x23, 0x3d);
+	&data_byte(0xee, 0x4c, 0x95, 0x0b, 0x42, 0xfa, 0xc3, 0x4e);
+	&data_byte(0x08, 0x2e, 0xa1, 0x66, 0x28, 0xd9, 0x24, 0xb2);
+	&data_byte(0x76, 0x5b, 0xa2, 0x49, 0x6d, 0x8b, 0xd1, 0x25);
+	&data_byte(0x72, 0xf8, 0xf6, 0x64, 0x86, 0x68, 0x98, 0x16);
+	&data_byte(0xd4, 0xa4, 0x5c, 0xcc, 0x5d, 0x65, 0xb6, 0x92);
+	&data_byte(0x6c, 0x70, 0x48, 0x50, 0xfd, 0xed, 0xb9, 0xda);
+	&data_byte(0x5e, 0x15, 0x46, 0x57, 0xa7, 0x8d, 0x9d, 0x84);
+	&data_byte(0x90, 0xd8, 0xab, 0x00, 0x8c, 0xbc, 0xd3, 0x0a);
+	&data_byte(0xf7, 0xe4, 0x58, 0x05, 0xb8, 0xb3, 0x45, 0x06);
+	&data_byte(0xd0, 0x2c, 0x1e, 0x8f, 0xca, 0x3f, 0x0f, 0x02);
+	&data_byte(0xc1, 0xaf, 0xbd, 0x03, 0x01, 0x13, 0x8a, 0x6b);
+	&data_byte(0x3a, 0x91, 0x11, 0x41, 0x4f, 0x67, 0xdc, 0xea);
+	&data_byte(0x97, 0xf2, 0xcf, 0xce, 0xf0, 0xb4, 0xe6, 0x73);
+	&data_byte(0x96, 0xac, 0x74, 0x22, 0xe7, 0xad, 0x35, 0x85);
+	&data_byte(0xe2, 0xf9, 0x37, 0xe8, 0x1c, 0x75, 0xdf, 0x6e);
+	&data_byte(0x47, 0xf1, 0x1a, 0x71, 0x1d, 0x29, 0xc5, 0x89);
+	&data_byte(0x6f, 0xb7, 0x62, 0x0e, 0xaa, 0x18, 0xbe, 0x1b);
+	&data_byte(0xfc, 0x56, 0x3e, 0x4b, 0xc6, 0xd2, 0x79, 0x20);
+	&data_byte(0x9a, 0xdb, 0xc0, 0xfe, 0x78, 0xcd, 0x5a, 0xf4);
+	&data_byte(0x1f, 0xdd, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x88, 0x07, 0xc7, 0x31);
+	&data_byte(0xb1, 0x12, 0x10, 0x59, 0x27, 0x80, 0xec, 0x5f);
+	&data_byte(0x60, 0x51, 0x7f, 0xa9, 0x19, 0xb5, 0x4a, 0x0d);
+	&data_byte(0x2d, 0xe5, 0x7a, 0x9f, 0x93, 0xc9, 0x9c, 0xef);
+	&data_byte(0xa0, 0xe0, 0x3b, 0x4d, 0xae, 0x2a, 0xf5, 0xb0);
+	&data_byte(0xc8, 0xeb, 0xbb, 0x3c, 0x83, 0x53, 0x99, 0x61);
+	&data_byte(0x17, 0x2b, 0x04, 0x7e, 0xba, 0x77, 0xd6, 0x26);
+	&data_byte(0xe1, 0x69, 0x14, 0x63, 0x55, 0x21, 0x0c, 0x7d);
+
+	&data_byte(0x52, 0x09, 0x6a, 0xd5, 0x30, 0x36, 0xa5, 0x38);
+	&data_byte(0xbf, 0x40, 0xa3, 0x9e, 0x81, 0xf3, 0xd7, 0xfb);
+	&data_byte(0x7c, 0xe3, 0x39, 0x82, 0x9b, 0x2f, 0xff, 0x87);
+	&data_byte(0x34, 0x8e, 0x43, 0x44, 0xc4, 0xde, 0xe9, 0xcb);
+	&data_byte(0x54, 0x7b, 0x94, 0x32, 0xa6, 0xc2, 0x23, 0x3d);
+	&data_byte(0xee, 0x4c, 0x95, 0x0b, 0x42, 0xfa, 0xc3, 0x4e);
+	&data_byte(0x08, 0x2e, 0xa1, 0x66, 0x28, 0xd9, 0x24, 0xb2);
+	&data_byte(0x76, 0x5b, 0xa2, 0x49, 0x6d, 0x8b, 0xd1, 0x25);
+	&data_byte(0x72, 0xf8, 0xf6, 0x64, 0x86, 0x68, 0x98, 0x16);
+	&data_byte(0xd4, 0xa4, 0x5c, 0xcc, 0x5d, 0x65, 0xb6, 0x92);
+	&data_byte(0x6c, 0x70, 0x48, 0x50, 0xfd, 0xed, 0xb9, 0xda);
+	&data_byte(0x5e, 0x15, 0x46, 0x57, 0xa7, 0x8d, 0x9d, 0x84);
+	&data_byte(0x90, 0xd8, 0xab, 0x00, 0x8c, 0xbc, 0xd3, 0x0a);
+	&data_byte(0xf7, 0xe4, 0x58, 0x05, 0xb8, 0xb3, 0x45, 0x06);
+	&data_byte(0xd0, 0x2c, 0x1e, 0x8f, 0xca, 0x3f, 0x0f, 0x02);
+	&data_byte(0xc1, 0xaf, 0xbd, 0x03, 0x01, 0x13, 0x8a, 0x6b);
+	&data_byte(0x3a, 0x91, 0x11, 0x41, 0x4f, 0x67, 0xdc, 0xea);
+	&data_byte(0x97, 0xf2, 0xcf, 0xce, 0xf0, 0xb4, 0xe6, 0x73);
+	&data_byte(0x96, 0xac, 0x74, 0x22, 0xe7, 0xad, 0x35, 0x85);
+	&data_byte(0xe2, 0xf9, 0x37, 0xe8, 0x1c, 0x75, 0xdf, 0x6e);
+	&data_byte(0x47, 0xf1, 0x1a, 0x71, 0x1d, 0x29, 0xc5, 0x89);
+	&data_byte(0x6f, 0xb7, 0x62, 0x0e, 0xaa, 0x18, 0xbe, 0x1b);
+	&data_byte(0xfc, 0x56, 0x3e, 0x4b, 0xc6, 0xd2, 0x79, 0x20);
+	&data_byte(0x9a, 0xdb, 0xc0, 0xfe, 0x78, 0xcd, 0x5a, 0xf4);
+	&data_byte(0x1f, 0xdd, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x88, 0x07, 0xc7, 0x31);
+	&data_byte(0xb1, 0x12, 0x10, 0x59, 0x27, 0x80, 0xec, 0x5f);
+	&data_byte(0x60, 0x51, 0x7f, 0xa9, 0x19, 0xb5, 0x4a, 0x0d);
+	&data_byte(0x2d, 0xe5, 0x7a, 0x9f, 0x93, 0xc9, 0x9c, 0xef);
+	&data_byte(0xa0, 0xe0, 0x3b, 0x4d, 0xae, 0x2a, 0xf5, 0xb0);
+	&data_byte(0xc8, 0xeb, 0xbb, 0x3c, 0x83, 0x53, 0x99, 0x61);
+	&data_byte(0x17, 0x2b, 0x04, 0x7e, 0xba, 0x77, 0xd6, 0x26);
+	&data_byte(0xe1, 0x69, 0x14, 0x63, 0x55, 0x21, 0x0c, 0x7d);
+
+	&data_byte(0x52, 0x09, 0x6a, 0xd5, 0x30, 0x36, 0xa5, 0x38);
+	&data_byte(0xbf, 0x40, 0xa3, 0x9e, 0x81, 0xf3, 0xd7, 0xfb);
+	&data_byte(0x7c, 0xe3, 0x39, 0x82, 0x9b, 0x2f, 0xff, 0x87);
+	&data_byte(0x34, 0x8e, 0x43, 0x44, 0xc4, 0xde, 0xe9, 0xcb);
+	&data_byte(0x54, 0x7b, 0x94, 0x32, 0xa6, 0xc2, 0x23, 0x3d);
+	&data_byte(0xee, 0x4c, 0x95, 0x0b, 0x42, 0xfa, 0xc3, 0x4e);
+	&data_byte(0x08, 0x2e, 0xa1, 0x66, 0x28, 0xd9, 0x24, 0xb2);
+	&data_byte(0x76, 0x5b, 0xa2, 0x49, 0x6d, 0x8b, 0xd1, 0x25);
+	&data_byte(0x72, 0xf8, 0xf6, 0x64, 0x86, 0x68, 0x98, 0x16);
+	&data_byte(0xd4, 0xa4, 0x5c, 0xcc, 0x5d, 0x65, 0xb6, 0x92);
+	&data_byte(0x6c, 0x70, 0x48, 0x50, 0xfd, 0xed, 0xb9, 0xda);
+	&data_byte(0x5e, 0x15, 0x46, 0x57, 0xa7, 0x8d, 0x9d, 0x84);
+	&data_byte(0x90, 0xd8, 0xab, 0x00, 0x8c, 0xbc, 0xd3, 0x0a);
+	&data_byte(0xf7, 0xe4, 0x58, 0x05, 0xb8, 0xb3, 0x45, 0x06);
+	&data_byte(0xd0, 0x2c, 0x1e, 0x8f, 0xca, 0x3f, 0x0f, 0x02);
+	&data_byte(0xc1, 0xaf, 0xbd, 0x03, 0x01, 0x13, 0x8a, 0x6b);
+	&data_byte(0x3a, 0x91, 0x11, 0x41, 0x4f, 0x67, 0xdc, 0xea);
+	&data_byte(0x97, 0xf2, 0xcf, 0xce, 0xf0, 0xb4, 0xe6, 0x73);
+	&data_byte(0x96, 0xac, 0x74, 0x22, 0xe7, 0xad, 0x35, 0x85);
+	&data_byte(0xe2, 0xf9, 0x37, 0xe8, 0x1c, 0x75, 0xdf, 0x6e);
+	&data_byte(0x47, 0xf1, 0x1a, 0x71, 0x1d, 0x29, 0xc5, 0x89);
+	&data_byte(0x6f, 0xb7, 0x62, 0x0e, 0xaa, 0x18, 0xbe, 0x1b);
+	&data_byte(0xfc, 0x56, 0x3e, 0x4b, 0xc6, 0xd2, 0x79, 0x20);
+	&data_byte(0x9a, 0xdb, 0xc0, 0xfe, 0x78, 0xcd, 0x5a, 0xf4);
+	&data_byte(0x1f, 0xdd, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x88, 0x07, 0xc7, 0x31);
+	&data_byte(0xb1, 0x12, 0x10, 0x59, 0x27, 0x80, 0xec, 0x5f);
+	&data_byte(0x60, 0x51, 0x7f, 0xa9, 0x19, 0xb5, 0x4a, 0x0d);
+	&data_byte(0x2d, 0xe5, 0x7a, 0x9f, 0x93, 0xc9, 0x9c, 0xef);
+	&data_byte(0xa0, 0xe0, 0x3b, 0x4d, 0xae, 0x2a, 0xf5, 0xb0);
+	&data_byte(0xc8, 0xeb, 0xbb, 0x3c, 0x83, 0x53, 0x99, 0x61);
+	&data_byte(0x17, 0x2b, 0x04, 0x7e, 0xba, 0x77, 0xd6, 0x26);
+	&data_byte(0xe1, 0x69, 0x14, 0x63, 0x55, 0x21, 0x0c, 0x7d);
+&function_end_B("_x86_AES_decrypt");
+
+# void AES_decrypt (const void *inp,void *out,const AES_KEY *key);
+&function_begin("AES_decrypt");
+	&mov	($acc,&wparam(0));		# load inp
+	&mov	($key,&wparam(2));		# load key
+
+	&mov	($s0,"esp");
+	&sub	("esp",36);
+	&and	("esp",-64);			# align to cache-line
+
+	# place stack frame just "above" the key schedule
+	&lea	($s1,&DWP(-64-63,$key));
+	&sub	($s1,"esp");
+	&neg	($s1);
+	&and	($s1,0x3C0);	# modulo 1024, but aligned to cache-line
+	&sub	("esp",$s1);
+	&add	("esp",4);	# 4 is reserved for caller's return address
+	&mov	($_esp,$s0);	# save stack pointer
+
+	&call   (&label("pic_point"));          # make it PIC!
+	&set_label("pic_point");
+	&blindpop($tbl);
+	&picmeup($s0,"OPENSSL_ia32cap_P",$tbl,&label("pic_point")) if(!$x86only);
+	&lea    ($tbl,&DWP(&label("AES_Td")."-".&label("pic_point"),$tbl));
+
+	# pick Td4 copy which can't "overlap" with stack frame or key schedule
+	&lea	($s1,&DWP(768-4,"esp"));
+	&sub	($s1,$tbl);
+	&and	($s1,0x300);
+	&lea	($tbl,&DWP(2048+128,$tbl,$s1));
+
+					if (!$x86only) {
+	&bt	(&DWP(0,$s0),25);	# check for SSE bit
+	&jnc	(&label("x86"));
+
+	&movq	("mm0",&QWP(0,$acc));
+	&movq	("mm4",&QWP(8,$acc));
+	&call	("_sse_AES_decrypt_compact");
+	&mov	("esp",$_esp);			# restore stack pointer
+	&mov	($acc,&wparam(1));		# load out
+	&movq	(&QWP(0,$acc),"mm0");		# write output data
+	&movq	(&QWP(8,$acc),"mm4");
+	&emms	();
+	&function_end_A();
+					}
+	&set_label("x86",16);
+	&mov	($_tbl,$tbl);
+	&mov	($s0,&DWP(0,$acc));		# load input data
+	&mov	($s1,&DWP(4,$acc));
+	&mov	($s2,&DWP(8,$acc));
+	&mov	($s3,&DWP(12,$acc));
+	&call	("_x86_AES_decrypt_compact");
+	&mov	("esp",$_esp);			# restore stack pointer
+	&mov	($acc,&wparam(1));		# load out
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,$acc),$s0);		# write output data
+	&mov	(&DWP(4,$acc),$s1);
+	&mov	(&DWP(8,$acc),$s2);
+	&mov	(&DWP(12,$acc),$s3);
+&function_end("AES_decrypt");
+
+# void AES_cbc_encrypt (const void char *inp, unsigned char *out,
+#			size_t length, const AES_KEY *key,
+#			unsigned char *ivp,const int enc);
+{
+# stack frame layout
+#             -4(%esp)		# return address	 0(%esp)
+#              0(%esp)		# s0 backing store	 4(%esp)	
+#              4(%esp)		# s1 backing store	 8(%esp)
+#              8(%esp)		# s2 backing store	12(%esp)
+#             12(%esp)		# s3 backing store	16(%esp)
+#             16(%esp)		# key backup		20(%esp)
+#             20(%esp)		# end of key schedule	24(%esp)
+#             24(%esp)		# %ebp backup		28(%esp)
+#             28(%esp)		# %esp backup
+my $_inp=&DWP(32,"esp");	# copy of wparam(0)
+my $_out=&DWP(36,"esp");	# copy of wparam(1)
+my $_len=&DWP(40,"esp");	# copy of wparam(2)
+my $_key=&DWP(44,"esp");	# copy of wparam(3)
+my $_ivp=&DWP(48,"esp");	# copy of wparam(4)
+my $_tmp=&DWP(52,"esp");	# volatile variable
+#
+my $ivec=&DWP(60,"esp");	# ivec[16]
+my $aes_key=&DWP(76,"esp");	# copy of aes_key
+my $mark=&DWP(76+240,"esp");	# copy of aes_key->rounds
+
+&function_begin("AES_cbc_encrypt");
+	&mov	($s2 eq "ecx"? $s2 : "",&wparam(2));	# load len
+	&cmp	($s2,0);
+	&je	(&label("drop_out"));
+
+	&call   (&label("pic_point"));		# make it PIC!
+	&set_label("pic_point");
+	&blindpop($tbl);
+	&picmeup($s0,"OPENSSL_ia32cap_P",$tbl,&label("pic_point")) if(!$x86only);
+
+	&cmp	(&wparam(5),0);
+	&lea    ($tbl,&DWP(&label("AES_Te")."-".&label("pic_point"),$tbl));
+	&jne	(&label("picked_te"));
+	&lea	($tbl,&DWP(&label("AES_Td")."-".&label("AES_Te"),$tbl));
+	&set_label("picked_te");
+
+	# one can argue if this is required
+	&pushf	();
+	&cld	();
+
+	&cmp	($s2,$speed_limit);
+	&jb	(&label("slow_way"));
+	&test	($s2,15);
+	&jnz	(&label("slow_way"));
+					if (!$x86only) {
+	&bt	(&DWP(0,$s0),28);	# check for hyper-threading bit
+	&jc	(&label("slow_way"));
+					}
+	# pre-allocate aligned stack frame...
+	&lea	($acc,&DWP(-80-244,"esp"));
+	&and	($acc,-64);
+
+	# ... and make sure it doesn't alias with $tbl modulo 4096
+	&mov	($s0,$tbl);
+	&lea	($s1,&DWP(2048+256,$tbl));
+	&mov	($s3,$acc);
+	&and	($s0,0xfff);		# s = %ebp&0xfff
+	&and	($s1,0xfff);		# e = (%ebp+2048+256)&0xfff
+	&and	($s3,0xfff);		# p = %esp&0xfff
+
+	&cmp	($s3,$s1);		# if (p>=e) %esp =- (p-e);
+	&jb	(&label("tbl_break_out"));
+	&sub	($s3,$s1);
+	&sub	($acc,$s3);
+	&jmp	(&label("tbl_ok"));
+	&set_label("tbl_break_out",4);	# else %esp -= (p-s)&0xfff + framesz;
+	&sub	($s3,$s0);
+	&and	($s3,0xfff);
+	&add	($s3,384);
+	&sub	($acc,$s3);
+	&set_label("tbl_ok",4);
+
+	&lea	($s3,&wparam(0));	# obtain pointer to parameter block
+	&exch	("esp",$acc);		# allocate stack frame
+	&add	("esp",4);		# reserve for return address!
+	&mov	($_tbl,$tbl);		# save %ebp
+	&mov	($_esp,$acc);		# save %esp
+
+	&mov	($s0,&DWP(0,$s3));	# load inp
+	&mov	($s1,&DWP(4,$s3));	# load out
+	#&mov	($s2,&DWP(8,$s3));	# load len
+	&mov	($key,&DWP(12,$s3));	# load key
+	&mov	($acc,&DWP(16,$s3));	# load ivp
+	&mov	($s3,&DWP(20,$s3));	# load enc flag
+
+	&mov	($_inp,$s0);		# save copy of inp
+	&mov	($_out,$s1);		# save copy of out
+	&mov	($_len,$s2);		# save copy of len
+	&mov	($_key,$key);		# save copy of key
+	&mov	($_ivp,$acc);		# save copy of ivp
+
+	&mov	($mark,0);		# copy of aes_key->rounds = 0;
+	# do we copy key schedule to stack?
+	&mov	($s1 eq "ebx" ? $s1 : "",$key);
+	&mov	($s2 eq "ecx" ? $s2 : "",244/4);
+	&sub	($s1,$tbl);
+	&mov	("esi",$key);
+	&and	($s1,0xfff);
+	&lea	("edi",$aes_key);
+	&cmp	($s1,2048+256);
+	&jb	(&label("do_copy"));
+	&cmp	($s1,4096-244);
+	&jb	(&label("skip_copy"));
+	&set_label("do_copy",4);
+		&mov	($_key,"edi");
+		&data_word(0xA5F3F689);	# rep movsd
+	&set_label("skip_copy");
+
+	&mov	($key,16);
+	&set_label("prefetch_tbl",4);
+		&mov	($s0,&DWP(0,$tbl));
+		&mov	($s1,&DWP(32,$tbl));
+		&mov	($s2,&DWP(64,$tbl));
+		&mov	($acc,&DWP(96,$tbl));
+		&lea	($tbl,&DWP(128,$tbl));
+		&sub	($key,1);
+	&jnz	(&label("prefetch_tbl"));
+	&sub	($tbl,2048);
+
+	&mov	($acc,$_inp);
+	&mov	($key,$_ivp);
+
+	&cmp	($s3,0);
+	&je	(&label("fast_decrypt"));
+
+#----------------------------- ENCRYPT -----------------------------#
+	&mov	($s0,&DWP(0,$key));		# load iv
+	&mov	($s1,&DWP(4,$key));
+
+	&set_label("fast_enc_loop",16);
+		&mov	($s2,&DWP(8,$key));
+		&mov	($s3,&DWP(12,$key));
+
+		&xor	($s0,&DWP(0,$acc));	# xor input data
+		&xor	($s1,&DWP(4,$acc));
+		&xor	($s2,&DWP(8,$acc));
+		&xor	($s3,&DWP(12,$acc));
+
+		&mov	($key,$_key);		# load key
+		&call	("_x86_AES_encrypt");
+
+		&mov	($acc,$_inp);		# load inp
+		&mov	($key,$_out);		# load out
+
+		&mov	(&DWP(0,$key),$s0);	# save output data
+		&mov	(&DWP(4,$key),$s1);
+		&mov	(&DWP(8,$key),$s2);
+		&mov	(&DWP(12,$key),$s3);
+
+		&lea	($acc,&DWP(16,$acc));	# advance inp
+		&mov	($s2,$_len);		# load len
+		&mov	($_inp,$acc);		# save inp
+		&lea	($s3,&DWP(16,$key));	# advance out
+		&mov	($_out,$s3);		# save out
+		&sub	($s2,16);		# decrease len
+		&mov	($_len,$s2);		# save len
+	&jnz	(&label("fast_enc_loop"));
+	&mov	($acc,$_ivp);		# load ivp
+	&mov	($s2,&DWP(8,$key));	# restore last 2 dwords
+	&mov	($s3,&DWP(12,$key));
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,$acc),$s0);	# save ivec
+	&mov	(&DWP(4,$acc),$s1);
+	&mov	(&DWP(8,$acc),$s2);
+	&mov	(&DWP(12,$acc),$s3);
+
+	&cmp	($mark,0);		# was the key schedule copied?
+	&mov	("edi",$_key);
+	&je	(&label("skip_ezero"));
+	# zero copy of key schedule
+	&mov	("ecx",240/4);
+	&xor	("eax","eax");
+	&align	(4);
+	&data_word(0xABF3F689);		# rep stosd
+	&set_label("skip_ezero");
+	&mov	("esp",$_esp);
+	&popf	();
+    &set_label("drop_out");
+	&function_end_A();
+	&pushf	();			# kludge, never executed
+
+#----------------------------- DECRYPT -----------------------------#
+&set_label("fast_decrypt",16);
+
+	&cmp	($acc,$_out);
+	&je	(&label("fast_dec_in_place"));	# in-place processing...
+
+	&mov	($_tmp,$key);
+
+	&align	(4);
+	&set_label("fast_dec_loop",16);
+		&mov	($s0,&DWP(0,$acc));	# read input
+		&mov	($s1,&DWP(4,$acc));
+		&mov	($s2,&DWP(8,$acc));
+		&mov	($s3,&DWP(12,$acc));
+
+		&mov	($key,$_key);		# load key
+		&call	("_x86_AES_decrypt");
+
+		&mov	($key,$_tmp);		# load ivp
+		&mov	($acc,$_len);		# load len
+		&xor	($s0,&DWP(0,$key));	# xor iv
+		&xor	($s1,&DWP(4,$key));
+		&xor	($s2,&DWP(8,$key));
+		&xor	($s3,&DWP(12,$key));
+
+		&mov	($key,$_out);		# load out
+		&mov	($acc,$_inp);		# load inp
+
+		&mov	(&DWP(0,$key),$s0);	# write output
+		&mov	(&DWP(4,$key),$s1);
+		&mov	(&DWP(8,$key),$s2);
+		&mov	(&DWP(12,$key),$s3);
+
+		&mov	($s2,$_len);		# load len
+		&mov	($_tmp,$acc);		# save ivp
+		&lea	($acc,&DWP(16,$acc));	# advance inp
+		&mov	($_inp,$acc);		# save inp
+		&lea	($key,&DWP(16,$key));	# advance out
+		&mov	($_out,$key);		# save out
+		&sub	($s2,16);		# decrease len
+		&mov	($_len,$s2);		# save len
+	&jnz	(&label("fast_dec_loop"));
+	&mov	($key,$_tmp);		# load temp ivp
+	&mov	($acc,$_ivp);		# load user ivp
+	&mov	($s0,&DWP(0,$key));	# load iv
+	&mov	($s1,&DWP(4,$key));
+	&mov	($s2,&DWP(8,$key));
+	&mov	($s3,&DWP(12,$key));
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,$acc),$s0);	# copy back to user
+	&mov	(&DWP(4,$acc),$s1);
+	&mov	(&DWP(8,$acc),$s2);
+	&mov	(&DWP(12,$acc),$s3);
+	&jmp	(&label("fast_dec_out"));
+
+    &set_label("fast_dec_in_place",16);
+	&set_label("fast_dec_in_place_loop");
+		&mov	($s0,&DWP(0,$acc));	# read input
+		&mov	($s1,&DWP(4,$acc));
+		&mov	($s2,&DWP(8,$acc));
+		&mov	($s3,&DWP(12,$acc));
+
+		&lea	($key,$ivec);
+		&mov	(&DWP(0,$key),$s0);	# copy to temp
+		&mov	(&DWP(4,$key),$s1);
+		&mov	(&DWP(8,$key),$s2);
+		&mov	(&DWP(12,$key),$s3);
+
+		&mov	($key,$_key);		# load key
+		&call	("_x86_AES_decrypt");
+
+		&mov	($key,$_ivp);		# load ivp
+		&mov	($acc,$_out);		# load out
+		&xor	($s0,&DWP(0,$key));	# xor iv
+		&xor	($s1,&DWP(4,$key));
+		&xor	($s2,&DWP(8,$key));
+		&xor	($s3,&DWP(12,$key));
+
+		&mov	(&DWP(0,$acc),$s0);	# write output
+		&mov	(&DWP(4,$acc),$s1);
+		&mov	(&DWP(8,$acc),$s2);
+		&mov	(&DWP(12,$acc),$s3);
+
+		&lea	($acc,&DWP(16,$acc));	# advance out
+		&mov	($_out,$acc);		# save out
+
+		&lea	($acc,$ivec);
+		&mov	($s0,&DWP(0,$acc));	# read temp
+		&mov	($s1,&DWP(4,$acc));
+		&mov	($s2,&DWP(8,$acc));
+		&mov	($s3,&DWP(12,$acc));
+
+		&mov	(&DWP(0,$key),$s0);	# copy iv
+		&mov	(&DWP(4,$key),$s1);
+		&mov	(&DWP(8,$key),$s2);
+		&mov	(&DWP(12,$key),$s3);
+
+		&mov	($acc,$_inp);		# load inp
+		&mov	($s2,$_len);		# load len
+		&lea	($acc,&DWP(16,$acc));	# advance inp
+		&mov	($_inp,$acc);		# save inp
+		&sub	($s2,16);		# decrease len
+		&mov	($_len,$s2);		# save len
+	&jnz	(&label("fast_dec_in_place_loop"));
+
+    &set_label("fast_dec_out",4);
+	&cmp	($mark,0);		# was the key schedule copied?
+	&mov	("edi",$_key);
+	&je	(&label("skip_dzero"));
+	# zero copy of key schedule
+	&mov	("ecx",240/4);
+	&xor	("eax","eax");
+	&align	(4);
+	&data_word(0xABF3F689);		# rep stosd
+	&set_label("skip_dzero");
+	&mov	("esp",$_esp);
+	&popf	();
+	&function_end_A();
+	&pushf	();			# kludge, never executed
+
+#--------------------------- SLOW ROUTINE ---------------------------#
+&set_label("slow_way",16);
+
+	&mov	($s0,&DWP(0,$s0)) if (!$x86only);# load OPENSSL_ia32cap
+	&mov	($key,&wparam(3));	# load key
+
+	# pre-allocate aligned stack frame...
+	&lea	($acc,&DWP(-80,"esp"));
+	&and	($acc,-64);
+
+	# ... and make sure it doesn't alias with $key modulo 1024
+	&lea	($s1,&DWP(-80-63,$key));
+	&sub	($s1,$acc);
+	&neg	($s1);
+	&and	($s1,0x3C0);	# modulo 1024, but aligned to cache-line
+	&sub	($acc,$s1);
+
+	# pick S-box copy which can't overlap with stack frame or $key
+	&lea	($s1,&DWP(768,$acc));
+	&sub	($s1,$tbl);
+	&and	($s1,0x300);
+	&lea	($tbl,&DWP(2048+128,$tbl,$s1));
+
+	&lea	($s3,&wparam(0));	# pointer to parameter block
+
+	&exch	("esp",$acc);
+	&add	("esp",4);		# reserve for return address!
+	&mov	($_tbl,$tbl);		# save %ebp
+	&mov	($_esp,$acc);		# save %esp
+	&mov	($_tmp,$s0);		# save OPENSSL_ia32cap
+
+	&mov	($s0,&DWP(0,$s3));	# load inp
+	&mov	($s1,&DWP(4,$s3));	# load out
+	#&mov	($s2,&DWP(8,$s3));	# load len
+	#&mov	($key,&DWP(12,$s3));	# load key
+	&mov	($acc,&DWP(16,$s3));	# load ivp
+	&mov	($s3,&DWP(20,$s3));	# load enc flag
+
+	&mov	($_inp,$s0);		# save copy of inp
+	&mov	($_out,$s1);		# save copy of out
+	&mov	($_len,$s2);		# save copy of len
+	&mov	($_key,$key);		# save copy of key
+	&mov	($_ivp,$acc);		# save copy of ivp
+
+	&mov	($key,$acc);
+	&mov	($acc,$s0);
+
+	&cmp	($s3,0);
+	&je	(&label("slow_decrypt"));
+
+#--------------------------- SLOW ENCRYPT ---------------------------#
+	&cmp	($s2,16);
+	&mov	($s3,$s1);
+	&jb	(&label("slow_enc_tail"));
+
+					if (!$x86only) {
+	&bt	($_tmp,25);		# check for SSE bit
+	&jnc	(&label("slow_enc_x86"));
+
+	&movq	("mm0",&QWP(0,$key));	# load iv
+	&movq	("mm4",&QWP(8,$key));
+
+	&set_label("slow_enc_loop_sse",16);
+		&pxor	("mm0",&QWP(0,$acc));	# xor input data
+		&pxor	("mm4",&QWP(8,$acc));
+
+		&mov	($key,$_key);
+		&call	("_sse_AES_encrypt_compact");
+
+		&mov	($acc,$_inp);		# load inp
+		&mov	($key,$_out);		# load out
+		&mov	($s2,$_len);		# load len
+
+		&movq	(&QWP(0,$key),"mm0");	# save output data
+		&movq	(&QWP(8,$key),"mm4");
+
+		&lea	($acc,&DWP(16,$acc));	# advance inp
+		&mov	($_inp,$acc);		# save inp
+		&lea	($s3,&DWP(16,$key));	# advance out
+		&mov	($_out,$s3);		# save out
+		&sub	($s2,16);		# decrease len
+		&cmp	($s2,16);
+		&mov	($_len,$s2);		# save len
+	&jae	(&label("slow_enc_loop_sse"));
+	&test	($s2,15);
+	&jnz	(&label("slow_enc_tail"));
+	&mov	($acc,$_ivp);		# load ivp
+	&movq	(&QWP(0,$acc),"mm0");	# save ivec
+	&movq	(&QWP(8,$acc),"mm4");
+	&emms	();
+	&mov	("esp",$_esp);
+	&popf	();
+	&function_end_A();
+	&pushf	();			# kludge, never executed
+					}
+    &set_label("slow_enc_x86",16);
+	&mov	($s0,&DWP(0,$key));	# load iv
+	&mov	($s1,&DWP(4,$key));
+
+	&set_label("slow_enc_loop_x86",4);
+		&mov	($s2,&DWP(8,$key));
+		&mov	($s3,&DWP(12,$key));
+
+		&xor	($s0,&DWP(0,$acc));	# xor input data
+		&xor	($s1,&DWP(4,$acc));
+		&xor	($s2,&DWP(8,$acc));
+		&xor	($s3,&DWP(12,$acc));
+
+		&mov	($key,$_key);		# load key
+		&call	("_x86_AES_encrypt_compact");
+
+		&mov	($acc,$_inp);		# load inp
+		&mov	($key,$_out);		# load out
+
+		&mov	(&DWP(0,$key),$s0);	# save output data
+		&mov	(&DWP(4,$key),$s1);
+		&mov	(&DWP(8,$key),$s2);
+		&mov	(&DWP(12,$key),$s3);
+
+		&mov	($s2,$_len);		# load len
+		&lea	($acc,&DWP(16,$acc));	# advance inp
+		&mov	($_inp,$acc);		# save inp
+		&lea	($s3,&DWP(16,$key));	# advance out
+		&mov	($_out,$s3);		# save out
+		&sub	($s2,16);		# decrease len
+		&cmp	($s2,16);
+		&mov	($_len,$s2);		# save len
+	&jae	(&label("slow_enc_loop_x86"));
+	&test	($s2,15);
+	&jnz	(&label("slow_enc_tail"));
+	&mov	($acc,$_ivp);		# load ivp
+	&mov	($s2,&DWP(8,$key));	# restore last dwords
+	&mov	($s3,&DWP(12,$key));
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,$acc),$s0);	# save ivec
+	&mov	(&DWP(4,$acc),$s1);
+	&mov	(&DWP(8,$acc),$s2);
+	&mov	(&DWP(12,$acc),$s3);
+
+	&mov	("esp",$_esp);
+	&popf	();
+	&function_end_A();
+	&pushf	();			# kludge, never executed
+
+    &set_label("slow_enc_tail",16);
+	&emms	()	if (!$x86only);
+	&mov	($key eq "edi"? $key:"",$s3);	# load out to edi
+	&mov	($s1,16);
+	&sub	($s1,$s2);
+	&cmp	($key,$acc eq "esi"? $acc:"");	# compare with inp
+	&je	(&label("enc_in_place"));
+	&align	(4);
+	&data_word(0xA4F3F689);	# rep movsb	# copy input
+	&jmp	(&label("enc_skip_in_place"));
+    &set_label("enc_in_place");
+	&lea	($key,&DWP(0,$key,$s2));
+    &set_label("enc_skip_in_place");
+	&mov	($s2,$s1);
+	&xor	($s0,$s0);
+	&align	(4);
+	&data_word(0xAAF3F689);	# rep stosb	# zero tail
+
+	&mov	($key,$_ivp);			# restore ivp
+	&mov	($acc,$s3);			# output as input
+	&mov	($s0,&DWP(0,$key));
+	&mov	($s1,&DWP(4,$key));
+	&mov	($_len,16);			# len=16
+	&jmp	(&label("slow_enc_loop_x86"));	# one more spin...
+
+#--------------------------- SLOW DECRYPT ---------------------------#
+&set_label("slow_decrypt",16);
+					if (!$x86only) {
+	&bt	($_tmp,25);		# check for SSE bit
+	&jnc	(&label("slow_dec_loop_x86"));
+
+	&set_label("slow_dec_loop_sse",4);
+		&movq	("mm0",&QWP(0,$acc));	# read input
+		&movq	("mm4",&QWP(8,$acc));
+
+		&mov	($key,$_key);
+		&call	("_sse_AES_decrypt_compact");
+
+		&mov	($acc,$_inp);		# load inp
+		&lea	($s0,$ivec);
+		&mov	($s1,$_out);		# load out
+		&mov	($s2,$_len);		# load len
+		&mov	($key,$_ivp);		# load ivp
+
+		&movq	("mm1",&QWP(0,$acc));	# re-read input
+		&movq	("mm5",&QWP(8,$acc));
+
+		&pxor	("mm0",&QWP(0,$key));	# xor iv
+		&pxor	("mm4",&QWP(8,$key));
+
+		&movq	(&QWP(0,$key),"mm1");	# copy input to iv
+		&movq	(&QWP(8,$key),"mm5");
+
+		&sub	($s2,16);		# decrease len
+		&jc	(&label("slow_dec_partial_sse"));
+
+		&movq	(&QWP(0,$s1),"mm0");	# write output
+		&movq	(&QWP(8,$s1),"mm4");
+
+		&lea	($s1,&DWP(16,$s1));	# advance out
+		&mov	($_out,$s1);		# save out
+		&lea	($acc,&DWP(16,$acc));	# advance inp
+		&mov	($_inp,$acc);		# save inp
+		&mov	($_len,$s2);		# save len
+	&jnz	(&label("slow_dec_loop_sse"));
+	&emms	();
+	&mov	("esp",$_esp);
+	&popf	();
+	&function_end_A();
+	&pushf	();			# kludge, never executed
+
+    &set_label("slow_dec_partial_sse",16);
+	&movq	(&QWP(0,$s0),"mm0");	# save output to temp
+	&movq	(&QWP(8,$s0),"mm4");
+	&emms	();
+
+	&add	($s2 eq "ecx" ? "ecx":"",16);
+	&mov	("edi",$s1);		# out
+	&mov	("esi",$s0);		# temp
+	&align	(4);
+	&data_word(0xA4F3F689);		# rep movsb # copy partial output
+
+	&mov	("esp",$_esp);
+	&popf	();
+	&function_end_A();
+	&pushf	();			# kludge, never executed
+					}
+	&set_label("slow_dec_loop_x86",16);
+		&mov	($s0,&DWP(0,$acc));	# read input
+		&mov	($s1,&DWP(4,$acc));
+		&mov	($s2,&DWP(8,$acc));
+		&mov	($s3,&DWP(12,$acc));
+
+		&lea	($key,$ivec);
+		&mov	(&DWP(0,$key),$s0);	# copy to temp
+		&mov	(&DWP(4,$key),$s1);
+		&mov	(&DWP(8,$key),$s2);
+		&mov	(&DWP(12,$key),$s3);
+
+		&mov	($key,$_key);		# load key
+		&call	("_x86_AES_decrypt_compact");
+
+		&mov	($key,$_ivp);		# load ivp
+		&mov	($acc,$_len);		# load len
+		&xor	($s0,&DWP(0,$key));	# xor iv
+		&xor	($s1,&DWP(4,$key));
+		&xor	($s2,&DWP(8,$key));
+		&xor	($s3,&DWP(12,$key));
+
+		&sub	($acc,16);
+		&jc	(&label("slow_dec_partial_x86"));
+
+		&mov	($_len,$acc);		# save len
+		&mov	($acc,$_out);		# load out
+
+		&mov	(&DWP(0,$acc),$s0);	# write output
+		&mov	(&DWP(4,$acc),$s1);
+		&mov	(&DWP(8,$acc),$s2);
+		&mov	(&DWP(12,$acc),$s3);
+
+		&lea	($acc,&DWP(16,$acc));	# advance out
+		&mov	($_out,$acc);		# save out
+
+		&lea	($acc,$ivec);
+		&mov	($s0,&DWP(0,$acc));	# read temp
+		&mov	($s1,&DWP(4,$acc));
+		&mov	($s2,&DWP(8,$acc));
+		&mov	($s3,&DWP(12,$acc));
+
+		&mov	(&DWP(0,$key),$s0);	# copy it to iv
+		&mov	(&DWP(4,$key),$s1);
+		&mov	(&DWP(8,$key),$s2);
+		&mov	(&DWP(12,$key),$s3);
+
+		&mov	($acc,$_inp);		# load inp
+		&lea	($acc,&DWP(16,$acc));	# advance inp
+		&mov	($_inp,$acc);		# save inp
+	&jnz	(&label("slow_dec_loop_x86"));
+	&mov	("esp",$_esp);
+	&popf	();
+	&function_end_A();
+	&pushf	();			# kludge, never executed
+
+    &set_label("slow_dec_partial_x86",16);
+	&lea	($acc,$ivec);
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,$acc),$s0);	# save output to temp
+	&mov	(&DWP(4,$acc),$s1);
+	&mov	(&DWP(8,$acc),$s2);
+	&mov	(&DWP(12,$acc),$s3);
+
+	&mov	($acc,$_inp);
+	&mov	($s0,&DWP(0,$acc));	# re-read input
+	&mov	($s1,&DWP(4,$acc));
+	&mov	($s2,&DWP(8,$acc));
+	&mov	($s3,&DWP(12,$acc));
+
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,$key),$s0);	# copy it to iv
+	&mov	(&DWP(4,$key),$s1);
+	&mov	(&DWP(8,$key),$s2);
+	&mov	(&DWP(12,$key),$s3);
+
+	&mov	("ecx",$_len);
+	&mov	("edi",$_out);
+	&lea	("esi",$ivec);
+	&align	(4);
+	&data_word(0xA4F3F689);		# rep movsb # copy partial output
+
+	&mov	("esp",$_esp);
+	&popf	();
+&function_end("AES_cbc_encrypt");
+}
+
+#------------------------------------------------------------------#
+
+sub enckey()
+{
+	&movz	("esi",&LB("edx"));		# rk[i]>>0
+	&movz	("ebx",&BP(-128,$tbl,"esi",1));
+	&movz	("esi",&HB("edx"));		# rk[i]>>8
+	&shl	("ebx",24);
+	&xor	("eax","ebx");
+
+	&movz	("ebx",&BP(-128,$tbl,"esi",1));
+	&shr	("edx",16);
+	&movz	("esi",&LB("edx"));		# rk[i]>>16
+	&xor	("eax","ebx");
+
+	&movz	("ebx",&BP(-128,$tbl,"esi",1));
+	&movz	("esi",&HB("edx"));		# rk[i]>>24
+	&shl	("ebx",8);
+	&xor	("eax","ebx");
+
+	&movz	("ebx",&BP(-128,$tbl,"esi",1));
+	&shl	("ebx",16);
+	&xor	("eax","ebx");
+
+	&xor	("eax",&DWP(1024-128,$tbl,"ecx",4));	# rcon
+}
+
+&function_begin("_x86_AES_set_encrypt_key");
+	&mov	("esi",&wparam(1));		# user supplied key
+	&mov	("edi",&wparam(3));		# private key schedule
+
+	&test	("esi",-1);
+	&jz	(&label("badpointer"));
+	&test	("edi",-1);
+	&jz	(&label("badpointer"));
+
+	&call	(&label("pic_point"));
+	&set_label("pic_point");
+	&blindpop($tbl);
+	&lea	($tbl,&DWP(&label("AES_Te")."-".&label("pic_point"),$tbl));
+	&lea	($tbl,&DWP(2048+128,$tbl));
+
+	# prefetch Te4
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(0-128,$tbl));
+	&mov	("ebx",&DWP(32-128,$tbl));
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(64-128,$tbl));
+	&mov	("edx",&DWP(96-128,$tbl));
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(128-128,$tbl));
+	&mov	("ebx",&DWP(160-128,$tbl));
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(192-128,$tbl));
+	&mov	("edx",&DWP(224-128,$tbl));
+
+	&mov	("ecx",&wparam(2));		# number of bits in key
+	&cmp	("ecx",128);
+	&je	(&label("10rounds"));
+	&cmp	("ecx",192);
+	&je	(&label("12rounds"));
+	&cmp	("ecx",256);
+	&je	(&label("14rounds"));
+	&mov	("eax",-2);			# invalid number of bits
+	&jmp	(&label("exit"));
+
+    &set_label("10rounds");
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(0,"esi"));		# copy first 4 dwords
+	&mov	("ebx",&DWP(4,"esi"));
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(8,"esi"));
+	&mov	("edx",&DWP(12,"esi"));
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,"edi"),"eax");
+	&mov	(&DWP(4,"edi"),"ebx");
+	&mov	(&DWP(8,"edi"),"ecx");
+	&mov	(&DWP(12,"edi"),"edx");
+
+	&xor	("ecx","ecx");
+	&jmp	(&label("10shortcut"));
+
+	&align	(4);
+	&set_label("10loop");
+		&mov	("eax",&DWP(0,"edi"));		# rk[0]
+		&mov	("edx",&DWP(12,"edi"));		# rk[3]
+	&set_label("10shortcut");
+		&enckey	();
+
+		&mov	(&DWP(16,"edi"),"eax");		# rk[4]
+		&xor	("eax",&DWP(4,"edi"));
+		&mov	(&DWP(20,"edi"),"eax");		# rk[5]
+		&xor	("eax",&DWP(8,"edi"));
+		&mov	(&DWP(24,"edi"),"eax");		# rk[6]
+		&xor	("eax",&DWP(12,"edi"));
+		&mov	(&DWP(28,"edi"),"eax");		# rk[7]
+		&inc	("ecx");
+		&add	("edi",16);
+		&cmp	("ecx",10);
+	&jl	(&label("10loop"));
+
+	&mov	(&DWP(80,"edi"),10);		# setup number of rounds
+	&xor	("eax","eax");
+	&jmp	(&label("exit"));
+		
+    &set_label("12rounds");
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(0,"esi"));		# copy first 6 dwords
+	&mov	("ebx",&DWP(4,"esi"));
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(8,"esi"));
+	&mov	("edx",&DWP(12,"esi"));
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,"edi"),"eax");
+	&mov	(&DWP(4,"edi"),"ebx");
+	&mov	(&DWP(8,"edi"),"ecx");
+	&mov	(&DWP(12,"edi"),"edx");
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(16,"esi"));
+	&mov	("edx",&DWP(20,"esi"));
+	&mov	(&DWP(16,"edi"),"ecx");
+	&mov	(&DWP(20,"edi"),"edx");
+
+	&xor	("ecx","ecx");
+	&jmp	(&label("12shortcut"));
+
+	&align	(4);
+	&set_label("12loop");
+		&mov	("eax",&DWP(0,"edi"));		# rk[0]
+		&mov	("edx",&DWP(20,"edi"));		# rk[5]
+	&set_label("12shortcut");
+		&enckey	();
+
+		&mov	(&DWP(24,"edi"),"eax");		# rk[6]
+		&xor	("eax",&DWP(4,"edi"));
+		&mov	(&DWP(28,"edi"),"eax");		# rk[7]
+		&xor	("eax",&DWP(8,"edi"));
+		&mov	(&DWP(32,"edi"),"eax");		# rk[8]
+		&xor	("eax",&DWP(12,"edi"));
+		&mov	(&DWP(36,"edi"),"eax");		# rk[9]
+
+		&cmp	("ecx",7);
+		&je	(&label("12break"));
+		&inc	("ecx");
+
+		&xor	("eax",&DWP(16,"edi"));
+		&mov	(&DWP(40,"edi"),"eax");		# rk[10]
+		&xor	("eax",&DWP(20,"edi"));
+		&mov	(&DWP(44,"edi"),"eax");		# rk[11]
+
+		&add	("edi",24);
+	&jmp	(&label("12loop"));
+
+	&set_label("12break");
+	&mov	(&DWP(72,"edi"),12);		# setup number of rounds
+	&xor	("eax","eax");
+	&jmp	(&label("exit"));
+
+    &set_label("14rounds");
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(0,"esi"));		# copy first 8 dwords
+	&mov	("ebx",&DWP(4,"esi"));
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(8,"esi"));
+	&mov	("edx",&DWP(12,"esi"));
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,"edi"),"eax");
+	&mov	(&DWP(4,"edi"),"ebx");
+	&mov	(&DWP(8,"edi"),"ecx");
+	&mov	(&DWP(12,"edi"),"edx");
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(16,"esi"));
+	&mov	("ebx",&DWP(20,"esi"));
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(24,"esi"));
+	&mov	("edx",&DWP(28,"esi"));
+	&mov	(&DWP(16,"edi"),"eax");
+	&mov	(&DWP(20,"edi"),"ebx");
+	&mov	(&DWP(24,"edi"),"ecx");
+	&mov	(&DWP(28,"edi"),"edx");
+
+	&xor	("ecx","ecx");
+	&jmp	(&label("14shortcut"));
+
+	&align	(4);
+	&set_label("14loop");
+		&mov	("edx",&DWP(28,"edi"));		# rk[7]
+	&set_label("14shortcut");
+		&mov	("eax",&DWP(0,"edi"));		# rk[0]
+
+		&enckey	();
+
+		&mov	(&DWP(32,"edi"),"eax");		# rk[8]
+		&xor	("eax",&DWP(4,"edi"));
+		&mov	(&DWP(36,"edi"),"eax");		# rk[9]
+		&xor	("eax",&DWP(8,"edi"));
+		&mov	(&DWP(40,"edi"),"eax");		# rk[10]
+		&xor	("eax",&DWP(12,"edi"));
+		&mov	(&DWP(44,"edi"),"eax");		# rk[11]
+
+		&cmp	("ecx",6);
+		&je	(&label("14break"));
+		&inc	("ecx");
+
+		&mov	("edx","eax");
+		&mov	("eax",&DWP(16,"edi"));		# rk[4]
+		&movz	("esi",&LB("edx"));		# rk[11]>>0
+		&movz	("ebx",&BP(-128,$tbl,"esi",1));
+		&movz	("esi",&HB("edx"));		# rk[11]>>8
+		&xor	("eax","ebx");
+
+		&movz	("ebx",&BP(-128,$tbl,"esi",1));
+		&shr	("edx",16);
+		&shl	("ebx",8);
+		&movz	("esi",&LB("edx"));		# rk[11]>>16
+		&xor	("eax","ebx");
+
+		&movz	("ebx",&BP(-128,$tbl,"esi",1));
+		&movz	("esi",&HB("edx"));		# rk[11]>>24
+		&shl	("ebx",16);
+		&xor	("eax","ebx");
+
+		&movz	("ebx",&BP(-128,$tbl,"esi",1));
+		&shl	("ebx",24);
+		&xor	("eax","ebx");
+
+		&mov	(&DWP(48,"edi"),"eax");		# rk[12]
+		&xor	("eax",&DWP(20,"edi"));
+		&mov	(&DWP(52,"edi"),"eax");		# rk[13]
+		&xor	("eax",&DWP(24,"edi"));
+		&mov	(&DWP(56,"edi"),"eax");		# rk[14]
+		&xor	("eax",&DWP(28,"edi"));
+		&mov	(&DWP(60,"edi"),"eax");		# rk[15]
+
+		&add	("edi",32);
+	&jmp	(&label("14loop"));
+
+	&set_label("14break");
+	&mov	(&DWP(48,"edi"),14);		# setup number of rounds
+	&xor	("eax","eax");
+	&jmp	(&label("exit"));
+
+    &set_label("badpointer");
+	&mov	("eax",-1);
+    &set_label("exit");
+&function_end("_x86_AES_set_encrypt_key");
+
+# int AES_set_encrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, const int bits,
+#                        AES_KEY *key)
+&function_begin_B("AES_set_encrypt_key");
+	&call	("_x86_AES_set_encrypt_key");
+	&ret	();
+&function_end_B("AES_set_encrypt_key");
+
+sub deckey()
+{ my ($i,$key,$tp1,$tp2,$tp4,$tp8) = @_;
+  my $tmp = $tbl;
+
+	&mov	($tmp,0x80808080);
+	&and	($tmp,$tp1);
+	&lea	($tp2,&DWP(0,$tp1,$tp1));
+	&mov	($acc,$tmp);
+	&shr	($tmp,7);
+	&sub	($acc,$tmp);
+	&and	($tp2,0xfefefefe);
+	&and	($acc,0x1b1b1b1b);
+	&xor	($tp2,$acc);
+	&mov	($tmp,0x80808080);
+
+	&and	($tmp,$tp2);
+	&lea	($tp4,&DWP(0,$tp2,$tp2));
+	&mov	($acc,$tmp);
+	&shr	($tmp,7);
+	&sub	($acc,$tmp);
+	&and	($tp4,0xfefefefe);
+	&and	($acc,0x1b1b1b1b);
+	 &xor	($tp2,$tp1);	# tp2^tp1
+	&xor	($tp4,$acc);
+	&mov	($tmp,0x80808080);
+
+	&and	($tmp,$tp4);
+	&lea	($tp8,&DWP(0,$tp4,$tp4));
+	&mov	($acc,$tmp);
+	&shr	($tmp,7);
+	 &xor	($tp4,$tp1);	# tp4^tp1
+	&sub	($acc,$tmp);
+	&and	($tp8,0xfefefefe);
+	&and	($acc,0x1b1b1b1b);
+	 &rotl	($tp1,8);	# = ROTATE(tp1,8)
+	&xor	($tp8,$acc);
+
+	&mov	($tmp,&DWP(4*($i+1),$key));	# modulo-scheduled load
+
+	&xor	($tp1,$tp2);
+	&xor	($tp2,$tp8);
+	&xor	($tp1,$tp4);
+	&rotl	($tp2,24);
+	&xor	($tp4,$tp8);
+	&xor	($tp1,$tp8);	# ^= tp8^(tp4^tp1)^(tp2^tp1)
+	&rotl	($tp4,16);
+	&xor	($tp1,$tp2);	# ^= ROTATE(tp8^tp2^tp1,24)
+	&rotl	($tp8,8);
+	&xor	($tp1,$tp4);	# ^= ROTATE(tp8^tp4^tp1,16)
+	&mov	($tp2,$tmp);
+	&xor	($tp1,$tp8);	# ^= ROTATE(tp8,8)
+
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*$i,$key),$tp1);
+}
+
+# int AES_set_decrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, const int bits,
+#                        AES_KEY *key)
+&function_begin_B("AES_set_decrypt_key");
+	&call	("_x86_AES_set_encrypt_key");
+	&cmp	("eax",0);
+	&je	(&label("proceed"));
+	&ret	();
+
+    &set_label("proceed");
+	&push	("ebp");
+	&push	("ebx");
+	&push	("esi");
+	&push	("edi");
+
+	&mov	("esi",&wparam(2));
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(240,"esi"));	# pull number of rounds
+	&lea	("ecx",&DWP(0,"","ecx",4));
+	&lea	("edi",&DWP(0,"esi","ecx",4));	# pointer to last chunk
+
+	&set_label("invert",4);			# invert order of chunks
+		&mov	("eax",&DWP(0,"esi"));
+		&mov	("ebx",&DWP(4,"esi"));
+		&mov	("ecx",&DWP(0,"edi"));
+		&mov	("edx",&DWP(4,"edi"));
+		&mov	(&DWP(0,"edi"),"eax");
+		&mov	(&DWP(4,"edi"),"ebx");
+		&mov	(&DWP(0,"esi"),"ecx");
+		&mov	(&DWP(4,"esi"),"edx");
+		&mov	("eax",&DWP(8,"esi"));
+		&mov	("ebx",&DWP(12,"esi"));
+		&mov	("ecx",&DWP(8,"edi"));
+		&mov	("edx",&DWP(12,"edi"));
+		&mov	(&DWP(8,"edi"),"eax");
+		&mov	(&DWP(12,"edi"),"ebx");
+		&mov	(&DWP(8,"esi"),"ecx");
+		&mov	(&DWP(12,"esi"),"edx");
+		&add	("esi",16);
+		&sub	("edi",16);
+		&cmp	("esi","edi");
+	&jne	(&label("invert"));
+
+	&mov	($key,&wparam(2));
+	&mov	($acc,&DWP(240,$key));		# pull number of rounds
+	&lea	($acc,&DWP(-2,$acc,$acc));
+	&lea	($acc,&DWP(0,$key,$acc,8));
+	&mov	(&wparam(2),$acc);
+
+	&mov	($s0,&DWP(16,$key));		# modulo-scheduled load
+	&set_label("permute",4);		# permute the key schedule
+		&add	($key,16);
+		&deckey	(0,$key,$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3);
+		&deckey	(1,$key,$s1,$s2,$s3,$s0);
+		&deckey	(2,$key,$s2,$s3,$s0,$s1);
+		&deckey	(3,$key,$s3,$s0,$s1,$s2);
+		&cmp	($key,&wparam(2));
+	&jb	(&label("permute"));
+
+	&xor	("eax","eax");			# return success
+&function_end("AES_set_decrypt_key");
+&asciz("AES for x86, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>");
+
+&asm_finish();
+
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/asm/aes-armv4.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/asm/aes-armv4.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9981589
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/asm/aes-armv4.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,1245 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2007-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+
+# AES for ARMv4
+
+# January 2007.
+#
+# Code uses single 1K S-box and is >2 times faster than code generated
+# by gcc-3.4.1. This is thanks to unique feature of ARMv4 ISA, which
+# allows to merge logical or arithmetic operation with shift or rotate
+# in one instruction and emit combined result every cycle. The module
+# is endian-neutral. The performance is ~42 cycles/byte for 128-bit
+# key [on single-issue Xscale PXA250 core].
+
+# May 2007.
+#
+# AES_set_[en|de]crypt_key is added.
+
+# July 2010.
+#
+# Rescheduling for dual-issue pipeline resulted in 12% improvement on
+# Cortex A8 core and ~25 cycles per byte processed with 128-bit key.
+
+# February 2011.
+#
+# Profiler-assisted and platform-specific optimization resulted in 16%
+# improvement on Cortex A8 core and ~21.5 cycles per byte.
+
+$flavour = shift;
+if ($flavour=~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/) { $output=$flavour; undef $flavour; }
+else { while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {} }
+
+if ($flavour && $flavour ne "void") {
+    $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+    ( $xlate="${dir}arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
+    ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
+    die "can't locate arm-xlate.pl";
+
+    open STDOUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output";
+} else {
+    open STDOUT,">$output";
+}
+
+$s0="r0";
+$s1="r1";
+$s2="r2";
+$s3="r3";
+$t1="r4";
+$t2="r5";
+$t3="r6";
+$i1="r7";
+$i2="r8";
+$i3="r9";
+
+$tbl="r10";
+$key="r11";
+$rounds="r12";
+
+$code=<<___;
+#ifndef __KERNEL__
+# include "arm_arch.h"
+#else
+# define __ARM_ARCH__ __LINUX_ARM_ARCH__
+#endif
+
+.text
+#if defined(__thumb2__) && !defined(__APPLE__)
+.syntax	unified
+.thumb
+#else
+.code	32
+#undef __thumb2__
+#endif
+
+.type	AES_Te,%object
+.align	5
+AES_Te:
+.word	0xc66363a5, 0xf87c7c84, 0xee777799, 0xf67b7b8d
+.word	0xfff2f20d, 0xd66b6bbd, 0xde6f6fb1, 0x91c5c554
+.word	0x60303050, 0x02010103, 0xce6767a9, 0x562b2b7d
+.word	0xe7fefe19, 0xb5d7d762, 0x4dababe6, 0xec76769a
+.word	0x8fcaca45, 0x1f82829d, 0x89c9c940, 0xfa7d7d87
+.word	0xeffafa15, 0xb25959eb, 0x8e4747c9, 0xfbf0f00b
+.word	0x41adadec, 0xb3d4d467, 0x5fa2a2fd, 0x45afafea
+.word	0x239c9cbf, 0x53a4a4f7, 0xe4727296, 0x9bc0c05b
+.word	0x75b7b7c2, 0xe1fdfd1c, 0x3d9393ae, 0x4c26266a
+.word	0x6c36365a, 0x7e3f3f41, 0xf5f7f702, 0x83cccc4f
+.word	0x6834345c, 0x51a5a5f4, 0xd1e5e534, 0xf9f1f108
+.word	0xe2717193, 0xabd8d873, 0x62313153, 0x2a15153f
+.word	0x0804040c, 0x95c7c752, 0x46232365, 0x9dc3c35e
+.word	0x30181828, 0x379696a1, 0x0a05050f, 0x2f9a9ab5
+.word	0x0e070709, 0x24121236, 0x1b80809b, 0xdfe2e23d
+.word	0xcdebeb26, 0x4e272769, 0x7fb2b2cd, 0xea75759f
+.word	0x1209091b, 0x1d83839e, 0x582c2c74, 0x341a1a2e
+.word	0x361b1b2d, 0xdc6e6eb2, 0xb45a5aee, 0x5ba0a0fb
+.word	0xa45252f6, 0x763b3b4d, 0xb7d6d661, 0x7db3b3ce
+.word	0x5229297b, 0xdde3e33e, 0x5e2f2f71, 0x13848497
+.word	0xa65353f5, 0xb9d1d168, 0x00000000, 0xc1eded2c
+.word	0x40202060, 0xe3fcfc1f, 0x79b1b1c8, 0xb65b5bed
+.word	0xd46a6abe, 0x8dcbcb46, 0x67bebed9, 0x7239394b
+.word	0x944a4ade, 0x984c4cd4, 0xb05858e8, 0x85cfcf4a
+.word	0xbbd0d06b, 0xc5efef2a, 0x4faaaae5, 0xedfbfb16
+.word	0x864343c5, 0x9a4d4dd7, 0x66333355, 0x11858594
+.word	0x8a4545cf, 0xe9f9f910, 0x04020206, 0xfe7f7f81
+.word	0xa05050f0, 0x783c3c44, 0x259f9fba, 0x4ba8a8e3
+.word	0xa25151f3, 0x5da3a3fe, 0x804040c0, 0x058f8f8a
+.word	0x3f9292ad, 0x219d9dbc, 0x70383848, 0xf1f5f504
+.word	0x63bcbcdf, 0x77b6b6c1, 0xafdada75, 0x42212163
+.word	0x20101030, 0xe5ffff1a, 0xfdf3f30e, 0xbfd2d26d
+.word	0x81cdcd4c, 0x180c0c14, 0x26131335, 0xc3ecec2f
+.word	0xbe5f5fe1, 0x359797a2, 0x884444cc, 0x2e171739
+.word	0x93c4c457, 0x55a7a7f2, 0xfc7e7e82, 0x7a3d3d47
+.word	0xc86464ac, 0xba5d5de7, 0x3219192b, 0xe6737395
+.word	0xc06060a0, 0x19818198, 0x9e4f4fd1, 0xa3dcdc7f
+.word	0x44222266, 0x542a2a7e, 0x3b9090ab, 0x0b888883
+.word	0x8c4646ca, 0xc7eeee29, 0x6bb8b8d3, 0x2814143c
+.word	0xa7dede79, 0xbc5e5ee2, 0x160b0b1d, 0xaddbdb76
+.word	0xdbe0e03b, 0x64323256, 0x743a3a4e, 0x140a0a1e
+.word	0x924949db, 0x0c06060a, 0x4824246c, 0xb85c5ce4
+.word	0x9fc2c25d, 0xbdd3d36e, 0x43acacef, 0xc46262a6
+.word	0x399191a8, 0x319595a4, 0xd3e4e437, 0xf279798b
+.word	0xd5e7e732, 0x8bc8c843, 0x6e373759, 0xda6d6db7
+.word	0x018d8d8c, 0xb1d5d564, 0x9c4e4ed2, 0x49a9a9e0
+.word	0xd86c6cb4, 0xac5656fa, 0xf3f4f407, 0xcfeaea25
+.word	0xca6565af, 0xf47a7a8e, 0x47aeaee9, 0x10080818
+.word	0x6fbabad5, 0xf0787888, 0x4a25256f, 0x5c2e2e72
+.word	0x381c1c24, 0x57a6a6f1, 0x73b4b4c7, 0x97c6c651
+.word	0xcbe8e823, 0xa1dddd7c, 0xe874749c, 0x3e1f1f21
+.word	0x964b4bdd, 0x61bdbddc, 0x0d8b8b86, 0x0f8a8a85
+.word	0xe0707090, 0x7c3e3e42, 0x71b5b5c4, 0xcc6666aa
+.word	0x904848d8, 0x06030305, 0xf7f6f601, 0x1c0e0e12
+.word	0xc26161a3, 0x6a35355f, 0xae5757f9, 0x69b9b9d0
+.word	0x17868691, 0x99c1c158, 0x3a1d1d27, 0x279e9eb9
+.word	0xd9e1e138, 0xebf8f813, 0x2b9898b3, 0x22111133
+.word	0xd26969bb, 0xa9d9d970, 0x078e8e89, 0x339494a7
+.word	0x2d9b9bb6, 0x3c1e1e22, 0x15878792, 0xc9e9e920
+.word	0x87cece49, 0xaa5555ff, 0x50282878, 0xa5dfdf7a
+.word	0x038c8c8f, 0x59a1a1f8, 0x09898980, 0x1a0d0d17
+.word	0x65bfbfda, 0xd7e6e631, 0x844242c6, 0xd06868b8
+.word	0x824141c3, 0x299999b0, 0x5a2d2d77, 0x1e0f0f11
+.word	0x7bb0b0cb, 0xa85454fc, 0x6dbbbbd6, 0x2c16163a
+@ Te4[256]
+.byte	0x63, 0x7c, 0x77, 0x7b, 0xf2, 0x6b, 0x6f, 0xc5
+.byte	0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2b, 0xfe, 0xd7, 0xab, 0x76
+.byte	0xca, 0x82, 0xc9, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0x59, 0x47, 0xf0
+.byte	0xad, 0xd4, 0xa2, 0xaf, 0x9c, 0xa4, 0x72, 0xc0
+.byte	0xb7, 0xfd, 0x93, 0x26, 0x36, 0x3f, 0xf7, 0xcc
+.byte	0x34, 0xa5, 0xe5, 0xf1, 0x71, 0xd8, 0x31, 0x15
+.byte	0x04, 0xc7, 0x23, 0xc3, 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9a
+.byte	0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xeb, 0x27, 0xb2, 0x75
+.byte	0x09, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x6e, 0x5a, 0xa0
+.byte	0x52, 0x3b, 0xd6, 0xb3, 0x29, 0xe3, 0x2f, 0x84
+.byte	0x53, 0xd1, 0x00, 0xed, 0x20, 0xfc, 0xb1, 0x5b
+.byte	0x6a, 0xcb, 0xbe, 0x39, 0x4a, 0x4c, 0x58, 0xcf
+.byte	0xd0, 0xef, 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x43, 0x4d, 0x33, 0x85
+.byte	0x45, 0xf9, 0x02, 0x7f, 0x50, 0x3c, 0x9f, 0xa8
+.byte	0x51, 0xa3, 0x40, 0x8f, 0x92, 0x9d, 0x38, 0xf5
+.byte	0xbc, 0xb6, 0xda, 0x21, 0x10, 0xff, 0xf3, 0xd2
+.byte	0xcd, 0x0c, 0x13, 0xec, 0x5f, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17
+.byte	0xc4, 0xa7, 0x7e, 0x3d, 0x64, 0x5d, 0x19, 0x73
+.byte	0x60, 0x81, 0x4f, 0xdc, 0x22, 0x2a, 0x90, 0x88
+.byte	0x46, 0xee, 0xb8, 0x14, 0xde, 0x5e, 0x0b, 0xdb
+.byte	0xe0, 0x32, 0x3a, 0x0a, 0x49, 0x06, 0x24, 0x5c
+.byte	0xc2, 0xd3, 0xac, 0x62, 0x91, 0x95, 0xe4, 0x79
+.byte	0xe7, 0xc8, 0x37, 0x6d, 0x8d, 0xd5, 0x4e, 0xa9
+.byte	0x6c, 0x56, 0xf4, 0xea, 0x65, 0x7a, 0xae, 0x08
+.byte	0xba, 0x78, 0x25, 0x2e, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xb4, 0xc6
+.byte	0xe8, 0xdd, 0x74, 0x1f, 0x4b, 0xbd, 0x8b, 0x8a
+.byte	0x70, 0x3e, 0xb5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xf6, 0x0e
+.byte	0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xb9, 0x86, 0xc1, 0x1d, 0x9e
+.byte	0xe1, 0xf8, 0x98, 0x11, 0x69, 0xd9, 0x8e, 0x94
+.byte	0x9b, 0x1e, 0x87, 0xe9, 0xce, 0x55, 0x28, 0xdf
+.byte	0x8c, 0xa1, 0x89, 0x0d, 0xbf, 0xe6, 0x42, 0x68
+.byte	0x41, 0x99, 0x2d, 0x0f, 0xb0, 0x54, 0xbb, 0x16
+@ rcon[]
+.word	0x01000000, 0x02000000, 0x04000000, 0x08000000
+.word	0x10000000, 0x20000000, 0x40000000, 0x80000000
+.word	0x1B000000, 0x36000000, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
+.size	AES_Te,.-AES_Te
+
+@ void AES_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+@ 		 const AES_KEY *key) {
+.global AES_encrypt
+.type   AES_encrypt,%function
+.align	5
+AES_encrypt:
+#ifndef	__thumb2__
+	sub	r3,pc,#8		@ AES_encrypt
+#else
+	adr	r3,.
+#endif
+	stmdb   sp!,{r1,r4-r12,lr}
+#if defined(__thumb2__) || defined(__APPLE__)
+	adr	$tbl,AES_Te
+#else
+	sub	$tbl,r3,#AES_encrypt-AES_Te	@ Te
+#endif
+	mov	$rounds,r0		@ inp
+	mov	$key,r2
+#if __ARM_ARCH__<7
+	ldrb	$s0,[$rounds,#3]	@ load input data in endian-neutral
+	ldrb	$t1,[$rounds,#2]	@ manner...
+	ldrb	$t2,[$rounds,#1]
+	ldrb	$t3,[$rounds,#0]
+	orr	$s0,$s0,$t1,lsl#8
+	ldrb	$s1,[$rounds,#7]
+	orr	$s0,$s0,$t2,lsl#16
+	ldrb	$t1,[$rounds,#6]
+	orr	$s0,$s0,$t3,lsl#24
+	ldrb	$t2,[$rounds,#5]
+	ldrb	$t3,[$rounds,#4]
+	orr	$s1,$s1,$t1,lsl#8
+	ldrb	$s2,[$rounds,#11]
+	orr	$s1,$s1,$t2,lsl#16
+	ldrb	$t1,[$rounds,#10]
+	orr	$s1,$s1,$t3,lsl#24
+	ldrb	$t2,[$rounds,#9]
+	ldrb	$t3,[$rounds,#8]
+	orr	$s2,$s2,$t1,lsl#8
+	ldrb	$s3,[$rounds,#15]
+	orr	$s2,$s2,$t2,lsl#16
+	ldrb	$t1,[$rounds,#14]
+	orr	$s2,$s2,$t3,lsl#24
+	ldrb	$t2,[$rounds,#13]
+	ldrb	$t3,[$rounds,#12]
+	orr	$s3,$s3,$t1,lsl#8
+	orr	$s3,$s3,$t2,lsl#16
+	orr	$s3,$s3,$t3,lsl#24
+#else
+	ldr	$s0,[$rounds,#0]
+	ldr	$s1,[$rounds,#4]
+	ldr	$s2,[$rounds,#8]
+	ldr	$s3,[$rounds,#12]
+#ifdef __ARMEL__
+	rev	$s0,$s0
+	rev	$s1,$s1
+	rev	$s2,$s2
+	rev	$s3,$s3
+#endif
+#endif
+	bl	_armv4_AES_encrypt
+
+	ldr	$rounds,[sp],#4		@ pop out
+#if __ARM_ARCH__>=7
+#ifdef __ARMEL__
+	rev	$s0,$s0
+	rev	$s1,$s1
+	rev	$s2,$s2
+	rev	$s3,$s3
+#endif
+	str	$s0,[$rounds,#0]
+	str	$s1,[$rounds,#4]
+	str	$s2,[$rounds,#8]
+	str	$s3,[$rounds,#12]
+#else
+	mov	$t1,$s0,lsr#24		@ write output in endian-neutral
+	mov	$t2,$s0,lsr#16		@ manner...
+	mov	$t3,$s0,lsr#8
+	strb	$t1,[$rounds,#0]
+	strb	$t2,[$rounds,#1]
+	mov	$t1,$s1,lsr#24
+	strb	$t3,[$rounds,#2]
+	mov	$t2,$s1,lsr#16
+	strb	$s0,[$rounds,#3]
+	mov	$t3,$s1,lsr#8
+	strb	$t1,[$rounds,#4]
+	strb	$t2,[$rounds,#5]
+	mov	$t1,$s2,lsr#24
+	strb	$t3,[$rounds,#6]
+	mov	$t2,$s2,lsr#16
+	strb	$s1,[$rounds,#7]
+	mov	$t3,$s2,lsr#8
+	strb	$t1,[$rounds,#8]
+	strb	$t2,[$rounds,#9]
+	mov	$t1,$s3,lsr#24
+	strb	$t3,[$rounds,#10]
+	mov	$t2,$s3,lsr#16
+	strb	$s2,[$rounds,#11]
+	mov	$t3,$s3,lsr#8
+	strb	$t1,[$rounds,#12]
+	strb	$t2,[$rounds,#13]
+	strb	$t3,[$rounds,#14]
+	strb	$s3,[$rounds,#15]
+#endif
+#if __ARM_ARCH__>=5
+	ldmia	sp!,{r4-r12,pc}
+#else
+	ldmia   sp!,{r4-r12,lr}
+	tst	lr,#1
+	moveq	pc,lr			@ be binary compatible with V4, yet
+	bx	lr			@ interoperable with Thumb ISA:-)
+#endif
+.size	AES_encrypt,.-AES_encrypt
+
+.type   _armv4_AES_encrypt,%function
+.align	2
+_armv4_AES_encrypt:
+	str	lr,[sp,#-4]!		@ push lr
+	ldmia	$key!,{$t1-$i1}
+	eor	$s0,$s0,$t1
+	ldr	$rounds,[$key,#240-16]
+	eor	$s1,$s1,$t2
+	eor	$s2,$s2,$t3
+	eor	$s3,$s3,$i1
+	sub	$rounds,$rounds,#1
+	mov	lr,#255
+
+	and	$i1,lr,$s0
+	and	$i2,lr,$s0,lsr#8
+	and	$i3,lr,$s0,lsr#16
+	mov	$s0,$s0,lsr#24
+.Lenc_loop:
+	ldr	$t1,[$tbl,$i1,lsl#2]	@ Te3[s0>>0]
+	and	$i1,lr,$s1,lsr#16	@ i0
+	ldr	$t2,[$tbl,$i2,lsl#2]	@ Te2[s0>>8]
+	and	$i2,lr,$s1
+	ldr	$t3,[$tbl,$i3,lsl#2]	@ Te1[s0>>16]
+	and	$i3,lr,$s1,lsr#8
+	ldr	$s0,[$tbl,$s0,lsl#2]	@ Te0[s0>>24]
+	mov	$s1,$s1,lsr#24
+
+	ldr	$i1,[$tbl,$i1,lsl#2]	@ Te1[s1>>16]
+	ldr	$i2,[$tbl,$i2,lsl#2]	@ Te3[s1>>0]
+	ldr	$i3,[$tbl,$i3,lsl#2]	@ Te2[s1>>8]
+	eor	$s0,$s0,$i1,ror#8
+	ldr	$s1,[$tbl,$s1,lsl#2]	@ Te0[s1>>24]
+	and	$i1,lr,$s2,lsr#8	@ i0
+	eor	$t2,$t2,$i2,ror#8
+	and	$i2,lr,$s2,lsr#16	@ i1
+	eor	$t3,$t3,$i3,ror#8
+	and	$i3,lr,$s2
+	ldr	$i1,[$tbl,$i1,lsl#2]	@ Te2[s2>>8]
+	eor	$s1,$s1,$t1,ror#24
+	ldr	$i2,[$tbl,$i2,lsl#2]	@ Te1[s2>>16]
+	mov	$s2,$s2,lsr#24
+
+	ldr	$i3,[$tbl,$i3,lsl#2]	@ Te3[s2>>0]
+	eor	$s0,$s0,$i1,ror#16
+	ldr	$s2,[$tbl,$s2,lsl#2]	@ Te0[s2>>24]
+	and	$i1,lr,$s3		@ i0
+	eor	$s1,$s1,$i2,ror#8
+	and	$i2,lr,$s3,lsr#8	@ i1
+	eor	$t3,$t3,$i3,ror#16
+	and	$i3,lr,$s3,lsr#16	@ i2
+	ldr	$i1,[$tbl,$i1,lsl#2]	@ Te3[s3>>0]
+	eor	$s2,$s2,$t2,ror#16
+	ldr	$i2,[$tbl,$i2,lsl#2]	@ Te2[s3>>8]
+	mov	$s3,$s3,lsr#24
+
+	ldr	$i3,[$tbl,$i3,lsl#2]	@ Te1[s3>>16]
+	eor	$s0,$s0,$i1,ror#24
+	ldr	$i1,[$key],#16
+	eor	$s1,$s1,$i2,ror#16
+	ldr	$s3,[$tbl,$s3,lsl#2]	@ Te0[s3>>24]
+	eor	$s2,$s2,$i3,ror#8
+	ldr	$t1,[$key,#-12]
+	eor	$s3,$s3,$t3,ror#8
+
+	ldr	$t2,[$key,#-8]
+	eor	$s0,$s0,$i1
+	ldr	$t3,[$key,#-4]
+	and	$i1,lr,$s0
+	eor	$s1,$s1,$t1
+	and	$i2,lr,$s0,lsr#8
+	eor	$s2,$s2,$t2
+	and	$i3,lr,$s0,lsr#16
+	eor	$s3,$s3,$t3
+	mov	$s0,$s0,lsr#24
+
+	subs	$rounds,$rounds,#1
+	bne	.Lenc_loop
+
+	add	$tbl,$tbl,#2
+
+	ldrb	$t1,[$tbl,$i1,lsl#2]	@ Te4[s0>>0]
+	and	$i1,lr,$s1,lsr#16	@ i0
+	ldrb	$t2,[$tbl,$i2,lsl#2]	@ Te4[s0>>8]
+	and	$i2,lr,$s1
+	ldrb	$t3,[$tbl,$i3,lsl#2]	@ Te4[s0>>16]
+	and	$i3,lr,$s1,lsr#8
+	ldrb	$s0,[$tbl,$s0,lsl#2]	@ Te4[s0>>24]
+	mov	$s1,$s1,lsr#24
+
+	ldrb	$i1,[$tbl,$i1,lsl#2]	@ Te4[s1>>16]
+	ldrb	$i2,[$tbl,$i2,lsl#2]	@ Te4[s1>>0]
+	ldrb	$i3,[$tbl,$i3,lsl#2]	@ Te4[s1>>8]
+	eor	$s0,$i1,$s0,lsl#8
+	ldrb	$s1,[$tbl,$s1,lsl#2]	@ Te4[s1>>24]
+	and	$i1,lr,$s2,lsr#8	@ i0
+	eor	$t2,$i2,$t2,lsl#8
+	and	$i2,lr,$s2,lsr#16	@ i1
+	eor	$t3,$i3,$t3,lsl#8
+	and	$i3,lr,$s2
+	ldrb	$i1,[$tbl,$i1,lsl#2]	@ Te4[s2>>8]
+	eor	$s1,$t1,$s1,lsl#24
+	ldrb	$i2,[$tbl,$i2,lsl#2]	@ Te4[s2>>16]
+	mov	$s2,$s2,lsr#24
+
+	ldrb	$i3,[$tbl,$i3,lsl#2]	@ Te4[s2>>0]
+	eor	$s0,$i1,$s0,lsl#8
+	ldrb	$s2,[$tbl,$s2,lsl#2]	@ Te4[s2>>24]
+	and	$i1,lr,$s3		@ i0
+	eor	$s1,$s1,$i2,lsl#16
+	and	$i2,lr,$s3,lsr#8	@ i1
+	eor	$t3,$i3,$t3,lsl#8
+	and	$i3,lr,$s3,lsr#16	@ i2
+	ldrb	$i1,[$tbl,$i1,lsl#2]	@ Te4[s3>>0]
+	eor	$s2,$t2,$s2,lsl#24
+	ldrb	$i2,[$tbl,$i2,lsl#2]	@ Te4[s3>>8]
+	mov	$s3,$s3,lsr#24
+
+	ldrb	$i3,[$tbl,$i3,lsl#2]	@ Te4[s3>>16]
+	eor	$s0,$i1,$s0,lsl#8
+	ldr	$i1,[$key,#0]
+	ldrb	$s3,[$tbl,$s3,lsl#2]	@ Te4[s3>>24]
+	eor	$s1,$s1,$i2,lsl#8
+	ldr	$t1,[$key,#4]
+	eor	$s2,$s2,$i3,lsl#16
+	ldr	$t2,[$key,#8]
+	eor	$s3,$t3,$s3,lsl#24
+	ldr	$t3,[$key,#12]
+
+	eor	$s0,$s0,$i1
+	eor	$s1,$s1,$t1
+	eor	$s2,$s2,$t2
+	eor	$s3,$s3,$t3
+
+	sub	$tbl,$tbl,#2
+	ldr	pc,[sp],#4		@ pop and return
+.size	_armv4_AES_encrypt,.-_armv4_AES_encrypt
+
+.global AES_set_encrypt_key
+.type   AES_set_encrypt_key,%function
+.align	5
+AES_set_encrypt_key:
+_armv4_AES_set_encrypt_key:
+#ifndef	__thumb2__
+	sub	r3,pc,#8		@ AES_set_encrypt_key
+#else
+	adr	r3,.
+#endif
+	teq	r0,#0
+#ifdef	__thumb2__
+	itt	eq			@ Thumb2 thing, sanity check in ARM
+#endif
+	moveq	r0,#-1
+	beq	.Labrt
+	teq	r2,#0
+#ifdef	__thumb2__
+	itt	eq			@ Thumb2 thing, sanity check in ARM
+#endif
+	moveq	r0,#-1
+	beq	.Labrt
+
+	teq	r1,#128
+	beq	.Lok
+	teq	r1,#192
+	beq	.Lok
+	teq	r1,#256
+#ifdef	__thumb2__
+	itt	ne			@ Thumb2 thing, sanity check in ARM
+#endif
+	movne	r0,#-1
+	bne	.Labrt
+
+.Lok:	stmdb   sp!,{r4-r12,lr}
+	mov	$rounds,r0		@ inp
+	mov	lr,r1			@ bits
+	mov	$key,r2			@ key
+
+#if defined(__thumb2__) || defined(__APPLE__)
+	adr	$tbl,AES_Te+1024				@ Te4
+#else
+	sub	$tbl,r3,#_armv4_AES_set_encrypt_key-AES_Te-1024	@ Te4
+#endif
+
+#if __ARM_ARCH__<7
+	ldrb	$s0,[$rounds,#3]	@ load input data in endian-neutral
+	ldrb	$t1,[$rounds,#2]	@ manner...
+	ldrb	$t2,[$rounds,#1]
+	ldrb	$t3,[$rounds,#0]
+	orr	$s0,$s0,$t1,lsl#8
+	ldrb	$s1,[$rounds,#7]
+	orr	$s0,$s0,$t2,lsl#16
+	ldrb	$t1,[$rounds,#6]
+	orr	$s0,$s0,$t3,lsl#24
+	ldrb	$t2,[$rounds,#5]
+	ldrb	$t3,[$rounds,#4]
+	orr	$s1,$s1,$t1,lsl#8
+	ldrb	$s2,[$rounds,#11]
+	orr	$s1,$s1,$t2,lsl#16
+	ldrb	$t1,[$rounds,#10]
+	orr	$s1,$s1,$t3,lsl#24
+	ldrb	$t2,[$rounds,#9]
+	ldrb	$t3,[$rounds,#8]
+	orr	$s2,$s2,$t1,lsl#8
+	ldrb	$s3,[$rounds,#15]
+	orr	$s2,$s2,$t2,lsl#16
+	ldrb	$t1,[$rounds,#14]
+	orr	$s2,$s2,$t3,lsl#24
+	ldrb	$t2,[$rounds,#13]
+	ldrb	$t3,[$rounds,#12]
+	orr	$s3,$s3,$t1,lsl#8
+	str	$s0,[$key],#16
+	orr	$s3,$s3,$t2,lsl#16
+	str	$s1,[$key,#-12]
+	orr	$s3,$s3,$t3,lsl#24
+	str	$s2,[$key,#-8]
+	str	$s3,[$key,#-4]
+#else
+	ldr	$s0,[$rounds,#0]
+	ldr	$s1,[$rounds,#4]
+	ldr	$s2,[$rounds,#8]
+	ldr	$s3,[$rounds,#12]
+#ifdef __ARMEL__
+	rev	$s0,$s0
+	rev	$s1,$s1
+	rev	$s2,$s2
+	rev	$s3,$s3
+#endif
+	str	$s0,[$key],#16
+	str	$s1,[$key,#-12]
+	str	$s2,[$key,#-8]
+	str	$s3,[$key,#-4]
+#endif
+
+	teq	lr,#128
+	bne	.Lnot128
+	mov	$rounds,#10
+	str	$rounds,[$key,#240-16]
+	add	$t3,$tbl,#256			@ rcon
+	mov	lr,#255
+
+.L128_loop:
+	and	$t2,lr,$s3,lsr#24
+	and	$i1,lr,$s3,lsr#16
+	ldrb	$t2,[$tbl,$t2]
+	and	$i2,lr,$s3,lsr#8
+	ldrb	$i1,[$tbl,$i1]
+	and	$i3,lr,$s3
+	ldrb	$i2,[$tbl,$i2]
+	orr	$t2,$t2,$i1,lsl#24
+	ldrb	$i3,[$tbl,$i3]
+	orr	$t2,$t2,$i2,lsl#16
+	ldr	$t1,[$t3],#4			@ rcon[i++]
+	orr	$t2,$t2,$i3,lsl#8
+	eor	$t2,$t2,$t1
+	eor	$s0,$s0,$t2			@ rk[4]=rk[0]^...
+	eor	$s1,$s1,$s0			@ rk[5]=rk[1]^rk[4]
+	str	$s0,[$key],#16
+	eor	$s2,$s2,$s1			@ rk[6]=rk[2]^rk[5]
+	str	$s1,[$key,#-12]
+	eor	$s3,$s3,$s2			@ rk[7]=rk[3]^rk[6]
+	str	$s2,[$key,#-8]
+	subs	$rounds,$rounds,#1
+	str	$s3,[$key,#-4]
+	bne	.L128_loop
+	sub	r2,$key,#176
+	b	.Ldone
+
+.Lnot128:
+#if __ARM_ARCH__<7
+	ldrb	$i2,[$rounds,#19]
+	ldrb	$t1,[$rounds,#18]
+	ldrb	$t2,[$rounds,#17]
+	ldrb	$t3,[$rounds,#16]
+	orr	$i2,$i2,$t1,lsl#8
+	ldrb	$i3,[$rounds,#23]
+	orr	$i2,$i2,$t2,lsl#16
+	ldrb	$t1,[$rounds,#22]
+	orr	$i2,$i2,$t3,lsl#24
+	ldrb	$t2,[$rounds,#21]
+	ldrb	$t3,[$rounds,#20]
+	orr	$i3,$i3,$t1,lsl#8
+	orr	$i3,$i3,$t2,lsl#16
+	str	$i2,[$key],#8
+	orr	$i3,$i3,$t3,lsl#24
+	str	$i3,[$key,#-4]
+#else
+	ldr	$i2,[$rounds,#16]
+	ldr	$i3,[$rounds,#20]
+#ifdef __ARMEL__
+	rev	$i2,$i2
+	rev	$i3,$i3
+#endif
+	str	$i2,[$key],#8
+	str	$i3,[$key,#-4]
+#endif
+
+	teq	lr,#192
+	bne	.Lnot192
+	mov	$rounds,#12
+	str	$rounds,[$key,#240-24]
+	add	$t3,$tbl,#256			@ rcon
+	mov	lr,#255
+	mov	$rounds,#8
+
+.L192_loop:
+	and	$t2,lr,$i3,lsr#24
+	and	$i1,lr,$i3,lsr#16
+	ldrb	$t2,[$tbl,$t2]
+	and	$i2,lr,$i3,lsr#8
+	ldrb	$i1,[$tbl,$i1]
+	and	$i3,lr,$i3
+	ldrb	$i2,[$tbl,$i2]
+	orr	$t2,$t2,$i1,lsl#24
+	ldrb	$i3,[$tbl,$i3]
+	orr	$t2,$t2,$i2,lsl#16
+	ldr	$t1,[$t3],#4			@ rcon[i++]
+	orr	$t2,$t2,$i3,lsl#8
+	eor	$i3,$t2,$t1
+	eor	$s0,$s0,$i3			@ rk[6]=rk[0]^...
+	eor	$s1,$s1,$s0			@ rk[7]=rk[1]^rk[6]
+	str	$s0,[$key],#24
+	eor	$s2,$s2,$s1			@ rk[8]=rk[2]^rk[7]
+	str	$s1,[$key,#-20]
+	eor	$s3,$s3,$s2			@ rk[9]=rk[3]^rk[8]
+	str	$s2,[$key,#-16]
+	subs	$rounds,$rounds,#1
+	str	$s3,[$key,#-12]
+#ifdef	__thumb2__
+	itt	eq				@ Thumb2 thing, sanity check in ARM
+#endif
+	subeq	r2,$key,#216
+	beq	.Ldone
+
+	ldr	$i1,[$key,#-32]
+	ldr	$i2,[$key,#-28]
+	eor	$i1,$i1,$s3			@ rk[10]=rk[4]^rk[9]
+	eor	$i3,$i2,$i1			@ rk[11]=rk[5]^rk[10]
+	str	$i1,[$key,#-8]
+	str	$i3,[$key,#-4]
+	b	.L192_loop
+
+.Lnot192:
+#if __ARM_ARCH__<7
+	ldrb	$i2,[$rounds,#27]
+	ldrb	$t1,[$rounds,#26]
+	ldrb	$t2,[$rounds,#25]
+	ldrb	$t3,[$rounds,#24]
+	orr	$i2,$i2,$t1,lsl#8
+	ldrb	$i3,[$rounds,#31]
+	orr	$i2,$i2,$t2,lsl#16
+	ldrb	$t1,[$rounds,#30]
+	orr	$i2,$i2,$t3,lsl#24
+	ldrb	$t2,[$rounds,#29]
+	ldrb	$t3,[$rounds,#28]
+	orr	$i3,$i3,$t1,lsl#8
+	orr	$i3,$i3,$t2,lsl#16
+	str	$i2,[$key],#8
+	orr	$i3,$i3,$t3,lsl#24
+	str	$i3,[$key,#-4]
+#else
+	ldr	$i2,[$rounds,#24]
+	ldr	$i3,[$rounds,#28]
+#ifdef __ARMEL__
+	rev	$i2,$i2
+	rev	$i3,$i3
+#endif
+	str	$i2,[$key],#8
+	str	$i3,[$key,#-4]
+#endif
+
+	mov	$rounds,#14
+	str	$rounds,[$key,#240-32]
+	add	$t3,$tbl,#256			@ rcon
+	mov	lr,#255
+	mov	$rounds,#7
+
+.L256_loop:
+	and	$t2,lr,$i3,lsr#24
+	and	$i1,lr,$i3,lsr#16
+	ldrb	$t2,[$tbl,$t2]
+	and	$i2,lr,$i3,lsr#8
+	ldrb	$i1,[$tbl,$i1]
+	and	$i3,lr,$i3
+	ldrb	$i2,[$tbl,$i2]
+	orr	$t2,$t2,$i1,lsl#24
+	ldrb	$i3,[$tbl,$i3]
+	orr	$t2,$t2,$i2,lsl#16
+	ldr	$t1,[$t3],#4			@ rcon[i++]
+	orr	$t2,$t2,$i3,lsl#8
+	eor	$i3,$t2,$t1
+	eor	$s0,$s0,$i3			@ rk[8]=rk[0]^...
+	eor	$s1,$s1,$s0			@ rk[9]=rk[1]^rk[8]
+	str	$s0,[$key],#32
+	eor	$s2,$s2,$s1			@ rk[10]=rk[2]^rk[9]
+	str	$s1,[$key,#-28]
+	eor	$s3,$s3,$s2			@ rk[11]=rk[3]^rk[10]
+	str	$s2,[$key,#-24]
+	subs	$rounds,$rounds,#1
+	str	$s3,[$key,#-20]
+#ifdef	__thumb2__
+	itt	eq				@ Thumb2 thing, sanity check in ARM
+#endif
+	subeq	r2,$key,#256
+	beq	.Ldone
+
+	and	$t2,lr,$s3
+	and	$i1,lr,$s3,lsr#8
+	ldrb	$t2,[$tbl,$t2]
+	and	$i2,lr,$s3,lsr#16
+	ldrb	$i1,[$tbl,$i1]
+	and	$i3,lr,$s3,lsr#24
+	ldrb	$i2,[$tbl,$i2]
+	orr	$t2,$t2,$i1,lsl#8
+	ldrb	$i3,[$tbl,$i3]
+	orr	$t2,$t2,$i2,lsl#16
+	ldr	$t1,[$key,#-48]
+	orr	$t2,$t2,$i3,lsl#24
+
+	ldr	$i1,[$key,#-44]
+	ldr	$i2,[$key,#-40]
+	eor	$t1,$t1,$t2			@ rk[12]=rk[4]^...
+	ldr	$i3,[$key,#-36]
+	eor	$i1,$i1,$t1			@ rk[13]=rk[5]^rk[12]
+	str	$t1,[$key,#-16]
+	eor	$i2,$i2,$i1			@ rk[14]=rk[6]^rk[13]
+	str	$i1,[$key,#-12]
+	eor	$i3,$i3,$i2			@ rk[15]=rk[7]^rk[14]
+	str	$i2,[$key,#-8]
+	str	$i3,[$key,#-4]
+	b	.L256_loop
+
+.align	2
+.Ldone:	mov	r0,#0
+	ldmia   sp!,{r4-r12,lr}
+.Labrt:
+#if __ARM_ARCH__>=5
+	ret				@ bx lr
+#else
+	tst	lr,#1
+	moveq	pc,lr			@ be binary compatible with V4, yet
+	bx	lr			@ interoperable with Thumb ISA:-)
+#endif
+.size	AES_set_encrypt_key,.-AES_set_encrypt_key
+
+.global AES_set_decrypt_key
+.type   AES_set_decrypt_key,%function
+.align	5
+AES_set_decrypt_key:
+	str	lr,[sp,#-4]!            @ push lr
+	bl	_armv4_AES_set_encrypt_key
+	teq	r0,#0
+	ldr	lr,[sp],#4              @ pop lr
+	bne	.Labrt
+
+	mov	r0,r2			@ AES_set_encrypt_key preserves r2,
+	mov	r1,r2			@ which is AES_KEY *key
+	b	_armv4_AES_set_enc2dec_key
+.size	AES_set_decrypt_key,.-AES_set_decrypt_key
+
+@ void AES_set_enc2dec_key(const AES_KEY *inp,AES_KEY *out)
+.global	AES_set_enc2dec_key
+.type	AES_set_enc2dec_key,%function
+.align	5
+AES_set_enc2dec_key:
+_armv4_AES_set_enc2dec_key:
+	stmdb   sp!,{r4-r12,lr}
+
+	ldr	$rounds,[r0,#240]
+	mov	$i1,r0			@ input
+	add	$i2,r0,$rounds,lsl#4
+	mov	$key,r1			@ output
+	add	$tbl,r1,$rounds,lsl#4
+	str	$rounds,[r1,#240]
+
+.Linv:	ldr	$s0,[$i1],#16
+	ldr	$s1,[$i1,#-12]
+	ldr	$s2,[$i1,#-8]
+	ldr	$s3,[$i1,#-4]
+	ldr	$t1,[$i2],#-16
+	ldr	$t2,[$i2,#16+4]
+	ldr	$t3,[$i2,#16+8]
+	ldr	$i3,[$i2,#16+12]
+	str	$s0,[$tbl],#-16
+	str	$s1,[$tbl,#16+4]
+	str	$s2,[$tbl,#16+8]
+	str	$s3,[$tbl,#16+12]
+	str	$t1,[$key],#16
+	str	$t2,[$key,#-12]
+	str	$t3,[$key,#-8]
+	str	$i3,[$key,#-4]
+	teq	$i1,$i2
+	bne	.Linv
+
+	ldr	$s0,[$i1]
+	ldr	$s1,[$i1,#4]
+	ldr	$s2,[$i1,#8]
+	ldr	$s3,[$i1,#12]
+	str	$s0,[$key]
+	str	$s1,[$key,#4]
+	str	$s2,[$key,#8]
+	str	$s3,[$key,#12]
+	sub	$key,$key,$rounds,lsl#3
+___
+$mask80=$i1;
+$mask1b=$i2;
+$mask7f=$i3;
+$code.=<<___;
+	ldr	$s0,[$key,#16]!		@ prefetch tp1
+	mov	$mask80,#0x80
+	mov	$mask1b,#0x1b
+	orr	$mask80,$mask80,#0x8000
+	orr	$mask1b,$mask1b,#0x1b00
+	orr	$mask80,$mask80,$mask80,lsl#16
+	orr	$mask1b,$mask1b,$mask1b,lsl#16
+	sub	$rounds,$rounds,#1
+	mvn	$mask7f,$mask80
+	mov	$rounds,$rounds,lsl#2	@ (rounds-1)*4
+
+.Lmix:	and	$t1,$s0,$mask80
+	and	$s1,$s0,$mask7f
+	sub	$t1,$t1,$t1,lsr#7
+	and	$t1,$t1,$mask1b
+	eor	$s1,$t1,$s1,lsl#1	@ tp2
+
+	and	$t1,$s1,$mask80
+	and	$s2,$s1,$mask7f
+	sub	$t1,$t1,$t1,lsr#7
+	and	$t1,$t1,$mask1b
+	eor	$s2,$t1,$s2,lsl#1	@ tp4
+
+	and	$t1,$s2,$mask80
+	and	$s3,$s2,$mask7f
+	sub	$t1,$t1,$t1,lsr#7
+	and	$t1,$t1,$mask1b
+	eor	$s3,$t1,$s3,lsl#1	@ tp8
+
+	eor	$t1,$s1,$s2
+	eor	$t2,$s0,$s3		@ tp9
+	eor	$t1,$t1,$s3		@ tpe
+	eor	$t1,$t1,$s1,ror#24
+	eor	$t1,$t1,$t2,ror#24	@ ^= ROTATE(tpb=tp9^tp2,8)
+	eor	$t1,$t1,$s2,ror#16
+	eor	$t1,$t1,$t2,ror#16	@ ^= ROTATE(tpd=tp9^tp4,16)
+	eor	$t1,$t1,$t2,ror#8	@ ^= ROTATE(tp9,24)
+
+	ldr	$s0,[$key,#4]		@ prefetch tp1
+	str	$t1,[$key],#4
+	subs	$rounds,$rounds,#1
+	bne	.Lmix
+
+	mov	r0,#0
+#if __ARM_ARCH__>=5
+	ldmia	sp!,{r4-r12,pc}
+#else
+	ldmia   sp!,{r4-r12,lr}
+	tst	lr,#1
+	moveq	pc,lr			@ be binary compatible with V4, yet
+	bx	lr			@ interoperable with Thumb ISA:-)
+#endif
+.size	AES_set_enc2dec_key,.-AES_set_enc2dec_key
+
+.type	AES_Td,%object
+.align	5
+AES_Td:
+.word	0x51f4a750, 0x7e416553, 0x1a17a4c3, 0x3a275e96
+.word	0x3bab6bcb, 0x1f9d45f1, 0xacfa58ab, 0x4be30393
+.word	0x2030fa55, 0xad766df6, 0x88cc7691, 0xf5024c25
+.word	0x4fe5d7fc, 0xc52acbd7, 0x26354480, 0xb562a38f
+.word	0xdeb15a49, 0x25ba1b67, 0x45ea0e98, 0x5dfec0e1
+.word	0xc32f7502, 0x814cf012, 0x8d4697a3, 0x6bd3f9c6
+.word	0x038f5fe7, 0x15929c95, 0xbf6d7aeb, 0x955259da
+.word	0xd4be832d, 0x587421d3, 0x49e06929, 0x8ec9c844
+.word	0x75c2896a, 0xf48e7978, 0x99583e6b, 0x27b971dd
+.word	0xbee14fb6, 0xf088ad17, 0xc920ac66, 0x7dce3ab4
+.word	0x63df4a18, 0xe51a3182, 0x97513360, 0x62537f45
+.word	0xb16477e0, 0xbb6bae84, 0xfe81a01c, 0xf9082b94
+.word	0x70486858, 0x8f45fd19, 0x94de6c87, 0x527bf8b7
+.word	0xab73d323, 0x724b02e2, 0xe31f8f57, 0x6655ab2a
+.word	0xb2eb2807, 0x2fb5c203, 0x86c57b9a, 0xd33708a5
+.word	0x302887f2, 0x23bfa5b2, 0x02036aba, 0xed16825c
+.word	0x8acf1c2b, 0xa779b492, 0xf307f2f0, 0x4e69e2a1
+.word	0x65daf4cd, 0x0605bed5, 0xd134621f, 0xc4a6fe8a
+.word	0x342e539d, 0xa2f355a0, 0x058ae132, 0xa4f6eb75
+.word	0x0b83ec39, 0x4060efaa, 0x5e719f06, 0xbd6e1051
+.word	0x3e218af9, 0x96dd063d, 0xdd3e05ae, 0x4de6bd46
+.word	0x91548db5, 0x71c45d05, 0x0406d46f, 0x605015ff
+.word	0x1998fb24, 0xd6bde997, 0x894043cc, 0x67d99e77
+.word	0xb0e842bd, 0x07898b88, 0xe7195b38, 0x79c8eedb
+.word	0xa17c0a47, 0x7c420fe9, 0xf8841ec9, 0x00000000
+.word	0x09808683, 0x322bed48, 0x1e1170ac, 0x6c5a724e
+.word	0xfd0efffb, 0x0f853856, 0x3daed51e, 0x362d3927
+.word	0x0a0fd964, 0x685ca621, 0x9b5b54d1, 0x24362e3a
+.word	0x0c0a67b1, 0x9357e70f, 0xb4ee96d2, 0x1b9b919e
+.word	0x80c0c54f, 0x61dc20a2, 0x5a774b69, 0x1c121a16
+.word	0xe293ba0a, 0xc0a02ae5, 0x3c22e043, 0x121b171d
+.word	0x0e090d0b, 0xf28bc7ad, 0x2db6a8b9, 0x141ea9c8
+.word	0x57f11985, 0xaf75074c, 0xee99ddbb, 0xa37f60fd
+.word	0xf701269f, 0x5c72f5bc, 0x44663bc5, 0x5bfb7e34
+.word	0x8b432976, 0xcb23c6dc, 0xb6edfc68, 0xb8e4f163
+.word	0xd731dcca, 0x42638510, 0x13972240, 0x84c61120
+.word	0x854a247d, 0xd2bb3df8, 0xaef93211, 0xc729a16d
+.word	0x1d9e2f4b, 0xdcb230f3, 0x0d8652ec, 0x77c1e3d0
+.word	0x2bb3166c, 0xa970b999, 0x119448fa, 0x47e96422
+.word	0xa8fc8cc4, 0xa0f03f1a, 0x567d2cd8, 0x223390ef
+.word	0x87494ec7, 0xd938d1c1, 0x8ccaa2fe, 0x98d40b36
+.word	0xa6f581cf, 0xa57ade28, 0xdab78e26, 0x3fadbfa4
+.word	0x2c3a9de4, 0x5078920d, 0x6a5fcc9b, 0x547e4662
+.word	0xf68d13c2, 0x90d8b8e8, 0x2e39f75e, 0x82c3aff5
+.word	0x9f5d80be, 0x69d0937c, 0x6fd52da9, 0xcf2512b3
+.word	0xc8ac993b, 0x10187da7, 0xe89c636e, 0xdb3bbb7b
+.word	0xcd267809, 0x6e5918f4, 0xec9ab701, 0x834f9aa8
+.word	0xe6956e65, 0xaaffe67e, 0x21bccf08, 0xef15e8e6
+.word	0xbae79bd9, 0x4a6f36ce, 0xea9f09d4, 0x29b07cd6
+.word	0x31a4b2af, 0x2a3f2331, 0xc6a59430, 0x35a266c0
+.word	0x744ebc37, 0xfc82caa6, 0xe090d0b0, 0x33a7d815
+.word	0xf104984a, 0x41ecdaf7, 0x7fcd500e, 0x1791f62f
+.word	0x764dd68d, 0x43efb04d, 0xccaa4d54, 0xe49604df
+.word	0x9ed1b5e3, 0x4c6a881b, 0xc12c1fb8, 0x4665517f
+.word	0x9d5eea04, 0x018c355d, 0xfa877473, 0xfb0b412e
+.word	0xb3671d5a, 0x92dbd252, 0xe9105633, 0x6dd64713
+.word	0x9ad7618c, 0x37a10c7a, 0x59f8148e, 0xeb133c89
+.word	0xcea927ee, 0xb761c935, 0xe11ce5ed, 0x7a47b13c
+.word	0x9cd2df59, 0x55f2733f, 0x1814ce79, 0x73c737bf
+.word	0x53f7cdea, 0x5ffdaa5b, 0xdf3d6f14, 0x7844db86
+.word	0xcaaff381, 0xb968c43e, 0x3824342c, 0xc2a3405f
+.word	0x161dc372, 0xbce2250c, 0x283c498b, 0xff0d9541
+.word	0x39a80171, 0x080cb3de, 0xd8b4e49c, 0x6456c190
+.word	0x7bcb8461, 0xd532b670, 0x486c5c74, 0xd0b85742
+@ Td4[256]
+.byte	0x52, 0x09, 0x6a, 0xd5, 0x30, 0x36, 0xa5, 0x38
+.byte	0xbf, 0x40, 0xa3, 0x9e, 0x81, 0xf3, 0xd7, 0xfb
+.byte	0x7c, 0xe3, 0x39, 0x82, 0x9b, 0x2f, 0xff, 0x87
+.byte	0x34, 0x8e, 0x43, 0x44, 0xc4, 0xde, 0xe9, 0xcb
+.byte	0x54, 0x7b, 0x94, 0x32, 0xa6, 0xc2, 0x23, 0x3d
+.byte	0xee, 0x4c, 0x95, 0x0b, 0x42, 0xfa, 0xc3, 0x4e
+.byte	0x08, 0x2e, 0xa1, 0x66, 0x28, 0xd9, 0x24, 0xb2
+.byte	0x76, 0x5b, 0xa2, 0x49, 0x6d, 0x8b, 0xd1, 0x25
+.byte	0x72, 0xf8, 0xf6, 0x64, 0x86, 0x68, 0x98, 0x16
+.byte	0xd4, 0xa4, 0x5c, 0xcc, 0x5d, 0x65, 0xb6, 0x92
+.byte	0x6c, 0x70, 0x48, 0x50, 0xfd, 0xed, 0xb9, 0xda
+.byte	0x5e, 0x15, 0x46, 0x57, 0xa7, 0x8d, 0x9d, 0x84
+.byte	0x90, 0xd8, 0xab, 0x00, 0x8c, 0xbc, 0xd3, 0x0a
+.byte	0xf7, 0xe4, 0x58, 0x05, 0xb8, 0xb3, 0x45, 0x06
+.byte	0xd0, 0x2c, 0x1e, 0x8f, 0xca, 0x3f, 0x0f, 0x02
+.byte	0xc1, 0xaf, 0xbd, 0x03, 0x01, 0x13, 0x8a, 0x6b
+.byte	0x3a, 0x91, 0x11, 0x41, 0x4f, 0x67, 0xdc, 0xea
+.byte	0x97, 0xf2, 0xcf, 0xce, 0xf0, 0xb4, 0xe6, 0x73
+.byte	0x96, 0xac, 0x74, 0x22, 0xe7, 0xad, 0x35, 0x85
+.byte	0xe2, 0xf9, 0x37, 0xe8, 0x1c, 0x75, 0xdf, 0x6e
+.byte	0x47, 0xf1, 0x1a, 0x71, 0x1d, 0x29, 0xc5, 0x89
+.byte	0x6f, 0xb7, 0x62, 0x0e, 0xaa, 0x18, 0xbe, 0x1b
+.byte	0xfc, 0x56, 0x3e, 0x4b, 0xc6, 0xd2, 0x79, 0x20
+.byte	0x9a, 0xdb, 0xc0, 0xfe, 0x78, 0xcd, 0x5a, 0xf4
+.byte	0x1f, 0xdd, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x88, 0x07, 0xc7, 0x31
+.byte	0xb1, 0x12, 0x10, 0x59, 0x27, 0x80, 0xec, 0x5f
+.byte	0x60, 0x51, 0x7f, 0xa9, 0x19, 0xb5, 0x4a, 0x0d
+.byte	0x2d, 0xe5, 0x7a, 0x9f, 0x93, 0xc9, 0x9c, 0xef
+.byte	0xa0, 0xe0, 0x3b, 0x4d, 0xae, 0x2a, 0xf5, 0xb0
+.byte	0xc8, 0xeb, 0xbb, 0x3c, 0x83, 0x53, 0x99, 0x61
+.byte	0x17, 0x2b, 0x04, 0x7e, 0xba, 0x77, 0xd6, 0x26
+.byte	0xe1, 0x69, 0x14, 0x63, 0x55, 0x21, 0x0c, 0x7d
+.size	AES_Td,.-AES_Td
+
+@ void AES_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+@ 		 const AES_KEY *key) {
+.global AES_decrypt
+.type   AES_decrypt,%function
+.align	5
+AES_decrypt:
+#ifndef	__thumb2__
+	sub	r3,pc,#8		@ AES_decrypt
+#else
+	adr	r3,.
+#endif
+	stmdb   sp!,{r1,r4-r12,lr}
+#if defined(__thumb2__) || defined(__APPLE__)
+	adr	$tbl,AES_Td
+#else
+	sub	$tbl,r3,#AES_decrypt-AES_Td	@ Td
+#endif
+	mov	$rounds,r0		@ inp
+	mov	$key,r2
+#if __ARM_ARCH__<7
+	ldrb	$s0,[$rounds,#3]	@ load input data in endian-neutral
+	ldrb	$t1,[$rounds,#2]	@ manner...
+	ldrb	$t2,[$rounds,#1]
+	ldrb	$t3,[$rounds,#0]
+	orr	$s0,$s0,$t1,lsl#8
+	ldrb	$s1,[$rounds,#7]
+	orr	$s0,$s0,$t2,lsl#16
+	ldrb	$t1,[$rounds,#6]
+	orr	$s0,$s0,$t3,lsl#24
+	ldrb	$t2,[$rounds,#5]
+	ldrb	$t3,[$rounds,#4]
+	orr	$s1,$s1,$t1,lsl#8
+	ldrb	$s2,[$rounds,#11]
+	orr	$s1,$s1,$t2,lsl#16
+	ldrb	$t1,[$rounds,#10]
+	orr	$s1,$s1,$t3,lsl#24
+	ldrb	$t2,[$rounds,#9]
+	ldrb	$t3,[$rounds,#8]
+	orr	$s2,$s2,$t1,lsl#8
+	ldrb	$s3,[$rounds,#15]
+	orr	$s2,$s2,$t2,lsl#16
+	ldrb	$t1,[$rounds,#14]
+	orr	$s2,$s2,$t3,lsl#24
+	ldrb	$t2,[$rounds,#13]
+	ldrb	$t3,[$rounds,#12]
+	orr	$s3,$s3,$t1,lsl#8
+	orr	$s3,$s3,$t2,lsl#16
+	orr	$s3,$s3,$t3,lsl#24
+#else
+	ldr	$s0,[$rounds,#0]
+	ldr	$s1,[$rounds,#4]
+	ldr	$s2,[$rounds,#8]
+	ldr	$s3,[$rounds,#12]
+#ifdef __ARMEL__
+	rev	$s0,$s0
+	rev	$s1,$s1
+	rev	$s2,$s2
+	rev	$s3,$s3
+#endif
+#endif
+	bl	_armv4_AES_decrypt
+
+	ldr	$rounds,[sp],#4		@ pop out
+#if __ARM_ARCH__>=7
+#ifdef __ARMEL__
+	rev	$s0,$s0
+	rev	$s1,$s1
+	rev	$s2,$s2
+	rev	$s3,$s3
+#endif
+	str	$s0,[$rounds,#0]
+	str	$s1,[$rounds,#4]
+	str	$s2,[$rounds,#8]
+	str	$s3,[$rounds,#12]
+#else
+	mov	$t1,$s0,lsr#24		@ write output in endian-neutral
+	mov	$t2,$s0,lsr#16		@ manner...
+	mov	$t3,$s0,lsr#8
+	strb	$t1,[$rounds,#0]
+	strb	$t2,[$rounds,#1]
+	mov	$t1,$s1,lsr#24
+	strb	$t3,[$rounds,#2]
+	mov	$t2,$s1,lsr#16
+	strb	$s0,[$rounds,#3]
+	mov	$t3,$s1,lsr#8
+	strb	$t1,[$rounds,#4]
+	strb	$t2,[$rounds,#5]
+	mov	$t1,$s2,lsr#24
+	strb	$t3,[$rounds,#6]
+	mov	$t2,$s2,lsr#16
+	strb	$s1,[$rounds,#7]
+	mov	$t3,$s2,lsr#8
+	strb	$t1,[$rounds,#8]
+	strb	$t2,[$rounds,#9]
+	mov	$t1,$s3,lsr#24
+	strb	$t3,[$rounds,#10]
+	mov	$t2,$s3,lsr#16
+	strb	$s2,[$rounds,#11]
+	mov	$t3,$s3,lsr#8
+	strb	$t1,[$rounds,#12]
+	strb	$t2,[$rounds,#13]
+	strb	$t3,[$rounds,#14]
+	strb	$s3,[$rounds,#15]
+#endif
+#if __ARM_ARCH__>=5
+	ldmia	sp!,{r4-r12,pc}
+#else
+	ldmia   sp!,{r4-r12,lr}
+	tst	lr,#1
+	moveq	pc,lr			@ be binary compatible with V4, yet
+	bx	lr			@ interoperable with Thumb ISA:-)
+#endif
+.size	AES_decrypt,.-AES_decrypt
+
+.type   _armv4_AES_decrypt,%function
+.align	2
+_armv4_AES_decrypt:
+	str	lr,[sp,#-4]!		@ push lr
+	ldmia	$key!,{$t1-$i1}
+	eor	$s0,$s0,$t1
+	ldr	$rounds,[$key,#240-16]
+	eor	$s1,$s1,$t2
+	eor	$s2,$s2,$t3
+	eor	$s3,$s3,$i1
+	sub	$rounds,$rounds,#1
+	mov	lr,#255
+
+	and	$i1,lr,$s0,lsr#16
+	and	$i2,lr,$s0,lsr#8
+	and	$i3,lr,$s0
+	mov	$s0,$s0,lsr#24
+.Ldec_loop:
+	ldr	$t1,[$tbl,$i1,lsl#2]	@ Td1[s0>>16]
+	and	$i1,lr,$s1		@ i0
+	ldr	$t2,[$tbl,$i2,lsl#2]	@ Td2[s0>>8]
+	and	$i2,lr,$s1,lsr#16
+	ldr	$t3,[$tbl,$i3,lsl#2]	@ Td3[s0>>0]
+	and	$i3,lr,$s1,lsr#8
+	ldr	$s0,[$tbl,$s0,lsl#2]	@ Td0[s0>>24]
+	mov	$s1,$s1,lsr#24
+
+	ldr	$i1,[$tbl,$i1,lsl#2]	@ Td3[s1>>0]
+	ldr	$i2,[$tbl,$i2,lsl#2]	@ Td1[s1>>16]
+	ldr	$i3,[$tbl,$i3,lsl#2]	@ Td2[s1>>8]
+	eor	$s0,$s0,$i1,ror#24
+	ldr	$s1,[$tbl,$s1,lsl#2]	@ Td0[s1>>24]
+	and	$i1,lr,$s2,lsr#8	@ i0
+	eor	$t2,$i2,$t2,ror#8
+	and	$i2,lr,$s2		@ i1
+	eor	$t3,$i3,$t3,ror#8
+	and	$i3,lr,$s2,lsr#16
+	ldr	$i1,[$tbl,$i1,lsl#2]	@ Td2[s2>>8]
+	eor	$s1,$s1,$t1,ror#8
+	ldr	$i2,[$tbl,$i2,lsl#2]	@ Td3[s2>>0]
+	mov	$s2,$s2,lsr#24
+
+	ldr	$i3,[$tbl,$i3,lsl#2]	@ Td1[s2>>16]
+	eor	$s0,$s0,$i1,ror#16
+	ldr	$s2,[$tbl,$s2,lsl#2]	@ Td0[s2>>24]
+	and	$i1,lr,$s3,lsr#16	@ i0
+	eor	$s1,$s1,$i2,ror#24
+	and	$i2,lr,$s3,lsr#8	@ i1
+	eor	$t3,$i3,$t3,ror#8
+	and	$i3,lr,$s3		@ i2
+	ldr	$i1,[$tbl,$i1,lsl#2]	@ Td1[s3>>16]
+	eor	$s2,$s2,$t2,ror#8
+	ldr	$i2,[$tbl,$i2,lsl#2]	@ Td2[s3>>8]
+	mov	$s3,$s3,lsr#24
+
+	ldr	$i3,[$tbl,$i3,lsl#2]	@ Td3[s3>>0]
+	eor	$s0,$s0,$i1,ror#8
+	ldr	$i1,[$key],#16
+	eor	$s1,$s1,$i2,ror#16
+	ldr	$s3,[$tbl,$s3,lsl#2]	@ Td0[s3>>24]
+	eor	$s2,$s2,$i3,ror#24
+
+	ldr	$t1,[$key,#-12]
+	eor	$s0,$s0,$i1
+	ldr	$t2,[$key,#-8]
+	eor	$s3,$s3,$t3,ror#8
+	ldr	$t3,[$key,#-4]
+	and	$i1,lr,$s0,lsr#16
+	eor	$s1,$s1,$t1
+	and	$i2,lr,$s0,lsr#8
+	eor	$s2,$s2,$t2
+	and	$i3,lr,$s0
+	eor	$s3,$s3,$t3
+	mov	$s0,$s0,lsr#24
+
+	subs	$rounds,$rounds,#1
+	bne	.Ldec_loop
+
+	add	$tbl,$tbl,#1024
+
+	ldr	$t2,[$tbl,#0]		@ prefetch Td4
+	ldr	$t3,[$tbl,#32]
+	ldr	$t1,[$tbl,#64]
+	ldr	$t2,[$tbl,#96]
+	ldr	$t3,[$tbl,#128]
+	ldr	$t1,[$tbl,#160]
+	ldr	$t2,[$tbl,#192]
+	ldr	$t3,[$tbl,#224]
+
+	ldrb	$s0,[$tbl,$s0]		@ Td4[s0>>24]
+	ldrb	$t1,[$tbl,$i1]		@ Td4[s0>>16]
+	and	$i1,lr,$s1		@ i0
+	ldrb	$t2,[$tbl,$i2]		@ Td4[s0>>8]
+	and	$i2,lr,$s1,lsr#16
+	ldrb	$t3,[$tbl,$i3]		@ Td4[s0>>0]
+	and	$i3,lr,$s1,lsr#8
+
+	add	$s1,$tbl,$s1,lsr#24
+	ldrb	$i1,[$tbl,$i1]		@ Td4[s1>>0]
+	ldrb	$s1,[$s1]		@ Td4[s1>>24]
+	ldrb	$i2,[$tbl,$i2]		@ Td4[s1>>16]
+	eor	$s0,$i1,$s0,lsl#24
+	ldrb	$i3,[$tbl,$i3]		@ Td4[s1>>8]
+	eor	$s1,$t1,$s1,lsl#8
+	and	$i1,lr,$s2,lsr#8	@ i0
+	eor	$t2,$t2,$i2,lsl#8
+	and	$i2,lr,$s2		@ i1
+	ldrb	$i1,[$tbl,$i1]		@ Td4[s2>>8]
+	eor	$t3,$t3,$i3,lsl#8
+	ldrb	$i2,[$tbl,$i2]		@ Td4[s2>>0]
+	and	$i3,lr,$s2,lsr#16
+
+	add	$s2,$tbl,$s2,lsr#24
+	ldrb	$s2,[$s2]		@ Td4[s2>>24]
+	eor	$s0,$s0,$i1,lsl#8
+	ldrb	$i3,[$tbl,$i3]		@ Td4[s2>>16]
+	eor	$s1,$i2,$s1,lsl#16
+	and	$i1,lr,$s3,lsr#16	@ i0
+	eor	$s2,$t2,$s2,lsl#16
+	and	$i2,lr,$s3,lsr#8	@ i1
+	ldrb	$i1,[$tbl,$i1]		@ Td4[s3>>16]
+	eor	$t3,$t3,$i3,lsl#16
+	ldrb	$i2,[$tbl,$i2]		@ Td4[s3>>8]
+	and	$i3,lr,$s3		@ i2
+
+	add	$s3,$tbl,$s3,lsr#24
+	ldrb	$i3,[$tbl,$i3]		@ Td4[s3>>0]
+	ldrb	$s3,[$s3]		@ Td4[s3>>24]
+	eor	$s0,$s0,$i1,lsl#16
+	ldr	$i1,[$key,#0]
+	eor	$s1,$s1,$i2,lsl#8
+	ldr	$t1,[$key,#4]
+	eor	$s2,$i3,$s2,lsl#8
+	ldr	$t2,[$key,#8]
+	eor	$s3,$t3,$s3,lsl#24
+	ldr	$t3,[$key,#12]
+
+	eor	$s0,$s0,$i1
+	eor	$s1,$s1,$t1
+	eor	$s2,$s2,$t2
+	eor	$s3,$s3,$t3
+
+	sub	$tbl,$tbl,#1024
+	ldr	pc,[sp],#4		@ pop and return
+.size	_armv4_AES_decrypt,.-_armv4_AES_decrypt
+.asciz	"AES for ARMv4, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+.align	2
+___
+
+$code =~ s/\bbx\s+lr\b/.word\t0xe12fff1e/gm;	# make it possible to compile with -march=armv4
+$code =~ s/\bret\b/bx\tlr/gm;
+
+open SELF,$0;
+while(<SELF>) {
+	next if (/^#!/);
+	last if (!s/^#/@/ and !/^$/);
+	print;
+}
+close SELF;
+
+print $code;
+close STDOUT;	# enforce flush
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/asm/aes-c64xplus.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/asm/aes-c64xplus.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..19d2cc1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/asm/aes-c64xplus.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,1382 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2012-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# [Endian-neutral] AES for C64x+.
+#
+# Even though SPLOOPs are scheduled for 13 cycles, and thus expected
+# performance is ~8.5 cycles per byte processed with 128-bit key,
+# measured performance turned to be ~10 cycles per byte. Discrepancy
+# must be caused by limitations of L1D memory banking(*), see SPRU871
+# TI publication for further details. If any consolation it's still
+# ~20% faster than TI's linear assembly module anyway... Compared to
+# aes_core.c compiled with cl6x 6.0 with -mv6400+ -o2 options this
+# code is 3.75x faster and almost 3x smaller (tables included).
+#
+# (*)	This means that there might be subtle correlation between data
+#	and timing and one can wonder if it can be ... attacked:-(
+#	On the other hand this also means that *if* one chooses to
+#	implement *4* T-tables variant [instead of 1 T-table as in
+#	this implementation, or in addition to], then one ought to
+#	*interleave* them. Even though it complicates addressing,
+#	references to interleaved tables would be guaranteed not to
+#	clash. I reckon that it should be possible to break 8 cycles
+#	per byte "barrier," i.e. improve by ~20%, naturally at the
+#	cost of 8x increased pressure on L1D. 8x because you'd have
+#	to interleave both Te and Td tables...
+
+while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {}
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+($TEA,$TEB)=("A5","B5");
+($KPA,$KPB)=("A3","B1");
+@K=("A6","B6","A7","B7");
+@s=("A8","B8","A9","B9");
+@Te0=@Td0=("A16","B16","A17","B17");
+@Te1=@Td1=("A18","B18","A19","B19");
+@Te2=@Td2=("A20","B20","A21","B21");
+@Te3=@Td3=("A22","B22","A23","B23");
+
+$code=<<___;
+	.text
+
+	.if	.ASSEMBLER_VERSION<7000000
+	.asg	0,__TI_EABI__
+	.endif
+	.if	__TI_EABI__
+	.nocmp
+	.asg	AES_encrypt,_AES_encrypt
+	.asg	AES_decrypt,_AES_decrypt
+	.asg	AES_set_encrypt_key,_AES_set_encrypt_key
+	.asg	AES_set_decrypt_key,_AES_set_decrypt_key
+	.asg	AES_ctr32_encrypt,_AES_ctr32_encrypt
+	.endif
+
+	.asg	B3,RA
+	.asg	A4,INP
+	.asg	B4,OUT
+	.asg	A6,KEY
+	.asg	A4,RET
+	.asg	B15,SP
+
+	.eval	24,EXT0
+	.eval	16,EXT1
+	.eval	8,EXT2
+	.eval	0,EXT3
+	.eval	8,TBL1
+	.eval	16,TBL2
+	.eval	24,TBL3
+
+	.if	.BIG_ENDIAN
+	.eval	24-EXT0,EXT0
+	.eval	24-EXT1,EXT1
+	.eval	24-EXT2,EXT2
+	.eval	24-EXT3,EXT3
+	.eval	32-TBL1,TBL1
+	.eval	32-TBL2,TBL2
+	.eval	32-TBL3,TBL3
+	.endif
+
+	.global	_AES_encrypt
+_AES_encrypt:
+	.asmfunc
+	MVK	1,B2
+__encrypt:
+	.if	__TI_EABI__
+   [B2]	LDNDW	*INP++,A9:A8			; load input
+||	MVKL	\$PCR_OFFSET(AES_Te,__encrypt),$TEA
+||	ADDKPC	__encrypt,B0
+   [B2]	LDNDW	*INP++,B9:B8
+||	MVKH	\$PCR_OFFSET(AES_Te,__encrypt),$TEA
+||	ADD	0,KEY,$KPA
+||	ADD	4,KEY,$KPB
+	.else
+   [B2]	LDNDW	*INP++,A9:A8			; load input
+||	MVKL	(AES_Te-__encrypt),$TEA
+||	ADDKPC	__encrypt,B0
+   [B2]	LDNDW	*INP++,B9:B8
+||	MVKH	(AES_Te-__encrypt),$TEA
+||	ADD	0,KEY,$KPA
+||	ADD	4,KEY,$KPB
+	.endif
+	LDW	*$KPA++[2],$Te0[0]		; zero round key
+||	LDW	*$KPB++[2],$Te0[1]
+||	MVK	60,A0
+||	ADD	B0,$TEA,$TEA			; AES_Te
+	LDW	*KEY[A0],B0			; rounds
+||	MVK	1024,A0				; sizeof(AES_Te)
+	LDW	*$KPA++[2],$Te0[2]
+||	LDW	*$KPB++[2],$Te0[3]
+||	MV	$TEA,$TEB
+	NOP
+	.if	.BIG_ENDIAN
+	MV	A9,$s[0]
+||	MV	A8,$s[1]
+||	MV	B9,$s[2]
+||	MV	B8,$s[3]
+	.else
+	MV	A8,$s[0]
+||	MV	A9,$s[1]
+||	MV	B8,$s[2]
+||	MV	B9,$s[3]
+	.endif
+	XOR	$Te0[0],$s[0],$s[0]
+||	XOR	$Te0[1],$s[1],$s[1]
+||	LDW	*$KPA++[2],$K[0]		; 1st round key
+||	LDW	*$KPB++[2],$K[1]
+	SUB	B0,2,B0
+
+	SPLOOPD	13
+||	MVC	B0,ILC
+||	LDW	*$KPA++[2],$K[2]
+||	LDW	*$KPB++[2],$K[3]
+;;====================================================================
+	EXTU	$s[1],EXT1,24,$Te1[1]
+||	EXTU	$s[0],EXT3,24,$Te3[0]
+	LDW	*${TEB}[$Te1[1]],$Te1[1]	; Te1[s1>>8],	t0
+||	LDW	*${TEA}[$Te3[0]],$Te3[0]	; Te3[s0>>24],	t1
+||	XOR	$s[2],$Te0[2],$s[2]		; modulo-scheduled
+||	XOR	$s[3],$Te0[3],$s[3]		; modulo-scheduled
+||	EXTU	$s[1],EXT3,24,$Te3[1]
+||	EXTU	$s[0],EXT1,24,$Te1[0]
+	LDW	*${TEB}[$Te3[1]],$Te3[1]	; Te3[s1>>24],	t2
+||	LDW	*${TEA}[$Te1[0]],$Te1[0]	; Te1[s0>>8],	t3
+||	EXTU	$s[2],EXT2,24,$Te2[2]
+||	EXTU	$s[3],EXT2,24,$Te2[3]
+	LDW	*${TEA}[$Te2[2]],$Te2[2]	; Te2[s2>>16],	t0
+||	LDW	*${TEB}[$Te2[3]],$Te2[3]	; Te2[s3>>16],	t1
+||	EXTU	$s[3],EXT3,24,$Te3[3]
+||	EXTU	$s[2],EXT1,24,$Te1[2]
+	LDW	*${TEB}[$Te3[3]],$Te3[3]	; Te3[s3>>24],	t0
+||	LDW	*${TEA}[$Te1[2]],$Te1[2]	; Te1[s2>>8],	t1
+||	EXTU	$s[0],EXT2,24,$Te2[0]
+||	EXTU	$s[1],EXT2,24,$Te2[1]
+	LDW	*${TEA}[$Te2[0]],$Te2[0]	; Te2[s0>>16],	t2
+||	LDW	*${TEB}[$Te2[1]],$Te2[1]	; Te2[s1>>16],	t3
+||	EXTU	$s[3],EXT1,24,$Te1[3]
+||	EXTU	$s[2],EXT3,24,$Te3[2]
+	LDW	*${TEB}[$Te1[3]],$Te1[3]	; Te1[s3>>8],	t2
+||	LDW	*${TEA}[$Te3[2]],$Te3[2]	; Te3[s2>>24],	t3
+||	ROTL	$Te1[1],TBL1,$Te3[0]		; t0
+||	ROTL	$Te3[0],TBL3,$Te1[1]		; t1
+||	EXTU	$s[0],EXT0,24,$Te0[0]
+||	EXTU	$s[1],EXT0,24,$Te0[1]
+	LDW	*${TEA}[$Te0[0]],$Te0[0]	; Te0[s0],	t0
+||	LDW	*${TEB}[$Te0[1]],$Te0[1]	; Te0[s1],	t1
+||	ROTL	$Te3[1],TBL3,$Te1[0]		; t2
+||	ROTL	$Te1[0],TBL1,$Te3[1]		; t3
+||	EXTU	$s[2],EXT0,24,$Te0[2]
+||	EXTU	$s[3],EXT0,24,$Te0[3]
+	LDW	*${TEA}[$Te0[2]],$Te0[2]	; Te0[s2],	t2
+||	LDW	*${TEB}[$Te0[3]],$Te0[3]	; Te0[s3],	t3
+||	ROTL	$Te2[2],TBL2,$Te2[2]		; t0
+||	ROTL	$Te2[3],TBL2,$Te2[3]		; t1
+||	XOR	$K[0],$Te3[0],$s[0]
+||	XOR	$K[1],$Te1[1],$s[1]
+	ROTL	$Te3[3],TBL3,$Te1[2]		; t0
+||	ROTL	$Te1[2],TBL1,$Te3[3]		; t1
+||	XOR	$K[2],$Te1[0],$s[2]
+||	XOR	$K[3],$Te3[1],$s[3]
+||	LDW	*$KPA++[2],$K[0]		; next round key
+||	LDW	*$KPB++[2],$K[1]
+	ROTL	$Te2[0],TBL2,$Te2[0]		; t2
+||	ROTL	$Te2[1],TBL2,$Te2[1]		; t3
+||	XOR	$s[0],$Te2[2],$s[0]
+||	XOR	$s[1],$Te2[3],$s[1]
+||	LDW	*$KPA++[2],$K[2]
+||	LDW	*$KPB++[2],$K[3]
+	ROTL	$Te1[3],TBL1,$Te3[2]		; t2
+||	ROTL	$Te3[2],TBL3,$Te1[3]		; t3
+||	XOR	$s[0],$Te1[2],$s[0]
+||	XOR	$s[1],$Te3[3],$s[1]
+	XOR	$s[2],$Te2[0],$s[2]
+||	XOR	$s[3],$Te2[1],$s[3]
+||	XOR	$s[0],$Te0[0],$s[0]
+||	XOR	$s[1],$Te0[1],$s[1]
+	SPKERNEL
+||	XOR.L	$s[2],$Te3[2],$s[2]
+||	XOR.L	$s[3],$Te1[3],$s[3]
+;;====================================================================
+	ADD.D	${TEA},A0,${TEA}		; point to Te4
+||	ADD.D	${TEB},A0,${TEB}
+||	EXTU	$s[1],EXT1,24,$Te1[1]
+||	EXTU	$s[0],EXT3,24,$Te3[0]
+	LDBU	*${TEB}[$Te1[1]],$Te1[1]	; Te1[s1>>8],	t0
+||	LDBU	*${TEA}[$Te3[0]],$Te3[0]	; Te3[s0>>24],	t1
+||	XOR	$s[2],$Te0[2],$s[2]		; modulo-scheduled
+||	XOR	$s[3],$Te0[3],$s[3]		; modulo-scheduled
+||	EXTU	$s[0],EXT0,24,$Te0[0]
+||	EXTU	$s[1],EXT0,24,$Te0[1]
+	LDBU	*${TEA}[$Te0[0]],$Te0[0]	; Te0[s0],	t0
+||	LDBU	*${TEB}[$Te0[1]],$Te0[1]	; Te0[s1],	t1
+||	EXTU	$s[3],EXT3,24,$Te3[3]
+||	EXTU	$s[2],EXT1,24,$Te1[2]
+	LDBU	*${TEB}[$Te3[3]],$Te3[3]	; Te3[s3>>24],	t0
+||	LDBU	*${TEA}[$Te1[2]],$Te1[2]	; Te1[s2>>8],	t1
+||	EXTU	$s[2],EXT2,24,$Te2[2]
+||	EXTU	$s[3],EXT2,24,$Te2[3]
+	LDBU	*${TEA}[$Te2[2]],$Te2[2]	; Te2[s2>>16],	t0
+||	LDBU	*${TEB}[$Te2[3]],$Te2[3]	; Te2[s3>>16],	t1
+||	EXTU	$s[1],EXT3,24,$Te3[1]
+||	EXTU	$s[0],EXT1,24,$Te1[0]
+	LDBU	*${TEB}[$Te3[1]],$Te3[1]	; Te3[s1>>24],	t2
+||	LDBU	*${TEA}[$Te1[0]],$Te1[0]	; Te1[s0>>8],	t3
+||	EXTU	$s[3],EXT1,24,$Te1[3]
+||	EXTU	$s[2],EXT3,24,$Te3[2]
+	LDBU	*${TEB}[$Te1[3]],$Te1[3]	; Te1[s3>>8],	t2
+||	LDBU	*${TEA}[$Te3[2]],$Te3[2]	; Te3[s2>>24],	t3
+||	EXTU	$s[2],EXT0,24,$Te0[2]
+||	EXTU	$s[3],EXT0,24,$Te0[3]
+	LDBU	*${TEA}[$Te0[2]],$Te0[2]	; Te0[s2],	t2
+||	LDBU	*${TEB}[$Te0[3]],$Te0[3]	; Te0[s3],	t3
+||	EXTU	$s[0],EXT2,24,$Te2[0]
+||	EXTU	$s[1],EXT2,24,$Te2[1]
+	LDBU	*${TEA}[$Te2[0]],$Te2[0]	; Te2[s0>>16],	t2
+||	LDBU	*${TEB}[$Te2[1]],$Te2[1]	; Te2[s1>>16],	t3
+
+	.if	.BIG_ENDIAN
+	PACK2	$Te0[0],$Te1[1],$Te0[0]
+||	PACK2	$Te0[1],$Te1[2],$Te0[1]
+	PACK2	$Te2[2],$Te3[3],$Te2[2]
+||	PACK2	$Te2[3],$Te3[0],$Te2[3]
+	PACKL4	$Te0[0],$Te2[2],$Te0[0]
+||	PACKL4	$Te0[1],$Te2[3],$Te0[1]
+	XOR	$K[0],$Te0[0],$Te0[0]		; s[0]
+||	XOR	$K[1],$Te0[1],$Te0[1]		; s[1]
+
+	PACK2	$Te0[2],$Te1[3],$Te0[2]
+||	PACK2	$Te0[3],$Te1[0],$Te0[3]
+	PACK2	$Te2[0],$Te3[1],$Te2[0]
+||	PACK2	$Te2[1],$Te3[2],$Te2[1]
+||	BNOP	RA
+	PACKL4	$Te0[2],$Te2[0],$Te0[2]
+||	PACKL4	$Te0[3],$Te2[1],$Te0[3]
+	XOR	$K[2],$Te0[2],$Te0[2]		; s[2]
+||	XOR	$K[3],$Te0[3],$Te0[3]		; s[3]
+
+	MV	$Te0[0],A9
+||	MV	$Te0[1],A8
+	MV	$Te0[2],B9
+||	MV	$Te0[3],B8
+|| [B2]	STNDW	A9:A8,*OUT++
+   [B2]	STNDW	B9:B8,*OUT++
+	.else
+	PACK2	$Te1[1],$Te0[0],$Te1[1]
+||	PACK2	$Te1[2],$Te0[1],$Te1[2]
+	PACK2	$Te3[3],$Te2[2],$Te3[3]
+||	PACK2	$Te3[0],$Te2[3],$Te3[0]
+	PACKL4	$Te3[3],$Te1[1],$Te1[1]
+||	PACKL4	$Te3[0],$Te1[2],$Te1[2]
+	XOR	$K[0],$Te1[1],$Te1[1]		; s[0]
+||	XOR	$K[1],$Te1[2],$Te1[2]		; s[1]
+
+	PACK2	$Te1[3],$Te0[2],$Te1[3]
+||	PACK2	$Te1[0],$Te0[3],$Te1[0]
+	PACK2	$Te3[1],$Te2[0],$Te3[1]
+||	PACK2	$Te3[2],$Te2[1],$Te3[2]
+||	BNOP	RA
+	PACKL4	$Te3[1],$Te1[3],$Te1[3]
+||	PACKL4	$Te3[2],$Te1[0],$Te1[0]
+	XOR	$K[2],$Te1[3],$Te1[3]		; s[2]
+||	XOR	$K[3],$Te1[0],$Te1[0]		; s[3]
+
+	MV	$Te1[1],A8
+||	MV	$Te1[2],A9
+	MV	$Te1[3],B8
+||	MV	$Te1[0],B9
+|| [B2]	STNDW	A9:A8,*OUT++
+   [B2]	STNDW	B9:B8,*OUT++
+	.endif
+	.endasmfunc
+
+	.global	_AES_decrypt
+_AES_decrypt:
+	.asmfunc
+	MVK	1,B2
+__decrypt:
+	.if	__TI_EABI__
+   [B2]	LDNDW	*INP++,A9:A8			; load input
+||	MVKL	\$PCR_OFFSET(AES_Td,__decrypt),$TEA
+||	ADDKPC	__decrypt,B0
+   [B2]	LDNDW	*INP++,B9:B8
+||	MVKH	\$PCR_OFFSET(AES_Td,__decrypt),$TEA
+||	ADD	0,KEY,$KPA
+||	ADD	4,KEY,$KPB
+	.else
+   [B2]	LDNDW	*INP++,A9:A8			; load input
+||	MVKL	(AES_Td-__decrypt),$TEA
+||	ADDKPC	__decrypt,B0
+   [B2]	LDNDW	*INP++,B9:B8
+||	MVKH	(AES_Td-__decrypt),$TEA
+||	ADD	0,KEY,$KPA
+||	ADD	4,KEY,$KPB
+	.endif
+	LDW	*$KPA++[2],$Td0[0]		; zero round key
+||	LDW	*$KPB++[2],$Td0[1]
+||	MVK	60,A0
+||	ADD	B0,$TEA,$TEA			; AES_Td
+	LDW	*KEY[A0],B0			; rounds
+||	MVK	1024,A0				; sizeof(AES_Td)
+	LDW	*$KPA++[2],$Td0[2]
+||	LDW	*$KPB++[2],$Td0[3]
+||	MV	$TEA,$TEB
+	NOP
+	.if	.BIG_ENDIAN
+	MV	A9,$s[0]
+||	MV	A8,$s[1]
+||	MV	B9,$s[2]
+||	MV	B8,$s[3]
+	.else
+	MV	A8,$s[0]
+||	MV	A9,$s[1]
+||	MV	B8,$s[2]
+||	MV	B9,$s[3]
+	.endif
+	XOR	$Td0[0],$s[0],$s[0]
+||	XOR	$Td0[1],$s[1],$s[1]
+||	LDW	*$KPA++[2],$K[0]		; 1st round key
+||	LDW	*$KPB++[2],$K[1]
+	SUB	B0,2,B0
+
+	SPLOOPD	13
+||	MVC	B0,ILC
+||	LDW	*$KPA++[2],$K[2]
+||	LDW	*$KPB++[2],$K[3]
+;;====================================================================
+	EXTU	$s[1],EXT3,24,$Td3[1]
+||	EXTU	$s[0],EXT1,24,$Td1[0]
+	LDW	*${TEB}[$Td3[1]],$Td3[1]	; Td3[s1>>24],	t0
+||	LDW	*${TEA}[$Td1[0]],$Td1[0]	; Td1[s0>>8],	t1
+||	XOR	$s[2],$Td0[2],$s[2]		; modulo-scheduled
+||	XOR	$s[3],$Td0[3],$s[3]		; modulo-scheduled
+||	EXTU	$s[1],EXT1,24,$Td1[1]
+||	EXTU	$s[0],EXT3,24,$Td3[0]
+	LDW	*${TEB}[$Td1[1]],$Td1[1]	; Td1[s1>>8],	t2
+||	LDW	*${TEA}[$Td3[0]],$Td3[0]	; Td3[s0>>24],	t3
+||	EXTU	$s[2],EXT2,24,$Td2[2]
+||	EXTU	$s[3],EXT2,24,$Td2[3]
+	LDW	*${TEA}[$Td2[2]],$Td2[2]	; Td2[s2>>16],	t0
+||	LDW	*${TEB}[$Td2[3]],$Td2[3]	; Td2[s3>>16],	t1
+||	EXTU	$s[3],EXT1,24,$Td1[3]
+||	EXTU	$s[2],EXT3,24,$Td3[2]
+	LDW	*${TEB}[$Td1[3]],$Td1[3]	; Td1[s3>>8],	t0
+||	LDW	*${TEA}[$Td3[2]],$Td3[2]	; Td3[s2>>24],	t1
+||	EXTU	$s[0],EXT2,24,$Td2[0]
+||	EXTU	$s[1],EXT2,24,$Td2[1]
+	LDW	*${TEA}[$Td2[0]],$Td2[0]	; Td2[s0>>16],	t2
+||	LDW	*${TEB}[$Td2[1]],$Td2[1]	; Td2[s1>>16],	t3
+||	EXTU	$s[3],EXT3,24,$Td3[3]
+||	EXTU	$s[2],EXT1,24,$Td1[2]
+	LDW	*${TEB}[$Td3[3]],$Td3[3]	; Td3[s3>>24],	t2
+||	LDW	*${TEA}[$Td1[2]],$Td1[2]	; Td1[s2>>8],	t3
+||	ROTL	$Td3[1],TBL3,$Td1[0]		; t0
+||	ROTL	$Td1[0],TBL1,$Td3[1]		; t1
+||	EXTU	$s[0],EXT0,24,$Td0[0]
+||	EXTU	$s[1],EXT0,24,$Td0[1]
+	LDW	*${TEA}[$Td0[0]],$Td0[0]	; Td0[s0],	t0
+||	LDW	*${TEB}[$Td0[1]],$Td0[1]	; Td0[s1],	t1
+||	ROTL	$Td1[1],TBL1,$Td3[0]		; t2
+||	ROTL	$Td3[0],TBL3,$Td1[1]		; t3
+||	EXTU	$s[2],EXT0,24,$Td0[2]
+||	EXTU	$s[3],EXT0,24,$Td0[3]
+	LDW	*${TEA}[$Td0[2]],$Td0[2]	; Td0[s2],	t2
+||	LDW	*${TEB}[$Td0[3]],$Td0[3]	; Td0[s3],	t3
+||	ROTL	$Td2[2],TBL2,$Td2[2]		; t0
+||	ROTL	$Td2[3],TBL2,$Td2[3]		; t1
+||	XOR	$K[0],$Td1[0],$s[0]
+||	XOR	$K[1],$Td3[1],$s[1]
+	ROTL	$Td1[3],TBL1,$Td3[2]		; t0
+||	ROTL	$Td3[2],TBL3,$Td1[3]		; t1
+||	XOR	$K[2],$Td3[0],$s[2]
+||	XOR	$K[3],$Td1[1],$s[3]
+||	LDW	*$KPA++[2],$K[0]		; next round key
+||	LDW	*$KPB++[2],$K[1]
+	ROTL	$Td2[0],TBL2,$Td2[0]		; t2
+||	ROTL	$Td2[1],TBL2,$Td2[1]		; t3
+||	XOR	$s[0],$Td2[2],$s[0]
+||	XOR	$s[1],$Td2[3],$s[1]
+||	LDW	*$KPA++[2],$K[2]
+||	LDW	*$KPB++[2],$K[3]
+	ROTL	$Td3[3],TBL3,$Td1[2]		; t2
+||	ROTL	$Td1[2],TBL1,$Td3[3]		; t3
+||	XOR	$s[0],$Td3[2],$s[0]
+||	XOR	$s[1],$Td1[3],$s[1]
+	XOR	$s[2],$Td2[0],$s[2]
+||	XOR	$s[3],$Td2[1],$s[3]
+||	XOR	$s[0],$Td0[0],$s[0]
+||	XOR	$s[1],$Td0[1],$s[1]
+	SPKERNEL
+||	XOR.L	$s[2],$Td1[2],$s[2]
+||	XOR.L	$s[3],$Td3[3],$s[3]
+;;====================================================================
+	ADD.D	${TEA},A0,${TEA}		; point to Td4
+||	ADD.D	${TEB},A0,${TEB}
+||	EXTU	$s[1],EXT3,24,$Td3[1]
+||	EXTU	$s[0],EXT1,24,$Td1[0]
+	LDBU	*${TEB}[$Td3[1]],$Td3[1]	; Td3[s1>>24],	t0
+||	LDBU	*${TEA}[$Td1[0]],$Td1[0]	; Td1[s0>>8],	t1
+||	XOR	$s[2],$Td0[2],$s[2]		; modulo-scheduled
+||	XOR	$s[3],$Td0[3],$s[3]		; modulo-scheduled
+||	EXTU	$s[0],EXT0,24,$Td0[0]
+||	EXTU	$s[1],EXT0,24,$Td0[1]
+	LDBU	*${TEA}[$Td0[0]],$Td0[0]	; Td0[s0],	t0
+||	LDBU	*${TEB}[$Td0[1]],$Td0[1]	; Td0[s1],	t1
+||	EXTU	$s[2],EXT2,24,$Td2[2]
+||	EXTU	$s[3],EXT2,24,$Td2[3]
+	LDBU	*${TEA}[$Td2[2]],$Td2[2]	; Td2[s2>>16],	t0
+||	LDBU	*${TEB}[$Td2[3]],$Td2[3]	; Td2[s3>>16],	t1
+||	EXTU	$s[3],EXT1,24,$Td1[3]
+||	EXTU	$s[2],EXT3,24,$Td3[2]
+	LDBU	*${TEB}[$Td1[3]],$Td1[3]	; Td1[s3>>8],	t0
+||	LDBU	*${TEA}[$Td3[2]],$Td3[2]	; Td3[s2>>24],	t1
+||	EXTU	$s[1],EXT1,24,$Td1[1]
+||	EXTU	$s[0],EXT3,24,$Td3[0]
+	LDBU	*${TEB}[$Td1[1]],$Td1[1]	; Td1[s1>>8],	t2
+||	LDBU	*${TEA}[$Td3[0]],$Td3[0]	; Td3[s0>>24],	t3
+||	EXTU	$s[0],EXT2,24,$Td2[0]
+||	EXTU	$s[1],EXT2,24,$Td2[1]
+	LDBU	*${TEA}[$Td2[0]],$Td2[0]	; Td2[s0>>16],	t2
+||	LDBU	*${TEB}[$Td2[1]],$Td2[1]	; Td2[s1>>16],	t3
+||	EXTU	$s[3],EXT3,24,$Td3[3]
+||	EXTU	$s[2],EXT1,24,$Td1[2]
+	LDBU	*${TEB}[$Td3[3]],$Td3[3]	; Td3[s3>>24],	t2
+||	LDBU	*${TEA}[$Td1[2]],$Td1[2]	; Td1[s2>>8],	t3
+||	EXTU	$s[2],EXT0,24,$Td0[2]
+||	EXTU	$s[3],EXT0,24,$Td0[3]
+	LDBU	*${TEA}[$Td0[2]],$Td0[2]	; Td0[s2],	t2
+||	LDBU	*${TEB}[$Td0[3]],$Td0[3]	; Td0[s3],	t3
+
+	.if	.BIG_ENDIAN
+	PACK2	$Td0[0],$Td1[3],$Td0[0]
+||	PACK2	$Td0[1],$Td1[0],$Td0[1]
+	PACK2	$Td2[2],$Td3[1],$Td2[2]
+||	PACK2	$Td2[3],$Td3[2],$Td2[3]
+	PACKL4	$Td0[0],$Td2[2],$Td0[0]
+||	PACKL4	$Td0[1],$Td2[3],$Td0[1]
+	XOR	$K[0],$Td0[0],$Td0[0]		; s[0]
+||	XOR	$K[1],$Td0[1],$Td0[1]		; s[1]
+
+	PACK2	$Td0[2],$Td1[1],$Td0[2]
+||	PACK2	$Td0[3],$Td1[2],$Td0[3]
+	PACK2	$Td2[0],$Td3[3],$Td2[0]
+||	PACK2	$Td2[1],$Td3[0],$Td2[1]
+||	BNOP	RA
+	PACKL4	$Td0[2],$Td2[0],$Td0[2]
+||	PACKL4	$Td0[3],$Td2[1],$Td0[3]
+	XOR	$K[2],$Td0[2],$Td0[2]		; s[2]
+||	XOR	$K[3],$Td0[3],$Td0[3]		; s[3]
+
+	MV	$Td0[0],A9
+||	MV	$Td0[1],A8
+	MV	$Td0[2],B9
+||	MV	$Td0[3],B8
+|| [B2]	STNDW	A9:A8,*OUT++
+   [B2]	STNDW	B9:B8,*OUT++
+	.else
+	PACK2	$Td1[3],$Td0[0],$Td1[3]
+||	PACK2	$Td1[0],$Td0[1],$Td1[0]
+	PACK2	$Td3[1],$Td2[2],$Td3[1]
+||	PACK2	$Td3[2],$Td2[3],$Td3[2]
+	PACKL4	$Td3[1],$Td1[3],$Td1[3]
+||	PACKL4	$Td3[2],$Td1[0],$Td1[0]
+	XOR	$K[0],$Td1[3],$Td1[3]		; s[0]
+||	XOR	$K[1],$Td1[0],$Td1[0]		; s[1]
+
+	PACK2	$Td1[1],$Td0[2],$Td1[1]
+||	PACK2	$Td1[2],$Td0[3],$Td1[2]
+	PACK2	$Td3[3],$Td2[0],$Td3[3]
+||	PACK2	$Td3[0],$Td2[1],$Td3[0]
+||	BNOP	RA
+	PACKL4	$Td3[3],$Td1[1],$Td1[1]
+||	PACKL4	$Td3[0],$Td1[2],$Td1[2]
+	XOR	$K[2],$Td1[1],$Td1[1]		; s[2]
+||	XOR	$K[3],$Td1[2],$Td1[2]		; s[3]
+
+	MV	$Td1[3],A8
+||	MV	$Td1[0],A9
+	MV	$Td1[1],B8
+||	MV	$Td1[2],B9
+|| [B2]	STNDW	A9:A8,*OUT++
+   [B2]	STNDW	B9:B8,*OUT++
+	.endif
+	.endasmfunc
+___
+{
+my @K=(@K,@s);			# extended key
+my @Te4=map("B$_",(16..19));
+
+my @Kx9=@Te0;			# used in AES_set_decrypt_key
+my @KxB=@Te1;
+my @KxD=@Te2;
+my @KxE=@Te3;
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	.asg	OUT,BITS
+
+	.global	_AES_set_encrypt_key
+_AES_set_encrypt_key:
+__set_encrypt_key:
+	.asmfunc
+	MV	INP,A0
+||	SHRU	BITS,5,BITS			; 128-192-256 -> 4-6-8
+||	MV	KEY,A1
+  [!A0]	B	RA
+||[!A0]	MVK	-1,RET
+||[!A0]	MVK	1,A1				; only one B RA
+  [!A1]	B	RA
+||[!A1]	MVK	-1,RET
+||[!A1]	MVK	0,A0
+||	MVK	0,B0
+||	MVK	0,A1
+   [A0]	LDNDW	*INP++,A9:A8
+|| [A0]	CMPEQ	4,BITS,B0
+|| [A0]	CMPLT	3,BITS,A1
+   [B0]	B	key128?
+|| [A1]	LDNDW	*INP++,B9:B8
+|| [A0]	CMPEQ	6,BITS,B0
+|| [A0]	CMPLT	5,BITS,A1
+   [B0]	B	key192?
+|| [A1]	LDNDW	*INP++,B17:B16
+|| [A0]	CMPEQ	8,BITS,B0
+|| [A0]	CMPLT	7,BITS,A1
+   [B0]	B	key256?
+|| [A1]	LDNDW	*INP++,B19:B18
+
+	.if	__TI_EABI__
+   [A0]	ADD	0,KEY,$KPA
+|| [A0]	ADD	4,KEY,$KPB
+|| [A0]	MVKL	\$PCR_OFFSET(AES_Te4,__set_encrypt_key),$TEA
+|| [A0]	ADDKPC	__set_encrypt_key,B6
+   [A0]	MVKH	\$PCR_OFFSET(AES_Te4,__set_encrypt_key),$TEA
+   [A0]	ADD	B6,$TEA,$TEA			; AES_Te4
+	.else
+   [A0]	ADD	0,KEY,$KPA
+|| [A0]	ADD	4,KEY,$KPB
+|| [A0]	MVKL	(AES_Te4-__set_encrypt_key),$TEA
+|| [A0]	ADDKPC	__set_encrypt_key,B6
+   [A0]	MVKH	(AES_Te4-__set_encrypt_key),$TEA
+   [A0]	ADD	B6,$TEA,$TEA			; AES_Te4
+	.endif
+	NOP
+	NOP
+
+	BNOP	RA,5
+||	MVK	-2,RET				; unknown bit length
+||	MVK	0,B0				; redundant
+;;====================================================================
+;;====================================================================
+key128?:
+	.if	.BIG_ENDIAN
+	MV	A9,$K[0]
+||	MV	A8,$K[1]
+||	MV	B9,$Te4[2]
+||	MV	B8,$K[3]
+	.else
+	MV	A8,$K[0]
+||	MV	A9,$K[1]
+||	MV	B8,$Te4[2]
+||	MV	B9,$K[3]
+	.endif
+
+	MVK	256,A0
+||	MVK	9,B0
+
+	SPLOOPD	14
+||	MVC	B0,ILC
+||	MV	$TEA,$TEB
+||	ADD	$TEA,A0,A30			; rcon
+;;====================================================================
+	LDW	*A30++[1],A31			; rcon[i]
+||	MV	$Te4[2],$K[2]
+||	EXTU	$K[3],EXT1,24,$Te4[0]
+	LDBU	*${TEB}[$Te4[0]],$Te4[0]
+||	MV	$K[3],A0
+||	EXTU	$K[3],EXT2,24,$Te4[1]
+	LDBU	*${TEB}[$Te4[1]],$Te4[1]
+||	EXTU	A0,EXT3,24,A0
+||	EXTU	$K[3],EXT0,24,$Te4[3]
+	.if	.BIG_ENDIAN
+	LDBU	*${TEA}[A0],$Te4[3]
+||	LDBU	*${TEB}[$Te4[3]],A0
+	.else
+	LDBU	*${TEA}[A0],A0
+||	LDBU	*${TEB}[$Te4[3]],$Te4[3]
+	.endif
+
+	STW	$K[0],*$KPA++[2]
+||	STW	$K[1],*$KPB++[2]
+	STW	$K[2],*$KPA++[2]
+||	STW	$K[3],*$KPB++[2]
+
+	XOR	A31,$K[0],$K[0]			; ^=rcon[i]
+	.if	.BIG_ENDIAN
+	PACK2	$Te4[0],$Te4[1],$Te4[1]
+	PACK2	$Te4[3],A0,$Te4[3]
+	PACKL4	$Te4[1],$Te4[3],$Te4[3]
+	.else
+	PACK2	$Te4[1],$Te4[0],$Te4[1]
+	PACK2	$Te4[3],A0,$Te4[3]
+	PACKL4	$Te4[3],$Te4[1],$Te4[3]
+	.endif
+	XOR	$Te4[3],$K[0],$Te4[0]		; K[0]
+	XOR	$Te4[0],$K[1],$K[1]		; K[1]
+	MV	$Te4[0],$K[0]
+||	XOR	$K[1],$K[2],$Te4[2]		; K[2]
+	XOR	$Te4[2],$K[3],$K[3]		; K[3]
+	SPKERNEL
+;;====================================================================
+	BNOP	RA
+	MV	$Te4[2],$K[2]
+||	STW	$K[0],*$KPA++[2]
+||	STW	$K[1],*$KPB++[2]
+	STW	$K[2],*$KPA++[2]
+||	STW	$K[3],*$KPB++[2]
+	MVK	10,B0				; rounds
+	STW	B0,*++${KPB}[15]
+	MVK	0,RET
+;;====================================================================
+;;====================================================================
+key192?:
+	.if	.BIG_ENDIAN
+	MV	A9,$K[0]
+||	MV	A8,$K[1]
+||	MV	B9,$K[2]
+||	MV	B8,$K[3]
+	MV	B17,$Te4[2]
+||	MV	B16,$K[5]
+	.else
+	MV	A8,$K[0]
+||	MV	A9,$K[1]
+||	MV	B8,$K[2]
+||	MV	B9,$K[3]
+	MV	B16,$Te4[2]
+||	MV	B17,$K[5]
+	.endif
+
+	MVK	256,A0
+||	MVK	6,B0
+	MV	$TEA,$TEB
+||	ADD	$TEA,A0,A30			; rcon
+;;====================================================================
+loop192?:
+	LDW	*A30++[1],A31			; rcon[i]
+||	MV	$Te4[2],$K[4]
+||	EXTU	$K[5],EXT1,24,$Te4[0]
+	LDBU	*${TEB}[$Te4[0]],$Te4[0]
+||	MV	$K[5],A0
+||	EXTU	$K[5],EXT2,24,$Te4[1]
+	LDBU	*${TEB}[$Te4[1]],$Te4[1]
+||	EXTU	A0,EXT3,24,A0
+||	EXTU	$K[5],EXT0,24,$Te4[3]
+	.if	.BIG_ENDIAN
+	LDBU	*${TEA}[A0],$Te4[3]
+||	LDBU	*${TEB}[$Te4[3]],A0
+	.else
+	LDBU	*${TEA}[A0],A0
+||	LDBU	*${TEB}[$Te4[3]],$Te4[3]
+	.endif
+
+	STW	$K[0],*$KPA++[2]
+||	STW	$K[1],*$KPB++[2]
+	STW	$K[2],*$KPA++[2]
+||	STW	$K[3],*$KPB++[2]
+	STW	$K[4],*$KPA++[2]
+||	STW	$K[5],*$KPB++[2]
+
+	XOR	A31,$K[0],$K[0]			; ^=rcon[i]
+	.if	.BIG_ENDIAN
+	PACK2	$Te4[0],$Te4[1],$Te4[1]
+||	PACK2	$Te4[3],A0,$Te4[3]
+	PACKL4	$Te4[1],$Te4[3],$Te4[3]
+	.else
+	PACK2	$Te4[1],$Te4[0],$Te4[1]
+||	PACK2	$Te4[3],A0,$Te4[3]
+	PACKL4	$Te4[3],$Te4[1],$Te4[3]
+	.endif
+	BDEC	loop192?,B0
+||	XOR	$Te4[3],$K[0],$Te4[0]		; K[0]
+	XOR	$Te4[0],$K[1],$K[1]		; K[1]
+	MV	$Te4[0],$K[0]
+||	XOR	$K[1],$K[2],$Te4[2]		; K[2]
+	XOR	$Te4[2],$K[3],$K[3]		; K[3]
+	MV	$Te4[2],$K[2]
+||	XOR	$K[3],$K[4],$Te4[2]		; K[4]
+	XOR	$Te4[2],$K[5],$K[5]		; K[5]
+;;====================================================================
+	BNOP	RA
+	STW	$K[0],*$KPA++[2]
+||	STW	$K[1],*$KPB++[2]
+	STW	$K[2],*$KPA++[2]
+||	STW	$K[3],*$KPB++[2]
+	MVK	12,B0				; rounds
+	STW	B0,*++${KPB}[7]
+	MVK	0,RET
+;;====================================================================
+;;====================================================================
+key256?:
+	.if	.BIG_ENDIAN
+	MV	A9,$K[0]
+||	MV	A8,$K[1]
+||	MV	B9,$K[2]
+||	MV	B8,$K[3]
+	MV	B17,$K[4]
+||	MV	B16,$K[5]
+||	MV	B19,$Te4[2]
+||	MV	B18,$K[7]
+	.else
+	MV	A8,$K[0]
+||	MV	A9,$K[1]
+||	MV	B8,$K[2]
+||	MV	B9,$K[3]
+	MV	B16,$K[4]
+||	MV	B17,$K[5]
+||	MV	B18,$Te4[2]
+||	MV	B19,$K[7]
+	.endif
+
+	MVK	256,A0
+||	MVK	6,B0
+	MV	$TEA,$TEB
+||	ADD	$TEA,A0,A30			; rcon
+;;====================================================================
+loop256?:
+	LDW	*A30++[1],A31			; rcon[i]
+||	MV	$Te4[2],$K[6]
+||	EXTU	$K[7],EXT1,24,$Te4[0]
+	LDBU	*${TEB}[$Te4[0]],$Te4[0]
+||	MV	$K[7],A0
+||	EXTU	$K[7],EXT2,24,$Te4[1]
+	LDBU	*${TEB}[$Te4[1]],$Te4[1]
+||	EXTU	A0,EXT3,24,A0
+||	EXTU	$K[7],EXT0,24,$Te4[3]
+	.if	.BIG_ENDIAN
+	LDBU	*${TEA}[A0],$Te4[3]
+||	LDBU	*${TEB}[$Te4[3]],A0
+	.else
+	LDBU	*${TEA}[A0],A0
+||	LDBU	*${TEB}[$Te4[3]],$Te4[3]
+	.endif
+
+	STW	$K[0],*$KPA++[2]
+||	STW	$K[1],*$KPB++[2]
+	STW	$K[2],*$KPA++[2]
+||	STW	$K[3],*$KPB++[2]
+	STW	$K[4],*$KPA++[2]
+||	STW	$K[5],*$KPB++[2]
+	STW	$K[6],*$KPA++[2]
+||	STW	$K[7],*$KPB++[2]
+||	XOR	A31,$K[0],$K[0]			; ^=rcon[i]
+	.if	.BIG_ENDIAN
+	PACK2	$Te4[0],$Te4[1],$Te4[1]
+||	PACK2	$Te4[3],A0,$Te4[3]
+	PACKL4	$Te4[1],$Te4[3],$Te4[3]
+||[!B0]	B	done256?
+	.else
+	PACK2	$Te4[1],$Te4[0],$Te4[1]
+||	PACK2	$Te4[3],A0,$Te4[3]
+	PACKL4	$Te4[3],$Te4[1],$Te4[3]
+||[!B0]	B	done256?
+	.endif
+	XOR	$Te4[3],$K[0],$Te4[0]		; K[0]
+	XOR	$Te4[0],$K[1],$K[1]		; K[1]
+	MV	$Te4[0],$K[0]
+||	XOR	$K[1],$K[2],$Te4[2]		; K[2]
+	XOR	$Te4[2],$K[3],$K[3]		; K[3]
+
+	MV	$Te4[2],$K[2]
+|| [B0]	EXTU	$K[3],EXT0,24,$Te4[0]
+|| [B0]	SUB	B0,1,B0
+	LDBU	*${TEB}[$Te4[0]],$Te4[0]
+||	MV	$K[3],A0
+||	EXTU	$K[3],EXT1,24,$Te4[1]
+	LDBU	*${TEB}[$Te4[1]],$Te4[1]
+||	EXTU	A0,EXT2,24,A0
+||	EXTU	$K[3],EXT3,24,$Te4[3]
+
+	.if	.BIG_ENDIAN
+	LDBU	*${TEA}[A0],$Te4[3]
+||	LDBU	*${TEB}[$Te4[3]],A0
+	NOP	3
+	PACK2	$Te4[0],$Te4[1],$Te4[1]
+	PACK2	$Te4[3],A0,$Te4[3]
+||	B	loop256?
+	PACKL4	$Te4[1],$Te4[3],$Te4[3]
+	.else
+	LDBU	*${TEA}[A0],A0
+||	LDBU	*${TEB}[$Te4[3]],$Te4[3]
+	NOP	3
+	PACK2	$Te4[1],$Te4[0],$Te4[1]
+	PACK2	$Te4[3],A0,$Te4[3]
+||	B	loop256?
+	PACKL4	$Te4[3],$Te4[1],$Te4[3]
+	.endif
+
+	XOR	$Te4[3],$K[4],$Te4[0]		; K[4]
+	XOR	$Te4[0],$K[5],$K[5]		; K[5]
+	MV	$Te4[0],$K[4]
+||	XOR	$K[5],$K[6],$Te4[2]		; K[6]
+	XOR	$Te4[2],$K[7],$K[7]		; K[7]
+;;====================================================================
+done256?:
+	BNOP	RA
+	STW	$K[0],*$KPA++[2]
+||	STW	$K[1],*$KPB++[2]
+	STW	$K[2],*$KPA++[2]
+||	STW	$K[3],*$KPB++[2]
+	MVK	14,B0				; rounds
+	STW	B0,*--${KPB}[1]
+	MVK	0,RET
+	.endasmfunc
+
+	.global	_AES_set_decrypt_key
+_AES_set_decrypt_key:
+	.asmfunc
+	B	__set_encrypt_key		; guarantee local call
+	MV	KEY,B30				; B30 is not modified
+	MV	RA, B31				; B31 is not modified
+	ADDKPC	ret?,RA,2
+ret?:						; B0 holds rounds or zero
+  [!B0]	BNOP	B31				; return if zero
+   [B0]	SHL	B0,4,A0				; offset to last round key
+   [B0]	SHRU	B0,1,B1
+   [B0]	SUB	B1,1,B1
+   [B0]	MVK	0x0000001B,B3			; AES polynomial
+   [B0]	MVKH	0x07000000,B3
+
+	SPLOOPD	9				; flip round keys
+||	MVC	B1,ILC
+||	MV	B30,$KPA
+||	ADD	B30,A0,$KPB
+||	MVK	16,A0				; sizeof(round key)
+;;====================================================================
+	LDW	*${KPA}[0],A16
+||	LDW	*${KPB}[0],B16
+	LDW	*${KPA}[1],A17
+||	LDW	*${KPB}[1],B17
+	LDW	*${KPA}[2],A18
+||	LDW	*${KPB}[2],B18
+	LDW	*${KPA}[3],A19
+||	ADD	$KPA,A0,$KPA
+||	LDW	*${KPB}[3],B19
+||	SUB	$KPB,A0,$KPB
+	NOP
+	STW	B16,*${KPA}[-4]
+||	STW	A16,*${KPB}[4]
+	STW	B17,*${KPA}[-3]
+||	STW	A17,*${KPB}[5]
+	STW	B18,*${KPA}[-2]
+||	STW	A18,*${KPB}[6]
+	STW	B19,*${KPA}[-1]
+||	STW	A19,*${KPB}[7]
+	SPKERNEL
+;;====================================================================
+	SUB	B0,1,B0				; skip last round
+||	ADD	B30,A0,$KPA			; skip first round
+||	ADD	B30,A0,$KPB
+||	MVC	GFPGFR,B30			; save GFPGFR
+	LDW	*${KPA}[0],$K[0]
+||	LDW	*${KPB}[1],$K[1]
+||	MVC	B3,GFPGFR
+	LDW	*${KPA}[2],$K[2]
+||	LDW	*${KPB}[3],$K[3]
+	MVK	0x00000909,A24
+||	MVK	0x00000B0B,B24
+	MVKH	0x09090000,A24
+||	MVKH	0x0B0B0000,B24
+	MVC	B0,ILC
+||	SUB	B0,1,B0
+
+	GMPY4	$K[0],A24,$Kx9[0]		; ·0x09
+||	GMPY4	$K[1],A24,$Kx9[1]
+||	MVK	0x00000D0D,A25
+||	MVK	0x00000E0E,B25
+	GMPY4	$K[2],A24,$Kx9[2]
+||	GMPY4	$K[3],A24,$Kx9[3]
+||	MVKH	0x0D0D0000,A25
+||	MVKH	0x0E0E0000,B25
+
+	GMPY4	$K[0],B24,$KxB[0]		; ·0x0B
+||	GMPY4	$K[1],B24,$KxB[1]
+	GMPY4	$K[2],B24,$KxB[2]
+||	GMPY4	$K[3],B24,$KxB[3]
+
+	SPLOOP	11				; InvMixColumns
+;;====================================================================
+	GMPY4	$K[0],A25,$KxD[0]		; ·0x0D
+||	GMPY4	$K[1],A25,$KxD[1]
+||	SWAP2	$Kx9[0],$Kx9[0]			; rotate by 16
+||	SWAP2	$Kx9[1],$Kx9[1]
+||	MV	$K[0],$s[0]			; this or DINT
+||	MV	$K[1],$s[1]
+|| [B0]	LDW	*${KPA}[4],$K[0]
+|| [B0]	LDW	*${KPB}[5],$K[1]
+	GMPY4	$K[2],A25,$KxD[2]
+||	GMPY4	$K[3],A25,$KxD[3]
+||	SWAP2	$Kx9[2],$Kx9[2]
+||	SWAP2	$Kx9[3],$Kx9[3]
+||	MV	$K[2],$s[2]
+||	MV	$K[3],$s[3]
+|| [B0]	LDW	*${KPA}[6],$K[2]
+|| [B0]	LDW	*${KPB}[7],$K[3]
+
+	GMPY4	$s[0],B25,$KxE[0]		; ·0x0E
+||	GMPY4	$s[1],B25,$KxE[1]
+||	XOR	$Kx9[0],$KxB[0],$KxB[0]
+||	XOR	$Kx9[1],$KxB[1],$KxB[1]
+	GMPY4	$s[2],B25,$KxE[2]
+||	GMPY4	$s[3],B25,$KxE[3]
+||	XOR	$Kx9[2],$KxB[2],$KxB[2]
+||	XOR	$Kx9[3],$KxB[3],$KxB[3]
+
+	ROTL	$KxB[0],TBL3,$KxB[0]
+||	ROTL	$KxB[1],TBL3,$KxB[1]
+||	SWAP2	$KxD[0],$KxD[0]			; rotate by 16
+||	SWAP2	$KxD[1],$KxD[1]
+	ROTL	$KxB[2],TBL3,$KxB[2]
+||	ROTL	$KxB[3],TBL3,$KxB[3]
+||	SWAP2	$KxD[2],$KxD[2]
+||	SWAP2	$KxD[3],$KxD[3]
+
+	XOR	$KxE[0],$KxD[0],$KxE[0]
+||	XOR	$KxE[1],$KxD[1],$KxE[1]
+|| [B0]	GMPY4	$K[0],A24,$Kx9[0]		; ·0x09
+|| [B0]	GMPY4	$K[1],A24,$Kx9[1]
+||	ADDAW	$KPA,4,$KPA
+	XOR	$KxE[2],$KxD[2],$KxE[2]
+||	XOR	$KxE[3],$KxD[3],$KxE[3]
+|| [B0]	GMPY4	$K[2],A24,$Kx9[2]
+|| [B0]	GMPY4	$K[3],A24,$Kx9[3]
+||	ADDAW	$KPB,4,$KPB
+
+	XOR	$KxB[0],$KxE[0],$KxE[0]
+||	XOR	$KxB[1],$KxE[1],$KxE[1]
+|| [B0]	GMPY4	$K[0],B24,$KxB[0]		; ·0x0B
+|| [B0]	GMPY4	$K[1],B24,$KxB[1]
+	XOR	$KxB[2],$KxE[2],$KxE[2]
+||	XOR	$KxB[3],$KxE[3],$KxE[3]
+|| [B0]	GMPY4	$K[2],B24,$KxB[2]
+|| [B0]	GMPY4	$K[3],B24,$KxB[3]
+||	STW	$KxE[0],*${KPA}[-4]
+||	STW	$KxE[1],*${KPB}[-3]
+	STW	$KxE[2],*${KPA}[-2]
+||	STW	$KxE[3],*${KPB}[-1]
+|| [B0]	SUB	B0,1,B0
+	SPKERNEL
+;;====================================================================
+	BNOP	B31,3
+	MVC	B30,GFPGFR			; restore GFPGFR(*)
+	MVK	0,RET
+	.endasmfunc
+___
+# (*)	Even though ABI doesn't specify GFPGFR as non-volatile, there
+#	are code samples out there that *assume* its default value.
+}
+{
+my ($inp,$out,$blocks,$key,$ivp)=("A4","B4","A6","B6","A8");
+$code.=<<___;
+	.global	_AES_ctr32_encrypt
+_AES_ctr32_encrypt:
+	.asmfunc
+	LDNDW	*${ivp}[0],A31:A30	; load counter value
+||	MV	$blocks,A2		; reassign $blocks
+||	DMV	RA,$key,B27:B26		; reassign RA and $key
+	LDNDW	*${ivp}[1],B31:B30
+||	MVK	0,B2			; don't let __encrypt load input
+||	MVK	0,A1			; and postpone writing output
+	.if	.BIG_ENDIAN
+	NOP
+	.else
+	NOP	4
+	SWAP2	B31,B31			; keep least significant 32 bits
+	SWAP4	B31,B31			; in host byte order
+	.endif
+ctr32_loop?:
+   [A2]	BNOP	__encrypt
+|| [A1]	XOR	A29,A9,A9		; input^Ek(counter)
+|| [A1]	XOR	A28,A8,A8
+|| [A2]	LDNDW	*INP++,A29:A28		; load input
+  [!A2]	BNOP	B27			; return
+|| [A1]	XOR	B29,B9,B9
+|| [A1]	XOR	B28,B8,B8
+|| [A2]	LDNDW	*INP++,B29:B28
+	.if	.BIG_ENDIAN
+   [A1]	STNDW	A9:A8,*OUT++		; save output
+|| [A2]	DMV	A31,A30,A9:A8		; pass counter value to __encrypt
+   [A1]	STNDW	B9:B8,*OUT++
+|| [A2]	DMV	B31,B30,B9:B8
+|| [A2]	ADD	B30,1,B30		; counter++
+	.else
+   [A1]	STNDW	A9:A8,*OUT++		; save output
+|| [A2]	DMV	A31,A30,A9:A8
+|| [A2]	SWAP2	B31,B0
+|| [A2]	ADD	B31,1,B31		; counter++
+   [A1]	STNDW	B9:B8,*OUT++
+|| [A2]	MV	B30,B8
+|| [A2]	SWAP4	B0,B9
+	.endif
+   [A2]	ADDKPC	ctr32_loop?,RA		; return to ctr32_loop?
+|| [A2]	MV	B26,KEY			; pass $key
+|| [A2]	SUB	A2,1,A2			; $blocks--
+||[!A1]	MVK	1,A1
+	NOP
+	NOP
+	.endasmfunc
+___
+}
+# Tables are kept in endian-neutral manner
+$code.=<<___;
+	.if	__TI_EABI__
+	.sect	".text:aes_asm.const"
+	.else
+	.sect	".const:aes_asm"
+	.endif
+	.align	128
+AES_Te:
+	.byte	0xc6,0x63,0x63,0xa5,	0xf8,0x7c,0x7c,0x84
+	.byte	0xee,0x77,0x77,0x99,	0xf6,0x7b,0x7b,0x8d
+	.byte	0xff,0xf2,0xf2,0x0d,	0xd6,0x6b,0x6b,0xbd
+	.byte	0xde,0x6f,0x6f,0xb1,	0x91,0xc5,0xc5,0x54
+	.byte	0x60,0x30,0x30,0x50,	0x02,0x01,0x01,0x03
+	.byte	0xce,0x67,0x67,0xa9,	0x56,0x2b,0x2b,0x7d
+	.byte	0xe7,0xfe,0xfe,0x19,	0xb5,0xd7,0xd7,0x62
+	.byte	0x4d,0xab,0xab,0xe6,	0xec,0x76,0x76,0x9a
+	.byte	0x8f,0xca,0xca,0x45,	0x1f,0x82,0x82,0x9d
+	.byte	0x89,0xc9,0xc9,0x40,	0xfa,0x7d,0x7d,0x87
+	.byte	0xef,0xfa,0xfa,0x15,	0xb2,0x59,0x59,0xeb
+	.byte	0x8e,0x47,0x47,0xc9,	0xfb,0xf0,0xf0,0x0b
+	.byte	0x41,0xad,0xad,0xec,	0xb3,0xd4,0xd4,0x67
+	.byte	0x5f,0xa2,0xa2,0xfd,	0x45,0xaf,0xaf,0xea
+	.byte	0x23,0x9c,0x9c,0xbf,	0x53,0xa4,0xa4,0xf7
+	.byte	0xe4,0x72,0x72,0x96,	0x9b,0xc0,0xc0,0x5b
+	.byte	0x75,0xb7,0xb7,0xc2,	0xe1,0xfd,0xfd,0x1c
+	.byte	0x3d,0x93,0x93,0xae,	0x4c,0x26,0x26,0x6a
+	.byte	0x6c,0x36,0x36,0x5a,	0x7e,0x3f,0x3f,0x41
+	.byte	0xf5,0xf7,0xf7,0x02,	0x83,0xcc,0xcc,0x4f
+	.byte	0x68,0x34,0x34,0x5c,	0x51,0xa5,0xa5,0xf4
+	.byte	0xd1,0xe5,0xe5,0x34,	0xf9,0xf1,0xf1,0x08
+	.byte	0xe2,0x71,0x71,0x93,	0xab,0xd8,0xd8,0x73
+	.byte	0x62,0x31,0x31,0x53,	0x2a,0x15,0x15,0x3f
+	.byte	0x08,0x04,0x04,0x0c,	0x95,0xc7,0xc7,0x52
+	.byte	0x46,0x23,0x23,0x65,	0x9d,0xc3,0xc3,0x5e
+	.byte	0x30,0x18,0x18,0x28,	0x37,0x96,0x96,0xa1
+	.byte	0x0a,0x05,0x05,0x0f,	0x2f,0x9a,0x9a,0xb5
+	.byte	0x0e,0x07,0x07,0x09,	0x24,0x12,0x12,0x36
+	.byte	0x1b,0x80,0x80,0x9b,	0xdf,0xe2,0xe2,0x3d
+	.byte	0xcd,0xeb,0xeb,0x26,	0x4e,0x27,0x27,0x69
+	.byte	0x7f,0xb2,0xb2,0xcd,	0xea,0x75,0x75,0x9f
+	.byte	0x12,0x09,0x09,0x1b,	0x1d,0x83,0x83,0x9e
+	.byte	0x58,0x2c,0x2c,0x74,	0x34,0x1a,0x1a,0x2e
+	.byte	0x36,0x1b,0x1b,0x2d,	0xdc,0x6e,0x6e,0xb2
+	.byte	0xb4,0x5a,0x5a,0xee,	0x5b,0xa0,0xa0,0xfb
+	.byte	0xa4,0x52,0x52,0xf6,	0x76,0x3b,0x3b,0x4d
+	.byte	0xb7,0xd6,0xd6,0x61,	0x7d,0xb3,0xb3,0xce
+	.byte	0x52,0x29,0x29,0x7b,	0xdd,0xe3,0xe3,0x3e
+	.byte	0x5e,0x2f,0x2f,0x71,	0x13,0x84,0x84,0x97
+	.byte	0xa6,0x53,0x53,0xf5,	0xb9,0xd1,0xd1,0x68
+	.byte	0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,	0xc1,0xed,0xed,0x2c
+	.byte	0x40,0x20,0x20,0x60,	0xe3,0xfc,0xfc,0x1f
+	.byte	0x79,0xb1,0xb1,0xc8,	0xb6,0x5b,0x5b,0xed
+	.byte	0xd4,0x6a,0x6a,0xbe,	0x8d,0xcb,0xcb,0x46
+	.byte	0x67,0xbe,0xbe,0xd9,	0x72,0x39,0x39,0x4b
+	.byte	0x94,0x4a,0x4a,0xde,	0x98,0x4c,0x4c,0xd4
+	.byte	0xb0,0x58,0x58,0xe8,	0x85,0xcf,0xcf,0x4a
+	.byte	0xbb,0xd0,0xd0,0x6b,	0xc5,0xef,0xef,0x2a
+	.byte	0x4f,0xaa,0xaa,0xe5,	0xed,0xfb,0xfb,0x16
+	.byte	0x86,0x43,0x43,0xc5,	0x9a,0x4d,0x4d,0xd7
+	.byte	0x66,0x33,0x33,0x55,	0x11,0x85,0x85,0x94
+	.byte	0x8a,0x45,0x45,0xcf,	0xe9,0xf9,0xf9,0x10
+	.byte	0x04,0x02,0x02,0x06,	0xfe,0x7f,0x7f,0x81
+	.byte	0xa0,0x50,0x50,0xf0,	0x78,0x3c,0x3c,0x44
+	.byte	0x25,0x9f,0x9f,0xba,	0x4b,0xa8,0xa8,0xe3
+	.byte	0xa2,0x51,0x51,0xf3,	0x5d,0xa3,0xa3,0xfe
+	.byte	0x80,0x40,0x40,0xc0,	0x05,0x8f,0x8f,0x8a
+	.byte	0x3f,0x92,0x92,0xad,	0x21,0x9d,0x9d,0xbc
+	.byte	0x70,0x38,0x38,0x48,	0xf1,0xf5,0xf5,0x04
+	.byte	0x63,0xbc,0xbc,0xdf,	0x77,0xb6,0xb6,0xc1
+	.byte	0xaf,0xda,0xda,0x75,	0x42,0x21,0x21,0x63
+	.byte	0x20,0x10,0x10,0x30,	0xe5,0xff,0xff,0x1a
+	.byte	0xfd,0xf3,0xf3,0x0e,	0xbf,0xd2,0xd2,0x6d
+	.byte	0x81,0xcd,0xcd,0x4c,	0x18,0x0c,0x0c,0x14
+	.byte	0x26,0x13,0x13,0x35,	0xc3,0xec,0xec,0x2f
+	.byte	0xbe,0x5f,0x5f,0xe1,	0x35,0x97,0x97,0xa2
+	.byte	0x88,0x44,0x44,0xcc,	0x2e,0x17,0x17,0x39
+	.byte	0x93,0xc4,0xc4,0x57,	0x55,0xa7,0xa7,0xf2
+	.byte	0xfc,0x7e,0x7e,0x82,	0x7a,0x3d,0x3d,0x47
+	.byte	0xc8,0x64,0x64,0xac,	0xba,0x5d,0x5d,0xe7
+	.byte	0x32,0x19,0x19,0x2b,	0xe6,0x73,0x73,0x95
+	.byte	0xc0,0x60,0x60,0xa0,	0x19,0x81,0x81,0x98
+	.byte	0x9e,0x4f,0x4f,0xd1,	0xa3,0xdc,0xdc,0x7f
+	.byte	0x44,0x22,0x22,0x66,	0x54,0x2a,0x2a,0x7e
+	.byte	0x3b,0x90,0x90,0xab,	0x0b,0x88,0x88,0x83
+	.byte	0x8c,0x46,0x46,0xca,	0xc7,0xee,0xee,0x29
+	.byte	0x6b,0xb8,0xb8,0xd3,	0x28,0x14,0x14,0x3c
+	.byte	0xa7,0xde,0xde,0x79,	0xbc,0x5e,0x5e,0xe2
+	.byte	0x16,0x0b,0x0b,0x1d,	0xad,0xdb,0xdb,0x76
+	.byte	0xdb,0xe0,0xe0,0x3b,	0x64,0x32,0x32,0x56
+	.byte	0x74,0x3a,0x3a,0x4e,	0x14,0x0a,0x0a,0x1e
+	.byte	0x92,0x49,0x49,0xdb,	0x0c,0x06,0x06,0x0a
+	.byte	0x48,0x24,0x24,0x6c,	0xb8,0x5c,0x5c,0xe4
+	.byte	0x9f,0xc2,0xc2,0x5d,	0xbd,0xd3,0xd3,0x6e
+	.byte	0x43,0xac,0xac,0xef,	0xc4,0x62,0x62,0xa6
+	.byte	0x39,0x91,0x91,0xa8,	0x31,0x95,0x95,0xa4
+	.byte	0xd3,0xe4,0xe4,0x37,	0xf2,0x79,0x79,0x8b
+	.byte	0xd5,0xe7,0xe7,0x32,	0x8b,0xc8,0xc8,0x43
+	.byte	0x6e,0x37,0x37,0x59,	0xda,0x6d,0x6d,0xb7
+	.byte	0x01,0x8d,0x8d,0x8c,	0xb1,0xd5,0xd5,0x64
+	.byte	0x9c,0x4e,0x4e,0xd2,	0x49,0xa9,0xa9,0xe0
+	.byte	0xd8,0x6c,0x6c,0xb4,	0xac,0x56,0x56,0xfa
+	.byte	0xf3,0xf4,0xf4,0x07,	0xcf,0xea,0xea,0x25
+	.byte	0xca,0x65,0x65,0xaf,	0xf4,0x7a,0x7a,0x8e
+	.byte	0x47,0xae,0xae,0xe9,	0x10,0x08,0x08,0x18
+	.byte	0x6f,0xba,0xba,0xd5,	0xf0,0x78,0x78,0x88
+	.byte	0x4a,0x25,0x25,0x6f,	0x5c,0x2e,0x2e,0x72
+	.byte	0x38,0x1c,0x1c,0x24,	0x57,0xa6,0xa6,0xf1
+	.byte	0x73,0xb4,0xb4,0xc7,	0x97,0xc6,0xc6,0x51
+	.byte	0xcb,0xe8,0xe8,0x23,	0xa1,0xdd,0xdd,0x7c
+	.byte	0xe8,0x74,0x74,0x9c,	0x3e,0x1f,0x1f,0x21
+	.byte	0x96,0x4b,0x4b,0xdd,	0x61,0xbd,0xbd,0xdc
+	.byte	0x0d,0x8b,0x8b,0x86,	0x0f,0x8a,0x8a,0x85
+	.byte	0xe0,0x70,0x70,0x90,	0x7c,0x3e,0x3e,0x42
+	.byte	0x71,0xb5,0xb5,0xc4,	0xcc,0x66,0x66,0xaa
+	.byte	0x90,0x48,0x48,0xd8,	0x06,0x03,0x03,0x05
+	.byte	0xf7,0xf6,0xf6,0x01,	0x1c,0x0e,0x0e,0x12
+	.byte	0xc2,0x61,0x61,0xa3,	0x6a,0x35,0x35,0x5f
+	.byte	0xae,0x57,0x57,0xf9,	0x69,0xb9,0xb9,0xd0
+	.byte	0x17,0x86,0x86,0x91,	0x99,0xc1,0xc1,0x58
+	.byte	0x3a,0x1d,0x1d,0x27,	0x27,0x9e,0x9e,0xb9
+	.byte	0xd9,0xe1,0xe1,0x38,	0xeb,0xf8,0xf8,0x13
+	.byte	0x2b,0x98,0x98,0xb3,	0x22,0x11,0x11,0x33
+	.byte	0xd2,0x69,0x69,0xbb,	0xa9,0xd9,0xd9,0x70
+	.byte	0x07,0x8e,0x8e,0x89,	0x33,0x94,0x94,0xa7
+	.byte	0x2d,0x9b,0x9b,0xb6,	0x3c,0x1e,0x1e,0x22
+	.byte	0x15,0x87,0x87,0x92,	0xc9,0xe9,0xe9,0x20
+	.byte	0x87,0xce,0xce,0x49,	0xaa,0x55,0x55,0xff
+	.byte	0x50,0x28,0x28,0x78,	0xa5,0xdf,0xdf,0x7a
+	.byte	0x03,0x8c,0x8c,0x8f,	0x59,0xa1,0xa1,0xf8
+	.byte	0x09,0x89,0x89,0x80,	0x1a,0x0d,0x0d,0x17
+	.byte	0x65,0xbf,0xbf,0xda,	0xd7,0xe6,0xe6,0x31
+	.byte	0x84,0x42,0x42,0xc6,	0xd0,0x68,0x68,0xb8
+	.byte	0x82,0x41,0x41,0xc3,	0x29,0x99,0x99,0xb0
+	.byte	0x5a,0x2d,0x2d,0x77,	0x1e,0x0f,0x0f,0x11
+	.byte	0x7b,0xb0,0xb0,0xcb,	0xa8,0x54,0x54,0xfc
+	.byte	0x6d,0xbb,0xbb,0xd6,	0x2c,0x16,0x16,0x3a
+AES_Te4:
+	.byte	0x63, 0x7c, 0x77, 0x7b, 0xf2, 0x6b, 0x6f, 0xc5
+	.byte	0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2b, 0xfe, 0xd7, 0xab, 0x76
+	.byte	0xca, 0x82, 0xc9, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0x59, 0x47, 0xf0
+	.byte	0xad, 0xd4, 0xa2, 0xaf, 0x9c, 0xa4, 0x72, 0xc0
+	.byte	0xb7, 0xfd, 0x93, 0x26, 0x36, 0x3f, 0xf7, 0xcc
+	.byte	0x34, 0xa5, 0xe5, 0xf1, 0x71, 0xd8, 0x31, 0x15
+	.byte	0x04, 0xc7, 0x23, 0xc3, 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9a
+	.byte	0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xeb, 0x27, 0xb2, 0x75
+	.byte	0x09, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x6e, 0x5a, 0xa0
+	.byte	0x52, 0x3b, 0xd6, 0xb3, 0x29, 0xe3, 0x2f, 0x84
+	.byte	0x53, 0xd1, 0x00, 0xed, 0x20, 0xfc, 0xb1, 0x5b
+	.byte	0x6a, 0xcb, 0xbe, 0x39, 0x4a, 0x4c, 0x58, 0xcf
+	.byte	0xd0, 0xef, 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x43, 0x4d, 0x33, 0x85
+	.byte	0x45, 0xf9, 0x02, 0x7f, 0x50, 0x3c, 0x9f, 0xa8
+	.byte	0x51, 0xa3, 0x40, 0x8f, 0x92, 0x9d, 0x38, 0xf5
+	.byte	0xbc, 0xb6, 0xda, 0x21, 0x10, 0xff, 0xf3, 0xd2
+	.byte	0xcd, 0x0c, 0x13, 0xec, 0x5f, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17
+	.byte	0xc4, 0xa7, 0x7e, 0x3d, 0x64, 0x5d, 0x19, 0x73
+	.byte	0x60, 0x81, 0x4f, 0xdc, 0x22, 0x2a, 0x90, 0x88
+	.byte	0x46, 0xee, 0xb8, 0x14, 0xde, 0x5e, 0x0b, 0xdb
+	.byte	0xe0, 0x32, 0x3a, 0x0a, 0x49, 0x06, 0x24, 0x5c
+	.byte	0xc2, 0xd3, 0xac, 0x62, 0x91, 0x95, 0xe4, 0x79
+	.byte	0xe7, 0xc8, 0x37, 0x6d, 0x8d, 0xd5, 0x4e, 0xa9
+	.byte	0x6c, 0x56, 0xf4, 0xea, 0x65, 0x7a, 0xae, 0x08
+	.byte	0xba, 0x78, 0x25, 0x2e, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xb4, 0xc6
+	.byte	0xe8, 0xdd, 0x74, 0x1f, 0x4b, 0xbd, 0x8b, 0x8a
+	.byte	0x70, 0x3e, 0xb5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xf6, 0x0e
+	.byte	0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xb9, 0x86, 0xc1, 0x1d, 0x9e
+	.byte	0xe1, 0xf8, 0x98, 0x11, 0x69, 0xd9, 0x8e, 0x94
+	.byte	0x9b, 0x1e, 0x87, 0xe9, 0xce, 0x55, 0x28, 0xdf
+	.byte	0x8c, 0xa1, 0x89, 0x0d, 0xbf, 0xe6, 0x42, 0x68
+	.byte	0x41, 0x99, 0x2d, 0x0f, 0xb0, 0x54, 0xbb, 0x16
+rcon:
+	.byte	0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,	0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00
+	.byte	0x04,0x00,0x00,0x00,	0x08,0x00,0x00,0x00
+	.byte	0x10,0x00,0x00,0x00,	0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00
+	.byte	0x40,0x00,0x00,0x00,	0x80,0x00,0x00,0x00
+	.byte	0x1B,0x00,0x00,0x00,	0x36,0x00,0x00,0x00
+	.align	128
+AES_Td:
+	.byte	0x51,0xf4,0xa7,0x50,	0x7e,0x41,0x65,0x53
+	.byte	0x1a,0x17,0xa4,0xc3,	0x3a,0x27,0x5e,0x96
+	.byte	0x3b,0xab,0x6b,0xcb,	0x1f,0x9d,0x45,0xf1
+	.byte	0xac,0xfa,0x58,0xab,	0x4b,0xe3,0x03,0x93
+	.byte	0x20,0x30,0xfa,0x55,	0xad,0x76,0x6d,0xf6
+	.byte	0x88,0xcc,0x76,0x91,	0xf5,0x02,0x4c,0x25
+	.byte	0x4f,0xe5,0xd7,0xfc,	0xc5,0x2a,0xcb,0xd7
+	.byte	0x26,0x35,0x44,0x80,	0xb5,0x62,0xa3,0x8f
+	.byte	0xde,0xb1,0x5a,0x49,	0x25,0xba,0x1b,0x67
+	.byte	0x45,0xea,0x0e,0x98,	0x5d,0xfe,0xc0,0xe1
+	.byte	0xc3,0x2f,0x75,0x02,	0x81,0x4c,0xf0,0x12
+	.byte	0x8d,0x46,0x97,0xa3,	0x6b,0xd3,0xf9,0xc6
+	.byte	0x03,0x8f,0x5f,0xe7,	0x15,0x92,0x9c,0x95
+	.byte	0xbf,0x6d,0x7a,0xeb,	0x95,0x52,0x59,0xda
+	.byte	0xd4,0xbe,0x83,0x2d,	0x58,0x74,0x21,0xd3
+	.byte	0x49,0xe0,0x69,0x29,	0x8e,0xc9,0xc8,0x44
+	.byte	0x75,0xc2,0x89,0x6a,	0xf4,0x8e,0x79,0x78
+	.byte	0x99,0x58,0x3e,0x6b,	0x27,0xb9,0x71,0xdd
+	.byte	0xbe,0xe1,0x4f,0xb6,	0xf0,0x88,0xad,0x17
+	.byte	0xc9,0x20,0xac,0x66,	0x7d,0xce,0x3a,0xb4
+	.byte	0x63,0xdf,0x4a,0x18,	0xe5,0x1a,0x31,0x82
+	.byte	0x97,0x51,0x33,0x60,	0x62,0x53,0x7f,0x45
+	.byte	0xb1,0x64,0x77,0xe0,	0xbb,0x6b,0xae,0x84
+	.byte	0xfe,0x81,0xa0,0x1c,	0xf9,0x08,0x2b,0x94
+	.byte	0x70,0x48,0x68,0x58,	0x8f,0x45,0xfd,0x19
+	.byte	0x94,0xde,0x6c,0x87,	0x52,0x7b,0xf8,0xb7
+	.byte	0xab,0x73,0xd3,0x23,	0x72,0x4b,0x02,0xe2
+	.byte	0xe3,0x1f,0x8f,0x57,	0x66,0x55,0xab,0x2a
+	.byte	0xb2,0xeb,0x28,0x07,	0x2f,0xb5,0xc2,0x03
+	.byte	0x86,0xc5,0x7b,0x9a,	0xd3,0x37,0x08,0xa5
+	.byte	0x30,0x28,0x87,0xf2,	0x23,0xbf,0xa5,0xb2
+	.byte	0x02,0x03,0x6a,0xba,	0xed,0x16,0x82,0x5c
+	.byte	0x8a,0xcf,0x1c,0x2b,	0xa7,0x79,0xb4,0x92
+	.byte	0xf3,0x07,0xf2,0xf0,	0x4e,0x69,0xe2,0xa1
+	.byte	0x65,0xda,0xf4,0xcd,	0x06,0x05,0xbe,0xd5
+	.byte	0xd1,0x34,0x62,0x1f,	0xc4,0xa6,0xfe,0x8a
+	.byte	0x34,0x2e,0x53,0x9d,	0xa2,0xf3,0x55,0xa0
+	.byte	0x05,0x8a,0xe1,0x32,	0xa4,0xf6,0xeb,0x75
+	.byte	0x0b,0x83,0xec,0x39,	0x40,0x60,0xef,0xaa
+	.byte	0x5e,0x71,0x9f,0x06,	0xbd,0x6e,0x10,0x51
+	.byte	0x3e,0x21,0x8a,0xf9,	0x96,0xdd,0x06,0x3d
+	.byte	0xdd,0x3e,0x05,0xae,	0x4d,0xe6,0xbd,0x46
+	.byte	0x91,0x54,0x8d,0xb5,	0x71,0xc4,0x5d,0x05
+	.byte	0x04,0x06,0xd4,0x6f,	0x60,0x50,0x15,0xff
+	.byte	0x19,0x98,0xfb,0x24,	0xd6,0xbd,0xe9,0x97
+	.byte	0x89,0x40,0x43,0xcc,	0x67,0xd9,0x9e,0x77
+	.byte	0xb0,0xe8,0x42,0xbd,	0x07,0x89,0x8b,0x88
+	.byte	0xe7,0x19,0x5b,0x38,	0x79,0xc8,0xee,0xdb
+	.byte	0xa1,0x7c,0x0a,0x47,	0x7c,0x42,0x0f,0xe9
+	.byte	0xf8,0x84,0x1e,0xc9,	0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00
+	.byte	0x09,0x80,0x86,0x83,	0x32,0x2b,0xed,0x48
+	.byte	0x1e,0x11,0x70,0xac,	0x6c,0x5a,0x72,0x4e
+	.byte	0xfd,0x0e,0xff,0xfb,	0x0f,0x85,0x38,0x56
+	.byte	0x3d,0xae,0xd5,0x1e,	0x36,0x2d,0x39,0x27
+	.byte	0x0a,0x0f,0xd9,0x64,	0x68,0x5c,0xa6,0x21
+	.byte	0x9b,0x5b,0x54,0xd1,	0x24,0x36,0x2e,0x3a
+	.byte	0x0c,0x0a,0x67,0xb1,	0x93,0x57,0xe7,0x0f
+	.byte	0xb4,0xee,0x96,0xd2,	0x1b,0x9b,0x91,0x9e
+	.byte	0x80,0xc0,0xc5,0x4f,	0x61,0xdc,0x20,0xa2
+	.byte	0x5a,0x77,0x4b,0x69,	0x1c,0x12,0x1a,0x16
+	.byte	0xe2,0x93,0xba,0x0a,	0xc0,0xa0,0x2a,0xe5
+	.byte	0x3c,0x22,0xe0,0x43,	0x12,0x1b,0x17,0x1d
+	.byte	0x0e,0x09,0x0d,0x0b,	0xf2,0x8b,0xc7,0xad
+	.byte	0x2d,0xb6,0xa8,0xb9,	0x14,0x1e,0xa9,0xc8
+	.byte	0x57,0xf1,0x19,0x85,	0xaf,0x75,0x07,0x4c
+	.byte	0xee,0x99,0xdd,0xbb,	0xa3,0x7f,0x60,0xfd
+	.byte	0xf7,0x01,0x26,0x9f,	0x5c,0x72,0xf5,0xbc
+	.byte	0x44,0x66,0x3b,0xc5,	0x5b,0xfb,0x7e,0x34
+	.byte	0x8b,0x43,0x29,0x76,	0xcb,0x23,0xc6,0xdc
+	.byte	0xb6,0xed,0xfc,0x68,	0xb8,0xe4,0xf1,0x63
+	.byte	0xd7,0x31,0xdc,0xca,	0x42,0x63,0x85,0x10
+	.byte	0x13,0x97,0x22,0x40,	0x84,0xc6,0x11,0x20
+	.byte	0x85,0x4a,0x24,0x7d,	0xd2,0xbb,0x3d,0xf8
+	.byte	0xae,0xf9,0x32,0x11,	0xc7,0x29,0xa1,0x6d
+	.byte	0x1d,0x9e,0x2f,0x4b,	0xdc,0xb2,0x30,0xf3
+	.byte	0x0d,0x86,0x52,0xec,	0x77,0xc1,0xe3,0xd0
+	.byte	0x2b,0xb3,0x16,0x6c,	0xa9,0x70,0xb9,0x99
+	.byte	0x11,0x94,0x48,0xfa,	0x47,0xe9,0x64,0x22
+	.byte	0xa8,0xfc,0x8c,0xc4,	0xa0,0xf0,0x3f,0x1a
+	.byte	0x56,0x7d,0x2c,0xd8,	0x22,0x33,0x90,0xef
+	.byte	0x87,0x49,0x4e,0xc7,	0xd9,0x38,0xd1,0xc1
+	.byte	0x8c,0xca,0xa2,0xfe,	0x98,0xd4,0x0b,0x36
+	.byte	0xa6,0xf5,0x81,0xcf,	0xa5,0x7a,0xde,0x28
+	.byte	0xda,0xb7,0x8e,0x26,	0x3f,0xad,0xbf,0xa4
+	.byte	0x2c,0x3a,0x9d,0xe4,	0x50,0x78,0x92,0x0d
+	.byte	0x6a,0x5f,0xcc,0x9b,	0x54,0x7e,0x46,0x62
+	.byte	0xf6,0x8d,0x13,0xc2,	0x90,0xd8,0xb8,0xe8
+	.byte	0x2e,0x39,0xf7,0x5e,	0x82,0xc3,0xaf,0xf5
+	.byte	0x9f,0x5d,0x80,0xbe,	0x69,0xd0,0x93,0x7c
+	.byte	0x6f,0xd5,0x2d,0xa9,	0xcf,0x25,0x12,0xb3
+	.byte	0xc8,0xac,0x99,0x3b,	0x10,0x18,0x7d,0xa7
+	.byte	0xe8,0x9c,0x63,0x6e,	0xdb,0x3b,0xbb,0x7b
+	.byte	0xcd,0x26,0x78,0x09,	0x6e,0x59,0x18,0xf4
+	.byte	0xec,0x9a,0xb7,0x01,	0x83,0x4f,0x9a,0xa8
+	.byte	0xe6,0x95,0x6e,0x65,	0xaa,0xff,0xe6,0x7e
+	.byte	0x21,0xbc,0xcf,0x08,	0xef,0x15,0xe8,0xe6
+	.byte	0xba,0xe7,0x9b,0xd9,	0x4a,0x6f,0x36,0xce
+	.byte	0xea,0x9f,0x09,0xd4,	0x29,0xb0,0x7c,0xd6
+	.byte	0x31,0xa4,0xb2,0xaf,	0x2a,0x3f,0x23,0x31
+	.byte	0xc6,0xa5,0x94,0x30,	0x35,0xa2,0x66,0xc0
+	.byte	0x74,0x4e,0xbc,0x37,	0xfc,0x82,0xca,0xa6
+	.byte	0xe0,0x90,0xd0,0xb0,	0x33,0xa7,0xd8,0x15
+	.byte	0xf1,0x04,0x98,0x4a,	0x41,0xec,0xda,0xf7
+	.byte	0x7f,0xcd,0x50,0x0e,	0x17,0x91,0xf6,0x2f
+	.byte	0x76,0x4d,0xd6,0x8d,	0x43,0xef,0xb0,0x4d
+	.byte	0xcc,0xaa,0x4d,0x54,	0xe4,0x96,0x04,0xdf
+	.byte	0x9e,0xd1,0xb5,0xe3,	0x4c,0x6a,0x88,0x1b
+	.byte	0xc1,0x2c,0x1f,0xb8,	0x46,0x65,0x51,0x7f
+	.byte	0x9d,0x5e,0xea,0x04,	0x01,0x8c,0x35,0x5d
+	.byte	0xfa,0x87,0x74,0x73,	0xfb,0x0b,0x41,0x2e
+	.byte	0xb3,0x67,0x1d,0x5a,	0x92,0xdb,0xd2,0x52
+	.byte	0xe9,0x10,0x56,0x33,	0x6d,0xd6,0x47,0x13
+	.byte	0x9a,0xd7,0x61,0x8c,	0x37,0xa1,0x0c,0x7a
+	.byte	0x59,0xf8,0x14,0x8e,	0xeb,0x13,0x3c,0x89
+	.byte	0xce,0xa9,0x27,0xee,	0xb7,0x61,0xc9,0x35
+	.byte	0xe1,0x1c,0xe5,0xed,	0x7a,0x47,0xb1,0x3c
+	.byte	0x9c,0xd2,0xdf,0x59,	0x55,0xf2,0x73,0x3f
+	.byte	0x18,0x14,0xce,0x79,	0x73,0xc7,0x37,0xbf
+	.byte	0x53,0xf7,0xcd,0xea,	0x5f,0xfd,0xaa,0x5b
+	.byte	0xdf,0x3d,0x6f,0x14,	0x78,0x44,0xdb,0x86
+	.byte	0xca,0xaf,0xf3,0x81,	0xb9,0x68,0xc4,0x3e
+	.byte	0x38,0x24,0x34,0x2c,	0xc2,0xa3,0x40,0x5f
+	.byte	0x16,0x1d,0xc3,0x72,	0xbc,0xe2,0x25,0x0c
+	.byte	0x28,0x3c,0x49,0x8b,	0xff,0x0d,0x95,0x41
+	.byte	0x39,0xa8,0x01,0x71,	0x08,0x0c,0xb3,0xde
+	.byte	0xd8,0xb4,0xe4,0x9c,	0x64,0x56,0xc1,0x90
+	.byte	0x7b,0xcb,0x84,0x61,	0xd5,0x32,0xb6,0x70
+	.byte	0x48,0x6c,0x5c,0x74,	0xd0,0xb8,0x57,0x42
+AES_Td4:
+	.byte	0x52, 0x09, 0x6a, 0xd5, 0x30, 0x36, 0xa5, 0x38
+	.byte	0xbf, 0x40, 0xa3, 0x9e, 0x81, 0xf3, 0xd7, 0xfb
+	.byte	0x7c, 0xe3, 0x39, 0x82, 0x9b, 0x2f, 0xff, 0x87
+	.byte	0x34, 0x8e, 0x43, 0x44, 0xc4, 0xde, 0xe9, 0xcb
+	.byte	0x54, 0x7b, 0x94, 0x32, 0xa6, 0xc2, 0x23, 0x3d
+	.byte	0xee, 0x4c, 0x95, 0x0b, 0x42, 0xfa, 0xc3, 0x4e
+	.byte	0x08, 0x2e, 0xa1, 0x66, 0x28, 0xd9, 0x24, 0xb2
+	.byte	0x76, 0x5b, 0xa2, 0x49, 0x6d, 0x8b, 0xd1, 0x25
+	.byte	0x72, 0xf8, 0xf6, 0x64, 0x86, 0x68, 0x98, 0x16
+	.byte	0xd4, 0xa4, 0x5c, 0xcc, 0x5d, 0x65, 0xb6, 0x92
+	.byte	0x6c, 0x70, 0x48, 0x50, 0xfd, 0xed, 0xb9, 0xda
+	.byte	0x5e, 0x15, 0x46, 0x57, 0xa7, 0x8d, 0x9d, 0x84
+	.byte	0x90, 0xd8, 0xab, 0x00, 0x8c, 0xbc, 0xd3, 0x0a
+	.byte	0xf7, 0xe4, 0x58, 0x05, 0xb8, 0xb3, 0x45, 0x06
+	.byte	0xd0, 0x2c, 0x1e, 0x8f, 0xca, 0x3f, 0x0f, 0x02
+	.byte	0xc1, 0xaf, 0xbd, 0x03, 0x01, 0x13, 0x8a, 0x6b
+	.byte	0x3a, 0x91, 0x11, 0x41, 0x4f, 0x67, 0xdc, 0xea
+	.byte	0x97, 0xf2, 0xcf, 0xce, 0xf0, 0xb4, 0xe6, 0x73
+	.byte	0x96, 0xac, 0x74, 0x22, 0xe7, 0xad, 0x35, 0x85
+	.byte	0xe2, 0xf9, 0x37, 0xe8, 0x1c, 0x75, 0xdf, 0x6e
+	.byte	0x47, 0xf1, 0x1a, 0x71, 0x1d, 0x29, 0xc5, 0x89
+	.byte	0x6f, 0xb7, 0x62, 0x0e, 0xaa, 0x18, 0xbe, 0x1b
+	.byte	0xfc, 0x56, 0x3e, 0x4b, 0xc6, 0xd2, 0x79, 0x20
+	.byte	0x9a, 0xdb, 0xc0, 0xfe, 0x78, 0xcd, 0x5a, 0xf4
+	.byte	0x1f, 0xdd, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x88, 0x07, 0xc7, 0x31
+	.byte	0xb1, 0x12, 0x10, 0x59, 0x27, 0x80, 0xec, 0x5f
+	.byte	0x60, 0x51, 0x7f, 0xa9, 0x19, 0xb5, 0x4a, 0x0d
+	.byte	0x2d, 0xe5, 0x7a, 0x9f, 0x93, 0xc9, 0x9c, 0xef
+	.byte	0xa0, 0xe0, 0x3b, 0x4d, 0xae, 0x2a, 0xf5, 0xb0
+	.byte	0xc8, 0xeb, 0xbb, 0x3c, 0x83, 0x53, 0x99, 0x61
+	.byte	0x17, 0x2b, 0x04, 0x7e, 0xba, 0x77, 0xd6, 0x26
+	.byte	0xe1, 0x69, 0x14, 0x63, 0x55, 0x21, 0x0c, 0x7d
+	.cstring "AES for C64x+, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+	.align	4
+___
+
+print $code;
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/asm/aes-ia64.S b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/asm/aes-ia64.S
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f7f1f63
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/asm/aes-ia64.S
@@ -0,0 +1,1130 @@
+// Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+//
+// Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+// this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+// in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+// https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+//
+// ====================================================================
+// Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se> for the OpenSSL
+// project. Rights for redistribution and usage in source and binary
+// forms are granted according to the OpenSSL license.
+// ====================================================================
+//
+// What's wrong with compiler generated code? Compiler never uses
+// variable 'shr' which is pairable with 'extr'/'dep' instructions.
+// Then it uses 'zxt' which is an I-type, but can be replaced with
+// 'and' which in turn can be assigned to M-port [there're double as
+// much M-ports as there're I-ports on Itanium 2]. By sacrificing few
+// registers for small constants (255, 24 and 16) to be used with
+// 'shr' and 'and' instructions I can achieve better ILP, Instruction
+// Level Parallelism, and performance. This code outperforms GCC 3.3
+// generated code by over factor of 2 (two), GCC 3.4 - by 70% and
+// HP C - by 40%. Measured best-case scenario, i.e. aligned
+// big-endian input, ECB timing on Itanium 2 is (18 + 13*rounds)
+// ticks per block, or 9.25 CPU cycles per byte for 128 bit key.
+
+// Version 1.2 mitigates the hazard of cache-timing attacks by
+// a) compressing S-boxes from 8KB to 2KB+256B, b) scheduling
+// references to S-boxes for L2 cache latency, c) prefetching T[ed]4
+// prior last round. As result performance dropped to (26 + 15*rounds)
+// ticks per block or 11 cycles per byte processed with 128-bit key.
+// This is ~16% deterioration. For reference Itanium 2 L1 cache has
+// 64 bytes line size and L2 - 128 bytes...
+
+.ident	"aes-ia64.S, version 1.2"
+.ident	"IA-64 ISA artwork by Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se>"
+.explicit
+.text
+
+rk0=r8;     rk1=r9;
+
+pfssave=r2;
+lcsave=r10;
+prsave=r3;
+maskff=r11;
+twenty4=r14;
+sixteen=r15;
+
+te00=r16;   te11=r17;   te22=r18;   te33=r19;
+te01=r20;   te12=r21;   te23=r22;   te30=r23;
+te02=r24;   te13=r25;   te20=r26;   te31=r27;
+te03=r28;   te10=r29;   te21=r30;   te32=r31;
+
+// these are rotating...
+t0=r32;     s0=r33;
+t1=r34;     s1=r35;
+t2=r36;     s2=r37;
+t3=r38;     s3=r39;
+
+te0=r40;    te1=r41;    te2=r42;    te3=r43;
+
+#if defined(_HPUX_SOURCE) && !defined(_LP64)
+# define ADDP	addp4
+#else
+# define ADDP	add
+#endif
+
+// Offsets from Te0
+#define TE0	0
+#define TE2	2
+#if defined(_HPUX_SOURCE) || defined(B_ENDIAN)
+#define TE1	3
+#define TE3	1
+#else
+#define TE1	1
+#define TE3	3
+#endif
+
+// This implies that AES_KEY comprises 32-bit key schedule elements
+// even on LP64 platforms.
+#ifndef	KSZ
+# define KSZ	4
+# define LDKEY	ld4
+#endif
+
+.proc	_ia64_AES_encrypt#
+// Input:	rk0-rk1
+//		te0
+//		te3	as AES_KEY->rounds!!!
+//		s0-s3
+//		maskff,twenty4,sixteen
+// Output:	r16,r20,r24,r28 as s0-s3
+// Clobber:	r16-r31,rk0-rk1,r32-r43
+.align	32
+_ia64_AES_encrypt:
+	.prologue
+	.altrp	b6
+	.body
+{ .mmi;	alloc	r16=ar.pfs,12,0,0,8
+	LDKEY	t0=[rk0],2*KSZ
+	mov	pr.rot=1<<16	}
+{ .mmi;	LDKEY	t1=[rk1],2*KSZ
+	add	te1=TE1,te0
+	add	te3=-3,te3	};;
+{ .mib;	LDKEY	t2=[rk0],2*KSZ
+	mov	ar.ec=2		}
+{ .mib;	LDKEY	t3=[rk1],2*KSZ
+	add	te2=TE2,te0
+	brp.loop.imp	.Le_top,.Le_end-16	};;
+
+{ .mmi;	xor	s0=s0,t0
+	xor	s1=s1,t1
+	mov	ar.lc=te3	}
+{ .mmi;	xor	s2=s2,t2
+	xor	s3=s3,t3
+	add	te3=TE3,te0	};;
+
+.align	32
+.Le_top:
+{ .mmi;	(p0)	LDKEY	t0=[rk0],2*KSZ		// 0/0:rk[0]
+	(p0)	and	te33=s3,maskff		// 0/0:s3&0xff
+	(p0)	extr.u	te22=s2,8,8	}	// 0/0:s2>>8&0xff
+{ .mmi; (p0)	LDKEY	t1=[rk1],2*KSZ		// 0/1:rk[1]
+	(p0)	and	te30=s0,maskff		// 0/1:s0&0xff
+	(p0)	shr.u	te00=s0,twenty4	};;	// 0/0:s0>>24
+{ .mmi;	(p0)	LDKEY	t2=[rk0],2*KSZ		// 1/2:rk[2]
+	(p0)	shladd	te33=te33,3,te3		// 1/0:te0+s0>>24
+	(p0)	extr.u	te23=s3,8,8	}	// 1/1:s3>>8&0xff
+{ .mmi;	(p0)	LDKEY	t3=[rk1],2*KSZ		// 1/3:rk[3]
+	(p0)	shladd	te30=te30,3,te3		// 1/1:te3+s0
+	(p0)	shr.u	te01=s1,twenty4	};;	// 1/1:s1>>24
+{ .mmi;	(p0)	ld4	te33=[te33]		// 2/0:te3[s3&0xff]
+	(p0)	shladd	te22=te22,3,te2		// 2/0:te2+s2>>8&0xff
+	(p0)	extr.u	te20=s0,8,8	}	// 2/2:s0>>8&0xff
+{ .mmi;	(p0)	ld4	te30=[te30]		// 2/1:te3[s0]
+	(p0)	shladd	te23=te23,3,te2		// 2/1:te2+s3>>8
+	(p0)	shr.u	te02=s2,twenty4	};;	// 2/2:s2>>24
+{ .mmi;	(p0)	ld4	te22=[te22]		// 3/0:te2[s2>>8]
+	(p0)	shladd	te20=te20,3,te2		// 3/2:te2+s0>>8
+	(p0)	extr.u	te21=s1,8,8	}	// 3/3:s1>>8&0xff
+{ .mmi;	(p0)	ld4	te23=[te23]		// 3/1:te2[s3>>8]
+	(p0)	shladd	te00=te00,3,te0		// 3/0:te0+s0>>24
+	(p0)	shr.u	te03=s3,twenty4	};;	// 3/3:s3>>24
+{ .mmi;	(p0)	ld4	te20=[te20]		// 4/2:te2[s0>>8]
+	(p0)	shladd	te21=te21,3,te2		// 4/3:te3+s2
+	(p0)	extr.u	te11=s1,16,8	}	// 4/0:s1>>16&0xff
+{ .mmi;	(p0)	ld4	te00=[te00]		// 4/0:te0[s0>>24]
+	(p0)	shladd	te01=te01,3,te0		// 4/1:te0+s1>>24
+	(p0)	shr.u	te13=s3,sixteen	};;	// 4/2:s3>>16
+{ .mmi;	(p0)	ld4	te21=[te21]		// 5/3:te2[s1>>8]
+	(p0)	shladd	te11=te11,3,te1		// 5/0:te1+s1>>16
+	(p0)	extr.u	te12=s2,16,8	}	// 5/1:s2>>16&0xff
+{ .mmi;	(p0)	ld4	te01=[te01]		// 5/1:te0[s1>>24]
+	(p0)	shladd	te02=te02,3,te0		// 5/2:te0+s2>>24
+	(p0)	and	te31=s1,maskff	};;	// 5/2:s1&0xff
+{ .mmi;	(p0)	ld4	te11=[te11]		// 6/0:te1[s1>>16]
+	(p0)	shladd	te12=te12,3,te1		// 6/1:te1+s2>>16
+	(p0)	extr.u	te10=s0,16,8	}	// 6/3:s0>>16&0xff
+{ .mmi;	(p0)	ld4	te02=[te02]		// 6/2:te0[s2>>24]
+	(p0)	shladd	te03=te03,3,te0		// 6/3:te1+s0>>16
+	(p0)	and	te32=s2,maskff	};;	// 6/3:s2&0xff
+
+{ .mmi;	(p0)	ld4	te12=[te12]		// 7/1:te1[s2>>16]
+	(p0)	shladd	te31=te31,3,te3		// 7/2:te3+s1&0xff
+	(p0)	and	te13=te13,maskff}	// 7/2:s3>>16&0xff
+{ .mmi;	(p0)	ld4	te03=[te03]		// 7/3:te0[s3>>24]
+	(p0)	shladd	te32=te32,3,te3		// 7/3:te3+s2
+	(p0)	xor	t0=t0,te33	};;	// 7/0:
+{ .mmi;	(p0)	ld4	te31=[te31]		// 8/2:te3[s1]
+	(p0)	shladd	te13=te13,3,te1		// 8/2:te1+s3>>16
+	(p0)	xor	t0=t0,te22	}	// 8/0:
+{ .mmi;	(p0)	ld4	te32=[te32]		// 8/3:te3[s2]
+	(p0)	shladd	te10=te10,3,te1		// 8/3:te1+s0>>16
+	(p0)	xor	t1=t1,te30	};;	// 8/1:
+{ .mmi;	(p0)	ld4	te13=[te13]		// 9/2:te1[s3>>16]
+	(p0)	ld4	te10=[te10]		// 9/3:te1[s0>>16]
+	(p0)	xor	t0=t0,te00	};;	// 9/0:		!L2 scheduling
+{ .mmi;	(p0)	xor	t1=t1,te23		// 10[9]/1:	
+	(p0)	xor	t2=t2,te20		// 10[9]/2:
+	(p0)	xor	t3=t3,te21	};;	// 10[9]/3:
+{ .mmi;	(p0)	xor	t0=t0,te11		// 11[10]/0:done!
+	(p0)	xor	t1=t1,te01		// 11[10]/1:
+	(p0)	xor	t2=t2,te02	};;	// 11[10]/2:	!L2 scheduling
+{ .mmi;	(p0)	xor	t3=t3,te03		// 12[10]/3:
+	(p16)	cmp.eq	p0,p17=r0,r0 	};;	// 12[10]/clear (p17)
+{ .mmi;	(p0)	xor	t1=t1,te12		// 13[11]/1:done!
+	(p0)	xor	t2=t2,te31		// 13[11]/2:
+	(p0)	xor	t3=t3,te32	}	// 13[11]/3:
+{ .mmi;	(p17)	add	te0=2048,te0		// 13[11]/
+	(p17)	add	te1=2048+64-TE1,te1};;	// 13[11]/
+{ .mib;	(p0)	xor	t2=t2,te13		// 14[12]/2:done!
+	(p17)	add	te2=2048+128-TE2,te2}	// 14[12]/
+{ .mib;	(p0)	xor	t3=t3,te10		// 14[12]/3:done!
+	(p17)	add	te3=2048+192-TE3,te3	// 14[12]/
+	br.ctop.sptk	.Le_top		};;
+.Le_end:
+
+
+{ .mmi;	ld8	te12=[te0]		// prefetch Te4
+	ld8	te31=[te1]	}
+{ .mmi;	ld8	te10=[te2]
+	ld8	te32=[te3]	}
+
+{ .mmi;	LDKEY	t0=[rk0],2*KSZ		// 0/0:rk[0]
+	and	te33=s3,maskff		// 0/0:s3&0xff
+	extr.u	te22=s2,8,8	}	// 0/0:s2>>8&0xff
+{ .mmi; LDKEY	t1=[rk1],2*KSZ		// 0/1:rk[1]
+	and	te30=s0,maskff		// 0/1:s0&0xff
+	shr.u	te00=s0,twenty4	};;	// 0/0:s0>>24
+{ .mmi;	LDKEY	t2=[rk0],2*KSZ		// 1/2:rk[2]
+	add	te33=te33,te0		// 1/0:te0+s0>>24
+	extr.u	te23=s3,8,8	}	// 1/1:s3>>8&0xff
+{ .mmi;	LDKEY	t3=[rk1],2*KSZ		// 1/3:rk[3]
+	add	te30=te30,te0		// 1/1:te0+s0
+	shr.u	te01=s1,twenty4	};;	// 1/1:s1>>24
+{ .mmi;	ld1	te33=[te33]		// 2/0:te0[s3&0xff]
+	add	te22=te22,te0		// 2/0:te0+s2>>8&0xff
+	extr.u	te20=s0,8,8	}	// 2/2:s0>>8&0xff
+{ .mmi;	ld1	te30=[te30]		// 2/1:te0[s0]
+	add	te23=te23,te0		// 2/1:te0+s3>>8
+	shr.u	te02=s2,twenty4	};;	// 2/2:s2>>24
+{ .mmi;	ld1	te22=[te22]		// 3/0:te0[s2>>8]
+	add	te20=te20,te0		// 3/2:te0+s0>>8
+	extr.u	te21=s1,8,8	}	// 3/3:s1>>8&0xff
+{ .mmi;	ld1	te23=[te23]		// 3/1:te0[s3>>8]
+	add	te00=te00,te0		// 3/0:te0+s0>>24
+	shr.u	te03=s3,twenty4	};;	// 3/3:s3>>24
+{ .mmi;	ld1	te20=[te20]		// 4/2:te0[s0>>8]
+	add	te21=te21,te0		// 4/3:te0+s2
+	extr.u	te11=s1,16,8	}	// 4/0:s1>>16&0xff
+{ .mmi;	ld1	te00=[te00]		// 4/0:te0[s0>>24]
+	add	te01=te01,te0		// 4/1:te0+s1>>24
+	shr.u	te13=s3,sixteen	};;	// 4/2:s3>>16
+{ .mmi;	ld1	te21=[te21]		// 5/3:te0[s1>>8]
+	add	te11=te11,te0		// 5/0:te0+s1>>16
+	extr.u	te12=s2,16,8	}	// 5/1:s2>>16&0xff
+{ .mmi;	ld1	te01=[te01]		// 5/1:te0[s1>>24]
+	add	te02=te02,te0		// 5/2:te0+s2>>24
+	and	te31=s1,maskff	};;	// 5/2:s1&0xff
+{ .mmi;	ld1	te11=[te11]		// 6/0:te0[s1>>16]
+	add	te12=te12,te0		// 6/1:te0+s2>>16
+	extr.u	te10=s0,16,8	}	// 6/3:s0>>16&0xff
+{ .mmi;	ld1	te02=[te02]		// 6/2:te0[s2>>24]
+	add	te03=te03,te0		// 6/3:te0+s0>>16
+	and	te32=s2,maskff	};;	// 6/3:s2&0xff
+
+{ .mmi;	ld1	te12=[te12]		// 7/1:te0[s2>>16]
+	add	te31=te31,te0		// 7/2:te0+s1&0xff
+	dep	te33=te22,te33,8,8}	// 7/0:
+{ .mmi;	ld1	te03=[te03]		// 7/3:te0[s3>>24]
+	add	te32=te32,te0		// 7/3:te0+s2
+	and	te13=te13,maskff};;	// 7/2:s3>>16&0xff
+{ .mmi;	ld1	te31=[te31]		// 8/2:te0[s1]
+	add	te13=te13,te0		// 8/2:te0+s3>>16
+	dep	te30=te23,te30,8,8}	// 8/1:
+{ .mmi;	ld1	te32=[te32]		// 8/3:te0[s2]
+	add	te10=te10,te0		// 8/3:te0+s0>>16
+	shl	te00=te00,twenty4};;	// 8/0:
+{ .mii;	ld1	te13=[te13]		// 9/2:te0[s3>>16]
+	dep	te33=te11,te33,16,8	// 9/0:
+	shl	te01=te01,twenty4};;	// 9/1:
+{ .mii;	ld1	te10=[te10]		// 10/3:te0[s0>>16]
+	dep	te31=te20,te31,8,8	// 10/2:
+	shl	te02=te02,twenty4};;	// 10/2:
+{ .mii;	xor	t0=t0,te33		// 11/0:
+	dep	te32=te21,te32,8,8	// 11/3:
+	shl	te12=te12,sixteen};;	// 11/1:
+{ .mii;	xor	r16=t0,te00		// 12/0:done!
+	dep	te31=te13,te31,16,8	// 12/2:
+	shl	te03=te03,twenty4};;	// 12/3:
+{ .mmi;	xor	t1=t1,te01		// 13/1:
+	xor	t2=t2,te02		// 13/2:
+	dep	te32=te10,te32,16,8};;	// 13/3:
+{ .mmi;	xor	t1=t1,te30		// 14/1:
+	xor	r24=t2,te31		// 14/2:done!
+	xor	t3=t3,te32	};;	// 14/3:
+{ .mib;	xor	r20=t1,te12		// 15/1:done!
+	xor	r28=t3,te03		// 15/3:done!
+	br.ret.sptk	b6	};;
+.endp	_ia64_AES_encrypt#
+
+// void AES_encrypt (const void *in,void *out,const AES_KEY *key);
+.global	AES_encrypt#
+.proc	AES_encrypt#
+.align	32
+AES_encrypt:
+	.prologue
+	.save	ar.pfs,pfssave
+{ .mmi;	alloc	pfssave=ar.pfs,3,1,12,0
+	and	out0=3,in0
+	mov	r3=ip			}
+{ .mmi;	ADDP	in0=0,in0
+	mov	loc0=psr.um
+	ADDP	out11=KSZ*60,in2	};;	// &AES_KEY->rounds
+
+{ .mmi;	ld4	out11=[out11]			// AES_KEY->rounds
+	add	out8=(AES_Te#-AES_encrypt#),r3	// Te0
+	.save	pr,prsave
+	mov	prsave=pr		}
+{ .mmi;	rum	1<<3				// clear um.ac
+	.save	ar.lc,lcsave
+	mov	lcsave=ar.lc		};;
+
+	.body
+#if defined(_HPUX_SOURCE)	// HPUX is big-endian, cut 15+15 cycles...
+{ .mib; cmp.ne	p6,p0=out0,r0
+	add	out0=4,in0
+(p6)	br.dpnt.many	.Le_i_unaligned	};;
+
+{ .mmi;	ld4	out1=[in0],8		// s0
+	and	out9=3,in1
+	mov	twenty4=24		}
+{ .mmi;	ld4	out3=[out0],8		// s1
+	ADDP	rk0=0,in2
+	mov	sixteen=16		};;
+{ .mmi;	ld4	out5=[in0]		// s2
+	cmp.ne	p6,p0=out9,r0
+	mov	maskff=0xff		}
+{ .mmb;	ld4	out7=[out0]		// s3
+	ADDP	rk1=KSZ,in2
+	br.call.sptk.many	b6=_ia64_AES_encrypt	};;
+
+{ .mib;	ADDP	in0=4,in1
+	ADDP	in1=0,in1
+(p6)	br.spnt	.Le_o_unaligned		};;
+
+{ .mii;	mov	psr.um=loc0
+	mov	ar.pfs=pfssave
+	mov	ar.lc=lcsave		};;
+{ .mmi;	st4	[in1]=r16,8		// s0
+	st4	[in0]=r20,8		// s1
+	mov	pr=prsave,0x1ffff	};;
+{ .mmb;	st4	[in1]=r24		// s2
+	st4	[in0]=r28		// s3
+	br.ret.sptk.many	b0	};;
+#endif
+
+.align	32
+.Le_i_unaligned:
+{ .mmi;	add	out0=1,in0
+	add	out2=2,in0
+	add	out4=3,in0	};;
+{ .mmi;	ld1	r16=[in0],4
+	ld1	r17=[out0],4	}//;;
+{ .mmi;	ld1	r18=[out2],4
+	ld1	out1=[out4],4	};;	// s0
+{ .mmi;	ld1	r20=[in0],4
+	ld1	r21=[out0],4	}//;;
+{ .mmi;	ld1	r22=[out2],4
+	ld1	out3=[out4],4	};;	// s1
+{ .mmi;	ld1	r24=[in0],4
+	ld1	r25=[out0],4	}//;;
+{ .mmi;	ld1	r26=[out2],4
+	ld1	out5=[out4],4	};;	// s2
+{ .mmi;	ld1	r28=[in0]
+	ld1	r29=[out0]	}//;;
+{ .mmi;	ld1	r30=[out2]
+	ld1	out7=[out4]	};;	// s3
+
+{ .mii;
+	dep	out1=r16,out1,24,8	//;;
+	dep	out3=r20,out3,24,8	}//;;
+{ .mii;	ADDP	rk0=0,in2
+	dep	out5=r24,out5,24,8	//;;
+	dep	out7=r28,out7,24,8	};;
+{ .mii;	ADDP	rk1=KSZ,in2
+	dep	out1=r17,out1,16,8	//;;
+	dep	out3=r21,out3,16,8	}//;;
+{ .mii;	mov	twenty4=24
+	dep	out5=r25,out5,16,8	//;;
+	dep	out7=r29,out7,16,8	};;
+{ .mii;	mov	sixteen=16
+	dep	out1=r18,out1,8,8	//;;
+	dep	out3=r22,out3,8,8	}//;;
+{ .mii;	mov	maskff=0xff
+	dep	out5=r26,out5,8,8	//;;
+	dep	out7=r30,out7,8,8	};;
+
+{ .mib;	br.call.sptk.many	b6=_ia64_AES_encrypt	};;
+
+.Le_o_unaligned:
+{ .mii;	ADDP	out0=0,in1
+	extr.u	r17=r16,8,8			// s0
+	shr.u	r19=r16,twenty4		}//;;
+{ .mii;	ADDP	out1=1,in1
+	extr.u	r18=r16,16,8
+	shr.u	r23=r20,twenty4		}//;;	// s1
+{ .mii;	ADDP	out2=2,in1
+	extr.u	r21=r20,8,8
+	shr.u	r22=r20,sixteen		}//;;
+{ .mii;	ADDP	out3=3,in1
+	extr.u	r25=r24,8,8			// s2
+	shr.u	r27=r24,twenty4		};;
+{ .mii;	st1	[out3]=r16,4
+	extr.u	r26=r24,16,8
+	shr.u	r31=r28,twenty4		}//;;	// s3
+{ .mii;	st1	[out2]=r17,4
+	extr.u	r29=r28,8,8
+	shr.u	r30=r28,sixteen		}//;;
+
+{ .mmi;	st1	[out1]=r18,4
+	st1	[out0]=r19,4		};;
+{ .mmi;	st1	[out3]=r20,4
+	st1	[out2]=r21,4		}//;;
+{ .mmi;	st1	[out1]=r22,4
+	st1	[out0]=r23,4		};;
+{ .mmi;	st1	[out3]=r24,4
+	st1	[out2]=r25,4
+	mov	pr=prsave,0x1ffff	}//;;
+{ .mmi;	st1	[out1]=r26,4
+	st1	[out0]=r27,4
+	mov	ar.pfs=pfssave		};;
+{ .mmi;	st1	[out3]=r28
+	st1	[out2]=r29
+	mov	ar.lc=lcsave		}//;;
+{ .mmi;	st1	[out1]=r30
+	st1	[out0]=r31		}
+{ .mfb;	mov	psr.um=loc0			// restore user mask
+	br.ret.sptk.many	b0	};;
+.endp	AES_encrypt#
+
+// *AES_decrypt are autogenerated by the following script:
+#if 0
+#!/usr/bin/env perl
+print "// *AES_decrypt are autogenerated by the following script:\n#if 0\n";
+open(PROG,'<'.$0); while(<PROG>) { print; } close(PROG);
+print "#endif\n";
+while(<>) {
+	$process=1	if (/\.proc\s+_ia64_AES_encrypt/);
+	next		if (!$process);
+
+	#s/te00=s0/td00=s0/;	s/te00/td00/g;
+	s/te11=s1/td13=s3/;	s/te11/td13/g;
+	#s/te22=s2/td22=s2/;	s/te22/td22/g;
+	s/te33=s3/td31=s1/;	s/te33/td31/g;
+
+	#s/te01=s1/td01=s1/;	s/te01/td01/g;
+	s/te12=s2/td10=s0/;	s/te12/td10/g;
+	#s/te23=s3/td23=s3/;	s/te23/td23/g;
+	s/te30=s0/td32=s2/;	s/te30/td32/g;
+
+	#s/te02=s2/td02=s2/;	s/te02/td02/g;
+	s/te13=s3/td11=s1/;	s/te13/td11/g;
+	#s/te20=s0/td20=s0/;	s/te20/td20/g;
+	s/te31=s1/td33=s3/;	s/te31/td33/g;
+
+	#s/te03=s3/td03=s3/;	s/te03/td03/g;
+	s/te10=s0/td12=s2/;	s/te10/td12/g;
+	#s/te21=s1/td21=s1/;	s/te21/td21/g;
+	s/te32=s2/td30=s0/;	s/te32/td30/g;
+
+	s/td/te/g;
+
+	s/AES_encrypt/AES_decrypt/g;
+	s/\.Le_/.Ld_/g;
+	s/AES_Te#/AES_Td#/g;
+
+	print;
+
+	exit		if (/\.endp\s+AES_decrypt/);
+}
+#endif
+.proc	_ia64_AES_decrypt#
+// Input:	rk0-rk1
+//		te0
+//		te3	as AES_KEY->rounds!!!
+//		s0-s3
+//		maskff,twenty4,sixteen
+// Output:	r16,r20,r24,r28 as s0-s3
+// Clobber:	r16-r31,rk0-rk1,r32-r43
+.align	32
+_ia64_AES_decrypt:
+	.prologue
+	.altrp	b6
+	.body
+{ .mmi;	alloc	r16=ar.pfs,12,0,0,8
+	LDKEY	t0=[rk0],2*KSZ
+	mov	pr.rot=1<<16	}
+{ .mmi;	LDKEY	t1=[rk1],2*KSZ
+	add	te1=TE1,te0
+	add	te3=-3,te3	};;
+{ .mib;	LDKEY	t2=[rk0],2*KSZ
+	mov	ar.ec=2		}
+{ .mib;	LDKEY	t3=[rk1],2*KSZ
+	add	te2=TE2,te0
+	brp.loop.imp	.Ld_top,.Ld_end-16	};;
+
+{ .mmi;	xor	s0=s0,t0
+	xor	s1=s1,t1
+	mov	ar.lc=te3	}
+{ .mmi;	xor	s2=s2,t2
+	xor	s3=s3,t3
+	add	te3=TE3,te0	};;
+
+.align	32
+.Ld_top:
+{ .mmi;	(p0)	LDKEY	t0=[rk0],2*KSZ		// 0/0:rk[0]
+	(p0)	and	te31=s1,maskff		// 0/0:s3&0xff
+	(p0)	extr.u	te22=s2,8,8	}	// 0/0:s2>>8&0xff
+{ .mmi; (p0)	LDKEY	t1=[rk1],2*KSZ		// 0/1:rk[1]
+	(p0)	and	te32=s2,maskff		// 0/1:s0&0xff
+	(p0)	shr.u	te00=s0,twenty4	};;	// 0/0:s0>>24
+{ .mmi;	(p0)	LDKEY	t2=[rk0],2*KSZ		// 1/2:rk[2]
+	(p0)	shladd	te31=te31,3,te3		// 1/0:te0+s0>>24
+	(p0)	extr.u	te23=s3,8,8	}	// 1/1:s3>>8&0xff
+{ .mmi;	(p0)	LDKEY	t3=[rk1],2*KSZ		// 1/3:rk[3]
+	(p0)	shladd	te32=te32,3,te3		// 1/1:te3+s0
+	(p0)	shr.u	te01=s1,twenty4	};;	// 1/1:s1>>24
+{ .mmi;	(p0)	ld4	te31=[te31]		// 2/0:te3[s3&0xff]
+	(p0)	shladd	te22=te22,3,te2		// 2/0:te2+s2>>8&0xff
+	(p0)	extr.u	te20=s0,8,8	}	// 2/2:s0>>8&0xff
+{ .mmi;	(p0)	ld4	te32=[te32]		// 2/1:te3[s0]
+	(p0)	shladd	te23=te23,3,te2		// 2/1:te2+s3>>8
+	(p0)	shr.u	te02=s2,twenty4	};;	// 2/2:s2>>24
+{ .mmi;	(p0)	ld4	te22=[te22]		// 3/0:te2[s2>>8]
+	(p0)	shladd	te20=te20,3,te2		// 3/2:te2+s0>>8
+	(p0)	extr.u	te21=s1,8,8	}	// 3/3:s1>>8&0xff
+{ .mmi;	(p0)	ld4	te23=[te23]		// 3/1:te2[s3>>8]
+	(p0)	shladd	te00=te00,3,te0		// 3/0:te0+s0>>24
+	(p0)	shr.u	te03=s3,twenty4	};;	// 3/3:s3>>24
+{ .mmi;	(p0)	ld4	te20=[te20]		// 4/2:te2[s0>>8]
+	(p0)	shladd	te21=te21,3,te2		// 4/3:te3+s2
+	(p0)	extr.u	te13=s3,16,8	}	// 4/0:s1>>16&0xff
+{ .mmi;	(p0)	ld4	te00=[te00]		// 4/0:te0[s0>>24]
+	(p0)	shladd	te01=te01,3,te0		// 4/1:te0+s1>>24
+	(p0)	shr.u	te11=s1,sixteen	};;	// 4/2:s3>>16
+{ .mmi;	(p0)	ld4	te21=[te21]		// 5/3:te2[s1>>8]
+	(p0)	shladd	te13=te13,3,te1		// 5/0:te1+s1>>16
+	(p0)	extr.u	te10=s0,16,8	}	// 5/1:s2>>16&0xff
+{ .mmi;	(p0)	ld4	te01=[te01]		// 5/1:te0[s1>>24]
+	(p0)	shladd	te02=te02,3,te0		// 5/2:te0+s2>>24
+	(p0)	and	te33=s3,maskff	};;	// 5/2:s1&0xff
+{ .mmi;	(p0)	ld4	te13=[te13]		// 6/0:te1[s1>>16]
+	(p0)	shladd	te10=te10,3,te1		// 6/1:te1+s2>>16
+	(p0)	extr.u	te12=s2,16,8	}	// 6/3:s0>>16&0xff
+{ .mmi;	(p0)	ld4	te02=[te02]		// 6/2:te0[s2>>24]
+	(p0)	shladd	te03=te03,3,te0		// 6/3:te1+s0>>16
+	(p0)	and	te30=s0,maskff	};;	// 6/3:s2&0xff
+
+{ .mmi;	(p0)	ld4	te10=[te10]		// 7/1:te1[s2>>16]
+	(p0)	shladd	te33=te33,3,te3		// 7/2:te3+s1&0xff
+	(p0)	and	te11=te11,maskff}	// 7/2:s3>>16&0xff
+{ .mmi;	(p0)	ld4	te03=[te03]		// 7/3:te0[s3>>24]
+	(p0)	shladd	te30=te30,3,te3		// 7/3:te3+s2
+	(p0)	xor	t0=t0,te31	};;	// 7/0:
+{ .mmi;	(p0)	ld4	te33=[te33]		// 8/2:te3[s1]
+	(p0)	shladd	te11=te11,3,te1		// 8/2:te1+s3>>16
+	(p0)	xor	t0=t0,te22	}	// 8/0:
+{ .mmi;	(p0)	ld4	te30=[te30]		// 8/3:te3[s2]
+	(p0)	shladd	te12=te12,3,te1		// 8/3:te1+s0>>16
+	(p0)	xor	t1=t1,te32	};;	// 8/1:
+{ .mmi;	(p0)	ld4	te11=[te11]		// 9/2:te1[s3>>16]
+	(p0)	ld4	te12=[te12]		// 9/3:te1[s0>>16]
+	(p0)	xor	t0=t0,te00	};;	// 9/0:		!L2 scheduling
+{ .mmi;	(p0)	xor	t1=t1,te23		// 10[9]/1:	
+	(p0)	xor	t2=t2,te20		// 10[9]/2:
+	(p0)	xor	t3=t3,te21	};;	// 10[9]/3:
+{ .mmi;	(p0)	xor	t0=t0,te13		// 11[10]/0:done!
+	(p0)	xor	t1=t1,te01		// 11[10]/1:
+	(p0)	xor	t2=t2,te02	};;	// 11[10]/2:	!L2 scheduling
+{ .mmi;	(p0)	xor	t3=t3,te03		// 12[10]/3:
+	(p16)	cmp.eq	p0,p17=r0,r0 	};;	// 12[10]/clear (p17)
+{ .mmi;	(p0)	xor	t1=t1,te10		// 13[11]/1:done!
+	(p0)	xor	t2=t2,te33		// 13[11]/2:
+	(p0)	xor	t3=t3,te30	}	// 13[11]/3:
+{ .mmi;	(p17)	add	te0=2048,te0		// 13[11]/
+	(p17)	add	te1=2048+64-TE1,te1};;	// 13[11]/
+{ .mib;	(p0)	xor	t2=t2,te11		// 14[12]/2:done!
+	(p17)	add	te2=2048+128-TE2,te2}	// 14[12]/
+{ .mib;	(p0)	xor	t3=t3,te12		// 14[12]/3:done!
+	(p17)	add	te3=2048+192-TE3,te3	// 14[12]/
+	br.ctop.sptk	.Ld_top		};;
+.Ld_end:
+
+
+{ .mmi;	ld8	te10=[te0]		// prefetch Td4
+	ld8	te33=[te1]	}
+{ .mmi;	ld8	te12=[te2]
+	ld8	te30=[te3]	}
+
+{ .mmi;	LDKEY	t0=[rk0],2*KSZ		// 0/0:rk[0]
+	and	te31=s1,maskff		// 0/0:s3&0xff
+	extr.u	te22=s2,8,8	}	// 0/0:s2>>8&0xff
+{ .mmi; LDKEY	t1=[rk1],2*KSZ		// 0/1:rk[1]
+	and	te32=s2,maskff		// 0/1:s0&0xff
+	shr.u	te00=s0,twenty4	};;	// 0/0:s0>>24
+{ .mmi;	LDKEY	t2=[rk0],2*KSZ		// 1/2:rk[2]
+	add	te31=te31,te0		// 1/0:te0+s0>>24
+	extr.u	te23=s3,8,8	}	// 1/1:s3>>8&0xff
+{ .mmi;	LDKEY	t3=[rk1],2*KSZ		// 1/3:rk[3]
+	add	te32=te32,te0		// 1/1:te0+s0
+	shr.u	te01=s1,twenty4	};;	// 1/1:s1>>24
+{ .mmi;	ld1	te31=[te31]		// 2/0:te0[s3&0xff]
+	add	te22=te22,te0		// 2/0:te0+s2>>8&0xff
+	extr.u	te20=s0,8,8	}	// 2/2:s0>>8&0xff
+{ .mmi;	ld1	te32=[te32]		// 2/1:te0[s0]
+	add	te23=te23,te0		// 2/1:te0+s3>>8
+	shr.u	te02=s2,twenty4	};;	// 2/2:s2>>24
+{ .mmi;	ld1	te22=[te22]		// 3/0:te0[s2>>8]
+	add	te20=te20,te0		// 3/2:te0+s0>>8
+	extr.u	te21=s1,8,8	}	// 3/3:s1>>8&0xff
+{ .mmi;	ld1	te23=[te23]		// 3/1:te0[s3>>8]
+	add	te00=te00,te0		// 3/0:te0+s0>>24
+	shr.u	te03=s3,twenty4	};;	// 3/3:s3>>24
+{ .mmi;	ld1	te20=[te20]		// 4/2:te0[s0>>8]
+	add	te21=te21,te0		// 4/3:te0+s2
+	extr.u	te13=s3,16,8	}	// 4/0:s1>>16&0xff
+{ .mmi;	ld1	te00=[te00]		// 4/0:te0[s0>>24]
+	add	te01=te01,te0		// 4/1:te0+s1>>24
+	shr.u	te11=s1,sixteen	};;	// 4/2:s3>>16
+{ .mmi;	ld1	te21=[te21]		// 5/3:te0[s1>>8]
+	add	te13=te13,te0		// 5/0:te0+s1>>16
+	extr.u	te10=s0,16,8	}	// 5/1:s2>>16&0xff
+{ .mmi;	ld1	te01=[te01]		// 5/1:te0[s1>>24]
+	add	te02=te02,te0		// 5/2:te0+s2>>24
+	and	te33=s3,maskff	};;	// 5/2:s1&0xff
+{ .mmi;	ld1	te13=[te13]		// 6/0:te0[s1>>16]
+	add	te10=te10,te0		// 6/1:te0+s2>>16
+	extr.u	te12=s2,16,8	}	// 6/3:s0>>16&0xff
+{ .mmi;	ld1	te02=[te02]		// 6/2:te0[s2>>24]
+	add	te03=te03,te0		// 6/3:te0+s0>>16
+	and	te30=s0,maskff	};;	// 6/3:s2&0xff
+
+{ .mmi;	ld1	te10=[te10]		// 7/1:te0[s2>>16]
+	add	te33=te33,te0		// 7/2:te0+s1&0xff
+	dep	te31=te22,te31,8,8}	// 7/0:
+{ .mmi;	ld1	te03=[te03]		// 7/3:te0[s3>>24]
+	add	te30=te30,te0		// 7/3:te0+s2
+	and	te11=te11,maskff};;	// 7/2:s3>>16&0xff
+{ .mmi;	ld1	te33=[te33]		// 8/2:te0[s1]
+	add	te11=te11,te0		// 8/2:te0+s3>>16
+	dep	te32=te23,te32,8,8}	// 8/1:
+{ .mmi;	ld1	te30=[te30]		// 8/3:te0[s2]
+	add	te12=te12,te0		// 8/3:te0+s0>>16
+	shl	te00=te00,twenty4};;	// 8/0:
+{ .mii;	ld1	te11=[te11]		// 9/2:te0[s3>>16]
+	dep	te31=te13,te31,16,8	// 9/0:
+	shl	te01=te01,twenty4};;	// 9/1:
+{ .mii;	ld1	te12=[te12]		// 10/3:te0[s0>>16]
+	dep	te33=te20,te33,8,8	// 10/2:
+	shl	te02=te02,twenty4};;	// 10/2:
+{ .mii;	xor	t0=t0,te31		// 11/0:
+	dep	te30=te21,te30,8,8	// 11/3:
+	shl	te10=te10,sixteen};;	// 11/1:
+{ .mii;	xor	r16=t0,te00		// 12/0:done!
+	dep	te33=te11,te33,16,8	// 12/2:
+	shl	te03=te03,twenty4};;	// 12/3:
+{ .mmi;	xor	t1=t1,te01		// 13/1:
+	xor	t2=t2,te02		// 13/2:
+	dep	te30=te12,te30,16,8};;	// 13/3:
+{ .mmi;	xor	t1=t1,te32		// 14/1:
+	xor	r24=t2,te33		// 14/2:done!
+	xor	t3=t3,te30	};;	// 14/3:
+{ .mib;	xor	r20=t1,te10		// 15/1:done!
+	xor	r28=t3,te03		// 15/3:done!
+	br.ret.sptk	b6	};;
+.endp	_ia64_AES_decrypt#
+
+// void AES_decrypt (const void *in,void *out,const AES_KEY *key);
+.global	AES_decrypt#
+.proc	AES_decrypt#
+.align	32
+AES_decrypt:
+	.prologue
+	.save	ar.pfs,pfssave
+{ .mmi;	alloc	pfssave=ar.pfs,3,1,12,0
+	and	out0=3,in0
+	mov	r3=ip			}
+{ .mmi;	ADDP	in0=0,in0
+	mov	loc0=psr.um
+	ADDP	out11=KSZ*60,in2	};;	// &AES_KEY->rounds
+
+{ .mmi;	ld4	out11=[out11]			// AES_KEY->rounds
+	add	out8=(AES_Td#-AES_decrypt#),r3	// Te0
+	.save	pr,prsave
+	mov	prsave=pr		}
+{ .mmi;	rum	1<<3				// clear um.ac
+	.save	ar.lc,lcsave
+	mov	lcsave=ar.lc		};;
+
+	.body
+#if defined(_HPUX_SOURCE)	// HPUX is big-endian, cut 15+15 cycles...
+{ .mib; cmp.ne	p6,p0=out0,r0
+	add	out0=4,in0
+(p6)	br.dpnt.many	.Ld_i_unaligned	};;
+
+{ .mmi;	ld4	out1=[in0],8		// s0
+	and	out9=3,in1
+	mov	twenty4=24		}
+{ .mmi;	ld4	out3=[out0],8		// s1
+	ADDP	rk0=0,in2
+	mov	sixteen=16		};;
+{ .mmi;	ld4	out5=[in0]		// s2
+	cmp.ne	p6,p0=out9,r0
+	mov	maskff=0xff		}
+{ .mmb;	ld4	out7=[out0]		// s3
+	ADDP	rk1=KSZ,in2
+	br.call.sptk.many	b6=_ia64_AES_decrypt	};;
+
+{ .mib;	ADDP	in0=4,in1
+	ADDP	in1=0,in1
+(p6)	br.spnt	.Ld_o_unaligned		};;
+
+{ .mii;	mov	psr.um=loc0
+	mov	ar.pfs=pfssave
+	mov	ar.lc=lcsave		};;
+{ .mmi;	st4	[in1]=r16,8		// s0
+	st4	[in0]=r20,8		// s1
+	mov	pr=prsave,0x1ffff	};;
+{ .mmb;	st4	[in1]=r24		// s2
+	st4	[in0]=r28		// s3
+	br.ret.sptk.many	b0	};;
+#endif
+
+.align	32
+.Ld_i_unaligned:
+{ .mmi;	add	out0=1,in0
+	add	out2=2,in0
+	add	out4=3,in0	};;
+{ .mmi;	ld1	r16=[in0],4
+	ld1	r17=[out0],4	}//;;
+{ .mmi;	ld1	r18=[out2],4
+	ld1	out1=[out4],4	};;	// s0
+{ .mmi;	ld1	r20=[in0],4
+	ld1	r21=[out0],4	}//;;
+{ .mmi;	ld1	r22=[out2],4
+	ld1	out3=[out4],4	};;	// s1
+{ .mmi;	ld1	r24=[in0],4
+	ld1	r25=[out0],4	}//;;
+{ .mmi;	ld1	r26=[out2],4
+	ld1	out5=[out4],4	};;	// s2
+{ .mmi;	ld1	r28=[in0]
+	ld1	r29=[out0]	}//;;
+{ .mmi;	ld1	r30=[out2]
+	ld1	out7=[out4]	};;	// s3
+
+{ .mii;
+	dep	out1=r16,out1,24,8	//;;
+	dep	out3=r20,out3,24,8	}//;;
+{ .mii;	ADDP	rk0=0,in2
+	dep	out5=r24,out5,24,8	//;;
+	dep	out7=r28,out7,24,8	};;
+{ .mii;	ADDP	rk1=KSZ,in2
+	dep	out1=r17,out1,16,8	//;;
+	dep	out3=r21,out3,16,8	}//;;
+{ .mii;	mov	twenty4=24
+	dep	out5=r25,out5,16,8	//;;
+	dep	out7=r29,out7,16,8	};;
+{ .mii;	mov	sixteen=16
+	dep	out1=r18,out1,8,8	//;;
+	dep	out3=r22,out3,8,8	}//;;
+{ .mii;	mov	maskff=0xff
+	dep	out5=r26,out5,8,8	//;;
+	dep	out7=r30,out7,8,8	};;
+
+{ .mib;	br.call.sptk.many	b6=_ia64_AES_decrypt	};;
+
+.Ld_o_unaligned:
+{ .mii;	ADDP	out0=0,in1
+	extr.u	r17=r16,8,8			// s0
+	shr.u	r19=r16,twenty4		}//;;
+{ .mii;	ADDP	out1=1,in1
+	extr.u	r18=r16,16,8
+	shr.u	r23=r20,twenty4		}//;;	// s1
+{ .mii;	ADDP	out2=2,in1
+	extr.u	r21=r20,8,8
+	shr.u	r22=r20,sixteen		}//;;
+{ .mii;	ADDP	out3=3,in1
+	extr.u	r25=r24,8,8			// s2
+	shr.u	r27=r24,twenty4		};;
+{ .mii;	st1	[out3]=r16,4
+	extr.u	r26=r24,16,8
+	shr.u	r31=r28,twenty4		}//;;	// s3
+{ .mii;	st1	[out2]=r17,4
+	extr.u	r29=r28,8,8
+	shr.u	r30=r28,sixteen		}//;;
+
+{ .mmi;	st1	[out1]=r18,4
+	st1	[out0]=r19,4		};;
+{ .mmi;	st1	[out3]=r20,4
+	st1	[out2]=r21,4		}//;;
+{ .mmi;	st1	[out1]=r22,4
+	st1	[out0]=r23,4		};;
+{ .mmi;	st1	[out3]=r24,4
+	st1	[out2]=r25,4
+	mov	pr=prsave,0x1ffff	}//;;
+{ .mmi;	st1	[out1]=r26,4
+	st1	[out0]=r27,4
+	mov	ar.pfs=pfssave		};;
+{ .mmi;	st1	[out3]=r28
+	st1	[out2]=r29
+	mov	ar.lc=lcsave		}//;;
+{ .mmi;	st1	[out1]=r30
+	st1	[out0]=r31		}
+{ .mfb;	mov	psr.um=loc0			// restore user mask
+	br.ret.sptk.many	b0	};;
+.endp	AES_decrypt#
+
+// leave it in .text segment...
+.align	64
+.global	AES_Te#
+.type	AES_Te#,@object
+AES_Te:	data4	0xc66363a5,0xc66363a5, 0xf87c7c84,0xf87c7c84
+	data4	0xee777799,0xee777799, 0xf67b7b8d,0xf67b7b8d
+	data4	0xfff2f20d,0xfff2f20d, 0xd66b6bbd,0xd66b6bbd
+	data4	0xde6f6fb1,0xde6f6fb1, 0x91c5c554,0x91c5c554
+	data4	0x60303050,0x60303050, 0x02010103,0x02010103
+	data4	0xce6767a9,0xce6767a9, 0x562b2b7d,0x562b2b7d
+	data4	0xe7fefe19,0xe7fefe19, 0xb5d7d762,0xb5d7d762
+	data4	0x4dababe6,0x4dababe6, 0xec76769a,0xec76769a
+	data4	0x8fcaca45,0x8fcaca45, 0x1f82829d,0x1f82829d
+	data4	0x89c9c940,0x89c9c940, 0xfa7d7d87,0xfa7d7d87
+	data4	0xeffafa15,0xeffafa15, 0xb25959eb,0xb25959eb
+	data4	0x8e4747c9,0x8e4747c9, 0xfbf0f00b,0xfbf0f00b
+	data4	0x41adadec,0x41adadec, 0xb3d4d467,0xb3d4d467
+	data4	0x5fa2a2fd,0x5fa2a2fd, 0x45afafea,0x45afafea
+	data4	0x239c9cbf,0x239c9cbf, 0x53a4a4f7,0x53a4a4f7
+	data4	0xe4727296,0xe4727296, 0x9bc0c05b,0x9bc0c05b
+	data4	0x75b7b7c2,0x75b7b7c2, 0xe1fdfd1c,0xe1fdfd1c
+	data4	0x3d9393ae,0x3d9393ae, 0x4c26266a,0x4c26266a
+	data4	0x6c36365a,0x6c36365a, 0x7e3f3f41,0x7e3f3f41
+	data4	0xf5f7f702,0xf5f7f702, 0x83cccc4f,0x83cccc4f
+	data4	0x6834345c,0x6834345c, 0x51a5a5f4,0x51a5a5f4
+	data4	0xd1e5e534,0xd1e5e534, 0xf9f1f108,0xf9f1f108
+	data4	0xe2717193,0xe2717193, 0xabd8d873,0xabd8d873
+	data4	0x62313153,0x62313153, 0x2a15153f,0x2a15153f
+	data4	0x0804040c,0x0804040c, 0x95c7c752,0x95c7c752
+	data4	0x46232365,0x46232365, 0x9dc3c35e,0x9dc3c35e
+	data4	0x30181828,0x30181828, 0x379696a1,0x379696a1
+	data4	0x0a05050f,0x0a05050f, 0x2f9a9ab5,0x2f9a9ab5
+	data4	0x0e070709,0x0e070709, 0x24121236,0x24121236
+	data4	0x1b80809b,0x1b80809b, 0xdfe2e23d,0xdfe2e23d
+	data4	0xcdebeb26,0xcdebeb26, 0x4e272769,0x4e272769
+	data4	0x7fb2b2cd,0x7fb2b2cd, 0xea75759f,0xea75759f
+	data4	0x1209091b,0x1209091b, 0x1d83839e,0x1d83839e
+	data4	0x582c2c74,0x582c2c74, 0x341a1a2e,0x341a1a2e
+	data4	0x361b1b2d,0x361b1b2d, 0xdc6e6eb2,0xdc6e6eb2
+	data4	0xb45a5aee,0xb45a5aee, 0x5ba0a0fb,0x5ba0a0fb
+	data4	0xa45252f6,0xa45252f6, 0x763b3b4d,0x763b3b4d
+	data4	0xb7d6d661,0xb7d6d661, 0x7db3b3ce,0x7db3b3ce
+	data4	0x5229297b,0x5229297b, 0xdde3e33e,0xdde3e33e
+	data4	0x5e2f2f71,0x5e2f2f71, 0x13848497,0x13848497
+	data4	0xa65353f5,0xa65353f5, 0xb9d1d168,0xb9d1d168
+	data4	0x00000000,0x00000000, 0xc1eded2c,0xc1eded2c
+	data4	0x40202060,0x40202060, 0xe3fcfc1f,0xe3fcfc1f
+	data4	0x79b1b1c8,0x79b1b1c8, 0xb65b5bed,0xb65b5bed
+	data4	0xd46a6abe,0xd46a6abe, 0x8dcbcb46,0x8dcbcb46
+	data4	0x67bebed9,0x67bebed9, 0x7239394b,0x7239394b
+	data4	0x944a4ade,0x944a4ade, 0x984c4cd4,0x984c4cd4
+	data4	0xb05858e8,0xb05858e8, 0x85cfcf4a,0x85cfcf4a
+	data4	0xbbd0d06b,0xbbd0d06b, 0xc5efef2a,0xc5efef2a
+	data4	0x4faaaae5,0x4faaaae5, 0xedfbfb16,0xedfbfb16
+	data4	0x864343c5,0x864343c5, 0x9a4d4dd7,0x9a4d4dd7
+	data4	0x66333355,0x66333355, 0x11858594,0x11858594
+	data4	0x8a4545cf,0x8a4545cf, 0xe9f9f910,0xe9f9f910
+	data4	0x04020206,0x04020206, 0xfe7f7f81,0xfe7f7f81
+	data4	0xa05050f0,0xa05050f0, 0x783c3c44,0x783c3c44
+	data4	0x259f9fba,0x259f9fba, 0x4ba8a8e3,0x4ba8a8e3
+	data4	0xa25151f3,0xa25151f3, 0x5da3a3fe,0x5da3a3fe
+	data4	0x804040c0,0x804040c0, 0x058f8f8a,0x058f8f8a
+	data4	0x3f9292ad,0x3f9292ad, 0x219d9dbc,0x219d9dbc
+	data4	0x70383848,0x70383848, 0xf1f5f504,0xf1f5f504
+	data4	0x63bcbcdf,0x63bcbcdf, 0x77b6b6c1,0x77b6b6c1
+	data4	0xafdada75,0xafdada75, 0x42212163,0x42212163
+	data4	0x20101030,0x20101030, 0xe5ffff1a,0xe5ffff1a
+	data4	0xfdf3f30e,0xfdf3f30e, 0xbfd2d26d,0xbfd2d26d
+	data4	0x81cdcd4c,0x81cdcd4c, 0x180c0c14,0x180c0c14
+	data4	0x26131335,0x26131335, 0xc3ecec2f,0xc3ecec2f
+	data4	0xbe5f5fe1,0xbe5f5fe1, 0x359797a2,0x359797a2
+	data4	0x884444cc,0x884444cc, 0x2e171739,0x2e171739
+	data4	0x93c4c457,0x93c4c457, 0x55a7a7f2,0x55a7a7f2
+	data4	0xfc7e7e82,0xfc7e7e82, 0x7a3d3d47,0x7a3d3d47
+	data4	0xc86464ac,0xc86464ac, 0xba5d5de7,0xba5d5de7
+	data4	0x3219192b,0x3219192b, 0xe6737395,0xe6737395
+	data4	0xc06060a0,0xc06060a0, 0x19818198,0x19818198
+	data4	0x9e4f4fd1,0x9e4f4fd1, 0xa3dcdc7f,0xa3dcdc7f
+	data4	0x44222266,0x44222266, 0x542a2a7e,0x542a2a7e
+	data4	0x3b9090ab,0x3b9090ab, 0x0b888883,0x0b888883
+	data4	0x8c4646ca,0x8c4646ca, 0xc7eeee29,0xc7eeee29
+	data4	0x6bb8b8d3,0x6bb8b8d3, 0x2814143c,0x2814143c
+	data4	0xa7dede79,0xa7dede79, 0xbc5e5ee2,0xbc5e5ee2
+	data4	0x160b0b1d,0x160b0b1d, 0xaddbdb76,0xaddbdb76
+	data4	0xdbe0e03b,0xdbe0e03b, 0x64323256,0x64323256
+	data4	0x743a3a4e,0x743a3a4e, 0x140a0a1e,0x140a0a1e
+	data4	0x924949db,0x924949db, 0x0c06060a,0x0c06060a
+	data4	0x4824246c,0x4824246c, 0xb85c5ce4,0xb85c5ce4
+	data4	0x9fc2c25d,0x9fc2c25d, 0xbdd3d36e,0xbdd3d36e
+	data4	0x43acacef,0x43acacef, 0xc46262a6,0xc46262a6
+	data4	0x399191a8,0x399191a8, 0x319595a4,0x319595a4
+	data4	0xd3e4e437,0xd3e4e437, 0xf279798b,0xf279798b
+	data4	0xd5e7e732,0xd5e7e732, 0x8bc8c843,0x8bc8c843
+	data4	0x6e373759,0x6e373759, 0xda6d6db7,0xda6d6db7
+	data4	0x018d8d8c,0x018d8d8c, 0xb1d5d564,0xb1d5d564
+	data4	0x9c4e4ed2,0x9c4e4ed2, 0x49a9a9e0,0x49a9a9e0
+	data4	0xd86c6cb4,0xd86c6cb4, 0xac5656fa,0xac5656fa
+	data4	0xf3f4f407,0xf3f4f407, 0xcfeaea25,0xcfeaea25
+	data4	0xca6565af,0xca6565af, 0xf47a7a8e,0xf47a7a8e
+	data4	0x47aeaee9,0x47aeaee9, 0x10080818,0x10080818
+	data4	0x6fbabad5,0x6fbabad5, 0xf0787888,0xf0787888
+	data4	0x4a25256f,0x4a25256f, 0x5c2e2e72,0x5c2e2e72
+	data4	0x381c1c24,0x381c1c24, 0x57a6a6f1,0x57a6a6f1
+	data4	0x73b4b4c7,0x73b4b4c7, 0x97c6c651,0x97c6c651
+	data4	0xcbe8e823,0xcbe8e823, 0xa1dddd7c,0xa1dddd7c
+	data4	0xe874749c,0xe874749c, 0x3e1f1f21,0x3e1f1f21
+	data4	0x964b4bdd,0x964b4bdd, 0x61bdbddc,0x61bdbddc
+	data4	0x0d8b8b86,0x0d8b8b86, 0x0f8a8a85,0x0f8a8a85
+	data4	0xe0707090,0xe0707090, 0x7c3e3e42,0x7c3e3e42
+	data4	0x71b5b5c4,0x71b5b5c4, 0xcc6666aa,0xcc6666aa
+	data4	0x904848d8,0x904848d8, 0x06030305,0x06030305
+	data4	0xf7f6f601,0xf7f6f601, 0x1c0e0e12,0x1c0e0e12
+	data4	0xc26161a3,0xc26161a3, 0x6a35355f,0x6a35355f
+	data4	0xae5757f9,0xae5757f9, 0x69b9b9d0,0x69b9b9d0
+	data4	0x17868691,0x17868691, 0x99c1c158,0x99c1c158
+	data4	0x3a1d1d27,0x3a1d1d27, 0x279e9eb9,0x279e9eb9
+	data4	0xd9e1e138,0xd9e1e138, 0xebf8f813,0xebf8f813
+	data4	0x2b9898b3,0x2b9898b3, 0x22111133,0x22111133
+	data4	0xd26969bb,0xd26969bb, 0xa9d9d970,0xa9d9d970
+	data4	0x078e8e89,0x078e8e89, 0x339494a7,0x339494a7
+	data4	0x2d9b9bb6,0x2d9b9bb6, 0x3c1e1e22,0x3c1e1e22
+	data4	0x15878792,0x15878792, 0xc9e9e920,0xc9e9e920
+	data4	0x87cece49,0x87cece49, 0xaa5555ff,0xaa5555ff
+	data4	0x50282878,0x50282878, 0xa5dfdf7a,0xa5dfdf7a
+	data4	0x038c8c8f,0x038c8c8f, 0x59a1a1f8,0x59a1a1f8
+	data4	0x09898980,0x09898980, 0x1a0d0d17,0x1a0d0d17
+	data4	0x65bfbfda,0x65bfbfda, 0xd7e6e631,0xd7e6e631
+	data4	0x844242c6,0x844242c6, 0xd06868b8,0xd06868b8
+	data4	0x824141c3,0x824141c3, 0x299999b0,0x299999b0
+	data4	0x5a2d2d77,0x5a2d2d77, 0x1e0f0f11,0x1e0f0f11
+	data4	0x7bb0b0cb,0x7bb0b0cb, 0xa85454fc,0xa85454fc
+	data4	0x6dbbbbd6,0x6dbbbbd6, 0x2c16163a,0x2c16163a
+// Te4:
+	data1	0x63, 0x7c, 0x77, 0x7b, 0xf2, 0x6b, 0x6f, 0xc5
+	data1	0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2b, 0xfe, 0xd7, 0xab, 0x76
+	data1	0xca, 0x82, 0xc9, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0x59, 0x47, 0xf0
+	data1	0xad, 0xd4, 0xa2, 0xaf, 0x9c, 0xa4, 0x72, 0xc0
+	data1	0xb7, 0xfd, 0x93, 0x26, 0x36, 0x3f, 0xf7, 0xcc
+	data1	0x34, 0xa5, 0xe5, 0xf1, 0x71, 0xd8, 0x31, 0x15
+	data1	0x04, 0xc7, 0x23, 0xc3, 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9a
+	data1	0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xeb, 0x27, 0xb2, 0x75
+	data1	0x09, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x6e, 0x5a, 0xa0
+	data1	0x52, 0x3b, 0xd6, 0xb3, 0x29, 0xe3, 0x2f, 0x84
+	data1	0x53, 0xd1, 0x00, 0xed, 0x20, 0xfc, 0xb1, 0x5b
+	data1	0x6a, 0xcb, 0xbe, 0x39, 0x4a, 0x4c, 0x58, 0xcf
+	data1	0xd0, 0xef, 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x43, 0x4d, 0x33, 0x85
+	data1	0x45, 0xf9, 0x02, 0x7f, 0x50, 0x3c, 0x9f, 0xa8
+	data1	0x51, 0xa3, 0x40, 0x8f, 0x92, 0x9d, 0x38, 0xf5
+	data1	0xbc, 0xb6, 0xda, 0x21, 0x10, 0xff, 0xf3, 0xd2
+	data1	0xcd, 0x0c, 0x13, 0xec, 0x5f, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17
+	data1	0xc4, 0xa7, 0x7e, 0x3d, 0x64, 0x5d, 0x19, 0x73
+	data1	0x60, 0x81, 0x4f, 0xdc, 0x22, 0x2a, 0x90, 0x88
+	data1	0x46, 0xee, 0xb8, 0x14, 0xde, 0x5e, 0x0b, 0xdb
+	data1	0xe0, 0x32, 0x3a, 0x0a, 0x49, 0x06, 0x24, 0x5c
+	data1	0xc2, 0xd3, 0xac, 0x62, 0x91, 0x95, 0xe4, 0x79
+	data1	0xe7, 0xc8, 0x37, 0x6d, 0x8d, 0xd5, 0x4e, 0xa9
+	data1	0x6c, 0x56, 0xf4, 0xea, 0x65, 0x7a, 0xae, 0x08
+	data1	0xba, 0x78, 0x25, 0x2e, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xb4, 0xc6
+	data1	0xe8, 0xdd, 0x74, 0x1f, 0x4b, 0xbd, 0x8b, 0x8a
+	data1	0x70, 0x3e, 0xb5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xf6, 0x0e
+	data1	0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xb9, 0x86, 0xc1, 0x1d, 0x9e
+	data1	0xe1, 0xf8, 0x98, 0x11, 0x69, 0xd9, 0x8e, 0x94
+	data1	0x9b, 0x1e, 0x87, 0xe9, 0xce, 0x55, 0x28, 0xdf
+	data1	0x8c, 0xa1, 0x89, 0x0d, 0xbf, 0xe6, 0x42, 0x68
+	data1	0x41, 0x99, 0x2d, 0x0f, 0xb0, 0x54, 0xbb, 0x16
+.size	AES_Te#,2048+256	// HP-UX assembler fails to ".-AES_Te#"
+
+.align	64
+.global	AES_Td#
+.type	AES_Td#,@object
+AES_Td:	data4	0x51f4a750,0x51f4a750, 0x7e416553,0x7e416553
+	data4	0x1a17a4c3,0x1a17a4c3, 0x3a275e96,0x3a275e96
+	data4	0x3bab6bcb,0x3bab6bcb, 0x1f9d45f1,0x1f9d45f1
+	data4	0xacfa58ab,0xacfa58ab, 0x4be30393,0x4be30393
+	data4	0x2030fa55,0x2030fa55, 0xad766df6,0xad766df6
+	data4	0x88cc7691,0x88cc7691, 0xf5024c25,0xf5024c25
+	data4	0x4fe5d7fc,0x4fe5d7fc, 0xc52acbd7,0xc52acbd7
+	data4	0x26354480,0x26354480, 0xb562a38f,0xb562a38f
+	data4	0xdeb15a49,0xdeb15a49, 0x25ba1b67,0x25ba1b67
+	data4	0x45ea0e98,0x45ea0e98, 0x5dfec0e1,0x5dfec0e1
+	data4	0xc32f7502,0xc32f7502, 0x814cf012,0x814cf012
+	data4	0x8d4697a3,0x8d4697a3, 0x6bd3f9c6,0x6bd3f9c6
+	data4	0x038f5fe7,0x038f5fe7, 0x15929c95,0x15929c95
+	data4	0xbf6d7aeb,0xbf6d7aeb, 0x955259da,0x955259da
+	data4	0xd4be832d,0xd4be832d, 0x587421d3,0x587421d3
+	data4	0x49e06929,0x49e06929, 0x8ec9c844,0x8ec9c844
+	data4	0x75c2896a,0x75c2896a, 0xf48e7978,0xf48e7978
+	data4	0x99583e6b,0x99583e6b, 0x27b971dd,0x27b971dd
+	data4	0xbee14fb6,0xbee14fb6, 0xf088ad17,0xf088ad17
+	data4	0xc920ac66,0xc920ac66, 0x7dce3ab4,0x7dce3ab4
+	data4	0x63df4a18,0x63df4a18, 0xe51a3182,0xe51a3182
+	data4	0x97513360,0x97513360, 0x62537f45,0x62537f45
+	data4	0xb16477e0,0xb16477e0, 0xbb6bae84,0xbb6bae84
+	data4	0xfe81a01c,0xfe81a01c, 0xf9082b94,0xf9082b94
+	data4	0x70486858,0x70486858, 0x8f45fd19,0x8f45fd19
+	data4	0x94de6c87,0x94de6c87, 0x527bf8b7,0x527bf8b7
+	data4	0xab73d323,0xab73d323, 0x724b02e2,0x724b02e2
+	data4	0xe31f8f57,0xe31f8f57, 0x6655ab2a,0x6655ab2a
+	data4	0xb2eb2807,0xb2eb2807, 0x2fb5c203,0x2fb5c203
+	data4	0x86c57b9a,0x86c57b9a, 0xd33708a5,0xd33708a5
+	data4	0x302887f2,0x302887f2, 0x23bfa5b2,0x23bfa5b2
+	data4	0x02036aba,0x02036aba, 0xed16825c,0xed16825c
+	data4	0x8acf1c2b,0x8acf1c2b, 0xa779b492,0xa779b492
+	data4	0xf307f2f0,0xf307f2f0, 0x4e69e2a1,0x4e69e2a1
+	data4	0x65daf4cd,0x65daf4cd, 0x0605bed5,0x0605bed5
+	data4	0xd134621f,0xd134621f, 0xc4a6fe8a,0xc4a6fe8a
+	data4	0x342e539d,0x342e539d, 0xa2f355a0,0xa2f355a0
+	data4	0x058ae132,0x058ae132, 0xa4f6eb75,0xa4f6eb75
+	data4	0x0b83ec39,0x0b83ec39, 0x4060efaa,0x4060efaa
+	data4	0x5e719f06,0x5e719f06, 0xbd6e1051,0xbd6e1051
+	data4	0x3e218af9,0x3e218af9, 0x96dd063d,0x96dd063d
+	data4	0xdd3e05ae,0xdd3e05ae, 0x4de6bd46,0x4de6bd46
+	data4	0x91548db5,0x91548db5, 0x71c45d05,0x71c45d05
+	data4	0x0406d46f,0x0406d46f, 0x605015ff,0x605015ff
+	data4	0x1998fb24,0x1998fb24, 0xd6bde997,0xd6bde997
+	data4	0x894043cc,0x894043cc, 0x67d99e77,0x67d99e77
+	data4	0xb0e842bd,0xb0e842bd, 0x07898b88,0x07898b88
+	data4	0xe7195b38,0xe7195b38, 0x79c8eedb,0x79c8eedb
+	data4	0xa17c0a47,0xa17c0a47, 0x7c420fe9,0x7c420fe9
+	data4	0xf8841ec9,0xf8841ec9, 0x00000000,0x00000000
+	data4	0x09808683,0x09808683, 0x322bed48,0x322bed48
+	data4	0x1e1170ac,0x1e1170ac, 0x6c5a724e,0x6c5a724e
+	data4	0xfd0efffb,0xfd0efffb, 0x0f853856,0x0f853856
+	data4	0x3daed51e,0x3daed51e, 0x362d3927,0x362d3927
+	data4	0x0a0fd964,0x0a0fd964, 0x685ca621,0x685ca621
+	data4	0x9b5b54d1,0x9b5b54d1, 0x24362e3a,0x24362e3a
+	data4	0x0c0a67b1,0x0c0a67b1, 0x9357e70f,0x9357e70f
+	data4	0xb4ee96d2,0xb4ee96d2, 0x1b9b919e,0x1b9b919e
+	data4	0x80c0c54f,0x80c0c54f, 0x61dc20a2,0x61dc20a2
+	data4	0x5a774b69,0x5a774b69, 0x1c121a16,0x1c121a16
+	data4	0xe293ba0a,0xe293ba0a, 0xc0a02ae5,0xc0a02ae5
+	data4	0x3c22e043,0x3c22e043, 0x121b171d,0x121b171d
+	data4	0x0e090d0b,0x0e090d0b, 0xf28bc7ad,0xf28bc7ad
+	data4	0x2db6a8b9,0x2db6a8b9, 0x141ea9c8,0x141ea9c8
+	data4	0x57f11985,0x57f11985, 0xaf75074c,0xaf75074c
+	data4	0xee99ddbb,0xee99ddbb, 0xa37f60fd,0xa37f60fd
+	data4	0xf701269f,0xf701269f, 0x5c72f5bc,0x5c72f5bc
+	data4	0x44663bc5,0x44663bc5, 0x5bfb7e34,0x5bfb7e34
+	data4	0x8b432976,0x8b432976, 0xcb23c6dc,0xcb23c6dc
+	data4	0xb6edfc68,0xb6edfc68, 0xb8e4f163,0xb8e4f163
+	data4	0xd731dcca,0xd731dcca, 0x42638510,0x42638510
+	data4	0x13972240,0x13972240, 0x84c61120,0x84c61120
+	data4	0x854a247d,0x854a247d, 0xd2bb3df8,0xd2bb3df8
+	data4	0xaef93211,0xaef93211, 0xc729a16d,0xc729a16d
+	data4	0x1d9e2f4b,0x1d9e2f4b, 0xdcb230f3,0xdcb230f3
+	data4	0x0d8652ec,0x0d8652ec, 0x77c1e3d0,0x77c1e3d0
+	data4	0x2bb3166c,0x2bb3166c, 0xa970b999,0xa970b999
+	data4	0x119448fa,0x119448fa, 0x47e96422,0x47e96422
+	data4	0xa8fc8cc4,0xa8fc8cc4, 0xa0f03f1a,0xa0f03f1a
+	data4	0x567d2cd8,0x567d2cd8, 0x223390ef,0x223390ef
+	data4	0x87494ec7,0x87494ec7, 0xd938d1c1,0xd938d1c1
+	data4	0x8ccaa2fe,0x8ccaa2fe, 0x98d40b36,0x98d40b36
+	data4	0xa6f581cf,0xa6f581cf, 0xa57ade28,0xa57ade28
+	data4	0xdab78e26,0xdab78e26, 0x3fadbfa4,0x3fadbfa4
+	data4	0x2c3a9de4,0x2c3a9de4, 0x5078920d,0x5078920d
+	data4	0x6a5fcc9b,0x6a5fcc9b, 0x547e4662,0x547e4662
+	data4	0xf68d13c2,0xf68d13c2, 0x90d8b8e8,0x90d8b8e8
+	data4	0x2e39f75e,0x2e39f75e, 0x82c3aff5,0x82c3aff5
+	data4	0x9f5d80be,0x9f5d80be, 0x69d0937c,0x69d0937c
+	data4	0x6fd52da9,0x6fd52da9, 0xcf2512b3,0xcf2512b3
+	data4	0xc8ac993b,0xc8ac993b, 0x10187da7,0x10187da7
+	data4	0xe89c636e,0xe89c636e, 0xdb3bbb7b,0xdb3bbb7b
+	data4	0xcd267809,0xcd267809, 0x6e5918f4,0x6e5918f4
+	data4	0xec9ab701,0xec9ab701, 0x834f9aa8,0x834f9aa8
+	data4	0xe6956e65,0xe6956e65, 0xaaffe67e,0xaaffe67e
+	data4	0x21bccf08,0x21bccf08, 0xef15e8e6,0xef15e8e6
+	data4	0xbae79bd9,0xbae79bd9, 0x4a6f36ce,0x4a6f36ce
+	data4	0xea9f09d4,0xea9f09d4, 0x29b07cd6,0x29b07cd6
+	data4	0x31a4b2af,0x31a4b2af, 0x2a3f2331,0x2a3f2331
+	data4	0xc6a59430,0xc6a59430, 0x35a266c0,0x35a266c0
+	data4	0x744ebc37,0x744ebc37, 0xfc82caa6,0xfc82caa6
+	data4	0xe090d0b0,0xe090d0b0, 0x33a7d815,0x33a7d815
+	data4	0xf104984a,0xf104984a, 0x41ecdaf7,0x41ecdaf7
+	data4	0x7fcd500e,0x7fcd500e, 0x1791f62f,0x1791f62f
+	data4	0x764dd68d,0x764dd68d, 0x43efb04d,0x43efb04d
+	data4	0xccaa4d54,0xccaa4d54, 0xe49604df,0xe49604df
+	data4	0x9ed1b5e3,0x9ed1b5e3, 0x4c6a881b,0x4c6a881b
+	data4	0xc12c1fb8,0xc12c1fb8, 0x4665517f,0x4665517f
+	data4	0x9d5eea04,0x9d5eea04, 0x018c355d,0x018c355d
+	data4	0xfa877473,0xfa877473, 0xfb0b412e,0xfb0b412e
+	data4	0xb3671d5a,0xb3671d5a, 0x92dbd252,0x92dbd252
+	data4	0xe9105633,0xe9105633, 0x6dd64713,0x6dd64713
+	data4	0x9ad7618c,0x9ad7618c, 0x37a10c7a,0x37a10c7a
+	data4	0x59f8148e,0x59f8148e, 0xeb133c89,0xeb133c89
+	data4	0xcea927ee,0xcea927ee, 0xb761c935,0xb761c935
+	data4	0xe11ce5ed,0xe11ce5ed, 0x7a47b13c,0x7a47b13c
+	data4	0x9cd2df59,0x9cd2df59, 0x55f2733f,0x55f2733f
+	data4	0x1814ce79,0x1814ce79, 0x73c737bf,0x73c737bf
+	data4	0x53f7cdea,0x53f7cdea, 0x5ffdaa5b,0x5ffdaa5b
+	data4	0xdf3d6f14,0xdf3d6f14, 0x7844db86,0x7844db86
+	data4	0xcaaff381,0xcaaff381, 0xb968c43e,0xb968c43e
+	data4	0x3824342c,0x3824342c, 0xc2a3405f,0xc2a3405f
+	data4	0x161dc372,0x161dc372, 0xbce2250c,0xbce2250c
+	data4	0x283c498b,0x283c498b, 0xff0d9541,0xff0d9541
+	data4	0x39a80171,0x39a80171, 0x080cb3de,0x080cb3de
+	data4	0xd8b4e49c,0xd8b4e49c, 0x6456c190,0x6456c190
+	data4	0x7bcb8461,0x7bcb8461, 0xd532b670,0xd532b670
+	data4	0x486c5c74,0x486c5c74, 0xd0b85742,0xd0b85742
+// Td4:
+	data1	0x52, 0x09, 0x6a, 0xd5, 0x30, 0x36, 0xa5, 0x38
+	data1	0xbf, 0x40, 0xa3, 0x9e, 0x81, 0xf3, 0xd7, 0xfb
+	data1	0x7c, 0xe3, 0x39, 0x82, 0x9b, 0x2f, 0xff, 0x87
+	data1	0x34, 0x8e, 0x43, 0x44, 0xc4, 0xde, 0xe9, 0xcb
+	data1	0x54, 0x7b, 0x94, 0x32, 0xa6, 0xc2, 0x23, 0x3d
+	data1	0xee, 0x4c, 0x95, 0x0b, 0x42, 0xfa, 0xc3, 0x4e
+	data1	0x08, 0x2e, 0xa1, 0x66, 0x28, 0xd9, 0x24, 0xb2
+	data1	0x76, 0x5b, 0xa2, 0x49, 0x6d, 0x8b, 0xd1, 0x25
+	data1	0x72, 0xf8, 0xf6, 0x64, 0x86, 0x68, 0x98, 0x16
+	data1	0xd4, 0xa4, 0x5c, 0xcc, 0x5d, 0x65, 0xb6, 0x92
+	data1	0x6c, 0x70, 0x48, 0x50, 0xfd, 0xed, 0xb9, 0xda
+	data1	0x5e, 0x15, 0x46, 0x57, 0xa7, 0x8d, 0x9d, 0x84
+	data1	0x90, 0xd8, 0xab, 0x00, 0x8c, 0xbc, 0xd3, 0x0a
+	data1	0xf7, 0xe4, 0x58, 0x05, 0xb8, 0xb3, 0x45, 0x06
+	data1	0xd0, 0x2c, 0x1e, 0x8f, 0xca, 0x3f, 0x0f, 0x02
+	data1	0xc1, 0xaf, 0xbd, 0x03, 0x01, 0x13, 0x8a, 0x6b
+	data1	0x3a, 0x91, 0x11, 0x41, 0x4f, 0x67, 0xdc, 0xea
+	data1	0x97, 0xf2, 0xcf, 0xce, 0xf0, 0xb4, 0xe6, 0x73
+	data1	0x96, 0xac, 0x74, 0x22, 0xe7, 0xad, 0x35, 0x85
+	data1	0xe2, 0xf9, 0x37, 0xe8, 0x1c, 0x75, 0xdf, 0x6e
+	data1	0x47, 0xf1, 0x1a, 0x71, 0x1d, 0x29, 0xc5, 0x89
+	data1	0x6f, 0xb7, 0x62, 0x0e, 0xaa, 0x18, 0xbe, 0x1b
+	data1	0xfc, 0x56, 0x3e, 0x4b, 0xc6, 0xd2, 0x79, 0x20
+	data1	0x9a, 0xdb, 0xc0, 0xfe, 0x78, 0xcd, 0x5a, 0xf4
+	data1	0x1f, 0xdd, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x88, 0x07, 0xc7, 0x31
+	data1	0xb1, 0x12, 0x10, 0x59, 0x27, 0x80, 0xec, 0x5f
+	data1	0x60, 0x51, 0x7f, 0xa9, 0x19, 0xb5, 0x4a, 0x0d
+	data1	0x2d, 0xe5, 0x7a, 0x9f, 0x93, 0xc9, 0x9c, 0xef
+	data1	0xa0, 0xe0, 0x3b, 0x4d, 0xae, 0x2a, 0xf5, 0xb0
+	data1	0xc8, 0xeb, 0xbb, 0x3c, 0x83, 0x53, 0x99, 0x61
+	data1	0x17, 0x2b, 0x04, 0x7e, 0xba, 0x77, 0xd6, 0x26
+	data1	0xe1, 0x69, 0x14, 0x63, 0x55, 0x21, 0x0c, 0x7d
+.size	AES_Td#,2048+256	// HP-UX assembler fails to ".-AES_Td#"
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/asm/aes-mips.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/asm/aes-mips.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..439578d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/asm/aes-mips.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,2131 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2010-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+
+# AES for MIPS
+
+# October 2010
+#
+# Code uses 1K[+256B] S-box and on single-issue core [such as R5000]
+# spends ~68 cycles per byte processed with 128-bit key. This is ~16%
+# faster than gcc-generated code, which is not very impressive. But
+# recall that compressed S-box requires extra processing, namely
+# additional rotations. Rotations are implemented with lwl/lwr pairs,
+# which is normally used for loading unaligned data. Another cool
+# thing about this module is its endian neutrality, which means that
+# it processes data without ever changing byte order...
+
+# September 2012
+#
+# Add MIPS32R2 (~10% less instructions) and SmartMIPS ASE (further
+# ~25% less instructions) code. Note that there is no run-time switch,
+# instead, code path is chosen upon pre-process time, pass -mips32r2
+# or/and -msmartmips.
+
+######################################################################
+# There is a number of MIPS ABI in use, O32 and N32/64 are most
+# widely used. Then there is a new contender: NUBI. It appears that if
+# one picks the latter, it's possible to arrange code in ABI neutral
+# manner. Therefore let's stick to NUBI register layout:
+#
+($zero,$at,$t0,$t1,$t2)=map("\$$_",(0..2,24,25));
+($a0,$a1,$a2,$a3,$a4,$a5,$a6,$a7)=map("\$$_",(4..11));
+($s0,$s1,$s2,$s3,$s4,$s5,$s6,$s7,$s8,$s9,$s10,$s11)=map("\$$_",(12..23));
+($gp,$tp,$sp,$fp,$ra)=map("\$$_",(3,28..31));
+#
+# The return value is placed in $a0. Following coding rules facilitate
+# interoperability:
+#
+# - never ever touch $tp, "thread pointer", former $gp;
+# - copy return value to $t0, former $v0 [or to $a0 if you're adapting
+#   old code];
+# - on O32 populate $a4-$a7 with 'lw $aN,4*N($sp)' if necessary;
+#
+# For reference here is register layout for N32/64 MIPS ABIs:
+#
+# ($zero,$at,$v0,$v1)=map("\$$_",(0..3));
+# ($a0,$a1,$a2,$a3,$a4,$a5,$a6,$a7)=map("\$$_",(4..11));
+# ($t0,$t1,$t2,$t3,$t8,$t9)=map("\$$_",(12..15,24,25));
+# ($s0,$s1,$s2,$s3,$s4,$s5,$s6,$s7)=map("\$$_",(16..23));
+# ($gp,$sp,$fp,$ra)=map("\$$_",(28..31));
+#
+$flavour = shift || "o32"; # supported flavours are o32,n32,64,nubi32,nubi64
+
+if ($flavour =~ /64|n32/i) {
+	$PTR_LA="dla";
+	$PTR_ADD="dadd";	# incidentally works even on n32
+	$PTR_SUB="dsub";	# incidentally works even on n32
+	$PTR_INS="dins";
+	$REG_S="sd";
+	$REG_L="ld";
+	$PTR_SLL="dsll";	# incidentally works even on n32
+	$SZREG=8;
+} else {
+	$PTR_LA="la";
+	$PTR_ADD="add";
+	$PTR_SUB="sub";
+	$PTR_INS="ins";
+	$REG_S="sw";
+	$REG_L="lw";
+	$PTR_SLL="sll";
+	$SZREG=4;
+}
+$pf = ($flavour =~ /nubi/i) ? $t0 : $t2;
+#
+# <appro@openssl.org>
+#
+######################################################################
+
+$big_endian=(`echo MIPSEL | $ENV{CC} -E -`=~/MIPSEL/)?1:0 if ($ENV{CC});
+
+for (@ARGV) {	$output=$_ if (/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/);	}
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+if (!defined($big_endian))
+{    $big_endian=(unpack('L',pack('N',1))==1);   }
+
+while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {}
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+my ($MSB,$LSB)=(0,3);	# automatically converted to little-endian
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.text
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPSCANISTER
+# include <openssl/fipssyms.h>
+#endif
+
+#if defined(__mips_smartmips) && !defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS32R2)
+#define _MIPS_ARCH_MIPS32R2
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(__mips_eabi) && (!defined(__vxworks) || defined(__pic__))
+.option	pic2
+#endif
+.set	noat
+___
+
+{{{
+my $FRAMESIZE=16*$SZREG;
+my $SAVED_REGS_MASK = ($flavour =~ /nubi/i) ? "0xc0fff008" : "0xc0ff0000";
+
+my ($inp,$out,$key,$Tbl,$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3)=($a0,$a1,$a2,$a3,$a4,$a5,$a6,$a7);
+my ($i0,$i1,$i2,$i3)=($at,$t0,$t1,$t2);
+my ($t0,$t1,$t2,$t3,$t4,$t5,$t6,$t7,$t8,$t9,$t10,$t11) = map("\$$_",(12..23));
+my ($key0,$cnt)=($gp,$fp);
+
+# instuction ordering is "stolen" from output from MIPSpro assembler
+# invoked with -mips3 -O3 arguments...
+$code.=<<___;
+.align	5
+.ent	_mips_AES_encrypt
+_mips_AES_encrypt:
+	.frame	$sp,0,$ra
+	.set	reorder
+	lw	$t0,0($key)
+	lw	$t1,4($key)
+	lw	$t2,8($key)
+	lw	$t3,12($key)
+	lw	$cnt,240($key)
+	$PTR_ADD $key0,$key,16
+
+	xor	$s0,$t0
+	xor	$s1,$t1
+	xor	$s2,$t2
+	xor	$s3,$t3
+
+	sub	$cnt,1
+#if defined(__mips_smartmips)
+	ext	$i0,$s1,16,8
+.Loop_enc:
+	ext	$i1,$s2,16,8
+	ext	$i2,$s3,16,8
+	ext	$i3,$s0,16,8
+	lwxs	$t0,$i0($Tbl)		# Te1[s1>>16]
+	ext	$i0,$s2,8,8
+	lwxs	$t1,$i1($Tbl)		# Te1[s2>>16]
+	ext	$i1,$s3,8,8
+	lwxs	$t2,$i2($Tbl)		# Te1[s3>>16]
+	ext	$i2,$s0,8,8
+	lwxs	$t3,$i3($Tbl)		# Te1[s0>>16]
+	ext	$i3,$s1,8,8
+
+	lwxs	$t4,$i0($Tbl)		# Te2[s2>>8]
+	ext	$i0,$s3,0,8
+	lwxs	$t5,$i1($Tbl)		# Te2[s3>>8]
+	ext	$i1,$s0,0,8
+	lwxs	$t6,$i2($Tbl)		# Te2[s0>>8]
+	ext	$i2,$s1,0,8
+	lwxs	$t7,$i3($Tbl)		# Te2[s1>>8]
+	ext	$i3,$s2,0,8
+
+	lwxs	$t8,$i0($Tbl)		# Te3[s3]
+	ext	$i0,$s0,24,8
+	lwxs	$t9,$i1($Tbl)		# Te3[s0]
+	ext	$i1,$s1,24,8
+	lwxs	$t10,$i2($Tbl)		# Te3[s1]
+	ext	$i2,$s2,24,8
+	lwxs	$t11,$i3($Tbl)		# Te3[s2]
+	ext	$i3,$s3,24,8
+
+	rotr	$t0,$t0,8
+	rotr	$t1,$t1,8
+	rotr	$t2,$t2,8
+	rotr	$t3,$t3,8
+
+	rotr	$t4,$t4,16
+	rotr	$t5,$t5,16
+	rotr	$t6,$t6,16
+	rotr	$t7,$t7,16
+
+	xor	$t0,$t4
+	lwxs	$t4,$i0($Tbl)		# Te0[s0>>24]
+	xor	$t1,$t5
+	lwxs	$t5,$i1($Tbl)		# Te0[s1>>24]
+	xor	$t2,$t6
+	lwxs	$t6,$i2($Tbl)		# Te0[s2>>24]
+	xor	$t3,$t7
+	lwxs	$t7,$i3($Tbl)		# Te0[s3>>24]
+
+	rotr	$t8,$t8,24
+	lw	$s0,0($key0)
+	rotr	$t9,$t9,24
+	lw	$s1,4($key0)
+	rotr	$t10,$t10,24
+	lw	$s2,8($key0)
+	rotr	$t11,$t11,24
+	lw	$s3,12($key0)
+
+	xor	$t0,$t8
+	xor	$t1,$t9
+	xor	$t2,$t10
+	xor	$t3,$t11
+
+	xor	$t0,$t4
+	xor	$t1,$t5
+	xor	$t2,$t6
+	xor	$t3,$t7
+
+	sub	$cnt,1
+	$PTR_ADD $key0,16
+	xor	$s0,$t0
+	xor	$s1,$t1
+	xor	$s2,$t2
+	xor	$s3,$t3
+	.set	noreorder
+	bnez	$cnt,.Loop_enc
+	ext	$i0,$s1,16,8
+
+	_xtr	$i0,$s1,16-2
+#else
+	_xtr	$i0,$s1,16-2
+.Loop_enc:
+	_xtr	$i1,$s2,16-2
+	_xtr	$i2,$s3,16-2
+	_xtr	$i3,$s0,16-2
+	and	$i0,0x3fc
+	and	$i1,0x3fc
+	and	$i2,0x3fc
+	and	$i3,0x3fc
+	$PTR_ADD $i0,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i1,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i2,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i3,$Tbl
+#if defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS32R2) || defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS64R2)
+	lw	$t0,0($i0)		# Te1[s1>>16]
+	_xtr	$i0,$s2,8-2
+	lw	$t1,0($i1)		# Te1[s2>>16]
+	_xtr	$i1,$s3,8-2
+	lw	$t2,0($i2)		# Te1[s3>>16]
+	_xtr	$i2,$s0,8-2
+	lw	$t3,0($i3)		# Te1[s0>>16]
+	_xtr	$i3,$s1,8-2
+#else
+	lwl	$t0,3($i0)		# Te1[s1>>16]
+	lwl	$t1,3($i1)		# Te1[s2>>16]
+	lwl	$t2,3($i2)		# Te1[s3>>16]
+	lwl	$t3,3($i3)		# Te1[s0>>16]
+	lwr	$t0,2($i0)		# Te1[s1>>16]
+	_xtr	$i0,$s2,8-2
+	lwr	$t1,2($i1)		# Te1[s2>>16]
+	_xtr	$i1,$s3,8-2
+	lwr	$t2,2($i2)		# Te1[s3>>16]
+	_xtr	$i2,$s0,8-2
+	lwr	$t3,2($i3)		# Te1[s0>>16]
+	_xtr	$i3,$s1,8-2
+#endif
+	and	$i0,0x3fc
+	and	$i1,0x3fc
+	and	$i2,0x3fc
+	and	$i3,0x3fc
+	$PTR_ADD $i0,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i1,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i2,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i3,$Tbl
+#if defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS32R2) || defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS64R2)
+	rotr	$t0,$t0,8
+	rotr	$t1,$t1,8
+	rotr	$t2,$t2,8
+	rotr	$t3,$t3,8
+# if defined(_MIPSEL)
+	lw	$t4,0($i0)		# Te2[s2>>8]
+	_xtr	$i0,$s3,0-2
+	lw	$t5,0($i1)		# Te2[s3>>8]
+	_xtr	$i1,$s0,0-2
+	lw	$t6,0($i2)		# Te2[s0>>8]
+	_xtr	$i2,$s1,0-2
+	lw	$t7,0($i3)		# Te2[s1>>8]
+	_xtr	$i3,$s2,0-2
+
+	and	$i0,0x3fc
+	and	$i1,0x3fc
+	and	$i2,0x3fc
+	and	$i3,0x3fc
+	$PTR_ADD $i0,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i1,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i2,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i3,$Tbl
+	lw	$t8,0($i0)		# Te3[s3]
+	$PTR_INS $i0,$s0,2,8
+	lw	$t9,0($i1)		# Te3[s0]
+	$PTR_INS $i1,$s1,2,8
+	lw	$t10,0($i2)		# Te3[s1]
+	$PTR_INS $i2,$s2,2,8
+	lw	$t11,0($i3)		# Te3[s2]
+	$PTR_INS $i3,$s3,2,8
+# else
+	lw	$t4,0($i0)		# Te2[s2>>8]
+	$PTR_INS $i0,$s3,2,8
+	lw	$t5,0($i1)		# Te2[s3>>8]
+	$PTR_INS $i1,$s0,2,8
+	lw	$t6,0($i2)		# Te2[s0>>8]
+	$PTR_INS $i2,$s1,2,8
+	lw	$t7,0($i3)		# Te2[s1>>8]
+	$PTR_INS $i3,$s2,2,8
+
+	lw	$t8,0($i0)		# Te3[s3]
+	_xtr	$i0,$s0,24-2
+	lw	$t9,0($i1)		# Te3[s0]
+	_xtr	$i1,$s1,24-2
+	lw	$t10,0($i2)		# Te3[s1]
+	_xtr	$i2,$s2,24-2
+	lw	$t11,0($i3)		# Te3[s2]
+	_xtr	$i3,$s3,24-2
+
+	and	$i0,0x3fc
+	and	$i1,0x3fc
+	and	$i2,0x3fc
+	and	$i3,0x3fc
+	$PTR_ADD $i0,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i1,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i2,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i3,$Tbl
+# endif
+	rotr	$t4,$t4,16
+	rotr	$t5,$t5,16
+	rotr	$t6,$t6,16
+	rotr	$t7,$t7,16
+
+	rotr	$t8,$t8,24
+	rotr	$t9,$t9,24
+	rotr	$t10,$t10,24
+	rotr	$t11,$t11,24
+#else
+	lwl	$t4,2($i0)		# Te2[s2>>8]
+	lwl	$t5,2($i1)		# Te2[s3>>8]
+	lwl	$t6,2($i2)		# Te2[s0>>8]
+	lwl	$t7,2($i3)		# Te2[s1>>8]
+	lwr	$t4,1($i0)		# Te2[s2>>8]
+	_xtr	$i0,$s3,0-2
+	lwr	$t5,1($i1)		# Te2[s3>>8]
+	_xtr	$i1,$s0,0-2
+	lwr	$t6,1($i2)		# Te2[s0>>8]
+	_xtr	$i2,$s1,0-2
+	lwr	$t7,1($i3)		# Te2[s1>>8]
+	_xtr	$i3,$s2,0-2
+
+	and	$i0,0x3fc
+	and	$i1,0x3fc
+	and	$i2,0x3fc
+	and	$i3,0x3fc
+	$PTR_ADD $i0,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i1,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i2,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i3,$Tbl
+	lwl	$t8,1($i0)		# Te3[s3]
+	lwl	$t9,1($i1)		# Te3[s0]
+	lwl	$t10,1($i2)		# Te3[s1]
+	lwl	$t11,1($i3)		# Te3[s2]
+	lwr	$t8,0($i0)		# Te3[s3]
+	_xtr	$i0,$s0,24-2
+	lwr	$t9,0($i1)		# Te3[s0]
+	_xtr	$i1,$s1,24-2
+	lwr	$t10,0($i2)		# Te3[s1]
+	_xtr	$i2,$s2,24-2
+	lwr	$t11,0($i3)		# Te3[s2]
+	_xtr	$i3,$s3,24-2
+
+	and	$i0,0x3fc
+	and	$i1,0x3fc
+	and	$i2,0x3fc
+	and	$i3,0x3fc
+	$PTR_ADD $i0,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i1,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i2,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i3,$Tbl
+#endif
+	xor	$t0,$t4
+	lw	$t4,0($i0)		# Te0[s0>>24]
+	xor	$t1,$t5
+	lw	$t5,0($i1)		# Te0[s1>>24]
+	xor	$t2,$t6
+	lw	$t6,0($i2)		# Te0[s2>>24]
+	xor	$t3,$t7
+	lw	$t7,0($i3)		# Te0[s3>>24]
+
+	xor	$t0,$t8
+	lw	$s0,0($key0)
+	xor	$t1,$t9
+	lw	$s1,4($key0)
+	xor	$t2,$t10
+	lw	$s2,8($key0)
+	xor	$t3,$t11
+	lw	$s3,12($key0)
+
+	xor	$t0,$t4
+	xor	$t1,$t5
+	xor	$t2,$t6
+	xor	$t3,$t7
+
+	sub	$cnt,1
+	$PTR_ADD $key0,16
+	xor	$s0,$t0
+	xor	$s1,$t1
+	xor	$s2,$t2
+	xor	$s3,$t3
+	.set	noreorder
+	bnez	$cnt,.Loop_enc
+	_xtr	$i0,$s1,16-2
+#endif
+
+	.set	reorder
+	_xtr	$i1,$s2,16-2
+	_xtr	$i2,$s3,16-2
+	_xtr	$i3,$s0,16-2
+	and	$i0,0x3fc
+	and	$i1,0x3fc
+	and	$i2,0x3fc
+	and	$i3,0x3fc
+	$PTR_ADD $i0,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i1,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i2,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i3,$Tbl
+	lbu	$t0,2($i0)		# Te4[s1>>16]
+	_xtr	$i0,$s2,8-2
+	lbu	$t1,2($i1)		# Te4[s2>>16]
+	_xtr	$i1,$s3,8-2
+	lbu	$t2,2($i2)		# Te4[s3>>16]
+	_xtr	$i2,$s0,8-2
+	lbu	$t3,2($i3)		# Te4[s0>>16]
+	_xtr	$i3,$s1,8-2
+
+	and	$i0,0x3fc
+	and	$i1,0x3fc
+	and	$i2,0x3fc
+	and	$i3,0x3fc
+	$PTR_ADD $i0,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i1,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i2,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i3,$Tbl
+#if defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS32R2) || defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS64R2)
+# if defined(_MIPSEL)
+	lbu	$t4,2($i0)		# Te4[s2>>8]
+	$PTR_INS $i0,$s0,2,8
+	lbu	$t5,2($i1)		# Te4[s3>>8]
+	$PTR_INS $i1,$s1,2,8
+	lbu	$t6,2($i2)		# Te4[s0>>8]
+	$PTR_INS $i2,$s2,2,8
+	lbu	$t7,2($i3)		# Te4[s1>>8]
+	$PTR_INS $i3,$s3,2,8
+
+	lbu	$t8,2($i0)		# Te4[s0>>24]
+	_xtr	$i0,$s3,0-2
+	lbu	$t9,2($i1)		# Te4[s1>>24]
+	_xtr	$i1,$s0,0-2
+	lbu	$t10,2($i2)		# Te4[s2>>24]
+	_xtr	$i2,$s1,0-2
+	lbu	$t11,2($i3)		# Te4[s3>>24]
+	_xtr	$i3,$s2,0-2
+
+	and	$i0,0x3fc
+	and	$i1,0x3fc
+	and	$i2,0x3fc
+	and	$i3,0x3fc
+	$PTR_ADD $i0,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i1,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i2,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i3,$Tbl
+# else
+	lbu	$t4,2($i0)		# Te4[s2>>8]
+	_xtr	$i0,$s0,24-2
+	lbu	$t5,2($i1)		# Te4[s3>>8]
+	_xtr	$i1,$s1,24-2
+	lbu	$t6,2($i2)		# Te4[s0>>8]
+	_xtr	$i2,$s2,24-2
+	lbu	$t7,2($i3)		# Te4[s1>>8]
+	_xtr	$i3,$s3,24-2
+
+	and	$i0,0x3fc
+	and	$i1,0x3fc
+	and	$i2,0x3fc
+	and	$i3,0x3fc
+	$PTR_ADD $i0,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i1,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i2,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i3,$Tbl
+	lbu	$t8,2($i0)		# Te4[s0>>24]
+	$PTR_INS $i0,$s3,2,8
+	lbu	$t9,2($i1)		# Te4[s1>>24]
+	$PTR_INS $i1,$s0,2,8
+	lbu	$t10,2($i2)		# Te4[s2>>24]
+	$PTR_INS $i2,$s1,2,8
+	lbu	$t11,2($i3)		# Te4[s3>>24]
+	$PTR_INS $i3,$s2,2,8
+# endif
+	_ins	$t0,16
+	_ins	$t1,16
+	_ins	$t2,16
+	_ins	$t3,16
+
+	_ins2	$t0,$t4,8
+	lbu	$t4,2($i0)		# Te4[s3]
+	_ins2	$t1,$t5,8
+	lbu	$t5,2($i1)		# Te4[s0]
+	_ins2	$t2,$t6,8
+	lbu	$t6,2($i2)		# Te4[s1]
+	_ins2	$t3,$t7,8
+	lbu	$t7,2($i3)		# Te4[s2]
+
+	_ins2	$t0,$t8,24
+	lw	$s0,0($key0)
+	_ins2	$t1,$t9,24
+	lw	$s1,4($key0)
+	_ins2	$t2,$t10,24
+	lw	$s2,8($key0)
+	_ins2	$t3,$t11,24
+	lw	$s3,12($key0)
+
+	_ins2	$t0,$t4,0
+	_ins2	$t1,$t5,0
+	_ins2	$t2,$t6,0
+	_ins2	$t3,$t7,0
+#else
+	lbu	$t4,2($i0)		# Te4[s2>>8]
+	_xtr	$i0,$s0,24-2
+	lbu	$t5,2($i1)		# Te4[s3>>8]
+	_xtr	$i1,$s1,24-2
+	lbu	$t6,2($i2)		# Te4[s0>>8]
+	_xtr	$i2,$s2,24-2
+	lbu	$t7,2($i3)		# Te4[s1>>8]
+	_xtr	$i3,$s3,24-2
+
+	and	$i0,0x3fc
+	and	$i1,0x3fc
+	and	$i2,0x3fc
+	and	$i3,0x3fc
+	$PTR_ADD $i0,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i1,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i2,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i3,$Tbl
+	lbu	$t8,2($i0)		# Te4[s0>>24]
+	_xtr	$i0,$s3,0-2
+	lbu	$t9,2($i1)		# Te4[s1>>24]
+	_xtr	$i1,$s0,0-2
+	lbu	$t10,2($i2)		# Te4[s2>>24]
+	_xtr	$i2,$s1,0-2
+	lbu	$t11,2($i3)		# Te4[s3>>24]
+	_xtr	$i3,$s2,0-2
+
+	and	$i0,0x3fc
+	and	$i1,0x3fc
+	and	$i2,0x3fc
+	and	$i3,0x3fc
+	$PTR_ADD $i0,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i1,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i2,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i3,$Tbl
+
+	_ins	$t0,16
+	_ins	$t1,16
+	_ins	$t2,16
+	_ins	$t3,16
+
+	_ins	$t4,8
+	_ins	$t5,8
+	_ins	$t6,8
+	_ins	$t7,8
+
+	xor	$t0,$t4
+	lbu	$t4,2($i0)		# Te4[s3]
+	xor	$t1,$t5
+	lbu	$t5,2($i1)		# Te4[s0]
+	xor	$t2,$t6
+	lbu	$t6,2($i2)		# Te4[s1]
+	xor	$t3,$t7
+	lbu	$t7,2($i3)		# Te4[s2]
+
+	_ins	$t8,24
+	lw	$s0,0($key0)
+	_ins	$t9,24
+	lw	$s1,4($key0)
+	_ins	$t10,24
+	lw	$s2,8($key0)
+	_ins	$t11,24
+	lw	$s3,12($key0)
+
+	xor	$t0,$t8
+	xor	$t1,$t9
+	xor	$t2,$t10
+	xor	$t3,$t11
+
+	_ins	$t4,0
+	_ins	$t5,0
+	_ins	$t6,0
+	_ins	$t7,0
+
+	xor	$t0,$t4
+	xor	$t1,$t5
+	xor	$t2,$t6
+	xor	$t3,$t7
+#endif
+	xor	$s0,$t0
+	xor	$s1,$t1
+	xor	$s2,$t2
+	xor	$s3,$t3
+
+	jr	$ra
+.end	_mips_AES_encrypt
+
+.align	5
+.globl	AES_encrypt
+.ent	AES_encrypt
+AES_encrypt:
+	.frame	$sp,$FRAMESIZE,$ra
+	.mask	$SAVED_REGS_MASK,-$SZREG
+	.set	noreorder
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /o32/i);	# o32 PIC-ification
+	.cpload	$pf
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	$PTR_SUB $sp,$FRAMESIZE
+	$REG_S	$ra,$FRAMESIZE-1*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$fp,$FRAMESIZE-2*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$s11,$FRAMESIZE-3*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$s10,$FRAMESIZE-4*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$s9,$FRAMESIZE-5*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$s8,$FRAMESIZE-6*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$s7,$FRAMESIZE-7*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$s6,$FRAMESIZE-8*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$s5,$FRAMESIZE-9*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$s4,$FRAMESIZE-10*$SZREG($sp)
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i);	# optimize non-nubi prologue
+	$REG_S	\$15,$FRAMESIZE-11*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	\$14,$FRAMESIZE-12*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	\$13,$FRAMESIZE-13*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	\$12,$FRAMESIZE-14*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$gp,$FRAMESIZE-15*$SZREG($sp)
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($flavour !~ /o32/i);	# non-o32 PIC-ification
+	.cplocal	$Tbl
+	.cpsetup	$pf,$zero,AES_encrypt
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	.set	reorder
+	$PTR_LA	$Tbl,AES_Te		# PIC-ified 'load address'
+
+	lwl	$s0,0+$MSB($inp)
+	lwl	$s1,4+$MSB($inp)
+	lwl	$s2,8+$MSB($inp)
+	lwl	$s3,12+$MSB($inp)
+	lwr	$s0,0+$LSB($inp)
+	lwr	$s1,4+$LSB($inp)
+	lwr	$s2,8+$LSB($inp)
+	lwr	$s3,12+$LSB($inp)
+
+	bal	_mips_AES_encrypt
+
+	swr	$s0,0+$LSB($out)
+	swr	$s1,4+$LSB($out)
+	swr	$s2,8+$LSB($out)
+	swr	$s3,12+$LSB($out)
+	swl	$s0,0+$MSB($out)
+	swl	$s1,4+$MSB($out)
+	swl	$s2,8+$MSB($out)
+	swl	$s3,12+$MSB($out)
+
+	.set	noreorder
+	$REG_L	$ra,$FRAMESIZE-1*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$fp,$FRAMESIZE-2*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$s11,$FRAMESIZE-3*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$s10,$FRAMESIZE-4*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$s9,$FRAMESIZE-5*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$s8,$FRAMESIZE-6*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$s7,$FRAMESIZE-7*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$s6,$FRAMESIZE-8*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$s5,$FRAMESIZE-9*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$s4,$FRAMESIZE-10*$SZREG($sp)
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i);
+	$REG_L	\$15,$FRAMESIZE-11*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	\$14,$FRAMESIZE-12*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	\$13,$FRAMESIZE-13*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	\$12,$FRAMESIZE-14*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$gp,$FRAMESIZE-15*$SZREG($sp)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	jr	$ra
+	$PTR_ADD $sp,$FRAMESIZE
+.end	AES_encrypt
+___
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.align	5
+.ent	_mips_AES_decrypt
+_mips_AES_decrypt:
+	.frame	$sp,0,$ra
+	.set	reorder
+	lw	$t0,0($key)
+	lw	$t1,4($key)
+	lw	$t2,8($key)
+	lw	$t3,12($key)
+	lw	$cnt,240($key)
+	$PTR_ADD $key0,$key,16
+
+	xor	$s0,$t0
+	xor	$s1,$t1
+	xor	$s2,$t2
+	xor	$s3,$t3
+
+	sub	$cnt,1
+#if defined(__mips_smartmips)
+	ext	$i0,$s3,16,8
+.Loop_dec:
+	ext	$i1,$s0,16,8
+	ext	$i2,$s1,16,8
+	ext	$i3,$s2,16,8
+	lwxs	$t0,$i0($Tbl)		# Td1[s3>>16]
+	ext	$i0,$s2,8,8
+	lwxs	$t1,$i1($Tbl)		# Td1[s0>>16]
+	ext	$i1,$s3,8,8
+	lwxs	$t2,$i2($Tbl)		# Td1[s1>>16]
+	ext	$i2,$s0,8,8
+	lwxs	$t3,$i3($Tbl)		# Td1[s2>>16]
+	ext	$i3,$s1,8,8
+
+	lwxs	$t4,$i0($Tbl)		# Td2[s2>>8]
+	ext	$i0,$s1,0,8
+	lwxs	$t5,$i1($Tbl)		# Td2[s3>>8]
+	ext	$i1,$s2,0,8
+	lwxs	$t6,$i2($Tbl)		# Td2[s0>>8]
+	ext	$i2,$s3,0,8
+	lwxs	$t7,$i3($Tbl)		# Td2[s1>>8]
+	ext	$i3,$s0,0,8
+
+	lwxs	$t8,$i0($Tbl)		# Td3[s1]
+	ext	$i0,$s0,24,8
+	lwxs	$t9,$i1($Tbl)		# Td3[s2]
+	ext	$i1,$s1,24,8
+	lwxs	$t10,$i2($Tbl)		# Td3[s3]
+	ext	$i2,$s2,24,8
+	lwxs	$t11,$i3($Tbl)		# Td3[s0]
+	ext	$i3,$s3,24,8
+
+	rotr	$t0,$t0,8
+	rotr	$t1,$t1,8
+	rotr	$t2,$t2,8
+	rotr	$t3,$t3,8
+
+	rotr	$t4,$t4,16
+	rotr	$t5,$t5,16
+	rotr	$t6,$t6,16
+	rotr	$t7,$t7,16
+
+	xor	$t0,$t4
+	lwxs	$t4,$i0($Tbl)		# Td0[s0>>24]
+	xor	$t1,$t5
+	lwxs	$t5,$i1($Tbl)		# Td0[s1>>24]
+	xor	$t2,$t6
+	lwxs	$t6,$i2($Tbl)		# Td0[s2>>24]
+	xor	$t3,$t7
+	lwxs	$t7,$i3($Tbl)		# Td0[s3>>24]
+
+	rotr	$t8,$t8,24
+	lw	$s0,0($key0)
+	rotr	$t9,$t9,24
+	lw	$s1,4($key0)
+	rotr	$t10,$t10,24
+	lw	$s2,8($key0)
+	rotr	$t11,$t11,24
+	lw	$s3,12($key0)
+
+	xor	$t0,$t8
+	xor	$t1,$t9
+	xor	$t2,$t10
+	xor	$t3,$t11
+
+	xor	$t0,$t4
+	xor	$t1,$t5
+	xor	$t2,$t6
+	xor	$t3,$t7
+
+	sub	$cnt,1
+	$PTR_ADD $key0,16
+	xor	$s0,$t0
+	xor	$s1,$t1
+	xor	$s2,$t2
+	xor	$s3,$t3
+	.set	noreorder
+	bnez	$cnt,.Loop_dec
+	ext	$i0,$s3,16,8
+
+	_xtr	$i0,$s3,16-2
+#else
+	_xtr	$i0,$s3,16-2
+.Loop_dec:
+	_xtr	$i1,$s0,16-2
+	_xtr	$i2,$s1,16-2
+	_xtr	$i3,$s2,16-2
+	and	$i0,0x3fc
+	and	$i1,0x3fc
+	and	$i2,0x3fc
+	and	$i3,0x3fc
+	$PTR_ADD $i0,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i1,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i2,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i3,$Tbl
+#if defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS32R2) || defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS64R2)
+	lw	$t0,0($i0)		# Td1[s3>>16]
+	_xtr	$i0,$s2,8-2
+	lw	$t1,0($i1)		# Td1[s0>>16]
+	_xtr	$i1,$s3,8-2
+	lw	$t2,0($i2)		# Td1[s1>>16]
+	_xtr	$i2,$s0,8-2
+	lw	$t3,0($i3)		# Td1[s2>>16]
+	_xtr	$i3,$s1,8-2
+#else
+	lwl	$t0,3($i0)		# Td1[s3>>16]
+	lwl	$t1,3($i1)		# Td1[s0>>16]
+	lwl	$t2,3($i2)		# Td1[s1>>16]
+	lwl	$t3,3($i3)		# Td1[s2>>16]
+	lwr	$t0,2($i0)		# Td1[s3>>16]
+	_xtr	$i0,$s2,8-2
+	lwr	$t1,2($i1)		# Td1[s0>>16]
+	_xtr	$i1,$s3,8-2
+	lwr	$t2,2($i2)		# Td1[s1>>16]
+	_xtr	$i2,$s0,8-2
+	lwr	$t3,2($i3)		# Td1[s2>>16]
+	_xtr	$i3,$s1,8-2
+#endif
+
+	and	$i0,0x3fc
+	and	$i1,0x3fc
+	and	$i2,0x3fc
+	and	$i3,0x3fc
+	$PTR_ADD $i0,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i1,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i2,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i3,$Tbl
+#if defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS32R2) || defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS64R2)
+	rotr	$t0,$t0,8
+	rotr	$t1,$t1,8
+	rotr	$t2,$t2,8
+	rotr	$t3,$t3,8
+# if defined(_MIPSEL)
+	lw	$t4,0($i0)		# Td2[s2>>8]
+	_xtr	$i0,$s1,0-2
+	lw	$t5,0($i1)		# Td2[s3>>8]
+	_xtr	$i1,$s2,0-2
+	lw	$t6,0($i2)		# Td2[s0>>8]
+	_xtr	$i2,$s3,0-2
+	lw	$t7,0($i3)		# Td2[s1>>8]
+	_xtr	$i3,$s0,0-2
+
+	and	$i0,0x3fc
+	and	$i1,0x3fc
+	and	$i2,0x3fc
+	and	$i3,0x3fc
+	$PTR_ADD $i0,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i1,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i2,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i3,$Tbl
+	lw	$t8,0($i0)		# Td3[s1]
+	$PTR_INS $i0,$s0,2,8
+	lw	$t9,0($i1)		# Td3[s2]
+	$PTR_INS $i1,$s1,2,8
+	lw	$t10,0($i2)		# Td3[s3]
+	$PTR_INS $i2,$s2,2,8
+	lw	$t11,0($i3)		# Td3[s0]
+	$PTR_INS $i3,$s3,2,8
+#else
+	lw	$t4,0($i0)		# Td2[s2>>8]
+	$PTR_INS $i0,$s1,2,8
+	lw	$t5,0($i1)		# Td2[s3>>8]
+	$PTR_INS $i1,$s2,2,8
+	lw	$t6,0($i2)		# Td2[s0>>8]
+	$PTR_INS $i2,$s3,2,8
+	lw	$t7,0($i3)		# Td2[s1>>8]
+	$PTR_INS $i3,$s0,2,8
+
+	lw	$t8,0($i0)		# Td3[s1]
+	_xtr	$i0,$s0,24-2
+	lw	$t9,0($i1)		# Td3[s2]
+	_xtr	$i1,$s1,24-2
+	lw	$t10,0($i2)		# Td3[s3]
+	_xtr	$i2,$s2,24-2
+	lw	$t11,0($i3)		# Td3[s0]
+	_xtr	$i3,$s3,24-2
+
+	and	$i0,0x3fc
+	and	$i1,0x3fc
+	and	$i2,0x3fc
+	and	$i3,0x3fc
+	$PTR_ADD $i0,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i1,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i2,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i3,$Tbl
+#endif
+	rotr	$t4,$t4,16
+	rotr	$t5,$t5,16
+	rotr	$t6,$t6,16
+	rotr	$t7,$t7,16
+
+	rotr	$t8,$t8,24
+	rotr	$t9,$t9,24
+	rotr	$t10,$t10,24
+	rotr	$t11,$t11,24
+#else
+	lwl	$t4,2($i0)		# Td2[s2>>8]
+	lwl	$t5,2($i1)		# Td2[s3>>8]
+	lwl	$t6,2($i2)		# Td2[s0>>8]
+	lwl	$t7,2($i3)		# Td2[s1>>8]
+	lwr	$t4,1($i0)		# Td2[s2>>8]
+	_xtr	$i0,$s1,0-2
+	lwr	$t5,1($i1)		# Td2[s3>>8]
+	_xtr	$i1,$s2,0-2
+	lwr	$t6,1($i2)		# Td2[s0>>8]
+	_xtr	$i2,$s3,0-2
+	lwr	$t7,1($i3)		# Td2[s1>>8]
+	_xtr	$i3,$s0,0-2
+
+	and	$i0,0x3fc
+	and	$i1,0x3fc
+	and	$i2,0x3fc
+	and	$i3,0x3fc
+	$PTR_ADD $i0,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i1,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i2,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i3,$Tbl
+	lwl	$t8,1($i0)		# Td3[s1]
+	lwl	$t9,1($i1)		# Td3[s2]
+	lwl	$t10,1($i2)		# Td3[s3]
+	lwl	$t11,1($i3)		# Td3[s0]
+	lwr	$t8,0($i0)		# Td3[s1]
+	_xtr	$i0,$s0,24-2
+	lwr	$t9,0($i1)		# Td3[s2]
+	_xtr	$i1,$s1,24-2
+	lwr	$t10,0($i2)		# Td3[s3]
+	_xtr	$i2,$s2,24-2
+	lwr	$t11,0($i3)		# Td3[s0]
+	_xtr	$i3,$s3,24-2
+
+	and	$i0,0x3fc
+	and	$i1,0x3fc
+	and	$i2,0x3fc
+	and	$i3,0x3fc
+	$PTR_ADD $i0,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i1,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i2,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i3,$Tbl
+#endif
+
+	xor	$t0,$t4
+	lw	$t4,0($i0)		# Td0[s0>>24]
+	xor	$t1,$t5
+	lw	$t5,0($i1)		# Td0[s1>>24]
+	xor	$t2,$t6
+	lw	$t6,0($i2)		# Td0[s2>>24]
+	xor	$t3,$t7
+	lw	$t7,0($i3)		# Td0[s3>>24]
+
+	xor	$t0,$t8
+	lw	$s0,0($key0)
+	xor	$t1,$t9
+	lw	$s1,4($key0)
+	xor	$t2,$t10
+	lw	$s2,8($key0)
+	xor	$t3,$t11
+	lw	$s3,12($key0)
+
+	xor	$t0,$t4
+	xor	$t1,$t5
+	xor	$t2,$t6
+	xor	$t3,$t7
+
+	sub	$cnt,1
+	$PTR_ADD $key0,16
+	xor	$s0,$t0
+	xor	$s1,$t1
+	xor	$s2,$t2
+	xor	$s3,$t3
+	.set	noreorder
+	bnez	$cnt,.Loop_dec
+	_xtr	$i0,$s3,16-2
+#endif
+
+	.set	reorder
+	lw	$t4,1024($Tbl)		# prefetch Td4
+	_xtr	$i0,$s3,16
+	lw	$t5,1024+32($Tbl)
+	_xtr	$i1,$s0,16
+	lw	$t6,1024+64($Tbl)
+	_xtr	$i2,$s1,16
+	lw	$t7,1024+96($Tbl)
+	_xtr	$i3,$s2,16
+	lw	$t8,1024+128($Tbl)
+	and	$i0,0xff
+	lw	$t9,1024+160($Tbl)
+	and	$i1,0xff
+	lw	$t10,1024+192($Tbl)
+	and	$i2,0xff
+	lw	$t11,1024+224($Tbl)
+	and	$i3,0xff
+
+	$PTR_ADD $i0,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i1,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i2,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i3,$Tbl
+	lbu	$t0,1024($i0)		# Td4[s3>>16]
+	_xtr	$i0,$s2,8
+	lbu	$t1,1024($i1)		# Td4[s0>>16]
+	_xtr	$i1,$s3,8
+	lbu	$t2,1024($i2)		# Td4[s1>>16]
+	_xtr	$i2,$s0,8
+	lbu	$t3,1024($i3)		# Td4[s2>>16]
+	_xtr	$i3,$s1,8
+
+	and	$i0,0xff
+	and	$i1,0xff
+	and	$i2,0xff
+	and	$i3,0xff
+	$PTR_ADD $i0,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i1,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i2,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i3,$Tbl
+#if defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS32R2) || defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS64R2)
+# if defined(_MIPSEL)
+	lbu	$t4,1024($i0)		# Td4[s2>>8]
+	$PTR_INS $i0,$s0,0,8
+	lbu	$t5,1024($i1)		# Td4[s3>>8]
+	$PTR_INS $i1,$s1,0,8
+	lbu	$t6,1024($i2)		# Td4[s0>>8]
+	$PTR_INS $i2,$s2,0,8
+	lbu	$t7,1024($i3)		# Td4[s1>>8]
+	$PTR_INS $i3,$s3,0,8
+
+	lbu	$t8,1024($i0)		# Td4[s0>>24]
+	_xtr	$i0,$s1,0
+	lbu	$t9,1024($i1)		# Td4[s1>>24]
+	_xtr	$i1,$s2,0
+	lbu	$t10,1024($i2)		# Td4[s2>>24]
+	_xtr	$i2,$s3,0
+	lbu	$t11,1024($i3)		# Td4[s3>>24]
+	_xtr	$i3,$s0,0
+
+	$PTR_ADD $i0,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i1,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i2,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i3,$Tbl
+# else
+	lbu	$t4,1024($i0)		# Td4[s2>>8]
+	_xtr	$i0,$s0,24
+	lbu	$t5,1024($i1)		# Td4[s3>>8]
+	_xtr	$i1,$s1,24
+	lbu	$t6,1024($i2)		# Td4[s0>>8]
+	_xtr	$i2,$s2,24
+	lbu	$t7,1024($i3)		# Td4[s1>>8]
+	_xtr	$i3,$s3,24
+
+	$PTR_ADD $i0,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i1,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i2,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i3,$Tbl
+	lbu	$t8,1024($i0)		# Td4[s0>>24]
+	$PTR_INS $i0,$s1,0,8
+	lbu	$t9,1024($i1)		# Td4[s1>>24]
+	$PTR_INS $i1,$s2,0,8
+	lbu	$t10,1024($i2)		# Td4[s2>>24]
+	$PTR_INS $i2,$s3,0,8
+	lbu	$t11,1024($i3)		# Td4[s3>>24]
+	$PTR_INS $i3,$s0,0,8
+# endif
+	_ins	$t0,16
+	_ins	$t1,16
+	_ins	$t2,16
+	_ins	$t3,16
+
+	_ins2	$t0,$t4,8
+	lbu	$t4,1024($i0)		# Td4[s1]
+	_ins2	$t1,$t5,8
+	lbu	$t5,1024($i1)		# Td4[s2]
+	_ins2	$t2,$t6,8
+	lbu	$t6,1024($i2)		# Td4[s3]
+	_ins2	$t3,$t7,8
+	lbu	$t7,1024($i3)		# Td4[s0]
+
+	_ins2	$t0,$t8,24
+	lw	$s0,0($key0)
+	_ins2	$t1,$t9,24
+	lw	$s1,4($key0)
+	_ins2	$t2,$t10,24
+	lw	$s2,8($key0)
+	_ins2	$t3,$t11,24
+	lw	$s3,12($key0)
+
+	_ins2	$t0,$t4,0
+	_ins2	$t1,$t5,0
+	_ins2	$t2,$t6,0
+	_ins2	$t3,$t7,0
+#else
+	lbu	$t4,1024($i0)		# Td4[s2>>8]
+	_xtr	$i0,$s0,24
+	lbu	$t5,1024($i1)		# Td4[s3>>8]
+	_xtr	$i1,$s1,24
+	lbu	$t6,1024($i2)		# Td4[s0>>8]
+	_xtr	$i2,$s2,24
+	lbu	$t7,1024($i3)		# Td4[s1>>8]
+	_xtr	$i3,$s3,24
+
+	$PTR_ADD $i0,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i1,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i2,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i3,$Tbl
+	lbu	$t8,1024($i0)		# Td4[s0>>24]
+	_xtr	$i0,$s1,0
+	lbu	$t9,1024($i1)		# Td4[s1>>24]
+	_xtr	$i1,$s2,0
+	lbu	$t10,1024($i2)		# Td4[s2>>24]
+	_xtr	$i2,$s3,0
+	lbu	$t11,1024($i3)		# Td4[s3>>24]
+	_xtr	$i3,$s0,0
+
+	$PTR_ADD $i0,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i1,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i2,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i3,$Tbl
+
+	_ins	$t0,16
+	_ins	$t1,16
+	_ins	$t2,16
+	_ins	$t3,16
+
+	_ins	$t4,8
+	_ins	$t5,8
+	_ins	$t6,8
+	_ins	$t7,8
+
+	xor	$t0,$t4
+	lbu	$t4,1024($i0)		# Td4[s1]
+	xor	$t1,$t5
+	lbu	$t5,1024($i1)		# Td4[s2]
+	xor	$t2,$t6
+	lbu	$t6,1024($i2)		# Td4[s3]
+	xor	$t3,$t7
+	lbu	$t7,1024($i3)		# Td4[s0]
+
+	_ins	$t8,24
+	lw	$s0,0($key0)
+	_ins	$t9,24
+	lw	$s1,4($key0)
+	_ins	$t10,24
+	lw	$s2,8($key0)
+	_ins	$t11,24
+	lw	$s3,12($key0)
+
+	xor	$t0,$t8
+	xor	$t1,$t9
+	xor	$t2,$t10
+	xor	$t3,$t11
+
+	_ins	$t4,0
+	_ins	$t5,0
+	_ins	$t6,0
+	_ins	$t7,0
+
+	xor	$t0,$t4
+	xor	$t1,$t5
+	xor	$t2,$t6
+	xor	$t3,$t7
+#endif
+
+	xor	$s0,$t0
+	xor	$s1,$t1
+	xor	$s2,$t2
+	xor	$s3,$t3
+
+	jr	$ra
+.end	_mips_AES_decrypt
+
+.align	5
+.globl	AES_decrypt
+.ent	AES_decrypt
+AES_decrypt:
+	.frame	$sp,$FRAMESIZE,$ra
+	.mask	$SAVED_REGS_MASK,-$SZREG
+	.set	noreorder
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /o32/i);	# o32 PIC-ification
+	.cpload	$pf
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	$PTR_SUB $sp,$FRAMESIZE
+	$REG_S	$ra,$FRAMESIZE-1*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$fp,$FRAMESIZE-2*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$s11,$FRAMESIZE-3*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$s10,$FRAMESIZE-4*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$s9,$FRAMESIZE-5*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$s8,$FRAMESIZE-6*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$s7,$FRAMESIZE-7*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$s6,$FRAMESIZE-8*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$s5,$FRAMESIZE-9*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$s4,$FRAMESIZE-10*$SZREG($sp)
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i);	# optimize non-nubi prologue
+	$REG_S	\$15,$FRAMESIZE-11*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	\$14,$FRAMESIZE-12*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	\$13,$FRAMESIZE-13*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	\$12,$FRAMESIZE-14*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$gp,$FRAMESIZE-15*$SZREG($sp)
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($flavour !~ /o32/i);	# non-o32 PIC-ification
+	.cplocal	$Tbl
+	.cpsetup	$pf,$zero,AES_decrypt
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	.set	reorder
+	$PTR_LA	$Tbl,AES_Td		# PIC-ified 'load address'
+
+	lwl	$s0,0+$MSB($inp)
+	lwl	$s1,4+$MSB($inp)
+	lwl	$s2,8+$MSB($inp)
+	lwl	$s3,12+$MSB($inp)
+	lwr	$s0,0+$LSB($inp)
+	lwr	$s1,4+$LSB($inp)
+	lwr	$s2,8+$LSB($inp)
+	lwr	$s3,12+$LSB($inp)
+
+	bal	_mips_AES_decrypt
+
+	swr	$s0,0+$LSB($out)
+	swr	$s1,4+$LSB($out)
+	swr	$s2,8+$LSB($out)
+	swr	$s3,12+$LSB($out)
+	swl	$s0,0+$MSB($out)
+	swl	$s1,4+$MSB($out)
+	swl	$s2,8+$MSB($out)
+	swl	$s3,12+$MSB($out)
+
+	.set	noreorder
+	$REG_L	$ra,$FRAMESIZE-1*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$fp,$FRAMESIZE-2*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$s11,$FRAMESIZE-3*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$s10,$FRAMESIZE-4*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$s9,$FRAMESIZE-5*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$s8,$FRAMESIZE-6*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$s7,$FRAMESIZE-7*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$s6,$FRAMESIZE-8*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$s5,$FRAMESIZE-9*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$s4,$FRAMESIZE-10*$SZREG($sp)
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i);
+	$REG_L	\$15,$FRAMESIZE-11*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	\$14,$FRAMESIZE-12*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	\$13,$FRAMESIZE-13*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	\$12,$FRAMESIZE-14*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$gp,$FRAMESIZE-15*$SZREG($sp)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	jr	$ra
+	$PTR_ADD $sp,$FRAMESIZE
+.end	AES_decrypt
+___
+}}}
+
+{{{
+my $FRAMESIZE=8*$SZREG;
+my $SAVED_REGS_MASK = ($flavour =~ /nubi/i) ? "0xc000f008" : "0xc0000000";
+
+my ($inp,$bits,$key,$Tbl)=($a0,$a1,$a2,$a3);
+my ($rk0,$rk1,$rk2,$rk3,$rk4,$rk5,$rk6,$rk7)=($a4,$a5,$a6,$a7,$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3);
+my ($i0,$i1,$i2,$i3)=($at,$t0,$t1,$t2);
+my ($rcon,$cnt)=($gp,$fp);
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.align	5
+.ent	_mips_AES_set_encrypt_key
+_mips_AES_set_encrypt_key:
+	.frame	$sp,0,$ra
+	.set	noreorder
+	beqz	$inp,.Lekey_done
+	li	$t0,-1
+	beqz	$key,.Lekey_done
+	$PTR_ADD $rcon,$Tbl,256
+
+	.set	reorder
+	lwl	$rk0,0+$MSB($inp)	# load 128 bits
+	lwl	$rk1,4+$MSB($inp)
+	lwl	$rk2,8+$MSB($inp)
+	lwl	$rk3,12+$MSB($inp)
+	li	$at,128
+	lwr	$rk0,0+$LSB($inp)
+	lwr	$rk1,4+$LSB($inp)
+	lwr	$rk2,8+$LSB($inp)
+	lwr	$rk3,12+$LSB($inp)
+	.set	noreorder
+	beq	$bits,$at,.L128bits
+	li	$cnt,10
+
+	.set	reorder
+	lwl	$rk4,16+$MSB($inp)	# load 192 bits
+	lwl	$rk5,20+$MSB($inp)
+	li	$at,192
+	lwr	$rk4,16+$LSB($inp)
+	lwr	$rk5,20+$LSB($inp)
+	.set	noreorder
+	beq	$bits,$at,.L192bits
+	li	$cnt,8
+
+	.set	reorder
+	lwl	$rk6,24+$MSB($inp)	# load 256 bits
+	lwl	$rk7,28+$MSB($inp)
+	li	$at,256
+	lwr	$rk6,24+$LSB($inp)
+	lwr	$rk7,28+$LSB($inp)
+	.set	noreorder
+	beq	$bits,$at,.L256bits
+	li	$cnt,7
+
+	b	.Lekey_done
+	li	$t0,-2
+
+.align	4
+.L128bits:
+	.set	reorder
+	srl	$i0,$rk3,16
+	srl	$i1,$rk3,8
+	and	$i0,0xff
+	and	$i1,0xff
+	and	$i2,$rk3,0xff
+	srl	$i3,$rk3,24
+	$PTR_ADD $i0,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i1,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i2,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i3,$Tbl
+	lbu	$i0,0($i0)
+	lbu	$i1,0($i1)
+	lbu	$i2,0($i2)
+	lbu	$i3,0($i3)
+
+	sw	$rk0,0($key)
+	sw	$rk1,4($key)
+	sw	$rk2,8($key)
+	sw	$rk3,12($key)
+	sub	$cnt,1
+	$PTR_ADD $key,16
+
+	_bias	$i0,24
+	_bias	$i1,16
+	_bias	$i2,8
+	_bias	$i3,0
+
+	xor	$rk0,$i0
+	lw	$i0,0($rcon)
+	xor	$rk0,$i1
+	xor	$rk0,$i2
+	xor	$rk0,$i3
+	xor	$rk0,$i0
+
+	xor	$rk1,$rk0
+	xor	$rk2,$rk1
+	xor	$rk3,$rk2
+
+	.set	noreorder
+	bnez	$cnt,.L128bits
+	$PTR_ADD $rcon,4
+
+	sw	$rk0,0($key)
+	sw	$rk1,4($key)
+	sw	$rk2,8($key)
+	li	$cnt,10
+	sw	$rk3,12($key)
+	li	$t0,0
+	sw	$cnt,80($key)
+	b	.Lekey_done
+	$PTR_SUB $key,10*16
+
+.align	4
+.L192bits:
+	.set	reorder
+	srl	$i0,$rk5,16
+	srl	$i1,$rk5,8
+	and	$i0,0xff
+	and	$i1,0xff
+	and	$i2,$rk5,0xff
+	srl	$i3,$rk5,24
+	$PTR_ADD $i0,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i1,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i2,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i3,$Tbl
+	lbu	$i0,0($i0)
+	lbu	$i1,0($i1)
+	lbu	$i2,0($i2)
+	lbu	$i3,0($i3)
+
+	sw	$rk0,0($key)
+	sw	$rk1,4($key)
+	sw	$rk2,8($key)
+	sw	$rk3,12($key)
+	sw	$rk4,16($key)
+	sw	$rk5,20($key)
+	sub	$cnt,1
+	$PTR_ADD $key,24
+
+	_bias	$i0,24
+	_bias	$i1,16
+	_bias	$i2,8
+	_bias	$i3,0
+
+	xor	$rk0,$i0
+	lw	$i0,0($rcon)
+	xor	$rk0,$i1
+	xor	$rk0,$i2
+	xor	$rk0,$i3
+	xor	$rk0,$i0
+
+	xor	$rk1,$rk0
+	xor	$rk2,$rk1
+	xor	$rk3,$rk2
+	xor	$rk4,$rk3
+	xor	$rk5,$rk4
+
+	.set	noreorder
+	bnez	$cnt,.L192bits
+	$PTR_ADD $rcon,4
+
+	sw	$rk0,0($key)
+	sw	$rk1,4($key)
+	sw	$rk2,8($key)
+	li	$cnt,12
+	sw	$rk3,12($key)
+	li	$t0,0
+	sw	$cnt,48($key)
+	b	.Lekey_done
+	$PTR_SUB $key,12*16
+
+.align	4
+.L256bits:
+	.set	reorder
+	srl	$i0,$rk7,16
+	srl	$i1,$rk7,8
+	and	$i0,0xff
+	and	$i1,0xff
+	and	$i2,$rk7,0xff
+	srl	$i3,$rk7,24
+	$PTR_ADD $i0,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i1,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i2,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i3,$Tbl
+	lbu	$i0,0($i0)
+	lbu	$i1,0($i1)
+	lbu	$i2,0($i2)
+	lbu	$i3,0($i3)
+
+	sw	$rk0,0($key)
+	sw	$rk1,4($key)
+	sw	$rk2,8($key)
+	sw	$rk3,12($key)
+	sw	$rk4,16($key)
+	sw	$rk5,20($key)
+	sw	$rk6,24($key)
+	sw	$rk7,28($key)
+	sub	$cnt,1
+
+	_bias	$i0,24
+	_bias	$i1,16
+	_bias	$i2,8
+	_bias	$i3,0
+
+	xor	$rk0,$i0
+	lw	$i0,0($rcon)
+	xor	$rk0,$i1
+	xor	$rk0,$i2
+	xor	$rk0,$i3
+	xor	$rk0,$i0
+
+	xor	$rk1,$rk0
+	xor	$rk2,$rk1
+	xor	$rk3,$rk2
+	beqz	$cnt,.L256bits_done
+
+	srl	$i0,$rk3,24
+	srl	$i1,$rk3,16
+	srl	$i2,$rk3,8
+	and	$i3,$rk3,0xff
+	and	$i1,0xff
+	and	$i2,0xff
+	$PTR_ADD $i0,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i1,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i2,$Tbl
+	$PTR_ADD $i3,$Tbl
+	lbu	$i0,0($i0)
+	lbu	$i1,0($i1)
+	lbu	$i2,0($i2)
+	lbu	$i3,0($i3)
+	sll	$i0,24
+	sll	$i1,16
+	sll	$i2,8
+
+	xor	$rk4,$i0
+	xor	$rk4,$i1
+	xor	$rk4,$i2
+	xor	$rk4,$i3
+
+	xor	$rk5,$rk4
+	xor	$rk6,$rk5
+	xor	$rk7,$rk6
+
+	$PTR_ADD $key,32
+	.set	noreorder
+	b	.L256bits
+	$PTR_ADD $rcon,4
+
+.L256bits_done:
+	sw	$rk0,32($key)
+	sw	$rk1,36($key)
+	sw	$rk2,40($key)
+	li	$cnt,14
+	sw	$rk3,44($key)
+	li	$t0,0
+	sw	$cnt,48($key)
+	$PTR_SUB $key,12*16
+
+.Lekey_done:
+	jr	$ra
+	nop
+.end	_mips_AES_set_encrypt_key
+
+.globl	AES_set_encrypt_key
+.ent	AES_set_encrypt_key
+AES_set_encrypt_key:
+	.frame	$sp,$FRAMESIZE,$ra
+	.mask	$SAVED_REGS_MASK,-$SZREG
+	.set	noreorder
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /o32/i);	# o32 PIC-ification
+	.cpload	$pf
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	$PTR_SUB $sp,$FRAMESIZE
+	$REG_S	$ra,$FRAMESIZE-1*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$fp,$FRAMESIZE-2*$SZREG($sp)
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i);	# optimize non-nubi prologue
+	$REG_S	$s3,$FRAMESIZE-3*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$s2,$FRAMESIZE-4*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$s1,$FRAMESIZE-5*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$s0,$FRAMESIZE-6*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$gp,$FRAMESIZE-7*$SZREG($sp)
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($flavour !~ /o32/i);	# non-o32 PIC-ification
+	.cplocal	$Tbl
+	.cpsetup	$pf,$zero,AES_set_encrypt_key
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	.set	reorder
+	$PTR_LA	$Tbl,AES_Te4		# PIC-ified 'load address'
+
+	bal	_mips_AES_set_encrypt_key
+
+	.set	noreorder
+	move	$a0,$t0
+	$REG_L	$ra,$FRAMESIZE-1*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$fp,$FRAMESIZE-2*$SZREG($sp)
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i);
+	$REG_L	$s3,$FRAMESIZE-11*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$s2,$FRAMESIZE-12*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$s1,$FRAMESIZE-13*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$s0,$FRAMESIZE-14*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$gp,$FRAMESIZE-15*$SZREG($sp)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	jr	$ra
+	$PTR_ADD $sp,$FRAMESIZE
+.end	AES_set_encrypt_key
+___
+
+my ($head,$tail)=($inp,$bits);
+my ($tp1,$tp2,$tp4,$tp8,$tp9,$tpb,$tpd,$tpe)=($a4,$a5,$a6,$a7,$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3);
+my ($m,$x80808080,$x7f7f7f7f,$x1b1b1b1b)=($at,$t0,$t1,$t2);
+$code.=<<___;
+.align	5
+.globl	AES_set_decrypt_key
+.ent	AES_set_decrypt_key
+AES_set_decrypt_key:
+	.frame	$sp,$FRAMESIZE,$ra
+	.mask	$SAVED_REGS_MASK,-$SZREG
+	.set	noreorder
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /o32/i);	# o32 PIC-ification
+	.cpload	$pf
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	$PTR_SUB $sp,$FRAMESIZE
+	$REG_S	$ra,$FRAMESIZE-1*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$fp,$FRAMESIZE-2*$SZREG($sp)
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i);	# optimize non-nubi prologue
+	$REG_S	$s3,$FRAMESIZE-3*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$s2,$FRAMESIZE-4*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$s1,$FRAMESIZE-5*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$s0,$FRAMESIZE-6*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$gp,$FRAMESIZE-7*$SZREG($sp)
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($flavour !~ /o32/i);	# non-o32 PIC-ification
+	.cplocal	$Tbl
+	.cpsetup	$pf,$zero,AES_set_decrypt_key
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	.set	reorder
+	$PTR_LA	$Tbl,AES_Te4		# PIC-ified 'load address'
+
+	bal	_mips_AES_set_encrypt_key
+
+	bltz	$t0,.Ldkey_done
+
+	sll	$at,$cnt,4
+	$PTR_ADD $head,$key,0
+	$PTR_ADD $tail,$key,$at
+.align	4
+.Lswap:
+	lw	$rk0,0($head)
+	lw	$rk1,4($head)
+	lw	$rk2,8($head)
+	lw	$rk3,12($head)
+	lw	$rk4,0($tail)
+	lw	$rk5,4($tail)
+	lw	$rk6,8($tail)
+	lw	$rk7,12($tail)
+	sw	$rk0,0($tail)
+	sw	$rk1,4($tail)
+	sw	$rk2,8($tail)
+	sw	$rk3,12($tail)
+	$PTR_ADD $head,16
+	$PTR_SUB $tail,16
+	sw	$rk4,-16($head)
+	sw	$rk5,-12($head)
+	sw	$rk6,-8($head)
+	sw	$rk7,-4($head)
+	bne	$head,$tail,.Lswap
+
+	lw	$tp1,16($key)		# modulo-scheduled
+	lui	$x80808080,0x8080
+	sub	$cnt,1
+	or	$x80808080,0x8080
+	sll	$cnt,2
+	$PTR_ADD $key,16
+	lui	$x1b1b1b1b,0x1b1b
+	nor	$x7f7f7f7f,$zero,$x80808080
+	or	$x1b1b1b1b,0x1b1b
+.align	4
+.Lmix:
+	and	$m,$tp1,$x80808080
+	and	$tp2,$tp1,$x7f7f7f7f
+	srl	$tp4,$m,7
+	addu	$tp2,$tp2		# tp2<<1
+	subu	$m,$tp4
+	and	$m,$x1b1b1b1b
+	xor	$tp2,$m
+
+	and	$m,$tp2,$x80808080
+	and	$tp4,$tp2,$x7f7f7f7f
+	srl	$tp8,$m,7
+	addu	$tp4,$tp4		# tp4<<1
+	subu	$m,$tp8
+	and	$m,$x1b1b1b1b
+	xor	$tp4,$m
+
+	and	$m,$tp4,$x80808080
+	and	$tp8,$tp4,$x7f7f7f7f
+	srl	$tp9,$m,7
+	addu	$tp8,$tp8		# tp8<<1
+	subu	$m,$tp9
+	and	$m,$x1b1b1b1b
+	xor	$tp8,$m
+
+	xor	$tp9,$tp8,$tp1
+	xor	$tpe,$tp8,$tp4
+	xor	$tpb,$tp9,$tp2
+	xor	$tpd,$tp9,$tp4
+
+#if defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS32R2) || defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS64R2)
+	rotr	$tp1,$tpd,16
+	 xor	$tpe,$tp2
+	rotr	$tp2,$tp9,8
+	xor	$tpe,$tp1
+	rotr	$tp4,$tpb,24
+	xor	$tpe,$tp2
+	lw	$tp1,4($key)		# modulo-scheduled
+	xor	$tpe,$tp4
+#else
+	_ror	$tp1,$tpd,16
+	 xor	$tpe,$tp2
+	_ror	$tp2,$tpd,-16
+	xor	$tpe,$tp1
+	_ror	$tp1,$tp9,8
+	xor	$tpe,$tp2
+	_ror	$tp2,$tp9,-24
+	xor	$tpe,$tp1
+	_ror	$tp1,$tpb,24
+	xor	$tpe,$tp2
+	_ror	$tp2,$tpb,-8
+	xor	$tpe,$tp1
+	lw	$tp1,4($key)		# modulo-scheduled
+	xor	$tpe,$tp2
+#endif
+	sub	$cnt,1
+	sw	$tpe,0($key)
+	$PTR_ADD $key,4
+	bnez	$cnt,.Lmix
+
+	li	$t0,0
+.Ldkey_done:
+	.set	noreorder
+	move	$a0,$t0
+	$REG_L	$ra,$FRAMESIZE-1*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$fp,$FRAMESIZE-2*$SZREG($sp)
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i);
+	$REG_L	$s3,$FRAMESIZE-11*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$s2,$FRAMESIZE-12*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$s1,$FRAMESIZE-13*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$s0,$FRAMESIZE-14*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$gp,$FRAMESIZE-15*$SZREG($sp)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	jr	$ra
+	$PTR_ADD $sp,$FRAMESIZE
+.end	AES_set_decrypt_key
+___
+}}}
+
+######################################################################
+# Tables are kept in endian-neutral manner
+$code.=<<___;
+.rdata
+.align	10
+AES_Te:
+.byte	0xc6,0x63,0x63,0xa5,	0xf8,0x7c,0x7c,0x84	# Te0
+.byte	0xee,0x77,0x77,0x99,	0xf6,0x7b,0x7b,0x8d
+.byte	0xff,0xf2,0xf2,0x0d,	0xd6,0x6b,0x6b,0xbd
+.byte	0xde,0x6f,0x6f,0xb1,	0x91,0xc5,0xc5,0x54
+.byte	0x60,0x30,0x30,0x50,	0x02,0x01,0x01,0x03
+.byte	0xce,0x67,0x67,0xa9,	0x56,0x2b,0x2b,0x7d
+.byte	0xe7,0xfe,0xfe,0x19,	0xb5,0xd7,0xd7,0x62
+.byte	0x4d,0xab,0xab,0xe6,	0xec,0x76,0x76,0x9a
+.byte	0x8f,0xca,0xca,0x45,	0x1f,0x82,0x82,0x9d
+.byte	0x89,0xc9,0xc9,0x40,	0xfa,0x7d,0x7d,0x87
+.byte	0xef,0xfa,0xfa,0x15,	0xb2,0x59,0x59,0xeb
+.byte	0x8e,0x47,0x47,0xc9,	0xfb,0xf0,0xf0,0x0b
+.byte	0x41,0xad,0xad,0xec,	0xb3,0xd4,0xd4,0x67
+.byte	0x5f,0xa2,0xa2,0xfd,	0x45,0xaf,0xaf,0xea
+.byte	0x23,0x9c,0x9c,0xbf,	0x53,0xa4,0xa4,0xf7
+.byte	0xe4,0x72,0x72,0x96,	0x9b,0xc0,0xc0,0x5b
+.byte	0x75,0xb7,0xb7,0xc2,	0xe1,0xfd,0xfd,0x1c
+.byte	0x3d,0x93,0x93,0xae,	0x4c,0x26,0x26,0x6a
+.byte	0x6c,0x36,0x36,0x5a,	0x7e,0x3f,0x3f,0x41
+.byte	0xf5,0xf7,0xf7,0x02,	0x83,0xcc,0xcc,0x4f
+.byte	0x68,0x34,0x34,0x5c,	0x51,0xa5,0xa5,0xf4
+.byte	0xd1,0xe5,0xe5,0x34,	0xf9,0xf1,0xf1,0x08
+.byte	0xe2,0x71,0x71,0x93,	0xab,0xd8,0xd8,0x73
+.byte	0x62,0x31,0x31,0x53,	0x2a,0x15,0x15,0x3f
+.byte	0x08,0x04,0x04,0x0c,	0x95,0xc7,0xc7,0x52
+.byte	0x46,0x23,0x23,0x65,	0x9d,0xc3,0xc3,0x5e
+.byte	0x30,0x18,0x18,0x28,	0x37,0x96,0x96,0xa1
+.byte	0x0a,0x05,0x05,0x0f,	0x2f,0x9a,0x9a,0xb5
+.byte	0x0e,0x07,0x07,0x09,	0x24,0x12,0x12,0x36
+.byte	0x1b,0x80,0x80,0x9b,	0xdf,0xe2,0xe2,0x3d
+.byte	0xcd,0xeb,0xeb,0x26,	0x4e,0x27,0x27,0x69
+.byte	0x7f,0xb2,0xb2,0xcd,	0xea,0x75,0x75,0x9f
+.byte	0x12,0x09,0x09,0x1b,	0x1d,0x83,0x83,0x9e
+.byte	0x58,0x2c,0x2c,0x74,	0x34,0x1a,0x1a,0x2e
+.byte	0x36,0x1b,0x1b,0x2d,	0xdc,0x6e,0x6e,0xb2
+.byte	0xb4,0x5a,0x5a,0xee,	0x5b,0xa0,0xa0,0xfb
+.byte	0xa4,0x52,0x52,0xf6,	0x76,0x3b,0x3b,0x4d
+.byte	0xb7,0xd6,0xd6,0x61,	0x7d,0xb3,0xb3,0xce
+.byte	0x52,0x29,0x29,0x7b,	0xdd,0xe3,0xe3,0x3e
+.byte	0x5e,0x2f,0x2f,0x71,	0x13,0x84,0x84,0x97
+.byte	0xa6,0x53,0x53,0xf5,	0xb9,0xd1,0xd1,0x68
+.byte	0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,	0xc1,0xed,0xed,0x2c
+.byte	0x40,0x20,0x20,0x60,	0xe3,0xfc,0xfc,0x1f
+.byte	0x79,0xb1,0xb1,0xc8,	0xb6,0x5b,0x5b,0xed
+.byte	0xd4,0x6a,0x6a,0xbe,	0x8d,0xcb,0xcb,0x46
+.byte	0x67,0xbe,0xbe,0xd9,	0x72,0x39,0x39,0x4b
+.byte	0x94,0x4a,0x4a,0xde,	0x98,0x4c,0x4c,0xd4
+.byte	0xb0,0x58,0x58,0xe8,	0x85,0xcf,0xcf,0x4a
+.byte	0xbb,0xd0,0xd0,0x6b,	0xc5,0xef,0xef,0x2a
+.byte	0x4f,0xaa,0xaa,0xe5,	0xed,0xfb,0xfb,0x16
+.byte	0x86,0x43,0x43,0xc5,	0x9a,0x4d,0x4d,0xd7
+.byte	0x66,0x33,0x33,0x55,	0x11,0x85,0x85,0x94
+.byte	0x8a,0x45,0x45,0xcf,	0xe9,0xf9,0xf9,0x10
+.byte	0x04,0x02,0x02,0x06,	0xfe,0x7f,0x7f,0x81
+.byte	0xa0,0x50,0x50,0xf0,	0x78,0x3c,0x3c,0x44
+.byte	0x25,0x9f,0x9f,0xba,	0x4b,0xa8,0xa8,0xe3
+.byte	0xa2,0x51,0x51,0xf3,	0x5d,0xa3,0xa3,0xfe
+.byte	0x80,0x40,0x40,0xc0,	0x05,0x8f,0x8f,0x8a
+.byte	0x3f,0x92,0x92,0xad,	0x21,0x9d,0x9d,0xbc
+.byte	0x70,0x38,0x38,0x48,	0xf1,0xf5,0xf5,0x04
+.byte	0x63,0xbc,0xbc,0xdf,	0x77,0xb6,0xb6,0xc1
+.byte	0xaf,0xda,0xda,0x75,	0x42,0x21,0x21,0x63
+.byte	0x20,0x10,0x10,0x30,	0xe5,0xff,0xff,0x1a
+.byte	0xfd,0xf3,0xf3,0x0e,	0xbf,0xd2,0xd2,0x6d
+.byte	0x81,0xcd,0xcd,0x4c,	0x18,0x0c,0x0c,0x14
+.byte	0x26,0x13,0x13,0x35,	0xc3,0xec,0xec,0x2f
+.byte	0xbe,0x5f,0x5f,0xe1,	0x35,0x97,0x97,0xa2
+.byte	0x88,0x44,0x44,0xcc,	0x2e,0x17,0x17,0x39
+.byte	0x93,0xc4,0xc4,0x57,	0x55,0xa7,0xa7,0xf2
+.byte	0xfc,0x7e,0x7e,0x82,	0x7a,0x3d,0x3d,0x47
+.byte	0xc8,0x64,0x64,0xac,	0xba,0x5d,0x5d,0xe7
+.byte	0x32,0x19,0x19,0x2b,	0xe6,0x73,0x73,0x95
+.byte	0xc0,0x60,0x60,0xa0,	0x19,0x81,0x81,0x98
+.byte	0x9e,0x4f,0x4f,0xd1,	0xa3,0xdc,0xdc,0x7f
+.byte	0x44,0x22,0x22,0x66,	0x54,0x2a,0x2a,0x7e
+.byte	0x3b,0x90,0x90,0xab,	0x0b,0x88,0x88,0x83
+.byte	0x8c,0x46,0x46,0xca,	0xc7,0xee,0xee,0x29
+.byte	0x6b,0xb8,0xb8,0xd3,	0x28,0x14,0x14,0x3c
+.byte	0xa7,0xde,0xde,0x79,	0xbc,0x5e,0x5e,0xe2
+.byte	0x16,0x0b,0x0b,0x1d,	0xad,0xdb,0xdb,0x76
+.byte	0xdb,0xe0,0xe0,0x3b,	0x64,0x32,0x32,0x56
+.byte	0x74,0x3a,0x3a,0x4e,	0x14,0x0a,0x0a,0x1e
+.byte	0x92,0x49,0x49,0xdb,	0x0c,0x06,0x06,0x0a
+.byte	0x48,0x24,0x24,0x6c,	0xb8,0x5c,0x5c,0xe4
+.byte	0x9f,0xc2,0xc2,0x5d,	0xbd,0xd3,0xd3,0x6e
+.byte	0x43,0xac,0xac,0xef,	0xc4,0x62,0x62,0xa6
+.byte	0x39,0x91,0x91,0xa8,	0x31,0x95,0x95,0xa4
+.byte	0xd3,0xe4,0xe4,0x37,	0xf2,0x79,0x79,0x8b
+.byte	0xd5,0xe7,0xe7,0x32,	0x8b,0xc8,0xc8,0x43
+.byte	0x6e,0x37,0x37,0x59,	0xda,0x6d,0x6d,0xb7
+.byte	0x01,0x8d,0x8d,0x8c,	0xb1,0xd5,0xd5,0x64
+.byte	0x9c,0x4e,0x4e,0xd2,	0x49,0xa9,0xa9,0xe0
+.byte	0xd8,0x6c,0x6c,0xb4,	0xac,0x56,0x56,0xfa
+.byte	0xf3,0xf4,0xf4,0x07,	0xcf,0xea,0xea,0x25
+.byte	0xca,0x65,0x65,0xaf,	0xf4,0x7a,0x7a,0x8e
+.byte	0x47,0xae,0xae,0xe9,	0x10,0x08,0x08,0x18
+.byte	0x6f,0xba,0xba,0xd5,	0xf0,0x78,0x78,0x88
+.byte	0x4a,0x25,0x25,0x6f,	0x5c,0x2e,0x2e,0x72
+.byte	0x38,0x1c,0x1c,0x24,	0x57,0xa6,0xa6,0xf1
+.byte	0x73,0xb4,0xb4,0xc7,	0x97,0xc6,0xc6,0x51
+.byte	0xcb,0xe8,0xe8,0x23,	0xa1,0xdd,0xdd,0x7c
+.byte	0xe8,0x74,0x74,0x9c,	0x3e,0x1f,0x1f,0x21
+.byte	0x96,0x4b,0x4b,0xdd,	0x61,0xbd,0xbd,0xdc
+.byte	0x0d,0x8b,0x8b,0x86,	0x0f,0x8a,0x8a,0x85
+.byte	0xe0,0x70,0x70,0x90,	0x7c,0x3e,0x3e,0x42
+.byte	0x71,0xb5,0xb5,0xc4,	0xcc,0x66,0x66,0xaa
+.byte	0x90,0x48,0x48,0xd8,	0x06,0x03,0x03,0x05
+.byte	0xf7,0xf6,0xf6,0x01,	0x1c,0x0e,0x0e,0x12
+.byte	0xc2,0x61,0x61,0xa3,	0x6a,0x35,0x35,0x5f
+.byte	0xae,0x57,0x57,0xf9,	0x69,0xb9,0xb9,0xd0
+.byte	0x17,0x86,0x86,0x91,	0x99,0xc1,0xc1,0x58
+.byte	0x3a,0x1d,0x1d,0x27,	0x27,0x9e,0x9e,0xb9
+.byte	0xd9,0xe1,0xe1,0x38,	0xeb,0xf8,0xf8,0x13
+.byte	0x2b,0x98,0x98,0xb3,	0x22,0x11,0x11,0x33
+.byte	0xd2,0x69,0x69,0xbb,	0xa9,0xd9,0xd9,0x70
+.byte	0x07,0x8e,0x8e,0x89,	0x33,0x94,0x94,0xa7
+.byte	0x2d,0x9b,0x9b,0xb6,	0x3c,0x1e,0x1e,0x22
+.byte	0x15,0x87,0x87,0x92,	0xc9,0xe9,0xe9,0x20
+.byte	0x87,0xce,0xce,0x49,	0xaa,0x55,0x55,0xff
+.byte	0x50,0x28,0x28,0x78,	0xa5,0xdf,0xdf,0x7a
+.byte	0x03,0x8c,0x8c,0x8f,	0x59,0xa1,0xa1,0xf8
+.byte	0x09,0x89,0x89,0x80,	0x1a,0x0d,0x0d,0x17
+.byte	0x65,0xbf,0xbf,0xda,	0xd7,0xe6,0xe6,0x31
+.byte	0x84,0x42,0x42,0xc6,	0xd0,0x68,0x68,0xb8
+.byte	0x82,0x41,0x41,0xc3,	0x29,0x99,0x99,0xb0
+.byte	0x5a,0x2d,0x2d,0x77,	0x1e,0x0f,0x0f,0x11
+.byte	0x7b,0xb0,0xb0,0xcb,	0xa8,0x54,0x54,0xfc
+.byte	0x6d,0xbb,0xbb,0xd6,	0x2c,0x16,0x16,0x3a
+
+AES_Td:
+.byte	0x51,0xf4,0xa7,0x50,	0x7e,0x41,0x65,0x53	# Td0
+.byte	0x1a,0x17,0xa4,0xc3,	0x3a,0x27,0x5e,0x96
+.byte	0x3b,0xab,0x6b,0xcb,	0x1f,0x9d,0x45,0xf1
+.byte	0xac,0xfa,0x58,0xab,	0x4b,0xe3,0x03,0x93
+.byte	0x20,0x30,0xfa,0x55,	0xad,0x76,0x6d,0xf6
+.byte	0x88,0xcc,0x76,0x91,	0xf5,0x02,0x4c,0x25
+.byte	0x4f,0xe5,0xd7,0xfc,	0xc5,0x2a,0xcb,0xd7
+.byte	0x26,0x35,0x44,0x80,	0xb5,0x62,0xa3,0x8f
+.byte	0xde,0xb1,0x5a,0x49,	0x25,0xba,0x1b,0x67
+.byte	0x45,0xea,0x0e,0x98,	0x5d,0xfe,0xc0,0xe1
+.byte	0xc3,0x2f,0x75,0x02,	0x81,0x4c,0xf0,0x12
+.byte	0x8d,0x46,0x97,0xa3,	0x6b,0xd3,0xf9,0xc6
+.byte	0x03,0x8f,0x5f,0xe7,	0x15,0x92,0x9c,0x95
+.byte	0xbf,0x6d,0x7a,0xeb,	0x95,0x52,0x59,0xda
+.byte	0xd4,0xbe,0x83,0x2d,	0x58,0x74,0x21,0xd3
+.byte	0x49,0xe0,0x69,0x29,	0x8e,0xc9,0xc8,0x44
+.byte	0x75,0xc2,0x89,0x6a,	0xf4,0x8e,0x79,0x78
+.byte	0x99,0x58,0x3e,0x6b,	0x27,0xb9,0x71,0xdd
+.byte	0xbe,0xe1,0x4f,0xb6,	0xf0,0x88,0xad,0x17
+.byte	0xc9,0x20,0xac,0x66,	0x7d,0xce,0x3a,0xb4
+.byte	0x63,0xdf,0x4a,0x18,	0xe5,0x1a,0x31,0x82
+.byte	0x97,0x51,0x33,0x60,	0x62,0x53,0x7f,0x45
+.byte	0xb1,0x64,0x77,0xe0,	0xbb,0x6b,0xae,0x84
+.byte	0xfe,0x81,0xa0,0x1c,	0xf9,0x08,0x2b,0x94
+.byte	0x70,0x48,0x68,0x58,	0x8f,0x45,0xfd,0x19
+.byte	0x94,0xde,0x6c,0x87,	0x52,0x7b,0xf8,0xb7
+.byte	0xab,0x73,0xd3,0x23,	0x72,0x4b,0x02,0xe2
+.byte	0xe3,0x1f,0x8f,0x57,	0x66,0x55,0xab,0x2a
+.byte	0xb2,0xeb,0x28,0x07,	0x2f,0xb5,0xc2,0x03
+.byte	0x86,0xc5,0x7b,0x9a,	0xd3,0x37,0x08,0xa5
+.byte	0x30,0x28,0x87,0xf2,	0x23,0xbf,0xa5,0xb2
+.byte	0x02,0x03,0x6a,0xba,	0xed,0x16,0x82,0x5c
+.byte	0x8a,0xcf,0x1c,0x2b,	0xa7,0x79,0xb4,0x92
+.byte	0xf3,0x07,0xf2,0xf0,	0x4e,0x69,0xe2,0xa1
+.byte	0x65,0xda,0xf4,0xcd,	0x06,0x05,0xbe,0xd5
+.byte	0xd1,0x34,0x62,0x1f,	0xc4,0xa6,0xfe,0x8a
+.byte	0x34,0x2e,0x53,0x9d,	0xa2,0xf3,0x55,0xa0
+.byte	0x05,0x8a,0xe1,0x32,	0xa4,0xf6,0xeb,0x75
+.byte	0x0b,0x83,0xec,0x39,	0x40,0x60,0xef,0xaa
+.byte	0x5e,0x71,0x9f,0x06,	0xbd,0x6e,0x10,0x51
+.byte	0x3e,0x21,0x8a,0xf9,	0x96,0xdd,0x06,0x3d
+.byte	0xdd,0x3e,0x05,0xae,	0x4d,0xe6,0xbd,0x46
+.byte	0x91,0x54,0x8d,0xb5,	0x71,0xc4,0x5d,0x05
+.byte	0x04,0x06,0xd4,0x6f,	0x60,0x50,0x15,0xff
+.byte	0x19,0x98,0xfb,0x24,	0xd6,0xbd,0xe9,0x97
+.byte	0x89,0x40,0x43,0xcc,	0x67,0xd9,0x9e,0x77
+.byte	0xb0,0xe8,0x42,0xbd,	0x07,0x89,0x8b,0x88
+.byte	0xe7,0x19,0x5b,0x38,	0x79,0xc8,0xee,0xdb
+.byte	0xa1,0x7c,0x0a,0x47,	0x7c,0x42,0x0f,0xe9
+.byte	0xf8,0x84,0x1e,0xc9,	0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00
+.byte	0x09,0x80,0x86,0x83,	0x32,0x2b,0xed,0x48
+.byte	0x1e,0x11,0x70,0xac,	0x6c,0x5a,0x72,0x4e
+.byte	0xfd,0x0e,0xff,0xfb,	0x0f,0x85,0x38,0x56
+.byte	0x3d,0xae,0xd5,0x1e,	0x36,0x2d,0x39,0x27
+.byte	0x0a,0x0f,0xd9,0x64,	0x68,0x5c,0xa6,0x21
+.byte	0x9b,0x5b,0x54,0xd1,	0x24,0x36,0x2e,0x3a
+.byte	0x0c,0x0a,0x67,0xb1,	0x93,0x57,0xe7,0x0f
+.byte	0xb4,0xee,0x96,0xd2,	0x1b,0x9b,0x91,0x9e
+.byte	0x80,0xc0,0xc5,0x4f,	0x61,0xdc,0x20,0xa2
+.byte	0x5a,0x77,0x4b,0x69,	0x1c,0x12,0x1a,0x16
+.byte	0xe2,0x93,0xba,0x0a,	0xc0,0xa0,0x2a,0xe5
+.byte	0x3c,0x22,0xe0,0x43,	0x12,0x1b,0x17,0x1d
+.byte	0x0e,0x09,0x0d,0x0b,	0xf2,0x8b,0xc7,0xad
+.byte	0x2d,0xb6,0xa8,0xb9,	0x14,0x1e,0xa9,0xc8
+.byte	0x57,0xf1,0x19,0x85,	0xaf,0x75,0x07,0x4c
+.byte	0xee,0x99,0xdd,0xbb,	0xa3,0x7f,0x60,0xfd
+.byte	0xf7,0x01,0x26,0x9f,	0x5c,0x72,0xf5,0xbc
+.byte	0x44,0x66,0x3b,0xc5,	0x5b,0xfb,0x7e,0x34
+.byte	0x8b,0x43,0x29,0x76,	0xcb,0x23,0xc6,0xdc
+.byte	0xb6,0xed,0xfc,0x68,	0xb8,0xe4,0xf1,0x63
+.byte	0xd7,0x31,0xdc,0xca,	0x42,0x63,0x85,0x10
+.byte	0x13,0x97,0x22,0x40,	0x84,0xc6,0x11,0x20
+.byte	0x85,0x4a,0x24,0x7d,	0xd2,0xbb,0x3d,0xf8
+.byte	0xae,0xf9,0x32,0x11,	0xc7,0x29,0xa1,0x6d
+.byte	0x1d,0x9e,0x2f,0x4b,	0xdc,0xb2,0x30,0xf3
+.byte	0x0d,0x86,0x52,0xec,	0x77,0xc1,0xe3,0xd0
+.byte	0x2b,0xb3,0x16,0x6c,	0xa9,0x70,0xb9,0x99
+.byte	0x11,0x94,0x48,0xfa,	0x47,0xe9,0x64,0x22
+.byte	0xa8,0xfc,0x8c,0xc4,	0xa0,0xf0,0x3f,0x1a
+.byte	0x56,0x7d,0x2c,0xd8,	0x22,0x33,0x90,0xef
+.byte	0x87,0x49,0x4e,0xc7,	0xd9,0x38,0xd1,0xc1
+.byte	0x8c,0xca,0xa2,0xfe,	0x98,0xd4,0x0b,0x36
+.byte	0xa6,0xf5,0x81,0xcf,	0xa5,0x7a,0xde,0x28
+.byte	0xda,0xb7,0x8e,0x26,	0x3f,0xad,0xbf,0xa4
+.byte	0x2c,0x3a,0x9d,0xe4,	0x50,0x78,0x92,0x0d
+.byte	0x6a,0x5f,0xcc,0x9b,	0x54,0x7e,0x46,0x62
+.byte	0xf6,0x8d,0x13,0xc2,	0x90,0xd8,0xb8,0xe8
+.byte	0x2e,0x39,0xf7,0x5e,	0x82,0xc3,0xaf,0xf5
+.byte	0x9f,0x5d,0x80,0xbe,	0x69,0xd0,0x93,0x7c
+.byte	0x6f,0xd5,0x2d,0xa9,	0xcf,0x25,0x12,0xb3
+.byte	0xc8,0xac,0x99,0x3b,	0x10,0x18,0x7d,0xa7
+.byte	0xe8,0x9c,0x63,0x6e,	0xdb,0x3b,0xbb,0x7b
+.byte	0xcd,0x26,0x78,0x09,	0x6e,0x59,0x18,0xf4
+.byte	0xec,0x9a,0xb7,0x01,	0x83,0x4f,0x9a,0xa8
+.byte	0xe6,0x95,0x6e,0x65,	0xaa,0xff,0xe6,0x7e
+.byte	0x21,0xbc,0xcf,0x08,	0xef,0x15,0xe8,0xe6
+.byte	0xba,0xe7,0x9b,0xd9,	0x4a,0x6f,0x36,0xce
+.byte	0xea,0x9f,0x09,0xd4,	0x29,0xb0,0x7c,0xd6
+.byte	0x31,0xa4,0xb2,0xaf,	0x2a,0x3f,0x23,0x31
+.byte	0xc6,0xa5,0x94,0x30,	0x35,0xa2,0x66,0xc0
+.byte	0x74,0x4e,0xbc,0x37,	0xfc,0x82,0xca,0xa6
+.byte	0xe0,0x90,0xd0,0xb0,	0x33,0xa7,0xd8,0x15
+.byte	0xf1,0x04,0x98,0x4a,	0x41,0xec,0xda,0xf7
+.byte	0x7f,0xcd,0x50,0x0e,	0x17,0x91,0xf6,0x2f
+.byte	0x76,0x4d,0xd6,0x8d,	0x43,0xef,0xb0,0x4d
+.byte	0xcc,0xaa,0x4d,0x54,	0xe4,0x96,0x04,0xdf
+.byte	0x9e,0xd1,0xb5,0xe3,	0x4c,0x6a,0x88,0x1b
+.byte	0xc1,0x2c,0x1f,0xb8,	0x46,0x65,0x51,0x7f
+.byte	0x9d,0x5e,0xea,0x04,	0x01,0x8c,0x35,0x5d
+.byte	0xfa,0x87,0x74,0x73,	0xfb,0x0b,0x41,0x2e
+.byte	0xb3,0x67,0x1d,0x5a,	0x92,0xdb,0xd2,0x52
+.byte	0xe9,0x10,0x56,0x33,	0x6d,0xd6,0x47,0x13
+.byte	0x9a,0xd7,0x61,0x8c,	0x37,0xa1,0x0c,0x7a
+.byte	0x59,0xf8,0x14,0x8e,	0xeb,0x13,0x3c,0x89
+.byte	0xce,0xa9,0x27,0xee,	0xb7,0x61,0xc9,0x35
+.byte	0xe1,0x1c,0xe5,0xed,	0x7a,0x47,0xb1,0x3c
+.byte	0x9c,0xd2,0xdf,0x59,	0x55,0xf2,0x73,0x3f
+.byte	0x18,0x14,0xce,0x79,	0x73,0xc7,0x37,0xbf
+.byte	0x53,0xf7,0xcd,0xea,	0x5f,0xfd,0xaa,0x5b
+.byte	0xdf,0x3d,0x6f,0x14,	0x78,0x44,0xdb,0x86
+.byte	0xca,0xaf,0xf3,0x81,	0xb9,0x68,0xc4,0x3e
+.byte	0x38,0x24,0x34,0x2c,	0xc2,0xa3,0x40,0x5f
+.byte	0x16,0x1d,0xc3,0x72,	0xbc,0xe2,0x25,0x0c
+.byte	0x28,0x3c,0x49,0x8b,	0xff,0x0d,0x95,0x41
+.byte	0x39,0xa8,0x01,0x71,	0x08,0x0c,0xb3,0xde
+.byte	0xd8,0xb4,0xe4,0x9c,	0x64,0x56,0xc1,0x90
+.byte	0x7b,0xcb,0x84,0x61,	0xd5,0x32,0xb6,0x70
+.byte	0x48,0x6c,0x5c,0x74,	0xd0,0xb8,0x57,0x42
+
+.byte	0x52, 0x09, 0x6a, 0xd5, 0x30, 0x36, 0xa5, 0x38	# Td4
+.byte	0xbf, 0x40, 0xa3, 0x9e, 0x81, 0xf3, 0xd7, 0xfb
+.byte	0x7c, 0xe3, 0x39, 0x82, 0x9b, 0x2f, 0xff, 0x87
+.byte	0x34, 0x8e, 0x43, 0x44, 0xc4, 0xde, 0xe9, 0xcb
+.byte	0x54, 0x7b, 0x94, 0x32, 0xa6, 0xc2, 0x23, 0x3d
+.byte	0xee, 0x4c, 0x95, 0x0b, 0x42, 0xfa, 0xc3, 0x4e
+.byte	0x08, 0x2e, 0xa1, 0x66, 0x28, 0xd9, 0x24, 0xb2
+.byte	0x76, 0x5b, 0xa2, 0x49, 0x6d, 0x8b, 0xd1, 0x25
+.byte	0x72, 0xf8, 0xf6, 0x64, 0x86, 0x68, 0x98, 0x16
+.byte	0xd4, 0xa4, 0x5c, 0xcc, 0x5d, 0x65, 0xb6, 0x92
+.byte	0x6c, 0x70, 0x48, 0x50, 0xfd, 0xed, 0xb9, 0xda
+.byte	0x5e, 0x15, 0x46, 0x57, 0xa7, 0x8d, 0x9d, 0x84
+.byte	0x90, 0xd8, 0xab, 0x00, 0x8c, 0xbc, 0xd3, 0x0a
+.byte	0xf7, 0xe4, 0x58, 0x05, 0xb8, 0xb3, 0x45, 0x06
+.byte	0xd0, 0x2c, 0x1e, 0x8f, 0xca, 0x3f, 0x0f, 0x02
+.byte	0xc1, 0xaf, 0xbd, 0x03, 0x01, 0x13, 0x8a, 0x6b
+.byte	0x3a, 0x91, 0x11, 0x41, 0x4f, 0x67, 0xdc, 0xea
+.byte	0x97, 0xf2, 0xcf, 0xce, 0xf0, 0xb4, 0xe6, 0x73
+.byte	0x96, 0xac, 0x74, 0x22, 0xe7, 0xad, 0x35, 0x85
+.byte	0xe2, 0xf9, 0x37, 0xe8, 0x1c, 0x75, 0xdf, 0x6e
+.byte	0x47, 0xf1, 0x1a, 0x71, 0x1d, 0x29, 0xc5, 0x89
+.byte	0x6f, 0xb7, 0x62, 0x0e, 0xaa, 0x18, 0xbe, 0x1b
+.byte	0xfc, 0x56, 0x3e, 0x4b, 0xc6, 0xd2, 0x79, 0x20
+.byte	0x9a, 0xdb, 0xc0, 0xfe, 0x78, 0xcd, 0x5a, 0xf4
+.byte	0x1f, 0xdd, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x88, 0x07, 0xc7, 0x31
+.byte	0xb1, 0x12, 0x10, 0x59, 0x27, 0x80, 0xec, 0x5f
+.byte	0x60, 0x51, 0x7f, 0xa9, 0x19, 0xb5, 0x4a, 0x0d
+.byte	0x2d, 0xe5, 0x7a, 0x9f, 0x93, 0xc9, 0x9c, 0xef
+.byte	0xa0, 0xe0, 0x3b, 0x4d, 0xae, 0x2a, 0xf5, 0xb0
+.byte	0xc8, 0xeb, 0xbb, 0x3c, 0x83, 0x53, 0x99, 0x61
+.byte	0x17, 0x2b, 0x04, 0x7e, 0xba, 0x77, 0xd6, 0x26
+.byte	0xe1, 0x69, 0x14, 0x63, 0x55, 0x21, 0x0c, 0x7d
+
+AES_Te4:
+.byte	0x63, 0x7c, 0x77, 0x7b, 0xf2, 0x6b, 0x6f, 0xc5	# Te4
+.byte	0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2b, 0xfe, 0xd7, 0xab, 0x76
+.byte	0xca, 0x82, 0xc9, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0x59, 0x47, 0xf0
+.byte	0xad, 0xd4, 0xa2, 0xaf, 0x9c, 0xa4, 0x72, 0xc0
+.byte	0xb7, 0xfd, 0x93, 0x26, 0x36, 0x3f, 0xf7, 0xcc
+.byte	0x34, 0xa5, 0xe5, 0xf1, 0x71, 0xd8, 0x31, 0x15
+.byte	0x04, 0xc7, 0x23, 0xc3, 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9a
+.byte	0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xeb, 0x27, 0xb2, 0x75
+.byte	0x09, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x6e, 0x5a, 0xa0
+.byte	0x52, 0x3b, 0xd6, 0xb3, 0x29, 0xe3, 0x2f, 0x84
+.byte	0x53, 0xd1, 0x00, 0xed, 0x20, 0xfc, 0xb1, 0x5b
+.byte	0x6a, 0xcb, 0xbe, 0x39, 0x4a, 0x4c, 0x58, 0xcf
+.byte	0xd0, 0xef, 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x43, 0x4d, 0x33, 0x85
+.byte	0x45, 0xf9, 0x02, 0x7f, 0x50, 0x3c, 0x9f, 0xa8
+.byte	0x51, 0xa3, 0x40, 0x8f, 0x92, 0x9d, 0x38, 0xf5
+.byte	0xbc, 0xb6, 0xda, 0x21, 0x10, 0xff, 0xf3, 0xd2
+.byte	0xcd, 0x0c, 0x13, 0xec, 0x5f, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17
+.byte	0xc4, 0xa7, 0x7e, 0x3d, 0x64, 0x5d, 0x19, 0x73
+.byte	0x60, 0x81, 0x4f, 0xdc, 0x22, 0x2a, 0x90, 0x88
+.byte	0x46, 0xee, 0xb8, 0x14, 0xde, 0x5e, 0x0b, 0xdb
+.byte	0xe0, 0x32, 0x3a, 0x0a, 0x49, 0x06, 0x24, 0x5c
+.byte	0xc2, 0xd3, 0xac, 0x62, 0x91, 0x95, 0xe4, 0x79
+.byte	0xe7, 0xc8, 0x37, 0x6d, 0x8d, 0xd5, 0x4e, 0xa9
+.byte	0x6c, 0x56, 0xf4, 0xea, 0x65, 0x7a, 0xae, 0x08
+.byte	0xba, 0x78, 0x25, 0x2e, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xb4, 0xc6
+.byte	0xe8, 0xdd, 0x74, 0x1f, 0x4b, 0xbd, 0x8b, 0x8a
+.byte	0x70, 0x3e, 0xb5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xf6, 0x0e
+.byte	0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xb9, 0x86, 0xc1, 0x1d, 0x9e
+.byte	0xe1, 0xf8, 0x98, 0x11, 0x69, 0xd9, 0x8e, 0x94
+.byte	0x9b, 0x1e, 0x87, 0xe9, 0xce, 0x55, 0x28, 0xdf
+.byte	0x8c, 0xa1, 0x89, 0x0d, 0xbf, 0xe6, 0x42, 0x68
+.byte	0x41, 0x99, 0x2d, 0x0f, 0xb0, 0x54, 0xbb, 0x16
+
+.byte	0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,	0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00	# rcon
+.byte	0x04,0x00,0x00,0x00,	0x08,0x00,0x00,0x00
+.byte	0x10,0x00,0x00,0x00,	0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00
+.byte	0x40,0x00,0x00,0x00,	0x80,0x00,0x00,0x00
+.byte	0x1B,0x00,0x00,0x00,	0x36,0x00,0x00,0x00
+___
+
+foreach (split("\n",$code)) {
+	s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/ge;
+
+	# made-up _instructions, _xtr, _ins, _ror and _bias, cope
+	# with byte order dependencies...
+	if (/^\s+_/) {
+	    s/(_[a-z]+\s+)(\$[0-9]+),([^,]+)(#.*)*$/$1$2,$2,$3/;
+
+	    s/_xtr\s+(\$[0-9]+),(\$[0-9]+),([0-9]+(\-2)*)/
+		sprintf("srl\t$1,$2,%d",$big_endian ?	eval($3)
+					:		eval("24-$3"))/e or
+	    s/_ins\s+(\$[0-9]+),(\$[0-9]+),([0-9]+)/
+		sprintf("sll\t$1,$2,%d",$big_endian ?	eval($3)
+					:		eval("24-$3"))/e or
+	    s/_ins2\s+(\$[0-9]+),(\$[0-9]+),([0-9]+)/
+		sprintf("ins\t$1,$2,%d,8",$big_endian ?	eval($3)
+					:		eval("24-$3"))/e or
+	    s/_ror\s+(\$[0-9]+),(\$[0-9]+),(\-?[0-9]+)/
+		sprintf("srl\t$1,$2,%d",$big_endian ?	eval($3)
+					:		eval("$3*-1"))/e or
+	    s/_bias\s+(\$[0-9]+),(\$[0-9]+),([0-9]+)/
+		sprintf("sll\t$1,$2,%d",$big_endian ?	eval($3)
+					:		eval("($3-16)&31"))/e;
+
+	    s/srl\s+(\$[0-9]+),(\$[0-9]+),\-([0-9]+)/
+		sprintf("sll\t$1,$2,$3")/e				or
+	    s/srl\s+(\$[0-9]+),(\$[0-9]+),0/
+		sprintf("and\t$1,$2,0xff")/e				or
+	    s/(sll\s+\$[0-9]+,\$[0-9]+,0)/#$1/;
+	}
+
+	# convert lwl/lwr and swr/swl to little-endian order
+	if (!$big_endian && /^\s+[sl]w[lr]\s+/) {
+	    s/([sl]wl.*)([0-9]+)\((\$[0-9]+)\)/
+		sprintf("$1%d($3)",eval("$2-$2%4+($2%4-1)&3"))/e	or
+	    s/([sl]wr.*)([0-9]+)\((\$[0-9]+)\)/
+		sprintf("$1%d($3)",eval("$2-$2%4+($2%4+1)&3"))/e;
+	}
+
+	if (!$big_endian) {
+	    s/(rotr\s+\$[0-9]+,\$[0-9]+),([0-9]+)/sprintf("$1,%d",32-$2)/e;
+	    s/(ext\s+\$[0-9]+,\$[0-9]+),([0-9]+),8/sprintf("$1,%d,8",24-$2)/e;
+	}
+
+	print $_,"\n";
+}
+
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/asm/aes-parisc.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/asm/aes-parisc.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2c785bc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/asm/aes-parisc.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,1029 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2009-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+
+# AES for PA-RISC.
+#
+# June 2009.
+#
+# The module is mechanical transliteration of aes-sparcv9.pl, but with
+# a twist: S-boxes are compressed even further down to 1K+256B. On
+# PA-7100LC performance is ~40% better than gcc 3.2 generated code and
+# is about 33 cycles per byte processed with 128-bit key. Newer CPUs
+# perform at 16 cycles per byte. It's not faster than code generated
+# by vendor compiler, but recall that it has compressed S-boxes, which
+# requires extra processing.
+#
+# Special thanks to polarhome.com for providing HP-UX account.
+
+$flavour = shift;
+$output = shift;
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+if ($flavour =~ /64/) {
+	$LEVEL		="2.0W";
+	$SIZE_T		=8;
+	$FRAME_MARKER	=80;
+	$SAVED_RP	=16;
+	$PUSH		="std";
+	$PUSHMA		="std,ma";
+	$POP		="ldd";
+	$POPMB		="ldd,mb";
+} else {
+	$LEVEL		="1.0";
+	$SIZE_T		=4;
+	$FRAME_MARKER	=48;
+	$SAVED_RP	=20;
+	$PUSH		="stw";
+	$PUSHMA		="stwm";
+	$POP		="ldw";
+	$POPMB		="ldwm";
+}
+
+$FRAME=16*$SIZE_T+$FRAME_MARKER;# 16 saved regs + frame marker
+				#                 [+ argument transfer]
+$inp="%r26";	# arg0
+$out="%r25";	# arg1
+$key="%r24";	# arg2
+
+($s0,$s1,$s2,$s3) = ("%r1","%r2","%r3","%r4");
+($t0,$t1,$t2,$t3) = ("%r5","%r6","%r7","%r8");
+
+($acc0, $acc1, $acc2, $acc3, $acc4, $acc5, $acc6, $acc7,
+ $acc8, $acc9,$acc10,$acc11,$acc12,$acc13,$acc14,$acc15) =
+("%r9","%r10","%r11","%r12","%r13","%r14","%r15","%r16",
+"%r17","%r18","%r19","%r20","%r21","%r22","%r23","%r26");
+
+$tbl="%r28";
+$rounds="%r29";
+
+$code=<<___;
+	.LEVEL	$LEVEL
+	.SPACE	\$TEXT\$
+	.SUBSPA	\$CODE\$,QUAD=0,ALIGN=8,ACCESS=0x2C,CODE_ONLY
+
+	.EXPORT	AES_encrypt,ENTRY,ARGW0=GR,ARGW1=GR,ARGW2=GR
+	.ALIGN	64
+AES_encrypt
+	.PROC
+	.CALLINFO	FRAME=`$FRAME-16*$SIZE_T`,NO_CALLS,SAVE_RP,ENTRY_GR=18
+	.ENTRY
+	$PUSH	%r2,-$SAVED_RP(%sp)	; standard prologue
+	$PUSHMA	%r3,$FRAME(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r4,`-$FRAME+1*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r5,`-$FRAME+2*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r6,`-$FRAME+3*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r7,`-$FRAME+4*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r8,`-$FRAME+5*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r9,`-$FRAME+6*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r10,`-$FRAME+7*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r11,`-$FRAME+8*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r12,`-$FRAME+9*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r13,`-$FRAME+10*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r14,`-$FRAME+11*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r15,`-$FRAME+12*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r16,`-$FRAME+13*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r17,`-$FRAME+14*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r18,`-$FRAME+15*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+
+	blr	%r0,$tbl
+	ldi	3,$t0
+L\$enc_pic
+	andcm	$tbl,$t0,$tbl
+	ldo	L\$AES_Te-L\$enc_pic($tbl),$tbl
+
+	and	$inp,$t0,$t0
+	sub	$inp,$t0,$inp
+	ldw	0($inp),$s0
+	ldw	4($inp),$s1
+	ldw	8($inp),$s2
+	comib,=	0,$t0,L\$enc_inp_aligned
+	ldw	12($inp),$s3
+
+	sh3addl	$t0,%r0,$t0
+	subi	32,$t0,$t0
+	mtctl	$t0,%cr11
+	ldw	16($inp),$t1
+	vshd	$s0,$s1,$s0
+	vshd	$s1,$s2,$s1
+	vshd	$s2,$s3,$s2
+	vshd	$s3,$t1,$s3
+
+L\$enc_inp_aligned
+	bl	_parisc_AES_encrypt,%r31
+	nop
+
+	extru,<> $out,31,2,%r0
+	b	L\$enc_out_aligned
+	nop
+
+	_srm	$s0,24,$acc0
+	_srm	$s0,16,$acc1
+	stb	$acc0,0($out)
+	_srm	$s0,8,$acc2
+	stb	$acc1,1($out)
+	_srm	$s1,24,$acc4
+	stb	$acc2,2($out)
+	_srm	$s1,16,$acc5
+	stb	$s0,3($out)
+	_srm	$s1,8,$acc6
+	stb	$acc4,4($out)
+	_srm	$s2,24,$acc0
+	stb	$acc5,5($out)
+	_srm	$s2,16,$acc1
+	stb	$acc6,6($out)
+	_srm	$s2,8,$acc2
+	stb	$s1,7($out)
+	_srm	$s3,24,$acc4
+	stb	$acc0,8($out)
+	_srm	$s3,16,$acc5
+	stb	$acc1,9($out)
+	_srm	$s3,8,$acc6
+	stb	$acc2,10($out)
+	stb	$s2,11($out)
+	stb	$acc4,12($out)
+	stb	$acc5,13($out)
+	stb	$acc6,14($out)
+	b	L\$enc_done
+	stb	$s3,15($out)
+
+L\$enc_out_aligned
+	stw	$s0,0($out)
+	stw	$s1,4($out)
+	stw	$s2,8($out)
+	stw	$s3,12($out)
+
+L\$enc_done
+	$POP	`-$FRAME-$SAVED_RP`(%sp),%r2	; standard epilogue
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+1*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r4
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+2*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r5
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+3*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r6
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+4*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r7
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+5*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r8
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+6*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r9
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+7*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r10
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+8*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r11
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+9*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r12
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+10*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r13
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+11*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r14
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+12*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r15
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+13*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r16
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+14*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r17
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+15*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r18
+	bv	(%r2)
+	.EXIT
+	$POPMB	-$FRAME(%sp),%r3
+	.PROCEND
+
+	.ALIGN	16
+_parisc_AES_encrypt
+	.PROC
+	.CALLINFO	MILLICODE
+	.ENTRY
+	ldw	240($key),$rounds
+	ldw	0($key),$t0
+	ldw	4($key),$t1
+	ldw	8($key),$t2
+	_srm	$rounds,1,$rounds
+	xor	$t0,$s0,$s0
+	ldw	12($key),$t3
+	_srm	$s0,24,$acc0
+	xor	$t1,$s1,$s1
+	ldw	16($key),$t0
+	_srm	$s1,16,$acc1
+	xor	$t2,$s2,$s2
+	ldw	20($key),$t1
+	xor	$t3,$s3,$s3
+	ldw	24($key),$t2
+	ldw	28($key),$t3
+L\$enc_loop
+	_srm	$s2,8,$acc2
+	ldwx,s	$acc0($tbl),$acc0
+	_srm	$s3,0,$acc3
+	ldwx,s	$acc1($tbl),$acc1
+	_srm	$s1,24,$acc4
+	ldwx,s	$acc2($tbl),$acc2
+	_srm	$s2,16,$acc5
+	ldwx,s	$acc3($tbl),$acc3
+	_srm	$s3,8,$acc6
+	ldwx,s	$acc4($tbl),$acc4
+	_srm	$s0,0,$acc7
+	ldwx,s	$acc5($tbl),$acc5
+	_srm	$s2,24,$acc8
+	ldwx,s	$acc6($tbl),$acc6
+	_srm	$s3,16,$acc9
+	ldwx,s	$acc7($tbl),$acc7
+	_srm	$s0,8,$acc10
+	ldwx,s	$acc8($tbl),$acc8
+	_srm	$s1,0,$acc11
+	ldwx,s	$acc9($tbl),$acc9
+	_srm	$s3,24,$acc12
+	ldwx,s	$acc10($tbl),$acc10
+	_srm	$s0,16,$acc13
+	ldwx,s	$acc11($tbl),$acc11
+	_srm	$s1,8,$acc14
+	ldwx,s	$acc12($tbl),$acc12
+	_srm	$s2,0,$acc15
+	ldwx,s	$acc13($tbl),$acc13
+	ldwx,s	$acc14($tbl),$acc14
+	ldwx,s	$acc15($tbl),$acc15
+	addib,= -1,$rounds,L\$enc_last
+	ldo	32($key),$key
+
+		_ror	$acc1,8,$acc1
+		xor	$acc0,$t0,$t0
+	ldw	0($key),$s0
+		_ror	$acc2,16,$acc2
+		xor	$acc1,$t0,$t0
+	ldw	4($key),$s1
+		_ror	$acc3,24,$acc3
+		xor	$acc2,$t0,$t0
+	ldw	8($key),$s2
+		_ror	$acc5,8,$acc5
+		xor	$acc3,$t0,$t0
+	ldw	12($key),$s3
+		_ror	$acc6,16,$acc6
+		xor	$acc4,$t1,$t1
+		_ror	$acc7,24,$acc7
+		xor	$acc5,$t1,$t1
+		_ror	$acc9,8,$acc9
+		xor	$acc6,$t1,$t1
+		_ror	$acc10,16,$acc10
+		xor	$acc7,$t1,$t1
+		_ror	$acc11,24,$acc11
+		xor	$acc8,$t2,$t2
+		_ror	$acc13,8,$acc13
+		xor	$acc9,$t2,$t2
+		_ror	$acc14,16,$acc14
+		xor	$acc10,$t2,$t2
+		_ror	$acc15,24,$acc15
+		xor	$acc11,$t2,$t2
+		xor	$acc12,$acc14,$acc14
+		xor	$acc13,$t3,$t3
+	_srm	$t0,24,$acc0
+		xor	$acc14,$t3,$t3
+	_srm	$t1,16,$acc1
+		xor	$acc15,$t3,$t3
+
+	_srm	$t2,8,$acc2
+	ldwx,s	$acc0($tbl),$acc0
+	_srm	$t3,0,$acc3
+	ldwx,s	$acc1($tbl),$acc1
+	_srm	$t1,24,$acc4
+	ldwx,s	$acc2($tbl),$acc2
+	_srm	$t2,16,$acc5
+	ldwx,s	$acc3($tbl),$acc3
+	_srm	$t3,8,$acc6
+	ldwx,s	$acc4($tbl),$acc4
+	_srm	$t0,0,$acc7
+	ldwx,s	$acc5($tbl),$acc5
+	_srm	$t2,24,$acc8
+	ldwx,s	$acc6($tbl),$acc6
+	_srm	$t3,16,$acc9
+	ldwx,s	$acc7($tbl),$acc7
+	_srm	$t0,8,$acc10
+	ldwx,s	$acc8($tbl),$acc8
+	_srm	$t1,0,$acc11
+	ldwx,s	$acc9($tbl),$acc9
+	_srm	$t3,24,$acc12
+	ldwx,s	$acc10($tbl),$acc10
+	_srm	$t0,16,$acc13
+	ldwx,s	$acc11($tbl),$acc11
+	_srm	$t1,8,$acc14
+	ldwx,s	$acc12($tbl),$acc12
+	_srm	$t2,0,$acc15
+	ldwx,s	$acc13($tbl),$acc13
+		_ror	$acc1,8,$acc1
+	ldwx,s	$acc14($tbl),$acc14
+
+		_ror	$acc2,16,$acc2
+		xor	$acc0,$s0,$s0
+	ldwx,s	$acc15($tbl),$acc15
+		_ror	$acc3,24,$acc3
+		xor	$acc1,$s0,$s0
+	ldw	16($key),$t0
+		_ror	$acc5,8,$acc5
+		xor	$acc2,$s0,$s0
+	ldw	20($key),$t1
+		_ror	$acc6,16,$acc6
+		xor	$acc3,$s0,$s0
+	ldw	24($key),$t2
+		_ror	$acc7,24,$acc7
+		xor	$acc4,$s1,$s1
+	ldw	28($key),$t3
+		_ror	$acc9,8,$acc9
+		xor	$acc5,$s1,$s1
+	ldw	1024+0($tbl),%r0		; prefetch te4
+		_ror	$acc10,16,$acc10
+		xor	$acc6,$s1,$s1
+	ldw	1024+32($tbl),%r0		; prefetch te4
+		_ror	$acc11,24,$acc11
+		xor	$acc7,$s1,$s1
+	ldw	1024+64($tbl),%r0		; prefetch te4
+		_ror	$acc13,8,$acc13
+		xor	$acc8,$s2,$s2
+	ldw	1024+96($tbl),%r0		; prefetch te4
+		_ror	$acc14,16,$acc14
+		xor	$acc9,$s2,$s2
+	ldw	1024+128($tbl),%r0		; prefetch te4
+		_ror	$acc15,24,$acc15
+		xor	$acc10,$s2,$s2
+	ldw	1024+160($tbl),%r0		; prefetch te4
+	_srm	$s0,24,$acc0
+		xor	$acc11,$s2,$s2
+	ldw	1024+192($tbl),%r0		; prefetch te4
+		xor	$acc12,$acc14,$acc14
+		xor	$acc13,$s3,$s3
+	ldw	1024+224($tbl),%r0		; prefetch te4
+	_srm	$s1,16,$acc1
+		xor	$acc14,$s3,$s3
+	b	L\$enc_loop
+		xor	$acc15,$s3,$s3
+
+	.ALIGN	16
+L\$enc_last
+	ldo	1024($tbl),$rounds
+		_ror	$acc1,8,$acc1
+		xor	$acc0,$t0,$t0
+	ldw	0($key),$s0
+		_ror	$acc2,16,$acc2
+		xor	$acc1,$t0,$t0
+	ldw	4($key),$s1
+		_ror	$acc3,24,$acc3
+		xor	$acc2,$t0,$t0
+	ldw	8($key),$s2
+		_ror	$acc5,8,$acc5
+		xor	$acc3,$t0,$t0
+	ldw	12($key),$s3
+		_ror	$acc6,16,$acc6
+		xor	$acc4,$t1,$t1
+		_ror	$acc7,24,$acc7
+		xor	$acc5,$t1,$t1
+		_ror	$acc9,8,$acc9
+		xor	$acc6,$t1,$t1
+		_ror	$acc10,16,$acc10
+		xor	$acc7,$t1,$t1
+		_ror	$acc11,24,$acc11
+		xor	$acc8,$t2,$t2
+		_ror	$acc13,8,$acc13
+		xor	$acc9,$t2,$t2
+		_ror	$acc14,16,$acc14
+		xor	$acc10,$t2,$t2
+		_ror	$acc15,24,$acc15
+		xor	$acc11,$t2,$t2
+		xor	$acc12,$acc14,$acc14
+		xor	$acc13,$t3,$t3
+	_srm	$t0,24,$acc0
+		xor	$acc14,$t3,$t3
+	_srm	$t1,16,$acc1
+		xor	$acc15,$t3,$t3
+
+	_srm	$t2,8,$acc2
+	ldbx	$acc0($rounds),$acc0
+	_srm	$t1,24,$acc4
+	ldbx	$acc1($rounds),$acc1
+	_srm	$t2,16,$acc5
+	_srm	$t3,0,$acc3
+	ldbx	$acc2($rounds),$acc2
+	ldbx	$acc3($rounds),$acc3
+	_srm	$t3,8,$acc6
+	ldbx	$acc4($rounds),$acc4
+	_srm	$t2,24,$acc8
+	ldbx	$acc5($rounds),$acc5
+	_srm	$t3,16,$acc9
+	_srm	$t0,0,$acc7
+	ldbx	$acc6($rounds),$acc6
+	ldbx	$acc7($rounds),$acc7
+	_srm	$t0,8,$acc10
+	ldbx	$acc8($rounds),$acc8
+	_srm	$t3,24,$acc12
+	ldbx	$acc9($rounds),$acc9
+	_srm	$t0,16,$acc13
+	_srm	$t1,0,$acc11
+	ldbx	$acc10($rounds),$acc10
+	_srm	$t1,8,$acc14
+	ldbx	$acc11($rounds),$acc11
+	ldbx	$acc12($rounds),$acc12
+	ldbx	$acc13($rounds),$acc13
+	_srm	$t2,0,$acc15
+	ldbx	$acc14($rounds),$acc14
+
+		dep	$acc0,7,8,$acc3
+	ldbx	$acc15($rounds),$acc15
+		dep	$acc4,7,8,$acc7
+		dep	$acc1,15,8,$acc3
+		dep	$acc5,15,8,$acc7
+		dep	$acc2,23,8,$acc3
+		dep	$acc6,23,8,$acc7
+		xor	$acc3,$s0,$s0
+		xor	$acc7,$s1,$s1
+		dep	$acc8,7,8,$acc11
+		dep	$acc12,7,8,$acc15
+		dep	$acc9,15,8,$acc11
+		dep	$acc13,15,8,$acc15
+		dep	$acc10,23,8,$acc11
+		dep	$acc14,23,8,$acc15
+		xor	$acc11,$s2,$s2
+
+	bv	(%r31)
+	.EXIT
+		xor	$acc15,$s3,$s3
+	.PROCEND
+
+	.ALIGN	64
+L\$AES_Te
+	.WORD	0xc66363a5, 0xf87c7c84, 0xee777799, 0xf67b7b8d
+	.WORD	0xfff2f20d, 0xd66b6bbd, 0xde6f6fb1, 0x91c5c554
+	.WORD	0x60303050, 0x02010103, 0xce6767a9, 0x562b2b7d
+	.WORD	0xe7fefe19, 0xb5d7d762, 0x4dababe6, 0xec76769a
+	.WORD	0x8fcaca45, 0x1f82829d, 0x89c9c940, 0xfa7d7d87
+	.WORD	0xeffafa15, 0xb25959eb, 0x8e4747c9, 0xfbf0f00b
+	.WORD	0x41adadec, 0xb3d4d467, 0x5fa2a2fd, 0x45afafea
+	.WORD	0x239c9cbf, 0x53a4a4f7, 0xe4727296, 0x9bc0c05b
+	.WORD	0x75b7b7c2, 0xe1fdfd1c, 0x3d9393ae, 0x4c26266a
+	.WORD	0x6c36365a, 0x7e3f3f41, 0xf5f7f702, 0x83cccc4f
+	.WORD	0x6834345c, 0x51a5a5f4, 0xd1e5e534, 0xf9f1f108
+	.WORD	0xe2717193, 0xabd8d873, 0x62313153, 0x2a15153f
+	.WORD	0x0804040c, 0x95c7c752, 0x46232365, 0x9dc3c35e
+	.WORD	0x30181828, 0x379696a1, 0x0a05050f, 0x2f9a9ab5
+	.WORD	0x0e070709, 0x24121236, 0x1b80809b, 0xdfe2e23d
+	.WORD	0xcdebeb26, 0x4e272769, 0x7fb2b2cd, 0xea75759f
+	.WORD	0x1209091b, 0x1d83839e, 0x582c2c74, 0x341a1a2e
+	.WORD	0x361b1b2d, 0xdc6e6eb2, 0xb45a5aee, 0x5ba0a0fb
+	.WORD	0xa45252f6, 0x763b3b4d, 0xb7d6d661, 0x7db3b3ce
+	.WORD	0x5229297b, 0xdde3e33e, 0x5e2f2f71, 0x13848497
+	.WORD	0xa65353f5, 0xb9d1d168, 0x00000000, 0xc1eded2c
+	.WORD	0x40202060, 0xe3fcfc1f, 0x79b1b1c8, 0xb65b5bed
+	.WORD	0xd46a6abe, 0x8dcbcb46, 0x67bebed9, 0x7239394b
+	.WORD	0x944a4ade, 0x984c4cd4, 0xb05858e8, 0x85cfcf4a
+	.WORD	0xbbd0d06b, 0xc5efef2a, 0x4faaaae5, 0xedfbfb16
+	.WORD	0x864343c5, 0x9a4d4dd7, 0x66333355, 0x11858594
+	.WORD	0x8a4545cf, 0xe9f9f910, 0x04020206, 0xfe7f7f81
+	.WORD	0xa05050f0, 0x783c3c44, 0x259f9fba, 0x4ba8a8e3
+	.WORD	0xa25151f3, 0x5da3a3fe, 0x804040c0, 0x058f8f8a
+	.WORD	0x3f9292ad, 0x219d9dbc, 0x70383848, 0xf1f5f504
+	.WORD	0x63bcbcdf, 0x77b6b6c1, 0xafdada75, 0x42212163
+	.WORD	0x20101030, 0xe5ffff1a, 0xfdf3f30e, 0xbfd2d26d
+	.WORD	0x81cdcd4c, 0x180c0c14, 0x26131335, 0xc3ecec2f
+	.WORD	0xbe5f5fe1, 0x359797a2, 0x884444cc, 0x2e171739
+	.WORD	0x93c4c457, 0x55a7a7f2, 0xfc7e7e82, 0x7a3d3d47
+	.WORD	0xc86464ac, 0xba5d5de7, 0x3219192b, 0xe6737395
+	.WORD	0xc06060a0, 0x19818198, 0x9e4f4fd1, 0xa3dcdc7f
+	.WORD	0x44222266, 0x542a2a7e, 0x3b9090ab, 0x0b888883
+	.WORD	0x8c4646ca, 0xc7eeee29, 0x6bb8b8d3, 0x2814143c
+	.WORD	0xa7dede79, 0xbc5e5ee2, 0x160b0b1d, 0xaddbdb76
+	.WORD	0xdbe0e03b, 0x64323256, 0x743a3a4e, 0x140a0a1e
+	.WORD	0x924949db, 0x0c06060a, 0x4824246c, 0xb85c5ce4
+	.WORD	0x9fc2c25d, 0xbdd3d36e, 0x43acacef, 0xc46262a6
+	.WORD	0x399191a8, 0x319595a4, 0xd3e4e437, 0xf279798b
+	.WORD	0xd5e7e732, 0x8bc8c843, 0x6e373759, 0xda6d6db7
+	.WORD	0x018d8d8c, 0xb1d5d564, 0x9c4e4ed2, 0x49a9a9e0
+	.WORD	0xd86c6cb4, 0xac5656fa, 0xf3f4f407, 0xcfeaea25
+	.WORD	0xca6565af, 0xf47a7a8e, 0x47aeaee9, 0x10080818
+	.WORD	0x6fbabad5, 0xf0787888, 0x4a25256f, 0x5c2e2e72
+	.WORD	0x381c1c24, 0x57a6a6f1, 0x73b4b4c7, 0x97c6c651
+	.WORD	0xcbe8e823, 0xa1dddd7c, 0xe874749c, 0x3e1f1f21
+	.WORD	0x964b4bdd, 0x61bdbddc, 0x0d8b8b86, 0x0f8a8a85
+	.WORD	0xe0707090, 0x7c3e3e42, 0x71b5b5c4, 0xcc6666aa
+	.WORD	0x904848d8, 0x06030305, 0xf7f6f601, 0x1c0e0e12
+	.WORD	0xc26161a3, 0x6a35355f, 0xae5757f9, 0x69b9b9d0
+	.WORD	0x17868691, 0x99c1c158, 0x3a1d1d27, 0x279e9eb9
+	.WORD	0xd9e1e138, 0xebf8f813, 0x2b9898b3, 0x22111133
+	.WORD	0xd26969bb, 0xa9d9d970, 0x078e8e89, 0x339494a7
+	.WORD	0x2d9b9bb6, 0x3c1e1e22, 0x15878792, 0xc9e9e920
+	.WORD	0x87cece49, 0xaa5555ff, 0x50282878, 0xa5dfdf7a
+	.WORD	0x038c8c8f, 0x59a1a1f8, 0x09898980, 0x1a0d0d17
+	.WORD	0x65bfbfda, 0xd7e6e631, 0x844242c6, 0xd06868b8
+	.WORD	0x824141c3, 0x299999b0, 0x5a2d2d77, 0x1e0f0f11
+	.WORD	0x7bb0b0cb, 0xa85454fc, 0x6dbbbbd6, 0x2c16163a
+	.BYTE	0x63, 0x7c, 0x77, 0x7b, 0xf2, 0x6b, 0x6f, 0xc5
+	.BYTE	0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2b, 0xfe, 0xd7, 0xab, 0x76
+	.BYTE	0xca, 0x82, 0xc9, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0x59, 0x47, 0xf0
+	.BYTE	0xad, 0xd4, 0xa2, 0xaf, 0x9c, 0xa4, 0x72, 0xc0
+	.BYTE	0xb7, 0xfd, 0x93, 0x26, 0x36, 0x3f, 0xf7, 0xcc
+	.BYTE	0x34, 0xa5, 0xe5, 0xf1, 0x71, 0xd8, 0x31, 0x15
+	.BYTE	0x04, 0xc7, 0x23, 0xc3, 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9a
+	.BYTE	0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xeb, 0x27, 0xb2, 0x75
+	.BYTE	0x09, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x6e, 0x5a, 0xa0
+	.BYTE	0x52, 0x3b, 0xd6, 0xb3, 0x29, 0xe3, 0x2f, 0x84
+	.BYTE	0x53, 0xd1, 0x00, 0xed, 0x20, 0xfc, 0xb1, 0x5b
+	.BYTE	0x6a, 0xcb, 0xbe, 0x39, 0x4a, 0x4c, 0x58, 0xcf
+	.BYTE	0xd0, 0xef, 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x43, 0x4d, 0x33, 0x85
+	.BYTE	0x45, 0xf9, 0x02, 0x7f, 0x50, 0x3c, 0x9f, 0xa8
+	.BYTE	0x51, 0xa3, 0x40, 0x8f, 0x92, 0x9d, 0x38, 0xf5
+	.BYTE	0xbc, 0xb6, 0xda, 0x21, 0x10, 0xff, 0xf3, 0xd2
+	.BYTE	0xcd, 0x0c, 0x13, 0xec, 0x5f, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17
+	.BYTE	0xc4, 0xa7, 0x7e, 0x3d, 0x64, 0x5d, 0x19, 0x73
+	.BYTE	0x60, 0x81, 0x4f, 0xdc, 0x22, 0x2a, 0x90, 0x88
+	.BYTE	0x46, 0xee, 0xb8, 0x14, 0xde, 0x5e, 0x0b, 0xdb
+	.BYTE	0xe0, 0x32, 0x3a, 0x0a, 0x49, 0x06, 0x24, 0x5c
+	.BYTE	0xc2, 0xd3, 0xac, 0x62, 0x91, 0x95, 0xe4, 0x79
+	.BYTE	0xe7, 0xc8, 0x37, 0x6d, 0x8d, 0xd5, 0x4e, 0xa9
+	.BYTE	0x6c, 0x56, 0xf4, 0xea, 0x65, 0x7a, 0xae, 0x08
+	.BYTE	0xba, 0x78, 0x25, 0x2e, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xb4, 0xc6
+	.BYTE	0xe8, 0xdd, 0x74, 0x1f, 0x4b, 0xbd, 0x8b, 0x8a
+	.BYTE	0x70, 0x3e, 0xb5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xf6, 0x0e
+	.BYTE	0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xb9, 0x86, 0xc1, 0x1d, 0x9e
+	.BYTE	0xe1, 0xf8, 0x98, 0x11, 0x69, 0xd9, 0x8e, 0x94
+	.BYTE	0x9b, 0x1e, 0x87, 0xe9, 0xce, 0x55, 0x28, 0xdf
+	.BYTE	0x8c, 0xa1, 0x89, 0x0d, 0xbf, 0xe6, 0x42, 0x68
+	.BYTE	0x41, 0x99, 0x2d, 0x0f, 0xb0, 0x54, 0xbb, 0x16
+___
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	.EXPORT	AES_decrypt,ENTRY,ARGW0=GR,ARGW1=GR,ARGW2=GR
+	.ALIGN	16
+AES_decrypt
+	.PROC
+	.CALLINFO	FRAME=`$FRAME-16*$SIZE_T`,NO_CALLS,SAVE_RP,ENTRY_GR=18
+	.ENTRY
+	$PUSH	%r2,-$SAVED_RP(%sp)	; standard prologue
+	$PUSHMA	%r3,$FRAME(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r4,`-$FRAME+1*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r5,`-$FRAME+2*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r6,`-$FRAME+3*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r7,`-$FRAME+4*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r8,`-$FRAME+5*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r9,`-$FRAME+6*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r10,`-$FRAME+7*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r11,`-$FRAME+8*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r12,`-$FRAME+9*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r13,`-$FRAME+10*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r14,`-$FRAME+11*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r15,`-$FRAME+12*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r16,`-$FRAME+13*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r17,`-$FRAME+14*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r18,`-$FRAME+15*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+
+	blr	%r0,$tbl
+	ldi	3,$t0
+L\$dec_pic
+	andcm	$tbl,$t0,$tbl
+	ldo	L\$AES_Td-L\$dec_pic($tbl),$tbl
+
+	and	$inp,$t0,$t0
+	sub	$inp,$t0,$inp
+	ldw	0($inp),$s0
+	ldw	4($inp),$s1
+	ldw	8($inp),$s2
+	comib,=	0,$t0,L\$dec_inp_aligned
+	ldw	12($inp),$s3
+
+	sh3addl	$t0,%r0,$t0
+	subi	32,$t0,$t0
+	mtctl	$t0,%cr11
+	ldw	16($inp),$t1
+	vshd	$s0,$s1,$s0
+	vshd	$s1,$s2,$s1
+	vshd	$s2,$s3,$s2
+	vshd	$s3,$t1,$s3
+
+L\$dec_inp_aligned
+	bl	_parisc_AES_decrypt,%r31
+	nop
+
+	extru,<> $out,31,2,%r0
+	b	L\$dec_out_aligned
+	nop
+
+	_srm	$s0,24,$acc0
+	_srm	$s0,16,$acc1
+	stb	$acc0,0($out)
+	_srm	$s0,8,$acc2
+	stb	$acc1,1($out)
+	_srm	$s1,24,$acc4
+	stb	$acc2,2($out)
+	_srm	$s1,16,$acc5
+	stb	$s0,3($out)
+	_srm	$s1,8,$acc6
+	stb	$acc4,4($out)
+	_srm	$s2,24,$acc0
+	stb	$acc5,5($out)
+	_srm	$s2,16,$acc1
+	stb	$acc6,6($out)
+	_srm	$s2,8,$acc2
+	stb	$s1,7($out)
+	_srm	$s3,24,$acc4
+	stb	$acc0,8($out)
+	_srm	$s3,16,$acc5
+	stb	$acc1,9($out)
+	_srm	$s3,8,$acc6
+	stb	$acc2,10($out)
+	stb	$s2,11($out)
+	stb	$acc4,12($out)
+	stb	$acc5,13($out)
+	stb	$acc6,14($out)
+	b	L\$dec_done
+	stb	$s3,15($out)
+
+L\$dec_out_aligned
+	stw	$s0,0($out)
+	stw	$s1,4($out)
+	stw	$s2,8($out)
+	stw	$s3,12($out)
+
+L\$dec_done
+	$POP	`-$FRAME-$SAVED_RP`(%sp),%r2	; standard epilogue
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+1*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r4
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+2*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r5
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+3*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r6
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+4*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r7
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+5*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r8
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+6*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r9
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+7*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r10
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+8*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r11
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+9*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r12
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+10*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r13
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+11*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r14
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+12*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r15
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+13*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r16
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+14*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r17
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+15*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r18
+	bv	(%r2)
+	.EXIT
+	$POPMB	-$FRAME(%sp),%r3
+	.PROCEND
+
+	.ALIGN	16
+_parisc_AES_decrypt
+	.PROC
+	.CALLINFO	MILLICODE
+	.ENTRY
+	ldw	240($key),$rounds
+	ldw	0($key),$t0
+	ldw	4($key),$t1
+	ldw	8($key),$t2
+	ldw	12($key),$t3
+	_srm	$rounds,1,$rounds
+	xor	$t0,$s0,$s0
+	ldw	16($key),$t0
+	xor	$t1,$s1,$s1
+	ldw	20($key),$t1
+	_srm	$s0,24,$acc0
+	xor	$t2,$s2,$s2
+	ldw	24($key),$t2
+	xor	$t3,$s3,$s3
+	ldw	28($key),$t3
+	_srm	$s3,16,$acc1
+L\$dec_loop
+	_srm	$s2,8,$acc2
+	ldwx,s	$acc0($tbl),$acc0
+	_srm	$s1,0,$acc3
+	ldwx,s	$acc1($tbl),$acc1
+	_srm	$s1,24,$acc4
+	ldwx,s	$acc2($tbl),$acc2
+	_srm	$s0,16,$acc5
+	ldwx,s	$acc3($tbl),$acc3
+	_srm	$s3,8,$acc6
+	ldwx,s	$acc4($tbl),$acc4
+	_srm	$s2,0,$acc7
+	ldwx,s	$acc5($tbl),$acc5
+	_srm	$s2,24,$acc8
+	ldwx,s	$acc6($tbl),$acc6
+	_srm	$s1,16,$acc9
+	ldwx,s	$acc7($tbl),$acc7
+	_srm	$s0,8,$acc10
+	ldwx,s	$acc8($tbl),$acc8
+	_srm	$s3,0,$acc11
+	ldwx,s	$acc9($tbl),$acc9
+	_srm	$s3,24,$acc12
+	ldwx,s	$acc10($tbl),$acc10
+	_srm	$s2,16,$acc13
+	ldwx,s	$acc11($tbl),$acc11
+	_srm	$s1,8,$acc14
+	ldwx,s	$acc12($tbl),$acc12
+	_srm	$s0,0,$acc15
+	ldwx,s	$acc13($tbl),$acc13
+	ldwx,s	$acc14($tbl),$acc14
+	ldwx,s	$acc15($tbl),$acc15
+	addib,= -1,$rounds,L\$dec_last
+	ldo	32($key),$key
+
+		_ror	$acc1,8,$acc1
+		xor	$acc0,$t0,$t0
+	ldw	0($key),$s0
+		_ror	$acc2,16,$acc2
+		xor	$acc1,$t0,$t0
+	ldw	4($key),$s1
+		_ror	$acc3,24,$acc3
+		xor	$acc2,$t0,$t0
+	ldw	8($key),$s2
+		_ror	$acc5,8,$acc5
+		xor	$acc3,$t0,$t0
+	ldw	12($key),$s3
+		_ror	$acc6,16,$acc6
+		xor	$acc4,$t1,$t1
+		_ror	$acc7,24,$acc7
+		xor	$acc5,$t1,$t1
+		_ror	$acc9,8,$acc9
+		xor	$acc6,$t1,$t1
+		_ror	$acc10,16,$acc10
+		xor	$acc7,$t1,$t1
+		_ror	$acc11,24,$acc11
+		xor	$acc8,$t2,$t2
+		_ror	$acc13,8,$acc13
+		xor	$acc9,$t2,$t2
+		_ror	$acc14,16,$acc14
+		xor	$acc10,$t2,$t2
+		_ror	$acc15,24,$acc15
+		xor	$acc11,$t2,$t2
+		xor	$acc12,$acc14,$acc14
+		xor	$acc13,$t3,$t3
+	_srm	$t0,24,$acc0
+		xor	$acc14,$t3,$t3
+		xor	$acc15,$t3,$t3
+	_srm	$t3,16,$acc1
+
+	_srm	$t2,8,$acc2
+	ldwx,s	$acc0($tbl),$acc0
+	_srm	$t1,0,$acc3
+	ldwx,s	$acc1($tbl),$acc1
+	_srm	$t1,24,$acc4
+	ldwx,s	$acc2($tbl),$acc2
+	_srm	$t0,16,$acc5
+	ldwx,s	$acc3($tbl),$acc3
+	_srm	$t3,8,$acc6
+	ldwx,s	$acc4($tbl),$acc4
+	_srm	$t2,0,$acc7
+	ldwx,s	$acc5($tbl),$acc5
+	_srm	$t2,24,$acc8
+	ldwx,s	$acc6($tbl),$acc6
+	_srm	$t1,16,$acc9
+	ldwx,s	$acc7($tbl),$acc7
+	_srm	$t0,8,$acc10
+	ldwx,s	$acc8($tbl),$acc8
+	_srm	$t3,0,$acc11
+	ldwx,s	$acc9($tbl),$acc9
+	_srm	$t3,24,$acc12
+	ldwx,s	$acc10($tbl),$acc10
+	_srm	$t2,16,$acc13
+	ldwx,s	$acc11($tbl),$acc11
+	_srm	$t1,8,$acc14
+	ldwx,s	$acc12($tbl),$acc12
+	_srm	$t0,0,$acc15
+	ldwx,s	$acc13($tbl),$acc13
+		_ror	$acc1,8,$acc1
+	ldwx,s	$acc14($tbl),$acc14
+
+		_ror	$acc2,16,$acc2
+		xor	$acc0,$s0,$s0
+	ldwx,s	$acc15($tbl),$acc15
+		_ror	$acc3,24,$acc3
+		xor	$acc1,$s0,$s0
+	ldw	16($key),$t0
+		_ror	$acc5,8,$acc5
+		xor	$acc2,$s0,$s0
+	ldw	20($key),$t1
+		_ror	$acc6,16,$acc6
+		xor	$acc3,$s0,$s0
+	ldw	24($key),$t2
+		_ror	$acc7,24,$acc7
+		xor	$acc4,$s1,$s1
+	ldw	28($key),$t3
+		_ror	$acc9,8,$acc9
+		xor	$acc5,$s1,$s1
+	ldw	1024+0($tbl),%r0		; prefetch td4
+		_ror	$acc10,16,$acc10
+		xor	$acc6,$s1,$s1
+	ldw	1024+32($tbl),%r0		; prefetch td4
+		_ror	$acc11,24,$acc11
+		xor	$acc7,$s1,$s1
+	ldw	1024+64($tbl),%r0		; prefetch td4
+		_ror	$acc13,8,$acc13
+		xor	$acc8,$s2,$s2
+	ldw	1024+96($tbl),%r0		; prefetch td4
+		_ror	$acc14,16,$acc14
+		xor	$acc9,$s2,$s2
+	ldw	1024+128($tbl),%r0		; prefetch td4
+		_ror	$acc15,24,$acc15
+		xor	$acc10,$s2,$s2
+	ldw	1024+160($tbl),%r0		; prefetch td4
+	_srm	$s0,24,$acc0
+		xor	$acc11,$s2,$s2
+	ldw	1024+192($tbl),%r0		; prefetch td4
+		xor	$acc12,$acc14,$acc14
+		xor	$acc13,$s3,$s3
+	ldw	1024+224($tbl),%r0		; prefetch td4
+		xor	$acc14,$s3,$s3
+		xor	$acc15,$s3,$s3
+	b	L\$dec_loop
+	_srm	$s3,16,$acc1
+
+	.ALIGN	16
+L\$dec_last
+	ldo	1024($tbl),$rounds
+		_ror	$acc1,8,$acc1
+		xor	$acc0,$t0,$t0
+	ldw	0($key),$s0
+		_ror	$acc2,16,$acc2
+		xor	$acc1,$t0,$t0
+	ldw	4($key),$s1
+		_ror	$acc3,24,$acc3
+		xor	$acc2,$t0,$t0
+	ldw	8($key),$s2
+		_ror	$acc5,8,$acc5
+		xor	$acc3,$t0,$t0
+	ldw	12($key),$s3
+		_ror	$acc6,16,$acc6
+		xor	$acc4,$t1,$t1
+		_ror	$acc7,24,$acc7
+		xor	$acc5,$t1,$t1
+		_ror	$acc9,8,$acc9
+		xor	$acc6,$t1,$t1
+		_ror	$acc10,16,$acc10
+		xor	$acc7,$t1,$t1
+		_ror	$acc11,24,$acc11
+		xor	$acc8,$t2,$t2
+		_ror	$acc13,8,$acc13
+		xor	$acc9,$t2,$t2
+		_ror	$acc14,16,$acc14
+		xor	$acc10,$t2,$t2
+		_ror	$acc15,24,$acc15
+		xor	$acc11,$t2,$t2
+		xor	$acc12,$acc14,$acc14
+		xor	$acc13,$t3,$t3
+	_srm	$t0,24,$acc0
+		xor	$acc14,$t3,$t3
+		xor	$acc15,$t3,$t3
+	_srm	$t3,16,$acc1
+
+	_srm	$t2,8,$acc2
+	ldbx	$acc0($rounds),$acc0
+	_srm	$t1,24,$acc4
+	ldbx	$acc1($rounds),$acc1
+	_srm	$t0,16,$acc5
+	_srm	$t1,0,$acc3
+	ldbx	$acc2($rounds),$acc2
+	ldbx	$acc3($rounds),$acc3
+	_srm	$t3,8,$acc6
+	ldbx	$acc4($rounds),$acc4
+	_srm	$t2,24,$acc8
+	ldbx	$acc5($rounds),$acc5
+	_srm	$t1,16,$acc9
+	_srm	$t2,0,$acc7
+	ldbx	$acc6($rounds),$acc6
+	ldbx	$acc7($rounds),$acc7
+	_srm	$t0,8,$acc10
+	ldbx	$acc8($rounds),$acc8
+	_srm	$t3,24,$acc12
+	ldbx	$acc9($rounds),$acc9
+	_srm	$t2,16,$acc13
+	_srm	$t3,0,$acc11
+	ldbx	$acc10($rounds),$acc10
+	_srm	$t1,8,$acc14
+	ldbx	$acc11($rounds),$acc11
+	ldbx	$acc12($rounds),$acc12
+	ldbx	$acc13($rounds),$acc13
+	_srm	$t0,0,$acc15
+	ldbx	$acc14($rounds),$acc14
+
+		dep	$acc0,7,8,$acc3
+	ldbx	$acc15($rounds),$acc15
+		dep	$acc4,7,8,$acc7
+		dep	$acc1,15,8,$acc3
+		dep	$acc5,15,8,$acc7
+		dep	$acc2,23,8,$acc3
+		dep	$acc6,23,8,$acc7
+		xor	$acc3,$s0,$s0
+		xor	$acc7,$s1,$s1
+		dep	$acc8,7,8,$acc11
+		dep	$acc12,7,8,$acc15
+		dep	$acc9,15,8,$acc11
+		dep	$acc13,15,8,$acc15
+		dep	$acc10,23,8,$acc11
+		dep	$acc14,23,8,$acc15
+		xor	$acc11,$s2,$s2
+
+	bv	(%r31)
+	.EXIT
+		xor	$acc15,$s3,$s3
+	.PROCEND
+
+	.ALIGN	64
+L\$AES_Td
+	.WORD	0x51f4a750, 0x7e416553, 0x1a17a4c3, 0x3a275e96
+	.WORD	0x3bab6bcb, 0x1f9d45f1, 0xacfa58ab, 0x4be30393
+	.WORD	0x2030fa55, 0xad766df6, 0x88cc7691, 0xf5024c25
+	.WORD	0x4fe5d7fc, 0xc52acbd7, 0x26354480, 0xb562a38f
+	.WORD	0xdeb15a49, 0x25ba1b67, 0x45ea0e98, 0x5dfec0e1
+	.WORD	0xc32f7502, 0x814cf012, 0x8d4697a3, 0x6bd3f9c6
+	.WORD	0x038f5fe7, 0x15929c95, 0xbf6d7aeb, 0x955259da
+	.WORD	0xd4be832d, 0x587421d3, 0x49e06929, 0x8ec9c844
+	.WORD	0x75c2896a, 0xf48e7978, 0x99583e6b, 0x27b971dd
+	.WORD	0xbee14fb6, 0xf088ad17, 0xc920ac66, 0x7dce3ab4
+	.WORD	0x63df4a18, 0xe51a3182, 0x97513360, 0x62537f45
+	.WORD	0xb16477e0, 0xbb6bae84, 0xfe81a01c, 0xf9082b94
+	.WORD	0x70486858, 0x8f45fd19, 0x94de6c87, 0x527bf8b7
+	.WORD	0xab73d323, 0x724b02e2, 0xe31f8f57, 0x6655ab2a
+	.WORD	0xb2eb2807, 0x2fb5c203, 0x86c57b9a, 0xd33708a5
+	.WORD	0x302887f2, 0x23bfa5b2, 0x02036aba, 0xed16825c
+	.WORD	0x8acf1c2b, 0xa779b492, 0xf307f2f0, 0x4e69e2a1
+	.WORD	0x65daf4cd, 0x0605bed5, 0xd134621f, 0xc4a6fe8a
+	.WORD	0x342e539d, 0xa2f355a0, 0x058ae132, 0xa4f6eb75
+	.WORD	0x0b83ec39, 0x4060efaa, 0x5e719f06, 0xbd6e1051
+	.WORD	0x3e218af9, 0x96dd063d, 0xdd3e05ae, 0x4de6bd46
+	.WORD	0x91548db5, 0x71c45d05, 0x0406d46f, 0x605015ff
+	.WORD	0x1998fb24, 0xd6bde997, 0x894043cc, 0x67d99e77
+	.WORD	0xb0e842bd, 0x07898b88, 0xe7195b38, 0x79c8eedb
+	.WORD	0xa17c0a47, 0x7c420fe9, 0xf8841ec9, 0x00000000
+	.WORD	0x09808683, 0x322bed48, 0x1e1170ac, 0x6c5a724e
+	.WORD	0xfd0efffb, 0x0f853856, 0x3daed51e, 0x362d3927
+	.WORD	0x0a0fd964, 0x685ca621, 0x9b5b54d1, 0x24362e3a
+	.WORD	0x0c0a67b1, 0x9357e70f, 0xb4ee96d2, 0x1b9b919e
+	.WORD	0x80c0c54f, 0x61dc20a2, 0x5a774b69, 0x1c121a16
+	.WORD	0xe293ba0a, 0xc0a02ae5, 0x3c22e043, 0x121b171d
+	.WORD	0x0e090d0b, 0xf28bc7ad, 0x2db6a8b9, 0x141ea9c8
+	.WORD	0x57f11985, 0xaf75074c, 0xee99ddbb, 0xa37f60fd
+	.WORD	0xf701269f, 0x5c72f5bc, 0x44663bc5, 0x5bfb7e34
+	.WORD	0x8b432976, 0xcb23c6dc, 0xb6edfc68, 0xb8e4f163
+	.WORD	0xd731dcca, 0x42638510, 0x13972240, 0x84c61120
+	.WORD	0x854a247d, 0xd2bb3df8, 0xaef93211, 0xc729a16d
+	.WORD	0x1d9e2f4b, 0xdcb230f3, 0x0d8652ec, 0x77c1e3d0
+	.WORD	0x2bb3166c, 0xa970b999, 0x119448fa, 0x47e96422
+	.WORD	0xa8fc8cc4, 0xa0f03f1a, 0x567d2cd8, 0x223390ef
+	.WORD	0x87494ec7, 0xd938d1c1, 0x8ccaa2fe, 0x98d40b36
+	.WORD	0xa6f581cf, 0xa57ade28, 0xdab78e26, 0x3fadbfa4
+	.WORD	0x2c3a9de4, 0x5078920d, 0x6a5fcc9b, 0x547e4662
+	.WORD	0xf68d13c2, 0x90d8b8e8, 0x2e39f75e, 0x82c3aff5
+	.WORD	0x9f5d80be, 0x69d0937c, 0x6fd52da9, 0xcf2512b3
+	.WORD	0xc8ac993b, 0x10187da7, 0xe89c636e, 0xdb3bbb7b
+	.WORD	0xcd267809, 0x6e5918f4, 0xec9ab701, 0x834f9aa8
+	.WORD	0xe6956e65, 0xaaffe67e, 0x21bccf08, 0xef15e8e6
+	.WORD	0xbae79bd9, 0x4a6f36ce, 0xea9f09d4, 0x29b07cd6
+	.WORD	0x31a4b2af, 0x2a3f2331, 0xc6a59430, 0x35a266c0
+	.WORD	0x744ebc37, 0xfc82caa6, 0xe090d0b0, 0x33a7d815
+	.WORD	0xf104984a, 0x41ecdaf7, 0x7fcd500e, 0x1791f62f
+	.WORD	0x764dd68d, 0x43efb04d, 0xccaa4d54, 0xe49604df
+	.WORD	0x9ed1b5e3, 0x4c6a881b, 0xc12c1fb8, 0x4665517f
+	.WORD	0x9d5eea04, 0x018c355d, 0xfa877473, 0xfb0b412e
+	.WORD	0xb3671d5a, 0x92dbd252, 0xe9105633, 0x6dd64713
+	.WORD	0x9ad7618c, 0x37a10c7a, 0x59f8148e, 0xeb133c89
+	.WORD	0xcea927ee, 0xb761c935, 0xe11ce5ed, 0x7a47b13c
+	.WORD	0x9cd2df59, 0x55f2733f, 0x1814ce79, 0x73c737bf
+	.WORD	0x53f7cdea, 0x5ffdaa5b, 0xdf3d6f14, 0x7844db86
+	.WORD	0xcaaff381, 0xb968c43e, 0x3824342c, 0xc2a3405f
+	.WORD	0x161dc372, 0xbce2250c, 0x283c498b, 0xff0d9541
+	.WORD	0x39a80171, 0x080cb3de, 0xd8b4e49c, 0x6456c190
+	.WORD	0x7bcb8461, 0xd532b670, 0x486c5c74, 0xd0b85742
+	.BYTE	0x52, 0x09, 0x6a, 0xd5, 0x30, 0x36, 0xa5, 0x38
+	.BYTE	0xbf, 0x40, 0xa3, 0x9e, 0x81, 0xf3, 0xd7, 0xfb
+	.BYTE	0x7c, 0xe3, 0x39, 0x82, 0x9b, 0x2f, 0xff, 0x87
+	.BYTE	0x34, 0x8e, 0x43, 0x44, 0xc4, 0xde, 0xe9, 0xcb
+	.BYTE	0x54, 0x7b, 0x94, 0x32, 0xa6, 0xc2, 0x23, 0x3d
+	.BYTE	0xee, 0x4c, 0x95, 0x0b, 0x42, 0xfa, 0xc3, 0x4e
+	.BYTE	0x08, 0x2e, 0xa1, 0x66, 0x28, 0xd9, 0x24, 0xb2
+	.BYTE	0x76, 0x5b, 0xa2, 0x49, 0x6d, 0x8b, 0xd1, 0x25
+	.BYTE	0x72, 0xf8, 0xf6, 0x64, 0x86, 0x68, 0x98, 0x16
+	.BYTE	0xd4, 0xa4, 0x5c, 0xcc, 0x5d, 0x65, 0xb6, 0x92
+	.BYTE	0x6c, 0x70, 0x48, 0x50, 0xfd, 0xed, 0xb9, 0xda
+	.BYTE	0x5e, 0x15, 0x46, 0x57, 0xa7, 0x8d, 0x9d, 0x84
+	.BYTE	0x90, 0xd8, 0xab, 0x00, 0x8c, 0xbc, 0xd3, 0x0a
+	.BYTE	0xf7, 0xe4, 0x58, 0x05, 0xb8, 0xb3, 0x45, 0x06
+	.BYTE	0xd0, 0x2c, 0x1e, 0x8f, 0xca, 0x3f, 0x0f, 0x02
+	.BYTE	0xc1, 0xaf, 0xbd, 0x03, 0x01, 0x13, 0x8a, 0x6b
+	.BYTE	0x3a, 0x91, 0x11, 0x41, 0x4f, 0x67, 0xdc, 0xea
+	.BYTE	0x97, 0xf2, 0xcf, 0xce, 0xf0, 0xb4, 0xe6, 0x73
+	.BYTE	0x96, 0xac, 0x74, 0x22, 0xe7, 0xad, 0x35, 0x85
+	.BYTE	0xe2, 0xf9, 0x37, 0xe8, 0x1c, 0x75, 0xdf, 0x6e
+	.BYTE	0x47, 0xf1, 0x1a, 0x71, 0x1d, 0x29, 0xc5, 0x89
+	.BYTE	0x6f, 0xb7, 0x62, 0x0e, 0xaa, 0x18, 0xbe, 0x1b
+	.BYTE	0xfc, 0x56, 0x3e, 0x4b, 0xc6, 0xd2, 0x79, 0x20
+	.BYTE	0x9a, 0xdb, 0xc0, 0xfe, 0x78, 0xcd, 0x5a, 0xf4
+	.BYTE	0x1f, 0xdd, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x88, 0x07, 0xc7, 0x31
+	.BYTE	0xb1, 0x12, 0x10, 0x59, 0x27, 0x80, 0xec, 0x5f
+	.BYTE	0x60, 0x51, 0x7f, 0xa9, 0x19, 0xb5, 0x4a, 0x0d
+	.BYTE	0x2d, 0xe5, 0x7a, 0x9f, 0x93, 0xc9, 0x9c, 0xef
+	.BYTE	0xa0, 0xe0, 0x3b, 0x4d, 0xae, 0x2a, 0xf5, 0xb0
+	.BYTE	0xc8, 0xeb, 0xbb, 0x3c, 0x83, 0x53, 0x99, 0x61
+	.BYTE	0x17, 0x2b, 0x04, 0x7e, 0xba, 0x77, 0xd6, 0x26
+	.BYTE	0xe1, 0x69, 0x14, 0x63, 0x55, 0x21, 0x0c, 0x7d
+	.STRINGZ "AES for PA-RISC, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+___
+
+foreach (split("\n",$code)) {
+	s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/ge;
+
+	# translate made up instructons: _ror, _srm
+	s/_ror(\s+)(%r[0-9]+),/shd$1$2,$2,/				or
+
+	s/_srm(\s+%r[0-9]+),([0-9]+),/
+		$SIZE_T==4 ? sprintf("extru%s,%d,8,",$1,31-$2)
+		:            sprintf("extrd,u%s,%d,8,",$1,63-$2)/e;
+
+	s/,\*/,/			if ($SIZE_T==4);
+	s/\bbv\b(.*\(%r2\))/bve$1/	if ($SIZE_T==8);
+	print $_,"\n";
+}
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/asm/aes-ppc.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/asm/aes-ppc.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1558d8e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/asm/aes-ppc.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,1459 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2007-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+
+# Needs more work: key setup, CBC routine...
+#
+# ppc_AES_[en|de]crypt perform at 18 cycles per byte processed with
+# 128-bit key, which is ~40% better than 64-bit code generated by gcc
+# 4.0. But these are not the ones currently used! Their "compact"
+# counterparts are, for security reason. ppc_AES_encrypt_compact runs
+# at 1/2 of ppc_AES_encrypt speed, while ppc_AES_decrypt_compact -
+# at 1/3 of ppc_AES_decrypt.
+
+# February 2010
+#
+# Rescheduling instructions to favour Power6 pipeline gave 10%
+# performance improvement on the platform in question (and marginal
+# improvement even on others). It should be noted that Power6 fails
+# to process byte in 18 cycles, only in 23, because it fails to issue
+# 4 load instructions in two cycles, only in 3. As result non-compact
+# block subroutines are 25% slower than one would expect. Compact
+# functions scale better, because they have pure computational part,
+# which scales perfectly with clock frequency. To be specific
+# ppc_AES_encrypt_compact operates at 42 cycles per byte, while
+# ppc_AES_decrypt_compact - at 55 (in 64-bit build).
+
+$flavour = shift;
+
+if ($flavour =~ /64/) {
+	$SIZE_T	=8;
+	$LRSAVE	=2*$SIZE_T;
+	$STU	="stdu";
+	$POP	="ld";
+	$PUSH	="std";
+} elsif ($flavour =~ /32/) {
+	$SIZE_T	=4;
+	$LRSAVE	=$SIZE_T;
+	$STU	="stwu";
+	$POP	="lwz";
+	$PUSH	="stw";
+} else { die "nonsense $flavour"; }
+
+$LITTLE_ENDIAN = ($flavour=~/le$/) ? $SIZE_T : 0;
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+( $xlate="${dir}ppc-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
+( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/ppc-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
+die "can't locate ppc-xlate.pl";
+
+open STDOUT,"| $^X $xlate $flavour ".shift || die "can't call $xlate: $!";
+
+$FRAME=32*$SIZE_T;
+
+sub _data_word()
+{ my $i;
+    while(defined($i=shift)) { $code.=sprintf"\t.long\t0x%08x,0x%08x\n",$i,$i; }
+}
+
+$sp="r1";
+$toc="r2";
+$inp="r3";
+$out="r4";
+$key="r5";
+
+$Tbl0="r3";
+$Tbl1="r6";
+$Tbl2="r7";
+$Tbl3=$out;	# stay away from "r2"; $out is offloaded to stack
+
+$s0="r8";
+$s1="r9";
+$s2="r10";
+$s3="r11";
+
+$t0="r12";
+$t1="r0";	# stay away from "r13";
+$t2="r14";
+$t3="r15";
+
+$acc00="r16";
+$acc01="r17";
+$acc02="r18";
+$acc03="r19";
+
+$acc04="r20";
+$acc05="r21";
+$acc06="r22";
+$acc07="r23";
+
+$acc08="r24";
+$acc09="r25";
+$acc10="r26";
+$acc11="r27";
+
+$acc12="r28";
+$acc13="r29";
+$acc14="r30";
+$acc15="r31";
+
+$mask80=$Tbl2;
+$mask1b=$Tbl3;
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.machine	"any"
+.text
+
+.align	7
+LAES_Te:
+	mflr	r0
+	bcl	20,31,\$+4
+	mflr	$Tbl0	;    vvvvv "distance" between . and 1st data entry
+	addi	$Tbl0,$Tbl0,`128-8`
+	mtlr	r0
+	blr
+	.long	0
+	.byte	0,12,0x14,0,0,0,0,0
+	.space	`64-9*4`
+LAES_Td:
+	mflr	r0
+	bcl	20,31,\$+4
+	mflr	$Tbl0	;    vvvvvvvv "distance" between . and 1st data entry
+	addi	$Tbl0,$Tbl0,`128-64-8+2048+256`
+	mtlr	r0
+	blr
+	.long	0
+	.byte	0,12,0x14,0,0,0,0,0
+	.space	`128-64-9*4`
+___
+&_data_word(
+	0xc66363a5, 0xf87c7c84, 0xee777799, 0xf67b7b8d,
+	0xfff2f20d, 0xd66b6bbd, 0xde6f6fb1, 0x91c5c554,
+	0x60303050, 0x02010103, 0xce6767a9, 0x562b2b7d,
+	0xe7fefe19, 0xb5d7d762, 0x4dababe6, 0xec76769a,
+	0x8fcaca45, 0x1f82829d, 0x89c9c940, 0xfa7d7d87,
+	0xeffafa15, 0xb25959eb, 0x8e4747c9, 0xfbf0f00b,
+	0x41adadec, 0xb3d4d467, 0x5fa2a2fd, 0x45afafea,
+	0x239c9cbf, 0x53a4a4f7, 0xe4727296, 0x9bc0c05b,
+	0x75b7b7c2, 0xe1fdfd1c, 0x3d9393ae, 0x4c26266a,
+	0x6c36365a, 0x7e3f3f41, 0xf5f7f702, 0x83cccc4f,
+	0x6834345c, 0x51a5a5f4, 0xd1e5e534, 0xf9f1f108,
+	0xe2717193, 0xabd8d873, 0x62313153, 0x2a15153f,
+	0x0804040c, 0x95c7c752, 0x46232365, 0x9dc3c35e,
+	0x30181828, 0x379696a1, 0x0a05050f, 0x2f9a9ab5,
+	0x0e070709, 0x24121236, 0x1b80809b, 0xdfe2e23d,
+	0xcdebeb26, 0x4e272769, 0x7fb2b2cd, 0xea75759f,
+	0x1209091b, 0x1d83839e, 0x582c2c74, 0x341a1a2e,
+	0x361b1b2d, 0xdc6e6eb2, 0xb45a5aee, 0x5ba0a0fb,
+	0xa45252f6, 0x763b3b4d, 0xb7d6d661, 0x7db3b3ce,
+	0x5229297b, 0xdde3e33e, 0x5e2f2f71, 0x13848497,
+	0xa65353f5, 0xb9d1d168, 0x00000000, 0xc1eded2c,
+	0x40202060, 0xe3fcfc1f, 0x79b1b1c8, 0xb65b5bed,
+	0xd46a6abe, 0x8dcbcb46, 0x67bebed9, 0x7239394b,
+	0x944a4ade, 0x984c4cd4, 0xb05858e8, 0x85cfcf4a,
+	0xbbd0d06b, 0xc5efef2a, 0x4faaaae5, 0xedfbfb16,
+	0x864343c5, 0x9a4d4dd7, 0x66333355, 0x11858594,
+	0x8a4545cf, 0xe9f9f910, 0x04020206, 0xfe7f7f81,
+	0xa05050f0, 0x783c3c44, 0x259f9fba, 0x4ba8a8e3,
+	0xa25151f3, 0x5da3a3fe, 0x804040c0, 0x058f8f8a,
+	0x3f9292ad, 0x219d9dbc, 0x70383848, 0xf1f5f504,
+	0x63bcbcdf, 0x77b6b6c1, 0xafdada75, 0x42212163,
+	0x20101030, 0xe5ffff1a, 0xfdf3f30e, 0xbfd2d26d,
+	0x81cdcd4c, 0x180c0c14, 0x26131335, 0xc3ecec2f,
+	0xbe5f5fe1, 0x359797a2, 0x884444cc, 0x2e171739,
+	0x93c4c457, 0x55a7a7f2, 0xfc7e7e82, 0x7a3d3d47,
+	0xc86464ac, 0xba5d5de7, 0x3219192b, 0xe6737395,
+	0xc06060a0, 0x19818198, 0x9e4f4fd1, 0xa3dcdc7f,
+	0x44222266, 0x542a2a7e, 0x3b9090ab, 0x0b888883,
+	0x8c4646ca, 0xc7eeee29, 0x6bb8b8d3, 0x2814143c,
+	0xa7dede79, 0xbc5e5ee2, 0x160b0b1d, 0xaddbdb76,
+	0xdbe0e03b, 0x64323256, 0x743a3a4e, 0x140a0a1e,
+	0x924949db, 0x0c06060a, 0x4824246c, 0xb85c5ce4,
+	0x9fc2c25d, 0xbdd3d36e, 0x43acacef, 0xc46262a6,
+	0x399191a8, 0x319595a4, 0xd3e4e437, 0xf279798b,
+	0xd5e7e732, 0x8bc8c843, 0x6e373759, 0xda6d6db7,
+	0x018d8d8c, 0xb1d5d564, 0x9c4e4ed2, 0x49a9a9e0,
+	0xd86c6cb4, 0xac5656fa, 0xf3f4f407, 0xcfeaea25,
+	0xca6565af, 0xf47a7a8e, 0x47aeaee9, 0x10080818,
+	0x6fbabad5, 0xf0787888, 0x4a25256f, 0x5c2e2e72,
+	0x381c1c24, 0x57a6a6f1, 0x73b4b4c7, 0x97c6c651,
+	0xcbe8e823, 0xa1dddd7c, 0xe874749c, 0x3e1f1f21,
+	0x964b4bdd, 0x61bdbddc, 0x0d8b8b86, 0x0f8a8a85,
+	0xe0707090, 0x7c3e3e42, 0x71b5b5c4, 0xcc6666aa,
+	0x904848d8, 0x06030305, 0xf7f6f601, 0x1c0e0e12,
+	0xc26161a3, 0x6a35355f, 0xae5757f9, 0x69b9b9d0,
+	0x17868691, 0x99c1c158, 0x3a1d1d27, 0x279e9eb9,
+	0xd9e1e138, 0xebf8f813, 0x2b9898b3, 0x22111133,
+	0xd26969bb, 0xa9d9d970, 0x078e8e89, 0x339494a7,
+	0x2d9b9bb6, 0x3c1e1e22, 0x15878792, 0xc9e9e920,
+	0x87cece49, 0xaa5555ff, 0x50282878, 0xa5dfdf7a,
+	0x038c8c8f, 0x59a1a1f8, 0x09898980, 0x1a0d0d17,
+	0x65bfbfda, 0xd7e6e631, 0x844242c6, 0xd06868b8,
+	0x824141c3, 0x299999b0, 0x5a2d2d77, 0x1e0f0f11,
+	0x7bb0b0cb, 0xa85454fc, 0x6dbbbbd6, 0x2c16163a);
+$code.=<<___;
+.byte	0x63, 0x7c, 0x77, 0x7b, 0xf2, 0x6b, 0x6f, 0xc5
+.byte	0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2b, 0xfe, 0xd7, 0xab, 0x76
+.byte	0xca, 0x82, 0xc9, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0x59, 0x47, 0xf0
+.byte	0xad, 0xd4, 0xa2, 0xaf, 0x9c, 0xa4, 0x72, 0xc0
+.byte	0xb7, 0xfd, 0x93, 0x26, 0x36, 0x3f, 0xf7, 0xcc
+.byte	0x34, 0xa5, 0xe5, 0xf1, 0x71, 0xd8, 0x31, 0x15
+.byte	0x04, 0xc7, 0x23, 0xc3, 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9a
+.byte	0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xeb, 0x27, 0xb2, 0x75
+.byte	0x09, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x6e, 0x5a, 0xa0
+.byte	0x52, 0x3b, 0xd6, 0xb3, 0x29, 0xe3, 0x2f, 0x84
+.byte	0x53, 0xd1, 0x00, 0xed, 0x20, 0xfc, 0xb1, 0x5b
+.byte	0x6a, 0xcb, 0xbe, 0x39, 0x4a, 0x4c, 0x58, 0xcf
+.byte	0xd0, 0xef, 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x43, 0x4d, 0x33, 0x85
+.byte	0x45, 0xf9, 0x02, 0x7f, 0x50, 0x3c, 0x9f, 0xa8
+.byte	0x51, 0xa3, 0x40, 0x8f, 0x92, 0x9d, 0x38, 0xf5
+.byte	0xbc, 0xb6, 0xda, 0x21, 0x10, 0xff, 0xf3, 0xd2
+.byte	0xcd, 0x0c, 0x13, 0xec, 0x5f, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17
+.byte	0xc4, 0xa7, 0x7e, 0x3d, 0x64, 0x5d, 0x19, 0x73
+.byte	0x60, 0x81, 0x4f, 0xdc, 0x22, 0x2a, 0x90, 0x88
+.byte	0x46, 0xee, 0xb8, 0x14, 0xde, 0x5e, 0x0b, 0xdb
+.byte	0xe0, 0x32, 0x3a, 0x0a, 0x49, 0x06, 0x24, 0x5c
+.byte	0xc2, 0xd3, 0xac, 0x62, 0x91, 0x95, 0xe4, 0x79
+.byte	0xe7, 0xc8, 0x37, 0x6d, 0x8d, 0xd5, 0x4e, 0xa9
+.byte	0x6c, 0x56, 0xf4, 0xea, 0x65, 0x7a, 0xae, 0x08
+.byte	0xba, 0x78, 0x25, 0x2e, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xb4, 0xc6
+.byte	0xe8, 0xdd, 0x74, 0x1f, 0x4b, 0xbd, 0x8b, 0x8a
+.byte	0x70, 0x3e, 0xb5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xf6, 0x0e
+.byte	0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xb9, 0x86, 0xc1, 0x1d, 0x9e
+.byte	0xe1, 0xf8, 0x98, 0x11, 0x69, 0xd9, 0x8e, 0x94
+.byte	0x9b, 0x1e, 0x87, 0xe9, 0xce, 0x55, 0x28, 0xdf
+.byte	0x8c, 0xa1, 0x89, 0x0d, 0xbf, 0xe6, 0x42, 0x68
+.byte	0x41, 0x99, 0x2d, 0x0f, 0xb0, 0x54, 0xbb, 0x16
+___
+&_data_word(
+	0x51f4a750, 0x7e416553, 0x1a17a4c3, 0x3a275e96,
+	0x3bab6bcb, 0x1f9d45f1, 0xacfa58ab, 0x4be30393,
+	0x2030fa55, 0xad766df6, 0x88cc7691, 0xf5024c25,
+	0x4fe5d7fc, 0xc52acbd7, 0x26354480, 0xb562a38f,
+	0xdeb15a49, 0x25ba1b67, 0x45ea0e98, 0x5dfec0e1,
+	0xc32f7502, 0x814cf012, 0x8d4697a3, 0x6bd3f9c6,
+	0x038f5fe7, 0x15929c95, 0xbf6d7aeb, 0x955259da,
+	0xd4be832d, 0x587421d3, 0x49e06929, 0x8ec9c844,
+	0x75c2896a, 0xf48e7978, 0x99583e6b, 0x27b971dd,
+	0xbee14fb6, 0xf088ad17, 0xc920ac66, 0x7dce3ab4,
+	0x63df4a18, 0xe51a3182, 0x97513360, 0x62537f45,
+	0xb16477e0, 0xbb6bae84, 0xfe81a01c, 0xf9082b94,
+	0x70486858, 0x8f45fd19, 0x94de6c87, 0x527bf8b7,
+	0xab73d323, 0x724b02e2, 0xe31f8f57, 0x6655ab2a,
+	0xb2eb2807, 0x2fb5c203, 0x86c57b9a, 0xd33708a5,
+	0x302887f2, 0x23bfa5b2, 0x02036aba, 0xed16825c,
+	0x8acf1c2b, 0xa779b492, 0xf307f2f0, 0x4e69e2a1,
+	0x65daf4cd, 0x0605bed5, 0xd134621f, 0xc4a6fe8a,
+	0x342e539d, 0xa2f355a0, 0x058ae132, 0xa4f6eb75,
+	0x0b83ec39, 0x4060efaa, 0x5e719f06, 0xbd6e1051,
+	0x3e218af9, 0x96dd063d, 0xdd3e05ae, 0x4de6bd46,
+	0x91548db5, 0x71c45d05, 0x0406d46f, 0x605015ff,
+	0x1998fb24, 0xd6bde997, 0x894043cc, 0x67d99e77,
+	0xb0e842bd, 0x07898b88, 0xe7195b38, 0x79c8eedb,
+	0xa17c0a47, 0x7c420fe9, 0xf8841ec9, 0x00000000,
+	0x09808683, 0x322bed48, 0x1e1170ac, 0x6c5a724e,
+	0xfd0efffb, 0x0f853856, 0x3daed51e, 0x362d3927,
+	0x0a0fd964, 0x685ca621, 0x9b5b54d1, 0x24362e3a,
+	0x0c0a67b1, 0x9357e70f, 0xb4ee96d2, 0x1b9b919e,
+	0x80c0c54f, 0x61dc20a2, 0x5a774b69, 0x1c121a16,
+	0xe293ba0a, 0xc0a02ae5, 0x3c22e043, 0x121b171d,
+	0x0e090d0b, 0xf28bc7ad, 0x2db6a8b9, 0x141ea9c8,
+	0x57f11985, 0xaf75074c, 0xee99ddbb, 0xa37f60fd,
+	0xf701269f, 0x5c72f5bc, 0x44663bc5, 0x5bfb7e34,
+	0x8b432976, 0xcb23c6dc, 0xb6edfc68, 0xb8e4f163,
+	0xd731dcca, 0x42638510, 0x13972240, 0x84c61120,
+	0x854a247d, 0xd2bb3df8, 0xaef93211, 0xc729a16d,
+	0x1d9e2f4b, 0xdcb230f3, 0x0d8652ec, 0x77c1e3d0,
+	0x2bb3166c, 0xa970b999, 0x119448fa, 0x47e96422,
+	0xa8fc8cc4, 0xa0f03f1a, 0x567d2cd8, 0x223390ef,
+	0x87494ec7, 0xd938d1c1, 0x8ccaa2fe, 0x98d40b36,
+	0xa6f581cf, 0xa57ade28, 0xdab78e26, 0x3fadbfa4,
+	0x2c3a9de4, 0x5078920d, 0x6a5fcc9b, 0x547e4662,
+	0xf68d13c2, 0x90d8b8e8, 0x2e39f75e, 0x82c3aff5,
+	0x9f5d80be, 0x69d0937c, 0x6fd52da9, 0xcf2512b3,
+	0xc8ac993b, 0x10187da7, 0xe89c636e, 0xdb3bbb7b,
+	0xcd267809, 0x6e5918f4, 0xec9ab701, 0x834f9aa8,
+	0xe6956e65, 0xaaffe67e, 0x21bccf08, 0xef15e8e6,
+	0xbae79bd9, 0x4a6f36ce, 0xea9f09d4, 0x29b07cd6,
+	0x31a4b2af, 0x2a3f2331, 0xc6a59430, 0x35a266c0,
+	0x744ebc37, 0xfc82caa6, 0xe090d0b0, 0x33a7d815,
+	0xf104984a, 0x41ecdaf7, 0x7fcd500e, 0x1791f62f,
+	0x764dd68d, 0x43efb04d, 0xccaa4d54, 0xe49604df,
+	0x9ed1b5e3, 0x4c6a881b, 0xc12c1fb8, 0x4665517f,
+	0x9d5eea04, 0x018c355d, 0xfa877473, 0xfb0b412e,
+	0xb3671d5a, 0x92dbd252, 0xe9105633, 0x6dd64713,
+	0x9ad7618c, 0x37a10c7a, 0x59f8148e, 0xeb133c89,
+	0xcea927ee, 0xb761c935, 0xe11ce5ed, 0x7a47b13c,
+	0x9cd2df59, 0x55f2733f, 0x1814ce79, 0x73c737bf,
+	0x53f7cdea, 0x5ffdaa5b, 0xdf3d6f14, 0x7844db86,
+	0xcaaff381, 0xb968c43e, 0x3824342c, 0xc2a3405f,
+	0x161dc372, 0xbce2250c, 0x283c498b, 0xff0d9541,
+	0x39a80171, 0x080cb3de, 0xd8b4e49c, 0x6456c190,
+	0x7bcb8461, 0xd532b670, 0x486c5c74, 0xd0b85742);
+$code.=<<___;
+.byte	0x52, 0x09, 0x6a, 0xd5, 0x30, 0x36, 0xa5, 0x38
+.byte	0xbf, 0x40, 0xa3, 0x9e, 0x81, 0xf3, 0xd7, 0xfb
+.byte	0x7c, 0xe3, 0x39, 0x82, 0x9b, 0x2f, 0xff, 0x87
+.byte	0x34, 0x8e, 0x43, 0x44, 0xc4, 0xde, 0xe9, 0xcb
+.byte	0x54, 0x7b, 0x94, 0x32, 0xa6, 0xc2, 0x23, 0x3d
+.byte	0xee, 0x4c, 0x95, 0x0b, 0x42, 0xfa, 0xc3, 0x4e
+.byte	0x08, 0x2e, 0xa1, 0x66, 0x28, 0xd9, 0x24, 0xb2
+.byte	0x76, 0x5b, 0xa2, 0x49, 0x6d, 0x8b, 0xd1, 0x25
+.byte	0x72, 0xf8, 0xf6, 0x64, 0x86, 0x68, 0x98, 0x16
+.byte	0xd4, 0xa4, 0x5c, 0xcc, 0x5d, 0x65, 0xb6, 0x92
+.byte	0x6c, 0x70, 0x48, 0x50, 0xfd, 0xed, 0xb9, 0xda
+.byte	0x5e, 0x15, 0x46, 0x57, 0xa7, 0x8d, 0x9d, 0x84
+.byte	0x90, 0xd8, 0xab, 0x00, 0x8c, 0xbc, 0xd3, 0x0a
+.byte	0xf7, 0xe4, 0x58, 0x05, 0xb8, 0xb3, 0x45, 0x06
+.byte	0xd0, 0x2c, 0x1e, 0x8f, 0xca, 0x3f, 0x0f, 0x02
+.byte	0xc1, 0xaf, 0xbd, 0x03, 0x01, 0x13, 0x8a, 0x6b
+.byte	0x3a, 0x91, 0x11, 0x41, 0x4f, 0x67, 0xdc, 0xea
+.byte	0x97, 0xf2, 0xcf, 0xce, 0xf0, 0xb4, 0xe6, 0x73
+.byte	0x96, 0xac, 0x74, 0x22, 0xe7, 0xad, 0x35, 0x85
+.byte	0xe2, 0xf9, 0x37, 0xe8, 0x1c, 0x75, 0xdf, 0x6e
+.byte	0x47, 0xf1, 0x1a, 0x71, 0x1d, 0x29, 0xc5, 0x89
+.byte	0x6f, 0xb7, 0x62, 0x0e, 0xaa, 0x18, 0xbe, 0x1b
+.byte	0xfc, 0x56, 0x3e, 0x4b, 0xc6, 0xd2, 0x79, 0x20
+.byte	0x9a, 0xdb, 0xc0, 0xfe, 0x78, 0xcd, 0x5a, 0xf4
+.byte	0x1f, 0xdd, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x88, 0x07, 0xc7, 0x31
+.byte	0xb1, 0x12, 0x10, 0x59, 0x27, 0x80, 0xec, 0x5f
+.byte	0x60, 0x51, 0x7f, 0xa9, 0x19, 0xb5, 0x4a, 0x0d
+.byte	0x2d, 0xe5, 0x7a, 0x9f, 0x93, 0xc9, 0x9c, 0xef
+.byte	0xa0, 0xe0, 0x3b, 0x4d, 0xae, 0x2a, 0xf5, 0xb0
+.byte	0xc8, 0xeb, 0xbb, 0x3c, 0x83, 0x53, 0x99, 0x61
+.byte	0x17, 0x2b, 0x04, 0x7e, 0xba, 0x77, 0xd6, 0x26
+.byte	0xe1, 0x69, 0x14, 0x63, 0x55, 0x21, 0x0c, 0x7d
+
+
+.globl	.AES_encrypt
+.align	7
+.AES_encrypt:
+	$STU	$sp,-$FRAME($sp)
+	mflr	r0
+
+	$PUSH	$out,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*19`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r14,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*18`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r15,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*17`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r16,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*16`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r17,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*15`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r18,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*14`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r19,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*13`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r20,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*12`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r21,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*11`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r22,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*10`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r23,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*9`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r24,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*8`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r25,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*7`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r26,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*6`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r27,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*5`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r28,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*4`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r29,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*3`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r30,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*2`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r31,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*1`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r0,`$FRAME+$LRSAVE`($sp)
+
+	andi.	$t0,$inp,3
+	andi.	$t1,$out,3
+	or.	$t0,$t0,$t1
+	bne	Lenc_unaligned
+
+Lenc_unaligned_ok:
+___
+$code.=<<___ if (!$LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+	lwz	$s0,0($inp)
+	lwz	$s1,4($inp)
+	lwz	$s2,8($inp)
+	lwz	$s3,12($inp)
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+	lwz	$t0,0($inp)
+	lwz	$t1,4($inp)
+	lwz	$t2,8($inp)
+	lwz	$t3,12($inp)
+	rotlwi	$s0,$t0,8
+	rotlwi	$s1,$t1,8
+	rotlwi	$s2,$t2,8
+	rotlwi	$s3,$t3,8
+	rlwimi	$s0,$t0,24,0,7
+	rlwimi	$s1,$t1,24,0,7
+	rlwimi	$s2,$t2,24,0,7
+	rlwimi	$s3,$t3,24,0,7
+	rlwimi	$s0,$t0,24,16,23
+	rlwimi	$s1,$t1,24,16,23
+	rlwimi	$s2,$t2,24,16,23
+	rlwimi	$s3,$t3,24,16,23
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	bl	LAES_Te
+	bl	Lppc_AES_encrypt_compact
+	$POP	$out,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*19`($sp)
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+	rotlwi	$t0,$s0,8
+	rotlwi	$t1,$s1,8
+	rotlwi	$t2,$s2,8
+	rotlwi	$t3,$s3,8
+	rlwimi	$t0,$s0,24,0,7
+	rlwimi	$t1,$s1,24,0,7
+	rlwimi	$t2,$s2,24,0,7
+	rlwimi	$t3,$s3,24,0,7
+	rlwimi	$t0,$s0,24,16,23
+	rlwimi	$t1,$s1,24,16,23
+	rlwimi	$t2,$s2,24,16,23
+	rlwimi	$t3,$s3,24,16,23
+	stw	$t0,0($out)
+	stw	$t1,4($out)
+	stw	$t2,8($out)
+	stw	$t3,12($out)
+___
+$code.=<<___ if (!$LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+	stw	$s0,0($out)
+	stw	$s1,4($out)
+	stw	$s2,8($out)
+	stw	$s3,12($out)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	b	Lenc_done
+
+Lenc_unaligned:
+	subfic	$t0,$inp,4096
+	subfic	$t1,$out,4096
+	andi.	$t0,$t0,4096-16
+	beq	Lenc_xpage
+	andi.	$t1,$t1,4096-16
+	bne	Lenc_unaligned_ok
+
+Lenc_xpage:
+	lbz	$acc00,0($inp)
+	lbz	$acc01,1($inp)
+	lbz	$acc02,2($inp)
+	lbz	$s0,3($inp)
+	lbz	$acc04,4($inp)
+	lbz	$acc05,5($inp)
+	lbz	$acc06,6($inp)
+	lbz	$s1,7($inp)
+	lbz	$acc08,8($inp)
+	lbz	$acc09,9($inp)
+	lbz	$acc10,10($inp)
+	insrwi	$s0,$acc00,8,0
+	lbz	$s2,11($inp)
+	insrwi	$s1,$acc04,8,0
+	lbz	$acc12,12($inp)
+	insrwi	$s0,$acc01,8,8
+	lbz	$acc13,13($inp)
+	insrwi	$s1,$acc05,8,8
+	lbz	$acc14,14($inp)
+	insrwi	$s0,$acc02,8,16
+	lbz	$s3,15($inp)
+	insrwi	$s1,$acc06,8,16
+	insrwi	$s2,$acc08,8,0
+	insrwi	$s3,$acc12,8,0
+	insrwi	$s2,$acc09,8,8
+	insrwi	$s3,$acc13,8,8
+	insrwi	$s2,$acc10,8,16
+	insrwi	$s3,$acc14,8,16
+
+	bl	LAES_Te
+	bl	Lppc_AES_encrypt_compact
+	$POP	$out,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*19`($sp)
+
+	extrwi	$acc00,$s0,8,0
+	extrwi	$acc01,$s0,8,8
+	stb	$acc00,0($out)
+	extrwi	$acc02,$s0,8,16
+	stb	$acc01,1($out)
+	stb	$acc02,2($out)
+	extrwi	$acc04,$s1,8,0
+	stb	$s0,3($out)
+	extrwi	$acc05,$s1,8,8
+	stb	$acc04,4($out)
+	extrwi	$acc06,$s1,8,16
+	stb	$acc05,5($out)
+	stb	$acc06,6($out)
+	extrwi	$acc08,$s2,8,0
+	stb	$s1,7($out)
+	extrwi	$acc09,$s2,8,8
+	stb	$acc08,8($out)
+	extrwi	$acc10,$s2,8,16
+	stb	$acc09,9($out)
+	stb	$acc10,10($out)
+	extrwi	$acc12,$s3,8,0
+	stb	$s2,11($out)
+	extrwi	$acc13,$s3,8,8
+	stb	$acc12,12($out)
+	extrwi	$acc14,$s3,8,16
+	stb	$acc13,13($out)
+	stb	$acc14,14($out)
+	stb	$s3,15($out)
+
+Lenc_done:
+	$POP	r0,`$FRAME+$LRSAVE`($sp)
+	$POP	r14,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*18`($sp)
+	$POP	r15,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*17`($sp)
+	$POP	r16,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*16`($sp)
+	$POP	r17,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*15`($sp)
+	$POP	r18,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*14`($sp)
+	$POP	r19,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*13`($sp)
+	$POP	r20,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*12`($sp)
+	$POP	r21,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*11`($sp)
+	$POP	r22,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*10`($sp)
+	$POP	r23,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*9`($sp)
+	$POP	r24,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*8`($sp)
+	$POP	r25,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*7`($sp)
+	$POP	r26,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*6`($sp)
+	$POP	r27,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*5`($sp)
+	$POP	r28,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*4`($sp)
+	$POP	r29,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*3`($sp)
+	$POP	r30,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*2`($sp)
+	$POP	r31,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*1`($sp)
+	mtlr	r0
+	addi	$sp,$sp,$FRAME
+	blr
+	.long	0
+	.byte	0,12,4,1,0x80,18,3,0
+	.long	0
+
+.align	5
+Lppc_AES_encrypt:
+	lwz	$acc00,240($key)
+	addi	$Tbl1,$Tbl0,3
+	lwz	$t0,0($key)
+	addi	$Tbl2,$Tbl0,2
+	lwz	$t1,4($key)
+	addi	$Tbl3,$Tbl0,1
+	lwz	$t2,8($key)
+	addi	$acc00,$acc00,-1
+	lwz	$t3,12($key)
+	addi	$key,$key,16
+	xor	$s0,$s0,$t0
+	xor	$s1,$s1,$t1
+	xor	$s2,$s2,$t2
+	xor	$s3,$s3,$t3
+	mtctr	$acc00
+.align	4
+Lenc_loop:
+	rlwinm	$acc00,$s0,`32-24+3`,21,28
+	rlwinm	$acc01,$s1,`32-24+3`,21,28
+	rlwinm	$acc02,$s2,`32-24+3`,21,28
+	rlwinm	$acc03,$s3,`32-24+3`,21,28
+	lwz	$t0,0($key)
+	rlwinm	$acc04,$s1,`32-16+3`,21,28
+	lwz	$t1,4($key)
+	rlwinm	$acc05,$s2,`32-16+3`,21,28
+	lwz	$t2,8($key)
+	rlwinm	$acc06,$s3,`32-16+3`,21,28
+	lwz	$t3,12($key)
+	rlwinm	$acc07,$s0,`32-16+3`,21,28
+	lwzx	$acc00,$Tbl0,$acc00
+	rlwinm	$acc08,$s2,`32-8+3`,21,28
+	lwzx	$acc01,$Tbl0,$acc01
+	rlwinm	$acc09,$s3,`32-8+3`,21,28
+	lwzx	$acc02,$Tbl0,$acc02
+	rlwinm	$acc10,$s0,`32-8+3`,21,28
+	lwzx	$acc03,$Tbl0,$acc03
+	rlwinm	$acc11,$s1,`32-8+3`,21,28
+	lwzx	$acc04,$Tbl1,$acc04
+	rlwinm	$acc12,$s3,`0+3`,21,28
+	lwzx	$acc05,$Tbl1,$acc05
+	rlwinm	$acc13,$s0,`0+3`,21,28
+	lwzx	$acc06,$Tbl1,$acc06
+	rlwinm	$acc14,$s1,`0+3`,21,28
+	lwzx	$acc07,$Tbl1,$acc07
+	rlwinm	$acc15,$s2,`0+3`,21,28
+	lwzx	$acc08,$Tbl2,$acc08
+	xor	$t0,$t0,$acc00
+	lwzx	$acc09,$Tbl2,$acc09
+	xor	$t1,$t1,$acc01
+	lwzx	$acc10,$Tbl2,$acc10
+	xor	$t2,$t2,$acc02
+	lwzx	$acc11,$Tbl2,$acc11
+	xor	$t3,$t3,$acc03
+	lwzx	$acc12,$Tbl3,$acc12
+	xor	$t0,$t0,$acc04
+	lwzx	$acc13,$Tbl3,$acc13
+	xor	$t1,$t1,$acc05
+	lwzx	$acc14,$Tbl3,$acc14
+	xor	$t2,$t2,$acc06
+	lwzx	$acc15,$Tbl3,$acc15
+	xor	$t3,$t3,$acc07
+	xor	$t0,$t0,$acc08
+	xor	$t1,$t1,$acc09
+	xor	$t2,$t2,$acc10
+	xor	$t3,$t3,$acc11
+	xor	$s0,$t0,$acc12
+	xor	$s1,$t1,$acc13
+	xor	$s2,$t2,$acc14
+	xor	$s3,$t3,$acc15
+	addi	$key,$key,16
+	bdnz	Lenc_loop
+
+	addi	$Tbl2,$Tbl0,2048
+	nop
+	lwz	$t0,0($key)
+	rlwinm	$acc00,$s0,`32-24`,24,31
+	lwz	$t1,4($key)
+	rlwinm	$acc01,$s1,`32-24`,24,31
+	lwz	$t2,8($key)
+	rlwinm	$acc02,$s2,`32-24`,24,31
+	lwz	$t3,12($key)
+	rlwinm	$acc03,$s3,`32-24`,24,31
+	lwz	$acc08,`2048+0`($Tbl0)	! prefetch Te4
+	rlwinm	$acc04,$s1,`32-16`,24,31
+	lwz	$acc09,`2048+32`($Tbl0)
+	rlwinm	$acc05,$s2,`32-16`,24,31
+	lwz	$acc10,`2048+64`($Tbl0)
+	rlwinm	$acc06,$s3,`32-16`,24,31
+	lwz	$acc11,`2048+96`($Tbl0)
+	rlwinm	$acc07,$s0,`32-16`,24,31
+	lwz	$acc12,`2048+128`($Tbl0)
+	rlwinm	$acc08,$s2,`32-8`,24,31
+	lwz	$acc13,`2048+160`($Tbl0)
+	rlwinm	$acc09,$s3,`32-8`,24,31
+	lwz	$acc14,`2048+192`($Tbl0)
+	rlwinm	$acc10,$s0,`32-8`,24,31
+	lwz	$acc15,`2048+224`($Tbl0)
+	rlwinm	$acc11,$s1,`32-8`,24,31
+	lbzx	$acc00,$Tbl2,$acc00
+	rlwinm	$acc12,$s3,`0`,24,31
+	lbzx	$acc01,$Tbl2,$acc01
+	rlwinm	$acc13,$s0,`0`,24,31
+	lbzx	$acc02,$Tbl2,$acc02
+	rlwinm	$acc14,$s1,`0`,24,31
+	lbzx	$acc03,$Tbl2,$acc03
+	rlwinm	$acc15,$s2,`0`,24,31
+	lbzx	$acc04,$Tbl2,$acc04
+	rlwinm	$s0,$acc00,24,0,7
+	lbzx	$acc05,$Tbl2,$acc05
+	rlwinm	$s1,$acc01,24,0,7
+	lbzx	$acc06,$Tbl2,$acc06
+	rlwinm	$s2,$acc02,24,0,7
+	lbzx	$acc07,$Tbl2,$acc07
+	rlwinm	$s3,$acc03,24,0,7
+	lbzx	$acc08,$Tbl2,$acc08
+	rlwimi	$s0,$acc04,16,8,15
+	lbzx	$acc09,$Tbl2,$acc09
+	rlwimi	$s1,$acc05,16,8,15
+	lbzx	$acc10,$Tbl2,$acc10
+	rlwimi	$s2,$acc06,16,8,15
+	lbzx	$acc11,$Tbl2,$acc11
+	rlwimi	$s3,$acc07,16,8,15
+	lbzx	$acc12,$Tbl2,$acc12
+	rlwimi	$s0,$acc08,8,16,23
+	lbzx	$acc13,$Tbl2,$acc13
+	rlwimi	$s1,$acc09,8,16,23
+	lbzx	$acc14,$Tbl2,$acc14
+	rlwimi	$s2,$acc10,8,16,23
+	lbzx	$acc15,$Tbl2,$acc15
+	rlwimi	$s3,$acc11,8,16,23
+	or	$s0,$s0,$acc12
+	or	$s1,$s1,$acc13
+	or	$s2,$s2,$acc14
+	or	$s3,$s3,$acc15
+	xor	$s0,$s0,$t0
+	xor	$s1,$s1,$t1
+	xor	$s2,$s2,$t2
+	xor	$s3,$s3,$t3
+	blr
+	.long	0
+	.byte	0,12,0x14,0,0,0,0,0
+
+.align	4
+Lppc_AES_encrypt_compact:
+	lwz	$acc00,240($key)
+	addi	$Tbl1,$Tbl0,2048
+	lwz	$t0,0($key)
+	lis	$mask80,0x8080
+	lwz	$t1,4($key)
+	lis	$mask1b,0x1b1b
+	lwz	$t2,8($key)
+	ori	$mask80,$mask80,0x8080
+	lwz	$t3,12($key)
+	ori	$mask1b,$mask1b,0x1b1b
+	addi	$key,$key,16
+	mtctr	$acc00
+.align	4
+Lenc_compact_loop:
+	xor	$s0,$s0,$t0
+	xor	$s1,$s1,$t1
+	rlwinm	$acc00,$s0,`32-24`,24,31
+	xor	$s2,$s2,$t2
+	rlwinm	$acc01,$s1,`32-24`,24,31
+	xor	$s3,$s3,$t3
+	rlwinm	$acc02,$s2,`32-24`,24,31
+	rlwinm	$acc03,$s3,`32-24`,24,31
+	rlwinm	$acc04,$s1,`32-16`,24,31
+	rlwinm	$acc05,$s2,`32-16`,24,31
+	rlwinm	$acc06,$s3,`32-16`,24,31
+	rlwinm	$acc07,$s0,`32-16`,24,31
+	lbzx	$acc00,$Tbl1,$acc00
+	rlwinm	$acc08,$s2,`32-8`,24,31
+	lbzx	$acc01,$Tbl1,$acc01
+	rlwinm	$acc09,$s3,`32-8`,24,31
+	lbzx	$acc02,$Tbl1,$acc02
+	rlwinm	$acc10,$s0,`32-8`,24,31
+	lbzx	$acc03,$Tbl1,$acc03
+	rlwinm	$acc11,$s1,`32-8`,24,31
+	lbzx	$acc04,$Tbl1,$acc04
+	rlwinm	$acc12,$s3,`0`,24,31
+	lbzx	$acc05,$Tbl1,$acc05
+	rlwinm	$acc13,$s0,`0`,24,31
+	lbzx	$acc06,$Tbl1,$acc06
+	rlwinm	$acc14,$s1,`0`,24,31
+	lbzx	$acc07,$Tbl1,$acc07
+	rlwinm	$acc15,$s2,`0`,24,31
+	lbzx	$acc08,$Tbl1,$acc08
+	rlwinm	$s0,$acc00,24,0,7
+	lbzx	$acc09,$Tbl1,$acc09
+	rlwinm	$s1,$acc01,24,0,7
+	lbzx	$acc10,$Tbl1,$acc10
+	rlwinm	$s2,$acc02,24,0,7
+	lbzx	$acc11,$Tbl1,$acc11
+	rlwinm	$s3,$acc03,24,0,7
+	lbzx	$acc12,$Tbl1,$acc12
+	rlwimi	$s0,$acc04,16,8,15
+	lbzx	$acc13,$Tbl1,$acc13
+	rlwimi	$s1,$acc05,16,8,15
+	lbzx	$acc14,$Tbl1,$acc14
+	rlwimi	$s2,$acc06,16,8,15
+	lbzx	$acc15,$Tbl1,$acc15
+	rlwimi	$s3,$acc07,16,8,15
+	rlwimi	$s0,$acc08,8,16,23
+	rlwimi	$s1,$acc09,8,16,23
+	rlwimi	$s2,$acc10,8,16,23
+	rlwimi	$s3,$acc11,8,16,23
+	lwz	$t0,0($key)
+	or	$s0,$s0,$acc12
+	lwz	$t1,4($key)
+	or	$s1,$s1,$acc13
+	lwz	$t2,8($key)
+	or	$s2,$s2,$acc14
+	lwz	$t3,12($key)
+	or	$s3,$s3,$acc15
+
+	addi	$key,$key,16
+	bdz	Lenc_compact_done
+
+	and	$acc00,$s0,$mask80	# r1=r0&0x80808080
+	and	$acc01,$s1,$mask80
+	and	$acc02,$s2,$mask80
+	and	$acc03,$s3,$mask80
+	srwi	$acc04,$acc00,7		# r1>>7
+	andc	$acc08,$s0,$mask80	# r0&0x7f7f7f7f
+	srwi	$acc05,$acc01,7
+	andc	$acc09,$s1,$mask80
+	srwi	$acc06,$acc02,7
+	andc	$acc10,$s2,$mask80
+	srwi	$acc07,$acc03,7
+	andc	$acc11,$s3,$mask80
+	sub	$acc00,$acc00,$acc04	# r1-(r1>>7)
+	sub	$acc01,$acc01,$acc05
+	sub	$acc02,$acc02,$acc06
+	sub	$acc03,$acc03,$acc07
+	add	$acc08,$acc08,$acc08	# (r0&0x7f7f7f7f)<<1
+	add	$acc09,$acc09,$acc09
+	add	$acc10,$acc10,$acc10
+	add	$acc11,$acc11,$acc11
+	and	$acc00,$acc00,$mask1b	# (r1-(r1>>7))&0x1b1b1b1b
+	and	$acc01,$acc01,$mask1b
+	and	$acc02,$acc02,$mask1b
+	and	$acc03,$acc03,$mask1b
+	xor	$acc00,$acc00,$acc08	# r2
+	xor	$acc01,$acc01,$acc09
+	 rotlwi	$acc12,$s0,16		# ROTATE(r0,16)
+	xor	$acc02,$acc02,$acc10
+	 rotlwi	$acc13,$s1,16
+	xor	$acc03,$acc03,$acc11
+	 rotlwi	$acc14,$s2,16
+
+	xor	$s0,$s0,$acc00		# r0^r2
+	rotlwi	$acc15,$s3,16
+	xor	$s1,$s1,$acc01
+	rotrwi	$s0,$s0,24		# ROTATE(r2^r0,24)
+	xor	$s2,$s2,$acc02
+	rotrwi	$s1,$s1,24
+	xor	$s3,$s3,$acc03
+	rotrwi	$s2,$s2,24
+	xor	$s0,$s0,$acc00		# ROTATE(r2^r0,24)^r2
+	rotrwi	$s3,$s3,24
+	xor	$s1,$s1,$acc01
+	xor	$s2,$s2,$acc02
+	xor	$s3,$s3,$acc03
+	rotlwi	$acc08,$acc12,8		# ROTATE(r0,24)
+	xor	$s0,$s0,$acc12		#
+	rotlwi	$acc09,$acc13,8
+	xor	$s1,$s1,$acc13
+	rotlwi	$acc10,$acc14,8
+	xor	$s2,$s2,$acc14
+	rotlwi	$acc11,$acc15,8
+	xor	$s3,$s3,$acc15
+	xor	$s0,$s0,$acc08		#
+	xor	$s1,$s1,$acc09
+	xor	$s2,$s2,$acc10
+	xor	$s3,$s3,$acc11
+
+	b	Lenc_compact_loop
+.align	4
+Lenc_compact_done:
+	xor	$s0,$s0,$t0
+	xor	$s1,$s1,$t1
+	xor	$s2,$s2,$t2
+	xor	$s3,$s3,$t3
+	blr
+	.long	0
+	.byte	0,12,0x14,0,0,0,0,0
+.size	.AES_encrypt,.-.AES_encrypt
+
+.globl	.AES_decrypt
+.align	7
+.AES_decrypt:
+	$STU	$sp,-$FRAME($sp)
+	mflr	r0
+
+	$PUSH	$out,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*19`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r14,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*18`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r15,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*17`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r16,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*16`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r17,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*15`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r18,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*14`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r19,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*13`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r20,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*12`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r21,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*11`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r22,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*10`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r23,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*9`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r24,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*8`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r25,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*7`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r26,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*6`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r27,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*5`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r28,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*4`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r29,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*3`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r30,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*2`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r31,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*1`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r0,`$FRAME+$LRSAVE`($sp)
+
+	andi.	$t0,$inp,3
+	andi.	$t1,$out,3
+	or.	$t0,$t0,$t1
+	bne	Ldec_unaligned
+
+Ldec_unaligned_ok:
+___
+$code.=<<___ if (!$LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+	lwz	$s0,0($inp)
+	lwz	$s1,4($inp)
+	lwz	$s2,8($inp)
+	lwz	$s3,12($inp)
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+	lwz	$t0,0($inp)
+	lwz	$t1,4($inp)
+	lwz	$t2,8($inp)
+	lwz	$t3,12($inp)
+	rotlwi	$s0,$t0,8
+	rotlwi	$s1,$t1,8
+	rotlwi	$s2,$t2,8
+	rotlwi	$s3,$t3,8
+	rlwimi	$s0,$t0,24,0,7
+	rlwimi	$s1,$t1,24,0,7
+	rlwimi	$s2,$t2,24,0,7
+	rlwimi	$s3,$t3,24,0,7
+	rlwimi	$s0,$t0,24,16,23
+	rlwimi	$s1,$t1,24,16,23
+	rlwimi	$s2,$t2,24,16,23
+	rlwimi	$s3,$t3,24,16,23
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	bl	LAES_Td
+	bl	Lppc_AES_decrypt_compact
+	$POP	$out,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*19`($sp)
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+	rotlwi	$t0,$s0,8
+	rotlwi	$t1,$s1,8
+	rotlwi	$t2,$s2,8
+	rotlwi	$t3,$s3,8
+	rlwimi	$t0,$s0,24,0,7
+	rlwimi	$t1,$s1,24,0,7
+	rlwimi	$t2,$s2,24,0,7
+	rlwimi	$t3,$s3,24,0,7
+	rlwimi	$t0,$s0,24,16,23
+	rlwimi	$t1,$s1,24,16,23
+	rlwimi	$t2,$s2,24,16,23
+	rlwimi	$t3,$s3,24,16,23
+	stw	$t0,0($out)
+	stw	$t1,4($out)
+	stw	$t2,8($out)
+	stw	$t3,12($out)
+___
+$code.=<<___ if (!$LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+	stw	$s0,0($out)
+	stw	$s1,4($out)
+	stw	$s2,8($out)
+	stw	$s3,12($out)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	b	Ldec_done
+
+Ldec_unaligned:
+	subfic	$t0,$inp,4096
+	subfic	$t1,$out,4096
+	andi.	$t0,$t0,4096-16
+	beq	Ldec_xpage
+	andi.	$t1,$t1,4096-16
+	bne	Ldec_unaligned_ok
+
+Ldec_xpage:
+	lbz	$acc00,0($inp)
+	lbz	$acc01,1($inp)
+	lbz	$acc02,2($inp)
+	lbz	$s0,3($inp)
+	lbz	$acc04,4($inp)
+	lbz	$acc05,5($inp)
+	lbz	$acc06,6($inp)
+	lbz	$s1,7($inp)
+	lbz	$acc08,8($inp)
+	lbz	$acc09,9($inp)
+	lbz	$acc10,10($inp)
+	insrwi	$s0,$acc00,8,0
+	lbz	$s2,11($inp)
+	insrwi	$s1,$acc04,8,0
+	lbz	$acc12,12($inp)
+	insrwi	$s0,$acc01,8,8
+	lbz	$acc13,13($inp)
+	insrwi	$s1,$acc05,8,8
+	lbz	$acc14,14($inp)
+	insrwi	$s0,$acc02,8,16
+	lbz	$s3,15($inp)
+	insrwi	$s1,$acc06,8,16
+	insrwi	$s2,$acc08,8,0
+	insrwi	$s3,$acc12,8,0
+	insrwi	$s2,$acc09,8,8
+	insrwi	$s3,$acc13,8,8
+	insrwi	$s2,$acc10,8,16
+	insrwi	$s3,$acc14,8,16
+
+	bl	LAES_Td
+	bl	Lppc_AES_decrypt_compact
+	$POP	$out,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*19`($sp)
+
+	extrwi	$acc00,$s0,8,0
+	extrwi	$acc01,$s0,8,8
+	stb	$acc00,0($out)
+	extrwi	$acc02,$s0,8,16
+	stb	$acc01,1($out)
+	stb	$acc02,2($out)
+	extrwi	$acc04,$s1,8,0
+	stb	$s0,3($out)
+	extrwi	$acc05,$s1,8,8
+	stb	$acc04,4($out)
+	extrwi	$acc06,$s1,8,16
+	stb	$acc05,5($out)
+	stb	$acc06,6($out)
+	extrwi	$acc08,$s2,8,0
+	stb	$s1,7($out)
+	extrwi	$acc09,$s2,8,8
+	stb	$acc08,8($out)
+	extrwi	$acc10,$s2,8,16
+	stb	$acc09,9($out)
+	stb	$acc10,10($out)
+	extrwi	$acc12,$s3,8,0
+	stb	$s2,11($out)
+	extrwi	$acc13,$s3,8,8
+	stb	$acc12,12($out)
+	extrwi	$acc14,$s3,8,16
+	stb	$acc13,13($out)
+	stb	$acc14,14($out)
+	stb	$s3,15($out)
+
+Ldec_done:
+	$POP	r0,`$FRAME+$LRSAVE`($sp)
+	$POP	r14,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*18`($sp)
+	$POP	r15,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*17`($sp)
+	$POP	r16,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*16`($sp)
+	$POP	r17,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*15`($sp)
+	$POP	r18,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*14`($sp)
+	$POP	r19,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*13`($sp)
+	$POP	r20,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*12`($sp)
+	$POP	r21,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*11`($sp)
+	$POP	r22,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*10`($sp)
+	$POP	r23,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*9`($sp)
+	$POP	r24,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*8`($sp)
+	$POP	r25,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*7`($sp)
+	$POP	r26,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*6`($sp)
+	$POP	r27,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*5`($sp)
+	$POP	r28,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*4`($sp)
+	$POP	r29,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*3`($sp)
+	$POP	r30,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*2`($sp)
+	$POP	r31,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*1`($sp)
+	mtlr	r0
+	addi	$sp,$sp,$FRAME
+	blr
+	.long	0
+	.byte	0,12,4,1,0x80,18,3,0
+	.long	0
+
+.align	5
+Lppc_AES_decrypt:
+	lwz	$acc00,240($key)
+	addi	$Tbl1,$Tbl0,3
+	lwz	$t0,0($key)
+	addi	$Tbl2,$Tbl0,2
+	lwz	$t1,4($key)
+	addi	$Tbl3,$Tbl0,1
+	lwz	$t2,8($key)
+	addi	$acc00,$acc00,-1
+	lwz	$t3,12($key)
+	addi	$key,$key,16
+	xor	$s0,$s0,$t0
+	xor	$s1,$s1,$t1
+	xor	$s2,$s2,$t2
+	xor	$s3,$s3,$t3
+	mtctr	$acc00
+.align	4
+Ldec_loop:
+	rlwinm	$acc00,$s0,`32-24+3`,21,28
+	rlwinm	$acc01,$s1,`32-24+3`,21,28
+	rlwinm	$acc02,$s2,`32-24+3`,21,28
+	rlwinm	$acc03,$s3,`32-24+3`,21,28
+	lwz	$t0,0($key)
+	rlwinm	$acc04,$s3,`32-16+3`,21,28
+	lwz	$t1,4($key)
+	rlwinm	$acc05,$s0,`32-16+3`,21,28
+	lwz	$t2,8($key)
+	rlwinm	$acc06,$s1,`32-16+3`,21,28
+	lwz	$t3,12($key)
+	rlwinm	$acc07,$s2,`32-16+3`,21,28
+	lwzx	$acc00,$Tbl0,$acc00
+	rlwinm	$acc08,$s2,`32-8+3`,21,28
+	lwzx	$acc01,$Tbl0,$acc01
+	rlwinm	$acc09,$s3,`32-8+3`,21,28
+	lwzx	$acc02,$Tbl0,$acc02
+	rlwinm	$acc10,$s0,`32-8+3`,21,28
+	lwzx	$acc03,$Tbl0,$acc03
+	rlwinm	$acc11,$s1,`32-8+3`,21,28
+	lwzx	$acc04,$Tbl1,$acc04
+	rlwinm	$acc12,$s1,`0+3`,21,28
+	lwzx	$acc05,$Tbl1,$acc05
+	rlwinm	$acc13,$s2,`0+3`,21,28
+	lwzx	$acc06,$Tbl1,$acc06
+	rlwinm	$acc14,$s3,`0+3`,21,28
+	lwzx	$acc07,$Tbl1,$acc07
+	rlwinm	$acc15,$s0,`0+3`,21,28
+	lwzx	$acc08,$Tbl2,$acc08
+	xor	$t0,$t0,$acc00
+	lwzx	$acc09,$Tbl2,$acc09
+	xor	$t1,$t1,$acc01
+	lwzx	$acc10,$Tbl2,$acc10
+	xor	$t2,$t2,$acc02
+	lwzx	$acc11,$Tbl2,$acc11
+	xor	$t3,$t3,$acc03
+	lwzx	$acc12,$Tbl3,$acc12
+	xor	$t0,$t0,$acc04
+	lwzx	$acc13,$Tbl3,$acc13
+	xor	$t1,$t1,$acc05
+	lwzx	$acc14,$Tbl3,$acc14
+	xor	$t2,$t2,$acc06
+	lwzx	$acc15,$Tbl3,$acc15
+	xor	$t3,$t3,$acc07
+	xor	$t0,$t0,$acc08
+	xor	$t1,$t1,$acc09
+	xor	$t2,$t2,$acc10
+	xor	$t3,$t3,$acc11
+	xor	$s0,$t0,$acc12
+	xor	$s1,$t1,$acc13
+	xor	$s2,$t2,$acc14
+	xor	$s3,$t3,$acc15
+	addi	$key,$key,16
+	bdnz	Ldec_loop
+
+	addi	$Tbl2,$Tbl0,2048
+	nop
+	lwz	$t0,0($key)
+	rlwinm	$acc00,$s0,`32-24`,24,31
+	lwz	$t1,4($key)
+	rlwinm	$acc01,$s1,`32-24`,24,31
+	lwz	$t2,8($key)
+	rlwinm	$acc02,$s2,`32-24`,24,31
+	lwz	$t3,12($key)
+	rlwinm	$acc03,$s3,`32-24`,24,31
+	lwz	$acc08,`2048+0`($Tbl0)	! prefetch Td4
+	rlwinm	$acc04,$s3,`32-16`,24,31
+	lwz	$acc09,`2048+32`($Tbl0)
+	rlwinm	$acc05,$s0,`32-16`,24,31
+	lwz	$acc10,`2048+64`($Tbl0)
+	lbzx	$acc00,$Tbl2,$acc00
+	lwz	$acc11,`2048+96`($Tbl0)
+	lbzx	$acc01,$Tbl2,$acc01
+	lwz	$acc12,`2048+128`($Tbl0)
+	rlwinm	$acc06,$s1,`32-16`,24,31
+	lwz	$acc13,`2048+160`($Tbl0)
+	rlwinm	$acc07,$s2,`32-16`,24,31
+	lwz	$acc14,`2048+192`($Tbl0)
+	rlwinm	$acc08,$s2,`32-8`,24,31
+	lwz	$acc15,`2048+224`($Tbl0)
+	rlwinm	$acc09,$s3,`32-8`,24,31
+	lbzx	$acc02,$Tbl2,$acc02
+	rlwinm	$acc10,$s0,`32-8`,24,31
+	lbzx	$acc03,$Tbl2,$acc03
+	rlwinm	$acc11,$s1,`32-8`,24,31
+	lbzx	$acc04,$Tbl2,$acc04
+	rlwinm	$acc12,$s1,`0`,24,31
+	lbzx	$acc05,$Tbl2,$acc05
+	rlwinm	$acc13,$s2,`0`,24,31
+	lbzx	$acc06,$Tbl2,$acc06
+	rlwinm	$acc14,$s3,`0`,24,31
+	lbzx	$acc07,$Tbl2,$acc07
+	rlwinm	$acc15,$s0,`0`,24,31
+	lbzx	$acc08,$Tbl2,$acc08
+	rlwinm	$s0,$acc00,24,0,7
+	lbzx	$acc09,$Tbl2,$acc09
+	rlwinm	$s1,$acc01,24,0,7
+	lbzx	$acc10,$Tbl2,$acc10
+	rlwinm	$s2,$acc02,24,0,7
+	lbzx	$acc11,$Tbl2,$acc11
+	rlwinm	$s3,$acc03,24,0,7
+	lbzx	$acc12,$Tbl2,$acc12
+	rlwimi	$s0,$acc04,16,8,15
+	lbzx	$acc13,$Tbl2,$acc13
+	rlwimi	$s1,$acc05,16,8,15
+	lbzx	$acc14,$Tbl2,$acc14
+	rlwimi	$s2,$acc06,16,8,15
+	lbzx	$acc15,$Tbl2,$acc15
+	rlwimi	$s3,$acc07,16,8,15
+	rlwimi	$s0,$acc08,8,16,23
+	rlwimi	$s1,$acc09,8,16,23
+	rlwimi	$s2,$acc10,8,16,23
+	rlwimi	$s3,$acc11,8,16,23
+	or	$s0,$s0,$acc12
+	or	$s1,$s1,$acc13
+	or	$s2,$s2,$acc14
+	or	$s3,$s3,$acc15
+	xor	$s0,$s0,$t0
+	xor	$s1,$s1,$t1
+	xor	$s2,$s2,$t2
+	xor	$s3,$s3,$t3
+	blr
+	.long	0
+	.byte	0,12,0x14,0,0,0,0,0
+
+.align	4
+Lppc_AES_decrypt_compact:
+	lwz	$acc00,240($key)
+	addi	$Tbl1,$Tbl0,2048
+	lwz	$t0,0($key)
+	lis	$mask80,0x8080
+	lwz	$t1,4($key)
+	lis	$mask1b,0x1b1b
+	lwz	$t2,8($key)
+	ori	$mask80,$mask80,0x8080
+	lwz	$t3,12($key)
+	ori	$mask1b,$mask1b,0x1b1b
+	addi	$key,$key,16
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==8);
+	insrdi	$mask80,$mask80,32,0
+	insrdi	$mask1b,$mask1b,32,0
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	mtctr	$acc00
+.align	4
+Ldec_compact_loop:
+	xor	$s0,$s0,$t0
+	xor	$s1,$s1,$t1
+	rlwinm	$acc00,$s0,`32-24`,24,31
+	xor	$s2,$s2,$t2
+	rlwinm	$acc01,$s1,`32-24`,24,31
+	xor	$s3,$s3,$t3
+	rlwinm	$acc02,$s2,`32-24`,24,31
+	rlwinm	$acc03,$s3,`32-24`,24,31
+	rlwinm	$acc04,$s3,`32-16`,24,31
+	rlwinm	$acc05,$s0,`32-16`,24,31
+	rlwinm	$acc06,$s1,`32-16`,24,31
+	rlwinm	$acc07,$s2,`32-16`,24,31
+	lbzx	$acc00,$Tbl1,$acc00
+	rlwinm	$acc08,$s2,`32-8`,24,31
+	lbzx	$acc01,$Tbl1,$acc01
+	rlwinm	$acc09,$s3,`32-8`,24,31
+	lbzx	$acc02,$Tbl1,$acc02
+	rlwinm	$acc10,$s0,`32-8`,24,31
+	lbzx	$acc03,$Tbl1,$acc03
+	rlwinm	$acc11,$s1,`32-8`,24,31
+	lbzx	$acc04,$Tbl1,$acc04
+	rlwinm	$acc12,$s1,`0`,24,31
+	lbzx	$acc05,$Tbl1,$acc05
+	rlwinm	$acc13,$s2,`0`,24,31
+	lbzx	$acc06,$Tbl1,$acc06
+	rlwinm	$acc14,$s3,`0`,24,31
+	lbzx	$acc07,$Tbl1,$acc07
+	rlwinm	$acc15,$s0,`0`,24,31
+	lbzx	$acc08,$Tbl1,$acc08
+	rlwinm	$s0,$acc00,24,0,7
+	lbzx	$acc09,$Tbl1,$acc09
+	rlwinm	$s1,$acc01,24,0,7
+	lbzx	$acc10,$Tbl1,$acc10
+	rlwinm	$s2,$acc02,24,0,7
+	lbzx	$acc11,$Tbl1,$acc11
+	rlwinm	$s3,$acc03,24,0,7
+	lbzx	$acc12,$Tbl1,$acc12
+	rlwimi	$s0,$acc04,16,8,15
+	lbzx	$acc13,$Tbl1,$acc13
+	rlwimi	$s1,$acc05,16,8,15
+	lbzx	$acc14,$Tbl1,$acc14
+	rlwimi	$s2,$acc06,16,8,15
+	lbzx	$acc15,$Tbl1,$acc15
+	rlwimi	$s3,$acc07,16,8,15
+	rlwimi	$s0,$acc08,8,16,23
+	rlwimi	$s1,$acc09,8,16,23
+	rlwimi	$s2,$acc10,8,16,23
+	rlwimi	$s3,$acc11,8,16,23
+	lwz	$t0,0($key)
+	or	$s0,$s0,$acc12
+	lwz	$t1,4($key)
+	or	$s1,$s1,$acc13
+	lwz	$t2,8($key)
+	or	$s2,$s2,$acc14
+	lwz	$t3,12($key)
+	or	$s3,$s3,$acc15
+
+	addi	$key,$key,16
+	bdz	Ldec_compact_done
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==8);
+	# vectorized permutation improves decrypt performance by 10%
+	insrdi	$s0,$s1,32,0
+	insrdi	$s2,$s3,32,0
+
+	and	$acc00,$s0,$mask80	# r1=r0&0x80808080
+	and	$acc02,$s2,$mask80
+	srdi	$acc04,$acc00,7		# r1>>7
+	srdi	$acc06,$acc02,7
+	andc	$acc08,$s0,$mask80	# r0&0x7f7f7f7f
+	andc	$acc10,$s2,$mask80
+	sub	$acc00,$acc00,$acc04	# r1-(r1>>7)
+	sub	$acc02,$acc02,$acc06
+	add	$acc08,$acc08,$acc08	# (r0&0x7f7f7f7f)<<1
+	add	$acc10,$acc10,$acc10
+	and	$acc00,$acc00,$mask1b	# (r1-(r1>>7))&0x1b1b1b1b
+	and	$acc02,$acc02,$mask1b
+	xor	$acc00,$acc00,$acc08	# r2
+	xor	$acc02,$acc02,$acc10
+
+	and	$acc04,$acc00,$mask80	# r1=r2&0x80808080
+	and	$acc06,$acc02,$mask80
+	srdi	$acc08,$acc04,7		# r1>>7
+	srdi	$acc10,$acc06,7
+	andc	$acc12,$acc00,$mask80	# r2&0x7f7f7f7f
+	andc	$acc14,$acc02,$mask80
+	sub	$acc04,$acc04,$acc08	# r1-(r1>>7)
+	sub	$acc06,$acc06,$acc10
+	add	$acc12,$acc12,$acc12	# (r2&0x7f7f7f7f)<<1
+	add	$acc14,$acc14,$acc14
+	and	$acc04,$acc04,$mask1b	# (r1-(r1>>7))&0x1b1b1b1b
+	and	$acc06,$acc06,$mask1b
+	xor	$acc04,$acc04,$acc12	# r4
+	xor	$acc06,$acc06,$acc14
+
+	and	$acc08,$acc04,$mask80	# r1=r4&0x80808080
+	and	$acc10,$acc06,$mask80
+	srdi	$acc12,$acc08,7		# r1>>7
+	srdi	$acc14,$acc10,7
+	sub	$acc08,$acc08,$acc12	# r1-(r1>>7)
+	sub	$acc10,$acc10,$acc14
+	andc	$acc12,$acc04,$mask80	# r4&0x7f7f7f7f
+	andc	$acc14,$acc06,$mask80
+	add	$acc12,$acc12,$acc12	# (r4&0x7f7f7f7f)<<1
+	add	$acc14,$acc14,$acc14
+	and	$acc08,$acc08,$mask1b	# (r1-(r1>>7))&0x1b1b1b1b
+	and	$acc10,$acc10,$mask1b
+	xor	$acc08,$acc08,$acc12	# r8
+	xor	$acc10,$acc10,$acc14
+
+	xor	$acc00,$acc00,$s0	# r2^r0
+	xor	$acc02,$acc02,$s2
+	xor	$acc04,$acc04,$s0	# r4^r0
+	xor	$acc06,$acc06,$s2
+
+	extrdi	$acc01,$acc00,32,0
+	extrdi	$acc03,$acc02,32,0
+	extrdi	$acc05,$acc04,32,0
+	extrdi	$acc07,$acc06,32,0
+	extrdi	$acc09,$acc08,32,0
+	extrdi	$acc11,$acc10,32,0
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==4);
+	and	$acc00,$s0,$mask80	# r1=r0&0x80808080
+	and	$acc01,$s1,$mask80
+	and	$acc02,$s2,$mask80
+	and	$acc03,$s3,$mask80
+	srwi	$acc04,$acc00,7		# r1>>7
+	andc	$acc08,$s0,$mask80	# r0&0x7f7f7f7f
+	srwi	$acc05,$acc01,7
+	andc	$acc09,$s1,$mask80
+	srwi	$acc06,$acc02,7
+	andc	$acc10,$s2,$mask80
+	srwi	$acc07,$acc03,7
+	andc	$acc11,$s3,$mask80
+	sub	$acc00,$acc00,$acc04	# r1-(r1>>7)
+	sub	$acc01,$acc01,$acc05
+	sub	$acc02,$acc02,$acc06
+	sub	$acc03,$acc03,$acc07
+	add	$acc08,$acc08,$acc08	# (r0&0x7f7f7f7f)<<1
+	add	$acc09,$acc09,$acc09
+	add	$acc10,$acc10,$acc10
+	add	$acc11,$acc11,$acc11
+	and	$acc00,$acc00,$mask1b	# (r1-(r1>>7))&0x1b1b1b1b
+	and	$acc01,$acc01,$mask1b
+	and	$acc02,$acc02,$mask1b
+	and	$acc03,$acc03,$mask1b
+	xor	$acc00,$acc00,$acc08	# r2
+	xor	$acc01,$acc01,$acc09
+	xor	$acc02,$acc02,$acc10
+	xor	$acc03,$acc03,$acc11
+
+	and	$acc04,$acc00,$mask80	# r1=r2&0x80808080
+	and	$acc05,$acc01,$mask80
+	and	$acc06,$acc02,$mask80
+	and	$acc07,$acc03,$mask80
+	srwi	$acc08,$acc04,7		# r1>>7
+	andc	$acc12,$acc00,$mask80	# r2&0x7f7f7f7f
+	srwi	$acc09,$acc05,7
+	andc	$acc13,$acc01,$mask80
+	srwi	$acc10,$acc06,7
+	andc	$acc14,$acc02,$mask80
+	srwi	$acc11,$acc07,7
+	andc	$acc15,$acc03,$mask80
+	sub	$acc04,$acc04,$acc08	# r1-(r1>>7)
+	sub	$acc05,$acc05,$acc09
+	sub	$acc06,$acc06,$acc10
+	sub	$acc07,$acc07,$acc11
+	add	$acc12,$acc12,$acc12	# (r2&0x7f7f7f7f)<<1
+	add	$acc13,$acc13,$acc13
+	add	$acc14,$acc14,$acc14
+	add	$acc15,$acc15,$acc15
+	and	$acc04,$acc04,$mask1b	# (r1-(r1>>7))&0x1b1b1b1b
+	and	$acc05,$acc05,$mask1b
+	and	$acc06,$acc06,$mask1b
+	and	$acc07,$acc07,$mask1b
+	xor	$acc04,$acc04,$acc12	# r4
+	xor	$acc05,$acc05,$acc13
+	xor	$acc06,$acc06,$acc14
+	xor	$acc07,$acc07,$acc15
+
+	and	$acc08,$acc04,$mask80	# r1=r4&0x80808080
+	and	$acc09,$acc05,$mask80
+	srwi	$acc12,$acc08,7		# r1>>7
+	and	$acc10,$acc06,$mask80
+	srwi	$acc13,$acc09,7
+	and	$acc11,$acc07,$mask80
+	srwi	$acc14,$acc10,7
+	sub	$acc08,$acc08,$acc12	# r1-(r1>>7)
+	srwi	$acc15,$acc11,7
+	sub	$acc09,$acc09,$acc13
+	sub	$acc10,$acc10,$acc14
+	sub	$acc11,$acc11,$acc15
+	andc	$acc12,$acc04,$mask80	# r4&0x7f7f7f7f
+	andc	$acc13,$acc05,$mask80
+	andc	$acc14,$acc06,$mask80
+	andc	$acc15,$acc07,$mask80
+	add	$acc12,$acc12,$acc12	# (r4&0x7f7f7f7f)<<1
+	add	$acc13,$acc13,$acc13
+	add	$acc14,$acc14,$acc14
+	add	$acc15,$acc15,$acc15
+	and	$acc08,$acc08,$mask1b	# (r1-(r1>>7))&0x1b1b1b1b
+	and	$acc09,$acc09,$mask1b
+	and	$acc10,$acc10,$mask1b
+	and	$acc11,$acc11,$mask1b
+	xor	$acc08,$acc08,$acc12	# r8
+	xor	$acc09,$acc09,$acc13
+	xor	$acc10,$acc10,$acc14
+	xor	$acc11,$acc11,$acc15
+
+	xor	$acc00,$acc00,$s0	# r2^r0
+	xor	$acc01,$acc01,$s1
+	xor	$acc02,$acc02,$s2
+	xor	$acc03,$acc03,$s3
+	xor	$acc04,$acc04,$s0	# r4^r0
+	xor	$acc05,$acc05,$s1
+	xor	$acc06,$acc06,$s2
+	xor	$acc07,$acc07,$s3
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	rotrwi	$s0,$s0,8		# = ROTATE(r0,8)
+	rotrwi	$s1,$s1,8
+	xor	$s0,$s0,$acc00		# ^= r2^r0
+	rotrwi	$s2,$s2,8
+	xor	$s1,$s1,$acc01
+	rotrwi	$s3,$s3,8
+	xor	$s2,$s2,$acc02
+	xor	$s3,$s3,$acc03
+	xor	$acc00,$acc00,$acc08
+	xor	$acc01,$acc01,$acc09
+	xor	$acc02,$acc02,$acc10
+	xor	$acc03,$acc03,$acc11
+	xor	$s0,$s0,$acc04		# ^= r4^r0
+	rotrwi	$acc00,$acc00,24
+	xor	$s1,$s1,$acc05
+	rotrwi	$acc01,$acc01,24
+	xor	$s2,$s2,$acc06
+	rotrwi	$acc02,$acc02,24
+	xor	$s3,$s3,$acc07
+	rotrwi	$acc03,$acc03,24
+	xor	$acc04,$acc04,$acc08
+	xor	$acc05,$acc05,$acc09
+	xor	$acc06,$acc06,$acc10
+	xor	$acc07,$acc07,$acc11
+	xor	$s0,$s0,$acc08		# ^= r8 [^((r4^r0)^(r2^r0)=r4^r2)]
+	rotrwi	$acc04,$acc04,16
+	xor	$s1,$s1,$acc09
+	rotrwi	$acc05,$acc05,16
+	xor	$s2,$s2,$acc10
+	rotrwi	$acc06,$acc06,16
+	xor	$s3,$s3,$acc11
+	rotrwi	$acc07,$acc07,16
+	xor	$s0,$s0,$acc00		# ^= ROTATE(r8^r2^r0,24)
+	rotrwi	$acc08,$acc08,8
+	xor	$s1,$s1,$acc01
+	rotrwi	$acc09,$acc09,8
+	xor	$s2,$s2,$acc02
+	rotrwi	$acc10,$acc10,8
+	xor	$s3,$s3,$acc03
+	rotrwi	$acc11,$acc11,8
+	xor	$s0,$s0,$acc04		# ^= ROTATE(r8^r4^r0,16)
+	xor	$s1,$s1,$acc05
+	xor	$s2,$s2,$acc06
+	xor	$s3,$s3,$acc07
+	xor	$s0,$s0,$acc08		# ^= ROTATE(r8,8)	
+	xor	$s1,$s1,$acc09	
+	xor	$s2,$s2,$acc10	
+	xor	$s3,$s3,$acc11	
+
+	b	Ldec_compact_loop
+.align	4
+Ldec_compact_done:
+	xor	$s0,$s0,$t0
+	xor	$s1,$s1,$t1
+	xor	$s2,$s2,$t2
+	xor	$s3,$s3,$t3
+	blr
+	.long	0
+	.byte	0,12,0x14,0,0,0,0,0
+.size	.AES_decrypt,.-.AES_decrypt
+
+.asciz	"AES for PPC, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+.align	7
+___
+
+$code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem;
+print $code;
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/asm/aes-s390x.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/asm/aes-s390x.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fd8a737
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/asm/aes-s390x.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,2226 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2007-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+
+# AES for s390x.
+
+# April 2007.
+#
+# Software performance improvement over gcc-generated code is ~70% and
+# in absolute terms is ~73 cycles per byte processed with 128-bit key.
+# You're likely to exclaim "why so slow?" Keep in mind that z-CPUs are
+# *strictly* in-order execution and issued instruction [in this case
+# load value from memory is critical] has to complete before execution
+# flow proceeds. S-boxes are compressed to 2KB[+256B].
+#
+# As for hardware acceleration support. It's basically a "teaser," as
+# it can and should be improved in several ways. Most notably support
+# for CBC is not utilized, nor multiple blocks are ever processed.
+# Then software key schedule can be postponed till hardware support
+# detection... Performance improvement over assembler is reportedly
+# ~2.5x, but can reach >8x [naturally on larger chunks] if proper
+# support is implemented.
+
+# May 2007.
+#
+# Implement AES_set_[en|de]crypt_key. Key schedule setup is avoided
+# for 128-bit keys, if hardware support is detected.
+
+# Januray 2009.
+#
+# Add support for hardware AES192/256 and reschedule instructions to
+# minimize/avoid Address Generation Interlock hazard and to favour
+# dual-issue z10 pipeline. This gave ~25% improvement on z10 and
+# almost 50% on z9. The gain is smaller on z10, because being dual-
+# issue z10 makes it improssible to eliminate the interlock condition:
+# critial path is not long enough. Yet it spends ~24 cycles per byte
+# processed with 128-bit key.
+#
+# Unlike previous version hardware support detection takes place only
+# at the moment of key schedule setup, which is denoted in key->rounds.
+# This is done, because deferred key setup can't be made MT-safe, not
+# for keys longer than 128 bits.
+#
+# Add AES_cbc_encrypt, which gives incredible performance improvement,
+# it was measured to be ~6.6x. It's less than previously mentioned 8x,
+# because software implementation was optimized.
+
+# May 2010.
+#
+# Add AES_ctr32_encrypt. If hardware-assisted, it provides up to 4.3x
+# performance improvement over "generic" counter mode routine relying
+# on single-block, also hardware-assisted, AES_encrypt. "Up to" refers
+# to the fact that exact throughput value depends on current stack
+# frame alignment within 4KB page. In worst case you get ~75% of the
+# maximum, but *on average* it would be as much as ~98%. Meaning that
+# worst case is unlike, it's like hitting ravine on plateau.
+
+# November 2010.
+#
+# Adapt for -m31 build. If kernel supports what's called "highgprs"
+# feature on Linux [see /proc/cpuinfo], it's possible to use 64-bit
+# instructions and achieve "64-bit" performance even in 31-bit legacy
+# application context. The feature is not specific to any particular
+# processor, as long as it's "z-CPU". Latter implies that the code
+# remains z/Architecture specific. On z990 it was measured to perform
+# 2x better than code generated by gcc 4.3.
+
+# December 2010.
+#
+# Add support for z196 "cipher message with counter" instruction.
+# Note however that it's disengaged, because it was measured to
+# perform ~12% worse than vanilla km-based code...
+
+# February 2011.
+#
+# Add AES_xts_[en|de]crypt. This includes support for z196 km-xts-aes
+# instructions, which deliver ~70% improvement at 8KB block size over
+# vanilla km-based code, 37% - at most like 512-bytes block size.
+
+$flavour = shift;
+
+if ($flavour =~ /3[12]/) {
+	$SIZE_T=4;
+	$g="";
+} else {
+	$SIZE_T=8;
+	$g="g";
+}
+
+while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {}
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+$softonly=0;	# allow hardware support
+
+$t0="%r0";	$mask="%r0";
+$t1="%r1";
+$t2="%r2";	$inp="%r2";
+$t3="%r3";	$out="%r3";	$bits="%r3";
+$key="%r4";
+$i1="%r5";
+$i2="%r6";
+$i3="%r7";
+$s0="%r8";
+$s1="%r9";
+$s2="%r10";
+$s3="%r11";
+$tbl="%r12";
+$rounds="%r13";
+$ra="%r14";
+$sp="%r15";
+
+$stdframe=16*$SIZE_T+4*8;
+
+sub _data_word()
+{ my $i;
+    while(defined($i=shift)) { $code.=sprintf".long\t0x%08x,0x%08x\n",$i,$i; }
+}
+
+$code=<<___;
+.text
+
+.type	AES_Te,\@object
+.align	256
+AES_Te:
+___
+&_data_word(
+	0xc66363a5, 0xf87c7c84, 0xee777799, 0xf67b7b8d,
+	0xfff2f20d, 0xd66b6bbd, 0xde6f6fb1, 0x91c5c554,
+	0x60303050, 0x02010103, 0xce6767a9, 0x562b2b7d,
+	0xe7fefe19, 0xb5d7d762, 0x4dababe6, 0xec76769a,
+	0x8fcaca45, 0x1f82829d, 0x89c9c940, 0xfa7d7d87,
+	0xeffafa15, 0xb25959eb, 0x8e4747c9, 0xfbf0f00b,
+	0x41adadec, 0xb3d4d467, 0x5fa2a2fd, 0x45afafea,
+	0x239c9cbf, 0x53a4a4f7, 0xe4727296, 0x9bc0c05b,
+	0x75b7b7c2, 0xe1fdfd1c, 0x3d9393ae, 0x4c26266a,
+	0x6c36365a, 0x7e3f3f41, 0xf5f7f702, 0x83cccc4f,
+	0x6834345c, 0x51a5a5f4, 0xd1e5e534, 0xf9f1f108,
+	0xe2717193, 0xabd8d873, 0x62313153, 0x2a15153f,
+	0x0804040c, 0x95c7c752, 0x46232365, 0x9dc3c35e,
+	0x30181828, 0x379696a1, 0x0a05050f, 0x2f9a9ab5,
+	0x0e070709, 0x24121236, 0x1b80809b, 0xdfe2e23d,
+	0xcdebeb26, 0x4e272769, 0x7fb2b2cd, 0xea75759f,
+	0x1209091b, 0x1d83839e, 0x582c2c74, 0x341a1a2e,
+	0x361b1b2d, 0xdc6e6eb2, 0xb45a5aee, 0x5ba0a0fb,
+	0xa45252f6, 0x763b3b4d, 0xb7d6d661, 0x7db3b3ce,
+	0x5229297b, 0xdde3e33e, 0x5e2f2f71, 0x13848497,
+	0xa65353f5, 0xb9d1d168, 0x00000000, 0xc1eded2c,
+	0x40202060, 0xe3fcfc1f, 0x79b1b1c8, 0xb65b5bed,
+	0xd46a6abe, 0x8dcbcb46, 0x67bebed9, 0x7239394b,
+	0x944a4ade, 0x984c4cd4, 0xb05858e8, 0x85cfcf4a,
+	0xbbd0d06b, 0xc5efef2a, 0x4faaaae5, 0xedfbfb16,
+	0x864343c5, 0x9a4d4dd7, 0x66333355, 0x11858594,
+	0x8a4545cf, 0xe9f9f910, 0x04020206, 0xfe7f7f81,
+	0xa05050f0, 0x783c3c44, 0x259f9fba, 0x4ba8a8e3,
+	0xa25151f3, 0x5da3a3fe, 0x804040c0, 0x058f8f8a,
+	0x3f9292ad, 0x219d9dbc, 0x70383848, 0xf1f5f504,
+	0x63bcbcdf, 0x77b6b6c1, 0xafdada75, 0x42212163,
+	0x20101030, 0xe5ffff1a, 0xfdf3f30e, 0xbfd2d26d,
+	0x81cdcd4c, 0x180c0c14, 0x26131335, 0xc3ecec2f,
+	0xbe5f5fe1, 0x359797a2, 0x884444cc, 0x2e171739,
+	0x93c4c457, 0x55a7a7f2, 0xfc7e7e82, 0x7a3d3d47,
+	0xc86464ac, 0xba5d5de7, 0x3219192b, 0xe6737395,
+	0xc06060a0, 0x19818198, 0x9e4f4fd1, 0xa3dcdc7f,
+	0x44222266, 0x542a2a7e, 0x3b9090ab, 0x0b888883,
+	0x8c4646ca, 0xc7eeee29, 0x6bb8b8d3, 0x2814143c,
+	0xa7dede79, 0xbc5e5ee2, 0x160b0b1d, 0xaddbdb76,
+	0xdbe0e03b, 0x64323256, 0x743a3a4e, 0x140a0a1e,
+	0x924949db, 0x0c06060a, 0x4824246c, 0xb85c5ce4,
+	0x9fc2c25d, 0xbdd3d36e, 0x43acacef, 0xc46262a6,
+	0x399191a8, 0x319595a4, 0xd3e4e437, 0xf279798b,
+	0xd5e7e732, 0x8bc8c843, 0x6e373759, 0xda6d6db7,
+	0x018d8d8c, 0xb1d5d564, 0x9c4e4ed2, 0x49a9a9e0,
+	0xd86c6cb4, 0xac5656fa, 0xf3f4f407, 0xcfeaea25,
+	0xca6565af, 0xf47a7a8e, 0x47aeaee9, 0x10080818,
+	0x6fbabad5, 0xf0787888, 0x4a25256f, 0x5c2e2e72,
+	0x381c1c24, 0x57a6a6f1, 0x73b4b4c7, 0x97c6c651,
+	0xcbe8e823, 0xa1dddd7c, 0xe874749c, 0x3e1f1f21,
+	0x964b4bdd, 0x61bdbddc, 0x0d8b8b86, 0x0f8a8a85,
+	0xe0707090, 0x7c3e3e42, 0x71b5b5c4, 0xcc6666aa,
+	0x904848d8, 0x06030305, 0xf7f6f601, 0x1c0e0e12,
+	0xc26161a3, 0x6a35355f, 0xae5757f9, 0x69b9b9d0,
+	0x17868691, 0x99c1c158, 0x3a1d1d27, 0x279e9eb9,
+	0xd9e1e138, 0xebf8f813, 0x2b9898b3, 0x22111133,
+	0xd26969bb, 0xa9d9d970, 0x078e8e89, 0x339494a7,
+	0x2d9b9bb6, 0x3c1e1e22, 0x15878792, 0xc9e9e920,
+	0x87cece49, 0xaa5555ff, 0x50282878, 0xa5dfdf7a,
+	0x038c8c8f, 0x59a1a1f8, 0x09898980, 0x1a0d0d17,
+	0x65bfbfda, 0xd7e6e631, 0x844242c6, 0xd06868b8,
+	0x824141c3, 0x299999b0, 0x5a2d2d77, 0x1e0f0f11,
+	0x7bb0b0cb, 0xa85454fc, 0x6dbbbbd6, 0x2c16163a);
+$code.=<<___;
+# Te4[256]
+.byte	0x63, 0x7c, 0x77, 0x7b, 0xf2, 0x6b, 0x6f, 0xc5
+.byte	0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2b, 0xfe, 0xd7, 0xab, 0x76
+.byte	0xca, 0x82, 0xc9, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0x59, 0x47, 0xf0
+.byte	0xad, 0xd4, 0xa2, 0xaf, 0x9c, 0xa4, 0x72, 0xc0
+.byte	0xb7, 0xfd, 0x93, 0x26, 0x36, 0x3f, 0xf7, 0xcc
+.byte	0x34, 0xa5, 0xe5, 0xf1, 0x71, 0xd8, 0x31, 0x15
+.byte	0x04, 0xc7, 0x23, 0xc3, 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9a
+.byte	0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xeb, 0x27, 0xb2, 0x75
+.byte	0x09, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x6e, 0x5a, 0xa0
+.byte	0x52, 0x3b, 0xd6, 0xb3, 0x29, 0xe3, 0x2f, 0x84
+.byte	0x53, 0xd1, 0x00, 0xed, 0x20, 0xfc, 0xb1, 0x5b
+.byte	0x6a, 0xcb, 0xbe, 0x39, 0x4a, 0x4c, 0x58, 0xcf
+.byte	0xd0, 0xef, 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x43, 0x4d, 0x33, 0x85
+.byte	0x45, 0xf9, 0x02, 0x7f, 0x50, 0x3c, 0x9f, 0xa8
+.byte	0x51, 0xa3, 0x40, 0x8f, 0x92, 0x9d, 0x38, 0xf5
+.byte	0xbc, 0xb6, 0xda, 0x21, 0x10, 0xff, 0xf3, 0xd2
+.byte	0xcd, 0x0c, 0x13, 0xec, 0x5f, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17
+.byte	0xc4, 0xa7, 0x7e, 0x3d, 0x64, 0x5d, 0x19, 0x73
+.byte	0x60, 0x81, 0x4f, 0xdc, 0x22, 0x2a, 0x90, 0x88
+.byte	0x46, 0xee, 0xb8, 0x14, 0xde, 0x5e, 0x0b, 0xdb
+.byte	0xe0, 0x32, 0x3a, 0x0a, 0x49, 0x06, 0x24, 0x5c
+.byte	0xc2, 0xd3, 0xac, 0x62, 0x91, 0x95, 0xe4, 0x79
+.byte	0xe7, 0xc8, 0x37, 0x6d, 0x8d, 0xd5, 0x4e, 0xa9
+.byte	0x6c, 0x56, 0xf4, 0xea, 0x65, 0x7a, 0xae, 0x08
+.byte	0xba, 0x78, 0x25, 0x2e, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xb4, 0xc6
+.byte	0xe8, 0xdd, 0x74, 0x1f, 0x4b, 0xbd, 0x8b, 0x8a
+.byte	0x70, 0x3e, 0xb5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xf6, 0x0e
+.byte	0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xb9, 0x86, 0xc1, 0x1d, 0x9e
+.byte	0xe1, 0xf8, 0x98, 0x11, 0x69, 0xd9, 0x8e, 0x94
+.byte	0x9b, 0x1e, 0x87, 0xe9, 0xce, 0x55, 0x28, 0xdf
+.byte	0x8c, 0xa1, 0x89, 0x0d, 0xbf, 0xe6, 0x42, 0x68
+.byte	0x41, 0x99, 0x2d, 0x0f, 0xb0, 0x54, 0xbb, 0x16
+# rcon[]
+.long	0x01000000, 0x02000000, 0x04000000, 0x08000000
+.long	0x10000000, 0x20000000, 0x40000000, 0x80000000
+.long	0x1B000000, 0x36000000, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
+.align	256
+.size	AES_Te,.-AES_Te
+
+# void AES_encrypt(const unsigned char *inp, unsigned char *out,
+# 		 const AES_KEY *key) {
+.globl	AES_encrypt
+.type	AES_encrypt,\@function
+AES_encrypt:
+___
+$code.=<<___ if (!$softonly);
+	l	%r0,240($key)
+	lhi	%r1,16
+	clr	%r0,%r1
+	jl	.Lesoft
+
+	la	%r1,0($key)
+	#la	%r2,0($inp)
+	la	%r4,0($out)
+	lghi	%r3,16		# single block length
+	.long	0xb92e0042	# km %r4,%r2
+	brc	1,.-4		# can this happen?
+	br	%r14
+.align	64
+.Lesoft:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	stm${g}	%r3,$ra,3*$SIZE_T($sp)
+
+	llgf	$s0,0($inp)
+	llgf	$s1,4($inp)
+	llgf	$s2,8($inp)
+	llgf	$s3,12($inp)
+
+	larl	$tbl,AES_Te
+	bras	$ra,_s390x_AES_encrypt
+
+	l${g}	$out,3*$SIZE_T($sp)
+	st	$s0,0($out)
+	st	$s1,4($out)
+	st	$s2,8($out)
+	st	$s3,12($out)
+
+	lm${g}	%r6,$ra,6*$SIZE_T($sp)
+	br	$ra
+.size	AES_encrypt,.-AES_encrypt
+
+.type   _s390x_AES_encrypt,\@function
+.align	16
+_s390x_AES_encrypt:
+	st${g}	$ra,15*$SIZE_T($sp)
+	x	$s0,0($key)
+	x	$s1,4($key)
+	x	$s2,8($key)
+	x	$s3,12($key)
+	l	$rounds,240($key)
+	llill	$mask,`0xff<<3`
+	aghi	$rounds,-1
+	j	.Lenc_loop
+.align	16
+.Lenc_loop:
+	sllg	$t1,$s0,`0+3`
+	srlg	$t2,$s0,`8-3`
+	srlg	$t3,$s0,`16-3`
+	srl	$s0,`24-3`
+	nr	$s0,$mask
+	ngr	$t1,$mask
+	nr	$t2,$mask
+	nr	$t3,$mask
+
+	srlg	$i1,$s1,`16-3`	# i0
+	sllg	$i2,$s1,`0+3`
+	srlg	$i3,$s1,`8-3`
+	srl	$s1,`24-3`
+	nr	$i1,$mask
+	nr	$s1,$mask
+	ngr	$i2,$mask
+	nr	$i3,$mask
+
+	l	$s0,0($s0,$tbl)	# Te0[s0>>24]
+	l	$t1,1($t1,$tbl)	# Te3[s0>>0]
+	l	$t2,2($t2,$tbl) # Te2[s0>>8]
+	l	$t3,3($t3,$tbl)	# Te1[s0>>16]
+
+	x	$s0,3($i1,$tbl)	# Te1[s1>>16]
+	l	$s1,0($s1,$tbl)	# Te0[s1>>24]
+	x	$t2,1($i2,$tbl)	# Te3[s1>>0]
+	x	$t3,2($i3,$tbl)	# Te2[s1>>8]
+
+	srlg	$i1,$s2,`8-3`	# i0
+	srlg	$i2,$s2,`16-3`	# i1
+	nr	$i1,$mask
+	nr	$i2,$mask
+	sllg	$i3,$s2,`0+3`
+	srl	$s2,`24-3`
+	nr	$s2,$mask
+	ngr	$i3,$mask
+
+	xr	$s1,$t1
+	srlg	$ra,$s3,`8-3`	# i1
+	sllg	$t1,$s3,`0+3`	# i0
+	nr	$ra,$mask
+	la	$key,16($key)
+	ngr	$t1,$mask
+
+	x	$s0,2($i1,$tbl)	# Te2[s2>>8]
+	x	$s1,3($i2,$tbl)	# Te1[s2>>16]
+	l	$s2,0($s2,$tbl)	# Te0[s2>>24]
+	x	$t3,1($i3,$tbl)	# Te3[s2>>0]
+
+	srlg	$i3,$s3,`16-3`	# i2
+	xr	$s2,$t2
+	srl	$s3,`24-3`
+	nr	$i3,$mask
+	nr	$s3,$mask
+
+	x	$s0,0($key)
+	x	$s1,4($key)
+	x	$s2,8($key)
+	x	$t3,12($key)
+
+	x	$s0,1($t1,$tbl)	# Te3[s3>>0]
+	x	$s1,2($ra,$tbl)	# Te2[s3>>8]
+	x	$s2,3($i3,$tbl)	# Te1[s3>>16]
+	l	$s3,0($s3,$tbl)	# Te0[s3>>24]
+	xr	$s3,$t3
+
+	brct	$rounds,.Lenc_loop
+	.align	16
+
+	sllg	$t1,$s0,`0+3`
+	srlg	$t2,$s0,`8-3`
+	ngr	$t1,$mask
+	srlg	$t3,$s0,`16-3`
+	srl	$s0,`24-3`
+	nr	$s0,$mask
+	nr	$t2,$mask
+	nr	$t3,$mask
+
+	srlg	$i1,$s1,`16-3`	# i0
+	sllg	$i2,$s1,`0+3`
+	ngr	$i2,$mask
+	srlg	$i3,$s1,`8-3`
+	srl	$s1,`24-3`
+	nr	$i1,$mask
+	nr	$s1,$mask
+	nr	$i3,$mask
+
+	llgc	$s0,2($s0,$tbl)	# Te4[s0>>24]
+	llgc	$t1,2($t1,$tbl)	# Te4[s0>>0]
+	sll	$s0,24
+	llgc	$t2,2($t2,$tbl)	# Te4[s0>>8]
+	llgc	$t3,2($t3,$tbl)	# Te4[s0>>16]
+	sll	$t2,8
+	sll	$t3,16
+
+	llgc	$i1,2($i1,$tbl)	# Te4[s1>>16]
+	llgc	$s1,2($s1,$tbl)	# Te4[s1>>24]
+	llgc	$i2,2($i2,$tbl)	# Te4[s1>>0]
+	llgc	$i3,2($i3,$tbl)	# Te4[s1>>8]
+	sll	$i1,16
+	sll	$s1,24
+	sll	$i3,8
+	or	$s0,$i1
+	or	$s1,$t1
+	or	$t2,$i2
+	or	$t3,$i3
+	
+	srlg	$i1,$s2,`8-3`	# i0
+	srlg	$i2,$s2,`16-3`	# i1
+	nr	$i1,$mask
+	nr	$i2,$mask
+	sllg	$i3,$s2,`0+3`
+	srl	$s2,`24-3`
+	ngr	$i3,$mask
+	nr	$s2,$mask
+
+	sllg	$t1,$s3,`0+3`	# i0
+	srlg	$ra,$s3,`8-3`	# i1
+	ngr	$t1,$mask
+
+	llgc	$i1,2($i1,$tbl)	# Te4[s2>>8]
+	llgc	$i2,2($i2,$tbl)	# Te4[s2>>16]
+	sll	$i1,8
+	llgc	$s2,2($s2,$tbl)	# Te4[s2>>24]
+	llgc	$i3,2($i3,$tbl)	# Te4[s2>>0]
+	sll	$i2,16
+	nr	$ra,$mask
+	sll	$s2,24
+	or	$s0,$i1
+	or	$s1,$i2
+	or	$s2,$t2
+	or	$t3,$i3
+
+	srlg	$i3,$s3,`16-3`	# i2
+	srl	$s3,`24-3`
+	nr	$i3,$mask
+	nr	$s3,$mask
+
+	l	$t0,16($key)
+	l	$t2,20($key)
+
+	llgc	$i1,2($t1,$tbl)	# Te4[s3>>0]
+	llgc	$i2,2($ra,$tbl)	# Te4[s3>>8]
+	llgc	$i3,2($i3,$tbl)	# Te4[s3>>16]
+	llgc	$s3,2($s3,$tbl)	# Te4[s3>>24]
+	sll	$i2,8
+	sll	$i3,16
+	sll	$s3,24
+	or	$s0,$i1
+	or	$s1,$i2
+	or	$s2,$i3
+	or	$s3,$t3
+
+	l${g}	$ra,15*$SIZE_T($sp)
+	xr	$s0,$t0
+	xr	$s1,$t2
+	x	$s2,24($key)
+	x	$s3,28($key)
+
+	br	$ra	
+.size	_s390x_AES_encrypt,.-_s390x_AES_encrypt
+___
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.type	AES_Td,\@object
+.align	256
+AES_Td:
+___
+&_data_word(
+	0x51f4a750, 0x7e416553, 0x1a17a4c3, 0x3a275e96,
+	0x3bab6bcb, 0x1f9d45f1, 0xacfa58ab, 0x4be30393,
+	0x2030fa55, 0xad766df6, 0x88cc7691, 0xf5024c25,
+	0x4fe5d7fc, 0xc52acbd7, 0x26354480, 0xb562a38f,
+	0xdeb15a49, 0x25ba1b67, 0x45ea0e98, 0x5dfec0e1,
+	0xc32f7502, 0x814cf012, 0x8d4697a3, 0x6bd3f9c6,
+	0x038f5fe7, 0x15929c95, 0xbf6d7aeb, 0x955259da,
+	0xd4be832d, 0x587421d3, 0x49e06929, 0x8ec9c844,
+	0x75c2896a, 0xf48e7978, 0x99583e6b, 0x27b971dd,
+	0xbee14fb6, 0xf088ad17, 0xc920ac66, 0x7dce3ab4,
+	0x63df4a18, 0xe51a3182, 0x97513360, 0x62537f45,
+	0xb16477e0, 0xbb6bae84, 0xfe81a01c, 0xf9082b94,
+	0x70486858, 0x8f45fd19, 0x94de6c87, 0x527bf8b7,
+	0xab73d323, 0x724b02e2, 0xe31f8f57, 0x6655ab2a,
+	0xb2eb2807, 0x2fb5c203, 0x86c57b9a, 0xd33708a5,
+	0x302887f2, 0x23bfa5b2, 0x02036aba, 0xed16825c,
+	0x8acf1c2b, 0xa779b492, 0xf307f2f0, 0x4e69e2a1,
+	0x65daf4cd, 0x0605bed5, 0xd134621f, 0xc4a6fe8a,
+	0x342e539d, 0xa2f355a0, 0x058ae132, 0xa4f6eb75,
+	0x0b83ec39, 0x4060efaa, 0x5e719f06, 0xbd6e1051,
+	0x3e218af9, 0x96dd063d, 0xdd3e05ae, 0x4de6bd46,
+	0x91548db5, 0x71c45d05, 0x0406d46f, 0x605015ff,
+	0x1998fb24, 0xd6bde997, 0x894043cc, 0x67d99e77,
+	0xb0e842bd, 0x07898b88, 0xe7195b38, 0x79c8eedb,
+	0xa17c0a47, 0x7c420fe9, 0xf8841ec9, 0x00000000,
+	0x09808683, 0x322bed48, 0x1e1170ac, 0x6c5a724e,
+	0xfd0efffb, 0x0f853856, 0x3daed51e, 0x362d3927,
+	0x0a0fd964, 0x685ca621, 0x9b5b54d1, 0x24362e3a,
+	0x0c0a67b1, 0x9357e70f, 0xb4ee96d2, 0x1b9b919e,
+	0x80c0c54f, 0x61dc20a2, 0x5a774b69, 0x1c121a16,
+	0xe293ba0a, 0xc0a02ae5, 0x3c22e043, 0x121b171d,
+	0x0e090d0b, 0xf28bc7ad, 0x2db6a8b9, 0x141ea9c8,
+	0x57f11985, 0xaf75074c, 0xee99ddbb, 0xa37f60fd,
+	0xf701269f, 0x5c72f5bc, 0x44663bc5, 0x5bfb7e34,
+	0x8b432976, 0xcb23c6dc, 0xb6edfc68, 0xb8e4f163,
+	0xd731dcca, 0x42638510, 0x13972240, 0x84c61120,
+	0x854a247d, 0xd2bb3df8, 0xaef93211, 0xc729a16d,
+	0x1d9e2f4b, 0xdcb230f3, 0x0d8652ec, 0x77c1e3d0,
+	0x2bb3166c, 0xa970b999, 0x119448fa, 0x47e96422,
+	0xa8fc8cc4, 0xa0f03f1a, 0x567d2cd8, 0x223390ef,
+	0x87494ec7, 0xd938d1c1, 0x8ccaa2fe, 0x98d40b36,
+	0xa6f581cf, 0xa57ade28, 0xdab78e26, 0x3fadbfa4,
+	0x2c3a9de4, 0x5078920d, 0x6a5fcc9b, 0x547e4662,
+	0xf68d13c2, 0x90d8b8e8, 0x2e39f75e, 0x82c3aff5,
+	0x9f5d80be, 0x69d0937c, 0x6fd52da9, 0xcf2512b3,
+	0xc8ac993b, 0x10187da7, 0xe89c636e, 0xdb3bbb7b,
+	0xcd267809, 0x6e5918f4, 0xec9ab701, 0x834f9aa8,
+	0xe6956e65, 0xaaffe67e, 0x21bccf08, 0xef15e8e6,
+	0xbae79bd9, 0x4a6f36ce, 0xea9f09d4, 0x29b07cd6,
+	0x31a4b2af, 0x2a3f2331, 0xc6a59430, 0x35a266c0,
+	0x744ebc37, 0xfc82caa6, 0xe090d0b0, 0x33a7d815,
+	0xf104984a, 0x41ecdaf7, 0x7fcd500e, 0x1791f62f,
+	0x764dd68d, 0x43efb04d, 0xccaa4d54, 0xe49604df,
+	0x9ed1b5e3, 0x4c6a881b, 0xc12c1fb8, 0x4665517f,
+	0x9d5eea04, 0x018c355d, 0xfa877473, 0xfb0b412e,
+	0xb3671d5a, 0x92dbd252, 0xe9105633, 0x6dd64713,
+	0x9ad7618c, 0x37a10c7a, 0x59f8148e, 0xeb133c89,
+	0xcea927ee, 0xb761c935, 0xe11ce5ed, 0x7a47b13c,
+	0x9cd2df59, 0x55f2733f, 0x1814ce79, 0x73c737bf,
+	0x53f7cdea, 0x5ffdaa5b, 0xdf3d6f14, 0x7844db86,
+	0xcaaff381, 0xb968c43e, 0x3824342c, 0xc2a3405f,
+	0x161dc372, 0xbce2250c, 0x283c498b, 0xff0d9541,
+	0x39a80171, 0x080cb3de, 0xd8b4e49c, 0x6456c190,
+	0x7bcb8461, 0xd532b670, 0x486c5c74, 0xd0b85742);
+$code.=<<___;
+# Td4[256]
+.byte	0x52, 0x09, 0x6a, 0xd5, 0x30, 0x36, 0xa5, 0x38
+.byte	0xbf, 0x40, 0xa3, 0x9e, 0x81, 0xf3, 0xd7, 0xfb
+.byte	0x7c, 0xe3, 0x39, 0x82, 0x9b, 0x2f, 0xff, 0x87
+.byte	0x34, 0x8e, 0x43, 0x44, 0xc4, 0xde, 0xe9, 0xcb
+.byte	0x54, 0x7b, 0x94, 0x32, 0xa6, 0xc2, 0x23, 0x3d
+.byte	0xee, 0x4c, 0x95, 0x0b, 0x42, 0xfa, 0xc3, 0x4e
+.byte	0x08, 0x2e, 0xa1, 0x66, 0x28, 0xd9, 0x24, 0xb2
+.byte	0x76, 0x5b, 0xa2, 0x49, 0x6d, 0x8b, 0xd1, 0x25
+.byte	0x72, 0xf8, 0xf6, 0x64, 0x86, 0x68, 0x98, 0x16
+.byte	0xd4, 0xa4, 0x5c, 0xcc, 0x5d, 0x65, 0xb6, 0x92
+.byte	0x6c, 0x70, 0x48, 0x50, 0xfd, 0xed, 0xb9, 0xda
+.byte	0x5e, 0x15, 0x46, 0x57, 0xa7, 0x8d, 0x9d, 0x84
+.byte	0x90, 0xd8, 0xab, 0x00, 0x8c, 0xbc, 0xd3, 0x0a
+.byte	0xf7, 0xe4, 0x58, 0x05, 0xb8, 0xb3, 0x45, 0x06
+.byte	0xd0, 0x2c, 0x1e, 0x8f, 0xca, 0x3f, 0x0f, 0x02
+.byte	0xc1, 0xaf, 0xbd, 0x03, 0x01, 0x13, 0x8a, 0x6b
+.byte	0x3a, 0x91, 0x11, 0x41, 0x4f, 0x67, 0xdc, 0xea
+.byte	0x97, 0xf2, 0xcf, 0xce, 0xf0, 0xb4, 0xe6, 0x73
+.byte	0x96, 0xac, 0x74, 0x22, 0xe7, 0xad, 0x35, 0x85
+.byte	0xe2, 0xf9, 0x37, 0xe8, 0x1c, 0x75, 0xdf, 0x6e
+.byte	0x47, 0xf1, 0x1a, 0x71, 0x1d, 0x29, 0xc5, 0x89
+.byte	0x6f, 0xb7, 0x62, 0x0e, 0xaa, 0x18, 0xbe, 0x1b
+.byte	0xfc, 0x56, 0x3e, 0x4b, 0xc6, 0xd2, 0x79, 0x20
+.byte	0x9a, 0xdb, 0xc0, 0xfe, 0x78, 0xcd, 0x5a, 0xf4
+.byte	0x1f, 0xdd, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x88, 0x07, 0xc7, 0x31
+.byte	0xb1, 0x12, 0x10, 0x59, 0x27, 0x80, 0xec, 0x5f
+.byte	0x60, 0x51, 0x7f, 0xa9, 0x19, 0xb5, 0x4a, 0x0d
+.byte	0x2d, 0xe5, 0x7a, 0x9f, 0x93, 0xc9, 0x9c, 0xef
+.byte	0xa0, 0xe0, 0x3b, 0x4d, 0xae, 0x2a, 0xf5, 0xb0
+.byte	0xc8, 0xeb, 0xbb, 0x3c, 0x83, 0x53, 0x99, 0x61
+.byte	0x17, 0x2b, 0x04, 0x7e, 0xba, 0x77, 0xd6, 0x26
+.byte	0xe1, 0x69, 0x14, 0x63, 0x55, 0x21, 0x0c, 0x7d
+.size	AES_Td,.-AES_Td
+
+# void AES_decrypt(const unsigned char *inp, unsigned char *out,
+# 		 const AES_KEY *key) {
+.globl	AES_decrypt
+.type	AES_decrypt,\@function
+AES_decrypt:
+___
+$code.=<<___ if (!$softonly);
+	l	%r0,240($key)
+	lhi	%r1,16
+	clr	%r0,%r1
+	jl	.Ldsoft
+
+	la	%r1,0($key)
+	#la	%r2,0($inp)
+	la	%r4,0($out)
+	lghi	%r3,16		# single block length
+	.long	0xb92e0042	# km %r4,%r2
+	brc	1,.-4		# can this happen?
+	br	%r14
+.align	64
+.Ldsoft:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	stm${g}	%r3,$ra,3*$SIZE_T($sp)
+
+	llgf	$s0,0($inp)
+	llgf	$s1,4($inp)
+	llgf	$s2,8($inp)
+	llgf	$s3,12($inp)
+
+	larl	$tbl,AES_Td
+	bras	$ra,_s390x_AES_decrypt
+
+	l${g}	$out,3*$SIZE_T($sp)
+	st	$s0,0($out)
+	st	$s1,4($out)
+	st	$s2,8($out)
+	st	$s3,12($out)
+
+	lm${g}	%r6,$ra,6*$SIZE_T($sp)
+	br	$ra
+.size	AES_decrypt,.-AES_decrypt
+
+.type   _s390x_AES_decrypt,\@function
+.align	16
+_s390x_AES_decrypt:
+	st${g}	$ra,15*$SIZE_T($sp)
+	x	$s0,0($key)
+	x	$s1,4($key)
+	x	$s2,8($key)
+	x	$s3,12($key)
+	l	$rounds,240($key)
+	llill	$mask,`0xff<<3`
+	aghi	$rounds,-1
+	j	.Ldec_loop
+.align	16
+.Ldec_loop:
+	srlg	$t1,$s0,`16-3`
+	srlg	$t2,$s0,`8-3`
+	sllg	$t3,$s0,`0+3`
+	srl	$s0,`24-3`
+	nr	$s0,$mask
+	nr	$t1,$mask
+	nr	$t2,$mask
+	ngr	$t3,$mask
+
+	sllg	$i1,$s1,`0+3`	# i0
+	srlg	$i2,$s1,`16-3`
+	srlg	$i3,$s1,`8-3`
+	srl	$s1,`24-3`
+	ngr	$i1,$mask
+	nr	$s1,$mask
+	nr	$i2,$mask
+	nr	$i3,$mask
+
+	l	$s0,0($s0,$tbl)	# Td0[s0>>24]
+	l	$t1,3($t1,$tbl)	# Td1[s0>>16]
+	l	$t2,2($t2,$tbl)	# Td2[s0>>8]
+	l	$t3,1($t3,$tbl)	# Td3[s0>>0]
+
+	x	$s0,1($i1,$tbl)	# Td3[s1>>0]
+	l	$s1,0($s1,$tbl)	# Td0[s1>>24]
+	x	$t2,3($i2,$tbl)	# Td1[s1>>16]
+	x	$t3,2($i3,$tbl)	# Td2[s1>>8]
+
+	srlg	$i1,$s2,`8-3`	# i0
+	sllg	$i2,$s2,`0+3`	# i1
+	srlg	$i3,$s2,`16-3`
+	srl	$s2,`24-3`
+	nr	$i1,$mask
+	ngr	$i2,$mask
+	nr	$s2,$mask
+	nr	$i3,$mask
+
+	xr	$s1,$t1
+	srlg	$ra,$s3,`8-3`	# i1
+	srlg	$t1,$s3,`16-3`	# i0
+	nr	$ra,$mask
+	la	$key,16($key)
+	nr	$t1,$mask
+
+	x	$s0,2($i1,$tbl)	# Td2[s2>>8]
+	x	$s1,1($i2,$tbl)	# Td3[s2>>0]
+	l	$s2,0($s2,$tbl)	# Td0[s2>>24]
+	x	$t3,3($i3,$tbl)	# Td1[s2>>16]
+
+	sllg	$i3,$s3,`0+3`	# i2
+	srl	$s3,`24-3`
+	ngr	$i3,$mask
+	nr	$s3,$mask
+
+	xr	$s2,$t2
+	x	$s0,0($key)
+	x	$s1,4($key)
+	x	$s2,8($key)
+	x	$t3,12($key)
+
+	x	$s0,3($t1,$tbl)	# Td1[s3>>16]
+	x	$s1,2($ra,$tbl)	# Td2[s3>>8]
+	x	$s2,1($i3,$tbl)	# Td3[s3>>0]
+	l	$s3,0($s3,$tbl)	# Td0[s3>>24]
+	xr	$s3,$t3
+
+	brct	$rounds,.Ldec_loop
+	.align	16
+
+	l	$t1,`2048+0`($tbl)	# prefetch Td4
+	l	$t2,`2048+64`($tbl)
+	l	$t3,`2048+128`($tbl)
+	l	$i1,`2048+192`($tbl)
+	llill	$mask,0xff
+
+	srlg	$i3,$s0,24	# i0
+	srlg	$t1,$s0,16
+	srlg	$t2,$s0,8
+	nr	$s0,$mask	# i3
+	nr	$t1,$mask
+
+	srlg	$i1,$s1,24
+	nr	$t2,$mask
+	srlg	$i2,$s1,16
+	srlg	$ra,$s1,8
+	nr	$s1,$mask	# i0
+	nr	$i2,$mask
+	nr	$ra,$mask
+
+	llgc	$i3,2048($i3,$tbl)	# Td4[s0>>24]
+	llgc	$t1,2048($t1,$tbl)	# Td4[s0>>16]
+	llgc	$t2,2048($t2,$tbl)	# Td4[s0>>8]
+	sll	$t1,16
+	llgc	$t3,2048($s0,$tbl)	# Td4[s0>>0]
+	sllg	$s0,$i3,24
+	sll	$t2,8
+
+	llgc	$s1,2048($s1,$tbl)	# Td4[s1>>0]
+	llgc	$i1,2048($i1,$tbl)	# Td4[s1>>24]
+	llgc	$i2,2048($i2,$tbl)	# Td4[s1>>16]
+	sll	$i1,24
+	llgc	$i3,2048($ra,$tbl)	# Td4[s1>>8]
+	sll	$i2,16
+	sll	$i3,8
+	or	$s0,$s1
+	or	$t1,$i1
+	or	$t2,$i2
+	or	$t3,$i3
+
+	srlg	$i1,$s2,8	# i0
+	srlg	$i2,$s2,24
+	srlg	$i3,$s2,16
+	nr	$s2,$mask	# i1
+	nr	$i1,$mask
+	nr	$i3,$mask
+	llgc	$i1,2048($i1,$tbl)	# Td4[s2>>8]
+	llgc	$s1,2048($s2,$tbl)	# Td4[s2>>0]
+	llgc	$i2,2048($i2,$tbl)	# Td4[s2>>24]
+	llgc	$i3,2048($i3,$tbl)	# Td4[s2>>16]
+	sll	$i1,8
+	sll	$i2,24
+	or	$s0,$i1
+	sll	$i3,16
+	or	$t2,$i2
+	or	$t3,$i3
+
+	srlg	$i1,$s3,16	# i0
+	srlg	$i2,$s3,8	# i1
+	srlg	$i3,$s3,24
+	nr	$s3,$mask	# i2
+	nr	$i1,$mask
+	nr	$i2,$mask
+
+	l${g}	$ra,15*$SIZE_T($sp)
+	or	$s1,$t1
+	l	$t0,16($key)
+	l	$t1,20($key)
+
+	llgc	$i1,2048($i1,$tbl)	# Td4[s3>>16]
+	llgc	$i2,2048($i2,$tbl)	# Td4[s3>>8]
+	sll	$i1,16
+	llgc	$s2,2048($s3,$tbl)	# Td4[s3>>0]
+	llgc	$s3,2048($i3,$tbl)	# Td4[s3>>24]
+	sll	$i2,8
+	sll	$s3,24
+	or	$s0,$i1
+	or	$s1,$i2
+	or	$s2,$t2
+	or	$s3,$t3
+
+	xr	$s0,$t0
+	xr	$s1,$t1
+	x	$s2,24($key)
+	x	$s3,28($key)
+
+	br	$ra	
+.size	_s390x_AES_decrypt,.-_s390x_AES_decrypt
+___
+
+$code.=<<___;
+# void AES_set_encrypt_key(const unsigned char *in, int bits,
+# 		 AES_KEY *key) {
+.globl	AES_set_encrypt_key
+.type	AES_set_encrypt_key,\@function
+.align	16
+AES_set_encrypt_key:
+_s390x_AES_set_encrypt_key:
+	lghi	$t0,0
+	cl${g}r	$inp,$t0
+	je	.Lminus1
+	cl${g}r	$key,$t0
+	je	.Lminus1
+
+	lghi	$t0,128
+	clr	$bits,$t0
+	je	.Lproceed
+	lghi	$t0,192
+	clr	$bits,$t0
+	je	.Lproceed
+	lghi	$t0,256
+	clr	$bits,$t0
+	je	.Lproceed
+	lghi	%r2,-2
+	br	%r14
+
+.align	16
+.Lproceed:
+___
+$code.=<<___ if (!$softonly);
+	# convert bits to km(c) code, [128,192,256]->[18,19,20]
+	lhi	%r5,-128
+	lhi	%r0,18
+	ar	%r5,$bits
+	srl	%r5,6
+	ar	%r5,%r0
+
+	larl	%r1,OPENSSL_s390xcap_P
+	llihh	%r0,0x8000
+	srlg	%r0,%r0,0(%r5)
+	ng	%r0,32(%r1)	# check availability of both km...
+	ng	%r0,48(%r1)	# ...and kmc support for given key length
+	jz	.Lekey_internal
+
+	lmg	%r0,%r1,0($inp)	# just copy 128 bits...
+	stmg	%r0,%r1,0($key)
+	lhi	%r0,192
+	cr	$bits,%r0
+	jl	1f
+	lg	%r1,16($inp)
+	stg	%r1,16($key)
+	je	1f
+	lg	%r1,24($inp)
+	stg	%r1,24($key)
+1:	st	$bits,236($key)	# save bits [for debugging purposes]
+	lgr	$t0,%r5
+	st	%r5,240($key)	# save km(c) code
+	lghi	%r2,0
+	br	%r14
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+.align	16
+.Lekey_internal:
+	stm${g}	%r4,%r13,4*$SIZE_T($sp)	# all non-volatile regs and $key
+
+	larl	$tbl,AES_Te+2048
+
+	llgf	$s0,0($inp)
+	llgf	$s1,4($inp)
+	llgf	$s2,8($inp)
+	llgf	$s3,12($inp)
+	st	$s0,0($key)
+	st	$s1,4($key)
+	st	$s2,8($key)
+	st	$s3,12($key)
+	lghi	$t0,128
+	cr	$bits,$t0
+	jne	.Lnot128
+
+	llill	$mask,0xff
+	lghi	$t3,0			# i=0
+	lghi	$rounds,10
+	st	$rounds,240($key)
+
+	llgfr	$t2,$s3			# temp=rk[3]
+	srlg	$i1,$s3,8
+	srlg	$i2,$s3,16
+	srlg	$i3,$s3,24
+	nr	$t2,$mask
+	nr	$i1,$mask
+	nr	$i2,$mask
+
+.align	16
+.L128_loop:
+	la	$t2,0($t2,$tbl)
+	la	$i1,0($i1,$tbl)
+	la	$i2,0($i2,$tbl)
+	la	$i3,0($i3,$tbl)
+	icm	$t2,2,0($t2)		# Te4[rk[3]>>0]<<8
+	icm	$t2,4,0($i1)		# Te4[rk[3]>>8]<<16
+	icm	$t2,8,0($i2)		# Te4[rk[3]>>16]<<24
+	icm	$t2,1,0($i3)		# Te4[rk[3]>>24]
+	x	$t2,256($t3,$tbl)	# rcon[i]
+	xr	$s0,$t2			# rk[4]=rk[0]^...
+	xr	$s1,$s0			# rk[5]=rk[1]^rk[4]
+	xr	$s2,$s1			# rk[6]=rk[2]^rk[5]
+	xr	$s3,$s2			# rk[7]=rk[3]^rk[6]
+
+	llgfr	$t2,$s3			# temp=rk[3]
+	srlg	$i1,$s3,8
+	srlg	$i2,$s3,16
+	nr	$t2,$mask
+	nr	$i1,$mask
+	srlg	$i3,$s3,24
+	nr	$i2,$mask
+
+	st	$s0,16($key)
+	st	$s1,20($key)
+	st	$s2,24($key)
+	st	$s3,28($key)
+	la	$key,16($key)		# key+=4
+	la	$t3,4($t3)		# i++
+	brct	$rounds,.L128_loop
+	lghi	$t0,10
+	lghi	%r2,0
+	lm${g}	%r4,%r13,4*$SIZE_T($sp)
+	br	$ra
+
+.align	16
+.Lnot128:
+	llgf	$t0,16($inp)
+	llgf	$t1,20($inp)
+	st	$t0,16($key)
+	st	$t1,20($key)
+	lghi	$t0,192
+	cr	$bits,$t0
+	jne	.Lnot192
+
+	llill	$mask,0xff
+	lghi	$t3,0			# i=0
+	lghi	$rounds,12
+	st	$rounds,240($key)
+	lghi	$rounds,8
+
+	srlg	$i1,$t1,8
+	srlg	$i2,$t1,16
+	srlg	$i3,$t1,24
+	nr	$t1,$mask
+	nr	$i1,$mask
+	nr	$i2,$mask
+
+.align	16
+.L192_loop:
+	la	$t1,0($t1,$tbl)
+	la	$i1,0($i1,$tbl)
+	la	$i2,0($i2,$tbl)
+	la	$i3,0($i3,$tbl)
+	icm	$t1,2,0($t1)		# Te4[rk[5]>>0]<<8
+	icm	$t1,4,0($i1)		# Te4[rk[5]>>8]<<16
+	icm	$t1,8,0($i2)		# Te4[rk[5]>>16]<<24
+	icm	$t1,1,0($i3)		# Te4[rk[5]>>24]
+	x	$t1,256($t3,$tbl)	# rcon[i]
+	xr	$s0,$t1			# rk[6]=rk[0]^...
+	xr	$s1,$s0			# rk[7]=rk[1]^rk[6]
+	xr	$s2,$s1			# rk[8]=rk[2]^rk[7]
+	xr	$s3,$s2			# rk[9]=rk[3]^rk[8]
+
+	st	$s0,24($key)
+	st	$s1,28($key)
+	st	$s2,32($key)
+	st	$s3,36($key)
+	brct	$rounds,.L192_continue
+	lghi	$t0,12
+	lghi	%r2,0
+	lm${g}	%r4,%r13,4*$SIZE_T($sp)
+	br	$ra
+
+.align	16
+.L192_continue:
+	lgr	$t1,$s3
+	x	$t1,16($key)		# rk[10]=rk[4]^rk[9]
+	st	$t1,40($key)
+	x	$t1,20($key)		# rk[11]=rk[5]^rk[10]
+	st	$t1,44($key)
+
+	srlg	$i1,$t1,8
+	srlg	$i2,$t1,16
+	srlg	$i3,$t1,24
+	nr	$t1,$mask
+	nr	$i1,$mask
+	nr	$i2,$mask
+
+	la	$key,24($key)		# key+=6
+	la	$t3,4($t3)		# i++
+	j	.L192_loop
+
+.align	16
+.Lnot192:
+	llgf	$t0,24($inp)
+	llgf	$t1,28($inp)
+	st	$t0,24($key)
+	st	$t1,28($key)
+	llill	$mask,0xff
+	lghi	$t3,0			# i=0
+	lghi	$rounds,14
+	st	$rounds,240($key)
+	lghi	$rounds,7
+
+	srlg	$i1,$t1,8
+	srlg	$i2,$t1,16
+	srlg	$i3,$t1,24
+	nr	$t1,$mask
+	nr	$i1,$mask
+	nr	$i2,$mask
+
+.align	16
+.L256_loop:
+	la	$t1,0($t1,$tbl)
+	la	$i1,0($i1,$tbl)
+	la	$i2,0($i2,$tbl)
+	la	$i3,0($i3,$tbl)
+	icm	$t1,2,0($t1)		# Te4[rk[7]>>0]<<8
+	icm	$t1,4,0($i1)		# Te4[rk[7]>>8]<<16
+	icm	$t1,8,0($i2)		# Te4[rk[7]>>16]<<24
+	icm	$t1,1,0($i3)		# Te4[rk[7]>>24]
+	x	$t1,256($t3,$tbl)	# rcon[i]
+	xr	$s0,$t1			# rk[8]=rk[0]^...
+	xr	$s1,$s0			# rk[9]=rk[1]^rk[8]
+	xr	$s2,$s1			# rk[10]=rk[2]^rk[9]
+	xr	$s3,$s2			# rk[11]=rk[3]^rk[10]
+	st	$s0,32($key)
+	st	$s1,36($key)
+	st	$s2,40($key)
+	st	$s3,44($key)
+	brct	$rounds,.L256_continue
+	lghi	$t0,14
+	lghi	%r2,0
+	lm${g}	%r4,%r13,4*$SIZE_T($sp)
+	br	$ra
+
+.align	16
+.L256_continue:
+	lgr	$t1,$s3			# temp=rk[11]
+	srlg	$i1,$s3,8
+	srlg	$i2,$s3,16
+	srlg	$i3,$s3,24
+	nr	$t1,$mask
+	nr	$i1,$mask
+	nr	$i2,$mask
+	la	$t1,0($t1,$tbl)
+	la	$i1,0($i1,$tbl)
+	la	$i2,0($i2,$tbl)
+	la	$i3,0($i3,$tbl)
+	llgc	$t1,0($t1)		# Te4[rk[11]>>0]
+	icm	$t1,2,0($i1)		# Te4[rk[11]>>8]<<8
+	icm	$t1,4,0($i2)		# Te4[rk[11]>>16]<<16
+	icm	$t1,8,0($i3)		# Te4[rk[11]>>24]<<24
+	x	$t1,16($key)		# rk[12]=rk[4]^...
+	st	$t1,48($key)
+	x	$t1,20($key)		# rk[13]=rk[5]^rk[12]
+	st	$t1,52($key)
+	x	$t1,24($key)		# rk[14]=rk[6]^rk[13]
+	st	$t1,56($key)
+	x	$t1,28($key)		# rk[15]=rk[7]^rk[14]
+	st	$t1,60($key)
+
+	srlg	$i1,$t1,8
+	srlg	$i2,$t1,16
+	srlg	$i3,$t1,24
+	nr	$t1,$mask
+	nr	$i1,$mask
+	nr	$i2,$mask
+
+	la	$key,32($key)		# key+=8
+	la	$t3,4($t3)		# i++
+	j	.L256_loop
+
+.Lminus1:
+	lghi	%r2,-1
+	br	$ra
+.size	AES_set_encrypt_key,.-AES_set_encrypt_key
+
+# void AES_set_decrypt_key(const unsigned char *in, int bits,
+# 		 AES_KEY *key) {
+.globl	AES_set_decrypt_key
+.type	AES_set_decrypt_key,\@function
+.align	16
+AES_set_decrypt_key:
+	#st${g}	$key,4*$SIZE_T($sp)	# I rely on AES_set_encrypt_key to
+	st${g}	$ra,14*$SIZE_T($sp)	# save non-volatile registers and $key!
+	bras	$ra,_s390x_AES_set_encrypt_key
+	#l${g}	$key,4*$SIZE_T($sp)
+	l${g}	$ra,14*$SIZE_T($sp)
+	ltgr	%r2,%r2
+	bnzr	$ra
+___
+$code.=<<___ if (!$softonly);
+	#l	$t0,240($key)
+	lhi	$t1,16
+	cr	$t0,$t1
+	jl	.Lgo
+	oill	$t0,0x80	# set "decrypt" bit
+	st	$t0,240($key)
+	br	$ra
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+.align	16
+.Lgo:	lgr	$rounds,$t0	#llgf	$rounds,240($key)
+	la	$i1,0($key)
+	sllg	$i2,$rounds,4
+	la	$i2,0($i2,$key)
+	srl	$rounds,1
+	lghi	$t1,-16
+
+.align	16
+.Linv:	lmg	$s0,$s1,0($i1)
+	lmg	$s2,$s3,0($i2)
+	stmg	$s0,$s1,0($i2)
+	stmg	$s2,$s3,0($i1)
+	la	$i1,16($i1)
+	la	$i2,0($t1,$i2)
+	brct	$rounds,.Linv
+___
+$mask80=$i1;
+$mask1b=$i2;
+$maskfe=$i3;
+$code.=<<___;
+	llgf	$rounds,240($key)
+	aghi	$rounds,-1
+	sll	$rounds,2	# (rounds-1)*4
+	llilh	$mask80,0x8080
+	llilh	$mask1b,0x1b1b
+	llilh	$maskfe,0xfefe
+	oill	$mask80,0x8080
+	oill	$mask1b,0x1b1b
+	oill	$maskfe,0xfefe
+
+.align	16
+.Lmix:	l	$s0,16($key)	# tp1
+	lr	$s1,$s0
+	ngr	$s1,$mask80
+	srlg	$t1,$s1,7
+	slr	$s1,$t1
+	nr	$s1,$mask1b
+	sllg	$t1,$s0,1
+	nr	$t1,$maskfe
+	xr	$s1,$t1		# tp2
+
+	lr	$s2,$s1
+	ngr	$s2,$mask80
+	srlg	$t1,$s2,7
+	slr	$s2,$t1
+	nr	$s2,$mask1b
+	sllg	$t1,$s1,1
+	nr	$t1,$maskfe
+	xr	$s2,$t1		# tp4
+
+	lr	$s3,$s2
+	ngr	$s3,$mask80
+	srlg	$t1,$s3,7
+	slr	$s3,$t1
+	nr	$s3,$mask1b
+	sllg	$t1,$s2,1
+	nr	$t1,$maskfe
+	xr	$s3,$t1		# tp8
+
+	xr	$s1,$s0		# tp2^tp1
+	xr	$s2,$s0		# tp4^tp1
+	rll	$s0,$s0,24	# = ROTATE(tp1,8)
+	xr	$s2,$s3		# ^=tp8
+	xr	$s0,$s1		# ^=tp2^tp1
+	xr	$s1,$s3		# tp2^tp1^tp8
+	xr	$s0,$s2		# ^=tp4^tp1^tp8
+	rll	$s1,$s1,8
+	rll	$s2,$s2,16
+	xr	$s0,$s1		# ^= ROTATE(tp8^tp2^tp1,24)
+	rll	$s3,$s3,24
+	xr	$s0,$s2    	# ^= ROTATE(tp8^tp4^tp1,16)
+	xr	$s0,$s3		# ^= ROTATE(tp8,8)
+
+	st	$s0,16($key)
+	la	$key,4($key)
+	brct	$rounds,.Lmix
+
+	lm${g}	%r6,%r13,6*$SIZE_T($sp)# as was saved by AES_set_encrypt_key!
+	lghi	%r2,0
+	br	$ra
+.size	AES_set_decrypt_key,.-AES_set_decrypt_key
+___
+
+########################################################################
+# void AES_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+#                     size_t length, const AES_KEY *key,
+#                     unsigned char *ivec, const int enc)
+{
+my $inp="%r2";
+my $out="%r4";	# length and out are swapped
+my $len="%r3";
+my $key="%r5";
+my $ivp="%r6";
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	AES_cbc_encrypt
+.type	AES_cbc_encrypt,\@function
+.align	16
+AES_cbc_encrypt:
+	xgr	%r3,%r4		# flip %r3 and %r4, out and len
+	xgr	%r4,%r3
+	xgr	%r3,%r4
+___
+$code.=<<___ if (!$softonly);
+	lhi	%r0,16
+	cl	%r0,240($key)
+	jh	.Lcbc_software
+
+	lg	%r0,0($ivp)	# copy ivec
+	lg	%r1,8($ivp)
+	stmg	%r0,%r1,16($sp)
+	lmg	%r0,%r1,0($key)	# copy key, cover 256 bit
+	stmg	%r0,%r1,32($sp)
+	lmg	%r0,%r1,16($key)
+	stmg	%r0,%r1,48($sp)
+	l	%r0,240($key)	# load kmc code
+	lghi	$key,15		# res=len%16, len-=res;
+	ngr	$key,$len
+	sl${g}r	$len,$key
+	la	%r1,16($sp)	# parameter block - ivec || key
+	jz	.Lkmc_truncated
+	.long	0xb92f0042	# kmc %r4,%r2
+	brc	1,.-4		# pay attention to "partial completion"
+	ltr	$key,$key
+	jnz	.Lkmc_truncated
+.Lkmc_done:
+	lmg	%r0,%r1,16($sp)	# copy ivec to caller
+	stg	%r0,0($ivp)
+	stg	%r1,8($ivp)
+	br	$ra
+.align	16
+.Lkmc_truncated:
+	ahi	$key,-1		# it's the way it's encoded in mvc
+	tmll	%r0,0x80
+	jnz	.Lkmc_truncated_dec
+	lghi	%r1,0
+	stg	%r1,16*$SIZE_T($sp)
+	stg	%r1,16*$SIZE_T+8($sp)
+	bras	%r1,1f
+	mvc	16*$SIZE_T(1,$sp),0($inp)
+1:	ex	$key,0(%r1)
+	la	%r1,16($sp)	# restore parameter block
+	la	$inp,16*$SIZE_T($sp)
+	lghi	$len,16
+	.long	0xb92f0042	# kmc %r4,%r2
+	j	.Lkmc_done
+.align	16
+.Lkmc_truncated_dec:
+	st${g}	$out,4*$SIZE_T($sp)
+	la	$out,16*$SIZE_T($sp)
+	lghi	$len,16
+	.long	0xb92f0042	# kmc %r4,%r2
+	l${g}	$out,4*$SIZE_T($sp)
+	bras	%r1,2f
+	mvc	0(1,$out),16*$SIZE_T($sp)
+2:	ex	$key,0(%r1)
+	j	.Lkmc_done
+.align	16
+.Lcbc_software:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	stm${g}	$key,$ra,5*$SIZE_T($sp)
+	lhi	%r0,0
+	cl	%r0,`$stdframe+$SIZE_T-4`($sp)
+	je	.Lcbc_decrypt
+
+	larl	$tbl,AES_Te
+
+	llgf	$s0,0($ivp)
+	llgf	$s1,4($ivp)
+	llgf	$s2,8($ivp)
+	llgf	$s3,12($ivp)
+
+	lghi	$t0,16
+	sl${g}r	$len,$t0
+	brc	4,.Lcbc_enc_tail	# if borrow
+.Lcbc_enc_loop:
+	stm${g}	$inp,$out,2*$SIZE_T($sp)
+	x	$s0,0($inp)
+	x	$s1,4($inp)
+	x	$s2,8($inp)
+	x	$s3,12($inp)
+	lgr	%r4,$key
+
+	bras	$ra,_s390x_AES_encrypt
+
+	lm${g}	$inp,$key,2*$SIZE_T($sp)
+	st	$s0,0($out)
+	st	$s1,4($out)
+	st	$s2,8($out)
+	st	$s3,12($out)
+
+	la	$inp,16($inp)
+	la	$out,16($out)
+	lghi	$t0,16
+	lt${g}r	$len,$len
+	jz	.Lcbc_enc_done
+	sl${g}r	$len,$t0
+	brc	4,.Lcbc_enc_tail	# if borrow
+	j	.Lcbc_enc_loop
+.align	16
+.Lcbc_enc_done:
+	l${g}	$ivp,6*$SIZE_T($sp)
+	st	$s0,0($ivp)
+	st	$s1,4($ivp)	
+	st	$s2,8($ivp)
+	st	$s3,12($ivp)
+
+	lm${g}	%r7,$ra,7*$SIZE_T($sp)
+	br	$ra
+
+.align	16
+.Lcbc_enc_tail:
+	aghi	$len,15
+	lghi	$t0,0
+	stg	$t0,16*$SIZE_T($sp)
+	stg	$t0,16*$SIZE_T+8($sp)
+	bras	$t1,3f
+	mvc	16*$SIZE_T(1,$sp),0($inp)
+3:	ex	$len,0($t1)
+	lghi	$len,0
+	la	$inp,16*$SIZE_T($sp)
+	j	.Lcbc_enc_loop
+
+.align	16
+.Lcbc_decrypt:
+	larl	$tbl,AES_Td
+
+	lg	$t0,0($ivp)
+	lg	$t1,8($ivp)
+	stmg	$t0,$t1,16*$SIZE_T($sp)
+
+.Lcbc_dec_loop:
+	stm${g}	$inp,$out,2*$SIZE_T($sp)
+	llgf	$s0,0($inp)
+	llgf	$s1,4($inp)
+	llgf	$s2,8($inp)
+	llgf	$s3,12($inp)
+	lgr	%r4,$key
+
+	bras	$ra,_s390x_AES_decrypt
+
+	lm${g}	$inp,$key,2*$SIZE_T($sp)
+	sllg	$s0,$s0,32
+	sllg	$s2,$s2,32
+	lr	$s0,$s1
+	lr	$s2,$s3
+
+	lg	$t0,0($inp)
+	lg	$t1,8($inp)
+	xg	$s0,16*$SIZE_T($sp)
+	xg	$s2,16*$SIZE_T+8($sp)
+	lghi	$s1,16
+	sl${g}r	$len,$s1
+	brc	4,.Lcbc_dec_tail	# if borrow
+	brc	2,.Lcbc_dec_done	# if zero
+	stg	$s0,0($out)
+	stg	$s2,8($out)
+	stmg	$t0,$t1,16*$SIZE_T($sp)
+
+	la	$inp,16($inp)
+	la	$out,16($out)
+	j	.Lcbc_dec_loop
+
+.Lcbc_dec_done:
+	stg	$s0,0($out)
+	stg	$s2,8($out)
+.Lcbc_dec_exit:
+	lm${g}	%r6,$ra,6*$SIZE_T($sp)
+	stmg	$t0,$t1,0($ivp)
+
+	br	$ra
+
+.align	16
+.Lcbc_dec_tail:
+	aghi	$len,15
+	stg	$s0,16*$SIZE_T($sp)
+	stg	$s2,16*$SIZE_T+8($sp)
+	bras	$s1,4f
+	mvc	0(1,$out),16*$SIZE_T($sp)
+4:	ex	$len,0($s1)
+	j	.Lcbc_dec_exit
+.size	AES_cbc_encrypt,.-AES_cbc_encrypt
+___
+}
+########################################################################
+# void AES_ctr32_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+#                     size_t blocks, const AES_KEY *key,
+#                     const unsigned char *ivec)
+{
+my $inp="%r2";
+my $out="%r4";	# blocks and out are swapped
+my $len="%r3";
+my $key="%r5";	my $iv0="%r5";
+my $ivp="%r6";
+my $fp ="%r7";
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	AES_ctr32_encrypt
+.type	AES_ctr32_encrypt,\@function
+.align	16
+AES_ctr32_encrypt:
+	xgr	%r3,%r4		# flip %r3 and %r4, $out and $len
+	xgr	%r4,%r3
+	xgr	%r3,%r4
+	llgfr	$len,$len	# safe in ctr32 subroutine even in 64-bit case
+___
+$code.=<<___ if (!$softonly);
+	l	%r0,240($key)
+	lhi	%r1,16
+	clr	%r0,%r1
+	jl	.Lctr32_software
+
+	stm${g}	%r6,$s3,6*$SIZE_T($sp)
+
+	slgr	$out,$inp
+	la	%r1,0($key)	# %r1 is permanent copy of $key
+	lg	$iv0,0($ivp)	# load ivec
+	lg	$ivp,8($ivp)
+
+	# prepare and allocate stack frame at the top of 4K page
+	# with 1K reserved for eventual signal handling
+	lghi	$s0,-1024-256-16# guarantee at least 256-bytes buffer
+	lghi	$s1,-4096
+	algr	$s0,$sp
+	lgr	$fp,$sp
+	ngr	$s0,$s1		# align at page boundary
+	slgr	$fp,$s0		# total buffer size
+	lgr	$s2,$sp
+	lghi	$s1,1024+16	# sl[g]fi is extended-immediate facility
+	slgr	$fp,$s1		# deduct reservation to get usable buffer size
+	# buffer size is at lest 256 and at most 3072+256-16
+
+	la	$sp,1024($s0)	# alloca
+	srlg	$fp,$fp,4	# convert bytes to blocks, minimum 16
+	st${g}	$s2,0($sp)	# back-chain
+	st${g}	$fp,$SIZE_T($sp)
+
+	slgr	$len,$fp
+	brc	1,.Lctr32_hw_switch	# not zero, no borrow
+	algr	$fp,$len	# input is shorter than allocated buffer
+	lghi	$len,0
+	st${g}	$fp,$SIZE_T($sp)
+
+.Lctr32_hw_switch:
+___
+$code.=<<___ if (!$softonly && 0);# kmctr code was measured to be ~12% slower
+	llgfr	$s0,%r0
+	lgr	$s1,%r1
+	larl	%r1,OPENSSL_s390xcap_P
+	llihh	%r0,0x8000	# check if kmctr supports the function code
+	srlg	%r0,%r0,0($s0)
+	ng	%r0,64(%r1)	# check kmctr capability vector
+	lgr	%r0,$s0
+	lgr	%r1,$s1
+	jz	.Lctr32_km_loop
+
+####### kmctr code
+	algr	$out,$inp	# restore $out
+	lgr	$s1,$len	# $s1 undertakes $len
+	j	.Lctr32_kmctr_loop
+.align	16
+.Lctr32_kmctr_loop:
+	la	$s2,16($sp)
+	lgr	$s3,$fp
+.Lctr32_kmctr_prepare:
+	stg	$iv0,0($s2)
+	stg	$ivp,8($s2)
+	la	$s2,16($s2)
+	ahi	$ivp,1		# 32-bit increment, preserves upper half
+	brct	$s3,.Lctr32_kmctr_prepare
+
+	#la	$inp,0($inp)	# inp
+	sllg	$len,$fp,4	# len
+	#la	$out,0($out)	# out
+	la	$s2,16($sp)	# iv
+	.long	0xb92da042	# kmctr $out,$s2,$inp
+	brc	1,.-4		# pay attention to "partial completion"
+
+	slgr	$s1,$fp
+	brc	1,.Lctr32_kmctr_loop	# not zero, no borrow
+	algr	$fp,$s1
+	lghi	$s1,0
+	brc	4+1,.Lctr32_kmctr_loop	# not zero
+
+	l${g}	$sp,0($sp)
+	lm${g}	%r6,$s3,6*$SIZE_T($sp)
+	br	$ra
+.align	16
+___
+$code.=<<___ if (!$softonly);
+.Lctr32_km_loop:
+	la	$s2,16($sp)
+	lgr	$s3,$fp
+.Lctr32_km_prepare:
+	stg	$iv0,0($s2)
+	stg	$ivp,8($s2)
+	la	$s2,16($s2)
+	ahi	$ivp,1		# 32-bit increment, preserves upper half
+	brct	$s3,.Lctr32_km_prepare
+
+	la	$s0,16($sp)	# inp
+	sllg	$s1,$fp,4	# len
+	la	$s2,16($sp)	# out
+	.long	0xb92e00a8	# km %r10,%r8
+	brc	1,.-4		# pay attention to "partial completion"
+
+	la	$s2,16($sp)
+	lgr	$s3,$fp
+	slgr	$s2,$inp
+.Lctr32_km_xor:
+	lg	$s0,0($inp)
+	lg	$s1,8($inp)
+	xg	$s0,0($s2,$inp)
+	xg	$s1,8($s2,$inp)
+	stg	$s0,0($out,$inp)
+	stg	$s1,8($out,$inp)
+	la	$inp,16($inp)
+	brct	$s3,.Lctr32_km_xor
+
+	slgr	$len,$fp
+	brc	1,.Lctr32_km_loop	# not zero, no borrow
+	algr	$fp,$len
+	lghi	$len,0
+	brc	4+1,.Lctr32_km_loop	# not zero
+
+	l${g}	$s0,0($sp)
+	l${g}	$s1,$SIZE_T($sp)
+	la	$s2,16($sp)
+.Lctr32_km_zap:
+	stg	$s0,0($s2)
+	stg	$s0,8($s2)
+	la	$s2,16($s2)
+	brct	$s1,.Lctr32_km_zap
+
+	la	$sp,0($s0)
+	lm${g}	%r6,$s3,6*$SIZE_T($sp)
+	br	$ra
+.align	16
+.Lctr32_software:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	stm${g}	$key,$ra,5*$SIZE_T($sp)
+	sl${g}r	$inp,$out
+	larl	$tbl,AES_Te
+	llgf	$t1,12($ivp)
+
+.Lctr32_loop:
+	stm${g}	$inp,$out,2*$SIZE_T($sp)
+	llgf	$s0,0($ivp)
+	llgf	$s1,4($ivp)
+	llgf	$s2,8($ivp)
+	lgr	$s3,$t1
+	st	$t1,16*$SIZE_T($sp)
+	lgr	%r4,$key
+
+	bras	$ra,_s390x_AES_encrypt
+
+	lm${g}	$inp,$ivp,2*$SIZE_T($sp)
+	llgf	$t1,16*$SIZE_T($sp)
+	x	$s0,0($inp,$out)
+	x	$s1,4($inp,$out)
+	x	$s2,8($inp,$out)
+	x	$s3,12($inp,$out)
+	stm	$s0,$s3,0($out)
+
+	la	$out,16($out)
+	ahi	$t1,1		# 32-bit increment
+	brct	$len,.Lctr32_loop
+
+	lm${g}	%r6,$ra,6*$SIZE_T($sp)
+	br	$ra
+.size	AES_ctr32_encrypt,.-AES_ctr32_encrypt
+___
+}
+
+########################################################################
+# void AES_xts_encrypt(const char *inp,char *out,size_t len,
+#	const AES_KEY *key1, const AES_KEY *key2,
+#	const unsigned char iv[16]);
+#
+{
+my $inp="%r2";
+my $out="%r4";	# len and out are swapped
+my $len="%r3";
+my $key1="%r5";	# $i1
+my $key2="%r6";	# $i2
+my $fp="%r7";	# $i3
+my $tweak=16*$SIZE_T+16;	# or $stdframe-16, bottom of the frame...
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.type	_s390x_xts_km,\@function
+.align	16
+_s390x_xts_km:
+___
+$code.=<<___ if(1);
+	llgfr	$s0,%r0			# put aside the function code
+	lghi	$s1,0x7f
+	nr	$s1,%r0
+	larl	%r1,OPENSSL_s390xcap_P
+	llihh	%r0,0x8000
+	srlg	%r0,%r0,32($s1)		# check for 32+function code
+	ng	%r0,32(%r1)		# check km capability vector
+	lgr	%r0,$s0			# restore the function code
+	la	%r1,0($key1)		# restore $key1
+	jz	.Lxts_km_vanilla
+
+	lmg	$i2,$i3,$tweak($sp)	# put aside the tweak value
+	algr	$out,$inp
+
+	oill	%r0,32			# switch to xts function code
+	aghi	$s1,-18			#
+	sllg	$s1,$s1,3		# (function code - 18)*8, 0 or 16
+	la	%r1,$tweak-16($sp)
+	slgr	%r1,$s1			# parameter block position
+	lmg	$s0,$s3,0($key1)	# load 256 bits of key material,
+	stmg	$s0,$s3,0(%r1)		# and copy it to parameter block.
+					# yes, it contains junk and overlaps
+					# with the tweak in 128-bit case.
+					# it's done to avoid conditional
+					# branch.
+	stmg	$i2,$i3,$tweak($sp)	# "re-seat" the tweak value
+
+	.long	0xb92e0042		# km %r4,%r2
+	brc	1,.-4			# pay attention to "partial completion"
+
+	lrvg	$s0,$tweak+0($sp)	# load the last tweak
+	lrvg	$s1,$tweak+8($sp)
+	stmg	%r0,%r3,$tweak-32($sp)	# wipe copy of the key
+
+	nill	%r0,0xffdf		# switch back to original function code
+	la	%r1,0($key1)		# restore pointer to $key1
+	slgr	$out,$inp
+
+	llgc	$len,2*$SIZE_T-1($sp)
+	nill	$len,0x0f		# $len%=16
+	br	$ra
+	
+.align	16
+.Lxts_km_vanilla:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	# prepare and allocate stack frame at the top of 4K page
+	# with 1K reserved for eventual signal handling
+	lghi	$s0,-1024-256-16# guarantee at least 256-bytes buffer
+	lghi	$s1,-4096
+	algr	$s0,$sp
+	lgr	$fp,$sp
+	ngr	$s0,$s1		# align at page boundary
+	slgr	$fp,$s0		# total buffer size
+	lgr	$s2,$sp
+	lghi	$s1,1024+16	# sl[g]fi is extended-immediate facility
+	slgr	$fp,$s1		# deduct reservation to get usable buffer size
+	# buffer size is at lest 256 and at most 3072+256-16
+
+	la	$sp,1024($s0)	# alloca
+	nill	$fp,0xfff0	# round to 16*n
+	st${g}	$s2,0($sp)	# back-chain
+	nill	$len,0xfff0	# redundant
+	st${g}	$fp,$SIZE_T($sp)
+
+	slgr	$len,$fp
+	brc	1,.Lxts_km_go	# not zero, no borrow
+	algr	$fp,$len	# input is shorter than allocated buffer
+	lghi	$len,0
+	st${g}	$fp,$SIZE_T($sp)
+
+.Lxts_km_go:
+	lrvg	$s0,$tweak+0($s2)	# load the tweak value in little-endian
+	lrvg	$s1,$tweak+8($s2)
+
+	la	$s2,16($sp)		# vector of ascending tweak values
+	slgr	$s2,$inp
+	srlg	$s3,$fp,4
+	j	.Lxts_km_start
+
+.Lxts_km_loop:
+	la	$s2,16($sp)
+	slgr	$s2,$inp
+	srlg	$s3,$fp,4
+.Lxts_km_prepare:
+	lghi	$i1,0x87
+	srag	$i2,$s1,63		# broadcast upper bit
+	ngr	$i1,$i2			# rem
+	algr	$s0,$s0
+	alcgr	$s1,$s1
+	xgr	$s0,$i1
+.Lxts_km_start:
+	lrvgr	$i1,$s0			# flip byte order
+	lrvgr	$i2,$s1
+	stg	$i1,0($s2,$inp)
+	stg	$i2,8($s2,$inp)
+	xg	$i1,0($inp)
+	xg	$i2,8($inp)
+	stg	$i1,0($out,$inp)
+	stg	$i2,8($out,$inp)
+	la	$inp,16($inp)
+	brct	$s3,.Lxts_km_prepare
+
+	slgr	$inp,$fp		# rewind $inp
+	la	$s2,0($out,$inp)
+	lgr	$s3,$fp
+	.long	0xb92e00aa		# km $s2,$s2
+	brc	1,.-4			# pay attention to "partial completion"
+
+	la	$s2,16($sp)
+	slgr	$s2,$inp
+	srlg	$s3,$fp,4
+.Lxts_km_xor:
+	lg	$i1,0($out,$inp)
+	lg	$i2,8($out,$inp)
+	xg	$i1,0($s2,$inp)
+	xg	$i2,8($s2,$inp)
+	stg	$i1,0($out,$inp)
+	stg	$i2,8($out,$inp)
+	la	$inp,16($inp)
+	brct	$s3,.Lxts_km_xor
+
+	slgr	$len,$fp
+	brc	1,.Lxts_km_loop		# not zero, no borrow
+	algr	$fp,$len
+	lghi	$len,0
+	brc	4+1,.Lxts_km_loop	# not zero
+
+	l${g}	$i1,0($sp)		# back-chain
+	llgf	$fp,`2*$SIZE_T-4`($sp)	# bytes used
+	la	$i2,16($sp)
+	srlg	$fp,$fp,4
+.Lxts_km_zap:
+	stg	$i1,0($i2)
+	stg	$i1,8($i2)
+	la	$i2,16($i2)
+	brct	$fp,.Lxts_km_zap
+
+	la	$sp,0($i1)
+	llgc	$len,2*$SIZE_T-1($i1)
+	nill	$len,0x0f		# $len%=16
+	bzr	$ra
+
+	# generate one more tweak...
+	lghi	$i1,0x87
+	srag	$i2,$s1,63		# broadcast upper bit
+	ngr	$i1,$i2			# rem
+	algr	$s0,$s0
+	alcgr	$s1,$s1
+	xgr	$s0,$i1
+
+	ltr	$len,$len		# clear zero flag
+	br	$ra
+.size	_s390x_xts_km,.-_s390x_xts_km
+
+.globl	AES_xts_encrypt
+.type	AES_xts_encrypt,\@function
+.align	16
+AES_xts_encrypt:
+	xgr	%r3,%r4			# flip %r3 and %r4, $out and $len
+	xgr	%r4,%r3
+	xgr	%r3,%r4
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==4);
+	llgfr	$len,$len
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	st${g}	$len,1*$SIZE_T($sp)	# save copy of $len
+	srag	$len,$len,4		# formally wrong, because it expands
+					# sign byte, but who can afford asking
+					# to process more than 2^63-1 bytes?
+					# I use it, because it sets condition
+					# code...
+	bcr	8,$ra			# abort if zero (i.e. less than 16)
+___
+$code.=<<___ if (!$softonly);
+	llgf	%r0,240($key2)
+	lhi	%r1,16
+	clr	%r0,%r1
+	jl	.Lxts_enc_software
+
+	st${g}	$ra,5*$SIZE_T($sp)
+	stm${g}	%r6,$s3,6*$SIZE_T($sp)
+
+	sllg	$len,$len,4		# $len&=~15
+	slgr	$out,$inp
+
+	# generate the tweak value
+	l${g}	$s3,$stdframe($sp)	# pointer to iv
+	la	$s2,$tweak($sp)
+	lmg	$s0,$s1,0($s3)
+	lghi	$s3,16
+	stmg	$s0,$s1,0($s2)
+	la	%r1,0($key2)		# $key2 is not needed anymore
+	.long	0xb92e00aa		# km $s2,$s2, generate the tweak
+	brc	1,.-4			# can this happen?
+
+	l	%r0,240($key1)
+	la	%r1,0($key1)		# $key1 is not needed anymore
+	bras	$ra,_s390x_xts_km
+	jz	.Lxts_enc_km_done
+
+	aghi	$inp,-16		# take one step back
+	la	$i3,0($out,$inp)	# put aside real $out
+.Lxts_enc_km_steal:
+	llgc	$i1,16($inp)
+	llgc	$i2,0($out,$inp)
+	stc	$i1,0($out,$inp)
+	stc	$i2,16($out,$inp)
+	la	$inp,1($inp)
+	brct	$len,.Lxts_enc_km_steal
+
+	la	$s2,0($i3)
+	lghi	$s3,16
+	lrvgr	$i1,$s0			# flip byte order
+	lrvgr	$i2,$s1
+	xg	$i1,0($s2)
+	xg	$i2,8($s2)
+	stg	$i1,0($s2)
+	stg	$i2,8($s2)
+	.long	0xb92e00aa		# km $s2,$s2
+	brc	1,.-4			# can this happen?
+	lrvgr	$i1,$s0			# flip byte order
+	lrvgr	$i2,$s1
+	xg	$i1,0($i3)
+	xg	$i2,8($i3)
+	stg	$i1,0($i3)
+	stg	$i2,8($i3)
+
+.Lxts_enc_km_done:
+	stg	$sp,$tweak+0($sp)	# wipe tweak
+	stg	$sp,$tweak+8($sp)
+	l${g}	$ra,5*$SIZE_T($sp)
+	lm${g}	%r6,$s3,6*$SIZE_T($sp)
+	br	$ra
+.align	16
+.Lxts_enc_software:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	stm${g}	%r6,$ra,6*$SIZE_T($sp)
+
+	slgr	$out,$inp
+
+	l${g}	$s3,$stdframe($sp)	# ivp
+	llgf	$s0,0($s3)		# load iv
+	llgf	$s1,4($s3)
+	llgf	$s2,8($s3)
+	llgf	$s3,12($s3)
+	stm${g}	%r2,%r5,2*$SIZE_T($sp)
+	la	$key,0($key2)
+	larl	$tbl,AES_Te
+	bras	$ra,_s390x_AES_encrypt	# generate the tweak
+	lm${g}	%r2,%r5,2*$SIZE_T($sp)
+	stm	$s0,$s3,$tweak($sp)	# save the tweak
+	j	.Lxts_enc_enter
+
+.align	16
+.Lxts_enc_loop:
+	lrvg	$s1,$tweak+0($sp)	# load the tweak in little-endian
+	lrvg	$s3,$tweak+8($sp)
+	lghi	%r1,0x87
+	srag	%r0,$s3,63		# broadcast upper bit
+	ngr	%r1,%r0			# rem
+	algr	$s1,$s1
+	alcgr	$s3,$s3
+	xgr	$s1,%r1
+	lrvgr	$s1,$s1			# flip byte order
+	lrvgr	$s3,$s3
+	srlg	$s0,$s1,32		# smash the tweak to 4x32-bits 
+	stg	$s1,$tweak+0($sp)	# save the tweak
+	llgfr	$s1,$s1
+	srlg	$s2,$s3,32
+	stg	$s3,$tweak+8($sp)
+	llgfr	$s3,$s3
+	la	$inp,16($inp)		# $inp+=16
+.Lxts_enc_enter:
+	x	$s0,0($inp)		# ^=*($inp)
+	x	$s1,4($inp)
+	x	$s2,8($inp)
+	x	$s3,12($inp)
+	stm${g}	%r2,%r3,2*$SIZE_T($sp)	# only two registers are changing
+	la	$key,0($key1)
+	bras	$ra,_s390x_AES_encrypt
+	lm${g}	%r2,%r5,2*$SIZE_T($sp)
+	x	$s0,$tweak+0($sp)	# ^=tweak
+	x	$s1,$tweak+4($sp)
+	x	$s2,$tweak+8($sp)
+	x	$s3,$tweak+12($sp)
+	st	$s0,0($out,$inp)
+	st	$s1,4($out,$inp)
+	st	$s2,8($out,$inp)
+	st	$s3,12($out,$inp)
+	brct${g}	$len,.Lxts_enc_loop
+
+	llgc	$len,`2*$SIZE_T-1`($sp)
+	nill	$len,0x0f		# $len%16
+	jz	.Lxts_enc_done
+
+	la	$i3,0($inp,$out)	# put aside real $out
+.Lxts_enc_steal:
+	llgc	%r0,16($inp)
+	llgc	%r1,0($out,$inp)
+	stc	%r0,0($out,$inp)
+	stc	%r1,16($out,$inp)
+	la	$inp,1($inp)
+	brct	$len,.Lxts_enc_steal
+	la	$out,0($i3)		# restore real $out
+
+	# generate last tweak...
+	lrvg	$s1,$tweak+0($sp)	# load the tweak in little-endian
+	lrvg	$s3,$tweak+8($sp)
+	lghi	%r1,0x87
+	srag	%r0,$s3,63		# broadcast upper bit
+	ngr	%r1,%r0			# rem
+	algr	$s1,$s1
+	alcgr	$s3,$s3
+	xgr	$s1,%r1
+	lrvgr	$s1,$s1			# flip byte order
+	lrvgr	$s3,$s3
+	srlg	$s0,$s1,32		# smash the tweak to 4x32-bits 
+	stg	$s1,$tweak+0($sp)	# save the tweak
+	llgfr	$s1,$s1
+	srlg	$s2,$s3,32
+	stg	$s3,$tweak+8($sp)
+	llgfr	$s3,$s3
+
+	x	$s0,0($out)		# ^=*(inp)|stolen cipther-text
+	x	$s1,4($out)
+	x	$s2,8($out)
+	x	$s3,12($out)
+	st${g}	$out,4*$SIZE_T($sp)
+	la	$key,0($key1)
+	bras	$ra,_s390x_AES_encrypt
+	l${g}	$out,4*$SIZE_T($sp)
+	x	$s0,`$tweak+0`($sp)	# ^=tweak
+	x	$s1,`$tweak+4`($sp)
+	x	$s2,`$tweak+8`($sp)
+	x	$s3,`$tweak+12`($sp)
+	st	$s0,0($out)
+	st	$s1,4($out)
+	st	$s2,8($out)
+	st	$s3,12($out)
+
+.Lxts_enc_done:
+	stg	$sp,$tweak+0($sp)	# wipe tweak
+	stg	$sp,$twesk+8($sp)
+	lm${g}	%r6,$ra,6*$SIZE_T($sp)
+	br	$ra
+.size	AES_xts_encrypt,.-AES_xts_encrypt
+___
+# void AES_xts_decrypt(const char *inp,char *out,size_t len,
+#	const AES_KEY *key1, const AES_KEY *key2,
+#	const unsigned char iv[16]);
+#
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	AES_xts_decrypt
+.type	AES_xts_decrypt,\@function
+.align	16
+AES_xts_decrypt:
+	xgr	%r3,%r4			# flip %r3 and %r4, $out and $len
+	xgr	%r4,%r3
+	xgr	%r3,%r4
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==4);
+	llgfr	$len,$len
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	st${g}	$len,1*$SIZE_T($sp)	# save copy of $len
+	aghi	$len,-16
+	bcr	4,$ra			# abort if less than zero. formally
+					# wrong, because $len is unsigned,
+					# but who can afford asking to
+					# process more than 2^63-1 bytes?
+	tmll	$len,0x0f
+	jnz	.Lxts_dec_proceed
+	aghi	$len,16
+.Lxts_dec_proceed:
+___
+$code.=<<___ if (!$softonly);
+	llgf	%r0,240($key2)
+	lhi	%r1,16
+	clr	%r0,%r1
+	jl	.Lxts_dec_software
+
+	st${g}	$ra,5*$SIZE_T($sp)
+	stm${g}	%r6,$s3,6*$SIZE_T($sp)
+
+	nill	$len,0xfff0		# $len&=~15
+	slgr	$out,$inp
+
+	# generate the tweak value
+	l${g}	$s3,$stdframe($sp)	# pointer to iv
+	la	$s2,$tweak($sp)
+	lmg	$s0,$s1,0($s3)
+	lghi	$s3,16
+	stmg	$s0,$s1,0($s2)
+	la	%r1,0($key2)		# $key2 is not needed past this point
+	.long	0xb92e00aa		# km $s2,$s2, generate the tweak
+	brc	1,.-4			# can this happen?
+
+	l	%r0,240($key1)
+	la	%r1,0($key1)		# $key1 is not needed anymore
+
+	ltgr	$len,$len
+	jz	.Lxts_dec_km_short
+	bras	$ra,_s390x_xts_km
+	jz	.Lxts_dec_km_done
+
+	lrvgr	$s2,$s0			# make copy in reverse byte order
+	lrvgr	$s3,$s1
+	j	.Lxts_dec_km_2ndtweak
+
+.Lxts_dec_km_short:
+	llgc	$len,`2*$SIZE_T-1`($sp)
+	nill	$len,0x0f		# $len%=16
+	lrvg	$s0,$tweak+0($sp)	# load the tweak
+	lrvg	$s1,$tweak+8($sp)
+	lrvgr	$s2,$s0			# make copy in reverse byte order
+	lrvgr	$s3,$s1
+
+.Lxts_dec_km_2ndtweak:
+	lghi	$i1,0x87
+	srag	$i2,$s1,63		# broadcast upper bit
+	ngr	$i1,$i2			# rem
+	algr	$s0,$s0
+	alcgr	$s1,$s1
+	xgr	$s0,$i1
+	lrvgr	$i1,$s0			# flip byte order
+	lrvgr	$i2,$s1
+
+	xg	$i1,0($inp)
+	xg	$i2,8($inp)
+	stg	$i1,0($out,$inp)
+	stg	$i2,8($out,$inp)
+	la	$i2,0($out,$inp)
+	lghi	$i3,16
+	.long	0xb92e0066		# km $i2,$i2
+	brc	1,.-4			# can this happen?
+	lrvgr	$i1,$s0
+	lrvgr	$i2,$s1
+	xg	$i1,0($out,$inp)
+	xg	$i2,8($out,$inp)
+	stg	$i1,0($out,$inp)
+	stg	$i2,8($out,$inp)
+
+	la	$i3,0($out,$inp)	# put aside real $out
+.Lxts_dec_km_steal:
+	llgc	$i1,16($inp)
+	llgc	$i2,0($out,$inp)
+	stc	$i1,0($out,$inp)
+	stc	$i2,16($out,$inp)
+	la	$inp,1($inp)
+	brct	$len,.Lxts_dec_km_steal
+
+	lgr	$s0,$s2
+	lgr	$s1,$s3
+	xg	$s0,0($i3)
+	xg	$s1,8($i3)
+	stg	$s0,0($i3)
+	stg	$s1,8($i3)
+	la	$s0,0($i3)
+	lghi	$s1,16
+	.long	0xb92e0088		# km $s0,$s0
+	brc	1,.-4			# can this happen?
+	xg	$s2,0($i3)
+	xg	$s3,8($i3)
+	stg	$s2,0($i3)
+	stg	$s3,8($i3)
+.Lxts_dec_km_done:
+	stg	$sp,$tweak+0($sp)	# wipe tweak
+	stg	$sp,$tweak+8($sp)
+	l${g}	$ra,5*$SIZE_T($sp)
+	lm${g}	%r6,$s3,6*$SIZE_T($sp)
+	br	$ra
+.align	16
+.Lxts_dec_software:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	stm${g}	%r6,$ra,6*$SIZE_T($sp)
+
+	srlg	$len,$len,4
+	slgr	$out,$inp
+
+	l${g}	$s3,$stdframe($sp)	# ivp
+	llgf	$s0,0($s3)		# load iv
+	llgf	$s1,4($s3)
+	llgf	$s2,8($s3)
+	llgf	$s3,12($s3)
+	stm${g}	%r2,%r5,2*$SIZE_T($sp)
+	la	$key,0($key2)
+	larl	$tbl,AES_Te
+	bras	$ra,_s390x_AES_encrypt	# generate the tweak
+	lm${g}	%r2,%r5,2*$SIZE_T($sp)
+	larl	$tbl,AES_Td
+	lt${g}r	$len,$len
+	stm	$s0,$s3,$tweak($sp)	# save the tweak
+	jz	.Lxts_dec_short
+	j	.Lxts_dec_enter
+
+.align	16
+.Lxts_dec_loop:
+	lrvg	$s1,$tweak+0($sp)	# load the tweak in little-endian
+	lrvg	$s3,$tweak+8($sp)
+	lghi	%r1,0x87
+	srag	%r0,$s3,63		# broadcast upper bit
+	ngr	%r1,%r0			# rem
+	algr	$s1,$s1
+	alcgr	$s3,$s3
+	xgr	$s1,%r1
+	lrvgr	$s1,$s1			# flip byte order
+	lrvgr	$s3,$s3
+	srlg	$s0,$s1,32		# smash the tweak to 4x32-bits 
+	stg	$s1,$tweak+0($sp)	# save the tweak
+	llgfr	$s1,$s1
+	srlg	$s2,$s3,32
+	stg	$s3,$tweak+8($sp)
+	llgfr	$s3,$s3
+.Lxts_dec_enter:
+	x	$s0,0($inp)		# tweak^=*(inp)
+	x	$s1,4($inp)
+	x	$s2,8($inp)
+	x	$s3,12($inp)
+	stm${g}	%r2,%r3,2*$SIZE_T($sp)	# only two registers are changing
+	la	$key,0($key1)
+	bras	$ra,_s390x_AES_decrypt
+	lm${g}	%r2,%r5,2*$SIZE_T($sp)
+	x	$s0,$tweak+0($sp)	# ^=tweak
+	x	$s1,$tweak+4($sp)
+	x	$s2,$tweak+8($sp)
+	x	$s3,$tweak+12($sp)
+	st	$s0,0($out,$inp)
+	st	$s1,4($out,$inp)
+	st	$s2,8($out,$inp)
+	st	$s3,12($out,$inp)
+	la	$inp,16($inp)
+	brct${g}	$len,.Lxts_dec_loop
+
+	llgc	$len,`2*$SIZE_T-1`($sp)
+	nill	$len,0x0f		# $len%16
+	jz	.Lxts_dec_done
+
+	# generate pair of tweaks...
+	lrvg	$s1,$tweak+0($sp)	# load the tweak in little-endian
+	lrvg	$s3,$tweak+8($sp)
+	lghi	%r1,0x87
+	srag	%r0,$s3,63		# broadcast upper bit
+	ngr	%r1,%r0			# rem
+	algr	$s1,$s1
+	alcgr	$s3,$s3
+	xgr	$s1,%r1
+	lrvgr	$i2,$s1			# flip byte order
+	lrvgr	$i3,$s3
+	stmg	$i2,$i3,$tweak($sp)	# save the 1st tweak
+	j	.Lxts_dec_2ndtweak
+
+.align	16
+.Lxts_dec_short:
+	llgc	$len,`2*$SIZE_T-1`($sp)
+	nill	$len,0x0f		# $len%16
+	lrvg	$s1,$tweak+0($sp)	# load the tweak in little-endian
+	lrvg	$s3,$tweak+8($sp)
+.Lxts_dec_2ndtweak:
+	lghi	%r1,0x87
+	srag	%r0,$s3,63		# broadcast upper bit
+	ngr	%r1,%r0			# rem
+	algr	$s1,$s1
+	alcgr	$s3,$s3
+	xgr	$s1,%r1
+	lrvgr	$s1,$s1			# flip byte order
+	lrvgr	$s3,$s3
+	srlg	$s0,$s1,32		# smash the tweak to 4x32-bits
+	stg	$s1,$tweak-16+0($sp)	# save the 2nd tweak
+	llgfr	$s1,$s1
+	srlg	$s2,$s3,32
+	stg	$s3,$tweak-16+8($sp)
+	llgfr	$s3,$s3
+
+	x	$s0,0($inp)		# tweak_the_2nd^=*(inp)
+	x	$s1,4($inp)
+	x	$s2,8($inp)
+	x	$s3,12($inp)
+	stm${g}	%r2,%r3,2*$SIZE_T($sp)
+	la	$key,0($key1)
+	bras	$ra,_s390x_AES_decrypt
+	lm${g}	%r2,%r5,2*$SIZE_T($sp)
+	x	$s0,$tweak-16+0($sp)	# ^=tweak_the_2nd
+	x	$s1,$tweak-16+4($sp)
+	x	$s2,$tweak-16+8($sp)
+	x	$s3,$tweak-16+12($sp)
+	st	$s0,0($out,$inp)
+	st	$s1,4($out,$inp)
+	st	$s2,8($out,$inp)
+	st	$s3,12($out,$inp)
+
+	la	$i3,0($out,$inp)	# put aside real $out
+.Lxts_dec_steal:
+	llgc	%r0,16($inp)
+	llgc	%r1,0($out,$inp)
+	stc	%r0,0($out,$inp)
+	stc	%r1,16($out,$inp)
+	la	$inp,1($inp)
+	brct	$len,.Lxts_dec_steal
+	la	$out,0($i3)		# restore real $out
+
+	lm	$s0,$s3,$tweak($sp)	# load the 1st tweak
+	x	$s0,0($out)		# tweak^=*(inp)|stolen cipher-text
+	x	$s1,4($out)
+	x	$s2,8($out)
+	x	$s3,12($out)
+	st${g}	$out,4*$SIZE_T($sp)
+	la	$key,0($key1)
+	bras	$ra,_s390x_AES_decrypt
+	l${g}	$out,4*$SIZE_T($sp)
+	x	$s0,$tweak+0($sp)	# ^=tweak
+	x	$s1,$tweak+4($sp)
+	x	$s2,$tweak+8($sp)
+	x	$s3,$tweak+12($sp)
+	st	$s0,0($out)
+	st	$s1,4($out)
+	st	$s2,8($out)
+	st	$s3,12($out)
+	stg	$sp,$tweak-16+0($sp)	# wipe 2nd tweak
+	stg	$sp,$tweak-16+8($sp)
+.Lxts_dec_done:
+	stg	$sp,$tweak+0($sp)	# wipe tweak
+	stg	$sp,$twesk+8($sp)
+	lm${g}	%r6,$ra,6*$SIZE_T($sp)
+	br	$ra
+.size	AES_xts_decrypt,.-AES_xts_decrypt
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+.string	"AES for s390x, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+___
+
+$code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem;
+print $code;
+close STDOUT;	# force flush
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/asm/aes-sparcv9.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/asm/aes-sparcv9.pl
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..883fae8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/asm/aes-sparcv9.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,1192 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se> for the OpenSSL
+# project. Rights for redistribution and usage in source and binary
+# forms are granted according to the OpenSSL license.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# Version 1.1
+#
+# The major reason for undertaken effort was to mitigate the hazard of
+# cache-timing attack. This is [currently and initially!] addressed in
+# two ways. 1. S-boxes are compressed from 5KB to 2KB+256B size each.
+# 2. References to them are scheduled for L2 cache latency, meaning
+# that the tables don't have to reside in L1 cache. Once again, this
+# is an initial draft and one should expect more countermeasures to
+# be implemented...
+#
+# Version 1.1 prefetches T[ed]4 in order to mitigate attack on last
+# round.
+#
+# Even though performance was not the primary goal [on the contrary,
+# extra shifts "induced" by compressed S-box and longer loop epilogue
+# "induced" by scheduling for L2 have negative effect on performance],
+# the code turned out to run in ~23 cycles per processed byte en-/
+# decrypted with 128-bit key. This is pretty good result for code
+# with mentioned qualities and UltraSPARC core. Compared to Sun C
+# generated code my encrypt procedure runs just few percents faster,
+# while decrypt one - whole 50% faster [yes, Sun C failed to generate
+# optimal decrypt procedure]. Compared to GNU C generated code both
+# procedures are more than 60% faster:-)
+
+$output = pop;
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+$frame="STACK_FRAME";
+$bias="STACK_BIAS";
+$locals=16;
+
+$acc0="%l0";
+$acc1="%o0";
+$acc2="%o1";
+$acc3="%o2";
+
+$acc4="%l1";
+$acc5="%o3";
+$acc6="%o4";
+$acc7="%o5";
+
+$acc8="%l2";
+$acc9="%o7";
+$acc10="%g1";
+$acc11="%g2";
+
+$acc12="%l3";
+$acc13="%g3";
+$acc14="%g4";
+$acc15="%g5";
+
+$t0="%l4";
+$t1="%l5";
+$t2="%l6";
+$t3="%l7";
+
+$s0="%i0";
+$s1="%i1";
+$s2="%i2";
+$s3="%i3";
+$tbl="%i4";
+$key="%i5";
+$rounds="%i7";	# aliases with return address, which is off-loaded to stack
+
+sub _data_word()
+{ my $i;
+    while(defined($i=shift)) { $code.=sprintf"\t.long\t0x%08x,0x%08x\n",$i,$i; }
+}
+
+$code.=<<___;
+#include "sparc_arch.h"
+
+#ifdef  __arch64__
+.register	%g2,#scratch
+.register	%g3,#scratch
+#endif
+.section	".text",#alloc,#execinstr
+
+.align	256
+AES_Te:
+___
+&_data_word(
+	0xc66363a5, 0xf87c7c84, 0xee777799, 0xf67b7b8d,
+	0xfff2f20d, 0xd66b6bbd, 0xde6f6fb1, 0x91c5c554,
+	0x60303050, 0x02010103, 0xce6767a9, 0x562b2b7d,
+	0xe7fefe19, 0xb5d7d762, 0x4dababe6, 0xec76769a,
+	0x8fcaca45, 0x1f82829d, 0x89c9c940, 0xfa7d7d87,
+	0xeffafa15, 0xb25959eb, 0x8e4747c9, 0xfbf0f00b,
+	0x41adadec, 0xb3d4d467, 0x5fa2a2fd, 0x45afafea,
+	0x239c9cbf, 0x53a4a4f7, 0xe4727296, 0x9bc0c05b,
+	0x75b7b7c2, 0xe1fdfd1c, 0x3d9393ae, 0x4c26266a,
+	0x6c36365a, 0x7e3f3f41, 0xf5f7f702, 0x83cccc4f,
+	0x6834345c, 0x51a5a5f4, 0xd1e5e534, 0xf9f1f108,
+	0xe2717193, 0xabd8d873, 0x62313153, 0x2a15153f,
+	0x0804040c, 0x95c7c752, 0x46232365, 0x9dc3c35e,
+	0x30181828, 0x379696a1, 0x0a05050f, 0x2f9a9ab5,
+	0x0e070709, 0x24121236, 0x1b80809b, 0xdfe2e23d,
+	0xcdebeb26, 0x4e272769, 0x7fb2b2cd, 0xea75759f,
+	0x1209091b, 0x1d83839e, 0x582c2c74, 0x341a1a2e,
+	0x361b1b2d, 0xdc6e6eb2, 0xb45a5aee, 0x5ba0a0fb,
+	0xa45252f6, 0x763b3b4d, 0xb7d6d661, 0x7db3b3ce,
+	0x5229297b, 0xdde3e33e, 0x5e2f2f71, 0x13848497,
+	0xa65353f5, 0xb9d1d168, 0x00000000, 0xc1eded2c,
+	0x40202060, 0xe3fcfc1f, 0x79b1b1c8, 0xb65b5bed,
+	0xd46a6abe, 0x8dcbcb46, 0x67bebed9, 0x7239394b,
+	0x944a4ade, 0x984c4cd4, 0xb05858e8, 0x85cfcf4a,
+	0xbbd0d06b, 0xc5efef2a, 0x4faaaae5, 0xedfbfb16,
+	0x864343c5, 0x9a4d4dd7, 0x66333355, 0x11858594,
+	0x8a4545cf, 0xe9f9f910, 0x04020206, 0xfe7f7f81,
+	0xa05050f0, 0x783c3c44, 0x259f9fba, 0x4ba8a8e3,
+	0xa25151f3, 0x5da3a3fe, 0x804040c0, 0x058f8f8a,
+	0x3f9292ad, 0x219d9dbc, 0x70383848, 0xf1f5f504,
+	0x63bcbcdf, 0x77b6b6c1, 0xafdada75, 0x42212163,
+	0x20101030, 0xe5ffff1a, 0xfdf3f30e, 0xbfd2d26d,
+	0x81cdcd4c, 0x180c0c14, 0x26131335, 0xc3ecec2f,
+	0xbe5f5fe1, 0x359797a2, 0x884444cc, 0x2e171739,
+	0x93c4c457, 0x55a7a7f2, 0xfc7e7e82, 0x7a3d3d47,
+	0xc86464ac, 0xba5d5de7, 0x3219192b, 0xe6737395,
+	0xc06060a0, 0x19818198, 0x9e4f4fd1, 0xa3dcdc7f,
+	0x44222266, 0x542a2a7e, 0x3b9090ab, 0x0b888883,
+	0x8c4646ca, 0xc7eeee29, 0x6bb8b8d3, 0x2814143c,
+	0xa7dede79, 0xbc5e5ee2, 0x160b0b1d, 0xaddbdb76,
+	0xdbe0e03b, 0x64323256, 0x743a3a4e, 0x140a0a1e,
+	0x924949db, 0x0c06060a, 0x4824246c, 0xb85c5ce4,
+	0x9fc2c25d, 0xbdd3d36e, 0x43acacef, 0xc46262a6,
+	0x399191a8, 0x319595a4, 0xd3e4e437, 0xf279798b,
+	0xd5e7e732, 0x8bc8c843, 0x6e373759, 0xda6d6db7,
+	0x018d8d8c, 0xb1d5d564, 0x9c4e4ed2, 0x49a9a9e0,
+	0xd86c6cb4, 0xac5656fa, 0xf3f4f407, 0xcfeaea25,
+	0xca6565af, 0xf47a7a8e, 0x47aeaee9, 0x10080818,
+	0x6fbabad5, 0xf0787888, 0x4a25256f, 0x5c2e2e72,
+	0x381c1c24, 0x57a6a6f1, 0x73b4b4c7, 0x97c6c651,
+	0xcbe8e823, 0xa1dddd7c, 0xe874749c, 0x3e1f1f21,
+	0x964b4bdd, 0x61bdbddc, 0x0d8b8b86, 0x0f8a8a85,
+	0xe0707090, 0x7c3e3e42, 0x71b5b5c4, 0xcc6666aa,
+	0x904848d8, 0x06030305, 0xf7f6f601, 0x1c0e0e12,
+	0xc26161a3, 0x6a35355f, 0xae5757f9, 0x69b9b9d0,
+	0x17868691, 0x99c1c158, 0x3a1d1d27, 0x279e9eb9,
+	0xd9e1e138, 0xebf8f813, 0x2b9898b3, 0x22111133,
+	0xd26969bb, 0xa9d9d970, 0x078e8e89, 0x339494a7,
+	0x2d9b9bb6, 0x3c1e1e22, 0x15878792, 0xc9e9e920,
+	0x87cece49, 0xaa5555ff, 0x50282878, 0xa5dfdf7a,
+	0x038c8c8f, 0x59a1a1f8, 0x09898980, 0x1a0d0d17,
+	0x65bfbfda, 0xd7e6e631, 0x844242c6, 0xd06868b8,
+	0x824141c3, 0x299999b0, 0x5a2d2d77, 0x1e0f0f11,
+	0x7bb0b0cb, 0xa85454fc, 0x6dbbbbd6, 0x2c16163a);
+$code.=<<___;
+	.byte	0x63, 0x7c, 0x77, 0x7b, 0xf2, 0x6b, 0x6f, 0xc5
+	.byte	0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2b, 0xfe, 0xd7, 0xab, 0x76
+	.byte	0xca, 0x82, 0xc9, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0x59, 0x47, 0xf0
+	.byte	0xad, 0xd4, 0xa2, 0xaf, 0x9c, 0xa4, 0x72, 0xc0
+	.byte	0xb7, 0xfd, 0x93, 0x26, 0x36, 0x3f, 0xf7, 0xcc
+	.byte	0x34, 0xa5, 0xe5, 0xf1, 0x71, 0xd8, 0x31, 0x15
+	.byte	0x04, 0xc7, 0x23, 0xc3, 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9a
+	.byte	0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xeb, 0x27, 0xb2, 0x75
+	.byte	0x09, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x6e, 0x5a, 0xa0
+	.byte	0x52, 0x3b, 0xd6, 0xb3, 0x29, 0xe3, 0x2f, 0x84
+	.byte	0x53, 0xd1, 0x00, 0xed, 0x20, 0xfc, 0xb1, 0x5b
+	.byte	0x6a, 0xcb, 0xbe, 0x39, 0x4a, 0x4c, 0x58, 0xcf
+	.byte	0xd0, 0xef, 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x43, 0x4d, 0x33, 0x85
+	.byte	0x45, 0xf9, 0x02, 0x7f, 0x50, 0x3c, 0x9f, 0xa8
+	.byte	0x51, 0xa3, 0x40, 0x8f, 0x92, 0x9d, 0x38, 0xf5
+	.byte	0xbc, 0xb6, 0xda, 0x21, 0x10, 0xff, 0xf3, 0xd2
+	.byte	0xcd, 0x0c, 0x13, 0xec, 0x5f, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17
+	.byte	0xc4, 0xa7, 0x7e, 0x3d, 0x64, 0x5d, 0x19, 0x73
+	.byte	0x60, 0x81, 0x4f, 0xdc, 0x22, 0x2a, 0x90, 0x88
+	.byte	0x46, 0xee, 0xb8, 0x14, 0xde, 0x5e, 0x0b, 0xdb
+	.byte	0xe0, 0x32, 0x3a, 0x0a, 0x49, 0x06, 0x24, 0x5c
+	.byte	0xc2, 0xd3, 0xac, 0x62, 0x91, 0x95, 0xe4, 0x79
+	.byte	0xe7, 0xc8, 0x37, 0x6d, 0x8d, 0xd5, 0x4e, 0xa9
+	.byte	0x6c, 0x56, 0xf4, 0xea, 0x65, 0x7a, 0xae, 0x08
+	.byte	0xba, 0x78, 0x25, 0x2e, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xb4, 0xc6
+	.byte	0xe8, 0xdd, 0x74, 0x1f, 0x4b, 0xbd, 0x8b, 0x8a
+	.byte	0x70, 0x3e, 0xb5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xf6, 0x0e
+	.byte	0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xb9, 0x86, 0xc1, 0x1d, 0x9e
+	.byte	0xe1, 0xf8, 0x98, 0x11, 0x69, 0xd9, 0x8e, 0x94
+	.byte	0x9b, 0x1e, 0x87, 0xe9, 0xce, 0x55, 0x28, 0xdf
+	.byte	0x8c, 0xa1, 0x89, 0x0d, 0xbf, 0xe6, 0x42, 0x68
+	.byte	0x41, 0x99, 0x2d, 0x0f, 0xb0, 0x54, 0xbb, 0x16
+.type	AES_Te,#object
+.size	AES_Te,(.-AES_Te)
+
+.align	64
+.skip	16
+_sparcv9_AES_encrypt:
+	save	%sp,-$frame-$locals,%sp
+	stx	%i7,[%sp+$bias+$frame+0]	! off-load return address
+	ld	[$key+240],$rounds
+	ld	[$key+0],$t0
+	ld	[$key+4],$t1			!
+	ld	[$key+8],$t2
+	srl	$rounds,1,$rounds
+	xor	$t0,$s0,$s0
+	ld	[$key+12],$t3
+	srl	$s0,21,$acc0
+	xor	$t1,$s1,$s1
+	ld	[$key+16],$t0
+	srl	$s1,13,$acc1			!
+	xor	$t2,$s2,$s2
+	ld	[$key+20],$t1
+	xor	$t3,$s3,$s3
+	ld	[$key+24],$t2
+	and	$acc0,2040,$acc0
+	ld	[$key+28],$t3
+	nop
+.Lenc_loop:
+	srl	$s2,5,$acc2			!
+	and	$acc1,2040,$acc1
+	ldx	[$tbl+$acc0],$acc0
+	sll	$s3,3,$acc3
+	and	$acc2,2040,$acc2
+	ldx	[$tbl+$acc1],$acc1
+	srl	$s1,21,$acc4
+	and	$acc3,2040,$acc3
+	ldx	[$tbl+$acc2],$acc2		!
+	srl	$s2,13,$acc5
+	and	$acc4,2040,$acc4
+	ldx	[$tbl+$acc3],$acc3
+	srl	$s3,5,$acc6
+	and	$acc5,2040,$acc5
+	ldx	[$tbl+$acc4],$acc4
+	fmovs	%f0,%f0
+	sll	$s0,3,$acc7			!
+	and	$acc6,2040,$acc6
+	ldx	[$tbl+$acc5],$acc5
+	srl	$s2,21,$acc8
+	and	$acc7,2040,$acc7
+	ldx	[$tbl+$acc6],$acc6
+	srl	$s3,13,$acc9
+	and	$acc8,2040,$acc8
+	ldx	[$tbl+$acc7],$acc7		!
+	srl	$s0,5,$acc10
+	and	$acc9,2040,$acc9
+	ldx	[$tbl+$acc8],$acc8
+	sll	$s1,3,$acc11
+	and	$acc10,2040,$acc10
+	ldx	[$tbl+$acc9],$acc9
+	fmovs	%f0,%f0
+	srl	$s3,21,$acc12			!
+	and	$acc11,2040,$acc11
+	ldx	[$tbl+$acc10],$acc10
+	srl	$s0,13,$acc13
+	and	$acc12,2040,$acc12
+	ldx	[$tbl+$acc11],$acc11
+	srl	$s1,5,$acc14
+	and	$acc13,2040,$acc13
+	ldx	[$tbl+$acc12],$acc12		!
+	sll	$s2,3,$acc15
+	and	$acc14,2040,$acc14
+	ldx	[$tbl+$acc13],$acc13
+	and	$acc15,2040,$acc15
+	add	$key,32,$key
+	ldx	[$tbl+$acc14],$acc14
+	fmovs	%f0,%f0
+	subcc	$rounds,1,$rounds		!
+	ldx	[$tbl+$acc15],$acc15
+	bz,a,pn	%icc,.Lenc_last
+	add	$tbl,2048,$rounds
+
+		srlx	$acc1,8,$acc1
+		xor	$acc0,$t0,$t0
+	ld	[$key+0],$s0
+	fmovs	%f0,%f0
+		srlx	$acc2,16,$acc2		!
+		xor	$acc1,$t0,$t0
+	ld	[$key+4],$s1
+		srlx	$acc3,24,$acc3
+		xor	$acc2,$t0,$t0
+	ld	[$key+8],$s2
+		srlx	$acc5,8,$acc5
+		xor	$acc3,$t0,$t0
+	ld	[$key+12],$s3			!
+		srlx	$acc6,16,$acc6
+		xor	$acc4,$t1,$t1
+	fmovs	%f0,%f0
+		srlx	$acc7,24,$acc7
+		xor	$acc5,$t1,$t1
+		srlx	$acc9,8,$acc9
+		xor	$acc6,$t1,$t1
+		srlx	$acc10,16,$acc10	!
+		xor	$acc7,$t1,$t1
+		srlx	$acc11,24,$acc11
+		xor	$acc8,$t2,$t2
+		srlx	$acc13,8,$acc13
+		xor	$acc9,$t2,$t2
+		srlx	$acc14,16,$acc14
+		xor	$acc10,$t2,$t2
+		srlx	$acc15,24,$acc15	!
+		xor	$acc11,$t2,$t2
+		xor	$acc12,$acc14,$acc14
+		xor	$acc13,$t3,$t3
+	srl	$t0,21,$acc0
+		xor	$acc14,$t3,$t3
+	srl	$t1,13,$acc1
+		xor	$acc15,$t3,$t3
+
+	and	$acc0,2040,$acc0		!
+	srl	$t2,5,$acc2
+	and	$acc1,2040,$acc1
+	ldx	[$tbl+$acc0],$acc0
+	sll	$t3,3,$acc3
+	and	$acc2,2040,$acc2
+	ldx	[$tbl+$acc1],$acc1
+	fmovs	%f0,%f0
+	srl	$t1,21,$acc4			!
+	and	$acc3,2040,$acc3
+	ldx	[$tbl+$acc2],$acc2
+	srl	$t2,13,$acc5
+	and	$acc4,2040,$acc4
+	ldx	[$tbl+$acc3],$acc3
+	srl	$t3,5,$acc6
+	and	$acc5,2040,$acc5
+	ldx	[$tbl+$acc4],$acc4		!
+	sll	$t0,3,$acc7
+	and	$acc6,2040,$acc6
+	ldx	[$tbl+$acc5],$acc5
+	srl	$t2,21,$acc8
+	and	$acc7,2040,$acc7
+	ldx	[$tbl+$acc6],$acc6
+	fmovs	%f0,%f0
+	srl	$t3,13,$acc9			!
+	and	$acc8,2040,$acc8
+	ldx	[$tbl+$acc7],$acc7
+	srl	$t0,5,$acc10
+	and	$acc9,2040,$acc9
+	ldx	[$tbl+$acc8],$acc8
+	sll	$t1,3,$acc11
+	and	$acc10,2040,$acc10
+	ldx	[$tbl+$acc9],$acc9		!
+	srl	$t3,21,$acc12
+	and	$acc11,2040,$acc11
+	ldx	[$tbl+$acc10],$acc10
+	srl	$t0,13,$acc13
+	and	$acc12,2040,$acc12
+	ldx	[$tbl+$acc11],$acc11
+	fmovs	%f0,%f0
+	srl	$t1,5,$acc14			!
+	and	$acc13,2040,$acc13
+	ldx	[$tbl+$acc12],$acc12
+	sll	$t2,3,$acc15
+	and	$acc14,2040,$acc14
+	ldx	[$tbl+$acc13],$acc13
+		srlx	$acc1,8,$acc1
+	and	$acc15,2040,$acc15
+	ldx	[$tbl+$acc14],$acc14		!
+
+		srlx	$acc2,16,$acc2
+		xor	$acc0,$s0,$s0
+	ldx	[$tbl+$acc15],$acc15
+		srlx	$acc3,24,$acc3
+		xor	$acc1,$s0,$s0
+	ld	[$key+16],$t0
+	fmovs	%f0,%f0
+		srlx	$acc5,8,$acc5		!
+		xor	$acc2,$s0,$s0
+	ld	[$key+20],$t1
+		srlx	$acc6,16,$acc6
+		xor	$acc3,$s0,$s0
+	ld	[$key+24],$t2
+		srlx	$acc7,24,$acc7
+		xor	$acc4,$s1,$s1
+	ld	[$key+28],$t3			!
+		srlx	$acc9,8,$acc9
+		xor	$acc5,$s1,$s1
+	ldx	[$tbl+2048+0],%g0		! prefetch te4
+		srlx	$acc10,16,$acc10
+		xor	$acc6,$s1,$s1
+	ldx	[$tbl+2048+32],%g0		! prefetch te4
+		srlx	$acc11,24,$acc11
+		xor	$acc7,$s1,$s1
+	ldx	[$tbl+2048+64],%g0		! prefetch te4
+		srlx	$acc13,8,$acc13
+		xor	$acc8,$s2,$s2
+	ldx	[$tbl+2048+96],%g0		! prefetch te4
+		srlx	$acc14,16,$acc14	!
+		xor	$acc9,$s2,$s2
+	ldx	[$tbl+2048+128],%g0		! prefetch te4
+		srlx	$acc15,24,$acc15
+		xor	$acc10,$s2,$s2
+	ldx	[$tbl+2048+160],%g0		! prefetch te4
+	srl	$s0,21,$acc0
+		xor	$acc11,$s2,$s2
+	ldx	[$tbl+2048+192],%g0		! prefetch te4
+		xor	$acc12,$acc14,$acc14
+		xor	$acc13,$s3,$s3
+	ldx	[$tbl+2048+224],%g0		! prefetch te4
+	srl	$s1,13,$acc1			!
+		xor	$acc14,$s3,$s3
+		xor	$acc15,$s3,$s3
+	ba	.Lenc_loop
+	and	$acc0,2040,$acc0
+
+.align	32
+.Lenc_last:
+		srlx	$acc1,8,$acc1		!
+		xor	$acc0,$t0,$t0
+	ld	[$key+0],$s0
+		srlx	$acc2,16,$acc2
+		xor	$acc1,$t0,$t0
+	ld	[$key+4],$s1
+		srlx	$acc3,24,$acc3
+		xor	$acc2,$t0,$t0
+	ld	[$key+8],$s2			!
+		srlx	$acc5,8,$acc5
+		xor	$acc3,$t0,$t0
+	ld	[$key+12],$s3
+		srlx	$acc6,16,$acc6
+		xor	$acc4,$t1,$t1
+		srlx	$acc7,24,$acc7
+		xor	$acc5,$t1,$t1
+		srlx	$acc9,8,$acc9		!
+		xor	$acc6,$t1,$t1
+		srlx	$acc10,16,$acc10
+		xor	$acc7,$t1,$t1
+		srlx	$acc11,24,$acc11
+		xor	$acc8,$t2,$t2
+		srlx	$acc13,8,$acc13
+		xor	$acc9,$t2,$t2
+		srlx	$acc14,16,$acc14	!
+		xor	$acc10,$t2,$t2
+		srlx	$acc15,24,$acc15
+		xor	$acc11,$t2,$t2
+		xor	$acc12,$acc14,$acc14
+		xor	$acc13,$t3,$t3
+	srl	$t0,24,$acc0
+		xor	$acc14,$t3,$t3
+	srl	$t1,16,$acc1			!
+		xor	$acc15,$t3,$t3
+
+	srl	$t2,8,$acc2
+	and	$acc1,255,$acc1
+	ldub	[$rounds+$acc0],$acc0
+	srl	$t1,24,$acc4
+	and	$acc2,255,$acc2
+	ldub	[$rounds+$acc1],$acc1
+	srl	$t2,16,$acc5			!
+	and	$t3,255,$acc3
+	ldub	[$rounds+$acc2],$acc2
+	ldub	[$rounds+$acc3],$acc3
+	srl	$t3,8,$acc6
+	and	$acc5,255,$acc5
+	ldub	[$rounds+$acc4],$acc4
+	fmovs	%f0,%f0
+	srl	$t2,24,$acc8			!
+	and	$acc6,255,$acc6
+	ldub	[$rounds+$acc5],$acc5
+	srl	$t3,16,$acc9
+	and	$t0,255,$acc7
+	ldub	[$rounds+$acc6],$acc6
+	ldub	[$rounds+$acc7],$acc7
+	fmovs	%f0,%f0
+	srl	$t0,8,$acc10			!
+	and	$acc9,255,$acc9
+	ldub	[$rounds+$acc8],$acc8
+	srl	$t3,24,$acc12
+	and	$acc10,255,$acc10
+	ldub	[$rounds+$acc9],$acc9
+	srl	$t0,16,$acc13
+	and	$t1,255,$acc11
+	ldub	[$rounds+$acc10],$acc10		!
+	srl	$t1,8,$acc14
+	and	$acc13,255,$acc13
+	ldub	[$rounds+$acc11],$acc11
+	ldub	[$rounds+$acc12],$acc12
+	and	$acc14,255,$acc14
+	ldub	[$rounds+$acc13],$acc13
+	and	$t2,255,$acc15
+	ldub	[$rounds+$acc14],$acc14		!
+
+		sll	$acc0,24,$acc0
+		xor	$acc3,$s0,$s0
+	ldub	[$rounds+$acc15],$acc15
+		sll	$acc1,16,$acc1
+		xor	$acc0,$s0,$s0
+	ldx	[%sp+$bias+$frame+0],%i7	! restore return address
+	fmovs	%f0,%f0
+		sll	$acc2,8,$acc2		!
+		xor	$acc1,$s0,$s0
+		sll	$acc4,24,$acc4
+		xor	$acc2,$s0,$s0
+		sll	$acc5,16,$acc5
+		xor	$acc7,$s1,$s1
+		sll	$acc6,8,$acc6
+		xor	$acc4,$s1,$s1
+		sll	$acc8,24,$acc8		!
+		xor	$acc5,$s1,$s1
+		sll	$acc9,16,$acc9
+		xor	$acc11,$s2,$s2
+		sll	$acc10,8,$acc10
+		xor	$acc6,$s1,$s1
+		sll	$acc12,24,$acc12
+		xor	$acc8,$s2,$s2
+		sll	$acc13,16,$acc13	!
+		xor	$acc9,$s2,$s2
+		sll	$acc14,8,$acc14
+		xor	$acc10,$s2,$s2
+		xor	$acc12,$acc14,$acc14
+		xor	$acc13,$s3,$s3
+		xor	$acc14,$s3,$s3
+		xor	$acc15,$s3,$s3
+
+	ret
+	restore
+.type	_sparcv9_AES_encrypt,#function
+.size	_sparcv9_AES_encrypt,(.-_sparcv9_AES_encrypt)
+
+.align	32
+.globl	AES_encrypt
+AES_encrypt:
+	or	%o0,%o1,%g1
+	andcc	%g1,3,%g0
+	bnz,pn	%xcc,.Lunaligned_enc
+	save	%sp,-$frame,%sp
+
+	ld	[%i0+0],%o0
+	ld	[%i0+4],%o1
+	ld	[%i0+8],%o2
+	ld	[%i0+12],%o3
+
+1:	call	.+8
+	add	%o7,AES_Te-1b,%o4
+	call	_sparcv9_AES_encrypt
+	mov	%i2,%o5
+
+	st	%o0,[%i1+0]
+	st	%o1,[%i1+4]
+	st	%o2,[%i1+8]
+	st	%o3,[%i1+12]
+
+	ret
+	restore
+
+.align	32
+.Lunaligned_enc:
+	ldub	[%i0+0],%l0
+	ldub	[%i0+1],%l1
+	ldub	[%i0+2],%l2
+
+	sll	%l0,24,%l0
+	ldub	[%i0+3],%l3
+	sll	%l1,16,%l1
+	ldub	[%i0+4],%l4
+	sll	%l2,8,%l2
+	or	%l1,%l0,%l0
+	ldub	[%i0+5],%l5
+	sll	%l4,24,%l4
+	or	%l3,%l2,%l2
+	ldub	[%i0+6],%l6
+	sll	%l5,16,%l5
+	or	%l0,%l2,%o0
+	ldub	[%i0+7],%l7
+
+	sll	%l6,8,%l6
+	or	%l5,%l4,%l4
+	ldub	[%i0+8],%l0
+	or	%l7,%l6,%l6
+	ldub	[%i0+9],%l1
+	or	%l4,%l6,%o1
+	ldub	[%i0+10],%l2
+
+	sll	%l0,24,%l0
+	ldub	[%i0+11],%l3
+	sll	%l1,16,%l1
+	ldub	[%i0+12],%l4
+	sll	%l2,8,%l2
+	or	%l1,%l0,%l0
+	ldub	[%i0+13],%l5
+	sll	%l4,24,%l4
+	or	%l3,%l2,%l2
+	ldub	[%i0+14],%l6
+	sll	%l5,16,%l5
+	or	%l0,%l2,%o2
+	ldub	[%i0+15],%l7
+
+	sll	%l6,8,%l6
+	or	%l5,%l4,%l4
+	or	%l7,%l6,%l6
+	or	%l4,%l6,%o3
+
+1:	call	.+8
+	add	%o7,AES_Te-1b,%o4
+	call	_sparcv9_AES_encrypt
+	mov	%i2,%o5
+
+	srl	%o0,24,%l0
+	srl	%o0,16,%l1
+	stb	%l0,[%i1+0]
+	srl	%o0,8,%l2
+	stb	%l1,[%i1+1]
+	stb	%l2,[%i1+2]
+	srl	%o1,24,%l4
+	stb	%o0,[%i1+3]
+
+	srl	%o1,16,%l5
+	stb	%l4,[%i1+4]
+	srl	%o1,8,%l6
+	stb	%l5,[%i1+5]
+	stb	%l6,[%i1+6]
+	srl	%o2,24,%l0
+	stb	%o1,[%i1+7]
+
+	srl	%o2,16,%l1
+	stb	%l0,[%i1+8]
+	srl	%o2,8,%l2
+	stb	%l1,[%i1+9]
+	stb	%l2,[%i1+10]
+	srl	%o3,24,%l4
+	stb	%o2,[%i1+11]
+
+	srl	%o3,16,%l5
+	stb	%l4,[%i1+12]
+	srl	%o3,8,%l6
+	stb	%l5,[%i1+13]
+	stb	%l6,[%i1+14]
+	stb	%o3,[%i1+15]
+
+	ret
+	restore
+.type	AES_encrypt,#function
+.size	AES_encrypt,(.-AES_encrypt)
+
+___
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.align	256
+AES_Td:
+___
+&_data_word(
+	0x51f4a750, 0x7e416553, 0x1a17a4c3, 0x3a275e96,
+	0x3bab6bcb, 0x1f9d45f1, 0xacfa58ab, 0x4be30393,
+	0x2030fa55, 0xad766df6, 0x88cc7691, 0xf5024c25,
+	0x4fe5d7fc, 0xc52acbd7, 0x26354480, 0xb562a38f,
+	0xdeb15a49, 0x25ba1b67, 0x45ea0e98, 0x5dfec0e1,
+	0xc32f7502, 0x814cf012, 0x8d4697a3, 0x6bd3f9c6,
+	0x038f5fe7, 0x15929c95, 0xbf6d7aeb, 0x955259da,
+	0xd4be832d, 0x587421d3, 0x49e06929, 0x8ec9c844,
+	0x75c2896a, 0xf48e7978, 0x99583e6b, 0x27b971dd,
+	0xbee14fb6, 0xf088ad17, 0xc920ac66, 0x7dce3ab4,
+	0x63df4a18, 0xe51a3182, 0x97513360, 0x62537f45,
+	0xb16477e0, 0xbb6bae84, 0xfe81a01c, 0xf9082b94,
+	0x70486858, 0x8f45fd19, 0x94de6c87, 0x527bf8b7,
+	0xab73d323, 0x724b02e2, 0xe31f8f57, 0x6655ab2a,
+	0xb2eb2807, 0x2fb5c203, 0x86c57b9a, 0xd33708a5,
+	0x302887f2, 0x23bfa5b2, 0x02036aba, 0xed16825c,
+	0x8acf1c2b, 0xa779b492, 0xf307f2f0, 0x4e69e2a1,
+	0x65daf4cd, 0x0605bed5, 0xd134621f, 0xc4a6fe8a,
+	0x342e539d, 0xa2f355a0, 0x058ae132, 0xa4f6eb75,
+	0x0b83ec39, 0x4060efaa, 0x5e719f06, 0xbd6e1051,
+	0x3e218af9, 0x96dd063d, 0xdd3e05ae, 0x4de6bd46,
+	0x91548db5, 0x71c45d05, 0x0406d46f, 0x605015ff,
+	0x1998fb24, 0xd6bde997, 0x894043cc, 0x67d99e77,
+	0xb0e842bd, 0x07898b88, 0xe7195b38, 0x79c8eedb,
+	0xa17c0a47, 0x7c420fe9, 0xf8841ec9, 0x00000000,
+	0x09808683, 0x322bed48, 0x1e1170ac, 0x6c5a724e,
+	0xfd0efffb, 0x0f853856, 0x3daed51e, 0x362d3927,
+	0x0a0fd964, 0x685ca621, 0x9b5b54d1, 0x24362e3a,
+	0x0c0a67b1, 0x9357e70f, 0xb4ee96d2, 0x1b9b919e,
+	0x80c0c54f, 0x61dc20a2, 0x5a774b69, 0x1c121a16,
+	0xe293ba0a, 0xc0a02ae5, 0x3c22e043, 0x121b171d,
+	0x0e090d0b, 0xf28bc7ad, 0x2db6a8b9, 0x141ea9c8,
+	0x57f11985, 0xaf75074c, 0xee99ddbb, 0xa37f60fd,
+	0xf701269f, 0x5c72f5bc, 0x44663bc5, 0x5bfb7e34,
+	0x8b432976, 0xcb23c6dc, 0xb6edfc68, 0xb8e4f163,
+	0xd731dcca, 0x42638510, 0x13972240, 0x84c61120,
+	0x854a247d, 0xd2bb3df8, 0xaef93211, 0xc729a16d,
+	0x1d9e2f4b, 0xdcb230f3, 0x0d8652ec, 0x77c1e3d0,
+	0x2bb3166c, 0xa970b999, 0x119448fa, 0x47e96422,
+	0xa8fc8cc4, 0xa0f03f1a, 0x567d2cd8, 0x223390ef,
+	0x87494ec7, 0xd938d1c1, 0x8ccaa2fe, 0x98d40b36,
+	0xa6f581cf, 0xa57ade28, 0xdab78e26, 0x3fadbfa4,
+	0x2c3a9de4, 0x5078920d, 0x6a5fcc9b, 0x547e4662,
+	0xf68d13c2, 0x90d8b8e8, 0x2e39f75e, 0x82c3aff5,
+	0x9f5d80be, 0x69d0937c, 0x6fd52da9, 0xcf2512b3,
+	0xc8ac993b, 0x10187da7, 0xe89c636e, 0xdb3bbb7b,
+	0xcd267809, 0x6e5918f4, 0xec9ab701, 0x834f9aa8,
+	0xe6956e65, 0xaaffe67e, 0x21bccf08, 0xef15e8e6,
+	0xbae79bd9, 0x4a6f36ce, 0xea9f09d4, 0x29b07cd6,
+	0x31a4b2af, 0x2a3f2331, 0xc6a59430, 0x35a266c0,
+	0x744ebc37, 0xfc82caa6, 0xe090d0b0, 0x33a7d815,
+	0xf104984a, 0x41ecdaf7, 0x7fcd500e, 0x1791f62f,
+	0x764dd68d, 0x43efb04d, 0xccaa4d54, 0xe49604df,
+	0x9ed1b5e3, 0x4c6a881b, 0xc12c1fb8, 0x4665517f,
+	0x9d5eea04, 0x018c355d, 0xfa877473, 0xfb0b412e,
+	0xb3671d5a, 0x92dbd252, 0xe9105633, 0x6dd64713,
+	0x9ad7618c, 0x37a10c7a, 0x59f8148e, 0xeb133c89,
+	0xcea927ee, 0xb761c935, 0xe11ce5ed, 0x7a47b13c,
+	0x9cd2df59, 0x55f2733f, 0x1814ce79, 0x73c737bf,
+	0x53f7cdea, 0x5ffdaa5b, 0xdf3d6f14, 0x7844db86,
+	0xcaaff381, 0xb968c43e, 0x3824342c, 0xc2a3405f,
+	0x161dc372, 0xbce2250c, 0x283c498b, 0xff0d9541,
+	0x39a80171, 0x080cb3de, 0xd8b4e49c, 0x6456c190,
+	0x7bcb8461, 0xd532b670, 0x486c5c74, 0xd0b85742);
+$code.=<<___;
+	.byte	0x52, 0x09, 0x6a, 0xd5, 0x30, 0x36, 0xa5, 0x38
+	.byte	0xbf, 0x40, 0xa3, 0x9e, 0x81, 0xf3, 0xd7, 0xfb
+	.byte	0x7c, 0xe3, 0x39, 0x82, 0x9b, 0x2f, 0xff, 0x87
+	.byte	0x34, 0x8e, 0x43, 0x44, 0xc4, 0xde, 0xe9, 0xcb
+	.byte	0x54, 0x7b, 0x94, 0x32, 0xa6, 0xc2, 0x23, 0x3d
+	.byte	0xee, 0x4c, 0x95, 0x0b, 0x42, 0xfa, 0xc3, 0x4e
+	.byte	0x08, 0x2e, 0xa1, 0x66, 0x28, 0xd9, 0x24, 0xb2
+	.byte	0x76, 0x5b, 0xa2, 0x49, 0x6d, 0x8b, 0xd1, 0x25
+	.byte	0x72, 0xf8, 0xf6, 0x64, 0x86, 0x68, 0x98, 0x16
+	.byte	0xd4, 0xa4, 0x5c, 0xcc, 0x5d, 0x65, 0xb6, 0x92
+	.byte	0x6c, 0x70, 0x48, 0x50, 0xfd, 0xed, 0xb9, 0xda
+	.byte	0x5e, 0x15, 0x46, 0x57, 0xa7, 0x8d, 0x9d, 0x84
+	.byte	0x90, 0xd8, 0xab, 0x00, 0x8c, 0xbc, 0xd3, 0x0a
+	.byte	0xf7, 0xe4, 0x58, 0x05, 0xb8, 0xb3, 0x45, 0x06
+	.byte	0xd0, 0x2c, 0x1e, 0x8f, 0xca, 0x3f, 0x0f, 0x02
+	.byte	0xc1, 0xaf, 0xbd, 0x03, 0x01, 0x13, 0x8a, 0x6b
+	.byte	0x3a, 0x91, 0x11, 0x41, 0x4f, 0x67, 0xdc, 0xea
+	.byte	0x97, 0xf2, 0xcf, 0xce, 0xf0, 0xb4, 0xe6, 0x73
+	.byte	0x96, 0xac, 0x74, 0x22, 0xe7, 0xad, 0x35, 0x85
+	.byte	0xe2, 0xf9, 0x37, 0xe8, 0x1c, 0x75, 0xdf, 0x6e
+	.byte	0x47, 0xf1, 0x1a, 0x71, 0x1d, 0x29, 0xc5, 0x89
+	.byte	0x6f, 0xb7, 0x62, 0x0e, 0xaa, 0x18, 0xbe, 0x1b
+	.byte	0xfc, 0x56, 0x3e, 0x4b, 0xc6, 0xd2, 0x79, 0x20
+	.byte	0x9a, 0xdb, 0xc0, 0xfe, 0x78, 0xcd, 0x5a, 0xf4
+	.byte	0x1f, 0xdd, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x88, 0x07, 0xc7, 0x31
+	.byte	0xb1, 0x12, 0x10, 0x59, 0x27, 0x80, 0xec, 0x5f
+	.byte	0x60, 0x51, 0x7f, 0xa9, 0x19, 0xb5, 0x4a, 0x0d
+	.byte	0x2d, 0xe5, 0x7a, 0x9f, 0x93, 0xc9, 0x9c, 0xef
+	.byte	0xa0, 0xe0, 0x3b, 0x4d, 0xae, 0x2a, 0xf5, 0xb0
+	.byte	0xc8, 0xeb, 0xbb, 0x3c, 0x83, 0x53, 0x99, 0x61
+	.byte	0x17, 0x2b, 0x04, 0x7e, 0xba, 0x77, 0xd6, 0x26
+	.byte	0xe1, 0x69, 0x14, 0x63, 0x55, 0x21, 0x0c, 0x7d
+.type	AES_Td,#object
+.size	AES_Td,(.-AES_Td)
+
+.align	64
+.skip	16
+_sparcv9_AES_decrypt:
+	save	%sp,-$frame-$locals,%sp
+	stx	%i7,[%sp+$bias+$frame+0]	! off-load return address
+	ld	[$key+240],$rounds
+	ld	[$key+0],$t0
+	ld	[$key+4],$t1			!
+	ld	[$key+8],$t2
+	ld	[$key+12],$t3
+	srl	$rounds,1,$rounds
+	xor	$t0,$s0,$s0
+	ld	[$key+16],$t0
+	xor	$t1,$s1,$s1
+	ld	[$key+20],$t1
+	srl	$s0,21,$acc0			!
+	xor	$t2,$s2,$s2
+	ld	[$key+24],$t2
+	xor	$t3,$s3,$s3
+	and	$acc0,2040,$acc0
+	ld	[$key+28],$t3
+	srl	$s3,13,$acc1
+	nop
+.Ldec_loop:
+	srl	$s2,5,$acc2			!
+	and	$acc1,2040,$acc1
+	ldx	[$tbl+$acc0],$acc0
+	sll	$s1,3,$acc3
+	and	$acc2,2040,$acc2
+	ldx	[$tbl+$acc1],$acc1
+	srl	$s1,21,$acc4
+	and	$acc3,2040,$acc3
+	ldx	[$tbl+$acc2],$acc2		!
+	srl	$s0,13,$acc5
+	and	$acc4,2040,$acc4
+	ldx	[$tbl+$acc3],$acc3
+	srl	$s3,5,$acc6
+	and	$acc5,2040,$acc5
+	ldx	[$tbl+$acc4],$acc4
+	fmovs	%f0,%f0
+	sll	$s2,3,$acc7			!
+	and	$acc6,2040,$acc6
+	ldx	[$tbl+$acc5],$acc5
+	srl	$s2,21,$acc8
+	and	$acc7,2040,$acc7
+	ldx	[$tbl+$acc6],$acc6
+	srl	$s1,13,$acc9
+	and	$acc8,2040,$acc8
+	ldx	[$tbl+$acc7],$acc7		!
+	srl	$s0,5,$acc10
+	and	$acc9,2040,$acc9
+	ldx	[$tbl+$acc8],$acc8
+	sll	$s3,3,$acc11
+	and	$acc10,2040,$acc10
+	ldx	[$tbl+$acc9],$acc9
+	fmovs	%f0,%f0
+	srl	$s3,21,$acc12			!
+	and	$acc11,2040,$acc11
+	ldx	[$tbl+$acc10],$acc10
+	srl	$s2,13,$acc13
+	and	$acc12,2040,$acc12
+	ldx	[$tbl+$acc11],$acc11
+	srl	$s1,5,$acc14
+	and	$acc13,2040,$acc13
+	ldx	[$tbl+$acc12],$acc12		!
+	sll	$s0,3,$acc15
+	and	$acc14,2040,$acc14
+	ldx	[$tbl+$acc13],$acc13
+	and	$acc15,2040,$acc15
+	add	$key,32,$key
+	ldx	[$tbl+$acc14],$acc14
+	fmovs	%f0,%f0
+	subcc	$rounds,1,$rounds		!
+	ldx	[$tbl+$acc15],$acc15
+	bz,a,pn	%icc,.Ldec_last
+	add	$tbl,2048,$rounds
+
+		srlx	$acc1,8,$acc1
+		xor	$acc0,$t0,$t0
+	ld	[$key+0],$s0
+	fmovs	%f0,%f0
+		srlx	$acc2,16,$acc2		!
+		xor	$acc1,$t0,$t0
+	ld	[$key+4],$s1
+		srlx	$acc3,24,$acc3
+		xor	$acc2,$t0,$t0
+	ld	[$key+8],$s2
+		srlx	$acc5,8,$acc5
+		xor	$acc3,$t0,$t0
+	ld	[$key+12],$s3			!
+		srlx	$acc6,16,$acc6
+		xor	$acc4,$t1,$t1
+	fmovs	%f0,%f0
+		srlx	$acc7,24,$acc7
+		xor	$acc5,$t1,$t1
+		srlx	$acc9,8,$acc9
+		xor	$acc6,$t1,$t1
+		srlx	$acc10,16,$acc10	!
+		xor	$acc7,$t1,$t1
+		srlx	$acc11,24,$acc11
+		xor	$acc8,$t2,$t2
+		srlx	$acc13,8,$acc13
+		xor	$acc9,$t2,$t2
+		srlx	$acc14,16,$acc14
+		xor	$acc10,$t2,$t2
+		srlx	$acc15,24,$acc15	!
+		xor	$acc11,$t2,$t2
+		xor	$acc12,$acc14,$acc14
+		xor	$acc13,$t3,$t3
+	srl	$t0,21,$acc0
+		xor	$acc14,$t3,$t3
+		xor	$acc15,$t3,$t3
+	srl	$t3,13,$acc1
+
+	and	$acc0,2040,$acc0		!
+	srl	$t2,5,$acc2
+	and	$acc1,2040,$acc1
+	ldx	[$tbl+$acc0],$acc0
+	sll	$t1,3,$acc3
+	and	$acc2,2040,$acc2
+	ldx	[$tbl+$acc1],$acc1
+	fmovs	%f0,%f0
+	srl	$t1,21,$acc4			!
+	and	$acc3,2040,$acc3
+	ldx	[$tbl+$acc2],$acc2
+	srl	$t0,13,$acc5
+	and	$acc4,2040,$acc4
+	ldx	[$tbl+$acc3],$acc3
+	srl	$t3,5,$acc6
+	and	$acc5,2040,$acc5
+	ldx	[$tbl+$acc4],$acc4		!
+	sll	$t2,3,$acc7
+	and	$acc6,2040,$acc6
+	ldx	[$tbl+$acc5],$acc5
+	srl	$t2,21,$acc8
+	and	$acc7,2040,$acc7
+	ldx	[$tbl+$acc6],$acc6
+	fmovs	%f0,%f0
+	srl	$t1,13,$acc9			!
+	and	$acc8,2040,$acc8
+	ldx	[$tbl+$acc7],$acc7
+	srl	$t0,5,$acc10
+	and	$acc9,2040,$acc9
+	ldx	[$tbl+$acc8],$acc8
+	sll	$t3,3,$acc11
+	and	$acc10,2040,$acc10
+	ldx	[$tbl+$acc9],$acc9		!
+	srl	$t3,21,$acc12
+	and	$acc11,2040,$acc11
+	ldx	[$tbl+$acc10],$acc10
+	srl	$t2,13,$acc13
+	and	$acc12,2040,$acc12
+	ldx	[$tbl+$acc11],$acc11
+	fmovs	%f0,%f0
+	srl	$t1,5,$acc14			!
+	and	$acc13,2040,$acc13
+	ldx	[$tbl+$acc12],$acc12
+	sll	$t0,3,$acc15
+	and	$acc14,2040,$acc14
+	ldx	[$tbl+$acc13],$acc13
+		srlx	$acc1,8,$acc1
+	and	$acc15,2040,$acc15
+	ldx	[$tbl+$acc14],$acc14		!
+
+		srlx	$acc2,16,$acc2
+		xor	$acc0,$s0,$s0
+	ldx	[$tbl+$acc15],$acc15
+		srlx	$acc3,24,$acc3
+		xor	$acc1,$s0,$s0
+	ld	[$key+16],$t0
+	fmovs	%f0,%f0
+		srlx	$acc5,8,$acc5		!
+		xor	$acc2,$s0,$s0
+	ld	[$key+20],$t1
+		srlx	$acc6,16,$acc6
+		xor	$acc3,$s0,$s0
+	ld	[$key+24],$t2
+		srlx	$acc7,24,$acc7
+		xor	$acc4,$s1,$s1
+	ld	[$key+28],$t3			!
+		srlx	$acc9,8,$acc9
+		xor	$acc5,$s1,$s1
+	ldx	[$tbl+2048+0],%g0		! prefetch td4
+		srlx	$acc10,16,$acc10
+		xor	$acc6,$s1,$s1
+	ldx	[$tbl+2048+32],%g0		! prefetch td4
+		srlx	$acc11,24,$acc11
+		xor	$acc7,$s1,$s1
+	ldx	[$tbl+2048+64],%g0		! prefetch td4
+		srlx	$acc13,8,$acc13
+		xor	$acc8,$s2,$s2
+	ldx	[$tbl+2048+96],%g0		! prefetch td4
+		srlx	$acc14,16,$acc14	!
+		xor	$acc9,$s2,$s2
+	ldx	[$tbl+2048+128],%g0		! prefetch td4
+		srlx	$acc15,24,$acc15
+		xor	$acc10,$s2,$s2
+	ldx	[$tbl+2048+160],%g0		! prefetch td4
+	srl	$s0,21,$acc0
+		xor	$acc11,$s2,$s2
+	ldx	[$tbl+2048+192],%g0		! prefetch td4
+		xor	$acc12,$acc14,$acc14
+		xor	$acc13,$s3,$s3
+	ldx	[$tbl+2048+224],%g0		! prefetch td4
+	and	$acc0,2040,$acc0		!
+		xor	$acc14,$s3,$s3
+		xor	$acc15,$s3,$s3
+	ba	.Ldec_loop
+	srl	$s3,13,$acc1
+
+.align	32
+.Ldec_last:
+		srlx	$acc1,8,$acc1		!
+		xor	$acc0,$t0,$t0
+	ld	[$key+0],$s0
+		srlx	$acc2,16,$acc2
+		xor	$acc1,$t0,$t0
+	ld	[$key+4],$s1
+		srlx	$acc3,24,$acc3
+		xor	$acc2,$t0,$t0
+	ld	[$key+8],$s2			!
+		srlx	$acc5,8,$acc5
+		xor	$acc3,$t0,$t0
+	ld	[$key+12],$s3
+		srlx	$acc6,16,$acc6
+		xor	$acc4,$t1,$t1
+		srlx	$acc7,24,$acc7
+		xor	$acc5,$t1,$t1
+		srlx	$acc9,8,$acc9		!
+		xor	$acc6,$t1,$t1
+		srlx	$acc10,16,$acc10
+		xor	$acc7,$t1,$t1
+		srlx	$acc11,24,$acc11
+		xor	$acc8,$t2,$t2
+		srlx	$acc13,8,$acc13
+		xor	$acc9,$t2,$t2
+		srlx	$acc14,16,$acc14	!
+		xor	$acc10,$t2,$t2
+		srlx	$acc15,24,$acc15
+		xor	$acc11,$t2,$t2
+		xor	$acc12,$acc14,$acc14
+		xor	$acc13,$t3,$t3
+	srl	$t0,24,$acc0
+		xor	$acc14,$t3,$t3
+		xor	$acc15,$t3,$t3		!
+	srl	$t3,16,$acc1
+
+	srl	$t2,8,$acc2
+	and	$acc1,255,$acc1
+	ldub	[$rounds+$acc0],$acc0
+	srl	$t1,24,$acc4
+	and	$acc2,255,$acc2
+	ldub	[$rounds+$acc1],$acc1
+	srl	$t0,16,$acc5			!
+	and	$t1,255,$acc3
+	ldub	[$rounds+$acc2],$acc2
+	ldub	[$rounds+$acc3],$acc3
+	srl	$t3,8,$acc6
+	and	$acc5,255,$acc5
+	ldub	[$rounds+$acc4],$acc4
+	fmovs	%f0,%f0
+	srl	$t2,24,$acc8			!
+	and	$acc6,255,$acc6
+	ldub	[$rounds+$acc5],$acc5
+	srl	$t1,16,$acc9
+	and	$t2,255,$acc7
+	ldub	[$rounds+$acc6],$acc6
+	ldub	[$rounds+$acc7],$acc7
+	fmovs	%f0,%f0
+	srl	$t0,8,$acc10			!
+	and	$acc9,255,$acc9
+	ldub	[$rounds+$acc8],$acc8
+	srl	$t3,24,$acc12
+	and	$acc10,255,$acc10
+	ldub	[$rounds+$acc9],$acc9
+	srl	$t2,16,$acc13
+	and	$t3,255,$acc11
+	ldub	[$rounds+$acc10],$acc10		!
+	srl	$t1,8,$acc14
+	and	$acc13,255,$acc13
+	ldub	[$rounds+$acc11],$acc11
+	ldub	[$rounds+$acc12],$acc12
+	and	$acc14,255,$acc14
+	ldub	[$rounds+$acc13],$acc13
+	and	$t0,255,$acc15
+	ldub	[$rounds+$acc14],$acc14		!
+
+		sll	$acc0,24,$acc0
+		xor	$acc3,$s0,$s0
+	ldub	[$rounds+$acc15],$acc15
+		sll	$acc1,16,$acc1
+		xor	$acc0,$s0,$s0
+	ldx	[%sp+$bias+$frame+0],%i7	! restore return address
+	fmovs	%f0,%f0
+		sll	$acc2,8,$acc2		!
+		xor	$acc1,$s0,$s0
+		sll	$acc4,24,$acc4
+		xor	$acc2,$s0,$s0
+		sll	$acc5,16,$acc5
+		xor	$acc7,$s1,$s1
+		sll	$acc6,8,$acc6
+		xor	$acc4,$s1,$s1
+		sll	$acc8,24,$acc8		!
+		xor	$acc5,$s1,$s1
+		sll	$acc9,16,$acc9
+		xor	$acc11,$s2,$s2
+		sll	$acc10,8,$acc10
+		xor	$acc6,$s1,$s1
+		sll	$acc12,24,$acc12
+		xor	$acc8,$s2,$s2
+		sll	$acc13,16,$acc13	!
+		xor	$acc9,$s2,$s2
+		sll	$acc14,8,$acc14
+		xor	$acc10,$s2,$s2
+		xor	$acc12,$acc14,$acc14
+		xor	$acc13,$s3,$s3
+		xor	$acc14,$s3,$s3
+		xor	$acc15,$s3,$s3
+
+	ret
+	restore
+.type	_sparcv9_AES_decrypt,#function
+.size	_sparcv9_AES_decrypt,(.-_sparcv9_AES_decrypt)
+
+.align	32
+.globl	AES_decrypt
+AES_decrypt:
+	or	%o0,%o1,%g1
+	andcc	%g1,3,%g0
+	bnz,pn	%xcc,.Lunaligned_dec
+	save	%sp,-$frame,%sp
+
+	ld	[%i0+0],%o0
+	ld	[%i0+4],%o1
+	ld	[%i0+8],%o2
+	ld	[%i0+12],%o3
+
+1:	call	.+8
+	add	%o7,AES_Td-1b,%o4
+	call	_sparcv9_AES_decrypt
+	mov	%i2,%o5
+
+	st	%o0,[%i1+0]
+	st	%o1,[%i1+4]
+	st	%o2,[%i1+8]
+	st	%o3,[%i1+12]
+
+	ret
+	restore
+
+.align	32
+.Lunaligned_dec:
+	ldub	[%i0+0],%l0
+	ldub	[%i0+1],%l1
+	ldub	[%i0+2],%l2
+
+	sll	%l0,24,%l0
+	ldub	[%i0+3],%l3
+	sll	%l1,16,%l1
+	ldub	[%i0+4],%l4
+	sll	%l2,8,%l2
+	or	%l1,%l0,%l0
+	ldub	[%i0+5],%l5
+	sll	%l4,24,%l4
+	or	%l3,%l2,%l2
+	ldub	[%i0+6],%l6
+	sll	%l5,16,%l5
+	or	%l0,%l2,%o0
+	ldub	[%i0+7],%l7
+
+	sll	%l6,8,%l6
+	or	%l5,%l4,%l4
+	ldub	[%i0+8],%l0
+	or	%l7,%l6,%l6
+	ldub	[%i0+9],%l1
+	or	%l4,%l6,%o1
+	ldub	[%i0+10],%l2
+
+	sll	%l0,24,%l0
+	ldub	[%i0+11],%l3
+	sll	%l1,16,%l1
+	ldub	[%i0+12],%l4
+	sll	%l2,8,%l2
+	or	%l1,%l0,%l0
+	ldub	[%i0+13],%l5
+	sll	%l4,24,%l4
+	or	%l3,%l2,%l2
+	ldub	[%i0+14],%l6
+	sll	%l5,16,%l5
+	or	%l0,%l2,%o2
+	ldub	[%i0+15],%l7
+
+	sll	%l6,8,%l6
+	or	%l5,%l4,%l4
+	or	%l7,%l6,%l6
+	or	%l4,%l6,%o3
+
+1:	call	.+8
+	add	%o7,AES_Td-1b,%o4
+	call	_sparcv9_AES_decrypt
+	mov	%i2,%o5
+
+	srl	%o0,24,%l0
+	srl	%o0,16,%l1
+	stb	%l0,[%i1+0]
+	srl	%o0,8,%l2
+	stb	%l1,[%i1+1]
+	stb	%l2,[%i1+2]
+	srl	%o1,24,%l4
+	stb	%o0,[%i1+3]
+
+	srl	%o1,16,%l5
+	stb	%l4,[%i1+4]
+	srl	%o1,8,%l6
+	stb	%l5,[%i1+5]
+	stb	%l6,[%i1+6]
+	srl	%o2,24,%l0
+	stb	%o1,[%i1+7]
+
+	srl	%o2,16,%l1
+	stb	%l0,[%i1+8]
+	srl	%o2,8,%l2
+	stb	%l1,[%i1+9]
+	stb	%l2,[%i1+10]
+	srl	%o3,24,%l4
+	stb	%o2,[%i1+11]
+
+	srl	%o3,16,%l5
+	stb	%l4,[%i1+12]
+	srl	%o3,8,%l6
+	stb	%l5,[%i1+13]
+	stb	%l6,[%i1+14]
+	stb	%o3,[%i1+15]
+
+	ret
+	restore
+.type	AES_decrypt,#function
+.size	AES_decrypt,(.-AES_decrypt)
+___
+
+# fmovs instructions substituting for FP nops were originally added
+# to meet specific instruction alignment requirements to maximize ILP.
+# As UltraSPARC T1, a.k.a. Niagara, has shared FPU, FP nops can have
+# undesired effect, so just omit them and sacrifice some portion of
+# percent in performance...
+$code =~ s/fmovs.*$//gm;
+
+print $code;
+close STDOUT;	# ensure flush
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/asm/aes-x86_64.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/asm/aes-x86_64.pl
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..ce4ca30
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/asm/aes-x86_64.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,2820 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# Version 2.1.
+#
+# aes-*-cbc benchmarks are improved by >70% [compared to gcc 3.3.2 on
+# Opteron 240 CPU] plus all the bells-n-whistles from 32-bit version
+# [you'll notice a lot of resemblance], such as compressed S-boxes
+# in little-endian byte order, prefetch of these tables in CBC mode,
+# as well as avoiding L1 cache aliasing between stack frame and key
+# schedule and already mentioned tables, compressed Td4...
+#
+# Performance in number of cycles per processed byte for 128-bit key:
+#
+#		ECB encrypt	ECB decrypt	CBC large chunk
+# AMD64		33		43		13.0
+# EM64T		38		56		18.6(*)
+# Core 2	30		42		14.5(*)
+# Atom		65		86		32.1(*)
+#
+# (*) with hyper-threading off
+
+$flavour = shift;
+$output  = shift;
+if ($flavour =~ /\./) { $output = $flavour; undef $flavour; }
+
+$win64=0; $win64=1 if ($flavour =~ /[nm]asm|mingw64/ || $output =~ /\.asm$/);
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+( $xlate="${dir}x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
+( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
+die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl";
+
+open OUT,"| \"$^X\" \"$xlate\" $flavour \"$output\"";
+*STDOUT=*OUT;
+
+$verticalspin=1;	# unlike 32-bit version $verticalspin performs
+			# ~15% better on both AMD and Intel cores
+$speed_limit=512;	# see aes-586.pl for details
+
+$code=".text\n";
+
+$s0="%eax";
+$s1="%ebx";
+$s2="%ecx";
+$s3="%edx";
+$acc0="%esi";	$mask80="%rsi";
+$acc1="%edi";	$maskfe="%rdi";
+$acc2="%ebp";	$mask1b="%rbp";
+$inp="%r8";
+$out="%r9";
+$t0="%r10d";
+$t1="%r11d";
+$t2="%r12d";
+$rnds="%r13d";
+$sbox="%r14";
+$key="%r15";
+
+sub hi() { my $r=shift;	$r =~ s/%[er]([a-d])x/%\1h/;	$r; }
+sub lo() { my $r=shift;	$r =~ s/%[er]([a-d])x/%\1l/;
+			$r =~ s/%[er]([sd]i)/%\1l/;
+			$r =~ s/%(r[0-9]+)[d]?/%\1b/;	$r; }
+sub LO() { my $r=shift; $r =~ s/%r([a-z]+)/%e\1/;
+			$r =~ s/%r([0-9]+)/%r\1d/;	$r; }
+sub _data_word()
+{ my $i;
+    while(defined($i=shift)) { $code.=sprintf".long\t0x%08x,0x%08x\n",$i,$i; }
+}
+sub data_word()
+{ my $i;
+  my $last=pop(@_);
+    $code.=".long\t";
+    while(defined($i=shift)) { $code.=sprintf"0x%08x,",$i; }
+    $code.=sprintf"0x%08x\n",$last;
+}
+
+sub data_byte()
+{ my $i;
+  my $last=pop(@_);
+    $code.=".byte\t";
+    while(defined($i=shift)) { $code.=sprintf"0x%02x,",$i&0xff; }
+    $code.=sprintf"0x%02x\n",$last&0xff;
+}
+
+sub encvert()
+{ my $t3="%r8d";	# zaps $inp!
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	# favor 3-way issue Opteron pipeline...
+	movzb	`&lo("$s0")`,$acc0
+	movzb	`&lo("$s1")`,$acc1
+	movzb	`&lo("$s2")`,$acc2
+	mov	0($sbox,$acc0,8),$t0
+	mov	0($sbox,$acc1,8),$t1
+	mov	0($sbox,$acc2,8),$t2
+
+	movzb	`&hi("$s1")`,$acc0
+	movzb	`&hi("$s2")`,$acc1
+	movzb	`&lo("$s3")`,$acc2
+	xor	3($sbox,$acc0,8),$t0
+	xor	3($sbox,$acc1,8),$t1
+	mov	0($sbox,$acc2,8),$t3
+
+	movzb	`&hi("$s3")`,$acc0
+	shr	\$16,$s2
+	movzb	`&hi("$s0")`,$acc2
+	xor	3($sbox,$acc0,8),$t2
+	shr	\$16,$s3
+	xor	3($sbox,$acc2,8),$t3
+
+	shr	\$16,$s1
+	lea	16($key),$key
+	shr	\$16,$s0
+
+	movzb	`&lo("$s2")`,$acc0
+	movzb	`&lo("$s3")`,$acc1
+	movzb	`&lo("$s0")`,$acc2
+	xor	2($sbox,$acc0,8),$t0
+	xor	2($sbox,$acc1,8),$t1
+	xor	2($sbox,$acc2,8),$t2
+
+	movzb	`&hi("$s3")`,$acc0
+	movzb	`&hi("$s0")`,$acc1
+	movzb	`&lo("$s1")`,$acc2
+	xor	1($sbox,$acc0,8),$t0
+	xor	1($sbox,$acc1,8),$t1
+	xor	2($sbox,$acc2,8),$t3
+
+	mov	12($key),$s3
+	movzb	`&hi("$s1")`,$acc1
+	movzb	`&hi("$s2")`,$acc2
+	mov	0($key),$s0
+	xor	1($sbox,$acc1,8),$t2
+	xor	1($sbox,$acc2,8),$t3
+
+	mov	4($key),$s1
+	mov	8($key),$s2
+	xor	$t0,$s0
+	xor	$t1,$s1
+	xor	$t2,$s2
+	xor	$t3,$s3
+___
+}
+
+sub enclastvert()
+{ my $t3="%r8d";	# zaps $inp!
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	movzb	`&lo("$s0")`,$acc0
+	movzb	`&lo("$s1")`,$acc1
+	movzb	`&lo("$s2")`,$acc2
+	movzb	2($sbox,$acc0,8),$t0
+	movzb	2($sbox,$acc1,8),$t1
+	movzb	2($sbox,$acc2,8),$t2
+
+	movzb	`&lo("$s3")`,$acc0
+	movzb	`&hi("$s1")`,$acc1
+	movzb	`&hi("$s2")`,$acc2
+	movzb	2($sbox,$acc0,8),$t3
+	mov	0($sbox,$acc1,8),$acc1	#$t0
+	mov	0($sbox,$acc2,8),$acc2	#$t1
+
+	and	\$0x0000ff00,$acc1
+	and	\$0x0000ff00,$acc2
+
+	xor	$acc1,$t0
+	xor	$acc2,$t1
+	shr	\$16,$s2
+
+	movzb	`&hi("$s3")`,$acc0
+	movzb	`&hi("$s0")`,$acc1
+	shr	\$16,$s3
+	mov	0($sbox,$acc0,8),$acc0	#$t2
+	mov	0($sbox,$acc1,8),$acc1	#$t3
+
+	and	\$0x0000ff00,$acc0
+	and	\$0x0000ff00,$acc1
+	shr	\$16,$s1
+	xor	$acc0,$t2
+	xor	$acc1,$t3
+	shr	\$16,$s0
+
+	movzb	`&lo("$s2")`,$acc0
+	movzb	`&lo("$s3")`,$acc1
+	movzb	`&lo("$s0")`,$acc2
+	mov	0($sbox,$acc0,8),$acc0	#$t0
+	mov	0($sbox,$acc1,8),$acc1	#$t1
+	mov	0($sbox,$acc2,8),$acc2	#$t2
+
+	and	\$0x00ff0000,$acc0
+	and	\$0x00ff0000,$acc1
+	and	\$0x00ff0000,$acc2
+
+	xor	$acc0,$t0
+	xor	$acc1,$t1
+	xor	$acc2,$t2
+
+	movzb	`&lo("$s1")`,$acc0
+	movzb	`&hi("$s3")`,$acc1
+	movzb	`&hi("$s0")`,$acc2
+	mov	0($sbox,$acc0,8),$acc0	#$t3
+	mov	2($sbox,$acc1,8),$acc1	#$t0
+	mov	2($sbox,$acc2,8),$acc2	#$t1
+
+	and	\$0x00ff0000,$acc0
+	and	\$0xff000000,$acc1
+	and	\$0xff000000,$acc2
+
+	xor	$acc0,$t3
+	xor	$acc1,$t0
+	xor	$acc2,$t1
+
+	movzb	`&hi("$s1")`,$acc0
+	movzb	`&hi("$s2")`,$acc1
+	mov	16+12($key),$s3
+	mov	2($sbox,$acc0,8),$acc0	#$t2
+	mov	2($sbox,$acc1,8),$acc1	#$t3
+	mov	16+0($key),$s0
+
+	and	\$0xff000000,$acc0
+	and	\$0xff000000,$acc1
+
+	xor	$acc0,$t2
+	xor	$acc1,$t3
+
+	mov	16+4($key),$s1
+	mov	16+8($key),$s2
+	xor	$t0,$s0
+	xor	$t1,$s1
+	xor	$t2,$s2
+	xor	$t3,$s3
+___
+}
+
+sub encstep()
+{ my ($i,@s) = @_;
+  my $tmp0=$acc0;
+  my $tmp1=$acc1;
+  my $tmp2=$acc2;
+  my $out=($t0,$t1,$t2,$s[0])[$i];
+
+	if ($i==3) {
+		$tmp0=$s[1];
+		$tmp1=$s[2];
+		$tmp2=$s[3];
+	}
+	$code.="	movzb	".&lo($s[0]).",$out\n";
+	$code.="	mov	$s[2],$tmp1\n"		if ($i!=3);
+	$code.="	lea	16($key),$key\n"	if ($i==0);
+
+	$code.="	movzb	".&hi($s[1]).",$tmp0\n";
+	$code.="	mov	0($sbox,$out,8),$out\n";
+
+	$code.="	shr	\$16,$tmp1\n";
+	$code.="	mov	$s[3],$tmp2\n"		if ($i!=3);
+	$code.="	xor	3($sbox,$tmp0,8),$out\n";
+
+	$code.="	movzb	".&lo($tmp1).",$tmp1\n";
+	$code.="	shr	\$24,$tmp2\n";
+	$code.="	xor	4*$i($key),$out\n";
+
+	$code.="	xor	2($sbox,$tmp1,8),$out\n";
+	$code.="	xor	1($sbox,$tmp2,8),$out\n";
+
+	$code.="	mov	$t0,$s[1]\n"		if ($i==3);
+	$code.="	mov	$t1,$s[2]\n"		if ($i==3);
+	$code.="	mov	$t2,$s[3]\n"		if ($i==3);
+	$code.="\n";
+}
+
+sub enclast()
+{ my ($i,@s)=@_;
+  my $tmp0=$acc0;
+  my $tmp1=$acc1;
+  my $tmp2=$acc2;
+  my $out=($t0,$t1,$t2,$s[0])[$i];
+
+	if ($i==3) {
+		$tmp0=$s[1];
+		$tmp1=$s[2];
+		$tmp2=$s[3];
+	}
+	$code.="	movzb	".&lo($s[0]).",$out\n";
+	$code.="	mov	$s[2],$tmp1\n"		if ($i!=3);
+
+	$code.="	mov	2($sbox,$out,8),$out\n";
+	$code.="	shr	\$16,$tmp1\n";
+	$code.="	mov	$s[3],$tmp2\n"		if ($i!=3);
+
+	$code.="	and	\$0x000000ff,$out\n";
+	$code.="	movzb	".&hi($s[1]).",$tmp0\n";
+	$code.="	movzb	".&lo($tmp1).",$tmp1\n";
+	$code.="	shr	\$24,$tmp2\n";
+
+	$code.="	mov	0($sbox,$tmp0,8),$tmp0\n";
+	$code.="	mov	0($sbox,$tmp1,8),$tmp1\n";
+	$code.="	mov	2($sbox,$tmp2,8),$tmp2\n";
+
+	$code.="	and	\$0x0000ff00,$tmp0\n";
+	$code.="	and	\$0x00ff0000,$tmp1\n";
+	$code.="	and	\$0xff000000,$tmp2\n";
+
+	$code.="	xor	$tmp0,$out\n";
+	$code.="	mov	$t0,$s[1]\n"		if ($i==3);
+	$code.="	xor	$tmp1,$out\n";
+	$code.="	mov	$t1,$s[2]\n"		if ($i==3);
+	$code.="	xor	$tmp2,$out\n";
+	$code.="	mov	$t2,$s[3]\n"		if ($i==3);
+	$code.="\n";
+}
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.type	_x86_64_AES_encrypt,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+_x86_64_AES_encrypt:
+	xor	0($key),$s0			# xor with key
+	xor	4($key),$s1
+	xor	8($key),$s2
+	xor	12($key),$s3
+
+	mov	240($key),$rnds			# load key->rounds
+	sub	\$1,$rnds
+	jmp	.Lenc_loop
+.align	16
+.Lenc_loop:
+___
+	if ($verticalspin) { &encvert(); }
+	else {	&encstep(0,$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3);
+		&encstep(1,$s1,$s2,$s3,$s0);
+		&encstep(2,$s2,$s3,$s0,$s1);
+		&encstep(3,$s3,$s0,$s1,$s2);
+	}
+$code.=<<___;
+	sub	\$1,$rnds
+	jnz	.Lenc_loop
+___
+	if ($verticalspin) { &enclastvert(); }
+	else {	&enclast(0,$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3);
+		&enclast(1,$s1,$s2,$s3,$s0);
+		&enclast(2,$s2,$s3,$s0,$s1);
+		&enclast(3,$s3,$s0,$s1,$s2);
+		$code.=<<___;
+		xor	16+0($key),$s0		# xor with key
+		xor	16+4($key),$s1
+		xor	16+8($key),$s2
+		xor	16+12($key),$s3
+___
+	}
+$code.=<<___;
+	.byte	0xf3,0xc3			# rep ret
+.size	_x86_64_AES_encrypt,.-_x86_64_AES_encrypt
+___
+
+# it's possible to implement this by shifting tN by 8, filling least
+# significant byte with byte load and finally bswap-ing at the end,
+# but such partial register load kills Core 2...
+sub enccompactvert()
+{ my ($t3,$t4,$t5)=("%r8d","%r9d","%r13d");
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	movzb	`&lo("$s0")`,$t0
+	movzb	`&lo("$s1")`,$t1
+	movzb	`&lo("$s2")`,$t2
+	movzb	`&lo("$s3")`,$t3
+	movzb	`&hi("$s1")`,$acc0
+	movzb	`&hi("$s2")`,$acc1
+	shr	\$16,$s2
+	movzb	`&hi("$s3")`,$acc2
+	movzb	($sbox,$t0,1),$t0
+	movzb	($sbox,$t1,1),$t1
+	movzb	($sbox,$t2,1),$t2
+	movzb	($sbox,$t3,1),$t3
+
+	movzb	($sbox,$acc0,1),$t4	#$t0
+	movzb	`&hi("$s0")`,$acc0
+	movzb	($sbox,$acc1,1),$t5	#$t1
+	movzb	`&lo("$s2")`,$acc1
+	movzb	($sbox,$acc2,1),$acc2	#$t2
+	movzb	($sbox,$acc0,1),$acc0	#$t3
+
+	shl	\$8,$t4
+	shr	\$16,$s3
+	shl	\$8,$t5
+	xor	$t4,$t0
+	shr	\$16,$s0
+	movzb	`&lo("$s3")`,$t4
+	shr	\$16,$s1
+	xor	$t5,$t1
+	shl	\$8,$acc2
+	movzb	`&lo("$s0")`,$t5
+	movzb	($sbox,$acc1,1),$acc1	#$t0
+	xor	$acc2,$t2
+
+	shl	\$8,$acc0
+	movzb	`&lo("$s1")`,$acc2
+	shl	\$16,$acc1
+	xor	$acc0,$t3
+	movzb	($sbox,$t4,1),$t4	#$t1
+	movzb	`&hi("$s3")`,$acc0
+	movzb	($sbox,$t5,1),$t5	#$t2
+	xor	$acc1,$t0
+
+	shr	\$8,$s2
+	movzb	`&hi("$s0")`,$acc1
+	shl	\$16,$t4
+	shr	\$8,$s1
+	shl	\$16,$t5
+	xor	$t4,$t1
+	movzb	($sbox,$acc2,1),$acc2	#$t3
+	movzb	($sbox,$acc0,1),$acc0	#$t0
+	movzb	($sbox,$acc1,1),$acc1	#$t1
+	movzb	($sbox,$s2,1),$s3	#$t3
+	movzb	($sbox,$s1,1),$s2	#$t2
+
+	shl	\$16,$acc2
+	xor	$t5,$t2
+	shl	\$24,$acc0
+	xor	$acc2,$t3
+	shl	\$24,$acc1
+	xor	$acc0,$t0
+	shl	\$24,$s3
+	xor	$acc1,$t1
+	shl	\$24,$s2
+	mov	$t0,$s0
+	mov	$t1,$s1
+	xor	$t2,$s2
+	xor	$t3,$s3
+___
+}
+
+sub enctransform_ref()
+{ my $sn = shift;
+  my ($acc,$r2,$tmp)=("%r8d","%r9d","%r13d");
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	$sn,$acc
+	and	\$0x80808080,$acc
+	mov	$acc,$tmp
+	shr	\$7,$tmp
+	lea	($sn,$sn),$r2
+	sub	$tmp,$acc
+	and	\$0xfefefefe,$r2
+	and	\$0x1b1b1b1b,$acc
+	mov	$sn,$tmp
+	xor	$acc,$r2
+
+	xor	$r2,$sn
+	rol	\$24,$sn
+	xor	$r2,$sn
+	ror	\$16,$tmp
+	xor	$tmp,$sn
+	ror	\$8,$tmp
+	xor	$tmp,$sn
+___
+}
+
+# unlike decrypt case it does not pay off to parallelize enctransform
+sub enctransform()
+{ my ($t3,$r20,$r21)=($acc2,"%r8d","%r9d");
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	\$0x80808080,$t0
+	mov	\$0x80808080,$t1
+	and	$s0,$t0
+	and	$s1,$t1
+	mov	$t0,$acc0
+	mov	$t1,$acc1
+	shr	\$7,$t0
+	lea	($s0,$s0),$r20
+	shr	\$7,$t1
+	lea	($s1,$s1),$r21
+	sub	$t0,$acc0
+	sub	$t1,$acc1
+	and	\$0xfefefefe,$r20
+	and	\$0xfefefefe,$r21
+	and	\$0x1b1b1b1b,$acc0
+	and	\$0x1b1b1b1b,$acc1
+	mov	$s0,$t0
+	mov	$s1,$t1
+	xor	$acc0,$r20
+	xor	$acc1,$r21
+
+	xor	$r20,$s0
+	xor	$r21,$s1
+	 mov	\$0x80808080,$t2
+	rol	\$24,$s0
+	 mov	\$0x80808080,$t3
+	rol	\$24,$s1
+	 and	$s2,$t2
+	 and	$s3,$t3
+	xor	$r20,$s0
+	xor	$r21,$s1
+	 mov	$t2,$acc0
+	ror	\$16,$t0
+	 mov	$t3,$acc1
+	ror	\$16,$t1
+	 lea	($s2,$s2),$r20
+	 shr	\$7,$t2
+	xor	$t0,$s0
+	 shr	\$7,$t3
+	xor	$t1,$s1
+	ror	\$8,$t0
+	 lea	($s3,$s3),$r21
+	ror	\$8,$t1
+	 sub	$t2,$acc0
+	 sub	$t3,$acc1
+	xor	$t0,$s0
+	xor	$t1,$s1
+
+	and	\$0xfefefefe,$r20
+	and	\$0xfefefefe,$r21
+	and	\$0x1b1b1b1b,$acc0
+	and	\$0x1b1b1b1b,$acc1
+	mov	$s2,$t2
+	mov	$s3,$t3
+	xor	$acc0,$r20
+	xor	$acc1,$r21
+
+	ror	\$16,$t2
+	xor	$r20,$s2
+	ror	\$16,$t3
+	xor	$r21,$s3
+	rol	\$24,$s2
+	mov	0($sbox),$acc0			# prefetch Te4
+	rol	\$24,$s3
+	xor	$r20,$s2
+	mov	64($sbox),$acc1
+	xor	$r21,$s3
+	mov	128($sbox),$r20
+	xor	$t2,$s2
+	ror	\$8,$t2
+	xor	$t3,$s3
+	ror	\$8,$t3
+	xor	$t2,$s2
+	mov	192($sbox),$r21
+	xor	$t3,$s3
+___
+}
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.type	_x86_64_AES_encrypt_compact,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+_x86_64_AES_encrypt_compact:
+	lea	128($sbox),$inp			# size optimization
+	mov	0-128($inp),$acc1		# prefetch Te4
+	mov	32-128($inp),$acc2
+	mov	64-128($inp),$t0
+	mov	96-128($inp),$t1
+	mov	128-128($inp),$acc1
+	mov	160-128($inp),$acc2
+	mov	192-128($inp),$t0
+	mov	224-128($inp),$t1
+	jmp	.Lenc_loop_compact
+.align	16
+.Lenc_loop_compact:
+		xor	0($key),$s0		# xor with key
+		xor	4($key),$s1
+		xor	8($key),$s2
+		xor	12($key),$s3
+		lea	16($key),$key
+___
+		&enccompactvert();
+$code.=<<___;
+		cmp	16(%rsp),$key
+		je	.Lenc_compact_done
+___
+		&enctransform();
+$code.=<<___;
+	jmp	.Lenc_loop_compact
+.align	16
+.Lenc_compact_done:
+	xor	0($key),$s0
+	xor	4($key),$s1
+	xor	8($key),$s2
+	xor	12($key),$s3
+	.byte	0xf3,0xc3			# rep ret
+.size	_x86_64_AES_encrypt_compact,.-_x86_64_AES_encrypt_compact
+___
+
+# void AES_encrypt (const void *inp,void *out,const AES_KEY *key);
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	AES_encrypt
+.type	AES_encrypt,\@function,3
+.align	16
+.globl	asm_AES_encrypt
+.hidden	asm_AES_encrypt
+asm_AES_encrypt:
+AES_encrypt:
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+
+	# allocate frame "above" key schedule
+	mov	%rsp,%r10
+	lea	-63(%rdx),%rcx	# %rdx is key argument
+	and	\$-64,%rsp
+	sub	%rsp,%rcx
+	neg	%rcx
+	and	\$0x3c0,%rcx
+	sub	%rcx,%rsp
+	sub	\$32,%rsp
+
+	mov	%rsi,16(%rsp)	# save out
+	mov	%r10,24(%rsp)	# save real stack pointer
+.Lenc_prologue:
+
+	mov	%rdx,$key
+	mov	240($key),$rnds	# load rounds
+
+	mov	0(%rdi),$s0	# load input vector
+	mov	4(%rdi),$s1
+	mov	8(%rdi),$s2
+	mov	12(%rdi),$s3
+
+	shl	\$4,$rnds
+	lea	($key,$rnds),%rbp
+	mov	$key,(%rsp)	# key schedule
+	mov	%rbp,8(%rsp)	# end of key schedule
+
+	# pick Te4 copy which can't "overlap" with stack frame or key schedule
+	lea	.LAES_Te+2048(%rip),$sbox
+	lea	768(%rsp),%rbp
+	sub	$sbox,%rbp
+	and	\$0x300,%rbp
+	lea	($sbox,%rbp),$sbox
+
+	call	_x86_64_AES_encrypt_compact
+
+	mov	16(%rsp),$out	# restore out
+	mov	24(%rsp),%rsi	# restore saved stack pointer
+	mov	$s0,0($out)	# write output vector
+	mov	$s1,4($out)
+	mov	$s2,8($out)
+	mov	$s3,12($out)
+
+	mov	(%rsi),%r15
+	mov	8(%rsi),%r14
+	mov	16(%rsi),%r13
+	mov	24(%rsi),%r12
+	mov	32(%rsi),%rbp
+	mov	40(%rsi),%rbx
+	lea	48(%rsi),%rsp
+.Lenc_epilogue:
+	ret
+.size	AES_encrypt,.-AES_encrypt
+___
+
+#------------------------------------------------------------------#
+
+sub decvert()
+{ my $t3="%r8d";	# zaps $inp!
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	# favor 3-way issue Opteron pipeline...
+	movzb	`&lo("$s0")`,$acc0
+	movzb	`&lo("$s1")`,$acc1
+	movzb	`&lo("$s2")`,$acc2
+	mov	0($sbox,$acc0,8),$t0
+	mov	0($sbox,$acc1,8),$t1
+	mov	0($sbox,$acc2,8),$t2
+
+	movzb	`&hi("$s3")`,$acc0
+	movzb	`&hi("$s0")`,$acc1
+	movzb	`&lo("$s3")`,$acc2
+	xor	3($sbox,$acc0,8),$t0
+	xor	3($sbox,$acc1,8),$t1
+	mov	0($sbox,$acc2,8),$t3
+
+	movzb	`&hi("$s1")`,$acc0
+	shr	\$16,$s0
+	movzb	`&hi("$s2")`,$acc2
+	xor	3($sbox,$acc0,8),$t2
+	shr	\$16,$s3
+	xor	3($sbox,$acc2,8),$t3
+
+	shr	\$16,$s1
+	lea	16($key),$key
+	shr	\$16,$s2
+
+	movzb	`&lo("$s2")`,$acc0
+	movzb	`&lo("$s3")`,$acc1
+	movzb	`&lo("$s0")`,$acc2
+	xor	2($sbox,$acc0,8),$t0
+	xor	2($sbox,$acc1,8),$t1
+	xor	2($sbox,$acc2,8),$t2
+
+	movzb	`&hi("$s1")`,$acc0
+	movzb	`&hi("$s2")`,$acc1
+	movzb	`&lo("$s1")`,$acc2
+	xor	1($sbox,$acc0,8),$t0
+	xor	1($sbox,$acc1,8),$t1
+	xor	2($sbox,$acc2,8),$t3
+
+	movzb	`&hi("$s3")`,$acc0
+	mov	12($key),$s3
+	movzb	`&hi("$s0")`,$acc2
+	xor	1($sbox,$acc0,8),$t2
+	mov	0($key),$s0
+	xor	1($sbox,$acc2,8),$t3
+
+	xor	$t0,$s0
+	mov	4($key),$s1
+	mov	8($key),$s2
+	xor	$t2,$s2
+	xor	$t1,$s1
+	xor	$t3,$s3
+___
+}
+
+sub declastvert()
+{ my $t3="%r8d";	# zaps $inp!
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	lea	2048($sbox),$sbox	# size optimization
+	movzb	`&lo("$s0")`,$acc0
+	movzb	`&lo("$s1")`,$acc1
+	movzb	`&lo("$s2")`,$acc2
+	movzb	($sbox,$acc0,1),$t0
+	movzb	($sbox,$acc1,1),$t1
+	movzb	($sbox,$acc2,1),$t2
+
+	movzb	`&lo("$s3")`,$acc0
+	movzb	`&hi("$s3")`,$acc1
+	movzb	`&hi("$s0")`,$acc2
+	movzb	($sbox,$acc0,1),$t3
+	movzb	($sbox,$acc1,1),$acc1	#$t0
+	movzb	($sbox,$acc2,1),$acc2	#$t1
+
+	shl	\$8,$acc1
+	shl	\$8,$acc2
+
+	xor	$acc1,$t0
+	xor	$acc2,$t1
+	shr	\$16,$s3
+
+	movzb	`&hi("$s1")`,$acc0
+	movzb	`&hi("$s2")`,$acc1
+	shr	\$16,$s0
+	movzb	($sbox,$acc0,1),$acc0	#$t2
+	movzb	($sbox,$acc1,1),$acc1	#$t3
+
+	shl	\$8,$acc0
+	shl	\$8,$acc1
+	shr	\$16,$s1
+	xor	$acc0,$t2
+	xor	$acc1,$t3
+	shr	\$16,$s2
+
+	movzb	`&lo("$s2")`,$acc0
+	movzb	`&lo("$s3")`,$acc1
+	movzb	`&lo("$s0")`,$acc2
+	movzb	($sbox,$acc0,1),$acc0	#$t0
+	movzb	($sbox,$acc1,1),$acc1	#$t1
+	movzb	($sbox,$acc2,1),$acc2	#$t2
+
+	shl	\$16,$acc0
+	shl	\$16,$acc1
+	shl	\$16,$acc2
+
+	xor	$acc0,$t0
+	xor	$acc1,$t1
+	xor	$acc2,$t2
+
+	movzb	`&lo("$s1")`,$acc0
+	movzb	`&hi("$s1")`,$acc1
+	movzb	`&hi("$s2")`,$acc2
+	movzb	($sbox,$acc0,1),$acc0	#$t3
+	movzb	($sbox,$acc1,1),$acc1	#$t0
+	movzb	($sbox,$acc2,1),$acc2	#$t1
+
+	shl	\$16,$acc0
+	shl	\$24,$acc1
+	shl	\$24,$acc2
+
+	xor	$acc0,$t3
+	xor	$acc1,$t0
+	xor	$acc2,$t1
+
+	movzb	`&hi("$s3")`,$acc0
+	movzb	`&hi("$s0")`,$acc1
+	mov	16+12($key),$s3
+	movzb	($sbox,$acc0,1),$acc0	#$t2
+	movzb	($sbox,$acc1,1),$acc1	#$t3
+	mov	16+0($key),$s0
+
+	shl	\$24,$acc0
+	shl	\$24,$acc1
+
+	xor	$acc0,$t2
+	xor	$acc1,$t3
+
+	mov	16+4($key),$s1
+	mov	16+8($key),$s2
+	lea	-2048($sbox),$sbox
+	xor	$t0,$s0
+	xor	$t1,$s1
+	xor	$t2,$s2
+	xor	$t3,$s3
+___
+}
+
+sub decstep()
+{ my ($i,@s) = @_;
+  my $tmp0=$acc0;
+  my $tmp1=$acc1;
+  my $tmp2=$acc2;
+  my $out=($t0,$t1,$t2,$s[0])[$i];
+
+	$code.="	mov	$s[0],$out\n"		if ($i!=3);
+			$tmp1=$s[2]			if ($i==3);
+	$code.="	mov	$s[2],$tmp1\n"		if ($i!=3);
+	$code.="	and	\$0xFF,$out\n";
+
+	$code.="	mov	0($sbox,$out,8),$out\n";
+	$code.="	shr	\$16,$tmp1\n";
+			$tmp2=$s[3]			if ($i==3);
+	$code.="	mov	$s[3],$tmp2\n"		if ($i!=3);
+
+			$tmp0=$s[1]			if ($i==3);
+	$code.="	movzb	".&hi($s[1]).",$tmp0\n";
+	$code.="	and	\$0xFF,$tmp1\n";
+	$code.="	shr	\$24,$tmp2\n";
+
+	$code.="	xor	3($sbox,$tmp0,8),$out\n";
+	$code.="	xor	2($sbox,$tmp1,8),$out\n";
+	$code.="	xor	1($sbox,$tmp2,8),$out\n";
+
+	$code.="	mov	$t2,$s[1]\n"		if ($i==3);
+	$code.="	mov	$t1,$s[2]\n"		if ($i==3);
+	$code.="	mov	$t0,$s[3]\n"		if ($i==3);
+	$code.="\n";
+}
+
+sub declast()
+{ my ($i,@s)=@_;
+  my $tmp0=$acc0;
+  my $tmp1=$acc1;
+  my $tmp2=$acc2;
+  my $out=($t0,$t1,$t2,$s[0])[$i];
+
+	$code.="	mov	$s[0],$out\n"		if ($i!=3);
+			$tmp1=$s[2]			if ($i==3);
+	$code.="	mov	$s[2],$tmp1\n"		if ($i!=3);
+	$code.="	and	\$0xFF,$out\n";
+
+	$code.="	movzb	2048($sbox,$out,1),$out\n";
+	$code.="	shr	\$16,$tmp1\n";
+			$tmp2=$s[3]			if ($i==3);
+	$code.="	mov	$s[3],$tmp2\n"		if ($i!=3);
+
+			$tmp0=$s[1]			if ($i==3);
+	$code.="	movzb	".&hi($s[1]).",$tmp0\n";
+	$code.="	and	\$0xFF,$tmp1\n";
+	$code.="	shr	\$24,$tmp2\n";
+
+	$code.="	movzb	2048($sbox,$tmp0,1),$tmp0\n";
+	$code.="	movzb	2048($sbox,$tmp1,1),$tmp1\n";
+	$code.="	movzb	2048($sbox,$tmp2,1),$tmp2\n";
+
+	$code.="	shl	\$8,$tmp0\n";
+	$code.="	shl	\$16,$tmp1\n";
+	$code.="	shl	\$24,$tmp2\n";
+
+	$code.="	xor	$tmp0,$out\n";
+	$code.="	mov	$t2,$s[1]\n"		if ($i==3);
+	$code.="	xor	$tmp1,$out\n";
+	$code.="	mov	$t1,$s[2]\n"		if ($i==3);
+	$code.="	xor	$tmp2,$out\n";
+	$code.="	mov	$t0,$s[3]\n"		if ($i==3);
+	$code.="\n";
+}
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.type	_x86_64_AES_decrypt,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+_x86_64_AES_decrypt:
+	xor	0($key),$s0			# xor with key
+	xor	4($key),$s1
+	xor	8($key),$s2
+	xor	12($key),$s3
+
+	mov	240($key),$rnds			# load key->rounds
+	sub	\$1,$rnds
+	jmp	.Ldec_loop
+.align	16
+.Ldec_loop:
+___
+	if ($verticalspin) { &decvert(); }
+	else {	&decstep(0,$s0,$s3,$s2,$s1);
+		&decstep(1,$s1,$s0,$s3,$s2);
+		&decstep(2,$s2,$s1,$s0,$s3);
+		&decstep(3,$s3,$s2,$s1,$s0);
+		$code.=<<___;
+		lea	16($key),$key
+		xor	0($key),$s0			# xor with key
+		xor	4($key),$s1
+		xor	8($key),$s2
+		xor	12($key),$s3
+___
+	}
+$code.=<<___;
+	sub	\$1,$rnds
+	jnz	.Ldec_loop
+___
+	if ($verticalspin) { &declastvert(); }
+	else {	&declast(0,$s0,$s3,$s2,$s1);
+		&declast(1,$s1,$s0,$s3,$s2);
+		&declast(2,$s2,$s1,$s0,$s3);
+		&declast(3,$s3,$s2,$s1,$s0);
+		$code.=<<___;
+		xor	16+0($key),$s0			# xor with key
+		xor	16+4($key),$s1
+		xor	16+8($key),$s2
+		xor	16+12($key),$s3
+___
+	}
+$code.=<<___;
+	.byte	0xf3,0xc3			# rep ret
+.size	_x86_64_AES_decrypt,.-_x86_64_AES_decrypt
+___
+
+sub deccompactvert()
+{ my ($t3,$t4,$t5)=("%r8d","%r9d","%r13d");
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	movzb	`&lo("$s0")`,$t0
+	movzb	`&lo("$s1")`,$t1
+	movzb	`&lo("$s2")`,$t2
+	movzb	`&lo("$s3")`,$t3
+	movzb	`&hi("$s3")`,$acc0
+	movzb	`&hi("$s0")`,$acc1
+	shr	\$16,$s3
+	movzb	`&hi("$s1")`,$acc2
+	movzb	($sbox,$t0,1),$t0
+	movzb	($sbox,$t1,1),$t1
+	movzb	($sbox,$t2,1),$t2
+	movzb	($sbox,$t3,1),$t3
+
+	movzb	($sbox,$acc0,1),$t4	#$t0
+	movzb	`&hi("$s2")`,$acc0
+	movzb	($sbox,$acc1,1),$t5	#$t1
+	movzb	($sbox,$acc2,1),$acc2	#$t2
+	movzb	($sbox,$acc0,1),$acc0	#$t3
+
+	shr	\$16,$s2
+	shl	\$8,$t5
+	shl	\$8,$t4
+	movzb	`&lo("$s2")`,$acc1
+	shr	\$16,$s0
+	xor	$t4,$t0
+	shr	\$16,$s1
+	movzb	`&lo("$s3")`,$t4
+
+	shl	\$8,$acc2
+	xor	$t5,$t1
+	shl	\$8,$acc0
+	movzb	`&lo("$s0")`,$t5
+	movzb	($sbox,$acc1,1),$acc1	#$t0
+	xor	$acc2,$t2
+	movzb	`&lo("$s1")`,$acc2
+
+	shl	\$16,$acc1
+	xor	$acc0,$t3
+	movzb	($sbox,$t4,1),$t4	#$t1
+	movzb	`&hi("$s1")`,$acc0
+	movzb	($sbox,$acc2,1),$acc2	#$t3
+	xor	$acc1,$t0
+	movzb	($sbox,$t5,1),$t5	#$t2
+	movzb	`&hi("$s2")`,$acc1
+
+	shl	\$16,$acc2
+	shl	\$16,$t4
+	shl	\$16,$t5
+	xor	$acc2,$t3
+	movzb	`&hi("$s3")`,$acc2
+	xor	$t4,$t1
+	shr	\$8,$s0
+	xor	$t5,$t2
+
+	movzb	($sbox,$acc0,1),$acc0	#$t0
+	movzb	($sbox,$acc1,1),$s1	#$t1
+	movzb	($sbox,$acc2,1),$s2	#$t2
+	movzb	($sbox,$s0,1),$s3	#$t3
+
+	mov	$t0,$s0
+	shl	\$24,$acc0
+	shl	\$24,$s1
+	shl	\$24,$s2
+	xor	$acc0,$s0
+	shl	\$24,$s3
+	xor	$t1,$s1
+	xor	$t2,$s2
+	xor	$t3,$s3
+___
+}
+
+# parallelized version! input is pair of 64-bit values: %rax=s1.s0
+# and %rcx=s3.s2, output is four 32-bit values in %eax=s0, %ebx=s1,
+# %ecx=s2 and %edx=s3.
+sub dectransform()
+{ my ($tp10,$tp20,$tp40,$tp80,$acc0)=("%rax","%r8", "%r9", "%r10","%rbx");
+  my ($tp18,$tp28,$tp48,$tp88,$acc8)=("%rcx","%r11","%r12","%r13","%rdx");
+  my $prefetch = shift;
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	$mask80,$tp40
+	mov	$mask80,$tp48
+	and	$tp10,$tp40
+	and	$tp18,$tp48
+	mov	$tp40,$acc0
+	mov	$tp48,$acc8
+	shr	\$7,$tp40
+	lea	($tp10,$tp10),$tp20
+	shr	\$7,$tp48
+	lea	($tp18,$tp18),$tp28
+	sub	$tp40,$acc0
+	sub	$tp48,$acc8
+	and	$maskfe,$tp20
+	and	$maskfe,$tp28
+	and	$mask1b,$acc0
+	and	$mask1b,$acc8
+	xor	$acc0,$tp20
+	xor	$acc8,$tp28
+	mov	$mask80,$tp80
+	mov	$mask80,$tp88
+
+	and	$tp20,$tp80
+	and	$tp28,$tp88
+	mov	$tp80,$acc0
+	mov	$tp88,$acc8
+	shr	\$7,$tp80
+	lea	($tp20,$tp20),$tp40
+	shr	\$7,$tp88
+	lea	($tp28,$tp28),$tp48
+	sub	$tp80,$acc0
+	sub	$tp88,$acc8
+	and	$maskfe,$tp40
+	and	$maskfe,$tp48
+	and	$mask1b,$acc0
+	and	$mask1b,$acc8
+	xor	$acc0,$tp40
+	xor	$acc8,$tp48
+	mov	$mask80,$tp80
+	mov	$mask80,$tp88
+
+	and	$tp40,$tp80
+	and	$tp48,$tp88
+	mov	$tp80,$acc0
+	mov	$tp88,$acc8
+	shr	\$7,$tp80
+	 xor	$tp10,$tp20		# tp2^=tp1
+	shr	\$7,$tp88
+	 xor	$tp18,$tp28		# tp2^=tp1
+	sub	$tp80,$acc0
+	sub	$tp88,$acc8
+	lea	($tp40,$tp40),$tp80
+	lea	($tp48,$tp48),$tp88
+	 xor	$tp10,$tp40		# tp4^=tp1
+	 xor	$tp18,$tp48		# tp4^=tp1
+	and	$maskfe,$tp80
+	and	$maskfe,$tp88
+	and	$mask1b,$acc0
+	and	$mask1b,$acc8
+	xor	$acc0,$tp80
+	xor	$acc8,$tp88
+
+	xor	$tp80,$tp10		# tp1^=tp8
+	xor	$tp88,$tp18		# tp1^=tp8
+	xor	$tp80,$tp20		# tp2^tp1^=tp8
+	xor	$tp88,$tp28		# tp2^tp1^=tp8
+	mov	$tp10,$acc0
+	mov	$tp18,$acc8
+	xor	$tp80,$tp40		# tp4^tp1^=tp8
+	shr	\$32,$acc0
+	xor	$tp88,$tp48		# tp4^tp1^=tp8
+	shr	\$32,$acc8
+	xor	$tp20,$tp80		# tp8^=tp8^tp2^tp1=tp2^tp1
+	rol	\$8,`&LO("$tp10")`	# ROTATE(tp1^tp8,8)
+	xor	$tp28,$tp88		# tp8^=tp8^tp2^tp1=tp2^tp1
+	rol	\$8,`&LO("$tp18")`	# ROTATE(tp1^tp8,8)
+	xor	$tp40,$tp80		# tp2^tp1^=tp8^tp4^tp1=tp8^tp4^tp2
+	rol	\$8,`&LO("$acc0")`	# ROTATE(tp1^tp8,8)
+	xor	$tp48,$tp88		# tp2^tp1^=tp8^tp4^tp1=tp8^tp4^tp2
+
+	rol	\$8,`&LO("$acc8")`	# ROTATE(tp1^tp8,8)
+	xor	`&LO("$tp80")`,`&LO("$tp10")`
+	shr	\$32,$tp80
+	xor	`&LO("$tp88")`,`&LO("$tp18")`
+	shr	\$32,$tp88
+	xor	`&LO("$tp80")`,`&LO("$acc0")`
+	xor	`&LO("$tp88")`,`&LO("$acc8")`
+
+	mov	$tp20,$tp80
+	rol	\$24,`&LO("$tp20")`	# ROTATE(tp2^tp1^tp8,24)
+	mov	$tp28,$tp88
+	rol	\$24,`&LO("$tp28")`	# ROTATE(tp2^tp1^tp8,24)
+	shr	\$32,$tp80
+	xor	`&LO("$tp20")`,`&LO("$tp10")`
+	shr	\$32,$tp88
+	xor	`&LO("$tp28")`,`&LO("$tp18")`
+	rol	\$24,`&LO("$tp80")`	# ROTATE(tp2^tp1^tp8,24)
+	mov	$tp40,$tp20
+	rol	\$24,`&LO("$tp88")`	# ROTATE(tp2^tp1^tp8,24)
+	mov	$tp48,$tp28
+	shr	\$32,$tp20
+	xor	`&LO("$tp80")`,`&LO("$acc0")`
+	shr	\$32,$tp28
+	xor	`&LO("$tp88")`,`&LO("$acc8")`
+
+	`"mov	0($sbox),$mask80"	if ($prefetch)`
+	rol	\$16,`&LO("$tp40")`	# ROTATE(tp4^tp1^tp8,16)
+	`"mov	64($sbox),$maskfe"	if ($prefetch)`
+	rol	\$16,`&LO("$tp48")`	# ROTATE(tp4^tp1^tp8,16)
+	`"mov	128($sbox),$mask1b"	if ($prefetch)`
+	rol	\$16,`&LO("$tp20")`	# ROTATE(tp4^tp1^tp8,16)
+	`"mov	192($sbox),$tp80"	if ($prefetch)`
+	xor	`&LO("$tp40")`,`&LO("$tp10")`
+	rol	\$16,`&LO("$tp28")`	# ROTATE(tp4^tp1^tp8,16)
+	xor	`&LO("$tp48")`,`&LO("$tp18")`
+	`"mov	256($sbox),$tp88"	if ($prefetch)`
+	xor	`&LO("$tp20")`,`&LO("$acc0")`
+	xor	`&LO("$tp28")`,`&LO("$acc8")`
+___
+}
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.type	_x86_64_AES_decrypt_compact,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+_x86_64_AES_decrypt_compact:
+	lea	128($sbox),$inp			# size optimization
+	mov	0-128($inp),$acc1		# prefetch Td4
+	mov	32-128($inp),$acc2
+	mov	64-128($inp),$t0
+	mov	96-128($inp),$t1
+	mov	128-128($inp),$acc1
+	mov	160-128($inp),$acc2
+	mov	192-128($inp),$t0
+	mov	224-128($inp),$t1
+	jmp	.Ldec_loop_compact
+
+.align	16
+.Ldec_loop_compact:
+		xor	0($key),$s0		# xor with key
+		xor	4($key),$s1
+		xor	8($key),$s2
+		xor	12($key),$s3
+		lea	16($key),$key
+___
+		&deccompactvert();
+$code.=<<___;
+		cmp	16(%rsp),$key
+		je	.Ldec_compact_done
+
+		mov	256+0($sbox),$mask80
+		shl	\$32,%rbx
+		shl	\$32,%rdx
+		mov	256+8($sbox),$maskfe
+		or	%rbx,%rax
+		or	%rdx,%rcx
+		mov	256+16($sbox),$mask1b
+___
+		&dectransform(1);
+$code.=<<___;
+	jmp	.Ldec_loop_compact
+.align	16
+.Ldec_compact_done:
+	xor	0($key),$s0
+	xor	4($key),$s1
+	xor	8($key),$s2
+	xor	12($key),$s3
+	.byte	0xf3,0xc3			# rep ret
+.size	_x86_64_AES_decrypt_compact,.-_x86_64_AES_decrypt_compact
+___
+
+# void AES_decrypt (const void *inp,void *out,const AES_KEY *key);
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	AES_decrypt
+.type	AES_decrypt,\@function,3
+.align	16
+.globl	asm_AES_decrypt
+.hidden	asm_AES_decrypt
+asm_AES_decrypt:
+AES_decrypt:
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+
+	# allocate frame "above" key schedule
+	mov	%rsp,%r10
+	lea	-63(%rdx),%rcx	# %rdx is key argument
+	and	\$-64,%rsp
+	sub	%rsp,%rcx
+	neg	%rcx
+	and	\$0x3c0,%rcx
+	sub	%rcx,%rsp
+	sub	\$32,%rsp
+
+	mov	%rsi,16(%rsp)	# save out
+	mov	%r10,24(%rsp)	# save real stack pointer
+.Ldec_prologue:
+
+	mov	%rdx,$key
+	mov	240($key),$rnds	# load rounds
+
+	mov	0(%rdi),$s0	# load input vector
+	mov	4(%rdi),$s1
+	mov	8(%rdi),$s2
+	mov	12(%rdi),$s3
+
+	shl	\$4,$rnds
+	lea	($key,$rnds),%rbp
+	mov	$key,(%rsp)	# key schedule
+	mov	%rbp,8(%rsp)	# end of key schedule
+
+	# pick Td4 copy which can't "overlap" with stack frame or key schedule
+	lea	.LAES_Td+2048(%rip),$sbox
+	lea	768(%rsp),%rbp
+	sub	$sbox,%rbp
+	and	\$0x300,%rbp
+	lea	($sbox,%rbp),$sbox
+	shr	\$3,%rbp	# recall "magic" constants!
+	add	%rbp,$sbox
+
+	call	_x86_64_AES_decrypt_compact
+
+	mov	16(%rsp),$out	# restore out
+	mov	24(%rsp),%rsi	# restore saved stack pointer
+	mov	$s0,0($out)	# write output vector
+	mov	$s1,4($out)
+	mov	$s2,8($out)
+	mov	$s3,12($out)
+
+	mov	(%rsi),%r15
+	mov	8(%rsi),%r14
+	mov	16(%rsi),%r13
+	mov	24(%rsi),%r12
+	mov	32(%rsi),%rbp
+	mov	40(%rsi),%rbx
+	lea	48(%rsi),%rsp
+.Ldec_epilogue:
+	ret
+.size	AES_decrypt,.-AES_decrypt
+___
+#------------------------------------------------------------------#
+
+sub enckey()
+{
+$code.=<<___;
+	movz	%dl,%esi		# rk[i]>>0
+	movzb	-128(%rbp,%rsi),%ebx
+	movz	%dh,%esi		# rk[i]>>8
+	shl	\$24,%ebx
+	xor	%ebx,%eax
+
+	movzb	-128(%rbp,%rsi),%ebx
+	shr	\$16,%edx
+	movz	%dl,%esi		# rk[i]>>16
+	xor	%ebx,%eax
+
+	movzb	-128(%rbp,%rsi),%ebx
+	movz	%dh,%esi		# rk[i]>>24
+	shl	\$8,%ebx
+	xor	%ebx,%eax
+
+	movzb	-128(%rbp,%rsi),%ebx
+	shl	\$16,%ebx
+	xor	%ebx,%eax
+
+	xor	1024-128(%rbp,%rcx,4),%eax		# rcon
+___
+}
+
+# int AES_set_encrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, const int bits,
+#                        AES_KEY *key)
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	AES_set_encrypt_key
+.type	AES_set_encrypt_key,\@function,3
+.align	16
+AES_set_encrypt_key:
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12			# redundant, but allows to share 
+	push	%r13			# exception handler...
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+	sub	\$8,%rsp
+.Lenc_key_prologue:
+
+	call	_x86_64_AES_set_encrypt_key
+
+	mov	40(%rsp),%rbp
+	mov	48(%rsp),%rbx
+	add	\$56,%rsp
+.Lenc_key_epilogue:
+	ret
+.size	AES_set_encrypt_key,.-AES_set_encrypt_key
+
+.type	_x86_64_AES_set_encrypt_key,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+_x86_64_AES_set_encrypt_key:
+	mov	%esi,%ecx			# %ecx=bits
+	mov	%rdi,%rsi			# %rsi=userKey
+	mov	%rdx,%rdi			# %rdi=key
+
+	test	\$-1,%rsi
+	jz	.Lbadpointer
+	test	\$-1,%rdi
+	jz	.Lbadpointer
+
+	lea	.LAES_Te(%rip),%rbp
+	lea	2048+128(%rbp),%rbp
+
+	# prefetch Te4
+	mov	0-128(%rbp),%eax
+	mov	32-128(%rbp),%ebx
+	mov	64-128(%rbp),%r8d
+	mov	96-128(%rbp),%edx
+	mov	128-128(%rbp),%eax
+	mov	160-128(%rbp),%ebx
+	mov	192-128(%rbp),%r8d
+	mov	224-128(%rbp),%edx
+
+	cmp	\$128,%ecx
+	je	.L10rounds
+	cmp	\$192,%ecx
+	je	.L12rounds
+	cmp	\$256,%ecx
+	je	.L14rounds
+	mov	\$-2,%rax			# invalid number of bits
+	jmp	.Lexit
+
+.L10rounds:
+	mov	0(%rsi),%rax			# copy first 4 dwords
+	mov	8(%rsi),%rdx
+	mov	%rax,0(%rdi)
+	mov	%rdx,8(%rdi)
+
+	shr	\$32,%rdx
+	xor	%ecx,%ecx
+	jmp	.L10shortcut
+.align	4
+.L10loop:
+		mov	0(%rdi),%eax			# rk[0]
+		mov	12(%rdi),%edx			# rk[3]
+.L10shortcut:
+___
+		&enckey	();
+$code.=<<___;
+		mov	%eax,16(%rdi)			# rk[4]
+		xor	4(%rdi),%eax
+		mov	%eax,20(%rdi)			# rk[5]
+		xor	8(%rdi),%eax
+		mov	%eax,24(%rdi)			# rk[6]
+		xor	12(%rdi),%eax
+		mov	%eax,28(%rdi)			# rk[7]
+		add	\$1,%ecx
+		lea	16(%rdi),%rdi
+		cmp	\$10,%ecx
+	jl	.L10loop
+
+	movl	\$10,80(%rdi)			# setup number of rounds
+	xor	%rax,%rax
+	jmp	.Lexit
+
+.L12rounds:
+	mov	0(%rsi),%rax			# copy first 6 dwords
+	mov	8(%rsi),%rbx
+	mov	16(%rsi),%rdx
+	mov	%rax,0(%rdi)
+	mov	%rbx,8(%rdi)
+	mov	%rdx,16(%rdi)
+
+	shr	\$32,%rdx
+	xor	%ecx,%ecx
+	jmp	.L12shortcut
+.align	4
+.L12loop:
+		mov	0(%rdi),%eax			# rk[0]
+		mov	20(%rdi),%edx			# rk[5]
+.L12shortcut:
+___
+		&enckey	();
+$code.=<<___;
+		mov	%eax,24(%rdi)			# rk[6]
+		xor	4(%rdi),%eax
+		mov	%eax,28(%rdi)			# rk[7]
+		xor	8(%rdi),%eax
+		mov	%eax,32(%rdi)			# rk[8]
+		xor	12(%rdi),%eax
+		mov	%eax,36(%rdi)			# rk[9]
+
+		cmp	\$7,%ecx
+		je	.L12break
+		add	\$1,%ecx
+
+		xor	16(%rdi),%eax
+		mov	%eax,40(%rdi)			# rk[10]
+		xor	20(%rdi),%eax
+		mov	%eax,44(%rdi)			# rk[11]
+
+		lea	24(%rdi),%rdi
+	jmp	.L12loop
+.L12break:
+	movl	\$12,72(%rdi)		# setup number of rounds
+	xor	%rax,%rax
+	jmp	.Lexit
+
+.L14rounds:		
+	mov	0(%rsi),%rax			# copy first 8 dwords
+	mov	8(%rsi),%rbx
+	mov	16(%rsi),%rcx
+	mov	24(%rsi),%rdx
+	mov	%rax,0(%rdi)
+	mov	%rbx,8(%rdi)
+	mov	%rcx,16(%rdi)
+	mov	%rdx,24(%rdi)
+
+	shr	\$32,%rdx
+	xor	%ecx,%ecx
+	jmp	.L14shortcut
+.align	4
+.L14loop:
+		mov	0(%rdi),%eax			# rk[0]
+		mov	28(%rdi),%edx			# rk[4]
+.L14shortcut:
+___
+		&enckey	();
+$code.=<<___;
+		mov	%eax,32(%rdi)			# rk[8]
+		xor	4(%rdi),%eax
+		mov	%eax,36(%rdi)			# rk[9]
+		xor	8(%rdi),%eax
+		mov	%eax,40(%rdi)			# rk[10]
+		xor	12(%rdi),%eax
+		mov	%eax,44(%rdi)			# rk[11]
+
+		cmp	\$6,%ecx
+		je	.L14break
+		add	\$1,%ecx
+
+		mov	%eax,%edx
+		mov	16(%rdi),%eax			# rk[4]
+		movz	%dl,%esi			# rk[11]>>0
+		movzb	-128(%rbp,%rsi),%ebx
+		movz	%dh,%esi			# rk[11]>>8
+		xor	%ebx,%eax
+
+		movzb	-128(%rbp,%rsi),%ebx
+		shr	\$16,%edx
+		shl	\$8,%ebx
+		movz	%dl,%esi			# rk[11]>>16
+		xor	%ebx,%eax
+
+		movzb	-128(%rbp,%rsi),%ebx
+		movz	%dh,%esi			# rk[11]>>24
+		shl	\$16,%ebx
+		xor	%ebx,%eax
+
+		movzb	-128(%rbp,%rsi),%ebx
+		shl	\$24,%ebx
+		xor	%ebx,%eax
+
+		mov	%eax,48(%rdi)			# rk[12]
+		xor	20(%rdi),%eax
+		mov	%eax,52(%rdi)			# rk[13]
+		xor	24(%rdi),%eax
+		mov	%eax,56(%rdi)			# rk[14]
+		xor	28(%rdi),%eax
+		mov	%eax,60(%rdi)			# rk[15]
+
+		lea	32(%rdi),%rdi
+	jmp	.L14loop
+.L14break:
+	movl	\$14,48(%rdi)		# setup number of rounds
+	xor	%rax,%rax
+	jmp	.Lexit
+
+.Lbadpointer:
+	mov	\$-1,%rax
+.Lexit:
+	.byte	0xf3,0xc3			# rep ret
+.size	_x86_64_AES_set_encrypt_key,.-_x86_64_AES_set_encrypt_key
+___
+
+sub deckey_ref()
+{ my ($i,$ptr,$te,$td) = @_;
+  my ($tp1,$tp2,$tp4,$tp8,$acc)=("%eax","%ebx","%edi","%edx","%r8d");
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	$i($ptr),$tp1
+	mov	$tp1,$acc
+	and	\$0x80808080,$acc
+	mov	$acc,$tp4
+	shr	\$7,$tp4
+	lea	0($tp1,$tp1),$tp2
+	sub	$tp4,$acc
+	and	\$0xfefefefe,$tp2
+	and	\$0x1b1b1b1b,$acc
+	xor	$tp2,$acc
+	mov	$acc,$tp2
+
+	and	\$0x80808080,$acc
+	mov	$acc,$tp8
+	shr	\$7,$tp8
+	lea	0($tp2,$tp2),$tp4
+	sub	$tp8,$acc
+	and	\$0xfefefefe,$tp4
+	and	\$0x1b1b1b1b,$acc
+	 xor	$tp1,$tp2		# tp2^tp1
+	xor	$tp4,$acc
+	mov	$acc,$tp4
+
+	and	\$0x80808080,$acc
+	mov	$acc,$tp8
+	shr	\$7,$tp8
+	sub	$tp8,$acc
+	lea	0($tp4,$tp4),$tp8
+	 xor	$tp1,$tp4		# tp4^tp1
+	and	\$0xfefefefe,$tp8
+	and	\$0x1b1b1b1b,$acc
+	xor	$acc,$tp8
+
+	xor	$tp8,$tp1		# tp1^tp8
+	rol	\$8,$tp1		# ROTATE(tp1^tp8,8)
+	xor	$tp8,$tp2		# tp2^tp1^tp8
+	xor	$tp8,$tp4		# tp4^tp1^tp8
+	xor	$tp2,$tp8
+	xor	$tp4,$tp8		# tp8^(tp8^tp4^tp1)^(tp8^tp2^tp1)=tp8^tp4^tp2
+
+	xor	$tp8,$tp1
+	rol	\$24,$tp2		# ROTATE(tp2^tp1^tp8,24)
+	xor	$tp2,$tp1
+	rol	\$16,$tp4		# ROTATE(tp4^tp1^tp8,16)
+	xor	$tp4,$tp1
+
+	mov	$tp1,$i($ptr)
+___
+}
+
+# int AES_set_decrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, const int bits,
+#                        AES_KEY *key)
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	AES_set_decrypt_key
+.type	AES_set_decrypt_key,\@function,3
+.align	16
+AES_set_decrypt_key:
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+	push	%rdx			# save key schedule
+.Ldec_key_prologue:
+
+	call	_x86_64_AES_set_encrypt_key
+	mov	(%rsp),%r8		# restore key schedule
+	cmp	\$0,%eax
+	jne	.Labort
+
+	mov	240(%r8),%r14d		# pull number of rounds
+	xor	%rdi,%rdi
+	lea	(%rdi,%r14d,4),%rcx
+	mov	%r8,%rsi
+	lea	(%r8,%rcx,4),%rdi	# pointer to last chunk
+.align	4
+.Linvert:
+		mov	0(%rsi),%rax
+		mov	8(%rsi),%rbx
+		mov	0(%rdi),%rcx
+		mov	8(%rdi),%rdx
+		mov	%rax,0(%rdi)
+		mov	%rbx,8(%rdi)
+		mov	%rcx,0(%rsi)
+		mov	%rdx,8(%rsi)
+		lea	16(%rsi),%rsi
+		lea	-16(%rdi),%rdi
+		cmp	%rsi,%rdi
+	jne	.Linvert
+
+	lea	.LAES_Te+2048+1024(%rip),%rax	# rcon
+
+	mov	40(%rax),$mask80
+	mov	48(%rax),$maskfe
+	mov	56(%rax),$mask1b
+
+	mov	%r8,$key
+	sub	\$1,%r14d
+.align	4
+.Lpermute:
+		lea	16($key),$key
+		mov	0($key),%rax
+		mov	8($key),%rcx
+___
+		&dectransform ();
+$code.=<<___;
+		mov	%eax,0($key)
+		mov	%ebx,4($key)
+		mov	%ecx,8($key)
+		mov	%edx,12($key)
+		sub	\$1,%r14d
+	jnz	.Lpermute
+
+	xor	%rax,%rax
+.Labort:
+	mov	8(%rsp),%r15
+	mov	16(%rsp),%r14
+	mov	24(%rsp),%r13
+	mov	32(%rsp),%r12
+	mov	40(%rsp),%rbp
+	mov	48(%rsp),%rbx
+	add	\$56,%rsp
+.Ldec_key_epilogue:
+	ret
+.size	AES_set_decrypt_key,.-AES_set_decrypt_key
+___
+
+# void AES_cbc_encrypt (const void char *inp, unsigned char *out,
+#			size_t length, const AES_KEY *key,
+#			unsigned char *ivp,const int enc);
+{
+# stack frame layout
+# -8(%rsp)		return address
+my $keyp="0(%rsp)";		# one to pass as $key
+my $keyend="8(%rsp)";		# &(keyp->rd_key[4*keyp->rounds])
+my $_rsp="16(%rsp)";		# saved %rsp
+my $_inp="24(%rsp)";		# copy of 1st parameter, inp
+my $_out="32(%rsp)";		# copy of 2nd parameter, out
+my $_len="40(%rsp)";		# copy of 3rd parameter, length
+my $_key="48(%rsp)";		# copy of 4th parameter, key
+my $_ivp="56(%rsp)";		# copy of 5th parameter, ivp
+my $ivec="64(%rsp)";		# ivec[16]
+my $aes_key="80(%rsp)";		# copy of aes_key
+my $mark="80+240(%rsp)";	# copy of aes_key->rounds
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	AES_cbc_encrypt
+.type	AES_cbc_encrypt,\@function,6
+.align	16
+.extern	OPENSSL_ia32cap_P
+.globl	asm_AES_cbc_encrypt
+.hidden	asm_AES_cbc_encrypt
+asm_AES_cbc_encrypt:
+AES_cbc_encrypt:
+	cmp	\$0,%rdx	# check length
+	je	.Lcbc_epilogue
+	pushfq
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+.Lcbc_prologue:
+
+	cld
+	mov	%r9d,%r9d	# clear upper half of enc
+
+	lea	.LAES_Te(%rip),$sbox
+	cmp	\$0,%r9
+	jne	.Lcbc_picked_te
+	lea	.LAES_Td(%rip),$sbox
+.Lcbc_picked_te:
+
+	mov	OPENSSL_ia32cap_P(%rip),%r10d
+	cmp	\$$speed_limit,%rdx
+	jb	.Lcbc_slow_prologue
+	test	\$15,%rdx
+	jnz	.Lcbc_slow_prologue
+	bt	\$28,%r10d
+	jc	.Lcbc_slow_prologue
+
+	# allocate aligned stack frame...
+	lea	-88-248(%rsp),$key
+	and	\$-64,$key
+
+	# ... and make sure it doesn't alias with AES_T[ed] modulo 4096
+	mov	$sbox,%r10
+	lea	2304($sbox),%r11
+	mov	$key,%r12
+	and	\$0xFFF,%r10	# s = $sbox&0xfff
+	and	\$0xFFF,%r11	# e = ($sbox+2048)&0xfff
+	and	\$0xFFF,%r12	# p = %rsp&0xfff
+
+	cmp	%r11,%r12	# if (p=>e) %rsp =- (p-e);
+	jb	.Lcbc_te_break_out
+	sub	%r11,%r12
+	sub	%r12,$key
+	jmp	.Lcbc_te_ok
+.Lcbc_te_break_out:		# else %rsp -= (p-s)&0xfff + framesz
+	sub	%r10,%r12
+	and	\$0xFFF,%r12
+	add	\$320,%r12
+	sub	%r12,$key
+.align	4
+.Lcbc_te_ok:
+
+	xchg	%rsp,$key
+	#add	\$8,%rsp	# reserve for return address!
+	mov	$key,$_rsp	# save %rsp
+.Lcbc_fast_body:
+	mov	%rdi,$_inp	# save copy of inp
+	mov	%rsi,$_out	# save copy of out
+	mov	%rdx,$_len	# save copy of len
+	mov	%rcx,$_key	# save copy of key
+	mov	%r8,$_ivp	# save copy of ivp
+	movl	\$0,$mark	# copy of aes_key->rounds = 0;
+	mov	%r8,%rbp	# rearrange input arguments
+	mov	%r9,%rbx
+	mov	%rsi,$out
+	mov	%rdi,$inp
+	mov	%rcx,$key
+
+	mov	240($key),%eax		# key->rounds
+	# do we copy key schedule to stack?
+	mov	$key,%r10
+	sub	$sbox,%r10
+	and	\$0xfff,%r10
+	cmp	\$2304,%r10
+	jb	.Lcbc_do_ecopy
+	cmp	\$4096-248,%r10
+	jb	.Lcbc_skip_ecopy
+.align	4
+.Lcbc_do_ecopy:
+		mov	$key,%rsi
+		lea	$aes_key,%rdi
+		lea	$aes_key,$key
+		mov	\$240/8,%ecx
+		.long	0x90A548F3	# rep movsq
+		mov	%eax,(%rdi)	# copy aes_key->rounds
+.Lcbc_skip_ecopy:
+	mov	$key,$keyp	# save key pointer
+
+	mov	\$18,%ecx
+.align	4
+.Lcbc_prefetch_te:
+		mov	0($sbox),%r10
+		mov	32($sbox),%r11
+		mov	64($sbox),%r12
+		mov	96($sbox),%r13
+		lea	128($sbox),$sbox
+		sub	\$1,%ecx
+	jnz	.Lcbc_prefetch_te
+	lea	-2304($sbox),$sbox
+
+	cmp	\$0,%rbx
+	je	.LFAST_DECRYPT
+
+#----------------------------- ENCRYPT -----------------------------#
+	mov	0(%rbp),$s0		# load iv
+	mov	4(%rbp),$s1
+	mov	8(%rbp),$s2
+	mov	12(%rbp),$s3
+
+.align	4
+.Lcbc_fast_enc_loop:
+		xor	0($inp),$s0
+		xor	4($inp),$s1
+		xor	8($inp),$s2
+		xor	12($inp),$s3
+		mov	$keyp,$key	# restore key
+		mov	$inp,$_inp	# if ($verticalspin) save inp
+
+		call	_x86_64_AES_encrypt
+
+		mov	$_inp,$inp	# if ($verticalspin) restore inp
+		mov	$_len,%r10
+		mov	$s0,0($out)
+		mov	$s1,4($out)
+		mov	$s2,8($out)
+		mov	$s3,12($out)
+
+		lea	16($inp),$inp
+		lea	16($out),$out
+		sub	\$16,%r10
+		test	\$-16,%r10
+		mov	%r10,$_len
+	jnz	.Lcbc_fast_enc_loop
+	mov	$_ivp,%rbp	# restore ivp
+	mov	$s0,0(%rbp)	# save ivec
+	mov	$s1,4(%rbp)
+	mov	$s2,8(%rbp)
+	mov	$s3,12(%rbp)
+
+	jmp	.Lcbc_fast_cleanup
+
+#----------------------------- DECRYPT -----------------------------#
+.align	16
+.LFAST_DECRYPT:
+	cmp	$inp,$out
+	je	.Lcbc_fast_dec_in_place
+
+	mov	%rbp,$ivec
+.align	4
+.Lcbc_fast_dec_loop:
+		mov	0($inp),$s0	# read input
+		mov	4($inp),$s1
+		mov	8($inp),$s2
+		mov	12($inp),$s3
+		mov	$keyp,$key	# restore key
+		mov	$inp,$_inp	# if ($verticalspin) save inp
+
+		call	_x86_64_AES_decrypt
+
+		mov	$ivec,%rbp	# load ivp
+		mov	$_inp,$inp	# if ($verticalspin) restore inp
+		mov	$_len,%r10	# load len
+		xor	0(%rbp),$s0	# xor iv
+		xor	4(%rbp),$s1
+		xor	8(%rbp),$s2
+		xor	12(%rbp),$s3
+		mov	$inp,%rbp	# current input, next iv
+
+		sub	\$16,%r10
+		mov	%r10,$_len	# update len
+		mov	%rbp,$ivec	# update ivp
+
+		mov	$s0,0($out)	# write output
+		mov	$s1,4($out)
+		mov	$s2,8($out)
+		mov	$s3,12($out)
+
+		lea	16($inp),$inp
+		lea	16($out),$out
+	jnz	.Lcbc_fast_dec_loop
+	mov	$_ivp,%r12		# load user ivp
+	mov	0(%rbp),%r10		# load iv
+	mov	8(%rbp),%r11
+	mov	%r10,0(%r12)		# copy back to user
+	mov	%r11,8(%r12)
+	jmp	.Lcbc_fast_cleanup
+
+.align	16
+.Lcbc_fast_dec_in_place:
+	mov	0(%rbp),%r10		# copy iv to stack
+	mov	8(%rbp),%r11
+	mov	%r10,0+$ivec
+	mov	%r11,8+$ivec
+.align	4
+.Lcbc_fast_dec_in_place_loop:
+		mov	0($inp),$s0	# load input
+		mov	4($inp),$s1
+		mov	8($inp),$s2
+		mov	12($inp),$s3
+		mov	$keyp,$key	# restore key
+		mov	$inp,$_inp	# if ($verticalspin) save inp
+
+		call	_x86_64_AES_decrypt
+
+		mov	$_inp,$inp	# if ($verticalspin) restore inp
+		mov	$_len,%r10
+		xor	0+$ivec,$s0
+		xor	4+$ivec,$s1
+		xor	8+$ivec,$s2
+		xor	12+$ivec,$s3
+
+		mov	0($inp),%r11	# load input
+		mov	8($inp),%r12
+		sub	\$16,%r10
+		jz	.Lcbc_fast_dec_in_place_done
+
+		mov	%r11,0+$ivec	# copy input to iv
+		mov	%r12,8+$ivec
+
+		mov	$s0,0($out)	# save output [zaps input]
+		mov	$s1,4($out)
+		mov	$s2,8($out)
+		mov	$s3,12($out)
+
+		lea	16($inp),$inp
+		lea	16($out),$out
+		mov	%r10,$_len
+	jmp	.Lcbc_fast_dec_in_place_loop
+.Lcbc_fast_dec_in_place_done:
+	mov	$_ivp,%rdi
+	mov	%r11,0(%rdi)	# copy iv back to user
+	mov	%r12,8(%rdi)
+
+	mov	$s0,0($out)	# save output [zaps input]
+	mov	$s1,4($out)
+	mov	$s2,8($out)
+	mov	$s3,12($out)
+
+.align	4
+.Lcbc_fast_cleanup:
+	cmpl	\$0,$mark	# was the key schedule copied?
+	lea	$aes_key,%rdi
+	je	.Lcbc_exit
+		mov	\$240/8,%ecx
+		xor	%rax,%rax
+		.long	0x90AB48F3	# rep stosq
+
+	jmp	.Lcbc_exit
+
+#--------------------------- SLOW ROUTINE ---------------------------#
+.align	16
+.Lcbc_slow_prologue:
+	# allocate aligned stack frame...
+	lea	-88(%rsp),%rbp
+	and	\$-64,%rbp
+	# ... just "above" key schedule
+	lea	-88-63(%rcx),%r10
+	sub	%rbp,%r10
+	neg	%r10
+	and	\$0x3c0,%r10
+	sub	%r10,%rbp
+
+	xchg	%rsp,%rbp
+	#add	\$8,%rsp	# reserve for return address!
+	mov	%rbp,$_rsp	# save %rsp
+.Lcbc_slow_body:
+	#mov	%rdi,$_inp	# save copy of inp
+	#mov	%rsi,$_out	# save copy of out
+	#mov	%rdx,$_len	# save copy of len
+	#mov	%rcx,$_key	# save copy of key
+	mov	%r8,$_ivp	# save copy of ivp
+	mov	%r8,%rbp	# rearrange input arguments
+	mov	%r9,%rbx
+	mov	%rsi,$out
+	mov	%rdi,$inp
+	mov	%rcx,$key
+	mov	%rdx,%r10
+
+	mov	240($key),%eax
+	mov	$key,$keyp	# save key pointer
+	shl	\$4,%eax
+	lea	($key,%rax),%rax
+	mov	%rax,$keyend
+
+	# pick Te4 copy which can't "overlap" with stack frame or key scdedule
+	lea	2048($sbox),$sbox
+	lea	768-8(%rsp),%rax
+	sub	$sbox,%rax
+	and	\$0x300,%rax
+	lea	($sbox,%rax),$sbox
+
+	cmp	\$0,%rbx
+	je	.LSLOW_DECRYPT
+
+#--------------------------- SLOW ENCRYPT ---------------------------#
+	test	\$-16,%r10		# check upon length
+	mov	0(%rbp),$s0		# load iv
+	mov	4(%rbp),$s1
+	mov	8(%rbp),$s2
+	mov	12(%rbp),$s3
+	jz	.Lcbc_slow_enc_tail	# short input...
+
+.align	4
+.Lcbc_slow_enc_loop:
+		xor	0($inp),$s0
+		xor	4($inp),$s1
+		xor	8($inp),$s2
+		xor	12($inp),$s3
+		mov	$keyp,$key	# restore key
+		mov	$inp,$_inp	# save inp
+		mov	$out,$_out	# save out
+		mov	%r10,$_len	# save len
+
+		call	_x86_64_AES_encrypt_compact
+
+		mov	$_inp,$inp	# restore inp
+		mov	$_out,$out	# restore out
+		mov	$_len,%r10	# restore len
+		mov	$s0,0($out)
+		mov	$s1,4($out)
+		mov	$s2,8($out)
+		mov	$s3,12($out)
+
+		lea	16($inp),$inp
+		lea	16($out),$out
+		sub	\$16,%r10
+		test	\$-16,%r10
+	jnz	.Lcbc_slow_enc_loop
+	test	\$15,%r10
+	jnz	.Lcbc_slow_enc_tail
+	mov	$_ivp,%rbp	# restore ivp
+	mov	$s0,0(%rbp)	# save ivec
+	mov	$s1,4(%rbp)
+	mov	$s2,8(%rbp)
+	mov	$s3,12(%rbp)
+
+	jmp	.Lcbc_exit
+
+.align	4
+.Lcbc_slow_enc_tail:
+	mov	%rax,%r11
+	mov	%rcx,%r12
+	mov	%r10,%rcx
+	mov	$inp,%rsi
+	mov	$out,%rdi
+	.long	0x9066A4F3		# rep movsb
+	mov	\$16,%rcx		# zero tail
+	sub	%r10,%rcx
+	xor	%rax,%rax
+	.long	0x9066AAF3		# rep stosb
+	mov	$out,$inp		# this is not a mistake!
+	mov	\$16,%r10		# len=16
+	mov	%r11,%rax
+	mov	%r12,%rcx
+	jmp	.Lcbc_slow_enc_loop	# one more spin...
+#--------------------------- SLOW DECRYPT ---------------------------#
+.align	16
+.LSLOW_DECRYPT:
+	shr	\$3,%rax
+	add	%rax,$sbox		# recall "magic" constants!
+
+	mov	0(%rbp),%r11		# copy iv to stack
+	mov	8(%rbp),%r12
+	mov	%r11,0+$ivec
+	mov	%r12,8+$ivec
+
+.align	4
+.Lcbc_slow_dec_loop:
+		mov	0($inp),$s0	# load input
+		mov	4($inp),$s1
+		mov	8($inp),$s2
+		mov	12($inp),$s3
+		mov	$keyp,$key	# restore key
+		mov	$inp,$_inp	# save inp
+		mov	$out,$_out	# save out
+		mov	%r10,$_len	# save len
+
+		call	_x86_64_AES_decrypt_compact
+
+		mov	$_inp,$inp	# restore inp
+		mov	$_out,$out	# restore out
+		mov	$_len,%r10
+		xor	0+$ivec,$s0
+		xor	4+$ivec,$s1
+		xor	8+$ivec,$s2
+		xor	12+$ivec,$s3
+
+		mov	0($inp),%r11	# load input
+		mov	8($inp),%r12
+		sub	\$16,%r10
+		jc	.Lcbc_slow_dec_partial
+		jz	.Lcbc_slow_dec_done
+
+		mov	%r11,0+$ivec	# copy input to iv
+		mov	%r12,8+$ivec
+
+		mov	$s0,0($out)	# save output [can zap input]
+		mov	$s1,4($out)
+		mov	$s2,8($out)
+		mov	$s3,12($out)
+
+		lea	16($inp),$inp
+		lea	16($out),$out
+	jmp	.Lcbc_slow_dec_loop
+.Lcbc_slow_dec_done:
+	mov	$_ivp,%rdi
+	mov	%r11,0(%rdi)		# copy iv back to user
+	mov	%r12,8(%rdi)
+
+	mov	$s0,0($out)		# save output [can zap input]
+	mov	$s1,4($out)
+	mov	$s2,8($out)
+	mov	$s3,12($out)
+
+	jmp	.Lcbc_exit
+
+.align	4
+.Lcbc_slow_dec_partial:
+	mov	$_ivp,%rdi
+	mov	%r11,0(%rdi)		# copy iv back to user
+	mov	%r12,8(%rdi)
+
+	mov	$s0,0+$ivec		# save output to stack
+	mov	$s1,4+$ivec
+	mov	$s2,8+$ivec
+	mov	$s3,12+$ivec
+
+	mov	$out,%rdi
+	lea	$ivec,%rsi
+	lea	16(%r10),%rcx
+	.long	0x9066A4F3	# rep movsb
+	jmp	.Lcbc_exit
+
+.align	16
+.Lcbc_exit:
+	mov	$_rsp,%rsi
+	mov	(%rsi),%r15
+	mov	8(%rsi),%r14
+	mov	16(%rsi),%r13
+	mov	24(%rsi),%r12
+	mov	32(%rsi),%rbp
+	mov	40(%rsi),%rbx
+	lea	48(%rsi),%rsp
+.Lcbc_popfq:
+	popfq
+.Lcbc_epilogue:
+	ret
+.size	AES_cbc_encrypt,.-AES_cbc_encrypt
+___
+}
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.align	64
+.LAES_Te:
+___
+	&_data_word(0xa56363c6, 0x847c7cf8, 0x997777ee, 0x8d7b7bf6);
+	&_data_word(0x0df2f2ff, 0xbd6b6bd6, 0xb16f6fde, 0x54c5c591);
+	&_data_word(0x50303060, 0x03010102, 0xa96767ce, 0x7d2b2b56);
+	&_data_word(0x19fefee7, 0x62d7d7b5, 0xe6abab4d, 0x9a7676ec);
+	&_data_word(0x45caca8f, 0x9d82821f, 0x40c9c989, 0x877d7dfa);
+	&_data_word(0x15fafaef, 0xeb5959b2, 0xc947478e, 0x0bf0f0fb);
+	&_data_word(0xecadad41, 0x67d4d4b3, 0xfda2a25f, 0xeaafaf45);
+	&_data_word(0xbf9c9c23, 0xf7a4a453, 0x967272e4, 0x5bc0c09b);
+	&_data_word(0xc2b7b775, 0x1cfdfde1, 0xae93933d, 0x6a26264c);
+	&_data_word(0x5a36366c, 0x413f3f7e, 0x02f7f7f5, 0x4fcccc83);
+	&_data_word(0x5c343468, 0xf4a5a551, 0x34e5e5d1, 0x08f1f1f9);
+	&_data_word(0x937171e2, 0x73d8d8ab, 0x53313162, 0x3f15152a);
+	&_data_word(0x0c040408, 0x52c7c795, 0x65232346, 0x5ec3c39d);
+	&_data_word(0x28181830, 0xa1969637, 0x0f05050a, 0xb59a9a2f);
+	&_data_word(0x0907070e, 0x36121224, 0x9b80801b, 0x3de2e2df);
+	&_data_word(0x26ebebcd, 0x6927274e, 0xcdb2b27f, 0x9f7575ea);
+	&_data_word(0x1b090912, 0x9e83831d, 0x742c2c58, 0x2e1a1a34);
+	&_data_word(0x2d1b1b36, 0xb26e6edc, 0xee5a5ab4, 0xfba0a05b);
+	&_data_word(0xf65252a4, 0x4d3b3b76, 0x61d6d6b7, 0xceb3b37d);
+	&_data_word(0x7b292952, 0x3ee3e3dd, 0x712f2f5e, 0x97848413);
+	&_data_word(0xf55353a6, 0x68d1d1b9, 0x00000000, 0x2cededc1);
+	&_data_word(0x60202040, 0x1ffcfce3, 0xc8b1b179, 0xed5b5bb6);
+	&_data_word(0xbe6a6ad4, 0x46cbcb8d, 0xd9bebe67, 0x4b393972);
+	&_data_word(0xde4a4a94, 0xd44c4c98, 0xe85858b0, 0x4acfcf85);
+	&_data_word(0x6bd0d0bb, 0x2aefefc5, 0xe5aaaa4f, 0x16fbfbed);
+	&_data_word(0xc5434386, 0xd74d4d9a, 0x55333366, 0x94858511);
+	&_data_word(0xcf45458a, 0x10f9f9e9, 0x06020204, 0x817f7ffe);
+	&_data_word(0xf05050a0, 0x443c3c78, 0xba9f9f25, 0xe3a8a84b);
+	&_data_word(0xf35151a2, 0xfea3a35d, 0xc0404080, 0x8a8f8f05);
+	&_data_word(0xad92923f, 0xbc9d9d21, 0x48383870, 0x04f5f5f1);
+	&_data_word(0xdfbcbc63, 0xc1b6b677, 0x75dadaaf, 0x63212142);
+	&_data_word(0x30101020, 0x1affffe5, 0x0ef3f3fd, 0x6dd2d2bf);
+	&_data_word(0x4ccdcd81, 0x140c0c18, 0x35131326, 0x2fececc3);
+	&_data_word(0xe15f5fbe, 0xa2979735, 0xcc444488, 0x3917172e);
+	&_data_word(0x57c4c493, 0xf2a7a755, 0x827e7efc, 0x473d3d7a);
+	&_data_word(0xac6464c8, 0xe75d5dba, 0x2b191932, 0x957373e6);
+	&_data_word(0xa06060c0, 0x98818119, 0xd14f4f9e, 0x7fdcdca3);
+	&_data_word(0x66222244, 0x7e2a2a54, 0xab90903b, 0x8388880b);
+	&_data_word(0xca46468c, 0x29eeeec7, 0xd3b8b86b, 0x3c141428);
+	&_data_word(0x79dedea7, 0xe25e5ebc, 0x1d0b0b16, 0x76dbdbad);
+	&_data_word(0x3be0e0db, 0x56323264, 0x4e3a3a74, 0x1e0a0a14);
+	&_data_word(0xdb494992, 0x0a06060c, 0x6c242448, 0xe45c5cb8);
+	&_data_word(0x5dc2c29f, 0x6ed3d3bd, 0xefacac43, 0xa66262c4);
+	&_data_word(0xa8919139, 0xa4959531, 0x37e4e4d3, 0x8b7979f2);
+	&_data_word(0x32e7e7d5, 0x43c8c88b, 0x5937376e, 0xb76d6dda);
+	&_data_word(0x8c8d8d01, 0x64d5d5b1, 0xd24e4e9c, 0xe0a9a949);
+	&_data_word(0xb46c6cd8, 0xfa5656ac, 0x07f4f4f3, 0x25eaeacf);
+	&_data_word(0xaf6565ca, 0x8e7a7af4, 0xe9aeae47, 0x18080810);
+	&_data_word(0xd5baba6f, 0x887878f0, 0x6f25254a, 0x722e2e5c);
+	&_data_word(0x241c1c38, 0xf1a6a657, 0xc7b4b473, 0x51c6c697);
+	&_data_word(0x23e8e8cb, 0x7cdddda1, 0x9c7474e8, 0x211f1f3e);
+	&_data_word(0xdd4b4b96, 0xdcbdbd61, 0x868b8b0d, 0x858a8a0f);
+	&_data_word(0x907070e0, 0x423e3e7c, 0xc4b5b571, 0xaa6666cc);
+	&_data_word(0xd8484890, 0x05030306, 0x01f6f6f7, 0x120e0e1c);
+	&_data_word(0xa36161c2, 0x5f35356a, 0xf95757ae, 0xd0b9b969);
+	&_data_word(0x91868617, 0x58c1c199, 0x271d1d3a, 0xb99e9e27);
+	&_data_word(0x38e1e1d9, 0x13f8f8eb, 0xb398982b, 0x33111122);
+	&_data_word(0xbb6969d2, 0x70d9d9a9, 0x898e8e07, 0xa7949433);
+	&_data_word(0xb69b9b2d, 0x221e1e3c, 0x92878715, 0x20e9e9c9);
+	&_data_word(0x49cece87, 0xff5555aa, 0x78282850, 0x7adfdfa5);
+	&_data_word(0x8f8c8c03, 0xf8a1a159, 0x80898909, 0x170d0d1a);
+	&_data_word(0xdabfbf65, 0x31e6e6d7, 0xc6424284, 0xb86868d0);
+	&_data_word(0xc3414182, 0xb0999929, 0x772d2d5a, 0x110f0f1e);
+	&_data_word(0xcbb0b07b, 0xfc5454a8, 0xd6bbbb6d, 0x3a16162c);
+
+#Te4	# four copies of Te4 to choose from to avoid L1 aliasing
+	&data_byte(0x63, 0x7c, 0x77, 0x7b, 0xf2, 0x6b, 0x6f, 0xc5);
+	&data_byte(0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2b, 0xfe, 0xd7, 0xab, 0x76);
+	&data_byte(0xca, 0x82, 0xc9, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0x59, 0x47, 0xf0);
+	&data_byte(0xad, 0xd4, 0xa2, 0xaf, 0x9c, 0xa4, 0x72, 0xc0);
+	&data_byte(0xb7, 0xfd, 0x93, 0x26, 0x36, 0x3f, 0xf7, 0xcc);
+	&data_byte(0x34, 0xa5, 0xe5, 0xf1, 0x71, 0xd8, 0x31, 0x15);
+	&data_byte(0x04, 0xc7, 0x23, 0xc3, 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9a);
+	&data_byte(0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xeb, 0x27, 0xb2, 0x75);
+	&data_byte(0x09, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x6e, 0x5a, 0xa0);
+	&data_byte(0x52, 0x3b, 0xd6, 0xb3, 0x29, 0xe3, 0x2f, 0x84);
+	&data_byte(0x53, 0xd1, 0x00, 0xed, 0x20, 0xfc, 0xb1, 0x5b);
+	&data_byte(0x6a, 0xcb, 0xbe, 0x39, 0x4a, 0x4c, 0x58, 0xcf);
+	&data_byte(0xd0, 0xef, 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x43, 0x4d, 0x33, 0x85);
+	&data_byte(0x45, 0xf9, 0x02, 0x7f, 0x50, 0x3c, 0x9f, 0xa8);
+	&data_byte(0x51, 0xa3, 0x40, 0x8f, 0x92, 0x9d, 0x38, 0xf5);
+	&data_byte(0xbc, 0xb6, 0xda, 0x21, 0x10, 0xff, 0xf3, 0xd2);
+	&data_byte(0xcd, 0x0c, 0x13, 0xec, 0x5f, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17);
+	&data_byte(0xc4, 0xa7, 0x7e, 0x3d, 0x64, 0x5d, 0x19, 0x73);
+	&data_byte(0x60, 0x81, 0x4f, 0xdc, 0x22, 0x2a, 0x90, 0x88);
+	&data_byte(0x46, 0xee, 0xb8, 0x14, 0xde, 0x5e, 0x0b, 0xdb);
+	&data_byte(0xe0, 0x32, 0x3a, 0x0a, 0x49, 0x06, 0x24, 0x5c);
+	&data_byte(0xc2, 0xd3, 0xac, 0x62, 0x91, 0x95, 0xe4, 0x79);
+	&data_byte(0xe7, 0xc8, 0x37, 0x6d, 0x8d, 0xd5, 0x4e, 0xa9);
+	&data_byte(0x6c, 0x56, 0xf4, 0xea, 0x65, 0x7a, 0xae, 0x08);
+	&data_byte(0xba, 0x78, 0x25, 0x2e, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xb4, 0xc6);
+	&data_byte(0xe8, 0xdd, 0x74, 0x1f, 0x4b, 0xbd, 0x8b, 0x8a);
+	&data_byte(0x70, 0x3e, 0xb5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xf6, 0x0e);
+	&data_byte(0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xb9, 0x86, 0xc1, 0x1d, 0x9e);
+	&data_byte(0xe1, 0xf8, 0x98, 0x11, 0x69, 0xd9, 0x8e, 0x94);
+	&data_byte(0x9b, 0x1e, 0x87, 0xe9, 0xce, 0x55, 0x28, 0xdf);
+	&data_byte(0x8c, 0xa1, 0x89, 0x0d, 0xbf, 0xe6, 0x42, 0x68);
+	&data_byte(0x41, 0x99, 0x2d, 0x0f, 0xb0, 0x54, 0xbb, 0x16);
+
+	&data_byte(0x63, 0x7c, 0x77, 0x7b, 0xf2, 0x6b, 0x6f, 0xc5);
+	&data_byte(0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2b, 0xfe, 0xd7, 0xab, 0x76);
+	&data_byte(0xca, 0x82, 0xc9, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0x59, 0x47, 0xf0);
+	&data_byte(0xad, 0xd4, 0xa2, 0xaf, 0x9c, 0xa4, 0x72, 0xc0);
+	&data_byte(0xb7, 0xfd, 0x93, 0x26, 0x36, 0x3f, 0xf7, 0xcc);
+	&data_byte(0x34, 0xa5, 0xe5, 0xf1, 0x71, 0xd8, 0x31, 0x15);
+	&data_byte(0x04, 0xc7, 0x23, 0xc3, 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9a);
+	&data_byte(0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xeb, 0x27, 0xb2, 0x75);
+	&data_byte(0x09, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x6e, 0x5a, 0xa0);
+	&data_byte(0x52, 0x3b, 0xd6, 0xb3, 0x29, 0xe3, 0x2f, 0x84);
+	&data_byte(0x53, 0xd1, 0x00, 0xed, 0x20, 0xfc, 0xb1, 0x5b);
+	&data_byte(0x6a, 0xcb, 0xbe, 0x39, 0x4a, 0x4c, 0x58, 0xcf);
+	&data_byte(0xd0, 0xef, 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x43, 0x4d, 0x33, 0x85);
+	&data_byte(0x45, 0xf9, 0x02, 0x7f, 0x50, 0x3c, 0x9f, 0xa8);
+	&data_byte(0x51, 0xa3, 0x40, 0x8f, 0x92, 0x9d, 0x38, 0xf5);
+	&data_byte(0xbc, 0xb6, 0xda, 0x21, 0x10, 0xff, 0xf3, 0xd2);
+	&data_byte(0xcd, 0x0c, 0x13, 0xec, 0x5f, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17);
+	&data_byte(0xc4, 0xa7, 0x7e, 0x3d, 0x64, 0x5d, 0x19, 0x73);
+	&data_byte(0x60, 0x81, 0x4f, 0xdc, 0x22, 0x2a, 0x90, 0x88);
+	&data_byte(0x46, 0xee, 0xb8, 0x14, 0xde, 0x5e, 0x0b, 0xdb);
+	&data_byte(0xe0, 0x32, 0x3a, 0x0a, 0x49, 0x06, 0x24, 0x5c);
+	&data_byte(0xc2, 0xd3, 0xac, 0x62, 0x91, 0x95, 0xe4, 0x79);
+	&data_byte(0xe7, 0xc8, 0x37, 0x6d, 0x8d, 0xd5, 0x4e, 0xa9);
+	&data_byte(0x6c, 0x56, 0xf4, 0xea, 0x65, 0x7a, 0xae, 0x08);
+	&data_byte(0xba, 0x78, 0x25, 0x2e, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xb4, 0xc6);
+	&data_byte(0xe8, 0xdd, 0x74, 0x1f, 0x4b, 0xbd, 0x8b, 0x8a);
+	&data_byte(0x70, 0x3e, 0xb5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xf6, 0x0e);
+	&data_byte(0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xb9, 0x86, 0xc1, 0x1d, 0x9e);
+	&data_byte(0xe1, 0xf8, 0x98, 0x11, 0x69, 0xd9, 0x8e, 0x94);
+	&data_byte(0x9b, 0x1e, 0x87, 0xe9, 0xce, 0x55, 0x28, 0xdf);
+	&data_byte(0x8c, 0xa1, 0x89, 0x0d, 0xbf, 0xe6, 0x42, 0x68);
+	&data_byte(0x41, 0x99, 0x2d, 0x0f, 0xb0, 0x54, 0xbb, 0x16);
+
+	&data_byte(0x63, 0x7c, 0x77, 0x7b, 0xf2, 0x6b, 0x6f, 0xc5);
+	&data_byte(0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2b, 0xfe, 0xd7, 0xab, 0x76);
+	&data_byte(0xca, 0x82, 0xc9, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0x59, 0x47, 0xf0);
+	&data_byte(0xad, 0xd4, 0xa2, 0xaf, 0x9c, 0xa4, 0x72, 0xc0);
+	&data_byte(0xb7, 0xfd, 0x93, 0x26, 0x36, 0x3f, 0xf7, 0xcc);
+	&data_byte(0x34, 0xa5, 0xe5, 0xf1, 0x71, 0xd8, 0x31, 0x15);
+	&data_byte(0x04, 0xc7, 0x23, 0xc3, 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9a);
+	&data_byte(0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xeb, 0x27, 0xb2, 0x75);
+	&data_byte(0x09, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x6e, 0x5a, 0xa0);
+	&data_byte(0x52, 0x3b, 0xd6, 0xb3, 0x29, 0xe3, 0x2f, 0x84);
+	&data_byte(0x53, 0xd1, 0x00, 0xed, 0x20, 0xfc, 0xb1, 0x5b);
+	&data_byte(0x6a, 0xcb, 0xbe, 0x39, 0x4a, 0x4c, 0x58, 0xcf);
+	&data_byte(0xd0, 0xef, 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x43, 0x4d, 0x33, 0x85);
+	&data_byte(0x45, 0xf9, 0x02, 0x7f, 0x50, 0x3c, 0x9f, 0xa8);
+	&data_byte(0x51, 0xa3, 0x40, 0x8f, 0x92, 0x9d, 0x38, 0xf5);
+	&data_byte(0xbc, 0xb6, 0xda, 0x21, 0x10, 0xff, 0xf3, 0xd2);
+	&data_byte(0xcd, 0x0c, 0x13, 0xec, 0x5f, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17);
+	&data_byte(0xc4, 0xa7, 0x7e, 0x3d, 0x64, 0x5d, 0x19, 0x73);
+	&data_byte(0x60, 0x81, 0x4f, 0xdc, 0x22, 0x2a, 0x90, 0x88);
+	&data_byte(0x46, 0xee, 0xb8, 0x14, 0xde, 0x5e, 0x0b, 0xdb);
+	&data_byte(0xe0, 0x32, 0x3a, 0x0a, 0x49, 0x06, 0x24, 0x5c);
+	&data_byte(0xc2, 0xd3, 0xac, 0x62, 0x91, 0x95, 0xe4, 0x79);
+	&data_byte(0xe7, 0xc8, 0x37, 0x6d, 0x8d, 0xd5, 0x4e, 0xa9);
+	&data_byte(0x6c, 0x56, 0xf4, 0xea, 0x65, 0x7a, 0xae, 0x08);
+	&data_byte(0xba, 0x78, 0x25, 0x2e, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xb4, 0xc6);
+	&data_byte(0xe8, 0xdd, 0x74, 0x1f, 0x4b, 0xbd, 0x8b, 0x8a);
+	&data_byte(0x70, 0x3e, 0xb5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xf6, 0x0e);
+	&data_byte(0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xb9, 0x86, 0xc1, 0x1d, 0x9e);
+	&data_byte(0xe1, 0xf8, 0x98, 0x11, 0x69, 0xd9, 0x8e, 0x94);
+	&data_byte(0x9b, 0x1e, 0x87, 0xe9, 0xce, 0x55, 0x28, 0xdf);
+	&data_byte(0x8c, 0xa1, 0x89, 0x0d, 0xbf, 0xe6, 0x42, 0x68);
+	&data_byte(0x41, 0x99, 0x2d, 0x0f, 0xb0, 0x54, 0xbb, 0x16);
+
+	&data_byte(0x63, 0x7c, 0x77, 0x7b, 0xf2, 0x6b, 0x6f, 0xc5);
+	&data_byte(0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2b, 0xfe, 0xd7, 0xab, 0x76);
+	&data_byte(0xca, 0x82, 0xc9, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0x59, 0x47, 0xf0);
+	&data_byte(0xad, 0xd4, 0xa2, 0xaf, 0x9c, 0xa4, 0x72, 0xc0);
+	&data_byte(0xb7, 0xfd, 0x93, 0x26, 0x36, 0x3f, 0xf7, 0xcc);
+	&data_byte(0x34, 0xa5, 0xe5, 0xf1, 0x71, 0xd8, 0x31, 0x15);
+	&data_byte(0x04, 0xc7, 0x23, 0xc3, 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9a);
+	&data_byte(0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xeb, 0x27, 0xb2, 0x75);
+	&data_byte(0x09, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x6e, 0x5a, 0xa0);
+	&data_byte(0x52, 0x3b, 0xd6, 0xb3, 0x29, 0xe3, 0x2f, 0x84);
+	&data_byte(0x53, 0xd1, 0x00, 0xed, 0x20, 0xfc, 0xb1, 0x5b);
+	&data_byte(0x6a, 0xcb, 0xbe, 0x39, 0x4a, 0x4c, 0x58, 0xcf);
+	&data_byte(0xd0, 0xef, 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x43, 0x4d, 0x33, 0x85);
+	&data_byte(0x45, 0xf9, 0x02, 0x7f, 0x50, 0x3c, 0x9f, 0xa8);
+	&data_byte(0x51, 0xa3, 0x40, 0x8f, 0x92, 0x9d, 0x38, 0xf5);
+	&data_byte(0xbc, 0xb6, 0xda, 0x21, 0x10, 0xff, 0xf3, 0xd2);
+	&data_byte(0xcd, 0x0c, 0x13, 0xec, 0x5f, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17);
+	&data_byte(0xc4, 0xa7, 0x7e, 0x3d, 0x64, 0x5d, 0x19, 0x73);
+	&data_byte(0x60, 0x81, 0x4f, 0xdc, 0x22, 0x2a, 0x90, 0x88);
+	&data_byte(0x46, 0xee, 0xb8, 0x14, 0xde, 0x5e, 0x0b, 0xdb);
+	&data_byte(0xe0, 0x32, 0x3a, 0x0a, 0x49, 0x06, 0x24, 0x5c);
+	&data_byte(0xc2, 0xd3, 0xac, 0x62, 0x91, 0x95, 0xe4, 0x79);
+	&data_byte(0xe7, 0xc8, 0x37, 0x6d, 0x8d, 0xd5, 0x4e, 0xa9);
+	&data_byte(0x6c, 0x56, 0xf4, 0xea, 0x65, 0x7a, 0xae, 0x08);
+	&data_byte(0xba, 0x78, 0x25, 0x2e, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xb4, 0xc6);
+	&data_byte(0xe8, 0xdd, 0x74, 0x1f, 0x4b, 0xbd, 0x8b, 0x8a);
+	&data_byte(0x70, 0x3e, 0xb5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xf6, 0x0e);
+	&data_byte(0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xb9, 0x86, 0xc1, 0x1d, 0x9e);
+	&data_byte(0xe1, 0xf8, 0x98, 0x11, 0x69, 0xd9, 0x8e, 0x94);
+	&data_byte(0x9b, 0x1e, 0x87, 0xe9, 0xce, 0x55, 0x28, 0xdf);
+	&data_byte(0x8c, 0xa1, 0x89, 0x0d, 0xbf, 0xe6, 0x42, 0x68);
+	&data_byte(0x41, 0x99, 0x2d, 0x0f, 0xb0, 0x54, 0xbb, 0x16);
+#rcon:
+$code.=<<___;
+	.long	0x00000001, 0x00000002, 0x00000004, 0x00000008
+	.long	0x00000010, 0x00000020, 0x00000040, 0x00000080
+	.long	0x0000001b, 0x00000036, 0x80808080, 0x80808080
+	.long	0xfefefefe, 0xfefefefe, 0x1b1b1b1b, 0x1b1b1b1b
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+.align	64
+.LAES_Td:
+___
+	&_data_word(0x50a7f451, 0x5365417e, 0xc3a4171a, 0x965e273a);
+	&_data_word(0xcb6bab3b, 0xf1459d1f, 0xab58faac, 0x9303e34b);
+	&_data_word(0x55fa3020, 0xf66d76ad, 0x9176cc88, 0x254c02f5);
+	&_data_word(0xfcd7e54f, 0xd7cb2ac5, 0x80443526, 0x8fa362b5);
+	&_data_word(0x495ab1de, 0x671bba25, 0x980eea45, 0xe1c0fe5d);
+	&_data_word(0x02752fc3, 0x12f04c81, 0xa397468d, 0xc6f9d36b);
+	&_data_word(0xe75f8f03, 0x959c9215, 0xeb7a6dbf, 0xda595295);
+	&_data_word(0x2d83bed4, 0xd3217458, 0x2969e049, 0x44c8c98e);
+	&_data_word(0x6a89c275, 0x78798ef4, 0x6b3e5899, 0xdd71b927);
+	&_data_word(0xb64fe1be, 0x17ad88f0, 0x66ac20c9, 0xb43ace7d);
+	&_data_word(0x184adf63, 0x82311ae5, 0x60335197, 0x457f5362);
+	&_data_word(0xe07764b1, 0x84ae6bbb, 0x1ca081fe, 0x942b08f9);
+	&_data_word(0x58684870, 0x19fd458f, 0x876cde94, 0xb7f87b52);
+	&_data_word(0x23d373ab, 0xe2024b72, 0x578f1fe3, 0x2aab5566);
+	&_data_word(0x0728ebb2, 0x03c2b52f, 0x9a7bc586, 0xa50837d3);
+	&_data_word(0xf2872830, 0xb2a5bf23, 0xba6a0302, 0x5c8216ed);
+	&_data_word(0x2b1ccf8a, 0x92b479a7, 0xf0f207f3, 0xa1e2694e);
+	&_data_word(0xcdf4da65, 0xd5be0506, 0x1f6234d1, 0x8afea6c4);
+	&_data_word(0x9d532e34, 0xa055f3a2, 0x32e18a05, 0x75ebf6a4);
+	&_data_word(0x39ec830b, 0xaaef6040, 0x069f715e, 0x51106ebd);
+	&_data_word(0xf98a213e, 0x3d06dd96, 0xae053edd, 0x46bde64d);
+	&_data_word(0xb58d5491, 0x055dc471, 0x6fd40604, 0xff155060);
+	&_data_word(0x24fb9819, 0x97e9bdd6, 0xcc434089, 0x779ed967);
+	&_data_word(0xbd42e8b0, 0x888b8907, 0x385b19e7, 0xdbeec879);
+	&_data_word(0x470a7ca1, 0xe90f427c, 0xc91e84f8, 0x00000000);
+	&_data_word(0x83868009, 0x48ed2b32, 0xac70111e, 0x4e725a6c);
+	&_data_word(0xfbff0efd, 0x5638850f, 0x1ed5ae3d, 0x27392d36);
+	&_data_word(0x64d90f0a, 0x21a65c68, 0xd1545b9b, 0x3a2e3624);
+	&_data_word(0xb1670a0c, 0x0fe75793, 0xd296eeb4, 0x9e919b1b);
+	&_data_word(0x4fc5c080, 0xa220dc61, 0x694b775a, 0x161a121c);
+	&_data_word(0x0aba93e2, 0xe52aa0c0, 0x43e0223c, 0x1d171b12);
+	&_data_word(0x0b0d090e, 0xadc78bf2, 0xb9a8b62d, 0xc8a91e14);
+	&_data_word(0x8519f157, 0x4c0775af, 0xbbdd99ee, 0xfd607fa3);
+	&_data_word(0x9f2601f7, 0xbcf5725c, 0xc53b6644, 0x347efb5b);
+	&_data_word(0x7629438b, 0xdcc623cb, 0x68fcedb6, 0x63f1e4b8);
+	&_data_word(0xcadc31d7, 0x10856342, 0x40229713, 0x2011c684);
+	&_data_word(0x7d244a85, 0xf83dbbd2, 0x1132f9ae, 0x6da129c7);
+	&_data_word(0x4b2f9e1d, 0xf330b2dc, 0xec52860d, 0xd0e3c177);
+	&_data_word(0x6c16b32b, 0x99b970a9, 0xfa489411, 0x2264e947);
+	&_data_word(0xc48cfca8, 0x1a3ff0a0, 0xd82c7d56, 0xef903322);
+	&_data_word(0xc74e4987, 0xc1d138d9, 0xfea2ca8c, 0x360bd498);
+	&_data_word(0xcf81f5a6, 0x28de7aa5, 0x268eb7da, 0xa4bfad3f);
+	&_data_word(0xe49d3a2c, 0x0d927850, 0x9bcc5f6a, 0x62467e54);
+	&_data_word(0xc2138df6, 0xe8b8d890, 0x5ef7392e, 0xf5afc382);
+	&_data_word(0xbe805d9f, 0x7c93d069, 0xa92dd56f, 0xb31225cf);
+	&_data_word(0x3b99acc8, 0xa77d1810, 0x6e639ce8, 0x7bbb3bdb);
+	&_data_word(0x097826cd, 0xf418596e, 0x01b79aec, 0xa89a4f83);
+	&_data_word(0x656e95e6, 0x7ee6ffaa, 0x08cfbc21, 0xe6e815ef);
+	&_data_word(0xd99be7ba, 0xce366f4a, 0xd4099fea, 0xd67cb029);
+	&_data_word(0xafb2a431, 0x31233f2a, 0x3094a5c6, 0xc066a235);
+	&_data_word(0x37bc4e74, 0xa6ca82fc, 0xb0d090e0, 0x15d8a733);
+	&_data_word(0x4a9804f1, 0xf7daec41, 0x0e50cd7f, 0x2ff69117);
+	&_data_word(0x8dd64d76, 0x4db0ef43, 0x544daacc, 0xdf0496e4);
+	&_data_word(0xe3b5d19e, 0x1b886a4c, 0xb81f2cc1, 0x7f516546);
+	&_data_word(0x04ea5e9d, 0x5d358c01, 0x737487fa, 0x2e410bfb);
+	&_data_word(0x5a1d67b3, 0x52d2db92, 0x335610e9, 0x1347d66d);
+	&_data_word(0x8c61d79a, 0x7a0ca137, 0x8e14f859, 0x893c13eb);
+	&_data_word(0xee27a9ce, 0x35c961b7, 0xede51ce1, 0x3cb1477a);
+	&_data_word(0x59dfd29c, 0x3f73f255, 0x79ce1418, 0xbf37c773);
+	&_data_word(0xeacdf753, 0x5baafd5f, 0x146f3ddf, 0x86db4478);
+	&_data_word(0x81f3afca, 0x3ec468b9, 0x2c342438, 0x5f40a3c2);
+	&_data_word(0x72c31d16, 0x0c25e2bc, 0x8b493c28, 0x41950dff);
+	&_data_word(0x7101a839, 0xdeb30c08, 0x9ce4b4d8, 0x90c15664);
+	&_data_word(0x6184cb7b, 0x70b632d5, 0x745c6c48, 0x4257b8d0);
+
+#Td4:	# four copies of Td4 to choose from to avoid L1 aliasing
+	&data_byte(0x52, 0x09, 0x6a, 0xd5, 0x30, 0x36, 0xa5, 0x38);
+	&data_byte(0xbf, 0x40, 0xa3, 0x9e, 0x81, 0xf3, 0xd7, 0xfb);
+	&data_byte(0x7c, 0xe3, 0x39, 0x82, 0x9b, 0x2f, 0xff, 0x87);
+	&data_byte(0x34, 0x8e, 0x43, 0x44, 0xc4, 0xde, 0xe9, 0xcb);
+	&data_byte(0x54, 0x7b, 0x94, 0x32, 0xa6, 0xc2, 0x23, 0x3d);
+	&data_byte(0xee, 0x4c, 0x95, 0x0b, 0x42, 0xfa, 0xc3, 0x4e);
+	&data_byte(0x08, 0x2e, 0xa1, 0x66, 0x28, 0xd9, 0x24, 0xb2);
+	&data_byte(0x76, 0x5b, 0xa2, 0x49, 0x6d, 0x8b, 0xd1, 0x25);
+	&data_byte(0x72, 0xf8, 0xf6, 0x64, 0x86, 0x68, 0x98, 0x16);
+	&data_byte(0xd4, 0xa4, 0x5c, 0xcc, 0x5d, 0x65, 0xb6, 0x92);
+	&data_byte(0x6c, 0x70, 0x48, 0x50, 0xfd, 0xed, 0xb9, 0xda);
+	&data_byte(0x5e, 0x15, 0x46, 0x57, 0xa7, 0x8d, 0x9d, 0x84);
+	&data_byte(0x90, 0xd8, 0xab, 0x00, 0x8c, 0xbc, 0xd3, 0x0a);
+	&data_byte(0xf7, 0xe4, 0x58, 0x05, 0xb8, 0xb3, 0x45, 0x06);
+	&data_byte(0xd0, 0x2c, 0x1e, 0x8f, 0xca, 0x3f, 0x0f, 0x02);
+	&data_byte(0xc1, 0xaf, 0xbd, 0x03, 0x01, 0x13, 0x8a, 0x6b);
+	&data_byte(0x3a, 0x91, 0x11, 0x41, 0x4f, 0x67, 0xdc, 0xea);
+	&data_byte(0x97, 0xf2, 0xcf, 0xce, 0xf0, 0xb4, 0xe6, 0x73);
+	&data_byte(0x96, 0xac, 0x74, 0x22, 0xe7, 0xad, 0x35, 0x85);
+	&data_byte(0xe2, 0xf9, 0x37, 0xe8, 0x1c, 0x75, 0xdf, 0x6e);
+	&data_byte(0x47, 0xf1, 0x1a, 0x71, 0x1d, 0x29, 0xc5, 0x89);
+	&data_byte(0x6f, 0xb7, 0x62, 0x0e, 0xaa, 0x18, 0xbe, 0x1b);
+	&data_byte(0xfc, 0x56, 0x3e, 0x4b, 0xc6, 0xd2, 0x79, 0x20);
+	&data_byte(0x9a, 0xdb, 0xc0, 0xfe, 0x78, 0xcd, 0x5a, 0xf4);
+	&data_byte(0x1f, 0xdd, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x88, 0x07, 0xc7, 0x31);
+	&data_byte(0xb1, 0x12, 0x10, 0x59, 0x27, 0x80, 0xec, 0x5f);
+	&data_byte(0x60, 0x51, 0x7f, 0xa9, 0x19, 0xb5, 0x4a, 0x0d);
+	&data_byte(0x2d, 0xe5, 0x7a, 0x9f, 0x93, 0xc9, 0x9c, 0xef);
+	&data_byte(0xa0, 0xe0, 0x3b, 0x4d, 0xae, 0x2a, 0xf5, 0xb0);
+	&data_byte(0xc8, 0xeb, 0xbb, 0x3c, 0x83, 0x53, 0x99, 0x61);
+	&data_byte(0x17, 0x2b, 0x04, 0x7e, 0xba, 0x77, 0xd6, 0x26);
+	&data_byte(0xe1, 0x69, 0x14, 0x63, 0x55, 0x21, 0x0c, 0x7d);
+$code.=<<___;
+	.long	0x80808080, 0x80808080, 0xfefefefe, 0xfefefefe
+	.long	0x1b1b1b1b, 0x1b1b1b1b, 0, 0
+___
+	&data_byte(0x52, 0x09, 0x6a, 0xd5, 0x30, 0x36, 0xa5, 0x38);
+	&data_byte(0xbf, 0x40, 0xa3, 0x9e, 0x81, 0xf3, 0xd7, 0xfb);
+	&data_byte(0x7c, 0xe3, 0x39, 0x82, 0x9b, 0x2f, 0xff, 0x87);
+	&data_byte(0x34, 0x8e, 0x43, 0x44, 0xc4, 0xde, 0xe9, 0xcb);
+	&data_byte(0x54, 0x7b, 0x94, 0x32, 0xa6, 0xc2, 0x23, 0x3d);
+	&data_byte(0xee, 0x4c, 0x95, 0x0b, 0x42, 0xfa, 0xc3, 0x4e);
+	&data_byte(0x08, 0x2e, 0xa1, 0x66, 0x28, 0xd9, 0x24, 0xb2);
+	&data_byte(0x76, 0x5b, 0xa2, 0x49, 0x6d, 0x8b, 0xd1, 0x25);
+	&data_byte(0x72, 0xf8, 0xf6, 0x64, 0x86, 0x68, 0x98, 0x16);
+	&data_byte(0xd4, 0xa4, 0x5c, 0xcc, 0x5d, 0x65, 0xb6, 0x92);
+	&data_byte(0x6c, 0x70, 0x48, 0x50, 0xfd, 0xed, 0xb9, 0xda);
+	&data_byte(0x5e, 0x15, 0x46, 0x57, 0xa7, 0x8d, 0x9d, 0x84);
+	&data_byte(0x90, 0xd8, 0xab, 0x00, 0x8c, 0xbc, 0xd3, 0x0a);
+	&data_byte(0xf7, 0xe4, 0x58, 0x05, 0xb8, 0xb3, 0x45, 0x06);
+	&data_byte(0xd0, 0x2c, 0x1e, 0x8f, 0xca, 0x3f, 0x0f, 0x02);
+	&data_byte(0xc1, 0xaf, 0xbd, 0x03, 0x01, 0x13, 0x8a, 0x6b);
+	&data_byte(0x3a, 0x91, 0x11, 0x41, 0x4f, 0x67, 0xdc, 0xea);
+	&data_byte(0x97, 0xf2, 0xcf, 0xce, 0xf0, 0xb4, 0xe6, 0x73);
+	&data_byte(0x96, 0xac, 0x74, 0x22, 0xe7, 0xad, 0x35, 0x85);
+	&data_byte(0xe2, 0xf9, 0x37, 0xe8, 0x1c, 0x75, 0xdf, 0x6e);
+	&data_byte(0x47, 0xf1, 0x1a, 0x71, 0x1d, 0x29, 0xc5, 0x89);
+	&data_byte(0x6f, 0xb7, 0x62, 0x0e, 0xaa, 0x18, 0xbe, 0x1b);
+	&data_byte(0xfc, 0x56, 0x3e, 0x4b, 0xc6, 0xd2, 0x79, 0x20);
+	&data_byte(0x9a, 0xdb, 0xc0, 0xfe, 0x78, 0xcd, 0x5a, 0xf4);
+	&data_byte(0x1f, 0xdd, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x88, 0x07, 0xc7, 0x31);
+	&data_byte(0xb1, 0x12, 0x10, 0x59, 0x27, 0x80, 0xec, 0x5f);
+	&data_byte(0x60, 0x51, 0x7f, 0xa9, 0x19, 0xb5, 0x4a, 0x0d);
+	&data_byte(0x2d, 0xe5, 0x7a, 0x9f, 0x93, 0xc9, 0x9c, 0xef);
+	&data_byte(0xa0, 0xe0, 0x3b, 0x4d, 0xae, 0x2a, 0xf5, 0xb0);
+	&data_byte(0xc8, 0xeb, 0xbb, 0x3c, 0x83, 0x53, 0x99, 0x61);
+	&data_byte(0x17, 0x2b, 0x04, 0x7e, 0xba, 0x77, 0xd6, 0x26);
+	&data_byte(0xe1, 0x69, 0x14, 0x63, 0x55, 0x21, 0x0c, 0x7d);
+$code.=<<___;
+	.long	0x80808080, 0x80808080, 0xfefefefe, 0xfefefefe
+	.long	0x1b1b1b1b, 0x1b1b1b1b, 0, 0
+___
+	&data_byte(0x52, 0x09, 0x6a, 0xd5, 0x30, 0x36, 0xa5, 0x38);
+	&data_byte(0xbf, 0x40, 0xa3, 0x9e, 0x81, 0xf3, 0xd7, 0xfb);
+	&data_byte(0x7c, 0xe3, 0x39, 0x82, 0x9b, 0x2f, 0xff, 0x87);
+	&data_byte(0x34, 0x8e, 0x43, 0x44, 0xc4, 0xde, 0xe9, 0xcb);
+	&data_byte(0x54, 0x7b, 0x94, 0x32, 0xa6, 0xc2, 0x23, 0x3d);
+	&data_byte(0xee, 0x4c, 0x95, 0x0b, 0x42, 0xfa, 0xc3, 0x4e);
+	&data_byte(0x08, 0x2e, 0xa1, 0x66, 0x28, 0xd9, 0x24, 0xb2);
+	&data_byte(0x76, 0x5b, 0xa2, 0x49, 0x6d, 0x8b, 0xd1, 0x25);
+	&data_byte(0x72, 0xf8, 0xf6, 0x64, 0x86, 0x68, 0x98, 0x16);
+	&data_byte(0xd4, 0xa4, 0x5c, 0xcc, 0x5d, 0x65, 0xb6, 0x92);
+	&data_byte(0x6c, 0x70, 0x48, 0x50, 0xfd, 0xed, 0xb9, 0xda);
+	&data_byte(0x5e, 0x15, 0x46, 0x57, 0xa7, 0x8d, 0x9d, 0x84);
+	&data_byte(0x90, 0xd8, 0xab, 0x00, 0x8c, 0xbc, 0xd3, 0x0a);
+	&data_byte(0xf7, 0xe4, 0x58, 0x05, 0xb8, 0xb3, 0x45, 0x06);
+	&data_byte(0xd0, 0x2c, 0x1e, 0x8f, 0xca, 0x3f, 0x0f, 0x02);
+	&data_byte(0xc1, 0xaf, 0xbd, 0x03, 0x01, 0x13, 0x8a, 0x6b);
+	&data_byte(0x3a, 0x91, 0x11, 0x41, 0x4f, 0x67, 0xdc, 0xea);
+	&data_byte(0x97, 0xf2, 0xcf, 0xce, 0xf0, 0xb4, 0xe6, 0x73);
+	&data_byte(0x96, 0xac, 0x74, 0x22, 0xe7, 0xad, 0x35, 0x85);
+	&data_byte(0xe2, 0xf9, 0x37, 0xe8, 0x1c, 0x75, 0xdf, 0x6e);
+	&data_byte(0x47, 0xf1, 0x1a, 0x71, 0x1d, 0x29, 0xc5, 0x89);
+	&data_byte(0x6f, 0xb7, 0x62, 0x0e, 0xaa, 0x18, 0xbe, 0x1b);
+	&data_byte(0xfc, 0x56, 0x3e, 0x4b, 0xc6, 0xd2, 0x79, 0x20);
+	&data_byte(0x9a, 0xdb, 0xc0, 0xfe, 0x78, 0xcd, 0x5a, 0xf4);
+	&data_byte(0x1f, 0xdd, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x88, 0x07, 0xc7, 0x31);
+	&data_byte(0xb1, 0x12, 0x10, 0x59, 0x27, 0x80, 0xec, 0x5f);
+	&data_byte(0x60, 0x51, 0x7f, 0xa9, 0x19, 0xb5, 0x4a, 0x0d);
+	&data_byte(0x2d, 0xe5, 0x7a, 0x9f, 0x93, 0xc9, 0x9c, 0xef);
+	&data_byte(0xa0, 0xe0, 0x3b, 0x4d, 0xae, 0x2a, 0xf5, 0xb0);
+	&data_byte(0xc8, 0xeb, 0xbb, 0x3c, 0x83, 0x53, 0x99, 0x61);
+	&data_byte(0x17, 0x2b, 0x04, 0x7e, 0xba, 0x77, 0xd6, 0x26);
+	&data_byte(0xe1, 0x69, 0x14, 0x63, 0x55, 0x21, 0x0c, 0x7d);
+$code.=<<___;
+	.long	0x80808080, 0x80808080, 0xfefefefe, 0xfefefefe
+	.long	0x1b1b1b1b, 0x1b1b1b1b, 0, 0
+___
+	&data_byte(0x52, 0x09, 0x6a, 0xd5, 0x30, 0x36, 0xa5, 0x38);
+	&data_byte(0xbf, 0x40, 0xa3, 0x9e, 0x81, 0xf3, 0xd7, 0xfb);
+	&data_byte(0x7c, 0xe3, 0x39, 0x82, 0x9b, 0x2f, 0xff, 0x87);
+	&data_byte(0x34, 0x8e, 0x43, 0x44, 0xc4, 0xde, 0xe9, 0xcb);
+	&data_byte(0x54, 0x7b, 0x94, 0x32, 0xa6, 0xc2, 0x23, 0x3d);
+	&data_byte(0xee, 0x4c, 0x95, 0x0b, 0x42, 0xfa, 0xc3, 0x4e);
+	&data_byte(0x08, 0x2e, 0xa1, 0x66, 0x28, 0xd9, 0x24, 0xb2);
+	&data_byte(0x76, 0x5b, 0xa2, 0x49, 0x6d, 0x8b, 0xd1, 0x25);
+	&data_byte(0x72, 0xf8, 0xf6, 0x64, 0x86, 0x68, 0x98, 0x16);
+	&data_byte(0xd4, 0xa4, 0x5c, 0xcc, 0x5d, 0x65, 0xb6, 0x92);
+	&data_byte(0x6c, 0x70, 0x48, 0x50, 0xfd, 0xed, 0xb9, 0xda);
+	&data_byte(0x5e, 0x15, 0x46, 0x57, 0xa7, 0x8d, 0x9d, 0x84);
+	&data_byte(0x90, 0xd8, 0xab, 0x00, 0x8c, 0xbc, 0xd3, 0x0a);
+	&data_byte(0xf7, 0xe4, 0x58, 0x05, 0xb8, 0xb3, 0x45, 0x06);
+	&data_byte(0xd0, 0x2c, 0x1e, 0x8f, 0xca, 0x3f, 0x0f, 0x02);
+	&data_byte(0xc1, 0xaf, 0xbd, 0x03, 0x01, 0x13, 0x8a, 0x6b);
+	&data_byte(0x3a, 0x91, 0x11, 0x41, 0x4f, 0x67, 0xdc, 0xea);
+	&data_byte(0x97, 0xf2, 0xcf, 0xce, 0xf0, 0xb4, 0xe6, 0x73);
+	&data_byte(0x96, 0xac, 0x74, 0x22, 0xe7, 0xad, 0x35, 0x85);
+	&data_byte(0xe2, 0xf9, 0x37, 0xe8, 0x1c, 0x75, 0xdf, 0x6e);
+	&data_byte(0x47, 0xf1, 0x1a, 0x71, 0x1d, 0x29, 0xc5, 0x89);
+	&data_byte(0x6f, 0xb7, 0x62, 0x0e, 0xaa, 0x18, 0xbe, 0x1b);
+	&data_byte(0xfc, 0x56, 0x3e, 0x4b, 0xc6, 0xd2, 0x79, 0x20);
+	&data_byte(0x9a, 0xdb, 0xc0, 0xfe, 0x78, 0xcd, 0x5a, 0xf4);
+	&data_byte(0x1f, 0xdd, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x88, 0x07, 0xc7, 0x31);
+	&data_byte(0xb1, 0x12, 0x10, 0x59, 0x27, 0x80, 0xec, 0x5f);
+	&data_byte(0x60, 0x51, 0x7f, 0xa9, 0x19, 0xb5, 0x4a, 0x0d);
+	&data_byte(0x2d, 0xe5, 0x7a, 0x9f, 0x93, 0xc9, 0x9c, 0xef);
+	&data_byte(0xa0, 0xe0, 0x3b, 0x4d, 0xae, 0x2a, 0xf5, 0xb0);
+	&data_byte(0xc8, 0xeb, 0xbb, 0x3c, 0x83, 0x53, 0x99, 0x61);
+	&data_byte(0x17, 0x2b, 0x04, 0x7e, 0xba, 0x77, 0xd6, 0x26);
+	&data_byte(0xe1, 0x69, 0x14, 0x63, 0x55, 0x21, 0x0c, 0x7d);
+$code.=<<___;
+	.long	0x80808080, 0x80808080, 0xfefefefe, 0xfefefefe
+	.long	0x1b1b1b1b, 0x1b1b1b1b, 0, 0
+.asciz  "AES for x86_64, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+.align	64
+___
+
+# EXCEPTION_DISPOSITION handler (EXCEPTION_RECORD *rec,ULONG64 frame,
+#		CONTEXT *context,DISPATCHER_CONTEXT *disp)
+if ($win64) {
+$rec="%rcx";
+$frame="%rdx";
+$context="%r8";
+$disp="%r9";
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.extern	__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind
+.type	block_se_handler,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+block_se_handler:
+	push	%rsi
+	push	%rdi
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+	pushfq
+	sub	\$64,%rsp
+
+	mov	120($context),%rax	# pull context->Rax
+	mov	248($context),%rbx	# pull context->Rip
+
+	mov	8($disp),%rsi		# disp->ImageBase
+	mov	56($disp),%r11		# disp->HandlerData
+
+	mov	0(%r11),%r10d		# HandlerData[0]
+	lea	(%rsi,%r10),%r10	# prologue label
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip<prologue label
+	jb	.Lin_block_prologue
+
+	mov	152($context),%rax	# pull context->Rsp
+
+	mov	4(%r11),%r10d		# HandlerData[1]
+	lea	(%rsi,%r10),%r10	# epilogue label
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip>=epilogue label
+	jae	.Lin_block_prologue
+
+	mov	24(%rax),%rax		# pull saved real stack pointer
+	lea	48(%rax),%rax		# adjust...
+
+	mov	-8(%rax),%rbx
+	mov	-16(%rax),%rbp
+	mov	-24(%rax),%r12
+	mov	-32(%rax),%r13
+	mov	-40(%rax),%r14
+	mov	-48(%rax),%r15
+	mov	%rbx,144($context)	# restore context->Rbx
+	mov	%rbp,160($context)	# restore context->Rbp
+	mov	%r12,216($context)	# restore context->R12
+	mov	%r13,224($context)	# restore context->R13
+	mov	%r14,232($context)	# restore context->R14
+	mov	%r15,240($context)	# restore context->R15
+
+.Lin_block_prologue:
+	mov	8(%rax),%rdi
+	mov	16(%rax),%rsi
+	mov	%rax,152($context)	# restore context->Rsp
+	mov	%rsi,168($context)	# restore context->Rsi
+	mov	%rdi,176($context)	# restore context->Rdi
+
+	jmp	.Lcommon_seh_exit
+.size	block_se_handler,.-block_se_handler
+
+.type	key_se_handler,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+key_se_handler:
+	push	%rsi
+	push	%rdi
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+	pushfq
+	sub	\$64,%rsp
+
+	mov	120($context),%rax	# pull context->Rax
+	mov	248($context),%rbx	# pull context->Rip
+
+	mov	8($disp),%rsi		# disp->ImageBase
+	mov	56($disp),%r11		# disp->HandlerData
+
+	mov	0(%r11),%r10d		# HandlerData[0]
+	lea	(%rsi,%r10),%r10	# prologue label
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip<prologue label
+	jb	.Lin_key_prologue
+
+	mov	152($context),%rax	# pull context->Rsp
+
+	mov	4(%r11),%r10d		# HandlerData[1]
+	lea	(%rsi,%r10),%r10	# epilogue label
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip>=epilogue label
+	jae	.Lin_key_prologue
+
+	lea	56(%rax),%rax
+
+	mov	-8(%rax),%rbx
+	mov	-16(%rax),%rbp
+	mov	-24(%rax),%r12
+	mov	-32(%rax),%r13
+	mov	-40(%rax),%r14
+	mov	-48(%rax),%r15
+	mov	%rbx,144($context)	# restore context->Rbx
+	mov	%rbp,160($context)	# restore context->Rbp
+	mov	%r12,216($context)	# restore context->R12
+	mov	%r13,224($context)	# restore context->R13
+	mov	%r14,232($context)	# restore context->R14
+	mov	%r15,240($context)	# restore context->R15
+
+.Lin_key_prologue:
+	mov	8(%rax),%rdi
+	mov	16(%rax),%rsi
+	mov	%rax,152($context)	# restore context->Rsp
+	mov	%rsi,168($context)	# restore context->Rsi
+	mov	%rdi,176($context)	# restore context->Rdi
+
+	jmp	.Lcommon_seh_exit
+.size	key_se_handler,.-key_se_handler
+
+.type	cbc_se_handler,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+cbc_se_handler:
+	push	%rsi
+	push	%rdi
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+	pushfq
+	sub	\$64,%rsp
+
+	mov	120($context),%rax	# pull context->Rax
+	mov	248($context),%rbx	# pull context->Rip
+
+	lea	.Lcbc_prologue(%rip),%r10
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip<.Lcbc_prologue
+	jb	.Lin_cbc_prologue
+
+	lea	.Lcbc_fast_body(%rip),%r10
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip<.Lcbc_fast_body
+	jb	.Lin_cbc_frame_setup
+
+	lea	.Lcbc_slow_prologue(%rip),%r10
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip<.Lcbc_slow_prologue
+	jb	.Lin_cbc_body
+
+	lea	.Lcbc_slow_body(%rip),%r10
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip<.Lcbc_slow_body
+	jb	.Lin_cbc_frame_setup
+
+.Lin_cbc_body:
+	mov	152($context),%rax	# pull context->Rsp
+
+	lea	.Lcbc_epilogue(%rip),%r10
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip>=.Lcbc_epilogue
+	jae	.Lin_cbc_prologue
+
+	lea	8(%rax),%rax
+
+	lea	.Lcbc_popfq(%rip),%r10
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip>=.Lcbc_popfq
+	jae	.Lin_cbc_prologue
+
+	mov	`16-8`(%rax),%rax	# biased $_rsp
+	lea	56(%rax),%rax
+
+.Lin_cbc_frame_setup:
+	mov	-16(%rax),%rbx
+	mov	-24(%rax),%rbp
+	mov	-32(%rax),%r12
+	mov	-40(%rax),%r13
+	mov	-48(%rax),%r14
+	mov	-56(%rax),%r15
+	mov	%rbx,144($context)	# restore context->Rbx
+	mov	%rbp,160($context)	# restore context->Rbp
+	mov	%r12,216($context)	# restore context->R12
+	mov	%r13,224($context)	# restore context->R13
+	mov	%r14,232($context)	# restore context->R14
+	mov	%r15,240($context)	# restore context->R15
+
+.Lin_cbc_prologue:
+	mov	8(%rax),%rdi
+	mov	16(%rax),%rsi
+	mov	%rax,152($context)	# restore context->Rsp
+	mov	%rsi,168($context)	# restore context->Rsi
+	mov	%rdi,176($context)	# restore context->Rdi
+
+.Lcommon_seh_exit:
+
+	mov	40($disp),%rdi		# disp->ContextRecord
+	mov	$context,%rsi		# context
+	mov	\$`1232/8`,%ecx		# sizeof(CONTEXT)
+	.long	0xa548f3fc		# cld; rep movsq
+
+	mov	$disp,%rsi
+	xor	%rcx,%rcx		# arg1, UNW_FLAG_NHANDLER
+	mov	8(%rsi),%rdx		# arg2, disp->ImageBase
+	mov	0(%rsi),%r8		# arg3, disp->ControlPc
+	mov	16(%rsi),%r9		# arg4, disp->FunctionEntry
+	mov	40(%rsi),%r10		# disp->ContextRecord
+	lea	56(%rsi),%r11		# &disp->HandlerData
+	lea	24(%rsi),%r12		# &disp->EstablisherFrame
+	mov	%r10,32(%rsp)		# arg5
+	mov	%r11,40(%rsp)		# arg6
+	mov	%r12,48(%rsp)		# arg7
+	mov	%rcx,56(%rsp)		# arg8, (NULL)
+	call	*__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind(%rip)
+
+	mov	\$1,%eax		# ExceptionContinueSearch
+	add	\$64,%rsp
+	popfq
+	pop	%r15
+	pop	%r14
+	pop	%r13
+	pop	%r12
+	pop	%rbp
+	pop	%rbx
+	pop	%rdi
+	pop	%rsi
+	ret
+.size	cbc_se_handler,.-cbc_se_handler
+
+.section	.pdata
+.align	4
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_AES_encrypt
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_AES_encrypt
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_AES_encrypt
+
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_AES_decrypt
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_AES_decrypt
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_AES_decrypt
+
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_AES_set_encrypt_key
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_AES_set_encrypt_key
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_AES_set_encrypt_key
+
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_AES_set_decrypt_key
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_AES_set_decrypt_key
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_AES_set_decrypt_key
+
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_AES_cbc_encrypt
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_AES_cbc_encrypt
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_AES_cbc_encrypt
+
+.section	.xdata
+.align	8
+.LSEH_info_AES_encrypt:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	block_se_handler
+	.rva	.Lenc_prologue,.Lenc_epilogue	# HandlerData[]
+.LSEH_info_AES_decrypt:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	block_se_handler
+	.rva	.Ldec_prologue,.Ldec_epilogue	# HandlerData[]
+.LSEH_info_AES_set_encrypt_key:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	key_se_handler
+	.rva	.Lenc_key_prologue,.Lenc_key_epilogue	# HandlerData[]
+.LSEH_info_AES_set_decrypt_key:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	key_se_handler
+	.rva	.Ldec_key_prologue,.Ldec_key_epilogue	# HandlerData[]
+.LSEH_info_AES_cbc_encrypt:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	cbc_se_handler
+___
+}
+
+$code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval($1)/gem;
+
+print $code;
+
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/asm/aesfx-sparcv9.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/asm/aesfx-sparcv9.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..04b3cf7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/asm/aesfx-sparcv9.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,1270 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+
+# March 2016
+#
+# Initial support for Fujitsu SPARC64 X/X+ comprises minimally
+# required key setup and single-block procedures.
+#
+# April 2016
+#
+# Add "teaser" CBC and CTR mode-specific subroutines. "Teaser" means
+# that parallelizeable nature of CBC decrypt and CTR is not utilized
+# yet. CBC encrypt on the other hand is as good as it can possibly
+# get processing one byte in 4.1 cycles with 128-bit key on SPARC64 X.
+# This is ~6x faster than pure software implementation...
+#
+# July 2016
+#
+# Switch from faligndata to fshiftorx, which allows to omit alignaddr
+# instructions and improve single-block and short-input performance
+# with misaligned data.
+
+$output = pop;
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+{
+my ($inp,$out,$key,$rounds,$tmp,$mask) = map("%o$_",(0..5));
+
+$code.=<<___;
+#include "sparc_arch.h"
+
+#define LOCALS (STACK_BIAS+STACK_FRAME)
+
+.text
+
+.globl	aes_fx_encrypt
+.align	32
+aes_fx_encrypt:
+	and		$inp, 7, $tmp		! is input aligned?
+	andn		$inp, 7, $inp
+	ldd		[$key +  0], %f6	! round[0]
+	ldd		[$key +  8], %f8
+	mov		%o7, %g1
+	ld		[$key + 240], $rounds
+
+1:	call		.+8
+	add		%o7, .Linp_align-1b, %o7
+
+	sll		$tmp, 3, $tmp
+	ldd		[$inp + 0], %f0		! load input
+	brz,pt		$tmp, .Lenc_inp_aligned
+	ldd		[$inp + 8], %f2
+
+	ldd		[%o7 + $tmp], %f14	! shift left params
+	ldd		[$inp + 16], %f4
+	fshiftorx	%f0, %f2, %f14, %f0
+	fshiftorx	%f2, %f4, %f14, %f2
+
+.Lenc_inp_aligned:
+	ldd		[$key + 16], %f10	! round[1]
+	ldd		[$key + 24], %f12
+
+	fxor		%f0, %f6, %f0		! ^=round[0]
+	fxor		%f2, %f8, %f2
+	ldd		[$key + 32], %f6	! round[2]
+	ldd		[$key + 40], %f8
+	add		$key, 32, $key
+	sub		$rounds, 4, $rounds
+
+.Loop_enc:
+	fmovd		%f0, %f4
+	faesencx	%f2, %f10, %f0
+	faesencx	%f4, %f12, %f2
+	ldd		[$key + 16], %f10
+	ldd		[$key + 24], %f12
+	add		$key, 32, $key
+
+	fmovd		%f0, %f4
+	faesencx	%f2, %f6, %f0
+	faesencx	%f4, %f8, %f2
+	ldd		[$key +  0], %f6
+	ldd		[$key +  8], %f8
+
+	brnz,a		$rounds, .Loop_enc
+	sub		$rounds, 2, $rounds
+
+	andcc		$out, 7, $tmp		! is output aligned?
+	andn		$out, 7, $out
+	mov		0xff, $mask
+	srl		$mask, $tmp, $mask
+	add		%o7, 64, %o7
+	sll		$tmp, 3, $tmp
+
+	fmovd		%f0, %f4
+	faesencx	%f2, %f10, %f0
+	faesencx	%f4, %f12, %f2
+	ldd		[%o7 + $tmp], %f14	! shift right params
+
+	fmovd		%f0, %f4
+	faesenclx	%f2, %f6, %f0
+	faesenclx	%f4, %f8, %f2
+
+	bnz,pn		%icc, .Lenc_out_unaligned
+	mov		%g1, %o7
+
+	std		%f0, [$out + 0]
+	retl
+	std		%f2, [$out + 8]
+
+.align	16
+.Lenc_out_unaligned:
+	add		$out, 16, $inp
+	orn		%g0, $mask, $tmp
+	fshiftorx	%f0, %f0, %f14, %f4
+	fshiftorx	%f0, %f2, %f14, %f6
+	fshiftorx	%f2, %f2, %f14, %f8
+
+	stda		%f4, [$out + $mask]0xc0	! partial store
+	std		%f6, [$out + 8]
+	stda		%f8, [$inp + $tmp]0xc0	! partial store
+	retl
+	nop
+.type	aes_fx_encrypt,#function
+.size	aes_fx_encrypt,.-aes_fx_encrypt
+
+.globl	aes_fx_decrypt
+.align	32
+aes_fx_decrypt:
+	and		$inp, 7, $tmp		! is input aligned?
+	andn		$inp, 7, $inp
+	ldd		[$key +  0], %f6	! round[0]
+	ldd		[$key +  8], %f8
+	mov		%o7, %g1
+	ld		[$key + 240], $rounds
+
+1:	call		.+8
+	add		%o7, .Linp_align-1b, %o7
+
+	sll		$tmp, 3, $tmp
+	ldd		[$inp + 0], %f0		! load input
+	brz,pt		$tmp, .Ldec_inp_aligned
+	ldd		[$inp + 8], %f2
+
+	ldd		[%o7 + $tmp], %f14	! shift left params
+	ldd		[$inp + 16], %f4
+	fshiftorx	%f0, %f2, %f14, %f0
+	fshiftorx	%f2, %f4, %f14, %f2
+
+.Ldec_inp_aligned:
+	ldd		[$key + 16], %f10	! round[1]
+	ldd		[$key + 24], %f12
+
+	fxor		%f0, %f6, %f0		! ^=round[0]
+	fxor		%f2, %f8, %f2
+	ldd		[$key + 32], %f6	! round[2]
+	ldd		[$key + 40], %f8
+	add		$key, 32, $key
+	sub		$rounds, 4, $rounds
+
+.Loop_dec:
+	fmovd		%f0, %f4
+	faesdecx	%f2, %f10, %f0
+	faesdecx	%f4, %f12, %f2
+	ldd		[$key + 16], %f10
+	ldd		[$key + 24], %f12
+	add		$key, 32, $key
+
+	fmovd		%f0, %f4
+	faesdecx	%f2, %f6, %f0
+	faesdecx	%f4, %f8, %f2
+	ldd		[$key +  0], %f6
+	ldd		[$key +  8], %f8
+
+	brnz,a		$rounds, .Loop_dec
+	sub		$rounds, 2, $rounds
+
+	andcc		$out, 7, $tmp		! is output aligned?
+	andn		$out, 7, $out
+	mov		0xff, $mask
+	srl		$mask, $tmp, $mask
+	add		%o7, 64, %o7
+	sll		$tmp, 3, $tmp
+
+	fmovd		%f0, %f4
+	faesdecx	%f2, %f10, %f0
+	faesdecx	%f4, %f12, %f2
+	ldd		[%o7 + $tmp], %f14	! shift right params
+
+	fmovd		%f0, %f4
+	faesdeclx	%f2, %f6, %f0
+	faesdeclx	%f4, %f8, %f2
+
+	bnz,pn		%icc, .Ldec_out_unaligned
+	mov		%g1, %o7
+
+	std		%f0, [$out + 0]
+	retl
+	std		%f2, [$out + 8]
+
+.align	16
+.Ldec_out_unaligned:
+	add		$out, 16, $inp
+	orn		%g0, $mask, $tmp
+	fshiftorx	%f0, %f0, %f14, %f4
+	fshiftorx	%f0, %f2, %f14, %f6
+	fshiftorx	%f2, %f2, %f14, %f8
+
+	stda		%f4, [$out + $mask]0xc0	! partial store
+	std		%f6, [$out + 8]
+	stda		%f8, [$inp + $tmp]0xc0	! partial store
+	retl
+	nop
+.type	aes_fx_decrypt,#function
+.size	aes_fx_decrypt,.-aes_fx_decrypt
+___
+}
+{
+my ($inp,$bits,$out,$tmp,$inc) = map("%o$_",(0..5));
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	aes_fx_set_decrypt_key
+.align	32
+aes_fx_set_decrypt_key:
+	b		.Lset_encrypt_key
+	mov		-1, $inc
+	retl
+	nop
+.type	aes_fx_set_decrypt_key,#function
+.size	aes_fx_set_decrypt_key,.-aes_fx_set_decrypt_key
+
+.globl	aes_fx_set_encrypt_key
+.align	32
+aes_fx_set_encrypt_key:
+	mov		1, $inc
+	nop
+.Lset_encrypt_key:
+	and		$inp, 7, $tmp
+	andn		$inp, 7, $inp
+	sll		$tmp, 3, $tmp
+	mov		%o7, %g1
+
+1:	call		.+8
+	add		%o7, .Linp_align-1b, %o7
+
+	ldd		[%o7 + $tmp], %f10	! shift left params
+	mov		%g1, %o7
+
+	cmp		$bits, 192
+	ldd		[$inp + 0], %f0
+	bl,pt		%icc, .L128
+	ldd		[$inp + 8], %f2
+
+	be,pt		%icc, .L192
+	ldd		[$inp + 16], %f4
+	brz,pt		$tmp, .L256aligned
+	ldd		[$inp + 24], %f6
+
+	ldd		[$inp + 32], %f8
+	fshiftorx	%f0, %f2, %f10, %f0
+	fshiftorx	%f2, %f4, %f10, %f2
+	fshiftorx	%f4, %f6, %f10, %f4
+	fshiftorx	%f6, %f8, %f10, %f6
+
+.L256aligned:
+	mov		14, $bits
+	and		$inc, `14*16`, $tmp
+	st		$bits, [$out + 240]	! store rounds
+	add		$out, $tmp, $out	! start or end of key schedule
+	sllx		$inc, 4, $inc		! 16 or -16
+___
+for ($i=0; $i<6; $i++) {
+    $code.=<<___;
+	std		%f0, [$out + 0]
+	faeskeyx	%f6, `0x10+$i`, %f0
+	std		%f2, [$out + 8]
+	add		$out, $inc, $out
+	faeskeyx	%f0, 0x00, %f2
+	std		%f4, [$out + 0]
+	faeskeyx	%f2, 0x01, %f4
+	std		%f6, [$out + 8]
+	add		$out, $inc, $out
+	faeskeyx	%f4, 0x00, %f6
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	std		%f0, [$out + 0]
+	faeskeyx	%f6, `0x10+$i`, %f0
+	std		%f2, [$out + 8]
+	add		$out, $inc, $out
+	faeskeyx	%f0, 0x00, %f2
+	std		%f4,[$out + 0]
+	std		%f6,[$out + 8]
+	add		$out, $inc, $out
+	std		%f0,[$out + 0]
+	std		%f2,[$out + 8]
+	retl
+	xor		%o0, %o0, %o0		! return 0
+
+.align	16
+.L192:
+	brz,pt		$tmp, .L192aligned
+	nop
+
+	ldd		[$inp + 24], %f6
+	fshiftorx	%f0, %f2, %f10, %f0
+	fshiftorx	%f2, %f4, %f10, %f2
+	fshiftorx	%f4, %f6, %f10, %f4
+
+.L192aligned:
+	mov		12, $bits
+	and		$inc, `12*16`, $tmp
+	st		$bits, [$out + 240]	! store rounds
+	add		$out, $tmp, $out	! start or end of key schedule
+	sllx		$inc, 4, $inc		! 16 or -16
+___
+for ($i=0; $i<8; $i+=2) {
+    $code.=<<___;
+	std		%f0, [$out + 0]
+	faeskeyx	%f4, `0x10+$i`, %f0
+	std		%f2, [$out + 8]
+	add		$out, $inc, $out
+	faeskeyx	%f0, 0x00, %f2
+	std		%f4, [$out + 0]
+	faeskeyx	%f2, 0x00, %f4
+	std		%f0, [$out + 8]
+	add		$out, $inc, $out
+	faeskeyx	%f4, `0x10+$i+1`, %f0
+	std		%f2, [$out + 0]
+	faeskeyx	%f0, 0x00, %f2
+	std		%f4, [$out + 8]
+	add		$out, $inc, $out
+___
+$code.=<<___		if ($i<6);
+	faeskeyx	%f2, 0x00, %f4
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	std		%f0, [$out + 0]
+	std		%f2, [$out + 8]
+	retl
+	xor		%o0, %o0, %o0		! return 0
+
+.align	16
+.L128:
+	brz,pt		$tmp, .L128aligned
+	nop
+
+	ldd		[$inp + 16], %f4
+	fshiftorx	%f0, %f2, %f10, %f0
+	fshiftorx	%f2, %f4, %f10, %f2
+
+.L128aligned:
+	mov		10, $bits
+	and		$inc, `10*16`, $tmp
+	st		$bits, [$out + 240]	! store rounds
+	add		$out, $tmp, $out	! start or end of key schedule
+	sllx		$inc, 4, $inc		! 16 or -16
+___
+for ($i=0; $i<10; $i++) {
+    $code.=<<___;
+	std		%f0, [$out + 0]
+	faeskeyx	%f2, `0x10+$i`, %f0
+	std		%f2, [$out + 8]
+	add		$out, $inc, $out
+	faeskeyx	%f0, 0x00, %f2
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	std		%f0, [$out + 0]
+	std		%f2, [$out + 8]
+	retl
+	xor		%o0, %o0, %o0		! return 0
+.type	aes_fx_set_encrypt_key,#function
+.size	aes_fx_set_encrypt_key,.-aes_fx_set_encrypt_key
+___
+}
+{
+my ($inp,$out,$len,$key,$ivp,$dir) = map("%i$_",(0..5));
+my ($rounds,$inner,$end,$inc,$ialign,$oalign,$mask) = map("%l$_",(0..7));
+my ($iv0,$iv1,$r0hi,$r0lo,$rlhi,$rllo,$in0,$in1,$intail,$outhead,$fshift)
+   = map("%f$_",grep { !($_ & 1) } (16 .. 62));
+my ($ileft,$iright) = ($ialign,$oalign);
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	aes_fx_cbc_encrypt
+.align	32
+aes_fx_cbc_encrypt:
+	save		%sp, -STACK_FRAME-16, %sp
+	srln		$len, 4, $len
+	and		$inp, 7, $ialign
+	andn		$inp, 7, $inp
+	brz,pn		$len, .Lcbc_no_data
+	sll		$ialign, 3, $ileft
+
+1:	call		.+8
+	add		%o7, .Linp_align-1b, %o7
+
+	ld		[$key + 240], $rounds
+	and		$out, 7, $oalign
+	ld		[$ivp + 0], %f0		! load ivec
+	andn		$out, 7, $out
+	ld		[$ivp + 4], %f1
+	sll		$oalign, 3, $mask
+	ld		[$ivp + 8], %f2
+	ld		[$ivp + 12], %f3
+
+	sll		$rounds, 4, $rounds
+	add		$rounds, $key, $end
+	ldd		[$key + 0], $r0hi	! round[0]
+	ldd		[$key + 8], $r0lo
+
+	add		$inp, 16, $inp
+	sub		$len,  1, $len
+	ldd		[$end + 0], $rlhi	! round[last]
+	ldd		[$end + 8], $rllo
+
+	mov		16, $inc
+	movrz		$len, 0, $inc
+	ldd		[$key + 16], %f10	! round[1]
+	ldd		[$key + 24], %f12
+
+	ldd		[%o7 + $ileft], $fshift	! shift left params
+	add		%o7, 64, %o7
+	ldd		[$inp - 16], $in0	! load input
+	ldd		[$inp -  8], $in1
+	ldda		[$inp]0x82, $intail	! non-faulting load
+	brz		$dir, .Lcbc_decrypt
+	add		$inp, $inc, $inp	! inp+=16
+
+	fxor		$r0hi, %f0, %f0		! ivec^=round[0]
+	fxor		$r0lo, %f2, %f2
+	fshiftorx	$in0, $in1, $fshift, $in0
+	fshiftorx	$in1, $intail, $fshift, $in1
+	nop
+
+.Loop_cbc_enc:
+	fxor		$in0, %f0, %f0		! inp^ivec^round[0]
+	fxor		$in1, %f2, %f2
+	ldd		[$key + 32], %f6	! round[2]
+	ldd		[$key + 40], %f8
+	add		$key, 32, $end
+	sub		$rounds, 16*6, $inner
+
+.Lcbc_enc:
+	fmovd		%f0, %f4
+	faesencx	%f2, %f10, %f0
+	faesencx	%f4, %f12, %f2
+	ldd		[$end + 16], %f10
+	ldd		[$end + 24], %f12
+	add		$end, 32, $end
+
+	fmovd		%f0, %f4
+	faesencx	%f2, %f6, %f0
+	faesencx	%f4, %f8, %f2
+	ldd		[$end + 0], %f6
+	ldd		[$end + 8], %f8
+
+	brnz,a		$inner, .Lcbc_enc
+	sub		$inner, 16*2, $inner
+
+	fmovd		%f0, %f4
+	faesencx	%f2, %f10, %f0
+	faesencx	%f4, %f12, %f2
+	ldd		[$end + 16], %f10	! round[last-1]
+	ldd		[$end + 24], %f12
+
+	movrz		$len, 0, $inc
+	fmovd		$intail, $in0
+	ldd		[$inp - 8], $in1	! load next input block
+	ldda		[$inp]0x82, $intail	! non-faulting load
+	add		$inp, $inc, $inp	! inp+=16
+
+	fmovd		%f0, %f4
+	faesencx	%f2, %f6, %f0
+	faesencx	%f4, %f8, %f2
+
+	fshiftorx	$in0, $in1, $fshift, $in0
+	fshiftorx	$in1, $intail, $fshift, $in1
+
+	fmovd		%f0, %f4
+	faesencx	%f2, %f10, %f0
+	faesencx	%f4, %f12, %f2
+	ldd		[$key + 16], %f10	! round[1]
+	ldd		[$key + 24], %f12
+
+	fxor		$r0hi, $in0, $in0	! inp^=round[0]
+	fxor		$r0lo, $in1, $in1
+
+	fmovd		%f0, %f4
+	faesenclx	%f2, $rlhi, %f0
+	faesenclx	%f4, $rllo, %f2
+
+	brnz,pn		$oalign, .Lcbc_enc_unaligned_out
+	nop
+
+	std		%f0, [$out + 0]
+	std		%f2, [$out + 8]
+	add		$out, 16, $out
+
+	brnz,a		$len, .Loop_cbc_enc
+	sub		$len, 1, $len
+
+	st		%f0, [$ivp + 0]		! output ivec
+	st		%f1, [$ivp + 4]
+	st		%f2, [$ivp + 8]
+	st		%f3, [$ivp + 12]
+
+.Lcbc_no_data:
+	ret
+	restore
+
+.align	32
+.Lcbc_enc_unaligned_out:
+	ldd		[%o7 + $mask], $fshift	! shift right params
+	mov		0xff, $mask
+	srl		$mask, $oalign, $mask
+	sub		%g0, $ileft, $iright
+
+	fshiftorx	%f0, %f0, $fshift, %f6
+	fshiftorx	%f0, %f2, $fshift, %f8
+
+	stda		%f6, [$out + $mask]0xc0	! partial store
+	orn		%g0, $mask, $mask
+	std		%f8, [$out + 8]
+	add		$out, 16, $out
+	brz		$len, .Lcbc_enc_unaligned_out_done
+	sub		$len, 1, $len
+	b		.Loop_cbc_enc_unaligned_out
+	nop
+
+.align	32
+.Loop_cbc_enc_unaligned_out:
+	fmovd		%f2, $outhead
+	fxor		$in0, %f0, %f0		! inp^ivec^round[0]
+	fxor		$in1, %f2, %f2
+	ldd		[$key + 32], %f6	! round[2]
+	ldd		[$key + 40], %f8
+
+	fmovd		%f0, %f4
+	faesencx	%f2, %f10, %f0
+	faesencx	%f4, %f12, %f2
+	ldd		[$key + 48], %f10	! round[3]
+	ldd		[$key + 56], %f12
+
+	ldx		[$inp - 16], %o0
+	ldx		[$inp -  8], %o1
+	brz		$ileft, .Lcbc_enc_aligned_inp
+	movrz		$len, 0, $inc
+
+	ldx		[$inp], %o2
+	sllx		%o0, $ileft, %o0
+	srlx		%o1, $iright, %g1
+	sllx		%o1, $ileft, %o1
+	or		%g1, %o0, %o0
+	srlx		%o2, $iright, %o2
+	or		%o2, %o1, %o1
+
+.Lcbc_enc_aligned_inp:
+	fmovd		%f0, %f4
+	faesencx	%f2, %f6, %f0
+	faesencx	%f4, %f8, %f2
+	ldd		[$key + 64], %f6	! round[4]
+	ldd		[$key + 72], %f8
+	add		$key, 64, $end
+	sub		$rounds, 16*8, $inner
+
+	stx		%o0, [%sp + LOCALS + 0]
+	stx		%o1, [%sp + LOCALS + 8]
+	add		$inp, $inc, $inp	! inp+=16
+	nop
+
+.Lcbc_enc_unaligned:
+	fmovd		%f0, %f4
+	faesencx	%f2, %f10, %f0
+	faesencx	%f4, %f12, %f2
+	ldd		[$end + 16], %f10
+	ldd		[$end + 24], %f12
+	add		$end, 32, $end
+
+	fmovd		%f0, %f4
+	faesencx	%f2, %f6, %f0
+	faesencx	%f4, %f8, %f2
+	ldd		[$end + 0], %f6
+	ldd		[$end + 8], %f8
+
+	brnz,a		$inner, .Lcbc_enc_unaligned
+	sub		$inner, 16*2, $inner
+
+	fmovd		%f0, %f4
+	faesencx	%f2, %f10, %f0
+	faesencx	%f4, %f12, %f2
+	ldd		[$end + 16], %f10	! round[last-1]
+	ldd		[$end + 24], %f12
+
+	fmovd		%f0, %f4
+	faesencx	%f2, %f6, %f0
+	faesencx	%f4, %f8, %f2
+
+	ldd		[%sp + LOCALS + 0], $in0
+	ldd		[%sp + LOCALS + 8], $in1
+
+	fmovd		%f0, %f4
+	faesencx	%f2, %f10, %f0
+	faesencx	%f4, %f12, %f2
+	ldd		[$key + 16], %f10	! round[1]
+	ldd		[$key + 24], %f12
+
+	fxor		$r0hi, $in0, $in0	! inp^=round[0]
+	fxor		$r0lo, $in1, $in1
+
+	fmovd		%f0, %f4
+	faesenclx	%f2, $rlhi, %f0
+	faesenclx	%f4, $rllo, %f2
+
+	fshiftorx	$outhead, %f0, $fshift, %f6
+	fshiftorx	%f0, %f2, $fshift, %f8
+	std		%f6, [$out + 0]
+	std		%f8, [$out + 8]
+	add		$out, 16, $out
+
+	brnz,a		$len, .Loop_cbc_enc_unaligned_out
+	sub		$len, 1, $len
+
+.Lcbc_enc_unaligned_out_done:
+	fshiftorx	%f2, %f2, $fshift, %f8
+	stda		%f8, [$out + $mask]0xc0	! partial store
+
+	st		%f0, [$ivp + 0]		! output ivec
+	st		%f1, [$ivp + 4]
+	st		%f2, [$ivp + 8]
+	st		%f3, [$ivp + 12]
+
+	ret
+	restore
+
+.align	32
+.Lcbc_decrypt:
+	fshiftorx	$in0, $in1, $fshift, $in0
+	fshiftorx	$in1, $intail, $fshift, $in1
+	fmovd		%f0, $iv0
+	fmovd		%f2, $iv1
+
+.Loop_cbc_dec:
+	fxor		$in0, $r0hi, %f0	! inp^round[0]
+	fxor		$in1, $r0lo, %f2
+	ldd		[$key + 32], %f6	! round[2]
+	ldd		[$key + 40], %f8
+	add		$key, 32, $end
+	sub		$rounds, 16*6, $inner
+
+.Lcbc_dec:
+	fmovd		%f0, %f4
+	faesdecx	%f2, %f10, %f0
+	faesdecx	%f4, %f12, %f2
+	ldd		[$end + 16], %f10
+	ldd		[$end + 24], %f12
+	add		$end, 32, $end
+
+	fmovd		%f0, %f4
+	faesdecx	%f2, %f6, %f0
+	faesdecx	%f4, %f8, %f2
+	ldd		[$end + 0], %f6
+	ldd		[$end + 8], %f8
+
+	brnz,a		$inner, .Lcbc_dec
+	sub		$inner, 16*2, $inner
+
+	fmovd		%f0, %f4
+	faesdecx	%f2, %f10, %f0
+	faesdecx	%f4, %f12, %f2
+	ldd		[$end + 16], %f10	! round[last-1]
+	ldd		[$end + 24], %f12
+
+	fmovd		%f0, %f4
+	faesdecx	%f2, %f6, %f0
+	faesdecx	%f4, %f8, %f2
+	fxor		$iv0, $rlhi, %f6	! ivec^round[last]
+	fxor		$iv1, $rllo, %f8
+	fmovd		$in0, $iv0
+	fmovd		$in1, $iv1
+
+	movrz		$len, 0, $inc
+	fmovd		$intail, $in0
+	ldd		[$inp - 8], $in1	! load next input block
+	ldda		[$inp]0x82, $intail	! non-faulting load
+	add		$inp, $inc, $inp	! inp+=16
+
+	fmovd		%f0, %f4
+	faesdecx	%f2, %f10, %f0
+	faesdecx	%f4, %f12, %f2
+	ldd		[$key + 16], %f10	! round[1]
+	ldd		[$key + 24], %f12
+
+	fshiftorx	$in0, $in1, $fshift, $in0
+	fshiftorx	$in1, $intail, $fshift, $in1
+
+	fmovd		%f0, %f4
+	faesdeclx	%f2, %f6, %f0
+	faesdeclx	%f4, %f8, %f2
+
+	brnz,pn		$oalign, .Lcbc_dec_unaligned_out
+	nop
+
+	std		%f0, [$out + 0]
+	std		%f2, [$out + 8]
+	add		$out, 16, $out
+
+	brnz,a		$len, .Loop_cbc_dec
+	sub		$len, 1, $len
+
+	st		$iv0,    [$ivp + 0]	! output ivec
+	st		$iv0#lo, [$ivp + 4]
+	st		$iv1,    [$ivp + 8]
+	st		$iv1#lo, [$ivp + 12]
+
+	ret
+	restore
+
+.align	32
+.Lcbc_dec_unaligned_out:
+	ldd		[%o7 + $mask], $fshift	! shift right params
+	mov		0xff, $mask
+	srl		$mask, $oalign, $mask
+	sub		%g0, $ileft, $iright
+
+	fshiftorx	%f0, %f0, $fshift, %f6
+	fshiftorx	%f0, %f2, $fshift, %f8
+
+	stda		%f6, [$out + $mask]0xc0	! partial store
+	orn		%g0, $mask, $mask
+	std		%f8, [$out + 8]
+	add		$out, 16, $out
+	brz		$len, .Lcbc_dec_unaligned_out_done
+	sub		$len, 1, $len
+	b		.Loop_cbc_dec_unaligned_out
+	nop
+
+.align	32
+.Loop_cbc_dec_unaligned_out:
+	fmovd		%f2, $outhead
+	fxor		$in0, $r0hi, %f0	! inp^round[0]
+	fxor		$in1, $r0lo, %f2
+	ldd		[$key + 32], %f6	! round[2]
+	ldd		[$key + 40], %f8
+
+	fmovd		%f0, %f4
+	faesdecx	%f2, %f10, %f0
+	faesdecx	%f4, %f12, %f2
+	ldd		[$key + 48], %f10	! round[3]
+	ldd		[$key + 56], %f12
+
+	ldx		[$inp - 16], %o0
+	ldx		[$inp - 8], %o1
+	brz		$ileft, .Lcbc_dec_aligned_inp
+	movrz		$len, 0, $inc
+
+	ldx		[$inp], %o2
+	sllx		%o0, $ileft, %o0
+	srlx		%o1, $iright, %g1
+	sllx		%o1, $ileft, %o1
+	or		%g1, %o0, %o0
+	srlx		%o2, $iright, %o2
+	or		%o2, %o1, %o1
+
+.Lcbc_dec_aligned_inp:
+	fmovd		%f0, %f4
+	faesdecx	%f2, %f6, %f0
+	faesdecx	%f4, %f8, %f2
+	ldd		[$key + 64], %f6	! round[4]
+	ldd		[$key + 72], %f8
+	add		$key, 64, $end
+	sub		$rounds, 16*8, $inner
+
+	stx		%o0, [%sp + LOCALS + 0]
+	stx		%o1, [%sp + LOCALS + 8]
+	add		$inp, $inc, $inp	! inp+=16
+	nop
+
+.Lcbc_dec_unaligned:
+	fmovd		%f0, %f4
+	faesdecx	%f2, %f10, %f0
+	faesdecx	%f4, %f12, %f2
+	ldd		[$end + 16], %f10
+	ldd		[$end + 24], %f12
+	add		$end, 32, $end
+
+	fmovd		%f0, %f4
+	faesdecx	%f2, %f6, %f0
+	faesdecx	%f4, %f8, %f2
+	ldd		[$end + 0], %f6
+	ldd		[$end + 8], %f8
+
+	brnz,a		$inner, .Lcbc_dec_unaligned
+	sub		$inner, 16*2, $inner
+
+	fmovd		%f0, %f4
+	faesdecx	%f2, %f10, %f0
+	faesdecx	%f4, %f12, %f2
+	ldd		[$end + 16], %f10	! round[last-1]
+	ldd		[$end + 24], %f12
+
+	fmovd		%f0, %f4
+	faesdecx	%f2, %f6, %f0
+	faesdecx	%f4, %f8, %f2
+
+	fxor		$iv0, $rlhi, %f6	! ivec^round[last]
+	fxor		$iv1, $rllo, %f8
+	fmovd		$in0, $iv0
+	fmovd		$in1, $iv1
+	ldd		[%sp + LOCALS + 0], $in0
+	ldd		[%sp + LOCALS + 8], $in1
+
+	fmovd		%f0, %f4
+	faesdecx	%f2, %f10, %f0
+	faesdecx	%f4, %f12, %f2
+	ldd		[$key + 16], %f10	! round[1]
+	ldd		[$key + 24], %f12
+
+	fmovd		%f0, %f4
+	faesdeclx	%f2, %f6, %f0
+	faesdeclx	%f4, %f8, %f2
+
+	fshiftorx	$outhead, %f0, $fshift, %f6
+	fshiftorx	%f0, %f2, $fshift, %f8
+	std		%f6, [$out + 0]
+	std		%f8, [$out + 8]
+	add		$out, 16, $out
+
+	brnz,a		$len, .Loop_cbc_dec_unaligned_out
+	sub		$len, 1, $len
+
+.Lcbc_dec_unaligned_out_done:
+	fshiftorx	%f2, %f2, $fshift, %f8
+	stda		%f8, [$out + $mask]0xc0	! partial store
+
+	st		$iv0,    [$ivp + 0]	! output ivec
+	st		$iv0#lo, [$ivp + 4]
+	st		$iv1,    [$ivp + 8]
+	st		$iv1#lo, [$ivp + 12]
+
+	ret
+	restore
+.type	aes_fx_cbc_encrypt,#function
+.size	aes_fx_cbc_encrypt,.-aes_fx_cbc_encrypt
+___
+}
+{
+my ($inp,$out,$len,$key,$ivp) = map("%i$_",(0..5));
+my ($rounds,$inner,$end,$inc,$ialign,$oalign,$mask) = map("%l$_",(0..7));
+my ($ctr0,$ctr1,$r0hi,$r0lo,$rlhi,$rllo,$in0,$in1,$intail,$outhead,$fshift)
+   = map("%f$_",grep { !($_ & 1) } (16 .. 62));
+my ($ileft,$iright) = ($ialign, $oalign);
+my $one = "%f14";
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	aes_fx_ctr32_encrypt_blocks
+.align	32
+aes_fx_ctr32_encrypt_blocks:
+	save		%sp, -STACK_FRAME-16, %sp
+	srln		$len, 0, $len
+	and		$inp, 7, $ialign
+	andn		$inp, 7, $inp
+	brz,pn		$len, .Lctr32_no_data
+	sll		$ialign, 3, $ileft
+
+.Lpic:	call		.+8
+	add		%o7, .Linp_align - .Lpic, %o7
+
+	ld		[$key + 240], $rounds
+	and		$out, 7, $oalign
+	ld		[$ivp +  0], $ctr0	! load counter
+	andn		$out, 7, $out
+	ld		[$ivp +  4], $ctr0#lo
+	sll		$oalign, 3, $mask
+	ld		[$ivp +  8], $ctr1
+	ld		[$ivp + 12], $ctr1#lo
+	ldd		[%o7 + 128], $one
+
+	sll		$rounds, 4, $rounds
+	add		$rounds, $key, $end
+	ldd		[$key + 0], $r0hi	! round[0]
+	ldd		[$key + 8], $r0lo
+
+	add		$inp, 16, $inp
+	sub		$len, 1, $len
+	ldd		[$key + 16], %f10	! round[1]
+	ldd		[$key + 24], %f12
+
+	mov		16, $inc
+	movrz		$len, 0, $inc
+	ldd		[$end + 0], $rlhi	! round[last]
+	ldd		[$end + 8], $rllo
+
+	ldd		[%o7 + $ileft], $fshift	! shiftleft params
+	add		%o7, 64, %o7
+	ldd		[$inp - 16], $in0	! load input
+	ldd		[$inp -  8], $in1
+	ldda		[$inp]0x82, $intail	! non-faulting load
+	add		$inp, $inc, $inp	! inp+=16
+
+	fshiftorx	$in0, $in1, $fshift, $in0
+	fshiftorx	$in1, $intail, $fshift, $in1
+
+.Loop_ctr32:
+	fxor		$ctr0, $r0hi, %f0	! counter^round[0]
+	fxor		$ctr1, $r0lo, %f2
+	ldd		[$key + 32], %f6	! round[2]
+	ldd		[$key + 40], %f8
+	add		$key, 32, $end
+	sub		$rounds, 16*6, $inner
+
+.Lctr32_enc:
+	fmovd		%f0, %f4
+	faesencx	%f2, %f10, %f0
+	faesencx	%f4, %f12, %f2
+	ldd		[$end + 16], %f10
+	ldd		[$end + 24], %f12
+	add		$end, 32, $end
+
+	fmovd		%f0, %f4
+	faesencx	%f2, %f6, %f0
+	faesencx	%f4, %f8, %f2
+	ldd		[$end + 0], %f6
+	ldd		[$end + 8], %f8
+
+	brnz,a		$inner, .Lctr32_enc
+	sub		$inner, 16*2, $inner
+
+	fmovd		%f0, %f4
+	faesencx	%f2, %f10, %f0
+	faesencx	%f4, %f12, %f2
+	ldd		[$end + 16], %f10	! round[last-1]
+	ldd		[$end + 24], %f12
+
+	fmovd		%f0, %f4
+	faesencx	%f2, %f6, %f0
+	faesencx	%f4, %f8, %f2
+	fxor		$in0, $rlhi, %f6	! inp^round[last]
+	fxor		$in1, $rllo, %f8
+
+	movrz		$len, 0, $inc
+	fmovd		$intail, $in0
+	ldd		[$inp - 8], $in1	! load next input block
+	ldda		[$inp]0x82, $intail	! non-faulting load
+	add		$inp, $inc, $inp	! inp+=16
+
+	fmovd		%f0, %f4
+	faesencx	%f2, %f10, %f0
+	faesencx	%f4, %f12, %f2
+	ldd		[$key + 16], %f10	! round[1]
+	ldd		[$key + 24], %f12
+
+	fshiftorx	$in0, $in1, $fshift, $in0
+	fshiftorx	$in1, $intail, $fshift, $in1
+	fpadd32		$ctr1, $one, $ctr1	! increment counter
+
+	fmovd		%f0, %f4
+	faesenclx	%f2, %f6, %f0
+	faesenclx	%f4, %f8, %f2
+
+	brnz,pn		$oalign, .Lctr32_unaligned_out
+	nop
+
+	std		%f0, [$out + 0]
+	std		%f2, [$out + 8]
+	add		$out, 16, $out
+
+	brnz,a		$len, .Loop_ctr32
+	sub		$len, 1, $len
+
+.Lctr32_no_data:
+	ret
+	restore
+
+.align	32
+.Lctr32_unaligned_out:
+	ldd		[%o7 + $mask], $fshift	! shift right params
+	mov		0xff, $mask
+	srl		$mask, $oalign, $mask
+	sub		%g0, $ileft, $iright
+
+	fshiftorx	%f0, %f0, $fshift, %f6
+	fshiftorx	%f0, %f2, $fshift, %f8
+
+	stda		%f6, [$out + $mask]0xc0	! partial store
+	orn		%g0, $mask, $mask
+	std		%f8, [$out + 8]
+	add		$out, 16, $out
+	brz		$len, .Lctr32_unaligned_out_done
+	sub		$len, 1, $len
+	b		.Loop_ctr32_unaligned_out
+	nop
+
+.align	32
+.Loop_ctr32_unaligned_out:
+	fmovd		%f2, $outhead
+	fxor		$ctr0, $r0hi, %f0	! counter^round[0]
+	fxor		$ctr1, $r0lo, %f2
+	ldd		[$key + 32], %f6	! round[2]
+	ldd		[$key + 40], %f8
+
+	fmovd		%f0, %f4
+	faesencx	%f2, %f10, %f0
+	faesencx	%f4, %f12, %f2
+	ldd		[$key + 48], %f10	! round[3]
+	ldd		[$key + 56], %f12
+
+	ldx		[$inp - 16], %o0
+	ldx		[$inp -  8], %o1
+	brz		$ileft, .Lctr32_aligned_inp
+	movrz		$len, 0, $inc
+
+	ldx		[$inp], %o2
+	sllx		%o0, $ileft, %o0
+	srlx		%o1, $iright, %g1
+	sllx		%o1, $ileft, %o1
+	or		%g1, %o0, %o0
+	srlx		%o2, $iright, %o2
+	or		%o2, %o1, %o1
+
+.Lctr32_aligned_inp:
+	fmovd		%f0, %f4
+	faesencx	%f2, %f6, %f0
+	faesencx	%f4, %f8, %f2
+	ldd		[$key + 64], %f6	! round[4]
+	ldd		[$key + 72], %f8
+	add		$key, 64, $end
+	sub		$rounds, 16*8, $inner
+
+	stx		%o0, [%sp + LOCALS + 0]
+	stx		%o1, [%sp + LOCALS + 8]
+	add		$inp, $inc, $inp	! inp+=16
+	nop
+
+.Lctr32_enc_unaligned:
+	fmovd		%f0, %f4
+	faesencx	%f2, %f10, %f0
+	faesencx	%f4, %f12, %f2
+	ldd		[$end + 16], %f10
+	ldd		[$end + 24], %f12
+	add		$end, 32, $end
+
+	fmovd		%f0, %f4
+	faesencx	%f2, %f6, %f0
+	faesencx	%f4, %f8, %f2
+	ldd		[$end + 0], %f6
+	ldd		[$end + 8], %f8
+
+	brnz,a		$inner, .Lctr32_enc_unaligned
+	sub		$inner, 16*2, $inner
+
+	fmovd		%f0, %f4
+	faesencx	%f2, %f10, %f0
+	faesencx	%f4, %f12, %f2
+	ldd		[$end + 16], %f10	! round[last-1]
+	ldd		[$end + 24], %f12
+	fpadd32		$ctr1, $one, $ctr1	! increment counter
+
+	fmovd		%f0, %f4
+	faesencx	%f2, %f6, %f0
+	faesencx	%f4, %f8, %f2
+	fxor		$in0, $rlhi, %f6	! inp^round[last]
+	fxor		$in1, $rllo, %f8
+	ldd		[%sp + LOCALS + 0], $in0
+	ldd		[%sp + LOCALS + 8], $in1
+
+	fmovd		%f0, %f4
+	faesencx	%f2, %f10, %f0
+	faesencx	%f4, %f12, %f2
+	ldd		[$key + 16], %f10	! round[1]
+	ldd		[$key + 24], %f12
+
+	fmovd		%f0, %f4
+	faesenclx	%f2, %f6, %f0
+	faesenclx	%f4, %f8, %f2
+
+	fshiftorx	$outhead, %f0, $fshift, %f6
+	fshiftorx	%f0, %f2, $fshift, %f8
+	std		%f6, [$out + 0]
+	std		%f8, [$out + 8]
+	add		$out, 16, $out
+
+	brnz,a		$len, .Loop_ctr32_unaligned_out
+	sub		$len, 1, $len
+
+.Lctr32_unaligned_out_done:
+	fshiftorx	%f2, %f2, $fshift, %f8
+	stda		%f8, [$out + $mask]0xc0	! partial store
+
+	ret
+	restore
+.type	aes_fx_ctr32_encrypt_blocks,#function
+.size	aes_fx_ctr32_encrypt_blocks,.-aes_fx_ctr32_encrypt_blocks
+
+.align	32
+.Linp_align:		! fshiftorx parameters for left shift toward %rs1
+	.byte	0, 0, 64,  0,	0, 64,  0, -64
+	.byte	0, 0, 56,  8,	0, 56,  8, -56
+	.byte	0, 0, 48, 16,	0, 48, 16, -48
+	.byte	0, 0, 40, 24,	0, 40, 24, -40
+	.byte	0, 0, 32, 32,	0, 32, 32, -32
+	.byte	0, 0, 24, 40,	0, 24, 40, -24
+	.byte	0, 0, 16, 48,	0, 16, 48, -16
+	.byte	0, 0,  8, 56,	0,  8, 56, -8
+.Lout_align:		! fshiftorx parameters for right shift toward %rs2
+	.byte	0, 0,  0, 64,	0,  0, 64,   0
+	.byte	0, 0,  8, 56,	0,  8, 56,  -8
+	.byte	0, 0, 16, 48,	0, 16, 48, -16
+	.byte	0, 0, 24, 40,	0, 24, 40, -24
+	.byte	0, 0, 32, 32,	0, 32, 32, -32
+	.byte	0, 0, 40, 24,	0, 40, 24, -40
+	.byte	0, 0, 48, 16,	0, 48, 16, -48
+	.byte	0, 0, 56,  8,	0, 56,  8, -56
+.Lone:
+	.word	0, 1
+.asciz	"AES for Fujitsu SPARC64 X, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+.align	4
+___
+}
+# Purpose of these subroutines is to explicitly encode VIS instructions,
+# so that one can compile the module without having to specify VIS
+# extensions on compiler command line, e.g. -xarch=v9 vs. -xarch=v9a.
+# Idea is to reserve for option to produce "universal" binary and let
+# programmer detect if current CPU is VIS capable at run-time.
+sub unvis {
+my ($mnemonic,$rs1,$rs2,$rd)=@_;
+my ($ref,$opf);
+my %visopf = (	"faligndata"	=> 0x048,
+		"bshuffle"	=> 0x04c,
+		"fpadd32"	=> 0x052,
+		"fxor"		=> 0x06c,
+		"fsrc2"		=> 0x078	);
+
+    $ref = "$mnemonic\t$rs1,$rs2,$rd";
+
+    if ($opf=$visopf{$mnemonic}) {
+	foreach ($rs1,$rs2,$rd) {
+	    return $ref if (!/%f([0-9]{1,2})/);
+	    $_=$1;
+	    if ($1>=32) {
+		return $ref if ($1&1);
+		# re-encode for upper double register addressing
+		$_=($1|$1>>5)&31;
+	    }
+	}
+
+	return	sprintf ".word\t0x%08x !%s",
+			0x81b00000|$rd<<25|$rs1<<14|$opf<<5|$rs2,
+			$ref;
+    } else {
+	return $ref;
+    }
+}
+
+sub unvis3 {
+my ($mnemonic,$rs1,$rs2,$rd)=@_;
+my %bias = ( "g" => 0, "o" => 8, "l" => 16, "i" => 24 );
+my ($ref,$opf);
+my %visopf = (	"alignaddr"	=> 0x018,
+		"bmask"		=> 0x019,
+		"alignaddrl"	=> 0x01a	);
+
+    $ref = "$mnemonic\t$rs1,$rs2,$rd";
+
+    if ($opf=$visopf{$mnemonic}) {
+	foreach ($rs1,$rs2,$rd) {
+	    return $ref if (!/%([goli])([0-9])/);
+	    $_=$bias{$1}+$2;
+	}
+
+	return	sprintf ".word\t0x%08x !%s",
+			0x81b00000|$rd<<25|$rs1<<14|$opf<<5|$rs2,
+			$ref;
+    } else {
+	return $ref;
+    }
+}
+
+sub unfx {
+my ($mnemonic,$rs1,$rs2,$rd)=@_;
+my ($ref,$opf);
+my %aesopf = (	"faesencx"	=> 0x90,
+		"faesdecx"	=> 0x91,
+		"faesenclx"	=> 0x92,
+		"faesdeclx"	=> 0x93,
+		"faeskeyx"	=> 0x94	);
+
+    $ref = "$mnemonic\t$rs1,$rs2,$rd";
+
+    if (defined($opf=$aesopf{$mnemonic})) {
+	$rs2 = ($rs2 =~ /%f([0-6]*[02468])/) ? (($1|$1>>5)&31) : $rs2;
+	$rs2 = oct($rs2) if ($rs2 =~ /^0/);
+
+	foreach ($rs1,$rd) {
+	    return $ref if (!/%f([0-9]{1,2})/);
+	    $_=$1;
+	    if ($1>=32) {
+		return $ref if ($1&1);
+		# re-encode for upper double register addressing
+		$_=($1|$1>>5)&31;
+	    }
+	}
+
+	return	sprintf ".word\t0x%08x !%s",
+			2<<30|$rd<<25|0x36<<19|$rs1<<14|$opf<<5|$rs2,
+			$ref;
+    } else {
+	return $ref;
+    }
+}
+
+sub unfx3src {
+my ($mnemonic,$rs1,$rs2,$rs3,$rd)=@_;
+my ($ref,$opf);
+my %aesopf = (	"fshiftorx"	=> 0x0b	);
+
+    $ref = "$mnemonic\t$rs1,$rs2,$rs3,$rd";
+
+    if (defined($opf=$aesopf{$mnemonic})) {
+	foreach ($rs1,$rs2,$rs3,$rd) {
+	    return $ref if (!/%f([0-9]{1,2})/);
+	    $_=$1;
+	    if ($1>=32) {
+		return $ref if ($1&1);
+		# re-encode for upper double register addressing
+		$_=($1|$1>>5)&31;
+	    }
+	}
+
+	return	sprintf ".word\t0x%08x !%s",
+			2<<30|$rd<<25|0x37<<19|$rs1<<14|$rs3<<9|$opf<<5|$rs2,
+			$ref;
+    } else {
+	return $ref;
+    }
+}
+
+foreach (split("\n",$code)) {
+    s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/ge;
+
+    s/%f([0-9]+)#lo/sprintf "%%f%d",$1+1/ge;
+
+    s/\b(faes[^x]{3,4}x)\s+(%f[0-9]{1,2}),\s*([%fx0-9]+),\s*(%f[0-9]{1,2})/
+		&unfx($1,$2,$3,$4)
+     /ge or
+    s/\b([f][^\s]*)\s+(%f[0-9]{1,2}),\s*(%f[0-9]{1,2}),\s*(%f[0-9]{1,2}),\s*(%f[0-9]{1,2})/
+		&unfx3src($1,$2,$3,$4,$5)
+     /ge or
+    s/\b([fb][^\s]*)\s+(%f[0-9]{1,2}),\s*(%f[0-9]{1,2}),\s*(%f[0-9]{1,2})/
+		&unvis($1,$2,$3,$4)
+     /ge or
+    s/\b(alignaddr[l]*)\s+(%[goli][0-7]),\s*(%[goli][0-7]),\s*(%[goli][0-7])/
+		&unvis3($1,$2,$3,$4)
+     /ge;
+    print $_,"\n";
+}
+
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-mb-x86_64.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-mb-x86_64.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..aa2735e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-mb-x86_64.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,1402 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2013-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+
+# Multi-buffer AES-NI procedures process several independent buffers
+# in parallel by interleaving independent instructions.
+#
+# Cycles per byte for interleave factor 4:
+#
+#			asymptotic	measured
+#			---------------------------
+# Westmere		5.00/4=1.25	5.13/4=1.28
+# Atom			15.0/4=3.75	?15.7/4=3.93
+# Sandy Bridge		5.06/4=1.27	5.18/4=1.29
+# Ivy Bridge		5.06/4=1.27	5.14/4=1.29
+# Haswell		4.44/4=1.11	4.44/4=1.11
+# Bulldozer		5.75/4=1.44	5.76/4=1.44
+#
+# Cycles per byte for interleave factor 8 (not implemented for
+# pre-AVX processors, where higher interleave factor incidentally
+# doesn't result in improvement):
+#
+#			asymptotic	measured
+#			---------------------------
+# Sandy Bridge		5.06/8=0.64	7.10/8=0.89(*)
+# Ivy Bridge		5.06/8=0.64	7.14/8=0.89(*)
+# Haswell		5.00/8=0.63	5.00/8=0.63
+# Bulldozer		5.75/8=0.72	5.77/8=0.72
+#
+# (*)	Sandy/Ivy Bridge are known to handle high interleave factors
+#	suboptimally;
+
+$flavour = shift;
+$output  = shift;
+if ($flavour =~ /\./) { $output = $flavour; undef $flavour; }
+
+$win64=0; $win64=1 if ($flavour =~ /[nm]asm|mingw64/ || $output =~ /\.asm$/);
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+( $xlate="${dir}x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
+( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
+die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl";
+
+$avx=0;
+
+if (`$ENV{CC} -Wa,-v -c -o /dev/null -x assembler /dev/null 2>&1`
+		=~ /GNU assembler version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
+	$avx = ($1>=2.19) + ($1>=2.22);
+}
+
+if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /nasm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /nasm/) &&
+	   `nasm -v 2>&1` =~ /NASM version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
+	$avx = ($1>=2.09) + ($1>=2.10);
+}
+
+if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
+	   `ml64 2>&1` =~ /Version ([0-9]+)\./) {
+	$avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=11);
+}
+
+if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
+	$avx = ($2>=3.0) + ($2>3.0);
+}
+
+open OUT,"| \"$^X\" \"$xlate\" $flavour \"$output\"";
+*STDOUT=*OUT;
+
+# void aesni_multi_cbc_encrypt (
+#     struct {	void *inp,*out; int blocks; double iv[2]; } inp[8];
+#     const AES_KEY *key,
+#     int num);		/* 1 or 2 */
+#
+$inp="%rdi";	# 1st arg
+$key="%rsi";	# 2nd arg
+$num="%edx";
+
+@inptr=map("%r$_",(8..11));
+@outptr=map("%r$_",(12..15));
+
+($rndkey0,$rndkey1)=("%xmm0","%xmm1");
+@out=map("%xmm$_",(2..5));
+@inp=map("%xmm$_",(6..9));
+($counters,$mask,$zero)=map("%xmm$_",(10..12));
+
+($rounds,$one,$sink,$offset)=("%eax","%ecx","%rbp","%rbx");
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.text
+
+.extern	OPENSSL_ia32cap_P
+
+.globl	aesni_multi_cbc_encrypt
+.type	aesni_multi_cbc_encrypt,\@function,3
+.align	32
+aesni_multi_cbc_encrypt:
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($avx);
+	cmp	\$2,$num
+	jb	.Lenc_non_avx
+	mov	OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+4(%rip),%ecx
+	test	\$`1<<28`,%ecx			# AVX bit
+	jnz	_avx_cbc_enc_shortcut
+	jmp	.Lenc_non_avx
+.align	16
+.Lenc_non_avx:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	%rsp,%rax
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	lea	-0xa8(%rsp),%rsp
+	movaps	%xmm6,(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm7,0x10(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm8,0x20(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm9,0x30(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm10,0x40(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm11,0x50(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm12,0x60(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm13,-0x68(%rax)	# not used, saved to share se_handler 
+	movaps	%xmm14,-0x58(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm15,-0x48(%rax)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	# stack layout
+	#
+	# +0	output sink
+	# +16	input sink [original %rsp and $num]
+	# +32	counters
+
+	sub	\$48,%rsp
+	and	\$-64,%rsp
+	mov	%rax,16(%rsp)			# original %rsp
+
+.Lenc4x_body:
+	movdqu	($key),$zero			# 0-round key
+	lea	0x78($key),$key			# size optimization
+	lea	40*2($inp),$inp
+
+.Lenc4x_loop_grande:
+	mov	$num,24(%rsp)			# original $num
+	xor	$num,$num
+___
+for($i=0;$i<4;$i++) {
+    $code.=<<___;
+	mov	`40*$i+16-40*2`($inp),$one	# borrow $one for number of blocks
+	mov	`40*$i+0-40*2`($inp),@inptr[$i]
+	cmp	$num,$one
+	mov	`40*$i+8-40*2`($inp),@outptr[$i]
+	cmovg	$one,$num			# find maximum
+	test	$one,$one
+	movdqu	`40*$i+24-40*2`($inp),@out[$i]	# load IV
+	mov	$one,`32+4*$i`(%rsp)		# initialize counters
+	cmovle	%rsp,@inptr[$i]			# cancel input
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	test	$num,$num
+	jz	.Lenc4x_done
+
+	movups	0x10-0x78($key),$rndkey1
+	 pxor	$zero,@out[0]
+	movups	0x20-0x78($key),$rndkey0
+	 pxor	$zero,@out[1]
+	mov	0xf0-0x78($key),$rounds
+	 pxor	$zero,@out[2]
+	movdqu	(@inptr[0]),@inp[0]		# load inputs
+	 pxor	$zero,@out[3]
+	movdqu	(@inptr[1]),@inp[1]
+	 pxor	@inp[0],@out[0]
+	movdqu	(@inptr[2]),@inp[2]
+	 pxor	@inp[1],@out[1]
+	movdqu	(@inptr[3]),@inp[3]
+	 pxor	@inp[2],@out[2]
+	 pxor	@inp[3],@out[3]
+	movdqa	32(%rsp),$counters		# load counters
+	xor	$offset,$offset
+	jmp	.Loop_enc4x
+
+.align	32
+.Loop_enc4x:
+	add	\$16,$offset
+	lea	16(%rsp),$sink			# sink pointer
+	mov	\$1,$one			# constant of 1
+	sub	$offset,$sink
+
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,@out[0]
+	prefetcht0	31(@inptr[0],$offset)	# prefetch input
+	prefetcht0	31(@inptr[1],$offset)
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,@out[1]
+	prefetcht0	31(@inptr[2],$offset)
+	prefetcht0	31(@inptr[2],$offset)
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,@out[2]
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,@out[3]
+	movups		0x30-0x78($key),$rndkey1
+___
+for($i=0;$i<4;$i++) {
+my $rndkey = ($i&1) ? $rndkey1 : $rndkey0;
+$code.=<<___;
+	 cmp		`32+4*$i`(%rsp),$one
+	aesenc		$rndkey,@out[0]
+	aesenc		$rndkey,@out[1]
+	aesenc		$rndkey,@out[2]
+	 cmovge		$sink,@inptr[$i]	# cancel input
+	 cmovg		$sink,@outptr[$i]	# sink output
+	aesenc		$rndkey,@out[3]
+	movups		`0x40+16*$i-0x78`($key),$rndkey
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	 movdqa		$counters,$mask
+	aesenc		$rndkey0,@out[0]
+	prefetcht0	15(@outptr[0],$offset)	# prefetch output
+	prefetcht0	15(@outptr[1],$offset)
+	aesenc		$rndkey0,@out[1]
+	prefetcht0	15(@outptr[2],$offset)
+	prefetcht0	15(@outptr[3],$offset)
+	aesenc		$rndkey0,@out[2]
+	aesenc		$rndkey0,@out[3]
+	movups		0x80-0x78($key),$rndkey0
+	 pxor		$zero,$zero
+
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,@out[0]
+	 pcmpgtd	$zero,$mask
+	 movdqu		-0x78($key),$zero	# reload 0-round key
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,@out[1]
+	 paddd		$mask,$counters		# decrement counters
+	 movdqa		$counters,32(%rsp)	# update counters
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,@out[2]
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,@out[3]
+	movups		0x90-0x78($key),$rndkey1
+
+	cmp	\$11,$rounds
+
+	aesenc		$rndkey0,@out[0]
+	aesenc		$rndkey0,@out[1]
+	aesenc		$rndkey0,@out[2]
+	aesenc		$rndkey0,@out[3]
+	movups		0xa0-0x78($key),$rndkey0
+
+	jb	.Lenc4x_tail
+
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,@out[0]
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,@out[1]
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,@out[2]
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,@out[3]
+	movups		0xb0-0x78($key),$rndkey1
+
+	aesenc		$rndkey0,@out[0]
+	aesenc		$rndkey0,@out[1]
+	aesenc		$rndkey0,@out[2]
+	aesenc		$rndkey0,@out[3]
+	movups		0xc0-0x78($key),$rndkey0
+
+	je	.Lenc4x_tail
+
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,@out[0]
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,@out[1]
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,@out[2]
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,@out[3]
+	movups		0xd0-0x78($key),$rndkey1
+
+	aesenc		$rndkey0,@out[0]
+	aesenc		$rndkey0,@out[1]
+	aesenc		$rndkey0,@out[2]
+	aesenc		$rndkey0,@out[3]
+	movups		0xe0-0x78($key),$rndkey0
+	jmp	.Lenc4x_tail
+
+.align	32
+.Lenc4x_tail:
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,@out[0]
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,@out[1]
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,@out[2]
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,@out[3]
+	 movdqu		(@inptr[0],$offset),@inp[0]
+	movdqu		0x10-0x78($key),$rndkey1
+
+	aesenclast	$rndkey0,@out[0]
+	 movdqu		(@inptr[1],$offset),@inp[1]
+	 pxor		$zero,@inp[0]
+	aesenclast	$rndkey0,@out[1]
+	 movdqu		(@inptr[2],$offset),@inp[2]
+	 pxor		$zero,@inp[1]
+	aesenclast	$rndkey0,@out[2]
+	 movdqu		(@inptr[3],$offset),@inp[3]
+	 pxor		$zero,@inp[2]
+	aesenclast	$rndkey0,@out[3]
+	movdqu		0x20-0x78($key),$rndkey0
+	 pxor		$zero,@inp[3]
+
+	movups		@out[0],-16(@outptr[0],$offset)
+	 pxor		@inp[0],@out[0]
+	movups		@out[1],-16(@outptr[1],$offset)	
+	 pxor		@inp[1],@out[1]
+	movups		@out[2],-16(@outptr[2],$offset)	
+	 pxor		@inp[2],@out[2]
+	movups		@out[3],-16(@outptr[3],$offset)
+	 pxor		@inp[3],@out[3]
+
+	dec	$num
+	jnz	.Loop_enc4x
+
+	mov	16(%rsp),%rax			# original %rsp
+	mov	24(%rsp),$num
+
+	#pxor	@inp[0],@out[0]
+	#pxor	@inp[1],@out[1]
+	#movdqu	@out[0],`40*0+24-40*2`($inp)	# output iv FIX ME!
+	#pxor	@inp[2],@out[2]
+	#movdqu	@out[1],`40*1+24-40*2`($inp)
+	#pxor	@inp[3],@out[3]
+	#movdqu	@out[2],`40*2+24-40*2`($inp)	# won't fix, let caller
+	#movdqu	@out[3],`40*3+24-40*2`($inp)	# figure this out...
+
+	lea	`40*4`($inp),$inp
+	dec	$num
+	jnz	.Lenc4x_loop_grande
+
+.Lenc4x_done:
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	movaps	-0xd8(%rax),%xmm6
+	movaps	-0xc8(%rax),%xmm7
+	movaps	-0xb8(%rax),%xmm8
+	movaps	-0xa8(%rax),%xmm9
+	movaps	-0x98(%rax),%xmm10
+	movaps	-0x88(%rax),%xmm11
+	movaps	-0x78(%rax),%xmm12
+	#movaps	-0x68(%rax),%xmm13
+	#movaps	-0x58(%rax),%xmm14
+	#movaps	-0x48(%rax),%xmm15
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	-48(%rax),%r15
+	mov	-40(%rax),%r14
+	mov	-32(%rax),%r13
+	mov	-24(%rax),%r12
+	mov	-16(%rax),%rbp
+	mov	-8(%rax),%rbx
+	lea	(%rax),%rsp
+.Lenc4x_epilogue:
+	ret
+.size	aesni_multi_cbc_encrypt,.-aesni_multi_cbc_encrypt
+
+.globl	aesni_multi_cbc_decrypt
+.type	aesni_multi_cbc_decrypt,\@function,3
+.align	32
+aesni_multi_cbc_decrypt:
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($avx);
+	cmp	\$2,$num
+	jb	.Ldec_non_avx
+	mov	OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+4(%rip),%ecx
+	test	\$`1<<28`,%ecx			# AVX bit
+	jnz	_avx_cbc_dec_shortcut
+	jmp	.Ldec_non_avx
+.align	16
+.Ldec_non_avx:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	%rsp,%rax
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	lea	-0xa8(%rsp),%rsp
+	movaps	%xmm6,(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm7,0x10(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm8,0x20(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm9,0x30(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm10,0x40(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm11,0x50(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm12,0x60(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm13,-0x68(%rax)	# not used, saved to share se_handler 
+	movaps	%xmm14,-0x58(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm15,-0x48(%rax)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	# stack layout
+	#
+	# +0	output sink
+	# +16	input sink [original %rsp and $num]
+	# +32	counters
+
+	sub	\$48,%rsp
+	and	\$-64,%rsp
+	mov	%rax,16(%rsp)			# original %rsp
+
+.Ldec4x_body:
+	movdqu	($key),$zero			# 0-round key
+	lea	0x78($key),$key			# size optimization
+	lea	40*2($inp),$inp
+
+.Ldec4x_loop_grande:
+	mov	$num,24(%rsp)			# original $num
+	xor	$num,$num
+___
+for($i=0;$i<4;$i++) {
+    $code.=<<___;
+	mov	`40*$i+16-40*2`($inp),$one	# borrow $one for number of blocks
+	mov	`40*$i+0-40*2`($inp),@inptr[$i]
+	cmp	$num,$one
+	mov	`40*$i+8-40*2`($inp),@outptr[$i]
+	cmovg	$one,$num			# find maximum
+	test	$one,$one
+	movdqu	`40*$i+24-40*2`($inp),@inp[$i]	# load IV
+	mov	$one,`32+4*$i`(%rsp)		# initialize counters
+	cmovle	%rsp,@inptr[$i]			# cancel input
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	test	$num,$num
+	jz	.Ldec4x_done
+
+	movups	0x10-0x78($key),$rndkey1
+	movups	0x20-0x78($key),$rndkey0
+	mov	0xf0-0x78($key),$rounds
+	movdqu	(@inptr[0]),@out[0]		# load inputs
+	movdqu	(@inptr[1]),@out[1]
+	 pxor	$zero,@out[0]
+	movdqu	(@inptr[2]),@out[2]
+	 pxor	$zero,@out[1]
+	movdqu	(@inptr[3]),@out[3]
+	 pxor	$zero,@out[2]
+	 pxor	$zero,@out[3]
+	movdqa	32(%rsp),$counters		# load counters
+	xor	$offset,$offset
+	jmp	.Loop_dec4x
+
+.align	32
+.Loop_dec4x:
+	add	\$16,$offset
+	lea	16(%rsp),$sink			# sink pointer
+	mov	\$1,$one			# constant of 1
+	sub	$offset,$sink
+
+	aesdec		$rndkey1,@out[0]
+	prefetcht0	31(@inptr[0],$offset)	# prefetch input
+	prefetcht0	31(@inptr[1],$offset)
+	aesdec		$rndkey1,@out[1]
+	prefetcht0	31(@inptr[2],$offset)
+	prefetcht0	31(@inptr[3],$offset)
+	aesdec		$rndkey1,@out[2]
+	aesdec		$rndkey1,@out[3]
+	movups		0x30-0x78($key),$rndkey1
+___
+for($i=0;$i<4;$i++) {
+my $rndkey = ($i&1) ? $rndkey1 : $rndkey0;
+$code.=<<___;
+	 cmp		`32+4*$i`(%rsp),$one
+	aesdec		$rndkey,@out[0]
+	aesdec		$rndkey,@out[1]
+	aesdec		$rndkey,@out[2]
+	 cmovge		$sink,@inptr[$i]	# cancel input
+	 cmovg		$sink,@outptr[$i]	# sink output
+	aesdec		$rndkey,@out[3]
+	movups		`0x40+16*$i-0x78`($key),$rndkey
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	 movdqa		$counters,$mask
+	aesdec		$rndkey0,@out[0]
+	prefetcht0	15(@outptr[0],$offset)	# prefetch output
+	prefetcht0	15(@outptr[1],$offset)
+	aesdec		$rndkey0,@out[1]
+	prefetcht0	15(@outptr[2],$offset)
+	prefetcht0	15(@outptr[3],$offset)
+	aesdec		$rndkey0,@out[2]
+	aesdec		$rndkey0,@out[3]
+	movups		0x80-0x78($key),$rndkey0
+	 pxor		$zero,$zero
+
+	aesdec		$rndkey1,@out[0]
+	 pcmpgtd	$zero,$mask
+	 movdqu		-0x78($key),$zero	# reload 0-round key
+	aesdec		$rndkey1,@out[1]
+	 paddd		$mask,$counters		# decrement counters
+	 movdqa		$counters,32(%rsp)	# update counters
+	aesdec		$rndkey1,@out[2]
+	aesdec		$rndkey1,@out[3]
+	movups		0x90-0x78($key),$rndkey1
+
+	cmp	\$11,$rounds
+
+	aesdec		$rndkey0,@out[0]
+	aesdec		$rndkey0,@out[1]
+	aesdec		$rndkey0,@out[2]
+	aesdec		$rndkey0,@out[3]
+	movups		0xa0-0x78($key),$rndkey0
+
+	jb	.Ldec4x_tail
+
+	aesdec		$rndkey1,@out[0]
+	aesdec		$rndkey1,@out[1]
+	aesdec		$rndkey1,@out[2]
+	aesdec		$rndkey1,@out[3]
+	movups		0xb0-0x78($key),$rndkey1
+
+	aesdec		$rndkey0,@out[0]
+	aesdec		$rndkey0,@out[1]
+	aesdec		$rndkey0,@out[2]
+	aesdec		$rndkey0,@out[3]
+	movups		0xc0-0x78($key),$rndkey0
+
+	je	.Ldec4x_tail
+
+	aesdec		$rndkey1,@out[0]
+	aesdec		$rndkey1,@out[1]
+	aesdec		$rndkey1,@out[2]
+	aesdec		$rndkey1,@out[3]
+	movups		0xd0-0x78($key),$rndkey1
+
+	aesdec		$rndkey0,@out[0]
+	aesdec		$rndkey0,@out[1]
+	aesdec		$rndkey0,@out[2]
+	aesdec		$rndkey0,@out[3]
+	movups		0xe0-0x78($key),$rndkey0
+	jmp	.Ldec4x_tail
+
+.align	32
+.Ldec4x_tail:
+	aesdec		$rndkey1,@out[0]
+	aesdec		$rndkey1,@out[1]
+	aesdec		$rndkey1,@out[2]
+	 pxor		$rndkey0,@inp[0]
+	 pxor		$rndkey0,@inp[1]
+	aesdec		$rndkey1,@out[3]
+	movdqu		0x10-0x78($key),$rndkey1
+	 pxor		$rndkey0,@inp[2]
+	 pxor		$rndkey0,@inp[3]
+	movdqu		0x20-0x78($key),$rndkey0
+
+	aesdeclast	@inp[0],@out[0]
+	aesdeclast	@inp[1],@out[1]
+	 movdqu		-16(@inptr[0],$offset),@inp[0]	# load next IV
+	 movdqu		-16(@inptr[1],$offset),@inp[1]
+	aesdeclast	@inp[2],@out[2]
+	aesdeclast	@inp[3],@out[3]
+	 movdqu		-16(@inptr[2],$offset),@inp[2]
+	 movdqu		-16(@inptr[3],$offset),@inp[3]
+
+	movups		@out[0],-16(@outptr[0],$offset)
+	 movdqu		(@inptr[0],$offset),@out[0]
+	movups		@out[1],-16(@outptr[1],$offset)	
+	 movdqu		(@inptr[1],$offset),@out[1]
+	 pxor		$zero,@out[0]
+	movups		@out[2],-16(@outptr[2],$offset)	
+	 movdqu		(@inptr[2],$offset),@out[2]
+	 pxor		$zero,@out[1]
+	movups		@out[3],-16(@outptr[3],$offset)
+	 movdqu		(@inptr[3],$offset),@out[3]
+	 pxor		$zero,@out[2]
+	 pxor		$zero,@out[3]
+
+	dec	$num
+	jnz	.Loop_dec4x
+
+	mov	16(%rsp),%rax			# original %rsp
+	mov	24(%rsp),$num
+
+	lea	`40*4`($inp),$inp
+	dec	$num
+	jnz	.Ldec4x_loop_grande
+
+.Ldec4x_done:
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	movaps	-0xd8(%rax),%xmm6
+	movaps	-0xc8(%rax),%xmm7
+	movaps	-0xb8(%rax),%xmm8
+	movaps	-0xa8(%rax),%xmm9
+	movaps	-0x98(%rax),%xmm10
+	movaps	-0x88(%rax),%xmm11
+	movaps	-0x78(%rax),%xmm12
+	#movaps	-0x68(%rax),%xmm13
+	#movaps	-0x58(%rax),%xmm14
+	#movaps	-0x48(%rax),%xmm15
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	-48(%rax),%r15
+	mov	-40(%rax),%r14
+	mov	-32(%rax),%r13
+	mov	-24(%rax),%r12
+	mov	-16(%rax),%rbp
+	mov	-8(%rax),%rbx
+	lea	(%rax),%rsp
+.Ldec4x_epilogue:
+	ret
+.size	aesni_multi_cbc_decrypt,.-aesni_multi_cbc_decrypt
+___
+
+						if ($avx) {{{
+my @ptr=map("%r$_",(8..15));
+my $offload=$sink;
+
+my @out=map("%xmm$_",(2..9));
+my @inp=map("%xmm$_",(10..13));
+my ($counters,$zero)=("%xmm14","%xmm15");
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.type	aesni_multi_cbc_encrypt_avx,\@function,3
+.align	32
+aesni_multi_cbc_encrypt_avx:
+_avx_cbc_enc_shortcut:
+	mov	%rsp,%rax
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	lea	-0xa8(%rsp),%rsp
+	movaps	%xmm6,(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm7,0x10(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm8,0x20(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm9,0x30(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm10,0x40(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm11,0x50(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm12,-0x78(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm13,-0x68(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm14,-0x58(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm15,-0x48(%rax)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	# stack layout
+	#
+	# +0	output sink
+	# +16	input sink [original %rsp and $num]
+	# +32	counters
+	# +64	distances between inputs and outputs
+	# +128	off-load area for @inp[0..3]
+
+	sub	\$192,%rsp
+	and	\$-128,%rsp
+	mov	%rax,16(%rsp)			# original %rsp
+
+.Lenc8x_body:
+	vzeroupper
+	vmovdqu	($key),$zero			# 0-round key
+	lea	0x78($key),$key			# size optimization
+	lea	40*4($inp),$inp
+	shr	\$1,$num
+
+.Lenc8x_loop_grande:
+	#mov	$num,24(%rsp)			# original $num
+	xor	$num,$num
+___
+for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) {
+  my $temp = $i ? $offload : $offset;
+    $code.=<<___;
+	mov	`40*$i+16-40*4`($inp),$one	# borrow $one for number of blocks
+	mov	`40*$i+0-40*4`($inp),@ptr[$i]	# input pointer
+	cmp	$num,$one
+	mov	`40*$i+8-40*4`($inp),$temp	# output pointer
+	cmovg	$one,$num			# find maximum
+	test	$one,$one
+	vmovdqu	`40*$i+24-40*4`($inp),@out[$i]	# load IV
+	mov	$one,`32+4*$i`(%rsp)		# initialize counters
+	cmovle	%rsp,@ptr[$i]			# cancel input
+	sub	@ptr[$i],$temp			# distance between input and output
+	mov	$temp,`64+8*$i`(%rsp)		# initialize distances
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	test	$num,$num
+	jz	.Lenc8x_done
+
+	vmovups	0x10-0x78($key),$rndkey1
+	vmovups	0x20-0x78($key),$rndkey0
+	mov	0xf0-0x78($key),$rounds
+
+	vpxor	(@ptr[0]),$zero,@inp[0]		# load inputs and xor with 0-round
+	 lea	128(%rsp),$offload		# offload area
+	vpxor	(@ptr[1]),$zero,@inp[1]
+	vpxor	(@ptr[2]),$zero,@inp[2]
+	vpxor	(@ptr[3]),$zero,@inp[3]
+	 vpxor	@inp[0],@out[0],@out[0]
+	vpxor	(@ptr[4]),$zero,@inp[0]
+	 vpxor	@inp[1],@out[1],@out[1]
+	vpxor	(@ptr[5]),$zero,@inp[1]
+	 vpxor	@inp[2],@out[2],@out[2]
+	vpxor	(@ptr[6]),$zero,@inp[2]
+	 vpxor	@inp[3],@out[3],@out[3]
+	vpxor	(@ptr[7]),$zero,@inp[3]
+	 vpxor	@inp[0],@out[4],@out[4]
+	mov	\$1,$one			# constant of 1
+	 vpxor	@inp[1],@out[5],@out[5]
+	 vpxor	@inp[2],@out[6],@out[6]
+	 vpxor	@inp[3],@out[7],@out[7]
+	jmp	.Loop_enc8x
+
+.align	32
+.Loop_enc8x:
+___
+for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) {
+my $rndkey=($i&1)?$rndkey0:$rndkey1;
+$code.=<<___;
+	vaesenc		$rndkey,@out[0],@out[0]
+	 cmp		32+4*$i(%rsp),$one
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i);
+	 mov		64+8*$i(%rsp),$offset
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	vaesenc		$rndkey,@out[1],@out[1]
+	prefetcht0	31(@ptr[$i])			# prefetch input
+	vaesenc		$rndkey,@out[2],@out[2]
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i>1);
+	prefetcht0	15(@ptr[$i-2])			# prefetch output
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	vaesenc		$rndkey,@out[3],@out[3]
+	 lea		(@ptr[$i],$offset),$offset
+	 cmovge		%rsp,@ptr[$i]			# cancel input
+	vaesenc		$rndkey,@out[4],@out[4]
+	 cmovg		%rsp,$offset			# sink output
+	vaesenc		$rndkey,@out[5],@out[5]
+	 sub		@ptr[$i],$offset
+	vaesenc		$rndkey,@out[6],@out[6]
+	 vpxor		16(@ptr[$i]),$zero,@inp[$i%4]	# load input and xor with 0-round
+	 mov		$offset,64+8*$i(%rsp)
+	vaesenc		$rndkey,@out[7],@out[7]
+	vmovups		`16*(3+$i)-0x78`($key),$rndkey
+	 lea		16(@ptr[$i],$offset),@ptr[$i]	# switch to output
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i<4)
+	 vmovdqu	@inp[$i%4],`16*$i`($offload)	# off-load
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	 vmovdqu	32(%rsp),$counters
+	prefetcht0	15(@ptr[$i-2])			# prefetch output
+	prefetcht0	15(@ptr[$i-1])
+	cmp	\$11,$rounds
+	jb	.Lenc8x_tail
+
+	vaesenc		$rndkey1,@out[0],@out[0]
+	vaesenc		$rndkey1,@out[1],@out[1]
+	vaesenc		$rndkey1,@out[2],@out[2]
+	vaesenc		$rndkey1,@out[3],@out[3]
+	vaesenc		$rndkey1,@out[4],@out[4]
+	vaesenc		$rndkey1,@out[5],@out[5]
+	vaesenc		$rndkey1,@out[6],@out[6]
+	vaesenc		$rndkey1,@out[7],@out[7]
+	vmovups		0xb0-0x78($key),$rndkey1
+
+	vaesenc		$rndkey0,@out[0],@out[0]
+	vaesenc		$rndkey0,@out[1],@out[1]
+	vaesenc		$rndkey0,@out[2],@out[2]
+	vaesenc		$rndkey0,@out[3],@out[3]
+	vaesenc		$rndkey0,@out[4],@out[4]
+	vaesenc		$rndkey0,@out[5],@out[5]
+	vaesenc		$rndkey0,@out[6],@out[6]
+	vaesenc		$rndkey0,@out[7],@out[7]
+	vmovups		0xc0-0x78($key),$rndkey0
+	je	.Lenc8x_tail
+
+	vaesenc		$rndkey1,@out[0],@out[0]
+	vaesenc		$rndkey1,@out[1],@out[1]
+	vaesenc		$rndkey1,@out[2],@out[2]
+	vaesenc		$rndkey1,@out[3],@out[3]
+	vaesenc		$rndkey1,@out[4],@out[4]
+	vaesenc		$rndkey1,@out[5],@out[5]
+	vaesenc		$rndkey1,@out[6],@out[6]
+	vaesenc		$rndkey1,@out[7],@out[7]
+	vmovups		0xd0-0x78($key),$rndkey1
+
+	vaesenc		$rndkey0,@out[0],@out[0]
+	vaesenc		$rndkey0,@out[1],@out[1]
+	vaesenc		$rndkey0,@out[2],@out[2]
+	vaesenc		$rndkey0,@out[3],@out[3]
+	vaesenc		$rndkey0,@out[4],@out[4]
+	vaesenc		$rndkey0,@out[5],@out[5]
+	vaesenc		$rndkey0,@out[6],@out[6]
+	vaesenc		$rndkey0,@out[7],@out[7]
+	vmovups		0xe0-0x78($key),$rndkey0
+
+.Lenc8x_tail:
+	vaesenc		$rndkey1,@out[0],@out[0]
+	 vpxor		$zero,$zero,$zero
+	vaesenc		$rndkey1,@out[1],@out[1]
+	vaesenc		$rndkey1,@out[2],@out[2]
+	 vpcmpgtd	$zero,$counters,$zero
+	vaesenc		$rndkey1,@out[3],@out[3]
+	vaesenc		$rndkey1,@out[4],@out[4]
+	 vpaddd		$counters,$zero,$zero		# decrement counters
+	 vmovdqu	48(%rsp),$counters
+	vaesenc		$rndkey1,@out[5],@out[5]
+	 mov		64(%rsp),$offset		# pre-load 1st offset
+	vaesenc		$rndkey1,@out[6],@out[6]
+	vaesenc		$rndkey1,@out[7],@out[7]
+	vmovups		0x10-0x78($key),$rndkey1
+
+	vaesenclast	$rndkey0,@out[0],@out[0]
+	 vmovdqa	$zero,32(%rsp)			# update counters
+	 vpxor		$zero,$zero,$zero
+	vaesenclast	$rndkey0,@out[1],@out[1]
+	vaesenclast	$rndkey0,@out[2],@out[2]
+	 vpcmpgtd	$zero,$counters,$zero
+	vaesenclast	$rndkey0,@out[3],@out[3]
+	vaesenclast	$rndkey0,@out[4],@out[4]
+	 vpaddd		$zero,$counters,$counters	# decrement counters
+	 vmovdqu	-0x78($key),$zero		# 0-round
+	vaesenclast	$rndkey0,@out[5],@out[5]
+	vaesenclast	$rndkey0,@out[6],@out[6]
+	 vmovdqa	$counters,48(%rsp)		# update counters
+	vaesenclast	$rndkey0,@out[7],@out[7]
+	vmovups		0x20-0x78($key),$rndkey0
+
+	vmovups		@out[0],-16(@ptr[0])		# write output
+	 sub		$offset,@ptr[0]			# switch to input
+	 vpxor		0x00($offload),@out[0],@out[0]
+	vmovups		@out[1],-16(@ptr[1])	
+	 sub		`64+1*8`(%rsp),@ptr[1]
+	 vpxor		0x10($offload),@out[1],@out[1]
+	vmovups		@out[2],-16(@ptr[2])	
+	 sub		`64+2*8`(%rsp),@ptr[2]
+	 vpxor		0x20($offload),@out[2],@out[2]
+	vmovups		@out[3],-16(@ptr[3])
+	 sub		`64+3*8`(%rsp),@ptr[3]
+	 vpxor		0x30($offload),@out[3],@out[3]
+	vmovups		@out[4],-16(@ptr[4])
+	 sub		`64+4*8`(%rsp),@ptr[4]
+	 vpxor		@inp[0],@out[4],@out[4]
+	vmovups		@out[5],-16(@ptr[5])	
+	 sub		`64+5*8`(%rsp),@ptr[5]
+	 vpxor		@inp[1],@out[5],@out[5]
+	vmovups		@out[6],-16(@ptr[6])	
+	 sub		`64+6*8`(%rsp),@ptr[6]
+	 vpxor		@inp[2],@out[6],@out[6]
+	vmovups		@out[7],-16(@ptr[7])
+	 sub		`64+7*8`(%rsp),@ptr[7]
+	 vpxor		@inp[3],@out[7],@out[7]
+
+	dec	$num
+	jnz	.Loop_enc8x
+
+	mov	16(%rsp),%rax			# original %rsp
+	#mov	24(%rsp),$num
+	#lea	`40*8`($inp),$inp
+	#dec	$num
+	#jnz	.Lenc8x_loop_grande
+
+.Lenc8x_done:
+	vzeroupper
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	movaps	-0xd8(%rax),%xmm6
+	movaps	-0xc8(%rax),%xmm7
+	movaps	-0xb8(%rax),%xmm8
+	movaps	-0xa8(%rax),%xmm9
+	movaps	-0x98(%rax),%xmm10
+	movaps	-0x88(%rax),%xmm11
+	movaps	-0x78(%rax),%xmm12
+	movaps	-0x68(%rax),%xmm13
+	movaps	-0x58(%rax),%xmm14
+	movaps	-0x48(%rax),%xmm15
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	-48(%rax),%r15
+	mov	-40(%rax),%r14
+	mov	-32(%rax),%r13
+	mov	-24(%rax),%r12
+	mov	-16(%rax),%rbp
+	mov	-8(%rax),%rbx
+	lea	(%rax),%rsp
+.Lenc8x_epilogue:
+	ret
+.size	aesni_multi_cbc_encrypt_avx,.-aesni_multi_cbc_encrypt_avx
+
+.type	aesni_multi_cbc_decrypt_avx,\@function,3
+.align	32
+aesni_multi_cbc_decrypt_avx:
+_avx_cbc_dec_shortcut:
+	mov	%rsp,%rax
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	lea	-0xa8(%rsp),%rsp
+	movaps	%xmm6,(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm7,0x10(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm8,0x20(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm9,0x30(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm10,0x40(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm11,0x50(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm12,-0x78(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm13,-0x68(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm14,-0x58(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm15,-0x48(%rax)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	# stack layout
+	#
+	# +0	output sink
+	# +16	input sink [original %rsp and $num]
+	# +32	counters
+	# +64	distances between inputs and outputs
+	# +128	off-load area for @inp[0..3]
+	# +192	IV/input offload
+
+	sub	\$256,%rsp
+	and	\$-256,%rsp
+	sub	\$192,%rsp
+	mov	%rax,16(%rsp)			# original %rsp
+
+.Ldec8x_body:
+	vzeroupper
+	vmovdqu	($key),$zero			# 0-round key
+	lea	0x78($key),$key			# size optimization
+	lea	40*4($inp),$inp
+	shr	\$1,$num
+
+.Ldec8x_loop_grande:
+	#mov	$num,24(%rsp)			# original $num
+	xor	$num,$num
+___
+for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) {
+  my $temp = $i ? $offload : $offset;
+    $code.=<<___;
+	mov	`40*$i+16-40*4`($inp),$one	# borrow $one for number of blocks
+	mov	`40*$i+0-40*4`($inp),@ptr[$i]	# input pointer
+	cmp	$num,$one
+	mov	`40*$i+8-40*4`($inp),$temp	# output pointer
+	cmovg	$one,$num			# find maximum
+	test	$one,$one
+	vmovdqu	`40*$i+24-40*4`($inp),@out[$i]	# load IV
+	mov	$one,`32+4*$i`(%rsp)		# initialize counters
+	cmovle	%rsp,@ptr[$i]			# cancel input
+	sub	@ptr[$i],$temp			# distance between input and output
+	mov	$temp,`64+8*$i`(%rsp)		# initialize distances
+	vmovdqu	@out[$i],`192+16*$i`(%rsp)	# offload IV
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	test	$num,$num
+	jz	.Ldec8x_done
+
+	vmovups	0x10-0x78($key),$rndkey1
+	vmovups	0x20-0x78($key),$rndkey0
+	mov	0xf0-0x78($key),$rounds
+	 lea	192+128(%rsp),$offload		# offload area
+
+	vmovdqu	(@ptr[0]),@out[0]		# load inputs
+	vmovdqu	(@ptr[1]),@out[1]
+	vmovdqu	(@ptr[2]),@out[2]
+	vmovdqu	(@ptr[3]),@out[3]
+	vmovdqu	(@ptr[4]),@out[4]
+	vmovdqu	(@ptr[5]),@out[5]
+	vmovdqu	(@ptr[6]),@out[6]
+	vmovdqu	(@ptr[7]),@out[7]
+	vmovdqu	@out[0],0x00($offload)		# offload inputs
+	vpxor	$zero,@out[0],@out[0]		# xor inputs with 0-round
+	vmovdqu	@out[1],0x10($offload)
+	vpxor	$zero,@out[1],@out[1]
+	vmovdqu	@out[2],0x20($offload)
+	vpxor	$zero,@out[2],@out[2]
+	vmovdqu	@out[3],0x30($offload)
+	vpxor	$zero,@out[3],@out[3]
+	vmovdqu	@out[4],0x40($offload)
+	vpxor	$zero,@out[4],@out[4]
+	vmovdqu	@out[5],0x50($offload)
+	vpxor	$zero,@out[5],@out[5]
+	vmovdqu	@out[6],0x60($offload)
+	vpxor	$zero,@out[6],@out[6]
+	vmovdqu	@out[7],0x70($offload)
+	vpxor	$zero,@out[7],@out[7]
+	xor	\$0x80,$offload
+	mov	\$1,$one			# constant of 1
+	jmp	.Loop_dec8x
+
+.align	32
+.Loop_dec8x:
+___
+for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) {
+my $rndkey=($i&1)?$rndkey0:$rndkey1;
+$code.=<<___;
+	vaesdec		$rndkey,@out[0],@out[0]
+	 cmp		32+4*$i(%rsp),$one
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i);
+	 mov		64+8*$i(%rsp),$offset
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	vaesdec		$rndkey,@out[1],@out[1]
+	prefetcht0	31(@ptr[$i])			# prefetch input
+	vaesdec		$rndkey,@out[2],@out[2]
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i>1);
+	prefetcht0	15(@ptr[$i-2])			# prefetch output
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	vaesdec		$rndkey,@out[3],@out[3]
+	 lea		(@ptr[$i],$offset),$offset
+	 cmovge		%rsp,@ptr[$i]			# cancel input
+	vaesdec		$rndkey,@out[4],@out[4]
+	 cmovg		%rsp,$offset			# sink output
+	vaesdec		$rndkey,@out[5],@out[5]
+	 sub		@ptr[$i],$offset
+	vaesdec		$rndkey,@out[6],@out[6]
+	 vmovdqu	16(@ptr[$i]),@inp[$i%4]		# load input
+	 mov		$offset,64+8*$i(%rsp)
+	vaesdec		$rndkey,@out[7],@out[7]
+	vmovups		`16*(3+$i)-0x78`($key),$rndkey
+	 lea		16(@ptr[$i],$offset),@ptr[$i]	# switch to output
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i<4);
+	 vmovdqu	@inp[$i%4],`128+16*$i`(%rsp)	# off-load
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	 vmovdqu	32(%rsp),$counters
+	prefetcht0	15(@ptr[$i-2])			# prefetch output
+	prefetcht0	15(@ptr[$i-1])
+	cmp	\$11,$rounds
+	jb	.Ldec8x_tail
+
+	vaesdec		$rndkey1,@out[0],@out[0]
+	vaesdec		$rndkey1,@out[1],@out[1]
+	vaesdec		$rndkey1,@out[2],@out[2]
+	vaesdec		$rndkey1,@out[3],@out[3]
+	vaesdec		$rndkey1,@out[4],@out[4]
+	vaesdec		$rndkey1,@out[5],@out[5]
+	vaesdec		$rndkey1,@out[6],@out[6]
+	vaesdec		$rndkey1,@out[7],@out[7]
+	vmovups		0xb0-0x78($key),$rndkey1
+
+	vaesdec		$rndkey0,@out[0],@out[0]
+	vaesdec		$rndkey0,@out[1],@out[1]
+	vaesdec		$rndkey0,@out[2],@out[2]
+	vaesdec		$rndkey0,@out[3],@out[3]
+	vaesdec		$rndkey0,@out[4],@out[4]
+	vaesdec		$rndkey0,@out[5],@out[5]
+	vaesdec		$rndkey0,@out[6],@out[6]
+	vaesdec		$rndkey0,@out[7],@out[7]
+	vmovups		0xc0-0x78($key),$rndkey0
+	je	.Ldec8x_tail
+
+	vaesdec		$rndkey1,@out[0],@out[0]
+	vaesdec		$rndkey1,@out[1],@out[1]
+	vaesdec		$rndkey1,@out[2],@out[2]
+	vaesdec		$rndkey1,@out[3],@out[3]
+	vaesdec		$rndkey1,@out[4],@out[4]
+	vaesdec		$rndkey1,@out[5],@out[5]
+	vaesdec		$rndkey1,@out[6],@out[6]
+	vaesdec		$rndkey1,@out[7],@out[7]
+	vmovups		0xd0-0x78($key),$rndkey1
+
+	vaesdec		$rndkey0,@out[0],@out[0]
+	vaesdec		$rndkey0,@out[1],@out[1]
+	vaesdec		$rndkey0,@out[2],@out[2]
+	vaesdec		$rndkey0,@out[3],@out[3]
+	vaesdec		$rndkey0,@out[4],@out[4]
+	vaesdec		$rndkey0,@out[5],@out[5]
+	vaesdec		$rndkey0,@out[6],@out[6]
+	vaesdec		$rndkey0,@out[7],@out[7]
+	vmovups		0xe0-0x78($key),$rndkey0
+
+.Ldec8x_tail:
+	vaesdec		$rndkey1,@out[0],@out[0]
+	 vpxor		$zero,$zero,$zero
+	vaesdec		$rndkey1,@out[1],@out[1]
+	vaesdec		$rndkey1,@out[2],@out[2]
+	 vpcmpgtd	$zero,$counters,$zero
+	vaesdec		$rndkey1,@out[3],@out[3]
+	vaesdec		$rndkey1,@out[4],@out[4]
+	 vpaddd		$counters,$zero,$zero		# decrement counters
+	 vmovdqu	48(%rsp),$counters
+	vaesdec		$rndkey1,@out[5],@out[5]
+	 mov		64(%rsp),$offset		# pre-load 1st offset
+	vaesdec		$rndkey1,@out[6],@out[6]
+	vaesdec		$rndkey1,@out[7],@out[7]
+	vmovups		0x10-0x78($key),$rndkey1
+
+	vaesdeclast	$rndkey0,@out[0],@out[0]
+	 vmovdqa	$zero,32(%rsp)			# update counters
+	 vpxor		$zero,$zero,$zero
+	vaesdeclast	$rndkey0,@out[1],@out[1]
+	vpxor		0x00($offload),@out[0],@out[0]	# xor with IV
+	vaesdeclast	$rndkey0,@out[2],@out[2]
+	vpxor		0x10($offload),@out[1],@out[1]
+	 vpcmpgtd	$zero,$counters,$zero
+	vaesdeclast	$rndkey0,@out[3],@out[3]
+	vpxor		0x20($offload),@out[2],@out[2]
+	vaesdeclast	$rndkey0,@out[4],@out[4]
+	vpxor		0x30($offload),@out[3],@out[3]
+	 vpaddd		$zero,$counters,$counters	# decrement counters
+	 vmovdqu	-0x78($key),$zero		# 0-round
+	vaesdeclast	$rndkey0,@out[5],@out[5]
+	vpxor		0x40($offload),@out[4],@out[4]
+	vaesdeclast	$rndkey0,@out[6],@out[6]
+	vpxor		0x50($offload),@out[5],@out[5]
+	 vmovdqa	$counters,48(%rsp)		# update counters
+	vaesdeclast	$rndkey0,@out[7],@out[7]
+	vpxor		0x60($offload),@out[6],@out[6]
+	vmovups		0x20-0x78($key),$rndkey0
+
+	vmovups		@out[0],-16(@ptr[0])		# write output
+	 sub		$offset,@ptr[0]			# switch to input
+	 vmovdqu	128+0(%rsp),@out[0]
+	vpxor		0x70($offload),@out[7],@out[7]
+	vmovups		@out[1],-16(@ptr[1])	
+	 sub		`64+1*8`(%rsp),@ptr[1]
+	 vmovdqu	@out[0],0x00($offload)
+	 vpxor		$zero,@out[0],@out[0]
+	 vmovdqu	128+16(%rsp),@out[1]
+	vmovups		@out[2],-16(@ptr[2])	
+	 sub		`64+2*8`(%rsp),@ptr[2]
+	 vmovdqu	@out[1],0x10($offload)
+	 vpxor		$zero,@out[1],@out[1]
+	 vmovdqu	128+32(%rsp),@out[2]
+	vmovups		@out[3],-16(@ptr[3])
+	 sub		`64+3*8`(%rsp),@ptr[3]
+	 vmovdqu	@out[2],0x20($offload)
+	 vpxor		$zero,@out[2],@out[2]
+	 vmovdqu	128+48(%rsp),@out[3]
+	vmovups		@out[4],-16(@ptr[4])
+	 sub		`64+4*8`(%rsp),@ptr[4]
+	 vmovdqu	@out[3],0x30($offload)
+	 vpxor		$zero,@out[3],@out[3]
+	 vmovdqu	@inp[0],0x40($offload)
+	 vpxor		@inp[0],$zero,@out[4]
+	vmovups		@out[5],-16(@ptr[5])	
+	 sub		`64+5*8`(%rsp),@ptr[5]
+	 vmovdqu	@inp[1],0x50($offload)
+	 vpxor		@inp[1],$zero,@out[5]
+	vmovups		@out[6],-16(@ptr[6])	
+	 sub		`64+6*8`(%rsp),@ptr[6]
+	 vmovdqu	@inp[2],0x60($offload)
+	 vpxor		@inp[2],$zero,@out[6]
+	vmovups		@out[7],-16(@ptr[7])
+	 sub		`64+7*8`(%rsp),@ptr[7]
+	 vmovdqu	@inp[3],0x70($offload)
+	 vpxor		@inp[3],$zero,@out[7]
+
+	xor	\$128,$offload
+	dec	$num
+	jnz	.Loop_dec8x
+
+	mov	16(%rsp),%rax			# original %rsp
+	#mov	24(%rsp),$num
+	#lea	`40*8`($inp),$inp
+	#dec	$num
+	#jnz	.Ldec8x_loop_grande
+
+.Ldec8x_done:
+	vzeroupper
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	movaps	-0xd8(%rax),%xmm6
+	movaps	-0xc8(%rax),%xmm7
+	movaps	-0xb8(%rax),%xmm8
+	movaps	-0xa8(%rax),%xmm9
+	movaps	-0x98(%rax),%xmm10
+	movaps	-0x88(%rax),%xmm11
+	movaps	-0x78(%rax),%xmm12
+	movaps	-0x68(%rax),%xmm13
+	movaps	-0x58(%rax),%xmm14
+	movaps	-0x48(%rax),%xmm15
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	-48(%rax),%r15
+	mov	-40(%rax),%r14
+	mov	-32(%rax),%r13
+	mov	-24(%rax),%r12
+	mov	-16(%rax),%rbp
+	mov	-8(%rax),%rbx
+	lea	(%rax),%rsp
+.Ldec8x_epilogue:
+	ret
+.size	aesni_multi_cbc_decrypt_avx,.-aesni_multi_cbc_decrypt_avx
+___
+						}}}
+
+if ($win64) {
+# EXCEPTION_DISPOSITION handler (EXCEPTION_RECORD *rec,ULONG64 frame,
+#		CONTEXT *context,DISPATCHER_CONTEXT *disp)
+$rec="%rcx";
+$frame="%rdx";
+$context="%r8";
+$disp="%r9";
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.extern	__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind
+.type	se_handler,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+se_handler:
+	push	%rsi
+	push	%rdi
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+	pushfq
+	sub	\$64,%rsp
+
+	mov	120($context),%rax	# pull context->Rax
+	mov	248($context),%rbx	# pull context->Rip
+
+	mov	8($disp),%rsi		# disp->ImageBase
+	mov	56($disp),%r11		# disp->HandlerData
+
+	mov	0(%r11),%r10d		# HandlerData[0]
+	lea	(%rsi,%r10),%r10	# prologue label
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip<.Lprologue
+	jb	.Lin_prologue
+
+	mov	152($context),%rax	# pull context->Rsp
+
+	mov	4(%r11),%r10d		# HandlerData[1]
+	lea	(%rsi,%r10),%r10	# epilogue label
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip>=.Lepilogue
+	jae	.Lin_prologue
+
+	mov	16(%rax),%rax		# pull saved stack pointer
+
+	mov	-8(%rax),%rbx
+	mov	-16(%rax),%rbp
+	mov	-24(%rax),%r12
+	mov	-32(%rax),%r13
+	mov	-40(%rax),%r14
+	mov	-48(%rax),%r15
+	mov	%rbx,144($context)	# restore context->Rbx
+	mov	%rbp,160($context)	# restore context->Rbp
+	mov	%r12,216($context)	# restore cotnext->R12
+	mov	%r13,224($context)	# restore cotnext->R13
+	mov	%r14,232($context)	# restore cotnext->R14
+	mov	%r15,240($context)	# restore cotnext->R15
+
+	lea	-56-10*16(%rax),%rsi
+	lea	512($context),%rdi	# &context.Xmm6
+	mov	\$20,%ecx
+	.long	0xa548f3fc		# cld; rep movsq
+
+.Lin_prologue:
+	mov	8(%rax),%rdi
+	mov	16(%rax),%rsi
+	mov	%rax,152($context)	# restore context->Rsp
+	mov	%rsi,168($context)	# restore context->Rsi
+	mov	%rdi,176($context)	# restore context->Rdi
+
+	mov	40($disp),%rdi		# disp->ContextRecord
+	mov	$context,%rsi		# context
+	mov	\$154,%ecx		# sizeof(CONTEXT)
+	.long	0xa548f3fc		# cld; rep movsq
+
+	mov	$disp,%rsi
+	xor	%rcx,%rcx		# arg1, UNW_FLAG_NHANDLER
+	mov	8(%rsi),%rdx		# arg2, disp->ImageBase
+	mov	0(%rsi),%r8		# arg3, disp->ControlPc
+	mov	16(%rsi),%r9		# arg4, disp->FunctionEntry
+	mov	40(%rsi),%r10		# disp->ContextRecord
+	lea	56(%rsi),%r11		# &disp->HandlerData
+	lea	24(%rsi),%r12		# &disp->EstablisherFrame
+	mov	%r10,32(%rsp)		# arg5
+	mov	%r11,40(%rsp)		# arg6
+	mov	%r12,48(%rsp)		# arg7
+	mov	%rcx,56(%rsp)		# arg8, (NULL)
+	call	*__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind(%rip)
+
+	mov	\$1,%eax		# ExceptionContinueSearch
+	add	\$64,%rsp
+	popfq
+	pop	%r15
+	pop	%r14
+	pop	%r13
+	pop	%r12
+	pop	%rbp
+	pop	%rbx
+	pop	%rdi
+	pop	%rsi
+	ret
+.size	se_handler,.-se_handler
+
+.section	.pdata
+.align	4
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_aesni_multi_cbc_encrypt
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_aesni_multi_cbc_encrypt
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_aesni_multi_cbc_encrypt
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_aesni_multi_cbc_decrypt
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_aesni_multi_cbc_decrypt
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_aesni_multi_cbc_decrypt
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($avx);
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_aesni_multi_cbc_encrypt_avx
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_aesni_multi_cbc_encrypt_avx
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_aesni_multi_cbc_encrypt_avx
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_aesni_multi_cbc_decrypt_avx
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_aesni_multi_cbc_decrypt_avx
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_aesni_multi_cbc_decrypt_avx
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+.section	.xdata
+.align	8
+.LSEH_info_aesni_multi_cbc_encrypt:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	se_handler
+	.rva	.Lenc4x_body,.Lenc4x_epilogue		# HandlerData[]
+.LSEH_info_aesni_multi_cbc_decrypt:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	se_handler
+	.rva	.Ldec4x_body,.Ldec4x_epilogue		# HandlerData[]
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($avx);
+.LSEH_info_aesni_multi_cbc_encrypt_avx:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	se_handler
+	.rva	.Lenc8x_body,.Lenc8x_epilogue		# HandlerData[]
+.LSEH_info_aesni_multi_cbc_decrypt_avx:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	se_handler
+	.rva	.Ldec8x_body,.Ldec8x_epilogue		# HandlerData[]
+___
+}
+####################################################################
+
+sub rex {
+  local *opcode=shift;
+  my ($dst,$src)=@_;
+  my $rex=0;
+
+    $rex|=0x04			if($dst>=8);
+    $rex|=0x01			if($src>=8);
+    push @opcode,$rex|0x40	if($rex);
+}
+
+sub aesni {
+  my $line=shift;
+  my @opcode=(0x66);
+
+    if ($line=~/(aeskeygenassist)\s+\$([x0-9a-f]+),\s*%xmm([0-9]+),\s*%xmm([0-9]+)/) {
+	rex(\@opcode,$4,$3);
+	push @opcode,0x0f,0x3a,0xdf;
+	push @opcode,0xc0|($3&7)|(($4&7)<<3);	# ModR/M
+	my $c=$2;
+	push @opcode,$c=~/^0/?oct($c):$c;
+	return ".byte\t".join(',',@opcode);
+    }
+    elsif ($line=~/(aes[a-z]+)\s+%xmm([0-9]+),\s*%xmm([0-9]+)/) {
+	my %opcodelet = (
+		"aesimc" => 0xdb,
+		"aesenc" => 0xdc,	"aesenclast" => 0xdd,
+		"aesdec" => 0xde,	"aesdeclast" => 0xdf
+	);
+	return undef if (!defined($opcodelet{$1}));
+	rex(\@opcode,$3,$2);
+	push @opcode,0x0f,0x38,$opcodelet{$1};
+	push @opcode,0xc0|($2&7)|(($3&7)<<3);	# ModR/M
+	return ".byte\t".join(',',@opcode);
+    }
+    elsif ($line=~/(aes[a-z]+)\s+([0x1-9a-fA-F]*)\(%rsp\),\s*%xmm([0-9]+)/) {
+	my %opcodelet = (
+		"aesenc" => 0xdc,	"aesenclast" => 0xdd,
+		"aesdec" => 0xde,	"aesdeclast" => 0xdf
+	);
+	return undef if (!defined($opcodelet{$1}));
+	my $off = $2;
+	push @opcode,0x44 if ($3>=8);
+	push @opcode,0x0f,0x38,$opcodelet{$1};
+	push @opcode,0x44|(($3&7)<<3),0x24;	# ModR/M
+	push @opcode,($off=~/^0/?oct($off):$off)&0xff;
+	return ".byte\t".join(',',@opcode);
+    }
+    return $line;
+}
+
+$code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval($1)/gem;
+$code =~ s/\b(aes.*%xmm[0-9]+).*$/aesni($1)/gem;
+
+print $code;
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-sha1-x86_64.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-sha1-x86_64.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..33a7f0c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-sha1-x86_64.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,2072 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# June 2011
+#
+# This is AESNI-CBC+SHA1 "stitch" implementation. The idea, as spelled
+# in http://download.intel.com/design/intarch/papers/323686.pdf, is
+# that since AESNI-CBC encrypt exhibit *very* low instruction-level
+# parallelism, interleaving it with another algorithm would allow to
+# utilize processor resources better and achieve better performance.
+# SHA1 instruction sequences(*) are taken from sha1-x86_64.pl and
+# AESNI code is weaved into it. Below are performance numbers in
+# cycles per processed byte, less is better, for standalone AESNI-CBC
+# encrypt, sum of the latter and standalone SHA1, and "stitched"
+# subroutine:
+#
+#		AES-128-CBC	+SHA1		stitch      gain
+# Westmere	3.77[+5.3]	9.07		6.55	    +38%
+# Sandy Bridge	5.05[+5.0(6.1)]	10.06(11.15)	5.98(7.05)  +68%(+58%)
+# Ivy Bridge	5.05[+4.6]	9.65		5.54        +74%
+# Haswell	4.43[+3.6(4.2)]	8.00(8.58)	4.55(5.21)  +75%(+65%)
+# Skylake	2.63[+3.5(4.1)]	6.17(6.69)	4.23(4.44)  +46%(+51%)
+# Bulldozer	5.77[+6.0]	11.72		6.37        +84%
+# Ryzen(**)	2.71[+1.93]	4.64		2.74        +69%
+# Goldmont(**)	3.82[+1.70]	5.52		4.20        +31%
+#
+#		AES-192-CBC
+# Westmere	4.51		9.81		6.80	    +44%
+# Sandy Bridge	6.05		11.06(12.15)	6.11(7.19)  +81%(+69%)
+# Ivy Bridge	6.05		10.65		6.07        +75%
+# Haswell	5.29		8.86(9.44)	5.32(5.32)  +67%(+77%)
+# Bulldozer	6.89		12.84		6.96        +84%
+#
+#		AES-256-CBC
+# Westmere	5.25		10.55		7.21	    +46%
+# Sandy Bridge	7.05		12.06(13.15)	7.12(7.72)  +69%(+70%)
+# Ivy Bridge	7.05		11.65		7.12        +64%
+# Haswell	6.19		9.76(10.34)	6.21(6.25)  +57%(+65%)
+# Skylake	3.62		7.16(7.68)	4.56(4.76)  +57%(+61%)
+# Bulldozer	8.00		13.95		8.25        +69%
+# Ryzen(**)	3.71		5.64		3.72        +52%
+# Goldmont(**)	5.35		7.05		5.76        +22%
+#
+# (*)	There are two code paths: SSSE3 and AVX. See sha1-568.pl for
+#	background information. Above numbers in parentheses are SSSE3
+#	results collected on AVX-capable CPU, i.e. apply on OSes that
+#	don't support AVX.
+# (**)	SHAEXT results.
+#
+# Needless to mention that it makes no sense to implement "stitched"
+# *decrypt* subroutine. Because *both* AESNI-CBC decrypt and SHA1
+# fully utilize parallelism, so stitching would not give any gain
+# anyway. Well, there might be some, e.g. because of better cache
+# locality... For reference, here are performance results for
+# standalone AESNI-CBC decrypt:
+#
+#		AES-128-CBC	AES-192-CBC	AES-256-CBC
+# Westmere	1.25		1.50		1.75
+# Sandy Bridge	0.74		0.91		1.09
+# Ivy Bridge	0.74		0.90		1.11
+# Haswell	0.63		0.76		0.88
+# Bulldozer	0.70		0.85		0.99
+
+# And indeed:
+#
+#		AES-256-CBC	+SHA1		stitch      gain
+# Westmere	1.75		7.20		6.68        +7.8%
+# Sandy Bridge	1.09		6.09(7.22)	5.82(6.95)  +4.6%(+3.9%)
+# Ivy Bridge	1.11		5.70		5.45        +4.6%
+# Haswell	0.88		4.45(5.00)	4.39(4.69)  +1.4%(*)(+6.6%)
+# Bulldozer	0.99		6.95		5.95        +17%(**)
+#
+# (*)	Tiny improvement coefficient on Haswell is because we compare
+#	AVX1 stitch to sum with AVX2 SHA1.
+# (**)	Execution is fully dominated by integer code sequence and
+#	SIMD still hardly shows [in single-process benchmark;-]
+
+$flavour = shift;
+$output  = shift;
+if ($flavour =~ /\./) { $output = $flavour; undef $flavour; }
+
+$win64=0; $win64=1 if ($flavour =~ /[nm]asm|mingw64/ || $output =~ /\.asm$/);
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+( $xlate="${dir}x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
+( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
+die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl";
+
+$avx=1 if (`$ENV{CC} -Wa,-v -c -o /dev/null -x assembler /dev/null 2>&1`
+		=~ /GNU assembler version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/ &&
+	   $1>=2.19);
+$avx=1 if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /nasm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /nasm/) &&
+	   `nasm -v 2>&1` =~ /NASM version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/ &&
+	   $1>=2.09);
+$avx=1 if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
+	   `ml64 2>&1` =~ /Version ([0-9]+)\./ &&
+	   $1>=10);
+$avx=1 if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/ && $2>=3.0);
+
+$shaext=1;	### set to zero if compiling for 1.0.1
+
+$stitched_decrypt=0;
+
+open OUT,"| \"$^X\" \"$xlate\" $flavour \"$output\"";
+*STDOUT=*OUT;
+
+# void aesni_cbc_sha1_enc(const void *inp,
+#			void *out,
+#			size_t length,
+#			const AES_KEY *key,
+#			unsigned char *iv,
+#			SHA_CTX *ctx,
+#			const void *in0);
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.text
+.extern	OPENSSL_ia32cap_P
+
+.globl	aesni_cbc_sha1_enc
+.type	aesni_cbc_sha1_enc,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	32
+aesni_cbc_sha1_enc:
+	# caller should check for SSSE3 and AES-NI bits
+	mov	OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+0(%rip),%r10d
+	mov	OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+4(%rip),%r11
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($shaext);
+	bt	\$61,%r11		# check SHA bit
+	jc	aesni_cbc_sha1_enc_shaext
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($avx);
+	and	\$`1<<28`,%r11d		# mask AVX bit
+	and	\$`1<<30`,%r10d		# mask "Intel CPU" bit
+	or	%r11d,%r10d
+	cmp	\$`1<<28|1<<30`,%r10d
+	je	aesni_cbc_sha1_enc_avx
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	jmp	aesni_cbc_sha1_enc_ssse3
+	ret
+.size	aesni_cbc_sha1_enc,.-aesni_cbc_sha1_enc
+___
+
+my ($in0,$out,$len,$key,$ivp,$ctx,$inp)=("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx","%rcx","%r8","%r9","%r10");
+
+my $Xi=4;
+my @X=map("%xmm$_",(4..7,0..3));
+my @Tx=map("%xmm$_",(8..10));
+my @V=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E)=("%eax","%ebx","%ecx","%edx","%ebp");	# size optimization
+my @T=("%esi","%edi");
+my $j=0; my $jj=0; my $r=0; my $sn=0; my $rx=0;
+my $K_XX_XX="%r11";
+my ($rndkey0,$iv,$in)=map("%xmm$_",(11..13));			# for enc
+my @rndkey=("%xmm14","%xmm15");					# for enc
+my ($inout0,$inout1,$inout2,$inout3)=map("%xmm$_",(12..15));	# for dec
+
+if (1) {	# reassign for Atom Silvermont
+    # The goal is to minimize amount of instructions with more than
+    # 3 prefix bytes. Or in more practical terms to keep AES-NI *and*
+    # SSSE3 instructions to upper half of the register bank.
+    @X=map("%xmm$_",(8..11,4..7));
+    @Tx=map("%xmm$_",(12,13,3));
+    ($iv,$in,$rndkey0)=map("%xmm$_",(2,14,15));
+    @rndkey=("%xmm0","%xmm1");
+}
+
+sub AUTOLOAD()		# thunk [simplified] 32-bit style perlasm
+{ my $opcode = $AUTOLOAD; $opcode =~ s/.*:://;
+  my $arg = pop;
+    $arg = "\$$arg" if ($arg*1 eq $arg);
+    $code .= "\t$opcode\t".join(',',$arg,reverse @_)."\n";
+}
+
+my $_rol=sub { &rol(@_) };
+my $_ror=sub { &ror(@_) };
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.type	aesni_cbc_sha1_enc_ssse3,\@function,6
+.align	32
+aesni_cbc_sha1_enc_ssse3:
+	mov	`($win64?56:8)`(%rsp),$inp	# load 7th argument
+	#shr	\$6,$len			# debugging artefact
+	#jz	.Lepilogue_ssse3		# debugging artefact
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+	lea	`-104-($win64?10*16:0)`(%rsp),%rsp
+	#mov	$in0,$inp			# debugging artefact
+	#lea	64(%rsp),$ctx			# debugging artefact
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	movaps	%xmm6,96+0(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm7,96+16(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm8,96+32(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm9,96+48(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm10,96+64(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm11,96+80(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm12,96+96(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm13,96+112(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm14,96+128(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm15,96+144(%rsp)
+.Lprologue_ssse3:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	$in0,%r12			# reassign arguments
+	mov	$out,%r13
+	mov	$len,%r14
+	lea	112($key),%r15			# size optimization
+	movdqu	($ivp),$iv			# load IV
+	mov	$ivp,88(%rsp)			# save $ivp
+___
+($in0,$out,$len,$key)=map("%r$_",(12..15));	# reassign arguments
+my $rounds="${ivp}d";
+$code.=<<___;
+	shl	\$6,$len
+	sub	$in0,$out
+	mov	240-112($key),$rounds
+	add	$inp,$len		# end of input
+
+	lea	K_XX_XX(%rip),$K_XX_XX
+	mov	0($ctx),$A		# load context
+	mov	4($ctx),$B
+	mov	8($ctx),$C
+	mov	12($ctx),$D
+	mov	$B,@T[0]		# magic seed
+	mov	16($ctx),$E
+	mov	$C,@T[1]
+	xor	$D,@T[1]
+	and	@T[1],@T[0]
+
+	movdqa	64($K_XX_XX),@Tx[2]	# pbswap mask
+	movdqa	0($K_XX_XX),@Tx[1]	# K_00_19
+	movdqu	0($inp),@X[-4&7]	# load input to %xmm[0-3]
+	movdqu	16($inp),@X[-3&7]
+	movdqu	32($inp),@X[-2&7]
+	movdqu	48($inp),@X[-1&7]
+	pshufb	@Tx[2],@X[-4&7]		# byte swap
+	pshufb	@Tx[2],@X[-3&7]
+	pshufb	@Tx[2],@X[-2&7]
+	add	\$64,$inp
+	paddd	@Tx[1],@X[-4&7]		# add K_00_19
+	pshufb	@Tx[2],@X[-1&7]
+	paddd	@Tx[1],@X[-3&7]
+	paddd	@Tx[1],@X[-2&7]
+	movdqa	@X[-4&7],0(%rsp)	# X[]+K xfer to IALU
+	psubd	@Tx[1],@X[-4&7]		# restore X[]
+	movdqa	@X[-3&7],16(%rsp)
+	psubd	@Tx[1],@X[-3&7]
+	movdqa	@X[-2&7],32(%rsp)
+	psubd	@Tx[1],@X[-2&7]
+	movups	-112($key),$rndkey0	# $key[0]
+	movups	16-112($key),$rndkey[0]	# forward reference
+	jmp	.Loop_ssse3
+___
+
+my $aesenc=sub {
+  use integer;
+  my ($n,$k)=($r/10,$r%10);
+    if ($k==0) {
+      $code.=<<___;
+	movups		`16*$n`($in0),$in		# load input
+	xorps		$rndkey0,$in
+___
+      $code.=<<___ if ($n);
+	movups		$iv,`16*($n-1)`($out,$in0)	# write output
+___
+      $code.=<<___;
+	xorps		$in,$iv
+	movups		`32+16*$k-112`($key),$rndkey[1]
+	aesenc		$rndkey[0],$iv
+___
+    } elsif ($k==9) {
+      $sn++;
+      $code.=<<___;
+	cmp		\$11,$rounds
+	jb		.Laesenclast$sn
+	movups		`32+16*($k+0)-112`($key),$rndkey[1]
+	aesenc		$rndkey[0],$iv
+	movups		`32+16*($k+1)-112`($key),$rndkey[0]
+	aesenc		$rndkey[1],$iv
+	je		.Laesenclast$sn
+	movups		`32+16*($k+2)-112`($key),$rndkey[1]
+	aesenc		$rndkey[0],$iv
+	movups		`32+16*($k+3)-112`($key),$rndkey[0]
+	aesenc		$rndkey[1],$iv
+.Laesenclast$sn:
+	aesenclast	$rndkey[0],$iv
+	movups		16-112($key),$rndkey[1]		# forward reference
+___
+    } else {
+      $code.=<<___;
+	movups		`32+16*$k-112`($key),$rndkey[1]
+	aesenc		$rndkey[0],$iv
+___
+    }
+    $r++;	unshift(@rndkey,pop(@rndkey));
+};
+
+sub Xupdate_ssse3_16_31()		# recall that $Xi starts with 4
+{ use integer;
+  my $body = shift;
+  my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body);	# 40 instructions
+  my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e);
+
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# ror
+	&pshufd	(@X[0],@X[-4&7],0xee);	# was &movdqa	(@X[0],@X[-3&7]);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&movdqa	(@Tx[0],@X[-1&7]);
+	  &paddd	(@Tx[1],@X[-1&7]);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	&punpcklqdq(@X[0],@X[-3&7]);	# compose "X[-14]" in "X[0]", was &palignr(@X[0],@X[-4&7],8);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# rol
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&psrldq	(@Tx[0],4);		# "X[-3]", 3 dwords
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	&pxor	(@X[0],@X[-4&7]);	# "X[0]"^="X[-16]"
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# ror
+	&pxor	(@Tx[0],@X[-2&7]);	# "X[-3]"^"X[-8]"
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	&pxor	(@X[0],@Tx[0]);		# "X[0]"^="X[-3]"^"X[-8]"
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# rol
+	  &movdqa	(eval(16*(($Xi-1)&3))."(%rsp)",@Tx[1]);	# X[]+K xfer to IALU
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	&movdqa	(@Tx[2],@X[0]);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# ror
+	&movdqa	(@Tx[0],@X[0]);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	&pslldq	(@Tx[2],12);		# "X[0]"<<96, extract one dword
+	&paddd	(@X[0],@X[0]);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	&psrld	(@Tx[0],31);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# rol
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&movdqa	(@Tx[1],@Tx[2]);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	&psrld	(@Tx[2],30);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# ror
+	&por	(@X[0],@Tx[0]);		# "X[0]"<<<=1
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	&pslld	(@Tx[1],2);
+	&pxor	(@X[0],@Tx[2]);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	  &movdqa	(@Tx[2],eval(16*(($Xi)/5))."($K_XX_XX)");	# K_XX_XX
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# rol
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	&pxor	(@X[0],@Tx[1]);		# "X[0]"^=("X[0]">>96)<<<2
+	&pshufd (@Tx[1],@X[-1&7],0xee)	if ($Xi==7);	# was &movdqa	(@Tx[0],@X[-1&7]) in Xupdate_ssse3_32_79
+
+	 foreach (@insns) { eval; }	# remaining instructions [if any]
+
+  $Xi++;	push(@X,shift(@X));	# "rotate" X[]
+		push(@Tx,shift(@Tx));
+}
+
+sub Xupdate_ssse3_32_79()
+{ use integer;
+  my $body = shift;
+  my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body);	# 32 to 44 instructions
+  my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e);
+
+	 eval(shift(@insns))		if ($Xi==8);
+	&pxor	(@X[0],@X[-4&7]);	# "X[0]"="X[-32]"^"X[-16]"
+	 eval(shift(@insns))		if ($Xi==8);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# body_20_39
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns))		if (@insns[1] =~ /_ror/);
+	 eval(shift(@insns))		if (@insns[0] =~ /_ror/);
+	&punpcklqdq(@Tx[0],@X[-1&7]);	# compose "X[-6]", was &palignr(@Tx[0],@X[-2&7],8);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# rol
+
+	&pxor	(@X[0],@X[-7&7]);	# "X[0]"^="X[-28]"
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	if ($Xi%5) {
+	  &movdqa	(@Tx[2],@Tx[1]);# "perpetuate" K_XX_XX...
+	} else {			# ... or load next one
+	  &movdqa	(@Tx[2],eval(16*($Xi/5))."($K_XX_XX)");
+	}
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# ror
+	  &paddd	(@Tx[1],@X[-1&7]);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	&pxor	(@X[0],@Tx[0]);		# "X[0]"^="X[-6]"
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# body_20_39
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# rol
+	 eval(shift(@insns))		if (@insns[0] =~ /_ror/);
+
+	&movdqa	(@Tx[0],@X[0]);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	  &movdqa	(eval(16*(($Xi-1)&3))."(%rsp)",@Tx[1]);	# X[]+K xfer to IALU
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# ror
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# body_20_39
+
+	&pslld	(@X[0],2);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&psrld	(@Tx[0],30);
+	 eval(shift(@insns))		if (@insns[0] =~ /_rol/);# rol
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# ror
+
+	&por	(@X[0],@Tx[0]);		# "X[0]"<<<=2
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# body_20_39
+	 eval(shift(@insns))		if (@insns[1] =~ /_rol/);
+	 eval(shift(@insns))		if (@insns[0] =~ /_rol/);
+	  &pshufd(@Tx[1],@X[-1&7],0xee)	if ($Xi<19);	# was &movdqa	(@Tx[1],@X[0])
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# rol
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# rol
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	 foreach (@insns) { eval; }	# remaining instructions
+
+  $Xi++;	push(@X,shift(@X));	# "rotate" X[]
+		push(@Tx,shift(@Tx));
+}
+
+sub Xuplast_ssse3_80()
+{ use integer;
+  my $body = shift;
+  my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body);	# 32 instructions
+  my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e);
+
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	  &paddd	(@Tx[1],@X[-1&7]);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	  &movdqa	(eval(16*(($Xi-1)&3))."(%rsp)",@Tx[1]);	# X[]+K xfer IALU
+
+	 foreach (@insns) { eval; }		# remaining instructions
+
+	&cmp	($inp,$len);
+	&je	(shift);
+
+	unshift(@Tx,pop(@Tx));
+
+	&movdqa	(@Tx[2],"64($K_XX_XX)");	# pbswap mask
+	&movdqa	(@Tx[1],"0($K_XX_XX)");		# K_00_19
+	&movdqu	(@X[-4&7],"0($inp)");		# load input
+	&movdqu	(@X[-3&7],"16($inp)");
+	&movdqu	(@X[-2&7],"32($inp)");
+	&movdqu	(@X[-1&7],"48($inp)");
+	&pshufb	(@X[-4&7],@Tx[2]);		# byte swap
+	&add	($inp,64);
+
+  $Xi=0;
+}
+
+sub Xloop_ssse3()
+{ use integer;
+  my $body = shift;
+  my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body);	# 32 instructions
+  my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e);
+
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&pshufb	(@X[($Xi-3)&7],@Tx[2]);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&paddd	(@X[($Xi-4)&7],@Tx[1]);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&movdqa	(eval(16*$Xi)."(%rsp)",@X[($Xi-4)&7]);	# X[]+K xfer to IALU
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&psubd	(@X[($Xi-4)&7],@Tx[1]);
+
+	foreach (@insns) { eval; }
+  $Xi++;
+}
+
+sub Xtail_ssse3()
+{ use integer;
+  my $body = shift;
+  my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body);	# 32 instructions
+  my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e);
+
+	foreach (@insns) { eval; }
+}
+
+my @body_00_19 = (
+	'($a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@V;'.
+	'&$_ror	($b,$j?7:2);',	# $b>>>2
+	'&xor	(@T[0],$d);',
+	'&mov	(@T[1],$a);',	# $b for next round
+
+	'&add	($e,eval(4*($j&15))."(%rsp)");',# X[]+K xfer
+	'&xor	($b,$c);',	# $c^$d for next round
+
+	'&$_rol	($a,5);',
+	'&add	($e,@T[0]);',
+	'&and	(@T[1],$b);',	# ($b&($c^$d)) for next round
+
+	'&xor	($b,$c);',	# restore $b
+	'&add	($e,$a);'	.'$j++; unshift(@V,pop(@V)); unshift(@T,pop(@T));'
+	);
+
+sub body_00_19 () {	# ((c^d)&b)^d
+    # on start @T[0]=(c^d)&b
+    return &body_20_39() if ($rx==19); $rx++;
+
+    use integer;
+    my ($k,$n);
+    my @r=@body_00_19;
+
+	$n = scalar(@r);
+	$k = (($jj+1)*12/20)*20*$n/12;	# 12 aesencs per these 20 rounds
+	@r[$k%$n].='&$aesenc();'	if ($jj==$k/$n);
+	$jj++;
+
+    return @r;
+}
+
+my @body_20_39 = (
+	'($a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@V;'.
+	'&add	($e,eval(4*($j&15))."(%rsp)");',# X[]+K xfer
+	'&xor	(@T[0],$d)	if($j==19);'.
+	'&xor	(@T[0],$c)	if($j> 19);',	# ($b^$d^$c)
+	'&mov	(@T[1],$a);',	# $b for next round
+
+	'&$_rol	($a,5);',
+	'&add	($e,@T[0]);',
+	'&xor	(@T[1],$c)	if ($j< 79);',	# $b^$d for next round
+
+	'&$_ror	($b,7);',	# $b>>>2
+	'&add	($e,$a);'	.'$j++; unshift(@V,pop(@V)); unshift(@T,pop(@T));'
+	);
+
+sub body_20_39 () {	# b^d^c
+    # on entry @T[0]=b^d
+    return &body_40_59() if ($rx==39); $rx++;
+
+    use integer;
+    my ($k,$n);
+    my @r=@body_20_39;
+
+	$n = scalar(@r);
+	$k = (($jj+1)*8/20)*20*$n/8;	# 8 aesencs per these 20 rounds
+	@r[$k%$n].='&$aesenc();'	if ($jj==$k/$n && $rx!=20);
+	$jj++;
+
+    return @r;
+}
+
+my @body_40_59 = (
+	'($a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@V;'.
+	'&add	($e,eval(4*($j&15))."(%rsp)");',# X[]+K xfer
+	'&and	(@T[0],$c)	if ($j>=40);',	# (b^c)&(c^d)
+	'&xor	($c,$d)		if ($j>=40);',	# restore $c
+
+	'&$_ror	($b,7);',	# $b>>>2
+	'&mov	(@T[1],$a);',	# $b for next round
+	'&xor	(@T[0],$c);',
+
+	'&$_rol	($a,5);',
+	'&add	($e,@T[0]);',
+	'&xor	(@T[1],$c)	if ($j==59);'.
+	'&xor	(@T[1],$b)	if ($j< 59);',	# b^c for next round
+
+	'&xor	($b,$c)		if ($j< 59);',	# c^d for next round
+	'&add	($e,$a);'	.'$j++; unshift(@V,pop(@V)); unshift(@T,pop(@T));'
+	);
+
+sub body_40_59 () {	# ((b^c)&(c^d))^c
+    # on entry @T[0]=(b^c), (c^=d)
+    $rx++;
+
+    use integer;
+    my ($k,$n);
+    my @r=@body_40_59;
+
+	$n = scalar(@r);
+	$k=(($jj+1)*12/20)*20*$n/12;	# 12 aesencs per these 20 rounds
+	@r[$k%$n].='&$aesenc();'	if ($jj==$k/$n && $rx!=40);
+	$jj++;
+
+    return @r;
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+.align	32
+.Loop_ssse3:
+___
+	&Xupdate_ssse3_16_31(\&body_00_19);
+	&Xupdate_ssse3_16_31(\&body_00_19);
+	&Xupdate_ssse3_16_31(\&body_00_19);
+	&Xupdate_ssse3_16_31(\&body_00_19);
+	&Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_00_19);
+	&Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_20_39);
+	&Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_20_39);
+	&Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_20_39);
+	&Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_20_39);
+	&Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_20_39);
+	&Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_40_59);
+	&Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_40_59);
+	&Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_40_59);
+	&Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_40_59);
+	&Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_40_59);
+	&Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_20_39);
+	&Xuplast_ssse3_80(\&body_20_39,".Ldone_ssse3");	# can jump to "done"
+
+				$saved_j=$j; @saved_V=@V;
+				$saved_r=$r; @saved_rndkey=@rndkey;
+
+	&Xloop_ssse3(\&body_20_39);
+	&Xloop_ssse3(\&body_20_39);
+	&Xloop_ssse3(\&body_20_39);
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	movups	$iv,48($out,$in0)		# write output
+	lea	64($in0),$in0
+
+	add	0($ctx),$A			# update context
+	add	4($ctx),@T[0]
+	add	8($ctx),$C
+	add	12($ctx),$D
+	mov	$A,0($ctx)
+	add	16($ctx),$E
+	mov	@T[0],4($ctx)
+	mov	@T[0],$B			# magic seed
+	mov	$C,8($ctx)
+	mov	$C,@T[1]
+	mov	$D,12($ctx)
+	xor	$D,@T[1]
+	mov	$E,16($ctx)
+	and	@T[1],@T[0]
+	jmp	.Loop_ssse3
+
+.Ldone_ssse3:
+___
+				$jj=$j=$saved_j; @V=@saved_V;
+				$r=$saved_r;     @rndkey=@saved_rndkey;
+
+	&Xtail_ssse3(\&body_20_39);
+	&Xtail_ssse3(\&body_20_39);
+	&Xtail_ssse3(\&body_20_39);
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	movups	$iv,48($out,$in0)		# write output
+	mov	88(%rsp),$ivp			# restore $ivp
+
+	add	0($ctx),$A			# update context
+	add	4($ctx),@T[0]
+	add	8($ctx),$C
+	mov	$A,0($ctx)
+	add	12($ctx),$D
+	mov	@T[0],4($ctx)
+	add	16($ctx),$E
+	mov	$C,8($ctx)
+	mov	$D,12($ctx)
+	mov	$E,16($ctx)
+	movups	$iv,($ivp)			# write IV
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	movaps	96+0(%rsp),%xmm6
+	movaps	96+16(%rsp),%xmm7
+	movaps	96+32(%rsp),%xmm8
+	movaps	96+48(%rsp),%xmm9
+	movaps	96+64(%rsp),%xmm10
+	movaps	96+80(%rsp),%xmm11
+	movaps	96+96(%rsp),%xmm12
+	movaps	96+112(%rsp),%xmm13
+	movaps	96+128(%rsp),%xmm14
+	movaps	96+144(%rsp),%xmm15
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	lea	`104+($win64?10*16:0)`(%rsp),%rsi
+	mov	0(%rsi),%r15
+	mov	8(%rsi),%r14
+	mov	16(%rsi),%r13
+	mov	24(%rsi),%r12
+	mov	32(%rsi),%rbp
+	mov	40(%rsi),%rbx
+	lea	48(%rsi),%rsp
+.Lepilogue_ssse3:
+	ret
+.size	aesni_cbc_sha1_enc_ssse3,.-aesni_cbc_sha1_enc_ssse3
+___
+
+						if ($stitched_decrypt) {{{
+# reset
+($in0,$out,$len,$key,$ivp,$ctx,$inp)=("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx","%rcx","%r8","%r9","%r10");
+$j=$jj=$r=$rx=0;
+$Xi=4;
+
+# reassign for Atom Silvermont (see above)
+($inout0,$inout1,$inout2,$inout3,$rndkey0)=map("%xmm$_",(0..4));
+@X=map("%xmm$_",(8..13,6,7));
+@Tx=map("%xmm$_",(14,15,5));
+
+my @aes256_dec = (
+	'&movdqu($inout0,"0x00($in0)");',
+	'&movdqu($inout1,"0x10($in0)");	&pxor	($inout0,$rndkey0);',
+	'&movdqu($inout2,"0x20($in0)");	&pxor	($inout1,$rndkey0);',
+	'&movdqu($inout3,"0x30($in0)");	&pxor	($inout2,$rndkey0);',
+
+	'&pxor	($inout3,$rndkey0);	&movups	($rndkey0,"16-112($key)");',
+	'&movaps("64(%rsp)",@X[2]);',	# save IV, originally @X[3]
+	undef,undef
+	);
+for ($i=0;$i<13;$i++) {
+    push (@aes256_dec,(
+	'&aesdec	($inout0,$rndkey0);',
+	'&aesdec	($inout1,$rndkey0);',
+	'&aesdec	($inout2,$rndkey0);',
+	'&aesdec	($inout3,$rndkey0);	&movups($rndkey0,"'.(16*($i+2)-112).'($key)");'
+	));
+    push (@aes256_dec,(undef,undef))	if (($i>=3 && $i<=5) || $i>=11);
+    push (@aes256_dec,(undef,undef))	if ($i==5);
+}
+push(@aes256_dec,(
+	'&aesdeclast	($inout0,$rndkey0);	&movups	(@X[0],"0x00($in0)");',
+	'&aesdeclast	($inout1,$rndkey0);	&movups	(@X[1],"0x10($in0)");',
+	'&aesdeclast	($inout2,$rndkey0);	&movups	(@X[2],"0x20($in0)");',
+	'&aesdeclast	($inout3,$rndkey0);	&movups	(@X[3],"0x30($in0)");',
+
+	'&xorps		($inout0,"64(%rsp)");	&movdqu	($rndkey0,"-112($key)");',
+	'&xorps		($inout1,@X[0]);	&movups	("0x00($out,$in0)",$inout0);',
+	'&xorps		($inout2,@X[1]);	&movups	("0x10($out,$in0)",$inout1);',
+	'&xorps		($inout3,@X[2]);	&movups	("0x20($out,$in0)",$inout2);',
+
+	'&movups	("0x30($out,$in0)",$inout3);'
+	));
+
+sub body_00_19_dec () {	# ((c^d)&b)^d
+    # on start @T[0]=(c^d)&b
+    return &body_20_39_dec() if ($rx==19);
+
+    my @r=@body_00_19;
+
+	unshift (@r,@aes256_dec[$rx])	if (@aes256_dec[$rx]);
+	$rx++;
+
+    return @r;
+}
+
+sub body_20_39_dec () {	# b^d^c
+    # on entry @T[0]=b^d
+    return &body_40_59_dec() if ($rx==39);
+  
+    my @r=@body_20_39;
+
+	unshift (@r,@aes256_dec[$rx])	if (@aes256_dec[$rx]);
+	$rx++;
+
+    return @r;
+}
+
+sub body_40_59_dec () {	# ((b^c)&(c^d))^c
+    # on entry @T[0]=(b^c), (c^=d)
+
+    my @r=@body_40_59;
+
+	unshift (@r,@aes256_dec[$rx])	if (@aes256_dec[$rx]);
+	$rx++;
+
+    return @r;
+}
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	aesni256_cbc_sha1_dec
+.type	aesni256_cbc_sha1_dec,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	32
+aesni256_cbc_sha1_dec:
+	# caller should check for SSSE3 and AES-NI bits
+	mov	OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+0(%rip),%r10d
+	mov	OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+4(%rip),%r11d
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($avx);
+	and	\$`1<<28`,%r11d		# mask AVX bit
+	and	\$`1<<30`,%r10d		# mask "Intel CPU" bit
+	or	%r11d,%r10d
+	cmp	\$`1<<28|1<<30`,%r10d
+	je	aesni256_cbc_sha1_dec_avx
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	jmp	aesni256_cbc_sha1_dec_ssse3
+	ret
+.size	aesni256_cbc_sha1_dec,.-aesni256_cbc_sha1_dec
+
+.type	aesni256_cbc_sha1_dec_ssse3,\@function,6
+.align	32
+aesni256_cbc_sha1_dec_ssse3:
+	mov	`($win64?56:8)`(%rsp),$inp	# load 7th argument
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+	lea	`-104-($win64?10*16:0)`(%rsp),%rsp
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	movaps	%xmm6,96+0(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm7,96+16(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm8,96+32(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm9,96+48(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm10,96+64(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm11,96+80(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm12,96+96(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm13,96+112(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm14,96+128(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm15,96+144(%rsp)
+.Lprologue_dec_ssse3:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	$in0,%r12			# reassign arguments
+	mov	$out,%r13
+	mov	$len,%r14
+	lea	112($key),%r15			# size optimization
+	movdqu	($ivp),@X[3]			# load IV
+	#mov	$ivp,88(%rsp)			# save $ivp
+___
+($in0,$out,$len,$key)=map("%r$_",(12..15));	# reassign arguments
+$code.=<<___;
+	shl	\$6,$len
+	sub	$in0,$out
+	add	$inp,$len		# end of input
+
+	lea	K_XX_XX(%rip),$K_XX_XX
+	mov	0($ctx),$A		# load context
+	mov	4($ctx),$B
+	mov	8($ctx),$C
+	mov	12($ctx),$D
+	mov	$B,@T[0]		# magic seed
+	mov	16($ctx),$E
+	mov	$C,@T[1]
+	xor	$D,@T[1]
+	and	@T[1],@T[0]
+
+	movdqa	64($K_XX_XX),@Tx[2]	# pbswap mask
+	movdqa	0($K_XX_XX),@Tx[1]	# K_00_19
+	movdqu	0($inp),@X[-4&7]	# load input to %xmm[0-3]
+	movdqu	16($inp),@X[-3&7]
+	movdqu	32($inp),@X[-2&7]
+	movdqu	48($inp),@X[-1&7]
+	pshufb	@Tx[2],@X[-4&7]		# byte swap
+	add	\$64,$inp
+	pshufb	@Tx[2],@X[-3&7]
+	pshufb	@Tx[2],@X[-2&7]
+	pshufb	@Tx[2],@X[-1&7]
+	paddd	@Tx[1],@X[-4&7]		# add K_00_19
+	paddd	@Tx[1],@X[-3&7]
+	paddd	@Tx[1],@X[-2&7]
+	movdqa	@X[-4&7],0(%rsp)	# X[]+K xfer to IALU
+	psubd	@Tx[1],@X[-4&7]		# restore X[]
+	movdqa	@X[-3&7],16(%rsp)
+	psubd	@Tx[1],@X[-3&7]
+	movdqa	@X[-2&7],32(%rsp)
+	psubd	@Tx[1],@X[-2&7]
+	movdqu	-112($key),$rndkey0	# $key[0]
+	jmp	.Loop_dec_ssse3
+
+.align	32
+.Loop_dec_ssse3:
+___
+	&Xupdate_ssse3_16_31(\&body_00_19_dec);
+	&Xupdate_ssse3_16_31(\&body_00_19_dec);
+	&Xupdate_ssse3_16_31(\&body_00_19_dec);
+	&Xupdate_ssse3_16_31(\&body_00_19_dec);
+	&Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_00_19_dec);
+	&Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_20_39_dec);
+	&Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_20_39_dec);
+	&Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_20_39_dec);
+	&Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_20_39_dec);
+	&Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_20_39_dec);
+	&Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_40_59_dec);
+	&Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_40_59_dec);
+	&Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_40_59_dec);
+	&Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_40_59_dec);
+	&Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_40_59_dec);
+	&Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_20_39_dec);
+	&Xuplast_ssse3_80(\&body_20_39_dec,".Ldone_dec_ssse3");	# can jump to "done"
+
+				$saved_j=$j;   @saved_V=@V;
+				$saved_rx=$rx;
+
+	&Xloop_ssse3(\&body_20_39_dec);
+	&Xloop_ssse3(\&body_20_39_dec);
+	&Xloop_ssse3(\&body_20_39_dec);
+
+	eval(@aes256_dec[-1]);			# last store
+$code.=<<___;
+	lea	64($in0),$in0
+
+	add	0($ctx),$A			# update context
+	add	4($ctx),@T[0]
+	add	8($ctx),$C
+	add	12($ctx),$D
+	mov	$A,0($ctx)
+	add	16($ctx),$E
+	mov	@T[0],4($ctx)
+	mov	@T[0],$B			# magic seed
+	mov	$C,8($ctx)
+	mov	$C,@T[1]
+	mov	$D,12($ctx)
+	xor	$D,@T[1]
+	mov	$E,16($ctx)
+	and	@T[1],@T[0]
+	jmp	.Loop_dec_ssse3
+
+.Ldone_dec_ssse3:
+___
+				$jj=$j=$saved_j; @V=@saved_V;
+				$rx=$saved_rx;
+
+	&Xtail_ssse3(\&body_20_39_dec);
+	&Xtail_ssse3(\&body_20_39_dec);
+	&Xtail_ssse3(\&body_20_39_dec);
+
+	eval(@aes256_dec[-1]);			# last store
+$code.=<<___;
+	add	0($ctx),$A			# update context
+	add	4($ctx),@T[0]
+	add	8($ctx),$C
+	mov	$A,0($ctx)
+	add	12($ctx),$D
+	mov	@T[0],4($ctx)
+	add	16($ctx),$E
+	mov	$C,8($ctx)
+	mov	$D,12($ctx)
+	mov	$E,16($ctx)
+	movups	@X[3],($ivp)			# write IV
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	movaps	96+0(%rsp),%xmm6
+	movaps	96+16(%rsp),%xmm7
+	movaps	96+32(%rsp),%xmm8
+	movaps	96+48(%rsp),%xmm9
+	movaps	96+64(%rsp),%xmm10
+	movaps	96+80(%rsp),%xmm11
+	movaps	96+96(%rsp),%xmm12
+	movaps	96+112(%rsp),%xmm13
+	movaps	96+128(%rsp),%xmm14
+	movaps	96+144(%rsp),%xmm15
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	lea	`104+($win64?10*16:0)`(%rsp),%rsi
+	mov	0(%rsi),%r15
+	mov	8(%rsi),%r14
+	mov	16(%rsi),%r13
+	mov	24(%rsi),%r12
+	mov	32(%rsi),%rbp
+	mov	40(%rsi),%rbx
+	lea	48(%rsi),%rsp
+.Lepilogue_dec_ssse3:
+	ret
+.size	aesni256_cbc_sha1_dec_ssse3,.-aesni256_cbc_sha1_dec_ssse3
+___
+						}}}
+$j=$jj=$r=$rx=0;
+
+if ($avx) {
+my ($in0,$out,$len,$key,$ivp,$ctx,$inp)=("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx","%rcx","%r8","%r9","%r10");
+
+my $Xi=4;
+my @X=map("%xmm$_",(4..7,0..3));
+my @Tx=map("%xmm$_",(8..10));
+my @V=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E)=("%eax","%ebx","%ecx","%edx","%ebp");	# size optimization
+my @T=("%esi","%edi");
+my ($rndkey0,$iv,$in)=map("%xmm$_",(11..13));
+my @rndkey=("%xmm14","%xmm15");
+my ($inout0,$inout1,$inout2,$inout3)=map("%xmm$_",(12..15));	# for dec
+my $Kx=@Tx[2];
+
+my $_rol=sub { &shld(@_[0],@_) };
+my $_ror=sub { &shrd(@_[0],@_) };
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.type	aesni_cbc_sha1_enc_avx,\@function,6
+.align	32
+aesni_cbc_sha1_enc_avx:
+	mov	`($win64?56:8)`(%rsp),$inp	# load 7th argument
+	#shr	\$6,$len			# debugging artefact
+	#jz	.Lepilogue_avx			# debugging artefact
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+	lea	`-104-($win64?10*16:0)`(%rsp),%rsp
+	#mov	$in0,$inp			# debugging artefact
+	#lea	64(%rsp),$ctx			# debugging artefact
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	movaps	%xmm6,96+0(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm7,96+16(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm8,96+32(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm9,96+48(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm10,96+64(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm11,96+80(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm12,96+96(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm13,96+112(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm14,96+128(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm15,96+144(%rsp)
+.Lprologue_avx:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	vzeroall
+	mov	$in0,%r12			# reassign arguments
+	mov	$out,%r13
+	mov	$len,%r14
+	lea	112($key),%r15			# size optimization
+	vmovdqu	($ivp),$iv			# load IV
+	mov	$ivp,88(%rsp)			# save $ivp
+___
+($in0,$out,$len,$key)=map("%r$_",(12..15));	# reassign arguments
+my $rounds="${ivp}d";
+$code.=<<___;
+	shl	\$6,$len
+	sub	$in0,$out
+	mov	240-112($key),$rounds
+	add	$inp,$len		# end of input
+
+	lea	K_XX_XX(%rip),$K_XX_XX
+	mov	0($ctx),$A		# load context
+	mov	4($ctx),$B
+	mov	8($ctx),$C
+	mov	12($ctx),$D
+	mov	$B,@T[0]		# magic seed
+	mov	16($ctx),$E
+	mov	$C,@T[1]
+	xor	$D,@T[1]
+	and	@T[1],@T[0]
+
+	vmovdqa	64($K_XX_XX),@X[2]	# pbswap mask
+	vmovdqa	0($K_XX_XX),$Kx		# K_00_19
+	vmovdqu	0($inp),@X[-4&7]	# load input to %xmm[0-3]
+	vmovdqu	16($inp),@X[-3&7]
+	vmovdqu	32($inp),@X[-2&7]
+	vmovdqu	48($inp),@X[-1&7]
+	vpshufb	@X[2],@X[-4&7],@X[-4&7]	# byte swap
+	add	\$64,$inp
+	vpshufb	@X[2],@X[-3&7],@X[-3&7]
+	vpshufb	@X[2],@X[-2&7],@X[-2&7]
+	vpshufb	@X[2],@X[-1&7],@X[-1&7]
+	vpaddd	$Kx,@X[-4&7],@X[0]	# add K_00_19
+	vpaddd	$Kx,@X[-3&7],@X[1]
+	vpaddd	$Kx,@X[-2&7],@X[2]
+	vmovdqa	@X[0],0(%rsp)		# X[]+K xfer to IALU
+	vmovdqa	@X[1],16(%rsp)
+	vmovdqa	@X[2],32(%rsp)
+	vmovups	-112($key),$rndkey[1]	# $key[0]
+	vmovups	16-112($key),$rndkey[0]	# forward reference
+	jmp	.Loop_avx
+___
+
+my $aesenc=sub {
+  use integer;
+  my ($n,$k)=($r/10,$r%10);
+    if ($k==0) {
+      $code.=<<___;
+	vmovdqu		`16*$n`($in0),$in		# load input
+	vpxor		$rndkey[1],$in,$in
+___
+      $code.=<<___ if ($n);
+	vmovups		$iv,`16*($n-1)`($out,$in0)	# write output
+___
+      $code.=<<___;
+	vpxor		$in,$iv,$iv
+	vaesenc		$rndkey[0],$iv,$iv
+	vmovups		`32+16*$k-112`($key),$rndkey[1]
+___
+    } elsif ($k==9) {
+      $sn++;
+      $code.=<<___;
+	cmp		\$11,$rounds
+	jb		.Lvaesenclast$sn
+	vaesenc		$rndkey[0],$iv,$iv
+	vmovups		`32+16*($k+0)-112`($key),$rndkey[1]
+	vaesenc		$rndkey[1],$iv,$iv
+	vmovups		`32+16*($k+1)-112`($key),$rndkey[0]
+	je		.Lvaesenclast$sn
+	vaesenc		$rndkey[0],$iv,$iv
+	vmovups		`32+16*($k+2)-112`($key),$rndkey[1]
+	vaesenc		$rndkey[1],$iv,$iv
+	vmovups		`32+16*($k+3)-112`($key),$rndkey[0]
+.Lvaesenclast$sn:
+	vaesenclast	$rndkey[0],$iv,$iv
+	vmovups		-112($key),$rndkey[0]
+	vmovups		16-112($key),$rndkey[1]		# forward reference
+___
+    } else {
+      $code.=<<___;
+	vaesenc		$rndkey[0],$iv,$iv
+	vmovups		`32+16*$k-112`($key),$rndkey[1]
+___
+    }
+    $r++;	unshift(@rndkey,pop(@rndkey));
+};
+
+sub Xupdate_avx_16_31()		# recall that $Xi starts with 4
+{ use integer;
+  my $body = shift;
+  my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body);	# 40 instructions
+  my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e);
+
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&vpalignr(@X[0],@X[-3&7],@X[-4&7],8);	# compose "X[-14]" in "X[0]"
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	  &vpaddd	(@Tx[1],$Kx,@X[-1&7]);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&vpsrldq(@Tx[0],@X[-1&7],4);		# "X[-3]", 3 dwords
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&vpxor	(@X[0],@X[0],@X[-4&7]);		# "X[0]"^="X[-16]"
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	&vpxor	(@Tx[0],@Tx[0],@X[-2&7]);	# "X[-3]"^"X[-8]"
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	&vpxor	(@X[0],@X[0],@Tx[0]);		# "X[0]"^="X[-3]"^"X[-8]"
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	  &vmovdqa	(eval(16*(($Xi-1)&3))."(%rsp)",@Tx[1]);	# X[]+K xfer to IALU
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	&vpsrld	(@Tx[0],@X[0],31);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	&vpslldq(@Tx[1],@X[0],12);		# "X[0]"<<96, extract one dword
+	&vpaddd	(@X[0],@X[0],@X[0]);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	&vpor	(@X[0],@X[0],@Tx[0]);		# "X[0]"<<<=1
+	&vpsrld	(@Tx[0],@Tx[1],30);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	&vpslld	(@Tx[1],@Tx[1],2);
+	&vpxor	(@X[0],@X[0],@Tx[0]);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	&vpxor	(@X[0],@X[0],@Tx[1]);		# "X[0]"^=("X[0]">>96)<<<2
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	  &vmovdqa	($Kx,eval(16*(($Xi)/5))."($K_XX_XX)")	if ($Xi%5==0);	# K_XX_XX
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+
+	 foreach (@insns) { eval; }	# remaining instructions [if any]
+
+  $Xi++;	push(@X,shift(@X));	# "rotate" X[]
+}
+
+sub Xupdate_avx_32_79()
+{ use integer;
+  my $body = shift;
+  my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body);	# 32 to 48 instructions
+  my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e);
+
+	&vpalignr(@Tx[0],@X[-1&7],@X[-2&7],8);	# compose "X[-6]"
+	&vpxor	(@X[0],@X[0],@X[-4&7]);		# "X[0]"="X[-32]"^"X[-16]"
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# body_20_39
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# rol
+
+	&vpxor	(@X[0],@X[0],@X[-7&7]);		# "X[0]"^="X[-28]"
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns))	if (@insns[0] !~ /&ro[rl]/);
+	  &vpaddd	(@Tx[1],$Kx,@X[-1&7]);
+	  &vmovdqa	($Kx,eval(16*($Xi/5))."($K_XX_XX)")	if ($Xi%5==0);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# ror
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	&vpxor	(@X[0],@X[0],@Tx[0]);		# "X[0]"^="X[-6]"
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# body_20_39
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# rol
+
+	&vpsrld	(@Tx[0],@X[0],30);
+	  &vmovdqa	(eval(16*(($Xi-1)&3))."(%rsp)",@Tx[1]);	# X[]+K xfer to IALU
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# ror
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	&vpslld	(@X[0],@X[0],2);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# body_20_39
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# rol
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# ror
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	&vpor	(@X[0],@X[0],@Tx[0]);		# "X[0]"<<<=2
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# body_20_39
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# rol
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# rol
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	 foreach (@insns) { eval; }	# remaining instructions
+
+  $Xi++;	push(@X,shift(@X));	# "rotate" X[]
+}
+
+sub Xuplast_avx_80()
+{ use integer;
+  my $body = shift;
+  my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body);	# 32 instructions
+  my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e);
+
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	  &vpaddd	(@Tx[1],$Kx,@X[-1&7]);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	  &vmovdqa	(eval(16*(($Xi-1)&3))."(%rsp)",@Tx[1]);	# X[]+K xfer IALU
+
+	 foreach (@insns) { eval; }		# remaining instructions
+
+	&cmp	($inp,$len);
+	&je	(shift);
+
+	&vmovdqa(@Tx[1],"64($K_XX_XX)");	# pbswap mask
+	&vmovdqa($Kx,"0($K_XX_XX)");		# K_00_19
+	&vmovdqu(@X[-4&7],"0($inp)");		# load input
+	&vmovdqu(@X[-3&7],"16($inp)");
+	&vmovdqu(@X[-2&7],"32($inp)");
+	&vmovdqu(@X[-1&7],"48($inp)");
+	&vpshufb(@X[-4&7],@X[-4&7],@Tx[1]);	# byte swap
+	&add	($inp,64);
+
+  $Xi=0;
+}
+
+sub Xloop_avx()
+{ use integer;
+  my $body = shift;
+  my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body);	# 32 instructions
+  my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e);
+
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&vpshufb(@X[($Xi-3)&7],@X[($Xi-3)&7],@Tx[1]);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&vpaddd	(@Tx[0],@X[($Xi-4)&7],$Kx);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&vmovdqa(eval(16*$Xi)."(%rsp)",@Tx[0]);	# X[]+K xfer to IALU
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	foreach (@insns) { eval; }
+  $Xi++;
+}
+
+sub Xtail_avx()
+{ use integer;
+  my $body = shift;
+  my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body);	# 32 instructions
+  my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e);
+
+	foreach (@insns) { eval; }
+}
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.align	32
+.Loop_avx:
+___
+	&Xupdate_avx_16_31(\&body_00_19);
+	&Xupdate_avx_16_31(\&body_00_19);
+	&Xupdate_avx_16_31(\&body_00_19);
+	&Xupdate_avx_16_31(\&body_00_19);
+	&Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_00_19);
+	&Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_20_39);
+	&Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_20_39);
+	&Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_20_39);
+	&Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_20_39);
+	&Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_20_39);
+	&Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_40_59);
+	&Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_40_59);
+	&Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_40_59);
+	&Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_40_59);
+	&Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_40_59);
+	&Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_20_39);
+	&Xuplast_avx_80(\&body_20_39,".Ldone_avx");	# can jump to "done"
+
+				$saved_j=$j; @saved_V=@V;
+				$saved_r=$r; @saved_rndkey=@rndkey;
+
+	&Xloop_avx(\&body_20_39);
+	&Xloop_avx(\&body_20_39);
+	&Xloop_avx(\&body_20_39);
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	vmovups	$iv,48($out,$in0)		# write output
+	lea	64($in0),$in0
+
+	add	0($ctx),$A			# update context
+	add	4($ctx),@T[0]
+	add	8($ctx),$C
+	add	12($ctx),$D
+	mov	$A,0($ctx)
+	add	16($ctx),$E
+	mov	@T[0],4($ctx)
+	mov	@T[0],$B			# magic seed
+	mov	$C,8($ctx)
+	mov	$C,@T[1]
+	mov	$D,12($ctx)
+	xor	$D,@T[1]
+	mov	$E,16($ctx)
+	and	@T[1],@T[0]
+	jmp	.Loop_avx
+
+.Ldone_avx:
+___
+				$jj=$j=$saved_j; @V=@saved_V;
+				$r=$saved_r;     @rndkey=@saved_rndkey;
+
+	&Xtail_avx(\&body_20_39);
+	&Xtail_avx(\&body_20_39);
+	&Xtail_avx(\&body_20_39);
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	vmovups	$iv,48($out,$in0)		# write output
+	mov	88(%rsp),$ivp			# restore $ivp
+
+	add	0($ctx),$A			# update context
+	add	4($ctx),@T[0]
+	add	8($ctx),$C
+	mov	$A,0($ctx)
+	add	12($ctx),$D
+	mov	@T[0],4($ctx)
+	add	16($ctx),$E
+	mov	$C,8($ctx)
+	mov	$D,12($ctx)
+	mov	$E,16($ctx)
+	vmovups	$iv,($ivp)			# write IV
+	vzeroall
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	movaps	96+0(%rsp),%xmm6
+	movaps	96+16(%rsp),%xmm7
+	movaps	96+32(%rsp),%xmm8
+	movaps	96+48(%rsp),%xmm9
+	movaps	96+64(%rsp),%xmm10
+	movaps	96+80(%rsp),%xmm11
+	movaps	96+96(%rsp),%xmm12
+	movaps	96+112(%rsp),%xmm13
+	movaps	96+128(%rsp),%xmm14
+	movaps	96+144(%rsp),%xmm15
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	lea	`104+($win64?10*16:0)`(%rsp),%rsi
+	mov	0(%rsi),%r15
+	mov	8(%rsi),%r14
+	mov	16(%rsi),%r13
+	mov	24(%rsi),%r12
+	mov	32(%rsi),%rbp
+	mov	40(%rsi),%rbx
+	lea	48(%rsi),%rsp
+.Lepilogue_avx:
+	ret
+.size	aesni_cbc_sha1_enc_avx,.-aesni_cbc_sha1_enc_avx
+___
+
+						if ($stitched_decrypt) {{{
+# reset
+($in0,$out,$len,$key,$ivp,$ctx,$inp)=("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx","%rcx","%r8","%r9","%r10");
+
+$j=$jj=$r=$rx=0;
+$Xi=4;
+
+@aes256_dec = (
+	'&vpxor	($inout0,$rndkey0,"0x00($in0)");',
+	'&vpxor	($inout1,$rndkey0,"0x10($in0)");',
+	'&vpxor	($inout2,$rndkey0,"0x20($in0)");',
+	'&vpxor	($inout3,$rndkey0,"0x30($in0)");',
+
+	'&vmovups($rndkey0,"16-112($key)");',
+	'&vmovups("64(%rsp)",@X[2]);',		# save IV, originally @X[3]
+	undef,undef
+	);
+for ($i=0;$i<13;$i++) {
+    push (@aes256_dec,(
+	'&vaesdec	($inout0,$inout0,$rndkey0);',
+	'&vaesdec	($inout1,$inout1,$rndkey0);',
+	'&vaesdec	($inout2,$inout2,$rndkey0);',
+	'&vaesdec	($inout3,$inout3,$rndkey0);	&vmovups($rndkey0,"'.(16*($i+2)-112).'($key)");'
+	));
+    push (@aes256_dec,(undef,undef))	if (($i>=3 && $i<=5) || $i>=11);
+    push (@aes256_dec,(undef,undef))	if ($i==5);
+}
+push(@aes256_dec,(
+	'&vaesdeclast	($inout0,$inout0,$rndkey0);	&vmovups(@X[0],"0x00($in0)");',
+	'&vaesdeclast	($inout1,$inout1,$rndkey0);	&vmovups(@X[1],"0x10($in0)");',
+	'&vaesdeclast	($inout2,$inout2,$rndkey0);	&vmovups(@X[2],"0x20($in0)");',
+	'&vaesdeclast	($inout3,$inout3,$rndkey0);	&vmovups(@X[3],"0x30($in0)");',
+
+	'&vxorps	($inout0,$inout0,"64(%rsp)");	&vmovdqu($rndkey0,"-112($key)");',
+	'&vxorps	($inout1,$inout1,@X[0]);	&vmovups("0x00($out,$in0)",$inout0);',
+	'&vxorps	($inout2,$inout2,@X[1]);	&vmovups("0x10($out,$in0)",$inout1);',
+	'&vxorps	($inout3,$inout3,@X[2]);	&vmovups("0x20($out,$in0)",$inout2);',
+
+	'&vmovups	("0x30($out,$in0)",$inout3);'
+	));
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.type	aesni256_cbc_sha1_dec_avx,\@function,6
+.align	32
+aesni256_cbc_sha1_dec_avx:
+	mov	`($win64?56:8)`(%rsp),$inp	# load 7th argument
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+	lea	`-104-($win64?10*16:0)`(%rsp),%rsp
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	movaps	%xmm6,96+0(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm7,96+16(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm8,96+32(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm9,96+48(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm10,96+64(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm11,96+80(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm12,96+96(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm13,96+112(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm14,96+128(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm15,96+144(%rsp)
+.Lprologue_dec_avx:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	vzeroall
+	mov	$in0,%r12			# reassign arguments
+	mov	$out,%r13
+	mov	$len,%r14
+	lea	112($key),%r15			# size optimization
+	vmovdqu	($ivp),@X[3]			# load IV
+___
+($in0,$out,$len,$key)=map("%r$_",(12..15));	# reassign arguments
+$code.=<<___;
+	shl	\$6,$len
+	sub	$in0,$out
+	add	$inp,$len		# end of input
+
+	lea	K_XX_XX(%rip),$K_XX_XX
+	mov	0($ctx),$A		# load context
+	mov	4($ctx),$B
+	mov	8($ctx),$C
+	mov	12($ctx),$D
+	mov	$B,@T[0]		# magic seed
+	mov	16($ctx),$E
+	mov	$C,@T[1]
+	xor	$D,@T[1]
+	and	@T[1],@T[0]
+
+	vmovdqa	64($K_XX_XX),@X[2]	# pbswap mask
+	vmovdqa	0($K_XX_XX),$Kx		# K_00_19
+	vmovdqu	0($inp),@X[-4&7]	# load input to %xmm[0-3]
+	vmovdqu	16($inp),@X[-3&7]
+	vmovdqu	32($inp),@X[-2&7]
+	vmovdqu	48($inp),@X[-1&7]
+	vpshufb	@X[2],@X[-4&7],@X[-4&7]	# byte swap
+	add	\$64,$inp
+	vpshufb	@X[2],@X[-3&7],@X[-3&7]
+	vpshufb	@X[2],@X[-2&7],@X[-2&7]
+	vpshufb	@X[2],@X[-1&7],@X[-1&7]
+	vpaddd	$Kx,@X[-4&7],@X[0]	# add K_00_19
+	vpaddd	$Kx,@X[-3&7],@X[1]
+	vpaddd	$Kx,@X[-2&7],@X[2]
+	vmovdqa	@X[0],0(%rsp)		# X[]+K xfer to IALU
+	vmovdqa	@X[1],16(%rsp)
+	vmovdqa	@X[2],32(%rsp)
+	vmovups	-112($key),$rndkey0	# $key[0]
+	jmp	.Loop_dec_avx
+
+.align	32
+.Loop_dec_avx:
+___
+	&Xupdate_avx_16_31(\&body_00_19_dec);
+	&Xupdate_avx_16_31(\&body_00_19_dec);
+	&Xupdate_avx_16_31(\&body_00_19_dec);
+	&Xupdate_avx_16_31(\&body_00_19_dec);
+	&Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_00_19_dec);
+	&Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_20_39_dec);
+	&Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_20_39_dec);
+	&Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_20_39_dec);
+	&Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_20_39_dec);
+	&Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_20_39_dec);
+	&Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_40_59_dec);
+	&Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_40_59_dec);
+	&Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_40_59_dec);
+	&Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_40_59_dec);
+	&Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_40_59_dec);
+	&Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_20_39_dec);
+	&Xuplast_avx_80(\&body_20_39_dec,".Ldone_dec_avx");	# can jump to "done"
+
+				$saved_j=$j; @saved_V=@V;
+				$saved_rx=$rx;
+
+	&Xloop_avx(\&body_20_39_dec);
+	&Xloop_avx(\&body_20_39_dec);
+	&Xloop_avx(\&body_20_39_dec);
+
+	eval(@aes256_dec[-1]);			# last store
+$code.=<<___;
+	lea	64($in0),$in0
+
+	add	0($ctx),$A			# update context
+	add	4($ctx),@T[0]
+	add	8($ctx),$C
+	add	12($ctx),$D
+	mov	$A,0($ctx)
+	add	16($ctx),$E
+	mov	@T[0],4($ctx)
+	mov	@T[0],$B			# magic seed
+	mov	$C,8($ctx)
+	mov	$C,@T[1]
+	mov	$D,12($ctx)
+	xor	$D,@T[1]
+	mov	$E,16($ctx)
+	and	@T[1],@T[0]
+	jmp	.Loop_dec_avx
+
+.Ldone_dec_avx:
+___
+				$jj=$j=$saved_j; @V=@saved_V;
+				$rx=$saved_rx;
+
+	&Xtail_avx(\&body_20_39_dec);
+	&Xtail_avx(\&body_20_39_dec);
+	&Xtail_avx(\&body_20_39_dec);
+
+	eval(@aes256_dec[-1]);			# last store
+$code.=<<___;
+
+	add	0($ctx),$A			# update context
+	add	4($ctx),@T[0]
+	add	8($ctx),$C
+	mov	$A,0($ctx)
+	add	12($ctx),$D
+	mov	@T[0],4($ctx)
+	add	16($ctx),$E
+	mov	$C,8($ctx)
+	mov	$D,12($ctx)
+	mov	$E,16($ctx)
+	vmovups	@X[3],($ivp)			# write IV
+	vzeroall
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	movaps	96+0(%rsp),%xmm6
+	movaps	96+16(%rsp),%xmm7
+	movaps	96+32(%rsp),%xmm8
+	movaps	96+48(%rsp),%xmm9
+	movaps	96+64(%rsp),%xmm10
+	movaps	96+80(%rsp),%xmm11
+	movaps	96+96(%rsp),%xmm12
+	movaps	96+112(%rsp),%xmm13
+	movaps	96+128(%rsp),%xmm14
+	movaps	96+144(%rsp),%xmm15
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	lea	`104+($win64?10*16:0)`(%rsp),%rsi
+	mov	0(%rsi),%r15
+	mov	8(%rsi),%r14
+	mov	16(%rsi),%r13
+	mov	24(%rsi),%r12
+	mov	32(%rsi),%rbp
+	mov	40(%rsi),%rbx
+	lea	48(%rsi),%rsp
+.Lepilogue_dec_avx:
+	ret
+.size	aesni256_cbc_sha1_dec_avx,.-aesni256_cbc_sha1_dec_avx
+___
+						}}}
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+.align	64
+K_XX_XX:
+.long	0x5a827999,0x5a827999,0x5a827999,0x5a827999	# K_00_19
+.long	0x6ed9eba1,0x6ed9eba1,0x6ed9eba1,0x6ed9eba1	# K_20_39
+.long	0x8f1bbcdc,0x8f1bbcdc,0x8f1bbcdc,0x8f1bbcdc	# K_40_59
+.long	0xca62c1d6,0xca62c1d6,0xca62c1d6,0xca62c1d6	# K_60_79
+.long	0x00010203,0x04050607,0x08090a0b,0x0c0d0e0f	# pbswap mask
+.byte	0xf,0xe,0xd,0xc,0xb,0xa,0x9,0x8,0x7,0x6,0x5,0x4,0x3,0x2,0x1,0x0
+
+.asciz	"AESNI-CBC+SHA1 stitch for x86_64, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+.align	64
+___
+						if ($shaext) {{{
+($in0,$out,$len,$key,$ivp,$ctx,$inp)=("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx","%rcx","%r8","%r9","%r10");
+
+$rounds="%r11d";
+
+($iv,$in,$rndkey0)=map("%xmm$_",(2,14,15));
+@rndkey=("%xmm0","%xmm1");
+$r=0;
+
+my ($BSWAP,$ABCD,$E,$E_,$ABCD_SAVE,$E_SAVE)=map("%xmm$_",(7..12));
+my @MSG=map("%xmm$_",(3..6));
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.type	aesni_cbc_sha1_enc_shaext,\@function,6
+.align	32
+aesni_cbc_sha1_enc_shaext:
+	mov	`($win64?56:8)`(%rsp),$inp	# load 7th argument
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	lea	`-8-10*16`(%rsp),%rsp
+	movaps	%xmm6,-8-10*16(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm7,-8-9*16(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm8,-8-8*16(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm9,-8-7*16(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm10,-8-6*16(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm11,-8-5*16(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm12,-8-4*16(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm13,-8-3*16(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm14,-8-2*16(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm15,-8-1*16(%rax)
+.Lprologue_shaext:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	movdqu	($ctx),$ABCD
+	movd	16($ctx),$E
+	movdqa	K_XX_XX+0x50(%rip),$BSWAP	# byte-n-word swap
+
+	mov	240($key),$rounds
+	sub	$in0,$out
+	movups	($key),$rndkey0			# $key[0]
+	movups	($ivp),$iv			# load IV
+	movups	16($key),$rndkey[0]		# forward reference
+	lea	112($key),$key			# size optimization
+
+	pshufd	\$0b00011011,$ABCD,$ABCD	# flip word order
+	pshufd	\$0b00011011,$E,$E		# flip word order
+	jmp	.Loop_shaext
+
+.align	16
+.Loop_shaext:
+___
+	&$aesenc();
+$code.=<<___;
+	movdqu		($inp),@MSG[0]
+	movdqa		$E,$E_SAVE		# offload $E
+	pshufb		$BSWAP,@MSG[0]
+	movdqu		0x10($inp),@MSG[1]
+	movdqa		$ABCD,$ABCD_SAVE	# offload $ABCD
+___
+	&$aesenc();
+$code.=<<___;
+	pshufb		$BSWAP,@MSG[1]
+
+	paddd		@MSG[0],$E
+	movdqu		0x20($inp),@MSG[2]
+	lea		0x40($inp),$inp
+	pxor		$E_SAVE,@MSG[0]		# black magic
+___
+	&$aesenc();
+$code.=<<___;
+	pxor		$E_SAVE,@MSG[0]		# black magic
+	movdqa		$ABCD,$E_
+	pshufb		$BSWAP,@MSG[2]
+	sha1rnds4	\$0,$E,$ABCD		# 0-3
+	sha1nexte	@MSG[1],$E_
+___
+	&$aesenc();
+$code.=<<___;
+	sha1msg1	@MSG[1],@MSG[0]
+	movdqu		-0x10($inp),@MSG[3]
+	movdqa		$ABCD,$E
+	pshufb		$BSWAP,@MSG[3]
+___
+	&$aesenc();
+$code.=<<___;
+	sha1rnds4	\$0,$E_,$ABCD		# 4-7
+	sha1nexte	@MSG[2],$E
+	pxor		@MSG[2],@MSG[0]
+	sha1msg1	@MSG[2],@MSG[1]
+___
+	&$aesenc();
+
+for($i=2;$i<20-4;$i++) {
+$code.=<<___;
+	movdqa		$ABCD,$E_
+	sha1rnds4	\$`int($i/5)`,$E,$ABCD	# 8-11
+	sha1nexte	@MSG[3],$E_
+___
+	&$aesenc();
+$code.=<<___;
+	sha1msg2	@MSG[3],@MSG[0]
+	pxor		@MSG[3],@MSG[1]
+	sha1msg1	@MSG[3],@MSG[2]
+___
+	($E,$E_)=($E_,$E);
+	push(@MSG,shift(@MSG));
+
+	&$aesenc();
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	movdqa		$ABCD,$E_
+	sha1rnds4	\$3,$E,$ABCD		# 64-67
+	sha1nexte	@MSG[3],$E_
+	sha1msg2	@MSG[3],@MSG[0]
+	pxor		@MSG[3],@MSG[1]
+___
+	&$aesenc();
+$code.=<<___;
+	movdqa		$ABCD,$E
+	sha1rnds4	\$3,$E_,$ABCD		# 68-71
+	sha1nexte	@MSG[0],$E
+	sha1msg2	@MSG[0],@MSG[1]
+___
+	&$aesenc();
+$code.=<<___;
+	movdqa		$E_SAVE,@MSG[0]
+	movdqa		$ABCD,$E_
+	sha1rnds4	\$3,$E,$ABCD		# 72-75
+	sha1nexte	@MSG[1],$E_
+___
+	&$aesenc();
+$code.=<<___;
+	movdqa		$ABCD,$E
+	sha1rnds4	\$3,$E_,$ABCD		# 76-79
+	sha1nexte	$MSG[0],$E
+___
+	while($r<40)	{ &$aesenc(); }		# remaining aesenc's
+$code.=<<___;
+	dec		$len
+
+	paddd		$ABCD_SAVE,$ABCD
+	movups		$iv,48($out,$in0)	# write output
+	lea		64($in0),$in0
+	jnz		.Loop_shaext
+
+	pshufd	\$0b00011011,$ABCD,$ABCD
+	pshufd	\$0b00011011,$E,$E
+	movups	$iv,($ivp)			# write IV
+	movdqu	$ABCD,($ctx)
+	movd	$E,16($ctx)
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	movaps	-8-10*16(%rax),%xmm6
+	movaps	-8-9*16(%rax),%xmm7
+	movaps	-8-8*16(%rax),%xmm8
+	movaps	-8-7*16(%rax),%xmm9
+	movaps	-8-6*16(%rax),%xmm10
+	movaps	-8-5*16(%rax),%xmm11
+	movaps	-8-4*16(%rax),%xmm12
+	movaps	-8-3*16(%rax),%xmm13
+	movaps	-8-2*16(%rax),%xmm14
+	movaps	-8-1*16(%rax),%xmm15
+	mov	%rax,%rsp
+.Lepilogue_shaext:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	ret
+.size	aesni_cbc_sha1_enc_shaext,.-aesni_cbc_sha1_enc_shaext
+___
+						}}}
+# EXCEPTION_DISPOSITION handler (EXCEPTION_RECORD *rec,ULONG64 frame,
+#		CONTEXT *context,DISPATCHER_CONTEXT *disp)
+if ($win64) {
+$rec="%rcx";
+$frame="%rdx";
+$context="%r8";
+$disp="%r9";
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.extern	__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind
+.type	ssse3_handler,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+ssse3_handler:
+	push	%rsi
+	push	%rdi
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+	pushfq
+	sub	\$64,%rsp
+
+	mov	120($context),%rax	# pull context->Rax
+	mov	248($context),%rbx	# pull context->Rip
+
+	mov	8($disp),%rsi		# disp->ImageBase
+	mov	56($disp),%r11		# disp->HandlerData
+
+	mov	0(%r11),%r10d		# HandlerData[0]
+	lea	(%rsi,%r10),%r10	# prologue label
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip<prologue label
+	jb	.Lcommon_seh_tail
+
+	mov	152($context),%rax	# pull context->Rsp
+
+	mov	4(%r11),%r10d		# HandlerData[1]
+	lea	(%rsi,%r10),%r10	# epilogue label
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip>=epilogue label
+	jae	.Lcommon_seh_tail
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($shaext);
+	lea	aesni_cbc_sha1_enc_shaext(%rip),%r10
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx
+	jb	.Lseh_no_shaext
+
+	lea	(%rax),%rsi
+	lea	512($context),%rdi	# &context.Xmm6
+	mov	\$20,%ecx
+	.long	0xa548f3fc		# cld; rep movsq
+	lea	168(%rax),%rax		# adjust stack pointer
+	jmp	.Lcommon_seh_tail
+.Lseh_no_shaext:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	lea	96(%rax),%rsi
+	lea	512($context),%rdi	# &context.Xmm6
+	mov	\$20,%ecx
+	.long	0xa548f3fc		# cld; rep movsq
+	lea	`104+10*16`(%rax),%rax	# adjust stack pointer
+
+	mov	0(%rax),%r15
+	mov	8(%rax),%r14
+	mov	16(%rax),%r13
+	mov	24(%rax),%r12
+	mov	32(%rax),%rbp
+	mov	40(%rax),%rbx
+	lea	48(%rax),%rax
+	mov	%rbx,144($context)	# restore context->Rbx
+	mov	%rbp,160($context)	# restore context->Rbp
+	mov	%r12,216($context)	# restore context->R12
+	mov	%r13,224($context)	# restore context->R13
+	mov	%r14,232($context)	# restore context->R14
+	mov	%r15,240($context)	# restore context->R15
+
+.Lcommon_seh_tail:
+	mov	8(%rax),%rdi
+	mov	16(%rax),%rsi
+	mov	%rax,152($context)	# restore context->Rsp
+	mov	%rsi,168($context)	# restore context->Rsi
+	mov	%rdi,176($context)	# restore context->Rdi
+
+	mov	40($disp),%rdi		# disp->ContextRecord
+	mov	$context,%rsi		# context
+	mov	\$154,%ecx		# sizeof(CONTEXT)
+	.long	0xa548f3fc		# cld; rep movsq
+
+	mov	$disp,%rsi
+	xor	%rcx,%rcx		# arg1, UNW_FLAG_NHANDLER
+	mov	8(%rsi),%rdx		# arg2, disp->ImageBase
+	mov	0(%rsi),%r8		# arg3, disp->ControlPc
+	mov	16(%rsi),%r9		# arg4, disp->FunctionEntry
+	mov	40(%rsi),%r10		# disp->ContextRecord
+	lea	56(%rsi),%r11		# &disp->HandlerData
+	lea	24(%rsi),%r12		# &disp->EstablisherFrame
+	mov	%r10,32(%rsp)		# arg5
+	mov	%r11,40(%rsp)		# arg6
+	mov	%r12,48(%rsp)		# arg7
+	mov	%rcx,56(%rsp)		# arg8, (NULL)
+	call	*__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind(%rip)
+
+	mov	\$1,%eax		# ExceptionContinueSearch
+	add	\$64,%rsp
+	popfq
+	pop	%r15
+	pop	%r14
+	pop	%r13
+	pop	%r12
+	pop	%rbp
+	pop	%rbx
+	pop	%rdi
+	pop	%rsi
+	ret
+.size	ssse3_handler,.-ssse3_handler
+
+.section	.pdata
+.align	4
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_aesni_cbc_sha1_enc_ssse3
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_aesni_cbc_sha1_enc_ssse3
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_aesni_cbc_sha1_enc_ssse3
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($avx);
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_aesni_cbc_sha1_enc_avx
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_aesni_cbc_sha1_enc_avx
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_aesni_cbc_sha1_enc_avx
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($shaext);
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_aesni_cbc_sha1_enc_shaext
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_aesni_cbc_sha1_enc_shaext
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_aesni_cbc_sha1_enc_shaext
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+.section	.xdata
+.align	8
+.LSEH_info_aesni_cbc_sha1_enc_ssse3:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	ssse3_handler
+	.rva	.Lprologue_ssse3,.Lepilogue_ssse3	# HandlerData[]
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($avx);
+.LSEH_info_aesni_cbc_sha1_enc_avx:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	ssse3_handler
+	.rva	.Lprologue_avx,.Lepilogue_avx		# HandlerData[]
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($shaext);
+.LSEH_info_aesni_cbc_sha1_enc_shaext:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	ssse3_handler
+	.rva	.Lprologue_shaext,.Lepilogue_shaext	# HandlerData[]
+___
+}
+
+####################################################################
+sub rex {
+  local *opcode=shift;
+  my ($dst,$src)=@_;
+  my $rex=0;
+
+    $rex|=0x04			if($dst>=8);
+    $rex|=0x01			if($src>=8);
+    unshift @opcode,$rex|0x40	if($rex);
+}
+
+sub sha1rnds4 {
+    if (@_[0] =~ /\$([x0-9a-f]+),\s*%xmm([0-9]+),\s*%xmm([0-9]+)/) {
+      my @opcode=(0x0f,0x3a,0xcc);
+	rex(\@opcode,$3,$2);
+	push @opcode,0xc0|($2&7)|(($3&7)<<3);		# ModR/M
+	my $c=$1;
+	push @opcode,$c=~/^0/?oct($c):$c;
+	return ".byte\t".join(',',@opcode);
+    } else {
+	return "sha1rnds4\t".@_[0];
+    }
+}
+
+sub sha1op38 {
+    my $instr = shift;
+    my %opcodelet = (
+		"sha1nexte" => 0xc8,
+  		"sha1msg1"  => 0xc9,
+		"sha1msg2"  => 0xca	);
+
+    if (defined($opcodelet{$instr}) && @_[0] =~ /%xmm([0-9]+),\s*%xmm([0-9]+)/) {
+      my @opcode=(0x0f,0x38);
+	rex(\@opcode,$2,$1);
+	push @opcode,$opcodelet{$instr};
+	push @opcode,0xc0|($1&7)|(($2&7)<<3);		# ModR/M
+	return ".byte\t".join(',',@opcode);
+    } else {
+	return $instr."\t".@_[0];
+    }
+}
+
+sub aesni {
+  my $line=shift;
+  my @opcode=(0x0f,0x38);
+
+    if ($line=~/(aes[a-z]+)\s+%xmm([0-9]+),\s*%xmm([0-9]+)/) {
+	my %opcodelet = (
+		"aesenc" => 0xdc,	"aesenclast" => 0xdd,
+		"aesdec" => 0xde,	"aesdeclast" => 0xdf
+	);
+	return undef if (!defined($opcodelet{$1}));
+	rex(\@opcode,$3,$2);
+	push @opcode,$opcodelet{$1},0xc0|($2&7)|(($3&7)<<3);	# ModR/M
+	unshift @opcode,0x66;
+	return ".byte\t".join(',',@opcode);
+    }
+    return $line;
+}
+
+foreach (split("\n",$code)) {
+        s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/geo;
+
+	s/\b(sha1rnds4)\s+(.*)/sha1rnds4($2)/geo		or
+	s/\b(sha1[^\s]*)\s+(.*)/sha1op38($1,$2)/geo		or
+	s/\b(aes.*%xmm[0-9]+).*$/aesni($1)/geo;
+
+	print $_,"\n";
+}
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-sha256-x86_64.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-sha256-x86_64.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0e49f26
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-sha256-x86_64.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,1717 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2013-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# January 2013
+#
+# This is AESNI-CBC+SHA256 stitch implementation. The idea, as spelled
+# in http://download.intel.com/design/intarch/papers/323686.pdf, is
+# that since AESNI-CBC encrypt exhibit *very* low instruction-level
+# parallelism, interleaving it with another algorithm would allow to
+# utilize processor resources better and achieve better performance.
+# SHA256 instruction sequences(*) are taken from sha512-x86_64.pl and
+# AESNI code is weaved into it. As SHA256 dominates execution time,
+# stitch performance does not depend on AES key length. Below are
+# performance numbers in cycles per processed byte, less is better,
+# for standalone AESNI-CBC encrypt, standalone SHA256, and stitched
+# subroutine:
+#
+#		 AES-128/-192/-256+SHA256   this(**)	gain
+# Sandy Bridge	    5.05/6.05/7.05+11.6	    13.0	+28%/36%/43%
+# Ivy Bridge	    5.05/6.05/7.05+10.3	    11.6	+32%/41%/50%
+# Haswell	    4.43/5.29/6.19+7.80	    8.79	+39%/49%/59%
+# Skylake	    2.62/3.14/3.62+7.70	    8.10	+27%/34%/40%
+# Bulldozer	    5.77/6.89/8.00+13.7	    13.7	+42%/50%/58%
+# Ryzen(***)	    2.71/-/3.71+2.05	    2.74/-/3.73	+74%/-/54%
+# Goldmont(***)	    3.82/-/5.35+4.16	    4.73/-/5.94	+69%/-/60%
+#
+# (*)	there are XOP, AVX1 and AVX2 code paths, meaning that
+#	Westmere is omitted from loop, this is because gain was not
+#	estimated high enough to justify the effort;
+# (**)	these are EVP-free results, results obtained with 'speed
+#	-evp aes-256-cbc-hmac-sha256' will vary by percent or two;
+# (***)	these are SHAEXT results;
+
+$flavour = shift;
+$output  = shift;
+if ($flavour =~ /\./) { $output = $flavour; undef $flavour; }
+
+$win64=0; $win64=1 if ($flavour =~ /[nm]asm|mingw64/ || $output =~ /\.asm$/);
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+( $xlate="${dir}x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
+( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
+die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl";
+
+if (`$ENV{CC} -Wa,-v -c -o /dev/null -x assembler /dev/null 2>&1`
+		=~ /GNU assembler version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
+	$avx = ($1>=2.19) + ($1>=2.22);
+}
+
+if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /nasm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /nasm/) &&
+	   `nasm -v 2>&1` =~ /NASM version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
+	$avx = ($1>=2.09) + ($1>=2.10);
+}
+
+if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
+	   `ml64 2>&1` =~ /Version ([0-9]+)\./) {
+	$avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=12);
+}
+
+if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
+	$avx = ($2>=3.0) + ($2>3.0);
+}
+
+$shaext=$avx;	### set to zero if compiling for 1.0.1
+$avx=1		if (!$shaext && $avx);
+
+open OUT,"| \"$^X\" \"$xlate\" $flavour \"$output\"";
+*STDOUT=*OUT;
+
+$func="aesni_cbc_sha256_enc";
+$TABLE="K256";
+$SZ=4;
+@ROT=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$F,$G,$H)=("%eax","%ebx","%ecx","%edx",
+				"%r8d","%r9d","%r10d","%r11d");
+($T1,$a0,$a1,$a2,$a3)=("%r12d","%r13d","%r14d","%r15d","%esi");
+@Sigma0=( 2,13,22);
+@Sigma1=( 6,11,25);
+@sigma0=( 7,18, 3);
+@sigma1=(17,19,10);
+$rounds=64;
+
+########################################################################
+# void aesni_cbc_sha256_enc(const void *inp,
+#			void *out,
+#			size_t length,
+#			const AES_KEY *key,
+#			unsigned char *iv,
+#			SHA256_CTX *ctx,
+#			const void *in0);
+($inp,  $out,  $len,  $key,  $ivp, $ctx, $in0) =
+("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx","%rcx","%r8","%r9","%r10");
+
+$Tbl="%rbp";
+
+$_inp="16*$SZ+0*8(%rsp)";
+$_out="16*$SZ+1*8(%rsp)";
+$_end="16*$SZ+2*8(%rsp)";
+$_key="16*$SZ+3*8(%rsp)";
+$_ivp="16*$SZ+4*8(%rsp)";
+$_ctx="16*$SZ+5*8(%rsp)";
+$_in0="16*$SZ+6*8(%rsp)";
+$_rsp="16*$SZ+7*8(%rsp)";
+$framesz=16*$SZ+8*8;
+
+$code=<<___;
+.text
+
+.extern	OPENSSL_ia32cap_P
+.globl	$func
+.type	$func,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+$func:
+___
+						if ($avx) {
+$code.=<<___;
+	lea	OPENSSL_ia32cap_P(%rip),%r11
+	mov	\$1,%eax
+	cmp	\$0,`$win64?"%rcx":"%rdi"`
+	je	.Lprobe
+	mov	0(%r11),%eax
+	mov	4(%r11),%r10
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($shaext);
+	bt	\$61,%r10			# check for SHA
+	jc	${func}_shaext
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	%r10,%r11
+	shr	\$32,%r11
+
+	test	\$`1<<11`,%r10d			# check for XOP
+	jnz	${func}_xop
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($avx>1);
+	and	\$`1<<8|1<<5|1<<3`,%r11d	# check for BMI2+AVX2+BMI1
+	cmp	\$`1<<8|1<<5|1<<3`,%r11d
+	je	${func}_avx2
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	and	\$`1<<28`,%r10d			# check for AVX
+	jnz	${func}_avx
+	ud2
+___
+						}
+$code.=<<___;
+	xor	%eax,%eax
+	cmp	\$0,`$win64?"%rcx":"%rdi"`
+	je	.Lprobe
+	ud2
+.Lprobe:
+	ret
+.size	$func,.-$func
+
+.align	64
+.type	$TABLE,\@object
+$TABLE:
+	.long	0x428a2f98,0x71374491,0xb5c0fbcf,0xe9b5dba5
+	.long	0x428a2f98,0x71374491,0xb5c0fbcf,0xe9b5dba5
+	.long	0x3956c25b,0x59f111f1,0x923f82a4,0xab1c5ed5
+	.long	0x3956c25b,0x59f111f1,0x923f82a4,0xab1c5ed5
+	.long	0xd807aa98,0x12835b01,0x243185be,0x550c7dc3
+	.long	0xd807aa98,0x12835b01,0x243185be,0x550c7dc3
+	.long	0x72be5d74,0x80deb1fe,0x9bdc06a7,0xc19bf174
+	.long	0x72be5d74,0x80deb1fe,0x9bdc06a7,0xc19bf174
+	.long	0xe49b69c1,0xefbe4786,0x0fc19dc6,0x240ca1cc
+	.long	0xe49b69c1,0xefbe4786,0x0fc19dc6,0x240ca1cc
+	.long	0x2de92c6f,0x4a7484aa,0x5cb0a9dc,0x76f988da
+	.long	0x2de92c6f,0x4a7484aa,0x5cb0a9dc,0x76f988da
+	.long	0x983e5152,0xa831c66d,0xb00327c8,0xbf597fc7
+	.long	0x983e5152,0xa831c66d,0xb00327c8,0xbf597fc7
+	.long	0xc6e00bf3,0xd5a79147,0x06ca6351,0x14292967
+	.long	0xc6e00bf3,0xd5a79147,0x06ca6351,0x14292967
+	.long	0x27b70a85,0x2e1b2138,0x4d2c6dfc,0x53380d13
+	.long	0x27b70a85,0x2e1b2138,0x4d2c6dfc,0x53380d13
+	.long	0x650a7354,0x766a0abb,0x81c2c92e,0x92722c85
+	.long	0x650a7354,0x766a0abb,0x81c2c92e,0x92722c85
+	.long	0xa2bfe8a1,0xa81a664b,0xc24b8b70,0xc76c51a3
+	.long	0xa2bfe8a1,0xa81a664b,0xc24b8b70,0xc76c51a3
+	.long	0xd192e819,0xd6990624,0xf40e3585,0x106aa070
+	.long	0xd192e819,0xd6990624,0xf40e3585,0x106aa070
+	.long	0x19a4c116,0x1e376c08,0x2748774c,0x34b0bcb5
+	.long	0x19a4c116,0x1e376c08,0x2748774c,0x34b0bcb5
+	.long	0x391c0cb3,0x4ed8aa4a,0x5b9cca4f,0x682e6ff3
+	.long	0x391c0cb3,0x4ed8aa4a,0x5b9cca4f,0x682e6ff3
+	.long	0x748f82ee,0x78a5636f,0x84c87814,0x8cc70208
+	.long	0x748f82ee,0x78a5636f,0x84c87814,0x8cc70208
+	.long	0x90befffa,0xa4506ceb,0xbef9a3f7,0xc67178f2
+	.long	0x90befffa,0xa4506ceb,0xbef9a3f7,0xc67178f2
+
+	.long	0x00010203,0x04050607,0x08090a0b,0x0c0d0e0f
+	.long	0x00010203,0x04050607,0x08090a0b,0x0c0d0e0f
+	.long	0,0,0,0,   0,0,0,0,   -1,-1,-1,-1
+	.long	0,0,0,0,   0,0,0,0
+	.asciz	"AESNI-CBC+SHA256 stitch for x86_64, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+.align	64
+___
+
+######################################################################
+# SIMD code paths
+#
+{{{
+($iv,$inout,$roundkey,$temp,
+ $mask10,$mask12,$mask14,$offload)=map("%xmm$_",(8..15));
+
+$aesni_cbc_idx=0;
+@aesni_cbc_block = (
+##	&vmovdqu	($roundkey,"0x00-0x80($inp)");'
+##	&vmovdqu	($inout,($inp));
+##	&mov		($_inp,$inp);
+
+	'&vpxor		($inout,$inout,$roundkey);'.
+	' &vmovdqu	($roundkey,"0x10-0x80($inp)");',
+
+	'&vpxor		($inout,$inout,$iv);',
+
+	'&vaesenc	($inout,$inout,$roundkey);'.
+	' &vmovdqu	($roundkey,"0x20-0x80($inp)");',
+
+	'&vaesenc	($inout,$inout,$roundkey);'.
+	' &vmovdqu	($roundkey,"0x30-0x80($inp)");',
+
+	'&vaesenc	($inout,$inout,$roundkey);'.
+	' &vmovdqu	($roundkey,"0x40-0x80($inp)");',
+
+	'&vaesenc	($inout,$inout,$roundkey);'.
+	' &vmovdqu	($roundkey,"0x50-0x80($inp)");',
+
+	'&vaesenc	($inout,$inout,$roundkey);'.
+	' &vmovdqu	($roundkey,"0x60-0x80($inp)");',
+
+	'&vaesenc	($inout,$inout,$roundkey);'.
+	' &vmovdqu	($roundkey,"0x70-0x80($inp)");',
+
+	'&vaesenc	($inout,$inout,$roundkey);'.
+	' &vmovdqu	($roundkey,"0x80-0x80($inp)");',
+
+	'&vaesenc	($inout,$inout,$roundkey);'.
+	' &vmovdqu	($roundkey,"0x90-0x80($inp)");',
+
+	'&vaesenc	($inout,$inout,$roundkey);'.
+	' &vmovdqu	($roundkey,"0xa0-0x80($inp)");',
+
+	'&vaesenclast	($temp,$inout,$roundkey);'.
+	' &vaesenc	($inout,$inout,$roundkey);'.
+	' &vmovdqu	($roundkey,"0xb0-0x80($inp)");',
+
+	'&vpand		($iv,$temp,$mask10);'.
+	' &vaesenc	($inout,$inout,$roundkey);'.
+	' &vmovdqu	($roundkey,"0xc0-0x80($inp)");',
+
+	'&vaesenclast	($temp,$inout,$roundkey);'.
+	' &vaesenc	($inout,$inout,$roundkey);'.
+	' &vmovdqu	($roundkey,"0xd0-0x80($inp)");',
+
+	'&vpand		($temp,$temp,$mask12);'.
+	' &vaesenc	($inout,$inout,$roundkey);'.
+	 '&vmovdqu	($roundkey,"0xe0-0x80($inp)");',
+
+	'&vpor		($iv,$iv,$temp);'.
+	' &vaesenclast	($temp,$inout,$roundkey);'.
+	' &vmovdqu	($roundkey,"0x00-0x80($inp)");'
+
+##	&mov		($inp,$_inp);
+##	&mov		($out,$_out);
+##	&vpand		($temp,$temp,$mask14);
+##	&vpor		($iv,$iv,$temp);
+##	&vmovdqu	($iv,($out,$inp);
+##	&lea		(inp,16($inp));
+);
+
+my $a4=$T1;
+my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f,$g,$h);
+
+sub AUTOLOAD()		# thunk [simplified] 32-bit style perlasm
+{ my $opcode = $AUTOLOAD; $opcode =~ s/.*:://;
+  my $arg = pop;
+    $arg = "\$$arg" if ($arg*1 eq $arg);
+    $code .= "\t$opcode\t".join(',',$arg,reverse @_)."\n";
+}
+
+sub body_00_15 () {
+	(
+	'($a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f,$g,$h)=@ROT;'.
+
+	'&ror	($a0,$Sigma1[2]-$Sigma1[1])',
+	'&mov	($a,$a1)',
+	'&mov	($a4,$f)',
+
+	'&xor	($a0,$e)',
+	'&ror	($a1,$Sigma0[2]-$Sigma0[1])',
+	'&xor	($a4,$g)',			# f^g
+
+	'&ror	($a0,$Sigma1[1]-$Sigma1[0])',
+	'&xor	($a1,$a)',
+	'&and	($a4,$e)',			# (f^g)&e
+
+	@aesni_cbc_block[$aesni_cbc_idx++].
+	'&xor	($a0,$e)',
+	'&add	($h,$SZ*($i&15)."(%rsp)")',	# h+=X[i]+K[i]
+	'&mov	($a2,$a)',
+
+	'&ror	($a1,$Sigma0[1]-$Sigma0[0])',
+	'&xor	($a4,$g)',			# Ch(e,f,g)=((f^g)&e)^g
+	'&xor	($a2,$b)',			# a^b, b^c in next round
+
+	'&ror	($a0,$Sigma1[0])',		# Sigma1(e)
+	'&add	($h,$a4)',			# h+=Ch(e,f,g)
+	'&and	($a3,$a2)',			# (b^c)&(a^b)
+
+	'&xor	($a1,$a)',
+	'&add	($h,$a0)',			# h+=Sigma1(e)
+	'&xor	($a3,$b)',			# Maj(a,b,c)=Ch(a^b,c,b)
+
+	'&add	($d,$h)',			# d+=h
+	'&ror	($a1,$Sigma0[0])',		# Sigma0(a)
+	'&add	($h,$a3)',			# h+=Maj(a,b,c)
+
+	'&mov	($a0,$d)',
+	'&add	($a1,$h);'.			# h+=Sigma0(a)
+	'($a2,$a3) = ($a3,$a2); unshift(@ROT,pop(@ROT)); $i++;'
+	);
+}
+
+if ($avx) {{
+######################################################################
+# XOP code path
+#
+$code.=<<___;
+.type	${func}_xop,\@function,6
+.align	64
+${func}_xop:
+.Lxop_shortcut:
+	mov	`($win64?56:8)`(%rsp),$in0	# load 7th parameter
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+	mov	%rsp,%r11		# copy %rsp
+	sub	\$`$framesz+$win64*16*10`,%rsp
+	and	\$-64,%rsp		# align stack frame
+
+	shl	\$6,$len
+	sub	$inp,$out		# re-bias
+	sub	$inp,$in0
+	add	$inp,$len		# end of input
+
+	#mov	$inp,$_inp		# saved later
+	mov	$out,$_out
+	mov	$len,$_end
+	#mov	$key,$_key		# remains resident in $inp register
+	mov	$ivp,$_ivp
+	mov	$ctx,$_ctx
+	mov	$in0,$_in0
+	mov	%r11,$_rsp
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	movaps	%xmm6,`$framesz+16*0`(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm7,`$framesz+16*1`(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm8,`$framesz+16*2`(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm9,`$framesz+16*3`(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm10,`$framesz+16*4`(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm11,`$framesz+16*5`(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm12,`$framesz+16*6`(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm13,`$framesz+16*7`(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm14,`$framesz+16*8`(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm15,`$framesz+16*9`(%rsp)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+.Lprologue_xop:
+	vzeroall
+
+	mov	$inp,%r12		# borrow $a4
+	lea	0x80($key),$inp		# size optimization, reassign
+	lea	$TABLE+`$SZ*2*$rounds+32`(%rip),%r13	# borrow $a0
+	mov	0xf0-0x80($inp),%r14d	# rounds, borrow $a1
+	mov	$ctx,%r15		# borrow $a2
+	mov	$in0,%rsi		# borrow $a3
+	vmovdqu	($ivp),$iv		# load IV
+	sub	\$9,%r14
+
+	mov	$SZ*0(%r15),$A
+	mov	$SZ*1(%r15),$B
+	mov	$SZ*2(%r15),$C
+	mov	$SZ*3(%r15),$D
+	mov	$SZ*4(%r15),$E
+	mov	$SZ*5(%r15),$F
+	mov	$SZ*6(%r15),$G
+	mov	$SZ*7(%r15),$H
+
+	vmovdqa	0x00(%r13,%r14,8),$mask14
+	vmovdqa	0x10(%r13,%r14,8),$mask12
+	vmovdqa	0x20(%r13,%r14,8),$mask10
+	vmovdqu	0x00-0x80($inp),$roundkey
+	jmp	.Lloop_xop
+___
+					if ($SZ==4) {	# SHA256
+    my @X = map("%xmm$_",(0..3));
+    my ($t0,$t1,$t2,$t3) = map("%xmm$_",(4..7));
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.align	16
+.Lloop_xop:
+	vmovdqa	$TABLE+`$SZ*2*$rounds`(%rip),$t3
+	vmovdqu	0x00(%rsi,%r12),@X[0]
+	vmovdqu	0x10(%rsi,%r12),@X[1]
+	vmovdqu	0x20(%rsi,%r12),@X[2]
+	vmovdqu	0x30(%rsi,%r12),@X[3]
+	vpshufb	$t3,@X[0],@X[0]
+	lea	$TABLE(%rip),$Tbl
+	vpshufb	$t3,@X[1],@X[1]
+	vpshufb	$t3,@X[2],@X[2]
+	vpaddd	0x00($Tbl),@X[0],$t0
+	vpshufb	$t3,@X[3],@X[3]
+	vpaddd	0x20($Tbl),@X[1],$t1
+	vpaddd	0x40($Tbl),@X[2],$t2
+	vpaddd	0x60($Tbl),@X[3],$t3
+	vmovdqa	$t0,0x00(%rsp)
+	mov	$A,$a1
+	vmovdqa	$t1,0x10(%rsp)
+	mov	$B,$a3
+	vmovdqa	$t2,0x20(%rsp)
+	xor	$C,$a3			# magic
+	vmovdqa	$t3,0x30(%rsp)
+	mov	$E,$a0
+	jmp	.Lxop_00_47
+
+.align	16
+.Lxop_00_47:
+	sub	\$-16*2*$SZ,$Tbl	# size optimization
+	vmovdqu	(%r12),$inout		# $a4
+	mov	%r12,$_inp		# $a4
+___
+sub XOP_256_00_47 () {
+my $j = shift;
+my $body = shift;
+my @X = @_;
+my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body);	# 104 instructions
+
+	&vpalignr	($t0,@X[1],@X[0],$SZ);	# X[1..4]
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	 &vpalignr	($t3,@X[3],@X[2],$SZ);	# X[9..12]
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	&vprotd		($t1,$t0,8*$SZ-$sigma0[1]);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	&vpsrld		($t0,$t0,$sigma0[2]);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	 &vpaddd	(@X[0],@X[0],$t3);	# X[0..3] += X[9..12]
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	&vprotd		($t2,$t1,$sigma0[1]-$sigma0[0]);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	&vpxor		($t0,$t0,$t1);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	 &vprotd	($t3,@X[3],8*$SZ-$sigma1[1]);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	&vpxor		($t0,$t0,$t2);		# sigma0(X[1..4])
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	 &vpsrld	($t2,@X[3],$sigma1[2]);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	&vpaddd		(@X[0],@X[0],$t0);	# X[0..3] += sigma0(X[1..4])
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	 &vprotd	($t1,$t3,$sigma1[1]-$sigma1[0]);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	 &vpxor		($t3,$t3,$t2);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	 &vpxor		($t3,$t3,$t1);		# sigma1(X[14..15])
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	&vpsrldq	($t3,$t3,8);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	&vpaddd		(@X[0],@X[0],$t3);	# X[0..1] += sigma1(X[14..15])
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	 &vprotd	($t3,@X[0],8*$SZ-$sigma1[1]);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	 &vpsrld	($t2,@X[0],$sigma1[2]);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	 &vprotd	($t1,$t3,$sigma1[1]-$sigma1[0]);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	 &vpxor		($t3,$t3,$t2);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	 &vpxor		($t3,$t3,$t1);		# sigma1(X[16..17])
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	&vpslldq	($t3,$t3,8);		# 22 instructions
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	&vpaddd		(@X[0],@X[0],$t3);	# X[2..3] += sigma1(X[16..17])
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	&vpaddd		($t2,@X[0],16*2*$j."($Tbl)");
+	  foreach (@insns) { eval; }		# remaining instructions
+	&vmovdqa	(16*$j."(%rsp)",$t2);
+}
+
+    $aesni_cbc_idx=0;
+    for ($i=0,$j=0; $j<4; $j++) {
+	&XOP_256_00_47($j,\&body_00_15,@X);
+	push(@X,shift(@X));			# rotate(@X)
+    }
+    	&mov		("%r12",$_inp);		# borrow $a4
+	&vpand		($temp,$temp,$mask14);
+	&mov		("%r15",$_out);		# borrow $a2
+	&vpor		($iv,$iv,$temp);
+	&vmovdqu	("(%r15,%r12)",$iv);	# write output
+	&lea		("%r12","16(%r12)");	# inp++
+
+	&cmpb	($SZ-1+16*2*$SZ."($Tbl)",0);
+	&jne	(".Lxop_00_47");
+
+	&vmovdqu	($inout,"(%r12)");
+	&mov		($_inp,"%r12");
+
+    $aesni_cbc_idx=0;
+    for ($i=0; $i<16; ) {
+	foreach(body_00_15()) { eval; }
+    }
+					}
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	$_inp,%r12		# borrow $a4
+	mov	$_out,%r13		# borrow $a0
+	mov	$_ctx,%r15		# borrow $a2
+	mov	$_in0,%rsi		# borrow $a3
+
+	vpand	$mask14,$temp,$temp
+	mov	$a1,$A
+	vpor	$temp,$iv,$iv
+	vmovdqu	$iv,(%r13,%r12)		# write output
+	lea	16(%r12),%r12		# inp++
+
+	add	$SZ*0(%r15),$A
+	add	$SZ*1(%r15),$B
+	add	$SZ*2(%r15),$C
+	add	$SZ*3(%r15),$D
+	add	$SZ*4(%r15),$E
+	add	$SZ*5(%r15),$F
+	add	$SZ*6(%r15),$G
+	add	$SZ*7(%r15),$H
+
+	cmp	$_end,%r12
+
+	mov	$A,$SZ*0(%r15)
+	mov	$B,$SZ*1(%r15)
+	mov	$C,$SZ*2(%r15)
+	mov	$D,$SZ*3(%r15)
+	mov	$E,$SZ*4(%r15)
+	mov	$F,$SZ*5(%r15)
+	mov	$G,$SZ*6(%r15)
+	mov	$H,$SZ*7(%r15)
+
+	jb	.Lloop_xop
+
+	mov	$_ivp,$ivp
+	mov	$_rsp,%rsi
+	vmovdqu	$iv,($ivp)		# output IV
+	vzeroall
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	movaps	`$framesz+16*0`(%rsp),%xmm6
+	movaps	`$framesz+16*1`(%rsp),%xmm7
+	movaps	`$framesz+16*2`(%rsp),%xmm8
+	movaps	`$framesz+16*3`(%rsp),%xmm9
+	movaps	`$framesz+16*4`(%rsp),%xmm10
+	movaps	`$framesz+16*5`(%rsp),%xmm11
+	movaps	`$framesz+16*6`(%rsp),%xmm12
+	movaps	`$framesz+16*7`(%rsp),%xmm13
+	movaps	`$framesz+16*8`(%rsp),%xmm14
+	movaps	`$framesz+16*9`(%rsp),%xmm15
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	(%rsi),%r15
+	mov	8(%rsi),%r14
+	mov	16(%rsi),%r13
+	mov	24(%rsi),%r12
+	mov	32(%rsi),%rbp
+	mov	40(%rsi),%rbx
+	lea	48(%rsi),%rsp
+.Lepilogue_xop:
+	ret
+.size	${func}_xop,.-${func}_xop
+___
+######################################################################
+# AVX+shrd code path
+#
+local *ror = sub { &shrd(@_[0],@_) };
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.type	${func}_avx,\@function,6
+.align	64
+${func}_avx:
+.Lavx_shortcut:
+	mov	`($win64?56:8)`(%rsp),$in0	# load 7th parameter
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+	mov	%rsp,%r11		# copy %rsp
+	sub	\$`$framesz+$win64*16*10`,%rsp
+	and	\$-64,%rsp		# align stack frame
+
+	shl	\$6,$len
+	sub	$inp,$out		# re-bias
+	sub	$inp,$in0
+	add	$inp,$len		# end of input
+
+	#mov	$inp,$_inp		# saved later
+	mov	$out,$_out
+	mov	$len,$_end
+	#mov	$key,$_key		# remains resident in $inp register
+	mov	$ivp,$_ivp
+	mov	$ctx,$_ctx
+	mov	$in0,$_in0
+	mov	%r11,$_rsp
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	movaps	%xmm6,`$framesz+16*0`(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm7,`$framesz+16*1`(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm8,`$framesz+16*2`(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm9,`$framesz+16*3`(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm10,`$framesz+16*4`(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm11,`$framesz+16*5`(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm12,`$framesz+16*6`(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm13,`$framesz+16*7`(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm14,`$framesz+16*8`(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm15,`$framesz+16*9`(%rsp)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+.Lprologue_avx:
+	vzeroall
+
+	mov	$inp,%r12		# borrow $a4
+	lea	0x80($key),$inp		# size optimization, reassign
+	lea	$TABLE+`$SZ*2*$rounds+32`(%rip),%r13	# borrow $a0
+	mov	0xf0-0x80($inp),%r14d	# rounds, borrow $a1
+	mov	$ctx,%r15		# borrow $a2
+	mov	$in0,%rsi		# borrow $a3
+	vmovdqu	($ivp),$iv		# load IV
+	sub	\$9,%r14
+
+	mov	$SZ*0(%r15),$A
+	mov	$SZ*1(%r15),$B
+	mov	$SZ*2(%r15),$C
+	mov	$SZ*3(%r15),$D
+	mov	$SZ*4(%r15),$E
+	mov	$SZ*5(%r15),$F
+	mov	$SZ*6(%r15),$G
+	mov	$SZ*7(%r15),$H
+
+	vmovdqa	0x00(%r13,%r14,8),$mask14
+	vmovdqa	0x10(%r13,%r14,8),$mask12
+	vmovdqa	0x20(%r13,%r14,8),$mask10
+	vmovdqu	0x00-0x80($inp),$roundkey
+___
+					if ($SZ==4) {	# SHA256
+    my @X = map("%xmm$_",(0..3));
+    my ($t0,$t1,$t2,$t3) = map("%xmm$_",(4..7));
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	jmp	.Lloop_avx
+.align	16
+.Lloop_avx:
+	vmovdqa	$TABLE+`$SZ*2*$rounds`(%rip),$t3
+	vmovdqu	0x00(%rsi,%r12),@X[0]
+	vmovdqu	0x10(%rsi,%r12),@X[1]
+	vmovdqu	0x20(%rsi,%r12),@X[2]
+	vmovdqu	0x30(%rsi,%r12),@X[3]
+	vpshufb	$t3,@X[0],@X[0]
+	lea	$TABLE(%rip),$Tbl
+	vpshufb	$t3,@X[1],@X[1]
+	vpshufb	$t3,@X[2],@X[2]
+	vpaddd	0x00($Tbl),@X[0],$t0
+	vpshufb	$t3,@X[3],@X[3]
+	vpaddd	0x20($Tbl),@X[1],$t1
+	vpaddd	0x40($Tbl),@X[2],$t2
+	vpaddd	0x60($Tbl),@X[3],$t3
+	vmovdqa	$t0,0x00(%rsp)
+	mov	$A,$a1
+	vmovdqa	$t1,0x10(%rsp)
+	mov	$B,$a3
+	vmovdqa	$t2,0x20(%rsp)
+	xor	$C,$a3			# magic
+	vmovdqa	$t3,0x30(%rsp)
+	mov	$E,$a0
+	jmp	.Lavx_00_47
+
+.align	16
+.Lavx_00_47:
+	sub	\$-16*2*$SZ,$Tbl	# size optimization
+	vmovdqu	(%r12),$inout		# $a4
+	mov	%r12,$_inp		# $a4
+___
+sub Xupdate_256_AVX () {
+	(
+	'&vpalignr	($t0,@X[1],@X[0],$SZ)',	# X[1..4]
+	 '&vpalignr	($t3,@X[3],@X[2],$SZ)',	# X[9..12]
+	'&vpsrld	($t2,$t0,$sigma0[0]);',
+	 '&vpaddd	(@X[0],@X[0],$t3)',	# X[0..3] += X[9..12]
+	'&vpsrld	($t3,$t0,$sigma0[2])',
+	'&vpslld	($t1,$t0,8*$SZ-$sigma0[1]);',
+	'&vpxor		($t0,$t3,$t2)',
+	 '&vpshufd	($t3,@X[3],0b11111010)',# X[14..15]
+	'&vpsrld	($t2,$t2,$sigma0[1]-$sigma0[0]);',
+	'&vpxor		($t0,$t0,$t1)',
+	'&vpslld	($t1,$t1,$sigma0[1]-$sigma0[0]);',
+	'&vpxor		($t0,$t0,$t2)',
+	 '&vpsrld	($t2,$t3,$sigma1[2]);',
+	'&vpxor		($t0,$t0,$t1)',		# sigma0(X[1..4])
+	 '&vpsrlq	($t3,$t3,$sigma1[0]);',
+	'&vpaddd	(@X[0],@X[0],$t0)',	# X[0..3] += sigma0(X[1..4])
+	 '&vpxor	($t2,$t2,$t3);',
+	 '&vpsrlq	($t3,$t3,$sigma1[1]-$sigma1[0])',
+	 '&vpxor	($t2,$t2,$t3)',		# sigma1(X[14..15])
+	 '&vpshufd	($t2,$t2,0b10000100)',
+	 '&vpsrldq	($t2,$t2,8)',
+	'&vpaddd	(@X[0],@X[0],$t2)',	# X[0..1] += sigma1(X[14..15])
+	 '&vpshufd	($t3,@X[0],0b01010000)',# X[16..17]
+	 '&vpsrld	($t2,$t3,$sigma1[2])',
+	 '&vpsrlq	($t3,$t3,$sigma1[0])',
+	 '&vpxor	($t2,$t2,$t3);',
+	 '&vpsrlq	($t3,$t3,$sigma1[1]-$sigma1[0])',
+	 '&vpxor	($t2,$t2,$t3)',
+	 '&vpshufd	($t2,$t2,0b11101000)',
+	 '&vpslldq	($t2,$t2,8)',
+	'&vpaddd	(@X[0],@X[0],$t2)'	# X[2..3] += sigma1(X[16..17])
+	);
+}
+
+sub AVX_256_00_47 () {
+my $j = shift;
+my $body = shift;
+my @X = @_;
+my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body);	# 104 instructions
+
+	foreach (Xupdate_256_AVX()) {		# 29 instructions
+	    eval;
+	    eval(shift(@insns));
+	    eval(shift(@insns));
+	    eval(shift(@insns));
+	}
+	&vpaddd		($t2,@X[0],16*2*$j."($Tbl)");
+	  foreach (@insns) { eval; }		# remaining instructions
+	&vmovdqa	(16*$j."(%rsp)",$t2);
+}
+
+    $aesni_cbc_idx=0;
+    for ($i=0,$j=0; $j<4; $j++) {
+	&AVX_256_00_47($j,\&body_00_15,@X);
+	push(@X,shift(@X));			# rotate(@X)
+    }
+    	&mov		("%r12",$_inp);		# borrow $a4
+	&vpand		($temp,$temp,$mask14);
+	&mov		("%r15",$_out);		# borrow $a2
+	&vpor		($iv,$iv,$temp);
+	&vmovdqu	("(%r15,%r12)",$iv);	# write output
+	&lea		("%r12","16(%r12)");	# inp++
+
+	&cmpb	($SZ-1+16*2*$SZ."($Tbl)",0);
+	&jne	(".Lavx_00_47");
+
+	&vmovdqu	($inout,"(%r12)");
+	&mov		($_inp,"%r12");
+
+    $aesni_cbc_idx=0;
+    for ($i=0; $i<16; ) {
+	foreach(body_00_15()) { eval; }
+    }
+
+					}
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	$_inp,%r12		# borrow $a4
+	mov	$_out,%r13		# borrow $a0
+	mov	$_ctx,%r15		# borrow $a2
+	mov	$_in0,%rsi		# borrow $a3
+
+	vpand	$mask14,$temp,$temp
+	mov	$a1,$A
+	vpor	$temp,$iv,$iv
+	vmovdqu	$iv,(%r13,%r12)		# write output
+	lea	16(%r12),%r12		# inp++
+
+	add	$SZ*0(%r15),$A
+	add	$SZ*1(%r15),$B
+	add	$SZ*2(%r15),$C
+	add	$SZ*3(%r15),$D
+	add	$SZ*4(%r15),$E
+	add	$SZ*5(%r15),$F
+	add	$SZ*6(%r15),$G
+	add	$SZ*7(%r15),$H
+
+	cmp	$_end,%r12
+
+	mov	$A,$SZ*0(%r15)
+	mov	$B,$SZ*1(%r15)
+	mov	$C,$SZ*2(%r15)
+	mov	$D,$SZ*3(%r15)
+	mov	$E,$SZ*4(%r15)
+	mov	$F,$SZ*5(%r15)
+	mov	$G,$SZ*6(%r15)
+	mov	$H,$SZ*7(%r15)
+	jb	.Lloop_avx
+
+	mov	$_ivp,$ivp
+	mov	$_rsp,%rsi
+	vmovdqu	$iv,($ivp)		# output IV
+	vzeroall
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	movaps	`$framesz+16*0`(%rsp),%xmm6
+	movaps	`$framesz+16*1`(%rsp),%xmm7
+	movaps	`$framesz+16*2`(%rsp),%xmm8
+	movaps	`$framesz+16*3`(%rsp),%xmm9
+	movaps	`$framesz+16*4`(%rsp),%xmm10
+	movaps	`$framesz+16*5`(%rsp),%xmm11
+	movaps	`$framesz+16*6`(%rsp),%xmm12
+	movaps	`$framesz+16*7`(%rsp),%xmm13
+	movaps	`$framesz+16*8`(%rsp),%xmm14
+	movaps	`$framesz+16*9`(%rsp),%xmm15
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	(%rsi),%r15
+	mov	8(%rsi),%r14
+	mov	16(%rsi),%r13
+	mov	24(%rsi),%r12
+	mov	32(%rsi),%rbp
+	mov	40(%rsi),%rbx
+	lea	48(%rsi),%rsp
+.Lepilogue_avx:
+	ret
+.size	${func}_avx,.-${func}_avx
+___
+
+if ($avx>1) {{
+######################################################################
+# AVX2+BMI code path
+#
+my $a5=$SZ==4?"%esi":"%rsi";	# zap $inp 
+my $PUSH8=8*2*$SZ;
+use integer;
+
+sub bodyx_00_15 () {
+	# at start $a1 should be zero, $a3 - $b^$c and $a4 copy of $f
+	(
+	'($a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f,$g,$h)=@ROT;'.
+
+	'&add	($h,(32*($i/(16/$SZ))+$SZ*($i%(16/$SZ)))%$PUSH8.$base)',    # h+=X[i]+K[i]
+	'&and	($a4,$e)',		# f&e
+	'&rorx	($a0,$e,$Sigma1[2])',
+	'&rorx	($a2,$e,$Sigma1[1])',
+
+	'&lea	($a,"($a,$a1)")',	# h+=Sigma0(a) from the past
+	'&lea	($h,"($h,$a4)")',
+	'&andn	($a4,$e,$g)',		# ~e&g
+	'&xor	($a0,$a2)',
+
+	'&rorx	($a1,$e,$Sigma1[0])',
+	'&lea	($h,"($h,$a4)")',	# h+=Ch(e,f,g)=(e&f)+(~e&g)
+	'&xor	($a0,$a1)',		# Sigma1(e)
+	'&mov	($a2,$a)',
+
+	'&rorx	($a4,$a,$Sigma0[2])',
+	'&lea	($h,"($h,$a0)")',	# h+=Sigma1(e)
+	'&xor	($a2,$b)',		# a^b, b^c in next round
+	'&rorx	($a1,$a,$Sigma0[1])',
+
+	'&rorx	($a0,$a,$Sigma0[0])',
+	'&lea	($d,"($d,$h)")',	# d+=h
+	'&and	($a3,$a2)',		# (b^c)&(a^b)
+	@aesni_cbc_block[$aesni_cbc_idx++].
+	'&xor	($a1,$a4)',
+
+	'&xor	($a3,$b)',		# Maj(a,b,c)=Ch(a^b,c,b)
+	'&xor	($a1,$a0)',		# Sigma0(a)
+	'&lea	($h,"($h,$a3)");'.	# h+=Maj(a,b,c)
+	'&mov	($a4,$e)',		# copy of f in future
+
+	'($a2,$a3) = ($a3,$a2); unshift(@ROT,pop(@ROT)); $i++;'
+	);
+	# and at the finish one has to $a+=$a1
+}
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.type	${func}_avx2,\@function,6
+.align	64
+${func}_avx2:
+.Lavx2_shortcut:
+	mov	`($win64?56:8)`(%rsp),$in0	# load 7th parameter
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+	mov	%rsp,%r11		# copy %rsp
+	sub	\$`2*$SZ*$rounds+8*8+$win64*16*10`,%rsp
+	and	\$-256*$SZ,%rsp		# align stack frame
+	add	\$`2*$SZ*($rounds-8)`,%rsp
+
+	shl	\$6,$len
+	sub	$inp,$out		# re-bias
+	sub	$inp,$in0
+	add	$inp,$len		# end of input
+
+	#mov	$inp,$_inp		# saved later
+	#mov	$out,$_out		# kept in $offload
+	mov	$len,$_end
+	#mov	$key,$_key		# remains resident in $inp register
+	mov	$ivp,$_ivp
+	mov	$ctx,$_ctx
+	mov	$in0,$_in0
+	mov	%r11,$_rsp
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	movaps	%xmm6,`$framesz+16*0`(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm7,`$framesz+16*1`(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm8,`$framesz+16*2`(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm9,`$framesz+16*3`(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm10,`$framesz+16*4`(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm11,`$framesz+16*5`(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm12,`$framesz+16*6`(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm13,`$framesz+16*7`(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm14,`$framesz+16*8`(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm15,`$framesz+16*9`(%rsp)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+.Lprologue_avx2:
+	vzeroall
+
+	mov	$inp,%r13		# borrow $a0
+	vpinsrq	\$1,$out,$offload,$offload
+	lea	0x80($key),$inp		# size optimization, reassign
+	lea	$TABLE+`$SZ*2*$rounds+32`(%rip),%r12	# borrow $a4
+	mov	0xf0-0x80($inp),%r14d	# rounds, borrow $a1
+	mov	$ctx,%r15		# borrow $a2
+	mov	$in0,%rsi		# borrow $a3
+	vmovdqu	($ivp),$iv		# load IV
+	lea	-9(%r14),%r14
+
+	vmovdqa	0x00(%r12,%r14,8),$mask14
+	vmovdqa	0x10(%r12,%r14,8),$mask12
+	vmovdqa	0x20(%r12,%r14,8),$mask10
+
+	sub	\$-16*$SZ,%r13		# inp++, size optimization
+	mov	$SZ*0(%r15),$A
+	lea	(%rsi,%r13),%r12	# borrow $a0
+	mov	$SZ*1(%r15),$B
+	cmp	$len,%r13		# $_end
+	mov	$SZ*2(%r15),$C
+	cmove	%rsp,%r12		# next block or random data
+	mov	$SZ*3(%r15),$D
+	mov	$SZ*4(%r15),$E
+	mov	$SZ*5(%r15),$F
+	mov	$SZ*6(%r15),$G
+	mov	$SZ*7(%r15),$H
+	vmovdqu	0x00-0x80($inp),$roundkey
+___
+					if ($SZ==4) {	# SHA256
+    my @X = map("%ymm$_",(0..3));
+    my ($t0,$t1,$t2,$t3) = map("%ymm$_",(4..7));
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	jmp	.Loop_avx2
+.align	16
+.Loop_avx2:
+	vmovdqa	$TABLE+`$SZ*2*$rounds`(%rip),$t3
+	vmovdqu	-16*$SZ+0(%rsi,%r13),%xmm0
+	vmovdqu	-16*$SZ+16(%rsi,%r13),%xmm1
+	vmovdqu	-16*$SZ+32(%rsi,%r13),%xmm2
+	vmovdqu	-16*$SZ+48(%rsi,%r13),%xmm3
+
+	vinserti128	\$1,(%r12),@X[0],@X[0]
+	vinserti128	\$1,16(%r12),@X[1],@X[1]
+	 vpshufb	$t3,@X[0],@X[0]
+	vinserti128	\$1,32(%r12),@X[2],@X[2]
+	 vpshufb	$t3,@X[1],@X[1]
+	vinserti128	\$1,48(%r12),@X[3],@X[3]
+
+	lea	$TABLE(%rip),$Tbl
+	vpshufb	$t3,@X[2],@X[2]
+	lea	-16*$SZ(%r13),%r13
+	vpaddd	0x00($Tbl),@X[0],$t0
+	vpshufb	$t3,@X[3],@X[3]
+	vpaddd	0x20($Tbl),@X[1],$t1
+	vpaddd	0x40($Tbl),@X[2],$t2
+	vpaddd	0x60($Tbl),@X[3],$t3
+	vmovdqa	$t0,0x00(%rsp)
+	xor	$a1,$a1
+	vmovdqa	$t1,0x20(%rsp)
+	lea	-$PUSH8(%rsp),%rsp
+	mov	$B,$a3
+	vmovdqa	$t2,0x00(%rsp)
+	xor	$C,$a3			# magic
+	vmovdqa	$t3,0x20(%rsp)
+	mov	$F,$a4
+	sub	\$-16*2*$SZ,$Tbl	# size optimization
+	jmp	.Lavx2_00_47
+
+.align	16
+.Lavx2_00_47:
+	vmovdqu	(%r13),$inout
+	vpinsrq	\$0,%r13,$offload,$offload
+___
+
+sub AVX2_256_00_47 () {
+my $j = shift;
+my $body = shift;
+my @X = @_;
+my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body);	# 96 instructions
+my $base = "+2*$PUSH8(%rsp)";
+
+	&lea	("%rsp","-$PUSH8(%rsp)")	if (($j%2)==0);
+	foreach (Xupdate_256_AVX()) {		# 29 instructions
+	    eval;
+	    eval(shift(@insns));
+	    eval(shift(@insns));
+	    eval(shift(@insns));
+	}
+	&vpaddd		($t2,@X[0],16*2*$j."($Tbl)");
+	  foreach (@insns) { eval; }		# remaining instructions
+	&vmovdqa	((32*$j)%$PUSH8."(%rsp)",$t2);
+}
+    $aesni_cbc_idx=0;
+    for ($i=0,$j=0; $j<4; $j++) {
+	&AVX2_256_00_47($j,\&bodyx_00_15,@X);
+	push(@X,shift(@X));			# rotate(@X)
+    }
+	&vmovq		("%r13",$offload);	# borrow $a0
+	&vpextrq	("%r15",$offload,1);	# borrow $a2
+	&vpand		($temp,$temp,$mask14);
+	&vpor		($iv,$iv,$temp);
+	&vmovdqu	("(%r15,%r13)",$iv);	# write output
+	&lea		("%r13","16(%r13)");	# inp++
+
+	&lea	($Tbl,16*2*$SZ."($Tbl)");
+	&cmpb	(($SZ-1)."($Tbl)",0);
+	&jne	(".Lavx2_00_47");
+
+	&vmovdqu	($inout,"(%r13)");
+	&vpinsrq	($offload,$offload,"%r13",0);
+
+    $aesni_cbc_idx=0;
+    for ($i=0; $i<16; ) {
+	my $base=$i<8?"+$PUSH8(%rsp)":"(%rsp)";
+	foreach(bodyx_00_15()) { eval; }
+    }
+					}
+$code.=<<___;
+	vpextrq	\$1,$offload,%r12		# $_out, borrow $a4
+	vmovq	$offload,%r13			# $_inp, borrow $a0
+	mov	`2*$SZ*$rounds+5*8`(%rsp),%r15	# $_ctx, borrow $a2
+	add	$a1,$A
+	lea	`2*$SZ*($rounds-8)`(%rsp),$Tbl
+
+	vpand	$mask14,$temp,$temp
+	vpor	$temp,$iv,$iv
+	vmovdqu	$iv,(%r12,%r13)			# write output
+	lea	16(%r13),%r13
+
+	add	$SZ*0(%r15),$A
+	add	$SZ*1(%r15),$B
+	add	$SZ*2(%r15),$C
+	add	$SZ*3(%r15),$D
+	add	$SZ*4(%r15),$E
+	add	$SZ*5(%r15),$F
+	add	$SZ*6(%r15),$G
+	add	$SZ*7(%r15),$H
+
+	mov	$A,$SZ*0(%r15)
+	mov	$B,$SZ*1(%r15)
+	mov	$C,$SZ*2(%r15)
+	mov	$D,$SZ*3(%r15)
+	mov	$E,$SZ*4(%r15)
+	mov	$F,$SZ*5(%r15)
+	mov	$G,$SZ*6(%r15)
+	mov	$H,$SZ*7(%r15)
+
+	cmp	`$PUSH8+2*8`($Tbl),%r13		# $_end
+	je	.Ldone_avx2
+
+	xor	$a1,$a1
+	mov	$B,$a3
+	mov	$F,$a4
+	xor	$C,$a3			# magic
+	jmp	.Lower_avx2
+.align	16
+.Lower_avx2:
+	vmovdqu	(%r13),$inout
+	vpinsrq	\$0,%r13,$offload,$offload
+___
+    $aesni_cbc_idx=0;
+    for ($i=0; $i<16; ) {
+	my $base="+16($Tbl)";
+	foreach(bodyx_00_15()) { eval; }
+	&lea	($Tbl,"-$PUSH8($Tbl)")	if ($i==8);
+    }
+$code.=<<___;
+	vmovq	$offload,%r13			# borrow $a0
+	vpextrq	\$1,$offload,%r15		# borrow $a2
+	vpand	$mask14,$temp,$temp
+	vpor	$temp,$iv,$iv
+	lea	-$PUSH8($Tbl),$Tbl
+	vmovdqu	$iv,(%r15,%r13)			# write output
+	lea	16(%r13),%r13			# inp++
+	cmp	%rsp,$Tbl
+	jae	.Lower_avx2
+
+	mov	`2*$SZ*$rounds+5*8`(%rsp),%r15	# $_ctx, borrow $a2
+	lea	16*$SZ(%r13),%r13
+	mov	`2*$SZ*$rounds+6*8`(%rsp),%rsi	# $_in0, borrow $a3
+	add	$a1,$A
+	lea	`2*$SZ*($rounds-8)`(%rsp),%rsp
+
+	add	$SZ*0(%r15),$A
+	add	$SZ*1(%r15),$B
+	add	$SZ*2(%r15),$C
+	add	$SZ*3(%r15),$D
+	add	$SZ*4(%r15),$E
+	add	$SZ*5(%r15),$F
+	add	$SZ*6(%r15),$G
+	lea	(%rsi,%r13),%r12
+	add	$SZ*7(%r15),$H
+
+	cmp	$_end,%r13
+
+	mov	$A,$SZ*0(%r15)
+	cmove	%rsp,%r12		# next block or stale data
+	mov	$B,$SZ*1(%r15)
+	mov	$C,$SZ*2(%r15)
+	mov	$D,$SZ*3(%r15)
+	mov	$E,$SZ*4(%r15)
+	mov	$F,$SZ*5(%r15)
+	mov	$G,$SZ*6(%r15)
+	mov	$H,$SZ*7(%r15)
+
+	jbe	.Loop_avx2
+	lea	(%rsp),$Tbl
+
+.Ldone_avx2:
+	lea	($Tbl),%rsp
+	mov	$_ivp,$ivp
+	mov	$_rsp,%rsi
+	vmovdqu	$iv,($ivp)		# output IV
+	vzeroall
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	movaps	`$framesz+16*0`(%rsp),%xmm6
+	movaps	`$framesz+16*1`(%rsp),%xmm7
+	movaps	`$framesz+16*2`(%rsp),%xmm8
+	movaps	`$framesz+16*3`(%rsp),%xmm9
+	movaps	`$framesz+16*4`(%rsp),%xmm10
+	movaps	`$framesz+16*5`(%rsp),%xmm11
+	movaps	`$framesz+16*6`(%rsp),%xmm12
+	movaps	`$framesz+16*7`(%rsp),%xmm13
+	movaps	`$framesz+16*8`(%rsp),%xmm14
+	movaps	`$framesz+16*9`(%rsp),%xmm15
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	(%rsi),%r15
+	mov	8(%rsi),%r14
+	mov	16(%rsi),%r13
+	mov	24(%rsi),%r12
+	mov	32(%rsi),%rbp
+	mov	40(%rsi),%rbx
+	lea	48(%rsi),%rsp
+.Lepilogue_avx2:
+	ret
+.size	${func}_avx2,.-${func}_avx2
+___
+}}
+}}
+{{
+my ($in0,$out,$len,$key,$ivp,$ctx,$inp)=("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx","%rcx","%r8","%r9","%r10");
+
+my ($rounds,$Tbl)=("%r11d","%rbx");
+
+my ($iv,$in,$rndkey0)=map("%xmm$_",(6,14,15));
+my @rndkey=("%xmm4","%xmm5");
+my $r=0;
+my $sn=0;
+
+my ($Wi,$ABEF,$CDGH,$TMP,$BSWAP,$ABEF_SAVE,$CDGH_SAVE)=map("%xmm$_",(0..3,7..9));
+my @MSG=map("%xmm$_",(10..13));
+
+my $aesenc=sub {
+  use integer;
+  my ($n,$k)=($r/10,$r%10);
+    if ($k==0) {
+      $code.=<<___;
+	movups		`16*$n`($in0),$in		# load input
+	xorps		$rndkey0,$in
+___
+      $code.=<<___ if ($n);
+	movups		$iv,`16*($n-1)`($out,$in0)	# write output
+___
+      $code.=<<___;
+	xorps		$in,$iv
+	movups		`32+16*$k-112`($key),$rndkey[1]
+	aesenc		$rndkey[0],$iv
+___
+    } elsif ($k==9) {
+      $sn++;
+      $code.=<<___;
+	cmp		\$11,$rounds
+	jb		.Laesenclast$sn
+	movups		`32+16*($k+0)-112`($key),$rndkey[1]
+	aesenc		$rndkey[0],$iv
+	movups		`32+16*($k+1)-112`($key),$rndkey[0]
+	aesenc		$rndkey[1],$iv
+	je		.Laesenclast$sn
+	movups		`32+16*($k+2)-112`($key),$rndkey[1]
+	aesenc		$rndkey[0],$iv
+	movups		`32+16*($k+3)-112`($key),$rndkey[0]
+	aesenc		$rndkey[1],$iv
+.Laesenclast$sn:
+	aesenclast	$rndkey[0],$iv
+	movups		16-112($key),$rndkey[1]		# forward reference
+	nop
+___
+    } else {
+      $code.=<<___;
+	movups		`32+16*$k-112`($key),$rndkey[1]
+	aesenc		$rndkey[0],$iv
+___
+    }
+    $r++;	unshift(@rndkey,pop(@rndkey));
+};
+
+if ($shaext) {
+my $Tbl="%rax";
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.type	${func}_shaext,\@function,6
+.align	32
+${func}_shaext:
+	mov	`($win64?56:8)`(%rsp),$inp	# load 7th argument
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	lea	`-8-10*16`(%rsp),%rsp
+	movaps	%xmm6,-8-10*16(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm7,-8-9*16(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm8,-8-8*16(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm9,-8-7*16(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm10,-8-6*16(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm11,-8-5*16(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm12,-8-4*16(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm13,-8-3*16(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm14,-8-2*16(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm15,-8-1*16(%rax)
+.Lprologue_shaext:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	lea		K256+0x80(%rip),$Tbl
+	movdqu		($ctx),$ABEF		# DCBA
+	movdqu		16($ctx),$CDGH		# HGFE
+	movdqa		0x200-0x80($Tbl),$TMP	# byte swap mask
+
+	mov		240($key),$rounds
+	sub		$in0,$out
+	movups		($key),$rndkey0		# $key[0]
+	movups		($ivp),$iv		# load IV
+	movups		16($key),$rndkey[0]	# forward reference
+	lea		112($key),$key		# size optimization
+
+	pshufd		\$0x1b,$ABEF,$Wi	# ABCD
+	pshufd		\$0xb1,$ABEF,$ABEF	# CDAB
+	pshufd		\$0x1b,$CDGH,$CDGH	# EFGH
+	movdqa		$TMP,$BSWAP		# offload
+	palignr		\$8,$CDGH,$ABEF		# ABEF
+	punpcklqdq	$Wi,$CDGH		# CDGH
+
+	jmp	.Loop_shaext
+
+.align	16
+.Loop_shaext:
+	movdqu		($inp),@MSG[0]
+	movdqu		0x10($inp),@MSG[1]
+	movdqu		0x20($inp),@MSG[2]
+	pshufb		$TMP,@MSG[0]
+	movdqu		0x30($inp),@MSG[3]
+
+	movdqa		0*32-0x80($Tbl),$Wi
+	paddd		@MSG[0],$Wi
+	pshufb		$TMP,@MSG[1]
+	movdqa		$CDGH,$CDGH_SAVE	# offload
+	movdqa		$ABEF,$ABEF_SAVE	# offload
+___
+	&$aesenc();
+$code.=<<___;
+	sha256rnds2	$ABEF,$CDGH		# 0-3
+	pshufd		\$0x0e,$Wi,$Wi
+___
+	&$aesenc();
+$code.=<<___;
+	sha256rnds2	$CDGH,$ABEF
+
+	movdqa		1*32-0x80($Tbl),$Wi
+	paddd		@MSG[1],$Wi
+	pshufb		$TMP,@MSG[2]
+	lea		0x40($inp),$inp
+___
+	&$aesenc();
+$code.=<<___;
+	sha256rnds2	$ABEF,$CDGH		# 4-7
+	pshufd		\$0x0e,$Wi,$Wi
+___
+	&$aesenc();
+$code.=<<___;
+	sha256rnds2	$CDGH,$ABEF
+
+	movdqa		2*32-0x80($Tbl),$Wi
+	paddd		@MSG[2],$Wi
+	pshufb		$TMP,@MSG[3]
+	sha256msg1	@MSG[1],@MSG[0]
+___
+	&$aesenc();
+$code.=<<___;
+	sha256rnds2	$ABEF,$CDGH		# 8-11
+	pshufd		\$0x0e,$Wi,$Wi
+	movdqa		@MSG[3],$TMP
+	palignr		\$4,@MSG[2],$TMP
+	paddd		$TMP,@MSG[0]
+___
+	&$aesenc();
+$code.=<<___;
+	sha256rnds2	$CDGH,$ABEF
+
+	movdqa		3*32-0x80($Tbl),$Wi
+	paddd		@MSG[3],$Wi
+	sha256msg2	@MSG[3],@MSG[0]
+	sha256msg1	@MSG[2],@MSG[1]
+___
+	&$aesenc();
+$code.=<<___;
+	sha256rnds2	$ABEF,$CDGH		# 12-15
+	pshufd		\$0x0e,$Wi,$Wi
+___
+	&$aesenc();
+$code.=<<___;
+	movdqa		@MSG[0],$TMP
+	palignr		\$4,@MSG[3],$TMP
+	paddd		$TMP,@MSG[1]
+	sha256rnds2	$CDGH,$ABEF
+___
+for($i=4;$i<16-3;$i++) {
+	&$aesenc()	if (($r%10)==0);
+$code.=<<___;
+	movdqa		$i*32-0x80($Tbl),$Wi
+	paddd		@MSG[0],$Wi
+	sha256msg2	@MSG[0],@MSG[1]
+	sha256msg1	@MSG[3],@MSG[2]
+___
+	&$aesenc();
+$code.=<<___;
+	sha256rnds2	$ABEF,$CDGH		# 16-19...
+	pshufd		\$0x0e,$Wi,$Wi
+	movdqa		@MSG[1],$TMP
+	palignr		\$4,@MSG[0],$TMP
+	paddd		$TMP,@MSG[2]
+___
+	&$aesenc();
+	&$aesenc()	if ($r==19);
+$code.=<<___;
+	sha256rnds2	$CDGH,$ABEF
+___
+	push(@MSG,shift(@MSG));
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	movdqa		13*32-0x80($Tbl),$Wi
+	paddd		@MSG[0],$Wi
+	sha256msg2	@MSG[0],@MSG[1]
+	sha256msg1	@MSG[3],@MSG[2]
+___
+	&$aesenc();
+$code.=<<___;
+	sha256rnds2	$ABEF,$CDGH		# 52-55
+	pshufd		\$0x0e,$Wi,$Wi
+	movdqa		@MSG[1],$TMP
+	palignr		\$4,@MSG[0],$TMP
+	paddd		$TMP,@MSG[2]
+___
+	&$aesenc();
+	&$aesenc();
+$code.=<<___;
+	sha256rnds2	$CDGH,$ABEF
+
+	movdqa		14*32-0x80($Tbl),$Wi
+	paddd		@MSG[1],$Wi
+	sha256msg2	@MSG[1],@MSG[2]
+	movdqa		$BSWAP,$TMP
+___
+	&$aesenc();
+$code.=<<___;
+	sha256rnds2	$ABEF,$CDGH		# 56-59
+	pshufd		\$0x0e,$Wi,$Wi
+___
+	&$aesenc();
+$code.=<<___;
+	sha256rnds2	$CDGH,$ABEF
+
+	movdqa		15*32-0x80($Tbl),$Wi
+	paddd		@MSG[2],$Wi
+___
+	&$aesenc();
+	&$aesenc();
+$code.=<<___;
+	sha256rnds2	$ABEF,$CDGH		# 60-63
+	pshufd		\$0x0e,$Wi,$Wi
+___
+	&$aesenc();
+$code.=<<___;
+	sha256rnds2	$CDGH,$ABEF
+	#pxor		$CDGH,$rndkey0		# black magic
+___
+	while ($r<40)	{ &$aesenc(); }		# remaining aesenc's
+$code.=<<___;
+	#xorps		$CDGH,$rndkey0		# black magic
+	paddd		$CDGH_SAVE,$CDGH
+	paddd		$ABEF_SAVE,$ABEF
+
+	dec		$len
+	movups		$iv,48($out,$in0)	# write output
+	lea		64($in0),$in0
+	jnz		.Loop_shaext
+
+	pshufd		\$0xb1,$CDGH,$CDGH	# DCHG
+	pshufd		\$0x1b,$ABEF,$TMP	# FEBA
+	pshufd		\$0xb1,$ABEF,$ABEF	# BAFE
+	punpckhqdq	$CDGH,$ABEF		# DCBA
+	palignr		\$8,$TMP,$CDGH		# HGFE
+
+	movups		$iv,($ivp)		# write IV
+	movdqu		$ABEF,($ctx)
+	movdqu		$CDGH,16($ctx)
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	movaps	0*16(%rsp),%xmm6
+	movaps	1*16(%rsp),%xmm7
+	movaps	2*16(%rsp),%xmm8
+	movaps	3*16(%rsp),%xmm9
+	movaps	4*16(%rsp),%xmm10
+	movaps	5*16(%rsp),%xmm11
+	movaps	6*16(%rsp),%xmm12
+	movaps	7*16(%rsp),%xmm13
+	movaps	8*16(%rsp),%xmm14
+	movaps	9*16(%rsp),%xmm15
+	lea	8+10*16(%rsp),%rsp
+.Lepilogue_shaext:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	ret
+.size	${func}_shaext,.-${func}_shaext
+___
+}
+}}}}}
+
+# EXCEPTION_DISPOSITION handler (EXCEPTION_RECORD *rec,ULONG64 frame,
+#		CONTEXT *context,DISPATCHER_CONTEXT *disp)
+if ($win64 && $avx) {
+$rec="%rcx";
+$frame="%rdx";
+$context="%r8";
+$disp="%r9";
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.extern	__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind
+.type	se_handler,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+se_handler:
+	push	%rsi
+	push	%rdi
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+	pushfq
+	sub	\$64,%rsp
+
+	mov	120($context),%rax	# pull context->Rax
+	mov	248($context),%rbx	# pull context->Rip
+
+	mov	8($disp),%rsi		# disp->ImageBase
+	mov	56($disp),%r11		# disp->HanderlData
+
+	mov	0(%r11),%r10d		# HandlerData[0]
+	lea	(%rsi,%r10),%r10	# prologue label
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip<prologue label
+	jb	.Lin_prologue
+
+	mov	152($context),%rax	# pull context->Rsp
+
+	mov	4(%r11),%r10d		# HandlerData[1]
+	lea	(%rsi,%r10),%r10	# epilogue label
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip>=epilogue label
+	jae	.Lin_prologue
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($shaext);
+	lea	aesni_cbc_sha256_enc_shaext(%rip),%r10
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx
+	jb	.Lnot_in_shaext
+
+	lea	(%rax),%rsi
+	lea	512($context),%rdi	# &context.Xmm6
+	mov	\$20,%ecx
+	.long	0xa548f3fc		# cld; rep movsq
+	lea	168(%rax),%rax		# adjust stack pointer
+	jmp	.Lin_prologue
+.Lnot_in_shaext:
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($avx>1);
+	lea	.Lavx2_shortcut(%rip),%r10
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip<avx2_shortcut
+	jb	.Lnot_in_avx2
+
+	and	\$-256*$SZ,%rax
+	add	\$`2*$SZ*($rounds-8)`,%rax
+.Lnot_in_avx2:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	%rax,%rsi		# put aside Rsp
+	mov	16*$SZ+7*8(%rax),%rax	# pull $_rsp
+	lea	48(%rax),%rax
+
+	mov	-8(%rax),%rbx
+	mov	-16(%rax),%rbp
+	mov	-24(%rax),%r12
+	mov	-32(%rax),%r13
+	mov	-40(%rax),%r14
+	mov	-48(%rax),%r15
+	mov	%rbx,144($context)	# restore context->Rbx
+	mov	%rbp,160($context)	# restore context->Rbp
+	mov	%r12,216($context)	# restore context->R12
+	mov	%r13,224($context)	# restore context->R13
+	mov	%r14,232($context)	# restore context->R14
+	mov	%r15,240($context)	# restore context->R15
+
+	lea	16*$SZ+8*8(%rsi),%rsi	# Xmm6- save area
+	lea	512($context),%rdi	# &context.Xmm6
+	mov	\$20,%ecx
+	.long	0xa548f3fc		# cld; rep movsq
+
+.Lin_prologue:
+	mov	8(%rax),%rdi
+	mov	16(%rax),%rsi
+	mov	%rax,152($context)	# restore context->Rsp
+	mov	%rsi,168($context)	# restore context->Rsi
+	mov	%rdi,176($context)	# restore context->Rdi
+
+	mov	40($disp),%rdi		# disp->ContextRecord
+	mov	$context,%rsi		# context
+	mov	\$154,%ecx		# sizeof(CONTEXT)
+	.long	0xa548f3fc		# cld; rep movsq
+
+	mov	$disp,%rsi
+	xor	%rcx,%rcx		# arg1, UNW_FLAG_NHANDLER
+	mov	8(%rsi),%rdx		# arg2, disp->ImageBase
+	mov	0(%rsi),%r8		# arg3, disp->ControlPc
+	mov	16(%rsi),%r9		# arg4, disp->FunctionEntry
+	mov	40(%rsi),%r10		# disp->ContextRecord
+	lea	56(%rsi),%r11		# &disp->HandlerData
+	lea	24(%rsi),%r12		# &disp->EstablisherFrame
+	mov	%r10,32(%rsp)		# arg5
+	mov	%r11,40(%rsp)		# arg6
+	mov	%r12,48(%rsp)		# arg7
+	mov	%rcx,56(%rsp)		# arg8, (NULL)
+	call	*__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind(%rip)
+
+	mov	\$1,%eax		# ExceptionContinueSearch
+	add	\$64,%rsp
+	popfq
+	pop	%r15
+	pop	%r14
+	pop	%r13
+	pop	%r12
+	pop	%rbp
+	pop	%rbx
+	pop	%rdi
+	pop	%rsi
+	ret
+.size	se_handler,.-se_handler
+
+.section	.pdata
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_${func}_xop
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_${func}_xop
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_${func}_xop
+
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_${func}_avx
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_${func}_avx
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_${func}_avx
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($avx>1);
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_${func}_avx2
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_${func}_avx2
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_${func}_avx2
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($shaext);
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_${func}_shaext
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_${func}_shaext
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_${func}_shaext
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+.section	.xdata
+.align	8
+.LSEH_info_${func}_xop:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	se_handler
+	.rva	.Lprologue_xop,.Lepilogue_xop		# HandlerData[]
+
+.LSEH_info_${func}_avx:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	se_handler
+	.rva	.Lprologue_avx,.Lepilogue_avx		# HandlerData[]
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($avx>1);
+.LSEH_info_${func}_avx2:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	se_handler
+	.rva	.Lprologue_avx2,.Lepilogue_avx2		# HandlerData[]
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($shaext);
+.LSEH_info_${func}_shaext:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	se_handler
+	.rva	.Lprologue_shaext,.Lepilogue_shaext	# HandlerData[]
+___
+}
+
+####################################################################
+sub rex {
+  local *opcode=shift;
+  my ($dst,$src)=@_;
+  my $rex=0;
+
+    $rex|=0x04			if($dst>=8);
+    $rex|=0x01			if($src>=8);
+    unshift @opcode,$rex|0x40	if($rex);
+}
+
+{
+  my %opcodelet = (
+		"sha256rnds2" => 0xcb,
+  		"sha256msg1"  => 0xcc,
+		"sha256msg2"  => 0xcd	);
+
+  sub sha256op38 {
+    my $instr = shift;
+
+    if (defined($opcodelet{$instr}) && @_[0] =~ /%xmm([0-9]+),\s*%xmm([0-9]+)/) {
+      my @opcode=(0x0f,0x38);
+	rex(\@opcode,$2,$1);
+	push @opcode,$opcodelet{$instr};
+	push @opcode,0xc0|($1&7)|(($2&7)<<3);		# ModR/M
+	return ".byte\t".join(',',@opcode);
+    } else {
+	return $instr."\t".@_[0];
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+$code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem;
+$code =~ s/\b(sha256[^\s]*)\s+(.*)/sha256op38($1,$2)/gem;
+print $code;
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ed1a47c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,3413 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2009-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# This module implements support for Intel AES-NI extension. In
+# OpenSSL context it's used with Intel engine, but can also be used as
+# drop-in replacement for crypto/aes/asm/aes-586.pl [see below for
+# details].
+#
+# Performance.
+#
+# To start with see corresponding paragraph in aesni-x86_64.pl...
+# Instead of filling table similar to one found there I've chosen to
+# summarize *comparison* results for raw ECB, CTR and CBC benchmarks.
+# The simplified table below represents 32-bit performance relative
+# to 64-bit one in every given point. Ratios vary for different
+# encryption modes, therefore interval values.
+#
+#	16-byte     64-byte     256-byte    1-KB        8-KB
+#	53-67%      67-84%      91-94%      95-98%      97-99.5%
+#
+# Lower ratios for smaller block sizes are perfectly understandable,
+# because function call overhead is higher in 32-bit mode. Largest
+# 8-KB block performance is virtually same: 32-bit code is less than
+# 1% slower for ECB, CBC and CCM, and ~3% slower otherwise.
+
+# January 2011
+#
+# See aesni-x86_64.pl for details. Unlike x86_64 version this module
+# interleaves at most 6 aes[enc|dec] instructions, because there are
+# not enough registers for 8x interleave [which should be optimal for
+# Sandy Bridge]. Actually, performance results for 6x interleave
+# factor presented in aesni-x86_64.pl (except for CTR) are for this
+# module.
+
+# April 2011
+#
+# Add aesni_xts_[en|de]crypt. Westmere spends 1.50 cycles processing
+# one byte out of 8KB with 128-bit key, Sandy Bridge - 1.09.
+
+# November 2015
+#
+# Add aesni_ocb_[en|de]crypt.
+
+######################################################################
+# Current large-block performance in cycles per byte processed with
+# 128-bit key (less is better).
+#
+#		CBC en-/decrypt	CTR	XTS	ECB	OCB
+# Westmere	3.77/1.37	1.37	1.52	1.27
+# * Bridge	5.07/0.98	0.99	1.09	0.91	1.10
+# Haswell	4.44/0.80	0.97	1.03	0.72	0.76
+# Silvermont	5.77/3.56	3.67	4.03	3.46	4.03
+# Bulldozer	5.80/0.98	1.05	1.24	0.93	1.23
+
+$PREFIX="aesni";	# if $PREFIX is set to "AES", the script
+			# generates drop-in replacement for
+			# crypto/aes/asm/aes-586.pl:-)
+$inline=1;		# inline _aesni_[en|de]crypt
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm");
+require "x86asm.pl";
+
+$output = pop;
+open OUT,">$output";
+*STDOUT=*OUT;
+
+&asm_init($ARGV[0],$0);
+
+&external_label("OPENSSL_ia32cap_P");
+&static_label("key_const");
+
+if ($PREFIX eq "aesni")	{ $movekey=\&movups; }
+else			{ $movekey=\&movups; }
+
+$len="eax";
+$rounds="ecx";
+$key="edx";
+$inp="esi";
+$out="edi";
+$rounds_="ebx";	# backup copy for $rounds
+$key_="ebp";	# backup copy for $key
+
+$rndkey0="xmm0";
+$rndkey1="xmm1";
+$inout0="xmm2";
+$inout1="xmm3";
+$inout2="xmm4";
+$inout3="xmm5";	$in1="xmm5";
+$inout4="xmm6";	$in0="xmm6";
+$inout5="xmm7";	$ivec="xmm7";
+
+# AESNI extension
+sub aeskeygenassist
+{ my($dst,$src,$imm)=@_;
+    if ("$dst:$src" =~ /xmm([0-7]):xmm([0-7])/)
+    {	&data_byte(0x66,0x0f,0x3a,0xdf,0xc0|($1<<3)|$2,$imm);	}
+}
+sub aescommon
+{ my($opcodelet,$dst,$src)=@_;
+    if ("$dst:$src" =~ /xmm([0-7]):xmm([0-7])/)
+    {	&data_byte(0x66,0x0f,0x38,$opcodelet,0xc0|($1<<3)|$2);}
+}
+sub aesimc	{ aescommon(0xdb,@_); }
+sub aesenc	{ aescommon(0xdc,@_); }
+sub aesenclast	{ aescommon(0xdd,@_); }
+sub aesdec	{ aescommon(0xde,@_); }
+sub aesdeclast	{ aescommon(0xdf,@_); }
+
+# Inline version of internal aesni_[en|de]crypt1
+{ my $sn;
+sub aesni_inline_generate1
+{ my ($p,$inout,$ivec)=@_; $inout=$inout0 if (!defined($inout));
+  $sn++;
+
+    &$movekey		($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key));
+    &$movekey		($rndkey1,&QWP(16,$key));
+    &xorps		($ivec,$rndkey0)	if (defined($ivec));
+    &lea		($key,&DWP(32,$key));
+    &xorps		($inout,$ivec)		if (defined($ivec));
+    &xorps		($inout,$rndkey0)	if (!defined($ivec));
+    &set_label("${p}1_loop_$sn");
+	eval"&aes${p}	($inout,$rndkey1)";
+	&dec		($rounds);
+	&$movekey	($rndkey1,&QWP(0,$key));
+	&lea		($key,&DWP(16,$key));
+    &jnz		(&label("${p}1_loop_$sn"));
+    eval"&aes${p}last	($inout,$rndkey1)";
+}}
+
+sub aesni_generate1	# fully unrolled loop
+{ my ($p,$inout)=@_; $inout=$inout0 if (!defined($inout));
+
+    &function_begin_B("_aesni_${p}rypt1");
+	&movups		($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key));
+	&$movekey	($rndkey1,&QWP(0x10,$key));
+	&xorps		($inout,$rndkey0);
+	&$movekey	($rndkey0,&QWP(0x20,$key));
+	&lea		($key,&DWP(0x30,$key));
+	&cmp		($rounds,11);
+	&jb		(&label("${p}128"));
+	&lea		($key,&DWP(0x20,$key));
+	&je		(&label("${p}192"));
+	&lea		($key,&DWP(0x20,$key));
+	eval"&aes${p}	($inout,$rndkey1)";
+	&$movekey	($rndkey1,&QWP(-0x40,$key));
+	eval"&aes${p}	($inout,$rndkey0)";
+	&$movekey	($rndkey0,&QWP(-0x30,$key));
+    &set_label("${p}192");
+	eval"&aes${p}	($inout,$rndkey1)";
+	&$movekey	($rndkey1,&QWP(-0x20,$key));
+	eval"&aes${p}	($inout,$rndkey0)";
+	&$movekey	($rndkey0,&QWP(-0x10,$key));
+    &set_label("${p}128");
+	eval"&aes${p}	($inout,$rndkey1)";
+	&$movekey	($rndkey1,&QWP(0,$key));
+	eval"&aes${p}	($inout,$rndkey0)";
+	&$movekey	($rndkey0,&QWP(0x10,$key));
+	eval"&aes${p}	($inout,$rndkey1)";
+	&$movekey	($rndkey1,&QWP(0x20,$key));
+	eval"&aes${p}	($inout,$rndkey0)";
+	&$movekey	($rndkey0,&QWP(0x30,$key));
+	eval"&aes${p}	($inout,$rndkey1)";
+	&$movekey	($rndkey1,&QWP(0x40,$key));
+	eval"&aes${p}	($inout,$rndkey0)";
+	&$movekey	($rndkey0,&QWP(0x50,$key));
+	eval"&aes${p}	($inout,$rndkey1)";
+	&$movekey	($rndkey1,&QWP(0x60,$key));
+	eval"&aes${p}	($inout,$rndkey0)";
+	&$movekey	($rndkey0,&QWP(0x70,$key));
+	eval"&aes${p}	($inout,$rndkey1)";
+    eval"&aes${p}last	($inout,$rndkey0)";
+    &ret();
+    &function_end_B("_aesni_${p}rypt1");
+}
+
+# void $PREFIX_encrypt (const void *inp,void *out,const AES_KEY *key);
+&aesni_generate1("enc") if (!$inline);
+&function_begin_B("${PREFIX}_encrypt");
+	&mov	("eax",&wparam(0));
+	&mov	($key,&wparam(2));
+	&movups	($inout0,&QWP(0,"eax"));
+	&mov	($rounds,&DWP(240,$key));
+	&mov	("eax",&wparam(1));
+	if ($inline)
+	{   &aesni_inline_generate1("enc");	}
+	else
+	{   &call	("_aesni_encrypt1");	}
+	&pxor	($rndkey0,$rndkey0);		# clear register bank
+	&pxor	($rndkey1,$rndkey1);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0,"eax"),$inout0);
+	&pxor	($inout0,$inout0);
+	&ret	();
+&function_end_B("${PREFIX}_encrypt");
+
+# void $PREFIX_decrypt (const void *inp,void *out,const AES_KEY *key);
+&aesni_generate1("dec") if(!$inline);
+&function_begin_B("${PREFIX}_decrypt");
+	&mov	("eax",&wparam(0));
+	&mov	($key,&wparam(2));
+	&movups	($inout0,&QWP(0,"eax"));
+	&mov	($rounds,&DWP(240,$key));
+	&mov	("eax",&wparam(1));
+	if ($inline)
+	{   &aesni_inline_generate1("dec");	}
+	else
+	{   &call	("_aesni_decrypt1");	}
+	&pxor	($rndkey0,$rndkey0);		# clear register bank
+	&pxor	($rndkey1,$rndkey1);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0,"eax"),$inout0);
+	&pxor	($inout0,$inout0);
+	&ret	();
+&function_end_B("${PREFIX}_decrypt");
+
+# _aesni_[en|de]cryptN are private interfaces, N denotes interleave
+# factor. Why 3x subroutine were originally used in loops? Even though
+# aes[enc|dec] latency was originally 6, it could be scheduled only
+# every *2nd* cycle. Thus 3x interleave was the one providing optimal
+# utilization, i.e. when subroutine's throughput is virtually same as
+# of non-interleaved subroutine [for number of input blocks up to 3].
+# This is why it originally made no sense to implement 2x subroutine.
+# But times change and it became appropriate to spend extra 192 bytes
+# on 2x subroutine on Atom Silvermont account. For processors that
+# can schedule aes[enc|dec] every cycle optimal interleave factor
+# equals to corresponding instructions latency. 8x is optimal for
+# * Bridge, but it's unfeasible to accommodate such implementation
+# in XMM registers addreassable in 32-bit mode and therefore maximum
+# of 6x is used instead...
+
+sub aesni_generate2
+{ my $p=shift;
+
+    &function_begin_B("_aesni_${p}rypt2");
+	&$movekey	($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key));
+	&shl		($rounds,4);
+	&$movekey	($rndkey1,&QWP(16,$key));
+	&xorps		($inout0,$rndkey0);
+	&pxor		($inout1,$rndkey0);
+	&$movekey	($rndkey0,&QWP(32,$key));
+	&lea		($key,&DWP(32,$key,$rounds));
+	&neg		($rounds);
+	&add		($rounds,16);
+
+    &set_label("${p}2_loop");
+	eval"&aes${p}	($inout0,$rndkey1)";
+	eval"&aes${p}	($inout1,$rndkey1)";
+	&$movekey	($rndkey1,&QWP(0,$key,$rounds));
+	&add		($rounds,32);
+	eval"&aes${p}	($inout0,$rndkey0)";
+	eval"&aes${p}	($inout1,$rndkey0)";
+	&$movekey	($rndkey0,&QWP(-16,$key,$rounds));
+	&jnz		(&label("${p}2_loop"));
+    eval"&aes${p}	($inout0,$rndkey1)";
+    eval"&aes${p}	($inout1,$rndkey1)";
+    eval"&aes${p}last	($inout0,$rndkey0)";
+    eval"&aes${p}last	($inout1,$rndkey0)";
+    &ret();
+    &function_end_B("_aesni_${p}rypt2");
+}
+
+sub aesni_generate3
+{ my $p=shift;
+
+    &function_begin_B("_aesni_${p}rypt3");
+	&$movekey	($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key));
+	&shl		($rounds,4);
+	&$movekey	($rndkey1,&QWP(16,$key));
+	&xorps		($inout0,$rndkey0);
+	&pxor		($inout1,$rndkey0);
+	&pxor		($inout2,$rndkey0);
+	&$movekey	($rndkey0,&QWP(32,$key));
+	&lea		($key,&DWP(32,$key,$rounds));
+	&neg		($rounds);
+	&add		($rounds,16);
+
+    &set_label("${p}3_loop");
+	eval"&aes${p}	($inout0,$rndkey1)";
+	eval"&aes${p}	($inout1,$rndkey1)";
+	eval"&aes${p}	($inout2,$rndkey1)";
+	&$movekey	($rndkey1,&QWP(0,$key,$rounds));
+	&add		($rounds,32);
+	eval"&aes${p}	($inout0,$rndkey0)";
+	eval"&aes${p}	($inout1,$rndkey0)";
+	eval"&aes${p}	($inout2,$rndkey0)";
+	&$movekey	($rndkey0,&QWP(-16,$key,$rounds));
+	&jnz		(&label("${p}3_loop"));
+    eval"&aes${p}	($inout0,$rndkey1)";
+    eval"&aes${p}	($inout1,$rndkey1)";
+    eval"&aes${p}	($inout2,$rndkey1)";
+    eval"&aes${p}last	($inout0,$rndkey0)";
+    eval"&aes${p}last	($inout1,$rndkey0)";
+    eval"&aes${p}last	($inout2,$rndkey0)";
+    &ret();
+    &function_end_B("_aesni_${p}rypt3");
+}
+
+# 4x interleave is implemented to improve small block performance,
+# most notably [and naturally] 4 block by ~30%. One can argue that one
+# should have implemented 5x as well, but improvement  would be <20%,
+# so it's not worth it...
+sub aesni_generate4
+{ my $p=shift;
+
+    &function_begin_B("_aesni_${p}rypt4");
+	&$movekey	($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key));
+	&$movekey	($rndkey1,&QWP(16,$key));
+	&shl		($rounds,4);
+	&xorps		($inout0,$rndkey0);
+	&pxor		($inout1,$rndkey0);
+	&pxor		($inout2,$rndkey0);
+	&pxor		($inout3,$rndkey0);
+	&$movekey	($rndkey0,&QWP(32,$key));
+	&lea		($key,&DWP(32,$key,$rounds));
+	&neg		($rounds);
+	&data_byte	(0x0f,0x1f,0x40,0x00);
+	&add		($rounds,16);
+
+    &set_label("${p}4_loop");
+	eval"&aes${p}	($inout0,$rndkey1)";
+	eval"&aes${p}	($inout1,$rndkey1)";
+	eval"&aes${p}	($inout2,$rndkey1)";
+	eval"&aes${p}	($inout3,$rndkey1)";
+	&$movekey	($rndkey1,&QWP(0,$key,$rounds));
+	&add		($rounds,32);
+	eval"&aes${p}	($inout0,$rndkey0)";
+	eval"&aes${p}	($inout1,$rndkey0)";
+	eval"&aes${p}	($inout2,$rndkey0)";
+	eval"&aes${p}	($inout3,$rndkey0)";
+	&$movekey	($rndkey0,&QWP(-16,$key,$rounds));
+    &jnz		(&label("${p}4_loop"));
+
+    eval"&aes${p}	($inout0,$rndkey1)";
+    eval"&aes${p}	($inout1,$rndkey1)";
+    eval"&aes${p}	($inout2,$rndkey1)";
+    eval"&aes${p}	($inout3,$rndkey1)";
+    eval"&aes${p}last	($inout0,$rndkey0)";
+    eval"&aes${p}last	($inout1,$rndkey0)";
+    eval"&aes${p}last	($inout2,$rndkey0)";
+    eval"&aes${p}last	($inout3,$rndkey0)";
+    &ret();
+    &function_end_B("_aesni_${p}rypt4");
+}
+
+sub aesni_generate6
+{ my $p=shift;
+
+    &function_begin_B("_aesni_${p}rypt6");
+    &static_label("_aesni_${p}rypt6_enter");
+	&$movekey	($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key));
+	&shl		($rounds,4);
+	&$movekey	($rndkey1,&QWP(16,$key));
+	&xorps		($inout0,$rndkey0);
+	&pxor		($inout1,$rndkey0);	# pxor does better here
+	&pxor		($inout2,$rndkey0);
+	eval"&aes${p}	($inout0,$rndkey1)";
+	&pxor		($inout3,$rndkey0);
+	&pxor		($inout4,$rndkey0);
+	eval"&aes${p}	($inout1,$rndkey1)";
+	&lea		($key,&DWP(32,$key,$rounds));
+	&neg		($rounds);
+	eval"&aes${p}	($inout2,$rndkey1)";
+	&pxor		($inout5,$rndkey0);
+	&$movekey	($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key,$rounds));
+	&add		($rounds,16);
+	&jmp		(&label("_aesni_${p}rypt6_inner"));
+
+    &set_label("${p}6_loop",16);
+	eval"&aes${p}	($inout0,$rndkey1)";
+	eval"&aes${p}	($inout1,$rndkey1)";
+	eval"&aes${p}	($inout2,$rndkey1)";
+    &set_label("_aesni_${p}rypt6_inner");
+	eval"&aes${p}	($inout3,$rndkey1)";
+	eval"&aes${p}	($inout4,$rndkey1)";
+	eval"&aes${p}	($inout5,$rndkey1)";
+    &set_label("_aesni_${p}rypt6_enter");
+	&$movekey	($rndkey1,&QWP(0,$key,$rounds));
+	&add		($rounds,32);
+	eval"&aes${p}	($inout0,$rndkey0)";
+	eval"&aes${p}	($inout1,$rndkey0)";
+	eval"&aes${p}	($inout2,$rndkey0)";
+	eval"&aes${p}	($inout3,$rndkey0)";
+	eval"&aes${p}	($inout4,$rndkey0)";
+	eval"&aes${p}	($inout5,$rndkey0)";
+	&$movekey	($rndkey0,&QWP(-16,$key,$rounds));
+    &jnz		(&label("${p}6_loop"));
+
+    eval"&aes${p}	($inout0,$rndkey1)";
+    eval"&aes${p}	($inout1,$rndkey1)";
+    eval"&aes${p}	($inout2,$rndkey1)";
+    eval"&aes${p}	($inout3,$rndkey1)";
+    eval"&aes${p}	($inout4,$rndkey1)";
+    eval"&aes${p}	($inout5,$rndkey1)";
+    eval"&aes${p}last	($inout0,$rndkey0)";
+    eval"&aes${p}last	($inout1,$rndkey0)";
+    eval"&aes${p}last	($inout2,$rndkey0)";
+    eval"&aes${p}last	($inout3,$rndkey0)";
+    eval"&aes${p}last	($inout4,$rndkey0)";
+    eval"&aes${p}last	($inout5,$rndkey0)";
+    &ret();
+    &function_end_B("_aesni_${p}rypt6");
+}
+&aesni_generate2("enc") if ($PREFIX eq "aesni");
+&aesni_generate2("dec");
+&aesni_generate3("enc") if ($PREFIX eq "aesni");
+&aesni_generate3("dec");
+&aesni_generate4("enc") if ($PREFIX eq "aesni");
+&aesni_generate4("dec");
+&aesni_generate6("enc") if ($PREFIX eq "aesni");
+&aesni_generate6("dec");
+
+if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
+######################################################################
+# void aesni_ecb_encrypt (const void *in, void *out,
+#                         size_t length, const AES_KEY *key,
+#                         int enc);
+&function_begin("aesni_ecb_encrypt");
+	&mov	($inp,&wparam(0));
+	&mov	($out,&wparam(1));
+	&mov	($len,&wparam(2));
+	&mov	($key,&wparam(3));
+	&mov	($rounds_,&wparam(4));
+	&and	($len,-16);
+	&jz	(&label("ecb_ret"));
+	&mov	($rounds,&DWP(240,$key));
+	&test	($rounds_,$rounds_);
+	&jz	(&label("ecb_decrypt"));
+
+	&mov	($key_,$key);		# backup $key
+	&mov	($rounds_,$rounds);	# backup $rounds
+	&cmp	($len,0x60);
+	&jb	(&label("ecb_enc_tail"));
+
+	&movdqu	($inout0,&QWP(0,$inp));
+	&movdqu	($inout1,&QWP(0x10,$inp));
+	&movdqu	($inout2,&QWP(0x20,$inp));
+	&movdqu	($inout3,&QWP(0x30,$inp));
+	&movdqu	($inout4,&QWP(0x40,$inp));
+	&movdqu	($inout5,&QWP(0x50,$inp));
+	&lea	($inp,&DWP(0x60,$inp));
+	&sub	($len,0x60);
+	&jmp	(&label("ecb_enc_loop6_enter"));
+
+&set_label("ecb_enc_loop6",16);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
+	&movdqu	($inout0,&QWP(0,$inp));
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
+	&movdqu	($inout1,&QWP(0x10,$inp));
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2);
+	&movdqu	($inout2,&QWP(0x20,$inp));
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x30,$out),$inout3);
+	&movdqu	($inout3,&QWP(0x30,$inp));
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x40,$out),$inout4);
+	&movdqu	($inout4,&QWP(0x40,$inp));
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x50,$out),$inout5);
+	&lea	($out,&DWP(0x60,$out));
+	&movdqu	($inout5,&QWP(0x50,$inp));
+	&lea	($inp,&DWP(0x60,$inp));
+&set_label("ecb_enc_loop6_enter");
+
+	&call	("_aesni_encrypt6");
+
+	&mov	($key,$key_);		# restore $key
+	&mov	($rounds,$rounds_);	# restore $rounds
+	&sub	($len,0x60);
+	&jnc	(&label("ecb_enc_loop6"));
+
+	&movups	(&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x30,$out),$inout3);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x40,$out),$inout4);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x50,$out),$inout5);
+	&lea	($out,&DWP(0x60,$out));
+	&add	($len,0x60);
+	&jz	(&label("ecb_ret"));
+
+&set_label("ecb_enc_tail");
+	&movups	($inout0,&QWP(0,$inp));
+	&cmp	($len,0x20);
+	&jb	(&label("ecb_enc_one"));
+	&movups	($inout1,&QWP(0x10,$inp));
+	&je	(&label("ecb_enc_two"));
+	&movups	($inout2,&QWP(0x20,$inp));
+	&cmp	($len,0x40);
+	&jb	(&label("ecb_enc_three"));
+	&movups	($inout3,&QWP(0x30,$inp));
+	&je	(&label("ecb_enc_four"));
+	&movups	($inout4,&QWP(0x40,$inp));
+	&xorps	($inout5,$inout5);
+	&call	("_aesni_encrypt6");
+	&movups	(&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x30,$out),$inout3);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x40,$out),$inout4);
+	jmp	(&label("ecb_ret"));
+
+&set_label("ecb_enc_one",16);
+	if ($inline)
+	{   &aesni_inline_generate1("enc");	}
+	else
+	{   &call	("_aesni_encrypt1");	}
+	&movups	(&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
+	&jmp	(&label("ecb_ret"));
+
+&set_label("ecb_enc_two",16);
+	&call	("_aesni_encrypt2");
+	&movups	(&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
+	&jmp	(&label("ecb_ret"));
+
+&set_label("ecb_enc_three",16);
+	&call	("_aesni_encrypt3");
+	&movups	(&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2);
+	&jmp	(&label("ecb_ret"));
+
+&set_label("ecb_enc_four",16);
+	&call	("_aesni_encrypt4");
+	&movups	(&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x30,$out),$inout3);
+	&jmp	(&label("ecb_ret"));
+######################################################################
+&set_label("ecb_decrypt",16);
+	&mov	($key_,$key);		# backup $key
+	&mov	($rounds_,$rounds);	# backup $rounds
+	&cmp	($len,0x60);
+	&jb	(&label("ecb_dec_tail"));
+
+	&movdqu	($inout0,&QWP(0,$inp));
+	&movdqu	($inout1,&QWP(0x10,$inp));
+	&movdqu	($inout2,&QWP(0x20,$inp));
+	&movdqu	($inout3,&QWP(0x30,$inp));
+	&movdqu	($inout4,&QWP(0x40,$inp));
+	&movdqu	($inout5,&QWP(0x50,$inp));
+	&lea	($inp,&DWP(0x60,$inp));
+	&sub	($len,0x60);
+	&jmp	(&label("ecb_dec_loop6_enter"));
+
+&set_label("ecb_dec_loop6",16);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
+	&movdqu	($inout0,&QWP(0,$inp));
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
+	&movdqu	($inout1,&QWP(0x10,$inp));
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2);
+	&movdqu	($inout2,&QWP(0x20,$inp));
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x30,$out),$inout3);
+	&movdqu	($inout3,&QWP(0x30,$inp));
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x40,$out),$inout4);
+	&movdqu	($inout4,&QWP(0x40,$inp));
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x50,$out),$inout5);
+	&lea	($out,&DWP(0x60,$out));
+	&movdqu	($inout5,&QWP(0x50,$inp));
+	&lea	($inp,&DWP(0x60,$inp));
+&set_label("ecb_dec_loop6_enter");
+
+	&call	("_aesni_decrypt6");
+
+	&mov	($key,$key_);		# restore $key
+	&mov	($rounds,$rounds_);	# restore $rounds
+	&sub	($len,0x60);
+	&jnc	(&label("ecb_dec_loop6"));
+
+	&movups	(&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x30,$out),$inout3);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x40,$out),$inout4);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x50,$out),$inout5);
+	&lea	($out,&DWP(0x60,$out));
+	&add	($len,0x60);
+	&jz	(&label("ecb_ret"));
+
+&set_label("ecb_dec_tail");
+	&movups	($inout0,&QWP(0,$inp));
+	&cmp	($len,0x20);
+	&jb	(&label("ecb_dec_one"));
+	&movups	($inout1,&QWP(0x10,$inp));
+	&je	(&label("ecb_dec_two"));
+	&movups	($inout2,&QWP(0x20,$inp));
+	&cmp	($len,0x40);
+	&jb	(&label("ecb_dec_three"));
+	&movups	($inout3,&QWP(0x30,$inp));
+	&je	(&label("ecb_dec_four"));
+	&movups	($inout4,&QWP(0x40,$inp));
+	&xorps	($inout5,$inout5);
+	&call	("_aesni_decrypt6");
+	&movups	(&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x30,$out),$inout3);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x40,$out),$inout4);
+	&jmp	(&label("ecb_ret"));
+
+&set_label("ecb_dec_one",16);
+	if ($inline)
+	{   &aesni_inline_generate1("dec");	}
+	else
+	{   &call	("_aesni_decrypt1");	}
+	&movups	(&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
+	&jmp	(&label("ecb_ret"));
+
+&set_label("ecb_dec_two",16);
+	&call	("_aesni_decrypt2");
+	&movups	(&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
+	&jmp	(&label("ecb_ret"));
+
+&set_label("ecb_dec_three",16);
+	&call	("_aesni_decrypt3");
+	&movups	(&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2);
+	&jmp	(&label("ecb_ret"));
+
+&set_label("ecb_dec_four",16);
+	&call	("_aesni_decrypt4");
+	&movups	(&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x30,$out),$inout3);
+
+&set_label("ecb_ret");
+	&pxor	("xmm0","xmm0");		# clear register bank
+	&pxor	("xmm1","xmm1");
+	&pxor	("xmm2","xmm2");
+	&pxor	("xmm3","xmm3");
+	&pxor	("xmm4","xmm4");
+	&pxor	("xmm5","xmm5");
+	&pxor	("xmm6","xmm6");
+	&pxor	("xmm7","xmm7");
+&function_end("aesni_ecb_encrypt");
+
+######################################################################
+# void aesni_ccm64_[en|de]crypt_blocks (const void *in, void *out,
+#                         size_t blocks, const AES_KEY *key,
+#                         const char *ivec,char *cmac);
+#
+# Handles only complete blocks, operates on 64-bit counter and
+# does not update *ivec! Nor does it finalize CMAC value
+# (see engine/eng_aesni.c for details)
+#
+{ my $cmac=$inout1;
+&function_begin("aesni_ccm64_encrypt_blocks");
+	&mov	($inp,&wparam(0));
+	&mov	($out,&wparam(1));
+	&mov	($len,&wparam(2));
+	&mov	($key,&wparam(3));
+	&mov	($rounds_,&wparam(4));
+	&mov	($rounds,&wparam(5));
+	&mov	($key_,"esp");
+	&sub	("esp",60);
+	&and	("esp",-16);			# align stack
+	&mov	(&DWP(48,"esp"),$key_);
+
+	&movdqu	($ivec,&QWP(0,$rounds_));	# load ivec
+	&movdqu	($cmac,&QWP(0,$rounds));	# load cmac
+	&mov	($rounds,&DWP(240,$key));
+
+	# compose byte-swap control mask for pshufb on stack
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,"esp"),0x0c0d0e0f);
+	&mov	(&DWP(4,"esp"),0x08090a0b);
+	&mov	(&DWP(8,"esp"),0x04050607);
+	&mov	(&DWP(12,"esp"),0x00010203);
+
+	# compose counter increment vector on stack
+	&mov	($rounds_,1);
+	&xor	($key_,$key_);
+	&mov	(&DWP(16,"esp"),$rounds_);
+	&mov	(&DWP(20,"esp"),$key_);
+	&mov	(&DWP(24,"esp"),$key_);
+	&mov	(&DWP(28,"esp"),$key_);
+
+	&shl	($rounds,4);
+	&mov	($rounds_,16);
+	&lea	($key_,&DWP(0,$key));
+	&movdqa	($inout3,&QWP(0,"esp"));
+	&movdqa	($inout0,$ivec);
+	&lea	($key,&DWP(32,$key,$rounds));
+	&sub	($rounds_,$rounds);
+	&pshufb	($ivec,$inout3);
+
+&set_label("ccm64_enc_outer");
+	&$movekey	($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key_));
+	&mov		($rounds,$rounds_);
+	&movups		($in0,&QWP(0,$inp));
+
+	&xorps		($inout0,$rndkey0);
+	&$movekey	($rndkey1,&QWP(16,$key_));
+	&xorps		($rndkey0,$in0);
+	&xorps		($cmac,$rndkey0);		# cmac^=inp
+	&$movekey	($rndkey0,&QWP(32,$key_));
+
+&set_label("ccm64_enc2_loop");
+	&aesenc		($inout0,$rndkey1);
+	&aesenc		($cmac,$rndkey1);
+	&$movekey	($rndkey1,&QWP(0,$key,$rounds));
+	&add		($rounds,32);
+	&aesenc		($inout0,$rndkey0);
+	&aesenc		($cmac,$rndkey0);
+	&$movekey	($rndkey0,&QWP(-16,$key,$rounds));
+	&jnz		(&label("ccm64_enc2_loop"));
+	&aesenc		($inout0,$rndkey1);
+	&aesenc		($cmac,$rndkey1);
+	&paddq		($ivec,&QWP(16,"esp"));
+	&dec		($len);
+	&aesenclast	($inout0,$rndkey0);
+	&aesenclast	($cmac,$rndkey0);
+
+	&lea	($inp,&DWP(16,$inp));
+	&xorps	($in0,$inout0);			# inp^=E(ivec)
+	&movdqa	($inout0,$ivec);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0,$out),$in0);		# save output
+	&pshufb	($inout0,$inout3);
+	&lea	($out,&DWP(16,$out));
+	&jnz	(&label("ccm64_enc_outer"));
+
+	&mov	("esp",&DWP(48,"esp"));
+	&mov	($out,&wparam(5));
+	&movups	(&QWP(0,$out),$cmac);
+
+	&pxor	("xmm0","xmm0");		# clear register bank
+	&pxor	("xmm1","xmm1");
+	&pxor	("xmm2","xmm2");
+	&pxor	("xmm3","xmm3");
+	&pxor	("xmm4","xmm4");
+	&pxor	("xmm5","xmm5");
+	&pxor	("xmm6","xmm6");
+	&pxor	("xmm7","xmm7");
+&function_end("aesni_ccm64_encrypt_blocks");
+
+&function_begin("aesni_ccm64_decrypt_blocks");
+	&mov	($inp,&wparam(0));
+	&mov	($out,&wparam(1));
+	&mov	($len,&wparam(2));
+	&mov	($key,&wparam(3));
+	&mov	($rounds_,&wparam(4));
+	&mov	($rounds,&wparam(5));
+	&mov	($key_,"esp");
+	&sub	("esp",60);
+	&and	("esp",-16);			# align stack
+	&mov	(&DWP(48,"esp"),$key_);
+
+	&movdqu	($ivec,&QWP(0,$rounds_));	# load ivec
+	&movdqu	($cmac,&QWP(0,$rounds));	# load cmac
+	&mov	($rounds,&DWP(240,$key));
+
+	# compose byte-swap control mask for pshufb on stack
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,"esp"),0x0c0d0e0f);
+	&mov	(&DWP(4,"esp"),0x08090a0b);
+	&mov	(&DWP(8,"esp"),0x04050607);
+	&mov	(&DWP(12,"esp"),0x00010203);
+
+	# compose counter increment vector on stack
+	&mov	($rounds_,1);
+	&xor	($key_,$key_);
+	&mov	(&DWP(16,"esp"),$rounds_);
+	&mov	(&DWP(20,"esp"),$key_);
+	&mov	(&DWP(24,"esp"),$key_);
+	&mov	(&DWP(28,"esp"),$key_);
+
+	&movdqa	($inout3,&QWP(0,"esp"));	# bswap mask
+	&movdqa	($inout0,$ivec);
+
+	&mov	($key_,$key);
+	&mov	($rounds_,$rounds);
+
+	&pshufb	($ivec,$inout3);
+	if ($inline)
+	{   &aesni_inline_generate1("enc");	}
+	else
+	{   &call	("_aesni_encrypt1");	}
+	&shl	($rounds_,4);
+	&mov	($rounds,16);
+	&movups	($in0,&QWP(0,$inp));		# load inp
+	&paddq	($ivec,&QWP(16,"esp"));
+	&lea	($inp,&QWP(16,$inp));
+	&sub	($rounds,$rounds_);
+	&lea	($key,&DWP(32,$key_,$rounds_));
+	&mov	($rounds_,$rounds);
+	&jmp	(&label("ccm64_dec_outer"));
+
+&set_label("ccm64_dec_outer",16);
+	&xorps	($in0,$inout0);			# inp ^= E(ivec)
+	&movdqa	($inout0,$ivec);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0,$out),$in0);		# save output
+	&lea	($out,&DWP(16,$out));
+	&pshufb	($inout0,$inout3);
+
+	&sub	($len,1);
+	&jz	(&label("ccm64_dec_break"));
+
+	&$movekey	($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key_));
+	&mov		($rounds,$rounds_);
+	&$movekey	($rndkey1,&QWP(16,$key_));
+	&xorps		($in0,$rndkey0);
+	&xorps		($inout0,$rndkey0);
+	&xorps		($cmac,$in0);		# cmac^=out
+	&$movekey	($rndkey0,&QWP(32,$key_));
+
+&set_label("ccm64_dec2_loop");
+	&aesenc		($inout0,$rndkey1);
+	&aesenc		($cmac,$rndkey1);
+	&$movekey	($rndkey1,&QWP(0,$key,$rounds));
+	&add		($rounds,32);
+	&aesenc		($inout0,$rndkey0);
+	&aesenc		($cmac,$rndkey0);
+	&$movekey	($rndkey0,&QWP(-16,$key,$rounds));
+	&jnz		(&label("ccm64_dec2_loop"));
+	&movups		($in0,&QWP(0,$inp));	# load inp
+	&paddq		($ivec,&QWP(16,"esp"));
+	&aesenc		($inout0,$rndkey1);
+	&aesenc		($cmac,$rndkey1);
+	&aesenclast	($inout0,$rndkey0);
+	&aesenclast	($cmac,$rndkey0);
+	&lea		($inp,&QWP(16,$inp));
+	&jmp	(&label("ccm64_dec_outer"));
+
+&set_label("ccm64_dec_break",16);
+	&mov	($rounds,&DWP(240,$key_));
+	&mov	($key,$key_);
+	if ($inline)
+	{   &aesni_inline_generate1("enc",$cmac,$in0);	}
+	else
+	{   &call	("_aesni_encrypt1",$cmac);	}
+
+	&mov	("esp",&DWP(48,"esp"));
+	&mov	($out,&wparam(5));
+	&movups	(&QWP(0,$out),$cmac);
+
+	&pxor	("xmm0","xmm0");		# clear register bank
+	&pxor	("xmm1","xmm1");
+	&pxor	("xmm2","xmm2");
+	&pxor	("xmm3","xmm3");
+	&pxor	("xmm4","xmm4");
+	&pxor	("xmm5","xmm5");
+	&pxor	("xmm6","xmm6");
+	&pxor	("xmm7","xmm7");
+&function_end("aesni_ccm64_decrypt_blocks");
+}
+
+######################################################################
+# void aesni_ctr32_encrypt_blocks (const void *in, void *out,
+#                         size_t blocks, const AES_KEY *key,
+#                         const char *ivec);
+#
+# Handles only complete blocks, operates on 32-bit counter and
+# does not update *ivec! (see crypto/modes/ctr128.c for details)
+#
+# stack layout:
+#	0	pshufb mask
+#	16	vector addend: 0,6,6,6
+# 	32	counter-less ivec
+#	48	1st triplet of counter vector
+#	64	2nd triplet of counter vector
+#	80	saved %esp
+
+&function_begin("aesni_ctr32_encrypt_blocks");
+	&mov	($inp,&wparam(0));
+	&mov	($out,&wparam(1));
+	&mov	($len,&wparam(2));
+	&mov	($key,&wparam(3));
+	&mov	($rounds_,&wparam(4));
+	&mov	($key_,"esp");
+	&sub	("esp",88);
+	&and	("esp",-16);			# align stack
+	&mov	(&DWP(80,"esp"),$key_);
+
+	&cmp	($len,1);
+	&je	(&label("ctr32_one_shortcut"));
+
+	&movdqu	($inout5,&QWP(0,$rounds_));	# load ivec
+
+	# compose byte-swap control mask for pshufb on stack
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,"esp"),0x0c0d0e0f);
+	&mov	(&DWP(4,"esp"),0x08090a0b);
+	&mov	(&DWP(8,"esp"),0x04050607);
+	&mov	(&DWP(12,"esp"),0x00010203);
+
+	# compose counter increment vector on stack
+	&mov	($rounds,6);
+	&xor	($key_,$key_);
+	&mov	(&DWP(16,"esp"),$rounds);
+	&mov	(&DWP(20,"esp"),$rounds);
+	&mov	(&DWP(24,"esp"),$rounds);
+	&mov	(&DWP(28,"esp"),$key_);
+
+	&pextrd	($rounds_,$inout5,3);		# pull 32-bit counter
+	&pinsrd	($inout5,$key_,3);		# wipe 32-bit counter
+
+	&mov	($rounds,&DWP(240,$key));	# key->rounds
+
+	# compose 2 vectors of 3x32-bit counters
+	&bswap	($rounds_);
+	&pxor	($rndkey0,$rndkey0);
+	&pxor	($rndkey1,$rndkey1);
+	&movdqa	($inout0,&QWP(0,"esp"));	# load byte-swap mask
+	&pinsrd	($rndkey0,$rounds_,0);
+	&lea	($key_,&DWP(3,$rounds_));
+	&pinsrd	($rndkey1,$key_,0);
+	&inc	($rounds_);
+	&pinsrd	($rndkey0,$rounds_,1);
+	&inc	($key_);
+	&pinsrd	($rndkey1,$key_,1);
+	&inc	($rounds_);
+	&pinsrd	($rndkey0,$rounds_,2);
+	&inc	($key_);
+	&pinsrd	($rndkey1,$key_,2);
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(48,"esp"),$rndkey0);	# save 1st triplet
+	&pshufb	($rndkey0,$inout0);		# byte swap
+	&movdqu	($inout4,&QWP(0,$key));		# key[0]
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(64,"esp"),$rndkey1);	# save 2nd triplet
+	&pshufb	($rndkey1,$inout0);		# byte swap
+
+	&pshufd	($inout0,$rndkey0,3<<6);	# place counter to upper dword
+	&pshufd	($inout1,$rndkey0,2<<6);
+	&cmp	($len,6);
+	&jb	(&label("ctr32_tail"));
+	&pxor	($inout5,$inout4);		# counter-less ivec^key[0]
+	&shl	($rounds,4);
+	&mov	($rounds_,16);
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(32,"esp"),$inout5);	# save counter-less ivec^key[0]
+	&mov	($key_,$key);			# backup $key
+	&sub	($rounds_,$rounds);		# backup twisted $rounds
+	&lea	($key,&DWP(32,$key,$rounds));
+	&sub	($len,6);
+	&jmp	(&label("ctr32_loop6"));
+
+&set_label("ctr32_loop6",16);
+	# inlining _aesni_encrypt6's prologue gives ~6% improvement...
+	&pshufd	($inout2,$rndkey0,1<<6);
+	&movdqa	($rndkey0,&QWP(32,"esp"));	# pull counter-less ivec
+	&pshufd	($inout3,$rndkey1,3<<6);
+	&pxor		($inout0,$rndkey0);	# merge counter-less ivec
+	&pshufd	($inout4,$rndkey1,2<<6);
+	&pxor		($inout1,$rndkey0);
+	&pshufd	($inout5,$rndkey1,1<<6);
+	&$movekey	($rndkey1,&QWP(16,$key_));
+	&pxor		($inout2,$rndkey0);
+	&pxor		($inout3,$rndkey0);
+	&aesenc		($inout0,$rndkey1);
+	&pxor		($inout4,$rndkey0);
+	&pxor		($inout5,$rndkey0);
+	&aesenc		($inout1,$rndkey1);
+	&$movekey	($rndkey0,&QWP(32,$key_));
+	&mov		($rounds,$rounds_);
+	&aesenc		($inout2,$rndkey1);
+	&aesenc		($inout3,$rndkey1);
+	&aesenc		($inout4,$rndkey1);
+	&aesenc		($inout5,$rndkey1);
+
+	&call		(&label("_aesni_encrypt6_enter"));
+
+	&movups	($rndkey1,&QWP(0,$inp));
+	&movups	($rndkey0,&QWP(0x10,$inp));
+	&xorps	($inout0,$rndkey1);
+	&movups	($rndkey1,&QWP(0x20,$inp));
+	&xorps	($inout1,$rndkey0);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
+	&movdqa	($rndkey0,&QWP(16,"esp"));	# load increment
+	&xorps	($inout2,$rndkey1);
+	&movdqa	($rndkey1,&QWP(64,"esp"));	# load 2nd triplet
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2);
+
+	&paddd	($rndkey1,$rndkey0);		# 2nd triplet increment
+	&paddd	($rndkey0,&QWP(48,"esp"));	# 1st triplet increment
+	&movdqa	($inout0,&QWP(0,"esp"));	# load byte swap mask
+
+	&movups	($inout1,&QWP(0x30,$inp));
+	&movups	($inout2,&QWP(0x40,$inp));
+	&xorps	($inout3,$inout1);
+	&movups	($inout1,&QWP(0x50,$inp));
+	&lea	($inp,&DWP(0x60,$inp));
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(48,"esp"),$rndkey0);	# save 1st triplet
+	&pshufb	($rndkey0,$inout0);		# byte swap
+	&xorps	($inout4,$inout2);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x30,$out),$inout3);
+	&xorps	($inout5,$inout1);
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(64,"esp"),$rndkey1);	# save 2nd triplet
+	&pshufb	($rndkey1,$inout0);		# byte swap
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x40,$out),$inout4);
+	&pshufd	($inout0,$rndkey0,3<<6);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x50,$out),$inout5);
+	&lea	($out,&DWP(0x60,$out));
+
+	&pshufd	($inout1,$rndkey0,2<<6);
+	&sub	($len,6);
+	&jnc	(&label("ctr32_loop6"));
+
+	&add	($len,6);
+	&jz	(&label("ctr32_ret"));
+	&movdqu	($inout5,&QWP(0,$key_));
+	&mov	($key,$key_);
+	&pxor	($inout5,&QWP(32,"esp"));	# restore count-less ivec
+	&mov	($rounds,&DWP(240,$key_));	# restore $rounds
+
+&set_label("ctr32_tail");
+	&por	($inout0,$inout5);
+	&cmp	($len,2);
+	&jb	(&label("ctr32_one"));
+
+	&pshufd	($inout2,$rndkey0,1<<6);
+	&por	($inout1,$inout5);
+	&je	(&label("ctr32_two"));
+
+	&pshufd	($inout3,$rndkey1,3<<6);
+	&por	($inout2,$inout5);
+	&cmp	($len,4);
+	&jb	(&label("ctr32_three"));
+
+	&pshufd	($inout4,$rndkey1,2<<6);
+	&por	($inout3,$inout5);
+	&je	(&label("ctr32_four"));
+
+	&por	($inout4,$inout5);
+	&call	("_aesni_encrypt6");
+	&movups	($rndkey1,&QWP(0,$inp));
+	&movups	($rndkey0,&QWP(0x10,$inp));
+	&xorps	($inout0,$rndkey1);
+	&movups	($rndkey1,&QWP(0x20,$inp));
+	&xorps	($inout1,$rndkey0);
+	&movups	($rndkey0,&QWP(0x30,$inp));
+	&xorps	($inout2,$rndkey1);
+	&movups	($rndkey1,&QWP(0x40,$inp));
+	&xorps	($inout3,$rndkey0);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
+	&xorps	($inout4,$rndkey1);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x30,$out),$inout3);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x40,$out),$inout4);
+	&jmp	(&label("ctr32_ret"));
+
+&set_label("ctr32_one_shortcut",16);
+	&movups	($inout0,&QWP(0,$rounds_));	# load ivec
+	&mov	($rounds,&DWP(240,$key));
+	
+&set_label("ctr32_one");
+	if ($inline)
+	{   &aesni_inline_generate1("enc");	}
+	else
+	{   &call	("_aesni_encrypt1");	}
+	&movups	($in0,&QWP(0,$inp));
+	&xorps	($in0,$inout0);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0,$out),$in0);
+	&jmp	(&label("ctr32_ret"));
+
+&set_label("ctr32_two",16);
+	&call	("_aesni_encrypt2");
+	&movups	($inout3,&QWP(0,$inp));
+	&movups	($inout4,&QWP(0x10,$inp));
+	&xorps	($inout0,$inout3);
+	&xorps	($inout1,$inout4);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
+	&jmp	(&label("ctr32_ret"));
+
+&set_label("ctr32_three",16);
+	&call	("_aesni_encrypt3");
+	&movups	($inout3,&QWP(0,$inp));
+	&movups	($inout4,&QWP(0x10,$inp));
+	&xorps	($inout0,$inout3);
+	&movups	($inout5,&QWP(0x20,$inp));
+	&xorps	($inout1,$inout4);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
+	&xorps	($inout2,$inout5);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2);
+	&jmp	(&label("ctr32_ret"));
+
+&set_label("ctr32_four",16);
+	&call	("_aesni_encrypt4");
+	&movups	($inout4,&QWP(0,$inp));
+	&movups	($inout5,&QWP(0x10,$inp));
+	&movups	($rndkey1,&QWP(0x20,$inp));
+	&xorps	($inout0,$inout4);
+	&movups	($rndkey0,&QWP(0x30,$inp));
+	&xorps	($inout1,$inout5);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
+	&xorps	($inout2,$rndkey1);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
+	&xorps	($inout3,$rndkey0);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x30,$out),$inout3);
+
+&set_label("ctr32_ret");
+	&pxor	("xmm0","xmm0");		# clear register bank
+	&pxor	("xmm1","xmm1");
+	&pxor	("xmm2","xmm2");
+	&pxor	("xmm3","xmm3");
+	&pxor	("xmm4","xmm4");
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(32,"esp"),"xmm0");	# clear stack
+	&pxor	("xmm5","xmm5");
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(48,"esp"),"xmm0");
+	&pxor	("xmm6","xmm6");
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(64,"esp"),"xmm0");
+	&pxor	("xmm7","xmm7");
+	&mov	("esp",&DWP(80,"esp"));
+&function_end("aesni_ctr32_encrypt_blocks");
+
+######################################################################
+# void aesni_xts_[en|de]crypt(const char *inp,char *out,size_t len,
+#	const AES_KEY *key1, const AES_KEY *key2
+#	const unsigned char iv[16]);
+#
+{ my ($tweak,$twtmp,$twres,$twmask)=($rndkey1,$rndkey0,$inout0,$inout1);
+
+&function_begin("aesni_xts_encrypt");
+	&mov	($key,&wparam(4));		# key2
+	&mov	($inp,&wparam(5));		# clear-text tweak
+
+	&mov	($rounds,&DWP(240,$key));	# key2->rounds
+	&movups	($inout0,&QWP(0,$inp));
+	if ($inline)
+	{   &aesni_inline_generate1("enc");	}
+	else
+	{   &call	("_aesni_encrypt1");	}
+
+	&mov	($inp,&wparam(0));
+	&mov	($out,&wparam(1));
+	&mov	($len,&wparam(2));
+	&mov	($key,&wparam(3));		# key1
+
+	&mov	($key_,"esp");
+	&sub	("esp",16*7+8);
+	&mov	($rounds,&DWP(240,$key));	# key1->rounds
+	&and	("esp",-16);			# align stack
+
+	&mov	(&DWP(16*6+0,"esp"),0x87);	# compose the magic constant
+	&mov	(&DWP(16*6+4,"esp"),0);
+	&mov	(&DWP(16*6+8,"esp"),1);
+	&mov	(&DWP(16*6+12,"esp"),0);
+	&mov	(&DWP(16*7+0,"esp"),$len);	# save original $len
+	&mov	(&DWP(16*7+4,"esp"),$key_);	# save original %esp
+
+	&movdqa	($tweak,$inout0);
+	&pxor	($twtmp,$twtmp);
+	&movdqa	($twmask,&QWP(6*16,"esp"));	# 0x0...010...87
+	&pcmpgtd($twtmp,$tweak);		# broadcast upper bits
+
+	&and	($len,-16);
+	&mov	($key_,$key);			# backup $key
+	&mov	($rounds_,$rounds);		# backup $rounds
+	&sub	($len,16*6);
+	&jc	(&label("xts_enc_short"));
+
+	&shl	($rounds,4);
+	&mov	($rounds_,16);
+	&sub	($rounds_,$rounds);
+	&lea	($key,&DWP(32,$key,$rounds));
+	&jmp	(&label("xts_enc_loop6"));
+
+&set_label("xts_enc_loop6",16);
+	for ($i=0;$i<4;$i++) {
+	    &pshufd	($twres,$twtmp,0x13);
+	    &pxor	($twtmp,$twtmp);
+	    &movdqa	(&QWP(16*$i,"esp"),$tweak);
+	    &paddq	($tweak,$tweak);	# &psllq($tweak,1);
+	    &pand	($twres,$twmask);	# isolate carry and residue
+	    &pcmpgtd	($twtmp,$tweak);	# broadcast upper bits
+	    &pxor	($tweak,$twres);
+	}
+	&pshufd	($inout5,$twtmp,0x13);
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(16*$i++,"esp"),$tweak);
+	&paddq	($tweak,$tweak);		# &psllq($tweak,1);
+	 &$movekey	($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key_));
+	&pand	($inout5,$twmask);		# isolate carry and residue
+	 &movups	($inout0,&QWP(0,$inp));	# load input
+	&pxor	($inout5,$tweak);
+
+	# inline _aesni_encrypt6 prologue and flip xor with tweak and key[0]
+	&mov	($rounds,$rounds_);		# restore $rounds
+	&movdqu	($inout1,&QWP(16*1,$inp));
+	 &xorps		($inout0,$rndkey0);	# input^=rndkey[0]
+	&movdqu	($inout2,&QWP(16*2,$inp));
+	 &pxor		($inout1,$rndkey0);
+	&movdqu	($inout3,&QWP(16*3,$inp));
+	 &pxor		($inout2,$rndkey0);
+	&movdqu	($inout4,&QWP(16*4,$inp));
+	 &pxor		($inout3,$rndkey0);
+	&movdqu	($rndkey1,&QWP(16*5,$inp));
+	 &pxor		($inout4,$rndkey0);
+	&lea	($inp,&DWP(16*6,$inp));
+	&pxor	($inout0,&QWP(16*0,"esp"));	# input^=tweak
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(16*$i,"esp"),$inout5);	# save last tweak
+	&pxor	($inout5,$rndkey1);
+
+	 &$movekey	($rndkey1,&QWP(16,$key_));
+	&pxor	($inout1,&QWP(16*1,"esp"));
+	&pxor	($inout2,&QWP(16*2,"esp"));
+	 &aesenc	($inout0,$rndkey1);
+	&pxor	($inout3,&QWP(16*3,"esp"));
+	&pxor	($inout4,&QWP(16*4,"esp"));
+	 &aesenc	($inout1,$rndkey1);
+	&pxor		($inout5,$rndkey0);
+	 &$movekey	($rndkey0,&QWP(32,$key_));
+	 &aesenc	($inout2,$rndkey1);
+	 &aesenc	($inout3,$rndkey1);
+	 &aesenc	($inout4,$rndkey1);
+	 &aesenc	($inout5,$rndkey1);
+	&call		(&label("_aesni_encrypt6_enter"));
+
+	&movdqa	($tweak,&QWP(16*5,"esp"));	# last tweak
+       &pxor	($twtmp,$twtmp);
+	&xorps	($inout0,&QWP(16*0,"esp"));	# output^=tweak
+       &pcmpgtd	($twtmp,$tweak);		# broadcast upper bits
+	&xorps	($inout1,&QWP(16*1,"esp"));
+	&movups	(&QWP(16*0,$out),$inout0);	# write output
+	&xorps	($inout2,&QWP(16*2,"esp"));
+	&movups	(&QWP(16*1,$out),$inout1);
+	&xorps	($inout3,&QWP(16*3,"esp"));
+	&movups	(&QWP(16*2,$out),$inout2);
+	&xorps	($inout4,&QWP(16*4,"esp"));
+	&movups	(&QWP(16*3,$out),$inout3);
+	&xorps	($inout5,$tweak);
+	&movups	(&QWP(16*4,$out),$inout4);
+       &pshufd	($twres,$twtmp,0x13);
+	&movups	(&QWP(16*5,$out),$inout5);
+	&lea	($out,&DWP(16*6,$out));
+       &movdqa	($twmask,&QWP(16*6,"esp"));	# 0x0...010...87
+
+	&pxor	($twtmp,$twtmp);
+	&paddq	($tweak,$tweak);		# &psllq($tweak,1);
+	&pand	($twres,$twmask);		# isolate carry and residue
+	&pcmpgtd($twtmp,$tweak);		# broadcast upper bits
+	&pxor	($tweak,$twres);
+
+	&sub	($len,16*6);
+	&jnc	(&label("xts_enc_loop6"));
+
+	&mov	($rounds,&DWP(240,$key_));	# restore $rounds
+	&mov	($key,$key_);			# restore $key
+	&mov	($rounds_,$rounds);
+
+&set_label("xts_enc_short");
+	&add	($len,16*6);
+	&jz	(&label("xts_enc_done6x"));
+
+	&movdqa	($inout3,$tweak);		# put aside previous tweak
+	&cmp	($len,0x20);
+	&jb	(&label("xts_enc_one"));
+
+	&pshufd	($twres,$twtmp,0x13);
+	&pxor	($twtmp,$twtmp);
+	&paddq	($tweak,$tweak);		# &psllq($tweak,1);
+	&pand	($twres,$twmask);		# isolate carry and residue
+	&pcmpgtd($twtmp,$tweak);		# broadcast upper bits
+	&pxor	($tweak,$twres);
+	&je	(&label("xts_enc_two"));
+
+	&pshufd	($twres,$twtmp,0x13);
+	&pxor	($twtmp,$twtmp);
+	&movdqa	($inout4,$tweak);		# put aside previous tweak
+	&paddq	($tweak,$tweak);		# &psllq($tweak,1);
+	&pand	($twres,$twmask);		# isolate carry and residue
+	&pcmpgtd($twtmp,$tweak);		# broadcast upper bits
+	&pxor	($tweak,$twres);
+	&cmp	($len,0x40);
+	&jb	(&label("xts_enc_three"));
+
+	&pshufd	($twres,$twtmp,0x13);
+	&pxor	($twtmp,$twtmp);
+	&movdqa	($inout5,$tweak);		# put aside previous tweak
+	&paddq	($tweak,$tweak);		# &psllq($tweak,1);
+	&pand	($twres,$twmask);		# isolate carry and residue
+	&pcmpgtd($twtmp,$tweak);		# broadcast upper bits
+	&pxor	($tweak,$twres);
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(16*0,"esp"),$inout3);
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(16*1,"esp"),$inout4);
+	&je	(&label("xts_enc_four"));
+
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(16*2,"esp"),$inout5);
+	&pshufd	($inout5,$twtmp,0x13);
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(16*3,"esp"),$tweak);
+	&paddq	($tweak,$tweak);		# &psllq($inout0,1);
+	&pand	($inout5,$twmask);		# isolate carry and residue
+	&pxor	($inout5,$tweak);
+
+	&movdqu	($inout0,&QWP(16*0,$inp));	# load input
+	&movdqu	($inout1,&QWP(16*1,$inp));
+	&movdqu	($inout2,&QWP(16*2,$inp));
+	&pxor	($inout0,&QWP(16*0,"esp"));	# input^=tweak
+	&movdqu	($inout3,&QWP(16*3,$inp));
+	&pxor	($inout1,&QWP(16*1,"esp"));
+	&movdqu	($inout4,&QWP(16*4,$inp));
+	&pxor	($inout2,&QWP(16*2,"esp"));
+	&lea	($inp,&DWP(16*5,$inp));
+	&pxor	($inout3,&QWP(16*3,"esp"));
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(16*4,"esp"),$inout5);	# save last tweak
+	&pxor	($inout4,$inout5);
+
+	&call	("_aesni_encrypt6");
+
+	&movaps	($tweak,&QWP(16*4,"esp"));	# last tweak
+	&xorps	($inout0,&QWP(16*0,"esp"));	# output^=tweak
+	&xorps	($inout1,&QWP(16*1,"esp"));
+	&xorps	($inout2,&QWP(16*2,"esp"));
+	&movups	(&QWP(16*0,$out),$inout0);	# write output
+	&xorps	($inout3,&QWP(16*3,"esp"));
+	&movups	(&QWP(16*1,$out),$inout1);
+	&xorps	($inout4,$tweak);
+	&movups	(&QWP(16*2,$out),$inout2);
+	&movups	(&QWP(16*3,$out),$inout3);
+	&movups	(&QWP(16*4,$out),$inout4);
+	&lea	($out,&DWP(16*5,$out));
+	&jmp	(&label("xts_enc_done"));
+
+&set_label("xts_enc_one",16);
+	&movups	($inout0,&QWP(16*0,$inp));	# load input
+	&lea	($inp,&DWP(16*1,$inp));
+	&xorps	($inout0,$inout3);		# input^=tweak
+	if ($inline)
+	{   &aesni_inline_generate1("enc");	}
+	else
+	{   &call	("_aesni_encrypt1");	}
+	&xorps	($inout0,$inout3);		# output^=tweak
+	&movups	(&QWP(16*0,$out),$inout0);	# write output
+	&lea	($out,&DWP(16*1,$out));
+
+	&movdqa	($tweak,$inout3);		# last tweak
+	&jmp	(&label("xts_enc_done"));
+
+&set_label("xts_enc_two",16);
+	&movaps	($inout4,$tweak);		# put aside last tweak
+
+	&movups	($inout0,&QWP(16*0,$inp));	# load input
+	&movups	($inout1,&QWP(16*1,$inp));
+	&lea	($inp,&DWP(16*2,$inp));
+	&xorps	($inout0,$inout3);		# input^=tweak
+	&xorps	($inout1,$inout4);
+
+	&call	("_aesni_encrypt2");
+
+	&xorps	($inout0,$inout3);		# output^=tweak
+	&xorps	($inout1,$inout4);
+	&movups	(&QWP(16*0,$out),$inout0);	# write output
+	&movups	(&QWP(16*1,$out),$inout1);
+	&lea	($out,&DWP(16*2,$out));
+
+	&movdqa	($tweak,$inout4);		# last tweak
+	&jmp	(&label("xts_enc_done"));
+
+&set_label("xts_enc_three",16);
+	&movaps	($inout5,$tweak);		# put aside last tweak
+	&movups	($inout0,&QWP(16*0,$inp));	# load input
+	&movups	($inout1,&QWP(16*1,$inp));
+	&movups	($inout2,&QWP(16*2,$inp));
+	&lea	($inp,&DWP(16*3,$inp));
+	&xorps	($inout0,$inout3);		# input^=tweak
+	&xorps	($inout1,$inout4);
+	&xorps	($inout2,$inout5);
+
+	&call	("_aesni_encrypt3");
+
+	&xorps	($inout0,$inout3);		# output^=tweak
+	&xorps	($inout1,$inout4);
+	&xorps	($inout2,$inout5);
+	&movups	(&QWP(16*0,$out),$inout0);	# write output
+	&movups	(&QWP(16*1,$out),$inout1);
+	&movups	(&QWP(16*2,$out),$inout2);
+	&lea	($out,&DWP(16*3,$out));
+
+	&movdqa	($tweak,$inout5);		# last tweak
+	&jmp	(&label("xts_enc_done"));
+
+&set_label("xts_enc_four",16);
+	&movaps	($inout4,$tweak);		# put aside last tweak
+
+	&movups	($inout0,&QWP(16*0,$inp));	# load input
+	&movups	($inout1,&QWP(16*1,$inp));
+	&movups	($inout2,&QWP(16*2,$inp));
+	&xorps	($inout0,&QWP(16*0,"esp"));	# input^=tweak
+	&movups	($inout3,&QWP(16*3,$inp));
+	&lea	($inp,&DWP(16*4,$inp));
+	&xorps	($inout1,&QWP(16*1,"esp"));
+	&xorps	($inout2,$inout5);
+	&xorps	($inout3,$inout4);
+
+	&call	("_aesni_encrypt4");
+
+	&xorps	($inout0,&QWP(16*0,"esp"));	# output^=tweak
+	&xorps	($inout1,&QWP(16*1,"esp"));
+	&xorps	($inout2,$inout5);
+	&movups	(&QWP(16*0,$out),$inout0);	# write output
+	&xorps	($inout3,$inout4);
+	&movups	(&QWP(16*1,$out),$inout1);
+	&movups	(&QWP(16*2,$out),$inout2);
+	&movups	(&QWP(16*3,$out),$inout3);
+	&lea	($out,&DWP(16*4,$out));
+
+	&movdqa	($tweak,$inout4);		# last tweak
+	&jmp	(&label("xts_enc_done"));
+
+&set_label("xts_enc_done6x",16);		# $tweak is pre-calculated
+	&mov	($len,&DWP(16*7+0,"esp"));	# restore original $len
+	&and	($len,15);
+	&jz	(&label("xts_enc_ret"));
+	&movdqa	($inout3,$tweak);
+	&mov	(&DWP(16*7+0,"esp"),$len);	# save $len%16
+	&jmp	(&label("xts_enc_steal"));
+
+&set_label("xts_enc_done",16);
+	&mov	($len,&DWP(16*7+0,"esp"));	# restore original $len
+	&pxor	($twtmp,$twtmp);
+	&and	($len,15);
+	&jz	(&label("xts_enc_ret"));
+
+	&pcmpgtd($twtmp,$tweak);		# broadcast upper bits
+	&mov	(&DWP(16*7+0,"esp"),$len);	# save $len%16
+	&pshufd	($inout3,$twtmp,0x13);
+	&paddq	($tweak,$tweak);		# &psllq($tweak,1);
+	&pand	($inout3,&QWP(16*6,"esp"));	# isolate carry and residue
+	&pxor	($inout3,$tweak);
+
+&set_label("xts_enc_steal");
+	&movz	($rounds,&BP(0,$inp));
+	&movz	($key,&BP(-16,$out));
+	&lea	($inp,&DWP(1,$inp));
+	&mov	(&BP(-16,$out),&LB($rounds));
+	&mov	(&BP(0,$out),&LB($key));
+	&lea	($out,&DWP(1,$out));
+	&sub	($len,1);
+	&jnz	(&label("xts_enc_steal"));
+
+	&sub	($out,&DWP(16*7+0,"esp"));	# rewind $out
+	&mov	($key,$key_);			# restore $key
+	&mov	($rounds,$rounds_);		# restore $rounds
+
+	&movups	($inout0,&QWP(-16,$out));	# load input
+	&xorps	($inout0,$inout3);		# input^=tweak
+	if ($inline)
+	{   &aesni_inline_generate1("enc");	}
+	else
+	{   &call	("_aesni_encrypt1");	}
+	&xorps	($inout0,$inout3);		# output^=tweak
+	&movups	(&QWP(-16,$out),$inout0);	# write output
+
+&set_label("xts_enc_ret");
+	&pxor	("xmm0","xmm0");		# clear register bank
+	&pxor	("xmm1","xmm1");
+	&pxor	("xmm2","xmm2");
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(16*0,"esp"),"xmm0");	# clear stack
+	&pxor	("xmm3","xmm3");
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(16*1,"esp"),"xmm0");
+	&pxor	("xmm4","xmm4");
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(16*2,"esp"),"xmm0");
+	&pxor	("xmm5","xmm5");
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(16*3,"esp"),"xmm0");
+	&pxor	("xmm6","xmm6");
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(16*4,"esp"),"xmm0");
+	&pxor	("xmm7","xmm7");
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(16*5,"esp"),"xmm0");
+	&mov	("esp",&DWP(16*7+4,"esp"));	# restore %esp
+&function_end("aesni_xts_encrypt");
+
+&function_begin("aesni_xts_decrypt");
+	&mov	($key,&wparam(4));		# key2
+	&mov	($inp,&wparam(5));		# clear-text tweak
+
+	&mov	($rounds,&DWP(240,$key));	# key2->rounds
+	&movups	($inout0,&QWP(0,$inp));
+	if ($inline)
+	{   &aesni_inline_generate1("enc");	}
+	else
+	{   &call	("_aesni_encrypt1");	}
+
+	&mov	($inp,&wparam(0));
+	&mov	($out,&wparam(1));
+	&mov	($len,&wparam(2));
+	&mov	($key,&wparam(3));		# key1
+
+	&mov	($key_,"esp");
+	&sub	("esp",16*7+8);
+	&and	("esp",-16);			# align stack
+
+	&xor	($rounds_,$rounds_);		# if(len%16) len-=16;
+	&test	($len,15);
+	&setnz	(&LB($rounds_));
+	&shl	($rounds_,4);
+	&sub	($len,$rounds_);
+
+	&mov	(&DWP(16*6+0,"esp"),0x87);	# compose the magic constant
+	&mov	(&DWP(16*6+4,"esp"),0);
+	&mov	(&DWP(16*6+8,"esp"),1);
+	&mov	(&DWP(16*6+12,"esp"),0);
+	&mov	(&DWP(16*7+0,"esp"),$len);	# save original $len
+	&mov	(&DWP(16*7+4,"esp"),$key_);	# save original %esp
+
+	&mov	($rounds,&DWP(240,$key));	# key1->rounds
+	&mov	($key_,$key);			# backup $key
+	&mov	($rounds_,$rounds);		# backup $rounds
+
+	&movdqa	($tweak,$inout0);
+	&pxor	($twtmp,$twtmp);
+	&movdqa	($twmask,&QWP(6*16,"esp"));	# 0x0...010...87
+	&pcmpgtd($twtmp,$tweak);		# broadcast upper bits
+
+	&and	($len,-16);
+	&sub	($len,16*6);
+	&jc	(&label("xts_dec_short"));
+
+	&shl	($rounds,4);
+	&mov	($rounds_,16);
+	&sub	($rounds_,$rounds);
+	&lea	($key,&DWP(32,$key,$rounds));
+	&jmp	(&label("xts_dec_loop6"));
+
+&set_label("xts_dec_loop6",16);
+	for ($i=0;$i<4;$i++) {
+	    &pshufd	($twres,$twtmp,0x13);
+	    &pxor	($twtmp,$twtmp);
+	    &movdqa	(&QWP(16*$i,"esp"),$tweak);
+	    &paddq	($tweak,$tweak);	# &psllq($tweak,1);
+	    &pand	($twres,$twmask);	# isolate carry and residue
+	    &pcmpgtd	($twtmp,$tweak);	# broadcast upper bits
+	    &pxor	($tweak,$twres);
+	}
+	&pshufd	($inout5,$twtmp,0x13);
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(16*$i++,"esp"),$tweak);
+	&paddq	($tweak,$tweak);		# &psllq($tweak,1);
+	 &$movekey	($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key_));
+	&pand	($inout5,$twmask);		# isolate carry and residue
+	 &movups	($inout0,&QWP(0,$inp));	# load input
+	&pxor	($inout5,$tweak);
+
+	# inline _aesni_encrypt6 prologue and flip xor with tweak and key[0]
+	&mov	($rounds,$rounds_);
+	&movdqu	($inout1,&QWP(16*1,$inp));
+	 &xorps		($inout0,$rndkey0);	# input^=rndkey[0]
+	&movdqu	($inout2,&QWP(16*2,$inp));
+	 &pxor		($inout1,$rndkey0);
+	&movdqu	($inout3,&QWP(16*3,$inp));
+	 &pxor		($inout2,$rndkey0);
+	&movdqu	($inout4,&QWP(16*4,$inp));
+	 &pxor		($inout3,$rndkey0);
+	&movdqu	($rndkey1,&QWP(16*5,$inp));
+	 &pxor		($inout4,$rndkey0);
+	&lea	($inp,&DWP(16*6,$inp));
+	&pxor	($inout0,&QWP(16*0,"esp"));	# input^=tweak
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(16*$i,"esp"),$inout5);	# save last tweak
+	&pxor	($inout5,$rndkey1);
+
+	 &$movekey	($rndkey1,&QWP(16,$key_));
+	&pxor	($inout1,&QWP(16*1,"esp"));
+	&pxor	($inout2,&QWP(16*2,"esp"));
+	 &aesdec	($inout0,$rndkey1);
+	&pxor	($inout3,&QWP(16*3,"esp"));
+	&pxor	($inout4,&QWP(16*4,"esp"));
+	 &aesdec	($inout1,$rndkey1);
+	&pxor		($inout5,$rndkey0);
+	 &$movekey	($rndkey0,&QWP(32,$key_));
+	 &aesdec	($inout2,$rndkey1);
+	 &aesdec	($inout3,$rndkey1);
+	 &aesdec	($inout4,$rndkey1);
+	 &aesdec	($inout5,$rndkey1);
+	&call		(&label("_aesni_decrypt6_enter"));
+
+	&movdqa	($tweak,&QWP(16*5,"esp"));	# last tweak
+       &pxor	($twtmp,$twtmp);
+	&xorps	($inout0,&QWP(16*0,"esp"));	# output^=tweak
+       &pcmpgtd	($twtmp,$tweak);		# broadcast upper bits
+	&xorps	($inout1,&QWP(16*1,"esp"));
+	&movups	(&QWP(16*0,$out),$inout0);	# write output
+	&xorps	($inout2,&QWP(16*2,"esp"));
+	&movups	(&QWP(16*1,$out),$inout1);
+	&xorps	($inout3,&QWP(16*3,"esp"));
+	&movups	(&QWP(16*2,$out),$inout2);
+	&xorps	($inout4,&QWP(16*4,"esp"));
+	&movups	(&QWP(16*3,$out),$inout3);
+	&xorps	($inout5,$tweak);
+	&movups	(&QWP(16*4,$out),$inout4);
+       &pshufd	($twres,$twtmp,0x13);
+	&movups	(&QWP(16*5,$out),$inout5);
+	&lea	($out,&DWP(16*6,$out));
+       &movdqa	($twmask,&QWP(16*6,"esp"));	# 0x0...010...87
+
+	&pxor	($twtmp,$twtmp);
+	&paddq	($tweak,$tweak);		# &psllq($tweak,1);
+	&pand	($twres,$twmask);		# isolate carry and residue
+	&pcmpgtd($twtmp,$tweak);		# broadcast upper bits
+	&pxor	($tweak,$twres);
+
+	&sub	($len,16*6);
+	&jnc	(&label("xts_dec_loop6"));
+
+	&mov	($rounds,&DWP(240,$key_));	# restore $rounds
+	&mov	($key,$key_);			# restore $key
+	&mov	($rounds_,$rounds);
+
+&set_label("xts_dec_short");
+	&add	($len,16*6);
+	&jz	(&label("xts_dec_done6x"));
+
+	&movdqa	($inout3,$tweak);		# put aside previous tweak
+	&cmp	($len,0x20);
+	&jb	(&label("xts_dec_one"));
+
+	&pshufd	($twres,$twtmp,0x13);
+	&pxor	($twtmp,$twtmp);
+	&paddq	($tweak,$tweak);		# &psllq($tweak,1);
+	&pand	($twres,$twmask);		# isolate carry and residue
+	&pcmpgtd($twtmp,$tweak);		# broadcast upper bits
+	&pxor	($tweak,$twres);
+	&je	(&label("xts_dec_two"));
+
+	&pshufd	($twres,$twtmp,0x13);
+	&pxor	($twtmp,$twtmp);
+	&movdqa	($inout4,$tweak);		# put aside previous tweak
+	&paddq	($tweak,$tweak);		# &psllq($tweak,1);
+	&pand	($twres,$twmask);		# isolate carry and residue
+	&pcmpgtd($twtmp,$tweak);		# broadcast upper bits
+	&pxor	($tweak,$twres);
+	&cmp	($len,0x40);
+	&jb	(&label("xts_dec_three"));
+
+	&pshufd	($twres,$twtmp,0x13);
+	&pxor	($twtmp,$twtmp);
+	&movdqa	($inout5,$tweak);		# put aside previous tweak
+	&paddq	($tweak,$tweak);		# &psllq($tweak,1);
+	&pand	($twres,$twmask);		# isolate carry and residue
+	&pcmpgtd($twtmp,$tweak);		# broadcast upper bits
+	&pxor	($tweak,$twres);
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(16*0,"esp"),$inout3);
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(16*1,"esp"),$inout4);
+	&je	(&label("xts_dec_four"));
+
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(16*2,"esp"),$inout5);
+	&pshufd	($inout5,$twtmp,0x13);
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(16*3,"esp"),$tweak);
+	&paddq	($tweak,$tweak);		# &psllq($inout0,1);
+	&pand	($inout5,$twmask);		# isolate carry and residue
+	&pxor	($inout5,$tweak);
+
+	&movdqu	($inout0,&QWP(16*0,$inp));	# load input
+	&movdqu	($inout1,&QWP(16*1,$inp));
+	&movdqu	($inout2,&QWP(16*2,$inp));
+	&pxor	($inout0,&QWP(16*0,"esp"));	# input^=tweak
+	&movdqu	($inout3,&QWP(16*3,$inp));
+	&pxor	($inout1,&QWP(16*1,"esp"));
+	&movdqu	($inout4,&QWP(16*4,$inp));
+	&pxor	($inout2,&QWP(16*2,"esp"));
+	&lea	($inp,&DWP(16*5,$inp));
+	&pxor	($inout3,&QWP(16*3,"esp"));
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(16*4,"esp"),$inout5);	# save last tweak
+	&pxor	($inout4,$inout5);
+
+	&call	("_aesni_decrypt6");
+
+	&movaps	($tweak,&QWP(16*4,"esp"));	# last tweak
+	&xorps	($inout0,&QWP(16*0,"esp"));	# output^=tweak
+	&xorps	($inout1,&QWP(16*1,"esp"));
+	&xorps	($inout2,&QWP(16*2,"esp"));
+	&movups	(&QWP(16*0,$out),$inout0);	# write output
+	&xorps	($inout3,&QWP(16*3,"esp"));
+	&movups	(&QWP(16*1,$out),$inout1);
+	&xorps	($inout4,$tweak);
+	&movups	(&QWP(16*2,$out),$inout2);
+	&movups	(&QWP(16*3,$out),$inout3);
+	&movups	(&QWP(16*4,$out),$inout4);
+	&lea	($out,&DWP(16*5,$out));
+	&jmp	(&label("xts_dec_done"));
+
+&set_label("xts_dec_one",16);
+	&movups	($inout0,&QWP(16*0,$inp));	# load input
+	&lea	($inp,&DWP(16*1,$inp));
+	&xorps	($inout0,$inout3);		# input^=tweak
+	if ($inline)
+	{   &aesni_inline_generate1("dec");	}
+	else
+	{   &call	("_aesni_decrypt1");	}
+	&xorps	($inout0,$inout3);		# output^=tweak
+	&movups	(&QWP(16*0,$out),$inout0);	# write output
+	&lea	($out,&DWP(16*1,$out));
+
+	&movdqa	($tweak,$inout3);		# last tweak
+	&jmp	(&label("xts_dec_done"));
+
+&set_label("xts_dec_two",16);
+	&movaps	($inout4,$tweak);		# put aside last tweak
+
+	&movups	($inout0,&QWP(16*0,$inp));	# load input
+	&movups	($inout1,&QWP(16*1,$inp));
+	&lea	($inp,&DWP(16*2,$inp));
+	&xorps	($inout0,$inout3);		# input^=tweak
+	&xorps	($inout1,$inout4);
+
+	&call	("_aesni_decrypt2");
+
+	&xorps	($inout0,$inout3);		# output^=tweak
+	&xorps	($inout1,$inout4);
+	&movups	(&QWP(16*0,$out),$inout0);	# write output
+	&movups	(&QWP(16*1,$out),$inout1);
+	&lea	($out,&DWP(16*2,$out));
+
+	&movdqa	($tweak,$inout4);		# last tweak
+	&jmp	(&label("xts_dec_done"));
+
+&set_label("xts_dec_three",16);
+	&movaps	($inout5,$tweak);		# put aside last tweak
+	&movups	($inout0,&QWP(16*0,$inp));	# load input
+	&movups	($inout1,&QWP(16*1,$inp));
+	&movups	($inout2,&QWP(16*2,$inp));
+	&lea	($inp,&DWP(16*3,$inp));
+	&xorps	($inout0,$inout3);		# input^=tweak
+	&xorps	($inout1,$inout4);
+	&xorps	($inout2,$inout5);
+
+	&call	("_aesni_decrypt3");
+
+	&xorps	($inout0,$inout3);		# output^=tweak
+	&xorps	($inout1,$inout4);
+	&xorps	($inout2,$inout5);
+	&movups	(&QWP(16*0,$out),$inout0);	# write output
+	&movups	(&QWP(16*1,$out),$inout1);
+	&movups	(&QWP(16*2,$out),$inout2);
+	&lea	($out,&DWP(16*3,$out));
+
+	&movdqa	($tweak,$inout5);		# last tweak
+	&jmp	(&label("xts_dec_done"));
+
+&set_label("xts_dec_four",16);
+	&movaps	($inout4,$tweak);		# put aside last tweak
+
+	&movups	($inout0,&QWP(16*0,$inp));	# load input
+	&movups	($inout1,&QWP(16*1,$inp));
+	&movups	($inout2,&QWP(16*2,$inp));
+	&xorps	($inout0,&QWP(16*0,"esp"));	# input^=tweak
+	&movups	($inout3,&QWP(16*3,$inp));
+	&lea	($inp,&DWP(16*4,$inp));
+	&xorps	($inout1,&QWP(16*1,"esp"));
+	&xorps	($inout2,$inout5);
+	&xorps	($inout3,$inout4);
+
+	&call	("_aesni_decrypt4");
+
+	&xorps	($inout0,&QWP(16*0,"esp"));	# output^=tweak
+	&xorps	($inout1,&QWP(16*1,"esp"));
+	&xorps	($inout2,$inout5);
+	&movups	(&QWP(16*0,$out),$inout0);	# write output
+	&xorps	($inout3,$inout4);
+	&movups	(&QWP(16*1,$out),$inout1);
+	&movups	(&QWP(16*2,$out),$inout2);
+	&movups	(&QWP(16*3,$out),$inout3);
+	&lea	($out,&DWP(16*4,$out));
+
+	&movdqa	($tweak,$inout4);		# last tweak
+	&jmp	(&label("xts_dec_done"));
+
+&set_label("xts_dec_done6x",16);		# $tweak is pre-calculated
+	&mov	($len,&DWP(16*7+0,"esp"));	# restore original $len
+	&and	($len,15);
+	&jz	(&label("xts_dec_ret"));
+	&mov	(&DWP(16*7+0,"esp"),$len);	# save $len%16
+	&jmp	(&label("xts_dec_only_one_more"));
+
+&set_label("xts_dec_done",16);
+	&mov	($len,&DWP(16*7+0,"esp"));	# restore original $len
+	&pxor	($twtmp,$twtmp);
+	&and	($len,15);
+	&jz	(&label("xts_dec_ret"));
+
+	&pcmpgtd($twtmp,$tweak);		# broadcast upper bits
+	&mov	(&DWP(16*7+0,"esp"),$len);	# save $len%16
+	&pshufd	($twres,$twtmp,0x13);
+	&pxor	($twtmp,$twtmp);
+	&movdqa	($twmask,&QWP(16*6,"esp"));
+	&paddq	($tweak,$tweak);		# &psllq($tweak,1);
+	&pand	($twres,$twmask);		# isolate carry and residue
+	&pcmpgtd($twtmp,$tweak);		# broadcast upper bits
+	&pxor	($tweak,$twres);
+
+&set_label("xts_dec_only_one_more");
+	&pshufd	($inout3,$twtmp,0x13);
+	&movdqa	($inout4,$tweak);		# put aside previous tweak
+	&paddq	($tweak,$tweak);		# &psllq($tweak,1);
+	&pand	($inout3,$twmask);		# isolate carry and residue
+	&pxor	($inout3,$tweak);
+
+	&mov	($key,$key_);			# restore $key
+	&mov	($rounds,$rounds_);		# restore $rounds
+
+	&movups	($inout0,&QWP(0,$inp));		# load input
+	&xorps	($inout0,$inout3);		# input^=tweak
+	if ($inline)
+	{   &aesni_inline_generate1("dec");	}
+	else
+	{   &call	("_aesni_decrypt1");	}
+	&xorps	($inout0,$inout3);		# output^=tweak
+	&movups	(&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);		# write output
+
+&set_label("xts_dec_steal");
+	&movz	($rounds,&BP(16,$inp));
+	&movz	($key,&BP(0,$out));
+	&lea	($inp,&DWP(1,$inp));
+	&mov	(&BP(0,$out),&LB($rounds));
+	&mov	(&BP(16,$out),&LB($key));
+	&lea	($out,&DWP(1,$out));
+	&sub	($len,1);
+	&jnz	(&label("xts_dec_steal"));
+
+	&sub	($out,&DWP(16*7+0,"esp"));	# rewind $out
+	&mov	($key,$key_);			# restore $key
+	&mov	($rounds,$rounds_);		# restore $rounds
+
+	&movups	($inout0,&QWP(0,$out));		# load input
+	&xorps	($inout0,$inout4);		# input^=tweak
+	if ($inline)
+	{   &aesni_inline_generate1("dec");	}
+	else
+	{   &call	("_aesni_decrypt1");	}
+	&xorps	($inout0,$inout4);		# output^=tweak
+	&movups	(&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);		# write output
+
+&set_label("xts_dec_ret");
+	&pxor	("xmm0","xmm0");		# clear register bank
+	&pxor	("xmm1","xmm1");
+	&pxor	("xmm2","xmm2");
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(16*0,"esp"),"xmm0");	# clear stack
+	&pxor	("xmm3","xmm3");
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(16*1,"esp"),"xmm0");
+	&pxor	("xmm4","xmm4");
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(16*2,"esp"),"xmm0");
+	&pxor	("xmm5","xmm5");
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(16*3,"esp"),"xmm0");
+	&pxor	("xmm6","xmm6");
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(16*4,"esp"),"xmm0");
+	&pxor	("xmm7","xmm7");
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(16*5,"esp"),"xmm0");
+	&mov	("esp",&DWP(16*7+4,"esp"));	# restore %esp
+&function_end("aesni_xts_decrypt");
+}
+
+######################################################################
+# void aesni_ocb_[en|de]crypt(const char *inp, char *out, size_t blocks,
+#	const AES_KEY *key, unsigned int start_block_num,
+#	unsigned char offset_i[16], const unsigned char L_[][16],
+#	unsigned char checksum[16]);
+#
+{
+# offsets within stack frame
+my $checksum = 16*6;
+my ($key_off,$rounds_off,$out_off,$end_off,$esp_off)=map(16*7+4*$_,(0..4));
+
+# reassigned registers
+my ($l_,$block,$i1,$i3,$i5) = ($rounds_,$key_,$rounds,$len,$out);
+# $l_, $blocks, $inp, $key are permanently allocated in registers;
+# remaining non-volatile ones are offloaded to stack, which even
+# stay invariant after written to stack.
+
+&function_begin("aesni_ocb_encrypt");
+	&mov	($rounds,&wparam(5));		# &offset_i
+	&mov	($rounds_,&wparam(7));		# &checksum
+
+	&mov	($inp,&wparam(0));
+	&mov	($out,&wparam(1));
+	&mov	($len,&wparam(2));
+	&mov	($key,&wparam(3));
+	&movdqu	($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$rounds));	# load offset_i
+	&mov	($block,&wparam(4));		# start_block_num
+	&movdqu	($rndkey1,&QWP(0,$rounds_));	# load checksum
+	&mov	($l_,&wparam(6));		# L_
+
+	&mov	($rounds,"esp");
+	&sub	("esp",$esp_off+4);		# alloca
+	&and	("esp",-16);			# align stack
+
+	&sub	($out,$inp);
+	&shl	($len,4);
+	&lea	($len,&DWP(-16*6,$inp,$len));	# end of input - 16*6
+	&mov	(&DWP($out_off,"esp"),$out);
+	&mov	(&DWP($end_off,"esp"),$len);
+	&mov	(&DWP($esp_off,"esp"),$rounds);
+
+	&mov	($rounds,&DWP(240,$key));
+
+	&test	($block,1);
+	&jnz	(&label("odd"));
+
+	&bsf		($i3,$block);
+	&add		($block,1);
+	&shl		($i3,4);
+	&movdqu		($inout5,&QWP(0,$l_,$i3));
+	&mov		($i3,$key);			# put aside key
+
+	&movdqu		($inout0,&QWP(16*0,$inp));	# load input
+	&lea		($inp,&DWP(16,$inp));
+
+	&pxor		($inout5,$rndkey0);		# ^ last offset_i
+	&pxor		($rndkey1,$inout0);		# checksum
+	&pxor		($inout0,$inout5);		# ^ offset_i
+
+	&movdqa		($inout4,$rndkey1);
+	if ($inline)
+	{   &aesni_inline_generate1("enc");	}
+	else
+	{   &call	("_aesni_encrypt1");	}
+
+	&xorps		($inout0,$inout5);		# ^ offset_i
+	&movdqa		($rndkey0,$inout5);		# pass last offset_i
+	&movdqa		($rndkey1,$inout4);		# pass the checksum
+
+	&movups		(&QWP(-16,$out,$inp),$inout0);	# store output
+
+	&mov		($rounds,&DWP(240,$i3));
+	&mov		($key,$i3);			# restore key
+	&mov		($len,&DWP($end_off,"esp"));
+
+&set_label("odd");
+	&shl		($rounds,4);
+	&mov		($out,16);
+	&sub		($out,$rounds);			# twisted rounds
+	&mov		(&DWP($key_off,"esp"),$key);
+	&lea		($key,&DWP(32,$key,$rounds));	# end of key schedule
+	&mov		(&DWP($rounds_off,"esp"),$out);
+
+	&cmp		($inp,$len);
+	&ja		(&label("short"));
+	&jmp		(&label("grandloop"));
+
+&set_label("grandloop",32);
+	&lea		($i1,&DWP(1,$block));
+	&lea		($i3,&DWP(3,$block));
+	&lea		($i5,&DWP(5,$block));
+	&add		($block,6);
+	&bsf		($i1,$i1);
+	&bsf		($i3,$i3);
+	&bsf		($i5,$i5);
+	&shl		($i1,4);
+	&shl		($i3,4);
+	&shl		($i5,4);
+	&movdqu		($inout0,&QWP(0,$l_));
+	&movdqu		($inout1,&QWP(0,$l_,$i1));
+	&mov		($rounds,&DWP($rounds_off,"esp"));
+	&movdqa		($inout2,$inout0);
+	&movdqu		($inout3,&QWP(0,$l_,$i3));
+	&movdqa		($inout4,$inout0);
+	&movdqu		($inout5,&QWP(0,$l_,$i5));
+
+	&pxor		($inout0,$rndkey0);		# ^ last offset_i
+	&pxor		($inout1,$inout0);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*0,"esp"),$inout0);
+	&pxor		($inout2,$inout1);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*1,"esp"),$inout1);
+	&pxor		($inout3,$inout2);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*2,"esp"),$inout2);
+	&pxor		($inout4,$inout3);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*3,"esp"),$inout3);
+	&pxor		($inout5,$inout4);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*4,"esp"),$inout4);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*5,"esp"),$inout5);
+
+	&$movekey	($rndkey0,&QWP(-48,$key,$rounds));
+	&movdqu		($inout0,&QWP(16*0,$inp));	# load input
+	&movdqu		($inout1,&QWP(16*1,$inp));
+	&movdqu		($inout2,&QWP(16*2,$inp));
+	&movdqu		($inout3,&QWP(16*3,$inp));
+	&movdqu		($inout4,&QWP(16*4,$inp));
+	&movdqu		($inout5,&QWP(16*5,$inp));
+	&lea		($inp,&DWP(16*6,$inp));
+
+	&pxor		($rndkey1,$inout0);		# checksum
+	&pxor		($inout0,$rndkey0);		# ^ roundkey[0]
+	&pxor		($rndkey1,$inout1);
+	&pxor		($inout1,$rndkey0);
+	&pxor		($rndkey1,$inout2);
+	&pxor		($inout2,$rndkey0);
+	&pxor		($rndkey1,$inout3);
+	&pxor		($inout3,$rndkey0);
+	&pxor		($rndkey1,$inout4);
+	&pxor		($inout4,$rndkey0);
+	&pxor		($rndkey1,$inout5);
+	&pxor		($inout5,$rndkey0);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP($checksum,"esp"),$rndkey1);
+
+	&$movekey	($rndkey1,&QWP(-32,$key,$rounds));
+	&pxor		($inout0,&QWP(16*0,"esp"));	# ^ offset_i
+	&pxor		($inout1,&QWP(16*1,"esp"));
+	&pxor		($inout2,&QWP(16*2,"esp"));
+	&pxor		($inout3,&QWP(16*3,"esp"));
+	&pxor		($inout4,&QWP(16*4,"esp"));
+	&pxor		($inout5,&QWP(16*5,"esp"));
+
+	&$movekey	($rndkey0,&QWP(-16,$key,$rounds));
+	&aesenc		($inout0,$rndkey1);
+	&aesenc		($inout1,$rndkey1);
+	&aesenc		($inout2,$rndkey1);
+	&aesenc		($inout3,$rndkey1);
+	&aesenc		($inout4,$rndkey1);
+	&aesenc		($inout5,$rndkey1);
+
+	&mov		($out,&DWP($out_off,"esp"));
+	&mov		($len,&DWP($end_off,"esp"));
+	&call		("_aesni_encrypt6_enter");
+
+	&movdqa		($rndkey0,&QWP(16*5,"esp"));	# pass last offset_i
+	&pxor		($inout0,&QWP(16*0,"esp"));	# ^ offset_i
+	&pxor		($inout1,&QWP(16*1,"esp"));
+	&pxor		($inout2,&QWP(16*2,"esp"));
+	&pxor		($inout3,&QWP(16*3,"esp"));
+	&pxor		($inout4,&QWP(16*4,"esp"));
+	&pxor		($inout5,$rndkey0);
+	&movdqa		($rndkey1,&QWP($checksum,"esp"));# pass the checksum
+
+	&movdqu		(&QWP(-16*6,$out,$inp),$inout0);# store output
+	&movdqu		(&QWP(-16*5,$out,$inp),$inout1);
+	&movdqu		(&QWP(-16*4,$out,$inp),$inout2);
+	&movdqu		(&QWP(-16*3,$out,$inp),$inout3);
+	&movdqu		(&QWP(-16*2,$out,$inp),$inout4);
+	&movdqu		(&QWP(-16*1,$out,$inp),$inout5);
+	&cmp		($inp,$len);			# done yet?
+	&jb		(&label("grandloop"));
+
+&set_label("short");
+	&add		($len,16*6);
+	&sub		($len,$inp);
+	&jz		(&label("done"));
+
+	&cmp		($len,16*2);
+	&jb		(&label("one"));
+	&je		(&label("two"));
+
+	&cmp		($len,16*4);
+	&jb		(&label("three"));
+	&je		(&label("four"));
+
+	&lea		($i1,&DWP(1,$block));
+	&lea		($i3,&DWP(3,$block));
+	&bsf		($i1,$i1);
+	&bsf		($i3,$i3);
+	&shl		($i1,4);
+	&shl		($i3,4);
+	&movdqu		($inout0,&QWP(0,$l_));
+	&movdqu		($inout1,&QWP(0,$l_,$i1));
+	&mov		($rounds,&DWP($rounds_off,"esp"));
+	&movdqa		($inout2,$inout0);
+	&movdqu		($inout3,&QWP(0,$l_,$i3));
+	&movdqa		($inout4,$inout0);
+
+	&pxor		($inout0,$rndkey0);		# ^ last offset_i
+	&pxor		($inout1,$inout0);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*0,"esp"),$inout0);
+	&pxor		($inout2,$inout1);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*1,"esp"),$inout1);
+	&pxor		($inout3,$inout2);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*2,"esp"),$inout2);
+	&pxor		($inout4,$inout3);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*3,"esp"),$inout3);
+	&pxor		($inout5,$inout4);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*4,"esp"),$inout4);
+
+	&$movekey	($rndkey0,&QWP(-48,$key,$rounds));
+	&movdqu		($inout0,&QWP(16*0,$inp));	# load input
+	&movdqu		($inout1,&QWP(16*1,$inp));
+	&movdqu		($inout2,&QWP(16*2,$inp));
+	&movdqu		($inout3,&QWP(16*3,$inp));
+	&movdqu		($inout4,&QWP(16*4,$inp));
+	&pxor		($inout5,$inout5);
+
+	&pxor		($rndkey1,$inout0);		# checksum
+	&pxor		($inout0,$rndkey0);		# ^ roundkey[0]
+	&pxor		($rndkey1,$inout1);
+	&pxor		($inout1,$rndkey0);
+	&pxor		($rndkey1,$inout2);
+	&pxor		($inout2,$rndkey0);
+	&pxor		($rndkey1,$inout3);
+	&pxor		($inout3,$rndkey0);
+	&pxor		($rndkey1,$inout4);
+	&pxor		($inout4,$rndkey0);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP($checksum,"esp"),$rndkey1);
+
+	&$movekey	($rndkey1,&QWP(-32,$key,$rounds));
+	&pxor		($inout0,&QWP(16*0,"esp"));	# ^ offset_i
+	&pxor		($inout1,&QWP(16*1,"esp"));
+	&pxor		($inout2,&QWP(16*2,"esp"));
+	&pxor		($inout3,&QWP(16*3,"esp"));
+	&pxor		($inout4,&QWP(16*4,"esp"));
+
+	&$movekey	($rndkey0,&QWP(-16,$key,$rounds));
+	&aesenc		($inout0,$rndkey1);
+	&aesenc		($inout1,$rndkey1);
+	&aesenc		($inout2,$rndkey1);
+	&aesenc		($inout3,$rndkey1);
+	&aesenc		($inout4,$rndkey1);
+	&aesenc		($inout5,$rndkey1);
+
+	&mov		($out,&DWP($out_off,"esp"));
+	&call		("_aesni_encrypt6_enter");
+
+	&movdqa		($rndkey0,&QWP(16*4,"esp"));	# pass last offset_i
+	&pxor		($inout0,&QWP(16*0,"esp"));	# ^ offset_i
+	&pxor		($inout1,&QWP(16*1,"esp"));
+	&pxor		($inout2,&QWP(16*2,"esp"));
+	&pxor		($inout3,&QWP(16*3,"esp"));
+	&pxor		($inout4,$rndkey0);
+	&movdqa		($rndkey1,&QWP($checksum,"esp"));# pass the checksum
+
+	&movdqu		(&QWP(16*0,$out,$inp),$inout0);	# store output
+	&movdqu		(&QWP(16*1,$out,$inp),$inout1);
+	&movdqu		(&QWP(16*2,$out,$inp),$inout2);
+	&movdqu		(&QWP(16*3,$out,$inp),$inout3);
+	&movdqu		(&QWP(16*4,$out,$inp),$inout4);
+
+	&jmp		(&label("done"));
+
+&set_label("one",16);
+	&movdqu		($inout5,&QWP(0,$l_));
+	&mov		($key,&DWP($key_off,"esp"));	# restore key
+
+	&movdqu		($inout0,&QWP(16*0,$inp));	# load input
+	&mov		($rounds,&DWP(240,$key));
+
+	&pxor		($inout5,$rndkey0);		# ^ last offset_i
+	&pxor		($rndkey1,$inout0);		# checksum
+	&pxor		($inout0,$inout5);		# ^ offset_i
+
+	&movdqa		($inout4,$rndkey1);
+	&mov		($out,&DWP($out_off,"esp"));
+	if ($inline)
+	{   &aesni_inline_generate1("enc");	}
+	else
+	{   &call	("_aesni_encrypt1");	}
+
+	&xorps		($inout0,$inout5);		# ^ offset_i
+	&movdqa		($rndkey0,$inout5);		# pass last offset_i
+	&movdqa		($rndkey1,$inout4);		# pass the checksum
+	&movups		(&QWP(0,$out,$inp),$inout0);
+
+	&jmp		(&label("done"));
+
+&set_label("two",16);
+	&lea		($i1,&DWP(1,$block));
+	&mov		($key,&DWP($key_off,"esp"));	# restore key
+	&bsf		($i1,$i1);
+	&shl		($i1,4);
+	&movdqu		($inout4,&QWP(0,$l_));
+	&movdqu		($inout5,&QWP(0,$l_,$i1));
+
+	&movdqu		($inout0,&QWP(16*0,$inp));	# load input
+	&movdqu		($inout1,&QWP(16*1,$inp));
+	&mov		($rounds,&DWP(240,$key));
+
+	&pxor		($inout4,$rndkey0);		# ^ last offset_i
+	&pxor		($inout5,$inout4);
+
+	&pxor		($rndkey1,$inout0);		# checksum
+	&pxor		($inout0,$inout4);		# ^ offset_i
+	&pxor		($rndkey1,$inout1);
+	&pxor		($inout1,$inout5);
+
+	&movdqa		($inout3,$rndkey1)
+	&mov		($out,&DWP($out_off,"esp"));
+	&call		("_aesni_encrypt2");
+
+	&xorps		($inout0,$inout4);		# ^ offset_i
+	&xorps		($inout1,$inout5);
+	&movdqa		($rndkey0,$inout5);		# pass last offset_i
+	&movdqa		($rndkey1,$inout3);		# pass the checksum
+	&movups		(&QWP(16*0,$out,$inp),$inout0);	# store output
+	&movups		(&QWP(16*1,$out,$inp),$inout1);
+
+	&jmp		(&label("done"));
+
+&set_label("three",16);
+	&lea		($i1,&DWP(1,$block));
+	&mov		($key,&DWP($key_off,"esp"));	# restore key
+	&bsf		($i1,$i1);
+	&shl		($i1,4);
+	&movdqu		($inout3,&QWP(0,$l_));
+	&movdqu		($inout4,&QWP(0,$l_,$i1));
+	&movdqa		($inout5,$inout3);
+
+	&movdqu		($inout0,&QWP(16*0,$inp));	# load input
+	&movdqu		($inout1,&QWP(16*1,$inp));
+	&movdqu		($inout2,&QWP(16*2,$inp));
+	&mov		($rounds,&DWP(240,$key));
+
+	&pxor		($inout3,$rndkey0);		# ^ last offset_i
+	&pxor		($inout4,$inout3);
+	&pxor		($inout5,$inout4);
+
+	&pxor		($rndkey1,$inout0);		# checksum
+	&pxor		($inout0,$inout3);		# ^ offset_i
+	&pxor		($rndkey1,$inout1);
+	&pxor		($inout1,$inout4);
+	&pxor		($rndkey1,$inout2);
+	&pxor		($inout2,$inout5);
+
+	&movdqa		(&QWP($checksum,"esp"),$rndkey1);
+	&mov		($out,&DWP($out_off,"esp"));
+	&call		("_aesni_encrypt3");
+
+	&xorps		($inout0,$inout3);		# ^ offset_i
+	&xorps		($inout1,$inout4);
+	&xorps		($inout2,$inout5);
+	&movdqa		($rndkey0,$inout5);		# pass last offset_i
+	&movdqa		($rndkey1,&QWP($checksum,"esp"));# pass the checksum
+	&movups		(&QWP(16*0,$out,$inp),$inout0);	# store output
+	&movups		(&QWP(16*1,$out,$inp),$inout1);
+	&movups		(&QWP(16*2,$out,$inp),$inout2);
+
+	&jmp		(&label("done"));
+
+&set_label("four",16);
+	&lea		($i1,&DWP(1,$block));
+	&lea		($i3,&DWP(3,$block));
+	&bsf		($i1,$i1);
+	&bsf		($i3,$i3);
+	&mov		($key,&DWP($key_off,"esp"));	# restore key
+	&shl		($i1,4);
+	&shl		($i3,4);
+	&movdqu		($inout2,&QWP(0,$l_));
+	&movdqu		($inout3,&QWP(0,$l_,$i1));
+	&movdqa		($inout4,$inout2);
+	&movdqu		($inout5,&QWP(0,$l_,$i3));
+
+	&pxor		($inout2,$rndkey0);		# ^ last offset_i
+	&movdqu		($inout0,&QWP(16*0,$inp));	# load input
+	&pxor		($inout3,$inout2);
+	&movdqu		($inout1,&QWP(16*1,$inp));
+	&pxor		($inout4,$inout3);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*0,"esp"),$inout2);
+	&pxor		($inout5,$inout4);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*1,"esp"),$inout3);
+	&movdqu		($inout2,&QWP(16*2,$inp));
+	&movdqu		($inout3,&QWP(16*3,$inp));
+	&mov		($rounds,&DWP(240,$key));
+
+	&pxor		($rndkey1,$inout0);		# checksum
+	&pxor		($inout0,&QWP(16*0,"esp"));	# ^ offset_i
+	&pxor		($rndkey1,$inout1);
+	&pxor		($inout1,&QWP(16*1,"esp"));
+	&pxor		($rndkey1,$inout2);
+	&pxor		($inout2,$inout4);
+	&pxor		($rndkey1,$inout3);
+	&pxor		($inout3,$inout5);
+
+	&movdqa		(&QWP($checksum,"esp"),$rndkey1)
+	&mov		($out,&DWP($out_off,"esp"));
+	&call		("_aesni_encrypt4");
+
+	&xorps		($inout0,&QWP(16*0,"esp"));	# ^ offset_i
+	&xorps		($inout1,&QWP(16*1,"esp"));
+	&xorps		($inout2,$inout4);
+	&movups		(&QWP(16*0,$out,$inp),$inout0);	# store output
+	&xorps		($inout3,$inout5);
+	&movups		(&QWP(16*1,$out,$inp),$inout1);
+	&movdqa		($rndkey0,$inout5);		# pass last offset_i
+	&movups		(&QWP(16*2,$out,$inp),$inout2);
+	&movdqa		($rndkey1,&QWP($checksum,"esp"));# pass the checksum
+	&movups		(&QWP(16*3,$out,$inp),$inout3);
+
+&set_label("done");
+	&mov	($key,&DWP($esp_off,"esp"));
+	&pxor	($inout0,$inout0);		# clear register bank
+	&pxor	($inout1,$inout1);
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(16*0,"esp"),$inout0);	# clear stack
+	&pxor	($inout2,$inout2);
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(16*1,"esp"),$inout0);
+	&pxor	($inout3,$inout3);
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(16*2,"esp"),$inout0);
+	&pxor	($inout4,$inout4);
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(16*3,"esp"),$inout0);
+	&pxor	($inout5,$inout5);
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(16*4,"esp"),$inout0);
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(16*5,"esp"),$inout0);
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(16*6,"esp"),$inout0);
+
+	&lea	("esp",&DWP(0,$key));
+	&mov	($rounds,&wparam(5));		# &offset_i
+	&mov	($rounds_,&wparam(7));		# &checksum
+	&movdqu	(&QWP(0,$rounds),$rndkey0);
+	&pxor	($rndkey0,$rndkey0);
+	&movdqu	(&QWP(0,$rounds_),$rndkey1);
+	&pxor	($rndkey1,$rndkey1);
+&function_end("aesni_ocb_encrypt");
+
+&function_begin("aesni_ocb_decrypt");
+	&mov	($rounds,&wparam(5));		# &offset_i
+	&mov	($rounds_,&wparam(7));		# &checksum
+
+	&mov	($inp,&wparam(0));
+	&mov	($out,&wparam(1));
+	&mov	($len,&wparam(2));
+	&mov	($key,&wparam(3));
+	&movdqu	($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$rounds));	# load offset_i
+	&mov	($block,&wparam(4));		# start_block_num
+	&movdqu	($rndkey1,&QWP(0,$rounds_));	# load checksum
+	&mov	($l_,&wparam(6));		# L_
+
+	&mov	($rounds,"esp");
+	&sub	("esp",$esp_off+4);		# alloca
+	&and	("esp",-16);			# align stack
+
+	&sub	($out,$inp);
+	&shl	($len,4);
+	&lea	($len,&DWP(-16*6,$inp,$len));	# end of input - 16*6
+	&mov	(&DWP($out_off,"esp"),$out);
+	&mov	(&DWP($end_off,"esp"),$len);
+	&mov	(&DWP($esp_off,"esp"),$rounds);
+
+	&mov	($rounds,&DWP(240,$key));
+
+	&test	($block,1);
+	&jnz	(&label("odd"));
+
+	&bsf		($i3,$block);
+	&add		($block,1);
+	&shl		($i3,4);
+	&movdqu		($inout5,&QWP(0,$l_,$i3));
+	&mov		($i3,$key);			# put aside key
+
+	&movdqu		($inout0,&QWP(16*0,$inp));	# load input
+	&lea		($inp,&DWP(16,$inp));
+
+	&pxor		($inout5,$rndkey0);		# ^ last offset_i
+	&pxor		($inout0,$inout5);		# ^ offset_i
+
+	&movdqa		($inout4,$rndkey1);
+	if ($inline)
+	{   &aesni_inline_generate1("dec");	}
+	else
+	{   &call	("_aesni_decrypt1");	}
+
+	&xorps		($inout0,$inout5);		# ^ offset_i
+	&movaps		($rndkey1,$inout4);		# pass the checksum
+	&movdqa		($rndkey0,$inout5);		# pass last offset_i
+	&xorps		($rndkey1,$inout0);		# checksum
+	&movups		(&QWP(-16,$out,$inp),$inout0);	# store output
+
+	&mov		($rounds,&DWP(240,$i3));
+	&mov		($key,$i3);			# restore key
+	&mov		($len,&DWP($end_off,"esp"));
+
+&set_label("odd");
+	&shl		($rounds,4);
+	&mov		($out,16);
+	&sub		($out,$rounds);			# twisted rounds
+	&mov		(&DWP($key_off,"esp"),$key);
+	&lea		($key,&DWP(32,$key,$rounds));	# end of key schedule
+	&mov		(&DWP($rounds_off,"esp"),$out);
+
+	&cmp		($inp,$len);
+	&ja		(&label("short"));
+	&jmp		(&label("grandloop"));
+
+&set_label("grandloop",32);
+	&lea		($i1,&DWP(1,$block));
+	&lea		($i3,&DWP(3,$block));
+	&lea		($i5,&DWP(5,$block));
+	&add		($block,6);
+	&bsf		($i1,$i1);
+	&bsf		($i3,$i3);
+	&bsf		($i5,$i5);
+	&shl		($i1,4);
+	&shl		($i3,4);
+	&shl		($i5,4);
+	&movdqu		($inout0,&QWP(0,$l_));
+	&movdqu		($inout1,&QWP(0,$l_,$i1));
+	&mov		($rounds,&DWP($rounds_off,"esp"));
+	&movdqa		($inout2,$inout0);
+	&movdqu		($inout3,&QWP(0,$l_,$i3));
+	&movdqa		($inout4,$inout0);
+	&movdqu		($inout5,&QWP(0,$l_,$i5));
+
+	&pxor		($inout0,$rndkey0);		# ^ last offset_i
+	&pxor		($inout1,$inout0);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*0,"esp"),$inout0);
+	&pxor		($inout2,$inout1);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*1,"esp"),$inout1);
+	&pxor		($inout3,$inout2);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*2,"esp"),$inout2);
+	&pxor		($inout4,$inout3);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*3,"esp"),$inout3);
+	&pxor		($inout5,$inout4);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*4,"esp"),$inout4);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*5,"esp"),$inout5);
+
+	&$movekey	($rndkey0,&QWP(-48,$key,$rounds));
+	&movdqu		($inout0,&QWP(16*0,$inp));	# load input
+	&movdqu		($inout1,&QWP(16*1,$inp));
+	&movdqu		($inout2,&QWP(16*2,$inp));
+	&movdqu		($inout3,&QWP(16*3,$inp));
+	&movdqu		($inout4,&QWP(16*4,$inp));
+	&movdqu		($inout5,&QWP(16*5,$inp));
+	&lea		($inp,&DWP(16*6,$inp));
+
+	&movdqa		(&QWP($checksum,"esp"),$rndkey1);
+	&pxor		($inout0,$rndkey0);		# ^ roundkey[0]
+	&pxor		($inout1,$rndkey0);
+	&pxor		($inout2,$rndkey0);
+	&pxor		($inout3,$rndkey0);
+	&pxor		($inout4,$rndkey0);
+	&pxor		($inout5,$rndkey0);
+
+	&$movekey	($rndkey1,&QWP(-32,$key,$rounds));
+	&pxor		($inout0,&QWP(16*0,"esp"));	# ^ offset_i
+	&pxor		($inout1,&QWP(16*1,"esp"));
+	&pxor		($inout2,&QWP(16*2,"esp"));
+	&pxor		($inout3,&QWP(16*3,"esp"));
+	&pxor		($inout4,&QWP(16*4,"esp"));
+	&pxor		($inout5,&QWP(16*5,"esp"));
+
+	&$movekey	($rndkey0,&QWP(-16,$key,$rounds));
+	&aesdec		($inout0,$rndkey1);
+	&aesdec		($inout1,$rndkey1);
+	&aesdec		($inout2,$rndkey1);
+	&aesdec		($inout3,$rndkey1);
+	&aesdec		($inout4,$rndkey1);
+	&aesdec		($inout5,$rndkey1);
+
+	&mov		($out,&DWP($out_off,"esp"));
+	&mov		($len,&DWP($end_off,"esp"));
+	&call		("_aesni_decrypt6_enter");
+
+	&movdqa		($rndkey0,&QWP(16*5,"esp"));	# pass last offset_i
+	&pxor		($inout0,&QWP(16*0,"esp"));	# ^ offset_i
+	&movdqa		($rndkey1,&QWP($checksum,"esp"));
+	&pxor		($inout1,&QWP(16*1,"esp"));
+	&pxor		($inout2,&QWP(16*2,"esp"));
+	&pxor		($inout3,&QWP(16*3,"esp"));
+	&pxor		($inout4,&QWP(16*4,"esp"));
+	&pxor		($inout5,$rndkey0);
+
+	&pxor		($rndkey1,$inout0);		# checksum
+	&movdqu		(&QWP(-16*6,$out,$inp),$inout0);# store output
+	&pxor		($rndkey1,$inout1);
+	&movdqu		(&QWP(-16*5,$out,$inp),$inout1);
+	&pxor		($rndkey1,$inout2);
+	&movdqu		(&QWP(-16*4,$out,$inp),$inout2);
+	&pxor		($rndkey1,$inout3);
+	&movdqu		(&QWP(-16*3,$out,$inp),$inout3);
+	&pxor		($rndkey1,$inout4);
+	&movdqu		(&QWP(-16*2,$out,$inp),$inout4);
+	&pxor		($rndkey1,$inout5);
+	&movdqu		(&QWP(-16*1,$out,$inp),$inout5);
+	&cmp		($inp,$len);			# done yet?
+	&jb		(&label("grandloop"));
+
+&set_label("short");
+	&add		($len,16*6);
+	&sub		($len,$inp);
+	&jz		(&label("done"));
+
+	&cmp		($len,16*2);
+	&jb		(&label("one"));
+	&je		(&label("two"));
+
+	&cmp		($len,16*4);
+	&jb		(&label("three"));
+	&je		(&label("four"));
+
+	&lea		($i1,&DWP(1,$block));
+	&lea		($i3,&DWP(3,$block));
+	&bsf		($i1,$i1);
+	&bsf		($i3,$i3);
+	&shl		($i1,4);
+	&shl		($i3,4);
+	&movdqu		($inout0,&QWP(0,$l_));
+	&movdqu		($inout1,&QWP(0,$l_,$i1));
+	&mov		($rounds,&DWP($rounds_off,"esp"));
+	&movdqa		($inout2,$inout0);
+	&movdqu		($inout3,&QWP(0,$l_,$i3));
+	&movdqa		($inout4,$inout0);
+
+	&pxor		($inout0,$rndkey0);		# ^ last offset_i
+	&pxor		($inout1,$inout0);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*0,"esp"),$inout0);
+	&pxor		($inout2,$inout1);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*1,"esp"),$inout1);
+	&pxor		($inout3,$inout2);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*2,"esp"),$inout2);
+	&pxor		($inout4,$inout3);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*3,"esp"),$inout3);
+	&pxor		($inout5,$inout4);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*4,"esp"),$inout4);
+
+	&$movekey	($rndkey0,&QWP(-48,$key,$rounds));
+	&movdqu		($inout0,&QWP(16*0,$inp));	# load input
+	&movdqu		($inout1,&QWP(16*1,$inp));
+	&movdqu		($inout2,&QWP(16*2,$inp));
+	&movdqu		($inout3,&QWP(16*3,$inp));
+	&movdqu		($inout4,&QWP(16*4,$inp));
+	&pxor		($inout5,$inout5);
+
+	&movdqa		(&QWP($checksum,"esp"),$rndkey1);
+	&pxor		($inout0,$rndkey0);		# ^ roundkey[0]
+	&pxor		($inout1,$rndkey0);
+	&pxor		($inout2,$rndkey0);
+	&pxor		($inout3,$rndkey0);
+	&pxor		($inout4,$rndkey0);
+
+	&$movekey	($rndkey1,&QWP(-32,$key,$rounds));
+	&pxor		($inout0,&QWP(16*0,"esp"));	# ^ offset_i
+	&pxor		($inout1,&QWP(16*1,"esp"));
+	&pxor		($inout2,&QWP(16*2,"esp"));
+	&pxor		($inout3,&QWP(16*3,"esp"));
+	&pxor		($inout4,&QWP(16*4,"esp"));
+
+	&$movekey	($rndkey0,&QWP(-16,$key,$rounds));
+	&aesdec		($inout0,$rndkey1);
+	&aesdec		($inout1,$rndkey1);
+	&aesdec		($inout2,$rndkey1);
+	&aesdec		($inout3,$rndkey1);
+	&aesdec		($inout4,$rndkey1);
+	&aesdec		($inout5,$rndkey1);
+
+	&mov		($out,&DWP($out_off,"esp"));
+	&call		("_aesni_decrypt6_enter");
+
+	&movdqa		($rndkey0,&QWP(16*4,"esp"));	# pass last offset_i
+	&pxor		($inout0,&QWP(16*0,"esp"));	# ^ offset_i
+	&movdqa		($rndkey1,&QWP($checksum,"esp"));
+	&pxor		($inout1,&QWP(16*1,"esp"));
+	&pxor		($inout2,&QWP(16*2,"esp"));
+	&pxor		($inout3,&QWP(16*3,"esp"));
+	&pxor		($inout4,$rndkey0);
+
+	&pxor		($rndkey1,$inout0);		# checksum
+	&movdqu		(&QWP(16*0,$out,$inp),$inout0);	# store output
+	&pxor		($rndkey1,$inout1);
+	&movdqu		(&QWP(16*1,$out,$inp),$inout1);
+	&pxor		($rndkey1,$inout2);
+	&movdqu		(&QWP(16*2,$out,$inp),$inout2);
+	&pxor		($rndkey1,$inout3);
+	&movdqu		(&QWP(16*3,$out,$inp),$inout3);
+	&pxor		($rndkey1,$inout4);
+	&movdqu		(&QWP(16*4,$out,$inp),$inout4);
+
+	&jmp		(&label("done"));
+
+&set_label("one",16);
+	&movdqu		($inout5,&QWP(0,$l_));
+	&mov		($key,&DWP($key_off,"esp"));	# restore key
+
+	&movdqu		($inout0,&QWP(16*0,$inp));	# load input
+	&mov		($rounds,&DWP(240,$key));
+
+	&pxor		($inout5,$rndkey0);		# ^ last offset_i
+	&pxor		($inout0,$inout5);		# ^ offset_i
+
+	&movdqa		($inout4,$rndkey1);
+	&mov		($out,&DWP($out_off,"esp"));
+	if ($inline)
+	{   &aesni_inline_generate1("dec");	}
+	else
+	{   &call	("_aesni_decrypt1");	}
+
+	&xorps		($inout0,$inout5);		# ^ offset_i
+	&movaps		($rndkey1,$inout4);		# pass the checksum
+	&movdqa		($rndkey0,$inout5);		# pass last offset_i
+	&xorps		($rndkey1,$inout0);		# checksum
+	&movups		(&QWP(0,$out,$inp),$inout0);
+
+	&jmp		(&label("done"));
+
+&set_label("two",16);
+	&lea		($i1,&DWP(1,$block));
+	&mov		($key,&DWP($key_off,"esp"));	# restore key
+	&bsf		($i1,$i1);
+	&shl		($i1,4);
+	&movdqu		($inout4,&QWP(0,$l_));
+	&movdqu		($inout5,&QWP(0,$l_,$i1));
+
+	&movdqu		($inout0,&QWP(16*0,$inp));	# load input
+	&movdqu		($inout1,&QWP(16*1,$inp));
+	&mov		($rounds,&DWP(240,$key));
+
+	&movdqa		($inout3,$rndkey1);
+	&pxor		($inout4,$rndkey0);		# ^ last offset_i
+	&pxor		($inout5,$inout4);
+
+	&pxor		($inout0,$inout4);		# ^ offset_i
+	&pxor		($inout1,$inout5);
+
+	&mov		($out,&DWP($out_off,"esp"));
+	&call		("_aesni_decrypt2");
+
+	&xorps		($inout0,$inout4);		# ^ offset_i
+	&xorps		($inout1,$inout5);
+	&movdqa		($rndkey0,$inout5);		# pass last offset_i
+	&xorps		($inout3,$inout0);		# checksum
+	&movups		(&QWP(16*0,$out,$inp),$inout0);	# store output
+	&xorps		($inout3,$inout1);
+	&movups		(&QWP(16*1,$out,$inp),$inout1);
+	&movaps		($rndkey1,$inout3);		# pass the checksum
+
+	&jmp		(&label("done"));
+
+&set_label("three",16);
+	&lea		($i1,&DWP(1,$block));
+	&mov		($key,&DWP($key_off,"esp"));	# restore key
+	&bsf		($i1,$i1);
+	&shl		($i1,4);
+	&movdqu		($inout3,&QWP(0,$l_));
+	&movdqu		($inout4,&QWP(0,$l_,$i1));
+	&movdqa		($inout5,$inout3);
+
+	&movdqu		($inout0,&QWP(16*0,$inp));	# load input
+	&movdqu		($inout1,&QWP(16*1,$inp));
+	&movdqu		($inout2,&QWP(16*2,$inp));
+	&mov		($rounds,&DWP(240,$key));
+
+	&movdqa		(&QWP($checksum,"esp"),$rndkey1);
+	&pxor		($inout3,$rndkey0);		# ^ last offset_i
+	&pxor		($inout4,$inout3);
+	&pxor		($inout5,$inout4);
+
+	&pxor		($inout0,$inout3);		# ^ offset_i
+	&pxor		($inout1,$inout4);
+	&pxor		($inout2,$inout5);
+
+	&mov		($out,&DWP($out_off,"esp"));
+	&call		("_aesni_decrypt3");
+
+	&movdqa		($rndkey1,&QWP($checksum,"esp"));# pass the checksum
+	&xorps		($inout0,$inout3);		# ^ offset_i
+	&xorps		($inout1,$inout4);
+	&xorps		($inout2,$inout5);
+	&movups		(&QWP(16*0,$out,$inp),$inout0);	# store output
+	&pxor		($rndkey1,$inout0);		# checksum
+	&movdqa		($rndkey0,$inout5);		# pass last offset_i
+	&movups		(&QWP(16*1,$out,$inp),$inout1);
+	&pxor		($rndkey1,$inout1);
+	&movups		(&QWP(16*2,$out,$inp),$inout2);
+	&pxor		($rndkey1,$inout2);
+
+	&jmp		(&label("done"));
+
+&set_label("four",16);
+	&lea		($i1,&DWP(1,$block));
+	&lea		($i3,&DWP(3,$block));
+	&bsf		($i1,$i1);
+	&bsf		($i3,$i3);
+	&mov		($key,&DWP($key_off,"esp"));	# restore key
+	&shl		($i1,4);
+	&shl		($i3,4);
+	&movdqu		($inout2,&QWP(0,$l_));
+	&movdqu		($inout3,&QWP(0,$l_,$i1));
+	&movdqa		($inout4,$inout2);
+	&movdqu		($inout5,&QWP(0,$l_,$i3));
+
+	&pxor		($inout2,$rndkey0);		# ^ last offset_i
+	&movdqu		($inout0,&QWP(16*0,$inp));	# load input
+	&pxor		($inout3,$inout2);
+	&movdqu		($inout1,&QWP(16*1,$inp));
+	&pxor		($inout4,$inout3);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*0,"esp"),$inout2);
+	&pxor		($inout5,$inout4);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*1,"esp"),$inout3);
+	&movdqu		($inout2,&QWP(16*2,$inp));
+	&movdqu		($inout3,&QWP(16*3,$inp));
+	&mov		($rounds,&DWP(240,$key));
+
+	&movdqa		(&QWP($checksum,"esp"),$rndkey1);
+	&pxor		($inout0,&QWP(16*0,"esp"));	# ^ offset_i
+	&pxor		($inout1,&QWP(16*1,"esp"));
+	&pxor		($inout2,$inout4);
+	&pxor		($inout3,$inout5);
+
+	&mov		($out,&DWP($out_off,"esp"));
+	&call		("_aesni_decrypt4");
+
+	&movdqa		($rndkey1,&QWP($checksum,"esp"));# pass the checksum
+	&xorps		($inout0,&QWP(16*0,"esp"));	# ^ offset_i
+	&xorps		($inout1,&QWP(16*1,"esp"));
+	&xorps		($inout2,$inout4);
+	&movups		(&QWP(16*0,$out,$inp),$inout0);	# store output
+	&pxor		($rndkey1,$inout0);		# checksum
+	&xorps		($inout3,$inout5);
+	&movups		(&QWP(16*1,$out,$inp),$inout1);
+	&pxor		($rndkey1,$inout1);
+	&movdqa		($rndkey0,$inout5);		# pass last offset_i
+	&movups		(&QWP(16*2,$out,$inp),$inout2);
+	&pxor		($rndkey1,$inout2);
+	&movups		(&QWP(16*3,$out,$inp),$inout3);
+	&pxor		($rndkey1,$inout3);
+
+&set_label("done");
+	&mov	($key,&DWP($esp_off,"esp"));
+	&pxor	($inout0,$inout0);		# clear register bank
+	&pxor	($inout1,$inout1);
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(16*0,"esp"),$inout0);	# clear stack
+	&pxor	($inout2,$inout2);
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(16*1,"esp"),$inout0);
+	&pxor	($inout3,$inout3);
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(16*2,"esp"),$inout0);
+	&pxor	($inout4,$inout4);
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(16*3,"esp"),$inout0);
+	&pxor	($inout5,$inout5);
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(16*4,"esp"),$inout0);
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(16*5,"esp"),$inout0);
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(16*6,"esp"),$inout0);
+
+	&lea	("esp",&DWP(0,$key));
+	&mov	($rounds,&wparam(5));		# &offset_i
+	&mov	($rounds_,&wparam(7));		# &checksum
+	&movdqu	(&QWP(0,$rounds),$rndkey0);
+	&pxor	($rndkey0,$rndkey0);
+	&movdqu	(&QWP(0,$rounds_),$rndkey1);
+	&pxor	($rndkey1,$rndkey1);
+&function_end("aesni_ocb_decrypt");
+}
+}
+
+######################################################################
+# void $PREFIX_cbc_encrypt (const void *inp, void *out,
+#                           size_t length, const AES_KEY *key,
+#                           unsigned char *ivp,const int enc);
+&function_begin("${PREFIX}_cbc_encrypt");
+	&mov	($inp,&wparam(0));
+	&mov	($rounds_,"esp");
+	&mov	($out,&wparam(1));
+	&sub	($rounds_,24);
+	&mov	($len,&wparam(2));
+	&and	($rounds_,-16);
+	&mov	($key,&wparam(3));
+	&mov	($key_,&wparam(4));
+	&test	($len,$len);
+	&jz	(&label("cbc_abort"));
+
+	&cmp	(&wparam(5),0);
+	&xchg	($rounds_,"esp");		# alloca
+	&movups	($ivec,&QWP(0,$key_));		# load IV
+	&mov	($rounds,&DWP(240,$key));
+	&mov	($key_,$key);			# backup $key
+	&mov	(&DWP(16,"esp"),$rounds_);	# save original %esp
+	&mov	($rounds_,$rounds);		# backup $rounds
+	&je	(&label("cbc_decrypt"));
+
+	&movaps	($inout0,$ivec);
+	&cmp	($len,16);
+	&jb	(&label("cbc_enc_tail"));
+	&sub	($len,16);
+	&jmp	(&label("cbc_enc_loop"));
+
+&set_label("cbc_enc_loop",16);
+	&movups	($ivec,&QWP(0,$inp));		# input actually
+	&lea	($inp,&DWP(16,$inp));
+	if ($inline)
+	{   &aesni_inline_generate1("enc",$inout0,$ivec);	}
+	else
+	{   &xorps($inout0,$ivec); &call("_aesni_encrypt1");	}
+	&mov	($rounds,$rounds_);	# restore $rounds
+	&mov	($key,$key_);		# restore $key
+	&movups	(&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);	# store output
+	&lea	($out,&DWP(16,$out));
+	&sub	($len,16);
+	&jnc	(&label("cbc_enc_loop"));
+	&add	($len,16);
+	&jnz	(&label("cbc_enc_tail"));
+	&movaps	($ivec,$inout0);
+	&pxor	($inout0,$inout0);
+	&jmp	(&label("cbc_ret"));
+
+&set_label("cbc_enc_tail");
+	&mov	("ecx",$len);		# zaps $rounds
+	&data_word(0xA4F3F689);		# rep movsb
+	&mov	("ecx",16);		# zero tail
+	&sub	("ecx",$len);
+	&xor	("eax","eax");		# zaps $len
+	&data_word(0xAAF3F689);		# rep stosb
+	&lea	($out,&DWP(-16,$out));	# rewind $out by 1 block
+	&mov	($rounds,$rounds_);	# restore $rounds
+	&mov	($inp,$out);		# $inp and $out are the same
+	&mov	($key,$key_);		# restore $key
+	&jmp	(&label("cbc_enc_loop"));
+######################################################################
+&set_label("cbc_decrypt",16);
+	&cmp	($len,0x50);
+	&jbe	(&label("cbc_dec_tail"));
+	&movaps	(&QWP(0,"esp"),$ivec);		# save IV
+	&sub	($len,0x50);
+	&jmp	(&label("cbc_dec_loop6_enter"));
+
+&set_label("cbc_dec_loop6",16);
+	&movaps	(&QWP(0,"esp"),$rndkey0);	# save IV
+	&movups	(&QWP(0,$out),$inout5);
+	&lea	($out,&DWP(0x10,$out));
+&set_label("cbc_dec_loop6_enter");
+	&movdqu	($inout0,&QWP(0,$inp));
+	&movdqu	($inout1,&QWP(0x10,$inp));
+	&movdqu	($inout2,&QWP(0x20,$inp));
+	&movdqu	($inout3,&QWP(0x30,$inp));
+	&movdqu	($inout4,&QWP(0x40,$inp));
+	&movdqu	($inout5,&QWP(0x50,$inp));
+
+	&call	("_aesni_decrypt6");
+
+	&movups	($rndkey1,&QWP(0,$inp));
+	&movups	($rndkey0,&QWP(0x10,$inp));
+	&xorps	($inout0,&QWP(0,"esp"));	# ^=IV
+	&xorps	($inout1,$rndkey1);
+	&movups	($rndkey1,&QWP(0x20,$inp));
+	&xorps	($inout2,$rndkey0);
+	&movups	($rndkey0,&QWP(0x30,$inp));
+	&xorps	($inout3,$rndkey1);
+	&movups	($rndkey1,&QWP(0x40,$inp));
+	&xorps	($inout4,$rndkey0);
+	&movups	($rndkey0,&QWP(0x50,$inp));	# IV
+	&xorps	($inout5,$rndkey1);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
+	&lea	($inp,&DWP(0x60,$inp));
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2);
+	&mov	($rounds,$rounds_);		# restore $rounds
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x30,$out),$inout3);
+	&mov	($key,$key_);			# restore $key
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x40,$out),$inout4);
+	&lea	($out,&DWP(0x50,$out));
+	&sub	($len,0x60);
+	&ja	(&label("cbc_dec_loop6"));
+
+	&movaps	($inout0,$inout5);
+	&movaps	($ivec,$rndkey0);
+	&add	($len,0x50);
+	&jle	(&label("cbc_dec_clear_tail_collected"));
+	&movups	(&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
+	&lea	($out,&DWP(0x10,$out));
+&set_label("cbc_dec_tail");
+	&movups	($inout0,&QWP(0,$inp));
+	&movaps	($in0,$inout0);
+	&cmp	($len,0x10);
+	&jbe	(&label("cbc_dec_one"));
+
+	&movups	($inout1,&QWP(0x10,$inp));
+	&movaps	($in1,$inout1);
+	&cmp	($len,0x20);
+	&jbe	(&label("cbc_dec_two"));
+
+	&movups	($inout2,&QWP(0x20,$inp));
+	&cmp	($len,0x30);
+	&jbe	(&label("cbc_dec_three"));
+
+	&movups	($inout3,&QWP(0x30,$inp));
+	&cmp	($len,0x40);
+	&jbe	(&label("cbc_dec_four"));
+
+	&movups	($inout4,&QWP(0x40,$inp));
+	&movaps	(&QWP(0,"esp"),$ivec);		# save IV
+	&movups	($inout0,&QWP(0,$inp));
+	&xorps	($inout5,$inout5);
+	&call	("_aesni_decrypt6");
+	&movups	($rndkey1,&QWP(0,$inp));
+	&movups	($rndkey0,&QWP(0x10,$inp));
+	&xorps	($inout0,&QWP(0,"esp"));	# ^= IV
+	&xorps	($inout1,$rndkey1);
+	&movups	($rndkey1,&QWP(0x20,$inp));
+	&xorps	($inout2,$rndkey0);
+	&movups	($rndkey0,&QWP(0x30,$inp));
+	&xorps	($inout3,$rndkey1);
+	&movups	($ivec,&QWP(0x40,$inp));	# IV
+	&xorps	($inout4,$rndkey0);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
+	&pxor	($inout1,$inout1);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2);
+	&pxor	($inout2,$inout2);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x30,$out),$inout3);
+	&pxor	($inout3,$inout3);
+	&lea	($out,&DWP(0x40,$out));
+	&movaps	($inout0,$inout4);
+	&pxor	($inout4,$inout4);
+	&sub	($len,0x50);
+	&jmp	(&label("cbc_dec_tail_collected"));
+
+&set_label("cbc_dec_one",16);
+	if ($inline)
+	{   &aesni_inline_generate1("dec");	}
+	else
+	{   &call	("_aesni_decrypt1");	}
+	&xorps	($inout0,$ivec);
+	&movaps	($ivec,$in0);
+	&sub	($len,0x10);
+	&jmp	(&label("cbc_dec_tail_collected"));
+
+&set_label("cbc_dec_two",16);
+	&call	("_aesni_decrypt2");
+	&xorps	($inout0,$ivec);
+	&xorps	($inout1,$in0);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
+	&movaps	($inout0,$inout1);
+	&pxor	($inout1,$inout1);
+	&lea	($out,&DWP(0x10,$out));
+	&movaps	($ivec,$in1);
+	&sub	($len,0x20);
+	&jmp	(&label("cbc_dec_tail_collected"));
+
+&set_label("cbc_dec_three",16);
+	&call	("_aesni_decrypt3");
+	&xorps	($inout0,$ivec);
+	&xorps	($inout1,$in0);
+	&xorps	($inout2,$in1);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
+	&movaps	($inout0,$inout2);
+	&pxor	($inout2,$inout2);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
+	&pxor	($inout1,$inout1);
+	&lea	($out,&DWP(0x20,$out));
+	&movups	($ivec,&QWP(0x20,$inp));
+	&sub	($len,0x30);
+	&jmp	(&label("cbc_dec_tail_collected"));
+
+&set_label("cbc_dec_four",16);
+	&call	("_aesni_decrypt4");
+	&movups	($rndkey1,&QWP(0x10,$inp));
+	&movups	($rndkey0,&QWP(0x20,$inp));
+	&xorps	($inout0,$ivec);
+	&movups	($ivec,&QWP(0x30,$inp));
+	&xorps	($inout1,$in0);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
+	&xorps	($inout2,$rndkey1);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
+	&pxor	($inout1,$inout1);
+	&xorps	($inout3,$rndkey0);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2);
+	&pxor	($inout2,$inout2);
+	&lea	($out,&DWP(0x30,$out));
+	&movaps	($inout0,$inout3);
+	&pxor	($inout3,$inout3);
+	&sub	($len,0x40);
+	&jmp	(&label("cbc_dec_tail_collected"));
+
+&set_label("cbc_dec_clear_tail_collected",16);
+	&pxor	($inout1,$inout1);
+	&pxor	($inout2,$inout2);
+	&pxor	($inout3,$inout3);
+	&pxor	($inout4,$inout4);
+&set_label("cbc_dec_tail_collected");
+	&and	($len,15);
+	&jnz	(&label("cbc_dec_tail_partial"));
+	&movups	(&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
+	&pxor	($rndkey0,$rndkey0);
+	&jmp	(&label("cbc_ret"));
+
+&set_label("cbc_dec_tail_partial",16);
+	&movaps	(&QWP(0,"esp"),$inout0);
+	&pxor	($rndkey0,$rndkey0);
+	&mov	("ecx",16);
+	&mov	($inp,"esp");
+	&sub	("ecx",$len);
+	&data_word(0xA4F3F689);		# rep movsb
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(0,"esp"),$inout0);
+
+&set_label("cbc_ret");
+	&mov	("esp",&DWP(16,"esp"));	# pull original %esp
+	&mov	($key_,&wparam(4));
+	&pxor	($inout0,$inout0);
+	&pxor	($rndkey1,$rndkey1);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0,$key_),$ivec);	# output IV
+	&pxor	($ivec,$ivec);
+&set_label("cbc_abort");
+&function_end("${PREFIX}_cbc_encrypt");
+
+######################################################################
+# Mechanical port from aesni-x86_64.pl.
+#
+# _aesni_set_encrypt_key is private interface,
+# input:
+#	"eax"	const unsigned char *userKey
+#	$rounds	int bits
+#	$key	AES_KEY *key
+# output:
+#	"eax"	return code
+#	$round	rounds
+
+&function_begin_B("_aesni_set_encrypt_key");
+	&push	("ebp");
+	&push	("ebx");
+	&test	("eax","eax");
+	&jz	(&label("bad_pointer"));
+	&test	($key,$key);
+	&jz	(&label("bad_pointer"));
+
+	&call	(&label("pic"));
+&set_label("pic");
+	&blindpop("ebx");
+	&lea	("ebx",&DWP(&label("key_const")."-".&label("pic"),"ebx"));
+
+	&picmeup("ebp","OPENSSL_ia32cap_P","ebx",&label("key_const"));
+	&movups	("xmm0",&QWP(0,"eax"));	# pull first 128 bits of *userKey
+	&xorps	("xmm4","xmm4");	# low dword of xmm4 is assumed 0
+	&mov	("ebp",&DWP(4,"ebp"));
+	&lea	($key,&DWP(16,$key));
+	&and	("ebp",1<<28|1<<11);	# AVX and XOP bits
+	&cmp	($rounds,256);
+	&je	(&label("14rounds"));
+	&cmp	($rounds,192);
+	&je	(&label("12rounds"));
+	&cmp	($rounds,128);
+	&jne	(&label("bad_keybits"));
+
+&set_label("10rounds",16);
+	&cmp		("ebp",1<<28);
+	&je		(&label("10rounds_alt"));
+
+	&mov		($rounds,9);
+	&$movekey	(&QWP(-16,$key),"xmm0");	# round 0
+	&aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x01);		# round 1
+	&call		(&label("key_128_cold"));
+	&aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x2);		# round 2
+	&call		(&label("key_128"));
+	&aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x04);		# round 3
+	&call		(&label("key_128"));
+	&aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x08);		# round 4
+	&call		(&label("key_128"));
+	&aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x10);		# round 5
+	&call		(&label("key_128"));
+	&aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x20);		# round 6
+	&call		(&label("key_128"));
+	&aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x40);		# round 7
+	&call		(&label("key_128"));
+	&aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x80);		# round 8
+	&call		(&label("key_128"));
+	&aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x1b);		# round 9
+	&call		(&label("key_128"));
+	&aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x36);		# round 10
+	&call		(&label("key_128"));
+	&$movekey	(&QWP(0,$key),"xmm0");
+	&mov		(&DWP(80,$key),$rounds);
+
+	&jmp	(&label("good_key"));
+
+&set_label("key_128",16);
+	&$movekey	(&QWP(0,$key),"xmm0");
+	&lea		($key,&DWP(16,$key));
+&set_label("key_128_cold");
+	&shufps		("xmm4","xmm0",0b00010000);
+	&xorps		("xmm0","xmm4");
+	&shufps		("xmm4","xmm0",0b10001100);
+	&xorps		("xmm0","xmm4");
+	&shufps		("xmm1","xmm1",0b11111111);	# critical path
+	&xorps		("xmm0","xmm1");
+	&ret();
+
+&set_label("10rounds_alt",16);
+	&movdqa		("xmm5",&QWP(0x00,"ebx"));
+	&mov		($rounds,8);
+	&movdqa		("xmm4",&QWP(0x20,"ebx"));
+	&movdqa		("xmm2","xmm0");
+	&movdqu		(&QWP(-16,$key),"xmm0");
+
+&set_label("loop_key128");
+	&pshufb		("xmm0","xmm5");
+	&aesenclast	("xmm0","xmm4");
+	&pslld		("xmm4",1);
+	&lea		($key,&DWP(16,$key));
+
+	&movdqa		("xmm3","xmm2");
+	&pslldq		("xmm2",4);
+	&pxor		("xmm3","xmm2");
+	&pslldq		("xmm2",4);
+	&pxor		("xmm3","xmm2");
+	&pslldq		("xmm2",4);
+	&pxor		("xmm2","xmm3");
+
+	&pxor		("xmm0","xmm2");
+	&movdqu		(&QWP(-16,$key),"xmm0");
+	&movdqa		("xmm2","xmm0");
+
+	&dec		($rounds);
+	&jnz		(&label("loop_key128"));
+
+	&movdqa		("xmm4",&QWP(0x30,"ebx"));
+
+	&pshufb		("xmm0","xmm5");
+	&aesenclast	("xmm0","xmm4");
+	&pslld		("xmm4",1);
+
+	&movdqa		("xmm3","xmm2");
+	&pslldq		("xmm2",4);
+	&pxor		("xmm3","xmm2");
+	&pslldq		("xmm2",4);
+	&pxor		("xmm3","xmm2");
+	&pslldq		("xmm2",4);
+	&pxor		("xmm2","xmm3");
+
+	&pxor		("xmm0","xmm2");
+	&movdqu		(&QWP(0,$key),"xmm0");
+
+	&movdqa		("xmm2","xmm0");
+	&pshufb		("xmm0","xmm5");
+	&aesenclast	("xmm0","xmm4");
+
+	&movdqa		("xmm3","xmm2");
+	&pslldq		("xmm2",4);
+	&pxor		("xmm3","xmm2");
+	&pslldq		("xmm2",4);
+	&pxor		("xmm3","xmm2");
+	&pslldq		("xmm2",4);
+	&pxor		("xmm2","xmm3");
+
+	&pxor		("xmm0","xmm2");
+	&movdqu		(&QWP(16,$key),"xmm0");
+
+	&mov		($rounds,9);
+	&mov		(&DWP(96,$key),$rounds);
+
+	&jmp	(&label("good_key"));
+
+&set_label("12rounds",16);
+	&movq		("xmm2",&QWP(16,"eax"));	# remaining 1/3 of *userKey
+	&cmp		("ebp",1<<28);
+	&je		(&label("12rounds_alt"));
+
+	&mov		($rounds,11);
+	&$movekey	(&QWP(-16,$key),"xmm0");	# round 0
+	&aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x01);		# round 1,2
+	&call		(&label("key_192a_cold"));
+	&aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x02);		# round 2,3
+	&call		(&label("key_192b"));
+	&aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x04);		# round 4,5
+	&call		(&label("key_192a"));
+	&aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x08);		# round 5,6
+	&call		(&label("key_192b"));
+	&aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x10);		# round 7,8
+	&call		(&label("key_192a"));
+	&aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x20);		# round 8,9
+	&call		(&label("key_192b"));
+	&aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x40);		# round 10,11
+	&call		(&label("key_192a"));
+	&aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x80);		# round 11,12
+	&call		(&label("key_192b"));
+	&$movekey	(&QWP(0,$key),"xmm0");
+	&mov		(&DWP(48,$key),$rounds);
+
+	&jmp	(&label("good_key"));
+
+&set_label("key_192a",16);
+	&$movekey	(&QWP(0,$key),"xmm0");
+	&lea		($key,&DWP(16,$key));
+&set_label("key_192a_cold",16);
+	&movaps		("xmm5","xmm2");
+&set_label("key_192b_warm");
+	&shufps		("xmm4","xmm0",0b00010000);
+	&movdqa		("xmm3","xmm2");
+	&xorps		("xmm0","xmm4");
+	&shufps		("xmm4","xmm0",0b10001100);
+	&pslldq		("xmm3",4);
+	&xorps		("xmm0","xmm4");
+	&pshufd		("xmm1","xmm1",0b01010101);	# critical path
+	&pxor		("xmm2","xmm3");
+	&pxor		("xmm0","xmm1");
+	&pshufd		("xmm3","xmm0",0b11111111);
+	&pxor		("xmm2","xmm3");
+	&ret();
+
+&set_label("key_192b",16);
+	&movaps		("xmm3","xmm0");
+	&shufps		("xmm5","xmm0",0b01000100);
+	&$movekey	(&QWP(0,$key),"xmm5");
+	&shufps		("xmm3","xmm2",0b01001110);
+	&$movekey	(&QWP(16,$key),"xmm3");
+	&lea		($key,&DWP(32,$key));
+	&jmp		(&label("key_192b_warm"));
+
+&set_label("12rounds_alt",16);
+	&movdqa		("xmm5",&QWP(0x10,"ebx"));
+	&movdqa		("xmm4",&QWP(0x20,"ebx"));
+	&mov		($rounds,8);
+	&movdqu		(&QWP(-16,$key),"xmm0");
+
+&set_label("loop_key192");
+	&movq		(&QWP(0,$key),"xmm2");
+	&movdqa		("xmm1","xmm2");
+	&pshufb		("xmm2","xmm5");
+	&aesenclast	("xmm2","xmm4");
+	&pslld		("xmm4",1);
+	&lea		($key,&DWP(24,$key));
+
+	&movdqa		("xmm3","xmm0");
+	&pslldq		("xmm0",4);
+	&pxor		("xmm3","xmm0");
+	&pslldq		("xmm0",4);
+	&pxor		("xmm3","xmm0");
+	&pslldq		("xmm0",4);
+	&pxor		("xmm0","xmm3");
+
+	&pshufd		("xmm3","xmm0",0xff);
+	&pxor		("xmm3","xmm1");
+	&pslldq		("xmm1",4);
+	&pxor		("xmm3","xmm1");
+
+	&pxor		("xmm0","xmm2");
+	&pxor		("xmm2","xmm3");
+	&movdqu		(&QWP(-16,$key),"xmm0");
+
+	&dec		($rounds);
+	&jnz		(&label("loop_key192"));
+
+	&mov	($rounds,11);
+	&mov	(&DWP(32,$key),$rounds);
+
+	&jmp	(&label("good_key"));
+
+&set_label("14rounds",16);
+	&movups		("xmm2",&QWP(16,"eax"));	# remaining half of *userKey
+	&lea		($key,&DWP(16,$key));
+	&cmp		("ebp",1<<28);
+	&je		(&label("14rounds_alt"));
+
+	&mov		($rounds,13);
+	&$movekey	(&QWP(-32,$key),"xmm0");	# round 0
+	&$movekey	(&QWP(-16,$key),"xmm2");	# round 1
+	&aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x01);		# round 2
+	&call		(&label("key_256a_cold"));
+	&aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x01);		# round 3
+	&call		(&label("key_256b"));
+	&aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x02);		# round 4
+	&call		(&label("key_256a"));
+	&aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x02);		# round 5
+	&call		(&label("key_256b"));
+	&aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x04);		# round 6
+	&call		(&label("key_256a"));
+	&aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x04);		# round 7
+	&call		(&label("key_256b"));
+	&aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x08);		# round 8
+	&call		(&label("key_256a"));
+	&aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x08);		# round 9
+	&call		(&label("key_256b"));
+	&aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x10);		# round 10
+	&call		(&label("key_256a"));
+	&aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x10);		# round 11
+	&call		(&label("key_256b"));
+	&aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x20);		# round 12
+	&call		(&label("key_256a"));
+	&aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x20);		# round 13
+	&call		(&label("key_256b"));
+	&aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x40);		# round 14
+	&call		(&label("key_256a"));
+	&$movekey	(&QWP(0,$key),"xmm0");
+	&mov		(&DWP(16,$key),$rounds);
+	&xor		("eax","eax");
+
+	&jmp	(&label("good_key"));
+
+&set_label("key_256a",16);
+	&$movekey	(&QWP(0,$key),"xmm2");
+	&lea		($key,&DWP(16,$key));
+&set_label("key_256a_cold");
+	&shufps		("xmm4","xmm0",0b00010000);
+	&xorps		("xmm0","xmm4");
+	&shufps		("xmm4","xmm0",0b10001100);
+	&xorps		("xmm0","xmm4");
+	&shufps		("xmm1","xmm1",0b11111111);	# critical path
+	&xorps		("xmm0","xmm1");
+	&ret();
+
+&set_label("key_256b",16);
+	&$movekey	(&QWP(0,$key),"xmm0");
+	&lea		($key,&DWP(16,$key));
+
+	&shufps		("xmm4","xmm2",0b00010000);
+	&xorps		("xmm2","xmm4");
+	&shufps		("xmm4","xmm2",0b10001100);
+	&xorps		("xmm2","xmm4");
+	&shufps		("xmm1","xmm1",0b10101010);	# critical path
+	&xorps		("xmm2","xmm1");
+	&ret();
+
+&set_label("14rounds_alt",16);
+	&movdqa		("xmm5",&QWP(0x00,"ebx"));
+	&movdqa		("xmm4",&QWP(0x20,"ebx"));
+	&mov		($rounds,7);
+	&movdqu		(&QWP(-32,$key),"xmm0");
+	&movdqa		("xmm1","xmm2");
+	&movdqu		(&QWP(-16,$key),"xmm2");
+
+&set_label("loop_key256");
+	&pshufb		("xmm2","xmm5");
+	&aesenclast	("xmm2","xmm4");
+
+	&movdqa		("xmm3","xmm0");
+	&pslldq		("xmm0",4);
+	&pxor		("xmm3","xmm0");
+	&pslldq		("xmm0",4);
+	&pxor		("xmm3","xmm0");
+	&pslldq		("xmm0",4);
+	&pxor		("xmm0","xmm3");
+	&pslld		("xmm4",1);
+
+	&pxor		("xmm0","xmm2");
+	&movdqu		(&QWP(0,$key),"xmm0");
+
+	&dec		($rounds);
+	&jz		(&label("done_key256"));
+
+	&pshufd		("xmm2","xmm0",0xff);
+	&pxor		("xmm3","xmm3");
+	&aesenclast	("xmm2","xmm3");
+
+	&movdqa		("xmm3","xmm1");
+	&pslldq		("xmm1",4);
+	&pxor		("xmm3","xmm1");
+	&pslldq		("xmm1",4);
+	&pxor		("xmm3","xmm1");
+	&pslldq		("xmm1",4);
+	&pxor		("xmm1","xmm3");
+
+	&pxor		("xmm2","xmm1");
+	&movdqu		(&QWP(16,$key),"xmm2");
+	&lea		($key,&DWP(32,$key));
+	&movdqa		("xmm1","xmm2");
+	&jmp		(&label("loop_key256"));
+
+&set_label("done_key256");
+	&mov		($rounds,13);
+	&mov		(&DWP(16,$key),$rounds);
+
+&set_label("good_key");
+	&pxor	("xmm0","xmm0");
+	&pxor	("xmm1","xmm1");
+	&pxor	("xmm2","xmm2");
+	&pxor	("xmm3","xmm3");
+	&pxor	("xmm4","xmm4");
+	&pxor	("xmm5","xmm5");
+	&xor	("eax","eax");
+	&pop	("ebx");
+	&pop	("ebp");
+	&ret	();
+
+&set_label("bad_pointer",4);
+	&mov	("eax",-1);
+	&pop	("ebx");
+	&pop	("ebp");
+	&ret	();
+&set_label("bad_keybits",4);
+	&pxor	("xmm0","xmm0");
+	&mov	("eax",-2);
+	&pop	("ebx");
+	&pop	("ebp");
+	&ret	();
+&function_end_B("_aesni_set_encrypt_key");
+
+# int $PREFIX_set_encrypt_key (const unsigned char *userKey, int bits,
+#                              AES_KEY *key)
+&function_begin_B("${PREFIX}_set_encrypt_key");
+	&mov	("eax",&wparam(0));
+	&mov	($rounds,&wparam(1));
+	&mov	($key,&wparam(2));
+	&call	("_aesni_set_encrypt_key");
+	&ret	();
+&function_end_B("${PREFIX}_set_encrypt_key");
+
+# int $PREFIX_set_decrypt_key (const unsigned char *userKey, int bits,
+#                              AES_KEY *key)
+&function_begin_B("${PREFIX}_set_decrypt_key");
+	&mov	("eax",&wparam(0));
+	&mov	($rounds,&wparam(1));
+	&mov	($key,&wparam(2));
+	&call	("_aesni_set_encrypt_key");
+	&mov	($key,&wparam(2));
+	&shl	($rounds,4);	# rounds-1 after _aesni_set_encrypt_key
+	&test	("eax","eax");
+	&jnz	(&label("dec_key_ret"));
+	&lea	("eax",&DWP(16,$key,$rounds));	# end of key schedule
+
+	&$movekey	("xmm0",&QWP(0,$key));	# just swap
+	&$movekey	("xmm1",&QWP(0,"eax"));
+	&$movekey	(&QWP(0,"eax"),"xmm0");
+	&$movekey	(&QWP(0,$key),"xmm1");
+	&lea		($key,&DWP(16,$key));
+	&lea		("eax",&DWP(-16,"eax"));
+
+&set_label("dec_key_inverse");
+	&$movekey	("xmm0",&QWP(0,$key));	# swap and inverse
+	&$movekey	("xmm1",&QWP(0,"eax"));
+	&aesimc		("xmm0","xmm0");
+	&aesimc		("xmm1","xmm1");
+	&lea		($key,&DWP(16,$key));
+	&lea		("eax",&DWP(-16,"eax"));
+	&$movekey	(&QWP(16,"eax"),"xmm0");
+	&$movekey	(&QWP(-16,$key),"xmm1");
+	&cmp		("eax",$key);
+	&ja		(&label("dec_key_inverse"));
+
+	&$movekey	("xmm0",&QWP(0,$key));	# inverse middle
+	&aesimc		("xmm0","xmm0");
+	&$movekey	(&QWP(0,$key),"xmm0");
+
+	&pxor		("xmm0","xmm0");
+	&pxor		("xmm1","xmm1");
+	&xor		("eax","eax");		# return success
+&set_label("dec_key_ret");
+	&ret	();
+&function_end_B("${PREFIX}_set_decrypt_key");
+
+&set_label("key_const",64);
+&data_word(0x0c0f0e0d,0x0c0f0e0d,0x0c0f0e0d,0x0c0f0e0d);
+&data_word(0x04070605,0x04070605,0x04070605,0x04070605);
+&data_word(1,1,1,1);
+&data_word(0x1b,0x1b,0x1b,0x1b);
+&asciz("AES for Intel AES-NI, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>");
+
+&asm_finish();
+
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86_64.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86_64.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..98ca179
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86_64.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,5060 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2009-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# This module implements support for Intel AES-NI extension. In
+# OpenSSL context it's used with Intel engine, but can also be used as
+# drop-in replacement for crypto/aes/asm/aes-x86_64.pl [see below for
+# details].
+#
+# Performance.
+#
+# Given aes(enc|dec) instructions' latency asymptotic performance for
+# non-parallelizable modes such as CBC encrypt is 3.75 cycles per byte
+# processed with 128-bit key. And given their throughput asymptotic
+# performance for parallelizable modes is 1.25 cycles per byte. Being
+# asymptotic limit it's not something you commonly achieve in reality,
+# but how close does one get? Below are results collected for
+# different modes and block sized. Pairs of numbers are for en-/
+# decryption.
+#
+#	16-byte     64-byte     256-byte    1-KB        8-KB
+# ECB	4.25/4.25   1.38/1.38   1.28/1.28   1.26/1.26	1.26/1.26
+# CTR	5.42/5.42   1.92/1.92   1.44/1.44   1.28/1.28   1.26/1.26
+# CBC	4.38/4.43   4.15/1.43   4.07/1.32   4.07/1.29   4.06/1.28
+# CCM	5.66/9.42   4.42/5.41   4.16/4.40   4.09/4.15   4.06/4.07   
+# OFB	5.42/5.42   4.64/4.64   4.44/4.44   4.39/4.39   4.38/4.38
+# CFB	5.73/5.85   5.56/5.62   5.48/5.56   5.47/5.55   5.47/5.55
+#
+# ECB, CTR, CBC and CCM results are free from EVP overhead. This means
+# that otherwise used 'openssl speed -evp aes-128-??? -engine aesni
+# [-decrypt]' will exhibit 10-15% worse results for smaller blocks.
+# The results were collected with specially crafted speed.c benchmark
+# in order to compare them with results reported in "Intel Advanced
+# Encryption Standard (AES) New Instruction Set" White Paper Revision
+# 3.0 dated May 2010. All above results are consistently better. This
+# module also provides better performance for block sizes smaller than
+# 128 bytes in points *not* represented in the above table.
+#
+# Looking at the results for 8-KB buffer.
+#
+# CFB and OFB results are far from the limit, because implementation
+# uses "generic" CRYPTO_[c|o]fb128_encrypt interfaces relying on
+# single-block aesni_encrypt, which is not the most optimal way to go.
+# CBC encrypt result is unexpectedly high and there is no documented
+# explanation for it. Seemingly there is a small penalty for feeding
+# the result back to AES unit the way it's done in CBC mode. There is
+# nothing one can do and the result appears optimal. CCM result is
+# identical to CBC, because CBC-MAC is essentially CBC encrypt without
+# saving output. CCM CTR "stays invisible," because it's neatly
+# interleaved wih CBC-MAC. This provides ~30% improvement over
+# "straghtforward" CCM implementation with CTR and CBC-MAC performed
+# disjointly. Parallelizable modes practically achieve the theoretical
+# limit.
+#
+# Looking at how results vary with buffer size.
+#
+# Curves are practically saturated at 1-KB buffer size. In most cases
+# "256-byte" performance is >95%, and "64-byte" is ~90% of "8-KB" one.
+# CTR curve doesn't follow this pattern and is "slowest" changing one
+# with "256-byte" result being 87% of "8-KB." This is because overhead
+# in CTR mode is most computationally intensive. Small-block CCM
+# decrypt is slower than encrypt, because first CTR and last CBC-MAC
+# iterations can't be interleaved.
+#
+# Results for 192- and 256-bit keys.
+#
+# EVP-free results were observed to scale perfectly with number of
+# rounds for larger block sizes, i.e. 192-bit result being 10/12 times
+# lower and 256-bit one - 10/14. Well, in CBC encrypt case differences
+# are a tad smaller, because the above mentioned penalty biases all
+# results by same constant value. In similar way function call
+# overhead affects small-block performance, as well as OFB and CFB
+# results. Differences are not large, most common coefficients are
+# 10/11.7 and 10/13.4 (as opposite to 10/12.0 and 10/14.0), but one
+# observe even 10/11.2 and 10/12.4 (CTR, OFB, CFB)...
+
+# January 2011
+#
+# While Westmere processor features 6 cycles latency for aes[enc|dec]
+# instructions, which can be scheduled every second cycle, Sandy
+# Bridge spends 8 cycles per instruction, but it can schedule them
+# every cycle. This means that code targeting Westmere would perform
+# suboptimally on Sandy Bridge. Therefore this update.
+#
+# In addition, non-parallelizable CBC encrypt (as well as CCM) is
+# optimized. Relative improvement might appear modest, 8% on Westmere,
+# but in absolute terms it's 3.77 cycles per byte encrypted with
+# 128-bit key on Westmere, and 5.07 - on Sandy Bridge. These numbers
+# should be compared to asymptotic limits of 3.75 for Westmere and
+# 5.00 for Sandy Bridge. Actually, the fact that they get this close
+# to asymptotic limits is quite amazing. Indeed, the limit is
+# calculated as latency times number of rounds, 10 for 128-bit key,
+# and divided by 16, the number of bytes in block, or in other words
+# it accounts *solely* for aesenc instructions. But there are extra
+# instructions, and numbers so close to the asymptotic limits mean
+# that it's as if it takes as little as *one* additional cycle to
+# execute all of them. How is it possible? It is possible thanks to
+# out-of-order execution logic, which manages to overlap post-
+# processing of previous block, things like saving the output, with
+# actual encryption of current block, as well as pre-processing of
+# current block, things like fetching input and xor-ing it with
+# 0-round element of the key schedule, with actual encryption of
+# previous block. Keep this in mind...
+#
+# For parallelizable modes, such as ECB, CBC decrypt, CTR, higher
+# performance is achieved by interleaving instructions working on
+# independent blocks. In which case asymptotic limit for such modes
+# can be obtained by dividing above mentioned numbers by AES
+# instructions' interleave factor. Westmere can execute at most 3 
+# instructions at a time, meaning that optimal interleave factor is 3,
+# and that's where the "magic" number of 1.25 come from. "Optimal
+# interleave factor" means that increase of interleave factor does
+# not improve performance. The formula has proven to reflect reality
+# pretty well on Westmere... Sandy Bridge on the other hand can
+# execute up to 8 AES instructions at a time, so how does varying
+# interleave factor affect the performance? Here is table for ECB
+# (numbers are cycles per byte processed with 128-bit key):
+#
+# instruction interleave factor		3x	6x	8x
+# theoretical asymptotic limit		1.67	0.83	0.625
+# measured performance for 8KB block	1.05	0.86	0.84
+#
+# "as if" interleave factor		4.7x	5.8x	6.0x
+#
+# Further data for other parallelizable modes:
+#
+# CBC decrypt				1.16	0.93	0.74
+# CTR					1.14	0.91	0.74
+#
+# Well, given 3x column it's probably inappropriate to call the limit
+# asymptotic, if it can be surpassed, isn't it? What happens there?
+# Rewind to CBC paragraph for the answer. Yes, out-of-order execution
+# magic is responsible for this. Processor overlaps not only the
+# additional instructions with AES ones, but even AES instuctions
+# processing adjacent triplets of independent blocks. In the 6x case
+# additional instructions  still claim disproportionally small amount
+# of additional cycles, but in 8x case number of instructions must be
+# a tad too high for out-of-order logic to cope with, and AES unit
+# remains underutilized... As you can see 8x interleave is hardly
+# justifiable, so there no need to feel bad that 32-bit aesni-x86.pl
+# utilizies 6x interleave because of limited register bank capacity.
+#
+# Higher interleave factors do have negative impact on Westmere
+# performance. While for ECB mode it's negligible ~1.5%, other
+# parallelizables perform ~5% worse, which is outweighed by ~25%
+# improvement on Sandy Bridge. To balance regression on Westmere
+# CTR mode was implemented with 6x aesenc interleave factor.
+
+# April 2011
+#
+# Add aesni_xts_[en|de]crypt. Westmere spends 1.25 cycles processing
+# one byte out of 8KB with 128-bit key, Sandy Bridge - 0.90. Just like
+# in CTR mode AES instruction interleave factor was chosen to be 6x.
+
+# November 2015
+#
+# Add aesni_ocb_[en|de]crypt. AES instruction interleave factor was
+# chosen to be 6x.
+
+######################################################################
+# Current large-block performance in cycles per byte processed with
+# 128-bit key (less is better).
+#
+#		CBC en-/decrypt	CTR	XTS	ECB	OCB
+# Westmere	3.77/1.25	1.25	1.25	1.26
+# * Bridge	5.07/0.74	0.75	0.90	0.85	0.98
+# Haswell	4.44/0.63	0.63	0.73	0.63	0.70
+# Skylake	2.62/0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63
+# Silvermont	5.75/3.54	3.56	4.12	3.87(*)	4.11
+# Goldmont	3.82/1.26	1.26	1.29	1.29	1.50
+# Bulldozer	5.77/0.70	0.72	0.90	0.70	0.95
+#
+# (*)	Atom Silvermont ECB result is suboptimal because of penalties
+#	incurred by operations on %xmm8-15. As ECB is not considered
+#	critical, nothing was done to mitigate the problem.
+
+$PREFIX="aesni";	# if $PREFIX is set to "AES", the script
+			# generates drop-in replacement for
+			# crypto/aes/asm/aes-x86_64.pl:-)
+
+$flavour = shift;
+$output  = shift;
+if ($flavour =~ /\./) { $output = $flavour; undef $flavour; }
+
+$win64=0; $win64=1 if ($flavour =~ /[nm]asm|mingw64/ || $output =~ /\.asm$/);
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+( $xlate="${dir}x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
+( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
+die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl";
+
+open OUT,"| \"$^X\" \"$xlate\" $flavour \"$output\"";
+*STDOUT=*OUT;
+
+$movkey = $PREFIX eq "aesni" ? "movups" : "movups";
+@_4args=$win64?	("%rcx","%rdx","%r8", "%r9") :	# Win64 order
+		("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx","%rcx");	# Unix order
+
+$code=".text\n";
+$code.=".extern	OPENSSL_ia32cap_P\n";
+
+$rounds="%eax";	# input to and changed by aesni_[en|de]cryptN !!!
+# this is natural Unix argument order for public $PREFIX_[ecb|cbc]_encrypt ...
+$inp="%rdi";
+$out="%rsi";
+$len="%rdx";
+$key="%rcx";	# input to and changed by aesni_[en|de]cryptN !!!
+$ivp="%r8";	# cbc, ctr, ...
+
+$rnds_="%r10d";	# backup copy for $rounds
+$key_="%r11";	# backup copy for $key
+
+# %xmm register layout
+$rndkey0="%xmm0";	$rndkey1="%xmm1";
+$inout0="%xmm2";	$inout1="%xmm3";
+$inout2="%xmm4";	$inout3="%xmm5";
+$inout4="%xmm6";	$inout5="%xmm7";
+$inout6="%xmm8";	$inout7="%xmm9";
+
+$in2="%xmm6";		$in1="%xmm7";	# used in CBC decrypt, CTR, ...
+$in0="%xmm8";		$iv="%xmm9";
+
+# Inline version of internal aesni_[en|de]crypt1.
+#
+# Why folded loop? Because aes[enc|dec] is slow enough to accommodate
+# cycles which take care of loop variables...
+{ my $sn;
+sub aesni_generate1 {
+my ($p,$key,$rounds,$inout,$ivec)=@_;	$inout=$inout0 if (!defined($inout));
+++$sn;
+$code.=<<___;
+	$movkey	($key),$rndkey0
+	$movkey	16($key),$rndkey1
+___
+$code.=<<___ if (defined($ivec));
+	xorps	$rndkey0,$ivec
+	lea	32($key),$key
+	xorps	$ivec,$inout
+___
+$code.=<<___ if (!defined($ivec));
+	lea	32($key),$key
+	xorps	$rndkey0,$inout
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+.Loop_${p}1_$sn:
+	aes${p}	$rndkey1,$inout
+	dec	$rounds
+	$movkey	($key),$rndkey1
+	lea	16($key),$key
+	jnz	.Loop_${p}1_$sn	# loop body is 16 bytes
+	aes${p}last	$rndkey1,$inout
+___
+}}
+# void $PREFIX_[en|de]crypt (const void *inp,void *out,const AES_KEY *key);
+#
+{ my ($inp,$out,$key) = @_4args;
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	${PREFIX}_encrypt
+.type	${PREFIX}_encrypt,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+${PREFIX}_encrypt:
+	movups	($inp),$inout0		# load input
+	mov	240($key),$rounds	# key->rounds
+___
+	&aesni_generate1("enc",$key,$rounds);
+$code.=<<___;
+	 pxor	$rndkey0,$rndkey0	# clear register bank
+	 pxor	$rndkey1,$rndkey1
+	movups	$inout0,($out)		# output
+	 pxor	$inout0,$inout0
+	ret
+.size	${PREFIX}_encrypt,.-${PREFIX}_encrypt
+
+.globl	${PREFIX}_decrypt
+.type	${PREFIX}_decrypt,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+${PREFIX}_decrypt:
+	movups	($inp),$inout0		# load input
+	mov	240($key),$rounds	# key->rounds
+___
+	&aesni_generate1("dec",$key,$rounds);
+$code.=<<___;
+	 pxor	$rndkey0,$rndkey0	# clear register bank
+	 pxor	$rndkey1,$rndkey1
+	movups	$inout0,($out)		# output
+	 pxor	$inout0,$inout0
+	ret
+.size	${PREFIX}_decrypt, .-${PREFIX}_decrypt
+___
+}
+
+# _aesni_[en|de]cryptN are private interfaces, N denotes interleave
+# factor. Why 3x subroutine were originally used in loops? Even though
+# aes[enc|dec] latency was originally 6, it could be scheduled only
+# every *2nd* cycle. Thus 3x interleave was the one providing optimal
+# utilization, i.e. when subroutine's throughput is virtually same as
+# of non-interleaved subroutine [for number of input blocks up to 3].
+# This is why it originally made no sense to implement 2x subroutine.
+# But times change and it became appropriate to spend extra 192 bytes
+# on 2x subroutine on Atom Silvermont account. For processors that
+# can schedule aes[enc|dec] every cycle optimal interleave factor
+# equals to corresponding instructions latency. 8x is optimal for
+# * Bridge and "super-optimal" for other Intel CPUs... 
+
+sub aesni_generate2 {
+my $dir=shift;
+# As already mentioned it takes in $key and $rounds, which are *not*
+# preserved. $inout[0-1] is cipher/clear text...
+$code.=<<___;
+.type	_aesni_${dir}rypt2,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+_aesni_${dir}rypt2:
+	$movkey	($key),$rndkey0
+	shl	\$4,$rounds
+	$movkey	16($key),$rndkey1
+	xorps	$rndkey0,$inout0
+	xorps	$rndkey0,$inout1
+	$movkey	32($key),$rndkey0
+	lea	32($key,$rounds),$key
+	neg	%rax				# $rounds
+	add	\$16,%rax
+
+.L${dir}_loop2:
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey1,$inout0
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey1,$inout1
+	$movkey		($key,%rax),$rndkey1
+	add		\$32,%rax
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey0,$inout0
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey0,$inout1
+	$movkey		-16($key,%rax),$rndkey0
+	jnz		.L${dir}_loop2
+
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey1,$inout0
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey1,$inout1
+	aes${dir}last	$rndkey0,$inout0
+	aes${dir}last	$rndkey0,$inout1
+	ret
+.size	_aesni_${dir}rypt2,.-_aesni_${dir}rypt2
+___
+}
+sub aesni_generate3 {
+my $dir=shift;
+# As already mentioned it takes in $key and $rounds, which are *not*
+# preserved. $inout[0-2] is cipher/clear text...
+$code.=<<___;
+.type	_aesni_${dir}rypt3,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+_aesni_${dir}rypt3:
+	$movkey	($key),$rndkey0
+	shl	\$4,$rounds
+	$movkey	16($key),$rndkey1
+	xorps	$rndkey0,$inout0
+	xorps	$rndkey0,$inout1
+	xorps	$rndkey0,$inout2
+	$movkey	32($key),$rndkey0
+	lea	32($key,$rounds),$key
+	neg	%rax				# $rounds
+	add	\$16,%rax
+
+.L${dir}_loop3:
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey1,$inout0
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey1,$inout1
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey1,$inout2
+	$movkey		($key,%rax),$rndkey1
+	add		\$32,%rax
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey0,$inout0
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey0,$inout1
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey0,$inout2
+	$movkey		-16($key,%rax),$rndkey0
+	jnz		.L${dir}_loop3
+
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey1,$inout0
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey1,$inout1
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey1,$inout2
+	aes${dir}last	$rndkey0,$inout0
+	aes${dir}last	$rndkey0,$inout1
+	aes${dir}last	$rndkey0,$inout2
+	ret
+.size	_aesni_${dir}rypt3,.-_aesni_${dir}rypt3
+___
+}
+# 4x interleave is implemented to improve small block performance,
+# most notably [and naturally] 4 block by ~30%. One can argue that one
+# should have implemented 5x as well, but improvement would be <20%,
+# so it's not worth it...
+sub aesni_generate4 {
+my $dir=shift;
+# As already mentioned it takes in $key and $rounds, which are *not*
+# preserved. $inout[0-3] is cipher/clear text...
+$code.=<<___;
+.type	_aesni_${dir}rypt4,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+_aesni_${dir}rypt4:
+	$movkey	($key),$rndkey0
+	shl	\$4,$rounds
+	$movkey	16($key),$rndkey1
+	xorps	$rndkey0,$inout0
+	xorps	$rndkey0,$inout1
+	xorps	$rndkey0,$inout2
+	xorps	$rndkey0,$inout3
+	$movkey	32($key),$rndkey0
+	lea	32($key,$rounds),$key
+	neg	%rax				# $rounds
+	.byte	0x0f,0x1f,0x00
+	add	\$16,%rax
+
+.L${dir}_loop4:
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey1,$inout0
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey1,$inout1
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey1,$inout2
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey1,$inout3
+	$movkey		($key,%rax),$rndkey1
+	add		\$32,%rax
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey0,$inout0
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey0,$inout1
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey0,$inout2
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey0,$inout3
+	$movkey		-16($key,%rax),$rndkey0
+	jnz		.L${dir}_loop4
+
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey1,$inout0
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey1,$inout1
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey1,$inout2
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey1,$inout3
+	aes${dir}last	$rndkey0,$inout0
+	aes${dir}last	$rndkey0,$inout1
+	aes${dir}last	$rndkey0,$inout2
+	aes${dir}last	$rndkey0,$inout3
+	ret
+.size	_aesni_${dir}rypt4,.-_aesni_${dir}rypt4
+___
+}
+sub aesni_generate6 {
+my $dir=shift;
+# As already mentioned it takes in $key and $rounds, which are *not*
+# preserved. $inout[0-5] is cipher/clear text...
+$code.=<<___;
+.type	_aesni_${dir}rypt6,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+_aesni_${dir}rypt6:
+	$movkey		($key),$rndkey0
+	shl		\$4,$rounds
+	$movkey		16($key),$rndkey1
+	xorps		$rndkey0,$inout0
+	pxor		$rndkey0,$inout1
+	pxor		$rndkey0,$inout2
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey1,$inout0
+	lea		32($key,$rounds),$key
+	neg		%rax			# $rounds
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey1,$inout1
+	pxor		$rndkey0,$inout3
+	pxor		$rndkey0,$inout4
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey1,$inout2
+	pxor		$rndkey0,$inout5
+	$movkey		($key,%rax),$rndkey0
+	add		\$16,%rax
+	jmp		.L${dir}_loop6_enter
+.align	16
+.L${dir}_loop6:
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey1,$inout0
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey1,$inout1
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey1,$inout2
+.L${dir}_loop6_enter:
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey1,$inout3
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey1,$inout4
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey1,$inout5
+	$movkey		($key,%rax),$rndkey1
+	add		\$32,%rax
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey0,$inout0
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey0,$inout1
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey0,$inout2
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey0,$inout3
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey0,$inout4
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey0,$inout5
+	$movkey		-16($key,%rax),$rndkey0
+	jnz		.L${dir}_loop6
+
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey1,$inout0
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey1,$inout1
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey1,$inout2
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey1,$inout3
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey1,$inout4
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey1,$inout5
+	aes${dir}last	$rndkey0,$inout0
+	aes${dir}last	$rndkey0,$inout1
+	aes${dir}last	$rndkey0,$inout2
+	aes${dir}last	$rndkey0,$inout3
+	aes${dir}last	$rndkey0,$inout4
+	aes${dir}last	$rndkey0,$inout5
+	ret
+.size	_aesni_${dir}rypt6,.-_aesni_${dir}rypt6
+___
+}
+sub aesni_generate8 {
+my $dir=shift;
+# As already mentioned it takes in $key and $rounds, which are *not*
+# preserved. $inout[0-7] is cipher/clear text...
+$code.=<<___;
+.type	_aesni_${dir}rypt8,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+_aesni_${dir}rypt8:
+	$movkey		($key),$rndkey0
+	shl		\$4,$rounds
+	$movkey		16($key),$rndkey1
+	xorps		$rndkey0,$inout0
+	xorps		$rndkey0,$inout1
+	pxor		$rndkey0,$inout2
+	pxor		$rndkey0,$inout3
+	pxor		$rndkey0,$inout4
+	lea		32($key,$rounds),$key
+	neg		%rax			# $rounds
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey1,$inout0
+	pxor		$rndkey0,$inout5
+	pxor		$rndkey0,$inout6
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey1,$inout1
+	pxor		$rndkey0,$inout7
+	$movkey		($key,%rax),$rndkey0
+	add		\$16,%rax
+	jmp		.L${dir}_loop8_inner
+.align	16
+.L${dir}_loop8:
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey1,$inout0
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey1,$inout1
+.L${dir}_loop8_inner:
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey1,$inout2
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey1,$inout3
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey1,$inout4
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey1,$inout5
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey1,$inout6
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey1,$inout7
+.L${dir}_loop8_enter:
+	$movkey		($key,%rax),$rndkey1
+	add		\$32,%rax
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey0,$inout0
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey0,$inout1
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey0,$inout2
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey0,$inout3
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey0,$inout4
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey0,$inout5
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey0,$inout6
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey0,$inout7
+	$movkey		-16($key,%rax),$rndkey0
+	jnz		.L${dir}_loop8
+
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey1,$inout0
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey1,$inout1
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey1,$inout2
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey1,$inout3
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey1,$inout4
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey1,$inout5
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey1,$inout6
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey1,$inout7
+	aes${dir}last	$rndkey0,$inout0
+	aes${dir}last	$rndkey0,$inout1
+	aes${dir}last	$rndkey0,$inout2
+	aes${dir}last	$rndkey0,$inout3
+	aes${dir}last	$rndkey0,$inout4
+	aes${dir}last	$rndkey0,$inout5
+	aes${dir}last	$rndkey0,$inout6
+	aes${dir}last	$rndkey0,$inout7
+	ret
+.size	_aesni_${dir}rypt8,.-_aesni_${dir}rypt8
+___
+}
+&aesni_generate2("enc") if ($PREFIX eq "aesni");
+&aesni_generate2("dec");
+&aesni_generate3("enc") if ($PREFIX eq "aesni");
+&aesni_generate3("dec");
+&aesni_generate4("enc") if ($PREFIX eq "aesni");
+&aesni_generate4("dec");
+&aesni_generate6("enc") if ($PREFIX eq "aesni");
+&aesni_generate6("dec");
+&aesni_generate8("enc") if ($PREFIX eq "aesni");
+&aesni_generate8("dec");
+
+if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
+########################################################################
+# void aesni_ecb_encrypt (const void *in, void *out,
+#			  size_t length, const AES_KEY *key,
+#			  int enc);
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	aesni_ecb_encrypt
+.type	aesni_ecb_encrypt,\@function,5
+.align	16
+aesni_ecb_encrypt:
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	lea	-0x58(%rsp),%rsp
+	movaps	%xmm6,(%rsp)		# offload $inout4..7
+	movaps	%xmm7,0x10(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm8,0x20(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm9,0x30(%rsp)
+.Lecb_enc_body:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	and	\$-16,$len		# if ($len<16)
+	jz	.Lecb_ret		# return
+
+	mov	240($key),$rounds	# key->rounds
+	$movkey	($key),$rndkey0
+	mov	$key,$key_		# backup $key
+	mov	$rounds,$rnds_		# backup $rounds
+	test	%r8d,%r8d		# 5th argument
+	jz	.Lecb_decrypt
+#--------------------------- ECB ENCRYPT ------------------------------#
+	cmp	\$0x80,$len		# if ($len<8*16)
+	jb	.Lecb_enc_tail		# short input
+
+	movdqu	($inp),$inout0		# load 8 input blocks
+	movdqu	0x10($inp),$inout1
+	movdqu	0x20($inp),$inout2
+	movdqu	0x30($inp),$inout3
+	movdqu	0x40($inp),$inout4
+	movdqu	0x50($inp),$inout5
+	movdqu	0x60($inp),$inout6
+	movdqu	0x70($inp),$inout7
+	lea	0x80($inp),$inp		# $inp+=8*16
+	sub	\$0x80,$len		# $len-=8*16 (can be zero)
+	jmp	.Lecb_enc_loop8_enter
+.align 16
+.Lecb_enc_loop8:
+	movups	$inout0,($out)		# store 8 output blocks
+	mov	$key_,$key		# restore $key
+	movdqu	($inp),$inout0		# load 8 input blocks
+	mov	$rnds_,$rounds		# restore $rounds
+	movups	$inout1,0x10($out)
+	movdqu	0x10($inp),$inout1
+	movups	$inout2,0x20($out)
+	movdqu	0x20($inp),$inout2
+	movups	$inout3,0x30($out)
+	movdqu	0x30($inp),$inout3
+	movups	$inout4,0x40($out)
+	movdqu	0x40($inp),$inout4
+	movups	$inout5,0x50($out)
+	movdqu	0x50($inp),$inout5
+	movups	$inout6,0x60($out)
+	movdqu	0x60($inp),$inout6
+	movups	$inout7,0x70($out)
+	lea	0x80($out),$out		# $out+=8*16
+	movdqu	0x70($inp),$inout7
+	lea	0x80($inp),$inp		# $inp+=8*16
+.Lecb_enc_loop8_enter:
+
+	call	_aesni_encrypt8
+
+	sub	\$0x80,$len
+	jnc	.Lecb_enc_loop8		# loop if $len-=8*16 didn't borrow
+
+	movups	$inout0,($out)		# store 8 output blocks
+	mov	$key_,$key		# restore $key
+	movups	$inout1,0x10($out)
+	mov	$rnds_,$rounds		# restore $rounds
+	movups	$inout2,0x20($out)
+	movups	$inout3,0x30($out)
+	movups	$inout4,0x40($out)
+	movups	$inout5,0x50($out)
+	movups	$inout6,0x60($out)
+	movups	$inout7,0x70($out)
+	lea	0x80($out),$out		# $out+=8*16
+	add	\$0x80,$len		# restore real remaining $len
+	jz	.Lecb_ret		# done if ($len==0)
+
+.Lecb_enc_tail:				# $len is less than 8*16
+	movups	($inp),$inout0
+	cmp	\$0x20,$len
+	jb	.Lecb_enc_one
+	movups	0x10($inp),$inout1
+	je	.Lecb_enc_two
+	movups	0x20($inp),$inout2
+	cmp	\$0x40,$len
+	jb	.Lecb_enc_three
+	movups	0x30($inp),$inout3
+	je	.Lecb_enc_four
+	movups	0x40($inp),$inout4
+	cmp	\$0x60,$len
+	jb	.Lecb_enc_five
+	movups	0x50($inp),$inout5
+	je	.Lecb_enc_six
+	movdqu	0x60($inp),$inout6
+	xorps	$inout7,$inout7
+	call	_aesni_encrypt8
+	movups	$inout0,($out)		# store 7 output blocks
+	movups	$inout1,0x10($out)
+	movups	$inout2,0x20($out)
+	movups	$inout3,0x30($out)
+	movups	$inout4,0x40($out)
+	movups	$inout5,0x50($out)
+	movups	$inout6,0x60($out)
+	jmp	.Lecb_ret
+.align	16
+.Lecb_enc_one:
+___
+	&aesni_generate1("enc",$key,$rounds);
+$code.=<<___;
+	movups	$inout0,($out)		# store one output block
+	jmp	.Lecb_ret
+.align	16
+.Lecb_enc_two:
+	call	_aesni_encrypt2
+	movups	$inout0,($out)		# store 2 output blocks
+	movups	$inout1,0x10($out)
+	jmp	.Lecb_ret
+.align	16
+.Lecb_enc_three:
+	call	_aesni_encrypt3
+	movups	$inout0,($out)		# store 3 output blocks
+	movups	$inout1,0x10($out)
+	movups	$inout2,0x20($out)
+	jmp	.Lecb_ret
+.align	16
+.Lecb_enc_four:
+	call	_aesni_encrypt4
+	movups	$inout0,($out)		# store 4 output blocks
+	movups	$inout1,0x10($out)
+	movups	$inout2,0x20($out)
+	movups	$inout3,0x30($out)
+	jmp	.Lecb_ret
+.align	16
+.Lecb_enc_five:
+	xorps	$inout5,$inout5
+	call	_aesni_encrypt6
+	movups	$inout0,($out)		# store 5 output blocks
+	movups	$inout1,0x10($out)
+	movups	$inout2,0x20($out)
+	movups	$inout3,0x30($out)
+	movups	$inout4,0x40($out)
+	jmp	.Lecb_ret
+.align	16
+.Lecb_enc_six:
+	call	_aesni_encrypt6
+	movups	$inout0,($out)		# store 6 output blocks
+	movups	$inout1,0x10($out)
+	movups	$inout2,0x20($out)
+	movups	$inout3,0x30($out)
+	movups	$inout4,0x40($out)
+	movups	$inout5,0x50($out)
+	jmp	.Lecb_ret
+#--------------------------- ECB DECRYPT ------------------------------#
+.align	16
+.Lecb_decrypt:
+	cmp	\$0x80,$len		# if ($len<8*16)
+	jb	.Lecb_dec_tail		# short input
+
+	movdqu	($inp),$inout0		# load 8 input blocks
+	movdqu	0x10($inp),$inout1
+	movdqu	0x20($inp),$inout2
+	movdqu	0x30($inp),$inout3
+	movdqu	0x40($inp),$inout4
+	movdqu	0x50($inp),$inout5
+	movdqu	0x60($inp),$inout6
+	movdqu	0x70($inp),$inout7
+	lea	0x80($inp),$inp		# $inp+=8*16
+	sub	\$0x80,$len		# $len-=8*16 (can be zero)
+	jmp	.Lecb_dec_loop8_enter
+.align 16
+.Lecb_dec_loop8:
+	movups	$inout0,($out)		# store 8 output blocks
+	mov	$key_,$key		# restore $key
+	movdqu	($inp),$inout0		# load 8 input blocks
+	mov	$rnds_,$rounds		# restore $rounds
+	movups	$inout1,0x10($out)
+	movdqu	0x10($inp),$inout1
+	movups	$inout2,0x20($out)
+	movdqu	0x20($inp),$inout2
+	movups	$inout3,0x30($out)
+	movdqu	0x30($inp),$inout3
+	movups	$inout4,0x40($out)
+	movdqu	0x40($inp),$inout4
+	movups	$inout5,0x50($out)
+	movdqu	0x50($inp),$inout5
+	movups	$inout6,0x60($out)
+	movdqu	0x60($inp),$inout6
+	movups	$inout7,0x70($out)
+	lea	0x80($out),$out		# $out+=8*16
+	movdqu	0x70($inp),$inout7
+	lea	0x80($inp),$inp		# $inp+=8*16
+.Lecb_dec_loop8_enter:
+
+	call	_aesni_decrypt8
+
+	$movkey	($key_),$rndkey0
+	sub	\$0x80,$len
+	jnc	.Lecb_dec_loop8		# loop if $len-=8*16 didn't borrow
+
+	movups	$inout0,($out)		# store 8 output blocks
+	 pxor	$inout0,$inout0		# clear register bank
+	mov	$key_,$key		# restore $key
+	movups	$inout1,0x10($out)
+	 pxor	$inout1,$inout1
+	mov	$rnds_,$rounds		# restore $rounds
+	movups	$inout2,0x20($out)
+	 pxor	$inout2,$inout2
+	movups	$inout3,0x30($out)
+	 pxor	$inout3,$inout3
+	movups	$inout4,0x40($out)
+	 pxor	$inout4,$inout4
+	movups	$inout5,0x50($out)
+	 pxor	$inout5,$inout5
+	movups	$inout6,0x60($out)
+	 pxor	$inout6,$inout6
+	movups	$inout7,0x70($out)
+	 pxor	$inout7,$inout7
+	lea	0x80($out),$out		# $out+=8*16
+	add	\$0x80,$len		# restore real remaining $len
+	jz	.Lecb_ret		# done if ($len==0)
+
+.Lecb_dec_tail:
+	movups	($inp),$inout0
+	cmp	\$0x20,$len
+	jb	.Lecb_dec_one
+	movups	0x10($inp),$inout1
+	je	.Lecb_dec_two
+	movups	0x20($inp),$inout2
+	cmp	\$0x40,$len
+	jb	.Lecb_dec_three
+	movups	0x30($inp),$inout3
+	je	.Lecb_dec_four
+	movups	0x40($inp),$inout4
+	cmp	\$0x60,$len
+	jb	.Lecb_dec_five
+	movups	0x50($inp),$inout5
+	je	.Lecb_dec_six
+	movups	0x60($inp),$inout6
+	$movkey	($key),$rndkey0
+	xorps	$inout7,$inout7
+	call	_aesni_decrypt8
+	movups	$inout0,($out)		# store 7 output blocks
+	 pxor	$inout0,$inout0		# clear register bank
+	movups	$inout1,0x10($out)
+	 pxor	$inout1,$inout1
+	movups	$inout2,0x20($out)
+	 pxor	$inout2,$inout2
+	movups	$inout3,0x30($out)
+	 pxor	$inout3,$inout3
+	movups	$inout4,0x40($out)
+	 pxor	$inout4,$inout4
+	movups	$inout5,0x50($out)
+	 pxor	$inout5,$inout5
+	movups	$inout6,0x60($out)
+	 pxor	$inout6,$inout6
+	 pxor	$inout7,$inout7
+	jmp	.Lecb_ret
+.align	16
+.Lecb_dec_one:
+___
+	&aesni_generate1("dec",$key,$rounds);
+$code.=<<___;
+	movups	$inout0,($out)		# store one output block
+	 pxor	$inout0,$inout0		# clear register bank
+	jmp	.Lecb_ret
+.align	16
+.Lecb_dec_two:
+	call	_aesni_decrypt2
+	movups	$inout0,($out)		# store 2 output blocks
+	 pxor	$inout0,$inout0		# clear register bank
+	movups	$inout1,0x10($out)
+	 pxor	$inout1,$inout1
+	jmp	.Lecb_ret
+.align	16
+.Lecb_dec_three:
+	call	_aesni_decrypt3
+	movups	$inout0,($out)		# store 3 output blocks
+	 pxor	$inout0,$inout0		# clear register bank
+	movups	$inout1,0x10($out)
+	 pxor	$inout1,$inout1
+	movups	$inout2,0x20($out)
+	 pxor	$inout2,$inout2
+	jmp	.Lecb_ret
+.align	16
+.Lecb_dec_four:
+	call	_aesni_decrypt4
+	movups	$inout0,($out)		# store 4 output blocks
+	 pxor	$inout0,$inout0		# clear register bank
+	movups	$inout1,0x10($out)
+	 pxor	$inout1,$inout1
+	movups	$inout2,0x20($out)
+	 pxor	$inout2,$inout2
+	movups	$inout3,0x30($out)
+	 pxor	$inout3,$inout3
+	jmp	.Lecb_ret
+.align	16
+.Lecb_dec_five:
+	xorps	$inout5,$inout5
+	call	_aesni_decrypt6
+	movups	$inout0,($out)		# store 5 output blocks
+	 pxor	$inout0,$inout0		# clear register bank
+	movups	$inout1,0x10($out)
+	 pxor	$inout1,$inout1
+	movups	$inout2,0x20($out)
+	 pxor	$inout2,$inout2
+	movups	$inout3,0x30($out)
+	 pxor	$inout3,$inout3
+	movups	$inout4,0x40($out)
+	 pxor	$inout4,$inout4
+	 pxor	$inout5,$inout5
+	jmp	.Lecb_ret
+.align	16
+.Lecb_dec_six:
+	call	_aesni_decrypt6
+	movups	$inout0,($out)		# store 6 output blocks
+	 pxor	$inout0,$inout0		# clear register bank
+	movups	$inout1,0x10($out)
+	 pxor	$inout1,$inout1
+	movups	$inout2,0x20($out)
+	 pxor	$inout2,$inout2
+	movups	$inout3,0x30($out)
+	 pxor	$inout3,$inout3
+	movups	$inout4,0x40($out)
+	 pxor	$inout4,$inout4
+	movups	$inout5,0x50($out)
+	 pxor	$inout5,$inout5
+
+.Lecb_ret:
+	xorps	$rndkey0,$rndkey0	# %xmm0
+	pxor	$rndkey1,$rndkey1
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	movaps	(%rsp),%xmm6
+	movaps	%xmm0,(%rsp)		# clear stack
+	movaps	0x10(%rsp),%xmm7
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x10(%rsp)
+	movaps	0x20(%rsp),%xmm8
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x20(%rsp)
+	movaps	0x30(%rsp),%xmm9
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x30(%rsp)
+	lea	0x58(%rsp),%rsp
+.Lecb_enc_ret:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	ret
+.size	aesni_ecb_encrypt,.-aesni_ecb_encrypt
+___
+
+{
+######################################################################
+# void aesni_ccm64_[en|de]crypt_blocks (const void *in, void *out,
+#                         size_t blocks, const AES_KEY *key,
+#                         const char *ivec,char *cmac);
+#
+# Handles only complete blocks, operates on 64-bit counter and
+# does not update *ivec! Nor does it finalize CMAC value
+# (see engine/eng_aesni.c for details)
+#
+{
+my $cmac="%r9";	# 6th argument
+
+my $increment="%xmm9";
+my $iv="%xmm6";
+my $bswap_mask="%xmm7";
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	aesni_ccm64_encrypt_blocks
+.type	aesni_ccm64_encrypt_blocks,\@function,6
+.align	16
+aesni_ccm64_encrypt_blocks:
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	lea	-0x58(%rsp),%rsp
+	movaps	%xmm6,(%rsp)		# $iv
+	movaps	%xmm7,0x10(%rsp)	# $bswap_mask
+	movaps	%xmm8,0x20(%rsp)	# $in0
+	movaps	%xmm9,0x30(%rsp)	# $increment
+.Lccm64_enc_body:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	240($key),$rounds		# key->rounds
+	movdqu	($ivp),$iv
+	movdqa	.Lincrement64(%rip),$increment
+	movdqa	.Lbswap_mask(%rip),$bswap_mask
+
+	shl	\$4,$rounds
+	mov	\$16,$rnds_
+	lea	0($key),$key_
+	movdqu	($cmac),$inout1
+	movdqa	$iv,$inout0
+	lea	32($key,$rounds),$key		# end of key schedule
+	pshufb	$bswap_mask,$iv
+	sub	%rax,%r10			# twisted $rounds
+	jmp	.Lccm64_enc_outer
+.align	16
+.Lccm64_enc_outer:
+	$movkey	($key_),$rndkey0
+	mov	%r10,%rax
+	movups	($inp),$in0			# load inp
+
+	xorps	$rndkey0,$inout0		# counter
+	$movkey	16($key_),$rndkey1
+	xorps	$in0,$rndkey0
+	xorps	$rndkey0,$inout1		# cmac^=inp
+	$movkey	32($key_),$rndkey0
+
+.Lccm64_enc2_loop:
+	aesenc	$rndkey1,$inout0
+	aesenc	$rndkey1,$inout1
+	$movkey	($key,%rax),$rndkey1
+	add	\$32,%rax
+	aesenc	$rndkey0,$inout0
+	aesenc	$rndkey0,$inout1
+	$movkey	-16($key,%rax),$rndkey0
+	jnz	.Lccm64_enc2_loop
+	aesenc	$rndkey1,$inout0
+	aesenc	$rndkey1,$inout1
+	paddq	$increment,$iv
+	dec	$len				# $len-- ($len is in blocks)
+	aesenclast	$rndkey0,$inout0
+	aesenclast	$rndkey0,$inout1
+
+	lea	16($inp),$inp
+	xorps	$inout0,$in0			# inp ^= E(iv)
+	movdqa	$iv,$inout0
+	movups	$in0,($out)			# save output
+	pshufb	$bswap_mask,$inout0
+	lea	16($out),$out			# $out+=16
+	jnz	.Lccm64_enc_outer		# loop if ($len!=0)
+
+	 pxor	$rndkey0,$rndkey0		# clear register bank
+	 pxor	$rndkey1,$rndkey1
+	 pxor	$inout0,$inout0
+	movups	$inout1,($cmac)			# store resulting mac
+	 pxor	$inout1,$inout1
+	 pxor	$in0,$in0
+	 pxor	$iv,$iv
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	movaps	(%rsp),%xmm6
+	movaps	%xmm0,(%rsp)			# clear stack
+	movaps	0x10(%rsp),%xmm7
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x10(%rsp)
+	movaps	0x20(%rsp),%xmm8
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x20(%rsp)
+	movaps	0x30(%rsp),%xmm9
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x30(%rsp)
+	lea	0x58(%rsp),%rsp
+.Lccm64_enc_ret:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	ret
+.size	aesni_ccm64_encrypt_blocks,.-aesni_ccm64_encrypt_blocks
+___
+######################################################################
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	aesni_ccm64_decrypt_blocks
+.type	aesni_ccm64_decrypt_blocks,\@function,6
+.align	16
+aesni_ccm64_decrypt_blocks:
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	lea	-0x58(%rsp),%rsp
+	movaps	%xmm6,(%rsp)		# $iv
+	movaps	%xmm7,0x10(%rsp)	# $bswap_mask
+	movaps	%xmm8,0x20(%rsp)	# $in8
+	movaps	%xmm9,0x30(%rsp)	# $increment
+.Lccm64_dec_body:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	240($key),$rounds		# key->rounds
+	movups	($ivp),$iv
+	movdqu	($cmac),$inout1
+	movdqa	.Lincrement64(%rip),$increment
+	movdqa	.Lbswap_mask(%rip),$bswap_mask
+
+	movaps	$iv,$inout0
+	mov	$rounds,$rnds_
+	mov	$key,$key_
+	pshufb	$bswap_mask,$iv
+___
+	&aesni_generate1("enc",$key,$rounds);
+$code.=<<___;
+	shl	\$4,$rnds_
+	mov	\$16,$rounds
+	movups	($inp),$in0			# load inp
+	paddq	$increment,$iv
+	lea	16($inp),$inp			# $inp+=16
+	sub	%r10,%rax			# twisted $rounds
+	lea	32($key_,$rnds_),$key		# end of key schedule
+	mov	%rax,%r10
+	jmp	.Lccm64_dec_outer
+.align	16
+.Lccm64_dec_outer:
+	xorps	$inout0,$in0			# inp ^= E(iv)
+	movdqa	$iv,$inout0
+	movups	$in0,($out)			# save output
+	lea	16($out),$out			# $out+=16
+	pshufb	$bswap_mask,$inout0
+
+	sub	\$1,$len			# $len-- ($len is in blocks)
+	jz	.Lccm64_dec_break		# if ($len==0) break
+
+	$movkey	($key_),$rndkey0
+	mov	%r10,%rax
+	$movkey	16($key_),$rndkey1
+	xorps	$rndkey0,$in0
+	xorps	$rndkey0,$inout0
+	xorps	$in0,$inout1			# cmac^=out
+	$movkey	32($key_),$rndkey0
+	jmp	.Lccm64_dec2_loop
+.align	16
+.Lccm64_dec2_loop:
+	aesenc	$rndkey1,$inout0
+	aesenc	$rndkey1,$inout1
+	$movkey	($key,%rax),$rndkey1
+	add	\$32,%rax
+	aesenc	$rndkey0,$inout0
+	aesenc	$rndkey0,$inout1
+	$movkey	-16($key,%rax),$rndkey0
+	jnz	.Lccm64_dec2_loop
+	movups	($inp),$in0			# load input
+	paddq	$increment,$iv
+	aesenc	$rndkey1,$inout0
+	aesenc	$rndkey1,$inout1
+	aesenclast	$rndkey0,$inout0
+	aesenclast	$rndkey0,$inout1
+	lea	16($inp),$inp			# $inp+=16
+	jmp	.Lccm64_dec_outer
+
+.align	16
+.Lccm64_dec_break:
+	#xorps	$in0,$inout1			# cmac^=out
+	mov	240($key_),$rounds
+___
+	&aesni_generate1("enc",$key_,$rounds,$inout1,$in0);
+$code.=<<___;
+	 pxor	$rndkey0,$rndkey0		# clear register bank
+	 pxor	$rndkey1,$rndkey1
+	 pxor	$inout0,$inout0
+	movups	$inout1,($cmac)			# store resulting mac
+	 pxor	$inout1,$inout1
+	 pxor	$in0,$in0
+	 pxor	$iv,$iv
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	movaps	(%rsp),%xmm6
+	movaps	%xmm0,(%rsp)			# clear stack
+	movaps	0x10(%rsp),%xmm7
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x10(%rsp)
+	movaps	0x20(%rsp),%xmm8
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x20(%rsp)
+	movaps	0x30(%rsp),%xmm9
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x30(%rsp)
+	lea	0x58(%rsp),%rsp
+.Lccm64_dec_ret:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	ret
+.size	aesni_ccm64_decrypt_blocks,.-aesni_ccm64_decrypt_blocks
+___
+}
+######################################################################
+# void aesni_ctr32_encrypt_blocks (const void *in, void *out,
+#                         size_t blocks, const AES_KEY *key,
+#                         const char *ivec);
+#
+# Handles only complete blocks, operates on 32-bit counter and
+# does not update *ivec! (see crypto/modes/ctr128.c for details)
+#
+# Overhaul based on suggestions from Shay Gueron and Vlad Krasnov,
+# http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=3021&user=guest&pass=guest.
+# Keywords are full unroll and modulo-schedule counter calculations
+# with zero-round key xor.
+{
+my ($in0,$in1,$in2,$in3,$in4,$in5)=map("%xmm$_",(10..15));
+my ($key0,$ctr)=("${key_}d","${ivp}d");
+my $frame_size = 0x80 + ($win64?160:0);
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	aesni_ctr32_encrypt_blocks
+.type	aesni_ctr32_encrypt_blocks,\@function,5
+.align	16
+aesni_ctr32_encrypt_blocks:
+	cmp	\$1,$len
+	jne	.Lctr32_bulk
+
+	# handle single block without allocating stack frame,
+	# useful when handling edges
+	movups	($ivp),$inout0
+	movups	($inp),$inout1
+	mov	240($key),%edx			# key->rounds
+___
+	&aesni_generate1("enc",$key,"%edx");
+$code.=<<___;
+	 pxor	$rndkey0,$rndkey0		# clear register bank
+	 pxor	$rndkey1,$rndkey1
+	xorps	$inout1,$inout0
+	 pxor	$inout1,$inout1
+	movups	$inout0,($out)
+	 xorps	$inout0,$inout0
+	jmp	.Lctr32_epilogue
+
+.align	16
+.Lctr32_bulk:
+	lea	(%rsp),%rax
+	push	%rbp
+	sub	\$$frame_size,%rsp
+	and	\$-16,%rsp	# Linux kernel stack can be incorrectly seeded
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	movaps	%xmm6,-0xa8(%rax)		# offload everything
+	movaps	%xmm7,-0x98(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm8,-0x88(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm9,-0x78(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm10,-0x68(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm11,-0x58(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm12,-0x48(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm13,-0x38(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm14,-0x28(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm15,-0x18(%rax)
+.Lctr32_body:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	lea	-8(%rax),%rbp
+
+	# 8 16-byte words on top of stack are counter values
+	# xor-ed with zero-round key
+
+	movdqu	($ivp),$inout0
+	movdqu	($key),$rndkey0
+	mov	12($ivp),$ctr			# counter LSB
+	pxor	$rndkey0,$inout0
+	mov	12($key),$key0			# 0-round key LSB
+	movdqa	$inout0,0x00(%rsp)		# populate counter block
+	bswap	$ctr
+	movdqa	$inout0,$inout1
+	movdqa	$inout0,$inout2
+	movdqa	$inout0,$inout3
+	movdqa	$inout0,0x40(%rsp)
+	movdqa	$inout0,0x50(%rsp)
+	movdqa	$inout0,0x60(%rsp)
+	mov	%rdx,%r10			# about to borrow %rdx
+	movdqa	$inout0,0x70(%rsp)
+
+	lea	1($ctr),%rax
+	 lea	2($ctr),%rdx
+	bswap	%eax
+	 bswap	%edx
+	xor	$key0,%eax
+	 xor	$key0,%edx
+	pinsrd	\$3,%eax,$inout1
+	lea	3($ctr),%rax
+	movdqa	$inout1,0x10(%rsp)
+	 pinsrd	\$3,%edx,$inout2
+	bswap	%eax
+	 mov	%r10,%rdx			# restore %rdx
+	 lea	4($ctr),%r10
+	 movdqa	$inout2,0x20(%rsp)
+	xor	$key0,%eax
+	 bswap	%r10d
+	pinsrd	\$3,%eax,$inout3
+	 xor	$key0,%r10d
+	movdqa	$inout3,0x30(%rsp)
+	lea	5($ctr),%r9
+	 mov	%r10d,0x40+12(%rsp)
+	bswap	%r9d
+	 lea	6($ctr),%r10
+	mov	240($key),$rounds		# key->rounds
+	xor	$key0,%r9d
+	 bswap	%r10d
+	mov	%r9d,0x50+12(%rsp)
+	 xor	$key0,%r10d
+	lea	7($ctr),%r9
+	 mov	%r10d,0x60+12(%rsp)
+	bswap	%r9d
+	 mov	OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+4(%rip),%r10d 
+	xor	$key0,%r9d
+	 and	\$`1<<26|1<<22`,%r10d		# isolate XSAVE+MOVBE
+	mov	%r9d,0x70+12(%rsp)
+
+	$movkey	0x10($key),$rndkey1
+
+	movdqa	0x40(%rsp),$inout4
+	movdqa	0x50(%rsp),$inout5
+
+	cmp	\$8,$len		# $len is in blocks
+	jb	.Lctr32_tail		# short input if ($len<8)
+
+	sub	\$6,$len		# $len is biased by -6
+	cmp	\$`1<<22`,%r10d		# check for MOVBE without XSAVE
+	je	.Lctr32_6x		# [which denotes Atom Silvermont]
+
+	lea	0x80($key),$key		# size optimization
+	sub	\$2,$len		# $len is biased by -8
+	jmp	.Lctr32_loop8
+
+.align	16
+.Lctr32_6x:
+	shl	\$4,$rounds
+	mov	\$48,$rnds_
+	bswap	$key0
+	lea	32($key,$rounds),$key	# end of key schedule
+	sub	%rax,%r10		# twisted $rounds
+	jmp	.Lctr32_loop6
+
+.align	16
+.Lctr32_loop6:
+	 add	\$6,$ctr		# next counter value
+	$movkey	-48($key,$rnds_),$rndkey0
+	aesenc	$rndkey1,$inout0
+	 mov	$ctr,%eax
+	 xor	$key0,%eax
+	aesenc	$rndkey1,$inout1
+	 movbe	%eax,`0x00+12`(%rsp)	# store next counter value
+	 lea	1($ctr),%eax
+	aesenc	$rndkey1,$inout2
+	 xor	$key0,%eax
+	 movbe	%eax,`0x10+12`(%rsp)
+	aesenc	$rndkey1,$inout3
+	 lea	2($ctr),%eax
+	 xor	$key0,%eax
+	aesenc	$rndkey1,$inout4
+	 movbe	%eax,`0x20+12`(%rsp)
+	 lea	3($ctr),%eax
+	aesenc	$rndkey1,$inout5
+	$movkey	-32($key,$rnds_),$rndkey1
+	 xor	$key0,%eax
+
+	aesenc	$rndkey0,$inout0
+	 movbe	%eax,`0x30+12`(%rsp)
+	 lea	4($ctr),%eax
+	aesenc	$rndkey0,$inout1
+	 xor	$key0,%eax
+	 movbe	%eax,`0x40+12`(%rsp)
+	aesenc	$rndkey0,$inout2
+	 lea	5($ctr),%eax
+	 xor	$key0,%eax
+	aesenc	$rndkey0,$inout3
+	 movbe	%eax,`0x50+12`(%rsp)
+	 mov	%r10,%rax		# mov	$rnds_,$rounds
+	aesenc	$rndkey0,$inout4
+	aesenc	$rndkey0,$inout5
+	$movkey	-16($key,$rnds_),$rndkey0
+
+	call	.Lenc_loop6
+
+	movdqu	($inp),$inout6		# load 6 input blocks
+	movdqu	0x10($inp),$inout7
+	movdqu	0x20($inp),$in0
+	movdqu	0x30($inp),$in1
+	movdqu	0x40($inp),$in2
+	movdqu	0x50($inp),$in3
+	lea	0x60($inp),$inp		# $inp+=6*16
+	$movkey	-64($key,$rnds_),$rndkey1
+	pxor	$inout0,$inout6		# inp^=E(ctr)
+	movaps	0x00(%rsp),$inout0	# load next counter [xor-ed with 0 round]
+	pxor	$inout1,$inout7
+	movaps	0x10(%rsp),$inout1
+	pxor	$inout2,$in0
+	movaps	0x20(%rsp),$inout2
+	pxor	$inout3,$in1
+	movaps	0x30(%rsp),$inout3
+	pxor	$inout4,$in2
+	movaps	0x40(%rsp),$inout4
+	pxor	$inout5,$in3
+	movaps	0x50(%rsp),$inout5
+	movdqu	$inout6,($out)		# store 6 output blocks
+	movdqu	$inout7,0x10($out)
+	movdqu	$in0,0x20($out)
+	movdqu	$in1,0x30($out)
+	movdqu	$in2,0x40($out)
+	movdqu	$in3,0x50($out)
+	lea	0x60($out),$out		# $out+=6*16
+
+	sub	\$6,$len
+	jnc	.Lctr32_loop6		# loop if $len-=6 didn't borrow
+
+	add	\$6,$len		# restore real remaining $len
+	jz	.Lctr32_done		# done if ($len==0)
+
+	lea	-48($rnds_),$rounds
+	lea	-80($key,$rnds_),$key	# restore $key
+	neg	$rounds
+	shr	\$4,$rounds		# restore $rounds
+	jmp	.Lctr32_tail
+
+.align	32
+.Lctr32_loop8:
+	 add		\$8,$ctr		# next counter value
+	movdqa		0x60(%rsp),$inout6
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout0
+	 mov		$ctr,%r9d
+	movdqa		0x70(%rsp),$inout7
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout1
+	 bswap		%r9d
+	$movkey		0x20-0x80($key),$rndkey0
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout2
+	 xor		$key0,%r9d
+	 nop
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout3
+	 mov		%r9d,0x00+12(%rsp)	# store next counter value
+	 lea		1($ctr),%r9
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout4
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout5
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout6
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout7
+	$movkey		0x30-0x80($key),$rndkey1
+___
+for($i=2;$i<8;$i++) {
+my $rndkeyx = ($i&1)?$rndkey1:$rndkey0;
+$code.=<<___;
+	 bswap		%r9d
+	aesenc		$rndkeyx,$inout0
+	aesenc		$rndkeyx,$inout1
+	 xor		$key0,%r9d
+	 .byte		0x66,0x90
+	aesenc		$rndkeyx,$inout2
+	aesenc		$rndkeyx,$inout3
+	 mov		%r9d,`0x10*($i-1)`+12(%rsp)
+	 lea		$i($ctr),%r9
+	aesenc		$rndkeyx,$inout4
+	aesenc		$rndkeyx,$inout5
+	aesenc		$rndkeyx,$inout6
+	aesenc		$rndkeyx,$inout7
+	$movkey		`0x20+0x10*$i`-0x80($key),$rndkeyx
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	 bswap		%r9d
+	aesenc		$rndkey0,$inout0
+	aesenc		$rndkey0,$inout1
+	aesenc		$rndkey0,$inout2
+	 xor		$key0,%r9d
+	 movdqu		0x00($inp),$in0		# start loading input
+	aesenc		$rndkey0,$inout3
+	 mov		%r9d,0x70+12(%rsp)
+	 cmp		\$11,$rounds
+	aesenc		$rndkey0,$inout4
+	aesenc		$rndkey0,$inout5
+	aesenc		$rndkey0,$inout6
+	aesenc		$rndkey0,$inout7
+	$movkey		0xa0-0x80($key),$rndkey0
+
+	jb		.Lctr32_enc_done
+
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout0
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout1
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout2
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout3
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout4
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout5
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout6
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout7
+	$movkey		0xb0-0x80($key),$rndkey1
+
+	aesenc		$rndkey0,$inout0
+	aesenc		$rndkey0,$inout1
+	aesenc		$rndkey0,$inout2
+	aesenc		$rndkey0,$inout3
+	aesenc		$rndkey0,$inout4
+	aesenc		$rndkey0,$inout5
+	aesenc		$rndkey0,$inout6
+	aesenc		$rndkey0,$inout7
+	$movkey		0xc0-0x80($key),$rndkey0
+	je		.Lctr32_enc_done
+
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout0
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout1
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout2
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout3
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout4
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout5
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout6
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout7
+	$movkey		0xd0-0x80($key),$rndkey1
+
+	aesenc		$rndkey0,$inout0
+	aesenc		$rndkey0,$inout1
+	aesenc		$rndkey0,$inout2
+	aesenc		$rndkey0,$inout3
+	aesenc		$rndkey0,$inout4
+	aesenc		$rndkey0,$inout5
+	aesenc		$rndkey0,$inout6
+	aesenc		$rndkey0,$inout7
+	$movkey		0xe0-0x80($key),$rndkey0
+	jmp		.Lctr32_enc_done
+
+.align	16
+.Lctr32_enc_done:
+	movdqu		0x10($inp),$in1
+	pxor		$rndkey0,$in0		# input^=round[last]
+	movdqu		0x20($inp),$in2
+	pxor		$rndkey0,$in1
+	movdqu		0x30($inp),$in3
+	pxor		$rndkey0,$in2
+	movdqu		0x40($inp),$in4
+	pxor		$rndkey0,$in3
+	movdqu		0x50($inp),$in5
+	pxor		$rndkey0,$in4
+	pxor		$rndkey0,$in5
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout0
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout1
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout2
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout3
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout4
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout5
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout6
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout7
+	movdqu		0x60($inp),$rndkey1	# borrow $rndkey1 for inp[6]
+	lea		0x80($inp),$inp		# $inp+=8*16
+
+	aesenclast	$in0,$inout0		# $inN is inp[N]^round[last]
+	pxor		$rndkey0,$rndkey1	# borrowed $rndkey
+	movdqu		0x70-0x80($inp),$in0
+	aesenclast	$in1,$inout1
+	pxor		$rndkey0,$in0
+	movdqa		0x00(%rsp),$in1		# load next counter block
+	aesenclast	$in2,$inout2
+	aesenclast	$in3,$inout3
+	movdqa		0x10(%rsp),$in2
+	movdqa		0x20(%rsp),$in3
+	aesenclast	$in4,$inout4
+	aesenclast	$in5,$inout5
+	movdqa		0x30(%rsp),$in4
+	movdqa		0x40(%rsp),$in5
+	aesenclast	$rndkey1,$inout6
+	movdqa		0x50(%rsp),$rndkey0
+	$movkey		0x10-0x80($key),$rndkey1#real 1st-round key
+	aesenclast	$in0,$inout7
+
+	movups		$inout0,($out)		# store 8 output blocks
+	movdqa		$in1,$inout0
+	movups		$inout1,0x10($out)
+	movdqa		$in2,$inout1
+	movups		$inout2,0x20($out)
+	movdqa		$in3,$inout2
+	movups		$inout3,0x30($out)
+	movdqa		$in4,$inout3
+	movups		$inout4,0x40($out)
+	movdqa		$in5,$inout4
+	movups		$inout5,0x50($out)
+	movdqa		$rndkey0,$inout5
+	movups		$inout6,0x60($out)
+	movups		$inout7,0x70($out)
+	lea		0x80($out),$out		# $out+=8*16
+
+	sub	\$8,$len
+	jnc	.Lctr32_loop8			# loop if $len-=8 didn't borrow
+
+	add	\$8,$len			# restore real remainig $len
+	jz	.Lctr32_done			# done if ($len==0)
+	lea	-0x80($key),$key
+
+.Lctr32_tail:
+	# note that at this point $inout0..5 are populated with
+	# counter values xor-ed with 0-round key 
+	lea	16($key),$key
+	cmp	\$4,$len
+	jb	.Lctr32_loop3
+	je	.Lctr32_loop4
+
+	# if ($len>4) compute 7 E(counter)
+	shl		\$4,$rounds
+	movdqa		0x60(%rsp),$inout6
+	pxor		$inout7,$inout7
+
+	$movkey		16($key),$rndkey0
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout0
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout1
+	lea		32-16($key,$rounds),$key# prepare for .Lenc_loop8_enter
+	neg		%rax
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout2
+	add		\$16,%rax		# prepare for .Lenc_loop8_enter
+	 movups		($inp),$in0
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout3
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout4
+	 movups		0x10($inp),$in1		# pre-load input
+	 movups		0x20($inp),$in2
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout5
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout6
+
+	call            .Lenc_loop8_enter
+
+	movdqu	0x30($inp),$in3
+	pxor	$in0,$inout0
+	movdqu	0x40($inp),$in0
+	pxor	$in1,$inout1
+	movdqu	$inout0,($out)			# store output
+	pxor	$in2,$inout2
+	movdqu	$inout1,0x10($out)
+	pxor	$in3,$inout3
+	movdqu	$inout2,0x20($out)
+	pxor	$in0,$inout4
+	movdqu	$inout3,0x30($out)
+	movdqu	$inout4,0x40($out)
+	cmp	\$6,$len
+	jb	.Lctr32_done			# $len was 5, stop store
+
+	movups	0x50($inp),$in1
+	xorps	$in1,$inout5
+	movups	$inout5,0x50($out)
+	je	.Lctr32_done			# $len was 6, stop store
+
+	movups	0x60($inp),$in2
+	xorps	$in2,$inout6
+	movups	$inout6,0x60($out)
+	jmp	.Lctr32_done			# $len was 7, stop store
+
+.align	32
+.Lctr32_loop4:
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout0
+	lea		16($key),$key
+	dec		$rounds
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout1
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout2
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout3
+	$movkey		($key),$rndkey1
+	jnz		.Lctr32_loop4
+	aesenclast	$rndkey1,$inout0
+	aesenclast	$rndkey1,$inout1
+	 movups		($inp),$in0		# load input
+	 movups		0x10($inp),$in1
+	aesenclast	$rndkey1,$inout2
+	aesenclast	$rndkey1,$inout3
+	 movups		0x20($inp),$in2
+	 movups		0x30($inp),$in3
+
+	xorps	$in0,$inout0
+	movups	$inout0,($out)			# store output
+	xorps	$in1,$inout1
+	movups	$inout1,0x10($out)
+	pxor	$in2,$inout2
+	movdqu	$inout2,0x20($out)
+	pxor	$in3,$inout3
+	movdqu	$inout3,0x30($out)
+	jmp	.Lctr32_done			# $len was 4, stop store
+
+.align	32
+.Lctr32_loop3:
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout0
+	lea		16($key),$key
+	dec		$rounds
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout1
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout2
+	$movkey		($key),$rndkey1
+	jnz		.Lctr32_loop3
+	aesenclast	$rndkey1,$inout0
+	aesenclast	$rndkey1,$inout1
+	aesenclast	$rndkey1,$inout2
+
+	movups	($inp),$in0			# load input
+	xorps	$in0,$inout0
+	movups	$inout0,($out)			# store output
+	cmp	\$2,$len
+	jb	.Lctr32_done			# $len was 1, stop store
+
+	movups	0x10($inp),$in1
+	xorps	$in1,$inout1
+	movups	$inout1,0x10($out)
+	je	.Lctr32_done			# $len was 2, stop store
+
+	movups	0x20($inp),$in2
+	xorps	$in2,$inout2
+	movups	$inout2,0x20($out)		# $len was 3, stop store
+
+.Lctr32_done:
+	xorps	%xmm0,%xmm0			# clear regiser bank
+	xor	$key0,$key0
+	pxor	%xmm1,%xmm1
+	pxor	%xmm2,%xmm2
+	pxor	%xmm3,%xmm3
+	pxor	%xmm4,%xmm4
+	pxor	%xmm5,%xmm5
+___
+$code.=<<___ if (!$win64);
+	pxor	%xmm6,%xmm6
+	pxor	%xmm7,%xmm7
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x00(%rsp)		# clear stack
+	pxor	%xmm8,%xmm8
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x10(%rsp)
+	pxor	%xmm9,%xmm9
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x20(%rsp)
+	pxor	%xmm10,%xmm10
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x30(%rsp)
+	pxor	%xmm11,%xmm11
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x40(%rsp)
+	pxor	%xmm12,%xmm12
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x50(%rsp)
+	pxor	%xmm13,%xmm13
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x60(%rsp)
+	pxor	%xmm14,%xmm14
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x70(%rsp)
+	pxor	%xmm15,%xmm15
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	movaps	-0xa0(%rbp),%xmm6
+	movaps	%xmm0,-0xa0(%rbp)		# clear stack
+	movaps	-0x90(%rbp),%xmm7
+	movaps	%xmm0,-0x90(%rbp)
+	movaps	-0x80(%rbp),%xmm8
+	movaps	%xmm0,-0x80(%rbp)
+	movaps	-0x70(%rbp),%xmm9
+	movaps	%xmm0,-0x70(%rbp)
+	movaps	-0x60(%rbp),%xmm10
+	movaps	%xmm0,-0x60(%rbp)
+	movaps	-0x50(%rbp),%xmm11
+	movaps	%xmm0,-0x50(%rbp)
+	movaps	-0x40(%rbp),%xmm12
+	movaps	%xmm0,-0x40(%rbp)
+	movaps	-0x30(%rbp),%xmm13
+	movaps	%xmm0,-0x30(%rbp)
+	movaps	-0x20(%rbp),%xmm14
+	movaps	%xmm0,-0x20(%rbp)
+	movaps	-0x10(%rbp),%xmm15
+	movaps	%xmm0,-0x10(%rbp)
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x00(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x10(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x20(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x30(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x40(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x50(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x60(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x70(%rsp)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	lea	(%rbp),%rsp
+	pop	%rbp
+.Lctr32_epilogue:
+	ret
+.size	aesni_ctr32_encrypt_blocks,.-aesni_ctr32_encrypt_blocks
+___
+}
+
+######################################################################
+# void aesni_xts_[en|de]crypt(const char *inp,char *out,size_t len,
+#	const AES_KEY *key1, const AES_KEY *key2
+#	const unsigned char iv[16]);
+#
+{
+my @tweak=map("%xmm$_",(10..15));
+my ($twmask,$twres,$twtmp)=("%xmm8","%xmm9",@tweak[4]);
+my ($key2,$ivp,$len_)=("%r8","%r9","%r9");
+my $frame_size = 0x70 + ($win64?160:0);
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	aesni_xts_encrypt
+.type	aesni_xts_encrypt,\@function,6
+.align	16
+aesni_xts_encrypt:
+	lea	(%rsp),%rax
+	push	%rbp
+	sub	\$$frame_size,%rsp
+	and	\$-16,%rsp	# Linux kernel stack can be incorrectly seeded
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	movaps	%xmm6,-0xa8(%rax)		# offload everything
+	movaps	%xmm7,-0x98(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm8,-0x88(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm9,-0x78(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm10,-0x68(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm11,-0x58(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm12,-0x48(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm13,-0x38(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm14,-0x28(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm15,-0x18(%rax)
+.Lxts_enc_body:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	lea	-8(%rax),%rbp
+	movups	($ivp),$inout0			# load clear-text tweak
+	mov	240(%r8),$rounds		# key2->rounds
+	mov	240($key),$rnds_		# key1->rounds
+___
+	# generate the tweak
+	&aesni_generate1("enc",$key2,$rounds,$inout0);
+$code.=<<___;
+	$movkey	($key),$rndkey0			# zero round key
+	mov	$key,$key_			# backup $key
+	mov	$rnds_,$rounds			# backup $rounds
+	shl	\$4,$rnds_
+	mov	$len,$len_			# backup $len
+	and	\$-16,$len
+
+	$movkey	16($key,$rnds_),$rndkey1	# last round key
+
+	movdqa	.Lxts_magic(%rip),$twmask
+	movdqa	$inout0,@tweak[5]
+	pshufd	\$0x5f,$inout0,$twres
+	pxor	$rndkey0,$rndkey1
+___
+    # alternative tweak calculation algorithm is based on suggestions
+    # by Shay Gueron. psrad doesn't conflict with AES-NI instructions
+    # and should help in the future...
+    for ($i=0;$i<4;$i++) {
+    $code.=<<___;
+	movdqa	$twres,$twtmp
+	paddd	$twres,$twres
+	movdqa	@tweak[5],@tweak[$i]
+	psrad	\$31,$twtmp			# broadcast upper bits
+	paddq	@tweak[5],@tweak[5]
+	pand	$twmask,$twtmp
+	pxor	$rndkey0,@tweak[$i]
+	pxor	$twtmp,@tweak[5]
+___
+    }
+$code.=<<___;
+	movdqa	@tweak[5],@tweak[4]
+	psrad	\$31,$twres
+	paddq	@tweak[5],@tweak[5]
+	pand	$twmask,$twres
+	pxor	$rndkey0,@tweak[4]
+	pxor	$twres,@tweak[5]
+	movaps	$rndkey1,0x60(%rsp)		# save round[0]^round[last]
+
+	sub	\$16*6,$len
+	jc	.Lxts_enc_short			# if $len-=6*16 borrowed
+
+	mov	\$16+96,$rounds
+	lea	32($key_,$rnds_),$key		# end of key schedule
+	sub	%r10,%rax			# twisted $rounds
+	$movkey	16($key_),$rndkey1
+	mov	%rax,%r10			# backup twisted $rounds
+	lea	.Lxts_magic(%rip),%r8
+	jmp	.Lxts_enc_grandloop
+
+.align	32
+.Lxts_enc_grandloop:
+	movdqu	`16*0`($inp),$inout0		# load input
+	movdqa	$rndkey0,$twmask
+	movdqu	`16*1`($inp),$inout1
+	pxor	@tweak[0],$inout0		# input^=tweak^round[0]
+	movdqu	`16*2`($inp),$inout2
+	pxor	@tweak[1],$inout1
+	 aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout0
+	movdqu	`16*3`($inp),$inout3
+	pxor	@tweak[2],$inout2
+	 aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout1
+	movdqu	`16*4`($inp),$inout4
+	pxor	@tweak[3],$inout3
+	 aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout2
+	movdqu	`16*5`($inp),$inout5
+	pxor	@tweak[5],$twmask		# round[0]^=tweak[5]
+	 movdqa	0x60(%rsp),$twres		# load round[0]^round[last]
+	pxor	@tweak[4],$inout4
+	 aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout3
+	$movkey	32($key_),$rndkey0
+	lea	`16*6`($inp),$inp
+	pxor	$twmask,$inout5
+
+	 pxor	$twres,@tweak[0]		# calclulate tweaks^round[last]
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout4
+	 pxor	$twres,@tweak[1]
+	 movdqa	@tweak[0],`16*0`(%rsp)		# put aside tweaks^round[last]
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout5
+	$movkey		48($key_),$rndkey1
+	 pxor	$twres,@tweak[2]
+
+	aesenc		$rndkey0,$inout0
+	 pxor	$twres,@tweak[3]
+	 movdqa	@tweak[1],`16*1`(%rsp)
+	aesenc		$rndkey0,$inout1
+	 pxor	$twres,@tweak[4]
+	 movdqa	@tweak[2],`16*2`(%rsp)
+	aesenc		$rndkey0,$inout2
+	aesenc		$rndkey0,$inout3
+	 pxor	$twres,$twmask
+	 movdqa	@tweak[4],`16*4`(%rsp)
+	aesenc		$rndkey0,$inout4
+	aesenc		$rndkey0,$inout5
+	$movkey		64($key_),$rndkey0
+	 movdqa	$twmask,`16*5`(%rsp)
+	pshufd	\$0x5f,@tweak[5],$twres
+	jmp	.Lxts_enc_loop6
+.align	32
+.Lxts_enc_loop6:
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout0
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout1
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout2
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout3
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout4
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout5
+	$movkey		-64($key,%rax),$rndkey1
+	add		\$32,%rax
+
+	aesenc		$rndkey0,$inout0
+	aesenc		$rndkey0,$inout1
+	aesenc		$rndkey0,$inout2
+	aesenc		$rndkey0,$inout3
+	aesenc		$rndkey0,$inout4
+	aesenc		$rndkey0,$inout5
+	$movkey		-80($key,%rax),$rndkey0
+	jnz		.Lxts_enc_loop6
+
+	movdqa	(%r8),$twmask			# start calculating next tweak
+	movdqa	$twres,$twtmp
+	paddd	$twres,$twres
+	 aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout0
+	paddq	@tweak[5],@tweak[5]
+	psrad	\$31,$twtmp
+	 aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout1
+	pand	$twmask,$twtmp
+	$movkey	($key_),@tweak[0]		# load round[0]
+	 aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout2
+	 aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout3
+	 aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout4
+	pxor	$twtmp,@tweak[5]
+	movaps	@tweak[0],@tweak[1]		# copy round[0]
+	 aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout5
+	 $movkey	-64($key),$rndkey1
+
+	movdqa	$twres,$twtmp
+	 aesenc		$rndkey0,$inout0
+	paddd	$twres,$twres
+	pxor	@tweak[5],@tweak[0]
+	 aesenc		$rndkey0,$inout1
+	psrad	\$31,$twtmp
+	paddq	@tweak[5],@tweak[5]
+	 aesenc		$rndkey0,$inout2
+	 aesenc		$rndkey0,$inout3
+	pand	$twmask,$twtmp
+	movaps	@tweak[1],@tweak[2]
+	 aesenc		$rndkey0,$inout4
+	pxor	$twtmp,@tweak[5]
+	movdqa	$twres,$twtmp
+	 aesenc		$rndkey0,$inout5
+	 $movkey	-48($key),$rndkey0
+
+	paddd	$twres,$twres
+	 aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout0
+	pxor	@tweak[5],@tweak[1]
+	psrad	\$31,$twtmp
+	 aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout1
+	paddq	@tweak[5],@tweak[5]
+	pand	$twmask,$twtmp
+	 aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout2
+	 aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout3
+	 movdqa	@tweak[3],`16*3`(%rsp)
+	pxor	$twtmp,@tweak[5]
+	 aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout4
+	movaps	@tweak[2],@tweak[3]
+	movdqa	$twres,$twtmp
+	 aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout5
+	 $movkey	-32($key),$rndkey1
+
+	paddd	$twres,$twres
+	 aesenc		$rndkey0,$inout0
+	pxor	@tweak[5],@tweak[2]
+	psrad	\$31,$twtmp
+	 aesenc		$rndkey0,$inout1
+	paddq	@tweak[5],@tweak[5]
+	pand	$twmask,$twtmp
+	 aesenc		$rndkey0,$inout2
+	 aesenc		$rndkey0,$inout3
+	 aesenc		$rndkey0,$inout4
+	pxor	$twtmp,@tweak[5]
+	movaps	@tweak[3],@tweak[4]
+	 aesenc		$rndkey0,$inout5
+
+	movdqa	$twres,$rndkey0
+	paddd	$twres,$twres
+	 aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout0
+	pxor	@tweak[5],@tweak[3]
+	psrad	\$31,$rndkey0
+	 aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout1
+	paddq	@tweak[5],@tweak[5]
+	pand	$twmask,$rndkey0
+	 aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout2
+	 aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout3
+	pxor	$rndkey0,@tweak[5]
+	$movkey		($key_),$rndkey0
+	 aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout4
+	 aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout5
+	$movkey		16($key_),$rndkey1
+
+	pxor	@tweak[5],@tweak[4]
+	 aesenclast	`16*0`(%rsp),$inout0
+	psrad	\$31,$twres
+	paddq	@tweak[5],@tweak[5]
+	 aesenclast	`16*1`(%rsp),$inout1
+	 aesenclast	`16*2`(%rsp),$inout2
+	pand	$twmask,$twres
+	mov	%r10,%rax			# restore $rounds
+	 aesenclast	`16*3`(%rsp),$inout3
+	 aesenclast	`16*4`(%rsp),$inout4
+	 aesenclast	`16*5`(%rsp),$inout5
+	pxor	$twres,@tweak[5]
+
+	lea	`16*6`($out),$out		# $out+=6*16
+	movups	$inout0,`-16*6`($out)		# store 6 output blocks
+	movups	$inout1,`-16*5`($out)
+	movups	$inout2,`-16*4`($out)
+	movups	$inout3,`-16*3`($out)
+	movups	$inout4,`-16*2`($out)
+	movups	$inout5,`-16*1`($out)
+	sub	\$16*6,$len
+	jnc	.Lxts_enc_grandloop		# loop if $len-=6*16 didn't borrow
+
+	mov	\$16+96,$rounds
+	sub	$rnds_,$rounds
+	mov	$key_,$key			# restore $key
+	shr	\$4,$rounds			# restore original value
+
+.Lxts_enc_short:
+	# at the point @tweak[0..5] are populated with tweak values
+	mov	$rounds,$rnds_			# backup $rounds
+	pxor	$rndkey0,@tweak[0]
+	add	\$16*6,$len			# restore real remaining $len
+	jz	.Lxts_enc_done			# done if ($len==0)
+
+	pxor	$rndkey0,@tweak[1]
+	cmp	\$0x20,$len
+	jb	.Lxts_enc_one			# $len is 1*16
+	pxor	$rndkey0,@tweak[2]
+	je	.Lxts_enc_two			# $len is 2*16
+
+	pxor	$rndkey0,@tweak[3]
+	cmp	\$0x40,$len
+	jb	.Lxts_enc_three			# $len is 3*16
+	pxor	$rndkey0,@tweak[4]
+	je	.Lxts_enc_four			# $len is 4*16
+
+	movdqu	($inp),$inout0			# $len is 5*16
+	movdqu	16*1($inp),$inout1
+	movdqu	16*2($inp),$inout2
+	pxor	@tweak[0],$inout0
+	movdqu	16*3($inp),$inout3
+	pxor	@tweak[1],$inout1
+	movdqu	16*4($inp),$inout4
+	lea	16*5($inp),$inp			# $inp+=5*16
+	pxor	@tweak[2],$inout2
+	pxor	@tweak[3],$inout3
+	pxor	@tweak[4],$inout4
+	pxor	$inout5,$inout5
+
+	call	_aesni_encrypt6
+
+	xorps	@tweak[0],$inout0
+	movdqa	@tweak[5],@tweak[0]
+	xorps	@tweak[1],$inout1
+	xorps	@tweak[2],$inout2
+	movdqu	$inout0,($out)			# store 5 output blocks
+	xorps	@tweak[3],$inout3
+	movdqu	$inout1,16*1($out)
+	xorps	@tweak[4],$inout4
+	movdqu	$inout2,16*2($out)
+	movdqu	$inout3,16*3($out)
+	movdqu	$inout4,16*4($out)
+	lea	16*5($out),$out			# $out+=5*16
+	jmp	.Lxts_enc_done
+
+.align	16
+.Lxts_enc_one:
+	movups	($inp),$inout0
+	lea	16*1($inp),$inp			# inp+=1*16
+	xorps	@tweak[0],$inout0
+___
+	&aesni_generate1("enc",$key,$rounds);
+$code.=<<___;
+	xorps	@tweak[0],$inout0
+	movdqa	@tweak[1],@tweak[0]
+	movups	$inout0,($out)			# store one output block
+	lea	16*1($out),$out			# $out+=1*16
+	jmp	.Lxts_enc_done
+
+.align	16
+.Lxts_enc_two:
+	movups	($inp),$inout0
+	movups	16($inp),$inout1
+	lea	32($inp),$inp			# $inp+=2*16
+	xorps	@tweak[0],$inout0
+	xorps	@tweak[1],$inout1
+
+	call	_aesni_encrypt2
+
+	xorps	@tweak[0],$inout0
+	movdqa	@tweak[2],@tweak[0]
+	xorps	@tweak[1],$inout1
+	movups	$inout0,($out)			# store 2 output blocks
+	movups	$inout1,16*1($out)
+	lea	16*2($out),$out			# $out+=2*16
+	jmp	.Lxts_enc_done
+
+.align	16
+.Lxts_enc_three:
+	movups	($inp),$inout0
+	movups	16*1($inp),$inout1
+	movups	16*2($inp),$inout2
+	lea	16*3($inp),$inp			# $inp+=3*16
+	xorps	@tweak[0],$inout0
+	xorps	@tweak[1],$inout1
+	xorps	@tweak[2],$inout2
+
+	call	_aesni_encrypt3
+
+	xorps	@tweak[0],$inout0
+	movdqa	@tweak[3],@tweak[0]
+	xorps	@tweak[1],$inout1
+	xorps	@tweak[2],$inout2
+	movups	$inout0,($out)			# store 3 output blocks
+	movups	$inout1,16*1($out)
+	movups	$inout2,16*2($out)
+	lea	16*3($out),$out			# $out+=3*16
+	jmp	.Lxts_enc_done
+
+.align	16
+.Lxts_enc_four:
+	movups	($inp),$inout0
+	movups	16*1($inp),$inout1
+	movups	16*2($inp),$inout2
+	xorps	@tweak[0],$inout0
+	movups	16*3($inp),$inout3
+	lea	16*4($inp),$inp			# $inp+=4*16
+	xorps	@tweak[1],$inout1
+	xorps	@tweak[2],$inout2
+	xorps	@tweak[3],$inout3
+
+	call	_aesni_encrypt4
+
+	pxor	@tweak[0],$inout0
+	movdqa	@tweak[4],@tweak[0]
+	pxor	@tweak[1],$inout1
+	pxor	@tweak[2],$inout2
+	movdqu	$inout0,($out)			# store 4 output blocks
+	pxor	@tweak[3],$inout3
+	movdqu	$inout1,16*1($out)
+	movdqu	$inout2,16*2($out)
+	movdqu	$inout3,16*3($out)
+	lea	16*4($out),$out			# $out+=4*16
+	jmp	.Lxts_enc_done
+
+.align	16
+.Lxts_enc_done:
+	and	\$15,$len_			# see if $len%16 is 0
+	jz	.Lxts_enc_ret
+	mov	$len_,$len
+
+.Lxts_enc_steal:
+	movzb	($inp),%eax			# borrow $rounds ...
+	movzb	-16($out),%ecx			# ... and $key
+	lea	1($inp),$inp
+	mov	%al,-16($out)
+	mov	%cl,0($out)
+	lea	1($out),$out
+	sub	\$1,$len
+	jnz	.Lxts_enc_steal
+
+	sub	$len_,$out			# rewind $out
+	mov	$key_,$key			# restore $key
+	mov	$rnds_,$rounds			# restore $rounds
+
+	movups	-16($out),$inout0
+	xorps	@tweak[0],$inout0
+___
+	&aesni_generate1("enc",$key,$rounds);
+$code.=<<___;
+	xorps	@tweak[0],$inout0
+	movups	$inout0,-16($out)
+
+.Lxts_enc_ret:
+	xorps	%xmm0,%xmm0			# clear register bank
+	pxor	%xmm1,%xmm1
+	pxor	%xmm2,%xmm2
+	pxor	%xmm3,%xmm3
+	pxor	%xmm4,%xmm4
+	pxor	%xmm5,%xmm5
+___
+$code.=<<___ if (!$win64);
+	pxor	%xmm6,%xmm6
+	pxor	%xmm7,%xmm7
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x00(%rsp)		# clear stack
+	pxor	%xmm8,%xmm8
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x10(%rsp)
+	pxor	%xmm9,%xmm9
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x20(%rsp)
+	pxor	%xmm10,%xmm10
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x30(%rsp)
+	pxor	%xmm11,%xmm11
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x40(%rsp)
+	pxor	%xmm12,%xmm12
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x50(%rsp)
+	pxor	%xmm13,%xmm13
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x60(%rsp)
+	pxor	%xmm14,%xmm14
+	pxor	%xmm15,%xmm15
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	movaps	-0xa0(%rbp),%xmm6
+	movaps	%xmm0,-0xa0(%rbp)		# clear stack
+	movaps	-0x90(%rbp),%xmm7
+	movaps	%xmm0,-0x90(%rbp)
+	movaps	-0x80(%rbp),%xmm8
+	movaps	%xmm0,-0x80(%rbp)
+	movaps	-0x70(%rbp),%xmm9
+	movaps	%xmm0,-0x70(%rbp)
+	movaps	-0x60(%rbp),%xmm10
+	movaps	%xmm0,-0x60(%rbp)
+	movaps	-0x50(%rbp),%xmm11
+	movaps	%xmm0,-0x50(%rbp)
+	movaps	-0x40(%rbp),%xmm12
+	movaps	%xmm0,-0x40(%rbp)
+	movaps	-0x30(%rbp),%xmm13
+	movaps	%xmm0,-0x30(%rbp)
+	movaps	-0x20(%rbp),%xmm14
+	movaps	%xmm0,-0x20(%rbp)
+	movaps	-0x10(%rbp),%xmm15
+	movaps	%xmm0,-0x10(%rbp)
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x00(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x10(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x20(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x30(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x40(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x50(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x60(%rsp)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	lea	(%rbp),%rsp
+	pop	%rbp
+.Lxts_enc_epilogue:
+	ret
+.size	aesni_xts_encrypt,.-aesni_xts_encrypt
+___
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	aesni_xts_decrypt
+.type	aesni_xts_decrypt,\@function,6
+.align	16
+aesni_xts_decrypt:
+	lea	(%rsp),%rax
+	push	%rbp
+	sub	\$$frame_size,%rsp
+	and	\$-16,%rsp	# Linux kernel stack can be incorrectly seeded
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	movaps	%xmm6,-0xa8(%rax)		# offload everything
+	movaps	%xmm7,-0x98(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm8,-0x88(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm9,-0x78(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm10,-0x68(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm11,-0x58(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm12,-0x48(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm13,-0x38(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm14,-0x28(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm15,-0x18(%rax)
+.Lxts_dec_body:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	lea	-8(%rax),%rbp
+	movups	($ivp),$inout0			# load clear-text tweak
+	mov	240($key2),$rounds		# key2->rounds
+	mov	240($key),$rnds_		# key1->rounds
+___
+	# generate the tweak
+	&aesni_generate1("enc",$key2,$rounds,$inout0);
+$code.=<<___;
+	xor	%eax,%eax			# if ($len%16) len-=16;
+	test	\$15,$len
+	setnz	%al
+	shl	\$4,%rax
+	sub	%rax,$len
+
+	$movkey	($key),$rndkey0			# zero round key
+	mov	$key,$key_			# backup $key
+	mov	$rnds_,$rounds			# backup $rounds
+	shl	\$4,$rnds_
+	mov	$len,$len_			# backup $len
+	and	\$-16,$len
+
+	$movkey	16($key,$rnds_),$rndkey1	# last round key
+
+	movdqa	.Lxts_magic(%rip),$twmask
+	movdqa	$inout0,@tweak[5]
+	pshufd	\$0x5f,$inout0,$twres
+	pxor	$rndkey0,$rndkey1
+___
+    for ($i=0;$i<4;$i++) {
+    $code.=<<___;
+	movdqa	$twres,$twtmp
+	paddd	$twres,$twres
+	movdqa	@tweak[5],@tweak[$i]
+	psrad	\$31,$twtmp			# broadcast upper bits
+	paddq	@tweak[5],@tweak[5]
+	pand	$twmask,$twtmp
+	pxor	$rndkey0,@tweak[$i]
+	pxor	$twtmp,@tweak[5]
+___
+    }
+$code.=<<___;
+	movdqa	@tweak[5],@tweak[4]
+	psrad	\$31,$twres
+	paddq	@tweak[5],@tweak[5]
+	pand	$twmask,$twres
+	pxor	$rndkey0,@tweak[4]
+	pxor	$twres,@tweak[5]
+	movaps	$rndkey1,0x60(%rsp)		# save round[0]^round[last]
+
+	sub	\$16*6,$len
+	jc	.Lxts_dec_short			# if $len-=6*16 borrowed
+
+	mov	\$16+96,$rounds
+	lea	32($key_,$rnds_),$key		# end of key schedule
+	sub	%r10,%rax			# twisted $rounds
+	$movkey	16($key_),$rndkey1
+	mov	%rax,%r10			# backup twisted $rounds
+	lea	.Lxts_magic(%rip),%r8
+	jmp	.Lxts_dec_grandloop
+
+.align	32
+.Lxts_dec_grandloop:
+	movdqu	`16*0`($inp),$inout0		# load input
+	movdqa	$rndkey0,$twmask
+	movdqu	`16*1`($inp),$inout1
+	pxor	@tweak[0],$inout0		# intput^=tweak^round[0]
+	movdqu	`16*2`($inp),$inout2
+	pxor	@tweak[1],$inout1
+	 aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout0
+	movdqu	`16*3`($inp),$inout3
+	pxor	@tweak[2],$inout2
+	 aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout1
+	movdqu	`16*4`($inp),$inout4
+	pxor	@tweak[3],$inout3
+	 aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout2
+	movdqu	`16*5`($inp),$inout5
+	pxor	@tweak[5],$twmask		# round[0]^=tweak[5]
+	 movdqa	0x60(%rsp),$twres		# load round[0]^round[last]
+	pxor	@tweak[4],$inout4
+	 aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout3
+	$movkey	32($key_),$rndkey0
+	lea	`16*6`($inp),$inp
+	pxor	$twmask,$inout5
+
+	 pxor	$twres,@tweak[0]		# calclulate tweaks^round[last]
+	aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout4
+	 pxor	$twres,@tweak[1]
+	 movdqa	@tweak[0],`16*0`(%rsp)		# put aside tweaks^last round key
+	aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout5
+	$movkey		48($key_),$rndkey1
+	 pxor	$twres,@tweak[2]
+
+	aesdec		$rndkey0,$inout0
+	 pxor	$twres,@tweak[3]
+	 movdqa	@tweak[1],`16*1`(%rsp)
+	aesdec		$rndkey0,$inout1
+	 pxor	$twres,@tweak[4]
+	 movdqa	@tweak[2],`16*2`(%rsp)
+	aesdec		$rndkey0,$inout2
+	aesdec		$rndkey0,$inout3
+	 pxor	$twres,$twmask
+	 movdqa	@tweak[4],`16*4`(%rsp)
+	aesdec		$rndkey0,$inout4
+	aesdec		$rndkey0,$inout5
+	$movkey		64($key_),$rndkey0
+	 movdqa	$twmask,`16*5`(%rsp)
+	pshufd	\$0x5f,@tweak[5],$twres
+	jmp	.Lxts_dec_loop6
+.align	32
+.Lxts_dec_loop6:
+	aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout0
+	aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout1
+	aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout2
+	aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout3
+	aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout4
+	aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout5
+	$movkey		-64($key,%rax),$rndkey1
+	add		\$32,%rax
+
+	aesdec		$rndkey0,$inout0
+	aesdec		$rndkey0,$inout1
+	aesdec		$rndkey0,$inout2
+	aesdec		$rndkey0,$inout3
+	aesdec		$rndkey0,$inout4
+	aesdec		$rndkey0,$inout5
+	$movkey		-80($key,%rax),$rndkey0
+	jnz		.Lxts_dec_loop6
+
+	movdqa	(%r8),$twmask			# start calculating next tweak
+	movdqa	$twres,$twtmp
+	paddd	$twres,$twres
+	 aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout0
+	paddq	@tweak[5],@tweak[5]
+	psrad	\$31,$twtmp
+	 aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout1
+	pand	$twmask,$twtmp
+	$movkey	($key_),@tweak[0]		# load round[0]
+	 aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout2
+	 aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout3
+	 aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout4
+	pxor	$twtmp,@tweak[5]
+	movaps	@tweak[0],@tweak[1]		# copy round[0]
+	 aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout5
+	 $movkey	-64($key),$rndkey1
+
+	movdqa	$twres,$twtmp
+	 aesdec		$rndkey0,$inout0
+	paddd	$twres,$twres
+	pxor	@tweak[5],@tweak[0]
+	 aesdec		$rndkey0,$inout1
+	psrad	\$31,$twtmp
+	paddq	@tweak[5],@tweak[5]
+	 aesdec		$rndkey0,$inout2
+	 aesdec		$rndkey0,$inout3
+	pand	$twmask,$twtmp
+	movaps	@tweak[1],@tweak[2]
+	 aesdec		$rndkey0,$inout4
+	pxor	$twtmp,@tweak[5]
+	movdqa	$twres,$twtmp
+	 aesdec		$rndkey0,$inout5
+	 $movkey	-48($key),$rndkey0
+
+	paddd	$twres,$twres
+	 aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout0
+	pxor	@tweak[5],@tweak[1]
+	psrad	\$31,$twtmp
+	 aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout1
+	paddq	@tweak[5],@tweak[5]
+	pand	$twmask,$twtmp
+	 aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout2
+	 aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout3
+	 movdqa	@tweak[3],`16*3`(%rsp)
+	pxor	$twtmp,@tweak[5]
+	 aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout4
+	movaps	@tweak[2],@tweak[3]
+	movdqa	$twres,$twtmp
+	 aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout5
+	 $movkey	-32($key),$rndkey1
+
+	paddd	$twres,$twres
+	 aesdec		$rndkey0,$inout0
+	pxor	@tweak[5],@tweak[2]
+	psrad	\$31,$twtmp
+	 aesdec		$rndkey0,$inout1
+	paddq	@tweak[5],@tweak[5]
+	pand	$twmask,$twtmp
+	 aesdec		$rndkey0,$inout2
+	 aesdec		$rndkey0,$inout3
+	 aesdec		$rndkey0,$inout4
+	pxor	$twtmp,@tweak[5]
+	movaps	@tweak[3],@tweak[4]
+	 aesdec		$rndkey0,$inout5
+
+	movdqa	$twres,$rndkey0
+	paddd	$twres,$twres
+	 aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout0
+	pxor	@tweak[5],@tweak[3]
+	psrad	\$31,$rndkey0
+	 aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout1
+	paddq	@tweak[5],@tweak[5]
+	pand	$twmask,$rndkey0
+	 aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout2
+	 aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout3
+	pxor	$rndkey0,@tweak[5]
+	$movkey		($key_),$rndkey0
+	 aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout4
+	 aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout5
+	$movkey		16($key_),$rndkey1
+
+	pxor	@tweak[5],@tweak[4]
+	 aesdeclast	`16*0`(%rsp),$inout0
+	psrad	\$31,$twres
+	paddq	@tweak[5],@tweak[5]
+	 aesdeclast	`16*1`(%rsp),$inout1
+	 aesdeclast	`16*2`(%rsp),$inout2
+	pand	$twmask,$twres
+	mov	%r10,%rax			# restore $rounds
+	 aesdeclast	`16*3`(%rsp),$inout3
+	 aesdeclast	`16*4`(%rsp),$inout4
+	 aesdeclast	`16*5`(%rsp),$inout5
+	pxor	$twres,@tweak[5]
+
+	lea	`16*6`($out),$out		# $out+=6*16
+	movups	$inout0,`-16*6`($out)		# store 6 output blocks
+	movups	$inout1,`-16*5`($out)
+	movups	$inout2,`-16*4`($out)
+	movups	$inout3,`-16*3`($out)
+	movups	$inout4,`-16*2`($out)
+	movups	$inout5,`-16*1`($out)
+	sub	\$16*6,$len
+	jnc	.Lxts_dec_grandloop		# loop if $len-=6*16 didn't borrow
+
+	mov	\$16+96,$rounds
+	sub	$rnds_,$rounds
+	mov	$key_,$key			# restore $key
+	shr	\$4,$rounds			# restore original value
+
+.Lxts_dec_short:
+	# at the point @tweak[0..5] are populated with tweak values
+	mov	$rounds,$rnds_			# backup $rounds
+	pxor	$rndkey0,@tweak[0]
+	pxor	$rndkey0,@tweak[1]
+	add	\$16*6,$len			# restore real remaining $len
+	jz	.Lxts_dec_done			# done if ($len==0)
+
+	pxor	$rndkey0,@tweak[2]
+	cmp	\$0x20,$len
+	jb	.Lxts_dec_one			# $len is 1*16
+	pxor	$rndkey0,@tweak[3]
+	je	.Lxts_dec_two			# $len is 2*16
+
+	pxor	$rndkey0,@tweak[4]
+	cmp	\$0x40,$len
+	jb	.Lxts_dec_three			# $len is 3*16
+	je	.Lxts_dec_four			# $len is 4*16
+
+	movdqu	($inp),$inout0			# $len is 5*16
+	movdqu	16*1($inp),$inout1
+	movdqu	16*2($inp),$inout2
+	pxor	@tweak[0],$inout0
+	movdqu	16*3($inp),$inout3
+	pxor	@tweak[1],$inout1
+	movdqu	16*4($inp),$inout4
+	lea	16*5($inp),$inp			# $inp+=5*16
+	pxor	@tweak[2],$inout2
+	pxor	@tweak[3],$inout3
+	pxor	@tweak[4],$inout4
+
+	call	_aesni_decrypt6
+
+	xorps	@tweak[0],$inout0
+	xorps	@tweak[1],$inout1
+	xorps	@tweak[2],$inout2
+	movdqu	$inout0,($out)			# store 5 output blocks
+	xorps	@tweak[3],$inout3
+	movdqu	$inout1,16*1($out)
+	xorps	@tweak[4],$inout4
+	movdqu	$inout2,16*2($out)
+	 pxor		$twtmp,$twtmp
+	movdqu	$inout3,16*3($out)
+	 pcmpgtd	@tweak[5],$twtmp
+	movdqu	$inout4,16*4($out)
+	lea	16*5($out),$out			# $out+=5*16
+	 pshufd		\$0x13,$twtmp,@tweak[1]	# $twres
+	and	\$15,$len_
+	jz	.Lxts_dec_ret
+
+	movdqa	@tweak[5],@tweak[0]
+	paddq	@tweak[5],@tweak[5]		# psllq 1,$tweak
+	pand	$twmask,@tweak[1]		# isolate carry and residue
+	pxor	@tweak[5],@tweak[1]
+	jmp	.Lxts_dec_done2
+
+.align	16
+.Lxts_dec_one:
+	movups	($inp),$inout0
+	lea	16*1($inp),$inp			# $inp+=1*16
+	xorps	@tweak[0],$inout0
+___
+	&aesni_generate1("dec",$key,$rounds);
+$code.=<<___;
+	xorps	@tweak[0],$inout0
+	movdqa	@tweak[1],@tweak[0]
+	movups	$inout0,($out)			# store one output block
+	movdqa	@tweak[2],@tweak[1]
+	lea	16*1($out),$out			# $out+=1*16
+	jmp	.Lxts_dec_done
+
+.align	16
+.Lxts_dec_two:
+	movups	($inp),$inout0
+	movups	16($inp),$inout1
+	lea	32($inp),$inp			# $inp+=2*16
+	xorps	@tweak[0],$inout0
+	xorps	@tweak[1],$inout1
+
+	call	_aesni_decrypt2
+
+	xorps	@tweak[0],$inout0
+	movdqa	@tweak[2],@tweak[0]
+	xorps	@tweak[1],$inout1
+	movdqa	@tweak[3],@tweak[1]
+	movups	$inout0,($out)			# store 2 output blocks
+	movups	$inout1,16*1($out)
+	lea	16*2($out),$out			# $out+=2*16
+	jmp	.Lxts_dec_done
+
+.align	16
+.Lxts_dec_three:
+	movups	($inp),$inout0
+	movups	16*1($inp),$inout1
+	movups	16*2($inp),$inout2
+	lea	16*3($inp),$inp			# $inp+=3*16
+	xorps	@tweak[0],$inout0
+	xorps	@tweak[1],$inout1
+	xorps	@tweak[2],$inout2
+
+	call	_aesni_decrypt3
+
+	xorps	@tweak[0],$inout0
+	movdqa	@tweak[3],@tweak[0]
+	xorps	@tweak[1],$inout1
+	movdqa	@tweak[4],@tweak[1]
+	xorps	@tweak[2],$inout2
+	movups	$inout0,($out)			# store 3 output blocks
+	movups	$inout1,16*1($out)
+	movups	$inout2,16*2($out)
+	lea	16*3($out),$out			# $out+=3*16
+	jmp	.Lxts_dec_done
+
+.align	16
+.Lxts_dec_four:
+	movups	($inp),$inout0
+	movups	16*1($inp),$inout1
+	movups	16*2($inp),$inout2
+	xorps	@tweak[0],$inout0
+	movups	16*3($inp),$inout3
+	lea	16*4($inp),$inp			# $inp+=4*16
+	xorps	@tweak[1],$inout1
+	xorps	@tweak[2],$inout2
+	xorps	@tweak[3],$inout3
+
+	call	_aesni_decrypt4
+
+	pxor	@tweak[0],$inout0
+	movdqa	@tweak[4],@tweak[0]
+	pxor	@tweak[1],$inout1
+	movdqa	@tweak[5],@tweak[1]
+	pxor	@tweak[2],$inout2
+	movdqu	$inout0,($out)			# store 4 output blocks
+	pxor	@tweak[3],$inout3
+	movdqu	$inout1,16*1($out)
+	movdqu	$inout2,16*2($out)
+	movdqu	$inout3,16*3($out)
+	lea	16*4($out),$out			# $out+=4*16
+	jmp	.Lxts_dec_done
+
+.align	16
+.Lxts_dec_done:
+	and	\$15,$len_			# see if $len%16 is 0
+	jz	.Lxts_dec_ret
+.Lxts_dec_done2:
+	mov	$len_,$len
+	mov	$key_,$key			# restore $key
+	mov	$rnds_,$rounds			# restore $rounds
+
+	movups	($inp),$inout0
+	xorps	@tweak[1],$inout0
+___
+	&aesni_generate1("dec",$key,$rounds);
+$code.=<<___;
+	xorps	@tweak[1],$inout0
+	movups	$inout0,($out)
+
+.Lxts_dec_steal:
+	movzb	16($inp),%eax			# borrow $rounds ...
+	movzb	($out),%ecx			# ... and $key
+	lea	1($inp),$inp
+	mov	%al,($out)
+	mov	%cl,16($out)
+	lea	1($out),$out
+	sub	\$1,$len
+	jnz	.Lxts_dec_steal
+
+	sub	$len_,$out			# rewind $out
+	mov	$key_,$key			# restore $key
+	mov	$rnds_,$rounds			# restore $rounds
+
+	movups	($out),$inout0
+	xorps	@tweak[0],$inout0
+___
+	&aesni_generate1("dec",$key,$rounds);
+$code.=<<___;
+	xorps	@tweak[0],$inout0
+	movups	$inout0,($out)
+
+.Lxts_dec_ret:
+	xorps	%xmm0,%xmm0			# clear register bank
+	pxor	%xmm1,%xmm1
+	pxor	%xmm2,%xmm2
+	pxor	%xmm3,%xmm3
+	pxor	%xmm4,%xmm4
+	pxor	%xmm5,%xmm5
+___
+$code.=<<___ if (!$win64);
+	pxor	%xmm6,%xmm6
+	pxor	%xmm7,%xmm7
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x00(%rsp)		# clear stack
+	pxor	%xmm8,%xmm8
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x10(%rsp)
+	pxor	%xmm9,%xmm9
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x20(%rsp)
+	pxor	%xmm10,%xmm10
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x30(%rsp)
+	pxor	%xmm11,%xmm11
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x40(%rsp)
+	pxor	%xmm12,%xmm12
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x50(%rsp)
+	pxor	%xmm13,%xmm13
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x60(%rsp)
+	pxor	%xmm14,%xmm14
+	pxor	%xmm15,%xmm15
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	movaps	-0xa0(%rbp),%xmm6
+	movaps	%xmm0,-0xa0(%rbp)		# clear stack
+	movaps	-0x90(%rbp),%xmm7
+	movaps	%xmm0,-0x90(%rbp)
+	movaps	-0x80(%rbp),%xmm8
+	movaps	%xmm0,-0x80(%rbp)
+	movaps	-0x70(%rbp),%xmm9
+	movaps	%xmm0,-0x70(%rbp)
+	movaps	-0x60(%rbp),%xmm10
+	movaps	%xmm0,-0x60(%rbp)
+	movaps	-0x50(%rbp),%xmm11
+	movaps	%xmm0,-0x50(%rbp)
+	movaps	-0x40(%rbp),%xmm12
+	movaps	%xmm0,-0x40(%rbp)
+	movaps	-0x30(%rbp),%xmm13
+	movaps	%xmm0,-0x30(%rbp)
+	movaps	-0x20(%rbp),%xmm14
+	movaps	%xmm0,-0x20(%rbp)
+	movaps	-0x10(%rbp),%xmm15
+	movaps	%xmm0,-0x10(%rbp)
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x00(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x10(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x20(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x30(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x40(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x50(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x60(%rsp)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	lea	(%rbp),%rsp
+	pop	%rbp
+.Lxts_dec_epilogue:
+	ret
+.size	aesni_xts_decrypt,.-aesni_xts_decrypt
+___
+}
+
+######################################################################
+# void aesni_ocb_[en|de]crypt(const char *inp, char *out, size_t blocks,
+#	const AES_KEY *key, unsigned int start_block_num,
+#	unsigned char offset_i[16], const unsigned char L_[][16],
+#	unsigned char checksum[16]);
+#
+{
+my @offset=map("%xmm$_",(10..15));
+my ($checksum,$rndkey0l)=("%xmm8","%xmm9");
+my ($block_num,$offset_p)=("%r8","%r9");		# 5th and 6th arguments
+my ($L_p,$checksum_p) = ("%rbx","%rbp");
+my ($i1,$i3,$i5) = ("%r12","%r13","%r14");
+my $seventh_arg = $win64 ? 56 : 8;
+my $blocks = $len;
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	aesni_ocb_encrypt
+.type	aesni_ocb_encrypt,\@function,6
+.align	32
+aesni_ocb_encrypt:
+	lea	(%rsp),%rax
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	lea	-0xa0(%rsp),%rsp
+	movaps	%xmm6,0x00(%rsp)		# offload everything
+	movaps	%xmm7,0x10(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm8,0x20(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm9,0x30(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm10,0x40(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm11,0x50(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm12,0x60(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm13,0x70(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm14,0x80(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm15,0x90(%rsp)
+.Locb_enc_body:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	$seventh_arg(%rax),$L_p		# 7th argument
+	mov	$seventh_arg+8(%rax),$checksum_p# 8th argument
+
+	mov	240($key),$rnds_
+	mov	$key,$key_
+	shl	\$4,$rnds_
+	$movkey	($key),$rndkey0l		# round[0]
+	$movkey	16($key,$rnds_),$rndkey1	# round[last]
+
+	movdqu	($offset_p),@offset[5]		# load last offset_i
+	pxor	$rndkey1,$rndkey0l		# round[0] ^ round[last]
+	pxor	$rndkey1,@offset[5]		# offset_i ^ round[last]
+
+	mov	\$16+32,$rounds
+	lea	32($key_,$rnds_),$key
+	$movkey	16($key_),$rndkey1		# round[1]
+	sub	%r10,%rax			# twisted $rounds
+	mov	%rax,%r10			# backup twisted $rounds
+
+	movdqu	($L_p),@offset[0]		# L_0 for all odd-numbered blocks
+	movdqu	($checksum_p),$checksum		# load checksum
+
+	test	\$1,$block_num			# is first block number odd?
+	jnz	.Locb_enc_odd
+
+	bsf	$block_num,$i1
+	add	\$1,$block_num
+	shl	\$4,$i1
+	movdqu	($L_p,$i1),$inout5		# borrow
+	movdqu	($inp),$inout0
+	lea	16($inp),$inp
+
+	call	__ocb_encrypt1
+
+	movdqa	$inout5,@offset[5]
+	movups	$inout0,($out)
+	lea	16($out),$out
+	sub	\$1,$blocks
+	jz	.Locb_enc_done
+
+.Locb_enc_odd:
+	lea	1($block_num),$i1		# even-numbered blocks
+	lea	3($block_num),$i3
+	lea	5($block_num),$i5
+	lea	6($block_num),$block_num
+	bsf	$i1,$i1				# ntz(block)
+	bsf	$i3,$i3
+	bsf	$i5,$i5
+	shl	\$4,$i1				# ntz(block) -> table offset
+	shl	\$4,$i3
+	shl	\$4,$i5
+
+	sub	\$6,$blocks
+	jc	.Locb_enc_short
+	jmp	.Locb_enc_grandloop
+
+.align	32
+.Locb_enc_grandloop:
+	movdqu	`16*0`($inp),$inout0		# load input
+	movdqu	`16*1`($inp),$inout1
+	movdqu	`16*2`($inp),$inout2
+	movdqu	`16*3`($inp),$inout3
+	movdqu	`16*4`($inp),$inout4
+	movdqu	`16*5`($inp),$inout5
+	lea	`16*6`($inp),$inp
+
+	call	__ocb_encrypt6
+
+	movups	$inout0,`16*0`($out)		# store output
+	movups	$inout1,`16*1`($out)
+	movups	$inout2,`16*2`($out)
+	movups	$inout3,`16*3`($out)
+	movups	$inout4,`16*4`($out)
+	movups	$inout5,`16*5`($out)
+	lea	`16*6`($out),$out
+	sub	\$6,$blocks
+	jnc	.Locb_enc_grandloop
+
+.Locb_enc_short:
+	add	\$6,$blocks
+	jz	.Locb_enc_done
+
+	movdqu	`16*0`($inp),$inout0
+	cmp	\$2,$blocks
+	jb	.Locb_enc_one
+	movdqu	`16*1`($inp),$inout1
+	je	.Locb_enc_two
+
+	movdqu	`16*2`($inp),$inout2
+	cmp	\$4,$blocks
+	jb	.Locb_enc_three
+	movdqu	`16*3`($inp),$inout3
+	je	.Locb_enc_four
+
+	movdqu	`16*4`($inp),$inout4
+	pxor	$inout5,$inout5
+
+	call	__ocb_encrypt6
+
+	movdqa	@offset[4],@offset[5]
+	movups	$inout0,`16*0`($out)
+	movups	$inout1,`16*1`($out)
+	movups	$inout2,`16*2`($out)
+	movups	$inout3,`16*3`($out)
+	movups	$inout4,`16*4`($out)
+
+	jmp	.Locb_enc_done
+
+.align	16
+.Locb_enc_one:
+	movdqa	@offset[0],$inout5		# borrow
+
+	call	__ocb_encrypt1
+
+	movdqa	$inout5,@offset[5]
+	movups	$inout0,`16*0`($out)
+	jmp	.Locb_enc_done
+
+.align	16
+.Locb_enc_two:
+	pxor	$inout2,$inout2
+	pxor	$inout3,$inout3
+
+	call	__ocb_encrypt4
+
+	movdqa	@offset[1],@offset[5]
+	movups	$inout0,`16*0`($out)
+	movups	$inout1,`16*1`($out)
+
+	jmp	.Locb_enc_done
+
+.align	16
+.Locb_enc_three:
+	pxor	$inout3,$inout3
+
+	call	__ocb_encrypt4
+
+	movdqa	@offset[2],@offset[5]
+	movups	$inout0,`16*0`($out)
+	movups	$inout1,`16*1`($out)
+	movups	$inout2,`16*2`($out)
+
+	jmp	.Locb_enc_done
+
+.align	16
+.Locb_enc_four:
+	call	__ocb_encrypt4
+
+	movdqa	@offset[3],@offset[5]
+	movups	$inout0,`16*0`($out)
+	movups	$inout1,`16*1`($out)
+	movups	$inout2,`16*2`($out)
+	movups	$inout3,`16*3`($out)
+
+.Locb_enc_done:
+	pxor	$rndkey0,@offset[5]		# "remove" round[last]
+	movdqu	$checksum,($checksum_p)		# store checksum
+	movdqu	@offset[5],($offset_p)		# store last offset_i
+
+	xorps	%xmm0,%xmm0			# clear register bank
+	pxor	%xmm1,%xmm1
+	pxor	%xmm2,%xmm2
+	pxor	%xmm3,%xmm3
+	pxor	%xmm4,%xmm4
+	pxor	%xmm5,%xmm5
+___
+$code.=<<___ if (!$win64);
+	pxor	%xmm6,%xmm6
+	pxor	%xmm7,%xmm7
+	pxor	%xmm8,%xmm8
+	pxor	%xmm9,%xmm9
+	pxor	%xmm10,%xmm10
+	pxor	%xmm11,%xmm11
+	pxor	%xmm12,%xmm12
+	pxor	%xmm13,%xmm13
+	pxor	%xmm14,%xmm14
+	pxor	%xmm15,%xmm15
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	movaps	0x00(%rsp),%xmm6
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x00(%rsp)		# clear stack
+	movaps	0x10(%rsp),%xmm7
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x10(%rsp)
+	movaps	0x20(%rsp),%xmm8
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x20(%rsp)
+	movaps	0x30(%rsp),%xmm9
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x30(%rsp)
+	movaps	0x40(%rsp),%xmm10
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x40(%rsp)
+	movaps	0x50(%rsp),%xmm11
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x50(%rsp)
+	movaps	0x60(%rsp),%xmm12
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x60(%rsp)
+	movaps	0x70(%rsp),%xmm13
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x70(%rsp)
+	movaps	0x80(%rsp),%xmm14
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x80(%rsp)
+	movaps	0x90(%rsp),%xmm15
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x90(%rsp)
+	lea	0xa0+0x28(%rsp),%rax
+.Locb_enc_pop:
+	lea	0xa0(%rsp),%rsp
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	pop	%r14
+	pop	%r13
+	pop	%r12
+	pop	%rbp
+	pop	%rbx
+.Locb_enc_epilogue:
+	ret
+.size	aesni_ocb_encrypt,.-aesni_ocb_encrypt
+
+.type	__ocb_encrypt6,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	32
+__ocb_encrypt6:
+	 pxor		$rndkey0l,@offset[5]	# offset_i ^ round[0]
+	 movdqu		($L_p,$i1),@offset[1]
+	 movdqa		@offset[0],@offset[2]
+	 movdqu		($L_p,$i3),@offset[3]
+	 movdqa		@offset[0],@offset[4]
+	 pxor		@offset[5],@offset[0]
+	 movdqu		($L_p,$i5),@offset[5]
+	 pxor		@offset[0],@offset[1]
+	pxor		$inout0,$checksum	# accumulate checksum
+	pxor		@offset[0],$inout0	# input ^ round[0] ^ offset_i
+	 pxor		@offset[1],@offset[2]
+	pxor		$inout1,$checksum
+	pxor		@offset[1],$inout1
+	 pxor		@offset[2],@offset[3]
+	pxor		$inout2,$checksum
+	pxor		@offset[2],$inout2
+	 pxor		@offset[3],@offset[4]
+	pxor		$inout3,$checksum
+	pxor		@offset[3],$inout3
+	 pxor		@offset[4],@offset[5]
+	pxor		$inout4,$checksum
+	pxor		@offset[4],$inout4
+	pxor		$inout5,$checksum
+	pxor		@offset[5],$inout5
+	$movkey		32($key_),$rndkey0
+
+	lea		1($block_num),$i1	# even-numbered blocks
+	lea		3($block_num),$i3
+	lea		5($block_num),$i5
+	add		\$6,$block_num
+	 pxor		$rndkey0l,@offset[0]	# offset_i ^ round[last]
+	bsf		$i1,$i1			# ntz(block)
+	bsf		$i3,$i3
+	bsf		$i5,$i5
+
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout0
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout1
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout2
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout3
+	 pxor		$rndkey0l,@offset[1]
+	 pxor		$rndkey0l,@offset[2]
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout4
+	 pxor		$rndkey0l,@offset[3]
+	 pxor		$rndkey0l,@offset[4]
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout5
+	$movkey		48($key_),$rndkey1
+	 pxor		$rndkey0l,@offset[5]
+
+	aesenc		$rndkey0,$inout0
+	aesenc		$rndkey0,$inout1
+	aesenc		$rndkey0,$inout2
+	aesenc		$rndkey0,$inout3
+	aesenc		$rndkey0,$inout4
+	aesenc		$rndkey0,$inout5
+	$movkey		64($key_),$rndkey0
+	shl		\$4,$i1			# ntz(block) -> table offset
+	shl		\$4,$i3
+	jmp		.Locb_enc_loop6
+
+.align	32
+.Locb_enc_loop6:
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout0
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout1
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout2
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout3
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout4
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout5
+	$movkey		($key,%rax),$rndkey1
+	add		\$32,%rax
+
+	aesenc		$rndkey0,$inout0
+	aesenc		$rndkey0,$inout1
+	aesenc		$rndkey0,$inout2
+	aesenc		$rndkey0,$inout3
+	aesenc		$rndkey0,$inout4
+	aesenc		$rndkey0,$inout5
+	$movkey		-16($key,%rax),$rndkey0
+	jnz		.Locb_enc_loop6
+
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout0
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout1
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout2
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout3
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout4
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout5
+	$movkey		16($key_),$rndkey1
+	shl		\$4,$i5
+
+	aesenclast	@offset[0],$inout0
+	movdqu		($L_p),@offset[0]	# L_0 for all odd-numbered blocks
+	mov		%r10,%rax		# restore twisted rounds
+	aesenclast	@offset[1],$inout1
+	aesenclast	@offset[2],$inout2
+	aesenclast	@offset[3],$inout3
+	aesenclast	@offset[4],$inout4
+	aesenclast	@offset[5],$inout5
+	ret
+.size	__ocb_encrypt6,.-__ocb_encrypt6
+
+.type	__ocb_encrypt4,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	32
+__ocb_encrypt4:
+	 pxor		$rndkey0l,@offset[5]	# offset_i ^ round[0]
+	 movdqu		($L_p,$i1),@offset[1]
+	 movdqa		@offset[0],@offset[2]
+	 movdqu		($L_p,$i3),@offset[3]
+	 pxor		@offset[5],@offset[0]
+	 pxor		@offset[0],@offset[1]
+	pxor		$inout0,$checksum	# accumulate checksum
+	pxor		@offset[0],$inout0	# input ^ round[0] ^ offset_i
+	 pxor		@offset[1],@offset[2]
+	pxor		$inout1,$checksum
+	pxor		@offset[1],$inout1
+	 pxor		@offset[2],@offset[3]
+	pxor		$inout2,$checksum
+	pxor		@offset[2],$inout2
+	pxor		$inout3,$checksum
+	pxor		@offset[3],$inout3
+	$movkey		32($key_),$rndkey0
+
+	 pxor		$rndkey0l,@offset[0]	# offset_i ^ round[last]
+	 pxor		$rndkey0l,@offset[1]
+	 pxor		$rndkey0l,@offset[2]
+	 pxor		$rndkey0l,@offset[3]
+
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout0
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout1
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout2
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout3
+	$movkey		48($key_),$rndkey1
+
+	aesenc		$rndkey0,$inout0
+	aesenc		$rndkey0,$inout1
+	aesenc		$rndkey0,$inout2
+	aesenc		$rndkey0,$inout3
+	$movkey		64($key_),$rndkey0
+	jmp		.Locb_enc_loop4
+
+.align	32
+.Locb_enc_loop4:
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout0
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout1
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout2
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout3
+	$movkey		($key,%rax),$rndkey1
+	add		\$32,%rax
+
+	aesenc		$rndkey0,$inout0
+	aesenc		$rndkey0,$inout1
+	aesenc		$rndkey0,$inout2
+	aesenc		$rndkey0,$inout3
+	$movkey		-16($key,%rax),$rndkey0
+	jnz		.Locb_enc_loop4
+
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout0
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout1
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout2
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout3
+	$movkey		16($key_),$rndkey1
+	mov		%r10,%rax		# restore twisted rounds
+
+	aesenclast	@offset[0],$inout0
+	aesenclast	@offset[1],$inout1
+	aesenclast	@offset[2],$inout2
+	aesenclast	@offset[3],$inout3
+	ret
+.size	__ocb_encrypt4,.-__ocb_encrypt4
+
+.type	__ocb_encrypt1,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	32
+__ocb_encrypt1:
+	 pxor		@offset[5],$inout5	# offset_i
+	 pxor		$rndkey0l,$inout5	# offset_i ^ round[0]
+	pxor		$inout0,$checksum	# accumulate checksum
+	pxor		$inout5,$inout0		# input ^ round[0] ^ offset_i
+	$movkey		32($key_),$rndkey0
+
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout0
+	$movkey		48($key_),$rndkey1
+	pxor		$rndkey0l,$inout5	# offset_i ^ round[last]
+
+	aesenc		$rndkey0,$inout0
+	$movkey		64($key_),$rndkey0
+	jmp		.Locb_enc_loop1
+
+.align	32
+.Locb_enc_loop1:
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout0
+	$movkey		($key,%rax),$rndkey1
+	add		\$32,%rax
+
+	aesenc		$rndkey0,$inout0
+	$movkey		-16($key,%rax),$rndkey0
+	jnz		.Locb_enc_loop1
+
+	aesenc		$rndkey1,$inout0
+	$movkey		16($key_),$rndkey1	# redundant in tail
+	mov		%r10,%rax		# restore twisted rounds
+
+	aesenclast	$inout5,$inout0
+	ret
+.size	__ocb_encrypt1,.-__ocb_encrypt1
+
+.globl	aesni_ocb_decrypt
+.type	aesni_ocb_decrypt,\@function,6
+.align	32
+aesni_ocb_decrypt:
+	lea	(%rsp),%rax
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	lea	-0xa0(%rsp),%rsp
+	movaps	%xmm6,0x00(%rsp)		# offload everything
+	movaps	%xmm7,0x10(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm8,0x20(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm9,0x30(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm10,0x40(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm11,0x50(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm12,0x60(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm13,0x70(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm14,0x80(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm15,0x90(%rsp)
+.Locb_dec_body:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	$seventh_arg(%rax),$L_p		# 7th argument
+	mov	$seventh_arg+8(%rax),$checksum_p# 8th argument
+
+	mov	240($key),$rnds_
+	mov	$key,$key_
+	shl	\$4,$rnds_
+	$movkey	($key),$rndkey0l		# round[0]
+	$movkey	16($key,$rnds_),$rndkey1	# round[last]
+
+	movdqu	($offset_p),@offset[5]		# load last offset_i
+	pxor	$rndkey1,$rndkey0l		# round[0] ^ round[last]
+	pxor	$rndkey1,@offset[5]		# offset_i ^ round[last]
+
+	mov	\$16+32,$rounds
+	lea	32($key_,$rnds_),$key
+	$movkey	16($key_),$rndkey1		# round[1]
+	sub	%r10,%rax			# twisted $rounds
+	mov	%rax,%r10			# backup twisted $rounds
+
+	movdqu	($L_p),@offset[0]		# L_0 for all odd-numbered blocks
+	movdqu	($checksum_p),$checksum		# load checksum
+
+	test	\$1,$block_num			# is first block number odd?
+	jnz	.Locb_dec_odd
+
+	bsf	$block_num,$i1
+	add	\$1,$block_num
+	shl	\$4,$i1
+	movdqu	($L_p,$i1),$inout5		# borrow
+	movdqu	($inp),$inout0
+	lea	16($inp),$inp
+
+	call	__ocb_decrypt1
+
+	movdqa	$inout5,@offset[5]
+	movups	$inout0,($out)
+	xorps	$inout0,$checksum		# accumulate checksum
+	lea	16($out),$out
+	sub	\$1,$blocks
+	jz	.Locb_dec_done
+
+.Locb_dec_odd:
+	lea	1($block_num),$i1		# even-numbered blocks
+	lea	3($block_num),$i3
+	lea	5($block_num),$i5
+	lea	6($block_num),$block_num
+	bsf	$i1,$i1				# ntz(block)
+	bsf	$i3,$i3
+	bsf	$i5,$i5
+	shl	\$4,$i1				# ntz(block) -> table offset
+	shl	\$4,$i3
+	shl	\$4,$i5
+
+	sub	\$6,$blocks
+	jc	.Locb_dec_short
+	jmp	.Locb_dec_grandloop
+
+.align	32
+.Locb_dec_grandloop:
+	movdqu	`16*0`($inp),$inout0		# load input
+	movdqu	`16*1`($inp),$inout1
+	movdqu	`16*2`($inp),$inout2
+	movdqu	`16*3`($inp),$inout3
+	movdqu	`16*4`($inp),$inout4
+	movdqu	`16*5`($inp),$inout5
+	lea	`16*6`($inp),$inp
+
+	call	__ocb_decrypt6
+
+	movups	$inout0,`16*0`($out)		# store output
+	pxor	$inout0,$checksum		# accumulate checksum
+	movups	$inout1,`16*1`($out)
+	pxor	$inout1,$checksum
+	movups	$inout2,`16*2`($out)
+	pxor	$inout2,$checksum
+	movups	$inout3,`16*3`($out)
+	pxor	$inout3,$checksum
+	movups	$inout4,`16*4`($out)
+	pxor	$inout4,$checksum
+	movups	$inout5,`16*5`($out)
+	pxor	$inout5,$checksum
+	lea	`16*6`($out),$out
+	sub	\$6,$blocks
+	jnc	.Locb_dec_grandloop
+
+.Locb_dec_short:
+	add	\$6,$blocks
+	jz	.Locb_dec_done
+
+	movdqu	`16*0`($inp),$inout0
+	cmp	\$2,$blocks
+	jb	.Locb_dec_one
+	movdqu	`16*1`($inp),$inout1
+	je	.Locb_dec_two
+
+	movdqu	`16*2`($inp),$inout2
+	cmp	\$4,$blocks
+	jb	.Locb_dec_three
+	movdqu	`16*3`($inp),$inout3
+	je	.Locb_dec_four
+
+	movdqu	`16*4`($inp),$inout4
+	pxor	$inout5,$inout5
+
+	call	__ocb_decrypt6
+
+	movdqa	@offset[4],@offset[5]
+	movups	$inout0,`16*0`($out)		# store output
+	pxor	$inout0,$checksum		# accumulate checksum
+	movups	$inout1,`16*1`($out)
+	pxor	$inout1,$checksum
+	movups	$inout2,`16*2`($out)
+	pxor	$inout2,$checksum
+	movups	$inout3,`16*3`($out)
+	pxor	$inout3,$checksum
+	movups	$inout4,`16*4`($out)
+	pxor	$inout4,$checksum
+
+	jmp	.Locb_dec_done
+
+.align	16
+.Locb_dec_one:
+	movdqa	@offset[0],$inout5		# borrow
+
+	call	__ocb_decrypt1
+
+	movdqa	$inout5,@offset[5]
+	movups	$inout0,`16*0`($out)		# store output
+	xorps	$inout0,$checksum		# accumulate checksum
+	jmp	.Locb_dec_done
+
+.align	16
+.Locb_dec_two:
+	pxor	$inout2,$inout2
+	pxor	$inout3,$inout3
+
+	call	__ocb_decrypt4
+
+	movdqa	@offset[1],@offset[5]
+	movups	$inout0,`16*0`($out)		# store output
+	xorps	$inout0,$checksum		# accumulate checksum
+	movups	$inout1,`16*1`($out)
+	xorps	$inout1,$checksum
+
+	jmp	.Locb_dec_done
+
+.align	16
+.Locb_dec_three:
+	pxor	$inout3,$inout3
+
+	call	__ocb_decrypt4
+
+	movdqa	@offset[2],@offset[5]
+	movups	$inout0,`16*0`($out)		# store output
+	xorps	$inout0,$checksum		# accumulate checksum
+	movups	$inout1,`16*1`($out)
+	xorps	$inout1,$checksum
+	movups	$inout2,`16*2`($out)
+	xorps	$inout2,$checksum
+
+	jmp	.Locb_dec_done
+
+.align	16
+.Locb_dec_four:
+	call	__ocb_decrypt4
+
+	movdqa	@offset[3],@offset[5]
+	movups	$inout0,`16*0`($out)		# store output
+	pxor	$inout0,$checksum		# accumulate checksum
+	movups	$inout1,`16*1`($out)
+	pxor	$inout1,$checksum
+	movups	$inout2,`16*2`($out)
+	pxor	$inout2,$checksum
+	movups	$inout3,`16*3`($out)
+	pxor	$inout3,$checksum
+
+.Locb_dec_done:
+	pxor	$rndkey0,@offset[5]		# "remove" round[last]
+	movdqu	$checksum,($checksum_p)		# store checksum
+	movdqu	@offset[5],($offset_p)		# store last offset_i
+
+	xorps	%xmm0,%xmm0			# clear register bank
+	pxor	%xmm1,%xmm1
+	pxor	%xmm2,%xmm2
+	pxor	%xmm3,%xmm3
+	pxor	%xmm4,%xmm4
+	pxor	%xmm5,%xmm5
+___
+$code.=<<___ if (!$win64);
+	pxor	%xmm6,%xmm6
+	pxor	%xmm7,%xmm7
+	pxor	%xmm8,%xmm8
+	pxor	%xmm9,%xmm9
+	pxor	%xmm10,%xmm10
+	pxor	%xmm11,%xmm11
+	pxor	%xmm12,%xmm12
+	pxor	%xmm13,%xmm13
+	pxor	%xmm14,%xmm14
+	pxor	%xmm15,%xmm15
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	movaps	0x00(%rsp),%xmm6
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x00(%rsp)		# clear stack
+	movaps	0x10(%rsp),%xmm7
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x10(%rsp)
+	movaps	0x20(%rsp),%xmm8
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x20(%rsp)
+	movaps	0x30(%rsp),%xmm9
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x30(%rsp)
+	movaps	0x40(%rsp),%xmm10
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x40(%rsp)
+	movaps	0x50(%rsp),%xmm11
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x50(%rsp)
+	movaps	0x60(%rsp),%xmm12
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x60(%rsp)
+	movaps	0x70(%rsp),%xmm13
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x70(%rsp)
+	movaps	0x80(%rsp),%xmm14
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x80(%rsp)
+	movaps	0x90(%rsp),%xmm15
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x90(%rsp)
+	lea	0xa0+0x28(%rsp),%rax
+.Locb_dec_pop:
+	lea	0xa0(%rsp),%rsp
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	pop	%r14
+	pop	%r13
+	pop	%r12
+	pop	%rbp
+	pop	%rbx
+.Locb_dec_epilogue:
+	ret
+.size	aesni_ocb_decrypt,.-aesni_ocb_decrypt
+
+.type	__ocb_decrypt6,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	32
+__ocb_decrypt6:
+	 pxor		$rndkey0l,@offset[5]	# offset_i ^ round[0]
+	 movdqu		($L_p,$i1),@offset[1]
+	 movdqa		@offset[0],@offset[2]
+	 movdqu		($L_p,$i3),@offset[3]
+	 movdqa		@offset[0],@offset[4]
+	 pxor		@offset[5],@offset[0]
+	 movdqu		($L_p,$i5),@offset[5]
+	 pxor		@offset[0],@offset[1]
+	pxor		@offset[0],$inout0	# input ^ round[0] ^ offset_i
+	 pxor		@offset[1],@offset[2]
+	pxor		@offset[1],$inout1
+	 pxor		@offset[2],@offset[3]
+	pxor		@offset[2],$inout2
+	 pxor		@offset[3],@offset[4]
+	pxor		@offset[3],$inout3
+	 pxor		@offset[4],@offset[5]
+	pxor		@offset[4],$inout4
+	pxor		@offset[5],$inout5
+	$movkey		32($key_),$rndkey0
+
+	lea		1($block_num),$i1	# even-numbered blocks
+	lea		3($block_num),$i3
+	lea		5($block_num),$i5
+	add		\$6,$block_num
+	 pxor		$rndkey0l,@offset[0]	# offset_i ^ round[last]
+	bsf		$i1,$i1			# ntz(block)
+	bsf		$i3,$i3
+	bsf		$i5,$i5
+
+	aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout0
+	aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout1
+	aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout2
+	aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout3
+	 pxor		$rndkey0l,@offset[1]
+	 pxor		$rndkey0l,@offset[2]
+	aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout4
+	 pxor		$rndkey0l,@offset[3]
+	 pxor		$rndkey0l,@offset[4]
+	aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout5
+	$movkey		48($key_),$rndkey1
+	 pxor		$rndkey0l,@offset[5]
+
+	aesdec		$rndkey0,$inout0
+	aesdec		$rndkey0,$inout1
+	aesdec		$rndkey0,$inout2
+	aesdec		$rndkey0,$inout3
+	aesdec		$rndkey0,$inout4
+	aesdec		$rndkey0,$inout5
+	$movkey		64($key_),$rndkey0
+	shl		\$4,$i1			# ntz(block) -> table offset
+	shl		\$4,$i3
+	jmp		.Locb_dec_loop6
+
+.align	32
+.Locb_dec_loop6:
+	aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout0
+	aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout1
+	aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout2
+	aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout3
+	aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout4
+	aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout5
+	$movkey		($key,%rax),$rndkey1
+	add		\$32,%rax
+
+	aesdec		$rndkey0,$inout0
+	aesdec		$rndkey0,$inout1
+	aesdec		$rndkey0,$inout2
+	aesdec		$rndkey0,$inout3
+	aesdec		$rndkey0,$inout4
+	aesdec		$rndkey0,$inout5
+	$movkey		-16($key,%rax),$rndkey0
+	jnz		.Locb_dec_loop6
+
+	aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout0
+	aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout1
+	aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout2
+	aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout3
+	aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout4
+	aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout5
+	$movkey		16($key_),$rndkey1
+	shl		\$4,$i5
+
+	aesdeclast	@offset[0],$inout0
+	movdqu		($L_p),@offset[0]	# L_0 for all odd-numbered blocks
+	mov		%r10,%rax		# restore twisted rounds
+	aesdeclast	@offset[1],$inout1
+	aesdeclast	@offset[2],$inout2
+	aesdeclast	@offset[3],$inout3
+	aesdeclast	@offset[4],$inout4
+	aesdeclast	@offset[5],$inout5
+	ret
+.size	__ocb_decrypt6,.-__ocb_decrypt6
+
+.type	__ocb_decrypt4,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	32
+__ocb_decrypt4:
+	 pxor		$rndkey0l,@offset[5]	# offset_i ^ round[0]
+	 movdqu		($L_p,$i1),@offset[1]
+	 movdqa		@offset[0],@offset[2]
+	 movdqu		($L_p,$i3),@offset[3]
+	 pxor		@offset[5],@offset[0]
+	 pxor		@offset[0],@offset[1]
+	pxor		@offset[0],$inout0	# input ^ round[0] ^ offset_i
+	 pxor		@offset[1],@offset[2]
+	pxor		@offset[1],$inout1
+	 pxor		@offset[2],@offset[3]
+	pxor		@offset[2],$inout2
+	pxor		@offset[3],$inout3
+	$movkey		32($key_),$rndkey0
+
+	 pxor		$rndkey0l,@offset[0]	# offset_i ^ round[last]
+	 pxor		$rndkey0l,@offset[1]
+	 pxor		$rndkey0l,@offset[2]
+	 pxor		$rndkey0l,@offset[3]
+
+	aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout0
+	aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout1
+	aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout2
+	aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout3
+	$movkey		48($key_),$rndkey1
+
+	aesdec		$rndkey0,$inout0
+	aesdec		$rndkey0,$inout1
+	aesdec		$rndkey0,$inout2
+	aesdec		$rndkey0,$inout3
+	$movkey		64($key_),$rndkey0
+	jmp		.Locb_dec_loop4
+
+.align	32
+.Locb_dec_loop4:
+	aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout0
+	aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout1
+	aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout2
+	aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout3
+	$movkey		($key,%rax),$rndkey1
+	add		\$32,%rax
+
+	aesdec		$rndkey0,$inout0
+	aesdec		$rndkey0,$inout1
+	aesdec		$rndkey0,$inout2
+	aesdec		$rndkey0,$inout3
+	$movkey		-16($key,%rax),$rndkey0
+	jnz		.Locb_dec_loop4
+
+	aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout0
+	aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout1
+	aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout2
+	aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout3
+	$movkey		16($key_),$rndkey1
+	mov		%r10,%rax		# restore twisted rounds
+
+	aesdeclast	@offset[0],$inout0
+	aesdeclast	@offset[1],$inout1
+	aesdeclast	@offset[2],$inout2
+	aesdeclast	@offset[3],$inout3
+	ret
+.size	__ocb_decrypt4,.-__ocb_decrypt4
+
+.type	__ocb_decrypt1,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	32
+__ocb_decrypt1:
+	 pxor		@offset[5],$inout5	# offset_i
+	 pxor		$rndkey0l,$inout5	# offset_i ^ round[0]
+	pxor		$inout5,$inout0		# input ^ round[0] ^ offset_i
+	$movkey		32($key_),$rndkey0
+
+	aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout0
+	$movkey		48($key_),$rndkey1
+	pxor		$rndkey0l,$inout5	# offset_i ^ round[last]
+
+	aesdec		$rndkey0,$inout0
+	$movkey		64($key_),$rndkey0
+	jmp		.Locb_dec_loop1
+
+.align	32
+.Locb_dec_loop1:
+	aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout0
+	$movkey		($key,%rax),$rndkey1
+	add		\$32,%rax
+
+	aesdec		$rndkey0,$inout0
+	$movkey		-16($key,%rax),$rndkey0
+	jnz		.Locb_dec_loop1
+
+	aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout0
+	$movkey		16($key_),$rndkey1	# redundant in tail
+	mov		%r10,%rax		# restore twisted rounds
+
+	aesdeclast	$inout5,$inout0
+	ret
+.size	__ocb_decrypt1,.-__ocb_decrypt1
+___
+} }}
+
+########################################################################
+# void $PREFIX_cbc_encrypt (const void *inp, void *out,
+#			    size_t length, const AES_KEY *key,
+#			    unsigned char *ivp,const int enc);
+{
+my $frame_size = 0x10 + ($win64?0xa0:0);	# used in decrypt
+my ($iv,$in0,$in1,$in2,$in3,$in4)=map("%xmm$_",(10..15));
+my $inp_=$key_;
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	${PREFIX}_cbc_encrypt
+.type	${PREFIX}_cbc_encrypt,\@function,6
+.align	16
+${PREFIX}_cbc_encrypt:
+	test	$len,$len		# check length
+	jz	.Lcbc_ret
+
+	mov	240($key),$rnds_	# key->rounds
+	mov	$key,$key_		# backup $key
+	test	%r9d,%r9d		# 6th argument
+	jz	.Lcbc_decrypt
+#--------------------------- CBC ENCRYPT ------------------------------#
+	movups	($ivp),$inout0		# load iv as initial state
+	mov	$rnds_,$rounds
+	cmp	\$16,$len
+	jb	.Lcbc_enc_tail
+	sub	\$16,$len
+	jmp	.Lcbc_enc_loop
+.align	16
+.Lcbc_enc_loop:
+	movups	($inp),$inout1		# load input
+	lea	16($inp),$inp
+	#xorps	$inout1,$inout0
+___
+	&aesni_generate1("enc",$key,$rounds,$inout0,$inout1);
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	$rnds_,$rounds		# restore $rounds
+	mov	$key_,$key		# restore $key
+	movups	$inout0,0($out)		# store output
+	lea	16($out),$out
+	sub	\$16,$len
+	jnc	.Lcbc_enc_loop
+	add	\$16,$len
+	jnz	.Lcbc_enc_tail
+	 pxor	$rndkey0,$rndkey0	# clear register bank
+	 pxor	$rndkey1,$rndkey1
+	movups	$inout0,($ivp)
+	 pxor	$inout0,$inout0
+	 pxor	$inout1,$inout1
+	jmp	.Lcbc_ret
+
+.Lcbc_enc_tail:
+	mov	$len,%rcx	# zaps $key
+	xchg	$inp,$out	# $inp is %rsi and $out is %rdi now
+	.long	0x9066A4F3	# rep movsb
+	mov	\$16,%ecx	# zero tail
+	sub	$len,%rcx
+	xor	%eax,%eax
+	.long	0x9066AAF3	# rep stosb
+	lea	-16(%rdi),%rdi	# rewind $out by 1 block
+	mov	$rnds_,$rounds	# restore $rounds
+	mov	%rdi,%rsi	# $inp and $out are the same
+	mov	$key_,$key	# restore $key
+	xor	$len,$len	# len=16
+	jmp	.Lcbc_enc_loop	# one more spin
+#--------------------------- CBC DECRYPT ------------------------------#
+.align	16
+.Lcbc_decrypt:
+	cmp	\$16,$len
+	jne	.Lcbc_decrypt_bulk
+
+	# handle single block without allocating stack frame,
+	# useful in ciphertext stealing mode
+	movdqu	($inp),$inout0		# load input
+	movdqu	($ivp),$inout1		# load iv
+	movdqa	$inout0,$inout2		# future iv
+___
+	&aesni_generate1("dec",$key,$rnds_);
+$code.=<<___;
+	 pxor	$rndkey0,$rndkey0	# clear register bank
+	 pxor	$rndkey1,$rndkey1
+	movdqu	$inout2,($ivp)		# store iv
+	xorps	$inout1,$inout0		# ^=iv
+	 pxor	$inout1,$inout1
+	movups	$inout0,($out)		# store output
+	 pxor	$inout0,$inout0
+	jmp	.Lcbc_ret
+.align	16
+.Lcbc_decrypt_bulk:
+	lea	(%rsp),%rax
+	push	%rbp
+	sub	\$$frame_size,%rsp
+	and	\$-16,%rsp	# Linux kernel stack can be incorrectly seeded
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	movaps	%xmm6,0x10(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm7,0x20(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm8,0x30(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm9,0x40(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm10,0x50(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm11,0x60(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm12,0x70(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm13,0x80(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm14,0x90(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm15,0xa0(%rsp)
+.Lcbc_decrypt_body:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	lea	-8(%rax),%rbp
+	movups	($ivp),$iv
+	mov	$rnds_,$rounds
+	cmp	\$0x50,$len
+	jbe	.Lcbc_dec_tail
+
+	$movkey	($key),$rndkey0
+	movdqu	0x00($inp),$inout0	# load input
+	movdqu	0x10($inp),$inout1
+	movdqa	$inout0,$in0
+	movdqu	0x20($inp),$inout2
+	movdqa	$inout1,$in1
+	movdqu	0x30($inp),$inout3
+	movdqa	$inout2,$in2
+	movdqu	0x40($inp),$inout4
+	movdqa	$inout3,$in3
+	movdqu	0x50($inp),$inout5
+	movdqa	$inout4,$in4
+	mov	OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+4(%rip),%r9d
+	cmp	\$0x70,$len
+	jbe	.Lcbc_dec_six_or_seven
+
+	and	\$`1<<26|1<<22`,%r9d	# isolate XSAVE+MOVBE
+	sub	\$0x50,$len		# $len is biased by -5*16
+	cmp	\$`1<<22`,%r9d		# check for MOVBE without XSAVE
+	je	.Lcbc_dec_loop6_enter	# [which denotes Atom Silvermont]
+	sub	\$0x20,$len		# $len is biased by -7*16
+	lea	0x70($key),$key		# size optimization
+	jmp	.Lcbc_dec_loop8_enter
+.align	16
+.Lcbc_dec_loop8:
+	movups	$inout7,($out)
+	lea	0x10($out),$out
+.Lcbc_dec_loop8_enter:
+	movdqu		0x60($inp),$inout6
+	pxor		$rndkey0,$inout0
+	movdqu		0x70($inp),$inout7
+	pxor		$rndkey0,$inout1
+	$movkey		0x10-0x70($key),$rndkey1
+	pxor		$rndkey0,$inout2
+	xor		$inp_,$inp_
+	cmp		\$0x70,$len	# is there at least 0x60 bytes ahead?
+	pxor		$rndkey0,$inout3
+	pxor		$rndkey0,$inout4
+	pxor		$rndkey0,$inout5
+	pxor		$rndkey0,$inout6
+
+	aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout0
+	pxor		$rndkey0,$inout7
+	$movkey		0x20-0x70($key),$rndkey0
+	aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout1
+	aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout2
+	aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout3
+	aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout4
+	aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout5
+	aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout6
+	setnc		${inp_}b
+	shl		\$7,$inp_
+	aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout7
+	add		$inp,$inp_
+	$movkey		0x30-0x70($key),$rndkey1
+___
+for($i=1;$i<12;$i++) {
+my $rndkeyx = ($i&1)?$rndkey0:$rndkey1;
+$code.=<<___	if ($i==7);
+	cmp		\$11,$rounds
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	aesdec		$rndkeyx,$inout0
+	aesdec		$rndkeyx,$inout1
+	aesdec		$rndkeyx,$inout2
+	aesdec		$rndkeyx,$inout3
+	aesdec		$rndkeyx,$inout4
+	aesdec		$rndkeyx,$inout5
+	aesdec		$rndkeyx,$inout6
+	aesdec		$rndkeyx,$inout7
+	$movkey		`0x30+0x10*$i`-0x70($key),$rndkeyx
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($i<6 || (!($i&1) && $i>7));
+	nop
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($i==7);
+	jb		.Lcbc_dec_done
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($i==9);
+	je		.Lcbc_dec_done
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($i==11);
+	jmp		.Lcbc_dec_done
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+.align	16
+.Lcbc_dec_done:
+	aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout0
+	aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout1
+	pxor		$rndkey0,$iv
+	pxor		$rndkey0,$in0
+	aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout2
+	aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout3
+	pxor		$rndkey0,$in1
+	pxor		$rndkey0,$in2
+	aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout4
+	aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout5
+	pxor		$rndkey0,$in3
+	pxor		$rndkey0,$in4
+	aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout6
+	aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout7
+	movdqu		0x50($inp),$rndkey1
+
+	aesdeclast	$iv,$inout0
+	movdqu		0x60($inp),$iv		# borrow $iv
+	pxor		$rndkey0,$rndkey1
+	aesdeclast	$in0,$inout1
+	pxor		$rndkey0,$iv
+	movdqu		0x70($inp),$rndkey0	# next IV
+	aesdeclast	$in1,$inout2
+	lea		0x80($inp),$inp
+	movdqu		0x00($inp_),$in0
+	aesdeclast	$in2,$inout3
+	aesdeclast	$in3,$inout4
+	movdqu		0x10($inp_),$in1
+	movdqu		0x20($inp_),$in2
+	aesdeclast	$in4,$inout5
+	aesdeclast	$rndkey1,$inout6
+	movdqu		0x30($inp_),$in3
+	movdqu		0x40($inp_),$in4
+	aesdeclast	$iv,$inout7
+	movdqa		$rndkey0,$iv		# return $iv
+	movdqu		0x50($inp_),$rndkey1
+	$movkey		-0x70($key),$rndkey0
+
+	movups		$inout0,($out)		# store output
+	movdqa		$in0,$inout0
+	movups		$inout1,0x10($out)
+	movdqa		$in1,$inout1
+	movups		$inout2,0x20($out)
+	movdqa		$in2,$inout2
+	movups		$inout3,0x30($out)
+	movdqa		$in3,$inout3
+	movups		$inout4,0x40($out)
+	movdqa		$in4,$inout4
+	movups		$inout5,0x50($out)
+	movdqa		$rndkey1,$inout5
+	movups		$inout6,0x60($out)
+	lea		0x70($out),$out
+
+	sub	\$0x80,$len
+	ja	.Lcbc_dec_loop8
+
+	movaps	$inout7,$inout0
+	lea	-0x70($key),$key
+	add	\$0x70,$len
+	jle	.Lcbc_dec_clear_tail_collected
+	movups	$inout7,($out)
+	lea	0x10($out),$out
+	cmp	\$0x50,$len
+	jbe	.Lcbc_dec_tail
+
+	movaps	$in0,$inout0
+.Lcbc_dec_six_or_seven:
+	cmp	\$0x60,$len
+	ja	.Lcbc_dec_seven
+
+	movaps	$inout5,$inout6
+	call	_aesni_decrypt6
+	pxor	$iv,$inout0		# ^= IV
+	movaps	$inout6,$iv
+	pxor	$in0,$inout1
+	movdqu	$inout0,($out)
+	pxor	$in1,$inout2
+	movdqu	$inout1,0x10($out)
+	 pxor	$inout1,$inout1		# clear register bank
+	pxor	$in2,$inout3
+	movdqu	$inout2,0x20($out)
+	 pxor	$inout2,$inout2
+	pxor	$in3,$inout4
+	movdqu	$inout3,0x30($out)
+	 pxor	$inout3,$inout3
+	pxor	$in4,$inout5
+	movdqu	$inout4,0x40($out)
+	 pxor	$inout4,$inout4
+	lea	0x50($out),$out
+	movdqa	$inout5,$inout0
+	 pxor	$inout5,$inout5
+	jmp	.Lcbc_dec_tail_collected
+
+.align	16
+.Lcbc_dec_seven:
+	movups	0x60($inp),$inout6
+	xorps	$inout7,$inout7
+	call	_aesni_decrypt8
+	movups	0x50($inp),$inout7
+	pxor	$iv,$inout0		# ^= IV
+	movups	0x60($inp),$iv
+	pxor	$in0,$inout1
+	movdqu	$inout0,($out)
+	pxor	$in1,$inout2
+	movdqu	$inout1,0x10($out)
+	 pxor	$inout1,$inout1		# clear register bank
+	pxor	$in2,$inout3
+	movdqu	$inout2,0x20($out)
+	 pxor	$inout2,$inout2
+	pxor	$in3,$inout4
+	movdqu	$inout3,0x30($out)
+	 pxor	$inout3,$inout3
+	pxor	$in4,$inout5
+	movdqu	$inout4,0x40($out)
+	 pxor	$inout4,$inout4
+	pxor	$inout7,$inout6
+	movdqu	$inout5,0x50($out)
+	 pxor	$inout5,$inout5
+	lea	0x60($out),$out
+	movdqa	$inout6,$inout0
+	 pxor	$inout6,$inout6
+	 pxor	$inout7,$inout7
+	jmp	.Lcbc_dec_tail_collected
+
+.align	16
+.Lcbc_dec_loop6:
+	movups	$inout5,($out)
+	lea	0x10($out),$out
+	movdqu	0x00($inp),$inout0	# load input
+	movdqu	0x10($inp),$inout1
+	movdqa	$inout0,$in0
+	movdqu	0x20($inp),$inout2
+	movdqa	$inout1,$in1
+	movdqu	0x30($inp),$inout3
+	movdqa	$inout2,$in2
+	movdqu	0x40($inp),$inout4
+	movdqa	$inout3,$in3
+	movdqu	0x50($inp),$inout5
+	movdqa	$inout4,$in4
+.Lcbc_dec_loop6_enter:
+	lea	0x60($inp),$inp
+	movdqa	$inout5,$inout6
+
+	call	_aesni_decrypt6
+
+	pxor	$iv,$inout0		# ^= IV
+	movdqa	$inout6,$iv
+	pxor	$in0,$inout1
+	movdqu	$inout0,($out)
+	pxor	$in1,$inout2
+	movdqu	$inout1,0x10($out)
+	pxor	$in2,$inout3
+	movdqu	$inout2,0x20($out)
+	pxor	$in3,$inout4
+	mov	$key_,$key
+	movdqu	$inout3,0x30($out)
+	pxor	$in4,$inout5
+	mov	$rnds_,$rounds
+	movdqu	$inout4,0x40($out)
+	lea	0x50($out),$out
+	sub	\$0x60,$len
+	ja	.Lcbc_dec_loop6
+
+	movdqa	$inout5,$inout0
+	add	\$0x50,$len
+	jle	.Lcbc_dec_clear_tail_collected
+	movups	$inout5,($out)
+	lea	0x10($out),$out
+
+.Lcbc_dec_tail:
+	movups	($inp),$inout0
+	sub	\$0x10,$len
+	jbe	.Lcbc_dec_one		# $len is 1*16 or less
+
+	movups	0x10($inp),$inout1
+	movaps	$inout0,$in0
+	sub	\$0x10,$len
+	jbe	.Lcbc_dec_two		# $len is 2*16 or less
+
+	movups	0x20($inp),$inout2
+	movaps	$inout1,$in1
+	sub	\$0x10,$len
+	jbe	.Lcbc_dec_three		# $len is 3*16 or less
+
+	movups	0x30($inp),$inout3
+	movaps	$inout2,$in2
+	sub	\$0x10,$len
+	jbe	.Lcbc_dec_four		# $len is 4*16 or less
+
+	movups	0x40($inp),$inout4	# $len is 5*16 or less
+	movaps	$inout3,$in3
+	movaps	$inout4,$in4
+	xorps	$inout5,$inout5
+	call	_aesni_decrypt6
+	pxor	$iv,$inout0
+	movaps	$in4,$iv
+	pxor	$in0,$inout1
+	movdqu	$inout0,($out)
+	pxor	$in1,$inout2
+	movdqu	$inout1,0x10($out)
+	 pxor	$inout1,$inout1		# clear register bank
+	pxor	$in2,$inout3
+	movdqu	$inout2,0x20($out)
+	 pxor	$inout2,$inout2
+	pxor	$in3,$inout4
+	movdqu	$inout3,0x30($out)
+	 pxor	$inout3,$inout3
+	lea	0x40($out),$out
+	movdqa	$inout4,$inout0
+	 pxor	$inout4,$inout4
+	 pxor	$inout5,$inout5
+	sub	\$0x10,$len
+	jmp	.Lcbc_dec_tail_collected
+
+.align	16
+.Lcbc_dec_one:
+	movaps	$inout0,$in0
+___
+	&aesni_generate1("dec",$key,$rounds);
+$code.=<<___;
+	xorps	$iv,$inout0
+	movaps	$in0,$iv
+	jmp	.Lcbc_dec_tail_collected
+.align	16
+.Lcbc_dec_two:
+	movaps	$inout1,$in1
+	call	_aesni_decrypt2
+	pxor	$iv,$inout0
+	movaps	$in1,$iv
+	pxor	$in0,$inout1
+	movdqu	$inout0,($out)
+	movdqa	$inout1,$inout0
+	 pxor	$inout1,$inout1		# clear register bank
+	lea	0x10($out),$out
+	jmp	.Lcbc_dec_tail_collected
+.align	16
+.Lcbc_dec_three:
+	movaps	$inout2,$in2
+	call	_aesni_decrypt3
+	pxor	$iv,$inout0
+	movaps	$in2,$iv
+	pxor	$in0,$inout1
+	movdqu	$inout0,($out)
+	pxor	$in1,$inout2
+	movdqu	$inout1,0x10($out)
+	 pxor	$inout1,$inout1		# clear register bank
+	movdqa	$inout2,$inout0
+	 pxor	$inout2,$inout2
+	lea	0x20($out),$out
+	jmp	.Lcbc_dec_tail_collected
+.align	16
+.Lcbc_dec_four:
+	movaps	$inout3,$in3
+	call	_aesni_decrypt4
+	pxor	$iv,$inout0
+	movaps	$in3,$iv
+	pxor	$in0,$inout1
+	movdqu	$inout0,($out)
+	pxor	$in1,$inout2
+	movdqu	$inout1,0x10($out)
+	 pxor	$inout1,$inout1		# clear register bank
+	pxor	$in2,$inout3
+	movdqu	$inout2,0x20($out)
+	 pxor	$inout2,$inout2
+	movdqa	$inout3,$inout0
+	 pxor	$inout3,$inout3
+	lea	0x30($out),$out
+	jmp	.Lcbc_dec_tail_collected
+
+.align	16
+.Lcbc_dec_clear_tail_collected:
+	pxor	$inout1,$inout1		# clear register bank
+	pxor	$inout2,$inout2
+	pxor	$inout3,$inout3
+___
+$code.=<<___ if (!$win64);
+	pxor	$inout4,$inout4		# %xmm6..9
+	pxor	$inout5,$inout5
+	pxor	$inout6,$inout6
+	pxor	$inout7,$inout7
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+.Lcbc_dec_tail_collected:
+	movups	$iv,($ivp)
+	and	\$15,$len
+	jnz	.Lcbc_dec_tail_partial
+	movups	$inout0,($out)
+	pxor	$inout0,$inout0
+	jmp	.Lcbc_dec_ret
+.align	16
+.Lcbc_dec_tail_partial:
+	movaps	$inout0,(%rsp)
+	pxor	$inout0,$inout0
+	mov	\$16,%rcx
+	mov	$out,%rdi
+	sub	$len,%rcx
+	lea	(%rsp),%rsi
+	.long	0x9066A4F3		# rep movsb
+	movdqa	$inout0,(%rsp)
+
+.Lcbc_dec_ret:
+	xorps	$rndkey0,$rndkey0	# %xmm0
+	pxor	$rndkey1,$rndkey1
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	movaps	0x10(%rsp),%xmm6
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x10(%rsp)	# clear stack
+	movaps	0x20(%rsp),%xmm7
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x20(%rsp)
+	movaps	0x30(%rsp),%xmm8
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x30(%rsp)
+	movaps	0x40(%rsp),%xmm9
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x40(%rsp)
+	movaps	0x50(%rsp),%xmm10
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x50(%rsp)
+	movaps	0x60(%rsp),%xmm11
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x60(%rsp)
+	movaps	0x70(%rsp),%xmm12
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x70(%rsp)
+	movaps	0x80(%rsp),%xmm13
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x80(%rsp)
+	movaps	0x90(%rsp),%xmm14
+	movaps	%xmm0,0x90(%rsp)
+	movaps	0xa0(%rsp),%xmm15
+	movaps	%xmm0,0xa0(%rsp)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	lea	(%rbp),%rsp
+	pop	%rbp
+.Lcbc_ret:
+	ret
+.size	${PREFIX}_cbc_encrypt,.-${PREFIX}_cbc_encrypt
+___
+} 
+# int ${PREFIX}_set_decrypt_key(const unsigned char *inp,
+#				int bits, AES_KEY *key)
+#
+# input:	$inp	user-supplied key
+#		$bits	$inp length in bits
+#		$key	pointer to key schedule
+# output:	%eax	0 denoting success, -1 or -2 - failure (see C)
+#		*$key	key schedule
+#
+{ my ($inp,$bits,$key) = @_4args;
+  $bits =~ s/%r/%e/;
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	${PREFIX}_set_decrypt_key
+.type	${PREFIX}_set_decrypt_key,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+${PREFIX}_set_decrypt_key:
+	.byte	0x48,0x83,0xEC,0x08	# sub rsp,8
+	call	__aesni_set_encrypt_key
+	shl	\$4,$bits		# rounds-1 after _aesni_set_encrypt_key
+	test	%eax,%eax
+	jnz	.Ldec_key_ret
+	lea	16($key,$bits),$inp	# points at the end of key schedule
+
+	$movkey	($key),%xmm0		# just swap
+	$movkey	($inp),%xmm1
+	$movkey	%xmm0,($inp)
+	$movkey	%xmm1,($key)
+	lea	16($key),$key
+	lea	-16($inp),$inp
+
+.Ldec_key_inverse:
+	$movkey	($key),%xmm0		# swap and inverse
+	$movkey	($inp),%xmm1
+	aesimc	%xmm0,%xmm0
+	aesimc	%xmm1,%xmm1
+	lea	16($key),$key
+	lea	-16($inp),$inp
+	$movkey	%xmm0,16($inp)
+	$movkey	%xmm1,-16($key)
+	cmp	$key,$inp
+	ja	.Ldec_key_inverse
+
+	$movkey	($key),%xmm0		# inverse middle
+	aesimc	%xmm0,%xmm0
+	pxor	%xmm1,%xmm1
+	$movkey	%xmm0,($inp)
+	pxor	%xmm0,%xmm0
+.Ldec_key_ret:
+	add	\$8,%rsp
+	ret
+.LSEH_end_set_decrypt_key:
+.size	${PREFIX}_set_decrypt_key,.-${PREFIX}_set_decrypt_key
+___
+
+# This is based on submission by
+#
+#	Huang Ying <ying.huang@intel.com>
+#	Vinodh Gopal <vinodh.gopal@intel.com>
+#	Kahraman Akdemir
+#
+# Aggressively optimized in respect to aeskeygenassist's critical path
+# and is contained in %xmm0-5 to meet Win64 ABI requirement.
+#
+# int ${PREFIX}_set_encrypt_key(const unsigned char *inp,
+#				int bits, AES_KEY * const key);
+#
+# input:	$inp	user-supplied key
+#		$bits	$inp length in bits
+#		$key	pointer to key schedule
+# output:	%eax	0 denoting success, -1 or -2 - failure (see C)
+#		$bits	rounds-1 (used in aesni_set_decrypt_key)
+#		*$key	key schedule
+#		$key	pointer to key schedule (used in
+#			aesni_set_decrypt_key)
+#
+# Subroutine is frame-less, which means that only volatile registers
+# are used. Note that it's declared "abi-omnipotent", which means that
+# amount of volatile registers is smaller on Windows.
+#
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	${PREFIX}_set_encrypt_key
+.type	${PREFIX}_set_encrypt_key,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+${PREFIX}_set_encrypt_key:
+__aesni_set_encrypt_key:
+	.byte	0x48,0x83,0xEC,0x08	# sub rsp,8
+	mov	\$-1,%rax
+	test	$inp,$inp
+	jz	.Lenc_key_ret
+	test	$key,$key
+	jz	.Lenc_key_ret
+
+	mov	\$`1<<28|1<<11`,%r10d	# AVX and XOP bits
+	movups	($inp),%xmm0		# pull first 128 bits of *userKey
+	xorps	%xmm4,%xmm4		# low dword of xmm4 is assumed 0
+	and	OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+4(%rip),%r10d
+	lea	16($key),%rax		# %rax is used as modifiable copy of $key
+	cmp	\$256,$bits
+	je	.L14rounds
+	cmp	\$192,$bits
+	je	.L12rounds
+	cmp	\$128,$bits
+	jne	.Lbad_keybits
+
+.L10rounds:
+	mov	\$9,$bits			# 10 rounds for 128-bit key
+	cmp	\$`1<<28`,%r10d			# AVX, bit no XOP
+	je	.L10rounds_alt
+
+	$movkey	%xmm0,($key)			# round 0
+	aeskeygenassist	\$0x1,%xmm0,%xmm1	# round 1
+	call		.Lkey_expansion_128_cold
+	aeskeygenassist	\$0x2,%xmm0,%xmm1	# round 2
+	call		.Lkey_expansion_128
+	aeskeygenassist	\$0x4,%xmm0,%xmm1	# round 3
+	call		.Lkey_expansion_128
+	aeskeygenassist	\$0x8,%xmm0,%xmm1	# round 4
+	call		.Lkey_expansion_128
+	aeskeygenassist	\$0x10,%xmm0,%xmm1	# round 5
+	call		.Lkey_expansion_128
+	aeskeygenassist	\$0x20,%xmm0,%xmm1	# round 6
+	call		.Lkey_expansion_128
+	aeskeygenassist	\$0x40,%xmm0,%xmm1	# round 7
+	call		.Lkey_expansion_128
+	aeskeygenassist	\$0x80,%xmm0,%xmm1	# round 8
+	call		.Lkey_expansion_128
+	aeskeygenassist	\$0x1b,%xmm0,%xmm1	# round 9
+	call		.Lkey_expansion_128
+	aeskeygenassist	\$0x36,%xmm0,%xmm1	# round 10
+	call		.Lkey_expansion_128
+	$movkey	%xmm0,(%rax)
+	mov	$bits,80(%rax)	# 240(%rdx)
+	xor	%eax,%eax
+	jmp	.Lenc_key_ret
+
+.align	16
+.L10rounds_alt:
+	movdqa	.Lkey_rotate(%rip),%xmm5
+	mov	\$8,%r10d
+	movdqa	.Lkey_rcon1(%rip),%xmm4
+	movdqa	%xmm0,%xmm2
+	movdqu	%xmm0,($key)
+	jmp	.Loop_key128
+
+.align	16
+.Loop_key128:
+	pshufb		%xmm5,%xmm0
+	aesenclast	%xmm4,%xmm0
+	pslld		\$1,%xmm4
+	lea		16(%rax),%rax
+
+	movdqa		%xmm2,%xmm3
+	pslldq		\$4,%xmm2
+	pxor		%xmm2,%xmm3
+	pslldq		\$4,%xmm2
+	pxor		%xmm2,%xmm3
+	pslldq		\$4,%xmm2
+	pxor		%xmm3,%xmm2
+
+	pxor		%xmm2,%xmm0
+	movdqu		%xmm0,-16(%rax)
+	movdqa		%xmm0,%xmm2
+
+	dec	%r10d
+	jnz	.Loop_key128
+
+	movdqa		.Lkey_rcon1b(%rip),%xmm4
+
+	pshufb		%xmm5,%xmm0
+	aesenclast	%xmm4,%xmm0
+	pslld		\$1,%xmm4
+
+	movdqa		%xmm2,%xmm3
+	pslldq		\$4,%xmm2
+	pxor		%xmm2,%xmm3
+	pslldq		\$4,%xmm2
+	pxor		%xmm2,%xmm3
+	pslldq		\$4,%xmm2
+	pxor		%xmm3,%xmm2
+
+	pxor		%xmm2,%xmm0
+	movdqu		%xmm0,(%rax)
+
+	movdqa		%xmm0,%xmm2
+	pshufb		%xmm5,%xmm0
+	aesenclast	%xmm4,%xmm0
+
+	movdqa		%xmm2,%xmm3
+	pslldq		\$4,%xmm2
+	pxor		%xmm2,%xmm3
+	pslldq		\$4,%xmm2
+	pxor		%xmm2,%xmm3
+	pslldq		\$4,%xmm2
+	pxor		%xmm3,%xmm2
+
+	pxor		%xmm2,%xmm0
+	movdqu		%xmm0,16(%rax)
+
+	mov	$bits,96(%rax)	# 240($key)
+	xor	%eax,%eax
+	jmp	.Lenc_key_ret
+
+.align	16
+.L12rounds:
+	movq	16($inp),%xmm2			# remaining 1/3 of *userKey
+	mov	\$11,$bits			# 12 rounds for 192
+	cmp	\$`1<<28`,%r10d			# AVX, but no XOP
+	je	.L12rounds_alt
+
+	$movkey	%xmm0,($key)			# round 0
+	aeskeygenassist	\$0x1,%xmm2,%xmm1	# round 1,2
+	call		.Lkey_expansion_192a_cold
+	aeskeygenassist	\$0x2,%xmm2,%xmm1	# round 2,3
+	call		.Lkey_expansion_192b
+	aeskeygenassist	\$0x4,%xmm2,%xmm1	# round 4,5
+	call		.Lkey_expansion_192a
+	aeskeygenassist	\$0x8,%xmm2,%xmm1	# round 5,6
+	call		.Lkey_expansion_192b
+	aeskeygenassist	\$0x10,%xmm2,%xmm1	# round 7,8
+	call		.Lkey_expansion_192a
+	aeskeygenassist	\$0x20,%xmm2,%xmm1	# round 8,9
+	call		.Lkey_expansion_192b
+	aeskeygenassist	\$0x40,%xmm2,%xmm1	# round 10,11
+	call		.Lkey_expansion_192a
+	aeskeygenassist	\$0x80,%xmm2,%xmm1	# round 11,12
+	call		.Lkey_expansion_192b
+	$movkey	%xmm0,(%rax)
+	mov	$bits,48(%rax)	# 240(%rdx)
+	xor	%rax, %rax
+	jmp	.Lenc_key_ret
+
+.align	16
+.L12rounds_alt:
+	movdqa	.Lkey_rotate192(%rip),%xmm5
+	movdqa	.Lkey_rcon1(%rip),%xmm4
+	mov	\$8,%r10d
+	movdqu	%xmm0,($key)
+	jmp	.Loop_key192
+
+.align	16
+.Loop_key192:
+	movq		%xmm2,0(%rax)
+	movdqa		%xmm2,%xmm1
+	pshufb		%xmm5,%xmm2
+	aesenclast	%xmm4,%xmm2
+	pslld		\$1, %xmm4
+	lea		24(%rax),%rax
+
+	movdqa		%xmm0,%xmm3
+	pslldq		\$4,%xmm0
+	pxor		%xmm0,%xmm3
+	pslldq		\$4,%xmm0
+	pxor		%xmm0,%xmm3
+	pslldq		\$4,%xmm0
+	pxor		%xmm3,%xmm0
+
+	pshufd		\$0xff,%xmm0,%xmm3
+	pxor		%xmm1,%xmm3
+	pslldq		\$4,%xmm1
+	pxor		%xmm1,%xmm3
+
+	pxor		%xmm2,%xmm0
+	pxor		%xmm3,%xmm2
+	movdqu		%xmm0,-16(%rax)
+
+	dec	%r10d
+	jnz	.Loop_key192
+
+	mov	$bits,32(%rax)	# 240($key)
+	xor	%eax,%eax
+	jmp	.Lenc_key_ret
+
+.align	16
+.L14rounds:
+	movups	16($inp),%xmm2			# remaning half of *userKey
+	mov	\$13,$bits			# 14 rounds for 256
+	lea	16(%rax),%rax
+	cmp	\$`1<<28`,%r10d			# AVX, but no XOP
+	je	.L14rounds_alt
+
+	$movkey	%xmm0,($key)			# round 0
+	$movkey	%xmm2,16($key)			# round 1
+	aeskeygenassist	\$0x1,%xmm2,%xmm1	# round 2
+	call		.Lkey_expansion_256a_cold
+	aeskeygenassist	\$0x1,%xmm0,%xmm1	# round 3
+	call		.Lkey_expansion_256b
+	aeskeygenassist	\$0x2,%xmm2,%xmm1	# round 4
+	call		.Lkey_expansion_256a
+	aeskeygenassist	\$0x2,%xmm0,%xmm1	# round 5
+	call		.Lkey_expansion_256b
+	aeskeygenassist	\$0x4,%xmm2,%xmm1	# round 6
+	call		.Lkey_expansion_256a
+	aeskeygenassist	\$0x4,%xmm0,%xmm1	# round 7
+	call		.Lkey_expansion_256b
+	aeskeygenassist	\$0x8,%xmm2,%xmm1	# round 8
+	call		.Lkey_expansion_256a
+	aeskeygenassist	\$0x8,%xmm0,%xmm1	# round 9
+	call		.Lkey_expansion_256b
+	aeskeygenassist	\$0x10,%xmm2,%xmm1	# round 10
+	call		.Lkey_expansion_256a
+	aeskeygenassist	\$0x10,%xmm0,%xmm1	# round 11
+	call		.Lkey_expansion_256b
+	aeskeygenassist	\$0x20,%xmm2,%xmm1	# round 12
+	call		.Lkey_expansion_256a
+	aeskeygenassist	\$0x20,%xmm0,%xmm1	# round 13
+	call		.Lkey_expansion_256b
+	aeskeygenassist	\$0x40,%xmm2,%xmm1	# round 14
+	call		.Lkey_expansion_256a
+	$movkey	%xmm0,(%rax)
+	mov	$bits,16(%rax)	# 240(%rdx)
+	xor	%rax,%rax
+	jmp	.Lenc_key_ret
+
+.align	16
+.L14rounds_alt:
+	movdqa	.Lkey_rotate(%rip),%xmm5
+	movdqa	.Lkey_rcon1(%rip),%xmm4
+	mov	\$7,%r10d
+	movdqu	%xmm0,0($key)
+	movdqa	%xmm2,%xmm1
+	movdqu	%xmm2,16($key)
+	jmp	.Loop_key256
+
+.align	16
+.Loop_key256:
+	pshufb		%xmm5,%xmm2
+	aesenclast	%xmm4,%xmm2
+
+	movdqa		%xmm0,%xmm3
+	pslldq		\$4,%xmm0
+	pxor		%xmm0,%xmm3
+	pslldq		\$4,%xmm0
+	pxor		%xmm0,%xmm3
+	pslldq		\$4,%xmm0
+	pxor		%xmm3,%xmm0
+	pslld		\$1,%xmm4
+
+	pxor		%xmm2,%xmm0
+	movdqu		%xmm0,(%rax)
+
+	dec	%r10d
+	jz	.Ldone_key256
+
+	pshufd		\$0xff,%xmm0,%xmm2
+	pxor		%xmm3,%xmm3
+	aesenclast	%xmm3,%xmm2
+
+	movdqa		%xmm1,%xmm3
+	pslldq		\$4,%xmm1
+	pxor		%xmm1,%xmm3
+	pslldq		\$4,%xmm1
+	pxor		%xmm1,%xmm3
+	pslldq		\$4,%xmm1
+	pxor		%xmm3,%xmm1
+
+	pxor		%xmm1,%xmm2
+	movdqu		%xmm2,16(%rax)
+	lea		32(%rax),%rax
+	movdqa		%xmm2,%xmm1
+
+	jmp	.Loop_key256
+
+.Ldone_key256:
+	mov	$bits,16(%rax)	# 240($key)
+	xor	%eax,%eax
+	jmp	.Lenc_key_ret
+
+.align	16
+.Lbad_keybits:
+	mov	\$-2,%rax
+.Lenc_key_ret:
+	pxor	%xmm0,%xmm0
+	pxor	%xmm1,%xmm1
+	pxor	%xmm2,%xmm2
+	pxor	%xmm3,%xmm3
+	pxor	%xmm4,%xmm4
+	pxor	%xmm5,%xmm5
+	add	\$8,%rsp
+	ret
+.LSEH_end_set_encrypt_key:
+
+.align	16
+.Lkey_expansion_128:
+	$movkey	%xmm0,(%rax)
+	lea	16(%rax),%rax
+.Lkey_expansion_128_cold:
+	shufps	\$0b00010000,%xmm0,%xmm4
+	xorps	%xmm4, %xmm0
+	shufps	\$0b10001100,%xmm0,%xmm4
+	xorps	%xmm4, %xmm0
+	shufps	\$0b11111111,%xmm1,%xmm1	# critical path
+	xorps	%xmm1,%xmm0
+	ret
+
+.align 16
+.Lkey_expansion_192a:
+	$movkey	%xmm0,(%rax)
+	lea	16(%rax),%rax
+.Lkey_expansion_192a_cold:
+	movaps	%xmm2, %xmm5
+.Lkey_expansion_192b_warm:
+	shufps	\$0b00010000,%xmm0,%xmm4
+	movdqa	%xmm2,%xmm3
+	xorps	%xmm4,%xmm0
+	shufps	\$0b10001100,%xmm0,%xmm4
+	pslldq	\$4,%xmm3
+	xorps	%xmm4,%xmm0
+	pshufd	\$0b01010101,%xmm1,%xmm1	# critical path
+	pxor	%xmm3,%xmm2
+	pxor	%xmm1,%xmm0
+	pshufd	\$0b11111111,%xmm0,%xmm3
+	pxor	%xmm3,%xmm2
+	ret
+
+.align 16
+.Lkey_expansion_192b:
+	movaps	%xmm0,%xmm3
+	shufps	\$0b01000100,%xmm0,%xmm5
+	$movkey	%xmm5,(%rax)
+	shufps	\$0b01001110,%xmm2,%xmm3
+	$movkey	%xmm3,16(%rax)
+	lea	32(%rax),%rax
+	jmp	.Lkey_expansion_192b_warm
+
+.align	16
+.Lkey_expansion_256a:
+	$movkey	%xmm2,(%rax)
+	lea	16(%rax),%rax
+.Lkey_expansion_256a_cold:
+	shufps	\$0b00010000,%xmm0,%xmm4
+	xorps	%xmm4,%xmm0
+	shufps	\$0b10001100,%xmm0,%xmm4
+	xorps	%xmm4,%xmm0
+	shufps	\$0b11111111,%xmm1,%xmm1	# critical path
+	xorps	%xmm1,%xmm0
+	ret
+
+.align 16
+.Lkey_expansion_256b:
+	$movkey	%xmm0,(%rax)
+	lea	16(%rax),%rax
+
+	shufps	\$0b00010000,%xmm2,%xmm4
+	xorps	%xmm4,%xmm2
+	shufps	\$0b10001100,%xmm2,%xmm4
+	xorps	%xmm4,%xmm2
+	shufps	\$0b10101010,%xmm1,%xmm1	# critical path
+	xorps	%xmm1,%xmm2
+	ret
+.size	${PREFIX}_set_encrypt_key,.-${PREFIX}_set_encrypt_key
+.size	__aesni_set_encrypt_key,.-__aesni_set_encrypt_key
+___
+}
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.align	64
+.Lbswap_mask:
+	.byte	15,14,13,12,11,10,9,8,7,6,5,4,3,2,1,0
+.Lincrement32:
+	.long	6,6,6,0
+.Lincrement64:
+	.long	1,0,0,0
+.Lxts_magic:
+	.long	0x87,0,1,0
+.Lincrement1:
+	.byte	0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1
+.Lkey_rotate:
+	.long	0x0c0f0e0d,0x0c0f0e0d,0x0c0f0e0d,0x0c0f0e0d
+.Lkey_rotate192:
+	.long	0x04070605,0x04070605,0x04070605,0x04070605
+.Lkey_rcon1:
+	.long	1,1,1,1
+.Lkey_rcon1b:
+	.long	0x1b,0x1b,0x1b,0x1b
+
+.asciz  "AES for Intel AES-NI, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+.align	64
+___
+
+# EXCEPTION_DISPOSITION handler (EXCEPTION_RECORD *rec,ULONG64 frame,
+#		CONTEXT *context,DISPATCHER_CONTEXT *disp)
+if ($win64) {
+$rec="%rcx";
+$frame="%rdx";
+$context="%r8";
+$disp="%r9";
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.extern	__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni");
+.type	ecb_ccm64_se_handler,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+ecb_ccm64_se_handler:
+	push	%rsi
+	push	%rdi
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+	pushfq
+	sub	\$64,%rsp
+
+	mov	120($context),%rax	# pull context->Rax
+	mov	248($context),%rbx	# pull context->Rip
+
+	mov	8($disp),%rsi		# disp->ImageBase
+	mov	56($disp),%r11		# disp->HandlerData
+
+	mov	0(%r11),%r10d		# HandlerData[0]
+	lea	(%rsi,%r10),%r10	# prologue label
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip<prologue label
+	jb	.Lcommon_seh_tail
+
+	mov	152($context),%rax	# pull context->Rsp
+
+	mov	4(%r11),%r10d		# HandlerData[1]
+	lea	(%rsi,%r10),%r10	# epilogue label
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip>=epilogue label
+	jae	.Lcommon_seh_tail
+
+	lea	0(%rax),%rsi		# %xmm save area
+	lea	512($context),%rdi	# &context.Xmm6
+	mov	\$8,%ecx		# 4*sizeof(%xmm0)/sizeof(%rax)
+	.long	0xa548f3fc		# cld; rep movsq
+	lea	0x58(%rax),%rax		# adjust stack pointer
+
+	jmp	.Lcommon_seh_tail
+.size	ecb_ccm64_se_handler,.-ecb_ccm64_se_handler
+
+.type	ctr_xts_se_handler,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+ctr_xts_se_handler:
+	push	%rsi
+	push	%rdi
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+	pushfq
+	sub	\$64,%rsp
+
+	mov	120($context),%rax	# pull context->Rax
+	mov	248($context),%rbx	# pull context->Rip
+
+	mov	8($disp),%rsi		# disp->ImageBase
+	mov	56($disp),%r11		# disp->HandlerData
+
+	mov	0(%r11),%r10d		# HandlerData[0]
+	lea	(%rsi,%r10),%r10	# prologue lable
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip<prologue label
+	jb	.Lcommon_seh_tail
+
+	mov	152($context),%rax	# pull context->Rsp
+
+	mov	4(%r11),%r10d		# HandlerData[1]
+	lea	(%rsi,%r10),%r10	# epilogue label
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip>=epilogue label
+	jae	.Lcommon_seh_tail
+
+	mov	160($context),%rax	# pull context->Rbp
+	lea	-0xa0(%rax),%rsi	# %xmm save area
+	lea	512($context),%rdi	# & context.Xmm6
+	mov	\$20,%ecx		# 10*sizeof(%xmm0)/sizeof(%rax)
+	.long	0xa548f3fc		# cld; rep movsq
+
+	jmp	.Lcommon_rbp_tail
+.size	ctr_xts_se_handler,.-ctr_xts_se_handler
+
+.type	ocb_se_handler,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+ocb_se_handler:
+	push	%rsi
+	push	%rdi
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+	pushfq
+	sub	\$64,%rsp
+
+	mov	120($context),%rax	# pull context->Rax
+	mov	248($context),%rbx	# pull context->Rip
+
+	mov	8($disp),%rsi		# disp->ImageBase
+	mov	56($disp),%r11		# disp->HandlerData
+
+	mov	0(%r11),%r10d		# HandlerData[0]
+	lea	(%rsi,%r10),%r10	# prologue lable
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip<prologue label
+	jb	.Lcommon_seh_tail
+
+	mov	4(%r11),%r10d		# HandlerData[1]
+	lea	(%rsi,%r10),%r10	# epilogue label
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip>=epilogue label
+	jae	.Lcommon_seh_tail
+
+	mov	8(%r11),%r10d		# HandlerData[2]
+	lea	(%rsi,%r10),%r10
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip>=pop label
+	jae	.Locb_no_xmm
+
+	mov	152($context),%rax	# pull context->Rsp
+
+	lea	(%rax),%rsi		# %xmm save area
+	lea	512($context),%rdi	# & context.Xmm6
+	mov	\$20,%ecx		# 10*sizeof(%xmm0)/sizeof(%rax)
+	.long	0xa548f3fc		# cld; rep movsq
+	lea	0xa0+0x28(%rax),%rax
+
+.Locb_no_xmm:
+	mov	-8(%rax),%rbx
+	mov	-16(%rax),%rbp
+	mov	-24(%rax),%r12
+	mov	-32(%rax),%r13
+	mov	-40(%rax),%r14
+
+	mov	%rbx,144($context)	# restore context->Rbx
+	mov	%rbp,160($context)	# restore context->Rbp
+	mov	%r12,216($context)	# restore context->R12
+	mov	%r13,224($context)	# restore context->R13
+	mov	%r14,232($context)	# restore context->R14
+
+	jmp	.Lcommon_seh_tail
+.size	ocb_se_handler,.-ocb_se_handler
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+.type	cbc_se_handler,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+cbc_se_handler:
+	push	%rsi
+	push	%rdi
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+	pushfq
+	sub	\$64,%rsp
+
+	mov	152($context),%rax	# pull context->Rsp
+	mov	248($context),%rbx	# pull context->Rip
+
+	lea	.Lcbc_decrypt_bulk(%rip),%r10
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip<"prologue" label
+	jb	.Lcommon_seh_tail
+
+	lea	.Lcbc_decrypt_body(%rip),%r10
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip<cbc_decrypt_body
+	jb	.Lrestore_cbc_rax
+
+	lea	.Lcbc_ret(%rip),%r10
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip>="epilogue" label
+	jae	.Lcommon_seh_tail
+
+	lea	16(%rax),%rsi		# %xmm save area
+	lea	512($context),%rdi	# &context.Xmm6
+	mov	\$20,%ecx		# 10*sizeof(%xmm0)/sizeof(%rax)
+	.long	0xa548f3fc		# cld; rep movsq
+
+.Lcommon_rbp_tail:
+	mov	160($context),%rax	# pull context->Rbp
+	mov	(%rax),%rbp		# restore saved %rbp
+	lea	8(%rax),%rax		# adjust stack pointer
+	mov	%rbp,160($context)	# restore context->Rbp
+	jmp	.Lcommon_seh_tail
+
+.Lrestore_cbc_rax:
+	mov	120($context),%rax
+
+.Lcommon_seh_tail:
+	mov	8(%rax),%rdi
+	mov	16(%rax),%rsi
+	mov	%rax,152($context)	# restore context->Rsp
+	mov	%rsi,168($context)	# restore context->Rsi
+	mov	%rdi,176($context)	# restore context->Rdi
+
+	mov	40($disp),%rdi		# disp->ContextRecord
+	mov	$context,%rsi		# context
+	mov	\$154,%ecx		# sizeof(CONTEXT)
+	.long	0xa548f3fc		# cld; rep movsq
+
+	mov	$disp,%rsi
+	xor	%rcx,%rcx		# arg1, UNW_FLAG_NHANDLER
+	mov	8(%rsi),%rdx		# arg2, disp->ImageBase
+	mov	0(%rsi),%r8		# arg3, disp->ControlPc
+	mov	16(%rsi),%r9		# arg4, disp->FunctionEntry
+	mov	40(%rsi),%r10		# disp->ContextRecord
+	lea	56(%rsi),%r11		# &disp->HandlerData
+	lea	24(%rsi),%r12		# &disp->EstablisherFrame
+	mov	%r10,32(%rsp)		# arg5
+	mov	%r11,40(%rsp)		# arg6
+	mov	%r12,48(%rsp)		# arg7
+	mov	%rcx,56(%rsp)		# arg8, (NULL)
+	call	*__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind(%rip)
+
+	mov	\$1,%eax		# ExceptionContinueSearch
+	add	\$64,%rsp
+	popfq
+	pop	%r15
+	pop	%r14
+	pop	%r13
+	pop	%r12
+	pop	%rbp
+	pop	%rbx
+	pop	%rdi
+	pop	%rsi
+	ret
+.size	cbc_se_handler,.-cbc_se_handler
+
+.section	.pdata
+.align	4
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni");
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_aesni_ecb_encrypt
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_aesni_ecb_encrypt
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_ecb
+
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_aesni_ccm64_encrypt_blocks
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_aesni_ccm64_encrypt_blocks
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_ccm64_enc
+
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_aesni_ccm64_decrypt_blocks
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_aesni_ccm64_decrypt_blocks
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_ccm64_dec
+
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_aesni_ctr32_encrypt_blocks
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_aesni_ctr32_encrypt_blocks
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_ctr32
+
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_aesni_xts_encrypt
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_aesni_xts_encrypt
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_xts_enc
+
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_aesni_xts_decrypt
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_aesni_xts_decrypt
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_xts_dec
+
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_aesni_ocb_encrypt
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_aesni_ocb_encrypt
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_ocb_enc
+
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_aesni_ocb_decrypt
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_aesni_ocb_decrypt
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_ocb_dec
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_${PREFIX}_cbc_encrypt
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_${PREFIX}_cbc_encrypt
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_cbc
+
+	.rva	${PREFIX}_set_decrypt_key
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_set_decrypt_key
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_key
+
+	.rva	${PREFIX}_set_encrypt_key
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_set_encrypt_key
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_key
+.section	.xdata
+.align	8
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni");
+.LSEH_info_ecb:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	ecb_ccm64_se_handler
+	.rva	.Lecb_enc_body,.Lecb_enc_ret		# HandlerData[]
+.LSEH_info_ccm64_enc:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	ecb_ccm64_se_handler
+	.rva	.Lccm64_enc_body,.Lccm64_enc_ret	# HandlerData[]
+.LSEH_info_ccm64_dec:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	ecb_ccm64_se_handler
+	.rva	.Lccm64_dec_body,.Lccm64_dec_ret	# HandlerData[]
+.LSEH_info_ctr32:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	ctr_xts_se_handler
+	.rva	.Lctr32_body,.Lctr32_epilogue		# HandlerData[]
+.LSEH_info_xts_enc:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	ctr_xts_se_handler
+	.rva	.Lxts_enc_body,.Lxts_enc_epilogue	# HandlerData[]
+.LSEH_info_xts_dec:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	ctr_xts_se_handler
+	.rva	.Lxts_dec_body,.Lxts_dec_epilogue	# HandlerData[]
+.LSEH_info_ocb_enc:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	ocb_se_handler
+	.rva	.Locb_enc_body,.Locb_enc_epilogue	# HandlerData[]
+	.rva	.Locb_enc_pop
+	.long	0
+.LSEH_info_ocb_dec:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	ocb_se_handler
+	.rva	.Locb_dec_body,.Locb_dec_epilogue	# HandlerData[]
+	.rva	.Locb_dec_pop
+	.long	0
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+.LSEH_info_cbc:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	cbc_se_handler
+.LSEH_info_key:
+	.byte	0x01,0x04,0x01,0x00
+	.byte	0x04,0x02,0x00,0x00	# sub rsp,8
+___
+}
+
+sub rex {
+  local *opcode=shift;
+  my ($dst,$src)=@_;
+  my $rex=0;
+
+    $rex|=0x04			if($dst>=8);
+    $rex|=0x01			if($src>=8);
+    push @opcode,$rex|0x40	if($rex);
+}
+
+sub aesni {
+  my $line=shift;
+  my @opcode=(0x66);
+
+    if ($line=~/(aeskeygenassist)\s+\$([x0-9a-f]+),\s*%xmm([0-9]+),\s*%xmm([0-9]+)/) {
+	rex(\@opcode,$4,$3);
+	push @opcode,0x0f,0x3a,0xdf;
+	push @opcode,0xc0|($3&7)|(($4&7)<<3);	# ModR/M
+	my $c=$2;
+	push @opcode,$c=~/^0/?oct($c):$c;
+	return ".byte\t".join(',',@opcode);
+    }
+    elsif ($line=~/(aes[a-z]+)\s+%xmm([0-9]+),\s*%xmm([0-9]+)/) {
+	my %opcodelet = (
+		"aesimc" => 0xdb,
+		"aesenc" => 0xdc,	"aesenclast" => 0xdd,
+		"aesdec" => 0xde,	"aesdeclast" => 0xdf
+	);
+	return undef if (!defined($opcodelet{$1}));
+	rex(\@opcode,$3,$2);
+	push @opcode,0x0f,0x38,$opcodelet{$1};
+	push @opcode,0xc0|($2&7)|(($3&7)<<3);	# ModR/M
+	return ".byte\t".join(',',@opcode);
+    }
+    elsif ($line=~/(aes[a-z]+)\s+([0x1-9a-fA-F]*)\(%rsp\),\s*%xmm([0-9]+)/) {
+	my %opcodelet = (
+		"aesenc" => 0xdc,	"aesenclast" => 0xdd,
+		"aesdec" => 0xde,	"aesdeclast" => 0xdf
+	);
+	return undef if (!defined($opcodelet{$1}));
+	my $off = $2;
+	push @opcode,0x44 if ($3>=8);
+	push @opcode,0x0f,0x38,$opcodelet{$1};
+	push @opcode,0x44|(($3&7)<<3),0x24;	# ModR/M
+	push @opcode,($off=~/^0/?oct($off):$off)&0xff;
+	return ".byte\t".join(',',@opcode);
+    }
+    return $line;
+}
+
+sub movbe {
+	".byte	0x0f,0x38,0xf1,0x44,0x24,".shift;
+}
+
+$code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval($1)/gem;
+$code =~ s/\b(aes.*%xmm[0-9]+).*$/aesni($1)/gem;
+#$code =~ s/\bmovbe\s+%eax/bswap %eax; mov %eax/gm;	# debugging artefact
+$code =~ s/\bmovbe\s+%eax,\s*([0-9]+)\(%rsp\)/movbe($1)/gem;
+
+print $code;
+
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/asm/aesp8-ppc.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/asm/aesp8-ppc.pl
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..b7e92f6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/asm/aesp8-ppc.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,3805 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2014-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# This module implements support for AES instructions as per PowerISA
+# specification version 2.07, first implemented by POWER8 processor.
+# The module is endian-agnostic in sense that it supports both big-
+# and little-endian cases. Data alignment in parallelizable modes is
+# handled with VSX loads and stores, which implies MSR.VSX flag being
+# set. It should also be noted that ISA specification doesn't prohibit
+# alignment exceptions for these instructions on page boundaries.
+# Initially alignment was handled in pure AltiVec/VMX way [when data
+# is aligned programmatically, which in turn guarantees exception-
+# free execution], but it turned to hamper performance when vcipher
+# instructions are interleaved. It's reckoned that eventual
+# misalignment penalties at page boundaries are in average lower
+# than additional overhead in pure AltiVec approach.
+#
+# May 2016
+#
+# Add XTS subroutine, 9x on little- and 12x improvement on big-endian
+# systems were measured.
+#
+######################################################################
+# Current large-block performance in cycles per byte processed with
+# 128-bit key (less is better).
+#
+#		CBC en-/decrypt	CTR	XTS
+# POWER8[le]	3.96/0.72	0.74	1.1
+# POWER8[be]	3.75/0.65	0.66	1.0
+
+$flavour = shift;
+
+if ($flavour =~ /64/) {
+	$SIZE_T	=8;
+	$LRSAVE	=2*$SIZE_T;
+	$STU	="stdu";
+	$POP	="ld";
+	$PUSH	="std";
+	$UCMP	="cmpld";
+	$SHL	="sldi";
+} elsif ($flavour =~ /32/) {
+	$SIZE_T	=4;
+	$LRSAVE	=$SIZE_T;
+	$STU	="stwu";
+	$POP	="lwz";
+	$PUSH	="stw";
+	$UCMP	="cmplw";
+	$SHL	="slwi";
+} else { die "nonsense $flavour"; }
+
+$LITTLE_ENDIAN = ($flavour=~/le$/) ? $SIZE_T : 0;
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+( $xlate="${dir}ppc-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
+( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/ppc-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
+die "can't locate ppc-xlate.pl";
+
+open STDOUT,"| $^X $xlate $flavour ".shift || die "can't call $xlate: $!";
+
+$FRAME=8*$SIZE_T;
+$prefix="aes_p8";
+
+$sp="r1";
+$vrsave="r12";
+
+#########################################################################
+{{{	# Key setup procedures						#
+my ($inp,$bits,$out,$ptr,$cnt,$rounds)=map("r$_",(3..8));
+my ($zero,$in0,$in1,$key,$rcon,$mask,$tmp)=map("v$_",(0..6));
+my ($stage,$outperm,$outmask,$outhead,$outtail)=map("v$_",(7..11));
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.machine	"any"
+
+.text
+
+.align	7
+rcon:
+.long	0x01000000, 0x01000000, 0x01000000, 0x01000000	?rev
+.long	0x1b000000, 0x1b000000, 0x1b000000, 0x1b000000	?rev
+.long	0x0d0e0f0c, 0x0d0e0f0c, 0x0d0e0f0c, 0x0d0e0f0c	?rev
+.long	0,0,0,0						?asis
+Lconsts:
+	mflr	r0
+	bcl	20,31,\$+4
+	mflr	$ptr	 #vvvvv "distance between . and rcon
+	addi	$ptr,$ptr,-0x48
+	mtlr	r0
+	blr
+	.long	0
+	.byte	0,12,0x14,0,0,0,0,0
+.asciz	"AES for PowerISA 2.07, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+
+.globl	.${prefix}_set_encrypt_key
+.align	5
+.${prefix}_set_encrypt_key:
+Lset_encrypt_key:
+	mflr		r11
+	$PUSH		r11,$LRSAVE($sp)
+
+	li		$ptr,-1
+	${UCMP}i	$inp,0
+	beq-		Lenc_key_abort		# if ($inp==0) return -1;
+	${UCMP}i	$out,0
+	beq-		Lenc_key_abort		# if ($out==0) return -1;
+	li		$ptr,-2
+	cmpwi		$bits,128
+	blt-		Lenc_key_abort
+	cmpwi		$bits,256
+	bgt-		Lenc_key_abort
+	andi.		r0,$bits,0x3f
+	bne-		Lenc_key_abort
+
+	lis		r0,0xfff0
+	mfspr		$vrsave,256
+	mtspr		256,r0
+
+	bl		Lconsts
+	mtlr		r11
+
+	neg		r9,$inp
+	lvx		$in0,0,$inp
+	addi		$inp,$inp,15		# 15 is not typo
+	lvsr		$key,0,r9		# borrow $key
+	li		r8,0x20
+	cmpwi		$bits,192
+	lvx		$in1,0,$inp
+	le?vspltisb	$mask,0x0f		# borrow $mask
+	lvx		$rcon,0,$ptr
+	le?vxor		$key,$key,$mask		# adjust for byte swap
+	lvx		$mask,r8,$ptr
+	addi		$ptr,$ptr,0x10
+	vperm		$in0,$in0,$in1,$key	# align [and byte swap in LE]
+	li		$cnt,8
+	vxor		$zero,$zero,$zero
+	mtctr		$cnt
+
+	?lvsr		$outperm,0,$out
+	vspltisb	$outmask,-1
+	lvx		$outhead,0,$out
+	?vperm		$outmask,$zero,$outmask,$outperm
+
+	blt		Loop128
+	addi		$inp,$inp,8
+	beq		L192
+	addi		$inp,$inp,8
+	b		L256
+
+.align	4
+Loop128:
+	vperm		$key,$in0,$in0,$mask	# rotate-n-splat
+	vsldoi		$tmp,$zero,$in0,12	# >>32
+	 vperm		$outtail,$in0,$in0,$outperm	# rotate
+	 vsel		$stage,$outhead,$outtail,$outmask
+	 vmr		$outhead,$outtail
+	vcipherlast	$key,$key,$rcon
+	 stvx		$stage,0,$out
+	 addi		$out,$out,16
+
+	vxor		$in0,$in0,$tmp
+	vsldoi		$tmp,$zero,$tmp,12	# >>32
+	vxor		$in0,$in0,$tmp
+	vsldoi		$tmp,$zero,$tmp,12	# >>32
+	vxor		$in0,$in0,$tmp
+	 vadduwm	$rcon,$rcon,$rcon
+	vxor		$in0,$in0,$key
+	bdnz		Loop128
+
+	lvx		$rcon,0,$ptr		# last two round keys
+
+	vperm		$key,$in0,$in0,$mask	# rotate-n-splat
+	vsldoi		$tmp,$zero,$in0,12	# >>32
+	 vperm		$outtail,$in0,$in0,$outperm	# rotate
+	 vsel		$stage,$outhead,$outtail,$outmask
+	 vmr		$outhead,$outtail
+	vcipherlast	$key,$key,$rcon
+	 stvx		$stage,0,$out
+	 addi		$out,$out,16
+
+	vxor		$in0,$in0,$tmp
+	vsldoi		$tmp,$zero,$tmp,12	# >>32
+	vxor		$in0,$in0,$tmp
+	vsldoi		$tmp,$zero,$tmp,12	# >>32
+	vxor		$in0,$in0,$tmp
+	 vadduwm	$rcon,$rcon,$rcon
+	vxor		$in0,$in0,$key
+
+	vperm		$key,$in0,$in0,$mask	# rotate-n-splat
+	vsldoi		$tmp,$zero,$in0,12	# >>32
+	 vperm		$outtail,$in0,$in0,$outperm	# rotate
+	 vsel		$stage,$outhead,$outtail,$outmask
+	 vmr		$outhead,$outtail
+	vcipherlast	$key,$key,$rcon
+	 stvx		$stage,0,$out
+	 addi		$out,$out,16
+
+	vxor		$in0,$in0,$tmp
+	vsldoi		$tmp,$zero,$tmp,12	# >>32
+	vxor		$in0,$in0,$tmp
+	vsldoi		$tmp,$zero,$tmp,12	# >>32
+	vxor		$in0,$in0,$tmp
+	vxor		$in0,$in0,$key
+	 vperm		$outtail,$in0,$in0,$outperm	# rotate
+	 vsel		$stage,$outhead,$outtail,$outmask
+	 vmr		$outhead,$outtail
+	 stvx		$stage,0,$out
+
+	addi		$inp,$out,15		# 15 is not typo
+	addi		$out,$out,0x50
+
+	li		$rounds,10
+	b		Ldone
+
+.align	4
+L192:
+	lvx		$tmp,0,$inp
+	li		$cnt,4
+	 vperm		$outtail,$in0,$in0,$outperm	# rotate
+	 vsel		$stage,$outhead,$outtail,$outmask
+	 vmr		$outhead,$outtail
+	 stvx		$stage,0,$out
+	 addi		$out,$out,16
+	vperm		$in1,$in1,$tmp,$key	# align [and byte swap in LE]
+	vspltisb	$key,8			# borrow $key
+	mtctr		$cnt
+	vsububm		$mask,$mask,$key	# adjust the mask
+
+Loop192:
+	vperm		$key,$in1,$in1,$mask	# roate-n-splat
+	vsldoi		$tmp,$zero,$in0,12	# >>32
+	vcipherlast	$key,$key,$rcon
+
+	vxor		$in0,$in0,$tmp
+	vsldoi		$tmp,$zero,$tmp,12	# >>32
+	vxor		$in0,$in0,$tmp
+	vsldoi		$tmp,$zero,$tmp,12	# >>32
+	vxor		$in0,$in0,$tmp
+
+	 vsldoi		$stage,$zero,$in1,8
+	vspltw		$tmp,$in0,3
+	vxor		$tmp,$tmp,$in1
+	vsldoi		$in1,$zero,$in1,12	# >>32
+	 vadduwm	$rcon,$rcon,$rcon
+	vxor		$in1,$in1,$tmp
+	vxor		$in0,$in0,$key
+	vxor		$in1,$in1,$key
+	 vsldoi		$stage,$stage,$in0,8
+
+	vperm		$key,$in1,$in1,$mask	# rotate-n-splat
+	vsldoi		$tmp,$zero,$in0,12	# >>32
+	 vperm		$outtail,$stage,$stage,$outperm	# rotate
+	 vsel		$stage,$outhead,$outtail,$outmask
+	 vmr		$outhead,$outtail
+	vcipherlast	$key,$key,$rcon
+	 stvx		$stage,0,$out
+	 addi		$out,$out,16
+
+	 vsldoi		$stage,$in0,$in1,8
+	vxor		$in0,$in0,$tmp
+	vsldoi		$tmp,$zero,$tmp,12	# >>32
+	 vperm		$outtail,$stage,$stage,$outperm	# rotate
+	 vsel		$stage,$outhead,$outtail,$outmask
+	 vmr		$outhead,$outtail
+	vxor		$in0,$in0,$tmp
+	vsldoi		$tmp,$zero,$tmp,12	# >>32
+	vxor		$in0,$in0,$tmp
+	 stvx		$stage,0,$out
+	 addi		$out,$out,16
+
+	vspltw		$tmp,$in0,3
+	vxor		$tmp,$tmp,$in1
+	vsldoi		$in1,$zero,$in1,12	# >>32
+	 vadduwm	$rcon,$rcon,$rcon
+	vxor		$in1,$in1,$tmp
+	vxor		$in0,$in0,$key
+	vxor		$in1,$in1,$key
+	 vperm		$outtail,$in0,$in0,$outperm	# rotate
+	 vsel		$stage,$outhead,$outtail,$outmask
+	 vmr		$outhead,$outtail
+	 stvx		$stage,0,$out
+	 addi		$inp,$out,15		# 15 is not typo
+	 addi		$out,$out,16
+	bdnz		Loop192
+
+	li		$rounds,12
+	addi		$out,$out,0x20
+	b		Ldone
+
+.align	4
+L256:
+	lvx		$tmp,0,$inp
+	li		$cnt,7
+	li		$rounds,14
+	 vperm		$outtail,$in0,$in0,$outperm	# rotate
+	 vsel		$stage,$outhead,$outtail,$outmask
+	 vmr		$outhead,$outtail
+	 stvx		$stage,0,$out
+	 addi		$out,$out,16
+	vperm		$in1,$in1,$tmp,$key	# align [and byte swap in LE]
+	mtctr		$cnt
+
+Loop256:
+	vperm		$key,$in1,$in1,$mask	# rotate-n-splat
+	vsldoi		$tmp,$zero,$in0,12	# >>32
+	 vperm		$outtail,$in1,$in1,$outperm	# rotate
+	 vsel		$stage,$outhead,$outtail,$outmask
+	 vmr		$outhead,$outtail
+	vcipherlast	$key,$key,$rcon
+	 stvx		$stage,0,$out
+	 addi		$out,$out,16
+
+	vxor		$in0,$in0,$tmp
+	vsldoi		$tmp,$zero,$tmp,12	# >>32
+	vxor		$in0,$in0,$tmp
+	vsldoi		$tmp,$zero,$tmp,12	# >>32
+	vxor		$in0,$in0,$tmp
+	 vadduwm	$rcon,$rcon,$rcon
+	vxor		$in0,$in0,$key
+	 vperm		$outtail,$in0,$in0,$outperm	# rotate
+	 vsel		$stage,$outhead,$outtail,$outmask
+	 vmr		$outhead,$outtail
+	 stvx		$stage,0,$out
+	 addi		$inp,$out,15		# 15 is not typo
+	 addi		$out,$out,16
+	bdz		Ldone
+
+	vspltw		$key,$in0,3		# just splat
+	vsldoi		$tmp,$zero,$in1,12	# >>32
+	vsbox		$key,$key
+
+	vxor		$in1,$in1,$tmp
+	vsldoi		$tmp,$zero,$tmp,12	# >>32
+	vxor		$in1,$in1,$tmp
+	vsldoi		$tmp,$zero,$tmp,12	# >>32
+	vxor		$in1,$in1,$tmp
+
+	vxor		$in1,$in1,$key
+	b		Loop256
+
+.align	4
+Ldone:
+	lvx		$in1,0,$inp		# redundant in aligned case
+	vsel		$in1,$outhead,$in1,$outmask
+	stvx		$in1,0,$inp
+	li		$ptr,0
+	mtspr		256,$vrsave
+	stw		$rounds,0($out)
+
+Lenc_key_abort:
+	mr		r3,$ptr
+	blr
+	.long		0
+	.byte		0,12,0x14,1,0,0,3,0
+	.long		0
+.size	.${prefix}_set_encrypt_key,.-.${prefix}_set_encrypt_key
+
+.globl	.${prefix}_set_decrypt_key
+.align	5
+.${prefix}_set_decrypt_key:
+	$STU		$sp,-$FRAME($sp)
+	mflr		r10
+	$PUSH		r10,$FRAME+$LRSAVE($sp)
+	bl		Lset_encrypt_key
+	mtlr		r10
+
+	cmpwi		r3,0
+	bne-		Ldec_key_abort
+
+	slwi		$cnt,$rounds,4
+	subi		$inp,$out,240		# first round key
+	srwi		$rounds,$rounds,1
+	add		$out,$inp,$cnt		# last round key
+	mtctr		$rounds
+
+Ldeckey:
+	lwz		r0, 0($inp)
+	lwz		r6, 4($inp)
+	lwz		r7, 8($inp)
+	lwz		r8, 12($inp)
+	addi		$inp,$inp,16
+	lwz		r9, 0($out)
+	lwz		r10,4($out)
+	lwz		r11,8($out)
+	lwz		r12,12($out)
+	stw		r0, 0($out)
+	stw		r6, 4($out)
+	stw		r7, 8($out)
+	stw		r8, 12($out)
+	subi		$out,$out,16
+	stw		r9, -16($inp)
+	stw		r10,-12($inp)
+	stw		r11,-8($inp)
+	stw		r12,-4($inp)
+	bdnz		Ldeckey
+
+	xor		r3,r3,r3		# return value
+Ldec_key_abort:
+	addi		$sp,$sp,$FRAME
+	blr
+	.long		0
+	.byte		0,12,4,1,0x80,0,3,0
+	.long		0
+.size	.${prefix}_set_decrypt_key,.-.${prefix}_set_decrypt_key
+___
+}}}
+#########################################################################
+{{{	# Single block en- and decrypt procedures			#
+sub gen_block () {
+my $dir = shift;
+my $n   = $dir eq "de" ? "n" : "";
+my ($inp,$out,$key,$rounds,$idx)=map("r$_",(3..7));
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	.${prefix}_${dir}crypt
+.align	5
+.${prefix}_${dir}crypt:
+	lwz		$rounds,240($key)
+	lis		r0,0xfc00
+	mfspr		$vrsave,256
+	li		$idx,15			# 15 is not typo
+	mtspr		256,r0
+
+	lvx		v0,0,$inp
+	neg		r11,$out
+	lvx		v1,$idx,$inp
+	lvsl		v2,0,$inp		# inpperm
+	le?vspltisb	v4,0x0f
+	?lvsl		v3,0,r11		# outperm
+	le?vxor		v2,v2,v4
+	li		$idx,16
+	vperm		v0,v0,v1,v2		# align [and byte swap in LE]
+	lvx		v1,0,$key
+	?lvsl		v5,0,$key		# keyperm
+	srwi		$rounds,$rounds,1
+	lvx		v2,$idx,$key
+	addi		$idx,$idx,16
+	subi		$rounds,$rounds,1
+	?vperm		v1,v1,v2,v5		# align round key
+
+	vxor		v0,v0,v1
+	lvx		v1,$idx,$key
+	addi		$idx,$idx,16
+	mtctr		$rounds
+
+Loop_${dir}c:
+	?vperm		v2,v2,v1,v5
+	v${n}cipher	v0,v0,v2
+	lvx		v2,$idx,$key
+	addi		$idx,$idx,16
+	?vperm		v1,v1,v2,v5
+	v${n}cipher	v0,v0,v1
+	lvx		v1,$idx,$key
+	addi		$idx,$idx,16
+	bdnz		Loop_${dir}c
+
+	?vperm		v2,v2,v1,v5
+	v${n}cipher	v0,v0,v2
+	lvx		v2,$idx,$key
+	?vperm		v1,v1,v2,v5
+	v${n}cipherlast	v0,v0,v1
+
+	vspltisb	v2,-1
+	vxor		v1,v1,v1
+	li		$idx,15			# 15 is not typo
+	?vperm		v2,v1,v2,v3		# outmask
+	le?vxor		v3,v3,v4
+	lvx		v1,0,$out		# outhead
+	vperm		v0,v0,v0,v3		# rotate [and byte swap in LE]
+	vsel		v1,v1,v0,v2
+	lvx		v4,$idx,$out
+	stvx		v1,0,$out
+	vsel		v0,v0,v4,v2
+	stvx		v0,$idx,$out
+
+	mtspr		256,$vrsave
+	blr
+	.long		0
+	.byte		0,12,0x14,0,0,0,3,0
+	.long		0
+.size	.${prefix}_${dir}crypt,.-.${prefix}_${dir}crypt
+___
+}
+&gen_block("en");
+&gen_block("de");
+}}}
+#########################################################################
+{{{	# CBC en- and decrypt procedures				#
+my ($inp,$out,$len,$key,$ivp,$enc,$rounds,$idx)=map("r$_",(3..10));
+my ($rndkey0,$rndkey1,$inout,$tmp)=		map("v$_",(0..3));
+my ($ivec,$inptail,$inpperm,$outhead,$outperm,$outmask,$keyperm)=
+						map("v$_",(4..10));
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	.${prefix}_cbc_encrypt
+.align	5
+.${prefix}_cbc_encrypt:
+	${UCMP}i	$len,16
+	bltlr-
+
+	cmpwi		$enc,0			# test direction
+	lis		r0,0xffe0
+	mfspr		$vrsave,256
+	mtspr		256,r0
+
+	li		$idx,15
+	vxor		$rndkey0,$rndkey0,$rndkey0
+	le?vspltisb	$tmp,0x0f
+
+	lvx		$ivec,0,$ivp		# load [unaligned] iv
+	lvsl		$inpperm,0,$ivp
+	lvx		$inptail,$idx,$ivp
+	le?vxor		$inpperm,$inpperm,$tmp
+	vperm		$ivec,$ivec,$inptail,$inpperm
+
+	neg		r11,$inp
+	?lvsl		$keyperm,0,$key		# prepare for unaligned key
+	lwz		$rounds,240($key)
+
+	lvsr		$inpperm,0,r11		# prepare for unaligned load
+	lvx		$inptail,0,$inp
+	addi		$inp,$inp,15		# 15 is not typo
+	le?vxor		$inpperm,$inpperm,$tmp
+
+	?lvsr		$outperm,0,$out		# prepare for unaligned store
+	vspltisb	$outmask,-1
+	lvx		$outhead,0,$out
+	?vperm		$outmask,$rndkey0,$outmask,$outperm
+	le?vxor		$outperm,$outperm,$tmp
+
+	srwi		$rounds,$rounds,1
+	li		$idx,16
+	subi		$rounds,$rounds,1
+	beq		Lcbc_dec
+
+Lcbc_enc:
+	vmr		$inout,$inptail
+	lvx		$inptail,0,$inp
+	addi		$inp,$inp,16
+	mtctr		$rounds
+	subi		$len,$len,16		# len-=16
+
+	lvx		$rndkey0,0,$key
+	 vperm		$inout,$inout,$inptail,$inpperm
+	lvx		$rndkey1,$idx,$key
+	addi		$idx,$idx,16
+	?vperm		$rndkey0,$rndkey0,$rndkey1,$keyperm
+	vxor		$inout,$inout,$rndkey0
+	lvx		$rndkey0,$idx,$key
+	addi		$idx,$idx,16
+	vxor		$inout,$inout,$ivec
+
+Loop_cbc_enc:
+	?vperm		$rndkey1,$rndkey1,$rndkey0,$keyperm
+	vcipher		$inout,$inout,$rndkey1
+	lvx		$rndkey1,$idx,$key
+	addi		$idx,$idx,16
+	?vperm		$rndkey0,$rndkey0,$rndkey1,$keyperm
+	vcipher		$inout,$inout,$rndkey0
+	lvx		$rndkey0,$idx,$key
+	addi		$idx,$idx,16
+	bdnz		Loop_cbc_enc
+
+	?vperm		$rndkey1,$rndkey1,$rndkey0,$keyperm
+	vcipher		$inout,$inout,$rndkey1
+	lvx		$rndkey1,$idx,$key
+	li		$idx,16
+	?vperm		$rndkey0,$rndkey0,$rndkey1,$keyperm
+	vcipherlast	$ivec,$inout,$rndkey0
+	${UCMP}i	$len,16
+
+	vperm		$tmp,$ivec,$ivec,$outperm
+	vsel		$inout,$outhead,$tmp,$outmask
+	vmr		$outhead,$tmp
+	stvx		$inout,0,$out
+	addi		$out,$out,16
+	bge		Lcbc_enc
+
+	b		Lcbc_done
+
+.align	4
+Lcbc_dec:
+	${UCMP}i	$len,128
+	bge		_aesp8_cbc_decrypt8x
+	vmr		$tmp,$inptail
+	lvx		$inptail,0,$inp
+	addi		$inp,$inp,16
+	mtctr		$rounds
+	subi		$len,$len,16		# len-=16
+
+	lvx		$rndkey0,0,$key
+	 vperm		$tmp,$tmp,$inptail,$inpperm
+	lvx		$rndkey1,$idx,$key
+	addi		$idx,$idx,16
+	?vperm		$rndkey0,$rndkey0,$rndkey1,$keyperm
+	vxor		$inout,$tmp,$rndkey0
+	lvx		$rndkey0,$idx,$key
+	addi		$idx,$idx,16
+
+Loop_cbc_dec:
+	?vperm		$rndkey1,$rndkey1,$rndkey0,$keyperm
+	vncipher	$inout,$inout,$rndkey1
+	lvx		$rndkey1,$idx,$key
+	addi		$idx,$idx,16
+	?vperm		$rndkey0,$rndkey0,$rndkey1,$keyperm
+	vncipher	$inout,$inout,$rndkey0
+	lvx		$rndkey0,$idx,$key
+	addi		$idx,$idx,16
+	bdnz		Loop_cbc_dec
+
+	?vperm		$rndkey1,$rndkey1,$rndkey0,$keyperm
+	vncipher	$inout,$inout,$rndkey1
+	lvx		$rndkey1,$idx,$key
+	li		$idx,16
+	?vperm		$rndkey0,$rndkey0,$rndkey1,$keyperm
+	vncipherlast	$inout,$inout,$rndkey0
+	${UCMP}i	$len,16
+
+	vxor		$inout,$inout,$ivec
+	vmr		$ivec,$tmp
+	vperm		$tmp,$inout,$inout,$outperm
+	vsel		$inout,$outhead,$tmp,$outmask
+	vmr		$outhead,$tmp
+	stvx		$inout,0,$out
+	addi		$out,$out,16
+	bge		Lcbc_dec
+
+Lcbc_done:
+	addi		$out,$out,-1
+	lvx		$inout,0,$out		# redundant in aligned case
+	vsel		$inout,$outhead,$inout,$outmask
+	stvx		$inout,0,$out
+
+	neg		$enc,$ivp		# write [unaligned] iv
+	li		$idx,15			# 15 is not typo
+	vxor		$rndkey0,$rndkey0,$rndkey0
+	vspltisb	$outmask,-1
+	le?vspltisb	$tmp,0x0f
+	?lvsl		$outperm,0,$enc
+	?vperm		$outmask,$rndkey0,$outmask,$outperm
+	le?vxor		$outperm,$outperm,$tmp
+	lvx		$outhead,0,$ivp
+	vperm		$ivec,$ivec,$ivec,$outperm
+	vsel		$inout,$outhead,$ivec,$outmask
+	lvx		$inptail,$idx,$ivp
+	stvx		$inout,0,$ivp
+	vsel		$inout,$ivec,$inptail,$outmask
+	stvx		$inout,$idx,$ivp
+
+	mtspr		256,$vrsave
+	blr
+	.long		0
+	.byte		0,12,0x14,0,0,0,6,0
+	.long		0
+___
+#########################################################################
+{{	# Optimized CBC decrypt procedure				#
+my $key_="r11";
+my ($x00,$x10,$x20,$x30,$x40,$x50,$x60,$x70)=map("r$_",(0,8,26..31));
+    $x00=0 if ($flavour =~ /osx/);
+my ($in0, $in1, $in2, $in3, $in4, $in5, $in6, $in7 )=map("v$_",(0..3,10..13));
+my ($out0,$out1,$out2,$out3,$out4,$out5,$out6,$out7)=map("v$_",(14..21));
+my $rndkey0="v23";	# v24-v25 rotating buffer for first found keys
+			# v26-v31 last 6 round keys
+my ($tmp,$keyperm)=($in3,$in4);	# aliases with "caller", redundant assignment
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.align	5
+_aesp8_cbc_decrypt8x:
+	$STU		$sp,-`($FRAME+21*16+6*$SIZE_T)`($sp)
+	li		r10,`$FRAME+8*16+15`
+	li		r11,`$FRAME+8*16+31`
+	stvx		v20,r10,$sp		# ABI says so
+	addi		r10,r10,32
+	stvx		v21,r11,$sp
+	addi		r11,r11,32
+	stvx		v22,r10,$sp
+	addi		r10,r10,32
+	stvx		v23,r11,$sp
+	addi		r11,r11,32
+	stvx		v24,r10,$sp
+	addi		r10,r10,32
+	stvx		v25,r11,$sp
+	addi		r11,r11,32
+	stvx		v26,r10,$sp
+	addi		r10,r10,32
+	stvx		v27,r11,$sp
+	addi		r11,r11,32
+	stvx		v28,r10,$sp
+	addi		r10,r10,32
+	stvx		v29,r11,$sp
+	addi		r11,r11,32
+	stvx		v30,r10,$sp
+	stvx		v31,r11,$sp
+	li		r0,-1
+	stw		$vrsave,`$FRAME+21*16-4`($sp)	# save vrsave
+	li		$x10,0x10
+	$PUSH		r26,`$FRAME+21*16+0*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+	li		$x20,0x20
+	$PUSH		r27,`$FRAME+21*16+1*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+	li		$x30,0x30
+	$PUSH		r28,`$FRAME+21*16+2*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+	li		$x40,0x40
+	$PUSH		r29,`$FRAME+21*16+3*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+	li		$x50,0x50
+	$PUSH		r30,`$FRAME+21*16+4*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+	li		$x60,0x60
+	$PUSH		r31,`$FRAME+21*16+5*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+	li		$x70,0x70
+	mtspr		256,r0
+
+	subi		$rounds,$rounds,3	# -4 in total
+	subi		$len,$len,128		# bias
+
+	lvx		$rndkey0,$x00,$key	# load key schedule
+	lvx		v30,$x10,$key
+	addi		$key,$key,0x20
+	lvx		v31,$x00,$key
+	?vperm		$rndkey0,$rndkey0,v30,$keyperm
+	addi		$key_,$sp,$FRAME+15
+	mtctr		$rounds
+
+Load_cbc_dec_key:
+	?vperm		v24,v30,v31,$keyperm
+	lvx		v30,$x10,$key
+	addi		$key,$key,0x20
+	stvx		v24,$x00,$key_		# off-load round[1]
+	?vperm		v25,v31,v30,$keyperm
+	lvx		v31,$x00,$key
+	stvx		v25,$x10,$key_		# off-load round[2]
+	addi		$key_,$key_,0x20
+	bdnz		Load_cbc_dec_key
+
+	lvx		v26,$x10,$key
+	?vperm		v24,v30,v31,$keyperm
+	lvx		v27,$x20,$key
+	stvx		v24,$x00,$key_		# off-load round[3]
+	?vperm		v25,v31,v26,$keyperm
+	lvx		v28,$x30,$key
+	stvx		v25,$x10,$key_		# off-load round[4]
+	addi		$key_,$sp,$FRAME+15	# rewind $key_
+	?vperm		v26,v26,v27,$keyperm
+	lvx		v29,$x40,$key
+	?vperm		v27,v27,v28,$keyperm
+	lvx		v30,$x50,$key
+	?vperm		v28,v28,v29,$keyperm
+	lvx		v31,$x60,$key
+	?vperm		v29,v29,v30,$keyperm
+	lvx		$out0,$x70,$key		# borrow $out0
+	?vperm		v30,v30,v31,$keyperm
+	lvx		v24,$x00,$key_		# pre-load round[1]
+	?vperm		v31,v31,$out0,$keyperm
+	lvx		v25,$x10,$key_		# pre-load round[2]
+
+	#lvx		$inptail,0,$inp		# "caller" already did this
+	#addi		$inp,$inp,15		# 15 is not typo
+	subi		$inp,$inp,15		# undo "caller"
+
+	 le?li		$idx,8
+	lvx_u		$in0,$x00,$inp		# load first 8 "words"
+	 le?lvsl	$inpperm,0,$idx
+	 le?vspltisb	$tmp,0x0f
+	lvx_u		$in1,$x10,$inp
+	 le?vxor	$inpperm,$inpperm,$tmp	# transform for lvx_u/stvx_u
+	lvx_u		$in2,$x20,$inp
+	 le?vperm	$in0,$in0,$in0,$inpperm
+	lvx_u		$in3,$x30,$inp
+	 le?vperm	$in1,$in1,$in1,$inpperm
+	lvx_u		$in4,$x40,$inp
+	 le?vperm	$in2,$in2,$in2,$inpperm
+	vxor		$out0,$in0,$rndkey0
+	lvx_u		$in5,$x50,$inp
+	 le?vperm	$in3,$in3,$in3,$inpperm
+	vxor		$out1,$in1,$rndkey0
+	lvx_u		$in6,$x60,$inp
+	 le?vperm	$in4,$in4,$in4,$inpperm
+	vxor		$out2,$in2,$rndkey0
+	lvx_u		$in7,$x70,$inp
+	addi		$inp,$inp,0x80
+	 le?vperm	$in5,$in5,$in5,$inpperm
+	vxor		$out3,$in3,$rndkey0
+	 le?vperm	$in6,$in6,$in6,$inpperm
+	vxor		$out4,$in4,$rndkey0
+	 le?vperm	$in7,$in7,$in7,$inpperm
+	vxor		$out5,$in5,$rndkey0
+	vxor		$out6,$in6,$rndkey0
+	vxor		$out7,$in7,$rndkey0
+
+	mtctr		$rounds
+	b		Loop_cbc_dec8x
+.align	5
+Loop_cbc_dec8x:
+	vncipher	$out0,$out0,v24
+	vncipher	$out1,$out1,v24
+	vncipher	$out2,$out2,v24
+	vncipher	$out3,$out3,v24
+	vncipher	$out4,$out4,v24
+	vncipher	$out5,$out5,v24
+	vncipher	$out6,$out6,v24
+	vncipher	$out7,$out7,v24
+	lvx		v24,$x20,$key_		# round[3]
+	addi		$key_,$key_,0x20
+
+	vncipher	$out0,$out0,v25
+	vncipher	$out1,$out1,v25
+	vncipher	$out2,$out2,v25
+	vncipher	$out3,$out3,v25
+	vncipher	$out4,$out4,v25
+	vncipher	$out5,$out5,v25
+	vncipher	$out6,$out6,v25
+	vncipher	$out7,$out7,v25
+	lvx		v25,$x10,$key_		# round[4]
+	bdnz		Loop_cbc_dec8x
+
+	subic		$len,$len,128		# $len-=128
+	vncipher	$out0,$out0,v24
+	vncipher	$out1,$out1,v24
+	vncipher	$out2,$out2,v24
+	vncipher	$out3,$out3,v24
+	vncipher	$out4,$out4,v24
+	vncipher	$out5,$out5,v24
+	vncipher	$out6,$out6,v24
+	vncipher	$out7,$out7,v24
+
+	subfe.		r0,r0,r0		# borrow?-1:0
+	vncipher	$out0,$out0,v25
+	vncipher	$out1,$out1,v25
+	vncipher	$out2,$out2,v25
+	vncipher	$out3,$out3,v25
+	vncipher	$out4,$out4,v25
+	vncipher	$out5,$out5,v25
+	vncipher	$out6,$out6,v25
+	vncipher	$out7,$out7,v25
+
+	and		r0,r0,$len
+	vncipher	$out0,$out0,v26
+	vncipher	$out1,$out1,v26
+	vncipher	$out2,$out2,v26
+	vncipher	$out3,$out3,v26
+	vncipher	$out4,$out4,v26
+	vncipher	$out5,$out5,v26
+	vncipher	$out6,$out6,v26
+	vncipher	$out7,$out7,v26
+
+	add		$inp,$inp,r0		# $inp is adjusted in such
+						# way that at exit from the
+						# loop inX-in7 are loaded
+						# with last "words"
+	vncipher	$out0,$out0,v27
+	vncipher	$out1,$out1,v27
+	vncipher	$out2,$out2,v27
+	vncipher	$out3,$out3,v27
+	vncipher	$out4,$out4,v27
+	vncipher	$out5,$out5,v27
+	vncipher	$out6,$out6,v27
+	vncipher	$out7,$out7,v27
+
+	addi		$key_,$sp,$FRAME+15	# rewind $key_
+	vncipher	$out0,$out0,v28
+	vncipher	$out1,$out1,v28
+	vncipher	$out2,$out2,v28
+	vncipher	$out3,$out3,v28
+	vncipher	$out4,$out4,v28
+	vncipher	$out5,$out5,v28
+	vncipher	$out6,$out6,v28
+	vncipher	$out7,$out7,v28
+	lvx		v24,$x00,$key_		# re-pre-load round[1]
+
+	vncipher	$out0,$out0,v29
+	vncipher	$out1,$out1,v29
+	vncipher	$out2,$out2,v29
+	vncipher	$out3,$out3,v29
+	vncipher	$out4,$out4,v29
+	vncipher	$out5,$out5,v29
+	vncipher	$out6,$out6,v29
+	vncipher	$out7,$out7,v29
+	lvx		v25,$x10,$key_		# re-pre-load round[2]
+
+	vncipher	$out0,$out0,v30
+	 vxor		$ivec,$ivec,v31		# xor with last round key
+	vncipher	$out1,$out1,v30
+	 vxor		$in0,$in0,v31
+	vncipher	$out2,$out2,v30
+	 vxor		$in1,$in1,v31
+	vncipher	$out3,$out3,v30
+	 vxor		$in2,$in2,v31
+	vncipher	$out4,$out4,v30
+	 vxor		$in3,$in3,v31
+	vncipher	$out5,$out5,v30
+	 vxor		$in4,$in4,v31
+	vncipher	$out6,$out6,v30
+	 vxor		$in5,$in5,v31
+	vncipher	$out7,$out7,v30
+	 vxor		$in6,$in6,v31
+
+	vncipherlast	$out0,$out0,$ivec
+	vncipherlast	$out1,$out1,$in0
+	 lvx_u		$in0,$x00,$inp		# load next input block
+	vncipherlast	$out2,$out2,$in1
+	 lvx_u		$in1,$x10,$inp
+	vncipherlast	$out3,$out3,$in2
+	 le?vperm	$in0,$in0,$in0,$inpperm
+	 lvx_u		$in2,$x20,$inp
+	vncipherlast	$out4,$out4,$in3
+	 le?vperm	$in1,$in1,$in1,$inpperm
+	 lvx_u		$in3,$x30,$inp
+	vncipherlast	$out5,$out5,$in4
+	 le?vperm	$in2,$in2,$in2,$inpperm
+	 lvx_u		$in4,$x40,$inp
+	vncipherlast	$out6,$out6,$in5
+	 le?vperm	$in3,$in3,$in3,$inpperm
+	 lvx_u		$in5,$x50,$inp
+	vncipherlast	$out7,$out7,$in6
+	 le?vperm	$in4,$in4,$in4,$inpperm
+	 lvx_u		$in6,$x60,$inp
+	vmr		$ivec,$in7
+	 le?vperm	$in5,$in5,$in5,$inpperm
+	 lvx_u		$in7,$x70,$inp
+	 addi		$inp,$inp,0x80
+
+	le?vperm	$out0,$out0,$out0,$inpperm
+	le?vperm	$out1,$out1,$out1,$inpperm
+	stvx_u		$out0,$x00,$out
+	 le?vperm	$in6,$in6,$in6,$inpperm
+	 vxor		$out0,$in0,$rndkey0
+	le?vperm	$out2,$out2,$out2,$inpperm
+	stvx_u		$out1,$x10,$out
+	 le?vperm	$in7,$in7,$in7,$inpperm
+	 vxor		$out1,$in1,$rndkey0
+	le?vperm	$out3,$out3,$out3,$inpperm
+	stvx_u		$out2,$x20,$out
+	 vxor		$out2,$in2,$rndkey0
+	le?vperm	$out4,$out4,$out4,$inpperm
+	stvx_u		$out3,$x30,$out
+	 vxor		$out3,$in3,$rndkey0
+	le?vperm	$out5,$out5,$out5,$inpperm
+	stvx_u		$out4,$x40,$out
+	 vxor		$out4,$in4,$rndkey0
+	le?vperm	$out6,$out6,$out6,$inpperm
+	stvx_u		$out5,$x50,$out
+	 vxor		$out5,$in5,$rndkey0
+	le?vperm	$out7,$out7,$out7,$inpperm
+	stvx_u		$out6,$x60,$out
+	 vxor		$out6,$in6,$rndkey0
+	stvx_u		$out7,$x70,$out
+	addi		$out,$out,0x80
+	 vxor		$out7,$in7,$rndkey0
+
+	mtctr		$rounds
+	beq		Loop_cbc_dec8x		# did $len-=128 borrow?
+
+	addic.		$len,$len,128
+	beq		Lcbc_dec8x_done
+	nop
+	nop
+
+Loop_cbc_dec8x_tail:				# up to 7 "words" tail...
+	vncipher	$out1,$out1,v24
+	vncipher	$out2,$out2,v24
+	vncipher	$out3,$out3,v24
+	vncipher	$out4,$out4,v24
+	vncipher	$out5,$out5,v24
+	vncipher	$out6,$out6,v24
+	vncipher	$out7,$out7,v24
+	lvx		v24,$x20,$key_		# round[3]
+	addi		$key_,$key_,0x20
+
+	vncipher	$out1,$out1,v25
+	vncipher	$out2,$out2,v25
+	vncipher	$out3,$out3,v25
+	vncipher	$out4,$out4,v25
+	vncipher	$out5,$out5,v25
+	vncipher	$out6,$out6,v25
+	vncipher	$out7,$out7,v25
+	lvx		v25,$x10,$key_		# round[4]
+	bdnz		Loop_cbc_dec8x_tail
+
+	vncipher	$out1,$out1,v24
+	vncipher	$out2,$out2,v24
+	vncipher	$out3,$out3,v24
+	vncipher	$out4,$out4,v24
+	vncipher	$out5,$out5,v24
+	vncipher	$out6,$out6,v24
+	vncipher	$out7,$out7,v24
+
+	vncipher	$out1,$out1,v25
+	vncipher	$out2,$out2,v25
+	vncipher	$out3,$out3,v25
+	vncipher	$out4,$out4,v25
+	vncipher	$out5,$out5,v25
+	vncipher	$out6,$out6,v25
+	vncipher	$out7,$out7,v25
+
+	vncipher	$out1,$out1,v26
+	vncipher	$out2,$out2,v26
+	vncipher	$out3,$out3,v26
+	vncipher	$out4,$out4,v26
+	vncipher	$out5,$out5,v26
+	vncipher	$out6,$out6,v26
+	vncipher	$out7,$out7,v26
+
+	vncipher	$out1,$out1,v27
+	vncipher	$out2,$out2,v27
+	vncipher	$out3,$out3,v27
+	vncipher	$out4,$out4,v27
+	vncipher	$out5,$out5,v27
+	vncipher	$out6,$out6,v27
+	vncipher	$out7,$out7,v27
+
+	vncipher	$out1,$out1,v28
+	vncipher	$out2,$out2,v28
+	vncipher	$out3,$out3,v28
+	vncipher	$out4,$out4,v28
+	vncipher	$out5,$out5,v28
+	vncipher	$out6,$out6,v28
+	vncipher	$out7,$out7,v28
+
+	vncipher	$out1,$out1,v29
+	vncipher	$out2,$out2,v29
+	vncipher	$out3,$out3,v29
+	vncipher	$out4,$out4,v29
+	vncipher	$out5,$out5,v29
+	vncipher	$out6,$out6,v29
+	vncipher	$out7,$out7,v29
+
+	vncipher	$out1,$out1,v30
+	 vxor		$ivec,$ivec,v31		# last round key
+	vncipher	$out2,$out2,v30
+	 vxor		$in1,$in1,v31
+	vncipher	$out3,$out3,v30
+	 vxor		$in2,$in2,v31
+	vncipher	$out4,$out4,v30
+	 vxor		$in3,$in3,v31
+	vncipher	$out5,$out5,v30
+	 vxor		$in4,$in4,v31
+	vncipher	$out6,$out6,v30
+	 vxor		$in5,$in5,v31
+	vncipher	$out7,$out7,v30
+	 vxor		$in6,$in6,v31
+
+	cmplwi		$len,32			# switch($len)
+	blt		Lcbc_dec8x_one
+	nop
+	beq		Lcbc_dec8x_two
+	cmplwi		$len,64
+	blt		Lcbc_dec8x_three
+	nop
+	beq		Lcbc_dec8x_four
+	cmplwi		$len,96
+	blt		Lcbc_dec8x_five
+	nop
+	beq		Lcbc_dec8x_six
+
+Lcbc_dec8x_seven:
+	vncipherlast	$out1,$out1,$ivec
+	vncipherlast	$out2,$out2,$in1
+	vncipherlast	$out3,$out3,$in2
+	vncipherlast	$out4,$out4,$in3
+	vncipherlast	$out5,$out5,$in4
+	vncipherlast	$out6,$out6,$in5
+	vncipherlast	$out7,$out7,$in6
+	vmr		$ivec,$in7
+
+	le?vperm	$out1,$out1,$out1,$inpperm
+	le?vperm	$out2,$out2,$out2,$inpperm
+	stvx_u		$out1,$x00,$out
+	le?vperm	$out3,$out3,$out3,$inpperm
+	stvx_u		$out2,$x10,$out
+	le?vperm	$out4,$out4,$out4,$inpperm
+	stvx_u		$out3,$x20,$out
+	le?vperm	$out5,$out5,$out5,$inpperm
+	stvx_u		$out4,$x30,$out
+	le?vperm	$out6,$out6,$out6,$inpperm
+	stvx_u		$out5,$x40,$out
+	le?vperm	$out7,$out7,$out7,$inpperm
+	stvx_u		$out6,$x50,$out
+	stvx_u		$out7,$x60,$out
+	addi		$out,$out,0x70
+	b		Lcbc_dec8x_done
+
+.align	5
+Lcbc_dec8x_six:
+	vncipherlast	$out2,$out2,$ivec
+	vncipherlast	$out3,$out3,$in2
+	vncipherlast	$out4,$out4,$in3
+	vncipherlast	$out5,$out5,$in4
+	vncipherlast	$out6,$out6,$in5
+	vncipherlast	$out7,$out7,$in6
+	vmr		$ivec,$in7
+
+	le?vperm	$out2,$out2,$out2,$inpperm
+	le?vperm	$out3,$out3,$out3,$inpperm
+	stvx_u		$out2,$x00,$out
+	le?vperm	$out4,$out4,$out4,$inpperm
+	stvx_u		$out3,$x10,$out
+	le?vperm	$out5,$out5,$out5,$inpperm
+	stvx_u		$out4,$x20,$out
+	le?vperm	$out6,$out6,$out6,$inpperm
+	stvx_u		$out5,$x30,$out
+	le?vperm	$out7,$out7,$out7,$inpperm
+	stvx_u		$out6,$x40,$out
+	stvx_u		$out7,$x50,$out
+	addi		$out,$out,0x60
+	b		Lcbc_dec8x_done
+
+.align	5
+Lcbc_dec8x_five:
+	vncipherlast	$out3,$out3,$ivec
+	vncipherlast	$out4,$out4,$in3
+	vncipherlast	$out5,$out5,$in4
+	vncipherlast	$out6,$out6,$in5
+	vncipherlast	$out7,$out7,$in6
+	vmr		$ivec,$in7
+
+	le?vperm	$out3,$out3,$out3,$inpperm
+	le?vperm	$out4,$out4,$out4,$inpperm
+	stvx_u		$out3,$x00,$out
+	le?vperm	$out5,$out5,$out5,$inpperm
+	stvx_u		$out4,$x10,$out
+	le?vperm	$out6,$out6,$out6,$inpperm
+	stvx_u		$out5,$x20,$out
+	le?vperm	$out7,$out7,$out7,$inpperm
+	stvx_u		$out6,$x30,$out
+	stvx_u		$out7,$x40,$out
+	addi		$out,$out,0x50
+	b		Lcbc_dec8x_done
+
+.align	5
+Lcbc_dec8x_four:
+	vncipherlast	$out4,$out4,$ivec
+	vncipherlast	$out5,$out5,$in4
+	vncipherlast	$out6,$out6,$in5
+	vncipherlast	$out7,$out7,$in6
+	vmr		$ivec,$in7
+
+	le?vperm	$out4,$out4,$out4,$inpperm
+	le?vperm	$out5,$out5,$out5,$inpperm
+	stvx_u		$out4,$x00,$out
+	le?vperm	$out6,$out6,$out6,$inpperm
+	stvx_u		$out5,$x10,$out
+	le?vperm	$out7,$out7,$out7,$inpperm
+	stvx_u		$out6,$x20,$out
+	stvx_u		$out7,$x30,$out
+	addi		$out,$out,0x40
+	b		Lcbc_dec8x_done
+
+.align	5
+Lcbc_dec8x_three:
+	vncipherlast	$out5,$out5,$ivec
+	vncipherlast	$out6,$out6,$in5
+	vncipherlast	$out7,$out7,$in6
+	vmr		$ivec,$in7
+
+	le?vperm	$out5,$out5,$out5,$inpperm
+	le?vperm	$out6,$out6,$out6,$inpperm
+	stvx_u		$out5,$x00,$out
+	le?vperm	$out7,$out7,$out7,$inpperm
+	stvx_u		$out6,$x10,$out
+	stvx_u		$out7,$x20,$out
+	addi		$out,$out,0x30
+	b		Lcbc_dec8x_done
+
+.align	5
+Lcbc_dec8x_two:
+	vncipherlast	$out6,$out6,$ivec
+	vncipherlast	$out7,$out7,$in6
+	vmr		$ivec,$in7
+
+	le?vperm	$out6,$out6,$out6,$inpperm
+	le?vperm	$out7,$out7,$out7,$inpperm
+	stvx_u		$out6,$x00,$out
+	stvx_u		$out7,$x10,$out
+	addi		$out,$out,0x20
+	b		Lcbc_dec8x_done
+
+.align	5
+Lcbc_dec8x_one:
+	vncipherlast	$out7,$out7,$ivec
+	vmr		$ivec,$in7
+
+	le?vperm	$out7,$out7,$out7,$inpperm
+	stvx_u		$out7,0,$out
+	addi		$out,$out,0x10
+
+Lcbc_dec8x_done:
+	le?vperm	$ivec,$ivec,$ivec,$inpperm
+	stvx_u		$ivec,0,$ivp		# write [unaligned] iv
+
+	li		r10,`$FRAME+15`
+	li		r11,`$FRAME+31`
+	stvx		$inpperm,r10,$sp	# wipe copies of round keys
+	addi		r10,r10,32
+	stvx		$inpperm,r11,$sp
+	addi		r11,r11,32
+	stvx		$inpperm,r10,$sp
+	addi		r10,r10,32
+	stvx		$inpperm,r11,$sp
+	addi		r11,r11,32
+	stvx		$inpperm,r10,$sp
+	addi		r10,r10,32
+	stvx		$inpperm,r11,$sp
+	addi		r11,r11,32
+	stvx		$inpperm,r10,$sp
+	addi		r10,r10,32
+	stvx		$inpperm,r11,$sp
+	addi		r11,r11,32
+
+	mtspr		256,$vrsave
+	lvx		v20,r10,$sp		# ABI says so
+	addi		r10,r10,32
+	lvx		v21,r11,$sp
+	addi		r11,r11,32
+	lvx		v22,r10,$sp
+	addi		r10,r10,32
+	lvx		v23,r11,$sp
+	addi		r11,r11,32
+	lvx		v24,r10,$sp
+	addi		r10,r10,32
+	lvx		v25,r11,$sp
+	addi		r11,r11,32
+	lvx		v26,r10,$sp
+	addi		r10,r10,32
+	lvx		v27,r11,$sp
+	addi		r11,r11,32
+	lvx		v28,r10,$sp
+	addi		r10,r10,32
+	lvx		v29,r11,$sp
+	addi		r11,r11,32
+	lvx		v30,r10,$sp
+	lvx		v31,r11,$sp
+	$POP		r26,`$FRAME+21*16+0*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+	$POP		r27,`$FRAME+21*16+1*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+	$POP		r28,`$FRAME+21*16+2*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+	$POP		r29,`$FRAME+21*16+3*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+	$POP		r30,`$FRAME+21*16+4*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+	$POP		r31,`$FRAME+21*16+5*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+	addi		$sp,$sp,`$FRAME+21*16+6*$SIZE_T`
+	blr
+	.long		0
+	.byte		0,12,0x04,0,0x80,6,6,0
+	.long		0
+.size	.${prefix}_cbc_encrypt,.-.${prefix}_cbc_encrypt
+___
+}}	}}}
+
+#########################################################################
+{{{	# CTR procedure[s]						#
+my ($inp,$out,$len,$key,$ivp,$x10,$rounds,$idx)=map("r$_",(3..10));
+my ($rndkey0,$rndkey1,$inout,$tmp)=		map("v$_",(0..3));
+my ($ivec,$inptail,$inpperm,$outhead,$outperm,$outmask,$keyperm,$one)=
+						map("v$_",(4..11));
+my $dat=$tmp;
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	.${prefix}_ctr32_encrypt_blocks
+.align	5
+.${prefix}_ctr32_encrypt_blocks:
+	${UCMP}i	$len,1
+	bltlr-
+
+	lis		r0,0xfff0
+	mfspr		$vrsave,256
+	mtspr		256,r0
+
+	li		$idx,15
+	vxor		$rndkey0,$rndkey0,$rndkey0
+	le?vspltisb	$tmp,0x0f
+
+	lvx		$ivec,0,$ivp		# load [unaligned] iv
+	lvsl		$inpperm,0,$ivp
+	lvx		$inptail,$idx,$ivp
+	 vspltisb	$one,1
+	le?vxor		$inpperm,$inpperm,$tmp
+	vperm		$ivec,$ivec,$inptail,$inpperm
+	 vsldoi		$one,$rndkey0,$one,1
+
+	neg		r11,$inp
+	?lvsl		$keyperm,0,$key		# prepare for unaligned key
+	lwz		$rounds,240($key)
+
+	lvsr		$inpperm,0,r11		# prepare for unaligned load
+	lvx		$inptail,0,$inp
+	addi		$inp,$inp,15		# 15 is not typo
+	le?vxor		$inpperm,$inpperm,$tmp
+
+	srwi		$rounds,$rounds,1
+	li		$idx,16
+	subi		$rounds,$rounds,1
+
+	${UCMP}i	$len,8
+	bge		_aesp8_ctr32_encrypt8x
+
+	?lvsr		$outperm,0,$out		# prepare for unaligned store
+	vspltisb	$outmask,-1
+	lvx		$outhead,0,$out
+	?vperm		$outmask,$rndkey0,$outmask,$outperm
+	le?vxor		$outperm,$outperm,$tmp
+
+	lvx		$rndkey0,0,$key
+	mtctr		$rounds
+	lvx		$rndkey1,$idx,$key
+	addi		$idx,$idx,16
+	?vperm		$rndkey0,$rndkey0,$rndkey1,$keyperm
+	vxor		$inout,$ivec,$rndkey0
+	lvx		$rndkey0,$idx,$key
+	addi		$idx,$idx,16
+	b		Loop_ctr32_enc
+
+.align	5
+Loop_ctr32_enc:
+	?vperm		$rndkey1,$rndkey1,$rndkey0,$keyperm
+	vcipher		$inout,$inout,$rndkey1
+	lvx		$rndkey1,$idx,$key
+	addi		$idx,$idx,16
+	?vperm		$rndkey0,$rndkey0,$rndkey1,$keyperm
+	vcipher		$inout,$inout,$rndkey0
+	lvx		$rndkey0,$idx,$key
+	addi		$idx,$idx,16
+	bdnz		Loop_ctr32_enc
+
+	vadduwm		$ivec,$ivec,$one
+	 vmr		$dat,$inptail
+	 lvx		$inptail,0,$inp
+	 addi		$inp,$inp,16
+	 subic.		$len,$len,1		# blocks--
+
+	?vperm		$rndkey1,$rndkey1,$rndkey0,$keyperm
+	vcipher		$inout,$inout,$rndkey1
+	lvx		$rndkey1,$idx,$key
+	 vperm		$dat,$dat,$inptail,$inpperm
+	 li		$idx,16
+	?vperm		$rndkey1,$rndkey0,$rndkey1,$keyperm
+	 lvx		$rndkey0,0,$key
+	vxor		$dat,$dat,$rndkey1	# last round key
+	vcipherlast	$inout,$inout,$dat
+
+	 lvx		$rndkey1,$idx,$key
+	 addi		$idx,$idx,16
+	vperm		$inout,$inout,$inout,$outperm
+	vsel		$dat,$outhead,$inout,$outmask
+	 mtctr		$rounds
+	 ?vperm		$rndkey0,$rndkey0,$rndkey1,$keyperm
+	vmr		$outhead,$inout
+	 vxor		$inout,$ivec,$rndkey0
+	 lvx		$rndkey0,$idx,$key
+	 addi		$idx,$idx,16
+	stvx		$dat,0,$out
+	addi		$out,$out,16
+	bne		Loop_ctr32_enc
+
+	addi		$out,$out,-1
+	lvx		$inout,0,$out		# redundant in aligned case
+	vsel		$inout,$outhead,$inout,$outmask
+	stvx		$inout,0,$out
+
+	mtspr		256,$vrsave
+	blr
+	.long		0
+	.byte		0,12,0x14,0,0,0,6,0
+	.long		0
+___
+#########################################################################
+{{	# Optimized CTR procedure					#
+my $key_="r11";
+my ($x00,$x10,$x20,$x30,$x40,$x50,$x60,$x70)=map("r$_",(0,8,26..31));
+    $x00=0 if ($flavour =~ /osx/);
+my ($in0, $in1, $in2, $in3, $in4, $in5, $in6, $in7 )=map("v$_",(0..3,10,12..14));
+my ($out0,$out1,$out2,$out3,$out4,$out5,$out6,$out7)=map("v$_",(15..22));
+my $rndkey0="v23";	# v24-v25 rotating buffer for first found keys
+			# v26-v31 last 6 round keys
+my ($tmp,$keyperm)=($in3,$in4);	# aliases with "caller", redundant assignment
+my ($two,$three,$four)=($outhead,$outperm,$outmask);
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.align	5
+_aesp8_ctr32_encrypt8x:
+	$STU		$sp,-`($FRAME+21*16+6*$SIZE_T)`($sp)
+	li		r10,`$FRAME+8*16+15`
+	li		r11,`$FRAME+8*16+31`
+	stvx		v20,r10,$sp		# ABI says so
+	addi		r10,r10,32
+	stvx		v21,r11,$sp
+	addi		r11,r11,32
+	stvx		v22,r10,$sp
+	addi		r10,r10,32
+	stvx		v23,r11,$sp
+	addi		r11,r11,32
+	stvx		v24,r10,$sp
+	addi		r10,r10,32
+	stvx		v25,r11,$sp
+	addi		r11,r11,32
+	stvx		v26,r10,$sp
+	addi		r10,r10,32
+	stvx		v27,r11,$sp
+	addi		r11,r11,32
+	stvx		v28,r10,$sp
+	addi		r10,r10,32
+	stvx		v29,r11,$sp
+	addi		r11,r11,32
+	stvx		v30,r10,$sp
+	stvx		v31,r11,$sp
+	li		r0,-1
+	stw		$vrsave,`$FRAME+21*16-4`($sp)	# save vrsave
+	li		$x10,0x10
+	$PUSH		r26,`$FRAME+21*16+0*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+	li		$x20,0x20
+	$PUSH		r27,`$FRAME+21*16+1*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+	li		$x30,0x30
+	$PUSH		r28,`$FRAME+21*16+2*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+	li		$x40,0x40
+	$PUSH		r29,`$FRAME+21*16+3*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+	li		$x50,0x50
+	$PUSH		r30,`$FRAME+21*16+4*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+	li		$x60,0x60
+	$PUSH		r31,`$FRAME+21*16+5*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+	li		$x70,0x70
+	mtspr		256,r0
+
+	subi		$rounds,$rounds,3	# -4 in total
+
+	lvx		$rndkey0,$x00,$key	# load key schedule
+	lvx		v30,$x10,$key
+	addi		$key,$key,0x20
+	lvx		v31,$x00,$key
+	?vperm		$rndkey0,$rndkey0,v30,$keyperm
+	addi		$key_,$sp,$FRAME+15
+	mtctr		$rounds
+
+Load_ctr32_enc_key:
+	?vperm		v24,v30,v31,$keyperm
+	lvx		v30,$x10,$key
+	addi		$key,$key,0x20
+	stvx		v24,$x00,$key_		# off-load round[1]
+	?vperm		v25,v31,v30,$keyperm
+	lvx		v31,$x00,$key
+	stvx		v25,$x10,$key_		# off-load round[2]
+	addi		$key_,$key_,0x20
+	bdnz		Load_ctr32_enc_key
+
+	lvx		v26,$x10,$key
+	?vperm		v24,v30,v31,$keyperm
+	lvx		v27,$x20,$key
+	stvx		v24,$x00,$key_		# off-load round[3]
+	?vperm		v25,v31,v26,$keyperm
+	lvx		v28,$x30,$key
+	stvx		v25,$x10,$key_		# off-load round[4]
+	addi		$key_,$sp,$FRAME+15	# rewind $key_
+	?vperm		v26,v26,v27,$keyperm
+	lvx		v29,$x40,$key
+	?vperm		v27,v27,v28,$keyperm
+	lvx		v30,$x50,$key
+	?vperm		v28,v28,v29,$keyperm
+	lvx		v31,$x60,$key
+	?vperm		v29,v29,v30,$keyperm
+	lvx		$out0,$x70,$key		# borrow $out0
+	?vperm		v30,v30,v31,$keyperm
+	lvx		v24,$x00,$key_		# pre-load round[1]
+	?vperm		v31,v31,$out0,$keyperm
+	lvx		v25,$x10,$key_		# pre-load round[2]
+
+	vadduwm		$two,$one,$one
+	subi		$inp,$inp,15		# undo "caller"
+	$SHL		$len,$len,4
+
+	vadduwm		$out1,$ivec,$one	# counter values ...
+	vadduwm		$out2,$ivec,$two
+	vxor		$out0,$ivec,$rndkey0	# ... xored with rndkey[0]
+	 le?li		$idx,8
+	vadduwm		$out3,$out1,$two
+	vxor		$out1,$out1,$rndkey0
+	 le?lvsl	$inpperm,0,$idx
+	vadduwm		$out4,$out2,$two
+	vxor		$out2,$out2,$rndkey0
+	 le?vspltisb	$tmp,0x0f
+	vadduwm		$out5,$out3,$two
+	vxor		$out3,$out3,$rndkey0
+	 le?vxor	$inpperm,$inpperm,$tmp	# transform for lvx_u/stvx_u
+	vadduwm		$out6,$out4,$two
+	vxor		$out4,$out4,$rndkey0
+	vadduwm		$out7,$out5,$two
+	vxor		$out5,$out5,$rndkey0
+	vadduwm		$ivec,$out6,$two	# next counter value
+	vxor		$out6,$out6,$rndkey0
+	vxor		$out7,$out7,$rndkey0
+
+	mtctr		$rounds
+	b		Loop_ctr32_enc8x
+.align	5
+Loop_ctr32_enc8x:
+	vcipher 	$out0,$out0,v24
+	vcipher 	$out1,$out1,v24
+	vcipher 	$out2,$out2,v24
+	vcipher 	$out3,$out3,v24
+	vcipher 	$out4,$out4,v24
+	vcipher 	$out5,$out5,v24
+	vcipher 	$out6,$out6,v24
+	vcipher 	$out7,$out7,v24
+Loop_ctr32_enc8x_middle:
+	lvx		v24,$x20,$key_		# round[3]
+	addi		$key_,$key_,0x20
+
+	vcipher 	$out0,$out0,v25
+	vcipher 	$out1,$out1,v25
+	vcipher 	$out2,$out2,v25
+	vcipher 	$out3,$out3,v25
+	vcipher 	$out4,$out4,v25
+	vcipher 	$out5,$out5,v25
+	vcipher 	$out6,$out6,v25
+	vcipher 	$out7,$out7,v25
+	lvx		v25,$x10,$key_		# round[4]
+	bdnz		Loop_ctr32_enc8x
+
+	subic		r11,$len,256		# $len-256, borrow $key_
+	vcipher 	$out0,$out0,v24
+	vcipher 	$out1,$out1,v24
+	vcipher 	$out2,$out2,v24
+	vcipher 	$out3,$out3,v24
+	vcipher 	$out4,$out4,v24
+	vcipher 	$out5,$out5,v24
+	vcipher 	$out6,$out6,v24
+	vcipher 	$out7,$out7,v24
+
+	subfe		r0,r0,r0		# borrow?-1:0
+	vcipher 	$out0,$out0,v25
+	vcipher 	$out1,$out1,v25
+	vcipher 	$out2,$out2,v25
+	vcipher 	$out3,$out3,v25
+	vcipher 	$out4,$out4,v25
+	vcipher		$out5,$out5,v25
+	vcipher		$out6,$out6,v25
+	vcipher		$out7,$out7,v25
+
+	and		r0,r0,r11
+	addi		$key_,$sp,$FRAME+15	# rewind $key_
+	vcipher		$out0,$out0,v26
+	vcipher		$out1,$out1,v26
+	vcipher		$out2,$out2,v26
+	vcipher		$out3,$out3,v26
+	vcipher		$out4,$out4,v26
+	vcipher		$out5,$out5,v26
+	vcipher		$out6,$out6,v26
+	vcipher		$out7,$out7,v26
+	lvx		v24,$x00,$key_		# re-pre-load round[1]
+
+	subic		$len,$len,129		# $len-=129
+	vcipher		$out0,$out0,v27
+	addi		$len,$len,1		# $len-=128 really
+	vcipher		$out1,$out1,v27
+	vcipher		$out2,$out2,v27
+	vcipher		$out3,$out3,v27
+	vcipher		$out4,$out4,v27
+	vcipher		$out5,$out5,v27
+	vcipher		$out6,$out6,v27
+	vcipher		$out7,$out7,v27
+	lvx		v25,$x10,$key_		# re-pre-load round[2]
+
+	vcipher		$out0,$out0,v28
+	 lvx_u		$in0,$x00,$inp		# load input
+	vcipher		$out1,$out1,v28
+	 lvx_u		$in1,$x10,$inp
+	vcipher		$out2,$out2,v28
+	 lvx_u		$in2,$x20,$inp
+	vcipher		$out3,$out3,v28
+	 lvx_u		$in3,$x30,$inp
+	vcipher		$out4,$out4,v28
+	 lvx_u		$in4,$x40,$inp
+	vcipher		$out5,$out5,v28
+	 lvx_u		$in5,$x50,$inp
+	vcipher		$out6,$out6,v28
+	 lvx_u		$in6,$x60,$inp
+	vcipher		$out7,$out7,v28
+	 lvx_u		$in7,$x70,$inp
+	 addi		$inp,$inp,0x80
+
+	vcipher		$out0,$out0,v29
+	 le?vperm	$in0,$in0,$in0,$inpperm
+	vcipher		$out1,$out1,v29
+	 le?vperm	$in1,$in1,$in1,$inpperm
+	vcipher		$out2,$out2,v29
+	 le?vperm	$in2,$in2,$in2,$inpperm
+	vcipher		$out3,$out3,v29
+	 le?vperm	$in3,$in3,$in3,$inpperm
+	vcipher		$out4,$out4,v29
+	 le?vperm	$in4,$in4,$in4,$inpperm
+	vcipher		$out5,$out5,v29
+	 le?vperm	$in5,$in5,$in5,$inpperm
+	vcipher		$out6,$out6,v29
+	 le?vperm	$in6,$in6,$in6,$inpperm
+	vcipher		$out7,$out7,v29
+	 le?vperm	$in7,$in7,$in7,$inpperm
+
+	add		$inp,$inp,r0		# $inp is adjusted in such
+						# way that at exit from the
+						# loop inX-in7 are loaded
+						# with last "words"
+	subfe.		r0,r0,r0		# borrow?-1:0
+	vcipher		$out0,$out0,v30
+	 vxor		$in0,$in0,v31		# xor with last round key
+	vcipher		$out1,$out1,v30
+	 vxor		$in1,$in1,v31
+	vcipher		$out2,$out2,v30
+	 vxor		$in2,$in2,v31
+	vcipher		$out3,$out3,v30
+	 vxor		$in3,$in3,v31
+	vcipher		$out4,$out4,v30
+	 vxor		$in4,$in4,v31
+	vcipher		$out5,$out5,v30
+	 vxor		$in5,$in5,v31
+	vcipher		$out6,$out6,v30
+	 vxor		$in6,$in6,v31
+	vcipher		$out7,$out7,v30
+	 vxor		$in7,$in7,v31
+
+	bne		Lctr32_enc8x_break	# did $len-129 borrow?
+
+	vcipherlast	$in0,$out0,$in0
+	vcipherlast	$in1,$out1,$in1
+	 vadduwm	$out1,$ivec,$one	# counter values ...
+	vcipherlast	$in2,$out2,$in2
+	 vadduwm	$out2,$ivec,$two
+	 vxor		$out0,$ivec,$rndkey0	# ... xored with rndkey[0]
+	vcipherlast	$in3,$out3,$in3
+	 vadduwm	$out3,$out1,$two
+	 vxor		$out1,$out1,$rndkey0
+	vcipherlast	$in4,$out4,$in4
+	 vadduwm	$out4,$out2,$two
+	 vxor		$out2,$out2,$rndkey0
+	vcipherlast	$in5,$out5,$in5
+	 vadduwm	$out5,$out3,$two
+	 vxor		$out3,$out3,$rndkey0
+	vcipherlast	$in6,$out6,$in6
+	 vadduwm	$out6,$out4,$two
+	 vxor		$out4,$out4,$rndkey0
+	vcipherlast	$in7,$out7,$in7
+	 vadduwm	$out7,$out5,$two
+	 vxor		$out5,$out5,$rndkey0
+	le?vperm	$in0,$in0,$in0,$inpperm
+	 vadduwm	$ivec,$out6,$two	# next counter value
+	 vxor		$out6,$out6,$rndkey0
+	le?vperm	$in1,$in1,$in1,$inpperm
+	 vxor		$out7,$out7,$rndkey0
+	mtctr		$rounds
+
+	 vcipher	$out0,$out0,v24
+	stvx_u		$in0,$x00,$out
+	le?vperm	$in2,$in2,$in2,$inpperm
+	 vcipher	$out1,$out1,v24
+	stvx_u		$in1,$x10,$out
+	le?vperm	$in3,$in3,$in3,$inpperm
+	 vcipher	$out2,$out2,v24
+	stvx_u		$in2,$x20,$out
+	le?vperm	$in4,$in4,$in4,$inpperm
+	 vcipher	$out3,$out3,v24
+	stvx_u		$in3,$x30,$out
+	le?vperm	$in5,$in5,$in5,$inpperm
+	 vcipher	$out4,$out4,v24
+	stvx_u		$in4,$x40,$out
+	le?vperm	$in6,$in6,$in6,$inpperm
+	 vcipher	$out5,$out5,v24
+	stvx_u		$in5,$x50,$out
+	le?vperm	$in7,$in7,$in7,$inpperm
+	 vcipher	$out6,$out6,v24
+	stvx_u		$in6,$x60,$out
+	 vcipher	$out7,$out7,v24
+	stvx_u		$in7,$x70,$out
+	addi		$out,$out,0x80
+
+	b		Loop_ctr32_enc8x_middle
+
+.align	5
+Lctr32_enc8x_break:
+	cmpwi		$len,-0x60
+	blt		Lctr32_enc8x_one
+	nop
+	beq		Lctr32_enc8x_two
+	cmpwi		$len,-0x40
+	blt		Lctr32_enc8x_three
+	nop
+	beq		Lctr32_enc8x_four
+	cmpwi		$len,-0x20
+	blt		Lctr32_enc8x_five
+	nop
+	beq		Lctr32_enc8x_six
+	cmpwi		$len,0x00
+	blt		Lctr32_enc8x_seven
+
+Lctr32_enc8x_eight:
+	vcipherlast	$out0,$out0,$in0
+	vcipherlast	$out1,$out1,$in1
+	vcipherlast	$out2,$out2,$in2
+	vcipherlast	$out3,$out3,$in3
+	vcipherlast	$out4,$out4,$in4
+	vcipherlast	$out5,$out5,$in5
+	vcipherlast	$out6,$out6,$in6
+	vcipherlast	$out7,$out7,$in7
+
+	le?vperm	$out0,$out0,$out0,$inpperm
+	le?vperm	$out1,$out1,$out1,$inpperm
+	stvx_u		$out0,$x00,$out
+	le?vperm	$out2,$out2,$out2,$inpperm
+	stvx_u		$out1,$x10,$out
+	le?vperm	$out3,$out3,$out3,$inpperm
+	stvx_u		$out2,$x20,$out
+	le?vperm	$out4,$out4,$out4,$inpperm
+	stvx_u		$out3,$x30,$out
+	le?vperm	$out5,$out5,$out5,$inpperm
+	stvx_u		$out4,$x40,$out
+	le?vperm	$out6,$out6,$out6,$inpperm
+	stvx_u		$out5,$x50,$out
+	le?vperm	$out7,$out7,$out7,$inpperm
+	stvx_u		$out6,$x60,$out
+	stvx_u		$out7,$x70,$out
+	addi		$out,$out,0x80
+	b		Lctr32_enc8x_done
+
+.align	5
+Lctr32_enc8x_seven:
+	vcipherlast	$out0,$out0,$in1
+	vcipherlast	$out1,$out1,$in2
+	vcipherlast	$out2,$out2,$in3
+	vcipherlast	$out3,$out3,$in4
+	vcipherlast	$out4,$out4,$in5
+	vcipherlast	$out5,$out5,$in6
+	vcipherlast	$out6,$out6,$in7
+
+	le?vperm	$out0,$out0,$out0,$inpperm
+	le?vperm	$out1,$out1,$out1,$inpperm
+	stvx_u		$out0,$x00,$out
+	le?vperm	$out2,$out2,$out2,$inpperm
+	stvx_u		$out1,$x10,$out
+	le?vperm	$out3,$out3,$out3,$inpperm
+	stvx_u		$out2,$x20,$out
+	le?vperm	$out4,$out4,$out4,$inpperm
+	stvx_u		$out3,$x30,$out
+	le?vperm	$out5,$out5,$out5,$inpperm
+	stvx_u		$out4,$x40,$out
+	le?vperm	$out6,$out6,$out6,$inpperm
+	stvx_u		$out5,$x50,$out
+	stvx_u		$out6,$x60,$out
+	addi		$out,$out,0x70
+	b		Lctr32_enc8x_done
+
+.align	5
+Lctr32_enc8x_six:
+	vcipherlast	$out0,$out0,$in2
+	vcipherlast	$out1,$out1,$in3
+	vcipherlast	$out2,$out2,$in4
+	vcipherlast	$out3,$out3,$in5
+	vcipherlast	$out4,$out4,$in6
+	vcipherlast	$out5,$out5,$in7
+
+	le?vperm	$out0,$out0,$out0,$inpperm
+	le?vperm	$out1,$out1,$out1,$inpperm
+	stvx_u		$out0,$x00,$out
+	le?vperm	$out2,$out2,$out2,$inpperm
+	stvx_u		$out1,$x10,$out
+	le?vperm	$out3,$out3,$out3,$inpperm
+	stvx_u		$out2,$x20,$out
+	le?vperm	$out4,$out4,$out4,$inpperm
+	stvx_u		$out3,$x30,$out
+	le?vperm	$out5,$out5,$out5,$inpperm
+	stvx_u		$out4,$x40,$out
+	stvx_u		$out5,$x50,$out
+	addi		$out,$out,0x60
+	b		Lctr32_enc8x_done
+
+.align	5
+Lctr32_enc8x_five:
+	vcipherlast	$out0,$out0,$in3
+	vcipherlast	$out1,$out1,$in4
+	vcipherlast	$out2,$out2,$in5
+	vcipherlast	$out3,$out3,$in6
+	vcipherlast	$out4,$out4,$in7
+
+	le?vperm	$out0,$out0,$out0,$inpperm
+	le?vperm	$out1,$out1,$out1,$inpperm
+	stvx_u		$out0,$x00,$out
+	le?vperm	$out2,$out2,$out2,$inpperm
+	stvx_u		$out1,$x10,$out
+	le?vperm	$out3,$out3,$out3,$inpperm
+	stvx_u		$out2,$x20,$out
+	le?vperm	$out4,$out4,$out4,$inpperm
+	stvx_u		$out3,$x30,$out
+	stvx_u		$out4,$x40,$out
+	addi		$out,$out,0x50
+	b		Lctr32_enc8x_done
+
+.align	5
+Lctr32_enc8x_four:
+	vcipherlast	$out0,$out0,$in4
+	vcipherlast	$out1,$out1,$in5
+	vcipherlast	$out2,$out2,$in6
+	vcipherlast	$out3,$out3,$in7
+
+	le?vperm	$out0,$out0,$out0,$inpperm
+	le?vperm	$out1,$out1,$out1,$inpperm
+	stvx_u		$out0,$x00,$out
+	le?vperm	$out2,$out2,$out2,$inpperm
+	stvx_u		$out1,$x10,$out
+	le?vperm	$out3,$out3,$out3,$inpperm
+	stvx_u		$out2,$x20,$out
+	stvx_u		$out3,$x30,$out
+	addi		$out,$out,0x40
+	b		Lctr32_enc8x_done
+
+.align	5
+Lctr32_enc8x_three:
+	vcipherlast	$out0,$out0,$in5
+	vcipherlast	$out1,$out1,$in6
+	vcipherlast	$out2,$out2,$in7
+
+	le?vperm	$out0,$out0,$out0,$inpperm
+	le?vperm	$out1,$out1,$out1,$inpperm
+	stvx_u		$out0,$x00,$out
+	le?vperm	$out2,$out2,$out2,$inpperm
+	stvx_u		$out1,$x10,$out
+	stvx_u		$out2,$x20,$out
+	addi		$out,$out,0x30
+	b		Lcbc_dec8x_done
+
+.align	5
+Lctr32_enc8x_two:
+	vcipherlast	$out0,$out0,$in6
+	vcipherlast	$out1,$out1,$in7
+
+	le?vperm	$out0,$out0,$out0,$inpperm
+	le?vperm	$out1,$out1,$out1,$inpperm
+	stvx_u		$out0,$x00,$out
+	stvx_u		$out1,$x10,$out
+	addi		$out,$out,0x20
+	b		Lcbc_dec8x_done
+
+.align	5
+Lctr32_enc8x_one:
+	vcipherlast	$out0,$out0,$in7
+
+	le?vperm	$out0,$out0,$out0,$inpperm
+	stvx_u		$out0,0,$out
+	addi		$out,$out,0x10
+
+Lctr32_enc8x_done:
+	li		r10,`$FRAME+15`
+	li		r11,`$FRAME+31`
+	stvx		$inpperm,r10,$sp	# wipe copies of round keys
+	addi		r10,r10,32
+	stvx		$inpperm,r11,$sp
+	addi		r11,r11,32
+	stvx		$inpperm,r10,$sp
+	addi		r10,r10,32
+	stvx		$inpperm,r11,$sp
+	addi		r11,r11,32
+	stvx		$inpperm,r10,$sp
+	addi		r10,r10,32
+	stvx		$inpperm,r11,$sp
+	addi		r11,r11,32
+	stvx		$inpperm,r10,$sp
+	addi		r10,r10,32
+	stvx		$inpperm,r11,$sp
+	addi		r11,r11,32
+
+	mtspr		256,$vrsave
+	lvx		v20,r10,$sp		# ABI says so
+	addi		r10,r10,32
+	lvx		v21,r11,$sp
+	addi		r11,r11,32
+	lvx		v22,r10,$sp
+	addi		r10,r10,32
+	lvx		v23,r11,$sp
+	addi		r11,r11,32
+	lvx		v24,r10,$sp
+	addi		r10,r10,32
+	lvx		v25,r11,$sp
+	addi		r11,r11,32
+	lvx		v26,r10,$sp
+	addi		r10,r10,32
+	lvx		v27,r11,$sp
+	addi		r11,r11,32
+	lvx		v28,r10,$sp
+	addi		r10,r10,32
+	lvx		v29,r11,$sp
+	addi		r11,r11,32
+	lvx		v30,r10,$sp
+	lvx		v31,r11,$sp
+	$POP		r26,`$FRAME+21*16+0*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+	$POP		r27,`$FRAME+21*16+1*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+	$POP		r28,`$FRAME+21*16+2*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+	$POP		r29,`$FRAME+21*16+3*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+	$POP		r30,`$FRAME+21*16+4*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+	$POP		r31,`$FRAME+21*16+5*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+	addi		$sp,$sp,`$FRAME+21*16+6*$SIZE_T`
+	blr
+	.long		0
+	.byte		0,12,0x04,0,0x80,6,6,0
+	.long		0
+.size	.${prefix}_ctr32_encrypt_blocks,.-.${prefix}_ctr32_encrypt_blocks
+___
+}}	}}}
+
+#########################################################################
+{{{	# XTS procedures						#
+# int aes_p8_xts_[en|de]crypt(const char *inp, char *out, size_t len,	#
+#                             const AES_KEY *key1, const AES_KEY *key2,	#
+#                             [const] unsigned char iv[16]);		#
+# If $key2 is NULL, then a "tweak chaining" mode is engaged, in which	#
+# input tweak value is assumed to be encrypted already, and last tweak	#
+# value, one suitable for consecutive call on same chunk of data, is	#
+# written back to original buffer. In addition, in "tweak chaining"	#
+# mode only complete input blocks are processed.			#
+
+my ($inp,$out,$len,$key1,$key2,$ivp,$rounds,$idx) =	map("r$_",(3..10));
+my ($rndkey0,$rndkey1,$inout) =				map("v$_",(0..2));
+my ($output,$inptail,$inpperm,$leperm,$keyperm) =	map("v$_",(3..7));
+my ($tweak,$seven,$eighty7,$tmp,$tweak1) =		map("v$_",(8..12));
+my $taillen = $key2;
+
+   ($inp,$idx) = ($idx,$inp);				# reassign
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	.${prefix}_xts_encrypt
+.align	5
+.${prefix}_xts_encrypt:
+	mr		$inp,r3				# reassign
+	li		r3,-1
+	${UCMP}i	$len,16
+	bltlr-
+
+	lis		r0,0xfff0
+	mfspr		r12,256				# save vrsave
+	li		r11,0
+	mtspr		256,r0
+
+	vspltisb	$seven,0x07			# 0x070707..07
+	le?lvsl		$leperm,r11,r11
+	le?vspltisb	$tmp,0x0f
+	le?vxor		$leperm,$leperm,$seven
+
+	li		$idx,15
+	lvx		$tweak,0,$ivp			# load [unaligned] iv
+	lvsl		$inpperm,0,$ivp
+	lvx		$inptail,$idx,$ivp
+	le?vxor		$inpperm,$inpperm,$tmp
+	vperm		$tweak,$tweak,$inptail,$inpperm
+
+	neg		r11,$inp
+	lvsr		$inpperm,0,r11			# prepare for unaligned load
+	lvx		$inout,0,$inp
+	addi		$inp,$inp,15			# 15 is not typo
+	le?vxor		$inpperm,$inpperm,$tmp
+
+	${UCMP}i	$key2,0				# key2==NULL?
+	beq		Lxts_enc_no_key2
+
+	?lvsl		$keyperm,0,$key2		# prepare for unaligned key
+	lwz		$rounds,240($key2)
+	srwi		$rounds,$rounds,1
+	subi		$rounds,$rounds,1
+	li		$idx,16
+
+	lvx		$rndkey0,0,$key2
+	lvx		$rndkey1,$idx,$key2
+	addi		$idx,$idx,16
+	?vperm		$rndkey0,$rndkey0,$rndkey1,$keyperm
+	vxor		$tweak,$tweak,$rndkey0
+	lvx		$rndkey0,$idx,$key2
+	addi		$idx,$idx,16
+	mtctr		$rounds
+
+Ltweak_xts_enc:
+	?vperm		$rndkey1,$rndkey1,$rndkey0,$keyperm
+	vcipher		$tweak,$tweak,$rndkey1
+	lvx		$rndkey1,$idx,$key2
+	addi		$idx,$idx,16
+	?vperm		$rndkey0,$rndkey0,$rndkey1,$keyperm
+	vcipher		$tweak,$tweak,$rndkey0
+	lvx		$rndkey0,$idx,$key2
+	addi		$idx,$idx,16
+	bdnz		Ltweak_xts_enc
+
+	?vperm		$rndkey1,$rndkey1,$rndkey0,$keyperm
+	vcipher		$tweak,$tweak,$rndkey1
+	lvx		$rndkey1,$idx,$key2
+	?vperm		$rndkey0,$rndkey0,$rndkey1,$keyperm
+	vcipherlast	$tweak,$tweak,$rndkey0
+
+	li		$ivp,0				# don't chain the tweak
+	b		Lxts_enc
+
+Lxts_enc_no_key2:
+	li		$idx,-16
+	and		$len,$len,$idx			# in "tweak chaining"
+							# mode only complete
+							# blocks are processed
+Lxts_enc:
+	lvx		$inptail,0,$inp
+	addi		$inp,$inp,16
+
+	?lvsl		$keyperm,0,$key1		# prepare for unaligned key
+	lwz		$rounds,240($key1)
+	srwi		$rounds,$rounds,1
+	subi		$rounds,$rounds,1
+	li		$idx,16
+
+	vslb		$eighty7,$seven,$seven		# 0x808080..80
+	vor		$eighty7,$eighty7,$seven	# 0x878787..87
+	vspltisb	$tmp,1				# 0x010101..01
+	vsldoi		$eighty7,$eighty7,$tmp,15	# 0x870101..01
+
+	${UCMP}i	$len,96
+	bge		_aesp8_xts_encrypt6x
+
+	andi.		$taillen,$len,15
+	subic		r0,$len,32
+	subi		$taillen,$taillen,16
+	subfe		r0,r0,r0
+	and		r0,r0,$taillen
+	add		$inp,$inp,r0
+
+	lvx		$rndkey0,0,$key1
+	lvx		$rndkey1,$idx,$key1
+	addi		$idx,$idx,16
+	vperm		$inout,$inout,$inptail,$inpperm
+	?vperm		$rndkey0,$rndkey0,$rndkey1,$keyperm
+	vxor		$inout,$inout,$tweak
+	vxor		$inout,$inout,$rndkey0
+	lvx		$rndkey0,$idx,$key1
+	addi		$idx,$idx,16
+	mtctr		$rounds
+	b		Loop_xts_enc
+
+.align	5
+Loop_xts_enc:
+	?vperm		$rndkey1,$rndkey1,$rndkey0,$keyperm
+	vcipher		$inout,$inout,$rndkey1
+	lvx		$rndkey1,$idx,$key1
+	addi		$idx,$idx,16
+	?vperm		$rndkey0,$rndkey0,$rndkey1,$keyperm
+	vcipher		$inout,$inout,$rndkey0
+	lvx		$rndkey0,$idx,$key1
+	addi		$idx,$idx,16
+	bdnz		Loop_xts_enc
+
+	?vperm		$rndkey1,$rndkey1,$rndkey0,$keyperm
+	vcipher		$inout,$inout,$rndkey1
+	lvx		$rndkey1,$idx,$key1
+	li		$idx,16
+	?vperm		$rndkey0,$rndkey0,$rndkey1,$keyperm
+	vxor		$rndkey0,$rndkey0,$tweak
+	vcipherlast	$output,$inout,$rndkey0
+
+	le?vperm	$tmp,$output,$output,$leperm
+	be?nop
+	le?stvx_u	$tmp,0,$out
+	be?stvx_u	$output,0,$out
+	addi		$out,$out,16
+
+	subic.		$len,$len,16
+	beq		Lxts_enc_done
+
+	vmr		$inout,$inptail
+	lvx		$inptail,0,$inp
+	addi		$inp,$inp,16
+	lvx		$rndkey0,0,$key1
+	lvx		$rndkey1,$idx,$key1
+	addi		$idx,$idx,16
+
+	subic		r0,$len,32
+	subfe		r0,r0,r0
+	and		r0,r0,$taillen
+	add		$inp,$inp,r0
+
+	vsrab		$tmp,$tweak,$seven		# next tweak value
+	vaddubm		$tweak,$tweak,$tweak
+	vsldoi		$tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
+	vand		$tmp,$tmp,$eighty7
+	vxor		$tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+
+	vperm		$inout,$inout,$inptail,$inpperm
+	?vperm		$rndkey0,$rndkey0,$rndkey1,$keyperm
+	vxor		$inout,$inout,$tweak
+	vxor		$output,$output,$rndkey0	# just in case $len<16
+	vxor		$inout,$inout,$rndkey0
+	lvx		$rndkey0,$idx,$key1
+	addi		$idx,$idx,16
+
+	mtctr		$rounds
+	${UCMP}i	$len,16
+	bge		Loop_xts_enc
+
+	vxor		$output,$output,$tweak
+	lvsr		$inpperm,0,$len			# $inpperm is no longer needed
+	vxor		$inptail,$inptail,$inptail	# $inptail is no longer needed
+	vspltisb	$tmp,-1
+	vperm		$inptail,$inptail,$tmp,$inpperm
+	vsel		$inout,$inout,$output,$inptail
+
+	subi		r11,$out,17
+	subi		$out,$out,16
+	mtctr		$len
+	li		$len,16
+Loop_xts_enc_steal:
+	lbzu		r0,1(r11)
+	stb		r0,16(r11)
+	bdnz		Loop_xts_enc_steal
+
+	mtctr		$rounds
+	b		Loop_xts_enc			# one more time...
+
+Lxts_enc_done:
+	${UCMP}i	$ivp,0
+	beq		Lxts_enc_ret
+
+	vsrab		$tmp,$tweak,$seven		# next tweak value
+	vaddubm		$tweak,$tweak,$tweak
+	vsldoi		$tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
+	vand		$tmp,$tmp,$eighty7
+	vxor		$tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+
+	le?vperm	$tweak,$tweak,$tweak,$leperm
+	stvx_u		$tweak,0,$ivp
+
+Lxts_enc_ret:
+	mtspr		256,r12				# restore vrsave
+	li		r3,0
+	blr
+	.long		0
+	.byte		0,12,0x04,0,0x80,6,6,0
+	.long		0
+.size	.${prefix}_xts_encrypt,.-.${prefix}_xts_encrypt
+
+.globl	.${prefix}_xts_decrypt
+.align	5
+.${prefix}_xts_decrypt:
+	mr		$inp,r3				# reassign
+	li		r3,-1
+	${UCMP}i	$len,16
+	bltlr-
+
+	lis		r0,0xfff8
+	mfspr		r12,256				# save vrsave
+	li		r11,0
+	mtspr		256,r0
+
+	andi.		r0,$len,15
+	neg		r0,r0
+	andi.		r0,r0,16
+	sub		$len,$len,r0
+
+	vspltisb	$seven,0x07			# 0x070707..07
+	le?lvsl		$leperm,r11,r11
+	le?vspltisb	$tmp,0x0f
+	le?vxor		$leperm,$leperm,$seven
+
+	li		$idx,15
+	lvx		$tweak,0,$ivp			# load [unaligned] iv
+	lvsl		$inpperm,0,$ivp
+	lvx		$inptail,$idx,$ivp
+	le?vxor		$inpperm,$inpperm,$tmp
+	vperm		$tweak,$tweak,$inptail,$inpperm
+
+	neg		r11,$inp
+	lvsr		$inpperm,0,r11			# prepare for unaligned load
+	lvx		$inout,0,$inp
+	addi		$inp,$inp,15			# 15 is not typo
+	le?vxor		$inpperm,$inpperm,$tmp
+
+	${UCMP}i	$key2,0				# key2==NULL?
+	beq		Lxts_dec_no_key2
+
+	?lvsl		$keyperm,0,$key2		# prepare for unaligned key
+	lwz		$rounds,240($key2)
+	srwi		$rounds,$rounds,1
+	subi		$rounds,$rounds,1
+	li		$idx,16
+
+	lvx		$rndkey0,0,$key2
+	lvx		$rndkey1,$idx,$key2
+	addi		$idx,$idx,16
+	?vperm		$rndkey0,$rndkey0,$rndkey1,$keyperm
+	vxor		$tweak,$tweak,$rndkey0
+	lvx		$rndkey0,$idx,$key2
+	addi		$idx,$idx,16
+	mtctr		$rounds
+
+Ltweak_xts_dec:
+	?vperm		$rndkey1,$rndkey1,$rndkey0,$keyperm
+	vcipher		$tweak,$tweak,$rndkey1
+	lvx		$rndkey1,$idx,$key2
+	addi		$idx,$idx,16
+	?vperm		$rndkey0,$rndkey0,$rndkey1,$keyperm
+	vcipher		$tweak,$tweak,$rndkey0
+	lvx		$rndkey0,$idx,$key2
+	addi		$idx,$idx,16
+	bdnz		Ltweak_xts_dec
+
+	?vperm		$rndkey1,$rndkey1,$rndkey0,$keyperm
+	vcipher		$tweak,$tweak,$rndkey1
+	lvx		$rndkey1,$idx,$key2
+	?vperm		$rndkey0,$rndkey0,$rndkey1,$keyperm
+	vcipherlast	$tweak,$tweak,$rndkey0
+
+	li		$ivp,0				# don't chain the tweak
+	b		Lxts_dec
+
+Lxts_dec_no_key2:
+	neg		$idx,$len
+	andi.		$idx,$idx,15
+	add		$len,$len,$idx			# in "tweak chaining"
+							# mode only complete
+							# blocks are processed
+Lxts_dec:
+	lvx		$inptail,0,$inp
+	addi		$inp,$inp,16
+
+	?lvsl		$keyperm,0,$key1		# prepare for unaligned key
+	lwz		$rounds,240($key1)
+	srwi		$rounds,$rounds,1
+	subi		$rounds,$rounds,1
+	li		$idx,16
+
+	vslb		$eighty7,$seven,$seven		# 0x808080..80
+	vor		$eighty7,$eighty7,$seven	# 0x878787..87
+	vspltisb	$tmp,1				# 0x010101..01
+	vsldoi		$eighty7,$eighty7,$tmp,15	# 0x870101..01
+
+	${UCMP}i	$len,96
+	bge		_aesp8_xts_decrypt6x
+
+	lvx		$rndkey0,0,$key1
+	lvx		$rndkey1,$idx,$key1
+	addi		$idx,$idx,16
+	vperm		$inout,$inout,$inptail,$inpperm
+	?vperm		$rndkey0,$rndkey0,$rndkey1,$keyperm
+	vxor		$inout,$inout,$tweak
+	vxor		$inout,$inout,$rndkey0
+	lvx		$rndkey0,$idx,$key1
+	addi		$idx,$idx,16
+	mtctr		$rounds
+
+	${UCMP}i	$len,16
+	blt		Ltail_xts_dec
+	be?b		Loop_xts_dec
+
+.align	5
+Loop_xts_dec:
+	?vperm		$rndkey1,$rndkey1,$rndkey0,$keyperm
+	vncipher	$inout,$inout,$rndkey1
+	lvx		$rndkey1,$idx,$key1
+	addi		$idx,$idx,16
+	?vperm		$rndkey0,$rndkey0,$rndkey1,$keyperm
+	vncipher	$inout,$inout,$rndkey0
+	lvx		$rndkey0,$idx,$key1
+	addi		$idx,$idx,16
+	bdnz		Loop_xts_dec
+
+	?vperm		$rndkey1,$rndkey1,$rndkey0,$keyperm
+	vncipher	$inout,$inout,$rndkey1
+	lvx		$rndkey1,$idx,$key1
+	li		$idx,16
+	?vperm		$rndkey0,$rndkey0,$rndkey1,$keyperm
+	vxor		$rndkey0,$rndkey0,$tweak
+	vncipherlast	$output,$inout,$rndkey0
+
+	le?vperm	$tmp,$output,$output,$leperm
+	be?nop
+	le?stvx_u	$tmp,0,$out
+	be?stvx_u	$output,0,$out
+	addi		$out,$out,16
+
+	subic.		$len,$len,16
+	beq		Lxts_dec_done
+
+	vmr		$inout,$inptail
+	lvx		$inptail,0,$inp
+	addi		$inp,$inp,16
+	lvx		$rndkey0,0,$key1
+	lvx		$rndkey1,$idx,$key1
+	addi		$idx,$idx,16
+
+	vsrab		$tmp,$tweak,$seven		# next tweak value
+	vaddubm		$tweak,$tweak,$tweak
+	vsldoi		$tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
+	vand		$tmp,$tmp,$eighty7
+	vxor		$tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+
+	vperm		$inout,$inout,$inptail,$inpperm
+	?vperm		$rndkey0,$rndkey0,$rndkey1,$keyperm
+	vxor		$inout,$inout,$tweak
+	vxor		$inout,$inout,$rndkey0
+	lvx		$rndkey0,$idx,$key1
+	addi		$idx,$idx,16
+
+	mtctr		$rounds
+	${UCMP}i	$len,16
+	bge		Loop_xts_dec
+
+Ltail_xts_dec:
+	vsrab		$tmp,$tweak,$seven		# next tweak value
+	vaddubm		$tweak1,$tweak,$tweak
+	vsldoi		$tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
+	vand		$tmp,$tmp,$eighty7
+	vxor		$tweak1,$tweak1,$tmp
+
+	subi		$inp,$inp,16
+	add		$inp,$inp,$len
+
+	vxor		$inout,$inout,$tweak		# :-(
+	vxor		$inout,$inout,$tweak1		# :-)
+
+Loop_xts_dec_short:
+	?vperm		$rndkey1,$rndkey1,$rndkey0,$keyperm
+	vncipher	$inout,$inout,$rndkey1
+	lvx		$rndkey1,$idx,$key1
+	addi		$idx,$idx,16
+	?vperm		$rndkey0,$rndkey0,$rndkey1,$keyperm
+	vncipher	$inout,$inout,$rndkey0
+	lvx		$rndkey0,$idx,$key1
+	addi		$idx,$idx,16
+	bdnz		Loop_xts_dec_short
+
+	?vperm		$rndkey1,$rndkey1,$rndkey0,$keyperm
+	vncipher	$inout,$inout,$rndkey1
+	lvx		$rndkey1,$idx,$key1
+	li		$idx,16
+	?vperm		$rndkey0,$rndkey0,$rndkey1,$keyperm
+	vxor		$rndkey0,$rndkey0,$tweak1
+	vncipherlast	$output,$inout,$rndkey0
+
+	le?vperm	$tmp,$output,$output,$leperm
+	be?nop
+	le?stvx_u	$tmp,0,$out
+	be?stvx_u	$output,0,$out
+
+	vmr		$inout,$inptail
+	lvx		$inptail,0,$inp
+	#addi		$inp,$inp,16
+	lvx		$rndkey0,0,$key1
+	lvx		$rndkey1,$idx,$key1
+	addi		$idx,$idx,16
+	vperm		$inout,$inout,$inptail,$inpperm
+	?vperm		$rndkey0,$rndkey0,$rndkey1,$keyperm
+
+	lvsr		$inpperm,0,$len			# $inpperm is no longer needed
+	vxor		$inptail,$inptail,$inptail	# $inptail is no longer needed
+	vspltisb	$tmp,-1
+	vperm		$inptail,$inptail,$tmp,$inpperm
+	vsel		$inout,$inout,$output,$inptail
+
+	vxor		$rndkey0,$rndkey0,$tweak
+	vxor		$inout,$inout,$rndkey0
+	lvx		$rndkey0,$idx,$key1
+	addi		$idx,$idx,16
+
+	subi		r11,$out,1
+	mtctr		$len
+	li		$len,16
+Loop_xts_dec_steal:
+	lbzu		r0,1(r11)
+	stb		r0,16(r11)
+	bdnz		Loop_xts_dec_steal
+
+	mtctr		$rounds
+	b		Loop_xts_dec			# one more time...
+
+Lxts_dec_done:
+	${UCMP}i	$ivp,0
+	beq		Lxts_dec_ret
+
+	vsrab		$tmp,$tweak,$seven		# next tweak value
+	vaddubm		$tweak,$tweak,$tweak
+	vsldoi		$tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
+	vand		$tmp,$tmp,$eighty7
+	vxor		$tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+
+	le?vperm	$tweak,$tweak,$tweak,$leperm
+	stvx_u		$tweak,0,$ivp
+
+Lxts_dec_ret:
+	mtspr		256,r12				# restore vrsave
+	li		r3,0
+	blr
+	.long		0
+	.byte		0,12,0x04,0,0x80,6,6,0
+	.long		0
+.size	.${prefix}_xts_decrypt,.-.${prefix}_xts_decrypt
+___
+#########################################################################
+{{	# Optimized XTS procedures					#
+my $key_=$key2;
+my ($x00,$x10,$x20,$x30,$x40,$x50,$x60,$x70)=map("r$_",(0,3,26..31));
+    $x00=0 if ($flavour =~ /osx/);
+my ($in0,  $in1,  $in2,  $in3,  $in4,  $in5 )=map("v$_",(0..5));
+my ($out0, $out1, $out2, $out3, $out4, $out5)=map("v$_",(7,12..16));
+my ($twk0, $twk1, $twk2, $twk3, $twk4, $twk5)=map("v$_",(17..22));
+my $rndkey0="v23";	# v24-v25 rotating buffer for first found keys
+			# v26-v31 last 6 round keys
+my ($keyperm)=($out0);	# aliases with "caller", redundant assignment
+my $taillen=$x70;
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.align	5
+_aesp8_xts_encrypt6x:
+	$STU		$sp,-`($FRAME+21*16+6*$SIZE_T)`($sp)
+	mflr		r11
+	li		r7,`$FRAME+8*16+15`
+	li		r3,`$FRAME+8*16+31`
+	$PUSH		r11,`$FRAME+21*16+6*$SIZE_T+$LRSAVE`($sp)
+	stvx		v20,r7,$sp		# ABI says so
+	addi		r7,r7,32
+	stvx		v21,r3,$sp
+	addi		r3,r3,32
+	stvx		v22,r7,$sp
+	addi		r7,r7,32
+	stvx		v23,r3,$sp
+	addi		r3,r3,32
+	stvx		v24,r7,$sp
+	addi		r7,r7,32
+	stvx		v25,r3,$sp
+	addi		r3,r3,32
+	stvx		v26,r7,$sp
+	addi		r7,r7,32
+	stvx		v27,r3,$sp
+	addi		r3,r3,32
+	stvx		v28,r7,$sp
+	addi		r7,r7,32
+	stvx		v29,r3,$sp
+	addi		r3,r3,32
+	stvx		v30,r7,$sp
+	stvx		v31,r3,$sp
+	li		r0,-1
+	stw		$vrsave,`$FRAME+21*16-4`($sp)	# save vrsave
+	li		$x10,0x10
+	$PUSH		r26,`$FRAME+21*16+0*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+	li		$x20,0x20
+	$PUSH		r27,`$FRAME+21*16+1*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+	li		$x30,0x30
+	$PUSH		r28,`$FRAME+21*16+2*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+	li		$x40,0x40
+	$PUSH		r29,`$FRAME+21*16+3*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+	li		$x50,0x50
+	$PUSH		r30,`$FRAME+21*16+4*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+	li		$x60,0x60
+	$PUSH		r31,`$FRAME+21*16+5*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+	li		$x70,0x70
+	mtspr		256,r0
+
+	subi		$rounds,$rounds,3	# -4 in total
+
+	lvx		$rndkey0,$x00,$key1	# load key schedule
+	lvx		v30,$x10,$key1
+	addi		$key1,$key1,0x20
+	lvx		v31,$x00,$key1
+	?vperm		$rndkey0,$rndkey0,v30,$keyperm
+	addi		$key_,$sp,$FRAME+15
+	mtctr		$rounds
+
+Load_xts_enc_key:
+	?vperm		v24,v30,v31,$keyperm
+	lvx		v30,$x10,$key1
+	addi		$key1,$key1,0x20
+	stvx		v24,$x00,$key_		# off-load round[1]
+	?vperm		v25,v31,v30,$keyperm
+	lvx		v31,$x00,$key1
+	stvx		v25,$x10,$key_		# off-load round[2]
+	addi		$key_,$key_,0x20
+	bdnz		Load_xts_enc_key
+
+	lvx		v26,$x10,$key1
+	?vperm		v24,v30,v31,$keyperm
+	lvx		v27,$x20,$key1
+	stvx		v24,$x00,$key_		# off-load round[3]
+	?vperm		v25,v31,v26,$keyperm
+	lvx		v28,$x30,$key1
+	stvx		v25,$x10,$key_		# off-load round[4]
+	addi		$key_,$sp,$FRAME+15	# rewind $key_
+	?vperm		v26,v26,v27,$keyperm
+	lvx		v29,$x40,$key1
+	?vperm		v27,v27,v28,$keyperm
+	lvx		v30,$x50,$key1
+	?vperm		v28,v28,v29,$keyperm
+	lvx		v31,$x60,$key1
+	?vperm		v29,v29,v30,$keyperm
+	lvx		$twk5,$x70,$key1	# borrow $twk5
+	?vperm		v30,v30,v31,$keyperm
+	lvx		v24,$x00,$key_		# pre-load round[1]
+	?vperm		v31,v31,$twk5,$keyperm
+	lvx		v25,$x10,$key_		# pre-load round[2]
+
+	 vperm		$in0,$inout,$inptail,$inpperm
+	 subi		$inp,$inp,31		# undo "caller"
+	vxor		$twk0,$tweak,$rndkey0
+	vsrab		$tmp,$tweak,$seven	# next tweak value
+	vaddubm		$tweak,$tweak,$tweak
+	vsldoi		$tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
+	vand		$tmp,$tmp,$eighty7
+	 vxor		$out0,$in0,$twk0
+	vxor		$tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+
+	 lvx_u		$in1,$x10,$inp
+	vxor		$twk1,$tweak,$rndkey0
+	vsrab		$tmp,$tweak,$seven	# next tweak value
+	vaddubm		$tweak,$tweak,$tweak
+	vsldoi		$tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
+	 le?vperm	$in1,$in1,$in1,$leperm
+	vand		$tmp,$tmp,$eighty7
+	 vxor		$out1,$in1,$twk1
+	vxor		$tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+
+	 lvx_u		$in2,$x20,$inp
+	 andi.		$taillen,$len,15
+	vxor		$twk2,$tweak,$rndkey0
+	vsrab		$tmp,$tweak,$seven	# next tweak value
+	vaddubm		$tweak,$tweak,$tweak
+	vsldoi		$tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
+	 le?vperm	$in2,$in2,$in2,$leperm
+	vand		$tmp,$tmp,$eighty7
+	 vxor		$out2,$in2,$twk2
+	vxor		$tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+
+	 lvx_u		$in3,$x30,$inp
+	 sub		$len,$len,$taillen
+	vxor		$twk3,$tweak,$rndkey0
+	vsrab		$tmp,$tweak,$seven	# next tweak value
+	vaddubm		$tweak,$tweak,$tweak
+	vsldoi		$tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
+	 le?vperm	$in3,$in3,$in3,$leperm
+	vand		$tmp,$tmp,$eighty7
+	 vxor		$out3,$in3,$twk3
+	vxor		$tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+
+	 lvx_u		$in4,$x40,$inp
+	 subi		$len,$len,0x60
+	vxor		$twk4,$tweak,$rndkey0
+	vsrab		$tmp,$tweak,$seven	# next tweak value
+	vaddubm		$tweak,$tweak,$tweak
+	vsldoi		$tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
+	 le?vperm	$in4,$in4,$in4,$leperm
+	vand		$tmp,$tmp,$eighty7
+	 vxor		$out4,$in4,$twk4
+	vxor		$tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+
+	 lvx_u		$in5,$x50,$inp
+	 addi		$inp,$inp,0x60
+	vxor		$twk5,$tweak,$rndkey0
+	vsrab		$tmp,$tweak,$seven	# next tweak value
+	vaddubm		$tweak,$tweak,$tweak
+	vsldoi		$tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
+	 le?vperm	$in5,$in5,$in5,$leperm
+	vand		$tmp,$tmp,$eighty7
+	 vxor		$out5,$in5,$twk5
+	vxor		$tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+
+	vxor		v31,v31,$rndkey0
+	mtctr		$rounds
+	b		Loop_xts_enc6x
+
+.align	5
+Loop_xts_enc6x:
+	vcipher		$out0,$out0,v24
+	vcipher		$out1,$out1,v24
+	vcipher		$out2,$out2,v24
+	vcipher		$out3,$out3,v24
+	vcipher		$out4,$out4,v24
+	vcipher		$out5,$out5,v24
+	lvx		v24,$x20,$key_		# round[3]
+	addi		$key_,$key_,0x20
+
+	vcipher		$out0,$out0,v25
+	vcipher		$out1,$out1,v25
+	vcipher		$out2,$out2,v25
+	vcipher		$out3,$out3,v25
+	vcipher		$out4,$out4,v25
+	vcipher		$out5,$out5,v25
+	lvx		v25,$x10,$key_		# round[4]
+	bdnz		Loop_xts_enc6x
+
+	subic		$len,$len,96		# $len-=96
+	 vxor		$in0,$twk0,v31		# xor with last round key
+	vcipher		$out0,$out0,v24
+	vcipher		$out1,$out1,v24
+	 vsrab		$tmp,$tweak,$seven	# next tweak value
+	 vxor		$twk0,$tweak,$rndkey0
+	 vaddubm	$tweak,$tweak,$tweak
+	vcipher		$out2,$out2,v24
+	vcipher		$out3,$out3,v24
+	 vsldoi		$tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
+	vcipher		$out4,$out4,v24
+	vcipher		$out5,$out5,v24
+
+	subfe.		r0,r0,r0		# borrow?-1:0
+	 vand		$tmp,$tmp,$eighty7
+	vcipher		$out0,$out0,v25
+	vcipher		$out1,$out1,v25
+	 vxor		$tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+	vcipher		$out2,$out2,v25
+	vcipher		$out3,$out3,v25
+	 vxor		$in1,$twk1,v31
+	 vsrab		$tmp,$tweak,$seven	# next tweak value
+	 vxor		$twk1,$tweak,$rndkey0
+	vcipher		$out4,$out4,v25
+	vcipher		$out5,$out5,v25
+
+	and		r0,r0,$len
+	 vaddubm	$tweak,$tweak,$tweak
+	 vsldoi		$tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
+	vcipher		$out0,$out0,v26
+	vcipher		$out1,$out1,v26
+	 vand		$tmp,$tmp,$eighty7
+	vcipher		$out2,$out2,v26
+	vcipher		$out3,$out3,v26
+	 vxor		$tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+	vcipher		$out4,$out4,v26
+	vcipher		$out5,$out5,v26
+
+	add		$inp,$inp,r0		# $inp is adjusted in such
+						# way that at exit from the
+						# loop inX-in5 are loaded
+						# with last "words"
+	 vxor		$in2,$twk2,v31
+	 vsrab		$tmp,$tweak,$seven	# next tweak value
+	 vxor		$twk2,$tweak,$rndkey0
+	 vaddubm	$tweak,$tweak,$tweak
+	vcipher		$out0,$out0,v27
+	vcipher		$out1,$out1,v27
+	 vsldoi		$tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
+	vcipher		$out2,$out2,v27
+	vcipher		$out3,$out3,v27
+	 vand		$tmp,$tmp,$eighty7
+	vcipher		$out4,$out4,v27
+	vcipher		$out5,$out5,v27
+
+	addi		$key_,$sp,$FRAME+15	# rewind $key_
+	 vxor		$tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+	vcipher		$out0,$out0,v28
+	vcipher		$out1,$out1,v28
+	 vxor		$in3,$twk3,v31
+	 vsrab		$tmp,$tweak,$seven	# next tweak value
+	 vxor		$twk3,$tweak,$rndkey0
+	vcipher		$out2,$out2,v28
+	vcipher		$out3,$out3,v28
+	 vaddubm	$tweak,$tweak,$tweak
+	 vsldoi		$tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
+	vcipher		$out4,$out4,v28
+	vcipher		$out5,$out5,v28
+	lvx		v24,$x00,$key_		# re-pre-load round[1]
+	 vand		$tmp,$tmp,$eighty7
+
+	vcipher		$out0,$out0,v29
+	vcipher		$out1,$out1,v29
+	 vxor		$tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+	vcipher		$out2,$out2,v29
+	vcipher		$out3,$out3,v29
+	 vxor		$in4,$twk4,v31
+	 vsrab		$tmp,$tweak,$seven	# next tweak value
+	 vxor		$twk4,$tweak,$rndkey0
+	vcipher		$out4,$out4,v29
+	vcipher		$out5,$out5,v29
+	lvx		v25,$x10,$key_		# re-pre-load round[2]
+	 vaddubm	$tweak,$tweak,$tweak
+	 vsldoi		$tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
+
+	vcipher		$out0,$out0,v30
+	vcipher		$out1,$out1,v30
+	 vand		$tmp,$tmp,$eighty7
+	vcipher		$out2,$out2,v30
+	vcipher		$out3,$out3,v30
+	 vxor		$tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+	vcipher		$out4,$out4,v30
+	vcipher		$out5,$out5,v30
+	 vxor		$in5,$twk5,v31
+	 vsrab		$tmp,$tweak,$seven	# next tweak value
+	 vxor		$twk5,$tweak,$rndkey0
+
+	vcipherlast	$out0,$out0,$in0
+	 lvx_u		$in0,$x00,$inp		# load next input block
+	 vaddubm	$tweak,$tweak,$tweak
+	 vsldoi		$tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
+	vcipherlast	$out1,$out1,$in1
+	 lvx_u		$in1,$x10,$inp
+	vcipherlast	$out2,$out2,$in2
+	 le?vperm	$in0,$in0,$in0,$leperm
+	 lvx_u		$in2,$x20,$inp
+	 vand		$tmp,$tmp,$eighty7
+	vcipherlast	$out3,$out3,$in3
+	 le?vperm	$in1,$in1,$in1,$leperm
+	 lvx_u		$in3,$x30,$inp
+	vcipherlast	$out4,$out4,$in4
+	 le?vperm	$in2,$in2,$in2,$leperm
+	 lvx_u		$in4,$x40,$inp
+	 vxor		$tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+	vcipherlast	$tmp,$out5,$in5		# last block might be needed
+						# in stealing mode
+	 le?vperm	$in3,$in3,$in3,$leperm
+	 lvx_u		$in5,$x50,$inp
+	 addi		$inp,$inp,0x60
+	 le?vperm	$in4,$in4,$in4,$leperm
+	 le?vperm	$in5,$in5,$in5,$leperm
+
+	le?vperm	$out0,$out0,$out0,$leperm
+	le?vperm	$out1,$out1,$out1,$leperm
+	stvx_u		$out0,$x00,$out		# store output
+	 vxor		$out0,$in0,$twk0
+	le?vperm	$out2,$out2,$out2,$leperm
+	stvx_u		$out1,$x10,$out
+	 vxor		$out1,$in1,$twk1
+	le?vperm	$out3,$out3,$out3,$leperm
+	stvx_u		$out2,$x20,$out
+	 vxor		$out2,$in2,$twk2
+	le?vperm	$out4,$out4,$out4,$leperm
+	stvx_u		$out3,$x30,$out
+	 vxor		$out3,$in3,$twk3
+	le?vperm	$out5,$tmp,$tmp,$leperm
+	stvx_u		$out4,$x40,$out
+	 vxor		$out4,$in4,$twk4
+	le?stvx_u	$out5,$x50,$out
+	be?stvx_u	$tmp, $x50,$out
+	 vxor		$out5,$in5,$twk5
+	addi		$out,$out,0x60
+
+	mtctr		$rounds
+	beq		Loop_xts_enc6x		# did $len-=96 borrow?
+
+	addic.		$len,$len,0x60
+	beq		Lxts_enc6x_zero
+	cmpwi		$len,0x20
+	blt		Lxts_enc6x_one
+	nop
+	beq		Lxts_enc6x_two
+	cmpwi		$len,0x40
+	blt		Lxts_enc6x_three
+	nop
+	beq		Lxts_enc6x_four
+
+Lxts_enc6x_five:
+	vxor		$out0,$in1,$twk0
+	vxor		$out1,$in2,$twk1
+	vxor		$out2,$in3,$twk2
+	vxor		$out3,$in4,$twk3
+	vxor		$out4,$in5,$twk4
+
+	bl		_aesp8_xts_enc5x
+
+	le?vperm	$out0,$out0,$out0,$leperm
+	vmr		$twk0,$twk5		# unused tweak
+	le?vperm	$out1,$out1,$out1,$leperm
+	stvx_u		$out0,$x00,$out		# store output
+	le?vperm	$out2,$out2,$out2,$leperm
+	stvx_u		$out1,$x10,$out
+	le?vperm	$out3,$out3,$out3,$leperm
+	stvx_u		$out2,$x20,$out
+	vxor		$tmp,$out4,$twk5	# last block prep for stealing
+	le?vperm	$out4,$out4,$out4,$leperm
+	stvx_u		$out3,$x30,$out
+	stvx_u		$out4,$x40,$out
+	addi		$out,$out,0x50
+	bne		Lxts_enc6x_steal
+	b		Lxts_enc6x_done
+
+.align	4
+Lxts_enc6x_four:
+	vxor		$out0,$in2,$twk0
+	vxor		$out1,$in3,$twk1
+	vxor		$out2,$in4,$twk2
+	vxor		$out3,$in5,$twk3
+	vxor		$out4,$out4,$out4
+
+	bl		_aesp8_xts_enc5x
+
+	le?vperm	$out0,$out0,$out0,$leperm
+	vmr		$twk0,$twk4		# unused tweak
+	le?vperm	$out1,$out1,$out1,$leperm
+	stvx_u		$out0,$x00,$out		# store output
+	le?vperm	$out2,$out2,$out2,$leperm
+	stvx_u		$out1,$x10,$out
+	vxor		$tmp,$out3,$twk4	# last block prep for stealing
+	le?vperm	$out3,$out3,$out3,$leperm
+	stvx_u		$out2,$x20,$out
+	stvx_u		$out3,$x30,$out
+	addi		$out,$out,0x40
+	bne		Lxts_enc6x_steal
+	b		Lxts_enc6x_done
+
+.align	4
+Lxts_enc6x_three:
+	vxor		$out0,$in3,$twk0
+	vxor		$out1,$in4,$twk1
+	vxor		$out2,$in5,$twk2
+	vxor		$out3,$out3,$out3
+	vxor		$out4,$out4,$out4
+
+	bl		_aesp8_xts_enc5x
+
+	le?vperm	$out0,$out0,$out0,$leperm
+	vmr		$twk0,$twk3		# unused tweak
+	le?vperm	$out1,$out1,$out1,$leperm
+	stvx_u		$out0,$x00,$out		# store output
+	vxor		$tmp,$out2,$twk3	# last block prep for stealing
+	le?vperm	$out2,$out2,$out2,$leperm
+	stvx_u		$out1,$x10,$out
+	stvx_u		$out2,$x20,$out
+	addi		$out,$out,0x30
+	bne		Lxts_enc6x_steal
+	b		Lxts_enc6x_done
+
+.align	4
+Lxts_enc6x_two:
+	vxor		$out0,$in4,$twk0
+	vxor		$out1,$in5,$twk1
+	vxor		$out2,$out2,$out2
+	vxor		$out3,$out3,$out3
+	vxor		$out4,$out4,$out4
+
+	bl		_aesp8_xts_enc5x
+
+	le?vperm	$out0,$out0,$out0,$leperm
+	vmr		$twk0,$twk2		# unused tweak
+	vxor		$tmp,$out1,$twk2	# last block prep for stealing
+	le?vperm	$out1,$out1,$out1,$leperm
+	stvx_u		$out0,$x00,$out		# store output
+	stvx_u		$out1,$x10,$out
+	addi		$out,$out,0x20
+	bne		Lxts_enc6x_steal
+	b		Lxts_enc6x_done
+
+.align	4
+Lxts_enc6x_one:
+	vxor		$out0,$in5,$twk0
+	nop
+Loop_xts_enc1x:
+	vcipher		$out0,$out0,v24
+	lvx		v24,$x20,$key_		# round[3]
+	addi		$key_,$key_,0x20
+
+	vcipher		$out0,$out0,v25
+	lvx		v25,$x10,$key_		# round[4]
+	bdnz		Loop_xts_enc1x
+
+	add		$inp,$inp,$taillen
+	cmpwi		$taillen,0
+	vcipher		$out0,$out0,v24
+
+	subi		$inp,$inp,16
+	vcipher		$out0,$out0,v25
+
+	lvsr		$inpperm,0,$taillen
+	vcipher		$out0,$out0,v26
+
+	lvx_u		$in0,0,$inp
+	vcipher		$out0,$out0,v27
+
+	addi		$key_,$sp,$FRAME+15	# rewind $key_
+	vcipher		$out0,$out0,v28
+	lvx		v24,$x00,$key_		# re-pre-load round[1]
+
+	vcipher		$out0,$out0,v29
+	lvx		v25,$x10,$key_		# re-pre-load round[2]
+	 vxor		$twk0,$twk0,v31
+
+	le?vperm	$in0,$in0,$in0,$leperm
+	vcipher		$out0,$out0,v30
+
+	vperm		$in0,$in0,$in0,$inpperm
+	vcipherlast	$out0,$out0,$twk0
+
+	vmr		$twk0,$twk1		# unused tweak
+	vxor		$tmp,$out0,$twk1	# last block prep for stealing
+	le?vperm	$out0,$out0,$out0,$leperm
+	stvx_u		$out0,$x00,$out		# store output
+	addi		$out,$out,0x10
+	bne		Lxts_enc6x_steal
+	b		Lxts_enc6x_done
+
+.align	4
+Lxts_enc6x_zero:
+	cmpwi		$taillen,0
+	beq		Lxts_enc6x_done
+
+	add		$inp,$inp,$taillen
+	subi		$inp,$inp,16
+	lvx_u		$in0,0,$inp
+	lvsr		$inpperm,0,$taillen	# $in5 is no more
+	le?vperm	$in0,$in0,$in0,$leperm
+	vperm		$in0,$in0,$in0,$inpperm
+	vxor		$tmp,$tmp,$twk0
+Lxts_enc6x_steal:
+	vxor		$in0,$in0,$twk0
+	vxor		$out0,$out0,$out0
+	vspltisb	$out1,-1
+	vperm		$out0,$out0,$out1,$inpperm
+	vsel		$out0,$in0,$tmp,$out0	# $tmp is last block, remember?
+
+	subi		r30,$out,17
+	subi		$out,$out,16
+	mtctr		$taillen
+Loop_xts_enc6x_steal:
+	lbzu		r0,1(r30)
+	stb		r0,16(r30)
+	bdnz		Loop_xts_enc6x_steal
+
+	li		$taillen,0
+	mtctr		$rounds
+	b		Loop_xts_enc1x		# one more time...
+
+.align	4
+Lxts_enc6x_done:
+	${UCMP}i	$ivp,0
+	beq		Lxts_enc6x_ret
+
+	vxor		$tweak,$twk0,$rndkey0
+	le?vperm	$tweak,$tweak,$tweak,$leperm
+	stvx_u		$tweak,0,$ivp
+
+Lxts_enc6x_ret:
+	mtlr		r11
+	li		r10,`$FRAME+15`
+	li		r11,`$FRAME+31`
+	stvx		$seven,r10,$sp		# wipe copies of round keys
+	addi		r10,r10,32
+	stvx		$seven,r11,$sp
+	addi		r11,r11,32
+	stvx		$seven,r10,$sp
+	addi		r10,r10,32
+	stvx		$seven,r11,$sp
+	addi		r11,r11,32
+	stvx		$seven,r10,$sp
+	addi		r10,r10,32
+	stvx		$seven,r11,$sp
+	addi		r11,r11,32
+	stvx		$seven,r10,$sp
+	addi		r10,r10,32
+	stvx		$seven,r11,$sp
+	addi		r11,r11,32
+
+	mtspr		256,$vrsave
+	lvx		v20,r10,$sp		# ABI says so
+	addi		r10,r10,32
+	lvx		v21,r11,$sp
+	addi		r11,r11,32
+	lvx		v22,r10,$sp
+	addi		r10,r10,32
+	lvx		v23,r11,$sp
+	addi		r11,r11,32
+	lvx		v24,r10,$sp
+	addi		r10,r10,32
+	lvx		v25,r11,$sp
+	addi		r11,r11,32
+	lvx		v26,r10,$sp
+	addi		r10,r10,32
+	lvx		v27,r11,$sp
+	addi		r11,r11,32
+	lvx		v28,r10,$sp
+	addi		r10,r10,32
+	lvx		v29,r11,$sp
+	addi		r11,r11,32
+	lvx		v30,r10,$sp
+	lvx		v31,r11,$sp
+	$POP		r26,`$FRAME+21*16+0*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+	$POP		r27,`$FRAME+21*16+1*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+	$POP		r28,`$FRAME+21*16+2*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+	$POP		r29,`$FRAME+21*16+3*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+	$POP		r30,`$FRAME+21*16+4*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+	$POP		r31,`$FRAME+21*16+5*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+	addi		$sp,$sp,`$FRAME+21*16+6*$SIZE_T`
+	blr
+	.long		0
+	.byte		0,12,0x04,1,0x80,6,6,0
+	.long		0
+
+.align	5
+_aesp8_xts_enc5x:
+	vcipher		$out0,$out0,v24
+	vcipher		$out1,$out1,v24
+	vcipher		$out2,$out2,v24
+	vcipher		$out3,$out3,v24
+	vcipher		$out4,$out4,v24
+	lvx		v24,$x20,$key_		# round[3]
+	addi		$key_,$key_,0x20
+
+	vcipher		$out0,$out0,v25
+	vcipher		$out1,$out1,v25
+	vcipher		$out2,$out2,v25
+	vcipher		$out3,$out3,v25
+	vcipher		$out4,$out4,v25
+	lvx		v25,$x10,$key_		# round[4]
+	bdnz		_aesp8_xts_enc5x
+
+	add		$inp,$inp,$taillen
+	cmpwi		$taillen,0
+	vcipher		$out0,$out0,v24
+	vcipher		$out1,$out1,v24
+	vcipher		$out2,$out2,v24
+	vcipher		$out3,$out3,v24
+	vcipher		$out4,$out4,v24
+
+	subi		$inp,$inp,16
+	vcipher		$out0,$out0,v25
+	vcipher		$out1,$out1,v25
+	vcipher		$out2,$out2,v25
+	vcipher		$out3,$out3,v25
+	vcipher		$out4,$out4,v25
+	 vxor		$twk0,$twk0,v31
+
+	vcipher		$out0,$out0,v26
+	lvsr		$inpperm,0,$taillen	# $in5 is no more
+	vcipher		$out1,$out1,v26
+	vcipher		$out2,$out2,v26
+	vcipher		$out3,$out3,v26
+	vcipher		$out4,$out4,v26
+	 vxor		$in1,$twk1,v31
+
+	vcipher		$out0,$out0,v27
+	lvx_u		$in0,0,$inp
+	vcipher		$out1,$out1,v27
+	vcipher		$out2,$out2,v27
+	vcipher		$out3,$out3,v27
+	vcipher		$out4,$out4,v27
+	 vxor		$in2,$twk2,v31
+
+	addi		$key_,$sp,$FRAME+15	# rewind $key_
+	vcipher		$out0,$out0,v28
+	vcipher		$out1,$out1,v28
+	vcipher		$out2,$out2,v28
+	vcipher		$out3,$out3,v28
+	vcipher		$out4,$out4,v28
+	lvx		v24,$x00,$key_		# re-pre-load round[1]
+	 vxor		$in3,$twk3,v31
+
+	vcipher		$out0,$out0,v29
+	le?vperm	$in0,$in0,$in0,$leperm
+	vcipher		$out1,$out1,v29
+	vcipher		$out2,$out2,v29
+	vcipher		$out3,$out3,v29
+	vcipher		$out4,$out4,v29
+	lvx		v25,$x10,$key_		# re-pre-load round[2]
+	 vxor		$in4,$twk4,v31
+
+	vcipher		$out0,$out0,v30
+	vperm		$in0,$in0,$in0,$inpperm
+	vcipher		$out1,$out1,v30
+	vcipher		$out2,$out2,v30
+	vcipher		$out3,$out3,v30
+	vcipher		$out4,$out4,v30
+
+	vcipherlast	$out0,$out0,$twk0
+	vcipherlast	$out1,$out1,$in1
+	vcipherlast	$out2,$out2,$in2
+	vcipherlast	$out3,$out3,$in3
+	vcipherlast	$out4,$out4,$in4
+	blr
+        .long   	0
+        .byte   	0,12,0x14,0,0,0,0,0
+
+.align	5
+_aesp8_xts_decrypt6x:
+	$STU		$sp,-`($FRAME+21*16+6*$SIZE_T)`($sp)
+	mflr		r11
+	li		r7,`$FRAME+8*16+15`
+	li		r3,`$FRAME+8*16+31`
+	$PUSH		r11,`$FRAME+21*16+6*$SIZE_T+$LRSAVE`($sp)
+	stvx		v20,r7,$sp		# ABI says so
+	addi		r7,r7,32
+	stvx		v21,r3,$sp
+	addi		r3,r3,32
+	stvx		v22,r7,$sp
+	addi		r7,r7,32
+	stvx		v23,r3,$sp
+	addi		r3,r3,32
+	stvx		v24,r7,$sp
+	addi		r7,r7,32
+	stvx		v25,r3,$sp
+	addi		r3,r3,32
+	stvx		v26,r7,$sp
+	addi		r7,r7,32
+	stvx		v27,r3,$sp
+	addi		r3,r3,32
+	stvx		v28,r7,$sp
+	addi		r7,r7,32
+	stvx		v29,r3,$sp
+	addi		r3,r3,32
+	stvx		v30,r7,$sp
+	stvx		v31,r3,$sp
+	li		r0,-1
+	stw		$vrsave,`$FRAME+21*16-4`($sp)	# save vrsave
+	li		$x10,0x10
+	$PUSH		r26,`$FRAME+21*16+0*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+	li		$x20,0x20
+	$PUSH		r27,`$FRAME+21*16+1*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+	li		$x30,0x30
+	$PUSH		r28,`$FRAME+21*16+2*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+	li		$x40,0x40
+	$PUSH		r29,`$FRAME+21*16+3*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+	li		$x50,0x50
+	$PUSH		r30,`$FRAME+21*16+4*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+	li		$x60,0x60
+	$PUSH		r31,`$FRAME+21*16+5*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+	li		$x70,0x70
+	mtspr		256,r0
+
+	subi		$rounds,$rounds,3	# -4 in total
+
+	lvx		$rndkey0,$x00,$key1	# load key schedule
+	lvx		v30,$x10,$key1
+	addi		$key1,$key1,0x20
+	lvx		v31,$x00,$key1
+	?vperm		$rndkey0,$rndkey0,v30,$keyperm
+	addi		$key_,$sp,$FRAME+15
+	mtctr		$rounds
+
+Load_xts_dec_key:
+	?vperm		v24,v30,v31,$keyperm
+	lvx		v30,$x10,$key1
+	addi		$key1,$key1,0x20
+	stvx		v24,$x00,$key_		# off-load round[1]
+	?vperm		v25,v31,v30,$keyperm
+	lvx		v31,$x00,$key1
+	stvx		v25,$x10,$key_		# off-load round[2]
+	addi		$key_,$key_,0x20
+	bdnz		Load_xts_dec_key
+
+	lvx		v26,$x10,$key1
+	?vperm		v24,v30,v31,$keyperm
+	lvx		v27,$x20,$key1
+	stvx		v24,$x00,$key_		# off-load round[3]
+	?vperm		v25,v31,v26,$keyperm
+	lvx		v28,$x30,$key1
+	stvx		v25,$x10,$key_		# off-load round[4]
+	addi		$key_,$sp,$FRAME+15	# rewind $key_
+	?vperm		v26,v26,v27,$keyperm
+	lvx		v29,$x40,$key1
+	?vperm		v27,v27,v28,$keyperm
+	lvx		v30,$x50,$key1
+	?vperm		v28,v28,v29,$keyperm
+	lvx		v31,$x60,$key1
+	?vperm		v29,v29,v30,$keyperm
+	lvx		$twk5,$x70,$key1	# borrow $twk5
+	?vperm		v30,v30,v31,$keyperm
+	lvx		v24,$x00,$key_		# pre-load round[1]
+	?vperm		v31,v31,$twk5,$keyperm
+	lvx		v25,$x10,$key_		# pre-load round[2]
+
+	 vperm		$in0,$inout,$inptail,$inpperm
+	 subi		$inp,$inp,31		# undo "caller"
+	vxor		$twk0,$tweak,$rndkey0
+	vsrab		$tmp,$tweak,$seven	# next tweak value
+	vaddubm		$tweak,$tweak,$tweak
+	vsldoi		$tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
+	vand		$tmp,$tmp,$eighty7
+	 vxor		$out0,$in0,$twk0
+	vxor		$tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+
+	 lvx_u		$in1,$x10,$inp
+	vxor		$twk1,$tweak,$rndkey0
+	vsrab		$tmp,$tweak,$seven	# next tweak value
+	vaddubm		$tweak,$tweak,$tweak
+	vsldoi		$tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
+	 le?vperm	$in1,$in1,$in1,$leperm
+	vand		$tmp,$tmp,$eighty7
+	 vxor		$out1,$in1,$twk1
+	vxor		$tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+
+	 lvx_u		$in2,$x20,$inp
+	 andi.		$taillen,$len,15
+	vxor		$twk2,$tweak,$rndkey0
+	vsrab		$tmp,$tweak,$seven	# next tweak value
+	vaddubm		$tweak,$tweak,$tweak
+	vsldoi		$tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
+	 le?vperm	$in2,$in2,$in2,$leperm
+	vand		$tmp,$tmp,$eighty7
+	 vxor		$out2,$in2,$twk2
+	vxor		$tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+
+	 lvx_u		$in3,$x30,$inp
+	 sub		$len,$len,$taillen
+	vxor		$twk3,$tweak,$rndkey0
+	vsrab		$tmp,$tweak,$seven	# next tweak value
+	vaddubm		$tweak,$tweak,$tweak
+	vsldoi		$tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
+	 le?vperm	$in3,$in3,$in3,$leperm
+	vand		$tmp,$tmp,$eighty7
+	 vxor		$out3,$in3,$twk3
+	vxor		$tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+
+	 lvx_u		$in4,$x40,$inp
+	 subi		$len,$len,0x60
+	vxor		$twk4,$tweak,$rndkey0
+	vsrab		$tmp,$tweak,$seven	# next tweak value
+	vaddubm		$tweak,$tweak,$tweak
+	vsldoi		$tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
+	 le?vperm	$in4,$in4,$in4,$leperm
+	vand		$tmp,$tmp,$eighty7
+	 vxor		$out4,$in4,$twk4
+	vxor		$tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+
+	 lvx_u		$in5,$x50,$inp
+	 addi		$inp,$inp,0x60
+	vxor		$twk5,$tweak,$rndkey0
+	vsrab		$tmp,$tweak,$seven	# next tweak value
+	vaddubm		$tweak,$tweak,$tweak
+	vsldoi		$tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
+	 le?vperm	$in5,$in5,$in5,$leperm
+	vand		$tmp,$tmp,$eighty7
+	 vxor		$out5,$in5,$twk5
+	vxor		$tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+
+	vxor		v31,v31,$rndkey0
+	mtctr		$rounds
+	b		Loop_xts_dec6x
+
+.align	5
+Loop_xts_dec6x:
+	vncipher	$out0,$out0,v24
+	vncipher	$out1,$out1,v24
+	vncipher	$out2,$out2,v24
+	vncipher	$out3,$out3,v24
+	vncipher	$out4,$out4,v24
+	vncipher	$out5,$out5,v24
+	lvx		v24,$x20,$key_		# round[3]
+	addi		$key_,$key_,0x20
+
+	vncipher	$out0,$out0,v25
+	vncipher	$out1,$out1,v25
+	vncipher	$out2,$out2,v25
+	vncipher	$out3,$out3,v25
+	vncipher	$out4,$out4,v25
+	vncipher	$out5,$out5,v25
+	lvx		v25,$x10,$key_		# round[4]
+	bdnz		Loop_xts_dec6x
+
+	subic		$len,$len,96		# $len-=96
+	 vxor		$in0,$twk0,v31		# xor with last round key
+	vncipher	$out0,$out0,v24
+	vncipher	$out1,$out1,v24
+	 vsrab		$tmp,$tweak,$seven	# next tweak value
+	 vxor		$twk0,$tweak,$rndkey0
+	 vaddubm	$tweak,$tweak,$tweak
+	vncipher	$out2,$out2,v24
+	vncipher	$out3,$out3,v24
+	 vsldoi		$tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
+	vncipher	$out4,$out4,v24
+	vncipher	$out5,$out5,v24
+
+	subfe.		r0,r0,r0		# borrow?-1:0
+	 vand		$tmp,$tmp,$eighty7
+	vncipher	$out0,$out0,v25
+	vncipher	$out1,$out1,v25
+	 vxor		$tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+	vncipher	$out2,$out2,v25
+	vncipher	$out3,$out3,v25
+	 vxor		$in1,$twk1,v31
+	 vsrab		$tmp,$tweak,$seven	# next tweak value
+	 vxor		$twk1,$tweak,$rndkey0
+	vncipher	$out4,$out4,v25
+	vncipher	$out5,$out5,v25
+
+	and		r0,r0,$len
+	 vaddubm	$tweak,$tweak,$tweak
+	 vsldoi		$tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
+	vncipher	$out0,$out0,v26
+	vncipher	$out1,$out1,v26
+	 vand		$tmp,$tmp,$eighty7
+	vncipher	$out2,$out2,v26
+	vncipher	$out3,$out3,v26
+	 vxor		$tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+	vncipher	$out4,$out4,v26
+	vncipher	$out5,$out5,v26
+
+	add		$inp,$inp,r0		# $inp is adjusted in such
+						# way that at exit from the
+						# loop inX-in5 are loaded
+						# with last "words"
+	 vxor		$in2,$twk2,v31
+	 vsrab		$tmp,$tweak,$seven	# next tweak value
+	 vxor		$twk2,$tweak,$rndkey0
+	 vaddubm	$tweak,$tweak,$tweak
+	vncipher	$out0,$out0,v27
+	vncipher	$out1,$out1,v27
+	 vsldoi		$tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
+	vncipher	$out2,$out2,v27
+	vncipher	$out3,$out3,v27
+	 vand		$tmp,$tmp,$eighty7
+	vncipher	$out4,$out4,v27
+	vncipher	$out5,$out5,v27
+
+	addi		$key_,$sp,$FRAME+15	# rewind $key_
+	 vxor		$tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+	vncipher	$out0,$out0,v28
+	vncipher	$out1,$out1,v28
+	 vxor		$in3,$twk3,v31
+	 vsrab		$tmp,$tweak,$seven	# next tweak value
+	 vxor		$twk3,$tweak,$rndkey0
+	vncipher	$out2,$out2,v28
+	vncipher	$out3,$out3,v28
+	 vaddubm	$tweak,$tweak,$tweak
+	 vsldoi		$tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
+	vncipher	$out4,$out4,v28
+	vncipher	$out5,$out5,v28
+	lvx		v24,$x00,$key_		# re-pre-load round[1]
+	 vand		$tmp,$tmp,$eighty7
+
+	vncipher	$out0,$out0,v29
+	vncipher	$out1,$out1,v29
+	 vxor		$tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+	vncipher	$out2,$out2,v29
+	vncipher	$out3,$out3,v29
+	 vxor		$in4,$twk4,v31
+	 vsrab		$tmp,$tweak,$seven	# next tweak value
+	 vxor		$twk4,$tweak,$rndkey0
+	vncipher	$out4,$out4,v29
+	vncipher	$out5,$out5,v29
+	lvx		v25,$x10,$key_		# re-pre-load round[2]
+	 vaddubm	$tweak,$tweak,$tweak
+	 vsldoi		$tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
+
+	vncipher	$out0,$out0,v30
+	vncipher	$out1,$out1,v30
+	 vand		$tmp,$tmp,$eighty7
+	vncipher	$out2,$out2,v30
+	vncipher	$out3,$out3,v30
+	 vxor		$tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+	vncipher	$out4,$out4,v30
+	vncipher	$out5,$out5,v30
+	 vxor		$in5,$twk5,v31
+	 vsrab		$tmp,$tweak,$seven	# next tweak value
+	 vxor		$twk5,$tweak,$rndkey0
+
+	vncipherlast	$out0,$out0,$in0
+	 lvx_u		$in0,$x00,$inp		# load next input block
+	 vaddubm	$tweak,$tweak,$tweak
+	 vsldoi		$tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
+	vncipherlast	$out1,$out1,$in1
+	 lvx_u		$in1,$x10,$inp
+	vncipherlast	$out2,$out2,$in2
+	 le?vperm	$in0,$in0,$in0,$leperm
+	 lvx_u		$in2,$x20,$inp
+	 vand		$tmp,$tmp,$eighty7
+	vncipherlast	$out3,$out3,$in3
+	 le?vperm	$in1,$in1,$in1,$leperm
+	 lvx_u		$in3,$x30,$inp
+	vncipherlast	$out4,$out4,$in4
+	 le?vperm	$in2,$in2,$in2,$leperm
+	 lvx_u		$in4,$x40,$inp
+	 vxor		$tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+	vncipherlast	$out5,$out5,$in5
+	 le?vperm	$in3,$in3,$in3,$leperm
+	 lvx_u		$in5,$x50,$inp
+	 addi		$inp,$inp,0x60
+	 le?vperm	$in4,$in4,$in4,$leperm
+	 le?vperm	$in5,$in5,$in5,$leperm
+
+	le?vperm	$out0,$out0,$out0,$leperm
+	le?vperm	$out1,$out1,$out1,$leperm
+	stvx_u		$out0,$x00,$out		# store output
+	 vxor		$out0,$in0,$twk0
+	le?vperm	$out2,$out2,$out2,$leperm
+	stvx_u		$out1,$x10,$out
+	 vxor		$out1,$in1,$twk1
+	le?vperm	$out3,$out3,$out3,$leperm
+	stvx_u		$out2,$x20,$out
+	 vxor		$out2,$in2,$twk2
+	le?vperm	$out4,$out4,$out4,$leperm
+	stvx_u		$out3,$x30,$out
+	 vxor		$out3,$in3,$twk3
+	le?vperm	$out5,$out5,$out5,$leperm
+	stvx_u		$out4,$x40,$out
+	 vxor		$out4,$in4,$twk4
+	stvx_u		$out5,$x50,$out
+	 vxor		$out5,$in5,$twk5
+	addi		$out,$out,0x60
+
+	mtctr		$rounds
+	beq		Loop_xts_dec6x		# did $len-=96 borrow?
+
+	addic.		$len,$len,0x60
+	beq		Lxts_dec6x_zero
+	cmpwi		$len,0x20
+	blt		Lxts_dec6x_one
+	nop
+	beq		Lxts_dec6x_two
+	cmpwi		$len,0x40
+	blt		Lxts_dec6x_three
+	nop
+	beq		Lxts_dec6x_four
+
+Lxts_dec6x_five:
+	vxor		$out0,$in1,$twk0
+	vxor		$out1,$in2,$twk1
+	vxor		$out2,$in3,$twk2
+	vxor		$out3,$in4,$twk3
+	vxor		$out4,$in5,$twk4
+
+	bl		_aesp8_xts_dec5x
+
+	le?vperm	$out0,$out0,$out0,$leperm
+	vmr		$twk0,$twk5		# unused tweak
+	vxor		$twk1,$tweak,$rndkey0
+	le?vperm	$out1,$out1,$out1,$leperm
+	stvx_u		$out0,$x00,$out		# store output
+	vxor		$out0,$in0,$twk1
+	le?vperm	$out2,$out2,$out2,$leperm
+	stvx_u		$out1,$x10,$out
+	le?vperm	$out3,$out3,$out3,$leperm
+	stvx_u		$out2,$x20,$out
+	le?vperm	$out4,$out4,$out4,$leperm
+	stvx_u		$out3,$x30,$out
+	stvx_u		$out4,$x40,$out
+	addi		$out,$out,0x50
+	bne		Lxts_dec6x_steal
+	b		Lxts_dec6x_done
+
+.align	4
+Lxts_dec6x_four:
+	vxor		$out0,$in2,$twk0
+	vxor		$out1,$in3,$twk1
+	vxor		$out2,$in4,$twk2
+	vxor		$out3,$in5,$twk3
+	vxor		$out4,$out4,$out4
+
+	bl		_aesp8_xts_dec5x
+
+	le?vperm	$out0,$out0,$out0,$leperm
+	vmr		$twk0,$twk4		# unused tweak
+	vmr		$twk1,$twk5
+	le?vperm	$out1,$out1,$out1,$leperm
+	stvx_u		$out0,$x00,$out		# store output
+	vxor		$out0,$in0,$twk5
+	le?vperm	$out2,$out2,$out2,$leperm
+	stvx_u		$out1,$x10,$out
+	le?vperm	$out3,$out3,$out3,$leperm
+	stvx_u		$out2,$x20,$out
+	stvx_u		$out3,$x30,$out
+	addi		$out,$out,0x40
+	bne		Lxts_dec6x_steal
+	b		Lxts_dec6x_done
+
+.align	4
+Lxts_dec6x_three:
+	vxor		$out0,$in3,$twk0
+	vxor		$out1,$in4,$twk1
+	vxor		$out2,$in5,$twk2
+	vxor		$out3,$out3,$out3
+	vxor		$out4,$out4,$out4
+
+	bl		_aesp8_xts_dec5x
+
+	le?vperm	$out0,$out0,$out0,$leperm
+	vmr		$twk0,$twk3		# unused tweak
+	vmr		$twk1,$twk4
+	le?vperm	$out1,$out1,$out1,$leperm
+	stvx_u		$out0,$x00,$out		# store output
+	vxor		$out0,$in0,$twk4
+	le?vperm	$out2,$out2,$out2,$leperm
+	stvx_u		$out1,$x10,$out
+	stvx_u		$out2,$x20,$out
+	addi		$out,$out,0x30
+	bne		Lxts_dec6x_steal
+	b		Lxts_dec6x_done
+
+.align	4
+Lxts_dec6x_two:
+	vxor		$out0,$in4,$twk0
+	vxor		$out1,$in5,$twk1
+	vxor		$out2,$out2,$out2
+	vxor		$out3,$out3,$out3
+	vxor		$out4,$out4,$out4
+
+	bl		_aesp8_xts_dec5x
+
+	le?vperm	$out0,$out0,$out0,$leperm
+	vmr		$twk0,$twk2		# unused tweak
+	vmr		$twk1,$twk3
+	le?vperm	$out1,$out1,$out1,$leperm
+	stvx_u		$out0,$x00,$out		# store output
+	vxor		$out0,$in0,$twk3
+	stvx_u		$out1,$x10,$out
+	addi		$out,$out,0x20
+	bne		Lxts_dec6x_steal
+	b		Lxts_dec6x_done
+
+.align	4
+Lxts_dec6x_one:
+	vxor		$out0,$in5,$twk0
+	nop
+Loop_xts_dec1x:
+	vncipher	$out0,$out0,v24
+	lvx		v24,$x20,$key_		# round[3]
+	addi		$key_,$key_,0x20
+
+	vncipher	$out0,$out0,v25
+	lvx		v25,$x10,$key_		# round[4]
+	bdnz		Loop_xts_dec1x
+
+	subi		r0,$taillen,1
+	vncipher	$out0,$out0,v24
+
+	andi.		r0,r0,16
+	cmpwi		$taillen,0
+	vncipher	$out0,$out0,v25
+
+	sub		$inp,$inp,r0
+	vncipher	$out0,$out0,v26
+
+	lvx_u		$in0,0,$inp
+	vncipher	$out0,$out0,v27
+
+	addi		$key_,$sp,$FRAME+15	# rewind $key_
+	vncipher	$out0,$out0,v28
+	lvx		v24,$x00,$key_		# re-pre-load round[1]
+
+	vncipher	$out0,$out0,v29
+	lvx		v25,$x10,$key_		# re-pre-load round[2]
+	 vxor		$twk0,$twk0,v31
+
+	le?vperm	$in0,$in0,$in0,$leperm
+	vncipher	$out0,$out0,v30
+
+	mtctr		$rounds
+	vncipherlast	$out0,$out0,$twk0
+
+	vmr		$twk0,$twk1		# unused tweak
+	vmr		$twk1,$twk2
+	le?vperm	$out0,$out0,$out0,$leperm
+	stvx_u		$out0,$x00,$out		# store output
+	addi		$out,$out,0x10
+	vxor		$out0,$in0,$twk2
+	bne		Lxts_dec6x_steal
+	b		Lxts_dec6x_done
+
+.align	4
+Lxts_dec6x_zero:
+	cmpwi		$taillen,0
+	beq		Lxts_dec6x_done
+
+	lvx_u		$in0,0,$inp
+	le?vperm	$in0,$in0,$in0,$leperm
+	vxor		$out0,$in0,$twk1
+Lxts_dec6x_steal:
+	vncipher	$out0,$out0,v24
+	lvx		v24,$x20,$key_		# round[3]
+	addi		$key_,$key_,0x20
+
+	vncipher	$out0,$out0,v25
+	lvx		v25,$x10,$key_		# round[4]
+	bdnz		Lxts_dec6x_steal
+
+	add		$inp,$inp,$taillen
+	vncipher	$out0,$out0,v24
+
+	cmpwi		$taillen,0
+	vncipher	$out0,$out0,v25
+
+	lvx_u		$in0,0,$inp
+	vncipher	$out0,$out0,v26
+
+	lvsr		$inpperm,0,$taillen	# $in5 is no more
+	vncipher	$out0,$out0,v27
+
+	addi		$key_,$sp,$FRAME+15	# rewind $key_
+	vncipher	$out0,$out0,v28
+	lvx		v24,$x00,$key_		# re-pre-load round[1]
+
+	vncipher	$out0,$out0,v29
+	lvx		v25,$x10,$key_		# re-pre-load round[2]
+	 vxor		$twk1,$twk1,v31
+
+	le?vperm	$in0,$in0,$in0,$leperm
+	vncipher	$out0,$out0,v30
+
+	vperm		$in0,$in0,$in0,$inpperm
+	vncipherlast	$tmp,$out0,$twk1
+
+	le?vperm	$out0,$tmp,$tmp,$leperm
+	le?stvx_u	$out0,0,$out
+	be?stvx_u	$tmp,0,$out
+
+	vxor		$out0,$out0,$out0
+	vspltisb	$out1,-1
+	vperm		$out0,$out0,$out1,$inpperm
+	vsel		$out0,$in0,$tmp,$out0
+	vxor		$out0,$out0,$twk0
+
+	subi		r30,$out,1
+	mtctr		$taillen
+Loop_xts_dec6x_steal:
+	lbzu		r0,1(r30)
+	stb		r0,16(r30)
+	bdnz		Loop_xts_dec6x_steal
+
+	li		$taillen,0
+	mtctr		$rounds
+	b		Loop_xts_dec1x		# one more time...
+
+.align	4
+Lxts_dec6x_done:
+	${UCMP}i	$ivp,0
+	beq		Lxts_dec6x_ret
+
+	vxor		$tweak,$twk0,$rndkey0
+	le?vperm	$tweak,$tweak,$tweak,$leperm
+	stvx_u		$tweak,0,$ivp
+
+Lxts_dec6x_ret:
+	mtlr		r11
+	li		r10,`$FRAME+15`
+	li		r11,`$FRAME+31`
+	stvx		$seven,r10,$sp		# wipe copies of round keys
+	addi		r10,r10,32
+	stvx		$seven,r11,$sp
+	addi		r11,r11,32
+	stvx		$seven,r10,$sp
+	addi		r10,r10,32
+	stvx		$seven,r11,$sp
+	addi		r11,r11,32
+	stvx		$seven,r10,$sp
+	addi		r10,r10,32
+	stvx		$seven,r11,$sp
+	addi		r11,r11,32
+	stvx		$seven,r10,$sp
+	addi		r10,r10,32
+	stvx		$seven,r11,$sp
+	addi		r11,r11,32
+
+	mtspr		256,$vrsave
+	lvx		v20,r10,$sp		# ABI says so
+	addi		r10,r10,32
+	lvx		v21,r11,$sp
+	addi		r11,r11,32
+	lvx		v22,r10,$sp
+	addi		r10,r10,32
+	lvx		v23,r11,$sp
+	addi		r11,r11,32
+	lvx		v24,r10,$sp
+	addi		r10,r10,32
+	lvx		v25,r11,$sp
+	addi		r11,r11,32
+	lvx		v26,r10,$sp
+	addi		r10,r10,32
+	lvx		v27,r11,$sp
+	addi		r11,r11,32
+	lvx		v28,r10,$sp
+	addi		r10,r10,32
+	lvx		v29,r11,$sp
+	addi		r11,r11,32
+	lvx		v30,r10,$sp
+	lvx		v31,r11,$sp
+	$POP		r26,`$FRAME+21*16+0*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+	$POP		r27,`$FRAME+21*16+1*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+	$POP		r28,`$FRAME+21*16+2*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+	$POP		r29,`$FRAME+21*16+3*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+	$POP		r30,`$FRAME+21*16+4*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+	$POP		r31,`$FRAME+21*16+5*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+	addi		$sp,$sp,`$FRAME+21*16+6*$SIZE_T`
+	blr
+	.long		0
+	.byte		0,12,0x04,1,0x80,6,6,0
+	.long		0
+
+.align	5
+_aesp8_xts_dec5x:
+	vncipher	$out0,$out0,v24
+	vncipher	$out1,$out1,v24
+	vncipher	$out2,$out2,v24
+	vncipher	$out3,$out3,v24
+	vncipher	$out4,$out4,v24
+	lvx		v24,$x20,$key_		# round[3]
+	addi		$key_,$key_,0x20
+
+	vncipher	$out0,$out0,v25
+	vncipher	$out1,$out1,v25
+	vncipher	$out2,$out2,v25
+	vncipher	$out3,$out3,v25
+	vncipher	$out4,$out4,v25
+	lvx		v25,$x10,$key_		# round[4]
+	bdnz		_aesp8_xts_dec5x
+
+	subi		r0,$taillen,1
+	vncipher	$out0,$out0,v24
+	vncipher	$out1,$out1,v24
+	vncipher	$out2,$out2,v24
+	vncipher	$out3,$out3,v24
+	vncipher	$out4,$out4,v24
+
+	andi.		r0,r0,16
+	cmpwi		$taillen,0
+	vncipher	$out0,$out0,v25
+	vncipher	$out1,$out1,v25
+	vncipher	$out2,$out2,v25
+	vncipher	$out3,$out3,v25
+	vncipher	$out4,$out4,v25
+	 vxor		$twk0,$twk0,v31
+
+	sub		$inp,$inp,r0
+	vncipher	$out0,$out0,v26
+	vncipher	$out1,$out1,v26
+	vncipher	$out2,$out2,v26
+	vncipher	$out3,$out3,v26
+	vncipher	$out4,$out4,v26
+	 vxor		$in1,$twk1,v31
+
+	vncipher	$out0,$out0,v27
+	lvx_u		$in0,0,$inp
+	vncipher	$out1,$out1,v27
+	vncipher	$out2,$out2,v27
+	vncipher	$out3,$out3,v27
+	vncipher	$out4,$out4,v27
+	 vxor		$in2,$twk2,v31
+
+	addi		$key_,$sp,$FRAME+15	# rewind $key_
+	vncipher	$out0,$out0,v28
+	vncipher	$out1,$out1,v28
+	vncipher	$out2,$out2,v28
+	vncipher	$out3,$out3,v28
+	vncipher	$out4,$out4,v28
+	lvx		v24,$x00,$key_		# re-pre-load round[1]
+	 vxor		$in3,$twk3,v31
+
+	vncipher	$out0,$out0,v29
+	le?vperm	$in0,$in0,$in0,$leperm
+	vncipher	$out1,$out1,v29
+	vncipher	$out2,$out2,v29
+	vncipher	$out3,$out3,v29
+	vncipher	$out4,$out4,v29
+	lvx		v25,$x10,$key_		# re-pre-load round[2]
+	 vxor		$in4,$twk4,v31
+
+	vncipher	$out0,$out0,v30
+	vncipher	$out1,$out1,v30
+	vncipher	$out2,$out2,v30
+	vncipher	$out3,$out3,v30
+	vncipher	$out4,$out4,v30
+
+	vncipherlast	$out0,$out0,$twk0
+	vncipherlast	$out1,$out1,$in1
+	vncipherlast	$out2,$out2,$in2
+	vncipherlast	$out3,$out3,$in3
+	vncipherlast	$out4,$out4,$in4
+	mtctr		$rounds
+	blr
+        .long   	0
+        .byte   	0,12,0x14,0,0,0,0,0
+___
+}}	}}}
+
+my $consts=1;
+foreach(split("\n",$code)) {
+        s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval($1)/geo;
+
+	# constants table endian-specific conversion
+	if ($consts && m/\.(long|byte)\s+(.+)\s+(\?[a-z]*)$/o) {
+	    my $conv=$3;
+	    my @bytes=();
+
+	    # convert to endian-agnostic format
+	    if ($1 eq "long") {
+	      foreach (split(/,\s*/,$2)) {
+		my $l = /^0/?oct:int;
+		push @bytes,($l>>24)&0xff,($l>>16)&0xff,($l>>8)&0xff,$l&0xff;
+	      }
+	    } else {
+		@bytes = map(/^0/?oct:int,split(/,\s*/,$2));
+	    }
+
+	    # little-endian conversion
+	    if ($flavour =~ /le$/o) {
+		SWITCH: for($conv)  {
+		    /\?inv/ && do   { @bytes=map($_^0xf,@bytes); last; };
+		    /\?rev/ && do   { @bytes=reverse(@bytes);    last; }; 
+		}
+	    }
+
+	    #emit
+	    print ".byte\t",join(',',map (sprintf("0x%02x",$_),@bytes)),"\n";
+	    next;
+	}
+	$consts=0 if (m/Lconsts:/o);	# end of table
+
+	# instructions prefixed with '?' are endian-specific and need
+	# to be adjusted accordingly...
+	if ($flavour =~ /le$/o) {	# little-endian
+	    s/le\?//o		or
+	    s/be\?/#be#/o	or
+	    s/\?lvsr/lvsl/o	or
+	    s/\?lvsl/lvsr/o	or
+	    s/\?(vperm\s+v[0-9]+,\s*)(v[0-9]+,\s*)(v[0-9]+,\s*)(v[0-9]+)/$1$3$2$4/o or
+	    s/\?(vsldoi\s+v[0-9]+,\s*)(v[0-9]+,)\s*(v[0-9]+,\s*)([0-9]+)/$1$3$2 16-$4/o or
+	    s/\?(vspltw\s+v[0-9]+,\s*)(v[0-9]+,)\s*([0-9])/$1$2 3-$3/o;
+	} else {			# big-endian
+	    s/le\?/#le#/o	or
+	    s/be\?//o		or
+	    s/\?([a-z]+)/$1/o;
+	}
+
+        print $_,"\n";
+}
+
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/asm/aest4-sparcv9.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/asm/aest4-sparcv9.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bf479c6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/asm/aest4-sparcv9.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,929 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2012-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by David S. Miller <davem@devemloft.net> and Andy Polyakov
+# <appro@openssl.org>. The module is licensed under 2-clause BSD
+# license. October 2012. All rights reserved.
+# ====================================================================
+
+######################################################################
+# AES for SPARC T4.
+#
+# AES round instructions complete in 3 cycles and can be issued every
+# cycle. It means that round calculations should take 4*rounds cycles,
+# because any given round instruction depends on result of *both*
+# previous instructions:
+#
+#	|0 |1 |2 |3 |4
+#	|01|01|01|
+#	   |23|23|23|
+#	            |01|01|...
+#	               |23|...
+#
+# Provided that fxor [with IV] takes 3 cycles to complete, critical
+# path length for CBC encrypt would be 3+4*rounds, or in other words
+# it should process one byte in at least (3+4*rounds)/16 cycles. This
+# estimate doesn't account for "collateral" instructions, such as
+# fetching input from memory, xor-ing it with zero-round key and
+# storing the result. Yet, *measured* performance [for data aligned
+# at 64-bit boundary!] deviates from this equation by less than 0.5%:
+#
+#		128-bit key	192-		256-
+# CBC encrypt	2.70/2.90(*)	3.20/3.40	3.70/3.90
+#			 (*) numbers after slash are for
+#			     misaligned data.
+#
+# Out-of-order execution logic managed to fully overlap "collateral"
+# instructions with those on critical path. Amazing!
+#
+# As with Intel AES-NI, question is if it's possible to improve
+# performance of parallelizeable modes by interleaving round
+# instructions. Provided round instruction latency and throughput
+# optimal interleave factor is 2. But can we expect 2x performance
+# improvement? Well, as round instructions can be issued one per
+# cycle, they don't saturate the 2-way issue pipeline and therefore
+# there is room for "collateral" calculations... Yet, 2x speed-up
+# over CBC encrypt remains unattaintable:
+#
+#		128-bit key	192-		256-
+# CBC decrypt	1.64/2.11	1.89/2.37	2.23/2.61
+# CTR		1.64/2.08(*)	1.89/2.33	2.23/2.61
+#			 (*) numbers after slash are for
+#			     misaligned data.
+#
+# Estimates based on amount of instructions under assumption that
+# round instructions are not pairable with any other instruction
+# suggest that latter is the actual case and pipeline runs
+# underutilized. It should be noted that T4 out-of-order execution
+# logic is so capable that performance gain from 2x interleave is
+# not even impressive, ~7-13% over non-interleaved code, largest
+# for 256-bit keys.
+
+# To anchor to something else, software implementation processes
+# one byte in 29 cycles with 128-bit key on same processor. Intel
+# Sandy Bridge encrypts byte in 5.07 cycles in CBC mode and decrypts
+# in 0.93, naturally with AES-NI.
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm");
+require "sparcv9_modes.pl";
+
+$output = pop;
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+$::evp=1;	# if $evp is set to 0, script generates module with
+# AES_[en|de]crypt, AES_set_[en|de]crypt_key and AES_cbc_encrypt entry
+# points. These however are not fully compatible with openssl/aes.h,
+# because they expect AES_KEY to be aligned at 64-bit boundary. When
+# used through EVP, alignment is arranged at EVP layer. Second thing
+# that is arranged by EVP is at least 32-bit alignment of IV.
+
+######################################################################
+# single-round subroutines
+#
+{
+my ($inp,$out,$key,$rounds,$tmp,$mask)=map("%o$_",(0..5));
+
+$code.=<<___;
+#include "sparc_arch.h"
+
+#ifdef	__arch64__
+.register	%g2,#scratch
+.register	%g3,#scratch
+#endif
+
+.text
+
+.globl	aes_t4_encrypt
+.align	32
+aes_t4_encrypt:
+	andcc		$inp, 7, %g1		! is input aligned?
+	andn		$inp, 7, $inp
+
+	ldx		[$key + 0], %g4
+	ldx		[$key + 8], %g5
+
+	ldx		[$inp + 0], %o4
+	bz,pt		%icc, 1f
+	ldx		[$inp + 8], %o5
+	ldx		[$inp + 16], $inp
+	sll		%g1, 3, %g1
+	sub		%g0, %g1, %o3
+	sllx		%o4, %g1, %o4
+	sllx		%o5, %g1, %g1
+	srlx		%o5, %o3, %o5
+	srlx		$inp, %o3, %o3
+	or		%o5, %o4, %o4
+	or		%o3, %g1, %o5
+1:
+	ld		[$key + 240], $rounds
+	ldd		[$key + 16], %f12
+	ldd		[$key + 24], %f14
+	xor		%g4, %o4, %o4
+	xor		%g5, %o5, %o5
+	movxtod		%o4, %f0
+	movxtod		%o5, %f2
+	srl		$rounds, 1, $rounds
+	ldd		[$key + 32], %f16
+	sub		$rounds, 1, $rounds
+	ldd		[$key + 40], %f18
+	add		$key, 48, $key
+
+.Lenc:
+	aes_eround01	%f12, %f0, %f2, %f4
+	aes_eround23	%f14, %f0, %f2, %f2
+	ldd		[$key + 0], %f12
+	ldd		[$key + 8], %f14
+	sub		$rounds,1,$rounds
+	aes_eround01	%f16, %f4, %f2, %f0
+	aes_eround23	%f18, %f4, %f2, %f2
+	ldd		[$key + 16], %f16
+	ldd		[$key + 24], %f18
+	brnz,pt		$rounds, .Lenc
+	add		$key, 32, $key
+
+	andcc		$out, 7, $tmp		! is output aligned?
+	aes_eround01	%f12, %f0, %f2, %f4
+	aes_eround23	%f14, %f0, %f2, %f2
+	aes_eround01_l	%f16, %f4, %f2, %f0
+	aes_eround23_l	%f18, %f4, %f2, %f2
+
+	bnz,pn		%icc, 2f
+	nop
+
+	std		%f0, [$out + 0]
+	retl
+	std		%f2, [$out + 8]
+
+2:	alignaddrl	$out, %g0, $out
+	mov		0xff, $mask
+	srl		$mask, $tmp, $mask
+
+	faligndata	%f0, %f0, %f4
+	faligndata	%f0, %f2, %f6
+	faligndata	%f2, %f2, %f8
+
+	stda		%f4, [$out + $mask]0xc0	! partial store
+	std		%f6, [$out + 8]
+	add		$out, 16, $out
+	orn		%g0, $mask, $mask
+	retl
+	stda		%f8, [$out + $mask]0xc0	! partial store
+.type	aes_t4_encrypt,#function
+.size	aes_t4_encrypt,.-aes_t4_encrypt
+
+.globl	aes_t4_decrypt
+.align	32
+aes_t4_decrypt:
+	andcc		$inp, 7, %g1		! is input aligned?
+	andn		$inp, 7, $inp
+
+	ldx		[$key + 0], %g4
+	ldx		[$key + 8], %g5
+
+	ldx		[$inp + 0], %o4
+	bz,pt		%icc, 1f
+	ldx		[$inp + 8], %o5
+	ldx		[$inp + 16], $inp
+	sll		%g1, 3, %g1
+	sub		%g0, %g1, %o3
+	sllx		%o4, %g1, %o4
+	sllx		%o5, %g1, %g1
+	srlx		%o5, %o3, %o5
+	srlx		$inp, %o3, %o3
+	or		%o5, %o4, %o4
+	or		%o3, %g1, %o5
+1:
+	ld		[$key + 240], $rounds
+	ldd		[$key + 16], %f12
+	ldd		[$key + 24], %f14
+	xor		%g4, %o4, %o4
+	xor		%g5, %o5, %o5
+	movxtod		%o4, %f0
+	movxtod		%o5, %f2
+	srl		$rounds, 1, $rounds
+	ldd		[$key + 32], %f16
+	sub		$rounds, 1, $rounds
+	ldd		[$key + 40], %f18
+	add		$key, 48, $key
+
+.Ldec:
+	aes_dround01	%f12, %f0, %f2, %f4
+	aes_dround23	%f14, %f0, %f2, %f2
+	ldd		[$key + 0], %f12
+	ldd		[$key + 8], %f14
+	sub		$rounds,1,$rounds
+	aes_dround01	%f16, %f4, %f2, %f0
+	aes_dround23	%f18, %f4, %f2, %f2
+	ldd		[$key + 16], %f16
+	ldd		[$key + 24], %f18
+	brnz,pt		$rounds, .Ldec
+	add		$key, 32, $key
+
+	andcc		$out, 7, $tmp		! is output aligned?
+	aes_dround01	%f12, %f0, %f2, %f4
+	aes_dround23	%f14, %f0, %f2, %f2
+	aes_dround01_l	%f16, %f4, %f2, %f0
+	aes_dround23_l	%f18, %f4, %f2, %f2
+
+	bnz,pn		%icc, 2f
+	nop
+
+	std		%f0, [$out + 0]
+	retl
+	std		%f2, [$out + 8]
+
+2:	alignaddrl	$out, %g0, $out
+	mov		0xff, $mask
+	srl		$mask, $tmp, $mask
+
+	faligndata	%f0, %f0, %f4
+	faligndata	%f0, %f2, %f6
+	faligndata	%f2, %f2, %f8
+
+	stda		%f4, [$out + $mask]0xc0	! partial store
+	std		%f6, [$out + 8]
+	add		$out, 16, $out
+	orn		%g0, $mask, $mask
+	retl
+	stda		%f8, [$out + $mask]0xc0	! partial store
+.type	aes_t4_decrypt,#function
+.size	aes_t4_decrypt,.-aes_t4_decrypt
+___
+}
+
+######################################################################
+# key setup subroutines
+#
+{
+my ($inp,$bits,$out,$tmp)=map("%o$_",(0..5));
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	aes_t4_set_encrypt_key
+.align	32
+aes_t4_set_encrypt_key:
+.Lset_encrypt_key:
+	and		$inp, 7, $tmp
+	alignaddr	$inp, %g0, $inp
+	cmp		$bits, 192
+	ldd		[$inp + 0], %f0
+	bl,pt		%icc,.L128
+	ldd		[$inp + 8], %f2
+
+	be,pt		%icc,.L192
+	ldd		[$inp + 16], %f4
+	brz,pt		$tmp, .L256aligned
+	ldd		[$inp + 24], %f6
+
+	ldd		[$inp + 32], %f8
+	faligndata	%f0, %f2, %f0
+	faligndata	%f2, %f4, %f2
+	faligndata	%f4, %f6, %f4
+	faligndata	%f6, %f8, %f6
+.L256aligned:
+___
+for ($i=0; $i<6; $i++) {
+    $code.=<<___;
+	std		%f0, [$out + `32*$i+0`]
+	aes_kexpand1	%f0, %f6, $i, %f0
+	std		%f2, [$out + `32*$i+8`]
+	aes_kexpand2	%f2, %f0, %f2
+	std		%f4, [$out + `32*$i+16`]
+	aes_kexpand0	%f4, %f2, %f4
+	std		%f6, [$out + `32*$i+24`]
+	aes_kexpand2	%f6, %f4, %f6
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	std		%f0, [$out + `32*$i+0`]
+	aes_kexpand1	%f0, %f6, $i, %f0
+	std		%f2, [$out + `32*$i+8`]
+	aes_kexpand2	%f2, %f0, %f2
+	std		%f4, [$out + `32*$i+16`]
+	std		%f6, [$out + `32*$i+24`]
+	std		%f0, [$out + `32*$i+32`]
+	std		%f2, [$out + `32*$i+40`]
+
+	mov		14, $tmp
+	st		$tmp, [$out + 240]
+	retl
+	xor		%o0, %o0, %o0
+
+.align	16
+.L192:
+	brz,pt		$tmp, .L192aligned
+	nop
+
+	ldd		[$inp + 24], %f6
+	faligndata	%f0, %f2, %f0
+	faligndata	%f2, %f4, %f2
+	faligndata	%f4, %f6, %f4
+.L192aligned:
+___
+for ($i=0; $i<7; $i++) {
+    $code.=<<___;
+	std		%f0, [$out + `24*$i+0`]
+	aes_kexpand1	%f0, %f4, $i, %f0
+	std		%f2, [$out + `24*$i+8`]
+	aes_kexpand2	%f2, %f0, %f2
+	std		%f4, [$out + `24*$i+16`]
+	aes_kexpand2	%f4, %f2, %f4
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	std		%f0, [$out + `24*$i+0`]
+	aes_kexpand1	%f0, %f4, $i, %f0
+	std		%f2, [$out + `24*$i+8`]
+	aes_kexpand2	%f2, %f0, %f2
+	std		%f4, [$out + `24*$i+16`]
+	std		%f0, [$out + `24*$i+24`]
+	std		%f2, [$out + `24*$i+32`]
+
+	mov		12, $tmp
+	st		$tmp, [$out + 240]
+	retl
+	xor		%o0, %o0, %o0
+
+.align	16
+.L128:
+	brz,pt		$tmp, .L128aligned
+	nop
+
+	ldd		[$inp + 16], %f4
+	faligndata	%f0, %f2, %f0
+	faligndata	%f2, %f4, %f2
+.L128aligned:
+___
+for ($i=0; $i<10; $i++) {
+    $code.=<<___;
+	std		%f0, [$out + `16*$i+0`]
+	aes_kexpand1	%f0, %f2, $i, %f0
+	std		%f2, [$out + `16*$i+8`]
+	aes_kexpand2	%f2, %f0, %f2
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	std		%f0, [$out + `16*$i+0`]
+	std		%f2, [$out + `16*$i+8`]
+
+	mov		10, $tmp
+	st		$tmp, [$out + 240]
+	retl
+	xor		%o0, %o0, %o0
+.type	aes_t4_set_encrypt_key,#function
+.size	aes_t4_set_encrypt_key,.-aes_t4_set_encrypt_key
+
+.globl	aes_t4_set_decrypt_key
+.align	32
+aes_t4_set_decrypt_key:
+	mov		%o7, %o5
+	call		.Lset_encrypt_key
+	nop
+
+	mov		%o5, %o7
+	sll		$tmp, 4, $inp		! $tmp is number of rounds
+	add		$tmp, 2, $tmp
+	add		$out, $inp, $inp	! $inp=$out+16*rounds
+	srl		$tmp, 2, $tmp		! $tmp=(rounds+2)/4
+
+.Lkey_flip:
+	ldd		[$out + 0],  %f0
+	ldd		[$out + 8],  %f2
+	ldd		[$out + 16], %f4
+	ldd		[$out + 24], %f6
+	ldd		[$inp + 0],  %f8
+	ldd		[$inp + 8],  %f10
+	ldd		[$inp - 16], %f12
+	ldd		[$inp - 8],  %f14
+	sub		$tmp, 1, $tmp
+	std		%f0, [$inp + 0]
+	std		%f2, [$inp + 8]
+	std		%f4, [$inp - 16]
+	std		%f6, [$inp - 8]
+	std		%f8, [$out + 0]
+	std		%f10, [$out + 8]
+	std		%f12, [$out + 16]
+	std		%f14, [$out + 24]
+	add		$out, 32, $out
+	brnz		$tmp, .Lkey_flip
+	sub		$inp, 32, $inp
+
+	retl
+	xor		%o0, %o0, %o0
+.type	aes_t4_set_decrypt_key,#function
+.size	aes_t4_set_decrypt_key,.-aes_t4_set_decrypt_key
+___
+}
+
+{{{
+my ($inp,$out,$len,$key,$ivec,$enc)=map("%i$_",(0..5));
+my ($ileft,$iright,$ooff,$omask,$ivoff)=map("%l$_",(1..7));
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.align	32
+_aes128_encrypt_1x:
+___
+for ($i=0; $i<4; $i++) {
+    $code.=<<___;
+	aes_eround01	%f`16+8*$i+0`, %f0, %f2, %f4
+	aes_eround23	%f`16+8*$i+2`, %f0, %f2, %f2
+	aes_eround01	%f`16+8*$i+4`, %f4, %f2, %f0
+	aes_eround23	%f`16+8*$i+6`, %f4, %f2, %f2
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	aes_eround01	%f48, %f0, %f2, %f4
+	aes_eround23	%f50, %f0, %f2, %f2
+	aes_eround01_l	%f52, %f4, %f2, %f0
+	retl
+	aes_eround23_l	%f54, %f4, %f2, %f2
+.type	_aes128_encrypt_1x,#function
+.size	_aes128_encrypt_1x,.-_aes128_encrypt_1x
+
+.align	32
+_aes128_encrypt_2x:
+___
+for ($i=0; $i<4; $i++) {
+    $code.=<<___;
+	aes_eround01	%f`16+8*$i+0`, %f0, %f2, %f8
+	aes_eround23	%f`16+8*$i+2`, %f0, %f2, %f2
+	aes_eround01	%f`16+8*$i+0`, %f4, %f6, %f10
+	aes_eround23	%f`16+8*$i+2`, %f4, %f6, %f6
+	aes_eround01	%f`16+8*$i+4`, %f8, %f2, %f0
+	aes_eround23	%f`16+8*$i+6`, %f8, %f2, %f2
+	aes_eround01	%f`16+8*$i+4`, %f10, %f6, %f4
+	aes_eround23	%f`16+8*$i+6`, %f10, %f6, %f6
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	aes_eround01	%f48, %f0, %f2, %f8
+	aes_eround23	%f50, %f0, %f2, %f2
+	aes_eround01	%f48, %f4, %f6, %f10
+	aes_eround23	%f50, %f4, %f6, %f6
+	aes_eround01_l	%f52, %f8, %f2, %f0
+	aes_eround23_l	%f54, %f8, %f2, %f2
+	aes_eround01_l	%f52, %f10, %f6, %f4
+	retl
+	aes_eround23_l	%f54, %f10, %f6, %f6
+.type	_aes128_encrypt_2x,#function
+.size	_aes128_encrypt_2x,.-_aes128_encrypt_2x
+
+.align	32
+_aes128_loadkey:
+	ldx		[$key + 0], %g4
+	ldx		[$key + 8], %g5
+___
+for ($i=2; $i<22;$i++) {			# load key schedule
+    $code.=<<___;
+	ldd		[$key + `8*$i`], %f`12+2*$i`
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	retl
+	nop
+.type	_aes128_loadkey,#function
+.size	_aes128_loadkey,.-_aes128_loadkey
+_aes128_load_enckey=_aes128_loadkey
+_aes128_load_deckey=_aes128_loadkey
+
+___
+
+&alg_cbc_encrypt_implement("aes",128);
+if ($::evp) {
+    &alg_ctr32_implement("aes",128);
+    &alg_xts_implement("aes",128,"en");
+    &alg_xts_implement("aes",128,"de");
+}
+&alg_cbc_decrypt_implement("aes",128);
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.align	32
+_aes128_decrypt_1x:
+___
+for ($i=0; $i<4; $i++) {
+    $code.=<<___;
+	aes_dround01	%f`16+8*$i+0`, %f0, %f2, %f4
+	aes_dround23	%f`16+8*$i+2`, %f0, %f2, %f2
+	aes_dround01	%f`16+8*$i+4`, %f4, %f2, %f0
+	aes_dround23	%f`16+8*$i+6`, %f4, %f2, %f2
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	aes_dround01	%f48, %f0, %f2, %f4
+	aes_dround23	%f50, %f0, %f2, %f2
+	aes_dround01_l	%f52, %f4, %f2, %f0
+	retl
+	aes_dround23_l	%f54, %f4, %f2, %f2
+.type	_aes128_decrypt_1x,#function
+.size	_aes128_decrypt_1x,.-_aes128_decrypt_1x
+
+.align	32
+_aes128_decrypt_2x:
+___
+for ($i=0; $i<4; $i++) {
+    $code.=<<___;
+	aes_dround01	%f`16+8*$i+0`, %f0, %f2, %f8
+	aes_dround23	%f`16+8*$i+2`, %f0, %f2, %f2
+	aes_dround01	%f`16+8*$i+0`, %f4, %f6, %f10
+	aes_dround23	%f`16+8*$i+2`, %f4, %f6, %f6
+	aes_dround01	%f`16+8*$i+4`, %f8, %f2, %f0
+	aes_dround23	%f`16+8*$i+6`, %f8, %f2, %f2
+	aes_dround01	%f`16+8*$i+4`, %f10, %f6, %f4
+	aes_dround23	%f`16+8*$i+6`, %f10, %f6, %f6
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	aes_dround01	%f48, %f0, %f2, %f8
+	aes_dround23	%f50, %f0, %f2, %f2
+	aes_dround01	%f48, %f4, %f6, %f10
+	aes_dround23	%f50, %f4, %f6, %f6
+	aes_dround01_l	%f52, %f8, %f2, %f0
+	aes_dround23_l	%f54, %f8, %f2, %f2
+	aes_dround01_l	%f52, %f10, %f6, %f4
+	retl
+	aes_dround23_l	%f54, %f10, %f6, %f6
+.type	_aes128_decrypt_2x,#function
+.size	_aes128_decrypt_2x,.-_aes128_decrypt_2x
+___
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.align	32
+_aes192_encrypt_1x:
+___
+for ($i=0; $i<5; $i++) {
+    $code.=<<___;
+	aes_eround01	%f`16+8*$i+0`, %f0, %f2, %f4
+	aes_eround23	%f`16+8*$i+2`, %f0, %f2, %f2
+	aes_eround01	%f`16+8*$i+4`, %f4, %f2, %f0
+	aes_eround23	%f`16+8*$i+6`, %f4, %f2, %f2
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	aes_eround01	%f56, %f0, %f2, %f4
+	aes_eround23	%f58, %f0, %f2, %f2
+	aes_eround01_l	%f60, %f4, %f2, %f0
+	retl
+	aes_eround23_l	%f62, %f4, %f2, %f2
+.type	_aes192_encrypt_1x,#function
+.size	_aes192_encrypt_1x,.-_aes192_encrypt_1x
+
+.align	32
+_aes192_encrypt_2x:
+___
+for ($i=0; $i<5; $i++) {
+    $code.=<<___;
+	aes_eround01	%f`16+8*$i+0`, %f0, %f2, %f8
+	aes_eround23	%f`16+8*$i+2`, %f0, %f2, %f2
+	aes_eround01	%f`16+8*$i+0`, %f4, %f6, %f10
+	aes_eround23	%f`16+8*$i+2`, %f4, %f6, %f6
+	aes_eround01	%f`16+8*$i+4`, %f8, %f2, %f0
+	aes_eround23	%f`16+8*$i+6`, %f8, %f2, %f2
+	aes_eround01	%f`16+8*$i+4`, %f10, %f6, %f4
+	aes_eround23	%f`16+8*$i+6`, %f10, %f6, %f6
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	aes_eround01	%f56, %f0, %f2, %f8
+	aes_eround23	%f58, %f0, %f2, %f2
+	aes_eround01	%f56, %f4, %f6, %f10
+	aes_eround23	%f58, %f4, %f6, %f6
+	aes_eround01_l	%f60, %f8, %f2, %f0
+	aes_eround23_l	%f62, %f8, %f2, %f2
+	aes_eround01_l	%f60, %f10, %f6, %f4
+	retl
+	aes_eround23_l	%f62, %f10, %f6, %f6
+.type	_aes192_encrypt_2x,#function
+.size	_aes192_encrypt_2x,.-_aes192_encrypt_2x
+
+.align	32
+_aes256_encrypt_1x:
+	aes_eround01	%f16, %f0, %f2, %f4
+	aes_eround23	%f18, %f0, %f2, %f2
+	ldd		[$key + 208], %f16
+	ldd		[$key + 216], %f18
+	aes_eround01	%f20, %f4, %f2, %f0
+	aes_eround23	%f22, %f4, %f2, %f2
+	ldd		[$key + 224], %f20
+	ldd		[$key + 232], %f22
+___
+for ($i=1; $i<6; $i++) {
+    $code.=<<___;
+	aes_eround01	%f`16+8*$i+0`, %f0, %f2, %f4
+	aes_eround23	%f`16+8*$i+2`, %f0, %f2, %f2
+	aes_eround01	%f`16+8*$i+4`, %f4, %f2, %f0
+	aes_eround23	%f`16+8*$i+6`, %f4, %f2, %f2
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	aes_eround01	%f16, %f0, %f2, %f4
+	aes_eround23	%f18, %f0, %f2, %f2
+	ldd		[$key + 16], %f16
+	ldd		[$key + 24], %f18
+	aes_eround01_l	%f20, %f4, %f2, %f0
+	aes_eround23_l	%f22, %f4, %f2, %f2
+	ldd		[$key + 32], %f20
+	retl
+	ldd		[$key + 40], %f22
+.type	_aes256_encrypt_1x,#function
+.size	_aes256_encrypt_1x,.-_aes256_encrypt_1x
+
+.align	32
+_aes256_encrypt_2x:
+	aes_eround01	%f16, %f0, %f2, %f8
+	aes_eround23	%f18, %f0, %f2, %f2
+	aes_eround01	%f16, %f4, %f6, %f10
+	aes_eround23	%f18, %f4, %f6, %f6
+	ldd		[$key + 208], %f16
+	ldd		[$key + 216], %f18
+	aes_eround01	%f20, %f8, %f2, %f0
+	aes_eround23	%f22, %f8, %f2, %f2
+	aes_eround01	%f20, %f10, %f6, %f4
+	aes_eround23	%f22, %f10, %f6, %f6
+	ldd		[$key + 224], %f20
+	ldd		[$key + 232], %f22
+___
+for ($i=1; $i<6; $i++) {
+    $code.=<<___;
+	aes_eround01	%f`16+8*$i+0`, %f0, %f2, %f8
+	aes_eround23	%f`16+8*$i+2`, %f0, %f2, %f2
+	aes_eround01	%f`16+8*$i+0`, %f4, %f6, %f10
+	aes_eround23	%f`16+8*$i+2`, %f4, %f6, %f6
+	aes_eround01	%f`16+8*$i+4`, %f8, %f2, %f0
+	aes_eround23	%f`16+8*$i+6`, %f8, %f2, %f2
+	aes_eround01	%f`16+8*$i+4`, %f10, %f6, %f4
+	aes_eround23	%f`16+8*$i+6`, %f10, %f6, %f6
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	aes_eround01	%f16, %f0, %f2, %f8
+	aes_eround23	%f18, %f0, %f2, %f2
+	aes_eround01	%f16, %f4, %f6, %f10
+	aes_eround23	%f18, %f4, %f6, %f6
+	ldd		[$key + 16], %f16
+	ldd		[$key + 24], %f18
+	aes_eround01_l	%f20, %f8, %f2, %f0
+	aes_eround23_l	%f22, %f8, %f2, %f2
+	aes_eround01_l	%f20, %f10, %f6, %f4
+	aes_eround23_l	%f22, %f10, %f6, %f6
+	ldd		[$key + 32], %f20
+	retl
+	ldd		[$key + 40], %f22
+.type	_aes256_encrypt_2x,#function
+.size	_aes256_encrypt_2x,.-_aes256_encrypt_2x
+
+.align	32
+_aes192_loadkey:
+	ldx		[$key + 0], %g4
+	ldx		[$key + 8], %g5
+___
+for ($i=2; $i<26;$i++) {			# load key schedule
+    $code.=<<___;
+	ldd		[$key + `8*$i`], %f`12+2*$i`
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	retl
+	nop
+.type	_aes192_loadkey,#function
+.size	_aes192_loadkey,.-_aes192_loadkey
+_aes256_loadkey=_aes192_loadkey
+_aes192_load_enckey=_aes192_loadkey
+_aes192_load_deckey=_aes192_loadkey
+_aes256_load_enckey=_aes192_loadkey
+_aes256_load_deckey=_aes192_loadkey
+___
+
+&alg_cbc_encrypt_implement("aes",256);
+&alg_cbc_encrypt_implement("aes",192);
+if ($::evp) {
+    &alg_ctr32_implement("aes",256);
+    &alg_xts_implement("aes",256,"en");
+    &alg_xts_implement("aes",256,"de");
+    &alg_ctr32_implement("aes",192);
+}
+&alg_cbc_decrypt_implement("aes",192);
+&alg_cbc_decrypt_implement("aes",256);
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.align	32
+_aes256_decrypt_1x:
+	aes_dround01	%f16, %f0, %f2, %f4
+	aes_dround23	%f18, %f0, %f2, %f2
+	ldd		[$key + 208], %f16
+	ldd		[$key + 216], %f18
+	aes_dround01	%f20, %f4, %f2, %f0
+	aes_dround23	%f22, %f4, %f2, %f2
+	ldd		[$key + 224], %f20
+	ldd		[$key + 232], %f22
+___
+for ($i=1; $i<6; $i++) {
+    $code.=<<___;
+	aes_dround01	%f`16+8*$i+0`, %f0, %f2, %f4
+	aes_dround23	%f`16+8*$i+2`, %f0, %f2, %f2
+	aes_dround01	%f`16+8*$i+4`, %f4, %f2, %f0
+	aes_dround23	%f`16+8*$i+6`, %f4, %f2, %f2
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	aes_dround01	%f16, %f0, %f2, %f4
+	aes_dround23	%f18, %f0, %f2, %f2
+	ldd		[$key + 16], %f16
+	ldd		[$key + 24], %f18
+	aes_dround01_l	%f20, %f4, %f2, %f0
+	aes_dround23_l	%f22, %f4, %f2, %f2
+	ldd		[$key + 32], %f20
+	retl
+	ldd		[$key + 40], %f22
+.type	_aes256_decrypt_1x,#function
+.size	_aes256_decrypt_1x,.-_aes256_decrypt_1x
+
+.align	32
+_aes256_decrypt_2x:
+	aes_dround01	%f16, %f0, %f2, %f8
+	aes_dround23	%f18, %f0, %f2, %f2
+	aes_dround01	%f16, %f4, %f6, %f10
+	aes_dround23	%f18, %f4, %f6, %f6
+	ldd		[$key + 208], %f16
+	ldd		[$key + 216], %f18
+	aes_dround01	%f20, %f8, %f2, %f0
+	aes_dround23	%f22, %f8, %f2, %f2
+	aes_dround01	%f20, %f10, %f6, %f4
+	aes_dround23	%f22, %f10, %f6, %f6
+	ldd		[$key + 224], %f20
+	ldd		[$key + 232], %f22
+___
+for ($i=1; $i<6; $i++) {
+    $code.=<<___;
+	aes_dround01	%f`16+8*$i+0`, %f0, %f2, %f8
+	aes_dround23	%f`16+8*$i+2`, %f0, %f2, %f2
+	aes_dround01	%f`16+8*$i+0`, %f4, %f6, %f10
+	aes_dround23	%f`16+8*$i+2`, %f4, %f6, %f6
+	aes_dround01	%f`16+8*$i+4`, %f8, %f2, %f0
+	aes_dround23	%f`16+8*$i+6`, %f8, %f2, %f2
+	aes_dround01	%f`16+8*$i+4`, %f10, %f6, %f4
+	aes_dround23	%f`16+8*$i+6`, %f10, %f6, %f6
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	aes_dround01	%f16, %f0, %f2, %f8
+	aes_dround23	%f18, %f0, %f2, %f2
+	aes_dround01	%f16, %f4, %f6, %f10
+	aes_dround23	%f18, %f4, %f6, %f6
+	ldd		[$key + 16], %f16
+	ldd		[$key + 24], %f18
+	aes_dround01_l	%f20, %f8, %f2, %f0
+	aes_dround23_l	%f22, %f8, %f2, %f2
+	aes_dround01_l	%f20, %f10, %f6, %f4
+	aes_dround23_l	%f22, %f10, %f6, %f6
+	ldd		[$key + 32], %f20
+	retl
+	ldd		[$key + 40], %f22
+.type	_aes256_decrypt_2x,#function
+.size	_aes256_decrypt_2x,.-_aes256_decrypt_2x
+
+.align	32
+_aes192_decrypt_1x:
+___
+for ($i=0; $i<5; $i++) {
+    $code.=<<___;
+	aes_dround01	%f`16+8*$i+0`, %f0, %f2, %f4
+	aes_dround23	%f`16+8*$i+2`, %f0, %f2, %f2
+	aes_dround01	%f`16+8*$i+4`, %f4, %f2, %f0
+	aes_dround23	%f`16+8*$i+6`, %f4, %f2, %f2
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	aes_dround01	%f56, %f0, %f2, %f4
+	aes_dround23	%f58, %f0, %f2, %f2
+	aes_dround01_l	%f60, %f4, %f2, %f0
+	retl
+	aes_dround23_l	%f62, %f4, %f2, %f2
+.type	_aes192_decrypt_1x,#function
+.size	_aes192_decrypt_1x,.-_aes192_decrypt_1x
+
+.align	32
+_aes192_decrypt_2x:
+___
+for ($i=0; $i<5; $i++) {
+    $code.=<<___;
+	aes_dround01	%f`16+8*$i+0`, %f0, %f2, %f8
+	aes_dround23	%f`16+8*$i+2`, %f0, %f2, %f2
+	aes_dround01	%f`16+8*$i+0`, %f4, %f6, %f10
+	aes_dround23	%f`16+8*$i+2`, %f4, %f6, %f6
+	aes_dround01	%f`16+8*$i+4`, %f8, %f2, %f0
+	aes_dround23	%f`16+8*$i+6`, %f8, %f2, %f2
+	aes_dround01	%f`16+8*$i+4`, %f10, %f6, %f4
+	aes_dround23	%f`16+8*$i+6`, %f10, %f6, %f6
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	aes_dround01	%f56, %f0, %f2, %f8
+	aes_dround23	%f58, %f0, %f2, %f2
+	aes_dround01	%f56, %f4, %f6, %f10
+	aes_dround23	%f58, %f4, %f6, %f6
+	aes_dround01_l	%f60, %f8, %f2, %f0
+	aes_dround23_l	%f62, %f8, %f2, %f2
+	aes_dround01_l	%f60, %f10, %f6, %f4
+	retl
+	aes_dround23_l	%f62, %f10, %f6, %f6
+.type	_aes192_decrypt_2x,#function
+.size	_aes192_decrypt_2x,.-_aes192_decrypt_2x
+___
+}}}
+
+if (!$::evp) {
+$code.=<<___;
+.global	AES_encrypt
+AES_encrypt=aes_t4_encrypt
+.global	AES_decrypt
+AES_decrypt=aes_t4_decrypt
+.global	AES_set_encrypt_key
+.align	32
+AES_set_encrypt_key:
+	andcc		%o2, 7, %g0		! check alignment
+	bnz,a,pn	%icc, 1f
+	mov		-1, %o0
+	brz,a,pn	%o0, 1f
+	mov		-1, %o0
+	brz,a,pn	%o2, 1f
+	mov		-1, %o0
+	andncc		%o1, 0x1c0, %g0
+	bnz,a,pn	%icc, 1f
+	mov		-2, %o0
+	cmp		%o1, 128
+	bl,a,pn		%icc, 1f
+	mov		-2, %o0
+	b		aes_t4_set_encrypt_key
+	nop
+1:	retl
+	nop
+.type	AES_set_encrypt_key,#function
+.size	AES_set_encrypt_key,.-AES_set_encrypt_key
+
+.global	AES_set_decrypt_key
+.align	32
+AES_set_decrypt_key:
+	andcc		%o2, 7, %g0		! check alignment
+	bnz,a,pn	%icc, 1f
+	mov		-1, %o0
+	brz,a,pn	%o0, 1f
+	mov		-1, %o0
+	brz,a,pn	%o2, 1f
+	mov		-1, %o0
+	andncc		%o1, 0x1c0, %g0
+	bnz,a,pn	%icc, 1f
+	mov		-2, %o0
+	cmp		%o1, 128
+	bl,a,pn		%icc, 1f
+	mov		-2, %o0
+	b		aes_t4_set_decrypt_key
+	nop
+1:	retl
+	nop
+.type	AES_set_decrypt_key,#function
+.size	AES_set_decrypt_key,.-AES_set_decrypt_key
+___
+
+my ($inp,$out,$len,$key,$ivec,$enc)=map("%o$_",(0..5));
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	AES_cbc_encrypt
+.align	32
+AES_cbc_encrypt:
+	ld		[$key + 240], %g1
+	nop
+	brz		$enc, .Lcbc_decrypt
+	cmp		%g1, 12
+
+	bl,pt		%icc, aes128_t4_cbc_encrypt
+	nop
+	be,pn		%icc, aes192_t4_cbc_encrypt
+	nop
+	ba		aes256_t4_cbc_encrypt
+	nop
+
+.Lcbc_decrypt:
+	bl,pt		%icc, aes128_t4_cbc_decrypt
+	nop
+	be,pn		%icc, aes192_t4_cbc_decrypt
+	nop
+	ba		aes256_t4_cbc_decrypt
+	nop
+.type	AES_cbc_encrypt,#function
+.size	AES_cbc_encrypt,.-AES_cbc_encrypt
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+.asciz	"AES for SPARC T4, David S. Miller, Andy Polyakov"
+.align	4
+___
+
+&emit_assembler();
+
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/asm/aesv8-armx.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/asm/aesv8-armx.pl
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..1782d5b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/asm/aesv8-armx.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,1008 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2014-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# This module implements support for ARMv8 AES instructions. The
+# module is endian-agnostic in sense that it supports both big- and
+# little-endian cases. As does it support both 32- and 64-bit modes
+# of operation. Latter is achieved by limiting amount of utilized
+# registers to 16, which implies additional NEON load and integer
+# instructions. This has no effect on mighty Apple A7, where results
+# are literally equal to the theoretical estimates based on AES
+# instruction latencies and issue rates. On Cortex-A53, an in-order
+# execution core, this costs up to 10-15%, which is partially
+# compensated by implementing dedicated code path for 128-bit
+# CBC encrypt case. On Cortex-A57 parallelizable mode performance
+# seems to be limited by sheer amount of NEON instructions...
+#
+# Performance in cycles per byte processed with 128-bit key:
+#
+#		CBC enc		CBC dec		CTR
+# Apple A7	2.39		1.20		1.20
+# Cortex-A53	1.32		1.29		1.46
+# Cortex-A57(*)	1.95		0.85		0.93
+# Denver	1.96		0.86		0.80
+# Mongoose	1.33		1.20		1.20
+#
+# (*)	original 3.64/1.34/1.32 results were for r0p0 revision
+#	and are still same even for updated module;
+
+$flavour = shift;
+$output  = shift;
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+( $xlate="${dir}arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
+( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
+die "can't locate arm-xlate.pl";
+
+open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output";
+*STDOUT=*OUT;
+
+$prefix="aes_v8";
+
+$code=<<___;
+#include "arm_arch.h"
+
+#if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7
+.text
+___
+$code.=".arch	armv8-a+crypto\n"			if ($flavour =~ /64/);
+$code.=<<___						if ($flavour !~ /64/);
+.arch	armv7-a	// don't confuse not-so-latest binutils with argv8 :-)
+.fpu	neon
+.code	32
+#undef	__thumb2__
+___
+
+# Assembler mnemonics are an eclectic mix of 32- and 64-bit syntax,
+# NEON is mostly 32-bit mnemonics, integer - mostly 64. Goal is to
+# maintain both 32- and 64-bit codes within single module and
+# transliterate common code to either flavour with regex vodoo.
+#
+{{{
+my ($inp,$bits,$out,$ptr,$rounds)=("x0","w1","x2","x3","w12");
+my ($zero,$rcon,$mask,$in0,$in1,$tmp,$key)=
+	$flavour=~/64/? map("q$_",(0..6)) : map("q$_",(0..3,8..10));
+
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.align	5
+.Lrcon:
+.long	0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01
+.long	0x0c0f0e0d,0x0c0f0e0d,0x0c0f0e0d,0x0c0f0e0d	// rotate-n-splat
+.long	0x1b,0x1b,0x1b,0x1b
+
+.globl	${prefix}_set_encrypt_key
+.type	${prefix}_set_encrypt_key,%function
+.align	5
+${prefix}_set_encrypt_key:
+.Lenc_key:
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($flavour =~ /64/);
+	stp	x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
+	add	x29,sp,#0
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	$ptr,#-1
+	cmp	$inp,#0
+	b.eq	.Lenc_key_abort
+	cmp	$out,#0
+	b.eq	.Lenc_key_abort
+	mov	$ptr,#-2
+	cmp	$bits,#128
+	b.lt	.Lenc_key_abort
+	cmp	$bits,#256
+	b.gt	.Lenc_key_abort
+	tst	$bits,#0x3f
+	b.ne	.Lenc_key_abort
+
+	adr	$ptr,.Lrcon
+	cmp	$bits,#192
+
+	veor	$zero,$zero,$zero
+	vld1.8	{$in0},[$inp],#16
+	mov	$bits,#8		// reuse $bits
+	vld1.32	{$rcon,$mask},[$ptr],#32
+
+	b.lt	.Loop128
+	b.eq	.L192
+	b	.L256
+
+.align	4
+.Loop128:
+	vtbl.8	$key,{$in0},$mask
+	vext.8	$tmp,$zero,$in0,#12
+	vst1.32	{$in0},[$out],#16
+	aese	$key,$zero
+	subs	$bits,$bits,#1
+
+	veor	$in0,$in0,$tmp
+	vext.8	$tmp,$zero,$tmp,#12
+	veor	$in0,$in0,$tmp
+	vext.8	$tmp,$zero,$tmp,#12
+	 veor	$key,$key,$rcon
+	veor	$in0,$in0,$tmp
+	vshl.u8	$rcon,$rcon,#1
+	veor	$in0,$in0,$key
+	b.ne	.Loop128
+
+	vld1.32	{$rcon},[$ptr]
+
+	vtbl.8	$key,{$in0},$mask
+	vext.8	$tmp,$zero,$in0,#12
+	vst1.32	{$in0},[$out],#16
+	aese	$key,$zero
+
+	veor	$in0,$in0,$tmp
+	vext.8	$tmp,$zero,$tmp,#12
+	veor	$in0,$in0,$tmp
+	vext.8	$tmp,$zero,$tmp,#12
+	 veor	$key,$key,$rcon
+	veor	$in0,$in0,$tmp
+	vshl.u8	$rcon,$rcon,#1
+	veor	$in0,$in0,$key
+
+	vtbl.8	$key,{$in0},$mask
+	vext.8	$tmp,$zero,$in0,#12
+	vst1.32	{$in0},[$out],#16
+	aese	$key,$zero
+
+	veor	$in0,$in0,$tmp
+	vext.8	$tmp,$zero,$tmp,#12
+	veor	$in0,$in0,$tmp
+	vext.8	$tmp,$zero,$tmp,#12
+	 veor	$key,$key,$rcon
+	veor	$in0,$in0,$tmp
+	veor	$in0,$in0,$key
+	vst1.32	{$in0},[$out]
+	add	$out,$out,#0x50
+
+	mov	$rounds,#10
+	b	.Ldone
+
+.align	4
+.L192:
+	vld1.8	{$in1},[$inp],#8
+	vmov.i8	$key,#8			// borrow $key
+	vst1.32	{$in0},[$out],#16
+	vsub.i8	$mask,$mask,$key	// adjust the mask
+
+.Loop192:
+	vtbl.8	$key,{$in1},$mask
+	vext.8	$tmp,$zero,$in0,#12
+	vst1.32	{$in1},[$out],#8
+	aese	$key,$zero
+	subs	$bits,$bits,#1
+
+	veor	$in0,$in0,$tmp
+	vext.8	$tmp,$zero,$tmp,#12
+	veor	$in0,$in0,$tmp
+	vext.8	$tmp,$zero,$tmp,#12
+	veor	$in0,$in0,$tmp
+
+	vdup.32	$tmp,${in0}[3]
+	veor	$tmp,$tmp,$in1
+	 veor	$key,$key,$rcon
+	vext.8	$in1,$zero,$in1,#12
+	vshl.u8	$rcon,$rcon,#1
+	veor	$in1,$in1,$tmp
+	veor	$in0,$in0,$key
+	veor	$in1,$in1,$key
+	vst1.32	{$in0},[$out],#16
+	b.ne	.Loop192
+
+	mov	$rounds,#12
+	add	$out,$out,#0x20
+	b	.Ldone
+
+.align	4
+.L256:
+	vld1.8	{$in1},[$inp]
+	mov	$bits,#7
+	mov	$rounds,#14
+	vst1.32	{$in0},[$out],#16
+
+.Loop256:
+	vtbl.8	$key,{$in1},$mask
+	vext.8	$tmp,$zero,$in0,#12
+	vst1.32	{$in1},[$out],#16
+	aese	$key,$zero
+	subs	$bits,$bits,#1
+
+	veor	$in0,$in0,$tmp
+	vext.8	$tmp,$zero,$tmp,#12
+	veor	$in0,$in0,$tmp
+	vext.8	$tmp,$zero,$tmp,#12
+	 veor	$key,$key,$rcon
+	veor	$in0,$in0,$tmp
+	vshl.u8	$rcon,$rcon,#1
+	veor	$in0,$in0,$key
+	vst1.32	{$in0},[$out],#16
+	b.eq	.Ldone
+
+	vdup.32	$key,${in0}[3]		// just splat
+	vext.8	$tmp,$zero,$in1,#12
+	aese	$key,$zero
+
+	veor	$in1,$in1,$tmp
+	vext.8	$tmp,$zero,$tmp,#12
+	veor	$in1,$in1,$tmp
+	vext.8	$tmp,$zero,$tmp,#12
+	veor	$in1,$in1,$tmp
+
+	veor	$in1,$in1,$key
+	b	.Loop256
+
+.Ldone:
+	str	$rounds,[$out]
+	mov	$ptr,#0
+
+.Lenc_key_abort:
+	mov	x0,$ptr			// return value
+	`"ldr	x29,[sp],#16"		if ($flavour =~ /64/)`
+	ret
+.size	${prefix}_set_encrypt_key,.-${prefix}_set_encrypt_key
+
+.globl	${prefix}_set_decrypt_key
+.type	${prefix}_set_decrypt_key,%function
+.align	5
+${prefix}_set_decrypt_key:
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($flavour =~ /64/);
+	stp	x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
+	add	x29,sp,#0
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($flavour !~ /64/);
+	stmdb	sp!,{r4,lr}
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	bl	.Lenc_key
+
+	cmp	x0,#0
+	b.ne	.Ldec_key_abort
+
+	sub	$out,$out,#240		// restore original $out
+	mov	x4,#-16
+	add	$inp,$out,x12,lsl#4	// end of key schedule
+
+	vld1.32	{v0.16b},[$out]
+	vld1.32	{v1.16b},[$inp]
+	vst1.32	{v0.16b},[$inp],x4
+	vst1.32	{v1.16b},[$out],#16
+
+.Loop_imc:
+	vld1.32	{v0.16b},[$out]
+	vld1.32	{v1.16b},[$inp]
+	aesimc	v0.16b,v0.16b
+	aesimc	v1.16b,v1.16b
+	vst1.32	{v0.16b},[$inp],x4
+	vst1.32	{v1.16b},[$out],#16
+	cmp	$inp,$out
+	b.hi	.Loop_imc
+
+	vld1.32	{v0.16b},[$out]
+	aesimc	v0.16b,v0.16b
+	vst1.32	{v0.16b},[$inp]
+
+	eor	x0,x0,x0		// return value
+.Ldec_key_abort:
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($flavour !~ /64/);
+	ldmia	sp!,{r4,pc}
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($flavour =~ /64/);
+	ldp	x29,x30,[sp],#16
+	ret
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+.size	${prefix}_set_decrypt_key,.-${prefix}_set_decrypt_key
+___
+}}}
+{{{
+sub gen_block () {
+my $dir = shift;
+my ($e,$mc) = $dir eq "en" ? ("e","mc") : ("d","imc");
+my ($inp,$out,$key)=map("x$_",(0..2));
+my $rounds="w3";
+my ($rndkey0,$rndkey1,$inout)=map("q$_",(0..3));
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	${prefix}_${dir}crypt
+.type	${prefix}_${dir}crypt,%function
+.align	5
+${prefix}_${dir}crypt:
+	ldr	$rounds,[$key,#240]
+	vld1.32	{$rndkey0},[$key],#16
+	vld1.8	{$inout},[$inp]
+	sub	$rounds,$rounds,#2
+	vld1.32	{$rndkey1},[$key],#16
+
+.Loop_${dir}c:
+	aes$e	$inout,$rndkey0
+	aes$mc	$inout,$inout
+	vld1.32	{$rndkey0},[$key],#16
+	subs	$rounds,$rounds,#2
+	aes$e	$inout,$rndkey1
+	aes$mc	$inout,$inout
+	vld1.32	{$rndkey1},[$key],#16
+	b.gt	.Loop_${dir}c
+
+	aes$e	$inout,$rndkey0
+	aes$mc	$inout,$inout
+	vld1.32	{$rndkey0},[$key]
+	aes$e	$inout,$rndkey1
+	veor	$inout,$inout,$rndkey0
+
+	vst1.8	{$inout},[$out]
+	ret
+.size	${prefix}_${dir}crypt,.-${prefix}_${dir}crypt
+___
+}
+&gen_block("en");
+&gen_block("de");
+}}}
+{{{
+my ($inp,$out,$len,$key,$ivp)=map("x$_",(0..4)); my $enc="w5";
+my ($rounds,$cnt,$key_,$step,$step1)=($enc,"w6","x7","x8","x12");
+my ($dat0,$dat1,$in0,$in1,$tmp0,$tmp1,$ivec,$rndlast)=map("q$_",(0..7));
+
+my ($dat,$tmp,$rndzero_n_last)=($dat0,$tmp0,$tmp1);
+my ($key4,$key5,$key6,$key7)=("x6","x12","x14",$key);
+
+### q8-q15	preloaded key schedule
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	${prefix}_cbc_encrypt
+.type	${prefix}_cbc_encrypt,%function
+.align	5
+${prefix}_cbc_encrypt:
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($flavour =~ /64/);
+	stp	x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
+	add	x29,sp,#0
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($flavour !~ /64/);
+	mov	ip,sp
+	stmdb	sp!,{r4-r8,lr}
+	vstmdb	sp!,{d8-d15}            @ ABI specification says so
+	ldmia	ip,{r4-r5}		@ load remaining args
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	subs	$len,$len,#16
+	mov	$step,#16
+	b.lo	.Lcbc_abort
+	cclr	$step,eq
+
+	cmp	$enc,#0			// en- or decrypting?
+	ldr	$rounds,[$key,#240]
+	and	$len,$len,#-16
+	vld1.8	{$ivec},[$ivp]
+	vld1.8	{$dat},[$inp],$step
+
+	vld1.32	{q8-q9},[$key]		// load key schedule...
+	sub	$rounds,$rounds,#6
+	add	$key_,$key,x5,lsl#4	// pointer to last 7 round keys
+	sub	$rounds,$rounds,#2
+	vld1.32	{q10-q11},[$key_],#32
+	vld1.32	{q12-q13},[$key_],#32
+	vld1.32	{q14-q15},[$key_],#32
+	vld1.32	{$rndlast},[$key_]
+
+	add	$key_,$key,#32
+	mov	$cnt,$rounds
+	b.eq	.Lcbc_dec
+
+	cmp	$rounds,#2
+	veor	$dat,$dat,$ivec
+	veor	$rndzero_n_last,q8,$rndlast
+	b.eq	.Lcbc_enc128
+
+	vld1.32	{$in0-$in1},[$key_]
+	add	$key_,$key,#16
+	add	$key4,$key,#16*4
+	add	$key5,$key,#16*5
+	aese	$dat,q8
+	aesmc	$dat,$dat
+	add	$key6,$key,#16*6
+	add	$key7,$key,#16*7
+	b	.Lenter_cbc_enc
+
+.align	4
+.Loop_cbc_enc:
+	aese	$dat,q8
+	aesmc	$dat,$dat
+	 vst1.8	{$ivec},[$out],#16
+.Lenter_cbc_enc:
+	aese	$dat,q9
+	aesmc	$dat,$dat
+	aese	$dat,$in0
+	aesmc	$dat,$dat
+	vld1.32	{q8},[$key4]
+	cmp	$rounds,#4
+	aese	$dat,$in1
+	aesmc	$dat,$dat
+	vld1.32	{q9},[$key5]
+	b.eq	.Lcbc_enc192
+
+	aese	$dat,q8
+	aesmc	$dat,$dat
+	vld1.32	{q8},[$key6]
+	aese	$dat,q9
+	aesmc	$dat,$dat
+	vld1.32	{q9},[$key7]
+	nop
+
+.Lcbc_enc192:
+	aese	$dat,q8
+	aesmc	$dat,$dat
+	 subs	$len,$len,#16
+	aese	$dat,q9
+	aesmc	$dat,$dat
+	 cclr	$step,eq
+	aese	$dat,q10
+	aesmc	$dat,$dat
+	aese	$dat,q11
+	aesmc	$dat,$dat
+	 vld1.8	{q8},[$inp],$step
+	aese	$dat,q12
+	aesmc	$dat,$dat
+	 veor	q8,q8,$rndzero_n_last
+	aese	$dat,q13
+	aesmc	$dat,$dat
+	 vld1.32 {q9},[$key_]		// re-pre-load rndkey[1]
+	aese	$dat,q14
+	aesmc	$dat,$dat
+	aese	$dat,q15
+	veor	$ivec,$dat,$rndlast
+	b.hs	.Loop_cbc_enc
+
+	vst1.8	{$ivec},[$out],#16
+	b	.Lcbc_done
+
+.align	5
+.Lcbc_enc128:
+	vld1.32	{$in0-$in1},[$key_]
+	aese	$dat,q8
+	aesmc	$dat,$dat
+	b	.Lenter_cbc_enc128
+.Loop_cbc_enc128:
+	aese	$dat,q8
+	aesmc	$dat,$dat
+	 vst1.8	{$ivec},[$out],#16
+.Lenter_cbc_enc128:
+	aese	$dat,q9
+	aesmc	$dat,$dat
+	 subs	$len,$len,#16
+	aese	$dat,$in0
+	aesmc	$dat,$dat
+	 cclr	$step,eq
+	aese	$dat,$in1
+	aesmc	$dat,$dat
+	aese	$dat,q10
+	aesmc	$dat,$dat
+	aese	$dat,q11
+	aesmc	$dat,$dat
+	 vld1.8	{q8},[$inp],$step
+	aese	$dat,q12
+	aesmc	$dat,$dat
+	aese	$dat,q13
+	aesmc	$dat,$dat
+	aese	$dat,q14
+	aesmc	$dat,$dat
+	 veor	q8,q8,$rndzero_n_last
+	aese	$dat,q15
+	veor	$ivec,$dat,$rndlast
+	b.hs	.Loop_cbc_enc128
+
+	vst1.8	{$ivec},[$out],#16
+	b	.Lcbc_done
+___
+{
+my ($dat2,$in2,$tmp2)=map("q$_",(10,11,9));
+$code.=<<___;
+.align	5
+.Lcbc_dec:
+	vld1.8	{$dat2},[$inp],#16
+	subs	$len,$len,#32		// bias
+	add	$cnt,$rounds,#2
+	vorr	$in1,$dat,$dat
+	vorr	$dat1,$dat,$dat
+	vorr	$in2,$dat2,$dat2
+	b.lo	.Lcbc_dec_tail
+
+	vorr	$dat1,$dat2,$dat2
+	vld1.8	{$dat2},[$inp],#16
+	vorr	$in0,$dat,$dat
+	vorr	$in1,$dat1,$dat1
+	vorr	$in2,$dat2,$dat2
+
+.Loop3x_cbc_dec:
+	aesd	$dat0,q8
+	aesimc	$dat0,$dat0
+	aesd	$dat1,q8
+	aesimc	$dat1,$dat1
+	aesd	$dat2,q8
+	aesimc	$dat2,$dat2
+	vld1.32	{q8},[$key_],#16
+	subs	$cnt,$cnt,#2
+	aesd	$dat0,q9
+	aesimc	$dat0,$dat0
+	aesd	$dat1,q9
+	aesimc	$dat1,$dat1
+	aesd	$dat2,q9
+	aesimc	$dat2,$dat2
+	vld1.32	{q9},[$key_],#16
+	b.gt	.Loop3x_cbc_dec
+
+	aesd	$dat0,q8
+	aesimc	$dat0,$dat0
+	aesd	$dat1,q8
+	aesimc	$dat1,$dat1
+	aesd	$dat2,q8
+	aesimc	$dat2,$dat2
+	 veor	$tmp0,$ivec,$rndlast
+	 subs	$len,$len,#0x30
+	 veor	$tmp1,$in0,$rndlast
+	 mov.lo	x6,$len			// x6, $cnt, is zero at this point
+	aesd	$dat0,q9
+	aesimc	$dat0,$dat0
+	aesd	$dat1,q9
+	aesimc	$dat1,$dat1
+	aesd	$dat2,q9
+	aesimc	$dat2,$dat2
+	 veor	$tmp2,$in1,$rndlast
+	 add	$inp,$inp,x6		// $inp is adjusted in such way that
+					// at exit from the loop $dat1-$dat2
+					// are loaded with last "words"
+	 vorr	$ivec,$in2,$in2
+	 mov	$key_,$key
+	aesd	$dat0,q12
+	aesimc	$dat0,$dat0
+	aesd	$dat1,q12
+	aesimc	$dat1,$dat1
+	aesd	$dat2,q12
+	aesimc	$dat2,$dat2
+	 vld1.8	{$in0},[$inp],#16
+	aesd	$dat0,q13
+	aesimc	$dat0,$dat0
+	aesd	$dat1,q13
+	aesimc	$dat1,$dat1
+	aesd	$dat2,q13
+	aesimc	$dat2,$dat2
+	 vld1.8	{$in1},[$inp],#16
+	aesd	$dat0,q14
+	aesimc	$dat0,$dat0
+	aesd	$dat1,q14
+	aesimc	$dat1,$dat1
+	aesd	$dat2,q14
+	aesimc	$dat2,$dat2
+	 vld1.8	{$in2},[$inp],#16
+	aesd	$dat0,q15
+	aesd	$dat1,q15
+	aesd	$dat2,q15
+	 vld1.32 {q8},[$key_],#16	// re-pre-load rndkey[0]
+	 add	$cnt,$rounds,#2
+	veor	$tmp0,$tmp0,$dat0
+	veor	$tmp1,$tmp1,$dat1
+	veor	$dat2,$dat2,$tmp2
+	 vld1.32 {q9},[$key_],#16	// re-pre-load rndkey[1]
+	vst1.8	{$tmp0},[$out],#16
+	 vorr	$dat0,$in0,$in0
+	vst1.8	{$tmp1},[$out],#16
+	 vorr	$dat1,$in1,$in1
+	vst1.8	{$dat2},[$out],#16
+	 vorr	$dat2,$in2,$in2
+	b.hs	.Loop3x_cbc_dec
+
+	cmn	$len,#0x30
+	b.eq	.Lcbc_done
+	nop
+
+.Lcbc_dec_tail:
+	aesd	$dat1,q8
+	aesimc	$dat1,$dat1
+	aesd	$dat2,q8
+	aesimc	$dat2,$dat2
+	vld1.32	{q8},[$key_],#16
+	subs	$cnt,$cnt,#2
+	aesd	$dat1,q9
+	aesimc	$dat1,$dat1
+	aesd	$dat2,q9
+	aesimc	$dat2,$dat2
+	vld1.32	{q9},[$key_],#16
+	b.gt	.Lcbc_dec_tail
+
+	aesd	$dat1,q8
+	aesimc	$dat1,$dat1
+	aesd	$dat2,q8
+	aesimc	$dat2,$dat2
+	aesd	$dat1,q9
+	aesimc	$dat1,$dat1
+	aesd	$dat2,q9
+	aesimc	$dat2,$dat2
+	aesd	$dat1,q12
+	aesimc	$dat1,$dat1
+	aesd	$dat2,q12
+	aesimc	$dat2,$dat2
+	 cmn	$len,#0x20
+	aesd	$dat1,q13
+	aesimc	$dat1,$dat1
+	aesd	$dat2,q13
+	aesimc	$dat2,$dat2
+	 veor	$tmp1,$ivec,$rndlast
+	aesd	$dat1,q14
+	aesimc	$dat1,$dat1
+	aesd	$dat2,q14
+	aesimc	$dat2,$dat2
+	 veor	$tmp2,$in1,$rndlast
+	aesd	$dat1,q15
+	aesd	$dat2,q15
+	b.eq	.Lcbc_dec_one
+	veor	$tmp1,$tmp1,$dat1
+	veor	$tmp2,$tmp2,$dat2
+	 vorr	$ivec,$in2,$in2
+	vst1.8	{$tmp1},[$out],#16
+	vst1.8	{$tmp2},[$out],#16
+	b	.Lcbc_done
+
+.Lcbc_dec_one:
+	veor	$tmp1,$tmp1,$dat2
+	 vorr	$ivec,$in2,$in2
+	vst1.8	{$tmp1},[$out],#16
+
+.Lcbc_done:
+	vst1.8	{$ivec},[$ivp]
+.Lcbc_abort:
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___	if ($flavour !~ /64/);
+	vldmia	sp!,{d8-d15}
+	ldmia	sp!,{r4-r8,pc}
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($flavour =~ /64/);
+	ldr	x29,[sp],#16
+	ret
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+.size	${prefix}_cbc_encrypt,.-${prefix}_cbc_encrypt
+___
+}}}
+{{{
+my ($inp,$out,$len,$key,$ivp)=map("x$_",(0..4));
+my ($rounds,$cnt,$key_)=("w5","w6","x7");
+my ($ctr,$tctr0,$tctr1,$tctr2)=map("w$_",(8..10,12));
+my $step="x12";		# aliases with $tctr2
+
+my ($dat0,$dat1,$in0,$in1,$tmp0,$tmp1,$ivec,$rndlast)=map("q$_",(0..7));
+my ($dat2,$in2,$tmp2)=map("q$_",(10,11,9));
+
+my ($dat,$tmp)=($dat0,$tmp0);
+
+### q8-q15	preloaded key schedule
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	${prefix}_ctr32_encrypt_blocks
+.type	${prefix}_ctr32_encrypt_blocks,%function
+.align	5
+${prefix}_ctr32_encrypt_blocks:
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($flavour =~ /64/);
+	stp		x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
+	add		x29,sp,#0
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($flavour !~ /64/);
+	mov		ip,sp
+	stmdb		sp!,{r4-r10,lr}
+	vstmdb		sp!,{d8-d15}            @ ABI specification says so
+	ldr		r4, [ip]		@ load remaining arg
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	ldr		$rounds,[$key,#240]
+
+	ldr		$ctr, [$ivp, #12]
+	vld1.32		{$dat0},[$ivp]
+
+	vld1.32		{q8-q9},[$key]		// load key schedule...
+	sub		$rounds,$rounds,#4
+	mov		$step,#16
+	cmp		$len,#2
+	add		$key_,$key,x5,lsl#4	// pointer to last 5 round keys
+	sub		$rounds,$rounds,#2
+	vld1.32		{q12-q13},[$key_],#32
+	vld1.32		{q14-q15},[$key_],#32
+	vld1.32		{$rndlast},[$key_]
+	add		$key_,$key,#32
+	mov		$cnt,$rounds
+	cclr		$step,lo
+#ifndef __ARMEB__
+	rev		$ctr, $ctr
+#endif
+	vorr		$dat1,$dat0,$dat0
+	add		$tctr1, $ctr, #1
+	vorr		$dat2,$dat0,$dat0
+	add		$ctr, $ctr, #2
+	vorr		$ivec,$dat0,$dat0
+	rev		$tctr1, $tctr1
+	vmov.32		${dat1}[3],$tctr1
+	b.ls		.Lctr32_tail
+	rev		$tctr2, $ctr
+	sub		$len,$len,#3		// bias
+	vmov.32		${dat2}[3],$tctr2
+	b		.Loop3x_ctr32
+
+.align	4
+.Loop3x_ctr32:
+	aese		$dat0,q8
+	aesmc		$dat0,$dat0
+	aese		$dat1,q8
+	aesmc		$dat1,$dat1
+	aese		$dat2,q8
+	aesmc		$dat2,$dat2
+	vld1.32		{q8},[$key_],#16
+	subs		$cnt,$cnt,#2
+	aese		$dat0,q9
+	aesmc		$dat0,$dat0
+	aese		$dat1,q9
+	aesmc		$dat1,$dat1
+	aese		$dat2,q9
+	aesmc		$dat2,$dat2
+	vld1.32		{q9},[$key_],#16
+	b.gt		.Loop3x_ctr32
+
+	aese		$dat0,q8
+	aesmc		$tmp0,$dat0
+	aese		$dat1,q8
+	aesmc		$tmp1,$dat1
+	 vld1.8		{$in0},[$inp],#16
+	 vorr		$dat0,$ivec,$ivec
+	aese		$dat2,q8
+	aesmc		$dat2,$dat2
+	 vld1.8		{$in1},[$inp],#16
+	 vorr		$dat1,$ivec,$ivec
+	aese		$tmp0,q9
+	aesmc		$tmp0,$tmp0
+	aese		$tmp1,q9
+	aesmc		$tmp1,$tmp1
+	 vld1.8		{$in2},[$inp],#16
+	 mov		$key_,$key
+	aese		$dat2,q9
+	aesmc		$tmp2,$dat2
+	 vorr		$dat2,$ivec,$ivec
+	 add		$tctr0,$ctr,#1
+	aese		$tmp0,q12
+	aesmc		$tmp0,$tmp0
+	aese		$tmp1,q12
+	aesmc		$tmp1,$tmp1
+	 veor		$in0,$in0,$rndlast
+	 add		$tctr1,$ctr,#2
+	aese		$tmp2,q12
+	aesmc		$tmp2,$tmp2
+	 veor		$in1,$in1,$rndlast
+	 add		$ctr,$ctr,#3
+	aese		$tmp0,q13
+	aesmc		$tmp0,$tmp0
+	aese		$tmp1,q13
+	aesmc		$tmp1,$tmp1
+	 veor		$in2,$in2,$rndlast
+	 rev		$tctr0,$tctr0
+	aese		$tmp2,q13
+	aesmc		$tmp2,$tmp2
+	 vmov.32	${dat0}[3], $tctr0
+	 rev		$tctr1,$tctr1
+	aese		$tmp0,q14
+	aesmc		$tmp0,$tmp0
+	aese		$tmp1,q14
+	aesmc		$tmp1,$tmp1
+	 vmov.32	${dat1}[3], $tctr1
+	 rev		$tctr2,$ctr
+	aese		$tmp2,q14
+	aesmc		$tmp2,$tmp2
+	 vmov.32	${dat2}[3], $tctr2
+	 subs		$len,$len,#3
+	aese		$tmp0,q15
+	aese		$tmp1,q15
+	aese		$tmp2,q15
+
+	veor		$in0,$in0,$tmp0
+	 vld1.32	 {q8},[$key_],#16	// re-pre-load rndkey[0]
+	vst1.8		{$in0},[$out],#16
+	veor		$in1,$in1,$tmp1
+	 mov		$cnt,$rounds
+	vst1.8		{$in1},[$out],#16
+	veor		$in2,$in2,$tmp2
+	 vld1.32	 {q9},[$key_],#16	// re-pre-load rndkey[1]
+	vst1.8		{$in2},[$out],#16
+	b.hs		.Loop3x_ctr32
+
+	adds		$len,$len,#3
+	b.eq		.Lctr32_done
+	cmp		$len,#1
+	mov		$step,#16
+	cclr		$step,eq
+
+.Lctr32_tail:
+	aese		$dat0,q8
+	aesmc		$dat0,$dat0
+	aese		$dat1,q8
+	aesmc		$dat1,$dat1
+	vld1.32		{q8},[$key_],#16
+	subs		$cnt,$cnt,#2
+	aese		$dat0,q9
+	aesmc		$dat0,$dat0
+	aese		$dat1,q9
+	aesmc		$dat1,$dat1
+	vld1.32		{q9},[$key_],#16
+	b.gt		.Lctr32_tail
+
+	aese		$dat0,q8
+	aesmc		$dat0,$dat0
+	aese		$dat1,q8
+	aesmc		$dat1,$dat1
+	aese		$dat0,q9
+	aesmc		$dat0,$dat0
+	aese		$dat1,q9
+	aesmc		$dat1,$dat1
+	 vld1.8		{$in0},[$inp],$step
+	aese		$dat0,q12
+	aesmc		$dat0,$dat0
+	aese		$dat1,q12
+	aesmc		$dat1,$dat1
+	 vld1.8		{$in1},[$inp]
+	aese		$dat0,q13
+	aesmc		$dat0,$dat0
+	aese		$dat1,q13
+	aesmc		$dat1,$dat1
+	 veor		$in0,$in0,$rndlast
+	aese		$dat0,q14
+	aesmc		$dat0,$dat0
+	aese		$dat1,q14
+	aesmc		$dat1,$dat1
+	 veor		$in1,$in1,$rndlast
+	aese		$dat0,q15
+	aese		$dat1,q15
+
+	cmp		$len,#1
+	veor		$in0,$in0,$dat0
+	veor		$in1,$in1,$dat1
+	vst1.8		{$in0},[$out],#16
+	b.eq		.Lctr32_done
+	vst1.8		{$in1},[$out]
+
+.Lctr32_done:
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($flavour !~ /64/);
+	vldmia		sp!,{d8-d15}
+	ldmia		sp!,{r4-r10,pc}
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($flavour =~ /64/);
+	ldr		x29,[sp],#16
+	ret
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+.size	${prefix}_ctr32_encrypt_blocks,.-${prefix}_ctr32_encrypt_blocks
+___
+}}}
+$code.=<<___;
+#endif
+___
+########################################
+if ($flavour =~ /64/) {			######## 64-bit code
+    my %opcode = (
+	"aesd"	=>	0x4e285800,	"aese"	=>	0x4e284800,
+	"aesimc"=>	0x4e287800,	"aesmc"	=>	0x4e286800	);
+
+    local *unaes = sub {
+	my ($mnemonic,$arg)=@_;
+
+	$arg =~ m/[qv]([0-9]+)[^,]*,\s*[qv]([0-9]+)/o	&&
+	sprintf ".inst\t0x%08x\t//%s %s",
+			$opcode{$mnemonic}|$1|($2<<5),
+			$mnemonic,$arg;
+    };
+
+    foreach(split("\n",$code)) {
+	s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval($1)/geo;
+
+	s/\bq([0-9]+)\b/"v".($1<8?$1:$1+8).".16b"/geo;	# old->new registers
+	s/@\s/\/\//o;			# old->new style commentary
+
+	#s/[v]?(aes\w+)\s+([qv].*)/unaes($1,$2)/geo	or
+	s/cclr\s+([wx])([^,]+),\s*([a-z]+)/csel	$1$2,$1zr,$1$2,$3/o	or
+	s/mov\.([a-z]+)\s+([wx][0-9]+),\s*([wx][0-9]+)/csel	$2,$3,$2,$1/o	or
+	s/vmov\.i8/movi/o	or	# fix up legacy mnemonics
+	s/vext\.8/ext/o		or
+	s/vrev32\.8/rev32/o	or
+	s/vtst\.8/cmtst/o	or
+	s/vshr/ushr/o		or
+	s/^(\s+)v/$1/o		or	# strip off v prefix
+	s/\bbx\s+lr\b/ret/o;
+
+	# fix up remainig legacy suffixes
+	s/\.[ui]?8//o;
+	m/\],#8/o and s/\.16b/\.8b/go;
+	s/\.[ui]?32//o and s/\.16b/\.4s/go;
+	s/\.[ui]?64//o and s/\.16b/\.2d/go;
+	s/\.[42]([sd])\[([0-3])\]/\.$1\[$2\]/o;
+
+	print $_,"\n";
+    }
+} else {				######## 32-bit code
+    my %opcode = (
+	"aesd"	=>	0xf3b00340,	"aese"	=>	0xf3b00300,
+	"aesimc"=>	0xf3b003c0,	"aesmc"	=>	0xf3b00380	);
+
+    local *unaes = sub {
+	my ($mnemonic,$arg)=@_;
+
+	if ($arg =~ m/[qv]([0-9]+)[^,]*,\s*[qv]([0-9]+)/o) {
+	    my $word = $opcode{$mnemonic}|(($1&7)<<13)|(($1&8)<<19)
+					 |(($2&7)<<1) |(($2&8)<<2);
+	    # since ARMv7 instructions are always encoded little-endian.
+	    # correct solution is to use .inst directive, but older
+	    # assemblers don't implement it:-(
+	    sprintf ".byte\t0x%02x,0x%02x,0x%02x,0x%02x\t@ %s %s",
+			$word&0xff,($word>>8)&0xff,
+			($word>>16)&0xff,($word>>24)&0xff,
+			$mnemonic,$arg;
+	}
+    };
+
+    sub unvtbl {
+	my $arg=shift;
+
+	$arg =~ m/q([0-9]+),\s*\{q([0-9]+)\},\s*q([0-9]+)/o &&
+	sprintf	"vtbl.8	d%d,{q%d},d%d\n\t".
+		"vtbl.8	d%d,{q%d},d%d", 2*$1,$2,2*$3, 2*$1+1,$2,2*$3+1;	
+    }
+
+    sub unvdup32 {
+	my $arg=shift;
+
+	$arg =~ m/q([0-9]+),\s*q([0-9]+)\[([0-3])\]/o &&
+	sprintf	"vdup.32	q%d,d%d[%d]",$1,2*$2+($3>>1),$3&1;	
+    }
+
+    sub unvmov32 {
+	my $arg=shift;
+
+	$arg =~ m/q([0-9]+)\[([0-3])\],(.*)/o &&
+	sprintf	"vmov.32	d%d[%d],%s",2*$1+($2>>1),$2&1,$3;	
+    }
+
+    foreach(split("\n",$code)) {
+	s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval($1)/geo;
+
+	s/\b[wx]([0-9]+)\b/r$1/go;		# new->old registers
+	s/\bv([0-9])\.[12468]+[bsd]\b/q$1/go;	# new->old registers
+	s/\/\/\s?/@ /o;				# new->old style commentary
+
+	# fix up remainig new-style suffixes
+	s/\{q([0-9]+)\},\s*\[(.+)\],#8/sprintf "{d%d},[$2]!",2*$1/eo	or
+	s/\],#[0-9]+/]!/o;
+
+	s/[v]?(aes\w+)\s+([qv].*)/unaes($1,$2)/geo	or
+	s/cclr\s+([^,]+),\s*([a-z]+)/mov$2	$1,#0/o	or
+	s/vtbl\.8\s+(.*)/unvtbl($1)/geo			or
+	s/vdup\.32\s+(.*)/unvdup32($1)/geo		or
+	s/vmov\.32\s+(.*)/unvmov32($1)/geo		or
+	s/^(\s+)b\./$1b/o				or
+	s/^(\s+)mov\./$1mov/o				or
+	s/^(\s+)ret/$1bx\tlr/o;
+
+	print $_,"\n";
+    }
+}
+
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/asm/bsaes-armv7.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/asm/bsaes-armv7.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7af38af
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/asm/bsaes-armv7.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,2495 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2012-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+#
+# Specific modes and adaptation for Linux kernel by Ard Biesheuvel
+# <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>. Permission to use under GPL terms is
+# granted.
+# ====================================================================
+
+# Bit-sliced AES for ARM NEON
+#
+# February 2012.
+#
+# This implementation is direct adaptation of bsaes-x86_64 module for
+# ARM NEON. Except that this module is endian-neutral [in sense that
+# it can be compiled for either endianness] by courtesy of vld1.8's
+# neutrality. Initial version doesn't implement interface to OpenSSL,
+# only low-level primitives and unsupported entry points, just enough
+# to collect performance results, which for Cortex-A8 core are:
+#
+# encrypt	19.5 cycles per byte processed with 128-bit key
+# decrypt	22.1 cycles per byte processed with 128-bit key
+# key conv.	440  cycles per 128-bit key/0.18 of 8x block
+#
+# Snapdragon S4 encrypts byte in 17.6 cycles and decrypts in 19.7,
+# which is [much] worse than anticipated (for further details see
+# http://www.openssl.org/~appro/Snapdragon-S4.html).
+#
+# Cortex-A15 manages in 14.2/16.1 cycles [when integer-only code
+# manages in 20.0 cycles].
+#
+# When comparing to x86_64 results keep in mind that NEON unit is
+# [mostly] single-issue and thus can't [fully] benefit from
+# instruction-level parallelism. And when comparing to aes-armv4
+# results keep in mind key schedule conversion overhead (see
+# bsaes-x86_64.pl for further details)...
+#
+#						<appro@openssl.org>
+
+# April-August 2013
+#
+# Add CBC, CTR and XTS subroutines, adapt for kernel use.
+#
+#					<ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
+
+$flavour = shift;
+if ($flavour=~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/) { $output=$flavour; undef $flavour; }
+else { while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {} }
+
+if ($flavour && $flavour ne "void") {
+    $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+    ( $xlate="${dir}arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
+    ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
+    die "can't locate arm-xlate.pl";
+
+    open STDOUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output";
+} else {
+    open STDOUT,">$output";
+}
+
+my ($inp,$out,$len,$key)=("r0","r1","r2","r3");
+my @XMM=map("q$_",(0..15));
+
+{
+my ($key,$rounds,$const)=("r4","r5","r6");
+
+sub Dlo()   { shift=~m|q([1]?[0-9])|?"d".($1*2):"";     }
+sub Dhi()   { shift=~m|q([1]?[0-9])|?"d".($1*2+1):"";   }
+
+sub Sbox {
+# input in  lsb > [b0, b1, b2, b3, b4, b5, b6, b7] < msb
+# output in lsb > [b0, b1, b4, b6, b3, b7, b2, b5] < msb
+my @b=@_[0..7];
+my @t=@_[8..11];
+my @s=@_[12..15];
+	&InBasisChange	(@b);
+	&Inv_GF256	(@b[6,5,0,3,7,1,4,2],@t,@s);
+	&OutBasisChange	(@b[7,1,4,2,6,5,0,3]);
+}
+
+sub InBasisChange {
+# input in  lsb > [b0, b1, b2, b3, b4, b5, b6, b7] < msb
+# output in lsb > [b6, b5, b0, b3, b7, b1, b4, b2] < msb 
+my @b=@_[0..7];
+$code.=<<___;
+	veor	@b[2], @b[2], @b[1]
+	veor	@b[5], @b[5], @b[6]
+	veor	@b[3], @b[3], @b[0]
+	veor	@b[6], @b[6], @b[2]
+	veor	@b[5], @b[5], @b[0]
+
+	veor	@b[6], @b[6], @b[3]
+	veor	@b[3], @b[3], @b[7]
+	veor	@b[7], @b[7], @b[5]
+	veor	@b[3], @b[3], @b[4]
+	veor	@b[4], @b[4], @b[5]
+
+	veor	@b[2], @b[2], @b[7]
+	veor	@b[3], @b[3], @b[1]
+	veor	@b[1], @b[1], @b[5]
+___
+}
+
+sub OutBasisChange {
+# input in  lsb > [b0, b1, b2, b3, b4, b5, b6, b7] < msb
+# output in lsb > [b6, b1, b2, b4, b7, b0, b3, b5] < msb
+my @b=@_[0..7];
+$code.=<<___;
+	veor	@b[0], @b[0], @b[6]
+	veor	@b[1], @b[1], @b[4]
+	veor	@b[4], @b[4], @b[6]
+	veor	@b[2], @b[2], @b[0]
+	veor	@b[6], @b[6], @b[1]
+
+	veor	@b[1], @b[1], @b[5]
+	veor	@b[5], @b[5], @b[3]
+	veor	@b[3], @b[3], @b[7]
+	veor	@b[7], @b[7], @b[5]
+	veor	@b[2], @b[2], @b[5]
+
+	veor	@b[4], @b[4], @b[7]
+___
+}
+
+sub InvSbox {
+# input in lsb 	> [b0, b1, b2, b3, b4, b5, b6, b7] < msb
+# output in lsb	> [b0, b1, b6, b4, b2, b7, b3, b5] < msb
+my @b=@_[0..7];
+my @t=@_[8..11];
+my @s=@_[12..15];
+	&InvInBasisChange	(@b);
+	&Inv_GF256		(@b[5,1,2,6,3,7,0,4],@t,@s);
+	&InvOutBasisChange	(@b[3,7,0,4,5,1,2,6]);
+}
+
+sub InvInBasisChange {		# OutBasisChange in reverse (with twist)
+my @b=@_[5,1,2,6,3,7,0,4];
+$code.=<<___
+	 veor	@b[1], @b[1], @b[7]
+	veor	@b[4], @b[4], @b[7]
+
+	veor	@b[7], @b[7], @b[5]
+	 veor	@b[1], @b[1], @b[3]
+	veor	@b[2], @b[2], @b[5]
+	veor	@b[3], @b[3], @b[7]
+
+	veor	@b[6], @b[6], @b[1]
+	veor	@b[2], @b[2], @b[0]
+	 veor	@b[5], @b[5], @b[3]
+	veor	@b[4], @b[4], @b[6]
+	veor	@b[0], @b[0], @b[6]
+	veor	@b[1], @b[1], @b[4]
+___
+}
+
+sub InvOutBasisChange {		# InBasisChange in reverse
+my @b=@_[2,5,7,3,6,1,0,4];
+$code.=<<___;
+	veor	@b[1], @b[1], @b[5]
+	veor	@b[2], @b[2], @b[7]
+
+	veor	@b[3], @b[3], @b[1]
+	veor	@b[4], @b[4], @b[5]
+	veor	@b[7], @b[7], @b[5]
+	veor	@b[3], @b[3], @b[4]
+	 veor 	@b[5], @b[5], @b[0]
+	veor	@b[3], @b[3], @b[7]
+	 veor	@b[6], @b[6], @b[2]
+	 veor	@b[2], @b[2], @b[1]
+	veor	@b[6], @b[6], @b[3]
+
+	veor	@b[3], @b[3], @b[0]
+	veor	@b[5], @b[5], @b[6]
+___
+}
+
+sub Mul_GF4 {
+#;*************************************************************
+#;* Mul_GF4: Input x0-x1,y0-y1 Output x0-x1 Temp t0 (8) *
+#;*************************************************************
+my ($x0,$x1,$y0,$y1,$t0,$t1)=@_;
+$code.=<<___;
+	veor 	$t0, $y0, $y1
+	vand	$t0, $t0, $x0
+	veor	$x0, $x0, $x1
+	vand	$t1, $x1, $y0
+	vand	$x0, $x0, $y1
+	veor	$x1, $t1, $t0
+	veor	$x0, $x0, $t1
+___
+}
+
+sub Mul_GF4_N {				# not used, see next subroutine
+# multiply and scale by N
+my ($x0,$x1,$y0,$y1,$t0)=@_;
+$code.=<<___;
+	veor	$t0, $y0, $y1
+	vand	$t0, $t0, $x0
+	veor	$x0, $x0, $x1
+	vand	$x1, $x1, $y0
+	vand	$x0, $x0, $y1
+	veor	$x1, $x1, $x0
+	veor	$x0, $x0, $t0
+___
+}
+
+sub Mul_GF4_N_GF4 {
+# interleaved Mul_GF4_N and Mul_GF4
+my ($x0,$x1,$y0,$y1,$t0,
+    $x2,$x3,$y2,$y3,$t1)=@_;
+$code.=<<___;
+	veor	$t0, $y0, $y1
+	 veor 	$t1, $y2, $y3
+	vand	$t0, $t0, $x0
+	 vand	$t1, $t1, $x2
+	veor	$x0, $x0, $x1
+	 veor	$x2, $x2, $x3
+	vand	$x1, $x1, $y0
+	 vand	$x3, $x3, $y2
+	vand	$x0, $x0, $y1
+	 vand	$x2, $x2, $y3
+	veor	$x1, $x1, $x0
+	 veor	$x2, $x2, $x3
+	veor	$x0, $x0, $t0
+	 veor	$x3, $x3, $t1
+___
+}
+sub Mul_GF16_2 {
+my @x=@_[0..7];
+my @y=@_[8..11];
+my @t=@_[12..15];
+$code.=<<___;
+	veor	@t[0], @x[0], @x[2]
+	veor	@t[1], @x[1], @x[3]
+___
+	&Mul_GF4  	(@x[0], @x[1], @y[0], @y[1], @t[2..3]);
+$code.=<<___;
+	veor	@y[0], @y[0], @y[2]
+	veor	@y[1], @y[1], @y[3]
+___
+	Mul_GF4_N_GF4	(@t[0], @t[1], @y[0], @y[1], @t[3],
+			 @x[2], @x[3], @y[2], @y[3], @t[2]);
+$code.=<<___;
+	veor	@x[0], @x[0], @t[0]
+	veor	@x[2], @x[2], @t[0]
+	veor	@x[1], @x[1], @t[1]
+	veor	@x[3], @x[3], @t[1]
+
+	veor	@t[0], @x[4], @x[6]
+	veor	@t[1], @x[5], @x[7]
+___
+	&Mul_GF4_N_GF4	(@t[0], @t[1], @y[0], @y[1], @t[3],
+			 @x[6], @x[7], @y[2], @y[3], @t[2]);
+$code.=<<___;
+	veor	@y[0], @y[0], @y[2]
+	veor	@y[1], @y[1], @y[3]
+___
+	&Mul_GF4  	(@x[4], @x[5], @y[0], @y[1], @t[2..3]);
+$code.=<<___;
+	veor	@x[4], @x[4], @t[0]
+	veor	@x[6], @x[6], @t[0]
+	veor	@x[5], @x[5], @t[1]
+	veor	@x[7], @x[7], @t[1]
+___
+}
+sub Inv_GF256 {
+#;********************************************************************
+#;* Inv_GF256: Input x0-x7 Output x0-x7 Temp t0-t3,s0-s3 (144)       *
+#;********************************************************************
+my @x=@_[0..7];
+my @t=@_[8..11];
+my @s=@_[12..15];
+# direct optimizations from hardware
+$code.=<<___;
+	veor	@t[3], @x[4], @x[6]
+	veor	@t[2], @x[5], @x[7]
+	veor	@t[1], @x[1], @x[3]
+	veor	@s[1], @x[7], @x[6]
+	 vmov	@t[0], @t[2]
+	veor	@s[0], @x[0], @x[2]
+
+	vorr	@t[2], @t[2], @t[1]
+	veor	@s[3], @t[3], @t[0]
+	vand	@s[2], @t[3], @s[0]
+	vorr	@t[3], @t[3], @s[0]
+	veor	@s[0], @s[0], @t[1]
+	vand	@t[0], @t[0], @t[1]
+	veor	@t[1], @x[3], @x[2]
+	vand	@s[3], @s[3], @s[0]
+	vand	@s[1], @s[1], @t[1]
+	veor	@t[1], @x[4], @x[5]
+	veor	@s[0], @x[1], @x[0]
+	veor	@t[3], @t[3], @s[1]
+	veor	@t[2], @t[2], @s[1]
+	vand	@s[1], @t[1], @s[0]
+	vorr	@t[1], @t[1], @s[0]
+	veor	@t[3], @t[3], @s[3]
+	veor	@t[0], @t[0], @s[1]
+	veor	@t[2], @t[2], @s[2]
+	veor	@t[1], @t[1], @s[3]
+	veor	@t[0], @t[0], @s[2]
+	vand	@s[0], @x[7], @x[3]
+	veor	@t[1], @t[1], @s[2]
+	vand	@s[1], @x[6], @x[2]
+	vand	@s[2], @x[5], @x[1]
+	vorr	@s[3], @x[4], @x[0]
+	veor	@t[3], @t[3], @s[0]
+	veor	@t[1], @t[1], @s[2]
+	veor	@t[0], @t[0], @s[3]
+	veor	@t[2], @t[2], @s[1]
+
+	@ Inv_GF16 \t0, \t1, \t2, \t3, \s0, \s1, \s2, \s3
+
+	@ new smaller inversion
+
+	vand	@s[2], @t[3], @t[1]
+	vmov	@s[0], @t[0]
+
+	veor	@s[1], @t[2], @s[2]
+	veor	@s[3], @t[0], @s[2]
+	veor	@s[2], @t[0], @s[2]	@ @s[2]=@s[3]
+
+	vbsl	@s[1], @t[1], @t[0]
+	vbsl	@s[3], @t[3], @t[2]
+	veor	@t[3], @t[3], @t[2]
+
+	vbsl	@s[0], @s[1], @s[2]
+	vbsl	@t[0], @s[2], @s[1]
+
+	vand	@s[2], @s[0], @s[3]
+	veor	@t[1], @t[1], @t[0]
+
+	veor	@s[2], @s[2], @t[3]
+___
+# output in s3, s2, s1, t1
+
+# Mul_GF16_2 \x0, \x1, \x2, \x3, \x4, \x5, \x6, \x7, \t2, \t3, \t0, \t1, \s0, \s1, \s2, \s3
+
+# Mul_GF16_2 \x0, \x1, \x2, \x3, \x4, \x5, \x6, \x7, \s3, \s2, \s1, \t1, \s0, \t0, \t2, \t3
+	&Mul_GF16_2(@x,@s[3,2,1],@t[1],@s[0],@t[0,2,3]);
+
+### output msb > [x3,x2,x1,x0,x7,x6,x5,x4] < lsb
+}
+
+# AES linear components
+
+sub ShiftRows {
+my @x=@_[0..7];
+my @t=@_[8..11];
+my $mask=pop;
+$code.=<<___;
+	vldmia	$key!, {@t[0]-@t[3]}
+	veor	@t[0], @t[0], @x[0]
+	veor	@t[1], @t[1], @x[1]
+	vtbl.8	`&Dlo(@x[0])`, {@t[0]}, `&Dlo($mask)`
+	vtbl.8	`&Dhi(@x[0])`, {@t[0]}, `&Dhi($mask)`
+	vldmia	$key!, {@t[0]}
+	veor	@t[2], @t[2], @x[2]
+	vtbl.8	`&Dlo(@x[1])`, {@t[1]}, `&Dlo($mask)`
+	vtbl.8	`&Dhi(@x[1])`, {@t[1]}, `&Dhi($mask)`
+	vldmia	$key!, {@t[1]}
+	veor	@t[3], @t[3], @x[3]
+	vtbl.8	`&Dlo(@x[2])`, {@t[2]}, `&Dlo($mask)`
+	vtbl.8	`&Dhi(@x[2])`, {@t[2]}, `&Dhi($mask)`
+	vldmia	$key!, {@t[2]}
+	vtbl.8	`&Dlo(@x[3])`, {@t[3]}, `&Dlo($mask)`
+	vtbl.8	`&Dhi(@x[3])`, {@t[3]}, `&Dhi($mask)`
+	vldmia	$key!, {@t[3]}
+	veor	@t[0], @t[0], @x[4]
+	veor	@t[1], @t[1], @x[5]
+	vtbl.8	`&Dlo(@x[4])`, {@t[0]}, `&Dlo($mask)`
+	vtbl.8	`&Dhi(@x[4])`, {@t[0]}, `&Dhi($mask)`
+	veor	@t[2], @t[2], @x[6]
+	vtbl.8	`&Dlo(@x[5])`, {@t[1]}, `&Dlo($mask)`
+	vtbl.8	`&Dhi(@x[5])`, {@t[1]}, `&Dhi($mask)`
+	veor	@t[3], @t[3], @x[7]
+	vtbl.8	`&Dlo(@x[6])`, {@t[2]}, `&Dlo($mask)`
+	vtbl.8	`&Dhi(@x[6])`, {@t[2]}, `&Dhi($mask)`
+	vtbl.8	`&Dlo(@x[7])`, {@t[3]}, `&Dlo($mask)`
+	vtbl.8	`&Dhi(@x[7])`, {@t[3]}, `&Dhi($mask)`
+___
+}
+
+sub MixColumns {
+# modified to emit output in order suitable for feeding back to aesenc[last]
+my @x=@_[0..7];
+my @t=@_[8..15];
+my $inv=@_[16];	# optional
+$code.=<<___;
+	vext.8	@t[0], @x[0], @x[0], #12	@ x0 <<< 32
+	vext.8	@t[1], @x[1], @x[1], #12
+	 veor	@x[0], @x[0], @t[0]		@ x0 ^ (x0 <<< 32)
+	vext.8	@t[2], @x[2], @x[2], #12
+	 veor	@x[1], @x[1], @t[1]
+	vext.8	@t[3], @x[3], @x[3], #12
+	 veor	@x[2], @x[2], @t[2]
+	vext.8	@t[4], @x[4], @x[4], #12
+	 veor	@x[3], @x[3], @t[3]
+	vext.8	@t[5], @x[5], @x[5], #12
+	 veor	@x[4], @x[4], @t[4]
+	vext.8	@t[6], @x[6], @x[6], #12
+	 veor	@x[5], @x[5], @t[5]
+	vext.8	@t[7], @x[7], @x[7], #12
+	 veor	@x[6], @x[6], @t[6]
+
+	veor	@t[1], @t[1], @x[0]
+	 veor	@x[7], @x[7], @t[7]
+	 vext.8	@x[0], @x[0], @x[0], #8		@ (x0 ^ (x0 <<< 32)) <<< 64)
+	veor	@t[2], @t[2], @x[1]
+	veor	@t[0], @t[0], @x[7]
+	veor	@t[1], @t[1], @x[7]
+	 vext.8	@x[1], @x[1], @x[1], #8
+	veor	@t[5], @t[5], @x[4]
+	 veor	@x[0], @x[0], @t[0]
+	veor	@t[6], @t[6], @x[5]
+	 veor	@x[1], @x[1], @t[1]
+	 vext.8	@t[0], @x[4], @x[4], #8
+	veor	@t[4], @t[4], @x[3]
+	 vext.8	@t[1], @x[5], @x[5], #8
+	veor	@t[7], @t[7], @x[6]
+	 vext.8	@x[4], @x[3], @x[3], #8
+	veor	@t[3], @t[3], @x[2]
+	 vext.8	@x[5], @x[7], @x[7], #8
+	veor	@t[4], @t[4], @x[7]
+	 vext.8	@x[3], @x[6], @x[6], #8
+	veor	@t[3], @t[3], @x[7]
+	 vext.8	@x[6], @x[2], @x[2], #8
+	veor	@x[7], @t[1], @t[5]
+___
+$code.=<<___ if (!$inv);
+	veor	@x[2], @t[0], @t[4]
+	veor	@x[4], @x[4], @t[3]
+	veor	@x[5], @x[5], @t[7]
+	veor	@x[3], @x[3], @t[6]
+	 @ vmov	@x[2], @t[0]
+	veor	@x[6], @x[6], @t[2]
+	 @ vmov	@x[7], @t[1]
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($inv);
+	veor	@t[3], @t[3], @x[4]
+	veor	@x[5], @x[5], @t[7]
+	veor	@x[2], @x[3], @t[6]
+	veor	@x[3], @t[0], @t[4]
+	veor	@x[4], @x[6], @t[2]
+	vmov	@x[6], @t[3]
+	 @ vmov	@x[7], @t[1]
+___
+}
+
+sub InvMixColumns_orig {
+my @x=@_[0..7];
+my @t=@_[8..15];
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	@ multiplication by 0x0e
+	vext.8	@t[7], @x[7], @x[7], #12
+	vmov	@t[2], @x[2]
+	veor	@x[2], @x[2], @x[5]		@ 2 5
+	veor	@x[7], @x[7], @x[5]		@ 7 5
+	vext.8	@t[0], @x[0], @x[0], #12
+	vmov	@t[5], @x[5]
+	veor	@x[5], @x[5], @x[0]		@ 5 0		[1]
+	veor	@x[0], @x[0], @x[1]		@ 0 1
+	vext.8	@t[1], @x[1], @x[1], #12
+	veor	@x[1], @x[1], @x[2]		@ 1 25
+	veor	@x[0], @x[0], @x[6]		@ 01 6		[2]
+	vext.8	@t[3], @x[3], @x[3], #12
+	veor	@x[1], @x[1], @x[3]		@ 125 3		[4]
+	veor	@x[2], @x[2], @x[0]		@ 25 016	[3]
+	veor	@x[3], @x[3], @x[7]		@ 3 75
+	veor	@x[7], @x[7], @x[6]		@ 75 6		[0]
+	vext.8	@t[6], @x[6], @x[6], #12
+	vmov	@t[4], @x[4]
+	veor	@x[6], @x[6], @x[4]		@ 6 4
+	veor	@x[4], @x[4], @x[3]		@ 4 375		[6]
+	veor	@x[3], @x[3], @x[7]		@ 375 756=36
+	veor	@x[6], @x[6], @t[5]		@ 64 5		[7]
+	veor	@x[3], @x[3], @t[2]		@ 36 2
+	vext.8	@t[5], @t[5], @t[5], #12
+	veor	@x[3], @x[3], @t[4]		@ 362 4		[5]
+___
+					my @y = @x[7,5,0,2,1,3,4,6];
+$code.=<<___;
+	@ multiplication by 0x0b
+	veor	@y[1], @y[1], @y[0]
+	veor	@y[0], @y[0], @t[0]
+	vext.8	@t[2], @t[2], @t[2], #12
+	veor	@y[1], @y[1], @t[1]
+	veor	@y[0], @y[0], @t[5]
+	vext.8	@t[4], @t[4], @t[4], #12
+	veor	@y[1], @y[1], @t[6]
+	veor	@y[0], @y[0], @t[7]
+	veor	@t[7], @t[7], @t[6]		@ clobber t[7]
+
+	veor	@y[3], @y[3], @t[0]
+	 veor	@y[1], @y[1], @y[0]
+	vext.8	@t[0], @t[0], @t[0], #12
+	veor	@y[2], @y[2], @t[1]
+	veor	@y[4], @y[4], @t[1]
+	vext.8	@t[1], @t[1], @t[1], #12
+	veor	@y[2], @y[2], @t[2]
+	veor	@y[3], @y[3], @t[2]
+	veor	@y[5], @y[5], @t[2]
+	veor	@y[2], @y[2], @t[7]
+	vext.8	@t[2], @t[2], @t[2], #12
+	veor	@y[3], @y[3], @t[3]
+	veor	@y[6], @y[6], @t[3]
+	veor	@y[4], @y[4], @t[3]
+	veor	@y[7], @y[7], @t[4]
+	vext.8	@t[3], @t[3], @t[3], #12
+	veor	@y[5], @y[5], @t[4]
+	veor	@y[7], @y[7], @t[7]
+	veor	@t[7], @t[7], @t[5]		@ clobber t[7] even more
+	veor	@y[3], @y[3], @t[5]
+	veor	@y[4], @y[4], @t[4]
+
+	veor	@y[5], @y[5], @t[7]
+	vext.8	@t[4], @t[4], @t[4], #12
+	veor	@y[6], @y[6], @t[7]
+	veor	@y[4], @y[4], @t[7]
+
+	veor	@t[7], @t[7], @t[5]
+	vext.8	@t[5], @t[5], @t[5], #12
+
+	@ multiplication by 0x0d
+	veor	@y[4], @y[4], @y[7]
+	 veor	@t[7], @t[7], @t[6]		@ restore t[7]
+	veor	@y[7], @y[7], @t[4]
+	vext.8	@t[6], @t[6], @t[6], #12
+	veor	@y[2], @y[2], @t[0]
+	veor	@y[7], @y[7], @t[5]
+	vext.8	@t[7], @t[7], @t[7], #12
+	veor	@y[2], @y[2], @t[2]
+
+	veor	@y[3], @y[3], @y[1]
+	veor	@y[1], @y[1], @t[1]
+	veor	@y[0], @y[0], @t[0]
+	veor	@y[3], @y[3], @t[0]
+	veor	@y[1], @y[1], @t[5]
+	veor	@y[0], @y[0], @t[5]
+	vext.8	@t[0], @t[0], @t[0], #12
+	veor	@y[1], @y[1], @t[7]
+	veor	@y[0], @y[0], @t[6]
+	veor	@y[3], @y[3], @y[1]
+	veor	@y[4], @y[4], @t[1]
+	vext.8	@t[1], @t[1], @t[1], #12
+
+	veor	@y[7], @y[7], @t[7]
+	veor	@y[4], @y[4], @t[2]
+	veor	@y[5], @y[5], @t[2]
+	veor	@y[2], @y[2], @t[6]
+	veor	@t[6], @t[6], @t[3]		@ clobber t[6]
+	vext.8	@t[2], @t[2], @t[2], #12
+	veor	@y[4], @y[4], @y[7]
+	veor	@y[3], @y[3], @t[6]
+
+	veor	@y[6], @y[6], @t[6]
+	veor	@y[5], @y[5], @t[5]
+	vext.8	@t[5], @t[5], @t[5], #12
+	veor	@y[6], @y[6], @t[4]
+	vext.8	@t[4], @t[4], @t[4], #12
+	veor	@y[5], @y[5], @t[6]
+	veor	@y[6], @y[6], @t[7]
+	vext.8	@t[7], @t[7], @t[7], #12
+	veor	@t[6], @t[6], @t[3]		@ restore t[6]
+	vext.8	@t[3], @t[3], @t[3], #12
+
+	@ multiplication by 0x09
+	veor	@y[4], @y[4], @y[1]
+	veor	@t[1], @t[1], @y[1]		@ t[1]=y[1]
+	veor	@t[0], @t[0], @t[5]		@ clobber t[0]
+	vext.8	@t[6], @t[6], @t[6], #12
+	veor	@t[1], @t[1], @t[5]
+	veor	@y[3], @y[3], @t[0]
+	veor	@t[0], @t[0], @y[0]		@ t[0]=y[0]
+	veor	@t[1], @t[1], @t[6]
+	veor	@t[6], @t[6], @t[7]		@ clobber t[6]
+	veor	@y[4], @y[4], @t[1]
+	veor	@y[7], @y[7], @t[4]
+	veor	@y[6], @y[6], @t[3]
+	veor	@y[5], @y[5], @t[2]
+	veor	@t[4], @t[4], @y[4]		@ t[4]=y[4]
+	veor	@t[3], @t[3], @y[3]		@ t[3]=y[3]
+	veor	@t[5], @t[5], @y[5]		@ t[5]=y[5]
+	veor	@t[2], @t[2], @y[2]		@ t[2]=y[2]
+	veor	@t[3], @t[3], @t[7]
+	veor	@XMM[5], @t[5], @t[6]
+	veor	@XMM[6], @t[6], @y[6]		@ t[6]=y[6]
+	veor	@XMM[2], @t[2], @t[6]
+	veor	@XMM[7], @t[7], @y[7]		@ t[7]=y[7]
+
+	vmov	@XMM[0], @t[0]
+	vmov	@XMM[1], @t[1]
+	@ vmov	@XMM[2], @t[2]
+	vmov	@XMM[3], @t[3]
+	vmov	@XMM[4], @t[4]
+	@ vmov	@XMM[5], @t[5]
+	@ vmov	@XMM[6], @t[6]
+	@ vmov	@XMM[7], @t[7]
+___
+}
+
+sub InvMixColumns {
+my @x=@_[0..7];
+my @t=@_[8..15];
+
+# Thanks to Jussi Kivilinna for providing pointer to
+#
+# | 0e 0b 0d 09 |   | 02 03 01 01 |   | 05 00 04 00 |
+# | 09 0e 0b 0d | = | 01 02 03 01 | x | 00 05 00 04 |
+# | 0d 09 0e 0b |   | 01 01 02 03 |   | 04 00 05 00 |
+# | 0b 0d 09 0e |   | 03 01 01 02 |   | 00 04 00 05 |
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	@ multiplication by 0x05-0x00-0x04-0x00
+	vext.8	@t[0], @x[0], @x[0], #8
+	vext.8	@t[6], @x[6], @x[6], #8
+	vext.8	@t[7], @x[7], @x[7], #8
+	veor	@t[0], @t[0], @x[0]
+	vext.8	@t[1], @x[1], @x[1], #8
+	veor	@t[6], @t[6], @x[6]
+	vext.8	@t[2], @x[2], @x[2], #8
+	veor	@t[7], @t[7], @x[7]
+	vext.8	@t[3], @x[3], @x[3], #8
+	veor	@t[1], @t[1], @x[1]
+	vext.8	@t[4], @x[4], @x[4], #8
+	veor	@t[2], @t[2], @x[2]
+	vext.8	@t[5], @x[5], @x[5], #8
+	veor	@t[3], @t[3], @x[3]
+	veor	@t[4], @t[4], @x[4]
+	veor	@t[5], @t[5], @x[5]
+
+	 veor	@x[0], @x[0], @t[6]
+	 veor	@x[1], @x[1], @t[6]
+	 veor	@x[2], @x[2], @t[0]
+	 veor	@x[4], @x[4], @t[2]
+	 veor	@x[3], @x[3], @t[1]
+	 veor	@x[1], @x[1], @t[7]
+	 veor	@x[2], @x[2], @t[7]
+	 veor	@x[4], @x[4], @t[6]
+	 veor	@x[5], @x[5], @t[3]
+	 veor	@x[3], @x[3], @t[6]
+	 veor	@x[6], @x[6], @t[4]
+	 veor	@x[4], @x[4], @t[7]
+	 veor	@x[5], @x[5], @t[7]
+	 veor	@x[7], @x[7], @t[5]
+___
+	&MixColumns	(@x,@t,1);	# flipped 2<->3 and 4<->6
+}
+
+sub swapmove {
+my ($a,$b,$n,$mask,$t)=@_;
+$code.=<<___;
+	vshr.u64	$t, $b, #$n
+	veor		$t, $t, $a
+	vand		$t, $t, $mask
+	veor		$a, $a, $t
+	vshl.u64	$t, $t, #$n
+	veor		$b, $b, $t
+___
+}
+sub swapmove2x {
+my ($a0,$b0,$a1,$b1,$n,$mask,$t0,$t1)=@_;
+$code.=<<___;
+	vshr.u64	$t0, $b0, #$n
+	 vshr.u64	$t1, $b1, #$n
+	veor		$t0, $t0, $a0
+	 veor		$t1, $t1, $a1
+	vand		$t0, $t0, $mask
+	 vand		$t1, $t1, $mask
+	veor		$a0, $a0, $t0
+	vshl.u64	$t0, $t0, #$n
+	 veor		$a1, $a1, $t1
+	 vshl.u64	$t1, $t1, #$n
+	veor		$b0, $b0, $t0
+	 veor		$b1, $b1, $t1
+___
+}
+
+sub bitslice {
+my @x=reverse(@_[0..7]);
+my ($t0,$t1,$t2,$t3)=@_[8..11];
+$code.=<<___;
+	vmov.i8	$t0,#0x55			@ compose .LBS0
+	vmov.i8	$t1,#0x33			@ compose .LBS1
+___
+	&swapmove2x(@x[0,1,2,3],1,$t0,$t2,$t3);
+	&swapmove2x(@x[4,5,6,7],1,$t0,$t2,$t3);
+$code.=<<___;
+	vmov.i8	$t0,#0x0f			@ compose .LBS2
+___
+	&swapmove2x(@x[0,2,1,3],2,$t1,$t2,$t3);
+	&swapmove2x(@x[4,6,5,7],2,$t1,$t2,$t3);
+
+	&swapmove2x(@x[0,4,1,5],4,$t0,$t2,$t3);
+	&swapmove2x(@x[2,6,3,7],4,$t0,$t2,$t3);
+}
+
+$code.=<<___;
+#ifndef __KERNEL__
+# include "arm_arch.h"
+
+# define VFP_ABI_PUSH	vstmdb	sp!,{d8-d15}
+# define VFP_ABI_POP	vldmia	sp!,{d8-d15}
+# define VFP_ABI_FRAME	0x40
+#else
+# define VFP_ABI_PUSH
+# define VFP_ABI_POP
+# define VFP_ABI_FRAME	0
+# define BSAES_ASM_EXTENDED_KEY
+# define XTS_CHAIN_TWEAK
+# define __ARM_ARCH__ __LINUX_ARM_ARCH__
+# define __ARM_MAX_ARCH__ 7
+#endif
+
+#ifdef __thumb__
+# define adrl adr
+#endif
+
+#if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7
+.arch	armv7-a
+.fpu	neon
+
+.text
+.syntax	unified 	@ ARMv7-capable assembler is expected to handle this
+#if defined(__thumb2__) && !defined(__APPLE__)
+.thumb
+#else
+.code   32
+# undef __thumb2__
+#endif
+
+.type	_bsaes_decrypt8,%function
+.align	4
+_bsaes_decrypt8:
+	adr	$const,.
+	vldmia	$key!, {@XMM[9]}		@ round 0 key
+#if defined(__thumb2__) || defined(__APPLE__)
+	adr	$const,.LM0ISR
+#else
+	add	$const,$const,#.LM0ISR-_bsaes_decrypt8
+#endif
+
+	vldmia	$const!, {@XMM[8]}		@ .LM0ISR
+	veor	@XMM[10], @XMM[0], @XMM[9]	@ xor with round0 key
+	veor	@XMM[11], @XMM[1], @XMM[9]
+	 vtbl.8	`&Dlo(@XMM[0])`, {@XMM[10]}, `&Dlo(@XMM[8])`
+	 vtbl.8	`&Dhi(@XMM[0])`, {@XMM[10]}, `&Dhi(@XMM[8])`
+	veor	@XMM[12], @XMM[2], @XMM[9]
+	 vtbl.8	`&Dlo(@XMM[1])`, {@XMM[11]}, `&Dlo(@XMM[8])`
+	 vtbl.8	`&Dhi(@XMM[1])`, {@XMM[11]}, `&Dhi(@XMM[8])`
+	veor	@XMM[13], @XMM[3], @XMM[9]
+	 vtbl.8	`&Dlo(@XMM[2])`, {@XMM[12]}, `&Dlo(@XMM[8])`
+	 vtbl.8	`&Dhi(@XMM[2])`, {@XMM[12]}, `&Dhi(@XMM[8])`
+	veor	@XMM[14], @XMM[4], @XMM[9]
+	 vtbl.8	`&Dlo(@XMM[3])`, {@XMM[13]}, `&Dlo(@XMM[8])`
+	 vtbl.8	`&Dhi(@XMM[3])`, {@XMM[13]}, `&Dhi(@XMM[8])`
+	veor	@XMM[15], @XMM[5], @XMM[9]
+	 vtbl.8	`&Dlo(@XMM[4])`, {@XMM[14]}, `&Dlo(@XMM[8])`
+	 vtbl.8	`&Dhi(@XMM[4])`, {@XMM[14]}, `&Dhi(@XMM[8])`
+	veor	@XMM[10], @XMM[6], @XMM[9]
+	 vtbl.8	`&Dlo(@XMM[5])`, {@XMM[15]}, `&Dlo(@XMM[8])`
+	 vtbl.8	`&Dhi(@XMM[5])`, {@XMM[15]}, `&Dhi(@XMM[8])`
+	veor	@XMM[11], @XMM[7], @XMM[9]
+	 vtbl.8	`&Dlo(@XMM[6])`, {@XMM[10]}, `&Dlo(@XMM[8])`
+	 vtbl.8	`&Dhi(@XMM[6])`, {@XMM[10]}, `&Dhi(@XMM[8])`
+	 vtbl.8	`&Dlo(@XMM[7])`, {@XMM[11]}, `&Dlo(@XMM[8])`
+	 vtbl.8	`&Dhi(@XMM[7])`, {@XMM[11]}, `&Dhi(@XMM[8])`
+___
+	&bitslice	(@XMM[0..7, 8..11]);
+$code.=<<___;
+	sub	$rounds,$rounds,#1
+	b	.Ldec_sbox
+.align	4
+.Ldec_loop:
+___
+	&ShiftRows	(@XMM[0..7, 8..12]);
+$code.=".Ldec_sbox:\n";
+	&InvSbox	(@XMM[0..7, 8..15]);
+$code.=<<___;
+	subs	$rounds,$rounds,#1
+	bcc	.Ldec_done
+___
+	&InvMixColumns	(@XMM[0,1,6,4,2,7,3,5, 8..15]);
+$code.=<<___;
+	vldmia	$const, {@XMM[12]}		@ .LISR
+	ite	eq				@ Thumb2 thing, sanity check in ARM
+	addeq	$const,$const,#0x10
+	bne	.Ldec_loop
+	vldmia	$const, {@XMM[12]}		@ .LISRM0
+	b	.Ldec_loop
+.align	4
+.Ldec_done:
+___
+	&bitslice	(@XMM[0,1,6,4,2,7,3,5, 8..11]);
+$code.=<<___;
+	vldmia	$key, {@XMM[8]}			@ last round key
+	veor	@XMM[6], @XMM[6], @XMM[8]
+	veor	@XMM[4], @XMM[4], @XMM[8]
+	veor	@XMM[2], @XMM[2], @XMM[8]
+	veor	@XMM[7], @XMM[7], @XMM[8]
+	veor	@XMM[3], @XMM[3], @XMM[8]
+	veor	@XMM[5], @XMM[5], @XMM[8]
+	veor	@XMM[0], @XMM[0], @XMM[8]
+	veor	@XMM[1], @XMM[1], @XMM[8]
+	bx	lr
+.size	_bsaes_decrypt8,.-_bsaes_decrypt8
+
+.type	_bsaes_const,%object
+.align	6
+_bsaes_const:
+.LM0ISR:	@ InvShiftRows constants
+	.quad	0x0a0e0206070b0f03, 0x0004080c0d010509
+.LISR:
+	.quad	0x0504070602010003, 0x0f0e0d0c080b0a09
+.LISRM0:
+	.quad	0x01040b0e0205080f, 0x0306090c00070a0d
+.LM0SR:		@ ShiftRows constants
+	.quad	0x0a0e02060f03070b, 0x0004080c05090d01
+.LSR:
+	.quad	0x0504070600030201, 0x0f0e0d0c0a09080b
+.LSRM0:
+	.quad	0x0304090e00050a0f, 0x01060b0c0207080d
+.LM0:
+	.quad	0x02060a0e03070b0f, 0x0004080c0105090d
+.LREVM0SR:
+	.quad	0x090d01050c000408, 0x03070b0f060a0e02
+.asciz	"Bit-sliced AES for NEON, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+.align	6
+.size	_bsaes_const,.-_bsaes_const
+
+.type	_bsaes_encrypt8,%function
+.align	4
+_bsaes_encrypt8:
+	adr	$const,.
+	vldmia	$key!, {@XMM[9]}		@ round 0 key
+#if defined(__thumb2__) || defined(__APPLE__)
+	adr	$const,.LM0SR
+#else
+	sub	$const,$const,#_bsaes_encrypt8-.LM0SR
+#endif
+
+	vldmia	$const!, {@XMM[8]}		@ .LM0SR
+_bsaes_encrypt8_alt:
+	veor	@XMM[10], @XMM[0], @XMM[9]	@ xor with round0 key
+	veor	@XMM[11], @XMM[1], @XMM[9]
+	 vtbl.8	`&Dlo(@XMM[0])`, {@XMM[10]}, `&Dlo(@XMM[8])`
+	 vtbl.8	`&Dhi(@XMM[0])`, {@XMM[10]}, `&Dhi(@XMM[8])`
+	veor	@XMM[12], @XMM[2], @XMM[9]
+	 vtbl.8	`&Dlo(@XMM[1])`, {@XMM[11]}, `&Dlo(@XMM[8])`
+	 vtbl.8	`&Dhi(@XMM[1])`, {@XMM[11]}, `&Dhi(@XMM[8])`
+	veor	@XMM[13], @XMM[3], @XMM[9]
+	 vtbl.8	`&Dlo(@XMM[2])`, {@XMM[12]}, `&Dlo(@XMM[8])`
+	 vtbl.8	`&Dhi(@XMM[2])`, {@XMM[12]}, `&Dhi(@XMM[8])`
+	veor	@XMM[14], @XMM[4], @XMM[9]
+	 vtbl.8	`&Dlo(@XMM[3])`, {@XMM[13]}, `&Dlo(@XMM[8])`
+	 vtbl.8	`&Dhi(@XMM[3])`, {@XMM[13]}, `&Dhi(@XMM[8])`
+	veor	@XMM[15], @XMM[5], @XMM[9]
+	 vtbl.8	`&Dlo(@XMM[4])`, {@XMM[14]}, `&Dlo(@XMM[8])`
+	 vtbl.8	`&Dhi(@XMM[4])`, {@XMM[14]}, `&Dhi(@XMM[8])`
+	veor	@XMM[10], @XMM[6], @XMM[9]
+	 vtbl.8	`&Dlo(@XMM[5])`, {@XMM[15]}, `&Dlo(@XMM[8])`
+	 vtbl.8	`&Dhi(@XMM[5])`, {@XMM[15]}, `&Dhi(@XMM[8])`
+	veor	@XMM[11], @XMM[7], @XMM[9]
+	 vtbl.8	`&Dlo(@XMM[6])`, {@XMM[10]}, `&Dlo(@XMM[8])`
+	 vtbl.8	`&Dhi(@XMM[6])`, {@XMM[10]}, `&Dhi(@XMM[8])`
+	 vtbl.8	`&Dlo(@XMM[7])`, {@XMM[11]}, `&Dlo(@XMM[8])`
+	 vtbl.8	`&Dhi(@XMM[7])`, {@XMM[11]}, `&Dhi(@XMM[8])`
+_bsaes_encrypt8_bitslice:
+___
+	&bitslice	(@XMM[0..7, 8..11]);
+$code.=<<___;
+	sub	$rounds,$rounds,#1
+	b	.Lenc_sbox
+.align	4
+.Lenc_loop:
+___
+	&ShiftRows	(@XMM[0..7, 8..12]);
+$code.=".Lenc_sbox:\n";
+	&Sbox		(@XMM[0..7, 8..15]);
+$code.=<<___;
+	subs	$rounds,$rounds,#1
+	bcc	.Lenc_done
+___
+	&MixColumns	(@XMM[0,1,4,6,3,7,2,5, 8..15]);
+$code.=<<___;
+	vldmia	$const, {@XMM[12]}		@ .LSR
+	ite	eq				@ Thumb2 thing, samity check in ARM
+	addeq	$const,$const,#0x10
+	bne	.Lenc_loop
+	vldmia	$const, {@XMM[12]}		@ .LSRM0
+	b	.Lenc_loop
+.align	4
+.Lenc_done:
+___
+	# output in lsb > [t0, t1, t4, t6, t3, t7, t2, t5] < msb
+	&bitslice	(@XMM[0,1,4,6,3,7,2,5, 8..11]);
+$code.=<<___;
+	vldmia	$key, {@XMM[8]}			@ last round key
+	veor	@XMM[4], @XMM[4], @XMM[8]
+	veor	@XMM[6], @XMM[6], @XMM[8]
+	veor	@XMM[3], @XMM[3], @XMM[8]
+	veor	@XMM[7], @XMM[7], @XMM[8]
+	veor	@XMM[2], @XMM[2], @XMM[8]
+	veor	@XMM[5], @XMM[5], @XMM[8]
+	veor	@XMM[0], @XMM[0], @XMM[8]
+	veor	@XMM[1], @XMM[1], @XMM[8]
+	bx	lr
+.size	_bsaes_encrypt8,.-_bsaes_encrypt8
+___
+}
+{
+my ($out,$inp,$rounds,$const)=("r12","r4","r5","r6");
+
+sub bitslice_key {
+my @x=reverse(@_[0..7]);
+my ($bs0,$bs1,$bs2,$t2,$t3)=@_[8..12];
+
+	&swapmove	(@x[0,1],1,$bs0,$t2,$t3);
+$code.=<<___;
+	@ &swapmove(@x[2,3],1,$t0,$t2,$t3);
+	vmov	@x[2], @x[0]
+	vmov	@x[3], @x[1]
+___
+	#&swapmove2x(@x[4,5,6,7],1,$t0,$t2,$t3);
+
+	&swapmove2x	(@x[0,2,1,3],2,$bs1,$t2,$t3);
+$code.=<<___;
+	@ &swapmove2x(@x[4,6,5,7],2,$t1,$t2,$t3);
+	vmov	@x[4], @x[0]
+	vmov	@x[6], @x[2]
+	vmov	@x[5], @x[1]
+	vmov	@x[7], @x[3]
+___
+	&swapmove2x	(@x[0,4,1,5],4,$bs2,$t2,$t3);
+	&swapmove2x	(@x[2,6,3,7],4,$bs2,$t2,$t3);
+}
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.type	_bsaes_key_convert,%function
+.align	4
+_bsaes_key_convert:
+	adr	$const,.
+	vld1.8	{@XMM[7]},  [$inp]!		@ load round 0 key
+#if defined(__thumb2__) || defined(__APPLE__)
+	adr	$const,.LM0
+#else
+	sub	$const,$const,#_bsaes_key_convert-.LM0
+#endif
+	vld1.8	{@XMM[15]}, [$inp]!		@ load round 1 key
+
+	vmov.i8	@XMM[8],  #0x01			@ bit masks
+	vmov.i8	@XMM[9],  #0x02
+	vmov.i8	@XMM[10], #0x04
+	vmov.i8	@XMM[11], #0x08
+	vmov.i8	@XMM[12], #0x10
+	vmov.i8	@XMM[13], #0x20
+	vldmia	$const, {@XMM[14]}		@ .LM0
+
+#ifdef __ARMEL__
+	vrev32.8	@XMM[7],  @XMM[7]
+	vrev32.8	@XMM[15], @XMM[15]
+#endif
+	sub	$rounds,$rounds,#1
+	vstmia	$out!, {@XMM[7]}		@ save round 0 key
+	b	.Lkey_loop
+
+.align	4
+.Lkey_loop:
+	vtbl.8	`&Dlo(@XMM[7])`,{@XMM[15]},`&Dlo(@XMM[14])`
+	vtbl.8	`&Dhi(@XMM[7])`,{@XMM[15]},`&Dhi(@XMM[14])`
+	vmov.i8	@XMM[6],  #0x40
+	vmov.i8	@XMM[15], #0x80
+
+	vtst.8	@XMM[0], @XMM[7], @XMM[8]
+	vtst.8	@XMM[1], @XMM[7], @XMM[9]
+	vtst.8	@XMM[2], @XMM[7], @XMM[10]
+	vtst.8	@XMM[3], @XMM[7], @XMM[11]
+	vtst.8	@XMM[4], @XMM[7], @XMM[12]
+	vtst.8	@XMM[5], @XMM[7], @XMM[13]
+	vtst.8	@XMM[6], @XMM[7], @XMM[6]
+	vtst.8	@XMM[7], @XMM[7], @XMM[15]
+	vld1.8	{@XMM[15]}, [$inp]!		@ load next round key
+	vmvn	@XMM[0], @XMM[0]		@ "pnot"
+	vmvn	@XMM[1], @XMM[1]
+	vmvn	@XMM[5], @XMM[5]
+	vmvn	@XMM[6], @XMM[6]
+#ifdef __ARMEL__
+	vrev32.8	@XMM[15], @XMM[15]
+#endif
+	subs	$rounds,$rounds,#1
+	vstmia	$out!,{@XMM[0]-@XMM[7]}		@ write bit-sliced round key
+	bne	.Lkey_loop
+
+	vmov.i8	@XMM[7],#0x63			@ compose .L63
+	@ don't save last round key
+	bx	lr
+.size	_bsaes_key_convert,.-_bsaes_key_convert
+___
+}
+
+if (0) {		# following four functions are unsupported interface
+			# used for benchmarking...
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	bsaes_enc_key_convert
+.type	bsaes_enc_key_convert,%function
+.align	4
+bsaes_enc_key_convert:
+	stmdb	sp!,{r4-r6,lr}
+	vstmdb	sp!,{d8-d15}		@ ABI specification says so
+
+	ldr	r5,[$inp,#240]			@ pass rounds
+	mov	r4,$inp				@ pass key
+	mov	r12,$out			@ pass key schedule
+	bl	_bsaes_key_convert
+	veor	@XMM[7],@XMM[7],@XMM[15]	@ fix up last round key
+	vstmia	r12, {@XMM[7]}			@ save last round key
+
+	vldmia	sp!,{d8-d15}
+	ldmia	sp!,{r4-r6,pc}
+.size	bsaes_enc_key_convert,.-bsaes_enc_key_convert
+
+.globl	bsaes_encrypt_128
+.type	bsaes_encrypt_128,%function
+.align	4
+bsaes_encrypt_128:
+	stmdb	sp!,{r4-r6,lr}
+	vstmdb	sp!,{d8-d15}		@ ABI specification says so
+.Lenc128_loop:
+	vld1.8	{@XMM[0]-@XMM[1]}, [$inp]!	@ load input
+	vld1.8	{@XMM[2]-@XMM[3]}, [$inp]!
+	mov	r4,$key				@ pass the key
+	vld1.8	{@XMM[4]-@XMM[5]}, [$inp]!
+	mov	r5,#10				@ pass rounds
+	vld1.8	{@XMM[6]-@XMM[7]}, [$inp]!
+
+	bl	_bsaes_encrypt8
+
+	vst1.8	{@XMM[0]-@XMM[1]}, [$out]!	@ write output
+	vst1.8	{@XMM[4]}, [$out]!
+	vst1.8	{@XMM[6]}, [$out]!
+	vst1.8	{@XMM[3]}, [$out]!
+	vst1.8	{@XMM[7]}, [$out]!
+	vst1.8	{@XMM[2]}, [$out]!
+	subs	$len,$len,#0x80
+	vst1.8	{@XMM[5]}, [$out]!
+	bhi	.Lenc128_loop
+
+	vldmia	sp!,{d8-d15}
+	ldmia	sp!,{r4-r6,pc}
+.size	bsaes_encrypt_128,.-bsaes_encrypt_128
+
+.globl	bsaes_dec_key_convert
+.type	bsaes_dec_key_convert,%function
+.align	4
+bsaes_dec_key_convert:
+	stmdb	sp!,{r4-r6,lr}
+	vstmdb	sp!,{d8-d15}		@ ABI specification says so
+
+	ldr	r5,[$inp,#240]			@ pass rounds
+	mov	r4,$inp				@ pass key
+	mov	r12,$out			@ pass key schedule
+	bl	_bsaes_key_convert
+	vldmia	$out, {@XMM[6]}
+	vstmia	r12,  {@XMM[15]}		@ save last round key
+	veor	@XMM[7], @XMM[7], @XMM[6]	@ fix up round 0 key
+	vstmia	$out, {@XMM[7]}
+
+	vldmia	sp!,{d8-d15}
+	ldmia	sp!,{r4-r6,pc}
+.size	bsaes_dec_key_convert,.-bsaes_dec_key_convert
+
+.globl	bsaes_decrypt_128
+.type	bsaes_decrypt_128,%function
+.align	4
+bsaes_decrypt_128:
+	stmdb	sp!,{r4-r6,lr}
+	vstmdb	sp!,{d8-d15}		@ ABI specification says so
+.Ldec128_loop:
+	vld1.8	{@XMM[0]-@XMM[1]}, [$inp]!	@ load input
+	vld1.8	{@XMM[2]-@XMM[3]}, [$inp]!
+	mov	r4,$key				@ pass the key
+	vld1.8	{@XMM[4]-@XMM[5]}, [$inp]!
+	mov	r5,#10				@ pass rounds
+	vld1.8	{@XMM[6]-@XMM[7]}, [$inp]!
+
+	bl	_bsaes_decrypt8
+
+	vst1.8	{@XMM[0]-@XMM[1]}, [$out]!	@ write output
+	vst1.8	{@XMM[6]}, [$out]!
+	vst1.8	{@XMM[4]}, [$out]!
+	vst1.8	{@XMM[2]}, [$out]!
+	vst1.8	{@XMM[7]}, [$out]!
+	vst1.8	{@XMM[3]}, [$out]!
+	subs	$len,$len,#0x80
+	vst1.8	{@XMM[5]}, [$out]!
+	bhi	.Ldec128_loop
+
+	vldmia	sp!,{d8-d15}
+	ldmia	sp!,{r4-r6,pc}
+.size	bsaes_decrypt_128,.-bsaes_decrypt_128
+___
+}
+{
+my ($inp,$out,$len,$key, $ivp,$fp,$rounds)=map("r$_",(0..3,8..10));
+my ($keysched)=("sp");
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.extern AES_cbc_encrypt
+.extern AES_decrypt
+
+.global	bsaes_cbc_encrypt
+.type	bsaes_cbc_encrypt,%function
+.align	5
+bsaes_cbc_encrypt:
+#ifndef	__KERNEL__
+	cmp	$len, #128
+#ifndef	__thumb__
+	blo	AES_cbc_encrypt
+#else
+	bhs	1f
+	b	AES_cbc_encrypt
+1:
+#endif
+#endif
+
+	@ it is up to the caller to make sure we are called with enc == 0
+
+	mov	ip, sp
+	stmdb	sp!, {r4-r10, lr}
+	VFP_ABI_PUSH
+	ldr	$ivp, [ip]			@ IV is 1st arg on the stack
+	mov	$len, $len, lsr#4		@ len in 16 byte blocks
+	sub	sp, #0x10			@ scratch space to carry over the IV
+	mov	$fp, sp				@ save sp
+
+	ldr	$rounds, [$key, #240]		@ get # of rounds
+#ifndef	BSAES_ASM_EXTENDED_KEY
+	@ allocate the key schedule on the stack
+	sub	r12, sp, $rounds, lsl#7		@ 128 bytes per inner round key
+	add	r12, #`128-32`			@ sifze of bit-slices key schedule
+
+	@ populate the key schedule
+	mov	r4, $key			@ pass key
+	mov	r5, $rounds			@ pass # of rounds
+	mov	sp, r12				@ sp is $keysched
+	bl	_bsaes_key_convert
+	vldmia	$keysched, {@XMM[6]}
+	vstmia	r12,  {@XMM[15]}		@ save last round key
+	veor	@XMM[7], @XMM[7], @XMM[6]	@ fix up round 0 key
+	vstmia	$keysched, {@XMM[7]}
+#else
+	ldr	r12, [$key, #244]
+	eors	r12, #1
+	beq	0f
+
+	@ populate the key schedule
+	str	r12, [$key, #244]
+	mov	r4, $key			@ pass key
+	mov	r5, $rounds			@ pass # of rounds
+	add	r12, $key, #248			@ pass key schedule
+	bl	_bsaes_key_convert
+	add	r4, $key, #248
+	vldmia	r4, {@XMM[6]}
+	vstmia	r12, {@XMM[15]}			@ save last round key
+	veor	@XMM[7], @XMM[7], @XMM[6]	@ fix up round 0 key
+	vstmia	r4, {@XMM[7]}
+
+.align	2
+0:
+#endif
+
+	vld1.8	{@XMM[15]}, [$ivp]		@ load IV
+	b	.Lcbc_dec_loop
+
+.align	4
+.Lcbc_dec_loop:
+	subs	$len, $len, #0x8
+	bmi	.Lcbc_dec_loop_finish
+
+	vld1.8	{@XMM[0]-@XMM[1]}, [$inp]!	@ load input
+	vld1.8	{@XMM[2]-@XMM[3]}, [$inp]!
+#ifndef	BSAES_ASM_EXTENDED_KEY
+	mov	r4, $keysched			@ pass the key
+#else
+	add	r4, $key, #248
+#endif
+	vld1.8	{@XMM[4]-@XMM[5]}, [$inp]!
+	mov	r5, $rounds
+	vld1.8	{@XMM[6]-@XMM[7]}, [$inp]
+	sub	$inp, $inp, #0x60
+	vstmia	$fp, {@XMM[15]}			@ put aside IV
+
+	bl	_bsaes_decrypt8
+
+	vldmia	$fp, {@XMM[14]}			@ reload IV
+	vld1.8	{@XMM[8]-@XMM[9]}, [$inp]!	@ reload input
+	veor	@XMM[0], @XMM[0], @XMM[14]	@ ^= IV
+	vld1.8	{@XMM[10]-@XMM[11]}, [$inp]!
+	veor	@XMM[1], @XMM[1], @XMM[8]
+	veor	@XMM[6], @XMM[6], @XMM[9]
+	vld1.8	{@XMM[12]-@XMM[13]}, [$inp]!
+	veor	@XMM[4], @XMM[4], @XMM[10]
+	veor	@XMM[2], @XMM[2], @XMM[11]
+	vld1.8	{@XMM[14]-@XMM[15]}, [$inp]!
+	veor	@XMM[7], @XMM[7], @XMM[12]
+	vst1.8	{@XMM[0]-@XMM[1]}, [$out]!	@ write output
+	veor	@XMM[3], @XMM[3], @XMM[13]
+	vst1.8	{@XMM[6]}, [$out]!
+	veor	@XMM[5], @XMM[5], @XMM[14]
+	vst1.8	{@XMM[4]}, [$out]!
+	vst1.8	{@XMM[2]}, [$out]!
+	vst1.8	{@XMM[7]}, [$out]!
+	vst1.8	{@XMM[3]}, [$out]!
+	vst1.8	{@XMM[5]}, [$out]!
+
+	b	.Lcbc_dec_loop
+
+.Lcbc_dec_loop_finish:
+	adds	$len, $len, #8
+	beq	.Lcbc_dec_done
+
+	vld1.8	{@XMM[0]}, [$inp]!		@ load input
+	cmp	$len, #2
+	blo	.Lcbc_dec_one
+	vld1.8	{@XMM[1]}, [$inp]!
+#ifndef	BSAES_ASM_EXTENDED_KEY
+	mov	r4, $keysched			@ pass the key
+#else
+	add	r4, $key, #248
+#endif
+	mov	r5, $rounds
+	vstmia	$fp, {@XMM[15]}			@ put aside IV
+	beq	.Lcbc_dec_two
+	vld1.8	{@XMM[2]}, [$inp]!
+	cmp	$len, #4
+	blo	.Lcbc_dec_three
+	vld1.8	{@XMM[3]}, [$inp]!
+	beq	.Lcbc_dec_four
+	vld1.8	{@XMM[4]}, [$inp]!
+	cmp	$len, #6
+	blo	.Lcbc_dec_five
+	vld1.8	{@XMM[5]}, [$inp]!
+	beq	.Lcbc_dec_six
+	vld1.8	{@XMM[6]}, [$inp]!
+	sub	$inp, $inp, #0x70
+
+	bl	_bsaes_decrypt8
+
+	vldmia	$fp, {@XMM[14]}			@ reload IV
+	vld1.8	{@XMM[8]-@XMM[9]}, [$inp]!	@ reload input
+	veor	@XMM[0], @XMM[0], @XMM[14]	@ ^= IV
+	vld1.8	{@XMM[10]-@XMM[11]}, [$inp]!
+	veor	@XMM[1], @XMM[1], @XMM[8]
+	veor	@XMM[6], @XMM[6], @XMM[9]
+	vld1.8	{@XMM[12]-@XMM[13]}, [$inp]!
+	veor	@XMM[4], @XMM[4], @XMM[10]
+	veor	@XMM[2], @XMM[2], @XMM[11]
+	vld1.8	{@XMM[15]}, [$inp]!
+	veor	@XMM[7], @XMM[7], @XMM[12]
+	vst1.8	{@XMM[0]-@XMM[1]}, [$out]!	@ write output
+	veor	@XMM[3], @XMM[3], @XMM[13]
+	vst1.8	{@XMM[6]}, [$out]!
+	vst1.8	{@XMM[4]}, [$out]!
+	vst1.8	{@XMM[2]}, [$out]!
+	vst1.8	{@XMM[7]}, [$out]!
+	vst1.8	{@XMM[3]}, [$out]!
+	b	.Lcbc_dec_done
+.align	4
+.Lcbc_dec_six:
+	sub	$inp, $inp, #0x60
+	bl	_bsaes_decrypt8
+	vldmia	$fp,{@XMM[14]}			@ reload IV
+	vld1.8	{@XMM[8]-@XMM[9]}, [$inp]!	@ reload input
+	veor	@XMM[0], @XMM[0], @XMM[14]	@ ^= IV
+	vld1.8	{@XMM[10]-@XMM[11]}, [$inp]!
+	veor	@XMM[1], @XMM[1], @XMM[8]
+	veor	@XMM[6], @XMM[6], @XMM[9]
+	vld1.8	{@XMM[12]}, [$inp]!
+	veor	@XMM[4], @XMM[4], @XMM[10]
+	veor	@XMM[2], @XMM[2], @XMM[11]
+	vld1.8	{@XMM[15]}, [$inp]!
+	veor	@XMM[7], @XMM[7], @XMM[12]
+	vst1.8	{@XMM[0]-@XMM[1]}, [$out]!	@ write output
+	vst1.8	{@XMM[6]}, [$out]!
+	vst1.8	{@XMM[4]}, [$out]!
+	vst1.8	{@XMM[2]}, [$out]!
+	vst1.8	{@XMM[7]}, [$out]!
+	b	.Lcbc_dec_done
+.align	4
+.Lcbc_dec_five:
+	sub	$inp, $inp, #0x50
+	bl	_bsaes_decrypt8
+	vldmia	$fp, {@XMM[14]}			@ reload IV
+	vld1.8	{@XMM[8]-@XMM[9]}, [$inp]!	@ reload input
+	veor	@XMM[0], @XMM[0], @XMM[14]	@ ^= IV
+	vld1.8	{@XMM[10]-@XMM[11]}, [$inp]!
+	veor	@XMM[1], @XMM[1], @XMM[8]
+	veor	@XMM[6], @XMM[6], @XMM[9]
+	vld1.8	{@XMM[15]}, [$inp]!
+	veor	@XMM[4], @XMM[4], @XMM[10]
+	vst1.8	{@XMM[0]-@XMM[1]}, [$out]!	@ write output
+	veor	@XMM[2], @XMM[2], @XMM[11]
+	vst1.8	{@XMM[6]}, [$out]!
+	vst1.8	{@XMM[4]}, [$out]!
+	vst1.8	{@XMM[2]}, [$out]!
+	b	.Lcbc_dec_done
+.align	4
+.Lcbc_dec_four:
+	sub	$inp, $inp, #0x40
+	bl	_bsaes_decrypt8
+	vldmia	$fp, {@XMM[14]}			@ reload IV
+	vld1.8	{@XMM[8]-@XMM[9]}, [$inp]!	@ reload input
+	veor	@XMM[0], @XMM[0], @XMM[14]	@ ^= IV
+	vld1.8	{@XMM[10]}, [$inp]!
+	veor	@XMM[1], @XMM[1], @XMM[8]
+	veor	@XMM[6], @XMM[6], @XMM[9]
+	vld1.8	{@XMM[15]}, [$inp]!
+	veor	@XMM[4], @XMM[4], @XMM[10]
+	vst1.8	{@XMM[0]-@XMM[1]}, [$out]!	@ write output
+	vst1.8	{@XMM[6]}, [$out]!
+	vst1.8	{@XMM[4]}, [$out]!
+	b	.Lcbc_dec_done
+.align	4
+.Lcbc_dec_three:
+	sub	$inp, $inp, #0x30
+	bl	_bsaes_decrypt8
+	vldmia	$fp, {@XMM[14]}			@ reload IV
+	vld1.8	{@XMM[8]-@XMM[9]}, [$inp]!	@ reload input
+	veor	@XMM[0], @XMM[0], @XMM[14]	@ ^= IV
+	vld1.8	{@XMM[15]}, [$inp]!
+	veor	@XMM[1], @XMM[1], @XMM[8]
+	veor	@XMM[6], @XMM[6], @XMM[9]
+	vst1.8	{@XMM[0]-@XMM[1]}, [$out]!	@ write output
+	vst1.8	{@XMM[6]}, [$out]!
+	b	.Lcbc_dec_done
+.align	4
+.Lcbc_dec_two:
+	sub	$inp, $inp, #0x20
+	bl	_bsaes_decrypt8
+	vldmia	$fp, {@XMM[14]}			@ reload IV
+	vld1.8	{@XMM[8]}, [$inp]!		@ reload input
+	veor	@XMM[0], @XMM[0], @XMM[14]	@ ^= IV
+	vld1.8	{@XMM[15]}, [$inp]!		@ reload input
+	veor	@XMM[1], @XMM[1], @XMM[8]
+	vst1.8	{@XMM[0]-@XMM[1]}, [$out]!	@ write output
+	b	.Lcbc_dec_done
+.align	4
+.Lcbc_dec_one:
+	sub	$inp, $inp, #0x10
+	mov	$rounds, $out			@ save original out pointer
+	mov	$out, $fp			@ use the iv scratch space as out buffer
+	mov	r2, $key
+	vmov	@XMM[4],@XMM[15]		@ just in case ensure that IV
+	vmov	@XMM[5],@XMM[0]			@ and input are preserved
+	bl	AES_decrypt
+	vld1.8	{@XMM[0]}, [$fp]		@ load result
+	veor	@XMM[0], @XMM[0], @XMM[4]	@ ^= IV
+	vmov	@XMM[15], @XMM[5]		@ @XMM[5] holds input
+	vst1.8	{@XMM[0]}, [$rounds]		@ write output
+
+.Lcbc_dec_done:
+#ifndef	BSAES_ASM_EXTENDED_KEY
+	vmov.i32	q0, #0
+	vmov.i32	q1, #0
+.Lcbc_dec_bzero:				@ wipe key schedule [if any]
+	vstmia		$keysched!, {q0-q1}
+	cmp		$keysched, $fp
+	bne		.Lcbc_dec_bzero
+#endif
+
+	mov	sp, $fp
+	add	sp, #0x10			@ add sp,$fp,#0x10 is no good for thumb
+	vst1.8	{@XMM[15]}, [$ivp]		@ return IV
+	VFP_ABI_POP
+	ldmia	sp!, {r4-r10, pc}
+.size	bsaes_cbc_encrypt,.-bsaes_cbc_encrypt
+___
+}
+{
+my ($inp,$out,$len,$key, $ctr,$fp,$rounds)=(map("r$_",(0..3,8..10)));
+my $const = "r6";	# shared with _bsaes_encrypt8_alt
+my $keysched = "sp";
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.extern	AES_encrypt
+.global	bsaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks
+.type	bsaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks,%function
+.align	5
+bsaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks:
+	cmp	$len, #8			@ use plain AES for
+	blo	.Lctr_enc_short			@ small sizes
+
+	mov	ip, sp
+	stmdb	sp!, {r4-r10, lr}
+	VFP_ABI_PUSH
+	ldr	$ctr, [ip]			@ ctr is 1st arg on the stack
+	sub	sp, sp, #0x10			@ scratch space to carry over the ctr
+	mov	$fp, sp				@ save sp
+
+	ldr	$rounds, [$key, #240]		@ get # of rounds
+#ifndef	BSAES_ASM_EXTENDED_KEY
+	@ allocate the key schedule on the stack
+	sub	r12, sp, $rounds, lsl#7		@ 128 bytes per inner round key
+	add	r12, #`128-32`			@ size of bit-sliced key schedule
+
+	@ populate the key schedule
+	mov	r4, $key			@ pass key
+	mov	r5, $rounds			@ pass # of rounds
+	mov	sp, r12				@ sp is $keysched
+	bl	_bsaes_key_convert
+	veor	@XMM[7],@XMM[7],@XMM[15]	@ fix up last round key
+	vstmia	r12, {@XMM[7]}			@ save last round key
+
+	vld1.8	{@XMM[0]}, [$ctr]		@ load counter
+#ifdef	__APPLE__
+	mov	$ctr, #:lower16:(.LREVM0SR-.LM0)
+	add	$ctr, $const, $ctr
+#else
+	add	$ctr, $const, #.LREVM0SR-.LM0	@ borrow $ctr
+#endif
+	vldmia	$keysched, {@XMM[4]}		@ load round0 key
+#else
+	ldr	r12, [$key, #244]
+	eors	r12, #1
+	beq	0f
+
+	@ populate the key schedule
+	str	r12, [$key, #244]
+	mov	r4, $key			@ pass key
+	mov	r5, $rounds			@ pass # of rounds
+	add	r12, $key, #248			@ pass key schedule
+	bl	_bsaes_key_convert
+	veor	@XMM[7],@XMM[7],@XMM[15]	@ fix up last round key
+	vstmia	r12, {@XMM[7]}			@ save last round key
+
+.align	2
+0:	add	r12, $key, #248
+	vld1.8	{@XMM[0]}, [$ctr]		@ load counter
+	adrl	$ctr, .LREVM0SR			@ borrow $ctr
+	vldmia	r12, {@XMM[4]}			@ load round0 key
+	sub	sp, #0x10			@ place for adjusted round0 key
+#endif
+
+	vmov.i32	@XMM[8],#1		@ compose 1<<96
+	veor		@XMM[9],@XMM[9],@XMM[9]
+	vrev32.8	@XMM[0],@XMM[0]
+	vext.8		@XMM[8],@XMM[9],@XMM[8],#4
+	vrev32.8	@XMM[4],@XMM[4]
+	vadd.u32	@XMM[9],@XMM[8],@XMM[8]	@ compose 2<<96
+	vstmia	$keysched, {@XMM[4]}		@ save adjusted round0 key
+	b	.Lctr_enc_loop
+
+.align	4
+.Lctr_enc_loop:
+	vadd.u32	@XMM[10], @XMM[8], @XMM[9]	@ compose 3<<96
+	vadd.u32	@XMM[1], @XMM[0], @XMM[8]	@ +1
+	vadd.u32	@XMM[2], @XMM[0], @XMM[9]	@ +2
+	vadd.u32	@XMM[3], @XMM[0], @XMM[10]	@ +3
+	vadd.u32	@XMM[4], @XMM[1], @XMM[10]
+	vadd.u32	@XMM[5], @XMM[2], @XMM[10]
+	vadd.u32	@XMM[6], @XMM[3], @XMM[10]
+	vadd.u32	@XMM[7], @XMM[4], @XMM[10]
+	vadd.u32	@XMM[10], @XMM[5], @XMM[10]	@ next counter
+
+	@ Borrow prologue from _bsaes_encrypt8 to use the opportunity
+	@ to flip byte order in 32-bit counter
+
+	vldmia		$keysched, {@XMM[9]}		@ load round0 key
+#ifndef	BSAES_ASM_EXTENDED_KEY
+	add		r4, $keysched, #0x10		@ pass next round key
+#else
+	add		r4, $key, #`248+16`
+#endif
+	vldmia		$ctr, {@XMM[8]}			@ .LREVM0SR
+	mov		r5, $rounds			@ pass rounds
+	vstmia		$fp, {@XMM[10]}			@ save next counter
+#ifdef	__APPLE__
+	mov		$const, #:lower16:(.LREVM0SR-.LSR)
+	sub		$const, $ctr, $const
+#else
+	sub		$const, $ctr, #.LREVM0SR-.LSR	@ pass constants
+#endif
+
+	bl		_bsaes_encrypt8_alt
+
+	subs		$len, $len, #8
+	blo		.Lctr_enc_loop_done
+
+	vld1.8		{@XMM[8]-@XMM[9]}, [$inp]!	@ load input
+	vld1.8		{@XMM[10]-@XMM[11]}, [$inp]!
+	veor		@XMM[0], @XMM[8]
+	veor		@XMM[1], @XMM[9]
+	vld1.8		{@XMM[12]-@XMM[13]}, [$inp]!
+	veor		@XMM[4], @XMM[10]
+	veor		@XMM[6], @XMM[11]
+	vld1.8		{@XMM[14]-@XMM[15]}, [$inp]!
+	veor		@XMM[3], @XMM[12]
+	vst1.8		{@XMM[0]-@XMM[1]}, [$out]!	@ write output
+	veor		@XMM[7], @XMM[13]
+	veor		@XMM[2], @XMM[14]
+	vst1.8		{@XMM[4]}, [$out]!
+	veor		@XMM[5], @XMM[15]
+	vst1.8		{@XMM[6]}, [$out]!
+	vmov.i32	@XMM[8], #1			@ compose 1<<96
+	vst1.8		{@XMM[3]}, [$out]!
+	veor		@XMM[9], @XMM[9], @XMM[9]
+	vst1.8		{@XMM[7]}, [$out]!
+	vext.8		@XMM[8], @XMM[9], @XMM[8], #4
+	vst1.8		{@XMM[2]}, [$out]!
+	vadd.u32	@XMM[9],@XMM[8],@XMM[8]		@ compose 2<<96
+	vst1.8		{@XMM[5]}, [$out]!
+	vldmia		$fp, {@XMM[0]}			@ load counter
+
+	bne		.Lctr_enc_loop
+	b		.Lctr_enc_done
+
+.align	4
+.Lctr_enc_loop_done:
+	add		$len, $len, #8
+	vld1.8		{@XMM[8]}, [$inp]!	@ load input
+	veor		@XMM[0], @XMM[8]
+	vst1.8		{@XMM[0]}, [$out]!	@ write output
+	cmp		$len, #2
+	blo		.Lctr_enc_done
+	vld1.8		{@XMM[9]}, [$inp]!
+	veor		@XMM[1], @XMM[9]
+	vst1.8		{@XMM[1]}, [$out]!
+	beq		.Lctr_enc_done
+	vld1.8		{@XMM[10]}, [$inp]!
+	veor		@XMM[4], @XMM[10]
+	vst1.8		{@XMM[4]}, [$out]!
+	cmp		$len, #4
+	blo		.Lctr_enc_done
+	vld1.8		{@XMM[11]}, [$inp]!
+	veor		@XMM[6], @XMM[11]
+	vst1.8		{@XMM[6]}, [$out]!
+	beq		.Lctr_enc_done
+	vld1.8		{@XMM[12]}, [$inp]!
+	veor		@XMM[3], @XMM[12]
+	vst1.8		{@XMM[3]}, [$out]!
+	cmp		$len, #6
+	blo		.Lctr_enc_done
+	vld1.8		{@XMM[13]}, [$inp]!
+	veor		@XMM[7], @XMM[13]
+	vst1.8		{@XMM[7]}, [$out]!
+	beq		.Lctr_enc_done
+	vld1.8		{@XMM[14]}, [$inp]
+	veor		@XMM[2], @XMM[14]
+	vst1.8		{@XMM[2]}, [$out]!
+
+.Lctr_enc_done:
+	vmov.i32	q0, #0
+	vmov.i32	q1, #0
+#ifndef	BSAES_ASM_EXTENDED_KEY
+.Lctr_enc_bzero:			@ wipe key schedule [if any]
+	vstmia		$keysched!, {q0-q1}
+	cmp		$keysched, $fp
+	bne		.Lctr_enc_bzero
+#else
+	vstmia		$keysched, {q0-q1}
+#endif
+
+	mov	sp, $fp
+	add	sp, #0x10		@ add sp,$fp,#0x10 is no good for thumb
+	VFP_ABI_POP
+	ldmia	sp!, {r4-r10, pc}	@ return
+
+.align	4
+.Lctr_enc_short:
+	ldr	ip, [sp]		@ ctr pointer is passed on stack
+	stmdb	sp!, {r4-r8, lr}
+
+	mov	r4, $inp		@ copy arguments
+	mov	r5, $out
+	mov	r6, $len
+	mov	r7, $key
+	ldr	r8, [ip, #12]		@ load counter LSW
+	vld1.8	{@XMM[1]}, [ip]		@ load whole counter value
+#ifdef __ARMEL__
+	rev	r8, r8
+#endif
+	sub	sp, sp, #0x10
+	vst1.8	{@XMM[1]}, [sp]		@ copy counter value
+	sub	sp, sp, #0x10
+
+.Lctr_enc_short_loop:
+	add	r0, sp, #0x10		@ input counter value
+	mov	r1, sp			@ output on the stack
+	mov	r2, r7			@ key
+
+	bl	AES_encrypt
+
+	vld1.8	{@XMM[0]}, [r4]!	@ load input
+	vld1.8	{@XMM[1]}, [sp]		@ load encrypted counter
+	add	r8, r8, #1
+#ifdef __ARMEL__
+	rev	r0, r8
+	str	r0, [sp, #0x1c]		@ next counter value
+#else
+	str	r8, [sp, #0x1c]		@ next counter value
+#endif
+	veor	@XMM[0],@XMM[0],@XMM[1]
+	vst1.8	{@XMM[0]}, [r5]!	@ store output
+	subs	r6, r6, #1
+	bne	.Lctr_enc_short_loop
+
+	vmov.i32	q0, #0
+	vmov.i32	q1, #0
+	vstmia		sp!, {q0-q1}
+
+	ldmia	sp!, {r4-r8, pc}
+.size	bsaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks,.-bsaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks
+___
+}
+{
+######################################################################
+# void bsaes_xts_[en|de]crypt(const char *inp,char *out,size_t len,
+#	const AES_KEY *key1, const AES_KEY *key2,
+#	const unsigned char iv[16]);
+#
+my ($inp,$out,$len,$key,$rounds,$magic,$fp)=(map("r$_",(7..10,1..3)));
+my $const="r6";		# returned by _bsaes_key_convert
+my $twmask=@XMM[5];
+my @T=@XMM[6..7];
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	bsaes_xts_encrypt
+.type	bsaes_xts_encrypt,%function
+.align	4
+bsaes_xts_encrypt:
+	mov	ip, sp
+	stmdb	sp!, {r4-r10, lr}		@ 0x20
+	VFP_ABI_PUSH
+	mov	r6, sp				@ future $fp
+
+	mov	$inp, r0
+	mov	$out, r1
+	mov	$len, r2
+	mov	$key, r3
+
+	sub	r0, sp, #0x10			@ 0x10
+	bic	r0, #0xf			@ align at 16 bytes
+	mov	sp, r0
+
+#ifdef	XTS_CHAIN_TWEAK
+	ldr	r0, [ip]			@ pointer to input tweak
+#else
+	@ generate initial tweak
+	ldr	r0, [ip, #4]			@ iv[]
+	mov	r1, sp
+	ldr	r2, [ip, #0]			@ key2
+	bl	AES_encrypt
+	mov	r0,sp				@ pointer to initial tweak
+#endif
+
+	ldr	$rounds, [$key, #240]		@ get # of rounds
+	mov	$fp, r6
+#ifndef	BSAES_ASM_EXTENDED_KEY
+	@ allocate the key schedule on the stack
+	sub	r12, sp, $rounds, lsl#7		@ 128 bytes per inner round key
+	@ add	r12, #`128-32`			@ size of bit-sliced key schedule
+	sub	r12, #`32+16`			@ place for tweak[9]
+
+	@ populate the key schedule
+	mov	r4, $key			@ pass key
+	mov	r5, $rounds			@ pass # of rounds
+	mov	sp, r12
+	add	r12, #0x90			@ pass key schedule
+	bl	_bsaes_key_convert
+	veor	@XMM[7], @XMM[7], @XMM[15]	@ fix up last round key
+	vstmia	r12, {@XMM[7]}			@ save last round key
+#else
+	ldr	r12, [$key, #244]
+	eors	r12, #1
+	beq	0f
+
+	str	r12, [$key, #244]
+	mov	r4, $key			@ pass key
+	mov	r5, $rounds			@ pass # of rounds
+	add	r12, $key, #248			@ pass key schedule
+	bl	_bsaes_key_convert
+	veor	@XMM[7], @XMM[7], @XMM[15]	@ fix up last round key
+	vstmia	r12, {@XMM[7]}
+
+.align	2
+0:	sub	sp, #0x90			@ place for tweak[9]
+#endif
+
+	vld1.8	{@XMM[8]}, [r0]			@ initial tweak
+	adr	$magic, .Lxts_magic
+
+	subs	$len, #0x80
+	blo	.Lxts_enc_short
+	b	.Lxts_enc_loop
+
+.align	4
+.Lxts_enc_loop:
+	vldmia		$magic, {$twmask}	@ load XTS magic
+	vshr.s64	@T[0], @XMM[8], #63
+	mov		r0, sp
+	vand		@T[0], @T[0], $twmask
+___
+for($i=9;$i<16;$i++) {
+$code.=<<___;
+	vadd.u64	@XMM[$i], @XMM[$i-1], @XMM[$i-1]
+	vst1.64		{@XMM[$i-1]}, [r0,:128]!
+	vswp		`&Dhi("@T[0]")`,`&Dlo("@T[0]")`
+	vshr.s64	@T[1], @XMM[$i], #63
+	veor		@XMM[$i], @XMM[$i], @T[0]
+	vand		@T[1], @T[1], $twmask
+___
+	@T=reverse(@T);
+
+$code.=<<___ if ($i>=10);
+	vld1.8		{@XMM[$i-10]}, [$inp]!
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i>=11);
+	veor		@XMM[$i-11], @XMM[$i-11], @XMM[$i-3]
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	vadd.u64	@XMM[8], @XMM[15], @XMM[15]
+	vst1.64		{@XMM[15]}, [r0,:128]!
+	vswp		`&Dhi("@T[0]")`,`&Dlo("@T[0]")`
+	veor		@XMM[8], @XMM[8], @T[0]
+	vst1.64		{@XMM[8]}, [r0,:128]		@ next round tweak
+
+	vld1.8		{@XMM[6]-@XMM[7]}, [$inp]!
+	veor		@XMM[5], @XMM[5], @XMM[13]
+#ifndef	BSAES_ASM_EXTENDED_KEY
+	add		r4, sp, #0x90			@ pass key schedule
+#else
+	add		r4, $key, #248			@ pass key schedule
+#endif
+	veor		@XMM[6], @XMM[6], @XMM[14]
+	mov		r5, $rounds			@ pass rounds
+	veor		@XMM[7], @XMM[7], @XMM[15]
+	mov		r0, sp
+
+	bl		_bsaes_encrypt8
+
+	vld1.64		{@XMM[ 8]-@XMM[ 9]}, [r0,:128]!
+	vld1.64		{@XMM[10]-@XMM[11]}, [r0,:128]!
+	veor		@XMM[0], @XMM[0], @XMM[ 8]
+	vld1.64		{@XMM[12]-@XMM[13]}, [r0,:128]!
+	veor		@XMM[1], @XMM[1], @XMM[ 9]
+	veor		@XMM[8], @XMM[4], @XMM[10]
+	vst1.8		{@XMM[0]-@XMM[1]}, [$out]!
+	veor		@XMM[9], @XMM[6], @XMM[11]
+	vld1.64		{@XMM[14]-@XMM[15]}, [r0,:128]!
+	veor		@XMM[10], @XMM[3], @XMM[12]
+	vst1.8		{@XMM[8]-@XMM[9]}, [$out]!
+	veor		@XMM[11], @XMM[7], @XMM[13]
+	veor		@XMM[12], @XMM[2], @XMM[14]
+	vst1.8		{@XMM[10]-@XMM[11]}, [$out]!
+	veor		@XMM[13], @XMM[5], @XMM[15]
+	vst1.8		{@XMM[12]-@XMM[13]}, [$out]!
+
+	vld1.64		{@XMM[8]}, [r0,:128]		@ next round tweak
+
+	subs		$len, #0x80
+	bpl		.Lxts_enc_loop
+
+.Lxts_enc_short:
+	adds		$len, #0x70
+	bmi		.Lxts_enc_done
+
+	vldmia		$magic, {$twmask}	@ load XTS magic
+	vshr.s64	@T[0], @XMM[8], #63
+	mov		r0, sp
+	vand		@T[0], @T[0], $twmask
+___
+for($i=9;$i<16;$i++) {
+$code.=<<___;
+	vadd.u64	@XMM[$i], @XMM[$i-1], @XMM[$i-1]
+	vst1.64		{@XMM[$i-1]}, [r0,:128]!
+	vswp		`&Dhi("@T[0]")`,`&Dlo("@T[0]")`
+	vshr.s64	@T[1], @XMM[$i], #63
+	veor		@XMM[$i], @XMM[$i], @T[0]
+	vand		@T[1], @T[1], $twmask
+___
+	@T=reverse(@T);
+
+$code.=<<___ if ($i>=10);
+	vld1.8		{@XMM[$i-10]}, [$inp]!
+	subs		$len, #0x10
+	bmi		.Lxts_enc_`$i-9`
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i>=11);
+	veor		@XMM[$i-11], @XMM[$i-11], @XMM[$i-3]
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	sub		$len, #0x10
+	vst1.64		{@XMM[15]}, [r0,:128]		@ next round tweak
+
+	vld1.8		{@XMM[6]}, [$inp]!
+	veor		@XMM[5], @XMM[5], @XMM[13]
+#ifndef	BSAES_ASM_EXTENDED_KEY
+	add		r4, sp, #0x90			@ pass key schedule
+#else
+	add		r4, $key, #248			@ pass key schedule
+#endif
+	veor		@XMM[6], @XMM[6], @XMM[14]
+	mov		r5, $rounds			@ pass rounds
+	mov		r0, sp
+
+	bl		_bsaes_encrypt8
+
+	vld1.64		{@XMM[ 8]-@XMM[ 9]}, [r0,:128]!
+	vld1.64		{@XMM[10]-@XMM[11]}, [r0,:128]!
+	veor		@XMM[0], @XMM[0], @XMM[ 8]
+	vld1.64		{@XMM[12]-@XMM[13]}, [r0,:128]!
+	veor		@XMM[1], @XMM[1], @XMM[ 9]
+	veor		@XMM[8], @XMM[4], @XMM[10]
+	vst1.8		{@XMM[0]-@XMM[1]}, [$out]!
+	veor		@XMM[9], @XMM[6], @XMM[11]
+	vld1.64		{@XMM[14]}, [r0,:128]!
+	veor		@XMM[10], @XMM[3], @XMM[12]
+	vst1.8		{@XMM[8]-@XMM[9]}, [$out]!
+	veor		@XMM[11], @XMM[7], @XMM[13]
+	veor		@XMM[12], @XMM[2], @XMM[14]
+	vst1.8		{@XMM[10]-@XMM[11]}, [$out]!
+	vst1.8		{@XMM[12]}, [$out]!
+
+	vld1.64		{@XMM[8]}, [r0,:128]		@ next round tweak
+	b		.Lxts_enc_done
+.align	4
+.Lxts_enc_6:
+	veor		@XMM[4], @XMM[4], @XMM[12]
+#ifndef	BSAES_ASM_EXTENDED_KEY
+	add		r4, sp, #0x90			@ pass key schedule
+#else
+	add		r4, $key, #248			@ pass key schedule
+#endif
+	veor		@XMM[5], @XMM[5], @XMM[13]
+	mov		r5, $rounds			@ pass rounds
+	mov		r0, sp
+
+	bl		_bsaes_encrypt8
+
+	vld1.64		{@XMM[ 8]-@XMM[ 9]}, [r0,:128]!
+	vld1.64		{@XMM[10]-@XMM[11]}, [r0,:128]!
+	veor		@XMM[0], @XMM[0], @XMM[ 8]
+	vld1.64		{@XMM[12]-@XMM[13]}, [r0,:128]!
+	veor		@XMM[1], @XMM[1], @XMM[ 9]
+	veor		@XMM[8], @XMM[4], @XMM[10]
+	vst1.8		{@XMM[0]-@XMM[1]}, [$out]!
+	veor		@XMM[9], @XMM[6], @XMM[11]
+	veor		@XMM[10], @XMM[3], @XMM[12]
+	vst1.8		{@XMM[8]-@XMM[9]}, [$out]!
+	veor		@XMM[11], @XMM[7], @XMM[13]
+	vst1.8		{@XMM[10]-@XMM[11]}, [$out]!
+
+	vld1.64		{@XMM[8]}, [r0,:128]		@ next round tweak
+	b		.Lxts_enc_done
+
+@ put this in range for both ARM and Thumb mode adr instructions
+.align	5
+.Lxts_magic:
+	.quad	1, 0x87
+
+.align	5
+.Lxts_enc_5:
+	veor		@XMM[3], @XMM[3], @XMM[11]
+#ifndef	BSAES_ASM_EXTENDED_KEY
+	add		r4, sp, #0x90			@ pass key schedule
+#else
+	add		r4, $key, #248			@ pass key schedule
+#endif
+	veor		@XMM[4], @XMM[4], @XMM[12]
+	mov		r5, $rounds			@ pass rounds
+	mov		r0, sp
+
+	bl		_bsaes_encrypt8
+
+	vld1.64		{@XMM[ 8]-@XMM[ 9]}, [r0,:128]!
+	vld1.64		{@XMM[10]-@XMM[11]}, [r0,:128]!
+	veor		@XMM[0], @XMM[0], @XMM[ 8]
+	vld1.64		{@XMM[12]}, [r0,:128]!
+	veor		@XMM[1], @XMM[1], @XMM[ 9]
+	veor		@XMM[8], @XMM[4], @XMM[10]
+	vst1.8		{@XMM[0]-@XMM[1]}, [$out]!
+	veor		@XMM[9], @XMM[6], @XMM[11]
+	veor		@XMM[10], @XMM[3], @XMM[12]
+	vst1.8		{@XMM[8]-@XMM[9]}, [$out]!
+	vst1.8		{@XMM[10]}, [$out]!
+
+	vld1.64		{@XMM[8]}, [r0,:128]		@ next round tweak
+	b		.Lxts_enc_done
+.align	4
+.Lxts_enc_4:
+	veor		@XMM[2], @XMM[2], @XMM[10]
+#ifndef	BSAES_ASM_EXTENDED_KEY
+	add		r4, sp, #0x90			@ pass key schedule
+#else
+	add		r4, $key, #248			@ pass key schedule
+#endif
+	veor		@XMM[3], @XMM[3], @XMM[11]
+	mov		r5, $rounds			@ pass rounds
+	mov		r0, sp
+
+	bl		_bsaes_encrypt8
+
+	vld1.64		{@XMM[ 8]-@XMM[ 9]}, [r0,:128]!
+	vld1.64		{@XMM[10]-@XMM[11]}, [r0,:128]!
+	veor		@XMM[0], @XMM[0], @XMM[ 8]
+	veor		@XMM[1], @XMM[1], @XMM[ 9]
+	veor		@XMM[8], @XMM[4], @XMM[10]
+	vst1.8		{@XMM[0]-@XMM[1]}, [$out]!
+	veor		@XMM[9], @XMM[6], @XMM[11]
+	vst1.8		{@XMM[8]-@XMM[9]}, [$out]!
+
+	vld1.64		{@XMM[8]}, [r0,:128]		@ next round tweak
+	b		.Lxts_enc_done
+.align	4
+.Lxts_enc_3:
+	veor		@XMM[1], @XMM[1], @XMM[9]
+#ifndef	BSAES_ASM_EXTENDED_KEY
+	add		r4, sp, #0x90			@ pass key schedule
+#else
+	add		r4, $key, #248			@ pass key schedule
+#endif
+	veor		@XMM[2], @XMM[2], @XMM[10]
+	mov		r5, $rounds			@ pass rounds
+	mov		r0, sp
+
+	bl		_bsaes_encrypt8
+
+	vld1.64		{@XMM[8]-@XMM[9]}, [r0,:128]!
+	vld1.64		{@XMM[10]}, [r0,:128]!
+	veor		@XMM[0], @XMM[0], @XMM[ 8]
+	veor		@XMM[1], @XMM[1], @XMM[ 9]
+	veor		@XMM[8], @XMM[4], @XMM[10]
+	vst1.8		{@XMM[0]-@XMM[1]}, [$out]!
+	vst1.8		{@XMM[8]}, [$out]!
+
+	vld1.64		{@XMM[8]}, [r0,:128]		@ next round tweak
+	b		.Lxts_enc_done
+.align	4
+.Lxts_enc_2:
+	veor		@XMM[0], @XMM[0], @XMM[8]
+#ifndef	BSAES_ASM_EXTENDED_KEY
+	add		r4, sp, #0x90			@ pass key schedule
+#else
+	add		r4, $key, #248			@ pass key schedule
+#endif
+	veor		@XMM[1], @XMM[1], @XMM[9]
+	mov		r5, $rounds			@ pass rounds
+	mov		r0, sp
+
+	bl		_bsaes_encrypt8
+
+	vld1.64		{@XMM[8]-@XMM[9]}, [r0,:128]!
+	veor		@XMM[0], @XMM[0], @XMM[ 8]
+	veor		@XMM[1], @XMM[1], @XMM[ 9]
+	vst1.8		{@XMM[0]-@XMM[1]}, [$out]!
+
+	vld1.64		{@XMM[8]}, [r0,:128]		@ next round tweak
+	b		.Lxts_enc_done
+.align	4
+.Lxts_enc_1:
+	mov		r0, sp
+	veor		@XMM[0], @XMM[0], @XMM[8]
+	mov		r1, sp
+	vst1.8		{@XMM[0]}, [sp,:128]
+	mov		r2, $key
+	mov		r4, $fp				@ preserve fp
+
+	bl		AES_encrypt
+
+	vld1.8		{@XMM[0]}, [sp,:128]
+	veor		@XMM[0], @XMM[0], @XMM[8]
+	vst1.8		{@XMM[0]}, [$out]!
+	mov		$fp, r4
+
+	vmov		@XMM[8], @XMM[9]		@ next round tweak
+
+.Lxts_enc_done:
+#ifndef	XTS_CHAIN_TWEAK
+	adds		$len, #0x10
+	beq		.Lxts_enc_ret
+	sub		r6, $out, #0x10
+
+.Lxts_enc_steal:
+	ldrb		r0, [$inp], #1
+	ldrb		r1, [$out, #-0x10]
+	strb		r0, [$out, #-0x10]
+	strb		r1, [$out], #1
+
+	subs		$len, #1
+	bhi		.Lxts_enc_steal
+
+	vld1.8		{@XMM[0]}, [r6]
+	mov		r0, sp
+	veor		@XMM[0], @XMM[0], @XMM[8]
+	mov		r1, sp
+	vst1.8		{@XMM[0]}, [sp,:128]
+	mov		r2, $key
+	mov		r4, $fp			@ preserve fp
+
+	bl		AES_encrypt
+
+	vld1.8		{@XMM[0]}, [sp,:128]
+	veor		@XMM[0], @XMM[0], @XMM[8]
+	vst1.8		{@XMM[0]}, [r6]
+	mov		$fp, r4
+#endif
+
+.Lxts_enc_ret:
+	bic		r0, $fp, #0xf
+	vmov.i32	q0, #0
+	vmov.i32	q1, #0
+#ifdef	XTS_CHAIN_TWEAK
+	ldr		r1, [$fp, #0x20+VFP_ABI_FRAME]	@ chain tweak
+#endif
+.Lxts_enc_bzero:				@ wipe key schedule [if any]
+	vstmia		sp!, {q0-q1}
+	cmp		sp, r0
+	bne		.Lxts_enc_bzero
+
+	mov		sp, $fp
+#ifdef	XTS_CHAIN_TWEAK
+	vst1.8		{@XMM[8]}, [r1]
+#endif
+	VFP_ABI_POP
+	ldmia		sp!, {r4-r10, pc}	@ return
+
+.size	bsaes_xts_encrypt,.-bsaes_xts_encrypt
+
+.globl	bsaes_xts_decrypt
+.type	bsaes_xts_decrypt,%function
+.align	4
+bsaes_xts_decrypt:
+	mov	ip, sp
+	stmdb	sp!, {r4-r10, lr}		@ 0x20
+	VFP_ABI_PUSH
+	mov	r6, sp				@ future $fp
+
+	mov	$inp, r0
+	mov	$out, r1
+	mov	$len, r2
+	mov	$key, r3
+
+	sub	r0, sp, #0x10			@ 0x10
+	bic	r0, #0xf			@ align at 16 bytes
+	mov	sp, r0
+
+#ifdef	XTS_CHAIN_TWEAK
+	ldr	r0, [ip]			@ pointer to input tweak
+#else
+	@ generate initial tweak
+	ldr	r0, [ip, #4]			@ iv[]
+	mov	r1, sp
+	ldr	r2, [ip, #0]			@ key2
+	bl	AES_encrypt
+	mov	r0, sp				@ pointer to initial tweak
+#endif
+
+	ldr	$rounds, [$key, #240]		@ get # of rounds
+	mov	$fp, r6
+#ifndef	BSAES_ASM_EXTENDED_KEY
+	@ allocate the key schedule on the stack
+	sub	r12, sp, $rounds, lsl#7		@ 128 bytes per inner round key
+	@ add	r12, #`128-32`			@ size of bit-sliced key schedule
+	sub	r12, #`32+16`			@ place for tweak[9]
+
+	@ populate the key schedule
+	mov	r4, $key			@ pass key
+	mov	r5, $rounds			@ pass # of rounds
+	mov	sp, r12
+	add	r12, #0x90			@ pass key schedule
+	bl	_bsaes_key_convert
+	add	r4, sp, #0x90
+	vldmia	r4, {@XMM[6]}
+	vstmia	r12,  {@XMM[15]}		@ save last round key
+	veor	@XMM[7], @XMM[7], @XMM[6]	@ fix up round 0 key
+	vstmia	r4, {@XMM[7]}
+#else
+	ldr	r12, [$key, #244]
+	eors	r12, #1
+	beq	0f
+
+	str	r12, [$key, #244]
+	mov	r4, $key			@ pass key
+	mov	r5, $rounds			@ pass # of rounds
+	add	r12, $key, #248			@ pass key schedule
+	bl	_bsaes_key_convert
+	add	r4, $key, #248
+	vldmia	r4, {@XMM[6]}
+	vstmia	r12,  {@XMM[15]}		@ save last round key
+	veor	@XMM[7], @XMM[7], @XMM[6]	@ fix up round 0 key
+	vstmia	r4, {@XMM[7]}
+
+.align	2
+0:	sub	sp, #0x90			@ place for tweak[9]
+#endif
+	vld1.8	{@XMM[8]}, [r0]			@ initial tweak
+	adr	$magic, .Lxts_magic
+
+#ifndef	XTS_CHAIN_TWEAK
+	tst	$len, #0xf			@ if not multiple of 16
+	it	ne				@ Thumb2 thing, sanity check in ARM
+	subne	$len, #0x10			@ subtract another 16 bytes
+#endif
+	subs	$len, #0x80
+
+	blo	.Lxts_dec_short
+	b	.Lxts_dec_loop
+
+.align	4
+.Lxts_dec_loop:
+	vldmia		$magic, {$twmask}	@ load XTS magic
+	vshr.s64	@T[0], @XMM[8], #63
+	mov		r0, sp
+	vand		@T[0], @T[0], $twmask
+___
+for($i=9;$i<16;$i++) {
+$code.=<<___;
+	vadd.u64	@XMM[$i], @XMM[$i-1], @XMM[$i-1]
+	vst1.64		{@XMM[$i-1]}, [r0,:128]!
+	vswp		`&Dhi("@T[0]")`,`&Dlo("@T[0]")`
+	vshr.s64	@T[1], @XMM[$i], #63
+	veor		@XMM[$i], @XMM[$i], @T[0]
+	vand		@T[1], @T[1], $twmask
+___
+	@T=reverse(@T);
+
+$code.=<<___ if ($i>=10);
+	vld1.8		{@XMM[$i-10]}, [$inp]!
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i>=11);
+	veor		@XMM[$i-11], @XMM[$i-11], @XMM[$i-3]
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	vadd.u64	@XMM[8], @XMM[15], @XMM[15]
+	vst1.64		{@XMM[15]}, [r0,:128]!
+	vswp		`&Dhi("@T[0]")`,`&Dlo("@T[0]")`
+	veor		@XMM[8], @XMM[8], @T[0]
+	vst1.64		{@XMM[8]}, [r0,:128]		@ next round tweak
+
+	vld1.8		{@XMM[6]-@XMM[7]}, [$inp]!
+	veor		@XMM[5], @XMM[5], @XMM[13]
+#ifndef	BSAES_ASM_EXTENDED_KEY
+	add		r4, sp, #0x90			@ pass key schedule
+#else
+	add		r4, $key, #248			@ pass key schedule
+#endif
+	veor		@XMM[6], @XMM[6], @XMM[14]
+	mov		r5, $rounds			@ pass rounds
+	veor		@XMM[7], @XMM[7], @XMM[15]
+	mov		r0, sp
+
+	bl		_bsaes_decrypt8
+
+	vld1.64		{@XMM[ 8]-@XMM[ 9]}, [r0,:128]!
+	vld1.64		{@XMM[10]-@XMM[11]}, [r0,:128]!
+	veor		@XMM[0], @XMM[0], @XMM[ 8]
+	vld1.64		{@XMM[12]-@XMM[13]}, [r0,:128]!
+	veor		@XMM[1], @XMM[1], @XMM[ 9]
+	veor		@XMM[8], @XMM[6], @XMM[10]
+	vst1.8		{@XMM[0]-@XMM[1]}, [$out]!
+	veor		@XMM[9], @XMM[4], @XMM[11]
+	vld1.64		{@XMM[14]-@XMM[15]}, [r0,:128]!
+	veor		@XMM[10], @XMM[2], @XMM[12]
+	vst1.8		{@XMM[8]-@XMM[9]}, [$out]!
+	veor		@XMM[11], @XMM[7], @XMM[13]
+	veor		@XMM[12], @XMM[3], @XMM[14]
+	vst1.8		{@XMM[10]-@XMM[11]}, [$out]!
+	veor		@XMM[13], @XMM[5], @XMM[15]
+	vst1.8		{@XMM[12]-@XMM[13]}, [$out]!
+
+	vld1.64		{@XMM[8]}, [r0,:128]		@ next round tweak
+
+	subs		$len, #0x80
+	bpl		.Lxts_dec_loop
+
+.Lxts_dec_short:
+	adds		$len, #0x70
+	bmi		.Lxts_dec_done
+
+	vldmia		$magic, {$twmask}	@ load XTS magic
+	vshr.s64	@T[0], @XMM[8], #63
+	mov		r0, sp
+	vand		@T[0], @T[0], $twmask
+___
+for($i=9;$i<16;$i++) {
+$code.=<<___;
+	vadd.u64	@XMM[$i], @XMM[$i-1], @XMM[$i-1]
+	vst1.64		{@XMM[$i-1]}, [r0,:128]!
+	vswp		`&Dhi("@T[0]")`,`&Dlo("@T[0]")`
+	vshr.s64	@T[1], @XMM[$i], #63
+	veor		@XMM[$i], @XMM[$i], @T[0]
+	vand		@T[1], @T[1], $twmask
+___
+	@T=reverse(@T);
+
+$code.=<<___ if ($i>=10);
+	vld1.8		{@XMM[$i-10]}, [$inp]!
+	subs		$len, #0x10
+	bmi		.Lxts_dec_`$i-9`
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i>=11);
+	veor		@XMM[$i-11], @XMM[$i-11], @XMM[$i-3]
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	sub		$len, #0x10
+	vst1.64		{@XMM[15]}, [r0,:128]		@ next round tweak
+
+	vld1.8		{@XMM[6]}, [$inp]!
+	veor		@XMM[5], @XMM[5], @XMM[13]
+#ifndef	BSAES_ASM_EXTENDED_KEY
+	add		r4, sp, #0x90			@ pass key schedule
+#else
+	add		r4, $key, #248			@ pass key schedule
+#endif
+	veor		@XMM[6], @XMM[6], @XMM[14]
+	mov		r5, $rounds			@ pass rounds
+	mov		r0, sp
+
+	bl		_bsaes_decrypt8
+
+	vld1.64		{@XMM[ 8]-@XMM[ 9]}, [r0,:128]!
+	vld1.64		{@XMM[10]-@XMM[11]}, [r0,:128]!
+	veor		@XMM[0], @XMM[0], @XMM[ 8]
+	vld1.64		{@XMM[12]-@XMM[13]}, [r0,:128]!
+	veor		@XMM[1], @XMM[1], @XMM[ 9]
+	veor		@XMM[8], @XMM[6], @XMM[10]
+	vst1.8		{@XMM[0]-@XMM[1]}, [$out]!
+	veor		@XMM[9], @XMM[4], @XMM[11]
+	vld1.64		{@XMM[14]}, [r0,:128]!
+	veor		@XMM[10], @XMM[2], @XMM[12]
+	vst1.8		{@XMM[8]-@XMM[9]}, [$out]!
+	veor		@XMM[11], @XMM[7], @XMM[13]
+	veor		@XMM[12], @XMM[3], @XMM[14]
+	vst1.8		{@XMM[10]-@XMM[11]}, [$out]!
+	vst1.8		{@XMM[12]}, [$out]!
+
+	vld1.64		{@XMM[8]}, [r0,:128]		@ next round tweak
+	b		.Lxts_dec_done
+.align	4
+.Lxts_dec_6:
+	vst1.64		{@XMM[14]}, [r0,:128]		@ next round tweak
+
+	veor		@XMM[4], @XMM[4], @XMM[12]
+#ifndef	BSAES_ASM_EXTENDED_KEY
+	add		r4, sp, #0x90			@ pass key schedule
+#else
+	add		r4, $key, #248			@ pass key schedule
+#endif
+	veor		@XMM[5], @XMM[5], @XMM[13]
+	mov		r5, $rounds			@ pass rounds
+	mov		r0, sp
+
+	bl		_bsaes_decrypt8
+
+	vld1.64		{@XMM[ 8]-@XMM[ 9]}, [r0,:128]!
+	vld1.64		{@XMM[10]-@XMM[11]}, [r0,:128]!
+	veor		@XMM[0], @XMM[0], @XMM[ 8]
+	vld1.64		{@XMM[12]-@XMM[13]}, [r0,:128]!
+	veor		@XMM[1], @XMM[1], @XMM[ 9]
+	veor		@XMM[8], @XMM[6], @XMM[10]
+	vst1.8		{@XMM[0]-@XMM[1]}, [$out]!
+	veor		@XMM[9], @XMM[4], @XMM[11]
+	veor		@XMM[10], @XMM[2], @XMM[12]
+	vst1.8		{@XMM[8]-@XMM[9]}, [$out]!
+	veor		@XMM[11], @XMM[7], @XMM[13]
+	vst1.8		{@XMM[10]-@XMM[11]}, [$out]!
+
+	vld1.64		{@XMM[8]}, [r0,:128]		@ next round tweak
+	b		.Lxts_dec_done
+.align	4
+.Lxts_dec_5:
+	veor		@XMM[3], @XMM[3], @XMM[11]
+#ifndef	BSAES_ASM_EXTENDED_KEY
+	add		r4, sp, #0x90			@ pass key schedule
+#else
+	add		r4, $key, #248			@ pass key schedule
+#endif
+	veor		@XMM[4], @XMM[4], @XMM[12]
+	mov		r5, $rounds			@ pass rounds
+	mov		r0, sp
+
+	bl		_bsaes_decrypt8
+
+	vld1.64		{@XMM[ 8]-@XMM[ 9]}, [r0,:128]!
+	vld1.64		{@XMM[10]-@XMM[11]}, [r0,:128]!
+	veor		@XMM[0], @XMM[0], @XMM[ 8]
+	vld1.64		{@XMM[12]}, [r0,:128]!
+	veor		@XMM[1], @XMM[1], @XMM[ 9]
+	veor		@XMM[8], @XMM[6], @XMM[10]
+	vst1.8		{@XMM[0]-@XMM[1]}, [$out]!
+	veor		@XMM[9], @XMM[4], @XMM[11]
+	veor		@XMM[10], @XMM[2], @XMM[12]
+	vst1.8		{@XMM[8]-@XMM[9]}, [$out]!
+	vst1.8		{@XMM[10]}, [$out]!
+
+	vld1.64		{@XMM[8]}, [r0,:128]		@ next round tweak
+	b		.Lxts_dec_done
+.align	4
+.Lxts_dec_4:
+	veor		@XMM[2], @XMM[2], @XMM[10]
+#ifndef	BSAES_ASM_EXTENDED_KEY
+	add		r4, sp, #0x90			@ pass key schedule
+#else
+	add		r4, $key, #248			@ pass key schedule
+#endif
+	veor		@XMM[3], @XMM[3], @XMM[11]
+	mov		r5, $rounds			@ pass rounds
+	mov		r0, sp
+
+	bl		_bsaes_decrypt8
+
+	vld1.64		{@XMM[ 8]-@XMM[ 9]}, [r0,:128]!
+	vld1.64		{@XMM[10]-@XMM[11]}, [r0,:128]!
+	veor		@XMM[0], @XMM[0], @XMM[ 8]
+	veor		@XMM[1], @XMM[1], @XMM[ 9]
+	veor		@XMM[8], @XMM[6], @XMM[10]
+	vst1.8		{@XMM[0]-@XMM[1]}, [$out]!
+	veor		@XMM[9], @XMM[4], @XMM[11]
+	vst1.8		{@XMM[8]-@XMM[9]}, [$out]!
+
+	vld1.64		{@XMM[8]}, [r0,:128]		@ next round tweak
+	b		.Lxts_dec_done
+.align	4
+.Lxts_dec_3:
+	veor		@XMM[1], @XMM[1], @XMM[9]
+#ifndef	BSAES_ASM_EXTENDED_KEY
+	add		r4, sp, #0x90			@ pass key schedule
+#else
+	add		r4, $key, #248			@ pass key schedule
+#endif
+	veor		@XMM[2], @XMM[2], @XMM[10]
+	mov		r5, $rounds			@ pass rounds
+	mov		r0, sp
+
+	bl		_bsaes_decrypt8
+
+	vld1.64		{@XMM[8]-@XMM[9]}, [r0,:128]!
+	vld1.64		{@XMM[10]}, [r0,:128]!
+	veor		@XMM[0], @XMM[0], @XMM[ 8]
+	veor		@XMM[1], @XMM[1], @XMM[ 9]
+	veor		@XMM[8], @XMM[6], @XMM[10]
+	vst1.8		{@XMM[0]-@XMM[1]}, [$out]!
+	vst1.8		{@XMM[8]}, [$out]!
+
+	vld1.64		{@XMM[8]}, [r0,:128]		@ next round tweak
+	b		.Lxts_dec_done
+.align	4
+.Lxts_dec_2:
+	veor		@XMM[0], @XMM[0], @XMM[8]
+#ifndef	BSAES_ASM_EXTENDED_KEY
+	add		r4, sp, #0x90			@ pass key schedule
+#else
+	add		r4, $key, #248			@ pass key schedule
+#endif
+	veor		@XMM[1], @XMM[1], @XMM[9]
+	mov		r5, $rounds			@ pass rounds
+	mov		r0, sp
+
+	bl		_bsaes_decrypt8
+
+	vld1.64		{@XMM[8]-@XMM[9]}, [r0,:128]!
+	veor		@XMM[0], @XMM[0], @XMM[ 8]
+	veor		@XMM[1], @XMM[1], @XMM[ 9]
+	vst1.8		{@XMM[0]-@XMM[1]}, [$out]!
+
+	vld1.64		{@XMM[8]}, [r0,:128]		@ next round tweak
+	b		.Lxts_dec_done
+.align	4
+.Lxts_dec_1:
+	mov		r0, sp
+	veor		@XMM[0], @XMM[0], @XMM[8]
+	mov		r1, sp
+	vst1.8		{@XMM[0]}, [sp,:128]
+	mov		r5, $magic			@ preserve magic
+	mov		r2, $key
+	mov		r4, $fp				@ preserve fp
+
+	bl		AES_decrypt
+
+	vld1.8		{@XMM[0]}, [sp,:128]
+	veor		@XMM[0], @XMM[0], @XMM[8]
+	vst1.8		{@XMM[0]}, [$out]!
+	mov		$fp, r4
+	mov		$magic, r5
+
+	vmov		@XMM[8], @XMM[9]		@ next round tweak
+
+.Lxts_dec_done:
+#ifndef	XTS_CHAIN_TWEAK
+	adds		$len, #0x10
+	beq		.Lxts_dec_ret
+
+	@ calculate one round of extra tweak for the stolen ciphertext
+	vldmia		$magic, {$twmask}
+	vshr.s64	@XMM[6], @XMM[8], #63
+	vand		@XMM[6], @XMM[6], $twmask
+	vadd.u64	@XMM[9], @XMM[8], @XMM[8]
+	vswp		`&Dhi("@XMM[6]")`,`&Dlo("@XMM[6]")`
+	veor		@XMM[9], @XMM[9], @XMM[6]
+
+	@ perform the final decryption with the last tweak value
+	vld1.8		{@XMM[0]}, [$inp]!
+	mov		r0, sp
+	veor		@XMM[0], @XMM[0], @XMM[9]
+	mov		r1, sp
+	vst1.8		{@XMM[0]}, [sp,:128]
+	mov		r2, $key
+	mov		r4, $fp			@ preserve fp
+
+	bl		AES_decrypt
+
+	vld1.8		{@XMM[0]}, [sp,:128]
+	veor		@XMM[0], @XMM[0], @XMM[9]
+	vst1.8		{@XMM[0]}, [$out]
+
+	mov		r6, $out
+.Lxts_dec_steal:
+	ldrb		r1, [$out]
+	ldrb		r0, [$inp], #1
+	strb		r1, [$out, #0x10]
+	strb		r0, [$out], #1
+
+	subs		$len, #1
+	bhi		.Lxts_dec_steal
+
+	vld1.8		{@XMM[0]}, [r6]
+	mov		r0, sp
+	veor		@XMM[0], @XMM[8]
+	mov		r1, sp
+	vst1.8		{@XMM[0]}, [sp,:128]
+	mov		r2, $key
+
+	bl		AES_decrypt
+
+	vld1.8		{@XMM[0]}, [sp,:128]
+	veor		@XMM[0], @XMM[0], @XMM[8]
+	vst1.8		{@XMM[0]}, [r6]
+	mov		$fp, r4
+#endif
+
+.Lxts_dec_ret:
+	bic		r0, $fp, #0xf
+	vmov.i32	q0, #0
+	vmov.i32	q1, #0
+#ifdef	XTS_CHAIN_TWEAK
+	ldr		r1, [$fp, #0x20+VFP_ABI_FRAME]	@ chain tweak
+#endif
+.Lxts_dec_bzero:				@ wipe key schedule [if any]
+	vstmia		sp!, {q0-q1}
+	cmp		sp, r0
+	bne		.Lxts_dec_bzero
+
+	mov		sp, $fp
+#ifdef	XTS_CHAIN_TWEAK
+	vst1.8		{@XMM[8]}, [r1]
+#endif
+	VFP_ABI_POP
+	ldmia		sp!, {r4-r10, pc}	@ return
+
+.size	bsaes_xts_decrypt,.-bsaes_xts_decrypt
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+#endif
+___
+
+$code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval($1)/gem;
+
+open SELF,$0;
+while(<SELF>) {
+	next if (/^#!/);
+        last if (!s/^#/@/ and !/^$/);
+        print;
+}
+close SELF;
+
+print $code;
+
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/asm/bsaes-x86_64.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/asm/bsaes-x86_64.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..921d870
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/asm/bsaes-x86_64.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,3111 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+###################################################################
+### AES-128 [originally in CTR mode]				###
+### bitsliced implementation for Intel Core 2 processors	###
+### requires support of SSE extensions up to SSSE3		###
+### Author: Emilia Käsper and Peter Schwabe			###
+### Date: 2009-03-19						###
+### Public domain						###
+###								###
+### See http://homes.esat.kuleuven.be/~ekasper/#software for	###
+### further information.					###
+###################################################################
+#
+# September 2011.
+#
+# Started as transliteration to "perlasm" the original code has
+# undergone following changes:
+#
+# - code was made position-independent;
+# - rounds were folded into a loop resulting in >5x size reduction
+#   from 12.5KB to 2.2KB;
+# - above was possibile thanks to mixcolumns() modification that
+#   allowed to feed its output back to aesenc[last], this was
+#   achieved at cost of two additional inter-registers moves;
+# - some instruction reordering and interleaving;
+# - this module doesn't implement key setup subroutine, instead it
+#   relies on conversion of "conventional" key schedule as returned
+#   by AES_set_encrypt_key (see discussion below);
+# - first and last round keys are treated differently, which allowed
+#   to skip one shiftrows(), reduce bit-sliced key schedule and
+#   speed-up conversion by 22%;
+# - support for 192- and 256-bit keys was added;
+#
+# Resulting performance in CPU cycles spent to encrypt one byte out
+# of 4096-byte buffer with 128-bit key is:
+#
+#		Emilia's	this(*)		difference
+#
+# Core 2    	9.30		8.69		+7%
+# Nehalem(**) 	7.63		6.88		+11%
+# Atom	    	17.1		16.4		+4%
+# Silvermont	-		12.9
+# Goldmont	-		8.85
+#
+# (*)	Comparison is not completely fair, because "this" is ECB,
+#	i.e. no extra processing such as counter values calculation
+#	and xor-ing input as in Emilia's CTR implementation is
+#	performed. However, the CTR calculations stand for not more
+#	than 1% of total time, so comparison is *rather* fair.
+#
+# (**)	Results were collected on Westmere, which is considered to
+#	be equivalent to Nehalem for this code.
+#
+# As for key schedule conversion subroutine. Interface to OpenSSL
+# relies on per-invocation on-the-fly conversion. This naturally
+# has impact on performance, especially for short inputs. Conversion
+# time in CPU cycles and its ratio to CPU cycles spent in 8x block
+# function is:
+#
+# 		conversion	conversion/8x block
+# Core 2	240		0.22
+# Nehalem	180		0.20
+# Atom		430		0.20
+#
+# The ratio values mean that 128-byte blocks will be processed
+# 16-18% slower, 256-byte blocks - 9-10%, 384-byte blocks - 6-7%,
+# etc. Then keep in mind that input sizes not divisible by 128 are
+# *effectively* slower, especially shortest ones, e.g. consecutive
+# 144-byte blocks are processed 44% slower than one would expect,
+# 272 - 29%, 400 - 22%, etc. Yet, despite all these "shortcomings"
+# it's still faster than ["hyper-threading-safe" code path in]
+# aes-x86_64.pl on all lengths above 64 bytes...
+#
+# October 2011.
+#
+# Add decryption procedure. Performance in CPU cycles spent to decrypt
+# one byte out of 4096-byte buffer with 128-bit key is:
+#
+# Core 2	9.98
+# Nehalem	7.80
+# Atom		17.9
+# Silvermont	14.0
+# Goldmont	10.2
+#
+# November 2011.
+#
+# Add bsaes_xts_[en|de]crypt. Less-than-80-bytes-block performance is
+# suboptimal, but XTS is meant to be used with larger blocks...
+#
+#						<appro@openssl.org>
+
+$flavour = shift;
+$output  = shift;
+if ($flavour =~ /\./) { $output = $flavour; undef $flavour; }
+
+$win64=0; $win64=1 if ($flavour =~ /[nm]asm|mingw64/ || $output =~ /\.asm$/);
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+( $xlate="${dir}x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
+( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
+die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl";
+
+open OUT,"| \"$^X\" \"$xlate\" $flavour \"$output\"";
+*STDOUT=*OUT;
+
+my ($inp,$out,$len,$key,$ivp)=("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx","%rcx");
+my @XMM=map("%xmm$_",(15,0..14));	# best on Atom, +10% over (0..15)
+my $ecb=0;	# suppress unreferenced ECB subroutines, spare some space...
+
+{
+my ($key,$rounds,$const)=("%rax","%r10d","%r11");
+
+sub Sbox {
+# input in  lsb > [b0, b1, b2, b3, b4, b5, b6, b7] < msb
+# output in lsb > [b0, b1, b4, b6, b3, b7, b2, b5] < msb
+my @b=@_[0..7];
+my @t=@_[8..11];
+my @s=@_[12..15];
+	&InBasisChange	(@b);
+	&Inv_GF256	(@b[6,5,0,3,7,1,4,2],@t,@s);
+	&OutBasisChange	(@b[7,1,4,2,6,5,0,3]);
+}
+
+sub InBasisChange {
+# input in  lsb > [b0, b1, b2, b3, b4, b5, b6, b7] < msb
+# output in lsb > [b6, b5, b0, b3, b7, b1, b4, b2] < msb 
+my @b=@_[0..7];
+$code.=<<___;
+	pxor	@b[6], @b[5]
+	pxor	@b[1], @b[2]
+	pxor	@b[0], @b[3]
+	pxor	@b[2], @b[6]
+	pxor 	@b[0], @b[5]
+
+	pxor	@b[3], @b[6]
+	pxor	@b[7], @b[3]
+	pxor	@b[5], @b[7]
+	pxor	@b[4], @b[3]
+	pxor	@b[5], @b[4]
+	pxor	@b[1], @b[3]
+
+	pxor	@b[7], @b[2]
+	pxor	@b[5], @b[1]
+___
+}
+
+sub OutBasisChange {
+# input in  lsb > [b0, b1, b2, b3, b4, b5, b6, b7] < msb
+# output in lsb > [b6, b1, b2, b4, b7, b0, b3, b5] < msb
+my @b=@_[0..7];
+$code.=<<___;
+	pxor	@b[6], @b[0]
+	pxor	@b[4], @b[1]
+	pxor	@b[0], @b[2]
+	pxor	@b[6], @b[4]
+	pxor	@b[1], @b[6]
+
+	pxor	@b[5], @b[1]
+	pxor	@b[3], @b[5]
+	pxor	@b[7], @b[3]
+	pxor	@b[5], @b[7]
+	pxor	@b[5], @b[2]
+
+	pxor	@b[7], @b[4]
+___
+}
+
+sub InvSbox {
+# input in lsb 	> [b0, b1, b2, b3, b4, b5, b6, b7] < msb
+# output in lsb	> [b0, b1, b6, b4, b2, b7, b3, b5] < msb
+my @b=@_[0..7];
+my @t=@_[8..11];
+my @s=@_[12..15];
+	&InvInBasisChange	(@b);
+	&Inv_GF256		(@b[5,1,2,6,3,7,0,4],@t,@s);
+	&InvOutBasisChange	(@b[3,7,0,4,5,1,2,6]);
+}
+
+sub InvInBasisChange {		# OutBasisChange in reverse
+my @b=@_[5,1,2,6,3,7,0,4];
+$code.=<<___
+	pxor	@b[7], @b[4]
+
+	pxor	@b[5], @b[7]
+	pxor	@b[5], @b[2]
+	pxor	@b[7], @b[3]
+	pxor	@b[3], @b[5]
+	pxor	@b[5], @b[1]
+
+	pxor	@b[1], @b[6]
+	pxor	@b[0], @b[2]
+	pxor	@b[6], @b[4]
+	pxor	@b[6], @b[0]
+	pxor	@b[4], @b[1]
+___
+}
+
+sub InvOutBasisChange {		# InBasisChange in reverse
+my @b=@_[2,5,7,3,6,1,0,4];
+$code.=<<___;
+	pxor	@b[5], @b[1]
+	pxor	@b[7], @b[2]
+
+	pxor	@b[1], @b[3]
+	pxor	@b[5], @b[4]
+	pxor	@b[5], @b[7]
+	pxor	@b[4], @b[3]
+	 pxor 	@b[0], @b[5]
+	pxor	@b[7], @b[3]
+	 pxor	@b[2], @b[6]
+	 pxor	@b[1], @b[2]
+	pxor	@b[3], @b[6]
+
+	pxor	@b[0], @b[3]
+	pxor	@b[6], @b[5]
+___
+}
+
+sub Mul_GF4 {
+#;*************************************************************
+#;* Mul_GF4: Input x0-x1,y0-y1 Output x0-x1 Temp t0 (8) *
+#;*************************************************************
+my ($x0,$x1,$y0,$y1,$t0)=@_;
+$code.=<<___;
+	movdqa	$y0, $t0
+	pxor 	$y1, $t0
+	pand	$x0, $t0
+	pxor	$x1, $x0
+	pand	$y0, $x1
+	pand	$y1, $x0
+	pxor	$x1, $x0
+	pxor	$t0, $x1
+___
+}
+
+sub Mul_GF4_N {				# not used, see next subroutine
+# multiply and scale by N
+my ($x0,$x1,$y0,$y1,$t0)=@_;
+$code.=<<___;
+	movdqa	$y0, $t0
+	pxor	$y1, $t0
+	pand	$x0, $t0
+	pxor	$x1, $x0
+	pand	$y0, $x1
+	pand	$y1, $x0
+	pxor	$x0, $x1
+	pxor	$t0, $x0
+___
+}
+
+sub Mul_GF4_N_GF4 {
+# interleaved Mul_GF4_N and Mul_GF4
+my ($x0,$x1,$y0,$y1,$t0,
+    $x2,$x3,$y2,$y3,$t1)=@_;
+$code.=<<___;
+	movdqa	$y0, $t0
+	 movdqa	$y2, $t1
+	pxor	$y1, $t0
+	 pxor 	$y3, $t1
+	pand	$x0, $t0
+	 pand	$x2, $t1
+	pxor	$x1, $x0
+	 pxor	$x3, $x2
+	pand	$y0, $x1
+	 pand	$y2, $x3
+	pand	$y1, $x0
+	 pand	$y3, $x2
+	pxor	$x0, $x1
+	 pxor	$x3, $x2
+	pxor	$t0, $x0
+	 pxor	$t1, $x3
+___
+}
+sub Mul_GF16_2 {
+my @x=@_[0..7];
+my @y=@_[8..11];
+my @t=@_[12..15];
+$code.=<<___;
+	movdqa	@x[0], @t[0]
+	movdqa	@x[1], @t[1]
+___
+	&Mul_GF4  	(@x[0], @x[1], @y[0], @y[1], @t[2]);
+$code.=<<___;
+	pxor	@x[2], @t[0]
+	pxor	@x[3], @t[1]
+	pxor	@y[2], @y[0]
+	pxor	@y[3], @y[1]
+___
+	Mul_GF4_N_GF4	(@t[0], @t[1], @y[0], @y[1], @t[3],
+			 @x[2], @x[3], @y[2], @y[3], @t[2]);
+$code.=<<___;
+	pxor	@t[0], @x[0]
+	pxor	@t[0], @x[2]
+	pxor	@t[1], @x[1]
+	pxor	@t[1], @x[3]
+
+	movdqa	@x[4], @t[0]
+	movdqa	@x[5], @t[1]
+	pxor	@x[6], @t[0]
+	pxor	@x[7], @t[1]
+___
+	&Mul_GF4_N_GF4	(@t[0], @t[1], @y[0], @y[1], @t[3],
+			 @x[6], @x[7], @y[2], @y[3], @t[2]);
+$code.=<<___;
+	pxor	@y[2], @y[0]
+	pxor	@y[3], @y[1]
+___
+	&Mul_GF4  	(@x[4], @x[5], @y[0], @y[1], @t[3]);
+$code.=<<___;
+	pxor	@t[0], @x[4]
+	pxor	@t[0], @x[6]
+	pxor	@t[1], @x[5]
+	pxor	@t[1], @x[7]
+___
+}
+sub Inv_GF256 {
+#;********************************************************************
+#;* Inv_GF256: Input x0-x7 Output x0-x7 Temp t0-t3,s0-s3 (144)       *
+#;********************************************************************
+my @x=@_[0..7];
+my @t=@_[8..11];
+my @s=@_[12..15];
+# direct optimizations from hardware
+$code.=<<___;
+	movdqa	@x[4], @t[3]
+	movdqa	@x[5], @t[2]
+	movdqa	@x[1], @t[1]
+	movdqa	@x[7], @s[1]
+	movdqa	@x[0], @s[0]
+
+	pxor	@x[6], @t[3]
+	pxor	@x[7], @t[2]
+	pxor	@x[3], @t[1]
+	 movdqa	@t[3], @s[2]
+	pxor	@x[6], @s[1]
+	 movdqa	@t[2], @t[0]
+	pxor	@x[2], @s[0]
+	 movdqa	@t[3], @s[3]
+
+	por	@t[1], @t[2]
+	por	@s[0], @t[3]
+	pxor	@t[0], @s[3]
+	pand	@s[0], @s[2]
+	pxor	@t[1], @s[0]
+	pand	@t[1], @t[0]
+	pand	@s[0], @s[3]
+	movdqa	@x[3], @s[0]
+	pxor	@x[2], @s[0]
+	pand	@s[0], @s[1]
+	pxor	@s[1], @t[3]
+	pxor	@s[1], @t[2]
+	movdqa	@x[4], @s[1]
+	movdqa	@x[1], @s[0]
+	pxor	@x[5], @s[1]
+	pxor	@x[0], @s[0]
+	movdqa	@s[1], @t[1]
+	pand	@s[0], @s[1]
+	por	@s[0], @t[1]
+	pxor	@s[1], @t[0]
+	pxor	@s[3], @t[3]
+	pxor	@s[2], @t[2]
+	pxor	@s[3], @t[1]
+	movdqa	@x[7], @s[0]
+	pxor	@s[2], @t[0]
+	movdqa	@x[6], @s[1]
+	pxor	@s[2], @t[1]
+	movdqa	@x[5], @s[2]
+	pand	@x[3], @s[0]
+	movdqa	@x[4], @s[3]
+	pand	@x[2], @s[1]
+	pand	@x[1], @s[2]
+	por	@x[0], @s[3]
+	pxor	@s[0], @t[3]
+	pxor	@s[1], @t[2]
+	pxor	@s[2], @t[1]
+	pxor	@s[3], @t[0] 
+
+	#Inv_GF16 \t0, \t1, \t2, \t3, \s0, \s1, \s2, \s3
+
+	# new smaller inversion
+
+	movdqa	@t[3], @s[0]
+	pand	@t[1], @t[3]
+	pxor	@t[2], @s[0]
+
+	movdqa	@t[0], @s[2]
+	movdqa	@s[0], @s[3]
+	pxor	@t[3], @s[2]
+	pand	@s[2], @s[3]
+
+	movdqa	@t[1], @s[1]
+	pxor	@t[2], @s[3]
+	pxor	@t[0], @s[1]
+
+	pxor	@t[2], @t[3]
+
+	pand	@t[3], @s[1]
+
+	movdqa	@s[2], @t[2]
+	pxor	@t[0], @s[1]
+
+	pxor	@s[1], @t[2]
+	pxor	@s[1], @t[1]
+
+	pand	@t[0], @t[2]
+
+	pxor	@t[2], @s[2]
+	pxor	@t[2], @t[1]
+
+	pand	@s[3], @s[2]
+
+	pxor	@s[0], @s[2]
+___
+# output in s3, s2, s1, t1
+
+# Mul_GF16_2 \x0, \x1, \x2, \x3, \x4, \x5, \x6, \x7, \t2, \t3, \t0, \t1, \s0, \s1, \s2, \s3
+
+# Mul_GF16_2 \x0, \x1, \x2, \x3, \x4, \x5, \x6, \x7, \s3, \s2, \s1, \t1, \s0, \t0, \t2, \t3
+	&Mul_GF16_2(@x,@s[3,2,1],@t[1],@s[0],@t[0,2,3]);
+
+### output msb > [x3,x2,x1,x0,x7,x6,x5,x4] < lsb
+}
+
+# AES linear components
+
+sub ShiftRows {
+my @x=@_[0..7];
+my $mask=pop;
+$code.=<<___;
+	pxor	0x00($key),@x[0]
+	pxor	0x10($key),@x[1]
+	pxor	0x20($key),@x[2]
+	pxor	0x30($key),@x[3]
+	pshufb	$mask,@x[0]
+	pshufb	$mask,@x[1]
+	pxor	0x40($key),@x[4]
+	pxor	0x50($key),@x[5]
+	pshufb	$mask,@x[2]
+	pshufb	$mask,@x[3]
+	pxor	0x60($key),@x[6]
+	pxor	0x70($key),@x[7]
+	pshufb	$mask,@x[4]
+	pshufb	$mask,@x[5]
+	pshufb	$mask,@x[6]
+	pshufb	$mask,@x[7]
+	lea	0x80($key),$key
+___
+}
+
+sub MixColumns {
+# modified to emit output in order suitable for feeding back to aesenc[last]
+my @x=@_[0..7];
+my @t=@_[8..15];
+my $inv=@_[16];	# optional
+$code.=<<___;
+	pshufd	\$0x93, @x[0], @t[0]	# x0 <<< 32
+	pshufd	\$0x93, @x[1], @t[1]
+	 pxor	@t[0], @x[0]		# x0 ^ (x0 <<< 32)
+	pshufd	\$0x93, @x[2], @t[2]
+	 pxor	@t[1], @x[1]
+	pshufd	\$0x93, @x[3], @t[3]
+	 pxor	@t[2], @x[2]
+	pshufd	\$0x93, @x[4], @t[4]
+	 pxor	@t[3], @x[3]
+	pshufd	\$0x93, @x[5], @t[5]
+	 pxor	@t[4], @x[4]
+	pshufd	\$0x93, @x[6], @t[6]
+	 pxor	@t[5], @x[5]
+	pshufd	\$0x93, @x[7], @t[7]
+	 pxor	@t[6], @x[6]
+	 pxor	@t[7], @x[7]
+
+	pxor	@x[0], @t[1]
+	pxor	@x[7], @t[0]
+	pxor	@x[7], @t[1]
+	 pshufd	\$0x4E, @x[0], @x[0] 	# (x0 ^ (x0 <<< 32)) <<< 64)
+	pxor	@x[1], @t[2]
+	 pshufd	\$0x4E, @x[1], @x[1]
+	pxor	@x[4], @t[5]
+	 pxor	@t[0], @x[0]
+	pxor	@x[5], @t[6]
+	 pxor	@t[1], @x[1]
+	pxor	@x[3], @t[4]
+	 pshufd	\$0x4E, @x[4], @t[0]
+	pxor	@x[6], @t[7]
+	 pshufd	\$0x4E, @x[5], @t[1]
+	pxor	@x[2], @t[3]
+	 pshufd	\$0x4E, @x[3], @x[4]
+	pxor	@x[7], @t[3]
+	 pshufd	\$0x4E, @x[7], @x[5]
+	pxor	@x[7], @t[4]
+	 pshufd	\$0x4E, @x[6], @x[3]
+	pxor	@t[4], @t[0]
+	 pshufd	\$0x4E, @x[2], @x[6]
+	pxor	@t[5], @t[1]
+___
+$code.=<<___ if (!$inv);
+	pxor	@t[3], @x[4]
+	pxor	@t[7], @x[5]
+	pxor	@t[6], @x[3]
+	 movdqa	@t[0], @x[2]
+	pxor	@t[2], @x[6]
+	 movdqa	@t[1], @x[7]
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($inv);
+	pxor	@x[4], @t[3]
+	pxor	@t[7], @x[5]
+	pxor	@x[3], @t[6]
+	 movdqa	@t[0], @x[3]
+	pxor	@t[2], @x[6]
+	 movdqa	@t[6], @x[2]
+	 movdqa	@t[1], @x[7]
+	 movdqa	@x[6], @x[4]
+	 movdqa	@t[3], @x[6]
+___
+}
+
+sub InvMixColumns_orig {
+my @x=@_[0..7];
+my @t=@_[8..15];
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	# multiplication by 0x0e
+	pshufd	\$0x93, @x[7], @t[7]
+	movdqa	@x[2], @t[2]
+	pxor	@x[5], @x[7]		# 7 5
+	pxor	@x[5], @x[2]		# 2 5
+	pshufd	\$0x93, @x[0], @t[0]
+	movdqa	@x[5], @t[5]
+	pxor	@x[0], @x[5]		# 5 0		[1]
+	pxor	@x[1], @x[0]		# 0 1
+	pshufd	\$0x93, @x[1], @t[1]
+	pxor	@x[2], @x[1]		# 1 25
+	pxor	@x[6], @x[0]		# 01 6		[2]
+	pxor	@x[3], @x[1]		# 125 3		[4]
+	pshufd	\$0x93, @x[3], @t[3]
+	pxor	@x[0], @x[2]		# 25 016	[3]
+	pxor	@x[7], @x[3]		# 3 75
+	pxor	@x[6], @x[7]		# 75 6		[0]
+	pshufd	\$0x93, @x[6], @t[6]
+	movdqa	@x[4], @t[4]
+	pxor	@x[4], @x[6]		# 6 4
+	pxor	@x[3], @x[4]		# 4 375		[6]
+	pxor	@x[7], @x[3]		# 375 756=36
+	pxor	@t[5], @x[6]		# 64 5		[7]
+	pxor	@t[2], @x[3]		# 36 2
+	pxor	@t[4], @x[3]		# 362 4		[5]
+	pshufd	\$0x93, @t[5], @t[5]
+___
+					my @y = @x[7,5,0,2,1,3,4,6];
+$code.=<<___;
+	# multiplication by 0x0b
+	pxor	@y[0], @y[1]
+	pxor	@t[0], @y[0]
+	pxor	@t[1], @y[1]
+	pshufd	\$0x93, @t[2], @t[2]
+	pxor	@t[5], @y[0]
+	pxor	@t[6], @y[1]
+	pxor	@t[7], @y[0]
+	pshufd	\$0x93, @t[4], @t[4]
+	pxor	@t[6], @t[7]		# clobber t[7]
+	pxor	@y[0], @y[1]
+
+	pxor	@t[0], @y[3]
+	pshufd	\$0x93, @t[0], @t[0]
+	pxor	@t[1], @y[2]
+	pxor	@t[1], @y[4]
+	pxor	@t[2], @y[2]
+	pshufd	\$0x93, @t[1], @t[1]
+	pxor	@t[2], @y[3]
+	pxor	@t[2], @y[5]
+	pxor	@t[7], @y[2]
+	pshufd	\$0x93, @t[2], @t[2]
+	pxor	@t[3], @y[3]
+	pxor	@t[3], @y[6]
+	pxor	@t[3], @y[4]
+	pshufd	\$0x93, @t[3], @t[3]
+	pxor	@t[4], @y[7]
+	pxor	@t[4], @y[5]
+	pxor	@t[7], @y[7]
+	pxor	@t[5], @y[3]
+	pxor	@t[4], @y[4]
+	pxor	@t[5], @t[7]		# clobber t[7] even more
+
+	pxor	@t[7], @y[5]
+	pshufd	\$0x93, @t[4], @t[4]
+	pxor	@t[7], @y[6]
+	pxor	@t[7], @y[4]
+
+	pxor	@t[5], @t[7]
+	pshufd	\$0x93, @t[5], @t[5]
+	pxor	@t[6], @t[7]		# restore t[7]
+
+	# multiplication by 0x0d
+	pxor	@y[7], @y[4]
+	pxor	@t[4], @y[7]
+	pshufd	\$0x93, @t[6], @t[6]
+	pxor	@t[0], @y[2]
+	pxor	@t[5], @y[7]
+	pxor	@t[2], @y[2]
+	pshufd	\$0x93, @t[7], @t[7]
+
+	pxor	@y[1], @y[3]
+	pxor	@t[1], @y[1]
+	pxor	@t[0], @y[0]
+	pxor	@t[0], @y[3]
+	pxor	@t[5], @y[1]
+	pxor	@t[5], @y[0]
+	pxor	@t[7], @y[1]
+	pshufd	\$0x93, @t[0], @t[0]
+	pxor	@t[6], @y[0]
+	pxor	@y[1], @y[3]
+	pxor	@t[1], @y[4]
+	pshufd	\$0x93, @t[1], @t[1]
+
+	pxor	@t[7], @y[7]
+	pxor	@t[2], @y[4]
+	pxor	@t[2], @y[5]
+	pshufd	\$0x93, @t[2], @t[2]
+	pxor	@t[6], @y[2]
+	pxor	@t[3], @t[6]		# clobber t[6]
+	pxor	@y[7], @y[4]
+	pxor	@t[6], @y[3]
+
+	pxor	@t[6], @y[6]
+	pxor	@t[5], @y[5]
+	pxor	@t[4], @y[6]
+	pshufd	\$0x93, @t[4], @t[4]
+	pxor	@t[6], @y[5]
+	pxor	@t[7], @y[6]
+	pxor	@t[3], @t[6]		# restore t[6]
+
+	pshufd	\$0x93, @t[5], @t[5]
+	pshufd	\$0x93, @t[6], @t[6]
+	pshufd	\$0x93, @t[7], @t[7]
+	pshufd	\$0x93, @t[3], @t[3]
+
+	# multiplication by 0x09
+	pxor	@y[1], @y[4]
+	pxor	@y[1], @t[1]		# t[1]=y[1]
+	pxor	@t[5], @t[0]		# clobber t[0]
+	pxor	@t[5], @t[1]
+	pxor	@t[0], @y[3]
+	pxor	@y[0], @t[0]		# t[0]=y[0]
+	pxor	@t[6], @t[1]
+	pxor	@t[7], @t[6]		# clobber t[6]
+	pxor	@t[1], @y[4]
+	pxor	@t[4], @y[7]
+	pxor	@y[4], @t[4]		# t[4]=y[4]
+	pxor	@t[3], @y[6]
+	pxor	@y[3], @t[3]		# t[3]=y[3]
+	pxor	@t[2], @y[5]
+	pxor	@y[2], @t[2]		# t[2]=y[2]
+	pxor	@t[7], @t[3]
+	pxor	@y[5], @t[5]		# t[5]=y[5]
+	pxor	@t[6], @t[2]
+	pxor	@t[6], @t[5]
+	pxor	@y[6], @t[6]		# t[6]=y[6]
+	pxor	@y[7], @t[7]		# t[7]=y[7]
+
+	movdqa	@t[0],@XMM[0]
+	movdqa	@t[1],@XMM[1]
+	movdqa	@t[2],@XMM[2]
+	movdqa	@t[3],@XMM[3]
+	movdqa	@t[4],@XMM[4]
+	movdqa	@t[5],@XMM[5]
+	movdqa	@t[6],@XMM[6]
+	movdqa	@t[7],@XMM[7]
+___
+}
+
+sub InvMixColumns {
+my @x=@_[0..7];
+my @t=@_[8..15];
+
+# Thanks to Jussi Kivilinna for providing pointer to
+#
+# | 0e 0b 0d 09 |   | 02 03 01 01 |   | 05 00 04 00 |
+# | 09 0e 0b 0d | = | 01 02 03 01 | x | 00 05 00 04 |
+# | 0d 09 0e 0b |   | 01 01 02 03 |   | 04 00 05 00 |
+# | 0b 0d 09 0e |   | 03 01 01 02 |   | 00 04 00 05 |
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	# multiplication by 0x05-0x00-0x04-0x00
+	pshufd	\$0x4E, @x[0], @t[0]
+	pshufd	\$0x4E, @x[6], @t[6]
+	pxor	@x[0], @t[0]
+	pshufd	\$0x4E, @x[7], @t[7]
+	pxor	@x[6], @t[6]
+	pshufd	\$0x4E, @x[1], @t[1]
+	pxor	@x[7], @t[7]
+	pshufd	\$0x4E, @x[2], @t[2]
+	pxor	@x[1], @t[1]
+	pshufd	\$0x4E, @x[3], @t[3]
+	pxor	@x[2], @t[2]
+	 pxor	@t[6], @x[0]
+	 pxor	@t[6], @x[1]
+	pshufd	\$0x4E, @x[4], @t[4]
+	pxor	@x[3], @t[3]
+	 pxor	@t[0], @x[2]
+	 pxor	@t[1], @x[3]
+	pshufd	\$0x4E, @x[5], @t[5]
+	pxor	@x[4], @t[4]
+	 pxor	@t[7], @x[1]
+	 pxor	@t[2], @x[4]
+	pxor	@x[5], @t[5]
+
+	 pxor	@t[7], @x[2]
+	 pxor	@t[6], @x[3]
+	 pxor	@t[6], @x[4]
+	 pxor	@t[3], @x[5]
+	 pxor	@t[4], @x[6]
+	 pxor	@t[7], @x[4]
+	 pxor	@t[7], @x[5]
+	 pxor	@t[5], @x[7]
+___
+	&MixColumns	(@x,@t,1);	# flipped 2<->3 and 4<->6
+}
+
+sub aesenc {				# not used
+my @b=@_[0..7];
+my @t=@_[8..15];
+$code.=<<___;
+	movdqa	0x30($const),@t[0]	# .LSR
+___
+	&ShiftRows	(@b,@t[0]);
+	&Sbox		(@b,@t);
+	&MixColumns	(@b[0,1,4,6,3,7,2,5],@t);
+}
+
+sub aesenclast {			# not used
+my @b=@_[0..7];
+my @t=@_[8..15];
+$code.=<<___;
+	movdqa	0x40($const),@t[0]	# .LSRM0
+___
+	&ShiftRows	(@b,@t[0]);
+	&Sbox		(@b,@t);
+$code.=<<___
+	pxor	0x00($key),@b[0]
+	pxor	0x10($key),@b[1]
+	pxor	0x20($key),@b[4]
+	pxor	0x30($key),@b[6]
+	pxor	0x40($key),@b[3]
+	pxor	0x50($key),@b[7]
+	pxor	0x60($key),@b[2]
+	pxor	0x70($key),@b[5]
+___
+}
+
+sub swapmove {
+my ($a,$b,$n,$mask,$t)=@_;
+$code.=<<___;
+	movdqa	$b,$t
+	psrlq	\$$n,$b
+	pxor  	$a,$b
+	pand	$mask,$b
+	pxor	$b,$a
+	psllq	\$$n,$b
+	pxor	$t,$b
+___
+}
+sub swapmove2x {
+my ($a0,$b0,$a1,$b1,$n,$mask,$t0,$t1)=@_;
+$code.=<<___;
+	movdqa	$b0,$t0
+	psrlq	\$$n,$b0
+	 movdqa	$b1,$t1
+	 psrlq	\$$n,$b1
+	pxor  	$a0,$b0
+	 pxor  	$a1,$b1
+	pand	$mask,$b0
+	 pand	$mask,$b1
+	pxor	$b0,$a0
+	psllq	\$$n,$b0
+	 pxor	$b1,$a1
+	 psllq	\$$n,$b1
+	pxor	$t0,$b0
+	 pxor	$t1,$b1
+___
+}
+
+sub bitslice {
+my @x=reverse(@_[0..7]);
+my ($t0,$t1,$t2,$t3)=@_[8..11];
+$code.=<<___;
+	movdqa	0x00($const),$t0	# .LBS0
+	movdqa	0x10($const),$t1	# .LBS1
+___
+	&swapmove2x(@x[0,1,2,3],1,$t0,$t2,$t3);
+	&swapmove2x(@x[4,5,6,7],1,$t0,$t2,$t3);
+$code.=<<___;
+	movdqa	0x20($const),$t0	# .LBS2
+___
+	&swapmove2x(@x[0,2,1,3],2,$t1,$t2,$t3);
+	&swapmove2x(@x[4,6,5,7],2,$t1,$t2,$t3);
+
+	&swapmove2x(@x[0,4,1,5],4,$t0,$t2,$t3);
+	&swapmove2x(@x[2,6,3,7],4,$t0,$t2,$t3);
+}
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.text
+
+.extern	asm_AES_encrypt
+.extern	asm_AES_decrypt
+
+.type	_bsaes_encrypt8,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	64
+_bsaes_encrypt8:
+	lea	.LBS0(%rip), $const	# constants table
+
+	movdqa	($key), @XMM[9]		# round 0 key
+	lea	0x10($key), $key
+	movdqa	0x50($const), @XMM[8]	# .LM0SR
+	pxor	@XMM[9], @XMM[0]	# xor with round0 key
+	pxor	@XMM[9], @XMM[1]
+	pxor	@XMM[9], @XMM[2]
+	pxor	@XMM[9], @XMM[3]
+	 pshufb	@XMM[8], @XMM[0]
+	 pshufb	@XMM[8], @XMM[1]
+	pxor	@XMM[9], @XMM[4]
+	pxor	@XMM[9], @XMM[5]
+	 pshufb	@XMM[8], @XMM[2]
+	 pshufb	@XMM[8], @XMM[3]
+	pxor	@XMM[9], @XMM[6]
+	pxor	@XMM[9], @XMM[7]
+	 pshufb	@XMM[8], @XMM[4]
+	 pshufb	@XMM[8], @XMM[5]
+	 pshufb	@XMM[8], @XMM[6]
+	 pshufb	@XMM[8], @XMM[7]
+_bsaes_encrypt8_bitslice:
+___
+	&bitslice	(@XMM[0..7, 8..11]);
+$code.=<<___;
+	dec	$rounds
+	jmp	.Lenc_sbox
+.align	16
+.Lenc_loop:
+___
+	&ShiftRows	(@XMM[0..7, 8]);
+$code.=".Lenc_sbox:\n";
+	&Sbox		(@XMM[0..7, 8..15]);
+$code.=<<___;
+	dec	$rounds
+	jl	.Lenc_done
+___
+	&MixColumns	(@XMM[0,1,4,6,3,7,2,5, 8..15]);
+$code.=<<___;
+	movdqa	0x30($const), @XMM[8]	# .LSR
+	jnz	.Lenc_loop
+	movdqa	0x40($const), @XMM[8]	# .LSRM0
+	jmp	.Lenc_loop
+.align	16
+.Lenc_done:
+___
+	# output in lsb > [t0, t1, t4, t6, t3, t7, t2, t5] < msb
+	&bitslice	(@XMM[0,1,4,6,3,7,2,5, 8..11]);
+$code.=<<___;
+	movdqa	($key), @XMM[8]		# last round key
+	pxor	@XMM[8], @XMM[4]
+	pxor	@XMM[8], @XMM[6]
+	pxor	@XMM[8], @XMM[3]
+	pxor	@XMM[8], @XMM[7]
+	pxor	@XMM[8], @XMM[2]
+	pxor	@XMM[8], @XMM[5]
+	pxor	@XMM[8], @XMM[0]
+	pxor	@XMM[8], @XMM[1]
+	ret
+.size	_bsaes_encrypt8,.-_bsaes_encrypt8
+
+.type	_bsaes_decrypt8,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	64
+_bsaes_decrypt8:
+	lea	.LBS0(%rip), $const	# constants table
+
+	movdqa	($key), @XMM[9]		# round 0 key
+	lea	0x10($key), $key
+	movdqa	-0x30($const), @XMM[8]	# .LM0ISR
+	pxor	@XMM[9], @XMM[0]	# xor with round0 key
+	pxor	@XMM[9], @XMM[1]
+	pxor	@XMM[9], @XMM[2]
+	pxor	@XMM[9], @XMM[3]
+	 pshufb	@XMM[8], @XMM[0]
+	 pshufb	@XMM[8], @XMM[1]
+	pxor	@XMM[9], @XMM[4]
+	pxor	@XMM[9], @XMM[5]
+	 pshufb	@XMM[8], @XMM[2]
+	 pshufb	@XMM[8], @XMM[3]
+	pxor	@XMM[9], @XMM[6]
+	pxor	@XMM[9], @XMM[7]
+	 pshufb	@XMM[8], @XMM[4]
+	 pshufb	@XMM[8], @XMM[5]
+	 pshufb	@XMM[8], @XMM[6]
+	 pshufb	@XMM[8], @XMM[7]
+___
+	&bitslice	(@XMM[0..7, 8..11]);
+$code.=<<___;
+	dec	$rounds
+	jmp	.Ldec_sbox
+.align	16
+.Ldec_loop:
+___
+	&ShiftRows	(@XMM[0..7, 8]);
+$code.=".Ldec_sbox:\n";
+	&InvSbox	(@XMM[0..7, 8..15]);
+$code.=<<___;
+	dec	$rounds
+	jl	.Ldec_done
+___
+	&InvMixColumns	(@XMM[0,1,6,4,2,7,3,5, 8..15]);
+$code.=<<___;
+	movdqa	-0x10($const), @XMM[8]	# .LISR
+	jnz	.Ldec_loop
+	movdqa	-0x20($const), @XMM[8]	# .LISRM0
+	jmp	.Ldec_loop
+.align	16
+.Ldec_done:
+___
+	&bitslice	(@XMM[0,1,6,4,2,7,3,5, 8..11]);
+$code.=<<___;
+	movdqa	($key), @XMM[8]		# last round key
+	pxor	@XMM[8], @XMM[6]
+	pxor	@XMM[8], @XMM[4]
+	pxor	@XMM[8], @XMM[2]
+	pxor	@XMM[8], @XMM[7]
+	pxor	@XMM[8], @XMM[3]
+	pxor	@XMM[8], @XMM[5]
+	pxor	@XMM[8], @XMM[0]
+	pxor	@XMM[8], @XMM[1]
+	ret
+.size	_bsaes_decrypt8,.-_bsaes_decrypt8
+___
+}
+{
+my ($out,$inp,$rounds,$const)=("%rax","%rcx","%r10d","%r11");
+
+sub bitslice_key {
+my @x=reverse(@_[0..7]);
+my ($bs0,$bs1,$bs2,$t2,$t3)=@_[8..12];
+
+	&swapmove	(@x[0,1],1,$bs0,$t2,$t3);
+$code.=<<___;
+	#&swapmove(@x[2,3],1,$t0,$t2,$t3);
+	movdqa	@x[0], @x[2]
+	movdqa	@x[1], @x[3]
+___
+	#&swapmove2x(@x[4,5,6,7],1,$t0,$t2,$t3);
+
+	&swapmove2x	(@x[0,2,1,3],2,$bs1,$t2,$t3);
+$code.=<<___;
+	#&swapmove2x(@x[4,6,5,7],2,$t1,$t2,$t3);
+	movdqa	@x[0], @x[4]
+	movdqa	@x[2], @x[6]
+	movdqa	@x[1], @x[5]
+	movdqa	@x[3], @x[7]
+___
+	&swapmove2x	(@x[0,4,1,5],4,$bs2,$t2,$t3);
+	&swapmove2x	(@x[2,6,3,7],4,$bs2,$t2,$t3);
+}
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.type	_bsaes_key_convert,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+_bsaes_key_convert:
+	lea	.Lmasks(%rip), $const
+	movdqu	($inp), %xmm7		# load round 0 key
+	lea	0x10($inp), $inp
+	movdqa	0x00($const), %xmm0	# 0x01...
+	movdqa	0x10($const), %xmm1	# 0x02...
+	movdqa	0x20($const), %xmm2	# 0x04...
+	movdqa	0x30($const), %xmm3	# 0x08...
+	movdqa	0x40($const), %xmm4	# .LM0
+	pcmpeqd	%xmm5, %xmm5		# .LNOT
+
+	movdqu	($inp), %xmm6		# load round 1 key
+	movdqa	%xmm7, ($out)		# save round 0 key
+	lea	0x10($out), $out
+	dec	$rounds
+	jmp	.Lkey_loop
+.align	16
+.Lkey_loop:
+	pshufb	%xmm4, %xmm6		# .LM0
+
+	movdqa	%xmm0,	%xmm8
+	movdqa	%xmm1,	%xmm9
+
+	pand	%xmm6,	%xmm8
+	pand	%xmm6,	%xmm9
+	movdqa	%xmm2,	%xmm10
+	pcmpeqb	%xmm0,	%xmm8
+	psllq	\$4,	%xmm0		# 0x10...
+	movdqa	%xmm3,	%xmm11
+	pcmpeqb	%xmm1,	%xmm9
+	psllq	\$4,	%xmm1		# 0x20...
+
+	pand	%xmm6,	%xmm10
+	pand	%xmm6,	%xmm11
+	movdqa	%xmm0,	%xmm12
+	pcmpeqb	%xmm2,	%xmm10
+	psllq	\$4,	%xmm2		# 0x40...
+	movdqa	%xmm1,	%xmm13
+	pcmpeqb	%xmm3,	%xmm11
+	psllq	\$4,	%xmm3		# 0x80...
+
+	movdqa	%xmm2,	%xmm14
+	movdqa	%xmm3,	%xmm15
+	 pxor	%xmm5,	%xmm8		# "pnot"
+	 pxor	%xmm5,	%xmm9
+
+	pand	%xmm6,	%xmm12
+	pand	%xmm6,	%xmm13
+	 movdqa	%xmm8, 0x00($out)	# write bit-sliced round key
+	pcmpeqb	%xmm0,	%xmm12
+	psrlq	\$4,	%xmm0		# 0x01...
+	 movdqa	%xmm9, 0x10($out)
+	pcmpeqb	%xmm1,	%xmm13
+	psrlq	\$4,	%xmm1		# 0x02...
+	 lea	0x10($inp), $inp
+
+	pand	%xmm6,	%xmm14
+	pand	%xmm6,	%xmm15
+	 movdqa	%xmm10, 0x20($out)
+	pcmpeqb	%xmm2,	%xmm14
+	psrlq	\$4,	%xmm2		# 0x04...
+	 movdqa	%xmm11, 0x30($out)
+	pcmpeqb	%xmm3,	%xmm15
+	psrlq	\$4,	%xmm3		# 0x08...
+	 movdqu	($inp), %xmm6		# load next round key
+
+	pxor	%xmm5, %xmm13		# "pnot"
+	pxor	%xmm5, %xmm14
+	movdqa	%xmm12, 0x40($out)
+	movdqa	%xmm13, 0x50($out)
+	movdqa	%xmm14, 0x60($out)
+	movdqa	%xmm15, 0x70($out)
+	lea	0x80($out),$out
+	dec	$rounds
+	jnz	.Lkey_loop
+
+	movdqa	0x50($const), %xmm7	# .L63
+	#movdqa	%xmm6, ($out)		# don't save last round key
+	ret
+.size	_bsaes_key_convert,.-_bsaes_key_convert
+___
+}
+
+if (0 && !$win64) {	# following four functions are unsupported interface
+			# used for benchmarking...
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	bsaes_enc_key_convert
+.type	bsaes_enc_key_convert,\@function,2
+.align	16
+bsaes_enc_key_convert:
+	mov	240($inp),%r10d		# pass rounds
+	mov	$inp,%rcx		# pass key
+	mov	$out,%rax		# pass key schedule
+	call	_bsaes_key_convert
+	pxor	%xmm6,%xmm7		# fix up last round key
+	movdqa	%xmm7,(%rax)		# save last round key
+	ret
+.size	bsaes_enc_key_convert,.-bsaes_enc_key_convert
+
+.globl	bsaes_encrypt_128
+.type	bsaes_encrypt_128,\@function,4
+.align	16
+bsaes_encrypt_128:
+.Lenc128_loop:
+	movdqu	0x00($inp), @XMM[0]	# load input
+	movdqu	0x10($inp), @XMM[1]
+	movdqu	0x20($inp), @XMM[2]
+	movdqu	0x30($inp), @XMM[3]
+	movdqu	0x40($inp), @XMM[4]
+	movdqu	0x50($inp), @XMM[5]
+	movdqu	0x60($inp), @XMM[6]
+	movdqu	0x70($inp), @XMM[7]
+	mov	$key, %rax		# pass the $key
+	lea	0x80($inp), $inp
+	mov	\$10,%r10d
+
+	call	_bsaes_encrypt8
+
+	movdqu	@XMM[0], 0x00($out)	# write output
+	movdqu	@XMM[1], 0x10($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[4], 0x20($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[6], 0x30($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[3], 0x40($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[7], 0x50($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[2], 0x60($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[5], 0x70($out)
+	lea	0x80($out), $out
+	sub	\$0x80,$len
+	ja	.Lenc128_loop
+	ret
+.size	bsaes_encrypt_128,.-bsaes_encrypt_128
+
+.globl	bsaes_dec_key_convert
+.type	bsaes_dec_key_convert,\@function,2
+.align	16
+bsaes_dec_key_convert:
+	mov	240($inp),%r10d		# pass rounds
+	mov	$inp,%rcx		# pass key
+	mov	$out,%rax		# pass key schedule
+	call	_bsaes_key_convert
+	pxor	($out),%xmm7		# fix up round 0 key
+	movdqa	%xmm6,(%rax)		# save last round key
+	movdqa	%xmm7,($out)
+	ret
+.size	bsaes_dec_key_convert,.-bsaes_dec_key_convert
+
+.globl	bsaes_decrypt_128
+.type	bsaes_decrypt_128,\@function,4
+.align	16
+bsaes_decrypt_128:
+.Ldec128_loop:
+	movdqu	0x00($inp), @XMM[0]	# load input
+	movdqu	0x10($inp), @XMM[1]
+	movdqu	0x20($inp), @XMM[2]
+	movdqu	0x30($inp), @XMM[3]
+	movdqu	0x40($inp), @XMM[4]
+	movdqu	0x50($inp), @XMM[5]
+	movdqu	0x60($inp), @XMM[6]
+	movdqu	0x70($inp), @XMM[7]
+	mov	$key, %rax		# pass the $key
+	lea	0x80($inp), $inp
+	mov	\$10,%r10d
+
+	call	_bsaes_decrypt8
+
+	movdqu	@XMM[0], 0x00($out)	# write output
+	movdqu	@XMM[1], 0x10($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[6], 0x20($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[4], 0x30($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[2], 0x40($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[7], 0x50($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[3], 0x60($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[5], 0x70($out)
+	lea	0x80($out), $out
+	sub	\$0x80,$len
+	ja	.Ldec128_loop
+	ret
+.size	bsaes_decrypt_128,.-bsaes_decrypt_128
+___
+}
+{
+######################################################################
+#
+# OpenSSL interface
+#
+my ($arg1,$arg2,$arg3,$arg4,$arg5,$arg6)=$win64	? ("%rcx","%rdx","%r8","%r9","%r10","%r11d")
+						: ("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx","%rcx","%r8","%r9d");
+my ($inp,$out,$len,$key)=("%r12","%r13","%r14","%r15");
+
+if ($ecb) {
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	bsaes_ecb_encrypt_blocks
+.type	bsaes_ecb_encrypt_blocks,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+bsaes_ecb_encrypt_blocks:
+	mov	%rsp, %rax
+.Lecb_enc_prologue:
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+	lea	-0x48(%rsp),%rsp
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	lea	-0xa0(%rsp), %rsp
+	movaps	%xmm6, 0x40(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm7, 0x50(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm8, 0x60(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm9, 0x70(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm10, 0x80(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm11, 0x90(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm12, 0xa0(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm13, 0xb0(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm14, 0xc0(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm15, 0xd0(%rsp)
+.Lecb_enc_body:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	%rsp,%rbp		# backup %rsp
+	mov	240($arg4),%eax		# rounds
+	mov	$arg1,$inp		# backup arguments
+	mov	$arg2,$out
+	mov	$arg3,$len
+	mov	$arg4,$key
+	cmp	\$8,$arg3
+	jb	.Lecb_enc_short
+
+	mov	%eax,%ebx		# backup rounds
+	shl	\$7,%rax		# 128 bytes per inner round key
+	sub	\$`128-32`,%rax		# size of bit-sliced key schedule
+	sub	%rax,%rsp
+	mov	%rsp,%rax		# pass key schedule
+	mov	$key,%rcx		# pass key
+	mov	%ebx,%r10d		# pass rounds
+	call	_bsaes_key_convert
+	pxor	%xmm6,%xmm7		# fix up last round key
+	movdqa	%xmm7,(%rax)		# save last round key
+
+	sub	\$8,$len
+.Lecb_enc_loop:
+	movdqu	0x00($inp), @XMM[0]	# load input
+	movdqu	0x10($inp), @XMM[1]
+	movdqu	0x20($inp), @XMM[2]
+	movdqu	0x30($inp), @XMM[3]
+	movdqu	0x40($inp), @XMM[4]
+	movdqu	0x50($inp), @XMM[5]
+	mov	%rsp, %rax		# pass key schedule
+	movdqu	0x60($inp), @XMM[6]
+	mov	%ebx,%r10d		# pass rounds
+	movdqu	0x70($inp), @XMM[7]
+	lea	0x80($inp), $inp
+
+	call	_bsaes_encrypt8
+
+	movdqu	@XMM[0], 0x00($out)	# write output
+	movdqu	@XMM[1], 0x10($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[4], 0x20($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[6], 0x30($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[3], 0x40($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[7], 0x50($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[2], 0x60($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[5], 0x70($out)
+	lea	0x80($out), $out
+	sub	\$8,$len
+	jnc	.Lecb_enc_loop
+
+	add	\$8,$len
+	jz	.Lecb_enc_done
+
+	movdqu	0x00($inp), @XMM[0]	# load input
+	mov	%rsp, %rax		# pass key schedule
+	mov	%ebx,%r10d		# pass rounds
+	cmp	\$2,$len
+	jb	.Lecb_enc_one
+	movdqu	0x10($inp), @XMM[1]
+	je	.Lecb_enc_two
+	movdqu	0x20($inp), @XMM[2]
+	cmp	\$4,$len
+	jb	.Lecb_enc_three
+	movdqu	0x30($inp), @XMM[3]
+	je	.Lecb_enc_four
+	movdqu	0x40($inp), @XMM[4]
+	cmp	\$6,$len
+	jb	.Lecb_enc_five
+	movdqu	0x50($inp), @XMM[5]
+	je	.Lecb_enc_six
+	movdqu	0x60($inp), @XMM[6]
+	call	_bsaes_encrypt8
+	movdqu	@XMM[0], 0x00($out)	# write output
+	movdqu	@XMM[1], 0x10($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[4], 0x20($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[6], 0x30($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[3], 0x40($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[7], 0x50($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[2], 0x60($out)
+	jmp	.Lecb_enc_done
+.align	16
+.Lecb_enc_six:
+	call	_bsaes_encrypt8
+	movdqu	@XMM[0], 0x00($out)	# write output
+	movdqu	@XMM[1], 0x10($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[4], 0x20($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[6], 0x30($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[3], 0x40($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[7], 0x50($out)
+	jmp	.Lecb_enc_done
+.align	16
+.Lecb_enc_five:
+	call	_bsaes_encrypt8
+	movdqu	@XMM[0], 0x00($out)	# write output
+	movdqu	@XMM[1], 0x10($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[4], 0x20($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[6], 0x30($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[3], 0x40($out)
+	jmp	.Lecb_enc_done
+.align	16
+.Lecb_enc_four:
+	call	_bsaes_encrypt8
+	movdqu	@XMM[0], 0x00($out)	# write output
+	movdqu	@XMM[1], 0x10($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[4], 0x20($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[6], 0x30($out)
+	jmp	.Lecb_enc_done
+.align	16
+.Lecb_enc_three:
+	call	_bsaes_encrypt8
+	movdqu	@XMM[0], 0x00($out)	# write output
+	movdqu	@XMM[1], 0x10($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[4], 0x20($out)
+	jmp	.Lecb_enc_done
+.align	16
+.Lecb_enc_two:
+	call	_bsaes_encrypt8
+	movdqu	@XMM[0], 0x00($out)	# write output
+	movdqu	@XMM[1], 0x10($out)
+	jmp	.Lecb_enc_done
+.align	16
+.Lecb_enc_one:
+	call	_bsaes_encrypt8
+	movdqu	@XMM[0], 0x00($out)	# write output
+	jmp	.Lecb_enc_done
+.align	16
+.Lecb_enc_short:
+	lea	($inp), $arg1
+	lea	($out), $arg2
+	lea	($key), $arg3
+	call	asm_AES_encrypt
+	lea	16($inp), $inp
+	lea	16($out), $out
+	dec	$len
+	jnz	.Lecb_enc_short
+
+.Lecb_enc_done:
+	lea	(%rsp),%rax
+	pxor	%xmm0, %xmm0
+.Lecb_enc_bzero:			# wipe key schedule [if any]
+	movdqa	%xmm0, 0x00(%rax)
+	movdqa	%xmm0, 0x10(%rax)
+	lea	0x20(%rax), %rax
+	cmp	%rax, %rbp
+	jb	.Lecb_enc_bzero
+
+	lea	(%rbp),%rsp		# restore %rsp
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	movaps	0x40(%rbp), %xmm6
+	movaps	0x50(%rbp), %xmm7
+	movaps	0x60(%rbp), %xmm8
+	movaps	0x70(%rbp), %xmm9
+	movaps	0x80(%rbp), %xmm10
+	movaps	0x90(%rbp), %xmm11
+	movaps	0xa0(%rbp), %xmm12
+	movaps	0xb0(%rbp), %xmm13
+	movaps	0xc0(%rbp), %xmm14
+	movaps	0xd0(%rbp), %xmm15
+	lea	0xa0(%rbp), %rsp
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	0x48(%rsp), %r15
+	mov	0x50(%rsp), %r14
+	mov	0x58(%rsp), %r13
+	mov	0x60(%rsp), %r12
+	mov	0x68(%rsp), %rbx
+	mov	0x70(%rsp), %rax
+	lea	0x78(%rsp), %rsp
+	mov	%rax, %rbp
+.Lecb_enc_epilogue:
+	ret
+.size	bsaes_ecb_encrypt_blocks,.-bsaes_ecb_encrypt_blocks
+
+.globl	bsaes_ecb_decrypt_blocks
+.type	bsaes_ecb_decrypt_blocks,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+bsaes_ecb_decrypt_blocks:
+	mov	%rsp, %rax
+.Lecb_dec_prologue:
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+	lea	-0x48(%rsp),%rsp
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	lea	-0xa0(%rsp), %rsp
+	movaps	%xmm6, 0x40(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm7, 0x50(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm8, 0x60(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm9, 0x70(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm10, 0x80(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm11, 0x90(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm12, 0xa0(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm13, 0xb0(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm14, 0xc0(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm15, 0xd0(%rsp)
+.Lecb_dec_body:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	%rsp,%rbp		# backup %rsp
+	mov	240($arg4),%eax		# rounds
+	mov	$arg1,$inp		# backup arguments
+	mov	$arg2,$out
+	mov	$arg3,$len
+	mov	$arg4,$key
+	cmp	\$8,$arg3
+	jb	.Lecb_dec_short
+
+	mov	%eax,%ebx		# backup rounds
+	shl	\$7,%rax		# 128 bytes per inner round key
+	sub	\$`128-32`,%rax		# size of bit-sliced key schedule
+	sub	%rax,%rsp
+	mov	%rsp,%rax		# pass key schedule
+	mov	$key,%rcx		# pass key
+	mov	%ebx,%r10d		# pass rounds
+	call	_bsaes_key_convert
+	pxor	(%rsp),%xmm7		# fix up 0 round key
+	movdqa	%xmm6,(%rax)		# save last round key
+	movdqa	%xmm7,(%rsp)
+
+	sub	\$8,$len
+.Lecb_dec_loop:
+	movdqu	0x00($inp), @XMM[0]	# load input
+	movdqu	0x10($inp), @XMM[1]
+	movdqu	0x20($inp), @XMM[2]
+	movdqu	0x30($inp), @XMM[3]
+	movdqu	0x40($inp), @XMM[4]
+	movdqu	0x50($inp), @XMM[5]
+	mov	%rsp, %rax		# pass key schedule
+	movdqu	0x60($inp), @XMM[6]
+	mov	%ebx,%r10d		# pass rounds
+	movdqu	0x70($inp), @XMM[7]
+	lea	0x80($inp), $inp
+
+	call	_bsaes_decrypt8
+
+	movdqu	@XMM[0], 0x00($out)	# write output
+	movdqu	@XMM[1], 0x10($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[6], 0x20($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[4], 0x30($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[2], 0x40($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[7], 0x50($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[3], 0x60($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[5], 0x70($out)
+	lea	0x80($out), $out
+	sub	\$8,$len
+	jnc	.Lecb_dec_loop
+
+	add	\$8,$len
+	jz	.Lecb_dec_done
+
+	movdqu	0x00($inp), @XMM[0]	# load input
+	mov	%rsp, %rax		# pass key schedule
+	mov	%ebx,%r10d		# pass rounds
+	cmp	\$2,$len
+	jb	.Lecb_dec_one
+	movdqu	0x10($inp), @XMM[1]
+	je	.Lecb_dec_two
+	movdqu	0x20($inp), @XMM[2]
+	cmp	\$4,$len
+	jb	.Lecb_dec_three
+	movdqu	0x30($inp), @XMM[3]
+	je	.Lecb_dec_four
+	movdqu	0x40($inp), @XMM[4]
+	cmp	\$6,$len
+	jb	.Lecb_dec_five
+	movdqu	0x50($inp), @XMM[5]
+	je	.Lecb_dec_six
+	movdqu	0x60($inp), @XMM[6]
+	call	_bsaes_decrypt8
+	movdqu	@XMM[0], 0x00($out)	# write output
+	movdqu	@XMM[1], 0x10($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[6], 0x20($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[4], 0x30($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[2], 0x40($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[7], 0x50($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[3], 0x60($out)
+	jmp	.Lecb_dec_done
+.align	16
+.Lecb_dec_six:
+	call	_bsaes_decrypt8
+	movdqu	@XMM[0], 0x00($out)	# write output
+	movdqu	@XMM[1], 0x10($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[6], 0x20($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[4], 0x30($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[2], 0x40($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[7], 0x50($out)
+	jmp	.Lecb_dec_done
+.align	16
+.Lecb_dec_five:
+	call	_bsaes_decrypt8
+	movdqu	@XMM[0], 0x00($out)	# write output
+	movdqu	@XMM[1], 0x10($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[6], 0x20($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[4], 0x30($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[2], 0x40($out)
+	jmp	.Lecb_dec_done
+.align	16
+.Lecb_dec_four:
+	call	_bsaes_decrypt8
+	movdqu	@XMM[0], 0x00($out)	# write output
+	movdqu	@XMM[1], 0x10($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[6], 0x20($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[4], 0x30($out)
+	jmp	.Lecb_dec_done
+.align	16
+.Lecb_dec_three:
+	call	_bsaes_decrypt8
+	movdqu	@XMM[0], 0x00($out)	# write output
+	movdqu	@XMM[1], 0x10($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[6], 0x20($out)
+	jmp	.Lecb_dec_done
+.align	16
+.Lecb_dec_two:
+	call	_bsaes_decrypt8
+	movdqu	@XMM[0], 0x00($out)	# write output
+	movdqu	@XMM[1], 0x10($out)
+	jmp	.Lecb_dec_done
+.align	16
+.Lecb_dec_one:
+	call	_bsaes_decrypt8
+	movdqu	@XMM[0], 0x00($out)	# write output
+	jmp	.Lecb_dec_done
+.align	16
+.Lecb_dec_short:
+	lea	($inp), $arg1
+	lea	($out), $arg2
+	lea	($key), $arg3
+	call	asm_AES_decrypt
+	lea	16($inp), $inp
+	lea	16($out), $out
+	dec	$len
+	jnz	.Lecb_dec_short
+
+.Lecb_dec_done:
+	lea	(%rsp),%rax
+	pxor	%xmm0, %xmm0
+.Lecb_dec_bzero:			# wipe key schedule [if any]
+	movdqa	%xmm0, 0x00(%rax)
+	movdqa	%xmm0, 0x10(%rax)
+	lea	0x20(%rax), %rax
+	cmp	%rax, %rbp
+	jb	.Lecb_dec_bzero
+
+	lea	(%rbp),%rsp		# restore %rsp
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	movaps	0x40(%rbp), %xmm6
+	movaps	0x50(%rbp), %xmm7
+	movaps	0x60(%rbp), %xmm8
+	movaps	0x70(%rbp), %xmm9
+	movaps	0x80(%rbp), %xmm10
+	movaps	0x90(%rbp), %xmm11
+	movaps	0xa0(%rbp), %xmm12
+	movaps	0xb0(%rbp), %xmm13
+	movaps	0xc0(%rbp), %xmm14
+	movaps	0xd0(%rbp), %xmm15
+	lea	0xa0(%rbp), %rsp
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	0x48(%rsp), %r15
+	mov	0x50(%rsp), %r14
+	mov	0x58(%rsp), %r13
+	mov	0x60(%rsp), %r12
+	mov	0x68(%rsp), %rbx
+	mov	0x70(%rsp), %rax
+	lea	0x78(%rsp), %rsp
+	mov	%rax, %rbp
+.Lecb_dec_epilogue:
+	ret
+.size	bsaes_ecb_decrypt_blocks,.-bsaes_ecb_decrypt_blocks
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+.extern	asm_AES_cbc_encrypt
+.globl	bsaes_cbc_encrypt
+.type	bsaes_cbc_encrypt,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+bsaes_cbc_encrypt:
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	mov	48(%rsp),$arg6		# pull direction flag
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	cmp	\$0,$arg6
+	jne	asm_AES_cbc_encrypt
+	cmp	\$128,$arg3
+	jb	asm_AES_cbc_encrypt
+
+	mov	%rsp, %rax
+.Lcbc_dec_prologue:
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+	lea	-0x48(%rsp), %rsp
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	mov	0xa0(%rsp),$arg5	# pull ivp
+	lea	-0xa0(%rsp), %rsp
+	movaps	%xmm6, 0x40(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm7, 0x50(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm8, 0x60(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm9, 0x70(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm10, 0x80(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm11, 0x90(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm12, 0xa0(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm13, 0xb0(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm14, 0xc0(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm15, 0xd0(%rsp)
+.Lcbc_dec_body:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	%rsp, %rbp		# backup %rsp
+	mov	240($arg4), %eax	# rounds
+	mov	$arg1, $inp		# backup arguments
+	mov	$arg2, $out
+	mov	$arg3, $len
+	mov	$arg4, $key
+	mov	$arg5, %rbx
+	shr	\$4, $len		# bytes to blocks
+
+	mov	%eax, %edx		# rounds
+	shl	\$7, %rax		# 128 bytes per inner round key
+	sub	\$`128-32`, %rax	# size of bit-sliced key schedule
+	sub	%rax, %rsp
+
+	mov	%rsp, %rax		# pass key schedule
+	mov	$key, %rcx		# pass key
+	mov	%edx, %r10d		# pass rounds
+	call	_bsaes_key_convert
+	pxor	(%rsp),%xmm7		# fix up 0 round key
+	movdqa	%xmm6,(%rax)		# save last round key
+	movdqa	%xmm7,(%rsp)
+
+	movdqu	(%rbx), @XMM[15]	# load IV
+	sub	\$8,$len
+.Lcbc_dec_loop:
+	movdqu	0x00($inp), @XMM[0]	# load input
+	movdqu	0x10($inp), @XMM[1]
+	movdqu	0x20($inp), @XMM[2]
+	movdqu	0x30($inp), @XMM[3]
+	movdqu	0x40($inp), @XMM[4]
+	movdqu	0x50($inp), @XMM[5]
+	mov	%rsp, %rax		# pass key schedule
+	movdqu	0x60($inp), @XMM[6]
+	mov	%edx,%r10d		# pass rounds
+	movdqu	0x70($inp), @XMM[7]
+	movdqa	@XMM[15], 0x20(%rbp)	# put aside IV
+
+	call	_bsaes_decrypt8
+
+	pxor	0x20(%rbp), @XMM[0]	# ^= IV
+	movdqu	0x00($inp), @XMM[8]	# re-load input
+	movdqu	0x10($inp), @XMM[9]
+	pxor	@XMM[8], @XMM[1]
+	movdqu	0x20($inp), @XMM[10]
+	pxor	@XMM[9], @XMM[6]
+	movdqu	0x30($inp), @XMM[11]
+	pxor	@XMM[10], @XMM[4]
+	movdqu	0x40($inp), @XMM[12]
+	pxor	@XMM[11], @XMM[2]
+	movdqu	0x50($inp), @XMM[13]
+	pxor	@XMM[12], @XMM[7]
+	movdqu	0x60($inp), @XMM[14]
+	pxor	@XMM[13], @XMM[3]
+	movdqu	0x70($inp), @XMM[15]	# IV
+	pxor	@XMM[14], @XMM[5]
+	movdqu	@XMM[0], 0x00($out)	# write output
+	lea	0x80($inp), $inp
+	movdqu	@XMM[1], 0x10($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[6], 0x20($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[4], 0x30($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[2], 0x40($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[7], 0x50($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[3], 0x60($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[5], 0x70($out)
+	lea	0x80($out), $out
+	sub	\$8,$len
+	jnc	.Lcbc_dec_loop
+
+	add	\$8,$len
+	jz	.Lcbc_dec_done
+
+	movdqu	0x00($inp), @XMM[0]	# load input
+	mov	%rsp, %rax		# pass key schedule
+	mov	%edx, %r10d		# pass rounds
+	cmp	\$2,$len
+	jb	.Lcbc_dec_one
+	movdqu	0x10($inp), @XMM[1]
+	je	.Lcbc_dec_two
+	movdqu	0x20($inp), @XMM[2]
+	cmp	\$4,$len
+	jb	.Lcbc_dec_three
+	movdqu	0x30($inp), @XMM[3]
+	je	.Lcbc_dec_four
+	movdqu	0x40($inp), @XMM[4]
+	cmp	\$6,$len
+	jb	.Lcbc_dec_five
+	movdqu	0x50($inp), @XMM[5]
+	je	.Lcbc_dec_six
+	movdqu	0x60($inp), @XMM[6]
+	movdqa	@XMM[15], 0x20(%rbp)	# put aside IV
+	call	_bsaes_decrypt8
+	pxor	0x20(%rbp), @XMM[0]	# ^= IV
+	movdqu	0x00($inp), @XMM[8]	# re-load input
+	movdqu	0x10($inp), @XMM[9]
+	pxor	@XMM[8], @XMM[1]
+	movdqu	0x20($inp), @XMM[10]
+	pxor	@XMM[9], @XMM[6]
+	movdqu	0x30($inp), @XMM[11]
+	pxor	@XMM[10], @XMM[4]
+	movdqu	0x40($inp), @XMM[12]
+	pxor	@XMM[11], @XMM[2]
+	movdqu	0x50($inp), @XMM[13]
+	pxor	@XMM[12], @XMM[7]
+	movdqu	0x60($inp), @XMM[15]	# IV
+	pxor	@XMM[13], @XMM[3]
+	movdqu	@XMM[0], 0x00($out)	# write output
+	movdqu	@XMM[1], 0x10($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[6], 0x20($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[4], 0x30($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[2], 0x40($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[7], 0x50($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[3], 0x60($out)
+	jmp	.Lcbc_dec_done
+.align	16
+.Lcbc_dec_six:
+	movdqa	@XMM[15], 0x20(%rbp)	# put aside IV
+	call	_bsaes_decrypt8
+	pxor	0x20(%rbp), @XMM[0]	# ^= IV
+	movdqu	0x00($inp), @XMM[8]	# re-load input
+	movdqu	0x10($inp), @XMM[9]
+	pxor	@XMM[8], @XMM[1]
+	movdqu	0x20($inp), @XMM[10]
+	pxor	@XMM[9], @XMM[6]
+	movdqu	0x30($inp), @XMM[11]
+	pxor	@XMM[10], @XMM[4]
+	movdqu	0x40($inp), @XMM[12]
+	pxor	@XMM[11], @XMM[2]
+	movdqu	0x50($inp), @XMM[15]	# IV
+	pxor	@XMM[12], @XMM[7]
+	movdqu	@XMM[0], 0x00($out)	# write output
+	movdqu	@XMM[1], 0x10($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[6], 0x20($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[4], 0x30($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[2], 0x40($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[7], 0x50($out)
+	jmp	.Lcbc_dec_done
+.align	16
+.Lcbc_dec_five:
+	movdqa	@XMM[15], 0x20(%rbp)	# put aside IV
+	call	_bsaes_decrypt8
+	pxor	0x20(%rbp), @XMM[0]	# ^= IV
+	movdqu	0x00($inp), @XMM[8]	# re-load input
+	movdqu	0x10($inp), @XMM[9]
+	pxor	@XMM[8], @XMM[1]
+	movdqu	0x20($inp), @XMM[10]
+	pxor	@XMM[9], @XMM[6]
+	movdqu	0x30($inp), @XMM[11]
+	pxor	@XMM[10], @XMM[4]
+	movdqu	0x40($inp), @XMM[15]	# IV
+	pxor	@XMM[11], @XMM[2]
+	movdqu	@XMM[0], 0x00($out)	# write output
+	movdqu	@XMM[1], 0x10($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[6], 0x20($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[4], 0x30($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[2], 0x40($out)
+	jmp	.Lcbc_dec_done
+.align	16
+.Lcbc_dec_four:
+	movdqa	@XMM[15], 0x20(%rbp)	# put aside IV
+	call	_bsaes_decrypt8
+	pxor	0x20(%rbp), @XMM[0]	# ^= IV
+	movdqu	0x00($inp), @XMM[8]	# re-load input
+	movdqu	0x10($inp), @XMM[9]
+	pxor	@XMM[8], @XMM[1]
+	movdqu	0x20($inp), @XMM[10]
+	pxor	@XMM[9], @XMM[6]
+	movdqu	0x30($inp), @XMM[15]	# IV
+	pxor	@XMM[10], @XMM[4]
+	movdqu	@XMM[0], 0x00($out)	# write output
+	movdqu	@XMM[1], 0x10($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[6], 0x20($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[4], 0x30($out)
+	jmp	.Lcbc_dec_done
+.align	16
+.Lcbc_dec_three:
+	movdqa	@XMM[15], 0x20(%rbp)	# put aside IV
+	call	_bsaes_decrypt8
+	pxor	0x20(%rbp), @XMM[0]	# ^= IV
+	movdqu	0x00($inp), @XMM[8]	# re-load input
+	movdqu	0x10($inp), @XMM[9]
+	pxor	@XMM[8], @XMM[1]
+	movdqu	0x20($inp), @XMM[15]	# IV
+	pxor	@XMM[9], @XMM[6]
+	movdqu	@XMM[0], 0x00($out)	# write output
+	movdqu	@XMM[1], 0x10($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[6], 0x20($out)
+	jmp	.Lcbc_dec_done
+.align	16
+.Lcbc_dec_two:
+	movdqa	@XMM[15], 0x20(%rbp)	# put aside IV
+	call	_bsaes_decrypt8
+	pxor	0x20(%rbp), @XMM[0]	# ^= IV
+	movdqu	0x00($inp), @XMM[8]	# re-load input
+	movdqu	0x10($inp), @XMM[15]	# IV
+	pxor	@XMM[8], @XMM[1]
+	movdqu	@XMM[0], 0x00($out)	# write output
+	movdqu	@XMM[1], 0x10($out)
+	jmp	.Lcbc_dec_done
+.align	16
+.Lcbc_dec_one:
+	lea	($inp), $arg1
+	lea	0x20(%rbp), $arg2	# buffer output
+	lea	($key), $arg3
+	call	asm_AES_decrypt		# doesn't touch %xmm
+	pxor	0x20(%rbp), @XMM[15]	# ^= IV
+	movdqu	@XMM[15], ($out)	# write output
+	movdqa	@XMM[0], @XMM[15]	# IV
+
+.Lcbc_dec_done:
+	movdqu	@XMM[15], (%rbx)	# return IV
+	lea	(%rsp), %rax
+	pxor	%xmm0, %xmm0
+.Lcbc_dec_bzero:			# wipe key schedule [if any]
+	movdqa	%xmm0, 0x00(%rax)
+	movdqa	%xmm0, 0x10(%rax)
+	lea	0x20(%rax), %rax
+	cmp	%rax, %rbp
+	ja	.Lcbc_dec_bzero
+
+	lea	(%rbp),%rsp		# restore %rsp
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	movaps	0x40(%rbp), %xmm6
+	movaps	0x50(%rbp), %xmm7
+	movaps	0x60(%rbp), %xmm8
+	movaps	0x70(%rbp), %xmm9
+	movaps	0x80(%rbp), %xmm10
+	movaps	0x90(%rbp), %xmm11
+	movaps	0xa0(%rbp), %xmm12
+	movaps	0xb0(%rbp), %xmm13
+	movaps	0xc0(%rbp), %xmm14
+	movaps	0xd0(%rbp), %xmm15
+	lea	0xa0(%rbp), %rsp
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	0x48(%rsp), %r15
+	mov	0x50(%rsp), %r14
+	mov	0x58(%rsp), %r13
+	mov	0x60(%rsp), %r12
+	mov	0x68(%rsp), %rbx
+	mov	0x70(%rsp), %rax
+	lea	0x78(%rsp), %rsp
+	mov	%rax, %rbp
+.Lcbc_dec_epilogue:
+	ret
+.size	bsaes_cbc_encrypt,.-bsaes_cbc_encrypt
+
+.globl	bsaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks
+.type	bsaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+bsaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks:
+	mov	%rsp, %rax
+.Lctr_enc_prologue:
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+	lea	-0x48(%rsp), %rsp
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	mov	0xa0(%rsp),$arg5	# pull ivp
+	lea	-0xa0(%rsp), %rsp
+	movaps	%xmm6, 0x40(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm7, 0x50(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm8, 0x60(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm9, 0x70(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm10, 0x80(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm11, 0x90(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm12, 0xa0(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm13, 0xb0(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm14, 0xc0(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm15, 0xd0(%rsp)
+.Lctr_enc_body:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	%rsp, %rbp		# backup %rsp
+	movdqu	($arg5), %xmm0		# load counter
+	mov	240($arg4), %eax	# rounds
+	mov	$arg1, $inp		# backup arguments
+	mov	$arg2, $out
+	mov	$arg3, $len
+	mov	$arg4, $key
+	movdqa	%xmm0, 0x20(%rbp)	# copy counter
+	cmp	\$8, $arg3
+	jb	.Lctr_enc_short
+
+	mov	%eax, %ebx		# rounds
+	shl	\$7, %rax		# 128 bytes per inner round key
+	sub	\$`128-32`, %rax	# size of bit-sliced key schedule
+	sub	%rax, %rsp
+
+	mov	%rsp, %rax		# pass key schedule
+	mov	$key, %rcx		# pass key
+	mov	%ebx, %r10d		# pass rounds
+	call	_bsaes_key_convert
+	pxor	%xmm6,%xmm7		# fix up last round key
+	movdqa	%xmm7,(%rax)		# save last round key
+
+	movdqa	(%rsp), @XMM[9]		# load round0 key
+	lea	.LADD1(%rip), %r11
+	movdqa	0x20(%rbp), @XMM[0]	# counter copy
+	movdqa	-0x20(%r11), @XMM[8]	# .LSWPUP
+	pshufb	@XMM[8], @XMM[9]	# byte swap upper part
+	pshufb	@XMM[8], @XMM[0]
+	movdqa	@XMM[9], (%rsp)		# save adjusted round0 key
+	jmp	.Lctr_enc_loop
+.align	16
+.Lctr_enc_loop:
+	movdqa	@XMM[0], 0x20(%rbp)	# save counter
+	movdqa	@XMM[0], @XMM[1]	# prepare 8 counter values
+	movdqa	@XMM[0], @XMM[2]
+	paddd	0x00(%r11), @XMM[1]	# .LADD1
+	movdqa	@XMM[0], @XMM[3]
+	paddd	0x10(%r11), @XMM[2]	# .LADD2
+	movdqa	@XMM[0], @XMM[4]
+	paddd	0x20(%r11), @XMM[3]	# .LADD3
+	movdqa	@XMM[0], @XMM[5]
+	paddd	0x30(%r11), @XMM[4]	# .LADD4
+	movdqa	@XMM[0], @XMM[6]
+	paddd	0x40(%r11), @XMM[5]	# .LADD5
+	movdqa	@XMM[0], @XMM[7]
+	paddd	0x50(%r11), @XMM[6]	# .LADD6
+	paddd	0x60(%r11), @XMM[7]	# .LADD7
+
+	# Borrow prologue from _bsaes_encrypt8 to use the opportunity
+	# to flip byte order in 32-bit counter
+	movdqa	(%rsp), @XMM[9]		# round 0 key
+	lea	0x10(%rsp), %rax	# pass key schedule
+	movdqa	-0x10(%r11), @XMM[8]	# .LSWPUPM0SR
+	pxor	@XMM[9], @XMM[0]	# xor with round0 key
+	pxor	@XMM[9], @XMM[1]
+	pxor	@XMM[9], @XMM[2]
+	pxor	@XMM[9], @XMM[3]
+	 pshufb	@XMM[8], @XMM[0]
+	 pshufb	@XMM[8], @XMM[1]
+	pxor	@XMM[9], @XMM[4]
+	pxor	@XMM[9], @XMM[5]
+	 pshufb	@XMM[8], @XMM[2]
+	 pshufb	@XMM[8], @XMM[3]
+	pxor	@XMM[9], @XMM[6]
+	pxor	@XMM[9], @XMM[7]
+	 pshufb	@XMM[8], @XMM[4]
+	 pshufb	@XMM[8], @XMM[5]
+	 pshufb	@XMM[8], @XMM[6]
+	 pshufb	@XMM[8], @XMM[7]
+	lea	.LBS0(%rip), %r11	# constants table
+	mov	%ebx,%r10d		# pass rounds
+
+	call	_bsaes_encrypt8_bitslice
+
+	sub	\$8,$len
+	jc	.Lctr_enc_loop_done
+
+	movdqu	0x00($inp), @XMM[8]	# load input
+	movdqu	0x10($inp), @XMM[9]
+	movdqu	0x20($inp), @XMM[10]
+	movdqu	0x30($inp), @XMM[11]
+	movdqu	0x40($inp), @XMM[12]
+	movdqu	0x50($inp), @XMM[13]
+	movdqu	0x60($inp), @XMM[14]
+	movdqu	0x70($inp), @XMM[15]
+	lea	0x80($inp),$inp
+	pxor	@XMM[0], @XMM[8]
+	movdqa	0x20(%rbp), @XMM[0]	# load counter
+	pxor	@XMM[9], @XMM[1]
+	movdqu	@XMM[8], 0x00($out)	# write output
+	pxor	@XMM[10], @XMM[4]
+	movdqu	@XMM[1], 0x10($out)
+	pxor	@XMM[11], @XMM[6]
+	movdqu	@XMM[4], 0x20($out)
+	pxor	@XMM[12], @XMM[3]
+	movdqu	@XMM[6], 0x30($out)
+	pxor	@XMM[13], @XMM[7]
+	movdqu	@XMM[3], 0x40($out)
+	pxor	@XMM[14], @XMM[2]
+	movdqu	@XMM[7], 0x50($out)
+	pxor	@XMM[15], @XMM[5]
+	movdqu	@XMM[2], 0x60($out)
+	lea	.LADD1(%rip), %r11
+	movdqu	@XMM[5], 0x70($out)
+	lea	0x80($out), $out
+	paddd	0x70(%r11), @XMM[0]	# .LADD8
+	jnz	.Lctr_enc_loop
+
+	jmp	.Lctr_enc_done
+.align	16
+.Lctr_enc_loop_done:
+	add	\$8, $len
+	movdqu	0x00($inp), @XMM[8]	# load input
+	pxor	@XMM[8], @XMM[0]
+	movdqu	@XMM[0], 0x00($out)	# write output
+	cmp	\$2,$len
+	jb	.Lctr_enc_done
+	movdqu	0x10($inp), @XMM[9]
+	pxor	@XMM[9], @XMM[1]
+	movdqu	@XMM[1], 0x10($out)
+	je	.Lctr_enc_done
+	movdqu	0x20($inp), @XMM[10]
+	pxor	@XMM[10], @XMM[4]
+	movdqu	@XMM[4], 0x20($out)
+	cmp	\$4,$len
+	jb	.Lctr_enc_done
+	movdqu	0x30($inp), @XMM[11]
+	pxor	@XMM[11], @XMM[6]
+	movdqu	@XMM[6], 0x30($out)
+	je	.Lctr_enc_done
+	movdqu	0x40($inp), @XMM[12]
+	pxor	@XMM[12], @XMM[3]
+	movdqu	@XMM[3], 0x40($out)
+	cmp	\$6,$len
+	jb	.Lctr_enc_done
+	movdqu	0x50($inp), @XMM[13]
+	pxor	@XMM[13], @XMM[7]
+	movdqu	@XMM[7], 0x50($out)
+	je	.Lctr_enc_done
+	movdqu	0x60($inp), @XMM[14]
+	pxor	@XMM[14], @XMM[2]
+	movdqu	@XMM[2], 0x60($out)
+	jmp	.Lctr_enc_done
+
+.align	16
+.Lctr_enc_short:
+	lea	0x20(%rbp), $arg1
+	lea	0x30(%rbp), $arg2
+	lea	($key), $arg3
+	call	asm_AES_encrypt
+	movdqu	($inp), @XMM[1]
+	lea	16($inp), $inp
+	mov	0x2c(%rbp), %eax	# load 32-bit counter
+	bswap	%eax
+	pxor	0x30(%rbp), @XMM[1]
+	inc	%eax			# increment
+	movdqu	@XMM[1], ($out)
+	bswap	%eax
+	lea	16($out), $out
+	mov	%eax, 0x2c(%rsp)	# save 32-bit counter
+	dec	$len
+	jnz	.Lctr_enc_short
+
+.Lctr_enc_done:
+	lea	(%rsp), %rax
+	pxor	%xmm0, %xmm0
+.Lctr_enc_bzero:			# wipe key schedule [if any]
+	movdqa	%xmm0, 0x00(%rax)
+	movdqa	%xmm0, 0x10(%rax)
+	lea	0x20(%rax), %rax
+	cmp	%rax, %rbp
+	ja	.Lctr_enc_bzero
+
+	lea	(%rbp),%rsp		# restore %rsp
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	movaps	0x40(%rbp), %xmm6
+	movaps	0x50(%rbp), %xmm7
+	movaps	0x60(%rbp), %xmm8
+	movaps	0x70(%rbp), %xmm9
+	movaps	0x80(%rbp), %xmm10
+	movaps	0x90(%rbp), %xmm11
+	movaps	0xa0(%rbp), %xmm12
+	movaps	0xb0(%rbp), %xmm13
+	movaps	0xc0(%rbp), %xmm14
+	movaps	0xd0(%rbp), %xmm15
+	lea	0xa0(%rbp), %rsp
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	0x48(%rsp), %r15
+	mov	0x50(%rsp), %r14
+	mov	0x58(%rsp), %r13
+	mov	0x60(%rsp), %r12
+	mov	0x68(%rsp), %rbx
+	mov	0x70(%rsp), %rax
+	lea	0x78(%rsp), %rsp
+	mov	%rax, %rbp
+.Lctr_enc_epilogue:
+	ret
+.size	bsaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks,.-bsaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks
+___
+######################################################################
+# void bsaes_xts_[en|de]crypt(const char *inp,char *out,size_t len,
+#	const AES_KEY *key1, const AES_KEY *key2,
+#	const unsigned char iv[16]);
+#
+my ($twmask,$twres,$twtmp)=@XMM[13..15];
+$arg6=~s/d$//;
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	bsaes_xts_encrypt
+.type	bsaes_xts_encrypt,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+bsaes_xts_encrypt:
+	mov	%rsp, %rax
+.Lxts_enc_prologue:
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+	lea	-0x48(%rsp), %rsp
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	mov	0xa0(%rsp),$arg5	# pull key2
+	mov	0xa8(%rsp),$arg6	# pull ivp
+	lea	-0xa0(%rsp), %rsp
+	movaps	%xmm6, 0x40(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm7, 0x50(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm8, 0x60(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm9, 0x70(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm10, 0x80(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm11, 0x90(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm12, 0xa0(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm13, 0xb0(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm14, 0xc0(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm15, 0xd0(%rsp)
+.Lxts_enc_body:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	%rsp, %rbp		# backup %rsp
+	mov	$arg1, $inp		# backup arguments
+	mov	$arg2, $out
+	mov	$arg3, $len
+	mov	$arg4, $key
+
+	lea	($arg6), $arg1
+	lea	0x20(%rbp), $arg2
+	lea	($arg5), $arg3
+	call	asm_AES_encrypt		# generate initial tweak
+
+	mov	240($key), %eax		# rounds
+	mov	$len, %rbx		# backup $len
+
+	mov	%eax, %edx		# rounds
+	shl	\$7, %rax		# 128 bytes per inner round key
+	sub	\$`128-32`, %rax	# size of bit-sliced key schedule
+	sub	%rax, %rsp
+
+	mov	%rsp, %rax		# pass key schedule
+	mov	$key, %rcx		# pass key
+	mov	%edx, %r10d		# pass rounds
+	call	_bsaes_key_convert
+	pxor	%xmm6, %xmm7		# fix up last round key
+	movdqa	%xmm7, (%rax)		# save last round key
+
+	and	\$-16, $len
+	sub	\$0x80, %rsp		# place for tweak[8]
+	movdqa	0x20(%rbp), @XMM[7]	# initial tweak
+
+	pxor	$twtmp, $twtmp
+	movdqa	.Lxts_magic(%rip), $twmask
+	pcmpgtd	@XMM[7], $twtmp		# broadcast upper bits
+
+	sub	\$0x80, $len
+	jc	.Lxts_enc_short
+	jmp	.Lxts_enc_loop
+
+.align	16
+.Lxts_enc_loop:
+___
+    for ($i=0;$i<7;$i++) {
+    $code.=<<___;
+	pshufd	\$0x13, $twtmp, $twres
+	pxor	$twtmp, $twtmp
+	movdqa	@XMM[7], @XMM[$i]
+	movdqa	@XMM[7], `0x10*$i`(%rsp)# save tweak[$i]
+	paddq	@XMM[7], @XMM[7]	# psllq	1,$tweak
+	pand	$twmask, $twres		# isolate carry and residue
+	pcmpgtd	@XMM[7], $twtmp		# broadcast upper bits
+	pxor	$twres, @XMM[7]
+___
+    $code.=<<___ if ($i>=1);
+	movdqu	`0x10*($i-1)`($inp), @XMM[8+$i-1]
+___
+    $code.=<<___ if ($i>=2);
+	pxor	@XMM[8+$i-2], @XMM[$i-2]# input[] ^ tweak[]
+___
+    }
+$code.=<<___;
+	movdqu	0x60($inp), @XMM[8+6]
+	pxor	@XMM[8+5], @XMM[5]
+	movdqu	0x70($inp), @XMM[8+7]
+	lea	0x80($inp), $inp
+	movdqa	@XMM[7], 0x70(%rsp)
+	pxor	@XMM[8+6], @XMM[6]
+	lea	0x80(%rsp), %rax	# pass key schedule
+	pxor	@XMM[8+7], @XMM[7]
+	mov	%edx, %r10d		# pass rounds
+
+	call	_bsaes_encrypt8
+
+	pxor	0x00(%rsp), @XMM[0]	# ^= tweak[]
+	pxor	0x10(%rsp), @XMM[1]
+	movdqu	@XMM[0], 0x00($out)	# write output
+	pxor	0x20(%rsp), @XMM[4]
+	movdqu	@XMM[1], 0x10($out)
+	pxor	0x30(%rsp), @XMM[6]
+	movdqu	@XMM[4], 0x20($out)
+	pxor	0x40(%rsp), @XMM[3]
+	movdqu	@XMM[6], 0x30($out)
+	pxor	0x50(%rsp), @XMM[7]
+	movdqu	@XMM[3], 0x40($out)
+	pxor	0x60(%rsp), @XMM[2]
+	movdqu	@XMM[7], 0x50($out)
+	pxor	0x70(%rsp), @XMM[5]
+	movdqu	@XMM[2], 0x60($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[5], 0x70($out)
+	lea	0x80($out), $out
+
+	movdqa	0x70(%rsp), @XMM[7]	# prepare next iteration tweak
+	pxor	$twtmp, $twtmp
+	movdqa	.Lxts_magic(%rip), $twmask
+	pcmpgtd	@XMM[7], $twtmp
+	pshufd	\$0x13, $twtmp, $twres
+	pxor	$twtmp, $twtmp
+	paddq	@XMM[7], @XMM[7]	# psllq	1,$tweak
+	pand	$twmask, $twres		# isolate carry and residue
+	pcmpgtd	@XMM[7], $twtmp		# broadcast upper bits
+	pxor	$twres, @XMM[7]
+
+	sub	\$0x80,$len
+	jnc	.Lxts_enc_loop
+
+.Lxts_enc_short:
+	add	\$0x80, $len
+	jz	.Lxts_enc_done
+___
+    for ($i=0;$i<7;$i++) {
+    $code.=<<___;
+	pshufd	\$0x13, $twtmp, $twres
+	pxor	$twtmp, $twtmp
+	movdqa	@XMM[7], @XMM[$i]
+	movdqa	@XMM[7], `0x10*$i`(%rsp)# save tweak[$i]
+	paddq	@XMM[7], @XMM[7]	# psllq	1,$tweak
+	pand	$twmask, $twres		# isolate carry and residue
+	pcmpgtd	@XMM[7], $twtmp		# broadcast upper bits
+	pxor	$twres, @XMM[7]
+___
+    $code.=<<___ if ($i>=1);
+	movdqu	`0x10*($i-1)`($inp), @XMM[8+$i-1]
+	cmp	\$`0x10*$i`,$len
+	je	.Lxts_enc_$i
+___
+    $code.=<<___ if ($i>=2);
+	pxor	@XMM[8+$i-2], @XMM[$i-2]# input[] ^ tweak[]
+___
+    }
+$code.=<<___;
+	movdqu	0x60($inp), @XMM[8+6]
+	pxor	@XMM[8+5], @XMM[5]
+	movdqa	@XMM[7], 0x70(%rsp)
+	lea	0x70($inp), $inp
+	pxor	@XMM[8+6], @XMM[6]
+	lea	0x80(%rsp), %rax	# pass key schedule
+	mov	%edx, %r10d		# pass rounds
+
+	call	_bsaes_encrypt8
+
+	pxor	0x00(%rsp), @XMM[0]	# ^= tweak[]
+	pxor	0x10(%rsp), @XMM[1]
+	movdqu	@XMM[0], 0x00($out)	# write output
+	pxor	0x20(%rsp), @XMM[4]
+	movdqu	@XMM[1], 0x10($out)
+	pxor	0x30(%rsp), @XMM[6]
+	movdqu	@XMM[4], 0x20($out)
+	pxor	0x40(%rsp), @XMM[3]
+	movdqu	@XMM[6], 0x30($out)
+	pxor	0x50(%rsp), @XMM[7]
+	movdqu	@XMM[3], 0x40($out)
+	pxor	0x60(%rsp), @XMM[2]
+	movdqu	@XMM[7], 0x50($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[2], 0x60($out)
+	lea	0x70($out), $out
+
+	movdqa	0x70(%rsp), @XMM[7]	# next iteration tweak
+	jmp	.Lxts_enc_done
+.align	16
+.Lxts_enc_6:
+	pxor	@XMM[8+4], @XMM[4]
+	lea	0x60($inp), $inp
+	pxor	@XMM[8+5], @XMM[5]
+	lea	0x80(%rsp), %rax	# pass key schedule
+	mov	%edx, %r10d		# pass rounds
+
+	call	_bsaes_encrypt8
+
+	pxor	0x00(%rsp), @XMM[0]	# ^= tweak[]
+	pxor	0x10(%rsp), @XMM[1]
+	movdqu	@XMM[0], 0x00($out)	# write output
+	pxor	0x20(%rsp), @XMM[4]
+	movdqu	@XMM[1], 0x10($out)
+	pxor	0x30(%rsp), @XMM[6]
+	movdqu	@XMM[4], 0x20($out)
+	pxor	0x40(%rsp), @XMM[3]
+	movdqu	@XMM[6], 0x30($out)
+	pxor	0x50(%rsp), @XMM[7]
+	movdqu	@XMM[3], 0x40($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[7], 0x50($out)
+	lea	0x60($out), $out
+
+	movdqa	0x60(%rsp), @XMM[7]	# next iteration tweak
+	jmp	.Lxts_enc_done
+.align	16
+.Lxts_enc_5:
+	pxor	@XMM[8+3], @XMM[3]
+	lea	0x50($inp), $inp
+	pxor	@XMM[8+4], @XMM[4]
+	lea	0x80(%rsp), %rax	# pass key schedule
+	mov	%edx, %r10d		# pass rounds
+
+	call	_bsaes_encrypt8
+
+	pxor	0x00(%rsp), @XMM[0]	# ^= tweak[]
+	pxor	0x10(%rsp), @XMM[1]
+	movdqu	@XMM[0], 0x00($out)	# write output
+	pxor	0x20(%rsp), @XMM[4]
+	movdqu	@XMM[1], 0x10($out)
+	pxor	0x30(%rsp), @XMM[6]
+	movdqu	@XMM[4], 0x20($out)
+	pxor	0x40(%rsp), @XMM[3]
+	movdqu	@XMM[6], 0x30($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[3], 0x40($out)
+	lea	0x50($out), $out
+
+	movdqa	0x50(%rsp), @XMM[7]	# next iteration tweak
+	jmp	.Lxts_enc_done
+.align	16
+.Lxts_enc_4:
+	pxor	@XMM[8+2], @XMM[2]
+	lea	0x40($inp), $inp
+	pxor	@XMM[8+3], @XMM[3]
+	lea	0x80(%rsp), %rax	# pass key schedule
+	mov	%edx, %r10d		# pass rounds
+
+	call	_bsaes_encrypt8
+
+	pxor	0x00(%rsp), @XMM[0]	# ^= tweak[]
+	pxor	0x10(%rsp), @XMM[1]
+	movdqu	@XMM[0], 0x00($out)	# write output
+	pxor	0x20(%rsp), @XMM[4]
+	movdqu	@XMM[1], 0x10($out)
+	pxor	0x30(%rsp), @XMM[6]
+	movdqu	@XMM[4], 0x20($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[6], 0x30($out)
+	lea	0x40($out), $out
+
+	movdqa	0x40(%rsp), @XMM[7]	# next iteration tweak
+	jmp	.Lxts_enc_done
+.align	16
+.Lxts_enc_3:
+	pxor	@XMM[8+1], @XMM[1]
+	lea	0x30($inp), $inp
+	pxor	@XMM[8+2], @XMM[2]
+	lea	0x80(%rsp), %rax	# pass key schedule
+	mov	%edx, %r10d		# pass rounds
+
+	call	_bsaes_encrypt8
+
+	pxor	0x00(%rsp), @XMM[0]	# ^= tweak[]
+	pxor	0x10(%rsp), @XMM[1]
+	movdqu	@XMM[0], 0x00($out)	# write output
+	pxor	0x20(%rsp), @XMM[4]
+	movdqu	@XMM[1], 0x10($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[4], 0x20($out)
+	lea	0x30($out), $out
+
+	movdqa	0x30(%rsp), @XMM[7]	# next iteration tweak
+	jmp	.Lxts_enc_done
+.align	16
+.Lxts_enc_2:
+	pxor	@XMM[8+0], @XMM[0]
+	lea	0x20($inp), $inp
+	pxor	@XMM[8+1], @XMM[1]
+	lea	0x80(%rsp), %rax	# pass key schedule
+	mov	%edx, %r10d		# pass rounds
+
+	call	_bsaes_encrypt8
+
+	pxor	0x00(%rsp), @XMM[0]	# ^= tweak[]
+	pxor	0x10(%rsp), @XMM[1]
+	movdqu	@XMM[0], 0x00($out)	# write output
+	movdqu	@XMM[1], 0x10($out)
+	lea	0x20($out), $out
+
+	movdqa	0x20(%rsp), @XMM[7]	# next iteration tweak
+	jmp	.Lxts_enc_done
+.align	16
+.Lxts_enc_1:
+	pxor	@XMM[0], @XMM[8]
+	lea	0x10($inp), $inp
+	movdqa	@XMM[8], 0x20(%rbp)
+	lea	0x20(%rbp), $arg1
+	lea	0x20(%rbp), $arg2
+	lea	($key), $arg3
+	call	asm_AES_encrypt		# doesn't touch %xmm
+	pxor	0x20(%rbp), @XMM[0]	# ^= tweak[]
+	#pxor	@XMM[8], @XMM[0]
+	#lea	0x80(%rsp), %rax	# pass key schedule
+	#mov	%edx, %r10d		# pass rounds
+	#call	_bsaes_encrypt8
+	#pxor	0x00(%rsp), @XMM[0]	# ^= tweak[]
+	movdqu	@XMM[0], 0x00($out)	# write output
+	lea	0x10($out), $out
+
+	movdqa	0x10(%rsp), @XMM[7]	# next iteration tweak
+
+.Lxts_enc_done:
+	and	\$15, %ebx
+	jz	.Lxts_enc_ret
+	mov	$out, %rdx
+
+.Lxts_enc_steal:
+	movzb	($inp), %eax
+	movzb	-16(%rdx), %ecx
+	lea	1($inp), $inp
+	mov	%al, -16(%rdx)
+	mov	%cl, 0(%rdx)
+	lea	1(%rdx), %rdx
+	sub	\$1,%ebx
+	jnz	.Lxts_enc_steal
+
+	movdqu	-16($out), @XMM[0]
+	lea	0x20(%rbp), $arg1
+	pxor	@XMM[7], @XMM[0]
+	lea	0x20(%rbp), $arg2
+	movdqa	@XMM[0], 0x20(%rbp)
+	lea	($key), $arg3
+	call	asm_AES_encrypt		# doesn't touch %xmm
+	pxor	0x20(%rbp), @XMM[7]
+	movdqu	@XMM[7], -16($out)
+
+.Lxts_enc_ret:
+	lea	(%rsp), %rax
+	pxor	%xmm0, %xmm0
+.Lxts_enc_bzero:			# wipe key schedule [if any]
+	movdqa	%xmm0, 0x00(%rax)
+	movdqa	%xmm0, 0x10(%rax)
+	lea	0x20(%rax), %rax
+	cmp	%rax, %rbp
+	ja	.Lxts_enc_bzero
+
+	lea	(%rbp),%rsp		# restore %rsp
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	movaps	0x40(%rbp), %xmm6
+	movaps	0x50(%rbp), %xmm7
+	movaps	0x60(%rbp), %xmm8
+	movaps	0x70(%rbp), %xmm9
+	movaps	0x80(%rbp), %xmm10
+	movaps	0x90(%rbp), %xmm11
+	movaps	0xa0(%rbp), %xmm12
+	movaps	0xb0(%rbp), %xmm13
+	movaps	0xc0(%rbp), %xmm14
+	movaps	0xd0(%rbp), %xmm15
+	lea	0xa0(%rbp), %rsp
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	0x48(%rsp), %r15
+	mov	0x50(%rsp), %r14
+	mov	0x58(%rsp), %r13
+	mov	0x60(%rsp), %r12
+	mov	0x68(%rsp), %rbx
+	mov	0x70(%rsp), %rax
+	lea	0x78(%rsp), %rsp
+	mov	%rax, %rbp
+.Lxts_enc_epilogue:
+	ret
+.size	bsaes_xts_encrypt,.-bsaes_xts_encrypt
+
+.globl	bsaes_xts_decrypt
+.type	bsaes_xts_decrypt,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+bsaes_xts_decrypt:
+	mov	%rsp, %rax
+.Lxts_dec_prologue:
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+	lea	-0x48(%rsp), %rsp
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	mov	0xa0(%rsp),$arg5	# pull key2
+	mov	0xa8(%rsp),$arg6	# pull ivp
+	lea	-0xa0(%rsp), %rsp
+	movaps	%xmm6, 0x40(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm7, 0x50(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm8, 0x60(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm9, 0x70(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm10, 0x80(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm11, 0x90(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm12, 0xa0(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm13, 0xb0(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm14, 0xc0(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm15, 0xd0(%rsp)
+.Lxts_dec_body:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	%rsp, %rbp		# backup %rsp
+	mov	$arg1, $inp		# backup arguments
+	mov	$arg2, $out
+	mov	$arg3, $len
+	mov	$arg4, $key
+
+	lea	($arg6), $arg1
+	lea	0x20(%rbp), $arg2
+	lea	($arg5), $arg3
+	call	asm_AES_encrypt		# generate initial tweak
+
+	mov	240($key), %eax		# rounds
+	mov	$len, %rbx		# backup $len
+
+	mov	%eax, %edx		# rounds
+	shl	\$7, %rax		# 128 bytes per inner round key
+	sub	\$`128-32`, %rax	# size of bit-sliced key schedule
+	sub	%rax, %rsp
+
+	mov	%rsp, %rax		# pass key schedule
+	mov	$key, %rcx		# pass key
+	mov	%edx, %r10d		# pass rounds
+	call	_bsaes_key_convert
+	pxor	(%rsp), %xmm7		# fix up round 0 key
+	movdqa	%xmm6, (%rax)		# save last round key
+	movdqa	%xmm7, (%rsp)
+
+	xor	%eax, %eax		# if ($len%16) len-=16;
+	and	\$-16, $len
+	test	\$15, %ebx
+	setnz	%al
+	shl	\$4, %rax
+	sub	%rax, $len
+
+	sub	\$0x80, %rsp		# place for tweak[8]
+	movdqa	0x20(%rbp), @XMM[7]	# initial tweak
+
+	pxor	$twtmp, $twtmp
+	movdqa	.Lxts_magic(%rip), $twmask
+	pcmpgtd	@XMM[7], $twtmp		# broadcast upper bits
+
+	sub	\$0x80, $len
+	jc	.Lxts_dec_short
+	jmp	.Lxts_dec_loop
+
+.align	16
+.Lxts_dec_loop:
+___
+    for ($i=0;$i<7;$i++) {
+    $code.=<<___;
+	pshufd	\$0x13, $twtmp, $twres
+	pxor	$twtmp, $twtmp
+	movdqa	@XMM[7], @XMM[$i]
+	movdqa	@XMM[7], `0x10*$i`(%rsp)# save tweak[$i]
+	paddq	@XMM[7], @XMM[7]	# psllq	1,$tweak
+	pand	$twmask, $twres		# isolate carry and residue
+	pcmpgtd	@XMM[7], $twtmp		# broadcast upper bits
+	pxor	$twres, @XMM[7]
+___
+    $code.=<<___ if ($i>=1);
+	movdqu	`0x10*($i-1)`($inp), @XMM[8+$i-1]
+___
+    $code.=<<___ if ($i>=2);
+	pxor	@XMM[8+$i-2], @XMM[$i-2]# input[] ^ tweak[]
+___
+    }
+$code.=<<___;
+	movdqu	0x60($inp), @XMM[8+6]
+	pxor	@XMM[8+5], @XMM[5]
+	movdqu	0x70($inp), @XMM[8+7]
+	lea	0x80($inp), $inp
+	movdqa	@XMM[7], 0x70(%rsp)
+	pxor	@XMM[8+6], @XMM[6]
+	lea	0x80(%rsp), %rax	# pass key schedule
+	pxor	@XMM[8+7], @XMM[7]
+	mov	%edx, %r10d		# pass rounds
+
+	call	_bsaes_decrypt8
+
+	pxor	0x00(%rsp), @XMM[0]	# ^= tweak[]
+	pxor	0x10(%rsp), @XMM[1]
+	movdqu	@XMM[0], 0x00($out)	# write output
+	pxor	0x20(%rsp), @XMM[6]
+	movdqu	@XMM[1], 0x10($out)
+	pxor	0x30(%rsp), @XMM[4]
+	movdqu	@XMM[6], 0x20($out)
+	pxor	0x40(%rsp), @XMM[2]
+	movdqu	@XMM[4], 0x30($out)
+	pxor	0x50(%rsp), @XMM[7]
+	movdqu	@XMM[2], 0x40($out)
+	pxor	0x60(%rsp), @XMM[3]
+	movdqu	@XMM[7], 0x50($out)
+	pxor	0x70(%rsp), @XMM[5]
+	movdqu	@XMM[3], 0x60($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[5], 0x70($out)
+	lea	0x80($out), $out
+
+	movdqa	0x70(%rsp), @XMM[7]	# prepare next iteration tweak
+	pxor	$twtmp, $twtmp
+	movdqa	.Lxts_magic(%rip), $twmask
+	pcmpgtd	@XMM[7], $twtmp
+	pshufd	\$0x13, $twtmp, $twres
+	pxor	$twtmp, $twtmp
+	paddq	@XMM[7], @XMM[7]	# psllq	1,$tweak
+	pand	$twmask, $twres		# isolate carry and residue
+	pcmpgtd	@XMM[7], $twtmp		# broadcast upper bits
+	pxor	$twres, @XMM[7]
+
+	sub	\$0x80,$len
+	jnc	.Lxts_dec_loop
+
+.Lxts_dec_short:
+	add	\$0x80, $len
+	jz	.Lxts_dec_done
+___
+    for ($i=0;$i<7;$i++) {
+    $code.=<<___;
+	pshufd	\$0x13, $twtmp, $twres
+	pxor	$twtmp, $twtmp
+	movdqa	@XMM[7], @XMM[$i]
+	movdqa	@XMM[7], `0x10*$i`(%rsp)# save tweak[$i]
+	paddq	@XMM[7], @XMM[7]	# psllq	1,$tweak
+	pand	$twmask, $twres		# isolate carry and residue
+	pcmpgtd	@XMM[7], $twtmp		# broadcast upper bits
+	pxor	$twres, @XMM[7]
+___
+    $code.=<<___ if ($i>=1);
+	movdqu	`0x10*($i-1)`($inp), @XMM[8+$i-1]
+	cmp	\$`0x10*$i`,$len
+	je	.Lxts_dec_$i
+___
+    $code.=<<___ if ($i>=2);
+	pxor	@XMM[8+$i-2], @XMM[$i-2]# input[] ^ tweak[]
+___
+    }
+$code.=<<___;
+	movdqu	0x60($inp), @XMM[8+6]
+	pxor	@XMM[8+5], @XMM[5]
+	movdqa	@XMM[7], 0x70(%rsp)
+	lea	0x70($inp), $inp
+	pxor	@XMM[8+6], @XMM[6]
+	lea	0x80(%rsp), %rax	# pass key schedule
+	mov	%edx, %r10d		# pass rounds
+
+	call	_bsaes_decrypt8
+
+	pxor	0x00(%rsp), @XMM[0]	# ^= tweak[]
+	pxor	0x10(%rsp), @XMM[1]
+	movdqu	@XMM[0], 0x00($out)	# write output
+	pxor	0x20(%rsp), @XMM[6]
+	movdqu	@XMM[1], 0x10($out)
+	pxor	0x30(%rsp), @XMM[4]
+	movdqu	@XMM[6], 0x20($out)
+	pxor	0x40(%rsp), @XMM[2]
+	movdqu	@XMM[4], 0x30($out)
+	pxor	0x50(%rsp), @XMM[7]
+	movdqu	@XMM[2], 0x40($out)
+	pxor	0x60(%rsp), @XMM[3]
+	movdqu	@XMM[7], 0x50($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[3], 0x60($out)
+	lea	0x70($out), $out
+
+	movdqa	0x70(%rsp), @XMM[7]	# next iteration tweak
+	jmp	.Lxts_dec_done
+.align	16
+.Lxts_dec_6:
+	pxor	@XMM[8+4], @XMM[4]
+	lea	0x60($inp), $inp
+	pxor	@XMM[8+5], @XMM[5]
+	lea	0x80(%rsp), %rax	# pass key schedule
+	mov	%edx, %r10d		# pass rounds
+
+	call	_bsaes_decrypt8
+
+	pxor	0x00(%rsp), @XMM[0]	# ^= tweak[]
+	pxor	0x10(%rsp), @XMM[1]
+	movdqu	@XMM[0], 0x00($out)	# write output
+	pxor	0x20(%rsp), @XMM[6]
+	movdqu	@XMM[1], 0x10($out)
+	pxor	0x30(%rsp), @XMM[4]
+	movdqu	@XMM[6], 0x20($out)
+	pxor	0x40(%rsp), @XMM[2]
+	movdqu	@XMM[4], 0x30($out)
+	pxor	0x50(%rsp), @XMM[7]
+	movdqu	@XMM[2], 0x40($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[7], 0x50($out)
+	lea	0x60($out), $out
+
+	movdqa	0x60(%rsp), @XMM[7]	# next iteration tweak
+	jmp	.Lxts_dec_done
+.align	16
+.Lxts_dec_5:
+	pxor	@XMM[8+3], @XMM[3]
+	lea	0x50($inp), $inp
+	pxor	@XMM[8+4], @XMM[4]
+	lea	0x80(%rsp), %rax	# pass key schedule
+	mov	%edx, %r10d		# pass rounds
+
+	call	_bsaes_decrypt8
+
+	pxor	0x00(%rsp), @XMM[0]	# ^= tweak[]
+	pxor	0x10(%rsp), @XMM[1]
+	movdqu	@XMM[0], 0x00($out)	# write output
+	pxor	0x20(%rsp), @XMM[6]
+	movdqu	@XMM[1], 0x10($out)
+	pxor	0x30(%rsp), @XMM[4]
+	movdqu	@XMM[6], 0x20($out)
+	pxor	0x40(%rsp), @XMM[2]
+	movdqu	@XMM[4], 0x30($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[2], 0x40($out)
+	lea	0x50($out), $out
+
+	movdqa	0x50(%rsp), @XMM[7]	# next iteration tweak
+	jmp	.Lxts_dec_done
+.align	16
+.Lxts_dec_4:
+	pxor	@XMM[8+2], @XMM[2]
+	lea	0x40($inp), $inp
+	pxor	@XMM[8+3], @XMM[3]
+	lea	0x80(%rsp), %rax	# pass key schedule
+	mov	%edx, %r10d		# pass rounds
+
+	call	_bsaes_decrypt8
+
+	pxor	0x00(%rsp), @XMM[0]	# ^= tweak[]
+	pxor	0x10(%rsp), @XMM[1]
+	movdqu	@XMM[0], 0x00($out)	# write output
+	pxor	0x20(%rsp), @XMM[6]
+	movdqu	@XMM[1], 0x10($out)
+	pxor	0x30(%rsp), @XMM[4]
+	movdqu	@XMM[6], 0x20($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[4], 0x30($out)
+	lea	0x40($out), $out
+
+	movdqa	0x40(%rsp), @XMM[7]	# next iteration tweak
+	jmp	.Lxts_dec_done
+.align	16
+.Lxts_dec_3:
+	pxor	@XMM[8+1], @XMM[1]
+	lea	0x30($inp), $inp
+	pxor	@XMM[8+2], @XMM[2]
+	lea	0x80(%rsp), %rax	# pass key schedule
+	mov	%edx, %r10d		# pass rounds
+
+	call	_bsaes_decrypt8
+
+	pxor	0x00(%rsp), @XMM[0]	# ^= tweak[]
+	pxor	0x10(%rsp), @XMM[1]
+	movdqu	@XMM[0], 0x00($out)	# write output
+	pxor	0x20(%rsp), @XMM[6]
+	movdqu	@XMM[1], 0x10($out)
+	movdqu	@XMM[6], 0x20($out)
+	lea	0x30($out), $out
+
+	movdqa	0x30(%rsp), @XMM[7]	# next iteration tweak
+	jmp	.Lxts_dec_done
+.align	16
+.Lxts_dec_2:
+	pxor	@XMM[8+0], @XMM[0]
+	lea	0x20($inp), $inp
+	pxor	@XMM[8+1], @XMM[1]
+	lea	0x80(%rsp), %rax	# pass key schedule
+	mov	%edx, %r10d		# pass rounds
+
+	call	_bsaes_decrypt8
+
+	pxor	0x00(%rsp), @XMM[0]	# ^= tweak[]
+	pxor	0x10(%rsp), @XMM[1]
+	movdqu	@XMM[0], 0x00($out)	# write output
+	movdqu	@XMM[1], 0x10($out)
+	lea	0x20($out), $out
+
+	movdqa	0x20(%rsp), @XMM[7]	# next iteration tweak
+	jmp	.Lxts_dec_done
+.align	16
+.Lxts_dec_1:
+	pxor	@XMM[0], @XMM[8]
+	lea	0x10($inp), $inp
+	movdqa	@XMM[8], 0x20(%rbp)
+	lea	0x20(%rbp), $arg1
+	lea	0x20(%rbp), $arg2
+	lea	($key), $arg3
+	call	asm_AES_decrypt		# doesn't touch %xmm
+	pxor	0x20(%rbp), @XMM[0]	# ^= tweak[]
+	#pxor	@XMM[8], @XMM[0]
+	#lea	0x80(%rsp), %rax	# pass key schedule
+	#mov	%edx, %r10d		# pass rounds
+	#call	_bsaes_decrypt8
+	#pxor	0x00(%rsp), @XMM[0]	# ^= tweak[]
+	movdqu	@XMM[0], 0x00($out)	# write output
+	lea	0x10($out), $out
+
+	movdqa	0x10(%rsp), @XMM[7]	# next iteration tweak
+
+.Lxts_dec_done:
+	and	\$15, %ebx
+	jz	.Lxts_dec_ret
+
+	pxor	$twtmp, $twtmp
+	movdqa	.Lxts_magic(%rip), $twmask
+	pcmpgtd	@XMM[7], $twtmp
+	pshufd	\$0x13, $twtmp, $twres
+	movdqa	@XMM[7], @XMM[6]
+	paddq	@XMM[7], @XMM[7]	# psllq 1,$tweak
+	pand	$twmask, $twres		# isolate carry and residue
+	movdqu	($inp), @XMM[0]
+	pxor	$twres, @XMM[7]
+
+	lea	0x20(%rbp), $arg1
+	pxor	@XMM[7], @XMM[0]
+	lea	0x20(%rbp), $arg2
+	movdqa	@XMM[0], 0x20(%rbp)
+	lea	($key), $arg3
+	call	asm_AES_decrypt		# doesn't touch %xmm
+	pxor	0x20(%rbp), @XMM[7]
+	mov	$out, %rdx
+	movdqu	@XMM[7], ($out)
+
+.Lxts_dec_steal:
+	movzb	16($inp), %eax
+	movzb	(%rdx), %ecx
+	lea	1($inp), $inp
+	mov	%al, (%rdx)
+	mov	%cl, 16(%rdx)
+	lea	1(%rdx), %rdx
+	sub	\$1,%ebx
+	jnz	.Lxts_dec_steal
+
+	movdqu	($out), @XMM[0]
+	lea	0x20(%rbp), $arg1
+	pxor	@XMM[6], @XMM[0]
+	lea	0x20(%rbp), $arg2
+	movdqa	@XMM[0], 0x20(%rbp)
+	lea	($key), $arg3
+	call	asm_AES_decrypt		# doesn't touch %xmm
+	pxor	0x20(%rbp), @XMM[6]
+	movdqu	@XMM[6], ($out)
+
+.Lxts_dec_ret:
+	lea	(%rsp), %rax
+	pxor	%xmm0, %xmm0
+.Lxts_dec_bzero:			# wipe key schedule [if any]
+	movdqa	%xmm0, 0x00(%rax)
+	movdqa	%xmm0, 0x10(%rax)
+	lea	0x20(%rax), %rax
+	cmp	%rax, %rbp
+	ja	.Lxts_dec_bzero
+
+	lea	(%rbp),%rsp		# restore %rsp
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	movaps	0x40(%rbp), %xmm6
+	movaps	0x50(%rbp), %xmm7
+	movaps	0x60(%rbp), %xmm8
+	movaps	0x70(%rbp), %xmm9
+	movaps	0x80(%rbp), %xmm10
+	movaps	0x90(%rbp), %xmm11
+	movaps	0xa0(%rbp), %xmm12
+	movaps	0xb0(%rbp), %xmm13
+	movaps	0xc0(%rbp), %xmm14
+	movaps	0xd0(%rbp), %xmm15
+	lea	0xa0(%rbp), %rsp
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	0x48(%rsp), %r15
+	mov	0x50(%rsp), %r14
+	mov	0x58(%rsp), %r13
+	mov	0x60(%rsp), %r12
+	mov	0x68(%rsp), %rbx
+	mov	0x70(%rsp), %rax
+	lea	0x78(%rsp), %rsp
+	mov	%rax, %rbp
+.Lxts_dec_epilogue:
+	ret
+.size	bsaes_xts_decrypt,.-bsaes_xts_decrypt
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+.type	_bsaes_const,\@object
+.align	64
+_bsaes_const:
+.LM0ISR:	# InvShiftRows constants
+	.quad	0x0a0e0206070b0f03, 0x0004080c0d010509
+.LISRM0:
+	.quad	0x01040b0e0205080f, 0x0306090c00070a0d
+.LISR:
+	.quad	0x0504070602010003, 0x0f0e0d0c080b0a09
+.LBS0:		# bit-slice constants
+	.quad	0x5555555555555555, 0x5555555555555555
+.LBS1:
+	.quad	0x3333333333333333, 0x3333333333333333
+.LBS2:
+	.quad	0x0f0f0f0f0f0f0f0f, 0x0f0f0f0f0f0f0f0f
+.LSR:		# shiftrows constants
+	.quad	0x0504070600030201, 0x0f0e0d0c0a09080b
+.LSRM0:
+	.quad	0x0304090e00050a0f, 0x01060b0c0207080d
+.LM0SR:
+	.quad	0x0a0e02060f03070b, 0x0004080c05090d01
+.LSWPUP:	# byte-swap upper dword
+	.quad	0x0706050403020100, 0x0c0d0e0f0b0a0908
+.LSWPUPM0SR:
+	.quad	0x0a0d02060c03070b, 0x0004080f05090e01
+.LADD1:		# counter increment constants
+	.quad	0x0000000000000000, 0x0000000100000000
+.LADD2:
+	.quad	0x0000000000000000, 0x0000000200000000
+.LADD3:
+	.quad	0x0000000000000000, 0x0000000300000000
+.LADD4:
+	.quad	0x0000000000000000, 0x0000000400000000
+.LADD5:
+	.quad	0x0000000000000000, 0x0000000500000000
+.LADD6:
+	.quad	0x0000000000000000, 0x0000000600000000
+.LADD7:
+	.quad	0x0000000000000000, 0x0000000700000000
+.LADD8:
+	.quad	0x0000000000000000, 0x0000000800000000
+.Lxts_magic:
+	.long	0x87,0,1,0
+.Lmasks:
+	.quad	0x0101010101010101, 0x0101010101010101
+	.quad	0x0202020202020202, 0x0202020202020202
+	.quad	0x0404040404040404, 0x0404040404040404
+	.quad	0x0808080808080808, 0x0808080808080808
+.LM0:
+	.quad	0x02060a0e03070b0f, 0x0004080c0105090d
+.L63:
+	.quad	0x6363636363636363, 0x6363636363636363
+.asciz	"Bit-sliced AES for x86_64/SSSE3, Emilia Käsper, Peter Schwabe, Andy Polyakov"
+.align	64
+.size	_bsaes_const,.-_bsaes_const
+___
+
+# EXCEPTION_DISPOSITION handler (EXCEPTION_RECORD *rec,ULONG64 frame,
+#		CONTEXT *context,DISPATCHER_CONTEXT *disp)
+if ($win64) {
+$rec="%rcx";
+$frame="%rdx";
+$context="%r8";
+$disp="%r9";
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.extern	__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind
+.type	se_handler,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+se_handler:
+	push	%rsi
+	push	%rdi
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+	pushfq
+	sub	\$64,%rsp
+
+	mov	120($context),%rax	# pull context->Rax
+	mov	248($context),%rbx	# pull context->Rip
+
+	mov	8($disp),%rsi		# disp->ImageBase
+	mov	56($disp),%r11		# disp->HandlerData
+
+	mov	0(%r11),%r10d		# HandlerData[0]
+	lea	(%rsi,%r10),%r10	# prologue label
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip<prologue label
+	jb	.Lin_prologue
+
+	mov	152($context),%rax	# pull context->Rsp
+
+	mov	4(%r11),%r10d		# HandlerData[1]
+	lea	(%rsi,%r10),%r10	# epilogue label
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip>=epilogue label
+	jae	.Lin_prologue
+
+	mov	160($context),%rax	# pull context->Rbp
+
+	lea	0x40(%rax),%rsi		# %xmm save area
+	lea	512($context),%rdi	# &context.Xmm6
+	mov	\$20,%ecx		# 10*sizeof(%xmm0)/sizeof(%rax)
+	.long	0xa548f3fc		# cld; rep movsq
+	lea	0xa0(%rax),%rax		# adjust stack pointer
+
+	mov	0x70(%rax),%rbp
+	mov	0x68(%rax),%rbx
+	mov	0x60(%rax),%r12
+	mov	0x58(%rax),%r13
+	mov	0x50(%rax),%r14
+	mov	0x48(%rax),%r15
+	lea	0x78(%rax),%rax		# adjust stack pointer
+	mov	%rbx,144($context)	# restore context->Rbx
+	mov	%rbp,160($context)	# restore context->Rbp
+	mov	%r12,216($context)	# restore context->R12
+	mov	%r13,224($context)	# restore context->R13
+	mov	%r14,232($context)	# restore context->R14
+	mov	%r15,240($context)	# restore context->R15
+
+.Lin_prologue:
+	mov	%rax,152($context)	# restore context->Rsp
+
+	mov	40($disp),%rdi		# disp->ContextRecord
+	mov	$context,%rsi		# context
+	mov	\$`1232/8`,%ecx		# sizeof(CONTEXT)
+	.long	0xa548f3fc		# cld; rep movsq
+
+	mov	$disp,%rsi
+	xor	%rcx,%rcx		# arg1, UNW_FLAG_NHANDLER
+	mov	8(%rsi),%rdx		# arg2, disp->ImageBase
+	mov	0(%rsi),%r8		# arg3, disp->ControlPc
+	mov	16(%rsi),%r9		# arg4, disp->FunctionEntry
+	mov	40(%rsi),%r10		# disp->ContextRecord
+	lea	56(%rsi),%r11		# &disp->HandlerData
+	lea	24(%rsi),%r12		# &disp->EstablisherFrame
+	mov	%r10,32(%rsp)		# arg5
+	mov	%r11,40(%rsp)		# arg6
+	mov	%r12,48(%rsp)		# arg7
+	mov	%rcx,56(%rsp)		# arg8, (NULL)
+	call	*__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind(%rip)
+
+	mov	\$1,%eax		# ExceptionContinueSearch
+	add	\$64,%rsp
+	popfq
+	pop	%r15
+	pop	%r14
+	pop	%r13
+	pop	%r12
+	pop	%rbp
+	pop	%rbx
+	pop	%rdi
+	pop	%rsi
+	ret
+.size	se_handler,.-se_handler
+
+.section	.pdata
+.align	4
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($ecb);
+	.rva	.Lecb_enc_prologue
+	.rva	.Lecb_enc_epilogue
+	.rva	.Lecb_enc_info
+
+	.rva	.Lecb_dec_prologue
+	.rva	.Lecb_dec_epilogue
+	.rva	.Lecb_dec_info
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	.rva	.Lcbc_dec_prologue
+	.rva	.Lcbc_dec_epilogue
+	.rva	.Lcbc_dec_info
+
+	.rva	.Lctr_enc_prologue
+	.rva	.Lctr_enc_epilogue
+	.rva	.Lctr_enc_info
+
+	.rva	.Lxts_enc_prologue
+	.rva	.Lxts_enc_epilogue
+	.rva	.Lxts_enc_info
+
+	.rva	.Lxts_dec_prologue
+	.rva	.Lxts_dec_epilogue
+	.rva	.Lxts_dec_info
+
+.section	.xdata
+.align	8
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($ecb);
+.Lecb_enc_info:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	se_handler
+	.rva	.Lecb_enc_body,.Lecb_enc_epilogue	# HandlerData[]
+.Lecb_dec_info:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	se_handler
+	.rva	.Lecb_dec_body,.Lecb_dec_epilogue	# HandlerData[]
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+.Lcbc_dec_info:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	se_handler
+	.rva	.Lcbc_dec_body,.Lcbc_dec_epilogue	# HandlerData[]
+.Lctr_enc_info:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	se_handler
+	.rva	.Lctr_enc_body,.Lctr_enc_epilogue	# HandlerData[]
+.Lxts_enc_info:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	se_handler
+	.rva	.Lxts_enc_body,.Lxts_enc_epilogue	# HandlerData[]
+.Lxts_dec_info:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	se_handler
+	.rva	.Lxts_dec_body,.Lxts_dec_epilogue	# HandlerData[]
+___
+}
+
+$code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval($1)/gem;
+
+print $code;
+
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/asm/vpaes-armv8.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/asm/vpaes-armv8.pl
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..d6b5f56
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/asm/vpaes-armv8.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,1259 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+######################################################################
+## Constant-time SSSE3 AES core implementation.
+## version 0.1
+##
+## By Mike Hamburg (Stanford University), 2009
+## Public domain.
+##
+## For details see http://shiftleft.org/papers/vector_aes/ and
+## http://crypto.stanford.edu/vpaes/.
+##
+######################################################################
+# ARMv8 NEON adaptation by <appro@openssl.org>
+#
+# Reason for undertaken effort is that there is at least one popular
+# SoC based on Cortex-A53 that doesn't have crypto extensions.
+#
+#                   CBC enc     ECB enc/dec(*)   [bit-sliced enc/dec]
+# Cortex-A53        21.5        18.1/20.6        [17.5/19.8         ]
+# Cortex-A57        36.0(**)    20.4/24.9(**)    [14.4/16.6         ]
+# X-Gene            45.9(**)    45.8/57.7(**)    [33.1/37.6(**)     ]
+# Denver(***)       16.6(**)    15.1/17.8(**)    [8.80/9.93         ]
+# Apple A7(***)     22.7(**)    10.9/14.3        [8.45/10.0         ]
+# Mongoose(***)     26.3(**)    21.0/25.0(**)    [13.3/16.8         ]
+#
+# (*)	ECB denotes approximate result for parallelizeable modes
+#	such as CBC decrypt, CTR, etc.;
+# (**)	these results are worse than scalar compiler-generated
+#	code, but it's constant-time and therefore preferred;
+# (***)	presented for reference/comparison purposes;
+
+$flavour = shift;
+while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {}
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+( $xlate="${dir}arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
+( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
+die "can't locate arm-xlate.pl";
+
+open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output";
+*STDOUT=*OUT;
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.text
+
+.type	_vpaes_consts,%object
+.align	7	// totally strategic alignment
+_vpaes_consts:
+.Lk_mc_forward:	// mc_forward
+	.quad	0x0407060500030201, 0x0C0F0E0D080B0A09
+	.quad	0x080B0A0904070605, 0x000302010C0F0E0D
+	.quad	0x0C0F0E0D080B0A09, 0x0407060500030201
+	.quad	0x000302010C0F0E0D, 0x080B0A0904070605
+.Lk_mc_backward:// mc_backward
+	.quad	0x0605040702010003, 0x0E0D0C0F0A09080B
+	.quad	0x020100030E0D0C0F, 0x0A09080B06050407
+	.quad	0x0E0D0C0F0A09080B, 0x0605040702010003
+	.quad	0x0A09080B06050407, 0x020100030E0D0C0F
+.Lk_sr:		// sr
+	.quad	0x0706050403020100, 0x0F0E0D0C0B0A0908
+	.quad	0x030E09040F0A0500, 0x0B06010C07020D08
+	.quad	0x0F060D040B020900, 0x070E050C030A0108
+	.quad	0x0B0E0104070A0D00, 0x0306090C0F020508
+
+//
+// "Hot" constants
+//
+.Lk_inv:	// inv, inva
+	.quad	0x0E05060F0D080180, 0x040703090A0B0C02
+	.quad	0x01040A060F0B0780, 0x030D0E0C02050809
+.Lk_ipt:	// input transform (lo, hi)
+	.quad	0xC2B2E8985A2A7000, 0xCABAE09052227808
+	.quad	0x4C01307D317C4D00, 0xCD80B1FCB0FDCC81
+.Lk_sbo:	// sbou, sbot
+	.quad	0xD0D26D176FBDC700, 0x15AABF7AC502A878
+	.quad	0xCFE474A55FBB6A00, 0x8E1E90D1412B35FA
+.Lk_sb1:	// sb1u, sb1t
+	.quad	0x3618D415FAE22300, 0x3BF7CCC10D2ED9EF
+	.quad	0xB19BE18FCB503E00, 0xA5DF7A6E142AF544
+.Lk_sb2:	// sb2u, sb2t
+	.quad	0x69EB88400AE12900, 0xC2A163C8AB82234A
+	.quad	0xE27A93C60B712400, 0x5EB7E955BC982FCD
+
+//
+//  Decryption stuff
+//
+.Lk_dipt:	// decryption input transform
+	.quad	0x0F505B040B545F00, 0x154A411E114E451A
+	.quad	0x86E383E660056500, 0x12771772F491F194
+.Lk_dsbo:	// decryption sbox final output
+	.quad	0x1387EA537EF94000, 0xC7AA6DB9D4943E2D
+	.quad	0x12D7560F93441D00, 0xCA4B8159D8C58E9C
+.Lk_dsb9:	// decryption sbox output *9*u, *9*t
+	.quad	0x851C03539A86D600, 0xCAD51F504F994CC9
+	.quad	0xC03B1789ECD74900, 0x725E2C9EB2FBA565
+.Lk_dsbd:	// decryption sbox output *D*u, *D*t
+	.quad	0x7D57CCDFE6B1A200, 0xF56E9B13882A4439
+	.quad	0x3CE2FAF724C6CB00, 0x2931180D15DEEFD3
+.Lk_dsbb:	// decryption sbox output *B*u, *B*t
+	.quad	0xD022649296B44200, 0x602646F6B0F2D404
+	.quad	0xC19498A6CD596700, 0xF3FF0C3E3255AA6B
+.Lk_dsbe:	// decryption sbox output *E*u, *E*t
+	.quad	0x46F2929626D4D000, 0x2242600464B4F6B0
+	.quad	0x0C55A6CDFFAAC100, 0x9467F36B98593E32
+
+//
+//  Key schedule constants
+//
+.Lk_dksd:	// decryption key schedule: invskew x*D
+	.quad	0xFEB91A5DA3E44700, 0x0740E3A45A1DBEF9
+	.quad	0x41C277F4B5368300, 0x5FDC69EAAB289D1E
+.Lk_dksb:	// decryption key schedule: invskew x*B
+	.quad	0x9A4FCA1F8550D500, 0x03D653861CC94C99
+	.quad	0x115BEDA7B6FC4A00, 0xD993256F7E3482C8
+.Lk_dkse:	// decryption key schedule: invskew x*E + 0x63
+	.quad	0xD5031CCA1FC9D600, 0x53859A4C994F5086
+	.quad	0xA23196054FDC7BE8, 0xCD5EF96A20B31487
+.Lk_dks9:	// decryption key schedule: invskew x*9
+	.quad	0xB6116FC87ED9A700, 0x4AED933482255BFC
+	.quad	0x4576516227143300, 0x8BB89FACE9DAFDCE
+
+.Lk_rcon:	// rcon
+	.quad	0x1F8391B9AF9DEEB6, 0x702A98084D7C7D81
+
+.Lk_opt:	// output transform
+	.quad	0xFF9F4929D6B66000, 0xF7974121DEBE6808
+	.quad	0x01EDBD5150BCEC00, 0xE10D5DB1B05C0CE0
+.Lk_deskew:	// deskew tables: inverts the sbox's "skew"
+	.quad	0x07E4A34047A4E300, 0x1DFEB95A5DBEF91A
+	.quad	0x5F36B5DC83EA6900, 0x2841C2ABF49D1E77
+
+.asciz  "Vector Permutaion AES for ARMv8, Mike Hamburg (Stanford University)"
+.size	_vpaes_consts,.-_vpaes_consts
+.align	6
+___
+
+{
+my ($inp,$out,$key) = map("x$_",(0..2));
+
+my ($invlo,$invhi,$iptlo,$ipthi,$sbou,$sbot) = map("v$_.16b",(18..23));
+my ($sb1u,$sb1t,$sb2u,$sb2t) = map("v$_.16b",(24..27));
+my ($sb9u,$sb9t,$sbdu,$sbdt,$sbbu,$sbbt,$sbeu,$sbet)=map("v$_.16b",(24..31));
+
+$code.=<<___;
+##
+##  _aes_preheat
+##
+##  Fills register %r10 -> .aes_consts (so you can -fPIC)
+##  and %xmm9-%xmm15 as specified below.
+##
+.type	_vpaes_encrypt_preheat,%function
+.align	4
+_vpaes_encrypt_preheat:
+	adr	x10, .Lk_inv
+	movi	v17.16b, #0x0f
+	ld1	{v18.2d-v19.2d}, [x10],#32	// .Lk_inv
+	ld1	{v20.2d-v23.2d}, [x10],#64	// .Lk_ipt, .Lk_sbo
+	ld1	{v24.2d-v27.2d}, [x10]		// .Lk_sb1, .Lk_sb2
+	ret
+.size	_vpaes_encrypt_preheat,.-_vpaes_encrypt_preheat
+
+##
+##  _aes_encrypt_core
+##
+##  AES-encrypt %xmm0.
+##
+##  Inputs:
+##     %xmm0 = input
+##     %xmm9-%xmm15 as in _vpaes_preheat
+##    (%rdx) = scheduled keys
+##
+##  Output in %xmm0
+##  Clobbers  %xmm1-%xmm5, %r9, %r10, %r11, %rax
+##  Preserves %xmm6 - %xmm8 so you get some local vectors
+##
+##
+.type	_vpaes_encrypt_core,%function
+.align 4
+_vpaes_encrypt_core:
+	mov	x9, $key
+	ldr	w8, [$key,#240]			// pull rounds
+	adr	x11, .Lk_mc_forward+16
+						// vmovdqa	.Lk_ipt(%rip),	%xmm2	# iptlo
+	ld1	{v16.2d}, [x9], #16		// vmovdqu	(%r9),	%xmm5		# round0 key
+	and	v1.16b, v7.16b, v17.16b		// vpand	%xmm9,	%xmm0,	%xmm1
+	ushr	v0.16b, v7.16b, #4		// vpsrlb	\$4,	%xmm0,	%xmm0
+	tbl	v1.16b, {$iptlo}, v1.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm1,	%xmm2,	%xmm1
+						// vmovdqa	.Lk_ipt+16(%rip), %xmm3	# ipthi
+	tbl	v2.16b, {$ipthi}, v0.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm0,	%xmm3,	%xmm2
+	eor	v0.16b, v1.16b, v16.16b		// vpxor	%xmm5,	%xmm1,	%xmm0
+	eor	v0.16b, v0.16b, v2.16b		// vpxor	%xmm2,	%xmm0,	%xmm0
+	b	.Lenc_entry
+
+.align 4
+.Lenc_loop:
+	// middle of middle round
+	add	x10, x11, #0x40
+	tbl	v4.16b, {$sb1t}, v2.16b		// vpshufb	%xmm2,	%xmm13,	%xmm4	# 4 = sb1u
+	ld1	{v1.2d}, [x11], #16		// vmovdqa	-0x40(%r11,%r10), %xmm1	# .Lk_mc_forward[]
+	tbl	v0.16b, {$sb1u}, v3.16b		// vpshufb	%xmm3,	%xmm12,	%xmm0	# 0 = sb1t
+	eor	v4.16b, v4.16b, v16.16b		// vpxor	%xmm5,	%xmm4,	%xmm4	# 4 = sb1u + k
+	tbl	v5.16b,	{$sb2t}, v2.16b		// vpshufb	%xmm2,	%xmm15,	%xmm5	# 4 = sb2u
+	eor	v0.16b, v0.16b, v4.16b		// vpxor	%xmm4,	%xmm0,	%xmm0	# 0 = A
+	tbl	v2.16b, {$sb2u}, v3.16b		// vpshufb	%xmm3,	%xmm14,	%xmm2	# 2 = sb2t
+	ld1	{v4.2d}, [x10]			// vmovdqa	(%r11,%r10), %xmm4	# .Lk_mc_backward[]
+	tbl	v3.16b, {v0.16b}, v1.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm1,	%xmm0,	%xmm3	# 0 = B
+	eor	v2.16b, v2.16b, v5.16b		// vpxor	%xmm5,	%xmm2,	%xmm2	# 2 = 2A
+	tbl	v0.16b, {v0.16b}, v4.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm4,	%xmm0,	%xmm0	# 3 = D
+	eor	v3.16b, v3.16b, v2.16b		// vpxor	%xmm2,	%xmm3,	%xmm3	# 0 = 2A+B
+	tbl	v4.16b, {v3.16b}, v1.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm1,	%xmm3,	%xmm4	# 0 = 2B+C
+	eor	v0.16b, v0.16b, v3.16b		// vpxor	%xmm3,	%xmm0,	%xmm0	# 3 = 2A+B+D
+	and	x11, x11, #~(1<<6)		// and		\$0x30,	%r11		# ... mod 4
+	eor	v0.16b, v0.16b, v4.16b		// vpxor	%xmm4,	%xmm0, %xmm0	# 0 = 2A+3B+C+D
+	sub	w8, w8, #1			// nr--
+
+.Lenc_entry:
+	// top of round
+	and	v1.16b, v0.16b, v17.16b		// vpand	%xmm0,	%xmm9,	%xmm1   # 0 = k
+	ushr	v0.16b, v0.16b, #4		// vpsrlb	\$4,	%xmm0,	%xmm0	# 1 = i
+	tbl	v5.16b, {$invhi}, v1.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm1,	%xmm11,	%xmm5	# 2 = a/k
+	eor	v1.16b, v1.16b, v0.16b		// vpxor	%xmm0,	%xmm1,	%xmm1	# 0 = j
+	tbl	v3.16b, {$invlo}, v0.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm0, 	%xmm10,	%xmm3  	# 3 = 1/i
+	tbl	v4.16b, {$invlo}, v1.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm1, 	%xmm10,	%xmm4  	# 4 = 1/j
+	eor	v3.16b, v3.16b, v5.16b		// vpxor	%xmm5,	%xmm3,	%xmm3	# 3 = iak = 1/i + a/k
+	eor	v4.16b, v4.16b, v5.16b		// vpxor	%xmm5,	%xmm4,	%xmm4  	# 4 = jak = 1/j + a/k
+	tbl	v2.16b, {$invlo}, v3.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm3,	%xmm10,	%xmm2  	# 2 = 1/iak
+	tbl	v3.16b, {$invlo}, v4.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm4,	%xmm10,	%xmm3	# 3 = 1/jak
+	eor	v2.16b, v2.16b, v1.16b		// vpxor	%xmm1,	%xmm2,	%xmm2  	# 2 = io
+	eor	v3.16b, v3.16b, v0.16b		// vpxor	%xmm0,	%xmm3,	%xmm3	# 3 = jo
+	ld1	{v16.2d}, [x9],#16		// vmovdqu	(%r9),	%xmm5
+	cbnz	w8, .Lenc_loop
+
+	// middle of last round
+	add	x10, x11, #0x80
+						// vmovdqa	-0x60(%r10), %xmm4	# 3 : sbou	.Lk_sbo
+						// vmovdqa	-0x50(%r10), %xmm0	# 0 : sbot	.Lk_sbo+16
+	tbl	v4.16b, {$sbou}, v2.16b		// vpshufb	%xmm2,	%xmm4,	%xmm4	# 4 = sbou
+	ld1	{v1.2d}, [x10]			// vmovdqa	0x40(%r11,%r10), %xmm1	# .Lk_sr[]
+	tbl	v0.16b, {$sbot}, v3.16b		// vpshufb	%xmm3,	%xmm0,	%xmm0	# 0 = sb1t
+	eor	v4.16b, v4.16b, v16.16b		// vpxor	%xmm5,	%xmm4,	%xmm4	# 4 = sb1u + k
+	eor	v0.16b, v0.16b, v4.16b		// vpxor	%xmm4,	%xmm0,	%xmm0	# 0 = A
+	tbl	v0.16b, {v0.16b}, v1.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm1,	%xmm0,	%xmm0
+	ret
+.size	_vpaes_encrypt_core,.-_vpaes_encrypt_core
+
+.globl	vpaes_encrypt
+.type	vpaes_encrypt,%function
+.align	4
+vpaes_encrypt:
+	stp	x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
+	add	x29,sp,#0
+
+	ld1	{v7.16b}, [$inp]
+	bl	_vpaes_encrypt_preheat
+	bl	_vpaes_encrypt_core
+	st1	{v0.16b}, [$out]
+
+	ldp	x29,x30,[sp],#16
+	ret
+.size	vpaes_encrypt,.-vpaes_encrypt
+
+.type	_vpaes_encrypt_2x,%function
+.align 4
+_vpaes_encrypt_2x:
+	mov	x9, $key
+	ldr	w8, [$key,#240]			// pull rounds
+	adr	x11, .Lk_mc_forward+16
+						// vmovdqa	.Lk_ipt(%rip),	%xmm2	# iptlo
+	ld1	{v16.2d}, [x9], #16		// vmovdqu	(%r9),	%xmm5		# round0 key
+	and	v1.16b,  v14.16b,  v17.16b	// vpand	%xmm9,	%xmm0,	%xmm1
+	ushr	v0.16b,  v14.16b,  #4		// vpsrlb	\$4,	%xmm0,	%xmm0
+	 and	v9.16b,  v15.16b,  v17.16b
+	 ushr	v8.16b,  v15.16b,  #4
+	tbl	v1.16b,  {$iptlo}, v1.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm1,	%xmm2,	%xmm1
+	 tbl	v9.16b,  {$iptlo}, v9.16b
+						// vmovdqa	.Lk_ipt+16(%rip), %xmm3	# ipthi
+	tbl	v2.16b,  {$ipthi}, v0.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm0,	%xmm3,	%xmm2
+	 tbl	v10.16b, {$ipthi}, v8.16b
+	eor	v0.16b,  v1.16b,   v16.16b	// vpxor	%xmm5,	%xmm1,	%xmm0
+	 eor	v8.16b,  v9.16b,   v16.16b
+	eor	v0.16b,  v0.16b,   v2.16b	// vpxor	%xmm2,	%xmm0,	%xmm0
+	 eor	v8.16b,  v8.16b,   v10.16b
+	b	.Lenc_2x_entry
+
+.align 4
+.Lenc_2x_loop:
+	// middle of middle round
+	add	x10, x11, #0x40
+	tbl	v4.16b,  {$sb1t}, v2.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm2,	%xmm13,	%xmm4	# 4 = sb1u
+	 tbl	v12.16b, {$sb1t}, v10.16b
+	ld1	{v1.2d}, [x11], #16		// vmovdqa	-0x40(%r11,%r10), %xmm1	# .Lk_mc_forward[]
+	tbl	v0.16b,  {$sb1u}, v3.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm3,	%xmm12,	%xmm0	# 0 = sb1t
+	 tbl	v8.16b,  {$sb1u}, v11.16b
+	eor	v4.16b,  v4.16b,  v16.16b	// vpxor	%xmm5,	%xmm4,	%xmm4	# 4 = sb1u + k
+	 eor	v12.16b, v12.16b, v16.16b
+	tbl	v5.16b,	 {$sb2t}, v2.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm2,	%xmm15,	%xmm5	# 4 = sb2u
+	 tbl	v13.16b, {$sb2t}, v10.16b
+	eor	v0.16b,  v0.16b,  v4.16b	// vpxor	%xmm4,	%xmm0,	%xmm0	# 0 = A
+	 eor	v8.16b,  v8.16b,  v12.16b
+	tbl	v2.16b,  {$sb2u}, v3.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm3,	%xmm14,	%xmm2	# 2 = sb2t
+	 tbl	v10.16b, {$sb2u}, v11.16b
+	ld1	{v4.2d}, [x10]			// vmovdqa	(%r11,%r10), %xmm4	# .Lk_mc_backward[]
+	tbl	v3.16b,  {v0.16b}, v1.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm1,	%xmm0,	%xmm3	# 0 = B
+	 tbl	v11.16b, {v8.16b}, v1.16b
+	eor	v2.16b,  v2.16b,  v5.16b	// vpxor	%xmm5,	%xmm2,	%xmm2	# 2 = 2A
+	 eor	v10.16b, v10.16b, v13.16b
+	tbl	v0.16b,  {v0.16b}, v4.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm4,	%xmm0,	%xmm0	# 3 = D
+	 tbl	v8.16b,  {v8.16b}, v4.16b
+	eor	v3.16b,  v3.16b,  v2.16b	// vpxor	%xmm2,	%xmm3,	%xmm3	# 0 = 2A+B
+	 eor	v11.16b, v11.16b, v10.16b
+	tbl	v4.16b,  {v3.16b}, v1.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm1,	%xmm3,	%xmm4	# 0 = 2B+C
+	 tbl	v12.16b, {v11.16b},v1.16b
+	eor	v0.16b,  v0.16b,  v3.16b	// vpxor	%xmm3,	%xmm0,	%xmm0	# 3 = 2A+B+D
+	 eor	v8.16b,  v8.16b,  v11.16b
+	and	x11, x11, #~(1<<6)		// and		\$0x30,	%r11		# ... mod 4
+	eor	v0.16b,  v0.16b,  v4.16b	// vpxor	%xmm4,	%xmm0, %xmm0	# 0 = 2A+3B+C+D
+	 eor	v8.16b,  v8.16b,  v12.16b
+	sub	w8, w8, #1			// nr--
+
+.Lenc_2x_entry:
+	// top of round
+	and	v1.16b,  v0.16b, v17.16b	// vpand	%xmm0,	%xmm9,	%xmm1   # 0 = k
+	ushr	v0.16b,  v0.16b, #4		// vpsrlb	\$4,	%xmm0,	%xmm0	# 1 = i
+	 and	v9.16b,  v8.16b, v17.16b
+	 ushr	v8.16b,  v8.16b, #4
+	tbl	v5.16b,  {$invhi},v1.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm1,	%xmm11,	%xmm5	# 2 = a/k
+	 tbl	v13.16b, {$invhi},v9.16b
+	eor	v1.16b,  v1.16b,  v0.16b	// vpxor	%xmm0,	%xmm1,	%xmm1	# 0 = j
+	 eor	v9.16b,  v9.16b,  v8.16b
+	tbl	v3.16b,  {$invlo},v0.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm0, 	%xmm10,	%xmm3  	# 3 = 1/i
+	 tbl	v11.16b, {$invlo},v8.16b
+	tbl	v4.16b,  {$invlo},v1.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm1, 	%xmm10,	%xmm4  	# 4 = 1/j
+	 tbl	v12.16b, {$invlo},v9.16b
+	eor	v3.16b,  v3.16b,  v5.16b	// vpxor	%xmm5,	%xmm3,	%xmm3	# 3 = iak = 1/i + a/k
+	 eor	v11.16b, v11.16b, v13.16b
+	eor	v4.16b,  v4.16b,  v5.16b	// vpxor	%xmm5,	%xmm4,	%xmm4  	# 4 = jak = 1/j + a/k
+	 eor	v12.16b, v12.16b, v13.16b
+	tbl	v2.16b,  {$invlo},v3.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm3,	%xmm10,	%xmm2  	# 2 = 1/iak
+	 tbl	v10.16b, {$invlo},v11.16b
+	tbl	v3.16b,  {$invlo},v4.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm4,	%xmm10,	%xmm3	# 3 = 1/jak
+	 tbl	v11.16b, {$invlo},v12.16b
+	eor	v2.16b,  v2.16b,  v1.16b	// vpxor	%xmm1,	%xmm2,	%xmm2  	# 2 = io
+	 eor	v10.16b, v10.16b, v9.16b
+	eor	v3.16b,  v3.16b,  v0.16b	// vpxor	%xmm0,	%xmm3,	%xmm3	# 3 = jo
+	 eor	v11.16b, v11.16b, v8.16b
+	ld1	{v16.2d}, [x9],#16		// vmovdqu	(%r9),	%xmm5
+	cbnz	w8, .Lenc_2x_loop
+
+	// middle of last round
+	add	x10, x11, #0x80
+						// vmovdqa	-0x60(%r10), %xmm4	# 3 : sbou	.Lk_sbo
+						// vmovdqa	-0x50(%r10), %xmm0	# 0 : sbot	.Lk_sbo+16
+	tbl	v4.16b,  {$sbou}, v2.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm2,	%xmm4,	%xmm4	# 4 = sbou
+	 tbl	v12.16b, {$sbou}, v10.16b
+	ld1	{v1.2d}, [x10]			// vmovdqa	0x40(%r11,%r10), %xmm1	# .Lk_sr[]
+	tbl	v0.16b,  {$sbot}, v3.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm3,	%xmm0,	%xmm0	# 0 = sb1t
+	 tbl	v8.16b,  {$sbot}, v11.16b
+	eor	v4.16b,  v4.16b,  v16.16b	// vpxor	%xmm5,	%xmm4,	%xmm4	# 4 = sb1u + k
+	 eor	v12.16b, v12.16b, v16.16b
+	eor	v0.16b,  v0.16b,  v4.16b	// vpxor	%xmm4,	%xmm0,	%xmm0	# 0 = A
+	 eor	v8.16b,  v8.16b,  v12.16b
+	tbl	v0.16b,  {v0.16b},v1.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm1,	%xmm0,	%xmm0
+	 tbl	v1.16b,  {v8.16b},v1.16b
+	ret
+.size	_vpaes_encrypt_2x,.-_vpaes_encrypt_2x
+
+.type	_vpaes_decrypt_preheat,%function
+.align	4
+_vpaes_decrypt_preheat:
+	adr	x10, .Lk_inv
+	movi	v17.16b, #0x0f
+	adr	x11, .Lk_dipt
+	ld1	{v18.2d-v19.2d}, [x10],#32	// .Lk_inv
+	ld1	{v20.2d-v23.2d}, [x11],#64	// .Lk_dipt, .Lk_dsbo
+	ld1	{v24.2d-v27.2d}, [x11],#64	// .Lk_dsb9, .Lk_dsbd
+	ld1	{v28.2d-v31.2d}, [x11]		// .Lk_dsbb, .Lk_dsbe
+	ret
+.size	_vpaes_decrypt_preheat,.-_vpaes_decrypt_preheat
+
+##
+##  Decryption core
+##
+##  Same API as encryption core.
+##
+.type	_vpaes_decrypt_core,%function
+.align	4
+_vpaes_decrypt_core:
+	mov	x9, $key
+	ldr	w8, [$key,#240]			// pull rounds
+
+						// vmovdqa	.Lk_dipt(%rip), %xmm2	# iptlo
+	lsl	x11, x8, #4			// mov	%rax,	%r11;	shl	\$4, %r11
+	eor	x11, x11, #0x30			// xor		\$0x30,	%r11
+	adr	x10, .Lk_sr
+	and	x11, x11, #0x30			// and		\$0x30,	%r11
+	add	x11, x11, x10
+	adr	x10, .Lk_mc_forward+48
+
+	ld1	{v16.2d}, [x9],#16		// vmovdqu	(%r9),	%xmm4		# round0 key
+	and	v1.16b, v7.16b, v17.16b		// vpand	%xmm9,	%xmm0,	%xmm1
+	ushr	v0.16b, v7.16b, #4		// vpsrlb	\$4,	%xmm0,	%xmm0
+	tbl	v2.16b, {$iptlo}, v1.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm1,	%xmm2,	%xmm2
+	ld1	{v5.2d}, [x10]			// vmovdqa	.Lk_mc_forward+48(%rip), %xmm5
+						// vmovdqa	.Lk_dipt+16(%rip), %xmm1 # ipthi
+	tbl	v0.16b, {$ipthi}, v0.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm0,	%xmm1,	%xmm0
+	eor	v2.16b, v2.16b, v16.16b		// vpxor	%xmm4,	%xmm2,	%xmm2
+	eor	v0.16b, v0.16b, v2.16b		// vpxor	%xmm2,	%xmm0,	%xmm0
+	b	.Ldec_entry
+
+.align 4
+.Ldec_loop:
+//
+//  Inverse mix columns
+//
+						// vmovdqa	-0x20(%r10),%xmm4		# 4 : sb9u
+						// vmovdqa	-0x10(%r10),%xmm1		# 0 : sb9t
+	tbl	v4.16b, {$sb9u}, v2.16b		// vpshufb	%xmm2,	%xmm4,	%xmm4		# 4 = sb9u
+	tbl	v1.16b, {$sb9t}, v3.16b		// vpshufb	%xmm3,	%xmm1,	%xmm1		# 0 = sb9t
+	eor	v0.16b, v4.16b, v16.16b		// vpxor	%xmm4,	%xmm0,	%xmm0
+						// vmovdqa	0x00(%r10),%xmm4		# 4 : sbdu
+	eor	v0.16b, v0.16b, v1.16b		// vpxor	%xmm1,	%xmm0,	%xmm0		# 0 = ch
+						// vmovdqa	0x10(%r10),%xmm1		# 0 : sbdt
+
+	tbl	v4.16b, {$sbdu}, v2.16b		// vpshufb	%xmm2,	%xmm4,	%xmm4		# 4 = sbdu
+	tbl 	v0.16b, {v0.16b}, v5.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm5,	%xmm0,	%xmm0		# MC ch
+	tbl	v1.16b, {$sbdt}, v3.16b		// vpshufb	%xmm3,	%xmm1,	%xmm1		# 0 = sbdt
+	eor	v0.16b, v0.16b, v4.16b		// vpxor	%xmm4,	%xmm0,	%xmm0		# 4 = ch
+						// vmovdqa	0x20(%r10),	%xmm4		# 4 : sbbu
+	eor	v0.16b, v0.16b, v1.16b		// vpxor	%xmm1,	%xmm0,	%xmm0		# 0 = ch
+						// vmovdqa	0x30(%r10),	%xmm1		# 0 : sbbt
+
+	tbl	v4.16b, {$sbbu}, v2.16b		// vpshufb	%xmm2,	%xmm4,	%xmm4		# 4 = sbbu
+	tbl	v0.16b, {v0.16b}, v5.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm5,	%xmm0,	%xmm0		# MC ch
+	tbl	v1.16b, {$sbbt}, v3.16b		// vpshufb	%xmm3,	%xmm1,	%xmm1		# 0 = sbbt
+	eor	v0.16b, v0.16b, v4.16b		// vpxor	%xmm4,	%xmm0,	%xmm0		# 4 = ch
+						// vmovdqa	0x40(%r10),	%xmm4		# 4 : sbeu
+	eor	v0.16b, v0.16b, v1.16b		// vpxor	%xmm1,	%xmm0,	%xmm0		# 0 = ch
+						// vmovdqa	0x50(%r10),	%xmm1		# 0 : sbet
+
+	tbl	v4.16b, {$sbeu}, v2.16b		// vpshufb	%xmm2,	%xmm4,	%xmm4		# 4 = sbeu
+	tbl	v0.16b, {v0.16b}, v5.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm5,	%xmm0,	%xmm0		# MC ch
+	tbl	v1.16b, {$sbet}, v3.16b		// vpshufb	%xmm3,	%xmm1,	%xmm1		# 0 = sbet
+	eor	v0.16b, v0.16b, v4.16b		// vpxor	%xmm4,	%xmm0,	%xmm0		# 4 = ch
+	ext	v5.16b, v5.16b, v5.16b, #12	// vpalignr \$12,	%xmm5,	%xmm5,	%xmm5
+	eor	v0.16b, v0.16b, v1.16b		// vpxor	%xmm1,	%xmm0,	%xmm0		# 0 = ch
+	sub	w8, w8, #1			// sub		\$1,%rax			# nr--
+
+.Ldec_entry:
+	// top of round
+	and	v1.16b, v0.16b, v17.16b		// vpand	%xmm9,	%xmm0,	%xmm1	# 0 = k
+	ushr	v0.16b, v0.16b, #4		// vpsrlb	\$4,	%xmm0,	%xmm0	# 1 = i
+	tbl	v2.16b, {$invhi}, v1.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm1,	%xmm11,	%xmm2	# 2 = a/k
+	eor	v1.16b,	v1.16b, v0.16b		// vpxor	%xmm0,	%xmm1,	%xmm1	# 0 = j
+	tbl	v3.16b, {$invlo}, v0.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm0, 	%xmm10,	%xmm3	# 3 = 1/i
+	tbl	v4.16b, {$invlo}, v1.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm1,	%xmm10,	%xmm4	# 4 = 1/j
+	eor	v3.16b, v3.16b, v2.16b		// vpxor	%xmm2,	%xmm3,	%xmm3	# 3 = iak = 1/i + a/k
+	eor	v4.16b, v4.16b, v2.16b		// vpxor	%xmm2, 	%xmm4,	%xmm4	# 4 = jak = 1/j + a/k
+	tbl	v2.16b, {$invlo}, v3.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm3,	%xmm10,	%xmm2	# 2 = 1/iak
+	tbl	v3.16b, {$invlo}, v4.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm4,  %xmm10,	%xmm3	# 3 = 1/jak
+	eor	v2.16b, v2.16b, v1.16b		// vpxor	%xmm1,	%xmm2,	%xmm2	# 2 = io
+	eor	v3.16b, v3.16b, v0.16b		// vpxor	%xmm0,  %xmm3,	%xmm3	# 3 = jo
+	ld1	{v16.2d}, [x9],#16		// vmovdqu	(%r9),	%xmm0
+	cbnz	w8, .Ldec_loop
+
+	// middle of last round
+						// vmovdqa	0x60(%r10),	%xmm4	# 3 : sbou
+	tbl	v4.16b, {$sbou}, v2.16b		// vpshufb	%xmm2,	%xmm4,	%xmm4	# 4 = sbou
+						// vmovdqa	0x70(%r10),	%xmm1	# 0 : sbot
+	ld1	{v2.2d}, [x11]			// vmovdqa	-0x160(%r11),	%xmm2	# .Lk_sr-.Lk_dsbd=-0x160
+	tbl	v1.16b, {$sbot}, v3.16b		// vpshufb	%xmm3,	%xmm1,	%xmm1	# 0 = sb1t
+	eor	v4.16b, v4.16b, v16.16b		// vpxor	%xmm0,	%xmm4,	%xmm4	# 4 = sb1u + k
+	eor	v0.16b, v1.16b, v4.16b		// vpxor	%xmm4,	%xmm1,	%xmm0	# 0 = A
+	tbl	v0.16b, {v0.16b}, v2.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm2,	%xmm0,	%xmm0
+	ret
+.size	_vpaes_decrypt_core,.-_vpaes_decrypt_core
+
+.globl	vpaes_decrypt
+.type	vpaes_decrypt,%function
+.align	4
+vpaes_decrypt:
+	stp	x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
+	add	x29,sp,#0
+
+	ld1	{v7.16b}, [$inp]
+	bl	_vpaes_decrypt_preheat
+	bl	_vpaes_decrypt_core
+	st1	{v0.16b}, [$out]
+
+	ldp	x29,x30,[sp],#16
+	ret
+.size	vpaes_decrypt,.-vpaes_decrypt
+
+// v14-v15 input, v0-v1 output
+.type	_vpaes_decrypt_2x,%function
+.align	4
+_vpaes_decrypt_2x:
+	mov	x9, $key
+	ldr	w8, [$key,#240]			// pull rounds
+
+						// vmovdqa	.Lk_dipt(%rip), %xmm2	# iptlo
+	lsl	x11, x8, #4			// mov	%rax,	%r11;	shl	\$4, %r11
+	eor	x11, x11, #0x30			// xor		\$0x30,	%r11
+	adr	x10, .Lk_sr
+	and	x11, x11, #0x30			// and		\$0x30,	%r11
+	add	x11, x11, x10
+	adr	x10, .Lk_mc_forward+48
+
+	ld1	{v16.2d}, [x9],#16		// vmovdqu	(%r9),	%xmm4		# round0 key
+	and	v1.16b,  v14.16b, v17.16b	// vpand	%xmm9,	%xmm0,	%xmm1
+	ushr	v0.16b,  v14.16b, #4		// vpsrlb	\$4,	%xmm0,	%xmm0
+	 and	v9.16b,  v15.16b, v17.16b
+	 ushr	v8.16b,  v15.16b, #4
+	tbl	v2.16b,  {$iptlo},v1.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm1,	%xmm2,	%xmm2
+	 tbl	v10.16b, {$iptlo},v9.16b
+	ld1	{v5.2d}, [x10]			// vmovdqa	.Lk_mc_forward+48(%rip), %xmm5
+						// vmovdqa	.Lk_dipt+16(%rip), %xmm1 # ipthi
+	tbl	v0.16b,  {$ipthi},v0.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm0,	%xmm1,	%xmm0
+	 tbl	v8.16b,  {$ipthi},v8.16b
+	eor	v2.16b,  v2.16b,  v16.16b	// vpxor	%xmm4,	%xmm2,	%xmm2
+	 eor	v10.16b, v10.16b, v16.16b
+	eor	v0.16b,  v0.16b,  v2.16b	// vpxor	%xmm2,	%xmm0,	%xmm0
+	 eor	v8.16b,  v8.16b,  v10.16b
+	b	.Ldec_2x_entry
+
+.align 4
+.Ldec_2x_loop:
+//
+//  Inverse mix columns
+//
+						// vmovdqa	-0x20(%r10),%xmm4		# 4 : sb9u
+						// vmovdqa	-0x10(%r10),%xmm1		# 0 : sb9t
+	tbl	v4.16b,  {$sb9u}, v2.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm2,	%xmm4,	%xmm4		# 4 = sb9u
+	 tbl	v12.16b, {$sb9u}, v10.16b
+	tbl	v1.16b,  {$sb9t}, v3.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm3,	%xmm1,	%xmm1		# 0 = sb9t
+	 tbl	v9.16b,  {$sb9t}, v11.16b
+	eor	v0.16b,  v4.16b,  v16.16b	// vpxor	%xmm4,	%xmm0,	%xmm0
+	 eor	v8.16b,  v12.16b, v16.16b
+						// vmovdqa	0x00(%r10),%xmm4		# 4 : sbdu
+	eor	v0.16b,  v0.16b,  v1.16b	// vpxor	%xmm1,	%xmm0,	%xmm0		# 0 = ch
+	 eor	v8.16b,  v8.16b,  v9.16b	// vpxor	%xmm1,	%xmm0,	%xmm0		# 0 = ch
+						// vmovdqa	0x10(%r10),%xmm1		# 0 : sbdt
+
+	tbl	v4.16b,  {$sbdu}, v2.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm2,	%xmm4,	%xmm4		# 4 = sbdu
+	 tbl	v12.16b, {$sbdu}, v10.16b
+	tbl 	v0.16b,  {v0.16b},v5.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm5,	%xmm0,	%xmm0		# MC ch
+	 tbl 	v8.16b,  {v8.16b},v5.16b
+	tbl	v1.16b,  {$sbdt}, v3.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm3,	%xmm1,	%xmm1		# 0 = sbdt
+	 tbl	v9.16b,  {$sbdt}, v11.16b
+	eor	v0.16b,  v0.16b,  v4.16b	// vpxor	%xmm4,	%xmm0,	%xmm0		# 4 = ch
+	 eor	v8.16b,  v8.16b,  v12.16b
+						// vmovdqa	0x20(%r10),	%xmm4		# 4 : sbbu
+	eor	v0.16b,  v0.16b,  v1.16b	// vpxor	%xmm1,	%xmm0,	%xmm0		# 0 = ch
+	 eor	v8.16b,  v8.16b,  v9.16b
+						// vmovdqa	0x30(%r10),	%xmm1		# 0 : sbbt
+
+	tbl	v4.16b,  {$sbbu}, v2.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm2,	%xmm4,	%xmm4		# 4 = sbbu
+	 tbl	v12.16b, {$sbbu}, v10.16b
+	tbl	v0.16b,  {v0.16b},v5.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm5,	%xmm0,	%xmm0		# MC ch
+	 tbl	v8.16b,  {v8.16b},v5.16b
+	tbl	v1.16b,  {$sbbt}, v3.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm3,	%xmm1,	%xmm1		# 0 = sbbt
+	 tbl	v9.16b,  {$sbbt}, v11.16b
+	eor	v0.16b,  v0.16b,  v4.16b	// vpxor	%xmm4,	%xmm0,	%xmm0		# 4 = ch
+	 eor	v8.16b,  v8.16b,  v12.16b
+						// vmovdqa	0x40(%r10),	%xmm4		# 4 : sbeu
+	eor	v0.16b,  v0.16b,  v1.16b	// vpxor	%xmm1,	%xmm0,	%xmm0		# 0 = ch
+	 eor	v8.16b,  v8.16b,  v9.16b
+						// vmovdqa	0x50(%r10),	%xmm1		# 0 : sbet
+
+	tbl	v4.16b,  {$sbeu}, v2.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm2,	%xmm4,	%xmm4		# 4 = sbeu
+	 tbl	v12.16b, {$sbeu}, v10.16b
+	tbl	v0.16b,  {v0.16b},v5.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm5,	%xmm0,	%xmm0		# MC ch
+	 tbl	v8.16b,  {v8.16b},v5.16b
+	tbl	v1.16b,  {$sbet}, v3.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm3,	%xmm1,	%xmm1		# 0 = sbet
+	 tbl	v9.16b,  {$sbet}, v11.16b
+	eor	v0.16b,  v0.16b,  v4.16b	// vpxor	%xmm4,	%xmm0,	%xmm0		# 4 = ch
+	 eor	v8.16b,  v8.16b,  v12.16b
+	ext	v5.16b,  v5.16b,  v5.16b, #12	// vpalignr \$12,	%xmm5,	%xmm5,	%xmm5
+	eor	v0.16b,  v0.16b,  v1.16b	// vpxor	%xmm1,	%xmm0,	%xmm0		# 0 = ch
+	 eor	v8.16b,  v8.16b,  v9.16b
+	sub	w8, w8, #1			// sub		\$1,%rax			# nr--
+
+.Ldec_2x_entry:
+	// top of round
+	and	v1.16b,  v0.16b,  v17.16b	// vpand	%xmm9,	%xmm0,	%xmm1	# 0 = k
+	ushr	v0.16b,  v0.16b,  #4		// vpsrlb	\$4,	%xmm0,	%xmm0	# 1 = i
+	 and	v9.16b,  v8.16b,  v17.16b
+	 ushr	v8.16b,  v8.16b,  #4
+	tbl	v2.16b,  {$invhi},v1.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm1,	%xmm11,	%xmm2	# 2 = a/k
+	 tbl	v10.16b, {$invhi},v9.16b
+	eor	v1.16b,	 v1.16b,  v0.16b	// vpxor	%xmm0,	%xmm1,	%xmm1	# 0 = j
+	 eor	v9.16b,	 v9.16b,  v8.16b
+	tbl	v3.16b,  {$invlo},v0.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm0, 	%xmm10,	%xmm3	# 3 = 1/i
+	 tbl	v11.16b, {$invlo},v8.16b
+	tbl	v4.16b,  {$invlo},v1.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm1,	%xmm10,	%xmm4	# 4 = 1/j
+	 tbl	v12.16b, {$invlo},v9.16b
+	eor	v3.16b,  v3.16b,  v2.16b	// vpxor	%xmm2,	%xmm3,	%xmm3	# 3 = iak = 1/i + a/k
+	 eor	v11.16b, v11.16b, v10.16b
+	eor	v4.16b,  v4.16b,  v2.16b	// vpxor	%xmm2, 	%xmm4,	%xmm4	# 4 = jak = 1/j + a/k
+	 eor	v12.16b, v12.16b, v10.16b
+	tbl	v2.16b,  {$invlo},v3.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm3,	%xmm10,	%xmm2	# 2 = 1/iak
+	 tbl	v10.16b, {$invlo},v11.16b
+	tbl	v3.16b,  {$invlo},v4.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm4,  %xmm10,	%xmm3	# 3 = 1/jak
+	 tbl	v11.16b, {$invlo},v12.16b
+	eor	v2.16b,  v2.16b,  v1.16b	// vpxor	%xmm1,	%xmm2,	%xmm2	# 2 = io
+	 eor	v10.16b, v10.16b, v9.16b
+	eor	v3.16b,  v3.16b,  v0.16b	// vpxor	%xmm0,  %xmm3,	%xmm3	# 3 = jo
+	 eor	v11.16b, v11.16b, v8.16b
+	ld1	{v16.2d}, [x9],#16		// vmovdqu	(%r9),	%xmm0
+	cbnz	w8, .Ldec_2x_loop
+
+	// middle of last round
+						// vmovdqa	0x60(%r10),	%xmm4	# 3 : sbou
+	tbl	v4.16b,  {$sbou}, v2.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm2,	%xmm4,	%xmm4	# 4 = sbou
+	 tbl	v12.16b, {$sbou}, v10.16b
+						// vmovdqa	0x70(%r10),	%xmm1	# 0 : sbot
+	tbl	v1.16b,  {$sbot}, v3.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm3,	%xmm1,	%xmm1	# 0 = sb1t
+	 tbl	v9.16b,  {$sbot}, v11.16b
+	ld1	{v2.2d}, [x11]			// vmovdqa	-0x160(%r11),	%xmm2	# .Lk_sr-.Lk_dsbd=-0x160
+	eor	v4.16b,  v4.16b,  v16.16b	// vpxor	%xmm0,	%xmm4,	%xmm4	# 4 = sb1u + k
+	 eor	v12.16b, v12.16b, v16.16b
+	eor	v0.16b,  v1.16b,  v4.16b	// vpxor	%xmm4,	%xmm1,	%xmm0	# 0 = A
+	 eor	v8.16b,  v9.16b,  v12.16b
+	tbl	v0.16b,  {v0.16b},v2.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm2,	%xmm0,	%xmm0
+	 tbl	v1.16b,  {v8.16b},v2.16b
+	ret
+.size	_vpaes_decrypt_2x,.-_vpaes_decrypt_2x
+___
+}
+{
+my ($inp,$bits,$out,$dir)=("x0","w1","x2","w3");
+my ($invlo,$invhi,$iptlo,$ipthi,$rcon) = map("v$_.16b",(18..21,8));
+
+$code.=<<___;
+########################################################
+##                                                    ##
+##                  AES key schedule                  ##
+##                                                    ##
+########################################################
+.type	_vpaes_key_preheat,%function
+.align	4
+_vpaes_key_preheat:
+	adr	x10, .Lk_inv
+	movi	v16.16b, #0x5b			// .Lk_s63
+	adr	x11, .Lk_sb1
+	movi	v17.16b, #0x0f			// .Lk_s0F
+	ld1	{v18.2d-v21.2d}, [x10]		// .Lk_inv, .Lk_ipt
+	adr	x10, .Lk_dksd
+	ld1	{v22.2d-v23.2d}, [x11]		// .Lk_sb1
+	adr	x11, .Lk_mc_forward
+	ld1	{v24.2d-v27.2d}, [x10],#64	// .Lk_dksd, .Lk_dksb
+	ld1	{v28.2d-v31.2d}, [x10],#64	// .Lk_dkse, .Lk_dks9
+	ld1	{v8.2d}, [x10]			// .Lk_rcon
+	ld1	{v9.2d}, [x11]			// .Lk_mc_forward[0]
+	ret
+.size	_vpaes_key_preheat,.-_vpaes_key_preheat
+
+.type	_vpaes_schedule_core,%function
+.align	4
+_vpaes_schedule_core:
+	stp	x29, x30, [sp,#-16]!
+	add	x29,sp,#0
+
+	bl	_vpaes_key_preheat		// load the tables
+
+	ld1	{v0.16b}, [$inp],#16		// vmovdqu	(%rdi),	%xmm0		# load key (unaligned)
+
+	// input transform
+	mov	v3.16b, v0.16b			// vmovdqa	%xmm0,	%xmm3
+	bl	_vpaes_schedule_transform
+	mov	v7.16b, v0.16b			// vmovdqa	%xmm0,	%xmm7
+
+	adr	x10, .Lk_sr			// lea	.Lk_sr(%rip),%r10
+	add	x8, x8, x10
+	cbnz	$dir, .Lschedule_am_decrypting
+
+	// encrypting, output zeroth round key after transform
+	st1	{v0.2d}, [$out]			// vmovdqu	%xmm0,	(%rdx)
+	b	.Lschedule_go
+
+.Lschedule_am_decrypting:
+	// decrypting, output zeroth round key after shiftrows
+	ld1	{v1.2d}, [x8]			// vmovdqa	(%r8,%r10),	%xmm1
+	tbl	v3.16b, {v3.16b}, v1.16b	// vpshufb  %xmm1,	%xmm3,	%xmm3
+	st1	{v3.2d}, [$out]			// vmovdqu	%xmm3,	(%rdx)
+	eor	x8, x8, #0x30			// xor	\$0x30, %r8
+
+.Lschedule_go:
+	cmp	$bits, #192			// cmp	\$192,	%esi
+	b.hi	.Lschedule_256
+	b.eq	.Lschedule_192
+	// 128: fall though
+
+##
+##  .schedule_128
+##
+##  128-bit specific part of key schedule.
+##
+##  This schedule is really simple, because all its parts
+##  are accomplished by the subroutines.
+##
+.Lschedule_128:
+	mov	$inp, #10			// mov	\$10, %esi
+
+.Loop_schedule_128:
+	sub	$inp, $inp, #1			// dec	%esi
+	bl 	_vpaes_schedule_round
+	cbz 	$inp, .Lschedule_mangle_last
+	bl	_vpaes_schedule_mangle		// write output
+	b 	.Loop_schedule_128
+
+##
+##  .aes_schedule_192
+##
+##  192-bit specific part of key schedule.
+##
+##  The main body of this schedule is the same as the 128-bit
+##  schedule, but with more smearing.  The long, high side is
+##  stored in %xmm7 as before, and the short, low side is in
+##  the high bits of %xmm6.
+##
+##  This schedule is somewhat nastier, however, because each
+##  round produces 192 bits of key material, or 1.5 round keys.
+##  Therefore, on each cycle we do 2 rounds and produce 3 round
+##  keys.
+##
+.align	4
+.Lschedule_192:
+	sub	$inp, $inp, #8
+	ld1	{v0.16b}, [$inp]		// vmovdqu	8(%rdi),%xmm0		# load key part 2 (very unaligned)
+	bl	_vpaes_schedule_transform	// input transform
+	mov	v6.16b, v0.16b			// vmovdqa	%xmm0,	%xmm6		# save short part
+	eor	v4.16b, v4.16b, v4.16b		// vpxor	%xmm4,	%xmm4, %xmm4	# clear 4
+	ins	v6.d[0], v4.d[0]		// vmovhlps	%xmm4,	%xmm6,	%xmm6		# clobber low side with zeros
+	mov	$inp, #4			// mov	\$4,	%esi
+
+.Loop_schedule_192:
+	sub	$inp, $inp, #1			// dec	%esi
+	bl	_vpaes_schedule_round
+	ext	v0.16b, v6.16b, v0.16b, #8	// vpalignr	\$8,%xmm6,%xmm0,%xmm0
+	bl	_vpaes_schedule_mangle		// save key n
+	bl	_vpaes_schedule_192_smear
+	bl	_vpaes_schedule_mangle		// save key n+1
+	bl	_vpaes_schedule_round
+	cbz 	$inp, .Lschedule_mangle_last
+	bl	_vpaes_schedule_mangle		// save key n+2
+	bl	_vpaes_schedule_192_smear
+	b	.Loop_schedule_192
+
+##
+##  .aes_schedule_256
+##
+##  256-bit specific part of key schedule.
+##
+##  The structure here is very similar to the 128-bit
+##  schedule, but with an additional "low side" in
+##  %xmm6.  The low side's rounds are the same as the
+##  high side's, except no rcon and no rotation.
+##
+.align	4
+.Lschedule_256:
+	ld1	{v0.16b}, [$inp]		// vmovdqu	16(%rdi),%xmm0		# load key part 2 (unaligned)
+	bl	_vpaes_schedule_transform	// input transform
+	mov	$inp, #7			// mov	\$7, %esi
+	
+.Loop_schedule_256:
+	sub	$inp, $inp, #1			// dec	%esi
+	bl	_vpaes_schedule_mangle		// output low result
+	mov	v6.16b, v0.16b			// vmovdqa	%xmm0,	%xmm6		# save cur_lo in xmm6
+
+	// high round
+	bl	_vpaes_schedule_round
+	cbz 	$inp, .Lschedule_mangle_last
+	bl	_vpaes_schedule_mangle	
+
+	// low round. swap xmm7 and xmm6
+	dup	v0.4s, v0.s[3]			// vpshufd	\$0xFF,	%xmm0,	%xmm0
+	movi	v4.16b, #0
+	mov	v5.16b, v7.16b			// vmovdqa	%xmm7,	%xmm5
+	mov	v7.16b, v6.16b			// vmovdqa	%xmm6,	%xmm7
+	bl	_vpaes_schedule_low_round
+	mov	v7.16b, v5.16b			// vmovdqa	%xmm5,	%xmm7
+	
+	b	.Loop_schedule_256
+
+##
+##  .aes_schedule_mangle_last
+##
+##  Mangler for last round of key schedule
+##  Mangles %xmm0
+##    when encrypting, outputs out(%xmm0) ^ 63
+##    when decrypting, outputs unskew(%xmm0)
+##
+##  Always called right before return... jumps to cleanup and exits
+##
+.align	4
+.Lschedule_mangle_last:
+	// schedule last round key from xmm0
+	adr	x11, .Lk_deskew			// lea	.Lk_deskew(%rip),%r11	# prepare to deskew
+	cbnz	$dir, .Lschedule_mangle_last_dec
+
+	// encrypting
+	ld1	{v1.2d}, [x8]			// vmovdqa	(%r8,%r10),%xmm1
+	adr	x11, .Lk_opt			// lea	.Lk_opt(%rip),	%r11		# prepare to output transform
+	add	$out, $out, #32			// add	\$32,	%rdx
+	tbl	v0.16b, {v0.16b}, v1.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm1,	%xmm0,	%xmm0		# output permute
+
+.Lschedule_mangle_last_dec:
+	ld1	{v20.2d-v21.2d}, [x11]		// reload constants
+	sub	$out, $out, #16			// add	\$-16,	%rdx 
+	eor	v0.16b, v0.16b, v16.16b		// vpxor	.Lk_s63(%rip),	%xmm0,	%xmm0
+	bl	_vpaes_schedule_transform	// output transform
+	st1	{v0.2d}, [$out]			// vmovdqu	%xmm0,	(%rdx)		# save last key
+
+	// cleanup
+	eor	v0.16b, v0.16b, v0.16b		// vpxor	%xmm0,	%xmm0,	%xmm0
+	eor	v1.16b, v1.16b, v1.16b		// vpxor	%xmm1,	%xmm1,	%xmm1
+	eor	v2.16b, v2.16b, v2.16b		// vpxor	%xmm2,	%xmm2,	%xmm2
+	eor	v3.16b, v3.16b, v3.16b		// vpxor	%xmm3,	%xmm3,	%xmm3
+	eor	v4.16b, v4.16b, v4.16b		// vpxor	%xmm4,	%xmm4,	%xmm4
+	eor	v5.16b, v5.16b, v5.16b		// vpxor	%xmm5,	%xmm5,	%xmm5
+	eor	v6.16b, v6.16b, v6.16b		// vpxor	%xmm6,	%xmm6,	%xmm6
+	eor	v7.16b, v7.16b, v7.16b		// vpxor	%xmm7,	%xmm7,	%xmm7
+	ldp	x29, x30, [sp],#16
+	ret
+.size	_vpaes_schedule_core,.-_vpaes_schedule_core
+
+##
+##  .aes_schedule_192_smear
+##
+##  Smear the short, low side in the 192-bit key schedule.
+##
+##  Inputs:
+##    %xmm7: high side, b  a  x  y
+##    %xmm6:  low side, d  c  0  0
+##    %xmm13: 0
+##
+##  Outputs:
+##    %xmm6: b+c+d  b+c  0  0
+##    %xmm0: b+c+d  b+c  b  a
+##
+.type	_vpaes_schedule_192_smear,%function
+.align	4
+_vpaes_schedule_192_smear:
+	movi	v1.16b, #0
+	dup	v0.4s, v7.s[3]
+	ins	v1.s[3], v6.s[2]	// vpshufd	\$0x80,	%xmm6,	%xmm1	# d c 0 0 -> c 0 0 0
+	ins	v0.s[0], v7.s[2]	// vpshufd	\$0xFE,	%xmm7,	%xmm0	# b a _ _ -> b b b a
+	eor	v6.16b, v6.16b, v1.16b	// vpxor	%xmm1,	%xmm6,	%xmm6	# -> c+d c 0 0
+	eor	v1.16b, v1.16b, v1.16b	// vpxor	%xmm1,	%xmm1,	%xmm1
+	eor	v6.16b, v6.16b, v0.16b	// vpxor	%xmm0,	%xmm6,	%xmm6	# -> b+c+d b+c b a
+	mov	v0.16b, v6.16b		// vmovdqa	%xmm6,	%xmm0
+	ins	v6.d[0], v1.d[0]	// vmovhlps	%xmm1,	%xmm6,	%xmm6	# clobber low side with zeros
+	ret
+.size	_vpaes_schedule_192_smear,.-_vpaes_schedule_192_smear
+
+##
+##  .aes_schedule_round
+##
+##  Runs one main round of the key schedule on %xmm0, %xmm7
+##
+##  Specifically, runs subbytes on the high dword of %xmm0
+##  then rotates it by one byte and xors into the low dword of
+##  %xmm7.
+##
+##  Adds rcon from low byte of %xmm8, then rotates %xmm8 for
+##  next rcon.
+##
+##  Smears the dwords of %xmm7 by xoring the low into the
+##  second low, result into third, result into highest.
+##
+##  Returns results in %xmm7 = %xmm0.
+##  Clobbers %xmm1-%xmm4, %r11.
+##
+.type	_vpaes_schedule_round,%function
+.align	4
+_vpaes_schedule_round:
+	// extract rcon from xmm8
+	movi	v4.16b, #0			// vpxor	%xmm4,	%xmm4,	%xmm4
+	ext	v1.16b, $rcon, v4.16b, #15	// vpalignr	\$15,	%xmm8,	%xmm4,	%xmm1
+	ext	$rcon, $rcon, $rcon, #15	// vpalignr	\$15,	%xmm8,	%xmm8,	%xmm8
+	eor	v7.16b, v7.16b, v1.16b		// vpxor	%xmm1,	%xmm7,	%xmm7
+
+	// rotate
+	dup	v0.4s, v0.s[3]			// vpshufd	\$0xFF,	%xmm0,	%xmm0
+	ext	v0.16b, v0.16b, v0.16b, #1	// vpalignr	\$1,	%xmm0,	%xmm0,	%xmm0
+
+	// fall through...
+
+	// low round: same as high round, but no rotation and no rcon.
+_vpaes_schedule_low_round:
+	// smear xmm7
+	ext	v1.16b, v4.16b, v7.16b, #12	// vpslldq	\$4,	%xmm7,	%xmm1
+	eor	v7.16b, v7.16b, v1.16b		// vpxor	%xmm1,	%xmm7,	%xmm7
+	ext	v4.16b, v4.16b, v7.16b, #8	// vpslldq	\$8,	%xmm7,	%xmm4
+
+	// subbytes
+	and	v1.16b, v0.16b, v17.16b		// vpand	%xmm9,	%xmm0,	%xmm1		# 0 = k
+	ushr	v0.16b, v0.16b, #4		// vpsrlb	\$4,	%xmm0,	%xmm0		# 1 = i
+	 eor	v7.16b, v7.16b, v4.16b		// vpxor	%xmm4,	%xmm7,	%xmm7
+	tbl	v2.16b, {$invhi}, v1.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm1,	%xmm11,	%xmm2		# 2 = a/k
+	eor	v1.16b, v1.16b, v0.16b		// vpxor	%xmm0,	%xmm1,	%xmm1		# 0 = j
+	tbl	v3.16b, {$invlo}, v0.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm0, 	%xmm10,	%xmm3		# 3 = 1/i
+	eor	v3.16b, v3.16b, v2.16b		// vpxor	%xmm2,	%xmm3,	%xmm3		# 3 = iak = 1/i + a/k
+	tbl	v4.16b, {$invlo}, v1.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm1,	%xmm10,	%xmm4		# 4 = 1/j
+	 eor	v7.16b, v7.16b, v16.16b		// vpxor	.Lk_s63(%rip),	%xmm7,	%xmm7
+	tbl	v3.16b, {$invlo}, v3.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm3,	%xmm10,	%xmm3		# 2 = 1/iak
+	eor	v4.16b, v4.16b, v2.16b		// vpxor	%xmm2,	%xmm4,	%xmm4		# 4 = jak = 1/j + a/k
+	tbl	v2.16b, {$invlo}, v4.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm4,	%xmm10,	%xmm2		# 3 = 1/jak
+	eor	v3.16b, v3.16b, v1.16b		// vpxor	%xmm1,	%xmm3,	%xmm3		# 2 = io
+	eor	v2.16b, v2.16b, v0.16b		// vpxor	%xmm0,	%xmm2,	%xmm2		# 3 = jo
+	tbl	v4.16b, {v23.16b}, v3.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm3,	%xmm13,	%xmm4		# 4 = sbou
+	tbl	v1.16b, {v22.16b}, v2.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm2,	%xmm12,	%xmm1		# 0 = sb1t
+	eor	v1.16b, v1.16b, v4.16b		// vpxor	%xmm4,	%xmm1,	%xmm1		# 0 = sbox output
+
+	// add in smeared stuff
+	eor	v0.16b, v1.16b, v7.16b		// vpxor	%xmm7,	%xmm1,	%xmm0
+	eor	v7.16b, v1.16b, v7.16b		// vmovdqa	%xmm0,	%xmm7
+	ret
+.size	_vpaes_schedule_round,.-_vpaes_schedule_round
+
+##
+##  .aes_schedule_transform
+##
+##  Linear-transform %xmm0 according to tables at (%r11)
+##
+##  Requires that %xmm9 = 0x0F0F... as in preheat
+##  Output in %xmm0
+##  Clobbers %xmm1, %xmm2
+##
+.type	_vpaes_schedule_transform,%function
+.align	4
+_vpaes_schedule_transform:
+	and	v1.16b, v0.16b, v17.16b		// vpand	%xmm9,	%xmm0,	%xmm1
+	ushr	v0.16b, v0.16b, #4		// vpsrlb	\$4,	%xmm0,	%xmm0
+						// vmovdqa	(%r11),	%xmm2 	# lo
+	tbl	v2.16b, {$iptlo}, v1.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm1,	%xmm2,	%xmm2
+						// vmovdqa	16(%r11),	%xmm1 # hi
+	tbl	v0.16b, {$ipthi}, v0.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm0,	%xmm1,	%xmm0
+	eor	v0.16b, v0.16b, v2.16b		// vpxor	%xmm2,	%xmm0,	%xmm0
+	ret
+.size	_vpaes_schedule_transform,.-_vpaes_schedule_transform
+
+##
+##  .aes_schedule_mangle
+##
+##  Mangle xmm0 from (basis-transformed) standard version
+##  to our version.
+##
+##  On encrypt,
+##    xor with 0x63
+##    multiply by circulant 0,1,1,1
+##    apply shiftrows transform
+##
+##  On decrypt,
+##    xor with 0x63
+##    multiply by "inverse mixcolumns" circulant E,B,D,9
+##    deskew
+##    apply shiftrows transform
+##
+##
+##  Writes out to (%rdx), and increments or decrements it
+##  Keeps track of round number mod 4 in %r8
+##  Preserves xmm0
+##  Clobbers xmm1-xmm5
+##
+.type	_vpaes_schedule_mangle,%function
+.align	4
+_vpaes_schedule_mangle:
+	mov	v4.16b, v0.16b			// vmovdqa	%xmm0,	%xmm4	# save xmm0 for later
+						// vmovdqa	.Lk_mc_forward(%rip),%xmm5
+	cbnz	$dir, .Lschedule_mangle_dec
+
+	// encrypting
+	eor	v4.16b, v0.16b, v16.16b		// vpxor	.Lk_s63(%rip),	%xmm0,	%xmm4
+	add	$out, $out, #16			// add	\$16,	%rdx
+	tbl	v4.16b, {v4.16b}, v9.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm5,	%xmm4,	%xmm4
+	tbl	v1.16b, {v4.16b}, v9.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm5,	%xmm4,	%xmm1
+	tbl	v3.16b, {v1.16b}, v9.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm5,	%xmm1,	%xmm3
+	eor	v4.16b, v4.16b, v1.16b		// vpxor	%xmm1,	%xmm4,	%xmm4
+	ld1	{v1.2d}, [x8]			// vmovdqa	(%r8,%r10),	%xmm1
+	eor	v3.16b, v3.16b, v4.16b		// vpxor	%xmm4,	%xmm3,	%xmm3
+
+	b	.Lschedule_mangle_both
+.align	4
+.Lschedule_mangle_dec:
+	// inverse mix columns
+						// lea	.Lk_dksd(%rip),%r11
+	ushr	v1.16b, v4.16b, #4		// vpsrlb	\$4,	%xmm4,	%xmm1	# 1 = hi
+	and	v4.16b, v4.16b, v17.16b		// vpand	%xmm9,	%xmm4,	%xmm4	# 4 = lo
+
+						// vmovdqa	0x00(%r11),	%xmm2
+	tbl	v2.16b, {v24.16b}, v4.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm4,	%xmm2,	%xmm2
+						// vmovdqa	0x10(%r11),	%xmm3
+	tbl	v3.16b,	{v25.16b}, v1.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm1,	%xmm3,	%xmm3
+	eor	v3.16b, v3.16b, v2.16b		// vpxor	%xmm2,	%xmm3,	%xmm3
+	tbl	v3.16b, {v3.16b}, v9.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm5,	%xmm3,	%xmm3
+
+						// vmovdqa	0x20(%r11),	%xmm2
+	tbl	v2.16b, {v26.16b}, v4.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm4,	%xmm2,	%xmm2
+	eor	v2.16b, v2.16b, v3.16b		// vpxor	%xmm3,	%xmm2,	%xmm2
+						// vmovdqa	0x30(%r11),	%xmm3
+	tbl	v3.16b, {v27.16b}, v1.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm1,	%xmm3,	%xmm3
+	eor	v3.16b, v3.16b, v2.16b		// vpxor	%xmm2,	%xmm3,	%xmm3
+	tbl	v3.16b, {v3.16b}, v9.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm5,	%xmm3,	%xmm3
+
+						// vmovdqa	0x40(%r11),	%xmm2
+	tbl	v2.16b, {v28.16b}, v4.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm4,	%xmm2,	%xmm2
+	eor	v2.16b, v2.16b, v3.16b		// vpxor	%xmm3,	%xmm2,	%xmm2
+						// vmovdqa	0x50(%r11),	%xmm3
+	tbl	v3.16b, {v29.16b}, v1.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm1,	%xmm3,	%xmm3
+	eor	v3.16b, v3.16b, v2.16b		// vpxor	%xmm2,	%xmm3,	%xmm3
+
+						// vmovdqa	0x60(%r11),	%xmm2
+	tbl	v2.16b, {v30.16b}, v4.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm4,	%xmm2,	%xmm2
+	tbl	v3.16b, {v3.16b}, v9.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm5,	%xmm3,	%xmm3
+						// vmovdqa	0x70(%r11),	%xmm4
+	tbl	v4.16b, {v31.16b}, v1.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm1,	%xmm4,	%xmm4
+	ld1	{v1.2d}, [x8]			// vmovdqa	(%r8,%r10),	%xmm1
+	eor	v2.16b, v2.16b, v3.16b		// vpxor	%xmm3,	%xmm2,	%xmm2
+	eor	v3.16b, v4.16b, v2.16b		// vpxor	%xmm2,	%xmm4,	%xmm3
+
+	sub	$out, $out, #16			// add	\$-16,	%rdx
+
+.Lschedule_mangle_both:
+	tbl	v3.16b, {v3.16b}, v1.16b	// vpshufb	%xmm1,	%xmm3,	%xmm3
+	add	x8, x8, #64-16			// add	\$-16,	%r8
+	and	x8, x8, #~(1<<6)		// and	\$0x30,	%r8
+	st1	{v3.2d}, [$out]			// vmovdqu	%xmm3,	(%rdx)
+	ret
+.size	_vpaes_schedule_mangle,.-_vpaes_schedule_mangle
+
+.globl	vpaes_set_encrypt_key
+.type	vpaes_set_encrypt_key,%function
+.align	4
+vpaes_set_encrypt_key:
+	stp	x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
+	add	x29,sp,#0
+	stp	d8,d9,[sp,#-16]!	// ABI spec says so
+
+	lsr	w9, $bits, #5		// shr	\$5,%eax
+	add	w9, w9, #5		// \$5,%eax
+	str	w9, [$out,#240]		// mov	%eax,240(%rdx)	# AES_KEY->rounds = nbits/32+5;
+
+	mov	$dir, #0		// mov	\$0,%ecx
+	mov	x8, #0x30		// mov	\$0x30,%r8d
+	bl	_vpaes_schedule_core
+	eor	x0, x0, x0
+
+	ldp	d8,d9,[sp],#16
+	ldp	x29,x30,[sp],#16
+	ret
+.size	vpaes_set_encrypt_key,.-vpaes_set_encrypt_key
+
+.globl	vpaes_set_decrypt_key
+.type	vpaes_set_decrypt_key,%function
+.align	4
+vpaes_set_decrypt_key:
+	stp	x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
+	add	x29,sp,#0
+	stp	d8,d9,[sp,#-16]!	// ABI spec says so
+
+	lsr	w9, $bits, #5		// shr	\$5,%eax
+	add	w9, w9, #5		// \$5,%eax
+	str	w9, [$out,#240]		// mov	%eax,240(%rdx)	# AES_KEY->rounds = nbits/32+5;
+	lsl	w9, w9, #4		// shl	\$4,%eax
+	add	$out, $out, #16		// lea	16(%rdx,%rax),%rdx
+	add	$out, $out, x9
+
+	mov	$dir, #1		// mov	\$1,%ecx
+	lsr	w8, $bits, #1		// shr	\$1,%r8d
+	and	x8, x8, #32		// and	\$32,%r8d
+	eor	x8, x8, #32		// xor	\$32,%r8d	# nbits==192?0:32
+	bl	_vpaes_schedule_core
+
+	ldp	d8,d9,[sp],#16
+	ldp	x29,x30,[sp],#16
+	ret
+.size	vpaes_set_decrypt_key,.-vpaes_set_decrypt_key
+___
+}
+{
+my ($inp,$out,$len,$key,$ivec,$dir) = map("x$_",(0..5));
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	vpaes_cbc_encrypt
+.type	vpaes_cbc_encrypt,%function
+.align	4
+vpaes_cbc_encrypt:
+	cbz	$len, .Lcbc_abort
+	cmp	w5, #0			// check direction
+	b.eq	vpaes_cbc_decrypt
+
+	stp	x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
+	add	x29,sp,#0
+
+	mov	x17, $len		// reassign
+	mov	x2,  $key		// reassign
+
+	ld1	{v0.16b}, [$ivec]	// load ivec
+	bl	_vpaes_encrypt_preheat
+	b	.Lcbc_enc_loop
+
+.align	4
+.Lcbc_enc_loop:
+	ld1	{v7.16b}, [$inp],#16	// load input
+	eor	v7.16b, v7.16b, v0.16b	// xor with ivec
+	bl	_vpaes_encrypt_core
+	st1	{v0.16b}, [$out],#16	// save output
+	subs	x17, x17, #16
+	b.hi	.Lcbc_enc_loop
+
+	st1	{v0.16b}, [$ivec]	// write ivec
+
+	ldp	x29,x30,[sp],#16
+.Lcbc_abort:
+	ret
+.size	vpaes_cbc_encrypt,.-vpaes_cbc_encrypt
+
+.type	vpaes_cbc_decrypt,%function
+.align	4
+vpaes_cbc_decrypt:
+	stp	x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
+	add	x29,sp,#0
+	stp	d8,d9,[sp,#-16]!	// ABI spec says so
+	stp	d10,d11,[sp,#-16]!
+	stp	d12,d13,[sp,#-16]!
+	stp	d14,d15,[sp,#-16]!
+
+	mov	x17, $len		// reassign
+	mov	x2,  $key		// reassign
+	ld1	{v6.16b}, [$ivec]	// load ivec
+	bl	_vpaes_decrypt_preheat
+	tst	x17, #16
+	b.eq	.Lcbc_dec_loop2x
+
+	ld1	{v7.16b}, [$inp], #16	// load input
+	bl	_vpaes_decrypt_core
+	eor	v0.16b, v0.16b, v6.16b	// xor with ivec
+	orr	v6.16b, v7.16b, v7.16b	// next ivec value
+	st1	{v0.16b}, [$out], #16
+	subs	x17, x17, #16
+	b.ls	.Lcbc_dec_done
+
+.align	4
+.Lcbc_dec_loop2x:
+	ld1	{v14.16b,v15.16b}, [$inp], #32
+	bl	_vpaes_decrypt_2x
+	eor	v0.16b, v0.16b, v6.16b	// xor with ivec
+	eor	v1.16b, v1.16b, v14.16b
+	orr	v6.16b, v15.16b, v15.16b
+	st1	{v0.16b,v1.16b}, [$out], #32
+	subs	x17, x17, #32
+	b.hi	.Lcbc_dec_loop2x
+
+.Lcbc_dec_done:
+	st1	{v6.16b}, [$ivec]
+
+	ldp	d14,d15,[sp],#16
+	ldp	d12,d13,[sp],#16
+	ldp	d10,d11,[sp],#16
+	ldp	d8,d9,[sp],#16
+	ldp	x29,x30,[sp],#16
+	ret
+.size	vpaes_cbc_decrypt,.-vpaes_cbc_decrypt
+___
+if (1) {
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	vpaes_ecb_encrypt
+.type	vpaes_ecb_encrypt,%function
+.align	4
+vpaes_ecb_encrypt:
+	stp	x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
+	add	x29,sp,#0
+	stp	d8,d9,[sp,#-16]!	// ABI spec says so
+	stp	d10,d11,[sp,#-16]!
+	stp	d12,d13,[sp,#-16]!
+	stp	d14,d15,[sp,#-16]!
+
+	mov	x17, $len
+	mov	x2,  $key
+	bl	_vpaes_encrypt_preheat
+	tst	x17, #16
+	b.eq	.Lecb_enc_loop
+
+	ld1	{v7.16b}, [$inp],#16
+	bl	_vpaes_encrypt_core
+	st1	{v0.16b}, [$out],#16
+	subs	x17, x17, #16
+	b.ls	.Lecb_enc_done
+
+.align	4
+.Lecb_enc_loop:
+	ld1	{v14.16b,v15.16b}, [$inp], #32
+	bl	_vpaes_encrypt_2x
+	st1	{v0.16b,v1.16b}, [$out], #32
+	subs	x17, x17, #32
+	b.hi	.Lecb_enc_loop
+
+.Lecb_enc_done:
+	ldp	d14,d15,[sp],#16
+	ldp	d12,d13,[sp],#16
+	ldp	d10,d11,[sp],#16
+	ldp	d8,d9,[sp],#16
+	ldp	x29,x30,[sp],#16
+	ret
+.size	vpaes_ecb_encrypt,.-vpaes_ecb_encrypt
+
+.globl	vpaes_ecb_decrypt
+.type	vpaes_ecb_decrypt,%function
+.align	4
+vpaes_ecb_decrypt:
+	stp	x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
+	add	x29,sp,#0
+	stp	d8,d9,[sp,#-16]!	// ABI spec says so
+	stp	d10,d11,[sp,#-16]!
+	stp	d12,d13,[sp,#-16]!
+	stp	d14,d15,[sp,#-16]!
+
+	mov	x17, $len
+	mov	x2,  $key
+	bl	_vpaes_decrypt_preheat
+	tst	x17, #16
+	b.eq	.Lecb_dec_loop
+
+	ld1	{v7.16b}, [$inp],#16
+	bl	_vpaes_encrypt_core
+	st1	{v0.16b}, [$out],#16
+	subs	x17, x17, #16
+	b.ls	.Lecb_dec_done
+
+.align	4
+.Lecb_dec_loop:
+	ld1	{v14.16b,v15.16b}, [$inp], #32
+	bl	_vpaes_decrypt_2x
+	st1	{v0.16b,v1.16b}, [$out], #32
+	subs	x17, x17, #32
+	b.hi	.Lecb_dec_loop
+
+.Lecb_dec_done:
+	ldp	d14,d15,[sp],#16
+	ldp	d12,d13,[sp],#16
+	ldp	d10,d11,[sp],#16
+	ldp	d8,d9,[sp],#16
+	ldp	x29,x30,[sp],#16
+	ret
+.size	vpaes_ecb_decrypt,.-vpaes_ecb_decrypt
+___
+}	}
+print $code;
+
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/asm/vpaes-ppc.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/asm/vpaes-ppc.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bb38fbe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/asm/vpaes-ppc.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,1594 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2013-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+######################################################################
+## Constant-time SSSE3 AES core implementation.
+## version 0.1
+##
+## By Mike Hamburg (Stanford University), 2009
+## Public domain.
+##
+## For details see http://shiftleft.org/papers/vector_aes/ and
+## http://crypto.stanford.edu/vpaes/.
+
+# CBC encrypt/decrypt performance in cycles per byte processed with
+# 128-bit key.
+#
+#		aes-ppc.pl		this
+# PPC74x0/G4e	35.5/52.1/(23.8)	11.9(*)/15.4
+# PPC970/G5	37.9/55.0/(28.5)	22.2/28.5
+# POWER6	42.7/54.3/(28.2)	63.0/92.8(**)
+# POWER7	32.3/42.9/(18.4)	18.5/23.3
+#
+# (*)	This is ~10% worse than reported in paper. The reason is
+#	twofold. This module doesn't make any assumption about
+#	key schedule (or data for that matter) alignment and handles
+#	it in-line. Secondly it, being transliterated from
+#	vpaes-x86_64.pl, relies on "nested inversion" better suited
+#	for Intel CPUs.
+# (**)	Inadequate POWER6 performance is due to astronomic AltiVec
+#	latency, 9 cycles per simple logical operation.
+
+$flavour = shift;
+
+if ($flavour =~ /64/) {
+	$SIZE_T	=8;
+	$LRSAVE	=2*$SIZE_T;
+	$STU	="stdu";
+	$POP	="ld";
+	$PUSH	="std";
+	$UCMP	="cmpld";
+} elsif ($flavour =~ /32/) {
+	$SIZE_T	=4;
+	$LRSAVE	=$SIZE_T;
+	$STU	="stwu";
+	$POP	="lwz";
+	$PUSH	="stw";
+	$UCMP	="cmplw";
+} else { die "nonsense $flavour"; }
+
+$sp="r1";
+$FRAME=6*$SIZE_T+13*16;	# 13*16 is for v20-v31 offload
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+( $xlate="${dir}ppc-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
+( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/ppc-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
+die "can't locate ppc-xlate.pl";
+
+open STDOUT,"| $^X $xlate $flavour ".shift || die "can't call $xlate: $!";
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.machine	"any"
+
+.text
+
+.align	7	# totally strategic alignment
+_vpaes_consts:
+Lk_mc_forward:	# mc_forward
+	.long	0x01020300, 0x05060704, 0x090a0b08, 0x0d0e0f0c	?inv
+	.long	0x05060704, 0x090a0b08, 0x0d0e0f0c, 0x01020300	?inv
+	.long	0x090a0b08, 0x0d0e0f0c, 0x01020300, 0x05060704	?inv
+	.long	0x0d0e0f0c, 0x01020300, 0x05060704, 0x090a0b08	?inv
+Lk_mc_backward:	# mc_backward
+	.long	0x03000102, 0x07040506, 0x0b08090a, 0x0f0c0d0e	?inv
+	.long	0x0f0c0d0e, 0x03000102, 0x07040506, 0x0b08090a	?inv
+	.long	0x0b08090a, 0x0f0c0d0e, 0x03000102, 0x07040506	?inv
+	.long	0x07040506, 0x0b08090a, 0x0f0c0d0e, 0x03000102	?inv
+Lk_sr:		# sr
+	.long	0x00010203, 0x04050607, 0x08090a0b, 0x0c0d0e0f	?inv
+	.long	0x00050a0f, 0x04090e03, 0x080d0207, 0x0c01060b	?inv
+	.long	0x0009020b, 0x040d060f, 0x08010a03, 0x0c050e07	?inv
+	.long	0x000d0a07, 0x04010e0b, 0x0805020f, 0x0c090603	?inv
+
+##
+## "Hot" constants
+##
+Lk_inv:		# inv, inva
+	.long	0xf001080d, 0x0f06050e, 0x020c0b0a, 0x09030704	?rev
+	.long	0xf0070b0f, 0x060a0401, 0x09080502, 0x0c0e0d03	?rev
+Lk_ipt:		# input transform (lo, hi)
+	.long	0x00702a5a, 0x98e8b2c2, 0x08782252, 0x90e0baca	?rev
+	.long	0x004d7c31, 0x7d30014c, 0x81ccfdb0, 0xfcb180cd	?rev
+Lk_sbo:		# sbou, sbot
+	.long	0x00c7bd6f, 0x176dd2d0, 0x78a802c5, 0x7abfaa15	?rev
+	.long	0x006abb5f, 0xa574e4cf, 0xfa352b41, 0xd1901e8e	?rev
+Lk_sb1:		# sb1u, sb1t
+	.long	0x0023e2fa, 0x15d41836, 0xefd92e0d, 0xc1ccf73b	?rev
+	.long	0x003e50cb, 0x8fe19bb1, 0x44f52a14, 0x6e7adfa5	?rev
+Lk_sb2:		# sb2u, sb2t
+	.long	0x0029e10a, 0x4088eb69, 0x4a2382ab, 0xc863a1c2	?rev
+	.long	0x0024710b, 0xc6937ae2, 0xcd2f98bc, 0x55e9b75e	?rev
+
+##
+##  Decryption stuff
+##
+Lk_dipt:	# decryption input transform
+	.long	0x005f540b, 0x045b500f, 0x1a454e11, 0x1e414a15	?rev
+	.long	0x00650560, 0xe683e386, 0x94f191f4, 0x72177712	?rev
+Lk_dsbo:	# decryption sbox final output
+	.long	0x0040f97e, 0x53ea8713, 0x2d3e94d4, 0xb96daac7	?rev
+	.long	0x001d4493, 0x0f56d712, 0x9c8ec5d8, 0x59814bca	?rev
+Lk_dsb9:	# decryption sbox output *9*u, *9*t
+	.long	0x00d6869a, 0x53031c85, 0xc94c994f, 0x501fd5ca	?rev
+	.long	0x0049d7ec, 0x89173bc0, 0x65a5fbb2, 0x9e2c5e72	?rev
+Lk_dsbd:	# decryption sbox output *D*u, *D*t
+	.long	0x00a2b1e6, 0xdfcc577d, 0x39442a88, 0x139b6ef5	?rev
+	.long	0x00cbc624, 0xf7fae23c, 0xd3efde15, 0x0d183129	?rev
+Lk_dsbb:	# decryption sbox output *B*u, *B*t
+	.long	0x0042b496, 0x926422d0, 0x04d4f2b0, 0xf6462660	?rev
+	.long	0x006759cd, 0xa69894c1, 0x6baa5532, 0x3e0cfff3	?rev
+Lk_dsbe:	# decryption sbox output *E*u, *E*t
+	.long	0x00d0d426, 0x9692f246, 0xb0f6b464, 0x04604222	?rev
+	.long	0x00c1aaff, 0xcda6550c, 0x323e5998, 0x6bf36794	?rev
+
+##
+##  Key schedule constants
+##
+Lk_dksd:	# decryption key schedule: invskew x*D
+	.long	0x0047e4a3, 0x5d1ab9fe, 0xf9be1d5a, 0xa4e34007	?rev
+	.long	0x008336b5, 0xf477c241, 0x1e9d28ab, 0xea69dc5f	?rev
+Lk_dksb:	# decryption key schedule: invskew x*B
+	.long	0x00d55085, 0x1fca4f9a, 0x994cc91c, 0x8653d603	?rev
+	.long	0x004afcb6, 0xa7ed5b11, 0xc882347e, 0x6f2593d9	?rev
+Lk_dkse:	# decryption key schedule: invskew x*E + 0x63
+	.long	0x00d6c91f, 0xca1c03d5, 0x86504f99, 0x4c9a8553	?rev
+	.long	0xe87bdc4f, 0x059631a2, 0x8714b320, 0x6af95ecd	?rev
+Lk_dks9:	# decryption key schedule: invskew x*9
+	.long	0x00a7d97e, 0xc86f11b6, 0xfc5b2582, 0x3493ed4a	?rev
+	.long	0x00331427, 0x62517645, 0xcefddae9, 0xac9fb88b	?rev
+
+Lk_rcon:	# rcon
+	.long	0xb6ee9daf, 0xb991831f, 0x817d7c4d, 0x08982a70	?asis
+Lk_s63:
+	.long	0x5b5b5b5b, 0x5b5b5b5b, 0x5b5b5b5b, 0x5b5b5b5b	?asis
+
+Lk_opt:		# output transform
+	.long	0x0060b6d6, 0x29499fff, 0x0868bede, 0x214197f7	?rev
+	.long	0x00ecbc50, 0x51bded01, 0xe00c5cb0, 0xb15d0de1	?rev
+Lk_deskew:	# deskew tables: inverts the sbox's "skew"
+	.long	0x00e3a447, 0x40a3e407, 0x1af9be5d, 0x5ab9fe1d	?rev
+	.long	0x0069ea83, 0xdcb5365f, 0x771e9df4, 0xabc24128	?rev
+.align	5
+Lconsts:
+	mflr	r0
+	bcl	20,31,\$+4
+	mflr	r12	#vvvvv "distance between . and _vpaes_consts
+	addi	r12,r12,-0x308
+	mtlr	r0
+	blr
+	.long	0
+	.byte	0,12,0x14,0,0,0,0,0
+.asciz  "Vector Permutation AES for AltiVec, Mike Hamburg (Stanford University)"
+.align	6
+___
+
+my ($inptail,$inpperm,$outhead,$outperm,$outmask,$keyperm) = map("v$_",(26..31));
+{
+my ($inp,$out,$key) = map("r$_",(3..5));
+
+my ($invlo,$invhi,$iptlo,$ipthi,$sbou,$sbot) = map("v$_",(10..15));
+my ($sb1u,$sb1t,$sb2u,$sb2t) = map("v$_",(16..19));
+my ($sb9u,$sb9t,$sbdu,$sbdt,$sbbu,$sbbt,$sbeu,$sbet)=map("v$_",(16..23));
+
+$code.=<<___;
+##
+##  _aes_preheat
+##
+##  Fills register %r10 -> .aes_consts (so you can -fPIC)
+##  and %xmm9-%xmm15 as specified below.
+##
+.align	4
+_vpaes_encrypt_preheat:
+	mflr	r8
+	bl	Lconsts
+	mtlr	r8
+	li	r11, 0xc0		# Lk_inv
+	li	r10, 0xd0
+	li	r9,  0xe0		# Lk_ipt
+	li	r8,  0xf0
+	vxor	v7, v7, v7		# 0x00..00
+	vspltisb	v8,4		# 0x04..04
+	vspltisb	v9,0x0f		# 0x0f..0f
+	lvx	$invlo, r12, r11
+	li	r11, 0x100
+	lvx	$invhi, r12, r10
+	li	r10, 0x110
+	lvx	$iptlo, r12, r9
+	li	r9,  0x120
+	lvx	$ipthi, r12, r8
+	li	r8,  0x130
+	lvx	$sbou, r12, r11
+	li	r11, 0x140
+	lvx	$sbot, r12, r10
+	li	r10, 0x150
+	lvx	$sb1u, r12, r9
+	lvx	$sb1t, r12, r8
+	lvx	$sb2u, r12, r11
+	lvx	$sb2t, r12, r10
+	blr
+	.long	0
+	.byte	0,12,0x14,0,0,0,0,0
+
+##
+##  _aes_encrypt_core
+##
+##  AES-encrypt %xmm0.
+##
+##  Inputs:
+##     %xmm0 = input
+##     %xmm9-%xmm15 as in _vpaes_preheat
+##    (%rdx) = scheduled keys
+##
+##  Output in %xmm0
+##  Clobbers  %xmm1-%xmm6, %r9, %r10, %r11, %rax
+##
+##
+.align 5
+_vpaes_encrypt_core:
+	lwz	r8, 240($key)		# pull rounds
+	li	r9, 16
+	lvx	v5, 0, $key		# vmovdqu	(%r9),	%xmm5		# round0 key
+	li	r11, 0x10
+	lvx	v6, r9, $key
+	addi	r9, r9, 16
+	?vperm	v5, v5, v6, $keyperm	# align round key
+	addi	r10, r11, 0x40
+	vsrb	v1, v0, v8		# vpsrlb	\$4,	%xmm0,	%xmm0
+	vperm	v0, $iptlo, $iptlo, v0	# vpshufb	%xmm1,	%xmm2,	%xmm1
+	vperm	v1, $ipthi, $ipthi, v1	# vpshufb	%xmm0,	%xmm3,	%xmm2
+	vxor	v0, v0, v5		# vpxor	%xmm5,	%xmm1,	%xmm0
+	vxor	v0, v0, v1		# vpxor	%xmm2,	%xmm0,	%xmm0
+	mtctr	r8
+	b	Lenc_entry
+
+.align 4
+Lenc_loop:
+	# middle of middle round
+	vperm	v4, $sb1t, v7, v2	# vpshufb	%xmm2,	%xmm13,	%xmm4	# 4 = sb1u
+	lvx	v1, r12, r11		# vmovdqa	-0x40(%r11,%r10), %xmm1	# .Lk_mc_forward[]
+	addi	r11, r11, 16
+	vperm	v0, $sb1u, v7, v3	# vpshufb	%xmm3,	%xmm12,	%xmm0	# 0 = sb1t
+	vxor	v4, v4, v5		# vpxor		%xmm5,	%xmm4,	%xmm4	# 4 = sb1u + k
+	andi.	r11, r11, 0x30		# and		\$0x30, %r11	# ... mod 4
+	vperm	v5, $sb2t, v7, v2	# vpshufb	%xmm2,	%xmm15,	%xmm5	# 4 = sb2u
+	vxor	v0, v0, v4		# vpxor		%xmm4,	%xmm0,	%xmm0	# 0 = A
+	vperm	v2, $sb2u, v7, v3	# vpshufb	%xmm3,	%xmm14,	%xmm2	# 2 = sb2t
+	lvx	v4, r12, r10		# vmovdqa	(%r11,%r10), %xmm4	# .Lk_mc_backward[]
+	addi	r10, r11, 0x40
+	vperm	v3, v0, v7, v1		# vpshufb	%xmm1,	%xmm0,	%xmm3	# 0 = B
+	vxor	v2, v2, v5		# vpxor		%xmm5,	%xmm2,	%xmm2	# 2 = 2A
+	vperm	v0, v0, v7, v4		# vpshufb	%xmm4,	%xmm0,	%xmm0	# 3 = D
+	vxor	v3, v3, v2		# vpxor		%xmm2,	%xmm3,	%xmm3	# 0 = 2A+B
+	vperm	v4, v3, v7, v1		# vpshufb	%xmm1,	%xmm3,	%xmm4	# 0 = 2B+C
+	vxor	v0, v0, v3		# vpxor		%xmm3,	%xmm0,	%xmm0	# 3 = 2A+B+D
+	vxor	v0, v0, v4		# vpxor		%xmm4,	%xmm0, %xmm0	# 0 = 2A+3B+C+D
+
+Lenc_entry:
+	# top of round
+	vsrb	v1, v0, v8		# vpsrlb	\$4,	%xmm0,	%xmm0	# 1 = i
+	vperm	v5, $invhi, $invhi, v0	# vpshufb	%xmm1,	%xmm11,	%xmm5	# 2 = a/k
+	vxor	v0, v0, v1		# vpxor		%xmm0,	%xmm1,	%xmm1	# 0 = j
+	vperm	v3, $invlo, $invlo, v1	# vpshufb	%xmm0, 	%xmm10,	%xmm3  	# 3 = 1/i
+	vperm	v4, $invlo, $invlo, v0	# vpshufb	%xmm1, 	%xmm10,	%xmm4  	# 4 = 1/j
+	vand	v0, v0, v9
+	vxor	v3, v3, v5		# vpxor		%xmm5,	%xmm3,	%xmm3	# 3 = iak = 1/i + a/k
+	vxor	v4, v4, v5		# vpxor		%xmm5,	%xmm4,	%xmm4  	# 4 = jak = 1/j + a/k
+	vperm	v2, $invlo, v7, v3	# vpshufb	%xmm3,	%xmm10,	%xmm2  	# 2 = 1/iak
+	vmr	v5, v6
+	lvx	v6, r9, $key		# vmovdqu	(%r9), %xmm5
+	vperm	v3, $invlo, v7, v4	# vpshufb	%xmm4,	%xmm10,	%xmm3	# 3 = 1/jak
+	addi	r9, r9, 16
+	vxor	v2, v2, v0		# vpxor		%xmm1,	%xmm2,	%xmm2  	# 2 = io
+	?vperm	v5, v5, v6, $keyperm	# align round key
+	vxor	v3, v3, v1		# vpxor		%xmm0,	%xmm3,	%xmm3	# 3 = jo
+	bdnz	Lenc_loop
+
+	# middle of last round
+	addi	r10, r11, 0x80
+					# vmovdqa	-0x60(%r10), %xmm4	# 3 : sbou	.Lk_sbo
+					# vmovdqa	-0x50(%r10), %xmm0	# 0 : sbot	.Lk_sbo+16
+	vperm	v4, $sbou, v7, v2	# vpshufb	%xmm2,	%xmm4,	%xmm4	# 4 = sbou
+	lvx	v1, r12, r10		# vmovdqa	0x40(%r11,%r10), %xmm1	# .Lk_sr[]
+	vperm	v0, $sbot, v7, v3	# vpshufb	%xmm3,	%xmm0,	%xmm0	# 0 = sb1t
+	vxor	v4, v4, v5		# vpxor		%xmm5,	%xmm4,	%xmm4	# 4 = sb1u + k
+	vxor	v0, v0, v4		# vpxor		%xmm4,	%xmm0,	%xmm0	# 0 = A
+	vperm	v0, v0, v7, v1		# vpshufb	%xmm1,	%xmm0,	%xmm0
+	blr
+	.long	0
+	.byte	0,12,0x14,0,0,0,0,0
+
+.globl	.vpaes_encrypt
+.align	5
+.vpaes_encrypt:
+	$STU	$sp,-$FRAME($sp)
+	li	r10,`15+6*$SIZE_T`
+	li	r11,`31+6*$SIZE_T`
+	mflr	r6
+	mfspr	r7, 256			# save vrsave
+	stvx	v20,r10,$sp
+	addi	r10,r10,32
+	stvx	v21,r11,$sp
+	addi	r11,r11,32
+	stvx	v22,r10,$sp
+	addi	r10,r10,32
+	stvx	v23,r11,$sp
+	addi	r11,r11,32
+	stvx	v24,r10,$sp
+	addi	r10,r10,32
+	stvx	v25,r11,$sp
+	addi	r11,r11,32
+	stvx	v26,r10,$sp
+	addi	r10,r10,32
+	stvx	v27,r11,$sp
+	addi	r11,r11,32
+	stvx	v28,r10,$sp
+	addi	r10,r10,32
+	stvx	v29,r11,$sp
+	addi	r11,r11,32
+	stvx	v30,r10,$sp
+	stvx	v31,r11,$sp
+	stw	r7,`$FRAME-4`($sp)	# save vrsave
+	li	r0, -1
+	$PUSH	r6,`$FRAME+$LRSAVE`($sp)
+	mtspr	256, r0			# preserve all AltiVec registers
+
+	bl	_vpaes_encrypt_preheat
+
+	?lvsl	$inpperm, 0, $inp	# prepare for unaligned access
+	lvx	v0, 0, $inp
+	addi	$inp, $inp, 15		# 15 is not a typo
+	 ?lvsr	$outperm, 0, $out
+	?lvsl	$keyperm, 0, $key	# prepare for unaligned access
+	lvx	$inptail, 0, $inp	# redundant in aligned case
+	?vperm	v0, v0, $inptail, $inpperm
+
+	bl	_vpaes_encrypt_core
+
+	andi.	r8, $out, 15
+	li	r9, 16
+	beq	Lenc_out_aligned
+
+	vperm	v0, v0, v0, $outperm	# rotate right/left
+	mtctr	r9
+Lenc_out_unaligned:
+	stvebx	v0, 0, $out
+	addi	$out, $out, 1
+	bdnz	Lenc_out_unaligned
+	b	Lenc_done
+
+.align	4
+Lenc_out_aligned:
+	stvx	v0, 0, $out
+Lenc_done:
+
+	li	r10,`15+6*$SIZE_T`
+	li	r11,`31+6*$SIZE_T`
+	mtlr	r6
+	mtspr	256, r7			# restore vrsave
+	lvx	v20,r10,$sp
+	addi	r10,r10,32
+	lvx	v21,r11,$sp
+	addi	r11,r11,32
+	lvx	v22,r10,$sp
+	addi	r10,r10,32
+	lvx	v23,r11,$sp
+	addi	r11,r11,32
+	lvx	v24,r10,$sp
+	addi	r10,r10,32
+	lvx	v25,r11,$sp
+	addi	r11,r11,32
+	lvx	v26,r10,$sp
+	addi	r10,r10,32
+	lvx	v27,r11,$sp
+	addi	r11,r11,32
+	lvx	v28,r10,$sp
+	addi	r10,r10,32
+	lvx	v29,r11,$sp
+	addi	r11,r11,32
+	lvx	v30,r10,$sp
+	lvx	v31,r11,$sp
+	addi	$sp,$sp,$FRAME
+	blr
+	.long	0
+	.byte	0,12,0x04,1,0x80,0,3,0
+	.long	0
+.size	.vpaes_encrypt,.-.vpaes_encrypt
+
+.align	4
+_vpaes_decrypt_preheat:
+	mflr	r8
+	bl	Lconsts
+	mtlr	r8
+	li	r11, 0xc0		# Lk_inv
+	li	r10, 0xd0
+	li	r9,  0x160		# Ldipt
+	li	r8,  0x170
+	vxor	v7, v7, v7		# 0x00..00
+	vspltisb	v8,4		# 0x04..04
+	vspltisb	v9,0x0f		# 0x0f..0f
+	lvx	$invlo, r12, r11
+	li	r11, 0x180
+	lvx	$invhi, r12, r10
+	li	r10, 0x190
+	lvx	$iptlo, r12, r9
+	li	r9,  0x1a0
+	lvx	$ipthi, r12, r8
+	li	r8,  0x1b0
+	lvx	$sbou, r12, r11
+	li	r11, 0x1c0
+	lvx	$sbot, r12, r10
+	li	r10, 0x1d0
+	lvx	$sb9u, r12, r9
+	li	r9,  0x1e0
+	lvx	$sb9t, r12, r8
+	li	r8,  0x1f0
+	lvx	$sbdu, r12, r11
+	li	r11, 0x200
+	lvx	$sbdt, r12, r10
+	li	r10, 0x210
+	lvx	$sbbu, r12, r9
+	lvx	$sbbt, r12, r8
+	lvx	$sbeu, r12, r11
+	lvx	$sbet, r12, r10
+	blr
+	.long	0
+	.byte	0,12,0x14,0,0,0,0,0
+
+##
+##  Decryption core
+##
+##  Same API as encryption core.
+##
+.align	4
+_vpaes_decrypt_core:
+	lwz	r8, 240($key)		# pull rounds
+	li	r9, 16
+	lvx	v5, 0, $key		# vmovdqu	(%r9),	%xmm4		# round0 key
+	li	r11, 0x30
+	lvx	v6, r9, $key
+	addi	r9, r9, 16
+	?vperm	v5, v5, v6, $keyperm	# align round key
+	vsrb	v1, v0, v8		# vpsrlb	\$4,	%xmm0,	%xmm0
+	vperm	v0, $iptlo, $iptlo, v0	# vpshufb	%xmm1,	%xmm2,	%xmm2
+	vperm	v1, $ipthi, $ipthi, v1	# vpshufb	%xmm0,	%xmm1,	%xmm0
+	vxor	v0, v0, v5		# vpxor	%xmm4,	%xmm2,	%xmm2
+	vxor	v0, v0, v1		# vpxor	%xmm2,	%xmm0,	%xmm0
+	mtctr	r8
+	b	Ldec_entry
+
+.align 4
+Ldec_loop:
+#
+#  Inverse mix columns
+#
+	lvx	v0, r12, r11		# v5 and v0 are flipped
+					# vmovdqa	-0x20(%r10),%xmm4		# 4 : sb9u
+					# vmovdqa	-0x10(%r10),%xmm1		# 0 : sb9t
+	vperm	v4, $sb9u, v7, v2	# vpshufb	%xmm2,	%xmm4,	%xmm4		# 4 = sb9u
+	subi	r11, r11, 16
+	vperm	v1, $sb9t, v7, v3	# vpshufb	%xmm3,	%xmm1,	%xmm1		# 0 = sb9t
+	andi.	r11, r11, 0x30
+	vxor	v5, v5, v4		# vpxor		%xmm4,	%xmm0,	%xmm0
+					# vmovdqa	0x00(%r10),%xmm4		# 4 : sbdu
+	vxor	v5, v5, v1		# vpxor		%xmm1,	%xmm0,	%xmm0		# 0 = ch
+					# vmovdqa	0x10(%r10),%xmm1		# 0 : sbdt
+
+	vperm	v4, $sbdu, v7, v2	# vpshufb	%xmm2,	%xmm4,	%xmm4		# 4 = sbdu
+	vperm 	v5, v5, v7, v0		# vpshufb	%xmm5,	%xmm0,	%xmm0		# MC ch
+	vperm	v1, $sbdt, v7, v3	# vpshufb	%xmm3,	%xmm1,	%xmm1		# 0 = sbdt
+	vxor	v5, v5, v4		# vpxor		%xmm4,	%xmm0,	%xmm0		# 4 = ch
+					# vmovdqa	0x20(%r10),	%xmm4		# 4 : sbbu
+	vxor	v5, v5, v1		# vpxor		%xmm1,	%xmm0,	%xmm0		# 0 = ch
+					# vmovdqa	0x30(%r10),	%xmm1		# 0 : sbbt
+
+	vperm	v4, $sbbu, v7, v2	# vpshufb	%xmm2,	%xmm4,	%xmm4		# 4 = sbbu
+	vperm	v5, v5, v7, v0		# vpshufb	%xmm5,	%xmm0,	%xmm0		# MC ch
+	vperm	v1, $sbbt, v7, v3	# vpshufb	%xmm3,	%xmm1,	%xmm1		# 0 = sbbt
+	vxor	v5, v5, v4		# vpxor		%xmm4,	%xmm0,	%xmm0		# 4 = ch
+					# vmovdqa	0x40(%r10),	%xmm4		# 4 : sbeu
+	vxor	v5, v5, v1		# vpxor		%xmm1,	%xmm0,	%xmm0		# 0 = ch
+					# vmovdqa	0x50(%r10),	%xmm1		# 0 : sbet
+
+	vperm	v4, $sbeu, v7, v2	# vpshufb	%xmm2,	%xmm4,	%xmm4		# 4 = sbeu
+	vperm	v5, v5, v7, v0		# vpshufb	%xmm5,	%xmm0,	%xmm0		# MC ch
+	vperm	v1, $sbet, v7, v3	# vpshufb	%xmm3,	%xmm1,	%xmm1		# 0 = sbet
+	vxor	v0, v5, v4		# vpxor		%xmm4,	%xmm0,	%xmm0		# 4 = ch
+	vxor	v0, v0, v1		# vpxor		%xmm1,	%xmm0,	%xmm0		# 0 = ch
+
+Ldec_entry:
+	# top of round
+	vsrb	v1, v0, v8		# vpsrlb	\$4,	%xmm0,	%xmm0	# 1 = i
+	vperm	v2, $invhi, $invhi, v0	# vpshufb	%xmm1,	%xmm11,	%xmm2	# 2 = a/k
+	vxor	v0, v0, v1		# vpxor		%xmm0,	%xmm1,	%xmm1	# 0 = j
+	vperm	v3, $invlo, $invlo, v1	# vpshufb	%xmm0, 	%xmm10,	%xmm3	# 3 = 1/i
+	vperm	v4, $invlo, $invlo, v0	# vpshufb	%xmm1,	%xmm10,	%xmm4	# 4 = 1/j
+	vand	v0, v0, v9
+	vxor	v3, v3, v2		# vpxor		%xmm2,	%xmm3,	%xmm3	# 3 = iak = 1/i + a/k
+	vxor	v4, v4, v2		# vpxor		%xmm2, 	%xmm4,	%xmm4	# 4 = jak = 1/j + a/k
+	vperm	v2, $invlo, v7, v3	# vpshufb	%xmm3,	%xmm10,	%xmm2	# 2 = 1/iak
+	vmr	v5, v6
+	lvx	v6, r9, $key		# vmovdqu	(%r9),	%xmm0
+	vperm	v3, $invlo, v7, v4	# vpshufb	%xmm4,  %xmm10,	%xmm3	# 3 = 1/jak
+	addi	r9, r9, 16
+	vxor	v2, v2, v0		# vpxor		%xmm1,	%xmm2,	%xmm2	# 2 = io
+	?vperm	v5, v5, v6, $keyperm	# align round key
+	vxor	v3, v3, v1		# vpxor		%xmm0,  %xmm3,	%xmm3	# 3 = jo
+	bdnz	Ldec_loop
+
+	# middle of last round
+	addi	r10, r11, 0x80
+					# vmovdqa	0x60(%r10),	%xmm4	# 3 : sbou
+	vperm	v4, $sbou, v7, v2	# vpshufb	%xmm2,	%xmm4,	%xmm4	# 4 = sbou
+					# vmovdqa	0x70(%r10),	%xmm1	# 0 : sbot
+	lvx	v2, r12, r10		# vmovdqa	-0x160(%r11),	%xmm2	# .Lk_sr-.Lk_dsbd=-0x160
+	vperm	v1, $sbot, v7, v3	# vpshufb	%xmm3,	%xmm1,	%xmm1	# 0 = sb1t
+	vxor	v4, v4, v5		# vpxor		%xmm0,	%xmm4,	%xmm4	# 4 = sb1u + k
+	vxor	v0, v1, v4		# vpxor		%xmm4,	%xmm1,	%xmm0	# 0 = A
+	vperm	v0, v0, v7, v2		# vpshufb	%xmm2,	%xmm0,	%xmm0
+	blr
+	.long	0
+	.byte	0,12,0x14,0,0,0,0,0
+
+.globl	.vpaes_decrypt
+.align	5
+.vpaes_decrypt:
+	$STU	$sp,-$FRAME($sp)
+	li	r10,`15+6*$SIZE_T`
+	li	r11,`31+6*$SIZE_T`
+	mflr	r6
+	mfspr	r7, 256			# save vrsave
+	stvx	v20,r10,$sp
+	addi	r10,r10,32
+	stvx	v21,r11,$sp
+	addi	r11,r11,32
+	stvx	v22,r10,$sp
+	addi	r10,r10,32
+	stvx	v23,r11,$sp
+	addi	r11,r11,32
+	stvx	v24,r10,$sp
+	addi	r10,r10,32
+	stvx	v25,r11,$sp
+	addi	r11,r11,32
+	stvx	v26,r10,$sp
+	addi	r10,r10,32
+	stvx	v27,r11,$sp
+	addi	r11,r11,32
+	stvx	v28,r10,$sp
+	addi	r10,r10,32
+	stvx	v29,r11,$sp
+	addi	r11,r11,32
+	stvx	v30,r10,$sp
+	stvx	v31,r11,$sp
+	stw	r7,`$FRAME-4`($sp)	# save vrsave
+	li	r0, -1
+	$PUSH	r6,`$FRAME+$LRSAVE`($sp)
+	mtspr	256, r0			# preserve all AltiVec registers
+
+	bl	_vpaes_decrypt_preheat
+
+	?lvsl	$inpperm, 0, $inp	# prepare for unaligned access
+	lvx	v0, 0, $inp
+	addi	$inp, $inp, 15		# 15 is not a typo
+	 ?lvsr	$outperm, 0, $out
+	?lvsl	$keyperm, 0, $key
+	lvx	$inptail, 0, $inp	# redundant in aligned case
+	?vperm	v0, v0, $inptail, $inpperm
+
+	bl	_vpaes_decrypt_core
+
+	andi.	r8, $out, 15
+	li	r9, 16
+	beq	Ldec_out_aligned
+
+	vperm	v0, v0, v0, $outperm	# rotate right/left
+	mtctr	r9
+Ldec_out_unaligned:
+	stvebx	v0, 0, $out
+	addi	$out, $out, 1
+	bdnz	Ldec_out_unaligned
+	b	Ldec_done
+
+.align	4
+Ldec_out_aligned:
+	stvx	v0, 0, $out
+Ldec_done:
+
+	li	r10,`15+6*$SIZE_T`
+	li	r11,`31+6*$SIZE_T`
+	mtlr	r6
+	mtspr	256, r7			# restore vrsave
+	lvx	v20,r10,$sp
+	addi	r10,r10,32
+	lvx	v21,r11,$sp
+	addi	r11,r11,32
+	lvx	v22,r10,$sp
+	addi	r10,r10,32
+	lvx	v23,r11,$sp
+	addi	r11,r11,32
+	lvx	v24,r10,$sp
+	addi	r10,r10,32
+	lvx	v25,r11,$sp
+	addi	r11,r11,32
+	lvx	v26,r10,$sp
+	addi	r10,r10,32
+	lvx	v27,r11,$sp
+	addi	r11,r11,32
+	lvx	v28,r10,$sp
+	addi	r10,r10,32
+	lvx	v29,r11,$sp
+	addi	r11,r11,32
+	lvx	v30,r10,$sp
+	lvx	v31,r11,$sp
+	addi	$sp,$sp,$FRAME
+	blr
+	.long	0
+	.byte	0,12,0x04,1,0x80,0,3,0
+	.long	0
+.size	.vpaes_decrypt,.-.vpaes_decrypt
+
+.globl	.vpaes_cbc_encrypt
+.align	5
+.vpaes_cbc_encrypt:
+	${UCMP}i r5,16
+	bltlr-
+
+	$STU	$sp,-`($FRAME+2*$SIZE_T)`($sp)
+	mflr	r0
+	li	r10,`15+6*$SIZE_T`
+	li	r11,`31+6*$SIZE_T`
+	mfspr	r12, 256
+	stvx	v20,r10,$sp
+	addi	r10,r10,32
+	stvx	v21,r11,$sp
+	addi	r11,r11,32
+	stvx	v22,r10,$sp
+	addi	r10,r10,32
+	stvx	v23,r11,$sp
+	addi	r11,r11,32
+	stvx	v24,r10,$sp
+	addi	r10,r10,32
+	stvx	v25,r11,$sp
+	addi	r11,r11,32
+	stvx	v26,r10,$sp
+	addi	r10,r10,32
+	stvx	v27,r11,$sp
+	addi	r11,r11,32
+	stvx	v28,r10,$sp
+	addi	r10,r10,32
+	stvx	v29,r11,$sp
+	addi	r11,r11,32
+	stvx	v30,r10,$sp
+	stvx	v31,r11,$sp
+	stw	r12,`$FRAME-4`($sp)	# save vrsave
+	$PUSH	r30,`$FRAME+$SIZE_T*0`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r31,`$FRAME+$SIZE_T*1`($sp)
+	li	r9, -16
+	$PUSH	r0, `$FRAME+$SIZE_T*2+$LRSAVE`($sp)
+
+	and	r30, r5, r9		# copy length&-16
+	andi.	r9, $out, 15		# is $out aligned?
+	mr	r5, r6			# copy pointer to key
+	mr	r31, r7			# copy pointer to iv
+	li	r6, -1
+	mcrf	cr1, cr0		# put aside $out alignment flag
+	mr	r7, r12			# copy vrsave
+	mtspr	256, r6			# preserve all AltiVec registers
+
+	lvx	v24, 0, r31		# load [potentially unaligned] iv
+	li	r9, 15
+	?lvsl	$inpperm, 0, r31
+	lvx	v25, r9, r31
+	?vperm	v24, v24, v25, $inpperm
+
+	cmpwi	r8, 0			# test direction
+	neg	r8, $inp		# prepare for unaligned access
+	 vxor	v7, v7, v7
+	?lvsl	$keyperm, 0, $key
+	 ?lvsr	$outperm, 0, $out
+	?lvsr	$inpperm, 0, r8		# -$inp
+	 vnor	$outmask, v7, v7	# 0xff..ff
+	lvx	$inptail, 0, $inp
+	 ?vperm	$outmask, v7, $outmask, $outperm
+	addi	$inp, $inp, 15		# 15 is not a typo
+
+	beq	Lcbc_decrypt
+
+	bl	_vpaes_encrypt_preheat
+	li	r0, 16
+
+	beq	cr1, Lcbc_enc_loop	# $out is aligned
+
+	vmr	v0, $inptail
+	lvx	$inptail, 0, $inp
+	addi	$inp, $inp, 16
+	?vperm	v0, v0, $inptail, $inpperm
+	vxor	v0, v0, v24		# ^= iv
+
+	bl	_vpaes_encrypt_core
+
+	andi.	r8, $out, 15
+	vmr	v24, v0			# put aside iv
+	sub	r9, $out, r8
+	vperm	$outhead, v0, v0, $outperm	# rotate right/left
+
+Lcbc_enc_head:
+	stvebx	$outhead, r8, r9
+	cmpwi	r8, 15
+	addi	r8, r8, 1
+	bne	Lcbc_enc_head
+
+	sub.	r30, r30, r0		# len -= 16
+	addi	$out, $out, 16
+	beq	Lcbc_unaligned_done
+
+Lcbc_enc_loop:
+	vmr	v0, $inptail
+	lvx	$inptail, 0, $inp
+	addi	$inp, $inp, 16
+	?vperm	v0, v0, $inptail, $inpperm
+	vxor	v0, v0, v24		# ^= iv
+
+	bl	_vpaes_encrypt_core
+
+	vmr	v24, v0			# put aside iv
+	sub.	r30, r30, r0		# len -= 16
+	vperm	v0, v0, v0, $outperm	# rotate right/left
+	vsel	v1, $outhead, v0, $outmask
+	vmr	$outhead, v0
+	stvx	v1, 0, $out
+	addi	$out, $out, 16
+	bne	Lcbc_enc_loop
+
+	b	Lcbc_done
+
+.align	5
+Lcbc_decrypt:
+	bl	_vpaes_decrypt_preheat
+	li	r0, 16
+
+	beq	cr1, Lcbc_dec_loop	# $out is aligned
+
+	vmr	v0, $inptail
+	lvx	$inptail, 0, $inp
+	addi	$inp, $inp, 16
+	?vperm	v0, v0, $inptail, $inpperm
+	vmr	v25, v0			# put aside input
+
+	bl	_vpaes_decrypt_core
+
+	andi.	r8, $out, 15
+	vxor	v0, v0, v24		# ^= iv
+	vmr	v24, v25
+	sub	r9, $out, r8
+	vperm	$outhead, v0, v0, $outperm	# rotate right/left
+
+Lcbc_dec_head:
+	stvebx	$outhead, r8, r9
+	cmpwi	r8, 15
+	addi	r8, r8, 1
+	bne	Lcbc_dec_head
+
+	sub.	r30, r30, r0		# len -= 16
+	addi	$out, $out, 16
+	beq	Lcbc_unaligned_done
+
+Lcbc_dec_loop:
+	vmr	v0, $inptail
+	lvx	$inptail, 0, $inp
+	addi	$inp, $inp, 16
+	?vperm	v0, v0, $inptail, $inpperm
+	vmr	v25, v0			# put aside input
+
+	bl	_vpaes_decrypt_core
+
+	vxor	v0, v0, v24		# ^= iv
+	vmr	v24, v25
+	sub.	r30, r30, r0		# len -= 16
+	vperm	v0, v0, v0, $outperm	# rotate right/left
+	vsel	v1, $outhead, v0, $outmask
+	vmr	$outhead, v0
+	stvx	v1, 0, $out
+	addi	$out, $out, 16
+	bne	Lcbc_dec_loop
+
+Lcbc_done:
+	beq	cr1, Lcbc_write_iv	# $out is aligned
+
+Lcbc_unaligned_done:
+	andi.	r8, $out, 15
+	sub	$out, $out, r8
+	li	r9, 0
+Lcbc_tail:
+	stvebx	$outhead, r9, $out
+	addi	r9, r9, 1
+	cmpw	r9, r8
+	bne	Lcbc_tail
+
+Lcbc_write_iv:
+	neg	r8, r31			# write [potentially unaligned] iv
+	li	r10, 4
+	?lvsl	$outperm, 0, r8
+	li	r11, 8
+	li	r12, 12
+	vperm	v24, v24, v24, $outperm	# rotate right/left
+	stvewx	v24, 0, r31		# ivp is at least 32-bit aligned
+	stvewx	v24, r10, r31
+	stvewx	v24, r11, r31
+	stvewx	v24, r12, r31
+
+	mtspr	256, r7			# restore vrsave
+	li	r10,`15+6*$SIZE_T`
+	li	r11,`31+6*$SIZE_T`
+	lvx	v20,r10,$sp
+	addi	r10,r10,32
+	lvx	v21,r11,$sp
+	addi	r11,r11,32
+	lvx	v22,r10,$sp
+	addi	r10,r10,32
+	lvx	v23,r11,$sp
+	addi	r11,r11,32
+	lvx	v24,r10,$sp
+	addi	r10,r10,32
+	lvx	v25,r11,$sp
+	addi	r11,r11,32
+	lvx	v26,r10,$sp
+	addi	r10,r10,32
+	lvx	v27,r11,$sp
+	addi	r11,r11,32
+	lvx	v28,r10,$sp
+	addi	r10,r10,32
+	lvx	v29,r11,$sp
+	addi	r11,r11,32
+	lvx	v30,r10,$sp
+	lvx	v31,r11,$sp
+Lcbc_abort:
+	$POP	r0, `$FRAME+$SIZE_T*2+$LRSAVE`($sp)
+	$POP	r30,`$FRAME+$SIZE_T*0`($sp)
+	$POP	r31,`$FRAME+$SIZE_T*1`($sp)
+	mtlr	r0
+	addi	$sp,$sp,`$FRAME+$SIZE_T*2`
+	blr
+	.long	0
+	.byte	0,12,0x04,1,0x80,2,6,0
+	.long	0
+.size	.vpaes_cbc_encrypt,.-.vpaes_cbc_encrypt
+___
+}
+{
+my ($inp,$bits,$out)=map("r$_",(3..5));
+my $dir="cr1";
+my ($invlo,$invhi,$iptlo,$ipthi,$rcon) = map("v$_",(10..13,24));
+
+$code.=<<___;
+########################################################
+##                                                    ##
+##                  AES key schedule                  ##
+##                                                    ##
+########################################################
+.align	4
+_vpaes_key_preheat:
+	mflr	r8
+	bl	Lconsts
+	mtlr	r8
+	li	r11, 0xc0		# Lk_inv
+	li	r10, 0xd0
+	li	r9,  0xe0		# L_ipt
+	li	r8,  0xf0
+
+	vspltisb	v8,4		# 0x04..04
+	vxor	v9,v9,v9		# 0x00..00
+	lvx	$invlo, r12, r11	# Lk_inv
+	li	r11, 0x120
+	lvx	$invhi, r12, r10
+	li	r10, 0x130
+	lvx	$iptlo, r12, r9		# Lk_ipt
+	li	r9, 0x220
+	lvx	$ipthi, r12, r8
+	li	r8, 0x230
+
+	lvx	v14, r12, r11		# Lk_sb1
+	li	r11, 0x240
+	lvx	v15, r12, r10
+	li	r10, 0x250
+
+	lvx	v16, r12, r9		# Lk_dksd
+	li	r9, 0x260
+	lvx	v17, r12, r8
+	li	r8, 0x270
+	lvx	v18, r12, r11		# Lk_dksb
+	li	r11, 0x280
+	lvx	v19, r12, r10
+	li	r10, 0x290
+	lvx	v20, r12, r9		# Lk_dkse
+	li	r9, 0x2a0
+	lvx	v21, r12, r8
+	li	r8, 0x2b0
+	lvx	v22, r12, r11		# Lk_dks9
+	lvx	v23, r12, r10
+
+	lvx	v24, r12, r9		# Lk_rcon
+	lvx	v25, 0, r12		# Lk_mc_forward[0]
+	lvx	v26, r12, r8		# Lks63
+	blr
+	.long	0
+	.byte	0,12,0x14,0,0,0,0,0
+
+.align	4
+_vpaes_schedule_core:
+	mflr	r7
+
+	bl	_vpaes_key_preheat	# load the tables
+
+	#lvx	v0, 0, $inp		# vmovdqu	(%rdi),	%xmm0		# load key (unaligned)
+	neg	r8, $inp		# prepare for unaligned access
+	lvx	v0, 0, $inp
+	addi	$inp, $inp, 15		# 15 is not typo
+	?lvsr	$inpperm, 0, r8		# -$inp
+	lvx	v6, 0, $inp		# v6 serves as inptail
+	addi	$inp, $inp, 8
+	?vperm	v0, v0, v6, $inpperm
+
+	# input transform
+	vmr	v3, v0			# vmovdqa	%xmm0,	%xmm3
+	bl	_vpaes_schedule_transform
+	vmr	v7, v0			# vmovdqa	%xmm0,	%xmm7
+
+	bne	$dir, Lschedule_am_decrypting
+
+	# encrypting, output zeroth round key after transform
+	li	r8, 0x30		# mov	\$0x30,%r8d
+	li	r9, 4
+	li	r10, 8
+	li	r11, 12
+
+	?lvsr	$outperm, 0, $out	# prepare for unaligned access
+	vnor	$outmask, v9, v9	# 0xff..ff
+	?vperm	$outmask, v9, $outmask, $outperm
+
+	#stvx	v0, 0, $out		# vmovdqu	%xmm0,	(%rdx)
+	vperm	$outhead, v0, v0, $outperm	# rotate right/left
+	stvewx	$outhead, 0, $out	# some are superfluous
+	stvewx	$outhead, r9, $out
+	stvewx	$outhead, r10, $out
+	addi	r10, r12, 0x80		# lea	.Lk_sr(%rip),%r10
+	stvewx	$outhead, r11, $out
+	b	Lschedule_go
+
+Lschedule_am_decrypting:
+	srwi	r8, $bits, 1		# shr	\$1,%r8d
+	andi.	r8, r8, 32		# and	\$32,%r8d
+	xori	r8, r8, 32		# xor	\$32,%r8d	# nbits==192?0:32
+	addi	r10, r12, 0x80		# lea	.Lk_sr(%rip),%r10
+	# decrypting, output zeroth round key after shiftrows
+	lvx	v1, r8, r10		# vmovdqa	(%r8,%r10),	%xmm1
+	li	r9, 4
+	li	r10, 8
+	li	r11, 12
+	vperm	v4, v3, v3, v1		# vpshufb	%xmm1,	%xmm3,	%xmm3
+
+	neg	r0, $out		# prepare for unaligned access
+	?lvsl	$outperm, 0, r0
+	vnor	$outmask, v9, v9	# 0xff..ff
+	?vperm	$outmask, $outmask, v9, $outperm
+
+	#stvx	v4, 0, $out		# vmovdqu	%xmm3,	(%rdx)
+	vperm	$outhead, v4, v4, $outperm	# rotate right/left
+	stvewx	$outhead, 0, $out	# some are superfluous
+	stvewx	$outhead, r9, $out
+	stvewx	$outhead, r10, $out
+	addi	r10, r12, 0x80		# lea	.Lk_sr(%rip),%r10
+	stvewx	$outhead, r11, $out
+	addi	$out, $out, 15		# 15 is not typo
+	xori	r8, r8, 0x30		# xor	\$0x30, %r8
+
+Lschedule_go:
+	cmplwi	$bits, 192		# cmp	\$192,	%esi
+	bgt	Lschedule_256
+	beq	Lschedule_192
+	# 128: fall though
+
+##
+##  .schedule_128
+##
+##  128-bit specific part of key schedule.
+##
+##  This schedule is really simple, because all its parts
+##  are accomplished by the subroutines.
+##
+Lschedule_128:
+	li	r0, 10			# mov	\$10, %esi
+	mtctr	r0
+
+Loop_schedule_128:
+	bl 	_vpaes_schedule_round
+	bdz 	Lschedule_mangle_last	# dec	%esi
+	bl	_vpaes_schedule_mangle	# write output
+	b 	Loop_schedule_128
+
+##
+##  .aes_schedule_192
+##
+##  192-bit specific part of key schedule.
+##
+##  The main body of this schedule is the same as the 128-bit
+##  schedule, but with more smearing.  The long, high side is
+##  stored in %xmm7 as before, and the short, low side is in
+##  the high bits of %xmm6.
+##
+##  This schedule is somewhat nastier, however, because each
+##  round produces 192 bits of key material, or 1.5 round keys.
+##  Therefore, on each cycle we do 2 rounds and produce 3 round
+##  keys.
+##
+.align	4
+Lschedule_192:
+	li	r0, 4			# mov	\$4,	%esi
+	lvx	v0, 0, $inp
+	?vperm	v0, v6, v0, $inpperm
+	?vsldoi	v0, v3, v0, 8		# vmovdqu	8(%rdi),%xmm0		# load key part 2 (very unaligned)
+	bl	_vpaes_schedule_transform	# input transform
+	?vsldoi	v6, v0, v9, 8
+	?vsldoi	v6, v9, v6, 8		# clobber "low" side with zeros
+	mtctr	r0
+
+Loop_schedule_192:
+	bl	_vpaes_schedule_round
+	?vsldoi	v0, v6, v0, 8		# vpalignr	\$8,%xmm6,%xmm0,%xmm0
+	bl	_vpaes_schedule_mangle	# save key n
+	bl	_vpaes_schedule_192_smear
+	bl	_vpaes_schedule_mangle	# save key n+1
+	bl	_vpaes_schedule_round
+	bdz 	Lschedule_mangle_last	# dec	%esi
+	bl	_vpaes_schedule_mangle	# save key n+2
+	bl	_vpaes_schedule_192_smear
+	b	Loop_schedule_192
+
+##
+##  .aes_schedule_256
+##
+##  256-bit specific part of key schedule.
+##
+##  The structure here is very similar to the 128-bit
+##  schedule, but with an additional "low side" in
+##  %xmm6.  The low side's rounds are the same as the
+##  high side's, except no rcon and no rotation.
+##
+.align	4
+Lschedule_256:
+	li	r0, 7			# mov	\$7, %esi
+	addi	$inp, $inp, 8
+	lvx	v0, 0, $inp		# vmovdqu	16(%rdi),%xmm0		# load key part 2 (unaligned)
+	?vperm	v0, v6, v0, $inpperm
+	bl	_vpaes_schedule_transform	# input transform
+	mtctr	r0
+
+Loop_schedule_256:
+	bl	_vpaes_schedule_mangle	# output low result
+	vmr	v6, v0			# vmovdqa	%xmm0,	%xmm6		# save cur_lo in xmm6
+
+	# high round
+	bl	_vpaes_schedule_round
+	bdz 	Lschedule_mangle_last	# dec	%esi
+	bl	_vpaes_schedule_mangle	
+
+	# low round. swap xmm7 and xmm6
+	?vspltw	v0, v0, 3		# vpshufd	\$0xFF,	%xmm0,	%xmm0
+	vmr	v5, v7			# vmovdqa	%xmm7,	%xmm5
+	vmr	v7, v6			# vmovdqa	%xmm6,	%xmm7
+	bl	_vpaes_schedule_low_round
+	vmr	v7, v5			# vmovdqa	%xmm5,	%xmm7
+	
+	b	Loop_schedule_256
+##
+##  .aes_schedule_mangle_last
+##
+##  Mangler for last round of key schedule
+##  Mangles %xmm0
+##    when encrypting, outputs out(%xmm0) ^ 63
+##    when decrypting, outputs unskew(%xmm0)
+##
+##  Always called right before return... jumps to cleanup and exits
+##
+.align	4
+Lschedule_mangle_last:
+	# schedule last round key from xmm0
+	li	r11, 0x2e0		# lea	.Lk_deskew(%rip),%r11
+	li	r9,  0x2f0
+	bne	$dir, Lschedule_mangle_last_dec
+
+	# encrypting
+	lvx	v1, r8, r10		# vmovdqa	(%r8,%r10),%xmm1
+	li	r11, 0x2c0		# lea		.Lk_opt(%rip),	%r11	# prepare to output transform
+	li	r9,  0x2d0		# prepare to output transform
+	vperm	v0, v0, v0, v1		# vpshufb	%xmm1,	%xmm0,	%xmm0	# output permute
+
+	lvx	$iptlo, r11, r12	# reload $ipt
+	lvx	$ipthi, r9, r12
+	addi	$out, $out, 16		# add	\$16,	%rdx
+	vxor	v0, v0, v26		# vpxor		.Lk_s63(%rip),	%xmm0,	%xmm0
+	bl	_vpaes_schedule_transform	# output transform
+
+	#stvx	v0, r0, $out		# vmovdqu	%xmm0,	(%rdx)		# save last key
+	vperm	v0, v0, v0, $outperm	# rotate right/left
+	li	r10, 4
+	vsel	v2, $outhead, v0, $outmask
+	li	r11, 8
+	stvx	v2, 0, $out
+	li	r12, 12
+	stvewx	v0, 0, $out		# some (or all) are redundant
+	stvewx	v0, r10, $out
+	stvewx	v0, r11, $out
+	stvewx	v0, r12, $out
+	b	Lschedule_mangle_done
+
+.align	4
+Lschedule_mangle_last_dec:
+	lvx	$iptlo, r11, r12	# reload $ipt
+	lvx	$ipthi, r9,  r12
+	addi	$out, $out, -16		# add	\$-16,	%rdx 
+	vxor	v0, v0, v26		# vpxor	.Lk_s63(%rip),	%xmm0,	%xmm0
+	bl	_vpaes_schedule_transform	# output transform
+
+	#stvx	v0, r0, $out		# vmovdqu	%xmm0,	(%rdx)		# save last key
+	addi	r9, $out, -15		# -15 is not typo
+	vperm	v0, v0, v0, $outperm	# rotate right/left
+	li	r10, 4
+	vsel	v2, $outhead, v0, $outmask
+	li	r11, 8
+	stvx	v2, 0, $out
+	li	r12, 12
+	stvewx	v0, 0, r9		# some (or all) are redundant
+	stvewx	v0, r10, r9
+	stvewx	v0, r11, r9
+	stvewx	v0, r12, r9
+
+
+Lschedule_mangle_done:
+	mtlr	r7
+	# cleanup
+	vxor	v0, v0, v0		# vpxor		%xmm0,	%xmm0,	%xmm0
+	vxor	v1, v1, v1		# vpxor		%xmm1,	%xmm1,	%xmm1
+	vxor	v2, v2, v2		# vpxor		%xmm2,	%xmm2,	%xmm2
+	vxor	v3, v3, v3		# vpxor		%xmm3,	%xmm3,	%xmm3
+	vxor	v4, v4, v4		# vpxor		%xmm4,	%xmm4,	%xmm4
+	vxor	v5, v5, v5		# vpxor		%xmm5,	%xmm5,	%xmm5
+	vxor	v6, v6, v6		# vpxor		%xmm6,	%xmm6,	%xmm6
+	vxor	v7, v7, v7		# vpxor		%xmm7,	%xmm7,	%xmm7
+
+	blr
+	.long	0
+	.byte	0,12,0x14,0,0,0,0,0
+
+##
+##  .aes_schedule_192_smear
+##
+##  Smear the short, low side in the 192-bit key schedule.
+##
+##  Inputs:
+##    %xmm7: high side, b  a  x  y
+##    %xmm6:  low side, d  c  0  0
+##    %xmm13: 0
+##
+##  Outputs:
+##    %xmm6: b+c+d  b+c  0  0
+##    %xmm0: b+c+d  b+c  b  a
+##
+.align	4
+_vpaes_schedule_192_smear:
+	?vspltw	v0, v7, 3
+	?vsldoi	v1, v9, v6, 12		# vpshufd	\$0x80,	%xmm6,	%xmm1	# d c 0 0 -> c 0 0 0
+	?vsldoi	v0, v7, v0, 8		# vpshufd	\$0xFE,	%xmm7,	%xmm0	# b a _ _ -> b b b a
+	vxor	v6, v6, v1		# vpxor		%xmm1,	%xmm6,	%xmm6	# -> c+d c 0 0
+	vxor	v6, v6, v0		# vpxor		%xmm0,	%xmm6,	%xmm6	# -> b+c+d b+c b a
+	vmr	v0, v6
+	?vsldoi	v6, v6, v9, 8
+	?vsldoi	v6, v9, v6, 8		# clobber low side with zeros
+	blr
+	.long	0
+	.byte	0,12,0x14,0,0,0,0,0
+
+##
+##  .aes_schedule_round
+##
+##  Runs one main round of the key schedule on %xmm0, %xmm7
+##
+##  Specifically, runs subbytes on the high dword of %xmm0
+##  then rotates it by one byte and xors into the low dword of
+##  %xmm7.
+##
+##  Adds rcon from low byte of %xmm8, then rotates %xmm8 for
+##  next rcon.
+##
+##  Smears the dwords of %xmm7 by xoring the low into the
+##  second low, result into third, result into highest.
+##
+##  Returns results in %xmm7 = %xmm0.
+##  Clobbers %xmm1-%xmm4, %r11.
+##
+.align	4
+_vpaes_schedule_round:
+	# extract rcon from xmm8
+	#vxor	v4, v4, v4		# vpxor		%xmm4,	%xmm4,	%xmm4
+	?vsldoi	v1, $rcon, v9, 15	# vpalignr	\$15,	%xmm8,	%xmm4,	%xmm1
+	?vsldoi	$rcon, $rcon, $rcon, 15	# vpalignr	\$15,	%xmm8,	%xmm8,	%xmm8
+	vxor	v7, v7, v1		# vpxor		%xmm1,	%xmm7,	%xmm7
+
+	# rotate
+	?vspltw	v0, v0, 3		# vpshufd	\$0xFF,	%xmm0,	%xmm0
+	?vsldoi	v0, v0, v0, 1		# vpalignr	\$1,	%xmm0,	%xmm0,	%xmm0
+
+	# fall through...
+
+	# low round: same as high round, but no rotation and no rcon.
+_vpaes_schedule_low_round:
+	# smear xmm7
+	?vsldoi	v1, v9, v7, 12		# vpslldq	\$4,	%xmm7,	%xmm1
+	vxor	v7, v7, v1		# vpxor		%xmm1,	%xmm7,	%xmm7
+	vspltisb	v1, 0x0f	# 0x0f..0f
+	?vsldoi	v4, v9, v7, 8		# vpslldq	\$8,	%xmm7,	%xmm4
+
+	# subbytes
+	vand	v1, v1, v0		# vpand		%xmm9,	%xmm0,	%xmm1		# 0 = k
+	vsrb	v0, v0, v8		# vpsrlb	\$4,	%xmm0,	%xmm0		# 1 = i
+	 vxor	v7, v7, v4		# vpxor		%xmm4,	%xmm7,	%xmm7
+	vperm	v2, $invhi, v9, v1	# vpshufb	%xmm1,	%xmm11,	%xmm2		# 2 = a/k
+	vxor	v1, v1, v0		# vpxor		%xmm0,	%xmm1,	%xmm1		# 0 = j
+	vperm	v3, $invlo, v9, v0	# vpshufb	%xmm0, 	%xmm10,	%xmm3		# 3 = 1/i
+	vxor	v3, v3, v2		# vpxor		%xmm2,	%xmm3,	%xmm3		# 3 = iak = 1/i + a/k
+	vperm	v4, $invlo, v9, v1	# vpshufb	%xmm1,	%xmm10,	%xmm4		# 4 = 1/j
+	 vxor	v7, v7, v26		# vpxor		.Lk_s63(%rip),	%xmm7,	%xmm7
+	vperm	v3, $invlo, v9, v3	# vpshufb	%xmm3,	%xmm10,	%xmm3		# 2 = 1/iak
+	vxor	v4, v4, v2		# vpxor		%xmm2,	%xmm4,	%xmm4		# 4 = jak = 1/j + a/k
+	vperm	v2, $invlo, v9, v4	# vpshufb	%xmm4,	%xmm10,	%xmm2		# 3 = 1/jak
+	vxor	v3, v3, v1		# vpxor		%xmm1,	%xmm3,	%xmm3		# 2 = io
+	vxor	v2, v2, v0		# vpxor		%xmm0,	%xmm2,	%xmm2		# 3 = jo
+	vperm	v4, v15, v9, v3		# vpshufb	%xmm3,	%xmm13,	%xmm4		# 4 = sbou
+	vperm	v1, v14, v9, v2		# vpshufb	%xmm2,	%xmm12,	%xmm1		# 0 = sb1t
+	vxor	v1, v1, v4		# vpxor		%xmm4,	%xmm1,	%xmm1		# 0 = sbox output
+
+	# add in smeared stuff
+	vxor	v0, v1, v7		# vpxor		%xmm7,	%xmm1,	%xmm0
+	vxor	v7, v1, v7		# vmovdqa	%xmm0,	%xmm7
+	blr
+	.long	0
+	.byte	0,12,0x14,0,0,0,0,0
+
+##
+##  .aes_schedule_transform
+##
+##  Linear-transform %xmm0 according to tables at (%r11)
+##
+##  Requires that %xmm9 = 0x0F0F... as in preheat
+##  Output in %xmm0
+##  Clobbers %xmm2
+##
+.align	4
+_vpaes_schedule_transform:
+	#vand	v1, v0, v9		# vpand		%xmm9,	%xmm0,	%xmm1
+	vsrb	v2, v0, v8		# vpsrlb	\$4,	%xmm0,	%xmm0
+					# vmovdqa	(%r11),	%xmm2 	# lo
+	vperm	v0, $iptlo, $iptlo, v0	# vpshufb	%xmm1,	%xmm2,	%xmm2
+					# vmovdqa	16(%r11),	%xmm1 # hi
+	vperm	v2, $ipthi, $ipthi, v2	# vpshufb	%xmm0,	%xmm1,	%xmm0
+	vxor	v0, v0, v2		# vpxor		%xmm2,	%xmm0,	%xmm0
+	blr
+	.long	0
+	.byte	0,12,0x14,0,0,0,0,0
+
+##
+##  .aes_schedule_mangle
+##
+##  Mangle xmm0 from (basis-transformed) standard version
+##  to our version.
+##
+##  On encrypt,
+##    xor with 0x63
+##    multiply by circulant 0,1,1,1
+##    apply shiftrows transform
+##
+##  On decrypt,
+##    xor with 0x63
+##    multiply by "inverse mixcolumns" circulant E,B,D,9
+##    deskew
+##    apply shiftrows transform
+##
+##
+##  Writes out to (%rdx), and increments or decrements it
+##  Keeps track of round number mod 4 in %r8
+##  Preserves xmm0
+##  Clobbers xmm1-xmm5
+##
+.align	4
+_vpaes_schedule_mangle:
+	#vmr	v4, v0			# vmovdqa	%xmm0,	%xmm4	# save xmm0 for later
+					# vmovdqa	.Lk_mc_forward(%rip),%xmm5
+	bne	$dir, Lschedule_mangle_dec
+
+	# encrypting
+	vxor	v4, v0, v26		# vpxor	.Lk_s63(%rip),	%xmm0,	%xmm4
+	addi	$out, $out, 16		# add	\$16,	%rdx
+	vperm	v4, v4, v4, v25		# vpshufb	%xmm5,	%xmm4,	%xmm4
+	vperm	v1, v4, v4, v25		# vpshufb	%xmm5,	%xmm4,	%xmm1
+	vperm	v3, v1, v1, v25		# vpshufb	%xmm5,	%xmm1,	%xmm3
+	vxor	v4, v4, v1		# vpxor		%xmm1,	%xmm4,	%xmm4
+	lvx	v1, r8, r10		# vmovdqa	(%r8,%r10),	%xmm1
+	vxor	v3, v3, v4		# vpxor		%xmm4,	%xmm3,	%xmm3
+
+	vperm	v3, v3, v3, v1		# vpshufb	%xmm1,	%xmm3,	%xmm3
+	addi	r8, r8, -16		# add	\$-16,	%r8
+	andi.	r8, r8, 0x30		# and	\$0x30,	%r8
+
+	#stvx	v3, 0, $out		# vmovdqu	%xmm3,	(%rdx)
+	vperm	v1, v3, v3, $outperm	# rotate right/left
+	vsel	v2, $outhead, v1, $outmask
+	vmr	$outhead, v1
+	stvx	v2, 0, $out
+	blr
+
+.align	4
+Lschedule_mangle_dec:
+	# inverse mix columns
+					# lea	.Lk_dksd(%rip),%r11
+	vsrb	v1, v0, v8		# vpsrlb	\$4,	%xmm4,	%xmm1	# 1 = hi
+	#and	v4, v0, v9		# vpand		%xmm9,	%xmm4,	%xmm4	# 4 = lo
+
+					# vmovdqa	0x00(%r11),	%xmm2
+	vperm	v2, v16, v16, v0	# vpshufb	%xmm4,	%xmm2,	%xmm2
+					# vmovdqa	0x10(%r11),	%xmm3
+	vperm	v3, v17, v17, v1	# vpshufb	%xmm1,	%xmm3,	%xmm3
+	vxor	v3, v3, v2		# vpxor		%xmm2,	%xmm3,	%xmm3
+	vperm	v3, v3, v9, v25		# vpshufb	%xmm5,	%xmm3,	%xmm3
+
+					# vmovdqa	0x20(%r11),	%xmm2
+	vperm	v2, v18, v18, v0	# vpshufb	%xmm4,	%xmm2,	%xmm2
+	vxor	v2, v2, v3		# vpxor		%xmm3,	%xmm2,	%xmm2
+					# vmovdqa	0x30(%r11),	%xmm3
+	vperm	v3, v19, v19, v1	# vpshufb	%xmm1,	%xmm3,	%xmm3
+	vxor	v3, v3, v2		# vpxor		%xmm2,	%xmm3,	%xmm3
+	vperm	v3, v3, v9, v25		# vpshufb	%xmm5,	%xmm3,	%xmm3
+
+					# vmovdqa	0x40(%r11),	%xmm2
+	vperm	v2, v20, v20, v0	# vpshufb	%xmm4,	%xmm2,	%xmm2
+	vxor	v2, v2, v3		# vpxor		%xmm3,	%xmm2,	%xmm2
+					# vmovdqa	0x50(%r11),	%xmm3
+	vperm	v3, v21, v21, v1	# vpshufb	%xmm1,	%xmm3,	%xmm3
+	vxor	v3, v3, v2		# vpxor		%xmm2,	%xmm3,	%xmm3
+
+					# vmovdqa	0x60(%r11),	%xmm2
+	vperm	v2, v22, v22, v0	# vpshufb	%xmm4,	%xmm2,	%xmm2
+	vperm	v3, v3, v9, v25		# vpshufb	%xmm5,	%xmm3,	%xmm3
+					# vmovdqa	0x70(%r11),	%xmm4
+	vperm	v4, v23, v23, v1	# vpshufb	%xmm1,	%xmm4,	%xmm4
+	lvx	v1, r8, r10		# vmovdqa	(%r8,%r10),	%xmm1
+	vxor	v2, v2, v3		# vpxor		%xmm3,	%xmm2,	%xmm2
+	vxor	v3, v4, v2		# vpxor		%xmm2,	%xmm4,	%xmm3
+
+	addi	$out, $out, -16		# add	\$-16,	%rdx
+
+	vperm	v3, v3, v3, v1		# vpshufb	%xmm1,	%xmm3,	%xmm3
+	addi	r8, r8, -16		# add	\$-16,	%r8
+	andi.	r8, r8, 0x30		# and	\$0x30,	%r8
+
+	#stvx	v3, 0, $out		# vmovdqu	%xmm3,	(%rdx)
+	vperm	v1, v3, v3, $outperm	# rotate right/left
+	vsel	v2, $outhead, v1, $outmask
+	vmr	$outhead, v1
+	stvx	v2, 0, $out
+	blr
+	.long	0
+	.byte	0,12,0x14,0,0,0,0,0
+
+.globl	.vpaes_set_encrypt_key
+.align	5
+.vpaes_set_encrypt_key:
+	$STU	$sp,-$FRAME($sp)
+	li	r10,`15+6*$SIZE_T`
+	li	r11,`31+6*$SIZE_T`
+	mflr	r0
+	mfspr	r6, 256			# save vrsave
+	stvx	v20,r10,$sp
+	addi	r10,r10,32
+	stvx	v21,r11,$sp
+	addi	r11,r11,32
+	stvx	v22,r10,$sp
+	addi	r10,r10,32
+	stvx	v23,r11,$sp
+	addi	r11,r11,32
+	stvx	v24,r10,$sp
+	addi	r10,r10,32
+	stvx	v25,r11,$sp
+	addi	r11,r11,32
+	stvx	v26,r10,$sp
+	addi	r10,r10,32
+	stvx	v27,r11,$sp
+	addi	r11,r11,32
+	stvx	v28,r10,$sp
+	addi	r10,r10,32
+	stvx	v29,r11,$sp
+	addi	r11,r11,32
+	stvx	v30,r10,$sp
+	stvx	v31,r11,$sp
+	stw	r6,`$FRAME-4`($sp)	# save vrsave
+	li	r7, -1
+	$PUSH	r0, `$FRAME+$LRSAVE`($sp)
+	mtspr	256, r7			# preserve all AltiVec registers
+
+	srwi	r9, $bits, 5		# shr	\$5,%eax
+	addi	r9, r9, 6		# add	\$5,%eax
+	stw	r9, 240($out)		# mov	%eax,240(%rdx)	# AES_KEY->rounds = nbits/32+5;
+
+	cmplw	$dir, $bits, $bits	# set encrypt direction
+	li	r8, 0x30		# mov	\$0x30,%r8d
+	bl	_vpaes_schedule_core
+
+	$POP	r0, `$FRAME+$LRSAVE`($sp)
+	li	r10,`15+6*$SIZE_T`
+	li	r11,`31+6*$SIZE_T`
+	mtspr	256, r6			# restore vrsave
+	mtlr	r0
+	xor	r3, r3, r3
+	lvx	v20,r10,$sp
+	addi	r10,r10,32
+	lvx	v21,r11,$sp
+	addi	r11,r11,32
+	lvx	v22,r10,$sp
+	addi	r10,r10,32
+	lvx	v23,r11,$sp
+	addi	r11,r11,32
+	lvx	v24,r10,$sp
+	addi	r10,r10,32
+	lvx	v25,r11,$sp
+	addi	r11,r11,32
+	lvx	v26,r10,$sp
+	addi	r10,r10,32
+	lvx	v27,r11,$sp
+	addi	r11,r11,32
+	lvx	v28,r10,$sp
+	addi	r10,r10,32
+	lvx	v29,r11,$sp
+	addi	r11,r11,32
+	lvx	v30,r10,$sp
+	lvx	v31,r11,$sp
+	addi	$sp,$sp,$FRAME
+	blr
+	.long	0
+	.byte	0,12,0x04,1,0x80,0,3,0
+	.long	0
+.size	.vpaes_set_encrypt_key,.-.vpaes_set_encrypt_key
+
+.globl	.vpaes_set_decrypt_key
+.align	4
+.vpaes_set_decrypt_key:
+	$STU	$sp,-$FRAME($sp)
+	li	r10,`15+6*$SIZE_T`
+	li	r11,`31+6*$SIZE_T`
+	mflr	r0
+	mfspr	r6, 256			# save vrsave
+	stvx	v20,r10,$sp
+	addi	r10,r10,32
+	stvx	v21,r11,$sp
+	addi	r11,r11,32
+	stvx	v22,r10,$sp
+	addi	r10,r10,32
+	stvx	v23,r11,$sp
+	addi	r11,r11,32
+	stvx	v24,r10,$sp
+	addi	r10,r10,32
+	stvx	v25,r11,$sp
+	addi	r11,r11,32
+	stvx	v26,r10,$sp
+	addi	r10,r10,32
+	stvx	v27,r11,$sp
+	addi	r11,r11,32
+	stvx	v28,r10,$sp
+	addi	r10,r10,32
+	stvx	v29,r11,$sp
+	addi	r11,r11,32
+	stvx	v30,r10,$sp
+	stvx	v31,r11,$sp
+	stw	r6,`$FRAME-4`($sp)	# save vrsave
+	li	r7, -1
+	$PUSH	r0, `$FRAME+$LRSAVE`($sp)
+	mtspr	256, r7			# preserve all AltiVec registers
+
+	srwi	r9, $bits, 5		# shr	\$5,%eax
+	addi	r9, r9, 6		# add	\$5,%eax
+	stw	r9, 240($out)		# mov	%eax,240(%rdx)	# AES_KEY->rounds = nbits/32+5;
+
+	slwi	r9, r9, 4		# shl	\$4,%eax
+	add	$out, $out, r9		# lea	(%rdx,%rax),%rdx
+
+	cmplwi	$dir, $bits, 0		# set decrypt direction
+	srwi	r8, $bits, 1		# shr	\$1,%r8d
+	andi.	r8, r8, 32		# and	\$32,%r8d
+	xori	r8, r8, 32		# xor	\$32,%r8d	# nbits==192?0:32
+	bl	_vpaes_schedule_core
+
+	$POP	r0,  `$FRAME+$LRSAVE`($sp)
+	li	r10,`15+6*$SIZE_T`
+	li	r11,`31+6*$SIZE_T`
+	mtspr	256, r6			# restore vrsave
+	mtlr	r0
+	xor	r3, r3, r3
+	lvx	v20,r10,$sp
+	addi	r10,r10,32
+	lvx	v21,r11,$sp
+	addi	r11,r11,32
+	lvx	v22,r10,$sp
+	addi	r10,r10,32
+	lvx	v23,r11,$sp
+	addi	r11,r11,32
+	lvx	v24,r10,$sp
+	addi	r10,r10,32
+	lvx	v25,r11,$sp
+	addi	r11,r11,32
+	lvx	v26,r10,$sp
+	addi	r10,r10,32
+	lvx	v27,r11,$sp
+	addi	r11,r11,32
+	lvx	v28,r10,$sp
+	addi	r10,r10,32
+	lvx	v29,r11,$sp
+	addi	r11,r11,32
+	lvx	v30,r10,$sp
+	lvx	v31,r11,$sp
+	addi	$sp,$sp,$FRAME
+	blr
+	.long	0
+	.byte	0,12,0x04,1,0x80,0,3,0
+	.long	0
+.size	.vpaes_set_decrypt_key,.-.vpaes_set_decrypt_key
+___
+}
+
+my $consts=1;
+foreach  (split("\n",$code)) {
+	s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/geo;
+
+	# constants table endian-specific conversion
+	if ($consts && m/\.long\s+(.+)\s+(\?[a-z]*)$/o) {
+	    my $conv=$2;
+	    my @bytes=();
+
+	    # convert to endian-agnostic format
+	    foreach (split(/,\s+/,$1)) {
+		my $l = /^0/?oct:int;
+		push @bytes,($l>>24)&0xff,($l>>16)&0xff,($l>>8)&0xff,$l&0xff;
+	    }
+
+	    # little-endian conversion
+	    if ($flavour =~ /le$/o) {
+		SWITCH: for($conv)  {
+		    /\?inv/ && do   { @bytes=map($_^0xf,@bytes); last; };
+		    /\?rev/ && do   { @bytes=reverse(@bytes);    last; }; 
+		}
+	    }
+
+	    #emit
+	    print ".byte\t",join(',',map (sprintf("0x%02x",$_),@bytes)),"\n";
+	    next;
+	}
+	$consts=0 if (m/Lconsts:/o);	# end of table
+
+	# instructions prefixed with '?' are endian-specific and need
+	# to be adjusted accordingly...
+	if ($flavour =~ /le$/o) {	# little-endian
+	    s/\?lvsr/lvsl/o or
+	    s/\?lvsl/lvsr/o or
+	    s/\?(vperm\s+v[0-9]+,\s*)(v[0-9]+,\s*)(v[0-9]+,\s*)(v[0-9]+)/$1$3$2$4/o or
+	    s/\?(vsldoi\s+v[0-9]+,\s*)(v[0-9]+,)\s*(v[0-9]+,\s*)([0-9]+)/$1$3$2 16-$4/o or
+	    s/\?(vspltw\s+v[0-9]+,\s*)(v[0-9]+,)\s*([0-9])/$1$2 3-$3/o;
+	} else {			# big-endian
+	    s/\?([a-z]+)/$1/o;
+	}
+
+	print $_,"\n";
+}
+
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/asm/vpaes-x86.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/asm/vpaes-x86.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..47615c0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/asm/vpaes-x86.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,916 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+######################################################################
+## Constant-time SSSE3 AES core implementation.
+## version 0.1
+##
+## By Mike Hamburg (Stanford University), 2009
+## Public domain.
+##
+## For details see http://shiftleft.org/papers/vector_aes/ and
+## http://crypto.stanford.edu/vpaes/.
+
+######################################################################
+# September 2011.
+#
+# Port vpaes-x86_64.pl as 32-bit "almost" drop-in replacement for
+# aes-586.pl. "Almost" refers to the fact that AES_cbc_encrypt
+# doesn't handle partial vectors (doesn't have to if called from
+# EVP only). "Drop-in" implies that this module doesn't share key
+# schedule structure with the original nor does it make assumption
+# about its alignment...
+#
+# Performance summary. aes-586.pl column lists large-block CBC
+# encrypt/decrypt/with-hyper-threading-off(*) results in cycles per
+# byte processed with 128-bit key, and vpaes-x86.pl column - [also
+# large-block CBC] encrypt/decrypt.
+#
+#		aes-586.pl		vpaes-x86.pl
+#
+# Core 2(**)	28.1/41.4/18.3		21.9/25.2(***)
+# Nehalem	27.9/40.4/18.1		10.2/11.9
+# Atom		70.7/92.1/60.1		61.1/75.4(***)
+# Silvermont	45.4/62.9/24.1		49.2/61.1(***)
+#
+# (*)	"Hyper-threading" in the context refers rather to cache shared
+#	among multiple cores, than to specifically Intel HTT. As vast
+#	majority of contemporary cores share cache, slower code path
+#	is common place. In other words "with-hyper-threading-off"
+#	results are presented mostly for reference purposes.
+#
+# (**)	"Core 2" refers to initial 65nm design, a.k.a. Conroe.
+#
+# (***)	Less impressive improvement on Core 2 and Atom is due to slow
+#	pshufb,	yet it's respectable +28%/64%  improvement on Core 2
+#	and +15% on Atom (as implied, over "hyper-threading-safe"
+#	code path).
+#
+#						<appro@openssl.org>
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm");
+require "x86asm.pl";
+
+$output = pop;
+open OUT,">$output";
+*STDOUT=*OUT;
+
+&asm_init($ARGV[0],"vpaes-x86.pl",$x86only = $ARGV[$#ARGV] eq "386");
+
+$PREFIX="vpaes";
+
+my  ($round, $base, $magic, $key, $const, $inp, $out)=
+    ("eax",  "ebx", "ecx",  "edx","ebp",  "esi","edi");
+
+&static_label("_vpaes_consts");
+&static_label("_vpaes_schedule_low_round");
+
+&set_label("_vpaes_consts",64);
+$k_inv=-0x30;		# inv, inva
+	&data_word(0x0D080180,0x0E05060F,0x0A0B0C02,0x04070309);
+	&data_word(0x0F0B0780,0x01040A06,0x02050809,0x030D0E0C);
+
+$k_s0F=-0x10;		# s0F
+	&data_word(0x0F0F0F0F,0x0F0F0F0F,0x0F0F0F0F,0x0F0F0F0F);
+
+$k_ipt=0x00;		# input transform (lo, hi)
+	&data_word(0x5A2A7000,0xC2B2E898,0x52227808,0xCABAE090);
+	&data_word(0x317C4D00,0x4C01307D,0xB0FDCC81,0xCD80B1FC);
+
+$k_sb1=0x20;		# sb1u, sb1t
+	&data_word(0xCB503E00,0xB19BE18F,0x142AF544,0xA5DF7A6E);
+	&data_word(0xFAE22300,0x3618D415,0x0D2ED9EF,0x3BF7CCC1);
+$k_sb2=0x40;		# sb2u, sb2t
+	&data_word(0x0B712400,0xE27A93C6,0xBC982FCD,0x5EB7E955);
+	&data_word(0x0AE12900,0x69EB8840,0xAB82234A,0xC2A163C8);
+$k_sbo=0x60;		# sbou, sbot
+	&data_word(0x6FBDC700,0xD0D26D17,0xC502A878,0x15AABF7A);
+	&data_word(0x5FBB6A00,0xCFE474A5,0x412B35FA,0x8E1E90D1);
+
+$k_mc_forward=0x80;	# mc_forward
+	&data_word(0x00030201,0x04070605,0x080B0A09,0x0C0F0E0D);
+	&data_word(0x04070605,0x080B0A09,0x0C0F0E0D,0x00030201);
+	&data_word(0x080B0A09,0x0C0F0E0D,0x00030201,0x04070605);
+	&data_word(0x0C0F0E0D,0x00030201,0x04070605,0x080B0A09);
+
+$k_mc_backward=0xc0;	# mc_backward
+	&data_word(0x02010003,0x06050407,0x0A09080B,0x0E0D0C0F);
+	&data_word(0x0E0D0C0F,0x02010003,0x06050407,0x0A09080B);
+	&data_word(0x0A09080B,0x0E0D0C0F,0x02010003,0x06050407);
+	&data_word(0x06050407,0x0A09080B,0x0E0D0C0F,0x02010003);
+
+$k_sr=0x100;		# sr
+	&data_word(0x03020100,0x07060504,0x0B0A0908,0x0F0E0D0C);
+	&data_word(0x0F0A0500,0x030E0904,0x07020D08,0x0B06010C);
+	&data_word(0x0B020900,0x0F060D04,0x030A0108,0x070E050C);
+	&data_word(0x070A0D00,0x0B0E0104,0x0F020508,0x0306090C);
+
+$k_rcon=0x140;		# rcon
+	&data_word(0xAF9DEEB6,0x1F8391B9,0x4D7C7D81,0x702A9808);
+
+$k_s63=0x150;		# s63: all equal to 0x63 transformed
+	&data_word(0x5B5B5B5B,0x5B5B5B5B,0x5B5B5B5B,0x5B5B5B5B);
+
+$k_opt=0x160;		# output transform
+	&data_word(0xD6B66000,0xFF9F4929,0xDEBE6808,0xF7974121);
+	&data_word(0x50BCEC00,0x01EDBD51,0xB05C0CE0,0xE10D5DB1);
+
+$k_deskew=0x180;	# deskew tables: inverts the sbox's "skew"
+	&data_word(0x47A4E300,0x07E4A340,0x5DBEF91A,0x1DFEB95A);
+	&data_word(0x83EA6900,0x5F36B5DC,0xF49D1E77,0x2841C2AB);
+##
+##  Decryption stuff
+##  Key schedule constants
+##
+$k_dksd=0x1a0;		# decryption key schedule: invskew x*D
+	&data_word(0xA3E44700,0xFEB91A5D,0x5A1DBEF9,0x0740E3A4);
+	&data_word(0xB5368300,0x41C277F4,0xAB289D1E,0x5FDC69EA);
+$k_dksb=0x1c0;		# decryption key schedule: invskew x*B
+	&data_word(0x8550D500,0x9A4FCA1F,0x1CC94C99,0x03D65386);
+	&data_word(0xB6FC4A00,0x115BEDA7,0x7E3482C8,0xD993256F);
+$k_dkse=0x1e0;		# decryption key schedule: invskew x*E + 0x63
+	&data_word(0x1FC9D600,0xD5031CCA,0x994F5086,0x53859A4C);
+	&data_word(0x4FDC7BE8,0xA2319605,0x20B31487,0xCD5EF96A);
+$k_dks9=0x200;		# decryption key schedule: invskew x*9
+	&data_word(0x7ED9A700,0xB6116FC8,0x82255BFC,0x4AED9334);
+	&data_word(0x27143300,0x45765162,0xE9DAFDCE,0x8BB89FAC);
+
+##
+##  Decryption stuff
+##  Round function constants
+##
+$k_dipt=0x220;		# decryption input transform
+	&data_word(0x0B545F00,0x0F505B04,0x114E451A,0x154A411E);
+	&data_word(0x60056500,0x86E383E6,0xF491F194,0x12771772);
+
+$k_dsb9=0x240;		# decryption sbox output *9*u, *9*t
+	&data_word(0x9A86D600,0x851C0353,0x4F994CC9,0xCAD51F50);
+	&data_word(0xECD74900,0xC03B1789,0xB2FBA565,0x725E2C9E);
+$k_dsbd=0x260;		# decryption sbox output *D*u, *D*t
+	&data_word(0xE6B1A200,0x7D57CCDF,0x882A4439,0xF56E9B13);
+	&data_word(0x24C6CB00,0x3CE2FAF7,0x15DEEFD3,0x2931180D);
+$k_dsbb=0x280;		# decryption sbox output *B*u, *B*t
+	&data_word(0x96B44200,0xD0226492,0xB0F2D404,0x602646F6);
+	&data_word(0xCD596700,0xC19498A6,0x3255AA6B,0xF3FF0C3E);
+$k_dsbe=0x2a0;		# decryption sbox output *E*u, *E*t
+	&data_word(0x26D4D000,0x46F29296,0x64B4F6B0,0x22426004);
+	&data_word(0xFFAAC100,0x0C55A6CD,0x98593E32,0x9467F36B);
+$k_dsbo=0x2c0;		# decryption sbox final output
+	&data_word(0x7EF94000,0x1387EA53,0xD4943E2D,0xC7AA6DB9);
+	&data_word(0x93441D00,0x12D7560F,0xD8C58E9C,0xCA4B8159);
+&asciz	("Vector Permutation AES for x86/SSSE3, Mike Hamburg (Stanford University)");
+&align	(64);
+
+&function_begin_B("_vpaes_preheat");
+	&add	($const,&DWP(0,"esp"));
+	&movdqa	("xmm7",&QWP($k_inv,$const));
+	&movdqa	("xmm6",&QWP($k_s0F,$const));
+	&ret	();
+&function_end_B("_vpaes_preheat");
+
+##
+##  _aes_encrypt_core
+##
+##  AES-encrypt %xmm0.
+##
+##  Inputs:
+##     %xmm0 = input
+##     %xmm6-%xmm7 as in _vpaes_preheat
+##    (%edx) = scheduled keys
+##
+##  Output in %xmm0
+##  Clobbers  %xmm1-%xmm5, %eax, %ebx, %ecx, %edx
+##
+##
+&function_begin_B("_vpaes_encrypt_core");
+	&mov	($magic,16);
+	&mov	($round,&DWP(240,$key));
+	&movdqa	("xmm1","xmm6")
+	&movdqa	("xmm2",&QWP($k_ipt,$const));
+	&pandn	("xmm1","xmm0");
+	&pand	("xmm0","xmm6");
+	&movdqu	("xmm5",&QWP(0,$key));
+	&pshufb	("xmm2","xmm0");
+	&movdqa	("xmm0",&QWP($k_ipt+16,$const));
+	&pxor	("xmm2","xmm5");
+	&psrld	("xmm1",4);
+	&add	($key,16);
+	&pshufb	("xmm0","xmm1");
+	&lea	($base,&DWP($k_mc_backward,$const));
+	&pxor	("xmm0","xmm2");
+	&jmp	(&label("enc_entry"));
+
+
+&set_label("enc_loop",16);
+	# middle of middle round
+	&movdqa	("xmm4",&QWP($k_sb1,$const));	# 4 : sb1u
+	&movdqa	("xmm0",&QWP($k_sb1+16,$const));# 0 : sb1t
+	&pshufb	("xmm4","xmm2");		# 4 = sb1u
+	&pshufb	("xmm0","xmm3");		# 0 = sb1t
+	&pxor	("xmm4","xmm5");		# 4 = sb1u + k
+	&movdqa	("xmm5",&QWP($k_sb2,$const));	# 4 : sb2u
+	&pxor	("xmm0","xmm4");		# 0 = A
+	&movdqa	("xmm1",&QWP(-0x40,$base,$magic));# .Lk_mc_forward[]
+	&pshufb	("xmm5","xmm2");		# 4 = sb2u
+	&movdqa	("xmm2",&QWP($k_sb2+16,$const));# 2 : sb2t
+	&movdqa	("xmm4",&QWP(0,$base,$magic));	# .Lk_mc_backward[]
+	&pshufb	("xmm2","xmm3");		# 2 = sb2t
+	&movdqa	("xmm3","xmm0");		# 3 = A
+	&pxor	("xmm2","xmm5");		# 2 = 2A
+	&pshufb	("xmm0","xmm1");		# 0 = B
+	&add	($key,16);			# next key
+	&pxor	("xmm0","xmm2");		# 0 = 2A+B
+	&pshufb	("xmm3","xmm4");		# 3 = D
+	&add	($magic,16);			# next mc
+	&pxor	("xmm3","xmm0");		# 3 = 2A+B+D
+	&pshufb	("xmm0","xmm1");		# 0 = 2B+C
+	&and	($magic,0x30);			# ... mod 4
+	&sub	($round,1);			# nr--
+	&pxor	("xmm0","xmm3");		# 0 = 2A+3B+C+D
+
+&set_label("enc_entry");
+	# top of round
+	&movdqa	("xmm1","xmm6");		# 1 : i
+	&movdqa	("xmm5",&QWP($k_inv+16,$const));# 2 : a/k
+	&pandn	("xmm1","xmm0");		# 1 = i<<4
+	&psrld	("xmm1",4);			# 1 = i
+	&pand	("xmm0","xmm6");		# 0 = k
+	&pshufb	("xmm5","xmm0");		# 2 = a/k
+	&movdqa	("xmm3","xmm7");		# 3 : 1/i
+	&pxor	("xmm0","xmm1");		# 0 = j
+	&pshufb	("xmm3","xmm1");		# 3 = 1/i
+	&movdqa	("xmm4","xmm7");		# 4 : 1/j
+	&pxor	("xmm3","xmm5");		# 3 = iak = 1/i + a/k
+	&pshufb	("xmm4","xmm0");		# 4 = 1/j
+	&movdqa	("xmm2","xmm7");		# 2 : 1/iak
+	&pxor	("xmm4","xmm5");		# 4 = jak = 1/j + a/k
+	&pshufb	("xmm2","xmm3");		# 2 = 1/iak
+	&movdqa	("xmm3","xmm7");		# 3 : 1/jak
+	&pxor	("xmm2","xmm0");		# 2 = io
+	&pshufb	("xmm3","xmm4");		# 3 = 1/jak
+	&movdqu	("xmm5",&QWP(0,$key));
+	&pxor	("xmm3","xmm1");		# 3 = jo
+	&jnz	(&label("enc_loop"));
+
+	# middle of last round
+	&movdqa	("xmm4",&QWP($k_sbo,$const));	# 3 : sbou      .Lk_sbo
+	&movdqa	("xmm0",&QWP($k_sbo+16,$const));# 3 : sbot      .Lk_sbo+16
+	&pshufb	("xmm4","xmm2");		# 4 = sbou
+	&pxor	("xmm4","xmm5");		# 4 = sb1u + k
+	&pshufb	("xmm0","xmm3");		# 0 = sb1t
+	&movdqa	("xmm1",&QWP(0x40,$base,$magic));# .Lk_sr[]
+	&pxor	("xmm0","xmm4");		# 0 = A
+	&pshufb	("xmm0","xmm1");
+	&ret	();
+&function_end_B("_vpaes_encrypt_core");
+
+##
+##  Decryption core
+##
+##  Same API as encryption core.
+##
+&function_begin_B("_vpaes_decrypt_core");
+	&lea	($base,&DWP($k_dsbd,$const));
+	&mov	($round,&DWP(240,$key));
+	&movdqa	("xmm1","xmm6");
+	&movdqa	("xmm2",&QWP($k_dipt-$k_dsbd,$base));
+	&pandn	("xmm1","xmm0");
+	&mov	($magic,$round);
+	&psrld	("xmm1",4)
+	&movdqu	("xmm5",&QWP(0,$key));
+	&shl	($magic,4);
+	&pand	("xmm0","xmm6");
+	&pshufb	("xmm2","xmm0");
+	&movdqa	("xmm0",&QWP($k_dipt-$k_dsbd+16,$base));
+	&xor	($magic,0x30);
+	&pshufb	("xmm0","xmm1");
+	&and	($magic,0x30);
+	&pxor	("xmm2","xmm5");
+	&movdqa	("xmm5",&QWP($k_mc_forward+48,$const));
+	&pxor	("xmm0","xmm2");
+	&add	($key,16);
+	&lea	($magic,&DWP($k_sr-$k_dsbd,$base,$magic));
+	&jmp	(&label("dec_entry"));
+
+&set_label("dec_loop",16);
+##
+##  Inverse mix columns
+##
+	&movdqa	("xmm4",&QWP(-0x20,$base));	# 4 : sb9u
+	&movdqa	("xmm1",&QWP(-0x10,$base));	# 0 : sb9t
+	&pshufb	("xmm4","xmm2");		# 4 = sb9u
+	&pshufb	("xmm1","xmm3");		# 0 = sb9t
+	&pxor	("xmm0","xmm4");
+	&movdqa	("xmm4",&QWP(0,$base));		# 4 : sbdu
+	&pxor	("xmm0","xmm1");		# 0 = ch
+	&movdqa	("xmm1",&QWP(0x10,$base));	# 0 : sbdt
+
+	&pshufb	("xmm4","xmm2");		# 4 = sbdu
+	&pshufb	("xmm0","xmm5");		# MC ch
+	&pshufb	("xmm1","xmm3");		# 0 = sbdt
+	&pxor	("xmm0","xmm4");		# 4 = ch
+	&movdqa	("xmm4",&QWP(0x20,$base));	# 4 : sbbu
+	&pxor	("xmm0","xmm1");		# 0 = ch
+	&movdqa	("xmm1",&QWP(0x30,$base));	# 0 : sbbt
+
+	&pshufb	("xmm4","xmm2");		# 4 = sbbu
+	&pshufb	("xmm0","xmm5");		# MC ch
+	&pshufb	("xmm1","xmm3");		# 0 = sbbt
+	&pxor	("xmm0","xmm4");		# 4 = ch
+	&movdqa	("xmm4",&QWP(0x40,$base));	# 4 : sbeu
+	&pxor	("xmm0","xmm1");		# 0 = ch
+	&movdqa	("xmm1",&QWP(0x50,$base));	# 0 : sbet
+
+	&pshufb	("xmm4","xmm2");		# 4 = sbeu
+	&pshufb	("xmm0","xmm5");		# MC ch
+	&pshufb	("xmm1","xmm3");		# 0 = sbet
+	&pxor	("xmm0","xmm4");		# 4 = ch
+	&add	($key,16);			# next round key
+	&palignr("xmm5","xmm5",12);
+	&pxor	("xmm0","xmm1");		# 0 = ch
+	&sub	($round,1);			# nr--
+
+&set_label("dec_entry");
+	# top of round
+	&movdqa	("xmm1","xmm6");		# 1 : i
+	&movdqa	("xmm2",&QWP($k_inv+16,$const));# 2 : a/k
+	&pandn	("xmm1","xmm0");		# 1 = i<<4
+	&pand	("xmm0","xmm6");		# 0 = k
+	&psrld	("xmm1",4);			# 1 = i
+	&pshufb	("xmm2","xmm0");		# 2 = a/k
+	&movdqa	("xmm3","xmm7");		# 3 : 1/i
+	&pxor	("xmm0","xmm1");		# 0 = j
+	&pshufb	("xmm3","xmm1");		# 3 = 1/i
+	&movdqa	("xmm4","xmm7");		# 4 : 1/j
+	&pxor	("xmm3","xmm2");		# 3 = iak = 1/i + a/k
+	&pshufb	("xmm4","xmm0");		# 4 = 1/j
+	&pxor	("xmm4","xmm2");		# 4 = jak = 1/j + a/k
+	&movdqa	("xmm2","xmm7");		# 2 : 1/iak
+	&pshufb	("xmm2","xmm3");		# 2 = 1/iak
+	&movdqa	("xmm3","xmm7");		# 3 : 1/jak
+	&pxor	("xmm2","xmm0");		# 2 = io
+	&pshufb	("xmm3","xmm4");		# 3 = 1/jak
+	&movdqu	("xmm0",&QWP(0,$key));
+	&pxor	("xmm3","xmm1");		# 3 = jo
+	&jnz	(&label("dec_loop"));
+
+	# middle of last round
+	&movdqa	("xmm4",&QWP(0x60,$base));	# 3 : sbou
+	&pshufb	("xmm4","xmm2");		# 4 = sbou
+	&pxor	("xmm4","xmm0");		# 4 = sb1u + k
+	&movdqa	("xmm0",&QWP(0x70,$base));	# 0 : sbot
+	&movdqa	("xmm2",&QWP(0,$magic));
+	&pshufb	("xmm0","xmm3");		# 0 = sb1t
+	&pxor	("xmm0","xmm4");		# 0 = A
+	&pshufb	("xmm0","xmm2");
+	&ret	();
+&function_end_B("_vpaes_decrypt_core");
+
+########################################################
+##                                                    ##
+##                  AES key schedule                  ##
+##                                                    ##
+########################################################
+&function_begin_B("_vpaes_schedule_core");
+	&add	($const,&DWP(0,"esp"));
+	&movdqu	("xmm0",&QWP(0,$inp));		# load key (unaligned)
+	&movdqa	("xmm2",&QWP($k_rcon,$const));	# load rcon
+
+	# input transform
+	&movdqa	("xmm3","xmm0");
+	&lea	($base,&DWP($k_ipt,$const));
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(4,"esp"),"xmm2");		# xmm8
+	&call	("_vpaes_schedule_transform");
+	&movdqa	("xmm7","xmm0");
+
+	&test	($out,$out);
+	&jnz	(&label("schedule_am_decrypting"));
+
+	# encrypting, output zeroth round key after transform
+	&movdqu	(&QWP(0,$key),"xmm0");
+	&jmp	(&label("schedule_go"));
+
+&set_label("schedule_am_decrypting");
+	# decrypting, output zeroth round key after shiftrows
+	&movdqa	("xmm1",&QWP($k_sr,$const,$magic));
+	&pshufb	("xmm3","xmm1");
+	&movdqu	(&QWP(0,$key),"xmm3");
+	&xor	($magic,0x30);
+
+&set_label("schedule_go");
+	&cmp	($round,192);
+	&ja	(&label("schedule_256"));
+	&je	(&label("schedule_192"));
+	# 128: fall though
+
+##
+##  .schedule_128
+##
+##  128-bit specific part of key schedule.
+##
+##  This schedule is really simple, because all its parts
+##  are accomplished by the subroutines.
+##
+&set_label("schedule_128");
+	&mov	($round,10);
+
+&set_label("loop_schedule_128");
+	&call	("_vpaes_schedule_round");
+	&dec	($round);
+	&jz	(&label("schedule_mangle_last"));
+	&call	("_vpaes_schedule_mangle");	# write output
+	&jmp	(&label("loop_schedule_128"));
+
+##
+##  .aes_schedule_192
+##
+##  192-bit specific part of key schedule.
+##
+##  The main body of this schedule is the same as the 128-bit
+##  schedule, but with more smearing.  The long, high side is
+##  stored in %xmm7 as before, and the short, low side is in
+##  the high bits of %xmm6.
+##
+##  This schedule is somewhat nastier, however, because each
+##  round produces 192 bits of key material, or 1.5 round keys.
+##  Therefore, on each cycle we do 2 rounds and produce 3 round
+##  keys.
+##
+&set_label("schedule_192",16);
+	&movdqu	("xmm0",&QWP(8,$inp));		# load key part 2 (very unaligned)
+	&call	("_vpaes_schedule_transform");	# input transform	
+	&movdqa	("xmm6","xmm0");		# save short part
+	&pxor	("xmm4","xmm4");		# clear 4
+	&movhlps("xmm6","xmm4");		# clobber low side with zeros
+	&mov	($round,4);
+
+&set_label("loop_schedule_192");
+	&call	("_vpaes_schedule_round");
+	&palignr("xmm0","xmm6",8);
+	&call	("_vpaes_schedule_mangle");	# save key n
+	&call	("_vpaes_schedule_192_smear");
+	&call	("_vpaes_schedule_mangle");	# save key n+1
+	&call	("_vpaes_schedule_round");
+	&dec	($round);
+	&jz	(&label("schedule_mangle_last"));
+	&call	("_vpaes_schedule_mangle");	# save key n+2
+	&call	("_vpaes_schedule_192_smear");
+	&jmp	(&label("loop_schedule_192"));
+
+##
+##  .aes_schedule_256
+##
+##  256-bit specific part of key schedule.
+##
+##  The structure here is very similar to the 128-bit
+##  schedule, but with an additional "low side" in
+##  %xmm6.  The low side's rounds are the same as the
+##  high side's, except no rcon and no rotation.
+##
+&set_label("schedule_256",16);
+	&movdqu	("xmm0",&QWP(16,$inp));		# load key part 2 (unaligned)
+	&call	("_vpaes_schedule_transform");	# input transform	
+	&mov	($round,7);
+
+&set_label("loop_schedule_256");
+	&call	("_vpaes_schedule_mangle");	# output low result
+	&movdqa	("xmm6","xmm0");		# save cur_lo in xmm6
+
+	# high round
+	&call	("_vpaes_schedule_round");
+	&dec	($round);
+	&jz	(&label("schedule_mangle_last"));
+	&call	("_vpaes_schedule_mangle");	
+
+	# low round. swap xmm7 and xmm6
+	&pshufd	("xmm0","xmm0",0xFF);
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(20,"esp"),"xmm7");
+	&movdqa	("xmm7","xmm6");
+	&call	("_vpaes_schedule_low_round");
+	&movdqa	("xmm7",&QWP(20,"esp"));
+
+	&jmp	(&label("loop_schedule_256"));
+
+##
+##  .aes_schedule_mangle_last
+##
+##  Mangler for last round of key schedule
+##  Mangles %xmm0
+##    when encrypting, outputs out(%xmm0) ^ 63
+##    when decrypting, outputs unskew(%xmm0)
+##
+##  Always called right before return... jumps to cleanup and exits
+##
+&set_label("schedule_mangle_last",16);
+	# schedule last round key from xmm0
+	&lea	($base,&DWP($k_deskew,$const));
+	&test	($out,$out);
+	&jnz	(&label("schedule_mangle_last_dec"));
+
+	# encrypting
+	&movdqa	("xmm1",&QWP($k_sr,$const,$magic));
+	&pshufb	("xmm0","xmm1");		# output permute
+	&lea	($base,&DWP($k_opt,$const));	# prepare to output transform
+	&add	($key,32);
+
+&set_label("schedule_mangle_last_dec");
+	&add	($key,-16);
+	&pxor	("xmm0",&QWP($k_s63,$const));
+	&call	("_vpaes_schedule_transform");	# output transform
+	&movdqu	(&QWP(0,$key),"xmm0");		# save last key
+
+	# cleanup
+	&pxor	("xmm0","xmm0");
+	&pxor	("xmm1","xmm1");
+	&pxor	("xmm2","xmm2");
+	&pxor	("xmm3","xmm3");
+	&pxor	("xmm4","xmm4");
+	&pxor	("xmm5","xmm5");
+	&pxor	("xmm6","xmm6");
+	&pxor	("xmm7","xmm7");
+	&ret	();
+&function_end_B("_vpaes_schedule_core");
+
+##
+##  .aes_schedule_192_smear
+##
+##  Smear the short, low side in the 192-bit key schedule.
+##
+##  Inputs:
+##    %xmm7: high side, b  a  x  y
+##    %xmm6:  low side, d  c  0  0
+##    %xmm13: 0
+##
+##  Outputs:
+##    %xmm6: b+c+d  b+c  0  0
+##    %xmm0: b+c+d  b+c  b  a
+##
+&function_begin_B("_vpaes_schedule_192_smear");
+	&pshufd	("xmm1","xmm6",0x80);		# d c 0 0 -> c 0 0 0
+	&pshufd	("xmm0","xmm7",0xFE);		# b a _ _ -> b b b a
+	&pxor	("xmm6","xmm1");		# -> c+d c 0 0
+	&pxor	("xmm1","xmm1");
+	&pxor	("xmm6","xmm0");		# -> b+c+d b+c b a
+	&movdqa	("xmm0","xmm6");
+	&movhlps("xmm6","xmm1");		# clobber low side with zeros
+	&ret	();
+&function_end_B("_vpaes_schedule_192_smear");
+
+##
+##  .aes_schedule_round
+##
+##  Runs one main round of the key schedule on %xmm0, %xmm7
+##
+##  Specifically, runs subbytes on the high dword of %xmm0
+##  then rotates it by one byte and xors into the low dword of
+##  %xmm7.
+##
+##  Adds rcon from low byte of %xmm8, then rotates %xmm8 for
+##  next rcon.
+##
+##  Smears the dwords of %xmm7 by xoring the low into the
+##  second low, result into third, result into highest.
+##
+##  Returns results in %xmm7 = %xmm0.
+##  Clobbers %xmm1-%xmm5.
+##
+&function_begin_B("_vpaes_schedule_round");
+	# extract rcon from xmm8
+	&movdqa	("xmm2",&QWP(8,"esp"));		# xmm8
+	&pxor	("xmm1","xmm1");
+	&palignr("xmm1","xmm2",15);
+	&palignr("xmm2","xmm2",15);
+	&pxor	("xmm7","xmm1");
+
+	# rotate
+	&pshufd	("xmm0","xmm0",0xFF);
+	&palignr("xmm0","xmm0",1);
+
+	# fall through...
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(8,"esp"),"xmm2");		# xmm8
+
+	# low round: same as high round, but no rotation and no rcon.
+&set_label("_vpaes_schedule_low_round");
+	# smear xmm7
+	&movdqa	("xmm1","xmm7");
+	&pslldq	("xmm7",4);
+	&pxor	("xmm7","xmm1");
+	&movdqa	("xmm1","xmm7");
+	&pslldq	("xmm7",8);
+	&pxor	("xmm7","xmm1");
+	&pxor	("xmm7",&QWP($k_s63,$const));
+
+	# subbyte
+	&movdqa	("xmm4",&QWP($k_s0F,$const));
+	&movdqa	("xmm5",&QWP($k_inv,$const));	# 4 : 1/j
+	&movdqa	("xmm1","xmm4");	
+	&pandn	("xmm1","xmm0");
+	&psrld	("xmm1",4);			# 1 = i
+	&pand	("xmm0","xmm4");		# 0 = k
+	&movdqa	("xmm2",&QWP($k_inv+16,$const));# 2 : a/k
+	&pshufb	("xmm2","xmm0");		# 2 = a/k
+	&pxor	("xmm0","xmm1");		# 0 = j
+	&movdqa	("xmm3","xmm5");		# 3 : 1/i
+	&pshufb	("xmm3","xmm1");		# 3 = 1/i
+	&pxor	("xmm3","xmm2");		# 3 = iak = 1/i + a/k
+	&movdqa	("xmm4","xmm5");		# 4 : 1/j
+	&pshufb	("xmm4","xmm0");		# 4 = 1/j
+	&pxor	("xmm4","xmm2");		# 4 = jak = 1/j + a/k
+	&movdqa	("xmm2","xmm5");		# 2 : 1/iak
+	&pshufb	("xmm2","xmm3");		# 2 = 1/iak
+	&pxor	("xmm2","xmm0");		# 2 = io
+	&movdqa	("xmm3","xmm5");		# 3 : 1/jak
+	&pshufb	("xmm3","xmm4");		# 3 = 1/jak
+	&pxor	("xmm3","xmm1");		# 3 = jo
+	&movdqa	("xmm4",&QWP($k_sb1,$const));	# 4 : sbou
+	&pshufb	("xmm4","xmm2");		# 4 = sbou
+	&movdqa	("xmm0",&QWP($k_sb1+16,$const));# 0 : sbot
+	&pshufb	("xmm0","xmm3");		# 0 = sb1t
+	&pxor	("xmm0","xmm4");		# 0 = sbox output
+
+	# add in smeared stuff
+	&pxor	("xmm0","xmm7");
+	&movdqa	("xmm7","xmm0");
+	&ret	();
+&function_end_B("_vpaes_schedule_round");
+
+##
+##  .aes_schedule_transform
+##
+##  Linear-transform %xmm0 according to tables at (%ebx)
+##
+##  Output in %xmm0
+##  Clobbers %xmm1, %xmm2
+##
+&function_begin_B("_vpaes_schedule_transform");
+	&movdqa	("xmm2",&QWP($k_s0F,$const));
+	&movdqa	("xmm1","xmm2");
+	&pandn	("xmm1","xmm0");
+	&psrld	("xmm1",4);
+	&pand	("xmm0","xmm2");
+	&movdqa	("xmm2",&QWP(0,$base));
+	&pshufb	("xmm2","xmm0");
+	&movdqa	("xmm0",&QWP(16,$base));
+	&pshufb	("xmm0","xmm1");
+	&pxor	("xmm0","xmm2");
+	&ret	();
+&function_end_B("_vpaes_schedule_transform");
+
+##
+##  .aes_schedule_mangle
+##
+##  Mangle xmm0 from (basis-transformed) standard version
+##  to our version.
+##
+##  On encrypt,
+##    xor with 0x63
+##    multiply by circulant 0,1,1,1
+##    apply shiftrows transform
+##
+##  On decrypt,
+##    xor with 0x63
+##    multiply by "inverse mixcolumns" circulant E,B,D,9
+##    deskew
+##    apply shiftrows transform
+##
+##
+##  Writes out to (%edx), and increments or decrements it
+##  Keeps track of round number mod 4 in %ecx
+##  Preserves xmm0
+##  Clobbers xmm1-xmm5
+##
+&function_begin_B("_vpaes_schedule_mangle");
+	&movdqa	("xmm4","xmm0");	# save xmm0 for later
+	&movdqa	("xmm5",&QWP($k_mc_forward,$const));
+	&test	($out,$out);
+	&jnz	(&label("schedule_mangle_dec"));
+
+	# encrypting
+	&add	($key,16);
+	&pxor	("xmm4",&QWP($k_s63,$const));
+	&pshufb	("xmm4","xmm5");
+	&movdqa	("xmm3","xmm4");
+	&pshufb	("xmm4","xmm5");
+	&pxor	("xmm3","xmm4");
+	&pshufb	("xmm4","xmm5");
+	&pxor	("xmm3","xmm4");
+
+	&jmp	(&label("schedule_mangle_both"));
+
+&set_label("schedule_mangle_dec",16);
+	# inverse mix columns
+	&movdqa	("xmm2",&QWP($k_s0F,$const));
+	&lea	($inp,&DWP($k_dksd,$const));
+	&movdqa	("xmm1","xmm2");
+	&pandn	("xmm1","xmm4");
+	&psrld	("xmm1",4);			# 1 = hi
+	&pand	("xmm4","xmm2");		# 4 = lo
+
+	&movdqa	("xmm2",&QWP(0,$inp));
+	&pshufb	("xmm2","xmm4");
+	&movdqa	("xmm3",&QWP(0x10,$inp));
+	&pshufb	("xmm3","xmm1");
+	&pxor	("xmm3","xmm2");
+	&pshufb	("xmm3","xmm5");
+
+	&movdqa	("xmm2",&QWP(0x20,$inp));
+	&pshufb	("xmm2","xmm4");
+	&pxor	("xmm2","xmm3");
+	&movdqa	("xmm3",&QWP(0x30,$inp));
+	&pshufb	("xmm3","xmm1");
+	&pxor	("xmm3","xmm2");
+	&pshufb	("xmm3","xmm5");
+
+	&movdqa	("xmm2",&QWP(0x40,$inp));
+	&pshufb	("xmm2","xmm4");
+	&pxor	("xmm2","xmm3");
+	&movdqa	("xmm3",&QWP(0x50,$inp));
+	&pshufb	("xmm3","xmm1");
+	&pxor	("xmm3","xmm2");
+	&pshufb	("xmm3","xmm5");
+
+	&movdqa	("xmm2",&QWP(0x60,$inp));
+	&pshufb	("xmm2","xmm4");
+	&pxor	("xmm2","xmm3");
+	&movdqa	("xmm3",&QWP(0x70,$inp));
+	&pshufb	("xmm3","xmm1");
+	&pxor	("xmm3","xmm2");
+
+	&add	($key,-16);
+
+&set_label("schedule_mangle_both");
+	&movdqa	("xmm1",&QWP($k_sr,$const,$magic));
+	&pshufb	("xmm3","xmm1");
+	&add	($magic,-16);
+	&and	($magic,0x30);
+	&movdqu	(&QWP(0,$key),"xmm3");
+	&ret	();
+&function_end_B("_vpaes_schedule_mangle");
+
+#
+# Interface to OpenSSL
+#
+&function_begin("${PREFIX}_set_encrypt_key");
+	&mov	($inp,&wparam(0));		# inp
+	&lea	($base,&DWP(-56,"esp"));
+	&mov	($round,&wparam(1));		# bits
+	&and	($base,-16);
+	&mov	($key,&wparam(2));		# key
+	&xchg	($base,"esp");			# alloca
+	&mov	(&DWP(48,"esp"),$base);
+
+	&mov	($base,$round);
+	&shr	($base,5);
+	&add	($base,5);
+	&mov	(&DWP(240,$key),$base);		# AES_KEY->rounds = nbits/32+5;
+	&mov	($magic,0x30);
+	&mov	($out,0);
+
+	&lea	($const,&DWP(&label("_vpaes_consts")."+0x30-".&label("pic_point")));
+	&call	("_vpaes_schedule_core");
+&set_label("pic_point");
+
+	&mov	("esp",&DWP(48,"esp"));
+	&xor	("eax","eax");
+&function_end("${PREFIX}_set_encrypt_key");
+
+&function_begin("${PREFIX}_set_decrypt_key");
+	&mov	($inp,&wparam(0));		# inp
+	&lea	($base,&DWP(-56,"esp"));
+	&mov	($round,&wparam(1));		# bits
+	&and	($base,-16);
+	&mov	($key,&wparam(2));		# key
+	&xchg	($base,"esp");			# alloca
+	&mov	(&DWP(48,"esp"),$base);
+
+	&mov	($base,$round);
+	&shr	($base,5);
+	&add	($base,5);
+	&mov	(&DWP(240,$key),$base);	# AES_KEY->rounds = nbits/32+5;
+	&shl	($base,4);
+	&lea	($key,&DWP(16,$key,$base));
+
+	&mov	($out,1);
+	&mov	($magic,$round);
+	&shr	($magic,1);
+	&and	($magic,32);
+	&xor	($magic,32);			# nbist==192?0:32;
+
+	&lea	($const,&DWP(&label("_vpaes_consts")."+0x30-".&label("pic_point")));
+	&call	("_vpaes_schedule_core");
+&set_label("pic_point");
+
+	&mov	("esp",&DWP(48,"esp"));
+	&xor	("eax","eax");
+&function_end("${PREFIX}_set_decrypt_key");
+
+&function_begin("${PREFIX}_encrypt");
+	&lea	($const,&DWP(&label("_vpaes_consts")."+0x30-".&label("pic_point")));
+	&call	("_vpaes_preheat");
+&set_label("pic_point");
+	&mov	($inp,&wparam(0));		# inp
+	&lea	($base,&DWP(-56,"esp"));
+	&mov	($out,&wparam(1));		# out
+	&and	($base,-16);
+	&mov	($key,&wparam(2));		# key
+	&xchg	($base,"esp");			# alloca
+	&mov	(&DWP(48,"esp"),$base);
+
+	&movdqu	("xmm0",&QWP(0,$inp));
+	&call	("_vpaes_encrypt_core");
+	&movdqu	(&QWP(0,$out),"xmm0");
+
+	&mov	("esp",&DWP(48,"esp"));
+&function_end("${PREFIX}_encrypt");
+
+&function_begin("${PREFIX}_decrypt");
+	&lea	($const,&DWP(&label("_vpaes_consts")."+0x30-".&label("pic_point")));
+	&call	("_vpaes_preheat");
+&set_label("pic_point");
+	&mov	($inp,&wparam(0));		# inp
+	&lea	($base,&DWP(-56,"esp"));
+	&mov	($out,&wparam(1));		# out
+	&and	($base,-16);
+	&mov	($key,&wparam(2));		# key
+	&xchg	($base,"esp");			# alloca
+	&mov	(&DWP(48,"esp"),$base);
+
+	&movdqu	("xmm0",&QWP(0,$inp));
+	&call	("_vpaes_decrypt_core");
+	&movdqu	(&QWP(0,$out),"xmm0");
+
+	&mov	("esp",&DWP(48,"esp"));
+&function_end("${PREFIX}_decrypt");
+
+&function_begin("${PREFIX}_cbc_encrypt");
+	&mov	($inp,&wparam(0));		# inp
+	&mov	($out,&wparam(1));		# out
+	&mov	($round,&wparam(2));		# len
+	&mov	($key,&wparam(3));		# key
+	&sub	($round,16);
+	&jc	(&label("cbc_abort"));
+	&lea	($base,&DWP(-56,"esp"));
+	&mov	($const,&wparam(4));		# ivp
+	&and	($base,-16);
+	&mov	($magic,&wparam(5));		# enc
+	&xchg	($base,"esp");			# alloca
+	&movdqu	("xmm1",&QWP(0,$const));	# load IV
+	&sub	($out,$inp);
+	&mov	(&DWP(48,"esp"),$base);
+
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,"esp"),$out);		# save out
+	&mov	(&DWP(4,"esp"),$key)		# save key
+	&mov	(&DWP(8,"esp"),$const);		# save ivp
+	&mov	($out,$round);			# $out works as $len
+
+	&lea	($const,&DWP(&label("_vpaes_consts")."+0x30-".&label("pic_point")));
+	&call	("_vpaes_preheat");
+&set_label("pic_point");
+	&cmp	($magic,0);
+	&je	(&label("cbc_dec_loop"));
+	&jmp	(&label("cbc_enc_loop"));
+
+&set_label("cbc_enc_loop",16);
+	&movdqu	("xmm0",&QWP(0,$inp));		# load input
+	&pxor	("xmm0","xmm1");		# inp^=iv
+	&call	("_vpaes_encrypt_core");
+	&mov	($base,&DWP(0,"esp"));		# restore out
+	&mov	($key,&DWP(4,"esp"));		# restore key
+	&movdqa	("xmm1","xmm0");
+	&movdqu	(&QWP(0,$base,$inp),"xmm0");	# write output
+	&lea	($inp,&DWP(16,$inp));
+	&sub	($out,16);
+	&jnc	(&label("cbc_enc_loop"));
+	&jmp	(&label("cbc_done"));
+
+&set_label("cbc_dec_loop",16);
+	&movdqu	("xmm0",&QWP(0,$inp));		# load input
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(16,"esp"),"xmm1");	# save IV
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(32,"esp"),"xmm0");	# save future IV
+	&call	("_vpaes_decrypt_core");
+	&mov	($base,&DWP(0,"esp"));		# restore out
+	&mov	($key,&DWP(4,"esp"));		# restore key
+	&pxor	("xmm0",&QWP(16,"esp"));	# out^=iv
+	&movdqa	("xmm1",&QWP(32,"esp"));	# load next IV
+	&movdqu	(&QWP(0,$base,$inp),"xmm0");	# write output
+	&lea	($inp,&DWP(16,$inp));
+	&sub	($out,16);
+	&jnc	(&label("cbc_dec_loop"));
+
+&set_label("cbc_done");
+	&mov	($base,&DWP(8,"esp"));		# restore ivp
+	&mov	("esp",&DWP(48,"esp"));
+	&movdqu	(&QWP(0,$base),"xmm1");		# write IV
+&set_label("cbc_abort");
+&function_end("${PREFIX}_cbc_encrypt");
+
+&asm_finish();
+
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/asm/vpaes-x86_64.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/asm/vpaes-x86_64.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..422e8ee
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/asm/vpaes-x86_64.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,1215 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+######################################################################
+## Constant-time SSSE3 AES core implementation.
+## version 0.1
+##
+## By Mike Hamburg (Stanford University), 2009
+## Public domain.
+##
+## For details see http://shiftleft.org/papers/vector_aes/ and
+## http://crypto.stanford.edu/vpaes/.
+
+######################################################################
+# September 2011.
+#
+# Interface to OpenSSL as "almost" drop-in replacement for
+# aes-x86_64.pl. "Almost" refers to the fact that AES_cbc_encrypt
+# doesn't handle partial vectors (doesn't have to if called from
+# EVP only). "Drop-in" implies that this module doesn't share key
+# schedule structure with the original nor does it make assumption
+# about its alignment...
+#
+# Performance summary. aes-x86_64.pl column lists large-block CBC
+# encrypt/decrypt/with-hyper-threading-off(*) results in cycles per
+# byte processed with 128-bit key, and vpaes-x86_64.pl column -
+# [also large-block CBC] encrypt/decrypt.
+#
+#		aes-x86_64.pl		vpaes-x86_64.pl
+#
+# Core 2(**)	29.6/41.1/14.3		21.9/25.2(***)
+# Nehalem	29.6/40.3/14.6		10.0/11.8
+# Atom		57.3/74.2/32.1		60.9/77.2(***)
+# Silvermont	52.7/64.0/19.5		48.8/60.8(***)
+# Goldmont	38.9/49.0/17.8		10.6/12.6
+#
+# (*)	"Hyper-threading" in the context refers rather to cache shared
+#	among multiple cores, than to specifically Intel HTT. As vast
+#	majority of contemporary cores share cache, slower code path
+#	is common place. In other words "with-hyper-threading-off"
+#	results are presented mostly for reference purposes.
+#
+# (**)	"Core 2" refers to initial 65nm design, a.k.a. Conroe.
+#
+# (***)	Less impressive improvement on Core 2 and Atom is due to slow
+#	pshufb,	yet it's respectable +36%/62% improvement on Core 2
+#	(as implied, over "hyper-threading-safe" code path).
+#
+#						<appro@openssl.org>
+
+$flavour = shift;
+$output  = shift;
+if ($flavour =~ /\./) { $output = $flavour; undef $flavour; }
+
+$win64=0; $win64=1 if ($flavour =~ /[nm]asm|mingw64/ || $output =~ /\.asm$/);
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+( $xlate="${dir}x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
+( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
+die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl";
+
+open OUT,"| \"$^X\" \"$xlate\" $flavour \"$output\"";
+*STDOUT=*OUT;
+
+$PREFIX="vpaes";
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.text
+
+##
+##  _aes_encrypt_core
+##
+##  AES-encrypt %xmm0.
+##
+##  Inputs:
+##     %xmm0 = input
+##     %xmm9-%xmm15 as in _vpaes_preheat
+##    (%rdx) = scheduled keys
+##
+##  Output in %xmm0
+##  Clobbers  %xmm1-%xmm5, %r9, %r10, %r11, %rax
+##  Preserves %xmm6 - %xmm8 so you get some local vectors
+##
+##
+.type	_vpaes_encrypt_core,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align 16
+_vpaes_encrypt_core:
+	mov	%rdx,	%r9
+	mov	\$16,	%r11
+	mov	240(%rdx),%eax
+	movdqa	%xmm9,	%xmm1
+	movdqa	.Lk_ipt(%rip), %xmm2	# iptlo
+	pandn	%xmm0,	%xmm1
+	movdqu	(%r9),	%xmm5		# round0 key
+	psrld	\$4,	%xmm1
+	pand	%xmm9,	%xmm0
+	pshufb	%xmm0,	%xmm2
+	movdqa	.Lk_ipt+16(%rip), %xmm0	# ipthi
+	pshufb	%xmm1,	%xmm0
+	pxor	%xmm5,	%xmm2
+	add	\$16,	%r9
+	pxor	%xmm2,	%xmm0
+	lea	.Lk_mc_backward(%rip),%r10
+	jmp	.Lenc_entry
+
+.align 16
+.Lenc_loop:
+	# middle of middle round
+	movdqa  %xmm13,	%xmm4	# 4 : sb1u
+	movdqa  %xmm12,	%xmm0	# 0 : sb1t
+	pshufb  %xmm2,	%xmm4	# 4 = sb1u
+	pshufb  %xmm3,	%xmm0	# 0 = sb1t
+	pxor	%xmm5,	%xmm4	# 4 = sb1u + k
+	movdqa  %xmm15,	%xmm5	# 4 : sb2u
+	pxor	%xmm4,	%xmm0	# 0 = A
+	movdqa	-0x40(%r11,%r10), %xmm1		# .Lk_mc_forward[]
+	pshufb	%xmm2,	%xmm5	# 4 = sb2u
+	movdqa	(%r11,%r10), %xmm4		# .Lk_mc_backward[]
+	movdqa	%xmm14, %xmm2	# 2 : sb2t
+	pshufb	%xmm3,  %xmm2	# 2 = sb2t
+	movdqa	%xmm0,  %xmm3	# 3 = A
+	pxor	%xmm5,	%xmm2	# 2 = 2A
+	pshufb  %xmm1,  %xmm0	# 0 = B
+	add	\$16,	%r9	# next key
+	pxor	%xmm2,  %xmm0	# 0 = 2A+B
+	pshufb	%xmm4,	%xmm3	# 3 = D
+	add	\$16,	%r11	# next mc
+	pxor	%xmm0,	%xmm3	# 3 = 2A+B+D
+	pshufb  %xmm1,	%xmm0	# 0 = 2B+C
+	and	\$0x30,	%r11	# ... mod 4
+	sub	\$1,%rax	# nr--
+	pxor	%xmm3,	%xmm0	# 0 = 2A+3B+C+D
+
+.Lenc_entry:
+	# top of round
+	movdqa  %xmm9, 	%xmm1	# 1 : i
+	movdqa	%xmm11, %xmm5	# 2 : a/k
+	pandn	%xmm0, 	%xmm1	# 1 = i<<4
+	psrld	\$4,   	%xmm1   # 1 = i
+	pand	%xmm9, 	%xmm0   # 0 = k
+	pshufb  %xmm0,  %xmm5	# 2 = a/k
+	movdqa	%xmm10,	%xmm3  	# 3 : 1/i
+	pxor	%xmm1,	%xmm0	# 0 = j
+	pshufb  %xmm1, 	%xmm3  	# 3 = 1/i
+	movdqa	%xmm10,	%xmm4  	# 4 : 1/j
+	pxor	%xmm5, 	%xmm3  	# 3 = iak = 1/i + a/k
+	pshufb	%xmm0, 	%xmm4  	# 4 = 1/j
+	movdqa	%xmm10,	%xmm2  	# 2 : 1/iak
+	pxor	%xmm5, 	%xmm4  	# 4 = jak = 1/j + a/k
+	pshufb  %xmm3,	%xmm2  	# 2 = 1/iak
+	movdqa	%xmm10, %xmm3   # 3 : 1/jak
+	pxor	%xmm0, 	%xmm2  	# 2 = io
+	pshufb  %xmm4,  %xmm3   # 3 = 1/jak
+	movdqu	(%r9),	%xmm5
+	pxor	%xmm1,  %xmm3   # 3 = jo
+	jnz	.Lenc_loop
+
+	# middle of last round
+	movdqa	-0x60(%r10), %xmm4	# 3 : sbou	.Lk_sbo
+	movdqa	-0x50(%r10), %xmm0	# 0 : sbot	.Lk_sbo+16
+	pshufb  %xmm2,  %xmm4	# 4 = sbou
+	pxor	%xmm5,  %xmm4	# 4 = sb1u + k
+	pshufb  %xmm3,	%xmm0	# 0 = sb1t
+	movdqa	0x40(%r11,%r10), %xmm1		# .Lk_sr[]
+	pxor	%xmm4,	%xmm0	# 0 = A
+	pshufb	%xmm1,	%xmm0
+	ret
+.size	_vpaes_encrypt_core,.-_vpaes_encrypt_core
+	
+##
+##  Decryption core
+##
+##  Same API as encryption core.
+##
+.type	_vpaes_decrypt_core,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+_vpaes_decrypt_core:
+	mov	%rdx,	%r9		# load key
+	mov	240(%rdx),%eax
+	movdqa	%xmm9,	%xmm1
+	movdqa	.Lk_dipt(%rip), %xmm2	# iptlo
+	pandn	%xmm0,	%xmm1
+	mov	%rax,	%r11
+	psrld	\$4,	%xmm1
+	movdqu	(%r9),	%xmm5		# round0 key
+	shl	\$4,	%r11
+	pand	%xmm9,	%xmm0
+	pshufb	%xmm0,	%xmm2
+	movdqa	.Lk_dipt+16(%rip), %xmm0 # ipthi
+	xor	\$0x30,	%r11
+	lea	.Lk_dsbd(%rip),%r10
+	pshufb	%xmm1,	%xmm0
+	and	\$0x30,	%r11
+	pxor	%xmm5,	%xmm2
+	movdqa	.Lk_mc_forward+48(%rip), %xmm5
+	pxor	%xmm2,	%xmm0
+	add	\$16,	%r9
+	add	%r10,	%r11
+	jmp	.Ldec_entry
+
+.align 16
+.Ldec_loop:
+##
+##  Inverse mix columns
+##
+	movdqa  -0x20(%r10),%xmm4	# 4 : sb9u
+	movdqa  -0x10(%r10),%xmm1	# 0 : sb9t
+	pshufb	%xmm2,	%xmm4		# 4 = sb9u
+	pshufb	%xmm3,	%xmm1		# 0 = sb9t
+	pxor	%xmm4,	%xmm0
+	movdqa  0x00(%r10),%xmm4	# 4 : sbdu
+	pxor	%xmm1,	%xmm0		# 0 = ch
+	movdqa  0x10(%r10),%xmm1	# 0 : sbdt
+
+	pshufb	%xmm2,	%xmm4		# 4 = sbdu
+	pshufb	%xmm5,	%xmm0		# MC ch
+	pshufb	%xmm3,	%xmm1		# 0 = sbdt
+	pxor	%xmm4,	%xmm0		# 4 = ch
+	movdqa  0x20(%r10),%xmm4	# 4 : sbbu
+	pxor	%xmm1,	%xmm0		# 0 = ch
+	movdqa  0x30(%r10),%xmm1	# 0 : sbbt
+
+	pshufb	%xmm2,	%xmm4		# 4 = sbbu
+	pshufb	%xmm5,	%xmm0		# MC ch
+	pshufb	%xmm3,	%xmm1		# 0 = sbbt
+	pxor	%xmm4,	%xmm0		# 4 = ch
+	movdqa  0x40(%r10),%xmm4	# 4 : sbeu
+	pxor	%xmm1,	%xmm0		# 0 = ch
+	movdqa  0x50(%r10),%xmm1	# 0 : sbet
+
+	pshufb	%xmm2,	%xmm4		# 4 = sbeu
+	pshufb	%xmm5,	%xmm0		# MC ch
+	pshufb	%xmm3,	%xmm1		# 0 = sbet
+	pxor	%xmm4,	%xmm0		# 4 = ch
+	add	\$16, %r9		# next round key
+	palignr	\$12,	%xmm5,	%xmm5
+	pxor	%xmm1,	%xmm0		# 0 = ch
+	sub	\$1,%rax		# nr--
+
+.Ldec_entry:
+	# top of round
+	movdqa  %xmm9, 	%xmm1	# 1 : i
+	pandn	%xmm0, 	%xmm1	# 1 = i<<4
+	movdqa	%xmm11, %xmm2	# 2 : a/k
+	psrld	\$4,    %xmm1	# 1 = i
+	pand	%xmm9, 	%xmm0	# 0 = k
+	pshufb  %xmm0,  %xmm2	# 2 = a/k
+	movdqa	%xmm10,	%xmm3	# 3 : 1/i
+	pxor	%xmm1,	%xmm0	# 0 = j
+	pshufb  %xmm1, 	%xmm3	# 3 = 1/i
+	movdqa	%xmm10,	%xmm4	# 4 : 1/j
+	pxor	%xmm2, 	%xmm3	# 3 = iak = 1/i + a/k
+	pshufb	%xmm0, 	%xmm4	# 4 = 1/j
+	pxor	%xmm2, 	%xmm4	# 4 = jak = 1/j + a/k
+	movdqa	%xmm10,	%xmm2	# 2 : 1/iak
+	pshufb  %xmm3,	%xmm2	# 2 = 1/iak
+	movdqa	%xmm10, %xmm3	# 3 : 1/jak
+	pxor	%xmm0, 	%xmm2	# 2 = io
+	pshufb  %xmm4,  %xmm3	# 3 = 1/jak
+	movdqu	(%r9),	%xmm0
+	pxor	%xmm1,  %xmm3	# 3 = jo
+	jnz	.Ldec_loop
+
+	# middle of last round
+	movdqa	0x60(%r10), %xmm4	# 3 : sbou
+	pshufb  %xmm2,  %xmm4	# 4 = sbou
+	pxor	%xmm0,  %xmm4	# 4 = sb1u + k
+	movdqa	0x70(%r10), %xmm0	# 0 : sbot
+	movdqa	-0x160(%r11), %xmm2	# .Lk_sr-.Lk_dsbd=-0x160
+	pshufb  %xmm3,	%xmm0	# 0 = sb1t
+	pxor	%xmm4,	%xmm0	# 0 = A
+	pshufb	%xmm2,	%xmm0
+	ret
+.size	_vpaes_decrypt_core,.-_vpaes_decrypt_core
+
+########################################################
+##                                                    ##
+##                  AES key schedule                  ##
+##                                                    ##
+########################################################
+.type	_vpaes_schedule_core,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+_vpaes_schedule_core:
+	# rdi = key
+	# rsi = size in bits
+	# rdx = buffer
+	# rcx = direction.  0=encrypt, 1=decrypt
+
+	call	_vpaes_preheat		# load the tables
+	movdqa	.Lk_rcon(%rip), %xmm8	# load rcon
+	movdqu	(%rdi),	%xmm0		# load key (unaligned)
+
+	# input transform
+	movdqa	%xmm0,	%xmm3
+	lea	.Lk_ipt(%rip), %r11
+	call	_vpaes_schedule_transform
+	movdqa	%xmm0,	%xmm7
+
+	lea	.Lk_sr(%rip),%r10
+	test	%rcx,	%rcx
+	jnz	.Lschedule_am_decrypting
+
+	# encrypting, output zeroth round key after transform
+	movdqu	%xmm0,	(%rdx)
+	jmp	.Lschedule_go
+
+.Lschedule_am_decrypting:
+	# decrypting, output zeroth round key after shiftrows
+	movdqa	(%r8,%r10),%xmm1
+	pshufb  %xmm1,	%xmm3
+	movdqu	%xmm3,	(%rdx)
+	xor	\$0x30, %r8
+
+.Lschedule_go:
+	cmp	\$192,	%esi
+	ja	.Lschedule_256
+	je	.Lschedule_192
+	# 128: fall though
+
+##
+##  .schedule_128
+##
+##  128-bit specific part of key schedule.
+##
+##  This schedule is really simple, because all its parts
+##  are accomplished by the subroutines.
+##
+.Lschedule_128:
+	mov	\$10, %esi
+	
+.Loop_schedule_128:
+	call 	_vpaes_schedule_round
+	dec	%rsi
+	jz 	.Lschedule_mangle_last
+	call	_vpaes_schedule_mangle	# write output
+	jmp 	.Loop_schedule_128
+
+##
+##  .aes_schedule_192
+##
+##  192-bit specific part of key schedule.
+##
+##  The main body of this schedule is the same as the 128-bit
+##  schedule, but with more smearing.  The long, high side is
+##  stored in %xmm7 as before, and the short, low side is in
+##  the high bits of %xmm6.
+##
+##  This schedule is somewhat nastier, however, because each
+##  round produces 192 bits of key material, or 1.5 round keys.
+##  Therefore, on each cycle we do 2 rounds and produce 3 round
+##  keys.
+##
+.align	16
+.Lschedule_192:
+	movdqu	8(%rdi),%xmm0		# load key part 2 (very unaligned)
+	call	_vpaes_schedule_transform	# input transform
+	movdqa	%xmm0,	%xmm6		# save short part
+	pxor	%xmm4,	%xmm4		# clear 4
+	movhlps	%xmm4,	%xmm6		# clobber low side with zeros
+	mov	\$4,	%esi
+
+.Loop_schedule_192:
+	call	_vpaes_schedule_round
+	palignr	\$8,%xmm6,%xmm0	
+	call	_vpaes_schedule_mangle	# save key n
+	call	_vpaes_schedule_192_smear
+	call	_vpaes_schedule_mangle	# save key n+1
+	call	_vpaes_schedule_round
+	dec	%rsi
+	jz 	.Lschedule_mangle_last
+	call	_vpaes_schedule_mangle	# save key n+2
+	call	_vpaes_schedule_192_smear
+	jmp	.Loop_schedule_192
+
+##
+##  .aes_schedule_256
+##
+##  256-bit specific part of key schedule.
+##
+##  The structure here is very similar to the 128-bit
+##  schedule, but with an additional "low side" in
+##  %xmm6.  The low side's rounds are the same as the
+##  high side's, except no rcon and no rotation.
+##
+.align	16
+.Lschedule_256:
+	movdqu	16(%rdi),%xmm0		# load key part 2 (unaligned)
+	call	_vpaes_schedule_transform	# input transform
+	mov	\$7, %esi
+	
+.Loop_schedule_256:
+	call	_vpaes_schedule_mangle	# output low result
+	movdqa	%xmm0,	%xmm6		# save cur_lo in xmm6
+
+	# high round
+	call	_vpaes_schedule_round
+	dec	%rsi
+	jz 	.Lschedule_mangle_last
+	call	_vpaes_schedule_mangle	
+
+	# low round. swap xmm7 and xmm6
+	pshufd	\$0xFF,	%xmm0,	%xmm0
+	movdqa	%xmm7,	%xmm5
+	movdqa	%xmm6,	%xmm7
+	call	_vpaes_schedule_low_round
+	movdqa	%xmm5,	%xmm7
+	
+	jmp	.Loop_schedule_256
+
+	
+##
+##  .aes_schedule_mangle_last
+##
+##  Mangler for last round of key schedule
+##  Mangles %xmm0
+##    when encrypting, outputs out(%xmm0) ^ 63
+##    when decrypting, outputs unskew(%xmm0)
+##
+##  Always called right before return... jumps to cleanup and exits
+##
+.align	16
+.Lschedule_mangle_last:
+	# schedule last round key from xmm0
+	lea	.Lk_deskew(%rip),%r11	# prepare to deskew
+	test	%rcx, 	%rcx
+	jnz	.Lschedule_mangle_last_dec
+
+	# encrypting
+	movdqa	(%r8,%r10),%xmm1
+	pshufb	%xmm1,	%xmm0		# output permute
+	lea	.Lk_opt(%rip),	%r11	# prepare to output transform
+	add	\$32,	%rdx
+
+.Lschedule_mangle_last_dec:
+	add	\$-16,	%rdx
+	pxor	.Lk_s63(%rip),	%xmm0
+	call	_vpaes_schedule_transform # output transform
+	movdqu	%xmm0,	(%rdx)		# save last key
+
+	# cleanup
+	pxor	%xmm0,  %xmm0
+	pxor	%xmm1,  %xmm1
+	pxor	%xmm2,  %xmm2
+	pxor	%xmm3,  %xmm3
+	pxor	%xmm4,  %xmm4
+	pxor	%xmm5,  %xmm5
+	pxor	%xmm6,  %xmm6
+	pxor	%xmm7,  %xmm7
+	ret
+.size	_vpaes_schedule_core,.-_vpaes_schedule_core
+
+##
+##  .aes_schedule_192_smear
+##
+##  Smear the short, low side in the 192-bit key schedule.
+##
+##  Inputs:
+##    %xmm7: high side, b  a  x  y
+##    %xmm6:  low side, d  c  0  0
+##    %xmm13: 0
+##
+##  Outputs:
+##    %xmm6: b+c+d  b+c  0  0
+##    %xmm0: b+c+d  b+c  b  a
+##
+.type	_vpaes_schedule_192_smear,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+_vpaes_schedule_192_smear:
+	pshufd	\$0x80,	%xmm6,	%xmm1	# d c 0 0 -> c 0 0 0
+	pshufd	\$0xFE,	%xmm7,	%xmm0	# b a _ _ -> b b b a
+	pxor	%xmm1,	%xmm6		# -> c+d c 0 0
+	pxor	%xmm1,	%xmm1
+	pxor	%xmm0,	%xmm6		# -> b+c+d b+c b a
+	movdqa	%xmm6,	%xmm0
+	movhlps	%xmm1,	%xmm6		# clobber low side with zeros
+	ret
+.size	_vpaes_schedule_192_smear,.-_vpaes_schedule_192_smear
+
+##
+##  .aes_schedule_round
+##
+##  Runs one main round of the key schedule on %xmm0, %xmm7
+##
+##  Specifically, runs subbytes on the high dword of %xmm0
+##  then rotates it by one byte and xors into the low dword of
+##  %xmm7.
+##
+##  Adds rcon from low byte of %xmm8, then rotates %xmm8 for
+##  next rcon.
+##
+##  Smears the dwords of %xmm7 by xoring the low into the
+##  second low, result into third, result into highest.
+##
+##  Returns results in %xmm7 = %xmm0.
+##  Clobbers %xmm1-%xmm4, %r11.
+##
+.type	_vpaes_schedule_round,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+_vpaes_schedule_round:
+	# extract rcon from xmm8
+	pxor	%xmm1,	%xmm1
+	palignr	\$15,	%xmm8,	%xmm1
+	palignr	\$15,	%xmm8,	%xmm8
+	pxor	%xmm1,	%xmm7
+
+	# rotate
+	pshufd	\$0xFF,	%xmm0,	%xmm0
+	palignr	\$1,	%xmm0,	%xmm0
+	
+	# fall through...
+	
+	# low round: same as high round, but no rotation and no rcon.
+_vpaes_schedule_low_round:
+	# smear xmm7
+	movdqa	%xmm7,	%xmm1
+	pslldq	\$4,	%xmm7
+	pxor	%xmm1,	%xmm7
+	movdqa	%xmm7,	%xmm1
+	pslldq	\$8,	%xmm7
+	pxor	%xmm1,	%xmm7
+	pxor	.Lk_s63(%rip), %xmm7
+
+	# subbytes
+	movdqa  %xmm9, 	%xmm1
+	pandn	%xmm0, 	%xmm1
+	psrld	\$4,    %xmm1		# 1 = i
+	pand	%xmm9, 	%xmm0		# 0 = k
+	movdqa	%xmm11, %xmm2		# 2 : a/k
+	pshufb  %xmm0,  %xmm2		# 2 = a/k
+	pxor	%xmm1,	%xmm0		# 0 = j
+	movdqa	%xmm10,	%xmm3		# 3 : 1/i
+	pshufb  %xmm1, 	%xmm3		# 3 = 1/i
+	pxor	%xmm2, 	%xmm3		# 3 = iak = 1/i + a/k
+	movdqa	%xmm10,	%xmm4		# 4 : 1/j
+	pshufb	%xmm0, 	%xmm4		# 4 = 1/j
+	pxor	%xmm2, 	%xmm4		# 4 = jak = 1/j + a/k
+	movdqa	%xmm10,	%xmm2		# 2 : 1/iak
+	pshufb  %xmm3,	%xmm2		# 2 = 1/iak
+	pxor	%xmm0, 	%xmm2		# 2 = io
+	movdqa	%xmm10, %xmm3		# 3 : 1/jak
+	pshufb  %xmm4,  %xmm3		# 3 = 1/jak
+	pxor	%xmm1,  %xmm3		# 3 = jo
+	movdqa	%xmm13, %xmm4		# 4 : sbou
+	pshufb  %xmm2,  %xmm4		# 4 = sbou
+	movdqa	%xmm12, %xmm0		# 0 : sbot
+	pshufb  %xmm3,	%xmm0		# 0 = sb1t
+	pxor	%xmm4, 	%xmm0		# 0 = sbox output
+
+	# add in smeared stuff
+	pxor	%xmm7,	%xmm0	
+	movdqa	%xmm0,	%xmm7
+	ret
+.size	_vpaes_schedule_round,.-_vpaes_schedule_round
+
+##
+##  .aes_schedule_transform
+##
+##  Linear-transform %xmm0 according to tables at (%r11)
+##
+##  Requires that %xmm9 = 0x0F0F... as in preheat
+##  Output in %xmm0
+##  Clobbers %xmm1, %xmm2
+##
+.type	_vpaes_schedule_transform,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+_vpaes_schedule_transform:
+	movdqa	%xmm9,	%xmm1
+	pandn	%xmm0,	%xmm1
+	psrld	\$4,	%xmm1
+	pand	%xmm9,	%xmm0
+	movdqa	(%r11), %xmm2 	# lo
+	pshufb	%xmm0,	%xmm2
+	movdqa	16(%r11), %xmm0 # hi
+	pshufb	%xmm1,	%xmm0
+	pxor	%xmm2,	%xmm0
+	ret
+.size	_vpaes_schedule_transform,.-_vpaes_schedule_transform
+
+##
+##  .aes_schedule_mangle
+##
+##  Mangle xmm0 from (basis-transformed) standard version
+##  to our version.
+##
+##  On encrypt,
+##    xor with 0x63
+##    multiply by circulant 0,1,1,1
+##    apply shiftrows transform
+##
+##  On decrypt,
+##    xor with 0x63
+##    multiply by "inverse mixcolumns" circulant E,B,D,9
+##    deskew
+##    apply shiftrows transform
+##
+##
+##  Writes out to (%rdx), and increments or decrements it
+##  Keeps track of round number mod 4 in %r8
+##  Preserves xmm0
+##  Clobbers xmm1-xmm5
+##
+.type	_vpaes_schedule_mangle,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+_vpaes_schedule_mangle:
+	movdqa	%xmm0,	%xmm4	# save xmm0 for later
+	movdqa	.Lk_mc_forward(%rip),%xmm5
+	test	%rcx, 	%rcx
+	jnz	.Lschedule_mangle_dec
+
+	# encrypting
+	add	\$16,	%rdx
+	pxor	.Lk_s63(%rip),%xmm4
+	pshufb	%xmm5,	%xmm4
+	movdqa	%xmm4,	%xmm3
+	pshufb	%xmm5,	%xmm4
+	pxor	%xmm4,	%xmm3
+	pshufb	%xmm5,	%xmm4
+	pxor	%xmm4,	%xmm3
+
+	jmp	.Lschedule_mangle_both
+.align	16
+.Lschedule_mangle_dec:
+	# inverse mix columns
+	lea	.Lk_dksd(%rip),%r11
+	movdqa	%xmm9,	%xmm1
+	pandn	%xmm4,	%xmm1
+	psrld	\$4,	%xmm1	# 1 = hi
+	pand	%xmm9,	%xmm4	# 4 = lo
+
+	movdqa	0x00(%r11), %xmm2
+	pshufb	%xmm4,	%xmm2
+	movdqa	0x10(%r11), %xmm3
+	pshufb	%xmm1,	%xmm3
+	pxor	%xmm2,	%xmm3
+	pshufb	%xmm5,	%xmm3
+
+	movdqa	0x20(%r11), %xmm2
+	pshufb	%xmm4,	%xmm2
+	pxor	%xmm3,	%xmm2
+	movdqa	0x30(%r11), %xmm3
+	pshufb	%xmm1,	%xmm3
+	pxor	%xmm2,	%xmm3
+	pshufb	%xmm5,	%xmm3
+
+	movdqa	0x40(%r11), %xmm2
+	pshufb	%xmm4,	%xmm2
+	pxor	%xmm3,	%xmm2
+	movdqa	0x50(%r11), %xmm3
+	pshufb	%xmm1,	%xmm3
+	pxor	%xmm2,	%xmm3
+	pshufb	%xmm5,	%xmm3
+
+	movdqa	0x60(%r11), %xmm2
+	pshufb	%xmm4,	%xmm2
+	pxor	%xmm3,	%xmm2
+	movdqa	0x70(%r11), %xmm3
+	pshufb	%xmm1,	%xmm3
+	pxor	%xmm2,	%xmm3
+
+	add	\$-16,	%rdx
+
+.Lschedule_mangle_both:
+	movdqa	(%r8,%r10),%xmm1
+	pshufb	%xmm1,%xmm3
+	add	\$-16,	%r8
+	and	\$0x30,	%r8
+	movdqu	%xmm3,	(%rdx)
+	ret
+.size	_vpaes_schedule_mangle,.-_vpaes_schedule_mangle
+
+#
+# Interface to OpenSSL
+#
+.globl	${PREFIX}_set_encrypt_key
+.type	${PREFIX}_set_encrypt_key,\@function,3
+.align	16
+${PREFIX}_set_encrypt_key:
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	lea	-0xb8(%rsp),%rsp
+	movaps	%xmm6,0x10(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm7,0x20(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm8,0x30(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm9,0x40(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm10,0x50(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm11,0x60(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm12,0x70(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm13,0x80(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm14,0x90(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm15,0xa0(%rsp)
+.Lenc_key_body:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	%esi,%eax
+	shr	\$5,%eax
+	add	\$5,%eax
+	mov	%eax,240(%rdx)	# AES_KEY->rounds = nbits/32+5;
+
+	mov	\$0,%ecx
+	mov	\$0x30,%r8d
+	call	_vpaes_schedule_core
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	movaps	0x10(%rsp),%xmm6
+	movaps	0x20(%rsp),%xmm7
+	movaps	0x30(%rsp),%xmm8
+	movaps	0x40(%rsp),%xmm9
+	movaps	0x50(%rsp),%xmm10
+	movaps	0x60(%rsp),%xmm11
+	movaps	0x70(%rsp),%xmm12
+	movaps	0x80(%rsp),%xmm13
+	movaps	0x90(%rsp),%xmm14
+	movaps	0xa0(%rsp),%xmm15
+	lea	0xb8(%rsp),%rsp
+.Lenc_key_epilogue:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	xor	%eax,%eax
+	ret
+.size	${PREFIX}_set_encrypt_key,.-${PREFIX}_set_encrypt_key
+
+.globl	${PREFIX}_set_decrypt_key
+.type	${PREFIX}_set_decrypt_key,\@function,3
+.align	16
+${PREFIX}_set_decrypt_key:
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	lea	-0xb8(%rsp),%rsp
+	movaps	%xmm6,0x10(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm7,0x20(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm8,0x30(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm9,0x40(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm10,0x50(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm11,0x60(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm12,0x70(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm13,0x80(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm14,0x90(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm15,0xa0(%rsp)
+.Ldec_key_body:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	%esi,%eax
+	shr	\$5,%eax
+	add	\$5,%eax
+	mov	%eax,240(%rdx)	# AES_KEY->rounds = nbits/32+5;
+	shl	\$4,%eax
+	lea	16(%rdx,%rax),%rdx
+
+	mov	\$1,%ecx
+	mov	%esi,%r8d
+	shr	\$1,%r8d
+	and	\$32,%r8d
+	xor	\$32,%r8d	# nbits==192?0:32
+	call	_vpaes_schedule_core
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	movaps	0x10(%rsp),%xmm6
+	movaps	0x20(%rsp),%xmm7
+	movaps	0x30(%rsp),%xmm8
+	movaps	0x40(%rsp),%xmm9
+	movaps	0x50(%rsp),%xmm10
+	movaps	0x60(%rsp),%xmm11
+	movaps	0x70(%rsp),%xmm12
+	movaps	0x80(%rsp),%xmm13
+	movaps	0x90(%rsp),%xmm14
+	movaps	0xa0(%rsp),%xmm15
+	lea	0xb8(%rsp),%rsp
+.Ldec_key_epilogue:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	xor	%eax,%eax
+	ret
+.size	${PREFIX}_set_decrypt_key,.-${PREFIX}_set_decrypt_key
+
+.globl	${PREFIX}_encrypt
+.type	${PREFIX}_encrypt,\@function,3
+.align	16
+${PREFIX}_encrypt:
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	lea	-0xb8(%rsp),%rsp
+	movaps	%xmm6,0x10(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm7,0x20(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm8,0x30(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm9,0x40(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm10,0x50(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm11,0x60(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm12,0x70(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm13,0x80(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm14,0x90(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm15,0xa0(%rsp)
+.Lenc_body:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	movdqu	(%rdi),%xmm0
+	call	_vpaes_preheat
+	call	_vpaes_encrypt_core
+	movdqu	%xmm0,(%rsi)
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	movaps	0x10(%rsp),%xmm6
+	movaps	0x20(%rsp),%xmm7
+	movaps	0x30(%rsp),%xmm8
+	movaps	0x40(%rsp),%xmm9
+	movaps	0x50(%rsp),%xmm10
+	movaps	0x60(%rsp),%xmm11
+	movaps	0x70(%rsp),%xmm12
+	movaps	0x80(%rsp),%xmm13
+	movaps	0x90(%rsp),%xmm14
+	movaps	0xa0(%rsp),%xmm15
+	lea	0xb8(%rsp),%rsp
+.Lenc_epilogue:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	ret
+.size	${PREFIX}_encrypt,.-${PREFIX}_encrypt
+
+.globl	${PREFIX}_decrypt
+.type	${PREFIX}_decrypt,\@function,3
+.align	16
+${PREFIX}_decrypt:
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	lea	-0xb8(%rsp),%rsp
+	movaps	%xmm6,0x10(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm7,0x20(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm8,0x30(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm9,0x40(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm10,0x50(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm11,0x60(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm12,0x70(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm13,0x80(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm14,0x90(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm15,0xa0(%rsp)
+.Ldec_body:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	movdqu	(%rdi),%xmm0
+	call	_vpaes_preheat
+	call	_vpaes_decrypt_core
+	movdqu	%xmm0,(%rsi)
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	movaps	0x10(%rsp),%xmm6
+	movaps	0x20(%rsp),%xmm7
+	movaps	0x30(%rsp),%xmm8
+	movaps	0x40(%rsp),%xmm9
+	movaps	0x50(%rsp),%xmm10
+	movaps	0x60(%rsp),%xmm11
+	movaps	0x70(%rsp),%xmm12
+	movaps	0x80(%rsp),%xmm13
+	movaps	0x90(%rsp),%xmm14
+	movaps	0xa0(%rsp),%xmm15
+	lea	0xb8(%rsp),%rsp
+.Ldec_epilogue:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	ret
+.size	${PREFIX}_decrypt,.-${PREFIX}_decrypt
+___
+{
+my ($inp,$out,$len,$key,$ivp,$enc)=("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx","%rcx","%r8","%r9");
+# void AES_cbc_encrypt (const void char *inp, unsigned char *out,
+#                       size_t length, const AES_KEY *key,
+#                       unsigned char *ivp,const int enc);
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	${PREFIX}_cbc_encrypt
+.type	${PREFIX}_cbc_encrypt,\@function,6
+.align	16
+${PREFIX}_cbc_encrypt:
+	xchg	$key,$len
+___
+($len,$key)=($key,$len);
+$code.=<<___;
+	sub	\$16,$len
+	jc	.Lcbc_abort
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	lea	-0xb8(%rsp),%rsp
+	movaps	%xmm6,0x10(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm7,0x20(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm8,0x30(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm9,0x40(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm10,0x50(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm11,0x60(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm12,0x70(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm13,0x80(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm14,0x90(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm15,0xa0(%rsp)
+.Lcbc_body:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	movdqu	($ivp),%xmm6		# load IV
+	sub	$inp,$out
+	call	_vpaes_preheat
+	cmp	\$0,${enc}d
+	je	.Lcbc_dec_loop
+	jmp	.Lcbc_enc_loop
+.align	16
+.Lcbc_enc_loop:
+	movdqu	($inp),%xmm0
+	pxor	%xmm6,%xmm0
+	call	_vpaes_encrypt_core
+	movdqa	%xmm0,%xmm6
+	movdqu	%xmm0,($out,$inp)
+	lea	16($inp),$inp
+	sub	\$16,$len
+	jnc	.Lcbc_enc_loop
+	jmp	.Lcbc_done
+.align	16
+.Lcbc_dec_loop:
+	movdqu	($inp),%xmm0
+	movdqa	%xmm0,%xmm7
+	call	_vpaes_decrypt_core
+	pxor	%xmm6,%xmm0
+	movdqa	%xmm7,%xmm6
+	movdqu	%xmm0,($out,$inp)
+	lea	16($inp),$inp
+	sub	\$16,$len
+	jnc	.Lcbc_dec_loop
+.Lcbc_done:
+	movdqu	%xmm6,($ivp)		# save IV
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	movaps	0x10(%rsp),%xmm6
+	movaps	0x20(%rsp),%xmm7
+	movaps	0x30(%rsp),%xmm8
+	movaps	0x40(%rsp),%xmm9
+	movaps	0x50(%rsp),%xmm10
+	movaps	0x60(%rsp),%xmm11
+	movaps	0x70(%rsp),%xmm12
+	movaps	0x80(%rsp),%xmm13
+	movaps	0x90(%rsp),%xmm14
+	movaps	0xa0(%rsp),%xmm15
+	lea	0xb8(%rsp),%rsp
+.Lcbc_epilogue:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+.Lcbc_abort:
+	ret
+.size	${PREFIX}_cbc_encrypt,.-${PREFIX}_cbc_encrypt
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+##
+##  _aes_preheat
+##
+##  Fills register %r10 -> .aes_consts (so you can -fPIC)
+##  and %xmm9-%xmm15 as specified below.
+##
+.type	_vpaes_preheat,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+_vpaes_preheat:
+	lea	.Lk_s0F(%rip), %r10
+	movdqa	-0x20(%r10), %xmm10	# .Lk_inv
+	movdqa	-0x10(%r10), %xmm11	# .Lk_inv+16
+	movdqa	0x00(%r10), %xmm9	# .Lk_s0F
+	movdqa	0x30(%r10), %xmm13	# .Lk_sb1
+	movdqa	0x40(%r10), %xmm12	# .Lk_sb1+16
+	movdqa	0x50(%r10), %xmm15	# .Lk_sb2
+	movdqa	0x60(%r10), %xmm14	# .Lk_sb2+16
+	ret
+.size	_vpaes_preheat,.-_vpaes_preheat
+########################################################
+##                                                    ##
+##                     Constants                      ##
+##                                                    ##
+########################################################
+.type	_vpaes_consts,\@object
+.align	64
+_vpaes_consts:
+.Lk_inv:	# inv, inva
+	.quad	0x0E05060F0D080180, 0x040703090A0B0C02
+	.quad	0x01040A060F0B0780, 0x030D0E0C02050809
+
+.Lk_s0F:	# s0F
+	.quad	0x0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F, 0x0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F
+
+.Lk_ipt:	# input transform (lo, hi)
+	.quad	0xC2B2E8985A2A7000, 0xCABAE09052227808
+	.quad	0x4C01307D317C4D00, 0xCD80B1FCB0FDCC81
+
+.Lk_sb1:	# sb1u, sb1t
+	.quad	0xB19BE18FCB503E00, 0xA5DF7A6E142AF544
+	.quad	0x3618D415FAE22300, 0x3BF7CCC10D2ED9EF
+.Lk_sb2:	# sb2u, sb2t
+	.quad	0xE27A93C60B712400, 0x5EB7E955BC982FCD
+	.quad	0x69EB88400AE12900, 0xC2A163C8AB82234A
+.Lk_sbo:	# sbou, sbot
+	.quad	0xD0D26D176FBDC700, 0x15AABF7AC502A878
+	.quad	0xCFE474A55FBB6A00, 0x8E1E90D1412B35FA
+
+.Lk_mc_forward:	# mc_forward
+	.quad	0x0407060500030201, 0x0C0F0E0D080B0A09
+	.quad	0x080B0A0904070605, 0x000302010C0F0E0D
+	.quad	0x0C0F0E0D080B0A09, 0x0407060500030201
+	.quad	0x000302010C0F0E0D, 0x080B0A0904070605
+
+.Lk_mc_backward:# mc_backward
+	.quad	0x0605040702010003, 0x0E0D0C0F0A09080B
+	.quad	0x020100030E0D0C0F, 0x0A09080B06050407
+	.quad	0x0E0D0C0F0A09080B, 0x0605040702010003
+	.quad	0x0A09080B06050407, 0x020100030E0D0C0F
+
+.Lk_sr:		# sr
+	.quad	0x0706050403020100, 0x0F0E0D0C0B0A0908
+	.quad	0x030E09040F0A0500, 0x0B06010C07020D08
+	.quad	0x0F060D040B020900, 0x070E050C030A0108
+	.quad	0x0B0E0104070A0D00, 0x0306090C0F020508
+
+.Lk_rcon:	# rcon
+	.quad	0x1F8391B9AF9DEEB6, 0x702A98084D7C7D81
+
+.Lk_s63:	# s63: all equal to 0x63 transformed
+	.quad	0x5B5B5B5B5B5B5B5B, 0x5B5B5B5B5B5B5B5B
+
+.Lk_opt:	# output transform
+	.quad	0xFF9F4929D6B66000, 0xF7974121DEBE6808
+	.quad	0x01EDBD5150BCEC00, 0xE10D5DB1B05C0CE0
+
+.Lk_deskew:	# deskew tables: inverts the sbox's "skew"
+	.quad	0x07E4A34047A4E300, 0x1DFEB95A5DBEF91A
+	.quad	0x5F36B5DC83EA6900, 0x2841C2ABF49D1E77
+
+##
+##  Decryption stuff
+##  Key schedule constants
+##
+.Lk_dksd:	# decryption key schedule: invskew x*D
+	.quad	0xFEB91A5DA3E44700, 0x0740E3A45A1DBEF9
+	.quad	0x41C277F4B5368300, 0x5FDC69EAAB289D1E
+.Lk_dksb:	# decryption key schedule: invskew x*B
+	.quad	0x9A4FCA1F8550D500, 0x03D653861CC94C99
+	.quad	0x115BEDA7B6FC4A00, 0xD993256F7E3482C8
+.Lk_dkse:	# decryption key schedule: invskew x*E + 0x63
+	.quad	0xD5031CCA1FC9D600, 0x53859A4C994F5086
+	.quad	0xA23196054FDC7BE8, 0xCD5EF96A20B31487
+.Lk_dks9:	# decryption key schedule: invskew x*9
+	.quad	0xB6116FC87ED9A700, 0x4AED933482255BFC
+	.quad	0x4576516227143300, 0x8BB89FACE9DAFDCE
+
+##
+##  Decryption stuff
+##  Round function constants
+##
+.Lk_dipt:	# decryption input transform
+	.quad	0x0F505B040B545F00, 0x154A411E114E451A
+	.quad	0x86E383E660056500, 0x12771772F491F194
+
+.Lk_dsb9:	# decryption sbox output *9*u, *9*t
+	.quad	0x851C03539A86D600, 0xCAD51F504F994CC9
+	.quad	0xC03B1789ECD74900, 0x725E2C9EB2FBA565
+.Lk_dsbd:	# decryption sbox output *D*u, *D*t
+	.quad	0x7D57CCDFE6B1A200, 0xF56E9B13882A4439
+	.quad	0x3CE2FAF724C6CB00, 0x2931180D15DEEFD3
+.Lk_dsbb:	# decryption sbox output *B*u, *B*t
+	.quad	0xD022649296B44200, 0x602646F6B0F2D404
+	.quad	0xC19498A6CD596700, 0xF3FF0C3E3255AA6B
+.Lk_dsbe:	# decryption sbox output *E*u, *E*t
+	.quad	0x46F2929626D4D000, 0x2242600464B4F6B0
+	.quad	0x0C55A6CDFFAAC100, 0x9467F36B98593E32
+.Lk_dsbo:	# decryption sbox final output
+	.quad	0x1387EA537EF94000, 0xC7AA6DB9D4943E2D
+	.quad	0x12D7560F93441D00, 0xCA4B8159D8C58E9C
+.asciz	"Vector Permutation AES for x86_64/SSSE3, Mike Hamburg (Stanford University)"
+.align	64
+.size	_vpaes_consts,.-_vpaes_consts
+___
+
+if ($win64) {
+# EXCEPTION_DISPOSITION handler (EXCEPTION_RECORD *rec,ULONG64 frame,
+#		CONTEXT *context,DISPATCHER_CONTEXT *disp)
+$rec="%rcx";
+$frame="%rdx";
+$context="%r8";
+$disp="%r9";
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.extern	__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind
+.type	se_handler,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+se_handler:
+	push	%rsi
+	push	%rdi
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+	pushfq
+	sub	\$64,%rsp
+
+	mov	120($context),%rax	# pull context->Rax
+	mov	248($context),%rbx	# pull context->Rip
+
+	mov	8($disp),%rsi		# disp->ImageBase
+	mov	56($disp),%r11		# disp->HandlerData
+
+	mov	0(%r11),%r10d		# HandlerData[0]
+	lea	(%rsi,%r10),%r10	# prologue label
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip<prologue label
+	jb	.Lin_prologue
+
+	mov	152($context),%rax	# pull context->Rsp
+
+	mov	4(%r11),%r10d		# HandlerData[1]
+	lea	(%rsi,%r10),%r10	# epilogue label
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip>=epilogue label
+	jae	.Lin_prologue
+
+	lea	16(%rax),%rsi		# %xmm save area
+	lea	512($context),%rdi	# &context.Xmm6
+	mov	\$20,%ecx		# 10*sizeof(%xmm0)/sizeof(%rax)
+	.long	0xa548f3fc		# cld; rep movsq
+	lea	0xb8(%rax),%rax		# adjust stack pointer
+
+.Lin_prologue:
+	mov	8(%rax),%rdi
+	mov	16(%rax),%rsi
+	mov	%rax,152($context)	# restore context->Rsp
+	mov	%rsi,168($context)	# restore context->Rsi
+	mov	%rdi,176($context)	# restore context->Rdi
+
+	mov	40($disp),%rdi		# disp->ContextRecord
+	mov	$context,%rsi		# context
+	mov	\$`1232/8`,%ecx		# sizeof(CONTEXT)
+	.long	0xa548f3fc		# cld; rep movsq
+
+	mov	$disp,%rsi
+	xor	%rcx,%rcx		# arg1, UNW_FLAG_NHANDLER
+	mov	8(%rsi),%rdx		# arg2, disp->ImageBase
+	mov	0(%rsi),%r8		# arg3, disp->ControlPc
+	mov	16(%rsi),%r9		# arg4, disp->FunctionEntry
+	mov	40(%rsi),%r10		# disp->ContextRecord
+	lea	56(%rsi),%r11		# &disp->HandlerData
+	lea	24(%rsi),%r12		# &disp->EstablisherFrame
+	mov	%r10,32(%rsp)		# arg5
+	mov	%r11,40(%rsp)		# arg6
+	mov	%r12,48(%rsp)		# arg7
+	mov	%rcx,56(%rsp)		# arg8, (NULL)
+	call	*__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind(%rip)
+
+	mov	\$1,%eax		# ExceptionContinueSearch
+	add	\$64,%rsp
+	popfq
+	pop	%r15
+	pop	%r14
+	pop	%r13
+	pop	%r12
+	pop	%rbp
+	pop	%rbx
+	pop	%rdi
+	pop	%rsi
+	ret
+.size	se_handler,.-se_handler
+
+.section	.pdata
+.align	4
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_${PREFIX}_set_encrypt_key
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_${PREFIX}_set_encrypt_key
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_${PREFIX}_set_encrypt_key
+
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_${PREFIX}_set_decrypt_key
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_${PREFIX}_set_decrypt_key
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_${PREFIX}_set_decrypt_key
+
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_${PREFIX}_encrypt
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_${PREFIX}_encrypt
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_${PREFIX}_encrypt
+
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_${PREFIX}_decrypt
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_${PREFIX}_decrypt
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_${PREFIX}_decrypt
+
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_${PREFIX}_cbc_encrypt
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_${PREFIX}_cbc_encrypt
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_${PREFIX}_cbc_encrypt
+
+.section	.xdata
+.align	8
+.LSEH_info_${PREFIX}_set_encrypt_key:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	se_handler
+	.rva	.Lenc_key_body,.Lenc_key_epilogue	# HandlerData[]
+.LSEH_info_${PREFIX}_set_decrypt_key:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	se_handler
+	.rva	.Ldec_key_body,.Ldec_key_epilogue	# HandlerData[]
+.LSEH_info_${PREFIX}_encrypt:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	se_handler
+	.rva	.Lenc_body,.Lenc_epilogue		# HandlerData[]
+.LSEH_info_${PREFIX}_decrypt:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	se_handler
+	.rva	.Ldec_body,.Ldec_epilogue		# HandlerData[]
+.LSEH_info_${PREFIX}_cbc_encrypt:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	se_handler
+	.rva	.Lcbc_body,.Lcbc_epilogue		# HandlerData[]
+___
+}
+
+$code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval($1)/gem;
+
+print $code;
+
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/build.info b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/build.info
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cf6cb5e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/aes/build.info
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+LIBS=../../libcrypto
+SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
+        aes_misc.c aes_ecb.c aes_cfb.c aes_ofb.c \
+        aes_ige.c aes_wrap.c {- $target{aes_asm_src} -}
+
+GENERATE[aes-ia64.s]=asm/aes-ia64.S
+
+GENERATE[aes-586.s]=asm/aes-586.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $(CFLAGS) $(LIB_CFLAGS) $(PROCESSOR)
+DEPEND[aes-586.s]=../perlasm/x86asm.pl
+GENERATE[vpaes-x86.s]=asm/vpaes-x86.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $(CFLAGS) $(LIB_CFLAGS) $(PROCESSOR)
+DEPEND[vpaes-586.s]=../perlasm/x86asm.pl
+GENERATE[aesni-x86.s]=asm/aesni-x86.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $(CFLAGS) $(LIB_CFLAGS) $(PROCESSOR)
+DEPEND[aesni-586.s]=../perlasm/x86asm.pl
+
+GENERATE[aes-x86_64.s]=asm/aes-x86_64.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+GENERATE[vpaes-x86_64.s]=asm/vpaes-x86_64.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+GENERATE[bsaes-x86_64.s]=asm/bsaes-x86_64.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+GENERATE[aesni-x86_64.s]=asm/aesni-x86_64.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+GENERATE[aesni-sha1-x86_64.s]=asm/aesni-sha1-x86_64.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+GENERATE[aesni-sha256-x86_64.s]=asm/aesni-sha256-x86_64.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+GENERATE[aesni-mb-x86_64.s]=asm/aesni-mb-x86_64.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+
+GENERATE[aes-sparcv9.S]=asm/aes-sparcv9.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+INCLUDE[aes-sparcv9.o]=..
+GENERATE[aest4-sparcv9.S]=asm/aest4-sparcv9.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+INCLUDE[aest4-sparcv9.o]=..
+DEPEND[aest4-sparcv9.S]=../perlasm/sparcv9_modes.pl
+GENERATE[aesfx-sparcv9.S]=asm/aesfx-sparcv9.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+INCLUDE[aesfx-sparcv9.o]=..
+
+GENERATE[aes-ppc.s]=asm/aes-ppc.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+GENERATE[vpaes-ppc.s]=asm/vpaes-ppc.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+GENERATE[aesp8-ppc.s]=asm/aesp8-ppc.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+
+GENERATE[aes-parisc.s]=asm/aes-parisc.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+
+GENERATE[aes-mips.S]=asm/aes-mips.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+
+GENERATE[aesv8-armx.S]=asm/aesv8-armx.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+INCLUDE[aesv8-armx.o]=..
+GENERATE[vpaes-armv8.S]=asm/vpaes-armv8.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+
+GENERATE[aes-armv4.S]=asm/aes-armv4.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+INCLUDE[aes-armv4.o]=..
+GENERATE[bsaes-armv7.S]=asm/bsaes-armv7.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+INCLUDE[bsaes-armv7.o]=..
+
+BEGINRAW[Makefile]
+##### AES assembler implementations
+
+# GNU make "catch all"
+{- $builddir -}/aes-%.S:	{- $sourcedir -}/asm/aes-%.pl
+	CC="$(CC)" $(PERL) $< $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $@
+{- $builddir -}/bsaes-%.S:	{- $sourcedir -}/asm/bsaes-%.pl
+	CC="$(CC)" $(PERL) $< $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $@
+
+ENDRAW[Makefile]
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/alphacpuid.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/alphacpuid.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6c7fd4c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/alphacpuid.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,257 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2010-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+$output = pop;
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+print <<'___';
+.text
+
+.set	noat
+
+.globl	OPENSSL_cpuid_setup
+.ent	OPENSSL_cpuid_setup
+OPENSSL_cpuid_setup:
+	.frame	$30,0,$26
+	.prologue 0
+	ret	($26)
+.end	OPENSSL_cpuid_setup
+
+.globl	OPENSSL_wipe_cpu
+.ent	OPENSSL_wipe_cpu
+OPENSSL_wipe_cpu:
+	.frame	$30,0,$26
+	.prologue 0
+	clr	$1
+	clr	$2
+	clr	$3
+	clr	$4
+	clr	$5
+	clr	$6
+	clr	$7
+	clr	$8
+	clr	$16
+	clr	$17
+	clr	$18
+	clr	$19
+	clr	$20
+	clr	$21
+	clr	$22
+	clr	$23
+	clr	$24
+	clr	$25
+	clr	$27
+	clr	$at
+	clr	$29
+	fclr	$f0
+	fclr	$f1
+	fclr	$f10
+	fclr	$f11
+	fclr	$f12
+	fclr	$f13
+	fclr	$f14
+	fclr	$f15
+	fclr	$f16
+	fclr	$f17
+	fclr	$f18
+	fclr	$f19
+	fclr	$f20
+	fclr	$f21
+	fclr	$f22
+	fclr	$f23
+	fclr	$f24
+	fclr	$f25
+	fclr	$f26
+	fclr	$f27
+	fclr	$f28
+	fclr	$f29
+	fclr	$f30
+	mov	$sp,$0
+	ret	($26)
+.end	OPENSSL_wipe_cpu
+
+.globl	OPENSSL_atomic_add
+.ent	OPENSSL_atomic_add
+OPENSSL_atomic_add:
+	.frame	$30,0,$26
+	.prologue 0
+1:	ldl_l	$0,0($16)
+	addl	$0,$17,$1
+	stl_c	$1,0($16)
+	beq	$1,1b
+	addl	$0,$17,$0
+	ret	($26)
+.end	OPENSSL_atomic_add
+
+.globl	OPENSSL_rdtsc
+.ent	OPENSSL_rdtsc
+OPENSSL_rdtsc:
+	.frame	$30,0,$26
+	.prologue 0
+	rpcc	$0
+	ret	($26)
+.end	OPENSSL_rdtsc
+
+.globl	OPENSSL_cleanse
+.ent	OPENSSL_cleanse
+OPENSSL_cleanse:
+	.frame	$30,0,$26
+	.prologue 0
+	beq	$17,.Ldone
+	and	$16,7,$0
+	bic	$17,7,$at
+	beq	$at,.Little
+	beq	$0,.Laligned
+
+.Little:
+	subq	$0,8,$0
+	ldq_u	$1,0($16)
+	mov	$16,$2
+.Lalign:
+	mskbl	$1,$16,$1
+	lda	$16,1($16)
+	subq	$17,1,$17
+	addq	$0,1,$0
+	beq	$17,.Lout
+	bne	$0,.Lalign
+.Lout:	stq_u	$1,0($2)
+	beq	$17,.Ldone
+	bic	$17,7,$at
+	beq	$at,.Little
+
+.Laligned:
+	stq	$31,0($16)
+	subq	$17,8,$17
+	lda	$16,8($16)
+	bic	$17,7,$at
+	bne	$at,.Laligned
+	bne	$17,.Little
+.Ldone: ret	($26)
+.end	OPENSSL_cleanse
+
+.globl	CRYPTO_memcmp
+.ent	CRYPTO_memcmp
+CRYPTO_memcmp:
+	.frame	$30,0,$26
+	.prologue 0
+	xor	$0,$0,$0
+	beq	$18,.Lno_data
+
+	xor	$1,$1,$1
+	nop
+.Loop_cmp:
+	ldq_u	$2,0($16)
+	subq	$18,1,$18
+	ldq_u	$3,0($17)
+	extbl	$2,$16,$2
+	lda	$16,1($16)
+	extbl	$3,$17,$3
+	lda	$17,1($17)
+	xor	$3,$2,$2
+	or	$2,$0,$0
+	bne	$18,.Loop_cmp
+
+	subq	$31,$0,$0
+	srl	$0,63,$0
+.Lno_data:
+	ret	($26)
+.end	CRYPTO_memcmp
+___
+{
+my ($out,$cnt,$max)=("\$16","\$17","\$18");
+my ($tick,$lasttick)=("\$19","\$20");
+my ($diff,$lastdiff)=("\$21","\$22");
+my ($v0,$ra,$sp,$zero)=("\$0","\$26","\$30","\$31");
+
+print <<___;
+.globl	OPENSSL_instrument_bus
+.ent	OPENSSL_instrument_bus
+OPENSSL_instrument_bus:
+	.frame	$sp,0,$ra
+	.prologue 0
+	mov	$cnt,$v0
+
+	rpcc	$lasttick
+	mov	0,$diff
+
+	ecb	($out)
+	ldl_l	$tick,0($out)
+	addl	$diff,$tick,$tick
+	mov	$tick,$diff
+	stl_c	$tick,0($out)
+	stl	$diff,0($out)
+
+.Loop:	rpcc	$tick
+	subq	$tick,$lasttick,$diff
+	mov	$tick,$lasttick
+
+	ecb	($out)
+	ldl_l	$tick,0($out)
+	addl	$diff,$tick,$tick
+	mov	$tick,$diff
+	stl_c	$tick,0($out)
+	stl	$diff,0($out)
+
+	subl	$cnt,1,$cnt
+	lda	$out,4($out)
+	bne	$cnt,.Loop
+
+	ret	($ra)
+.end	OPENSSL_instrument_bus
+
+.globl	OPENSSL_instrument_bus2
+.ent	OPENSSL_instrument_bus2
+OPENSSL_instrument_bus2:
+	.frame	$sp,0,$ra
+	.prologue 0
+	mov	$cnt,$v0
+
+	rpcc	$lasttick
+	mov	0,$diff
+
+	ecb	($out)
+	ldl_l	$tick,0($out)
+	addl	$diff,$tick,$tick
+	mov	$tick,$diff
+	stl_c	$tick,0($out)
+	stl	$diff,0($out)
+
+	rpcc	$tick
+	subq	$tick,$lasttick,$diff
+	mov	$tick,$lasttick
+	mov	$diff,$lastdiff
+.Loop2:
+	ecb	($out)
+	ldl_l	$tick,0($out)
+	addl	$diff,$tick,$tick
+	mov	$tick,$diff
+	stl_c	$tick,0($out)
+	stl	$diff,0($out)
+
+	subl	$max,1,$max
+	beq	$max,.Ldone2
+
+	rpcc	$tick
+	subq	$tick,$lasttick,$diff
+	mov	$tick,$lasttick
+	subq	$lastdiff,$diff,$tick
+	mov	$diff,$lastdiff
+	cmovne	$tick,1,$tick
+	subl	$cnt,$tick,$cnt
+	s4addq	$tick,$out,$out
+	bne	$cnt,.Loop2
+
+.Ldone2:
+	subl	$v0,$cnt,$v0
+	ret	($ra)
+.end	OPENSSL_instrument_bus2
+___
+}
+
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/arm64cpuid.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/arm64cpuid.pl
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..caa3387
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/arm64cpuid.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+$flavour = shift;
+$output  = shift;
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+( $xlate="${dir}arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
+( $xlate="${dir}perlasm/arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
+die "can't locate arm-xlate.pl";
+
+open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output";
+*STDOUT=*OUT;
+
+$code.=<<___;
+#include "arm_arch.h"
+
+.text
+.arch	armv8-a+crypto
+
+.align	5
+.globl	_armv7_neon_probe
+.type	_armv7_neon_probe,%function
+_armv7_neon_probe:
+	orr	v15.16b, v15.16b, v15.16b
+	ret
+.size	_armv7_neon_probe,.-_armv7_neon_probe
+
+.globl	_armv7_tick
+.type	_armv7_tick,%function
+_armv7_tick:
+#ifdef	__APPLE__
+	mrs	x0, CNTPCT_EL0
+#else
+	mrs	x0, CNTVCT_EL0
+#endif
+	ret
+.size	_armv7_tick,.-_armv7_tick
+
+.globl	_armv8_aes_probe
+.type	_armv8_aes_probe,%function
+_armv8_aes_probe:
+	aese	v0.16b, v0.16b
+	ret
+.size	_armv8_aes_probe,.-_armv8_aes_probe
+
+.globl	_armv8_sha1_probe
+.type	_armv8_sha1_probe,%function
+_armv8_sha1_probe:
+	sha1h	s0, s0
+	ret
+.size	_armv8_sha1_probe,.-_armv8_sha1_probe
+
+.globl	_armv8_sha256_probe
+.type	_armv8_sha256_probe,%function
+_armv8_sha256_probe:
+	sha256su0	v0.4s, v0.4s
+	ret
+.size	_armv8_sha256_probe,.-_armv8_sha256_probe
+.globl	_armv8_pmull_probe
+.type	_armv8_pmull_probe,%function
+_armv8_pmull_probe:
+	pmull	v0.1q, v0.1d, v0.1d
+	ret
+.size	_armv8_pmull_probe,.-_armv8_pmull_probe
+
+.globl	OPENSSL_cleanse
+.type	OPENSSL_cleanse,%function
+.align	5
+OPENSSL_cleanse:
+	cbz	x1,.Lret	// len==0?
+	cmp	x1,#15
+	b.hi	.Lot		// len>15
+	nop
+.Little:
+	strb	wzr,[x0],#1	// store byte-by-byte
+	subs	x1,x1,#1
+	b.ne	.Little
+.Lret:	ret
+
+.align	4
+.Lot:	tst	x0,#7
+	b.eq	.Laligned	// inp is aligned
+	strb	wzr,[x0],#1	// store byte-by-byte
+	sub	x1,x1,#1
+	b	.Lot
+
+.align	4
+.Laligned:
+	str	xzr,[x0],#8	// store word-by-word
+	sub	x1,x1,#8
+	tst	x1,#-8
+	b.ne	.Laligned	// len>=8
+	cbnz	x1,.Little	// len!=0?
+	ret
+.size	OPENSSL_cleanse,.-OPENSSL_cleanse
+
+.globl	CRYPTO_memcmp
+.type	CRYPTO_memcmp,%function
+.align	4
+CRYPTO_memcmp:
+	eor	w3,w3,w3
+	cbz	x2,.Lno_data	// len==0?
+.Loop_cmp:
+	ldrb	w4,[x0],#1
+	ldrb	w5,[x1],#1
+	eor	w4,w4,w5
+	orr	w3,w3,w4
+	subs	x2,x2,#1
+	b.ne	.Loop_cmp
+
+.Lno_data:
+	neg	w0,w3
+	lsr	w0,w0,#31
+	ret
+.size	CRYPTO_memcmp,.-CRYPTO_memcmp
+___
+
+print $code;
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/arm_arch.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/arm_arch.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3fc9e69
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/arm_arch.h
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef __ARM_ARCH_H__
+# define __ARM_ARCH_H__
+
+# if !defined(__ARM_ARCH__)
+#  if defined(__CC_ARM)
+#   define __ARM_ARCH__ __TARGET_ARCH_ARM
+#   if defined(__BIG_ENDIAN)
+#    define __ARMEB__
+#   else
+#    define __ARMEL__
+#   endif
+#  elif defined(__GNUC__)
+#   if   defined(__aarch64__)
+#    define __ARM_ARCH__ 8
+#    if __BYTE_ORDER__==__ORDER_BIG_ENDIAN__
+#     define __ARMEB__
+#    else
+#     define __ARMEL__
+#    endif
+  /*
+   * Why doesn't gcc define __ARM_ARCH__? Instead it defines
+   * bunch of below macros. See all_architectires[] table in
+   * gcc/config/arm/arm.c. On a side note it defines
+   * __ARMEL__/__ARMEB__ for little-/big-endian.
+   */
+#   elif defined(__ARM_ARCH)
+#    define __ARM_ARCH__ __ARM_ARCH
+#   elif defined(__ARM_ARCH_8A__)
+#    define __ARM_ARCH__ 8
+#   elif defined(__ARM_ARCH_7__) || defined(__ARM_ARCH_7A__)     || \
+        defined(__ARM_ARCH_7R__)|| defined(__ARM_ARCH_7M__)     || \
+        defined(__ARM_ARCH_7EM__)
+#    define __ARM_ARCH__ 7
+#   elif defined(__ARM_ARCH_6__) || defined(__ARM_ARCH_6J__)     || \
+        defined(__ARM_ARCH_6K__)|| defined(__ARM_ARCH_6M__)     || \
+        defined(__ARM_ARCH_6Z__)|| defined(__ARM_ARCH_6ZK__)    || \
+        defined(__ARM_ARCH_6T2__)
+#    define __ARM_ARCH__ 6
+#   elif defined(__ARM_ARCH_5__) || defined(__ARM_ARCH_5T__)     || \
+        defined(__ARM_ARCH_5E__)|| defined(__ARM_ARCH_5TE__)    || \
+        defined(__ARM_ARCH_5TEJ__)
+#    define __ARM_ARCH__ 5
+#   elif defined(__ARM_ARCH_4__) || defined(__ARM_ARCH_4T__)
+#    define __ARM_ARCH__ 4
+#   else
+#    error "unsupported ARM architecture"
+#   endif
+#  endif
+# endif
+
+# if !defined(__ARM_MAX_ARCH__)
+#  define __ARM_MAX_ARCH__ __ARM_ARCH__
+# endif
+
+# if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__<__ARM_ARCH__
+#  error "__ARM_MAX_ARCH__ can't be less than __ARM_ARCH__"
+# elif __ARM_MAX_ARCH__!=__ARM_ARCH__
+#  if __ARM_ARCH__<7 && __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7 && defined(__ARMEB__)
+#   error "can't build universal big-endian binary"
+#  endif
+# endif
+
+# if !__ASSEMBLER__
+extern unsigned int OPENSSL_armcap_P;
+# endif
+
+# define ARMV7_NEON      (1<<0)
+# define ARMV7_TICK      (1<<1)
+# define ARMV8_AES       (1<<2)
+# define ARMV8_SHA1      (1<<3)
+# define ARMV8_SHA256    (1<<4)
+# define ARMV8_PMULL     (1<<5)
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/armcap.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/armcap.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..432a06c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/armcap.c
@@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2011-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <setjmp.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+
+#include "arm_arch.h"
+
+unsigned int OPENSSL_armcap_P = 0;
+
+#if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__<7
+void OPENSSL_cpuid_setup(void)
+{
+}
+
+unsigned long OPENSSL_rdtsc(void)
+{
+    return 0;
+}
+#else
+static sigset_t all_masked;
+
+static sigjmp_buf ill_jmp;
+static void ill_handler(int sig)
+{
+    siglongjmp(ill_jmp, sig);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Following subroutines could have been inlined, but it's not all
+ * ARM compilers support inline assembler...
+ */
+void _armv7_neon_probe(void);
+void _armv8_aes_probe(void);
+void _armv8_sha1_probe(void);
+void _armv8_sha256_probe(void);
+void _armv8_pmull_probe(void);
+unsigned long _armv7_tick(void);
+
+unsigned long OPENSSL_rdtsc(void)
+{
+    if (OPENSSL_armcap_P & ARMV7_TICK)
+        return _armv7_tick();
+    else
+        return 0;
+}
+
+# if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2
+void OPENSSL_cpuid_setup(void) __attribute__ ((constructor));
+# endif
+/*
+ * Use a weak reference to getauxval() so we can use it if it is available but
+ * don't break the build if it is not.
+ */
+# if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 && defined(__ELF__)
+extern unsigned long getauxval(unsigned long type) __attribute__ ((weak));
+# else
+static unsigned long (*getauxval) (unsigned long) = NULL;
+# endif
+
+/*
+ * ARM puts the feature bits for Crypto Extensions in AT_HWCAP2, whereas
+ * AArch64 used AT_HWCAP.
+ */
+# if defined(__arm__) || defined (__arm)
+#  define HWCAP                  16
+                                  /* AT_HWCAP */
+#  define HWCAP_NEON             (1 << 12)
+
+#  define HWCAP_CE               26
+                                  /* AT_HWCAP2 */
+#  define HWCAP_CE_AES           (1 << 0)
+#  define HWCAP_CE_PMULL         (1 << 1)
+#  define HWCAP_CE_SHA1          (1 << 2)
+#  define HWCAP_CE_SHA256        (1 << 3)
+# elif defined(__aarch64__)
+#  define HWCAP                  16
+                                  /* AT_HWCAP */
+#  define HWCAP_NEON             (1 << 1)
+
+#  define HWCAP_CE               HWCAP
+#  define HWCAP_CE_AES           (1 << 3)
+#  define HWCAP_CE_PMULL         (1 << 4)
+#  define HWCAP_CE_SHA1          (1 << 5)
+#  define HWCAP_CE_SHA256        (1 << 6)
+# endif
+
+void OPENSSL_cpuid_setup(void)
+{
+    char *e;
+    struct sigaction ill_oact, ill_act;
+    sigset_t oset;
+    static int trigger = 0;
+
+    if (trigger)
+        return;
+    trigger = 1;
+
+    if ((e = getenv("OPENSSL_armcap"))) {
+        OPENSSL_armcap_P = (unsigned int)strtoul(e, NULL, 0);
+        return;
+    }
+
+# if defined(__APPLE__) && !defined(__aarch64__)
+    /*
+     * Capability probing by catching SIGILL appears to be problematic
+     * on iOS. But since Apple universe is "monocultural", it's actually
+     * possible to simply set pre-defined processor capability mask.
+     */
+    if (1) {
+        OPENSSL_armcap_P = ARMV7_NEON;
+        return;
+    }
+    /*
+     * One could do same even for __aarch64__ iOS builds. It's not done
+     * exclusively for reasons of keeping code unified across platforms.
+     * Unified code works because it never triggers SIGILL on Apple
+     * devices...
+     */
+# endif
+
+    sigfillset(&all_masked);
+    sigdelset(&all_masked, SIGILL);
+    sigdelset(&all_masked, SIGTRAP);
+    sigdelset(&all_masked, SIGFPE);
+    sigdelset(&all_masked, SIGBUS);
+    sigdelset(&all_masked, SIGSEGV);
+
+    OPENSSL_armcap_P = 0;
+
+    memset(&ill_act, 0, sizeof(ill_act));
+    ill_act.sa_handler = ill_handler;
+    ill_act.sa_mask = all_masked;
+
+    sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &ill_act.sa_mask, &oset);
+    sigaction(SIGILL, &ill_act, &ill_oact);
+
+    if (getauxval != NULL) {
+        if (getauxval(HWCAP) & HWCAP_NEON) {
+            unsigned long hwcap = getauxval(HWCAP_CE);
+
+            OPENSSL_armcap_P |= ARMV7_NEON;
+
+            if (hwcap & HWCAP_CE_AES)
+                OPENSSL_armcap_P |= ARMV8_AES;
+
+            if (hwcap & HWCAP_CE_PMULL)
+                OPENSSL_armcap_P |= ARMV8_PMULL;
+
+            if (hwcap & HWCAP_CE_SHA1)
+                OPENSSL_armcap_P |= ARMV8_SHA1;
+
+            if (hwcap & HWCAP_CE_SHA256)
+                OPENSSL_armcap_P |= ARMV8_SHA256;
+        }
+    } else if (sigsetjmp(ill_jmp, 1) == 0) {
+        _armv7_neon_probe();
+        OPENSSL_armcap_P |= ARMV7_NEON;
+        if (sigsetjmp(ill_jmp, 1) == 0) {
+            _armv8_pmull_probe();
+            OPENSSL_armcap_P |= ARMV8_PMULL | ARMV8_AES;
+        } else if (sigsetjmp(ill_jmp, 1) == 0) {
+            _armv8_aes_probe();
+            OPENSSL_armcap_P |= ARMV8_AES;
+        }
+        if (sigsetjmp(ill_jmp, 1) == 0) {
+            _armv8_sha1_probe();
+            OPENSSL_armcap_P |= ARMV8_SHA1;
+        }
+        if (sigsetjmp(ill_jmp, 1) == 0) {
+            _armv8_sha256_probe();
+            OPENSSL_armcap_P |= ARMV8_SHA256;
+        }
+    }
+    if (sigsetjmp(ill_jmp, 1) == 0) {
+        _armv7_tick();
+        OPENSSL_armcap_P |= ARMV7_TICK;
+    }
+
+    sigaction(SIGILL, &ill_oact, NULL);
+    sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &oset, NULL);
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/armv4cpuid.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/armv4cpuid.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f7d31a6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/armv4cpuid.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,296 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+$flavour = shift;
+$output  = shift;
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+( $xlate="${dir}arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
+( $xlate="${dir}perlasm/arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
+die "can't locate arm-xlate.pl";
+
+open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output";
+*STDOUT=*OUT;
+
+$code.=<<___;
+#include "arm_arch.h"
+
+.text
+#if defined(__thumb2__) && !defined(__APPLE__)
+.syntax	unified
+.thumb
+#else
+.code	32
+#undef	__thumb2__
+#endif
+
+.align	5
+.global	OPENSSL_atomic_add
+.type	OPENSSL_atomic_add,%function
+OPENSSL_atomic_add:
+#if __ARM_ARCH__>=6
+.Ladd:	ldrex	r2,[r0]
+	add	r3,r2,r1
+	strex	r2,r3,[r0]
+	cmp	r2,#0
+	bne	.Ladd
+	mov	r0,r3
+	bx	lr
+#else
+	stmdb	sp!,{r4-r6,lr}
+	ldr	r2,.Lspinlock
+	adr	r3,.Lspinlock
+	mov	r4,r0
+	mov	r5,r1
+	add	r6,r3,r2	@ &spinlock
+	b	.+8
+.Lspin:	bl	sched_yield
+	mov	r0,#-1
+	swp	r0,r0,[r6]
+	cmp	r0,#0
+	bne	.Lspin
+
+	ldr	r2,[r4]
+	add	r2,r2,r5
+	str	r2,[r4]
+	str	r0,[r6]		@ release spinlock
+	ldmia	sp!,{r4-r6,lr}
+	tst	lr,#1
+	moveq	pc,lr
+	.word	0xe12fff1e	@ bx	lr
+#endif
+.size	OPENSSL_atomic_add,.-OPENSSL_atomic_add
+
+.global	OPENSSL_cleanse
+.type	OPENSSL_cleanse,%function
+OPENSSL_cleanse:
+	eor	ip,ip,ip
+	cmp	r1,#7
+#ifdef	__thumb2__
+	itt	hs
+#endif
+	subhs	r1,r1,#4
+	bhs	.Lot
+	cmp	r1,#0
+	beq	.Lcleanse_done
+.Little:
+	strb	ip,[r0],#1
+	subs	r1,r1,#1
+	bhi	.Little
+	b	.Lcleanse_done
+
+.Lot:	tst	r0,#3
+	beq	.Laligned
+	strb	ip,[r0],#1
+	sub	r1,r1,#1
+	b	.Lot
+.Laligned:
+	str	ip,[r0],#4
+	subs	r1,r1,#4
+	bhs	.Laligned
+	adds	r1,r1,#4
+	bne	.Little
+.Lcleanse_done:
+#if __ARM_ARCH__>=5
+	bx	lr
+#else
+	tst	lr,#1
+	moveq	pc,lr
+	.word	0xe12fff1e	@ bx	lr
+#endif
+.size	OPENSSL_cleanse,.-OPENSSL_cleanse
+
+.global	CRYPTO_memcmp
+.type	CRYPTO_memcmp,%function
+.align	4
+CRYPTO_memcmp:
+	eor	ip,ip,ip
+	cmp	r2,#0
+	beq	.Lno_data
+	stmdb	sp!,{r4,r5}
+
+.Loop_cmp:
+	ldrb	r4,[r0],#1
+	ldrb	r5,[r1],#1
+	eor	r4,r4,r5
+	orr	ip,ip,r4
+	subs	r2,r2,#1
+	bne	.Loop_cmp
+
+	ldmia	sp!,{r4,r5}
+.Lno_data:
+	neg	r0,ip
+	mov	r0,r0,lsr#31
+#if __ARM_ARCH__>=5
+	bx	lr
+#else
+	tst	lr,#1
+	moveq	pc,lr
+	.word	0xe12fff1e	@ bx	lr
+#endif
+.size	CRYPTO_memcmp,.-CRYPTO_memcmp
+
+#if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7
+.arch	armv7-a
+.fpu	neon
+
+.align	5
+.global	_armv7_neon_probe
+.type	_armv7_neon_probe,%function
+_armv7_neon_probe:
+	vorr	q0,q0,q0
+	bx	lr
+.size	_armv7_neon_probe,.-_armv7_neon_probe
+
+.global	_armv7_tick
+.type	_armv7_tick,%function
+_armv7_tick:
+#ifdef	__APPLE__
+	mrrc	p15,0,r0,r1,c14		@ CNTPCT
+#else
+	mrrc	p15,1,r0,r1,c14		@ CNTVCT
+#endif
+	bx	lr
+.size	_armv7_tick,.-_armv7_tick
+
+.global	_armv8_aes_probe
+.type	_armv8_aes_probe,%function
+_armv8_aes_probe:
+#if defined(__thumb2__) && !defined(__APPLE__)
+	.byte	0xb0,0xff,0x00,0x03	@ aese.8	q0,q0
+#else
+	.byte	0x00,0x03,0xb0,0xf3	@ aese.8	q0,q0
+#endif
+	bx	lr
+.size	_armv8_aes_probe,.-_armv8_aes_probe
+
+.global	_armv8_sha1_probe
+.type	_armv8_sha1_probe,%function
+_armv8_sha1_probe:
+#if defined(__thumb2__) && !defined(__APPLE__)
+	.byte	0x00,0xef,0x40,0x0c	@ sha1c.32	q0,q0,q0
+#else
+	.byte	0x40,0x0c,0x00,0xf2	@ sha1c.32	q0,q0,q0
+#endif
+	bx	lr
+.size	_armv8_sha1_probe,.-_armv8_sha1_probe
+
+.global	_armv8_sha256_probe
+.type	_armv8_sha256_probe,%function
+_armv8_sha256_probe:
+#if defined(__thumb2__) && !defined(__APPLE__)
+	.byte	0x00,0xff,0x40,0x0c	@ sha256h.32	q0,q0,q0
+#else
+	.byte	0x40,0x0c,0x00,0xf3	@ sha256h.32	q0,q0,q0
+#endif
+	bx	lr
+.size	_armv8_sha256_probe,.-_armv8_sha256_probe
+.global	_armv8_pmull_probe
+.type	_armv8_pmull_probe,%function
+_armv8_pmull_probe:
+#if defined(__thumb2__) && !defined(__APPLE__)
+	.byte	0xa0,0xef,0x00,0x0e	@ vmull.p64	q0,d0,d0
+#else
+	.byte	0x00,0x0e,0xa0,0xf2	@ vmull.p64	q0,d0,d0
+#endif
+	bx	lr
+.size	_armv8_pmull_probe,.-_armv8_pmull_probe
+#endif
+
+.global	OPENSSL_wipe_cpu
+.type	OPENSSL_wipe_cpu,%function
+OPENSSL_wipe_cpu:
+#if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7
+	ldr	r0,.LOPENSSL_armcap
+	adr	r1,.LOPENSSL_armcap
+	ldr	r0,[r1,r0]
+#ifdef	__APPLE__
+	ldr	r0,[r0]
+#endif
+#endif
+	eor	r2,r2,r2
+	eor	r3,r3,r3
+	eor	ip,ip,ip
+#if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7
+	tst	r0,#1
+	beq	.Lwipe_done
+	veor	q0, q0, q0
+	veor	q1, q1, q1
+	veor	q2, q2, q2
+	veor	q3, q3, q3
+	veor	q8, q8, q8
+	veor	q9, q9, q9
+	veor	q10, q10, q10
+	veor	q11, q11, q11
+	veor	q12, q12, q12
+	veor	q13, q13, q13
+	veor	q14, q14, q14
+	veor	q15, q15, q15
+.Lwipe_done:
+#endif
+	mov	r0,sp
+#if __ARM_ARCH__>=5
+	bx	lr
+#else
+	tst	lr,#1
+	moveq	pc,lr
+	.word	0xe12fff1e	@ bx	lr
+#endif
+.size	OPENSSL_wipe_cpu,.-OPENSSL_wipe_cpu
+
+.global	OPENSSL_instrument_bus
+.type	OPENSSL_instrument_bus,%function
+OPENSSL_instrument_bus:
+	eor	r0,r0,r0
+#if __ARM_ARCH__>=5
+	bx	lr
+#else
+	tst	lr,#1
+	moveq	pc,lr
+	.word	0xe12fff1e	@ bx	lr
+#endif
+.size	OPENSSL_instrument_bus,.-OPENSSL_instrument_bus
+
+.global	OPENSSL_instrument_bus2
+.type	OPENSSL_instrument_bus2,%function
+OPENSSL_instrument_bus2:
+	eor	r0,r0,r0
+#if __ARM_ARCH__>=5
+	bx	lr
+#else
+	tst	lr,#1
+	moveq	pc,lr
+	.word	0xe12fff1e	@ bx	lr
+#endif
+.size	OPENSSL_instrument_bus2,.-OPENSSL_instrument_bus2
+
+.align	5
+#if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7
+.LOPENSSL_armcap:
+.word	OPENSSL_armcap_P-.
+#endif
+#if __ARM_ARCH__>=6
+.align	5
+#else
+.Lspinlock:
+.word	atomic_add_spinlock-.Lspinlock
+.align	5
+
+.data
+.align	2
+atomic_add_spinlock:
+.word	0
+#endif
+
+.comm	OPENSSL_armcap_P,4,4
+.hidden	OPENSSL_armcap_P
+___
+
+print $code;
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/a_bitstr.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/a_bitstr.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b2e0fb6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/a_bitstr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,216 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include "asn1_locl.h"
+
+int ASN1_BIT_STRING_set(ASN1_BIT_STRING *x, unsigned char *d, int len)
+{
+    return ASN1_STRING_set(x, d, len);
+}
+
+int i2c_ASN1_BIT_STRING(ASN1_BIT_STRING *a, unsigned char **pp)
+{
+    int ret, j, bits, len;
+    unsigned char *p, *d;
+
+    if (a == NULL)
+        return (0);
+
+    len = a->length;
+
+    if (len > 0) {
+        if (a->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT) {
+            bits = (int)a->flags & 0x07;
+        } else {
+            for (; len > 0; len--) {
+                if (a->data[len - 1])
+                    break;
+            }
+            j = a->data[len - 1];
+            if (j & 0x01)
+                bits = 0;
+            else if (j & 0x02)
+                bits = 1;
+            else if (j & 0x04)
+                bits = 2;
+            else if (j & 0x08)
+                bits = 3;
+            else if (j & 0x10)
+                bits = 4;
+            else if (j & 0x20)
+                bits = 5;
+            else if (j & 0x40)
+                bits = 6;
+            else if (j & 0x80)
+                bits = 7;
+            else
+                bits = 0;       /* should not happen */
+        }
+    } else
+        bits = 0;
+
+    ret = 1 + len;
+    if (pp == NULL)
+        return (ret);
+
+    p = *pp;
+
+    *(p++) = (unsigned char)bits;
+    d = a->data;
+    if (len > 0) {
+        memcpy(p, d, len);
+        p += len;
+        p[-1] &= (0xff << bits);
+    }
+    *pp = p;
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+ASN1_BIT_STRING *c2i_ASN1_BIT_STRING(ASN1_BIT_STRING **a,
+                                     const unsigned char **pp, long len)
+{
+    ASN1_BIT_STRING *ret = NULL;
+    const unsigned char *p;
+    unsigned char *s;
+    int i;
+
+    if (len < 1) {
+        i = ASN1_R_STRING_TOO_SHORT;
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (len > INT_MAX) {
+        i = ASN1_R_STRING_TOO_LONG;
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if ((a == NULL) || ((*a) == NULL)) {
+        if ((ret = ASN1_BIT_STRING_new()) == NULL)
+            return (NULL);
+    } else
+        ret = (*a);
+
+    p = *pp;
+    i = *(p++);
+    if (i > 7) {
+        i = ASN1_R_INVALID_BIT_STRING_BITS_LEFT;
+        goto err;
+    }
+    /*
+     * We do this to preserve the settings.  If we modify the settings, via
+     * the _set_bit function, we will recalculate on output
+     */
+    ret->flags &= ~(ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT | 0x07); /* clear */
+    ret->flags |= (ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT | i); /* set */
+
+    if (len-- > 1) {            /* using one because of the bits left byte */
+        s = OPENSSL_malloc((int)len);
+        if (s == NULL) {
+            i = ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE;
+            goto err;
+        }
+        memcpy(s, p, (int)len);
+        s[len - 1] &= (0xff << i);
+        p += len;
+    } else
+        s = NULL;
+
+    ret->length = (int)len;
+    OPENSSL_free(ret->data);
+    ret->data = s;
+    ret->type = V_ASN1_BIT_STRING;
+    if (a != NULL)
+        (*a) = ret;
+    *pp = p;
+    return (ret);
+ err:
+    ASN1err(ASN1_F_C2I_ASN1_BIT_STRING, i);
+    if ((a == NULL) || (*a != ret))
+        ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(ret);
+    return (NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * These next 2 functions from Goetz Babin-Ebell <babinebell@trustcenter.de>
+ */
+int ASN1_BIT_STRING_set_bit(ASN1_BIT_STRING *a, int n, int value)
+{
+    int w, v, iv;
+    unsigned char *c;
+
+    w = n / 8;
+    v = 1 << (7 - (n & 0x07));
+    iv = ~v;
+    if (!value)
+        v = 0;
+
+    if (a == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    a->flags &= ~(ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT | 0x07); /* clear, set on write */
+
+    if ((a->length < (w + 1)) || (a->data == NULL)) {
+        if (!value)
+            return (1);         /* Don't need to set */
+        c = OPENSSL_clear_realloc(a->data, a->length, w + 1);
+        if (c == NULL) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_BIT_STRING_SET_BIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        if (w + 1 - a->length > 0)
+            memset(c + a->length, 0, w + 1 - a->length);
+        a->data = c;
+        a->length = w + 1;
+    }
+    a->data[w] = ((a->data[w]) & iv) | v;
+    while ((a->length > 0) && (a->data[a->length - 1] == 0))
+        a->length--;
+    return (1);
+}
+
+int ASN1_BIT_STRING_get_bit(const ASN1_BIT_STRING *a, int n)
+{
+    int w, v;
+
+    w = n / 8;
+    v = 1 << (7 - (n & 0x07));
+    if ((a == NULL) || (a->length < (w + 1)) || (a->data == NULL))
+        return (0);
+    return ((a->data[w] & v) != 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Checks if the given bit string contains only bits specified by
+ * the flags vector. Returns 0 if there is at least one bit set in 'a'
+ * which is not specified in 'flags', 1 otherwise.
+ * 'len' is the length of 'flags'.
+ */
+int ASN1_BIT_STRING_check(const ASN1_BIT_STRING *a,
+                          const unsigned char *flags, int flags_len)
+{
+    int i, ok;
+    /* Check if there is one bit set at all. */
+    if (!a || !a->data)
+        return 1;
+
+    /*
+     * Check each byte of the internal representation of the bit string.
+     */
+    ok = 1;
+    for (i = 0; i < a->length && ok; ++i) {
+        unsigned char mask = i < flags_len ? ~flags[i] : 0xff;
+        /* We are done if there is an unneeded bit set. */
+        ok = (a->data[i] & mask) == 0;
+    }
+    return ok;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/a_d2i_fp.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/a_d2i_fp.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e5c1d0e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/a_d2i_fp.c
@@ -0,0 +1,235 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "internal/numbers.h"
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+
+static int asn1_d2i_read_bio(BIO *in, BUF_MEM **pb);
+
+#ifndef NO_OLD_ASN1
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+
+void *ASN1_d2i_fp(void *(*xnew) (void), d2i_of_void *d2i, FILE *in, void **x)
+{
+    BIO *b;
+    void *ret;
+
+    if ((b = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_FP, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+    BIO_set_fp(b, in, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+    ret = ASN1_d2i_bio(xnew, d2i, b, x);
+    BIO_free(b);
+    return (ret);
+}
+# endif
+
+void *ASN1_d2i_bio(void *(*xnew) (void), d2i_of_void *d2i, BIO *in, void **x)
+{
+    BUF_MEM *b = NULL;
+    const unsigned char *p;
+    void *ret = NULL;
+    int len;
+
+    len = asn1_d2i_read_bio(in, &b);
+    if (len < 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    p = (unsigned char *)b->data;
+    ret = d2i(x, &p, len);
+ err:
+    BUF_MEM_free(b);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+#endif
+
+void *ASN1_item_d2i_bio(const ASN1_ITEM *it, BIO *in, void *x)
+{
+    BUF_MEM *b = NULL;
+    const unsigned char *p;
+    void *ret = NULL;
+    int len;
+
+    len = asn1_d2i_read_bio(in, &b);
+    if (len < 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    p = (const unsigned char *)b->data;
+    ret = ASN1_item_d2i(x, &p, len, it);
+ err:
+    BUF_MEM_free(b);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+void *ASN1_item_d2i_fp(const ASN1_ITEM *it, FILE *in, void *x)
+{
+    BIO *b;
+    char *ret;
+
+    if ((b = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_D2I_FP, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+    BIO_set_fp(b, in, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+    ret = ASN1_item_d2i_bio(it, b, x);
+    BIO_free(b);
+    return (ret);
+}
+#endif
+
+#define HEADER_SIZE   8
+#define ASN1_CHUNK_INITIAL_SIZE (16 * 1024)
+static int asn1_d2i_read_bio(BIO *in, BUF_MEM **pb)
+{
+    BUF_MEM *b;
+    unsigned char *p;
+    int i;
+    size_t want = HEADER_SIZE;
+    uint32_t eos = 0;
+    size_t off = 0;
+    size_t len = 0;
+
+    const unsigned char *q;
+    long slen;
+    int inf, tag, xclass;
+
+    b = BUF_MEM_new();
+    if (b == NULL) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    ERR_clear_error();
+    for (;;) {
+        if (want >= (len - off)) {
+            want -= (len - off);
+
+            if (len + want < len || !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(b, len + want)) {
+                ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            i = BIO_read(in, &(b->data[len]), want);
+            if ((i < 0) && ((len - off) == 0)) {
+                ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO, ASN1_R_NOT_ENOUGH_DATA);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            if (i > 0) {
+                if (len + i < len) {
+                    ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO, ASN1_R_TOO_LONG);
+                    goto err;
+                }
+                len += i;
+            }
+        }
+        /* else data already loaded */
+
+        p = (unsigned char *)&(b->data[off]);
+        q = p;
+        inf = ASN1_get_object(&q, &slen, &tag, &xclass, len - off);
+        if (inf & 0x80) {
+            unsigned long e;
+
+            e = ERR_GET_REASON(ERR_peek_error());
+            if (e != ASN1_R_TOO_LONG)
+                goto err;
+            else
+                ERR_clear_error(); /* clear error */
+        }
+        i = q - p;            /* header length */
+        off += i;               /* end of data */
+
+        if (inf & 1) {
+            /* no data body so go round again */
+            if (eos == UINT32_MAX) {
+                ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO, ASN1_R_HEADER_TOO_LONG);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            eos++;
+            want = HEADER_SIZE;
+        } else if (eos && (slen == 0) && (tag == V_ASN1_EOC)) {
+            /* eos value, so go back and read another header */
+            eos--;
+            if (eos == 0)
+                break;
+            else
+                want = HEADER_SIZE;
+        } else {
+            /* suck in slen bytes of data */
+            want = slen;
+            if (want > (len - off)) {
+                size_t chunk_max = ASN1_CHUNK_INITIAL_SIZE;
+
+                want -= (len - off);
+                if (want > INT_MAX /* BIO_read takes an int length */  ||
+                    len + want < len) {
+                    ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO, ASN1_R_TOO_LONG);
+                    goto err;
+                }
+                while (want > 0) {
+                    /*
+                     * Read content in chunks of increasing size
+                     * so we can return an error for EOF without
+                     * having to allocate the entire content length
+                     * in one go.
+                     */
+                    size_t chunk = want > chunk_max ? chunk_max : want;
+
+                    if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(b, len + chunk)) {
+                        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                        goto err;
+                    }
+                    want -= chunk;
+                    while (chunk > 0) {
+                        i = BIO_read(in, &(b->data[len]), chunk);
+                        if (i <= 0) {
+                            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,
+                                    ASN1_R_NOT_ENOUGH_DATA);
+                            goto err;
+                        }
+                    /*
+                     * This can't overflow because |len+want| didn't
+                     * overflow.
+                     */
+                        len += i;
+                        chunk -= i;
+                    }
+                    if (chunk_max < INT_MAX/2)
+                        chunk_max *= 2;
+                }
+            }
+            if (off + slen < off) {
+                ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO, ASN1_R_TOO_LONG);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            off += slen;
+            if (eos == 0) {
+                break;
+            } else
+                want = HEADER_SIZE;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (off > INT_MAX) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO, ASN1_R_TOO_LONG);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    *pb = b;
+    return off;
+ err:
+    BUF_MEM_free(b);
+    return -1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/a_digest.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/a_digest.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c84ecc9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/a_digest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+#ifndef NO_ASN1_OLD
+
+int ASN1_digest(i2d_of_void *i2d, const EVP_MD *type, char *data,
+                unsigned char *md, unsigned int *len)
+{
+    int i;
+    unsigned char *str, *p;
+
+    i = i2d(data, NULL);
+    if ((str = OPENSSL_malloc(i)) == NULL) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_DIGEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return (0);
+    }
+    p = str;
+    i2d(data, &p);
+
+    if (!EVP_Digest(str, i, md, len, type, NULL)) {
+        OPENSSL_free(str);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    OPENSSL_free(str);
+    return (1);
+}
+
+#endif
+
+int ASN1_item_digest(const ASN1_ITEM *it, const EVP_MD *type, void *asn,
+                     unsigned char *md, unsigned int *len)
+{
+    int i;
+    unsigned char *str = NULL;
+
+    i = ASN1_item_i2d(asn, &str, it);
+    if (!str)
+        return (0);
+
+    if (!EVP_Digest(str, i, md, len, type, NULL)) {
+        OPENSSL_free(str);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    OPENSSL_free(str);
+    return (1);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/a_dup.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/a_dup.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d9a57b2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/a_dup.c
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+
+#ifndef NO_OLD_ASN1
+
+void *ASN1_dup(i2d_of_void *i2d, d2i_of_void *d2i, void *x)
+{
+    unsigned char *b, *p;
+    const unsigned char *p2;
+    int i;
+    char *ret;
+
+    if (x == NULL)
+        return (NULL);
+
+    i = i2d(x, NULL);
+    b = OPENSSL_malloc(i + 10);
+    if (b == NULL) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+    p = b;
+    i = i2d(x, &p);
+    p2 = b;
+    ret = d2i(NULL, &p2, i);
+    OPENSSL_free(b);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * ASN1_ITEM version of dup: this follows the model above except we don't
+ * need to allocate the buffer. At some point this could be rewritten to
+ * directly dup the underlying structure instead of doing and encode and
+ * decode.
+ */
+
+void *ASN1_item_dup(const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *x)
+{
+    unsigned char *b = NULL;
+    const unsigned char *p;
+    long i;
+    void *ret;
+
+    if (x == NULL)
+        return (NULL);
+
+    i = ASN1_item_i2d(x, &b, it);
+    if (b == NULL) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+    p = b;
+    ret = ASN1_item_d2i(NULL, &p, i, it);
+    OPENSSL_free(b);
+    return (ret);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/a_gentm.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/a_gentm.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ff1b695
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/a_gentm.c
@@ -0,0 +1,273 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * GENERALIZEDTIME implementation. Based on UTCTIME
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include "asn1_locl.h"
+
+int asn1_generalizedtime_to_tm(struct tm *tm, const ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *d)
+{
+    static const int min[9] = { 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 };
+    static const int max[9] = { 99, 99, 12, 31, 23, 59, 59, 12, 59 };
+    char *a;
+    int n, i, l, o;
+
+    if (d->type != V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
+        return (0);
+    l = d->length;
+    a = (char *)d->data;
+    o = 0;
+    /*
+     * GENERALIZEDTIME is similar to UTCTIME except the year is represented
+     * as YYYY. This stuff treats everything as a two digit field so make
+     * first two fields 00 to 99
+     */
+    if (l < 13)
+        goto err;
+    for (i = 0; i < 7; i++) {
+        if ((i == 6) && ((a[o] == 'Z') || (a[o] == '+') || (a[o] == '-'))) {
+            i++;
+            if (tm)
+                tm->tm_sec = 0;
+            break;
+        }
+        if ((a[o] < '0') || (a[o] > '9'))
+            goto err;
+        n = a[o] - '0';
+        if (++o > l)
+            goto err;
+
+        if ((a[o] < '0') || (a[o] > '9'))
+            goto err;
+        n = (n * 10) + a[o] - '0';
+        if (++o > l)
+            goto err;
+
+        if ((n < min[i]) || (n > max[i]))
+            goto err;
+        if (tm) {
+            switch (i) {
+            case 0:
+                tm->tm_year = n * 100 - 1900;
+                break;
+            case 1:
+                tm->tm_year += n;
+                break;
+            case 2:
+                tm->tm_mon = n - 1;
+                break;
+            case 3:
+                tm->tm_mday = n;
+                break;
+            case 4:
+                tm->tm_hour = n;
+                break;
+            case 5:
+                tm->tm_min = n;
+                break;
+            case 6:
+                tm->tm_sec = n;
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    /*
+     * Optional fractional seconds: decimal point followed by one or more
+     * digits.
+     */
+    if (a[o] == '.') {
+        if (++o > l)
+            goto err;
+        i = o;
+        while ((a[o] >= '0') && (a[o] <= '9') && (o <= l))
+            o++;
+        /* Must have at least one digit after decimal point */
+        if (i == o)
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (a[o] == 'Z')
+        o++;
+    else if ((a[o] == '+') || (a[o] == '-')) {
+        int offsign = a[o] == '-' ? 1 : -1, offset = 0;
+        o++;
+        if (o + 4 > l)
+            goto err;
+        for (i = 7; i < 9; i++) {
+            if ((a[o] < '0') || (a[o] > '9'))
+                goto err;
+            n = a[o] - '0';
+            o++;
+            if ((a[o] < '0') || (a[o] > '9'))
+                goto err;
+            n = (n * 10) + a[o] - '0';
+            if ((n < min[i]) || (n > max[i]))
+                goto err;
+            if (tm) {
+                if (i == 7)
+                    offset = n * 3600;
+                else if (i == 8)
+                    offset += n * 60;
+            }
+            o++;
+        }
+        if (offset && !OPENSSL_gmtime_adj(tm, 0, offset * offsign))
+            return 0;
+    } else if (a[o]) {
+        /* Missing time zone information. */
+        goto err;
+    }
+    return (o == l);
+ err:
+    return (0);
+}
+
+int ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_check(const ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *d)
+{
+    return asn1_generalizedtime_to_tm(NULL, d);
+}
+
+int ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set_string(ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *s, const char *str)
+{
+    ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME t;
+
+    t.type = V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME;
+    t.length = strlen(str);
+    t.data = (unsigned char *)str;
+    if (ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_check(&t)) {
+        if (s != NULL) {
+            if (!ASN1_STRING_set((ASN1_STRING *)s, str, t.length))
+                return 0;
+            s->type = V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME;
+        }
+        return (1);
+    } else
+        return (0);
+}
+
+ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set(ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *s,
+                                               time_t t)
+{
+    return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, 0, 0);
+}
+
+ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *s,
+                                               time_t t, int offset_day,
+                                               long offset_sec)
+{
+    char *p;
+    struct tm *ts;
+    struct tm data;
+    size_t len = 20;
+    ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *tmps = NULL;
+
+    if (s == NULL)
+        tmps = ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_new();
+    else
+        tmps = s;
+    if (tmps == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+
+    ts = OPENSSL_gmtime(&t, &data);
+    if (ts == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (offset_day || offset_sec) {
+        if (!OPENSSL_gmtime_adj(ts, offset_day, offset_sec))
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    p = (char *)tmps->data;
+    if ((p == NULL) || ((size_t)tmps->length < len)) {
+        p = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
+        if (p == NULL) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_ADJ, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        OPENSSL_free(tmps->data);
+        tmps->data = (unsigned char *)p;
+    }
+
+    BIO_snprintf(p, len, "%04d%02d%02d%02d%02d%02dZ", ts->tm_year + 1900,
+                 ts->tm_mon + 1, ts->tm_mday, ts->tm_hour, ts->tm_min,
+                 ts->tm_sec);
+    tmps->length = strlen(p);
+    tmps->type = V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME;
+#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC_not
+    ebcdic2ascii(tmps->data, tmps->data, tmps->length);
+#endif
+    return tmps;
+ err:
+    if (s == NULL)
+        ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_free(tmps);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+const char *_asn1_mon[12] = {
+    "Jan", "Feb", "Mar", "Apr", "May", "Jun",
+    "Jul", "Aug", "Sep", "Oct", "Nov", "Dec"
+};
+
+int ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(BIO *bp, const ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *tm)
+{
+    char *v;
+    int gmt = 0;
+    int i;
+    int y = 0, M = 0, d = 0, h = 0, m = 0, s = 0;
+    char *f = NULL;
+    int f_len = 0;
+
+    i = tm->length;
+    v = (char *)tm->data;
+
+    if (i < 12)
+        goto err;
+    if (v[i - 1] == 'Z')
+        gmt = 1;
+    for (i = 0; i < 12; i++)
+        if ((v[i] > '9') || (v[i] < '0'))
+            goto err;
+    y = (v[0] - '0') * 1000 + (v[1] - '0') * 100
+        + (v[2] - '0') * 10 + (v[3] - '0');
+    M = (v[4] - '0') * 10 + (v[5] - '0');
+    if ((M > 12) || (M < 1))
+        goto err;
+    d = (v[6] - '0') * 10 + (v[7] - '0');
+    h = (v[8] - '0') * 10 + (v[9] - '0');
+    m = (v[10] - '0') * 10 + (v[11] - '0');
+    if (tm->length >= 14 &&
+        (v[12] >= '0') && (v[12] <= '9') &&
+        (v[13] >= '0') && (v[13] <= '9')) {
+        s = (v[12] - '0') * 10 + (v[13] - '0');
+        /* Check for fractions of seconds. */
+        if (tm->length >= 15 && v[14] == '.') {
+            int l = tm->length;
+            f = &v[14];         /* The decimal point. */
+            f_len = 1;
+            while (14 + f_len < l && f[f_len] >= '0' && f[f_len] <= '9')
+                ++f_len;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (BIO_printf(bp, "%s %2d %02d:%02d:%02d%.*s %d%s",
+                   _asn1_mon[M - 1], d, h, m, s, f_len, f, y,
+                   (gmt) ? " GMT" : "") <= 0)
+        return (0);
+    else
+        return (1);
+ err:
+    BIO_write(bp, "Bad time value", 14);
+    return (0);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/a_i2d_fp.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/a_i2d_fp.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3b3f713
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/a_i2d_fp.c
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+
+#ifndef NO_OLD_ASN1
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+int ASN1_i2d_fp(i2d_of_void *i2d, FILE *out, void *x)
+{
+    BIO *b;
+    int ret;
+
+    if ((b = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_I2D_FP, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+        return (0);
+    }
+    BIO_set_fp(b, out, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+    ret = ASN1_i2d_bio(i2d, b, x);
+    BIO_free(b);
+    return (ret);
+}
+# endif
+
+int ASN1_i2d_bio(i2d_of_void *i2d, BIO *out, unsigned char *x)
+{
+    char *b;
+    unsigned char *p;
+    int i, j = 0, n, ret = 1;
+
+    n = i2d(x, NULL);
+    if (n <= 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    b = OPENSSL_malloc(n);
+    if (b == NULL) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_I2D_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return (0);
+    }
+
+    p = (unsigned char *)b;
+    i2d(x, &p);
+
+    for (;;) {
+        i = BIO_write(out, &(b[j]), n);
+        if (i == n)
+            break;
+        if (i <= 0) {
+            ret = 0;
+            break;
+        }
+        j += i;
+        n -= i;
+    }
+    OPENSSL_free(b);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+int ASN1_item_i2d_fp(const ASN1_ITEM *it, FILE *out, void *x)
+{
+    BIO *b;
+    int ret;
+
+    if ((b = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_I2D_FP, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+        return (0);
+    }
+    BIO_set_fp(b, out, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+    ret = ASN1_item_i2d_bio(it, b, x);
+    BIO_free(b);
+    return (ret);
+}
+#endif
+
+int ASN1_item_i2d_bio(const ASN1_ITEM *it, BIO *out, void *x)
+{
+    unsigned char *b = NULL;
+    int i, j = 0, n, ret = 1;
+
+    n = ASN1_item_i2d(x, &b, it);
+    if (b == NULL) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_I2D_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return (0);
+    }
+
+    for (;;) {
+        i = BIO_write(out, &(b[j]), n);
+        if (i == n)
+            break;
+        if (i <= 0) {
+            ret = 0;
+            break;
+        }
+        j += i;
+        n -= i;
+    }
+    OPENSSL_free(b);
+    return (ret);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/a_int.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/a_int.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..217650a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/a_int.c
@@ -0,0 +1,630 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "internal/numbers.h"
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include "asn1_locl.h"
+
+ASN1_INTEGER *ASN1_INTEGER_dup(const ASN1_INTEGER *x)
+{
+    return ASN1_STRING_dup(x);
+}
+
+int ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(const ASN1_INTEGER *x, const ASN1_INTEGER *y)
+{
+    int neg, ret;
+    /* Compare signs */
+    neg = x->type & V_ASN1_NEG;
+    if (neg != (y->type & V_ASN1_NEG)) {
+        if (neg)
+            return -1;
+        else
+            return 1;
+    }
+
+    ret = ASN1_STRING_cmp(x, y);
+
+    if (neg)
+        return -ret;
+    else
+        return ret;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * This converts a big endian buffer and sign into its content encoding.
+ * This is used for INTEGER and ENUMERATED types.
+ * The internal representation is an ASN1_STRING whose data is a big endian
+ * representation of the value, ignoring the sign. The sign is determined by
+ * the type: if type & V_ASN1_NEG is true it is negative, otherwise positive.
+ *
+ * Positive integers are no problem: they are almost the same as the DER
+ * encoding, except if the first byte is >= 0x80 we need to add a zero pad.
+ *
+ * Negative integers are a bit trickier...
+ * The DER representation of negative integers is in 2s complement form.
+ * The internal form is converted by complementing each octet and finally
+ * adding one to the result. This can be done less messily with a little trick.
+ * If the internal form has trailing zeroes then they will become FF by the
+ * complement and 0 by the add one (due to carry) so just copy as many trailing
+ * zeros to the destination as there are in the source. The carry will add one
+ * to the last none zero octet: so complement this octet and add one and finally
+ * complement any left over until you get to the start of the string.
+ *
+ * Padding is a little trickier too. If the first bytes is > 0x80 then we pad
+ * with 0xff. However if the first byte is 0x80 and one of the following bytes
+ * is non-zero we pad with 0xff. The reason for this distinction is that 0x80
+ * followed by optional zeros isn't padded.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * If |pad| is zero, the operation is effectively reduced to memcpy,
+ * and if |pad| is 0xff, then it performs two's complement, ~dst + 1.
+ * Note that in latter case sequence of zeros yields itself, and so
+ * does 0x80 followed by any number of zeros. These properties are
+ * used elsewhere below...
+ */
+static void twos_complement(unsigned char *dst, const unsigned char *src,
+                            size_t len, unsigned char pad)
+{
+    unsigned int carry = pad & 1;
+
+    /* Begin at the end of the encoding */
+    dst += len;
+    src += len;
+    /* two's complement value: ~value + 1 */
+    while (len-- != 0) {
+        *(--dst) = (unsigned char)(carry += *(--src) ^ pad);
+        carry >>= 8;
+    }
+}
+
+static size_t i2c_ibuf(const unsigned char *b, size_t blen, int neg,
+                       unsigned char **pp)
+{
+    unsigned int pad = 0;
+    size_t ret, i;
+    unsigned char *p, pb = 0;
+
+    if (b != NULL && blen) {
+        ret = blen;
+        i = b[0];
+        if (!neg && (i > 127)) {
+            pad = 1;
+            pb = 0;
+        } else if (neg) {
+            pb = 0xFF;
+            if (i > 128) {
+                pad = 1;
+            } else if (i == 128) {
+                /*
+                 * Special case [of minimal negative for given length]:
+                 * if any other bytes non zero we pad, otherwise we don't.
+                 */
+                for (pad = 0, i = 1; i < blen; i++)
+                    pad |= b[i];
+                pb = pad != 0 ? 0xffU : 0;
+                pad = pb & 1;
+            }
+        }
+        ret += pad;
+    } else {
+        ret = 1;
+        blen = 0;   /* reduce '(b == NULL || blen == 0)' to '(blen == 0)' */
+    }
+
+    if (pp == NULL || (p = *pp) == NULL)
+        return ret;
+
+    /*
+     * This magically handles all corner cases, such as '(b == NULL ||
+     * blen == 0)', non-negative value, "negative" zero, 0x80 followed
+     * by any number of zeros...
+     */
+    *p = pb;
+    p += pad;       /* yes, p[0] can be written twice, but it's little
+                     * price to pay for eliminated branches */
+    twos_complement(p, b, blen, pb);
+
+    *pp += ret;
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * convert content octets into a big endian buffer. Returns the length
+ * of buffer or 0 on error: for malformed INTEGER. If output buffer is
+ * NULL just return length.
+ */
+
+static size_t c2i_ibuf(unsigned char *b, int *pneg,
+                       const unsigned char *p, size_t plen)
+{
+    int neg, pad;
+    /* Zero content length is illegal */
+    if (plen == 0) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_C2I_IBUF, ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_ZERO_CONTENT);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    neg = p[0] & 0x80;
+    if (pneg)
+        *pneg = neg;
+    /* Handle common case where length is 1 octet separately */
+    if (plen == 1) {
+        if (b != NULL) {
+            if (neg)
+                b[0] = (p[0] ^ 0xFF) + 1;
+            else
+                b[0] = p[0];
+        }
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    pad = 0;
+    if (p[0] == 0) {
+        pad = 1;
+    } else if (p[0] == 0xFF) {
+        size_t i;
+
+        /*
+         * Special case [of "one less minimal negative" for given length]:
+         * if any other bytes non zero it was padded, otherwise not.
+         */
+        for (pad = 0, i = 1; i < plen; i++)
+            pad |= p[i];
+        pad = pad != 0 ? 1 : 0;
+    }
+    /* reject illegal padding: first two octets MSB can't match */
+    if (pad && (neg == (p[1] & 0x80))) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_C2I_IBUF, ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* skip over pad */
+    p += pad;
+    plen -= pad;
+
+    if (b != NULL)
+        twos_complement(b, p, plen, neg ? 0xffU : 0);
+
+    return plen;
+}
+
+int i2c_ASN1_INTEGER(ASN1_INTEGER *a, unsigned char **pp)
+{
+    return i2c_ibuf(a->data, a->length, a->type & V_ASN1_NEG, pp);
+}
+
+/* Convert big endian buffer into uint64_t, return 0 on error */
+static int asn1_get_uint64(uint64_t *pr, const unsigned char *b, size_t blen)
+{
+    size_t i;
+    uint64_t r;
+
+    if (blen > sizeof(*pr)) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_GET_UINT64, ASN1_R_TOO_LARGE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (b == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    for (r = 0, i = 0; i < blen; i++) {
+        r <<= 8;
+        r |= b[i];
+    }
+    *pr = r;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Write uint64_t to big endian buffer and return offset to first
+ * written octet. In other words it returns offset in range from 0
+ * to 7, with 0 denoting 8 written octets and 7 - one.
+ */
+static size_t asn1_put_uint64(unsigned char b[sizeof(uint64_t)], uint64_t r)
+{
+    size_t off = sizeof(uint64_t);
+
+    do {
+        b[--off] = (unsigned char)r;
+    } while (r >>= 8);
+
+    return off;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Absolute value of INT64_MIN: we can't just use -INT64_MIN as gcc produces
+ * overflow warnings.
+ */
+#define ABS_INT64_MIN ((uint64_t)INT64_MAX + (-(INT64_MIN + INT64_MAX)))
+
+/* signed version of asn1_get_uint64 */
+static int asn1_get_int64(int64_t *pr, const unsigned char *b, size_t blen,
+                          int neg)
+{
+    uint64_t r;
+    if (asn1_get_uint64(&r, b, blen) == 0)
+        return 0;
+    if (neg) {
+        if (r <= INT64_MAX) {
+            /* Most significant bit is guaranteed to be clear, negation
+             * is guaranteed to be meaningful in platform-neutral sense. */
+            *pr = -(int64_t)r;
+        } else if (r == ABS_INT64_MIN) {
+            /* This never happens if INT64_MAX == ABS_INT64_MIN, e.g.
+             * on ones'-complement system. */
+            *pr = (int64_t)(0 - r);
+        } else {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_GET_INT64, ASN1_R_TOO_SMALL);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    } else {
+        if (r <= INT64_MAX) {
+            *pr = (int64_t)r;
+        } else {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_GET_INT64, ASN1_R_TOO_LARGE);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Convert ASN1 INTEGER content octets to ASN1_INTEGER structure */
+ASN1_INTEGER *c2i_ASN1_INTEGER(ASN1_INTEGER **a, const unsigned char **pp,
+                               long len)
+{
+    ASN1_INTEGER *ret = NULL;
+    size_t r;
+    int neg;
+
+    r = c2i_ibuf(NULL, NULL, *pp, len);
+
+    if (r == 0)
+        return NULL;
+
+    if ((a == NULL) || ((*a) == NULL)) {
+        ret = ASN1_INTEGER_new();
+        if (ret == NULL)
+            return NULL;
+        ret->type = V_ASN1_INTEGER;
+    } else
+        ret = *a;
+
+    if (ASN1_STRING_set(ret, NULL, r) == 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    c2i_ibuf(ret->data, &neg, *pp, len);
+
+    if (neg)
+        ret->type |= V_ASN1_NEG;
+
+    *pp += len;
+    if (a != NULL)
+        (*a) = ret;
+    return ret;
+ err:
+    ASN1err(ASN1_F_C2I_ASN1_INTEGER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    if ((a == NULL) || (*a != ret))
+        ASN1_INTEGER_free(ret);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+static int asn1_string_get_int64(int64_t *pr, const ASN1_STRING *a, int itype)
+{
+    if (a == NULL) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_STRING_GET_INT64, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if ((a->type & ~V_ASN1_NEG) != itype) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_STRING_GET_INT64, ASN1_R_WRONG_INTEGER_TYPE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return asn1_get_int64(pr, a->data, a->length, a->type & V_ASN1_NEG);
+}
+
+static int asn1_string_set_int64(ASN1_STRING *a, int64_t r, int itype)
+{
+    unsigned char tbuf[sizeof(r)];
+    size_t off;
+
+    a->type = itype;
+    if (r < 0) {
+        /* Most obvious '-r' triggers undefined behaviour for most
+         * common INT64_MIN. Even though below '0 - (uint64_t)r' can
+         * appear two's-complement centric, it does produce correct/
+         * expected result even on one's-complement. This is because
+         * cast to unsigned has to change bit pattern... */
+        off = asn1_put_uint64(tbuf, 0 - (uint64_t)r);
+        a->type |= V_ASN1_NEG;
+    } else {
+        off = asn1_put_uint64(tbuf, r);
+        a->type &= ~V_ASN1_NEG;
+    }
+    return ASN1_STRING_set(a, tbuf + off, sizeof(tbuf) - off);
+}
+
+static int asn1_string_get_uint64(uint64_t *pr, const ASN1_STRING *a,
+                                  int itype)
+{
+    if (a == NULL) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_STRING_GET_UINT64, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if ((a->type & ~V_ASN1_NEG) != itype) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_STRING_GET_UINT64, ASN1_R_WRONG_INTEGER_TYPE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (a->type & V_ASN1_NEG) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_STRING_GET_UINT64, ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_NEGATIVE_VALUE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return asn1_get_uint64(pr, a->data, a->length);
+}
+
+static int asn1_string_set_uint64(ASN1_STRING *a, uint64_t r, int itype)
+{
+    unsigned char tbuf[sizeof(r)];
+    size_t off;
+
+    a->type = itype;
+    off = asn1_put_uint64(tbuf, r);
+    return ASN1_STRING_set(a, tbuf + off, sizeof(tbuf) - off);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is a version of d2i_ASN1_INTEGER that ignores the sign bit of ASN1
+ * integers: some broken software can encode a positive INTEGER with its MSB
+ * set as negative (it doesn't add a padding zero).
+ */
+
+ASN1_INTEGER *d2i_ASN1_UINTEGER(ASN1_INTEGER **a, const unsigned char **pp,
+                                long length)
+{
+    ASN1_INTEGER *ret = NULL;
+    const unsigned char *p;
+    unsigned char *s;
+    long len;
+    int inf, tag, xclass;
+    int i;
+
+    if ((a == NULL) || ((*a) == NULL)) {
+        if ((ret = ASN1_INTEGER_new()) == NULL)
+            return (NULL);
+        ret->type = V_ASN1_INTEGER;
+    } else
+        ret = (*a);
+
+    p = *pp;
+    inf = ASN1_get_object(&p, &len, &tag, &xclass, length);
+    if (inf & 0x80) {
+        i = ASN1_R_BAD_OBJECT_HEADER;
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (tag != V_ASN1_INTEGER) {
+        i = ASN1_R_EXPECTING_AN_INTEGER;
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * We must OPENSSL_malloc stuff, even for 0 bytes otherwise it signifies
+     * a missing NULL parameter.
+     */
+    s = OPENSSL_malloc((int)len + 1);
+    if (s == NULL) {
+        i = ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE;
+        goto err;
+    }
+    ret->type = V_ASN1_INTEGER;
+    if (len) {
+        if ((*p == 0) && (len != 1)) {
+            p++;
+            len--;
+        }
+        memcpy(s, p, (int)len);
+        p += len;
+    }
+
+    OPENSSL_free(ret->data);
+    ret->data = s;
+    ret->length = (int)len;
+    if (a != NULL)
+        (*a) = ret;
+    *pp = p;
+    return (ret);
+ err:
+    ASN1err(ASN1_F_D2I_ASN1_UINTEGER, i);
+    if ((a == NULL) || (*a != ret))
+        ASN1_INTEGER_free(ret);
+    return (NULL);
+}
+
+static ASN1_STRING *bn_to_asn1_string(const BIGNUM *bn, ASN1_STRING *ai,
+                                      int atype)
+{
+    ASN1_INTEGER *ret;
+    int len;
+
+    if (ai == NULL) {
+        ret = ASN1_STRING_type_new(atype);
+    } else {
+        ret = ai;
+        ret->type = atype;
+    }
+
+    if (ret == NULL) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_BN_TO_ASN1_STRING, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (BN_is_negative(bn) && !BN_is_zero(bn))
+        ret->type |= V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER;
+
+    len = BN_num_bytes(bn);
+
+    if (len == 0)
+        len = 1;
+
+    if (ASN1_STRING_set(ret, NULL, len) == 0) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_BN_TO_ASN1_STRING, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* Correct zero case */
+    if (BN_is_zero(bn))
+        ret->data[0] = 0;
+    else
+        len = BN_bn2bin(bn, ret->data);
+    ret->length = len;
+    return ret;
+ err:
+    if (ret != ai)
+        ASN1_INTEGER_free(ret);
+    return (NULL);
+}
+
+static BIGNUM *asn1_string_to_bn(const ASN1_INTEGER *ai, BIGNUM *bn,
+                                 int itype)
+{
+    BIGNUM *ret;
+
+    if ((ai->type & ~V_ASN1_NEG) != itype) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_STRING_TO_BN, ASN1_R_WRONG_INTEGER_TYPE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    ret = BN_bin2bn(ai->data, ai->length, bn);
+    if (ret == NULL) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_STRING_TO_BN, ASN1_R_BN_LIB);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    if (ai->type & V_ASN1_NEG)
+        BN_set_negative(ret, 1);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int ASN1_INTEGER_get_int64(int64_t *pr, const ASN1_INTEGER *a)
+{
+    return asn1_string_get_int64(pr, a, V_ASN1_INTEGER);
+}
+
+int ASN1_INTEGER_set_int64(ASN1_INTEGER *a, int64_t r)
+{
+    return asn1_string_set_int64(a, r, V_ASN1_INTEGER);
+}
+
+int ASN1_INTEGER_get_uint64(uint64_t *pr, const ASN1_INTEGER *a)
+{
+    return asn1_string_get_uint64(pr, a, V_ASN1_INTEGER);
+}
+
+int ASN1_INTEGER_set_uint64(ASN1_INTEGER *a, uint64_t r)
+{
+    return asn1_string_set_uint64(a, r, V_ASN1_INTEGER);
+}
+
+int ASN1_INTEGER_set(ASN1_INTEGER *a, long v)
+{
+    return ASN1_INTEGER_set_int64(a, v);
+}
+
+long ASN1_INTEGER_get(const ASN1_INTEGER *a)
+{
+    int i;
+    int64_t r;
+    if (a == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    i = ASN1_INTEGER_get_int64(&r, a);
+    if (i == 0)
+        return -1;
+    if (r > LONG_MAX || r < LONG_MIN)
+        return -1;
+    return (long)r;
+}
+
+ASN1_INTEGER *BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(const BIGNUM *bn, ASN1_INTEGER *ai)
+{
+    return bn_to_asn1_string(bn, ai, V_ASN1_INTEGER);
+}
+
+BIGNUM *ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(const ASN1_INTEGER *ai, BIGNUM *bn)
+{
+    return asn1_string_to_bn(ai, bn, V_ASN1_INTEGER);
+}
+
+int ASN1_ENUMERATED_get_int64(int64_t *pr, const ASN1_ENUMERATED *a)
+{
+    return asn1_string_get_int64(pr, a, V_ASN1_ENUMERATED);
+}
+
+int ASN1_ENUMERATED_set_int64(ASN1_ENUMERATED *a, int64_t r)
+{
+    return asn1_string_set_int64(a, r, V_ASN1_ENUMERATED);
+}
+
+int ASN1_ENUMERATED_set(ASN1_ENUMERATED *a, long v)
+{
+    return ASN1_ENUMERATED_set_int64(a, v);
+}
+
+long ASN1_ENUMERATED_get(const ASN1_ENUMERATED *a)
+{
+    int i;
+    int64_t r;
+    if (a == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    if ((a->type & ~V_ASN1_NEG) != V_ASN1_ENUMERATED)
+        return -1;
+    if (a->length > (int)sizeof(long))
+        return 0xffffffffL;
+    i = ASN1_ENUMERATED_get_int64(&r, a);
+    if (i == 0)
+        return -1;
+    if (r > LONG_MAX || r < LONG_MIN)
+        return -1;
+    return (long)r;
+}
+
+ASN1_ENUMERATED *BN_to_ASN1_ENUMERATED(const BIGNUM *bn, ASN1_ENUMERATED *ai)
+{
+    return bn_to_asn1_string(bn, ai, V_ASN1_ENUMERATED);
+}
+
+BIGNUM *ASN1_ENUMERATED_to_BN(const ASN1_ENUMERATED *ai, BIGNUM *bn)
+{
+    return asn1_string_to_bn(ai, bn, V_ASN1_ENUMERATED);
+}
+
+/* Internal functions used by x_int64.c */
+int c2i_uint64_int(uint64_t *ret, int *neg, const unsigned char **pp, long len)
+{
+    unsigned char buf[sizeof(uint64_t)];
+    size_t buflen;
+
+    buflen = c2i_ibuf(NULL, NULL, *pp, len);
+    if (buflen == 0)
+        return 0;
+    if (buflen > sizeof(uint64_t)) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_C2I_UINT64_INT, ASN1_R_TOO_LARGE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    (void)c2i_ibuf(buf, neg, *pp, len);
+    return asn1_get_uint64(ret, buf, buflen);
+}
+
+int i2c_uint64_int(unsigned char *p, uint64_t r, int neg)
+{
+    unsigned char buf[sizeof(uint64_t)];
+    size_t off;
+
+    off = asn1_put_uint64(buf, r);
+    return i2c_ibuf(buf + off, sizeof(buf) - off, neg, &p);
+}
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/a_mbstr.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/a_mbstr.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7a035af
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/a_mbstr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,395 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+
+static int traverse_string(const unsigned char *p, int len, int inform,
+                           int (*rfunc) (unsigned long value, void *in),
+                           void *arg);
+static int in_utf8(unsigned long value, void *arg);
+static int out_utf8(unsigned long value, void *arg);
+static int type_str(unsigned long value, void *arg);
+static int cpy_asc(unsigned long value, void *arg);
+static int cpy_bmp(unsigned long value, void *arg);
+static int cpy_univ(unsigned long value, void *arg);
+static int cpy_utf8(unsigned long value, void *arg);
+static int is_numeric(unsigned long value);
+static int is_printable(unsigned long value);
+
+/*
+ * These functions take a string in UTF8, ASCII or multibyte form and a mask
+ * of permissible ASN1 string types. It then works out the minimal type
+ * (using the order Numeric < Printable < IA5 < T61 < BMP < Universal < UTF8)
+ * and creates a string of the correct type with the supplied data. Yes this is
+ * horrible: it has to be :-( The 'ncopy' form checks minimum and maximum
+ * size limits too.
+ */
+
+int ASN1_mbstring_copy(ASN1_STRING **out, const unsigned char *in, int len,
+                       int inform, unsigned long mask)
+{
+    return ASN1_mbstring_ncopy(out, in, len, inform, mask, 0, 0);
+}
+
+int ASN1_mbstring_ncopy(ASN1_STRING **out, const unsigned char *in, int len,
+                        int inform, unsigned long mask,
+                        long minsize, long maxsize)
+{
+    int str_type;
+    int ret;
+    char free_out;
+    int outform, outlen = 0;
+    ASN1_STRING *dest;
+    unsigned char *p;
+    int nchar;
+    char strbuf[32];
+    int (*cpyfunc) (unsigned long, void *) = NULL;
+    if (len == -1)
+        len = strlen((const char *)in);
+    if (!mask)
+        mask = DIRSTRING_TYPE;
+
+    /* First do a string check and work out the number of characters */
+    switch (inform) {
+
+    case MBSTRING_BMP:
+        if (len & 1) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_MBSTRING_NCOPY,
+                    ASN1_R_INVALID_BMPSTRING_LENGTH);
+            return -1;
+        }
+        nchar = len >> 1;
+        break;
+
+    case MBSTRING_UNIV:
+        if (len & 3) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_MBSTRING_NCOPY,
+                    ASN1_R_INVALID_UNIVERSALSTRING_LENGTH);
+            return -1;
+        }
+        nchar = len >> 2;
+        break;
+
+    case MBSTRING_UTF8:
+        nchar = 0;
+        /* This counts the characters and does utf8 syntax checking */
+        ret = traverse_string(in, len, MBSTRING_UTF8, in_utf8, &nchar);
+        if (ret < 0) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_MBSTRING_NCOPY, ASN1_R_INVALID_UTF8STRING);
+            return -1;
+        }
+        break;
+
+    case MBSTRING_ASC:
+        nchar = len;
+        break;
+
+    default:
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_MBSTRING_NCOPY, ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_FORMAT);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if ((minsize > 0) && (nchar < minsize)) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_MBSTRING_NCOPY, ASN1_R_STRING_TOO_SHORT);
+        BIO_snprintf(strbuf, sizeof(strbuf), "%ld", minsize);
+        ERR_add_error_data(2, "minsize=", strbuf);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if ((maxsize > 0) && (nchar > maxsize)) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_MBSTRING_NCOPY, ASN1_R_STRING_TOO_LONG);
+        BIO_snprintf(strbuf, sizeof(strbuf), "%ld", maxsize);
+        ERR_add_error_data(2, "maxsize=", strbuf);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    /* Now work out minimal type (if any) */
+    if (traverse_string(in, len, inform, type_str, &mask) < 0) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_MBSTRING_NCOPY, ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_CHARACTERS);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    /* Now work out output format and string type */
+    outform = MBSTRING_ASC;
+    if (mask & B_ASN1_NUMERICSTRING)
+        str_type = V_ASN1_NUMERICSTRING;
+    else if (mask & B_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING)
+        str_type = V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING;
+    else if (mask & B_ASN1_IA5STRING)
+        str_type = V_ASN1_IA5STRING;
+    else if (mask & B_ASN1_T61STRING)
+        str_type = V_ASN1_T61STRING;
+    else if (mask & B_ASN1_BMPSTRING) {
+        str_type = V_ASN1_BMPSTRING;
+        outform = MBSTRING_BMP;
+    } else if (mask & B_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING) {
+        str_type = V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING;
+        outform = MBSTRING_UNIV;
+    } else {
+        str_type = V_ASN1_UTF8STRING;
+        outform = MBSTRING_UTF8;
+    }
+    if (!out)
+        return str_type;
+    if (*out) {
+        free_out = 0;
+        dest = *out;
+        OPENSSL_free(dest->data);
+        dest->data = NULL;
+        dest->length = 0;
+        dest->type = str_type;
+    } else {
+        free_out = 1;
+        dest = ASN1_STRING_type_new(str_type);
+        if (dest == NULL) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_MBSTRING_NCOPY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            return -1;
+        }
+        *out = dest;
+    }
+    /* If both the same type just copy across */
+    if (inform == outform) {
+        if (!ASN1_STRING_set(dest, in, len)) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_MBSTRING_NCOPY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            return -1;
+        }
+        return str_type;
+    }
+
+    /* Work out how much space the destination will need */
+    switch (outform) {
+    case MBSTRING_ASC:
+        outlen = nchar;
+        cpyfunc = cpy_asc;
+        break;
+
+    case MBSTRING_BMP:
+        outlen = nchar << 1;
+        cpyfunc = cpy_bmp;
+        break;
+
+    case MBSTRING_UNIV:
+        outlen = nchar << 2;
+        cpyfunc = cpy_univ;
+        break;
+
+    case MBSTRING_UTF8:
+        outlen = 0;
+        traverse_string(in, len, inform, out_utf8, &outlen);
+        cpyfunc = cpy_utf8;
+        break;
+    }
+    if ((p = OPENSSL_malloc(outlen + 1)) == NULL) {
+        if (free_out)
+            ASN1_STRING_free(dest);
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_MBSTRING_NCOPY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return -1;
+    }
+    dest->length = outlen;
+    dest->data = p;
+    p[outlen] = 0;
+    traverse_string(in, len, inform, cpyfunc, &p);
+    return str_type;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function traverses a string and passes the value of each character to
+ * an optional function along with a void * argument.
+ */
+
+static int traverse_string(const unsigned char *p, int len, int inform,
+                           int (*rfunc) (unsigned long value, void *in),
+                           void *arg)
+{
+    unsigned long value;
+    int ret;
+    while (len) {
+        if (inform == MBSTRING_ASC) {
+            value = *p++;
+            len--;
+        } else if (inform == MBSTRING_BMP) {
+            value = *p++ << 8;
+            value |= *p++;
+            len -= 2;
+        } else if (inform == MBSTRING_UNIV) {
+            value = ((unsigned long)*p++) << 24;
+            value |= ((unsigned long)*p++) << 16;
+            value |= *p++ << 8;
+            value |= *p++;
+            len -= 4;
+        } else {
+            ret = UTF8_getc(p, len, &value);
+            if (ret < 0)
+                return -1;
+            len -= ret;
+            p += ret;
+        }
+        if (rfunc) {
+            ret = rfunc(value, arg);
+            if (ret <= 0)
+                return ret;
+        }
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Various utility functions for traverse_string */
+
+/* Just count number of characters */
+
+static int in_utf8(unsigned long value, void *arg)
+{
+    int *nchar;
+    nchar = arg;
+    (*nchar)++;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Determine size of output as a UTF8 String */
+
+static int out_utf8(unsigned long value, void *arg)
+{
+    int *outlen;
+    outlen = arg;
+    *outlen += UTF8_putc(NULL, -1, value);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Determine the "type" of a string: check each character against a supplied
+ * "mask".
+ */
+
+static int type_str(unsigned long value, void *arg)
+{
+    unsigned long types;
+    types = *((unsigned long *)arg);
+    if ((types & B_ASN1_NUMERICSTRING) && !is_numeric(value))
+        types &= ~B_ASN1_NUMERICSTRING;
+    if ((types & B_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING) && !is_printable(value))
+        types &= ~B_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING;
+    if ((types & B_ASN1_IA5STRING) && (value > 127))
+        types &= ~B_ASN1_IA5STRING;
+    if ((types & B_ASN1_T61STRING) && (value > 0xff))
+        types &= ~B_ASN1_T61STRING;
+    if ((types & B_ASN1_BMPSTRING) && (value > 0xffff))
+        types &= ~B_ASN1_BMPSTRING;
+    if (!types)
+        return -1;
+    *((unsigned long *)arg) = types;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Copy one byte per character ASCII like strings */
+
+static int cpy_asc(unsigned long value, void *arg)
+{
+    unsigned char **p, *q;
+    p = arg;
+    q = *p;
+    *q = (unsigned char)value;
+    (*p)++;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Copy two byte per character BMPStrings */
+
+static int cpy_bmp(unsigned long value, void *arg)
+{
+    unsigned char **p, *q;
+    p = arg;
+    q = *p;
+    *q++ = (unsigned char)((value >> 8) & 0xff);
+    *q = (unsigned char)(value & 0xff);
+    *p += 2;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Copy four byte per character UniversalStrings */
+
+static int cpy_univ(unsigned long value, void *arg)
+{
+    unsigned char **p, *q;
+    p = arg;
+    q = *p;
+    *q++ = (unsigned char)((value >> 24) & 0xff);
+    *q++ = (unsigned char)((value >> 16) & 0xff);
+    *q++ = (unsigned char)((value >> 8) & 0xff);
+    *q = (unsigned char)(value & 0xff);
+    *p += 4;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Copy to a UTF8String */
+
+static int cpy_utf8(unsigned long value, void *arg)
+{
+    unsigned char **p;
+    int ret;
+    p = arg;
+    /* We already know there is enough room so pass 0xff as the length */
+    ret = UTF8_putc(*p, 0xff, value);
+    *p += ret;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Return 1 if the character is permitted in a PrintableString */
+static int is_printable(unsigned long value)
+{
+    int ch;
+    if (value > 0x7f)
+        return 0;
+    ch = (int)value;
+    /*
+     * Note: we can't use 'isalnum' because certain accented characters may
+     * count as alphanumeric in some environments.
+     */
+#ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+    if ((ch >= 'a') && (ch <= 'z'))
+        return 1;
+    if ((ch >= 'A') && (ch <= 'Z'))
+        return 1;
+    if ((ch >= '0') && (ch <= '9'))
+        return 1;
+    if ((ch == ' ') || strchr("'()+,-./:=?", ch))
+        return 1;
+#else                           /* CHARSET_EBCDIC */
+    if ((ch >= os_toascii['a']) && (ch <= os_toascii['z']))
+        return 1;
+    if ((ch >= os_toascii['A']) && (ch <= os_toascii['Z']))
+        return 1;
+    if ((ch >= os_toascii['0']) && (ch <= os_toascii['9']))
+        return 1;
+    if ((ch == os_toascii[' ']) || strchr("'()+,-./:=?", os_toebcdic[ch]))
+        return 1;
+#endif                          /* CHARSET_EBCDIC */
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/* Return 1 if the character is a digit or space */
+static int is_numeric(unsigned long value)
+{
+    int ch;
+    if (value > 0x7f)
+        return 0;
+    ch = (int)value;
+#ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+    if (!isdigit(ch) && ch != ' ')
+        return 0;
+#else
+    if (ch > os_toascii['9'])
+        return 0;
+    if (ch < os_toascii['0'] && ch != os_toascii[' '])
+        return 0;
+#endif
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/a_object.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/a_object.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1ec7a7e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/a_object.c
@@ -0,0 +1,370 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include "internal/asn1_int.h"
+#include "asn1_locl.h"
+
+int i2d_ASN1_OBJECT(const ASN1_OBJECT *a, unsigned char **pp)
+{
+    unsigned char *p;
+    int objsize;
+
+    if ((a == NULL) || (a->data == NULL))
+        return (0);
+
+    objsize = ASN1_object_size(0, a->length, V_ASN1_OBJECT);
+    if (pp == NULL || objsize == -1)
+        return objsize;
+
+    p = *pp;
+    ASN1_put_object(&p, 0, a->length, V_ASN1_OBJECT, V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL);
+    memcpy(p, a->data, a->length);
+    p += a->length;
+
+    *pp = p;
+    return (objsize);
+}
+
+int a2d_ASN1_OBJECT(unsigned char *out, int olen, const char *buf, int num)
+{
+    int i, first, len = 0, c, use_bn;
+    char ftmp[24], *tmp = ftmp;
+    int tmpsize = sizeof(ftmp);
+    const char *p;
+    unsigned long l;
+    BIGNUM *bl = NULL;
+
+    if (num == 0)
+        return (0);
+    else if (num == -1)
+        num = strlen(buf);
+
+    p = buf;
+    c = *(p++);
+    num--;
+    if ((c >= '0') && (c <= '2')) {
+        first = c - '0';
+    } else {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_A2D_ASN1_OBJECT, ASN1_R_FIRST_NUM_TOO_LARGE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (num <= 0) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_A2D_ASN1_OBJECT, ASN1_R_MISSING_SECOND_NUMBER);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    c = *(p++);
+    num--;
+    for (;;) {
+        if (num <= 0)
+            break;
+        if ((c != '.') && (c != ' ')) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_A2D_ASN1_OBJECT, ASN1_R_INVALID_SEPARATOR);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        l = 0;
+        use_bn = 0;
+        for (;;) {
+            if (num <= 0)
+                break;
+            num--;
+            c = *(p++);
+            if ((c == ' ') || (c == '.'))
+                break;
+            if ((c < '0') || (c > '9')) {
+                ASN1err(ASN1_F_A2D_ASN1_OBJECT, ASN1_R_INVALID_DIGIT);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            if (!use_bn && l >= ((ULONG_MAX - 80) / 10L)) {
+                use_bn = 1;
+                if (bl == NULL)
+                    bl = BN_new();
+                if (bl == NULL || !BN_set_word(bl, l))
+                    goto err;
+            }
+            if (use_bn) {
+                if (!BN_mul_word(bl, 10L)
+                    || !BN_add_word(bl, c - '0'))
+                    goto err;
+            } else
+                l = l * 10L + (long)(c - '0');
+        }
+        if (len == 0) {
+            if ((first < 2) && (l >= 40)) {
+                ASN1err(ASN1_F_A2D_ASN1_OBJECT,
+                        ASN1_R_SECOND_NUMBER_TOO_LARGE);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            if (use_bn) {
+                if (!BN_add_word(bl, first * 40))
+                    goto err;
+            } else
+                l += (long)first *40;
+        }
+        i = 0;
+        if (use_bn) {
+            int blsize;
+            blsize = BN_num_bits(bl);
+            blsize = (blsize + 6) / 7;
+            if (blsize > tmpsize) {
+                if (tmp != ftmp)
+                    OPENSSL_free(tmp);
+                tmpsize = blsize + 32;
+                tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(tmpsize);
+                if (tmp == NULL)
+                    goto err;
+            }
+            while (blsize--) {
+                BN_ULONG t = BN_div_word(bl, 0x80L);
+                if (t == (BN_ULONG)-1)
+                    goto err;
+                tmp[i++] = (unsigned char)t;
+            }
+        } else {
+
+            for (;;) {
+                tmp[i++] = (unsigned char)l & 0x7f;
+                l >>= 7L;
+                if (l == 0L)
+                    break;
+            }
+
+        }
+        if (out != NULL) {
+            if (len + i > olen) {
+                ASN1err(ASN1_F_A2D_ASN1_OBJECT, ASN1_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            while (--i > 0)
+                out[len++] = tmp[i] | 0x80;
+            out[len++] = tmp[0];
+        } else
+            len += i;
+    }
+    if (tmp != ftmp)
+        OPENSSL_free(tmp);
+    BN_free(bl);
+    return (len);
+ err:
+    if (tmp != ftmp)
+        OPENSSL_free(tmp);
+    BN_free(bl);
+    return (0);
+}
+
+int i2t_ASN1_OBJECT(char *buf, int buf_len, const ASN1_OBJECT *a)
+{
+    return OBJ_obj2txt(buf, buf_len, a, 0);
+}
+
+int i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(BIO *bp, const ASN1_OBJECT *a)
+{
+    char buf[80], *p = buf;
+    int i;
+
+    if ((a == NULL) || (a->data == NULL))
+        return (BIO_write(bp, "NULL", 4));
+    i = i2t_ASN1_OBJECT(buf, sizeof(buf), a);
+    if (i > (int)(sizeof(buf) - 1)) {
+        p = OPENSSL_malloc(i + 1);
+        if (p == NULL)
+            return -1;
+        i2t_ASN1_OBJECT(p, i + 1, a);
+    }
+    if (i <= 0) {
+        i = BIO_write(bp, "<INVALID>", 9);
+        i += BIO_dump(bp, (const char *)a->data, a->length);
+        return i;
+    }
+    BIO_write(bp, p, i);
+    if (p != buf)
+        OPENSSL_free(p);
+    return (i);
+}
+
+ASN1_OBJECT *d2i_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT **a, const unsigned char **pp,
+                             long length)
+{
+    const unsigned char *p;
+    long len;
+    int tag, xclass;
+    int inf, i;
+    ASN1_OBJECT *ret = NULL;
+    p = *pp;
+    inf = ASN1_get_object(&p, &len, &tag, &xclass, length);
+    if (inf & 0x80) {
+        i = ASN1_R_BAD_OBJECT_HEADER;
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (tag != V_ASN1_OBJECT) {
+        i = ASN1_R_EXPECTING_AN_OBJECT;
+        goto err;
+    }
+    ret = c2i_ASN1_OBJECT(a, &p, len);
+    if (ret)
+        *pp = p;
+    return ret;
+ err:
+    ASN1err(ASN1_F_D2I_ASN1_OBJECT, i);
+    return (NULL);
+}
+
+ASN1_OBJECT *c2i_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT **a, const unsigned char **pp,
+                             long len)
+{
+    ASN1_OBJECT *ret = NULL, tobj;
+    const unsigned char *p;
+    unsigned char *data;
+    int i, length;
+
+    /*
+     * Sanity check OID encoding. Need at least one content octet. MSB must
+     * be clear in the last octet. can't have leading 0x80 in subidentifiers,
+     * see: X.690 8.19.2
+     */
+    if (len <= 0 || len > INT_MAX || pp == NULL || (p = *pp) == NULL ||
+        p[len - 1] & 0x80) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_C2I_ASN1_OBJECT, ASN1_R_INVALID_OBJECT_ENCODING);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    /* Now 0 < len <= INT_MAX, so the cast is safe. */
+    length = (int)len;
+    /*
+     * Try to lookup OID in table: these are all valid encodings so if we get
+     * a match we know the OID is valid.
+     */
+    tobj.nid = NID_undef;
+    tobj.data = p;
+    tobj.length = length;
+    tobj.flags = 0;
+    i = OBJ_obj2nid(&tobj);
+    if (i != NID_undef) {
+        /*
+         * Return shared registered OID object: this improves efficiency
+         * because we don't have to return a dynamically allocated OID
+         * and NID lookups can use the cached value.
+         */
+        ret = OBJ_nid2obj(i);
+        if (a) {
+            ASN1_OBJECT_free(*a);
+            *a = ret;
+        }
+        *pp += len;
+        return ret;
+    }
+    for (i = 0; i < length; i++, p++) {
+        if (*p == 0x80 && (!i || !(p[-1] & 0x80))) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_C2I_ASN1_OBJECT, ASN1_R_INVALID_OBJECT_ENCODING);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * only the ASN1_OBJECTs from the 'table' will have values for ->sn or
+     * ->ln
+     */
+    if ((a == NULL) || ((*a) == NULL) ||
+        !((*a)->flags & ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC)) {
+        if ((ret = ASN1_OBJECT_new()) == NULL)
+            return (NULL);
+    } else
+        ret = (*a);
+
+    p = *pp;
+    /* detach data from object */
+    data = (unsigned char *)ret->data;
+    ret->data = NULL;
+    /* once detached we can change it */
+    if ((data == NULL) || (ret->length < length)) {
+        ret->length = 0;
+        OPENSSL_free(data);
+        data = OPENSSL_malloc(length);
+        if (data == NULL) {
+            i = ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE;
+            goto err;
+        }
+        ret->flags |= ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_DATA;
+    }
+    memcpy(data, p, length);
+    /* reattach data to object, after which it remains const */
+    ret->data = data;
+    ret->length = length;
+    ret->sn = NULL;
+    ret->ln = NULL;
+    /* ret->flags=ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC; we know it is dynamic */
+    p += length;
+
+    if (a != NULL)
+        (*a) = ret;
+    *pp = p;
+    return (ret);
+ err:
+    ASN1err(ASN1_F_C2I_ASN1_OBJECT, i);
+    if ((a == NULL) || (*a != ret))
+        ASN1_OBJECT_free(ret);
+    return (NULL);
+}
+
+ASN1_OBJECT *ASN1_OBJECT_new(void)
+{
+    ASN1_OBJECT *ret;
+
+    ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
+    if (ret == NULL) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_OBJECT_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+    ret->flags = ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC;
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+void ASN1_OBJECT_free(ASN1_OBJECT *a)
+{
+    if (a == NULL)
+        return;
+    if (a->flags & ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_STRINGS) {
+#ifndef CONST_STRICT            /* disable purely for compile-time strict
+                                 * const checking. Doing this on a "real"
+                                 * compile will cause memory leaks */
+        OPENSSL_free((void*)a->sn);
+        OPENSSL_free((void*)a->ln);
+#endif
+        a->sn = a->ln = NULL;
+    }
+    if (a->flags & ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_DATA) {
+        OPENSSL_free((void*)a->data);
+        a->data = NULL;
+        a->length = 0;
+    }
+    if (a->flags & ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC)
+        OPENSSL_free(a);
+}
+
+ASN1_OBJECT *ASN1_OBJECT_create(int nid, unsigned char *data, int len,
+                                const char *sn, const char *ln)
+{
+    ASN1_OBJECT o;
+
+    o.sn = sn;
+    o.ln = ln;
+    o.data = data;
+    o.nid = nid;
+    o.length = len;
+    o.flags = ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC | ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_STRINGS |
+        ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_DATA;
+    return (OBJ_dup(&o));
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/a_octet.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/a_octet.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2e1205c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/a_octet.c
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+
+ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ASN1_OCTET_STRING_dup(const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *x)
+{
+    return ASN1_STRING_dup(x);
+}
+
+int ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *a,
+                          const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *b)
+{
+    return ASN1_STRING_cmp(a, b);
+}
+
+int ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(ASN1_OCTET_STRING *x, const unsigned char *d,
+                          int len)
+{
+    return ASN1_STRING_set(x, d, len);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/a_print.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/a_print.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1aafe7c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/a_print.c
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+
+int ASN1_PRINTABLE_type(const unsigned char *s, int len)
+{
+    int c;
+    int ia5 = 0;
+    int t61 = 0;
+
+    if (len <= 0)
+        len = -1;
+    if (s == NULL)
+        return (V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING);
+
+    while ((*s) && (len-- != 0)) {
+        c = *(s++);
+#ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+        if (!(((c >= 'a') && (c <= 'z')) ||
+              ((c >= 'A') && (c <= 'Z')) ||
+              ((c >= '0') && (c <= '9')) ||
+              (c == ' ') || (c == '\'') ||
+              (c == '(') || (c == ')') ||
+              (c == '+') || (c == ',') ||
+              (c == '-') || (c == '.') ||
+              (c == '/') || (c == ':') || (c == '=') || (c == '?')))
+            ia5 = 1;
+        if (c & 0x80)
+            t61 = 1;
+#else
+        if (!isalnum(c) && (c != ' ') && strchr("'()+,-./:=?", c) == NULL)
+            ia5 = 1;
+        if (os_toascii[c] & 0x80)
+            t61 = 1;
+#endif
+    }
+    if (t61)
+        return (V_ASN1_T61STRING);
+    if (ia5)
+        return (V_ASN1_IA5STRING);
+    return (V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING);
+}
+
+int ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING_to_string(ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING *s)
+{
+    int i;
+    unsigned char *p;
+
+    if (s->type != V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING)
+        return (0);
+    if ((s->length % 4) != 0)
+        return (0);
+    p = s->data;
+    for (i = 0; i < s->length; i += 4) {
+        if ((p[0] != '\0') || (p[1] != '\0') || (p[2] != '\0'))
+            break;
+        else
+            p += 4;
+    }
+    if (i < s->length)
+        return (0);
+    p = s->data;
+    for (i = 3; i < s->length; i += 4) {
+        *(p++) = s->data[i];
+    }
+    *(p) = '\0';
+    s->length /= 4;
+    s->type = ASN1_PRINTABLE_type(s->data, s->length);
+    return (1);
+}
+
+int ASN1_STRING_print(BIO *bp, const ASN1_STRING *v)
+{
+    int i, n;
+    char buf[80];
+    const char *p;
+
+    if (v == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    n = 0;
+    p = (const char *)v->data;
+    for (i = 0; i < v->length; i++) {
+        if ((p[i] > '~') || ((p[i] < ' ') &&
+                             (p[i] != '\n') && (p[i] != '\r')))
+            buf[n] = '.';
+        else
+            buf[n] = p[i];
+        n++;
+        if (n >= 80) {
+            if (BIO_write(bp, buf, n) <= 0)
+                return (0);
+            n = 0;
+        }
+    }
+    if (n > 0)
+        if (BIO_write(bp, buf, n) <= 0)
+            return (0);
+    return (1);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/a_sign.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/a_sign.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3b261eb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/a_sign.c
@@ -0,0 +1,225 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include "internal/asn1_int.h"
+#include "internal/evp_int.h"
+
+#ifndef NO_ASN1_OLD
+
+int ASN1_sign(i2d_of_void *i2d, X509_ALGOR *algor1, X509_ALGOR *algor2,
+              ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature, char *data, EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+              const EVP_MD *type)
+{
+    EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+    unsigned char *p, *buf_in = NULL, *buf_out = NULL;
+    int i, inl = 0, outl = 0, outll = 0;
+    X509_ALGOR *a;
+
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
+        if (i == 0)
+            a = algor1;
+        else
+            a = algor2;
+        if (a == NULL)
+            continue;
+        if (type->pkey_type == NID_dsaWithSHA1) {
+            /*
+             * special case: RFC 2459 tells us to omit 'parameters' with
+             * id-dsa-with-sha1
+             */
+            ASN1_TYPE_free(a->parameter);
+            a->parameter = NULL;
+        } else if ((a->parameter == NULL) ||
+                   (a->parameter->type != V_ASN1_NULL)) {
+            ASN1_TYPE_free(a->parameter);
+            if ((a->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new()) == NULL)
+                goto err;
+            a->parameter->type = V_ASN1_NULL;
+        }
+        ASN1_OBJECT_free(a->algorithm);
+        a->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type->pkey_type);
+        if (a->algorithm == NULL) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_SIGN, ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_OBJECT_TYPE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (a->algorithm->length == 0) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_SIGN,
+                    ASN1_R_THE_ASN1_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER_IS_NOT_KNOWN_FOR_THIS_MD);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+    inl = i2d(data, NULL);
+    buf_in = OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)inl);
+    outll = outl = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
+    buf_out = OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)outl);
+    if ((buf_in == NULL) || (buf_out == NULL)) {
+        outl = 0;
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    p = buf_in;
+
+    i2d(data, &p);
+    if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(ctx, type, NULL)
+        || !EVP_SignUpdate(ctx, (unsigned char *)buf_in, inl)
+        || !EVP_SignFinal(ctx, (unsigned char *)buf_out,
+                          (unsigned int *)&outl, pkey)) {
+        outl = 0;
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_SIGN, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    OPENSSL_free(signature->data);
+    signature->data = buf_out;
+    buf_out = NULL;
+    signature->length = outl;
+    /*
+     * In the interests of compatibility, I'll make sure that the bit string
+     * has a 'not-used bits' value of 0
+     */
+    signature->flags &= ~(ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT | 0x07);
+    signature->flags |= ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT;
+ err:
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
+    OPENSSL_clear_free((char *)buf_in, (unsigned int)inl);
+    OPENSSL_clear_free((char *)buf_out, outll);
+    return (outl);
+}
+
+#endif
+
+int ASN1_item_sign(const ASN1_ITEM *it, X509_ALGOR *algor1,
+                   X509_ALGOR *algor2, ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature, void *asn,
+                   EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *type)
+{
+    int rv;
+    EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(ctx, NULL, type, NULL, pkey)) {
+        EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    rv = ASN1_item_sign_ctx(it, algor1, algor2, signature, asn, ctx);
+
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
+    return rv;
+}
+
+int ASN1_item_sign_ctx(const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+                       X509_ALGOR *algor1, X509_ALGOR *algor2,
+                       ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature, void *asn, EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    const EVP_MD *type;
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+    unsigned char *buf_in = NULL, *buf_out = NULL;
+    size_t inl = 0, outl = 0, outll = 0;
+    int signid, paramtype;
+    int rv;
+
+    type = EVP_MD_CTX_md(ctx);
+    pkey = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(EVP_MD_CTX_pkey_ctx(ctx));
+
+    if (type == NULL || pkey == NULL) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_SIGN_CTX, ASN1_R_CONTEXT_NOT_INITIALISED);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (pkey->ameth == NULL) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_SIGN_CTX, ASN1_R_DIGEST_AND_KEY_TYPE_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (pkey->ameth->item_sign) {
+        rv = pkey->ameth->item_sign(ctx, it, asn, algor1, algor2, signature);
+        if (rv == 1)
+            outl = signature->length;
+        /*-
+         * Return value meanings:
+         * <=0: error.
+         *   1: method does everything.
+         *   2: carry on as normal.
+         *   3: ASN1 method sets algorithm identifiers: just sign.
+         */
+        if (rv <= 0)
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_SIGN_CTX, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+        if (rv <= 1)
+            goto err;
+    } else
+        rv = 2;
+
+    if (rv == 2) {
+        if (!OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(&signid,
+                                    EVP_MD_nid(type),
+                                    pkey->ameth->pkey_id)) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_SIGN_CTX,
+                    ASN1_R_DIGEST_AND_KEY_TYPE_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        if (pkey->ameth->pkey_flags & ASN1_PKEY_SIGPARAM_NULL)
+            paramtype = V_ASN1_NULL;
+        else
+            paramtype = V_ASN1_UNDEF;
+
+        if (algor1)
+            X509_ALGOR_set0(algor1, OBJ_nid2obj(signid), paramtype, NULL);
+        if (algor2)
+            X509_ALGOR_set0(algor2, OBJ_nid2obj(signid), paramtype, NULL);
+
+    }
+
+    inl = ASN1_item_i2d(asn, &buf_in, it);
+    outll = outl = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
+    buf_out = OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)outl);
+    if ((buf_in == NULL) || (buf_out == NULL)) {
+        outl = 0;
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_SIGN_CTX, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(ctx, buf_in, inl)
+        || !EVP_DigestSignFinal(ctx, buf_out, &outl)) {
+        outl = 0;
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_SIGN_CTX, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    OPENSSL_free(signature->data);
+    signature->data = buf_out;
+    buf_out = NULL;
+    signature->length = outl;
+    /*
+     * In the interests of compatibility, I'll make sure that the bit string
+     * has a 'not-used bits' value of 0
+     */
+    signature->flags &= ~(ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT | 0x07);
+    signature->flags |= ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT;
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_clear_free((char *)buf_in, (unsigned int)inl);
+    OPENSSL_clear_free((char *)buf_out, outll);
+    return (outl);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/a_strex.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/a_strex.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b91266b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/a_strex.c
@@ -0,0 +1,644 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "internal/asn1_int.h"
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+
+#include "charmap.h"
+
+/*
+ * ASN1_STRING_print_ex() and X509_NAME_print_ex(). Enhanced string and name
+ * printing routines handling multibyte characters, RFC2253 and a host of
+ * other options.
+ */
+
+#define CHARTYPE_BS_ESC         (ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_2253 | CHARTYPE_FIRST_ESC_2253 | CHARTYPE_LAST_ESC_2253)
+
+#define ESC_FLAGS (ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_2253 | \
+                  ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_2254 | \
+                  ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_QUOTE | \
+                  ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_CTRL | \
+                  ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_MSB)
+
+/*
+ * Three IO functions for sending data to memory, a BIO and and a FILE
+ * pointer.
+ */
+static int send_bio_chars(void *arg, const void *buf, int len)
+{
+    if (!arg)
+        return 1;
+    if (BIO_write(arg, buf, len) != len)
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+static int send_fp_chars(void *arg, const void *buf, int len)
+{
+    if (!arg)
+        return 1;
+    if (fwrite(buf, 1, len, arg) != (unsigned int)len)
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+#endif
+
+typedef int char_io (void *arg, const void *buf, int len);
+
+/*
+ * This function handles display of strings, one character at a time. It is
+ * passed an unsigned long for each character because it could come from 2 or
+ * even 4 byte forms.
+ */
+
+static int do_esc_char(unsigned long c, unsigned short flags, char *do_quotes,
+                       char_io *io_ch, void *arg)
+{
+    unsigned short chflgs;
+    unsigned char chtmp;
+    char tmphex[HEX_SIZE(long) + 3];
+
+    if (c > 0xffffffffL)
+        return -1;
+    if (c > 0xffff) {
+        BIO_snprintf(tmphex, sizeof(tmphex), "\\W%08lX", c);
+        if (!io_ch(arg, tmphex, 10))
+            return -1;
+        return 10;
+    }
+    if (c > 0xff) {
+        BIO_snprintf(tmphex, sizeof(tmphex), "\\U%04lX", c);
+        if (!io_ch(arg, tmphex, 6))
+            return -1;
+        return 6;
+    }
+    chtmp = (unsigned char)c;
+    if (chtmp > 0x7f)
+        chflgs = flags & ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_MSB;
+    else
+        chflgs = char_type[chtmp] & flags;
+    if (chflgs & CHARTYPE_BS_ESC) {
+        /* If we don't escape with quotes, signal we need quotes */
+        if (chflgs & ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_QUOTE) {
+            if (do_quotes)
+                *do_quotes = 1;
+            if (!io_ch(arg, &chtmp, 1))
+                return -1;
+            return 1;
+        }
+        if (!io_ch(arg, "\\", 1))
+            return -1;
+        if (!io_ch(arg, &chtmp, 1))
+            return -1;
+        return 2;
+    }
+    if (chflgs & (ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_CTRL
+                  | ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_MSB
+                  | ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_2254)) {
+        BIO_snprintf(tmphex, 11, "\\%02X", chtmp);
+        if (!io_ch(arg, tmphex, 3))
+            return -1;
+        return 3;
+    }
+    /*
+     * If we get this far and do any escaping at all must escape the escape
+     * character itself: backslash.
+     */
+    if (chtmp == '\\' && (flags & ESC_FLAGS)) {
+        if (!io_ch(arg, "\\\\", 2))
+            return -1;
+        return 2;
+    }
+    if (!io_ch(arg, &chtmp, 1))
+        return -1;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+#define BUF_TYPE_WIDTH_MASK     0x7
+#define BUF_TYPE_CONVUTF8       0x8
+
+/*
+ * This function sends each character in a buffer to do_esc_char(). It
+ * interprets the content formats and converts to or from UTF8 as
+ * appropriate.
+ */
+
+static int do_buf(unsigned char *buf, int buflen,
+                  int type, unsigned short flags, char *quotes, char_io *io_ch,
+                  void *arg)
+{
+    int i, outlen, len;
+    unsigned short orflags;
+    unsigned char *p, *q;
+    unsigned long c;
+
+    p = buf;
+    q = buf + buflen;
+    outlen = 0;
+    while (p != q) {
+        if (p == buf && flags & ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_2253)
+            orflags = CHARTYPE_FIRST_ESC_2253;
+        else
+            orflags = 0;
+        switch (type & BUF_TYPE_WIDTH_MASK) {
+        case 4:
+            c = ((unsigned long)*p++) << 24;
+            c |= ((unsigned long)*p++) << 16;
+            c |= ((unsigned long)*p++) << 8;
+            c |= *p++;
+            break;
+
+        case 2:
+            c = ((unsigned long)*p++) << 8;
+            c |= *p++;
+            break;
+
+        case 1:
+            c = *p++;
+            break;
+
+        case 0:
+            i = UTF8_getc(p, buflen, &c);
+            if (i < 0)
+                return -1;      /* Invalid UTF8String */
+            p += i;
+            break;
+        default:
+            return -1;          /* invalid width */
+        }
+        if (p == q && flags & ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_2253)
+            orflags = CHARTYPE_LAST_ESC_2253;
+        if (type & BUF_TYPE_CONVUTF8) {
+            unsigned char utfbuf[6];
+            int utflen;
+            utflen = UTF8_putc(utfbuf, sizeof(utfbuf), c);
+            for (i = 0; i < utflen; i++) {
+                /*
+                 * We don't need to worry about setting orflags correctly
+                 * because if utflen==1 its value will be correct anyway
+                 * otherwise each character will be > 0x7f and so the
+                 * character will never be escaped on first and last.
+                 */
+                len = do_esc_char(utfbuf[i], flags | orflags, quotes,
+                                  io_ch, arg);
+                if (len < 0)
+                    return -1;
+                outlen += len;
+            }
+        } else {
+            len = do_esc_char(c, flags | orflags, quotes,
+                              io_ch, arg);
+            if (len < 0)
+                return -1;
+            outlen += len;
+        }
+    }
+    return outlen;
+}
+
+/* This function hex dumps a buffer of characters */
+
+static int do_hex_dump(char_io *io_ch, void *arg, unsigned char *buf,
+                       int buflen)
+{
+    static const char hexdig[] = "0123456789ABCDEF";
+    unsigned char *p, *q;
+    char hextmp[2];
+    if (arg) {
+        p = buf;
+        q = buf + buflen;
+        while (p != q) {
+            hextmp[0] = hexdig[*p >> 4];
+            hextmp[1] = hexdig[*p & 0xf];
+            if (!io_ch(arg, hextmp, 2))
+                return -1;
+            p++;
+        }
+    }
+    return buflen << 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * "dump" a string. This is done when the type is unknown, or the flags
+ * request it. We can either dump the content octets or the entire DER
+ * encoding. This uses the RFC2253 #01234 format.
+ */
+
+static int do_dump(unsigned long lflags, char_io *io_ch, void *arg,
+                   const ASN1_STRING *str)
+{
+    /*
+     * Placing the ASN1_STRING in a temp ASN1_TYPE allows the DER encoding to
+     * readily obtained
+     */
+    ASN1_TYPE t;
+    unsigned char *der_buf, *p;
+    int outlen, der_len;
+
+    if (!io_ch(arg, "#", 1))
+        return -1;
+    /* If we don't dump DER encoding just dump content octets */
+    if (!(lflags & ASN1_STRFLGS_DUMP_DER)) {
+        outlen = do_hex_dump(io_ch, arg, str->data, str->length);
+        if (outlen < 0)
+            return -1;
+        return outlen + 1;
+    }
+    t.type = str->type;
+    t.value.ptr = (char *)str;
+    der_len = i2d_ASN1_TYPE(&t, NULL);
+    der_buf = OPENSSL_malloc(der_len);
+    if (der_buf == NULL)
+        return -1;
+    p = der_buf;
+    i2d_ASN1_TYPE(&t, &p);
+    outlen = do_hex_dump(io_ch, arg, der_buf, der_len);
+    OPENSSL_free(der_buf);
+    if (outlen < 0)
+        return -1;
+    return outlen + 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Lookup table to convert tags to character widths, 0 = UTF8 encoded, -1 is
+ * used for non string types otherwise it is the number of bytes per
+ * character
+ */
+
+static const signed char tag2nbyte[] = {
+    -1, -1, -1, -1, -1,         /* 0-4 */
+    -1, -1, -1, -1, -1,         /* 5-9 */
+    -1, -1, 0, -1,              /* 10-13 */
+    -1, -1, -1, -1,             /* 15-17 */
+    1, 1, 1,                    /* 18-20 */
+    -1, 1, 1, 1,                /* 21-24 */
+    -1, 1, -1,                  /* 25-27 */
+    4, -1, 2                    /* 28-30 */
+};
+
+/*
+ * This is the main function, print out an ASN1_STRING taking note of various
+ * escape and display options. Returns number of characters written or -1 if
+ * an error occurred.
+ */
+
+static int do_print_ex(char_io *io_ch, void *arg, unsigned long lflags,
+                       const ASN1_STRING *str)
+{
+    int outlen, len;
+    int type;
+    char quotes;
+    unsigned short flags;
+    quotes = 0;
+    /* Keep a copy of escape flags */
+    flags = (unsigned short)(lflags & ESC_FLAGS);
+
+    type = str->type;
+
+    outlen = 0;
+
+    if (lflags & ASN1_STRFLGS_SHOW_TYPE) {
+        const char *tagname;
+        tagname = ASN1_tag2str(type);
+        outlen += strlen(tagname);
+        if (!io_ch(arg, tagname, outlen) || !io_ch(arg, ":", 1))
+            return -1;
+        outlen++;
+    }
+
+    /* Decide what to do with type, either dump content or display it */
+
+    /* Dump everything */
+    if (lflags & ASN1_STRFLGS_DUMP_ALL)
+        type = -1;
+    /* Ignore the string type */
+    else if (lflags & ASN1_STRFLGS_IGNORE_TYPE)
+        type = 1;
+    else {
+        /* Else determine width based on type */
+        if ((type > 0) && (type < 31))
+            type = tag2nbyte[type];
+        else
+            type = -1;
+        if ((type == -1) && !(lflags & ASN1_STRFLGS_DUMP_UNKNOWN))
+            type = 1;
+    }
+
+    if (type == -1) {
+        len = do_dump(lflags, io_ch, arg, str);
+        if (len < 0)
+            return -1;
+        outlen += len;
+        return outlen;
+    }
+
+    if (lflags & ASN1_STRFLGS_UTF8_CONVERT) {
+        /*
+         * Note: if string is UTF8 and we want to convert to UTF8 then we
+         * just interpret it as 1 byte per character to avoid converting
+         * twice.
+         */
+        if (!type)
+            type = 1;
+        else
+            type |= BUF_TYPE_CONVUTF8;
+    }
+
+    len = do_buf(str->data, str->length, type, flags, &quotes, io_ch, NULL);
+    if (len < 0)
+        return -1;
+    outlen += len;
+    if (quotes)
+        outlen += 2;
+    if (!arg)
+        return outlen;
+    if (quotes && !io_ch(arg, "\"", 1))
+        return -1;
+    if (do_buf(str->data, str->length, type, flags, NULL, io_ch, arg) < 0)
+        return -1;
+    if (quotes && !io_ch(arg, "\"", 1))
+        return -1;
+    return outlen;
+}
+
+/* Used for line indenting: print 'indent' spaces */
+
+static int do_indent(char_io *io_ch, void *arg, int indent)
+{
+    int i;
+    for (i = 0; i < indent; i++)
+        if (!io_ch(arg, " ", 1))
+            return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+#define FN_WIDTH_LN     25
+#define FN_WIDTH_SN     10
+
+static int do_name_ex(char_io *io_ch, void *arg, const X509_NAME *n,
+                      int indent, unsigned long flags)
+{
+    int i, prev = -1, orflags, cnt;
+    int fn_opt, fn_nid;
+    ASN1_OBJECT *fn;
+    const ASN1_STRING *val;
+    const X509_NAME_ENTRY *ent;
+    char objtmp[80];
+    const char *objbuf;
+    int outlen, len;
+    char *sep_dn, *sep_mv, *sep_eq;
+    int sep_dn_len, sep_mv_len, sep_eq_len;
+    if (indent < 0)
+        indent = 0;
+    outlen = indent;
+    if (!do_indent(io_ch, arg, indent))
+        return -1;
+    switch (flags & XN_FLAG_SEP_MASK) {
+    case XN_FLAG_SEP_MULTILINE:
+        sep_dn = "\n";
+        sep_dn_len = 1;
+        sep_mv = " + ";
+        sep_mv_len = 3;
+        break;
+
+    case XN_FLAG_SEP_COMMA_PLUS:
+        sep_dn = ",";
+        sep_dn_len = 1;
+        sep_mv = "+";
+        sep_mv_len = 1;
+        indent = 0;
+        break;
+
+    case XN_FLAG_SEP_CPLUS_SPC:
+        sep_dn = ", ";
+        sep_dn_len = 2;
+        sep_mv = " + ";
+        sep_mv_len = 3;
+        indent = 0;
+        break;
+
+    case XN_FLAG_SEP_SPLUS_SPC:
+        sep_dn = "; ";
+        sep_dn_len = 2;
+        sep_mv = " + ";
+        sep_mv_len = 3;
+        indent = 0;
+        break;
+
+    default:
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (flags & XN_FLAG_SPC_EQ) {
+        sep_eq = " = ";
+        sep_eq_len = 3;
+    } else {
+        sep_eq = "=";
+        sep_eq_len = 1;
+    }
+
+    fn_opt = flags & XN_FLAG_FN_MASK;
+
+    cnt = X509_NAME_entry_count(n);
+    for (i = 0; i < cnt; i++) {
+        if (flags & XN_FLAG_DN_REV)
+            ent = X509_NAME_get_entry(n, cnt - i - 1);
+        else
+            ent = X509_NAME_get_entry(n, i);
+        if (prev != -1) {
+            if (prev == X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(ent)) {
+                if (!io_ch(arg, sep_mv, sep_mv_len))
+                    return -1;
+                outlen += sep_mv_len;
+            } else {
+                if (!io_ch(arg, sep_dn, sep_dn_len))
+                    return -1;
+                outlen += sep_dn_len;
+                if (!do_indent(io_ch, arg, indent))
+                    return -1;
+                outlen += indent;
+            }
+        }
+        prev = X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(ent);
+        fn = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(ent);
+        val = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(ent);
+        fn_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(fn);
+        if (fn_opt != XN_FLAG_FN_NONE) {
+            int objlen, fld_len;
+            if ((fn_opt == XN_FLAG_FN_OID) || (fn_nid == NID_undef)) {
+                OBJ_obj2txt(objtmp, sizeof(objtmp), fn, 1);
+                fld_len = 0;    /* XXX: what should this be? */
+                objbuf = objtmp;
+            } else {
+                if (fn_opt == XN_FLAG_FN_SN) {
+                    fld_len = FN_WIDTH_SN;
+                    objbuf = OBJ_nid2sn(fn_nid);
+                } else if (fn_opt == XN_FLAG_FN_LN) {
+                    fld_len = FN_WIDTH_LN;
+                    objbuf = OBJ_nid2ln(fn_nid);
+                } else {
+                    fld_len = 0; /* XXX: what should this be? */
+                    objbuf = "";
+                }
+            }
+            objlen = strlen(objbuf);
+            if (!io_ch(arg, objbuf, objlen))
+                return -1;
+            if ((objlen < fld_len) && (flags & XN_FLAG_FN_ALIGN)) {
+                if (!do_indent(io_ch, arg, fld_len - objlen))
+                    return -1;
+                outlen += fld_len - objlen;
+            }
+            if (!io_ch(arg, sep_eq, sep_eq_len))
+                return -1;
+            outlen += objlen + sep_eq_len;
+        }
+        /*
+         * If the field name is unknown then fix up the DER dump flag. We
+         * might want to limit this further so it will DER dump on anything
+         * other than a few 'standard' fields.
+         */
+        if ((fn_nid == NID_undef) && (flags & XN_FLAG_DUMP_UNKNOWN_FIELDS))
+            orflags = ASN1_STRFLGS_DUMP_ALL;
+        else
+            orflags = 0;
+
+        len = do_print_ex(io_ch, arg, flags | orflags, val);
+        if (len < 0)
+            return -1;
+        outlen += len;
+    }
+    return outlen;
+}
+
+/* Wrappers round the main functions */
+
+int X509_NAME_print_ex(BIO *out, const X509_NAME *nm, int indent,
+                       unsigned long flags)
+{
+    if (flags == XN_FLAG_COMPAT)
+        return X509_NAME_print(out, nm, indent);
+    return do_name_ex(send_bio_chars, out, nm, indent, flags);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+int X509_NAME_print_ex_fp(FILE *fp, const X509_NAME *nm, int indent,
+                          unsigned long flags)
+{
+    if (flags == XN_FLAG_COMPAT) {
+        BIO *btmp;
+        int ret;
+        btmp = BIO_new_fp(fp, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+        if (!btmp)
+            return -1;
+        ret = X509_NAME_print(btmp, nm, indent);
+        BIO_free(btmp);
+        return ret;
+    }
+    return do_name_ex(send_fp_chars, fp, nm, indent, flags);
+}
+#endif
+
+int ASN1_STRING_print_ex(BIO *out, const ASN1_STRING *str, unsigned long flags)
+{
+    return do_print_ex(send_bio_chars, out, flags, str);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+int ASN1_STRING_print_ex_fp(FILE *fp, const ASN1_STRING *str, unsigned long flags)
+{
+    return do_print_ex(send_fp_chars, fp, flags, str);
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Utility function: convert any string type to UTF8, returns number of bytes
+ * in output string or a negative error code
+ */
+
+int ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(unsigned char **out, const ASN1_STRING *in)
+{
+    ASN1_STRING stmp, *str = &stmp;
+    int mbflag, type, ret;
+    if (!in)
+        return -1;
+    type = in->type;
+    if ((type < 0) || (type > 30))
+        return -1;
+    mbflag = tag2nbyte[type];
+    if (mbflag == -1)
+        return -1;
+    mbflag |= MBSTRING_FLAG;
+    stmp.data = NULL;
+    stmp.length = 0;
+    stmp.flags = 0;
+    ret =
+        ASN1_mbstring_copy(&str, in->data, in->length, mbflag,
+                           B_ASN1_UTF8STRING);
+    if (ret < 0)
+        return ret;
+    *out = stmp.data;
+    return stmp.length;
+}
+
+/* Return 1 if host is a valid hostname and 0 otherwise */
+int asn1_valid_host(const ASN1_STRING *host)
+{
+    int hostlen = host->length;
+    const unsigned char *hostptr = host->data;
+    int type = host->type;
+    int i;
+    signed char width = -1;
+    unsigned short chflags = 0, prevchflags;
+
+    if (type > 0 && type < 31)
+        width = tag2nbyte[type];
+    if (width == -1 || hostlen == 0)
+        return 0;
+    /* Treat UTF8String as width 1 as any MSB set is invalid */
+    if (width == 0)
+        width = 1;
+    for (i = 0 ; i < hostlen; i+= width) {
+        prevchflags = chflags;
+        /* Value must be <= 0x7F: check upper bytes are all zeroes */
+        if (width == 4) {
+            if (*hostptr++ != 0 || *hostptr++ != 0 || *hostptr++ != 0)
+                return 0;
+        } else if (width == 2) {
+            if (*hostptr++ != 0)
+                return 0;
+        }
+        if (*hostptr > 0x7f)
+            return 0;
+        chflags = char_type[*hostptr++];
+        if (!(chflags & (CHARTYPE_HOST_ANY | CHARTYPE_HOST_WILD))) {
+            /* Nothing else allowed at start or end of string */
+            if (i == 0 || i == hostlen - 1)
+                return 0;
+            /* Otherwise invalid if not dot or hyphen */
+            if (!(chflags & (CHARTYPE_HOST_DOT | CHARTYPE_HOST_HYPHEN)))
+                return 0;
+            /*
+             * If previous is dot or hyphen then illegal unless both
+             * are hyphens: as .- -. .. are all illegal
+             */
+            if (prevchflags & (CHARTYPE_HOST_DOT | CHARTYPE_HOST_HYPHEN)
+                && ((prevchflags & CHARTYPE_HOST_DOT)
+                    || (chflags & CHARTYPE_HOST_DOT)))
+                return 0;
+        }
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/a_strnid.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/a_strnid.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ecf178e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/a_strnid.c
@@ -0,0 +1,289 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+
+static STACK_OF(ASN1_STRING_TABLE) *stable = NULL;
+static void st_free(ASN1_STRING_TABLE *tbl);
+static int sk_table_cmp(const ASN1_STRING_TABLE *const *a,
+                        const ASN1_STRING_TABLE *const *b);
+
+/*
+ * This is the global mask for the mbstring functions: this is use to mask
+ * out certain types (such as BMPString and UTF8String) because certain
+ * software (e.g. Netscape) has problems with them.
+ */
+
+static unsigned long global_mask = B_ASN1_UTF8STRING;
+
+void ASN1_STRING_set_default_mask(unsigned long mask)
+{
+    global_mask = mask;
+}
+
+unsigned long ASN1_STRING_get_default_mask(void)
+{
+    return global_mask;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * This function sets the default to various "flavours" of configuration.
+ * based on an ASCII string. Currently this is:
+ * MASK:XXXX : a numerical mask value.
+ * nobmp : Don't use BMPStrings (just Printable, T61).
+ * pkix : PKIX recommendation in RFC2459.
+ * utf8only : only use UTF8Strings (RFC2459 recommendation for 2004).
+ * default:   the default value, Printable, T61, BMP.
+ */
+
+int ASN1_STRING_set_default_mask_asc(const char *p)
+{
+    unsigned long mask;
+    char *end;
+    if (strncmp(p, "MASK:", 5) == 0) {
+        if (!p[5])
+            return 0;
+        mask = strtoul(p + 5, &end, 0);
+        if (*end)
+            return 0;
+    } else if (strcmp(p, "nombstr") == 0)
+        mask = ~((unsigned long)(B_ASN1_BMPSTRING | B_ASN1_UTF8STRING));
+    else if (strcmp(p, "pkix") == 0)
+        mask = ~((unsigned long)B_ASN1_T61STRING);
+    else if (strcmp(p, "utf8only") == 0)
+        mask = B_ASN1_UTF8STRING;
+    else if (strcmp(p, "default") == 0)
+        mask = 0xFFFFFFFFL;
+    else
+        return 0;
+    ASN1_STRING_set_default_mask(mask);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The following function generates an ASN1_STRING based on limits in a
+ * table. Frequently the types and length of an ASN1_STRING are restricted by
+ * a corresponding OID. For example certificates and certificate requests.
+ */
+
+ASN1_STRING *ASN1_STRING_set_by_NID(ASN1_STRING **out,
+                                    const unsigned char *in, int inlen,
+                                    int inform, int nid)
+{
+    ASN1_STRING_TABLE *tbl;
+    ASN1_STRING *str = NULL;
+    unsigned long mask;
+    int ret;
+    if (!out)
+        out = &str;
+    tbl = ASN1_STRING_TABLE_get(nid);
+    if (tbl) {
+        mask = tbl->mask;
+        if (!(tbl->flags & STABLE_NO_MASK))
+            mask &= global_mask;
+        ret = ASN1_mbstring_ncopy(out, in, inlen, inform, mask,
+                                  tbl->minsize, tbl->maxsize);
+    } else
+        ret =
+            ASN1_mbstring_copy(out, in, inlen, inform,
+                               DIRSTRING_TYPE & global_mask);
+    if (ret <= 0)
+        return NULL;
+    return *out;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Now the tables and helper functions for the string table:
+ */
+
+/* size limits: this stuff is taken straight from RFC3280 */
+
+#define ub_name                         32768
+#define ub_common_name                  64
+#define ub_locality_name                128
+#define ub_state_name                   128
+#define ub_organization_name            64
+#define ub_organization_unit_name       64
+#define ub_title                        64
+#define ub_email_address                128
+#define ub_serial_number                64
+
+/* From RFC4524 */
+
+#define ub_rfc822_mailbox               256
+
+/* This table must be kept in NID order */
+
+static const ASN1_STRING_TABLE tbl_standard[] = {
+    {NID_commonName, 1, ub_common_name, DIRSTRING_TYPE, 0},
+    {NID_countryName, 2, 2, B_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING, STABLE_NO_MASK},
+    {NID_localityName, 1, ub_locality_name, DIRSTRING_TYPE, 0},
+    {NID_stateOrProvinceName, 1, ub_state_name, DIRSTRING_TYPE, 0},
+    {NID_organizationName, 1, ub_organization_name, DIRSTRING_TYPE, 0},
+    {NID_organizationalUnitName, 1, ub_organization_unit_name, DIRSTRING_TYPE,
+     0},
+    {NID_pkcs9_emailAddress, 1, ub_email_address, B_ASN1_IA5STRING,
+     STABLE_NO_MASK},
+    {NID_pkcs9_unstructuredName, 1, -1, PKCS9STRING_TYPE, 0},
+    {NID_pkcs9_challengePassword, 1, -1, PKCS9STRING_TYPE, 0},
+    {NID_pkcs9_unstructuredAddress, 1, -1, DIRSTRING_TYPE, 0},
+    {NID_givenName, 1, ub_name, DIRSTRING_TYPE, 0},
+    {NID_surname, 1, ub_name, DIRSTRING_TYPE, 0},
+    {NID_initials, 1, ub_name, DIRSTRING_TYPE, 0},
+    {NID_serialNumber, 1, ub_serial_number, B_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING,
+     STABLE_NO_MASK},
+    {NID_friendlyName, -1, -1, B_ASN1_BMPSTRING, STABLE_NO_MASK},
+    {NID_name, 1, ub_name, DIRSTRING_TYPE, 0},
+    {NID_dnQualifier, -1, -1, B_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING, STABLE_NO_MASK},
+    {NID_domainComponent, 1, -1, B_ASN1_IA5STRING, STABLE_NO_MASK},
+    {NID_ms_csp_name, -1, -1, B_ASN1_BMPSTRING, STABLE_NO_MASK},
+    {NID_rfc822Mailbox, 1, ub_rfc822_mailbox, B_ASN1_IA5STRING,
+     STABLE_NO_MASK},
+    {NID_jurisdictionCountryName, 2, 2, B_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING, STABLE_NO_MASK},
+    {NID_INN, 1, 12, B_ASN1_NUMERICSTRING, STABLE_NO_MASK},
+    {NID_OGRN, 1, 13, B_ASN1_NUMERICSTRING, STABLE_NO_MASK},
+    {NID_SNILS, 1, 11, B_ASN1_NUMERICSTRING, STABLE_NO_MASK}
+};
+
+static int sk_table_cmp(const ASN1_STRING_TABLE *const *a,
+                        const ASN1_STRING_TABLE *const *b)
+{
+    return (*a)->nid - (*b)->nid;
+}
+
+DECLARE_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(ASN1_STRING_TABLE, ASN1_STRING_TABLE, table);
+
+static int table_cmp(const ASN1_STRING_TABLE *a, const ASN1_STRING_TABLE *b)
+{
+    return a->nid - b->nid;
+}
+
+IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(ASN1_STRING_TABLE, ASN1_STRING_TABLE, table);
+
+ASN1_STRING_TABLE *ASN1_STRING_TABLE_get(int nid)
+{
+    int idx;
+    ASN1_STRING_TABLE fnd;
+    fnd.nid = nid;
+    if (stable) {
+        idx = sk_ASN1_STRING_TABLE_find(stable, &fnd);
+        if (idx >= 0)
+            return sk_ASN1_STRING_TABLE_value(stable, idx);
+    }
+    return OBJ_bsearch_table(&fnd, tbl_standard, OSSL_NELEM(tbl_standard));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return a string table pointer which can be modified: either directly from
+ * table or a copy of an internal value added to the table.
+ */
+
+static ASN1_STRING_TABLE *stable_get(int nid)
+{
+    ASN1_STRING_TABLE *tmp, *rv;
+    /* Always need a string table so allocate one if NULL */
+    if (stable == NULL) {
+        stable = sk_ASN1_STRING_TABLE_new(sk_table_cmp);
+        if (stable == NULL)
+            return NULL;
+    }
+    tmp = ASN1_STRING_TABLE_get(nid);
+    if (tmp && tmp->flags & STABLE_FLAGS_MALLOC)
+        return tmp;
+    rv = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*rv));
+    if (rv == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    if (!sk_ASN1_STRING_TABLE_push(stable, rv)) {
+        OPENSSL_free(rv);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    if (tmp) {
+        rv->nid = tmp->nid;
+        rv->minsize = tmp->minsize;
+        rv->maxsize = tmp->maxsize;
+        rv->mask = tmp->mask;
+        rv->flags = tmp->flags | STABLE_FLAGS_MALLOC;
+    } else {
+        rv->nid = nid;
+        rv->minsize = -1;
+        rv->maxsize = -1;
+        rv->flags = STABLE_FLAGS_MALLOC;
+    }
+    return rv;
+}
+
+int ASN1_STRING_TABLE_add(int nid,
+                          long minsize, long maxsize, unsigned long mask,
+                          unsigned long flags)
+{
+    ASN1_STRING_TABLE *tmp;
+    tmp = stable_get(nid);
+    if (!tmp) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_STRING_TABLE_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (minsize >= 0)
+        tmp->minsize = minsize;
+    if (maxsize >= 0)
+        tmp->maxsize = maxsize;
+    if (mask)
+        tmp->mask = mask;
+    if (flags)
+        tmp->flags = STABLE_FLAGS_MALLOC | flags;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+void ASN1_STRING_TABLE_cleanup(void)
+{
+    STACK_OF(ASN1_STRING_TABLE) *tmp;
+    tmp = stable;
+    if (!tmp)
+        return;
+    stable = NULL;
+    sk_ASN1_STRING_TABLE_pop_free(tmp, st_free);
+}
+
+static void st_free(ASN1_STRING_TABLE *tbl)
+{
+    if (tbl->flags & STABLE_FLAGS_MALLOC)
+        OPENSSL_free(tbl);
+}
+
+
+#ifdef STRING_TABLE_TEST
+
+main()
+{
+    ASN1_STRING_TABLE *tmp;
+    int i, last_nid = -1;
+
+    for (tmp = tbl_standard, i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tbl_standard); i++, tmp++) {
+        if (tmp->nid < last_nid) {
+            last_nid = 0;
+            break;
+        }
+        last_nid = tmp->nid;
+    }
+
+    if (last_nid != 0) {
+        printf("Table order OK\n");
+        exit(0);
+    }
+
+    for (tmp = tbl_standard, i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tbl_standard); i++, tmp++)
+        printf("Index %d, NID %d, Name=%s\n", i, tmp->nid,
+               OBJ_nid2ln(tmp->nid));
+
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/a_time.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/a_time.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..46f539c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/a_time.c
@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*-
+ * This is an implementation of the ASN1 Time structure which is:
+ *    Time ::= CHOICE {
+ *      utcTime        UTCTime,
+ *      generalTime    GeneralizedTime }
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include "asn1_locl.h"
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_MSTRING(ASN1_TIME, B_ASN1_TIME)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_TIME)
+
+ASN1_TIME *ASN1_TIME_set(ASN1_TIME *s, time_t t)
+{
+    return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, 0, 0);
+}
+
+ASN1_TIME *ASN1_TIME_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, time_t t,
+                         int offset_day, long offset_sec)
+{
+    struct tm *ts;
+    struct tm data;
+
+    ts = OPENSSL_gmtime(&t, &data);
+    if (ts == NULL) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TIME_ADJ, ASN1_R_ERROR_GETTING_TIME);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    if (offset_day || offset_sec) {
+        if (!OPENSSL_gmtime_adj(ts, offset_day, offset_sec))
+            return NULL;
+    }
+    if ((ts->tm_year >= 50) && (ts->tm_year < 150))
+        return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
+    return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
+}
+
+int ASN1_TIME_check(const ASN1_TIME *t)
+{
+    if (t->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
+        return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_check(t);
+    else if (t->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
+        return ASN1_UTCTIME_check(t);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/* Convert an ASN1_TIME structure to GeneralizedTime */
+ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *ASN1_TIME_to_generalizedtime(const ASN1_TIME *t,
+                                                   ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **out)
+{
+    ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *ret = NULL;
+    char *str;
+    int newlen;
+
+    if (!ASN1_TIME_check(t))
+        return NULL;
+
+    if (out == NULL || *out == NULL) {
+        if ((ret = ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_new()) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+    } else
+        ret = *out;
+
+    /* If already GeneralizedTime just copy across */
+    if (t->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) {
+        if (!ASN1_STRING_set(ret, t->data, t->length))
+            goto err;
+        goto done;
+    }
+
+    /* grow the string */
+    if (!ASN1_STRING_set(ret, NULL, t->length + 2))
+        goto err;
+    /* ASN1_STRING_set() allocated 'len + 1' bytes. */
+    newlen = t->length + 2 + 1;
+    str = (char *)ret->data;
+    /* Work out the century and prepend */
+    if (t->data[0] >= '5')
+        OPENSSL_strlcpy(str, "19", newlen);
+    else
+        OPENSSL_strlcpy(str, "20", newlen);
+
+    OPENSSL_strlcat(str, (const char *)t->data, newlen);
+
+ done:
+   if (out != NULL && *out == NULL)
+       *out = ret;
+   return ret;
+
+ err:
+    if (out == NULL || *out != ret)
+        ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_free(ret);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+
+int ASN1_TIME_set_string(ASN1_TIME *s, const char *str)
+{
+    ASN1_TIME t;
+
+    t.length = strlen(str);
+    t.data = (unsigned char *)str;
+    t.flags = 0;
+
+    t.type = V_ASN1_UTCTIME;
+
+    if (!ASN1_TIME_check(&t)) {
+        t.type = V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME;
+        if (!ASN1_TIME_check(&t))
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (s && !ASN1_STRING_copy((ASN1_STRING *)s, (ASN1_STRING *)&t))
+        return 0;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int asn1_time_to_tm(struct tm *tm, const ASN1_TIME *t)
+{
+    if (t == NULL) {
+        time_t now_t;
+        time(&now_t);
+        if (OPENSSL_gmtime(&now_t, tm))
+            return 1;
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (t->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
+        return asn1_utctime_to_tm(tm, t);
+    else if (t->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
+        return asn1_generalizedtime_to_tm(tm, t);
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int ASN1_TIME_diff(int *pday, int *psec,
+                   const ASN1_TIME *from, const ASN1_TIME *to)
+{
+    struct tm tm_from, tm_to;
+    if (!asn1_time_to_tm(&tm_from, from))
+        return 0;
+    if (!asn1_time_to_tm(&tm_to, to))
+        return 0;
+    return OPENSSL_gmtime_diff(pday, psec, &tm_from, &tm_to);
+}
+
+int ASN1_TIME_print(BIO *bp, const ASN1_TIME *tm)
+{
+    if (tm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
+        return ASN1_UTCTIME_print(bp, tm);
+    if (tm->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
+        return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(bp, tm);
+    BIO_write(bp, "Bad time value", 14);
+    return (0);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/a_type.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/a_type.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..df42360
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/a_type.c
@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include "asn1_locl.h"
+
+int ASN1_TYPE_get(const ASN1_TYPE *a)
+{
+    if ((a->value.ptr != NULL) || (a->type == V_ASN1_NULL))
+        return (a->type);
+    else
+        return (0);
+}
+
+void ASN1_TYPE_set(ASN1_TYPE *a, int type, void *value)
+{
+    if (a->value.ptr != NULL) {
+        ASN1_TYPE **tmp_a = &a;
+        asn1_primitive_free((ASN1_VALUE **)tmp_a, NULL, 0);
+    }
+    a->type = type;
+    if (type == V_ASN1_BOOLEAN)
+        a->value.boolean = value ? 0xff : 0;
+    else
+        a->value.ptr = value;
+}
+
+int ASN1_TYPE_set1(ASN1_TYPE *a, int type, const void *value)
+{
+    if (!value || (type == V_ASN1_BOOLEAN)) {
+        void *p = (void *)value;
+        ASN1_TYPE_set(a, type, p);
+    } else if (type == V_ASN1_OBJECT) {
+        ASN1_OBJECT *odup;
+        odup = OBJ_dup(value);
+        if (!odup)
+            return 0;
+        ASN1_TYPE_set(a, type, odup);
+    } else {
+        ASN1_STRING *sdup;
+        sdup = ASN1_STRING_dup(value);
+        if (!sdup)
+            return 0;
+        ASN1_TYPE_set(a, type, sdup);
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Returns 0 if they are equal, != 0 otherwise. */
+int ASN1_TYPE_cmp(const ASN1_TYPE *a, const ASN1_TYPE *b)
+{
+    int result = -1;
+
+    if (!a || !b || a->type != b->type)
+        return -1;
+
+    switch (a->type) {
+    case V_ASN1_OBJECT:
+        result = OBJ_cmp(a->value.object, b->value.object);
+        break;
+    case V_ASN1_BOOLEAN:
+        result = a->value.boolean - b->value.boolean;
+        break;
+    case V_ASN1_NULL:
+        result = 0;             /* They do not have content. */
+        break;
+    case V_ASN1_INTEGER:
+    case V_ASN1_ENUMERATED:
+    case V_ASN1_BIT_STRING:
+    case V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING:
+    case V_ASN1_SEQUENCE:
+    case V_ASN1_SET:
+    case V_ASN1_NUMERICSTRING:
+    case V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING:
+    case V_ASN1_T61STRING:
+    case V_ASN1_VIDEOTEXSTRING:
+    case V_ASN1_IA5STRING:
+    case V_ASN1_UTCTIME:
+    case V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME:
+    case V_ASN1_GRAPHICSTRING:
+    case V_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING:
+    case V_ASN1_GENERALSTRING:
+    case V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING:
+    case V_ASN1_BMPSTRING:
+    case V_ASN1_UTF8STRING:
+    case V_ASN1_OTHER:
+    default:
+        result = ASN1_STRING_cmp((ASN1_STRING *)a->value.ptr,
+                                 (ASN1_STRING *)b->value.ptr);
+        break;
+    }
+
+    return result;
+}
+
+ASN1_TYPE *ASN1_TYPE_pack_sequence(const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *s, ASN1_TYPE **t)
+{
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *oct;
+    ASN1_TYPE *rt;
+
+    oct = ASN1_item_pack(s, it, NULL);
+    if (oct == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+
+    if (t && *t) {
+        rt = *t;
+    } else {
+        rt = ASN1_TYPE_new();
+        if (rt == NULL) {
+            ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(oct);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+        if (t)
+            *t = rt;
+    }
+    ASN1_TYPE_set(rt, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, oct);
+    return rt;
+}
+
+void *ASN1_TYPE_unpack_sequence(const ASN1_ITEM *it, const ASN1_TYPE *t)
+{
+    if (t == NULL || t->type != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || t->value.sequence == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    return ASN1_item_unpack(t->value.sequence, it);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/a_utctm.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/a_utctm.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9797aa8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/a_utctm.c
@@ -0,0 +1,254 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include "asn1_locl.h"
+
+int asn1_utctime_to_tm(struct tm *tm, const ASN1_UTCTIME *d)
+{
+    static const int min[8] = { 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 };
+    static const int max[8] = { 99, 12, 31, 23, 59, 59, 12, 59 };
+    char *a;
+    int n, i, l, o;
+
+    if (d->type != V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
+        return (0);
+    l = d->length;
+    a = (char *)d->data;
+    o = 0;
+
+    if (l < 11)
+        goto err;
+    for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
+        if ((i == 5) && ((a[o] == 'Z') || (a[o] == '+') || (a[o] == '-'))) {
+            i++;
+            if (tm)
+                tm->tm_sec = 0;
+            break;
+        }
+        if ((a[o] < '0') || (a[o] > '9'))
+            goto err;
+        n = a[o] - '0';
+        if (++o > l)
+            goto err;
+
+        if ((a[o] < '0') || (a[o] > '9'))
+            goto err;
+        n = (n * 10) + a[o] - '0';
+        if (++o > l)
+            goto err;
+
+        if ((n < min[i]) || (n > max[i]))
+            goto err;
+        if (tm) {
+            switch (i) {
+            case 0:
+                tm->tm_year = n < 50 ? n + 100 : n;
+                break;
+            case 1:
+                tm->tm_mon = n - 1;
+                break;
+            case 2:
+                tm->tm_mday = n;
+                break;
+            case 3:
+                tm->tm_hour = n;
+                break;
+            case 4:
+                tm->tm_min = n;
+                break;
+            case 5:
+                tm->tm_sec = n;
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    if (a[o] == 'Z')
+        o++;
+    else if ((a[o] == '+') || (a[o] == '-')) {
+        int offsign = a[o] == '-' ? 1 : -1, offset = 0;
+        o++;
+        if (o + 4 > l)
+            goto err;
+        for (i = 6; i < 8; i++) {
+            if ((a[o] < '0') || (a[o] > '9'))
+                goto err;
+            n = a[o] - '0';
+            o++;
+            if ((a[o] < '0') || (a[o] > '9'))
+                goto err;
+            n = (n * 10) + a[o] - '0';
+            if ((n < min[i]) || (n > max[i]))
+                goto err;
+            if (tm) {
+                if (i == 6)
+                    offset = n * 3600;
+                else if (i == 7)
+                    offset += n * 60;
+            }
+            o++;
+        }
+        if (offset && !OPENSSL_gmtime_adj(tm, 0, offset * offsign))
+            return 0;
+    }
+    return o == l;
+ err:
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int ASN1_UTCTIME_check(const ASN1_UTCTIME *d)
+{
+    return asn1_utctime_to_tm(NULL, d);
+}
+
+int ASN1_UTCTIME_set_string(ASN1_UTCTIME *s, const char *str)
+{
+    ASN1_UTCTIME t;
+
+    t.type = V_ASN1_UTCTIME;
+    t.length = strlen(str);
+    t.data = (unsigned char *)str;
+    if (ASN1_UTCTIME_check(&t)) {
+        if (s != NULL) {
+            if (!ASN1_STRING_set((ASN1_STRING *)s, str, t.length))
+                return 0;
+            s->type = V_ASN1_UTCTIME;
+        }
+        return (1);
+    } else
+        return (0);
+}
+
+ASN1_UTCTIME *ASN1_UTCTIME_set(ASN1_UTCTIME *s, time_t t)
+{
+    return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s, t, 0, 0);
+}
+
+ASN1_UTCTIME *ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(ASN1_UTCTIME *s, time_t t,
+                               int offset_day, long offset_sec)
+{
+    char *p;
+    struct tm *ts;
+    struct tm data;
+    size_t len = 20;
+    int free_s = 0;
+
+    if (s == NULL) {
+        s = ASN1_UTCTIME_new();
+        if (s == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        free_s = 1;
+    }
+
+    ts = OPENSSL_gmtime(&t, &data);
+    if (ts == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (offset_day || offset_sec) {
+        if (!OPENSSL_gmtime_adj(ts, offset_day, offset_sec))
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    if ((ts->tm_year < 50) || (ts->tm_year >= 150))
+        goto err;
+
+    p = (char *)s->data;
+    if ((p == NULL) || ((size_t)s->length < len)) {
+        p = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
+        if (p == NULL) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_UTCTIME_ADJ, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        OPENSSL_free(s->data);
+        s->data = (unsigned char *)p;
+    }
+
+    BIO_snprintf(p, len, "%02d%02d%02d%02d%02d%02dZ", ts->tm_year % 100,
+                 ts->tm_mon + 1, ts->tm_mday, ts->tm_hour, ts->tm_min,
+                 ts->tm_sec);
+    s->length = strlen(p);
+    s->type = V_ASN1_UTCTIME;
+#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC_not
+    ebcdic2ascii(s->data, s->data, s->length);
+#endif
+    return (s);
+ err:
+    if (free_s)
+        ASN1_UTCTIME_free(s);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+int ASN1_UTCTIME_cmp_time_t(const ASN1_UTCTIME *s, time_t t)
+{
+    struct tm stm, ttm;
+    int day, sec;
+
+    if (!asn1_utctime_to_tm(&stm, s))
+        return -2;
+
+    if (!OPENSSL_gmtime(&t, &ttm))
+        return -2;
+
+    if (!OPENSSL_gmtime_diff(&day, &sec, &ttm, &stm))
+        return -2;
+
+    if (day > 0)
+        return 1;
+    if (day < 0)
+        return -1;
+    if (sec > 0)
+        return 1;
+    if (sec < 0)
+        return -1;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int ASN1_UTCTIME_print(BIO *bp, const ASN1_UTCTIME *tm)
+{
+    const char *v;
+    int gmt = 0;
+    int i;
+    int y = 0, M = 0, d = 0, h = 0, m = 0, s = 0;
+
+    i = tm->length;
+    v = (const char *)tm->data;
+
+    if (i < 10)
+        goto err;
+    if (v[i - 1] == 'Z')
+        gmt = 1;
+    for (i = 0; i < 10; i++)
+        if ((v[i] > '9') || (v[i] < '0'))
+            goto err;
+    y = (v[0] - '0') * 10 + (v[1] - '0');
+    if (y < 50)
+        y += 100;
+    M = (v[2] - '0') * 10 + (v[3] - '0');
+    if ((M > 12) || (M < 1))
+        goto err;
+    d = (v[4] - '0') * 10 + (v[5] - '0');
+    h = (v[6] - '0') * 10 + (v[7] - '0');
+    m = (v[8] - '0') * 10 + (v[9] - '0');
+    if (tm->length >= 12 &&
+        (v[10] >= '0') && (v[10] <= '9') && (v[11] >= '0') && (v[11] <= '9'))
+        s = (v[10] - '0') * 10 + (v[11] - '0');
+
+    if (BIO_printf(bp, "%s %2d %02d:%02d:%02d %d%s",
+                   _asn1_mon[M - 1], d, h, m, s, y + 1900,
+                   (gmt) ? " GMT" : "") <= 0)
+        return (0);
+    else
+        return (1);
+ err:
+    BIO_write(bp, "Bad time value", 14);
+    return (0);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/a_utf8.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/a_utf8.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e2dc09f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/a_utf8.c
@@ -0,0 +1,188 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+
+/* UTF8 utilities */
+
+/*-
+ * This parses a UTF8 string one character at a time. It is passed a pointer
+ * to the string and the length of the string. It sets 'value' to the value of
+ * the current character. It returns the number of characters read or a
+ * negative error code:
+ * -1 = string too short
+ * -2 = illegal character
+ * -3 = subsequent characters not of the form 10xxxxxx
+ * -4 = character encoded incorrectly (not minimal length).
+ */
+
+int UTF8_getc(const unsigned char *str, int len, unsigned long *val)
+{
+    const unsigned char *p;
+    unsigned long value;
+    int ret;
+    if (len <= 0)
+        return 0;
+    p = str;
+
+    /* Check syntax and work out the encoded value (if correct) */
+    if ((*p & 0x80) == 0) {
+        value = *p++ & 0x7f;
+        ret = 1;
+    } else if ((*p & 0xe0) == 0xc0) {
+        if (len < 2)
+            return -1;
+        if ((p[1] & 0xc0) != 0x80)
+            return -3;
+        value = (*p++ & 0x1f) << 6;
+        value |= *p++ & 0x3f;
+        if (value < 0x80)
+            return -4;
+        ret = 2;
+    } else if ((*p & 0xf0) == 0xe0) {
+        if (len < 3)
+            return -1;
+        if (((p[1] & 0xc0) != 0x80)
+            || ((p[2] & 0xc0) != 0x80))
+            return -3;
+        value = (*p++ & 0xf) << 12;
+        value |= (*p++ & 0x3f) << 6;
+        value |= *p++ & 0x3f;
+        if (value < 0x800)
+            return -4;
+        ret = 3;
+    } else if ((*p & 0xf8) == 0xf0) {
+        if (len < 4)
+            return -1;
+        if (((p[1] & 0xc0) != 0x80)
+            || ((p[2] & 0xc0) != 0x80)
+            || ((p[3] & 0xc0) != 0x80))
+            return -3;
+        value = ((unsigned long)(*p++ & 0x7)) << 18;
+        value |= (*p++ & 0x3f) << 12;
+        value |= (*p++ & 0x3f) << 6;
+        value |= *p++ & 0x3f;
+        if (value < 0x10000)
+            return -4;
+        ret = 4;
+    } else if ((*p & 0xfc) == 0xf8) {
+        if (len < 5)
+            return -1;
+        if (((p[1] & 0xc0) != 0x80)
+            || ((p[2] & 0xc0) != 0x80)
+            || ((p[3] & 0xc0) != 0x80)
+            || ((p[4] & 0xc0) != 0x80))
+            return -3;
+        value = ((unsigned long)(*p++ & 0x3)) << 24;
+        value |= ((unsigned long)(*p++ & 0x3f)) << 18;
+        value |= ((unsigned long)(*p++ & 0x3f)) << 12;
+        value |= (*p++ & 0x3f) << 6;
+        value |= *p++ & 0x3f;
+        if (value < 0x200000)
+            return -4;
+        ret = 5;
+    } else if ((*p & 0xfe) == 0xfc) {
+        if (len < 6)
+            return -1;
+        if (((p[1] & 0xc0) != 0x80)
+            || ((p[2] & 0xc0) != 0x80)
+            || ((p[3] & 0xc0) != 0x80)
+            || ((p[4] & 0xc0) != 0x80)
+            || ((p[5] & 0xc0) != 0x80))
+            return -3;
+        value = ((unsigned long)(*p++ & 0x1)) << 30;
+        value |= ((unsigned long)(*p++ & 0x3f)) << 24;
+        value |= ((unsigned long)(*p++ & 0x3f)) << 18;
+        value |= ((unsigned long)(*p++ & 0x3f)) << 12;
+        value |= (*p++ & 0x3f) << 6;
+        value |= *p++ & 0x3f;
+        if (value < 0x4000000)
+            return -4;
+        ret = 6;
+    } else
+        return -2;
+    *val = value;
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This takes a character 'value' and writes the UTF8 encoded value in 'str'
+ * where 'str' is a buffer containing 'len' characters. Returns the number of
+ * characters written or -1 if 'len' is too small. 'str' can be set to NULL
+ * in which case it just returns the number of characters. It will need at
+ * most 6 characters.
+ */
+
+int UTF8_putc(unsigned char *str, int len, unsigned long value)
+{
+    if (!str)
+        len = 6;                /* Maximum we will need */
+    else if (len <= 0)
+        return -1;
+    if (value < 0x80) {
+        if (str)
+            *str = (unsigned char)value;
+        return 1;
+    }
+    if (value < 0x800) {
+        if (len < 2)
+            return -1;
+        if (str) {
+            *str++ = (unsigned char)(((value >> 6) & 0x1f) | 0xc0);
+            *str = (unsigned char)((value & 0x3f) | 0x80);
+        }
+        return 2;
+    }
+    if (value < 0x10000) {
+        if (len < 3)
+            return -1;
+        if (str) {
+            *str++ = (unsigned char)(((value >> 12) & 0xf) | 0xe0);
+            *str++ = (unsigned char)(((value >> 6) & 0x3f) | 0x80);
+            *str = (unsigned char)((value & 0x3f) | 0x80);
+        }
+        return 3;
+    }
+    if (value < 0x200000) {
+        if (len < 4)
+            return -1;
+        if (str) {
+            *str++ = (unsigned char)(((value >> 18) & 0x7) | 0xf0);
+            *str++ = (unsigned char)(((value >> 12) & 0x3f) | 0x80);
+            *str++ = (unsigned char)(((value >> 6) & 0x3f) | 0x80);
+            *str = (unsigned char)((value & 0x3f) | 0x80);
+        }
+        return 4;
+    }
+    if (value < 0x4000000) {
+        if (len < 5)
+            return -1;
+        if (str) {
+            *str++ = (unsigned char)(((value >> 24) & 0x3) | 0xf8);
+            *str++ = (unsigned char)(((value >> 18) & 0x3f) | 0x80);
+            *str++ = (unsigned char)(((value >> 12) & 0x3f) | 0x80);
+            *str++ = (unsigned char)(((value >> 6) & 0x3f) | 0x80);
+            *str = (unsigned char)((value & 0x3f) | 0x80);
+        }
+        return 5;
+    }
+    if (len < 6)
+        return -1;
+    if (str) {
+        *str++ = (unsigned char)(((value >> 30) & 0x1) | 0xfc);
+        *str++ = (unsigned char)(((value >> 24) & 0x3f) | 0x80);
+        *str++ = (unsigned char)(((value >> 18) & 0x3f) | 0x80);
+        *str++ = (unsigned char)(((value >> 12) & 0x3f) | 0x80);
+        *str++ = (unsigned char)(((value >> 6) & 0x3f) | 0x80);
+        *str = (unsigned char)((value & 0x3f) | 0x80);
+    }
+    return 6;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fb3607c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c
@@ -0,0 +1,179 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include "internal/asn1_int.h"
+#include "internal/evp_int.h"
+
+#ifndef NO_ASN1_OLD
+
+int ASN1_verify(i2d_of_void *i2d, X509_ALGOR *a, ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature,
+                char *data, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+    const EVP_MD *type;
+    unsigned char *p, *buf_in = NULL;
+    int ret = -1, i, inl;
+
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    i = OBJ_obj2nid(a->algorithm);
+    type = EVP_get_digestbyname(OBJ_nid2sn(i));
+    if (type == NULL) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_VERIFY, ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (signature->type == V_ASN1_BIT_STRING && signature->flags & 0x7) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_VERIFY, ASN1_R_INVALID_BIT_STRING_BITS_LEFT);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    inl = i2d(data, NULL);
+    buf_in = OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)inl);
+    if (buf_in == NULL) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    p = buf_in;
+
+    i2d(data, &p);
+    ret = EVP_VerifyInit_ex(ctx, type, NULL)
+        && EVP_VerifyUpdate(ctx, (unsigned char *)buf_in, inl);
+
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(buf_in, (unsigned int)inl);
+
+    if (!ret) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    ret = -1;
+
+    if (EVP_VerifyFinal(ctx, (unsigned char *)signature->data,
+                        (unsigned int)signature->length, pkey) <= 0) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+        ret = 0;
+        goto err;
+    }
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+#endif
+
+int ASN1_item_verify(const ASN1_ITEM *it, X509_ALGOR *a,
+                     ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature, void *asn, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+    unsigned char *buf_in = NULL;
+    int ret = -1, inl;
+
+    int mdnid, pknid;
+
+    if (!pkey) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (signature->type == V_ASN1_BIT_STRING && signature->flags & 0x7) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY, ASN1_R_INVALID_BIT_STRING_BITS_LEFT);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* Convert signature OID into digest and public key OIDs */
+    if (!OBJ_find_sigid_algs(OBJ_obj2nid(a->algorithm), &mdnid, &pknid)) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY, ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (mdnid == NID_undef) {
+        if (!pkey->ameth || !pkey->ameth->item_verify) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,
+                    ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        ret = pkey->ameth->item_verify(ctx, it, asn, a, signature, pkey);
+        /*
+         * Return value of 2 means carry on, anything else means we exit
+         * straight away: either a fatal error of the underlying verification
+         * routine handles all verification.
+         */
+        if (ret != 2)
+            goto err;
+        ret = -1;
+    } else {
+        const EVP_MD *type;
+        type = EVP_get_digestbynid(mdnid);
+        if (type == NULL) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,
+                    ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        /* Check public key OID matches public key type */
+        if (EVP_PKEY_type(pknid) != pkey->ameth->pkey_id) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY, ASN1_R_WRONG_PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        if (!EVP_DigestVerifyInit(ctx, NULL, type, NULL, pkey)) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+            ret = 0;
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+    }
+
+    inl = ASN1_item_i2d(asn, &buf_in, it);
+
+    if (buf_in == NULL) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    ret = EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(ctx, buf_in, inl);
+
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(buf_in, (unsigned int)inl);
+
+    if (!ret) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    ret = -1;
+
+    if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(ctx, signature->data,
+                              (size_t)signature->length) <= 0) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+        ret = 0;
+        goto err;
+    }
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
+    return (ret);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/ameth_lib.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/ameth_lib.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b8ba067
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/ameth_lib.c
@@ -0,0 +1,411 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2006-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#include "internal/asn1_int.h"
+#include "internal/evp_int.h"
+
+/* Keep this sorted in type order !! */
+static const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *standard_methods[] = {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+    &rsa_asn1_meths[0],
+    &rsa_asn1_meths[1],
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+    &dh_asn1_meth,
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+    &dsa_asn1_meths[0],
+    &dsa_asn1_meths[1],
+    &dsa_asn1_meths[2],
+    &dsa_asn1_meths[3],
+    &dsa_asn1_meths[4],
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    &eckey_asn1_meth,
+#endif
+    &hmac_asn1_meth,
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMAC
+    &cmac_asn1_meth,
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+    &dhx_asn1_meth,
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    &ecx25519_asn1_meth
+#endif
+};
+
+typedef int sk_cmp_fn_type(const char *const *a, const char *const *b);
+static STACK_OF(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD) *app_methods = NULL;
+
+#ifdef TEST
+void main()
+{
+    int i;
+    for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(standard_methods); i++)
+        fprintf(stderr, "Number %d id=%d (%s)\n", i,
+                standard_methods[i]->pkey_id,
+                OBJ_nid2sn(standard_methods[i]->pkey_id));
+}
+#endif
+
+DECLARE_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *,
+                           const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *, ameth);
+
+static int ameth_cmp(const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *const *a,
+                     const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *const *b)
+{
+    return ((*a)->pkey_id - (*b)->pkey_id);
+}
+
+IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *,
+                             const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *, ameth);
+
+int EVP_PKEY_asn1_get_count(void)
+{
+    int num = OSSL_NELEM(standard_methods);
+    if (app_methods)
+        num += sk_EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD_num(app_methods);
+    return num;
+}
+
+const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0(int idx)
+{
+    int num = OSSL_NELEM(standard_methods);
+    if (idx < 0)
+        return NULL;
+    if (idx < num)
+        return standard_methods[idx];
+    idx -= num;
+    return sk_EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD_value(app_methods, idx);
+}
+
+static const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *pkey_asn1_find(int type)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD tmp;
+    const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *t = &tmp, **ret;
+    tmp.pkey_id = type;
+    if (app_methods) {
+        int idx;
+        idx = sk_EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD_find(app_methods, &tmp);
+        if (idx >= 0)
+            return sk_EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD_value(app_methods, idx);
+    }
+    ret = OBJ_bsearch_ameth(&t, standard_methods, OSSL_NELEM(standard_methods));
+    if (!ret || !*ret)
+        return NULL;
+    return *ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Find an implementation of an ASN1 algorithm. If 'pe' is not NULL also
+ * search through engines and set *pe to a functional reference to the engine
+ * implementing 'type' or NULL if no engine implements it.
+ */
+
+const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *EVP_PKEY_asn1_find(ENGINE **pe, int type)
+{
+    const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *t;
+
+    for (;;) {
+        t = pkey_asn1_find(type);
+        if (!t || !(t->pkey_flags & ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS))
+            break;
+        type = t->pkey_base_id;
+    }
+    if (pe) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+        ENGINE *e;
+        /* type will contain the final unaliased type */
+        e = ENGINE_get_pkey_asn1_meth_engine(type);
+        if (e) {
+            *pe = e;
+            return ENGINE_get_pkey_asn1_meth(e, type);
+        }
+#endif
+        *pe = NULL;
+    }
+    return t;
+}
+
+const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str(ENGINE **pe,
+                                                   const char *str, int len)
+{
+    int i;
+    const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth = NULL;
+
+    if (len == -1)
+        len = strlen(str);
+    if (pe) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+        ENGINE *e;
+        ameth = ENGINE_pkey_asn1_find_str(&e, str, len);
+        if (ameth) {
+            /*
+             * Convert structural into functional reference
+             */
+            if (!ENGINE_init(e))
+                ameth = NULL;
+            ENGINE_free(e);
+            *pe = e;
+            return ameth;
+        }
+#endif
+        *pe = NULL;
+    }
+    for (i = EVP_PKEY_asn1_get_count(); i-- > 0; ) {
+        ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0(i);
+        if (ameth->pkey_flags & ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS)
+            continue;
+        if ((int)strlen(ameth->pem_str) == len
+            && strncasecmp(ameth->pem_str, str, len) == 0)
+            return ameth;
+    }
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_asn1_add0(const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD tmp = { 0, };
+
+    if (app_methods == NULL) {
+        app_methods = sk_EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD_new(ameth_cmp);
+        if (app_methods == NULL)
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    tmp.pkey_id = ameth->pkey_id;
+    if (sk_EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD_find(app_methods, &tmp) >= 0) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_ASN1_ADD0,
+               EVP_R_PKEY_APPLICATION_ASN1_METHOD_ALREADY_REGISTERED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (!sk_EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD_push(app_methods, ameth))
+        return 0;
+    sk_EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD_sort(app_methods);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_asn1_add_alias(int to, int from)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth;
+    ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_new(from, ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS, NULL, NULL);
+    if (ameth == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    ameth->pkey_base_id = to;
+    if (!EVP_PKEY_asn1_add0(ameth)) {
+        EVP_PKEY_asn1_free(ameth);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(int *ppkey_id, int *ppkey_base_id,
+                            int *ppkey_flags, const char **pinfo,
+                            const char **ppem_str,
+                            const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth)
+{
+    if (!ameth)
+        return 0;
+    if (ppkey_id)
+        *ppkey_id = ameth->pkey_id;
+    if (ppkey_base_id)
+        *ppkey_base_id = ameth->pkey_base_id;
+    if (ppkey_flags)
+        *ppkey_flags = ameth->pkey_flags;
+    if (pinfo)
+        *pinfo = ameth->info;
+    if (ppem_str)
+        *ppem_str = ameth->pem_str;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *EVP_PKEY_get0_asn1(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    return pkey->ameth;
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *EVP_PKEY_asn1_new(int id, int flags,
+                                        const char *pem_str, const char *info)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ameth));
+
+    if (ameth == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+
+    ameth->pkey_id = id;
+    ameth->pkey_base_id = id;
+    ameth->pkey_flags = flags | ASN1_PKEY_DYNAMIC;
+
+    if (info) {
+        ameth->info = OPENSSL_strdup(info);
+        if (!ameth->info)
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (pem_str) {
+        ameth->pem_str = OPENSSL_strdup(pem_str);
+        if (!ameth->pem_str)
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    return ameth;
+
+ err:
+    EVP_PKEY_asn1_free(ameth);
+    return NULL;
+
+}
+
+void EVP_PKEY_asn1_copy(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *dst,
+                        const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *src)
+{
+
+    dst->pub_decode = src->pub_decode;
+    dst->pub_encode = src->pub_encode;
+    dst->pub_cmp = src->pub_cmp;
+    dst->pub_print = src->pub_print;
+
+    dst->priv_decode = src->priv_decode;
+    dst->priv_encode = src->priv_encode;
+    dst->priv_print = src->priv_print;
+
+    dst->old_priv_encode = src->old_priv_encode;
+    dst->old_priv_decode = src->old_priv_decode;
+
+    dst->pkey_size = src->pkey_size;
+    dst->pkey_bits = src->pkey_bits;
+
+    dst->param_decode = src->param_decode;
+    dst->param_encode = src->param_encode;
+    dst->param_missing = src->param_missing;
+    dst->param_copy = src->param_copy;
+    dst->param_cmp = src->param_cmp;
+    dst->param_print = src->param_print;
+
+    dst->pkey_free = src->pkey_free;
+    dst->pkey_ctrl = src->pkey_ctrl;
+
+    dst->item_sign = src->item_sign;
+    dst->item_verify = src->item_verify;
+
+}
+
+void EVP_PKEY_asn1_free(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth)
+{
+    if (ameth && (ameth->pkey_flags & ASN1_PKEY_DYNAMIC)) {
+        OPENSSL_free(ameth->pem_str);
+        OPENSSL_free(ameth->info);
+        OPENSSL_free(ameth);
+    }
+}
+
+void EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_public(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth,
+                              int (*pub_decode) (EVP_PKEY *pk,
+                                                 X509_PUBKEY *pub),
+                              int (*pub_encode) (X509_PUBKEY *pub,
+                                                 const EVP_PKEY *pk),
+                              int (*pub_cmp) (const EVP_PKEY *a,
+                                              const EVP_PKEY *b),
+                              int (*pub_print) (BIO *out,
+                                                const EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+                                                int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx),
+                              int (*pkey_size) (const EVP_PKEY *pk),
+                              int (*pkey_bits) (const EVP_PKEY *pk))
+{
+    ameth->pub_decode = pub_decode;
+    ameth->pub_encode = pub_encode;
+    ameth->pub_cmp = pub_cmp;
+    ameth->pub_print = pub_print;
+    ameth->pkey_size = pkey_size;
+    ameth->pkey_bits = pkey_bits;
+}
+
+void EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_private(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth,
+                               int (*priv_decode) (EVP_PKEY *pk,
+                                                   const PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO
+                                                   *p8inf),
+                               int (*priv_encode) (PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8,
+                                                   const EVP_PKEY *pk),
+                               int (*priv_print) (BIO *out,
+                                                  const EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+                                                  int indent,
+                                                  ASN1_PCTX *pctx))
+{
+    ameth->priv_decode = priv_decode;
+    ameth->priv_encode = priv_encode;
+    ameth->priv_print = priv_print;
+}
+
+void EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_param(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth,
+                             int (*param_decode) (EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+                                                  const unsigned char **pder,
+                                                  int derlen),
+                             int (*param_encode) (const EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+                                                  unsigned char **pder),
+                             int (*param_missing) (const EVP_PKEY *pk),
+                             int (*param_copy) (EVP_PKEY *to,
+                                                const EVP_PKEY *from),
+                             int (*param_cmp) (const EVP_PKEY *a,
+                                               const EVP_PKEY *b),
+                             int (*param_print) (BIO *out,
+                                                 const EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+                                                 int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx))
+{
+    ameth->param_decode = param_decode;
+    ameth->param_encode = param_encode;
+    ameth->param_missing = param_missing;
+    ameth->param_copy = param_copy;
+    ameth->param_cmp = param_cmp;
+    ameth->param_print = param_print;
+}
+
+void EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_free(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth,
+                            void (*pkey_free) (EVP_PKEY *pkey))
+{
+    ameth->pkey_free = pkey_free;
+}
+
+void EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth,
+                            int (*pkey_ctrl) (EVP_PKEY *pkey, int op,
+                                              long arg1, void *arg2))
+{
+    ameth->pkey_ctrl = pkey_ctrl;
+}
+
+void EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_security_bits(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth,
+                                     int (*pkey_security_bits) (const EVP_PKEY
+                                                                *pk))
+{
+    ameth->pkey_security_bits = pkey_security_bits;
+}
+
+void EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_item(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth,
+                            int (*item_verify) (EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
+                                                const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+                                                void *asn,
+                                                X509_ALGOR *a,
+                                                ASN1_BIT_STRING *sig,
+                                                EVP_PKEY *pkey),
+                            int (*item_sign) (EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
+                                              const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+                                              void *asn,
+                                              X509_ALGOR *alg1,
+                                              X509_ALGOR *alg2,
+                                              ASN1_BIT_STRING *sig))
+{
+    ameth->item_sign = item_sign;
+    ameth->item_verify = item_verify;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8602c40
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c
@@ -0,0 +1,271 @@
+/*
+ * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
+ * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+
+# define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_ASN1,func,0)
+# define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_ASN1,0,reason)
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA ASN1_str_functs[] = {
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_A2D_ASN1_OBJECT), "a2d_ASN1_OBJECT"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_A2I_ASN1_INTEGER), "a2i_ASN1_INTEGER"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_A2I_ASN1_STRING), "a2i_ASN1_STRING"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_APPEND_EXP), "append_exp"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_BIT_STRING_SET_BIT), "ASN1_BIT_STRING_set_bit"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_CB), "asn1_cb"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_CHECK_TLEN), "asn1_check_tlen"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_COLLECT), "asn1_collect"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_EX_PRIMITIVE), "asn1_d2i_ex_primitive"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_FP), "ASN1_d2i_fp"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO), "asn1_d2i_read_bio"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_DIGEST), "ASN1_digest"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_DO_ADB), "asn1_do_adb"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_DO_LOCK), "asn1_do_lock"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_DUP), "ASN1_dup"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_EX_C2I), "asn1_ex_c2i"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_FIND_END), "asn1_find_end"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_ADJ), "ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_GENERATE_V3), "ASN1_generate_v3"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_GET_INT64), "asn1_get_int64"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_GET_OBJECT), "ASN1_get_object"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_GET_UINT64), "asn1_get_uint64"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_I2D_BIO), "ASN1_i2d_bio"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_I2D_FP), "ASN1_i2d_fp"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_D2I_FP), "ASN1_item_d2i_fp"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_DUP), "ASN1_item_dup"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EMBED_D2I), "asn1_item_embed_d2i"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EMBED_NEW), "asn1_item_embed_new"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_I2D_BIO), "ASN1_item_i2d_bio"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_I2D_FP), "ASN1_item_i2d_fp"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_PACK), "ASN1_item_pack"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_SIGN), "ASN1_item_sign"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_SIGN_CTX), "ASN1_item_sign_ctx"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_UNPACK), "ASN1_item_unpack"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY), "ASN1_item_verify"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_MBSTRING_NCOPY), "ASN1_mbstring_ncopy"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_OBJECT_NEW), "ASN1_OBJECT_new"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_OUTPUT_DATA), "asn1_output_data"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_PCTX_NEW), "ASN1_PCTX_new"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_SCTX_NEW), "ASN1_SCTX_new"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_SIGN), "ASN1_sign"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_STR2TYPE), "asn1_str2type"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_STRING_GET_INT64), "asn1_string_get_int64"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_STRING_GET_UINT64), "asn1_string_get_uint64"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_STRING_SET), "ASN1_STRING_set"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_STRING_TABLE_ADD), "ASN1_STRING_TABLE_add"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_STRING_TO_BN), "asn1_string_to_bn"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_STRING_TYPE_NEW), "ASN1_STRING_type_new"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_EX_D2I), "asn1_template_ex_d2i"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NEW), "asn1_template_new"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NOEXP_D2I), "asn1_template_noexp_d2i"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_TIME_ADJ), "ASN1_TIME_adj"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_TYPE_GET_INT_OCTETSTRING),
+     "ASN1_TYPE_get_int_octetstring"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_TYPE_GET_OCTETSTRING), "ASN1_TYPE_get_octetstring"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_UTCTIME_ADJ), "ASN1_UTCTIME_adj"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_VERIFY), "ASN1_verify"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_B64_READ_ASN1), "b64_read_asn1"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_B64_WRITE_ASN1), "B64_write_ASN1"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_BIO_NEW_NDEF), "BIO_new_NDEF"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_BITSTR_CB), "bitstr_cb"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_BN_TO_ASN1_STRING), "bn_to_asn1_string"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_C2I_ASN1_BIT_STRING), "c2i_ASN1_BIT_STRING"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_C2I_ASN1_INTEGER), "c2i_ASN1_INTEGER"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_C2I_ASN1_OBJECT), "c2i_ASN1_OBJECT"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_C2I_IBUF), "c2i_ibuf"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_C2I_UINT64_INT), "c2i_uint64_int"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_COLLECT_DATA), "collect_data"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_D2I_ASN1_OBJECT), "d2i_ASN1_OBJECT"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_D2I_ASN1_UINTEGER), "d2i_ASN1_UINTEGER"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_D2I_AUTOPRIVATEKEY), "d2i_AutoPrivateKey"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_D2I_PRIVATEKEY), "d2i_PrivateKey"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_D2I_PUBLICKEY), "d2i_PublicKey"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_DO_TCREATE), "do_tcreate"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_I2D_ASN1_BIO_STREAM), "i2d_ASN1_bio_stream"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_I2D_DSA_PUBKEY), "i2d_DSA_PUBKEY"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_I2D_EC_PUBKEY), "i2d_EC_PUBKEY"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_I2D_PRIVATEKEY), "i2d_PrivateKey"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_I2D_PUBLICKEY), "i2d_PublicKey"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_I2D_RSA_PUBKEY), "i2d_RSA_PUBKEY"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_LONG_C2I), "long_c2i"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_OID_MODULE_INIT), "oid_module_init"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_PARSE_TAGGING), "parse_tagging"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_PKCS5_PBE2_SET_IV), "PKCS5_pbe2_set_iv"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_PKCS5_PBE2_SET_SCRYPT), "PKCS5_pbe2_set_scrypt"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_PKCS5_PBE_SET), "PKCS5_pbe_set"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_PKCS5_PBE_SET0_ALGOR), "PKCS5_pbe_set0_algor"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SET), "PKCS5_pbkdf2_set"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_PKCS5_SCRYPT_SET), "pkcs5_scrypt_set"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_SMIME_READ_ASN1), "SMIME_read_ASN1"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_SMIME_TEXT), "SMIME_text"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_STBL_MODULE_INIT), "stbl_module_init"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_UINT32_C2I), "uint32_c2i"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_UINT64_C2I), "uint64_c2i"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_X509_CRL_ADD0_REVOKED), "X509_CRL_add0_revoked"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_X509_INFO_NEW), "X509_INFO_new"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_X509_NAME_ENCODE), "x509_name_encode"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_X509_NAME_EX_D2I), "x509_name_ex_d2i"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_X509_NAME_EX_NEW), "x509_name_ex_new"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_X509_PKEY_NEW), "X509_PKEY_new"},
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA ASN1_str_reasons[] = {
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ADDING_OBJECT), "adding object"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ASN1_PARSE_ERROR), "asn1 parse error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ASN1_SIG_PARSE_ERROR), "asn1 sig parse error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_AUX_ERROR), "aux error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_BAD_OBJECT_HEADER), "bad object header"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_BMPSTRING_IS_WRONG_LENGTH),
+     "bmpstring is wrong length"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_BN_LIB), "bn lib"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_BOOLEAN_IS_WRONG_LENGTH), "boolean is wrong length"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL), "buffer too small"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_CIPHER_HAS_NO_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER),
+     "cipher has no object identifier"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_CONTEXT_NOT_INITIALISED), "context not initialised"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_DATA_IS_WRONG), "data is wrong"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_DECODE_ERROR), "decode error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_DEPTH_EXCEEDED), "depth exceeded"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_DIGEST_AND_KEY_TYPE_NOT_SUPPORTED),
+     "digest and key type not supported"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ENCODE_ERROR), "encode error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ERROR_GETTING_TIME), "error getting time"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ERROR_LOADING_SECTION), "error loading section"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ERROR_SETTING_CIPHER_PARAMS),
+     "error setting cipher params"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_EXPECTING_AN_INTEGER), "expecting an integer"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_EXPECTING_AN_OBJECT), "expecting an object"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_EXPLICIT_LENGTH_MISMATCH), "explicit length mismatch"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_EXPLICIT_TAG_NOT_CONSTRUCTED),
+     "explicit tag not constructed"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_FIELD_MISSING), "field missing"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_FIRST_NUM_TOO_LARGE), "first num too large"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_HEADER_TOO_LONG), "header too long"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_BITSTRING_FORMAT), "illegal bitstring format"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_BOOLEAN), "illegal boolean"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_CHARACTERS), "illegal characters"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_FORMAT), "illegal format"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_HEX), "illegal hex"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_IMPLICIT_TAG), "illegal implicit tag"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_INTEGER), "illegal integer"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_NEGATIVE_VALUE), "illegal negative value"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_NESTED_TAGGING), "illegal nested tagging"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_NULL), "illegal null"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_NULL_VALUE), "illegal null value"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_OBJECT), "illegal object"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_OPTIONAL_ANY), "illegal optional any"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_OPTIONS_ON_ITEM_TEMPLATE),
+     "illegal options on item template"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING), "illegal padding"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_TAGGED_ANY), "illegal tagged any"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_TIME_VALUE), "illegal time value"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_ZERO_CONTENT), "illegal zero content"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INTEGER_NOT_ASCII_FORMAT), "integer not ascii format"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INTEGER_TOO_LARGE_FOR_LONG),
+     "integer too large for long"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INVALID_BIT_STRING_BITS_LEFT),
+     "invalid bit string bits left"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INVALID_BMPSTRING_LENGTH), "invalid bmpstring length"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INVALID_DIGIT), "invalid digit"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INVALID_MIME_TYPE), "invalid mime type"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INVALID_MODIFIER), "invalid modifier"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INVALID_NUMBER), "invalid number"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INVALID_OBJECT_ENCODING), "invalid object encoding"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INVALID_SCRYPT_PARAMETERS),
+     "invalid scrypt parameters"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INVALID_SEPARATOR), "invalid separator"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INVALID_STRING_TABLE_VALUE),
+     "invalid string table value"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INVALID_UNIVERSALSTRING_LENGTH),
+     "invalid universalstring length"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INVALID_UTF8STRING), "invalid utf8string"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INVALID_VALUE), "invalid value"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_LIST_ERROR), "list error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_MIME_NO_CONTENT_TYPE), "mime no content type"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_MIME_PARSE_ERROR), "mime parse error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_MIME_SIG_PARSE_ERROR), "mime sig parse error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_MISSING_EOC), "missing eoc"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_MISSING_SECOND_NUMBER), "missing second number"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_MISSING_VALUE), "missing value"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_MSTRING_NOT_UNIVERSAL), "mstring not universal"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_MSTRING_WRONG_TAG), "mstring wrong tag"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_NESTED_ASN1_STRING), "nested asn1 string"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_NESTED_TOO_DEEP), "nested too deep"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_NON_HEX_CHARACTERS), "non hex characters"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_NOT_ASCII_FORMAT), "not ascii format"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_NOT_ENOUGH_DATA), "not enough data"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_NO_CONTENT_TYPE), "no content type"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_NO_MATCHING_CHOICE_TYPE), "no matching choice type"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_NO_MULTIPART_BODY_FAILURE),
+     "no multipart body failure"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_NO_MULTIPART_BOUNDARY), "no multipart boundary"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_NO_SIG_CONTENT_TYPE), "no sig content type"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_NULL_IS_WRONG_LENGTH), "null is wrong length"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_OBJECT_NOT_ASCII_FORMAT), "object not ascii format"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ODD_NUMBER_OF_CHARS), "odd number of chars"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_SECOND_NUMBER_TOO_LARGE), "second number too large"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_SEQUENCE_LENGTH_MISMATCH), "sequence length mismatch"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_SEQUENCE_NOT_CONSTRUCTED), "sequence not constructed"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_SEQUENCE_OR_SET_NEEDS_CONFIG),
+     "sequence or set needs config"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_SHORT_LINE), "short line"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_SIG_INVALID_MIME_TYPE), "sig invalid mime type"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_STREAMING_NOT_SUPPORTED), "streaming not supported"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_STRING_TOO_LONG), "string too long"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_STRING_TOO_SHORT), "string too short"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_THE_ASN1_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER_IS_NOT_KNOWN_FOR_THIS_MD),
+     "the asn1 object identifier is not known for this md"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_TIME_NOT_ASCII_FORMAT), "time not ascii format"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_TOO_LARGE), "too large"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_TOO_LONG), "too long"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_TOO_SMALL), "too small"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_TYPE_NOT_CONSTRUCTED), "type not constructed"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_TYPE_NOT_PRIMITIVE), "type not primitive"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNEXPECTED_EOC), "unexpected eoc"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNIVERSALSTRING_IS_WRONG_LENGTH),
+     "universalstring is wrong length"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_FORMAT), "unknown format"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM),
+     "unknown message digest algorithm"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_OBJECT_TYPE), "unknown object type"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE), "unknown public key type"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM),
+     "unknown signature algorithm"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_TAG), "unknown tag"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNSUPPORTED_ANY_DEFINED_BY_TYPE),
+     "unsupported any defined by type"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNSUPPORTED_PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE),
+     "unsupported public key type"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNSUPPORTED_TYPE), "unsupported type"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_WRONG_INTEGER_TYPE), "wrong integer type"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_WRONG_PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE), "wrong public key type"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_WRONG_TAG), "wrong tag"},
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+
+#endif
+
+int ERR_load_ASN1_strings(void)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+
+    if (ERR_func_error_string(ASN1_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) {
+        ERR_load_strings(0, ASN1_str_functs);
+        ERR_load_strings(0, ASN1_str_reasons);
+    }
+#endif
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/asn1_gen.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/asn1_gen.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..493a693
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/asn1_gen.c
@@ -0,0 +1,789 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+
+#define ASN1_GEN_FLAG           0x10000
+#define ASN1_GEN_FLAG_IMP       (ASN1_GEN_FLAG|1)
+#define ASN1_GEN_FLAG_EXP       (ASN1_GEN_FLAG|2)
+#define ASN1_GEN_FLAG_TAG       (ASN1_GEN_FLAG|3)
+#define ASN1_GEN_FLAG_BITWRAP   (ASN1_GEN_FLAG|4)
+#define ASN1_GEN_FLAG_OCTWRAP   (ASN1_GEN_FLAG|5)
+#define ASN1_GEN_FLAG_SEQWRAP   (ASN1_GEN_FLAG|6)
+#define ASN1_GEN_FLAG_SETWRAP   (ASN1_GEN_FLAG|7)
+#define ASN1_GEN_FLAG_FORMAT    (ASN1_GEN_FLAG|8)
+
+#define ASN1_GEN_STR(str,val)   {str, sizeof(str) - 1, val}
+
+#define ASN1_FLAG_EXP_MAX       20
+/* Maximum number of nested sequences */
+#define ASN1_GEN_SEQ_MAX_DEPTH  50
+
+/* Input formats */
+
+/* ASCII: default */
+#define ASN1_GEN_FORMAT_ASCII   1
+/* UTF8 */
+#define ASN1_GEN_FORMAT_UTF8    2
+/* Hex */
+#define ASN1_GEN_FORMAT_HEX     3
+/* List of bits */
+#define ASN1_GEN_FORMAT_BITLIST 4
+
+struct tag_name_st {
+    const char *strnam;
+    int len;
+    int tag;
+};
+
+typedef struct {
+    int exp_tag;
+    int exp_class;
+    int exp_constructed;
+    int exp_pad;
+    long exp_len;
+} tag_exp_type;
+
+typedef struct {
+    int imp_tag;
+    int imp_class;
+    int utype;
+    int format;
+    const char *str;
+    tag_exp_type exp_list[ASN1_FLAG_EXP_MAX];
+    int exp_count;
+} tag_exp_arg;
+
+static ASN1_TYPE *generate_v3(const char *str, X509V3_CTX *cnf, int depth,
+                              int *perr);
+static int bitstr_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *bitstr);
+static int asn1_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *bitstr);
+static int append_exp(tag_exp_arg *arg, int exp_tag, int exp_class,
+                      int exp_constructed, int exp_pad, int imp_ok);
+static int parse_tagging(const char *vstart, int vlen, int *ptag,
+                         int *pclass);
+static ASN1_TYPE *asn1_multi(int utype, const char *section, X509V3_CTX *cnf,
+                             int depth, int *perr);
+static ASN1_TYPE *asn1_str2type(const char *str, int format, int utype);
+static int asn1_str2tag(const char *tagstr, int len);
+
+ASN1_TYPE *ASN1_generate_nconf(const char *str, CONF *nconf)
+{
+    X509V3_CTX cnf;
+
+    if (!nconf)
+        return ASN1_generate_v3(str, NULL);
+
+    X509V3_set_nconf(&cnf, nconf);
+    return ASN1_generate_v3(str, &cnf);
+}
+
+ASN1_TYPE *ASN1_generate_v3(const char *str, X509V3_CTX *cnf)
+{
+    int err = 0;
+    ASN1_TYPE *ret = generate_v3(str, cnf, 0, &err);
+    if (err)
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_GENERATE_V3, err);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static ASN1_TYPE *generate_v3(const char *str, X509V3_CTX *cnf, int depth,
+                              int *perr)
+{
+    ASN1_TYPE *ret;
+    tag_exp_arg asn1_tags;
+    tag_exp_type *etmp;
+
+    int i, len;
+
+    unsigned char *orig_der = NULL, *new_der = NULL;
+    const unsigned char *cpy_start;
+    unsigned char *p;
+    const unsigned char *cp;
+    int cpy_len;
+    long hdr_len = 0;
+    int hdr_constructed = 0, hdr_tag, hdr_class;
+    int r;
+
+    asn1_tags.imp_tag = -1;
+    asn1_tags.imp_class = -1;
+    asn1_tags.format = ASN1_GEN_FORMAT_ASCII;
+    asn1_tags.exp_count = 0;
+    if (CONF_parse_list(str, ',', 1, asn1_cb, &asn1_tags) != 0) {
+        *perr = ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_TAG;
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    if ((asn1_tags.utype == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
+        || (asn1_tags.utype == V_ASN1_SET)) {
+        if (!cnf) {
+            *perr = ASN1_R_SEQUENCE_OR_SET_NEEDS_CONFIG;
+            return NULL;
+        }
+        if (depth >= ASN1_GEN_SEQ_MAX_DEPTH) {
+            *perr = ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_NESTED_TAGGING;
+            return NULL;
+        }
+        ret = asn1_multi(asn1_tags.utype, asn1_tags.str, cnf, depth, perr);
+    } else
+        ret = asn1_str2type(asn1_tags.str, asn1_tags.format, asn1_tags.utype);
+
+    if (!ret)
+        return NULL;
+
+    /* If no tagging return base type */
+    if ((asn1_tags.imp_tag == -1) && (asn1_tags.exp_count == 0))
+        return ret;
+
+    /* Generate the encoding */
+    cpy_len = i2d_ASN1_TYPE(ret, &orig_der);
+    ASN1_TYPE_free(ret);
+    ret = NULL;
+    /* Set point to start copying for modified encoding */
+    cpy_start = orig_der;
+
+    /* Do we need IMPLICIT tagging? */
+    if (asn1_tags.imp_tag != -1) {
+        /* If IMPLICIT we will replace the underlying tag */
+        /* Skip existing tag+len */
+        r = ASN1_get_object(&cpy_start, &hdr_len, &hdr_tag, &hdr_class,
+                            cpy_len);
+        if (r & 0x80)
+            goto err;
+        /* Update copy length */
+        cpy_len -= cpy_start - orig_der;
+        /*
+         * For IMPLICIT tagging the length should match the original length
+         * and constructed flag should be consistent.
+         */
+        if (r & 0x1) {
+            /* Indefinite length constructed */
+            hdr_constructed = 2;
+            hdr_len = 0;
+        } else
+            /* Just retain constructed flag */
+            hdr_constructed = r & V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED;
+        /*
+         * Work out new length with IMPLICIT tag: ignore constructed because
+         * it will mess up if indefinite length
+         */
+        len = ASN1_object_size(0, hdr_len, asn1_tags.imp_tag);
+    } else
+        len = cpy_len;
+
+    /* Work out length in any EXPLICIT, starting from end */
+
+    for (i = 0, etmp = asn1_tags.exp_list + asn1_tags.exp_count - 1;
+         i < asn1_tags.exp_count; i++, etmp--) {
+        /* Content length: number of content octets + any padding */
+        len += etmp->exp_pad;
+        etmp->exp_len = len;
+        /* Total object length: length including new header */
+        len = ASN1_object_size(0, len, etmp->exp_tag);
+    }
+
+    /* Allocate buffer for new encoding */
+
+    new_der = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
+    if (new_der == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* Generate tagged encoding */
+
+    p = new_der;
+
+    /* Output explicit tags first */
+
+    for (i = 0, etmp = asn1_tags.exp_list; i < asn1_tags.exp_count;
+         i++, etmp++) {
+        ASN1_put_object(&p, etmp->exp_constructed, etmp->exp_len,
+                        etmp->exp_tag, etmp->exp_class);
+        if (etmp->exp_pad)
+            *p++ = 0;
+    }
+
+    /* If IMPLICIT, output tag */
+
+    if (asn1_tags.imp_tag != -1) {
+        if (asn1_tags.imp_class == V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL
+            && (asn1_tags.imp_tag == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
+                || asn1_tags.imp_tag == V_ASN1_SET))
+            hdr_constructed = V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED;
+        ASN1_put_object(&p, hdr_constructed, hdr_len,
+                        asn1_tags.imp_tag, asn1_tags.imp_class);
+    }
+
+    /* Copy across original encoding */
+    memcpy(p, cpy_start, cpy_len);
+
+    cp = new_der;
+
+    /* Obtain new ASN1_TYPE structure */
+    ret = d2i_ASN1_TYPE(NULL, &cp, len);
+
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_free(orig_der);
+    OPENSSL_free(new_der);
+
+    return ret;
+
+}
+
+static int asn1_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *bitstr)
+{
+    tag_exp_arg *arg = bitstr;
+    int i;
+    int utype;
+    int vlen = 0;
+    const char *p, *vstart = NULL;
+
+    int tmp_tag, tmp_class;
+
+    if (elem == NULL)
+        return -1;
+
+    for (i = 0, p = elem; i < len; p++, i++) {
+        /* Look for the ':' in name value pairs */
+        if (*p == ':') {
+            vstart = p + 1;
+            vlen = len - (vstart - elem);
+            len = p - elem;
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+
+    utype = asn1_str2tag(elem, len);
+
+    if (utype == -1) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_CB, ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_TAG);
+        ERR_add_error_data(2, "tag=", elem);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    /* If this is not a modifier mark end of string and exit */
+    if (!(utype & ASN1_GEN_FLAG)) {
+        arg->utype = utype;
+        arg->str = vstart;
+        /* If no value and not end of string, error */
+        if (!vstart && elem[len]) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_CB, ASN1_R_MISSING_VALUE);
+            return -1;
+        }
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    switch (utype) {
+
+    case ASN1_GEN_FLAG_IMP:
+        /* Check for illegal multiple IMPLICIT tagging */
+        if (arg->imp_tag != -1) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_CB, ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_NESTED_TAGGING);
+            return -1;
+        }
+        if (!parse_tagging(vstart, vlen, &arg->imp_tag, &arg->imp_class))
+            return -1;
+        break;
+
+    case ASN1_GEN_FLAG_EXP:
+
+        if (!parse_tagging(vstart, vlen, &tmp_tag, &tmp_class))
+            return -1;
+        if (!append_exp(arg, tmp_tag, tmp_class, 1, 0, 0))
+            return -1;
+        break;
+
+    case ASN1_GEN_FLAG_SEQWRAP:
+        if (!append_exp(arg, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL, 1, 0, 1))
+            return -1;
+        break;
+
+    case ASN1_GEN_FLAG_SETWRAP:
+        if (!append_exp(arg, V_ASN1_SET, V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL, 1, 0, 1))
+            return -1;
+        break;
+
+    case ASN1_GEN_FLAG_BITWRAP:
+        if (!append_exp(arg, V_ASN1_BIT_STRING, V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL, 0, 1, 1))
+            return -1;
+        break;
+
+    case ASN1_GEN_FLAG_OCTWRAP:
+        if (!append_exp(arg, V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL, 0, 0, 1))
+            return -1;
+        break;
+
+    case ASN1_GEN_FLAG_FORMAT:
+        if (!vstart) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_CB, ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_FORMAT);
+            return -1;
+        }
+        if (strncmp(vstart, "ASCII", 5) == 0)
+            arg->format = ASN1_GEN_FORMAT_ASCII;
+        else if (strncmp(vstart, "UTF8", 4) == 0)
+            arg->format = ASN1_GEN_FORMAT_UTF8;
+        else if (strncmp(vstart, "HEX", 3) == 0)
+            arg->format = ASN1_GEN_FORMAT_HEX;
+        else if (strncmp(vstart, "BITLIST", 7) == 0)
+            arg->format = ASN1_GEN_FORMAT_BITLIST;
+        else {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_CB, ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_FORMAT);
+            return -1;
+        }
+        break;
+
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+
+}
+
+static int parse_tagging(const char *vstart, int vlen, int *ptag, int *pclass)
+{
+    char erch[2];
+    long tag_num;
+    char *eptr;
+    if (!vstart)
+        return 0;
+    tag_num = strtoul(vstart, &eptr, 10);
+    /* Check we haven't gone past max length: should be impossible */
+    if (eptr && *eptr && (eptr > vstart + vlen))
+        return 0;
+    if (tag_num < 0) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_PARSE_TAGGING, ASN1_R_INVALID_NUMBER);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    *ptag = tag_num;
+    /* If we have non numeric characters, parse them */
+    if (eptr)
+        vlen -= eptr - vstart;
+    else
+        vlen = 0;
+    if (vlen) {
+        switch (*eptr) {
+
+        case 'U':
+            *pclass = V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL;
+            break;
+
+        case 'A':
+            *pclass = V_ASN1_APPLICATION;
+            break;
+
+        case 'P':
+            *pclass = V_ASN1_PRIVATE;
+            break;
+
+        case 'C':
+            *pclass = V_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC;
+            break;
+
+        default:
+            erch[0] = *eptr;
+            erch[1] = 0;
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_PARSE_TAGGING, ASN1_R_INVALID_MODIFIER);
+            ERR_add_error_data(2, "Char=", erch);
+            return 0;
+
+        }
+    } else
+        *pclass = V_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC;
+
+    return 1;
+
+}
+
+/* Handle multiple types: SET and SEQUENCE */
+
+static ASN1_TYPE *asn1_multi(int utype, const char *section, X509V3_CTX *cnf,
+                             int depth, int *perr)
+{
+    ASN1_TYPE *ret = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(ASN1_TYPE) *sk = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *sect = NULL;
+    unsigned char *der = NULL;
+    int derlen;
+    int i;
+    sk = sk_ASN1_TYPE_new_null();
+    if (!sk)
+        goto bad;
+    if (section) {
+        if (!cnf)
+            goto bad;
+        sect = X509V3_get_section(cnf, (char *)section);
+        if (!sect)
+            goto bad;
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(sect); i++) {
+            ASN1_TYPE *typ =
+                generate_v3(sk_CONF_VALUE_value(sect, i)->value, cnf,
+                            depth + 1, perr);
+            if (!typ)
+                goto bad;
+            if (!sk_ASN1_TYPE_push(sk, typ))
+                goto bad;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Now we has a STACK of the components, convert to the correct form
+     */
+
+    if (utype == V_ASN1_SET)
+        derlen = i2d_ASN1_SET_ANY(sk, &der);
+    else
+        derlen = i2d_ASN1_SEQUENCE_ANY(sk, &der);
+
+    if (derlen < 0)
+        goto bad;
+    if ((ret = ASN1_TYPE_new()) == NULL)
+        goto bad;
+    if ((ret->value.asn1_string = ASN1_STRING_type_new(utype)) == NULL)
+        goto bad;
+
+    ret->type = utype;
+    ret->value.asn1_string->data = der;
+    ret->value.asn1_string->length = derlen;
+
+    der = NULL;
+
+ bad:
+
+    OPENSSL_free(der);
+
+    sk_ASN1_TYPE_pop_free(sk, ASN1_TYPE_free);
+    X509V3_section_free(cnf, sect);
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int append_exp(tag_exp_arg *arg, int exp_tag, int exp_class,
+                      int exp_constructed, int exp_pad, int imp_ok)
+{
+    tag_exp_type *exp_tmp;
+    /* Can only have IMPLICIT if permitted */
+    if ((arg->imp_tag != -1) && !imp_ok) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_APPEND_EXP, ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_IMPLICIT_TAG);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (arg->exp_count == ASN1_FLAG_EXP_MAX) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_APPEND_EXP, ASN1_R_DEPTH_EXCEEDED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    exp_tmp = &arg->exp_list[arg->exp_count++];
+
+    /*
+     * If IMPLICIT set tag to implicit value then reset implicit tag since it
+     * has been used.
+     */
+    if (arg->imp_tag != -1) {
+        exp_tmp->exp_tag = arg->imp_tag;
+        exp_tmp->exp_class = arg->imp_class;
+        arg->imp_tag = -1;
+        arg->imp_class = -1;
+    } else {
+        exp_tmp->exp_tag = exp_tag;
+        exp_tmp->exp_class = exp_class;
+    }
+    exp_tmp->exp_constructed = exp_constructed;
+    exp_tmp->exp_pad = exp_pad;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int asn1_str2tag(const char *tagstr, int len)
+{
+    unsigned int i;
+    static const struct tag_name_st *tntmp, tnst[] = {
+        ASN1_GEN_STR("BOOL", V_ASN1_BOOLEAN),
+        ASN1_GEN_STR("BOOLEAN", V_ASN1_BOOLEAN),
+        ASN1_GEN_STR("NULL", V_ASN1_NULL),
+        ASN1_GEN_STR("INT", V_ASN1_INTEGER),
+        ASN1_GEN_STR("INTEGER", V_ASN1_INTEGER),
+        ASN1_GEN_STR("ENUM", V_ASN1_ENUMERATED),
+        ASN1_GEN_STR("ENUMERATED", V_ASN1_ENUMERATED),
+        ASN1_GEN_STR("OID", V_ASN1_OBJECT),
+        ASN1_GEN_STR("OBJECT", V_ASN1_OBJECT),
+        ASN1_GEN_STR("UTCTIME", V_ASN1_UTCTIME),
+        ASN1_GEN_STR("UTC", V_ASN1_UTCTIME),
+        ASN1_GEN_STR("GENERALIZEDTIME", V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME),
+        ASN1_GEN_STR("GENTIME", V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME),
+        ASN1_GEN_STR("OCT", V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING),
+        ASN1_GEN_STR("OCTETSTRING", V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING),
+        ASN1_GEN_STR("BITSTR", V_ASN1_BIT_STRING),
+        ASN1_GEN_STR("BITSTRING", V_ASN1_BIT_STRING),
+        ASN1_GEN_STR("UNIVERSALSTRING", V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING),
+        ASN1_GEN_STR("UNIV", V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING),
+        ASN1_GEN_STR("IA5", V_ASN1_IA5STRING),
+        ASN1_GEN_STR("IA5STRING", V_ASN1_IA5STRING),
+        ASN1_GEN_STR("UTF8", V_ASN1_UTF8STRING),
+        ASN1_GEN_STR("UTF8String", V_ASN1_UTF8STRING),
+        ASN1_GEN_STR("BMP", V_ASN1_BMPSTRING),
+        ASN1_GEN_STR("BMPSTRING", V_ASN1_BMPSTRING),
+        ASN1_GEN_STR("VISIBLESTRING", V_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING),
+        ASN1_GEN_STR("VISIBLE", V_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING),
+        ASN1_GEN_STR("PRINTABLESTRING", V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING),
+        ASN1_GEN_STR("PRINTABLE", V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING),
+        ASN1_GEN_STR("T61", V_ASN1_T61STRING),
+        ASN1_GEN_STR("T61STRING", V_ASN1_T61STRING),
+        ASN1_GEN_STR("TELETEXSTRING", V_ASN1_T61STRING),
+        ASN1_GEN_STR("GeneralString", V_ASN1_GENERALSTRING),
+        ASN1_GEN_STR("GENSTR", V_ASN1_GENERALSTRING),
+        ASN1_GEN_STR("NUMERIC", V_ASN1_NUMERICSTRING),
+        ASN1_GEN_STR("NUMERICSTRING", V_ASN1_NUMERICSTRING),
+
+        /* Special cases */
+        ASN1_GEN_STR("SEQUENCE", V_ASN1_SEQUENCE),
+        ASN1_GEN_STR("SEQ", V_ASN1_SEQUENCE),
+        ASN1_GEN_STR("SET", V_ASN1_SET),
+        /* type modifiers */
+        /* Explicit tag */
+        ASN1_GEN_STR("EXP", ASN1_GEN_FLAG_EXP),
+        ASN1_GEN_STR("EXPLICIT", ASN1_GEN_FLAG_EXP),
+        /* Implicit tag */
+        ASN1_GEN_STR("IMP", ASN1_GEN_FLAG_IMP),
+        ASN1_GEN_STR("IMPLICIT", ASN1_GEN_FLAG_IMP),
+        /* OCTET STRING wrapper */
+        ASN1_GEN_STR("OCTWRAP", ASN1_GEN_FLAG_OCTWRAP),
+        /* SEQUENCE wrapper */
+        ASN1_GEN_STR("SEQWRAP", ASN1_GEN_FLAG_SEQWRAP),
+        /* SET wrapper */
+        ASN1_GEN_STR("SETWRAP", ASN1_GEN_FLAG_SETWRAP),
+        /* BIT STRING wrapper */
+        ASN1_GEN_STR("BITWRAP", ASN1_GEN_FLAG_BITWRAP),
+        ASN1_GEN_STR("FORM", ASN1_GEN_FLAG_FORMAT),
+        ASN1_GEN_STR("FORMAT", ASN1_GEN_FLAG_FORMAT),
+    };
+
+    if (len == -1)
+        len = strlen(tagstr);
+
+    tntmp = tnst;
+    for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tnst); i++, tntmp++) {
+        if ((len == tntmp->len) && (strncmp(tntmp->strnam, tagstr, len) == 0))
+            return tntmp->tag;
+    }
+
+    return -1;
+}
+
+static ASN1_TYPE *asn1_str2type(const char *str, int format, int utype)
+{
+    ASN1_TYPE *atmp = NULL;
+    CONF_VALUE vtmp;
+    unsigned char *rdata;
+    long rdlen;
+    int no_unused = 1;
+
+    if ((atmp = ASN1_TYPE_new()) == NULL) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_STR2TYPE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    if (!str)
+        str = "";
+
+    switch (utype) {
+
+    case V_ASN1_NULL:
+        if (str && *str) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_STR2TYPE, ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_NULL_VALUE);
+            goto bad_form;
+        }
+        break;
+
+    case V_ASN1_BOOLEAN:
+        if (format != ASN1_GEN_FORMAT_ASCII) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_STR2TYPE, ASN1_R_NOT_ASCII_FORMAT);
+            goto bad_form;
+        }
+        vtmp.name = NULL;
+        vtmp.section = NULL;
+        vtmp.value = (char *)str;
+        if (!X509V3_get_value_bool(&vtmp, &atmp->value.boolean)) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_STR2TYPE, ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_BOOLEAN);
+            goto bad_str;
+        }
+        break;
+
+    case V_ASN1_INTEGER:
+    case V_ASN1_ENUMERATED:
+        if (format != ASN1_GEN_FORMAT_ASCII) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_STR2TYPE, ASN1_R_INTEGER_NOT_ASCII_FORMAT);
+            goto bad_form;
+        }
+        if ((atmp->value.integer
+                    = s2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, str)) == NULL) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_STR2TYPE, ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_INTEGER);
+            goto bad_str;
+        }
+        break;
+
+    case V_ASN1_OBJECT:
+        if (format != ASN1_GEN_FORMAT_ASCII) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_STR2TYPE, ASN1_R_OBJECT_NOT_ASCII_FORMAT);
+            goto bad_form;
+        }
+        if ((atmp->value.object = OBJ_txt2obj(str, 0)) == NULL) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_STR2TYPE, ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_OBJECT);
+            goto bad_str;
+        }
+        break;
+
+    case V_ASN1_UTCTIME:
+    case V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME:
+        if (format != ASN1_GEN_FORMAT_ASCII) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_STR2TYPE, ASN1_R_TIME_NOT_ASCII_FORMAT);
+            goto bad_form;
+        }
+        if ((atmp->value.asn1_string = ASN1_STRING_new()) == NULL) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_STR2TYPE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto bad_str;
+        }
+        if (!ASN1_STRING_set(atmp->value.asn1_string, str, -1)) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_STR2TYPE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto bad_str;
+        }
+        atmp->value.asn1_string->type = utype;
+        if (!ASN1_TIME_check(atmp->value.asn1_string)) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_STR2TYPE, ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_TIME_VALUE);
+            goto bad_str;
+        }
+
+        break;
+
+    case V_ASN1_BMPSTRING:
+    case V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING:
+    case V_ASN1_IA5STRING:
+    case V_ASN1_T61STRING:
+    case V_ASN1_UTF8STRING:
+    case V_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING:
+    case V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING:
+    case V_ASN1_GENERALSTRING:
+    case V_ASN1_NUMERICSTRING:
+        if (format == ASN1_GEN_FORMAT_ASCII)
+            format = MBSTRING_ASC;
+        else if (format == ASN1_GEN_FORMAT_UTF8)
+            format = MBSTRING_UTF8;
+        else {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_STR2TYPE, ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_FORMAT);
+            goto bad_form;
+        }
+
+        if (ASN1_mbstring_copy(&atmp->value.asn1_string, (unsigned char *)str,
+                               -1, format, ASN1_tag2bit(utype)) <= 0) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_STR2TYPE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto bad_str;
+        }
+
+        break;
+
+    case V_ASN1_BIT_STRING:
+    case V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING:
+        if ((atmp->value.asn1_string = ASN1_STRING_new()) == NULL) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_STR2TYPE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto bad_form;
+        }
+
+        if (format == ASN1_GEN_FORMAT_HEX) {
+            if ((rdata = OPENSSL_hexstr2buf(str, &rdlen)) == NULL) {
+                ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_STR2TYPE, ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_HEX);
+                goto bad_str;
+            }
+            atmp->value.asn1_string->data = rdata;
+            atmp->value.asn1_string->length = rdlen;
+            atmp->value.asn1_string->type = utype;
+        } else if (format == ASN1_GEN_FORMAT_ASCII)
+            ASN1_STRING_set(atmp->value.asn1_string, str, -1);
+        else if ((format == ASN1_GEN_FORMAT_BITLIST)
+                 && (utype == V_ASN1_BIT_STRING)) {
+            if (!CONF_parse_list
+                (str, ',', 1, bitstr_cb, atmp->value.bit_string)) {
+                ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_STR2TYPE, ASN1_R_LIST_ERROR);
+                goto bad_str;
+            }
+            no_unused = 0;
+
+        } else {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_STR2TYPE, ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_BITSTRING_FORMAT);
+            goto bad_form;
+        }
+
+        if ((utype == V_ASN1_BIT_STRING) && no_unused) {
+            atmp->value.asn1_string->flags
+                &= ~(ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT | 0x07);
+            atmp->value.asn1_string->flags |= ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT;
+        }
+
+        break;
+
+    default:
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_STR2TYPE, ASN1_R_UNSUPPORTED_TYPE);
+        goto bad_str;
+    }
+
+    atmp->type = utype;
+    return atmp;
+
+ bad_str:
+    ERR_add_error_data(2, "string=", str);
+ bad_form:
+
+    ASN1_TYPE_free(atmp);
+    return NULL;
+
+}
+
+static int bitstr_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *bitstr)
+{
+    long bitnum;
+    char *eptr;
+    if (!elem)
+        return 0;
+    bitnum = strtoul(elem, &eptr, 10);
+    if (eptr && *eptr && (eptr != elem + len))
+        return 0;
+    if (bitnum < 0) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_BITSTR_CB, ASN1_R_INVALID_NUMBER);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (!ASN1_BIT_STRING_set_bit(bitstr, bitnum, 1)) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_BITSTR_CB, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int mask_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
+{
+    unsigned long *pmask = arg, tmpmask;
+    int tag;
+    if (elem == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    if ((len == 3) && (strncmp(elem, "DIR", 3) == 0)) {
+        *pmask |= B_ASN1_DIRECTORYSTRING;
+        return 1;
+    }
+    tag = asn1_str2tag(elem, len);
+    if (!tag || (tag & ASN1_GEN_FLAG))
+        return 0;
+    tmpmask = ASN1_tag2bit(tag);
+    if (!tmpmask)
+        return 0;
+    *pmask |= tmpmask;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int ASN1_str2mask(const char *str, unsigned long *pmask)
+{
+    *pmask = 0;
+    return CONF_parse_list(str, '|', 1, mask_cb, pmask);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8ca53b4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.c
@@ -0,0 +1,384 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include "asn1_locl.h"
+
+static int asn1_get_length(const unsigned char **pp, int *inf, long *rl,
+                           long max);
+static void asn1_put_length(unsigned char **pp, int length);
+
+static int _asn1_check_infinite_end(const unsigned char **p, long len)
+{
+    /*
+     * If there is 0 or 1 byte left, the length check should pick things up
+     */
+    if (len <= 0)
+        return (1);
+    else if ((len >= 2) && ((*p)[0] == 0) && ((*p)[1] == 0)) {
+        (*p) += 2;
+        return (1);
+    }
+    return (0);
+}
+
+int ASN1_check_infinite_end(unsigned char **p, long len)
+{
+    return _asn1_check_infinite_end((const unsigned char **)p, len);
+}
+
+int ASN1_const_check_infinite_end(const unsigned char **p, long len)
+{
+    return _asn1_check_infinite_end(p, len);
+}
+
+int ASN1_get_object(const unsigned char **pp, long *plength, int *ptag,
+                    int *pclass, long omax)
+{
+    int i, ret;
+    long l;
+    const unsigned char *p = *pp;
+    int tag, xclass, inf;
+    long max = omax;
+
+    if (!max)
+        goto err;
+    ret = (*p & V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED);
+    xclass = (*p & V_ASN1_PRIVATE);
+    i = *p & V_ASN1_PRIMITIVE_TAG;
+    if (i == V_ASN1_PRIMITIVE_TAG) { /* high-tag */
+        p++;
+        if (--max == 0)
+            goto err;
+        l = 0;
+        while (*p & 0x80) {
+            l <<= 7L;
+            l |= *(p++) & 0x7f;
+            if (--max == 0)
+                goto err;
+            if (l > (INT_MAX >> 7L))
+                goto err;
+        }
+        l <<= 7L;
+        l |= *(p++) & 0x7f;
+        tag = (int)l;
+        if (--max == 0)
+            goto err;
+    } else {
+        tag = i;
+        p++;
+        if (--max == 0)
+            goto err;
+    }
+    *ptag = tag;
+    *pclass = xclass;
+    if (!asn1_get_length(&p, &inf, plength, max))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (inf && !(ret & V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (*plength > (omax - (p - *pp))) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_GET_OBJECT, ASN1_R_TOO_LONG);
+        /*
+         * Set this so that even if things are not long enough the values are
+         * set correctly
+         */
+        ret |= 0x80;
+    }
+    *pp = p;
+    return (ret | inf);
+ err:
+    ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_GET_OBJECT, ASN1_R_HEADER_TOO_LONG);
+    return (0x80);
+}
+
+static int asn1_get_length(const unsigned char **pp, int *inf, long *rl,
+                           long max)
+{
+    const unsigned char *p = *pp;
+    unsigned long ret = 0;
+    unsigned long i;
+
+    if (max-- < 1)
+        return 0;
+    if (*p == 0x80) {
+        *inf = 1;
+        ret = 0;
+        p++;
+    } else {
+        *inf = 0;
+        i = *p & 0x7f;
+        if (*(p++) & 0x80) {
+            if (max < (long)i + 1)
+                return 0;
+            /* Skip leading zeroes */
+            while (i && *p == 0) {
+                p++;
+                i--;
+            }
+            if (i > sizeof(long))
+                return 0;
+            while (i-- > 0) {
+                ret <<= 8L;
+                ret |= *(p++);
+            }
+        } else
+            ret = i;
+    }
+    if (ret > LONG_MAX)
+        return 0;
+    *pp = p;
+    *rl = (long)ret;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * class 0 is constructed constructed == 2 for indefinite length constructed
+ */
+void ASN1_put_object(unsigned char **pp, int constructed, int length, int tag,
+                     int xclass)
+{
+    unsigned char *p = *pp;
+    int i, ttag;
+
+    i = (constructed) ? V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED : 0;
+    i |= (xclass & V_ASN1_PRIVATE);
+    if (tag < 31)
+        *(p++) = i | (tag & V_ASN1_PRIMITIVE_TAG);
+    else {
+        *(p++) = i | V_ASN1_PRIMITIVE_TAG;
+        for (i = 0, ttag = tag; ttag > 0; i++)
+            ttag >>= 7;
+        ttag = i;
+        while (i-- > 0) {
+            p[i] = tag & 0x7f;
+            if (i != (ttag - 1))
+                p[i] |= 0x80;
+            tag >>= 7;
+        }
+        p += ttag;
+    }
+    if (constructed == 2)
+        *(p++) = 0x80;
+    else
+        asn1_put_length(&p, length);
+    *pp = p;
+}
+
+int ASN1_put_eoc(unsigned char **pp)
+{
+    unsigned char *p = *pp;
+    *p++ = 0;
+    *p++ = 0;
+    *pp = p;
+    return 2;
+}
+
+static void asn1_put_length(unsigned char **pp, int length)
+{
+    unsigned char *p = *pp;
+    int i, l;
+    if (length <= 127)
+        *(p++) = (unsigned char)length;
+    else {
+        l = length;
+        for (i = 0; l > 0; i++)
+            l >>= 8;
+        *(p++) = i | 0x80;
+        l = i;
+        while (i-- > 0) {
+            p[i] = length & 0xff;
+            length >>= 8;
+        }
+        p += l;
+    }
+    *pp = p;
+}
+
+int ASN1_object_size(int constructed, int length, int tag)
+{
+    int ret = 1;
+    if (length < 0)
+        return -1;
+    if (tag >= 31) {
+        while (tag > 0) {
+            tag >>= 7;
+            ret++;
+        }
+    }
+    if (constructed == 2) {
+        ret += 3;
+    } else {
+        ret++;
+        if (length > 127) {
+            int tmplen = length;
+            while (tmplen > 0) {
+                tmplen >>= 8;
+                ret++;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    if (ret >= INT_MAX - length)
+        return -1;
+    return ret + length;
+}
+
+int ASN1_STRING_copy(ASN1_STRING *dst, const ASN1_STRING *str)
+{
+    if (str == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    dst->type = str->type;
+    if (!ASN1_STRING_set(dst, str->data, str->length))
+        return 0;
+    /* Copy flags but preserve embed value */
+    dst->flags &= ASN1_STRING_FLAG_EMBED;
+    dst->flags |= str->flags & ~ASN1_STRING_FLAG_EMBED;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+ASN1_STRING *ASN1_STRING_dup(const ASN1_STRING *str)
+{
+    ASN1_STRING *ret;
+    if (!str)
+        return NULL;
+    ret = ASN1_STRING_new();
+    if (ret == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    if (!ASN1_STRING_copy(ret, str)) {
+        ASN1_STRING_free(ret);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int ASN1_STRING_set(ASN1_STRING *str, const void *_data, int len)
+{
+    unsigned char *c;
+    const char *data = _data;
+
+    if (len < 0) {
+        if (data == NULL)
+            return (0);
+        else
+            len = strlen(data);
+    }
+    if ((str->length <= len) || (str->data == NULL)) {
+        c = str->data;
+        str->data = OPENSSL_realloc(c, len + 1);
+        if (str->data == NULL) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_STRING_SET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            str->data = c;
+            return (0);
+        }
+    }
+    str->length = len;
+    if (data != NULL) {
+        memcpy(str->data, data, len);
+        /* an allowance for strings :-) */
+        str->data[len] = '\0';
+    }
+    return (1);
+}
+
+void ASN1_STRING_set0(ASN1_STRING *str, void *data, int len)
+{
+    OPENSSL_free(str->data);
+    str->data = data;
+    str->length = len;
+}
+
+ASN1_STRING *ASN1_STRING_new(void)
+{
+    return (ASN1_STRING_type_new(V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING));
+}
+
+ASN1_STRING *ASN1_STRING_type_new(int type)
+{
+    ASN1_STRING *ret;
+
+    ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
+    if (ret == NULL) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_STRING_TYPE_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+    ret->type = type;
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+void asn1_string_embed_free(ASN1_STRING *a, int embed)
+{
+    if (a == NULL)
+        return;
+    if (!(a->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_NDEF))
+        OPENSSL_free(a->data);
+    if (embed == 0)
+        OPENSSL_free(a);
+}
+
+void ASN1_STRING_free(ASN1_STRING *a)
+{
+    if (a == NULL)
+        return;
+    asn1_string_embed_free(a, a->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_EMBED);
+}
+
+void ASN1_STRING_clear_free(ASN1_STRING *a)
+{
+    if (a == NULL)
+        return;
+    if (a->data && !(a->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_NDEF))
+        OPENSSL_cleanse(a->data, a->length);
+    ASN1_STRING_free(a);
+}
+
+int ASN1_STRING_cmp(const ASN1_STRING *a, const ASN1_STRING *b)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    i = (a->length - b->length);
+    if (i == 0) {
+        i = memcmp(a->data, b->data, a->length);
+        if (i == 0)
+            return (a->type - b->type);
+        else
+            return (i);
+    } else
+        return (i);
+}
+
+int ASN1_STRING_length(const ASN1_STRING *x)
+{
+    return x->length;
+}
+
+void ASN1_STRING_length_set(ASN1_STRING *x, int len)
+{
+    x->length = len;
+}
+
+int ASN1_STRING_type(const ASN1_STRING *x)
+{
+    return x->type;
+}
+
+const unsigned char *ASN1_STRING_get0_data(const ASN1_STRING *x)
+{
+    return x->data;
+}
+
+# if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+unsigned char *ASN1_STRING_data(ASN1_STRING *x)
+{
+    return x->data;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/asn1_locl.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/asn1_locl.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9a47b1e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/asn1_locl.h
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2005-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* Internal ASN1 structures and functions: not for application use */
+
+int asn1_utctime_to_tm(struct tm *tm, const ASN1_UTCTIME *d);
+int asn1_generalizedtime_to_tm(struct tm *tm, const ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *d);
+
+/* ASN1 scan context structure */
+
+struct asn1_sctx_st {
+    /* The ASN1_ITEM associated with this field */
+    const ASN1_ITEM *it;
+    /* If ASN1_TEMPLATE associated with this field */
+    const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt;
+    /* Various flags associated with field and context */
+    unsigned long flags;
+    /* If SEQUENCE OF or SET OF, field index */
+    int skidx;
+    /* ASN1 depth of field */
+    int depth;
+    /* Structure and field name */
+    const char *sname, *fname;
+    /* If a primitive type the type of underlying field */
+    int prim_type;
+    /* The field value itself */
+    ASN1_VALUE **field;
+    /* Callback to pass information to */
+    int (*scan_cb) (ASN1_SCTX *ctx);
+    /* Context specific application data */
+    void *app_data;
+} /* ASN1_SCTX */ ;
+
+typedef struct mime_param_st MIME_PARAM;
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(MIME_PARAM)
+typedef struct mime_header_st MIME_HEADER;
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(MIME_HEADER)
+
+/* Month values for printing out times */
+extern const char *_asn1_mon[12];
+
+void asn1_string_embed_free(ASN1_STRING *a, int embed);
+
+int asn1_get_choice_selector(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
+int asn1_set_choice_selector(ASN1_VALUE **pval, int value,
+                             const ASN1_ITEM *it);
+
+ASN1_VALUE **asn1_get_field_ptr(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt);
+
+const ASN1_TEMPLATE *asn1_do_adb(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt,
+                                 int nullerr);
+
+int asn1_do_lock(ASN1_VALUE **pval, int op, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
+
+void asn1_enc_init(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
+void asn1_enc_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
+int asn1_enc_restore(int *len, unsigned char **out, ASN1_VALUE **pval,
+                     const ASN1_ITEM *it);
+int asn1_enc_save(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char *in, int inlen,
+                  const ASN1_ITEM *it);
+
+void asn1_item_embed_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it, int embed);
+void asn1_primitive_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it, int embed);
+void asn1_template_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt);
+
+ASN1_OBJECT *c2i_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT **a, const unsigned char **pp,
+                             long length);
+int i2c_ASN1_BIT_STRING(ASN1_BIT_STRING *a, unsigned char **pp);
+ASN1_BIT_STRING *c2i_ASN1_BIT_STRING(ASN1_BIT_STRING **a,
+                                     const unsigned char **pp, long length);
+int i2c_ASN1_INTEGER(ASN1_INTEGER *a, unsigned char **pp);
+ASN1_INTEGER *c2i_ASN1_INTEGER(ASN1_INTEGER **a, const unsigned char **pp,
+                               long length);
+
+/* Internal functions used by x_int64.c */
+int c2i_uint64_int(uint64_t *ret, int *neg, const unsigned char **pp, long len);
+int i2c_uint64_int(unsigned char *p, uint64_t r, int neg);
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/asn1_par.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/asn1_par.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fabc8d6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/asn1_par.c
@@ -0,0 +1,375 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+
+#ifndef ASN1_PARSE_MAXDEPTH
+#define ASN1_PARSE_MAXDEPTH 128
+#endif
+
+static int asn1_print_info(BIO *bp, int tag, int xclass, int constructed,
+                           int indent);
+static int asn1_parse2(BIO *bp, const unsigned char **pp, long length,
+                       int offset, int depth, int indent, int dump);
+static int asn1_print_info(BIO *bp, int tag, int xclass, int constructed,
+                           int indent)
+{
+    static const char fmt[] = "%-18s";
+    char str[128];
+    const char *p;
+
+    if (constructed & V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
+        p = "cons: ";
+    else
+        p = "prim: ";
+    if (BIO_write(bp, p, 6) < 6)
+        goto err;
+    BIO_indent(bp, indent, 128);
+
+    p = str;
+    if ((xclass & V_ASN1_PRIVATE) == V_ASN1_PRIVATE)
+        BIO_snprintf(str, sizeof(str), "priv [ %d ] ", tag);
+    else if ((xclass & V_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC) == V_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC)
+        BIO_snprintf(str, sizeof(str), "cont [ %d ]", tag);
+    else if ((xclass & V_ASN1_APPLICATION) == V_ASN1_APPLICATION)
+        BIO_snprintf(str, sizeof(str), "appl [ %d ]", tag);
+    else if (tag > 30)
+        BIO_snprintf(str, sizeof(str), "<ASN1 %d>", tag);
+    else
+        p = ASN1_tag2str(tag);
+
+    if (BIO_printf(bp, fmt, p) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    return (1);
+ err:
+    return (0);
+}
+
+int ASN1_parse(BIO *bp, const unsigned char *pp, long len, int indent)
+{
+    return (asn1_parse2(bp, &pp, len, 0, 0, indent, 0));
+}
+
+int ASN1_parse_dump(BIO *bp, const unsigned char *pp, long len, int indent,
+                    int dump)
+{
+    return (asn1_parse2(bp, &pp, len, 0, 0, indent, dump));
+}
+
+static int asn1_parse2(BIO *bp, const unsigned char **pp, long length,
+                       int offset, int depth, int indent, int dump)
+{
+    const unsigned char *p, *ep, *tot, *op, *opp;
+    long len;
+    int tag, xclass, ret = 0;
+    int nl, hl, j, r;
+    ASN1_OBJECT *o = NULL;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os = NULL;
+    /* ASN1_BMPSTRING *bmp=NULL; */
+    int dump_indent, dump_cont = 0;
+
+    if (depth > ASN1_PARSE_MAXDEPTH) {
+        BIO_puts(bp, "BAD RECURSION DEPTH\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    dump_indent = 6;            /* Because we know BIO_dump_indent() */
+    p = *pp;
+    tot = p + length;
+    while (length > 0) {
+        op = p;
+        j = ASN1_get_object(&p, &len, &tag, &xclass, length);
+        if (j & 0x80) {
+            if (BIO_write(bp, "Error in encoding\n", 18) <= 0)
+                goto end;
+            ret = 0;
+            goto end;
+        }
+        hl = (p - op);
+        length -= hl;
+        /*
+         * if j == 0x21 it is a constructed indefinite length object
+         */
+        if (BIO_printf(bp, "%5ld:", (long)offset + (long)(op - *pp))
+            <= 0)
+            goto end;
+
+        if (j != (V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 1)) {
+            if (BIO_printf(bp, "d=%-2d hl=%ld l=%4ld ",
+                           depth, (long)hl, len) <= 0)
+                goto end;
+        } else {
+            if (BIO_printf(bp, "d=%-2d hl=%ld l=inf  ", depth, (long)hl) <= 0)
+                goto end;
+        }
+        if (!asn1_print_info(bp, tag, xclass, j, (indent) ? depth : 0))
+            goto end;
+        if (j & V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED) {
+            const unsigned char *sp = p;
+
+            ep = p + len;
+            if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) <= 0)
+                goto end;
+            if (len > length) {
+                BIO_printf(bp, "length is greater than %ld\n", length);
+                ret = 0;
+                goto end;
+            }
+            if ((j == 0x21) && (len == 0)) {
+                for (;;) {
+                    r = asn1_parse2(bp, &p, (long)(tot - p),
+                                    offset + (p - *pp), depth + 1,
+                                    indent, dump);
+                    if (r == 0) {
+                        ret = 0;
+                        goto end;
+                    }
+                    if ((r == 2) || (p >= tot)) {
+                        len = p - sp;
+                        break;
+                    }
+                }
+            } else {
+                long tmp = len;
+
+                while (p < ep) {
+                    sp = p;
+                    r = asn1_parse2(bp, &p, tmp,
+                                    offset + (p - *pp), depth + 1,
+                                    indent, dump);
+                    if (r == 0) {
+                        ret = 0;
+                        goto end;
+                    }
+                    tmp -= p - sp;
+                }
+            }
+        } else if (xclass != 0) {
+            p += len;
+            if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) <= 0)
+                goto end;
+        } else {
+            nl = 0;
+            if ((tag == V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING) ||
+                (tag == V_ASN1_T61STRING) ||
+                (tag == V_ASN1_IA5STRING) ||
+                (tag == V_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING) ||
+                (tag == V_ASN1_NUMERICSTRING) ||
+                (tag == V_ASN1_UTF8STRING) ||
+                (tag == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) || (tag == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)) {
+                if (BIO_write(bp, ":", 1) <= 0)
+                    goto end;
+                if ((len > 0) && BIO_write(bp, (const char *)p, (int)len)
+                    != (int)len)
+                    goto end;
+            } else if (tag == V_ASN1_OBJECT) {
+                opp = op;
+                if (d2i_ASN1_OBJECT(&o, &opp, len + hl) != NULL) {
+                    if (BIO_write(bp, ":", 1) <= 0)
+                        goto end;
+                    i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, o);
+                } else {
+                    if (BIO_puts(bp, ":BAD OBJECT") <= 0)
+                        goto end;
+                    dump_cont = 1;
+                }
+            } else if (tag == V_ASN1_BOOLEAN) {
+                if (len != 1) {
+                    if (BIO_puts(bp, ":BAD BOOLEAN") <= 0)
+                        goto end;
+                    dump_cont = 1;
+                }
+                if (len > 0)
+                    BIO_printf(bp, ":%u", p[0]);
+            } else if (tag == V_ASN1_BMPSTRING) {
+                /* do the BMP thang */
+            } else if (tag == V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING) {
+                int i, printable = 1;
+
+                opp = op;
+                os = d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(NULL, &opp, len + hl);
+                if (os != NULL && os->length > 0) {
+                    opp = os->data;
+                    /*
+                     * testing whether the octet string is printable
+                     */
+                    for (i = 0; i < os->length; i++) {
+                        if (((opp[i] < ' ') &&
+                             (opp[i] != '\n') &&
+                             (opp[i] != '\r') &&
+                             (opp[i] != '\t')) || (opp[i] > '~')) {
+                            printable = 0;
+                            break;
+                        }
+                    }
+                    if (printable)
+                        /* printable string */
+                    {
+                        if (BIO_write(bp, ":", 1) <= 0)
+                            goto end;
+                        if (BIO_write(bp, (const char *)opp, os->length) <= 0)
+                            goto end;
+                    } else if (!dump)
+                        /*
+                         * not printable => print octet string as hex dump
+                         */
+                    {
+                        if (BIO_write(bp, "[HEX DUMP]:", 11) <= 0)
+                            goto end;
+                        for (i = 0; i < os->length; i++) {
+                            if (BIO_printf(bp, "%02X", opp[i]) <= 0)
+                                goto end;
+                        }
+                    } else
+                        /* print the normal dump */
+                    {
+                        if (!nl) {
+                            if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) <= 0)
+                                goto end;
+                        }
+                        if (BIO_dump_indent(bp,
+                                            (const char *)opp,
+                                            ((dump == -1 || dump >
+                                              os->
+                                              length) ? os->length : dump),
+                                            dump_indent) <= 0)
+                            goto end;
+                        nl = 1;
+                    }
+                }
+                ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os);
+                os = NULL;
+            } else if (tag == V_ASN1_INTEGER) {
+                ASN1_INTEGER *bs;
+                int i;
+
+                opp = op;
+                bs = d2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, &opp, len + hl);
+                if (bs != NULL) {
+                    if (BIO_write(bp, ":", 1) <= 0)
+                        goto end;
+                    if (bs->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER)
+                        if (BIO_write(bp, "-", 1) <= 0)
+                            goto end;
+                    for (i = 0; i < bs->length; i++) {
+                        if (BIO_printf(bp, "%02X", bs->data[i]) <= 0)
+                            goto end;
+                    }
+                    if (bs->length == 0) {
+                        if (BIO_write(bp, "00", 2) <= 0)
+                            goto end;
+                    }
+                } else {
+                    if (BIO_puts(bp, ":BAD INTEGER") <= 0)
+                        goto end;
+                    dump_cont = 1;
+                }
+                ASN1_INTEGER_free(bs);
+            } else if (tag == V_ASN1_ENUMERATED) {
+                ASN1_ENUMERATED *bs;
+                int i;
+
+                opp = op;
+                bs = d2i_ASN1_ENUMERATED(NULL, &opp, len + hl);
+                if (bs != NULL) {
+                    if (BIO_write(bp, ":", 1) <= 0)
+                        goto end;
+                    if (bs->type == V_ASN1_NEG_ENUMERATED)
+                        if (BIO_write(bp, "-", 1) <= 0)
+                            goto end;
+                    for (i = 0; i < bs->length; i++) {
+                        if (BIO_printf(bp, "%02X", bs->data[i]) <= 0)
+                            goto end;
+                    }
+                    if (bs->length == 0) {
+                        if (BIO_write(bp, "00", 2) <= 0)
+                            goto end;
+                    }
+                } else {
+                    if (BIO_puts(bp, ":BAD ENUMERATED") <= 0)
+                        goto end;
+                    dump_cont = 1;
+                }
+                ASN1_ENUMERATED_free(bs);
+            } else if (len > 0 && dump) {
+                if (!nl) {
+                    if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) <= 0)
+                        goto end;
+                }
+                if (BIO_dump_indent(bp, (const char *)p,
+                                    ((dump == -1 || dump > len) ? len : dump),
+                                    dump_indent) <= 0)
+                    goto end;
+                nl = 1;
+            }
+            if (dump_cont) {
+                int i;
+                const unsigned char *tmp = op + hl;
+                if (BIO_puts(bp, ":[") <= 0)
+                    goto end;
+                for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+                    if (BIO_printf(bp, "%02X", tmp[i]) <= 0)
+                        goto end;
+                }
+                if (BIO_puts(bp, "]") <= 0)
+                    goto end;
+            }
+
+            if (!nl) {
+                if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) <= 0)
+                    goto end;
+            }
+            p += len;
+            if ((tag == V_ASN1_EOC) && (xclass == 0)) {
+                ret = 2;        /* End of sequence */
+                goto end;
+            }
+        }
+        length -= len;
+    }
+    ret = 1;
+ end:
+    ASN1_OBJECT_free(o);
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os);
+    *pp = p;
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+const char *ASN1_tag2str(int tag)
+{
+    static const char *const tag2str[] = {
+        /* 0-4 */
+        "EOC", "BOOLEAN", "INTEGER", "BIT STRING", "OCTET STRING",
+        /* 5-9 */
+        "NULL", "OBJECT", "OBJECT DESCRIPTOR", "EXTERNAL", "REAL",
+        /* 10-13 */
+        "ENUMERATED", "<ASN1 11>", "UTF8STRING", "<ASN1 13>",
+        /* 15-17 */
+        "<ASN1 14>", "<ASN1 15>", "SEQUENCE", "SET",
+        /* 18-20 */
+        "NUMERICSTRING", "PRINTABLESTRING", "T61STRING",
+        /* 21-24 */
+        "VIDEOTEXSTRING", "IA5STRING", "UTCTIME", "GENERALIZEDTIME",
+        /* 25-27 */
+        "GRAPHICSTRING", "VISIBLESTRING", "GENERALSTRING",
+        /* 28-30 */
+        "UNIVERSALSTRING", "<ASN1 29>", "BMPSTRING"
+    };
+
+    if ((tag == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER) || (tag == V_ASN1_NEG_ENUMERATED))
+        tag &= ~0x100;
+
+    if (tag < 0 || tag > 30)
+        return "(unknown)";
+    return tag2str[tag];
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..84475e9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c
@@ -0,0 +1,981 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2008-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include "internal/evp_int.h"
+#include "internal/bio.h"
+#include "asn1_locl.h"
+
+/*
+ * Generalised MIME like utilities for streaming ASN1. Although many have a
+ * PKCS7/CMS like flavour others are more general purpose.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * MIME format structures Note that all are translated to lower case apart
+ * from parameter values. Quotes are stripped off
+ */
+
+struct mime_param_st {
+    char *param_name;           /* Param name e.g. "micalg" */
+    char *param_value;          /* Param value e.g. "sha1" */
+};
+
+struct mime_header_st {
+    char *name;                 /* Name of line e.g. "content-type" */
+    char *value;                /* Value of line e.g. "text/plain" */
+    STACK_OF(MIME_PARAM) *params; /* Zero or more parameters */
+};
+
+static int asn1_output_data(BIO *out, BIO *data, ASN1_VALUE *val, int flags,
+                            const ASN1_ITEM *it);
+static char *strip_ends(char *name);
+static char *strip_start(char *name);
+static char *strip_end(char *name);
+static MIME_HEADER *mime_hdr_new(const char *name, const char *value);
+static int mime_hdr_addparam(MIME_HEADER *mhdr, const char *name, const char *value);
+static STACK_OF(MIME_HEADER) *mime_parse_hdr(BIO *bio);
+static int mime_hdr_cmp(const MIME_HEADER *const *a,
+                        const MIME_HEADER *const *b);
+static int mime_param_cmp(const MIME_PARAM *const *a,
+                          const MIME_PARAM *const *b);
+static void mime_param_free(MIME_PARAM *param);
+static int mime_bound_check(char *line, int linelen, const char *bound, int blen);
+static int multi_split(BIO *bio, const char *bound, STACK_OF(BIO) **ret);
+static int strip_eol(char *linebuf, int *plen, int flags);
+static MIME_HEADER *mime_hdr_find(STACK_OF(MIME_HEADER) *hdrs, const char *name);
+static MIME_PARAM *mime_param_find(MIME_HEADER *hdr, const char *name);
+static void mime_hdr_free(MIME_HEADER *hdr);
+
+#define MAX_SMLEN 1024
+#define mime_debug(x)           /* x */
+
+/* Output an ASN1 structure in BER format streaming if necessary */
+
+int i2d_ASN1_bio_stream(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE *val, BIO *in, int flags,
+                        const ASN1_ITEM *it)
+{
+    /* If streaming create stream BIO and copy all content through it */
+    if (flags & SMIME_STREAM) {
+        BIO *bio, *tbio;
+        bio = BIO_new_NDEF(out, val, it);
+        if (!bio) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_I2D_ASN1_BIO_STREAM, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        SMIME_crlf_copy(in, bio, flags);
+        (void)BIO_flush(bio);
+        /* Free up successive BIOs until we hit the old output BIO */
+        do {
+            tbio = BIO_pop(bio);
+            BIO_free(bio);
+            bio = tbio;
+        } while (bio != out);
+    }
+    /*
+     * else just write out ASN1 structure which will have all content stored
+     * internally
+     */
+    else
+        ASN1_item_i2d_bio(it, out, val);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Base 64 read and write of ASN1 structure */
+
+static int B64_write_ASN1(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE *val, BIO *in, int flags,
+                          const ASN1_ITEM *it)
+{
+    BIO *b64;
+    int r;
+    b64 = BIO_new(BIO_f_base64());
+    if (b64 == NULL) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_B64_WRITE_ASN1, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    /*
+     * prepend the b64 BIO so all data is base64 encoded.
+     */
+    out = BIO_push(b64, out);
+    r = i2d_ASN1_bio_stream(out, val, in, flags, it);
+    (void)BIO_flush(out);
+    BIO_pop(out);
+    BIO_free(b64);
+    return r;
+}
+
+/* Streaming ASN1 PEM write */
+
+int PEM_write_bio_ASN1_stream(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE *val, BIO *in, int flags,
+                              const char *hdr, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
+{
+    int r;
+    BIO_printf(out, "-----BEGIN %s-----\n", hdr);
+    r = B64_write_ASN1(out, val, in, flags, it);
+    BIO_printf(out, "-----END %s-----\n", hdr);
+    return r;
+}
+
+static ASN1_VALUE *b64_read_asn1(BIO *bio, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
+{
+    BIO *b64;
+    ASN1_VALUE *val;
+
+    if ((b64 = BIO_new(BIO_f_base64())) == NULL) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_B64_READ_ASN1, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    bio = BIO_push(b64, bio);
+    val = ASN1_item_d2i_bio(it, bio, NULL);
+    if (!val)
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_B64_READ_ASN1, ASN1_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+    (void)BIO_flush(bio);
+    BIO_pop(bio);
+    BIO_free(b64);
+    return val;
+}
+
+/* Generate the MIME "micalg" parameter from RFC3851, RFC4490 */
+
+static int asn1_write_micalg(BIO *out, STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) *mdalgs)
+{
+    const EVP_MD *md;
+    int i, have_unknown = 0, write_comma, ret = 0, md_nid;
+    have_unknown = 0;
+    write_comma = 0;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_ALGOR_num(mdalgs); i++) {
+        if (write_comma)
+            BIO_write(out, ",", 1);
+        write_comma = 1;
+        md_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(sk_X509_ALGOR_value(mdalgs, i)->algorithm);
+        md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid);
+        if (md && md->md_ctrl) {
+            int rv;
+            char *micstr;
+            rv = md->md_ctrl(NULL, EVP_MD_CTRL_MICALG, 0, &micstr);
+            if (rv > 0) {
+                BIO_puts(out, micstr);
+                OPENSSL_free(micstr);
+                continue;
+            }
+            if (rv != -2)
+                goto err;
+        }
+        switch (md_nid) {
+        case NID_sha1:
+            BIO_puts(out, "sha1");
+            break;
+
+        case NID_md5:
+            BIO_puts(out, "md5");
+            break;
+
+        case NID_sha256:
+            BIO_puts(out, "sha-256");
+            break;
+
+        case NID_sha384:
+            BIO_puts(out, "sha-384");
+            break;
+
+        case NID_sha512:
+            BIO_puts(out, "sha-512");
+            break;
+
+        case NID_id_GostR3411_94:
+            BIO_puts(out, "gostr3411-94");
+            goto err;
+
+        default:
+            if (have_unknown)
+                write_comma = 0;
+            else {
+                BIO_puts(out, "unknown");
+                have_unknown = 1;
+            }
+            break;
+
+        }
+    }
+
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+
+    return ret;
+
+}
+
+/* SMIME sender */
+
+int SMIME_write_ASN1(BIO *bio, ASN1_VALUE *val, BIO *data, int flags,
+                     int ctype_nid, int econt_nid,
+                     STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) *mdalgs, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
+{
+    char bound[33], c;
+    int i;
+    const char *mime_prefix, *mime_eol, *cname = "smime.p7m";
+    const char *msg_type = NULL;
+    if (flags & SMIME_OLDMIME)
+        mime_prefix = "application/x-pkcs7-";
+    else
+        mime_prefix = "application/pkcs7-";
+
+    if (flags & SMIME_CRLFEOL)
+        mime_eol = "\r\n";
+    else
+        mime_eol = "\n";
+    if ((flags & SMIME_DETACHED) && data) {
+        /* We want multipart/signed */
+        /* Generate a random boundary */
+        if (RAND_bytes((unsigned char *)bound, 32) <= 0)
+            return 0;
+        for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
+            c = bound[i] & 0xf;
+            if (c < 10)
+                c += '0';
+            else
+                c += 'A' - 10;
+            bound[i] = c;
+        }
+        bound[32] = 0;
+        BIO_printf(bio, "MIME-Version: 1.0%s", mime_eol);
+        BIO_printf(bio, "Content-Type: multipart/signed;");
+        BIO_printf(bio, " protocol=\"%ssignature\";", mime_prefix);
+        BIO_puts(bio, " micalg=\"");
+        asn1_write_micalg(bio, mdalgs);
+        BIO_printf(bio, "\"; boundary=\"----%s\"%s%s",
+                   bound, mime_eol, mime_eol);
+        BIO_printf(bio, "This is an S/MIME signed message%s%s",
+                   mime_eol, mime_eol);
+        /* Now write out the first part */
+        BIO_printf(bio, "------%s%s", bound, mime_eol);
+        if (!asn1_output_data(bio, data, val, flags, it))
+            return 0;
+        BIO_printf(bio, "%s------%s%s", mime_eol, bound, mime_eol);
+
+        /* Headers for signature */
+
+        BIO_printf(bio, "Content-Type: %ssignature;", mime_prefix);
+        BIO_printf(bio, " name=\"smime.p7s\"%s", mime_eol);
+        BIO_printf(bio, "Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64%s", mime_eol);
+        BIO_printf(bio, "Content-Disposition: attachment;");
+        BIO_printf(bio, " filename=\"smime.p7s\"%s%s", mime_eol, mime_eol);
+        B64_write_ASN1(bio, val, NULL, 0, it);
+        BIO_printf(bio, "%s------%s--%s%s", mime_eol, bound,
+                   mime_eol, mime_eol);
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    /* Determine smime-type header */
+
+    if (ctype_nid == NID_pkcs7_enveloped)
+        msg_type = "enveloped-data";
+    else if (ctype_nid == NID_pkcs7_signed) {
+        if (econt_nid == NID_id_smime_ct_receipt)
+            msg_type = "signed-receipt";
+        else if (sk_X509_ALGOR_num(mdalgs) >= 0)
+            msg_type = "signed-data";
+        else
+            msg_type = "certs-only";
+    } else if (ctype_nid == NID_id_smime_ct_compressedData) {
+        msg_type = "compressed-data";
+        cname = "smime.p7z";
+    }
+    /* MIME headers */
+    BIO_printf(bio, "MIME-Version: 1.0%s", mime_eol);
+    BIO_printf(bio, "Content-Disposition: attachment;");
+    BIO_printf(bio, " filename=\"%s\"%s", cname, mime_eol);
+    BIO_printf(bio, "Content-Type: %smime;", mime_prefix);
+    if (msg_type)
+        BIO_printf(bio, " smime-type=%s;", msg_type);
+    BIO_printf(bio, " name=\"%s\"%s", cname, mime_eol);
+    BIO_printf(bio, "Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64%s%s",
+               mime_eol, mime_eol);
+    if (!B64_write_ASN1(bio, val, data, flags, it))
+        return 0;
+    BIO_printf(bio, "%s", mime_eol);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Handle output of ASN1 data */
+
+static int asn1_output_data(BIO *out, BIO *data, ASN1_VALUE *val, int flags,
+                            const ASN1_ITEM *it)
+{
+    BIO *tmpbio;
+    const ASN1_AUX *aux = it->funcs;
+    ASN1_STREAM_ARG sarg;
+    int rv = 1;
+
+    /*
+     * If data is not detached or resigning then the output BIO is already
+     * set up to finalise when it is written through.
+     */
+    if (!(flags & SMIME_DETACHED) || (flags & PKCS7_REUSE_DIGEST)) {
+        SMIME_crlf_copy(data, out, flags);
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    if (!aux || !aux->asn1_cb) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_OUTPUT_DATA, ASN1_R_STREAMING_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    sarg.out = out;
+    sarg.ndef_bio = NULL;
+    sarg.boundary = NULL;
+
+    /* Let ASN1 code prepend any needed BIOs */
+
+    if (aux->asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_DETACHED_PRE, &val, it, &sarg) <= 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    /* Copy data across, passing through filter BIOs for processing */
+    SMIME_crlf_copy(data, sarg.ndef_bio, flags);
+
+    /* Finalize structure */
+    if (aux->asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_DETACHED_POST, &val, it, &sarg) <= 0)
+        rv = 0;
+
+    /* Now remove any digests prepended to the BIO */
+
+    while (sarg.ndef_bio != out) {
+        tmpbio = BIO_pop(sarg.ndef_bio);
+        BIO_free(sarg.ndef_bio);
+        sarg.ndef_bio = tmpbio;
+    }
+
+    return rv;
+
+}
+
+/*
+ * SMIME reader: handle multipart/signed and opaque signing. in multipart
+ * case the content is placed in a memory BIO pointed to by "bcont". In
+ * opaque this is set to NULL
+ */
+
+ASN1_VALUE *SMIME_read_ASN1(BIO *bio, BIO **bcont, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
+{
+    BIO *asnin;
+    STACK_OF(MIME_HEADER) *headers = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(BIO) *parts = NULL;
+    MIME_HEADER *hdr;
+    MIME_PARAM *prm;
+    ASN1_VALUE *val;
+    int ret;
+
+    if (bcont)
+        *bcont = NULL;
+
+    if ((headers = mime_parse_hdr(bio)) == NULL) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_SMIME_READ_ASN1, ASN1_R_MIME_PARSE_ERROR);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    if ((hdr = mime_hdr_find(headers, "content-type")) == NULL
+        || hdr->value == NULL) {
+        sk_MIME_HEADER_pop_free(headers, mime_hdr_free);
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_SMIME_READ_ASN1, ASN1_R_NO_CONTENT_TYPE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    /* Handle multipart/signed */
+
+    if (strcmp(hdr->value, "multipart/signed") == 0) {
+        /* Split into two parts */
+        prm = mime_param_find(hdr, "boundary");
+        if (!prm || !prm->param_value) {
+            sk_MIME_HEADER_pop_free(headers, mime_hdr_free);
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_SMIME_READ_ASN1, ASN1_R_NO_MULTIPART_BOUNDARY);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+        ret = multi_split(bio, prm->param_value, &parts);
+        sk_MIME_HEADER_pop_free(headers, mime_hdr_free);
+        if (!ret || (sk_BIO_num(parts) != 2)) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_SMIME_READ_ASN1, ASN1_R_NO_MULTIPART_BODY_FAILURE);
+            sk_BIO_pop_free(parts, BIO_vfree);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+
+        /* Parse the signature piece */
+        asnin = sk_BIO_value(parts, 1);
+
+        if ((headers = mime_parse_hdr(asnin)) == NULL) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_SMIME_READ_ASN1, ASN1_R_MIME_SIG_PARSE_ERROR);
+            sk_BIO_pop_free(parts, BIO_vfree);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+
+        /* Get content type */
+
+        if ((hdr = mime_hdr_find(headers, "content-type")) == NULL
+            || hdr->value == NULL) {
+            sk_MIME_HEADER_pop_free(headers, mime_hdr_free);
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_SMIME_READ_ASN1, ASN1_R_NO_SIG_CONTENT_TYPE);
+            sk_BIO_pop_free(parts, BIO_vfree);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+
+        if (strcmp(hdr->value, "application/x-pkcs7-signature") &&
+            strcmp(hdr->value, "application/pkcs7-signature")) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_SMIME_READ_ASN1, ASN1_R_SIG_INVALID_MIME_TYPE);
+            ERR_add_error_data(2, "type: ", hdr->value);
+            sk_MIME_HEADER_pop_free(headers, mime_hdr_free);
+            sk_BIO_pop_free(parts, BIO_vfree);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+        sk_MIME_HEADER_pop_free(headers, mime_hdr_free);
+        /* Read in ASN1 */
+        if ((val = b64_read_asn1(asnin, it)) == NULL) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_SMIME_READ_ASN1, ASN1_R_ASN1_SIG_PARSE_ERROR);
+            sk_BIO_pop_free(parts, BIO_vfree);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+
+        if (bcont) {
+            *bcont = sk_BIO_value(parts, 0);
+            BIO_free(asnin);
+            sk_BIO_free(parts);
+        } else
+            sk_BIO_pop_free(parts, BIO_vfree);
+        return val;
+    }
+
+    /* OK, if not multipart/signed try opaque signature */
+
+    if (strcmp(hdr->value, "application/x-pkcs7-mime") &&
+        strcmp(hdr->value, "application/pkcs7-mime")) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_SMIME_READ_ASN1, ASN1_R_INVALID_MIME_TYPE);
+        ERR_add_error_data(2, "type: ", hdr->value);
+        sk_MIME_HEADER_pop_free(headers, mime_hdr_free);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    sk_MIME_HEADER_pop_free(headers, mime_hdr_free);
+
+    if ((val = b64_read_asn1(bio, it)) == NULL) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_SMIME_READ_ASN1, ASN1_R_ASN1_PARSE_ERROR);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    return val;
+
+}
+
+/* Copy text from one BIO to another making the output CRLF at EOL */
+int SMIME_crlf_copy(BIO *in, BIO *out, int flags)
+{
+    BIO *bf;
+    char eol;
+    int len;
+    char linebuf[MAX_SMLEN];
+    /*
+     * Buffer output so we don't write one line at a time. This is useful
+     * when streaming as we don't end up with one OCTET STRING per line.
+     */
+    bf = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer());
+    if (bf == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    out = BIO_push(bf, out);
+    if (flags & SMIME_BINARY) {
+        while ((len = BIO_read(in, linebuf, MAX_SMLEN)) > 0)
+            BIO_write(out, linebuf, len);
+    } else {
+        int eolcnt = 0;
+        if (flags & SMIME_TEXT)
+            BIO_printf(out, "Content-Type: text/plain\r\n\r\n");
+        while ((len = BIO_gets(in, linebuf, MAX_SMLEN)) > 0) {
+            eol = strip_eol(linebuf, &len, flags);
+            if (len) {
+                /* Not EOF: write out all CRLF */
+                if (flags & SMIME_ASCIICRLF) {
+                    int i;
+                    for (i = 0; i < eolcnt; i++)
+                        BIO_write(out, "\r\n", 2);
+                    eolcnt = 0;
+                }
+                BIO_write(out, linebuf, len);
+                if (eol)
+                    BIO_write(out, "\r\n", 2);
+            } else if (flags & SMIME_ASCIICRLF)
+                eolcnt++;
+            else if (eol)
+                BIO_write(out, "\r\n", 2);
+        }
+    }
+    (void)BIO_flush(out);
+    BIO_pop(out);
+    BIO_free(bf);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Strip off headers if they are text/plain */
+int SMIME_text(BIO *in, BIO *out)
+{
+    char iobuf[4096];
+    int len;
+    STACK_OF(MIME_HEADER) *headers;
+    MIME_HEADER *hdr;
+
+    if ((headers = mime_parse_hdr(in)) == NULL) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_SMIME_TEXT, ASN1_R_MIME_PARSE_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if ((hdr = mime_hdr_find(headers, "content-type")) == NULL
+        || hdr->value == NULL) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_SMIME_TEXT, ASN1_R_MIME_NO_CONTENT_TYPE);
+        sk_MIME_HEADER_pop_free(headers, mime_hdr_free);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (strcmp(hdr->value, "text/plain")) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_SMIME_TEXT, ASN1_R_INVALID_MIME_TYPE);
+        ERR_add_error_data(2, "type: ", hdr->value);
+        sk_MIME_HEADER_pop_free(headers, mime_hdr_free);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    sk_MIME_HEADER_pop_free(headers, mime_hdr_free);
+    while ((len = BIO_read(in, iobuf, sizeof(iobuf))) > 0)
+        BIO_write(out, iobuf, len);
+    if (len < 0)
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Split a multipart/XXX message body into component parts: result is
+ * canonical parts in a STACK of bios
+ */
+
+static int multi_split(BIO *bio, const char *bound, STACK_OF(BIO) **ret)
+{
+    char linebuf[MAX_SMLEN];
+    int len, blen;
+    int eol = 0, next_eol = 0;
+    BIO *bpart = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(BIO) *parts;
+    char state, part, first;
+
+    blen = strlen(bound);
+    part = 0;
+    state = 0;
+    first = 1;
+    parts = sk_BIO_new_null();
+    *ret = parts;
+    if (*ret == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    while ((len = BIO_gets(bio, linebuf, MAX_SMLEN)) > 0) {
+        state = mime_bound_check(linebuf, len, bound, blen);
+        if (state == 1) {
+            first = 1;
+            part++;
+        } else if (state == 2) {
+            if (!sk_BIO_push(parts, bpart)) {
+                BIO_free(bpart);
+                return 0;
+            }
+            return 1;
+        } else if (part) {
+            /* Strip CR+LF from linebuf */
+            next_eol = strip_eol(linebuf, &len, 0);
+            if (first) {
+                first = 0;
+                if (bpart)
+                    if (!sk_BIO_push(parts, bpart)) {
+                        BIO_free(bpart);
+                        return 0;
+                    }
+                bpart = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+                if (bpart == NULL)
+                    return 0;
+                BIO_set_mem_eof_return(bpart, 0);
+            } else if (eol)
+                BIO_write(bpart, "\r\n", 2);
+            eol = next_eol;
+            if (len)
+                BIO_write(bpart, linebuf, len);
+        }
+    }
+    BIO_free(bpart);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/* This is the big one: parse MIME header lines up to message body */
+
+#define MIME_INVALID    0
+#define MIME_START      1
+#define MIME_TYPE       2
+#define MIME_NAME       3
+#define MIME_VALUE      4
+#define MIME_QUOTE      5
+#define MIME_COMMENT    6
+
+static STACK_OF(MIME_HEADER) *mime_parse_hdr(BIO *bio)
+{
+    char *p, *q, c;
+    char *ntmp;
+    char linebuf[MAX_SMLEN];
+    MIME_HEADER *mhdr = NULL, *new_hdr = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(MIME_HEADER) *headers;
+    int len, state, save_state = 0;
+
+    headers = sk_MIME_HEADER_new(mime_hdr_cmp);
+    if (headers == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    while ((len = BIO_gets(bio, linebuf, MAX_SMLEN)) > 0) {
+        /* If whitespace at line start then continuation line */
+        if (mhdr && isspace((unsigned char)linebuf[0]))
+            state = MIME_NAME;
+        else
+            state = MIME_START;
+        ntmp = NULL;
+        /* Go through all characters */
+        for (p = linebuf, q = linebuf; (c = *p) && (c != '\r') && (c != '\n');
+             p++) {
+
+            /*
+             * State machine to handle MIME headers if this looks horrible
+             * that's because it *is*
+             */
+
+            switch (state) {
+            case MIME_START:
+                if (c == ':') {
+                    state = MIME_TYPE;
+                    *p = 0;
+                    ntmp = strip_ends(q);
+                    q = p + 1;
+                }
+                break;
+
+            case MIME_TYPE:
+                if (c == ';') {
+                    mime_debug("Found End Value\n");
+                    *p = 0;
+                    new_hdr = mime_hdr_new(ntmp, strip_ends(q));
+                    if (new_hdr == NULL)
+                        goto err;
+                    if (!sk_MIME_HEADER_push(headers, new_hdr))
+                        goto err;
+                    mhdr = new_hdr;
+                    new_hdr = NULL;
+                    ntmp = NULL;
+                    q = p + 1;
+                    state = MIME_NAME;
+                } else if (c == '(') {
+                    save_state = state;
+                    state = MIME_COMMENT;
+                }
+                break;
+
+            case MIME_COMMENT:
+                if (c == ')') {
+                    state = save_state;
+                }
+                break;
+
+            case MIME_NAME:
+                if (c == '=') {
+                    state = MIME_VALUE;
+                    *p = 0;
+                    ntmp = strip_ends(q);
+                    q = p + 1;
+                }
+                break;
+
+            case MIME_VALUE:
+                if (c == ';') {
+                    state = MIME_NAME;
+                    *p = 0;
+                    mime_hdr_addparam(mhdr, ntmp, strip_ends(q));
+                    ntmp = NULL;
+                    q = p + 1;
+                } else if (c == '"') {
+                    mime_debug("Found Quote\n");
+                    state = MIME_QUOTE;
+                } else if (c == '(') {
+                    save_state = state;
+                    state = MIME_COMMENT;
+                }
+                break;
+
+            case MIME_QUOTE:
+                if (c == '"') {
+                    mime_debug("Found Match Quote\n");
+                    state = MIME_VALUE;
+                }
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+
+        if (state == MIME_TYPE) {
+            new_hdr = mime_hdr_new(ntmp, strip_ends(q));
+            if (new_hdr == NULL)
+                goto err;
+            if (!sk_MIME_HEADER_push(headers, new_hdr))
+                goto err;
+            mhdr = new_hdr;
+            new_hdr = NULL;
+        } else if (state == MIME_VALUE)
+            mime_hdr_addparam(mhdr, ntmp, strip_ends(q));
+        if (p == linebuf)
+            break;              /* Blank line means end of headers */
+    }
+
+    return headers;
+
+err:
+    mime_hdr_free(new_hdr);
+    sk_MIME_HEADER_pop_free(headers, mime_hdr_free);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+static char *strip_ends(char *name)
+{
+    return strip_end(strip_start(name));
+}
+
+/* Strip a parameter of whitespace from start of param */
+static char *strip_start(char *name)
+{
+    char *p, c;
+    /* Look for first non white space or quote */
+    for (p = name; (c = *p); p++) {
+        if (c == '"') {
+            /* Next char is start of string if non null */
+            if (p[1])
+                return p + 1;
+            /* Else null string */
+            return NULL;
+        }
+        if (!isspace((unsigned char)c))
+            return p;
+    }
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+/* As above but strip from end of string : maybe should handle brackets? */
+static char *strip_end(char *name)
+{
+    char *p, c;
+    if (!name)
+        return NULL;
+    /* Look for first non white space or quote */
+    for (p = name + strlen(name) - 1; p >= name; p--) {
+        c = *p;
+        if (c == '"') {
+            if (p - 1 == name)
+                return NULL;
+            *p = 0;
+            return name;
+        }
+        if (isspace((unsigned char)c))
+            *p = 0;
+        else
+            return name;
+    }
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+static MIME_HEADER *mime_hdr_new(const char *name, const char *value)
+{
+    MIME_HEADER *mhdr = NULL;
+    char *tmpname = NULL, *tmpval = NULL, *p;
+    int c;
+
+    if (name) {
+        if ((tmpname = OPENSSL_strdup(name)) == NULL)
+            return NULL;
+        for (p = tmpname; *p; p++) {
+            c = (unsigned char)*p;
+            if (isupper(c)) {
+                c = tolower(c);
+                *p = c;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    if (value) {
+        if ((tmpval = OPENSSL_strdup(value)) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        for (p = tmpval; *p; p++) {
+            c = (unsigned char)*p;
+            if (isupper(c)) {
+                c = tolower(c);
+                *p = c;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    mhdr = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*mhdr));
+    if (mhdr == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    mhdr->name = tmpname;
+    mhdr->value = tmpval;
+    if ((mhdr->params = sk_MIME_PARAM_new(mime_param_cmp)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    return mhdr;
+
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_free(tmpname);
+    OPENSSL_free(tmpval);
+    OPENSSL_free(mhdr);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+static int mime_hdr_addparam(MIME_HEADER *mhdr, const char *name, const char *value)
+{
+    char *tmpname = NULL, *tmpval = NULL, *p;
+    int c;
+    MIME_PARAM *mparam = NULL;
+    if (name) {
+        tmpname = OPENSSL_strdup(name);
+        if (!tmpname)
+            goto err;
+        for (p = tmpname; *p; p++) {
+            c = (unsigned char)*p;
+            if (isupper(c)) {
+                c = tolower(c);
+                *p = c;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    if (value) {
+        tmpval = OPENSSL_strdup(value);
+        if (!tmpval)
+            goto err;
+    }
+    /* Parameter values are case sensitive so leave as is */
+    mparam = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*mparam));
+    if (mparam == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    mparam->param_name = tmpname;
+    mparam->param_value = tmpval;
+    if (!sk_MIME_PARAM_push(mhdr->params, mparam))
+        goto err;
+    return 1;
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_free(tmpname);
+    OPENSSL_free(tmpval);
+    OPENSSL_free(mparam);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int mime_hdr_cmp(const MIME_HEADER *const *a,
+                        const MIME_HEADER *const *b)
+{
+    if (!(*a)->name || !(*b)->name)
+        return ! !(*a)->name - ! !(*b)->name;
+
+    return (strcmp((*a)->name, (*b)->name));
+}
+
+static int mime_param_cmp(const MIME_PARAM *const *a,
+                          const MIME_PARAM *const *b)
+{
+    if (!(*a)->param_name || !(*b)->param_name)
+        return ! !(*a)->param_name - ! !(*b)->param_name;
+    return (strcmp((*a)->param_name, (*b)->param_name));
+}
+
+/* Find a header with a given name (if possible) */
+
+static MIME_HEADER *mime_hdr_find(STACK_OF(MIME_HEADER) *hdrs, const char *name)
+{
+    MIME_HEADER htmp;
+    int idx;
+
+    htmp.name = (char *)name;
+    htmp.value = NULL;
+    htmp.params = NULL;
+
+    idx = sk_MIME_HEADER_find(hdrs, &htmp);
+    if (idx < 0)
+        return NULL;
+    return sk_MIME_HEADER_value(hdrs, idx);
+}
+
+static MIME_PARAM *mime_param_find(MIME_HEADER *hdr, const char *name)
+{
+    MIME_PARAM param;
+    int idx;
+
+    param.param_name = (char *)name;
+    param.param_value = NULL;
+    idx = sk_MIME_PARAM_find(hdr->params, &param);
+    if (idx < 0)
+        return NULL;
+    return sk_MIME_PARAM_value(hdr->params, idx);
+}
+
+static void mime_hdr_free(MIME_HEADER *hdr)
+{
+    if (hdr == NULL)
+        return;
+    OPENSSL_free(hdr->name);
+    OPENSSL_free(hdr->value);
+    if (hdr->params)
+        sk_MIME_PARAM_pop_free(hdr->params, mime_param_free);
+    OPENSSL_free(hdr);
+}
+
+static void mime_param_free(MIME_PARAM *param)
+{
+    OPENSSL_free(param->param_name);
+    OPENSSL_free(param->param_value);
+    OPENSSL_free(param);
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Check for a multipart boundary. Returns:
+ * 0 : no boundary
+ * 1 : part boundary
+ * 2 : final boundary
+ */
+static int mime_bound_check(char *line, int linelen, const char *bound, int blen)
+{
+    if (linelen == -1)
+        linelen = strlen(line);
+    if (blen == -1)
+        blen = strlen(bound);
+    /* Quickly eliminate if line length too short */
+    if (blen + 2 > linelen)
+        return 0;
+    /* Check for part boundary */
+    if ((strncmp(line, "--", 2) == 0)
+        && strncmp(line + 2, bound, blen) == 0) {
+        if (strncmp(line + blen + 2, "--", 2) == 0)
+            return 2;
+        else
+            return 1;
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int strip_eol(char *linebuf, int *plen, int flags)
+{
+    int len = *plen;
+    char *p, c;
+    int is_eol = 0;
+    p = linebuf + len - 1;
+    for (p = linebuf + len - 1; len > 0; len--, p--) {
+        c = *p;
+        if (c == '\n')
+            is_eol = 1;
+        else if (is_eol && flags & SMIME_ASCIICRLF && c < 33)
+            continue;
+        else if (c != '\r')
+            break;
+    }
+    *plen = len;
+    return is_eol;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/asn_moid.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/asn_moid.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8176b76
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/asn_moid.c
@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/conf.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include "internal/asn1_int.h"
+#include "internal/objects.h"
+
+/* Simple ASN1 OID module: add all objects in a given section */
+
+static int do_create(const char *value, const char *name);
+
+static int oid_module_init(CONF_IMODULE *md, const CONF *cnf)
+{
+    int i;
+    const char *oid_section;
+    STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *sktmp;
+    CONF_VALUE *oval;
+
+    oid_section = CONF_imodule_get_value(md);
+    if ((sktmp = NCONF_get_section(cnf, oid_section)) == NULL) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_OID_MODULE_INIT, ASN1_R_ERROR_LOADING_SECTION);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(sktmp); i++) {
+        oval = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(sktmp, i);
+        if (!do_create(oval->value, oval->name)) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_OID_MODULE_INIT, ASN1_R_ADDING_OBJECT);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static void oid_module_finish(CONF_IMODULE *md)
+{
+}
+
+void ASN1_add_oid_module(void)
+{
+    CONF_module_add("oid_section", oid_module_init, oid_module_finish);
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Create an OID based on a name value pair. Accept two formats.
+ * shortname = 1.2.3.4
+ * shortname = some long name, 1.2.3.4
+ */
+
+static int do_create(const char *value, const char *name)
+{
+    int nid;
+    ASN1_OBJECT *oid;
+    const char *ln, *ostr, *p;
+    char *lntmp;
+    p = strrchr(value, ',');
+    if (!p) {
+        ln = name;
+        ostr = value;
+    } else {
+        ln = NULL;
+        ostr = p + 1;
+        if (!*ostr)
+            return 0;
+        while (isspace((unsigned char)*ostr))
+            ostr++;
+    }
+
+    nid = OBJ_create(ostr, name, ln);
+
+    if (nid == NID_undef)
+        return 0;
+
+    if (p) {
+        ln = value;
+        while (isspace((unsigned char)*ln))
+            ln++;
+        p--;
+        while (isspace((unsigned char)*p)) {
+            if (p == ln)
+                return 0;
+            p--;
+        }
+        p++;
+        lntmp = OPENSSL_malloc((p - ln) + 1);
+        if (lntmp == NULL)
+            return 0;
+        memcpy(lntmp, ln, p - ln);
+        lntmp[p - ln] = 0;
+        oid = OBJ_nid2obj(nid);
+        oid->ln = lntmp;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/asn_mstbl.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/asn_mstbl.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8260939
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/asn_mstbl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2012-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/conf.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+
+/* Multi string module: add table entries from a given section */
+
+static int do_tcreate(const char *value, const char *name);
+
+static int stbl_module_init(CONF_IMODULE *md, const CONF *cnf)
+{
+    int i;
+    const char *stbl_section;
+    STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *sktmp;
+    CONF_VALUE *mval;
+
+    stbl_section = CONF_imodule_get_value(md);
+    if ((sktmp = NCONF_get_section(cnf, stbl_section)) == NULL) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_STBL_MODULE_INIT, ASN1_R_ERROR_LOADING_SECTION);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(sktmp); i++) {
+        mval = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(sktmp, i);
+        if (!do_tcreate(mval->value, mval->name)) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_STBL_MODULE_INIT, ASN1_R_INVALID_VALUE);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static void stbl_module_finish(CONF_IMODULE *md)
+{
+    ASN1_STRING_TABLE_cleanup();
+}
+
+void ASN1_add_stable_module(void)
+{
+    CONF_module_add("stbl_section", stbl_module_init, stbl_module_finish);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Create an table entry based on a name value pair. format is oid_name =
+ * n1:v1, n2:v2,... where name is "min", "max", "mask" or "flags".
+ */
+
+static int do_tcreate(const char *value, const char *name)
+{
+    char *eptr;
+    int nid, i, rv = 0;
+    long tbl_min = -1, tbl_max = -1;
+    unsigned long tbl_mask = 0, tbl_flags = 0;
+    STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *lst = NULL;
+    CONF_VALUE *cnf = NULL;
+    nid = OBJ_sn2nid(name);
+    if (nid == NID_undef)
+        nid = OBJ_ln2nid(name);
+    if (nid == NID_undef)
+        goto err;
+    lst = X509V3_parse_list(value);
+    if (!lst)
+        goto err;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(lst); i++) {
+        cnf = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(lst, i);
+        if (strcmp(cnf->name, "min") == 0) {
+            tbl_min = strtoul(cnf->value, &eptr, 0);
+            if (*eptr)
+                goto err;
+        } else if (strcmp(cnf->name, "max") == 0) {
+            tbl_max = strtoul(cnf->value, &eptr, 0);
+            if (*eptr)
+                goto err;
+        } else if (strcmp(cnf->name, "mask") == 0) {
+            if (!ASN1_str2mask(cnf->value, &tbl_mask) || !tbl_mask)
+                goto err;
+        } else if (strcmp(cnf->name, "flags") == 0) {
+            if (strcmp(cnf->value, "nomask") == 0)
+                tbl_flags = STABLE_NO_MASK;
+            else if (strcmp(cnf->value, "none") == 0)
+                tbl_flags = STABLE_FLAGS_CLEAR;
+            else
+                goto err;
+        } else
+            goto err;
+    }
+    rv = 1;
+ err:
+    if (rv == 0) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_DO_TCREATE, ASN1_R_INVALID_STRING_TABLE_VALUE);
+        if (cnf)
+            ERR_add_error_data(4, "field=", cnf->name,
+                               ", value=", cnf->value);
+        else
+            ERR_add_error_data(4, "name=", name, ", value=", value);
+    } else {
+        rv = ASN1_STRING_TABLE_add(nid, tbl_min, tbl_max,
+                                   tbl_mask, tbl_flags);
+        if (!rv)
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_DO_TCREATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    }
+    sk_CONF_VALUE_pop_free(lst, X509V3_conf_free);
+    return rv;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/asn_pack.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/asn_pack.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..63bc306
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/asn_pack.c
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+
+/* ASN1 packing and unpacking functions */
+
+ASN1_STRING *ASN1_item_pack(void *obj, const ASN1_ITEM *it, ASN1_STRING **oct)
+{
+    ASN1_STRING *octmp;
+
+     if (oct == NULL || *oct == NULL) {
+        if ((octmp = ASN1_STRING_new()) == NULL) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_PACK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+    } else {
+        octmp = *oct;
+    }
+
+    OPENSSL_free(octmp->data);
+    octmp->data = NULL;
+
+    if ((octmp->length = ASN1_item_i2d(obj, &octmp->data, it)) == 0) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_PACK, ASN1_R_ENCODE_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (octmp->data == NULL) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_PACK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (oct != NULL && *oct == NULL)
+        *oct = octmp;
+
+    return octmp;
+ err:
+    if (oct == NULL || *oct == NULL)
+        ASN1_STRING_free(octmp);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+/* Extract an ASN1 object from an ASN1_STRING */
+
+void *ASN1_item_unpack(const ASN1_STRING *oct, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
+{
+    const unsigned char *p;
+    void *ret;
+
+    p = oct->data;
+    if ((ret = ASN1_item_d2i(NULL, &p, oct->length, it)) == NULL)
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_UNPACK, ASN1_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+    return ret;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/bio_asn1.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/bio_asn1.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2a8a41f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/bio_asn1.c
@@ -0,0 +1,437 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Experimental ASN1 BIO. When written through the data is converted to an
+ * ASN1 string type: default is OCTET STRING. Additional functions can be
+ * provided to add prefix and suffix data.
+ */
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <internal/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+
+/* Must be large enough for biggest tag+length */
+#define DEFAULT_ASN1_BUF_SIZE 20
+
+typedef enum {
+    ASN1_STATE_START,
+    ASN1_STATE_PRE_COPY,
+    ASN1_STATE_HEADER,
+    ASN1_STATE_HEADER_COPY,
+    ASN1_STATE_DATA_COPY,
+    ASN1_STATE_POST_COPY,
+    ASN1_STATE_DONE
+} asn1_bio_state_t;
+
+typedef struct BIO_ASN1_EX_FUNCS_st {
+    asn1_ps_func *ex_func;
+    asn1_ps_func *ex_free_func;
+} BIO_ASN1_EX_FUNCS;
+
+typedef struct BIO_ASN1_BUF_CTX_t {
+    /* Internal state */
+    asn1_bio_state_t state;
+    /* Internal buffer */
+    unsigned char *buf;
+    /* Size of buffer */
+    int bufsize;
+    /* Current position in buffer */
+    int bufpos;
+    /* Current buffer length */
+    int buflen;
+    /* Amount of data to copy */
+    int copylen;
+    /* Class and tag to use */
+    int asn1_class, asn1_tag;
+    asn1_ps_func *prefix, *prefix_free, *suffix, *suffix_free;
+    /* Extra buffer for prefix and suffix data */
+    unsigned char *ex_buf;
+    int ex_len;
+    int ex_pos;
+    void *ex_arg;
+} BIO_ASN1_BUF_CTX;
+
+static int asn1_bio_write(BIO *h, const char *buf, int num);
+static int asn1_bio_read(BIO *h, char *buf, int size);
+static int asn1_bio_puts(BIO *h, const char *str);
+static int asn1_bio_gets(BIO *h, char *str, int size);
+static long asn1_bio_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, long arg1, void *arg2);
+static int asn1_bio_new(BIO *h);
+static int asn1_bio_free(BIO *data);
+static long asn1_bio_callback_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, BIO_info_cb *fp);
+
+static int asn1_bio_init(BIO_ASN1_BUF_CTX *ctx, int size);
+static int asn1_bio_flush_ex(BIO *b, BIO_ASN1_BUF_CTX *ctx,
+                             asn1_ps_func *cleanup, asn1_bio_state_t next);
+static int asn1_bio_setup_ex(BIO *b, BIO_ASN1_BUF_CTX *ctx,
+                             asn1_ps_func *setup,
+                             asn1_bio_state_t ex_state,
+                             asn1_bio_state_t other_state);
+
+static const BIO_METHOD methods_asn1 = {
+    BIO_TYPE_ASN1,
+    "asn1",
+    asn1_bio_write,
+    asn1_bio_read,
+    asn1_bio_puts,
+    asn1_bio_gets,
+    asn1_bio_ctrl,
+    asn1_bio_new,
+    asn1_bio_free,
+    asn1_bio_callback_ctrl,
+};
+
+const BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_asn1(void)
+{
+    return (&methods_asn1);
+}
+
+static int asn1_bio_new(BIO *b)
+{
+    BIO_ASN1_BUF_CTX *ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx));
+
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    if (!asn1_bio_init(ctx, DEFAULT_ASN1_BUF_SIZE)) {
+        OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    BIO_set_data(b, ctx);
+    BIO_set_init(b, 1);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int asn1_bio_init(BIO_ASN1_BUF_CTX *ctx, int size)
+{
+    ctx->buf = OPENSSL_malloc(size);
+    if (ctx->buf == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    ctx->bufsize = size;
+    ctx->asn1_class = V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL;
+    ctx->asn1_tag = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
+    ctx->state = ASN1_STATE_START;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int asn1_bio_free(BIO *b)
+{
+    BIO_ASN1_BUF_CTX *ctx;
+
+    if (b == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    ctx = BIO_get_data(b);
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    OPENSSL_free(ctx->buf);
+    OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+    BIO_set_data(b, NULL);
+    BIO_set_init(b, 0);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int asn1_bio_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl)
+{
+    BIO_ASN1_BUF_CTX *ctx;
+    int wrmax, wrlen, ret;
+    unsigned char *p;
+    BIO *next;
+
+    ctx = BIO_get_data(b);
+    next = BIO_next(b);
+    if (in == NULL || inl < 0 || ctx == NULL || next == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    wrlen = 0;
+    ret = -1;
+
+    for (;;) {
+        switch (ctx->state) {
+
+            /* Setup prefix data, call it */
+        case ASN1_STATE_START:
+            if (!asn1_bio_setup_ex(b, ctx, ctx->prefix,
+                                   ASN1_STATE_PRE_COPY, ASN1_STATE_HEADER))
+                return 0;
+            break;
+
+            /* Copy any pre data first */
+        case ASN1_STATE_PRE_COPY:
+
+            ret = asn1_bio_flush_ex(b, ctx, ctx->prefix_free,
+                                    ASN1_STATE_HEADER);
+
+            if (ret <= 0)
+                goto done;
+
+            break;
+
+        case ASN1_STATE_HEADER:
+            ctx->buflen = ASN1_object_size(0, inl, ctx->asn1_tag) - inl;
+            OPENSSL_assert(ctx->buflen <= ctx->bufsize);
+            p = ctx->buf;
+            ASN1_put_object(&p, 0, inl, ctx->asn1_tag, ctx->asn1_class);
+            ctx->copylen = inl;
+            ctx->state = ASN1_STATE_HEADER_COPY;
+
+            break;
+
+        case ASN1_STATE_HEADER_COPY:
+            ret = BIO_write(next, ctx->buf + ctx->bufpos, ctx->buflen);
+            if (ret <= 0)
+                goto done;
+
+            ctx->buflen -= ret;
+            if (ctx->buflen)
+                ctx->bufpos += ret;
+            else {
+                ctx->bufpos = 0;
+                ctx->state = ASN1_STATE_DATA_COPY;
+            }
+
+            break;
+
+        case ASN1_STATE_DATA_COPY:
+
+            if (inl > ctx->copylen)
+                wrmax = ctx->copylen;
+            else
+                wrmax = inl;
+            ret = BIO_write(next, in, wrmax);
+            if (ret <= 0)
+                goto done;
+            wrlen += ret;
+            ctx->copylen -= ret;
+            in += ret;
+            inl -= ret;
+
+            if (ctx->copylen == 0)
+                ctx->state = ASN1_STATE_HEADER;
+
+            if (inl == 0)
+                goto done;
+
+            break;
+
+        default:
+            BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+            return 0;
+
+        }
+
+    }
+
+ done:
+    BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+    BIO_copy_next_retry(b);
+
+    return (wrlen > 0) ? wrlen : ret;
+
+}
+
+static int asn1_bio_flush_ex(BIO *b, BIO_ASN1_BUF_CTX *ctx,
+                             asn1_ps_func *cleanup, asn1_bio_state_t next)
+{
+    int ret;
+
+    if (ctx->ex_len <= 0)
+        return 1;
+    for (;;) {
+        ret = BIO_write(BIO_next(b), ctx->ex_buf + ctx->ex_pos, ctx->ex_len);
+        if (ret <= 0)
+            break;
+        ctx->ex_len -= ret;
+        if (ctx->ex_len > 0)
+            ctx->ex_pos += ret;
+        else {
+            if (cleanup)
+                cleanup(b, &ctx->ex_buf, &ctx->ex_len, &ctx->ex_arg);
+            ctx->state = next;
+            ctx->ex_pos = 0;
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int asn1_bio_setup_ex(BIO *b, BIO_ASN1_BUF_CTX *ctx,
+                             asn1_ps_func *setup,
+                             asn1_bio_state_t ex_state,
+                             asn1_bio_state_t other_state)
+{
+    if (setup && !setup(b, &ctx->ex_buf, &ctx->ex_len, &ctx->ex_arg)) {
+        BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (ctx->ex_len > 0)
+        ctx->state = ex_state;
+    else
+        ctx->state = other_state;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int asn1_bio_read(BIO *b, char *in, int inl)
+{
+    BIO *next = BIO_next(b);
+    if (next == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    return BIO_read(next, in, inl);
+}
+
+static int asn1_bio_puts(BIO *b, const char *str)
+{
+    return asn1_bio_write(b, str, strlen(str));
+}
+
+static int asn1_bio_gets(BIO *b, char *str, int size)
+{
+    BIO *next = BIO_next(b);
+    if (next == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    return BIO_gets(next, str, size);
+}
+
+static long asn1_bio_callback_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, BIO_info_cb *fp)
+{
+    BIO *next = BIO_next(b);
+    if (next == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    return BIO_callback_ctrl(next, cmd, fp);
+}
+
+static long asn1_bio_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long arg1, void *arg2)
+{
+    BIO_ASN1_BUF_CTX *ctx;
+    BIO_ASN1_EX_FUNCS *ex_func;
+    long ret = 1;
+    BIO *next;
+
+    ctx = BIO_get_data(b);
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    next = BIO_next(b);
+    switch (cmd) {
+
+    case BIO_C_SET_PREFIX:
+        ex_func = arg2;
+        ctx->prefix = ex_func->ex_func;
+        ctx->prefix_free = ex_func->ex_free_func;
+        break;
+
+    case BIO_C_GET_PREFIX:
+        ex_func = arg2;
+        ex_func->ex_func = ctx->prefix;
+        ex_func->ex_free_func = ctx->prefix_free;
+        break;
+
+    case BIO_C_SET_SUFFIX:
+        ex_func = arg2;
+        ctx->suffix = ex_func->ex_func;
+        ctx->suffix_free = ex_func->ex_free_func;
+        break;
+
+    case BIO_C_GET_SUFFIX:
+        ex_func = arg2;
+        ex_func->ex_func = ctx->suffix;
+        ex_func->ex_free_func = ctx->suffix_free;
+        break;
+
+    case BIO_C_SET_EX_ARG:
+        ctx->ex_arg = arg2;
+        break;
+
+    case BIO_C_GET_EX_ARG:
+        *(void **)arg2 = ctx->ex_arg;
+        break;
+
+    case BIO_CTRL_FLUSH:
+        if (next == NULL)
+            return 0;
+
+        /* Call post function if possible */
+        if (ctx->state == ASN1_STATE_HEADER) {
+            if (!asn1_bio_setup_ex(b, ctx, ctx->suffix,
+                                   ASN1_STATE_POST_COPY, ASN1_STATE_DONE))
+                return 0;
+        }
+
+        if (ctx->state == ASN1_STATE_POST_COPY) {
+            ret = asn1_bio_flush_ex(b, ctx, ctx->suffix_free,
+                                    ASN1_STATE_DONE);
+            if (ret <= 0)
+                return ret;
+        }
+
+        if (ctx->state == ASN1_STATE_DONE)
+            return BIO_ctrl(next, cmd, arg1, arg2);
+        else {
+            BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+            return 0;
+        }
+
+    default:
+        if (next == NULL)
+            return 0;
+        return BIO_ctrl(next, cmd, arg1, arg2);
+
+    }
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int asn1_bio_set_ex(BIO *b, int cmd,
+                           asn1_ps_func *ex_func, asn1_ps_func *ex_free_func)
+{
+    BIO_ASN1_EX_FUNCS extmp;
+    extmp.ex_func = ex_func;
+    extmp.ex_free_func = ex_free_func;
+    return BIO_ctrl(b, cmd, 0, &extmp);
+}
+
+static int asn1_bio_get_ex(BIO *b, int cmd,
+                           asn1_ps_func **ex_func,
+                           asn1_ps_func **ex_free_func)
+{
+    BIO_ASN1_EX_FUNCS extmp;
+    int ret;
+    ret = BIO_ctrl(b, cmd, 0, &extmp);
+    if (ret > 0) {
+        *ex_func = extmp.ex_func;
+        *ex_free_func = extmp.ex_free_func;
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int BIO_asn1_set_prefix(BIO *b, asn1_ps_func *prefix,
+                        asn1_ps_func *prefix_free)
+{
+    return asn1_bio_set_ex(b, BIO_C_SET_PREFIX, prefix, prefix_free);
+}
+
+int BIO_asn1_get_prefix(BIO *b, asn1_ps_func **pprefix,
+                        asn1_ps_func **pprefix_free)
+{
+    return asn1_bio_get_ex(b, BIO_C_GET_PREFIX, pprefix, pprefix_free);
+}
+
+int BIO_asn1_set_suffix(BIO *b, asn1_ps_func *suffix,
+                        asn1_ps_func *suffix_free)
+{
+    return asn1_bio_set_ex(b, BIO_C_SET_SUFFIX, suffix, suffix_free);
+}
+
+int BIO_asn1_get_suffix(BIO *b, asn1_ps_func **psuffix,
+                        asn1_ps_func **psuffix_free)
+{
+    return asn1_bio_get_ex(b, BIO_C_GET_SUFFIX, psuffix, psuffix_free);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/bio_ndef.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/bio_ndef.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0f206b2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/bio_ndef.c
@@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+/* Experimental NDEF ASN1 BIO support routines */
+
+/*
+ * The usage is quite simple, initialize an ASN1 structure, get a BIO from it
+ * then any data written through the BIO will end up translated to
+ * appropriate format on the fly. The data is streamed out and does *not*
+ * need to be all held in memory at once. When the BIO is flushed the output
+ * is finalized and any signatures etc written out. The BIO is a 'proper'
+ * BIO and can handle non blocking I/O correctly. The usage is simple. The
+ * implementation is *not*...
+ */
+
+/* BIO support data stored in the ASN1 BIO ex_arg */
+
+typedef struct ndef_aux_st {
+    /* ASN1 structure this BIO refers to */
+    ASN1_VALUE *val;
+    const ASN1_ITEM *it;
+    /* Top of the BIO chain */
+    BIO *ndef_bio;
+    /* Output BIO */
+    BIO *out;
+    /* Boundary where content is inserted */
+    unsigned char **boundary;
+    /* DER buffer start */
+    unsigned char *derbuf;
+} NDEF_SUPPORT;
+
+static int ndef_prefix(BIO *b, unsigned char **pbuf, int *plen, void *parg);
+static int ndef_prefix_free(BIO *b, unsigned char **pbuf, int *plen,
+                            void *parg);
+static int ndef_suffix(BIO *b, unsigned char **pbuf, int *plen, void *parg);
+static int ndef_suffix_free(BIO *b, unsigned char **pbuf, int *plen,
+                            void *parg);
+
+BIO *BIO_new_NDEF(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE *val, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
+{
+    NDEF_SUPPORT *ndef_aux = NULL;
+    BIO *asn_bio = NULL;
+    const ASN1_AUX *aux = it->funcs;
+    ASN1_STREAM_ARG sarg;
+
+    if (!aux || !aux->asn1_cb) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_BIO_NEW_NDEF, ASN1_R_STREAMING_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    ndef_aux = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ndef_aux));
+    asn_bio = BIO_new(BIO_f_asn1());
+    if (ndef_aux == NULL || asn_bio == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* ASN1 bio needs to be next to output BIO */
+    out = BIO_push(asn_bio, out);
+    if (out == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    BIO_asn1_set_prefix(asn_bio, ndef_prefix, ndef_prefix_free);
+    BIO_asn1_set_suffix(asn_bio, ndef_suffix, ndef_suffix_free);
+
+    /*
+     * Now let callback prepends any digest, cipher etc BIOs ASN1 structure
+     * needs.
+     */
+
+    sarg.out = out;
+    sarg.ndef_bio = NULL;
+    sarg.boundary = NULL;
+
+    if (aux->asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_STREAM_PRE, &val, it, &sarg) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    ndef_aux->val = val;
+    ndef_aux->it = it;
+    ndef_aux->ndef_bio = sarg.ndef_bio;
+    ndef_aux->boundary = sarg.boundary;
+    ndef_aux->out = out;
+
+    BIO_ctrl(asn_bio, BIO_C_SET_EX_ARG, 0, ndef_aux);
+
+    return sarg.ndef_bio;
+
+ err:
+    BIO_free(asn_bio);
+    OPENSSL_free(ndef_aux);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+static int ndef_prefix(BIO *b, unsigned char **pbuf, int *plen, void *parg)
+{
+    NDEF_SUPPORT *ndef_aux;
+    unsigned char *p;
+    int derlen;
+
+    if (!parg)
+        return 0;
+
+    ndef_aux = *(NDEF_SUPPORT **)parg;
+
+    derlen = ASN1_item_ndef_i2d(ndef_aux->val, NULL, ndef_aux->it);
+    p = OPENSSL_malloc(derlen);
+    if (p == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    ndef_aux->derbuf = p;
+    *pbuf = p;
+    derlen = ASN1_item_ndef_i2d(ndef_aux->val, &p, ndef_aux->it);
+
+    if (!*ndef_aux->boundary)
+        return 0;
+
+    *plen = *ndef_aux->boundary - *pbuf;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int ndef_prefix_free(BIO *b, unsigned char **pbuf, int *plen,
+                            void *parg)
+{
+    NDEF_SUPPORT *ndef_aux;
+
+    if (!parg)
+        return 0;
+
+    ndef_aux = *(NDEF_SUPPORT **)parg;
+
+    OPENSSL_free(ndef_aux->derbuf);
+
+    ndef_aux->derbuf = NULL;
+    *pbuf = NULL;
+    *plen = 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int ndef_suffix_free(BIO *b, unsigned char **pbuf, int *plen,
+                            void *parg)
+{
+    NDEF_SUPPORT **pndef_aux = (NDEF_SUPPORT **)parg;
+    if (!ndef_prefix_free(b, pbuf, plen, parg))
+        return 0;
+    OPENSSL_free(*pndef_aux);
+    *pndef_aux = NULL;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int ndef_suffix(BIO *b, unsigned char **pbuf, int *plen, void *parg)
+{
+    NDEF_SUPPORT *ndef_aux;
+    unsigned char *p;
+    int derlen;
+    const ASN1_AUX *aux;
+    ASN1_STREAM_ARG sarg;
+
+    if (!parg)
+        return 0;
+
+    ndef_aux = *(NDEF_SUPPORT **)parg;
+
+    aux = ndef_aux->it->funcs;
+
+    /* Finalize structures */
+    sarg.ndef_bio = ndef_aux->ndef_bio;
+    sarg.out = ndef_aux->out;
+    sarg.boundary = ndef_aux->boundary;
+    if (aux->asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_STREAM_POST,
+                     &ndef_aux->val, ndef_aux->it, &sarg) <= 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    derlen = ASN1_item_ndef_i2d(ndef_aux->val, NULL, ndef_aux->it);
+    p = OPENSSL_malloc(derlen);
+    if (p == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    ndef_aux->derbuf = p;
+    *pbuf = p;
+    derlen = ASN1_item_ndef_i2d(ndef_aux->val, &p, ndef_aux->it);
+
+    if (!*ndef_aux->boundary)
+        return 0;
+    *pbuf = *ndef_aux->boundary;
+    *plen = derlen - (*ndef_aux->boundary - ndef_aux->derbuf);
+
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/build.info b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/build.info
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c1afb71
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/build.info
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+LIBS=../../libcrypto
+SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
+        a_object.c a_bitstr.c a_utctm.c a_gentm.c a_time.c a_int.c a_octet.c \
+        a_print.c a_type.c a_dup.c a_d2i_fp.c a_i2d_fp.c \
+        a_utf8.c a_sign.c a_digest.c a_verify.c a_mbstr.c a_strex.c \
+        x_algor.c x_val.c x_sig.c x_bignum.c \
+        x_long.c x_int64.c x_info.c x_spki.c nsseq.c \
+        d2i_pu.c d2i_pr.c i2d_pu.c i2d_pr.c\
+        t_pkey.c t_spki.c t_bitst.c \
+        tasn_new.c tasn_fre.c tasn_enc.c tasn_dec.c tasn_utl.c tasn_typ.c \
+        tasn_prn.c tasn_scn.c ameth_lib.c \
+        f_int.c f_string.c n_pkey.c \
+        x_pkey.c bio_asn1.c bio_ndef.c asn_mime.c \
+        asn1_gen.c asn1_par.c asn1_lib.c asn1_err.c a_strnid.c \
+        evp_asn1.c asn_pack.c p5_pbe.c p5_pbev2.c p5_scrypt.c p8_pkey.c \
+        asn_moid.c asn_mstbl.c
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/charmap.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/charmap.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2a75925
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/charmap.h
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+/*
+ * WARNING: do not edit!
+ * Generated by crypto/asn1/charmap.pl
+ *
+ * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#define CHARTYPE_HOST_ANY 4096
+#define CHARTYPE_HOST_DOT 8192
+#define CHARTYPE_HOST_HYPHEN 16384
+#define CHARTYPE_HOST_WILD 32768
+
+/*
+ * Mask of various character properties
+ */
+
+static const unsigned short char_type[] = {
+    1026,    2,    2,    2,    2,    2,    2,    2,    2,    2,    2,    2,
+       2,    2,    2,    2,    2,    2,    2,    2,    2,    2,    2,    2,
+       2,    2,    2,    2,    2,    2,    2,    2,  120,    0,    1,   40,
+       0,    0,    0,   16, 1040, 1040, 33792,   25,   25, 16400, 8208,   16,
+    4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112,   16,    9,
+       9,   16,    9,   16,    0, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112,
+    4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112,
+    4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112,    0, 1025,    0,    0,    0,
+       0, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112,
+    4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112,
+    4112, 4112, 4112,    0,    0,    0,    0,    2
+};
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/charmap.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/charmap.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..26ca325
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/charmap.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+use strict;
+
+my ($i, @arr);
+
+# Set up an array with the type of ASCII characters
+# Each set bit represents a character property.
+
+# RFC2253 character properties
+my $RFC2253_ESC = 1;	# Character escaped with \
+my $ESC_CTRL	= 2;	# Escaped control character
+# These are used with RFC1779 quoting using "
+my $NOESC_QUOTE	= 8;	# Not escaped if quoted
+my $PSTRING_CHAR = 0x10;	# Valid PrintableString character
+my $RFC2253_FIRST_ESC = 0x20; # Escaped with \ if first character
+my $RFC2253_LAST_ESC = 0x40;  # Escaped with \ if last character
+my $RFC2254_ESC = 0x400;	# Character escaped \XX
+my $HOST_ANY = 0x1000;      # Valid hostname character anywhere in label
+my $HOST_DOT = 0x2000;  # Dot: hostname label separator
+my $HOST_HYPHEN = 0x4000; # Hyphen: not valid at start or end.
+my $HOST_WILD = 0x8000; # Wildcard character
+
+for($i = 0; $i < 128; $i++) {
+	# Set the RFC2253 escape characters (control)
+	$arr[$i] = 0;
+	if(($i < 32) || ($i > 126)) {
+		$arr[$i] |= $ESC_CTRL;
+	}
+
+	# Some PrintableString characters
+	if(		   ( ( $i >= ord("a")) && ( $i <= ord("z")) )
+			|| (  ( $i >= ord("A")) && ( $i <= ord("Z")) )
+			|| (  ( $i >= ord("0")) && ( $i <= ord("9")) )  ) {
+		$arr[$i] |= $PSTRING_CHAR | $HOST_ANY;
+	}
+}
+
+# Now setup the rest
+
+# Remaining RFC2253 escaped characters
+
+$arr[ord(" ")] |= $NOESC_QUOTE | $RFC2253_FIRST_ESC | $RFC2253_LAST_ESC;
+$arr[ord("#")] |= $NOESC_QUOTE | $RFC2253_FIRST_ESC;
+
+$arr[ord(",")] |= $NOESC_QUOTE | $RFC2253_ESC;
+$arr[ord("+")] |= $NOESC_QUOTE | $RFC2253_ESC;
+$arr[ord("\"")] |= $RFC2253_ESC;
+$arr[ord("\\")] |= $RFC2253_ESC;
+$arr[ord("<")] |= $NOESC_QUOTE | $RFC2253_ESC;
+$arr[ord(">")] |= $NOESC_QUOTE | $RFC2253_ESC;
+$arr[ord(";")] |= $NOESC_QUOTE | $RFC2253_ESC;
+
+# Remaining RFC2254 characters
+
+$arr[0] |= $RFC2254_ESC;
+$arr[ord("(")] |= $RFC2254_ESC;
+$arr[ord(")")] |= $RFC2254_ESC;
+$arr[ord("*")] |= $RFC2254_ESC | $HOST_WILD;
+$arr[ord("\\")] |= $RFC2254_ESC;
+
+# Remaining PrintableString characters
+
+$arr[ord(" ")] |= $PSTRING_CHAR;
+$arr[ord("'")] |= $PSTRING_CHAR;
+$arr[ord("(")] |= $PSTRING_CHAR;
+$arr[ord(")")] |= $PSTRING_CHAR;
+$arr[ord("+")] |= $PSTRING_CHAR;
+$arr[ord(",")] |= $PSTRING_CHAR;
+$arr[ord("-")] |= $PSTRING_CHAR | $HOST_HYPHEN;
+$arr[ord(".")] |= $PSTRING_CHAR | $HOST_DOT;
+$arr[ord("/")] |= $PSTRING_CHAR;
+$arr[ord(":")] |= $PSTRING_CHAR;
+$arr[ord("=")] |= $PSTRING_CHAR;
+$arr[ord("?")] |= $PSTRING_CHAR;
+
+# Now generate the C code
+
+print <<EOF;
+/*
+ * WARNING: do not edit!
+ * Generated by crypto/asn1/charmap.pl
+ *
+ * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#define CHARTYPE_HOST_ANY $HOST_ANY
+#define CHARTYPE_HOST_DOT $HOST_DOT
+#define CHARTYPE_HOST_HYPHEN $HOST_HYPHEN
+#define CHARTYPE_HOST_WILD $HOST_WILD
+
+/*
+ * Mask of various character properties
+ */
+
+static const unsigned short char_type[] = {
+EOF
+
+print "   ";
+for($i = 0; $i < 128; $i++) {
+	print("\n   ") if($i && (($i % 12) == 0));
+	printf(" %4d", $arr[$i]);
+	print(",") if ($i != 127);
+}
+print("\n};\n");
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/d2i_pr.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/d2i_pr.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e311b90
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/d2i_pr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include "internal/asn1_int.h"
+#include "internal/evp_int.h"
+
+EVP_PKEY *d2i_PrivateKey(int type, EVP_PKEY **a, const unsigned char **pp,
+                         long length)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY *ret;
+    const unsigned char *p = *pp;
+
+    if ((a == NULL) || (*a == NULL)) {
+        if ((ret = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_D2I_PRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+            return (NULL);
+        }
+    } else {
+        ret = *a;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+        ENGINE_finish(ret->engine);
+        ret->engine = NULL;
+#endif
+    }
+
+    if (!EVP_PKEY_set_type(ret, type)) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_D2I_PRIVATEKEY, ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!ret->ameth->old_priv_decode ||
+        !ret->ameth->old_priv_decode(ret, &p, length)) {
+        if (ret->ameth->priv_decode) {
+            EVP_PKEY *tmp;
+            PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8 = NULL;
+            p8 = d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO(NULL, &p, length);
+            if (!p8)
+                goto err;
+            tmp = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(p8);
+            PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8);
+            if (tmp == NULL)
+                goto err;
+            EVP_PKEY_free(ret);
+            ret = tmp;
+        } else {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_D2I_PRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+    *pp = p;
+    if (a != NULL)
+        (*a) = ret;
+    return (ret);
+ err:
+    if (a == NULL || *a != ret)
+        EVP_PKEY_free(ret);
+    return (NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This works like d2i_PrivateKey() except it automatically works out the
+ * type
+ */
+
+EVP_PKEY *d2i_AutoPrivateKey(EVP_PKEY **a, const unsigned char **pp,
+                             long length)
+{
+    STACK_OF(ASN1_TYPE) *inkey;
+    const unsigned char *p;
+    int keytype;
+    p = *pp;
+    /*
+     * Dirty trick: read in the ASN1 data into a STACK_OF(ASN1_TYPE): by
+     * analyzing it we can determine the passed structure: this assumes the
+     * input is surrounded by an ASN1 SEQUENCE.
+     */
+    inkey = d2i_ASN1_SEQUENCE_ANY(NULL, &p, length);
+    p = *pp;
+    /*
+     * Since we only need to discern "traditional format" RSA and DSA keys we
+     * can just count the elements.
+     */
+    if (sk_ASN1_TYPE_num(inkey) == 6)
+        keytype = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
+    else if (sk_ASN1_TYPE_num(inkey) == 4)
+        keytype = EVP_PKEY_EC;
+    else if (sk_ASN1_TYPE_num(inkey) == 3) { /* This seems to be PKCS8, not
+                                              * traditional format */
+        PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8 = d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO(NULL, &p, length);
+        EVP_PKEY *ret;
+
+        sk_ASN1_TYPE_pop_free(inkey, ASN1_TYPE_free);
+        if (!p8) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_D2I_AUTOPRIVATEKEY,
+                    ASN1_R_UNSUPPORTED_PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+        ret = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(p8);
+        PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8);
+        if (ret == NULL)
+            return NULL;
+        *pp = p;
+        if (a) {
+            *a = ret;
+        }
+        return ret;
+    } else
+        keytype = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
+    sk_ASN1_TYPE_pop_free(inkey, ASN1_TYPE_free);
+    return d2i_PrivateKey(keytype, a, pp, length);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/d2i_pu.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/d2i_pu.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dfdc1a6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/d2i_pu.c
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
+#include <openssl/ec.h>
+
+#include "internal/evp_int.h"
+
+EVP_PKEY *d2i_PublicKey(int type, EVP_PKEY **a, const unsigned char **pp,
+                        long length)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY *ret;
+
+    if ((a == NULL) || (*a == NULL)) {
+        if ((ret = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_D2I_PUBLICKEY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+            return (NULL);
+        }
+    } else
+        ret = *a;
+
+    if (!EVP_PKEY_set_type(ret, type)) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_D2I_PUBLICKEY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    switch (EVP_PKEY_id(ret)) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+    case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
+        if ((ret->pkey.rsa = d2i_RSAPublicKey(NULL, pp, length)) == NULL) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_D2I_PUBLICKEY, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        break;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+    case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
+        /* TMP UGLY CAST */
+        if (!d2i_DSAPublicKey(&ret->pkey.dsa, pp, length)) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_D2I_PUBLICKEY, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        break;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    case EVP_PKEY_EC:
+        if (!o2i_ECPublicKey(&ret->pkey.ec, pp, length)) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_D2I_PUBLICKEY, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        break;
+#endif
+    default:
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_D2I_PUBLICKEY, ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE);
+        goto err;
+        /* break; */
+    }
+    if (a != NULL)
+        (*a) = ret;
+    return (ret);
+ err:
+    if (a == NULL || *a != ret)
+        EVP_PKEY_free(ret);
+    return (NULL);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/evp_asn1.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/evp_asn1.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a458367
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/evp_asn1.c
@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+
+int ASN1_TYPE_set_octetstring(ASN1_TYPE *a, unsigned char *data, int len)
+{
+    ASN1_STRING *os;
+
+    if ((os = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new()) == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(os, data, len)) {
+        ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    ASN1_TYPE_set(a, V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, os);
+    return (1);
+}
+
+/* int max_len:  for returned value    */
+int ASN1_TYPE_get_octetstring(const ASN1_TYPE *a, unsigned char *data, int max_len)
+{
+    int ret, num;
+    const unsigned char *p;
+
+    if ((a->type != V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING) || (a->value.octet_string == NULL)) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TYPE_GET_OCTETSTRING, ASN1_R_DATA_IS_WRONG);
+        return (-1);
+    }
+    p = ASN1_STRING_get0_data(a->value.octet_string);
+    ret = ASN1_STRING_length(a->value.octet_string);
+    if (ret < max_len)
+        num = ret;
+    else
+        num = max_len;
+    memcpy(data, p, num);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+typedef struct {
+    long num;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *oct;
+} asn1_int_oct;
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(asn1_int_oct) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(asn1_int_oct, num, LONG),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(asn1_int_oct, oct, ASN1_OCTET_STRING)
+} static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(asn1_int_oct)
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(asn1_int_oct)
+
+int ASN1_TYPE_set_int_octetstring(ASN1_TYPE *a, long num, unsigned char *data,
+                                  int len)
+{
+    asn1_int_oct atmp;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING oct;
+
+    atmp.num = num;
+    atmp.oct = &oct;
+    oct.data = data;
+    oct.type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
+    oct.length = len;
+    oct.flags = 0;
+
+    if (ASN1_TYPE_pack_sequence(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(asn1_int_oct), &atmp, &a))
+        return 1;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * we return the actual length...
+ */
+/* int max_len:  for returned value    */
+int ASN1_TYPE_get_int_octetstring(const ASN1_TYPE *a, long *num,
+                                  unsigned char *data, int max_len)
+{
+    asn1_int_oct *atmp = NULL;
+    int ret = -1, n;
+
+    if ((a->type != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) || (a->value.sequence == NULL)) {
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    atmp = ASN1_TYPE_unpack_sequence(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(asn1_int_oct), a);
+
+    if (atmp == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (num != NULL)
+        *num = atmp->num;
+
+    ret = ASN1_STRING_length(atmp->oct);
+    if (max_len > ret)
+        n = ret;
+    else
+        n = max_len;
+
+    if (data != NULL)
+        memcpy(data, ASN1_STRING_get0_data(atmp->oct), n);
+    if (ret == -1) {
+ err:
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TYPE_GET_INT_OCTETSTRING, ASN1_R_DATA_IS_WRONG);
+    }
+    M_ASN1_free_of(atmp, asn1_int_oct);
+    return ret;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/f_int.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/f_int.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ec556c9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/f_int.c
@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+
+int i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(BIO *bp, const ASN1_INTEGER *a)
+{
+    int i, n = 0;
+    static const char *h = "0123456789ABCDEF";
+    char buf[2];
+
+    if (a == NULL)
+        return (0);
+
+    if (a->type & V_ASN1_NEG) {
+        if (BIO_write(bp, "-", 1) != 1)
+            goto err;
+        n = 1;
+    }
+
+    if (a->length == 0) {
+        if (BIO_write(bp, "00", 2) != 2)
+            goto err;
+        n += 2;
+    } else {
+        for (i = 0; i < a->length; i++) {
+            if ((i != 0) && (i % 35 == 0)) {
+                if (BIO_write(bp, "\\\n", 2) != 2)
+                    goto err;
+                n += 2;
+            }
+            buf[0] = h[((unsigned char)a->data[i] >> 4) & 0x0f];
+            buf[1] = h[((unsigned char)a->data[i]) & 0x0f];
+            if (BIO_write(bp, buf, 2) != 2)
+                goto err;
+            n += 2;
+        }
+    }
+    return (n);
+ err:
+    return (-1);
+}
+
+int a2i_ASN1_INTEGER(BIO *bp, ASN1_INTEGER *bs, char *buf, int size)
+{
+    int i, j, k, m, n, again, bufsize;
+    unsigned char *s = NULL, *sp;
+    unsigned char *bufp;
+    int num = 0, slen = 0, first = 1;
+
+    bs->type = V_ASN1_INTEGER;
+
+    bufsize = BIO_gets(bp, buf, size);
+    for (;;) {
+        if (bufsize < 1)
+            goto err;
+        i = bufsize;
+        if (buf[i - 1] == '\n')
+            buf[--i] = '\0';
+        if (i == 0)
+            goto err;
+        if (buf[i - 1] == '\r')
+            buf[--i] = '\0';
+        if (i == 0)
+            goto err;
+        again = (buf[i - 1] == '\\');
+
+        for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
+#ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+            if (!(((buf[j] >= '0') && (buf[j] <= '9')) ||
+                  ((buf[j] >= 'a') && (buf[j] <= 'f')) ||
+                  ((buf[j] >= 'A') && (buf[j] <= 'F'))))
+#else
+            /*
+             * This #ifdef is not strictly necessary, since the characters
+             * A...F a...f 0...9 are contiguous (yes, even in EBCDIC - but
+             * not the whole alphabet). Nevertheless, isxdigit() is faster.
+             */
+            if (!isxdigit(buf[j]))
+#endif
+            {
+                i = j;
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+        buf[i] = '\0';
+        /*
+         * We have now cleared all the crap off the end of the line
+         */
+        if (i < 2)
+            goto err;
+
+        bufp = (unsigned char *)buf;
+        if (first) {
+            first = 0;
+            if ((bufp[0] == '0') && (bufp[1] == '0')) {
+                bufp += 2;
+                i -= 2;
+            }
+        }
+        k = 0;
+        i -= again;
+        if (i % 2 != 0) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_A2I_ASN1_INTEGER, ASN1_R_ODD_NUMBER_OF_CHARS);
+            OPENSSL_free(s);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        i /= 2;
+        if (num + i > slen) {
+            sp = OPENSSL_clear_realloc(s, slen, num + i * 2);
+            if (sp == NULL) {
+                ASN1err(ASN1_F_A2I_ASN1_INTEGER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                OPENSSL_free(s);
+                return 0;
+            }
+            s = sp;
+            slen = num + i * 2;
+        }
+        for (j = 0; j < i; j++, k += 2) {
+            for (n = 0; n < 2; n++) {
+                m = OPENSSL_hexchar2int(bufp[k + n]);
+                if (m < 0) {
+                    ASN1err(ASN1_F_A2I_ASN1_INTEGER,
+                            ASN1_R_NON_HEX_CHARACTERS);
+                    goto err;
+                }
+                s[num + j] <<= 4;
+                s[num + j] |= m;
+            }
+        }
+        num += i;
+        if (again)
+            bufsize = BIO_gets(bp, buf, size);
+        else
+            break;
+    }
+    bs->length = num;
+    bs->data = s;
+    return 1;
+ err:
+    ASN1err(ASN1_F_A2I_ASN1_INTEGER, ASN1_R_SHORT_LINE);
+    OPENSSL_free(s);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int i2a_ASN1_ENUMERATED(BIO *bp, const ASN1_ENUMERATED *a)
+{
+    return i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(bp, a);
+}
+
+int a2i_ASN1_ENUMERATED(BIO *bp, ASN1_ENUMERATED *bs, char *buf, int size)
+{
+    int rv = a2i_ASN1_INTEGER(bp, bs, buf, size);
+    if (rv == 1)
+        bs->type = V_ASN1_INTEGER | (bs->type & V_ASN1_NEG);
+    return rv;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/f_string.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/f_string.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b9258bb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/f_string.c
@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+
+int i2a_ASN1_STRING(BIO *bp, const ASN1_STRING *a, int type)
+{
+    int i, n = 0;
+    static const char *h = "0123456789ABCDEF";
+    char buf[2];
+
+    if (a == NULL)
+        return (0);
+
+    if (a->length == 0) {
+        if (BIO_write(bp, "0", 1) != 1)
+            goto err;
+        n = 1;
+    } else {
+        for (i = 0; i < a->length; i++) {
+            if ((i != 0) && (i % 35 == 0)) {
+                if (BIO_write(bp, "\\\n", 2) != 2)
+                    goto err;
+                n += 2;
+            }
+            buf[0] = h[((unsigned char)a->data[i] >> 4) & 0x0f];
+            buf[1] = h[((unsigned char)a->data[i]) & 0x0f];
+            if (BIO_write(bp, buf, 2) != 2)
+                goto err;
+            n += 2;
+        }
+    }
+    return (n);
+ err:
+    return (-1);
+}
+
+int a2i_ASN1_STRING(BIO *bp, ASN1_STRING *bs, char *buf, int size)
+{
+    int i, j, k, m, n, again, bufsize, spec_char;
+    unsigned char *s = NULL, *sp;
+    unsigned char *bufp;
+    int num = 0, slen = 0, first = 1;
+
+    bufsize = BIO_gets(bp, buf, size);
+    for (;;) {
+        if (bufsize < 1) {
+            if (first)
+                break;
+            else
+                goto err;
+        }
+        first = 0;
+
+        i = bufsize;
+        if (buf[i - 1] == '\n')
+            buf[--i] = '\0';
+        if (i == 0)
+            goto err;
+        if (buf[i - 1] == '\r')
+            buf[--i] = '\0';
+        if (i == 0)
+            goto err;
+        again = (buf[i - 1] == '\\');
+
+        for (j = i - 1; j > 0; j--) {
+#ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+            spec_char = (!(((buf[j] >= '0') && (buf[j] <= '9')) ||
+                  ((buf[j] >= 'a') && (buf[j] <= 'f')) ||
+                  ((buf[j] >= 'A') && (buf[j] <= 'F'))));
+#else
+            /*
+             * This #ifdef is not strictly necessary, since the characters
+             * A...F a...f 0...9 are contiguous (yes, even in EBCDIC - but
+             * not the whole alphabet). Nevertheless, isxdigit() is faster.
+             */
+            spec_char = (!isxdigit(buf[j]));
+#endif
+            if (spec_char) {
+                i = j;
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+        buf[i] = '\0';
+        /*
+         * We have now cleared all the crap off the end of the line
+         */
+        if (i < 2)
+            goto err;
+
+        bufp = (unsigned char *)buf;
+
+        k = 0;
+        i -= again;
+        if (i % 2 != 0) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_A2I_ASN1_STRING, ASN1_R_ODD_NUMBER_OF_CHARS);
+            OPENSSL_free(s);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        i /= 2;
+        if (num + i > slen) {
+            sp = OPENSSL_realloc(s, (unsigned int)num + i * 2);
+            if (sp == NULL) {
+                ASN1err(ASN1_F_A2I_ASN1_STRING, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                OPENSSL_free(s);
+                return 0;
+            }
+            s = sp;
+            slen = num + i * 2;
+        }
+        for (j = 0; j < i; j++, k += 2) {
+            for (n = 0; n < 2; n++) {
+                m = OPENSSL_hexchar2int(bufp[k + n]);
+                if (m < 0) {
+                    ASN1err(ASN1_F_A2I_ASN1_STRING,
+                            ASN1_R_NON_HEX_CHARACTERS);
+                    OPENSSL_free(s);
+                    return 0;
+                }
+                s[num + j] <<= 4;
+                s[num + j] |= m;
+            }
+        }
+        num += i;
+        if (again)
+            bufsize = BIO_gets(bp, buf, size);
+        else
+            break;
+    }
+    bs->length = num;
+    bs->data = s;
+    return 1;
+
+ err:
+    ASN1err(ASN1_F_A2I_ASN1_STRING, ASN1_R_SHORT_LINE);
+    OPENSSL_free(s);
+    return 0;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/i2d_pr.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/i2d_pr.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..445b0c8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/i2d_pr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include "internal/asn1_int.h"
+#include "internal/evp_int.h"
+
+int i2d_PrivateKey(EVP_PKEY *a, unsigned char **pp)
+{
+    if (a->ameth && a->ameth->old_priv_encode) {
+        return a->ameth->old_priv_encode(a, pp);
+    }
+    if (a->ameth && a->ameth->priv_encode) {
+        PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8 = EVP_PKEY2PKCS8(a);
+        int ret = 0;
+        if (p8 != NULL) {
+            ret = i2d_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO(p8, pp);
+            PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8);
+        }
+        return ret;
+    }
+    ASN1err(ASN1_F_I2D_PRIVATEKEY, ASN1_R_UNSUPPORTED_PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE);
+    return -1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/i2d_pu.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/i2d_pu.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8986c43
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/i2d_pu.c
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
+#include <openssl/ec.h>
+
+int i2d_PublicKey(EVP_PKEY *a, unsigned char **pp)
+{
+    switch (EVP_PKEY_id(a)) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+    case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
+        return i2d_RSAPublicKey(EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(a), pp);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+    case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
+        return i2d_DSAPublicKey(EVP_PKEY_get0_DSA(a), pp);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    case EVP_PKEY_EC:
+        return i2o_ECPublicKey(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(a), pp);
+#endif
+    default:
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_I2D_PUBLICKEY, ASN1_R_UNSUPPORTED_PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE);
+        return -1;
+    }
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/n_pkey.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/n_pkey.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..267ce60
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/n_pkey.c
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "openssl/opensslconf.h"
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT
+#else
+
+# include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+# include <stdio.h>
+# include <openssl/rsa.h>
+# include <openssl/objects.h>
+# include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+# include <openssl/evp.h>
+# include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
+
+typedef struct netscape_pkey_st {
+    long version;
+    X509_ALGOR *algor;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *private_key;
+} NETSCAPE_PKEY;
+
+typedef struct netscape_encrypted_pkey_st {
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os;
+    /*
+     * This is the same structure as DigestInfo so use it: although this
+     * isn't really anything to do with digests.
+     */
+    X509_SIG *enckey;
+} NETSCAPE_ENCRYPTED_PKEY;
+
+
+ASN1_BROKEN_SEQUENCE(NETSCAPE_ENCRYPTED_PKEY) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(NETSCAPE_ENCRYPTED_PKEY, os, ASN1_OCTET_STRING),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(NETSCAPE_ENCRYPTED_PKEY, enckey, X509_SIG)
+} static_ASN1_BROKEN_SEQUENCE_END(NETSCAPE_ENCRYPTED_PKEY)
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const(NETSCAPE_ENCRYPTED_PKEY)
+DECLARE_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const(NETSCAPE_ENCRYPTED_PKEY,NETSCAPE_ENCRYPTED_PKEY)
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const(NETSCAPE_ENCRYPTED_PKEY)
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(NETSCAPE_PKEY) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(NETSCAPE_PKEY, version, LONG),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(NETSCAPE_PKEY, algor, X509_ALGOR),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(NETSCAPE_PKEY, private_key, ASN1_OCTET_STRING)
+} static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(NETSCAPE_PKEY)
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const(NETSCAPE_PKEY)
+DECLARE_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const(NETSCAPE_PKEY,NETSCAPE_PKEY)
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const(NETSCAPE_PKEY)
+
+# endif                         /* OPENSSL_NO_RC4 */
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/nsseq.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/nsseq.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c7baf40
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/nsseq.c
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+
+static int nsseq_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+                    void *exarg)
+{
+    if (operation == ASN1_OP_NEW_POST) {
+        NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE *nsseq;
+        nsseq = (NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE *)*pval;
+        nsseq->type = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_netscape_cert_sequence);
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Netscape certificate sequence structure */
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE_cb(NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE, nsseq_cb) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE, type, ASN1_OBJECT),
+        ASN1_EXP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE, certs, X509, 0)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_cb(NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE, NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE)
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/p5_pbe.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/p5_pbe.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ab7e168
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/p5_pbe.c
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+/* PKCS#5 password based encryption structure */
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(PBEPARAM) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(PBEPARAM, salt, ASN1_OCTET_STRING),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(PBEPARAM, iter, ASN1_INTEGER)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(PBEPARAM)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PBEPARAM)
+
+/* Set an algorithm identifier for a PKCS#5 PBE algorithm */
+
+int PKCS5_pbe_set0_algor(X509_ALGOR *algor, int alg, int iter,
+                         const unsigned char *salt, int saltlen)
+{
+    PBEPARAM *pbe = NULL;
+    ASN1_STRING *pbe_str = NULL;
+    unsigned char *sstr = NULL;
+
+    pbe = PBEPARAM_new();
+    if (pbe == NULL) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_PKCS5_PBE_SET0_ALGOR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (iter <= 0)
+        iter = PKCS5_DEFAULT_ITER;
+    if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(pbe->iter, iter)) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_PKCS5_PBE_SET0_ALGOR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (!saltlen)
+        saltlen = PKCS5_SALT_LEN;
+
+    sstr = OPENSSL_malloc(saltlen);
+    if (sstr == NULL) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_PKCS5_PBE_SET0_ALGOR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (salt)
+        memcpy(sstr, salt, saltlen);
+    else if (RAND_bytes(sstr, saltlen) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    ASN1_STRING_set0(pbe->salt, sstr, saltlen);
+    sstr = NULL;
+
+    if (!ASN1_item_pack(pbe, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PBEPARAM), &pbe_str)) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_PKCS5_PBE_SET0_ALGOR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    PBEPARAM_free(pbe);
+    pbe = NULL;
+
+    if (X509_ALGOR_set0(algor, OBJ_nid2obj(alg), V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, pbe_str))
+        return 1;
+
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_free(sstr);
+    PBEPARAM_free(pbe);
+    ASN1_STRING_free(pbe_str);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/* Return an algorithm identifier for a PKCS#5 PBE algorithm */
+
+X509_ALGOR *PKCS5_pbe_set(int alg, int iter,
+                          const unsigned char *salt, int saltlen)
+{
+    X509_ALGOR *ret;
+    ret = X509_ALGOR_new();
+    if (ret == NULL) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_PKCS5_PBE_SET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    if (PKCS5_pbe_set0_algor(ret, alg, iter, salt, saltlen))
+        return ret;
+
+    X509_ALGOR_free(ret);
+    return NULL;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/p5_pbev2.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/p5_pbev2.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..14e8700
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/p5_pbev2.c
@@ -0,0 +1,221 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+/* PKCS#5 v2.0 password based encryption structures */
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(PBE2PARAM) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(PBE2PARAM, keyfunc, X509_ALGOR),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(PBE2PARAM, encryption, X509_ALGOR)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(PBE2PARAM)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PBE2PARAM)
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(PBKDF2PARAM) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(PBKDF2PARAM, salt, ASN1_ANY),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(PBKDF2PARAM, iter, ASN1_INTEGER),
+        ASN1_OPT(PBKDF2PARAM, keylength, ASN1_INTEGER),
+        ASN1_OPT(PBKDF2PARAM, prf, X509_ALGOR)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(PBKDF2PARAM)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PBKDF2PARAM)
+
+/*
+ * Return an algorithm identifier for a PKCS#5 v2.0 PBE algorithm: yes I know
+ * this is horrible! Extended version to allow application supplied PRF NID
+ * and IV.
+ */
+
+X509_ALGOR *PKCS5_pbe2_set_iv(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, int iter,
+                              unsigned char *salt, int saltlen,
+                              unsigned char *aiv, int prf_nid)
+{
+    X509_ALGOR *scheme = NULL, *ret = NULL;
+    int alg_nid, keylen;
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+    unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+    PBE2PARAM *pbe2 = NULL;
+
+    alg_nid = EVP_CIPHER_type(cipher);
+    if (alg_nid == NID_undef) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_PKCS5_PBE2_SET_IV,
+                ASN1_R_CIPHER_HAS_NO_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if ((pbe2 = PBE2PARAM_new()) == NULL)
+        goto merr;
+
+    /* Setup the AlgorithmIdentifier for the encryption scheme */
+    scheme = pbe2->encryption;
+    scheme->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(alg_nid);
+    if ((scheme->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new()) == NULL)
+        goto merr;
+
+    /* Create random IV */
+    if (EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher)) {
+        if (aiv)
+            memcpy(iv, aiv, EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher));
+        else if (RAND_bytes(iv, EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher)) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        goto merr;
+
+    /* Dummy cipherinit to just setup the IV, and PRF */
+    if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, NULL, iv, 0))
+        goto err;
+    if (EVP_CIPHER_param_to_asn1(ctx, scheme->parameter) < 0) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_PKCS5_PBE2_SET_IV, ASN1_R_ERROR_SETTING_CIPHER_PARAMS);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    /*
+     * If prf NID unspecified see if cipher has a preference. An error is OK
+     * here: just means use default PRF.
+     */
+    if ((prf_nid == -1) &&
+        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_PBE_PRF_NID, 0, &prf_nid) <= 0) {
+        ERR_clear_error();
+        prf_nid = NID_hmacWithSHA256;
+    }
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
+    ctx = NULL;
+
+    /* If its RC2 then we'd better setup the key length */
+
+    if (alg_nid == NID_rc2_cbc)
+        keylen = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher);
+    else
+        keylen = -1;
+
+    /* Setup keyfunc */
+
+    X509_ALGOR_free(pbe2->keyfunc);
+
+    pbe2->keyfunc = PKCS5_pbkdf2_set(iter, salt, saltlen, prf_nid, keylen);
+
+    if (!pbe2->keyfunc)
+        goto merr;
+
+    /* Now set up top level AlgorithmIdentifier */
+
+    if ((ret = X509_ALGOR_new()) == NULL)
+        goto merr;
+
+    ret->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pbes2);
+
+    /* Encode PBE2PARAM into parameter */
+
+    if (!ASN1_TYPE_pack_sequence(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PBE2PARAM), pbe2,
+                                 &ret->parameter))
+         goto merr;
+
+    PBE2PARAM_free(pbe2);
+    pbe2 = NULL;
+
+    return ret;
+
+ merr:
+    ASN1err(ASN1_F_PKCS5_PBE2_SET_IV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+
+ err:
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
+    PBE2PARAM_free(pbe2);
+    /* Note 'scheme' is freed as part of pbe2 */
+    X509_ALGOR_free(ret);
+
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+X509_ALGOR *PKCS5_pbe2_set(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, int iter,
+                           unsigned char *salt, int saltlen)
+{
+    return PKCS5_pbe2_set_iv(cipher, iter, salt, saltlen, NULL, -1);
+}
+
+X509_ALGOR *PKCS5_pbkdf2_set(int iter, unsigned char *salt, int saltlen,
+                             int prf_nid, int keylen)
+{
+    X509_ALGOR *keyfunc = NULL;
+    PBKDF2PARAM *kdf = NULL;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *osalt = NULL;
+
+    if ((kdf = PBKDF2PARAM_new()) == NULL)
+        goto merr;
+    if ((osalt = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new()) == NULL)
+        goto merr;
+
+    kdf->salt->value.octet_string = osalt;
+    kdf->salt->type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
+
+    if (saltlen == 0)
+        saltlen = PKCS5_SALT_LEN;
+    if ((osalt->data = OPENSSL_malloc(saltlen)) == NULL)
+        goto merr;
+
+    osalt->length = saltlen;
+
+    if (salt)
+        memcpy(osalt->data, salt, saltlen);
+    else if (RAND_bytes(osalt->data, saltlen) <= 0)
+        goto merr;
+
+    if (iter <= 0)
+        iter = PKCS5_DEFAULT_ITER;
+
+    if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(kdf->iter, iter))
+        goto merr;
+
+    /* If have a key len set it up */
+
+    if (keylen > 0) {
+        if ((kdf->keylength = ASN1_INTEGER_new()) == NULL)
+            goto merr;
+        if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(kdf->keylength, keylen))
+            goto merr;
+    }
+
+    /* prf can stay NULL if we are using hmacWithSHA1 */
+    if (prf_nid > 0 && prf_nid != NID_hmacWithSHA1) {
+        kdf->prf = X509_ALGOR_new();
+        if (kdf->prf == NULL)
+            goto merr;
+        X509_ALGOR_set0(kdf->prf, OBJ_nid2obj(prf_nid), V_ASN1_NULL, NULL);
+    }
+
+    /* Finally setup the keyfunc structure */
+
+    keyfunc = X509_ALGOR_new();
+    if (keyfunc == NULL)
+        goto merr;
+
+    keyfunc->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_id_pbkdf2);
+
+    /* Encode PBKDF2PARAM into parameter of pbe2 */
+
+    if (!ASN1_TYPE_pack_sequence(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PBKDF2PARAM), kdf,
+                                 &keyfunc->parameter))
+         goto merr;
+
+    PBKDF2PARAM_free(kdf);
+    return keyfunc;
+
+ merr:
+    ASN1err(ASN1_F_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    PBKDF2PARAM_free(kdf);
+    X509_ALGOR_free(keyfunc);
+    return NULL;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/p5_scrypt.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/p5_scrypt.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4cb7837
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/p5_scrypt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,283 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCRYPT
+/* PKCS#5 scrypt password based encryption structures */
+
+typedef struct {
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *salt;
+    ASN1_INTEGER *costParameter;
+    ASN1_INTEGER *blockSize;
+    ASN1_INTEGER *parallelizationParameter;
+    ASN1_INTEGER *keyLength;
+} SCRYPT_PARAMS;
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(SCRYPT_PARAMS) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(SCRYPT_PARAMS, salt, ASN1_OCTET_STRING),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(SCRYPT_PARAMS, costParameter, ASN1_INTEGER),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(SCRYPT_PARAMS, blockSize, ASN1_INTEGER),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(SCRYPT_PARAMS, parallelizationParameter, ASN1_INTEGER),
+        ASN1_OPT(SCRYPT_PARAMS, keyLength, ASN1_INTEGER),
+} static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(SCRYPT_PARAMS)
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(SCRYPT_PARAMS)
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(SCRYPT_PARAMS)
+
+static X509_ALGOR *pkcs5_scrypt_set(const unsigned char *salt, size_t saltlen,
+                                    size_t keylen, uint64_t N, uint64_t r,
+                                    uint64_t p);
+
+/*
+ * Return an algorithm identifier for a PKCS#5 v2.0 PBE algorithm using scrypt
+ */
+
+X509_ALGOR *PKCS5_pbe2_set_scrypt(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
+                                  const unsigned char *salt, int saltlen,
+                                  unsigned char *aiv, uint64_t N, uint64_t r,
+                                  uint64_t p)
+{
+    X509_ALGOR *scheme = NULL, *ret = NULL;
+    int alg_nid;
+    size_t keylen = 0;
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+    unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+    PBE2PARAM *pbe2 = NULL;
+
+    if (!cipher) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_PKCS5_PBE2_SET_SCRYPT, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (EVP_PBE_scrypt(NULL, 0, NULL, 0, N, r, p, 0, NULL, 0) == 0) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_PKCS5_PBE2_SET_SCRYPT,
+                ASN1_R_INVALID_SCRYPT_PARAMETERS);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    alg_nid = EVP_CIPHER_type(cipher);
+    if (alg_nid == NID_undef) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_PKCS5_PBE2_SET_SCRYPT,
+                ASN1_R_CIPHER_HAS_NO_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    pbe2 = PBE2PARAM_new();
+    if (pbe2 == NULL)
+        goto merr;
+
+    /* Setup the AlgorithmIdentifier for the encryption scheme */
+    scheme = pbe2->encryption;
+
+    scheme->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(alg_nid);
+    scheme->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new();
+    if (scheme->parameter == NULL)
+        goto merr;
+
+    /* Create random IV */
+    if (EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher)) {
+        if (aiv)
+            memcpy(iv, aiv, EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher));
+        else if (RAND_bytes(iv, EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher)) < 0)
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        goto merr;
+
+    /* Dummy cipherinit to just setup the IV */
+    if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, NULL, iv, 0) == 0)
+        goto err;
+    if (EVP_CIPHER_param_to_asn1(ctx, scheme->parameter) < 0) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_PKCS5_PBE2_SET_SCRYPT,
+                ASN1_R_ERROR_SETTING_CIPHER_PARAMS);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
+    ctx = NULL;
+
+    /* If its RC2 then we'd better setup the key length */
+
+    if (alg_nid == NID_rc2_cbc)
+        keylen = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher);
+
+    /* Setup keyfunc */
+
+    X509_ALGOR_free(pbe2->keyfunc);
+
+    pbe2->keyfunc = pkcs5_scrypt_set(salt, saltlen, keylen, N, r, p);
+
+    if (pbe2->keyfunc == NULL)
+        goto merr;
+
+    /* Now set up top level AlgorithmIdentifier */
+
+    ret = X509_ALGOR_new();
+    if (ret == NULL)
+        goto merr;
+
+    ret->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pbes2);
+
+    /* Encode PBE2PARAM into parameter */
+
+    if (ASN1_TYPE_pack_sequence(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PBE2PARAM), pbe2,
+                                &ret->parameter) == NULL)
+        goto merr;
+
+    PBE2PARAM_free(pbe2);
+    pbe2 = NULL;
+
+    return ret;
+
+ merr:
+    ASN1err(ASN1_F_PKCS5_PBE2_SET_SCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+
+ err:
+    PBE2PARAM_free(pbe2);
+    X509_ALGOR_free(ret);
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
+
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+static X509_ALGOR *pkcs5_scrypt_set(const unsigned char *salt, size_t saltlen,
+                                    size_t keylen, uint64_t N, uint64_t r,
+                                    uint64_t p)
+{
+    X509_ALGOR *keyfunc = NULL;
+    SCRYPT_PARAMS *sparam = SCRYPT_PARAMS_new();
+
+    if (sparam == NULL)
+        goto merr;
+
+    if (!saltlen)
+        saltlen = PKCS5_SALT_LEN;
+
+    /* This will either copy salt or grow the buffer */
+    if (ASN1_STRING_set(sparam->salt, salt, saltlen) == 0)
+        goto merr;
+
+    if (salt == NULL && RAND_bytes(sparam->salt->data, saltlen) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (ASN1_INTEGER_set_uint64(sparam->costParameter, N) == 0)
+        goto merr;
+
+    if (ASN1_INTEGER_set_uint64(sparam->blockSize, r) == 0)
+        goto merr;
+
+    if (ASN1_INTEGER_set_uint64(sparam->parallelizationParameter, p) == 0)
+        goto merr;
+
+    /* If have a key len set it up */
+
+    if (keylen > 0) {
+        sparam->keyLength = ASN1_INTEGER_new();
+        if (sparam->keyLength == NULL)
+            goto merr;
+        if (ASN1_INTEGER_set_int64(sparam->keyLength, keylen) == 0)
+            goto merr;
+    }
+
+    /* Finally setup the keyfunc structure */
+
+    keyfunc = X509_ALGOR_new();
+    if (keyfunc == NULL)
+        goto merr;
+
+    keyfunc->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_id_scrypt);
+
+    /* Encode SCRYPT_PARAMS into parameter of pbe2 */
+
+    if (ASN1_TYPE_pack_sequence(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(SCRYPT_PARAMS), sparam,
+                                &keyfunc->parameter) == NULL)
+        goto merr;
+
+    SCRYPT_PARAMS_free(sparam);
+    return keyfunc;
+
+ merr:
+    ASN1err(ASN1_F_PKCS5_SCRYPT_SET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ err:
+    SCRYPT_PARAMS_free(sparam);
+    X509_ALGOR_free(keyfunc);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+int PKCS5_v2_scrypt_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const char *pass,
+                             int passlen, ASN1_TYPE *param,
+                             const EVP_CIPHER *c, const EVP_MD *md, int en_de)
+{
+    unsigned char *salt, key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
+    uint64_t p, r, N;
+    size_t saltlen;
+    size_t keylen = 0;
+    int rv = 0;
+    SCRYPT_PARAMS *sparam = NULL;
+
+    if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx) == NULL) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_SCRYPT_KEYIVGEN, EVP_R_NO_CIPHER_SET);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* Decode parameter */
+
+    sparam = ASN1_TYPE_unpack_sequence(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(SCRYPT_PARAMS), param);
+
+    if (sparam == NULL) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_SCRYPT_KEYIVGEN, EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
+
+    /* Now check the parameters of sparam */
+
+    if (sparam->keyLength) {
+        uint64_t spkeylen;
+        if ((ASN1_INTEGER_get_uint64(&spkeylen, sparam->keyLength) == 0)
+            || (spkeylen != keylen)) {
+            EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_SCRYPT_KEYIVGEN,
+                   EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEYLENGTH);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+    /* Check all parameters fit in uint64_t and are acceptable to scrypt */
+    if (ASN1_INTEGER_get_uint64(&N, sparam->costParameter) == 0
+        || ASN1_INTEGER_get_uint64(&r, sparam->blockSize) == 0
+        || ASN1_INTEGER_get_uint64(&p, sparam->parallelizationParameter) == 0
+        || EVP_PBE_scrypt(NULL, 0, NULL, 0, N, r, p, 0, NULL, 0) == 0) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_SCRYPT_KEYIVGEN,
+               EVP_R_ILLEGAL_SCRYPT_PARAMETERS);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* it seems that its all OK */
+
+    salt = sparam->salt->data;
+    saltlen = sparam->salt->length;
+    if (EVP_PBE_scrypt(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, N, r, p, 0, key, keylen)
+        == 0)
+        goto err;
+    rv = EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, key, NULL, en_de);
+ err:
+    if (keylen)
+        OPENSSL_cleanse(key, keylen);
+    SCRYPT_PARAMS_free(sparam);
+    return rv;
+}
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SCRYPT */
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/p8_pkey.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/p8_pkey.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dbee827
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/p8_pkey.c
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include "internal/x509_int.h"
+
+/* Minor tweak to operation: zero private key data */
+static int pkey_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+                   void *exarg)
+{
+    /* Since the structure must still be valid use ASN1_OP_FREE_PRE */
+    if (operation == ASN1_OP_FREE_PRE) {
+        PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *key = (PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *)*pval;
+        if (key->pkey)
+            OPENSSL_cleanse(key->pkey->data, key->pkey->length);
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE_cb(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, pkey_cb) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, version, ASN1_INTEGER),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, pkeyalg, X509_ALGOR),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, pkey, ASN1_OCTET_STRING),
+        ASN1_IMP_SET_OF_OPT(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, attributes, X509_ATTRIBUTE, 0)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_cb(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO)
+
+int PKCS8_pkey_set0(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *priv, ASN1_OBJECT *aobj,
+                    int version,
+                    int ptype, void *pval, unsigned char *penc, int penclen)
+{
+    if (version >= 0) {
+        if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(priv->version, version))
+            return 0;
+    }
+    if (!X509_ALGOR_set0(priv->pkeyalg, aobj, ptype, pval))
+        return 0;
+    if (penc)
+        ASN1_STRING_set0(priv->pkey, penc, penclen);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int PKCS8_pkey_get0(const ASN1_OBJECT **ppkalg,
+                    const unsigned char **pk, int *ppklen,
+                    const X509_ALGOR **pa, const PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8)
+{
+    if (ppkalg)
+        *ppkalg = p8->pkeyalg->algorithm;
+    if (pk) {
+        *pk = ASN1_STRING_get0_data(p8->pkey);
+        *ppklen = ASN1_STRING_length(p8->pkey);
+    }
+    if (pa)
+        *pa = p8->pkeyalg;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+const STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *
+PKCS8_pkey_get0_attrs(const PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8)
+{
+    return p8->attributes;
+}
+
+int PKCS8_pkey_add1_attr_by_NID(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, int nid, int type,
+                                const unsigned char *bytes, int len)
+{
+    if (X509at_add1_attr_by_NID(&p8->attributes, nid, type, bytes, len) != NULL)
+        return 1;
+    return 0;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/t_bitst.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/t_bitst.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c0aeca4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/t_bitst.c
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/conf.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+
+int ASN1_BIT_STRING_name_print(BIO *out, ASN1_BIT_STRING *bs,
+                               BIT_STRING_BITNAME *tbl, int indent)
+{
+    BIT_STRING_BITNAME *bnam;
+    char first = 1;
+    BIO_printf(out, "%*s", indent, "");
+    for (bnam = tbl; bnam->lname; bnam++) {
+        if (ASN1_BIT_STRING_get_bit(bs, bnam->bitnum)) {
+            if (!first)
+                BIO_puts(out, ", ");
+            BIO_puts(out, bnam->lname);
+            first = 0;
+        }
+    }
+    BIO_puts(out, "\n");
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int ASN1_BIT_STRING_set_asc(ASN1_BIT_STRING *bs, const char *name, int value,
+                            BIT_STRING_BITNAME *tbl)
+{
+    int bitnum;
+    bitnum = ASN1_BIT_STRING_num_asc(name, tbl);
+    if (bitnum < 0)
+        return 0;
+    if (bs) {
+        if (!ASN1_BIT_STRING_set_bit(bs, bitnum, value))
+            return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int ASN1_BIT_STRING_num_asc(const char *name, BIT_STRING_BITNAME *tbl)
+{
+    BIT_STRING_BITNAME *bnam;
+    for (bnam = tbl; bnam->lname; bnam++) {
+        if ((strcmp(bnam->sname, name) == 0)
+            || (strcmp(bnam->lname, name) == 0))
+            return bnam->bitnum;
+    }
+    return -1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/t_pkey.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/t_pkey.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3b2c9df
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/t_pkey.c
@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include "internal/bn_int.h"
+
+/* Number of octets per line */
+#define ASN1_BUF_PRINT_WIDTH    15
+/* Maximum indent */
+#define ASN1_PRINT_MAX_INDENT 128
+
+int ASN1_buf_print(BIO *bp, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen, int indent)
+{
+    size_t i;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < buflen; i++) {
+        if ((i % ASN1_BUF_PRINT_WIDTH) == 0) {
+            if (i > 0 && BIO_puts(bp, "\n") <= 0)
+                return 0;
+            if (!BIO_indent(bp, indent, ASN1_PRINT_MAX_INDENT))
+                return 0;
+        }
+        /*
+         * Use colon separators for each octet for compatibility as
+         * this function is used to print out key components.
+         */
+        if (BIO_printf(bp, "%02x%s", buf[i],
+                       (i == buflen - 1) ? "" : ":") <= 0)
+                return 0;
+    }
+    if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) <= 0)
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int ASN1_bn_print(BIO *bp, const char *number, const BIGNUM *num,
+                  unsigned char *ign, int indent)
+{
+    int n, rv = 0;
+    const char *neg;
+    unsigned char *buf = NULL, *tmp = NULL;
+    int buflen;
+
+    if (num == NULL)
+        return 1;
+    neg = BN_is_negative(num) ? "-" : "";
+    if (!BIO_indent(bp, indent, ASN1_PRINT_MAX_INDENT))
+        return 0;
+    if (BN_is_zero(num)) {
+        if (BIO_printf(bp, "%s 0\n", number) <= 0)
+            return 0;
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    if (BN_num_bytes(num) <= BN_BYTES) {
+        if (BIO_printf(bp, "%s %s%lu (%s0x%lx)\n", number, neg,
+                       (unsigned long)bn_get_words(num)[0], neg,
+                       (unsigned long)bn_get_words(num)[0]) <= 0)
+            return 0;
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    buflen = BN_num_bytes(num) + 1;
+    buf = tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(buflen);
+    if (buf == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    buf[0] = 0;
+    if (BIO_printf(bp, "%s%s\n", number,
+                   (neg[0] == '-') ? " (Negative)" : "") <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    n = BN_bn2bin(num, buf + 1);
+
+    if (buf[1] & 0x80)
+        n++;
+    else
+        tmp++;
+
+    if (ASN1_buf_print(bp, tmp, n, indent + 4) == 0)
+        goto err;
+    rv = 1;
+    err:
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(buf, buflen);
+    return rv;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/t_spki.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/t_spki.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..51b56d0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/t_spki.c
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+/* Print out an SPKI */
+
+int NETSCAPE_SPKI_print(BIO *out, NETSCAPE_SPKI *spki)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+    ASN1_IA5STRING *chal;
+    ASN1_OBJECT *spkioid;
+    int i, n;
+    char *s;
+    BIO_printf(out, "Netscape SPKI:\n");
+    X509_PUBKEY_get0_param(&spkioid, NULL, NULL, NULL, spki->spkac->pubkey);
+    i = OBJ_obj2nid(spkioid);
+    BIO_printf(out, "  Public Key Algorithm: %s\n",
+               (i == NID_undef) ? "UNKNOWN" : OBJ_nid2ln(i));
+    pkey = X509_PUBKEY_get(spki->spkac->pubkey);
+    if (!pkey)
+        BIO_printf(out, "  Unable to load public key\n");
+    else {
+        EVP_PKEY_print_public(out, pkey, 4, NULL);
+        EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+    }
+    chal = spki->spkac->challenge;
+    if (chal->length)
+        BIO_printf(out, "  Challenge String: %s\n", chal->data);
+    i = OBJ_obj2nid(spki->sig_algor.algorithm);
+    BIO_printf(out, "  Signature Algorithm: %s",
+               (i == NID_undef) ? "UNKNOWN" : OBJ_nid2ln(i));
+
+    n = spki->signature->length;
+    s = (char *)spki->signature->data;
+    for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+        if ((i % 18) == 0)
+            BIO_write(out, "\n      ", 7);
+        BIO_printf(out, "%02x%s", (unsigned char)s[i],
+                   ((i + 1) == n) ? "" : ":");
+    }
+    BIO_write(out, "\n", 1);
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..af8641e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1159 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2000-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include "internal/numbers.h"
+#include "asn1_locl.h"
+
+/*
+ * Constructed types with a recursive definition (such as can be found in PKCS7)
+ * could eventually exceed the stack given malicious input with excessive
+ * recursion. Therefore we limit the stack depth. This is the maximum number of
+ * recursive invocations of asn1_item_embed_d2i().
+ */
+#define ASN1_MAX_CONSTRUCTED_NEST 30
+
+static int asn1_item_embed_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in,
+                               long len, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+                               int tag, int aclass, char opt, ASN1_TLC *ctx,
+                               int depth);
+
+static int asn1_check_eoc(const unsigned char **in, long len);
+static int asn1_find_end(const unsigned char **in, long len, char inf);
+
+static int asn1_collect(BUF_MEM *buf, const unsigned char **in, long len,
+                        char inf, int tag, int aclass, int depth);
+
+static int collect_data(BUF_MEM *buf, const unsigned char **p, long plen);
+
+static int asn1_check_tlen(long *olen, int *otag, unsigned char *oclass,
+                           char *inf, char *cst,
+                           const unsigned char **in, long len,
+                           int exptag, int expclass, char opt, ASN1_TLC *ctx);
+
+static int asn1_template_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval,
+                                const unsigned char **in, long len,
+                                const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt, char opt,
+                                ASN1_TLC *ctx, int depth);
+static int asn1_template_noexp_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **val,
+                                   const unsigned char **in, long len,
+                                   const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt, char opt,
+                                   ASN1_TLC *ctx, int depth);
+static int asn1_d2i_ex_primitive(ASN1_VALUE **pval,
+                                 const unsigned char **in, long len,
+                                 const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+                                 int tag, int aclass, char opt,
+                                 ASN1_TLC *ctx);
+static int asn1_ex_c2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char *cont, int len,
+                       int utype, char *free_cont, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
+
+/* Table to convert tags to bit values, used for MSTRING type */
+static const unsigned long tag2bit[32] = {
+    /* tags  0 -  3 */
+    0, 0, 0, B_ASN1_BIT_STRING,
+    /* tags  4- 7 */
+    B_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 0, 0, B_ASN1_UNKNOWN,
+    /* tags  8-11 */
+    B_ASN1_UNKNOWN, B_ASN1_UNKNOWN, B_ASN1_UNKNOWN, B_ASN1_UNKNOWN,
+    /* tags 12-15 */
+    B_ASN1_UTF8STRING, B_ASN1_UNKNOWN, B_ASN1_UNKNOWN, B_ASN1_UNKNOWN,
+    /* tags 16-19 */
+    B_ASN1_SEQUENCE, 0, B_ASN1_NUMERICSTRING, B_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING,
+    /* tags 20-22 */
+    B_ASN1_T61STRING, B_ASN1_VIDEOTEXSTRING, B_ASN1_IA5STRING,
+    /* tags 23-24 */
+    B_ASN1_UTCTIME, B_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME,
+    /* tags 25-27 */
+    B_ASN1_GRAPHICSTRING, B_ASN1_ISO64STRING, B_ASN1_GENERALSTRING,
+    /* tags 28-31 */
+    B_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING, B_ASN1_UNKNOWN, B_ASN1_BMPSTRING, B_ASN1_UNKNOWN,
+};
+
+unsigned long ASN1_tag2bit(int tag)
+{
+    if ((tag < 0) || (tag > 30))
+        return 0;
+    return tag2bit[tag];
+}
+
+/* Macro to initialize and invalidate the cache */
+
+#define asn1_tlc_clear(c)       if (c) (c)->valid = 0
+/* Version to avoid compiler warning about 'c' always non-NULL */
+#define asn1_tlc_clear_nc(c)    (c)->valid = 0
+
+/*
+ * Decode an ASN1 item, this currently behaves just like a standard 'd2i'
+ * function. 'in' points to a buffer to read the data from, in future we
+ * will have more advanced versions that can input data a piece at a time and
+ * this will simply be a special case.
+ */
+
+ASN1_VALUE *ASN1_item_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval,
+                          const unsigned char **in, long len,
+                          const ASN1_ITEM *it)
+{
+    ASN1_TLC c;
+    ASN1_VALUE *ptmpval = NULL;
+    if (!pval)
+        pval = &ptmpval;
+    asn1_tlc_clear_nc(&c);
+    if (ASN1_item_ex_d2i(pval, in, len, it, -1, 0, 0, &c) > 0)
+        return *pval;
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len,
+                     const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+                     int tag, int aclass, char opt, ASN1_TLC *ctx)
+{
+    int rv;
+    rv = asn1_item_embed_d2i(pval, in, len, it, tag, aclass, opt, ctx, 0);
+    if (rv <= 0)
+        ASN1_item_ex_free(pval, it);
+    return rv;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Decode an item, taking care of IMPLICIT tagging, if any. If 'opt' set and
+ * tag mismatch return -1 to handle OPTIONAL
+ */
+
+static int asn1_item_embed_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in,
+                               long len, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+                               int tag, int aclass, char opt, ASN1_TLC *ctx,
+                               int depth)
+{
+    const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt, *errtt = NULL;
+    const ASN1_EXTERN_FUNCS *ef;
+    const ASN1_AUX *aux = it->funcs;
+    ASN1_aux_cb *asn1_cb;
+    const unsigned char *p = NULL, *q;
+    unsigned char oclass;
+    char seq_eoc, seq_nolen, cst, isopt;
+    long tmplen;
+    int i;
+    int otag;
+    int ret = 0;
+    ASN1_VALUE **pchptr;
+    if (!pval)
+        return 0;
+    if (aux && aux->asn1_cb)
+        asn1_cb = aux->asn1_cb;
+    else
+        asn1_cb = 0;
+
+    if (++depth > ASN1_MAX_CONSTRUCTED_NEST) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EMBED_D2I, ASN1_R_NESTED_TOO_DEEP);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    switch (it->itype) {
+    case ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE:
+        if (it->templates) {
+            /*
+             * tagging or OPTIONAL is currently illegal on an item template
+             * because the flags can't get passed down. In practice this
+             * isn't a problem: we include the relevant flags from the item
+             * template in the template itself.
+             */
+            if ((tag != -1) || opt) {
+                ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EMBED_D2I,
+                        ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_OPTIONS_ON_ITEM_TEMPLATE);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            return asn1_template_ex_d2i(pval, in, len,
+                                        it->templates, opt, ctx, depth);
+        }
+        return asn1_d2i_ex_primitive(pval, in, len, it,
+                                     tag, aclass, opt, ctx);
+
+    case ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING:
+        p = *in;
+        /* Just read in tag and class */
+        ret = asn1_check_tlen(NULL, &otag, &oclass, NULL, NULL,
+                              &p, len, -1, 0, 1, ctx);
+        if (!ret) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EMBED_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        /* Must be UNIVERSAL class */
+        if (oclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
+            /* If OPTIONAL, assume this is OK */
+            if (opt)
+                return -1;
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EMBED_D2I, ASN1_R_MSTRING_NOT_UNIVERSAL);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        /* Check tag matches bit map */
+        if (!(ASN1_tag2bit(otag) & it->utype)) {
+            /* If OPTIONAL, assume this is OK */
+            if (opt)
+                return -1;
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EMBED_D2I, ASN1_R_MSTRING_WRONG_TAG);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        return asn1_d2i_ex_primitive(pval, in, len, it, otag, 0, 0, ctx);
+
+    case ASN1_ITYPE_EXTERN:
+        /* Use new style d2i */
+        ef = it->funcs;
+        return ef->asn1_ex_d2i(pval, in, len, it, tag, aclass, opt, ctx);
+
+    case ASN1_ITYPE_CHOICE:
+        if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_PRE, pval, it, NULL))
+            goto auxerr;
+        if (*pval) {
+            /* Free up and zero CHOICE value if initialised */
+            i = asn1_get_choice_selector(pval, it);
+            if ((i >= 0) && (i < it->tcount)) {
+                tt = it->templates + i;
+                pchptr = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, tt);
+                asn1_template_free(pchptr, tt);
+                asn1_set_choice_selector(pval, -1, it);
+            }
+        } else if (!ASN1_item_ex_new(pval, it)) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EMBED_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        /* CHOICE type, try each possibility in turn */
+        p = *in;
+        for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; i++, tt++) {
+            pchptr = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, tt);
+            /*
+             * We mark field as OPTIONAL so its absence can be recognised.
+             */
+            ret = asn1_template_ex_d2i(pchptr, &p, len, tt, 1, ctx, depth);
+            /* If field not present, try the next one */
+            if (ret == -1)
+                continue;
+            /* If positive return, read OK, break loop */
+            if (ret > 0)
+                break;
+            /*
+             * Must be an ASN1 parsing error.
+             * Free up any partial choice value
+             */
+            asn1_template_free(pchptr, tt);
+            errtt = tt;
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EMBED_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        /* Did we fall off the end without reading anything? */
+        if (i == it->tcount) {
+            /* If OPTIONAL, this is OK */
+            if (opt) {
+                /* Free and zero it */
+                ASN1_item_ex_free(pval, it);
+                return -1;
+            }
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EMBED_D2I, ASN1_R_NO_MATCHING_CHOICE_TYPE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        asn1_set_choice_selector(pval, i, it);
+
+        if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_POST, pval, it, NULL))
+            goto auxerr;
+        *in = p;
+        return 1;
+
+    case ASN1_ITYPE_NDEF_SEQUENCE:
+    case ASN1_ITYPE_SEQUENCE:
+        p = *in;
+        tmplen = len;
+
+        /* If no IMPLICIT tagging set to SEQUENCE, UNIVERSAL */
+        if (tag == -1) {
+            tag = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE;
+            aclass = V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL;
+        }
+        /* Get SEQUENCE length and update len, p */
+        ret = asn1_check_tlen(&len, NULL, NULL, &seq_eoc, &cst,
+                              &p, len, tag, aclass, opt, ctx);
+        if (!ret) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EMBED_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
+            goto err;
+        } else if (ret == -1)
+            return -1;
+        if (aux && (aux->flags & ASN1_AFLG_BROKEN)) {
+            len = tmplen - (p - *in);
+            seq_nolen = 1;
+        }
+        /* If indefinite we don't do a length check */
+        else
+            seq_nolen = seq_eoc;
+        if (!cst) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EMBED_D2I, ASN1_R_SEQUENCE_NOT_CONSTRUCTED);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        if (!*pval && !ASN1_item_ex_new(pval, it)) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EMBED_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_PRE, pval, it, NULL))
+            goto auxerr;
+
+        /* Free up and zero any ADB found */
+        for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; i++, tt++) {
+            if (tt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_ADB_MASK) {
+                const ASN1_TEMPLATE *seqtt;
+                ASN1_VALUE **pseqval;
+                seqtt = asn1_do_adb(pval, tt, 0);
+                if (seqtt == NULL)
+                    continue;
+                pseqval = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, seqtt);
+                asn1_template_free(pseqval, seqtt);
+            }
+        }
+
+        /* Get each field entry */
+        for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; i++, tt++) {
+            const ASN1_TEMPLATE *seqtt;
+            ASN1_VALUE **pseqval;
+            seqtt = asn1_do_adb(pval, tt, 1);
+            if (seqtt == NULL)
+                goto err;
+            pseqval = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, seqtt);
+            /* Have we ran out of data? */
+            if (!len)
+                break;
+            q = p;
+            if (asn1_check_eoc(&p, len)) {
+                if (!seq_eoc) {
+                    ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EMBED_D2I, ASN1_R_UNEXPECTED_EOC);
+                    goto err;
+                }
+                len -= p - q;
+                seq_eoc = 0;
+                q = p;
+                break;
+            }
+            /*
+             * This determines the OPTIONAL flag value. The field cannot be
+             * omitted if it is the last of a SEQUENCE and there is still
+             * data to be read. This isn't strictly necessary but it
+             * increases efficiency in some cases.
+             */
+            if (i == (it->tcount - 1))
+                isopt = 0;
+            else
+                isopt = (char)(seqtt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_OPTIONAL);
+            /*
+             * attempt to read in field, allowing each to be OPTIONAL
+             */
+
+            ret = asn1_template_ex_d2i(pseqval, &p, len, seqtt, isopt, ctx,
+                                       depth);
+            if (!ret) {
+                errtt = seqtt;
+                goto err;
+            } else if (ret == -1) {
+                /*
+                 * OPTIONAL component absent. Free and zero the field.
+                 */
+                asn1_template_free(pseqval, seqtt);
+                continue;
+            }
+            /* Update length */
+            len -= p - q;
+        }
+
+        /* Check for EOC if expecting one */
+        if (seq_eoc && !asn1_check_eoc(&p, len)) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EMBED_D2I, ASN1_R_MISSING_EOC);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        /* Check all data read */
+        if (!seq_nolen && len) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EMBED_D2I, ASN1_R_SEQUENCE_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        /*
+         * If we get here we've got no more data in the SEQUENCE, however we
+         * may not have read all fields so check all remaining are OPTIONAL
+         * and clear any that are.
+         */
+        for (; i < it->tcount; tt++, i++) {
+            const ASN1_TEMPLATE *seqtt;
+            seqtt = asn1_do_adb(pval, tt, 1);
+            if (seqtt == NULL)
+                goto err;
+            if (seqtt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_OPTIONAL) {
+                ASN1_VALUE **pseqval;
+                pseqval = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, seqtt);
+                asn1_template_free(pseqval, seqtt);
+            } else {
+                errtt = seqtt;
+                ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EMBED_D2I, ASN1_R_FIELD_MISSING);
+                goto err;
+            }
+        }
+        /* Save encoding */
+        if (!asn1_enc_save(pval, *in, p - *in, it))
+            goto auxerr;
+        if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_POST, pval, it, NULL))
+            goto auxerr;
+        *in = p;
+        return 1;
+
+    default:
+        return 0;
+    }
+ auxerr:
+    ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EMBED_D2I, ASN1_R_AUX_ERROR);
+ err:
+    if (errtt)
+        ERR_add_error_data(4, "Field=", errtt->field_name,
+                           ", Type=", it->sname);
+    else
+        ERR_add_error_data(2, "Type=", it->sname);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Templates are handled with two separate functions. One handles any
+ * EXPLICIT tag and the other handles the rest.
+ */
+
+static int asn1_template_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **val,
+                                const unsigned char **in, long inlen,
+                                const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt, char opt,
+                                ASN1_TLC *ctx, int depth)
+{
+    int flags, aclass;
+    int ret;
+    long len;
+    const unsigned char *p, *q;
+    char exp_eoc;
+    if (!val)
+        return 0;
+    flags = tt->flags;
+    aclass = flags & ASN1_TFLG_TAG_CLASS;
+
+    p = *in;
+
+    /* Check if EXPLICIT tag expected */
+    if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_EXPTAG) {
+        char cst;
+        /*
+         * Need to work out amount of data available to the inner content and
+         * where it starts: so read in EXPLICIT header to get the info.
+         */
+        ret = asn1_check_tlen(&len, NULL, NULL, &exp_eoc, &cst,
+                              &p, inlen, tt->tag, aclass, opt, ctx);
+        q = p;
+        if (!ret) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
+            return 0;
+        } else if (ret == -1)
+            return -1;
+        if (!cst) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_EX_D2I,
+                    ASN1_R_EXPLICIT_TAG_NOT_CONSTRUCTED);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        /* We've found the field so it can't be OPTIONAL now */
+        ret = asn1_template_noexp_d2i(val, &p, len, tt, 0, ctx, depth);
+        if (!ret) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        /* We read the field in OK so update length */
+        len -= p - q;
+        if (exp_eoc) {
+            /* If NDEF we must have an EOC here */
+            if (!asn1_check_eoc(&p, len)) {
+                ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_MISSING_EOC);
+                goto err;
+            }
+        } else {
+            /*
+             * Otherwise we must hit the EXPLICIT tag end or its an error
+             */
+            if (len) {
+                ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_EX_D2I,
+                        ASN1_R_EXPLICIT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+                goto err;
+            }
+        }
+    } else
+        return asn1_template_noexp_d2i(val, in, inlen, tt, opt, ctx, depth);
+
+    *in = p;
+    return 1;
+
+ err:
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int asn1_template_noexp_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **val,
+                                   const unsigned char **in, long len,
+                                   const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt, char opt,
+                                   ASN1_TLC *ctx, int depth)
+{
+    int flags, aclass;
+    int ret;
+    ASN1_VALUE *tval;
+    const unsigned char *p, *q;
+    if (!val)
+        return 0;
+    flags = tt->flags;
+    aclass = flags & ASN1_TFLG_TAG_CLASS;
+
+    p = *in;
+    q = p;
+
+    /*
+     * If field is embedded then val needs fixing so it is a pointer to
+     * a pointer to a field.
+     */
+    if (tt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_EMBED) {
+        tval = (ASN1_VALUE *)val;
+        val = &tval;
+    }
+
+    if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_SK_MASK) {
+        /* SET OF, SEQUENCE OF */
+        int sktag, skaclass;
+        char sk_eoc;
+        /* First work out expected inner tag value */
+        if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_IMPTAG) {
+            sktag = tt->tag;
+            skaclass = aclass;
+        } else {
+            skaclass = V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL;
+            if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_SET_OF)
+                sktag = V_ASN1_SET;
+            else
+                sktag = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE;
+        }
+        /* Get the tag */
+        ret = asn1_check_tlen(&len, NULL, NULL, &sk_eoc, NULL,
+                              &p, len, sktag, skaclass, opt, ctx);
+        if (!ret) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NOEXP_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
+            return 0;
+        } else if (ret == -1)
+            return -1;
+        if (!*val)
+            *val = (ASN1_VALUE *)OPENSSL_sk_new_null();
+        else {
+            /*
+             * We've got a valid STACK: free up any items present
+             */
+            STACK_OF(ASN1_VALUE) *sktmp = (STACK_OF(ASN1_VALUE) *)*val;
+            ASN1_VALUE *vtmp;
+            while (sk_ASN1_VALUE_num(sktmp) > 0) {
+                vtmp = sk_ASN1_VALUE_pop(sktmp);
+                ASN1_item_ex_free(&vtmp, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item));
+            }
+        }
+
+        if (!*val) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NOEXP_D2I, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        /* Read as many items as we can */
+        while (len > 0) {
+            ASN1_VALUE *skfield;
+            q = p;
+            /* See if EOC found */
+            if (asn1_check_eoc(&p, len)) {
+                if (!sk_eoc) {
+                    ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NOEXP_D2I,
+                            ASN1_R_UNEXPECTED_EOC);
+                    goto err;
+                }
+                len -= p - q;
+                sk_eoc = 0;
+                break;
+            }
+            skfield = NULL;
+            if (!asn1_item_embed_d2i(&skfield, &p, len,
+                                     ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item), -1, 0, 0, ctx,
+                                     depth)) {
+                ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NOEXP_D2I,
+                        ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
+                /* |skfield| may be partially allocated despite failure. */
+                ASN1_item_free(skfield, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item));
+                goto err;
+            }
+            len -= p - q;
+            if (!sk_ASN1_VALUE_push((STACK_OF(ASN1_VALUE) *)*val, skfield)) {
+                ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NOEXP_D2I, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                ASN1_item_free(skfield, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item));
+                goto err;
+            }
+        }
+        if (sk_eoc) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NOEXP_D2I, ASN1_R_MISSING_EOC);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    } else if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_IMPTAG) {
+        /* IMPLICIT tagging */
+        ret = asn1_item_embed_d2i(val, &p, len,
+                                  ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item), tt->tag, aclass, opt,
+                                  ctx, depth);
+        if (!ret) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NOEXP_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
+            goto err;
+        } else if (ret == -1)
+            return -1;
+    } else {
+        /* Nothing special */
+        ret = asn1_item_embed_d2i(val, &p, len, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item),
+                                  -1, 0, opt, ctx, depth);
+        if (!ret) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NOEXP_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
+            goto err;
+        } else if (ret == -1)
+            return -1;
+    }
+
+    *in = p;
+    return 1;
+
+ err:
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int asn1_d2i_ex_primitive(ASN1_VALUE **pval,
+                                 const unsigned char **in, long inlen,
+                                 const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+                                 int tag, int aclass, char opt, ASN1_TLC *ctx)
+{
+    int ret = 0, utype;
+    long plen;
+    char cst, inf, free_cont = 0;
+    const unsigned char *p;
+    BUF_MEM buf = { 0, NULL, 0, 0 };
+    const unsigned char *cont = NULL;
+    long len;
+    if (!pval) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_EX_PRIMITIVE, ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_NULL);
+        return 0;               /* Should never happen */
+    }
+
+    if (it->itype == ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING) {
+        utype = tag;
+        tag = -1;
+    } else
+        utype = it->utype;
+
+    if (utype == V_ASN1_ANY) {
+        /* If type is ANY need to figure out type from tag */
+        unsigned char oclass;
+        if (tag >= 0) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_EX_PRIMITIVE, ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_TAGGED_ANY);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        if (opt) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_EX_PRIMITIVE,
+                    ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_OPTIONAL_ANY);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        p = *in;
+        ret = asn1_check_tlen(NULL, &utype, &oclass, NULL, NULL,
+                              &p, inlen, -1, 0, 0, ctx);
+        if (!ret) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_EX_PRIMITIVE, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        if (oclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL)
+            utype = V_ASN1_OTHER;
+    }
+    if (tag == -1) {
+        tag = utype;
+        aclass = V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL;
+    }
+    p = *in;
+    /* Check header */
+    ret = asn1_check_tlen(&plen, NULL, NULL, &inf, &cst,
+                          &p, inlen, tag, aclass, opt, ctx);
+    if (!ret) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_EX_PRIMITIVE, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    } else if (ret == -1)
+        return -1;
+    ret = 0;
+    /* SEQUENCE, SET and "OTHER" are left in encoded form */
+    if ((utype == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
+        || (utype == V_ASN1_SET) || (utype == V_ASN1_OTHER)) {
+        /*
+         * Clear context cache for type OTHER because the auto clear when we
+         * have a exact match won't work
+         */
+        if (utype == V_ASN1_OTHER) {
+            asn1_tlc_clear(ctx);
+        }
+        /* SEQUENCE and SET must be constructed */
+        else if (!cst) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_EX_PRIMITIVE,
+                    ASN1_R_TYPE_NOT_CONSTRUCTED);
+            return 0;
+        }
+
+        cont = *in;
+        /* If indefinite length constructed find the real end */
+        if (inf) {
+            if (!asn1_find_end(&p, plen, inf))
+                goto err;
+            len = p - cont;
+        } else {
+            len = p - cont + plen;
+            p += plen;
+        }
+    } else if (cst) {
+        if (utype == V_ASN1_NULL || utype == V_ASN1_BOOLEAN
+            || utype == V_ASN1_OBJECT || utype == V_ASN1_INTEGER
+            || utype == V_ASN1_ENUMERATED) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_EX_PRIMITIVE, ASN1_R_TYPE_NOT_PRIMITIVE);
+            return 0;
+        }
+
+        /* Free any returned 'buf' content */
+        free_cont = 1;
+        /*
+         * Should really check the internal tags are correct but some things
+         * may get this wrong. The relevant specs say that constructed string
+         * types should be OCTET STRINGs internally irrespective of the type.
+         * So instead just check for UNIVERSAL class and ignore the tag.
+         */
+        if (!asn1_collect(&buf, &p, plen, inf, -1, V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL, 0)) {
+            goto err;
+        }
+        len = buf.length;
+        /* Append a final null to string */
+        if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(&buf, len + 1)) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_EX_PRIMITIVE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        buf.data[len] = 0;
+        cont = (const unsigned char *)buf.data;
+    } else {
+        cont = p;
+        len = plen;
+        p += plen;
+    }
+
+    /* We now have content length and type: translate into a structure */
+    /* asn1_ex_c2i may reuse allocated buffer, and so sets free_cont to 0 */
+    if (!asn1_ex_c2i(pval, cont, len, utype, &free_cont, it))
+        goto err;
+
+    *in = p;
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    if (free_cont)
+        OPENSSL_free(buf.data);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/* Translate ASN1 content octets into a structure */
+
+static int asn1_ex_c2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char *cont, int len,
+                       int utype, char *free_cont, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
+{
+    ASN1_VALUE **opval = NULL;
+    ASN1_STRING *stmp;
+    ASN1_TYPE *typ = NULL;
+    int ret = 0;
+    const ASN1_PRIMITIVE_FUNCS *pf;
+    ASN1_INTEGER **tint;
+    pf = it->funcs;
+
+    if (pf && pf->prim_c2i)
+        return pf->prim_c2i(pval, cont, len, utype, free_cont, it);
+    /* If ANY type clear type and set pointer to internal value */
+    if (it->utype == V_ASN1_ANY) {
+        if (!*pval) {
+            typ = ASN1_TYPE_new();
+            if (typ == NULL)
+                goto err;
+            *pval = (ASN1_VALUE *)typ;
+        } else
+            typ = (ASN1_TYPE *)*pval;
+
+        if (utype != typ->type)
+            ASN1_TYPE_set(typ, utype, NULL);
+        opval = pval;
+        pval = &typ->value.asn1_value;
+    }
+    switch (utype) {
+    case V_ASN1_OBJECT:
+        if (!c2i_ASN1_OBJECT((ASN1_OBJECT **)pval, &cont, len))
+            goto err;
+        break;
+
+    case V_ASN1_NULL:
+        if (len) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_EX_C2I, ASN1_R_NULL_IS_WRONG_LENGTH);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        *pval = (ASN1_VALUE *)1;
+        break;
+
+    case V_ASN1_BOOLEAN:
+        if (len != 1) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_EX_C2I, ASN1_R_BOOLEAN_IS_WRONG_LENGTH);
+            goto err;
+        } else {
+            ASN1_BOOLEAN *tbool;
+            tbool = (ASN1_BOOLEAN *)pval;
+            *tbool = *cont;
+        }
+        break;
+
+    case V_ASN1_BIT_STRING:
+        if (!c2i_ASN1_BIT_STRING((ASN1_BIT_STRING **)pval, &cont, len))
+            goto err;
+        break;
+
+    case V_ASN1_INTEGER:
+    case V_ASN1_ENUMERATED:
+        tint = (ASN1_INTEGER **)pval;
+        if (!c2i_ASN1_INTEGER(tint, &cont, len))
+            goto err;
+        /* Fixup type to match the expected form */
+        (*tint)->type = utype | ((*tint)->type & V_ASN1_NEG);
+        break;
+
+    case V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING:
+    case V_ASN1_NUMERICSTRING:
+    case V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING:
+    case V_ASN1_T61STRING:
+    case V_ASN1_VIDEOTEXSTRING:
+    case V_ASN1_IA5STRING:
+    case V_ASN1_UTCTIME:
+    case V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME:
+    case V_ASN1_GRAPHICSTRING:
+    case V_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING:
+    case V_ASN1_GENERALSTRING:
+    case V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING:
+    case V_ASN1_BMPSTRING:
+    case V_ASN1_UTF8STRING:
+    case V_ASN1_OTHER:
+    case V_ASN1_SET:
+    case V_ASN1_SEQUENCE:
+    default:
+        if (utype == V_ASN1_BMPSTRING && (len & 1)) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_EX_C2I, ASN1_R_BMPSTRING_IS_WRONG_LENGTH);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (utype == V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING && (len & 3)) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_EX_C2I,
+                    ASN1_R_UNIVERSALSTRING_IS_WRONG_LENGTH);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        /* All based on ASN1_STRING and handled the same */
+        if (!*pval) {
+            stmp = ASN1_STRING_type_new(utype);
+            if (stmp == NULL) {
+                ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_EX_C2I, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            *pval = (ASN1_VALUE *)stmp;
+        } else {
+            stmp = (ASN1_STRING *)*pval;
+            stmp->type = utype;
+        }
+        /* If we've already allocated a buffer use it */
+        if (*free_cont) {
+            OPENSSL_free(stmp->data);
+            stmp->data = (unsigned char *)cont; /* UGLY CAST! RL */
+            stmp->length = len;
+            *free_cont = 0;
+        } else {
+            if (!ASN1_STRING_set(stmp, cont, len)) {
+                ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_EX_C2I, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                ASN1_STRING_free(stmp);
+                *pval = NULL;
+                goto err;
+            }
+        }
+        break;
+    }
+    /* If ASN1_ANY and NULL type fix up value */
+    if (typ && (utype == V_ASN1_NULL))
+        typ->value.ptr = NULL;
+
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    if (!ret) {
+        ASN1_TYPE_free(typ);
+        if (opval)
+            *opval = NULL;
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function finds the end of an ASN1 structure when passed its maximum
+ * length, whether it is indefinite length and a pointer to the content. This
+ * is more efficient than calling asn1_collect because it does not recurse on
+ * each indefinite length header.
+ */
+
+static int asn1_find_end(const unsigned char **in, long len, char inf)
+{
+    uint32_t expected_eoc;
+    long plen;
+    const unsigned char *p = *in, *q;
+    /* If not indefinite length constructed just add length */
+    if (inf == 0) {
+        *in += len;
+        return 1;
+    }
+    expected_eoc = 1;
+    /*
+     * Indefinite length constructed form. Find the end when enough EOCs are
+     * found. If more indefinite length constructed headers are encountered
+     * increment the expected eoc count otherwise just skip to the end of the
+     * data.
+     */
+    while (len > 0) {
+        if (asn1_check_eoc(&p, len)) {
+            expected_eoc--;
+            if (expected_eoc == 0)
+                break;
+            len -= 2;
+            continue;
+        }
+        q = p;
+        /* Just read in a header: only care about the length */
+        if (!asn1_check_tlen(&plen, NULL, NULL, &inf, NULL, &p, len,
+                             -1, 0, 0, NULL)) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_FIND_END, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        if (inf) {
+            if (expected_eoc == UINT32_MAX) {
+                ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_FIND_END, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
+                return 0;
+            }
+            expected_eoc++;
+        } else {
+            p += plen;
+        }
+        len -= p - q;
+    }
+    if (expected_eoc) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_FIND_END, ASN1_R_MISSING_EOC);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    *in = p;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function collects the asn1 data from a constructed string type into
+ * a buffer. The values of 'in' and 'len' should refer to the contents of the
+ * constructed type and 'inf' should be set if it is indefinite length.
+ */
+
+#ifndef ASN1_MAX_STRING_NEST
+/*
+ * This determines how many levels of recursion are permitted in ASN1 string
+ * types. If it is not limited stack overflows can occur. If set to zero no
+ * recursion is allowed at all. Although zero should be adequate examples
+ * exist that require a value of 1. So 5 should be more than enough.
+ */
+# define ASN1_MAX_STRING_NEST 5
+#endif
+
+static int asn1_collect(BUF_MEM *buf, const unsigned char **in, long len,
+                        char inf, int tag, int aclass, int depth)
+{
+    const unsigned char *p, *q;
+    long plen;
+    char cst, ininf;
+    p = *in;
+    inf &= 1;
+    /*
+     * If no buffer and not indefinite length constructed just pass over the
+     * encoded data
+     */
+    if (!buf && !inf) {
+        *in += len;
+        return 1;
+    }
+    while (len > 0) {
+        q = p;
+        /* Check for EOC */
+        if (asn1_check_eoc(&p, len)) {
+            /*
+             * EOC is illegal outside indefinite length constructed form
+             */
+            if (!inf) {
+                ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_COLLECT, ASN1_R_UNEXPECTED_EOC);
+                return 0;
+            }
+            inf = 0;
+            break;
+        }
+
+        if (!asn1_check_tlen(&plen, NULL, NULL, &ininf, &cst, &p,
+                             len, tag, aclass, 0, NULL)) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_COLLECT, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
+            return 0;
+        }
+
+        /* If indefinite length constructed update max length */
+        if (cst) {
+            if (depth >= ASN1_MAX_STRING_NEST) {
+                ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_COLLECT, ASN1_R_NESTED_ASN1_STRING);
+                return 0;
+            }
+            if (!asn1_collect(buf, &p, plen, ininf, tag, aclass, depth + 1))
+                return 0;
+        } else if (plen && !collect_data(buf, &p, plen))
+            return 0;
+        len -= p - q;
+    }
+    if (inf) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_COLLECT, ASN1_R_MISSING_EOC);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    *in = p;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int collect_data(BUF_MEM *buf, const unsigned char **p, long plen)
+{
+    int len;
+    if (buf) {
+        len = buf->length;
+        if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, len + plen)) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_COLLECT_DATA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        memcpy(buf->data + len, *p, plen);
+    }
+    *p += plen;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Check for ASN1 EOC and swallow it if found */
+
+static int asn1_check_eoc(const unsigned char **in, long len)
+{
+    const unsigned char *p;
+    if (len < 2)
+        return 0;
+    p = *in;
+    if (!p[0] && !p[1]) {
+        *in += 2;
+        return 1;
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check an ASN1 tag and length: a bit like ASN1_get_object but it sets the
+ * length for indefinite length constructed form, we don't know the exact
+ * length but we can set an upper bound to the amount of data available minus
+ * the header length just read.
+ */
+
+static int asn1_check_tlen(long *olen, int *otag, unsigned char *oclass,
+                           char *inf, char *cst,
+                           const unsigned char **in, long len,
+                           int exptag, int expclass, char opt, ASN1_TLC *ctx)
+{
+    int i;
+    int ptag, pclass;
+    long plen;
+    const unsigned char *p, *q;
+    p = *in;
+    q = p;
+
+    if (ctx && ctx->valid) {
+        i = ctx->ret;
+        plen = ctx->plen;
+        pclass = ctx->pclass;
+        ptag = ctx->ptag;
+        p += ctx->hdrlen;
+    } else {
+        i = ASN1_get_object(&p, &plen, &ptag, &pclass, len);
+        if (ctx) {
+            ctx->ret = i;
+            ctx->plen = plen;
+            ctx->pclass = pclass;
+            ctx->ptag = ptag;
+            ctx->hdrlen = p - q;
+            ctx->valid = 1;
+            /*
+             * If definite length, and no error, length + header can't exceed
+             * total amount of data available.
+             */
+            if (!(i & 0x81) && ((plen + ctx->hdrlen) > len)) {
+                ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_CHECK_TLEN, ASN1_R_TOO_LONG);
+                asn1_tlc_clear(ctx);
+                return 0;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (i & 0x80) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_CHECK_TLEN, ASN1_R_BAD_OBJECT_HEADER);
+        asn1_tlc_clear(ctx);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (exptag >= 0) {
+        if ((exptag != ptag) || (expclass != pclass)) {
+            /*
+             * If type is OPTIONAL, not an error: indicate missing type.
+             */
+            if (opt)
+                return -1;
+            asn1_tlc_clear(ctx);
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_CHECK_TLEN, ASN1_R_WRONG_TAG);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        /*
+         * We have a tag and class match: assume we are going to do something
+         * with it
+         */
+        asn1_tlc_clear(ctx);
+    }
+
+    if (i & 1)
+        plen = len - (p - q);
+
+    if (inf)
+        *inf = i & 1;
+
+    if (cst)
+        *cst = i & V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED;
+
+    if (olen)
+        *olen = plen;
+
+    if (oclass)
+        *oclass = pclass;
+
+    if (otag)
+        *otag = ptag;
+
+    *in = p;
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/tasn_enc.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/tasn_enc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..caa4869
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/tasn_enc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,605 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include "internal/asn1_int.h"
+#include "asn1_locl.h"
+
+static int asn1_i2d_ex_primitive(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out,
+                                 const ASN1_ITEM *it, int tag, int aclass);
+static int asn1_set_seq_out(STACK_OF(ASN1_VALUE) *sk, unsigned char **out,
+                            int skcontlen, const ASN1_ITEM *item,
+                            int do_sort, int iclass);
+static int asn1_template_ex_i2d(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out,
+                                const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt, int tag, int aclass);
+static int asn1_item_flags_i2d(ASN1_VALUE *val, unsigned char **out,
+                               const ASN1_ITEM *it, int flags);
+static int asn1_ex_i2c(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char *cout, int *putype,
+                       const ASN1_ITEM *it);
+
+/*
+ * Top level i2d equivalents: the 'ndef' variant instructs the encoder to use
+ * indefinite length constructed encoding, where appropriate
+ */
+
+int ASN1_item_ndef_i2d(ASN1_VALUE *val, unsigned char **out,
+                       const ASN1_ITEM *it)
+{
+    return asn1_item_flags_i2d(val, out, it, ASN1_TFLG_NDEF);
+}
+
+int ASN1_item_i2d(ASN1_VALUE *val, unsigned char **out, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
+{
+    return asn1_item_flags_i2d(val, out, it, 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Encode an ASN1 item, this is use by the standard 'i2d' function. 'out'
+ * points to a buffer to output the data to. The new i2d has one additional
+ * feature. If the output buffer is NULL (i.e. *out == NULL) then a buffer is
+ * allocated and populated with the encoding.
+ */
+
+static int asn1_item_flags_i2d(ASN1_VALUE *val, unsigned char **out,
+                               const ASN1_ITEM *it, int flags)
+{
+    if (out && !*out) {
+        unsigned char *p, *buf;
+        int len;
+        len = ASN1_item_ex_i2d(&val, NULL, it, -1, flags);
+        if (len <= 0)
+            return len;
+        buf = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
+        if (buf == NULL)
+            return -1;
+        p = buf;
+        ASN1_item_ex_i2d(&val, &p, it, -1, flags);
+        *out = buf;
+        return len;
+    }
+
+    return ASN1_item_ex_i2d(&val, out, it, -1, flags);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Encode an item, taking care of IMPLICIT tagging (if any). This function
+ * performs the normal item handling: it can be used in external types.
+ */
+
+int ASN1_item_ex_i2d(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out,
+                     const ASN1_ITEM *it, int tag, int aclass)
+{
+    const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt = NULL;
+    int i, seqcontlen, seqlen, ndef = 1;
+    const ASN1_EXTERN_FUNCS *ef;
+    const ASN1_AUX *aux = it->funcs;
+    ASN1_aux_cb *asn1_cb = 0;
+
+    if ((it->itype != ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE) && !*pval)
+        return 0;
+
+    if (aux && aux->asn1_cb)
+        asn1_cb = aux->asn1_cb;
+
+    switch (it->itype) {
+
+    case ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE:
+        if (it->templates)
+            return asn1_template_ex_i2d(pval, out, it->templates,
+                                        tag, aclass);
+        return asn1_i2d_ex_primitive(pval, out, it, tag, aclass);
+
+    case ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING:
+        return asn1_i2d_ex_primitive(pval, out, it, -1, aclass);
+
+    case ASN1_ITYPE_CHOICE:
+        if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_I2D_PRE, pval, it, NULL))
+            return 0;
+        i = asn1_get_choice_selector(pval, it);
+        if ((i >= 0) && (i < it->tcount)) {
+            ASN1_VALUE **pchval;
+            const ASN1_TEMPLATE *chtt;
+            chtt = it->templates + i;
+            pchval = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, chtt);
+            return asn1_template_ex_i2d(pchval, out, chtt, -1, aclass);
+        }
+        /* Fixme: error condition if selector out of range */
+        if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_I2D_POST, pval, it, NULL))
+            return 0;
+        break;
+
+    case ASN1_ITYPE_EXTERN:
+        /* If new style i2d it does all the work */
+        ef = it->funcs;
+        return ef->asn1_ex_i2d(pval, out, it, tag, aclass);
+
+    case ASN1_ITYPE_NDEF_SEQUENCE:
+        /* Use indefinite length constructed if requested */
+        if (aclass & ASN1_TFLG_NDEF)
+            ndef = 2;
+        /* fall through */
+
+    case ASN1_ITYPE_SEQUENCE:
+        i = asn1_enc_restore(&seqcontlen, out, pval, it);
+        /* An error occurred */
+        if (i < 0)
+            return 0;
+        /* We have a valid cached encoding... */
+        if (i > 0)
+            return seqcontlen;
+        /* Otherwise carry on */
+        seqcontlen = 0;
+        /* If no IMPLICIT tagging set to SEQUENCE, UNIVERSAL */
+        if (tag == -1) {
+            tag = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE;
+            /* Retain any other flags in aclass */
+            aclass = (aclass & ~ASN1_TFLG_TAG_CLASS)
+                | V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL;
+        }
+        if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_I2D_PRE, pval, it, NULL))
+            return 0;
+        /* First work out sequence content length */
+        for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; tt++, i++) {
+            const ASN1_TEMPLATE *seqtt;
+            ASN1_VALUE **pseqval;
+            int tmplen;
+            seqtt = asn1_do_adb(pval, tt, 1);
+            if (!seqtt)
+                return 0;
+            pseqval = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, seqtt);
+            tmplen = asn1_template_ex_i2d(pseqval, NULL, seqtt, -1, aclass);
+            if (tmplen == -1 || (tmplen > INT_MAX - seqcontlen))
+                return -1;
+            seqcontlen += tmplen;
+        }
+
+        seqlen = ASN1_object_size(ndef, seqcontlen, tag);
+        if (!out || seqlen == -1)
+            return seqlen;
+        /* Output SEQUENCE header */
+        ASN1_put_object(out, ndef, seqcontlen, tag, aclass);
+        for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; tt++, i++) {
+            const ASN1_TEMPLATE *seqtt;
+            ASN1_VALUE **pseqval;
+            seqtt = asn1_do_adb(pval, tt, 1);
+            if (!seqtt)
+                return 0;
+            pseqval = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, seqtt);
+            /* FIXME: check for errors in enhanced version */
+            asn1_template_ex_i2d(pseqval, out, seqtt, -1, aclass);
+        }
+        if (ndef == 2)
+            ASN1_put_eoc(out);
+        if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_I2D_POST, pval, it, NULL))
+            return 0;
+        return seqlen;
+
+    default:
+        return 0;
+
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int asn1_template_ex_i2d(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out,
+                                const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt, int tag, int iclass)
+{
+    int i, ret, flags, ttag, tclass, ndef;
+    ASN1_VALUE *tval;
+    flags = tt->flags;
+
+    /*
+     * If field is embedded then val needs fixing so it is a pointer to
+     * a pointer to a field.
+     */
+    if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_EMBED) {
+        tval = (ASN1_VALUE *)pval;
+        pval = &tval;
+    }
+    /*
+     * Work out tag and class to use: tagging may come either from the
+     * template or the arguments, not both because this would create
+     * ambiguity. Additionally the iclass argument may contain some
+     * additional flags which should be noted and passed down to other
+     * levels.
+     */
+    if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_TAG_MASK) {
+        /* Error if argument and template tagging */
+        if (tag != -1)
+            /* FIXME: error code here */
+            return -1;
+        /* Get tagging from template */
+        ttag = tt->tag;
+        tclass = flags & ASN1_TFLG_TAG_CLASS;
+    } else if (tag != -1) {
+        /* No template tagging, get from arguments */
+        ttag = tag;
+        tclass = iclass & ASN1_TFLG_TAG_CLASS;
+    } else {
+        ttag = -1;
+        tclass = 0;
+    }
+    /*
+     * Remove any class mask from iflag.
+     */
+    iclass &= ~ASN1_TFLG_TAG_CLASS;
+
+    /*
+     * At this point 'ttag' contains the outer tag to use, 'tclass' is the
+     * class and iclass is any flags passed to this function.
+     */
+
+    /* if template and arguments require ndef, use it */
+    if ((flags & ASN1_TFLG_NDEF) && (iclass & ASN1_TFLG_NDEF))
+        ndef = 2;
+    else
+        ndef = 1;
+
+    if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_SK_MASK) {
+        /* SET OF, SEQUENCE OF */
+        STACK_OF(ASN1_VALUE) *sk = (STACK_OF(ASN1_VALUE) *)*pval;
+        int isset, sktag, skaclass;
+        int skcontlen, sklen;
+        ASN1_VALUE *skitem;
+
+        if (!*pval)
+            return 0;
+
+        if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_SET_OF) {
+            isset = 1;
+            /* 2 means we reorder */
+            if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_SEQUENCE_OF)
+                isset = 2;
+        } else
+            isset = 0;
+
+        /*
+         * Work out inner tag value: if EXPLICIT or no tagging use underlying
+         * type.
+         */
+        if ((ttag != -1) && !(flags & ASN1_TFLG_EXPTAG)) {
+            sktag = ttag;
+            skaclass = tclass;
+        } else {
+            skaclass = V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL;
+            if (isset)
+                sktag = V_ASN1_SET;
+            else
+                sktag = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE;
+        }
+
+        /* Determine total length of items */
+        skcontlen = 0;
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_VALUE_num(sk); i++) {
+            int tmplen;
+            skitem = sk_ASN1_VALUE_value(sk, i);
+            tmplen = ASN1_item_ex_i2d(&skitem, NULL, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item),
+                                      -1, iclass);
+            if (tmplen == -1 || (skcontlen > INT_MAX - tmplen))
+                return -1;
+            skcontlen += tmplen;
+        }
+        sklen = ASN1_object_size(ndef, skcontlen, sktag);
+        if (sklen == -1)
+            return -1;
+        /* If EXPLICIT need length of surrounding tag */
+        if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_EXPTAG)
+            ret = ASN1_object_size(ndef, sklen, ttag);
+        else
+            ret = sklen;
+
+        if (!out || ret == -1)
+            return ret;
+
+        /* Now encode this lot... */
+        /* EXPLICIT tag */
+        if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_EXPTAG)
+            ASN1_put_object(out, ndef, sklen, ttag, tclass);
+        /* SET or SEQUENCE and IMPLICIT tag */
+        ASN1_put_object(out, ndef, skcontlen, sktag, skaclass);
+        /* And the stuff itself */
+        asn1_set_seq_out(sk, out, skcontlen, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item),
+                         isset, iclass);
+        if (ndef == 2) {
+            ASN1_put_eoc(out);
+            if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_EXPTAG)
+                ASN1_put_eoc(out);
+        }
+
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_EXPTAG) {
+        /* EXPLICIT tagging */
+        /* Find length of tagged item */
+        i = ASN1_item_ex_i2d(pval, NULL, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item), -1, iclass);
+        if (!i)
+            return 0;
+        /* Find length of EXPLICIT tag */
+        ret = ASN1_object_size(ndef, i, ttag);
+        if (out && ret != -1) {
+            /* Output tag and item */
+            ASN1_put_object(out, ndef, i, ttag, tclass);
+            ASN1_item_ex_i2d(pval, out, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item), -1, iclass);
+            if (ndef == 2)
+                ASN1_put_eoc(out);
+        }
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    /* Either normal or IMPLICIT tagging: combine class and flags */
+    return ASN1_item_ex_i2d(pval, out, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item),
+                            ttag, tclass | iclass);
+
+}
+
+/* Temporary structure used to hold DER encoding of items for SET OF */
+
+typedef struct {
+    unsigned char *data;
+    int length;
+    ASN1_VALUE *field;
+} DER_ENC;
+
+static int der_cmp(const void *a, const void *b)
+{
+    const DER_ENC *d1 = a, *d2 = b;
+    int cmplen, i;
+    cmplen = (d1->length < d2->length) ? d1->length : d2->length;
+    i = memcmp(d1->data, d2->data, cmplen);
+    if (i)
+        return i;
+    return d1->length - d2->length;
+}
+
+/* Output the content octets of SET OF or SEQUENCE OF */
+
+static int asn1_set_seq_out(STACK_OF(ASN1_VALUE) *sk, unsigned char **out,
+                            int skcontlen, const ASN1_ITEM *item,
+                            int do_sort, int iclass)
+{
+    int i;
+    ASN1_VALUE *skitem;
+    unsigned char *tmpdat = NULL, *p = NULL;
+    DER_ENC *derlst = NULL, *tder;
+    if (do_sort) {
+        /* Don't need to sort less than 2 items */
+        if (sk_ASN1_VALUE_num(sk) < 2)
+            do_sort = 0;
+        else {
+            derlst = OPENSSL_malloc(sk_ASN1_VALUE_num(sk)
+                                    * sizeof(*derlst));
+            if (derlst == NULL)
+                return 0;
+            tmpdat = OPENSSL_malloc(skcontlen);
+            if (tmpdat == NULL) {
+                OPENSSL_free(derlst);
+                return 0;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    /* If not sorting just output each item */
+    if (!do_sort) {
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_VALUE_num(sk); i++) {
+            skitem = sk_ASN1_VALUE_value(sk, i);
+            ASN1_item_ex_i2d(&skitem, out, item, -1, iclass);
+        }
+        return 1;
+    }
+    p = tmpdat;
+
+    /* Doing sort: build up a list of each member's DER encoding */
+    for (i = 0, tder = derlst; i < sk_ASN1_VALUE_num(sk); i++, tder++) {
+        skitem = sk_ASN1_VALUE_value(sk, i);
+        tder->data = p;
+        tder->length = ASN1_item_ex_i2d(&skitem, &p, item, -1, iclass);
+        tder->field = skitem;
+    }
+
+    /* Now sort them */
+    qsort(derlst, sk_ASN1_VALUE_num(sk), sizeof(*derlst), der_cmp);
+    /* Output sorted DER encoding */
+    p = *out;
+    for (i = 0, tder = derlst; i < sk_ASN1_VALUE_num(sk); i++, tder++) {
+        memcpy(p, tder->data, tder->length);
+        p += tder->length;
+    }
+    *out = p;
+    /* If do_sort is 2 then reorder the STACK */
+    if (do_sort == 2) {
+        for (i = 0, tder = derlst; i < sk_ASN1_VALUE_num(sk); i++, tder++)
+            (void)sk_ASN1_VALUE_set(sk, i, tder->field);
+    }
+    OPENSSL_free(derlst);
+    OPENSSL_free(tmpdat);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int asn1_i2d_ex_primitive(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out,
+                                 const ASN1_ITEM *it, int tag, int aclass)
+{
+    int len;
+    int utype;
+    int usetag;
+    int ndef = 0;
+
+    utype = it->utype;
+
+    /*
+     * Get length of content octets and maybe find out the underlying type.
+     */
+
+    len = asn1_ex_i2c(pval, NULL, &utype, it);
+
+    /*
+     * If SEQUENCE, SET or OTHER then header is included in pseudo content
+     * octets so don't include tag+length. We need to check here because the
+     * call to asn1_ex_i2c() could change utype.
+     */
+    if ((utype == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) || (utype == V_ASN1_SET) ||
+        (utype == V_ASN1_OTHER))
+        usetag = 0;
+    else
+        usetag = 1;
+
+    /* -1 means omit type */
+
+    if (len == -1)
+        return 0;
+
+    /* -2 return is special meaning use ndef */
+    if (len == -2) {
+        ndef = 2;
+        len = 0;
+    }
+
+    /* If not implicitly tagged get tag from underlying type */
+    if (tag == -1)
+        tag = utype;
+
+    /* Output tag+length followed by content octets */
+    if (out) {
+        if (usetag)
+            ASN1_put_object(out, ndef, len, tag, aclass);
+        asn1_ex_i2c(pval, *out, &utype, it);
+        if (ndef)
+            ASN1_put_eoc(out);
+        else
+            *out += len;
+    }
+
+    if (usetag)
+        return ASN1_object_size(ndef, len, tag);
+    return len;
+}
+
+/* Produce content octets from a structure */
+
+static int asn1_ex_i2c(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char *cout, int *putype,
+                       const ASN1_ITEM *it)
+{
+    ASN1_BOOLEAN *tbool = NULL;
+    ASN1_STRING *strtmp;
+    ASN1_OBJECT *otmp;
+    int utype;
+    const unsigned char *cont;
+    unsigned char c;
+    int len;
+    const ASN1_PRIMITIVE_FUNCS *pf;
+    pf = it->funcs;
+    if (pf && pf->prim_i2c)
+        return pf->prim_i2c(pval, cout, putype, it);
+
+    /* Should type be omitted? */
+    if ((it->itype != ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE)
+        || (it->utype != V_ASN1_BOOLEAN)) {
+        if (!*pval)
+            return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (it->itype == ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING) {
+        /* If MSTRING type set the underlying type */
+        strtmp = (ASN1_STRING *)*pval;
+        utype = strtmp->type;
+        *putype = utype;
+    } else if (it->utype == V_ASN1_ANY) {
+        /* If ANY set type and pointer to value */
+        ASN1_TYPE *typ;
+        typ = (ASN1_TYPE *)*pval;
+        utype = typ->type;
+        *putype = utype;
+        pval = &typ->value.asn1_value;
+    } else
+        utype = *putype;
+
+    switch (utype) {
+    case V_ASN1_OBJECT:
+        otmp = (ASN1_OBJECT *)*pval;
+        cont = otmp->data;
+        len = otmp->length;
+        break;
+
+    case V_ASN1_NULL:
+        cont = NULL;
+        len = 0;
+        break;
+
+    case V_ASN1_BOOLEAN:
+        tbool = (ASN1_BOOLEAN *)pval;
+        if (*tbool == -1)
+            return -1;
+        if (it->utype != V_ASN1_ANY) {
+            /*
+             * Default handling if value == size field then omit
+             */
+            if (*tbool && (it->size > 0))
+                return -1;
+            if (!*tbool && !it->size)
+                return -1;
+        }
+        c = (unsigned char)*tbool;
+        cont = &c;
+        len = 1;
+        break;
+
+    case V_ASN1_BIT_STRING:
+        return i2c_ASN1_BIT_STRING((ASN1_BIT_STRING *)*pval,
+                                   cout ? &cout : NULL);
+
+    case V_ASN1_INTEGER:
+    case V_ASN1_ENUMERATED:
+        /*
+         * These are all have the same content format as ASN1_INTEGER
+         */
+        return i2c_ASN1_INTEGER((ASN1_INTEGER *)*pval, cout ? &cout : NULL);
+
+    case V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING:
+    case V_ASN1_NUMERICSTRING:
+    case V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING:
+    case V_ASN1_T61STRING:
+    case V_ASN1_VIDEOTEXSTRING:
+    case V_ASN1_IA5STRING:
+    case V_ASN1_UTCTIME:
+    case V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME:
+    case V_ASN1_GRAPHICSTRING:
+    case V_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING:
+    case V_ASN1_GENERALSTRING:
+    case V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING:
+    case V_ASN1_BMPSTRING:
+    case V_ASN1_UTF8STRING:
+    case V_ASN1_SEQUENCE:
+    case V_ASN1_SET:
+    default:
+        /* All based on ASN1_STRING and handled the same */
+        strtmp = (ASN1_STRING *)*pval;
+        /* Special handling for NDEF */
+        if ((it->size == ASN1_TFLG_NDEF)
+            && (strtmp->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_NDEF)) {
+            if (cout) {
+                strtmp->data = cout;
+                strtmp->length = 0;
+            }
+            /* Special return code */
+            return -2;
+        }
+        cont = strtmp->data;
+        len = strtmp->length;
+
+        break;
+
+    }
+    if (cout && len)
+        memcpy(cout, cont, len);
+    return len;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/tasn_fre.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/tasn_fre.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bbce489
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/tasn_fre.c
@@ -0,0 +1,208 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include "asn1_locl.h"
+
+/* Free up an ASN1 structure */
+
+void ASN1_item_free(ASN1_VALUE *val, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
+{
+    asn1_item_embed_free(&val, it, 0);
+}
+
+void ASN1_item_ex_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
+{
+    asn1_item_embed_free(pval, it, 0);
+}
+
+void asn1_item_embed_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it, int embed)
+{
+    const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt = NULL, *seqtt;
+    const ASN1_EXTERN_FUNCS *ef;
+    const ASN1_AUX *aux = it->funcs;
+    ASN1_aux_cb *asn1_cb;
+    int i;
+
+    if (!pval)
+        return;
+    if ((it->itype != ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE) && !*pval)
+        return;
+    if (aux && aux->asn1_cb)
+        asn1_cb = aux->asn1_cb;
+    else
+        asn1_cb = 0;
+
+    switch (it->itype) {
+
+    case ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE:
+        if (it->templates)
+            asn1_template_free(pval, it->templates);
+        else
+            asn1_primitive_free(pval, it, embed);
+        break;
+
+    case ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING:
+        asn1_primitive_free(pval, it, embed);
+        break;
+
+    case ASN1_ITYPE_CHOICE:
+        if (asn1_cb) {
+            i = asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_FREE_PRE, pval, it, NULL);
+            if (i == 2)
+                return;
+        }
+        i = asn1_get_choice_selector(pval, it);
+        if ((i >= 0) && (i < it->tcount)) {
+            ASN1_VALUE **pchval;
+
+            tt = it->templates + i;
+            pchval = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, tt);
+            asn1_template_free(pchval, tt);
+        }
+        if (asn1_cb)
+            asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_FREE_POST, pval, it, NULL);
+        if (embed == 0) {
+            OPENSSL_free(*pval);
+            *pval = NULL;
+        }
+        break;
+
+    case ASN1_ITYPE_EXTERN:
+        ef = it->funcs;
+        if (ef && ef->asn1_ex_free)
+            ef->asn1_ex_free(pval, it);
+        break;
+
+    case ASN1_ITYPE_NDEF_SEQUENCE:
+    case ASN1_ITYPE_SEQUENCE:
+        if (asn1_do_lock(pval, -1, it) != 0) /* if error or ref-counter > 0 */
+            return;
+        if (asn1_cb) {
+            i = asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_FREE_PRE, pval, it, NULL);
+            if (i == 2)
+                return;
+        }
+        asn1_enc_free(pval, it);
+        /*
+         * If we free up as normal we will invalidate any ANY DEFINED BY
+         * field and we won't be able to determine the type of the field it
+         * defines. So free up in reverse order.
+         */
+        tt = it->templates + it->tcount;
+        for (i = 0; i < it->tcount; i++) {
+            ASN1_VALUE **pseqval;
+
+            tt--;
+            seqtt = asn1_do_adb(pval, tt, 0);
+            if (!seqtt)
+                continue;
+            pseqval = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, seqtt);
+            asn1_template_free(pseqval, seqtt);
+        }
+        if (asn1_cb)
+            asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_FREE_POST, pval, it, NULL);
+        if (embed == 0) {
+            OPENSSL_free(*pval);
+            *pval = NULL;
+        }
+        break;
+    }
+}
+
+void asn1_template_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt)
+{
+    int embed = tt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_EMBED;
+    ASN1_VALUE *tval;
+    if (embed) {
+        tval = (ASN1_VALUE *)pval;
+        pval = &tval;
+    }
+    if (tt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_SK_MASK) {
+        STACK_OF(ASN1_VALUE) *sk = (STACK_OF(ASN1_VALUE) *)*pval;
+        int i;
+
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_VALUE_num(sk); i++) {
+            ASN1_VALUE *vtmp = sk_ASN1_VALUE_value(sk, i);
+
+            asn1_item_embed_free(&vtmp, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item), embed);
+        }
+        sk_ASN1_VALUE_free(sk);
+        *pval = NULL;
+    } else {
+        asn1_item_embed_free(pval, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item), embed);
+    }
+}
+
+void asn1_primitive_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it, int embed)
+{
+    int utype;
+
+    /* Special case: if 'it' is a primitive with a free_func, use that. */
+    if (it) {
+        const ASN1_PRIMITIVE_FUNCS *pf = it->funcs;
+
+        if (embed) {
+            if (pf && pf->prim_clear) {
+                pf->prim_clear(pval, it);
+                return;
+            }
+        } else if (pf && pf->prim_free) {
+            pf->prim_free(pval, it);
+            return;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* Special case: if 'it' is NULL, free contents of ASN1_TYPE */
+    if (!it) {
+        ASN1_TYPE *typ = (ASN1_TYPE *)*pval;
+
+        utype = typ->type;
+        pval = &typ->value.asn1_value;
+        if (!*pval)
+            return;
+    } else if (it->itype == ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING) {
+        utype = -1;
+        if (!*pval)
+            return;
+    } else {
+        utype = it->utype;
+        if ((utype != V_ASN1_BOOLEAN) && !*pval)
+            return;
+    }
+
+    switch (utype) {
+    case V_ASN1_OBJECT:
+        ASN1_OBJECT_free((ASN1_OBJECT *)*pval);
+        break;
+
+    case V_ASN1_BOOLEAN:
+        if (it)
+            *(ASN1_BOOLEAN *)pval = it->size;
+        else
+            *(ASN1_BOOLEAN *)pval = -1;
+        return;
+
+    case V_ASN1_NULL:
+        break;
+
+    case V_ASN1_ANY:
+        asn1_primitive_free(pval, NULL, 0);
+        OPENSSL_free(*pval);
+        break;
+
+    default:
+        asn1_string_embed_free((ASN1_STRING *)*pval, embed);
+        break;
+    }
+    *pval = NULL;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/tasn_new.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/tasn_new.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..11c8040
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/tasn_new.c
@@ -0,0 +1,348 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include "asn1_locl.h"
+
+static int asn1_item_embed_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+                               int embed);
+static int asn1_primitive_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+                              int embed);
+static void asn1_item_clear(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
+static int asn1_template_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt);
+static void asn1_template_clear(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt);
+static void asn1_primitive_clear(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
+
+ASN1_VALUE *ASN1_item_new(const ASN1_ITEM *it)
+{
+    ASN1_VALUE *ret = NULL;
+    if (ASN1_item_ex_new(&ret, it) > 0)
+        return ret;
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+/* Allocate an ASN1 structure */
+
+int ASN1_item_ex_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
+{
+    return asn1_item_embed_new(pval, it, 0);
+}
+
+int asn1_item_embed_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it, int embed)
+{
+    const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt = NULL;
+    const ASN1_EXTERN_FUNCS *ef;
+    const ASN1_AUX *aux = it->funcs;
+    ASN1_aux_cb *asn1_cb;
+    ASN1_VALUE **pseqval;
+    int i;
+    if (aux && aux->asn1_cb)
+        asn1_cb = aux->asn1_cb;
+    else
+        asn1_cb = 0;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG
+    OPENSSL_mem_debug_push(it->sname ? it->sname : "asn1_item_embed_new");
+#endif
+
+    switch (it->itype) {
+
+    case ASN1_ITYPE_EXTERN:
+        ef = it->funcs;
+        if (ef && ef->asn1_ex_new) {
+            if (!ef->asn1_ex_new(pval, it))
+                goto memerr;
+        }
+        break;
+
+    case ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE:
+        if (it->templates) {
+            if (!asn1_template_new(pval, it->templates))
+                goto memerr;
+        } else if (!asn1_primitive_new(pval, it, embed))
+            goto memerr;
+        break;
+
+    case ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING:
+        if (!asn1_primitive_new(pval, it, embed))
+            goto memerr;
+        break;
+
+    case ASN1_ITYPE_CHOICE:
+        if (asn1_cb) {
+            i = asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_NEW_PRE, pval, it, NULL);
+            if (!i)
+                goto auxerr;
+            if (i == 2) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG
+                OPENSSL_mem_debug_pop();
+#endif
+                return 1;
+            }
+        }
+        if (embed) {
+            memset(*pval, 0, it->size);
+        } else {
+            *pval = OPENSSL_zalloc(it->size);
+            if (*pval == NULL)
+                goto memerr;
+        }
+        asn1_set_choice_selector(pval, -1, it);
+        if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_NEW_POST, pval, it, NULL))
+            goto auxerr2;
+        break;
+
+    case ASN1_ITYPE_NDEF_SEQUENCE:
+    case ASN1_ITYPE_SEQUENCE:
+        if (asn1_cb) {
+            i = asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_NEW_PRE, pval, it, NULL);
+            if (!i)
+                goto auxerr;
+            if (i == 2) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG
+                OPENSSL_mem_debug_pop();
+#endif
+                return 1;
+            }
+        }
+        if (embed) {
+            memset(*pval, 0, it->size);
+        } else {
+            *pval = OPENSSL_zalloc(it->size);
+            if (*pval == NULL)
+                goto memerr;
+        }
+        /* 0 : init. lock */
+        if (asn1_do_lock(pval, 0, it) < 0) {
+            if (!embed) {
+                OPENSSL_free(*pval);
+                *pval = NULL;
+            }
+            goto memerr;
+        }
+        asn1_enc_init(pval, it);
+        for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; tt++, i++) {
+            pseqval = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, tt);
+            if (!asn1_template_new(pseqval, tt))
+                goto memerr2;
+        }
+        if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_NEW_POST, pval, it, NULL))
+            goto auxerr2;
+        break;
+    }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG
+    OPENSSL_mem_debug_pop();
+#endif
+    return 1;
+
+ memerr2:
+    asn1_item_embed_free(pval, it, embed);
+ memerr:
+    ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EMBED_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG
+    OPENSSL_mem_debug_pop();
+#endif
+    return 0;
+
+ auxerr2:
+    asn1_item_embed_free(pval, it, embed);
+ auxerr:
+    ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EMBED_NEW, ASN1_R_AUX_ERROR);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG
+    OPENSSL_mem_debug_pop();
+#endif
+    return 0;
+
+}
+
+static void asn1_item_clear(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
+{
+    const ASN1_EXTERN_FUNCS *ef;
+
+    switch (it->itype) {
+
+    case ASN1_ITYPE_EXTERN:
+        ef = it->funcs;
+        if (ef && ef->asn1_ex_clear)
+            ef->asn1_ex_clear(pval, it);
+        else
+            *pval = NULL;
+        break;
+
+    case ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE:
+        if (it->templates)
+            asn1_template_clear(pval, it->templates);
+        else
+            asn1_primitive_clear(pval, it);
+        break;
+
+    case ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING:
+        asn1_primitive_clear(pval, it);
+        break;
+
+    case ASN1_ITYPE_CHOICE:
+    case ASN1_ITYPE_SEQUENCE:
+    case ASN1_ITYPE_NDEF_SEQUENCE:
+        *pval = NULL;
+        break;
+    }
+}
+
+static int asn1_template_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt)
+{
+    const ASN1_ITEM *it = ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item);
+    int embed = tt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_EMBED;
+    ASN1_VALUE *tval;
+    int ret;
+    if (embed) {
+        tval = (ASN1_VALUE *)pval;
+        pval = &tval;
+    }
+    if (tt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_OPTIONAL) {
+        asn1_template_clear(pval, tt);
+        return 1;
+    }
+    /* If ANY DEFINED BY nothing to do */
+
+    if (tt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_ADB_MASK) {
+        *pval = NULL;
+        return 1;
+    }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG
+    OPENSSL_mem_debug_push(tt->field_name
+            ? tt->field_name : "asn1_template_new");
+#endif
+    /* If SET OF or SEQUENCE OF, its a STACK */
+    if (tt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_SK_MASK) {
+        STACK_OF(ASN1_VALUE) *skval;
+        skval = sk_ASN1_VALUE_new_null();
+        if (!skval) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            ret = 0;
+            goto done;
+        }
+        *pval = (ASN1_VALUE *)skval;
+        ret = 1;
+        goto done;
+    }
+    /* Otherwise pass it back to the item routine */
+    ret = asn1_item_embed_new(pval, it, embed);
+ done:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG
+    OPENSSL_mem_debug_pop();
+#endif
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static void asn1_template_clear(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt)
+{
+    /* If ADB or STACK just NULL the field */
+    if (tt->flags & (ASN1_TFLG_ADB_MASK | ASN1_TFLG_SK_MASK))
+        *pval = NULL;
+    else
+        asn1_item_clear(pval, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item));
+}
+
+/*
+ * NB: could probably combine most of the real XXX_new() behaviour and junk
+ * all the old functions.
+ */
+
+static int asn1_primitive_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+                              int embed)
+{
+    ASN1_TYPE *typ;
+    ASN1_STRING *str;
+    int utype;
+
+    if (!it)
+        return 0;
+
+    if (it->funcs) {
+        const ASN1_PRIMITIVE_FUNCS *pf = it->funcs;
+        if (embed) {
+            if (pf->prim_clear) {
+                pf->prim_clear(pval, it);
+                return 1;
+            }
+        } else if (pf->prim_new) {
+            return pf->prim_new(pval, it);
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (it->itype == ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING)
+        utype = -1;
+    else
+        utype = it->utype;
+    switch (utype) {
+    case V_ASN1_OBJECT:
+        *pval = (ASN1_VALUE *)OBJ_nid2obj(NID_undef);
+        return 1;
+
+    case V_ASN1_BOOLEAN:
+        *(ASN1_BOOLEAN *)pval = it->size;
+        return 1;
+
+    case V_ASN1_NULL:
+        *pval = (ASN1_VALUE *)1;
+        return 1;
+
+    case V_ASN1_ANY:
+        typ = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*typ));
+        if (typ == NULL)
+            return 0;
+        typ->value.ptr = NULL;
+        typ->type = -1;
+        *pval = (ASN1_VALUE *)typ;
+        break;
+
+    default:
+        if (embed) {
+            str = *(ASN1_STRING **)pval;
+            memset(str, 0, sizeof(*str));
+            str->type = utype;
+            str->flags = ASN1_STRING_FLAG_EMBED;
+        } else {
+            str = ASN1_STRING_type_new(utype);
+            *pval = (ASN1_VALUE *)str;
+        }
+        if (it->itype == ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING && str)
+            str->flags |= ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING;
+        break;
+    }
+    if (*pval)
+        return 1;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static void asn1_primitive_clear(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
+{
+    int utype;
+    if (it && it->funcs) {
+        const ASN1_PRIMITIVE_FUNCS *pf = it->funcs;
+        if (pf->prim_clear)
+            pf->prim_clear(pval, it);
+        else
+            *pval = NULL;
+        return;
+    }
+    if (!it || (it->itype == ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING))
+        utype = -1;
+    else
+        utype = it->utype;
+    if (utype == V_ASN1_BOOLEAN)
+        *(ASN1_BOOLEAN *)pval = it->size;
+    else
+        *pval = NULL;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/tasn_prn.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/tasn_prn.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..53a9ee8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/tasn_prn.c
@@ -0,0 +1,538 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include "internal/asn1_int.h"
+#include "asn1_locl.h"
+
+/*
+ * Print routines.
+ */
+
+/* ASN1_PCTX routines */
+
+static ASN1_PCTX default_pctx = {
+    ASN1_PCTX_FLAGS_SHOW_ABSENT, /* flags */
+    0,                          /* nm_flags */
+    0,                          /* cert_flags */
+    0,                          /* oid_flags */
+    0                           /* str_flags */
+};
+
+ASN1_PCTX *ASN1_PCTX_new(void)
+{
+    ASN1_PCTX *ret;
+
+    ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
+    if (ret == NULL) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_PCTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+void ASN1_PCTX_free(ASN1_PCTX *p)
+{
+    OPENSSL_free(p);
+}
+
+unsigned long ASN1_PCTX_get_flags(const ASN1_PCTX *p)
+{
+    return p->flags;
+}
+
+void ASN1_PCTX_set_flags(ASN1_PCTX *p, unsigned long flags)
+{
+    p->flags = flags;
+}
+
+unsigned long ASN1_PCTX_get_nm_flags(const ASN1_PCTX *p)
+{
+    return p->nm_flags;
+}
+
+void ASN1_PCTX_set_nm_flags(ASN1_PCTX *p, unsigned long flags)
+{
+    p->nm_flags = flags;
+}
+
+unsigned long ASN1_PCTX_get_cert_flags(const ASN1_PCTX *p)
+{
+    return p->cert_flags;
+}
+
+void ASN1_PCTX_set_cert_flags(ASN1_PCTX *p, unsigned long flags)
+{
+    p->cert_flags = flags;
+}
+
+unsigned long ASN1_PCTX_get_oid_flags(const ASN1_PCTX *p)
+{
+    return p->oid_flags;
+}
+
+void ASN1_PCTX_set_oid_flags(ASN1_PCTX *p, unsigned long flags)
+{
+    p->oid_flags = flags;
+}
+
+unsigned long ASN1_PCTX_get_str_flags(const ASN1_PCTX *p)
+{
+    return p->str_flags;
+}
+
+void ASN1_PCTX_set_str_flags(ASN1_PCTX *p, unsigned long flags)
+{
+    p->str_flags = flags;
+}
+
+/* Main print routines */
+
+static int asn1_item_print_ctx(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE **fld, int indent,
+                               const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+                               const char *fname, const char *sname,
+                               int nohdr, const ASN1_PCTX *pctx);
+
+static int asn1_template_print_ctx(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE **fld, int indent,
+                            const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt, const ASN1_PCTX *pctx);
+
+static int asn1_primitive_print(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE **fld,
+                                const ASN1_ITEM *it, int indent,
+                                const char *fname, const char *sname,
+                                const ASN1_PCTX *pctx);
+
+static int asn1_print_fsname(BIO *out, int indent,
+                             const char *fname, const char *sname,
+                             const ASN1_PCTX *pctx);
+
+int ASN1_item_print(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE *ifld, int indent,
+                    const ASN1_ITEM *it, const ASN1_PCTX *pctx)
+{
+    const char *sname;
+    if (pctx == NULL)
+        pctx = &default_pctx;
+    if (pctx->flags & ASN1_PCTX_FLAGS_NO_STRUCT_NAME)
+        sname = NULL;
+    else
+        sname = it->sname;
+    return asn1_item_print_ctx(out, &ifld, indent, it, NULL, sname, 0, pctx);
+}
+
+static int asn1_item_print_ctx(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE **fld, int indent,
+                               const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+                               const char *fname, const char *sname,
+                               int nohdr, const ASN1_PCTX *pctx)
+{
+    const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt;
+    const ASN1_EXTERN_FUNCS *ef;
+    ASN1_VALUE **tmpfld;
+    const ASN1_AUX *aux = it->funcs;
+    ASN1_aux_cb *asn1_cb;
+    ASN1_PRINT_ARG parg;
+    int i;
+    if (aux && aux->asn1_cb) {
+        parg.out = out;
+        parg.indent = indent;
+        parg.pctx = pctx;
+        asn1_cb = aux->asn1_cb;
+    } else
+        asn1_cb = 0;
+
+   if (((it->itype != ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE)
+       || (it->utype != V_ASN1_BOOLEAN)) && *fld == NULL) {
+        if (pctx->flags & ASN1_PCTX_FLAGS_SHOW_ABSENT) {
+            if (!nohdr && !asn1_print_fsname(out, indent, fname, sname, pctx))
+                return 0;
+            if (BIO_puts(out, "<ABSENT>\n") <= 0)
+                return 0;
+        }
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    switch (it->itype) {
+    case ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE:
+        if (it->templates) {
+            if (!asn1_template_print_ctx(out, fld, indent,
+                                         it->templates, pctx))
+                return 0;
+            break;
+        }
+        /* fall through */
+    case ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING:
+        if (!asn1_primitive_print(out, fld, it, indent, fname, sname, pctx))
+            return 0;
+        break;
+
+    case ASN1_ITYPE_EXTERN:
+        if (!nohdr && !asn1_print_fsname(out, indent, fname, sname, pctx))
+            return 0;
+        /* Use new style print routine if possible */
+        ef = it->funcs;
+        if (ef && ef->asn1_ex_print) {
+            i = ef->asn1_ex_print(out, fld, indent, "", pctx);
+            if (!i)
+                return 0;
+            if ((i == 2) && (BIO_puts(out, "\n") <= 0))
+                return 0;
+            return 1;
+        } else if (sname &&
+                   BIO_printf(out, ":EXTERNAL TYPE %s\n", sname) <= 0)
+            return 0;
+        break;
+
+    case ASN1_ITYPE_CHOICE:
+        /* CHOICE type, get selector */
+        i = asn1_get_choice_selector(fld, it);
+        /* This should never happen... */
+        if ((i < 0) || (i >= it->tcount)) {
+            if (BIO_printf(out, "ERROR: selector [%d] invalid\n", i) <= 0)
+                return 0;
+            return 1;
+        }
+        tt = it->templates + i;
+        tmpfld = asn1_get_field_ptr(fld, tt);
+        if (!asn1_template_print_ctx(out, tmpfld, indent, tt, pctx))
+            return 0;
+        break;
+
+    case ASN1_ITYPE_SEQUENCE:
+    case ASN1_ITYPE_NDEF_SEQUENCE:
+        if (!nohdr && !asn1_print_fsname(out, indent, fname, sname, pctx))
+            return 0;
+        if (fname || sname) {
+            if (pctx->flags & ASN1_PCTX_FLAGS_SHOW_SEQUENCE) {
+                if (BIO_puts(out, " {\n") <= 0)
+                    return 0;
+            } else {
+                if (BIO_puts(out, "\n") <= 0)
+                    return 0;
+            }
+        }
+
+        if (asn1_cb) {
+            i = asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_PRINT_PRE, fld, it, &parg);
+            if (i == 0)
+                return 0;
+            if (i == 2)
+                return 1;
+        }
+
+        /* Print each field entry */
+        for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; i++, tt++) {
+            const ASN1_TEMPLATE *seqtt;
+            seqtt = asn1_do_adb(fld, tt, 1);
+            if (!seqtt)
+                return 0;
+            tmpfld = asn1_get_field_ptr(fld, seqtt);
+            if (!asn1_template_print_ctx(out, tmpfld,
+                                         indent + 2, seqtt, pctx))
+                return 0;
+        }
+        if (pctx->flags & ASN1_PCTX_FLAGS_SHOW_SEQUENCE) {
+            if (BIO_printf(out, "%*s}\n", indent, "") < 0)
+                return 0;
+        }
+
+        if (asn1_cb) {
+            i = asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_PRINT_POST, fld, it, &parg);
+            if (i == 0)
+                return 0;
+        }
+        break;
+
+    default:
+        BIO_printf(out, "Unprocessed type %d\n", it->itype);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int asn1_template_print_ctx(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE **fld, int indent,
+                            const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt, const ASN1_PCTX *pctx)
+{
+    int i, flags;
+    const char *sname, *fname;
+    ASN1_VALUE *tfld;
+    flags = tt->flags;
+    if (pctx->flags & ASN1_PCTX_FLAGS_SHOW_FIELD_STRUCT_NAME)
+        sname = ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item)->sname;
+    else
+        sname = NULL;
+    if (pctx->flags & ASN1_PCTX_FLAGS_NO_FIELD_NAME)
+        fname = NULL;
+    else
+        fname = tt->field_name;
+
+    /*
+     * If field is embedded then fld needs fixing so it is a pointer to
+     * a pointer to a field.
+     */
+    if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_EMBED) {
+        tfld = (ASN1_VALUE *)fld;
+        fld = &tfld;
+    }
+
+    if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_SK_MASK) {
+        char *tname;
+        ASN1_VALUE *skitem;
+        STACK_OF(ASN1_VALUE) *stack;
+
+        /* SET OF, SEQUENCE OF */
+        if (fname) {
+            if (pctx->flags & ASN1_PCTX_FLAGS_SHOW_SSOF) {
+                if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_SET_OF)
+                    tname = "SET";
+                else
+                    tname = "SEQUENCE";
+                if (BIO_printf(out, "%*s%s OF %s {\n",
+                               indent, "", tname, tt->field_name) <= 0)
+                    return 0;
+            } else if (BIO_printf(out, "%*s%s:\n", indent, "", fname) <= 0)
+                return 0;
+        }
+        stack = (STACK_OF(ASN1_VALUE) *)*fld;
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_VALUE_num(stack); i++) {
+            if ((i > 0) && (BIO_puts(out, "\n") <= 0))
+                return 0;
+
+            skitem = sk_ASN1_VALUE_value(stack, i);
+            if (!asn1_item_print_ctx(out, &skitem, indent + 2,
+                                     ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item), NULL, NULL, 1,
+                                     pctx))
+                return 0;
+        }
+        if (!i && BIO_printf(out, "%*s<EMPTY>\n", indent + 2, "") <= 0)
+            return 0;
+        if (pctx->flags & ASN1_PCTX_FLAGS_SHOW_SEQUENCE) {
+            if (BIO_printf(out, "%*s}\n", indent, "") <= 0)
+                return 0;
+        }
+        return 1;
+    }
+    return asn1_item_print_ctx(out, fld, indent, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item),
+                               fname, sname, 0, pctx);
+}
+
+static int asn1_print_fsname(BIO *out, int indent,
+                             const char *fname, const char *sname,
+                             const ASN1_PCTX *pctx)
+{
+    static const char spaces[] = "                    ";
+    static const int nspaces = sizeof(spaces) - 1;
+
+    while (indent > nspaces) {
+        if (BIO_write(out, spaces, nspaces) != nspaces)
+            return 0;
+        indent -= nspaces;
+    }
+    if (BIO_write(out, spaces, indent) != indent)
+        return 0;
+    if (pctx->flags & ASN1_PCTX_FLAGS_NO_STRUCT_NAME)
+        sname = NULL;
+    if (pctx->flags & ASN1_PCTX_FLAGS_NO_FIELD_NAME)
+        fname = NULL;
+    if (!sname && !fname)
+        return 1;
+    if (fname) {
+        if (BIO_puts(out, fname) <= 0)
+            return 0;
+    }
+    if (sname) {
+        if (fname) {
+            if (BIO_printf(out, " (%s)", sname) <= 0)
+                return 0;
+        } else {
+            if (BIO_puts(out, sname) <= 0)
+                return 0;
+        }
+    }
+    if (BIO_write(out, ": ", 2) != 2)
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int asn1_print_boolean(BIO *out, int boolval)
+{
+    const char *str;
+    switch (boolval) {
+    case -1:
+        str = "BOOL ABSENT";
+        break;
+
+    case 0:
+        str = "FALSE";
+        break;
+
+    default:
+        str = "TRUE";
+        break;
+
+    }
+
+    if (BIO_puts(out, str) <= 0)
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+
+}
+
+static int asn1_print_integer(BIO *out, const ASN1_INTEGER *str)
+{
+    char *s;
+    int ret = 1;
+    s = i2s_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, str);
+    if (s == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    if (BIO_puts(out, s) <= 0)
+        ret = 0;
+    OPENSSL_free(s);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int asn1_print_oid(BIO *out, const ASN1_OBJECT *oid)
+{
+    char objbuf[80];
+    const char *ln;
+    ln = OBJ_nid2ln(OBJ_obj2nid(oid));
+    if (!ln)
+        ln = "";
+    OBJ_obj2txt(objbuf, sizeof(objbuf), oid, 1);
+    if (BIO_printf(out, "%s (%s)", ln, objbuf) <= 0)
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int asn1_print_obstring(BIO *out, const ASN1_STRING *str, int indent)
+{
+    if (str->type == V_ASN1_BIT_STRING) {
+        if (BIO_printf(out, " (%ld unused bits)\n", str->flags & 0x7) <= 0)
+            return 0;
+    } else if (BIO_puts(out, "\n") <= 0)
+        return 0;
+    if ((str->length > 0)
+        && BIO_dump_indent(out, (const char *)str->data, str->length,
+                           indent + 2) <= 0)
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int asn1_primitive_print(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE **fld,
+                                const ASN1_ITEM *it, int indent,
+                                const char *fname, const char *sname,
+                                const ASN1_PCTX *pctx)
+{
+    long utype;
+    ASN1_STRING *str;
+    int ret = 1, needlf = 1;
+    const char *pname;
+    const ASN1_PRIMITIVE_FUNCS *pf;
+    pf = it->funcs;
+    if (!asn1_print_fsname(out, indent, fname, sname, pctx))
+        return 0;
+    if (pf && pf->prim_print)
+        return pf->prim_print(out, fld, it, indent, pctx);
+    if (it->itype == ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING) {
+        str = (ASN1_STRING *)*fld;
+        utype = str->type & ~V_ASN1_NEG;
+    } else {
+        utype = it->utype;
+        if (utype == V_ASN1_BOOLEAN)
+            str = NULL;
+        else
+            str = (ASN1_STRING *)*fld;
+    }
+    if (utype == V_ASN1_ANY) {
+        ASN1_TYPE *atype = (ASN1_TYPE *)*fld;
+        utype = atype->type;
+        fld = &atype->value.asn1_value;
+        str = (ASN1_STRING *)*fld;
+        if (pctx->flags & ASN1_PCTX_FLAGS_NO_ANY_TYPE)
+            pname = NULL;
+        else
+            pname = ASN1_tag2str(utype);
+    } else {
+        if (pctx->flags & ASN1_PCTX_FLAGS_SHOW_TYPE)
+            pname = ASN1_tag2str(utype);
+        else
+            pname = NULL;
+    }
+
+    if (utype == V_ASN1_NULL) {
+        if (BIO_puts(out, "NULL\n") <= 0)
+            return 0;
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    if (pname) {
+        if (BIO_puts(out, pname) <= 0)
+            return 0;
+        if (BIO_puts(out, ":") <= 0)
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    switch (utype) {
+    case V_ASN1_BOOLEAN:
+        {
+            int boolval = *(int *)fld;
+            if (boolval == -1)
+                boolval = it->size;
+            ret = asn1_print_boolean(out, boolval);
+        }
+        break;
+
+    case V_ASN1_INTEGER:
+    case V_ASN1_ENUMERATED:
+        ret = asn1_print_integer(out, str);
+        break;
+
+    case V_ASN1_UTCTIME:
+        ret = ASN1_UTCTIME_print(out, str);
+        break;
+
+    case V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME:
+        ret = ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(out, str);
+        break;
+
+    case V_ASN1_OBJECT:
+        ret = asn1_print_oid(out, (const ASN1_OBJECT *)*fld);
+        break;
+
+    case V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING:
+    case V_ASN1_BIT_STRING:
+        ret = asn1_print_obstring(out, str, indent);
+        needlf = 0;
+        break;
+
+    case V_ASN1_SEQUENCE:
+    case V_ASN1_SET:
+    case V_ASN1_OTHER:
+        if (BIO_puts(out, "\n") <= 0)
+            return 0;
+        if (ASN1_parse_dump(out, str->data, str->length, indent, 0) <= 0)
+            ret = 0;
+        needlf = 0;
+        break;
+
+    default:
+        ret = ASN1_STRING_print_ex(out, str, pctx->str_flags);
+
+    }
+    if (!ret)
+        return 0;
+    if (needlf && BIO_puts(out, "\n") <= 0)
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/tasn_scn.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/tasn_scn.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e1df2cf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/tasn_scn.c
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2010-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include "asn1_locl.h"
+
+/*
+ * General ASN1 structure recursive scanner: iterate through all fields
+ * passing details to a callback.
+ */
+
+ASN1_SCTX *ASN1_SCTX_new(int (*scan_cb) (ASN1_SCTX *ctx))
+{
+    ASN1_SCTX *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
+
+    if (ret == NULL) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_SCTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    ret->scan_cb = scan_cb;
+    return ret;
+}
+
+void ASN1_SCTX_free(ASN1_SCTX *p)
+{
+    OPENSSL_free(p);
+}
+
+const ASN1_ITEM *ASN1_SCTX_get_item(ASN1_SCTX *p)
+{
+    return p->it;
+}
+
+const ASN1_TEMPLATE *ASN1_SCTX_get_template(ASN1_SCTX *p)
+{
+    return p->tt;
+}
+
+unsigned long ASN1_SCTX_get_flags(ASN1_SCTX *p)
+{
+    return p->flags;
+}
+
+void ASN1_SCTX_set_app_data(ASN1_SCTX *p, void *data)
+{
+    p->app_data = data;
+}
+
+void *ASN1_SCTX_get_app_data(ASN1_SCTX *p)
+{
+    return p->app_data;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/tasn_typ.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/tasn_typ.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..98d9879
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/tasn_typ.c
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+
+/* Declarations for string types */
+
+#define IMPLEMENT_ASN1_STRING_FUNCTIONS(sname) \
+    IMPLEMENT_ASN1_TYPE(sname) \
+    IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_fname(sname, sname, sname) \
+sname *sname##_new(void) \
+{ \
+    return ASN1_STRING_type_new(V_##sname); \
+} \
+void sname##_free(sname *x) \
+{ \
+    ASN1_STRING_free(x); \
+}
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_STRING_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_OCTET_STRING)
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_STRING_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_INTEGER)
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_STRING_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_ENUMERATED)
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_STRING_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_BIT_STRING)
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_STRING_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_UTF8STRING)
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_STRING_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING)
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_STRING_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_T61STRING)
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_STRING_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_IA5STRING)
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_STRING_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_GENERALSTRING)
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_STRING_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_UTCTIME)
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_STRING_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_STRING_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_VISIBLESTRING)
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_STRING_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING)
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_STRING_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_BMPSTRING)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_TYPE(ASN1_NULL)
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_NULL)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_TYPE(ASN1_OBJECT)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_TYPE(ASN1_ANY)
+
+/* Just swallow an ASN1_SEQUENCE in an ASN1_STRING */
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_TYPE(ASN1_SEQUENCE)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_fname(ASN1_TYPE, ASN1_ANY, ASN1_TYPE)
+
+/* Multistring types */
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_MSTRING(ASN1_PRINTABLE, B_ASN1_PRINTABLE)
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_name(ASN1_STRING, ASN1_PRINTABLE)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_MSTRING(DISPLAYTEXT, B_ASN1_DISPLAYTEXT)
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_name(ASN1_STRING, DISPLAYTEXT)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_MSTRING(DIRECTORYSTRING, B_ASN1_DIRECTORYSTRING)
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_name(ASN1_STRING, DIRECTORYSTRING)
+
+/* Three separate BOOLEAN type: normal, DEFAULT TRUE and DEFAULT FALSE */
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_TYPE_ex(ASN1_BOOLEAN, ASN1_BOOLEAN, -1)
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_TYPE_ex(ASN1_TBOOLEAN, ASN1_BOOLEAN, 1)
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_TYPE_ex(ASN1_FBOOLEAN, ASN1_BOOLEAN, 0)
+
+/* Special, OCTET STRING with indefinite length constructed support */
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_TYPE_ex(ASN1_OCTET_STRING_NDEF, ASN1_OCTET_STRING, ASN1_TFLG_NDEF)
+
+ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE(ASN1_SEQUENCE_ANY) =
+        ASN1_EX_TEMPLATE_TYPE(ASN1_TFLG_SEQUENCE_OF, 0, ASN1_SEQUENCE_ANY, ASN1_ANY)
+ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE_END(ASN1_SEQUENCE_ANY)
+
+ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE(ASN1_SET_ANY) =
+        ASN1_EX_TEMPLATE_TYPE(ASN1_TFLG_SET_OF, 0, ASN1_SET_ANY, ASN1_ANY)
+ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE_END(ASN1_SET_ANY)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const_fname(ASN1_SEQUENCE_ANY, ASN1_SEQUENCE_ANY, ASN1_SEQUENCE_ANY)
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const_fname(ASN1_SEQUENCE_ANY, ASN1_SET_ANY, ASN1_SET_ANY)
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/tasn_utl.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/tasn_utl.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f79d7d6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/tasn_utl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,240 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <internal/cryptlib.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include "asn1_locl.h"
+
+/* Utility functions for manipulating fields and offsets */
+
+/* Add 'offset' to 'addr' */
+#define offset2ptr(addr, offset) (void *)(((char *) addr) + offset)
+
+/*
+ * Given an ASN1_ITEM CHOICE type return the selector value
+ */
+
+int asn1_get_choice_selector(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
+{
+    int *sel = offset2ptr(*pval, it->utype);
+    return *sel;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Given an ASN1_ITEM CHOICE type set the selector value, return old value.
+ */
+
+int asn1_set_choice_selector(ASN1_VALUE **pval, int value,
+                             const ASN1_ITEM *it)
+{
+    int *sel, ret;
+    sel = offset2ptr(*pval, it->utype);
+    ret = *sel;
+    *sel = value;
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Do atomic reference counting. The value 'op' decides what to do.
+ * If it is +1 then the count is incremented.
+ * If |op| is 0, lock is initialised and count is set to 1.
+ * If |op| is -1, count is decremented and the return value is the current
+ * reference count or 0 if no reference count is active.
+ * It returns -1 on initialisation error.
+ * Used by ASN1_SEQUENCE construct of X509, X509_REQ, X509_CRL objects
+ */
+int asn1_do_lock(ASN1_VALUE **pval, int op, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
+{
+    const ASN1_AUX *aux;
+    int *lck, ret;
+    CRYPTO_RWLOCK **lock;
+    if ((it->itype != ASN1_ITYPE_SEQUENCE)
+        && (it->itype != ASN1_ITYPE_NDEF_SEQUENCE))
+        return 0;
+    aux = it->funcs;
+    if (!aux || !(aux->flags & ASN1_AFLG_REFCOUNT))
+        return 0;
+    lck = offset2ptr(*pval, aux->ref_offset);
+    lock = offset2ptr(*pval, aux->ref_lock);
+    if (op == 0) {
+        *lck = 1;
+        *lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
+        if (*lock == NULL) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_DO_LOCK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            return -1;
+        }
+        return 1;
+    }
+    if (CRYPTO_atomic_add(lck, op, &ret, *lock) < 0)
+        return -1;  /* failed */
+#ifdef REF_PRINT
+    fprintf(stderr, "%p:%4d:%s\n", it, *lck, it->sname);
+#endif
+    REF_ASSERT_ISNT(ret < 0);
+    if (ret == 0) {
+        CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(*lock);
+        *lock = NULL;
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static ASN1_ENCODING *asn1_get_enc_ptr(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
+{
+    const ASN1_AUX *aux;
+    if (!pval || !*pval)
+        return NULL;
+    aux = it->funcs;
+    if (!aux || !(aux->flags & ASN1_AFLG_ENCODING))
+        return NULL;
+    return offset2ptr(*pval, aux->enc_offset);
+}
+
+void asn1_enc_init(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
+{
+    ASN1_ENCODING *enc;
+    enc = asn1_get_enc_ptr(pval, it);
+    if (enc) {
+        enc->enc = NULL;
+        enc->len = 0;
+        enc->modified = 1;
+    }
+}
+
+void asn1_enc_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
+{
+    ASN1_ENCODING *enc;
+    enc = asn1_get_enc_ptr(pval, it);
+    if (enc) {
+        OPENSSL_free(enc->enc);
+        enc->enc = NULL;
+        enc->len = 0;
+        enc->modified = 1;
+    }
+}
+
+int asn1_enc_save(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char *in, int inlen,
+                  const ASN1_ITEM *it)
+{
+    ASN1_ENCODING *enc;
+    enc = asn1_get_enc_ptr(pval, it);
+    if (!enc)
+        return 1;
+
+    OPENSSL_free(enc->enc);
+    enc->enc = OPENSSL_malloc(inlen);
+    if (enc->enc == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    memcpy(enc->enc, in, inlen);
+    enc->len = inlen;
+    enc->modified = 0;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int asn1_enc_restore(int *len, unsigned char **out, ASN1_VALUE **pval,
+                     const ASN1_ITEM *it)
+{
+    ASN1_ENCODING *enc;
+    enc = asn1_get_enc_ptr(pval, it);
+    if (!enc || enc->modified)
+        return 0;
+    if (out) {
+        memcpy(*out, enc->enc, enc->len);
+        *out += enc->len;
+    }
+    if (len)
+        *len = enc->len;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Given an ASN1_TEMPLATE get a pointer to a field */
+ASN1_VALUE **asn1_get_field_ptr(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt)
+{
+    ASN1_VALUE **pvaltmp;
+    pvaltmp = offset2ptr(*pval, tt->offset);
+    /*
+     * NOTE for BOOLEAN types the field is just a plain int so we can't
+     * return int **, so settle for (int *).
+     */
+    return pvaltmp;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Handle ANY DEFINED BY template, find the selector, look up the relevant
+ * ASN1_TEMPLATE in the table and return it.
+ */
+
+const ASN1_TEMPLATE *asn1_do_adb(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt,
+                                 int nullerr)
+{
+    const ASN1_ADB *adb;
+    const ASN1_ADB_TABLE *atbl;
+    long selector;
+    ASN1_VALUE **sfld;
+    int i;
+    if (!(tt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_ADB_MASK))
+        return tt;
+
+    /* Else ANY DEFINED BY ... get the table */
+    adb = ASN1_ADB_ptr(tt->item);
+
+    /* Get the selector field */
+    sfld = offset2ptr(*pval, adb->offset);
+
+    /* Check if NULL */
+    if (*sfld == NULL) {
+        if (!adb->null_tt)
+            goto err;
+        return adb->null_tt;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Convert type to a long: NB: don't check for NID_undef here because it
+     * might be a legitimate value in the table
+     */
+    if (tt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_ADB_OID)
+        selector = OBJ_obj2nid((ASN1_OBJECT *)*sfld);
+    else
+        selector = ASN1_INTEGER_get((ASN1_INTEGER *)*sfld);
+
+    /* Let application callback translate value */
+    if (adb->adb_cb != NULL && adb->adb_cb(&selector) == 0) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_DO_ADB, ASN1_R_UNSUPPORTED_ANY_DEFINED_BY_TYPE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Try to find matching entry in table Maybe should check application
+     * types first to allow application override? Might also be useful to
+     * have a flag which indicates table is sorted and we can do a binary
+     * search. For now stick to a linear search.
+     */
+
+    for (atbl = adb->tbl, i = 0; i < adb->tblcount; i++, atbl++)
+        if (atbl->value == selector)
+            return &atbl->tt;
+
+    /* FIXME: need to search application table too */
+
+    /* No match, return default type */
+    if (!adb->default_tt)
+        goto err;
+    return adb->default_tt;
+
+ err:
+    /* FIXME: should log the value or OID of unsupported type */
+    if (nullerr)
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_DO_ADB, ASN1_R_UNSUPPORTED_ANY_DEFINED_BY_TYPE);
+    return NULL;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/x_algor.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/x_algor.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..72378db
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/x_algor.c
@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1998-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include "internal/evp_int.h"
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(X509_ALGOR) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_ALGOR, algorithm, ASN1_OBJECT),
+        ASN1_OPT(X509_ALGOR, parameter, ASN1_ANY)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(X509_ALGOR)
+
+ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE(X509_ALGORS) =
+        ASN1_EX_TEMPLATE_TYPE(ASN1_TFLG_SEQUENCE_OF, 0, algorithms, X509_ALGOR)
+ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE_END(X509_ALGORS)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_ALGOR)
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_fname(X509_ALGORS, X509_ALGORS, X509_ALGORS)
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(X509_ALGOR)
+
+int X509_ALGOR_set0(X509_ALGOR *alg, ASN1_OBJECT *aobj, int ptype, void *pval)
+{
+    if (!alg)
+        return 0;
+    if (ptype != V_ASN1_UNDEF) {
+        if (alg->parameter == NULL)
+            alg->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new();
+        if (alg->parameter == NULL)
+            return 0;
+    }
+    if (alg) {
+        ASN1_OBJECT_free(alg->algorithm);
+        alg->algorithm = aobj;
+    }
+    if (ptype == 0)
+        return 1;
+    if (ptype == V_ASN1_UNDEF) {
+        ASN1_TYPE_free(alg->parameter);
+        alg->parameter = NULL;
+    } else
+        ASN1_TYPE_set(alg->parameter, ptype, pval);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+void X509_ALGOR_get0(const ASN1_OBJECT **paobj, int *pptype,
+                     const void **ppval, const X509_ALGOR *algor)
+{
+    if (paobj)
+        *paobj = algor->algorithm;
+    if (pptype) {
+        if (algor->parameter == NULL) {
+            *pptype = V_ASN1_UNDEF;
+            return;
+        } else
+            *pptype = algor->parameter->type;
+        if (ppval)
+            *ppval = algor->parameter->value.ptr;
+    }
+}
+
+/* Set up an X509_ALGOR DigestAlgorithmIdentifier from an EVP_MD */
+
+void X509_ALGOR_set_md(X509_ALGOR *alg, const EVP_MD *md)
+{
+    int param_type;
+
+    if (md->flags & EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT)
+        param_type = V_ASN1_UNDEF;
+    else
+        param_type = V_ASN1_NULL;
+
+    X509_ALGOR_set0(alg, OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_MD_type(md)), param_type, NULL);
+
+}
+
+int X509_ALGOR_cmp(const X509_ALGOR *a, const X509_ALGOR *b)
+{
+    int rv;
+    rv = OBJ_cmp(a->algorithm, b->algorithm);
+    if (rv)
+        return rv;
+    if (!a->parameter && !b->parameter)
+        return 0;
+    return ASN1_TYPE_cmp(a->parameter, b->parameter);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/x_bignum.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/x_bignum.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..da57e77
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/x_bignum.c
@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+/*
+ * Custom primitive type for BIGNUM handling. This reads in an ASN1_INTEGER
+ * as a BIGNUM directly. Currently it ignores the sign which isn't a problem
+ * since all BIGNUMs used are non negative and anything that looks negative
+ * is normally due to an encoding error.
+ */
+
+#define BN_SENSITIVE    1
+
+static int bn_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
+static int bn_secure_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
+static void bn_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
+
+static int bn_i2c(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char *cont, int *putype,
+                  const ASN1_ITEM *it);
+static int bn_c2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char *cont, int len,
+                  int utype, char *free_cont, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
+static int bn_secure_c2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char *cont, int len,
+                         int utype, char *free_cont, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
+static int bn_print(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+                    int indent, const ASN1_PCTX *pctx);
+
+static ASN1_PRIMITIVE_FUNCS bignum_pf = {
+    NULL, 0,
+    bn_new,
+    bn_free,
+    0,
+    bn_c2i,
+    bn_i2c,
+    bn_print
+};
+
+static ASN1_PRIMITIVE_FUNCS cbignum_pf = {
+    NULL, 0,
+    bn_secure_new,
+    bn_free,
+    0,
+    bn_secure_c2i,
+    bn_i2c,
+    bn_print
+};
+
+ASN1_ITEM_start(BIGNUM)
+        ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE, V_ASN1_INTEGER, NULL, 0, &bignum_pf, 0, "BIGNUM"
+ASN1_ITEM_end(BIGNUM)
+
+ASN1_ITEM_start(CBIGNUM)
+        ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE, V_ASN1_INTEGER, NULL, 0, &cbignum_pf, BN_SENSITIVE, "CBIGNUM"
+ASN1_ITEM_end(CBIGNUM)
+
+static int bn_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
+{
+    *pval = (ASN1_VALUE *)BN_new();
+    if (*pval != NULL)
+        return 1;
+    else
+        return 0;
+}
+
+static int bn_secure_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
+{
+    *pval = (ASN1_VALUE *)BN_secure_new();
+    if (*pval != NULL)
+        return 1;
+    else
+        return 0;
+}
+
+static void bn_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
+{
+    if (!*pval)
+        return;
+    if (it->size & BN_SENSITIVE)
+        BN_clear_free((BIGNUM *)*pval);
+    else
+        BN_free((BIGNUM *)*pval);
+    *pval = NULL;
+}
+
+static int bn_i2c(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char *cont, int *putype,
+                  const ASN1_ITEM *it)
+{
+    BIGNUM *bn;
+    int pad;
+    if (!*pval)
+        return -1;
+    bn = (BIGNUM *)*pval;
+    /* If MSB set in an octet we need a padding byte */
+    if (BN_num_bits(bn) & 0x7)
+        pad = 0;
+    else
+        pad = 1;
+    if (cont) {
+        if (pad)
+            *cont++ = 0;
+        BN_bn2bin(bn, cont);
+    }
+    return pad + BN_num_bytes(bn);
+}
+
+static int bn_c2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char *cont, int len,
+                  int utype, char *free_cont, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
+{
+    BIGNUM *bn;
+
+    if (*pval == NULL && !bn_new(pval, it))
+        return 0;
+    bn = (BIGNUM *)*pval;
+    if (!BN_bin2bn(cont, len, bn)) {
+        bn_free(pval, it);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int bn_secure_c2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char *cont, int len,
+                         int utype, char *free_cont, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
+{
+    if (!*pval)
+        bn_secure_new(pval, it);
+    return bn_c2i(pval, cont, len, utype, free_cont, it);
+}
+
+static int bn_print(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+                    int indent, const ASN1_PCTX *pctx)
+{
+    if (!BN_print(out, *(BIGNUM **)pval))
+        return 0;
+    if (BIO_puts(out, "\n") <= 0)
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/x_info.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/x_info.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8d99f07
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/x_info.c
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+X509_INFO *X509_INFO_new(void)
+{
+    X509_INFO *ret;
+
+    ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
+    if (ret == NULL) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_X509_INFO_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+void X509_INFO_free(X509_INFO *x)
+{
+    if (x == NULL)
+        return;
+
+    X509_free(x->x509);
+    X509_CRL_free(x->crl);
+    X509_PKEY_free(x->x_pkey);
+    OPENSSL_free(x->enc_data);
+    OPENSSL_free(x);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/x_int64.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/x_int64.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4433167
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/x_int64.c
@@ -0,0 +1,265 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "internal/asn1t.h"
+#include "internal/numbers.h"
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include "asn1_locl.h"
+
+/*
+ * Custom primitive types for handling int32_t, int64_t, uint32_t, uint64_t.
+ * This converts between an ASN1_INTEGER and those types directly.
+ * This is preferred to using the LONG / ZLONG primitives.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * We abuse the ASN1_ITEM fields |size| as a flags field
+ */
+#define INTxx_FLAG_ZERO_DEFAULT (1<<0)
+#define INTxx_FLAG_SIGNED       (1<<1)
+
+static int uint64_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
+{
+    *pval = (ASN1_VALUE *)OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(uint64_t));
+    if (*pval == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static void uint64_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
+{
+    OPENSSL_free(*pval);
+    *pval = NULL;
+}
+
+static void uint64_clear(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
+{
+    **(uint64_t **)pval = 0;
+}
+
+static int uint64_i2c(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char *cont, int *putype,
+                    const ASN1_ITEM *it)
+{
+    uint64_t utmp;
+    int neg = 0;
+    /* this exists to bypass broken gcc optimization */
+    char *cp = (char *)*pval;
+
+    /* use memcpy, because we may not be uint64_t aligned */
+    memcpy(&utmp, cp, sizeof(utmp));
+
+    if ((it->size & INTxx_FLAG_ZERO_DEFAULT) == INTxx_FLAG_ZERO_DEFAULT
+        && utmp == 0)
+        return -1;
+    if ((it->size & INTxx_FLAG_SIGNED) == INTxx_FLAG_SIGNED
+        && (int64_t)utmp < 0) {
+        /* i2c_uint64_int() assumes positive values */
+        utmp = 0 - utmp;
+        neg = 1;
+    }
+
+    return i2c_uint64_int(cont, utmp, neg);
+}
+
+static int uint64_c2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char *cont, int len,
+                    int utype, char *free_cont, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
+{
+    uint64_t utmp = 0;
+    char *cp;
+    int neg = 0;
+
+    if (*pval == NULL && !uint64_new(pval, it))
+        return 0;
+
+    cp = (char *)*pval;
+    if (!c2i_uint64_int(&utmp, &neg, &cont, len))
+        return 0;
+    if ((it->size & INTxx_FLAG_SIGNED) == 0 && neg) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_UINT64_C2I, ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_NEGATIVE_VALUE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if ((it->size & INTxx_FLAG_SIGNED) == INTxx_FLAG_SIGNED
+            && !neg && utmp > INT64_MAX) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_UINT64_C2I, ASN1_R_TOO_LARGE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (neg)
+        /* c2i_uint64_int() returns positive values */
+        utmp = 0 - utmp;
+    memcpy(cp, &utmp, sizeof(utmp));
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int uint64_print(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+                        int indent, const ASN1_PCTX *pctx)
+{
+    if ((it->size & INTxx_FLAG_SIGNED) == INTxx_FLAG_SIGNED)
+        return BIO_printf(out, "%"BIO_PRI64"d\n", **(int64_t **)pval);
+    return BIO_printf(out, "%"BIO_PRI64"u\n", **(uint64_t **)pval);
+}
+
+/* 32-bit variants */
+
+static int uint32_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
+{
+    *pval = (ASN1_VALUE *)OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(uint32_t));
+    if (*pval == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static void uint32_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
+{
+    OPENSSL_free(*pval);
+    *pval = NULL;
+}
+
+static void uint32_clear(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
+{
+    **(uint32_t **)pval = 0;
+}
+
+static int uint32_i2c(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char *cont, int *putype,
+                    const ASN1_ITEM *it)
+{
+    uint32_t utmp;
+    int neg = 0;
+    /* this exists to bypass broken gcc optimization */
+    char *cp = (char *)*pval;
+
+    /* use memcpy, because we may not be uint32_t aligned */
+    memcpy(&utmp, cp, sizeof(utmp));
+
+    if ((it->size & INTxx_FLAG_ZERO_DEFAULT) == INTxx_FLAG_ZERO_DEFAULT
+        && utmp == 0)
+        return -1;
+    if ((it->size & INTxx_FLAG_SIGNED) == INTxx_FLAG_SIGNED
+        && (int32_t)utmp < 0) {
+        /* i2c_uint64_int() assumes positive values */
+        utmp = 0 - utmp;
+        neg = 1;
+    }
+
+    return i2c_uint64_int(cont, (uint64_t)utmp, neg);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Absolute value of INT32_MIN: we can't just use -INT32_MIN as it produces
+ * overflow warnings.
+ */
+
+#define ABS_INT32_MIN ((uint32_t)INT32_MAX + 1)
+
+static int uint32_c2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char *cont, int len,
+                    int utype, char *free_cont, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
+{
+    uint64_t utmp = 0;
+    uint32_t utmp2 = 0;
+    char *cp;
+    int neg = 0;
+
+    if (*pval == NULL && !uint64_new(pval, it))
+        return 0;
+
+    cp = (char *)*pval;
+    if (!c2i_uint64_int(&utmp, &neg, &cont, len))
+        return 0;
+    if ((it->size & INTxx_FLAG_SIGNED) == 0 && neg) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_UINT32_C2I, ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_NEGATIVE_VALUE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (neg) {
+        if (utmp > ABS_INT32_MIN) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_UINT32_C2I, ASN1_R_TOO_SMALL);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        utmp = 0 - utmp;
+    } else {
+        if (((it->size & INTxx_FLAG_SIGNED) != 0 && utmp > INT32_MAX)
+            || ((it->size & INTxx_FLAG_SIGNED) == 0 && utmp > UINT32_MAX)) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_UINT32_C2I, ASN1_R_TOO_LARGE);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+    utmp2 = (uint32_t)utmp;
+    memcpy(cp, &utmp2, sizeof(utmp2));
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int uint32_print(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+                        int indent, const ASN1_PCTX *pctx)
+{
+    if ((it->size & INTxx_FLAG_SIGNED) == INTxx_FLAG_SIGNED)
+        return BIO_printf(out, "%d\n", **(int32_t **)pval);
+    return BIO_printf(out, "%u\n", **(uint32_t **)pval);
+}
+
+
+/* Define the primitives themselves */
+
+static ASN1_PRIMITIVE_FUNCS uint32_pf = {
+    NULL, 0,
+    uint32_new,
+    uint32_free,
+    uint32_clear,
+    uint32_c2i,
+    uint32_i2c,
+    uint32_print
+};
+
+static ASN1_PRIMITIVE_FUNCS uint64_pf = {
+    NULL, 0,
+    uint64_new,
+    uint64_free,
+    uint64_clear,
+    uint64_c2i,
+    uint64_i2c,
+    uint64_print
+};
+
+ASN1_ITEM_start(INT32)
+    ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE, V_ASN1_INTEGER, NULL, 0, &uint32_pf,
+    INTxx_FLAG_SIGNED, "INT32"
+ASN1_ITEM_end(INT32)
+
+ASN1_ITEM_start(UINT32)
+    ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE, V_ASN1_INTEGER, NULL, 0, &uint32_pf, 0, "UINT32"
+ASN1_ITEM_end(UINT32)
+
+ASN1_ITEM_start(INT64)
+    ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE, V_ASN1_INTEGER, NULL, 0, &uint64_pf,
+    INTxx_FLAG_SIGNED, "INT64"
+ASN1_ITEM_end(INT64)
+
+ASN1_ITEM_start(UINT64)
+    ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE, V_ASN1_INTEGER, NULL, 0, &uint64_pf, 0, "UINT64"
+ASN1_ITEM_end(UINT64)
+
+ASN1_ITEM_start(ZINT32)
+    ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE, V_ASN1_INTEGER, NULL, 0, &uint32_pf,
+    INTxx_FLAG_ZERO_DEFAULT|INTxx_FLAG_SIGNED, "ZINT32"
+ASN1_ITEM_end(ZINT32)
+
+ASN1_ITEM_start(ZUINT32)
+    ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE, V_ASN1_INTEGER, NULL, 0, &uint32_pf,
+    INTxx_FLAG_ZERO_DEFAULT, "ZUINT32"
+ASN1_ITEM_end(ZUINT32)
+
+ASN1_ITEM_start(ZINT64)
+    ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE, V_ASN1_INTEGER, NULL, 0, &uint64_pf,
+    INTxx_FLAG_ZERO_DEFAULT|INTxx_FLAG_SIGNED, "ZINT64"
+ASN1_ITEM_end(ZINT64)
+
+ASN1_ITEM_start(ZUINT64)
+    ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE, V_ASN1_INTEGER, NULL, 0, &uint64_pf,
+    INTxx_FLAG_ZERO_DEFAULT, "ZUINT64"
+ASN1_ITEM_end(ZUINT64)
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/x_long.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/x_long.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5895345
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/x_long.c
@@ -0,0 +1,196 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+
+/*
+ * Custom primitive type for long handling. This converts between an
+ * ASN1_INTEGER and a long directly.
+ */
+
+static int long_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
+static void long_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
+
+static int long_i2c(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char *cont, int *putype,
+                    const ASN1_ITEM *it);
+static int long_c2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char *cont, int len,
+                    int utype, char *free_cont, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
+static int long_print(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+                      int indent, const ASN1_PCTX *pctx);
+
+static ASN1_PRIMITIVE_FUNCS long_pf = {
+    NULL, 0,
+    long_new,
+    long_free,
+    long_free,                  /* Clear should set to initial value */
+    long_c2i,
+    long_i2c,
+    long_print
+};
+
+ASN1_ITEM_start(LONG)
+        ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE, V_ASN1_INTEGER, NULL, 0, &long_pf, ASN1_LONG_UNDEF, "LONG"
+ASN1_ITEM_end(LONG)
+
+ASN1_ITEM_start(ZLONG)
+        ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE, V_ASN1_INTEGER, NULL, 0, &long_pf, 0, "ZLONG"
+ASN1_ITEM_end(ZLONG)
+
+static int long_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
+{
+    *(long *)pval = it->size;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static void long_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
+{
+    *(long *)pval = it->size;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Originally BN_num_bits_word was called to perform this operation, but
+ * trouble is that there is no guarantee that sizeof(long) equals to
+ * sizeof(BN_ULONG). BN_ULONG is a configurable type that can be as wide
+ * as long, but also double or half...
+ */
+static int num_bits_ulong(unsigned long value)
+{
+    size_t i;
+    unsigned long ret = 0;
+
+    /*
+     * It is argued that *on average* constant counter loop performs
+     * not worse [if not better] than one with conditional break or
+     * mask-n-table-lookup-style, because of branch misprediction
+     * penalties.
+     */
+    for (i = 0; i < sizeof(value) * 8; i++) {
+        ret += (value != 0);
+        value >>= 1;
+    }
+
+    return (int)ret;
+}
+
+static int long_i2c(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char *cont, int *putype,
+                    const ASN1_ITEM *it)
+{
+    long ltmp;
+    unsigned long utmp, sign;
+    int clen, pad, i;
+    /* this exists to bypass broken gcc optimization */
+    char *cp = (char *)pval;
+
+    /* use memcpy, because we may not be long aligned */
+    memcpy(&ltmp, cp, sizeof(long));
+
+    if (ltmp == it->size)
+        return -1;
+    /*
+     * Convert the long to positive: we subtract one if negative so we can
+     * cleanly handle the padding if only the MSB of the leading octet is
+     * set.
+     */
+    if (ltmp < 0) {
+        sign = 0xff;
+        utmp = 0 - (unsigned long)ltmp - 1;
+    } else {
+        sign = 0;
+        utmp = ltmp;
+    }
+    clen = num_bits_ulong(utmp);
+    /* If MSB of leading octet set we need to pad */
+    if (!(clen & 0x7))
+        pad = 1;
+    else
+        pad = 0;
+
+    /* Convert number of bits to number of octets */
+    clen = (clen + 7) >> 3;
+
+    if (cont != NULL) {
+        if (pad)
+            *cont++ = (unsigned char)sign;
+        for (i = clen - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+            cont[i] = (unsigned char)(utmp ^ sign);
+            utmp >>= 8;
+        }
+    }
+    return clen + pad;
+}
+
+static int long_c2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char *cont, int len,
+                    int utype, char *free_cont, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
+{
+    int i;
+    long ltmp;
+    unsigned long utmp = 0, sign = 0x100;
+    char *cp = (char *)pval;
+
+    if (len > 1) {
+        /*
+         * Check possible pad byte.  Worst case, we're skipping past actual
+         * content, but since that's only with 0x00 and 0xff and we set neg
+         * accordingly, the result will be correct in the end anyway.
+         */
+        switch (cont[0]) {
+        case 0xff:
+            cont++;
+            len--;
+            sign = 0xff;
+            break;
+        case 0:
+            cont++;
+            len--;
+            sign = 0;
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    if (len > (int)sizeof(long)) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_LONG_C2I, ASN1_R_INTEGER_TOO_LARGE_FOR_LONG);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (sign == 0x100) {
+        /* Is it negative? */
+        if (len && (cont[0] & 0x80))
+            sign = 0xff;
+        else
+            sign = 0;
+    } else if (((sign ^ cont[0]) & 0x80) == 0) { /* same sign bit? */
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_LONG_C2I, ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    utmp = 0;
+    for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+        utmp <<= 8;
+        utmp |= cont[i] ^ sign;
+    }
+    ltmp = (long)utmp;
+    if (ltmp < 0) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_LONG_C2I, ASN1_R_INTEGER_TOO_LARGE_FOR_LONG);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (sign)
+        ltmp = -ltmp - 1;
+    if (ltmp == it->size) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_LONG_C2I, ASN1_R_INTEGER_TOO_LARGE_FOR_LONG);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    memcpy(cp, &ltmp, sizeof(long));
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int long_print(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+                      int indent, const ASN1_PCTX *pctx)
+{
+    return BIO_printf(out, "%ld\n", *(long *)pval);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/x_pkey.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/x_pkey.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..593049f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/x_pkey.c
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+X509_PKEY *X509_PKEY_new(void)
+{
+    X509_PKEY *ret = NULL;
+
+    ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
+    if (ret == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    ret->enc_algor = X509_ALGOR_new();
+    ret->enc_pkey = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
+    if (ret->enc_algor == NULL || ret->enc_pkey == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    return ret;
+err:
+    X509_PKEY_free(ret);
+    ASN1err(ASN1_F_X509_PKEY_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+void X509_PKEY_free(X509_PKEY *x)
+{
+    if (x == NULL)
+        return;
+
+    X509_ALGOR_free(x->enc_algor);
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(x->enc_pkey);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(x->dec_pkey);
+    if (x->key_free)
+        OPENSSL_free(x->key_data);
+    OPENSSL_free(x);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/x_sig.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/x_sig.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e465cf2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/x_sig.c
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include "internal/x509_int.h"
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(X509_SIG) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_SIG, algor, X509_ALGOR),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_SIG, digest, ASN1_OCTET_STRING)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(X509_SIG)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_SIG)
+
+void X509_SIG_get0(const X509_SIG *sig, const X509_ALGOR **palg,
+                   const ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pdigest)
+{
+    if (palg)
+        *palg = sig->algor;
+    if (pdigest)
+        *pdigest = sig->digest;
+}
+
+void X509_SIG_getm(X509_SIG *sig, X509_ALGOR **palg,
+                   ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pdigest)
+{
+    if (palg)
+        *palg = sig->algor;
+    if (pdigest)
+        *pdigest = sig->digest;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/x_spki.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/x_spki.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c45400b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/x_spki.c
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+ /*
+  * This module was send to me my Pat Richards <patr@x509.com> who wrote it.
+  * It is under my Copyright with his permission
+  */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(NETSCAPE_SPKAC) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(NETSCAPE_SPKAC, pubkey, X509_PUBKEY),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(NETSCAPE_SPKAC, challenge, ASN1_IA5STRING)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(NETSCAPE_SPKAC)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(NETSCAPE_SPKAC)
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(NETSCAPE_SPKI) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(NETSCAPE_SPKI, spkac, NETSCAPE_SPKAC),
+        ASN1_EMBED(NETSCAPE_SPKI, sig_algor, X509_ALGOR),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(NETSCAPE_SPKI, signature, ASN1_BIT_STRING)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(NETSCAPE_SPKI)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(NETSCAPE_SPKI)
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/x_val.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/x_val.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d1f1d3b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/asn1/x_val.c
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(X509_VAL) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_VAL, notBefore, ASN1_TIME),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_VAL, notAfter, ASN1_TIME)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(X509_VAL)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_VAL)
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/async/arch/async_null.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/async/arch/async_null.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3eaf170
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/async/arch/async_null.c
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* This must be the first #include file */
+#include "../async_locl.h"
+
+#ifdef ASYNC_NULL
+int ASYNC_is_capable(void)
+{
+    return 0;
+}
+
+void async_local_cleanup(void)
+{
+}
+#endif
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/async/arch/async_null.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/async/arch/async_null.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..aef40b5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/async/arch/async_null.h
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/async.h>
+
+/*
+ * If we haven't managed to detect any other async architecture then we default
+ * to NULL.
+ */
+#ifndef ASYNC_ARCH
+# define ASYNC_NULL
+# define ASYNC_ARCH
+
+typedef struct async_fibre_st {
+    int dummy;
+} async_fibre;
+
+
+# define async_fibre_swapcontext(o,n,r)         0
+# define async_fibre_makecontext(c)             0
+# define async_fibre_free(f)
+# define async_fibre_init_dispatcher(f)
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/async/arch/async_posix.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/async/arch/async_posix.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..02c342d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/async/arch/async_posix.c
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* This must be the first #include file */
+#include "../async_locl.h"
+
+#ifdef ASYNC_POSIX
+
+# include <stddef.h>
+# include <unistd.h>
+
+#define STACKSIZE       32768
+
+int ASYNC_is_capable(void)
+{
+    ucontext_t ctx;
+
+    /*
+     * Some platforms provide getcontext() but it does not work (notably
+     * MacOSX PPC64). Check for a working getcontext();
+     */
+    return getcontext(&ctx) == 0;
+}
+
+void async_local_cleanup(void)
+{
+}
+
+int async_fibre_makecontext(async_fibre *fibre)
+{
+    fibre->env_init = 0;
+    if (getcontext(&fibre->fibre) == 0) {
+        fibre->fibre.uc_stack.ss_sp = OPENSSL_malloc(STACKSIZE);
+        if (fibre->fibre.uc_stack.ss_sp != NULL) {
+            fibre->fibre.uc_stack.ss_size = STACKSIZE;
+            fibre->fibre.uc_link = NULL;
+            makecontext(&fibre->fibre, async_start_func, 0);
+            return 1;
+        }
+    } else {
+        fibre->fibre.uc_stack.ss_sp = NULL;
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+void async_fibre_free(async_fibre *fibre)
+{
+    OPENSSL_free(fibre->fibre.uc_stack.ss_sp);
+    fibre->fibre.uc_stack.ss_sp = NULL;
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/async/arch/async_posix.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/async/arch/async_posix.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..76937a9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/async/arch/async_posix.h
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2015-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_ASYNC_ARCH_ASYNC_POSIX_H
+#define OPENSSL_ASYNC_ARCH_ASYNC_POSIX_H
+#include <openssl/e_os2.h>
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX) \
+    && defined(OPENSSL_THREADS) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASYNC) \
+    && !defined(__ANDROID__) && !defined(__OpenBSD__)
+
+# include <unistd.h>
+
+# if _POSIX_VERSION >= 200112L
+
+# include <pthread.h>
+
+#  define ASYNC_POSIX
+#  define ASYNC_ARCH
+
+#  include <ucontext.h>
+#  include <setjmp.h>
+#  include "e_os.h"
+
+typedef struct async_fibre_st {
+    ucontext_t fibre;
+    jmp_buf env;
+    int env_init;
+} async_fibre;
+
+static ossl_inline int async_fibre_swapcontext(async_fibre *o, async_fibre *n, int r)
+{
+    o->env_init = 1;
+
+    if (!r || !_setjmp(o->env)) {
+        if (n->env_init)
+            _longjmp(n->env, 1);
+        else
+            setcontext(&n->fibre);
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+#  define async_fibre_init_dispatcher(d)
+
+int async_fibre_makecontext(async_fibre *fibre);
+void async_fibre_free(async_fibre *fibre);
+
+# endif
+#endif
+#endif /* OPENSSL_ASYNC_ARCH_ASYNC_POSIX_H */
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/async/arch/async_win.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/async/arch/async_win.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..077d56c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/async/arch/async_win.c
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* This must be the first #include file */
+#include "../async_locl.h"
+
+#ifdef ASYNC_WIN
+
+# include <windows.h>
+# include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+
+int ASYNC_is_capable(void)
+{
+    return 1;
+}
+
+void async_local_cleanup(void)
+{
+    async_ctx *ctx = async_get_ctx();
+    if (ctx != NULL) {
+        async_fibre *fibre = &ctx->dispatcher;
+        if (fibre != NULL && fibre->fibre != NULL && fibre->converted) {
+            ConvertFiberToThread();
+            fibre->fibre = NULL;
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+int async_fibre_init_dispatcher(async_fibre *fibre)
+{
+    fibre->fibre = ConvertThreadToFiber(NULL);
+    if (fibre->fibre == NULL) {
+        fibre->converted = 0;
+        fibre->fibre = GetCurrentFiber();
+        if (fibre->fibre == NULL)
+            return 0;
+    } else {
+        fibre->converted = 1;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+VOID CALLBACK async_start_func_win(PVOID unused)
+{
+    async_start_func();
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/async/arch/async_win.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/async/arch/async_win.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..61cfdd7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/async/arch/async_win.h
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * This is the same detection used in cryptlib to set up the thread local
+ * storage that we depend on, so just copy that
+ */
+#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASYNC)
+#include <openssl/async.h>
+# define ASYNC_WIN
+# define ASYNC_ARCH
+
+# include <windows.h>
+# include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+
+typedef struct async_fibre_st {
+    LPVOID fibre;
+    int converted;
+} async_fibre;
+
+# define async_fibre_swapcontext(o,n,r) \
+        (SwitchToFiber((n)->fibre), 1)
+# define async_fibre_makecontext(c) \
+        ((c)->fibre = CreateFiber(0, async_start_func_win, 0))
+# define async_fibre_free(f)             (DeleteFiber((f)->fibre))
+
+int async_fibre_init_dispatcher(async_fibre *fibre);
+VOID CALLBACK async_start_func_win(PVOID unused);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/async/async.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/async/async.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9a4e6b2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/async/async.c
@@ -0,0 +1,433 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Without this we start getting longjmp crashes because it thinks we're jumping
+ * up the stack when in fact we are jumping to an entirely different stack. The
+ * cost of this is not having certain buffer overrun/underrun checks etc for
+ * this source file :-(
+ */
+#undef _FORTIFY_SOURCE
+
+/* This must be the first #include file */
+#include "async_locl.h"
+
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <internal/cryptlib_int.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#define ASYNC_JOB_RUNNING   0
+#define ASYNC_JOB_PAUSING   1
+#define ASYNC_JOB_PAUSED    2
+#define ASYNC_JOB_STOPPING  3
+
+static CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL ctxkey;
+static CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL poolkey;
+
+static void async_free_pool_internal(async_pool *pool);
+
+static async_ctx *async_ctx_new(void)
+{
+    async_ctx *nctx = NULL;
+
+    nctx = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(async_ctx));
+    if (nctx == NULL) {
+        ASYNCerr(ASYNC_F_ASYNC_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    async_fibre_init_dispatcher(&nctx->dispatcher);
+    nctx->currjob = NULL;
+    nctx->blocked = 0;
+    if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&ctxkey, nctx))
+        goto err;
+
+    return nctx;
+err:
+    OPENSSL_free(nctx);
+
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+async_ctx *async_get_ctx(void)
+{
+    if (!OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_ASYNC, NULL))
+        return NULL;
+
+    return (async_ctx *)CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&ctxkey);
+}
+
+static int async_ctx_free(void)
+{
+    async_ctx *ctx;
+
+    ctx = async_get_ctx();
+
+    if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&ctxkey, NULL))
+        return 0;
+
+    OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static ASYNC_JOB *async_job_new(void)
+{
+    ASYNC_JOB *job = NULL;
+
+    job = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(ASYNC_JOB));
+    if (job == NULL) {
+        ASYNCerr(ASYNC_F_ASYNC_JOB_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    job->status = ASYNC_JOB_RUNNING;
+
+    return job;
+}
+
+static void async_job_free(ASYNC_JOB *job)
+{
+    if (job != NULL) {
+        OPENSSL_free(job->funcargs);
+        async_fibre_free(&job->fibrectx);
+        OPENSSL_free(job);
+    }
+}
+
+static ASYNC_JOB *async_get_pool_job(void) {
+    ASYNC_JOB *job;
+    async_pool *pool;
+
+    pool = (async_pool *)CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&poolkey);
+    if (pool == NULL) {
+        /*
+         * Pool has not been initialised, so init with the defaults, i.e.
+         * no max size and no pre-created jobs
+         */
+        if (ASYNC_init_thread(0, 0) == 0)
+            return NULL;
+        pool = (async_pool *)CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&poolkey);
+    }
+
+    job = sk_ASYNC_JOB_pop(pool->jobs);
+    if (job == NULL) {
+        /* Pool is empty */
+        if ((pool->max_size != 0) && (pool->curr_size >= pool->max_size))
+            return NULL;
+
+        job = async_job_new();
+        if (job != NULL) {
+            if (! async_fibre_makecontext(&job->fibrectx)) {
+                async_job_free(job);
+                return NULL;
+            }
+            pool->curr_size++;
+        }
+    }
+    return job;
+}
+
+static void async_release_job(ASYNC_JOB *job) {
+    async_pool *pool;
+
+    pool = (async_pool *)CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&poolkey);
+    OPENSSL_free(job->funcargs);
+    job->funcargs = NULL;
+    sk_ASYNC_JOB_push(pool->jobs, job);
+}
+
+void async_start_func(void)
+{
+    ASYNC_JOB *job;
+    async_ctx *ctx = async_get_ctx();
+
+    while (1) {
+        /* Run the job */
+        job = ctx->currjob;
+        job->ret = job->func(job->funcargs);
+
+        /* Stop the job */
+        job->status = ASYNC_JOB_STOPPING;
+        if (!async_fibre_swapcontext(&job->fibrectx,
+                                     &ctx->dispatcher, 1)) {
+            /*
+             * Should not happen. Getting here will close the thread...can't do
+             * much about it
+             */
+            ASYNCerr(ASYNC_F_ASYNC_START_FUNC, ASYNC_R_FAILED_TO_SWAP_CONTEXT);
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+int ASYNC_start_job(ASYNC_JOB **job, ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *wctx, int *ret,
+                    int (*func)(void *), void *args, size_t size)
+{
+    async_ctx *ctx = async_get_ctx();
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        ctx = async_ctx_new();
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+        return ASYNC_ERR;
+    }
+
+    if (*job) {
+        ctx->currjob = *job;
+    }
+
+    for (;;) {
+        if (ctx->currjob != NULL) {
+            if (ctx->currjob->status == ASYNC_JOB_STOPPING) {
+                *ret = ctx->currjob->ret;
+                ctx->currjob->waitctx = NULL;
+                async_release_job(ctx->currjob);
+                ctx->currjob = NULL;
+                *job = NULL;
+                return ASYNC_FINISH;
+            }
+
+            if (ctx->currjob->status == ASYNC_JOB_PAUSING) {
+                *job = ctx->currjob;
+                ctx->currjob->status = ASYNC_JOB_PAUSED;
+                ctx->currjob = NULL;
+                return ASYNC_PAUSE;
+            }
+
+            if (ctx->currjob->status == ASYNC_JOB_PAUSED) {
+                ctx->currjob = *job;
+                /* Resume previous job */
+                if (!async_fibre_swapcontext(&ctx->dispatcher,
+                        &ctx->currjob->fibrectx, 1)) {
+                    ASYNCerr(ASYNC_F_ASYNC_START_JOB,
+                             ASYNC_R_FAILED_TO_SWAP_CONTEXT);
+                    goto err;
+                }
+                continue;
+            }
+
+            /* Should not happen */
+            ASYNCerr(ASYNC_F_ASYNC_START_JOB, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            async_release_job(ctx->currjob);
+            ctx->currjob = NULL;
+            *job = NULL;
+            return ASYNC_ERR;
+        }
+
+        /* Start a new job */
+        if ((ctx->currjob = async_get_pool_job()) == NULL) {
+            return ASYNC_NO_JOBS;
+        }
+
+        if (args != NULL) {
+            ctx->currjob->funcargs = OPENSSL_malloc(size);
+            if (ctx->currjob->funcargs == NULL) {
+                ASYNCerr(ASYNC_F_ASYNC_START_JOB, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                async_release_job(ctx->currjob);
+                ctx->currjob = NULL;
+                return ASYNC_ERR;
+            }
+            memcpy(ctx->currjob->funcargs, args, size);
+        } else {
+            ctx->currjob->funcargs = NULL;
+        }
+
+        ctx->currjob->func = func;
+        ctx->currjob->waitctx = wctx;
+        if (!async_fibre_swapcontext(&ctx->dispatcher,
+                &ctx->currjob->fibrectx, 1)) {
+            ASYNCerr(ASYNC_F_ASYNC_START_JOB, ASYNC_R_FAILED_TO_SWAP_CONTEXT);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+err:
+    async_release_job(ctx->currjob);
+    ctx->currjob = NULL;
+    *job = NULL;
+    return ASYNC_ERR;
+}
+
+int ASYNC_pause_job(void)
+{
+    ASYNC_JOB *job;
+    async_ctx *ctx = async_get_ctx();
+
+    if (ctx == NULL
+            || ctx->currjob == NULL
+            || ctx->blocked) {
+        /*
+         * Could be we've deliberately not been started within a job so this is
+         * counted as success.
+         */
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    job = ctx->currjob;
+    job->status = ASYNC_JOB_PAUSING;
+
+    if (!async_fibre_swapcontext(&job->fibrectx,
+                                 &ctx->dispatcher, 1)) {
+        ASYNCerr(ASYNC_F_ASYNC_PAUSE_JOB, ASYNC_R_FAILED_TO_SWAP_CONTEXT);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    /* Reset counts of added and deleted fds */
+    async_wait_ctx_reset_counts(job->waitctx);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static void async_empty_pool(async_pool *pool)
+{
+    ASYNC_JOB *job;
+
+    if (!pool || !pool->jobs)
+        return;
+
+    do {
+        job = sk_ASYNC_JOB_pop(pool->jobs);
+        async_job_free(job);
+    } while (job);
+}
+
+int async_init(void)
+{
+    if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local(&ctxkey, NULL))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local(&poolkey, NULL)) {
+        CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&ctxkey);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+void async_deinit(void)
+{
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&ctxkey);
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&poolkey);
+}
+
+int ASYNC_init_thread(size_t max_size, size_t init_size)
+{
+    async_pool *pool;
+    size_t curr_size = 0;
+
+    if (init_size > max_size) {
+        ASYNCerr(ASYNC_F_ASYNC_INIT_THREAD, ASYNC_R_INVALID_POOL_SIZE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (!OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_ASYNC, NULL)) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (!ossl_init_thread_start(OPENSSL_INIT_THREAD_ASYNC)) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    pool = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*pool));
+    if (pool == NULL) {
+        ASYNCerr(ASYNC_F_ASYNC_INIT_THREAD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    pool->jobs = sk_ASYNC_JOB_new_null();
+    if (pool->jobs == NULL) {
+        ASYNCerr(ASYNC_F_ASYNC_INIT_THREAD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        OPENSSL_free(pool);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    pool->max_size = max_size;
+
+    /* Pre-create jobs as required */
+    while (init_size--) {
+        ASYNC_JOB *job;
+        job = async_job_new();
+        if (job == NULL || !async_fibre_makecontext(&job->fibrectx)) {
+            /*
+             * Not actually fatal because we already created the pool, just
+             * skip creation of any more jobs
+             */
+            async_job_free(job);
+            break;
+        }
+        job->funcargs = NULL;
+        sk_ASYNC_JOB_push(pool->jobs, job);
+        curr_size++;
+    }
+    pool->curr_size = curr_size;
+    if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&poolkey, pool)) {
+        ASYNCerr(ASYNC_F_ASYNC_INIT_THREAD, ASYNC_R_FAILED_TO_SET_POOL);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+err:
+    async_free_pool_internal(pool);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static void async_free_pool_internal(async_pool *pool)
+{
+    if (pool == NULL)
+        return;
+
+    async_empty_pool(pool);
+    sk_ASYNC_JOB_free(pool->jobs);
+    OPENSSL_free(pool);
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&poolkey, NULL);
+    async_local_cleanup();
+    async_ctx_free();
+}
+
+void ASYNC_cleanup_thread(void)
+{
+    async_free_pool_internal((async_pool *)CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&poolkey));
+}
+
+ASYNC_JOB *ASYNC_get_current_job(void)
+{
+    async_ctx *ctx;
+
+    ctx = async_get_ctx();
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+
+    return ctx->currjob;
+}
+
+ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *ASYNC_get_wait_ctx(ASYNC_JOB *job)
+{
+    return job->waitctx;
+}
+
+void ASYNC_block_pause(void)
+{
+    async_ctx *ctx = async_get_ctx();
+    if (ctx == NULL || ctx->currjob == NULL) {
+        /*
+         * We're not in a job anyway so ignore this
+         */
+        return;
+    }
+    ctx->blocked++;
+}
+
+void ASYNC_unblock_pause(void)
+{
+    async_ctx *ctx = async_get_ctx();
+    if (ctx == NULL || ctx->currjob == NULL) {
+        /*
+         * We're not in a job anyway so ignore this
+         */
+        return;
+    }
+    if (ctx->blocked > 0)
+        ctx->blocked--;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/async/async_err.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/async/async_err.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ae97e96
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/async/async_err.c
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+/*
+ * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/async.h>
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+
+# define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_ASYNC,func,0)
+# define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_ASYNC,0,reason)
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA ASYNC_str_functs[] = {
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASYNC_F_ASYNC_CTX_NEW), "async_ctx_new"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASYNC_F_ASYNC_INIT_THREAD), "ASYNC_init_thread"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASYNC_F_ASYNC_JOB_NEW), "async_job_new"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASYNC_F_ASYNC_PAUSE_JOB), "ASYNC_pause_job"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASYNC_F_ASYNC_START_FUNC), "async_start_func"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASYNC_F_ASYNC_START_JOB), "ASYNC_start_job"},
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA ASYNC_str_reasons[] = {
+    {ERR_REASON(ASYNC_R_FAILED_TO_SET_POOL), "failed to set pool"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASYNC_R_FAILED_TO_SWAP_CONTEXT), "failed to swap context"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASYNC_R_INIT_FAILED), "init failed"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ASYNC_R_INVALID_POOL_SIZE), "invalid pool size"},
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+
+#endif
+
+int ERR_load_ASYNC_strings(void)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+
+    if (ERR_func_error_string(ASYNC_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) {
+        ERR_load_strings(0, ASYNC_str_functs);
+        ERR_load_strings(0, ASYNC_str_reasons);
+    }
+#endif
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/async/async_locl.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/async/async_locl.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f0ac05a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/async/async_locl.h
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Must do this before including any header files, because on MacOS/X <stlib.h>
+ * includes <signal.h> which includes <ucontext.h>
+ */
+#if defined(__APPLE__) && defined(__MACH__) && !defined(_XOPEN_SOURCE)
+# define _XOPEN_SOURCE          /* Otherwise incomplete ucontext_t structure */
+# pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wdeprecated-declarations"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(_WIN32)
+# include <windows.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <internal/async.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+
+typedef struct async_ctx_st async_ctx;
+typedef struct async_pool_st async_pool;
+
+#include "arch/async_win.h"
+#include "arch/async_posix.h"
+#include "arch/async_null.h"
+
+struct async_ctx_st {
+    async_fibre dispatcher;
+    ASYNC_JOB *currjob;
+    unsigned int blocked;
+};
+
+struct async_job_st {
+    async_fibre fibrectx;
+    int (*func) (void *);
+    void *funcargs;
+    int ret;
+    int status;
+    ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *waitctx;
+};
+
+struct fd_lookup_st {
+    const void *key;
+    OSSL_ASYNC_FD fd;
+    void *custom_data;
+    void (*cleanup)(ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *, const void *, OSSL_ASYNC_FD, void *);
+    int add;
+    int del;
+    struct fd_lookup_st *next;
+};
+
+struct async_wait_ctx_st {
+    struct fd_lookup_st *fds;
+    size_t numadd;
+    size_t numdel;
+};
+
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(ASYNC_JOB)
+
+struct async_pool_st {
+    STACK_OF(ASYNC_JOB) *jobs;
+    size_t curr_size;
+    size_t max_size;
+};
+
+void async_local_cleanup(void);
+void async_start_func(void);
+async_ctx *async_get_ctx(void);
+
+void async_wait_ctx_reset_counts(ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *ctx);
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/async/async_wait.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/async/async_wait.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0a0bf87
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/async/async_wait.c
@@ -0,0 +1,211 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* This must be the first #include file */
+#include "async_locl.h"
+
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_new(void)
+{
+    return OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(ASYNC_WAIT_CTX));
+}
+
+void ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_free(ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    struct fd_lookup_st *curr;
+    struct fd_lookup_st *next;
+
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        return;
+
+    curr = ctx->fds;
+    while (curr != NULL) {
+        if (!curr->del) {
+            /* Only try and cleanup if it hasn't been marked deleted */
+            if (curr->cleanup != NULL)
+                curr->cleanup(ctx, curr->key, curr->fd, curr->custom_data);
+        }
+        /* Always free the fd_lookup_st */
+        next = curr->next;
+        OPENSSL_free(curr);
+        curr = next;
+    }
+
+    OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+}
+int ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_set_wait_fd(ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *ctx, const void *key,
+                               OSSL_ASYNC_FD fd, void *custom_data,
+                               void (*cleanup)(ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *, const void *,
+                                               OSSL_ASYNC_FD, void *))
+{
+    struct fd_lookup_st *fdlookup;
+
+    fdlookup = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*fdlookup));
+    if (fdlookup == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    fdlookup->key = key;
+    fdlookup->fd = fd;
+    fdlookup->custom_data = custom_data;
+    fdlookup->cleanup = cleanup;
+    fdlookup->add = 1;
+    fdlookup->next = ctx->fds;
+    ctx->fds = fdlookup;
+    ctx->numadd++;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_fd(ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *ctx, const void *key,
+                          OSSL_ASYNC_FD *fd, void **custom_data)
+{
+    struct fd_lookup_st *curr;
+
+    curr = ctx->fds;
+    while (curr != NULL) {
+        if (curr->del) {
+            /* This one has been marked deleted so do nothing */
+            curr = curr->next;
+            continue;
+        }
+        if (curr->key == key) {
+            *fd = curr->fd;
+            *custom_data = curr->custom_data;
+            return 1;
+        }
+        curr = curr->next;
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_all_fds(ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *ctx, OSSL_ASYNC_FD *fd,
+                               size_t *numfds)
+{
+    struct fd_lookup_st *curr;
+
+    curr = ctx->fds;
+    *numfds = 0;
+    while (curr != NULL) {
+        if (curr->del) {
+            /* This one has been marked deleted so do nothing */
+            curr = curr->next;
+            continue;
+        }
+        if (fd != NULL) {
+            *fd = curr->fd;
+            fd++;
+        }
+        (*numfds)++;
+        curr = curr->next;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_changed_fds(ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *ctx, OSSL_ASYNC_FD *addfd,
+                                   size_t *numaddfds, OSSL_ASYNC_FD *delfd,
+                                   size_t *numdelfds)
+{
+    struct fd_lookup_st *curr;
+
+    *numaddfds = ctx->numadd;
+    *numdelfds = ctx->numdel;
+    if (addfd == NULL && delfd == NULL)
+        return 1;
+
+    curr = ctx->fds;
+
+    while (curr != NULL) {
+        /* We ignore fds that have been marked as both added and deleted */
+        if (curr->del && !curr->add && (delfd != NULL)) {
+            *delfd = curr->fd;
+            delfd++;
+        }
+        if (curr->add && !curr->del && (addfd != NULL)) {
+            *addfd = curr->fd;
+            addfd++;
+        }
+        curr = curr->next;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_clear_fd(ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *ctx, const void *key)
+{
+    struct fd_lookup_st *curr, *prev;
+
+    curr = ctx->fds;
+    prev = NULL;
+    while (curr != NULL) {
+        if (curr->del == 1) {
+            /* This one has been marked deleted already so do nothing */
+            curr = curr->next;
+            continue;
+        }
+        if (curr->key == key) {
+            /* If fd has just been added, remove it from the list */
+            if (curr->add == 1) {
+                if (ctx->fds == curr) {
+                    ctx->fds = curr->next;
+                } else {
+                    prev->next = curr->next;
+                }
+
+                /* It is responsibility of the caller to cleanup before calling
+                 * ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_clear_fd
+                 */
+                OPENSSL_free(curr);
+                ctx->numadd--;
+                return 1;
+            }
+
+            /*
+             * Mark it as deleted. We don't call cleanup if explicitly asked
+             * to clear an fd. We assume the caller is going to do that (if
+             * appropriate).
+             */
+            curr->del = 1;
+            ctx->numdel++;
+            return 1;
+        }
+        prev = curr;
+        curr = curr->next;
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+void async_wait_ctx_reset_counts(ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    struct fd_lookup_st *curr, *prev = NULL;
+
+    ctx->numadd = 0;
+    ctx->numdel = 0;
+
+    curr = ctx->fds;
+
+    while (curr != NULL) {
+        if (curr->del) {
+            if (prev == NULL)
+                ctx->fds = curr->next;
+            else
+                prev->next = curr->next;
+            OPENSSL_free(curr);
+            if (prev == NULL)
+                curr = ctx->fds;
+            else
+                curr = prev->next;
+            continue;
+        }
+        if (curr->add) {
+            curr->add = 0;
+        }
+        prev = curr;
+        curr = curr->next;
+    }
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/async/build.info b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/async/build.info
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..278e3e9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/async/build.info
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+LIBS=../../libcrypto
+SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
+        async.c async_wait.c async_err.c arch/async_posix.c arch/async_win.c \
+        arch/async_null.c
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bf/asm/bf-586.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bf/asm/bf-586.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ebc24f4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bf/asm/bf-586.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm");
+require "x86asm.pl";
+require "cbc.pl";
+
+$output = pop;
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+&asm_init($ARGV[0],"bf-586.pl",$ARGV[$#ARGV] eq "386");
+
+$BF_ROUNDS=16;
+$BF_OFF=($BF_ROUNDS+2)*4;
+$L="edi";
+$R="esi";
+$P="ebp";
+$tmp1="eax";
+$tmp2="ebx";
+$tmp3="ecx";
+$tmp4="edx";
+
+&BF_encrypt("BF_encrypt",1);
+&BF_encrypt("BF_decrypt",0);
+&cbc("BF_cbc_encrypt","BF_encrypt","BF_decrypt",1,4,5,3,-1,-1);
+&asm_finish();
+
+close STDOUT;
+
+sub BF_encrypt
+	{
+	local($name,$enc)=@_;
+
+	&function_begin_B($name,"");
+
+	&comment("");
+
+	&push("ebp");
+	&push("ebx");
+	&mov($tmp2,&wparam(0));
+	&mov($P,&wparam(1));
+	&push("esi");
+	&push("edi");
+
+	&comment("Load the 2 words");
+	&mov($L,&DWP(0,$tmp2,"",0));
+	&mov($R,&DWP(4,$tmp2,"",0));
+
+	&xor(	$tmp1,	$tmp1);
+
+	# encrypting part
+
+	if ($enc)
+		{
+		 &mov($tmp2,&DWP(0,$P,"",0));
+		&xor(	$tmp3,	$tmp3);
+
+		&xor($L,$tmp2);
+		for ($i=0; $i<$BF_ROUNDS; $i+=2)
+			{
+			&comment("");
+			&comment("Round $i");
+			&BF_ENCRYPT($i+1,$R,$L,$P,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3,$tmp4,1);
+
+			&comment("");
+			&comment("Round ".sprintf("%d",$i+1));
+			&BF_ENCRYPT($i+2,$L,$R,$P,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3,$tmp4,1);
+			}
+		# &mov($tmp1,&wparam(0)); In last loop
+		&mov($tmp4,&DWP(($BF_ROUNDS+1)*4,$P,"",0));
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		 &mov($tmp2,&DWP(($BF_ROUNDS+1)*4,$P,"",0));
+		&xor(	$tmp3,	$tmp3);
+
+		&xor($L,$tmp2);
+		for ($i=$BF_ROUNDS; $i>0; $i-=2)
+			{
+			&comment("");
+			&comment("Round $i");
+			&BF_ENCRYPT($i,$R,$L,$P,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3,$tmp4,0);
+			&comment("");
+			&comment("Round ".sprintf("%d",$i-1));
+			&BF_ENCRYPT($i-1,$L,$R,$P,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3,$tmp4,0);
+			}
+		# &mov($tmp1,&wparam(0)); In last loop
+		&mov($tmp4,&DWP(0,$P,"",0));
+		}
+
+	&xor($R,$tmp4);
+	&mov(&DWP(4,$tmp1,"",0),$L);
+
+	&mov(&DWP(0,$tmp1,"",0),$R);
+	&function_end($name);
+	}
+
+sub BF_ENCRYPT
+	{
+	local($i,$L,$R,$P,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3,$tmp4,$enc)=@_;
+
+	&mov(	$tmp4,		&DWP(&n2a($i*4),$P,"",0)); # for next round
+
+	&mov(	$tmp2,		$R);
+	&xor(	$L,		$tmp4);
+
+	&shr(	$tmp2,		16);
+	&mov(	$tmp4,		$R);
+
+	&movb(	&LB($tmp1),	&HB($tmp2));	# A
+	&and(	$tmp2,		0xff);		# B
+
+	&movb(	&LB($tmp3),	&HB($tmp4));	# C
+	&and(	$tmp4,		0xff);		# D
+
+	&mov(	$tmp1,		&DWP(&n2a($BF_OFF+0x0000),$P,$tmp1,4));
+	&mov(	$tmp2,		&DWP(&n2a($BF_OFF+0x0400),$P,$tmp2,4));
+
+	&add(	$tmp2,		$tmp1);
+	&mov(	$tmp1,		&DWP(&n2a($BF_OFF+0x0800),$P,$tmp3,4));
+
+	&xor(	$tmp2,		$tmp1);
+	&mov(	$tmp4,		&DWP(&n2a($BF_OFF+0x0C00),$P,$tmp4,4));
+
+	&add(	$tmp2,		$tmp4);
+	if (($enc && ($i != 16)) || ((!$enc) && ($i != 1)))
+		{ &xor(	$tmp1,		$tmp1); }
+	else
+		{
+		&comment("Load parameter 0 ($i) enc=$enc");
+		&mov($tmp1,&wparam(0));
+		} # In last loop
+
+	&xor(	$L,		$tmp2);
+	# delay
+	}
+
+sub n2a
+	{
+	sprintf("%d",$_[0]);
+	}
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bf/bf_cbc.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bf/bf_cbc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6ed6257
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bf/bf_cbc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/blowfish.h>
+#include "bf_locl.h"
+
+void BF_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, long length,
+                    const BF_KEY *schedule, unsigned char *ivec, int encrypt)
+{
+    register BF_LONG tin0, tin1;
+    register BF_LONG tout0, tout1, xor0, xor1;
+    register long l = length;
+    BF_LONG tin[2];
+
+    if (encrypt) {
+        n2l(ivec, tout0);
+        n2l(ivec, tout1);
+        ivec -= 8;
+        for (l -= 8; l >= 0; l -= 8) {
+            n2l(in, tin0);
+            n2l(in, tin1);
+            tin0 ^= tout0;
+            tin1 ^= tout1;
+            tin[0] = tin0;
+            tin[1] = tin1;
+            BF_encrypt(tin, schedule);
+            tout0 = tin[0];
+            tout1 = tin[1];
+            l2n(tout0, out);
+            l2n(tout1, out);
+        }
+        if (l != -8) {
+            n2ln(in, tin0, tin1, l + 8);
+            tin0 ^= tout0;
+            tin1 ^= tout1;
+            tin[0] = tin0;
+            tin[1] = tin1;
+            BF_encrypt(tin, schedule);
+            tout0 = tin[0];
+            tout1 = tin[1];
+            l2n(tout0, out);
+            l2n(tout1, out);
+        }
+        l2n(tout0, ivec);
+        l2n(tout1, ivec);
+    } else {
+        n2l(ivec, xor0);
+        n2l(ivec, xor1);
+        ivec -= 8;
+        for (l -= 8; l >= 0; l -= 8) {
+            n2l(in, tin0);
+            n2l(in, tin1);
+            tin[0] = tin0;
+            tin[1] = tin1;
+            BF_decrypt(tin, schedule);
+            tout0 = tin[0] ^ xor0;
+            tout1 = tin[1] ^ xor1;
+            l2n(tout0, out);
+            l2n(tout1, out);
+            xor0 = tin0;
+            xor1 = tin1;
+        }
+        if (l != -8) {
+            n2l(in, tin0);
+            n2l(in, tin1);
+            tin[0] = tin0;
+            tin[1] = tin1;
+            BF_decrypt(tin, schedule);
+            tout0 = tin[0] ^ xor0;
+            tout1 = tin[1] ^ xor1;
+            l2nn(tout0, tout1, out, l + 8);
+            xor0 = tin0;
+            xor1 = tin1;
+        }
+        l2n(xor0, ivec);
+        l2n(xor1, ivec);
+    }
+    tin0 = tin1 = tout0 = tout1 = xor0 = xor1 = 0;
+    tin[0] = tin[1] = 0;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bf/bf_cfb64.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bf/bf_cfb64.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ce6e13b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bf/bf_cfb64.c
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/blowfish.h>
+#include "bf_locl.h"
+
+/*
+ * The input and output encrypted as though 64bit cfb mode is being used.
+ * The extra state information to record how much of the 64bit block we have
+ * used is contained in *num;
+ */
+
+void BF_cfb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                      long length, const BF_KEY *schedule,
+                      unsigned char *ivec, int *num, int encrypt)
+{
+    register BF_LONG v0, v1, t;
+    register int n = *num;
+    register long l = length;
+    BF_LONG ti[2];
+    unsigned char *iv, c, cc;
+
+    iv = (unsigned char *)ivec;
+    if (encrypt) {
+        while (l--) {
+            if (n == 0) {
+                n2l(iv, v0);
+                ti[0] = v0;
+                n2l(iv, v1);
+                ti[1] = v1;
+                BF_encrypt((BF_LONG *)ti, schedule);
+                iv = (unsigned char *)ivec;
+                t = ti[0];
+                l2n(t, iv);
+                t = ti[1];
+                l2n(t, iv);
+                iv = (unsigned char *)ivec;
+            }
+            c = *(in++) ^ iv[n];
+            *(out++) = c;
+            iv[n] = c;
+            n = (n + 1) & 0x07;
+        }
+    } else {
+        while (l--) {
+            if (n == 0) {
+                n2l(iv, v0);
+                ti[0] = v0;
+                n2l(iv, v1);
+                ti[1] = v1;
+                BF_encrypt((BF_LONG *)ti, schedule);
+                iv = (unsigned char *)ivec;
+                t = ti[0];
+                l2n(t, iv);
+                t = ti[1];
+                l2n(t, iv);
+                iv = (unsigned char *)ivec;
+            }
+            cc = *(in++);
+            c = iv[n];
+            iv[n] = cc;
+            *(out++) = c ^ cc;
+            n = (n + 1) & 0x07;
+        }
+    }
+    v0 = v1 = ti[0] = ti[1] = t = c = cc = 0;
+    *num = n;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bf/bf_ecb.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bf/bf_ecb.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..aa73540
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bf/bf_ecb.c
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/blowfish.h>
+#include "bf_locl.h"
+#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+
+/*
+ * Blowfish as implemented from 'Blowfish: Springer-Verlag paper' (From
+ * LECTURE NOTES IN COMPUTER SCIENCE 809, FAST SOFTWARE ENCRYPTION, CAMBRIDGE
+ * SECURITY WORKSHOP, CAMBRIDGE, U.K., DECEMBER 9-11, 1993)
+ */
+
+const char *BF_options(void)
+{
+    return ("blowfish(ptr)");
+}
+
+void BF_ecb_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                    const BF_KEY *key, int encrypt)
+{
+    BF_LONG l, d[2];
+
+    n2l(in, l);
+    d[0] = l;
+    n2l(in, l);
+    d[1] = l;
+    if (encrypt)
+        BF_encrypt(d, key);
+    else
+        BF_decrypt(d, key);
+    l = d[0];
+    l2n(l, out);
+    l = d[1];
+    l2n(l, out);
+    l = d[0] = d[1] = 0;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bf/bf_enc.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bf/bf_enc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9f80c56
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bf/bf_enc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,179 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/blowfish.h>
+#include "bf_locl.h"
+
+/*
+ * Blowfish as implemented from 'Blowfish: Springer-Verlag paper' (From
+ * LECTURE NOTES IN COMPUTER SCIENCE 809, FAST SOFTWARE ENCRYPTION, CAMBRIDGE
+ * SECURITY WORKSHOP, CAMBRIDGE, U.K., DECEMBER 9-11, 1993)
+ */
+
+#if (BF_ROUNDS != 16) && (BF_ROUNDS != 20)
+# error If you set BF_ROUNDS to some value other than 16 or 20, you will have \
+to modify the code.
+#endif
+
+void BF_encrypt(BF_LONG *data, const BF_KEY *key)
+{
+    register BF_LONG l, r;
+    register const BF_LONG *p, *s;
+
+    p = key->P;
+    s = &(key->S[0]);
+    l = data[0];
+    r = data[1];
+
+    l ^= p[0];
+    BF_ENC(r, l, s, p[1]);
+    BF_ENC(l, r, s, p[2]);
+    BF_ENC(r, l, s, p[3]);
+    BF_ENC(l, r, s, p[4]);
+    BF_ENC(r, l, s, p[5]);
+    BF_ENC(l, r, s, p[6]);
+    BF_ENC(r, l, s, p[7]);
+    BF_ENC(l, r, s, p[8]);
+    BF_ENC(r, l, s, p[9]);
+    BF_ENC(l, r, s, p[10]);
+    BF_ENC(r, l, s, p[11]);
+    BF_ENC(l, r, s, p[12]);
+    BF_ENC(r, l, s, p[13]);
+    BF_ENC(l, r, s, p[14]);
+    BF_ENC(r, l, s, p[15]);
+    BF_ENC(l, r, s, p[16]);
+# if BF_ROUNDS == 20
+    BF_ENC(r, l, s, p[17]);
+    BF_ENC(l, r, s, p[18]);
+    BF_ENC(r, l, s, p[19]);
+    BF_ENC(l, r, s, p[20]);
+# endif
+    r ^= p[BF_ROUNDS + 1];
+
+    data[1] = l & 0xffffffffU;
+    data[0] = r & 0xffffffffU;
+}
+
+#ifndef BF_DEFAULT_OPTIONS
+
+void BF_decrypt(BF_LONG *data, const BF_KEY *key)
+{
+    register BF_LONG l, r;
+    register const BF_LONG *p, *s;
+
+    p = key->P;
+    s = &(key->S[0]);
+    l = data[0];
+    r = data[1];
+
+    l ^= p[BF_ROUNDS + 1];
+#  if BF_ROUNDS == 20
+    BF_ENC(r, l, s, p[20]);
+    BF_ENC(l, r, s, p[19]);
+    BF_ENC(r, l, s, p[18]);
+    BF_ENC(l, r, s, p[17]);
+#  endif
+    BF_ENC(r, l, s, p[16]);
+    BF_ENC(l, r, s, p[15]);
+    BF_ENC(r, l, s, p[14]);
+    BF_ENC(l, r, s, p[13]);
+    BF_ENC(r, l, s, p[12]);
+    BF_ENC(l, r, s, p[11]);
+    BF_ENC(r, l, s, p[10]);
+    BF_ENC(l, r, s, p[9]);
+    BF_ENC(r, l, s, p[8]);
+    BF_ENC(l, r, s, p[7]);
+    BF_ENC(r, l, s, p[6]);
+    BF_ENC(l, r, s, p[5]);
+    BF_ENC(r, l, s, p[4]);
+    BF_ENC(l, r, s, p[3]);
+    BF_ENC(r, l, s, p[2]);
+    BF_ENC(l, r, s, p[1]);
+    r ^= p[0];
+
+    data[1] = l & 0xffffffffU;
+    data[0] = r & 0xffffffffU;
+}
+
+void BF_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, long length,
+                    const BF_KEY *schedule, unsigned char *ivec, int encrypt)
+{
+    register BF_LONG tin0, tin1;
+    register BF_LONG tout0, tout1, xor0, xor1;
+    register long l = length;
+    BF_LONG tin[2];
+
+    if (encrypt) {
+        n2l(ivec, tout0);
+        n2l(ivec, tout1);
+        ivec -= 8;
+        for (l -= 8; l >= 0; l -= 8) {
+            n2l(in, tin0);
+            n2l(in, tin1);
+            tin0 ^= tout0;
+            tin1 ^= tout1;
+            tin[0] = tin0;
+            tin[1] = tin1;
+            BF_encrypt(tin, schedule);
+            tout0 = tin[0];
+            tout1 = tin[1];
+            l2n(tout0, out);
+            l2n(tout1, out);
+        }
+        if (l != -8) {
+            n2ln(in, tin0, tin1, l + 8);
+            tin0 ^= tout0;
+            tin1 ^= tout1;
+            tin[0] = tin0;
+            tin[1] = tin1;
+            BF_encrypt(tin, schedule);
+            tout0 = tin[0];
+            tout1 = tin[1];
+            l2n(tout0, out);
+            l2n(tout1, out);
+        }
+        l2n(tout0, ivec);
+        l2n(tout1, ivec);
+    } else {
+        n2l(ivec, xor0);
+        n2l(ivec, xor1);
+        ivec -= 8;
+        for (l -= 8; l >= 0; l -= 8) {
+            n2l(in, tin0);
+            n2l(in, tin1);
+            tin[0] = tin0;
+            tin[1] = tin1;
+            BF_decrypt(tin, schedule);
+            tout0 = tin[0] ^ xor0;
+            tout1 = tin[1] ^ xor1;
+            l2n(tout0, out);
+            l2n(tout1, out);
+            xor0 = tin0;
+            xor1 = tin1;
+        }
+        if (l != -8) {
+            n2l(in, tin0);
+            n2l(in, tin1);
+            tin[0] = tin0;
+            tin[1] = tin1;
+            BF_decrypt(tin, schedule);
+            tout0 = tin[0] ^ xor0;
+            tout1 = tin[1] ^ xor1;
+            l2nn(tout0, tout1, out, l + 8);
+            xor0 = tin0;
+            xor1 = tin1;
+        }
+        l2n(xor0, ivec);
+        l2n(xor1, ivec);
+    }
+    tin0 = tin1 = tout0 = tout1 = xor0 = xor1 = 0;
+    tin[0] = tin[1] = 0;
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bf/bf_locl.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bf/bf_locl.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b1a415e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bf/bf_locl.h
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_BF_LOCL_H
+# define HEADER_BF_LOCL_H
+# include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+
+/* NOTE - c is not incremented as per n2l */
+# define n2ln(c,l1,l2,n) { \
+                        c+=n; \
+                        l1=l2=0; \
+                        switch (n) { \
+                        case 8: l2 =((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))    ; \
+                        /* fall thru */                              \
+                        case 7: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<< 8; \
+                        /* fall thru */                              \
+                        case 6: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<16; \
+                        /* fall thru */                              \
+                        case 5: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<24; \
+                        /* fall thru */                              \
+                        case 4: l1 =((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))    ; \
+                        /* fall thru */                              \
+                        case 3: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<< 8; \
+                        /* fall thru */                              \
+                        case 2: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<16; \
+                        /* fall thru */                              \
+                        case 1: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<24; \
+                                } \
+                        }
+
+/* NOTE - c is not incremented as per l2n */
+# define l2nn(l1,l2,c,n) { \
+                        c+=n; \
+                        switch (n) { \
+                        case 8: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)    )&0xff); \
+                        /* fall thru */                                    \
+                        case 7: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>> 8)&0xff); \
+                        /* fall thru */                                    \
+                        case 6: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>>16)&0xff); \
+                        /* fall thru */                                    \
+                        case 5: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>>24)&0xff); \
+                        /* fall thru */                                    \
+                        case 4: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)    )&0xff); \
+                        /* fall thru */                                    \
+                        case 3: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>> 8)&0xff); \
+                        /* fall thru */                                    \
+                        case 2: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>>16)&0xff); \
+                        /* fall thru */                                    \
+                        case 1: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>>24)&0xff); \
+                                } \
+                        }
+
+# undef n2l
+# define n2l(c,l)        (l =((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<24L, \
+                         l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<16L, \
+                         l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<< 8L, \
+                         l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++))))
+
+# undef l2n
+# define l2n(l,c)        (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24L)&0xff), \
+                         *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16L)&0xff), \
+                         *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8L)&0xff), \
+                         *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)     )&0xff))
+
+/*
+ * This is actually a big endian algorithm, the most significant byte is used
+ * to lookup array 0
+ */
+
+# define BF_ENC(LL,R,S,P) ( \
+        LL^=P, \
+        LL^=((( S[       ((R>>24)&0xff)] + \
+                S[0x0100+((R>>16)&0xff)])^ \
+                S[0x0200+((R>> 8)&0xff)])+ \
+                S[0x0300+((R    )&0xff)])&0xffffffffU \
+        )
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bf/bf_ofb64.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bf/bf_ofb64.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6418217
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bf/bf_ofb64.c
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/blowfish.h>
+#include "bf_locl.h"
+
+/*
+ * The input and output encrypted as though 64bit ofb mode is being used.
+ * The extra state information to record how much of the 64bit block we have
+ * used is contained in *num;
+ */
+void BF_ofb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                      long length, const BF_KEY *schedule,
+                      unsigned char *ivec, int *num)
+{
+    register BF_LONG v0, v1, t;
+    register int n = *num;
+    register long l = length;
+    unsigned char d[8];
+    register char *dp;
+    BF_LONG ti[2];
+    unsigned char *iv;
+    int save = 0;
+
+    iv = (unsigned char *)ivec;
+    n2l(iv, v0);
+    n2l(iv, v1);
+    ti[0] = v0;
+    ti[1] = v1;
+    dp = (char *)d;
+    l2n(v0, dp);
+    l2n(v1, dp);
+    while (l--) {
+        if (n == 0) {
+            BF_encrypt((BF_LONG *)ti, schedule);
+            dp = (char *)d;
+            t = ti[0];
+            l2n(t, dp);
+            t = ti[1];
+            l2n(t, dp);
+            save++;
+        }
+        *(out++) = *(in++) ^ d[n];
+        n = (n + 1) & 0x07;
+    }
+    if (save) {
+        v0 = ti[0];
+        v1 = ti[1];
+        iv = (unsigned char *)ivec;
+        l2n(v0, iv);
+        l2n(v1, iv);
+    }
+    t = v0 = v1 = ti[0] = ti[1] = 0;
+    *num = n;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bf/bf_pi.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bf/bf_pi.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a054b03
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bf/bf_pi.h
@@ -0,0 +1,530 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+static const BF_KEY bf_init = {
+    {
+     0x243f6a88L, 0x85a308d3L, 0x13198a2eL, 0x03707344L,
+     0xa4093822L, 0x299f31d0L, 0x082efa98L, 0xec4e6c89L,
+     0x452821e6L, 0x38d01377L, 0xbe5466cfL, 0x34e90c6cL,
+     0xc0ac29b7L, 0xc97c50ddL, 0x3f84d5b5L, 0xb5470917L,
+     0x9216d5d9L, 0x8979fb1b}, {
+                                0xd1310ba6L, 0x98dfb5acL, 0x2ffd72dbL,
+                                0xd01adfb7L,
+                                0xb8e1afedL, 0x6a267e96L, 0xba7c9045L,
+                                0xf12c7f99L,
+                                0x24a19947L, 0xb3916cf7L, 0x0801f2e2L,
+                                0x858efc16L,
+                                0x636920d8L, 0x71574e69L, 0xa458fea3L,
+                                0xf4933d7eL,
+                                0x0d95748fL, 0x728eb658L, 0x718bcd58L,
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+                                0xbbcbee56L, 0x90bcb6deL, 0xebfc7da1L,
+                                0xce591d76L,
+                                0x6f05e409L, 0x4b7c0188L, 0x39720a3dL,
+                                0x7c927c24L,
+                                0x86e3725fL, 0x724d9db9L, 0x1ac15bb4L,
+                                0xd39eb8fcL,
+                                0xed545578L, 0x08fca5b5L, 0xd83d7cd3L,
+                                0x4dad0fc4L,
+                                0x1e50ef5eL, 0xb161e6f8L, 0xa28514d9L,
+                                0x6c51133cL,
+                                0x6fd5c7e7L, 0x56e14ec4L, 0x362abfceL,
+                                0xddc6c837L,
+                                0xd79a3234L, 0x92638212L, 0x670efa8eL,
+                                0x406000e0L,
+                                0x3a39ce37L, 0xd3faf5cfL, 0xabc27737L,
+                                0x5ac52d1bL,
+                                0x5cb0679eL, 0x4fa33742L, 0xd3822740L,
+                                0x99bc9bbeL,
+                                0xd5118e9dL, 0xbf0f7315L, 0xd62d1c7eL,
+                                0xc700c47bL,
+                                0xb78c1b6bL, 0x21a19045L, 0xb26eb1beL,
+                                0x6a366eb4L,
+                                0x5748ab2fL, 0xbc946e79L, 0xc6a376d2L,
+                                0x6549c2c8L,
+                                0x530ff8eeL, 0x468dde7dL, 0xd5730a1dL,
+                                0x4cd04dc6L,
+                                0x2939bbdbL, 0xa9ba4650L, 0xac9526e8L,
+                                0xbe5ee304L,
+                                0xa1fad5f0L, 0x6a2d519aL, 0x63ef8ce2L,
+                                0x9a86ee22L,
+                                0xc089c2b8L, 0x43242ef6L, 0xa51e03aaL,
+                                0x9cf2d0a4L,
+                                0x83c061baL, 0x9be96a4dL, 0x8fe51550L,
+                                0xba645bd6L,
+                                0x2826a2f9L, 0xa73a3ae1L, 0x4ba99586L,
+                                0xef5562e9L,
+                                0xc72fefd3L, 0xf752f7daL, 0x3f046f69L,
+                                0x77fa0a59L,
+                                0x80e4a915L, 0x87b08601L, 0x9b09e6adL,
+                                0x3b3ee593L,
+                                0xe990fd5aL, 0x9e34d797L, 0x2cf0b7d9L,
+                                0x022b8b51L,
+                                0x96d5ac3aL, 0x017da67dL, 0xd1cf3ed6L,
+                                0x7c7d2d28L,
+                                0x1f9f25cfL, 0xadf2b89bL, 0x5ad6b472L,
+                                0x5a88f54cL,
+                                0xe029ac71L, 0xe019a5e6L, 0x47b0acfdL,
+                                0xed93fa9bL,
+                                0xe8d3c48dL, 0x283b57ccL, 0xf8d56629L,
+                                0x79132e28L,
+                                0x785f0191L, 0xed756055L, 0xf7960e44L,
+                                0xe3d35e8cL,
+                                0x15056dd4L, 0x88f46dbaL, 0x03a16125L,
+                                0x0564f0bdL,
+                                0xc3eb9e15L, 0x3c9057a2L, 0x97271aecL,
+                                0xa93a072aL,
+                                0x1b3f6d9bL, 0x1e6321f5L, 0xf59c66fbL,
+                                0x26dcf319L,
+                                0x7533d928L, 0xb155fdf5L, 0x03563482L,
+                                0x8aba3cbbL,
+                                0x28517711L, 0xc20ad9f8L, 0xabcc5167L,
+                                0xccad925fL,
+                                0x4de81751L, 0x3830dc8eL, 0x379d5862L,
+                                0x9320f991L,
+                                0xea7a90c2L, 0xfb3e7bceL, 0x5121ce64L,
+                                0x774fbe32L,
+                                0xa8b6e37eL, 0xc3293d46L, 0x48de5369L,
+                                0x6413e680L,
+                                0xa2ae0810L, 0xdd6db224L, 0x69852dfdL,
+                                0x09072166L,
+                                0xb39a460aL, 0x6445c0ddL, 0x586cdecfL,
+                                0x1c20c8aeL,
+                                0x5bbef7ddL, 0x1b588d40L, 0xccd2017fL,
+                                0x6bb4e3bbL,
+                                0xdda26a7eL, 0x3a59ff45L, 0x3e350a44L,
+                                0xbcb4cdd5L,
+                                0x72eacea8L, 0xfa6484bbL, 0x8d6612aeL,
+                                0xbf3c6f47L,
+                                0xd29be463L, 0x542f5d9eL, 0xaec2771bL,
+                                0xf64e6370L,
+                                0x740e0d8dL, 0xe75b1357L, 0xf8721671L,
+                                0xaf537d5dL,
+                                0x4040cb08L, 0x4eb4e2ccL, 0x34d2466aL,
+                                0x0115af84L,
+                                0xe1b00428L, 0x95983a1dL, 0x06b89fb4L,
+                                0xce6ea048L,
+                                0x6f3f3b82L, 0x3520ab82L, 0x011a1d4bL,
+                                0x277227f8L,
+                                0x611560b1L, 0xe7933fdcL, 0xbb3a792bL,
+                                0x344525bdL,
+                                0xa08839e1L, 0x51ce794bL, 0x2f32c9b7L,
+                                0xa01fbac9L,
+                                0xe01cc87eL, 0xbcc7d1f6L, 0xcf0111c3L,
+                                0xa1e8aac7L,
+                                0x1a908749L, 0xd44fbd9aL, 0xd0dadecbL,
+                                0xd50ada38L,
+                                0x0339c32aL, 0xc6913667L, 0x8df9317cL,
+                                0xe0b12b4fL,
+                                0xf79e59b7L, 0x43f5bb3aL, 0xf2d519ffL,
+                                0x27d9459cL,
+                                0xbf97222cL, 0x15e6fc2aL, 0x0f91fc71L,
+                                0x9b941525L,
+                                0xfae59361L, 0xceb69cebL, 0xc2a86459L,
+                                0x12baa8d1L,
+                                0xb6c1075eL, 0xe3056a0cL, 0x10d25065L,
+                                0xcb03a442L,
+                                0xe0ec6e0eL, 0x1698db3bL, 0x4c98a0beL,
+                                0x3278e964L,
+                                0x9f1f9532L, 0xe0d392dfL, 0xd3a0342bL,
+                                0x8971f21eL,
+                                0x1b0a7441L, 0x4ba3348cL, 0xc5be7120L,
+                                0xc37632d8L,
+                                0xdf359f8dL, 0x9b992f2eL, 0xe60b6f47L,
+                                0x0fe3f11dL,
+                                0xe54cda54L, 0x1edad891L, 0xce6279cfL,
+                                0xcd3e7e6fL,
+                                0x1618b166L, 0xfd2c1d05L, 0x848fd2c5L,
+                                0xf6fb2299L,
+                                0xf523f357L, 0xa6327623L, 0x93a83531L,
+                                0x56cccd02L,
+                                0xacf08162L, 0x5a75ebb5L, 0x6e163697L,
+                                0x88d273ccL,
+                                0xde966292L, 0x81b949d0L, 0x4c50901bL,
+                                0x71c65614L,
+                                0xe6c6c7bdL, 0x327a140aL, 0x45e1d006L,
+                                0xc3f27b9aL,
+                                0xc9aa53fdL, 0x62a80f00L, 0xbb25bfe2L,
+                                0x35bdd2f6L,
+                                0x71126905L, 0xb2040222L, 0xb6cbcf7cL,
+                                0xcd769c2bL,
+                                0x53113ec0L, 0x1640e3d3L, 0x38abbd60L,
+                                0x2547adf0L,
+                                0xba38209cL, 0xf746ce76L, 0x77afa1c5L,
+                                0x20756060L,
+                                0x85cbfe4eL, 0x8ae88dd8L, 0x7aaaf9b0L,
+                                0x4cf9aa7eL,
+                                0x1948c25cL, 0x02fb8a8cL, 0x01c36ae4L,
+                                0xd6ebe1f9L,
+                                0x90d4f869L, 0xa65cdea0L, 0x3f09252dL,
+                                0xc208e69fL,
+                                0xb74e6132L, 0xce77e25bL, 0x578fdfe3L,
+                                0x3ac372e6L,
+                                }
+};
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bf/bf_skey.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bf/bf_skey.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a4903a2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bf/bf_skey.c
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/blowfish.h>
+#include "bf_locl.h"
+#include "bf_pi.h"
+
+void BF_set_key(BF_KEY *key, int len, const unsigned char *data)
+{
+    int i;
+    BF_LONG *p, ri, in[2];
+    const unsigned char *d, *end;
+
+    memcpy(key, &bf_init, sizeof(BF_KEY));
+    p = key->P;
+
+    if (len > ((BF_ROUNDS + 2) * 4))
+        len = (BF_ROUNDS + 2) * 4;
+
+    d = data;
+    end = &(data[len]);
+    for (i = 0; i < (BF_ROUNDS + 2); i++) {
+        ri = *(d++);
+        if (d >= end)
+            d = data;
+
+        ri <<= 8;
+        ri |= *(d++);
+        if (d >= end)
+            d = data;
+
+        ri <<= 8;
+        ri |= *(d++);
+        if (d >= end)
+            d = data;
+
+        ri <<= 8;
+        ri |= *(d++);
+        if (d >= end)
+            d = data;
+
+        p[i] ^= ri;
+    }
+
+    in[0] = 0L;
+    in[1] = 0L;
+    for (i = 0; i < (BF_ROUNDS + 2); i += 2) {
+        BF_encrypt(in, key);
+        p[i] = in[0];
+        p[i + 1] = in[1];
+    }
+
+    p = key->S;
+    for (i = 0; i < 4 * 256; i += 2) {
+        BF_encrypt(in, key);
+        p[i] = in[0];
+        p[i + 1] = in[1];
+    }
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bf/build.info b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bf/build.info
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..37a004e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bf/build.info
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+LIBS=../../libcrypto
+SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=bf_skey.c bf_ecb.c bf_cfb64.c bf_ofb64.c \
+        {- $target{bf_asm_src} -}
+
+GENERATE[bf-586.s]=asm/bf-586.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $(CFLAGS) $(LIB_CFLAGS) $(PROCESSOR)
+DEPEND[bf-586.s]=../perlasm/x86asm.pl ../perlasm/cbc.pl
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bio/b_addr.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bio/b_addr.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..aea843a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bio/b_addr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,883 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "bio_lcl.h"
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <internal/thread_once.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+
+CRYPTO_RWLOCK *bio_lookup_lock;
+static CRYPTO_ONCE bio_lookup_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
+
+/*
+ * Throughout this file and bio_lcl.h, the existence of the macro
+ * AI_PASSIVE is used to detect the availability of struct addrinfo,
+ * getnameinfo() and getaddrinfo().  If that macro doesn't exist,
+ * we use our own implementation instead, using gethostbyname,
+ * getservbyname and a few other.
+ */
+
+/**********************************************************************
+ *
+ * Address structure
+ *
+ */
+
+BIO_ADDR *BIO_ADDR_new(void)
+{
+    BIO_ADDR *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
+
+    if (ret == NULL) {
+        BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_ADDR_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    ret->sa.sa_family = AF_UNSPEC;
+    return ret;
+}
+
+void BIO_ADDR_free(BIO_ADDR *ap)
+{
+    OPENSSL_free(ap);
+}
+
+void BIO_ADDR_clear(BIO_ADDR *ap)
+{
+    memset(ap, 0, sizeof(*ap));
+    ap->sa.sa_family = AF_UNSPEC;
+}
+
+/*
+ * BIO_ADDR_make - non-public routine to fill a BIO_ADDR with the contents
+ * of a struct sockaddr.
+ */
+int BIO_ADDR_make(BIO_ADDR *ap, const struct sockaddr *sa)
+{
+    if (sa->sa_family == AF_INET) {
+        ap->s_in = *(const struct sockaddr_in *)sa;
+        return 1;
+    }
+#ifdef AF_INET6
+    if (sa->sa_family == AF_INET6) {
+        ap->s_in6 = *(const struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa;
+        return 1;
+    }
+#endif
+#ifdef AF_UNIX
+    if (sa->sa_family == AF_UNIX) {
+        ap->s_un = *(const struct sockaddr_un *)sa;
+        return 1;
+    }
+#endif
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int BIO_ADDR_rawmake(BIO_ADDR *ap, int family,
+                     const void *where, size_t wherelen,
+                     unsigned short port)
+{
+#ifdef AF_UNIX
+    if (family == AF_UNIX) {
+        if (wherelen + 1 > sizeof(ap->s_un.sun_path))
+            return 0;
+        memset(&ap->s_un, 0, sizeof(ap->s_un));
+        ap->s_un.sun_family = family;
+        strncpy(ap->s_un.sun_path, where, sizeof(ap->s_un.sun_path) - 1);
+        return 1;
+    }
+#endif
+    if (family == AF_INET) {
+        if (wherelen != sizeof(struct in_addr))
+            return 0;
+        memset(&ap->s_in, 0, sizeof(ap->s_in));
+        ap->s_in.sin_family = family;
+        ap->s_in.sin_port = port;
+        ap->s_in.sin_addr = *(struct in_addr *)where;
+        return 1;
+    }
+#ifdef AF_INET6
+    if (family == AF_INET6) {
+        if (wherelen != sizeof(struct in6_addr))
+            return 0;
+        memset(&ap->s_in6, 0, sizeof(ap->s_in6));
+        ap->s_in6.sin6_family = family;
+        ap->s_in6.sin6_port = port;
+        ap->s_in6.sin6_addr = *(struct in6_addr *)where;
+        return 1;
+    }
+#endif
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int BIO_ADDR_family(const BIO_ADDR *ap)
+{
+    return ap->sa.sa_family;
+}
+
+int BIO_ADDR_rawaddress(const BIO_ADDR *ap, void *p, size_t *l)
+{
+    size_t len = 0;
+    const void *addrptr = NULL;
+
+    if (ap->sa.sa_family == AF_INET) {
+        len = sizeof(ap->s_in.sin_addr);
+        addrptr = &ap->s_in.sin_addr;
+    }
+#ifdef AF_INET6
+    else if (ap->sa.sa_family == AF_INET6) {
+        len = sizeof(ap->s_in6.sin6_addr);
+        addrptr = &ap->s_in6.sin6_addr;
+    }
+#endif
+#ifdef AF_UNIX
+    else if (ap->sa.sa_family == AF_UNIX) {
+        len = strlen(ap->s_un.sun_path);
+        addrptr = &ap->s_un.sun_path;
+    }
+#endif
+
+    if (addrptr == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    if (p != NULL) {
+        memcpy(p, addrptr, len);
+    }
+    if (l != NULL)
+        *l = len;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+unsigned short BIO_ADDR_rawport(const BIO_ADDR *ap)
+{
+    if (ap->sa.sa_family == AF_INET)
+        return ap->s_in.sin_port;
+#ifdef AF_INET6
+    if (ap->sa.sa_family == AF_INET6)
+        return ap->s_in6.sin6_port;
+#endif
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * addr_strings - helper function to get host and service names
+ * @ap: the BIO_ADDR that has the input info
+ * @numeric: 0 if actual names should be returned, 1 if the numeric
+ * representation should be returned.
+ * @hostname: a pointer to a pointer to a memory area to store the
+ * host name or numeric representation.  Unused if NULL.
+ * @service: a pointer to a pointer to a memory area to store the
+ * service name or numeric representation.  Unused if NULL.
+ *
+ * The return value is 0 on failure, with the error code in the error
+ * stack, and 1 on success.
+ */
+static int addr_strings(const BIO_ADDR *ap, int numeric,
+                        char **hostname, char **service)
+{
+    if (BIO_sock_init() != 1)
+        return 0;
+
+    if (1) {
+#ifdef AI_PASSIVE
+        int ret = 0;
+        char host[NI_MAXHOST] = "", serv[NI_MAXSERV] = "";
+        int flags = 0;
+
+        if (numeric)
+            flags |= NI_NUMERICHOST | NI_NUMERICSERV;
+
+        if ((ret = getnameinfo(BIO_ADDR_sockaddr(ap),
+                               BIO_ADDR_sockaddr_size(ap),
+                               host, sizeof(host), serv, sizeof(serv),
+                               flags)) != 0) {
+# ifdef EAI_SYSTEM
+            if (ret == EAI_SYSTEM) {
+                SYSerr(SYS_F_GETNAMEINFO, get_last_socket_error());
+                BIOerr(BIO_F_ADDR_STRINGS, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
+            } else
+# endif
+            {
+                BIOerr(BIO_F_ADDR_STRINGS, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
+                ERR_add_error_data(1, gai_strerror(ret));
+            }
+            return 0;
+        }
+
+        /* VMS getnameinfo() has a bug, it doesn't fill in serv, which
+         * leaves it with whatever garbage that happens to be there.
+         * However, we initialise serv with the empty string (serv[0]
+         * is therefore NUL), so it gets real easy to detect when things
+         * didn't go the way one might expect.
+         */
+        if (serv[0] == '\0') {
+            BIO_snprintf(serv, sizeof(serv), "%d",
+                         ntohs(BIO_ADDR_rawport(ap)));
+        }
+
+        if (hostname != NULL)
+            *hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(host);
+        if (service != NULL)
+            *service = OPENSSL_strdup(serv);
+    } else {
+#endif
+        if (hostname != NULL)
+            *hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(inet_ntoa(ap->s_in.sin_addr));
+        if (service != NULL) {
+            char serv[6];        /* port is 16 bits => max 5 decimal digits */
+            BIO_snprintf(serv, sizeof(serv), "%d", ntohs(ap->s_in.sin_port));
+            *service = OPENSSL_strdup(serv);
+        }
+    }
+
+    if ((hostname != NULL && *hostname == NULL)
+            || (service != NULL && *service == NULL)) {
+        if (hostname != NULL) {
+            OPENSSL_free(*hostname);
+            *hostname = NULL;
+        }
+        if (service != NULL) {
+            OPENSSL_free(*service);
+            *service = NULL;
+        }
+        BIOerr(BIO_F_ADDR_STRINGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+char *BIO_ADDR_hostname_string(const BIO_ADDR *ap, int numeric)
+{
+    char *hostname = NULL;
+
+    if (addr_strings(ap, numeric, &hostname, NULL))
+        return hostname;
+
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+char *BIO_ADDR_service_string(const BIO_ADDR *ap, int numeric)
+{
+    char *service = NULL;
+
+    if (addr_strings(ap, numeric, NULL, &service))
+        return service;
+
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+char *BIO_ADDR_path_string(const BIO_ADDR *ap)
+{
+#ifdef AF_UNIX
+    if (ap->sa.sa_family == AF_UNIX)
+        return OPENSSL_strdup(ap->s_un.sun_path);
+#endif
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * BIO_ADDR_sockaddr - non-public routine to return the struct sockaddr
+ * for a given BIO_ADDR.  In reality, this is simply a type safe cast.
+ * The returned struct sockaddr is const, so it can't be tampered with.
+ */
+const struct sockaddr *BIO_ADDR_sockaddr(const BIO_ADDR *ap)
+{
+    return &(ap->sa);
+}
+
+/*
+ * BIO_ADDR_sockaddr_noconst - non-public function that does the same
+ * as BIO_ADDR_sockaddr, but returns a non-const.  USE WITH CARE, as
+ * it allows you to tamper with the data (and thereby the contents
+ * of the input BIO_ADDR).
+ */
+struct sockaddr *BIO_ADDR_sockaddr_noconst(BIO_ADDR *ap)
+{
+    return &(ap->sa);
+}
+
+/*
+ * BIO_ADDR_sockaddr_size - non-public function that returns the size
+ * of the struct sockaddr the BIO_ADDR is using.  If the protocol family
+ * isn't set or is something other than AF_INET, AF_INET6 or AF_UNIX,
+ * the size of the BIO_ADDR type is returned.
+ */
+socklen_t BIO_ADDR_sockaddr_size(const BIO_ADDR *ap)
+{
+    if (ap->sa.sa_family == AF_INET)
+        return sizeof(ap->s_in);
+#ifdef AF_INET6
+    if (ap->sa.sa_family == AF_INET6)
+        return sizeof(ap->s_in6);
+#endif
+#ifdef AF_UNIX
+    if (ap->sa.sa_family == AF_UNIX)
+        return sizeof(ap->s_un);
+#endif
+    return sizeof(*ap);
+}
+
+/**********************************************************************
+ *
+ * Address info database
+ *
+ */
+
+const BIO_ADDRINFO *BIO_ADDRINFO_next(const BIO_ADDRINFO *bai)
+{
+    if (bai != NULL)
+        return bai->bai_next;
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+int BIO_ADDRINFO_family(const BIO_ADDRINFO *bai)
+{
+    if (bai != NULL)
+        return bai->bai_family;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int BIO_ADDRINFO_socktype(const BIO_ADDRINFO *bai)
+{
+    if (bai != NULL)
+        return bai->bai_socktype;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int BIO_ADDRINFO_protocol(const BIO_ADDRINFO *bai)
+{
+    if (bai != NULL) {
+        if (bai->bai_protocol != 0)
+            return bai->bai_protocol;
+
+#ifdef AF_UNIX
+        if (bai->bai_family == AF_UNIX)
+            return 0;
+#endif
+
+        switch (bai->bai_socktype) {
+        case SOCK_STREAM:
+            return IPPROTO_TCP;
+        case SOCK_DGRAM:
+            return IPPROTO_UDP;
+        default:
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * BIO_ADDRINFO_sockaddr_size - non-public function that returns the size
+ * of the struct sockaddr inside the BIO_ADDRINFO.
+ */
+socklen_t BIO_ADDRINFO_sockaddr_size(const BIO_ADDRINFO *bai)
+{
+    if (bai != NULL)
+        return bai->bai_addrlen;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * BIO_ADDRINFO_sockaddr - non-public function that returns bai_addr
+ * as the struct sockaddr it is.
+ */
+const struct sockaddr *BIO_ADDRINFO_sockaddr(const BIO_ADDRINFO *bai)
+{
+    if (bai != NULL)
+        return bai->bai_addr;
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+const BIO_ADDR *BIO_ADDRINFO_address(const BIO_ADDRINFO *bai)
+{
+    if (bai != NULL)
+        return (BIO_ADDR *)bai->bai_addr;
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+void BIO_ADDRINFO_free(BIO_ADDRINFO *bai)
+{
+    if (bai == NULL)
+        return;
+
+#ifdef AI_PASSIVE
+# ifdef AF_UNIX
+#  define _cond bai->bai_family != AF_UNIX
+# else
+#  define _cond 1
+# endif
+    if (_cond) {
+        freeaddrinfo(bai);
+        return;
+    }
+#endif
+
+    /* Free manually when we know that addrinfo_wrap() was used.
+     * See further comment above addrinfo_wrap()
+     */
+    while (bai != NULL) {
+        BIO_ADDRINFO *next = bai->bai_next;
+        OPENSSL_free(bai->bai_addr);
+        OPENSSL_free(bai);
+        bai = next;
+    }
+}
+
+/**********************************************************************
+ *
+ * Service functions
+ *
+ */
+
+/*-
+ * The specs in hostserv can take these forms:
+ *
+ * host:service         => *host = "host", *service = "service"
+ * host:*               => *host = "host", *service = NULL
+ * host:                => *host = "host", *service = NULL
+ * :service             => *host = NULL, *service = "service"
+ * *:service            => *host = NULL, *service = "service"
+ *
+ * in case no : is present in the string, the result depends on
+ * hostserv_prio, as follows:
+ *
+ * when hostserv_prio == BIO_PARSE_PRIO_HOST
+ * host                 => *host = "host", *service untouched
+ *
+ * when hostserv_prio == BIO_PARSE_PRIO_SERV
+ * service              => *host untouched, *service = "service"
+ *
+ */
+int BIO_parse_hostserv(const char *hostserv, char **host, char **service,
+                       enum BIO_hostserv_priorities hostserv_prio)
+{
+    const char *h = NULL; size_t hl = 0;
+    const char *p = NULL; size_t pl = 0;
+
+    if (*hostserv == '[') {
+        if ((p = strchr(hostserv, ']')) == NULL)
+            goto spec_err;
+        h = hostserv + 1;
+        hl = p - h;
+        p++;
+        if (*p == '\0')
+            p = NULL;
+        else if (*p != ':')
+            goto spec_err;
+        else {
+            p++;
+            pl = strlen(p);
+        }
+    } else {
+        const char *p2 = strrchr(hostserv, ':');
+        p = strchr(hostserv, ':');
+
+        /*-
+         * Check for more than one colon.  There are three possible
+         * interpretations:
+         * 1. IPv6 address with port number, last colon being separator.
+         * 2. IPv6 address only.
+         * 3. IPv6 address only if hostserv_prio == BIO_PARSE_PRIO_HOST,
+         *    IPv6 address and port number if hostserv_prio == BIO_PARSE_PRIO_SERV
+         * Because of this ambiguity, we currently choose to make it an
+         * error.
+         */
+        if (p != p2)
+            goto amb_err;
+
+        if (p != NULL) {
+            h = hostserv;
+            hl = p - h;
+            p++;
+            pl = strlen(p);
+        } else if (hostserv_prio == BIO_PARSE_PRIO_HOST) {
+            h = hostserv;
+            hl = strlen(h);
+        } else {
+            p = hostserv;
+            pl = strlen(p);
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (p != NULL && strchr(p, ':'))
+        goto spec_err;
+
+    if (h != NULL && host != NULL) {
+        if (hl == 0
+            || (hl == 1 && h[0] == '*')) {
+            *host = NULL;
+        } else {
+            *host = OPENSSL_strndup(h, hl);
+            if (*host == NULL)
+                goto memerr;
+        }
+    }
+    if (p != NULL && service != NULL) {
+        if (pl == 0
+            || (pl == 1 && p[0] == '*')) {
+            *service = NULL;
+        } else {
+            *service = OPENSSL_strndup(p, pl);
+            if (*service == NULL)
+                goto memerr;
+        }
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+ amb_err:
+    BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_PARSE_HOSTSERV, BIO_R_AMBIGUOUS_HOST_OR_SERVICE);
+    return 0;
+ spec_err:
+    BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_PARSE_HOSTSERV, BIO_R_MALFORMED_HOST_OR_SERVICE);
+    return 0;
+ memerr:
+    BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_PARSE_HOSTSERV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/* addrinfo_wrap is used to build our own addrinfo "chain".
+ * (it has only one entry, so calling it a chain may be a stretch)
+ * It should ONLY be called when getaddrinfo() and friends
+ * aren't available, OR when dealing with a non IP protocol
+ * family, such as AF_UNIX
+ *
+ * the return value is 1 on success, or 0 on failure, which
+ * only happens if a memory allocation error occurred.
+ */
+static int addrinfo_wrap(int family, int socktype,
+                         const void *where, size_t wherelen,
+                         unsigned short port,
+                         BIO_ADDRINFO **bai)
+{
+    OPENSSL_assert(bai != NULL);
+
+    *bai = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(**bai));
+    if (*bai == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    (*bai)->bai_family = family;
+    (*bai)->bai_socktype = socktype;
+    if (socktype == SOCK_STREAM)
+        (*bai)->bai_protocol = IPPROTO_TCP;
+    if (socktype == SOCK_DGRAM)
+        (*bai)->bai_protocol = IPPROTO_UDP;
+#ifdef AF_UNIX
+    if (family == AF_UNIX)
+        (*bai)->bai_protocol = 0;
+#endif
+    {
+        /* Magic: We know that BIO_ADDR_sockaddr_noconst is really
+           just an advanced cast of BIO_ADDR* to struct sockaddr *
+           by the power of union, so while it may seem that we're
+           creating a memory leak here, we are not.  It will be
+           all right. */
+        BIO_ADDR *addr = BIO_ADDR_new();
+        if (addr != NULL) {
+            BIO_ADDR_rawmake(addr, family, where, wherelen, port);
+            (*bai)->bai_addr = BIO_ADDR_sockaddr_noconst(addr);
+        }
+    }
+    (*bai)->bai_next = NULL;
+    if ((*bai)->bai_addr == NULL) {
+        BIO_ADDRINFO_free(*bai);
+        *bai = NULL;
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_bio_lookup_init)
+{
+    OPENSSL_init_crypto(0, NULL);
+    bio_lookup_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
+    return bio_lookup_lock != NULL;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * BIO_lookup - look up the node and service you want to connect to.
+ * @node: the node you want to connect to.
+ * @service: the service you want to connect to.
+ * @lookup_type: declare intent with the result, client or server.
+ * @family: the address family you want to use.  Use AF_UNSPEC for any, or
+ *  AF_INET, AF_INET6 or AF_UNIX.
+ * @socktype: The socket type you want to use.  Can be SOCK_STREAM, SOCK_DGRAM
+ *  or 0 for all.
+ * @res: Storage place for the resulting list of returned addresses
+ *
+ * This will do a lookup of the node and service that you want to connect to.
+ * It returns a linked list of different addresses you can try to connect to.
+ *
+ * When no longer needed you should call BIO_ADDRINFO_free() to free the result.
+ *
+ * The return value is 1 on success or 0 in case of error.
+ */
+int BIO_lookup(const char *host, const char *service,
+               enum BIO_lookup_type lookup_type,
+               int family, int socktype, BIO_ADDRINFO **res)
+{
+    int ret = 0;                 /* Assume failure */
+
+    switch(family) {
+    case AF_INET:
+#ifdef AF_INET6
+    case AF_INET6:
+#endif
+#ifdef AF_UNIX
+    case AF_UNIX:
+#endif
+#ifdef AF_UNSPEC
+    case AF_UNSPEC:
+#endif
+        break;
+    default:
+        BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_LOOKUP, BIO_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL_FAMILY);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+#ifdef AF_UNIX
+    if (family == AF_UNIX) {
+        if (addrinfo_wrap(family, socktype, host, strlen(host), 0, res))
+            return 1;
+        else
+            BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_LOOKUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+#endif
+
+    if (BIO_sock_init() != 1)
+        return 0;
+
+    if (1) {
+#ifdef AI_PASSIVE
+        int gai_ret = 0;
+        struct addrinfo hints;
+
+        memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+
+        hints.ai_family = family;
+        hints.ai_socktype = socktype;
+
+        if (lookup_type == BIO_LOOKUP_SERVER)
+            hints.ai_flags |= AI_PASSIVE;
+
+        /* Note that |res| SHOULD be a 'struct addrinfo **' thanks to
+         * macro magic in bio_lcl.h
+         */
+        switch ((gai_ret = getaddrinfo(host, service, &hints, res))) {
+# ifdef EAI_SYSTEM
+        case EAI_SYSTEM:
+            SYSerr(SYS_F_GETADDRINFO, get_last_socket_error());
+            BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_LOOKUP, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
+            break;
+# endif
+        case 0:
+            ret = 1;             /* Success */
+            break;
+        default:
+            BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_LOOKUP, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
+            ERR_add_error_data(1, gai_strerror(gai_ret));
+            break;
+        }
+    } else {
+#endif
+        const struct hostent *he;
+/*
+ * Because struct hostent is defined for 32-bit pointers only with
+ * VMS C, we need to make sure that '&he_fallback_address' and
+ * '&he_fallback_addresses' are 32-bit pointers
+ */
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && defined(__DECC)
+# pragma pointer_size save
+# pragma pointer_size 32
+#endif
+        /* Windows doesn't seem to have in_addr_t */
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS
+        static uint32_t he_fallback_address;
+        static const char *he_fallback_addresses[] =
+            { (char *)&he_fallback_address, NULL };
+#else
+        static in_addr_t he_fallback_address;
+        static const char *he_fallback_addresses[] =
+            { (char *)&he_fallback_address, NULL };
+#endif
+        static const struct hostent he_fallback =
+            { NULL, NULL, AF_INET, sizeof(he_fallback_address),
+              (char **)&he_fallback_addresses };
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && defined(__DECC)
+# pragma pointer_size restore
+#endif
+
+        struct servent *se;
+        /* Apparently, on WIN64, s_proto and s_port have traded places... */
+#ifdef _WIN64
+        struct servent se_fallback = { NULL, NULL, NULL, 0 };
+#else
+        struct servent se_fallback = { NULL, NULL, 0, NULL };
+#endif
+
+        if (!RUN_ONCE(&bio_lookup_init, do_bio_lookup_init)) {
+            BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_LOOKUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            ret = 0;
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(bio_lookup_lock);
+        he_fallback_address = INADDR_ANY;
+        if (host == NULL) {
+            he = &he_fallback;
+            switch(lookup_type) {
+            case BIO_LOOKUP_CLIENT:
+                he_fallback_address = INADDR_LOOPBACK;
+                break;
+            case BIO_LOOKUP_SERVER:
+                he_fallback_address = INADDR_ANY;
+                break;
+            default:
+                OPENSSL_assert(("We forgot to handle a lookup type!" == 0));
+                break;
+            }
+        } else {
+            he = gethostbyname(host);
+
+            if (he == NULL) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS
+                /*
+                 * This might be misleading, because h_errno is used as if
+                 * it was errno. To minimize mixup add 1000. Underlying
+                 * reason for this is that hstrerror is declared obsolete,
+                 * not to mention that a) h_errno is not always guaranteed
+                 * to be meaningless; b) hstrerror can reside in yet another
+                 * library, linking for sake of hstrerror is an overkill;
+                 * c) this path is not executed on contemporary systems
+                 * anyway [above getaddrinfo/gai_strerror is]. We just let
+                 * system administrator figure this out...
+                 */
+                SYSerr(SYS_F_GETHOSTBYNAME, 1000 + h_errno);
+#else
+                SYSerr(SYS_F_GETHOSTBYNAME, WSAGetLastError());
+#endif
+                ret = 0;
+                goto err;
+            }
+        }
+
+        if (service == NULL) {
+            se_fallback.s_port = 0;
+            se_fallback.s_proto = NULL;
+            se = &se_fallback;
+        } else {
+            char *endp = NULL;
+            long portnum = strtol(service, &endp, 10);
+
+/*
+ * Because struct servent is defined for 32-bit pointers only with
+ * VMS C, we need to make sure that 'proto' is a 32-bit pointer.
+ */
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && defined(__DECC)
+# pragma pointer_size save
+# pragma pointer_size 32
+#endif
+            char *proto = NULL;
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && defined(__DECC)
+# pragma pointer_size restore
+#endif
+
+            switch (socktype) {
+            case SOCK_STREAM:
+                proto = "tcp";
+                break;
+            case SOCK_DGRAM:
+                proto = "udp";
+                break;
+            }
+
+            if (endp != service && *endp == '\0'
+                    && portnum > 0 && portnum < 65536) {
+                se_fallback.s_port = htons(portnum);
+                se_fallback.s_proto = proto;
+                se = &se_fallback;
+            } else if (endp == service) {
+                se = getservbyname(service, proto);
+
+                if (se == NULL) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS
+                    SYSerr(SYS_F_GETSERVBYNAME, errno);
+#else
+                    SYSerr(SYS_F_GETSERVBYNAME, WSAGetLastError());
+#endif
+                    goto err;
+                }
+            } else {
+                BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_LOOKUP, BIO_R_MALFORMED_HOST_OR_SERVICE);
+                goto err;
+            }
+        }
+
+        *res = NULL;
+
+        {
+/*
+ * Because hostent::h_addr_list is an array of 32-bit pointers with VMS C,
+ * we must make sure our iterator designates the same element type, hence
+ * the pointer size dance.
+ */
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && defined(__DECC)
+# pragma pointer_size save
+# pragma pointer_size 32
+#endif
+            char **addrlistp;
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && defined(__DECC)
+# pragma pointer_size restore
+#endif
+            size_t addresses;
+            BIO_ADDRINFO *tmp_bai = NULL;
+
+            /* The easiest way to create a linked list from an
+               array is to start from the back */
+            for(addrlistp = he->h_addr_list; *addrlistp != NULL;
+                addrlistp++)
+                ;
+
+            for(addresses = addrlistp - he->h_addr_list;
+                addrlistp--, addresses-- > 0; ) {
+                if (!addrinfo_wrap(he->h_addrtype, socktype,
+                                   *addrlistp, he->h_length,
+                                   se->s_port, &tmp_bai))
+                    goto addrinfo_malloc_err;
+                tmp_bai->bai_next = *res;
+                *res = tmp_bai;
+                continue;
+             addrinfo_malloc_err:
+                BIO_ADDRINFO_free(*res);
+                *res = NULL;
+                BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_LOOKUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                ret = 0;
+                goto err;
+            }
+
+            ret = 1;
+        }
+     err:
+        CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(bio_lookup_lock);
+    }
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SOCK */
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bio/b_dump.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bio/b_dump.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..424195e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bio/b_dump.c
@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Stolen from tjh's ssl/ssl_trc.c stuff.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "bio_lcl.h"
+
+#define DUMP_WIDTH      16
+#define DUMP_WIDTH_LESS_INDENT(i) (DUMP_WIDTH-((i-(i>6?6:i)+3)/4))
+
+int BIO_dump_cb(int (*cb) (const void *data, size_t len, void *u),
+                void *u, const char *s, int len)
+{
+    return BIO_dump_indent_cb(cb, u, s, len, 0);
+}
+
+int BIO_dump_indent_cb(int (*cb) (const void *data, size_t len, void *u),
+                       void *u, const char *s, int len, int indent)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    char buf[288 + 1], tmp[20], str[128 + 1];
+    int i, j, rows;
+    unsigned char ch;
+    int dump_width;
+
+    if (indent < 0)
+        indent = 0;
+    if (indent) {
+        if (indent > 128)
+            indent = 128;
+        memset(str, ' ', indent);
+    }
+    str[indent] = '\0';
+
+    dump_width = DUMP_WIDTH_LESS_INDENT(indent);
+    rows = (len / dump_width);
+    if ((rows * dump_width) < len)
+        rows++;
+    for (i = 0; i < rows; i++) {
+        OPENSSL_strlcpy(buf, str, sizeof(buf));
+        BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof(tmp), "%04x - ", i * dump_width);
+        OPENSSL_strlcat(buf, tmp, sizeof(buf));
+        for (j = 0; j < dump_width; j++) {
+            if (((i * dump_width) + j) >= len) {
+                OPENSSL_strlcat(buf, "   ", sizeof(buf));
+            } else {
+                ch = ((unsigned char)*(s + i * dump_width + j)) & 0xff;
+                BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof(tmp), "%02x%c", ch,
+                             j == 7 ? '-' : ' ');
+                OPENSSL_strlcat(buf, tmp, sizeof(buf));
+            }
+        }
+        OPENSSL_strlcat(buf, "  ", sizeof(buf));
+        for (j = 0; j < dump_width; j++) {
+            if (((i * dump_width) + j) >= len)
+                break;
+            ch = ((unsigned char)*(s + i * dump_width + j)) & 0xff;
+#ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+            BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof(tmp), "%c",
+                         ((ch >= ' ') && (ch <= '~')) ? ch : '.');
+#else
+            BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof(tmp), "%c",
+                         ((ch >= os_toascii[' ']) && (ch <= os_toascii['~']))
+                         ? os_toebcdic[ch]
+                         : '.');
+#endif
+            OPENSSL_strlcat(buf, tmp, sizeof(buf));
+        }
+        OPENSSL_strlcat(buf, "\n", sizeof(buf));
+        /*
+         * if this is the last call then update the ddt_dump thing so that we
+         * will move the selection point in the debug window
+         */
+        ret += cb((void *)buf, strlen(buf), u);
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+static int write_fp(const void *data, size_t len, void *fp)
+{
+    return UP_fwrite(data, len, 1, fp);
+}
+
+int BIO_dump_fp(FILE *fp, const char *s, int len)
+{
+    return BIO_dump_cb(write_fp, fp, s, len);
+}
+
+int BIO_dump_indent_fp(FILE *fp, const char *s, int len, int indent)
+{
+    return BIO_dump_indent_cb(write_fp, fp, s, len, indent);
+}
+#endif
+
+static int write_bio(const void *data, size_t len, void *bp)
+{
+    return BIO_write((BIO *)bp, (const char *)data, len);
+}
+
+int BIO_dump(BIO *bp, const char *s, int len)
+{
+    return BIO_dump_cb(write_bio, bp, s, len);
+}
+
+int BIO_dump_indent(BIO *bp, const char *s, int len, int indent)
+{
+    return BIO_dump_indent_cb(write_bio, bp, s, len, indent);
+}
+
+int BIO_hex_string(BIO *out, int indent, int width, unsigned char *data,
+                   int datalen)
+{
+    int i, j = 0;
+
+    if (datalen < 1)
+        return 1;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < datalen - 1; i++) {
+        if (i && !j)
+            BIO_printf(out, "%*s", indent, "");
+
+        BIO_printf(out, "%02X:", data[i]);
+
+        j = (j + 1) % width;
+        if (!j)
+            BIO_printf(out, "\n");
+    }
+
+    if (i && !j)
+        BIO_printf(out, "%*s", indent, "");
+    BIO_printf(out, "%02X", data[datalen - 1]);
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bio/b_print.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bio/b_print.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cdfe05f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bio/b_print.c
@@ -0,0 +1,926 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include "internal/numbers.h"
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+
+/*
+ * Copyright Patrick Powell 1995
+ * This code is based on code written by Patrick Powell <papowell@astart.com>
+ * It may be used for any purpose as long as this notice remains intact
+ * on all source code distributions.
+ */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_LONG_DOUBLE
+# define LDOUBLE long double
+#else
+# define LDOUBLE double
+#endif
+
+static int fmtstr(char **, char **, size_t *, size_t *,
+                  const char *, int, int, int);
+static int fmtint(char **, char **, size_t *, size_t *,
+                  int64_t, int, int, int, int);
+static int fmtfp(char **, char **, size_t *, size_t *,
+                 LDOUBLE, int, int, int, int);
+static int doapr_outch(char **, char **, size_t *, size_t *, int);
+static int _dopr(char **sbuffer, char **buffer,
+                 size_t *maxlen, size_t *retlen, int *truncated,
+                 const char *format, va_list args);
+
+/* format read states */
+#define DP_S_DEFAULT    0
+#define DP_S_FLAGS      1
+#define DP_S_MIN        2
+#define DP_S_DOT        3
+#define DP_S_MAX        4
+#define DP_S_MOD        5
+#define DP_S_CONV       6
+#define DP_S_DONE       7
+
+/* format flags - Bits */
+/* left-aligned padding */
+#define DP_F_MINUS      (1 << 0)
+/* print an explicit '+' for a value with positive sign */
+#define DP_F_PLUS       (1 << 1)
+/* print an explicit ' ' for a value with positive sign */
+#define DP_F_SPACE      (1 << 2)
+/* print 0/0x prefix for octal/hex and decimal point for floating point */
+#define DP_F_NUM        (1 << 3)
+/* print leading zeroes */
+#define DP_F_ZERO       (1 << 4)
+/* print HEX in UPPPERcase */
+#define DP_F_UP         (1 << 5)
+/* treat value as unsigned */
+#define DP_F_UNSIGNED   (1 << 6)
+
+/* conversion flags */
+#define DP_C_SHORT      1
+#define DP_C_LONG       2
+#define DP_C_LDOUBLE    3
+#define DP_C_LLONG      4
+
+/* Floating point formats */
+#define F_FORMAT        0
+#define E_FORMAT        1
+#define G_FORMAT        2
+
+/* some handy macros */
+#define char_to_int(p) (p - '0')
+#define OSSL_MAX(p,q) ((p >= q) ? p : q)
+
+static int
+_dopr(char **sbuffer,
+      char **buffer,
+      size_t *maxlen,
+      size_t *retlen, int *truncated, const char *format, va_list args)
+{
+    char ch;
+    int64_t value;
+    LDOUBLE fvalue;
+    char *strvalue;
+    int min;
+    int max;
+    int state;
+    int flags;
+    int cflags;
+    size_t currlen;
+
+    state = DP_S_DEFAULT;
+    flags = currlen = cflags = min = 0;
+    max = -1;
+    ch = *format++;
+
+    while (state != DP_S_DONE) {
+        if (ch == '\0' || (buffer == NULL && currlen >= *maxlen))
+            state = DP_S_DONE;
+
+        switch (state) {
+        case DP_S_DEFAULT:
+            if (ch == '%')
+                state = DP_S_FLAGS;
+            else
+                if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, ch))
+                    return 0;
+            ch = *format++;
+            break;
+        case DP_S_FLAGS:
+            switch (ch) {
+            case '-':
+                flags |= DP_F_MINUS;
+                ch = *format++;
+                break;
+            case '+':
+                flags |= DP_F_PLUS;
+                ch = *format++;
+                break;
+            case ' ':
+                flags |= DP_F_SPACE;
+                ch = *format++;
+                break;
+            case '#':
+                flags |= DP_F_NUM;
+                ch = *format++;
+                break;
+            case '0':
+                flags |= DP_F_ZERO;
+                ch = *format++;
+                break;
+            default:
+                state = DP_S_MIN;
+                break;
+            }
+            break;
+        case DP_S_MIN:
+            if (isdigit((unsigned char)ch)) {
+                min = 10 * min + char_to_int(ch);
+                ch = *format++;
+            } else if (ch == '*') {
+                min = va_arg(args, int);
+                ch = *format++;
+                state = DP_S_DOT;
+            } else
+                state = DP_S_DOT;
+            break;
+        case DP_S_DOT:
+            if (ch == '.') {
+                state = DP_S_MAX;
+                ch = *format++;
+            } else
+                state = DP_S_MOD;
+            break;
+        case DP_S_MAX:
+            if (isdigit((unsigned char)ch)) {
+                if (max < 0)
+                    max = 0;
+                max = 10 * max + char_to_int(ch);
+                ch = *format++;
+            } else if (ch == '*') {
+                max = va_arg(args, int);
+                ch = *format++;
+                state = DP_S_MOD;
+            } else
+                state = DP_S_MOD;
+            break;
+        case DP_S_MOD:
+            switch (ch) {
+            case 'h':
+                cflags = DP_C_SHORT;
+                ch = *format++;
+                break;
+            case 'l':
+                if (*format == 'l') {
+                    cflags = DP_C_LLONG;
+                    format++;
+                } else
+                    cflags = DP_C_LONG;
+                ch = *format++;
+                break;
+            case 'q':
+                cflags = DP_C_LLONG;
+                ch = *format++;
+                break;
+            case 'L':
+                cflags = DP_C_LDOUBLE;
+                ch = *format++;
+                break;
+            default:
+                break;
+            }
+            state = DP_S_CONV;
+            break;
+        case DP_S_CONV:
+            switch (ch) {
+            case 'd':
+            case 'i':
+                switch (cflags) {
+                case DP_C_SHORT:
+                    value = (short int)va_arg(args, int);
+                    break;
+                case DP_C_LONG:
+                    value = va_arg(args, long int);
+                    break;
+                case DP_C_LLONG:
+                    value = va_arg(args, int64_t);
+                    break;
+                default:
+                    value = va_arg(args, int);
+                    break;
+                }
+                if (!fmtint(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, value, 10, min,
+                            max, flags))
+                    return 0;
+                break;
+            case 'X':
+                flags |= DP_F_UP;
+                /* FALLTHROUGH */
+            case 'x':
+            case 'o':
+            case 'u':
+                flags |= DP_F_UNSIGNED;
+                switch (cflags) {
+                case DP_C_SHORT:
+                    value = (unsigned short int)va_arg(args, unsigned int);
+                    break;
+                case DP_C_LONG:
+                    value = va_arg(args, unsigned long int);
+                    break;
+                case DP_C_LLONG:
+                    value = va_arg(args, uint64_t);
+                    break;
+                default:
+                    value = va_arg(args, unsigned int);
+                    break;
+                }
+                if (!fmtint(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, value,
+                            ch == 'o' ? 8 : (ch == 'u' ? 10 : 16),
+                            min, max, flags))
+                    return 0;
+                break;
+            case 'f':
+                if (cflags == DP_C_LDOUBLE)
+                    fvalue = va_arg(args, LDOUBLE);
+                else
+                    fvalue = va_arg(args, double);
+                if (!fmtfp(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, fvalue, min, max,
+                           flags, F_FORMAT))
+                    return 0;
+                break;
+            case 'E':
+                flags |= DP_F_UP;
+                /* fall thru */
+            case 'e':
+                if (cflags == DP_C_LDOUBLE)
+                    fvalue = va_arg(args, LDOUBLE);
+                else
+                    fvalue = va_arg(args, double);
+                if (!fmtfp(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, fvalue, min, max,
+                           flags, E_FORMAT))
+                    return 0;
+                break;
+            case 'G':
+                flags |= DP_F_UP;
+                /* fall thru */
+            case 'g':
+                if (cflags == DP_C_LDOUBLE)
+                    fvalue = va_arg(args, LDOUBLE);
+                else
+                    fvalue = va_arg(args, double);
+                if (!fmtfp(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, fvalue, min, max,
+                           flags, G_FORMAT))
+                    return 0;
+                break;
+            case 'c':
+                if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen,
+                            va_arg(args, int)))
+                    return 0;
+                break;
+            case 's':
+                strvalue = va_arg(args, char *);
+                if (max < 0) {
+                    if (buffer)
+                        max = INT_MAX;
+                    else
+                        max = *maxlen;
+                }
+                if (!fmtstr(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, strvalue,
+                            flags, min, max))
+                    return 0;
+                break;
+            case 'p':
+                value = (size_t)va_arg(args, void *);
+                if (!fmtint(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen,
+                            value, 16, min, max, flags | DP_F_NUM))
+                    return 0;
+                break;
+            case 'n':          /* XXX */
+                if (cflags == DP_C_SHORT) {
+                    short int *num;
+                    num = va_arg(args, short int *);
+                    *num = currlen;
+                } else if (cflags == DP_C_LONG) { /* XXX */
+                    long int *num;
+                    num = va_arg(args, long int *);
+                    *num = (long int)currlen;
+                } else if (cflags == DP_C_LLONG) { /* XXX */
+                    int64_t *num;
+                    num = va_arg(args, int64_t *);
+                    *num = (int64_t)currlen;
+                } else {
+                    int *num;
+                    num = va_arg(args, int *);
+                    *num = currlen;
+                }
+                break;
+            case '%':
+                if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, ch))
+                    return 0;
+                break;
+            case 'w':
+                /* not supported yet, treat as next char */
+                ch = *format++;
+                break;
+            default:
+                /* unknown, skip */
+                break;
+            }
+            ch = *format++;
+            state = DP_S_DEFAULT;
+            flags = cflags = min = 0;
+            max = -1;
+            break;
+        case DP_S_DONE:
+            break;
+        default:
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    /*
+     * We have to truncate if there is no dynamic buffer and we have filled the
+     * static buffer.
+     */
+    if (buffer == NULL) {
+        *truncated = (currlen > *maxlen - 1);
+        if (*truncated)
+            currlen = *maxlen - 1;
+    }
+    if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, '\0'))
+        return 0;
+    *retlen = currlen - 1;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+fmtstr(char **sbuffer,
+       char **buffer,
+       size_t *currlen,
+       size_t *maxlen, const char *value, int flags, int min, int max)
+{
+    int padlen;
+    size_t strln;
+    int cnt = 0;
+
+    if (value == 0)
+        value = "<NULL>";
+
+    strln = OPENSSL_strnlen(value, max < 0 ? SIZE_MAX : (size_t)max);
+
+    padlen = min - strln;
+    if (min < 0 || padlen < 0)
+        padlen = 0;
+    if (max >= 0) {
+        /*
+         * Calculate the maximum output including padding.
+         * Make sure max doesn't overflow into negativity
+         */
+        if (max < INT_MAX - padlen)
+            max += padlen;
+        else
+            max = INT_MAX;
+    }
+    if (flags & DP_F_MINUS)
+        padlen = -padlen;
+
+    while ((padlen > 0) && (max < 0 || cnt < max)) {
+        if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' '))
+            return 0;
+        --padlen;
+        ++cnt;
+    }
+    while (strln > 0 && (max < 0 || cnt < max)) {
+        if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, *value++))
+            return 0;
+        --strln;
+        ++cnt;
+    }
+    while ((padlen < 0) && (max < 0 || cnt < max)) {
+        if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' '))
+            return 0;
+        ++padlen;
+        ++cnt;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+fmtint(char **sbuffer,
+       char **buffer,
+       size_t *currlen,
+       size_t *maxlen, int64_t value, int base, int min, int max, int flags)
+{
+    int signvalue = 0;
+    const char *prefix = "";
+    uint64_t uvalue;
+    char convert[DECIMAL_SIZE(value) + 3];
+    int place = 0;
+    int spadlen = 0;
+    int zpadlen = 0;
+    int caps = 0;
+
+    if (max < 0)
+        max = 0;
+    uvalue = value;
+    if (!(flags & DP_F_UNSIGNED)) {
+        if (value < 0) {
+            signvalue = '-';
+            uvalue = 0 - (uint64_t)value;
+        } else if (flags & DP_F_PLUS)
+            signvalue = '+';
+        else if (flags & DP_F_SPACE)
+            signvalue = ' ';
+    }
+    if (flags & DP_F_NUM) {
+        if (base == 8)
+            prefix = "0";
+        if (base == 16)
+            prefix = "0x";
+    }
+    if (flags & DP_F_UP)
+        caps = 1;
+    do {
+        convert[place++] = (caps ? "0123456789ABCDEF" : "0123456789abcdef")
+            [uvalue % (unsigned)base];
+        uvalue = (uvalue / (unsigned)base);
+    } while (uvalue && (place < (int)sizeof(convert)));
+    if (place == sizeof(convert))
+        place--;
+    convert[place] = 0;
+
+    zpadlen = max - place;
+    spadlen =
+        min - OSSL_MAX(max, place) - (signvalue ? 1 : 0) - strlen(prefix);
+    if (zpadlen < 0)
+        zpadlen = 0;
+    if (spadlen < 0)
+        spadlen = 0;
+    if (flags & DP_F_ZERO) {
+        zpadlen = OSSL_MAX(zpadlen, spadlen);
+        spadlen = 0;
+    }
+    if (flags & DP_F_MINUS)
+        spadlen = -spadlen;
+
+    /* spaces */
+    while (spadlen > 0) {
+        if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' '))
+            return 0;
+        --spadlen;
+    }
+
+    /* sign */
+    if (signvalue)
+        if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, signvalue))
+            return 0;
+
+    /* prefix */
+    while (*prefix) {
+        if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, *prefix))
+            return 0;
+        prefix++;
+    }
+
+    /* zeros */
+    if (zpadlen > 0) {
+        while (zpadlen > 0) {
+            if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, '0'))
+                return 0;
+            --zpadlen;
+        }
+    }
+    /* digits */
+    while (place > 0) {
+        if (!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, convert[--place]))
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* left justified spaces */
+    while (spadlen < 0) {
+        if (!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' '))
+            return 0;
+        ++spadlen;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static LDOUBLE abs_val(LDOUBLE value)
+{
+    LDOUBLE result = value;
+    if (value < 0)
+        result = -value;
+    return result;
+}
+
+static LDOUBLE pow_10(int in_exp)
+{
+    LDOUBLE result = 1;
+    while (in_exp) {
+        result *= 10;
+        in_exp--;
+    }
+    return result;
+}
+
+static long roundv(LDOUBLE value)
+{
+    long intpart;
+    intpart = (long)value;
+    value = value - intpart;
+    if (value >= 0.5)
+        intpart++;
+    return intpart;
+}
+
+static int
+fmtfp(char **sbuffer,
+      char **buffer,
+      size_t *currlen,
+      size_t *maxlen, LDOUBLE fvalue, int min, int max, int flags, int style)
+{
+    int signvalue = 0;
+    LDOUBLE ufvalue;
+    LDOUBLE tmpvalue;
+    char iconvert[20];
+    char fconvert[20];
+    char econvert[20];
+    int iplace = 0;
+    int fplace = 0;
+    int eplace = 0;
+    int padlen = 0;
+    int zpadlen = 0;
+    long exp = 0;
+    unsigned long intpart;
+    unsigned long fracpart;
+    unsigned long max10;
+    int realstyle;
+
+    if (max < 0)
+        max = 6;
+
+    if (fvalue < 0)
+        signvalue = '-';
+    else if (flags & DP_F_PLUS)
+        signvalue = '+';
+    else if (flags & DP_F_SPACE)
+        signvalue = ' ';
+
+    /*
+     * G_FORMAT sometimes prints like E_FORMAT and sometimes like F_FORMAT
+     * depending on the number to be printed. Work out which one it is and use
+     * that from here on.
+     */
+    if (style == G_FORMAT) {
+        if (fvalue == 0.0) {
+            realstyle = F_FORMAT;
+        } else if (fvalue < 0.0001) {
+            realstyle = E_FORMAT;
+        } else if ((max == 0 && fvalue >= 10)
+                    || (max > 0 && fvalue >= pow_10(max))) {
+            realstyle = E_FORMAT;
+        } else {
+            realstyle = F_FORMAT;
+        }
+    } else {
+        realstyle = style;
+    }
+
+    if (style != F_FORMAT) {
+        tmpvalue = fvalue;
+        /* Calculate the exponent */
+        if (fvalue != 0.0) {
+            while (tmpvalue < 1) {
+                tmpvalue *= 10;
+                exp--;
+            }
+            while (tmpvalue > 10) {
+                tmpvalue /= 10;
+                exp++;
+            }
+        }
+        if (style == G_FORMAT) {
+            /*
+             * In G_FORMAT the "precision" represents significant digits. We
+             * always have at least 1 significant digit.
+             */
+            if (max == 0)
+                max = 1;
+            /* Now convert significant digits to decimal places */
+            if (realstyle == F_FORMAT) {
+                max -= (exp + 1);
+                if (max < 0) {
+                    /*
+                     * Should not happen. If we're in F_FORMAT then exp < max?
+                     */
+                    return 0;
+                }
+            } else {
+                /*
+                 * In E_FORMAT there is always one significant digit in front
+                 * of the decimal point, so:
+                 * significant digits == 1 + decimal places
+                 */
+                max--;
+            }
+        }
+        if (realstyle == E_FORMAT)
+            fvalue = tmpvalue;
+    }
+    ufvalue = abs_val(fvalue);
+    if (ufvalue > ULONG_MAX) {
+        /* Number too big */
+        return 0;
+    }
+    intpart = (unsigned long)ufvalue;
+
+    /*
+     * sorry, we only support 9 digits past the decimal because of our
+     * conversion method
+     */
+    if (max > 9)
+        max = 9;
+
+    /*
+     * we "cheat" by converting the fractional part to integer by multiplying
+     * by a factor of 10
+     */
+    max10 = roundv(pow_10(max));
+    fracpart = roundv(pow_10(max) * (ufvalue - intpart));
+
+    if (fracpart >= max10) {
+        intpart++;
+        fracpart -= max10;
+    }
+
+    /* convert integer part */
+    do {
+        iconvert[iplace++] = "0123456789"[intpart % 10];
+        intpart = (intpart / 10);
+    } while (intpart && (iplace < (int)sizeof(iconvert)));
+    if (iplace == sizeof(iconvert))
+        iplace--;
+    iconvert[iplace] = 0;
+
+    /* convert fractional part */
+    while (fplace < max) {
+        if (style == G_FORMAT && fplace == 0 && (fracpart % 10) == 0) {
+            /* We strip trailing zeros in G_FORMAT */
+            max--;
+            fracpart = fracpart / 10;
+            if (fplace < max)
+                continue;
+            break;
+        }
+        fconvert[fplace++] = "0123456789"[fracpart % 10];
+        fracpart = (fracpart / 10);
+    }
+
+    if (fplace == sizeof(fconvert))
+        fplace--;
+    fconvert[fplace] = 0;
+
+    /* convert exponent part */
+    if (realstyle == E_FORMAT) {
+        int tmpexp;
+        if (exp < 0)
+            tmpexp = -exp;
+        else
+            tmpexp = exp;
+
+        do {
+            econvert[eplace++] = "0123456789"[tmpexp % 10];
+            tmpexp = (tmpexp / 10);
+        } while (tmpexp > 0 && eplace < (int)sizeof(econvert));
+        /* Exponent is huge!! Too big to print */
+        if (tmpexp > 0)
+            return 0;
+        /* Add a leading 0 for single digit exponents */
+        if (eplace == 1)
+            econvert[eplace++] = '0';
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * -1 for decimal point (if we have one, i.e. max > 0),
+     * another -1 if we are printing a sign
+     */
+    padlen = min - iplace - max - (max > 0 ? 1 : 0) - ((signvalue) ? 1 : 0);
+    /* Take some off for exponent prefix "+e" and exponent */
+    if (realstyle == E_FORMAT)
+        padlen -= 2 + eplace;
+    zpadlen = max - fplace;
+    if (zpadlen < 0)
+        zpadlen = 0;
+    if (padlen < 0)
+        padlen = 0;
+    if (flags & DP_F_MINUS)
+        padlen = -padlen;
+
+    if ((flags & DP_F_ZERO) && (padlen > 0)) {
+        if (signvalue) {
+            if (!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, signvalue))
+                return 0;
+            --padlen;
+            signvalue = 0;
+        }
+        while (padlen > 0) {
+            if (!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, '0'))
+                return 0;
+            --padlen;
+        }
+    }
+    while (padlen > 0) {
+        if (!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' '))
+            return 0;
+        --padlen;
+    }
+    if (signvalue && !doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, signvalue))
+        return 0;
+
+    while (iplace > 0) {
+        if (!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, iconvert[--iplace]))
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Decimal point. This should probably use locale to find the correct
+     * char to print out.
+     */
+    if (max > 0 || (flags & DP_F_NUM)) {
+        if (!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, '.'))
+            return 0;
+
+        while (fplace > 0) {
+            if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen,
+                            fconvert[--fplace]))
+                return 0;
+        }
+    }
+    while (zpadlen > 0) {
+        if (!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, '0'))
+            return 0;
+        --zpadlen;
+    }
+    if (realstyle == E_FORMAT) {
+        char ech;
+
+        if ((flags & DP_F_UP) == 0)
+            ech = 'e';
+        else
+            ech = 'E';
+        if (!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, ech))
+                return 0;
+        if (exp < 0) {
+            if (!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, '-'))
+                    return 0;
+        } else {
+            if (!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, '+'))
+                    return 0;
+        }
+        while (eplace > 0) {
+            if (!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen,
+                             econvert[--eplace]))
+                return 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    while (padlen < 0) {
+        if (!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' '))
+            return 0;
+        ++padlen;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+#define BUFFER_INC  1024
+
+static int
+doapr_outch(char **sbuffer,
+            char **buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t *maxlen, int c)
+{
+    /* If we haven't at least one buffer, someone has doe a big booboo */
+    OPENSSL_assert(*sbuffer != NULL || buffer != NULL);
+
+    /* |currlen| must always be <= |*maxlen| */
+    OPENSSL_assert(*currlen <= *maxlen);
+
+    if (buffer && *currlen == *maxlen) {
+        if (*maxlen > INT_MAX - BUFFER_INC)
+            return 0;
+
+        *maxlen += BUFFER_INC;
+        if (*buffer == NULL) {
+            *buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(*maxlen);
+            if (*buffer == NULL)
+                return 0;
+            if (*currlen > 0) {
+                OPENSSL_assert(*sbuffer != NULL);
+                memcpy(*buffer, *sbuffer, *currlen);
+            }
+            *sbuffer = NULL;
+        } else {
+            char *tmpbuf;
+            tmpbuf = OPENSSL_realloc(*buffer, *maxlen);
+            if (tmpbuf == NULL)
+                return 0;
+            *buffer = tmpbuf;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (*currlen < *maxlen) {
+        if (*sbuffer)
+            (*sbuffer)[(*currlen)++] = (char)c;
+        else
+            (*buffer)[(*currlen)++] = (char)c;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/***************************************************************************/
+
+int BIO_printf(BIO *bio, const char *format, ...)
+{
+    va_list args;
+    int ret;
+
+    va_start(args, format);
+
+    ret = BIO_vprintf(bio, format, args);
+
+    va_end(args);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+int BIO_vprintf(BIO *bio, const char *format, va_list args)
+{
+    int ret;
+    size_t retlen;
+    char hugebuf[1024 * 2];     /* Was previously 10k, which is unreasonable
+                                 * in small-stack environments, like threads
+                                 * or DOS programs. */
+    char *hugebufp = hugebuf;
+    size_t hugebufsize = sizeof(hugebuf);
+    char *dynbuf = NULL;
+    int ignored;
+
+    dynbuf = NULL;
+    if (!_dopr(&hugebufp, &dynbuf, &hugebufsize, &retlen, &ignored, format,
+                args)) {
+        OPENSSL_free(dynbuf);
+        return -1;
+    }
+    if (dynbuf) {
+        ret = BIO_write(bio, dynbuf, (int)retlen);
+        OPENSSL_free(dynbuf);
+    } else {
+        ret = BIO_write(bio, hugebuf, (int)retlen);
+    }
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+/*
+ * As snprintf is not available everywhere, we provide our own
+ * implementation. This function has nothing to do with BIOs, but it's
+ * closely related to BIO_printf, and we need *some* name prefix ... (XXX the
+ * function should be renamed, but to what?)
+ */
+int BIO_snprintf(char *buf, size_t n, const char *format, ...)
+{
+    va_list args;
+    int ret;
+
+    va_start(args, format);
+
+    ret = BIO_vsnprintf(buf, n, format, args);
+
+    va_end(args);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+int BIO_vsnprintf(char *buf, size_t n, const char *format, va_list args)
+{
+    size_t retlen;
+    int truncated;
+
+    if(!_dopr(&buf, NULL, &n, &retlen, &truncated, format, args))
+        return -1;
+
+    if (truncated)
+        /*
+         * In case of truncation, return -1 like traditional snprintf.
+         * (Current drafts for ISO/IEC 9899 say snprintf should return the
+         * number of characters that would have been written, had the buffer
+         * been large enough.)
+         */
+        return -1;
+    else
+        return (retlen <= INT_MAX) ? (int)retlen : -1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bio/b_sock.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bio/b_sock.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..97dcc70
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bio/b_sock.c
@@ -0,0 +1,378 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include "bio_lcl.h"
+#if defined(NETWARE_CLIB)
+# include <sys/ioctl.h>
+NETDB_DEFINE_CONTEXT
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
+# define SOCKET_PROTOCOL IPPROTO_TCP
+# ifdef SO_MAXCONN
+#  define MAX_LISTEN  SO_MAXCONN
+# elif defined(SOMAXCONN)
+#  define MAX_LISTEN  SOMAXCONN
+# else
+#  define MAX_LISTEN  32
+# endif
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS)
+static int wsa_init_done = 0;
+# endif
+
+# if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+int BIO_get_host_ip(const char *str, unsigned char *ip)
+{
+    BIO_ADDRINFO *res = NULL;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    if (BIO_sock_init() != 1)
+        return 0;               /* don't generate another error code here */
+
+    if (BIO_lookup(str, NULL, BIO_LOOKUP_CLIENT, AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, &res)) {
+        size_t l;
+
+        if (BIO_ADDRINFO_family(res) != AF_INET) {
+            BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_GET_HOST_IP,
+                   BIO_R_GETHOSTBYNAME_ADDR_IS_NOT_AF_INET);
+        } else {
+            BIO_ADDR_rawaddress(BIO_ADDRINFO_address(res), NULL, &l);
+            /* Because only AF_INET addresses will reach this far,
+               we can assert that l should be 4 */
+            OPENSSL_assert(l == 4);
+
+            BIO_ADDR_rawaddress(BIO_ADDRINFO_address(res), ip, &l);
+            ret = 1;
+        }
+        BIO_ADDRINFO_free(res);
+    } else {
+        ERR_add_error_data(2, "host=", str);
+    }
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int BIO_get_port(const char *str, unsigned short *port_ptr)
+{
+    BIO_ADDRINFO *res = NULL;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    if (str == NULL) {
+        BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_GET_PORT, BIO_R_NO_PORT_DEFINED);
+        return (0);
+    }
+
+    if (BIO_sock_init() != 1)
+        return 0;               /* don't generate another error code here */
+
+    if (BIO_lookup(NULL, str, BIO_LOOKUP_CLIENT, AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, &res)) {
+        if (BIO_ADDRINFO_family(res) != AF_INET) {
+            BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_GET_PORT,
+                   BIO_R_ADDRINFO_ADDR_IS_NOT_AF_INET);
+        } else {
+            *port_ptr = ntohs(BIO_ADDR_rawport(BIO_ADDRINFO_address(res)));
+            ret = 1;
+        }
+        BIO_ADDRINFO_free(res);
+    } else {
+        ERR_add_error_data(2, "host=", str);
+    }
+
+    return ret;
+}
+# endif
+
+int BIO_sock_error(int sock)
+{
+    int j = 0, i;
+    socklen_t size = sizeof(j);
+
+    /*
+     * Note: under Windows the third parameter is of type (char *) whereas
+     * under other systems it is (void *) if you don't have a cast it will
+     * choke the compiler: if you do have a cast then you can either go for
+     * (char *) or (void *).
+     */
+    i = getsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ERROR, (void *)&j, &size);
+    if (i < 0)
+        return (get_last_socket_error());
+    else
+        return (j);
+}
+
+# if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+struct hostent *BIO_gethostbyname(const char *name)
+{
+    /*
+     * Caching gethostbyname() results forever is wrong, so we have to let
+     * the true gethostbyname() worry about this
+     */
+#  if (defined(NETWARE_BSDSOCK) && !defined(__NOVELL_LIBC__))
+    return gethostbyname((char *)name);
+#  else
+    return gethostbyname(name);
+#  endif
+}
+# endif
+
+int BIO_sock_init(void)
+{
+# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS
+    static struct WSAData wsa_state;
+
+    if (!wsa_init_done) {
+        int err;
+
+        wsa_init_done = 1;
+        memset(&wsa_state, 0, sizeof(wsa_state));
+        /*
+         * Not making wsa_state available to the rest of the code is formally
+         * wrong. But the structures we use are [believed to be] invariable
+         * among Winsock DLLs, while API availability is [expected to be]
+         * probed at run-time with DSO_global_lookup.
+         */
+        if (WSAStartup(0x0202, &wsa_state) != 0) {
+            err = WSAGetLastError();
+            SYSerr(SYS_F_WSASTARTUP, err);
+            BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_SOCK_INIT, BIO_R_WSASTARTUP);
+            return (-1);
+        }
+    }
+# endif                         /* OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS */
+# ifdef WATT32
+    extern int _watt_do_exit;
+    _watt_do_exit = 0;          /* don't make sock_init() call exit() */
+    if (sock_init())
+        return (-1);
+# endif
+
+    return (1);
+}
+
+void bio_sock_cleanup_int(void)
+{
+# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS
+    if (wsa_init_done) {
+        wsa_init_done = 0;
+        WSACleanup();
+    }
+# endif
+}
+
+int BIO_socket_ioctl(int fd, long type, void *arg)
+{
+    int i;
+
+#  ifdef __DJGPP__
+    i = ioctlsocket(fd, type, (char *)arg);
+#  else
+#   if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
+    /*-
+     * 2011-02-18 SMS.
+     * VMS ioctl() can't tolerate a 64-bit "void *arg", but we
+     * observe that all the consumers pass in an "unsigned long *",
+     * so we arrange a local copy with a short pointer, and use
+     * that, instead.
+     */
+#    if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64
+#     define ARG arg_32p
+#     pragma pointer_size save
+#     pragma pointer_size 32
+    unsigned long arg_32;
+    unsigned long *arg_32p;
+#     pragma pointer_size restore
+    arg_32p = &arg_32;
+    arg_32 = *((unsigned long *)arg);
+#    else                       /* __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 */
+#     define ARG arg
+#    endif                      /* __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 [else] */
+#   else                        /* defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) */
+#    define ARG arg
+#   endif                       /* defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) [else] */
+
+    i = ioctlsocket(fd, type, ARG);
+#  endif                        /* __DJGPP__ */
+    if (i < 0)
+        SYSerr(SYS_F_IOCTLSOCKET, get_last_socket_error());
+    return (i);
+}
+
+# if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+int BIO_get_accept_socket(char *host, int bind_mode)
+{
+    int s = INVALID_SOCKET;
+    char *h = NULL, *p = NULL;
+    BIO_ADDRINFO *res = NULL;
+
+    if (!BIO_parse_hostserv(host, &h, &p, BIO_PARSE_PRIO_SERV))
+        return INVALID_SOCKET;
+
+    if (BIO_sock_init() != 1)
+        return INVALID_SOCKET;
+
+    if (BIO_lookup(h, p, BIO_LOOKUP_SERVER, AF_UNSPEC, SOCK_STREAM, &res) != 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    if ((s = BIO_socket(BIO_ADDRINFO_family(res), BIO_ADDRINFO_socktype(res),
+                        BIO_ADDRINFO_protocol(res), 0)) == INVALID_SOCKET) {
+        s = INVALID_SOCKET;
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!BIO_listen(s, BIO_ADDRINFO_address(res),
+                    bind_mode ? BIO_SOCK_REUSEADDR : 0)) {
+        BIO_closesocket(s);
+        s = INVALID_SOCKET;
+    }
+
+ err:
+    BIO_ADDRINFO_free(res);
+    OPENSSL_free(h);
+    OPENSSL_free(p);
+
+    return s;
+}
+
+int BIO_accept(int sock, char **ip_port)
+{
+    BIO_ADDR res;
+    int ret = -1;
+
+    ret = BIO_accept_ex(sock, &res, 0);
+    if (ret == (int)INVALID_SOCKET) {
+        if (BIO_sock_should_retry(ret)) {
+            ret = -2;
+            goto end;
+        }
+        SYSerr(SYS_F_ACCEPT, get_last_socket_error());
+        BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_ACCEPT, BIO_R_ACCEPT_ERROR);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (ip_port != NULL) {
+        char *host = BIO_ADDR_hostname_string(&res, 1);
+        char *port = BIO_ADDR_service_string(&res, 1);
+        if (host != NULL && port != NULL)
+            *ip_port = OPENSSL_zalloc(strlen(host) + strlen(port) + 2);
+        else
+            *ip_port = NULL;
+
+        if (*ip_port == NULL) {
+            BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_ACCEPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            BIO_closesocket(ret);
+            ret = (int)INVALID_SOCKET;
+        } else {
+            strcpy(*ip_port, host);
+            strcat(*ip_port, ":");
+            strcat(*ip_port, port);
+        }
+        OPENSSL_free(host);
+        OPENSSL_free(port);
+    }
+
+ end:
+    return ret;
+}
+# endif
+
+int BIO_set_tcp_ndelay(int s, int on)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+# if defined(TCP_NODELAY) && (defined(IPPROTO_TCP) || defined(SOL_TCP))
+    int opt;
+
+#  ifdef SOL_TCP
+    opt = SOL_TCP;
+#  else
+#   ifdef IPPROTO_TCP
+    opt = IPPROTO_TCP;
+#   endif
+#  endif
+
+    ret = setsockopt(s, opt, TCP_NODELAY, (char *)&on, sizeof(on));
+# endif
+    return (ret == 0);
+}
+
+int BIO_socket_nbio(int s, int mode)
+{
+    int ret = -1;
+    int l;
+
+    l = mode;
+# ifdef FIONBIO
+    l = mode;
+
+    ret = BIO_socket_ioctl(s, FIONBIO, &l);
+# elif defined(F_GETFL) && defined(F_SETFL) && (defined(O_NONBLOCK) || defined(FNDELAY))
+    /* make sure this call always pushes an error level; BIO_socket_ioctl() does so, so we do too. */
+
+    l = fcntl(s, F_GETFL, 0);
+    if (l == -1) {
+        SYSerr(SYS_F_FCNTL, get_last_rtl_error());
+        ret = -1;
+    } else {
+#  if defined(O_NONBLOCK)
+        l &= ~O_NONBLOCK;
+#  else
+        l &= ~FNDELAY; /* BSD4.x */
+#  endif
+        if (mode) {
+#  if defined(O_NONBLOCK)
+            l |= O_NONBLOCK;
+#  else
+            l |= FNDELAY; /* BSD4.x */
+#  endif
+        }
+        ret = fcntl(s, F_SETFL, l);
+
+        if (ret < 0) {
+            SYSerr(SYS_F_FCNTL, get_last_rtl_error());
+        }
+    }
+# else
+    /* make sure this call always pushes an error level; BIO_socket_ioctl() does so, so we do too. */
+    BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_SOCKET_NBIO, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
+# endif
+
+    return (ret == 0);
+}
+
+int BIO_sock_info(int sock,
+                  enum BIO_sock_info_type type, union BIO_sock_info_u *info)
+{
+    switch (type) {
+    case BIO_SOCK_INFO_ADDRESS:
+        {
+            socklen_t addr_len;
+            int ret = 0;
+            addr_len = sizeof(*info->addr);
+            ret = getsockname(sock, BIO_ADDR_sockaddr_noconst(info->addr),
+                              &addr_len);
+            if (ret == -1) {
+                SYSerr(SYS_F_GETSOCKNAME, get_last_socket_error());
+                BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_SOCK_INFO, BIO_R_GETSOCKNAME_ERROR);
+                return 0;
+            }
+            if ((size_t)addr_len > sizeof(*info->addr)) {
+                BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_SOCK_INFO, BIO_R_GETSOCKNAME_TRUNCATED_ADDRESS);
+                return 0;
+            }
+        }
+        break;
+    default:
+        BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_SOCK_INFO, BIO_R_UNKNOWN_INFO_TYPE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bio/b_sock2.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bio/b_sock2.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d8b49d0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bio/b_sock2.c
@@ -0,0 +1,277 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+
+#include "bio_lcl.h"
+
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
+# ifdef SO_MAXCONN
+#  define MAX_LISTEN  SO_MAXCONN
+# elif defined(SOMAXCONN)
+#  define MAX_LISTEN  SOMAXCONN
+# else
+#  define MAX_LISTEN  32
+# endif
+
+/*-
+ * BIO_socket - create a socket
+ * @domain: the socket domain (AF_INET, AF_INET6, AF_UNIX, ...)
+ * @socktype: the socket type (SOCK_STEAM, SOCK_DGRAM)
+ * @protocol: the protocol to use (IPPROTO_TCP, IPPROTO_UDP)
+ * @options: BIO socket options (currently unused)
+ *
+ * Creates a socket.  This should be called before calling any
+ * of BIO_connect and BIO_listen.
+ *
+ * Returns the file descriptor on success or INVALID_SOCKET on failure.  On
+ * failure errno is set, and a status is added to the OpenSSL error stack.
+ */
+int BIO_socket(int domain, int socktype, int protocol, int options)
+{
+    int sock = -1;
+
+    if (BIO_sock_init() != 1)
+        return INVALID_SOCKET;
+
+    sock = socket(domain, socktype, protocol);
+    if (sock == -1) {
+        SYSerr(SYS_F_SOCKET, get_last_socket_error());
+        BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_SOCKET, BIO_R_UNABLE_TO_CREATE_SOCKET);
+        return INVALID_SOCKET;
+    }
+
+    return sock;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * BIO_connect - connect to an address
+ * @sock: the socket to connect with
+ * @addr: the address to connect to
+ * @options: BIO socket options
+ *
+ * Connects to the address using the given socket and options.
+ *
+ * Options can be a combination of the following:
+ * - BIO_SOCK_KEEPALIVE: enable regularly sending keep-alive messages.
+ * - BIO_SOCK_NONBLOCK: Make the socket non-blocking.
+ * - BIO_SOCK_NODELAY: don't delay small messages.
+ *
+ * options holds BIO socket options that can be used
+ * You should call this for every address returned by BIO_lookup
+ * until the connection is successful.
+ *
+ * Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.  On failure errno is set
+ * and an error status is added to the OpenSSL error stack.
+ */
+int BIO_connect(int sock, const BIO_ADDR *addr, int options)
+{
+    int on = 1;
+
+    if (sock == -1) {
+        BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_CONNECT, BIO_R_INVALID_SOCKET);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (!BIO_socket_nbio(sock, (options & BIO_SOCK_NONBLOCK) != 0))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (options & BIO_SOCK_KEEPALIVE) {
+        if (setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, &on, sizeof(on)) != 0) {
+            SYSerr(SYS_F_SETSOCKOPT, get_last_socket_error());
+            BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_CONNECT, BIO_R_UNABLE_TO_KEEPALIVE);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (options & BIO_SOCK_NODELAY) {
+        if (setsockopt(sock, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_NODELAY, &on, sizeof(on)) != 0) {
+            SYSerr(SYS_F_SETSOCKOPT, get_last_socket_error());
+            BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_CONNECT, BIO_R_UNABLE_TO_NODELAY);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (connect(sock, BIO_ADDR_sockaddr(addr),
+                BIO_ADDR_sockaddr_size(addr)) == -1) {
+        if (!BIO_sock_should_retry(-1)) {
+            SYSerr(SYS_F_CONNECT, get_last_socket_error());
+            BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_CONNECT, BIO_R_CONNECT_ERROR);
+        }
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * BIO_listen - Creates a listen socket
+ * @sock: the socket to listen with
+ * @addr: local address to bind to
+ * @options: BIO socket options
+ *
+ * Binds to the address using the given socket and options, then
+ * starts listening for incoming connections.
+ *
+ * Options can be a combination of the following:
+ * - BIO_SOCK_KEEPALIVE: enable regularly sending keep-alive messages.
+ * - BIO_SOCK_NONBLOCK: Make the socket non-blocking.
+ * - BIO_SOCK_NODELAY: don't delay small messages.
+ * - BIO_SOCK_REUSEADDR: Try to reuse the address and port combination
+ *   for a recently closed port.
+ * - BIO_SOCK_V6_ONLY: When creating an IPv6 socket, make it listen only
+ *   for IPv6 addresses and not IPv4 addresses mapped to IPv6.
+ *
+ * It's recommended that you set up both an IPv6 and IPv4 listen socket, and
+ * then check both for new clients that connect to it.  You want to set up
+ * the socket as non-blocking in that case since else it could hang.
+ *
+ * Not all operating systems support IPv4 addresses on an IPv6 socket, and for
+ * others it's an option.  If you pass the BIO_LISTEN_V6_ONLY it will try to
+ * create the IPv6 sockets to only listen for IPv6 connection.
+ *
+ * It could be that the first BIO_listen() call will listen to all the IPv6
+ * and IPv4 addresses and that then trying to bind to the IPv4 address will
+ * fail.  We can't tell the difference between already listening ourself to
+ * it and someone else listening to it when failing and errno is EADDRINUSE, so
+ * it's recommended to not give an error in that case if the first call was
+ * successful.
+ *
+ * When restarting the program it could be that the port is still in use.  If
+ * you set to BIO_SOCK_REUSEADDR option it will try to reuse the port anyway.
+ * It's recommended that you use this.
+ */
+int BIO_listen(int sock, const BIO_ADDR *addr, int options)
+{
+    int on = 1;
+    int socktype;
+    socklen_t socktype_len = sizeof(socktype);
+
+    if (sock == -1) {
+        BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_LISTEN, BIO_R_INVALID_SOCKET);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (getsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_TYPE, &socktype, &socktype_len) != 0
+        || socktype_len != sizeof(socktype)) {
+        SYSerr(SYS_F_GETSOCKOPT, get_last_socket_error());
+        BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_LISTEN, BIO_R_GETTING_SOCKTYPE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (!BIO_socket_nbio(sock, (options & BIO_SOCK_NONBLOCK) != 0))
+        return 0;
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS
+    /*
+     * SO_REUSEADDR has different behavior on Windows than on
+     * other operating systems, don't set it there.
+     */
+    if (options & BIO_SOCK_REUSEADDR) {
+        if (setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &on, sizeof(on)) != 0) {
+            SYSerr(SYS_F_SETSOCKOPT, get_last_socket_error());
+            BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_LISTEN, BIO_R_UNABLE_TO_REUSEADDR);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+# endif
+
+    if (options & BIO_SOCK_KEEPALIVE) {
+        if (setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, &on, sizeof(on)) != 0) {
+            SYSerr(SYS_F_SETSOCKOPT, get_last_socket_error());
+            BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_LISTEN, BIO_R_UNABLE_TO_KEEPALIVE);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (options & BIO_SOCK_NODELAY) {
+        if (setsockopt(sock, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_NODELAY, &on, sizeof(on)) != 0) {
+            SYSerr(SYS_F_SETSOCKOPT, get_last_socket_error());
+            BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_LISTEN, BIO_R_UNABLE_TO_NODELAY);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+# ifdef IPV6_V6ONLY
+    if (BIO_ADDR_family(addr) == AF_INET6) {
+        /*
+         * Note: Windows default of IPV6_V6ONLY is ON, and Linux is OFF.
+         * Therefore we always have to use setsockopt here.
+         */
+        on = options & BIO_SOCK_V6_ONLY ? 1 : 0;
+        if (setsockopt(sock, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_V6ONLY, &on, sizeof(on)) != 0) {
+            SYSerr(SYS_F_SETSOCKOPT, get_last_socket_error());
+            BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_LISTEN, BIO_R_LISTEN_V6_ONLY);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+# endif
+
+    if (bind(sock, BIO_ADDR_sockaddr(addr), BIO_ADDR_sockaddr_size(addr)) != 0) {
+        SYSerr(SYS_F_BIND, get_last_socket_error());
+        BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_LISTEN, BIO_R_UNABLE_TO_BIND_SOCKET);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (socktype != SOCK_DGRAM && listen(sock, MAX_LISTEN) == -1) {
+        SYSerr(SYS_F_LISTEN, get_last_socket_error());
+        BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_LISTEN, BIO_R_UNABLE_TO_LISTEN_SOCKET);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * BIO_accept_ex - Accept new incoming connections
+ * @sock: the listening socket
+ * @addr: the BIO_ADDR to store the peer address in
+ * @options: BIO socket options, applied on the accepted socket.
+ *
+ */
+int BIO_accept_ex(int accept_sock, BIO_ADDR *addr_, int options)
+{
+    socklen_t len;
+    int accepted_sock;
+    BIO_ADDR locaddr;
+    BIO_ADDR *addr = addr_ == NULL ? &locaddr : addr_;
+
+    len = sizeof(*addr);
+    accepted_sock = accept(accept_sock,
+                           BIO_ADDR_sockaddr_noconst(addr), &len);
+    if (accepted_sock == -1) {
+        if (!BIO_sock_should_retry(accepted_sock)) {
+            SYSerr(SYS_F_ACCEPT, get_last_socket_error());
+            BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_ACCEPT_EX, BIO_R_ACCEPT_ERROR);
+        }
+        return INVALID_SOCKET;
+    }
+
+    if (!BIO_socket_nbio(accepted_sock, (options & BIO_SOCK_NONBLOCK) != 0)) {
+        closesocket(accepted_sock);
+        return INVALID_SOCKET;
+    }
+
+    return accepted_sock;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * BIO_closesocket - Close a socket
+ * @sock: the socket to close
+ */
+int BIO_closesocket(int sock)
+{
+    if (closesocket(sock) < 0)
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bio/bf_buff.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bio/bf_buff.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8509956
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bio/bf_buff.c
@@ -0,0 +1,455 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include "bio_lcl.h"
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+
+static int buffer_write(BIO *h, const char *buf, int num);
+static int buffer_read(BIO *h, char *buf, int size);
+static int buffer_puts(BIO *h, const char *str);
+static int buffer_gets(BIO *h, char *str, int size);
+static long buffer_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, long arg1, void *arg2);
+static int buffer_new(BIO *h);
+static int buffer_free(BIO *data);
+static long buffer_callback_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, BIO_info_cb *fp);
+#define DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE     4096
+
+static const BIO_METHOD methods_buffer = {
+    BIO_TYPE_BUFFER,
+    "buffer",
+    buffer_write,
+    buffer_read,
+    buffer_puts,
+    buffer_gets,
+    buffer_ctrl,
+    buffer_new,
+    buffer_free,
+    buffer_callback_ctrl,
+};
+
+const BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_buffer(void)
+{
+    return (&methods_buffer);
+}
+
+static int buffer_new(BIO *bi)
+{
+    BIO_F_BUFFER_CTX *ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx));
+
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    ctx->ibuf_size = DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE;
+    ctx->ibuf = OPENSSL_malloc(DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE);
+    if (ctx->ibuf == NULL) {
+        OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+        return (0);
+    }
+    ctx->obuf_size = DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE;
+    ctx->obuf = OPENSSL_malloc(DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE);
+    if (ctx->obuf == NULL) {
+        OPENSSL_free(ctx->ibuf);
+        OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+        return (0);
+    }
+
+    bi->init = 1;
+    bi->ptr = (char *)ctx;
+    bi->flags = 0;
+    return (1);
+}
+
+static int buffer_free(BIO *a)
+{
+    BIO_F_BUFFER_CTX *b;
+
+    if (a == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    b = (BIO_F_BUFFER_CTX *)a->ptr;
+    OPENSSL_free(b->ibuf);
+    OPENSSL_free(b->obuf);
+    OPENSSL_free(a->ptr);
+    a->ptr = NULL;
+    a->init = 0;
+    a->flags = 0;
+    return (1);
+}
+
+static int buffer_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
+{
+    int i, num = 0;
+    BIO_F_BUFFER_CTX *ctx;
+
+    if (out == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    ctx = (BIO_F_BUFFER_CTX *)b->ptr;
+
+    if ((ctx == NULL) || (b->next_bio == NULL))
+        return (0);
+    num = 0;
+    BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+
+ start:
+    i = ctx->ibuf_len;
+    /* If there is stuff left over, grab it */
+    if (i != 0) {
+        if (i > outl)
+            i = outl;
+        memcpy(out, &(ctx->ibuf[ctx->ibuf_off]), i);
+        ctx->ibuf_off += i;
+        ctx->ibuf_len -= i;
+        num += i;
+        if (outl == i)
+            return (num);
+        outl -= i;
+        out += i;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * We may have done a partial read. try to do more. We have nothing in
+     * the buffer. If we get an error and have read some data, just return it
+     * and let them retry to get the error again. copy direct to parent
+     * address space
+     */
+    if (outl > ctx->ibuf_size) {
+        for (;;) {
+            i = BIO_read(b->next_bio, out, outl);
+            if (i <= 0) {
+                BIO_copy_next_retry(b);
+                if (i < 0)
+                    return ((num > 0) ? num : i);
+                if (i == 0)
+                    return (num);
+            }
+            num += i;
+            if (outl == i)
+                return (num);
+            out += i;
+            outl -= i;
+        }
+    }
+    /* else */
+
+    /* we are going to be doing some buffering */
+    i = BIO_read(b->next_bio, ctx->ibuf, ctx->ibuf_size);
+    if (i <= 0) {
+        BIO_copy_next_retry(b);
+        if (i < 0)
+            return ((num > 0) ? num : i);
+        if (i == 0)
+            return (num);
+    }
+    ctx->ibuf_off = 0;
+    ctx->ibuf_len = i;
+
+    /* Lets re-read using ourselves :-) */
+    goto start;
+}
+
+static int buffer_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl)
+{
+    int i, num = 0;
+    BIO_F_BUFFER_CTX *ctx;
+
+    if ((in == NULL) || (inl <= 0))
+        return (0);
+    ctx = (BIO_F_BUFFER_CTX *)b->ptr;
+    if ((ctx == NULL) || (b->next_bio == NULL))
+        return (0);
+
+    BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+ start:
+    i = ctx->obuf_size - (ctx->obuf_len + ctx->obuf_off);
+    /* add to buffer and return */
+    if (i >= inl) {
+        memcpy(&(ctx->obuf[ctx->obuf_off + ctx->obuf_len]), in, inl);
+        ctx->obuf_len += inl;
+        return (num + inl);
+    }
+    /* else */
+    /* stuff already in buffer, so add to it first, then flush */
+    if (ctx->obuf_len != 0) {
+        if (i > 0) {            /* lets fill it up if we can */
+            memcpy(&(ctx->obuf[ctx->obuf_off + ctx->obuf_len]), in, i);
+            in += i;
+            inl -= i;
+            num += i;
+            ctx->obuf_len += i;
+        }
+        /* we now have a full buffer needing flushing */
+        for (;;) {
+            i = BIO_write(b->next_bio, &(ctx->obuf[ctx->obuf_off]),
+                          ctx->obuf_len);
+            if (i <= 0) {
+                BIO_copy_next_retry(b);
+
+                if (i < 0)
+                    return ((num > 0) ? num : i);
+                if (i == 0)
+                    return (num);
+            }
+            ctx->obuf_off += i;
+            ctx->obuf_len -= i;
+            if (ctx->obuf_len == 0)
+                break;
+        }
+    }
+    /*
+     * we only get here if the buffer has been flushed and we still have
+     * stuff to write
+     */
+    ctx->obuf_off = 0;
+
+    /* we now have inl bytes to write */
+    while (inl >= ctx->obuf_size) {
+        i = BIO_write(b->next_bio, in, inl);
+        if (i <= 0) {
+            BIO_copy_next_retry(b);
+            if (i < 0)
+                return ((num > 0) ? num : i);
+            if (i == 0)
+                return (num);
+        }
+        num += i;
+        in += i;
+        inl -= i;
+        if (inl == 0)
+            return (num);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * copy the rest into the buffer since we have only a small amount left
+     */
+    goto start;
+}
+
+static long buffer_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
+{
+    BIO *dbio;
+    BIO_F_BUFFER_CTX *ctx;
+    long ret = 1;
+    char *p1, *p2;
+    int r, i, *ip;
+    int ibs, obs;
+
+    ctx = (BIO_F_BUFFER_CTX *)b->ptr;
+
+    switch (cmd) {
+    case BIO_CTRL_RESET:
+        ctx->ibuf_off = 0;
+        ctx->ibuf_len = 0;
+        ctx->obuf_off = 0;
+        ctx->obuf_len = 0;
+        if (b->next_bio == NULL)
+            return (0);
+        ret = BIO_ctrl(b->next_bio, cmd, num, ptr);
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_INFO:
+        ret = (long)ctx->obuf_len;
+        break;
+    case BIO_C_GET_BUFF_NUM_LINES:
+        ret = 0;
+        p1 = ctx->ibuf;
+        for (i = 0; i < ctx->ibuf_len; i++) {
+            if (p1[ctx->ibuf_off + i] == '\n')
+                ret++;
+        }
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_WPENDING:
+        ret = (long)ctx->obuf_len;
+        if (ret == 0) {
+            if (b->next_bio == NULL)
+                return (0);
+            ret = BIO_ctrl(b->next_bio, cmd, num, ptr);
+        }
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_PENDING:
+        ret = (long)ctx->ibuf_len;
+        if (ret == 0) {
+            if (b->next_bio == NULL)
+                return (0);
+            ret = BIO_ctrl(b->next_bio, cmd, num, ptr);
+        }
+        break;
+    case BIO_C_SET_BUFF_READ_DATA:
+        if (num > ctx->ibuf_size) {
+            p1 = OPENSSL_malloc((int)num);
+            if (p1 == NULL)
+                goto malloc_error;
+            OPENSSL_free(ctx->ibuf);
+            ctx->ibuf = p1;
+        }
+        ctx->ibuf_off = 0;
+        ctx->ibuf_len = (int)num;
+        memcpy(ctx->ibuf, ptr, (int)num);
+        ret = 1;
+        break;
+    case BIO_C_SET_BUFF_SIZE:
+        if (ptr != NULL) {
+            ip = (int *)ptr;
+            if (*ip == 0) {
+                ibs = (int)num;
+                obs = ctx->obuf_size;
+            } else {            /* if (*ip == 1) */
+
+                ibs = ctx->ibuf_size;
+                obs = (int)num;
+            }
+        } else {
+            ibs = (int)num;
+            obs = (int)num;
+        }
+        p1 = ctx->ibuf;
+        p2 = ctx->obuf;
+        if ((ibs > DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE) && (ibs != ctx->ibuf_size)) {
+            p1 = OPENSSL_malloc((int)num);
+            if (p1 == NULL)
+                goto malloc_error;
+        }
+        if ((obs > DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE) && (obs != ctx->obuf_size)) {
+            p2 = OPENSSL_malloc((int)num);
+            if (p2 == NULL) {
+                if (p1 != ctx->ibuf)
+                    OPENSSL_free(p1);
+                goto malloc_error;
+            }
+        }
+        if (ctx->ibuf != p1) {
+            OPENSSL_free(ctx->ibuf);
+            ctx->ibuf = p1;
+            ctx->ibuf_off = 0;
+            ctx->ibuf_len = 0;
+            ctx->ibuf_size = ibs;
+        }
+        if (ctx->obuf != p2) {
+            OPENSSL_free(ctx->obuf);
+            ctx->obuf = p2;
+            ctx->obuf_off = 0;
+            ctx->obuf_len = 0;
+            ctx->obuf_size = obs;
+        }
+        break;
+    case BIO_C_DO_STATE_MACHINE:
+        if (b->next_bio == NULL)
+            return (0);
+        BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+        ret = BIO_ctrl(b->next_bio, cmd, num, ptr);
+        BIO_copy_next_retry(b);
+        break;
+
+    case BIO_CTRL_FLUSH:
+        if (b->next_bio == NULL)
+            return (0);
+        if (ctx->obuf_len <= 0) {
+            ret = BIO_ctrl(b->next_bio, cmd, num, ptr);
+            break;
+        }
+
+        for (;;) {
+            BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+            if (ctx->obuf_len > 0) {
+                r = BIO_write(b->next_bio,
+                              &(ctx->obuf[ctx->obuf_off]), ctx->obuf_len);
+                BIO_copy_next_retry(b);
+                if (r <= 0)
+                    return ((long)r);
+                ctx->obuf_off += r;
+                ctx->obuf_len -= r;
+            } else {
+                ctx->obuf_len = 0;
+                ctx->obuf_off = 0;
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+        ret = BIO_ctrl(b->next_bio, cmd, num, ptr);
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_DUP:
+        dbio = (BIO *)ptr;
+        if (!BIO_set_read_buffer_size(dbio, ctx->ibuf_size) ||
+            !BIO_set_write_buffer_size(dbio, ctx->obuf_size))
+            ret = 0;
+        break;
+    default:
+        if (b->next_bio == NULL)
+            return (0);
+        ret = BIO_ctrl(b->next_bio, cmd, num, ptr);
+        break;
+    }
+    return (ret);
+ malloc_error:
+    BIOerr(BIO_F_BUFFER_CTRL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return (0);
+}
+
+static long buffer_callback_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, BIO_info_cb *fp)
+{
+    long ret = 1;
+
+    if (b->next_bio == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    switch (cmd) {
+    default:
+        ret = BIO_callback_ctrl(b->next_bio, cmd, fp);
+        break;
+    }
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static int buffer_gets(BIO *b, char *buf, int size)
+{
+    BIO_F_BUFFER_CTX *ctx;
+    int num = 0, i, flag;
+    char *p;
+
+    ctx = (BIO_F_BUFFER_CTX *)b->ptr;
+    size--;                     /* reserve space for a '\0' */
+    BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+
+    for (;;) {
+        if (ctx->ibuf_len > 0) {
+            p = &(ctx->ibuf[ctx->ibuf_off]);
+            flag = 0;
+            for (i = 0; (i < ctx->ibuf_len) && (i < size); i++) {
+                *(buf++) = p[i];
+                if (p[i] == '\n') {
+                    flag = 1;
+                    i++;
+                    break;
+                }
+            }
+            num += i;
+            size -= i;
+            ctx->ibuf_len -= i;
+            ctx->ibuf_off += i;
+            if (flag || size == 0) {
+                *buf = '\0';
+                return (num);
+            }
+        } else {                /* read another chunk */
+
+            i = BIO_read(b->next_bio, ctx->ibuf, ctx->ibuf_size);
+            if (i <= 0) {
+                BIO_copy_next_retry(b);
+                *buf = '\0';
+                if (i < 0)
+                    return ((num > 0) ? num : i);
+                if (i == 0)
+                    return (num);
+            }
+            ctx->ibuf_len = i;
+            ctx->ibuf_off = 0;
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+static int buffer_puts(BIO *b, const char *str)
+{
+    return (buffer_write(b, str, strlen(str)));
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bio/bf_lbuf.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bio/bf_lbuf.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a80f899
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bio/bf_lbuf.c
@@ -0,0 +1,320 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include "bio_lcl.h"
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+static int linebuffer_write(BIO *h, const char *buf, int num);
+static int linebuffer_read(BIO *h, char *buf, int size);
+static int linebuffer_puts(BIO *h, const char *str);
+static int linebuffer_gets(BIO *h, char *str, int size);
+static long linebuffer_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, long arg1, void *arg2);
+static int linebuffer_new(BIO *h);
+static int linebuffer_free(BIO *data);
+static long linebuffer_callback_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, BIO_info_cb *fp);
+
+/* A 10k maximum should be enough for most purposes */
+#define DEFAULT_LINEBUFFER_SIZE 1024*10
+
+/* #define DEBUG */
+
+static const BIO_METHOD methods_linebuffer = {
+    BIO_TYPE_LINEBUFFER,
+    "linebuffer",
+    linebuffer_write,
+    linebuffer_read,
+    linebuffer_puts,
+    linebuffer_gets,
+    linebuffer_ctrl,
+    linebuffer_new,
+    linebuffer_free,
+    linebuffer_callback_ctrl,
+};
+
+const BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_linebuffer(void)
+{
+    return (&methods_linebuffer);
+}
+
+typedef struct bio_linebuffer_ctx_struct {
+    char *obuf;                 /* the output char array */
+    int obuf_size;              /* how big is the output buffer */
+    int obuf_len;               /* how many bytes are in it */
+} BIO_LINEBUFFER_CTX;
+
+static int linebuffer_new(BIO *bi)
+{
+    BIO_LINEBUFFER_CTX *ctx;
+
+    ctx = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ctx));
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    ctx->obuf = OPENSSL_malloc(DEFAULT_LINEBUFFER_SIZE);
+    if (ctx->obuf == NULL) {
+        OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+        return (0);
+    }
+    ctx->obuf_size = DEFAULT_LINEBUFFER_SIZE;
+    ctx->obuf_len = 0;
+
+    bi->init = 1;
+    bi->ptr = (char *)ctx;
+    bi->flags = 0;
+    return (1);
+}
+
+static int linebuffer_free(BIO *a)
+{
+    BIO_LINEBUFFER_CTX *b;
+
+    if (a == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    b = (BIO_LINEBUFFER_CTX *)a->ptr;
+    OPENSSL_free(b->obuf);
+    OPENSSL_free(a->ptr);
+    a->ptr = NULL;
+    a->init = 0;
+    a->flags = 0;
+    return (1);
+}
+
+static int linebuffer_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    if (out == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    if (b->next_bio == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    ret = BIO_read(b->next_bio, out, outl);
+    BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+    BIO_copy_next_retry(b);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static int linebuffer_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl)
+{
+    int i, num = 0, foundnl;
+    BIO_LINEBUFFER_CTX *ctx;
+
+    if ((in == NULL) || (inl <= 0))
+        return (0);
+    ctx = (BIO_LINEBUFFER_CTX *)b->ptr;
+    if ((ctx == NULL) || (b->next_bio == NULL))
+        return (0);
+
+    BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+
+    do {
+        const char *p;
+        char c;
+
+        for (p = in, c = '\0'; p < in + inl && (c = *p) != '\n'; p++) ;
+        if (c == '\n') {
+            p++;
+            foundnl = 1;
+        } else
+            foundnl = 0;
+
+        /*
+         * If a NL was found and we already have text in the save buffer,
+         * concatenate them and write
+         */
+        while ((foundnl || p - in > ctx->obuf_size - ctx->obuf_len)
+               && ctx->obuf_len > 0) {
+            int orig_olen = ctx->obuf_len;
+
+            i = ctx->obuf_size - ctx->obuf_len;
+            if (p - in > 0) {
+                if (i >= p - in) {
+                    memcpy(&(ctx->obuf[ctx->obuf_len]), in, p - in);
+                    ctx->obuf_len += p - in;
+                    inl -= p - in;
+                    num += p - in;
+                    in = p;
+                } else {
+                    memcpy(&(ctx->obuf[ctx->obuf_len]), in, i);
+                    ctx->obuf_len += i;
+                    inl -= i;
+                    in += i;
+                    num += i;
+                }
+            }
+            i = BIO_write(b->next_bio, ctx->obuf, ctx->obuf_len);
+            if (i <= 0) {
+                ctx->obuf_len = orig_olen;
+                BIO_copy_next_retry(b);
+
+                if (i < 0)
+                    return ((num > 0) ? num : i);
+                if (i == 0)
+                    return (num);
+            }
+            if (i < ctx->obuf_len)
+                memmove(ctx->obuf, ctx->obuf + i, ctx->obuf_len - i);
+            ctx->obuf_len -= i;
+        }
+
+        /*
+         * Now that the save buffer is emptied, let's write the input buffer
+         * if a NL was found and there is anything to write.
+         */
+        if ((foundnl || p - in > ctx->obuf_size) && p - in > 0) {
+            i = BIO_write(b->next_bio, in, p - in);
+            if (i <= 0) {
+                BIO_copy_next_retry(b);
+                if (i < 0)
+                    return ((num > 0) ? num : i);
+                if (i == 0)
+                    return (num);
+            }
+            num += i;
+            in += i;
+            inl -= i;
+        }
+    }
+    while (foundnl && inl > 0);
+    /*
+     * We've written as much as we can.  The rest of the input buffer, if
+     * any, is text that doesn't and with a NL and therefore needs to be
+     * saved for the next trip.
+     */
+    if (inl > 0) {
+        memcpy(&(ctx->obuf[ctx->obuf_len]), in, inl);
+        ctx->obuf_len += inl;
+        num += inl;
+    }
+    return num;
+}
+
+static long linebuffer_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
+{
+    BIO *dbio;
+    BIO_LINEBUFFER_CTX *ctx;
+    long ret = 1;
+    char *p;
+    int r;
+    int obs;
+
+    ctx = (BIO_LINEBUFFER_CTX *)b->ptr;
+
+    switch (cmd) {
+    case BIO_CTRL_RESET:
+        ctx->obuf_len = 0;
+        if (b->next_bio == NULL)
+            return (0);
+        ret = BIO_ctrl(b->next_bio, cmd, num, ptr);
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_INFO:
+        ret = (long)ctx->obuf_len;
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_WPENDING:
+        ret = (long)ctx->obuf_len;
+        if (ret == 0) {
+            if (b->next_bio == NULL)
+                return (0);
+            ret = BIO_ctrl(b->next_bio, cmd, num, ptr);
+        }
+        break;
+    case BIO_C_SET_BUFF_SIZE:
+        obs = (int)num;
+        p = ctx->obuf;
+        if ((obs > DEFAULT_LINEBUFFER_SIZE) && (obs != ctx->obuf_size)) {
+            p = OPENSSL_malloc((int)num);
+            if (p == NULL)
+                goto malloc_error;
+        }
+        if (ctx->obuf != p) {
+            if (ctx->obuf_len > obs) {
+                ctx->obuf_len = obs;
+            }
+            memcpy(p, ctx->obuf, ctx->obuf_len);
+            OPENSSL_free(ctx->obuf);
+            ctx->obuf = p;
+            ctx->obuf_size = obs;
+        }
+        break;
+    case BIO_C_DO_STATE_MACHINE:
+        if (b->next_bio == NULL)
+            return (0);
+        BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+        ret = BIO_ctrl(b->next_bio, cmd, num, ptr);
+        BIO_copy_next_retry(b);
+        break;
+
+    case BIO_CTRL_FLUSH:
+        if (b->next_bio == NULL)
+            return (0);
+        if (ctx->obuf_len <= 0) {
+            ret = BIO_ctrl(b->next_bio, cmd, num, ptr);
+            break;
+        }
+
+        for (;;) {
+            BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+            if (ctx->obuf_len > 0) {
+                r = BIO_write(b->next_bio, ctx->obuf, ctx->obuf_len);
+                BIO_copy_next_retry(b);
+                if (r <= 0)
+                    return ((long)r);
+                if (r < ctx->obuf_len)
+                    memmove(ctx->obuf, ctx->obuf + r, ctx->obuf_len - r);
+                ctx->obuf_len -= r;
+            } else {
+                ctx->obuf_len = 0;
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+        ret = BIO_ctrl(b->next_bio, cmd, num, ptr);
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_DUP:
+        dbio = (BIO *)ptr;
+        if (!BIO_set_write_buffer_size(dbio, ctx->obuf_size))
+            ret = 0;
+        break;
+    default:
+        if (b->next_bio == NULL)
+            return (0);
+        ret = BIO_ctrl(b->next_bio, cmd, num, ptr);
+        break;
+    }
+    return (ret);
+ malloc_error:
+    BIOerr(BIO_F_LINEBUFFER_CTRL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return (0);
+}
+
+static long linebuffer_callback_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, BIO_info_cb *fp)
+{
+    long ret = 1;
+
+    if (b->next_bio == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    switch (cmd) {
+    default:
+        ret = BIO_callback_ctrl(b->next_bio, cmd, fp);
+        break;
+    }
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static int linebuffer_gets(BIO *b, char *buf, int size)
+{
+    if (b->next_bio == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    return (BIO_gets(b->next_bio, buf, size));
+}
+
+static int linebuffer_puts(BIO *b, const char *str)
+{
+    return (linebuffer_write(b, str, strlen(str)));
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bio/bf_nbio.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bio/bf_nbio.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3328506
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bio/bf_nbio.c
@@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include "bio_lcl.h"
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+/*
+ * BIO_put and BIO_get both add to the digest, BIO_gets returns the digest
+ */
+
+static int nbiof_write(BIO *h, const char *buf, int num);
+static int nbiof_read(BIO *h, char *buf, int size);
+static int nbiof_puts(BIO *h, const char *str);
+static int nbiof_gets(BIO *h, char *str, int size);
+static long nbiof_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, long arg1, void *arg2);
+static int nbiof_new(BIO *h);
+static int nbiof_free(BIO *data);
+static long nbiof_callback_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, BIO_info_cb *fp);
+typedef struct nbio_test_st {
+    /* only set if we sent a 'should retry' error */
+    int lrn;
+    int lwn;
+} NBIO_TEST;
+
+static const BIO_METHOD methods_nbiof = {
+    BIO_TYPE_NBIO_TEST,
+    "non-blocking IO test filter",
+    nbiof_write,
+    nbiof_read,
+    nbiof_puts,
+    nbiof_gets,
+    nbiof_ctrl,
+    nbiof_new,
+    nbiof_free,
+    nbiof_callback_ctrl,
+};
+
+const BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_nbio_test(void)
+{
+    return (&methods_nbiof);
+}
+
+static int nbiof_new(BIO *bi)
+{
+    NBIO_TEST *nt;
+
+    if ((nt = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*nt))) == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    nt->lrn = -1;
+    nt->lwn = -1;
+    bi->ptr = (char *)nt;
+    bi->init = 1;
+    return (1);
+}
+
+static int nbiof_free(BIO *a)
+{
+    if (a == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    OPENSSL_free(a->ptr);
+    a->ptr = NULL;
+    a->init = 0;
+    a->flags = 0;
+    return (1);
+}
+
+static int nbiof_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    int num;
+    unsigned char n;
+
+    if (out == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    if (b->next_bio == NULL)
+        return (0);
+
+    BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+    if (RAND_bytes(&n, 1) <= 0)
+        return -1;
+    num = (n & 0x07);
+
+    if (outl > num)
+        outl = num;
+
+    if (num == 0) {
+        ret = -1;
+        BIO_set_retry_read(b);
+    } else {
+        ret = BIO_read(b->next_bio, out, outl);
+        if (ret < 0)
+            BIO_copy_next_retry(b);
+    }
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static int nbiof_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl)
+{
+    NBIO_TEST *nt;
+    int ret = 0;
+    int num;
+    unsigned char n;
+
+    if ((in == NULL) || (inl <= 0))
+        return (0);
+    if (b->next_bio == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    nt = (NBIO_TEST *)b->ptr;
+
+    BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+
+    if (nt->lwn > 0) {
+        num = nt->lwn;
+        nt->lwn = 0;
+    } else {
+        if (RAND_bytes(&n, 1) <= 0)
+            return -1;
+        num = (n & 7);
+    }
+
+    if (inl > num)
+        inl = num;
+
+    if (num == 0) {
+        ret = -1;
+        BIO_set_retry_write(b);
+    } else {
+        ret = BIO_write(b->next_bio, in, inl);
+        if (ret < 0) {
+            BIO_copy_next_retry(b);
+            nt->lwn = inl;
+        }
+    }
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static long nbiof_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
+{
+    long ret;
+
+    if (b->next_bio == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    switch (cmd) {
+    case BIO_C_DO_STATE_MACHINE:
+        BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+        ret = BIO_ctrl(b->next_bio, cmd, num, ptr);
+        BIO_copy_next_retry(b);
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_DUP:
+        ret = 0L;
+        break;
+    default:
+        ret = BIO_ctrl(b->next_bio, cmd, num, ptr);
+        break;
+    }
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static long nbiof_callback_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, BIO_info_cb *fp)
+{
+    long ret = 1;
+
+    if (b->next_bio == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    switch (cmd) {
+    default:
+        ret = BIO_callback_ctrl(b->next_bio, cmd, fp);
+        break;
+    }
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static int nbiof_gets(BIO *bp, char *buf, int size)
+{
+    if (bp->next_bio == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    return (BIO_gets(bp->next_bio, buf, size));
+}
+
+static int nbiof_puts(BIO *bp, const char *str)
+{
+    if (bp->next_bio == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    return (BIO_puts(bp->next_bio, str));
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bio/bf_null.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bio/bf_null.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6b86aa5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bio/bf_null.c
@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include "bio_lcl.h"
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+
+/*
+ * BIO_put and BIO_get both add to the digest, BIO_gets returns the digest
+ */
+
+static int nullf_write(BIO *h, const char *buf, int num);
+static int nullf_read(BIO *h, char *buf, int size);
+static int nullf_puts(BIO *h, const char *str);
+static int nullf_gets(BIO *h, char *str, int size);
+static long nullf_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, long arg1, void *arg2);
+static long nullf_callback_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, BIO_info_cb *fp);
+static const BIO_METHOD methods_nullf = {
+    BIO_TYPE_NULL_FILTER,
+    "NULL filter",
+    nullf_write,
+    nullf_read,
+    nullf_puts,
+    nullf_gets,
+    nullf_ctrl,
+    NULL,
+    NULL,
+    nullf_callback_ctrl,
+};
+
+const BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_null(void)
+{
+    return (&methods_nullf);
+}
+
+static int nullf_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    if (out == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    if (b->next_bio == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    ret = BIO_read(b->next_bio, out, outl);
+    BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+    BIO_copy_next_retry(b);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static int nullf_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    if ((in == NULL) || (inl <= 0))
+        return (0);
+    if (b->next_bio == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    ret = BIO_write(b->next_bio, in, inl);
+    BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+    BIO_copy_next_retry(b);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static long nullf_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
+{
+    long ret;
+
+    if (b->next_bio == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    switch (cmd) {
+    case BIO_C_DO_STATE_MACHINE:
+        BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+        ret = BIO_ctrl(b->next_bio, cmd, num, ptr);
+        BIO_copy_next_retry(b);
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_DUP:
+        ret = 0L;
+        break;
+    default:
+        ret = BIO_ctrl(b->next_bio, cmd, num, ptr);
+    }
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static long nullf_callback_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, BIO_info_cb *fp)
+{
+    long ret = 1;
+
+    if (b->next_bio == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    switch (cmd) {
+    default:
+        ret = BIO_callback_ctrl(b->next_bio, cmd, fp);
+        break;
+    }
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static int nullf_gets(BIO *bp, char *buf, int size)
+{
+    if (bp->next_bio == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    return (BIO_gets(bp->next_bio, buf, size));
+}
+
+static int nullf_puts(BIO *bp, const char *str)
+{
+    if (bp->next_bio == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    return (BIO_puts(bp->next_bio, str));
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bio/bio_cb.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bio/bio_cb.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..412387b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bio/bio_cb.c
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include "bio_lcl.h"
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+long BIO_debug_callback(BIO *bio, int cmd, const char *argp,
+                        int argi, long argl, long ret)
+{
+    BIO *b;
+    char buf[256];
+    char *p;
+    long r = 1;
+    int len;
+    size_t p_maxlen;
+
+    if (BIO_CB_RETURN & cmd)
+        r = ret;
+
+    len = BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "BIO[%p]: ", (void *)bio);
+
+    /* Ignore errors and continue printing the other information. */
+    if (len < 0)
+        len = 0;
+    p = buf + len;
+    p_maxlen = sizeof(buf) - len;
+
+    switch (cmd) {
+    case BIO_CB_FREE:
+        BIO_snprintf(p, p_maxlen, "Free - %s\n", bio->method->name);
+        break;
+    case BIO_CB_READ:
+        if (bio->method->type & BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR)
+            BIO_snprintf(p, p_maxlen, "read(%d,%lu) - %s fd=%d\n",
+                         bio->num, (unsigned long)argi,
+                         bio->method->name, bio->num);
+        else
+            BIO_snprintf(p, p_maxlen, "read(%d,%lu) - %s\n",
+                         bio->num, (unsigned long)argi, bio->method->name);
+        break;
+    case BIO_CB_WRITE:
+        if (bio->method->type & BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR)
+            BIO_snprintf(p, p_maxlen, "write(%d,%lu) - %s fd=%d\n",
+                         bio->num, (unsigned long)argi,
+                         bio->method->name, bio->num);
+        else
+            BIO_snprintf(p, p_maxlen, "write(%d,%lu) - %s\n",
+                         bio->num, (unsigned long)argi, bio->method->name);
+        break;
+    case BIO_CB_PUTS:
+        BIO_snprintf(p, p_maxlen, "puts() - %s\n", bio->method->name);
+        break;
+    case BIO_CB_GETS:
+        BIO_snprintf(p, p_maxlen, "gets(%lu) - %s\n", (unsigned long)argi,
+                     bio->method->name);
+        break;
+    case BIO_CB_CTRL:
+        BIO_snprintf(p, p_maxlen, "ctrl(%lu) - %s\n", (unsigned long)argi,
+                     bio->method->name);
+        break;
+    case BIO_CB_RETURN | BIO_CB_READ:
+        BIO_snprintf(p, p_maxlen, "read return %ld\n", ret);
+        break;
+    case BIO_CB_RETURN | BIO_CB_WRITE:
+        BIO_snprintf(p, p_maxlen, "write return %ld\n", ret);
+        break;
+    case BIO_CB_RETURN | BIO_CB_GETS:
+        BIO_snprintf(p, p_maxlen, "gets return %ld\n", ret);
+        break;
+    case BIO_CB_RETURN | BIO_CB_PUTS:
+        BIO_snprintf(p, p_maxlen, "puts return %ld\n", ret);
+        break;
+    case BIO_CB_RETURN | BIO_CB_CTRL:
+        BIO_snprintf(p, p_maxlen, "ctrl return %ld\n", ret);
+        break;
+    default:
+        BIO_snprintf(p, p_maxlen, "bio callback - unknown type (%d)\n", cmd);
+        break;
+    }
+
+    b = (BIO *)bio->cb_arg;
+    if (b != NULL)
+        BIO_write(b, buf, strlen(buf));
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_STDIO)
+    else
+        fputs(buf, stderr);
+#endif
+    return (r);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bio/bio_err.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bio/bio_err.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c914dcf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bio/bio_err.c
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+/*
+ * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
+ * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+
+# define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_BIO,func,0)
+# define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_BIO,0,reason)
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA BIO_str_functs[] = {
+    {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_ACPT_STATE), "acpt_state"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_ADDR_STRINGS), "addr_strings"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_BIO_ACCEPT), "BIO_accept"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_BIO_ACCEPT_EX), "BIO_accept_ex"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_BIO_ADDR_NEW), "BIO_ADDR_new"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_BIO_CALLBACK_CTRL), "BIO_callback_ctrl"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_BIO_CONNECT), "BIO_connect"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_BIO_CTRL), "BIO_ctrl"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_BIO_GETS), "BIO_gets"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_BIO_GET_HOST_IP), "BIO_get_host_ip"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_BIO_GET_NEW_INDEX), "BIO_get_new_index"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_BIO_GET_PORT), "BIO_get_port"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_BIO_LISTEN), "BIO_listen"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_BIO_LOOKUP), "BIO_lookup"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_BIO_MAKE_PAIR), "bio_make_pair"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_BIO_METH_NEW), "BIO_meth_new"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_BIO_NEW), "BIO_new"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_BIO_NEW_FILE), "BIO_new_file"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_BIO_NEW_MEM_BUF), "BIO_new_mem_buf"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_BIO_NREAD), "BIO_nread"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_BIO_NREAD0), "BIO_nread0"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_BIO_NWRITE), "BIO_nwrite"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_BIO_NWRITE0), "BIO_nwrite0"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_BIO_PARSE_HOSTSERV), "BIO_parse_hostserv"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_BIO_PUTS), "BIO_puts"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_BIO_READ), "BIO_read"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_BIO_SOCKET), "BIO_socket"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_BIO_SOCKET_NBIO), "BIO_socket_nbio"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_BIO_SOCK_INFO), "BIO_sock_info"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_BIO_SOCK_INIT), "BIO_sock_init"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_BIO_WRITE), "BIO_write"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_BUFFER_CTRL), "buffer_ctrl"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_CONN_CTRL), "conn_ctrl"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_CONN_STATE), "conn_state"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_DGRAM_SCTP_READ), "dgram_sctp_read"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_DGRAM_SCTP_WRITE), "dgram_sctp_write"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_FILE_CTRL), "file_ctrl"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_FILE_READ), "file_read"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_LINEBUFFER_CTRL), "linebuffer_ctrl"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_MEM_WRITE), "mem_write"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_SSL_NEW), "SSL_new"},
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA BIO_str_reasons[] = {
+    {ERR_REASON(BIO_R_ACCEPT_ERROR), "accept error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(BIO_R_ADDRINFO_ADDR_IS_NOT_AF_INET),
+     "addrinfo addr is not af inet"},
+    {ERR_REASON(BIO_R_AMBIGUOUS_HOST_OR_SERVICE),
+     "ambiguous host or service"},
+    {ERR_REASON(BIO_R_BAD_FOPEN_MODE), "bad fopen mode"},
+    {ERR_REASON(BIO_R_BROKEN_PIPE), "broken pipe"},
+    {ERR_REASON(BIO_R_CONNECT_ERROR), "connect error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(BIO_R_GETHOSTBYNAME_ADDR_IS_NOT_AF_INET),
+     "gethostbyname addr is not af inet"},
+    {ERR_REASON(BIO_R_GETSOCKNAME_ERROR), "getsockname error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(BIO_R_GETSOCKNAME_TRUNCATED_ADDRESS),
+     "getsockname truncated address"},
+    {ERR_REASON(BIO_R_GETTING_SOCKTYPE), "getting socktype"},
+    {ERR_REASON(BIO_R_INVALID_ARGUMENT), "invalid argument"},
+    {ERR_REASON(BIO_R_INVALID_SOCKET), "invalid socket"},
+    {ERR_REASON(BIO_R_IN_USE), "in use"},
+    {ERR_REASON(BIO_R_LISTEN_V6_ONLY), "listen v6 only"},
+    {ERR_REASON(BIO_R_LOOKUP_RETURNED_NOTHING), "lookup returned nothing"},
+    {ERR_REASON(BIO_R_MALFORMED_HOST_OR_SERVICE),
+     "malformed host or service"},
+    {ERR_REASON(BIO_R_NBIO_CONNECT_ERROR), "nbio connect error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(BIO_R_NO_ACCEPT_ADDR_OR_SERVICE_SPECIFIED),
+     "no accept addr or service specified"},
+    {ERR_REASON(BIO_R_NO_HOSTNAME_OR_SERVICE_SPECIFIED),
+     "no hostname or service specified"},
+    {ERR_REASON(BIO_R_NO_PORT_DEFINED), "no port defined"},
+    {ERR_REASON(BIO_R_NO_SUCH_FILE), "no such file"},
+    {ERR_REASON(BIO_R_NULL_PARAMETER), "null parameter"},
+    {ERR_REASON(BIO_R_UNABLE_TO_BIND_SOCKET), "unable to bind socket"},
+    {ERR_REASON(BIO_R_UNABLE_TO_CREATE_SOCKET), "unable to create socket"},
+    {ERR_REASON(BIO_R_UNABLE_TO_KEEPALIVE), "unable to keepalive"},
+    {ERR_REASON(BIO_R_UNABLE_TO_LISTEN_SOCKET), "unable to listen socket"},
+    {ERR_REASON(BIO_R_UNABLE_TO_NODELAY), "unable to nodelay"},
+    {ERR_REASON(BIO_R_UNABLE_TO_REUSEADDR), "unable to reuseaddr"},
+    {ERR_REASON(BIO_R_UNAVAILABLE_IP_FAMILY), "unavailable ip family"},
+    {ERR_REASON(BIO_R_UNINITIALIZED), "uninitialized"},
+    {ERR_REASON(BIO_R_UNKNOWN_INFO_TYPE), "unknown info type"},
+    {ERR_REASON(BIO_R_UNSUPPORTED_IP_FAMILY), "unsupported ip family"},
+    {ERR_REASON(BIO_R_UNSUPPORTED_METHOD), "unsupported method"},
+    {ERR_REASON(BIO_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL_FAMILY),
+     "unsupported protocol family"},
+    {ERR_REASON(BIO_R_WRITE_TO_READ_ONLY_BIO), "write to read only BIO"},
+    {ERR_REASON(BIO_R_WSASTARTUP), "WSAStartup"},
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+
+#endif
+
+int ERR_load_BIO_strings(void)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+
+    if (ERR_func_error_string(BIO_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) {
+        ERR_load_strings(0, BIO_str_functs);
+        ERR_load_strings(0, BIO_str_reasons);
+    }
+#endif
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bio/bio_lcl.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bio/bio_lcl.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..39178cf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bio/bio_lcl.h
@@ -0,0 +1,188 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#define USE_SOCKETS
+#include "e_os.h"
+
+/* BEGIN BIO_ADDRINFO/BIO_ADDR stuff. */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
+/*
+ * Throughout this file and b_addr.c, the existence of the macro
+ * AI_PASSIVE is used to detect the availability of struct addrinfo,
+ * getnameinfo() and getaddrinfo().  If that macro doesn't exist,
+ * we use our own implementation instead.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * It's imperative that these macros get defined before openssl/bio.h gets
+ * included.  Otherwise, the AI_PASSIVE hack will not work properly.
+ * For clarity, we check for internal/cryptlib.h since it's a common header
+ * that also includes bio.h.
+ */
+# ifdef HEADER_CRYPTLIB_H
+#  error internal/cryptlib.h included before bio_lcl.h
+# endif
+# ifdef HEADER_BIO_H
+#  error openssl/bio.h included before bio_lcl.h
+# endif
+
+/*
+ * Undefine AF_UNIX on systems that define it but don't support it.
+ */
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
+#  undef AF_UNIX
+# endif
+
+# ifdef AI_PASSIVE
+
+/*
+ * There's a bug in VMS C header file netdb.h, where struct addrinfo
+ * always is the P32 variant, but the functions that handle that structure,
+ * such as getaddrinfo() and freeaddrinfo() adapt to the initial pointer
+ * size.  The easiest workaround is to force struct addrinfo to be the
+ * 64-bit variant when compiling in P64 mode.
+ */
+#  if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64
+#   define addrinfo __addrinfo64
+#  endif
+
+#  define bio_addrinfo_st addrinfo
+#  define bai_family      ai_family
+#  define bai_socktype    ai_socktype
+#  define bai_protocol    ai_protocol
+#  define bai_addrlen     ai_addrlen
+#  define bai_addr        ai_addr
+#  define bai_next        ai_next
+# else
+struct bio_addrinfo_st {
+    int bai_family;
+    int bai_socktype;
+    int bai_protocol;
+    size_t bai_addrlen;
+    struct sockaddr *bai_addr;
+    struct bio_addrinfo_st *bai_next;
+};
+# endif
+
+union bio_addr_st {
+    struct sockaddr sa;
+# ifdef AF_INET6
+    struct sockaddr_in6 s_in6;
+# endif
+    struct sockaddr_in s_in;
+# ifdef AF_UNIX
+    struct sockaddr_un s_un;
+# endif
+};
+#endif
+
+/* END BIO_ADDRINFO/BIO_ADDR stuff. */
+
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <internal/bio.h>
+
+typedef struct bio_f_buffer_ctx_struct {
+    /*-
+     * Buffers are setup like this:
+     *
+     * <---------------------- size ----------------------->
+     * +---------------------------------------------------+
+     * | consumed | remaining          | free space        |
+     * +---------------------------------------------------+
+     * <-- off --><------- len ------->
+     */
+    /*- BIO *bio; *//*
+     * this is now in the BIO struct
+     */
+    int ibuf_size;              /* how big is the input buffer */
+    int obuf_size;              /* how big is the output buffer */
+    char *ibuf;                 /* the char array */
+    int ibuf_len;               /* how many bytes are in it */
+    int ibuf_off;               /* write/read offset */
+    char *obuf;                 /* the char array */
+    int obuf_len;               /* how many bytes are in it */
+    int obuf_off;               /* write/read offset */
+} BIO_F_BUFFER_CTX;
+
+struct bio_st {
+    const BIO_METHOD *method;
+    /* bio, mode, argp, argi, argl, ret */
+    long (*callback) (struct bio_st *, int, const char *, int, long, long);
+    char *cb_arg;               /* first argument for the callback */
+    int init;
+    int shutdown;
+    int flags;                  /* extra storage */
+    int retry_reason;
+    int num;
+    void *ptr;
+    struct bio_st *next_bio;    /* used by filter BIOs */
+    struct bio_st *prev_bio;    /* used by filter BIOs */
+    int references;
+    uint64_t num_read;
+    uint64_t num_write;
+    CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data;
+    CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock;
+};
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
+# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+typedef unsigned int socklen_t;
+# endif
+
+extern CRYPTO_RWLOCK *bio_lookup_lock;
+
+int BIO_ADDR_make(BIO_ADDR *ap, const struct sockaddr *sa);
+const struct sockaddr *BIO_ADDR_sockaddr(const BIO_ADDR *ap);
+struct sockaddr *BIO_ADDR_sockaddr_noconst(BIO_ADDR *ap);
+socklen_t BIO_ADDR_sockaddr_size(const BIO_ADDR *ap);
+socklen_t BIO_ADDRINFO_sockaddr_size(const BIO_ADDRINFO *bai);
+const struct sockaddr *BIO_ADDRINFO_sockaddr(const BIO_ADDRINFO *bai);
+#endif
+
+extern CRYPTO_RWLOCK *bio_type_lock;
+
+void bio_sock_cleanup_int(void);
+
+#if BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK==0
+/* Shortcut UPLINK calls on most platforms... */
+# define UP_stdin        stdin
+# define UP_stdout       stdout
+# define UP_stderr       stderr
+# define UP_fprintf      fprintf
+# define UP_fgets        fgets
+# define UP_fread        fread
+# define UP_fwrite       fwrite
+# undef  UP_fsetmod
+# define UP_feof         feof
+# define UP_fclose       fclose
+
+# define UP_fopen        fopen
+# define UP_fseek        fseek
+# define UP_ftell        ftell
+# define UP_fflush       fflush
+# define UP_ferror       ferror
+# ifdef _WIN32
+#  define UP_fileno       _fileno
+#  define UP_open         _open
+#  define UP_read         _read
+#  define UP_write        _write
+#  define UP_lseek        _lseek
+#  define UP_close        _close
+# else
+#  define UP_fileno       fileno
+#  define UP_open         open
+#  define UP_read         read
+#  define UP_write        write
+#  define UP_lseek        lseek
+#  define UP_close        close
+# endif
+
+#endif
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bio/bio_lib.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bio/bio_lib.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7b98dc9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bio/bio_lib.c
@@ -0,0 +1,600 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include "bio_lcl.h"
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+
+BIO *BIO_new(const BIO_METHOD *method)
+{
+    BIO *bio = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*bio));
+
+    if (bio == NULL) {
+        BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+
+    bio->method = method;
+    bio->shutdown = 1;
+    bio->references = 1;
+
+    if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_BIO, bio, &bio->ex_data))
+        goto err;
+
+    bio->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
+    if (bio->lock == NULL) {
+        BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_BIO, bio, &bio->ex_data);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (method->create != NULL && !method->create(bio)) {
+        BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_NEW, ERR_R_INIT_FAIL);
+        CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_BIO, bio, &bio->ex_data);
+        CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(bio->lock);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (method->create == NULL)
+        bio->init = 1;
+
+    return bio;
+
+err:
+    OPENSSL_free(bio);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+int BIO_free(BIO *a)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    if (a == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    if (CRYPTO_atomic_add(&a->references, -1, &i, a->lock) <= 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    REF_PRINT_COUNT("BIO", a);
+    if (i > 0)
+        return 1;
+    REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0);
+    if ((a->callback != NULL) &&
+        ((i = (int)a->callback(a, BIO_CB_FREE, NULL, 0, 0L, 1L)) <= 0))
+        return i;
+
+    if ((a->method != NULL) && (a->method->destroy != NULL))
+        a->method->destroy(a);
+
+    CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_BIO, a, &a->ex_data);
+
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(a->lock);
+
+    OPENSSL_free(a);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+void BIO_set_data(BIO *a, void *ptr)
+{
+    a->ptr = ptr;
+}
+
+void *BIO_get_data(BIO *a)
+{
+    return a->ptr;
+}
+
+void BIO_set_init(BIO *a, int init)
+{
+    a->init = init;
+}
+
+int BIO_get_init(BIO *a)
+{
+    return a->init;
+}
+
+void BIO_set_shutdown(BIO *a, int shut)
+{
+    a->shutdown = shut;
+}
+
+int BIO_get_shutdown(BIO *a)
+{
+    return a->shutdown;
+}
+
+void BIO_vfree(BIO *a)
+{
+    BIO_free(a);
+}
+
+int BIO_up_ref(BIO *a)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    if (CRYPTO_atomic_add(&a->references, 1, &i, a->lock) <= 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    REF_PRINT_COUNT("BIO", a);
+    REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 2);
+    return ((i > 1) ? 1 : 0);
+}
+
+void BIO_clear_flags(BIO *b, int flags)
+{
+    b->flags &= ~flags;
+}
+
+int BIO_test_flags(const BIO *b, int flags)
+{
+    return (b->flags & flags);
+}
+
+void BIO_set_flags(BIO *b, int flags)
+{
+    b->flags |= flags;
+}
+
+long (*BIO_get_callback(const BIO *b)) (struct bio_st *, int, const char *,
+                                        int, long, long) {
+    return b->callback;
+}
+
+void BIO_set_callback(BIO *b,
+                      long (*cb) (struct bio_st *, int, const char *, int,
+                                  long, long))
+{
+    b->callback = cb;
+}
+
+void BIO_set_callback_arg(BIO *b, char *arg)
+{
+    b->cb_arg = arg;
+}
+
+char *BIO_get_callback_arg(const BIO *b)
+{
+    return b->cb_arg;
+}
+
+const char *BIO_method_name(const BIO *b)
+{
+    return b->method->name;
+}
+
+int BIO_method_type(const BIO *b)
+{
+    return b->method->type;
+}
+
+int BIO_read(BIO *b, void *out, int outl)
+{
+    int i;
+    long (*cb) (BIO *, int, const char *, int, long, long);
+
+    if ((b == NULL) || (b->method == NULL) || (b->method->bread == NULL)) {
+        BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_READ, BIO_R_UNSUPPORTED_METHOD);
+        return (-2);
+    }
+
+    cb = b->callback;
+    if ((cb != NULL) &&
+        ((i = (int)cb(b, BIO_CB_READ, out, outl, 0L, 1L)) <= 0))
+        return (i);
+
+    if (!b->init) {
+        BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_READ, BIO_R_UNINITIALIZED);
+        return (-2);
+    }
+
+    i = b->method->bread(b, out, outl);
+
+    if (i > 0)
+        b->num_read += (uint64_t)i;
+
+    if (cb != NULL)
+        i = (int)cb(b, BIO_CB_READ | BIO_CB_RETURN, out, outl, 0L, (long)i);
+    return (i);
+}
+
+int BIO_write(BIO *b, const void *in, int inl)
+{
+    int i;
+    long (*cb) (BIO *, int, const char *, int, long, long);
+
+    if (b == NULL)
+        return (0);
+
+    cb = b->callback;
+    if ((b->method == NULL) || (b->method->bwrite == NULL)) {
+        BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_WRITE, BIO_R_UNSUPPORTED_METHOD);
+        return (-2);
+    }
+
+    if ((cb != NULL) &&
+        ((i = (int)cb(b, BIO_CB_WRITE, in, inl, 0L, 1L)) <= 0))
+        return (i);
+
+    if (!b->init) {
+        BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_WRITE, BIO_R_UNINITIALIZED);
+        return (-2);
+    }
+
+    i = b->method->bwrite(b, in, inl);
+
+    if (i > 0)
+        b->num_write += (uint64_t)i;
+
+    if (cb != NULL)
+        i = (int)cb(b, BIO_CB_WRITE | BIO_CB_RETURN, in, inl, 0L, (long)i);
+    return (i);
+}
+
+int BIO_puts(BIO *b, const char *in)
+{
+    int i;
+    long (*cb) (BIO *, int, const char *, int, long, long);
+
+    if ((b == NULL) || (b->method == NULL) || (b->method->bputs == NULL)) {
+        BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_PUTS, BIO_R_UNSUPPORTED_METHOD);
+        return (-2);
+    }
+
+    cb = b->callback;
+
+    if ((cb != NULL) && ((i = (int)cb(b, BIO_CB_PUTS, in, 0, 0L, 1L)) <= 0))
+        return (i);
+
+    if (!b->init) {
+        BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_PUTS, BIO_R_UNINITIALIZED);
+        return (-2);
+    }
+
+    i = b->method->bputs(b, in);
+
+    if (i > 0)
+        b->num_write += (uint64_t)i;
+
+    if (cb != NULL)
+        i = (int)cb(b, BIO_CB_PUTS | BIO_CB_RETURN, in, 0, 0L, (long)i);
+    return (i);
+}
+
+int BIO_gets(BIO *b, char *in, int inl)
+{
+    int i;
+    long (*cb) (BIO *, int, const char *, int, long, long);
+
+    if ((b == NULL) || (b->method == NULL) || (b->method->bgets == NULL)) {
+        BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_GETS, BIO_R_UNSUPPORTED_METHOD);
+        return (-2);
+    }
+
+    cb = b->callback;
+
+    if ((cb != NULL) && ((i = (int)cb(b, BIO_CB_GETS, in, inl, 0L, 1L)) <= 0))
+        return (i);
+
+    if (!b->init) {
+        BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_GETS, BIO_R_UNINITIALIZED);
+        return (-2);
+    }
+
+    i = b->method->bgets(b, in, inl);
+
+    if (cb != NULL)
+        i = (int)cb(b, BIO_CB_GETS | BIO_CB_RETURN, in, inl, 0L, (long)i);
+    return (i);
+}
+
+int BIO_indent(BIO *b, int indent, int max)
+{
+    if (indent < 0)
+        indent = 0;
+    if (indent > max)
+        indent = max;
+    while (indent--)
+        if (BIO_puts(b, " ") != 1)
+            return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+long BIO_int_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long larg, int iarg)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    i = iarg;
+    return (BIO_ctrl(b, cmd, larg, (char *)&i));
+}
+
+void *BIO_ptr_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long larg)
+{
+    void *p = NULL;
+
+    if (BIO_ctrl(b, cmd, larg, (char *)&p) <= 0)
+        return (NULL);
+    else
+        return (p);
+}
+
+long BIO_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
+{
+    long ret;
+    long (*cb) (BIO *, int, const char *, int, long, long);
+
+    if (b == NULL)
+        return (0);
+
+    if ((b->method == NULL) || (b->method->ctrl == NULL)) {
+        BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_CTRL, BIO_R_UNSUPPORTED_METHOD);
+        return (-2);
+    }
+
+    cb = b->callback;
+
+    if ((cb != NULL) &&
+        ((ret = cb(b, BIO_CB_CTRL, parg, cmd, larg, 1L)) <= 0))
+        return (ret);
+
+    ret = b->method->ctrl(b, cmd, larg, parg);
+
+    if (cb != NULL)
+        ret = cb(b, BIO_CB_CTRL | BIO_CB_RETURN, parg, cmd, larg, ret);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+long BIO_callback_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, BIO_info_cb *fp)
+{
+    long ret;
+    long (*cb) (BIO *, int, const char *, int, long, long);
+
+    if (b == NULL)
+        return (0);
+
+    if ((b->method == NULL) || (b->method->callback_ctrl == NULL)) {
+        BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_CALLBACK_CTRL, BIO_R_UNSUPPORTED_METHOD);
+        return (-2);
+    }
+
+    cb = b->callback;
+
+    if ((cb != NULL) &&
+        ((ret = cb(b, BIO_CB_CTRL, (void *)&fp, cmd, 0, 1L)) <= 0))
+        return (ret);
+
+    ret = b->method->callback_ctrl(b, cmd, fp);
+
+    if (cb != NULL)
+        ret = cb(b, BIO_CB_CTRL | BIO_CB_RETURN, (void *)&fp, cmd, 0, ret);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+/*
+ * It is unfortunate to duplicate in functions what the BIO_(w)pending macros
+ * do; but those macros have inappropriate return type, and for interfacing
+ * from other programming languages, C macros aren't much of a help anyway.
+ */
+size_t BIO_ctrl_pending(BIO *bio)
+{
+    return BIO_ctrl(bio, BIO_CTRL_PENDING, 0, NULL);
+}
+
+size_t BIO_ctrl_wpending(BIO *bio)
+{
+    return BIO_ctrl(bio, BIO_CTRL_WPENDING, 0, NULL);
+}
+
+/* put the 'bio' on the end of b's list of operators */
+BIO *BIO_push(BIO *b, BIO *bio)
+{
+    BIO *lb;
+
+    if (b == NULL)
+        return (bio);
+    lb = b;
+    while (lb->next_bio != NULL)
+        lb = lb->next_bio;
+    lb->next_bio = bio;
+    if (bio != NULL)
+        bio->prev_bio = lb;
+    /* called to do internal processing */
+    BIO_ctrl(b, BIO_CTRL_PUSH, 0, lb);
+    return (b);
+}
+
+/* Remove the first and return the rest */
+BIO *BIO_pop(BIO *b)
+{
+    BIO *ret;
+
+    if (b == NULL)
+        return (NULL);
+    ret = b->next_bio;
+
+    BIO_ctrl(b, BIO_CTRL_POP, 0, b);
+
+    if (b->prev_bio != NULL)
+        b->prev_bio->next_bio = b->next_bio;
+    if (b->next_bio != NULL)
+        b->next_bio->prev_bio = b->prev_bio;
+
+    b->next_bio = NULL;
+    b->prev_bio = NULL;
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+BIO *BIO_get_retry_BIO(BIO *bio, int *reason)
+{
+    BIO *b, *last;
+
+    b = last = bio;
+    for (;;) {
+        if (!BIO_should_retry(b))
+            break;
+        last = b;
+        b = b->next_bio;
+        if (b == NULL)
+            break;
+    }
+    if (reason != NULL)
+        *reason = last->retry_reason;
+    return (last);
+}
+
+int BIO_get_retry_reason(BIO *bio)
+{
+    return (bio->retry_reason);
+}
+
+void BIO_set_retry_reason(BIO *bio, int reason)
+{
+    bio->retry_reason = reason;
+}
+
+BIO *BIO_find_type(BIO *bio, int type)
+{
+    int mt, mask;
+
+    if (bio == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    mask = type & 0xff;
+    do {
+        if (bio->method != NULL) {
+            mt = bio->method->type;
+
+            if (!mask) {
+                if (mt & type)
+                    return (bio);
+            } else if (mt == type)
+                return (bio);
+        }
+        bio = bio->next_bio;
+    } while (bio != NULL);
+    return (NULL);
+}
+
+BIO *BIO_next(BIO *b)
+{
+    if (b == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    return b->next_bio;
+}
+
+void BIO_set_next(BIO *b, BIO *next)
+{
+    b->next_bio = next;
+}
+
+void BIO_free_all(BIO *bio)
+{
+    BIO *b;
+    int ref;
+
+    while (bio != NULL) {
+        b = bio;
+        ref = b->references;
+        bio = bio->next_bio;
+        BIO_free(b);
+        /* Since ref count > 1, don't free anyone else. */
+        if (ref > 1)
+            break;
+    }
+}
+
+BIO *BIO_dup_chain(BIO *in)
+{
+    BIO *ret = NULL, *eoc = NULL, *bio, *new_bio;
+
+    for (bio = in; bio != NULL; bio = bio->next_bio) {
+        if ((new_bio = BIO_new(bio->method)) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        new_bio->callback = bio->callback;
+        new_bio->cb_arg = bio->cb_arg;
+        new_bio->init = bio->init;
+        new_bio->shutdown = bio->shutdown;
+        new_bio->flags = bio->flags;
+
+        /* This will let SSL_s_sock() work with stdin/stdout */
+        new_bio->num = bio->num;
+
+        if (!BIO_dup_state(bio, (char *)new_bio)) {
+            BIO_free(new_bio);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        /* copy app data */
+        if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_BIO, &new_bio->ex_data,
+                                &bio->ex_data)) {
+            BIO_free(new_bio);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        if (ret == NULL) {
+            eoc = new_bio;
+            ret = eoc;
+        } else {
+            BIO_push(eoc, new_bio);
+            eoc = new_bio;
+        }
+    }
+    return (ret);
+ err:
+    BIO_free_all(ret);
+
+    return (NULL);
+}
+
+void BIO_copy_next_retry(BIO *b)
+{
+    BIO_set_flags(b, BIO_get_retry_flags(b->next_bio));
+    b->retry_reason = b->next_bio->retry_reason;
+}
+
+int BIO_set_ex_data(BIO *bio, int idx, void *data)
+{
+    return (CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&(bio->ex_data), idx, data));
+}
+
+void *BIO_get_ex_data(BIO *bio, int idx)
+{
+    return (CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&(bio->ex_data), idx));
+}
+
+uint64_t BIO_number_read(BIO *bio)
+{
+    if (bio)
+        return bio->num_read;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+uint64_t BIO_number_written(BIO *bio)
+{
+    if (bio)
+        return bio->num_write;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+void bio_free_ex_data(BIO *bio)
+{
+    CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_BIO, bio, &bio->ex_data);
+}
+
+void bio_cleanup(void)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
+    bio_sock_cleanup_int();
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(bio_lookup_lock);
+    bio_lookup_lock = NULL;
+#endif
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(bio_type_lock);
+    bio_type_lock = NULL;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bio/bio_meth.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bio/bio_meth.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1e785d3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bio/bio_meth.c
@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "bio_lcl.h"
+#include <internal/thread_once.h>
+
+CRYPTO_RWLOCK *bio_type_lock = NULL;
+static CRYPTO_ONCE bio_type_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
+
+DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_bio_type_init)
+{
+    bio_type_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
+    return bio_type_lock != NULL;
+}
+
+int BIO_get_new_index()
+{
+    static int bio_count = BIO_TYPE_START;
+    int newval;
+
+    if (!RUN_ONCE(&bio_type_init, do_bio_type_init)) {
+        BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_GET_NEW_INDEX, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return -1;
+    }
+    if (!CRYPTO_atomic_add(&bio_count, 1, &newval, bio_type_lock))
+        return -1;
+    return newval;
+}
+
+BIO_METHOD *BIO_meth_new(int type, const char *name)
+{
+    BIO_METHOD *biom = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(BIO_METHOD));
+
+    if (biom == NULL
+            || (biom->name = OPENSSL_strdup(name)) == NULL) {
+        OPENSSL_free(biom);
+        BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_METH_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    return biom;
+}
+
+void BIO_meth_free(BIO_METHOD *biom)
+{
+    if (biom != NULL) {
+        OPENSSL_free(biom->name);
+        OPENSSL_free(biom);
+    }
+}
+
+int (*BIO_meth_get_write(BIO_METHOD *biom)) (BIO *, const char *, int)
+{
+    return biom->bwrite;
+}
+
+int BIO_meth_set_write(BIO_METHOD *biom,
+                       int (*bwrite) (BIO *, const char *, int))
+{
+    biom->bwrite = bwrite;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int (*BIO_meth_get_read(BIO_METHOD *biom)) (BIO *, char *, int)
+{
+    return biom->bread;
+}
+
+int BIO_meth_set_read(BIO_METHOD *biom,
+                      int (*bread) (BIO *, char *, int))
+{
+    biom->bread = bread;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int (*BIO_meth_get_puts(BIO_METHOD *biom)) (BIO *, const char *)
+{
+    return biom->bputs;
+}
+
+int BIO_meth_set_puts(BIO_METHOD *biom,
+                      int (*bputs) (BIO *, const char *))
+{
+    biom->bputs = bputs;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int (*BIO_meth_get_gets(BIO_METHOD *biom)) (BIO *, char *, int)
+{
+    return biom->bgets;
+}
+
+int BIO_meth_set_gets(BIO_METHOD *biom,
+                      int (*bgets) (BIO *, char *, int))
+{
+    biom->bgets = bgets;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+long (*BIO_meth_get_ctrl(BIO_METHOD *biom)) (BIO *, int, long, void *)
+{
+    return biom->ctrl;
+}
+
+int BIO_meth_set_ctrl(BIO_METHOD *biom,
+                      long (*ctrl) (BIO *, int, long, void *))
+{
+    biom->ctrl = ctrl;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int (*BIO_meth_get_create(BIO_METHOD *biom)) (BIO *)
+{
+    return biom->create;
+}
+
+int BIO_meth_set_create(BIO_METHOD *biom, int (*create) (BIO *))
+{
+    biom->create = create;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int (*BIO_meth_get_destroy(BIO_METHOD *biom)) (BIO *)
+{
+    return biom->destroy;
+}
+
+int BIO_meth_set_destroy(BIO_METHOD *biom, int (*destroy) (BIO *))
+{
+    biom->destroy = destroy;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+long (*BIO_meth_get_callback_ctrl(BIO_METHOD *biom)) (BIO *, int, BIO_info_cb *)
+{
+    return biom->callback_ctrl;
+}
+
+int BIO_meth_set_callback_ctrl(BIO_METHOD *biom,
+                               long (*callback_ctrl) (BIO *, int,
+                                                      BIO_info_cb *))
+{
+    biom->callback_ctrl = callback_ctrl;
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bio/bss_acpt.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bio/bss_acpt.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..21d21c1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bio/bss_acpt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,562 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include "bio_lcl.h"
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
+
+typedef struct bio_accept_st {
+    int state;
+    int accept_family;
+    int bind_mode;     /* Socket mode for BIO_listen */
+    int accepted_mode; /* Socket mode for BIO_accept (set on accepted sock) */
+    char *param_addr;
+    char *param_serv;
+
+    int accept_sock;
+
+    BIO_ADDRINFO *addr_first;
+    const BIO_ADDRINFO *addr_iter;
+    BIO_ADDR cache_accepting_addr;   /* Useful if we asked for port 0 */
+    char *cache_accepting_name, *cache_accepting_serv;
+    BIO_ADDR cache_peer_addr;
+    char *cache_peer_name, *cache_peer_serv;
+
+    BIO *bio_chain;
+} BIO_ACCEPT;
+
+static int acpt_write(BIO *h, const char *buf, int num);
+static int acpt_read(BIO *h, char *buf, int size);
+static int acpt_puts(BIO *h, const char *str);
+static long acpt_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, long arg1, void *arg2);
+static int acpt_new(BIO *h);
+static int acpt_free(BIO *data);
+static int acpt_state(BIO *b, BIO_ACCEPT *c);
+static void acpt_close_socket(BIO *data);
+static BIO_ACCEPT *BIO_ACCEPT_new(void);
+static void BIO_ACCEPT_free(BIO_ACCEPT *a);
+
+# define ACPT_S_BEFORE                   1
+# define ACPT_S_GET_ADDR                 2
+# define ACPT_S_CREATE_SOCKET            3
+# define ACPT_S_LISTEN                   4
+# define ACPT_S_ACCEPT                   5
+# define ACPT_S_OK                       6
+
+static const BIO_METHOD methods_acceptp = {
+    BIO_TYPE_ACCEPT,
+    "socket accept",
+    acpt_write,
+    acpt_read,
+    acpt_puts,
+    NULL,                       /* connect_gets,         */
+    acpt_ctrl,
+    acpt_new,
+    acpt_free,
+    NULL,                       /* connect_callback_ctrl */
+};
+
+const BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_accept(void)
+{
+    return (&methods_acceptp);
+}
+
+static int acpt_new(BIO *bi)
+{
+    BIO_ACCEPT *ba;
+
+    bi->init = 0;
+    bi->num = (int)INVALID_SOCKET;
+    bi->flags = 0;
+    if ((ba = BIO_ACCEPT_new()) == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    bi->ptr = (char *)ba;
+    ba->state = ACPT_S_BEFORE;
+    bi->shutdown = 1;
+    return (1);
+}
+
+static BIO_ACCEPT *BIO_ACCEPT_new(void)
+{
+    BIO_ACCEPT *ret;
+
+    if ((ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret))) == NULL)
+        return (NULL);
+    ret->accept_family = BIO_FAMILY_IPANY;
+    ret->accept_sock = (int)INVALID_SOCKET;
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static void BIO_ACCEPT_free(BIO_ACCEPT *a)
+{
+    if (a == NULL)
+        return;
+
+    OPENSSL_free(a->param_addr);
+    OPENSSL_free(a->param_serv);
+    BIO_ADDRINFO_free(a->addr_first);
+    OPENSSL_free(a->cache_accepting_name);
+    OPENSSL_free(a->cache_accepting_serv);
+    OPENSSL_free(a->cache_peer_name);
+    OPENSSL_free(a->cache_peer_serv);
+    BIO_free(a->bio_chain);
+    OPENSSL_free(a);
+}
+
+static void acpt_close_socket(BIO *bio)
+{
+    BIO_ACCEPT *c;
+
+    c = (BIO_ACCEPT *)bio->ptr;
+    if (c->accept_sock != (int)INVALID_SOCKET) {
+        shutdown(c->accept_sock, 2);
+        closesocket(c->accept_sock);
+        c->accept_sock = (int)INVALID_SOCKET;
+        bio->num = (int)INVALID_SOCKET;
+    }
+}
+
+static int acpt_free(BIO *a)
+{
+    BIO_ACCEPT *data;
+
+    if (a == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    data = (BIO_ACCEPT *)a->ptr;
+
+    if (a->shutdown) {
+        acpt_close_socket(a);
+        BIO_ACCEPT_free(data);
+        a->ptr = NULL;
+        a->flags = 0;
+        a->init = 0;
+    }
+    return (1);
+}
+
+static int acpt_state(BIO *b, BIO_ACCEPT *c)
+{
+    BIO *bio = NULL, *dbio;
+    int s = -1, ret = -1;
+
+    for (;;) {
+        switch (c->state) {
+        case ACPT_S_BEFORE:
+            if (c->param_addr == NULL && c->param_serv == NULL) {
+                BIOerr(BIO_F_ACPT_STATE, BIO_R_NO_ACCEPT_ADDR_OR_SERVICE_SPECIFIED);
+                ERR_add_error_data(4,
+                                   "hostname=", c->param_addr,
+                                   " service=", c->param_serv);
+                goto exit_loop;
+            }
+
+            /* Because we're starting a new bind, any cached name and serv
+             * are now obsolete and need to be cleaned out.
+             * QUESTION: should this be done in acpt_close_socket() instead?
+             */
+            OPENSSL_free(c->cache_accepting_name);
+            c->cache_accepting_name = NULL;
+            OPENSSL_free(c->cache_accepting_serv);
+            c->cache_accepting_serv = NULL;
+            OPENSSL_free(c->cache_peer_name);
+            c->cache_peer_name = NULL;
+            OPENSSL_free(c->cache_peer_serv);
+            c->cache_peer_serv = NULL;
+
+            c->state = ACPT_S_GET_ADDR;
+            break;
+
+        case ACPT_S_GET_ADDR:
+            {
+                int family = AF_UNSPEC;
+                switch (c->accept_family) {
+                case BIO_FAMILY_IPV6:
+                    if (1) { /* This is a trick we use to avoid bit rot.
+                              * at least the "else" part will always be
+                              * compiled.
+                              */
+#ifdef AF_INET6
+                        family = AF_INET6;
+                    } else {
+#endif
+                        BIOerr(BIO_F_ACPT_STATE, BIO_R_UNAVAILABLE_IP_FAMILY);
+                        goto exit_loop;
+                    }
+                    break;
+                case BIO_FAMILY_IPV4:
+                    family = AF_INET;
+                    break;
+                case BIO_FAMILY_IPANY:
+                    family = AF_UNSPEC;
+                    break;
+                default:
+                    BIOerr(BIO_F_ACPT_STATE, BIO_R_UNSUPPORTED_IP_FAMILY);
+                    goto exit_loop;
+                }
+                if (BIO_lookup(c->param_addr, c->param_serv, BIO_LOOKUP_SERVER,
+                               family, SOCK_STREAM, &c->addr_first) == 0)
+                    goto exit_loop;
+            }
+            if (c->addr_first == NULL) {
+                BIOerr(BIO_F_ACPT_STATE, BIO_R_LOOKUP_RETURNED_NOTHING);
+                goto exit_loop;
+            }
+            /* We're currently not iterating, but set this as preparation
+             * for possible future development in that regard
+             */
+            c->addr_iter = c->addr_first;
+            c->state = ACPT_S_CREATE_SOCKET;
+            break;
+
+        case ACPT_S_CREATE_SOCKET:
+            ret = BIO_socket(BIO_ADDRINFO_family(c->addr_iter),
+                             BIO_ADDRINFO_socktype(c->addr_iter),
+                             BIO_ADDRINFO_protocol(c->addr_iter), 0);
+            if (ret == (int)INVALID_SOCKET) {
+                SYSerr(SYS_F_SOCKET, get_last_socket_error());
+                ERR_add_error_data(4,
+                                   "hostname=", c->param_addr,
+                                   " service=", c->param_serv);
+                BIOerr(BIO_F_ACPT_STATE, BIO_R_UNABLE_TO_CREATE_SOCKET);
+                goto exit_loop;
+            }
+            c->accept_sock = ret;
+            b->num = ret;
+            c->state = ACPT_S_LISTEN;
+            break;
+
+        case ACPT_S_LISTEN:
+            {
+                if (!BIO_listen(c->accept_sock,
+                                BIO_ADDRINFO_address(c->addr_iter),
+                                c->bind_mode)) {
+                    BIO_closesocket(c->accept_sock);
+                    goto exit_loop;
+                }
+            }
+
+            {
+                union BIO_sock_info_u info;
+
+                info.addr = &c->cache_accepting_addr;
+                if (!BIO_sock_info(c->accept_sock, BIO_SOCK_INFO_ADDRESS,
+                                   &info)) {
+                    BIO_closesocket(c->accept_sock);
+                    goto exit_loop;
+                }
+            }
+
+            c->cache_accepting_name =
+                BIO_ADDR_hostname_string(&c->cache_accepting_addr, 1);
+            c->cache_accepting_serv =
+                BIO_ADDR_service_string(&c->cache_accepting_addr, 1);
+            c->state = ACPT_S_ACCEPT;
+            s = -1;
+            ret = 1;
+            goto end;
+
+        case ACPT_S_ACCEPT:
+            if (b->next_bio != NULL) {
+                c->state = ACPT_S_OK;
+                break;
+            }
+            BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+            b->retry_reason = 0;
+
+            OPENSSL_free(c->cache_peer_name);
+            c->cache_peer_name = NULL;
+            OPENSSL_free(c->cache_peer_serv);
+            c->cache_peer_serv = NULL;
+
+            s = BIO_accept_ex(c->accept_sock, &c->cache_peer_addr,
+                              c->accepted_mode);
+
+            /* If the returned socket is invalid, this might still be
+             * retryable
+             */
+            if (s < 0) {
+                if (BIO_sock_should_retry(s)) {
+                    BIO_set_retry_special(b);
+                    b->retry_reason = BIO_RR_ACCEPT;
+                    goto end;
+                }
+            }
+
+            /* If it wasn't retryable, we fail */
+            if (s < 0) {
+                ret = s;
+                goto exit_loop;
+            }
+
+            bio = BIO_new_socket(s, BIO_CLOSE);
+            if (bio == NULL)
+                goto exit_loop;
+
+            BIO_set_callback(bio, BIO_get_callback(b));
+            BIO_set_callback_arg(bio, BIO_get_callback_arg(b));
+
+            /*
+             * If the accept BIO has an bio_chain, we dup it and put the new
+             * socket at the end.
+             */
+            if (c->bio_chain != NULL) {
+                if ((dbio = BIO_dup_chain(c->bio_chain)) == NULL)
+                    goto exit_loop;
+                if (!BIO_push(dbio, bio))
+                    goto exit_loop;
+                bio = dbio;
+            }
+            if (BIO_push(b, bio) == NULL)
+                goto exit_loop;
+
+            c->cache_peer_name =
+                BIO_ADDR_hostname_string(&c->cache_peer_addr, 1);
+            c->cache_peer_serv =
+                BIO_ADDR_service_string(&c->cache_peer_addr, 1);
+            c->state = ACPT_S_OK;
+            bio = NULL;
+            ret = 1;
+            goto end;
+
+        case ACPT_S_OK:
+            if (b->next_bio == NULL) {
+                c->state = ACPT_S_ACCEPT;
+                break;
+            }
+            ret = 1;
+            goto end;
+
+        default:
+            ret = 0;
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+
+  exit_loop:
+    if (bio != NULL)
+        BIO_free(bio);
+    else if (s >= 0)
+        BIO_closesocket(s);
+  end:
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int acpt_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    BIO_ACCEPT *data;
+
+    BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+    data = (BIO_ACCEPT *)b->ptr;
+
+    while (b->next_bio == NULL) {
+        ret = acpt_state(b, data);
+        if (ret <= 0)
+            return (ret);
+    }
+
+    ret = BIO_read(b->next_bio, out, outl);
+    BIO_copy_next_retry(b);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static int acpt_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl)
+{
+    int ret;
+    BIO_ACCEPT *data;
+
+    BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+    data = (BIO_ACCEPT *)b->ptr;
+
+    while (b->next_bio == NULL) {
+        ret = acpt_state(b, data);
+        if (ret <= 0)
+            return (ret);
+    }
+
+    ret = BIO_write(b->next_bio, in, inl);
+    BIO_copy_next_retry(b);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static long acpt_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
+{
+    int *ip;
+    long ret = 1;
+    BIO_ACCEPT *data;
+    char **pp;
+
+    data = (BIO_ACCEPT *)b->ptr;
+
+    switch (cmd) {
+    case BIO_CTRL_RESET:
+        ret = 0;
+        data->state = ACPT_S_BEFORE;
+        acpt_close_socket(b);
+        BIO_ADDRINFO_free(data->addr_first);
+        data->addr_first = NULL;
+        b->flags = 0;
+        break;
+    case BIO_C_DO_STATE_MACHINE:
+        /* use this one to start the connection */
+        ret = (long)acpt_state(b, data);
+        break;
+    case BIO_C_SET_ACCEPT:
+        if (ptr != NULL) {
+            if (num == 0) {
+                char *hold_serv = data->param_serv;
+                /* We affect the hostname regardless.  However, the input
+                 * string might contain a host:service spec, so we must
+                 * parse it, which might or might not affect the service
+                 */
+                OPENSSL_free(data->param_addr);
+                data->param_addr = NULL;
+                ret = BIO_parse_hostserv(ptr,
+                                         &data->param_addr,
+                                         &data->param_serv,
+                                         BIO_PARSE_PRIO_SERV);
+                if (hold_serv != data->param_serv)
+                    OPENSSL_free(hold_serv);
+                b->init = 1;
+            } else if (num == 1) {
+                OPENSSL_free(data->param_serv);
+                data->param_serv = BUF_strdup(ptr);
+                b->init = 1;
+            } else if (num == 2) {
+                data->bind_mode |= BIO_SOCK_NONBLOCK;
+            } else if (num == 3) {
+                BIO_free(data->bio_chain);
+                data->bio_chain = (BIO *)ptr;
+            } else if (num == 4) {
+                data->accept_family = *(int *)ptr;
+            }
+        } else {
+            if (num == 2) {
+                data->bind_mode &= ~BIO_SOCK_NONBLOCK;
+            }
+        }
+        break;
+    case BIO_C_SET_NBIO:
+        if (num != 0)
+            data->accepted_mode |= BIO_SOCK_NONBLOCK;
+        else
+            data->accepted_mode &= ~BIO_SOCK_NONBLOCK;
+        break;
+    case BIO_C_SET_FD:
+        b->init = 1;
+        b->num = *((int *)ptr);
+        data->accept_sock = b->num;
+        data->state = ACPT_S_ACCEPT;
+        b->shutdown = (int)num;
+        b->init = 1;
+        break;
+    case BIO_C_GET_FD:
+        if (b->init) {
+            ip = (int *)ptr;
+            if (ip != NULL)
+                *ip = data->accept_sock;
+            ret = data->accept_sock;
+        } else
+            ret = -1;
+        break;
+    case BIO_C_GET_ACCEPT:
+        if (b->init) {
+            if (num == 0 && ptr != NULL) {
+                pp = (char **)ptr;
+                *pp = data->cache_accepting_name;
+            } else if (num == 1 && ptr != NULL) {
+                pp = (char **)ptr;
+                *pp = data->cache_accepting_serv;
+            } else if (num == 2 && ptr != NULL) {
+                pp = (char **)ptr;
+                *pp = data->cache_peer_name;
+            } else if (num == 3 && ptr != NULL) {
+                pp = (char **)ptr;
+                *pp = data->cache_peer_serv;
+            } else if (num == 4) {
+                switch (BIO_ADDRINFO_family(data->addr_iter)) {
+#ifdef AF_INET6
+                case AF_INET6:
+                    ret = BIO_FAMILY_IPV6;
+                    break;
+#endif
+                case AF_INET:
+                    ret = BIO_FAMILY_IPV4;
+                    break;
+                case 0:
+                    ret = data->accept_family;
+                    break;
+                default:
+                    ret = -1;
+                    break;
+                }
+            } else
+                ret = -1;
+        } else
+            ret = -1;
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_GET_CLOSE:
+        ret = b->shutdown;
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_SET_CLOSE:
+        b->shutdown = (int)num;
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_PENDING:
+    case BIO_CTRL_WPENDING:
+        ret = 0;
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_FLUSH:
+        break;
+    case BIO_C_SET_BIND_MODE:
+        data->bind_mode = (int)num;
+        break;
+    case BIO_C_GET_BIND_MODE:
+        ret = (long)data->bind_mode;
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_DUP:
+/*-     dbio=(BIO *)ptr;
+        if (data->param_port) EAY EAY
+                BIO_set_port(dbio,data->param_port);
+        if (data->param_hostname)
+                BIO_set_hostname(dbio,data->param_hostname);
+        BIO_set_nbio(dbio,data->nbio); */
+        break;
+
+    default:
+        ret = 0;
+        break;
+    }
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static int acpt_puts(BIO *bp, const char *str)
+{
+    int n, ret;
+
+    n = strlen(str);
+    ret = acpt_write(bp, str, n);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+BIO *BIO_new_accept(const char *str)
+{
+    BIO *ret;
+
+    ret = BIO_new(BIO_s_accept());
+    if (ret == NULL)
+        return (NULL);
+    if (BIO_set_accept_name(ret, str))
+        return (ret);
+    BIO_free(ret);
+    return (NULL);
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bio/bss_bio.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bio/bss_bio.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..de34f6b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bio/bss_bio.c
@@ -0,0 +1,805 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Special method for a BIO where the other endpoint is also a BIO of this
+ * kind, handled by the same thread (i.e. the "peer" is actually ourselves,
+ * wearing a different hat). Such "BIO pairs" are mainly for using the SSL
+ * library with I/O interfaces for which no specific BIO method is available.
+ * See ssl/ssltest.c for some hints on how this can be used.
+ */
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "bio_lcl.h"
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+
+#include "e_os.h"
+
+static int bio_new(BIO *bio);
+static int bio_free(BIO *bio);
+static int bio_read(BIO *bio, char *buf, int size);
+static int bio_write(BIO *bio, const char *buf, int num);
+static long bio_ctrl(BIO *bio, int cmd, long num, void *ptr);
+static int bio_puts(BIO *bio, const char *str);
+
+static int bio_make_pair(BIO *bio1, BIO *bio2);
+static void bio_destroy_pair(BIO *bio);
+
+static const BIO_METHOD methods_biop = {
+    BIO_TYPE_BIO,
+    "BIO pair",
+    bio_write,
+    bio_read,
+    bio_puts,
+    NULL /* no bio_gets */ ,
+    bio_ctrl,
+    bio_new,
+    bio_free,
+    NULL                        /* no bio_callback_ctrl */
+};
+
+const BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_bio(void)
+{
+    return &methods_biop;
+}
+
+struct bio_bio_st {
+    BIO *peer;                  /* NULL if buf == NULL. If peer != NULL, then
+                                 * peer->ptr is also a bio_bio_st, and its
+                                 * "peer" member points back to us. peer !=
+                                 * NULL iff init != 0 in the BIO. */
+    /* This is for what we write (i.e. reading uses peer's struct): */
+    int closed;                 /* valid iff peer != NULL */
+    size_t len;                 /* valid iff buf != NULL; 0 if peer == NULL */
+    size_t offset;              /* valid iff buf != NULL; 0 if len == 0 */
+    size_t size;
+    char *buf;                  /* "size" elements (if != NULL) */
+    size_t request;             /* valid iff peer != NULL; 0 if len != 0,
+                                 * otherwise set by peer to number of bytes
+                                 * it (unsuccessfully) tried to read, never
+                                 * more than buffer space (size-len)
+                                 * warrants. */
+};
+
+static int bio_new(BIO *bio)
+{
+    struct bio_bio_st *b = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*b));
+
+    if (b == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    /* enough for one TLS record (just a default) */
+    b->size = 17 * 1024;
+
+    bio->ptr = b;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int bio_free(BIO *bio)
+{
+    struct bio_bio_st *b;
+
+    if (bio == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    b = bio->ptr;
+
+    assert(b != NULL);
+
+    if (b->peer)
+        bio_destroy_pair(bio);
+
+    OPENSSL_free(b->buf);
+    OPENSSL_free(b);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int bio_read(BIO *bio, char *buf, int size_)
+{
+    size_t size = size_;
+    size_t rest;
+    struct bio_bio_st *b, *peer_b;
+
+    BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
+
+    if (!bio->init)
+        return 0;
+
+    b = bio->ptr;
+    assert(b != NULL);
+    assert(b->peer != NULL);
+    peer_b = b->peer->ptr;
+    assert(peer_b != NULL);
+    assert(peer_b->buf != NULL);
+
+    peer_b->request = 0;        /* will be set in "retry_read" situation */
+
+    if (buf == NULL || size == 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    if (peer_b->len == 0) {
+        if (peer_b->closed)
+            return 0;           /* writer has closed, and no data is left */
+        else {
+            BIO_set_retry_read(bio); /* buffer is empty */
+            if (size <= peer_b->size)
+                peer_b->request = size;
+            else
+                /*
+                 * don't ask for more than the peer can deliver in one write
+                 */
+                peer_b->request = peer_b->size;
+            return -1;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* we can read */
+    if (peer_b->len < size)
+        size = peer_b->len;
+
+    /* now read "size" bytes */
+
+    rest = size;
+
+    assert(rest > 0);
+    do {                        /* one or two iterations */
+        size_t chunk;
+
+        assert(rest <= peer_b->len);
+        if (peer_b->offset + rest <= peer_b->size)
+            chunk = rest;
+        else
+            /* wrap around ring buffer */
+            chunk = peer_b->size - peer_b->offset;
+        assert(peer_b->offset + chunk <= peer_b->size);
+
+        memcpy(buf, peer_b->buf + peer_b->offset, chunk);
+
+        peer_b->len -= chunk;
+        if (peer_b->len) {
+            peer_b->offset += chunk;
+            assert(peer_b->offset <= peer_b->size);
+            if (peer_b->offset == peer_b->size)
+                peer_b->offset = 0;
+            buf += chunk;
+        } else {
+            /* buffer now empty, no need to advance "buf" */
+            assert(chunk == rest);
+            peer_b->offset = 0;
+        }
+        rest -= chunk;
+    }
+    while (rest);
+
+    return size;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * non-copying interface: provide pointer to available data in buffer
+ *    bio_nread0:  return number of available bytes
+ *    bio_nread:   also advance index
+ * (example usage:  bio_nread0(), read from buffer, bio_nread()
+ *  or just         bio_nread(), read from buffer)
+ */
+/*
+ * WARNING: The non-copying interface is largely untested as of yet and may
+ * contain bugs.
+ */
+static ossl_ssize_t bio_nread0(BIO *bio, char **buf)
+{
+    struct bio_bio_st *b, *peer_b;
+    ossl_ssize_t num;
+
+    BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
+
+    if (!bio->init)
+        return 0;
+
+    b = bio->ptr;
+    assert(b != NULL);
+    assert(b->peer != NULL);
+    peer_b = b->peer->ptr;
+    assert(peer_b != NULL);
+    assert(peer_b->buf != NULL);
+
+    peer_b->request = 0;
+
+    if (peer_b->len == 0) {
+        char dummy;
+
+        /* avoid code duplication -- nothing available for reading */
+        return bio_read(bio, &dummy, 1); /* returns 0 or -1 */
+    }
+
+    num = peer_b->len;
+    if (peer_b->size < peer_b->offset + num)
+        /* no ring buffer wrap-around for non-copying interface */
+        num = peer_b->size - peer_b->offset;
+    assert(num > 0);
+
+    if (buf != NULL)
+        *buf = peer_b->buf + peer_b->offset;
+    return num;
+}
+
+static ossl_ssize_t bio_nread(BIO *bio, char **buf, size_t num_)
+{
+    struct bio_bio_st *b, *peer_b;
+    ossl_ssize_t num, available;
+
+    if (num_ > OSSL_SSIZE_MAX)
+        num = OSSL_SSIZE_MAX;
+    else
+        num = (ossl_ssize_t) num_;
+
+    available = bio_nread0(bio, buf);
+    if (num > available)
+        num = available;
+    if (num <= 0)
+        return num;
+
+    b = bio->ptr;
+    peer_b = b->peer->ptr;
+
+    peer_b->len -= num;
+    if (peer_b->len) {
+        peer_b->offset += num;
+        assert(peer_b->offset <= peer_b->size);
+        if (peer_b->offset == peer_b->size)
+            peer_b->offset = 0;
+    } else
+        peer_b->offset = 0;
+
+    return num;
+}
+
+static int bio_write(BIO *bio, const char *buf, int num_)
+{
+    size_t num = num_;
+    size_t rest;
+    struct bio_bio_st *b;
+
+    BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
+
+    if (!bio->init || buf == NULL || num == 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    b = bio->ptr;
+    assert(b != NULL);
+    assert(b->peer != NULL);
+    assert(b->buf != NULL);
+
+    b->request = 0;
+    if (b->closed) {
+        /* we already closed */
+        BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_WRITE, BIO_R_BROKEN_PIPE);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    assert(b->len <= b->size);
+
+    if (b->len == b->size) {
+        BIO_set_retry_write(bio); /* buffer is full */
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    /* we can write */
+    if (num > b->size - b->len)
+        num = b->size - b->len;
+
+    /* now write "num" bytes */
+
+    rest = num;
+
+    assert(rest > 0);
+    do {                        /* one or two iterations */
+        size_t write_offset;
+        size_t chunk;
+
+        assert(b->len + rest <= b->size);
+
+        write_offset = b->offset + b->len;
+        if (write_offset >= b->size)
+            write_offset -= b->size;
+        /* b->buf[write_offset] is the first byte we can write to. */
+
+        if (write_offset + rest <= b->size)
+            chunk = rest;
+        else
+            /* wrap around ring buffer */
+            chunk = b->size - write_offset;
+
+        memcpy(b->buf + write_offset, buf, chunk);
+
+        b->len += chunk;
+
+        assert(b->len <= b->size);
+
+        rest -= chunk;
+        buf += chunk;
+    }
+    while (rest);
+
+    return num;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * non-copying interface: provide pointer to region to write to
+ *   bio_nwrite0:  check how much space is available
+ *   bio_nwrite:   also increase length
+ * (example usage:  bio_nwrite0(), write to buffer, bio_nwrite()
+ *  or just         bio_nwrite(), write to buffer)
+ */
+static ossl_ssize_t bio_nwrite0(BIO *bio, char **buf)
+{
+    struct bio_bio_st *b;
+    size_t num;
+    size_t write_offset;
+
+    BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
+
+    if (!bio->init)
+        return 0;
+
+    b = bio->ptr;
+    assert(b != NULL);
+    assert(b->peer != NULL);
+    assert(b->buf != NULL);
+
+    b->request = 0;
+    if (b->closed) {
+        BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_NWRITE0, BIO_R_BROKEN_PIPE);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    assert(b->len <= b->size);
+
+    if (b->len == b->size) {
+        BIO_set_retry_write(bio);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    num = b->size - b->len;
+    write_offset = b->offset + b->len;
+    if (write_offset >= b->size)
+        write_offset -= b->size;
+    if (write_offset + num > b->size)
+        /*
+         * no ring buffer wrap-around for non-copying interface (to fulfil
+         * the promise by BIO_ctrl_get_write_guarantee, BIO_nwrite may have
+         * to be called twice)
+         */
+        num = b->size - write_offset;
+
+    if (buf != NULL)
+        *buf = b->buf + write_offset;
+    assert(write_offset + num <= b->size);
+
+    return num;
+}
+
+static ossl_ssize_t bio_nwrite(BIO *bio, char **buf, size_t num_)
+{
+    struct bio_bio_st *b;
+    ossl_ssize_t num, space;
+
+    if (num_ > OSSL_SSIZE_MAX)
+        num = OSSL_SSIZE_MAX;
+    else
+        num = (ossl_ssize_t) num_;
+
+    space = bio_nwrite0(bio, buf);
+    if (num > space)
+        num = space;
+    if (num <= 0)
+        return num;
+    b = bio->ptr;
+    assert(b != NULL);
+    b->len += num;
+    assert(b->len <= b->size);
+
+    return num;
+}
+
+static long bio_ctrl(BIO *bio, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
+{
+    long ret;
+    struct bio_bio_st *b = bio->ptr;
+
+    assert(b != NULL);
+
+    switch (cmd) {
+        /* specific CTRL codes */
+
+    case BIO_C_SET_WRITE_BUF_SIZE:
+        if (b->peer) {
+            BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_CTRL, BIO_R_IN_USE);
+            ret = 0;
+        } else if (num == 0) {
+            BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_CTRL, BIO_R_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
+            ret = 0;
+        } else {
+            size_t new_size = num;
+
+            if (b->size != new_size) {
+                OPENSSL_free(b->buf);
+                b->buf = NULL;
+                b->size = new_size;
+            }
+            ret = 1;
+        }
+        break;
+
+    case BIO_C_GET_WRITE_BUF_SIZE:
+        ret = (long)b->size;
+        break;
+
+    case BIO_C_MAKE_BIO_PAIR:
+        {
+            BIO *other_bio = ptr;
+
+            if (bio_make_pair(bio, other_bio))
+                ret = 1;
+            else
+                ret = 0;
+        }
+        break;
+
+    case BIO_C_DESTROY_BIO_PAIR:
+        /*
+         * Affects both BIOs in the pair -- call just once! Or let
+         * BIO_free(bio1); BIO_free(bio2); do the job.
+         */
+        bio_destroy_pair(bio);
+        ret = 1;
+        break;
+
+    case BIO_C_GET_WRITE_GUARANTEE:
+        /*
+         * How many bytes can the caller feed to the next write without
+         * having to keep any?
+         */
+        if (b->peer == NULL || b->closed)
+            ret = 0;
+        else
+            ret = (long)b->size - b->len;
+        break;
+
+    case BIO_C_GET_READ_REQUEST:
+        /*
+         * If the peer unsuccessfully tried to read, how many bytes were
+         * requested? (As with BIO_CTRL_PENDING, that number can usually be
+         * treated as boolean.)
+         */
+        ret = (long)b->request;
+        break;
+
+    case BIO_C_RESET_READ_REQUEST:
+        /*
+         * Reset request.  (Can be useful after read attempts at the other
+         * side that are meant to be non-blocking, e.g. when probing SSL_read
+         * to see if any data is available.)
+         */
+        b->request = 0;
+        ret = 1;
+        break;
+
+    case BIO_C_SHUTDOWN_WR:
+        /* similar to shutdown(..., SHUT_WR) */
+        b->closed = 1;
+        ret = 1;
+        break;
+
+    case BIO_C_NREAD0:
+        /* prepare for non-copying read */
+        ret = (long)bio_nread0(bio, ptr);
+        break;
+
+    case BIO_C_NREAD:
+        /* non-copying read */
+        ret = (long)bio_nread(bio, ptr, (size_t)num);
+        break;
+
+    case BIO_C_NWRITE0:
+        /* prepare for non-copying write */
+        ret = (long)bio_nwrite0(bio, ptr);
+        break;
+
+    case BIO_C_NWRITE:
+        /* non-copying write */
+        ret = (long)bio_nwrite(bio, ptr, (size_t)num);
+        break;
+
+        /* standard CTRL codes follow */
+
+    case BIO_CTRL_RESET:
+        if (b->buf != NULL) {
+            b->len = 0;
+            b->offset = 0;
+        }
+        ret = 0;
+        break;
+
+    case BIO_CTRL_GET_CLOSE:
+        ret = bio->shutdown;
+        break;
+
+    case BIO_CTRL_SET_CLOSE:
+        bio->shutdown = (int)num;
+        ret = 1;
+        break;
+
+    case BIO_CTRL_PENDING:
+        if (b->peer != NULL) {
+            struct bio_bio_st *peer_b = b->peer->ptr;
+
+            ret = (long)peer_b->len;
+        } else
+            ret = 0;
+        break;
+
+    case BIO_CTRL_WPENDING:
+        if (b->buf != NULL)
+            ret = (long)b->len;
+        else
+            ret = 0;
+        break;
+
+    case BIO_CTRL_DUP:
+        /* See BIO_dup_chain for circumstances we have to expect. */
+        {
+            BIO *other_bio = ptr;
+            struct bio_bio_st *other_b;
+
+            assert(other_bio != NULL);
+            other_b = other_bio->ptr;
+            assert(other_b != NULL);
+
+            assert(other_b->buf == NULL); /* other_bio is always fresh */
+
+            other_b->size = b->size;
+        }
+
+        ret = 1;
+        break;
+
+    case BIO_CTRL_FLUSH:
+        ret = 1;
+        break;
+
+    case BIO_CTRL_EOF:
+        if (b->peer != NULL) {
+            struct bio_bio_st *peer_b = b->peer->ptr;
+
+            if (peer_b->len == 0 && peer_b->closed)
+                ret = 1;
+            else
+                ret = 0;
+        } else {
+            ret = 1;
+        }
+        break;
+
+    default:
+        ret = 0;
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int bio_puts(BIO *bio, const char *str)
+{
+    return bio_write(bio, str, strlen(str));
+}
+
+static int bio_make_pair(BIO *bio1, BIO *bio2)
+{
+    struct bio_bio_st *b1, *b2;
+
+    assert(bio1 != NULL);
+    assert(bio2 != NULL);
+
+    b1 = bio1->ptr;
+    b2 = bio2->ptr;
+
+    if (b1->peer != NULL || b2->peer != NULL) {
+        BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_MAKE_PAIR, BIO_R_IN_USE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (b1->buf == NULL) {
+        b1->buf = OPENSSL_malloc(b1->size);
+        if (b1->buf == NULL) {
+            BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_MAKE_PAIR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        b1->len = 0;
+        b1->offset = 0;
+    }
+
+    if (b2->buf == NULL) {
+        b2->buf = OPENSSL_malloc(b2->size);
+        if (b2->buf == NULL) {
+            BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_MAKE_PAIR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        b2->len = 0;
+        b2->offset = 0;
+    }
+
+    b1->peer = bio2;
+    b1->closed = 0;
+    b1->request = 0;
+    b2->peer = bio1;
+    b2->closed = 0;
+    b2->request = 0;
+
+    bio1->init = 1;
+    bio2->init = 1;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static void bio_destroy_pair(BIO *bio)
+{
+    struct bio_bio_st *b = bio->ptr;
+
+    if (b != NULL) {
+        BIO *peer_bio = b->peer;
+
+        if (peer_bio != NULL) {
+            struct bio_bio_st *peer_b = peer_bio->ptr;
+
+            assert(peer_b != NULL);
+            assert(peer_b->peer == bio);
+
+            peer_b->peer = NULL;
+            peer_bio->init = 0;
+            assert(peer_b->buf != NULL);
+            peer_b->len = 0;
+            peer_b->offset = 0;
+
+            b->peer = NULL;
+            bio->init = 0;
+            assert(b->buf != NULL);
+            b->len = 0;
+            b->offset = 0;
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/* Exported convenience functions */
+int BIO_new_bio_pair(BIO **bio1_p, size_t writebuf1,
+                     BIO **bio2_p, size_t writebuf2)
+{
+    BIO *bio1 = NULL, *bio2 = NULL;
+    long r;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    bio1 = BIO_new(BIO_s_bio());
+    if (bio1 == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    bio2 = BIO_new(BIO_s_bio());
+    if (bio2 == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (writebuf1) {
+        r = BIO_set_write_buf_size(bio1, writebuf1);
+        if (!r)
+            goto err;
+    }
+    if (writebuf2) {
+        r = BIO_set_write_buf_size(bio2, writebuf2);
+        if (!r)
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    r = BIO_make_bio_pair(bio1, bio2);
+    if (!r)
+        goto err;
+    ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+    if (ret == 0) {
+        BIO_free(bio1);
+        bio1 = NULL;
+        BIO_free(bio2);
+        bio2 = NULL;
+    }
+
+    *bio1_p = bio1;
+    *bio2_p = bio2;
+    return ret;
+}
+
+size_t BIO_ctrl_get_write_guarantee(BIO *bio)
+{
+    return BIO_ctrl(bio, BIO_C_GET_WRITE_GUARANTEE, 0, NULL);
+}
+
+size_t BIO_ctrl_get_read_request(BIO *bio)
+{
+    return BIO_ctrl(bio, BIO_C_GET_READ_REQUEST, 0, NULL);
+}
+
+int BIO_ctrl_reset_read_request(BIO *bio)
+{
+    return (BIO_ctrl(bio, BIO_C_RESET_READ_REQUEST, 0, NULL) != 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * BIO_nread0/nread/nwrite0/nwrite are available only for BIO pairs for now
+ * (conceivably some other BIOs could allow non-copying reads and writes
+ * too.)
+ */
+int BIO_nread0(BIO *bio, char **buf)
+{
+    long ret;
+
+    if (!bio->init) {
+        BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_NREAD0, BIO_R_UNINITIALIZED);
+        return -2;
+    }
+
+    ret = BIO_ctrl(bio, BIO_C_NREAD0, 0, buf);
+    if (ret > INT_MAX)
+        return INT_MAX;
+    else
+        return (int)ret;
+}
+
+int BIO_nread(BIO *bio, char **buf, int num)
+{
+    int ret;
+
+    if (!bio->init) {
+        BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_NREAD, BIO_R_UNINITIALIZED);
+        return -2;
+    }
+
+    ret = (int)BIO_ctrl(bio, BIO_C_NREAD, num, buf);
+    if (ret > 0)
+        bio->num_read += ret;
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int BIO_nwrite0(BIO *bio, char **buf)
+{
+    long ret;
+
+    if (!bio->init) {
+        BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_NWRITE0, BIO_R_UNINITIALIZED);
+        return -2;
+    }
+
+    ret = BIO_ctrl(bio, BIO_C_NWRITE0, 0, buf);
+    if (ret > INT_MAX)
+        return INT_MAX;
+    else
+        return (int)ret;
+}
+
+int BIO_nwrite(BIO *bio, char **buf, int num)
+{
+    int ret;
+
+    if (!bio->init) {
+        BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_NWRITE, BIO_R_UNINITIALIZED);
+        return -2;
+    }
+
+    ret = BIO_ctrl(bio, BIO_C_NWRITE, num, buf);
+    if (ret > 0)
+        bio->num_write += ret;
+    return ret;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bio/bss_conn.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bio/bss_conn.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e343bcd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bio/bss_conn.c
@@ -0,0 +1,543 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+
+#include "bio_lcl.h"
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
+
+typedef struct bio_connect_st {
+    int state;
+    int connect_family;
+    char *param_hostname;
+    char *param_service;
+    int connect_mode;
+
+    BIO_ADDRINFO *addr_first;
+    const BIO_ADDRINFO *addr_iter;
+    /*
+     * int socket; this will be kept in bio->num so that it is compatible
+     * with the bss_sock bio
+     */
+    /*
+     * called when the connection is initially made callback(BIO,state,ret);
+     * The callback should return 'ret'.  state is for compatibility with the
+     * ssl info_callback
+     */
+    BIO_info_cb *info_callback;
+} BIO_CONNECT;
+
+static int conn_write(BIO *h, const char *buf, int num);
+static int conn_read(BIO *h, char *buf, int size);
+static int conn_puts(BIO *h, const char *str);
+static long conn_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, long arg1, void *arg2);
+static int conn_new(BIO *h);
+static int conn_free(BIO *data);
+static long conn_callback_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, BIO_info_cb *);
+
+static int conn_state(BIO *b, BIO_CONNECT *c);
+static void conn_close_socket(BIO *data);
+BIO_CONNECT *BIO_CONNECT_new(void);
+void BIO_CONNECT_free(BIO_CONNECT *a);
+
+#define BIO_CONN_S_BEFORE                1
+#define BIO_CONN_S_GET_ADDR              2
+#define BIO_CONN_S_CREATE_SOCKET         3
+#define BIO_CONN_S_CONNECT               4
+#define BIO_CONN_S_OK                    5
+#define BIO_CONN_S_BLOCKED_CONNECT       6
+
+static const BIO_METHOD methods_connectp = {
+    BIO_TYPE_CONNECT,
+    "socket connect",
+    conn_write,
+    conn_read,
+    conn_puts,
+    NULL,                       /* conn_gets, */
+    conn_ctrl,
+    conn_new,
+    conn_free,
+    conn_callback_ctrl,
+};
+
+static int conn_state(BIO *b, BIO_CONNECT *c)
+{
+    int ret = -1, i;
+    BIO_info_cb *cb = NULL;
+
+    if (c->info_callback != NULL)
+        cb = c->info_callback;
+
+    for (;;) {
+        switch (c->state) {
+        case BIO_CONN_S_BEFORE:
+            if (c->param_hostname == NULL && c->param_service == NULL) {
+                BIOerr(BIO_F_CONN_STATE, BIO_R_NO_HOSTNAME_OR_SERVICE_SPECIFIED);
+                ERR_add_error_data(4,
+                                   "hostname=", c->param_hostname,
+                                   " service=", c->param_service);
+                goto exit_loop;
+            }
+            c->state = BIO_CONN_S_GET_ADDR;
+            break;
+
+        case BIO_CONN_S_GET_ADDR:
+            {
+                int family = AF_UNSPEC;
+                switch (c->connect_family) {
+                case BIO_FAMILY_IPV6:
+                    if (1) { /* This is a trick we use to avoid bit rot.
+                              * at least the "else" part will always be
+                              * compiled.
+                              */
+#ifdef AF_INET6
+                        family = AF_INET6;
+                    } else {
+#endif
+                        BIOerr(BIO_F_CONN_STATE, BIO_R_UNAVAILABLE_IP_FAMILY);
+                        goto exit_loop;
+                    }
+                    break;
+                case BIO_FAMILY_IPV4:
+                    family = AF_INET;
+                    break;
+                case BIO_FAMILY_IPANY:
+                    family = AF_UNSPEC;
+                    break;
+                default:
+                    BIOerr(BIO_F_CONN_STATE, BIO_R_UNSUPPORTED_IP_FAMILY);
+                    goto exit_loop;
+                }
+                if (BIO_lookup(c->param_hostname, c->param_service,
+                               BIO_LOOKUP_CLIENT,
+                               family, SOCK_STREAM, &c->addr_first) == 0)
+                    goto exit_loop;
+            }
+            if (c->addr_first == NULL) {
+                BIOerr(BIO_F_CONN_STATE, BIO_R_LOOKUP_RETURNED_NOTHING);
+                goto exit_loop;
+            }
+            c->addr_iter = c->addr_first;
+            c->state = BIO_CONN_S_CREATE_SOCKET;
+            break;
+
+        case BIO_CONN_S_CREATE_SOCKET:
+            ret = BIO_socket(BIO_ADDRINFO_family(c->addr_iter),
+                             BIO_ADDRINFO_socktype(c->addr_iter),
+                             BIO_ADDRINFO_protocol(c->addr_iter), 0);
+            if (ret == (int)INVALID_SOCKET) {
+                SYSerr(SYS_F_SOCKET, get_last_socket_error());
+                ERR_add_error_data(4,
+                                   "hostname=", c->param_hostname,
+                                   " service=", c->param_service);
+                BIOerr(BIO_F_CONN_STATE, BIO_R_UNABLE_TO_CREATE_SOCKET);
+                goto exit_loop;
+            }
+            b->num = ret;
+            c->state = BIO_CONN_S_CONNECT;
+            break;
+
+        case BIO_CONN_S_CONNECT:
+            BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+            ret = BIO_connect(b->num, BIO_ADDRINFO_address(c->addr_iter),
+                              BIO_SOCK_KEEPALIVE | c->connect_mode);
+            b->retry_reason = 0;
+            if (ret == 0) {
+                if (BIO_sock_should_retry(ret)) {
+                    BIO_set_retry_special(b);
+                    c->state = BIO_CONN_S_BLOCKED_CONNECT;
+                    b->retry_reason = BIO_RR_CONNECT;
+                    ERR_clear_error();
+                } else if ((c->addr_iter = BIO_ADDRINFO_next(c->addr_iter))
+                           != NULL) {
+                    /*
+                     * if there are more addresses to try, do that first
+                     */
+                    BIO_closesocket(b->num);
+                    c->state = BIO_CONN_S_CREATE_SOCKET;
+                    ERR_clear_error();
+                    break;
+                } else {
+                    SYSerr(SYS_F_CONNECT, get_last_socket_error());
+                    ERR_add_error_data(4,
+                                       "hostname=", c->param_hostname,
+                                       " service=", c->param_service);
+                    BIOerr(BIO_F_CONN_STATE, BIO_R_CONNECT_ERROR);
+                }
+                goto exit_loop;
+            } else {
+                c->state = BIO_CONN_S_OK;
+            }
+            break;
+
+        case BIO_CONN_S_BLOCKED_CONNECT:
+            i = BIO_sock_error(b->num);
+            if (i) {
+                BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+                SYSerr(SYS_F_CONNECT, i);
+                ERR_add_error_data(4,
+                                   "hostname=", c->param_hostname,
+                                   " service=", c->param_service);
+                BIOerr(BIO_F_CONN_STATE, BIO_R_NBIO_CONNECT_ERROR);
+                ret = 0;
+                goto exit_loop;
+            } else
+                c->state = BIO_CONN_S_OK;
+            break;
+
+        case BIO_CONN_S_OK:
+            ret = 1;
+            goto exit_loop;
+        default:
+            /* abort(); */
+            goto exit_loop;
+        }
+
+        if (cb != NULL) {
+            if ((ret = cb((BIO *)b, c->state, ret)) == 0)
+                goto end;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* Loop does not exit */
+ exit_loop:
+    if (cb != NULL)
+        ret = cb((BIO *)b, c->state, ret);
+ end:
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+BIO_CONNECT *BIO_CONNECT_new(void)
+{
+    BIO_CONNECT *ret;
+
+    if ((ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret))) == NULL)
+        return (NULL);
+    ret->state = BIO_CONN_S_BEFORE;
+    ret->connect_family = BIO_FAMILY_IPANY;
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+void BIO_CONNECT_free(BIO_CONNECT *a)
+{
+    if (a == NULL)
+        return;
+
+    OPENSSL_free(a->param_hostname);
+    OPENSSL_free(a->param_service);
+    BIO_ADDRINFO_free(a->addr_first);
+    OPENSSL_free(a);
+}
+
+const BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_connect(void)
+{
+    return (&methods_connectp);
+}
+
+static int conn_new(BIO *bi)
+{
+    bi->init = 0;
+    bi->num = (int)INVALID_SOCKET;
+    bi->flags = 0;
+    if ((bi->ptr = (char *)BIO_CONNECT_new()) == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    else
+        return (1);
+}
+
+static void conn_close_socket(BIO *bio)
+{
+    BIO_CONNECT *c;
+
+    c = (BIO_CONNECT *)bio->ptr;
+    if (bio->num != (int)INVALID_SOCKET) {
+        /* Only do a shutdown if things were established */
+        if (c->state == BIO_CONN_S_OK)
+            shutdown(bio->num, 2);
+        BIO_closesocket(bio->num);
+        bio->num = (int)INVALID_SOCKET;
+    }
+}
+
+static int conn_free(BIO *a)
+{
+    BIO_CONNECT *data;
+
+    if (a == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    data = (BIO_CONNECT *)a->ptr;
+
+    if (a->shutdown) {
+        conn_close_socket(a);
+        BIO_CONNECT_free(data);
+        a->ptr = NULL;
+        a->flags = 0;
+        a->init = 0;
+    }
+    return (1);
+}
+
+static int conn_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    BIO_CONNECT *data;
+
+    data = (BIO_CONNECT *)b->ptr;
+    if (data->state != BIO_CONN_S_OK) {
+        ret = conn_state(b, data);
+        if (ret <= 0)
+            return (ret);
+    }
+
+    if (out != NULL) {
+        clear_socket_error();
+        ret = readsocket(b->num, out, outl);
+        BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+        if (ret <= 0) {
+            if (BIO_sock_should_retry(ret))
+                BIO_set_retry_read(b);
+        }
+    }
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static int conn_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl)
+{
+    int ret;
+    BIO_CONNECT *data;
+
+    data = (BIO_CONNECT *)b->ptr;
+    if (data->state != BIO_CONN_S_OK) {
+        ret = conn_state(b, data);
+        if (ret <= 0)
+            return (ret);
+    }
+
+    clear_socket_error();
+    ret = writesocket(b->num, in, inl);
+    BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+    if (ret <= 0) {
+        if (BIO_sock_should_retry(ret))
+            BIO_set_retry_write(b);
+    }
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static long conn_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
+{
+    BIO *dbio;
+    int *ip;
+    const char **pptr = NULL;
+    long ret = 1;
+    BIO_CONNECT *data;
+
+    data = (BIO_CONNECT *)b->ptr;
+
+    switch (cmd) {
+    case BIO_CTRL_RESET:
+        ret = 0;
+        data->state = BIO_CONN_S_BEFORE;
+        conn_close_socket(b);
+        BIO_ADDRINFO_free(data->addr_first);
+        data->addr_first = NULL;
+        b->flags = 0;
+        break;
+    case BIO_C_DO_STATE_MACHINE:
+        /* use this one to start the connection */
+        if (data->state != BIO_CONN_S_OK)
+            ret = (long)conn_state(b, data);
+        else
+            ret = 1;
+        break;
+    case BIO_C_GET_CONNECT:
+        if (ptr != NULL) {
+            pptr = (const char **)ptr;
+            if (num == 0) {
+                *pptr = data->param_hostname;
+            } else if (num == 1) {
+                *pptr = data->param_service;
+            } else if (num == 2) {
+                *pptr = (const char *)BIO_ADDRINFO_address(data->addr_iter);
+            } else if (num == 3) {
+                switch (BIO_ADDRINFO_family(data->addr_iter)) {
+# ifdef AF_INET6
+                case AF_INET6:
+                    ret = BIO_FAMILY_IPV6;
+                    break;
+# endif
+                case AF_INET:
+                    ret = BIO_FAMILY_IPV4;
+                    break;
+                case 0:
+                    ret = data->connect_family;
+                    break;
+                default:
+                    ret = -1;
+                    break;
+                }
+            } else {
+                ret = 0;
+            }
+        } else {
+            ret = 0;
+        }
+        break;
+    case BIO_C_SET_CONNECT:
+        if (ptr != NULL) {
+            b->init = 1;
+            if (num == 0) {
+                char *hold_service = data->param_service;
+                /* We affect the hostname regardless.  However, the input
+                 * string might contain a host:service spec, so we must
+                 * parse it, which might or might not affect the service
+                 */
+                OPENSSL_free(data->param_hostname);
+                data->param_hostname = NULL;
+                ret = BIO_parse_hostserv(ptr,
+                                         &data->param_hostname,
+                                         &data->param_service,
+                                         BIO_PARSE_PRIO_HOST);
+                if (hold_service != data->param_service)
+                    OPENSSL_free(hold_service);
+            } else if (num == 1) {
+                OPENSSL_free(data->param_service);
+                data->param_service = BUF_strdup(ptr);
+            } else if (num == 2) {
+                const BIO_ADDR *addr = (const BIO_ADDR *)ptr;
+                if (ret) {
+                    data->param_hostname = BIO_ADDR_hostname_string(addr, 1);
+                    data->param_service = BIO_ADDR_service_string(addr, 1);
+                    BIO_ADDRINFO_free(data->addr_first);
+                    data->addr_first = NULL;
+                    data->addr_iter = NULL;
+                }
+            } else if (num == 3) {
+                data->connect_family = *(int *)ptr;
+            } else {
+                ret = 0;
+            }
+        }
+        break;
+    case BIO_C_SET_NBIO:
+        if (num != 0)
+            data->connect_mode |= BIO_SOCK_NONBLOCK;
+        else
+            data->connect_mode &= ~BIO_SOCK_NONBLOCK;
+        break;
+    case BIO_C_SET_CONNECT_MODE:
+        data->connect_mode = (int)num;
+        break;
+    case BIO_C_GET_FD:
+        if (b->init) {
+            ip = (int *)ptr;
+            if (ip != NULL)
+                *ip = b->num;
+            ret = b->num;
+        } else
+            ret = -1;
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_GET_CLOSE:
+        ret = b->shutdown;
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_SET_CLOSE:
+        b->shutdown = (int)num;
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_PENDING:
+    case BIO_CTRL_WPENDING:
+        ret = 0;
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_FLUSH:
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_DUP:
+        {
+            dbio = (BIO *)ptr;
+            if (data->param_hostname)
+                BIO_set_conn_hostname(dbio, data->param_hostname);
+            if (data->param_service)
+                BIO_set_conn_port(dbio, data->param_service);
+            BIO_set_conn_ip_family(dbio, data->connect_family);
+            BIO_set_conn_mode(dbio, data->connect_mode);
+            /*
+             * FIXME: the cast of the function seems unlikely to be a good
+             * idea
+             */
+            (void)BIO_set_info_callback(dbio, data->info_callback);
+        }
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_SET_CALLBACK:
+        {
+# if 0                          /* FIXME: Should this be used? -- Richard
+                                 * Levitte */
+            BIOerr(BIO_F_CONN_CTRL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+            ret = -1;
+# else
+            ret = 0;
+# endif
+        }
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_GET_CALLBACK:
+        {
+            BIO_info_cb **fptr;
+
+            fptr = (BIO_info_cb **)ptr;
+            *fptr = data->info_callback;
+        }
+        break;
+    default:
+        ret = 0;
+        break;
+    }
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static long conn_callback_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, BIO_info_cb *fp)
+{
+    long ret = 1;
+    BIO_CONNECT *data;
+
+    data = (BIO_CONNECT *)b->ptr;
+
+    switch (cmd) {
+    case BIO_CTRL_SET_CALLBACK:
+        {
+            data->info_callback = fp;
+        }
+        break;
+    default:
+        ret = 0;
+        break;
+    }
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static int conn_puts(BIO *bp, const char *str)
+{
+    int n, ret;
+
+    n = strlen(str);
+    ret = conn_write(bp, str, n);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+BIO *BIO_new_connect(const char *str)
+{
+    BIO *ret;
+
+    ret = BIO_new(BIO_s_connect());
+    if (ret == NULL)
+        return (NULL);
+    if (BIO_set_conn_hostname(ret, str))
+        return (ret);
+    BIO_free(ret);
+    return (NULL);
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c772d95
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1923 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+
+#include "bio_lcl.h"
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DGRAM
+
+# if !(defined(_WIN32) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS))
+#  include <sys/time.h>
+# endif
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
+#  include <sys/timeb.h>
+# endif
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+#  include <netinet/sctp.h>
+#  include <fcntl.h>
+#  define OPENSSL_SCTP_DATA_CHUNK_TYPE            0x00
+#  define OPENSSL_SCTP_FORWARD_CUM_TSN_CHUNK_TYPE 0xc0
+# endif
+
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_LINUX) && !defined(IP_MTU)
+#  define IP_MTU      14        /* linux is lame */
+# endif
+
+# if OPENSSL_USE_IPV6 && !defined(IPPROTO_IPV6)
+#  define IPPROTO_IPV6 41       /* windows is lame */
+# endif
+
+# if defined(__FreeBSD__) && defined(IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED)
+/* Standard definition causes type-punning problems. */
+#  undef IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED
+#  define s6_addr32 __u6_addr.__u6_addr32
+#  define IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(a)               \
+        (((a)->s6_addr32[0] == 0) &&          \
+         ((a)->s6_addr32[1] == 0) &&          \
+         ((a)->s6_addr32[2] == htonl(0x0000ffff)))
+# endif
+
+static int dgram_write(BIO *h, const char *buf, int num);
+static int dgram_read(BIO *h, char *buf, int size);
+static int dgram_puts(BIO *h, const char *str);
+static long dgram_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, long arg1, void *arg2);
+static int dgram_new(BIO *h);
+static int dgram_free(BIO *data);
+static int dgram_clear(BIO *bio);
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+static int dgram_sctp_write(BIO *h, const char *buf, int num);
+static int dgram_sctp_read(BIO *h, char *buf, int size);
+static int dgram_sctp_puts(BIO *h, const char *str);
+static long dgram_sctp_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, long arg1, void *arg2);
+static int dgram_sctp_new(BIO *h);
+static int dgram_sctp_free(BIO *data);
+#  ifdef SCTP_AUTHENTICATION_EVENT
+static void dgram_sctp_handle_auth_free_key_event(BIO *b, union sctp_notification
+                                                  *snp);
+#  endif
+# endif
+
+static int BIO_dgram_should_retry(int s);
+
+static void get_current_time(struct timeval *t);
+
+static const BIO_METHOD methods_dgramp = {
+    BIO_TYPE_DGRAM,
+    "datagram socket",
+    dgram_write,
+    dgram_read,
+    dgram_puts,
+    NULL,                       /* dgram_gets,         */
+    dgram_ctrl,
+    dgram_new,
+    dgram_free,
+    NULL,                       /* dgram_callback_ctrl */
+};
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+static const BIO_METHOD methods_dgramp_sctp = {
+    BIO_TYPE_DGRAM_SCTP,
+    "datagram sctp socket",
+    dgram_sctp_write,
+    dgram_sctp_read,
+    dgram_sctp_puts,
+    NULL,                       /* dgram_gets,         */
+    dgram_sctp_ctrl,
+    dgram_sctp_new,
+    dgram_sctp_free,
+    NULL,                       /* dgram_callback_ctrl */
+};
+# endif
+
+typedef struct bio_dgram_data_st {
+    BIO_ADDR peer;
+    unsigned int connected;
+    unsigned int _errno;
+    unsigned int mtu;
+    struct timeval next_timeout;
+    struct timeval socket_timeout;
+    unsigned int peekmode;
+} bio_dgram_data;
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+typedef struct bio_dgram_sctp_save_message_st {
+    BIO *bio;
+    char *data;
+    int length;
+} bio_dgram_sctp_save_message;
+
+typedef struct bio_dgram_sctp_data_st {
+    BIO_ADDR peer;
+    unsigned int connected;
+    unsigned int _errno;
+    unsigned int mtu;
+    struct bio_dgram_sctp_sndinfo sndinfo;
+    struct bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo rcvinfo;
+    struct bio_dgram_sctp_prinfo prinfo;
+    void (*handle_notifications) (BIO *bio, void *context, void *buf);
+    void *notification_context;
+    int in_handshake;
+    int ccs_rcvd;
+    int ccs_sent;
+    int save_shutdown;
+    int peer_auth_tested;
+} bio_dgram_sctp_data;
+# endif
+
+const BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_datagram(void)
+{
+    return (&methods_dgramp);
+}
+
+BIO *BIO_new_dgram(int fd, int close_flag)
+{
+    BIO *ret;
+
+    ret = BIO_new(BIO_s_datagram());
+    if (ret == NULL)
+        return (NULL);
+    BIO_set_fd(ret, fd, close_flag);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static int dgram_new(BIO *bi)
+{
+    bio_dgram_data *data = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*data));
+
+    if (data == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    bi->ptr = data;
+    return (1);
+}
+
+static int dgram_free(BIO *a)
+{
+    bio_dgram_data *data;
+
+    if (a == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    if (!dgram_clear(a))
+        return 0;
+
+    data = (bio_dgram_data *)a->ptr;
+    OPENSSL_free(data);
+
+    return (1);
+}
+
+static int dgram_clear(BIO *a)
+{
+    if (a == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    if (a->shutdown) {
+        if (a->init) {
+            BIO_closesocket(a->num);
+        }
+        a->init = 0;
+        a->flags = 0;
+    }
+    return (1);
+}
+
+static void dgram_adjust_rcv_timeout(BIO *b)
+{
+# if defined(SO_RCVTIMEO)
+    bio_dgram_data *data = (bio_dgram_data *)b->ptr;
+    union {
+        size_t s;
+        int i;
+    } sz = {
+        0
+    };
+
+    /* Is a timer active? */
+    if (data->next_timeout.tv_sec > 0 || data->next_timeout.tv_usec > 0) {
+        struct timeval timenow, timeleft;
+
+        /* Read current socket timeout */
+#  ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS
+        int timeout;
+
+        sz.i = sizeof(timeout);
+        if (getsockopt(b->num, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVTIMEO,
+                       (void *)&timeout, &sz.i) < 0) {
+            perror("getsockopt");
+        } else {
+            data->socket_timeout.tv_sec = timeout / 1000;
+            data->socket_timeout.tv_usec = (timeout % 1000) * 1000;
+        }
+#  else
+        sz.i = sizeof(data->socket_timeout);
+        if (getsockopt(b->num, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVTIMEO,
+                       &(data->socket_timeout), (void *)&sz) < 0) {
+            perror("getsockopt");
+        } else if (sizeof(sz.s) != sizeof(sz.i) && sz.i == 0)
+            OPENSSL_assert(sz.s <= sizeof(data->socket_timeout));
+#  endif
+
+        /* Get current time */
+        get_current_time(&timenow);
+
+        /* Calculate time left until timer expires */
+        memcpy(&timeleft, &(data->next_timeout), sizeof(struct timeval));
+        if (timeleft.tv_usec < timenow.tv_usec) {
+            timeleft.tv_usec = 1000000 - timenow.tv_usec + timeleft.tv_usec;
+            timeleft.tv_sec--;
+        } else {
+            timeleft.tv_usec -= timenow.tv_usec;
+        }
+        if (timeleft.tv_sec < timenow.tv_sec) {
+            timeleft.tv_sec = 0;
+            timeleft.tv_usec = 1;
+        } else {
+            timeleft.tv_sec -= timenow.tv_sec;
+        }
+
+        /*
+         * Adjust socket timeout if next handshake message timer will expire
+         * earlier.
+         */
+        if ((data->socket_timeout.tv_sec == 0
+             && data->socket_timeout.tv_usec == 0)
+            || (data->socket_timeout.tv_sec > timeleft.tv_sec)
+            || (data->socket_timeout.tv_sec == timeleft.tv_sec
+                && data->socket_timeout.tv_usec >= timeleft.tv_usec)) {
+#  ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS
+            timeout = timeleft.tv_sec * 1000 + timeleft.tv_usec / 1000;
+            if (setsockopt(b->num, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVTIMEO,
+                           (void *)&timeout, sizeof(timeout)) < 0) {
+                perror("setsockopt");
+            }
+#  else
+            if (setsockopt(b->num, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVTIMEO, &timeleft,
+                           sizeof(struct timeval)) < 0) {
+                perror("setsockopt");
+            }
+#  endif
+        }
+    }
+# endif
+}
+
+static void dgram_reset_rcv_timeout(BIO *b)
+{
+# if defined(SO_RCVTIMEO)
+    bio_dgram_data *data = (bio_dgram_data *)b->ptr;
+
+    /* Is a timer active? */
+    if (data->next_timeout.tv_sec > 0 || data->next_timeout.tv_usec > 0) {
+#  ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS
+        int timeout = data->socket_timeout.tv_sec * 1000 +
+            data->socket_timeout.tv_usec / 1000;
+        if (setsockopt(b->num, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVTIMEO,
+                       (void *)&timeout, sizeof(timeout)) < 0) {
+            perror("setsockopt");
+        }
+#  else
+        if (setsockopt
+            (b->num, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVTIMEO, &(data->socket_timeout),
+             sizeof(struct timeval)) < 0) {
+            perror("setsockopt");
+        }
+#  endif
+    }
+# endif
+}
+
+static int dgram_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    bio_dgram_data *data = (bio_dgram_data *)b->ptr;
+    int flags = 0;
+
+    BIO_ADDR peer;
+    socklen_t len = sizeof(peer);
+
+    if (out != NULL) {
+        clear_socket_error();
+        memset(&peer, 0, sizeof(peer));
+        dgram_adjust_rcv_timeout(b);
+        if (data->peekmode)
+            flags = MSG_PEEK;
+        ret = recvfrom(b->num, out, outl, flags,
+                       BIO_ADDR_sockaddr_noconst(&peer), &len);
+
+        if (!data->connected && ret >= 0)
+            BIO_ctrl(b, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEER, 0, &peer);
+
+        BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+        if (ret < 0) {
+            if (BIO_dgram_should_retry(ret)) {
+                BIO_set_retry_read(b);
+                data->_errno = get_last_socket_error();
+            }
+        }
+
+        dgram_reset_rcv_timeout(b);
+    }
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static int dgram_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl)
+{
+    int ret;
+    bio_dgram_data *data = (bio_dgram_data *)b->ptr;
+    clear_socket_error();
+
+    if (data->connected)
+        ret = writesocket(b->num, in, inl);
+    else {
+        int peerlen = BIO_ADDR_sockaddr_size(&data->peer);
+
+# if defined(NETWARE_CLIB) && defined(NETWARE_BSDSOCK)
+        ret = sendto(b->num, (char *)in, inl, 0,
+                     BIO_ADDR_sockaddr(&data->peer), peerlen);
+# else
+        ret = sendto(b->num, in, inl, 0,
+                     BIO_ADDR_sockaddr(&data->peer), peerlen);
+# endif
+    }
+
+    BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+    if (ret <= 0) {
+        if (BIO_dgram_should_retry(ret)) {
+            BIO_set_retry_write(b);
+            data->_errno = get_last_socket_error();
+        }
+    }
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static long dgram_get_mtu_overhead(bio_dgram_data *data)
+{
+    long ret;
+
+    switch (BIO_ADDR_family(&data->peer)) {
+    case AF_INET:
+        /*
+         * Assume this is UDP - 20 bytes for IP, 8 bytes for UDP
+         */
+        ret = 28;
+        break;
+# ifdef AF_INET6
+    case AF_INET6:
+        {
+#  ifdef IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED
+            struct in6_addr tmp_addr;
+            if (BIO_ADDR_rawaddress(&data->peer, &tmp_addr, NULL)
+                && IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&tmp_addr))
+                /*
+                 * Assume this is UDP - 20 bytes for IP, 8 bytes for UDP
+                 */
+                ret = 28;
+            else
+#  endif
+            /*
+             * Assume this is UDP - 40 bytes for IP, 8 bytes for UDP
+             */
+            ret = 48;
+        }
+        break;
+# endif
+    default:
+        /* We don't know. Go with the historical default */
+        ret = 28;
+        break;
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static long dgram_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
+{
+    long ret = 1;
+    int *ip;
+    bio_dgram_data *data = NULL;
+    int sockopt_val = 0;
+    int d_errno;
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_LINUX) && (defined(IP_MTU_DISCOVER) || defined(IP_MTU))
+    socklen_t sockopt_len;      /* assume that system supporting IP_MTU is
+                                 * modern enough to define socklen_t */
+    socklen_t addr_len;
+    BIO_ADDR addr;
+# endif
+
+    data = (bio_dgram_data *)b->ptr;
+
+    switch (cmd) {
+    case BIO_CTRL_RESET:
+        num = 0;
+        ret = 0;
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_INFO:
+        ret = 0;
+        break;
+    case BIO_C_SET_FD:
+        dgram_clear(b);
+        b->num = *((int *)ptr);
+        b->shutdown = (int)num;
+        b->init = 1;
+        break;
+    case BIO_C_GET_FD:
+        if (b->init) {
+            ip = (int *)ptr;
+            if (ip != NULL)
+                *ip = b->num;
+            ret = b->num;
+        } else
+            ret = -1;
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_GET_CLOSE:
+        ret = b->shutdown;
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_SET_CLOSE:
+        b->shutdown = (int)num;
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_PENDING:
+    case BIO_CTRL_WPENDING:
+        ret = 0;
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_DUP:
+    case BIO_CTRL_FLUSH:
+        ret = 1;
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_CONNECT:
+        BIO_ADDR_make(&data->peer, BIO_ADDR_sockaddr((BIO_ADDR *)ptr));
+        break;
+        /* (Linux)kernel sets DF bit on outgoing IP packets */
+    case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_MTU_DISCOVER:
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_LINUX) && defined(IP_MTU_DISCOVER) && defined(IP_PMTUDISC_DO)
+        addr_len = (socklen_t) sizeof(addr);
+        memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
+        if (getsockname(b->num, &addr.sa, &addr_len) < 0) {
+            ret = 0;
+            break;
+        }
+        switch (addr.sa.sa_family) {
+        case AF_INET:
+            sockopt_val = IP_PMTUDISC_DO;
+            if ((ret = setsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_IP, IP_MTU_DISCOVER,
+                                  &sockopt_val, sizeof(sockopt_val))) < 0)
+                perror("setsockopt");
+            break;
+#  if OPENSSL_USE_IPV6 && defined(IPV6_MTU_DISCOVER) && defined(IPV6_PMTUDISC_DO)
+        case AF_INET6:
+            sockopt_val = IPV6_PMTUDISC_DO;
+            if ((ret = setsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_MTU_DISCOVER,
+                                  &sockopt_val, sizeof(sockopt_val))) < 0)
+                perror("setsockopt");
+            break;
+#  endif
+        default:
+            ret = -1;
+            break;
+        }
+# else
+        ret = -1;
+# endif
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU:
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_LINUX) && defined(IP_MTU)
+        addr_len = (socklen_t) sizeof(addr);
+        memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
+        if (getsockname(b->num, &addr.sa, &addr_len) < 0) {
+            ret = 0;
+            break;
+        }
+        sockopt_len = sizeof(sockopt_val);
+        switch (addr.sa.sa_family) {
+        case AF_INET:
+            if ((ret =
+                 getsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_IP, IP_MTU, (void *)&sockopt_val,
+                            &sockopt_len)) < 0 || sockopt_val < 0) {
+                ret = 0;
+            } else {
+                /*
+                 * we assume that the transport protocol is UDP and no IP
+                 * options are used.
+                 */
+                data->mtu = sockopt_val - 8 - 20;
+                ret = data->mtu;
+            }
+            break;
+#  if OPENSSL_USE_IPV6 && defined(IPV6_MTU)
+        case AF_INET6:
+            if ((ret =
+                 getsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_MTU,
+                            (void *)&sockopt_val, &sockopt_len)) < 0
+                || sockopt_val < 0) {
+                ret = 0;
+            } else {
+                /*
+                 * we assume that the transport protocol is UDP and no IPV6
+                 * options are used.
+                 */
+                data->mtu = sockopt_val - 8 - 40;
+                ret = data->mtu;
+            }
+            break;
+#  endif
+        default:
+            ret = 0;
+            break;
+        }
+# else
+        ret = 0;
+# endif
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_FALLBACK_MTU:
+        ret = -dgram_get_mtu_overhead(data);
+        switch (BIO_ADDR_family(&data->peer)) {
+        case AF_INET:
+            ret += 576;
+            break;
+# if OPENSSL_USE_IPV6
+        case AF_INET6:
+            {
+#  ifdef IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED
+                struct in6_addr tmp_addr;
+                if (BIO_ADDR_rawaddress(&data->peer, &tmp_addr, NULL)
+                    && IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&tmp_addr))
+                    ret += 576;
+                else
+#  endif
+                    ret += 1280;
+            }
+            break;
+# endif
+        default:
+            ret += 576;
+            break;
+        }
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_MTU:
+        return data->mtu;
+    case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_MTU:
+        data->mtu = num;
+        ret = num;
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_CONNECTED:
+        if (ptr != NULL) {
+            data->connected = 1;
+            BIO_ADDR_make(&data->peer, BIO_ADDR_sockaddr((BIO_ADDR *)ptr));
+        } else {
+            data->connected = 0;
+            memset(&data->peer, 0, sizeof(data->peer));
+        }
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_PEER:
+        ret = BIO_ADDR_sockaddr_size(&data->peer);
+        /* FIXME: if num < ret, we will only return part of an address.
+           That should bee an error, no? */
+        if (num == 0 || num > ret)
+            num = ret;
+        memcpy(ptr, &data->peer, (ret = num));
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEER:
+        BIO_ADDR_make(&data->peer, BIO_ADDR_sockaddr((BIO_ADDR *)ptr));
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_NEXT_TIMEOUT:
+        memcpy(&(data->next_timeout), ptr, sizeof(struct timeval));
+        break;
+# if defined(SO_RCVTIMEO)
+    case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_RECV_TIMEOUT:
+#  ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS
+        {
+            struct timeval *tv = (struct timeval *)ptr;
+            int timeout = tv->tv_sec * 1000 + tv->tv_usec / 1000;
+            if (setsockopt(b->num, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVTIMEO,
+                           (void *)&timeout, sizeof(timeout)) < 0) {
+                perror("setsockopt");
+                ret = -1;
+            }
+        }
+#  else
+        if (setsockopt(b->num, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVTIMEO, ptr,
+                       sizeof(struct timeval)) < 0) {
+            perror("setsockopt");
+            ret = -1;
+        }
+#  endif
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_RECV_TIMEOUT:
+        {
+            union {
+                size_t s;
+                int i;
+            } sz = {
+                0
+            };
+#  ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS
+            int timeout;
+            struct timeval *tv = (struct timeval *)ptr;
+
+            sz.i = sizeof(timeout);
+            if (getsockopt(b->num, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVTIMEO,
+                           (void *)&timeout, &sz.i) < 0) {
+                perror("getsockopt");
+                ret = -1;
+            } else {
+                tv->tv_sec = timeout / 1000;
+                tv->tv_usec = (timeout % 1000) * 1000;
+                ret = sizeof(*tv);
+            }
+#  else
+            sz.i = sizeof(struct timeval);
+            if (getsockopt(b->num, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVTIMEO,
+                           ptr, (void *)&sz) < 0) {
+                perror("getsockopt");
+                ret = -1;
+            } else if (sizeof(sz.s) != sizeof(sz.i) && sz.i == 0) {
+                OPENSSL_assert(sz.s <= sizeof(struct timeval));
+                ret = (int)sz.s;
+            } else
+                ret = sz.i;
+#  endif
+        }
+        break;
+# endif
+# if defined(SO_SNDTIMEO)
+    case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_SEND_TIMEOUT:
+#  ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS
+        {
+            struct timeval *tv = (struct timeval *)ptr;
+            int timeout = tv->tv_sec * 1000 + tv->tv_usec / 1000;
+            if (setsockopt(b->num, SOL_SOCKET, SO_SNDTIMEO,
+                           (void *)&timeout, sizeof(timeout)) < 0) {
+                perror("setsockopt");
+                ret = -1;
+            }
+        }
+#  else
+        if (setsockopt(b->num, SOL_SOCKET, SO_SNDTIMEO, ptr,
+                       sizeof(struct timeval)) < 0) {
+            perror("setsockopt");
+            ret = -1;
+        }
+#  endif
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_SEND_TIMEOUT:
+        {
+            union {
+                size_t s;
+                int i;
+            } sz = {
+                0
+            };
+#  ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS
+            int timeout;
+            struct timeval *tv = (struct timeval *)ptr;
+
+            sz.i = sizeof(timeout);
+            if (getsockopt(b->num, SOL_SOCKET, SO_SNDTIMEO,
+                           (void *)&timeout, &sz.i) < 0) {
+                perror("getsockopt");
+                ret = -1;
+            } else {
+                tv->tv_sec = timeout / 1000;
+                tv->tv_usec = (timeout % 1000) * 1000;
+                ret = sizeof(*tv);
+            }
+#  else
+            sz.i = sizeof(struct timeval);
+            if (getsockopt(b->num, SOL_SOCKET, SO_SNDTIMEO,
+                           ptr, (void *)&sz) < 0) {
+                perror("getsockopt");
+                ret = -1;
+            } else if (sizeof(sz.s) != sizeof(sz.i) && sz.i == 0) {
+                OPENSSL_assert(sz.s <= sizeof(struct timeval));
+                ret = (int)sz.s;
+            } else
+                ret = sz.i;
+#  endif
+        }
+        break;
+# endif
+    case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_SEND_TIMER_EXP:
+        /* fall-through */
+    case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_RECV_TIMER_EXP:
+# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS
+        d_errno = (data->_errno == WSAETIMEDOUT);
+# else
+        d_errno = (data->_errno == EAGAIN);
+# endif
+        if (d_errno) {
+            ret = 1;
+            data->_errno = 0;
+        } else
+            ret = 0;
+        break;
+# ifdef EMSGSIZE
+    case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_MTU_EXCEEDED:
+        if (data->_errno == EMSGSIZE) {
+            ret = 1;
+            data->_errno = 0;
+        } else
+            ret = 0;
+        break;
+# endif
+    case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_DONT_FRAG:
+        sockopt_val = num ? 1 : 0;
+
+        switch (data->peer.sa.sa_family) {
+        case AF_INET:
+# if defined(IP_DONTFRAG)
+            if ((ret = setsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_IP, IP_DONTFRAG,
+                                  &sockopt_val, sizeof(sockopt_val))) < 0) {
+                perror("setsockopt");
+                ret = -1;
+            }
+# elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_LINUX) && defined(IP_MTU_DISCOVER) && defined (IP_PMTUDISC_PROBE)
+            if ((sockopt_val = num ? IP_PMTUDISC_PROBE : IP_PMTUDISC_DONT),
+                (ret = setsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_IP, IP_MTU_DISCOVER,
+                                  &sockopt_val, sizeof(sockopt_val))) < 0) {
+                perror("setsockopt");
+                ret = -1;
+            }
+# elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) && defined(IP_DONTFRAGMENT)
+            if ((ret = setsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_IP, IP_DONTFRAGMENT,
+                                  (const char *)&sockopt_val,
+                                  sizeof(sockopt_val))) < 0) {
+                perror("setsockopt");
+                ret = -1;
+            }
+# else
+            ret = -1;
+# endif
+            break;
+# if OPENSSL_USE_IPV6
+        case AF_INET6:
+#  if defined(IPV6_DONTFRAG)
+            if ((ret = setsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_DONTFRAG,
+                                  (const void *)&sockopt_val,
+                                  sizeof(sockopt_val))) < 0) {
+                perror("setsockopt");
+                ret = -1;
+            }
+#  elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_LINUX) && defined(IPV6_MTUDISCOVER)
+            if ((sockopt_val = num ? IP_PMTUDISC_PROBE : IP_PMTUDISC_DONT),
+                (ret = setsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_MTU_DISCOVER,
+                                  &sockopt_val, sizeof(sockopt_val))) < 0) {
+                perror("setsockopt");
+                ret = -1;
+            }
+#  else
+            ret = -1;
+#  endif
+            break;
+# endif
+        default:
+            ret = -1;
+            break;
+        }
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_MTU_OVERHEAD:
+        ret = dgram_get_mtu_overhead(data);
+        break;
+
+    /*
+     * BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_IN_HANDSHAKE is used here for compatibility
+     * reasons. When BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEEK_MODE was first defined its value
+     * was incorrectly clashing with BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_IN_HANDSHAKE. The
+     * value has been updated to a non-clashing value. However to preserve
+     * binary compatiblity we now respond to both the old value and the new one
+     */
+    case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_IN_HANDSHAKE:
+    case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEEK_MODE:
+        data->peekmode = (unsigned int)num;
+        break;
+    default:
+        ret = 0;
+        break;
+    }
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static int dgram_puts(BIO *bp, const char *str)
+{
+    int n, ret;
+
+    n = strlen(str);
+    ret = dgram_write(bp, str, n);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+const BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_datagram_sctp(void)
+{
+    return (&methods_dgramp_sctp);
+}
+
+BIO *BIO_new_dgram_sctp(int fd, int close_flag)
+{
+    BIO *bio;
+    int ret, optval = 20000;
+    int auth_data = 0, auth_forward = 0;
+    unsigned char *p;
+    struct sctp_authchunk auth;
+    struct sctp_authchunks *authchunks;
+    socklen_t sockopt_len;
+#  ifdef SCTP_AUTHENTICATION_EVENT
+#   ifdef SCTP_EVENT
+    struct sctp_event event;
+#   else
+    struct sctp_event_subscribe event;
+#   endif
+#  endif
+
+    bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_datagram_sctp());
+    if (bio == NULL)
+        return (NULL);
+    BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, close_flag);
+
+    /* Activate SCTP-AUTH for DATA and FORWARD-TSN chunks */
+    auth.sauth_chunk = OPENSSL_SCTP_DATA_CHUNK_TYPE;
+    ret =
+        setsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_AUTH_CHUNK, &auth,
+                   sizeof(struct sctp_authchunk));
+    if (ret < 0) {
+        BIO_vfree(bio);
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+    auth.sauth_chunk = OPENSSL_SCTP_FORWARD_CUM_TSN_CHUNK_TYPE;
+    ret =
+        setsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_AUTH_CHUNK, &auth,
+                   sizeof(struct sctp_authchunk));
+    if (ret < 0) {
+        BIO_vfree(bio);
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Test if activation was successful. When using accept(), SCTP-AUTH has
+     * to be activated for the listening socket already, otherwise the
+     * connected socket won't use it.
+     */
+    sockopt_len = (socklen_t) (sizeof(sctp_assoc_t) + 256 * sizeof(uint8_t));
+    authchunks = OPENSSL_zalloc(sockopt_len);
+    if (authchunks == NULL) {
+        BIO_vfree(bio);
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+    ret = getsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_LOCAL_AUTH_CHUNKS, authchunks,
+                   &sockopt_len);
+    if (ret < 0) {
+        OPENSSL_free(authchunks);
+        BIO_vfree(bio);
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+
+    for (p = (unsigned char *)authchunks->gauth_chunks;
+         p < (unsigned char *)authchunks + sockopt_len;
+         p += sizeof(uint8_t)) {
+        if (*p == OPENSSL_SCTP_DATA_CHUNK_TYPE)
+            auth_data = 1;
+        if (*p == OPENSSL_SCTP_FORWARD_CUM_TSN_CHUNK_TYPE)
+            auth_forward = 1;
+    }
+
+    OPENSSL_free(authchunks);
+
+    OPENSSL_assert(auth_data);
+    OPENSSL_assert(auth_forward);
+
+#  ifdef SCTP_AUTHENTICATION_EVENT
+#   ifdef SCTP_EVENT
+    memset(&event, 0, sizeof(event));
+    event.se_assoc_id = 0;
+    event.se_type = SCTP_AUTHENTICATION_EVENT;
+    event.se_on = 1;
+    ret =
+        setsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_EVENT, &event,
+                   sizeof(struct sctp_event));
+    if (ret < 0) {
+        BIO_vfree(bio);
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+#   else
+    sockopt_len = (socklen_t) sizeof(struct sctp_event_subscribe);
+    ret = getsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_EVENTS, &event, &sockopt_len);
+    if (ret < 0) {
+        BIO_vfree(bio);
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+
+    event.sctp_authentication_event = 1;
+
+    ret =
+        setsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_EVENTS, &event,
+                   sizeof(struct sctp_event_subscribe));
+    if (ret < 0) {
+        BIO_vfree(bio);
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+#   endif
+#  endif
+
+    /*
+     * Disable partial delivery by setting the min size larger than the max
+     * record size of 2^14 + 2048 + 13
+     */
+    ret =
+        setsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_PARTIAL_DELIVERY_POINT, &optval,
+                   sizeof(optval));
+    if (ret < 0) {
+        BIO_vfree(bio);
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+
+    return (bio);
+}
+
+int BIO_dgram_is_sctp(BIO *bio)
+{
+    return (BIO_method_type(bio) == BIO_TYPE_DGRAM_SCTP);
+}
+
+static int dgram_sctp_new(BIO *bi)
+{
+    bio_dgram_sctp_data *data = NULL;
+
+    bi->init = 0;
+    bi->num = 0;
+    data = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*data));
+    if (data == NULL)
+        return 0;
+#  ifdef SCTP_PR_SCTP_NONE
+    data->prinfo.pr_policy = SCTP_PR_SCTP_NONE;
+#  endif
+    bi->ptr = data;
+
+    bi->flags = 0;
+    return (1);
+}
+
+static int dgram_sctp_free(BIO *a)
+{
+    bio_dgram_sctp_data *data;
+
+    if (a == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    if (!dgram_clear(a))
+        return 0;
+
+    data = (bio_dgram_sctp_data *) a->ptr;
+    if (data != NULL)
+        OPENSSL_free(data);
+
+    return (1);
+}
+
+#  ifdef SCTP_AUTHENTICATION_EVENT
+void dgram_sctp_handle_auth_free_key_event(BIO *b,
+                                           union sctp_notification *snp)
+{
+    int ret;
+    struct sctp_authkey_event *authkeyevent = &snp->sn_auth_event;
+
+    if (authkeyevent->auth_indication == SCTP_AUTH_FREE_KEY) {
+        struct sctp_authkeyid authkeyid;
+
+        /* delete key */
+        authkeyid.scact_keynumber = authkeyevent->auth_keynumber;
+        ret = setsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_AUTH_DELETE_KEY,
+                         &authkeyid, sizeof(struct sctp_authkeyid));
+    }
+}
+#  endif
+
+static int dgram_sctp_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
+{
+    int ret = 0, n = 0, i, optval;
+    socklen_t optlen;
+    bio_dgram_sctp_data *data = (bio_dgram_sctp_data *) b->ptr;
+    union sctp_notification *snp;
+    struct msghdr msg;
+    struct iovec iov;
+    struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
+    char cmsgbuf[512];
+
+    if (out != NULL) {
+        clear_socket_error();
+
+        do {
+            memset(&data->rcvinfo, 0, sizeof(data->rcvinfo));
+            iov.iov_base = out;
+            iov.iov_len = outl;
+            msg.msg_name = NULL;
+            msg.msg_namelen = 0;
+            msg.msg_iov = &iov;
+            msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
+            msg.msg_control = cmsgbuf;
+            msg.msg_controllen = 512;
+            msg.msg_flags = 0;
+            n = recvmsg(b->num, &msg, 0);
+
+            if (n <= 0) {
+                if (n < 0)
+                    ret = n;
+                break;
+            }
+
+            if (msg.msg_controllen > 0) {
+                for (cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg); cmsg;
+                     cmsg = CMSG_NXTHDR(&msg, cmsg)) {
+                    if (cmsg->cmsg_level != IPPROTO_SCTP)
+                        continue;
+#  ifdef SCTP_RCVINFO
+                    if (cmsg->cmsg_type == SCTP_RCVINFO) {
+                        struct sctp_rcvinfo *rcvinfo;
+
+                        rcvinfo = (struct sctp_rcvinfo *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg);
+                        data->rcvinfo.rcv_sid = rcvinfo->rcv_sid;
+                        data->rcvinfo.rcv_ssn = rcvinfo->rcv_ssn;
+                        data->rcvinfo.rcv_flags = rcvinfo->rcv_flags;
+                        data->rcvinfo.rcv_ppid = rcvinfo->rcv_ppid;
+                        data->rcvinfo.rcv_tsn = rcvinfo->rcv_tsn;
+                        data->rcvinfo.rcv_cumtsn = rcvinfo->rcv_cumtsn;
+                        data->rcvinfo.rcv_context = rcvinfo->rcv_context;
+                    }
+#  endif
+#  ifdef SCTP_SNDRCV
+                    if (cmsg->cmsg_type == SCTP_SNDRCV) {
+                        struct sctp_sndrcvinfo *sndrcvinfo;
+
+                        sndrcvinfo =
+                            (struct sctp_sndrcvinfo *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg);
+                        data->rcvinfo.rcv_sid = sndrcvinfo->sinfo_stream;
+                        data->rcvinfo.rcv_ssn = sndrcvinfo->sinfo_ssn;
+                        data->rcvinfo.rcv_flags = sndrcvinfo->sinfo_flags;
+                        data->rcvinfo.rcv_ppid = sndrcvinfo->sinfo_ppid;
+                        data->rcvinfo.rcv_tsn = sndrcvinfo->sinfo_tsn;
+                        data->rcvinfo.rcv_cumtsn = sndrcvinfo->sinfo_cumtsn;
+                        data->rcvinfo.rcv_context = sndrcvinfo->sinfo_context;
+                    }
+#  endif
+                }
+            }
+
+            if (msg.msg_flags & MSG_NOTIFICATION) {
+                snp = (union sctp_notification *)out;
+                if (snp->sn_header.sn_type == SCTP_SENDER_DRY_EVENT) {
+#  ifdef SCTP_EVENT
+                    struct sctp_event event;
+#  else
+                    struct sctp_event_subscribe event;
+                    socklen_t eventsize;
+#  endif
+
+                    /* disable sender dry event */
+#  ifdef SCTP_EVENT
+                    memset(&event, 0, sizeof(event));
+                    event.se_assoc_id = 0;
+                    event.se_type = SCTP_SENDER_DRY_EVENT;
+                    event.se_on = 0;
+                    i = setsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_EVENT, &event,
+                                   sizeof(struct sctp_event));
+                    if (i < 0) {
+                        ret = i;
+                        break;
+                    }
+#  else
+                    eventsize = sizeof(struct sctp_event_subscribe);
+                    i = getsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_EVENTS, &event,
+                                   &eventsize);
+                    if (i < 0) {
+                        ret = i;
+                        break;
+                    }
+
+                    event.sctp_sender_dry_event = 0;
+
+                    i = setsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_EVENTS, &event,
+                                   sizeof(struct sctp_event_subscribe));
+                    if (i < 0) {
+                        ret = i;
+                        break;
+                    }
+#  endif
+                }
+#  ifdef SCTP_AUTHENTICATION_EVENT
+                if (snp->sn_header.sn_type == SCTP_AUTHENTICATION_EVENT)
+                    dgram_sctp_handle_auth_free_key_event(b, snp);
+#  endif
+
+                if (data->handle_notifications != NULL)
+                    data->handle_notifications(b, data->notification_context,
+                                               (void *)out);
+
+                memset(out, 0, outl);
+            } else
+                ret += n;
+        }
+        while ((msg.msg_flags & MSG_NOTIFICATION) && (msg.msg_flags & MSG_EOR)
+               && (ret < outl));
+
+        if (ret > 0 && !(msg.msg_flags & MSG_EOR)) {
+            /* Partial message read, this should never happen! */
+
+            /*
+             * The buffer was too small, this means the peer sent a message
+             * that was larger than allowed.
+             */
+            if (ret == outl)
+                return -1;
+
+            /*
+             * Test if socket buffer can handle max record size (2^14 + 2048
+             * + 13)
+             */
+            optlen = (socklen_t) sizeof(int);
+            ret = getsockopt(b->num, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF, &optval, &optlen);
+            if (ret >= 0)
+                OPENSSL_assert(optval >= 18445);
+
+            /*
+             * Test if SCTP doesn't partially deliver below max record size
+             * (2^14 + 2048 + 13)
+             */
+            optlen = (socklen_t) sizeof(int);
+            ret =
+                getsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_PARTIAL_DELIVERY_POINT,
+                           &optval, &optlen);
+            if (ret >= 0)
+                OPENSSL_assert(optval >= 18445);
+
+            /*
+             * Partially delivered notification??? Probably a bug....
+             */
+            OPENSSL_assert(!(msg.msg_flags & MSG_NOTIFICATION));
+
+            /*
+             * Everything seems ok till now, so it's most likely a message
+             * dropped by PR-SCTP.
+             */
+            memset(out, 0, outl);
+            BIO_set_retry_read(b);
+            return -1;
+        }
+
+        BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+        if (ret < 0) {
+            if (BIO_dgram_should_retry(ret)) {
+                BIO_set_retry_read(b);
+                data->_errno = get_last_socket_error();
+            }
+        }
+
+        /* Test if peer uses SCTP-AUTH before continuing */
+        if (!data->peer_auth_tested) {
+            int ii, auth_data = 0, auth_forward = 0;
+            unsigned char *p;
+            struct sctp_authchunks *authchunks;
+
+            optlen =
+                (socklen_t) (sizeof(sctp_assoc_t) + 256 * sizeof(uint8_t));
+            authchunks = OPENSSL_malloc(optlen);
+            if (authchunks == NULL) {
+                BIOerr(BIO_F_DGRAM_SCTP_READ, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                return -1;
+            }
+            memset(authchunks, 0, optlen);
+            ii = getsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_PEER_AUTH_CHUNKS,
+                            authchunks, &optlen);
+
+            if (ii >= 0)
+                for (p = (unsigned char *)authchunks->gauth_chunks;
+                     p < (unsigned char *)authchunks + optlen;
+                     p += sizeof(uint8_t)) {
+                    if (*p == OPENSSL_SCTP_DATA_CHUNK_TYPE)
+                        auth_data = 1;
+                    if (*p == OPENSSL_SCTP_FORWARD_CUM_TSN_CHUNK_TYPE)
+                        auth_forward = 1;
+                }
+
+            OPENSSL_free(authchunks);
+
+            if (!auth_data || !auth_forward) {
+                BIOerr(BIO_F_DGRAM_SCTP_READ, BIO_R_CONNECT_ERROR);
+                return -1;
+            }
+
+            data->peer_auth_tested = 1;
+        }
+    }
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+/*
+ * dgram_sctp_write - send message on SCTP socket
+ * @b: BIO to write to
+ * @in: data to send
+ * @inl: amount of bytes in @in to send
+ *
+ * Returns -1 on error or the sent amount of bytes on success
+ */
+static int dgram_sctp_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl)
+{
+    int ret;
+    bio_dgram_sctp_data *data = (bio_dgram_sctp_data *) b->ptr;
+    struct bio_dgram_sctp_sndinfo *sinfo = &(data->sndinfo);
+    struct bio_dgram_sctp_prinfo *pinfo = &(data->prinfo);
+    struct bio_dgram_sctp_sndinfo handshake_sinfo;
+    struct iovec iov[1];
+    struct msghdr msg;
+    struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
+#  if defined(SCTP_SNDINFO) && defined(SCTP_PRINFO)
+    char cmsgbuf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(struct sctp_sndinfo)) +
+                 CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(struct sctp_prinfo))];
+    struct sctp_sndinfo *sndinfo;
+    struct sctp_prinfo *prinfo;
+#  else
+    char cmsgbuf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(struct sctp_sndrcvinfo))];
+    struct sctp_sndrcvinfo *sndrcvinfo;
+#  endif
+
+    clear_socket_error();
+
+    /*
+     * If we're send anything else than application data, disable all user
+     * parameters and flags.
+     */
+    if (in[0] != 23) {
+        memset(&handshake_sinfo, 0, sizeof(handshake_sinfo));
+#  ifdef SCTP_SACK_IMMEDIATELY
+        handshake_sinfo.snd_flags = SCTP_SACK_IMMEDIATELY;
+#  endif
+        sinfo = &handshake_sinfo;
+    }
+
+    /* We can only send a shutdown alert if the socket is dry */
+    if (data->save_shutdown) {
+        ret = BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry(b);
+        if (ret < 0)
+            return -1;
+        if (ret == 0) {
+            BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+            BIO_set_retry_write(b);
+            return -1;
+        }
+    }
+
+    iov[0].iov_base = (char *)in;
+    iov[0].iov_len = inl;
+    msg.msg_name = NULL;
+    msg.msg_namelen = 0;
+    msg.msg_iov = iov;
+    msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
+    msg.msg_control = (caddr_t) cmsgbuf;
+    msg.msg_controllen = 0;
+    msg.msg_flags = 0;
+#  if defined(SCTP_SNDINFO) && defined(SCTP_PRINFO)
+    cmsg = (struct cmsghdr *)cmsgbuf;
+    cmsg->cmsg_level = IPPROTO_SCTP;
+    cmsg->cmsg_type = SCTP_SNDINFO;
+    cmsg->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(struct sctp_sndinfo));
+    sndinfo = (struct sctp_sndinfo *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg);
+    memset(sndinfo, 0, sizeof(*sndinfo));
+    sndinfo->snd_sid = sinfo->snd_sid;
+    sndinfo->snd_flags = sinfo->snd_flags;
+    sndinfo->snd_ppid = sinfo->snd_ppid;
+    sndinfo->snd_context = sinfo->snd_context;
+    msg.msg_controllen += CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(struct sctp_sndinfo));
+
+    cmsg =
+        (struct cmsghdr *)&cmsgbuf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(struct sctp_sndinfo))];
+    cmsg->cmsg_level = IPPROTO_SCTP;
+    cmsg->cmsg_type = SCTP_PRINFO;
+    cmsg->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(struct sctp_prinfo));
+    prinfo = (struct sctp_prinfo *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg);
+    memset(prinfo, 0, sizeof(*prinfo));
+    prinfo->pr_policy = pinfo->pr_policy;
+    prinfo->pr_value = pinfo->pr_value;
+    msg.msg_controllen += CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(struct sctp_prinfo));
+#  else
+    cmsg = (struct cmsghdr *)cmsgbuf;
+    cmsg->cmsg_level = IPPROTO_SCTP;
+    cmsg->cmsg_type = SCTP_SNDRCV;
+    cmsg->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(struct sctp_sndrcvinfo));
+    sndrcvinfo = (struct sctp_sndrcvinfo *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg);
+    memset(sndrcvinfo, 0, sizeof(*sndrcvinfo));
+    sndrcvinfo->sinfo_stream = sinfo->snd_sid;
+    sndrcvinfo->sinfo_flags = sinfo->snd_flags;
+#   ifdef __FreeBSD__
+    sndrcvinfo->sinfo_flags |= pinfo->pr_policy;
+#   endif
+    sndrcvinfo->sinfo_ppid = sinfo->snd_ppid;
+    sndrcvinfo->sinfo_context = sinfo->snd_context;
+    sndrcvinfo->sinfo_timetolive = pinfo->pr_value;
+    msg.msg_controllen += CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(struct sctp_sndrcvinfo));
+#  endif
+
+    ret = sendmsg(b->num, &msg, 0);
+
+    BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+    if (ret <= 0) {
+        if (BIO_dgram_should_retry(ret)) {
+            BIO_set_retry_write(b);
+            data->_errno = get_last_socket_error();
+        }
+    }
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static long dgram_sctp_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
+{
+    long ret = 1;
+    bio_dgram_sctp_data *data = NULL;
+    socklen_t sockopt_len = 0;
+    struct sctp_authkeyid authkeyid;
+    struct sctp_authkey *authkey = NULL;
+
+    data = (bio_dgram_sctp_data *) b->ptr;
+
+    switch (cmd) {
+    case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU:
+        /*
+         * Set to maximum (2^14) and ignore user input to enable transport
+         * protocol fragmentation. Returns always 2^14.
+         */
+        data->mtu = 16384;
+        ret = data->mtu;
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_MTU:
+        /*
+         * Set to maximum (2^14) and ignore input to enable transport
+         * protocol fragmentation. Returns always 2^14.
+         */
+        data->mtu = 16384;
+        ret = data->mtu;
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_CONNECTED:
+    case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_CONNECT:
+        /* Returns always -1. */
+        ret = -1;
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_NEXT_TIMEOUT:
+        /*
+         * SCTP doesn't need the DTLS timer Returns always 1.
+         */
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_MTU_OVERHEAD:
+        /*
+         * We allow transport protocol fragmentation so this is irrelevant
+         */
+        ret = 0;
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_IN_HANDSHAKE:
+        if (num > 0)
+            data->in_handshake = 1;
+        else
+            data->in_handshake = 0;
+
+        ret =
+            setsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_NODELAY,
+                       &data->in_handshake, sizeof(int));
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY:
+        /*
+         * New shared key for SCTP AUTH. Returns 0 on success, -1 otherwise.
+         */
+
+        /* Get active key */
+        sockopt_len = sizeof(struct sctp_authkeyid);
+        ret =
+            getsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_AUTH_ACTIVE_KEY, &authkeyid,
+                       &sockopt_len);
+        if (ret < 0)
+            break;
+
+        /* Add new key */
+        sockopt_len = sizeof(struct sctp_authkey) + 64 * sizeof(uint8_t);
+        authkey = OPENSSL_malloc(sockopt_len);
+        if (authkey == NULL) {
+            ret = -1;
+            break;
+        }
+        memset(authkey, 0, sockopt_len);
+        authkey->sca_keynumber = authkeyid.scact_keynumber + 1;
+#  ifndef __FreeBSD__
+        /*
+         * This field is missing in FreeBSD 8.2 and earlier, and FreeBSD 8.3
+         * and higher work without it.
+         */
+        authkey->sca_keylength = 64;
+#  endif
+        memcpy(&authkey->sca_key[0], ptr, 64 * sizeof(uint8_t));
+
+        ret =
+            setsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_AUTH_KEY, authkey,
+                       sockopt_len);
+        OPENSSL_free(authkey);
+        authkey = NULL;
+        if (ret < 0)
+            break;
+
+        /* Reset active key */
+        ret = setsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_AUTH_ACTIVE_KEY,
+                         &authkeyid, sizeof(struct sctp_authkeyid));
+        if (ret < 0)
+            break;
+
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY:
+        /* Returns 0 on success, -1 otherwise. */
+
+        /* Get active key */
+        sockopt_len = sizeof(struct sctp_authkeyid);
+        ret =
+            getsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_AUTH_ACTIVE_KEY, &authkeyid,
+                       &sockopt_len);
+        if (ret < 0)
+            break;
+
+        /* Set active key */
+        authkeyid.scact_keynumber = authkeyid.scact_keynumber + 1;
+        ret = setsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_AUTH_ACTIVE_KEY,
+                         &authkeyid, sizeof(struct sctp_authkeyid));
+        if (ret < 0)
+            break;
+
+        /*
+         * CCS has been sent, so remember that and fall through to check if
+         * we need to deactivate an old key
+         */
+        data->ccs_sent = 1;
+        /* fall-through */
+
+    case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD:
+        /* Returns 0 on success, -1 otherwise. */
+
+        /*
+         * Has this command really been called or is this just a
+         * fall-through?
+         */
+        if (cmd == BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD)
+            data->ccs_rcvd = 1;
+
+        /*
+         * CSS has been both, received and sent, so deactivate an old key
+         */
+        if (data->ccs_rcvd == 1 && data->ccs_sent == 1) {
+            /* Get active key */
+            sockopt_len = sizeof(struct sctp_authkeyid);
+            ret =
+                getsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_AUTH_ACTIVE_KEY,
+                           &authkeyid, &sockopt_len);
+            if (ret < 0)
+                break;
+
+            /*
+             * Deactivate key or delete second last key if
+             * SCTP_AUTHENTICATION_EVENT is not available.
+             */
+            authkeyid.scact_keynumber = authkeyid.scact_keynumber - 1;
+#  ifdef SCTP_AUTH_DEACTIVATE_KEY
+            sockopt_len = sizeof(struct sctp_authkeyid);
+            ret = setsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_AUTH_DEACTIVATE_KEY,
+                             &authkeyid, sockopt_len);
+            if (ret < 0)
+                break;
+#  endif
+#  ifndef SCTP_AUTHENTICATION_EVENT
+            if (authkeyid.scact_keynumber > 0) {
+                authkeyid.scact_keynumber = authkeyid.scact_keynumber - 1;
+                ret = setsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_AUTH_DELETE_KEY,
+                                 &authkeyid, sizeof(struct sctp_authkeyid));
+                if (ret < 0)
+                    break;
+            }
+#  endif
+
+            data->ccs_rcvd = 0;
+            data->ccs_sent = 0;
+        }
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_GET_SNDINFO:
+        /* Returns the size of the copied struct. */
+        if (num > (long)sizeof(struct bio_dgram_sctp_sndinfo))
+            num = sizeof(struct bio_dgram_sctp_sndinfo);
+
+        memcpy(ptr, &(data->sndinfo), num);
+        ret = num;
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_SNDINFO:
+        /* Returns the size of the copied struct. */
+        if (num > (long)sizeof(struct bio_dgram_sctp_sndinfo))
+            num = sizeof(struct bio_dgram_sctp_sndinfo);
+
+        memcpy(&(data->sndinfo), ptr, num);
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_GET_RCVINFO:
+        /* Returns the size of the copied struct. */
+        if (num > (long)sizeof(struct bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo))
+            num = sizeof(struct bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo);
+
+        memcpy(ptr, &data->rcvinfo, num);
+
+        ret = num;
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_RCVINFO:
+        /* Returns the size of the copied struct. */
+        if (num > (long)sizeof(struct bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo))
+            num = sizeof(struct bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo);
+
+        memcpy(&(data->rcvinfo), ptr, num);
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_GET_PRINFO:
+        /* Returns the size of the copied struct. */
+        if (num > (long)sizeof(struct bio_dgram_sctp_prinfo))
+            num = sizeof(struct bio_dgram_sctp_prinfo);
+
+        memcpy(ptr, &(data->prinfo), num);
+        ret = num;
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_PRINFO:
+        /* Returns the size of the copied struct. */
+        if (num > (long)sizeof(struct bio_dgram_sctp_prinfo))
+            num = sizeof(struct bio_dgram_sctp_prinfo);
+
+        memcpy(&(data->prinfo), ptr, num);
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SAVE_SHUTDOWN:
+        /* Returns always 1. */
+        if (num > 0)
+            data->save_shutdown = 1;
+        else
+            data->save_shutdown = 0;
+        break;
+
+    default:
+        /*
+         * Pass to default ctrl function to process SCTP unspecific commands
+         */
+        ret = dgram_ctrl(b, cmd, num, ptr);
+        break;
+    }
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+int BIO_dgram_sctp_notification_cb(BIO *b,
+                                   void (*handle_notifications) (BIO *bio,
+                                                                 void
+                                                                 *context,
+                                                                 void *buf),
+                                   void *context)
+{
+    bio_dgram_sctp_data *data = (bio_dgram_sctp_data *) b->ptr;
+
+    if (handle_notifications != NULL) {
+        data->handle_notifications = handle_notifications;
+        data->notification_context = context;
+    } else
+        return -1;
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry - Wait for SCTP SENDER_DRY event
+ * @b: The BIO to check for the dry event
+ *
+ * Wait until the peer confirms all packets have been received, and so that
+ * our kernel doesn't have anything to send anymore.  This is only received by
+ * the peer's kernel, not the application.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ * -1 on error
+ *  0 when not dry yet
+ *  1 when dry
+ */
+int BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry(BIO *b)
+{
+    int is_dry = 0;
+    int sockflags = 0;
+    int n, ret;
+    union sctp_notification snp;
+    struct msghdr msg;
+    struct iovec iov;
+#  ifdef SCTP_EVENT
+    struct sctp_event event;
+#  else
+    struct sctp_event_subscribe event;
+    socklen_t eventsize;
+#  endif
+    bio_dgram_sctp_data *data = (bio_dgram_sctp_data *) b->ptr;
+
+    /* set sender dry event */
+#  ifdef SCTP_EVENT
+    memset(&event, 0, sizeof(event));
+    event.se_assoc_id = 0;
+    event.se_type = SCTP_SENDER_DRY_EVENT;
+    event.se_on = 1;
+    ret =
+        setsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_EVENT, &event,
+                   sizeof(struct sctp_event));
+#  else
+    eventsize = sizeof(struct sctp_event_subscribe);
+    ret = getsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_EVENTS, &event, &eventsize);
+    if (ret < 0)
+        return -1;
+
+    event.sctp_sender_dry_event = 1;
+
+    ret =
+        setsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_EVENTS, &event,
+                   sizeof(struct sctp_event_subscribe));
+#  endif
+    if (ret < 0)
+        return -1;
+
+    /* peek for notification */
+    memset(&snp, 0, sizeof(snp));
+    iov.iov_base = (char *)&snp;
+    iov.iov_len = sizeof(union sctp_notification);
+    msg.msg_name = NULL;
+    msg.msg_namelen = 0;
+    msg.msg_iov = &iov;
+    msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
+    msg.msg_control = NULL;
+    msg.msg_controllen = 0;
+    msg.msg_flags = 0;
+
+    n = recvmsg(b->num, &msg, MSG_PEEK);
+    if (n <= 0) {
+        if ((n < 0) && (get_last_socket_error() != EAGAIN)
+            && (get_last_socket_error() != EWOULDBLOCK))
+            return -1;
+        else
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* if we find a notification, process it and try again if necessary */
+    while (msg.msg_flags & MSG_NOTIFICATION) {
+        memset(&snp, 0, sizeof(snp));
+        iov.iov_base = (char *)&snp;
+        iov.iov_len = sizeof(union sctp_notification);
+        msg.msg_name = NULL;
+        msg.msg_namelen = 0;
+        msg.msg_iov = &iov;
+        msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
+        msg.msg_control = NULL;
+        msg.msg_controllen = 0;
+        msg.msg_flags = 0;
+
+        n = recvmsg(b->num, &msg, 0);
+        if (n <= 0) {
+            if ((n < 0) && (get_last_socket_error() != EAGAIN)
+                && (get_last_socket_error() != EWOULDBLOCK))
+                return -1;
+            else
+                return is_dry;
+        }
+
+        if (snp.sn_header.sn_type == SCTP_SENDER_DRY_EVENT) {
+            is_dry = 1;
+
+            /* disable sender dry event */
+#  ifdef SCTP_EVENT
+            memset(&event, 0, sizeof(event));
+            event.se_assoc_id = 0;
+            event.se_type = SCTP_SENDER_DRY_EVENT;
+            event.se_on = 0;
+            ret =
+                setsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_EVENT, &event,
+                           sizeof(struct sctp_event));
+#  else
+            eventsize = (socklen_t) sizeof(struct sctp_event_subscribe);
+            ret =
+                getsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_EVENTS, &event,
+                           &eventsize);
+            if (ret < 0)
+                return -1;
+
+            event.sctp_sender_dry_event = 0;
+
+            ret =
+                setsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_EVENTS, &event,
+                           sizeof(struct sctp_event_subscribe));
+#  endif
+            if (ret < 0)
+                return -1;
+        }
+#  ifdef SCTP_AUTHENTICATION_EVENT
+        if (snp.sn_header.sn_type == SCTP_AUTHENTICATION_EVENT)
+            dgram_sctp_handle_auth_free_key_event(b, &snp);
+#  endif
+
+        if (data->handle_notifications != NULL)
+            data->handle_notifications(b, data->notification_context,
+                                       (void *)&snp);
+
+        /* found notification, peek again */
+        memset(&snp, 0, sizeof(snp));
+        iov.iov_base = (char *)&snp;
+        iov.iov_len = sizeof(union sctp_notification);
+        msg.msg_name = NULL;
+        msg.msg_namelen = 0;
+        msg.msg_iov = &iov;
+        msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
+        msg.msg_control = NULL;
+        msg.msg_controllen = 0;
+        msg.msg_flags = 0;
+
+        /* if we have seen the dry already, don't wait */
+        if (is_dry) {
+            sockflags = fcntl(b->num, F_GETFL, 0);
+            fcntl(b->num, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK);
+        }
+
+        n = recvmsg(b->num, &msg, MSG_PEEK);
+
+        if (is_dry) {
+            fcntl(b->num, F_SETFL, sockflags);
+        }
+
+        if (n <= 0) {
+            if ((n < 0) && (get_last_socket_error() != EAGAIN)
+                && (get_last_socket_error() != EWOULDBLOCK))
+                return -1;
+            else
+                return is_dry;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* read anything else */
+    return is_dry;
+}
+
+int BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(BIO *b)
+{
+    int n, sockflags;
+    union sctp_notification snp;
+    struct msghdr msg;
+    struct iovec iov;
+    bio_dgram_sctp_data *data = (bio_dgram_sctp_data *) b->ptr;
+
+    /* Check if there are any messages waiting to be read */
+    do {
+        memset(&snp, 0, sizeof(snp));
+        iov.iov_base = (char *)&snp;
+        iov.iov_len = sizeof(union sctp_notification);
+        msg.msg_name = NULL;
+        msg.msg_namelen = 0;
+        msg.msg_iov = &iov;
+        msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
+        msg.msg_control = NULL;
+        msg.msg_controllen = 0;
+        msg.msg_flags = 0;
+
+        sockflags = fcntl(b->num, F_GETFL, 0);
+        fcntl(b->num, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK);
+        n = recvmsg(b->num, &msg, MSG_PEEK);
+        fcntl(b->num, F_SETFL, sockflags);
+
+        /* if notification, process and try again */
+        if (n > 0 && (msg.msg_flags & MSG_NOTIFICATION)) {
+#  ifdef SCTP_AUTHENTICATION_EVENT
+            if (snp.sn_header.sn_type == SCTP_AUTHENTICATION_EVENT)
+                dgram_sctp_handle_auth_free_key_event(b, &snp);
+#  endif
+
+            memset(&snp, 0, sizeof(snp));
+            iov.iov_base = (char *)&snp;
+            iov.iov_len = sizeof(union sctp_notification);
+            msg.msg_name = NULL;
+            msg.msg_namelen = 0;
+            msg.msg_iov = &iov;
+            msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
+            msg.msg_control = NULL;
+            msg.msg_controllen = 0;
+            msg.msg_flags = 0;
+            n = recvmsg(b->num, &msg, 0);
+
+            if (data->handle_notifications != NULL)
+                data->handle_notifications(b, data->notification_context,
+                                           (void *)&snp);
+        }
+
+    } while (n > 0 && (msg.msg_flags & MSG_NOTIFICATION));
+
+    /* Return 1 if there is a message to be read, return 0 otherwise. */
+    if (n > 0)
+        return 1;
+    else
+        return 0;
+}
+
+static int dgram_sctp_puts(BIO *bp, const char *str)
+{
+    int n, ret;
+
+    n = strlen(str);
+    ret = dgram_sctp_write(bp, str, n);
+    return (ret);
+}
+# endif
+
+static int BIO_dgram_should_retry(int i)
+{
+    int err;
+
+    if ((i == 0) || (i == -1)) {
+        err = get_last_socket_error();
+
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS)
+        /*
+         * If the socket return value (i) is -1 and err is unexpectedly 0 at
+         * this point, the error code was overwritten by another system call
+         * before this error handling is called.
+         */
+# endif
+
+        return (BIO_dgram_non_fatal_error(err));
+    }
+    return (0);
+}
+
+int BIO_dgram_non_fatal_error(int err)
+{
+    switch (err) {
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS)
+#  if defined(WSAEWOULDBLOCK)
+    case WSAEWOULDBLOCK:
+#  endif
+# endif
+
+# ifdef EWOULDBLOCK
+#  ifdef WSAEWOULDBLOCK
+#   if WSAEWOULDBLOCK != EWOULDBLOCK
+    case EWOULDBLOCK:
+#   endif
+#  else
+    case EWOULDBLOCK:
+#  endif
+# endif
+
+# ifdef EINTR
+    case EINTR:
+# endif
+
+# ifdef EAGAIN
+#  if EWOULDBLOCK != EAGAIN
+    case EAGAIN:
+#  endif
+# endif
+
+# ifdef EPROTO
+    case EPROTO:
+# endif
+
+# ifdef EINPROGRESS
+    case EINPROGRESS:
+# endif
+
+# ifdef EALREADY
+    case EALREADY:
+# endif
+
+        return (1);
+        /* break; */
+    default:
+        break;
+    }
+    return (0);
+}
+
+static void get_current_time(struct timeval *t)
+{
+# if defined(_WIN32)
+    SYSTEMTIME st;
+    union {
+        unsigned __int64 ul;
+        FILETIME ft;
+    } now;
+
+    GetSystemTime(&st);
+    SystemTimeToFileTime(&st, &now.ft);
+#  ifdef  __MINGW32__
+    now.ul -= 116444736000000000ULL;
+#  else
+    now.ul -= 116444736000000000UI64; /* re-bias to 1/1/1970 */
+#  endif
+    t->tv_sec = (long)(now.ul / 10000000);
+    t->tv_usec = ((int)(now.ul % 10000000)) / 10;
+# elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
+    struct timeb tb;
+    ftime(&tb);
+    t->tv_sec = (long)tb.time;
+    t->tv_usec = (long)tb.millitm * 1000;
+# else
+    gettimeofday(t, NULL);
+# endif
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bio/bss_fd.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bio/bss_fd.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2bd3517
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bio/bss_fd.c
@@ -0,0 +1,275 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+
+#include "bio_lcl.h"
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO)
+/*
+ * Dummy placeholder for BIO_s_fd...
+ */
+BIO *BIO_new_fd(int fd, int close_flag)
+{
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+int BIO_fd_non_fatal_error(int err)
+{
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int BIO_fd_should_retry(int i)
+{
+    return 0;
+}
+
+const BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_fd(void)
+{
+    return NULL;
+}
+#else
+/*
+ * As for unconditional usage of "UPLINK" interface in this module.
+ * Trouble is that unlike Unix file descriptors [which are indexes
+ * in kernel-side per-process table], corresponding descriptors on
+ * platforms which require "UPLINK" interface seem to be indexes
+ * in a user-land, non-global table. Well, in fact they are indexes
+ * in stdio _iob[], and recall that _iob[] was the very reason why
+ * "UPLINK" interface was introduced in first place. But one way on
+ * another. Neither libcrypto or libssl use this BIO meaning that
+ * file descriptors can only be provided by application. Therefore
+ * "UPLINK" calls are due...
+ */
+static int fd_write(BIO *h, const char *buf, int num);
+static int fd_read(BIO *h, char *buf, int size);
+static int fd_puts(BIO *h, const char *str);
+static int fd_gets(BIO *h, char *buf, int size);
+static long fd_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, long arg1, void *arg2);
+static int fd_new(BIO *h);
+static int fd_free(BIO *data);
+int BIO_fd_should_retry(int s);
+
+static const BIO_METHOD methods_fdp = {
+    BIO_TYPE_FD,
+    "file descriptor",
+    fd_write,
+    fd_read,
+    fd_puts,
+    fd_gets,
+    fd_ctrl,
+    fd_new,
+    fd_free,
+    NULL,                       /* fd_callback_ctrl */
+};
+
+const BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_fd(void)
+{
+    return (&methods_fdp);
+}
+
+BIO *BIO_new_fd(int fd, int close_flag)
+{
+    BIO *ret;
+    ret = BIO_new(BIO_s_fd());
+    if (ret == NULL)
+        return (NULL);
+    BIO_set_fd(ret, fd, close_flag);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static int fd_new(BIO *bi)
+{
+    bi->init = 0;
+    bi->num = -1;
+    bi->ptr = NULL;
+    bi->flags = BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK; /* essentially redundant */
+    return (1);
+}
+
+static int fd_free(BIO *a)
+{
+    if (a == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    if (a->shutdown) {
+        if (a->init) {
+            UP_close(a->num);
+        }
+        a->init = 0;
+        a->flags = BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK;
+    }
+    return (1);
+}
+
+static int fd_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    if (out != NULL) {
+        clear_sys_error();
+        ret = UP_read(b->num, out, outl);
+        BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+        if (ret <= 0) {
+            if (BIO_fd_should_retry(ret))
+                BIO_set_retry_read(b);
+        }
+    }
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static int fd_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl)
+{
+    int ret;
+    clear_sys_error();
+    ret = UP_write(b->num, in, inl);
+    BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+    if (ret <= 0) {
+        if (BIO_fd_should_retry(ret))
+            BIO_set_retry_write(b);
+    }
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static long fd_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
+{
+    long ret = 1;
+    int *ip;
+
+    switch (cmd) {
+    case BIO_CTRL_RESET:
+        num = 0;
+        /* fall thru */
+    case BIO_C_FILE_SEEK:
+        ret = (long)UP_lseek(b->num, num, 0);
+        break;
+    case BIO_C_FILE_TELL:
+    case BIO_CTRL_INFO:
+        ret = (long)UP_lseek(b->num, 0, 1);
+        break;
+    case BIO_C_SET_FD:
+        fd_free(b);
+        b->num = *((int *)ptr);
+        b->shutdown = (int)num;
+        b->init = 1;
+        break;
+    case BIO_C_GET_FD:
+        if (b->init) {
+            ip = (int *)ptr;
+            if (ip != NULL)
+                *ip = b->num;
+            ret = b->num;
+        } else
+            ret = -1;
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_GET_CLOSE:
+        ret = b->shutdown;
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_SET_CLOSE:
+        b->shutdown = (int)num;
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_PENDING:
+    case BIO_CTRL_WPENDING:
+        ret = 0;
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_DUP:
+    case BIO_CTRL_FLUSH:
+        ret = 1;
+        break;
+    default:
+        ret = 0;
+        break;
+    }
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static int fd_puts(BIO *bp, const char *str)
+{
+    int n, ret;
+
+    n = strlen(str);
+    ret = fd_write(bp, str, n);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static int fd_gets(BIO *bp, char *buf, int size)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    char *ptr = buf;
+    char *end = buf + size - 1;
+
+    while ((ptr < end) && (fd_read(bp, ptr, 1) > 0) && (ptr[0] != '\n'))
+        ptr++;
+
+    ptr[0] = '\0';
+
+    if (buf[0] != '\0')
+        ret = strlen(buf);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+int BIO_fd_should_retry(int i)
+{
+    int err;
+
+    if ((i == 0) || (i == -1)) {
+        err = get_last_sys_error();
+
+        return (BIO_fd_non_fatal_error(err));
+    }
+    return (0);
+}
+
+int BIO_fd_non_fatal_error(int err)
+{
+    switch (err) {
+
+# ifdef EWOULDBLOCK
+#  ifdef WSAEWOULDBLOCK
+#   if WSAEWOULDBLOCK != EWOULDBLOCK
+    case EWOULDBLOCK:
+#   endif
+#  else
+    case EWOULDBLOCK:
+#  endif
+# endif
+
+# if defined(ENOTCONN)
+    case ENOTCONN:
+# endif
+
+# ifdef EINTR
+    case EINTR:
+# endif
+
+# ifdef EAGAIN
+#  if EWOULDBLOCK != EAGAIN
+    case EAGAIN:
+#  endif
+# endif
+
+# ifdef EPROTO
+    case EPROTO:
+# endif
+
+# ifdef EINPROGRESS
+    case EINPROGRESS:
+# endif
+
+# ifdef EALREADY
+    case EALREADY:
+# endif
+        return (1);
+        /* break; */
+    default:
+        break;
+    }
+    return (0);
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bio/bss_file.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bio/bss_file.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2edf244
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bio/bss_file.c
@@ -0,0 +1,424 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*-
+ * 03-Dec-1997  rdenny@dc3.com  Fix bug preventing use of stdin/stdout
+ *              with binary data (e.g. asn1parse -inform DER < xxx) under
+ *              Windows
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_BSS_FILE_C
+# define HEADER_BSS_FILE_C
+
+# if defined(__linux) || defined(__sun) || defined(__hpux)
+/*
+ * Following definition aliases fopen to fopen64 on above mentioned
+ * platforms. This makes it possible to open and sequentially access files
+ * larger than 2GB from 32-bit application. It does not allow to traverse
+ * them beyond 2GB with fseek/ftell, but on the other hand *no* 32-bit
+ * platform permits that, not with fseek/ftell. Not to mention that breaking
+ * 2GB limit for seeking would require surgery to *our* API. But sequential
+ * access suffices for practical cases when you can run into large files,
+ * such as fingerprinting, so we can let API alone. For reference, the list
+ * of 32-bit platforms which allow for sequential access of large files
+ * without extra "magic" comprise *BSD, Darwin, IRIX...
+ */
+#  ifndef _FILE_OFFSET_BITS
+#   define _FILE_OFFSET_BITS 64
+#  endif
+# endif
+
+# include <stdio.h>
+# include <errno.h>
+# include "bio_lcl.h"
+# include <openssl/err.h>
+
+# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_STDIO)
+
+static int file_write(BIO *h, const char *buf, int num);
+static int file_read(BIO *h, char *buf, int size);
+static int file_puts(BIO *h, const char *str);
+static int file_gets(BIO *h, char *str, int size);
+static long file_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, long arg1, void *arg2);
+static int file_new(BIO *h);
+static int file_free(BIO *data);
+static const BIO_METHOD methods_filep = {
+    BIO_TYPE_FILE,
+    "FILE pointer",
+    file_write,
+    file_read,
+    file_puts,
+    file_gets,
+    file_ctrl,
+    file_new,
+    file_free,
+    NULL,                      /* file_callback_ctrl */
+};
+
+BIO *BIO_new_file(const char *filename, const char *mode)
+{
+    BIO  *ret;
+    FILE *file = openssl_fopen(filename, mode);
+    int fp_flags = BIO_CLOSE;
+
+    if (strchr(mode, 'b') == NULL)
+        fp_flags |= BIO_FP_TEXT;
+
+    if (file == NULL) {
+        SYSerr(SYS_F_FOPEN, get_last_sys_error());
+        ERR_add_error_data(5, "fopen('", filename, "','", mode, "')");
+        if (errno == ENOENT
+# ifdef ENXIO
+            || errno == ENXIO
+# endif
+            )
+            BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_NEW_FILE, BIO_R_NO_SUCH_FILE);
+        else
+            BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_NEW_FILE, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+    if ((ret = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL) {
+        fclose(file);
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+
+    BIO_clear_flags(ret, BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK); /* we did fopen -> we disengage
+                                             * UPLINK */
+    BIO_set_fp(ret, file, fp_flags);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+BIO *BIO_new_fp(FILE *stream, int close_flag)
+{
+    BIO *ret;
+
+    if ((ret = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL)
+        return (NULL);
+
+    /* redundant flag, left for documentation purposes */
+    BIO_set_flags(ret, BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK);
+    BIO_set_fp(ret, stream, close_flag);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+const BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_file(void)
+{
+    return (&methods_filep);
+}
+
+static int file_new(BIO *bi)
+{
+    bi->init = 0;
+    bi->num = 0;
+    bi->ptr = NULL;
+    bi->flags = BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK; /* default to UPLINK */
+    return (1);
+}
+
+static int file_free(BIO *a)
+{
+    if (a == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    if (a->shutdown) {
+        if ((a->init) && (a->ptr != NULL)) {
+            if (a->flags & BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK)
+                UP_fclose(a->ptr);
+            else
+                fclose(a->ptr);
+            a->ptr = NULL;
+            a->flags = BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK;
+        }
+        a->init = 0;
+    }
+    return (1);
+}
+
+static int file_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    if (b->init && (out != NULL)) {
+        if (b->flags & BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK)
+            ret = UP_fread(out, 1, (int)outl, b->ptr);
+        else
+            ret = fread(out, 1, (int)outl, (FILE *)b->ptr);
+        if (ret == 0
+            && (b->flags & BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK) ? UP_ferror((FILE *)b->ptr) :
+                                               ferror((FILE *)b->ptr)) {
+            SYSerr(SYS_F_FREAD, get_last_sys_error());
+            BIOerr(BIO_F_FILE_READ, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
+            ret = -1;
+        }
+    }
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static int file_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    if (b->init && (in != NULL)) {
+        if (b->flags & BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK)
+            ret = UP_fwrite(in, (int)inl, 1, b->ptr);
+        else
+            ret = fwrite(in, (int)inl, 1, (FILE *)b->ptr);
+        if (ret)
+            ret = inl;
+        /* ret=fwrite(in,1,(int)inl,(FILE *)b->ptr); */
+        /*
+         * according to Tim Hudson <tjh@cryptsoft.com>, the commented out
+         * version above can cause 'inl' write calls under some stupid stdio
+         * implementations (VMS)
+         */
+    }
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static long file_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
+{
+    long ret = 1;
+    FILE *fp = (FILE *)b->ptr;
+    FILE **fpp;
+    char p[4];
+    int st;
+
+    switch (cmd) {
+    case BIO_C_FILE_SEEK:
+    case BIO_CTRL_RESET:
+        if (b->flags & BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK)
+            ret = (long)UP_fseek(b->ptr, num, 0);
+        else
+            ret = (long)fseek(fp, num, 0);
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_EOF:
+        if (b->flags & BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK)
+            ret = (long)UP_feof(fp);
+        else
+            ret = (long)feof(fp);
+        break;
+    case BIO_C_FILE_TELL:
+    case BIO_CTRL_INFO:
+        if (b->flags & BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK)
+            ret = UP_ftell(b->ptr);
+        else
+            ret = ftell(fp);
+        break;
+    case BIO_C_SET_FILE_PTR:
+        file_free(b);
+        b->shutdown = (int)num & BIO_CLOSE;
+        b->ptr = ptr;
+        b->init = 1;
+#  if BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK!=0
+#   if defined(__MINGW32__) && defined(__MSVCRT__) && !defined(_IOB_ENTRIES)
+#    define _IOB_ENTRIES 20
+#   endif
+        /* Safety net to catch purely internal BIO_set_fp calls */
+#   if defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER>=1900
+        if (ptr == stdin || ptr == stdout || ptr == stderr)
+            BIO_clear_flags(b, BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK);
+#   elif defined(_IOB_ENTRIES)
+        if ((size_t)ptr >= (size_t)stdin &&
+            (size_t)ptr < (size_t)(stdin + _IOB_ENTRIES))
+            BIO_clear_flags(b, BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK);
+#   endif
+#  endif
+#  ifdef UP_fsetmod
+        if (b->flags & BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK)
+            UP_fsetmod(b->ptr, (char)((num & BIO_FP_TEXT) ? 't' : 'b'));
+        else
+#  endif
+        {
+#  if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS)
+            int fd = _fileno((FILE *)ptr);
+            if (num & BIO_FP_TEXT)
+                _setmode(fd, _O_TEXT);
+            else
+                _setmode(fd, _O_BINARY);
+#  elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS)
+            int fd = fileno((FILE *)ptr);
+            /* Set correct text/binary mode */
+            if (num & BIO_FP_TEXT)
+                _setmode(fd, _O_TEXT);
+            /* Dangerous to set stdin/stdout to raw (unless redirected) */
+            else {
+                if (fd == STDIN_FILENO || fd == STDOUT_FILENO) {
+                    if (isatty(fd) <= 0)
+                        _setmode(fd, _O_BINARY);
+                } else
+                    _setmode(fd, _O_BINARY);
+            }
+#  elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32_CYGWIN)
+            int fd = fileno((FILE *)ptr);
+            if (num & BIO_FP_TEXT)
+                setmode(fd, O_TEXT);
+            else
+                setmode(fd, O_BINARY);
+#  endif
+        }
+        break;
+    case BIO_C_SET_FILENAME:
+        file_free(b);
+        b->shutdown = (int)num & BIO_CLOSE;
+        if (num & BIO_FP_APPEND) {
+            if (num & BIO_FP_READ)
+                OPENSSL_strlcpy(p, "a+", sizeof(p));
+            else
+                OPENSSL_strlcpy(p, "a", sizeof(p));
+        } else if ((num & BIO_FP_READ) && (num & BIO_FP_WRITE))
+            OPENSSL_strlcpy(p, "r+", sizeof(p));
+        else if (num & BIO_FP_WRITE)
+            OPENSSL_strlcpy(p, "w", sizeof(p));
+        else if (num & BIO_FP_READ)
+            OPENSSL_strlcpy(p, "r", sizeof(p));
+        else {
+            BIOerr(BIO_F_FILE_CTRL, BIO_R_BAD_FOPEN_MODE);
+            ret = 0;
+            break;
+        }
+#  if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32_CYGWIN)
+        if (!(num & BIO_FP_TEXT))
+            strcat(p, "b");
+        else
+            strcat(p, "t");
+#  endif
+        fp = openssl_fopen(ptr, p);
+        if (fp == NULL) {
+            SYSerr(SYS_F_FOPEN, get_last_sys_error());
+            ERR_add_error_data(5, "fopen('", ptr, "','", p, "')");
+            BIOerr(BIO_F_FILE_CTRL, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
+            ret = 0;
+            break;
+        }
+        b->ptr = fp;
+        b->init = 1;
+        BIO_clear_flags(b, BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK); /* we did fopen -> we disengage
+                                               * UPLINK */
+        break;
+    case BIO_C_GET_FILE_PTR:
+        /* the ptr parameter is actually a FILE ** in this case. */
+        if (ptr != NULL) {
+            fpp = (FILE **)ptr;
+            *fpp = (FILE *)b->ptr;
+        }
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_GET_CLOSE:
+        ret = (long)b->shutdown;
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_SET_CLOSE:
+        b->shutdown = (int)num;
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_FLUSH:
+        st = b->flags & BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK
+                ? UP_fflush(b->ptr) : fflush((FILE *)b->ptr);
+        if (st == EOF) {
+            SYSerr(SYS_F_FFLUSH, get_last_sys_error());
+            ERR_add_error_data(1, "fflush()");
+            BIOerr(BIO_F_FILE_CTRL, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
+            ret = 0;
+        }
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_DUP:
+        ret = 1;
+        break;
+
+    case BIO_CTRL_WPENDING:
+    case BIO_CTRL_PENDING:
+    case BIO_CTRL_PUSH:
+    case BIO_CTRL_POP:
+    default:
+        ret = 0;
+        break;
+    }
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static int file_gets(BIO *bp, char *buf, int size)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    buf[0] = '\0';
+    if (bp->flags & BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK) {
+        if (!UP_fgets(buf, size, bp->ptr))
+            goto err;
+    } else {
+        if (!fgets(buf, size, (FILE *)bp->ptr))
+            goto err;
+    }
+    if (buf[0] != '\0')
+        ret = strlen(buf);
+ err:
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static int file_puts(BIO *bp, const char *str)
+{
+    int n, ret;
+
+    n = strlen(str);
+    ret = file_write(bp, str, n);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+#else
+
+static int file_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl)
+{
+    return -1;
+}
+static int file_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
+{
+    return -1;
+}
+static int file_puts(BIO *bp, const char *str)
+{
+    return -1;
+}
+static int file_gets(BIO *bp, char *buf, int size)
+{
+    return 0;
+}
+static long file_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
+{
+    return 0;
+}
+static int file_new(BIO *bi)
+{
+    return 0;
+}
+static int file_free(BIO *a)
+{
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static const BIO_METHOD methods_filep = {
+    BIO_TYPE_FILE,
+    "FILE pointer",
+    file_write,
+    file_read,
+    file_puts,
+    file_gets,
+    file_ctrl,
+    file_new,
+    file_free,
+    NULL,                      /* file_callback_ctrl */
+};
+
+const BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_file(void)
+{
+    return (&methods_filep);
+}
+
+BIO *BIO_new_file(const char *filename, const char *mode)
+{
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+# endif                         /* OPENSSL_NO_STDIO */
+
+#endif                          /* HEADER_BSS_FILE_C */
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bio/bss_log.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bio/bss_log.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5221acc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bio/bss_log.c
@@ -0,0 +1,407 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Why BIO_s_log?
+ *
+ * BIO_s_log is useful for system daemons (or services under NT). It is
+ * one-way BIO, it sends all stuff to syslogd (on system that commonly use
+ * that), or event log (on NT), or OPCOM (on OpenVMS).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+
+#include "bio_lcl.h"
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE)
+#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32)
+#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
+# include <opcdef.h>
+# include <descrip.h>
+# include <lib$routines.h>
+# include <starlet.h>
+/* Some compiler options may mask the declaration of "_malloc32". */
+# if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE && defined _ANSI_C_SOURCE
+#  if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64
+#   pragma pointer_size save
+#   pragma pointer_size 32
+void *_malloc32(__size_t);
+#   pragma pointer_size restore
+#  endif                        /* __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 */
+# endif                         /* __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE && defined
+                                 * _ANSI_C_SOURCE */
+#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE)
+# define NO_SYSLOG
+#elif (!defined(MSDOS) || defined(WATT32)) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) && !defined(NO_SYSLOG)
+# include <syslog.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+#ifndef NO_SYSLOG
+
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32)
+#  define LOG_EMERG       0
+#  define LOG_ALERT       1
+#  define LOG_CRIT        2
+#  define LOG_ERR         3
+#  define LOG_WARNING     4
+#  define LOG_NOTICE      5
+#  define LOG_INFO        6
+#  define LOG_DEBUG       7
+
+#  define LOG_DAEMON      (3<<3)
+# elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
+/* On VMS, we don't really care about these, but we need them to compile */
+#  define LOG_EMERG       0
+#  define LOG_ALERT       1
+#  define LOG_CRIT        2
+#  define LOG_ERR         3
+#  define LOG_WARNING     4
+#  define LOG_NOTICE      5
+#  define LOG_INFO        6
+#  define LOG_DEBUG       7
+
+#  define LOG_DAEMON      OPC$M_NM_NTWORK
+# endif
+
+static int slg_write(BIO *h, const char *buf, int num);
+static int slg_puts(BIO *h, const char *str);
+static long slg_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, long arg1, void *arg2);
+static int slg_new(BIO *h);
+static int slg_free(BIO *data);
+static void xopenlog(BIO *bp, char *name, int level);
+static void xsyslog(BIO *bp, int priority, const char *string);
+static void xcloselog(BIO *bp);
+
+static const BIO_METHOD methods_slg = {
+    BIO_TYPE_MEM,
+    "syslog",
+    slg_write,
+    NULL,                      /* slg_read,         */
+    slg_puts,
+    NULL,                      /* slg_gets,         */
+    slg_ctrl,
+    slg_new,
+    slg_free,
+    NULL,                      /* slg_callback_ctrl */
+};
+
+const BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_log(void)
+{
+    return (&methods_slg);
+}
+
+static int slg_new(BIO *bi)
+{
+    bi->init = 1;
+    bi->num = 0;
+    bi->ptr = NULL;
+    xopenlog(bi, "application", LOG_DAEMON);
+    return (1);
+}
+
+static int slg_free(BIO *a)
+{
+    if (a == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    xcloselog(a);
+    return (1);
+}
+
+static int slg_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl)
+{
+    int ret = inl;
+    char *buf;
+    char *pp;
+    int priority, i;
+    static const struct {
+        int strl;
+        char str[10];
+        int log_level;
+    } mapping[] = {
+        {
+            6, "PANIC ", LOG_EMERG
+        },
+        {
+            6, "EMERG ", LOG_EMERG
+        },
+        {
+            4, "EMR ", LOG_EMERG
+        },
+        {
+            6, "ALERT ", LOG_ALERT
+        },
+        {
+            4, "ALR ", LOG_ALERT
+        },
+        {
+            5, "CRIT ", LOG_CRIT
+        },
+        {
+            4, "CRI ", LOG_CRIT
+        },
+        {
+            6, "ERROR ", LOG_ERR
+        },
+        {
+            4, "ERR ", LOG_ERR
+        },
+        {
+            8, "WARNING ", LOG_WARNING
+        },
+        {
+            5, "WARN ", LOG_WARNING
+        },
+        {
+            4, "WAR ", LOG_WARNING
+        },
+        {
+            7, "NOTICE ", LOG_NOTICE
+        },
+        {
+            5, "NOTE ", LOG_NOTICE
+        },
+        {
+            4, "NOT ", LOG_NOTICE
+        },
+        {
+            5, "INFO ", LOG_INFO
+        },
+        {
+            4, "INF ", LOG_INFO
+        },
+        {
+            6, "DEBUG ", LOG_DEBUG
+        },
+        {
+            4, "DBG ", LOG_DEBUG
+        },
+        {
+            0, "", LOG_ERR
+        }
+        /* The default */
+    };
+
+    if ((buf = OPENSSL_malloc(inl + 1)) == NULL) {
+        return (0);
+    }
+    strncpy(buf, in, inl);
+    buf[inl] = '\0';
+
+    i = 0;
+    while (strncmp(buf, mapping[i].str, mapping[i].strl) != 0)
+        i++;
+    priority = mapping[i].log_level;
+    pp = buf + mapping[i].strl;
+
+    xsyslog(b, priority, pp);
+
+    OPENSSL_free(buf);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static long slg_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
+{
+    switch (cmd) {
+    case BIO_CTRL_SET:
+        xcloselog(b);
+        xopenlog(b, ptr, num);
+        break;
+    default:
+        break;
+    }
+    return (0);
+}
+
+static int slg_puts(BIO *bp, const char *str)
+{
+    int n, ret;
+
+    n = strlen(str);
+    ret = slg_write(bp, str, n);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32)
+
+static void xopenlog(BIO *bp, char *name, int level)
+{
+    if (check_winnt())
+        bp->ptr = RegisterEventSourceA(NULL, name);
+    else
+        bp->ptr = NULL;
+}
+
+static void xsyslog(BIO *bp, int priority, const char *string)
+{
+    LPCSTR lpszStrings[2];
+    WORD evtype = EVENTLOG_ERROR_TYPE;
+    char pidbuf[DECIMAL_SIZE(DWORD) + 4];
+
+    if (bp->ptr == NULL)
+        return;
+
+    switch (priority) {
+    case LOG_EMERG:
+    case LOG_ALERT:
+    case LOG_CRIT:
+    case LOG_ERR:
+        evtype = EVENTLOG_ERROR_TYPE;
+        break;
+    case LOG_WARNING:
+        evtype = EVENTLOG_WARNING_TYPE;
+        break;
+    case LOG_NOTICE:
+    case LOG_INFO:
+    case LOG_DEBUG:
+        evtype = EVENTLOG_INFORMATION_TYPE;
+        break;
+    default:
+        /*
+         * Should never happen, but set it
+         * as error anyway.
+         */
+        evtype = EVENTLOG_ERROR_TYPE;
+        break;
+    }
+
+    sprintf(pidbuf, "[%lu] ", GetCurrentProcessId());
+    lpszStrings[0] = pidbuf;
+    lpszStrings[1] = string;
+
+    ReportEventA(bp->ptr, evtype, 0, 1024, NULL, 2, 0, lpszStrings, NULL);
+}
+
+static void xcloselog(BIO *bp)
+{
+    if (bp->ptr)
+        DeregisterEventSource((HANDLE) (bp->ptr));
+    bp->ptr = NULL;
+}
+
+# elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
+
+static int VMS_OPC_target = LOG_DAEMON;
+
+static void xopenlog(BIO *bp, char *name, int level)
+{
+    VMS_OPC_target = level;
+}
+
+static void xsyslog(BIO *bp, int priority, const char *string)
+{
+    struct dsc$descriptor_s opc_dsc;
+
+/* Arrange 32-bit pointer to opcdef buffer and malloc(), if needed. */
+#  if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64
+#   pragma pointer_size save
+#   pragma pointer_size 32
+#   define OPCDEF_TYPE __char_ptr32
+#   define OPCDEF_MALLOC _malloc32
+#  else                         /* __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 */
+#   define OPCDEF_TYPE char *
+#   define OPCDEF_MALLOC OPENSSL_malloc
+#  endif                        /* __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 [else] */
+
+    struct opcdef *opcdef_p;
+
+#  if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64
+#   pragma pointer_size restore
+#  endif                        /* __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 */
+
+    char buf[10240];
+    unsigned int len;
+    struct dsc$descriptor_s buf_dsc;
+    $DESCRIPTOR(fao_cmd, "!AZ: !AZ");
+    char *priority_tag;
+
+    switch (priority) {
+    case LOG_EMERG:
+        priority_tag = "Emergency";
+        break;
+    case LOG_ALERT:
+        priority_tag = "Alert";
+        break;
+    case LOG_CRIT:
+        priority_tag = "Critical";
+        break;
+    case LOG_ERR:
+        priority_tag = "Error";
+        break;
+    case LOG_WARNING:
+        priority_tag = "Warning";
+        break;
+    case LOG_NOTICE:
+        priority_tag = "Notice";
+        break;
+    case LOG_INFO:
+        priority_tag = "Info";
+        break;
+    case LOG_DEBUG:
+        priority_tag = "DEBUG";
+        break;
+    }
+
+    buf_dsc.dsc$b_dtype = DSC$K_DTYPE_T;
+    buf_dsc.dsc$b_class = DSC$K_CLASS_S;
+    buf_dsc.dsc$a_pointer = buf;
+    buf_dsc.dsc$w_length = sizeof(buf) - 1;
+
+    lib$sys_fao(&fao_cmd, &len, &buf_dsc, priority_tag, string);
+
+    /* We know there's an 8-byte header.  That's documented. */
+    opcdef_p = OPCDEF_MALLOC(8 + len);
+    opcdef_p->opc$b_ms_type = OPC$_RQ_RQST;
+    memcpy(opcdef_p->opc$z_ms_target_classes, &VMS_OPC_target, 3);
+    opcdef_p->opc$l_ms_rqstid = 0;
+    memcpy(&opcdef_p->opc$l_ms_text, buf, len);
+
+    opc_dsc.dsc$b_dtype = DSC$K_DTYPE_T;
+    opc_dsc.dsc$b_class = DSC$K_CLASS_S;
+    opc_dsc.dsc$a_pointer = (OPCDEF_TYPE) opcdef_p;
+    opc_dsc.dsc$w_length = len + 8;
+
+    sys$sndopr(opc_dsc, 0);
+
+    OPENSSL_free(opcdef_p);
+}
+
+static void xcloselog(BIO *bp)
+{
+}
+
+# else                          /* Unix/Watt32 */
+
+static void xopenlog(BIO *bp, char *name, int level)
+{
+#  ifdef WATT32                 /* djgpp/DOS */
+    openlog(name, LOG_PID | LOG_CONS | LOG_NDELAY, level);
+#  else
+    openlog(name, LOG_PID | LOG_CONS, level);
+#  endif
+}
+
+static void xsyslog(BIO *bp, int priority, const char *string)
+{
+    syslog(priority, "%s", string);
+}
+
+static void xcloselog(BIO *bp)
+{
+    closelog();
+}
+
+# endif                         /* Unix */
+
+#endif                          /* NO_SYSLOG */
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bio/bss_mem.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bio/bss_mem.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ff9a3eb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bio/bss_mem.c
@@ -0,0 +1,347 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include "bio_lcl.h"
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+
+static int mem_write(BIO *h, const char *buf, int num);
+static int mem_read(BIO *h, char *buf, int size);
+static int mem_puts(BIO *h, const char *str);
+static int mem_gets(BIO *h, char *str, int size);
+static long mem_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, long arg1, void *arg2);
+static int mem_new(BIO *h);
+static int secmem_new(BIO *h);
+static int mem_free(BIO *data);
+static int mem_buf_free(BIO *data, int free_all);
+static int mem_buf_sync(BIO *h);
+
+static const BIO_METHOD mem_method = {
+    BIO_TYPE_MEM,
+    "memory buffer",
+    mem_write,
+    mem_read,
+    mem_puts,
+    mem_gets,
+    mem_ctrl,
+    mem_new,
+    mem_free,
+    NULL,                      /* mem_callback_ctrl */
+};
+
+static const BIO_METHOD secmem_method = {
+    BIO_TYPE_MEM,
+    "secure memory buffer",
+    mem_write,
+    mem_read,
+    mem_puts,
+    mem_gets,
+    mem_ctrl,
+    secmem_new,
+    mem_free,
+    NULL,                      /* mem_callback_ctrl */
+};
+
+/* BIO memory stores buffer and read pointer  */
+typedef struct bio_buf_mem_st {
+    struct buf_mem_st *buf;   /* allocated buffer */
+    struct buf_mem_st *readp; /* read pointer */
+} BIO_BUF_MEM;
+
+/*
+ * bio->num is used to hold the value to return on 'empty', if it is 0,
+ * should_retry is not set
+ */
+
+const BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_mem(void)
+{
+    return (&mem_method);
+}
+
+const BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_secmem(void)
+{
+    return(&secmem_method);
+}
+
+BIO *BIO_new_mem_buf(const void *buf, int len)
+{
+    BIO *ret;
+    BUF_MEM *b;
+    BIO_BUF_MEM *bb;
+    size_t sz;
+
+    if (buf == NULL) {
+        BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_NEW_MEM_BUF, BIO_R_NULL_PARAMETER);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    sz = (len < 0) ? strlen(buf) : (size_t)len;
+    if ((ret = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem())) == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    bb = (BIO_BUF_MEM *)ret->ptr;
+    b = bb->buf;
+    /* Cast away const and trust in the MEM_RDONLY flag. */
+    b->data = (void *)buf;
+    b->length = sz;
+    b->max = sz;
+    *bb->readp = *bb->buf;
+    ret->flags |= BIO_FLAGS_MEM_RDONLY;
+    /* Since this is static data retrying won't help */
+    ret->num = 0;
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int mem_init(BIO *bi, unsigned long flags)
+{
+    BIO_BUF_MEM *bb = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*bb));
+
+    if (bb == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    if ((bb->buf = BUF_MEM_new_ex(flags)) == NULL) {
+        OPENSSL_free(bb);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if ((bb->readp = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*bb->readp))) == NULL) {
+        BUF_MEM_free(bb->buf);
+        OPENSSL_free(bb);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    *bb->readp = *bb->buf;
+    bi->shutdown = 1;
+    bi->init = 1;
+    bi->num = -1;
+    bi->ptr = (char *)bb;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int mem_new(BIO *bi)
+{
+    return (mem_init(bi, 0L));
+}
+
+static int secmem_new(BIO *bi)
+{
+    return (mem_init(bi, BUF_MEM_FLAG_SECURE));
+}
+
+static int mem_free(BIO *a)
+{
+    return (mem_buf_free(a, 1));
+}
+
+static int mem_buf_free(BIO *a, int free_all)
+{
+    if (a == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    if (a->shutdown) {
+        if ((a->init) && (a->ptr != NULL)) {
+            BUF_MEM *b;
+            BIO_BUF_MEM *bb = (BIO_BUF_MEM *)a->ptr;
+
+            if (bb != NULL) {
+                b = bb->buf;
+                if (a->flags & BIO_FLAGS_MEM_RDONLY)
+                    b->data = NULL;
+                BUF_MEM_free(b);
+                if (free_all) {
+                    OPENSSL_free(bb->readp);
+                    OPENSSL_free(bb);
+                }
+            }
+            a->ptr = NULL;
+        }
+    }
+    return (1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Reallocate memory buffer if read pointer differs
+ */
+static int mem_buf_sync(BIO *b)
+{
+    if (b != NULL && b->init != 0 && b->ptr != NULL) {
+        BIO_BUF_MEM *bbm = (BIO_BUF_MEM *)b->ptr;
+
+        if (bbm->readp->data != bbm->buf->data) {
+            memmove(bbm->buf->data, bbm->readp->data, bbm->readp->length);
+            bbm->buf->length = bbm->readp->length;
+            bbm->readp->data = bbm->buf->data;
+        }
+    }
+    return (0);
+}
+
+static int mem_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
+{
+    int ret = -1;
+    BIO_BUF_MEM *bbm = (BIO_BUF_MEM *)b->ptr;
+    BUF_MEM *bm = bbm->readp;
+
+    BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+    ret = (outl >= 0 && (size_t)outl > bm->length) ? (int)bm->length : outl;
+    if ((out != NULL) && (ret > 0)) {
+        memcpy(out, bm->data, ret);
+        bm->length -= ret;
+        bm->data += ret;
+    } else if (bm->length == 0) {
+        ret = b->num;
+        if (ret != 0)
+            BIO_set_retry_read(b);
+    }
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static int mem_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl)
+{
+    int ret = -1;
+    int blen;
+    BIO_BUF_MEM *bbm = (BIO_BUF_MEM *)b->ptr;
+
+    if (in == NULL) {
+        BIOerr(BIO_F_MEM_WRITE, BIO_R_NULL_PARAMETER);
+        goto end;
+    }
+    if (b->flags & BIO_FLAGS_MEM_RDONLY) {
+        BIOerr(BIO_F_MEM_WRITE, BIO_R_WRITE_TO_READ_ONLY_BIO);
+        goto end;
+    }
+    BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+    blen = bbm->readp->length;
+    mem_buf_sync(b);
+    if (BUF_MEM_grow_clean(bbm->buf, blen + inl) == 0)
+        goto end;
+    memcpy(bbm->buf->data + blen, in, inl);
+    *bbm->readp = *bbm->buf;
+    ret = inl;
+ end:
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static long mem_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
+{
+    long ret = 1;
+    char **pptr;
+    BIO_BUF_MEM *bbm = (BIO_BUF_MEM *)b->ptr;
+    BUF_MEM *bm;
+
+    switch (cmd) {
+    case BIO_CTRL_RESET:
+        bm = bbm->buf;
+        if (bm->data != NULL) {
+            /* For read only case reset to the start again */
+            if ((b->flags & BIO_FLAGS_MEM_RDONLY) || (b->flags & BIO_FLAGS_NONCLEAR_RST)) {
+                bm->length = bm->max;
+            } else {
+                memset(bm->data, 0, bm->max);
+                bm->length = 0;
+            }
+            *bbm->readp = *bbm->buf;
+        }
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_EOF:
+        bm = bbm->readp;
+        ret = (long)(bm->length == 0);
+        break;
+    case BIO_C_SET_BUF_MEM_EOF_RETURN:
+        b->num = (int)num;
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_INFO:
+        bm = bbm->readp;
+        ret = (long)bm->length;
+        if (ptr != NULL) {
+            pptr = (char **)ptr;
+            *pptr = (char *)&(bm->data[0]);
+        }
+        break;
+    case BIO_C_SET_BUF_MEM:
+        mem_buf_free(b, 0);
+        b->shutdown = (int)num;
+        bbm->buf = ptr;
+        *bbm->readp = *bbm->buf;
+        b->ptr = bbm;
+        break;
+    case BIO_C_GET_BUF_MEM_PTR:
+        if (ptr != NULL) {
+            mem_buf_sync(b);
+            bm = bbm->readp;
+            pptr = (char **)ptr;
+            *pptr = (char *)bm;
+        }
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_GET_CLOSE:
+        ret = (long)b->shutdown;
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_SET_CLOSE:
+        b->shutdown = (int)num;
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_WPENDING:
+        ret = 0L;
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_PENDING:
+        bm = bbm->readp;
+        ret = (long)bm->length;
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_DUP:
+    case BIO_CTRL_FLUSH:
+        ret = 1;
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_PUSH:
+    case BIO_CTRL_POP:
+    default:
+        ret = 0;
+        break;
+    }
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static int mem_gets(BIO *bp, char *buf, int size)
+{
+    int i, j;
+    int ret = -1;
+    char *p;
+    BIO_BUF_MEM *bbm = (BIO_BUF_MEM *)bp->ptr;
+    BUF_MEM *bm = bbm->readp;
+
+    BIO_clear_retry_flags(bp);
+    j = bm->length;
+    if ((size - 1) < j)
+        j = size - 1;
+    if (j <= 0) {
+        *buf = '\0';
+        return 0;
+    }
+    p = bm->data;
+    for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
+        if (p[i] == '\n') {
+            i++;
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * i is now the max num of bytes to copy, either j or up to
+     * and including the first newline
+     */
+
+    i = mem_read(bp, buf, i);
+    if (i > 0)
+        buf[i] = '\0';
+    ret = i;
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static int mem_puts(BIO *bp, const char *str)
+{
+    int n, ret;
+
+    n = strlen(str);
+    ret = mem_write(bp, str, n);
+    /* memory semantics is that it will always work */
+    return (ret);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bio/bss_null.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bio/bss_null.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..56f95f9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bio/bss_null.c
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include "bio_lcl.h"
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+
+static int null_write(BIO *h, const char *buf, int num);
+static int null_read(BIO *h, char *buf, int size);
+static int null_puts(BIO *h, const char *str);
+static int null_gets(BIO *h, char *str, int size);
+static long null_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, long arg1, void *arg2);
+static const BIO_METHOD null_method = {
+    BIO_TYPE_NULL,
+    "NULL",
+    null_write,
+    null_read,
+    null_puts,
+    null_gets,
+    null_ctrl,
+    NULL,
+    NULL,
+    NULL,                     /* null_callback_ctrl */
+};
+
+const BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_null(void)
+{
+    return (&null_method);
+}
+
+static int null_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
+{
+    return (0);
+}
+
+static int null_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl)
+{
+    return (inl);
+}
+
+static long null_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
+{
+    long ret = 1;
+
+    switch (cmd) {
+    case BIO_CTRL_RESET:
+    case BIO_CTRL_EOF:
+    case BIO_CTRL_SET:
+    case BIO_CTRL_SET_CLOSE:
+    case BIO_CTRL_FLUSH:
+    case BIO_CTRL_DUP:
+        ret = 1;
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_GET_CLOSE:
+    case BIO_CTRL_INFO:
+    case BIO_CTRL_GET:
+    case BIO_CTRL_PENDING:
+    case BIO_CTRL_WPENDING:
+    default:
+        ret = 0;
+        break;
+    }
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static int null_gets(BIO *bp, char *buf, int size)
+{
+    return (0);
+}
+
+static int null_puts(BIO *bp, const char *str)
+{
+    if (str == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    return (strlen(str));
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bio/bss_sock.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bio/bss_sock.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..992266d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bio/bss_sock.c
@@ -0,0 +1,231 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#define USE_SOCKETS
+#include "bio_lcl.h"
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
+
+# include <openssl/bio.h>
+
+# ifdef WATT32
+/* Watt-32 uses same names */
+#  undef sock_write
+#  undef sock_read
+#  undef sock_puts
+#  define sock_write SockWrite
+#  define sock_read  SockRead
+#  define sock_puts  SockPuts
+# endif
+
+static int sock_write(BIO *h, const char *buf, int num);
+static int sock_read(BIO *h, char *buf, int size);
+static int sock_puts(BIO *h, const char *str);
+static long sock_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, long arg1, void *arg2);
+static int sock_new(BIO *h);
+static int sock_free(BIO *data);
+int BIO_sock_should_retry(int s);
+
+static const BIO_METHOD methods_sockp = {
+    BIO_TYPE_SOCKET,
+    "socket",
+    sock_write,
+    sock_read,
+    sock_puts,
+    NULL,                       /* sock_gets,         */
+    sock_ctrl,
+    sock_new,
+    sock_free,
+    NULL,                       /* sock_callback_ctrl */
+};
+
+const BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_socket(void)
+{
+    return (&methods_sockp);
+}
+
+BIO *BIO_new_socket(int fd, int close_flag)
+{
+    BIO *ret;
+
+    ret = BIO_new(BIO_s_socket());
+    if (ret == NULL)
+        return (NULL);
+    BIO_set_fd(ret, fd, close_flag);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static int sock_new(BIO *bi)
+{
+    bi->init = 0;
+    bi->num = 0;
+    bi->ptr = NULL;
+    bi->flags = 0;
+    return (1);
+}
+
+static int sock_free(BIO *a)
+{
+    if (a == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    if (a->shutdown) {
+        if (a->init) {
+            BIO_closesocket(a->num);
+        }
+        a->init = 0;
+        a->flags = 0;
+    }
+    return (1);
+}
+
+static int sock_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    if (out != NULL) {
+        clear_socket_error();
+        ret = readsocket(b->num, out, outl);
+        BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+        if (ret <= 0) {
+            if (BIO_sock_should_retry(ret))
+                BIO_set_retry_read(b);
+        }
+    }
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static int sock_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl)
+{
+    int ret;
+
+    clear_socket_error();
+    ret = writesocket(b->num, in, inl);
+    BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+    if (ret <= 0) {
+        if (BIO_sock_should_retry(ret))
+            BIO_set_retry_write(b);
+    }
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static long sock_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
+{
+    long ret = 1;
+    int *ip;
+
+    switch (cmd) {
+    case BIO_C_SET_FD:
+        sock_free(b);
+        b->num = *((int *)ptr);
+        b->shutdown = (int)num;
+        b->init = 1;
+        break;
+    case BIO_C_GET_FD:
+        if (b->init) {
+            ip = (int *)ptr;
+            if (ip != NULL)
+                *ip = b->num;
+            ret = b->num;
+        } else
+            ret = -1;
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_GET_CLOSE:
+        ret = b->shutdown;
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_SET_CLOSE:
+        b->shutdown = (int)num;
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_DUP:
+    case BIO_CTRL_FLUSH:
+        ret = 1;
+        break;
+    default:
+        ret = 0;
+        break;
+    }
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static int sock_puts(BIO *bp, const char *str)
+{
+    int n, ret;
+
+    n = strlen(str);
+    ret = sock_write(bp, str, n);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+int BIO_sock_should_retry(int i)
+{
+    int err;
+
+    if ((i == 0) || (i == -1)) {
+        err = get_last_socket_error();
+
+        return (BIO_sock_non_fatal_error(err));
+    }
+    return (0);
+}
+
+int BIO_sock_non_fatal_error(int err)
+{
+    switch (err) {
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS)
+#  if defined(WSAEWOULDBLOCK)
+    case WSAEWOULDBLOCK:
+#  endif
+# endif
+
+# ifdef EWOULDBLOCK
+#  ifdef WSAEWOULDBLOCK
+#   if WSAEWOULDBLOCK != EWOULDBLOCK
+    case EWOULDBLOCK:
+#   endif
+#  else
+    case EWOULDBLOCK:
+#  endif
+# endif
+
+# if defined(ENOTCONN)
+    case ENOTCONN:
+# endif
+
+# ifdef EINTR
+    case EINTR:
+# endif
+
+# ifdef EAGAIN
+#  if EWOULDBLOCK != EAGAIN
+    case EAGAIN:
+#  endif
+# endif
+
+# ifdef EPROTO
+    case EPROTO:
+# endif
+
+# ifdef EINPROGRESS
+    case EINPROGRESS:
+# endif
+
+# ifdef EALREADY
+    case EALREADY:
+# endif
+        return (1);
+        /* break; */
+    default:
+        break;
+    }
+    return (0);
+}
+
+#endif                          /* #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK */
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bio/build.info b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bio/build.info
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d1e7d73
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bio/build.info
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+LIBS=../../libcrypto
+SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
+        bio_lib.c bio_cb.c bio_err.c \
+        bss_mem.c bss_null.c bss_fd.c \
+        bss_file.c bss_sock.c bss_conn.c \
+        bf_null.c bf_buff.c b_print.c b_dump.c b_addr.c \
+        b_sock.c b_sock2.c bss_acpt.c bf_nbio.c bss_log.c bss_bio.c \
+        bss_dgram.c bio_meth.c bf_lbuf.c
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/blake2/blake2_impl.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/blake2/blake2_impl.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8fe5c95
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/blake2/blake2_impl.h
@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Derived from the BLAKE2 reference implementation written by Samuel Neves.
+ * Copyright 2012, Samuel Neves <sneves@dei.uc.pt>
+ * More information about the BLAKE2 hash function and its implementations
+ * can be found at https://blake2.net.
+ */
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include "e_os.h"
+
+static ossl_inline uint32_t load32(const uint8_t *src)
+{
+    const union {
+        long one;
+        char little;
+    } is_endian = { 1 };
+
+    if (is_endian.little) {
+        uint32_t w;
+        memcpy(&w, src, sizeof(w));
+        return w;
+    } else {
+        uint32_t w = ((uint32_t)src[0])
+                   | ((uint32_t)src[1] <<  8)
+                   | ((uint32_t)src[2] << 16)
+                   | ((uint32_t)src[3] << 24);
+        return w;
+    }
+}
+
+static ossl_inline uint64_t load64(const uint8_t *src)
+{
+    const union {
+        long one;
+        char little;
+    } is_endian = { 1 };
+
+    if (is_endian.little) {
+        uint64_t w;
+        memcpy(&w, src, sizeof(w));
+        return w;
+    } else {
+        uint64_t w = ((uint64_t)src[0])
+                   | ((uint64_t)src[1] <<  8)
+                   | ((uint64_t)src[2] << 16)
+                   | ((uint64_t)src[3] << 24)
+                   | ((uint64_t)src[4] << 32)
+                   | ((uint64_t)src[5] << 40)
+                   | ((uint64_t)src[6] << 48)
+                   | ((uint64_t)src[7] << 56);
+        return w;
+    }
+}
+
+static ossl_inline void store32(uint8_t *dst, uint32_t w)
+{
+    const union {
+        long one;
+        char little;
+    } is_endian = { 1 };
+
+    if (is_endian.little) {
+        memcpy(dst, &w, sizeof(w));
+    } else {
+        uint8_t *p = (uint8_t *)dst;
+        int i;
+
+        for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
+            p[i] = (uint8_t)(w >> (8 * i));
+    }
+}
+
+static ossl_inline void store64(uint8_t *dst, uint64_t w)
+{
+    const union {
+        long one;
+        char little;
+    } is_endian = { 1 };
+
+    if (is_endian.little) {
+        memcpy(dst, &w, sizeof(w));
+    } else {
+        uint8_t *p = (uint8_t *)dst;
+        int i;
+
+        for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
+            p[i] = (uint8_t)(w >> (8 * i));
+    }
+}
+
+static ossl_inline uint64_t load48(const uint8_t *src)
+{
+    uint64_t w = ((uint64_t)src[0])
+               | ((uint64_t)src[1] <<  8)
+               | ((uint64_t)src[2] << 16)
+               | ((uint64_t)src[3] << 24)
+               | ((uint64_t)src[4] << 32)
+               | ((uint64_t)src[5] << 40);
+    return w;
+}
+
+static ossl_inline void store48(uint8_t *dst, uint64_t w)
+{
+    uint8_t *p = (uint8_t *)dst;
+    p[0] = (uint8_t)w;
+    p[1] = (uint8_t)(w>>8);
+    p[2] = (uint8_t)(w>>16);
+    p[3] = (uint8_t)(w>>24);
+    p[4] = (uint8_t)(w>>32);
+    p[5] = (uint8_t)(w>>40);
+}
+
+static ossl_inline uint32_t rotr32(const uint32_t w, const unsigned int c)
+{
+    return (w >> c) | (w << (32 - c));
+}
+
+static ossl_inline uint64_t rotr64(const uint64_t w, const unsigned int c)
+{
+    return (w >> c) | (w << (64 - c));
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/blake2/blake2_locl.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/blake2/blake2_locl.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fb7beb9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/blake2/blake2_locl.h
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Derived from the BLAKE2 reference implementation written by Samuel Neves.
+ * Copyright 2012, Samuel Neves <sneves@dei.uc.pt>
+ * More information about the BLAKE2 hash function and its implementations
+ * can be found at https://blake2.net.
+ */
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include "e_os.h"
+
+#define BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES    64
+#define BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES      32
+#define BLAKE2S_KEYBYTES      32
+#define BLAKE2S_SALTBYTES     8
+#define BLAKE2S_PERSONALBYTES 8
+
+#define BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES    128
+#define BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES      64
+#define BLAKE2B_KEYBYTES      64
+#define BLAKE2B_SALTBYTES     16
+#define BLAKE2B_PERSONALBYTES 16
+
+struct blake2s_param_st {
+    uint8_t  digest_length; /* 1 */
+    uint8_t  key_length;    /* 2 */
+    uint8_t  fanout;        /* 3 */
+    uint8_t  depth;         /* 4 */
+    uint8_t  leaf_length[4];/* 8 */
+    uint8_t  node_offset[6];/* 14 */
+    uint8_t  node_depth;    /* 15 */
+    uint8_t  inner_length;  /* 16 */
+    uint8_t  salt[BLAKE2S_SALTBYTES]; /* 24 */
+    uint8_t  personal[BLAKE2S_PERSONALBYTES];  /* 32 */
+};
+
+typedef struct blake2s_param_st BLAKE2S_PARAM;
+
+struct blake2s_ctx_st {
+    uint32_t h[8];
+    uint32_t t[2];
+    uint32_t f[2];
+    uint8_t  buf[BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES];
+    size_t   buflen;
+};
+
+struct blake2b_param_st {
+    uint8_t  digest_length; /* 1 */
+    uint8_t  key_length;    /* 2 */
+    uint8_t  fanout;        /* 3 */
+    uint8_t  depth;         /* 4 */
+    uint8_t  leaf_length[4];/* 8 */
+    uint8_t  node_offset[8];/* 16 */
+    uint8_t  node_depth;    /* 17 */
+    uint8_t  inner_length;  /* 18 */
+    uint8_t  reserved[14];  /* 32 */
+    uint8_t  salt[BLAKE2B_SALTBYTES]; /* 48 */
+    uint8_t  personal[BLAKE2B_PERSONALBYTES];  /* 64 */
+};
+
+typedef struct blake2b_param_st BLAKE2B_PARAM;
+
+struct blake2b_ctx_st {
+    uint64_t h[8];
+    uint64_t t[2];
+    uint64_t f[2];
+    uint8_t  buf[BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES];
+    size_t   buflen;
+};
+
+#define BLAKE2B_DIGEST_LENGTH 64
+#define BLAKE2S_DIGEST_LENGTH 32
+
+typedef struct blake2s_ctx_st BLAKE2S_CTX;
+typedef struct blake2b_ctx_st BLAKE2B_CTX;
+
+int BLAKE2b_Init(BLAKE2B_CTX *c);
+int BLAKE2b_Update(BLAKE2B_CTX *c, const void *data, size_t datalen);
+int BLAKE2b_Final(unsigned char *md, BLAKE2B_CTX *c);
+
+int BLAKE2s_Init(BLAKE2S_CTX *c);
+int BLAKE2s_Update(BLAKE2S_CTX *c, const void *data, size_t datalen);
+int BLAKE2s_Final(unsigned char *md, BLAKE2S_CTX *c);
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/blake2/blake2b.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/blake2/blake2b.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e77bd9a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/blake2/blake2b.c
@@ -0,0 +1,270 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Derived from the BLAKE2 reference implementation written by Samuel Neves.
+ * Copyright 2012, Samuel Neves <sneves@dei.uc.pt>
+ * More information about the BLAKE2 hash function and its implementations
+ * can be found at https://blake2.net.
+ */
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include "e_os.h"
+
+#include "blake2_locl.h"
+#include "blake2_impl.h"
+
+static const uint64_t blake2b_IV[8] =
+{
+    0x6a09e667f3bcc908U, 0xbb67ae8584caa73bU,
+    0x3c6ef372fe94f82bU, 0xa54ff53a5f1d36f1U,
+    0x510e527fade682d1U, 0x9b05688c2b3e6c1fU,
+    0x1f83d9abfb41bd6bU, 0x5be0cd19137e2179U
+};
+
+static const uint8_t blake2b_sigma[12][16] =
+{
+    {  0,  1,  2,  3,  4,  5,  6,  7,  8,  9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 } ,
+    { 14, 10,  4,  8,  9, 15, 13,  6,  1, 12,  0,  2, 11,  7,  5,  3 } ,
+    { 11,  8, 12,  0,  5,  2, 15, 13, 10, 14,  3,  6,  7,  1,  9,  4 } ,
+    {  7,  9,  3,  1, 13, 12, 11, 14,  2,  6,  5, 10,  4,  0, 15,  8 } ,
+    {  9,  0,  5,  7,  2,  4, 10, 15, 14,  1, 11, 12,  6,  8,  3, 13 } ,
+    {  2, 12,  6, 10,  0, 11,  8,  3,  4, 13,  7,  5, 15, 14,  1,  9 } ,
+    { 12,  5,  1, 15, 14, 13,  4, 10,  0,  7,  6,  3,  9,  2,  8, 11 } ,
+    { 13, 11,  7, 14, 12,  1,  3,  9,  5,  0, 15,  4,  8,  6,  2, 10 } ,
+    {  6, 15, 14,  9, 11,  3,  0,  8, 12,  2, 13,  7,  1,  4, 10,  5 } ,
+    { 10,  2,  8,  4,  7,  6,  1,  5, 15, 11,  9, 14,  3, 12, 13 , 0 } ,
+    {  0,  1,  2,  3,  4,  5,  6,  7,  8,  9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 } ,
+    { 14, 10,  4,  8,  9, 15, 13,  6,  1, 12,  0,  2, 11,  7,  5,  3 }
+};
+
+/* Set that it's the last block we'll compress */
+static ossl_inline void blake2b_set_lastblock(BLAKE2B_CTX *S)
+{
+    S->f[0] = -1;
+}
+
+/* Initialize the hashing state. */
+static ossl_inline void blake2b_init0(BLAKE2B_CTX *S)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    memset(S, 0, sizeof(BLAKE2B_CTX));
+    for (i = 0; i < 8; ++i) {
+        S->h[i] = blake2b_IV[i];
+    }
+}
+
+/* init xors IV with input parameter block */
+static void blake2b_init_param(BLAKE2B_CTX *S, const BLAKE2B_PARAM *P)
+{
+    size_t i;
+    const uint8_t *p = (const uint8_t *)(P);
+    blake2b_init0(S);
+
+    /* The param struct is carefully hand packed, and should be 64 bytes on
+     * every platform. */
+    assert(sizeof(BLAKE2B_PARAM) == 64);
+    /* IV XOR ParamBlock */
+    for (i = 0; i < 8; ++i) {
+        S->h[i] ^= load64(p + sizeof(S->h[i]) * i);
+    }
+}
+
+/* Initialize the hashing context.  Always returns 1. */
+int BLAKE2b_Init(BLAKE2B_CTX *c)
+{
+    BLAKE2B_PARAM P[1];
+    P->digest_length = BLAKE2B_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+    P->key_length    = 0;
+    P->fanout        = 1;
+    P->depth         = 1;
+    store32(P->leaf_length, 0);
+    store64(P->node_offset, 0);
+    P->node_depth    = 0;
+    P->inner_length  = 0;
+    memset(P->reserved, 0, sizeof(P->reserved));
+    memset(P->salt,     0, sizeof(P->salt));
+    memset(P->personal, 0, sizeof(P->personal));
+    blake2b_init_param(c, P);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Permute the state while xoring in the block of data. */
+static void blake2b_compress(BLAKE2B_CTX *S,
+                            const uint8_t *blocks,
+                            size_t len)
+{
+    uint64_t m[16];
+    uint64_t v[16];
+    int i;
+    size_t increment;
+
+    /*
+     * There are two distinct usage vectors for this function:
+     *
+     * a) BLAKE2b_Update uses it to process complete blocks,
+     *    possibly more than one at a time;
+     *
+     * b) BLAK2b_Final uses it to process last block, always
+     *    single but possibly incomplete, in which case caller
+     *    pads input with zeros.
+     */
+    assert(len < BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES || len % BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES == 0);
+
+    /*
+     * Since last block is always processed with separate call,
+     * |len| not being multiple of complete blocks can be observed
+     * only with |len| being less than BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES ("less"
+     * including even zero), which is why following assignment doesn't
+     * have to reside inside the main loop below.
+     */
+    increment = len < BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES ? len : BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < 8; ++i) {
+        v[i] = S->h[i];
+    }
+
+    do {
+        for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i) {
+            m[i] = load64(blocks + i * sizeof(m[i]));
+        }
+
+        /* blake2b_increment_counter */
+        S->t[0] += increment;
+        S->t[1] += (S->t[0] < increment);
+
+        v[8]  = blake2b_IV[0];
+        v[9]  = blake2b_IV[1];
+        v[10] = blake2b_IV[2];
+        v[11] = blake2b_IV[3];
+        v[12] = S->t[0] ^ blake2b_IV[4];
+        v[13] = S->t[1] ^ blake2b_IV[5];
+        v[14] = S->f[0] ^ blake2b_IV[6];
+        v[15] = S->f[1] ^ blake2b_IV[7];
+#define G(r,i,a,b,c,d) \
+        do { \
+            a = a + b + m[blake2b_sigma[r][2*i+0]]; \
+            d = rotr64(d ^ a, 32); \
+            c = c + d; \
+            b = rotr64(b ^ c, 24); \
+            a = a + b + m[blake2b_sigma[r][2*i+1]]; \
+            d = rotr64(d ^ a, 16); \
+            c = c + d; \
+            b = rotr64(b ^ c, 63); \
+        } while (0)
+#define ROUND(r)  \
+        do { \
+            G(r,0,v[ 0],v[ 4],v[ 8],v[12]); \
+            G(r,1,v[ 1],v[ 5],v[ 9],v[13]); \
+            G(r,2,v[ 2],v[ 6],v[10],v[14]); \
+            G(r,3,v[ 3],v[ 7],v[11],v[15]); \
+            G(r,4,v[ 0],v[ 5],v[10],v[15]); \
+            G(r,5,v[ 1],v[ 6],v[11],v[12]); \
+            G(r,6,v[ 2],v[ 7],v[ 8],v[13]); \
+            G(r,7,v[ 3],v[ 4],v[ 9],v[14]); \
+        } while (0)
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT)
+        /* 3x size reduction on x86_64, almost 7x on ARMv8, 9x on ARMv4 */
+        for (i = 0; i < 12; i++) {
+            ROUND(i);
+        }
+#else
+        ROUND(0);
+        ROUND(1);
+        ROUND(2);
+        ROUND(3);
+        ROUND(4);
+        ROUND(5);
+        ROUND(6);
+        ROUND(7);
+        ROUND(8);
+        ROUND(9);
+        ROUND(10);
+        ROUND(11);
+#endif
+
+        for (i = 0; i < 8; ++i) {
+            S->h[i] = v[i] ^= v[i + 8] ^ S->h[i];
+        }
+#undef G
+#undef ROUND
+        blocks += increment;
+        len -= increment;
+    } while (len);
+}
+
+/* Absorb the input data into the hash state.  Always returns 1. */
+int BLAKE2b_Update(BLAKE2B_CTX *c, const void *data, size_t datalen)
+{
+    const uint8_t *in = data;
+    size_t fill;
+
+    /*
+     * Intuitively one would expect intermediate buffer, c->buf, to
+     * store incomplete blocks. But in this case we are interested to
+     * temporarily stash even complete blocks, because last one in the
+     * stream has to be treated in special way, and at this point we
+     * don't know if last block in *this* call is last one "ever". This
+     * is the reason for why |datalen| is compared as >, and not >=.
+     */
+    fill = sizeof(c->buf) - c->buflen;
+    if (datalen > fill) {
+        if (c->buflen) {
+            memcpy(c->buf + c->buflen, in, fill); /* Fill buffer */
+            blake2b_compress(c, c->buf, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES);
+            c->buflen = 0;
+            in += fill;
+            datalen -= fill;
+        }
+        if (datalen > BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES) {
+            size_t stashlen = datalen % BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES;
+            /*
+             * If |datalen| is a multiple of the blocksize, stash
+             * last complete block, it can be final one...
+             */
+            stashlen = stashlen ? stashlen : BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES;
+            datalen -= stashlen;
+            blake2b_compress(c, in, datalen);
+            in += datalen;
+            datalen = stashlen;
+        }
+    }
+
+    assert(datalen <= BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES);
+
+    memcpy(c->buf + c->buflen, in, datalen);
+    c->buflen += datalen; /* Be lazy, do not compress */
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Calculate the final hash and save it in md.
+ * Always returns 1.
+ */
+int BLAKE2b_Final(unsigned char *md, BLAKE2B_CTX *c)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    blake2b_set_lastblock(c);
+    /* Padding */
+    memset(c->buf + c->buflen, 0, sizeof(c->buf) - c->buflen);
+    blake2b_compress(c, c->buf, c->buflen);
+
+    /* Output full hash to message digest */
+    for (i = 0; i < 8; ++i) {
+        store64(md + sizeof(c->h[i]) * i, c->h[i]);
+    }
+
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(c, sizeof(BLAKE2B_CTX));
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/blake2/blake2s.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/blake2/blake2s.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0b3503e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/blake2/blake2s.c
@@ -0,0 +1,264 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Derived from the BLAKE2 reference implementation written by Samuel Neves.
+ * Copyright 2012, Samuel Neves <sneves@dei.uc.pt>
+ * More information about the BLAKE2 hash function and its implementations
+ * can be found at https://blake2.net.
+ */
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include "e_os.h"
+
+#include "blake2_locl.h"
+#include "blake2_impl.h"
+
+static const uint32_t blake2s_IV[8] =
+{
+    0x6A09E667U, 0xBB67AE85U, 0x3C6EF372U, 0xA54FF53AU,
+    0x510E527FU, 0x9B05688CU, 0x1F83D9ABU, 0x5BE0CD19U
+};
+
+static const uint8_t blake2s_sigma[10][16] =
+{
+    {  0,  1,  2,  3,  4,  5,  6,  7,  8,  9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 } ,
+    { 14, 10,  4,  8,  9, 15, 13,  6,  1, 12,  0,  2, 11,  7,  5,  3 } ,
+    { 11,  8, 12,  0,  5,  2, 15, 13, 10, 14,  3,  6,  7,  1,  9,  4 } ,
+    {  7,  9,  3,  1, 13, 12, 11, 14,  2,  6,  5, 10,  4,  0, 15,  8 } ,
+    {  9,  0,  5,  7,  2,  4, 10, 15, 14,  1, 11, 12,  6,  8,  3, 13 } ,
+    {  2, 12,  6, 10,  0, 11,  8,  3,  4, 13,  7,  5, 15, 14,  1,  9 } ,
+    { 12,  5,  1, 15, 14, 13,  4, 10,  0,  7,  6,  3,  9,  2,  8, 11 } ,
+    { 13, 11,  7, 14, 12,  1,  3,  9,  5,  0, 15,  4,  8,  6,  2, 10 } ,
+    {  6, 15, 14,  9, 11,  3,  0,  8, 12,  2, 13,  7,  1,  4, 10,  5 } ,
+    { 10,  2,  8,  4,  7,  6,  1,  5, 15, 11,  9, 14,  3, 12, 13 , 0 } ,
+};
+
+/* Set that it's the last block we'll compress */
+static ossl_inline void blake2s_set_lastblock(BLAKE2S_CTX *S)
+{
+    S->f[0] = -1;
+}
+
+/* Initialize the hashing state. */
+static ossl_inline void blake2s_init0(BLAKE2S_CTX *S)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    memset(S, 0, sizeof(BLAKE2S_CTX));
+    for (i = 0; i < 8; ++i) {
+        S->h[i] = blake2s_IV[i];
+    }
+}
+
+/* init2 xors IV with input parameter block */
+static void blake2s_init_param(BLAKE2S_CTX *S, const BLAKE2S_PARAM *P)
+{
+    const uint8_t *p = (const uint8_t *)(P);
+    size_t i;
+
+    /* The param struct is carefully hand packed, and should be 32 bytes on
+     * every platform. */
+    assert(sizeof(BLAKE2S_PARAM) == 32);
+    blake2s_init0(S);
+    /* IV XOR ParamBlock */
+    for (i = 0; i < 8; ++i) {
+        S->h[i] ^= load32(&p[i*4]);
+    }
+}
+
+/* Initialize the hashing context.  Always returns 1. */
+int BLAKE2s_Init(BLAKE2S_CTX *c)
+{
+    BLAKE2S_PARAM P[1];
+
+    P->digest_length = BLAKE2S_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+    P->key_length    = 0;
+    P->fanout        = 1;
+    P->depth         = 1;
+    store32(P->leaf_length, 0);
+    store48(P->node_offset, 0);
+    P->node_depth    = 0;
+    P->inner_length  = 0;
+    memset(P->salt,     0, sizeof(P->salt));
+    memset(P->personal, 0, sizeof(P->personal));
+    blake2s_init_param(c, P);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Permute the state while xoring in the block of data. */
+static void blake2s_compress(BLAKE2S_CTX *S,
+                            const uint8_t *blocks,
+                            size_t len)
+{
+    uint32_t m[16];
+    uint32_t v[16];
+    size_t i;
+    size_t increment;
+
+    /*
+     * There are two distinct usage vectors for this function:
+     *
+     * a) BLAKE2s_Update uses it to process complete blocks,
+     *    possibly more than one at a time;
+     *
+     * b) BLAK2s_Final uses it to process last block, always
+     *    single but possibly incomplete, in which case caller
+     *    pads input with zeros.
+     */
+    assert(len < BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES || len % BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES == 0);
+
+    /*
+     * Since last block is always processed with separate call,
+     * |len| not being multiple of complete blocks can be observed
+     * only with |len| being less than BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES ("less"
+     * including even zero), which is why following assignment doesn't
+     * have to reside inside the main loop below.
+     */
+    increment = len < BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES ? len : BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < 8; ++i) {
+        v[i] = S->h[i];
+    }
+
+    do {
+        for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i) {
+            m[i] = load32(blocks + i * sizeof(m[i]));
+        }
+
+        /* blake2s_increment_counter */
+        S->t[0] += increment;
+        S->t[1] += (S->t[0] < increment);
+
+        v[ 8] = blake2s_IV[0];
+        v[ 9] = blake2s_IV[1];
+        v[10] = blake2s_IV[2];
+        v[11] = blake2s_IV[3];
+        v[12] = S->t[0] ^ blake2s_IV[4];
+        v[13] = S->t[1] ^ blake2s_IV[5];
+        v[14] = S->f[0] ^ blake2s_IV[6];
+        v[15] = S->f[1] ^ blake2s_IV[7];
+#define G(r,i,a,b,c,d) \
+        do { \
+            a = a + b + m[blake2s_sigma[r][2*i+0]]; \
+            d = rotr32(d ^ a, 16); \
+            c = c + d; \
+            b = rotr32(b ^ c, 12); \
+            a = a + b + m[blake2s_sigma[r][2*i+1]]; \
+            d = rotr32(d ^ a, 8); \
+            c = c + d; \
+            b = rotr32(b ^ c, 7); \
+        } while (0)
+#define ROUND(r)  \
+        do { \
+            G(r,0,v[ 0],v[ 4],v[ 8],v[12]); \
+            G(r,1,v[ 1],v[ 5],v[ 9],v[13]); \
+            G(r,2,v[ 2],v[ 6],v[10],v[14]); \
+            G(r,3,v[ 3],v[ 7],v[11],v[15]); \
+            G(r,4,v[ 0],v[ 5],v[10],v[15]); \
+            G(r,5,v[ 1],v[ 6],v[11],v[12]); \
+            G(r,6,v[ 2],v[ 7],v[ 8],v[13]); \
+            G(r,7,v[ 3],v[ 4],v[ 9],v[14]); \
+        } while (0)
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT)
+        /* almost 3x reduction on x86_64, 4.5x on ARMv8, 4x on ARMv4 */
+        for (i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
+            ROUND(i);
+        }
+#else
+        ROUND(0);
+        ROUND(1);
+        ROUND(2);
+        ROUND(3);
+        ROUND(4);
+        ROUND(5);
+        ROUND(6);
+        ROUND(7);
+        ROUND(8);
+        ROUND(9);
+#endif
+
+        for (i = 0; i < 8; ++i) {
+            S->h[i] = v[i] ^= v[i + 8] ^ S->h[i];
+        }
+#undef G
+#undef ROUND
+        blocks += increment;
+        len -= increment;
+    } while (len);
+}
+
+/* Absorb the input data into the hash state.  Always returns 1. */
+int BLAKE2s_Update(BLAKE2S_CTX *c, const void *data, size_t datalen)
+{
+    const uint8_t *in = data;
+    size_t fill;
+
+    /*
+     * Intuitively one would expect intermediate buffer, c->buf, to
+     * store incomplete blocks. But in this case we are interested to
+     * temporarily stash even complete blocks, because last one in the
+     * stream has to be treated in special way, and at this point we
+     * don't know if last block in *this* call is last one "ever". This
+     * is the reason for why |datalen| is compared as >, and not >=.
+     */
+    fill = sizeof(c->buf) - c->buflen;
+    if (datalen > fill) {
+        if (c->buflen) {
+            memcpy(c->buf + c->buflen, in, fill); /* Fill buffer */
+            blake2s_compress(c, c->buf, BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES);
+            c->buflen = 0;
+            in += fill;
+            datalen -= fill;
+        }
+        if (datalen > BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES)  {
+            size_t stashlen = datalen % BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES;
+            /*
+             * If |datalen| is a multiple of the blocksize, stash
+             * last complete block, it can be final one...
+             */
+            stashlen = stashlen ? stashlen : BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES;
+            datalen -= stashlen;
+            blake2s_compress(c, in, datalen);
+            in += datalen;
+            datalen = stashlen;
+        }
+    }
+
+    assert(datalen <= BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES);
+
+    memcpy(c->buf + c->buflen, in, datalen);
+    c->buflen += datalen; /* Be lazy, do not compress */
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Calculate the final hash and save it in md.
+ * Always returns 1.
+ */
+int BLAKE2s_Final(unsigned char *md, BLAKE2S_CTX *c)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    blake2s_set_lastblock(c);
+    /* Padding */
+    memset(c->buf + c->buflen, 0, sizeof(c->buf) - c->buflen);
+    blake2s_compress(c, c->buf, c->buflen);
+
+    /* Output full hash to temp buffer */
+    for (i = 0; i < 8; ++i) {
+        store32(md + sizeof(c->h[i]) * i, c->h[i]);
+    }
+
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(c, sizeof(BLAKE2S_CTX));
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/blake2/build.info b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/blake2/build.info
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0036f08
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/blake2/build.info
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+LIBS=../../libcrypto
+SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
+        blake2b.c blake2s.c m_blake2b.c m_blake2s.c
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/blake2/m_blake2b.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/blake2/m_blake2b.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..82c6f6b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/blake2/m_blake2b.c
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Derived from the BLAKE2 reference implementation written by Samuel Neves.
+ * Copyright 2012, Samuel Neves <sneves@dei.uc.pt>
+ * More information about the BLAKE2 hash function and its implementations
+ * can be found at https://blake2.net.
+ */
+
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BLAKE2
+
+# include <openssl/evp.h>
+# include <openssl/objects.h>
+# include "blake2_locl.h"
+# include "internal/evp_int.h"
+
+static int init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return BLAKE2b_Init(EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx));
+}
+
+static int update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count)
+{
+    return BLAKE2b_Update(EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx), data, count);
+}
+
+static int final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md)
+{
+    return BLAKE2b_Final(md, EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx));
+}
+
+static const EVP_MD blake2b_md = {
+    NID_blake2b512,
+    0,
+    BLAKE2B_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+    0,
+    init,
+    update,
+    final,
+    NULL,
+    NULL,
+    BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES,
+    sizeof(EVP_MD *) + sizeof(BLAKE2B_CTX),
+};
+
+const EVP_MD *EVP_blake2b512(void)
+{
+    return (&blake2b_md);
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/blake2/m_blake2s.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/blake2/m_blake2s.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..467e91a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/blake2/m_blake2s.c
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Derived from the BLAKE2 reference implementation written by Samuel Neves.
+ * Copyright 2012, Samuel Neves <sneves@dei.uc.pt>
+ * More information about the BLAKE2 hash function and its implementations
+ * can be found at https://blake2.net.
+ */
+
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BLAKE2
+
+# include <openssl/evp.h>
+# include <openssl/objects.h>
+# include "blake2_locl.h"
+# include "internal/evp_int.h"
+
+static int init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return BLAKE2s_Init(EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx));
+}
+
+static int update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count)
+{
+    return BLAKE2s_Update(EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx), data, count);
+}
+
+static int final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md)
+{
+    return BLAKE2s_Final(md, EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx));
+}
+
+static const EVP_MD blake2s_md = {
+    NID_blake2s256,
+    0,
+    BLAKE2S_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+    0,
+    init,
+    update,
+    final,
+    NULL,
+    NULL,
+    BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES,
+    sizeof(EVP_MD *) + sizeof(BLAKE2S_CTX),
+};
+
+const EVP_MD *EVP_blake2s256(void)
+{
+    return (&blake2s_md);
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/README.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/README.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..109ab0d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/README.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,247 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+bn_mul_words, bn_mul_add_words, bn_sqr_words, bn_div_words,
+bn_add_words, bn_sub_words, bn_mul_comba4, bn_mul_comba8,
+bn_sqr_comba4, bn_sqr_comba8, bn_cmp_words, bn_mul_normal,
+bn_mul_low_normal, bn_mul_recursive, bn_mul_part_recursive,
+bn_mul_low_recursive, bn_mul_high, bn_sqr_normal, bn_sqr_recursive,
+bn_expand, bn_wexpand, bn_expand2, bn_fix_top, bn_check_top,
+bn_print, bn_dump, bn_set_max, bn_set_high, bn_set_low - BIGNUM
+library internal functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+ BN_ULONG bn_mul_words(BN_ULONG *rp, BN_ULONG *ap, int num, BN_ULONG w);
+ BN_ULONG bn_mul_add_words(BN_ULONG *rp, BN_ULONG *ap, int num,
+   BN_ULONG w);
+ void     bn_sqr_words(BN_ULONG *rp, BN_ULONG *ap, int num);
+ BN_ULONG bn_div_words(BN_ULONG h, BN_ULONG l, BN_ULONG d);
+ BN_ULONG bn_add_words(BN_ULONG *rp, BN_ULONG *ap, BN_ULONG *bp,
+   int num);
+ BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *rp, BN_ULONG *ap, BN_ULONG *bp,
+   int num);
+
+ void bn_mul_comba4(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b);
+ void bn_mul_comba8(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b);
+ void bn_sqr_comba4(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a);
+ void bn_sqr_comba8(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a);
+
+ int bn_cmp_words(BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n);
+
+ void bn_mul_normal(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, int na, BN_ULONG *b,
+   int nb);
+ void bn_mul_low_normal(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n);
+ void bn_mul_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n2,
+   int dna, int dnb, BN_ULONG *tmp);
+ void bn_mul_part_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b,
+   int n, int tna, int tnb, BN_ULONG *tmp);
+ void bn_mul_low_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b,
+   int n2, BN_ULONG *tmp);
+ void bn_mul_high(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, BN_ULONG *l,
+   int n2, BN_ULONG *tmp);
+
+ void bn_sqr_normal(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, int n, BN_ULONG *tmp);
+ void bn_sqr_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, int n2, BN_ULONG *tmp);
+
+ void mul(BN_ULONG r, BN_ULONG a, BN_ULONG w, BN_ULONG c);
+ void mul_add(BN_ULONG r, BN_ULONG a, BN_ULONG w, BN_ULONG c);
+ void sqr(BN_ULONG r0, BN_ULONG r1, BN_ULONG a);
+
+ BIGNUM *bn_expand(BIGNUM *a, int bits);
+ BIGNUM *bn_wexpand(BIGNUM *a, int n);
+ BIGNUM *bn_expand2(BIGNUM *a, int n);
+ void bn_fix_top(BIGNUM *a);
+
+ void bn_check_top(BIGNUM *a);
+ void bn_print(BIGNUM *a);
+ void bn_dump(BN_ULONG *d, int n);
+ void bn_set_max(BIGNUM *a);
+ void bn_set_high(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, int n);
+ void bn_set_low(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, int n);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+This page documents the internal functions used by the OpenSSL
+B<BIGNUM> implementation. They are described here to facilitate
+debugging and extending the library. They are I<not> to be used by
+applications.
+
+=head2 The BIGNUM structure
+
+ typedef struct bignum_st BIGNUM;
+
+ struct bignum_st
+        {
+        BN_ULONG *d;    /* Pointer to an array of 'BN_BITS2' bit chunks. */
+        int top;        /* Index of last used d +1. */
+        /* The next are internal book keeping for bn_expand. */
+        int dmax;       /* Size of the d array. */
+        int neg;        /* one if the number is negative */
+        int flags;
+        };
+
+
+The integer value is stored in B<d>, a malloc()ed array of words (B<BN_ULONG>),
+least significant word first. A B<BN_ULONG> can be either 16, 32 or 64 bits
+in size, depending on the 'number of bits' (B<BITS2>) specified in
+C<openssl/bn.h>.
+
+B<dmax> is the size of the B<d> array that has been allocated.  B<top>
+is the number of words being used, so for a value of 4, bn.d[0]=4 and
+bn.top=1.  B<neg> is 1 if the number is negative.  When a B<BIGNUM> is
+B<0>, the B<d> field can be B<NULL> and B<top> == B<0>.
+
+B<flags> is a bit field of flags which are defined in C<openssl/bn.h>. The
+flags begin with B<BN_FLG_>. The macros BN_set_flags(b, n) and
+BN_get_flags(b, n) exist to enable or fetch flag(s) B<n> from B<BIGNUM>
+structure B<b>.
+
+Various routines in this library require the use of temporary
+B<BIGNUM> variables during their execution.  Since dynamic memory
+allocation to create B<BIGNUM>s is rather expensive when used in
+conjunction with repeated subroutine calls, the B<BN_CTX> structure is
+used.  This structure contains B<BN_CTX_NUM> B<BIGNUM>s, see
+L<BN_CTX_start(3)>.
+
+=head2 Low-level arithmetic operations
+
+These functions are implemented in C and for several platforms in
+assembly language:
+
+bn_mul_words(B<rp>, B<ap>, B<num>, B<w>) operates on the B<num> word
+arrays B<rp> and B<ap>.  It computes B<ap> * B<w>, places the result
+in B<rp>, and returns the high word (carry).
+
+bn_mul_add_words(B<rp>, B<ap>, B<num>, B<w>) operates on the B<num>
+word arrays B<rp> and B<ap>.  It computes B<ap> * B<w> + B<rp>, places
+the result in B<rp>, and returns the high word (carry).
+
+bn_sqr_words(B<rp>, B<ap>, B<n>) operates on the B<num> word array
+B<ap> and the 2*B<num> word array B<ap>.  It computes B<ap> * B<ap>
+word-wise, and places the low and high bytes of the result in B<rp>.
+
+bn_div_words(B<h>, B<l>, B<d>) divides the two word number (B<h>, B<l>)
+by B<d> and returns the result.
+
+bn_add_words(B<rp>, B<ap>, B<bp>, B<num>) operates on the B<num> word
+arrays B<ap>, B<bp> and B<rp>.  It computes B<ap> + B<bp>, places the
+result in B<rp>, and returns the high word (carry).
+
+bn_sub_words(B<rp>, B<ap>, B<bp>, B<num>) operates on the B<num> word
+arrays B<ap>, B<bp> and B<rp>.  It computes B<ap> - B<bp>, places the
+result in B<rp>, and returns the carry (1 if B<bp> E<gt> B<ap>, 0
+otherwise).
+
+bn_mul_comba4(B<r>, B<a>, B<b>) operates on the 4 word arrays B<a> and
+B<b> and the 8 word array B<r>.  It computes B<a>*B<b> and places the
+result in B<r>.
+
+bn_mul_comba8(B<r>, B<a>, B<b>) operates on the 8 word arrays B<a> and
+B<b> and the 16 word array B<r>.  It computes B<a>*B<b> and places the
+result in B<r>.
+
+bn_sqr_comba4(B<r>, B<a>, B<b>) operates on the 4 word arrays B<a> and
+B<b> and the 8 word array B<r>.
+
+bn_sqr_comba8(B<r>, B<a>, B<b>) operates on the 8 word arrays B<a> and
+B<b> and the 16 word array B<r>.
+
+The following functions are implemented in C:
+
+bn_cmp_words(B<a>, B<b>, B<n>) operates on the B<n> word arrays B<a>
+and B<b>.  It returns 1, 0 and -1 if B<a> is greater than, equal and
+less than B<b>.
+
+bn_mul_normal(B<r>, B<a>, B<na>, B<b>, B<nb>) operates on the B<na>
+word array B<a>, the B<nb> word array B<b> and the B<na>+B<nb> word
+array B<r>.  It computes B<a>*B<b> and places the result in B<r>.
+
+bn_mul_low_normal(B<r>, B<a>, B<b>, B<n>) operates on the B<n> word
+arrays B<r>, B<a> and B<b>.  It computes the B<n> low words of
+B<a>*B<b> and places the result in B<r>.
+
+bn_mul_recursive(B<r>, B<a>, B<b>, B<n2>, B<dna>, B<dnb>, B<t>) operates
+on the word arrays B<a> and B<b> of length B<n2>+B<dna> and B<n2>+B<dnb>
+(B<dna> and B<dnb> are currently allowed to be 0 or negative) and the 2*B<n2>
+word arrays B<r> and B<t>.  B<n2> must be a power of 2.  It computes
+B<a>*B<b> and places the result in B<r>.
+
+bn_mul_part_recursive(B<r>, B<a>, B<b>, B<n>, B<tna>, B<tnb>, B<tmp>)
+operates on the word arrays B<a> and B<b> of length B<n>+B<tna> and
+B<n>+B<tnb> and the 4*B<n> word arrays B<r> and B<tmp>.
+
+bn_mul_low_recursive(B<r>, B<a>, B<b>, B<n2>, B<tmp>) operates on the
+B<n2> word arrays B<r> and B<tmp> and the B<n2>/2 word arrays B<a>
+and B<b>.
+
+bn_mul_high(B<r>, B<a>, B<b>, B<l>, B<n2>, B<tmp>) operates on the
+B<n2> word arrays B<r>, B<a>, B<b> and B<l> (?) and the 3*B<n2> word
+array B<tmp>.
+
+BN_mul() calls bn_mul_normal(), or an optimized implementation if the
+factors have the same size: bn_mul_comba8() is used if they are 8
+words long, bn_mul_recursive() if they are larger than
+B<BN_MULL_SIZE_NORMAL> and the size is an exact multiple of the word
+size, and bn_mul_part_recursive() for others that are larger than
+B<BN_MULL_SIZE_NORMAL>.
+
+bn_sqr_normal(B<r>, B<a>, B<n>, B<tmp>) operates on the B<n> word array
+B<a> and the 2*B<n> word arrays B<tmp> and B<r>.
+
+The implementations use the following macros which, depending on the
+architecture, may use "long long" C operations or inline assembler.
+They are defined in C<bn_lcl.h>.
+
+mul(B<r>, B<a>, B<w>, B<c>) computes B<w>*B<a>+B<c> and places the
+low word of the result in B<r> and the high word in B<c>.
+
+mul_add(B<r>, B<a>, B<w>, B<c>) computes B<w>*B<a>+B<r>+B<c> and
+places the low word of the result in B<r> and the high word in B<c>.
+
+sqr(B<r0>, B<r1>, B<a>) computes B<a>*B<a> and places the low word
+of the result in B<r0> and the high word in B<r1>.
+
+=head2 Size changes
+
+bn_expand() ensures that B<b> has enough space for a B<bits> bit
+number.  bn_wexpand() ensures that B<b> has enough space for an
+B<n> word number.  If the number has to be expanded, both macros
+call bn_expand2(), which allocates a new B<d> array and copies the
+data.  They return B<NULL> on error, B<b> otherwise.
+
+The bn_fix_top() macro reduces B<a-E<gt>top> to point to the most
+significant non-zero word plus one when B<a> has shrunk.
+
+=head2 Debugging
+
+bn_check_top() verifies that C<((a)-E<gt>top E<gt>= 0 && (a)-E<gt>top
+E<lt>= (a)-E<gt>dmax)>.  A violation will cause the program to abort.
+
+bn_print() prints B<a> to stderr. bn_dump() prints B<n> words at B<d>
+(in reverse order, i.e. most significant word first) to stderr.
+
+bn_set_max() makes B<a> a static number with a B<dmax> of its current size.
+This is used by bn_set_low() and bn_set_high() to make B<r> a read-only
+B<BIGNUM> that contains the B<n> low or high words of B<a>.
+
+If B<BN_DEBUG> is not defined, bn_check_top(), bn_print(), bn_dump()
+and bn_set_max() are defined as empty macros.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<bn(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/alpha-mont.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/alpha-mont.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1d68d6d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/alpha-mont.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,331 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# On 21264 RSA sign performance improves by 70/35/20/15 percent for
+# 512/1024/2048/4096 bit key lengths. This is against vendor compiler
+# instructed to '-tune host' code with in-line assembler. Other
+# benchmarks improve by 15-20%. To anchor it to something else, the
+# code provides approximately the same performance per GHz as AMD64.
+# I.e. if you compare 1GHz 21264 and 2GHz Opteron, you'll observe ~2x
+# difference.
+
+$output=pop;
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+# int bn_mul_mont(
+$rp="a0";	# BN_ULONG *rp,
+$ap="a1";	# const BN_ULONG *ap,
+$bp="a2";	# const BN_ULONG *bp,
+$np="a3";	# const BN_ULONG *np,
+$n0="a4";	# const BN_ULONG *n0,
+$num="a5";	# int num);
+
+$lo0="t0";
+$hi0="t1";
+$lo1="t2";
+$hi1="t3";
+$aj="t4";
+$bi="t5";
+$nj="t6";
+$tp="t7";
+$alo="t8";
+$ahi="t9";
+$nlo="t10";
+$nhi="t11";
+$tj="t12";
+$i="s3";
+$j="s4";
+$m1="s5";
+
+$code=<<___;
+#ifdef __linux__
+#include <asm/regdef.h>
+#else
+#include <asm.h>
+#include <regdef.h>
+#endif
+
+.text
+
+.set	noat
+.set	noreorder
+
+.globl	bn_mul_mont
+.align	5
+.ent	bn_mul_mont
+bn_mul_mont:
+	lda	sp,-48(sp)
+	stq	ra,0(sp)
+	stq	s3,8(sp)
+	stq	s4,16(sp)
+	stq	s5,24(sp)
+	stq	fp,32(sp)
+	mov	sp,fp
+	.mask	0x0400f000,-48
+	.frame	fp,48,ra
+	.prologue 0
+
+	.align	4
+	.set	reorder
+	sextl	$num,$num
+	mov	0,v0
+	cmplt	$num,4,AT
+	bne	AT,.Lexit
+
+	ldq	$hi0,0($ap)	# ap[0]
+	s8addq	$num,16,AT
+	ldq	$aj,8($ap)
+	subq	sp,AT,sp
+	ldq	$bi,0($bp)	# bp[0]
+	lda	AT,-4096(zero)	# mov	-4096,AT
+	ldq	$n0,0($n0)
+	and	sp,AT,sp
+
+	mulq	$hi0,$bi,$lo0
+	ldq	$hi1,0($np)	# np[0]
+	umulh	$hi0,$bi,$hi0
+	ldq	$nj,8($np)
+
+	mulq	$lo0,$n0,$m1
+
+	mulq	$hi1,$m1,$lo1
+	umulh	$hi1,$m1,$hi1
+
+	addq	$lo1,$lo0,$lo1
+	cmpult	$lo1,$lo0,AT
+	addq	$hi1,AT,$hi1
+
+	mulq	$aj,$bi,$alo
+	mov	2,$j
+	umulh	$aj,$bi,$ahi
+	mov	sp,$tp
+
+	mulq	$nj,$m1,$nlo
+	s8addq	$j,$ap,$aj
+	umulh	$nj,$m1,$nhi
+	s8addq	$j,$np,$nj
+.align	4
+.L1st:
+	.set	noreorder
+	ldq	$aj,0($aj)
+	addl	$j,1,$j
+	ldq	$nj,0($nj)
+	lda	$tp,8($tp)
+
+	addq	$alo,$hi0,$lo0
+	mulq	$aj,$bi,$alo
+	cmpult	$lo0,$hi0,AT
+	addq	$nlo,$hi1,$lo1
+
+	mulq	$nj,$m1,$nlo
+	addq	$ahi,AT,$hi0
+	cmpult	$lo1,$hi1,v0
+	cmplt	$j,$num,$tj
+
+	umulh	$aj,$bi,$ahi
+	addq	$nhi,v0,$hi1
+	addq	$lo1,$lo0,$lo1
+	s8addq	$j,$ap,$aj
+
+	umulh	$nj,$m1,$nhi
+	cmpult	$lo1,$lo0,v0
+	addq	$hi1,v0,$hi1
+	s8addq	$j,$np,$nj
+
+	stq	$lo1,-8($tp)
+	nop
+	unop
+	bne	$tj,.L1st
+	.set	reorder
+
+	addq	$alo,$hi0,$lo0
+	addq	$nlo,$hi1,$lo1
+	cmpult	$lo0,$hi0,AT
+	cmpult	$lo1,$hi1,v0
+	addq	$ahi,AT,$hi0
+	addq	$nhi,v0,$hi1
+
+	addq	$lo1,$lo0,$lo1
+	cmpult	$lo1,$lo0,v0
+	addq	$hi1,v0,$hi1
+
+	stq	$lo1,0($tp)
+
+	addq	$hi1,$hi0,$hi1
+	cmpult	$hi1,$hi0,AT
+	stq	$hi1,8($tp)
+	stq	AT,16($tp)
+
+	mov	1,$i
+.align	4
+.Louter:
+	s8addq	$i,$bp,$bi
+	ldq	$hi0,0($ap)
+	ldq	$aj,8($ap)
+	ldq	$bi,0($bi)
+	ldq	$hi1,0($np)
+	ldq	$nj,8($np)
+	ldq	$tj,0(sp)
+
+	mulq	$hi0,$bi,$lo0
+	umulh	$hi0,$bi,$hi0
+
+	addq	$lo0,$tj,$lo0
+	cmpult	$lo0,$tj,AT
+	addq	$hi0,AT,$hi0
+
+	mulq	$lo0,$n0,$m1
+
+	mulq	$hi1,$m1,$lo1
+	umulh	$hi1,$m1,$hi1
+
+	addq	$lo1,$lo0,$lo1
+	cmpult	$lo1,$lo0,AT
+	mov	2,$j
+	addq	$hi1,AT,$hi1
+
+	mulq	$aj,$bi,$alo
+	mov	sp,$tp
+	umulh	$aj,$bi,$ahi
+
+	mulq	$nj,$m1,$nlo
+	s8addq	$j,$ap,$aj
+	umulh	$nj,$m1,$nhi
+.align	4
+.Linner:
+	.set	noreorder
+	ldq	$tj,8($tp)	#L0
+	nop			#U1
+	ldq	$aj,0($aj)	#L1
+	s8addq	$j,$np,$nj	#U0
+
+	ldq	$nj,0($nj)	#L0
+	nop			#U1
+	addq	$alo,$hi0,$lo0	#L1
+	lda	$tp,8($tp)
+
+	mulq	$aj,$bi,$alo	#U1
+	cmpult	$lo0,$hi0,AT	#L0
+	addq	$nlo,$hi1,$lo1	#L1
+	addl	$j,1,$j
+
+	mulq	$nj,$m1,$nlo	#U1
+	addq	$ahi,AT,$hi0	#L0
+	addq	$lo0,$tj,$lo0	#L1
+	cmpult	$lo1,$hi1,v0	#U0
+
+	umulh	$aj,$bi,$ahi	#U1
+	cmpult	$lo0,$tj,AT	#L0
+	addq	$lo1,$lo0,$lo1	#L1
+	addq	$nhi,v0,$hi1	#U0
+
+	umulh	$nj,$m1,$nhi	#U1
+	s8addq	$j,$ap,$aj	#L0
+	cmpult	$lo1,$lo0,v0	#L1
+	cmplt	$j,$num,$tj	#U0	# borrow $tj
+
+	addq	$hi0,AT,$hi0	#L0
+	addq	$hi1,v0,$hi1	#U1
+	stq	$lo1,-8($tp)	#L1
+	bne	$tj,.Linner	#U0
+	.set	reorder
+
+	ldq	$tj,8($tp)
+	addq	$alo,$hi0,$lo0
+	addq	$nlo,$hi1,$lo1
+	cmpult	$lo0,$hi0,AT
+	cmpult	$lo1,$hi1,v0
+	addq	$ahi,AT,$hi0
+	addq	$nhi,v0,$hi1
+
+	addq	$lo0,$tj,$lo0
+	cmpult	$lo0,$tj,AT
+	addq	$hi0,AT,$hi0
+
+	ldq	$tj,16($tp)
+	addq	$lo1,$lo0,$j
+	cmpult	$j,$lo0,v0
+	addq	$hi1,v0,$hi1
+
+	addq	$hi1,$hi0,$lo1
+	stq	$j,0($tp)
+	cmpult	$lo1,$hi0,$hi1
+	addq	$lo1,$tj,$lo1
+	cmpult	$lo1,$tj,AT
+	addl	$i,1,$i
+	addq	$hi1,AT,$hi1
+	stq	$lo1,8($tp)
+	cmplt	$i,$num,$tj	# borrow $tj
+	stq	$hi1,16($tp)
+	bne	$tj,.Louter
+
+	s8addq	$num,sp,$tj	# &tp[num]
+	mov	$rp,$bp		# put rp aside
+	mov	sp,$tp
+	mov	sp,$ap
+	mov	0,$hi0		# clear borrow bit
+
+.align	4
+.Lsub:	ldq	$lo0,0($tp)
+	ldq	$lo1,0($np)
+	lda	$tp,8($tp)
+	lda	$np,8($np)
+	subq	$lo0,$lo1,$lo1	# tp[i]-np[i]
+	cmpult	$lo0,$lo1,AT
+	subq	$lo1,$hi0,$lo0
+	cmpult	$lo1,$lo0,$hi0
+	or	$hi0,AT,$hi0
+	stq	$lo0,0($rp)
+	cmpult	$tp,$tj,v0
+	lda	$rp,8($rp)
+	bne	v0,.Lsub
+
+	subq	$hi1,$hi0,$hi0	# handle upmost overflow bit
+	mov	sp,$tp
+	mov	$bp,$rp		# restore rp
+
+	and	sp,$hi0,$ap
+	bic	$bp,$hi0,$bp
+	bis	$bp,$ap,$ap	# ap=borrow?tp:rp
+
+.align	4
+.Lcopy:	ldq	$aj,0($ap)	# copy or in-place refresh
+	lda	$tp,8($tp)
+	lda	$rp,8($rp)
+	lda	$ap,8($ap)
+	stq	zero,-8($tp)	# zap tp
+	cmpult	$tp,$tj,AT
+	stq	$aj,-8($rp)
+	bne	AT,.Lcopy
+	mov	1,v0
+
+.Lexit:
+	.set	noreorder
+	mov	fp,sp
+	/*ldq	ra,0(sp)*/
+	ldq	s3,8(sp)
+	ldq	s4,16(sp)
+	ldq	s5,24(sp)
+	ldq	fp,32(sp)
+	lda	sp,48(sp)
+	ret	(ra)
+.end	bn_mul_mont
+.ascii	"Montgomery Multiplication for Alpha, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+.align	2
+___
+
+print $code;
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/armv4-gf2m.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/armv4-gf2m.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0bb5433
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/armv4-gf2m.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,332 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# May 2011
+#
+# The module implements bn_GF2m_mul_2x2 polynomial multiplication
+# used in bn_gf2m.c. It's kind of low-hanging mechanical port from
+# C for the time being... Except that it has two code paths: pure
+# integer code suitable for any ARMv4 and later CPU and NEON code
+# suitable for ARMv7. Pure integer 1x1 multiplication subroutine runs
+# in ~45 cycles on dual-issue core such as Cortex A8, which is ~50%
+# faster than compiler-generated code. For ECDH and ECDSA verify (but
+# not for ECDSA sign) it means 25%-45% improvement depending on key
+# length, more for longer keys. Even though NEON 1x1 multiplication
+# runs in even less cycles, ~30, improvement is measurable only on
+# longer keys. One has to optimize code elsewhere to get NEON glow...
+#
+# April 2014
+#
+# Double bn_GF2m_mul_2x2 performance by using algorithm from paper
+# referred below, which improves ECDH and ECDSA verify benchmarks
+# by 18-40%.
+#
+# Câmara, D.; Gouvêa, C. P. L.; López, J. & Dahab, R.: Fast Software
+# Polynomial Multiplication on ARM Processors using the NEON Engine.
+# 
+# http://conradoplg.cryptoland.net/files/2010/12/mocrysen13.pdf
+
+$flavour = shift;
+if ($flavour=~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/) { $output=$flavour; undef $flavour; }
+else { while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {} }
+
+if ($flavour && $flavour ne "void") {
+    $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+    ( $xlate="${dir}arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
+    ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
+    die "can't locate arm-xlate.pl";
+
+    open STDOUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output";
+} else {
+    open STDOUT,">$output";
+}
+
+$code=<<___;
+#include "arm_arch.h"
+
+.text
+#if defined(__thumb2__)
+.syntax	unified
+.thumb
+#else
+.code	32
+#endif
+___
+################
+# private interface to mul_1x1_ialu
+#
+$a="r1";
+$b="r0";
+
+($a0,$a1,$a2,$a12,$a4,$a14)=
+($hi,$lo,$t0,$t1, $i0,$i1 )=map("r$_",(4..9),12);
+
+$mask="r12";
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.type	mul_1x1_ialu,%function
+.align	5
+mul_1x1_ialu:
+	mov	$a0,#0
+	bic	$a1,$a,#3<<30		@ a1=a&0x3fffffff
+	str	$a0,[sp,#0]		@ tab[0]=0
+	add	$a2,$a1,$a1		@ a2=a1<<1
+	str	$a1,[sp,#4]		@ tab[1]=a1
+	eor	$a12,$a1,$a2		@ a1^a2
+	str	$a2,[sp,#8]		@ tab[2]=a2
+	mov	$a4,$a1,lsl#2		@ a4=a1<<2
+	str	$a12,[sp,#12]		@ tab[3]=a1^a2
+	eor	$a14,$a1,$a4		@ a1^a4
+	str	$a4,[sp,#16]		@ tab[4]=a4
+	eor	$a0,$a2,$a4		@ a2^a4
+	str	$a14,[sp,#20]		@ tab[5]=a1^a4
+	eor	$a12,$a12,$a4		@ a1^a2^a4
+	str	$a0,[sp,#24]		@ tab[6]=a2^a4
+	and	$i0,$mask,$b,lsl#2
+	str	$a12,[sp,#28]		@ tab[7]=a1^a2^a4
+
+	and	$i1,$mask,$b,lsr#1
+	ldr	$lo,[sp,$i0]		@ tab[b       & 0x7]
+	and	$i0,$mask,$b,lsr#4
+	ldr	$t1,[sp,$i1]		@ tab[b >>  3 & 0x7]
+	and	$i1,$mask,$b,lsr#7
+	ldr	$t0,[sp,$i0]		@ tab[b >>  6 & 0x7]
+	eor	$lo,$lo,$t1,lsl#3	@ stall
+	mov	$hi,$t1,lsr#29
+	ldr	$t1,[sp,$i1]		@ tab[b >>  9 & 0x7]
+
+	and	$i0,$mask,$b,lsr#10
+	eor	$lo,$lo,$t0,lsl#6
+	eor	$hi,$hi,$t0,lsr#26
+	ldr	$t0,[sp,$i0]		@ tab[b >> 12 & 0x7]
+
+	and	$i1,$mask,$b,lsr#13
+	eor	$lo,$lo,$t1,lsl#9
+	eor	$hi,$hi,$t1,lsr#23
+	ldr	$t1,[sp,$i1]		@ tab[b >> 15 & 0x7]
+
+	and	$i0,$mask,$b,lsr#16
+	eor	$lo,$lo,$t0,lsl#12
+	eor	$hi,$hi,$t0,lsr#20
+	ldr	$t0,[sp,$i0]		@ tab[b >> 18 & 0x7]
+
+	and	$i1,$mask,$b,lsr#19
+	eor	$lo,$lo,$t1,lsl#15
+	eor	$hi,$hi,$t1,lsr#17
+	ldr	$t1,[sp,$i1]		@ tab[b >> 21 & 0x7]
+
+	and	$i0,$mask,$b,lsr#22
+	eor	$lo,$lo,$t0,lsl#18
+	eor	$hi,$hi,$t0,lsr#14
+	ldr	$t0,[sp,$i0]		@ tab[b >> 24 & 0x7]
+
+	and	$i1,$mask,$b,lsr#25
+	eor	$lo,$lo,$t1,lsl#21
+	eor	$hi,$hi,$t1,lsr#11
+	ldr	$t1,[sp,$i1]		@ tab[b >> 27 & 0x7]
+
+	tst	$a,#1<<30
+	and	$i0,$mask,$b,lsr#28
+	eor	$lo,$lo,$t0,lsl#24
+	eor	$hi,$hi,$t0,lsr#8
+	ldr	$t0,[sp,$i0]		@ tab[b >> 30      ]
+
+#ifdef	__thumb2__
+	itt	ne
+#endif
+	eorne	$lo,$lo,$b,lsl#30
+	eorne	$hi,$hi,$b,lsr#2
+	tst	$a,#1<<31
+	eor	$lo,$lo,$t1,lsl#27
+	eor	$hi,$hi,$t1,lsr#5
+#ifdef	__thumb2__
+	itt	ne
+#endif
+	eorne	$lo,$lo,$b,lsl#31
+	eorne	$hi,$hi,$b,lsr#1
+	eor	$lo,$lo,$t0,lsl#30
+	eor	$hi,$hi,$t0,lsr#2
+
+	mov	pc,lr
+.size	mul_1x1_ialu,.-mul_1x1_ialu
+___
+################
+# void	bn_GF2m_mul_2x2(BN_ULONG *r,
+#	BN_ULONG a1,BN_ULONG a0,
+#	BN_ULONG b1,BN_ULONG b0);	# r[3..0]=a1a0·b1b0
+{
+$code.=<<___;
+.global	bn_GF2m_mul_2x2
+.type	bn_GF2m_mul_2x2,%function
+.align	5
+bn_GF2m_mul_2x2:
+#if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7
+	stmdb	sp!,{r10,lr}
+	ldr	r12,.LOPENSSL_armcap
+	adr	r10,.LOPENSSL_armcap
+	ldr	r12,[r12,r10]
+#ifdef	__APPLE__
+	ldr	r12,[r12]
+#endif
+	tst	r12,#ARMV7_NEON
+	itt	ne
+	ldrne	r10,[sp],#8
+	bne	.LNEON
+	stmdb	sp!,{r4-r9}
+#else
+	stmdb	sp!,{r4-r10,lr}
+#endif
+___
+$ret="r10";	# reassigned 1st argument
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	$ret,r0			@ reassign 1st argument
+	mov	$b,r3			@ $b=b1
+	sub	r7,sp,#36
+	mov	r8,sp
+	and	r7,r7,#-32
+	ldr	r3,[sp,#32]		@ load b0
+	mov	$mask,#7<<2
+	mov	sp,r7			@ allocate tab[8]
+	str	r8,[r7,#32]
+
+	bl	mul_1x1_ialu		@ a1·b1
+	str	$lo,[$ret,#8]
+	str	$hi,[$ret,#12]
+
+	eor	$b,$b,r3		@ flip b0 and b1
+	 eor	$a,$a,r2		@ flip a0 and a1
+	eor	r3,r3,$b
+	 eor	r2,r2,$a
+	eor	$b,$b,r3
+	 eor	$a,$a,r2
+	bl	mul_1x1_ialu		@ a0·b0
+	str	$lo,[$ret]
+	str	$hi,[$ret,#4]
+
+	eor	$a,$a,r2
+	eor	$b,$b,r3
+	bl	mul_1x1_ialu		@ (a1+a0)·(b1+b0)
+___
+@r=map("r$_",(6..9));
+$code.=<<___;
+	ldmia	$ret,{@r[0]-@r[3]}
+	eor	$lo,$lo,$hi
+	ldr	sp,[sp,#32]		@ destroy tab[8]
+	eor	$hi,$hi,@r[1]
+	eor	$lo,$lo,@r[0]
+	eor	$hi,$hi,@r[2]
+	eor	$lo,$lo,@r[3]
+	eor	$hi,$hi,@r[3]
+	str	$hi,[$ret,#8]
+	eor	$lo,$lo,$hi
+	str	$lo,[$ret,#4]
+
+#if __ARM_ARCH__>=5
+	ldmia	sp!,{r4-r10,pc}
+#else
+	ldmia	sp!,{r4-r10,lr}
+	tst	lr,#1
+	moveq	pc,lr			@ be binary compatible with V4, yet
+	bx	lr			@ interoperable with Thumb ISA:-)
+#endif
+___
+}
+{
+my ($r,$t0,$t1,$t2,$t3)=map("q$_",(0..3,8..12));
+my ($a,$b,$k48,$k32,$k16)=map("d$_",(26..31));
+
+$code.=<<___;
+#if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7
+.arch	armv7-a
+.fpu	neon
+
+.align	5
+.LNEON:
+	ldr		r12, [sp]		@ 5th argument
+	vmov		$a, r2, r1
+	vmov		$b, r12, r3
+	vmov.i64	$k48, #0x0000ffffffffffff
+	vmov.i64	$k32, #0x00000000ffffffff
+	vmov.i64	$k16, #0x000000000000ffff
+
+	vext.8		$t0#lo, $a, $a, #1	@ A1
+	vmull.p8	$t0, $t0#lo, $b		@ F = A1*B
+	vext.8		$r#lo, $b, $b, #1	@ B1
+	vmull.p8	$r, $a, $r#lo		@ E = A*B1
+	vext.8		$t1#lo, $a, $a, #2	@ A2
+	vmull.p8	$t1, $t1#lo, $b		@ H = A2*B
+	vext.8		$t3#lo, $b, $b, #2	@ B2
+	vmull.p8	$t3, $a, $t3#lo		@ G = A*B2
+	vext.8		$t2#lo, $a, $a, #3	@ A3
+	veor		$t0, $t0, $r		@ L = E + F
+	vmull.p8	$t2, $t2#lo, $b		@ J = A3*B
+	vext.8		$r#lo, $b, $b, #3	@ B3
+	veor		$t1, $t1, $t3		@ M = G + H
+	vmull.p8	$r, $a, $r#lo		@ I = A*B3
+	veor		$t0#lo, $t0#lo, $t0#hi	@ t0 = (L) (P0 + P1) << 8
+	vand		$t0#hi, $t0#hi, $k48
+	vext.8		$t3#lo, $b, $b, #4	@ B4
+	veor		$t1#lo, $t1#lo, $t1#hi	@ t1 = (M) (P2 + P3) << 16
+	vand		$t1#hi, $t1#hi, $k32
+	vmull.p8	$t3, $a, $t3#lo		@ K = A*B4
+	veor		$t2, $t2, $r		@ N = I + J
+	veor		$t0#lo, $t0#lo, $t0#hi
+	veor		$t1#lo, $t1#lo, $t1#hi
+	veor		$t2#lo, $t2#lo, $t2#hi	@ t2 = (N) (P4 + P5) << 24
+	vand		$t2#hi, $t2#hi, $k16
+	vext.8		$t0, $t0, $t0, #15
+	veor		$t3#lo, $t3#lo, $t3#hi	@ t3 = (K) (P6 + P7) << 32
+	vmov.i64	$t3#hi, #0
+	vext.8		$t1, $t1, $t1, #14
+	veor		$t2#lo, $t2#lo, $t2#hi
+	vmull.p8	$r, $a, $b		@ D = A*B
+	vext.8		$t3, $t3, $t3, #12
+	vext.8		$t2, $t2, $t2, #13
+	veor		$t0, $t0, $t1
+	veor		$t2, $t2, $t3
+	veor		$r, $r, $t0
+	veor		$r, $r, $t2
+
+	vst1.32		{$r}, [r0]
+	ret		@ bx lr
+#endif
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+.size	bn_GF2m_mul_2x2,.-bn_GF2m_mul_2x2
+#if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7
+.align	5
+.LOPENSSL_armcap:
+.word	OPENSSL_armcap_P-.
+#endif
+.asciz	"GF(2^m) Multiplication for ARMv4/NEON, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+.align	5
+
+#if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7
+.comm	OPENSSL_armcap_P,4,4
+#endif
+___
+
+foreach (split("\n",$code)) {
+	s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/geo;
+
+	s/\bq([0-9]+)#(lo|hi)/sprintf "d%d",2*$1+($2 eq "hi")/geo	or
+	s/\bret\b/bx	lr/go		or
+	s/\bbx\s+lr\b/.word\t0xe12fff1e/go;    # make it possible to compile with -march=armv4
+
+	print $_,"\n";
+}
+close STDOUT;   # enforce flush
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/armv4-mont.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/armv4-mont.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0dc4fe9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/armv4-mont.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,756 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2007-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+
+# January 2007.
+
+# Montgomery multiplication for ARMv4.
+#
+# Performance improvement naturally varies among CPU implementations
+# and compilers. The code was observed to provide +65-35% improvement
+# [depending on key length, less for longer keys] on ARM920T, and
+# +115-80% on Intel IXP425. This is compared to pre-bn_mul_mont code
+# base and compiler generated code with in-lined umull and even umlal
+# instructions. The latter means that this code didn't really have an 
+# "advantage" of utilizing some "secret" instruction.
+#
+# The code is interoperable with Thumb ISA and is rather compact, less
+# than 1/2KB. Windows CE port would be trivial, as it's exclusively
+# about decorations, ABI and instruction syntax are identical.
+
+# November 2013
+#
+# Add NEON code path, which handles lengths divisible by 8. RSA/DSA
+# performance improvement on Cortex-A8 is ~45-100% depending on key
+# length, more for longer keys. On Cortex-A15 the span is ~10-105%.
+# On Snapdragon S4 improvement was measured to vary from ~70% to
+# incredible ~380%, yes, 4.8x faster, for RSA4096 sign. But this is
+# rather because original integer-only code seems to perform
+# suboptimally on S4. Situation on Cortex-A9 is unfortunately
+# different. It's being looked into, but the trouble is that
+# performance for vectors longer than 256 bits is actually couple
+# of percent worse than for integer-only code. The code is chosen
+# for execution on all NEON-capable processors, because gain on
+# others outweighs the marginal loss on Cortex-A9.
+
+# September 2015
+#
+# Align Cortex-A9 performance with November 2013 improvements, i.e.
+# NEON code is now ~20-105% faster than integer-only one on this
+# processor. But this optimization further improved performance even
+# on other processors: NEON code path is ~45-180% faster than original
+# integer-only on Cortex-A8, ~10-210% on Cortex-A15, ~70-450% on
+# Snapdragon S4.
+
+$flavour = shift;
+if ($flavour=~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/) { $output=$flavour; undef $flavour; }
+else { while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {} }
+
+if ($flavour && $flavour ne "void") {
+    $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+    ( $xlate="${dir}arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
+    ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
+    die "can't locate arm-xlate.pl";
+
+    open STDOUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output";
+} else {
+    open STDOUT,">$output";
+}
+
+$num="r0";	# starts as num argument, but holds &tp[num-1]
+$ap="r1";
+$bp="r2"; $bi="r2"; $rp="r2";
+$np="r3";
+$tp="r4";
+$aj="r5";
+$nj="r6";
+$tj="r7";
+$n0="r8";
+###########	# r9 is reserved by ELF as platform specific, e.g. TLS pointer
+$alo="r10";	# sl, gcc uses it to keep @GOT
+$ahi="r11";	# fp
+$nlo="r12";	# ip
+###########	# r13 is stack pointer
+$nhi="r14";	# lr
+###########	# r15 is program counter
+
+#### argument block layout relative to &tp[num-1], a.k.a. $num
+$_rp="$num,#12*4";
+# ap permanently resides in r1
+$_bp="$num,#13*4";
+# np permanently resides in r3
+$_n0="$num,#14*4";
+$_num="$num,#15*4";	$_bpend=$_num;
+
+$code=<<___;
+#include "arm_arch.h"
+
+.text
+#if defined(__thumb2__)
+.syntax	unified
+.thumb
+#else
+.code	32
+#endif
+
+#if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7
+.align	5
+.LOPENSSL_armcap:
+.word	OPENSSL_armcap_P-.Lbn_mul_mont
+#endif
+
+.global	bn_mul_mont
+.type	bn_mul_mont,%function
+
+.align	5
+bn_mul_mont:
+.Lbn_mul_mont:
+	ldr	ip,[sp,#4]		@ load num
+	stmdb	sp!,{r0,r2}		@ sp points at argument block
+#if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7
+	tst	ip,#7
+	bne	.Lialu
+	adr	r0,.Lbn_mul_mont
+	ldr	r2,.LOPENSSL_armcap
+	ldr	r0,[r0,r2]
+#ifdef	__APPLE__
+	ldr	r0,[r0]
+#endif
+	tst	r0,#ARMV7_NEON		@ NEON available?
+	ldmia	sp, {r0,r2}
+	beq	.Lialu
+	add	sp,sp,#8
+	b	bn_mul8x_mont_neon
+.align	4
+.Lialu:
+#endif
+	cmp	ip,#2
+	mov	$num,ip			@ load num
+#ifdef	__thumb2__
+	ittt	lt
+#endif
+	movlt	r0,#0
+	addlt	sp,sp,#2*4
+	blt	.Labrt
+
+	stmdb	sp!,{r4-r12,lr}		@ save 10 registers
+
+	mov	$num,$num,lsl#2		@ rescale $num for byte count
+	sub	sp,sp,$num		@ alloca(4*num)
+	sub	sp,sp,#4		@ +extra dword
+	sub	$num,$num,#4		@ "num=num-1"
+	add	$tp,$bp,$num		@ &bp[num-1]
+
+	add	$num,sp,$num		@ $num to point at &tp[num-1]
+	ldr	$n0,[$_n0]		@ &n0
+	ldr	$bi,[$bp]		@ bp[0]
+	ldr	$aj,[$ap],#4		@ ap[0],ap++
+	ldr	$nj,[$np],#4		@ np[0],np++
+	ldr	$n0,[$n0]		@ *n0
+	str	$tp,[$_bpend]		@ save &bp[num]
+
+	umull	$alo,$ahi,$aj,$bi	@ ap[0]*bp[0]
+	str	$n0,[$_n0]		@ save n0 value
+	mul	$n0,$alo,$n0		@ "tp[0]"*n0
+	mov	$nlo,#0
+	umlal	$alo,$nlo,$nj,$n0	@ np[0]*n0+"t[0]"
+	mov	$tp,sp
+
+.L1st:
+	ldr	$aj,[$ap],#4		@ ap[j],ap++
+	mov	$alo,$ahi
+	ldr	$nj,[$np],#4		@ np[j],np++
+	mov	$ahi,#0
+	umlal	$alo,$ahi,$aj,$bi	@ ap[j]*bp[0]
+	mov	$nhi,#0
+	umlal	$nlo,$nhi,$nj,$n0	@ np[j]*n0
+	adds	$nlo,$nlo,$alo
+	str	$nlo,[$tp],#4		@ tp[j-1]=,tp++
+	adc	$nlo,$nhi,#0
+	cmp	$tp,$num
+	bne	.L1st
+
+	adds	$nlo,$nlo,$ahi
+	ldr	$tp,[$_bp]		@ restore bp
+	mov	$nhi,#0
+	ldr	$n0,[$_n0]		@ restore n0
+	adc	$nhi,$nhi,#0
+	str	$nlo,[$num]		@ tp[num-1]=
+	mov	$tj,sp
+	str	$nhi,[$num,#4]		@ tp[num]=
+
+.Louter:
+	sub	$tj,$num,$tj		@ "original" $num-1 value
+	sub	$ap,$ap,$tj		@ "rewind" ap to &ap[1]
+	ldr	$bi,[$tp,#4]!		@ *(++bp)
+	sub	$np,$np,$tj		@ "rewind" np to &np[1]
+	ldr	$aj,[$ap,#-4]		@ ap[0]
+	ldr	$alo,[sp]		@ tp[0]
+	ldr	$nj,[$np,#-4]		@ np[0]
+	ldr	$tj,[sp,#4]		@ tp[1]
+
+	mov	$ahi,#0
+	umlal	$alo,$ahi,$aj,$bi	@ ap[0]*bp[i]+tp[0]
+	str	$tp,[$_bp]		@ save bp
+	mul	$n0,$alo,$n0
+	mov	$nlo,#0
+	umlal	$alo,$nlo,$nj,$n0	@ np[0]*n0+"tp[0]"
+	mov	$tp,sp
+
+.Linner:
+	ldr	$aj,[$ap],#4		@ ap[j],ap++
+	adds	$alo,$ahi,$tj		@ +=tp[j]
+	ldr	$nj,[$np],#4		@ np[j],np++
+	mov	$ahi,#0
+	umlal	$alo,$ahi,$aj,$bi	@ ap[j]*bp[i]
+	mov	$nhi,#0
+	umlal	$nlo,$nhi,$nj,$n0	@ np[j]*n0
+	adc	$ahi,$ahi,#0
+	ldr	$tj,[$tp,#8]		@ tp[j+1]
+	adds	$nlo,$nlo,$alo
+	str	$nlo,[$tp],#4		@ tp[j-1]=,tp++
+	adc	$nlo,$nhi,#0
+	cmp	$tp,$num
+	bne	.Linner
+
+	adds	$nlo,$nlo,$ahi
+	mov	$nhi,#0
+	ldr	$tp,[$_bp]		@ restore bp
+	adc	$nhi,$nhi,#0
+	ldr	$n0,[$_n0]		@ restore n0
+	adds	$nlo,$nlo,$tj
+	ldr	$tj,[$_bpend]		@ restore &bp[num]
+	adc	$nhi,$nhi,#0
+	str	$nlo,[$num]		@ tp[num-1]=
+	str	$nhi,[$num,#4]		@ tp[num]=
+
+	cmp	$tp,$tj
+#ifdef	__thumb2__
+	itt	ne
+#endif
+	movne	$tj,sp
+	bne	.Louter
+
+	ldr	$rp,[$_rp]		@ pull rp
+	mov	$aj,sp
+	add	$num,$num,#4		@ $num to point at &tp[num]
+	sub	$aj,$num,$aj		@ "original" num value
+	mov	$tp,sp			@ "rewind" $tp
+	mov	$ap,$tp			@ "borrow" $ap
+	sub	$np,$np,$aj		@ "rewind" $np to &np[0]
+
+	subs	$tj,$tj,$tj		@ "clear" carry flag
+.Lsub:	ldr	$tj,[$tp],#4
+	ldr	$nj,[$np],#4
+	sbcs	$tj,$tj,$nj		@ tp[j]-np[j]
+	str	$tj,[$rp],#4		@ rp[j]=
+	teq	$tp,$num		@ preserve carry
+	bne	.Lsub
+	sbcs	$nhi,$nhi,#0		@ upmost carry
+	mov	$tp,sp			@ "rewind" $tp
+	sub	$rp,$rp,$aj		@ "rewind" $rp
+
+	and	$ap,$tp,$nhi
+	bic	$np,$rp,$nhi
+	orr	$ap,$ap,$np		@ ap=borrow?tp:rp
+
+.Lcopy:	ldr	$tj,[$ap],#4		@ copy or in-place refresh
+	str	sp,[$tp],#4		@ zap tp
+	str	$tj,[$rp],#4
+	cmp	$tp,$num
+	bne	.Lcopy
+
+	mov	sp,$num
+	add	sp,sp,#4		@ skip over tp[num+1]
+	ldmia	sp!,{r4-r12,lr}		@ restore registers
+	add	sp,sp,#2*4		@ skip over {r0,r2}
+	mov	r0,#1
+.Labrt:
+#if __ARM_ARCH__>=5
+	ret				@ bx lr
+#else
+	tst	lr,#1
+	moveq	pc,lr			@ be binary compatible with V4, yet
+	bx	lr			@ interoperable with Thumb ISA:-)
+#endif
+.size	bn_mul_mont,.-bn_mul_mont
+___
+{
+my ($A0,$A1,$A2,$A3)=map("d$_",(0..3));
+my ($N0,$N1,$N2,$N3)=map("d$_",(4..7));
+my ($Z,$Temp)=("q4","q5");
+my @ACC=map("q$_",(6..13));
+my ($Bi,$Ni,$M0)=map("d$_",(28..31));
+my $zero="$Z#lo";
+my $temp="$Temp#lo";
+
+my ($rptr,$aptr,$bptr,$nptr,$n0,$num)=map("r$_",(0..5));
+my ($tinptr,$toutptr,$inner,$outer,$bnptr)=map("r$_",(6..11));
+
+$code.=<<___;
+#if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7
+.arch	armv7-a
+.fpu	neon
+
+.type	bn_mul8x_mont_neon,%function
+.align	5
+bn_mul8x_mont_neon:
+	mov	ip,sp
+	stmdb	sp!,{r4-r11}
+	vstmdb	sp!,{d8-d15}		@ ABI specification says so
+	ldmia	ip,{r4-r5}		@ load rest of parameter block
+	mov	ip,sp
+
+	cmp	$num,#8
+	bhi	.LNEON_8n
+
+	@ special case for $num==8, everything is in register bank...
+
+	vld1.32		{${Bi}[0]}, [$bptr,:32]!
+	veor		$zero,$zero,$zero
+	sub		$toutptr,sp,$num,lsl#4
+	vld1.32		{$A0-$A3},  [$aptr]!		@ can't specify :32 :-(
+	and		$toutptr,$toutptr,#-64
+	vld1.32		{${M0}[0]}, [$n0,:32]
+	mov		sp,$toutptr			@ alloca
+	vzip.16		$Bi,$zero
+
+	vmull.u32	@ACC[0],$Bi,${A0}[0]
+	vmull.u32	@ACC[1],$Bi,${A0}[1]
+	vmull.u32	@ACC[2],$Bi,${A1}[0]
+	vshl.i64	$Ni,@ACC[0]#hi,#16
+	vmull.u32	@ACC[3],$Bi,${A1}[1]
+
+	vadd.u64	$Ni,$Ni,@ACC[0]#lo
+	veor		$zero,$zero,$zero
+	vmul.u32	$Ni,$Ni,$M0
+
+	vmull.u32	@ACC[4],$Bi,${A2}[0]
+	 vld1.32	{$N0-$N3}, [$nptr]!
+	vmull.u32	@ACC[5],$Bi,${A2}[1]
+	vmull.u32	@ACC[6],$Bi,${A3}[0]
+	vzip.16		$Ni,$zero
+	vmull.u32	@ACC[7],$Bi,${A3}[1]
+
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[0],$Ni,${N0}[0]
+	sub		$outer,$num,#1
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[1],$Ni,${N0}[1]
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[2],$Ni,${N1}[0]
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[3],$Ni,${N1}[1]
+
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[4],$Ni,${N2}[0]
+	vmov		$Temp,@ACC[0]
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[5],$Ni,${N2}[1]
+	vmov		@ACC[0],@ACC[1]
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[6],$Ni,${N3}[0]
+	vmov		@ACC[1],@ACC[2]
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[7],$Ni,${N3}[1]
+	vmov		@ACC[2],@ACC[3]
+	vmov		@ACC[3],@ACC[4]
+	vshr.u64	$temp,$temp,#16
+	vmov		@ACC[4],@ACC[5]
+	vmov		@ACC[5],@ACC[6]
+	vadd.u64	$temp,$temp,$Temp#hi
+	vmov		@ACC[6],@ACC[7]
+	veor		@ACC[7],@ACC[7]
+	vshr.u64	$temp,$temp,#16
+
+	b	.LNEON_outer8
+
+.align	4
+.LNEON_outer8:
+	vld1.32		{${Bi}[0]}, [$bptr,:32]!
+	veor		$zero,$zero,$zero
+	vzip.16		$Bi,$zero
+	vadd.u64	@ACC[0]#lo,@ACC[0]#lo,$temp
+
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[0],$Bi,${A0}[0]
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[1],$Bi,${A0}[1]
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[2],$Bi,${A1}[0]
+	vshl.i64	$Ni,@ACC[0]#hi,#16
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[3],$Bi,${A1}[1]
+
+	vadd.u64	$Ni,$Ni,@ACC[0]#lo
+	veor		$zero,$zero,$zero
+	subs		$outer,$outer,#1
+	vmul.u32	$Ni,$Ni,$M0
+
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[4],$Bi,${A2}[0]
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[5],$Bi,${A2}[1]
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[6],$Bi,${A3}[0]
+	vzip.16		$Ni,$zero
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[7],$Bi,${A3}[1]
+
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[0],$Ni,${N0}[0]
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[1],$Ni,${N0}[1]
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[2],$Ni,${N1}[0]
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[3],$Ni,${N1}[1]
+
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[4],$Ni,${N2}[0]
+	vmov		$Temp,@ACC[0]
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[5],$Ni,${N2}[1]
+	vmov		@ACC[0],@ACC[1]
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[6],$Ni,${N3}[0]
+	vmov		@ACC[1],@ACC[2]
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[7],$Ni,${N3}[1]
+	vmov		@ACC[2],@ACC[3]
+	vmov		@ACC[3],@ACC[4]
+	vshr.u64	$temp,$temp,#16
+	vmov		@ACC[4],@ACC[5]
+	vmov		@ACC[5],@ACC[6]
+	vadd.u64	$temp,$temp,$Temp#hi
+	vmov		@ACC[6],@ACC[7]
+	veor		@ACC[7],@ACC[7]
+	vshr.u64	$temp,$temp,#16
+
+	bne	.LNEON_outer8
+
+	vadd.u64	@ACC[0]#lo,@ACC[0]#lo,$temp
+	mov		$toutptr,sp
+	vshr.u64	$temp,@ACC[0]#lo,#16
+	mov		$inner,$num
+	vadd.u64	@ACC[0]#hi,@ACC[0]#hi,$temp
+	add		$tinptr,sp,#96
+	vshr.u64	$temp,@ACC[0]#hi,#16
+	vzip.16		@ACC[0]#lo,@ACC[0]#hi
+
+	b	.LNEON_tail_entry
+
+.align	4
+.LNEON_8n:
+	veor		@ACC[0],@ACC[0],@ACC[0]
+	 sub		$toutptr,sp,#128
+	veor		@ACC[1],@ACC[1],@ACC[1]
+	 sub		$toutptr,$toutptr,$num,lsl#4
+	veor		@ACC[2],@ACC[2],@ACC[2]
+	 and		$toutptr,$toutptr,#-64
+	veor		@ACC[3],@ACC[3],@ACC[3]
+	 mov		sp,$toutptr			@ alloca
+	veor		@ACC[4],@ACC[4],@ACC[4]
+	 add		$toutptr,$toutptr,#256
+	veor		@ACC[5],@ACC[5],@ACC[5]
+	 sub		$inner,$num,#8
+	veor		@ACC[6],@ACC[6],@ACC[6]
+	veor		@ACC[7],@ACC[7],@ACC[7]
+
+.LNEON_8n_init:
+	vst1.64		{@ACC[0]-@ACC[1]},[$toutptr,:256]!
+	subs		$inner,$inner,#8
+	vst1.64		{@ACC[2]-@ACC[3]},[$toutptr,:256]!
+	vst1.64		{@ACC[4]-@ACC[5]},[$toutptr,:256]!
+	vst1.64		{@ACC[6]-@ACC[7]},[$toutptr,:256]!
+	bne		.LNEON_8n_init
+
+	add		$tinptr,sp,#256
+	vld1.32		{$A0-$A3},[$aptr]!
+	add		$bnptr,sp,#8
+	vld1.32		{${M0}[0]},[$n0,:32]
+	mov		$outer,$num
+	b		.LNEON_8n_outer
+
+.align	4
+.LNEON_8n_outer:
+	vld1.32		{${Bi}[0]},[$bptr,:32]!	@ *b++
+	veor		$zero,$zero,$zero
+	vzip.16		$Bi,$zero
+	add		$toutptr,sp,#128
+	vld1.32		{$N0-$N3},[$nptr]!
+
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[0],$Bi,${A0}[0]
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[1],$Bi,${A0}[1]
+	 veor		$zero,$zero,$zero
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[2],$Bi,${A1}[0]
+	 vshl.i64	$Ni,@ACC[0]#hi,#16
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[3],$Bi,${A1}[1]
+	 vadd.u64	$Ni,$Ni,@ACC[0]#lo
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[4],$Bi,${A2}[0]
+	 vmul.u32	$Ni,$Ni,$M0
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[5],$Bi,${A2}[1]
+	vst1.32		{$Bi},[sp,:64]		@ put aside smashed b[8*i+0]
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[6],$Bi,${A3}[0]
+	 vzip.16	$Ni,$zero
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[7],$Bi,${A3}[1]
+___
+for ($i=0; $i<7;) {
+$code.=<<___;
+	vld1.32		{${Bi}[0]},[$bptr,:32]!	@ *b++
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[0],$Ni,${N0}[0]
+	veor		$temp,$temp,$temp
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[1],$Ni,${N0}[1]
+	vzip.16		$Bi,$temp
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[2],$Ni,${N1}[0]
+	 vshr.u64	@ACC[0]#lo,@ACC[0]#lo,#16
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[3],$Ni,${N1}[1]
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[4],$Ni,${N2}[0]
+	 vadd.u64	@ACC[0]#lo,@ACC[0]#lo,@ACC[0]#hi
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[5],$Ni,${N2}[1]
+	 vshr.u64	@ACC[0]#lo,@ACC[0]#lo,#16
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[6],$Ni,${N3}[0]
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[7],$Ni,${N3}[1]
+	 vadd.u64	@ACC[1]#lo,@ACC[1]#lo,@ACC[0]#lo
+	vst1.32		{$Ni},[$bnptr,:64]!	@ put aside smashed m[8*i+$i]
+___
+	push(@ACC,shift(@ACC));	$i++;
+$code.=<<___;
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[0],$Bi,${A0}[0]
+	vld1.64		{@ACC[7]},[$tinptr,:128]!
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[1],$Bi,${A0}[1]
+	 veor		$zero,$zero,$zero
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[2],$Bi,${A1}[0]
+	 vshl.i64	$Ni,@ACC[0]#hi,#16
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[3],$Bi,${A1}[1]
+	 vadd.u64	$Ni,$Ni,@ACC[0]#lo
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[4],$Bi,${A2}[0]
+	 vmul.u32	$Ni,$Ni,$M0
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[5],$Bi,${A2}[1]
+	vst1.32		{$Bi},[$bnptr,:64]!	@ put aside smashed b[8*i+$i]
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[6],$Bi,${A3}[0]
+	 vzip.16	$Ni,$zero
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[7],$Bi,${A3}[1]
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	vld1.32		{$Bi},[sp,:64]		@ pull smashed b[8*i+0]
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[0],$Ni,${N0}[0]
+	vld1.32		{$A0-$A3},[$aptr]!
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[1],$Ni,${N0}[1]
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[2],$Ni,${N1}[0]
+	 vshr.u64	@ACC[0]#lo,@ACC[0]#lo,#16
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[3],$Ni,${N1}[1]
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[4],$Ni,${N2}[0]
+	 vadd.u64	@ACC[0]#lo,@ACC[0]#lo,@ACC[0]#hi
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[5],$Ni,${N2}[1]
+	 vshr.u64	@ACC[0]#lo,@ACC[0]#lo,#16
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[6],$Ni,${N3}[0]
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[7],$Ni,${N3}[1]
+	 vadd.u64	@ACC[1]#lo,@ACC[1]#lo,@ACC[0]#lo
+	vst1.32		{$Ni},[$bnptr,:64]	@ put aside smashed m[8*i+$i]
+	add		$bnptr,sp,#8		@ rewind
+___
+	push(@ACC,shift(@ACC));
+$code.=<<___;
+	sub		$inner,$num,#8
+	b		.LNEON_8n_inner
+
+.align	4
+.LNEON_8n_inner:
+	subs		$inner,$inner,#8
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[0],$Bi,${A0}[0]
+	vld1.64		{@ACC[7]},[$tinptr,:128]
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[1],$Bi,${A0}[1]
+	vld1.32		{$Ni},[$bnptr,:64]!	@ pull smashed m[8*i+0]
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[2],$Bi,${A1}[0]
+	vld1.32		{$N0-$N3},[$nptr]!
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[3],$Bi,${A1}[1]
+	it		ne
+	addne		$tinptr,$tinptr,#16	@ don't advance in last iteration
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[4],$Bi,${A2}[0]
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[5],$Bi,${A2}[1]
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[6],$Bi,${A3}[0]
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[7],$Bi,${A3}[1]
+___
+for ($i=1; $i<8; $i++) {
+$code.=<<___;
+	vld1.32		{$Bi},[$bnptr,:64]!	@ pull smashed b[8*i+$i]
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[0],$Ni,${N0}[0]
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[1],$Ni,${N0}[1]
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[2],$Ni,${N1}[0]
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[3],$Ni,${N1}[1]
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[4],$Ni,${N2}[0]
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[5],$Ni,${N2}[1]
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[6],$Ni,${N3}[0]
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[7],$Ni,${N3}[1]
+	vst1.64		{@ACC[0]},[$toutptr,:128]!
+___
+	push(@ACC,shift(@ACC));
+$code.=<<___;
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[0],$Bi,${A0}[0]
+	vld1.64		{@ACC[7]},[$tinptr,:128]
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[1],$Bi,${A0}[1]
+	vld1.32		{$Ni},[$bnptr,:64]!	@ pull smashed m[8*i+$i]
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[2],$Bi,${A1}[0]
+	it		ne
+	addne		$tinptr,$tinptr,#16	@ don't advance in last iteration
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[3],$Bi,${A1}[1]
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[4],$Bi,${A2}[0]
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[5],$Bi,${A2}[1]
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[6],$Bi,${A3}[0]
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[7],$Bi,${A3}[1]
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	it		eq
+	subeq		$aptr,$aptr,$num,lsl#2	@ rewind
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[0],$Ni,${N0}[0]
+	vld1.32		{$Bi},[sp,:64]		@ pull smashed b[8*i+0]
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[1],$Ni,${N0}[1]
+	vld1.32		{$A0-$A3},[$aptr]!
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[2],$Ni,${N1}[0]
+	add		$bnptr,sp,#8		@ rewind
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[3],$Ni,${N1}[1]
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[4],$Ni,${N2}[0]
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[5],$Ni,${N2}[1]
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[6],$Ni,${N3}[0]
+	vst1.64		{@ACC[0]},[$toutptr,:128]!
+	vmlal.u32	@ACC[7],$Ni,${N3}[1]
+
+	bne		.LNEON_8n_inner
+___
+	push(@ACC,shift(@ACC));
+$code.=<<___;
+	add		$tinptr,sp,#128
+	vst1.64		{@ACC[0]-@ACC[1]},[$toutptr,:256]!
+	veor		q2,q2,q2		@ $N0-$N1
+	vst1.64		{@ACC[2]-@ACC[3]},[$toutptr,:256]!
+	veor		q3,q3,q3		@ $N2-$N3
+	vst1.64		{@ACC[4]-@ACC[5]},[$toutptr,:256]!
+	vst1.64		{@ACC[6]},[$toutptr,:128]
+
+	subs		$outer,$outer,#8
+	vld1.64		{@ACC[0]-@ACC[1]},[$tinptr,:256]!
+	vld1.64		{@ACC[2]-@ACC[3]},[$tinptr,:256]!
+	vld1.64		{@ACC[4]-@ACC[5]},[$tinptr,:256]!
+	vld1.64		{@ACC[6]-@ACC[7]},[$tinptr,:256]!
+
+	itt		ne
+	subne		$nptr,$nptr,$num,lsl#2	@ rewind
+	bne		.LNEON_8n_outer
+
+	add		$toutptr,sp,#128
+	vst1.64		{q2-q3}, [sp,:256]!	@ start wiping stack frame
+	vshr.u64	$temp,@ACC[0]#lo,#16
+	vst1.64		{q2-q3},[sp,:256]!
+	vadd.u64	@ACC[0]#hi,@ACC[0]#hi,$temp
+	vst1.64		{q2-q3}, [sp,:256]!
+	vshr.u64	$temp,@ACC[0]#hi,#16
+	vst1.64		{q2-q3}, [sp,:256]!
+	vzip.16		@ACC[0]#lo,@ACC[0]#hi
+
+	mov		$inner,$num
+	b		.LNEON_tail_entry
+
+.align	4
+.LNEON_tail:
+	vadd.u64	@ACC[0]#lo,@ACC[0]#lo,$temp
+	vshr.u64	$temp,@ACC[0]#lo,#16
+	vld1.64		{@ACC[2]-@ACC[3]}, [$tinptr, :256]!
+	vadd.u64	@ACC[0]#hi,@ACC[0]#hi,$temp
+	vld1.64		{@ACC[4]-@ACC[5]}, [$tinptr, :256]!
+	vshr.u64	$temp,@ACC[0]#hi,#16
+	vld1.64		{@ACC[6]-@ACC[7]}, [$tinptr, :256]!
+	vzip.16		@ACC[0]#lo,@ACC[0]#hi
+
+.LNEON_tail_entry:
+___
+for ($i=1; $i<8; $i++) {
+$code.=<<___;
+	vadd.u64	@ACC[1]#lo,@ACC[1]#lo,$temp
+	vst1.32		{@ACC[0]#lo[0]}, [$toutptr, :32]!
+	vshr.u64	$temp,@ACC[1]#lo,#16
+	vadd.u64	@ACC[1]#hi,@ACC[1]#hi,$temp
+	vshr.u64	$temp,@ACC[1]#hi,#16
+	vzip.16		@ACC[1]#lo,@ACC[1]#hi
+___
+	push(@ACC,shift(@ACC));
+}
+	push(@ACC,shift(@ACC));
+$code.=<<___;
+	vld1.64		{@ACC[0]-@ACC[1]}, [$tinptr, :256]!
+	subs		$inner,$inner,#8
+	vst1.32		{@ACC[7]#lo[0]},   [$toutptr, :32]!
+	bne	.LNEON_tail
+
+	vst1.32	{${temp}[0]}, [$toutptr, :32]		@ top-most bit
+	sub	$nptr,$nptr,$num,lsl#2			@ rewind $nptr
+	subs	$aptr,sp,#0				@ clear carry flag
+	add	$bptr,sp,$num,lsl#2
+
+.LNEON_sub:
+	ldmia	$aptr!, {r4-r7}
+	ldmia	$nptr!, {r8-r11}
+	sbcs	r8, r4,r8
+	sbcs	r9, r5,r9
+	sbcs	r10,r6,r10
+	sbcs	r11,r7,r11
+	teq	$aptr,$bptr				@ preserves carry
+	stmia	$rptr!, {r8-r11}
+	bne	.LNEON_sub
+
+	ldr	r10, [$aptr]				@ load top-most bit
+	mov	r11,sp
+	veor	q0,q0,q0
+	sub	r11,$bptr,r11				@ this is num*4
+	veor	q1,q1,q1
+	mov	$aptr,sp
+	sub	$rptr,$rptr,r11				@ rewind $rptr
+	mov	$nptr,$bptr				@ second 3/4th of frame
+	sbcs	r10,r10,#0				@ result is carry flag
+
+.LNEON_copy_n_zap:
+	ldmia	$aptr!, {r4-r7}
+	ldmia	$rptr,  {r8-r11}
+	it	cc
+	movcc	r8, r4
+	vst1.64	{q0-q1}, [$nptr,:256]!			@ wipe
+	itt	cc
+	movcc	r9, r5
+	movcc	r10,r6
+	vst1.64	{q0-q1}, [$nptr,:256]!			@ wipe
+	it	cc
+	movcc	r11,r7
+	ldmia	$aptr, {r4-r7}
+	stmia	$rptr!, {r8-r11}
+	sub	$aptr,$aptr,#16
+	ldmia	$rptr, {r8-r11}
+	it	cc
+	movcc	r8, r4
+	vst1.64	{q0-q1}, [$aptr,:256]!			@ wipe
+	itt	cc
+	movcc	r9, r5
+	movcc	r10,r6
+	vst1.64	{q0-q1}, [$nptr,:256]!			@ wipe
+	it	cc
+	movcc	r11,r7
+	teq	$aptr,$bptr				@ preserves carry
+	stmia	$rptr!, {r8-r11}
+	bne	.LNEON_copy_n_zap
+
+	mov	sp,ip
+        vldmia  sp!,{d8-d15}
+        ldmia   sp!,{r4-r11}
+	ret						@ bx lr
+.size	bn_mul8x_mont_neon,.-bn_mul8x_mont_neon
+#endif
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+.asciz	"Montgomery multiplication for ARMv4/NEON, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+.align	2
+#if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7
+.comm	OPENSSL_armcap_P,4,4
+#endif
+___
+
+foreach (split("\n",$code)) {
+	s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/ge;
+
+	s/\bq([0-9]+)#(lo|hi)/sprintf "d%d",2*$1+($2 eq "hi")/ge	or
+	s/\bret\b/bx    lr/g						or
+	s/\bbx\s+lr\b/.word\t0xe12fff1e/g;	# make it possible to compile with -march=armv4
+
+	print $_,"\n";
+}
+
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/armv8-mont.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/armv8-mont.pl
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..5d5af1b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/armv8-mont.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,1510 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+
+# March 2015
+#
+# "Teaser" Montgomery multiplication module for ARMv8. Needs more
+# work. While it does improve RSA sign performance by 20-30% (less for
+# longer keys) on most processors, for some reason RSA2048 is not
+# faster and RSA4096 goes 15-20% slower on Cortex-A57. Multiplication
+# instruction issue rate is limited on processor in question, meaning
+# that dedicated squaring procedure is a must. Well, actually all
+# contemporary AArch64 processors seem to have limited multiplication
+# issue rate, i.e. they can't issue multiplication every cycle, which
+# explains moderate improvement coefficients in comparison to
+# compiler-generated code. Recall that compiler is instructed to use
+# umulh and therefore uses same amount of multiplication instructions
+# to do the job. Assembly's edge is to minimize number of "collateral"
+# instructions and of course instruction scheduling.
+#
+# April 2015
+#
+# Squaring procedure that handles lengths divisible by 8 improves
+# RSA/DSA performance by 25-40-60% depending on processor and key
+# length. Overall improvement coefficients are always positive in
+# comparison to compiler-generated code. On Cortex-A57 improvement
+# is still modest on longest key lengths, while others exhibit e.g.
+# 50-70% improvement for RSA4096 sign. RSA2048 sign is ~25% faster
+# on Cortex-A57 and ~60-100% faster on others.
+
+$flavour = shift;
+$output  = shift;
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+( $xlate="${dir}arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
+( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
+die "can't locate arm-xlate.pl";
+
+open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output";
+*STDOUT=*OUT;
+
+($lo0,$hi0,$aj,$m0,$alo,$ahi,
+ $lo1,$hi1,$nj,$m1,$nlo,$nhi,
+ $ovf, $i,$j,$tp,$tj) = map("x$_",6..17,19..24);
+
+# int bn_mul_mont(
+$rp="x0";	# BN_ULONG *rp,
+$ap="x1";	# const BN_ULONG *ap,
+$bp="x2";	# const BN_ULONG *bp,
+$np="x3";	# const BN_ULONG *np,
+$n0="x4";	# const BN_ULONG *n0,
+$num="x5";	# int num);
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.text
+
+.globl	bn_mul_mont
+.type	bn_mul_mont,%function
+.align	5
+bn_mul_mont:
+	tst	$num,#7
+	b.eq	__bn_sqr8x_mont
+	tst	$num,#3
+	b.eq	__bn_mul4x_mont
+.Lmul_mont:
+	stp	x29,x30,[sp,#-64]!
+	add	x29,sp,#0
+	stp	x19,x20,[sp,#16]
+	stp	x21,x22,[sp,#32]
+	stp	x23,x24,[sp,#48]
+
+	ldr	$m0,[$bp],#8		// bp[0]
+	sub	$tp,sp,$num,lsl#3
+	ldp	$hi0,$aj,[$ap],#16	// ap[0..1]
+	lsl	$num,$num,#3
+	ldr	$n0,[$n0]		// *n0
+	and	$tp,$tp,#-16		// ABI says so
+	ldp	$hi1,$nj,[$np],#16	// np[0..1]
+
+	mul	$lo0,$hi0,$m0		// ap[0]*bp[0]
+	sub	$j,$num,#16		// j=num-2
+	umulh	$hi0,$hi0,$m0
+	mul	$alo,$aj,$m0		// ap[1]*bp[0]
+	umulh	$ahi,$aj,$m0
+
+	mul	$m1,$lo0,$n0		// "tp[0]"*n0
+	mov	sp,$tp			// alloca
+
+	// (*)	mul	$lo1,$hi1,$m1	// np[0]*m1
+	umulh	$hi1,$hi1,$m1
+	mul	$nlo,$nj,$m1		// np[1]*m1
+	// (*)	adds	$lo1,$lo1,$lo0	// discarded
+	// (*)	As for removal of first multiplication and addition
+	//	instructions. The outcome of first addition is
+	//	guaranteed to be zero, which leaves two computationally
+	//	significant outcomes: it either carries or not. Then
+	//	question is when does it carry? Is there alternative
+	//	way to deduce it? If you follow operations, you can
+	//	observe that condition for carry is quite simple:
+	//	$lo0 being non-zero. So that carry can be calculated
+	//	by adding -1 to $lo0. That's what next instruction does.
+	subs	xzr,$lo0,#1		// (*)
+	umulh	$nhi,$nj,$m1
+	adc	$hi1,$hi1,xzr
+	cbz	$j,.L1st_skip
+
+.L1st:
+	ldr	$aj,[$ap],#8
+	adds	$lo0,$alo,$hi0
+	sub	$j,$j,#8		// j--
+	adc	$hi0,$ahi,xzr
+
+	ldr	$nj,[$np],#8
+	adds	$lo1,$nlo,$hi1
+	mul	$alo,$aj,$m0		// ap[j]*bp[0]
+	adc	$hi1,$nhi,xzr
+	umulh	$ahi,$aj,$m0
+
+	adds	$lo1,$lo1,$lo0
+	mul	$nlo,$nj,$m1		// np[j]*m1
+	adc	$hi1,$hi1,xzr
+	umulh	$nhi,$nj,$m1
+	str	$lo1,[$tp],#8		// tp[j-1]
+	cbnz	$j,.L1st
+
+.L1st_skip:
+	adds	$lo0,$alo,$hi0
+	sub	$ap,$ap,$num		// rewind $ap
+	adc	$hi0,$ahi,xzr
+
+	adds	$lo1,$nlo,$hi1
+	sub	$np,$np,$num		// rewind $np
+	adc	$hi1,$nhi,xzr
+
+	adds	$lo1,$lo1,$lo0
+	sub	$i,$num,#8		// i=num-1
+	adcs	$hi1,$hi1,$hi0
+
+	adc	$ovf,xzr,xzr		// upmost overflow bit
+	stp	$lo1,$hi1,[$tp]
+
+.Louter:
+	ldr	$m0,[$bp],#8		// bp[i]
+	ldp	$hi0,$aj,[$ap],#16
+	ldr	$tj,[sp]		// tp[0]
+	add	$tp,sp,#8
+
+	mul	$lo0,$hi0,$m0		// ap[0]*bp[i]
+	sub	$j,$num,#16		// j=num-2
+	umulh	$hi0,$hi0,$m0
+	ldp	$hi1,$nj,[$np],#16
+	mul	$alo,$aj,$m0		// ap[1]*bp[i]
+	adds	$lo0,$lo0,$tj
+	umulh	$ahi,$aj,$m0
+	adc	$hi0,$hi0,xzr
+
+	mul	$m1,$lo0,$n0
+	sub	$i,$i,#8		// i--
+
+	// (*)	mul	$lo1,$hi1,$m1	// np[0]*m1
+	umulh	$hi1,$hi1,$m1
+	mul	$nlo,$nj,$m1		// np[1]*m1
+	// (*)	adds	$lo1,$lo1,$lo0
+	subs	xzr,$lo0,#1		// (*)
+	umulh	$nhi,$nj,$m1
+	cbz	$j,.Linner_skip
+
+.Linner:
+	ldr	$aj,[$ap],#8
+	adc	$hi1,$hi1,xzr
+	ldr	$tj,[$tp],#8		// tp[j]
+	adds	$lo0,$alo,$hi0
+	sub	$j,$j,#8		// j--
+	adc	$hi0,$ahi,xzr
+
+	adds	$lo1,$nlo,$hi1
+	ldr	$nj,[$np],#8
+	adc	$hi1,$nhi,xzr
+
+	mul	$alo,$aj,$m0		// ap[j]*bp[i]
+	adds	$lo0,$lo0,$tj
+	umulh	$ahi,$aj,$m0
+	adc	$hi0,$hi0,xzr
+
+	mul	$nlo,$nj,$m1		// np[j]*m1
+	adds	$lo1,$lo1,$lo0
+	umulh	$nhi,$nj,$m1
+	str	$lo1,[$tp,#-16]		// tp[j-1]
+	cbnz	$j,.Linner
+
+.Linner_skip:
+	ldr	$tj,[$tp],#8		// tp[j]
+	adc	$hi1,$hi1,xzr
+	adds	$lo0,$alo,$hi0
+	sub	$ap,$ap,$num		// rewind $ap
+	adc	$hi0,$ahi,xzr
+
+	adds	$lo1,$nlo,$hi1
+	sub	$np,$np,$num		// rewind $np
+	adcs	$hi1,$nhi,$ovf
+	adc	$ovf,xzr,xzr
+
+	adds	$lo0,$lo0,$tj
+	adc	$hi0,$hi0,xzr
+
+	adds	$lo1,$lo1,$lo0
+	adcs	$hi1,$hi1,$hi0
+	adc	$ovf,$ovf,xzr		// upmost overflow bit
+	stp	$lo1,$hi1,[$tp,#-16]
+
+	cbnz	$i,.Louter
+
+	// Final step. We see if result is larger than modulus, and
+	// if it is, subtract the modulus. But comparison implies
+	// subtraction. So we subtract modulus, see if it borrowed,
+	// and conditionally copy original value.
+	ldr	$tj,[sp]		// tp[0]
+	add	$tp,sp,#8
+	ldr	$nj,[$np],#8		// np[0]
+	subs	$j,$num,#8		// j=num-1 and clear borrow
+	mov	$ap,$rp
+.Lsub:
+	sbcs	$aj,$tj,$nj		// tp[j]-np[j]
+	ldr	$tj,[$tp],#8
+	sub	$j,$j,#8		// j--
+	ldr	$nj,[$np],#8
+	str	$aj,[$ap],#8		// rp[j]=tp[j]-np[j]
+	cbnz	$j,.Lsub
+
+	sbcs	$aj,$tj,$nj
+	sbcs	$ovf,$ovf,xzr		// did it borrow?
+	str	$aj,[$ap],#8		// rp[num-1]
+
+	ldr	$tj,[sp]		// tp[0]
+	add	$tp,sp,#8
+	ldr	$aj,[$rp],#8		// rp[0]
+	sub	$num,$num,#8		// num--
+	nop
+.Lcond_copy:
+	sub	$num,$num,#8		// num--
+	csel	$nj,$tj,$aj,lo		// did it borrow?
+	ldr	$tj,[$tp],#8
+	ldr	$aj,[$rp],#8
+	str	xzr,[$tp,#-16]		// wipe tp
+	str	$nj,[$rp,#-16]
+	cbnz	$num,.Lcond_copy
+
+	csel	$nj,$tj,$aj,lo
+	str	xzr,[$tp,#-8]		// wipe tp
+	str	$nj,[$rp,#-8]
+
+	ldp	x19,x20,[x29,#16]
+	mov	sp,x29
+	ldp	x21,x22,[x29,#32]
+	mov	x0,#1
+	ldp	x23,x24,[x29,#48]
+	ldr	x29,[sp],#64
+	ret
+.size	bn_mul_mont,.-bn_mul_mont
+___
+{
+########################################################################
+# Following is ARMv8 adaptation of sqrx8x_mont from x86_64-mont5 module.
+
+my ($a0,$a1,$a2,$a3,$a4,$a5,$a6,$a7)=map("x$_",(6..13));
+my ($t0,$t1,$t2,$t3)=map("x$_",(14..17));
+my ($acc0,$acc1,$acc2,$acc3,$acc4,$acc5,$acc6,$acc7)=map("x$_",(19..26));
+my ($cnt,$carry,$topmost)=("x27","x28","x30");
+my ($tp,$ap_end,$na0)=($bp,$np,$carry);
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.type	__bn_sqr8x_mont,%function
+.align	5
+__bn_sqr8x_mont:
+	cmp	$ap,$bp
+	b.ne	__bn_mul4x_mont
+.Lsqr8x_mont:
+	stp	x29,x30,[sp,#-128]!
+	add	x29,sp,#0
+	stp	x19,x20,[sp,#16]
+	stp	x21,x22,[sp,#32]
+	stp	x23,x24,[sp,#48]
+	stp	x25,x26,[sp,#64]
+	stp	x27,x28,[sp,#80]
+	stp	$rp,$np,[sp,#96]	// offload rp and np
+
+	ldp	$a0,$a1,[$ap,#8*0]
+	ldp	$a2,$a3,[$ap,#8*2]
+	ldp	$a4,$a5,[$ap,#8*4]
+	ldp	$a6,$a7,[$ap,#8*6]
+
+	sub	$tp,sp,$num,lsl#4
+	lsl	$num,$num,#3
+	ldr	$n0,[$n0]		// *n0
+	mov	sp,$tp			// alloca
+	sub	$cnt,$num,#8*8
+	b	.Lsqr8x_zero_start
+
+.Lsqr8x_zero:
+	sub	$cnt,$cnt,#8*8
+	stp	xzr,xzr,[$tp,#8*0]
+	stp	xzr,xzr,[$tp,#8*2]
+	stp	xzr,xzr,[$tp,#8*4]
+	stp	xzr,xzr,[$tp,#8*6]
+.Lsqr8x_zero_start:
+	stp	xzr,xzr,[$tp,#8*8]
+	stp	xzr,xzr,[$tp,#8*10]
+	stp	xzr,xzr,[$tp,#8*12]
+	stp	xzr,xzr,[$tp,#8*14]
+	add	$tp,$tp,#8*16
+	cbnz	$cnt,.Lsqr8x_zero
+
+	add	$ap_end,$ap,$num
+	add	$ap,$ap,#8*8
+	mov	$acc0,xzr
+	mov	$acc1,xzr
+	mov	$acc2,xzr
+	mov	$acc3,xzr
+	mov	$acc4,xzr
+	mov	$acc5,xzr
+	mov	$acc6,xzr
+	mov	$acc7,xzr
+	mov	$tp,sp
+	str	$n0,[x29,#112]		// offload n0
+
+	// Multiply everything but a[i]*a[i]
+.align	4
+.Lsqr8x_outer_loop:
+        //                                                 a[1]a[0]	(i)
+        //                                             a[2]a[0]
+        //                                         a[3]a[0]
+        //                                     a[4]a[0]
+        //                                 a[5]a[0]
+        //                             a[6]a[0]
+        //                         a[7]a[0]
+        //                                         a[2]a[1]		(ii)
+        //                                     a[3]a[1]
+        //                                 a[4]a[1]
+        //                             a[5]a[1]
+        //                         a[6]a[1]
+        //                     a[7]a[1]
+        //                                 a[3]a[2]			(iii)
+        //                             a[4]a[2]
+        //                         a[5]a[2]
+        //                     a[6]a[2]
+        //                 a[7]a[2]
+        //                         a[4]a[3]				(iv)
+        //                     a[5]a[3]
+        //                 a[6]a[3]
+        //             a[7]a[3]
+        //                 a[5]a[4]					(v)
+        //             a[6]a[4]
+        //         a[7]a[4]
+        //         a[6]a[5]						(vi)
+        //     a[7]a[5]
+        // a[7]a[6]							(vii)
+
+	mul	$t0,$a1,$a0		// lo(a[1..7]*a[0])		(i)
+	mul	$t1,$a2,$a0
+	mul	$t2,$a3,$a0
+	mul	$t3,$a4,$a0
+	adds	$acc1,$acc1,$t0		// t[1]+lo(a[1]*a[0])
+	mul	$t0,$a5,$a0
+	adcs	$acc2,$acc2,$t1
+	mul	$t1,$a6,$a0
+	adcs	$acc3,$acc3,$t2
+	mul	$t2,$a7,$a0
+	adcs	$acc4,$acc4,$t3
+	umulh	$t3,$a1,$a0		// hi(a[1..7]*a[0])
+	adcs	$acc5,$acc5,$t0
+	umulh	$t0,$a2,$a0
+	adcs	$acc6,$acc6,$t1
+	umulh	$t1,$a3,$a0
+	adcs	$acc7,$acc7,$t2
+	umulh	$t2,$a4,$a0
+	stp	$acc0,$acc1,[$tp],#8*2	// t[0..1]
+	adc	$acc0,xzr,xzr		// t[8]
+	adds	$acc2,$acc2,$t3		// t[2]+lo(a[1]*a[0])
+	umulh	$t3,$a5,$a0
+	adcs	$acc3,$acc3,$t0
+	umulh	$t0,$a6,$a0
+	adcs	$acc4,$acc4,$t1
+	umulh	$t1,$a7,$a0
+	adcs	$acc5,$acc5,$t2
+	 mul	$t2,$a2,$a1		// lo(a[2..7]*a[1])		(ii)
+	adcs	$acc6,$acc6,$t3
+	 mul	$t3,$a3,$a1
+	adcs	$acc7,$acc7,$t0
+	 mul	$t0,$a4,$a1
+	adc	$acc0,$acc0,$t1
+
+	mul	$t1,$a5,$a1
+	adds	$acc3,$acc3,$t2
+	mul	$t2,$a6,$a1
+	adcs	$acc4,$acc4,$t3
+	mul	$t3,$a7,$a1
+	adcs	$acc5,$acc5,$t0
+	umulh	$t0,$a2,$a1		// hi(a[2..7]*a[1])
+	adcs	$acc6,$acc6,$t1
+	umulh	$t1,$a3,$a1
+	adcs	$acc7,$acc7,$t2
+	umulh	$t2,$a4,$a1
+	adcs	$acc0,$acc0,$t3
+	umulh	$t3,$a5,$a1
+	stp	$acc2,$acc3,[$tp],#8*2	// t[2..3]
+	adc	$acc1,xzr,xzr		// t[9]
+	adds	$acc4,$acc4,$t0
+	umulh	$t0,$a6,$a1
+	adcs	$acc5,$acc5,$t1
+	umulh	$t1,$a7,$a1
+	adcs	$acc6,$acc6,$t2
+	 mul	$t2,$a3,$a2		// lo(a[3..7]*a[2])		(iii)
+	adcs	$acc7,$acc7,$t3
+	 mul	$t3,$a4,$a2
+	adcs	$acc0,$acc0,$t0
+	 mul	$t0,$a5,$a2
+	adc	$acc1,$acc1,$t1
+
+	mul	$t1,$a6,$a2
+	adds	$acc5,$acc5,$t2
+	mul	$t2,$a7,$a2
+	adcs	$acc6,$acc6,$t3
+	umulh	$t3,$a3,$a2		// hi(a[3..7]*a[2])
+	adcs	$acc7,$acc7,$t0
+	umulh	$t0,$a4,$a2
+	adcs	$acc0,$acc0,$t1
+	umulh	$t1,$a5,$a2
+	adcs	$acc1,$acc1,$t2
+	umulh	$t2,$a6,$a2
+	stp	$acc4,$acc5,[$tp],#8*2	// t[4..5]
+	adc	$acc2,xzr,xzr		// t[10]
+	adds	$acc6,$acc6,$t3
+	umulh	$t3,$a7,$a2
+	adcs	$acc7,$acc7,$t0
+	 mul	$t0,$a4,$a3		// lo(a[4..7]*a[3])		(iv)
+	adcs	$acc0,$acc0,$t1
+	 mul	$t1,$a5,$a3
+	adcs	$acc1,$acc1,$t2
+	 mul	$t2,$a6,$a3
+	adc	$acc2,$acc2,$t3
+
+	mul	$t3,$a7,$a3
+	adds	$acc7,$acc7,$t0
+	umulh	$t0,$a4,$a3		// hi(a[4..7]*a[3])
+	adcs	$acc0,$acc0,$t1
+	umulh	$t1,$a5,$a3
+	adcs	$acc1,$acc1,$t2
+	umulh	$t2,$a6,$a3
+	adcs	$acc2,$acc2,$t3
+	umulh	$t3,$a7,$a3
+	stp	$acc6,$acc7,[$tp],#8*2	// t[6..7]
+	adc	$acc3,xzr,xzr		// t[11]
+	adds	$acc0,$acc0,$t0
+	 mul	$t0,$a5,$a4		// lo(a[5..7]*a[4])		(v)
+	adcs	$acc1,$acc1,$t1
+	 mul	$t1,$a6,$a4
+	adcs	$acc2,$acc2,$t2
+	 mul	$t2,$a7,$a4
+	adc	$acc3,$acc3,$t3
+
+	umulh	$t3,$a5,$a4		// hi(a[5..7]*a[4])
+	adds	$acc1,$acc1,$t0
+	umulh	$t0,$a6,$a4
+	adcs	$acc2,$acc2,$t1
+	umulh	$t1,$a7,$a4
+	adcs	$acc3,$acc3,$t2
+	 mul	$t2,$a6,$a5		// lo(a[6..7]*a[5])		(vi)
+	adc	$acc4,xzr,xzr		// t[12]
+	adds	$acc2,$acc2,$t3
+	 mul	$t3,$a7,$a5
+	adcs	$acc3,$acc3,$t0
+	 umulh	$t0,$a6,$a5		// hi(a[6..7]*a[5])
+	adc	$acc4,$acc4,$t1
+
+	umulh	$t1,$a7,$a5
+	adds	$acc3,$acc3,$t2
+	 mul	$t2,$a7,$a6		// lo(a[7]*a[6])		(vii)
+	adcs	$acc4,$acc4,$t3
+	 umulh	$t3,$a7,$a6		// hi(a[7]*a[6])
+	adc	$acc5,xzr,xzr		// t[13]
+	adds	$acc4,$acc4,$t0
+	sub	$cnt,$ap_end,$ap	// done yet?
+	adc	$acc5,$acc5,$t1
+
+	adds	$acc5,$acc5,$t2
+	sub	$t0,$ap_end,$num	// rewinded ap
+	adc	$acc6,xzr,xzr		// t[14]
+	add	$acc6,$acc6,$t3
+
+	cbz	$cnt,.Lsqr8x_outer_break
+
+	mov	$n0,$a0
+	ldp	$a0,$a1,[$tp,#8*0]
+	ldp	$a2,$a3,[$tp,#8*2]
+	ldp	$a4,$a5,[$tp,#8*4]
+	ldp	$a6,$a7,[$tp,#8*6]
+	adds	$acc0,$acc0,$a0
+	adcs	$acc1,$acc1,$a1
+	ldp	$a0,$a1,[$ap,#8*0]
+	adcs	$acc2,$acc2,$a2
+	adcs	$acc3,$acc3,$a3
+	ldp	$a2,$a3,[$ap,#8*2]
+	adcs	$acc4,$acc4,$a4
+	adcs	$acc5,$acc5,$a5
+	ldp	$a4,$a5,[$ap,#8*4]
+	adcs	$acc6,$acc6,$a6
+	mov	$rp,$ap
+	adcs	$acc7,xzr,$a7
+	ldp	$a6,$a7,[$ap,#8*6]
+	add	$ap,$ap,#8*8
+	//adc	$carry,xzr,xzr		// moved below
+	mov	$cnt,#-8*8
+
+	//                                                         a[8]a[0]
+	//                                                     a[9]a[0]
+	//                                                 a[a]a[0]
+	//                                             a[b]a[0]
+	//                                         a[c]a[0]
+	//                                     a[d]a[0]
+	//                                 a[e]a[0]
+	//                             a[f]a[0]
+	//                                                     a[8]a[1]
+	//                         a[f]a[1]........................
+	//                                                 a[8]a[2]
+	//                     a[f]a[2]........................
+	//                                             a[8]a[3]
+	//                 a[f]a[3]........................
+	//                                         a[8]a[4]
+	//             a[f]a[4]........................
+	//                                     a[8]a[5]
+	//         a[f]a[5]........................
+	//                                 a[8]a[6]
+	//     a[f]a[6]........................
+	//                             a[8]a[7]
+	// a[f]a[7]........................
+.Lsqr8x_mul:
+	mul	$t0,$a0,$n0
+	adc	$carry,xzr,xzr		// carry bit, modulo-scheduled
+	mul	$t1,$a1,$n0
+	add	$cnt,$cnt,#8
+	mul	$t2,$a2,$n0
+	mul	$t3,$a3,$n0
+	adds	$acc0,$acc0,$t0
+	mul	$t0,$a4,$n0
+	adcs	$acc1,$acc1,$t1
+	mul	$t1,$a5,$n0
+	adcs	$acc2,$acc2,$t2
+	mul	$t2,$a6,$n0
+	adcs	$acc3,$acc3,$t3
+	mul	$t3,$a7,$n0
+	adcs	$acc4,$acc4,$t0
+	umulh	$t0,$a0,$n0
+	adcs	$acc5,$acc5,$t1
+	umulh	$t1,$a1,$n0
+	adcs	$acc6,$acc6,$t2
+	umulh	$t2,$a2,$n0
+	adcs	$acc7,$acc7,$t3
+	umulh	$t3,$a3,$n0
+	adc	$carry,$carry,xzr
+	str	$acc0,[$tp],#8
+	adds	$acc0,$acc1,$t0
+	umulh	$t0,$a4,$n0
+	adcs	$acc1,$acc2,$t1
+	umulh	$t1,$a5,$n0
+	adcs	$acc2,$acc3,$t2
+	umulh	$t2,$a6,$n0
+	adcs	$acc3,$acc4,$t3
+	umulh	$t3,$a7,$n0
+	ldr	$n0,[$rp,$cnt]
+	adcs	$acc4,$acc5,$t0
+	adcs	$acc5,$acc6,$t1
+	adcs	$acc6,$acc7,$t2
+	adcs	$acc7,$carry,$t3
+	//adc	$carry,xzr,xzr		// moved above
+	cbnz	$cnt,.Lsqr8x_mul
+					// note that carry flag is guaranteed
+					// to be zero at this point
+	cmp	$ap,$ap_end		// done yet?
+	b.eq	.Lsqr8x_break
+
+	ldp	$a0,$a1,[$tp,#8*0]
+	ldp	$a2,$a3,[$tp,#8*2]
+	ldp	$a4,$a5,[$tp,#8*4]
+	ldp	$a6,$a7,[$tp,#8*6]
+	adds	$acc0,$acc0,$a0
+	ldr	$n0,[$rp,#-8*8]
+	adcs	$acc1,$acc1,$a1
+	ldp	$a0,$a1,[$ap,#8*0]
+	adcs	$acc2,$acc2,$a2
+	adcs	$acc3,$acc3,$a3
+	ldp	$a2,$a3,[$ap,#8*2]
+	adcs	$acc4,$acc4,$a4
+	adcs	$acc5,$acc5,$a5
+	ldp	$a4,$a5,[$ap,#8*4]
+	adcs	$acc6,$acc6,$a6
+	mov	$cnt,#-8*8
+	adcs	$acc7,$acc7,$a7
+	ldp	$a6,$a7,[$ap,#8*6]
+	add	$ap,$ap,#8*8
+	//adc	$carry,xzr,xzr		// moved above
+	b	.Lsqr8x_mul
+
+.align	4
+.Lsqr8x_break:
+	ldp	$a0,$a1,[$rp,#8*0]
+	add	$ap,$rp,#8*8
+	ldp	$a2,$a3,[$rp,#8*2]
+	sub	$t0,$ap_end,$ap		// is it last iteration?
+	ldp	$a4,$a5,[$rp,#8*4]
+	sub	$t1,$tp,$t0
+	ldp	$a6,$a7,[$rp,#8*6]
+	cbz	$t0,.Lsqr8x_outer_loop
+
+	stp	$acc0,$acc1,[$tp,#8*0]
+	ldp	$acc0,$acc1,[$t1,#8*0]
+	stp	$acc2,$acc3,[$tp,#8*2]
+	ldp	$acc2,$acc3,[$t1,#8*2]
+	stp	$acc4,$acc5,[$tp,#8*4]
+	ldp	$acc4,$acc5,[$t1,#8*4]
+	stp	$acc6,$acc7,[$tp,#8*6]
+	mov	$tp,$t1
+	ldp	$acc6,$acc7,[$t1,#8*6]
+	b	.Lsqr8x_outer_loop
+
+.align	4
+.Lsqr8x_outer_break:
+	// Now multiply above result by 2 and add a[n-1]*a[n-1]|...|a[0]*a[0]
+	ldp	$a1,$a3,[$t0,#8*0]	// recall that $t0 is &a[0]
+	ldp	$t1,$t2,[sp,#8*1]
+	ldp	$a5,$a7,[$t0,#8*2]
+	add	$ap,$t0,#8*4
+	ldp	$t3,$t0,[sp,#8*3]
+
+	stp	$acc0,$acc1,[$tp,#8*0]
+	mul	$acc0,$a1,$a1
+	stp	$acc2,$acc3,[$tp,#8*2]
+	umulh	$a1,$a1,$a1
+	stp	$acc4,$acc5,[$tp,#8*4]
+	mul	$a2,$a3,$a3
+	stp	$acc6,$acc7,[$tp,#8*6]
+	mov	$tp,sp
+	umulh	$a3,$a3,$a3
+	adds	$acc1,$a1,$t1,lsl#1
+	extr	$t1,$t2,$t1,#63
+	sub	$cnt,$num,#8*4
+
+.Lsqr4x_shift_n_add:
+	adcs	$acc2,$a2,$t1
+	extr	$t2,$t3,$t2,#63
+	sub	$cnt,$cnt,#8*4
+	adcs	$acc3,$a3,$t2
+	ldp	$t1,$t2,[$tp,#8*5]
+	mul	$a4,$a5,$a5
+	ldp	$a1,$a3,[$ap],#8*2
+	umulh	$a5,$a5,$a5
+	mul	$a6,$a7,$a7
+	umulh	$a7,$a7,$a7
+	extr	$t3,$t0,$t3,#63
+	stp	$acc0,$acc1,[$tp,#8*0]
+	adcs	$acc4,$a4,$t3
+	extr	$t0,$t1,$t0,#63
+	stp	$acc2,$acc3,[$tp,#8*2]
+	adcs	$acc5,$a5,$t0
+	ldp	$t3,$t0,[$tp,#8*7]
+	extr	$t1,$t2,$t1,#63
+	adcs	$acc6,$a6,$t1
+	extr	$t2,$t3,$t2,#63
+	adcs	$acc7,$a7,$t2
+	ldp	$t1,$t2,[$tp,#8*9]
+	mul	$a0,$a1,$a1
+	ldp	$a5,$a7,[$ap],#8*2
+	umulh	$a1,$a1,$a1
+	mul	$a2,$a3,$a3
+	umulh	$a3,$a3,$a3
+	stp	$acc4,$acc5,[$tp,#8*4]
+	extr	$t3,$t0,$t3,#63
+	stp	$acc6,$acc7,[$tp,#8*6]
+	add	$tp,$tp,#8*8
+	adcs	$acc0,$a0,$t3
+	extr	$t0,$t1,$t0,#63
+	adcs	$acc1,$a1,$t0
+	ldp	$t3,$t0,[$tp,#8*3]
+	extr	$t1,$t2,$t1,#63
+	cbnz	$cnt,.Lsqr4x_shift_n_add
+___
+my ($np,$np_end)=($ap,$ap_end);
+$code.=<<___;
+	 ldp	$np,$n0,[x29,#104]	// pull np and n0
+
+	adcs	$acc2,$a2,$t1
+	extr	$t2,$t3,$t2,#63
+	adcs	$acc3,$a3,$t2
+	ldp	$t1,$t2,[$tp,#8*5]
+	mul	$a4,$a5,$a5
+	umulh	$a5,$a5,$a5
+	stp	$acc0,$acc1,[$tp,#8*0]
+	mul	$a6,$a7,$a7
+	umulh	$a7,$a7,$a7
+	stp	$acc2,$acc3,[$tp,#8*2]
+	extr	$t3,$t0,$t3,#63
+	adcs	$acc4,$a4,$t3
+	extr	$t0,$t1,$t0,#63
+	 ldp	$acc0,$acc1,[sp,#8*0]
+	adcs	$acc5,$a5,$t0
+	extr	$t1,$t2,$t1,#63
+	 ldp	$a0,$a1,[$np,#8*0]
+	adcs	$acc6,$a6,$t1
+	extr	$t2,xzr,$t2,#63
+	 ldp	$a2,$a3,[$np,#8*2]
+	adc	$acc7,$a7,$t2
+	 ldp	$a4,$a5,[$np,#8*4]
+
+	// Reduce by 512 bits per iteration
+	mul	$na0,$n0,$acc0		// t[0]*n0
+	ldp	$a6,$a7,[$np,#8*6]
+	add	$np_end,$np,$num
+	ldp	$acc2,$acc3,[sp,#8*2]
+	stp	$acc4,$acc5,[$tp,#8*4]
+	ldp	$acc4,$acc5,[sp,#8*4]
+	stp	$acc6,$acc7,[$tp,#8*6]
+	ldp	$acc6,$acc7,[sp,#8*6]
+	add	$np,$np,#8*8
+	mov	$topmost,xzr		// initial top-most carry
+	mov	$tp,sp
+	mov	$cnt,#8
+
+.Lsqr8x_reduction:
+	// (*)	mul	$t0,$a0,$na0	// lo(n[0-7])*lo(t[0]*n0)
+	mul	$t1,$a1,$na0
+	sub	$cnt,$cnt,#1
+	mul	$t2,$a2,$na0
+	str	$na0,[$tp],#8		// put aside t[0]*n0 for tail processing
+	mul	$t3,$a3,$na0
+	// (*)	adds	xzr,$acc0,$t0
+	subs	xzr,$acc0,#1		// (*)
+	mul	$t0,$a4,$na0
+	adcs	$acc0,$acc1,$t1
+	mul	$t1,$a5,$na0
+	adcs	$acc1,$acc2,$t2
+	mul	$t2,$a6,$na0
+	adcs	$acc2,$acc3,$t3
+	mul	$t3,$a7,$na0
+	adcs	$acc3,$acc4,$t0
+	umulh	$t0,$a0,$na0		// hi(n[0-7])*lo(t[0]*n0)
+	adcs	$acc4,$acc5,$t1
+	umulh	$t1,$a1,$na0
+	adcs	$acc5,$acc6,$t2
+	umulh	$t2,$a2,$na0
+	adcs	$acc6,$acc7,$t3
+	umulh	$t3,$a3,$na0
+	adc	$acc7,xzr,xzr
+	adds	$acc0,$acc0,$t0
+	umulh	$t0,$a4,$na0
+	adcs	$acc1,$acc1,$t1
+	umulh	$t1,$a5,$na0
+	adcs	$acc2,$acc2,$t2
+	umulh	$t2,$a6,$na0
+	adcs	$acc3,$acc3,$t3
+	umulh	$t3,$a7,$na0
+	mul	$na0,$n0,$acc0		// next t[0]*n0
+	adcs	$acc4,$acc4,$t0
+	adcs	$acc5,$acc5,$t1
+	adcs	$acc6,$acc6,$t2
+	adc	$acc7,$acc7,$t3
+	cbnz	$cnt,.Lsqr8x_reduction
+
+	ldp	$t0,$t1,[$tp,#8*0]
+	ldp	$t2,$t3,[$tp,#8*2]
+	mov	$rp,$tp
+	sub	$cnt,$np_end,$np	// done yet?
+	adds	$acc0,$acc0,$t0
+	adcs	$acc1,$acc1,$t1
+	ldp	$t0,$t1,[$tp,#8*4]
+	adcs	$acc2,$acc2,$t2
+	adcs	$acc3,$acc3,$t3
+	ldp	$t2,$t3,[$tp,#8*6]
+	adcs	$acc4,$acc4,$t0
+	adcs	$acc5,$acc5,$t1
+	adcs	$acc6,$acc6,$t2
+	adcs	$acc7,$acc7,$t3
+	//adc	$carry,xzr,xzr		// moved below
+	cbz	$cnt,.Lsqr8x8_post_condition
+
+	ldr	$n0,[$tp,#-8*8]
+	ldp	$a0,$a1,[$np,#8*0]
+	ldp	$a2,$a3,[$np,#8*2]
+	ldp	$a4,$a5,[$np,#8*4]
+	mov	$cnt,#-8*8
+	ldp	$a6,$a7,[$np,#8*6]
+	add	$np,$np,#8*8
+
+.Lsqr8x_tail:
+	mul	$t0,$a0,$n0
+	adc	$carry,xzr,xzr		// carry bit, modulo-scheduled
+	mul	$t1,$a1,$n0
+	add	$cnt,$cnt,#8
+	mul	$t2,$a2,$n0
+	mul	$t3,$a3,$n0
+	adds	$acc0,$acc0,$t0
+	mul	$t0,$a4,$n0
+	adcs	$acc1,$acc1,$t1
+	mul	$t1,$a5,$n0
+	adcs	$acc2,$acc2,$t2
+	mul	$t2,$a6,$n0
+	adcs	$acc3,$acc3,$t3
+	mul	$t3,$a7,$n0
+	adcs	$acc4,$acc4,$t0
+	umulh	$t0,$a0,$n0
+	adcs	$acc5,$acc5,$t1
+	umulh	$t1,$a1,$n0
+	adcs	$acc6,$acc6,$t2
+	umulh	$t2,$a2,$n0
+	adcs	$acc7,$acc7,$t3
+	umulh	$t3,$a3,$n0
+	adc	$carry,$carry,xzr
+	str	$acc0,[$tp],#8
+	adds	$acc0,$acc1,$t0
+	umulh	$t0,$a4,$n0
+	adcs	$acc1,$acc2,$t1
+	umulh	$t1,$a5,$n0
+	adcs	$acc2,$acc3,$t2
+	umulh	$t2,$a6,$n0
+	adcs	$acc3,$acc4,$t3
+	umulh	$t3,$a7,$n0
+	ldr	$n0,[$rp,$cnt]
+	adcs	$acc4,$acc5,$t0
+	adcs	$acc5,$acc6,$t1
+	adcs	$acc6,$acc7,$t2
+	adcs	$acc7,$carry,$t3
+	//adc	$carry,xzr,xzr		// moved above
+	cbnz	$cnt,.Lsqr8x_tail
+					// note that carry flag is guaranteed
+					// to be zero at this point
+	ldp	$a0,$a1,[$tp,#8*0]
+	sub	$cnt,$np_end,$np	// done yet?
+	sub	$t2,$np_end,$num	// rewinded np
+	ldp	$a2,$a3,[$tp,#8*2]
+	ldp	$a4,$a5,[$tp,#8*4]
+	ldp	$a6,$a7,[$tp,#8*6]
+	cbz	$cnt,.Lsqr8x_tail_break
+
+	ldr	$n0,[$rp,#-8*8]
+	adds	$acc0,$acc0,$a0
+	adcs	$acc1,$acc1,$a1
+	ldp	$a0,$a1,[$np,#8*0]
+	adcs	$acc2,$acc2,$a2
+	adcs	$acc3,$acc3,$a3
+	ldp	$a2,$a3,[$np,#8*2]
+	adcs	$acc4,$acc4,$a4
+	adcs	$acc5,$acc5,$a5
+	ldp	$a4,$a5,[$np,#8*4]
+	adcs	$acc6,$acc6,$a6
+	mov	$cnt,#-8*8
+	adcs	$acc7,$acc7,$a7
+	ldp	$a6,$a7,[$np,#8*6]
+	add	$np,$np,#8*8
+	//adc	$carry,xzr,xzr		// moved above
+	b	.Lsqr8x_tail
+
+.align	4
+.Lsqr8x_tail_break:
+	ldr	$n0,[x29,#112]		// pull n0
+	add	$cnt,$tp,#8*8		// end of current t[num] window
+
+	subs	xzr,$topmost,#1		// "move" top-most carry to carry bit
+	adcs	$t0,$acc0,$a0
+	adcs	$t1,$acc1,$a1
+	ldp	$acc0,$acc1,[$rp,#8*0]
+	adcs	$acc2,$acc2,$a2
+	ldp	$a0,$a1,[$t2,#8*0]	// recall that $t2 is &n[0]
+	adcs	$acc3,$acc3,$a3
+	ldp	$a2,$a3,[$t2,#8*2]
+	adcs	$acc4,$acc4,$a4
+	adcs	$acc5,$acc5,$a5
+	ldp	$a4,$a5,[$t2,#8*4]
+	adcs	$acc6,$acc6,$a6
+	adcs	$acc7,$acc7,$a7
+	ldp	$a6,$a7,[$t2,#8*6]
+	add	$np,$t2,#8*8
+	adc	$topmost,xzr,xzr	// top-most carry
+	mul	$na0,$n0,$acc0
+	stp	$t0,$t1,[$tp,#8*0]
+	stp	$acc2,$acc3,[$tp,#8*2]
+	ldp	$acc2,$acc3,[$rp,#8*2]
+	stp	$acc4,$acc5,[$tp,#8*4]
+	ldp	$acc4,$acc5,[$rp,#8*4]
+	cmp	$cnt,x29		// did we hit the bottom?
+	stp	$acc6,$acc7,[$tp,#8*6]
+	mov	$tp,$rp			// slide the window
+	ldp	$acc6,$acc7,[$rp,#8*6]
+	mov	$cnt,#8
+	b.ne	.Lsqr8x_reduction
+
+	// Final step. We see if result is larger than modulus, and
+	// if it is, subtract the modulus. But comparison implies
+	// subtraction. So we subtract modulus, see if it borrowed,
+	// and conditionally copy original value.
+	ldr	$rp,[x29,#96]		// pull rp
+	add	$tp,$tp,#8*8
+	subs	$t0,$acc0,$a0
+	sbcs	$t1,$acc1,$a1
+	sub	$cnt,$num,#8*8
+	mov	$ap_end,$rp		// $rp copy
+
+.Lsqr8x_sub:
+	sbcs	$t2,$acc2,$a2
+	ldp	$a0,$a1,[$np,#8*0]
+	sbcs	$t3,$acc3,$a3
+	stp	$t0,$t1,[$rp,#8*0]
+	sbcs	$t0,$acc4,$a4
+	ldp	$a2,$a3,[$np,#8*2]
+	sbcs	$t1,$acc5,$a5
+	stp	$t2,$t3,[$rp,#8*2]
+	sbcs	$t2,$acc6,$a6
+	ldp	$a4,$a5,[$np,#8*4]
+	sbcs	$t3,$acc7,$a7
+	ldp	$a6,$a7,[$np,#8*6]
+	add	$np,$np,#8*8
+	ldp	$acc0,$acc1,[$tp,#8*0]
+	sub	$cnt,$cnt,#8*8
+	ldp	$acc2,$acc3,[$tp,#8*2]
+	ldp	$acc4,$acc5,[$tp,#8*4]
+	ldp	$acc6,$acc7,[$tp,#8*6]
+	add	$tp,$tp,#8*8
+	stp	$t0,$t1,[$rp,#8*4]
+	sbcs	$t0,$acc0,$a0
+	stp	$t2,$t3,[$rp,#8*6]
+	add	$rp,$rp,#8*8
+	sbcs	$t1,$acc1,$a1
+	cbnz	$cnt,.Lsqr8x_sub
+
+	sbcs	$t2,$acc2,$a2
+	 mov	$tp,sp
+	 add	$ap,sp,$num
+	 ldp	$a0,$a1,[$ap_end,#8*0]
+	sbcs	$t3,$acc3,$a3
+	stp	$t0,$t1,[$rp,#8*0]
+	sbcs	$t0,$acc4,$a4
+	 ldp	$a2,$a3,[$ap_end,#8*2]
+	sbcs	$t1,$acc5,$a5
+	stp	$t2,$t3,[$rp,#8*2]
+	sbcs	$t2,$acc6,$a6
+	 ldp	$acc0,$acc1,[$ap,#8*0]
+	sbcs	$t3,$acc7,$a7
+	 ldp	$acc2,$acc3,[$ap,#8*2]
+	sbcs	xzr,$topmost,xzr	// did it borrow?
+	ldr	x30,[x29,#8]		// pull return address
+	stp	$t0,$t1,[$rp,#8*4]
+	stp	$t2,$t3,[$rp,#8*6]
+
+	sub	$cnt,$num,#8*4
+.Lsqr4x_cond_copy:
+	sub	$cnt,$cnt,#8*4
+	csel	$t0,$acc0,$a0,lo
+	 stp	xzr,xzr,[$tp,#8*0]
+	csel	$t1,$acc1,$a1,lo
+	ldp	$a0,$a1,[$ap_end,#8*4]
+	ldp	$acc0,$acc1,[$ap,#8*4]
+	csel	$t2,$acc2,$a2,lo
+	 stp	xzr,xzr,[$tp,#8*2]
+	 add	$tp,$tp,#8*4
+	csel	$t3,$acc3,$a3,lo
+	ldp	$a2,$a3,[$ap_end,#8*6]
+	ldp	$acc2,$acc3,[$ap,#8*6]
+	add	$ap,$ap,#8*4
+	stp	$t0,$t1,[$ap_end,#8*0]
+	stp	$t2,$t3,[$ap_end,#8*2]
+	add	$ap_end,$ap_end,#8*4
+	 stp	xzr,xzr,[$ap,#8*0]
+	 stp	xzr,xzr,[$ap,#8*2]
+	cbnz	$cnt,.Lsqr4x_cond_copy
+
+	csel	$t0,$acc0,$a0,lo
+	 stp	xzr,xzr,[$tp,#8*0]
+	csel	$t1,$acc1,$a1,lo
+	 stp	xzr,xzr,[$tp,#8*2]
+	csel	$t2,$acc2,$a2,lo
+	csel	$t3,$acc3,$a3,lo
+	stp	$t0,$t1,[$ap_end,#8*0]
+	stp	$t2,$t3,[$ap_end,#8*2]
+
+	b	.Lsqr8x_done
+
+.align	4
+.Lsqr8x8_post_condition:
+	adc	$carry,xzr,xzr
+	ldr	x30,[x29,#8]		// pull return address
+	// $acc0-7,$carry hold result, $a0-7 hold modulus
+	subs	$a0,$acc0,$a0
+	ldr	$ap,[x29,#96]		// pull rp
+	sbcs	$a1,$acc1,$a1
+	 stp	xzr,xzr,[sp,#8*0]
+	sbcs	$a2,$acc2,$a2
+	 stp	xzr,xzr,[sp,#8*2]
+	sbcs	$a3,$acc3,$a3
+	 stp	xzr,xzr,[sp,#8*4]
+	sbcs	$a4,$acc4,$a4
+	 stp	xzr,xzr,[sp,#8*6]
+	sbcs	$a5,$acc5,$a5
+	 stp	xzr,xzr,[sp,#8*8]
+	sbcs	$a6,$acc6,$a6
+	 stp	xzr,xzr,[sp,#8*10]
+	sbcs	$a7,$acc7,$a7
+	 stp	xzr,xzr,[sp,#8*12]
+	sbcs	$carry,$carry,xzr	// did it borrow?
+	 stp	xzr,xzr,[sp,#8*14]
+
+	// $a0-7 hold result-modulus
+	csel	$a0,$acc0,$a0,lo
+	csel	$a1,$acc1,$a1,lo
+	csel	$a2,$acc2,$a2,lo
+	csel	$a3,$acc3,$a3,lo
+	stp	$a0,$a1,[$ap,#8*0]
+	csel	$a4,$acc4,$a4,lo
+	csel	$a5,$acc5,$a5,lo
+	stp	$a2,$a3,[$ap,#8*2]
+	csel	$a6,$acc6,$a6,lo
+	csel	$a7,$acc7,$a7,lo
+	stp	$a4,$a5,[$ap,#8*4]
+	stp	$a6,$a7,[$ap,#8*6]
+
+.Lsqr8x_done:
+	ldp	x19,x20,[x29,#16]
+	mov	sp,x29
+	ldp	x21,x22,[x29,#32]
+	mov	x0,#1
+	ldp	x23,x24,[x29,#48]
+	ldp	x25,x26,[x29,#64]
+	ldp	x27,x28,[x29,#80]
+	ldr	x29,[sp],#128
+	ret
+.size	__bn_sqr8x_mont,.-__bn_sqr8x_mont
+___
+}
+
+{
+########################################################################
+# Even though this might look as ARMv8 adaptation of mulx4x_mont from
+# x86_64-mont5 module, it's different in sense that it performs
+# reduction 256 bits at a time.
+
+my ($a0,$a1,$a2,$a3,
+    $t0,$t1,$t2,$t3,
+    $m0,$m1,$m2,$m3,
+    $acc0,$acc1,$acc2,$acc3,$acc4,
+    $bi,$mi,$tp,$ap_end,$cnt) = map("x$_",(6..17,19..28));
+my  $bp_end=$rp;
+my  ($carry,$topmost) = ($rp,"x30");
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.type	__bn_mul4x_mont,%function
+.align	5
+__bn_mul4x_mont:
+	stp	x29,x30,[sp,#-128]!
+	add	x29,sp,#0
+	stp	x19,x20,[sp,#16]
+	stp	x21,x22,[sp,#32]
+	stp	x23,x24,[sp,#48]
+	stp	x25,x26,[sp,#64]
+	stp	x27,x28,[sp,#80]
+
+	sub	$tp,sp,$num,lsl#3
+	lsl	$num,$num,#3
+	ldr	$n0,[$n0]		// *n0
+	sub	sp,$tp,#8*4		// alloca
+
+	add	$t0,$bp,$num
+	add	$ap_end,$ap,$num
+	stp	$rp,$t0,[x29,#96]	// offload rp and &b[num]
+
+	ldr	$bi,[$bp,#8*0]		// b[0]
+	ldp	$a0,$a1,[$ap,#8*0]	// a[0..3]
+	ldp	$a2,$a3,[$ap,#8*2]
+	add	$ap,$ap,#8*4
+	mov	$acc0,xzr
+	mov	$acc1,xzr
+	mov	$acc2,xzr
+	mov	$acc3,xzr
+	ldp	$m0,$m1,[$np,#8*0]	// n[0..3]
+	ldp	$m2,$m3,[$np,#8*2]
+	adds	$np,$np,#8*4		// clear carry bit
+	mov	$carry,xzr
+	mov	$cnt,#0
+	mov	$tp,sp
+
+.Loop_mul4x_1st_reduction:
+	mul	$t0,$a0,$bi		// lo(a[0..3]*b[0])
+	adc	$carry,$carry,xzr	// modulo-scheduled
+	mul	$t1,$a1,$bi
+	add	$cnt,$cnt,#8
+	mul	$t2,$a2,$bi
+	and	$cnt,$cnt,#31
+	mul	$t3,$a3,$bi
+	adds	$acc0,$acc0,$t0
+	umulh	$t0,$a0,$bi		// hi(a[0..3]*b[0])
+	adcs	$acc1,$acc1,$t1
+	mul	$mi,$acc0,$n0		// t[0]*n0
+	adcs	$acc2,$acc2,$t2
+	umulh	$t1,$a1,$bi
+	adcs	$acc3,$acc3,$t3
+	umulh	$t2,$a2,$bi
+	adc	$acc4,xzr,xzr
+	umulh	$t3,$a3,$bi
+	ldr	$bi,[$bp,$cnt]		// next b[i] (or b[0])
+	adds	$acc1,$acc1,$t0
+	// (*)	mul	$t0,$m0,$mi	// lo(n[0..3]*t[0]*n0)
+	str	$mi,[$tp],#8		// put aside t[0]*n0 for tail processing
+	adcs	$acc2,$acc2,$t1
+	mul	$t1,$m1,$mi
+	adcs	$acc3,$acc3,$t2
+	mul	$t2,$m2,$mi
+	adc	$acc4,$acc4,$t3		// can't overflow
+	mul	$t3,$m3,$mi
+	// (*)	adds	xzr,$acc0,$t0
+	subs	xzr,$acc0,#1		// (*)
+	umulh	$t0,$m0,$mi		// hi(n[0..3]*t[0]*n0)
+	adcs	$acc0,$acc1,$t1
+	umulh	$t1,$m1,$mi
+	adcs	$acc1,$acc2,$t2
+	umulh	$t2,$m2,$mi
+	adcs	$acc2,$acc3,$t3
+	umulh	$t3,$m3,$mi
+	adcs	$acc3,$acc4,$carry
+	adc	$carry,xzr,xzr
+	adds	$acc0,$acc0,$t0
+	sub	$t0,$ap_end,$ap
+	adcs	$acc1,$acc1,$t1
+	adcs	$acc2,$acc2,$t2
+	adcs	$acc3,$acc3,$t3
+	//adc	$carry,$carry,xzr
+	cbnz	$cnt,.Loop_mul4x_1st_reduction
+
+	cbz	$t0,.Lmul4x4_post_condition
+
+	ldp	$a0,$a1,[$ap,#8*0]	// a[4..7]
+	ldp	$a2,$a3,[$ap,#8*2]
+	add	$ap,$ap,#8*4
+	ldr	$mi,[sp]		// a[0]*n0
+	ldp	$m0,$m1,[$np,#8*0]	// n[4..7]
+	ldp	$m2,$m3,[$np,#8*2]
+	add	$np,$np,#8*4
+
+.Loop_mul4x_1st_tail:
+	mul	$t0,$a0,$bi		// lo(a[4..7]*b[i])
+	adc	$carry,$carry,xzr	// modulo-scheduled
+	mul	$t1,$a1,$bi
+	add	$cnt,$cnt,#8
+	mul	$t2,$a2,$bi
+	and	$cnt,$cnt,#31
+	mul	$t3,$a3,$bi
+	adds	$acc0,$acc0,$t0
+	umulh	$t0,$a0,$bi		// hi(a[4..7]*b[i])
+	adcs	$acc1,$acc1,$t1
+	umulh	$t1,$a1,$bi
+	adcs	$acc2,$acc2,$t2
+	umulh	$t2,$a2,$bi
+	adcs	$acc3,$acc3,$t3
+	umulh	$t3,$a3,$bi
+	adc	$acc4,xzr,xzr
+	ldr	$bi,[$bp,$cnt]		// next b[i] (or b[0])
+	adds	$acc1,$acc1,$t0
+	mul	$t0,$m0,$mi		// lo(n[4..7]*a[0]*n0)
+	adcs	$acc2,$acc2,$t1
+	mul	$t1,$m1,$mi
+	adcs	$acc3,$acc3,$t2
+	mul	$t2,$m2,$mi
+	adc	$acc4,$acc4,$t3		// can't overflow
+	mul	$t3,$m3,$mi
+	adds	$acc0,$acc0,$t0
+	umulh	$t0,$m0,$mi		// hi(n[4..7]*a[0]*n0)
+	adcs	$acc1,$acc1,$t1
+	umulh	$t1,$m1,$mi
+	adcs	$acc2,$acc2,$t2
+	umulh	$t2,$m2,$mi
+	adcs	$acc3,$acc3,$t3
+	adcs	$acc4,$acc4,$carry
+	umulh	$t3,$m3,$mi
+	adc	$carry,xzr,xzr
+	ldr	$mi,[sp,$cnt]		// next t[0]*n0
+	str	$acc0,[$tp],#8		// result!!!
+	adds	$acc0,$acc1,$t0
+	sub	$t0,$ap_end,$ap		// done yet?
+	adcs	$acc1,$acc2,$t1
+	adcs	$acc2,$acc3,$t2
+	adcs	$acc3,$acc4,$t3
+	//adc	$carry,$carry,xzr
+	cbnz	$cnt,.Loop_mul4x_1st_tail
+
+	sub	$t1,$ap_end,$num	// rewinded $ap
+	cbz	$t0,.Lmul4x_proceed
+
+	ldp	$a0,$a1,[$ap,#8*0]
+	ldp	$a2,$a3,[$ap,#8*2]
+	add	$ap,$ap,#8*4
+	ldp	$m0,$m1,[$np,#8*0]
+	ldp	$m2,$m3,[$np,#8*2]
+	add	$np,$np,#8*4
+	b	.Loop_mul4x_1st_tail
+
+.align	5
+.Lmul4x_proceed:
+	ldr	$bi,[$bp,#8*4]!		// *++b
+	adc	$topmost,$carry,xzr
+	ldp	$a0,$a1,[$t1,#8*0]	// a[0..3]
+	sub	$np,$np,$num		// rewind np
+	ldp	$a2,$a3,[$t1,#8*2]
+	add	$ap,$t1,#8*4
+
+	stp	$acc0,$acc1,[$tp,#8*0]	// result!!!
+	ldp	$acc0,$acc1,[sp,#8*4]	// t[0..3]
+	stp	$acc2,$acc3,[$tp,#8*2]	// result!!!
+	ldp	$acc2,$acc3,[sp,#8*6]
+
+	ldp	$m0,$m1,[$np,#8*0]	// n[0..3]
+	mov	$tp,sp
+	ldp	$m2,$m3,[$np,#8*2]
+	adds	$np,$np,#8*4		// clear carry bit
+	mov	$carry,xzr
+
+.align	4
+.Loop_mul4x_reduction:
+	mul	$t0,$a0,$bi		// lo(a[0..3]*b[4])
+	adc	$carry,$carry,xzr	// modulo-scheduled
+	mul	$t1,$a1,$bi
+	add	$cnt,$cnt,#8
+	mul	$t2,$a2,$bi
+	and	$cnt,$cnt,#31
+	mul	$t3,$a3,$bi
+	adds	$acc0,$acc0,$t0
+	umulh	$t0,$a0,$bi		// hi(a[0..3]*b[4])
+	adcs	$acc1,$acc1,$t1
+	mul	$mi,$acc0,$n0		// t[0]*n0
+	adcs	$acc2,$acc2,$t2
+	umulh	$t1,$a1,$bi
+	adcs	$acc3,$acc3,$t3
+	umulh	$t2,$a2,$bi
+	adc	$acc4,xzr,xzr
+	umulh	$t3,$a3,$bi
+	ldr	$bi,[$bp,$cnt]		// next b[i]
+	adds	$acc1,$acc1,$t0
+	// (*)	mul	$t0,$m0,$mi
+	str	$mi,[$tp],#8		// put aside t[0]*n0 for tail processing
+	adcs	$acc2,$acc2,$t1
+	mul	$t1,$m1,$mi		// lo(n[0..3]*t[0]*n0
+	adcs	$acc3,$acc3,$t2
+	mul	$t2,$m2,$mi
+	adc	$acc4,$acc4,$t3		// can't overflow
+	mul	$t3,$m3,$mi
+	// (*)	adds	xzr,$acc0,$t0
+	subs	xzr,$acc0,#1		// (*)
+	umulh	$t0,$m0,$mi		// hi(n[0..3]*t[0]*n0
+	adcs	$acc0,$acc1,$t1
+	umulh	$t1,$m1,$mi
+	adcs	$acc1,$acc2,$t2
+	umulh	$t2,$m2,$mi
+	adcs	$acc2,$acc3,$t3
+	umulh	$t3,$m3,$mi
+	adcs	$acc3,$acc4,$carry
+	adc	$carry,xzr,xzr
+	adds	$acc0,$acc0,$t0
+	adcs	$acc1,$acc1,$t1
+	adcs	$acc2,$acc2,$t2
+	adcs	$acc3,$acc3,$t3
+	//adc	$carry,$carry,xzr
+	cbnz	$cnt,.Loop_mul4x_reduction
+
+	adc	$carry,$carry,xzr
+	ldp	$t0,$t1,[$tp,#8*4]	// t[4..7]
+	ldp	$t2,$t3,[$tp,#8*6]
+	ldp	$a0,$a1,[$ap,#8*0]	// a[4..7]
+	ldp	$a2,$a3,[$ap,#8*2]
+	add	$ap,$ap,#8*4
+	adds	$acc0,$acc0,$t0
+	adcs	$acc1,$acc1,$t1
+	adcs	$acc2,$acc2,$t2
+	adcs	$acc3,$acc3,$t3
+	//adc	$carry,$carry,xzr
+
+	ldr	$mi,[sp]		// t[0]*n0
+	ldp	$m0,$m1,[$np,#8*0]	// n[4..7]
+	ldp	$m2,$m3,[$np,#8*2]
+	add	$np,$np,#8*4
+
+.align	4
+.Loop_mul4x_tail:
+	mul	$t0,$a0,$bi		// lo(a[4..7]*b[4])
+	adc	$carry,$carry,xzr	// modulo-scheduled
+	mul	$t1,$a1,$bi
+	add	$cnt,$cnt,#8
+	mul	$t2,$a2,$bi
+	and	$cnt,$cnt,#31
+	mul	$t3,$a3,$bi
+	adds	$acc0,$acc0,$t0
+	umulh	$t0,$a0,$bi		// hi(a[4..7]*b[4])
+	adcs	$acc1,$acc1,$t1
+	umulh	$t1,$a1,$bi
+	adcs	$acc2,$acc2,$t2
+	umulh	$t2,$a2,$bi
+	adcs	$acc3,$acc3,$t3
+	umulh	$t3,$a3,$bi
+	adc	$acc4,xzr,xzr
+	ldr	$bi,[$bp,$cnt]		// next b[i]
+	adds	$acc1,$acc1,$t0
+	mul	$t0,$m0,$mi		// lo(n[4..7]*t[0]*n0)
+	adcs	$acc2,$acc2,$t1
+	mul	$t1,$m1,$mi
+	adcs	$acc3,$acc3,$t2
+	mul	$t2,$m2,$mi
+	adc	$acc4,$acc4,$t3		// can't overflow
+	mul	$t3,$m3,$mi
+	adds	$acc0,$acc0,$t0
+	umulh	$t0,$m0,$mi		// hi(n[4..7]*t[0]*n0)
+	adcs	$acc1,$acc1,$t1
+	umulh	$t1,$m1,$mi
+	adcs	$acc2,$acc2,$t2
+	umulh	$t2,$m2,$mi
+	adcs	$acc3,$acc3,$t3
+	umulh	$t3,$m3,$mi
+	adcs	$acc4,$acc4,$carry
+	ldr	$mi,[sp,$cnt]		// next a[0]*n0
+	adc	$carry,xzr,xzr
+	str	$acc0,[$tp],#8		// result!!!
+	adds	$acc0,$acc1,$t0
+	sub	$t0,$ap_end,$ap		// done yet?
+	adcs	$acc1,$acc2,$t1
+	adcs	$acc2,$acc3,$t2
+	adcs	$acc3,$acc4,$t3
+	//adc	$carry,$carry,xzr
+	cbnz	$cnt,.Loop_mul4x_tail
+
+	sub	$t1,$np,$num		// rewinded np?
+	adc	$carry,$carry,xzr
+	cbz	$t0,.Loop_mul4x_break
+
+	ldp	$t0,$t1,[$tp,#8*4]
+	ldp	$t2,$t3,[$tp,#8*6]
+	ldp	$a0,$a1,[$ap,#8*0]
+	ldp	$a2,$a3,[$ap,#8*2]
+	add	$ap,$ap,#8*4
+	adds	$acc0,$acc0,$t0
+	adcs	$acc1,$acc1,$t1
+	adcs	$acc2,$acc2,$t2
+	adcs	$acc3,$acc3,$t3
+	//adc	$carry,$carry,xzr
+	ldp	$m0,$m1,[$np,#8*0]
+	ldp	$m2,$m3,[$np,#8*2]
+	add	$np,$np,#8*4
+	b	.Loop_mul4x_tail
+
+.align	4
+.Loop_mul4x_break:
+	ldp	$t2,$t3,[x29,#96]	// pull rp and &b[num]
+	adds	$acc0,$acc0,$topmost
+	add	$bp,$bp,#8*4		// bp++
+	adcs	$acc1,$acc1,xzr
+	sub	$ap,$ap,$num		// rewind ap
+	adcs	$acc2,$acc2,xzr
+	stp	$acc0,$acc1,[$tp,#8*0]	// result!!!
+	adcs	$acc3,$acc3,xzr
+	ldp	$acc0,$acc1,[sp,#8*4]	// t[0..3]
+	adc	$topmost,$carry,xzr
+	stp	$acc2,$acc3,[$tp,#8*2]	// result!!!
+	cmp	$bp,$t3			// done yet?
+	ldp	$acc2,$acc3,[sp,#8*6]
+	ldp	$m0,$m1,[$t1,#8*0]	// n[0..3]
+	ldp	$m2,$m3,[$t1,#8*2]
+	add	$np,$t1,#8*4
+	b.eq	.Lmul4x_post
+
+	ldr	$bi,[$bp]
+	ldp	$a0,$a1,[$ap,#8*0]	// a[0..3]
+	ldp	$a2,$a3,[$ap,#8*2]
+	adds	$ap,$ap,#8*4		// clear carry bit
+	mov	$carry,xzr
+	mov	$tp,sp
+	b	.Loop_mul4x_reduction
+
+.align	4
+.Lmul4x_post:
+	// Final step. We see if result is larger than modulus, and
+	// if it is, subtract the modulus. But comparison implies
+	// subtraction. So we subtract modulus, see if it borrowed,
+	// and conditionally copy original value.
+	mov	$rp,$t2
+	mov	$ap_end,$t2		// $rp copy
+	subs	$t0,$acc0,$m0
+	add	$tp,sp,#8*8
+	sbcs	$t1,$acc1,$m1
+	sub	$cnt,$num,#8*4
+
+.Lmul4x_sub:
+	sbcs	$t2,$acc2,$m2
+	ldp	$m0,$m1,[$np,#8*0]
+	sub	$cnt,$cnt,#8*4
+	ldp	$acc0,$acc1,[$tp,#8*0]
+	sbcs	$t3,$acc3,$m3
+	ldp	$m2,$m3,[$np,#8*2]
+	add	$np,$np,#8*4
+	ldp	$acc2,$acc3,[$tp,#8*2]
+	add	$tp,$tp,#8*4
+	stp	$t0,$t1,[$rp,#8*0]
+	sbcs	$t0,$acc0,$m0
+	stp	$t2,$t3,[$rp,#8*2]
+	add	$rp,$rp,#8*4
+	sbcs	$t1,$acc1,$m1
+	cbnz	$cnt,.Lmul4x_sub
+
+	sbcs	$t2,$acc2,$m2
+	 mov	$tp,sp
+	 add	$ap,sp,#8*4
+	 ldp	$a0,$a1,[$ap_end,#8*0]
+	sbcs	$t3,$acc3,$m3
+	stp	$t0,$t1,[$rp,#8*0]
+	 ldp	$a2,$a3,[$ap_end,#8*2]
+	stp	$t2,$t3,[$rp,#8*2]
+	 ldp	$acc0,$acc1,[$ap,#8*0]
+	 ldp	$acc2,$acc3,[$ap,#8*2]
+	sbcs	xzr,$topmost,xzr	// did it borrow?
+	ldr	x30,[x29,#8]		// pull return address
+
+	sub	$cnt,$num,#8*4
+.Lmul4x_cond_copy:
+	sub	$cnt,$cnt,#8*4
+	csel	$t0,$acc0,$a0,lo
+	 stp	xzr,xzr,[$tp,#8*0]
+	csel	$t1,$acc1,$a1,lo
+	ldp	$a0,$a1,[$ap_end,#8*4]
+	ldp	$acc0,$acc1,[$ap,#8*4]
+	csel	$t2,$acc2,$a2,lo
+	 stp	xzr,xzr,[$tp,#8*2]
+	 add	$tp,$tp,#8*4
+	csel	$t3,$acc3,$a3,lo
+	ldp	$a2,$a3,[$ap_end,#8*6]
+	ldp	$acc2,$acc3,[$ap,#8*6]
+	add	$ap,$ap,#8*4
+	stp	$t0,$t1,[$ap_end,#8*0]
+	stp	$t2,$t3,[$ap_end,#8*2]
+	add	$ap_end,$ap_end,#8*4
+	cbnz	$cnt,.Lmul4x_cond_copy
+
+	csel	$t0,$acc0,$a0,lo
+	 stp	xzr,xzr,[$tp,#8*0]
+	csel	$t1,$acc1,$a1,lo
+	 stp	xzr,xzr,[$tp,#8*2]
+	csel	$t2,$acc2,$a2,lo
+	 stp	xzr,xzr,[$tp,#8*3]
+	csel	$t3,$acc3,$a3,lo
+	 stp	xzr,xzr,[$tp,#8*4]
+	stp	$t0,$t1,[$ap_end,#8*0]
+	stp	$t2,$t3,[$ap_end,#8*2]
+
+	b	.Lmul4x_done
+
+.align	4
+.Lmul4x4_post_condition:
+	adc	$carry,$carry,xzr
+	ldr	$ap,[x29,#96]		// pull rp
+	// $acc0-3,$carry hold result, $m0-7 hold modulus
+	subs	$a0,$acc0,$m0
+	ldr	x30,[x29,#8]		// pull return address
+	sbcs	$a1,$acc1,$m1
+	 stp	xzr,xzr,[sp,#8*0]
+	sbcs	$a2,$acc2,$m2
+	 stp	xzr,xzr,[sp,#8*2]
+	sbcs	$a3,$acc3,$m3
+	 stp	xzr,xzr,[sp,#8*4]
+	sbcs	xzr,$carry,xzr		// did it borrow?
+	 stp	xzr,xzr,[sp,#8*6]
+
+	// $a0-3 hold result-modulus
+	csel	$a0,$acc0,$a0,lo
+	csel	$a1,$acc1,$a1,lo
+	csel	$a2,$acc2,$a2,lo
+	csel	$a3,$acc3,$a3,lo
+	stp	$a0,$a1,[$ap,#8*0]
+	stp	$a2,$a3,[$ap,#8*2]
+
+.Lmul4x_done:
+	ldp	x19,x20,[x29,#16]
+	mov	sp,x29
+	ldp	x21,x22,[x29,#32]
+	mov	x0,#1
+	ldp	x23,x24,[x29,#48]
+	ldp	x25,x26,[x29,#64]
+	ldp	x27,x28,[x29,#80]
+	ldr	x29,[sp],#128
+	ret
+.size	__bn_mul4x_mont,.-__bn_mul4x_mont
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+.asciz	"Montgomery Multiplication for ARMv8, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+.align	4
+___
+
+print $code;
+
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/bn-586.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/bn-586.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1ca1bbf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/bn-586.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,785 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm");
+require "x86asm.pl";
+
+$output = pop;
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+&asm_init($ARGV[0],$0);
+
+$sse2=0;
+for (@ARGV) { $sse2=1 if (/-DOPENSSL_IA32_SSE2/); }
+
+&external_label("OPENSSL_ia32cap_P") if ($sse2);
+
+&bn_mul_add_words("bn_mul_add_words");
+&bn_mul_words("bn_mul_words");
+&bn_sqr_words("bn_sqr_words");
+&bn_div_words("bn_div_words");
+&bn_add_words("bn_add_words");
+&bn_sub_words("bn_sub_words");
+&bn_sub_part_words("bn_sub_part_words");
+
+&asm_finish();
+
+close STDOUT;
+
+sub bn_mul_add_words
+	{
+	local($name)=@_;
+
+	&function_begin_B($name,$sse2?"EXTRN\t_OPENSSL_ia32cap_P:DWORD":"");
+
+	$r="eax";
+	$a="edx";
+	$c="ecx";
+
+	if ($sse2) {
+		&picmeup("eax","OPENSSL_ia32cap_P");
+		&bt(&DWP(0,"eax"),26);
+		&jnc(&label("maw_non_sse2"));
+
+		&mov($r,&wparam(0));
+		&mov($a,&wparam(1));
+		&mov($c,&wparam(2));
+		&movd("mm0",&wparam(3));	# mm0 = w
+		&pxor("mm1","mm1");		# mm1 = carry_in
+		&jmp(&label("maw_sse2_entry"));
+		
+	&set_label("maw_sse2_unrolled",16);
+		&movd("mm3",&DWP(0,$r,"",0));	# mm3 = r[0]
+		&paddq("mm1","mm3");		# mm1 = carry_in + r[0]
+		&movd("mm2",&DWP(0,$a,"",0));	# mm2 = a[0]
+		&pmuludq("mm2","mm0");		# mm2 = w*a[0]
+		&movd("mm4",&DWP(4,$a,"",0));	# mm4 = a[1]
+		&pmuludq("mm4","mm0");		# mm4 = w*a[1]
+		&movd("mm6",&DWP(8,$a,"",0));	# mm6 = a[2]
+		&pmuludq("mm6","mm0");		# mm6 = w*a[2]
+		&movd("mm7",&DWP(12,$a,"",0));	# mm7 = a[3]
+		&pmuludq("mm7","mm0");		# mm7 = w*a[3]
+		&paddq("mm1","mm2");		# mm1 = carry_in + r[0] + w*a[0]
+		&movd("mm3",&DWP(4,$r,"",0));	# mm3 = r[1]
+		&paddq("mm3","mm4");		# mm3 = r[1] + w*a[1]
+		&movd("mm5",&DWP(8,$r,"",0));	# mm5 = r[2]
+		&paddq("mm5","mm6");		# mm5 = r[2] + w*a[2]
+		&movd("mm4",&DWP(12,$r,"",0));	# mm4 = r[3]
+		&paddq("mm7","mm4");		# mm7 = r[3] + w*a[3]
+		&movd(&DWP(0,$r,"",0),"mm1");
+		&movd("mm2",&DWP(16,$a,"",0));	# mm2 = a[4]
+		&pmuludq("mm2","mm0");		# mm2 = w*a[4]
+		&psrlq("mm1",32);		# mm1 = carry0
+		&movd("mm4",&DWP(20,$a,"",0));	# mm4 = a[5]
+		&pmuludq("mm4","mm0");		# mm4 = w*a[5]
+		&paddq("mm1","mm3");		# mm1 = carry0 + r[1] + w*a[1]
+		&movd("mm6",&DWP(24,$a,"",0));	# mm6 = a[6]
+		&pmuludq("mm6","mm0");		# mm6 = w*a[6]
+		&movd(&DWP(4,$r,"",0),"mm1");
+		&psrlq("mm1",32);		# mm1 = carry1
+		&movd("mm3",&DWP(28,$a,"",0));	# mm3 = a[7]
+		&add($a,32);
+		&pmuludq("mm3","mm0");		# mm3 = w*a[7]
+		&paddq("mm1","mm5");		# mm1 = carry1 + r[2] + w*a[2]
+		&movd("mm5",&DWP(16,$r,"",0));	# mm5 = r[4]
+		&paddq("mm2","mm5");		# mm2 = r[4] + w*a[4]
+		&movd(&DWP(8,$r,"",0),"mm1");
+		&psrlq("mm1",32);		# mm1 = carry2
+		&paddq("mm1","mm7");		# mm1 = carry2 + r[3] + w*a[3]
+		&movd("mm5",&DWP(20,$r,"",0));	# mm5 = r[5]
+		&paddq("mm4","mm5");		# mm4 = r[5] + w*a[5]
+		&movd(&DWP(12,$r,"",0),"mm1");
+		&psrlq("mm1",32);		# mm1 = carry3
+		&paddq("mm1","mm2");		# mm1 = carry3 + r[4] + w*a[4]
+		&movd("mm5",&DWP(24,$r,"",0));	# mm5 = r[6]
+		&paddq("mm6","mm5");		# mm6 = r[6] + w*a[6]
+		&movd(&DWP(16,$r,"",0),"mm1");
+		&psrlq("mm1",32);		# mm1 = carry4
+		&paddq("mm1","mm4");		# mm1 = carry4 + r[5] + w*a[5]
+		&movd("mm5",&DWP(28,$r,"",0));	# mm5 = r[7]
+		&paddq("mm3","mm5");		# mm3 = r[7] + w*a[7]
+		&movd(&DWP(20,$r,"",0),"mm1");
+		&psrlq("mm1",32);		# mm1 = carry5
+		&paddq("mm1","mm6");		# mm1 = carry5 + r[6] + w*a[6]
+		&movd(&DWP(24,$r,"",0),"mm1");
+		&psrlq("mm1",32);		# mm1 = carry6
+		&paddq("mm1","mm3");		# mm1 = carry6 + r[7] + w*a[7]
+		&movd(&DWP(28,$r,"",0),"mm1");
+		&lea($r,&DWP(32,$r));
+		&psrlq("mm1",32);		# mm1 = carry_out
+
+		&sub($c,8);
+		&jz(&label("maw_sse2_exit"));
+	&set_label("maw_sse2_entry");
+		&test($c,0xfffffff8);
+		&jnz(&label("maw_sse2_unrolled"));
+
+	&set_label("maw_sse2_loop",4);
+		&movd("mm2",&DWP(0,$a));	# mm2 = a[i]
+		&movd("mm3",&DWP(0,$r));	# mm3 = r[i]
+		&pmuludq("mm2","mm0");		# a[i] *= w
+		&lea($a,&DWP(4,$a));
+		&paddq("mm1","mm3");		# carry += r[i]
+		&paddq("mm1","mm2");		# carry += a[i]*w
+		&movd(&DWP(0,$r),"mm1");	# r[i] = carry_low
+		&sub($c,1);
+		&psrlq("mm1",32);		# carry = carry_high
+		&lea($r,&DWP(4,$r));
+		&jnz(&label("maw_sse2_loop"));
+	&set_label("maw_sse2_exit");
+		&movd("eax","mm1");		# c = carry_out
+		&emms();
+		&ret();
+
+	&set_label("maw_non_sse2",16);
+	}
+
+	# function_begin prologue
+	&push("ebp");
+	&push("ebx");
+	&push("esi");
+	&push("edi");
+
+	&comment("");
+	$Low="eax";
+	$High="edx";
+	$a="ebx";
+	$w="ebp";
+	$r="edi";
+	$c="esi";
+
+	&xor($c,$c);		# clear carry
+	&mov($r,&wparam(0));	#
+
+	&mov("ecx",&wparam(2));	#
+	&mov($a,&wparam(1));	#
+
+	&and("ecx",0xfffffff8);	# num / 8
+	&mov($w,&wparam(3));	#
+
+	&push("ecx");		# Up the stack for a tmp variable
+
+	&jz(&label("maw_finish"));
+
+	&set_label("maw_loop",16);
+
+	for ($i=0; $i<32; $i+=4)
+		{
+		&comment("Round $i");
+
+		 &mov("eax",&DWP($i,$a)); 	# *a
+		&mul($w);			# *a * w
+		&add("eax",$c);			# L(t)+= c
+		&adc("edx",0);			# H(t)+=carry
+		 &add("eax",&DWP($i,$r));	# L(t)+= *r
+		&adc("edx",0);			# H(t)+=carry
+		 &mov(&DWP($i,$r),"eax");	# *r= L(t);
+		&mov($c,"edx");			# c=  H(t);
+		}
+
+	&comment("");
+	&sub("ecx",8);
+	&lea($a,&DWP(32,$a));
+	&lea($r,&DWP(32,$r));
+	&jnz(&label("maw_loop"));
+
+	&set_label("maw_finish",0);
+	&mov("ecx",&wparam(2));	# get num
+	&and("ecx",7);
+	&jnz(&label("maw_finish2"));	# helps branch prediction
+	&jmp(&label("maw_end"));
+
+	&set_label("maw_finish2",1);
+	for ($i=0; $i<7; $i++)
+		{
+		&comment("Tail Round $i");
+		 &mov("eax",&DWP($i*4,$a));	# *a
+		&mul($w);			# *a * w
+		&add("eax",$c);			# L(t)+=c
+		&adc("edx",0);			# H(t)+=carry
+		 &add("eax",&DWP($i*4,$r));	# L(t)+= *r
+		&adc("edx",0);			# H(t)+=carry
+		 &dec("ecx") if ($i != 7-1);
+		&mov(&DWP($i*4,$r),"eax");	# *r= L(t);
+		 &mov($c,"edx");		# c=  H(t);
+		&jz(&label("maw_end")) if ($i != 7-1);
+		}
+	&set_label("maw_end",0);
+	&mov("eax",$c);
+
+	&pop("ecx");	# clear variable from
+
+	&function_end($name);
+	}
+
+sub bn_mul_words
+	{
+	local($name)=@_;
+
+	&function_begin_B($name,$sse2?"EXTRN\t_OPENSSL_ia32cap_P:DWORD":"");
+
+	$r="eax";
+	$a="edx";
+	$c="ecx";
+
+	if ($sse2) {
+		&picmeup("eax","OPENSSL_ia32cap_P");
+		&bt(&DWP(0,"eax"),26);
+		&jnc(&label("mw_non_sse2"));
+
+		&mov($r,&wparam(0));
+		&mov($a,&wparam(1));
+		&mov($c,&wparam(2));
+		&movd("mm0",&wparam(3));	# mm0 = w
+		&pxor("mm1","mm1");		# mm1 = carry = 0
+
+	&set_label("mw_sse2_loop",16);
+		&movd("mm2",&DWP(0,$a));	# mm2 = a[i]
+		&pmuludq("mm2","mm0");		# a[i] *= w
+		&lea($a,&DWP(4,$a));
+		&paddq("mm1","mm2");		# carry += a[i]*w
+		&movd(&DWP(0,$r),"mm1");	# r[i] = carry_low
+		&sub($c,1);
+		&psrlq("mm1",32);		# carry = carry_high
+		&lea($r,&DWP(4,$r));
+		&jnz(&label("mw_sse2_loop"));
+
+		&movd("eax","mm1");		# return carry
+		&emms();
+		&ret();
+	&set_label("mw_non_sse2",16);
+	}
+
+	# function_begin prologue
+	&push("ebp");
+	&push("ebx");
+	&push("esi");
+	&push("edi");
+
+	&comment("");
+	$Low="eax";
+	$High="edx";
+	$a="ebx";
+	$w="ecx";
+	$r="edi";
+	$c="esi";
+	$num="ebp";
+
+	&xor($c,$c);		# clear carry
+	&mov($r,&wparam(0));	#
+	&mov($a,&wparam(1));	#
+	&mov($num,&wparam(2));	#
+	&mov($w,&wparam(3));	#
+
+	&and($num,0xfffffff8);	# num / 8
+	&jz(&label("mw_finish"));
+
+	&set_label("mw_loop",0);
+	for ($i=0; $i<32; $i+=4)
+		{
+		&comment("Round $i");
+
+		 &mov("eax",&DWP($i,$a,"",0)); 	# *a
+		&mul($w);			# *a * w
+		&add("eax",$c);			# L(t)+=c
+		 # XXX
+
+		&adc("edx",0);			# H(t)+=carry
+		 &mov(&DWP($i,$r,"",0),"eax");	# *r= L(t);
+
+		&mov($c,"edx");			# c=  H(t);
+		}
+
+	&comment("");
+	&add($a,32);
+	&add($r,32);
+	&sub($num,8);
+	&jz(&label("mw_finish"));
+	&jmp(&label("mw_loop"));
+
+	&set_label("mw_finish",0);
+	&mov($num,&wparam(2));	# get num
+	&and($num,7);
+	&jnz(&label("mw_finish2"));
+	&jmp(&label("mw_end"));
+
+	&set_label("mw_finish2",1);
+	for ($i=0; $i<7; $i++)
+		{
+		&comment("Tail Round $i");
+		 &mov("eax",&DWP($i*4,$a,"",0));# *a
+		&mul($w);			# *a * w
+		&add("eax",$c);			# L(t)+=c
+		 # XXX
+		&adc("edx",0);			# H(t)+=carry
+		 &mov(&DWP($i*4,$r,"",0),"eax");# *r= L(t);
+		&mov($c,"edx");			# c=  H(t);
+		 &dec($num) if ($i != 7-1);
+		&jz(&label("mw_end")) if ($i != 7-1);
+		}
+	&set_label("mw_end",0);
+	&mov("eax",$c);
+
+	&function_end($name);
+	}
+
+sub bn_sqr_words
+	{
+	local($name)=@_;
+
+	&function_begin_B($name,$sse2?"EXTRN\t_OPENSSL_ia32cap_P:DWORD":"");
+
+	$r="eax";
+	$a="edx";
+	$c="ecx";
+
+	if ($sse2) {
+		&picmeup("eax","OPENSSL_ia32cap_P");
+		&bt(&DWP(0,"eax"),26);
+		&jnc(&label("sqr_non_sse2"));
+
+		&mov($r,&wparam(0));
+		&mov($a,&wparam(1));
+		&mov($c,&wparam(2));
+
+	&set_label("sqr_sse2_loop",16);
+		&movd("mm0",&DWP(0,$a));	# mm0 = a[i]
+		&pmuludq("mm0","mm0");		# a[i] *= a[i]
+		&lea($a,&DWP(4,$a));		# a++
+		&movq(&QWP(0,$r),"mm0");	# r[i] = a[i]*a[i]
+		&sub($c,1);
+		&lea($r,&DWP(8,$r));		# r += 2
+		&jnz(&label("sqr_sse2_loop"));
+
+		&emms();
+		&ret();
+	&set_label("sqr_non_sse2",16);
+	}
+
+	# function_begin prologue
+	&push("ebp");
+	&push("ebx");
+	&push("esi");
+	&push("edi");
+
+	&comment("");
+	$r="esi";
+	$a="edi";
+	$num="ebx";
+
+	&mov($r,&wparam(0));	#
+	&mov($a,&wparam(1));	#
+	&mov($num,&wparam(2));	#
+
+	&and($num,0xfffffff8);	# num / 8
+	&jz(&label("sw_finish"));
+
+	&set_label("sw_loop",0);
+	for ($i=0; $i<32; $i+=4)
+		{
+		&comment("Round $i");
+		&mov("eax",&DWP($i,$a,"",0)); 	# *a
+		 # XXX
+		&mul("eax");			# *a * *a
+		&mov(&DWP($i*2,$r,"",0),"eax");	#
+		 &mov(&DWP($i*2+4,$r,"",0),"edx");#
+		}
+
+	&comment("");
+	&add($a,32);
+	&add($r,64);
+	&sub($num,8);
+	&jnz(&label("sw_loop"));
+
+	&set_label("sw_finish",0);
+	&mov($num,&wparam(2));	# get num
+	&and($num,7);
+	&jz(&label("sw_end"));
+
+	for ($i=0; $i<7; $i++)
+		{
+		&comment("Tail Round $i");
+		&mov("eax",&DWP($i*4,$a,"",0));	# *a
+		 # XXX
+		&mul("eax");			# *a * *a
+		&mov(&DWP($i*8,$r,"",0),"eax");	#
+		 &dec($num) if ($i != 7-1);
+		&mov(&DWP($i*8+4,$r,"",0),"edx");
+		 &jz(&label("sw_end")) if ($i != 7-1);
+		}
+	&set_label("sw_end",0);
+
+	&function_end($name);
+	}
+
+sub bn_div_words
+	{
+	local($name)=@_;
+
+	&function_begin_B($name,"");
+	&mov("edx",&wparam(0));	#
+	&mov("eax",&wparam(1));	#
+	&mov("ecx",&wparam(2));	#
+	&div("ecx");
+	&ret();
+	&function_end_B($name);
+	}
+
+sub bn_add_words
+	{
+	local($name)=@_;
+
+	&function_begin($name,"");
+
+	&comment("");
+	$a="esi";
+	$b="edi";
+	$c="eax";
+	$r="ebx";
+	$tmp1="ecx";
+	$tmp2="edx";
+	$num="ebp";
+
+	&mov($r,&wparam(0));	# get r
+	 &mov($a,&wparam(1));	# get a
+	&mov($b,&wparam(2));	# get b
+	 &mov($num,&wparam(3));	# get num
+	&xor($c,$c);		# clear carry
+	 &and($num,0xfffffff8);	# num / 8
+
+	&jz(&label("aw_finish"));
+
+	&set_label("aw_loop",0);
+	for ($i=0; $i<8; $i++)
+		{
+		&comment("Round $i");
+
+		&mov($tmp1,&DWP($i*4,$a,"",0)); 	# *a
+		 &mov($tmp2,&DWP($i*4,$b,"",0)); 	# *b
+		&add($tmp1,$c);
+		 &mov($c,0);
+		&adc($c,$c);
+		 &add($tmp1,$tmp2);
+		&adc($c,0);
+		 &mov(&DWP($i*4,$r,"",0),$tmp1); 	# *r
+		}
+
+	&comment("");
+	&add($a,32);
+	 &add($b,32);
+	&add($r,32);
+	 &sub($num,8);
+	&jnz(&label("aw_loop"));
+
+	&set_label("aw_finish",0);
+	&mov($num,&wparam(3));	# get num
+	&and($num,7);
+	 &jz(&label("aw_end"));
+
+	for ($i=0; $i<7; $i++)
+		{
+		&comment("Tail Round $i");
+		&mov($tmp1,&DWP($i*4,$a,"",0));	# *a
+		 &mov($tmp2,&DWP($i*4,$b,"",0));# *b
+		&add($tmp1,$c);
+		 &mov($c,0);
+		&adc($c,$c);
+		 &add($tmp1,$tmp2);
+		&adc($c,0);
+		 &dec($num) if ($i != 6);
+		&mov(&DWP($i*4,$r,"",0),$tmp1);	# *r
+		 &jz(&label("aw_end")) if ($i != 6);
+		}
+	&set_label("aw_end",0);
+
+#	&mov("eax",$c);		# $c is "eax"
+
+	&function_end($name);
+	}
+
+sub bn_sub_words
+	{
+	local($name)=@_;
+
+	&function_begin($name,"");
+
+	&comment("");
+	$a="esi";
+	$b="edi";
+	$c="eax";
+	$r="ebx";
+	$tmp1="ecx";
+	$tmp2="edx";
+	$num="ebp";
+
+	&mov($r,&wparam(0));	# get r
+	 &mov($a,&wparam(1));	# get a
+	&mov($b,&wparam(2));	# get b
+	 &mov($num,&wparam(3));	# get num
+	&xor($c,$c);		# clear carry
+	 &and($num,0xfffffff8);	# num / 8
+
+	&jz(&label("aw_finish"));
+
+	&set_label("aw_loop",0);
+	for ($i=0; $i<8; $i++)
+		{
+		&comment("Round $i");
+
+		&mov($tmp1,&DWP($i*4,$a,"",0)); 	# *a
+		 &mov($tmp2,&DWP($i*4,$b,"",0)); 	# *b
+		&sub($tmp1,$c);
+		 &mov($c,0);
+		&adc($c,$c);
+		 &sub($tmp1,$tmp2);
+		&adc($c,0);
+		 &mov(&DWP($i*4,$r,"",0),$tmp1); 	# *r
+		}
+
+	&comment("");
+	&add($a,32);
+	 &add($b,32);
+	&add($r,32);
+	 &sub($num,8);
+	&jnz(&label("aw_loop"));
+
+	&set_label("aw_finish",0);
+	&mov($num,&wparam(3));	# get num
+	&and($num,7);
+	 &jz(&label("aw_end"));
+
+	for ($i=0; $i<7; $i++)
+		{
+		&comment("Tail Round $i");
+		&mov($tmp1,&DWP($i*4,$a,"",0));	# *a
+		 &mov($tmp2,&DWP($i*4,$b,"",0));# *b
+		&sub($tmp1,$c);
+		 &mov($c,0);
+		&adc($c,$c);
+		 &sub($tmp1,$tmp2);
+		&adc($c,0);
+		 &dec($num) if ($i != 6);
+		&mov(&DWP($i*4,$r,"",0),$tmp1);	# *r
+		 &jz(&label("aw_end")) if ($i != 6);
+		}
+	&set_label("aw_end",0);
+
+#	&mov("eax",$c);		# $c is "eax"
+
+	&function_end($name);
+	}
+
+sub bn_sub_part_words
+	{
+	local($name)=@_;
+
+	&function_begin($name,"");
+
+	&comment("");
+	$a="esi";
+	$b="edi";
+	$c="eax";
+	$r="ebx";
+	$tmp1="ecx";
+	$tmp2="edx";
+	$num="ebp";
+
+	&mov($r,&wparam(0));	# get r
+	 &mov($a,&wparam(1));	# get a
+	&mov($b,&wparam(2));	# get b
+	 &mov($num,&wparam(3));	# get num
+	&xor($c,$c);		# clear carry
+	 &and($num,0xfffffff8);	# num / 8
+
+	&jz(&label("aw_finish"));
+
+	&set_label("aw_loop",0);
+	for ($i=0; $i<8; $i++)
+		{
+		&comment("Round $i");
+
+		&mov($tmp1,&DWP($i*4,$a,"",0)); 	# *a
+		 &mov($tmp2,&DWP($i*4,$b,"",0)); 	# *b
+		&sub($tmp1,$c);
+		 &mov($c,0);
+		&adc($c,$c);
+		 &sub($tmp1,$tmp2);
+		&adc($c,0);
+		 &mov(&DWP($i*4,$r,"",0),$tmp1); 	# *r
+		}
+
+	&comment("");
+	&add($a,32);
+	 &add($b,32);
+	&add($r,32);
+	 &sub($num,8);
+	&jnz(&label("aw_loop"));
+
+	&set_label("aw_finish",0);
+	&mov($num,&wparam(3));	# get num
+	&and($num,7);
+	 &jz(&label("aw_end"));
+
+	for ($i=0; $i<7; $i++)
+		{
+		&comment("Tail Round $i");
+		&mov($tmp1,&DWP(0,$a,"",0));	# *a
+		 &mov($tmp2,&DWP(0,$b,"",0));# *b
+		&sub($tmp1,$c);
+		 &mov($c,0);
+		&adc($c,$c);
+		 &sub($tmp1,$tmp2);
+		&adc($c,0);
+		&mov(&DWP(0,$r,"",0),$tmp1);	# *r
+		&add($a, 4);
+		&add($b, 4);
+		&add($r, 4);
+		 &dec($num) if ($i != 6);
+		 &jz(&label("aw_end")) if ($i != 6);
+		}
+	&set_label("aw_end",0);
+
+	&cmp(&wparam(4),0);
+	&je(&label("pw_end"));
+
+	&mov($num,&wparam(4));	# get dl
+	&cmp($num,0);
+	&je(&label("pw_end"));
+	&jge(&label("pw_pos"));
+
+	&comment("pw_neg");
+	&mov($tmp2,0);
+	&sub($tmp2,$num);
+	&mov($num,$tmp2);
+	&and($num,0xfffffff8);	# num / 8
+	&jz(&label("pw_neg_finish"));
+
+	&set_label("pw_neg_loop",0);
+	for ($i=0; $i<8; $i++)
+	{
+	    &comment("dl<0 Round $i");
+
+	    &mov($tmp1,0);
+	    &mov($tmp2,&DWP($i*4,$b,"",0)); 	# *b
+	    &sub($tmp1,$c);
+	    &mov($c,0);
+	    &adc($c,$c);
+	    &sub($tmp1,$tmp2);
+	    &adc($c,0);
+	    &mov(&DWP($i*4,$r,"",0),$tmp1); 	# *r
+	}
+	    
+	&comment("");
+	&add($b,32);
+	&add($r,32);
+	&sub($num,8);
+	&jnz(&label("pw_neg_loop"));
+	    
+	&set_label("pw_neg_finish",0);
+	&mov($tmp2,&wparam(4));	# get dl
+	&mov($num,0);
+	&sub($num,$tmp2);
+	&and($num,7);
+	&jz(&label("pw_end"));
+	    
+	for ($i=0; $i<7; $i++)
+	{
+	    &comment("dl<0 Tail Round $i");
+	    &mov($tmp1,0);
+	    &mov($tmp2,&DWP($i*4,$b,"",0));# *b
+	    &sub($tmp1,$c);
+	    &mov($c,0);
+	    &adc($c,$c);
+	    &sub($tmp1,$tmp2);
+	    &adc($c,0);
+	    &dec($num) if ($i != 6);
+	    &mov(&DWP($i*4,$r,"",0),$tmp1);	# *r
+	    &jz(&label("pw_end")) if ($i != 6);
+	}
+
+	&jmp(&label("pw_end"));
+	
+	&set_label("pw_pos",0);
+	
+	&and($num,0xfffffff8);	# num / 8
+	&jz(&label("pw_pos_finish"));
+
+	&set_label("pw_pos_loop",0);
+
+	for ($i=0; $i<8; $i++)
+	{
+	    &comment("dl>0 Round $i");
+
+	    &mov($tmp1,&DWP($i*4,$a,"",0));	# *a
+	    &sub($tmp1,$c);
+	    &mov(&DWP($i*4,$r,"",0),$tmp1);	# *r
+	    &jnc(&label("pw_nc".$i));
+	}
+	    
+	&comment("");
+	&add($a,32);
+	&add($r,32);
+	&sub($num,8);
+	&jnz(&label("pw_pos_loop"));
+	    
+	&set_label("pw_pos_finish",0);
+	&mov($num,&wparam(4));	# get dl
+	&and($num,7);
+	&jz(&label("pw_end"));
+	    
+	for ($i=0; $i<7; $i++)
+	{
+	    &comment("dl>0 Tail Round $i");
+	    &mov($tmp1,&DWP($i*4,$a,"",0));	# *a
+	    &sub($tmp1,$c);
+	    &mov(&DWP($i*4,$r,"",0),$tmp1);	# *r
+	    &jnc(&label("pw_tail_nc".$i));
+	    &dec($num) if ($i != 6);
+	    &jz(&label("pw_end")) if ($i != 6);
+	}
+	&mov($c,1);
+	&jmp(&label("pw_end"));
+
+	&set_label("pw_nc_loop",0);
+	for ($i=0; $i<8; $i++)
+	{
+	    &mov($tmp1,&DWP($i*4,$a,"",0));	# *a
+	    &mov(&DWP($i*4,$r,"",0),$tmp1);	# *r
+	    &set_label("pw_nc".$i,0);
+	}
+	    
+	&comment("");
+	&add($a,32);
+	&add($r,32);
+	&sub($num,8);
+	&jnz(&label("pw_nc_loop"));
+	    
+	&mov($num,&wparam(4));	# get dl
+	&and($num,7);
+	&jz(&label("pw_nc_end"));
+	    
+	for ($i=0; $i<7; $i++)
+	{
+	    &mov($tmp1,&DWP($i*4,$a,"",0));	# *a
+	    &mov(&DWP($i*4,$r,"",0),$tmp1);	# *r
+	    &set_label("pw_tail_nc".$i,0);
+	    &dec($num) if ($i != 6);
+	    &jz(&label("pw_nc_end")) if ($i != 6);
+	}
+
+	&set_label("pw_nc_end",0);
+	&mov($c,0);
+
+	&set_label("pw_end",0);
+
+#	&mov("eax",$c);		# $c is "eax"
+
+	&function_end($name);
+	}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/bn-c64xplus.asm b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/bn-c64xplus.asm
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..de6d377
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/bn-c64xplus.asm
@@ -0,0 +1,382 @@
+;; Copyright 2012-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+;;
+;; Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+;; this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+;; in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+;; https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+;;
+;;====================================================================
+;; Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+;; project.
+;;
+;; Rights for redistribution and usage in source and binary forms are
+;; granted according to the OpenSSL license. Warranty of any kind is
+;; disclaimed.
+;;====================================================================
+;; Compiler-generated multiply-n-add SPLOOP runs at 12*n cycles, n
+;; being the number of 32-bit words, addition - 8*n. Corresponding 4x
+;; unrolled SPLOOP-free loops - at ~8*n and ~5*n. Below assembler
+;; SPLOOPs spin at ... 2*n cycles [plus epilogue].
+;;====================================================================
+	.text
+
+	.if	.ASSEMBLER_VERSION<7000000
+	.asg	0,__TI_EABI__
+	.endif
+	.if	__TI_EABI__
+	.asg	bn_mul_add_words,_bn_mul_add_words
+	.asg	bn_mul_words,_bn_mul_words
+	.asg	bn_sqr_words,_bn_sqr_words
+	.asg	bn_add_words,_bn_add_words
+	.asg	bn_sub_words,_bn_sub_words
+	.asg	bn_div_words,_bn_div_words
+	.asg	bn_sqr_comba8,_bn_sqr_comba8
+	.asg	bn_mul_comba8,_bn_mul_comba8
+	.asg	bn_sqr_comba4,_bn_sqr_comba4
+	.asg	bn_mul_comba4,_bn_mul_comba4
+	.endif
+
+	.asg	B3,RA
+	.asg	A4,ARG0
+	.asg	B4,ARG1
+	.asg	A6,ARG2
+	.asg	B6,ARG3
+	.asg	A8,ARG4
+	.asg	B8,ARG5
+	.asg	A4,RET
+	.asg	A15,FP
+	.asg	B14,DP
+	.asg	B15,SP
+
+	.global	_bn_mul_add_words
+_bn_mul_add_words:
+	.asmfunc
+	MV	ARG2,B0
+  [!B0]	BNOP	RA
+||[!B0]	MVK	0,RET
+   [B0]	MVC	B0,ILC
+   [B0]	ZERO	A19		; high part of accumulator
+|| [B0]	MV	ARG0,A2
+|| [B0]	MV	ARG3,A3
+	NOP	3
+
+	SPLOOP	2		; 2*n+10
+;;====================================================================
+	LDW	*ARG1++,B7	; ap[i]
+	NOP	3
+	LDW	*ARG0++,A7	; rp[i]
+	MPY32U	B7,A3,A17:A16
+	NOP	3		; [2,0] in epilogue
+	ADDU	A16,A7,A21:A20
+	ADDU	A19,A21:A20,A19:A18
+||	MV.S	A17,A23
+	SPKERNEL 2,1		; leave slot for "return value"
+||	STW	A18,*A2++	; rp[i]
+||	ADD	A19,A23,A19
+;;====================================================================
+	BNOP	RA,4
+	MV	A19,RET		; return value
+	.endasmfunc
+
+	.global	_bn_mul_words
+_bn_mul_words:
+	.asmfunc
+	MV	ARG2,B0
+  [!B0]	BNOP	RA
+||[!B0]	MVK	0,RET
+   [B0]	MVC	B0,ILC
+   [B0]	ZERO	A19		; high part of accumulator
+	NOP	3
+
+	SPLOOP	2		; 2*n+10
+;;====================================================================
+	LDW	*ARG1++,A7	; ap[i]
+	NOP	4
+	MPY32U	A7,ARG3,A17:A16
+	NOP	4		; [2,0] in epiloque
+	ADDU	A19,A16,A19:A18
+||	MV.S	A17,A21
+	SPKERNEL 2,1		; leave slot for "return value"
+||	STW	A18,*ARG0++	; rp[i]
+||	ADD.L	A19,A21,A19
+;;====================================================================
+	BNOP	RA,4
+	MV	A19,RET		; return value
+	.endasmfunc
+
+	.global	_bn_sqr_words
+_bn_sqr_words:
+	.asmfunc
+	MV	ARG2,B0
+  [!B0]	BNOP	RA
+||[!B0]	MVK	0,RET
+   [B0]	MVC	B0,ILC
+   [B0]	MV	ARG0,B2
+|| [B0]	ADD	4,ARG0,ARG0
+	NOP	3
+
+	SPLOOP	2		; 2*n+10
+;;====================================================================
+	LDW	*ARG1++,B7	; ap[i]
+	NOP	4
+	MPY32U	B7,B7,B1:B0
+	NOP	3		; [2,0] in epilogue
+	STW	B0,*B2++(8)	; rp[2*i]
+	MV	B1,A1
+	SPKERNEL 2,0		; fully overlap BNOP RA,5
+||	STW	A1,*ARG0++(8)	; rp[2*i+1]
+;;====================================================================
+	BNOP	RA,5
+	.endasmfunc
+
+	.global	_bn_add_words
+_bn_add_words:
+	.asmfunc
+	MV	ARG3,B0
+  [!B0]	BNOP	RA
+||[!B0]	MVK	0,RET
+   [B0]	MVC	B0,ILC
+   [B0]	ZERO	A1		; carry flag
+|| [B0]	MV	ARG0,A3
+	NOP	3
+
+	SPLOOP	2		; 2*n+6
+;;====================================================================
+	LDW	*ARG2++,A7	; bp[i]
+||	LDW	*ARG1++,B7	; ap[i]
+	NOP	4
+	ADDU	A7,B7,A9:A8
+	ADDU	A1,A9:A8,A1:A0
+	SPKERNEL 0,0		; fully overlap BNOP RA,5
+||	STW	A0,*A3++	; write result
+||	MV	A1,RET		; keep carry flag in RET
+;;====================================================================
+	BNOP	RA,5
+	.endasmfunc
+
+	.global	_bn_sub_words
+_bn_sub_words:
+	.asmfunc
+	MV	ARG3,B0
+  [!B0]	BNOP	RA
+||[!B0]	MVK	0,RET
+   [B0]	MVC	B0,ILC
+   [B0]	ZERO	A2		; borrow flag
+|| [B0]	MV	ARG0,A3
+	NOP	3
+
+	SPLOOP	2		; 2*n+6
+;;====================================================================
+	LDW	*ARG2++,A7	; bp[i]
+||	LDW	*ARG1++,B7	; ap[i]
+	NOP	4
+	SUBU	B7,A7,A1:A0
+  [A2]	SUB	A1:A0,1,A1:A0
+	SPKERNEL 0,1		; leave slot for "return borrow flag"
+||	STW	A0,*A3++	; write result
+||	AND	1,A1,A2		; pass on borrow flag
+;;====================================================================
+	BNOP	RA,4
+	AND	1,A1,RET	; return borrow flag
+	.endasmfunc
+
+	.global	_bn_div_words
+_bn_div_words:
+	.asmfunc
+	LMBD	1,A6,A0		; leading zero bits in dv
+	LMBD	1,A4,A1		; leading zero bits in hi
+||	MVK	32,B0
+	CMPLTU	A1,A0,A2
+||	ADD	A0,B0,B0
+  [ A2]	BNOP	RA
+||[ A2]	MVK	-1,A4		; return overflow
+||[!A2]	MV	A4,A3		; reassign hi
+  [!A2]	MV	B4,A4		; reassign lo, will be quotient
+||[!A2]	MVC	B0,ILC
+  [!A2]	SHL	A6,A0,A6	; normalize dv
+||	MVK	1,A1
+
+  [!A2]	CMPLTU	A3,A6,A1	; hi<dv?
+||[!A2]	SHL	A4,1,A5:A4	; lo<<1
+  [!A1]	SUB	A3,A6,A3	; hi-=dv
+||[!A1]	OR	1,A4,A4
+  [!A2]	SHRU	A3,31,A1	; upper bit
+||[!A2]	ADDAH	A5,A3,A3	; hi<<1|lo>>31
+
+	SPLOOP	3
+  [!A1]	CMPLTU	A3,A6,A1	; hi<dv?
+||[ A1]	ZERO	A1
+||	SHL	A4,1,A5:A4	; lo<<1
+  [!A1]	SUB	A3,A6,A3	; hi-=dv
+||[!A1]	OR	1,A4,A4		; quotient
+	SHRU	A3,31,A1	; upper bit
+||	ADDAH	A5,A3,A3	; hi<<1|lo>>31
+	SPKERNEL
+
+	BNOP	RA,5
+	.endasmfunc
+
+;;====================================================================
+;; Not really Comba algorithm, just straightforward NxM... Dedicated
+;; fully unrolled real Comba implementations are asymptotically 2x
+;; faster, but naturally larger undertaking. Purpose of this exercise
+;; was rather to learn to master nested SPLOOPs...
+;;====================================================================
+	.global	_bn_sqr_comba8
+	.global	_bn_mul_comba8
+_bn_sqr_comba8:
+	MV	ARG1,ARG2
+_bn_mul_comba8:
+	.asmfunc
+	MVK	8,B0		; N, RILC
+||	MVK	8,A0		; M, outer loop counter
+||	MV	ARG1,A5		; copy ap
+||	MV	ARG0,B4		; copy rp
+||	ZERO	B19		; high part of accumulator
+	MVC	B0,RILC
+||	SUB	B0,2,B1		; N-2, initial ILC
+||	SUB	B0,1,B2		; const B2=N-1
+||	LDW	*A5++,B6	; ap[0]
+||	MV	A0,A3		; const A3=M
+sploopNxM?:			; for best performance arrange M<=N
+   [A0]	SPLOOPD	2		; 2*n+10
+||	MVC	B1,ILC
+||	ADDAW	B4,B0,B5
+||	ZERO	B7
+||	LDW	*A5++,A9	; pre-fetch ap[1]
+||	ZERO	A1
+||	SUB	A0,1,A0
+;;====================================================================
+;; SPLOOP from bn_mul_add_words, but with flipped A<>B register files.
+;; This is because of Advisory 15 from TI publication SPRZ247I.
+	LDW	*ARG2++,A7	; bp[i]
+	NOP	3
+   [A1]	LDW	*B5++,B7	; rp[i]
+	MPY32U	A7,B6,B17:B16
+	NOP	3
+	ADDU	B16,B7,B21:B20
+	ADDU	B19,B21:B20,B19:B18
+||	MV.S	B17,B23
+	SPKERNEL
+||	STW	B18,*B4++	; rp[i]
+||	ADD.S	B19,B23,B19
+;;====================================================================
+outer?:				; m*2*(n+1)+10
+	SUBAW	ARG2,A3,ARG2	; rewind bp to bp[0]
+	SPMASKR
+||	CMPGT	A0,1,A2		; done pre-fetching ap[i+1]?
+	MVD	A9,B6		; move through .M unit(*)
+   [A2]	LDW	*A5++,A9	; pre-fetch ap[i+1]
+	SUBAW	B5,B2,B5	; rewind rp to rp[1]
+	MVK	1,A1
+   [A0]	BNOP.S1	outer?,4
+|| [A0]	SUB.L	A0,1,A0
+	STW	B19,*B4--[B2]	; rewind rp tp rp[1]
+||	ZERO.S	B19		; high part of accumulator
+;; end of outer?
+	BNOP	RA,5		; return
+	.endasmfunc
+;; (*)	It should be noted that B6 is used as input to MPY32U in
+;;	chronologically next cycle in *preceding* SPLOOP iteration.
+;;	Normally such arrangement would require DINT, but at this
+;;	point SPLOOP is draining and interrupts are disabled
+;;	implicitly.
+
+	.global	_bn_sqr_comba4
+	.global	_bn_mul_comba4
+_bn_sqr_comba4:
+	MV	ARG1,ARG2
+_bn_mul_comba4:
+	.asmfunc
+	.if	0
+	BNOP	sploopNxM?,3
+	;; Above mentioned m*2*(n+1)+10 does not apply in n=m=4 case,
+	;; because of low-counter effect, when prologue phase finishes
+	;; before SPKERNEL instruction is reached. As result it's 25%
+	;; slower than expected...
+	MVK	4,B0		; N, RILC
+||	MVK	4,A0		; M, outer loop counter
+||	MV	ARG1,A5		; copy ap
+||	MV	ARG0,B4		; copy rp
+||	ZERO	B19		; high part of accumulator
+	MVC	B0,RILC
+||	SUB	B0,2,B1		; first ILC
+||	SUB	B0,1,B2		; const B2=N-1
+||	LDW	*A5++,B6	; ap[0]
+||	MV	A0,A3		; const A3=M
+	.else
+	;; This alternative is an exercise in fully unrolled Comba
+	;; algorithm implementation that operates at n*(n+1)+12, or
+	;; as little as 32 cycles...
+	LDW	*ARG1[0],B16	; a[0]
+||	LDW	*ARG2[0],A16	; b[0]
+	LDW	*ARG1[1],B17	; a[1]
+||	LDW	*ARG2[1],A17	; b[1]
+	LDW	*ARG1[2],B18	; a[2]
+||	LDW	*ARG2[2],A18	; b[2]
+	LDW	*ARG1[3],B19	; a[3]
+||	LDW	*ARG2[3],A19	; b[3]
+	NOP
+	MPY32U	A16,B16,A1:A0	; a[0]*b[0]
+	MPY32U	A17,B16,A23:A22	; a[0]*b[1]
+	MPY32U	A16,B17,A25:A24	; a[1]*b[0]
+	MPY32U	A16,B18,A27:A26	; a[2]*b[0]
+	STW	A0,*ARG0[0]
+||	MPY32U	A17,B17,A29:A28	; a[1]*b[1]
+	MPY32U	A18,B16,A31:A30	; a[0]*b[2]
+||	ADDU	A22,A1,A1:A0
+	MV	A23,B0
+||	MPY32U	A19,B16,A21:A20	; a[3]*b[0]
+||	ADDU	A24,A1:A0,A1:A0
+	ADDU	A25,B0,B1:B0
+||	STW	A0,*ARG0[1]
+||	MPY32U	A18,B17,A23:A22	; a[2]*b[1]
+||	ADDU	A26,A1,A9:A8
+	ADDU	A27,B1,B9:B8
+||	MPY32U	A17,B18,A25:A24	; a[1]*b[2]
+||	ADDU	A28,A9:A8,A9:A8
+	ADDU	A29,B9:B8,B9:B8
+||	MPY32U	A16,B19,A27:A26	; a[0]*b[3]
+||	ADDU	A30,A9:A8,A9:A8
+	ADDU	A31,B9:B8,B9:B8
+||	ADDU	B0,A9:A8,A9:A8
+	STW	A8,*ARG0[2]
+||	ADDU	A20,A9,A1:A0
+	ADDU	A21,B9,B1:B0
+||	MPY32U	A19,B17,A21:A20	; a[3]*b[1]
+||	ADDU	A22,A1:A0,A1:A0
+	ADDU	A23,B1:B0,B1:B0
+||	MPY32U	A18,B18,A23:A22	; a[2]*b[2]
+||	ADDU	A24,A1:A0,A1:A0
+	ADDU	A25,B1:B0,B1:B0
+||	MPY32U	A17,B19,A25:A24	; a[1]*b[3]
+||	ADDU	A26,A1:A0,A1:A0
+	ADDU	A27,B1:B0,B1:B0
+||	ADDU	B8,A1:A0,A1:A0
+	STW	A0,*ARG0[3]
+||	MPY32U	A19,B18,A27:A26	; a[3]*b[2]
+||	ADDU	A20,A1,A9:A8
+	ADDU	A21,B1,B9:B8
+||	MPY32U	A18,B19,A29:A28	; a[2]*b[3]
+||	ADDU	A22,A9:A8,A9:A8
+	ADDU	A23,B9:B8,B9:B8
+||	MPY32U	A19,B19,A31:A30	; a[3]*b[3]
+||	ADDU	A24,A9:A8,A9:A8
+	ADDU	A25,B9:B8,B9:B8
+||	ADDU	B0,A9:A8,A9:A8
+	STW	A8,*ARG0[4]
+||	ADDU	A26,A9,A1:A0
+	ADDU	A27,B9,B1:B0
+||	ADDU	A28,A1:A0,A1:A0
+	ADDU	A29,B1:B0,B1:B0
+||	BNOP	RA
+||	ADDU	B8,A1:A0,A1:A0
+	STW	A0,*ARG0[5]
+||	ADDU	A30,A1,A9:A8
+	ADD	A31,B1,B8
+	ADDU	B0,A9:A8,A9:A8	; removed || to avoid cross-path stall below
+	ADD	B8,A9,A9
+||	STW	A8,*ARG0[6]
+	STW	A9,*ARG0[7]
+	.endif
+	.endasmfunc
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/c64xplus-gf2m.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/c64xplus-gf2m.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c0e5400
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/c64xplus-gf2m.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2012-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# February 2012
+#
+# The module implements bn_GF2m_mul_2x2 polynomial multiplication
+# used in bn_gf2m.c. It's kind of low-hanging mechanical port from
+# C for the time being... The subroutine runs in 37 cycles, which is
+# 4.5x faster than compiler-generated code. Though comparison is
+# totally unfair, because this module utilizes Galois Field Multiply
+# instruction.
+
+while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {}
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+($rp,$a1,$a0,$b1,$b0)=("A4","B4","A6","B6","A8");   # argument vector
+
+($Alo,$Alox0,$Alox1,$Alox2,$Alox3)=map("A$_",(16..20));
+($Ahi,$Ahix0,$Ahix1,$Ahix2,$Ahix3)=map("B$_",(16..20));
+($B_0,$B_1,$B_2,$B_3)=("B5","A5","A7","B7");
+($A,$B)=($Alo,$B_1);
+$xFF="B1";
+
+sub mul_1x1_upper {
+my ($A,$B)=@_;
+$code.=<<___;
+	EXTU	$B,8,24,$B_2		; smash $B to 4 bytes
+||	AND	$B,$xFF,$B_0
+||	SHRU	$B,24,$B_3
+	SHRU	$A,16,   $Ahi		; smash $A to two halfwords
+||	EXTU	$A,16,16,$Alo
+
+	XORMPY	$Alo,$B_2,$Alox2	; 16x8 bits muliplication
+||	XORMPY	$Ahi,$B_2,$Ahix2
+||	EXTU	$B,16,24,$B_1
+	XORMPY	$Alo,$B_0,$Alox0
+||	XORMPY	$Ahi,$B_0,$Ahix0
+	XORMPY	$Alo,$B_3,$Alox3
+||	XORMPY	$Ahi,$B_3,$Ahix3
+	XORMPY	$Alo,$B_1,$Alox1
+||	XORMPY	$Ahi,$B_1,$Ahix1
+___
+}
+sub mul_1x1_merged {
+my ($OUTlo,$OUThi,$A,$B)=@_;
+$code.=<<___;
+	 EXTU	$B,8,24,$B_2		; smash $B to 4 bytes
+||	 AND	$B,$xFF,$B_0
+||	 SHRU	$B,24,$B_3
+	 SHRU	$A,16,   $Ahi		; smash $A to two halfwords
+||	 EXTU	$A,16,16,$Alo
+
+	XOR	$Ahix0,$Alox2,$Ahix0
+||	MV	$Ahix2,$OUThi
+||	 XORMPY	$Alo,$B_2,$Alox2
+	 XORMPY	$Ahi,$B_2,$Ahix2
+||	 EXTU	$B,16,24,$B_1
+||	 XORMPY	$Alo,$B_0,A1		; $Alox0
+	XOR	$Ahix1,$Alox3,$Ahix1
+||	SHL	$Ahix0,16,$OUTlo
+||	SHRU	$Ahix0,16,$Ahix0
+	XOR	$Alox0,$OUTlo,$OUTlo
+||	XOR	$Ahix0,$OUThi,$OUThi
+||	 XORMPY	$Ahi,$B_0,$Ahix0
+||	 XORMPY	$Alo,$B_3,$Alox3
+||	SHL	$Alox1,8,$Alox1
+||	SHL	$Ahix3,8,$Ahix3
+	XOR	$Alox1,$OUTlo,$OUTlo
+||	XOR	$Ahix3,$OUThi,$OUThi
+||	 XORMPY	$Ahi,$B_3,$Ahix3
+||	SHL	$Ahix1,24,$Alox1
+||	SHRU	$Ahix1,8, $Ahix1
+	XOR	$Alox1,$OUTlo,$OUTlo
+||	XOR	$Ahix1,$OUThi,$OUThi
+||	 XORMPY	$Alo,$B_1,$Alox1
+||	 XORMPY	$Ahi,$B_1,$Ahix1
+||	 MV	A1,$Alox0
+___
+}
+sub mul_1x1_lower {
+my ($OUTlo,$OUThi)=@_;
+$code.=<<___;
+	;NOP
+	XOR	$Ahix0,$Alox2,$Ahix0
+||	MV	$Ahix2,$OUThi
+	NOP
+	XOR	$Ahix1,$Alox3,$Ahix1
+||	SHL	$Ahix0,16,$OUTlo
+||	SHRU	$Ahix0,16,$Ahix0
+	XOR	$Alox0,$OUTlo,$OUTlo
+||	XOR	$Ahix0,$OUThi,$OUThi
+||	SHL	$Alox1,8,$Alox1
+||	SHL	$Ahix3,8,$Ahix3
+	XOR	$Alox1,$OUTlo,$OUTlo
+||	XOR	$Ahix3,$OUThi,$OUThi
+||	SHL	$Ahix1,24,$Alox1
+||	SHRU	$Ahix1,8, $Ahix1
+	XOR	$Alox1,$OUTlo,$OUTlo
+||	XOR	$Ahix1,$OUThi,$OUThi
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	.text
+
+	.if	.ASSEMBLER_VERSION<7000000
+	.asg	0,__TI_EABI__
+	.endif
+	.if	__TI_EABI__
+	.asg	bn_GF2m_mul_2x2,_bn_GF2m_mul_2x2
+	.endif
+
+	.global	_bn_GF2m_mul_2x2
+_bn_GF2m_mul_2x2:
+	.asmfunc
+	MVK	0xFF,$xFF
+___
+	&mul_1x1_upper($a0,$b0);		# a0·b0
+$code.=<<___;
+||	MV	$b1,$B
+	MV	$a1,$A
+___
+	&mul_1x1_merged("A28","B28",$A,$B);	# a0·b0/a1·b1
+$code.=<<___;
+||	XOR	$b0,$b1,$B
+	XOR	$a0,$a1,$A
+___
+	&mul_1x1_merged("A31","B31",$A,$B);	# a1·b1/(a0+a1)·(b0+b1)
+$code.=<<___;
+	XOR	A28,A31,A29
+||	XOR	B28,B31,B29			; a0·b0+a1·b1
+___
+	&mul_1x1_lower("A30","B30");		# (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)
+$code.=<<___;
+||	BNOP	B3
+	XOR	A29,A30,A30
+||	XOR	B29,B30,B30			; (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)-a0·b0-a1·b1
+	XOR	B28,A30,A30
+||	STW	A28,*${rp}[0]
+	XOR	B30,A31,A31
+||	STW	A30,*${rp}[1]
+	STW	A31,*${rp}[2]
+	STW	B31,*${rp}[3]
+	.endasmfunc
+___
+
+print $code;
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/co-586.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/co-586.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..60d0363
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/co-586.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,298 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm");
+require "x86asm.pl";
+
+$output = pop;
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+&asm_init($ARGV[0],$0);
+
+&bn_mul_comba("bn_mul_comba8",8);
+&bn_mul_comba("bn_mul_comba4",4);
+&bn_sqr_comba("bn_sqr_comba8",8);
+&bn_sqr_comba("bn_sqr_comba4",4);
+
+&asm_finish();
+
+close STDOUT;
+
+sub mul_add_c
+	{
+	local($a,$ai,$b,$bi,$c0,$c1,$c2,$pos,$i,$na,$nb)=@_;
+
+	# pos == -1 if eax and edx are pre-loaded, 0 to load from next
+	# words, and 1 if load return value
+
+	&comment("mul a[$ai]*b[$bi]");
+
+	# "eax" and "edx" will always be pre-loaded.
+	# &mov("eax",&DWP($ai*4,$a,"",0)) ;
+	# &mov("edx",&DWP($bi*4,$b,"",0));
+
+	&mul("edx");
+	&add($c0,"eax");
+	 &mov("eax",&DWP(($na)*4,$a,"",0)) if $pos == 0;	# laod next a
+	 &mov("eax",&wparam(0)) if $pos > 0;			# load r[]
+	 ###
+	&adc($c1,"edx");
+	 &mov("edx",&DWP(($nb)*4,$b,"",0)) if $pos == 0;	# laod next b
+	 &mov("edx",&DWP(($nb)*4,$b,"",0)) if $pos == 1;	# laod next b
+	 ###
+	&adc($c2,0);
+	 # is pos > 1, it means it is the last loop 
+	 &mov(&DWP($i*4,"eax","",0),$c0) if $pos > 0;		# save r[];
+	&mov("eax",&DWP(($na)*4,$a,"",0)) if $pos == 1;		# laod next a
+	}
+
+sub sqr_add_c
+	{
+	local($r,$a,$ai,$bi,$c0,$c1,$c2,$pos,$i,$na,$nb)=@_;
+
+	# pos == -1 if eax and edx are pre-loaded, 0 to load from next
+	# words, and 1 if load return value
+
+	&comment("sqr a[$ai]*a[$bi]");
+
+	# "eax" and "edx" will always be pre-loaded.
+	# &mov("eax",&DWP($ai*4,$a,"",0)) ;
+	# &mov("edx",&DWP($bi*4,$b,"",0));
+
+	if ($ai == $bi)
+		{ &mul("eax");}
+	else
+		{ &mul("edx");}
+	&add($c0,"eax");
+	 &mov("eax",&DWP(($na)*4,$a,"",0)) if $pos == 0;	# load next a
+	 ###
+	&adc($c1,"edx");
+	 &mov("edx",&DWP(($nb)*4,$a,"",0)) if ($pos == 1) && ($na != $nb);
+	 ###
+	&adc($c2,0);
+	 # is pos > 1, it means it is the last loop 
+	 &mov(&DWP($i*4,$r,"",0),$c0) if $pos > 0;		# save r[];
+	&mov("eax",&DWP(($na)*4,$a,"",0)) if $pos == 1;		# load next b
+	}
+
+sub sqr_add_c2
+	{
+	local($r,$a,$ai,$bi,$c0,$c1,$c2,$pos,$i,$na,$nb)=@_;
+
+	# pos == -1 if eax and edx are pre-loaded, 0 to load from next
+	# words, and 1 if load return value
+
+	&comment("sqr a[$ai]*a[$bi]");
+
+	# "eax" and "edx" will always be pre-loaded.
+	# &mov("eax",&DWP($ai*4,$a,"",0)) ;
+	# &mov("edx",&DWP($bi*4,$a,"",0));
+
+	if ($ai == $bi)
+		{ &mul("eax");}
+	else
+		{ &mul("edx");}
+	&add("eax","eax");
+	 ###
+	&adc("edx","edx");
+	 ###
+	&adc($c2,0);
+	 &add($c0,"eax");
+	&adc($c1,"edx");
+	 &mov("eax",&DWP(($na)*4,$a,"",0)) if $pos == 0;	# load next a
+	 &mov("eax",&DWP(($na)*4,$a,"",0)) if $pos == 1;	# load next b
+	&adc($c2,0);
+	&mov(&DWP($i*4,$r,"",0),$c0) if $pos > 0;		# save r[];
+	 &mov("edx",&DWP(($nb)*4,$a,"",0)) if ($pos <= 1) && ($na != $nb);
+	 ###
+	}
+
+sub bn_mul_comba
+	{
+	local($name,$num)=@_;
+	local($a,$b,$c0,$c1,$c2);
+	local($i,$as,$ae,$bs,$be,$ai,$bi);
+	local($tot,$end);
+
+	&function_begin_B($name,"");
+
+	$c0="ebx";
+	$c1="ecx";
+	$c2="ebp";
+	$a="esi";
+	$b="edi";
+	
+	$as=0;
+	$ae=0;
+	$bs=0;
+	$be=0;
+	$tot=$num+$num-1;
+
+	&push("esi");
+	 &mov($a,&wparam(1));
+	&push("edi");
+	 &mov($b,&wparam(2));
+	&push("ebp");
+	 &push("ebx");
+
+	&xor($c0,$c0);
+	 &mov("eax",&DWP(0,$a,"",0));	# load the first word 
+	&xor($c1,$c1);
+	 &mov("edx",&DWP(0,$b,"",0));	# load the first second 
+
+	for ($i=0; $i<$tot; $i++)
+		{
+		$ai=$as;
+		$bi=$bs;
+		$end=$be+1;
+
+		&comment("################## Calculate word $i"); 
+
+		for ($j=$bs; $j<$end; $j++)
+			{
+			&xor($c2,$c2) if ($j == $bs);
+			if (($j+1) == $end)
+				{
+				$v=1;
+				$v=2 if (($i+1) == $tot);
+				}
+			else
+				{ $v=0; }
+			if (($j+1) != $end)
+				{
+				$na=($ai-1);
+				$nb=($bi+1);
+				}
+			else
+				{
+				$na=$as+($i < ($num-1));
+				$nb=$bs+($i >= ($num-1));
+				}
+#printf STDERR "[$ai,$bi] -> [$na,$nb]\n";
+			&mul_add_c($a,$ai,$b,$bi,$c0,$c1,$c2,$v,$i,$na,$nb);
+			if ($v)
+				{
+				&comment("saved r[$i]");
+				# &mov("eax",&wparam(0));
+				# &mov(&DWP($i*4,"eax","",0),$c0);
+				($c0,$c1,$c2)=($c1,$c2,$c0);
+				}
+			$ai--;
+			$bi++;
+			}
+		$as++ if ($i < ($num-1));
+		$ae++ if ($i >= ($num-1));
+
+		$bs++ if ($i >= ($num-1));
+		$be++ if ($i < ($num-1));
+		}
+	&comment("save r[$i]");
+	# &mov("eax",&wparam(0));
+	&mov(&DWP($i*4,"eax","",0),$c0);
+
+	&pop("ebx");
+	&pop("ebp");
+	&pop("edi");
+	&pop("esi");
+	&ret();
+	&function_end_B($name);
+	}
+
+sub bn_sqr_comba
+	{
+	local($name,$num)=@_;
+	local($r,$a,$c0,$c1,$c2)=@_;
+	local($i,$as,$ae,$bs,$be,$ai,$bi);
+	local($b,$tot,$end,$half);
+
+	&function_begin_B($name,"");
+
+	$c0="ebx";
+	$c1="ecx";
+	$c2="ebp";
+	$a="esi";
+	$r="edi";
+
+	&push("esi");
+	 &push("edi");
+	&push("ebp");
+	 &push("ebx");
+	&mov($r,&wparam(0));
+	 &mov($a,&wparam(1));
+	&xor($c0,$c0);
+	 &xor($c1,$c1);
+	&mov("eax",&DWP(0,$a,"",0)); # load the first word
+
+	$as=0;
+	$ae=0;
+	$bs=0;
+	$be=0;
+	$tot=$num+$num-1;
+
+	for ($i=0; $i<$tot; $i++)
+		{
+		$ai=$as;
+		$bi=$bs;
+		$end=$be+1;
+
+		&comment("############### Calculate word $i");
+		for ($j=$bs; $j<$end; $j++)
+			{
+			&xor($c2,$c2) if ($j == $bs);
+			if (($ai-1) < ($bi+1))
+				{
+				$v=1;
+				$v=2 if ($i+1) == $tot;
+				}
+			else
+				{ $v=0; }
+			if (!$v)
+				{
+				$na=$ai-1;
+				$nb=$bi+1;
+				}
+			else
+				{
+				$na=$as+($i < ($num-1));
+				$nb=$bs+($i >= ($num-1));
+				}
+			if ($ai == $bi)
+				{
+				&sqr_add_c($r,$a,$ai,$bi,
+					$c0,$c1,$c2,$v,$i,$na,$nb);
+				}
+			else
+				{
+				&sqr_add_c2($r,$a,$ai,$bi,
+					$c0,$c1,$c2,$v,$i,$na,$nb);
+				}
+			if ($v)
+				{
+				&comment("saved r[$i]");
+				#&mov(&DWP($i*4,$r,"",0),$c0);
+				($c0,$c1,$c2)=($c1,$c2,$c0);
+				last;
+				}
+			$ai--;
+			$bi++;
+			}
+		$as++ if ($i < ($num-1));
+		$ae++ if ($i >= ($num-1));
+
+		$bs++ if ($i >= ($num-1));
+		$be++ if ($i < ($num-1));
+		}
+	&mov(&DWP($i*4,$r,"",0),$c0);
+	&pop("ebx");
+	&pop("ebp");
+	&pop("edi");
+	&pop("esi");
+	&ret();
+	&function_end_B($name);
+	}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/ia64-mont.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/ia64-mont.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5cc5c59
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/ia64-mont.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,860 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2010-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+
+# January 2010
+#
+# "Teaser" Montgomery multiplication module for IA-64. There are
+# several possibilities for improvement:
+#
+# - modulo-scheduling outer loop would eliminate quite a number of
+#   stalls after ldf8, xma and getf.sig outside inner loop and
+#   improve shorter key performance;
+# - shorter vector support [with input vectors being fetched only
+#   once] should be added;
+# - 2x unroll with help of n0[1] would make the code scalable on
+#   "wider" IA-64, "wider" than Itanium 2 that is, which is not of
+#   acute interest, because upcoming Tukwila's individual cores are
+#   reportedly based on Itanium 2 design;
+# - dedicated squaring procedure(?);
+#
+# January 2010
+#
+# Shorter vector support is implemented by zero-padding ap and np
+# vectors up to 8 elements, or 512 bits. This means that 256-bit
+# inputs will be processed only 2 times faster than 512-bit inputs,
+# not 4 [as one would expect, because algorithm complexity is n^2].
+# The reason for padding is that inputs shorter than 512 bits won't
+# be processed faster anyway, because minimal critical path of the
+# core loop happens to match 512-bit timing. Either way, it resulted
+# in >100% improvement of 512-bit RSA sign benchmark and 50% - of
+# 1024-bit one [in comparison to original version of *this* module].
+#
+# So far 'openssl speed rsa dsa' output on 900MHz Itanium 2 *with*
+# this module is:
+#                   sign    verify    sign/s verify/s
+# rsa  512 bits 0.000290s 0.000024s   3452.8  42031.4
+# rsa 1024 bits 0.000793s 0.000058s   1261.7  17172.0
+# rsa 2048 bits 0.005908s 0.000148s    169.3   6754.0
+# rsa 4096 bits 0.033456s 0.000469s     29.9   2133.6
+# dsa  512 bits 0.000253s 0.000198s   3949.9   5057.0
+# dsa 1024 bits 0.000585s 0.000607s   1708.4   1647.4
+# dsa 2048 bits 0.001453s 0.001703s    688.1    587.4
+#
+# ... and *without* (but still with ia64.S):
+#
+# rsa  512 bits 0.000670s 0.000041s   1491.8  24145.5
+# rsa 1024 bits 0.001988s 0.000080s    502.9  12499.3
+# rsa 2048 bits 0.008702s 0.000189s    114.9   5293.9
+# rsa 4096 bits 0.043860s 0.000533s     22.8   1875.9
+# dsa  512 bits 0.000441s 0.000427s   2265.3   2340.6
+# dsa 1024 bits 0.000823s 0.000867s   1215.6   1153.2
+# dsa 2048 bits 0.001894s 0.002179s    528.1    458.9
+#
+# As it can be seen, RSA sign performance improves by 130-30%,
+# hereafter less for longer keys, while verify - by 74-13%.
+# DSA performance improves by 115-30%.
+
+$output=pop;
+
+if ($^O eq "hpux") {
+    $ADDP="addp4";
+    for (@ARGV) { $ADDP="add" if (/[\+DD|\-mlp]64/); }
+} else { $ADDP="add"; }
+
+$code=<<___;
+.explicit
+.text
+
+// int bn_mul_mont (BN_ULONG *rp,const BN_ULONG *ap,
+//		    const BN_ULONG *bp,const BN_ULONG *np,
+//		    const BN_ULONG *n0p,int num);			
+.align	64
+.global	bn_mul_mont#
+.proc	bn_mul_mont#
+bn_mul_mont:
+	.prologue
+	.body
+{ .mmi;	cmp4.le		p6,p7=2,r37;;
+(p6)	cmp4.lt.unc	p8,p9=8,r37
+	mov		ret0=r0		};;
+{ .bbb;
+(p9)	br.cond.dptk.many	bn_mul_mont_8
+(p8)	br.cond.dpnt.many	bn_mul_mont_general
+(p7)	br.ret.spnt.many	b0	};;
+.endp	bn_mul_mont#
+
+prevfs=r2;	prevpr=r3;	prevlc=r10;	prevsp=r11;
+
+rptr=r8;	aptr=r9;	bptr=r14;	nptr=r15;
+tptr=r16;	// &tp[0]
+tp_1=r17;	// &tp[-1]
+num=r18;	len=r19;	lc=r20;
+topbit=r21;	// carry bit from tmp[num]
+
+n0=f6;
+m0=f7;
+bi=f8;
+
+.align	64
+.local	bn_mul_mont_general#
+.proc	bn_mul_mont_general#
+bn_mul_mont_general:
+	.prologue
+{ .mmi;	.save	ar.pfs,prevfs
+	alloc	prevfs=ar.pfs,6,2,0,8
+	$ADDP	aptr=0,in1
+	.save	ar.lc,prevlc
+	mov	prevlc=ar.lc		}
+{ .mmi;	.vframe	prevsp
+	mov	prevsp=sp
+	$ADDP	bptr=0,in2
+	.save	pr,prevpr
+	mov	prevpr=pr		};;
+
+	.body
+	.rotf		alo[6],nlo[4],ahi[8],nhi[6]
+	.rotr		a[3],n[3],t[2]
+
+{ .mmi;	ldf8		bi=[bptr],8		// (*bp++)
+	ldf8		alo[4]=[aptr],16	// ap[0]
+	$ADDP		r30=8,in1	};;
+{ .mmi;	ldf8		alo[3]=[r30],16		// ap[1]
+	ldf8		alo[2]=[aptr],16	// ap[2]
+	$ADDP		in4=0,in4	};;
+{ .mmi;	ldf8		alo[1]=[r30]		// ap[3]
+	ldf8		n0=[in4]		// n0
+	$ADDP		rptr=0,in0		}
+{ .mmi;	$ADDP		nptr=0,in3
+	mov		r31=16
+	zxt4		num=in5		};;
+{ .mmi;	ldf8		nlo[2]=[nptr],8		// np[0]
+	shladd		len=num,3,r0
+	shladd		r31=num,3,r31	};;
+{ .mmi;	ldf8		nlo[1]=[nptr],8		// np[1]
+	add		lc=-5,num
+	sub		r31=sp,r31	};;
+{ .mfb;	and		sp=-16,r31		// alloca
+	xmpy.hu		ahi[2]=alo[4],bi	// ap[0]*bp[0]
+	nop.b		0		}
+{ .mfb;	nop.m		0
+	xmpy.lu		alo[4]=alo[4],bi
+	brp.loop.imp	.L1st_ctop,.L1st_cend-16
+					};;
+{ .mfi;	nop.m		0
+	xma.hu		ahi[1]=alo[3],bi,ahi[2]	// ap[1]*bp[0]
+	add		tp_1=8,sp	}
+{ .mfi;	nop.m		0
+	xma.lu		alo[3]=alo[3],bi,ahi[2]
+	mov		pr.rot=0x20001f<<16
+			// ------^----- (p40) at first (p23)
+			// ----------^^ p[16:20]=1
+					};;
+{ .mfi;	nop.m		0
+	xmpy.lu		m0=alo[4],n0		// (ap[0]*bp[0])*n0
+	mov		ar.lc=lc	}
+{ .mfi;	nop.m		0
+	fcvt.fxu.s1	nhi[1]=f0
+	mov		ar.ec=8		};;
+
+.align	32
+.L1st_ctop:
+.pred.rel	"mutex",p40,p42
+{ .mfi;	(p16)	ldf8		alo[0]=[aptr],8		    // *(aptr++)
+	(p18)	xma.hu		ahi[0]=alo[2],bi,ahi[1]
+	(p40)	add		n[2]=n[2],a[2]		}   // (p23)					}
+{ .mfi;	(p18)	ldf8		nlo[0]=[nptr],8		    // *(nptr++)(p16)
+	(p18)	xma.lu		alo[2]=alo[2],bi,ahi[1]
+	(p42)	add		n[2]=n[2],a[2],1	};; // (p23)
+{ .mfi;	(p21)	getf.sig	a[0]=alo[5]
+	(p20)	xma.hu		nhi[0]=nlo[2],m0,nhi[1]
+	(p42)	cmp.leu		p41,p39=n[2],a[2]   	}   // (p23)
+{ .mfi;	(p23)	st8		[tp_1]=n[2],8
+	(p20)	xma.lu		nlo[2]=nlo[2],m0,nhi[1]
+	(p40)	cmp.ltu		p41,p39=n[2],a[2]	}   // (p23)
+{ .mmb;	(p21)	getf.sig	n[0]=nlo[3]
+	(p16)	nop.m		0
+	br.ctop.sptk	.L1st_ctop			};;
+.L1st_cend:
+
+{ .mmi;	getf.sig	a[0]=ahi[6]		// (p24)
+	getf.sig	n[0]=nhi[4]
+	add		num=-1,num	};;	// num--
+{ .mmi;	.pred.rel	"mutex",p40,p42
+(p40)	add		n[0]=n[0],a[0]
+(p42)	add		n[0]=n[0],a[0],1
+	sub		aptr=aptr,len	};;	// rewind
+{ .mmi;	.pred.rel	"mutex",p40,p42
+(p40)	cmp.ltu		p41,p39=n[0],a[0]
+(p42)	cmp.leu		p41,p39=n[0],a[0]
+	sub		nptr=nptr,len	};;
+{ .mmi;	.pred.rel	"mutex",p39,p41
+(p39)	add		topbit=r0,r0
+(p41)	add		topbit=r0,r0,1
+	nop.i		0		}	
+{ .mmi;	st8		[tp_1]=n[0]
+	add		tptr=16,sp
+	add		tp_1=8,sp	};;
+
+.Louter:
+{ .mmi;	ldf8		bi=[bptr],8		// (*bp++)
+	ldf8		ahi[3]=[tptr]		// tp[0]
+	add		r30=8,aptr	};;
+{ .mmi;	ldf8		alo[4]=[aptr],16	// ap[0]
+	ldf8		alo[3]=[r30],16		// ap[1]
+	add		r31=8,nptr	};;
+{ .mfb;	ldf8		alo[2]=[aptr],16	// ap[2]
+	xma.hu		ahi[2]=alo[4],bi,ahi[3]	// ap[0]*bp[i]+tp[0]
+	brp.loop.imp	.Linner_ctop,.Linner_cend-16
+					}
+{ .mfb;	ldf8		alo[1]=[r30]		// ap[3]
+	xma.lu		alo[4]=alo[4],bi,ahi[3]
+	clrrrb.pr			};;
+{ .mfi;	ldf8		nlo[2]=[nptr],16	// np[0]
+	xma.hu		ahi[1]=alo[3],bi,ahi[2]	// ap[1]*bp[i]
+	nop.i		0		}
+{ .mfi;	ldf8		nlo[1]=[r31]		// np[1]
+	xma.lu		alo[3]=alo[3],bi,ahi[2]
+	mov		pr.rot=0x20101f<<16
+			// ------^----- (p40) at first (p23)
+			// --------^--- (p30) at first (p22)
+			// ----------^^ p[16:20]=1
+					};;
+{ .mfi;	st8		[tptr]=r0		// tp[0] is already accounted
+	xmpy.lu		m0=alo[4],n0		// (ap[0]*bp[i]+tp[0])*n0
+	mov		ar.lc=lc	}
+{ .mfi;
+	fcvt.fxu.s1	nhi[1]=f0
+	mov		ar.ec=8		};;
+
+// This loop spins in 4*(n+7) ticks on Itanium 2 and should spin in
+// 7*(n+7) ticks on Itanium (the one codenamed Merced). Factor of 7
+// in latter case accounts for two-tick pipeline stall, which means
+// that its performance would be ~20% lower than optimal one. No
+// attempt was made to address this, because original Itanium is
+// hardly represented out in the wild...
+.align	32
+.Linner_ctop:
+.pred.rel	"mutex",p40,p42
+.pred.rel	"mutex",p30,p32
+{ .mfi;	(p16)	ldf8		alo[0]=[aptr],8		    // *(aptr++)
+	(p18)	xma.hu		ahi[0]=alo[2],bi,ahi[1]
+	(p40)	add		n[2]=n[2],a[2]		}   // (p23)
+{ .mfi;	(p16)	nop.m		0
+	(p18)	xma.lu		alo[2]=alo[2],bi,ahi[1]
+	(p42)	add		n[2]=n[2],a[2],1	};; // (p23)
+{ .mfi;	(p21)	getf.sig	a[0]=alo[5]
+	(p16)	nop.f		0
+	(p40)	cmp.ltu		p41,p39=n[2],a[2]	}   // (p23)
+{ .mfi;	(p21)	ld8		t[0]=[tptr],8
+	(p16)	nop.f		0
+	(p42)	cmp.leu		p41,p39=n[2],a[2]	};; // (p23)
+{ .mfi;	(p18)	ldf8		nlo[0]=[nptr],8		    // *(nptr++)
+	(p20)	xma.hu		nhi[0]=nlo[2],m0,nhi[1]
+	(p30)	add		a[1]=a[1],t[1]		}   // (p22)
+{ .mfi;	(p16)	nop.m		0
+	(p20)	xma.lu		nlo[2]=nlo[2],m0,nhi[1]
+	(p32)	add		a[1]=a[1],t[1],1	};; // (p22)
+{ .mmi;	(p21)	getf.sig	n[0]=nlo[3]
+	(p16)	nop.m		0
+	(p30)	cmp.ltu		p31,p29=a[1],t[1]	}   // (p22)
+{ .mmb;	(p23)	st8		[tp_1]=n[2],8
+	(p32)	cmp.leu		p31,p29=a[1],t[1]	    // (p22)
+	br.ctop.sptk	.Linner_ctop			};;
+.Linner_cend:
+
+{ .mmi;	getf.sig	a[0]=ahi[6]		// (p24)
+	getf.sig	n[0]=nhi[4]
+	nop.i		0		};;
+
+{ .mmi;	.pred.rel	"mutex",p31,p33
+(p31)	add		a[0]=a[0],topbit
+(p33)	add		a[0]=a[0],topbit,1
+	mov		topbit=r0	};;
+{ .mfi; .pred.rel	"mutex",p31,p33
+(p31)	cmp.ltu		p32,p30=a[0],topbit
+(p33)	cmp.leu		p32,p30=a[0],topbit
+					}
+{ .mfi;	.pred.rel	"mutex",p40,p42
+(p40)	add		n[0]=n[0],a[0]
+(p42)	add		n[0]=n[0],a[0],1
+					};;
+{ .mmi;	.pred.rel	"mutex",p44,p46
+(p40)	cmp.ltu		p41,p39=n[0],a[0]
+(p42)	cmp.leu		p41,p39=n[0],a[0]
+(p32)	add		topbit=r0,r0,1	}
+
+{ .mmi;	st8		[tp_1]=n[0],8
+	cmp4.ne		p6,p0=1,num
+	sub		aptr=aptr,len	};;	// rewind
+{ .mmi;	sub		nptr=nptr,len
+(p41)	add		topbit=r0,r0,1
+	add		tptr=16,sp	}
+{ .mmb;	add		tp_1=8,sp
+	add		num=-1,num		// num--
+(p6)	br.cond.sptk.many	.Louter	};;
+
+{ .mbb;	add		lc=4,lc
+	brp.loop.imp	.Lsub_ctop,.Lsub_cend-16
+	clrrrb.pr			};;
+{ .mii;	nop.m		0
+	mov		pr.rot=0x10001<<16
+			// ------^---- (p33) at first (p17)
+	mov		ar.lc=lc	}
+{ .mii;	nop.m		0
+	mov		ar.ec=3
+	nop.i		0		};;
+
+.Lsub_ctop:
+.pred.rel	"mutex",p33,p35
+{ .mfi;	(p16)	ld8		t[0]=[tptr],8		    // t=*(tp++)
+	(p16)	nop.f		0
+	(p33)	sub		n[1]=t[1],n[1]		}   // (p17)
+{ .mfi;	(p16)	ld8		n[0]=[nptr],8		    // n=*(np++)
+	(p16)	nop.f		0
+	(p35)	sub		n[1]=t[1],n[1],1	};; // (p17)
+{ .mib;	(p18)	st8		[rptr]=n[2],8		    // *(rp++)=r
+	(p33)	cmp.gtu		p34,p32=n[1],t[1]	    // (p17)
+	(p18)	nop.b		0			}
+{ .mib;	(p18)	nop.m		0
+	(p35)	cmp.geu		p34,p32=n[1],t[1]	    // (p17)
+	br.ctop.sptk	.Lsub_ctop			};;
+.Lsub_cend:
+
+{ .mmb;	.pred.rel	"mutex",p34,p36
+(p34)	sub	topbit=topbit,r0	// (p19)
+(p36)	sub	topbit=topbit,r0,1
+	brp.loop.imp	.Lcopy_ctop,.Lcopy_cend-16
+					}
+{ .mmb;	sub	rptr=rptr,len		// rewind
+	sub	tptr=tptr,len
+	clrrrb.pr			};;
+{ .mmi;	and	aptr=tptr,topbit
+	andcm	bptr=rptr,topbit
+	mov	pr.rot=1<<16		};;
+{ .mii;	or	nptr=aptr,bptr
+	mov	ar.lc=lc
+	mov	ar.ec=3			};;
+
+.Lcopy_ctop:
+{ .mmb;	(p16)	ld8	n[0]=[nptr],8
+	(p18)	st8	[tptr]=r0,8
+	(p16)	nop.b	0		}
+{ .mmb;	(p16)	nop.m	0
+	(p18)	st8	[rptr]=n[2],8
+	br.ctop.sptk	.Lcopy_ctop	};;
+.Lcopy_cend:
+
+{ .mmi;	mov		ret0=1			// signal "handled"
+	rum		1<<5			// clear um.mfh
+	mov		ar.lc=prevlc	}
+{ .mib;	.restore	sp
+	mov		sp=prevsp
+	mov		pr=prevpr,0x1ffff
+	br.ret.sptk.many	b0	};;
+.endp	bn_mul_mont_general#
+
+a1=r16;  a2=r17;  a3=r18;  a4=r19;  a5=r20;  a6=r21;  a7=r22;  a8=r23;
+n1=r24;  n2=r25;  n3=r26;  n4=r27;  n5=r28;  n6=r29;  n7=r30;  n8=r31;
+t0=r15;
+
+ai0=f8;  ai1=f9;  ai2=f10; ai3=f11; ai4=f12; ai5=f13; ai6=f14; ai7=f15;
+ni0=f16; ni1=f17; ni2=f18; ni3=f19; ni4=f20; ni5=f21; ni6=f22; ni7=f23;
+
+.align	64
+.skip	48		// aligns loop body
+.local	bn_mul_mont_8#
+.proc	bn_mul_mont_8#
+bn_mul_mont_8:
+	.prologue
+{ .mmi;	.save		ar.pfs,prevfs
+	alloc		prevfs=ar.pfs,6,2,0,8
+	.vframe		prevsp
+	mov		prevsp=sp
+	.save		ar.lc,prevlc
+	mov		prevlc=ar.lc	}
+{ .mmi;	add		r17=-6*16,sp
+	add		sp=-7*16,sp
+	.save		pr,prevpr
+	mov		prevpr=pr	};;
+
+{ .mmi;	.save.gf	0,0x10
+	stf.spill	[sp]=f16,-16
+	.save.gf	0,0x20
+	stf.spill	[r17]=f17,32
+	add		r16=-5*16,prevsp};;
+{ .mmi;	.save.gf	0,0x40
+	stf.spill	[r16]=f18,32
+	.save.gf	0,0x80
+	stf.spill	[r17]=f19,32
+	$ADDP		aptr=0,in1	};;
+{ .mmi;	.save.gf	0,0x100
+	stf.spill	[r16]=f20,32
+	.save.gf	0,0x200
+	stf.spill	[r17]=f21,32
+	$ADDP		r29=8,in1	};;
+{ .mmi;	.save.gf	0,0x400
+	stf.spill	[r16]=f22
+	.save.gf	0,0x800
+	stf.spill	[r17]=f23
+	$ADDP		rptr=0,in0	};;
+
+	.body
+	.rotf		bj[8],mj[2],tf[2],alo[10],ahi[10],nlo[10],nhi[10]
+	.rotr		t[8]
+
+// load input vectors padding them to 8 elements
+{ .mmi;	ldf8		ai0=[aptr],16		// ap[0]
+	ldf8		ai1=[r29],16		// ap[1]
+	$ADDP		bptr=0,in2	}
+{ .mmi;	$ADDP		r30=8,in2
+	$ADDP		nptr=0,in3
+	$ADDP		r31=8,in3	};;
+{ .mmi;	ldf8		bj[7]=[bptr],16		// bp[0]
+	ldf8		bj[6]=[r30],16		// bp[1]
+	cmp4.le		p4,p5=3,in5	}
+{ .mmi;	ldf8		ni0=[nptr],16		// np[0]
+	ldf8		ni1=[r31],16		// np[1]
+	cmp4.le		p6,p7=4,in5	};;
+
+{ .mfi;	(p4)ldf8	ai2=[aptr],16		// ap[2]
+	(p5)fcvt.fxu	ai2=f0
+	cmp4.le		p8,p9=5,in5	}
+{ .mfi;	(p6)ldf8	ai3=[r29],16		// ap[3]
+	(p7)fcvt.fxu	ai3=f0
+	cmp4.le		p10,p11=6,in5	}
+{ .mfi;	(p4)ldf8	bj[5]=[bptr],16		// bp[2]
+	(p5)fcvt.fxu	bj[5]=f0
+	cmp4.le		p12,p13=7,in5	}
+{ .mfi;	(p6)ldf8	bj[4]=[r30],16		// bp[3]
+	(p7)fcvt.fxu	bj[4]=f0
+	cmp4.le		p14,p15=8,in5	}
+{ .mfi;	(p4)ldf8	ni2=[nptr],16		// np[2]
+	(p5)fcvt.fxu	ni2=f0
+	addp4		r28=-1,in5	}
+{ .mfi;	(p6)ldf8	ni3=[r31],16		// np[3]
+	(p7)fcvt.fxu	ni3=f0
+	$ADDP		in4=0,in4	};;
+
+{ .mfi;	ldf8		n0=[in4]
+	fcvt.fxu	tf[1]=f0
+	nop.i		0		}
+
+{ .mfi;	(p8)ldf8	ai4=[aptr],16		// ap[4]
+	(p9)fcvt.fxu	ai4=f0
+	mov		t[0]=r0		}
+{ .mfi;	(p10)ldf8	ai5=[r29],16		// ap[5]
+	(p11)fcvt.fxu	ai5=f0
+	mov		t[1]=r0		}
+{ .mfi;	(p8)ldf8	bj[3]=[bptr],16		// bp[4]
+	(p9)fcvt.fxu	bj[3]=f0
+	mov		t[2]=r0		}
+{ .mfi;	(p10)ldf8	bj[2]=[r30],16		// bp[5]
+	(p11)fcvt.fxu	bj[2]=f0
+	mov		t[3]=r0		}
+{ .mfi;	(p8)ldf8	ni4=[nptr],16		// np[4]
+	(p9)fcvt.fxu	ni4=f0
+	mov		t[4]=r0		}
+{ .mfi;	(p10)ldf8	ni5=[r31],16		// np[5]
+	(p11)fcvt.fxu	ni5=f0
+	mov		t[5]=r0		};;
+
+{ .mfi;	(p12)ldf8	ai6=[aptr],16		// ap[6]
+	(p13)fcvt.fxu	ai6=f0
+	mov		t[6]=r0		}
+{ .mfi;	(p14)ldf8	ai7=[r29],16		// ap[7]
+	(p15)fcvt.fxu	ai7=f0
+	mov		t[7]=r0		}
+{ .mfi;	(p12)ldf8	bj[1]=[bptr],16		// bp[6]
+	(p13)fcvt.fxu	bj[1]=f0
+	mov		ar.lc=r28	}
+{ .mfi;	(p14)ldf8	bj[0]=[r30],16		// bp[7]
+	(p15)fcvt.fxu	bj[0]=f0
+	mov		ar.ec=1		}
+{ .mfi;	(p12)ldf8	ni6=[nptr],16		// np[6]
+	(p13)fcvt.fxu	ni6=f0
+	mov		pr.rot=1<<16	}
+{ .mfb;	(p14)ldf8	ni7=[r31],16		// np[7]
+	(p15)fcvt.fxu	ni7=f0
+	brp.loop.imp	.Louter_8_ctop,.Louter_8_cend-16
+					};;
+
+// The loop is scheduled for 32*n ticks on Itanium 2. Actual attempt
+// to measure with help of Interval Time Counter indicated that the
+// factor is a tad higher: 33 or 34, if not 35. Exact measurement and
+// addressing the issue is problematic, because I don't have access
+// to platform-specific instruction-level profiler. On Itanium it
+// should run in 56*n ticks, because of higher xma latency...
+.Louter_8_ctop:
+	.pred.rel		"mutex",p40,p42
+	.pred.rel		"mutex",p48,p50
+{ .mfi;	(p16)	nop.m		0			// 0:
+	(p16)	xma.hu		ahi[0]=ai0,bj[7],tf[1]	//	ap[0]*b[i]+t[0]
+	(p40)	add		a3=a3,n3	}	//	(p17) a3+=n3
+{ .mfi;	(p42)	add		a3=a3,n3,1
+	(p16)	xma.lu		alo[0]=ai0,bj[7],tf[1]
+	(p16)	nop.i		0		};;
+{ .mii;	(p17)	getf.sig	a7=alo[8]		// 1:
+	(p48)	add		t[6]=t[6],a3		//	(p17) t[6]+=a3
+	(p50)	add		t[6]=t[6],a3,1	};;
+{ .mfi;	(p17)	getf.sig	a8=ahi[8]		// 2:
+	(p17)	xma.hu		nhi[7]=ni6,mj[1],nhi[6]	//	np[6]*m0
+	(p40)	cmp.ltu		p43,p41=a3,n3	}
+{ .mfi;	(p42)	cmp.leu		p43,p41=a3,n3
+	(p17)	xma.lu		nlo[7]=ni6,mj[1],nhi[6]
+	(p16)	nop.i		0		};;
+{ .mii;	(p17)	getf.sig	n5=nlo[6]		// 3:
+	(p48)	cmp.ltu		p51,p49=t[6],a3
+	(p50)	cmp.leu		p51,p49=t[6],a3	};;
+	.pred.rel		"mutex",p41,p43
+	.pred.rel		"mutex",p49,p51
+{ .mfi;	(p16)	nop.m		0			// 4:
+	(p16)	xma.hu		ahi[1]=ai1,bj[7],ahi[0]	//	ap[1]*b[i]
+	(p41)	add		a4=a4,n4	}	//	(p17) a4+=n4
+{ .mfi;	(p43)	add		a4=a4,n4,1
+	(p16)	xma.lu		alo[1]=ai1,bj[7],ahi[0]
+	(p16)	nop.i		0		};;
+{ .mfi;	(p49)	add		t[5]=t[5],a4		// 5:	(p17) t[5]+=a4
+	(p16)	xmpy.lu		mj[0]=alo[0],n0		//	(ap[0]*b[i]+t[0])*n0
+	(p51)	add		t[5]=t[5],a4,1	};;
+{ .mfi;	(p16)	nop.m		0			// 6:
+	(p17)	xma.hu		nhi[8]=ni7,mj[1],nhi[7]	//	np[7]*m0
+	(p41)	cmp.ltu		p42,p40=a4,n4	}
+{ .mfi;	(p43)	cmp.leu		p42,p40=a4,n4
+	(p17)	xma.lu		nlo[8]=ni7,mj[1],nhi[7]
+	(p16)	nop.i		0		};;
+{ .mii;	(p17)	getf.sig	n6=nlo[7]		// 7:
+	(p49)	cmp.ltu		p50,p48=t[5],a4
+	(p51)	cmp.leu		p50,p48=t[5],a4	};;
+	.pred.rel		"mutex",p40,p42
+	.pred.rel		"mutex",p48,p50
+{ .mfi;	(p16)	nop.m		0			// 8:
+	(p16)	xma.hu		ahi[2]=ai2,bj[7],ahi[1]	//	ap[2]*b[i]
+	(p40)	add		a5=a5,n5	}	//	(p17) a5+=n5
+{ .mfi;	(p42)	add		a5=a5,n5,1
+	(p16)	xma.lu		alo[2]=ai2,bj[7],ahi[1]
+	(p16)	nop.i		0		};;
+{ .mii;	(p16)	getf.sig	a1=alo[1]		// 9:
+	(p48)	add		t[4]=t[4],a5		//	p(17) t[4]+=a5
+	(p50)	add		t[4]=t[4],a5,1	};;
+{ .mfi;	(p16)	nop.m		0			// 10:
+	(p16)	xma.hu		nhi[0]=ni0,mj[0],alo[0]	//	np[0]*m0
+	(p40)	cmp.ltu		p43,p41=a5,n5	}
+{ .mfi;	(p42)	cmp.leu		p43,p41=a5,n5
+	(p16)	xma.lu		nlo[0]=ni0,mj[0],alo[0]
+	(p16)	nop.i		0		};;
+{ .mii;	(p17)	getf.sig	n7=nlo[8]		// 11:
+	(p48)	cmp.ltu		p51,p49=t[4],a5
+	(p50)	cmp.leu		p51,p49=t[4],a5	};;
+	.pred.rel		"mutex",p41,p43
+	.pred.rel		"mutex",p49,p51
+{ .mfi;	(p17)	getf.sig	n8=nhi[8]		// 12:
+	(p16)	xma.hu		ahi[3]=ai3,bj[7],ahi[2]	//	ap[3]*b[i]
+	(p41)	add		a6=a6,n6	}	//	(p17) a6+=n6
+{ .mfi;	(p43)	add		a6=a6,n6,1
+	(p16)	xma.lu		alo[3]=ai3,bj[7],ahi[2]
+	(p16)	nop.i		0		};;
+{ .mii;	(p16)	getf.sig	a2=alo[2]		// 13:
+	(p49)	add		t[3]=t[3],a6		//	(p17) t[3]+=a6
+	(p51)	add		t[3]=t[3],a6,1	};;
+{ .mfi;	(p16)	nop.m		0			// 14:
+	(p16)	xma.hu		nhi[1]=ni1,mj[0],nhi[0]	//	np[1]*m0
+	(p41)	cmp.ltu		p42,p40=a6,n6	}
+{ .mfi;	(p43)	cmp.leu		p42,p40=a6,n6
+	(p16)	xma.lu		nlo[1]=ni1,mj[0],nhi[0]
+	(p16)	nop.i		0		};;
+{ .mii;	(p16)	nop.m		0			// 15:
+	(p49)	cmp.ltu		p50,p48=t[3],a6
+	(p51)	cmp.leu		p50,p48=t[3],a6	};;
+	.pred.rel		"mutex",p40,p42
+	.pred.rel		"mutex",p48,p50
+{ .mfi;	(p16)	nop.m		0			// 16:
+	(p16)	xma.hu		ahi[4]=ai4,bj[7],ahi[3]	//	ap[4]*b[i]
+	(p40)	add		a7=a7,n7	}	//	(p17) a7+=n7
+{ .mfi;	(p42)	add		a7=a7,n7,1
+	(p16)	xma.lu		alo[4]=ai4,bj[7],ahi[3]
+	(p16)	nop.i		0		};;
+{ .mii;	(p16)	getf.sig	a3=alo[3]		// 17:
+	(p48)	add		t[2]=t[2],a7		//	(p17) t[2]+=a7
+	(p50)	add		t[2]=t[2],a7,1	};;
+{ .mfi;	(p16)	nop.m		0			// 18:
+	(p16)	xma.hu		nhi[2]=ni2,mj[0],nhi[1]	//	np[2]*m0
+	(p40)	cmp.ltu		p43,p41=a7,n7	}
+{ .mfi;	(p42)	cmp.leu		p43,p41=a7,n7
+	(p16)	xma.lu		nlo[2]=ni2,mj[0],nhi[1]
+	(p16)	nop.i		0		};;
+{ .mii;	(p16)	getf.sig	n1=nlo[1]		// 19:
+	(p48)	cmp.ltu		p51,p49=t[2],a7
+	(p50)	cmp.leu		p51,p49=t[2],a7	};;
+	.pred.rel		"mutex",p41,p43
+	.pred.rel		"mutex",p49,p51
+{ .mfi;	(p16)	nop.m		0			// 20:
+	(p16)	xma.hu		ahi[5]=ai5,bj[7],ahi[4]	//	ap[5]*b[i]
+	(p41)	add		a8=a8,n8	}	//	(p17) a8+=n8
+{ .mfi;	(p43)	add		a8=a8,n8,1
+	(p16)	xma.lu		alo[5]=ai5,bj[7],ahi[4]
+	(p16)	nop.i		0		};;
+{ .mii;	(p16)	getf.sig	a4=alo[4]		// 21:
+	(p49)	add		t[1]=t[1],a8		//	(p17) t[1]+=a8
+	(p51)	add		t[1]=t[1],a8,1	};;
+{ .mfi;	(p16)	nop.m		0			// 22:
+	(p16)	xma.hu		nhi[3]=ni3,mj[0],nhi[2]	//	np[3]*m0
+	(p41)	cmp.ltu		p42,p40=a8,n8	}
+{ .mfi;	(p43)	cmp.leu		p42,p40=a8,n8
+	(p16)	xma.lu		nlo[3]=ni3,mj[0],nhi[2]
+	(p16)	nop.i		0		};;
+{ .mii;	(p16)	getf.sig	n2=nlo[2]		// 23:
+	(p49)	cmp.ltu		p50,p48=t[1],a8
+	(p51)	cmp.leu		p50,p48=t[1],a8	};;
+{ .mfi;	(p16)	nop.m		0			// 24:
+	(p16)	xma.hu		ahi[6]=ai6,bj[7],ahi[5]	//	ap[6]*b[i]
+	(p16)	add		a1=a1,n1	}	//	(p16) a1+=n1
+{ .mfi;	(p16)	nop.m		0
+	(p16)	xma.lu		alo[6]=ai6,bj[7],ahi[5]
+	(p17)	mov		t[0]=r0		};;
+{ .mii;	(p16)	getf.sig	a5=alo[5]		// 25:
+	(p16)	add		t0=t[7],a1		//	(p16) t[7]+=a1
+	(p42)	add		t[0]=t[0],r0,1	};;
+{ .mfi;	(p16)	setf.sig	tf[0]=t0		// 26:
+	(p16)	xma.hu		nhi[4]=ni4,mj[0],nhi[3]	//	np[4]*m0
+	(p50)	add		t[0]=t[0],r0,1	}
+{ .mfi;	(p16)	cmp.ltu.unc	p42,p40=a1,n1
+	(p16)	xma.lu		nlo[4]=ni4,mj[0],nhi[3]
+	(p16)	nop.i		0		};;
+{ .mii;	(p16)	getf.sig	n3=nlo[3]		// 27:
+	(p16)	cmp.ltu.unc	p50,p48=t0,a1
+	(p16)	nop.i		0		};;
+	.pred.rel		"mutex",p40,p42
+	.pred.rel		"mutex",p48,p50
+{ .mfi;	(p16)	nop.m		0			// 28:
+	(p16)	xma.hu		ahi[7]=ai7,bj[7],ahi[6]	//	ap[7]*b[i]
+	(p40)	add		a2=a2,n2	}	//	(p16) a2+=n2
+{ .mfi;	(p42)	add		a2=a2,n2,1
+	(p16)	xma.lu		alo[7]=ai7,bj[7],ahi[6]
+	(p16)	nop.i		0		};;
+{ .mii;	(p16)	getf.sig	a6=alo[6]		// 29:
+	(p48)	add		t[6]=t[6],a2		//	(p16) t[6]+=a2
+	(p50)	add		t[6]=t[6],a2,1	};;
+{ .mfi;	(p16)	nop.m		0			// 30:
+	(p16)	xma.hu		nhi[5]=ni5,mj[0],nhi[4]	//	np[5]*m0
+	(p40)	cmp.ltu		p41,p39=a2,n2	}
+{ .mfi;	(p42)	cmp.leu		p41,p39=a2,n2
+	(p16)	xma.lu		nlo[5]=ni5,mj[0],nhi[4]
+	(p16)	nop.i		0		};;
+{ .mfi;	(p16)	getf.sig	n4=nlo[4]		// 31:
+	(p16)	nop.f		0
+	(p48)	cmp.ltu		p49,p47=t[6],a2	}
+{ .mfb;	(p50)	cmp.leu		p49,p47=t[6],a2
+	(p16)	nop.f		0
+	br.ctop.sptk.many	.Louter_8_ctop	};;
+.Louter_8_cend:
+
+// above loop has to execute one more time, without (p16), which is
+// replaced with merged move of np[8] to GPR bank
+	.pred.rel		"mutex",p40,p42
+	.pred.rel		"mutex",p48,p50
+{ .mmi;	(p0)	getf.sig	n1=ni0			// 0:
+	(p40)	add		a3=a3,n3		//	(p17) a3+=n3
+	(p42)	add		a3=a3,n3,1	};;
+{ .mii;	(p17)	getf.sig	a7=alo[8]		// 1:
+	(p48)	add		t[6]=t[6],a3		//	(p17) t[6]+=a3
+	(p50)	add		t[6]=t[6],a3,1	};;
+{ .mfi;	(p17)	getf.sig	a8=ahi[8]		// 2:
+	(p17)	xma.hu		nhi[7]=ni6,mj[1],nhi[6]	//	np[6]*m0
+	(p40)	cmp.ltu		p43,p41=a3,n3	}
+{ .mfi;	(p42)	cmp.leu		p43,p41=a3,n3
+	(p17)	xma.lu		nlo[7]=ni6,mj[1],nhi[6]
+	(p0)	nop.i		0		};;
+{ .mii;	(p17)	getf.sig	n5=nlo[6]		// 3:
+	(p48)	cmp.ltu		p51,p49=t[6],a3
+	(p50)	cmp.leu		p51,p49=t[6],a3	};;
+	.pred.rel		"mutex",p41,p43
+	.pred.rel		"mutex",p49,p51
+{ .mmi;	(p0)	getf.sig	n2=ni1			// 4:
+	(p41)	add		a4=a4,n4		//	(p17) a4+=n4
+	(p43)	add		a4=a4,n4,1	};;
+{ .mfi;	(p49)	add		t[5]=t[5],a4		// 5:	(p17) t[5]+=a4
+	(p0)	nop.f		0
+	(p51)	add		t[5]=t[5],a4,1	};;
+{ .mfi;	(p0)	getf.sig	n3=ni2			// 6:
+	(p17)	xma.hu		nhi[8]=ni7,mj[1],nhi[7]	//	np[7]*m0
+	(p41)	cmp.ltu		p42,p40=a4,n4	}
+{ .mfi;	(p43)	cmp.leu		p42,p40=a4,n4
+	(p17)	xma.lu		nlo[8]=ni7,mj[1],nhi[7]
+	(p0)	nop.i		0		};;
+{ .mii;	(p17)	getf.sig	n6=nlo[7]		// 7:
+	(p49)	cmp.ltu		p50,p48=t[5],a4
+	(p51)	cmp.leu		p50,p48=t[5],a4	};;
+	.pred.rel		"mutex",p40,p42
+	.pred.rel		"mutex",p48,p50
+{ .mii;	(p0)	getf.sig	n4=ni3			// 8:
+	(p40)	add		a5=a5,n5		//	(p17) a5+=n5
+	(p42)	add		a5=a5,n5,1	};;
+{ .mii;	(p0)	nop.m		0			// 9:
+	(p48)	add		t[4]=t[4],a5		//	p(17) t[4]+=a5
+	(p50)	add		t[4]=t[4],a5,1	};;
+{ .mii;	(p0)	nop.m		0			// 10:
+	(p40)	cmp.ltu		p43,p41=a5,n5
+	(p42)	cmp.leu		p43,p41=a5,n5	};;
+{ .mii;	(p17)	getf.sig	n7=nlo[8]		// 11:
+	(p48)	cmp.ltu		p51,p49=t[4],a5
+	(p50)	cmp.leu		p51,p49=t[4],a5	};;
+	.pred.rel		"mutex",p41,p43
+	.pred.rel		"mutex",p49,p51
+{ .mii;	(p17)	getf.sig	n8=nhi[8]		// 12:
+	(p41)	add		a6=a6,n6		//	(p17) a6+=n6
+	(p43)	add		a6=a6,n6,1	};;
+{ .mii;	(p0)	getf.sig	n5=ni4			// 13:
+	(p49)	add		t[3]=t[3],a6		//	(p17) t[3]+=a6
+	(p51)	add		t[3]=t[3],a6,1	};;
+{ .mii;	(p0)	nop.m		0			// 14:
+	(p41)	cmp.ltu		p42,p40=a6,n6
+	(p43)	cmp.leu		p42,p40=a6,n6	};;
+{ .mii;	(p0)	getf.sig	n6=ni5			// 15:
+	(p49)	cmp.ltu		p50,p48=t[3],a6
+	(p51)	cmp.leu		p50,p48=t[3],a6	};;
+	.pred.rel		"mutex",p40,p42
+	.pred.rel		"mutex",p48,p50
+{ .mii;	(p0)	nop.m		0			// 16:
+	(p40)	add		a7=a7,n7		//	(p17) a7+=n7
+	(p42)	add		a7=a7,n7,1	};;
+{ .mii;	(p0)	nop.m		0			// 17:
+	(p48)	add		t[2]=t[2],a7		//	(p17) t[2]+=a7
+	(p50)	add		t[2]=t[2],a7,1	};;
+{ .mii;	(p0)	nop.m		0			// 18:
+	(p40)	cmp.ltu		p43,p41=a7,n7
+	(p42)	cmp.leu		p43,p41=a7,n7	};;
+{ .mii;	(p0)	getf.sig	n7=ni6			// 19:
+	(p48)	cmp.ltu		p51,p49=t[2],a7
+	(p50)	cmp.leu		p51,p49=t[2],a7	};;
+	.pred.rel		"mutex",p41,p43
+	.pred.rel		"mutex",p49,p51
+{ .mii;	(p0)	nop.m		0			// 20:
+	(p41)	add		a8=a8,n8		//	(p17) a8+=n8
+	(p43)	add		a8=a8,n8,1	};;
+{ .mmi;	(p0)	nop.m		0			// 21:
+	(p49)	add		t[1]=t[1],a8		//	(p17) t[1]+=a8
+	(p51)	add		t[1]=t[1],a8,1	}
+{ .mmi;	(p17)	mov		t[0]=r0
+	(p41)	cmp.ltu		p42,p40=a8,n8
+	(p43)	cmp.leu		p42,p40=a8,n8	};;
+{ .mmi;	(p0)	getf.sig	n8=ni7			// 22:
+	(p49)	cmp.ltu		p50,p48=t[1],a8
+	(p51)	cmp.leu		p50,p48=t[1],a8	}
+{ .mmi;	(p42)	add		t[0]=t[0],r0,1
+	(p0)	add		r16=-7*16,prevsp
+	(p0)	add		r17=-6*16,prevsp	};;
+
+// subtract np[8] from carrybit|tmp[8]
+// carrybit|tmp[8] layout upon exit from above loop is:
+//	t[0]|t[1]|t[2]|t[3]|t[4]|t[5]|t[6]|t[7]|t0 (least significant)
+{ .mmi;	(p50)add	t[0]=t[0],r0,1
+	add		r18=-5*16,prevsp
+	sub		n1=t0,n1	};;
+{ .mmi;	cmp.gtu		p34,p32=n1,t0;;
+	.pred.rel	"mutex",p32,p34
+	(p32)sub	n2=t[7],n2
+	(p34)sub	n2=t[7],n2,1	};;
+{ .mii;	(p32)cmp.gtu	p35,p33=n2,t[7]
+	(p34)cmp.geu	p35,p33=n2,t[7];;
+	.pred.rel	"mutex",p33,p35
+	(p33)sub	n3=t[6],n3	}
+{ .mmi;	(p35)sub	n3=t[6],n3,1;;
+	(p33)cmp.gtu	p34,p32=n3,t[6]
+	(p35)cmp.geu	p34,p32=n3,t[6]	};;
+	.pred.rel	"mutex",p32,p34
+{ .mii;	(p32)sub	n4=t[5],n4
+	(p34)sub	n4=t[5],n4,1;;
+	(p32)cmp.gtu	p35,p33=n4,t[5]	}
+{ .mmi;	(p34)cmp.geu	p35,p33=n4,t[5];;
+	.pred.rel	"mutex",p33,p35
+	(p33)sub	n5=t[4],n5
+	(p35)sub	n5=t[4],n5,1	};;
+{ .mii;	(p33)cmp.gtu	p34,p32=n5,t[4]
+	(p35)cmp.geu	p34,p32=n5,t[4];;
+	.pred.rel	"mutex",p32,p34
+	(p32)sub	n6=t[3],n6	}
+{ .mmi;	(p34)sub	n6=t[3],n6,1;;
+	(p32)cmp.gtu	p35,p33=n6,t[3]
+	(p34)cmp.geu	p35,p33=n6,t[3]	};;
+	.pred.rel	"mutex",p33,p35
+{ .mii;	(p33)sub	n7=t[2],n7
+	(p35)sub	n7=t[2],n7,1;;
+	(p33)cmp.gtu	p34,p32=n7,t[2]	}
+{ .mmi;	(p35)cmp.geu	p34,p32=n7,t[2];;
+	.pred.rel	"mutex",p32,p34
+	(p32)sub	n8=t[1],n8
+	(p34)sub	n8=t[1],n8,1	};;
+{ .mii;	(p32)cmp.gtu	p35,p33=n8,t[1]
+	(p34)cmp.geu	p35,p33=n8,t[1];;
+	.pred.rel	"mutex",p33,p35
+	(p33)sub	a8=t[0],r0	}
+{ .mmi;	(p35)sub	a8=t[0],r0,1;;
+	(p33)cmp.gtu	p34,p32=a8,t[0]
+	(p35)cmp.geu	p34,p32=a8,t[0]	};;
+
+// save the result, either tmp[num] or tmp[num]-np[num]
+	.pred.rel	"mutex",p32,p34
+{ .mmi;	(p32)st8	[rptr]=n1,8
+	(p34)st8	[rptr]=t0,8
+	add		r19=-4*16,prevsp};;
+{ .mmb;	(p32)st8	[rptr]=n2,8
+	(p34)st8	[rptr]=t[7],8
+	(p5)br.cond.dpnt.few	.Ldone	};;
+{ .mmb;	(p32)st8	[rptr]=n3,8
+	(p34)st8	[rptr]=t[6],8
+	(p7)br.cond.dpnt.few	.Ldone	};;
+{ .mmb;	(p32)st8	[rptr]=n4,8
+	(p34)st8	[rptr]=t[5],8
+	(p9)br.cond.dpnt.few	.Ldone	};;
+{ .mmb;	(p32)st8	[rptr]=n5,8
+	(p34)st8	[rptr]=t[4],8
+	(p11)br.cond.dpnt.few	.Ldone	};;
+{ .mmb;	(p32)st8	[rptr]=n6,8
+	(p34)st8	[rptr]=t[3],8
+	(p13)br.cond.dpnt.few	.Ldone	};;
+{ .mmb;	(p32)st8	[rptr]=n7,8
+	(p34)st8	[rptr]=t[2],8
+	(p15)br.cond.dpnt.few	.Ldone	};;
+{ .mmb;	(p32)st8	[rptr]=n8,8
+	(p34)st8	[rptr]=t[1],8
+	nop.b		0		};;
+.Ldone:						// epilogue
+{ .mmi;	ldf.fill	f16=[r16],64
+	ldf.fill	f17=[r17],64
+	nop.i		0		}
+{ .mmi;	ldf.fill	f18=[r18],64
+	ldf.fill	f19=[r19],64
+	mov		pr=prevpr,0x1ffff	};;
+{ .mmi;	ldf.fill	f20=[r16]
+	ldf.fill	f21=[r17]
+	mov		ar.lc=prevlc	}
+{ .mmi;	ldf.fill	f22=[r18]
+	ldf.fill	f23=[r19]
+	mov		ret0=1		}	// signal "handled"
+{ .mib;	rum		1<<5
+	.restore	sp
+	mov		sp=prevsp
+	br.ret.sptk.many	b0	};;
+.endp	bn_mul_mont_8#
+
+.type	copyright#,\@object
+copyright:
+stringz	"Montgomery multiplication for IA-64, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+___
+
+open STDOUT,">$output" if $output;
+print $code;
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/ia64.S b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/ia64.S
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f2404a3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/ia64.S
@@ -0,0 +1,1562 @@
+.explicit
+.text
+.ident	"ia64.S, Version 2.1"
+.ident	"IA-64 ISA artwork by Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se>"
+
+// Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+//
+// Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+// this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+// in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+// https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+//
+// ====================================================================
+// Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se> for the OpenSSL
+// project.
+//
+// Rights for redistribution and usage in source and binary forms are
+// granted according to the OpenSSL license. Warranty of any kind is
+// disclaimed.
+// ====================================================================
+//
+// Version 2.x is Itanium2 re-tune. Few words about how Itanum2 is
+// different from Itanium to this module viewpoint. Most notably, is it
+// "wider" than Itanium? Can you experience loop scalability as
+// discussed in commentary sections? Not really:-( Itanium2 has 6
+// integer ALU ports, i.e. it's 2 ports wider, but it's not enough to
+// spin twice as fast, as I need 8 IALU ports. Amount of floating point
+// ports is the same, i.e. 2, while I need 4. In other words, to this
+// module Itanium2 remains effectively as "wide" as Itanium. Yet it's
+// essentially different in respect to this module, and a re-tune was
+// required. Well, because some instruction latencies has changed. Most
+// noticeably those intensively used:
+//
+//			Itanium	Itanium2
+//	ldf8		9	6		L2 hit
+//	ld8		2	1		L1 hit
+//	getf		2	5
+//	xma[->getf]	7[+1]	4[+0]
+//	add[->st8]	1[+1]	1[+0]
+//
+// What does it mean? You might ratiocinate that the original code
+// should run just faster... Because sum of latencies is smaller...
+// Wrong! Note that getf latency increased. This means that if a loop is
+// scheduled for lower latency (as they were), then it will suffer from
+// stall condition and the code will therefore turn anti-scalable, e.g.
+// original bn_mul_words spun at 5*n or 2.5 times slower than expected
+// on Itanium2! What to do? Reschedule loops for Itanium2? But then
+// Itanium would exhibit anti-scalability. So I've chosen to reschedule
+// for worst latency for every instruction aiming for best *all-round*
+// performance.  
+
+// Q.	How much faster does it get?
+// A.	Here is the output from 'openssl speed rsa dsa' for vanilla
+//	0.9.6a compiled with gcc version 2.96 20000731 (Red Hat
+//	Linux 7.1 2.96-81):
+//
+//	                  sign    verify    sign/s verify/s
+//	rsa  512 bits   0.0036s   0.0003s    275.3   2999.2
+//	rsa 1024 bits   0.0203s   0.0011s     49.3    894.1
+//	rsa 2048 bits   0.1331s   0.0040s      7.5    250.9
+//	rsa 4096 bits   0.9270s   0.0147s      1.1     68.1
+//	                  sign    verify    sign/s verify/s
+//	dsa  512 bits   0.0035s   0.0043s    288.3    234.8
+//	dsa 1024 bits   0.0111s   0.0135s     90.0     74.2
+//
+//	And here is similar output but for this assembler
+//	implementation:-)
+//
+//	                  sign    verify    sign/s verify/s
+//	rsa  512 bits   0.0021s   0.0001s    549.4   9638.5
+//	rsa 1024 bits   0.0055s   0.0002s    183.8   4481.1
+//	rsa 2048 bits   0.0244s   0.0006s     41.4   1726.3
+//	rsa 4096 bits   0.1295s   0.0018s      7.7    561.5
+//	                  sign    verify    sign/s verify/s
+//	dsa  512 bits   0.0012s   0.0013s    891.9    756.6
+//	dsa 1024 bits   0.0023s   0.0028s    440.4    376.2
+//	
+//	Yes, you may argue that it's not fair comparison as it's
+//	possible to craft the C implementation with BN_UMULT_HIGH
+//	inline assembler macro. But of course! Here is the output
+//	with the macro:
+//
+//	                  sign    verify    sign/s verify/s
+//	rsa  512 bits   0.0020s   0.0002s    495.0   6561.0
+//	rsa 1024 bits   0.0086s   0.0004s    116.2   2235.7
+//	rsa 2048 bits   0.0519s   0.0015s     19.3    667.3
+//	rsa 4096 bits   0.3464s   0.0053s      2.9    187.7
+//	                  sign    verify    sign/s verify/s
+//	dsa  512 bits   0.0016s   0.0020s    613.1    510.5
+//	dsa 1024 bits   0.0045s   0.0054s    221.0    183.9
+//
+//	My code is still way faster, huh:-) And I believe that even
+//	higher performance can be achieved. Note that as keys get
+//	longer, performance gain is larger. Why? According to the
+//	profiler there is another player in the field, namely
+//	BN_from_montgomery consuming larger and larger portion of CPU
+//	time as keysize decreases. I therefore consider putting effort
+//	to assembler implementation of the following routine:
+//
+//	void bn_mul_add_mont (BN_ULONG *rp,BN_ULONG *np,int nl,BN_ULONG n0)
+//	{
+//	int      i,j;
+//	BN_ULONG v;
+//
+//	for (i=0; i<nl; i++)
+//		{
+//		v=bn_mul_add_words(rp,np,nl,(rp[0]*n0)&BN_MASK2);
+//		nrp++;
+//		rp++;
+//		if (((nrp[-1]+=v)&BN_MASK2) < v)
+//			for (j=0; ((++nrp[j])&BN_MASK2) == 0; j++) ;
+//		}
+//	}
+//
+//	It might as well be beneficial to implement even combaX
+//	variants, as it appears as it can literally unleash the
+//	performance (see comment section to bn_mul_comba8 below).
+//
+//	And finally for your reference the output for 0.9.6a compiled
+//	with SGIcc version 0.01.0-12 (keep in mind that for the moment
+//	of this writing it's not possible to convince SGIcc to use
+//	BN_UMULT_HIGH inline assembler macro, yet the code is fast,
+//	i.e. for a compiler generated one:-):
+//
+//	                  sign    verify    sign/s verify/s
+//	rsa  512 bits   0.0022s   0.0002s    452.7   5894.3
+//	rsa 1024 bits   0.0097s   0.0005s    102.7   2002.9
+//	rsa 2048 bits   0.0578s   0.0017s     17.3    600.2
+//	rsa 4096 bits   0.3838s   0.0061s      2.6    164.5
+//	                  sign    verify    sign/s verify/s
+//	dsa  512 bits   0.0018s   0.0022s    547.3    459.6
+//	dsa 1024 bits   0.0051s   0.0062s    196.6    161.3
+//
+//	Oh! Benchmarks were performed on 733MHz Lion-class Itanium
+//	system running Redhat Linux 7.1 (very special thanks to Ray
+//	McCaffity of Williams Communications for providing an account).
+//
+// Q.	What's the heck with 'rum 1<<5' at the end of every function?
+// A.	Well, by clearing the "upper FP registers written" bit of the
+//	User Mask I want to excuse the kernel from preserving upper
+//	(f32-f128) FP register bank over process context switch, thus
+//	minimizing bus bandwidth consumption during the switch (i.e.
+//	after PKI opration completes and the program is off doing
+//	something else like bulk symmetric encryption). Having said
+//	this, I also want to point out that it might be good idea
+//	to compile the whole toolkit (as well as majority of the
+//	programs for that matter) with -mfixed-range=f32-f127 command
+//	line option. No, it doesn't prevent the compiler from writing
+//	to upper bank, but at least discourages to do so. If you don't
+//	like the idea you have the option to compile the module with
+//	-Drum=nop.m in command line.
+//
+
+#if defined(_HPUX_SOURCE) && !defined(_LP64)
+#define	ADDP	addp4
+#else
+#define	ADDP	add
+#endif
+
+#if 1
+//
+// bn_[add|sub]_words routines.
+//
+// Loops are spinning in 2*(n+5) ticks on Itanuim (provided that the
+// data reside in L1 cache, i.e. 2 ticks away). It's possible to
+// compress the epilogue and get down to 2*n+6, but at the cost of
+// scalability (the neat feature of this implementation is that it
+// shall automagically spin in n+5 on "wider" IA-64 implementations:-)
+// I consider that the epilogue is short enough as it is to trade tiny
+// performance loss on Itanium for scalability.
+//
+// BN_ULONG bn_add_words(BN_ULONG *rp, BN_ULONG *ap, BN_ULONG *bp,int num)
+//
+.global	bn_add_words#
+.proc	bn_add_words#
+.align	64
+.skip	32	// makes the loop body aligned at 64-byte boundary
+bn_add_words:
+	.prologue
+	.save	ar.pfs,r2
+{ .mii;	alloc		r2=ar.pfs,4,12,0,16
+	cmp4.le		p6,p0=r35,r0	};;
+{ .mfb;	mov		r8=r0			// return value
+(p6)	br.ret.spnt.many	b0	};;
+
+{ .mib;	sub		r10=r35,r0,1
+	.save	ar.lc,r3
+	mov		r3=ar.lc
+	brp.loop.imp	.L_bn_add_words_ctop,.L_bn_add_words_cend-16
+					}
+{ .mib;	ADDP		r14=0,r32		// rp
+	.save	pr,r9
+	mov		r9=pr		};;
+	.body
+{ .mii;	ADDP		r15=0,r33		// ap
+	mov		ar.lc=r10
+	mov		ar.ec=6		}
+{ .mib;	ADDP		r16=0,r34		// bp
+	mov		pr.rot=1<<16	};;
+
+.L_bn_add_words_ctop:
+{ .mii;	(p16)	ld8		r32=[r16],8	  // b=*(bp++)
+	(p18)	add		r39=r37,r34
+	(p19)	cmp.ltu.unc	p56,p0=r40,r38	}
+{ .mfb;	(p0)	nop.m		0x0
+	(p0)	nop.f		0x0
+	(p0)	nop.b		0x0		}
+{ .mii;	(p16)	ld8		r35=[r15],8	  // a=*(ap++)
+	(p58)	cmp.eq.or	p57,p0=-1,r41	  // (p20)
+	(p58)	add		r41=1,r41	} // (p20)
+{ .mfb;	(p21)	st8		[r14]=r42,8	  // *(rp++)=r
+	(p0)	nop.f		0x0
+	br.ctop.sptk	.L_bn_add_words_ctop	};;
+.L_bn_add_words_cend:
+
+{ .mii;
+(p59)	add		r8=1,r8		// return value
+	mov		pr=r9,0x1ffff
+	mov		ar.lc=r3	}
+{ .mbb;	nop.b		0x0
+	br.ret.sptk.many	b0	};;
+.endp	bn_add_words#
+
+//
+// BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *rp, BN_ULONG *ap, BN_ULONG *bp,int num)
+//
+.global	bn_sub_words#
+.proc	bn_sub_words#
+.align	64
+.skip	32	// makes the loop body aligned at 64-byte boundary
+bn_sub_words:
+	.prologue
+	.save	ar.pfs,r2
+{ .mii;	alloc		r2=ar.pfs,4,12,0,16
+	cmp4.le		p6,p0=r35,r0	};;
+{ .mfb;	mov		r8=r0			// return value
+(p6)	br.ret.spnt.many	b0	};;
+
+{ .mib;	sub		r10=r35,r0,1
+	.save	ar.lc,r3
+	mov		r3=ar.lc
+	brp.loop.imp	.L_bn_sub_words_ctop,.L_bn_sub_words_cend-16
+					}
+{ .mib;	ADDP		r14=0,r32		// rp
+	.save	pr,r9
+	mov		r9=pr		};;
+	.body
+{ .mii;	ADDP		r15=0,r33		// ap
+	mov		ar.lc=r10
+	mov		ar.ec=6		}
+{ .mib;	ADDP		r16=0,r34		// bp
+	mov		pr.rot=1<<16	};;
+
+.L_bn_sub_words_ctop:
+{ .mii;	(p16)	ld8		r32=[r16],8	  // b=*(bp++)
+	(p18)	sub		r39=r37,r34
+	(p19)	cmp.gtu.unc	p56,p0=r40,r38	}
+{ .mfb;	(p0)	nop.m		0x0
+	(p0)	nop.f		0x0
+	(p0)	nop.b		0x0		}
+{ .mii;	(p16)	ld8		r35=[r15],8	  // a=*(ap++)
+	(p58)	cmp.eq.or	p57,p0=0,r41	  // (p20)
+	(p58)	add		r41=-1,r41	} // (p20)
+{ .mbb;	(p21)	st8		[r14]=r42,8	  // *(rp++)=r
+	(p0)	nop.b		0x0
+	br.ctop.sptk	.L_bn_sub_words_ctop	};;
+.L_bn_sub_words_cend:
+
+{ .mii;
+(p59)	add		r8=1,r8		// return value
+	mov		pr=r9,0x1ffff
+	mov		ar.lc=r3	}
+{ .mbb;	nop.b		0x0
+	br.ret.sptk.many	b0	};;
+.endp	bn_sub_words#
+#endif
+
+#if 0
+#define XMA_TEMPTATION
+#endif
+
+#if 1
+//
+// BN_ULONG bn_mul_words(BN_ULONG *rp, BN_ULONG *ap, int num, BN_ULONG w)
+//
+.global	bn_mul_words#
+.proc	bn_mul_words#
+.align	64
+.skip	32	// makes the loop body aligned at 64-byte boundary
+bn_mul_words:
+	.prologue
+	.save	ar.pfs,r2
+#ifdef XMA_TEMPTATION
+{ .mfi;	alloc		r2=ar.pfs,4,0,0,0	};;
+#else
+{ .mfi;	alloc		r2=ar.pfs,4,12,0,16	};;
+#endif
+{ .mib;	mov		r8=r0			// return value
+	cmp4.le		p6,p0=r34,r0
+(p6)	br.ret.spnt.many	b0		};;
+
+{ .mii;	sub	r10=r34,r0,1
+	.save	ar.lc,r3
+	mov	r3=ar.lc
+	.save	pr,r9
+	mov	r9=pr			};;
+
+	.body
+{ .mib;	setf.sig	f8=r35	// w
+	mov		pr.rot=0x800001<<16
+			// ------^----- serves as (p50) at first (p27)
+	brp.loop.imp	.L_bn_mul_words_ctop,.L_bn_mul_words_cend-16
+					}
+
+#ifndef XMA_TEMPTATION
+
+{ .mmi;	ADDP		r14=0,r32	// rp
+	ADDP		r15=0,r33	// ap
+	mov		ar.lc=r10	}
+{ .mmi;	mov		r40=0		// serves as r35 at first (p27)
+	mov		ar.ec=13	};;
+
+// This loop spins in 2*(n+12) ticks. It's scheduled for data in Itanium
+// L2 cache (i.e. 9 ticks away) as floating point load/store instructions
+// bypass L1 cache and L2 latency is actually best-case scenario for
+// ldf8. The loop is not scalable and shall run in 2*(n+12) even on
+// "wider" IA-64 implementations. It's a trade-off here. n+24 loop
+// would give us ~5% in *overall* performance improvement on "wider"
+// IA-64, but would hurt Itanium for about same because of longer
+// epilogue. As it's a matter of few percents in either case I've
+// chosen to trade the scalability for development time (you can see
+// this very instruction sequence in bn_mul_add_words loop which in
+// turn is scalable).
+.L_bn_mul_words_ctop:
+{ .mfi;	(p25)	getf.sig	r36=f52			// low
+	(p21)	xmpy.lu		f48=f37,f8
+	(p28)	cmp.ltu		p54,p50=r41,r39	}
+{ .mfi;	(p16)	ldf8		f32=[r15],8
+	(p21)	xmpy.hu		f40=f37,f8
+	(p0)	nop.i		0x0		};;
+{ .mii;	(p25)	getf.sig	r32=f44			// high
+	.pred.rel	"mutex",p50,p54
+	(p50)	add		r40=r38,r35		// (p27)
+	(p54)	add		r40=r38,r35,1	}	// (p27)
+{ .mfb;	(p28)	st8		[r14]=r41,8
+	(p0)	nop.f		0x0
+	br.ctop.sptk	.L_bn_mul_words_ctop	};;
+.L_bn_mul_words_cend:
+
+{ .mii;	nop.m		0x0
+.pred.rel	"mutex",p51,p55
+(p51)	add		r8=r36,r0
+(p55)	add		r8=r36,r0,1	}
+{ .mfb;	nop.m	0x0
+	nop.f	0x0
+	nop.b	0x0			}
+
+#else	// XMA_TEMPTATION
+
+	setf.sig	f37=r0	// serves as carry at (p18) tick
+	mov		ar.lc=r10
+	mov		ar.ec=5;;
+
+// Most of you examining this code very likely wonder why in the name
+// of Intel the following loop is commented out? Indeed, it looks so
+// neat that you find it hard to believe that it's something wrong
+// with it, right? The catch is that every iteration depends on the
+// result from previous one and the latter isn't available instantly.
+// The loop therefore spins at the latency of xma minus 1, or in other
+// words at 6*(n+4) ticks:-( Compare to the "production" loop above
+// that runs in 2*(n+11) where the low latency problem is worked around
+// by moving the dependency to one-tick latent integer ALU. Note that
+// "distance" between ldf8 and xma is not latency of ldf8, but the
+// *difference* between xma and ldf8 latencies.
+.L_bn_mul_words_ctop:
+{ .mfi;	(p16)	ldf8		f32=[r33],8
+	(p18)	xma.hu		f38=f34,f8,f39	}
+{ .mfb;	(p20)	stf8		[r32]=f37,8
+	(p18)	xma.lu		f35=f34,f8,f39
+	br.ctop.sptk	.L_bn_mul_words_ctop	};;
+.L_bn_mul_words_cend:
+
+	getf.sig	r8=f41		// the return value
+
+#endif	// XMA_TEMPTATION
+
+{ .mii;	nop.m		0x0
+	mov		pr=r9,0x1ffff
+	mov		ar.lc=r3	}
+{ .mfb;	rum		1<<5		// clear um.mfh
+	nop.f		0x0
+	br.ret.sptk.many	b0	};;
+.endp	bn_mul_words#
+#endif
+
+#if 1
+//
+// BN_ULONG bn_mul_add_words(BN_ULONG *rp, BN_ULONG *ap, int num, BN_ULONG w)
+//
+.global	bn_mul_add_words#
+.proc	bn_mul_add_words#
+.align	64
+.skip	48	// makes the loop body aligned at 64-byte boundary
+bn_mul_add_words:
+	.prologue
+	.save	ar.pfs,r2
+{ .mmi;	alloc		r2=ar.pfs,4,4,0,8
+	cmp4.le		p6,p0=r34,r0
+	.save	ar.lc,r3
+	mov		r3=ar.lc	};;
+{ .mib;	mov		r8=r0		// return value
+	sub		r10=r34,r0,1
+(p6)	br.ret.spnt.many	b0	};;
+
+{ .mib;	setf.sig	f8=r35		// w
+	.save	pr,r9
+	mov		r9=pr
+	brp.loop.imp	.L_bn_mul_add_words_ctop,.L_bn_mul_add_words_cend-16
+					}
+	.body
+{ .mmi;	ADDP		r14=0,r32	// rp
+	ADDP		r15=0,r33	// ap
+	mov		ar.lc=r10	}
+{ .mii;	ADDP		r16=0,r32	// rp copy
+	mov		pr.rot=0x2001<<16
+			// ------^----- serves as (p40) at first (p27)
+	mov		ar.ec=11	};;
+
+// This loop spins in 3*(n+10) ticks on Itanium and in 2*(n+10) on
+// Itanium 2. Yes, unlike previous versions it scales:-) Previous
+// version was performing *all* additions in IALU and was starving
+// for those even on Itanium 2. In this version one addition is
+// moved to FPU and is folded with multiplication. This is at cost
+// of propagating the result from previous call to this subroutine
+// to L2 cache... In other words negligible even for shorter keys.
+// *Overall* performance improvement [over previous version] varies
+// from 11 to 22 percent depending on key length.
+.L_bn_mul_add_words_ctop:
+.pred.rel	"mutex",p40,p42
+{ .mfi;	(p23)	getf.sig	r36=f45			// low
+	(p20)	xma.lu		f42=f36,f8,f50		// low
+	(p40)	add		r39=r39,r35	}	// (p27)
+{ .mfi;	(p16)	ldf8		f32=[r15],8		// *(ap++)
+	(p20)	xma.hu		f36=f36,f8,f50		// high
+	(p42)	add		r39=r39,r35,1	};;	// (p27)
+{ .mmi;	(p24)	getf.sig	r32=f40			// high
+	(p16)	ldf8		f46=[r16],8		// *(rp1++)
+	(p40)	cmp.ltu		p41,p39=r39,r35	}	// (p27)
+{ .mib;	(p26)	st8		[r14]=r39,8		// *(rp2++)
+	(p42)	cmp.leu		p41,p39=r39,r35		// (p27)
+	br.ctop.sptk	.L_bn_mul_add_words_ctop};;
+.L_bn_mul_add_words_cend:
+
+{ .mmi;	.pred.rel	"mutex",p40,p42
+(p40)	add		r8=r35,r0
+(p42)	add		r8=r35,r0,1
+	mov		pr=r9,0x1ffff	}
+{ .mib;	rum		1<<5		// clear um.mfh
+	mov		ar.lc=r3
+	br.ret.sptk.many	b0	};;
+.endp	bn_mul_add_words#
+#endif
+
+#if 1
+//
+// void bn_sqr_words(BN_ULONG *rp, BN_ULONG *ap, int num)
+//
+.global	bn_sqr_words#
+.proc	bn_sqr_words#
+.align	64
+.skip	32	// makes the loop body aligned at 64-byte boundary 
+bn_sqr_words:
+	.prologue
+	.save	ar.pfs,r2
+{ .mii;	alloc		r2=ar.pfs,3,0,0,0
+	sxt4		r34=r34		};;
+{ .mii;	cmp.le		p6,p0=r34,r0
+	mov		r8=r0		}	// return value
+{ .mfb;	ADDP		r32=0,r32
+	nop.f		0x0
+(p6)	br.ret.spnt.many	b0	};;
+
+{ .mii;	sub	r10=r34,r0,1
+	.save	ar.lc,r3
+	mov	r3=ar.lc
+	.save	pr,r9
+	mov	r9=pr			};;
+
+	.body
+{ .mib;	ADDP		r33=0,r33
+	mov		pr.rot=1<<16
+	brp.loop.imp	.L_bn_sqr_words_ctop,.L_bn_sqr_words_cend-16
+					}
+{ .mii;	add		r34=8,r32
+	mov		ar.lc=r10
+	mov		ar.ec=18	};;
+
+// 2*(n+17) on Itanium, (n+17) on "wider" IA-64 implementations. It's
+// possible to compress the epilogue (I'm getting tired to write this
+// comment over and over) and get down to 2*n+16 at the cost of
+// scalability. The decision will very likely be reconsidered after the
+// benchmark program is profiled. I.e. if perfomance gain on Itanium
+// will appear larger than loss on "wider" IA-64, then the loop should
+// be explicitly split and the epilogue compressed.
+.L_bn_sqr_words_ctop:
+{ .mfi;	(p16)	ldf8		f32=[r33],8
+	(p25)	xmpy.lu		f42=f41,f41
+	(p0)	nop.i		0x0		}
+{ .mib;	(p33)	stf8		[r32]=f50,16
+	(p0)	nop.i		0x0
+	(p0)	nop.b		0x0		}
+{ .mfi;	(p0)	nop.m		0x0
+	(p25)	xmpy.hu		f52=f41,f41
+	(p0)	nop.i		0x0		}
+{ .mib;	(p33)	stf8		[r34]=f60,16
+	(p0)	nop.i		0x0
+	br.ctop.sptk	.L_bn_sqr_words_ctop	};;
+.L_bn_sqr_words_cend:
+
+{ .mii;	nop.m		0x0
+	mov		pr=r9,0x1ffff
+	mov		ar.lc=r3	}
+{ .mfb;	rum		1<<5		// clear um.mfh
+	nop.f		0x0
+	br.ret.sptk.many	b0	};;
+.endp	bn_sqr_words#
+#endif
+
+#if 1
+// Apparently we win nothing by implementing special bn_sqr_comba8.
+// Yes, it is possible to reduce the number of multiplications by
+// almost factor of two, but then the amount of additions would
+// increase by factor of two (as we would have to perform those
+// otherwise performed by xma ourselves). Normally we would trade
+// anyway as multiplications are way more expensive, but not this
+// time... Multiplication kernel is fully pipelined and as we drain
+// one 128-bit multiplication result per clock cycle multiplications
+// are effectively as inexpensive as additions. Special implementation
+// might become of interest for "wider" IA-64 implementation as you'll
+// be able to get through the multiplication phase faster (there won't
+// be any stall issues as discussed in the commentary section below and
+// you therefore will be able to employ all 4 FP units)... But these
+// Itanium days it's simply too hard to justify the effort so I just
+// drop down to bn_mul_comba8 code:-)
+//
+// void bn_sqr_comba8(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a)
+//
+.global	bn_sqr_comba8#
+.proc	bn_sqr_comba8#
+.align	64
+bn_sqr_comba8:
+	.prologue
+	.save	ar.pfs,r2
+#if defined(_HPUX_SOURCE) && !defined(_LP64)
+{ .mii;	alloc	r2=ar.pfs,2,1,0,0
+	addp4	r33=0,r33
+	addp4	r32=0,r32		};;
+{ .mii;
+#else
+{ .mii;	alloc	r2=ar.pfs,2,1,0,0
+#endif
+	mov	r34=r33
+	add	r14=8,r33		};;
+	.body
+{ .mii;	add	r17=8,r34
+	add	r15=16,r33
+	add	r18=16,r34		}
+{ .mfb;	add	r16=24,r33
+	br	.L_cheat_entry_point8	};;
+.endp	bn_sqr_comba8#
+#endif
+
+#if 1
+// I've estimated this routine to run in ~120 ticks, but in reality
+// (i.e. according to ar.itc) it takes ~160 ticks. Are those extra
+// cycles consumed for instructions fetch? Or did I misinterpret some
+// clause in Itanium µ-architecture manual? Comments are welcomed and
+// highly appreciated.
+//
+// On Itanium 2 it takes ~190 ticks. This is because of stalls on
+// result from getf.sig. I do nothing about it at this point for
+// reasons depicted below.
+//
+// However! It should be noted that even 160 ticks is darn good result
+// as it's over 10 (yes, ten, spelled as t-e-n) times faster than the
+// C version (compiled with gcc with inline assembler). I really
+// kicked compiler's butt here, didn't I? Yeah! This brings us to the
+// following statement. It's damn shame that this routine isn't called
+// very often nowadays! According to the profiler most CPU time is
+// consumed by bn_mul_add_words called from BN_from_montgomery. In
+// order to estimate what we're missing, I've compared the performance
+// of this routine against "traditional" implementation, i.e. against
+// following routine:
+//
+// void bn_mul_comba8(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b)
+// {	r[ 8]=bn_mul_words(    &(r[0]),a,8,b[0]);
+//	r[ 9]=bn_mul_add_words(&(r[1]),a,8,b[1]);
+//	r[10]=bn_mul_add_words(&(r[2]),a,8,b[2]);
+//	r[11]=bn_mul_add_words(&(r[3]),a,8,b[3]);
+//	r[12]=bn_mul_add_words(&(r[4]),a,8,b[4]);
+//	r[13]=bn_mul_add_words(&(r[5]),a,8,b[5]);
+//	r[14]=bn_mul_add_words(&(r[6]),a,8,b[6]);
+//	r[15]=bn_mul_add_words(&(r[7]),a,8,b[7]);
+// }
+//
+// The one below is over 8 times faster than the one above:-( Even
+// more reasons to "combafy" bn_mul_add_mont...
+//
+// And yes, this routine really made me wish there were an optimizing
+// assembler! It also feels like it deserves a dedication.
+//
+//	To my wife for being there and to my kids...
+//
+// void bn_mul_comba8(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b)
+//
+#define	carry1	r14
+#define	carry2	r15
+#define	carry3	r34
+.global	bn_mul_comba8#
+.proc	bn_mul_comba8#
+.align	64
+bn_mul_comba8:
+	.prologue
+	.save	ar.pfs,r2
+#if defined(_HPUX_SOURCE) && !defined(_LP64)
+{ .mii;	alloc	r2=ar.pfs,3,0,0,0
+	addp4	r33=0,r33
+	addp4	r34=0,r34		};;
+{ .mii;	addp4	r32=0,r32
+#else
+{ .mii;	alloc   r2=ar.pfs,3,0,0,0
+#endif
+	add	r14=8,r33
+	add	r17=8,r34		}
+	.body
+{ .mii;	add	r15=16,r33
+	add	r18=16,r34
+	add	r16=24,r33		}
+.L_cheat_entry_point8:
+{ .mmi;	add	r19=24,r34
+
+	ldf8	f32=[r33],32		};;
+
+{ .mmi;	ldf8	f120=[r34],32
+	ldf8	f121=[r17],32		}
+{ .mmi;	ldf8	f122=[r18],32
+	ldf8	f123=[r19],32		};;
+{ .mmi;	ldf8	f124=[r34]
+	ldf8	f125=[r17]		}
+{ .mmi;	ldf8	f126=[r18]
+	ldf8	f127=[r19]		}
+
+{ .mmi;	ldf8	f33=[r14],32
+	ldf8	f34=[r15],32		}
+{ .mmi;	ldf8	f35=[r16],32;;
+	ldf8	f36=[r33]		}
+{ .mmi;	ldf8	f37=[r14]
+	ldf8	f38=[r15]		}
+{ .mfi;	ldf8	f39=[r16]
+// -------\ Entering multiplier's heaven /-------
+// ------------\                    /------------
+// -----------------\          /-----------------
+// ----------------------\/----------------------
+		xma.hu	f41=f32,f120,f0		}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f40=f32,f120,f0		};; // (*)
+{ .mfi;		xma.hu	f51=f32,f121,f0		}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f50=f32,f121,f0		};;
+{ .mfi;		xma.hu	f61=f32,f122,f0		}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f60=f32,f122,f0		};;
+{ .mfi;		xma.hu	f71=f32,f123,f0		}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f70=f32,f123,f0		};;
+{ .mfi;		xma.hu	f81=f32,f124,f0		}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f80=f32,f124,f0		};;
+{ .mfi;		xma.hu	f91=f32,f125,f0		}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f90=f32,f125,f0		};;
+{ .mfi;		xma.hu	f101=f32,f126,f0	}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f100=f32,f126,f0	};;
+{ .mfi;		xma.hu	f111=f32,f127,f0	}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f110=f32,f127,f0	};;//
+// (*)	You can argue that splitting at every second bundle would
+//	prevent "wider" IA-64 implementations from achieving the peak
+//	performance. Well, not really... The catch is that if you
+//	intend to keep 4 FP units busy by splitting at every fourth
+//	bundle and thus perform these 16 multiplications in 4 ticks,
+//	the first bundle *below* would stall because the result from
+//	the first xma bundle *above* won't be available for another 3
+//	ticks (if not more, being an optimist, I assume that "wider"
+//	implementation will have same latency:-). This stall will hold
+//	you back and the performance would be as if every second bundle
+//	were split *anyway*...
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r16=f40
+		xma.hu	f42=f33,f120,f41
+	add		r33=8,r32		}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f41=f33,f120,f41	};;
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r24=f50
+		xma.hu	f52=f33,f121,f51	}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f51=f33,f121,f51	};;
+{ .mfi;	st8		[r32]=r16,16
+		xma.hu	f62=f33,f122,f61	}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f61=f33,f122,f61	};;
+{ .mfi;		xma.hu	f72=f33,f123,f71	}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f71=f33,f123,f71	};;
+{ .mfi;		xma.hu	f82=f33,f124,f81	}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f81=f33,f124,f81	};;
+{ .mfi;		xma.hu	f92=f33,f125,f91	}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f91=f33,f125,f91	};;
+{ .mfi;		xma.hu	f102=f33,f126,f101	}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f101=f33,f126,f101	};;
+{ .mfi;		xma.hu	f112=f33,f127,f111	}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f111=f33,f127,f111	};;//
+//-------------------------------------------------//
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r25=f41
+		xma.hu	f43=f34,f120,f42	}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f42=f34,f120,f42	};;
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r16=f60
+		xma.hu	f53=f34,f121,f52	}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f52=f34,f121,f52	};;
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r17=f51
+		xma.hu	f63=f34,f122,f62
+	add		r25=r25,r24		}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f62=f34,f122,f62
+	mov		carry1=0		};;
+{ .mfi;	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r25,r24
+		xma.hu	f73=f34,f123,f72	}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f72=f34,f123,f72	};;
+{ .mfi;	st8		[r33]=r25,16
+		xma.hu	f83=f34,f124,f82
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1		}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f82=f34,f124,f82	};;
+{ .mfi;		xma.hu	f93=f34,f125,f92	}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f92=f34,f125,f92	};;
+{ .mfi;		xma.hu	f103=f34,f126,f102	}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f102=f34,f126,f102	};;
+{ .mfi;		xma.hu	f113=f34,f127,f112	}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f112=f34,f127,f112	};;//
+//-------------------------------------------------//
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r18=f42
+		xma.hu	f44=f35,f120,f43
+	add		r17=r17,r16		}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f43=f35,f120,f43	};;
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r24=f70
+		xma.hu	f54=f35,f121,f53	}
+{ .mfi;	mov		carry2=0
+		xma.lu	f53=f35,f121,f53	};;
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r25=f61
+		xma.hu	f64=f35,f122,f63
+	cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r17,r16		}
+{ .mfi;	add		r18=r18,r17
+		xma.lu	f63=f35,f122,f63	};;
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r26=f52
+		xma.hu	f74=f35,f123,f73
+(p7)	add		carry2=1,carry2		}
+{ .mfi;	cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r18,r17
+		xma.lu	f73=f35,f123,f73
+	add		r18=r18,carry1		};;
+{ .mfi;
+		xma.hu	f84=f35,f124,f83
+(p7)	add		carry2=1,carry2		}
+{ .mfi;	cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r18,carry1
+		xma.lu	f83=f35,f124,f83	};;
+{ .mfi;	st8		[r32]=r18,16
+		xma.hu	f94=f35,f125,f93
+(p7)	add		carry2=1,carry2		}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f93=f35,f125,f93	};;
+{ .mfi;		xma.hu	f104=f35,f126,f103	}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f103=f35,f126,f103	};;
+{ .mfi;		xma.hu	f114=f35,f127,f113	}
+{ .mfi;	mov		carry1=0
+		xma.lu	f113=f35,f127,f113
+	add		r25=r25,r24		};;//
+//-------------------------------------------------//
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r27=f43
+		xma.hu	f45=f36,f120,f44
+	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r25,r24		}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f44=f36,f120,f44	
+	add		r26=r26,r25		};;
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r16=f80
+		xma.hu	f55=f36,f121,f54
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1		}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f54=f36,f121,f54	};;
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r17=f71
+		xma.hu	f65=f36,f122,f64
+	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r26,r25		}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f64=f36,f122,f64
+	add		r27=r27,r26		};;
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r18=f62
+		xma.hu	f75=f36,f123,f74
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1		}
+{ .mfi;	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r27,r26
+		xma.lu	f74=f36,f123,f74
+	add		r27=r27,carry2		};;
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r19=f53
+		xma.hu	f85=f36,f124,f84
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1		}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f84=f36,f124,f84
+	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r27,carry2	};;
+{ .mfi;	st8		[r33]=r27,16
+		xma.hu	f95=f36,f125,f94
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1		}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f94=f36,f125,f94	};;
+{ .mfi;		xma.hu	f105=f36,f126,f104	}
+{ .mfi;	mov		carry2=0
+		xma.lu	f104=f36,f126,f104
+	add		r17=r17,r16		};;
+{ .mfi;		xma.hu	f115=f36,f127,f114
+	cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r17,r16		}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f114=f36,f127,f114
+	add		r18=r18,r17		};;//
+//-------------------------------------------------//
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r20=f44
+		xma.hu	f46=f37,f120,f45
+(p7)	add		carry2=1,carry2		}
+{ .mfi;	cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r18,r17
+		xma.lu	f45=f37,f120,f45
+	add		r19=r19,r18		};;
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r24=f90
+		xma.hu	f56=f37,f121,f55	}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f55=f37,f121,f55	};;
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r25=f81
+		xma.hu	f66=f37,f122,f65
+(p7)	add		carry2=1,carry2		}
+{ .mfi;	cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r19,r18
+		xma.lu	f65=f37,f122,f65
+	add		r20=r20,r19		};;
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r26=f72
+		xma.hu	f76=f37,f123,f75
+(p7)	add		carry2=1,carry2		}
+{ .mfi;	cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r20,r19
+		xma.lu	f75=f37,f123,f75
+	add		r20=r20,carry1		};;
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r27=f63
+		xma.hu	f86=f37,f124,f85
+(p7)	add		carry2=1,carry2		}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f85=f37,f124,f85
+	cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r20,carry1	};;
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r28=f54
+		xma.hu	f96=f37,f125,f95
+(p7)	add		carry2=1,carry2		}
+{ .mfi;	st8		[r32]=r20,16
+		xma.lu	f95=f37,f125,f95	};;
+{ .mfi;		xma.hu	f106=f37,f126,f105	}
+{ .mfi;	mov		carry1=0
+		xma.lu	f105=f37,f126,f105
+	add		r25=r25,r24		};;
+{ .mfi;		xma.hu	f116=f37,f127,f115
+	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r25,r24		}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f115=f37,f127,f115
+	add		r26=r26,r25		};;//
+//-------------------------------------------------//
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r29=f45
+		xma.hu	f47=f38,f120,f46
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1		}
+{ .mfi;	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r26,r25
+		xma.lu	f46=f38,f120,f46
+	add		r27=r27,r26		};;
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r16=f100
+		xma.hu	f57=f38,f121,f56
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1		}
+{ .mfi;	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r27,r26
+		xma.lu	f56=f38,f121,f56
+	add		r28=r28,r27		};;
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r17=f91
+		xma.hu	f67=f38,f122,f66
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1		}
+{ .mfi;	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r28,r27
+		xma.lu	f66=f38,f122,f66
+	add		r29=r29,r28		};;
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r18=f82
+		xma.hu	f77=f38,f123,f76
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1		}
+{ .mfi;	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r29,r28
+		xma.lu	f76=f38,f123,f76
+	add		r29=r29,carry2		};;
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r19=f73
+		xma.hu	f87=f38,f124,f86
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1		}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f86=f38,f124,f86
+	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r29,carry2	};;
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r20=f64
+		xma.hu	f97=f38,f125,f96
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1		}
+{ .mfi;	st8		[r33]=r29,16
+		xma.lu	f96=f38,f125,f96	};;
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r21=f55
+		xma.hu	f107=f38,f126,f106	}
+{ .mfi;	mov		carry2=0
+		xma.lu	f106=f38,f126,f106
+	add		r17=r17,r16		};;
+{ .mfi;		xma.hu	f117=f38,f127,f116
+	cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r17,r16		}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f116=f38,f127,f116
+	add		r18=r18,r17		};;//
+//-------------------------------------------------//
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r22=f46
+		xma.hu	f48=f39,f120,f47
+(p7)	add		carry2=1,carry2		}
+{ .mfi;	cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r18,r17
+		xma.lu	f47=f39,f120,f47
+	add		r19=r19,r18		};;
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r24=f110
+		xma.hu	f58=f39,f121,f57
+(p7)	add		carry2=1,carry2		}
+{ .mfi;	cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r19,r18
+		xma.lu	f57=f39,f121,f57
+	add		r20=r20,r19		};;
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r25=f101
+		xma.hu	f68=f39,f122,f67
+(p7)	add		carry2=1,carry2		}
+{ .mfi;	cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r20,r19
+		xma.lu	f67=f39,f122,f67
+	add		r21=r21,r20		};;
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r26=f92
+		xma.hu	f78=f39,f123,f77
+(p7)	add		carry2=1,carry2		}
+{ .mfi;	cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r21,r20
+		xma.lu	f77=f39,f123,f77
+	add		r22=r22,r21		};;
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r27=f83
+		xma.hu	f88=f39,f124,f87
+(p7)	add		carry2=1,carry2		}
+{ .mfi;	cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r22,r21
+		xma.lu	f87=f39,f124,f87
+	add		r22=r22,carry1		};;
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r28=f74
+		xma.hu	f98=f39,f125,f97
+(p7)	add		carry2=1,carry2		}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f97=f39,f125,f97
+	cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r22,carry1	};;
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r29=f65
+		xma.hu	f108=f39,f126,f107
+(p7)	add		carry2=1,carry2		}
+{ .mfi;	st8		[r32]=r22,16
+		xma.lu	f107=f39,f126,f107	};;
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r30=f56
+		xma.hu	f118=f39,f127,f117	}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f117=f39,f127,f117	};;//
+//-------------------------------------------------//
+// Leaving muliplier's heaven... Quite a ride, huh?
+
+{ .mii;	getf.sig	r31=f47
+	add		r25=r25,r24
+	mov		carry1=0		};;
+{ .mii;		getf.sig	r16=f111
+	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r25,r24
+	add		r26=r26,r25		};;
+{ .mfb;		getf.sig	r17=f102	}
+{ .mii;
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1
+	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r26,r25
+	add		r27=r27,r26		};;
+{ .mfb;	nop.m	0x0				}
+{ .mii;
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1
+	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r27,r26
+	add		r28=r28,r27		};;
+{ .mii;		getf.sig	r18=f93
+		add		r17=r17,r16
+		mov		carry3=0	}
+{ .mii;
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1
+	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r28,r27
+	add		r29=r29,r28		};;
+{ .mii;		getf.sig	r19=f84
+		cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r17,r16	}
+{ .mii;
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1
+	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r29,r28
+	add		r30=r30,r29		};;
+{ .mii;		getf.sig	r20=f75
+		add		r18=r18,r17	}
+{ .mii;
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1
+	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r30,r29
+	add		r31=r31,r30		};;
+{ .mfb;		getf.sig	r21=f66		}
+{ .mii;	(p7)	add		carry3=1,carry3
+		cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r18,r17
+		add		r19=r19,r18	}
+{ .mfb;	nop.m	0x0				}
+{ .mii;
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1
+	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r31,r30
+	add		r31=r31,carry2		};;
+{ .mfb;		getf.sig	r22=f57		}
+{ .mii;	(p7)	add		carry3=1,carry3
+		cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r19,r18
+		add		r20=r20,r19	}
+{ .mfb;	nop.m	0x0				}
+{ .mii;
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1
+	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r31,carry2	};;
+{ .mfb;		getf.sig	r23=f48		}
+{ .mii;	(p7)	add		carry3=1,carry3
+		cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r20,r19
+		add		r21=r21,r20	}
+{ .mii;
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1		}
+{ .mfb;	st8		[r33]=r31,16		};;
+
+{ .mfb;	getf.sig	r24=f112		}
+{ .mii;	(p7)	add		carry3=1,carry3
+		cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r21,r20
+		add		r22=r22,r21	};;
+{ .mfb;	getf.sig	r25=f103		}
+{ .mii;	(p7)	add		carry3=1,carry3
+		cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r22,r21
+		add		r23=r23,r22	};;
+{ .mfb;	getf.sig	r26=f94			}
+{ .mii;	(p7)	add		carry3=1,carry3
+		cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r23,r22
+		add		r23=r23,carry1	};;
+{ .mfb;	getf.sig	r27=f85			}
+{ .mii;	(p7)	add		carry3=1,carry3
+		cmp.ltu		p7,p8=r23,carry1};;
+{ .mii;	getf.sig	r28=f76
+	add		r25=r25,r24
+	mov		carry1=0		}
+{ .mii;		st8		[r32]=r23,16
+	(p7)	add		carry2=1,carry3
+	(p8)	add		carry2=0,carry3	};;
+
+{ .mfb;	nop.m	0x0				}
+{ .mii;	getf.sig	r29=f67
+	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r25,r24
+	add		r26=r26,r25		};;
+{ .mfb;	getf.sig	r30=f58			}
+{ .mii;
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1
+	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r26,r25
+	add		r27=r27,r26		};;
+{ .mfb;		getf.sig	r16=f113	}
+{ .mii;
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1
+	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r27,r26
+	add		r28=r28,r27		};;
+{ .mfb;		getf.sig	r17=f104	}
+{ .mii;
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1
+	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r28,r27
+	add		r29=r29,r28		};;
+{ .mfb;		getf.sig	r18=f95		}
+{ .mii;
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1
+	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r29,r28
+	add		r30=r30,r29		};;
+{ .mii;		getf.sig	r19=f86
+		add		r17=r17,r16
+		mov		carry3=0	}
+{ .mii;
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1
+	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r30,r29
+	add		r30=r30,carry2		};;
+{ .mii;		getf.sig	r20=f77
+		cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r17,r16
+		add		r18=r18,r17	}
+{ .mii;
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1
+	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r30,carry2	};;
+{ .mfb;		getf.sig	r21=f68		}
+{ .mii;	st8		[r33]=r30,16
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1		};;
+
+{ .mfb;	getf.sig	r24=f114		}
+{ .mii;	(p7)	add		carry3=1,carry3
+		cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r18,r17
+		add		r19=r19,r18	};;
+{ .mfb;	getf.sig	r25=f105		}
+{ .mii;	(p7)	add		carry3=1,carry3
+		cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r19,r18
+		add		r20=r20,r19	};;
+{ .mfb;	getf.sig	r26=f96			}
+{ .mii;	(p7)	add		carry3=1,carry3
+		cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r20,r19
+		add		r21=r21,r20	};;
+{ .mfb;	getf.sig	r27=f87			}
+{ .mii;	(p7)	add		carry3=1,carry3
+		cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r21,r20
+		add		r21=r21,carry1	};;
+{ .mib;	getf.sig	r28=f78			
+	add		r25=r25,r24		}
+{ .mib;	(p7)	add		carry3=1,carry3
+		cmp.ltu		p7,p8=r21,carry1};;
+{ .mii;		st8		[r32]=r21,16
+	(p7)	add		carry2=1,carry3
+	(p8)	add		carry2=0,carry3	}
+
+{ .mii;	mov		carry1=0
+	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r25,r24
+	add		r26=r26,r25		};;
+{ .mfb;		getf.sig	r16=f115	}
+{ .mii;
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1
+	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r26,r25
+	add		r27=r27,r26		};;
+{ .mfb;		getf.sig	r17=f106	}
+{ .mii;
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1
+	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r27,r26
+	add		r28=r28,r27		};;
+{ .mfb;		getf.sig	r18=f97		}
+{ .mii;
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1
+	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r28,r27
+	add		r28=r28,carry2		};;
+{ .mib;		getf.sig	r19=f88
+		add		r17=r17,r16	}
+{ .mib;
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1
+	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r28,carry2	};;
+{ .mii;	st8		[r33]=r28,16
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1		}
+
+{ .mii;		mov		carry2=0
+		cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r17,r16
+		add		r18=r18,r17	};;
+{ .mfb;	getf.sig	r24=f116		}
+{ .mii;	(p7)	add		carry2=1,carry2
+		cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r18,r17
+		add		r19=r19,r18	};;
+{ .mfb;	getf.sig	r25=f107		}
+{ .mii;	(p7)	add		carry2=1,carry2
+		cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r19,r18
+		add		r19=r19,carry1	};;
+{ .mfb;	getf.sig	r26=f98			}
+{ .mii;	(p7)	add		carry2=1,carry2
+		cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r19,carry1};;
+{ .mii;		st8		[r32]=r19,16
+	(p7)	add		carry2=1,carry2	}
+
+{ .mfb;	add		r25=r25,r24		};;
+
+{ .mfb;		getf.sig	r16=f117	}
+{ .mii;	mov		carry1=0
+	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r25,r24
+	add		r26=r26,r25		};;
+{ .mfb;		getf.sig	r17=f108	}
+{ .mii;
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1
+	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r26,r25
+	add		r26=r26,carry2		};;
+{ .mfb;	nop.m	0x0				}
+{ .mii;
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1
+	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r26,carry2	};;
+{ .mii;	st8		[r33]=r26,16
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1		}
+
+{ .mfb;		add		r17=r17,r16	};;
+{ .mfb;	getf.sig	r24=f118		}
+{ .mii;		mov		carry2=0
+		cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r17,r16
+		add		r17=r17,carry1	};;
+{ .mii;	(p7)	add		carry2=1,carry2
+		cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r17,carry1};;
+{ .mii;		st8		[r32]=r17
+	(p7)	add		carry2=1,carry2	};;
+{ .mfb;	add		r24=r24,carry2		};;
+{ .mib;	st8		[r33]=r24		}
+
+{ .mib;	rum		1<<5		// clear um.mfh
+	br.ret.sptk.many	b0	};;
+.endp	bn_mul_comba8#
+#undef	carry3
+#undef	carry2
+#undef	carry1
+#endif
+
+#if 1
+// It's possible to make it faster (see comment to bn_sqr_comba8), but
+// I reckon it doesn't worth the effort. Basically because the routine
+// (actually both of them) practically never called... So I just play
+// same trick as with bn_sqr_comba8.
+//
+// void bn_sqr_comba4(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a)
+//
+.global	bn_sqr_comba4#
+.proc	bn_sqr_comba4#
+.align	64
+bn_sqr_comba4:
+	.prologue
+	.save	ar.pfs,r2
+#if defined(_HPUX_SOURCE) && !defined(_LP64)
+{ .mii;	alloc   r2=ar.pfs,2,1,0,0
+	addp4	r32=0,r32
+	addp4	r33=0,r33		};;
+{ .mii;
+#else
+{ .mii;	alloc	r2=ar.pfs,2,1,0,0
+#endif
+	mov	r34=r33
+	add	r14=8,r33		};;
+	.body
+{ .mii;	add	r17=8,r34
+	add	r15=16,r33
+	add	r18=16,r34		}
+{ .mfb;	add	r16=24,r33
+	br	.L_cheat_entry_point4	};;
+.endp	bn_sqr_comba4#
+#endif
+
+#if 1
+// Runs in ~115 cycles and ~4.5 times faster than C. Well, whatever...
+//
+// void bn_mul_comba4(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b)
+//
+#define	carry1	r14
+#define	carry2	r15
+.global	bn_mul_comba4#
+.proc	bn_mul_comba4#
+.align	64
+bn_mul_comba4:
+	.prologue
+	.save	ar.pfs,r2
+#if defined(_HPUX_SOURCE) && !defined(_LP64)
+{ .mii;	alloc   r2=ar.pfs,3,0,0,0
+	addp4	r33=0,r33
+	addp4	r34=0,r34		};;
+{ .mii;	addp4	r32=0,r32
+#else
+{ .mii;	alloc	r2=ar.pfs,3,0,0,0
+#endif
+	add	r14=8,r33
+	add	r17=8,r34		}
+	.body
+{ .mii;	add	r15=16,r33
+	add	r18=16,r34
+	add	r16=24,r33		};;
+.L_cheat_entry_point4:
+{ .mmi;	add	r19=24,r34
+
+	ldf8	f32=[r33]		}
+
+{ .mmi;	ldf8	f120=[r34]
+	ldf8	f121=[r17]		};;
+{ .mmi;	ldf8	f122=[r18]
+	ldf8	f123=[r19]		}
+
+{ .mmi;	ldf8	f33=[r14]
+	ldf8	f34=[r15]		}
+{ .mfi;	ldf8	f35=[r16]
+
+		xma.hu	f41=f32,f120,f0		}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f40=f32,f120,f0		};;
+{ .mfi;		xma.hu	f51=f32,f121,f0		}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f50=f32,f121,f0		};;
+{ .mfi;		xma.hu	f61=f32,f122,f0		}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f60=f32,f122,f0		};;
+{ .mfi;		xma.hu	f71=f32,f123,f0		}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f70=f32,f123,f0		};;//
+// Major stall takes place here, and 3 more places below. Result from
+// first xma is not available for another 3 ticks.
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r16=f40
+		xma.hu	f42=f33,f120,f41
+	add		r33=8,r32		}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f41=f33,f120,f41	};;
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r24=f50
+		xma.hu	f52=f33,f121,f51	}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f51=f33,f121,f51	};;
+{ .mfi;	st8		[r32]=r16,16
+		xma.hu	f62=f33,f122,f61	}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f61=f33,f122,f61	};;
+{ .mfi;		xma.hu	f72=f33,f123,f71	}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f71=f33,f123,f71	};;//
+//-------------------------------------------------//
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r25=f41
+		xma.hu	f43=f34,f120,f42	}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f42=f34,f120,f42	};;
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r16=f60
+		xma.hu	f53=f34,f121,f52	}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f52=f34,f121,f52	};;
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r17=f51
+		xma.hu	f63=f34,f122,f62
+	add		r25=r25,r24		}
+{ .mfi;	mov		carry1=0
+		xma.lu	f62=f34,f122,f62	};;
+{ .mfi;	st8		[r33]=r25,16
+		xma.hu	f73=f34,f123,f72
+	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r25,r24		}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f72=f34,f123,f72	};;//
+//-------------------------------------------------//
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r18=f42
+		xma.hu	f44=f35,f120,f43
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1		}
+{ .mfi;	add		r17=r17,r16
+		xma.lu	f43=f35,f120,f43
+	mov		carry2=0		};;
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r24=f70
+		xma.hu	f54=f35,f121,f53
+	cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r17,r16		}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f53=f35,f121,f53	};;
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r25=f61
+		xma.hu	f64=f35,f122,f63
+	add		r18=r18,r17		}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f63=f35,f122,f63
+(p7)	add		carry2=1,carry2		};;
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r26=f52
+		xma.hu	f74=f35,f123,f73
+	cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r18,r17		}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f73=f35,f123,f73
+	add		r18=r18,carry1		};;
+//-------------------------------------------------//
+{ .mii;	st8		[r32]=r18,16
+(p7)	add		carry2=1,carry2
+	cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r18,carry1	};;
+
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r27=f43	// last major stall
+(p7)	add		carry2=1,carry2		};;
+{ .mii;		getf.sig	r16=f71
+	add		r25=r25,r24
+	mov		carry1=0		};;
+{ .mii;		getf.sig	r17=f62	
+	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r25,r24
+	add		r26=r26,r25		};;
+{ .mii;
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1
+	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r26,r25
+	add		r27=r27,r26		};;
+{ .mii;
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1
+	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r27,r26
+	add		r27=r27,carry2		};;
+{ .mii;		getf.sig	r18=f53
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1
+	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r27,carry2	};;
+{ .mfi;	st8		[r33]=r27,16
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1		}
+
+{ .mii;		getf.sig	r19=f44
+		add		r17=r17,r16
+		mov		carry2=0	};;
+{ .mii;	getf.sig	r24=f72
+		cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r17,r16
+		add		r18=r18,r17	};;
+{ .mii;	(p7)	add		carry2=1,carry2
+		cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r18,r17
+		add		r19=r19,r18	};;
+{ .mii;	(p7)	add		carry2=1,carry2
+		cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r19,r18
+		add		r19=r19,carry1	};;
+{ .mii;	getf.sig	r25=f63
+	(p7)	add		carry2=1,carry2
+		cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r19,carry1};;
+{ .mii;		st8		[r32]=r19,16
+	(p7)	add		carry2=1,carry2	}
+
+{ .mii;	getf.sig	r26=f54
+	add		r25=r25,r24
+	mov		carry1=0		};;
+{ .mii;		getf.sig	r16=f73
+	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r25,r24
+	add		r26=r26,r25		};;
+{ .mii;
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1
+	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r26,r25
+	add		r26=r26,carry2		};;
+{ .mii;		getf.sig	r17=f64
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1
+	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r26,carry2	};;
+{ .mii;	st8		[r33]=r26,16
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1		}
+
+{ .mii;	getf.sig	r24=f74
+		add		r17=r17,r16	
+		mov		carry2=0	};;
+{ .mii;		cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r17,r16
+		add		r17=r17,carry1	};;
+
+{ .mii;	(p7)	add		carry2=1,carry2
+		cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r17,carry1};;
+{ .mii;		st8		[r32]=r17,16
+	(p7)	add		carry2=1,carry2	};;
+
+{ .mii;	add		r24=r24,carry2		};;
+{ .mii;	st8		[r33]=r24		}
+
+{ .mib;	rum		1<<5		// clear um.mfh
+	br.ret.sptk.many	b0	};;
+.endp	bn_mul_comba4#
+#undef	carry2
+#undef	carry1
+#endif
+
+#if 1
+//
+// BN_ULONG bn_div_words(BN_ULONG h, BN_ULONG l, BN_ULONG d)
+//
+// In the nutshell it's a port of my MIPS III/IV implementation.
+//
+#define	AT	r14
+#define	H	r16
+#define	HH	r20
+#define	L	r17
+#define	D	r18
+#define	DH	r22
+#define	I	r21
+
+#if 0
+// Some preprocessors (most notably HP-UX) appear to be allergic to
+// macros enclosed to parenthesis [as these three were].
+#define	cont	p16
+#define	break	p0	// p20
+#define	equ	p24
+#else
+cont=p16
+break=p0
+equ=p24
+#endif
+
+.global	abort#
+.global	bn_div_words#
+.proc	bn_div_words#
+.align	64
+bn_div_words:
+	.prologue
+	.save	ar.pfs,r2
+{ .mii;	alloc		r2=ar.pfs,3,5,0,8
+	.save	b0,r3
+	mov		r3=b0
+	.save	pr,r10
+	mov		r10=pr		};;
+{ .mmb;	cmp.eq		p6,p0=r34,r0
+	mov		r8=-1
+(p6)	br.ret.spnt.many	b0	};;
+
+	.body
+{ .mii;	mov		H=r32		// save h
+	mov		ar.ec=0		// don't rotate at exit
+	mov		pr.rot=0	}
+{ .mii;	mov		L=r33		// save l
+	mov		r36=r0		};;
+
+.L_divw_shift:	// -vv- note signed comparison
+{ .mfi;	(p0)	cmp.lt		p16,p0=r0,r34	// d
+	(p0)	shladd		r33=r34,1,r0	}
+{ .mfb;	(p0)	add		r35=1,r36
+	(p0)	nop.f		0x0
+(p16)	br.wtop.dpnt		.L_divw_shift	};;
+
+{ .mii;	mov		D=r34
+	shr.u		DH=r34,32
+	sub		r35=64,r36		};;
+{ .mii;	setf.sig	f7=DH
+	shr.u		AT=H,r35
+	mov		I=r36			};;
+{ .mib;	cmp.ne		p6,p0=r0,AT
+	shl		H=H,r36
+(p6)	br.call.spnt.clr	b0=abort	};;	// overflow, die...
+
+{ .mfi;	fcvt.xuf.s1	f7=f7
+	shr.u		AT=L,r35		};;
+{ .mii;	shl		L=L,r36
+	or		H=H,AT			};;
+
+{ .mii;	nop.m		0x0
+	cmp.leu		p6,p0=D,H;;
+(p6)	sub		H=H,D			}
+
+{ .mlx;	setf.sig	f14=D
+	movl		AT=0xffffffff		};;
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+{ .mii;	setf.sig	f6=H
+	shr.u		HH=H,32;;
+	cmp.eq		p6,p7=HH,DH		};;
+{ .mfb;
+(p6)	setf.sig	f8=AT
+(p7)	fcvt.xuf.s1	f6=f6
+(p7)	br.call.sptk	b6=.L_udiv64_32_b6	};;
+
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r33=f8				// q
+	xmpy.lu		f9=f8,f14		}
+{ .mfi;	xmpy.hu		f10=f8,f14
+	shrp		H=H,L,32		};;
+
+{ .mmi;	getf.sig	r35=f9				// tl
+	getf.sig	r31=f10			};;	// th
+
+.L_divw_1st_iter:
+{ .mii;	(p0)	add		r32=-1,r33
+	(p0)	cmp.eq		equ,cont=HH,r31		};;
+{ .mii;	(p0)	cmp.ltu		p8,p0=r35,D
+	(p0)	sub		r34=r35,D
+	(equ)	cmp.leu		break,cont=r35,H	};;
+{ .mib;	(cont)	cmp.leu		cont,break=HH,r31
+	(p8)	add		r31=-1,r31
+(cont)	br.wtop.spnt		.L_divw_1st_iter	};;
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+{ .mii;	sub		H=H,r35
+	shl		r8=r33,32
+	shl		L=L,32			};;
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+{ .mii;	setf.sig	f6=H
+	shr.u		HH=H,32;;
+	cmp.eq		p6,p7=HH,DH		};;
+{ .mfb;
+(p6)	setf.sig	f8=AT
+(p7)	fcvt.xuf.s1	f6=f6
+(p7)	br.call.sptk	b6=.L_udiv64_32_b6	};;
+
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r33=f8				// q
+	xmpy.lu		f9=f8,f14		}
+{ .mfi;	xmpy.hu		f10=f8,f14
+	shrp		H=H,L,32		};;
+
+{ .mmi;	getf.sig	r35=f9				// tl
+	getf.sig	r31=f10			};;	// th
+
+.L_divw_2nd_iter:
+{ .mii;	(p0)	add		r32=-1,r33
+	(p0)	cmp.eq		equ,cont=HH,r31		};;
+{ .mii;	(p0)	cmp.ltu		p8,p0=r35,D
+	(p0)	sub		r34=r35,D
+	(equ)	cmp.leu		break,cont=r35,H	};;
+{ .mib;	(cont)	cmp.leu		cont,break=HH,r31
+	(p8)	add		r31=-1,r31
+(cont)	br.wtop.spnt		.L_divw_2nd_iter	};;
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+{ .mii;	sub	H=H,r35
+	or	r8=r8,r33
+	mov	ar.pfs=r2		};;
+{ .mii;	shr.u	r9=H,I			// remainder if anybody wants it
+	mov	pr=r10,0x1ffff		}
+{ .mfb;	br.ret.sptk.many	b0	};;
+
+// Unsigned 64 by 32 (well, by 64 for the moment) bit integer division
+// procedure.
+//
+// inputs:	f6 = (double)a, f7 = (double)b
+// output:	f8 = (int)(a/b)
+// clobbered:	f8,f9,f10,f11,pred
+pred=p15
+// One can argue that this snippet is copyrighted to Intel
+// Corporation, as it's essentially identical to one of those
+// found in "Divide, Square Root and Remainder" section at
+// http://www.intel.com/software/products/opensource/libraries/num.htm.
+// Yes, I admit that the referred code was used as template,
+// but after I realized that there hardly is any other instruction
+// sequence which would perform this operation. I mean I figure that
+// any independent attempt to implement high-performance division
+// will result in code virtually identical to the Intel code. It
+// should be noted though that below division kernel is 1 cycle
+// faster than Intel one (note commented splits:-), not to mention
+// original prologue (rather lack of one) and epilogue.
+.align	32
+.skip	16
+.L_udiv64_32_b6:
+	frcpa.s1	f8,pred=f6,f7;;		// [0]  y0 = 1 / b
+
+(pred)	fnma.s1		f9=f7,f8,f1		// [5]  e0 = 1 - b * y0
+(pred)	fmpy.s1		f10=f6,f8;;		// [5]  q0 = a * y0
+(pred)	fmpy.s1		f11=f9,f9		// [10] e1 = e0 * e0
+(pred)	fma.s1		f10=f9,f10,f10;;	// [10] q1 = q0 + e0 * q0
+(pred)	fma.s1		f8=f9,f8,f8	//;;	// [15] y1 = y0 + e0 * y0
+(pred)	fma.s1		f9=f11,f10,f10;;	// [15] q2 = q1 + e1 * q1
+(pred)	fma.s1		f8=f11,f8,f8	//;;	// [20] y2 = y1 + e1 * y1
+(pred)	fnma.s1		f10=f7,f9,f6;;		// [20] r2 = a - b * q2
+(pred)	fma.s1		f8=f10,f8,f9;;		// [25] q3 = q2 + r2 * y2
+
+	fcvt.fxu.trunc.s1	f8=f8		// [30] q = trunc(q3)
+	br.ret.sptk.many	b6;;
+.endp	bn_div_words#
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/mips-mont.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/mips-mont.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a907571
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/mips-mont.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,433 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2010-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+
+# This module doesn't present direct interest for OpenSSL, because it
+# doesn't provide better performance for longer keys, at least not on
+# in-order-execution cores. While 512-bit RSA sign operations can be
+# 65% faster in 64-bit mode, 1024-bit ones are only 15% faster, and
+# 4096-bit ones are up to 15% slower. In 32-bit mode it varies from
+# 16% improvement for 512-bit RSA sign to -33% for 4096-bit RSA
+# verify:-( All comparisons are against bn_mul_mont-free assembler.
+# The module might be of interest to embedded system developers, as
+# the code is smaller than 1KB, yet offers >3x improvement on MIPS64
+# and 75-30% [less for longer keys] on MIPS32 over compiler-generated
+# code.
+
+######################################################################
+# There is a number of MIPS ABI in use, O32 and N32/64 are most
+# widely used. Then there is a new contender: NUBI. It appears that if
+# one picks the latter, it's possible to arrange code in ABI neutral
+# manner. Therefore let's stick to NUBI register layout:
+#
+($zero,$at,$t0,$t1,$t2)=map("\$$_",(0..2,24,25));
+($a0,$a1,$a2,$a3,$a4,$a5,$a6,$a7)=map("\$$_",(4..11));
+($s0,$s1,$s2,$s3,$s4,$s5,$s6,$s7,$s8,$s9,$s10,$s11)=map("\$$_",(12..23));
+($gp,$tp,$sp,$fp,$ra)=map("\$$_",(3,28..31));
+#
+# The return value is placed in $a0. Following coding rules facilitate
+# interoperability:
+#
+# - never ever touch $tp, "thread pointer", former $gp;
+# - copy return value to $t0, former $v0 [or to $a0 if you're adapting
+#   old code];
+# - on O32 populate $a4-$a7 with 'lw $aN,4*N($sp)' if necessary;
+#
+# For reference here is register layout for N32/64 MIPS ABIs:
+#
+# ($zero,$at,$v0,$v1)=map("\$$_",(0..3));
+# ($a0,$a1,$a2,$a3,$a4,$a5,$a6,$a7)=map("\$$_",(4..11));
+# ($t0,$t1,$t2,$t3,$t8,$t9)=map("\$$_",(12..15,24,25));
+# ($s0,$s1,$s2,$s3,$s4,$s5,$s6,$s7)=map("\$$_",(16..23));
+# ($gp,$sp,$fp,$ra)=map("\$$_",(28..31));
+#
+$flavour = shift || "o32"; # supported flavours are o32,n32,64,nubi32,nubi64
+
+if ($flavour =~ /64|n32/i) {
+	$PTR_ADD="dadd";	# incidentally works even on n32
+	$PTR_SUB="dsub";	# incidentally works even on n32
+	$REG_S="sd";
+	$REG_L="ld";
+	$SZREG=8;
+} else {
+	$PTR_ADD="add";
+	$PTR_SUB="sub";
+	$REG_S="sw";
+	$REG_L="lw";
+	$SZREG=4;
+}
+$SAVED_REGS_MASK = ($flavour =~ /nubi/i) ? 0x00fff000 : 0x00ff0000;
+#
+# <appro@openssl.org>
+#
+######################################################################
+
+while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {}
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+if ($flavour =~ /64|n32/i) {
+	$LD="ld";
+	$ST="sd";
+	$MULTU="dmultu";
+	$ADDU="daddu";
+	$SUBU="dsubu";
+	$BNSZ=8;
+} else {
+	$LD="lw";
+	$ST="sw";
+	$MULTU="multu";
+	$ADDU="addu";
+	$SUBU="subu";
+	$BNSZ=4;
+}
+
+# int bn_mul_mont(
+$rp=$a0;	# BN_ULONG *rp,
+$ap=$a1;	# const BN_ULONG *ap,
+$bp=$a2;	# const BN_ULONG *bp,
+$np=$a3;	# const BN_ULONG *np,
+$n0=$a4;	# const BN_ULONG *n0,
+$num=$a5;	# int num);
+
+$lo0=$a6;
+$hi0=$a7;
+$lo1=$t1;
+$hi1=$t2;
+$aj=$s0;
+$bi=$s1;
+$nj=$s2;
+$tp=$s3;
+$alo=$s4;
+$ahi=$s5;
+$nlo=$s6;
+$nhi=$s7;
+$tj=$s8;
+$i=$s9;
+$j=$s10;
+$m1=$s11;
+
+$FRAMESIZE=14;
+
+$code=<<___;
+.text
+
+.set	noat
+.set	noreorder
+
+.align	5
+.globl	bn_mul_mont
+.ent	bn_mul_mont
+bn_mul_mont:
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /o32/i);
+	lw	$n0,16($sp)
+	lw	$num,20($sp)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	slt	$at,$num,4
+	bnez	$at,1f
+	li	$t0,0
+	slt	$at,$num,17	# on in-order CPU
+	bnez	$at,bn_mul_mont_internal
+	nop
+1:	jr	$ra
+	li	$a0,0
+.end	bn_mul_mont
+
+.align	5
+.ent	bn_mul_mont_internal
+bn_mul_mont_internal:
+	.frame	$fp,$FRAMESIZE*$SZREG,$ra
+	.mask	0x40000000|$SAVED_REGS_MASK,-$SZREG
+	$PTR_SUB $sp,$FRAMESIZE*$SZREG
+	$REG_S	$fp,($FRAMESIZE-1)*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$s11,($FRAMESIZE-2)*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$s10,($FRAMESIZE-3)*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$s9,($FRAMESIZE-4)*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$s8,($FRAMESIZE-5)*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$s7,($FRAMESIZE-6)*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$s6,($FRAMESIZE-7)*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$s5,($FRAMESIZE-8)*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$s4,($FRAMESIZE-9)*$SZREG($sp)
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i);
+	$REG_S	$s3,($FRAMESIZE-10)*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$s2,($FRAMESIZE-11)*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$s1,($FRAMESIZE-12)*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$s0,($FRAMESIZE-13)*$SZREG($sp)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	move	$fp,$sp
+
+	.set	reorder
+	$LD	$n0,0($n0)
+	$LD	$bi,0($bp)	# bp[0]
+	$LD	$aj,0($ap)	# ap[0]
+	$LD	$nj,0($np)	# np[0]
+
+	$PTR_SUB $sp,2*$BNSZ	# place for two extra words
+	sll	$num,`log($BNSZ)/log(2)`
+	li	$at,-4096
+	$PTR_SUB $sp,$num
+	and	$sp,$at
+
+	$MULTU	$aj,$bi
+	$LD	$alo,$BNSZ($ap)
+	$LD	$nlo,$BNSZ($np)
+	mflo	$lo0
+	mfhi	$hi0
+	$MULTU	$lo0,$n0
+	mflo	$m1
+
+	$MULTU	$alo,$bi
+	mflo	$alo
+	mfhi	$ahi
+
+	$MULTU	$nj,$m1
+	mflo	$lo1
+	mfhi	$hi1
+	$MULTU	$nlo,$m1
+	$ADDU	$lo1,$lo0
+	sltu	$at,$lo1,$lo0
+	$ADDU	$hi1,$at
+	mflo	$nlo
+	mfhi	$nhi
+
+	move	$tp,$sp
+	li	$j,2*$BNSZ
+.align	4
+.L1st:
+	.set	noreorder
+	$PTR_ADD $aj,$ap,$j
+	$PTR_ADD $nj,$np,$j
+	$LD	$aj,($aj)
+	$LD	$nj,($nj)
+
+	$MULTU	$aj,$bi
+	$ADDU	$lo0,$alo,$hi0
+	$ADDU	$lo1,$nlo,$hi1
+	sltu	$at,$lo0,$hi0
+	sltu	$t0,$lo1,$hi1
+	$ADDU	$hi0,$ahi,$at
+	$ADDU	$hi1,$nhi,$t0
+	mflo	$alo
+	mfhi	$ahi
+
+	$ADDU	$lo1,$lo0
+	sltu	$at,$lo1,$lo0
+	$MULTU	$nj,$m1
+	$ADDU	$hi1,$at
+	addu	$j,$BNSZ
+	$ST	$lo1,($tp)
+	sltu	$t0,$j,$num
+	mflo	$nlo
+	mfhi	$nhi
+
+	bnez	$t0,.L1st
+	$PTR_ADD $tp,$BNSZ
+	.set	reorder
+
+	$ADDU	$lo0,$alo,$hi0
+	sltu	$at,$lo0,$hi0
+	$ADDU	$hi0,$ahi,$at
+
+	$ADDU	$lo1,$nlo,$hi1
+	sltu	$t0,$lo1,$hi1
+	$ADDU	$hi1,$nhi,$t0
+	$ADDU	$lo1,$lo0
+	sltu	$at,$lo1,$lo0
+	$ADDU	$hi1,$at
+
+	$ST	$lo1,($tp)
+
+	$ADDU	$hi1,$hi0
+	sltu	$at,$hi1,$hi0
+	$ST	$hi1,$BNSZ($tp)
+	$ST	$at,2*$BNSZ($tp)
+
+	li	$i,$BNSZ
+.align	4
+.Louter:
+	$PTR_ADD $bi,$bp,$i
+	$LD	$bi,($bi)
+	$LD	$aj,($ap)
+	$LD	$alo,$BNSZ($ap)
+	$LD	$tj,($sp)
+
+	$MULTU	$aj,$bi
+	$LD	$nj,($np)
+	$LD	$nlo,$BNSZ($np)
+	mflo	$lo0
+	mfhi	$hi0
+	$ADDU	$lo0,$tj
+	$MULTU	$lo0,$n0
+	sltu	$at,$lo0,$tj
+	$ADDU	$hi0,$at
+	mflo	$m1
+
+	$MULTU	$alo,$bi
+	mflo	$alo
+	mfhi	$ahi
+
+	$MULTU	$nj,$m1
+	mflo	$lo1
+	mfhi	$hi1
+
+	$MULTU	$nlo,$m1
+	$ADDU	$lo1,$lo0
+	sltu	$at,$lo1,$lo0
+	$ADDU	$hi1,$at
+	mflo	$nlo
+	mfhi	$nhi
+
+	move	$tp,$sp
+	li	$j,2*$BNSZ
+	$LD	$tj,$BNSZ($tp)
+.align	4
+.Linner:
+	.set	noreorder
+	$PTR_ADD $aj,$ap,$j
+	$PTR_ADD $nj,$np,$j
+	$LD	$aj,($aj)
+	$LD	$nj,($nj)
+
+	$MULTU	$aj,$bi
+	$ADDU	$lo0,$alo,$hi0
+	$ADDU	$lo1,$nlo,$hi1
+	sltu	$at,$lo0,$hi0
+	sltu	$t0,$lo1,$hi1
+	$ADDU	$hi0,$ahi,$at
+	$ADDU	$hi1,$nhi,$t0
+	mflo	$alo
+	mfhi	$ahi
+
+	$ADDU	$lo0,$tj
+	addu	$j,$BNSZ
+	$MULTU	$nj,$m1
+	sltu	$at,$lo0,$tj
+	$ADDU	$lo1,$lo0
+	$ADDU	$hi0,$at
+	sltu	$t0,$lo1,$lo0
+	$LD	$tj,2*$BNSZ($tp)
+	$ADDU	$hi1,$t0
+	sltu	$at,$j,$num
+	mflo	$nlo
+	mfhi	$nhi
+	$ST	$lo1,($tp)
+	bnez	$at,.Linner
+	$PTR_ADD $tp,$BNSZ
+	.set	reorder
+
+	$ADDU	$lo0,$alo,$hi0
+	sltu	$at,$lo0,$hi0
+	$ADDU	$hi0,$ahi,$at
+	$ADDU	$lo0,$tj
+	sltu	$t0,$lo0,$tj
+	$ADDU	$hi0,$t0
+
+	$LD	$tj,2*$BNSZ($tp)
+	$ADDU	$lo1,$nlo,$hi1
+	sltu	$at,$lo1,$hi1
+	$ADDU	$hi1,$nhi,$at
+	$ADDU	$lo1,$lo0
+	sltu	$t0,$lo1,$lo0
+	$ADDU	$hi1,$t0
+	$ST	$lo1,($tp)
+
+	$ADDU	$lo1,$hi1,$hi0
+	sltu	$hi1,$lo1,$hi0
+	$ADDU	$lo1,$tj
+	sltu	$at,$lo1,$tj
+	$ADDU	$hi1,$at
+	$ST	$lo1,$BNSZ($tp)
+	$ST	$hi1,2*$BNSZ($tp)
+
+	addu	$i,$BNSZ
+	sltu	$t0,$i,$num
+	bnez	$t0,.Louter
+
+	.set	noreorder
+	$PTR_ADD $tj,$sp,$num	# &tp[num]
+	move	$tp,$sp
+	move	$ap,$sp
+	li	$hi0,0		# clear borrow bit
+
+.align	4
+.Lsub:	$LD	$lo0,($tp)
+	$LD	$lo1,($np)
+	$PTR_ADD $tp,$BNSZ
+	$PTR_ADD $np,$BNSZ
+	$SUBU	$lo1,$lo0,$lo1	# tp[i]-np[i]
+	sgtu	$at,$lo1,$lo0
+	$SUBU	$lo0,$lo1,$hi0
+	sgtu	$hi0,$lo0,$lo1
+	$ST	$lo0,($rp)
+	or	$hi0,$at
+	sltu	$at,$tp,$tj
+	bnez	$at,.Lsub
+	$PTR_ADD $rp,$BNSZ
+
+	$SUBU	$hi0,$hi1,$hi0	# handle upmost overflow bit
+	move	$tp,$sp
+	$PTR_SUB $rp,$num	# restore rp
+	not	$hi1,$hi0
+
+	and	$ap,$hi0,$sp
+	and	$bp,$hi1,$rp
+	or	$ap,$ap,$bp	# ap=borrow?tp:rp
+
+.align	4
+.Lcopy:	$LD	$aj,($ap)
+	$PTR_ADD $ap,$BNSZ
+	$ST	$zero,($tp)
+	$PTR_ADD $tp,$BNSZ
+	sltu	$at,$tp,$tj
+	$ST	$aj,($rp)
+	bnez	$at,.Lcopy
+	$PTR_ADD $rp,$BNSZ
+
+	li	$a0,1
+	li	$t0,1
+
+	.set	noreorder
+	move	$sp,$fp
+	$REG_L	$fp,($FRAMESIZE-1)*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$s11,($FRAMESIZE-2)*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$s10,($FRAMESIZE-3)*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$s9,($FRAMESIZE-4)*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$s8,($FRAMESIZE-5)*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$s7,($FRAMESIZE-6)*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$s6,($FRAMESIZE-7)*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$s5,($FRAMESIZE-8)*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$s4,($FRAMESIZE-9)*$SZREG($sp)
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i);
+	$REG_L	$s3,($FRAMESIZE-10)*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$s2,($FRAMESIZE-11)*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$s1,($FRAMESIZE-12)*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$s0,($FRAMESIZE-13)*$SZREG($sp)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	jr	$ra
+	$PTR_ADD $sp,$FRAMESIZE*$SZREG
+.end	bn_mul_mont_internal
+.rdata
+.asciiz	"Montgomery Multiplication for MIPS, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+___
+
+$code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem;
+
+print $code;
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/mips.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/mips.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..420f01f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/mips.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,2241 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2010-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se> for the OpenSSL
+# project.
+#
+# Rights for redistribution and usage in source and binary forms are
+# granted according to the OpenSSL license. Warranty of any kind is
+# disclaimed.
+# ====================================================================
+
+
+# July 1999
+#
+# This is drop-in MIPS III/IV ISA replacement for crypto/bn/bn_asm.c.
+#
+# The module is designed to work with either of the "new" MIPS ABI(5),
+# namely N32 or N64, offered by IRIX 6.x. It's not meant to work under
+# IRIX 5.x not only because it doesn't support new ABIs but also
+# because 5.x kernels put R4x00 CPU into 32-bit mode and all those
+# 64-bit instructions (daddu, dmultu, etc.) found below gonna only
+# cause illegal instruction exception:-(
+#
+# In addition the code depends on preprocessor flags set up by MIPSpro
+# compiler driver (either as or cc) and therefore (probably?) can't be
+# compiled by the GNU assembler. GNU C driver manages fine though...
+# I mean as long as -mmips-as is specified or is the default option,
+# because then it simply invokes /usr/bin/as which in turn takes
+# perfect care of the preprocessor definitions. Another neat feature
+# offered by the MIPSpro assembler is an optimization pass. This gave
+# me the opportunity to have the code looking more regular as all those
+# architecture dependent instruction rescheduling details were left to
+# the assembler. Cool, huh?
+#
+# Performance improvement is astonishing! 'apps/openssl speed rsa dsa'
+# goes way over 3 times faster!
+#
+#					<appro@fy.chalmers.se>
+
+# October 2010
+#
+# Adapt the module even for 32-bit ABIs and other OSes. The former was
+# achieved by mechanical replacement of 64-bit arithmetic instructions
+# such as dmultu, daddu, etc. with their 32-bit counterparts and
+# adjusting offsets denoting multiples of BN_ULONG. Above mentioned
+# >3x performance improvement naturally does not apply to 32-bit code
+# [because there is no instruction 32-bit compiler can't use], one
+# has to content with 40-85% improvement depending on benchmark and
+# key length, more for longer keys.
+
+$flavour = shift || "o32";
+while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {}
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+if ($flavour =~ /64|n32/i) {
+	$LD="ld";
+	$ST="sd";
+	$MULTU="dmultu";
+	$DIVU="ddivu";
+	$ADDU="daddu";
+	$SUBU="dsubu";
+	$SRL="dsrl";
+	$SLL="dsll";
+	$BNSZ=8;
+	$PTR_ADD="daddu";
+	$PTR_SUB="dsubu";
+	$SZREG=8;
+	$REG_S="sd";
+	$REG_L="ld";
+} else {
+	$LD="lw";
+	$ST="sw";
+	$MULTU="multu";
+	$DIVU="divu";
+	$ADDU="addu";
+	$SUBU="subu";
+	$SRL="srl";
+	$SLL="sll";
+	$BNSZ=4;
+	$PTR_ADD="addu";
+	$PTR_SUB="subu";
+	$SZREG=4;
+	$REG_S="sw";
+	$REG_L="lw";
+	$code=".set	mips2\n";
+}
+
+# Below is N32/64 register layout used in the original module.
+#
+($zero,$at,$v0,$v1)=map("\$$_",(0..3));
+($a0,$a1,$a2,$a3,$a4,$a5,$a6,$a7)=map("\$$_",(4..11));
+($t0,$t1,$t2,$t3,$t8,$t9)=map("\$$_",(12..15,24,25));
+($s0,$s1,$s2,$s3,$s4,$s5,$s6,$s7)=map("\$$_",(16..23));
+($gp,$sp,$fp,$ra)=map("\$$_",(28..31));
+($ta0,$ta1,$ta2,$ta3)=($a4,$a5,$a6,$a7);
+#
+# No special adaptation is required for O32. NUBI on the other hand
+# is treated by saving/restoring ($v1,$t0..$t3).
+
+$gp=$v1 if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i);
+
+$minus4=$v1;
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.rdata
+.asciiz	"mips3.s, Version 1.2"
+.asciiz	"MIPS II/III/IV ISA artwork by Andy Polyakov <appro\@fy.chalmers.se>"
+
+.text
+.set	noat
+
+.align	5
+.globl	bn_mul_add_words
+.ent	bn_mul_add_words
+bn_mul_add_words:
+	.set	noreorder
+	bgtz	$a2,bn_mul_add_words_internal
+	move	$v0,$zero
+	jr	$ra
+	move	$a0,$v0
+.end	bn_mul_add_words
+
+.align	5
+.ent	bn_mul_add_words_internal
+bn_mul_add_words_internal:
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i);
+	.frame	$sp,6*$SZREG,$ra
+	.mask	0x8000f008,-$SZREG
+	.set	noreorder
+	$PTR_SUB $sp,6*$SZREG
+	$REG_S	$ra,5*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$t3,4*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$t2,3*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$t1,2*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$t0,1*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$gp,0*$SZREG($sp)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	.set	reorder
+	li	$minus4,-4
+	and	$ta0,$a2,$minus4
+	beqz	$ta0,.L_bn_mul_add_words_tail
+
+.L_bn_mul_add_words_loop:
+	$LD	$t0,0($a1)
+	$MULTU	$t0,$a3
+	$LD	$t1,0($a0)
+	$LD	$t2,$BNSZ($a1)
+	$LD	$t3,$BNSZ($a0)
+	$LD	$ta0,2*$BNSZ($a1)
+	$LD	$ta1,2*$BNSZ($a0)
+	$ADDU	$t1,$v0
+	sltu	$v0,$t1,$v0	# All manuals say it "compares 32-bit
+				# values", but it seems to work fine
+				# even on 64-bit registers.
+	mflo	$at
+	mfhi	$t0
+	$ADDU	$t1,$at
+	$ADDU	$v0,$t0
+	 $MULTU	$t2,$a3
+	sltu	$at,$t1,$at
+	$ST	$t1,0($a0)
+	$ADDU	$v0,$at
+
+	$LD	$ta2,3*$BNSZ($a1)
+	$LD	$ta3,3*$BNSZ($a0)
+	$ADDU	$t3,$v0
+	sltu	$v0,$t3,$v0
+	mflo	$at
+	mfhi	$t2
+	$ADDU	$t3,$at
+	$ADDU	$v0,$t2
+	 $MULTU	$ta0,$a3
+	sltu	$at,$t3,$at
+	$ST	$t3,$BNSZ($a0)
+	$ADDU	$v0,$at
+
+	subu	$a2,4
+	$PTR_ADD $a0,4*$BNSZ
+	$PTR_ADD $a1,4*$BNSZ
+	$ADDU	$ta1,$v0
+	sltu	$v0,$ta1,$v0
+	mflo	$at
+	mfhi	$ta0
+	$ADDU	$ta1,$at
+	$ADDU	$v0,$ta0
+	 $MULTU	$ta2,$a3
+	sltu	$at,$ta1,$at
+	$ST	$ta1,-2*$BNSZ($a0)
+	$ADDU	$v0,$at
+
+
+	and	$ta0,$a2,$minus4
+	$ADDU	$ta3,$v0
+	sltu	$v0,$ta3,$v0
+	mflo	$at
+	mfhi	$ta2
+	$ADDU	$ta3,$at
+	$ADDU	$v0,$ta2
+	sltu	$at,$ta3,$at
+	$ST	$ta3,-$BNSZ($a0)
+	.set	noreorder
+	bgtz	$ta0,.L_bn_mul_add_words_loop
+	$ADDU	$v0,$at
+
+	beqz	$a2,.L_bn_mul_add_words_return
+	nop
+
+.L_bn_mul_add_words_tail:
+	.set	reorder
+	$LD	$t0,0($a1)
+	$MULTU	$t0,$a3
+	$LD	$t1,0($a0)
+	subu	$a2,1
+	$ADDU	$t1,$v0
+	sltu	$v0,$t1,$v0
+	mflo	$at
+	mfhi	$t0
+	$ADDU	$t1,$at
+	$ADDU	$v0,$t0
+	sltu	$at,$t1,$at
+	$ST	$t1,0($a0)
+	$ADDU	$v0,$at
+	beqz	$a2,.L_bn_mul_add_words_return
+
+	$LD	$t0,$BNSZ($a1)
+	$MULTU	$t0,$a3
+	$LD	$t1,$BNSZ($a0)
+	subu	$a2,1
+	$ADDU	$t1,$v0
+	sltu	$v0,$t1,$v0
+	mflo	$at
+	mfhi	$t0
+	$ADDU	$t1,$at
+	$ADDU	$v0,$t0
+	sltu	$at,$t1,$at
+	$ST	$t1,$BNSZ($a0)
+	$ADDU	$v0,$at
+	beqz	$a2,.L_bn_mul_add_words_return
+
+	$LD	$t0,2*$BNSZ($a1)
+	$MULTU	$t0,$a3
+	$LD	$t1,2*$BNSZ($a0)
+	$ADDU	$t1,$v0
+	sltu	$v0,$t1,$v0
+	mflo	$at
+	mfhi	$t0
+	$ADDU	$t1,$at
+	$ADDU	$v0,$t0
+	sltu	$at,$t1,$at
+	$ST	$t1,2*$BNSZ($a0)
+	$ADDU	$v0,$at
+
+.L_bn_mul_add_words_return:
+	.set	noreorder
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i);
+	$REG_L	$t3,4*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$t2,3*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$t1,2*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$t0,1*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$gp,0*$SZREG($sp)
+	$PTR_ADD $sp,6*$SZREG
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	jr	$ra
+	move	$a0,$v0
+.end	bn_mul_add_words_internal
+
+.align	5
+.globl	bn_mul_words
+.ent	bn_mul_words
+bn_mul_words:
+	.set	noreorder
+	bgtz	$a2,bn_mul_words_internal
+	move	$v0,$zero
+	jr	$ra
+	move	$a0,$v0
+.end	bn_mul_words
+
+.align	5
+.ent	bn_mul_words_internal
+bn_mul_words_internal:
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i);
+	.frame	$sp,6*$SZREG,$ra
+	.mask	0x8000f008,-$SZREG
+	.set	noreorder
+	$PTR_SUB $sp,6*$SZREG
+	$REG_S	$ra,5*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$t3,4*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$t2,3*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$t1,2*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$t0,1*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$gp,0*$SZREG($sp)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	.set	reorder
+	li	$minus4,-4
+	and	$ta0,$a2,$minus4
+	beqz	$ta0,.L_bn_mul_words_tail
+
+.L_bn_mul_words_loop:
+	$LD	$t0,0($a1)
+	$MULTU	$t0,$a3
+	$LD	$t2,$BNSZ($a1)
+	$LD	$ta0,2*$BNSZ($a1)
+	$LD	$ta2,3*$BNSZ($a1)
+	mflo	$at
+	mfhi	$t0
+	$ADDU	$v0,$at
+	sltu	$t1,$v0,$at
+	 $MULTU	$t2,$a3
+	$ST	$v0,0($a0)
+	$ADDU	$v0,$t1,$t0
+
+	subu	$a2,4
+	$PTR_ADD $a0,4*$BNSZ
+	$PTR_ADD $a1,4*$BNSZ
+	mflo	$at
+	mfhi	$t2
+	$ADDU	$v0,$at
+	sltu	$t3,$v0,$at
+	 $MULTU	$ta0,$a3
+	$ST	$v0,-3*$BNSZ($a0)
+	$ADDU	$v0,$t3,$t2
+
+	mflo	$at
+	mfhi	$ta0
+	$ADDU	$v0,$at
+	sltu	$ta1,$v0,$at
+	 $MULTU	$ta2,$a3
+	$ST	$v0,-2*$BNSZ($a0)
+	$ADDU	$v0,$ta1,$ta0
+
+	and	$ta0,$a2,$minus4
+	mflo	$at
+	mfhi	$ta2
+	$ADDU	$v0,$at
+	sltu	$ta3,$v0,$at
+	$ST	$v0,-$BNSZ($a0)
+	.set	noreorder
+	bgtz	$ta0,.L_bn_mul_words_loop
+	$ADDU	$v0,$ta3,$ta2
+
+	beqz	$a2,.L_bn_mul_words_return
+	nop
+
+.L_bn_mul_words_tail:
+	.set	reorder
+	$LD	$t0,0($a1)
+	$MULTU	$t0,$a3
+	subu	$a2,1
+	mflo	$at
+	mfhi	$t0
+	$ADDU	$v0,$at
+	sltu	$t1,$v0,$at
+	$ST	$v0,0($a0)
+	$ADDU	$v0,$t1,$t0
+	beqz	$a2,.L_bn_mul_words_return
+
+	$LD	$t0,$BNSZ($a1)
+	$MULTU	$t0,$a3
+	subu	$a2,1
+	mflo	$at
+	mfhi	$t0
+	$ADDU	$v0,$at
+	sltu	$t1,$v0,$at
+	$ST	$v0,$BNSZ($a0)
+	$ADDU	$v0,$t1,$t0
+	beqz	$a2,.L_bn_mul_words_return
+
+	$LD	$t0,2*$BNSZ($a1)
+	$MULTU	$t0,$a3
+	mflo	$at
+	mfhi	$t0
+	$ADDU	$v0,$at
+	sltu	$t1,$v0,$at
+	$ST	$v0,2*$BNSZ($a0)
+	$ADDU	$v0,$t1,$t0
+
+.L_bn_mul_words_return:
+	.set	noreorder
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i);
+	$REG_L	$t3,4*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$t2,3*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$t1,2*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$t0,1*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$gp,0*$SZREG($sp)
+	$PTR_ADD $sp,6*$SZREG
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	jr	$ra
+	move	$a0,$v0
+.end	bn_mul_words_internal
+
+.align	5
+.globl	bn_sqr_words
+.ent	bn_sqr_words
+bn_sqr_words:
+	.set	noreorder
+	bgtz	$a2,bn_sqr_words_internal
+	move	$v0,$zero
+	jr	$ra
+	move	$a0,$v0
+.end	bn_sqr_words
+
+.align	5
+.ent	bn_sqr_words_internal
+bn_sqr_words_internal:
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i);
+	.frame	$sp,6*$SZREG,$ra
+	.mask	0x8000f008,-$SZREG
+	.set	noreorder
+	$PTR_SUB $sp,6*$SZREG
+	$REG_S	$ra,5*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$t3,4*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$t2,3*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$t1,2*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$t0,1*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$gp,0*$SZREG($sp)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	.set	reorder
+	li	$minus4,-4
+	and	$ta0,$a2,$minus4
+	beqz	$ta0,.L_bn_sqr_words_tail
+
+.L_bn_sqr_words_loop:
+	$LD	$t0,0($a1)
+	$MULTU	$t0,$t0
+	$LD	$t2,$BNSZ($a1)
+	$LD	$ta0,2*$BNSZ($a1)
+	$LD	$ta2,3*$BNSZ($a1)
+	mflo	$t1
+	mfhi	$t0
+	$ST	$t1,0($a0)
+	$ST	$t0,$BNSZ($a0)
+
+	$MULTU	$t2,$t2
+	subu	$a2,4
+	$PTR_ADD $a0,8*$BNSZ
+	$PTR_ADD $a1,4*$BNSZ
+	mflo	$t3
+	mfhi	$t2
+	$ST	$t3,-6*$BNSZ($a0)
+	$ST	$t2,-5*$BNSZ($a0)
+
+	$MULTU	$ta0,$ta0
+	mflo	$ta1
+	mfhi	$ta0
+	$ST	$ta1,-4*$BNSZ($a0)
+	$ST	$ta0,-3*$BNSZ($a0)
+
+
+	$MULTU	$ta2,$ta2
+	and	$ta0,$a2,$minus4
+	mflo	$ta3
+	mfhi	$ta2
+	$ST	$ta3,-2*$BNSZ($a0)
+
+	.set	noreorder
+	bgtz	$ta0,.L_bn_sqr_words_loop
+	$ST	$ta2,-$BNSZ($a0)
+
+	beqz	$a2,.L_bn_sqr_words_return
+	nop
+
+.L_bn_sqr_words_tail:
+	.set	reorder
+	$LD	$t0,0($a1)
+	$MULTU	$t0,$t0
+	subu	$a2,1
+	mflo	$t1
+	mfhi	$t0
+	$ST	$t1,0($a0)
+	$ST	$t0,$BNSZ($a0)
+	beqz	$a2,.L_bn_sqr_words_return
+
+	$LD	$t0,$BNSZ($a1)
+	$MULTU	$t0,$t0
+	subu	$a2,1
+	mflo	$t1
+	mfhi	$t0
+	$ST	$t1,2*$BNSZ($a0)
+	$ST	$t0,3*$BNSZ($a0)
+	beqz	$a2,.L_bn_sqr_words_return
+
+	$LD	$t0,2*$BNSZ($a1)
+	$MULTU	$t0,$t0
+	mflo	$t1
+	mfhi	$t0
+	$ST	$t1,4*$BNSZ($a0)
+	$ST	$t0,5*$BNSZ($a0)
+
+.L_bn_sqr_words_return:
+	.set	noreorder
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i);
+	$REG_L	$t3,4*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$t2,3*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$t1,2*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$t0,1*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$gp,0*$SZREG($sp)
+	$PTR_ADD $sp,6*$SZREG
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	jr	$ra
+	move	$a0,$v0
+
+.end	bn_sqr_words_internal
+
+.align	5
+.globl	bn_add_words
+.ent	bn_add_words
+bn_add_words:
+	.set	noreorder
+	bgtz	$a3,bn_add_words_internal
+	move	$v0,$zero
+	jr	$ra
+	move	$a0,$v0
+.end	bn_add_words
+
+.align	5
+.ent	bn_add_words_internal
+bn_add_words_internal:
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i);
+	.frame	$sp,6*$SZREG,$ra
+	.mask	0x8000f008,-$SZREG
+	.set	noreorder
+	$PTR_SUB $sp,6*$SZREG
+	$REG_S	$ra,5*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$t3,4*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$t2,3*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$t1,2*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$t0,1*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$gp,0*$SZREG($sp)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	.set	reorder
+	li	$minus4,-4
+	and	$at,$a3,$minus4
+	beqz	$at,.L_bn_add_words_tail
+
+.L_bn_add_words_loop:
+	$LD	$t0,0($a1)
+	$LD	$ta0,0($a2)
+	subu	$a3,4
+	$LD	$t1,$BNSZ($a1)
+	and	$at,$a3,$minus4
+	$LD	$t2,2*$BNSZ($a1)
+	$PTR_ADD $a2,4*$BNSZ
+	$LD	$t3,3*$BNSZ($a1)
+	$PTR_ADD $a0,4*$BNSZ
+	$LD	$ta1,-3*$BNSZ($a2)
+	$PTR_ADD $a1,4*$BNSZ
+	$LD	$ta2,-2*$BNSZ($a2)
+	$LD	$ta3,-$BNSZ($a2)
+	$ADDU	$ta0,$t0
+	sltu	$t8,$ta0,$t0
+	$ADDU	$t0,$ta0,$v0
+	sltu	$v0,$t0,$ta0
+	$ST	$t0,-4*$BNSZ($a0)
+	$ADDU	$v0,$t8
+
+	$ADDU	$ta1,$t1
+	sltu	$t9,$ta1,$t1
+	$ADDU	$t1,$ta1,$v0
+	sltu	$v0,$t1,$ta1
+	$ST	$t1,-3*$BNSZ($a0)
+	$ADDU	$v0,$t9
+
+	$ADDU	$ta2,$t2
+	sltu	$t8,$ta2,$t2
+	$ADDU	$t2,$ta2,$v0
+	sltu	$v0,$t2,$ta2
+	$ST	$t2,-2*$BNSZ($a0)
+	$ADDU	$v0,$t8
+	
+	$ADDU	$ta3,$t3
+	sltu	$t9,$ta3,$t3
+	$ADDU	$t3,$ta3,$v0
+	sltu	$v0,$t3,$ta3
+	$ST	$t3,-$BNSZ($a0)
+	
+	.set	noreorder
+	bgtz	$at,.L_bn_add_words_loop
+	$ADDU	$v0,$t9
+
+	beqz	$a3,.L_bn_add_words_return
+	nop
+
+.L_bn_add_words_tail:
+	.set	reorder
+	$LD	$t0,0($a1)
+	$LD	$ta0,0($a2)
+	$ADDU	$ta0,$t0
+	subu	$a3,1
+	sltu	$t8,$ta0,$t0
+	$ADDU	$t0,$ta0,$v0
+	sltu	$v0,$t0,$ta0
+	$ST	$t0,0($a0)
+	$ADDU	$v0,$t8
+	beqz	$a3,.L_bn_add_words_return
+
+	$LD	$t1,$BNSZ($a1)
+	$LD	$ta1,$BNSZ($a2)
+	$ADDU	$ta1,$t1
+	subu	$a3,1
+	sltu	$t9,$ta1,$t1
+	$ADDU	$t1,$ta1,$v0
+	sltu	$v0,$t1,$ta1
+	$ST	$t1,$BNSZ($a0)
+	$ADDU	$v0,$t9
+	beqz	$a3,.L_bn_add_words_return
+
+	$LD	$t2,2*$BNSZ($a1)
+	$LD	$ta2,2*$BNSZ($a2)
+	$ADDU	$ta2,$t2
+	sltu	$t8,$ta2,$t2
+	$ADDU	$t2,$ta2,$v0
+	sltu	$v0,$t2,$ta2
+	$ST	$t2,2*$BNSZ($a0)
+	$ADDU	$v0,$t8
+
+.L_bn_add_words_return:
+	.set	noreorder
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i);
+	$REG_L	$t3,4*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$t2,3*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$t1,2*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$t0,1*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$gp,0*$SZREG($sp)
+	$PTR_ADD $sp,6*$SZREG
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	jr	$ra
+	move	$a0,$v0
+
+.end	bn_add_words_internal
+
+.align	5
+.globl	bn_sub_words
+.ent	bn_sub_words
+bn_sub_words:
+	.set	noreorder
+	bgtz	$a3,bn_sub_words_internal
+	move	$v0,$zero
+	jr	$ra
+	move	$a0,$zero
+.end	bn_sub_words
+
+.align	5
+.ent	bn_sub_words_internal
+bn_sub_words_internal:
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i);
+	.frame	$sp,6*$SZREG,$ra
+	.mask	0x8000f008,-$SZREG
+	.set	noreorder
+	$PTR_SUB $sp,6*$SZREG
+	$REG_S	$ra,5*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$t3,4*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$t2,3*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$t1,2*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$t0,1*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$gp,0*$SZREG($sp)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	.set	reorder
+	li	$minus4,-4
+	and	$at,$a3,$minus4
+	beqz	$at,.L_bn_sub_words_tail
+
+.L_bn_sub_words_loop:
+	$LD	$t0,0($a1)
+	$LD	$ta0,0($a2)
+	subu	$a3,4
+	$LD	$t1,$BNSZ($a1)
+	and	$at,$a3,$minus4
+	$LD	$t2,2*$BNSZ($a1)
+	$PTR_ADD $a2,4*$BNSZ
+	$LD	$t3,3*$BNSZ($a1)
+	$PTR_ADD $a0,4*$BNSZ
+	$LD	$ta1,-3*$BNSZ($a2)
+	$PTR_ADD $a1,4*$BNSZ
+	$LD	$ta2,-2*$BNSZ($a2)
+	$LD	$ta3,-$BNSZ($a2)
+	sltu	$t8,$t0,$ta0
+	$SUBU	$ta0,$t0,$ta0
+	$SUBU	$t0,$ta0,$v0
+	sgtu	$v0,$t0,$ta0
+	$ST	$t0,-4*$BNSZ($a0)
+	$ADDU	$v0,$t8
+
+	sltu	$t9,$t1,$ta1
+	$SUBU	$ta1,$t1,$ta1
+	$SUBU	$t1,$ta1,$v0
+	sgtu	$v0,$t1,$ta1
+	$ST	$t1,-3*$BNSZ($a0)
+	$ADDU	$v0,$t9
+
+
+	sltu	$t8,$t2,$ta2
+	$SUBU	$ta2,$t2,$ta2
+	$SUBU	$t2,$ta2,$v0
+	sgtu	$v0,$t2,$ta2
+	$ST	$t2,-2*$BNSZ($a0)
+	$ADDU	$v0,$t8
+
+	sltu	$t9,$t3,$ta3
+	$SUBU	$ta3,$t3,$ta3
+	$SUBU	$t3,$ta3,$v0
+	sgtu	$v0,$t3,$ta3
+	$ST	$t3,-$BNSZ($a0)
+
+	.set	noreorder
+	bgtz	$at,.L_bn_sub_words_loop
+	$ADDU	$v0,$t9
+
+	beqz	$a3,.L_bn_sub_words_return
+	nop
+
+.L_bn_sub_words_tail:
+	.set	reorder
+	$LD	$t0,0($a1)
+	$LD	$ta0,0($a2)
+	subu	$a3,1
+	sltu	$t8,$t0,$ta0
+	$SUBU	$ta0,$t0,$ta0
+	$SUBU	$t0,$ta0,$v0
+	sgtu	$v0,$t0,$ta0
+	$ST	$t0,0($a0)
+	$ADDU	$v0,$t8
+	beqz	$a3,.L_bn_sub_words_return
+
+	$LD	$t1,$BNSZ($a1)
+	subu	$a3,1
+	$LD	$ta1,$BNSZ($a2)
+	sltu	$t9,$t1,$ta1
+	$SUBU	$ta1,$t1,$ta1
+	$SUBU	$t1,$ta1,$v0
+	sgtu	$v0,$t1,$ta1
+	$ST	$t1,$BNSZ($a0)
+	$ADDU	$v0,$t9
+	beqz	$a3,.L_bn_sub_words_return
+
+	$LD	$t2,2*$BNSZ($a1)
+	$LD	$ta2,2*$BNSZ($a2)
+	sltu	$t8,$t2,$ta2
+	$SUBU	$ta2,$t2,$ta2
+	$SUBU	$t2,$ta2,$v0
+	sgtu	$v0,$t2,$ta2
+	$ST	$t2,2*$BNSZ($a0)
+	$ADDU	$v0,$t8
+
+.L_bn_sub_words_return:
+	.set	noreorder
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i);
+	$REG_L	$t3,4*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$t2,3*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$t1,2*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$t0,1*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$gp,0*$SZREG($sp)
+	$PTR_ADD $sp,6*$SZREG
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	jr	$ra
+	move	$a0,$v0
+.end	bn_sub_words_internal
+
+.align 5
+.globl	bn_div_3_words
+.ent	bn_div_3_words
+bn_div_3_words:
+	.set	noreorder
+	move	$a3,$a0		# we know that bn_div_words does not
+				# touch $a3, $ta2, $ta3 and preserves $a2
+				# so that we can save two arguments
+				# and return address in registers
+				# instead of stack:-)
+				
+	$LD	$a0,($a3)
+	move	$ta2,$a1
+	bne	$a0,$a2,bn_div_3_words_internal
+	$LD	$a1,-$BNSZ($a3)
+	li	$v0,-1
+	jr	$ra
+	move	$a0,$v0
+.end	bn_div_3_words
+
+.align	5
+.ent	bn_div_3_words_internal
+bn_div_3_words_internal:
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i);
+	.frame	$sp,6*$SZREG,$ra
+	.mask	0x8000f008,-$SZREG
+	.set	noreorder
+	$PTR_SUB $sp,6*$SZREG
+	$REG_S	$ra,5*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$t3,4*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$t2,3*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$t1,2*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$t0,1*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$gp,0*$SZREG($sp)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	.set	reorder
+	move	$ta3,$ra
+	bal	bn_div_words_internal
+	move	$ra,$ta3
+	$MULTU	$ta2,$v0
+	$LD	$t2,-2*$BNSZ($a3)
+	move	$ta0,$zero
+	mfhi	$t1
+	mflo	$t0
+	sltu	$t8,$t1,$a1
+.L_bn_div_3_words_inner_loop:
+	bnez	$t8,.L_bn_div_3_words_inner_loop_done
+	sgeu	$at,$t2,$t0
+	seq	$t9,$t1,$a1
+	and	$at,$t9
+	sltu	$t3,$t0,$ta2
+	$ADDU	$a1,$a2
+	$SUBU	$t1,$t3
+	$SUBU	$t0,$ta2
+	sltu	$t8,$t1,$a1
+	sltu	$ta0,$a1,$a2
+	or	$t8,$ta0
+	.set	noreorder
+	beqz	$at,.L_bn_div_3_words_inner_loop
+	$SUBU	$v0,1
+	$ADDU	$v0,1
+	.set	reorder
+.L_bn_div_3_words_inner_loop_done:
+	.set	noreorder
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i);
+	$REG_L	$t3,4*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$t2,3*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$t1,2*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$t0,1*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$gp,0*$SZREG($sp)
+	$PTR_ADD $sp,6*$SZREG
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	jr	$ra
+	move	$a0,$v0
+.end	bn_div_3_words_internal
+
+.align	5
+.globl	bn_div_words
+.ent	bn_div_words
+bn_div_words:
+	.set	noreorder
+	bnez	$a2,bn_div_words_internal
+	li	$v0,-1		# I would rather signal div-by-zero
+				# which can be done with 'break 7'
+	jr	$ra
+	move	$a0,$v0
+.end	bn_div_words
+
+.align	5
+.ent	bn_div_words_internal
+bn_div_words_internal:
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i);
+	.frame	$sp,6*$SZREG,$ra
+	.mask	0x8000f008,-$SZREG
+	.set	noreorder
+	$PTR_SUB $sp,6*$SZREG
+	$REG_S	$ra,5*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$t3,4*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$t2,3*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$t1,2*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$t0,1*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$gp,0*$SZREG($sp)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	move	$v1,$zero
+	bltz	$a2,.L_bn_div_words_body
+	move	$t9,$v1
+	$SLL	$a2,1
+	bgtz	$a2,.-4
+	addu	$t9,1
+
+	.set	reorder
+	negu	$t1,$t9
+	li	$t2,-1
+	$SLL	$t2,$t1
+	and	$t2,$a0
+	$SRL	$at,$a1,$t1
+	.set	noreorder
+	beqz	$t2,.+12
+	nop
+	break	6		# signal overflow
+	.set	reorder
+	$SLL	$a0,$t9
+	$SLL	$a1,$t9
+	or	$a0,$at
+___
+$QT=$ta0;
+$HH=$ta1;
+$DH=$v1;
+$code.=<<___;
+.L_bn_div_words_body:
+	$SRL	$DH,$a2,4*$BNSZ	# bits
+	sgeu	$at,$a0,$a2
+	.set	noreorder
+	beqz	$at,.+12
+	nop
+	$SUBU	$a0,$a2
+	.set	reorder
+
+	li	$QT,-1
+	$SRL	$HH,$a0,4*$BNSZ	# bits
+	$SRL	$QT,4*$BNSZ	# q=0xffffffff
+	beq	$DH,$HH,.L_bn_div_words_skip_div1
+	$DIVU	$zero,$a0,$DH
+	mflo	$QT
+.L_bn_div_words_skip_div1:
+	$MULTU	$a2,$QT
+	$SLL	$t3,$a0,4*$BNSZ	# bits
+	$SRL	$at,$a1,4*$BNSZ	# bits
+	or	$t3,$at
+	mflo	$t0
+	mfhi	$t1
+.L_bn_div_words_inner_loop1:
+	sltu	$t2,$t3,$t0
+	seq	$t8,$HH,$t1
+	sltu	$at,$HH,$t1
+	and	$t2,$t8
+	sltu	$v0,$t0,$a2
+	or	$at,$t2
+	.set	noreorder
+	beqz	$at,.L_bn_div_words_inner_loop1_done
+	$SUBU	$t1,$v0
+	$SUBU	$t0,$a2
+	b	.L_bn_div_words_inner_loop1
+	$SUBU	$QT,1
+	.set	reorder
+.L_bn_div_words_inner_loop1_done:
+
+	$SLL	$a1,4*$BNSZ	# bits
+	$SUBU	$a0,$t3,$t0
+	$SLL	$v0,$QT,4*$BNSZ	# bits
+
+	li	$QT,-1
+	$SRL	$HH,$a0,4*$BNSZ	# bits
+	$SRL	$QT,4*$BNSZ	# q=0xffffffff
+	beq	$DH,$HH,.L_bn_div_words_skip_div2
+	$DIVU	$zero,$a0,$DH
+	mflo	$QT
+.L_bn_div_words_skip_div2:
+	$MULTU	$a2,$QT
+	$SLL	$t3,$a0,4*$BNSZ	# bits
+	$SRL	$at,$a1,4*$BNSZ	# bits
+	or	$t3,$at
+	mflo	$t0
+	mfhi	$t1
+.L_bn_div_words_inner_loop2:
+	sltu	$t2,$t3,$t0
+	seq	$t8,$HH,$t1
+	sltu	$at,$HH,$t1
+	and	$t2,$t8
+	sltu	$v1,$t0,$a2
+	or	$at,$t2
+	.set	noreorder
+	beqz	$at,.L_bn_div_words_inner_loop2_done
+	$SUBU	$t1,$v1
+	$SUBU	$t0,$a2
+	b	.L_bn_div_words_inner_loop2
+	$SUBU	$QT,1
+	.set	reorder
+.L_bn_div_words_inner_loop2_done:
+
+	$SUBU	$a0,$t3,$t0
+	or	$v0,$QT
+	$SRL	$v1,$a0,$t9	# $v1 contains remainder if anybody wants it
+	$SRL	$a2,$t9		# restore $a2
+
+	.set	noreorder
+	move	$a1,$v1
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i);
+	$REG_L	$t3,4*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$t2,3*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$t1,2*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$t0,1*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$gp,0*$SZREG($sp)
+	$PTR_ADD $sp,6*$SZREG
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	jr	$ra
+	move	$a0,$v0
+.end	bn_div_words_internal
+___
+undef $HH; undef $QT; undef $DH;
+
+($a_0,$a_1,$a_2,$a_3)=($t0,$t1,$t2,$t3);
+($b_0,$b_1,$b_2,$b_3)=($ta0,$ta1,$ta2,$ta3);
+
+($a_4,$a_5,$a_6,$a_7)=($s0,$s2,$s4,$a1); # once we load a[7], no use for $a1
+($b_4,$b_5,$b_6,$b_7)=($s1,$s3,$s5,$a2); # once we load b[7], no use for $a2
+
+($t_1,$t_2,$c_1,$c_2,$c_3)=($t8,$t9,$v0,$v1,$a3);
+
+$code.=<<___;
+
+.align	5
+.globl	bn_mul_comba8
+.ent	bn_mul_comba8
+bn_mul_comba8:
+	.set	noreorder
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i);
+	.frame	$sp,12*$SZREG,$ra
+	.mask	0x803ff008,-$SZREG
+	$PTR_SUB $sp,12*$SZREG
+	$REG_S	$ra,11*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$s5,10*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$s4,9*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$s3,8*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$s2,7*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$s1,6*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$s0,5*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$t3,4*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$t2,3*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$t1,2*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$t0,1*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$gp,0*$SZREG($sp)
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($flavour !~ /nubi/i);
+	.frame	$sp,6*$SZREG,$ra
+	.mask	0x003f0000,-$SZREG
+	$PTR_SUB $sp,6*$SZREG
+	$REG_S	$s5,5*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$s4,4*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$s3,3*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$s2,2*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$s1,1*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$s0,0*$SZREG($sp)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+
+	.set	reorder
+	$LD	$a_0,0($a1)	# If compiled with -mips3 option on
+				# R5000 box assembler barks on this
+				# 1ine with "should not have mult/div
+				# as last instruction in bb (R10K
+				# bug)" warning. If anybody out there
+				# has a clue about how to circumvent
+				# this do send me a note.
+				#		<appro\@fy.chalmers.se>
+
+	$LD	$b_0,0($a2)
+	$LD	$a_1,$BNSZ($a1)
+	$LD	$a_2,2*$BNSZ($a1)
+	$MULTU	$a_0,$b_0		# mul_add_c(a[0],b[0],c1,c2,c3);
+	$LD	$a_3,3*$BNSZ($a1)
+	$LD	$b_1,$BNSZ($a2)
+	$LD	$b_2,2*$BNSZ($a2)
+	$LD	$b_3,3*$BNSZ($a2)
+	mflo	$c_1
+	mfhi	$c_2
+
+	$LD	$a_4,4*$BNSZ($a1)
+	$LD	$a_5,5*$BNSZ($a1)
+	$MULTU	$a_0,$b_1		# mul_add_c(a[0],b[1],c2,c3,c1);
+	$LD	$a_6,6*$BNSZ($a1)
+	$LD	$a_7,7*$BNSZ($a1)
+	$LD	$b_4,4*$BNSZ($a2)
+	$LD	$b_5,5*$BNSZ($a2)
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_1
+	$MULTU	$a_1,$b_0		# mul_add_c(a[1],b[0],c2,c3,c1);
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_2,$at
+	$LD	$b_6,6*$BNSZ($a2)
+	$LD	$b_7,7*$BNSZ($a2)
+	$ST	$c_1,0($a0)	# r[0]=c1;
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_1
+	 $MULTU	$a_2,$b_0		# mul_add_c(a[2],b[0],c3,c1,c2);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_2
+	sltu	$c_1,$c_3,$t_2
+	$ST	$c_2,$BNSZ($a0)	# r[1]=c2;
+
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_1
+	$MULTU	$a_1,$b_1		# mul_add_c(a[1],b[1],c3,c1,c2);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_2
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_1
+	$MULTU	$a_0,$b_2		# mul_add_c(a[0],b[2],c3,c1,c2);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_2
+	sltu	$c_2,$c_1,$t_2
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_1
+	 $MULTU	$a_0,$b_3		# mul_add_c(a[0],b[3],c1,c2,c3);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_2
+	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$at
+	$ST	$c_3,2*$BNSZ($a0)	# r[2]=c3;
+
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_1
+	$MULTU	$a_1,$b_2		# mul_add_c(a[1],b[2],c1,c2,c3);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_2
+	sltu	$c_3,$c_2,$t_2
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_1
+	$MULTU	$a_2,$b_1		# mul_add_c(a[2],b[1],c1,c2,c3);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_2
+	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$at
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_1
+	$MULTU	$a_3,$b_0		# mul_add_c(a[3],b[0],c1,c2,c3);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_2
+	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$at
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_1
+	 $MULTU	$a_4,$b_0		# mul_add_c(a[4],b[0],c2,c3,c1);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_2
+	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$at
+	$ST	$c_1,3*$BNSZ($a0)	# r[3]=c1;
+
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_1
+	$MULTU	$a_3,$b_1		# mul_add_c(a[3],b[1],c2,c3,c1);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_2
+	sltu	$c_1,$c_3,$t_2
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_1
+	$MULTU	$a_2,$b_2		# mul_add_c(a[2],b[2],c2,c3,c1);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_2
+	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_1,$at
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_1
+	$MULTU	$a_1,$b_3		# mul_add_c(a[1],b[3],c2,c3,c1);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_2
+	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_1,$at
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_1
+	$MULTU	$a_0,$b_4		# mul_add_c(a[0],b[4],c2,c3,c1);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_2
+	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_1,$at
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_1
+	 $MULTU	$a_0,$b_5		# mul_add_c(a[0],b[5],c3,c1,c2);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_2
+	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_1,$at
+	$ST	$c_2,4*$BNSZ($a0)	# r[4]=c2;
+
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_1
+	$MULTU	$a_1,$b_4		# mul_add_c(a[1],b[4],c3,c1,c2);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_2
+	sltu	$c_2,$c_1,$t_2
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_1
+	$MULTU	$a_2,$b_3		# mul_add_c(a[2],b[3],c3,c1,c2);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_2
+	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$at
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_1
+	$MULTU	$a_3,$b_2		# mul_add_c(a[3],b[2],c3,c1,c2);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_2
+	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$at
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_1
+	$MULTU	$a_4,$b_1		# mul_add_c(a[4],b[1],c3,c1,c2);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_2
+	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$at
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_1
+	$MULTU	$a_5,$b_0		# mul_add_c(a[5],b[0],c3,c1,c2);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_2
+	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$at
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_1
+	 $MULTU	$a_6,$b_0		# mul_add_c(a[6],b[0],c1,c2,c3);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_2
+	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$at
+	$ST	$c_3,5*$BNSZ($a0)	# r[5]=c3;
+
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_1
+	$MULTU	$a_5,$b_1		# mul_add_c(a[5],b[1],c1,c2,c3);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_2
+	sltu	$c_3,$c_2,$t_2
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_1
+	$MULTU	$a_4,$b_2		# mul_add_c(a[4],b[2],c1,c2,c3);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_2
+	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$at
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_1
+	$MULTU	$a_3,$b_3		# mul_add_c(a[3],b[3],c1,c2,c3);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_2
+	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$at
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_1
+	$MULTU	$a_2,$b_4		# mul_add_c(a[2],b[4],c1,c2,c3);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_2
+	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$at
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_1
+	$MULTU	$a_1,$b_5		# mul_add_c(a[1],b[5],c1,c2,c3);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_2
+	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$at
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_1
+	$MULTU	$a_0,$b_6		# mul_add_c(a[0],b[6],c1,c2,c3);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_2
+	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$at
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_1
+	 $MULTU	$a_0,$b_7		# mul_add_c(a[0],b[7],c2,c3,c1);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_2
+	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$at
+	$ST	$c_1,6*$BNSZ($a0)	# r[6]=c1;
+
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_1
+	$MULTU	$a_1,$b_6		# mul_add_c(a[1],b[6],c2,c3,c1);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_2
+	sltu	$c_1,$c_3,$t_2
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_1
+	$MULTU	$a_2,$b_5		# mul_add_c(a[2],b[5],c2,c3,c1);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_2
+	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_1,$at
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_1
+	$MULTU	$a_3,$b_4		# mul_add_c(a[3],b[4],c2,c3,c1);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_2
+	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_1,$at
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_1
+	$MULTU	$a_4,$b_3		# mul_add_c(a[4],b[3],c2,c3,c1);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_2
+	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_1,$at
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_1
+	$MULTU	$a_5,$b_2		# mul_add_c(a[5],b[2],c2,c3,c1);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_2
+	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_1,$at
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_1
+	$MULTU	$a_6,$b_1		# mul_add_c(a[6],b[1],c2,c3,c1);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_2
+	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_1,$at
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_1
+	$MULTU	$a_7,$b_0		# mul_add_c(a[7],b[0],c2,c3,c1);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_2
+	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_1,$at
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_1
+	 $MULTU	$a_7,$b_1		# mul_add_c(a[7],b[1],c3,c1,c2);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_2
+	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_1,$at
+	$ST	$c_2,7*$BNSZ($a0)	# r[7]=c2;
+
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_1
+	$MULTU	$a_6,$b_2		# mul_add_c(a[6],b[2],c3,c1,c2);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_2
+	sltu	$c_2,$c_1,$t_2
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_1
+	$MULTU	$a_5,$b_3		# mul_add_c(a[5],b[3],c3,c1,c2);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_2
+	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$at
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_1
+	$MULTU	$a_4,$b_4		# mul_add_c(a[4],b[4],c3,c1,c2);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_2
+	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$at
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_1
+	$MULTU	$a_3,$b_5		# mul_add_c(a[3],b[5],c3,c1,c2);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_2
+	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$at
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_1
+	$MULTU	$a_2,$b_6		# mul_add_c(a[2],b[6],c3,c1,c2);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_2
+	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$at
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_1
+	$MULTU	$a_1,$b_7		# mul_add_c(a[1],b[7],c3,c1,c2);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_2
+	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$at
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_1
+	 $MULTU	$a_2,$b_7		# mul_add_c(a[2],b[7],c1,c2,c3);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_2
+	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$at
+	$ST	$c_3,8*$BNSZ($a0)	# r[8]=c3;
+
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_1
+	$MULTU	$a_3,$b_6		# mul_add_c(a[3],b[6],c1,c2,c3);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_2
+	sltu	$c_3,$c_2,$t_2
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_1
+	$MULTU	$a_4,$b_5		# mul_add_c(a[4],b[5],c1,c2,c3);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_2
+	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$at
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_1
+	$MULTU	$a_5,$b_4		# mul_add_c(a[5],b[4],c1,c2,c3);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_2
+	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$at
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_1
+	$MULTU	$a_6,$b_3		# mul_add_c(a[6],b[3],c1,c2,c3);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_2
+	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$at
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_1
+	$MULTU	$a_7,$b_2		# mul_add_c(a[7],b[2],c1,c2,c3);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_2
+	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$at
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_1
+	 $MULTU	$a_7,$b_3		# mul_add_c(a[7],b[3],c2,c3,c1);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_2
+	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$at
+	$ST	$c_1,9*$BNSZ($a0)	# r[9]=c1;
+
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_1
+	$MULTU	$a_6,$b_4		# mul_add_c(a[6],b[4],c2,c3,c1);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_2
+	sltu	$c_1,$c_3,$t_2
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_1
+	$MULTU	$a_5,$b_5		# mul_add_c(a[5],b[5],c2,c3,c1);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_2
+	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_1,$at
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_1
+	$MULTU	$a_4,$b_6		# mul_add_c(a[4],b[6],c2,c3,c1);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_2
+	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_1,$at
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_1
+	$MULTU	$a_3,$b_7		# mul_add_c(a[3],b[7],c2,c3,c1);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_2
+	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_1,$at
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_1
+	$MULTU	$a_4,$b_7		# mul_add_c(a[4],b[7],c3,c1,c2);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_2
+	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_1,$at
+	$ST	$c_2,10*$BNSZ($a0)	# r[10]=c2;
+
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_1
+	$MULTU	$a_5,$b_6		# mul_add_c(a[5],b[6],c3,c1,c2);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_2
+	sltu	$c_2,$c_1,$t_2
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_1
+	$MULTU	$a_6,$b_5		# mul_add_c(a[6],b[5],c3,c1,c2);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_2
+	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$at
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_1
+	$MULTU	$a_7,$b_4		# mul_add_c(a[7],b[4],c3,c1,c2);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_2
+	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$at
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_1
+	 $MULTU	$a_7,$b_5		# mul_add_c(a[7],b[5],c1,c2,c3);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_2
+	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$at
+	$ST	$c_3,11*$BNSZ($a0)	# r[11]=c3;
+
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_1
+	$MULTU	$a_6,$b_6		# mul_add_c(a[6],b[6],c1,c2,c3);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_2
+	sltu	$c_3,$c_2,$t_2
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_1
+	$MULTU	$a_5,$b_7		# mul_add_c(a[5],b[7],c1,c2,c3);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_2
+	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$at
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_1
+	 $MULTU	$a_6,$b_7		# mul_add_c(a[6],b[7],c2,c3,c1);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_2
+	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$at
+	$ST	$c_1,12*$BNSZ($a0)	# r[12]=c1;
+
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_1
+	$MULTU	$a_7,$b_6		# mul_add_c(a[7],b[6],c2,c3,c1);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_2
+	sltu	$c_1,$c_3,$t_2
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_1
+	$MULTU	$a_7,$b_7		# mul_add_c(a[7],b[7],c3,c1,c2);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_2
+	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_1,$at
+	$ST	$c_2,13*$BNSZ($a0)	# r[13]=c2;
+
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_1
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_2
+	$ST	$c_3,14*$BNSZ($a0)	# r[14]=c3;
+	$ST	$c_1,15*$BNSZ($a0)	# r[15]=c1;
+
+	.set	noreorder
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i);
+	$REG_L	$s5,10*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$s4,9*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$s3,8*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$s2,7*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$s1,6*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$s0,5*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$t3,4*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$t2,3*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$t1,2*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$t0,1*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$gp,0*$SZREG($sp)
+	jr	$ra
+	$PTR_ADD $sp,12*$SZREG
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($flavour !~ /nubi/i);
+	$REG_L	$s5,5*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$s4,4*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$s3,3*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$s2,2*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$s1,1*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$s0,0*$SZREG($sp)
+	jr	$ra
+	$PTR_ADD $sp,6*$SZREG
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+.end	bn_mul_comba8
+
+.align	5
+.globl	bn_mul_comba4
+.ent	bn_mul_comba4
+bn_mul_comba4:
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i);
+	.frame	$sp,6*$SZREG,$ra
+	.mask	0x8000f008,-$SZREG
+	.set	noreorder
+	$PTR_SUB $sp,6*$SZREG
+	$REG_S	$ra,5*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$t3,4*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$t2,3*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$t1,2*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$t0,1*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$gp,0*$SZREG($sp)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	.set	reorder
+	$LD	$a_0,0($a1)
+	$LD	$b_0,0($a2)
+	$LD	$a_1,$BNSZ($a1)
+	$LD	$a_2,2*$BNSZ($a1)
+	$MULTU	$a_0,$b_0		# mul_add_c(a[0],b[0],c1,c2,c3);
+	$LD	$a_3,3*$BNSZ($a1)
+	$LD	$b_1,$BNSZ($a2)
+	$LD	$b_2,2*$BNSZ($a2)
+	$LD	$b_3,3*$BNSZ($a2)
+	mflo	$c_1
+	mfhi	$c_2
+	$ST	$c_1,0($a0)
+
+	$MULTU	$a_0,$b_1		# mul_add_c(a[0],b[1],c2,c3,c1);
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_1
+	$MULTU	$a_1,$b_0		# mul_add_c(a[1],b[0],c2,c3,c1);
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_2,$at
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_1
+	 $MULTU	$a_2,$b_0		# mul_add_c(a[2],b[0],c3,c1,c2);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_2
+	sltu	$c_1,$c_3,$t_2
+	$ST	$c_2,$BNSZ($a0)
+
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_1
+	$MULTU	$a_1,$b_1		# mul_add_c(a[1],b[1],c3,c1,c2);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_2
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_1
+	$MULTU	$a_0,$b_2		# mul_add_c(a[0],b[2],c3,c1,c2);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_2
+	sltu	$c_2,$c_1,$t_2
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_1
+	 $MULTU	$a_0,$b_3		# mul_add_c(a[0],b[3],c1,c2,c3);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_2
+	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$at
+	$ST	$c_3,2*$BNSZ($a0)
+
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_1
+	$MULTU	$a_1,$b_2		# mul_add_c(a[1],b[2],c1,c2,c3);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_2
+	sltu	$c_3,$c_2,$t_2
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_1
+	$MULTU	$a_2,$b_1		# mul_add_c(a[2],b[1],c1,c2,c3);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_2
+	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$at
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_1
+	$MULTU	$a_3,$b_0		# mul_add_c(a[3],b[0],c1,c2,c3);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_2
+	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$at
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_1
+	 $MULTU	$a_3,$b_1		# mul_add_c(a[3],b[1],c2,c3,c1);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_2
+	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$at
+	$ST	$c_1,3*$BNSZ($a0)
+
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_1
+	$MULTU	$a_2,$b_2		# mul_add_c(a[2],b[2],c2,c3,c1);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_2
+	sltu	$c_1,$c_3,$t_2
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_1
+	$MULTU	$a_1,$b_3		# mul_add_c(a[1],b[3],c2,c3,c1);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_2
+	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_1,$at
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_1
+	 $MULTU	$a_2,$b_3		# mul_add_c(a[2],b[3],c3,c1,c2);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_2
+	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_1,$at
+	$ST	$c_2,4*$BNSZ($a0)
+
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_1
+	$MULTU	$a_3,$b_2		# mul_add_c(a[3],b[2],c3,c1,c2);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_2
+	sltu	$c_2,$c_1,$t_2
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_1
+	 $MULTU	$a_3,$b_3		# mul_add_c(a[3],b[3],c1,c2,c3);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_2
+	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$at
+	$ST	$c_3,5*$BNSZ($a0)
+
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_1
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_2
+	$ST	$c_1,6*$BNSZ($a0)
+	$ST	$c_2,7*$BNSZ($a0)
+
+	.set	noreorder
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i);
+	$REG_L	$t3,4*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$t2,3*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$t1,2*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$t0,1*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$gp,0*$SZREG($sp)
+	$PTR_ADD $sp,6*$SZREG
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	jr	$ra
+	nop
+.end	bn_mul_comba4
+___
+
+($a_4,$a_5,$a_6,$a_7)=($b_0,$b_1,$b_2,$b_3);
+
+sub add_c2 () {
+my ($hi,$lo,$c0,$c1,$c2,
+    $warm,      # !$warm denotes first call with specific sequence of
+                # $c_[XYZ] when there is no Z-carry to accumulate yet;
+    $an,$bn     # these two are arguments for multiplication which
+                # result is used in *next* step [which is why it's
+                # commented as "forward multiplication" below];
+    )=@_;
+$code.=<<___;
+	mflo	$lo
+	mfhi	$hi
+	$ADDU	$c0,$lo
+	sltu	$at,$c0,$lo
+	 $MULTU	$an,$bn			# forward multiplication
+	$ADDU	$c0,$lo
+	$ADDU	$at,$hi
+	sltu	$lo,$c0,$lo
+	$ADDU	$c1,$at
+	$ADDU	$hi,$lo
+___
+$code.=<<___	if (!$warm);
+	sltu	$c2,$c1,$at
+	$ADDU	$c1,$hi
+	sltu	$hi,$c1,$hi
+	$ADDU	$c2,$hi
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($warm);
+	sltu	$at,$c1,$at
+	$ADDU	$c1,$hi
+	$ADDU	$c2,$at
+	sltu	$hi,$c1,$hi
+	$ADDU	$c2,$hi
+___
+}
+
+$code.=<<___;
+
+.align	5
+.globl	bn_sqr_comba8
+.ent	bn_sqr_comba8
+bn_sqr_comba8:
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i);
+	.frame	$sp,6*$SZREG,$ra
+	.mask	0x8000f008,-$SZREG
+	.set	noreorder
+	$PTR_SUB $sp,6*$SZREG
+	$REG_S	$ra,5*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$t3,4*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$t2,3*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$t1,2*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$t0,1*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$gp,0*$SZREG($sp)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	.set	reorder
+	$LD	$a_0,0($a1)
+	$LD	$a_1,$BNSZ($a1)
+	$LD	$a_2,2*$BNSZ($a1)
+	$LD	$a_3,3*$BNSZ($a1)
+
+	$MULTU	$a_0,$a_0		# mul_add_c(a[0],b[0],c1,c2,c3);
+	$LD	$a_4,4*$BNSZ($a1)
+	$LD	$a_5,5*$BNSZ($a1)
+	$LD	$a_6,6*$BNSZ($a1)
+	$LD	$a_7,7*$BNSZ($a1)
+	mflo	$c_1
+	mfhi	$c_2
+	$ST	$c_1,0($a0)
+
+	$MULTU	$a_0,$a_1		# mul_add_c2(a[0],b[1],c2,c3,c1);
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	slt	$c_1,$t_2,$zero
+	$SLL	$t_2,1
+	 $MULTU	$a_2,$a_0		# mul_add_c2(a[2],b[0],c3,c1,c2);
+	slt	$a2,$t_1,$zero
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$a2
+	$SLL	$t_1,1
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_1
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_2,$at
+	$ST	$c_2,$BNSZ($a0)
+___
+	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_3,$c_1,$c_2,0,
+		$a_1,$a_1);		# mul_add_c(a[1],b[1],c3,c1,c2);
+$code.=<<___;
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_1
+	 $MULTU	$a_0,$a_3		# mul_add_c2(a[0],b[3],c1,c2,c3);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_2
+	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$at
+	$ST	$c_3,2*$BNSZ($a0)
+___
+	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_1,$c_2,$c_3,0,
+		$a_1,$a_2);		# mul_add_c2(a[1],b[2],c1,c2,c3);
+	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_1,$c_2,$c_3,1,
+		$a_4,$a_0);		# mul_add_c2(a[4],b[0],c2,c3,c1);
+$code.=<<___;
+	$ST	$c_1,3*$BNSZ($a0)
+___
+	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_2,$c_3,$c_1,0,
+		$a_3,$a_1);		# mul_add_c2(a[3],b[1],c2,c3,c1);
+	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_2,$c_3,$c_1,1,
+		$a_2,$a_2);		# mul_add_c(a[2],b[2],c2,c3,c1);
+$code.=<<___;
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_1
+	 $MULTU	$a_0,$a_5		# mul_add_c2(a[0],b[5],c3,c1,c2);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_2
+	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_1,$at
+	$ST	$c_2,4*$BNSZ($a0)
+___
+	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_3,$c_1,$c_2,0,
+		$a_1,$a_4);		# mul_add_c2(a[1],b[4],c3,c1,c2);
+	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_3,$c_1,$c_2,1,
+		$a_2,$a_3);		# mul_add_c2(a[2],b[3],c3,c1,c2);
+	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_3,$c_1,$c_2,1,
+		$a_6,$a_0);		# mul_add_c2(a[6],b[0],c1,c2,c3);
+$code.=<<___;
+	$ST	$c_3,5*$BNSZ($a0)
+___
+	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_1,$c_2,$c_3,0,
+		$a_5,$a_1);		# mul_add_c2(a[5],b[1],c1,c2,c3);
+	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_1,$c_2,$c_3,1,
+		$a_4,$a_2);		# mul_add_c2(a[4],b[2],c1,c2,c3);
+	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_1,$c_2,$c_3,1,
+		$a_3,$a_3);		# mul_add_c(a[3],b[3],c1,c2,c3);
+$code.=<<___;
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_1
+	 $MULTU	$a_0,$a_7		# mul_add_c2(a[0],b[7],c2,c3,c1);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_2
+	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$at
+	$ST	$c_1,6*$BNSZ($a0)
+___
+	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_2,$c_3,$c_1,0,
+		$a_1,$a_6);		# mul_add_c2(a[1],b[6],c2,c3,c1);
+	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_2,$c_3,$c_1,1,
+		$a_2,$a_5);		# mul_add_c2(a[2],b[5],c2,c3,c1);
+	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_2,$c_3,$c_1,1,
+		$a_3,$a_4);		# mul_add_c2(a[3],b[4],c2,c3,c1);
+	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_2,$c_3,$c_1,1,
+		$a_7,$a_1);		# mul_add_c2(a[7],b[1],c3,c1,c2);
+$code.=<<___;
+	$ST	$c_2,7*$BNSZ($a0)
+___
+	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_3,$c_1,$c_2,0,
+		$a_6,$a_2);		# mul_add_c2(a[6],b[2],c3,c1,c2);
+	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_3,$c_1,$c_2,1,
+		$a_5,$a_3);		# mul_add_c2(a[5],b[3],c3,c1,c2);
+	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_3,$c_1,$c_2,1,
+		$a_4,$a_4);		# mul_add_c(a[4],b[4],c3,c1,c2);
+$code.=<<___;
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_1
+	 $MULTU	$a_2,$a_7		# mul_add_c2(a[2],b[7],c1,c2,c3);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_2
+	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$at
+	$ST	$c_3,8*$BNSZ($a0)
+___
+	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_1,$c_2,$c_3,0,
+		$a_3,$a_6);		# mul_add_c2(a[3],b[6],c1,c2,c3);
+	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_1,$c_2,$c_3,1,
+		$a_4,$a_5);		# mul_add_c2(a[4],b[5],c1,c2,c3);
+	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_1,$c_2,$c_3,1,
+		$a_7,$a_3);		# mul_add_c2(a[7],b[3],c2,c3,c1);
+$code.=<<___;
+	$ST	$c_1,9*$BNSZ($a0)
+___
+	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_2,$c_3,$c_1,0,
+		$a_6,$a_4);		# mul_add_c2(a[6],b[4],c2,c3,c1);
+	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_2,$c_3,$c_1,1,
+		$a_5,$a_5);		# mul_add_c(a[5],b[5],c2,c3,c1);
+$code.=<<___;
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_1
+	 $MULTU	$a_4,$a_7		# mul_add_c2(a[4],b[7],c3,c1,c2);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_2
+	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_1,$at
+	$ST	$c_2,10*$BNSZ($a0)
+___
+	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_3,$c_1,$c_2,0,
+		$a_5,$a_6);		# mul_add_c2(a[5],b[6],c3,c1,c2);
+	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_3,$c_1,$c_2,1,
+		$a_7,$a_5);		# mul_add_c2(a[7],b[5],c1,c2,c3);
+$code.=<<___;
+	$ST	$c_3,11*$BNSZ($a0)
+___
+	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_1,$c_2,$c_3,0,
+		$a_6,$a_6);		# mul_add_c(a[6],b[6],c1,c2,c3);
+$code.=<<___;
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_1
+	 $MULTU	$a_6,$a_7		# mul_add_c2(a[6],b[7],c2,c3,c1);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_2
+	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$at
+	$ST	$c_1,12*$BNSZ($a0)
+___
+	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_2,$c_3,$c_1,0,
+		$a_7,$a_7);		# mul_add_c(a[7],b[7],c3,c1,c2);
+$code.=<<___;
+	$ST	$c_2,13*$BNSZ($a0)
+
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_1
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_2
+	$ST	$c_3,14*$BNSZ($a0)
+	$ST	$c_1,15*$BNSZ($a0)
+
+	.set	noreorder
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i);
+	$REG_L	$t3,4*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$t2,3*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$t1,2*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$t0,1*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$gp,0*$SZREG($sp)
+	$PTR_ADD $sp,6*$SZREG
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	jr	$ra
+	nop
+.end	bn_sqr_comba8
+
+.align	5
+.globl	bn_sqr_comba4
+.ent	bn_sqr_comba4
+bn_sqr_comba4:
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i);
+	.frame	$sp,6*$SZREG,$ra
+	.mask	0x8000f008,-$SZREG
+	.set	noreorder
+	$PTR_SUB $sp,6*$SZREG
+	$REG_S	$ra,5*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$t3,4*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$t2,3*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$t1,2*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$t0,1*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$gp,0*$SZREG($sp)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	.set	reorder
+	$LD	$a_0,0($a1)
+	$LD	$a_1,$BNSZ($a1)
+	$MULTU	$a_0,$a_0		# mul_add_c(a[0],b[0],c1,c2,c3);
+	$LD	$a_2,2*$BNSZ($a1)
+	$LD	$a_3,3*$BNSZ($a1)
+	mflo	$c_1
+	mfhi	$c_2
+	$ST	$c_1,0($a0)
+
+	$MULTU	$a_0,$a_1		# mul_add_c2(a[0],b[1],c2,c3,c1);
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	slt	$c_1,$t_2,$zero
+	$SLL	$t_2,1
+	 $MULTU	$a_2,$a_0		# mul_add_c2(a[2],b[0],c3,c1,c2);
+	slt	$a2,$t_1,$zero
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$a2
+	$SLL	$t_1,1
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_1
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_2,$at
+	$ST	$c_2,$BNSZ($a0)
+___
+	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_3,$c_1,$c_2,0,
+		$a_1,$a_1);		# mul_add_c(a[1],b[1],c3,c1,c2);
+$code.=<<___;
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_1
+	 $MULTU	$a_0,$a_3		# mul_add_c2(a[0],b[3],c1,c2,c3);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_2
+	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$at
+	$ST	$c_3,2*$BNSZ($a0)
+___
+	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_1,$c_2,$c_3,0,
+		$a_1,$a_2);		# mul_add_c2(a2[1],b[2],c1,c2,c3);
+	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_1,$c_2,$c_3,1,
+		$a_3,$a_1);		# mul_add_c2(a[3],b[1],c2,c3,c1);
+$code.=<<___;
+	$ST	$c_1,3*$BNSZ($a0)
+___
+	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_2,$c_3,$c_1,0,
+		$a_2,$a_2);		# mul_add_c(a[2],b[2],c2,c3,c1);
+$code.=<<___;
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_1
+	 $MULTU	$a_2,$a_3		# mul_add_c2(a[2],b[3],c3,c1,c2);
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_2
+	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_1,$at
+	$ST	$c_2,4*$BNSZ($a0)
+___
+	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_3,$c_1,$c_2,0,
+		$a_3,$a_3);		# mul_add_c(a[3],b[3],c1,c2,c3);
+$code.=<<___;
+	$ST	$c_3,5*$BNSZ($a0)
+
+	mflo	$t_1
+	mfhi	$t_2
+	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_1
+	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_1
+	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_2
+	$ST	$c_1,6*$BNSZ($a0)
+	$ST	$c_2,7*$BNSZ($a0)
+
+	.set	noreorder
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i);
+	$REG_L	$t3,4*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$t2,3*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$t1,2*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$t0,1*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$gp,0*$SZREG($sp)
+	$PTR_ADD $sp,6*$SZREG
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	jr	$ra
+	nop
+.end	bn_sqr_comba4
+___
+print $code;
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/pa-risc2.s b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/pa-risc2.s
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..413eac7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/pa-risc2.s
@@ -0,0 +1,1624 @@
+; Copyright 1998-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+;
+; Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+; this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+; in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+; https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+;
+; PA-RISC 2.0 implementation of bn_asm code, based on the
+; 64-bit version of the code.  This code is effectively the
+; same as the 64-bit version except the register model is
+; slightly different given all values must be 32-bit between
+; function calls.  Thus the 64-bit return values are returned
+; in %ret0 and %ret1 vs just %ret0 as is done in 64-bit
+;
+;
+; This code is approximately 2x faster than the C version
+; for RSA/DSA.
+;
+; See http://devresource.hp.com/  for more details on the PA-RISC
+; architecture.  Also see the book "PA-RISC 2.0 Architecture"
+; by Gerry Kane for information on the instruction set architecture.
+;
+; Code written by Chris Ruemmler (with some help from the HP C
+; compiler).
+;
+; The code compiles with HP's assembler
+;
+
+	.level	2.0N
+	.space	$TEXT$
+	.subspa	$CODE$,QUAD=0,ALIGN=8,ACCESS=0x2c,CODE_ONLY
+
+;
+; Global Register definitions used for the routines.
+;
+; Some information about HP's runtime architecture for 32-bits.
+;
+; "Caller save" means the calling function must save the register
+; if it wants the register to be preserved.
+; "Callee save" means if a function uses the register, it must save
+; the value before using it.
+;
+; For the floating point registers 
+;
+;    "caller save" registers: fr4-fr11, fr22-fr31
+;    "callee save" registers: fr12-fr21
+;    "special" registers: fr0-fr3 (status and exception registers)
+;
+; For the integer registers
+;     value zero             :  r0
+;     "caller save" registers: r1,r19-r26
+;     "callee save" registers: r3-r18
+;     return register        :  r2  (rp)
+;     return values          ; r28,r29  (ret0,ret1)
+;     Stack pointer          ; r30  (sp) 
+;     millicode return ptr   ; r31  (also a caller save register)
+
+
+;
+; Arguments to the routines
+;
+r_ptr       .reg %r26
+a_ptr       .reg %r25
+b_ptr       .reg %r24
+num         .reg %r24
+n           .reg %r23
+
+;
+; Note that the "w" argument for bn_mul_add_words and bn_mul_words
+; is passed on the stack at a delta of -56 from the top of stack
+; as the routine is entered.
+;
+
+;
+; Globals used in some routines
+;
+
+top_overflow .reg %r23
+high_mask    .reg %r22    ; value 0xffffffff80000000L
+
+
+;------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+;
+; bn_mul_add_words
+;
+;BN_ULONG bn_mul_add_words(BN_ULONG *r_ptr, BN_ULONG *a_ptr, 
+;								int num, BN_ULONG w)
+;
+; arg0 = r_ptr
+; arg1 = a_ptr
+; arg3 = num
+; -56(sp) =  w
+;
+; Local register definitions
+;
+
+fm1          .reg %fr22
+fm           .reg %fr23
+ht_temp      .reg %fr24
+ht_temp_1    .reg %fr25
+lt_temp      .reg %fr26
+lt_temp_1    .reg %fr27
+fm1_1        .reg %fr28
+fm_1         .reg %fr29
+
+fw_h         .reg %fr7L
+fw_l         .reg %fr7R
+fw           .reg %fr7
+
+fht_0        .reg %fr8L
+flt_0        .reg %fr8R
+t_float_0    .reg %fr8
+
+fht_1        .reg %fr9L
+flt_1        .reg %fr9R
+t_float_1    .reg %fr9
+
+tmp_0        .reg %r31
+tmp_1        .reg %r21
+m_0          .reg %r20 
+m_1          .reg %r19 
+ht_0         .reg %r1  
+ht_1         .reg %r3
+lt_0         .reg %r4
+lt_1         .reg %r5
+m1_0         .reg %r6 
+m1_1         .reg %r7 
+rp_val       .reg %r8
+rp_val_1     .reg %r9
+
+bn_mul_add_words
+	.export	bn_mul_add_words,entry,NO_RELOCATION,LONG_RETURN
+	.proc
+	.callinfo frame=128
+    .entry
+	.align 64
+
+    STD     %r3,0(%sp)          ; save r3  
+    STD     %r4,8(%sp)          ; save r4  
+	NOP                         ; Needed to make the loop 16-byte aligned
+	NOP                         ; needed to make the loop 16-byte aligned
+
+    STD     %r5,16(%sp)         ; save r5  
+	NOP
+    STD     %r6,24(%sp)         ; save r6  
+    STD     %r7,32(%sp)         ; save r7  
+
+    STD     %r8,40(%sp)         ; save r8  
+    STD     %r9,48(%sp)         ; save r9  
+    COPY    %r0,%ret1           ; return 0 by default
+    DEPDI,Z 1,31,1,top_overflow ; top_overflow = 1 << 32    
+
+    CMPIB,>= 0,num,bn_mul_add_words_exit  ; if (num <= 0) then exit
+	LDO     128(%sp),%sp        ; bump stack
+
+	;
+	; The loop is unrolled twice, so if there is only 1 number
+    ; then go straight to the cleanup code.
+	;
+	CMPIB,= 1,num,bn_mul_add_words_single_top
+	FLDD    -184(%sp),fw        ; (-56-128) load up w into fw (fw_h/fw_l)
+
+	;
+	; This loop is unrolled 2 times (64-byte aligned as well)
+	;
+	; PA-RISC 2.0 chips have two fully pipelined multipliers, thus
+    ; two 32-bit mutiplies can be issued per cycle.
+    ; 
+bn_mul_add_words_unroll2
+
+    FLDD    0(a_ptr),t_float_0       ; load up 64-bit value (fr8L) ht(L)/lt(R)
+    FLDD    8(a_ptr),t_float_1       ; load up 64-bit value (fr8L) ht(L)/lt(R)
+    LDD     0(r_ptr),rp_val          ; rp[0]
+    LDD     8(r_ptr),rp_val_1        ; rp[1]
+
+    XMPYU   fht_0,fw_l,fm1           ; m1[0] = fht_0*fw_l
+    XMPYU   fht_1,fw_l,fm1_1         ; m1[1] = fht_1*fw_l
+    FSTD    fm1,-16(%sp)             ; -16(sp) = m1[0]
+    FSTD    fm1_1,-48(%sp)           ; -48(sp) = m1[1]
+
+    XMPYU   flt_0,fw_h,fm            ; m[0] = flt_0*fw_h
+    XMPYU   flt_1,fw_h,fm_1          ; m[1] = flt_1*fw_h
+    FSTD    fm,-8(%sp)               ; -8(sp) = m[0]
+    FSTD    fm_1,-40(%sp)            ; -40(sp) = m[1]
+
+    XMPYU   fht_0,fw_h,ht_temp       ; ht_temp   = fht_0*fw_h
+    XMPYU   fht_1,fw_h,ht_temp_1     ; ht_temp_1 = fht_1*fw_h
+    FSTD    ht_temp,-24(%sp)         ; -24(sp)   = ht_temp
+    FSTD    ht_temp_1,-56(%sp)       ; -56(sp)   = ht_temp_1
+
+    XMPYU   flt_0,fw_l,lt_temp       ; lt_temp = lt*fw_l
+    XMPYU   flt_1,fw_l,lt_temp_1     ; lt_temp = lt*fw_l
+    FSTD    lt_temp,-32(%sp)         ; -32(sp) = lt_temp 
+    FSTD    lt_temp_1,-64(%sp)       ; -64(sp) = lt_temp_1 
+
+    LDD     -8(%sp),m_0              ; m[0] 
+    LDD     -40(%sp),m_1             ; m[1]
+    LDD     -16(%sp),m1_0            ; m1[0]
+    LDD     -48(%sp),m1_1            ; m1[1]
+
+    LDD     -24(%sp),ht_0            ; ht[0]
+    LDD     -56(%sp),ht_1            ; ht[1]
+    ADD,L   m1_0,m_0,tmp_0           ; tmp_0 = m[0] + m1[0]; 
+    ADD,L   m1_1,m_1,tmp_1           ; tmp_1 = m[1] + m1[1]; 
+
+    LDD     -32(%sp),lt_0            
+    LDD     -64(%sp),lt_1            
+    CMPCLR,*>>= tmp_0,m1_0, %r0      ; if (m[0] < m1[0])
+    ADD,L   ht_0,top_overflow,ht_0   ; ht[0] += (1<<32)
+
+    CMPCLR,*>>= tmp_1,m1_1,%r0       ; if (m[1] < m1[1])
+    ADD,L   ht_1,top_overflow,ht_1   ; ht[1] += (1<<32)
+    EXTRD,U tmp_0,31,32,m_0          ; m[0]>>32  
+    DEPD,Z  tmp_0,31,32,m1_0         ; m1[0] = m[0]<<32 
+
+    EXTRD,U tmp_1,31,32,m_1          ; m[1]>>32  
+    DEPD,Z  tmp_1,31,32,m1_1         ; m1[1] = m[1]<<32 
+    ADD,L   ht_0,m_0,ht_0            ; ht[0]+= (m[0]>>32)
+    ADD,L   ht_1,m_1,ht_1            ; ht[1]+= (m[1]>>32)
+
+    ADD     lt_0,m1_0,lt_0           ; lt[0] = lt[0]+m1[0];
+	ADD,DC  ht_0,%r0,ht_0            ; ht[0]++
+    ADD     lt_1,m1_1,lt_1           ; lt[1] = lt[1]+m1[1];
+    ADD,DC  ht_1,%r0,ht_1            ; ht[1]++
+
+    ADD    %ret1,lt_0,lt_0           ; lt[0] = lt[0] + c;
+	ADD,DC  ht_0,%r0,ht_0            ; ht[0]++
+    ADD     lt_0,rp_val,lt_0         ; lt[0] = lt[0]+rp[0]
+    ADD,DC  ht_0,%r0,ht_0            ; ht[0]++
+
+	LDO    -2(num),num               ; num = num - 2;
+    ADD     ht_0,lt_1,lt_1           ; lt[1] = lt[1] + ht_0 (c);
+    ADD,DC  ht_1,%r0,ht_1            ; ht[1]++
+    STD     lt_0,0(r_ptr)            ; rp[0] = lt[0]
+
+    ADD     lt_1,rp_val_1,lt_1       ; lt[1] = lt[1]+rp[1]
+    ADD,DC  ht_1,%r0,%ret1           ; ht[1]++
+    LDO     16(a_ptr),a_ptr          ; a_ptr += 2
+
+    STD     lt_1,8(r_ptr)            ; rp[1] = lt[1]
+	CMPIB,<= 2,num,bn_mul_add_words_unroll2 ; go again if more to do
+    LDO     16(r_ptr),r_ptr          ; r_ptr += 2
+
+    CMPIB,=,N 0,num,bn_mul_add_words_exit ; are we done, or cleanup last one
+
+	;
+	; Top of loop aligned on 64-byte boundary
+	;
+bn_mul_add_words_single_top
+    FLDD    0(a_ptr),t_float_0        ; load up 64-bit value (fr8L) ht(L)/lt(R)
+    LDD     0(r_ptr),rp_val           ; rp[0]
+    LDO     8(a_ptr),a_ptr            ; a_ptr++
+    XMPYU   fht_0,fw_l,fm1            ; m1 = ht*fw_l
+    FSTD    fm1,-16(%sp)              ; -16(sp) = m1
+    XMPYU   flt_0,fw_h,fm             ; m = lt*fw_h
+    FSTD    fm,-8(%sp)                ; -8(sp) = m
+    XMPYU   fht_0,fw_h,ht_temp        ; ht_temp = ht*fw_h
+    FSTD    ht_temp,-24(%sp)          ; -24(sp) = ht
+    XMPYU   flt_0,fw_l,lt_temp        ; lt_temp = lt*fw_l
+    FSTD    lt_temp,-32(%sp)          ; -32(sp) = lt 
+
+    LDD     -8(%sp),m_0               
+    LDD    -16(%sp),m1_0              ; m1 = temp1 
+    ADD,L   m_0,m1_0,tmp_0            ; tmp_0 = m + m1; 
+    LDD     -24(%sp),ht_0             
+    LDD     -32(%sp),lt_0             
+
+    CMPCLR,*>>= tmp_0,m1_0,%r0        ; if (m < m1)
+    ADD,L   ht_0,top_overflow,ht_0    ; ht += (1<<32)
+
+    EXTRD,U tmp_0,31,32,m_0           ; m>>32  
+    DEPD,Z  tmp_0,31,32,m1_0          ; m1 = m<<32 
+
+    ADD,L   ht_0,m_0,ht_0             ; ht+= (m>>32)
+    ADD     lt_0,m1_0,tmp_0           ; tmp_0 = lt+m1;
+    ADD,DC  ht_0,%r0,ht_0             ; ht++
+    ADD     %ret1,tmp_0,lt_0          ; lt = lt + c;
+    ADD,DC  ht_0,%r0,ht_0             ; ht++
+    ADD     lt_0,rp_val,lt_0          ; lt = lt+rp[0]
+    ADD,DC  ht_0,%r0,%ret1            ; ht++
+    STD     lt_0,0(r_ptr)             ; rp[0] = lt
+
+bn_mul_add_words_exit
+    .EXIT
+	
+    EXTRD,U %ret1,31,32,%ret0         ; for 32-bit, return in ret0/ret1
+    LDD     -80(%sp),%r9              ; restore r9  
+    LDD     -88(%sp),%r8              ; restore r8  
+    LDD     -96(%sp),%r7              ; restore r7  
+    LDD     -104(%sp),%r6             ; restore r6  
+    LDD     -112(%sp),%r5             ; restore r5  
+    LDD     -120(%sp),%r4             ; restore r4  
+    BVE     (%rp)
+    LDD,MB  -128(%sp),%r3             ; restore r3
+	.PROCEND	;in=23,24,25,26,29;out=28;
+
+;----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+;
+;BN_ULONG bn_mul_words(BN_ULONG *rp, BN_ULONG *ap, int num, BN_ULONG w)
+;
+; arg0 = rp
+; arg1 = ap
+; arg3 = num
+; w on stack at -56(sp)
+
+bn_mul_words
+	.proc
+	.callinfo frame=128
+    .entry
+	.EXPORT	bn_mul_words,ENTRY,PRIV_LEV=3,NO_RELOCATION,LONG_RETURN
+	.align 64
+
+    STD     %r3,0(%sp)          ; save r3  
+    STD     %r4,8(%sp)          ; save r4  
+	NOP
+    STD     %r5,16(%sp)         ; save r5  
+
+    STD     %r6,24(%sp)         ; save r6  
+    STD     %r7,32(%sp)         ; save r7  
+    COPY    %r0,%ret1           ; return 0 by default
+    DEPDI,Z 1,31,1,top_overflow ; top_overflow = 1 << 32    
+
+    CMPIB,>= 0,num,bn_mul_words_exit
+	LDO     128(%sp),%sp    ; bump stack
+
+	;
+	; See if only 1 word to do, thus just do cleanup
+	;
+	CMPIB,= 1,num,bn_mul_words_single_top
+	FLDD    -184(%sp),fw        ; (-56-128) load up w into fw (fw_h/fw_l)
+
+	;
+	; This loop is unrolled 2 times (64-byte aligned as well)
+	;
+	; PA-RISC 2.0 chips have two fully pipelined multipliers, thus
+    ; two 32-bit mutiplies can be issued per cycle.
+    ; 
+bn_mul_words_unroll2
+
+    FLDD    0(a_ptr),t_float_0        ; load up 64-bit value (fr8L) ht(L)/lt(R)
+    FLDD    8(a_ptr),t_float_1        ; load up 64-bit value (fr8L) ht(L)/lt(R)
+    XMPYU   fht_0,fw_l,fm1            ; m1[0] = fht_0*fw_l
+    XMPYU   fht_1,fw_l,fm1_1          ; m1[1] = ht*fw_l
+
+    FSTD    fm1,-16(%sp)              ; -16(sp) = m1
+    FSTD    fm1_1,-48(%sp)            ; -48(sp) = m1
+    XMPYU   flt_0,fw_h,fm             ; m = lt*fw_h
+    XMPYU   flt_1,fw_h,fm_1           ; m = lt*fw_h
+
+    FSTD    fm,-8(%sp)                ; -8(sp) = m
+    FSTD    fm_1,-40(%sp)             ; -40(sp) = m
+    XMPYU   fht_0,fw_h,ht_temp        ; ht_temp = fht_0*fw_h
+    XMPYU   fht_1,fw_h,ht_temp_1      ; ht_temp = ht*fw_h
+
+    FSTD    ht_temp,-24(%sp)          ; -24(sp) = ht
+    FSTD    ht_temp_1,-56(%sp)        ; -56(sp) = ht
+    XMPYU   flt_0,fw_l,lt_temp        ; lt_temp = lt*fw_l
+    XMPYU   flt_1,fw_l,lt_temp_1      ; lt_temp = lt*fw_l
+
+    FSTD    lt_temp,-32(%sp)          ; -32(sp) = lt 
+    FSTD    lt_temp_1,-64(%sp)        ; -64(sp) = lt 
+    LDD     -8(%sp),m_0               
+    LDD     -40(%sp),m_1              
+
+    LDD    -16(%sp),m1_0              
+    LDD    -48(%sp),m1_1              
+    LDD     -24(%sp),ht_0             
+    LDD     -56(%sp),ht_1             
+
+    ADD,L   m1_0,m_0,tmp_0            ; tmp_0 = m + m1; 
+    ADD,L   m1_1,m_1,tmp_1            ; tmp_1 = m + m1; 
+    LDD     -32(%sp),lt_0             
+    LDD     -64(%sp),lt_1             
+
+    CMPCLR,*>>= tmp_0,m1_0, %r0       ; if (m < m1)
+    ADD,L   ht_0,top_overflow,ht_0    ; ht += (1<<32)
+    CMPCLR,*>>= tmp_1,m1_1,%r0        ; if (m < m1)
+    ADD,L   ht_1,top_overflow,ht_1    ; ht += (1<<32)
+
+    EXTRD,U tmp_0,31,32,m_0           ; m>>32  
+    DEPD,Z  tmp_0,31,32,m1_0          ; m1 = m<<32 
+    EXTRD,U tmp_1,31,32,m_1           ; m>>32  
+    DEPD,Z  tmp_1,31,32,m1_1          ; m1 = m<<32 
+
+    ADD,L   ht_0,m_0,ht_0             ; ht+= (m>>32)
+    ADD,L   ht_1,m_1,ht_1             ; ht+= (m>>32)
+    ADD     lt_0,m1_0,lt_0            ; lt = lt+m1;
+	ADD,DC  ht_0,%r0,ht_0             ; ht++
+
+    ADD     lt_1,m1_1,lt_1            ; lt = lt+m1;
+    ADD,DC  ht_1,%r0,ht_1             ; ht++
+    ADD    %ret1,lt_0,lt_0            ; lt = lt + c (ret1);
+	ADD,DC  ht_0,%r0,ht_0             ; ht++
+
+    ADD     ht_0,lt_1,lt_1            ; lt = lt + c (ht_0)
+    ADD,DC  ht_1,%r0,ht_1             ; ht++
+    STD     lt_0,0(r_ptr)             ; rp[0] = lt
+    STD     lt_1,8(r_ptr)             ; rp[1] = lt
+
+	COPY    ht_1,%ret1                ; carry = ht
+	LDO    -2(num),num                ; num = num - 2;
+    LDO     16(a_ptr),a_ptr           ; ap += 2
+	CMPIB,<= 2,num,bn_mul_words_unroll2
+    LDO     16(r_ptr),r_ptr           ; rp++
+
+    CMPIB,=,N 0,num,bn_mul_words_exit ; are we done?
+
+	;
+	; Top of loop aligned on 64-byte boundary
+	;
+bn_mul_words_single_top
+    FLDD    0(a_ptr),t_float_0        ; load up 64-bit value (fr8L) ht(L)/lt(R)
+
+    XMPYU   fht_0,fw_l,fm1            ; m1 = ht*fw_l
+    FSTD    fm1,-16(%sp)              ; -16(sp) = m1
+    XMPYU   flt_0,fw_h,fm             ; m = lt*fw_h
+    FSTD    fm,-8(%sp)                ; -8(sp) = m
+    XMPYU   fht_0,fw_h,ht_temp        ; ht_temp = ht*fw_h
+    FSTD    ht_temp,-24(%sp)          ; -24(sp) = ht
+    XMPYU   flt_0,fw_l,lt_temp        ; lt_temp = lt*fw_l
+    FSTD    lt_temp,-32(%sp)          ; -32(sp) = lt 
+
+    LDD     -8(%sp),m_0               
+    LDD    -16(%sp),m1_0              
+    ADD,L   m_0,m1_0,tmp_0            ; tmp_0 = m + m1; 
+    LDD     -24(%sp),ht_0             
+    LDD     -32(%sp),lt_0             
+
+    CMPCLR,*>>= tmp_0,m1_0,%r0        ; if (m < m1)
+    ADD,L   ht_0,top_overflow,ht_0    ; ht += (1<<32)
+
+    EXTRD,U tmp_0,31,32,m_0           ; m>>32  
+    DEPD,Z  tmp_0,31,32,m1_0          ; m1 = m<<32 
+
+    ADD,L   ht_0,m_0,ht_0             ; ht+= (m>>32)
+    ADD     lt_0,m1_0,lt_0            ; lt= lt+m1;
+    ADD,DC  ht_0,%r0,ht_0             ; ht++
+
+    ADD     %ret1,lt_0,lt_0           ; lt = lt + c;
+    ADD,DC  ht_0,%r0,ht_0             ; ht++
+
+    COPY    ht_0,%ret1                ; copy carry
+    STD     lt_0,0(r_ptr)             ; rp[0] = lt
+
+bn_mul_words_exit
+    .EXIT
+    EXTRD,U %ret1,31,32,%ret0           ; for 32-bit, return in ret0/ret1
+    LDD     -96(%sp),%r7              ; restore r7  
+    LDD     -104(%sp),%r6             ; restore r6  
+    LDD     -112(%sp),%r5             ; restore r5  
+    LDD     -120(%sp),%r4             ; restore r4  
+    BVE     (%rp)
+    LDD,MB  -128(%sp),%r3             ; restore r3
+	.PROCEND	
+
+;----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+;
+;void bn_sqr_words(BN_ULONG *rp, BN_ULONG *ap, int num)
+;
+; arg0 = rp
+; arg1 = ap
+; arg2 = num
+;
+
+bn_sqr_words
+	.proc
+	.callinfo FRAME=128,ENTRY_GR=%r3,ARGS_SAVED,ORDERING_AWARE
+	.EXPORT	bn_sqr_words,ENTRY,PRIV_LEV=3,NO_RELOCATION,LONG_RETURN
+    .entry
+	.align 64
+
+    STD     %r3,0(%sp)          ; save r3  
+    STD     %r4,8(%sp)          ; save r4  
+	NOP
+    STD     %r5,16(%sp)         ; save r5  
+
+    CMPIB,>= 0,num,bn_sqr_words_exit
+	LDO     128(%sp),%sp       ; bump stack
+
+	;
+	; If only 1, the goto straight to cleanup
+	;
+	CMPIB,= 1,num,bn_sqr_words_single_top
+    DEPDI,Z -1,32,33,high_mask   ; Create Mask 0xffffffff80000000L
+
+	;
+	; This loop is unrolled 2 times (64-byte aligned as well)
+	;
+
+bn_sqr_words_unroll2
+    FLDD    0(a_ptr),t_float_0        ; a[0]
+    FLDD    8(a_ptr),t_float_1        ; a[1]
+    XMPYU   fht_0,flt_0,fm            ; m[0]
+    XMPYU   fht_1,flt_1,fm_1          ; m[1]
+
+    FSTD    fm,-24(%sp)               ; store m[0]
+    FSTD    fm_1,-56(%sp)             ; store m[1]
+    XMPYU   flt_0,flt_0,lt_temp       ; lt[0]
+    XMPYU   flt_1,flt_1,lt_temp_1     ; lt[1]
+
+    FSTD    lt_temp,-16(%sp)          ; store lt[0]
+    FSTD    lt_temp_1,-48(%sp)        ; store lt[1]
+    XMPYU   fht_0,fht_0,ht_temp       ; ht[0]
+    XMPYU   fht_1,fht_1,ht_temp_1     ; ht[1]
+
+    FSTD    ht_temp,-8(%sp)           ; store ht[0]
+    FSTD    ht_temp_1,-40(%sp)        ; store ht[1]
+    LDD     -24(%sp),m_0             
+    LDD     -56(%sp),m_1              
+
+    AND     m_0,high_mask,tmp_0       ; m[0] & Mask
+    AND     m_1,high_mask,tmp_1       ; m[1] & Mask
+    DEPD,Z  m_0,30,31,m_0             ; m[0] << 32+1
+    DEPD,Z  m_1,30,31,m_1             ; m[1] << 32+1
+
+    LDD     -16(%sp),lt_0        
+    LDD     -48(%sp),lt_1        
+    EXTRD,U tmp_0,32,33,tmp_0         ; tmp_0 = m[0]&Mask >> 32-1
+    EXTRD,U tmp_1,32,33,tmp_1         ; tmp_1 = m[1]&Mask >> 32-1
+
+    LDD     -8(%sp),ht_0            
+    LDD     -40(%sp),ht_1           
+    ADD,L   ht_0,tmp_0,ht_0           ; ht[0] += tmp_0
+    ADD,L   ht_1,tmp_1,ht_1           ; ht[1] += tmp_1
+
+    ADD     lt_0,m_0,lt_0             ; lt = lt+m
+    ADD,DC  ht_0,%r0,ht_0             ; ht[0]++
+    STD     lt_0,0(r_ptr)             ; rp[0] = lt[0]
+    STD     ht_0,8(r_ptr)             ; rp[1] = ht[1]
+
+    ADD     lt_1,m_1,lt_1             ; lt = lt+m
+    ADD,DC  ht_1,%r0,ht_1             ; ht[1]++
+    STD     lt_1,16(r_ptr)            ; rp[2] = lt[1]
+    STD     ht_1,24(r_ptr)            ; rp[3] = ht[1]
+
+	LDO    -2(num),num                ; num = num - 2;
+    LDO     16(a_ptr),a_ptr           ; ap += 2
+	CMPIB,<= 2,num,bn_sqr_words_unroll2
+    LDO     32(r_ptr),r_ptr           ; rp += 4
+
+    CMPIB,=,N 0,num,bn_sqr_words_exit ; are we done?
+
+	;
+	; Top of loop aligned on 64-byte boundary
+	;
+bn_sqr_words_single_top
+    FLDD    0(a_ptr),t_float_0        ; load up 64-bit value (fr8L) ht(L)/lt(R)
+
+    XMPYU   fht_0,flt_0,fm            ; m
+    FSTD    fm,-24(%sp)               ; store m
+
+    XMPYU   flt_0,flt_0,lt_temp       ; lt
+    FSTD    lt_temp,-16(%sp)          ; store lt
+
+    XMPYU   fht_0,fht_0,ht_temp       ; ht
+    FSTD    ht_temp,-8(%sp)           ; store ht
+
+    LDD     -24(%sp),m_0              ; load m
+    AND     m_0,high_mask,tmp_0       ; m & Mask
+    DEPD,Z  m_0,30,31,m_0             ; m << 32+1
+    LDD     -16(%sp),lt_0             ; lt
+
+    LDD     -8(%sp),ht_0              ; ht
+    EXTRD,U tmp_0,32,33,tmp_0         ; tmp_0 = m&Mask >> 32-1
+    ADD     m_0,lt_0,lt_0             ; lt = lt+m
+    ADD,L   ht_0,tmp_0,ht_0           ; ht += tmp_0
+    ADD,DC  ht_0,%r0,ht_0             ; ht++
+
+    STD     lt_0,0(r_ptr)             ; rp[0] = lt
+    STD     ht_0,8(r_ptr)             ; rp[1] = ht
+
+bn_sqr_words_exit
+    .EXIT
+    LDD     -112(%sp),%r5       ; restore r5  
+    LDD     -120(%sp),%r4       ; restore r4  
+    BVE     (%rp)
+    LDD,MB  -128(%sp),%r3 
+	.PROCEND	;in=23,24,25,26,29;out=28;
+
+
+;----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+;
+;BN_ULONG bn_add_words(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n)
+;
+; arg0 = rp 
+; arg1 = ap
+; arg2 = bp 
+; arg3 = n
+
+t  .reg %r22
+b  .reg %r21
+l  .reg %r20
+
+bn_add_words
+	.proc
+    .entry
+	.callinfo
+	.EXPORT	bn_add_words,ENTRY,PRIV_LEV=3,NO_RELOCATION,LONG_RETURN
+	.align 64
+
+    CMPIB,>= 0,n,bn_add_words_exit
+    COPY    %r0,%ret1           ; return 0 by default
+
+	;
+	; If 2 or more numbers do the loop
+	;
+	CMPIB,= 1,n,bn_add_words_single_top
+	NOP
+
+	;
+	; This loop is unrolled 2 times (64-byte aligned as well)
+	;
+bn_add_words_unroll2
+	LDD     0(a_ptr),t
+	LDD     0(b_ptr),b
+	ADD     t,%ret1,t                    ; t = t+c;
+	ADD,DC  %r0,%r0,%ret1                ; set c to carry
+	ADD     t,b,l                        ; l = t + b[0]
+	ADD,DC  %ret1,%r0,%ret1              ; c+= carry
+	STD     l,0(r_ptr)
+
+	LDD     8(a_ptr),t
+	LDD     8(b_ptr),b
+	ADD     t,%ret1,t                     ; t = t+c;
+	ADD,DC  %r0,%r0,%ret1                 ; set c to carry
+	ADD     t,b,l                         ; l = t + b[0]
+	ADD,DC  %ret1,%r0,%ret1               ; c+= carry
+	STD     l,8(r_ptr)
+
+	LDO     -2(n),n
+	LDO     16(a_ptr),a_ptr
+	LDO     16(b_ptr),b_ptr
+
+	CMPIB,<= 2,n,bn_add_words_unroll2
+	LDO     16(r_ptr),r_ptr
+
+    CMPIB,=,N 0,n,bn_add_words_exit ; are we done?
+
+bn_add_words_single_top
+	LDD     0(a_ptr),t
+	LDD     0(b_ptr),b
+
+	ADD     t,%ret1,t                 ; t = t+c;
+	ADD,DC  %r0,%r0,%ret1             ; set c to carry (could use CMPCLR??)
+	ADD     t,b,l                     ; l = t + b[0]
+	ADD,DC  %ret1,%r0,%ret1           ; c+= carry
+	STD     l,0(r_ptr)
+
+bn_add_words_exit
+    .EXIT
+    BVE     (%rp)
+    EXTRD,U %ret1,31,32,%ret0           ; for 32-bit, return in ret0/ret1
+	.PROCEND	;in=23,24,25,26,29;out=28;
+
+;----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+;
+;BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n)
+;
+; arg0 = rp 
+; arg1 = ap
+; arg2 = bp 
+; arg3 = n
+
+t1       .reg %r22
+t2       .reg %r21
+sub_tmp1 .reg %r20
+sub_tmp2 .reg %r19
+
+
+bn_sub_words
+	.proc
+	.callinfo 
+	.EXPORT	bn_sub_words,ENTRY,PRIV_LEV=3,NO_RELOCATION,LONG_RETURN
+    .entry
+	.align 64
+
+    CMPIB,>=  0,n,bn_sub_words_exit
+    COPY    %r0,%ret1           ; return 0 by default
+
+	;
+	; If 2 or more numbers do the loop
+	;
+	CMPIB,= 1,n,bn_sub_words_single_top
+	NOP
+
+	;
+	; This loop is unrolled 2 times (64-byte aligned as well)
+	;
+bn_sub_words_unroll2
+	LDD     0(a_ptr),t1
+	LDD     0(b_ptr),t2
+	SUB     t1,t2,sub_tmp1           ; t3 = t1-t2; 
+	SUB     sub_tmp1,%ret1,sub_tmp1  ; t3 = t3- c; 
+
+	CMPCLR,*>> t1,t2,sub_tmp2        ; clear if t1 > t2
+	LDO      1(%r0),sub_tmp2
+	
+	CMPCLR,*= t1,t2,%r0
+	COPY    sub_tmp2,%ret1
+	STD     sub_tmp1,0(r_ptr)
+
+	LDD     8(a_ptr),t1
+	LDD     8(b_ptr),t2
+	SUB     t1,t2,sub_tmp1            ; t3 = t1-t2; 
+	SUB     sub_tmp1,%ret1,sub_tmp1   ; t3 = t3- c; 
+	CMPCLR,*>> t1,t2,sub_tmp2         ; clear if t1 > t2
+	LDO      1(%r0),sub_tmp2
+	
+	CMPCLR,*= t1,t2,%r0
+	COPY    sub_tmp2,%ret1
+	STD     sub_tmp1,8(r_ptr)
+
+	LDO     -2(n),n
+	LDO     16(a_ptr),a_ptr
+	LDO     16(b_ptr),b_ptr
+
+	CMPIB,<= 2,n,bn_sub_words_unroll2
+	LDO     16(r_ptr),r_ptr
+
+    CMPIB,=,N 0,n,bn_sub_words_exit ; are we done?
+
+bn_sub_words_single_top
+	LDD     0(a_ptr),t1
+	LDD     0(b_ptr),t2
+	SUB     t1,t2,sub_tmp1            ; t3 = t1-t2; 
+	SUB     sub_tmp1,%ret1,sub_tmp1   ; t3 = t3- c; 
+	CMPCLR,*>> t1,t2,sub_tmp2         ; clear if t1 > t2
+	LDO      1(%r0),sub_tmp2
+	
+	CMPCLR,*= t1,t2,%r0
+	COPY    sub_tmp2,%ret1
+
+	STD     sub_tmp1,0(r_ptr)
+
+bn_sub_words_exit
+    .EXIT
+    BVE     (%rp)
+    EXTRD,U %ret1,31,32,%ret0           ; for 32-bit, return in ret0/ret1
+	.PROCEND	;in=23,24,25,26,29;out=28;
+
+;------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+;
+; unsigned long bn_div_words(unsigned long h, unsigned long l, unsigned long d)
+;
+; arg0 = h
+; arg1 = l
+; arg2 = d
+;
+; This is mainly just output from the HP C compiler.  
+;
+;------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+bn_div_words
+	.PROC
+	.EXPORT	bn_div_words,ENTRY,PRIV_LEV=3,ARGW0=GR,ARGW1=GR,ARGW2=GR,ARGW3=GR,RTNVAL=GR,LONG_RETURN
+	.IMPORT	BN_num_bits_word,CODE
+	;--- not PIC	.IMPORT	__iob,DATA
+	;--- not PIC	.IMPORT	fprintf,CODE
+	.IMPORT	abort,CODE
+	.IMPORT	$$div2U,MILLICODE
+	.CALLINFO CALLER,FRAME=144,ENTRY_GR=%r9,SAVE_RP,ARGS_SAVED,ORDERING_AWARE
+        .ENTRY
+        STW     %r2,-20(%r30)   ;offset 0x8ec
+        STW,MA  %r3,192(%r30)   ;offset 0x8f0
+        STW     %r4,-188(%r30)  ;offset 0x8f4
+        DEPD    %r5,31,32,%r6   ;offset 0x8f8
+        STD     %r6,-184(%r30)  ;offset 0x8fc
+        DEPD    %r7,31,32,%r8   ;offset 0x900
+        STD     %r8,-176(%r30)  ;offset 0x904
+        STW     %r9,-168(%r30)  ;offset 0x908
+        LDD     -248(%r30),%r3  ;offset 0x90c
+        COPY    %r26,%r4        ;offset 0x910
+        COPY    %r24,%r5        ;offset 0x914
+        DEPD    %r25,31,32,%r4  ;offset 0x918
+        CMPB,*<>        %r3,%r0,$0006000C       ;offset 0x91c
+        DEPD    %r23,31,32,%r5  ;offset 0x920
+        MOVIB,TR        -1,%r29,$00060002       ;offset 0x924
+        EXTRD,U %r29,31,32,%r28 ;offset 0x928
+$0006002A
+        LDO     -1(%r29),%r29   ;offset 0x92c
+        SUB     %r23,%r7,%r23   ;offset 0x930
+$00060024
+        SUB     %r4,%r31,%r25   ;offset 0x934
+        AND     %r25,%r19,%r26  ;offset 0x938
+        CMPB,*<>,N      %r0,%r26,$00060046      ;offset 0x93c
+        DEPD,Z  %r25,31,32,%r20 ;offset 0x940
+        OR      %r20,%r24,%r21  ;offset 0x944
+        CMPB,*<<,N      %r21,%r23,$0006002A     ;offset 0x948
+        SUB     %r31,%r2,%r31   ;offset 0x94c
+$00060046
+$0006002E
+        DEPD,Z  %r23,31,32,%r25 ;offset 0x950
+        EXTRD,U %r23,31,32,%r26 ;offset 0x954
+        AND     %r25,%r19,%r24  ;offset 0x958
+        ADD,L   %r31,%r26,%r31  ;offset 0x95c
+        CMPCLR,*>>=     %r5,%r24,%r0    ;offset 0x960
+        LDO     1(%r31),%r31    ;offset 0x964
+$00060032
+        CMPB,*<<=,N     %r31,%r4,$00060036      ;offset 0x968
+        LDO     -1(%r29),%r29   ;offset 0x96c
+        ADD,L   %r4,%r3,%r4     ;offset 0x970
+$00060036
+        ADDIB,=,N       -1,%r8,$D0      ;offset 0x974
+        SUB     %r5,%r24,%r28   ;offset 0x978
+$0006003A
+        SUB     %r4,%r31,%r24   ;offset 0x97c
+        SHRPD   %r24,%r28,32,%r4        ;offset 0x980
+        DEPD,Z  %r29,31,32,%r9  ;offset 0x984
+        DEPD,Z  %r28,31,32,%r5  ;offset 0x988
+$0006001C
+        EXTRD,U %r4,31,32,%r31  ;offset 0x98c
+        CMPB,*<>,N      %r31,%r2,$00060020      ;offset 0x990
+        MOVB,TR %r6,%r29,$D1    ;offset 0x994
+        STD     %r29,-152(%r30) ;offset 0x998
+$0006000C
+        EXTRD,U %r3,31,32,%r25  ;offset 0x99c
+        COPY    %r3,%r26        ;offset 0x9a0
+        EXTRD,U %r3,31,32,%r9   ;offset 0x9a4
+        EXTRD,U %r4,31,32,%r8   ;offset 0x9a8
+        .CALL   ARGW0=GR,ARGW1=GR,RTNVAL=GR     ;in=25,26;out=28;
+        B,L     BN_num_bits_word,%r2    ;offset 0x9ac
+        EXTRD,U %r5,31,32,%r7   ;offset 0x9b0
+        LDI     64,%r20 ;offset 0x9b4
+        DEPD    %r7,31,32,%r5   ;offset 0x9b8
+        DEPD    %r8,31,32,%r4   ;offset 0x9bc
+        DEPD    %r9,31,32,%r3   ;offset 0x9c0
+        CMPB,=  %r28,%r20,$00060012     ;offset 0x9c4
+        COPY    %r28,%r24       ;offset 0x9c8
+        MTSARCM %r24    ;offset 0x9cc
+        DEPDI,Z -1,%sar,1,%r19  ;offset 0x9d0
+        CMPB,*>>,N      %r4,%r19,$D2    ;offset 0x9d4
+$00060012
+        SUBI    64,%r24,%r31    ;offset 0x9d8
+        CMPCLR,*<<      %r4,%r3,%r0     ;offset 0x9dc
+        SUB     %r4,%r3,%r4     ;offset 0x9e0
+$00060016
+        CMPB,=  %r31,%r0,$0006001A      ;offset 0x9e4
+        COPY    %r0,%r9 ;offset 0x9e8
+        MTSARCM %r31    ;offset 0x9ec
+        DEPD,Z  %r3,%sar,64,%r3 ;offset 0x9f0
+        SUBI    64,%r31,%r26    ;offset 0x9f4
+        MTSAR   %r26    ;offset 0x9f8
+        SHRPD   %r4,%r5,%sar,%r4        ;offset 0x9fc
+        MTSARCM %r31    ;offset 0xa00
+        DEPD,Z  %r5,%sar,64,%r5 ;offset 0xa04
+$0006001A
+        DEPDI,Z -1,31,32,%r19   ;offset 0xa08
+        AND     %r3,%r19,%r29   ;offset 0xa0c
+        EXTRD,U %r29,31,32,%r2  ;offset 0xa10
+        DEPDI,Z -1,63,32,%r6    ;offset 0xa14
+        MOVIB,TR        2,%r8,$0006001C ;offset 0xa18
+        EXTRD,U %r3,63,32,%r7   ;offset 0xa1c
+$D2
+        ;--- not PIC	ADDIL   LR'__iob-$global$,%r27,%r1      ;offset 0xa20
+        ;--- not PIC	LDIL    LR'C$7,%r21     ;offset 0xa24
+        ;--- not PIC	LDO     RR'__iob-$global$+32(%r1),%r26  ;offset 0xa28
+        ;--- not PIC	.CALL   ARGW0=GR,ARGW1=GR,ARGW2=GR,RTNVAL=GR    ;in=24,25,26;out=28;
+        ;--- not PIC	B,L     fprintf,%r2     ;offset 0xa2c
+        ;--- not PIC	LDO     RR'C$7(%r21),%r25       ;offset 0xa30
+        .CALL           ;
+        B,L     abort,%r2       ;offset 0xa34
+        NOP             ;offset 0xa38
+        B       $D3     ;offset 0xa3c
+        LDW     -212(%r30),%r2  ;offset 0xa40
+$00060020
+        COPY    %r4,%r26        ;offset 0xa44
+        EXTRD,U %r4,31,32,%r25  ;offset 0xa48
+        COPY    %r2,%r24        ;offset 0xa4c
+        .CALL   ;in=23,24,25,26;out=20,21,22,28,29; (MILLICALL)
+        B,L     $$div2U,%r31    ;offset 0xa50
+        EXTRD,U %r2,31,32,%r23  ;offset 0xa54
+        DEPD    %r28,31,32,%r29 ;offset 0xa58
+$00060022
+        STD     %r29,-152(%r30) ;offset 0xa5c
+$D1
+        AND     %r5,%r19,%r24   ;offset 0xa60
+        EXTRD,U %r24,31,32,%r24 ;offset 0xa64
+        STW     %r2,-160(%r30)  ;offset 0xa68
+        STW     %r7,-128(%r30)  ;offset 0xa6c
+        FLDD    -152(%r30),%fr4 ;offset 0xa70
+        FLDD    -152(%r30),%fr7 ;offset 0xa74
+        FLDW    -160(%r30),%fr8L        ;offset 0xa78
+        FLDW    -128(%r30),%fr5L        ;offset 0xa7c
+        XMPYU   %fr8L,%fr7L,%fr10       ;offset 0xa80
+        FSTD    %fr10,-136(%r30)        ;offset 0xa84
+        XMPYU   %fr8L,%fr7R,%fr22       ;offset 0xa88
+        FSTD    %fr22,-144(%r30)        ;offset 0xa8c
+        XMPYU   %fr5L,%fr4L,%fr11       ;offset 0xa90
+        XMPYU   %fr5L,%fr4R,%fr23       ;offset 0xa94
+        FSTD    %fr11,-112(%r30)        ;offset 0xa98
+        FSTD    %fr23,-120(%r30)        ;offset 0xa9c
+        LDD     -136(%r30),%r28 ;offset 0xaa0
+        DEPD,Z  %r28,31,32,%r31 ;offset 0xaa4
+        LDD     -144(%r30),%r20 ;offset 0xaa8
+        ADD,L   %r20,%r31,%r31  ;offset 0xaac
+        LDD     -112(%r30),%r22 ;offset 0xab0
+        DEPD,Z  %r22,31,32,%r22 ;offset 0xab4
+        LDD     -120(%r30),%r21 ;offset 0xab8
+        B       $00060024       ;offset 0xabc
+        ADD,L   %r21,%r22,%r23  ;offset 0xac0
+$D0
+        OR      %r9,%r29,%r29   ;offset 0xac4
+$00060040
+        EXTRD,U %r29,31,32,%r28 ;offset 0xac8
+$00060002
+$L2
+        LDW     -212(%r30),%r2  ;offset 0xacc
+$D3
+        LDW     -168(%r30),%r9  ;offset 0xad0
+        LDD     -176(%r30),%r8  ;offset 0xad4
+        EXTRD,U %r8,31,32,%r7   ;offset 0xad8
+        LDD     -184(%r30),%r6  ;offset 0xadc
+        EXTRD,U %r6,31,32,%r5   ;offset 0xae0
+        LDW     -188(%r30),%r4  ;offset 0xae4
+        BVE     (%r2)   ;offset 0xae8
+        .EXIT
+        LDW,MB  -192(%r30),%r3  ;offset 0xaec
+	.PROCEND	;in=23,25;out=28,29;fpin=105,107;
+
+
+
+
+;----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+;
+; Registers to hold 64-bit values to manipulate.  The "L" part
+; of the register corresponds to the upper 32-bits, while the "R"
+; part corresponds to the lower 32-bits
+; 
+; Note, that when using b6 and b7, the code must save these before
+; using them because they are callee save registers 
+; 
+;
+; Floating point registers to use to save values that
+; are manipulated.  These don't collide with ftemp1-6 and
+; are all caller save registers
+;
+a0        .reg %fr22
+a0L       .reg %fr22L
+a0R       .reg %fr22R
+
+a1        .reg %fr23
+a1L       .reg %fr23L
+a1R       .reg %fr23R
+
+a2        .reg %fr24
+a2L       .reg %fr24L
+a2R       .reg %fr24R
+
+a3        .reg %fr25
+a3L       .reg %fr25L
+a3R       .reg %fr25R
+
+a4        .reg %fr26
+a4L       .reg %fr26L
+a4R       .reg %fr26R
+
+a5        .reg %fr27
+a5L       .reg %fr27L
+a5R       .reg %fr27R
+
+a6        .reg %fr28
+a6L       .reg %fr28L
+a6R       .reg %fr28R
+
+a7        .reg %fr29
+a7L       .reg %fr29L
+a7R       .reg %fr29R
+
+b0        .reg %fr30
+b0L       .reg %fr30L
+b0R       .reg %fr30R
+
+b1        .reg %fr31
+b1L       .reg %fr31L
+b1R       .reg %fr31R
+
+;
+; Temporary floating point variables, these are all caller save
+; registers
+;
+ftemp1    .reg %fr4
+ftemp2    .reg %fr5
+ftemp3    .reg %fr6
+ftemp4    .reg %fr7
+
+;
+; The B set of registers when used.
+;
+
+b2        .reg %fr8
+b2L       .reg %fr8L
+b2R       .reg %fr8R
+
+b3        .reg %fr9
+b3L       .reg %fr9L
+b3R       .reg %fr9R
+
+b4        .reg %fr10
+b4L       .reg %fr10L
+b4R       .reg %fr10R
+
+b5        .reg %fr11
+b5L       .reg %fr11L
+b5R       .reg %fr11R
+
+b6        .reg %fr12
+b6L       .reg %fr12L
+b6R       .reg %fr12R
+
+b7        .reg %fr13
+b7L       .reg %fr13L
+b7R       .reg %fr13R
+
+c1           .reg %r21   ; only reg
+temp1        .reg %r20   ; only reg
+temp2        .reg %r19   ; only reg
+temp3        .reg %r31   ; only reg
+
+m1           .reg %r28   
+c2           .reg %r23   
+high_one     .reg %r1
+ht           .reg %r6
+lt           .reg %r5
+m            .reg %r4
+c3           .reg %r3
+
+SQR_ADD_C  .macro  A0L,A0R,C1,C2,C3
+    XMPYU   A0L,A0R,ftemp1       ; m
+    FSTD    ftemp1,-24(%sp)      ; store m
+
+    XMPYU   A0R,A0R,ftemp2       ; lt
+    FSTD    ftemp2,-16(%sp)      ; store lt
+
+    XMPYU   A0L,A0L,ftemp3       ; ht
+    FSTD    ftemp3,-8(%sp)       ; store ht
+
+    LDD     -24(%sp),m           ; load m
+    AND     m,high_mask,temp2    ; m & Mask
+    DEPD,Z  m,30,31,temp3        ; m << 32+1
+    LDD     -16(%sp),lt          ; lt
+
+    LDD     -8(%sp),ht           ; ht
+    EXTRD,U temp2,32,33,temp1    ; temp1 = m&Mask >> 32-1
+    ADD     temp3,lt,lt          ; lt = lt+m
+    ADD,L   ht,temp1,ht          ; ht += temp1
+    ADD,DC  ht,%r0,ht            ; ht++
+
+    ADD     C1,lt,C1             ; c1=c1+lt
+    ADD,DC  ht,%r0,ht            ; ht++
+
+    ADD     C2,ht,C2             ; c2=c2+ht
+    ADD,DC  C3,%r0,C3            ; c3++
+.endm
+
+SQR_ADD_C2 .macro  A0L,A0R,A1L,A1R,C1,C2,C3
+    XMPYU   A0L,A1R,ftemp1          ; m1 = bl*ht
+    FSTD    ftemp1,-16(%sp)         ;
+    XMPYU   A0R,A1L,ftemp2          ; m = bh*lt
+    FSTD    ftemp2,-8(%sp)          ;
+    XMPYU   A0R,A1R,ftemp3          ; lt = bl*lt
+    FSTD    ftemp3,-32(%sp)
+    XMPYU   A0L,A1L,ftemp4          ; ht = bh*ht
+    FSTD    ftemp4,-24(%sp)         ;
+
+    LDD     -8(%sp),m               ; r21 = m
+    LDD     -16(%sp),m1             ; r19 = m1
+    ADD,L   m,m1,m                  ; m+m1
+
+    DEPD,Z  m,31,32,temp3           ; (m+m1<<32)
+    LDD     -24(%sp),ht             ; r24 = ht
+
+    CMPCLR,*>>= m,m1,%r0            ; if (m < m1)
+    ADD,L   ht,high_one,ht          ; ht+=high_one
+
+    EXTRD,U m,31,32,temp1           ; m >> 32
+    LDD     -32(%sp),lt             ; lt
+    ADD,L   ht,temp1,ht             ; ht+= m>>32
+    ADD     lt,temp3,lt             ; lt = lt+m1
+    ADD,DC  ht,%r0,ht               ; ht++
+
+    ADD     ht,ht,ht                ; ht=ht+ht;
+    ADD,DC  C3,%r0,C3               ; add in carry (c3++)
+
+    ADD     lt,lt,lt                ; lt=lt+lt;
+    ADD,DC  ht,%r0,ht               ; add in carry (ht++)
+
+    ADD     C1,lt,C1                ; c1=c1+lt
+    ADD,DC,*NUV ht,%r0,ht           ; add in carry (ht++)
+    LDO     1(C3),C3              ; bump c3 if overflow,nullify otherwise
+
+    ADD     C2,ht,C2                ; c2 = c2 + ht
+    ADD,DC  C3,%r0,C3             ; add in carry (c3++)
+.endm
+
+;
+;void bn_sqr_comba8(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a)
+; arg0 = r_ptr
+; arg1 = a_ptr
+;
+
+bn_sqr_comba8
+	.PROC
+	.CALLINFO FRAME=128,ENTRY_GR=%r3,ARGS_SAVED,ORDERING_AWARE
+	.EXPORT	bn_sqr_comba8,ENTRY,PRIV_LEV=3,NO_RELOCATION,LONG_RETURN
+    .ENTRY
+	.align 64
+
+    STD     %r3,0(%sp)          ; save r3
+    STD     %r4,8(%sp)          ; save r4
+    STD     %r5,16(%sp)         ; save r5
+    STD     %r6,24(%sp)         ; save r6
+
+	;
+	; Zero out carries
+	;
+	COPY     %r0,c1
+	COPY     %r0,c2
+	COPY     %r0,c3
+
+	LDO      128(%sp),%sp       ; bump stack
+    DEPDI,Z -1,32,33,high_mask   ; Create Mask 0xffffffff80000000L
+    DEPDI,Z  1,31,1,high_one     ; Create Value  1 << 32
+
+	;
+	; Load up all of the values we are going to use
+	;
+    FLDD     0(a_ptr),a0       
+    FLDD     8(a_ptr),a1       
+    FLDD    16(a_ptr),a2       
+    FLDD    24(a_ptr),a3       
+    FLDD    32(a_ptr),a4       
+    FLDD    40(a_ptr),a5       
+    FLDD    48(a_ptr),a6       
+    FLDD    56(a_ptr),a7       
+
+	SQR_ADD_C a0L,a0R,c1,c2,c3
+	STD     c1,0(r_ptr)          ; r[0] = c1;
+	COPY    %r0,c1
+
+	SQR_ADD_C2 a1L,a1R,a0L,a0R,c2,c3,c1
+	STD     c2,8(r_ptr)          ; r[1] = c2;
+	COPY    %r0,c2
+
+	SQR_ADD_C a1L,a1R,c3,c1,c2
+	SQR_ADD_C2 a2L,a2R,a0L,a0R,c3,c1,c2
+	STD     c3,16(r_ptr)            ; r[2] = c3;
+	COPY    %r0,c3
+
+	SQR_ADD_C2 a3L,a3R,a0L,a0R,c1,c2,c3
+	SQR_ADD_C2 a2L,a2R,a1L,a1R,c1,c2,c3
+	STD     c1,24(r_ptr)           ; r[3] = c1;
+	COPY    %r0,c1
+
+	SQR_ADD_C a2L,a2R,c2,c3,c1
+	SQR_ADD_C2 a3L,a3R,a1L,a1R,c2,c3,c1
+	SQR_ADD_C2 a4L,a4R,a0L,a0R,c2,c3,c1
+	STD     c2,32(r_ptr)          ; r[4] = c2;
+	COPY    %r0,c2
+
+	SQR_ADD_C2 a5L,a5R,a0L,a0R,c3,c1,c2
+	SQR_ADD_C2 a4L,a4R,a1L,a1R,c3,c1,c2
+	SQR_ADD_C2 a3L,a3R,a2L,a2R,c3,c1,c2
+	STD     c3,40(r_ptr)          ; r[5] = c3;
+	COPY    %r0,c3
+
+	SQR_ADD_C a3L,a3R,c1,c2,c3
+	SQR_ADD_C2 a4L,a4R,a2L,a2R,c1,c2,c3
+	SQR_ADD_C2 a5L,a5R,a1L,a1R,c1,c2,c3
+	SQR_ADD_C2 a6L,a6R,a0L,a0R,c1,c2,c3
+	STD     c1,48(r_ptr)          ; r[6] = c1;
+	COPY    %r0,c1
+
+	SQR_ADD_C2 a7L,a7R,a0L,a0R,c2,c3,c1
+	SQR_ADD_C2 a6L,a6R,a1L,a1R,c2,c3,c1
+	SQR_ADD_C2 a5L,a5R,a2L,a2R,c2,c3,c1
+	SQR_ADD_C2 a4L,a4R,a3L,a3R,c2,c3,c1
+	STD     c2,56(r_ptr)          ; r[7] = c2;
+	COPY    %r0,c2
+
+	SQR_ADD_C a4L,a4R,c3,c1,c2
+	SQR_ADD_C2 a5L,a5R,a3L,a3R,c3,c1,c2
+	SQR_ADD_C2 a6L,a6R,a2L,a2R,c3,c1,c2
+	SQR_ADD_C2 a7L,a7R,a1L,a1R,c3,c1,c2
+	STD     c3,64(r_ptr)          ; r[8] = c3;
+	COPY    %r0,c3
+
+	SQR_ADD_C2 a7L,a7R,a2L,a2R,c1,c2,c3
+	SQR_ADD_C2 a6L,a6R,a3L,a3R,c1,c2,c3
+	SQR_ADD_C2 a5L,a5R,a4L,a4R,c1,c2,c3
+	STD     c1,72(r_ptr)          ; r[9] = c1;
+	COPY    %r0,c1
+
+	SQR_ADD_C a5L,a5R,c2,c3,c1
+	SQR_ADD_C2 a6L,a6R,a4L,a4R,c2,c3,c1
+	SQR_ADD_C2 a7L,a7R,a3L,a3R,c2,c3,c1
+	STD     c2,80(r_ptr)          ; r[10] = c2;
+	COPY    %r0,c2
+
+	SQR_ADD_C2 a7L,a7R,a4L,a4R,c3,c1,c2
+	SQR_ADD_C2 a6L,a6R,a5L,a5R,c3,c1,c2
+	STD     c3,88(r_ptr)          ; r[11] = c3;
+	COPY    %r0,c3
+	
+	SQR_ADD_C a6L,a6R,c1,c2,c3
+	SQR_ADD_C2 a7L,a7R,a5L,a5R,c1,c2,c3
+	STD     c1,96(r_ptr)          ; r[12] = c1;
+	COPY    %r0,c1
+
+	SQR_ADD_C2 a7L,a7R,a6L,a6R,c2,c3,c1
+	STD     c2,104(r_ptr)         ; r[13] = c2;
+	COPY    %r0,c2
+
+	SQR_ADD_C a7L,a7R,c3,c1,c2
+	STD     c3, 112(r_ptr)       ; r[14] = c3
+	STD     c1, 120(r_ptr)       ; r[15] = c1
+
+    .EXIT
+    LDD     -104(%sp),%r6        ; restore r6
+    LDD     -112(%sp),%r5        ; restore r5
+    LDD     -120(%sp),%r4        ; restore r4
+    BVE     (%rp)
+    LDD,MB  -128(%sp),%r3
+
+	.PROCEND	
+
+;-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+;
+;void bn_sqr_comba4(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a)
+; arg0 = r_ptr
+; arg1 = a_ptr
+;
+
+bn_sqr_comba4
+	.proc
+	.callinfo FRAME=128,ENTRY_GR=%r3,ARGS_SAVED,ORDERING_AWARE
+	.EXPORT	bn_sqr_comba4,ENTRY,PRIV_LEV=3,NO_RELOCATION,LONG_RETURN
+    .entry
+	.align 64
+    STD     %r3,0(%sp)          ; save r3
+    STD     %r4,8(%sp)          ; save r4
+    STD     %r5,16(%sp)         ; save r5
+    STD     %r6,24(%sp)         ; save r6
+
+	;
+	; Zero out carries
+	;
+	COPY     %r0,c1
+	COPY     %r0,c2
+	COPY     %r0,c3
+
+	LDO      128(%sp),%sp       ; bump stack
+    DEPDI,Z -1,32,33,high_mask   ; Create Mask 0xffffffff80000000L
+    DEPDI,Z  1,31,1,high_one     ; Create Value  1 << 32
+
+	;
+	; Load up all of the values we are going to use
+	;
+    FLDD     0(a_ptr),a0       
+    FLDD     8(a_ptr),a1       
+    FLDD    16(a_ptr),a2       
+    FLDD    24(a_ptr),a3       
+    FLDD    32(a_ptr),a4       
+    FLDD    40(a_ptr),a5       
+    FLDD    48(a_ptr),a6       
+    FLDD    56(a_ptr),a7       
+
+	SQR_ADD_C a0L,a0R,c1,c2,c3
+
+	STD     c1,0(r_ptr)          ; r[0] = c1;
+	COPY    %r0,c1
+
+	SQR_ADD_C2 a1L,a1R,a0L,a0R,c2,c3,c1
+
+	STD     c2,8(r_ptr)          ; r[1] = c2;
+	COPY    %r0,c2
+
+	SQR_ADD_C a1L,a1R,c3,c1,c2
+	SQR_ADD_C2 a2L,a2R,a0L,a0R,c3,c1,c2
+
+	STD     c3,16(r_ptr)            ; r[2] = c3;
+	COPY    %r0,c3
+
+	SQR_ADD_C2 a3L,a3R,a0L,a0R,c1,c2,c3
+	SQR_ADD_C2 a2L,a2R,a1L,a1R,c1,c2,c3
+
+	STD     c1,24(r_ptr)           ; r[3] = c1;
+	COPY    %r0,c1
+
+	SQR_ADD_C a2L,a2R,c2,c3,c1
+	SQR_ADD_C2 a3L,a3R,a1L,a1R,c2,c3,c1
+
+	STD     c2,32(r_ptr)           ; r[4] = c2;
+	COPY    %r0,c2
+
+	SQR_ADD_C2 a3L,a3R,a2L,a2R,c3,c1,c2
+	STD     c3,40(r_ptr)           ; r[5] = c3;
+	COPY    %r0,c3
+
+	SQR_ADD_C a3L,a3R,c1,c2,c3
+	STD     c1,48(r_ptr)           ; r[6] = c1;
+	STD     c2,56(r_ptr)           ; r[7] = c2;
+
+    .EXIT
+    LDD     -104(%sp),%r6        ; restore r6
+    LDD     -112(%sp),%r5        ; restore r5
+    LDD     -120(%sp),%r4        ; restore r4
+    BVE     (%rp)
+    LDD,MB  -128(%sp),%r3
+
+	.PROCEND	
+
+
+;---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+MUL_ADD_C  .macro  A0L,A0R,B0L,B0R,C1,C2,C3
+    XMPYU   A0L,B0R,ftemp1        ; m1 = bl*ht
+    FSTD    ftemp1,-16(%sp)       ;
+    XMPYU   A0R,B0L,ftemp2        ; m = bh*lt
+    FSTD    ftemp2,-8(%sp)        ;
+    XMPYU   A0R,B0R,ftemp3        ; lt = bl*lt
+    FSTD    ftemp3,-32(%sp)
+    XMPYU   A0L,B0L,ftemp4        ; ht = bh*ht
+    FSTD    ftemp4,-24(%sp)       ;
+
+    LDD     -8(%sp),m             ; r21 = m
+    LDD     -16(%sp),m1           ; r19 = m1
+    ADD,L   m,m1,m                ; m+m1
+
+    DEPD,Z  m,31,32,temp3         ; (m+m1<<32)
+    LDD     -24(%sp),ht           ; r24 = ht
+
+    CMPCLR,*>>= m,m1,%r0          ; if (m < m1)
+    ADD,L   ht,high_one,ht        ; ht+=high_one
+
+    EXTRD,U m,31,32,temp1         ; m >> 32
+    LDD     -32(%sp),lt           ; lt
+    ADD,L   ht,temp1,ht           ; ht+= m>>32
+    ADD     lt,temp3,lt           ; lt = lt+m1
+    ADD,DC  ht,%r0,ht             ; ht++
+
+    ADD     C1,lt,C1              ; c1=c1+lt
+    ADD,DC  ht,%r0,ht             ; bump c3 if overflow,nullify otherwise
+
+    ADD     C2,ht,C2              ; c2 = c2 + ht
+    ADD,DC  C3,%r0,C3             ; add in carry (c3++)
+.endm
+
+
+;
+;void bn_mul_comba8(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b)
+; arg0 = r_ptr
+; arg1 = a_ptr
+; arg2 = b_ptr
+;
+
+bn_mul_comba8
+	.proc
+	.callinfo FRAME=128,ENTRY_GR=%r3,ARGS_SAVED,ORDERING_AWARE
+	.EXPORT	bn_mul_comba8,ENTRY,PRIV_LEV=3,NO_RELOCATION,LONG_RETURN
+    .entry
+	.align 64
+
+    STD     %r3,0(%sp)          ; save r3
+    STD     %r4,8(%sp)          ; save r4
+    STD     %r5,16(%sp)         ; save r5
+    STD     %r6,24(%sp)         ; save r6
+    FSTD    %fr12,32(%sp)       ; save r6
+    FSTD    %fr13,40(%sp)       ; save r7
+
+	;
+	; Zero out carries
+	;
+	COPY     %r0,c1
+	COPY     %r0,c2
+	COPY     %r0,c3
+
+	LDO      128(%sp),%sp       ; bump stack
+    DEPDI,Z  1,31,1,high_one     ; Create Value  1 << 32
+
+	;
+	; Load up all of the values we are going to use
+	;
+    FLDD      0(a_ptr),a0       
+    FLDD      8(a_ptr),a1       
+    FLDD     16(a_ptr),a2       
+    FLDD     24(a_ptr),a3       
+    FLDD     32(a_ptr),a4       
+    FLDD     40(a_ptr),a5       
+    FLDD     48(a_ptr),a6       
+    FLDD     56(a_ptr),a7       
+
+    FLDD      0(b_ptr),b0       
+    FLDD      8(b_ptr),b1       
+    FLDD     16(b_ptr),b2       
+    FLDD     24(b_ptr),b3       
+    FLDD     32(b_ptr),b4       
+    FLDD     40(b_ptr),b5       
+    FLDD     48(b_ptr),b6       
+    FLDD     56(b_ptr),b7       
+
+	MUL_ADD_C a0L,a0R,b0L,b0R,c1,c2,c3
+	STD       c1,0(r_ptr)
+	COPY      %r0,c1
+
+	MUL_ADD_C a0L,a0R,b1L,b1R,c2,c3,c1
+	MUL_ADD_C a1L,a1R,b0L,b0R,c2,c3,c1
+	STD       c2,8(r_ptr)
+	COPY      %r0,c2
+
+	MUL_ADD_C a2L,a2R,b0L,b0R,c3,c1,c2
+	MUL_ADD_C a1L,a1R,b1L,b1R,c3,c1,c2
+	MUL_ADD_C a0L,a0R,b2L,b2R,c3,c1,c2
+	STD       c3,16(r_ptr)
+	COPY      %r0,c3
+
+	MUL_ADD_C a0L,a0R,b3L,b3R,c1,c2,c3
+	MUL_ADD_C a1L,a1R,b2L,b2R,c1,c2,c3
+	MUL_ADD_C a2L,a2R,b1L,b1R,c1,c2,c3
+	MUL_ADD_C a3L,a3R,b0L,b0R,c1,c2,c3
+	STD       c1,24(r_ptr)
+	COPY      %r0,c1
+
+	MUL_ADD_C a4L,a4R,b0L,b0R,c2,c3,c1
+	MUL_ADD_C a3L,a3R,b1L,b1R,c2,c3,c1
+	MUL_ADD_C a2L,a2R,b2L,b2R,c2,c3,c1
+	MUL_ADD_C a1L,a1R,b3L,b3R,c2,c3,c1
+	MUL_ADD_C a0L,a0R,b4L,b4R,c2,c3,c1
+	STD       c2,32(r_ptr)
+	COPY      %r0,c2
+
+	MUL_ADD_C a0L,a0R,b5L,b5R,c3,c1,c2
+	MUL_ADD_C a1L,a1R,b4L,b4R,c3,c1,c2
+	MUL_ADD_C a2L,a2R,b3L,b3R,c3,c1,c2
+	MUL_ADD_C a3L,a3R,b2L,b2R,c3,c1,c2
+	MUL_ADD_C a4L,a4R,b1L,b1R,c3,c1,c2
+	MUL_ADD_C a5L,a5R,b0L,b0R,c3,c1,c2
+	STD       c3,40(r_ptr)
+	COPY      %r0,c3
+
+	MUL_ADD_C a6L,a6R,b0L,b0R,c1,c2,c3
+	MUL_ADD_C a5L,a5R,b1L,b1R,c1,c2,c3
+	MUL_ADD_C a4L,a4R,b2L,b2R,c1,c2,c3
+	MUL_ADD_C a3L,a3R,b3L,b3R,c1,c2,c3
+	MUL_ADD_C a2L,a2R,b4L,b4R,c1,c2,c3
+	MUL_ADD_C a1L,a1R,b5L,b5R,c1,c2,c3
+	MUL_ADD_C a0L,a0R,b6L,b6R,c1,c2,c3
+	STD       c1,48(r_ptr)
+	COPY      %r0,c1
+	
+	MUL_ADD_C a0L,a0R,b7L,b7R,c2,c3,c1
+	MUL_ADD_C a1L,a1R,b6L,b6R,c2,c3,c1
+	MUL_ADD_C a2L,a2R,b5L,b5R,c2,c3,c1
+	MUL_ADD_C a3L,a3R,b4L,b4R,c2,c3,c1
+	MUL_ADD_C a4L,a4R,b3L,b3R,c2,c3,c1
+	MUL_ADD_C a5L,a5R,b2L,b2R,c2,c3,c1
+	MUL_ADD_C a6L,a6R,b1L,b1R,c2,c3,c1
+	MUL_ADD_C a7L,a7R,b0L,b0R,c2,c3,c1
+	STD       c2,56(r_ptr)
+	COPY      %r0,c2
+
+	MUL_ADD_C a7L,a7R,b1L,b1R,c3,c1,c2
+	MUL_ADD_C a6L,a6R,b2L,b2R,c3,c1,c2
+	MUL_ADD_C a5L,a5R,b3L,b3R,c3,c1,c2
+	MUL_ADD_C a4L,a4R,b4L,b4R,c3,c1,c2
+	MUL_ADD_C a3L,a3R,b5L,b5R,c3,c1,c2
+	MUL_ADD_C a2L,a2R,b6L,b6R,c3,c1,c2
+	MUL_ADD_C a1L,a1R,b7L,b7R,c3,c1,c2
+	STD       c3,64(r_ptr)
+	COPY      %r0,c3
+
+	MUL_ADD_C a2L,a2R,b7L,b7R,c1,c2,c3
+	MUL_ADD_C a3L,a3R,b6L,b6R,c1,c2,c3
+	MUL_ADD_C a4L,a4R,b5L,b5R,c1,c2,c3
+	MUL_ADD_C a5L,a5R,b4L,b4R,c1,c2,c3
+	MUL_ADD_C a6L,a6R,b3L,b3R,c1,c2,c3
+	MUL_ADD_C a7L,a7R,b2L,b2R,c1,c2,c3
+	STD       c1,72(r_ptr)
+	COPY      %r0,c1
+
+	MUL_ADD_C a7L,a7R,b3L,b3R,c2,c3,c1
+	MUL_ADD_C a6L,a6R,b4L,b4R,c2,c3,c1
+	MUL_ADD_C a5L,a5R,b5L,b5R,c2,c3,c1
+	MUL_ADD_C a4L,a4R,b6L,b6R,c2,c3,c1
+	MUL_ADD_C a3L,a3R,b7L,b7R,c2,c3,c1
+	STD       c2,80(r_ptr)
+	COPY      %r0,c2
+
+	MUL_ADD_C a4L,a4R,b7L,b7R,c3,c1,c2
+	MUL_ADD_C a5L,a5R,b6L,b6R,c3,c1,c2
+	MUL_ADD_C a6L,a6R,b5L,b5R,c3,c1,c2
+	MUL_ADD_C a7L,a7R,b4L,b4R,c3,c1,c2
+	STD       c3,88(r_ptr)
+	COPY      %r0,c3
+
+	MUL_ADD_C a7L,a7R,b5L,b5R,c1,c2,c3
+	MUL_ADD_C a6L,a6R,b6L,b6R,c1,c2,c3
+	MUL_ADD_C a5L,a5R,b7L,b7R,c1,c2,c3
+	STD       c1,96(r_ptr)
+	COPY      %r0,c1
+
+	MUL_ADD_C a6L,a6R,b7L,b7R,c2,c3,c1
+	MUL_ADD_C a7L,a7R,b6L,b6R,c2,c3,c1
+	STD       c2,104(r_ptr)
+	COPY      %r0,c2
+
+	MUL_ADD_C a7L,a7R,b7L,b7R,c3,c1,c2
+	STD       c3,112(r_ptr)
+	STD       c1,120(r_ptr)
+
+    .EXIT
+    FLDD    -88(%sp),%fr13 
+    FLDD    -96(%sp),%fr12 
+    LDD     -104(%sp),%r6        ; restore r6
+    LDD     -112(%sp),%r5        ; restore r5
+    LDD     -120(%sp),%r4        ; restore r4
+    BVE     (%rp)
+    LDD,MB  -128(%sp),%r3
+
+	.PROCEND	
+
+;-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+;
+;void bn_mul_comba4(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b)
+; arg0 = r_ptr
+; arg1 = a_ptr
+; arg2 = b_ptr
+;
+
+bn_mul_comba4
+	.proc
+	.callinfo FRAME=128,ENTRY_GR=%r3,ARGS_SAVED,ORDERING_AWARE
+	.EXPORT	bn_mul_comba4,ENTRY,PRIV_LEV=3,NO_RELOCATION,LONG_RETURN
+    .entry
+	.align 64
+
+    STD     %r3,0(%sp)          ; save r3
+    STD     %r4,8(%sp)          ; save r4
+    STD     %r5,16(%sp)         ; save r5
+    STD     %r6,24(%sp)         ; save r6
+    FSTD    %fr12,32(%sp)       ; save r6
+    FSTD    %fr13,40(%sp)       ; save r7
+
+	;
+	; Zero out carries
+	;
+	COPY     %r0,c1
+	COPY     %r0,c2
+	COPY     %r0,c3
+
+	LDO      128(%sp),%sp       ; bump stack
+    DEPDI,Z  1,31,1,high_one     ; Create Value  1 << 32
+
+	;
+	; Load up all of the values we are going to use
+	;
+    FLDD      0(a_ptr),a0       
+    FLDD      8(a_ptr),a1       
+    FLDD     16(a_ptr),a2       
+    FLDD     24(a_ptr),a3       
+
+    FLDD      0(b_ptr),b0       
+    FLDD      8(b_ptr),b1       
+    FLDD     16(b_ptr),b2       
+    FLDD     24(b_ptr),b3       
+
+	MUL_ADD_C a0L,a0R,b0L,b0R,c1,c2,c3
+	STD       c1,0(r_ptr)
+	COPY      %r0,c1
+
+	MUL_ADD_C a0L,a0R,b1L,b1R,c2,c3,c1
+	MUL_ADD_C a1L,a1R,b0L,b0R,c2,c3,c1
+	STD       c2,8(r_ptr)
+	COPY      %r0,c2
+
+	MUL_ADD_C a2L,a2R,b0L,b0R,c3,c1,c2
+	MUL_ADD_C a1L,a1R,b1L,b1R,c3,c1,c2
+	MUL_ADD_C a0L,a0R,b2L,b2R,c3,c1,c2
+	STD       c3,16(r_ptr)
+	COPY      %r0,c3
+
+	MUL_ADD_C a0L,a0R,b3L,b3R,c1,c2,c3
+	MUL_ADD_C a1L,a1R,b2L,b2R,c1,c2,c3
+	MUL_ADD_C a2L,a2R,b1L,b1R,c1,c2,c3
+	MUL_ADD_C a3L,a3R,b0L,b0R,c1,c2,c3
+	STD       c1,24(r_ptr)
+	COPY      %r0,c1
+
+	MUL_ADD_C a3L,a3R,b1L,b1R,c2,c3,c1
+	MUL_ADD_C a2L,a2R,b2L,b2R,c2,c3,c1
+	MUL_ADD_C a1L,a1R,b3L,b3R,c2,c3,c1
+	STD       c2,32(r_ptr)
+	COPY      %r0,c2
+
+	MUL_ADD_C a2L,a2R,b3L,b3R,c3,c1,c2
+	MUL_ADD_C a3L,a3R,b2L,b2R,c3,c1,c2
+	STD       c3,40(r_ptr)
+	COPY      %r0,c3
+
+	MUL_ADD_C a3L,a3R,b3L,b3R,c1,c2,c3
+	STD       c1,48(r_ptr)
+	STD       c2,56(r_ptr)
+
+    .EXIT
+    FLDD    -88(%sp),%fr13 
+    FLDD    -96(%sp),%fr12 
+    LDD     -104(%sp),%r6        ; restore r6
+    LDD     -112(%sp),%r5        ; restore r5
+    LDD     -120(%sp),%r4        ; restore r4
+    BVE     (%rp)
+    LDD,MB  -128(%sp),%r3
+
+	.PROCEND	
+
+
+;--- not PIC	.SPACE	$TEXT$
+;--- not PIC	.SUBSPA	$CODE$
+;--- not PIC	.SPACE	$PRIVATE$,SORT=16
+;--- not PIC	.IMPORT	$global$,DATA
+;--- not PIC	.SPACE	$TEXT$
+;--- not PIC	.SUBSPA	$CODE$
+;--- not PIC	.SUBSPA	$LIT$,ACCESS=0x2c
+;--- not PIC	C$7
+;--- not PIC	.ALIGN	8
+;--- not PIC	.STRINGZ	"Division would overflow (%d)\n"
+	.END
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/pa-risc2W.s b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/pa-risc2W.s
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9738117
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/pa-risc2W.s
@@ -0,0 +1,1612 @@
+; Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+;
+; Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+; this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+; in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+; https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+;
+; PA-RISC 64-bit implementation of bn_asm code
+;
+; This code is approximately 2x faster than the C version
+; for RSA/DSA.
+;
+; See http://devresource.hp.com/  for more details on the PA-RISC
+; architecture.  Also see the book "PA-RISC 2.0 Architecture"
+; by Gerry Kane for information on the instruction set architecture.
+;
+; Code written by Chris Ruemmler (with some help from the HP C
+; compiler).
+;
+; The code compiles with HP's assembler
+;
+
+	.level	2.0W
+	.space	$TEXT$
+	.subspa	$CODE$,QUAD=0,ALIGN=8,ACCESS=0x2c,CODE_ONLY
+
+;
+; Global Register definitions used for the routines.
+;
+; Some information about HP's runtime architecture for 64-bits.
+;
+; "Caller save" means the calling function must save the register
+; if it wants the register to be preserved.
+; "Callee save" means if a function uses the register, it must save
+; the value before using it.
+;
+; For the floating point registers 
+;
+;    "caller save" registers: fr4-fr11, fr22-fr31
+;    "callee save" registers: fr12-fr21
+;    "special" registers: fr0-fr3 (status and exception registers)
+;
+; For the integer registers
+;     value zero             :  r0
+;     "caller save" registers: r1,r19-r26
+;     "callee save" registers: r3-r18
+;     return register        :  r2  (rp)
+;     return values          ; r28  (ret0,ret1)
+;     Stack pointer          ; r30  (sp) 
+;     global data pointer    ; r27  (dp)
+;     argument pointer       ; r29  (ap)
+;     millicode return ptr   ; r31  (also a caller save register)
+
+
+;
+; Arguments to the routines
+;
+r_ptr       .reg %r26
+a_ptr       .reg %r25
+b_ptr       .reg %r24
+num         .reg %r24
+w           .reg %r23
+n           .reg %r23
+
+
+;
+; Globals used in some routines
+;
+
+top_overflow .reg %r29
+high_mask    .reg %r22    ; value 0xffffffff80000000L
+
+
+;------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+;
+; bn_mul_add_words
+;
+;BN_ULONG bn_mul_add_words(BN_ULONG *r_ptr, BN_ULONG *a_ptr, 
+;								int num, BN_ULONG w)
+;
+; arg0 = r_ptr
+; arg1 = a_ptr
+; arg2 = num
+; arg3 = w
+;
+; Local register definitions
+;
+
+fm1          .reg %fr22
+fm           .reg %fr23
+ht_temp      .reg %fr24
+ht_temp_1    .reg %fr25
+lt_temp      .reg %fr26
+lt_temp_1    .reg %fr27
+fm1_1        .reg %fr28
+fm_1         .reg %fr29
+
+fw_h         .reg %fr7L
+fw_l         .reg %fr7R
+fw           .reg %fr7
+
+fht_0        .reg %fr8L
+flt_0        .reg %fr8R
+t_float_0    .reg %fr8
+
+fht_1        .reg %fr9L
+flt_1        .reg %fr9R
+t_float_1    .reg %fr9
+
+tmp_0        .reg %r31
+tmp_1        .reg %r21
+m_0          .reg %r20 
+m_1          .reg %r19 
+ht_0         .reg %r1  
+ht_1         .reg %r3
+lt_0         .reg %r4
+lt_1         .reg %r5
+m1_0         .reg %r6 
+m1_1         .reg %r7 
+rp_val       .reg %r8
+rp_val_1     .reg %r9
+
+bn_mul_add_words
+	.export	bn_mul_add_words,entry,NO_RELOCATION,LONG_RETURN
+	.proc
+	.callinfo frame=128
+    .entry
+	.align 64
+
+    STD     %r3,0(%sp)          ; save r3  
+    STD     %r4,8(%sp)          ; save r4  
+	NOP                         ; Needed to make the loop 16-byte aligned
+	NOP                         ; Needed to make the loop 16-byte aligned
+
+    STD     %r5,16(%sp)         ; save r5  
+    STD     %r6,24(%sp)         ; save r6  
+    STD     %r7,32(%sp)         ; save r7  
+    STD     %r8,40(%sp)         ; save r8  
+
+    STD     %r9,48(%sp)         ; save r9  
+    COPY    %r0,%ret0           ; return 0 by default
+    DEPDI,Z 1,31,1,top_overflow ; top_overflow = 1 << 32    
+	STD     w,56(%sp)           ; store w on stack
+
+    CMPIB,>= 0,num,bn_mul_add_words_exit  ; if (num <= 0) then exit
+	LDO     128(%sp),%sp       ; bump stack
+
+	;
+	; The loop is unrolled twice, so if there is only 1 number
+    ; then go straight to the cleanup code.
+	;
+	CMPIB,= 1,num,bn_mul_add_words_single_top
+	FLDD    -72(%sp),fw     ; load up w into fp register fw (fw_h/fw_l)
+
+	;
+	; This loop is unrolled 2 times (64-byte aligned as well)
+	;
+	; PA-RISC 2.0 chips have two fully pipelined multipliers, thus
+    ; two 32-bit mutiplies can be issued per cycle.
+    ; 
+bn_mul_add_words_unroll2
+
+    FLDD    0(a_ptr),t_float_0       ; load up 64-bit value (fr8L) ht(L)/lt(R)
+    FLDD    8(a_ptr),t_float_1       ; load up 64-bit value (fr8L) ht(L)/lt(R)
+    LDD     0(r_ptr),rp_val          ; rp[0]
+    LDD     8(r_ptr),rp_val_1        ; rp[1]
+
+    XMPYU   fht_0,fw_l,fm1           ; m1[0] = fht_0*fw_l
+    XMPYU   fht_1,fw_l,fm1_1         ; m1[1] = fht_1*fw_l
+    FSTD    fm1,-16(%sp)             ; -16(sp) = m1[0]
+    FSTD    fm1_1,-48(%sp)           ; -48(sp) = m1[1]
+
+    XMPYU   flt_0,fw_h,fm            ; m[0] = flt_0*fw_h
+    XMPYU   flt_1,fw_h,fm_1          ; m[1] = flt_1*fw_h
+    FSTD    fm,-8(%sp)               ; -8(sp) = m[0]
+    FSTD    fm_1,-40(%sp)            ; -40(sp) = m[1]
+
+    XMPYU   fht_0,fw_h,ht_temp       ; ht_temp   = fht_0*fw_h
+    XMPYU   fht_1,fw_h,ht_temp_1     ; ht_temp_1 = fht_1*fw_h
+    FSTD    ht_temp,-24(%sp)         ; -24(sp)   = ht_temp
+    FSTD    ht_temp_1,-56(%sp)       ; -56(sp)   = ht_temp_1
+
+    XMPYU   flt_0,fw_l,lt_temp       ; lt_temp = lt*fw_l
+    XMPYU   flt_1,fw_l,lt_temp_1     ; lt_temp = lt*fw_l
+    FSTD    lt_temp,-32(%sp)         ; -32(sp) = lt_temp 
+    FSTD    lt_temp_1,-64(%sp)       ; -64(sp) = lt_temp_1 
+
+    LDD     -8(%sp),m_0              ; m[0] 
+    LDD     -40(%sp),m_1             ; m[1]
+    LDD     -16(%sp),m1_0            ; m1[0]
+    LDD     -48(%sp),m1_1            ; m1[1]
+
+    LDD     -24(%sp),ht_0            ; ht[0]
+    LDD     -56(%sp),ht_1            ; ht[1]
+    ADD,L   m1_0,m_0,tmp_0           ; tmp_0 = m[0] + m1[0]; 
+    ADD,L   m1_1,m_1,tmp_1           ; tmp_1 = m[1] + m1[1]; 
+
+    LDD     -32(%sp),lt_0            
+    LDD     -64(%sp),lt_1            
+    CMPCLR,*>>= tmp_0,m1_0, %r0      ; if (m[0] < m1[0])
+    ADD,L   ht_0,top_overflow,ht_0   ; ht[0] += (1<<32)
+
+    CMPCLR,*>>= tmp_1,m1_1,%r0       ; if (m[1] < m1[1])
+    ADD,L   ht_1,top_overflow,ht_1   ; ht[1] += (1<<32)
+    EXTRD,U tmp_0,31,32,m_0          ; m[0]>>32  
+    DEPD,Z  tmp_0,31,32,m1_0         ; m1[0] = m[0]<<32 
+
+    EXTRD,U tmp_1,31,32,m_1          ; m[1]>>32  
+    DEPD,Z  tmp_1,31,32,m1_1         ; m1[1] = m[1]<<32 
+    ADD,L   ht_0,m_0,ht_0            ; ht[0]+= (m[0]>>32)
+    ADD,L   ht_1,m_1,ht_1            ; ht[1]+= (m[1]>>32)
+
+    ADD     lt_0,m1_0,lt_0           ; lt[0] = lt[0]+m1[0];
+	ADD,DC  ht_0,%r0,ht_0            ; ht[0]++
+    ADD     lt_1,m1_1,lt_1           ; lt[1] = lt[1]+m1[1];
+    ADD,DC  ht_1,%r0,ht_1            ; ht[1]++
+
+    ADD    %ret0,lt_0,lt_0           ; lt[0] = lt[0] + c;
+	ADD,DC  ht_0,%r0,ht_0            ; ht[0]++
+    ADD     lt_0,rp_val,lt_0         ; lt[0] = lt[0]+rp[0]
+    ADD,DC  ht_0,%r0,ht_0            ; ht[0]++
+
+	LDO    -2(num),num               ; num = num - 2;
+    ADD     ht_0,lt_1,lt_1           ; lt[1] = lt[1] + ht_0 (c);
+    ADD,DC  ht_1,%r0,ht_1            ; ht[1]++
+    STD     lt_0,0(r_ptr)            ; rp[0] = lt[0]
+
+    ADD     lt_1,rp_val_1,lt_1       ; lt[1] = lt[1]+rp[1]
+    ADD,DC  ht_1,%r0,%ret0           ; ht[1]++
+    LDO     16(a_ptr),a_ptr          ; a_ptr += 2
+
+    STD     lt_1,8(r_ptr)            ; rp[1] = lt[1]
+	CMPIB,<= 2,num,bn_mul_add_words_unroll2 ; go again if more to do
+    LDO     16(r_ptr),r_ptr          ; r_ptr += 2
+
+    CMPIB,=,N 0,num,bn_mul_add_words_exit ; are we done, or cleanup last one
+
+	;
+	; Top of loop aligned on 64-byte boundary
+	;
+bn_mul_add_words_single_top
+    FLDD    0(a_ptr),t_float_0        ; load up 64-bit value (fr8L) ht(L)/lt(R)
+    LDD     0(r_ptr),rp_val           ; rp[0]
+    LDO     8(a_ptr),a_ptr            ; a_ptr++
+    XMPYU   fht_0,fw_l,fm1            ; m1 = ht*fw_l
+    FSTD    fm1,-16(%sp)              ; -16(sp) = m1
+    XMPYU   flt_0,fw_h,fm             ; m = lt*fw_h
+    FSTD    fm,-8(%sp)                ; -8(sp) = m
+    XMPYU   fht_0,fw_h,ht_temp        ; ht_temp = ht*fw_h
+    FSTD    ht_temp,-24(%sp)          ; -24(sp) = ht
+    XMPYU   flt_0,fw_l,lt_temp        ; lt_temp = lt*fw_l
+    FSTD    lt_temp,-32(%sp)          ; -32(sp) = lt 
+
+    LDD     -8(%sp),m_0               
+    LDD    -16(%sp),m1_0              ; m1 = temp1 
+    ADD,L   m_0,m1_0,tmp_0            ; tmp_0 = m + m1; 
+    LDD     -24(%sp),ht_0             
+    LDD     -32(%sp),lt_0             
+
+    CMPCLR,*>>= tmp_0,m1_0,%r0        ; if (m < m1)
+    ADD,L   ht_0,top_overflow,ht_0    ; ht += (1<<32)
+
+    EXTRD,U tmp_0,31,32,m_0           ; m>>32  
+    DEPD,Z  tmp_0,31,32,m1_0          ; m1 = m<<32 
+
+    ADD,L   ht_0,m_0,ht_0             ; ht+= (m>>32)
+    ADD     lt_0,m1_0,tmp_0           ; tmp_0 = lt+m1;
+    ADD,DC  ht_0,%r0,ht_0             ; ht++
+    ADD     %ret0,tmp_0,lt_0          ; lt = lt + c;
+    ADD,DC  ht_0,%r0,ht_0             ; ht++
+    ADD     lt_0,rp_val,lt_0          ; lt = lt+rp[0]
+    ADD,DC  ht_0,%r0,%ret0            ; ht++
+    STD     lt_0,0(r_ptr)             ; rp[0] = lt
+
+bn_mul_add_words_exit
+    .EXIT
+    LDD     -80(%sp),%r9              ; restore r9  
+    LDD     -88(%sp),%r8              ; restore r8  
+    LDD     -96(%sp),%r7              ; restore r7  
+    LDD     -104(%sp),%r6             ; restore r6  
+    LDD     -112(%sp),%r5             ; restore r5  
+    LDD     -120(%sp),%r4             ; restore r4  
+    BVE     (%rp)
+    LDD,MB  -128(%sp),%r3             ; restore r3
+	.PROCEND	;in=23,24,25,26,29;out=28;
+
+;----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+;
+;BN_ULONG bn_mul_words(BN_ULONG *rp, BN_ULONG *ap, int num, BN_ULONG w)
+;
+; arg0 = rp
+; arg1 = ap
+; arg2 = num
+; arg3 = w
+
+bn_mul_words
+	.proc
+	.callinfo frame=128
+    .entry
+	.EXPORT	bn_mul_words,ENTRY,PRIV_LEV=3,NO_RELOCATION,LONG_RETURN
+	.align 64
+
+    STD     %r3,0(%sp)          ; save r3  
+    STD     %r4,8(%sp)          ; save r4  
+    STD     %r5,16(%sp)         ; save r5  
+    STD     %r6,24(%sp)         ; save r6  
+
+    STD     %r7,32(%sp)         ; save r7  
+    COPY    %r0,%ret0           ; return 0 by default
+    DEPDI,Z 1,31,1,top_overflow ; top_overflow = 1 << 32    
+	STD     w,56(%sp)           ; w on stack
+
+    CMPIB,>= 0,num,bn_mul_words_exit
+	LDO     128(%sp),%sp       ; bump stack
+
+	;
+	; See if only 1 word to do, thus just do cleanup
+	;
+	CMPIB,= 1,num,bn_mul_words_single_top
+	FLDD    -72(%sp),fw     ; load up w into fp register fw (fw_h/fw_l)
+
+	;
+	; This loop is unrolled 2 times (64-byte aligned as well)
+	;
+	; PA-RISC 2.0 chips have two fully pipelined multipliers, thus
+    ; two 32-bit mutiplies can be issued per cycle.
+    ; 
+bn_mul_words_unroll2
+
+    FLDD    0(a_ptr),t_float_0        ; load up 64-bit value (fr8L) ht(L)/lt(R)
+    FLDD    8(a_ptr),t_float_1        ; load up 64-bit value (fr8L) ht(L)/lt(R)
+    XMPYU   fht_0,fw_l,fm1            ; m1[0] = fht_0*fw_l
+    XMPYU   fht_1,fw_l,fm1_1          ; m1[1] = ht*fw_l
+
+    FSTD    fm1,-16(%sp)              ; -16(sp) = m1
+    FSTD    fm1_1,-48(%sp)            ; -48(sp) = m1
+    XMPYU   flt_0,fw_h,fm             ; m = lt*fw_h
+    XMPYU   flt_1,fw_h,fm_1           ; m = lt*fw_h
+
+    FSTD    fm,-8(%sp)                ; -8(sp) = m
+    FSTD    fm_1,-40(%sp)             ; -40(sp) = m
+    XMPYU   fht_0,fw_h,ht_temp        ; ht_temp = fht_0*fw_h
+    XMPYU   fht_1,fw_h,ht_temp_1      ; ht_temp = ht*fw_h
+
+    FSTD    ht_temp,-24(%sp)          ; -24(sp) = ht
+    FSTD    ht_temp_1,-56(%sp)        ; -56(sp) = ht
+    XMPYU   flt_0,fw_l,lt_temp        ; lt_temp = lt*fw_l
+    XMPYU   flt_1,fw_l,lt_temp_1      ; lt_temp = lt*fw_l
+
+    FSTD    lt_temp,-32(%sp)          ; -32(sp) = lt 
+    FSTD    lt_temp_1,-64(%sp)        ; -64(sp) = lt 
+    LDD     -8(%sp),m_0               
+    LDD     -40(%sp),m_1              
+
+    LDD    -16(%sp),m1_0              
+    LDD    -48(%sp),m1_1              
+    LDD     -24(%sp),ht_0             
+    LDD     -56(%sp),ht_1             
+
+    ADD,L   m1_0,m_0,tmp_0            ; tmp_0 = m + m1; 
+    ADD,L   m1_1,m_1,tmp_1            ; tmp_1 = m + m1; 
+    LDD     -32(%sp),lt_0             
+    LDD     -64(%sp),lt_1             
+
+    CMPCLR,*>>= tmp_0,m1_0, %r0       ; if (m < m1)
+    ADD,L   ht_0,top_overflow,ht_0    ; ht += (1<<32)
+    CMPCLR,*>>= tmp_1,m1_1,%r0        ; if (m < m1)
+    ADD,L   ht_1,top_overflow,ht_1    ; ht += (1<<32)
+
+    EXTRD,U tmp_0,31,32,m_0           ; m>>32  
+    DEPD,Z  tmp_0,31,32,m1_0          ; m1 = m<<32 
+    EXTRD,U tmp_1,31,32,m_1           ; m>>32  
+    DEPD,Z  tmp_1,31,32,m1_1          ; m1 = m<<32 
+
+    ADD,L   ht_0,m_0,ht_0             ; ht+= (m>>32)
+    ADD,L   ht_1,m_1,ht_1             ; ht+= (m>>32)
+    ADD     lt_0,m1_0,lt_0            ; lt = lt+m1;
+	ADD,DC  ht_0,%r0,ht_0             ; ht++
+
+    ADD     lt_1,m1_1,lt_1            ; lt = lt+m1;
+    ADD,DC  ht_1,%r0,ht_1             ; ht++
+    ADD    %ret0,lt_0,lt_0            ; lt = lt + c (ret0);
+	ADD,DC  ht_0,%r0,ht_0             ; ht++
+
+    ADD     ht_0,lt_1,lt_1            ; lt = lt + c (ht_0)
+    ADD,DC  ht_1,%r0,ht_1             ; ht++
+    STD     lt_0,0(r_ptr)             ; rp[0] = lt
+    STD     lt_1,8(r_ptr)             ; rp[1] = lt
+
+	COPY    ht_1,%ret0                ; carry = ht
+	LDO    -2(num),num                ; num = num - 2;
+    LDO     16(a_ptr),a_ptr           ; ap += 2
+	CMPIB,<= 2,num,bn_mul_words_unroll2
+    LDO     16(r_ptr),r_ptr           ; rp++
+
+    CMPIB,=,N 0,num,bn_mul_words_exit ; are we done?
+
+	;
+	; Top of loop aligned on 64-byte boundary
+	;
+bn_mul_words_single_top
+    FLDD    0(a_ptr),t_float_0        ; load up 64-bit value (fr8L) ht(L)/lt(R)
+
+    XMPYU   fht_0,fw_l,fm1            ; m1 = ht*fw_l
+    FSTD    fm1,-16(%sp)              ; -16(sp) = m1
+    XMPYU   flt_0,fw_h,fm             ; m = lt*fw_h
+    FSTD    fm,-8(%sp)                ; -8(sp) = m
+    XMPYU   fht_0,fw_h,ht_temp        ; ht_temp = ht*fw_h
+    FSTD    ht_temp,-24(%sp)          ; -24(sp) = ht
+    XMPYU   flt_0,fw_l,lt_temp        ; lt_temp = lt*fw_l
+    FSTD    lt_temp,-32(%sp)          ; -32(sp) = lt 
+
+    LDD     -8(%sp),m_0               
+    LDD    -16(%sp),m1_0              
+    ADD,L   m_0,m1_0,tmp_0            ; tmp_0 = m + m1; 
+    LDD     -24(%sp),ht_0             
+    LDD     -32(%sp),lt_0             
+
+    CMPCLR,*>>= tmp_0,m1_0,%r0        ; if (m < m1)
+    ADD,L   ht_0,top_overflow,ht_0    ; ht += (1<<32)
+
+    EXTRD,U tmp_0,31,32,m_0           ; m>>32  
+    DEPD,Z  tmp_0,31,32,m1_0          ; m1 = m<<32 
+
+    ADD,L   ht_0,m_0,ht_0             ; ht+= (m>>32)
+    ADD     lt_0,m1_0,lt_0            ; lt= lt+m1;
+    ADD,DC  ht_0,%r0,ht_0             ; ht++
+
+    ADD     %ret0,lt_0,lt_0           ; lt = lt + c;
+    ADD,DC  ht_0,%r0,ht_0             ; ht++
+
+    COPY    ht_0,%ret0                ; copy carry
+    STD     lt_0,0(r_ptr)             ; rp[0] = lt
+
+bn_mul_words_exit
+    .EXIT
+    LDD     -96(%sp),%r7              ; restore r7  
+    LDD     -104(%sp),%r6             ; restore r6  
+    LDD     -112(%sp),%r5             ; restore r5  
+    LDD     -120(%sp),%r4             ; restore r4  
+    BVE     (%rp)
+    LDD,MB  -128(%sp),%r3             ; restore r3
+	.PROCEND	;in=23,24,25,26,29;out=28;
+
+;----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+;
+;void bn_sqr_words(BN_ULONG *rp, BN_ULONG *ap, int num)
+;
+; arg0 = rp
+; arg1 = ap
+; arg2 = num
+;
+
+bn_sqr_words
+	.proc
+	.callinfo FRAME=128,ENTRY_GR=%r3,ARGS_SAVED,ORDERING_AWARE
+	.EXPORT	bn_sqr_words,ENTRY,PRIV_LEV=3,NO_RELOCATION,LONG_RETURN
+    .entry
+	.align 64
+
+    STD     %r3,0(%sp)          ; save r3  
+    STD     %r4,8(%sp)          ; save r4  
+	NOP
+    STD     %r5,16(%sp)         ; save r5  
+
+    CMPIB,>= 0,num,bn_sqr_words_exit
+	LDO     128(%sp),%sp       ; bump stack
+
+	;
+	; If only 1, the goto straight to cleanup
+	;
+	CMPIB,= 1,num,bn_sqr_words_single_top
+    DEPDI,Z -1,32,33,high_mask   ; Create Mask 0xffffffff80000000L
+
+	;
+	; This loop is unrolled 2 times (64-byte aligned as well)
+	;
+
+bn_sqr_words_unroll2
+    FLDD    0(a_ptr),t_float_0        ; a[0]
+    FLDD    8(a_ptr),t_float_1        ; a[1]
+    XMPYU   fht_0,flt_0,fm            ; m[0]
+    XMPYU   fht_1,flt_1,fm_1          ; m[1]
+
+    FSTD    fm,-24(%sp)               ; store m[0]
+    FSTD    fm_1,-56(%sp)             ; store m[1]
+    XMPYU   flt_0,flt_0,lt_temp       ; lt[0]
+    XMPYU   flt_1,flt_1,lt_temp_1     ; lt[1]
+
+    FSTD    lt_temp,-16(%sp)          ; store lt[0]
+    FSTD    lt_temp_1,-48(%sp)        ; store lt[1]
+    XMPYU   fht_0,fht_0,ht_temp       ; ht[0]
+    XMPYU   fht_1,fht_1,ht_temp_1     ; ht[1]
+
+    FSTD    ht_temp,-8(%sp)           ; store ht[0]
+    FSTD    ht_temp_1,-40(%sp)        ; store ht[1]
+    LDD     -24(%sp),m_0             
+    LDD     -56(%sp),m_1              
+
+    AND     m_0,high_mask,tmp_0       ; m[0] & Mask
+    AND     m_1,high_mask,tmp_1       ; m[1] & Mask
+    DEPD,Z  m_0,30,31,m_0             ; m[0] << 32+1
+    DEPD,Z  m_1,30,31,m_1             ; m[1] << 32+1
+
+    LDD     -16(%sp),lt_0        
+    LDD     -48(%sp),lt_1        
+    EXTRD,U tmp_0,32,33,tmp_0         ; tmp_0 = m[0]&Mask >> 32-1
+    EXTRD,U tmp_1,32,33,tmp_1         ; tmp_1 = m[1]&Mask >> 32-1
+
+    LDD     -8(%sp),ht_0            
+    LDD     -40(%sp),ht_1           
+    ADD,L   ht_0,tmp_0,ht_0           ; ht[0] += tmp_0
+    ADD,L   ht_1,tmp_1,ht_1           ; ht[1] += tmp_1
+
+    ADD     lt_0,m_0,lt_0             ; lt = lt+m
+    ADD,DC  ht_0,%r0,ht_0             ; ht[0]++
+    STD     lt_0,0(r_ptr)             ; rp[0] = lt[0]
+    STD     ht_0,8(r_ptr)             ; rp[1] = ht[1]
+
+    ADD     lt_1,m_1,lt_1             ; lt = lt+m
+    ADD,DC  ht_1,%r0,ht_1             ; ht[1]++
+    STD     lt_1,16(r_ptr)            ; rp[2] = lt[1]
+    STD     ht_1,24(r_ptr)            ; rp[3] = ht[1]
+
+	LDO    -2(num),num                ; num = num - 2;
+    LDO     16(a_ptr),a_ptr           ; ap += 2
+	CMPIB,<= 2,num,bn_sqr_words_unroll2
+    LDO     32(r_ptr),r_ptr           ; rp += 4
+
+    CMPIB,=,N 0,num,bn_sqr_words_exit ; are we done?
+
+	;
+	; Top of loop aligned on 64-byte boundary
+	;
+bn_sqr_words_single_top
+    FLDD    0(a_ptr),t_float_0        ; load up 64-bit value (fr8L) ht(L)/lt(R)
+
+    XMPYU   fht_0,flt_0,fm            ; m
+    FSTD    fm,-24(%sp)               ; store m
+
+    XMPYU   flt_0,flt_0,lt_temp       ; lt
+    FSTD    lt_temp,-16(%sp)          ; store lt
+
+    XMPYU   fht_0,fht_0,ht_temp       ; ht
+    FSTD    ht_temp,-8(%sp)           ; store ht
+
+    LDD     -24(%sp),m_0              ; load m
+    AND     m_0,high_mask,tmp_0       ; m & Mask
+    DEPD,Z  m_0,30,31,m_0             ; m << 32+1
+    LDD     -16(%sp),lt_0             ; lt
+
+    LDD     -8(%sp),ht_0              ; ht
+    EXTRD,U tmp_0,32,33,tmp_0         ; tmp_0 = m&Mask >> 32-1
+    ADD     m_0,lt_0,lt_0             ; lt = lt+m
+    ADD,L   ht_0,tmp_0,ht_0           ; ht += tmp_0
+    ADD,DC  ht_0,%r0,ht_0             ; ht++
+
+    STD     lt_0,0(r_ptr)             ; rp[0] = lt
+    STD     ht_0,8(r_ptr)             ; rp[1] = ht
+
+bn_sqr_words_exit
+    .EXIT
+    LDD     -112(%sp),%r5       ; restore r5  
+    LDD     -120(%sp),%r4       ; restore r4  
+    BVE     (%rp)
+    LDD,MB  -128(%sp),%r3 
+	.PROCEND	;in=23,24,25,26,29;out=28;
+
+
+;----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+;
+;BN_ULONG bn_add_words(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n)
+;
+; arg0 = rp 
+; arg1 = ap
+; arg2 = bp 
+; arg3 = n
+
+t  .reg %r22
+b  .reg %r21
+l  .reg %r20
+
+bn_add_words
+	.proc
+    .entry
+	.callinfo
+	.EXPORT	bn_add_words,ENTRY,PRIV_LEV=3,NO_RELOCATION,LONG_RETURN
+	.align 64
+
+    CMPIB,>= 0,n,bn_add_words_exit
+    COPY    %r0,%ret0           ; return 0 by default
+
+	;
+	; If 2 or more numbers do the loop
+	;
+	CMPIB,= 1,n,bn_add_words_single_top
+	NOP
+
+	;
+	; This loop is unrolled 2 times (64-byte aligned as well)
+	;
+bn_add_words_unroll2
+	LDD     0(a_ptr),t
+	LDD     0(b_ptr),b
+	ADD     t,%ret0,t                    ; t = t+c;
+	ADD,DC  %r0,%r0,%ret0                ; set c to carry
+	ADD     t,b,l                        ; l = t + b[0]
+	ADD,DC  %ret0,%r0,%ret0              ; c+= carry
+	STD     l,0(r_ptr)
+
+	LDD     8(a_ptr),t
+	LDD     8(b_ptr),b
+	ADD     t,%ret0,t                     ; t = t+c;
+	ADD,DC  %r0,%r0,%ret0                 ; set c to carry
+	ADD     t,b,l                         ; l = t + b[0]
+	ADD,DC  %ret0,%r0,%ret0               ; c+= carry
+	STD     l,8(r_ptr)
+
+	LDO     -2(n),n
+	LDO     16(a_ptr),a_ptr
+	LDO     16(b_ptr),b_ptr
+
+	CMPIB,<= 2,n,bn_add_words_unroll2
+	LDO     16(r_ptr),r_ptr
+
+    CMPIB,=,N 0,n,bn_add_words_exit ; are we done?
+
+bn_add_words_single_top
+	LDD     0(a_ptr),t
+	LDD     0(b_ptr),b
+
+	ADD     t,%ret0,t                 ; t = t+c;
+	ADD,DC  %r0,%r0,%ret0             ; set c to carry (could use CMPCLR??)
+	ADD     t,b,l                     ; l = t + b[0]
+	ADD,DC  %ret0,%r0,%ret0           ; c+= carry
+	STD     l,0(r_ptr)
+
+bn_add_words_exit
+    .EXIT
+    BVE     (%rp)
+	NOP
+	.PROCEND	;in=23,24,25,26,29;out=28;
+
+;----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+;
+;BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n)
+;
+; arg0 = rp 
+; arg1 = ap
+; arg2 = bp 
+; arg3 = n
+
+t1       .reg %r22
+t2       .reg %r21
+sub_tmp1 .reg %r20
+sub_tmp2 .reg %r19
+
+
+bn_sub_words
+	.proc
+	.callinfo 
+	.EXPORT	bn_sub_words,ENTRY,PRIV_LEV=3,NO_RELOCATION,LONG_RETURN
+    .entry
+	.align 64
+
+    CMPIB,>=  0,n,bn_sub_words_exit
+    COPY    %r0,%ret0           ; return 0 by default
+
+	;
+	; If 2 or more numbers do the loop
+	;
+	CMPIB,= 1,n,bn_sub_words_single_top
+	NOP
+
+	;
+	; This loop is unrolled 2 times (64-byte aligned as well)
+	;
+bn_sub_words_unroll2
+	LDD     0(a_ptr),t1
+	LDD     0(b_ptr),t2
+	SUB     t1,t2,sub_tmp1           ; t3 = t1-t2; 
+	SUB     sub_tmp1,%ret0,sub_tmp1  ; t3 = t3- c; 
+
+	CMPCLR,*>> t1,t2,sub_tmp2        ; clear if t1 > t2
+	LDO      1(%r0),sub_tmp2
+	
+	CMPCLR,*= t1,t2,%r0
+	COPY    sub_tmp2,%ret0
+	STD     sub_tmp1,0(r_ptr)
+
+	LDD     8(a_ptr),t1
+	LDD     8(b_ptr),t2
+	SUB     t1,t2,sub_tmp1            ; t3 = t1-t2; 
+	SUB     sub_tmp1,%ret0,sub_tmp1   ; t3 = t3- c; 
+	CMPCLR,*>> t1,t2,sub_tmp2         ; clear if t1 > t2
+	LDO      1(%r0),sub_tmp2
+	
+	CMPCLR,*= t1,t2,%r0
+	COPY    sub_tmp2,%ret0
+	STD     sub_tmp1,8(r_ptr)
+
+	LDO     -2(n),n
+	LDO     16(a_ptr),a_ptr
+	LDO     16(b_ptr),b_ptr
+
+	CMPIB,<= 2,n,bn_sub_words_unroll2
+	LDO     16(r_ptr),r_ptr
+
+    CMPIB,=,N 0,n,bn_sub_words_exit ; are we done?
+
+bn_sub_words_single_top
+	LDD     0(a_ptr),t1
+	LDD     0(b_ptr),t2
+	SUB     t1,t2,sub_tmp1            ; t3 = t1-t2; 
+	SUB     sub_tmp1,%ret0,sub_tmp1   ; t3 = t3- c; 
+	CMPCLR,*>> t1,t2,sub_tmp2         ; clear if t1 > t2
+	LDO      1(%r0),sub_tmp2
+	
+	CMPCLR,*= t1,t2,%r0
+	COPY    sub_tmp2,%ret0
+
+	STD     sub_tmp1,0(r_ptr)
+
+bn_sub_words_exit
+    .EXIT
+    BVE     (%rp)
+	NOP
+	.PROCEND	;in=23,24,25,26,29;out=28;
+
+;------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+;
+; unsigned long bn_div_words(unsigned long h, unsigned long l, unsigned long d)
+;
+; arg0 = h
+; arg1 = l
+; arg2 = d
+;
+; This is mainly just modified assembly from the compiler, thus the
+; lack of variable names.
+;
+;------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+bn_div_words
+	.proc
+	.callinfo CALLER,FRAME=272,ENTRY_GR=%r10,SAVE_RP,ARGS_SAVED,ORDERING_AWARE
+	.EXPORT	bn_div_words,ENTRY,PRIV_LEV=3,NO_RELOCATION,LONG_RETURN
+	.IMPORT	BN_num_bits_word,CODE,NO_RELOCATION
+	.IMPORT	__iob,DATA
+	.IMPORT	fprintf,CODE,NO_RELOCATION
+	.IMPORT	abort,CODE,NO_RELOCATION
+	.IMPORT	$$div2U,MILLICODE
+    .entry
+    STD     %r2,-16(%r30)   
+    STD,MA  %r3,352(%r30)   
+    STD     %r4,-344(%r30)  
+    STD     %r5,-336(%r30)  
+    STD     %r6,-328(%r30)  
+    STD     %r7,-320(%r30)  
+    STD     %r8,-312(%r30)  
+    STD     %r9,-304(%r30)  
+    STD     %r10,-296(%r30)
+
+    STD     %r27,-288(%r30)             ; save gp
+
+    COPY    %r24,%r3           ; save d 
+    COPY    %r26,%r4           ; save h (high 64-bits)
+    LDO      -1(%r0),%ret0     ; return -1 by default	
+
+    CMPB,*=  %r0,%arg2,$D3     ; if (d == 0)
+    COPY    %r25,%r5           ; save l (low 64-bits)
+
+    LDO     -48(%r30),%r29     ; create ap 
+    .CALL   ;in=26,29;out=28;
+    B,L     BN_num_bits_word,%r2 
+    COPY    %r3,%r26        
+    LDD     -288(%r30),%r27    ; restore gp 
+    LDI     64,%r21 
+
+    CMPB,=  %r21,%ret0,$00000012   ;if (i == 64) (forward) 
+    COPY    %ret0,%r24             ; i   
+    MTSARCM %r24    
+    DEPDI,Z -1,%sar,1,%r29  
+    CMPB,*<<,N %r29,%r4,bn_div_err_case ; if (h > 1<<i) (forward) 
+
+$00000012
+    SUBI    64,%r24,%r31                       ; i = 64 - i;
+    CMPCLR,*<< %r4,%r3,%r0                     ; if (h >= d)
+    SUB     %r4,%r3,%r4                        ; h -= d
+    CMPB,=  %r31,%r0,$0000001A                 ; if (i)
+    COPY    %r0,%r10                           ; ret = 0
+    MTSARCM %r31                               ; i to shift
+    DEPD,Z  %r3,%sar,64,%r3                    ; d <<= i;
+    SUBI    64,%r31,%r19                       ; 64 - i; redundent
+    MTSAR   %r19                               ; (64 -i) to shift
+    SHRPD   %r4,%r5,%sar,%r4                   ; l>> (64-i)
+    MTSARCM %r31                               ; i to shift
+    DEPD,Z  %r5,%sar,64,%r5                    ; l <<= i;
+
+$0000001A
+    DEPDI,Z -1,31,32,%r19                      
+    EXTRD,U %r3,31,32,%r6                      ; dh=(d&0xfff)>>32
+    EXTRD,U %r3,63,32,%r8                      ; dl = d&0xffffff
+    LDO     2(%r0),%r9
+    STD    %r3,-280(%r30)                      ; "d" to stack
+
+$0000001C
+    DEPDI,Z -1,63,32,%r29                      ; 
+    EXTRD,U %r4,31,32,%r31                     ; h >> 32
+    CMPB,*=,N  %r31,%r6,$D2     	       ; if ((h>>32) != dh)(forward) div
+    COPY    %r4,%r26       
+    EXTRD,U %r4,31,32,%r25 
+    COPY    %r6,%r24      
+    .CALL   ;in=23,24,25,26;out=20,21,22,28,29; (MILLICALL)
+    B,L     $$div2U,%r2     
+    EXTRD,U %r6,31,32,%r23  
+    DEPD    %r28,31,32,%r29 
+$D2
+    STD     %r29,-272(%r30)                   ; q
+    AND     %r5,%r19,%r24                   ; t & 0xffffffff00000000;
+    EXTRD,U %r24,31,32,%r24                 ; ??? 
+    FLDD    -272(%r30),%fr7                 ; q
+    FLDD    -280(%r30),%fr8                 ; d
+    XMPYU   %fr8L,%fr7L,%fr10  
+    FSTD    %fr10,-256(%r30)   
+    XMPYU   %fr8L,%fr7R,%fr22  
+    FSTD    %fr22,-264(%r30)   
+    XMPYU   %fr8R,%fr7L,%fr11 
+    XMPYU   %fr8R,%fr7R,%fr23
+    FSTD    %fr11,-232(%r30)
+    FSTD    %fr23,-240(%r30)
+    LDD     -256(%r30),%r28
+    DEPD,Z  %r28,31,32,%r2 
+    LDD     -264(%r30),%r20
+    ADD,L   %r20,%r2,%r31   
+    LDD     -232(%r30),%r22 
+    DEPD,Z  %r22,31,32,%r22 
+    LDD     -240(%r30),%r21 
+    B       $00000024       ; enter loop  
+    ADD,L   %r21,%r22,%r23 
+
+$0000002A
+    LDO     -1(%r29),%r29   
+    SUB     %r23,%r8,%r23   
+$00000024
+    SUB     %r4,%r31,%r25   
+    AND     %r25,%r19,%r26  
+    CMPB,*<>,N      %r0,%r26,$00000046  ; (forward)
+    DEPD,Z  %r25,31,32,%r20 
+    OR      %r20,%r24,%r21  
+    CMPB,*<<,N  %r21,%r23,$0000002A ;(backward) 
+    SUB     %r31,%r6,%r31   
+;-------------Break path---------------------
+
+$00000046
+    DEPD,Z  %r23,31,32,%r25              ;tl
+    EXTRD,U %r23,31,32,%r26              ;t
+    AND     %r25,%r19,%r24               ;tl = (tl<<32)&0xfffffff0000000L
+    ADD,L   %r31,%r26,%r31               ;th += t; 
+    CMPCLR,*>>=     %r5,%r24,%r0         ;if (l<tl)
+    LDO     1(%r31),%r31                 ; th++;
+    CMPB,*<<=,N     %r31,%r4,$00000036   ;if (n < th) (forward)
+    LDO     -1(%r29),%r29                ;q--; 
+    ADD,L   %r4,%r3,%r4                  ;h += d;
+$00000036
+    ADDIB,=,N       -1,%r9,$D1 ;if (--count == 0) break (forward) 
+    SUB     %r5,%r24,%r28                ; l -= tl;
+    SUB     %r4,%r31,%r24                ; h -= th;
+    SHRPD   %r24,%r28,32,%r4             ; h = ((h<<32)|(l>>32));
+    DEPD,Z  %r29,31,32,%r10              ; ret = q<<32
+    b      $0000001C
+    DEPD,Z  %r28,31,32,%r5               ; l = l << 32 
+
+$D1
+    OR      %r10,%r29,%r28           ; ret |= q
+$D3
+    LDD     -368(%r30),%r2  
+$D0
+    LDD     -296(%r30),%r10 
+    LDD     -304(%r30),%r9  
+    LDD     -312(%r30),%r8  
+    LDD     -320(%r30),%r7  
+    LDD     -328(%r30),%r6  
+    LDD     -336(%r30),%r5  
+    LDD     -344(%r30),%r4  
+    BVE     (%r2)   
+        .EXIT
+    LDD,MB  -352(%r30),%r3 
+
+bn_div_err_case
+    MFIA    %r6     
+    ADDIL   L'bn_div_words-bn_div_err_case,%r6,%r1 
+    LDO     R'bn_div_words-bn_div_err_case(%r1),%r6  
+    ADDIL   LT'__iob,%r27,%r1       
+    LDD     RT'__iob(%r1),%r26      
+    ADDIL   L'C$4-bn_div_words,%r6,%r1    
+    LDO     R'C$4-bn_div_words(%r1),%r25  
+    LDO     64(%r26),%r26   
+    .CALL           ;in=24,25,26,29;out=28;
+    B,L     fprintf,%r2    
+    LDO     -48(%r30),%r29 
+    LDD     -288(%r30),%r27
+    .CALL           ;in=29;
+    B,L     abort,%r2      
+    LDO     -48(%r30),%r29 
+    LDD     -288(%r30),%r27
+    B       $D0         
+    LDD     -368(%r30),%r2  
+	.PROCEND	;in=24,25,26,29;out=28;
+
+;----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+;
+; Registers to hold 64-bit values to manipulate.  The "L" part
+; of the register corresponds to the upper 32-bits, while the "R"
+; part corresponds to the lower 32-bits
+; 
+; Note, that when using b6 and b7, the code must save these before
+; using them because they are callee save registers 
+; 
+;
+; Floating point registers to use to save values that
+; are manipulated.  These don't collide with ftemp1-6 and
+; are all caller save registers
+;
+a0        .reg %fr22
+a0L       .reg %fr22L
+a0R       .reg %fr22R
+
+a1        .reg %fr23
+a1L       .reg %fr23L
+a1R       .reg %fr23R
+
+a2        .reg %fr24
+a2L       .reg %fr24L
+a2R       .reg %fr24R
+
+a3        .reg %fr25
+a3L       .reg %fr25L
+a3R       .reg %fr25R
+
+a4        .reg %fr26
+a4L       .reg %fr26L
+a4R       .reg %fr26R
+
+a5        .reg %fr27
+a5L       .reg %fr27L
+a5R       .reg %fr27R
+
+a6        .reg %fr28
+a6L       .reg %fr28L
+a6R       .reg %fr28R
+
+a7        .reg %fr29
+a7L       .reg %fr29L
+a7R       .reg %fr29R
+
+b0        .reg %fr30
+b0L       .reg %fr30L
+b0R       .reg %fr30R
+
+b1        .reg %fr31
+b1L       .reg %fr31L
+b1R       .reg %fr31R
+
+;
+; Temporary floating point variables, these are all caller save
+; registers
+;
+ftemp1    .reg %fr4
+ftemp2    .reg %fr5
+ftemp3    .reg %fr6
+ftemp4    .reg %fr7
+
+;
+; The B set of registers when used.
+;
+
+b2        .reg %fr8
+b2L       .reg %fr8L
+b2R       .reg %fr8R
+
+b3        .reg %fr9
+b3L       .reg %fr9L
+b3R       .reg %fr9R
+
+b4        .reg %fr10
+b4L       .reg %fr10L
+b4R       .reg %fr10R
+
+b5        .reg %fr11
+b5L       .reg %fr11L
+b5R       .reg %fr11R
+
+b6        .reg %fr12
+b6L       .reg %fr12L
+b6R       .reg %fr12R
+
+b7        .reg %fr13
+b7L       .reg %fr13L
+b7R       .reg %fr13R
+
+c1           .reg %r21   ; only reg
+temp1        .reg %r20   ; only reg
+temp2        .reg %r19   ; only reg
+temp3        .reg %r31   ; only reg
+
+m1           .reg %r28   
+c2           .reg %r23   
+high_one     .reg %r1
+ht           .reg %r6
+lt           .reg %r5
+m            .reg %r4
+c3           .reg %r3
+
+SQR_ADD_C  .macro  A0L,A0R,C1,C2,C3
+    XMPYU   A0L,A0R,ftemp1       ; m
+    FSTD    ftemp1,-24(%sp)      ; store m
+
+    XMPYU   A0R,A0R,ftemp2       ; lt
+    FSTD    ftemp2,-16(%sp)      ; store lt
+
+    XMPYU   A0L,A0L,ftemp3       ; ht
+    FSTD    ftemp3,-8(%sp)       ; store ht
+
+    LDD     -24(%sp),m           ; load m
+    AND     m,high_mask,temp2    ; m & Mask
+    DEPD,Z  m,30,31,temp3        ; m << 32+1
+    LDD     -16(%sp),lt          ; lt
+
+    LDD     -8(%sp),ht           ; ht
+    EXTRD,U temp2,32,33,temp1    ; temp1 = m&Mask >> 32-1
+    ADD     temp3,lt,lt          ; lt = lt+m
+    ADD,L   ht,temp1,ht          ; ht += temp1
+    ADD,DC  ht,%r0,ht            ; ht++
+
+    ADD     C1,lt,C1             ; c1=c1+lt
+    ADD,DC  ht,%r0,ht            ; ht++
+
+    ADD     C2,ht,C2             ; c2=c2+ht
+    ADD,DC  C3,%r0,C3            ; c3++
+.endm
+
+SQR_ADD_C2 .macro  A0L,A0R,A1L,A1R,C1,C2,C3
+    XMPYU   A0L,A1R,ftemp1          ; m1 = bl*ht
+    FSTD    ftemp1,-16(%sp)         ;
+    XMPYU   A0R,A1L,ftemp2          ; m = bh*lt
+    FSTD    ftemp2,-8(%sp)          ;
+    XMPYU   A0R,A1R,ftemp3          ; lt = bl*lt
+    FSTD    ftemp3,-32(%sp)
+    XMPYU   A0L,A1L,ftemp4          ; ht = bh*ht
+    FSTD    ftemp4,-24(%sp)         ;
+
+    LDD     -8(%sp),m               ; r21 = m
+    LDD     -16(%sp),m1             ; r19 = m1
+    ADD,L   m,m1,m                  ; m+m1
+
+    DEPD,Z  m,31,32,temp3           ; (m+m1<<32)
+    LDD     -24(%sp),ht             ; r24 = ht
+
+    CMPCLR,*>>= m,m1,%r0            ; if (m < m1)
+    ADD,L   ht,high_one,ht          ; ht+=high_one
+
+    EXTRD,U m,31,32,temp1           ; m >> 32
+    LDD     -32(%sp),lt             ; lt
+    ADD,L   ht,temp1,ht             ; ht+= m>>32
+    ADD     lt,temp3,lt             ; lt = lt+m1
+    ADD,DC  ht,%r0,ht               ; ht++
+
+    ADD     ht,ht,ht                ; ht=ht+ht;
+    ADD,DC  C3,%r0,C3               ; add in carry (c3++)
+
+    ADD     lt,lt,lt                ; lt=lt+lt;
+    ADD,DC  ht,%r0,ht               ; add in carry (ht++)
+
+    ADD     C1,lt,C1                ; c1=c1+lt
+    ADD,DC,*NUV ht,%r0,ht           ; add in carry (ht++)
+    LDO     1(C3),C3              ; bump c3 if overflow,nullify otherwise
+
+    ADD     C2,ht,C2                ; c2 = c2 + ht
+    ADD,DC  C3,%r0,C3             ; add in carry (c3++)
+.endm
+
+;
+;void bn_sqr_comba8(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a)
+; arg0 = r_ptr
+; arg1 = a_ptr
+;
+
+bn_sqr_comba8
+	.PROC
+	.CALLINFO FRAME=128,ENTRY_GR=%r3,ARGS_SAVED,ORDERING_AWARE
+	.EXPORT	bn_sqr_comba8,ENTRY,PRIV_LEV=3,NO_RELOCATION,LONG_RETURN
+    .ENTRY
+	.align 64
+
+    STD     %r3,0(%sp)          ; save r3
+    STD     %r4,8(%sp)          ; save r4
+    STD     %r5,16(%sp)         ; save r5
+    STD     %r6,24(%sp)         ; save r6
+
+	;
+	; Zero out carries
+	;
+	COPY     %r0,c1
+	COPY     %r0,c2
+	COPY     %r0,c3
+
+	LDO      128(%sp),%sp       ; bump stack
+    DEPDI,Z -1,32,33,high_mask   ; Create Mask 0xffffffff80000000L
+    DEPDI,Z  1,31,1,high_one     ; Create Value  1 << 32
+
+	;
+	; Load up all of the values we are going to use
+	;
+    FLDD     0(a_ptr),a0       
+    FLDD     8(a_ptr),a1       
+    FLDD    16(a_ptr),a2       
+    FLDD    24(a_ptr),a3       
+    FLDD    32(a_ptr),a4       
+    FLDD    40(a_ptr),a5       
+    FLDD    48(a_ptr),a6       
+    FLDD    56(a_ptr),a7       
+
+	SQR_ADD_C a0L,a0R,c1,c2,c3
+	STD     c1,0(r_ptr)          ; r[0] = c1;
+	COPY    %r0,c1
+
+	SQR_ADD_C2 a1L,a1R,a0L,a0R,c2,c3,c1
+	STD     c2,8(r_ptr)          ; r[1] = c2;
+	COPY    %r0,c2
+
+	SQR_ADD_C a1L,a1R,c3,c1,c2
+	SQR_ADD_C2 a2L,a2R,a0L,a0R,c3,c1,c2
+	STD     c3,16(r_ptr)            ; r[2] = c3;
+	COPY    %r0,c3
+
+	SQR_ADD_C2 a3L,a3R,a0L,a0R,c1,c2,c3
+	SQR_ADD_C2 a2L,a2R,a1L,a1R,c1,c2,c3
+	STD     c1,24(r_ptr)           ; r[3] = c1;
+	COPY    %r0,c1
+
+	SQR_ADD_C a2L,a2R,c2,c3,c1
+	SQR_ADD_C2 a3L,a3R,a1L,a1R,c2,c3,c1
+	SQR_ADD_C2 a4L,a4R,a0L,a0R,c2,c3,c1
+	STD     c2,32(r_ptr)          ; r[4] = c2;
+	COPY    %r0,c2
+
+	SQR_ADD_C2 a5L,a5R,a0L,a0R,c3,c1,c2
+	SQR_ADD_C2 a4L,a4R,a1L,a1R,c3,c1,c2
+	SQR_ADD_C2 a3L,a3R,a2L,a2R,c3,c1,c2
+	STD     c3,40(r_ptr)          ; r[5] = c3;
+	COPY    %r0,c3
+
+	SQR_ADD_C a3L,a3R,c1,c2,c3
+	SQR_ADD_C2 a4L,a4R,a2L,a2R,c1,c2,c3
+	SQR_ADD_C2 a5L,a5R,a1L,a1R,c1,c2,c3
+	SQR_ADD_C2 a6L,a6R,a0L,a0R,c1,c2,c3
+	STD     c1,48(r_ptr)          ; r[6] = c1;
+	COPY    %r0,c1
+
+	SQR_ADD_C2 a7L,a7R,a0L,a0R,c2,c3,c1
+	SQR_ADD_C2 a6L,a6R,a1L,a1R,c2,c3,c1
+	SQR_ADD_C2 a5L,a5R,a2L,a2R,c2,c3,c1
+	SQR_ADD_C2 a4L,a4R,a3L,a3R,c2,c3,c1
+	STD     c2,56(r_ptr)          ; r[7] = c2;
+	COPY    %r0,c2
+
+	SQR_ADD_C a4L,a4R,c3,c1,c2
+	SQR_ADD_C2 a5L,a5R,a3L,a3R,c3,c1,c2
+	SQR_ADD_C2 a6L,a6R,a2L,a2R,c3,c1,c2
+	SQR_ADD_C2 a7L,a7R,a1L,a1R,c3,c1,c2
+	STD     c3,64(r_ptr)          ; r[8] = c3;
+	COPY    %r0,c3
+
+	SQR_ADD_C2 a7L,a7R,a2L,a2R,c1,c2,c3
+	SQR_ADD_C2 a6L,a6R,a3L,a3R,c1,c2,c3
+	SQR_ADD_C2 a5L,a5R,a4L,a4R,c1,c2,c3
+	STD     c1,72(r_ptr)          ; r[9] = c1;
+	COPY    %r0,c1
+
+	SQR_ADD_C a5L,a5R,c2,c3,c1
+	SQR_ADD_C2 a6L,a6R,a4L,a4R,c2,c3,c1
+	SQR_ADD_C2 a7L,a7R,a3L,a3R,c2,c3,c1
+	STD     c2,80(r_ptr)          ; r[10] = c2;
+	COPY    %r0,c2
+
+	SQR_ADD_C2 a7L,a7R,a4L,a4R,c3,c1,c2
+	SQR_ADD_C2 a6L,a6R,a5L,a5R,c3,c1,c2
+	STD     c3,88(r_ptr)          ; r[11] = c3;
+	COPY    %r0,c3
+	
+	SQR_ADD_C a6L,a6R,c1,c2,c3
+	SQR_ADD_C2 a7L,a7R,a5L,a5R,c1,c2,c3
+	STD     c1,96(r_ptr)          ; r[12] = c1;
+	COPY    %r0,c1
+
+	SQR_ADD_C2 a7L,a7R,a6L,a6R,c2,c3,c1
+	STD     c2,104(r_ptr)         ; r[13] = c2;
+	COPY    %r0,c2
+
+	SQR_ADD_C a7L,a7R,c3,c1,c2
+	STD     c3, 112(r_ptr)       ; r[14] = c3
+	STD     c1, 120(r_ptr)       ; r[15] = c1
+
+    .EXIT
+    LDD     -104(%sp),%r6        ; restore r6
+    LDD     -112(%sp),%r5        ; restore r5
+    LDD     -120(%sp),%r4        ; restore r4
+    BVE     (%rp)
+    LDD,MB  -128(%sp),%r3
+
+	.PROCEND	
+
+;-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+;
+;void bn_sqr_comba4(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a)
+; arg0 = r_ptr
+; arg1 = a_ptr
+;
+
+bn_sqr_comba4
+	.proc
+	.callinfo FRAME=128,ENTRY_GR=%r3,ARGS_SAVED,ORDERING_AWARE
+	.EXPORT	bn_sqr_comba4,ENTRY,PRIV_LEV=3,NO_RELOCATION,LONG_RETURN
+    .entry
+	.align 64
+    STD     %r3,0(%sp)          ; save r3
+    STD     %r4,8(%sp)          ; save r4
+    STD     %r5,16(%sp)         ; save r5
+    STD     %r6,24(%sp)         ; save r6
+
+	;
+	; Zero out carries
+	;
+	COPY     %r0,c1
+	COPY     %r0,c2
+	COPY     %r0,c3
+
+	LDO      128(%sp),%sp       ; bump stack
+    DEPDI,Z -1,32,33,high_mask   ; Create Mask 0xffffffff80000000L
+    DEPDI,Z  1,31,1,high_one     ; Create Value  1 << 32
+
+	;
+	; Load up all of the values we are going to use
+	;
+    FLDD     0(a_ptr),a0       
+    FLDD     8(a_ptr),a1       
+    FLDD    16(a_ptr),a2       
+    FLDD    24(a_ptr),a3       
+    FLDD    32(a_ptr),a4       
+    FLDD    40(a_ptr),a5       
+    FLDD    48(a_ptr),a6       
+    FLDD    56(a_ptr),a7       
+
+	SQR_ADD_C a0L,a0R,c1,c2,c3
+
+	STD     c1,0(r_ptr)          ; r[0] = c1;
+	COPY    %r0,c1
+
+	SQR_ADD_C2 a1L,a1R,a0L,a0R,c2,c3,c1
+
+	STD     c2,8(r_ptr)          ; r[1] = c2;
+	COPY    %r0,c2
+
+	SQR_ADD_C a1L,a1R,c3,c1,c2
+	SQR_ADD_C2 a2L,a2R,a0L,a0R,c3,c1,c2
+
+	STD     c3,16(r_ptr)            ; r[2] = c3;
+	COPY    %r0,c3
+
+	SQR_ADD_C2 a3L,a3R,a0L,a0R,c1,c2,c3
+	SQR_ADD_C2 a2L,a2R,a1L,a1R,c1,c2,c3
+
+	STD     c1,24(r_ptr)           ; r[3] = c1;
+	COPY    %r0,c1
+
+	SQR_ADD_C a2L,a2R,c2,c3,c1
+	SQR_ADD_C2 a3L,a3R,a1L,a1R,c2,c3,c1
+
+	STD     c2,32(r_ptr)           ; r[4] = c2;
+	COPY    %r0,c2
+
+	SQR_ADD_C2 a3L,a3R,a2L,a2R,c3,c1,c2
+	STD     c3,40(r_ptr)           ; r[5] = c3;
+	COPY    %r0,c3
+
+	SQR_ADD_C a3L,a3R,c1,c2,c3
+	STD     c1,48(r_ptr)           ; r[6] = c1;
+	STD     c2,56(r_ptr)           ; r[7] = c2;
+
+    .EXIT
+    LDD     -104(%sp),%r6        ; restore r6
+    LDD     -112(%sp),%r5        ; restore r5
+    LDD     -120(%sp),%r4        ; restore r4
+    BVE     (%rp)
+    LDD,MB  -128(%sp),%r3
+
+	.PROCEND	
+
+
+;---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+MUL_ADD_C  .macro  A0L,A0R,B0L,B0R,C1,C2,C3
+    XMPYU   A0L,B0R,ftemp1        ; m1 = bl*ht
+    FSTD    ftemp1,-16(%sp)       ;
+    XMPYU   A0R,B0L,ftemp2        ; m = bh*lt
+    FSTD    ftemp2,-8(%sp)        ;
+    XMPYU   A0R,B0R,ftemp3        ; lt = bl*lt
+    FSTD    ftemp3,-32(%sp)
+    XMPYU   A0L,B0L,ftemp4        ; ht = bh*ht
+    FSTD    ftemp4,-24(%sp)       ;
+
+    LDD     -8(%sp),m             ; r21 = m
+    LDD     -16(%sp),m1           ; r19 = m1
+    ADD,L   m,m1,m                ; m+m1
+
+    DEPD,Z  m,31,32,temp3         ; (m+m1<<32)
+    LDD     -24(%sp),ht           ; r24 = ht
+
+    CMPCLR,*>>= m,m1,%r0          ; if (m < m1)
+    ADD,L   ht,high_one,ht        ; ht+=high_one
+
+    EXTRD,U m,31,32,temp1         ; m >> 32
+    LDD     -32(%sp),lt           ; lt
+    ADD,L   ht,temp1,ht           ; ht+= m>>32
+    ADD     lt,temp3,lt           ; lt = lt+m1
+    ADD,DC  ht,%r0,ht             ; ht++
+
+    ADD     C1,lt,C1              ; c1=c1+lt
+    ADD,DC  ht,%r0,ht             ; bump c3 if overflow,nullify otherwise
+
+    ADD     C2,ht,C2              ; c2 = c2 + ht
+    ADD,DC  C3,%r0,C3             ; add in carry (c3++)
+.endm
+
+
+;
+;void bn_mul_comba8(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b)
+; arg0 = r_ptr
+; arg1 = a_ptr
+; arg2 = b_ptr
+;
+
+bn_mul_comba8
+	.proc
+	.callinfo FRAME=128,ENTRY_GR=%r3,ARGS_SAVED,ORDERING_AWARE
+	.EXPORT	bn_mul_comba8,ENTRY,PRIV_LEV=3,NO_RELOCATION,LONG_RETURN
+    .entry
+	.align 64
+
+    STD     %r3,0(%sp)          ; save r3
+    STD     %r4,8(%sp)          ; save r4
+    STD     %r5,16(%sp)         ; save r5
+    STD     %r6,24(%sp)         ; save r6
+    FSTD    %fr12,32(%sp)       ; save r6
+    FSTD    %fr13,40(%sp)       ; save r7
+
+	;
+	; Zero out carries
+	;
+	COPY     %r0,c1
+	COPY     %r0,c2
+	COPY     %r0,c3
+
+	LDO      128(%sp),%sp       ; bump stack
+    DEPDI,Z  1,31,1,high_one     ; Create Value  1 << 32
+
+	;
+	; Load up all of the values we are going to use
+	;
+    FLDD      0(a_ptr),a0       
+    FLDD      8(a_ptr),a1       
+    FLDD     16(a_ptr),a2       
+    FLDD     24(a_ptr),a3       
+    FLDD     32(a_ptr),a4       
+    FLDD     40(a_ptr),a5       
+    FLDD     48(a_ptr),a6       
+    FLDD     56(a_ptr),a7       
+
+    FLDD      0(b_ptr),b0       
+    FLDD      8(b_ptr),b1       
+    FLDD     16(b_ptr),b2       
+    FLDD     24(b_ptr),b3       
+    FLDD     32(b_ptr),b4       
+    FLDD     40(b_ptr),b5       
+    FLDD     48(b_ptr),b6       
+    FLDD     56(b_ptr),b7       
+
+	MUL_ADD_C a0L,a0R,b0L,b0R,c1,c2,c3
+	STD       c1,0(r_ptr)
+	COPY      %r0,c1
+
+	MUL_ADD_C a0L,a0R,b1L,b1R,c2,c3,c1
+	MUL_ADD_C a1L,a1R,b0L,b0R,c2,c3,c1
+	STD       c2,8(r_ptr)
+	COPY      %r0,c2
+
+	MUL_ADD_C a2L,a2R,b0L,b0R,c3,c1,c2
+	MUL_ADD_C a1L,a1R,b1L,b1R,c3,c1,c2
+	MUL_ADD_C a0L,a0R,b2L,b2R,c3,c1,c2
+	STD       c3,16(r_ptr)
+	COPY      %r0,c3
+
+	MUL_ADD_C a0L,a0R,b3L,b3R,c1,c2,c3
+	MUL_ADD_C a1L,a1R,b2L,b2R,c1,c2,c3
+	MUL_ADD_C a2L,a2R,b1L,b1R,c1,c2,c3
+	MUL_ADD_C a3L,a3R,b0L,b0R,c1,c2,c3
+	STD       c1,24(r_ptr)
+	COPY      %r0,c1
+
+	MUL_ADD_C a4L,a4R,b0L,b0R,c2,c3,c1
+	MUL_ADD_C a3L,a3R,b1L,b1R,c2,c3,c1
+	MUL_ADD_C a2L,a2R,b2L,b2R,c2,c3,c1
+	MUL_ADD_C a1L,a1R,b3L,b3R,c2,c3,c1
+	MUL_ADD_C a0L,a0R,b4L,b4R,c2,c3,c1
+	STD       c2,32(r_ptr)
+	COPY      %r0,c2
+
+	MUL_ADD_C a0L,a0R,b5L,b5R,c3,c1,c2
+	MUL_ADD_C a1L,a1R,b4L,b4R,c3,c1,c2
+	MUL_ADD_C a2L,a2R,b3L,b3R,c3,c1,c2
+	MUL_ADD_C a3L,a3R,b2L,b2R,c3,c1,c2
+	MUL_ADD_C a4L,a4R,b1L,b1R,c3,c1,c2
+	MUL_ADD_C a5L,a5R,b0L,b0R,c3,c1,c2
+	STD       c3,40(r_ptr)
+	COPY      %r0,c3
+
+	MUL_ADD_C a6L,a6R,b0L,b0R,c1,c2,c3
+	MUL_ADD_C a5L,a5R,b1L,b1R,c1,c2,c3
+	MUL_ADD_C a4L,a4R,b2L,b2R,c1,c2,c3
+	MUL_ADD_C a3L,a3R,b3L,b3R,c1,c2,c3
+	MUL_ADD_C a2L,a2R,b4L,b4R,c1,c2,c3
+	MUL_ADD_C a1L,a1R,b5L,b5R,c1,c2,c3
+	MUL_ADD_C a0L,a0R,b6L,b6R,c1,c2,c3
+	STD       c1,48(r_ptr)
+	COPY      %r0,c1
+	
+	MUL_ADD_C a0L,a0R,b7L,b7R,c2,c3,c1
+	MUL_ADD_C a1L,a1R,b6L,b6R,c2,c3,c1
+	MUL_ADD_C a2L,a2R,b5L,b5R,c2,c3,c1
+	MUL_ADD_C a3L,a3R,b4L,b4R,c2,c3,c1
+	MUL_ADD_C a4L,a4R,b3L,b3R,c2,c3,c1
+	MUL_ADD_C a5L,a5R,b2L,b2R,c2,c3,c1
+	MUL_ADD_C a6L,a6R,b1L,b1R,c2,c3,c1
+	MUL_ADD_C a7L,a7R,b0L,b0R,c2,c3,c1
+	STD       c2,56(r_ptr)
+	COPY      %r0,c2
+
+	MUL_ADD_C a7L,a7R,b1L,b1R,c3,c1,c2
+	MUL_ADD_C a6L,a6R,b2L,b2R,c3,c1,c2
+	MUL_ADD_C a5L,a5R,b3L,b3R,c3,c1,c2
+	MUL_ADD_C a4L,a4R,b4L,b4R,c3,c1,c2
+	MUL_ADD_C a3L,a3R,b5L,b5R,c3,c1,c2
+	MUL_ADD_C a2L,a2R,b6L,b6R,c3,c1,c2
+	MUL_ADD_C a1L,a1R,b7L,b7R,c3,c1,c2
+	STD       c3,64(r_ptr)
+	COPY      %r0,c3
+
+	MUL_ADD_C a2L,a2R,b7L,b7R,c1,c2,c3
+	MUL_ADD_C a3L,a3R,b6L,b6R,c1,c2,c3
+	MUL_ADD_C a4L,a4R,b5L,b5R,c1,c2,c3
+	MUL_ADD_C a5L,a5R,b4L,b4R,c1,c2,c3
+	MUL_ADD_C a6L,a6R,b3L,b3R,c1,c2,c3
+	MUL_ADD_C a7L,a7R,b2L,b2R,c1,c2,c3
+	STD       c1,72(r_ptr)
+	COPY      %r0,c1
+
+	MUL_ADD_C a7L,a7R,b3L,b3R,c2,c3,c1
+	MUL_ADD_C a6L,a6R,b4L,b4R,c2,c3,c1
+	MUL_ADD_C a5L,a5R,b5L,b5R,c2,c3,c1
+	MUL_ADD_C a4L,a4R,b6L,b6R,c2,c3,c1
+	MUL_ADD_C a3L,a3R,b7L,b7R,c2,c3,c1
+	STD       c2,80(r_ptr)
+	COPY      %r0,c2
+
+	MUL_ADD_C a4L,a4R,b7L,b7R,c3,c1,c2
+	MUL_ADD_C a5L,a5R,b6L,b6R,c3,c1,c2
+	MUL_ADD_C a6L,a6R,b5L,b5R,c3,c1,c2
+	MUL_ADD_C a7L,a7R,b4L,b4R,c3,c1,c2
+	STD       c3,88(r_ptr)
+	COPY      %r0,c3
+
+	MUL_ADD_C a7L,a7R,b5L,b5R,c1,c2,c3
+	MUL_ADD_C a6L,a6R,b6L,b6R,c1,c2,c3
+	MUL_ADD_C a5L,a5R,b7L,b7R,c1,c2,c3
+	STD       c1,96(r_ptr)
+	COPY      %r0,c1
+
+	MUL_ADD_C a6L,a6R,b7L,b7R,c2,c3,c1
+	MUL_ADD_C a7L,a7R,b6L,b6R,c2,c3,c1
+	STD       c2,104(r_ptr)
+	COPY      %r0,c2
+
+	MUL_ADD_C a7L,a7R,b7L,b7R,c3,c1,c2
+	STD       c3,112(r_ptr)
+	STD       c1,120(r_ptr)
+
+    .EXIT
+    FLDD    -88(%sp),%fr13 
+    FLDD    -96(%sp),%fr12 
+    LDD     -104(%sp),%r6        ; restore r6
+    LDD     -112(%sp),%r5        ; restore r5
+    LDD     -120(%sp),%r4        ; restore r4
+    BVE     (%rp)
+    LDD,MB  -128(%sp),%r3
+
+	.PROCEND	
+
+;-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+;
+;void bn_mul_comba4(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b)
+; arg0 = r_ptr
+; arg1 = a_ptr
+; arg2 = b_ptr
+;
+
+bn_mul_comba4
+	.proc
+	.callinfo FRAME=128,ENTRY_GR=%r3,ARGS_SAVED,ORDERING_AWARE
+	.EXPORT	bn_mul_comba4,ENTRY,PRIV_LEV=3,NO_RELOCATION,LONG_RETURN
+    .entry
+	.align 64
+
+    STD     %r3,0(%sp)          ; save r3
+    STD     %r4,8(%sp)          ; save r4
+    STD     %r5,16(%sp)         ; save r5
+    STD     %r6,24(%sp)         ; save r6
+    FSTD    %fr12,32(%sp)       ; save r6
+    FSTD    %fr13,40(%sp)       ; save r7
+
+	;
+	; Zero out carries
+	;
+	COPY     %r0,c1
+	COPY     %r0,c2
+	COPY     %r0,c3
+
+	LDO      128(%sp),%sp       ; bump stack
+    DEPDI,Z  1,31,1,high_one     ; Create Value  1 << 32
+
+	;
+	; Load up all of the values we are going to use
+	;
+    FLDD      0(a_ptr),a0       
+    FLDD      8(a_ptr),a1       
+    FLDD     16(a_ptr),a2       
+    FLDD     24(a_ptr),a3       
+
+    FLDD      0(b_ptr),b0       
+    FLDD      8(b_ptr),b1       
+    FLDD     16(b_ptr),b2       
+    FLDD     24(b_ptr),b3       
+
+	MUL_ADD_C a0L,a0R,b0L,b0R,c1,c2,c3
+	STD       c1,0(r_ptr)
+	COPY      %r0,c1
+
+	MUL_ADD_C a0L,a0R,b1L,b1R,c2,c3,c1
+	MUL_ADD_C a1L,a1R,b0L,b0R,c2,c3,c1
+	STD       c2,8(r_ptr)
+	COPY      %r0,c2
+
+	MUL_ADD_C a2L,a2R,b0L,b0R,c3,c1,c2
+	MUL_ADD_C a1L,a1R,b1L,b1R,c3,c1,c2
+	MUL_ADD_C a0L,a0R,b2L,b2R,c3,c1,c2
+	STD       c3,16(r_ptr)
+	COPY      %r0,c3
+
+	MUL_ADD_C a0L,a0R,b3L,b3R,c1,c2,c3
+	MUL_ADD_C a1L,a1R,b2L,b2R,c1,c2,c3
+	MUL_ADD_C a2L,a2R,b1L,b1R,c1,c2,c3
+	MUL_ADD_C a3L,a3R,b0L,b0R,c1,c2,c3
+	STD       c1,24(r_ptr)
+	COPY      %r0,c1
+
+	MUL_ADD_C a3L,a3R,b1L,b1R,c2,c3,c1
+	MUL_ADD_C a2L,a2R,b2L,b2R,c2,c3,c1
+	MUL_ADD_C a1L,a1R,b3L,b3R,c2,c3,c1
+	STD       c2,32(r_ptr)
+	COPY      %r0,c2
+
+	MUL_ADD_C a2L,a2R,b3L,b3R,c3,c1,c2
+	MUL_ADD_C a3L,a3R,b2L,b2R,c3,c1,c2
+	STD       c3,40(r_ptr)
+	COPY      %r0,c3
+
+	MUL_ADD_C a3L,a3R,b3L,b3R,c1,c2,c3
+	STD       c1,48(r_ptr)
+	STD       c2,56(r_ptr)
+
+    .EXIT
+    FLDD    -88(%sp),%fr13 
+    FLDD    -96(%sp),%fr12 
+    LDD     -104(%sp),%r6        ; restore r6
+    LDD     -112(%sp),%r5        ; restore r5
+    LDD     -120(%sp),%r4        ; restore r4
+    BVE     (%rp)
+    LDD,MB  -128(%sp),%r3
+
+	.PROCEND	
+
+
+	.SPACE	$TEXT$
+	.SUBSPA	$CODE$
+	.SPACE	$PRIVATE$,SORT=16
+	.IMPORT	$global$,DATA
+	.SPACE	$TEXT$
+	.SUBSPA	$CODE$
+	.SUBSPA	$LIT$,ACCESS=0x2c
+C$4
+	.ALIGN	8
+	.STRINGZ	"Division would overflow (%d)\n"
+	.END
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/parisc-mont.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/parisc-mont.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8aa94e8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/parisc-mont.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,1002 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2009-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+
+# On PA-7100LC this module performs ~90-50% better, less for longer
+# keys, than code generated by gcc 3.2 for PA-RISC 1.1. Latter means
+# that compiler utilized xmpyu instruction to perform 32x32=64-bit
+# multiplication, which in turn means that "baseline" performance was
+# optimal in respect to instruction set capabilities. Fair comparison
+# with vendor compiler is problematic, because OpenSSL doesn't define
+# BN_LLONG [presumably] for historical reasons, which drives compiler
+# toward 4 times 16x16=32-bit multiplicatons [plus complementary
+# shifts and additions] instead. This means that you should observe
+# several times improvement over code generated by vendor compiler
+# for PA-RISC 1.1, but the "baseline" is far from optimal. The actual
+# improvement coefficient was never collected on PA-7100LC, or any
+# other 1.1 CPU, because I don't have access to such machine with
+# vendor compiler. But to give you a taste, PA-RISC 1.1 code path
+# reportedly outperformed code generated by cc +DA1.1 +O3 by factor
+# of ~5x on PA-8600.
+#
+# On PA-RISC 2.0 it has to compete with pa-risc2[W].s, which is
+# reportedly ~2x faster than vendor compiler generated code [according
+# to comment in pa-risc2[W].s]. Here comes a catch. Execution core of
+# this implementation is actually 32-bit one, in the sense that it
+# operates on 32-bit values. But pa-risc2[W].s operates on arrays of
+# 64-bit BN_LONGs... How do they interoperate then? No problem. This
+# module picks halves of 64-bit values in reverse order and pretends
+# they were 32-bit BN_LONGs. But can 32-bit core compete with "pure"
+# 64-bit code such as pa-risc2[W].s then? Well, the thing is that
+# 32x32=64-bit multiplication is the best even PA-RISC 2.0 can do,
+# i.e. there is no "wider" multiplication like on most other 64-bit
+# platforms. This means that even being effectively 32-bit, this
+# implementation performs "64-bit" computational task in same amount
+# of arithmetic operations, most notably multiplications. It requires
+# more memory references, most notably to tp[num], but this doesn't
+# seem to exhaust memory port capacity. And indeed, dedicated PA-RISC
+# 2.0 code path provides virtually same performance as pa-risc2[W].s:
+# it's ~10% better for shortest key length and ~10% worse for longest
+# one.
+#
+# In case it wasn't clear. The module has two distinct code paths:
+# PA-RISC 1.1 and PA-RISC 2.0 ones. Latter features carry-free 64-bit
+# additions and 64-bit integer loads, not to mention specific
+# instruction scheduling. In 64-bit build naturally only 2.0 code path
+# is assembled. In 32-bit application context both code paths are
+# assembled, PA-RISC 2.0 CPU is detected at run-time and proper path
+# is taken automatically. Also, in 32-bit build the module imposes
+# couple of limitations: vector lengths has to be even and vector
+# addresses has to be 64-bit aligned. Normally neither is a problem:
+# most common key lengths are even and vectors are commonly malloc-ed,
+# which ensures alignment.
+#
+# Special thanks to polarhome.com for providing HP-UX account on
+# PA-RISC 1.1 machine, and to correspondent who chose to remain
+# anonymous for testing the code on PA-RISC 2.0 machine.
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+
+$flavour = shift;
+$output = shift;
+
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+if ($flavour =~ /64/) {
+	$LEVEL		="2.0W";
+	$SIZE_T		=8;
+	$FRAME_MARKER	=80;
+	$SAVED_RP	=16;
+	$PUSH		="std";
+	$PUSHMA		="std,ma";
+	$POP		="ldd";
+	$POPMB		="ldd,mb";
+	$BN_SZ		=$SIZE_T;
+} else {
+	$LEVEL		="1.1";	#$LEVEL.="\n\t.ALLOW\t2.0";
+	$SIZE_T		=4;
+	$FRAME_MARKER	=48;
+	$SAVED_RP	=20;
+	$PUSH		="stw";
+	$PUSHMA		="stwm";
+	$POP		="ldw";
+	$POPMB		="ldwm";
+	$BN_SZ		=$SIZE_T;
+	if (open CONF,"<${dir}../../opensslconf.h") {
+	    while(<CONF>) {
+		if (m/#\s*define\s+SIXTY_FOUR_BIT/) {
+		    $BN_SZ=8;
+		    $LEVEL="2.0";
+		    last;
+		}
+	    }
+	    close CONF;
+	}
+}
+
+$FRAME=8*$SIZE_T+$FRAME_MARKER;	# 8 saved regs + frame marker
+				#                [+ argument transfer]
+$LOCALS=$FRAME-$FRAME_MARKER;
+$FRAME+=32;			# local variables
+
+$tp="%r31";
+$ti1="%r29";
+$ti0="%r28";
+
+$rp="%r26";
+$ap="%r25";
+$bp="%r24";
+$np="%r23";
+$n0="%r22";	# passed through stack in 32-bit
+$num="%r21";	# passed through stack in 32-bit
+$idx="%r20";
+$arrsz="%r19";
+
+$nm1="%r7";
+$nm0="%r6";
+$ab1="%r5";
+$ab0="%r4";
+
+$fp="%r3";
+$hi1="%r2";
+$hi0="%r1";
+
+$xfer=$n0;	# accommodates [-16..15] offset in fld[dw]s
+
+$fm0="%fr4";	$fti=$fm0;
+$fbi="%fr5L";
+$fn0="%fr5R";
+$fai="%fr6";	$fab0="%fr7";	$fab1="%fr8";
+$fni="%fr9";	$fnm0="%fr10";	$fnm1="%fr11";
+
+$code=<<___;
+	.LEVEL	$LEVEL
+	.SPACE	\$TEXT\$
+	.SUBSPA	\$CODE\$,QUAD=0,ALIGN=8,ACCESS=0x2C,CODE_ONLY
+
+	.EXPORT	bn_mul_mont,ENTRY,ARGW0=GR,ARGW1=GR,ARGW2=GR,ARGW3=GR
+	.ALIGN	64
+bn_mul_mont
+	.PROC
+	.CALLINFO	FRAME=`$FRAME-8*$SIZE_T`,NO_CALLS,SAVE_RP,SAVE_SP,ENTRY_GR=6
+	.ENTRY
+	$PUSH	%r2,-$SAVED_RP(%sp)		; standard prologue
+	$PUSHMA	%r3,$FRAME(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r4,`-$FRAME+1*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r5,`-$FRAME+2*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r6,`-$FRAME+3*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r7,`-$FRAME+4*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r8,`-$FRAME+5*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r9,`-$FRAME+6*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r10,`-$FRAME+7*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+	ldo	-$FRAME(%sp),$fp
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==4);
+	ldw	`-$FRAME_MARKER-4`($fp),$n0
+	ldw	`-$FRAME_MARKER-8`($fp),$num
+	nop
+	nop					; alignment
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($BN_SZ==4);
+	comiclr,<=	6,$num,%r0		; are vectors long enough?
+	b		L\$abort
+	ldi		0,%r28			; signal "unhandled"
+	add,ev		%r0,$num,$num		; is $num even?
+	b		L\$abort
+	nop
+	or		$ap,$np,$ti1
+	extru,=		$ti1,31,3,%r0		; are ap and np 64-bit aligned?
+	b		L\$abort
+	nop
+	nop					; alignment
+	nop
+
+	fldws		0($n0),${fn0}
+	fldws,ma	4($bp),${fbi}		; bp[0]
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($BN_SZ==8);
+	comib,>		3,$num,L\$abort		; are vectors long enough?
+	ldi		0,%r28			; signal "unhandled"
+	addl		$num,$num,$num		; I operate on 32-bit values
+
+	fldws		4($n0),${fn0}		; only low part of n0
+	fldws		4($bp),${fbi}		; bp[0] in flipped word order
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	fldds		0($ap),${fai}		; ap[0,1]
+	fldds		0($np),${fni}		; np[0,1]
+
+	sh2addl		$num,%r0,$arrsz
+	ldi		31,$hi0
+	ldo		36($arrsz),$hi1		; space for tp[num+1]
+	andcm		$hi1,$hi0,$hi1		; align
+	addl		$hi1,%sp,%sp
+	$PUSH		$fp,-$SIZE_T(%sp)
+
+	ldo		`$LOCALS+16`($fp),$xfer
+	ldo		`$LOCALS+32+4`($fp),$tp
+
+	xmpyu		${fai}L,${fbi},${fab0}	; ap[0]*bp[0]
+	xmpyu		${fai}R,${fbi},${fab1}	; ap[1]*bp[0]
+	xmpyu		${fn0},${fab0}R,${fm0}
+
+	addl		$arrsz,$ap,$ap		; point at the end
+	addl		$arrsz,$np,$np
+	subi		0,$arrsz,$idx		; j=0
+	ldo		8($idx),$idx		; j++++
+
+	xmpyu		${fni}L,${fm0}R,${fnm0}	; np[0]*m
+	xmpyu		${fni}R,${fm0}R,${fnm1}	; np[1]*m
+	fstds		${fab0},-16($xfer)
+	fstds		${fnm0},-8($xfer)
+	fstds		${fab1},0($xfer)
+	fstds		${fnm1},8($xfer)
+	 flddx		$idx($ap),${fai}	; ap[2,3]
+	 flddx		$idx($np),${fni}	; np[2,3]
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($BN_SZ==4);
+	mtctl		$hi0,%cr11		; $hi0 still holds 31
+	extrd,u,*=	$hi0,%sar,1,$hi0	; executes on PA-RISC 1.0
+	b		L\$parisc11
+	nop
+___
+$code.=<<___;					# PA-RISC 2.0 code-path
+	xmpyu		${fai}L,${fbi},${fab0}	; ap[j]*bp[0]
+	xmpyu		${fni}L,${fm0}R,${fnm0}	; np[j]*m
+	ldd		-16($xfer),$ab0
+	fstds		${fab0},-16($xfer)
+
+	extrd,u		$ab0,31,32,$hi0
+	extrd,u		$ab0,63,32,$ab0
+	ldd		-8($xfer),$nm0
+	fstds		${fnm0},-8($xfer)
+	 ldo		8($idx),$idx		; j++++
+	 addl		$ab0,$nm0,$nm0		; low part is discarded
+	 extrd,u	$nm0,31,32,$hi1
+
+L\$1st
+	xmpyu		${fai}R,${fbi},${fab1}	; ap[j+1]*bp[0]
+	xmpyu		${fni}R,${fm0}R,${fnm1}	; np[j+1]*m
+	ldd		0($xfer),$ab1
+	fstds		${fab1},0($xfer)
+	 addl		$hi0,$ab1,$ab1
+	 extrd,u	$ab1,31,32,$hi0
+	ldd		8($xfer),$nm1
+	fstds		${fnm1},8($xfer)
+	 extrd,u	$ab1,63,32,$ab1
+	 addl		$hi1,$nm1,$nm1
+	flddx		$idx($ap),${fai}	; ap[j,j+1]
+	flddx		$idx($np),${fni}	; np[j,j+1]
+	 addl		$ab1,$nm1,$nm1
+	 extrd,u	$nm1,31,32,$hi1
+
+	xmpyu		${fai}L,${fbi},${fab0}	; ap[j]*bp[0]
+	xmpyu		${fni}L,${fm0}R,${fnm0}	; np[j]*m
+	ldd		-16($xfer),$ab0
+	fstds		${fab0},-16($xfer)
+	 addl		$hi0,$ab0,$ab0
+	 extrd,u	$ab0,31,32,$hi0
+	ldd		-8($xfer),$nm0
+	fstds		${fnm0},-8($xfer)
+	 extrd,u	$ab0,63,32,$ab0
+	 addl		$hi1,$nm0,$nm0
+	stw		$nm1,-4($tp)		; tp[j-1]
+	 addl		$ab0,$nm0,$nm0
+	 stw,ma		$nm0,8($tp)		; tp[j-1]
+	addib,<>	8,$idx,L\$1st		; j++++
+	 extrd,u	$nm0,31,32,$hi1
+
+	xmpyu		${fai}R,${fbi},${fab1}	; ap[j]*bp[0]
+	xmpyu		${fni}R,${fm0}R,${fnm1}	; np[j]*m
+	ldd		0($xfer),$ab1
+	fstds		${fab1},0($xfer)
+	 addl		$hi0,$ab1,$ab1
+	 extrd,u	$ab1,31,32,$hi0
+	ldd		8($xfer),$nm1
+	fstds		${fnm1},8($xfer)
+	 extrd,u	$ab1,63,32,$ab1
+	 addl		$hi1,$nm1,$nm1
+	ldd		-16($xfer),$ab0
+	 addl		$ab1,$nm1,$nm1
+	ldd		-8($xfer),$nm0
+	 extrd,u	$nm1,31,32,$hi1
+
+	 addl		$hi0,$ab0,$ab0
+	 extrd,u	$ab0,31,32,$hi0
+	stw		$nm1,-4($tp)		; tp[j-1]
+	 extrd,u	$ab0,63,32,$ab0
+	 addl		$hi1,$nm0,$nm0
+	ldd		0($xfer),$ab1
+	 addl		$ab0,$nm0,$nm0
+	ldd,mb		8($xfer),$nm1
+	 extrd,u	$nm0,31,32,$hi1
+	stw,ma		$nm0,8($tp)		; tp[j-1]
+
+	ldo		-1($num),$num		; i--
+	subi		0,$arrsz,$idx		; j=0
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($BN_SZ==4);
+	fldws,ma	4($bp),${fbi}		; bp[1]
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($BN_SZ==8);
+	fldws		0($bp),${fbi}		; bp[1] in flipped word order
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	 flddx		$idx($ap),${fai}	; ap[0,1]
+	 flddx		$idx($np),${fni}	; np[0,1]
+	 fldws		8($xfer),${fti}R	; tp[0]
+	addl		$hi0,$ab1,$ab1
+	 extrd,u	$ab1,31,32,$hi0
+	 extrd,u	$ab1,63,32,$ab1
+	 ldo		8($idx),$idx		; j++++
+	 xmpyu		${fai}L,${fbi},${fab0}	; ap[0]*bp[1]
+	 xmpyu		${fai}R,${fbi},${fab1}	; ap[1]*bp[1]
+	addl		$hi1,$nm1,$nm1
+	addl		$ab1,$nm1,$nm1
+	extrd,u		$nm1,31,32,$hi1
+	 fstws,mb	${fab0}L,-8($xfer)	; save high part
+	stw		$nm1,-4($tp)		; tp[j-1]
+
+	 fcpy,sgl	%fr0,${fti}L		; zero high part
+	 fcpy,sgl	%fr0,${fab0}L
+	addl		$hi1,$hi0,$hi0
+	extrd,u		$hi0,31,32,$hi1
+	 fcnvxf,dbl,dbl	${fti},${fti}		; 32-bit unsigned int -> double
+	 fcnvxf,dbl,dbl	${fab0},${fab0}
+	stw		$hi0,0($tp)
+	stw		$hi1,4($tp)
+
+	fadd,dbl	${fti},${fab0},${fab0}	; add tp[0]
+	fcnvfx,dbl,dbl	${fab0},${fab0}		; double -> 33-bit unsigned int
+	xmpyu		${fn0},${fab0}R,${fm0}
+	ldo		`$LOCALS+32+4`($fp),$tp
+L\$outer
+	xmpyu		${fni}L,${fm0}R,${fnm0}	; np[0]*m
+	xmpyu		${fni}R,${fm0}R,${fnm1}	; np[1]*m
+	fstds		${fab0},-16($xfer)	; 33-bit value
+	fstds		${fnm0},-8($xfer)
+	 flddx		$idx($ap),${fai}	; ap[2]
+	 flddx		$idx($np),${fni}	; np[2]
+	 ldo		8($idx),$idx		; j++++
+	ldd		-16($xfer),$ab0		; 33-bit value
+	ldd		-8($xfer),$nm0
+	ldw		0($xfer),$hi0		; high part
+
+	xmpyu		${fai}L,${fbi},${fab0}	; ap[j]*bp[i]
+	xmpyu		${fni}L,${fm0}R,${fnm0}	; np[j]*m
+	 extrd,u	$ab0,31,32,$ti0		; carry bit
+	 extrd,u	$ab0,63,32,$ab0
+	fstds		${fab1},0($xfer)
+	 addl		$ti0,$hi0,$hi0		; account carry bit
+	fstds		${fnm1},8($xfer)
+	 addl		$ab0,$nm0,$nm0		; low part is discarded
+	ldw		0($tp),$ti1		; tp[1]
+	 extrd,u	$nm0,31,32,$hi1
+	fstds		${fab0},-16($xfer)
+	fstds		${fnm0},-8($xfer)
+
+L\$inner
+	xmpyu		${fai}R,${fbi},${fab1}	; ap[j+1]*bp[i]
+	xmpyu		${fni}R,${fm0}R,${fnm1}	; np[j+1]*m
+	ldd		0($xfer),$ab1
+	fstds		${fab1},0($xfer)
+	 addl		$hi0,$ti1,$ti1
+	 addl		$ti1,$ab1,$ab1
+	ldd		8($xfer),$nm1
+	fstds		${fnm1},8($xfer)
+	 extrd,u	$ab1,31,32,$hi0
+	 extrd,u	$ab1,63,32,$ab1
+	flddx		$idx($ap),${fai}	; ap[j,j+1]
+	flddx		$idx($np),${fni}	; np[j,j+1]
+	 addl		$hi1,$nm1,$nm1
+	 addl		$ab1,$nm1,$nm1
+	ldw		4($tp),$ti0		; tp[j]
+	stw		$nm1,-4($tp)		; tp[j-1]
+
+	xmpyu		${fai}L,${fbi},${fab0}	; ap[j]*bp[i]
+	xmpyu		${fni}L,${fm0}R,${fnm0}	; np[j]*m
+	ldd		-16($xfer),$ab0
+	fstds		${fab0},-16($xfer)
+	 addl		$hi0,$ti0,$ti0
+	 addl		$ti0,$ab0,$ab0
+	ldd		-8($xfer),$nm0
+	fstds		${fnm0},-8($xfer)
+	 extrd,u	$ab0,31,32,$hi0
+	 extrd,u	$nm1,31,32,$hi1
+	ldw		8($tp),$ti1		; tp[j]
+	 extrd,u	$ab0,63,32,$ab0
+	 addl		$hi1,$nm0,$nm0
+	 addl		$ab0,$nm0,$nm0
+	 stw,ma		$nm0,8($tp)		; tp[j-1]
+	addib,<>	8,$idx,L\$inner		; j++++
+	 extrd,u	$nm0,31,32,$hi1
+
+	xmpyu		${fai}R,${fbi},${fab1}	; ap[j]*bp[i]
+	xmpyu		${fni}R,${fm0}R,${fnm1}	; np[j]*m
+	ldd		0($xfer),$ab1
+	fstds		${fab1},0($xfer)
+	 addl		$hi0,$ti1,$ti1
+	 addl		$ti1,$ab1,$ab1
+	ldd		8($xfer),$nm1
+	fstds		${fnm1},8($xfer)
+	 extrd,u	$ab1,31,32,$hi0
+	 extrd,u	$ab1,63,32,$ab1
+	ldw		4($tp),$ti0		; tp[j]
+	 addl		$hi1,$nm1,$nm1
+	 addl		$ab1,$nm1,$nm1
+	ldd		-16($xfer),$ab0
+	ldd		-8($xfer),$nm0
+	 extrd,u	$nm1,31,32,$hi1
+
+	addl		$hi0,$ab0,$ab0
+	 addl		$ti0,$ab0,$ab0
+	 stw		$nm1,-4($tp)		; tp[j-1]
+	 extrd,u	$ab0,31,32,$hi0
+	ldw		8($tp),$ti1		; tp[j]
+	 extrd,u	$ab0,63,32,$ab0
+	 addl		$hi1,$nm0,$nm0
+	ldd		0($xfer),$ab1
+	 addl		$ab0,$nm0,$nm0
+	ldd,mb		8($xfer),$nm1
+	 extrd,u	$nm0,31,32,$hi1
+	 stw,ma		$nm0,8($tp)		; tp[j-1]
+
+	addib,=		-1,$num,L\$outerdone	; i--
+	subi		0,$arrsz,$idx		; j=0
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($BN_SZ==4);
+	fldws,ma	4($bp),${fbi}		; bp[i]
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($BN_SZ==8);
+	ldi		12,$ti0			; bp[i] in flipped word order
+	addl,ev		%r0,$num,$num
+	ldi		-4,$ti0
+	addl		$ti0,$bp,$bp
+	fldws		0($bp),${fbi}
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	 flddx		$idx($ap),${fai}	; ap[0]
+	addl		$hi0,$ab1,$ab1
+	 flddx		$idx($np),${fni}	; np[0]
+	 fldws		8($xfer),${fti}R	; tp[0]
+	addl		$ti1,$ab1,$ab1
+	extrd,u		$ab1,31,32,$hi0
+	extrd,u		$ab1,63,32,$ab1
+
+	 ldo		8($idx),$idx		; j++++
+	 xmpyu		${fai}L,${fbi},${fab0}	; ap[0]*bp[i]
+	 xmpyu		${fai}R,${fbi},${fab1}	; ap[1]*bp[i]
+	ldw		4($tp),$ti0		; tp[j]
+
+	addl		$hi1,$nm1,$nm1
+	 fstws,mb	${fab0}L,-8($xfer)	; save high part
+	addl		$ab1,$nm1,$nm1
+	extrd,u		$nm1,31,32,$hi1
+	 fcpy,sgl	%fr0,${fti}L		; zero high part
+	 fcpy,sgl	%fr0,${fab0}L
+	stw		$nm1,-4($tp)		; tp[j-1]
+
+	 fcnvxf,dbl,dbl	${fti},${fti}		; 32-bit unsigned int -> double
+	 fcnvxf,dbl,dbl	${fab0},${fab0}
+	addl		$hi1,$hi0,$hi0
+	 fadd,dbl	${fti},${fab0},${fab0}	; add tp[0]
+	addl		$ti0,$hi0,$hi0
+	extrd,u		$hi0,31,32,$hi1
+	 fcnvfx,dbl,dbl	${fab0},${fab0}		; double -> 33-bit unsigned int
+	stw		$hi0,0($tp)
+	stw		$hi1,4($tp)
+	 xmpyu		${fn0},${fab0}R,${fm0}
+
+	b		L\$outer
+	ldo		`$LOCALS+32+4`($fp),$tp
+
+L\$outerdone
+	addl		$hi0,$ab1,$ab1
+	addl		$ti1,$ab1,$ab1
+	extrd,u		$ab1,31,32,$hi0
+	extrd,u		$ab1,63,32,$ab1
+
+	ldw		4($tp),$ti0		; tp[j]
+
+	addl		$hi1,$nm1,$nm1
+	addl		$ab1,$nm1,$nm1
+	extrd,u		$nm1,31,32,$hi1
+	stw		$nm1,-4($tp)		; tp[j-1]
+
+	addl		$hi1,$hi0,$hi0
+	addl		$ti0,$hi0,$hi0
+	extrd,u		$hi0,31,32,$hi1
+	stw		$hi0,0($tp)
+	stw		$hi1,4($tp)
+
+	ldo		`$LOCALS+32`($fp),$tp
+	sub		%r0,%r0,%r0		; clear borrow
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($BN_SZ==4);
+	ldws,ma		4($tp),$ti0
+	extru,=		$rp,31,3,%r0		; is rp 64-bit aligned?
+	b		L\$sub_pa11
+	addl		$tp,$arrsz,$tp
+L\$sub
+	ldwx		$idx($np),$hi0
+	subb		$ti0,$hi0,$hi1
+	ldwx		$idx($tp),$ti0
+	addib,<>	4,$idx,L\$sub
+	stws,ma		$hi1,4($rp)
+
+	subb		$ti0,%r0,$hi1
+	ldo		-4($tp),$tp
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($BN_SZ==8);
+	ldd,ma		8($tp),$ti0
+L\$sub
+	ldd		$idx($np),$hi0
+	shrpd		$ti0,$ti0,32,$ti0	; flip word order
+	std		$ti0,-8($tp)		; save flipped value
+	sub,db		$ti0,$hi0,$hi1
+	ldd,ma		8($tp),$ti0
+	addib,<>	8,$idx,L\$sub
+	std,ma		$hi1,8($rp)
+
+	extrd,u		$ti0,31,32,$ti0		; carry in flipped word order
+	sub,db		$ti0,%r0,$hi1
+	ldo		-8($tp),$tp
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	and		$tp,$hi1,$ap
+	andcm		$rp,$hi1,$bp
+	or		$ap,$bp,$np
+
+	sub		$rp,$arrsz,$rp		; rewind rp
+	subi		0,$arrsz,$idx
+	ldo		`$LOCALS+32`($fp),$tp
+L\$copy
+	ldd		$idx($np),$hi0
+	std,ma		%r0,8($tp)
+	addib,<>	8,$idx,.-8		; L\$copy
+	std,ma		$hi0,8($rp)	
+___
+
+if ($BN_SZ==4) {				# PA-RISC 1.1 code-path
+$ablo=$ab0;
+$abhi=$ab1;
+$nmlo0=$nm0;
+$nmhi0=$nm1;
+$nmlo1="%r9";
+$nmhi1="%r8";
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	b		L\$done
+	nop
+
+	.ALIGN		8
+L\$parisc11
+	xmpyu		${fai}L,${fbi},${fab0}	; ap[j]*bp[0]
+	xmpyu		${fni}L,${fm0}R,${fnm0}	; np[j]*m
+	ldw		-12($xfer),$ablo
+	ldw		-16($xfer),$hi0
+	ldw		-4($xfer),$nmlo0
+	ldw		-8($xfer),$nmhi0
+	fstds		${fab0},-16($xfer)
+	fstds		${fnm0},-8($xfer)
+
+	 ldo		8($idx),$idx		; j++++
+	 add		$ablo,$nmlo0,$nmlo0	; discarded
+	 addc		%r0,$nmhi0,$hi1
+	ldw		4($xfer),$ablo
+	ldw		0($xfer),$abhi
+	nop
+
+L\$1st_pa11
+	xmpyu		${fai}R,${fbi},${fab1}	; ap[j+1]*bp[0]
+	flddx		$idx($ap),${fai}	; ap[j,j+1]
+	xmpyu		${fni}R,${fm0}R,${fnm1}	; np[j+1]*m
+	flddx		$idx($np),${fni}	; np[j,j+1]
+	 add		$hi0,$ablo,$ablo
+	ldw		12($xfer),$nmlo1
+	 addc		%r0,$abhi,$hi0
+	ldw		8($xfer),$nmhi1
+	 add		$ablo,$nmlo1,$nmlo1
+	fstds		${fab1},0($xfer)
+	 addc		%r0,$nmhi1,$nmhi1
+	fstds		${fnm1},8($xfer)
+	 add		$hi1,$nmlo1,$nmlo1
+	ldw		-12($xfer),$ablo
+	 addc		%r0,$nmhi1,$hi1
+	ldw		-16($xfer),$abhi
+
+	xmpyu		${fai}L,${fbi},${fab0}	; ap[j]*bp[0]
+	ldw		-4($xfer),$nmlo0
+	xmpyu		${fni}L,${fm0}R,${fnm0}	; np[j]*m
+	ldw		-8($xfer),$nmhi0
+	 add		$hi0,$ablo,$ablo
+	stw		$nmlo1,-4($tp)		; tp[j-1]
+	 addc		%r0,$abhi,$hi0
+	fstds		${fab0},-16($xfer)
+	 add		$ablo,$nmlo0,$nmlo0
+	fstds		${fnm0},-8($xfer)
+	 addc		%r0,$nmhi0,$nmhi0
+	ldw		0($xfer),$abhi
+	 add		$hi1,$nmlo0,$nmlo0
+	ldw		4($xfer),$ablo
+	 stws,ma	$nmlo0,8($tp)		; tp[j-1]
+	addib,<>	8,$idx,L\$1st_pa11	; j++++
+	 addc		%r0,$nmhi0,$hi1
+
+	 ldw		8($xfer),$nmhi1
+	 ldw		12($xfer),$nmlo1
+	xmpyu		${fai}R,${fbi},${fab1}	; ap[j]*bp[0]
+	xmpyu		${fni}R,${fm0}R,${fnm1}	; np[j]*m
+	 add		$hi0,$ablo,$ablo
+	fstds		${fab1},0($xfer)
+	 addc		%r0,$abhi,$hi0
+	fstds		${fnm1},8($xfer)
+	 add		$ablo,$nmlo1,$nmlo1
+	ldw		-16($xfer),$abhi
+	 addc		%r0,$nmhi1,$nmhi1
+	ldw		-12($xfer),$ablo
+	 add		$hi1,$nmlo1,$nmlo1
+	ldw		-8($xfer),$nmhi0
+	 addc		%r0,$nmhi1,$hi1
+	ldw		-4($xfer),$nmlo0
+
+	 add		$hi0,$ablo,$ablo
+	stw		$nmlo1,-4($tp)		; tp[j-1]
+	 addc		%r0,$abhi,$hi0
+	ldw		0($xfer),$abhi
+	 add		$ablo,$nmlo0,$nmlo0
+	ldw		4($xfer),$ablo
+	 addc		%r0,$nmhi0,$nmhi0
+	ldws,mb		8($xfer),$nmhi1
+	 add		$hi1,$nmlo0,$nmlo0
+	ldw		4($xfer),$nmlo1
+	 addc		%r0,$nmhi0,$hi1
+	stws,ma		$nmlo0,8($tp)		; tp[j-1]
+
+	ldo		-1($num),$num		; i--
+	subi		0,$arrsz,$idx		; j=0
+
+	 fldws,ma	4($bp),${fbi}		; bp[1]
+	 flddx		$idx($ap),${fai}	; ap[0,1]
+	 flddx		$idx($np),${fni}	; np[0,1]
+	 fldws		8($xfer),${fti}R	; tp[0]
+	add		$hi0,$ablo,$ablo
+	addc		%r0,$abhi,$hi0
+	 ldo		8($idx),$idx		; j++++
+	 xmpyu		${fai}L,${fbi},${fab0}	; ap[0]*bp[1]
+	 xmpyu		${fai}R,${fbi},${fab1}	; ap[1]*bp[1]
+	add		$hi1,$nmlo1,$nmlo1
+	addc		%r0,$nmhi1,$nmhi1
+	add		$ablo,$nmlo1,$nmlo1
+	addc		%r0,$nmhi1,$hi1
+	 fstws,mb	${fab0}L,-8($xfer)	; save high part
+	stw		$nmlo1,-4($tp)		; tp[j-1]
+
+	 fcpy,sgl	%fr0,${fti}L		; zero high part
+	 fcpy,sgl	%fr0,${fab0}L
+	add		$hi1,$hi0,$hi0
+	addc		%r0,%r0,$hi1
+	 fcnvxf,dbl,dbl	${fti},${fti}		; 32-bit unsigned int -> double
+	 fcnvxf,dbl,dbl	${fab0},${fab0}
+	stw		$hi0,0($tp)
+	stw		$hi1,4($tp)
+
+	fadd,dbl	${fti},${fab0},${fab0}	; add tp[0]
+	fcnvfx,dbl,dbl	${fab0},${fab0}		; double -> 33-bit unsigned int
+	xmpyu		${fn0},${fab0}R,${fm0}
+	ldo		`$LOCALS+32+4`($fp),$tp
+L\$outer_pa11
+	xmpyu		${fni}L,${fm0}R,${fnm0}	; np[0]*m
+	xmpyu		${fni}R,${fm0}R,${fnm1}	; np[1]*m
+	fstds		${fab0},-16($xfer)	; 33-bit value
+	fstds		${fnm0},-8($xfer)
+	 flddx		$idx($ap),${fai}	; ap[2,3]
+	 flddx		$idx($np),${fni}	; np[2,3]
+	ldw		-16($xfer),$abhi	; carry bit actually
+	 ldo		8($idx),$idx		; j++++
+	ldw		-12($xfer),$ablo
+	ldw		-8($xfer),$nmhi0
+	ldw		-4($xfer),$nmlo0
+	ldw		0($xfer),$hi0		; high part
+
+	xmpyu		${fai}L,${fbi},${fab0}	; ap[j]*bp[i]
+	xmpyu		${fni}L,${fm0}R,${fnm0}	; np[j]*m
+	fstds		${fab1},0($xfer)
+	 addl		$abhi,$hi0,$hi0		; account carry bit
+	fstds		${fnm1},8($xfer)
+	 add		$ablo,$nmlo0,$nmlo0	; discarded
+	ldw		0($tp),$ti1		; tp[1]
+	 addc		%r0,$nmhi0,$hi1
+	fstds		${fab0},-16($xfer)
+	fstds		${fnm0},-8($xfer)
+	ldw		4($xfer),$ablo
+	ldw		0($xfer),$abhi
+
+L\$inner_pa11
+	xmpyu		${fai}R,${fbi},${fab1}	; ap[j+1]*bp[i]
+	flddx		$idx($ap),${fai}	; ap[j,j+1]
+	xmpyu		${fni}R,${fm0}R,${fnm1}	; np[j+1]*m
+	flddx		$idx($np),${fni}	; np[j,j+1]
+	 add		$hi0,$ablo,$ablo
+	ldw		4($tp),$ti0		; tp[j]
+	 addc		%r0,$abhi,$abhi
+	ldw		12($xfer),$nmlo1
+	 add		$ti1,$ablo,$ablo
+	ldw		8($xfer),$nmhi1
+	 addc		%r0,$abhi,$hi0
+	fstds		${fab1},0($xfer)
+	 add		$ablo,$nmlo1,$nmlo1
+	fstds		${fnm1},8($xfer)
+	 addc		%r0,$nmhi1,$nmhi1
+	ldw		-12($xfer),$ablo
+	 add		$hi1,$nmlo1,$nmlo1
+	ldw		-16($xfer),$abhi
+	 addc		%r0,$nmhi1,$hi1
+
+	xmpyu		${fai}L,${fbi},${fab0}	; ap[j]*bp[i]
+	ldw		8($tp),$ti1		; tp[j]
+	xmpyu		${fni}L,${fm0}R,${fnm0}	; np[j]*m
+	ldw		-4($xfer),$nmlo0
+	 add		$hi0,$ablo,$ablo
+	ldw		-8($xfer),$nmhi0
+	 addc		%r0,$abhi,$abhi
+	stw		$nmlo1,-4($tp)		; tp[j-1]
+	 add		$ti0,$ablo,$ablo
+	fstds		${fab0},-16($xfer)
+	 addc		%r0,$abhi,$hi0
+	fstds		${fnm0},-8($xfer)
+	 add		$ablo,$nmlo0,$nmlo0
+	ldw		4($xfer),$ablo
+	 addc		%r0,$nmhi0,$nmhi0
+	ldw		0($xfer),$abhi
+	 add		$hi1,$nmlo0,$nmlo0
+	 stws,ma	$nmlo0,8($tp)		; tp[j-1]
+	addib,<>	8,$idx,L\$inner_pa11	; j++++
+	 addc		%r0,$nmhi0,$hi1
+
+	xmpyu		${fai}R,${fbi},${fab1}	; ap[j]*bp[i]
+	ldw		12($xfer),$nmlo1
+	xmpyu		${fni}R,${fm0}R,${fnm1}	; np[j]*m
+	ldw		8($xfer),$nmhi1
+	 add		$hi0,$ablo,$ablo
+	ldw		4($tp),$ti0		; tp[j]
+	 addc		%r0,$abhi,$abhi
+	fstds		${fab1},0($xfer)
+	 add		$ti1,$ablo,$ablo
+	fstds		${fnm1},8($xfer)
+	 addc		%r0,$abhi,$hi0
+	ldw		-16($xfer),$abhi
+	 add		$ablo,$nmlo1,$nmlo1
+	ldw		-12($xfer),$ablo
+	 addc		%r0,$nmhi1,$nmhi1
+	ldw		-8($xfer),$nmhi0
+	 add		$hi1,$nmlo1,$nmlo1
+	ldw		-4($xfer),$nmlo0
+	 addc		%r0,$nmhi1,$hi1
+
+	add		$hi0,$ablo,$ablo
+	 stw		$nmlo1,-4($tp)		; tp[j-1]
+	addc		%r0,$abhi,$abhi
+	 add		$ti0,$ablo,$ablo
+	ldw		8($tp),$ti1		; tp[j]
+	 addc		%r0,$abhi,$hi0
+	ldw		0($xfer),$abhi
+	 add		$ablo,$nmlo0,$nmlo0
+	ldw		4($xfer),$ablo
+	 addc		%r0,$nmhi0,$nmhi0
+	ldws,mb		8($xfer),$nmhi1
+	 add		$hi1,$nmlo0,$nmlo0
+	ldw		4($xfer),$nmlo1
+	 addc		%r0,$nmhi0,$hi1
+	 stws,ma	$nmlo0,8($tp)		; tp[j-1]
+
+	addib,=		-1,$num,L\$outerdone_pa11; i--
+	subi		0,$arrsz,$idx		; j=0
+
+	 fldws,ma	4($bp),${fbi}		; bp[i]
+	 flddx		$idx($ap),${fai}	; ap[0]
+	add		$hi0,$ablo,$ablo
+	addc		%r0,$abhi,$abhi
+	 flddx		$idx($np),${fni}	; np[0]
+	 fldws		8($xfer),${fti}R	; tp[0]
+	add		$ti1,$ablo,$ablo
+	addc		%r0,$abhi,$hi0
+
+	 ldo		8($idx),$idx		; j++++
+	 xmpyu		${fai}L,${fbi},${fab0}	; ap[0]*bp[i]
+	 xmpyu		${fai}R,${fbi},${fab1}	; ap[1]*bp[i]
+	ldw		4($tp),$ti0		; tp[j]
+
+	add		$hi1,$nmlo1,$nmlo1
+	addc		%r0,$nmhi1,$nmhi1
+	 fstws,mb	${fab0}L,-8($xfer)	; save high part
+	add		$ablo,$nmlo1,$nmlo1
+	addc		%r0,$nmhi1,$hi1
+	 fcpy,sgl	%fr0,${fti}L		; zero high part
+	 fcpy,sgl	%fr0,${fab0}L
+	stw		$nmlo1,-4($tp)		; tp[j-1]
+
+	 fcnvxf,dbl,dbl	${fti},${fti}		; 32-bit unsigned int -> double
+	 fcnvxf,dbl,dbl	${fab0},${fab0}
+	add		$hi1,$hi0,$hi0
+	addc		%r0,%r0,$hi1
+	 fadd,dbl	${fti},${fab0},${fab0}	; add tp[0]
+	add		$ti0,$hi0,$hi0
+	addc		%r0,$hi1,$hi1
+	 fcnvfx,dbl,dbl	${fab0},${fab0}		; double -> 33-bit unsigned int
+	stw		$hi0,0($tp)
+	stw		$hi1,4($tp)
+	 xmpyu		${fn0},${fab0}R,${fm0}
+
+	b		L\$outer_pa11
+	ldo		`$LOCALS+32+4`($fp),$tp
+
+L\$outerdone_pa11
+	add		$hi0,$ablo,$ablo
+	addc		%r0,$abhi,$abhi
+	add		$ti1,$ablo,$ablo
+	addc		%r0,$abhi,$hi0
+
+	ldw		4($tp),$ti0		; tp[j]
+
+	add		$hi1,$nmlo1,$nmlo1
+	addc		%r0,$nmhi1,$nmhi1
+	add		$ablo,$nmlo1,$nmlo1
+	addc		%r0,$nmhi1,$hi1
+	stw		$nmlo1,-4($tp)		; tp[j-1]
+
+	add		$hi1,$hi0,$hi0
+	addc		%r0,%r0,$hi1
+	add		$ti0,$hi0,$hi0
+	addc		%r0,$hi1,$hi1
+	stw		$hi0,0($tp)
+	stw		$hi1,4($tp)
+
+	ldo		`$LOCALS+32+4`($fp),$tp
+	sub		%r0,%r0,%r0		; clear borrow
+	ldw		-4($tp),$ti0
+	addl		$tp,$arrsz,$tp
+L\$sub_pa11
+	ldwx		$idx($np),$hi0
+	subb		$ti0,$hi0,$hi1
+	ldwx		$idx($tp),$ti0
+	addib,<>	4,$idx,L\$sub_pa11
+	stws,ma		$hi1,4($rp)
+
+	subb		$ti0,%r0,$hi1
+	ldo		-4($tp),$tp
+	and		$tp,$hi1,$ap
+	andcm		$rp,$hi1,$bp
+	or		$ap,$bp,$np
+
+	sub		$rp,$arrsz,$rp		; rewind rp
+	subi		0,$arrsz,$idx
+	ldo		`$LOCALS+32`($fp),$tp
+L\$copy_pa11
+	ldwx		$idx($np),$hi0
+	stws,ma		%r0,4($tp)
+	addib,<>	4,$idx,L\$copy_pa11
+	stws,ma		$hi0,4($rp)	
+
+	nop					; alignment
+L\$done
+___
+}
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	ldi		1,%r28			; signal "handled"
+	ldo		$FRAME($fp),%sp		; destroy tp[num+1]
+
+	$POP	`-$FRAME-$SAVED_RP`(%sp),%r2	; standard epilogue
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+1*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r4
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+2*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r5
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+3*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r6
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+4*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r7
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+5*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r8
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+6*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r9
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+7*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r10
+L\$abort
+	bv	(%r2)
+	.EXIT
+	$POPMB	-$FRAME(%sp),%r3
+	.PROCEND
+	.STRINGZ "Montgomery Multiplication for PA-RISC, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+___
+
+# Explicitly encode PA-RISC 2.0 instructions used in this module, so
+# that it can be compiled with .LEVEL 1.0. It should be noted that I
+# wouldn't have to do this, if GNU assembler understood .ALLOW 2.0
+# directive...
+
+my $ldd = sub {
+  my ($mod,$args) = @_;
+  my $orig = "ldd$mod\t$args";
+
+    if ($args =~ /%r([0-9]+)\(%r([0-9]+)\),%r([0-9]+)/)		# format 4
+    {	my $opcode=(0x03<<26)|($2<<21)|($1<<16)|(3<<6)|$3;
+	sprintf "\t.WORD\t0x%08x\t; %s",$opcode,$orig;
+    }
+    elsif ($args =~ /(\-?[0-9]+)\(%r([0-9]+)\),%r([0-9]+)/)	# format 5
+    {	my $opcode=(0x03<<26)|($2<<21)|(1<<12)|(3<<6)|$3;
+	$opcode|=(($1&0xF)<<17)|(($1&0x10)<<12);		# encode offset
+	$opcode|=(1<<5)  if ($mod =~ /^,m/);
+	$opcode|=(1<<13) if ($mod =~ /^,mb/);
+	sprintf "\t.WORD\t0x%08x\t; %s",$opcode,$orig;
+    }
+    else { "\t".$orig; }
+};
+
+my $std = sub {
+  my ($mod,$args) = @_;
+  my $orig = "std$mod\t$args";
+
+    if ($args =~ /%r([0-9]+),(\-?[0-9]+)\(%r([0-9]+)\)/)	# format 6
+    {	my $opcode=(0x03<<26)|($3<<21)|($1<<16)|(1<<12)|(0xB<<6);
+	$opcode|=(($2&0xF)<<1)|(($2&0x10)>>4);			# encode offset
+	$opcode|=(1<<5)  if ($mod =~ /^,m/);
+	$opcode|=(1<<13) if ($mod =~ /^,mb/);
+	sprintf "\t.WORD\t0x%08x\t; %s",$opcode,$orig;
+    }
+    else { "\t".$orig; }
+};
+
+my $extrd = sub {
+  my ($mod,$args) = @_;
+  my $orig = "extrd$mod\t$args";
+
+    # I only have ",u" completer, it's implicitly encoded...
+    if ($args =~ /%r([0-9]+),([0-9]+),([0-9]+),%r([0-9]+)/)	# format 15
+    {	my $opcode=(0x36<<26)|($1<<21)|($4<<16);
+	my $len=32-$3;
+	$opcode |= (($2&0x20)<<6)|(($2&0x1f)<<5);		# encode pos
+	$opcode |= (($len&0x20)<<7)|($len&0x1f);		# encode len
+	sprintf "\t.WORD\t0x%08x\t; %s",$opcode,$orig;
+    }
+    elsif ($args =~ /%r([0-9]+),%sar,([0-9]+),%r([0-9]+)/)	# format 12
+    {	my $opcode=(0x34<<26)|($1<<21)|($3<<16)|(2<<11)|(1<<9);
+	my $len=32-$2;
+	$opcode |= (($len&0x20)<<3)|($len&0x1f);		# encode len
+	$opcode |= (1<<13) if ($mod =~ /,\**=/);
+	sprintf "\t.WORD\t0x%08x\t; %s",$opcode,$orig;
+    }
+    else { "\t".$orig; }
+};
+
+my $shrpd = sub {
+  my ($mod,$args) = @_;
+  my $orig = "shrpd$mod\t$args";
+
+    if ($args =~ /%r([0-9]+),%r([0-9]+),([0-9]+),%r([0-9]+)/)	# format 14
+    {	my $opcode=(0x34<<26)|($2<<21)|($1<<16)|(1<<10)|$4;
+	my $cpos=63-$3;
+	$opcode |= (($cpos&0x20)<<6)|(($cpos&0x1f)<<5);		# encode sa
+	sprintf "\t.WORD\t0x%08x\t; %s",$opcode,$orig;
+    }
+    else { "\t".$orig; }
+};
+
+my $sub = sub {
+  my ($mod,$args) = @_;
+  my $orig = "sub$mod\t$args";
+
+    if ($mod eq ",db" && $args =~ /%r([0-9]+),%r([0-9]+),%r([0-9]+)/) {
+	my $opcode=(0x02<<26)|($2<<21)|($1<<16)|$3;
+	$opcode|=(1<<10);	# e1
+	$opcode|=(1<<8);	# e2
+	$opcode|=(1<<5);	# d
+	sprintf "\t.WORD\t0x%08x\t; %s",$opcode,$orig
+    }
+    else { "\t".$orig; }
+};
+
+sub assemble {
+  my ($mnemonic,$mod,$args)=@_;
+  my $opcode = eval("\$$mnemonic");
+
+    ref($opcode) eq 'CODE' ? &$opcode($mod,$args) : "\t$mnemonic$mod\t$args";
+}
+
+foreach (split("\n",$code)) {
+	s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/ge;
+	# flip word order in 64-bit mode...
+	s/(xmpyu\s+)($fai|$fni)([LR])/$1.$2.($3 eq "L"?"R":"L")/e if ($BN_SZ==8);
+	# assemble 2.0 instructions in 32-bit mode...
+	s/^\s+([a-z]+)([\S]*)\s+([\S]*)/&assemble($1,$2,$3)/e if ($BN_SZ==4);
+
+	s/\bbv\b/bve/gm	if ($SIZE_T==8);
+
+	print $_,"\n";
+}
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/ppc-mont.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/ppc-mont.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5802260
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/ppc-mont.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,342 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+
+# April 2006
+
+# "Teaser" Montgomery multiplication module for PowerPC. It's possible
+# to gain a bit more by modulo-scheduling outer loop, then dedicated
+# squaring procedure should give further 20% and code can be adapted
+# for 32-bit application running on 64-bit CPU. As for the latter.
+# It won't be able to achieve "native" 64-bit performance, because in
+# 32-bit application context every addc instruction will have to be
+# expanded as addc, twice right shift by 32 and finally adde, etc.
+# So far RSA *sign* performance improvement over pre-bn_mul_mont asm
+# for 64-bit application running on PPC970/G5 is:
+#
+# 512-bit	+65%	
+# 1024-bit	+35%
+# 2048-bit	+18%
+# 4096-bit	+4%
+
+$flavour = shift;
+
+if ($flavour =~ /32/) {
+	$BITS=	32;
+	$BNSZ=	$BITS/8;
+	$SIZE_T=4;
+	$RZONE=	224;
+
+	$LD=	"lwz";		# load
+	$LDU=	"lwzu";		# load and update
+	$LDX=	"lwzx";		# load indexed
+	$ST=	"stw";		# store
+	$STU=	"stwu";		# store and update
+	$STX=	"stwx";		# store indexed
+	$STUX=	"stwux";	# store indexed and update
+	$UMULL=	"mullw";	# unsigned multiply low
+	$UMULH=	"mulhwu";	# unsigned multiply high
+	$UCMP=	"cmplw";	# unsigned compare
+	$SHRI=	"srwi";		# unsigned shift right by immediate	
+	$PUSH=	$ST;
+	$POP=	$LD;
+} elsif ($flavour =~ /64/) {
+	$BITS=	64;
+	$BNSZ=	$BITS/8;
+	$SIZE_T=8;
+	$RZONE=	288;
+
+	# same as above, but 64-bit mnemonics...
+	$LD=	"ld";		# load
+	$LDU=	"ldu";		# load and update
+	$LDX=	"ldx";		# load indexed
+	$ST=	"std";		# store
+	$STU=	"stdu";		# store and update
+	$STX=	"stdx";		# store indexed
+	$STUX=	"stdux";	# store indexed and update
+	$UMULL=	"mulld";	# unsigned multiply low
+	$UMULH=	"mulhdu";	# unsigned multiply high
+	$UCMP=	"cmpld";	# unsigned compare
+	$SHRI=	"srdi";		# unsigned shift right by immediate	
+	$PUSH=	$ST;
+	$POP=	$LD;
+} else { die "nonsense $flavour"; }
+
+$FRAME=8*$SIZE_T+$RZONE;
+$LOCALS=8*$SIZE_T;
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+( $xlate="${dir}ppc-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
+( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/ppc-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
+die "can't locate ppc-xlate.pl";
+
+open STDOUT,"| $^X $xlate $flavour ".shift || die "can't call $xlate: $!";
+
+$sp="r1";
+$toc="r2";
+$rp="r3";	$ovf="r3";
+$ap="r4";
+$bp="r5";
+$np="r6";
+$n0="r7";
+$num="r8";
+$rp="r9";	# $rp is reassigned
+$aj="r10";
+$nj="r11";
+$tj="r12";
+# non-volatile registers
+$i="r20";
+$j="r21";
+$tp="r22";
+$m0="r23";
+$m1="r24";
+$lo0="r25";
+$hi0="r26";
+$lo1="r27";
+$hi1="r28";
+$alo="r29";
+$ahi="r30";
+$nlo="r31";
+#
+$nhi="r0";
+
+$code=<<___;
+.machine "any"
+.text
+
+.globl	.bn_mul_mont_int
+.align	4
+.bn_mul_mont_int:
+	cmpwi	$num,4
+	mr	$rp,r3		; $rp is reassigned
+	li	r3,0
+	bltlr
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($BNSZ==4);
+	cmpwi	$num,32		; longer key performance is not better
+	bgelr
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	slwi	$num,$num,`log($BNSZ)/log(2)`
+	li	$tj,-4096
+	addi	$ovf,$num,$FRAME
+	subf	$ovf,$ovf,$sp	; $sp-$ovf
+	and	$ovf,$ovf,$tj	; minimize TLB usage
+	subf	$ovf,$sp,$ovf	; $ovf-$sp
+	mr	$tj,$sp
+	srwi	$num,$num,`log($BNSZ)/log(2)`
+	$STUX	$sp,$sp,$ovf
+
+	$PUSH	r20,`-12*$SIZE_T`($tj)
+	$PUSH	r21,`-11*$SIZE_T`($tj)
+	$PUSH	r22,`-10*$SIZE_T`($tj)
+	$PUSH	r23,`-9*$SIZE_T`($tj)
+	$PUSH	r24,`-8*$SIZE_T`($tj)
+	$PUSH	r25,`-7*$SIZE_T`($tj)
+	$PUSH	r26,`-6*$SIZE_T`($tj)
+	$PUSH	r27,`-5*$SIZE_T`($tj)
+	$PUSH	r28,`-4*$SIZE_T`($tj)
+	$PUSH	r29,`-3*$SIZE_T`($tj)
+	$PUSH	r30,`-2*$SIZE_T`($tj)
+	$PUSH	r31,`-1*$SIZE_T`($tj)
+
+	$LD	$n0,0($n0)	; pull n0[0] value
+	addi	$num,$num,-2	; adjust $num for counter register
+
+	$LD	$m0,0($bp)	; m0=bp[0]
+	$LD	$aj,0($ap)	; ap[0]
+	addi	$tp,$sp,$LOCALS
+	$UMULL	$lo0,$aj,$m0	; ap[0]*bp[0]
+	$UMULH	$hi0,$aj,$m0
+
+	$LD	$aj,$BNSZ($ap)	; ap[1]
+	$LD	$nj,0($np)	; np[0]
+
+	$UMULL	$m1,$lo0,$n0	; "tp[0]"*n0
+
+	$UMULL	$alo,$aj,$m0	; ap[1]*bp[0]
+	$UMULH	$ahi,$aj,$m0
+
+	$UMULL	$lo1,$nj,$m1	; np[0]*m1
+	$UMULH	$hi1,$nj,$m1
+	$LD	$nj,$BNSZ($np)	; np[1]
+	addc	$lo1,$lo1,$lo0
+	addze	$hi1,$hi1
+
+	$UMULL	$nlo,$nj,$m1	; np[1]*m1
+	$UMULH	$nhi,$nj,$m1
+
+	mtctr	$num
+	li	$j,`2*$BNSZ`
+.align	4
+L1st:
+	$LDX	$aj,$ap,$j	; ap[j]
+	addc	$lo0,$alo,$hi0
+	$LDX	$nj,$np,$j	; np[j]
+	addze	$hi0,$ahi
+	$UMULL	$alo,$aj,$m0	; ap[j]*bp[0]
+	addc	$lo1,$nlo,$hi1
+	$UMULH	$ahi,$aj,$m0
+	addze	$hi1,$nhi
+	$UMULL	$nlo,$nj,$m1	; np[j]*m1
+	addc	$lo1,$lo1,$lo0	; np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0]
+	$UMULH	$nhi,$nj,$m1
+	addze	$hi1,$hi1
+	$ST	$lo1,0($tp)	; tp[j-1]
+
+	addi	$j,$j,$BNSZ	; j++
+	addi	$tp,$tp,$BNSZ	; tp++
+	bdnz	L1st
+;L1st
+	addc	$lo0,$alo,$hi0
+	addze	$hi0,$ahi
+
+	addc	$lo1,$nlo,$hi1
+	addze	$hi1,$nhi
+	addc	$lo1,$lo1,$lo0	; np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0]
+	addze	$hi1,$hi1
+	$ST	$lo1,0($tp)	; tp[j-1]
+
+	li	$ovf,0
+	addc	$hi1,$hi1,$hi0
+	addze	$ovf,$ovf	; upmost overflow bit
+	$ST	$hi1,$BNSZ($tp)
+
+	li	$i,$BNSZ
+.align	4
+Louter:
+	$LDX	$m0,$bp,$i	; m0=bp[i]
+	$LD	$aj,0($ap)	; ap[0]
+	addi	$tp,$sp,$LOCALS
+	$LD	$tj,$LOCALS($sp); tp[0]
+	$UMULL	$lo0,$aj,$m0	; ap[0]*bp[i]
+	$UMULH	$hi0,$aj,$m0
+	$LD	$aj,$BNSZ($ap)	; ap[1]
+	$LD	$nj,0($np)	; np[0]
+	addc	$lo0,$lo0,$tj	; ap[0]*bp[i]+tp[0]
+	$UMULL	$alo,$aj,$m0	; ap[j]*bp[i]
+	addze	$hi0,$hi0
+	$UMULL	$m1,$lo0,$n0	; tp[0]*n0
+	$UMULH	$ahi,$aj,$m0
+	$UMULL	$lo1,$nj,$m1	; np[0]*m1
+	$UMULH	$hi1,$nj,$m1
+	$LD	$nj,$BNSZ($np)	; np[1]
+	addc	$lo1,$lo1,$lo0
+	$UMULL	$nlo,$nj,$m1	; np[1]*m1
+	addze	$hi1,$hi1
+	$UMULH	$nhi,$nj,$m1
+
+	mtctr	$num
+	li	$j,`2*$BNSZ`
+.align	4
+Linner:
+	$LDX	$aj,$ap,$j	; ap[j]
+	addc	$lo0,$alo,$hi0
+	$LD	$tj,$BNSZ($tp)	; tp[j]
+	addze	$hi0,$ahi
+	$LDX	$nj,$np,$j	; np[j]
+	addc	$lo1,$nlo,$hi1
+	$UMULL	$alo,$aj,$m0	; ap[j]*bp[i]
+	addze	$hi1,$nhi
+	$UMULH	$ahi,$aj,$m0
+	addc	$lo0,$lo0,$tj	; ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j]
+	$UMULL	$nlo,$nj,$m1	; np[j]*m1
+	addze	$hi0,$hi0
+	$UMULH	$nhi,$nj,$m1
+	addc	$lo1,$lo1,$lo0	; np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j]
+	addi	$j,$j,$BNSZ	; j++
+	addze	$hi1,$hi1
+	$ST	$lo1,0($tp)	; tp[j-1]
+	addi	$tp,$tp,$BNSZ	; tp++
+	bdnz	Linner
+;Linner
+	$LD	$tj,$BNSZ($tp)	; tp[j]
+	addc	$lo0,$alo,$hi0
+	addze	$hi0,$ahi
+	addc	$lo0,$lo0,$tj	; ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j]
+	addze	$hi0,$hi0
+
+	addc	$lo1,$nlo,$hi1
+	addze	$hi1,$nhi
+	addc	$lo1,$lo1,$lo0	; np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j]
+	addze	$hi1,$hi1
+	$ST	$lo1,0($tp)	; tp[j-1]
+
+	addic	$ovf,$ovf,-1	; move upmost overflow to XER[CA]
+	li	$ovf,0
+	adde	$hi1,$hi1,$hi0
+	addze	$ovf,$ovf
+	$ST	$hi1,$BNSZ($tp)
+;
+	slwi	$tj,$num,`log($BNSZ)/log(2)`
+	$UCMP	$i,$tj
+	addi	$i,$i,$BNSZ
+	ble	Louter
+
+	addi	$num,$num,2	; restore $num
+	subfc	$j,$j,$j	; j=0 and "clear" XER[CA]
+	addi	$tp,$sp,$LOCALS
+	mtctr	$num
+
+.align	4
+Lsub:	$LDX	$tj,$tp,$j
+	$LDX	$nj,$np,$j
+	subfe	$aj,$nj,$tj	; tp[j]-np[j]
+	$STX	$aj,$rp,$j
+	addi	$j,$j,$BNSZ
+	bdnz	Lsub
+
+	li	$j,0
+	mtctr	$num
+	subfe	$ovf,$j,$ovf	; handle upmost overflow bit
+	and	$ap,$tp,$ovf
+	andc	$np,$rp,$ovf
+	or	$ap,$ap,$np	; ap=borrow?tp:rp
+
+.align	4
+Lcopy:				; copy or in-place refresh
+	$LDX	$tj,$ap,$j
+	$STX	$tj,$rp,$j
+	$STX	$j,$tp,$j	; zap at once
+	addi	$j,$j,$BNSZ
+	bdnz	Lcopy
+
+	$POP	$tj,0($sp)
+	li	r3,1
+	$POP	r20,`-12*$SIZE_T`($tj)
+	$POP	r21,`-11*$SIZE_T`($tj)
+	$POP	r22,`-10*$SIZE_T`($tj)
+	$POP	r23,`-9*$SIZE_T`($tj)
+	$POP	r24,`-8*$SIZE_T`($tj)
+	$POP	r25,`-7*$SIZE_T`($tj)
+	$POP	r26,`-6*$SIZE_T`($tj)
+	$POP	r27,`-5*$SIZE_T`($tj)
+	$POP	r28,`-4*$SIZE_T`($tj)
+	$POP	r29,`-3*$SIZE_T`($tj)
+	$POP	r30,`-2*$SIZE_T`($tj)
+	$POP	r31,`-1*$SIZE_T`($tj)
+	mr	$sp,$tj
+	blr
+	.long	0
+	.byte	0,12,4,0,0x80,12,6,0
+	.long	0
+.size	.bn_mul_mont_int,.-.bn_mul_mont_int
+
+.asciz  "Montgomery Multiplication for PPC, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+___
+
+$code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem;
+print $code;
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/ppc.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/ppc.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4ea534a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/ppc.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,2014 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+# Implemented as a Perl wrapper as we want to support several different
+# architectures with single file. We pick up the target based on the
+# file name we are asked to generate.
+#
+# It should be noted though that this perl code is nothing like
+# <openssl>/crypto/perlasm/x86*. In this case perl is used pretty much
+# as pre-processor to cover for platform differences in name decoration,
+# linker tables, 32-/64-bit instruction sets...
+#
+# As you might know there're several PowerPC ABI in use. Most notably
+# Linux and AIX use different 32-bit ABIs. Good news are that these ABIs
+# are similar enough to implement leaf(!) functions, which would be ABI
+# neutral. And that's what you find here: ABI neutral leaf functions.
+# In case you wonder what that is...
+#
+#       AIX performance
+#
+#	MEASUREMENTS WITH cc ON a 200 MhZ PowerPC 604e.
+#
+#	The following is the performance of 32-bit compiler
+#	generated code:
+#
+#	OpenSSL 0.9.6c 21 dec 2001
+#	built on: Tue Jun 11 11:06:51 EDT 2002
+#	options:bn(64,32) ...
+#compiler: cc -DTHREADS  -DAIX -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_LLONG -O3
+#                  sign    verify    sign/s verify/s
+#rsa  512 bits   0.0098s   0.0009s    102.0   1170.6
+#rsa 1024 bits   0.0507s   0.0026s     19.7    387.5
+#rsa 2048 bits   0.3036s   0.0085s      3.3    117.1
+#rsa 4096 bits   2.0040s   0.0299s      0.5     33.4
+#dsa  512 bits   0.0087s   0.0106s    114.3     94.5
+#dsa 1024 bits   0.0256s   0.0313s     39.0     32.0	
+#
+#	Same bechmark with this assembler code:
+#
+#rsa  512 bits   0.0056s   0.0005s    178.6   2049.2
+#rsa 1024 bits   0.0283s   0.0015s     35.3    674.1
+#rsa 2048 bits   0.1744s   0.0050s      5.7    201.2
+#rsa 4096 bits   1.1644s   0.0179s      0.9     55.7
+#dsa  512 bits   0.0052s   0.0062s    191.6    162.0
+#dsa 1024 bits   0.0149s   0.0180s     67.0     55.5
+#
+#	Number of operations increases by at almost 75%
+#
+#	Here are performance numbers for 64-bit compiler
+#	generated code:
+#
+#	OpenSSL 0.9.6g [engine] 9 Aug 2002
+#	built on: Fri Apr 18 16:59:20 EDT 2003
+#	options:bn(64,64) ...
+#	compiler: cc -DTHREADS -D_REENTRANT -q64 -DB_ENDIAN -O3
+#                  sign    verify    sign/s verify/s
+#rsa  512 bits   0.0028s   0.0003s    357.1   3844.4
+#rsa 1024 bits   0.0148s   0.0008s     67.5   1239.7
+#rsa 2048 bits   0.0963s   0.0028s     10.4    353.0
+#rsa 4096 bits   0.6538s   0.0102s      1.5     98.1
+#dsa  512 bits   0.0026s   0.0032s    382.5    313.7
+#dsa 1024 bits   0.0081s   0.0099s    122.8    100.6
+#
+#	Same benchmark with this assembler code:
+#
+#rsa  512 bits   0.0020s   0.0002s    510.4   6273.7
+#rsa 1024 bits   0.0088s   0.0005s    114.1   2128.3
+#rsa 2048 bits   0.0540s   0.0016s     18.5    622.5
+#rsa 4096 bits   0.3700s   0.0058s      2.7    171.0
+#dsa  512 bits   0.0016s   0.0020s    610.7    507.1
+#dsa 1024 bits   0.0047s   0.0058s    212.5    173.2
+#	
+#	Again, performance increases by at about 75%
+#
+#       Mac OS X, Apple G5 1.8GHz (Note this is 32 bit code)
+#       OpenSSL 0.9.7c 30 Sep 2003
+#
+#       Original code.
+#
+#rsa  512 bits   0.0011s   0.0001s    906.1  11012.5
+#rsa 1024 bits   0.0060s   0.0003s    166.6   3363.1
+#rsa 2048 bits   0.0370s   0.0010s     27.1    982.4
+#rsa 4096 bits   0.2426s   0.0036s      4.1    280.4
+#dsa  512 bits   0.0010s   0.0012s   1038.1    841.5
+#dsa 1024 bits   0.0030s   0.0037s    329.6    269.7
+#dsa 2048 bits   0.0101s   0.0127s     98.9     78.6
+#
+#       Same benchmark with this assembler code:
+#
+#rsa  512 bits   0.0007s   0.0001s   1416.2  16645.9
+#rsa 1024 bits   0.0036s   0.0002s    274.4   5380.6
+#rsa 2048 bits   0.0222s   0.0006s     45.1   1589.5
+#rsa 4096 bits   0.1469s   0.0022s      6.8    449.6
+#dsa  512 bits   0.0006s   0.0007s   1664.2   1376.2
+#dsa 1024 bits   0.0018s   0.0023s    545.0    442.2
+#dsa 2048 bits   0.0061s   0.0075s    163.5    132.8
+#
+#        Performance increase of ~60%
+#
+#	If you have comments or suggestions to improve code send
+#	me a note at schari@us.ibm.com
+#
+
+$flavour = shift;
+
+if ($flavour =~ /32/) {
+	$BITS=	32;
+	$BNSZ=	$BITS/8;
+	$ISA=	"\"ppc\"";
+
+	$LD=	"lwz";		# load
+	$LDU=	"lwzu";		# load and update
+	$ST=	"stw";		# store
+	$STU=	"stwu";		# store and update
+	$UMULL=	"mullw";	# unsigned multiply low
+	$UMULH=	"mulhwu";	# unsigned multiply high
+	$UDIV=	"divwu";	# unsigned divide
+	$UCMPI=	"cmplwi";	# unsigned compare with immediate
+	$UCMP=	"cmplw";	# unsigned compare
+	$CNTLZ=	"cntlzw";	# count leading zeros
+	$SHL=	"slw";		# shift left
+	$SHR=	"srw";		# unsigned shift right
+	$SHRI=	"srwi";		# unsigned shift right by immediate	
+	$SHLI=	"slwi";		# shift left by immediate
+	$CLRU=	"clrlwi";	# clear upper bits
+	$INSR=	"insrwi";	# insert right
+	$ROTL=	"rotlwi";	# rotate left by immediate
+	$TR=	"tw";		# conditional trap
+} elsif ($flavour =~ /64/) {
+	$BITS=	64;
+	$BNSZ=	$BITS/8;
+	$ISA=	"\"ppc64\"";
+
+	# same as above, but 64-bit mnemonics...
+	$LD=	"ld";		# load
+	$LDU=	"ldu";		# load and update
+	$ST=	"std";		# store
+	$STU=	"stdu";		# store and update
+	$UMULL=	"mulld";	# unsigned multiply low
+	$UMULH=	"mulhdu";	# unsigned multiply high
+	$UDIV=	"divdu";	# unsigned divide
+	$UCMPI=	"cmpldi";	# unsigned compare with immediate
+	$UCMP=	"cmpld";	# unsigned compare
+	$CNTLZ=	"cntlzd";	# count leading zeros
+	$SHL=	"sld";		# shift left
+	$SHR=	"srd";		# unsigned shift right
+	$SHRI=	"srdi";		# unsigned shift right by immediate	
+	$SHLI=	"sldi";		# shift left by immediate
+	$CLRU=	"clrldi";	# clear upper bits
+	$INSR=	"insrdi";	# insert right 
+	$ROTL=	"rotldi";	# rotate left by immediate
+	$TR=	"td";		# conditional trap
+} else { die "nonsense $flavour"; }
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+( $xlate="${dir}ppc-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
+( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/ppc-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
+die "can't locate ppc-xlate.pl";
+
+open STDOUT,"| $^X $xlate $flavour ".shift || die "can't call $xlate: $!";
+
+$data=<<EOF;
+#--------------------------------------------------------------------
+#
+#
+#
+#
+#	File:		ppc32.s
+#
+#	Created by:	Suresh Chari
+#			IBM Thomas J. Watson Research Library
+#			Hawthorne, NY
+#
+#
+#	Description:	Optimized assembly routines for OpenSSL crypto
+#			on the 32 bitPowerPC platform.
+#
+#
+#	Version History
+#
+#	2. Fixed bn_add,bn_sub and bn_div_words, added comments,
+#	   cleaned up code. Also made a single version which can
+#	   be used for both the AIX and Linux compilers. See NOTE
+#	   below.
+#				12/05/03		Suresh Chari
+#			(with lots of help from)        Andy Polyakov
+##	
+#	1. Initial version	10/20/02		Suresh Chari
+#
+#
+#	The following file works for the xlc,cc
+#	and gcc compilers.
+#
+#	NOTE:	To get the file to link correctly with the gcc compiler
+#	        you have to change the names of the routines and remove
+#		the first .(dot) character. This should automatically
+#		be done in the build process.
+#
+#	Hand optimized assembly code for the following routines
+#	
+#	bn_sqr_comba4
+#	bn_sqr_comba8
+#	bn_mul_comba4
+#	bn_mul_comba8
+#	bn_sub_words
+#	bn_add_words
+#	bn_div_words
+#	bn_sqr_words
+#	bn_mul_words
+#	bn_mul_add_words
+#
+#	NOTE:	It is possible to optimize this code more for
+#	specific PowerPC or Power architectures. On the Northstar
+#	architecture the optimizations in this file do
+#	 NOT provide much improvement.
+#
+#	If you have comments or suggestions to improve code send
+#	me a note at schari\@us.ibm.com
+#
+#--------------------------------------------------------------------------
+#
+#	Defines to be used in the assembly code.
+#	
+#.set r0,0	# we use it as storage for value of 0
+#.set SP,1	# preserved
+#.set RTOC,2	# preserved 
+#.set r3,3	# 1st argument/return value
+#.set r4,4	# 2nd argument/volatile register
+#.set r5,5	# 3rd argument/volatile register
+#.set r6,6	# ...
+#.set r7,7
+#.set r8,8
+#.set r9,9
+#.set r10,10
+#.set r11,11
+#.set r12,12
+#.set r13,13	# not used, nor any other "below" it...
+
+#	Declare function names to be global
+#	NOTE:	For gcc these names MUST be changed to remove
+#	        the first . i.e. for example change ".bn_sqr_comba4"
+#		to "bn_sqr_comba4". This should be automatically done
+#		in the build.
+	
+	.globl	.bn_sqr_comba4
+	.globl	.bn_sqr_comba8
+	.globl	.bn_mul_comba4
+	.globl	.bn_mul_comba8
+	.globl	.bn_sub_words
+	.globl	.bn_add_words
+	.globl	.bn_div_words
+	.globl	.bn_sqr_words
+	.globl	.bn_mul_words
+	.globl	.bn_mul_add_words
+	
+# .text section
+	
+	.machine	"any"
+
+#
+#	NOTE:	The following label name should be changed to
+#		"bn_sqr_comba4" i.e. remove the first dot
+#		for the gcc compiler. This should be automatically
+#		done in the build
+#
+
+.align	4
+.bn_sqr_comba4:
+#
+# Optimized version of bn_sqr_comba4.
+#
+# void bn_sqr_comba4(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a)
+# r3 contains r
+# r4 contains a
+#
+# Freely use registers r5,r6,r7,r8,r9,r10,r11 as follows:	
+# 
+# r5,r6 are the two BN_ULONGs being multiplied.
+# r7,r8 are the results of the 32x32 giving 64 bit multiply.
+# r9,r10, r11 are the equivalents of c1,c2, c3.
+# Here's the assembly
+#
+#
+	xor		r0,r0,r0		# set r0 = 0. Used in the addze
+						# instructions below
+	
+						#sqr_add_c(a,0,c1,c2,c3)
+	$LD		r5,`0*$BNSZ`(r4)		
+	$UMULL		r9,r5,r5		
+	$UMULH		r10,r5,r5		#in first iteration. No need
+						#to add since c1=c2=c3=0.
+						# Note c3(r11) is NOT set to 0
+						# but will be.
+
+	$ST		r9,`0*$BNSZ`(r3)	# r[0]=c1;
+						# sqr_add_c2(a,1,0,c2,c3,c1);
+	$LD		r6,`1*$BNSZ`(r4)		
+	$UMULL		r7,r5,r6
+	$UMULH		r8,r5,r6
+					
+	addc		r7,r7,r7		# compute (r7,r8)=2*(r7,r8)
+	adde		r8,r8,r8
+	addze		r9,r0			# catch carry if any.
+						# r9= r0(=0) and carry 
+	
+	addc		r10,r7,r10		# now add to temp result.
+	addze		r11,r8                  # r8 added to r11 which is 0 
+	addze		r9,r9
+	
+	$ST		r10,`1*$BNSZ`(r3)	#r[1]=c2; 
+						#sqr_add_c(a,1,c3,c1,c2)
+	$UMULL		r7,r6,r6
+	$UMULH		r8,r6,r6
+	addc		r11,r7,r11
+	adde		r9,r8,r9
+	addze		r10,r0
+						#sqr_add_c2(a,2,0,c3,c1,c2)
+	$LD		r6,`2*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$UMULL		r7,r5,r6
+	$UMULH		r8,r5,r6
+	
+	addc		r7,r7,r7
+	adde		r8,r8,r8
+	addze		r10,r10
+	
+	addc		r11,r7,r11
+	adde		r9,r8,r9
+	addze		r10,r10
+	$ST		r11,`2*$BNSZ`(r3)	#r[2]=c3 
+						#sqr_add_c2(a,3,0,c1,c2,c3);
+	$LD		r6,`3*$BNSZ`(r4)		
+	$UMULL		r7,r5,r6
+	$UMULH		r8,r5,r6
+	addc		r7,r7,r7
+	adde		r8,r8,r8
+	addze		r11,r0
+	
+	addc		r9,r7,r9
+	adde		r10,r8,r10
+	addze		r11,r11
+						#sqr_add_c2(a,2,1,c1,c2,c3);
+	$LD		r5,`1*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$LD		r6,`2*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$UMULL		r7,r5,r6
+	$UMULH		r8,r5,r6
+	
+	addc		r7,r7,r7
+	adde		r8,r8,r8
+	addze		r11,r11
+	addc		r9,r7,r9
+	adde		r10,r8,r10
+	addze		r11,r11
+	$ST		r9,`3*$BNSZ`(r3)	#r[3]=c1
+						#sqr_add_c(a,2,c2,c3,c1);
+	$UMULL		r7,r6,r6
+	$UMULH		r8,r6,r6
+	addc		r10,r7,r10
+	adde		r11,r8,r11
+	addze		r9,r0
+						#sqr_add_c2(a,3,1,c2,c3,c1);
+	$LD		r6,`3*$BNSZ`(r4)		
+	$UMULL		r7,r5,r6
+	$UMULH		r8,r5,r6
+	addc		r7,r7,r7
+	adde		r8,r8,r8
+	addze		r9,r9
+	
+	addc		r10,r7,r10
+	adde		r11,r8,r11
+	addze		r9,r9
+	$ST		r10,`4*$BNSZ`(r3)	#r[4]=c2
+						#sqr_add_c2(a,3,2,c3,c1,c2);
+	$LD		r5,`2*$BNSZ`(r4)		
+	$UMULL		r7,r5,r6
+	$UMULH		r8,r5,r6
+	addc		r7,r7,r7
+	adde		r8,r8,r8
+	addze		r10,r0
+	
+	addc		r11,r7,r11
+	adde		r9,r8,r9
+	addze		r10,r10
+	$ST		r11,`5*$BNSZ`(r3)	#r[5] = c3
+						#sqr_add_c(a,3,c1,c2,c3);
+	$UMULL		r7,r6,r6		
+	$UMULH		r8,r6,r6
+	addc		r9,r7,r9
+	adde		r10,r8,r10
+
+	$ST		r9,`6*$BNSZ`(r3)	#r[6]=c1
+	$ST		r10,`7*$BNSZ`(r3)	#r[7]=c2
+	blr
+	.long	0
+	.byte	0,12,0x14,0,0,0,2,0
+	.long	0
+.size	.bn_sqr_comba4,.-.bn_sqr_comba4
+
+#
+#	NOTE:	The following label name should be changed to
+#		"bn_sqr_comba8" i.e. remove the first dot
+#		for the gcc compiler. This should be automatically
+#		done in the build
+#
+	
+.align	4
+.bn_sqr_comba8:
+#
+# This is an optimized version of the bn_sqr_comba8 routine.
+# Tightly uses the adde instruction
+#
+#
+# void bn_sqr_comba8(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a)
+# r3 contains r
+# r4 contains a
+#
+# Freely use registers r5,r6,r7,r8,r9,r10,r11 as follows:	
+# 
+# r5,r6 are the two BN_ULONGs being multiplied.
+# r7,r8 are the results of the 32x32 giving 64 bit multiply.
+# r9,r10, r11 are the equivalents of c1,c2, c3.
+#
+# Possible optimization of loading all 8 longs of a into registers
+# doesn't provide any speedup
+# 
+
+	xor		r0,r0,r0		#set r0 = 0.Used in addze
+						#instructions below.
+
+						#sqr_add_c(a,0,c1,c2,c3);
+	$LD		r5,`0*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$UMULL		r9,r5,r5		#1st iteration:	no carries.
+	$UMULH		r10,r5,r5
+	$ST		r9,`0*$BNSZ`(r3)	# r[0]=c1;
+						#sqr_add_c2(a,1,0,c2,c3,c1);
+	$LD		r6,`1*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$UMULL		r7,r5,r6
+	$UMULH		r8,r5,r6	
+	
+	addc		r10,r7,r10		#add the two register number
+	adde		r11,r8,r0 		# (r8,r7) to the three register
+	addze		r9,r0			# number (r9,r11,r10).NOTE:r0=0
+	
+	addc		r10,r7,r10		#add the two register number
+	adde		r11,r8,r11 		# (r8,r7) to the three register
+	addze		r9,r9			# number (r9,r11,r10).
+	
+	$ST		r10,`1*$BNSZ`(r3)	# r[1]=c2
+				
+						#sqr_add_c(a,1,c3,c1,c2);
+	$UMULL		r7,r6,r6
+	$UMULH		r8,r6,r6
+	addc		r11,r7,r11
+	adde		r9,r8,r9
+	addze		r10,r0
+						#sqr_add_c2(a,2,0,c3,c1,c2);
+	$LD		r6,`2*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$UMULL		r7,r5,r6
+	$UMULH		r8,r5,r6
+	
+	addc		r11,r7,r11
+	adde		r9,r8,r9
+	addze		r10,r10
+	
+	addc		r11,r7,r11
+	adde		r9,r8,r9
+	addze		r10,r10
+	
+	$ST		r11,`2*$BNSZ`(r3)	#r[2]=c3
+						#sqr_add_c2(a,3,0,c1,c2,c3);
+	$LD		r6,`3*$BNSZ`(r4)	#r6 = a[3]. r5 is already a[0].
+	$UMULL		r7,r5,r6
+	$UMULH		r8,r5,r6
+	
+	addc		r9,r7,r9
+	adde		r10,r8,r10
+	addze		r11,r0
+	
+	addc		r9,r7,r9
+	adde		r10,r8,r10
+	addze		r11,r11
+						#sqr_add_c2(a,2,1,c1,c2,c3);
+	$LD		r5,`1*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$LD		r6,`2*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$UMULL		r7,r5,r6
+	$UMULH		r8,r5,r6
+	
+	addc		r9,r7,r9
+	adde		r10,r8,r10
+	addze		r11,r11
+	
+	addc		r9,r7,r9
+	adde		r10,r8,r10
+	addze		r11,r11
+	
+	$ST		r9,`3*$BNSZ`(r3)	#r[3]=c1;
+						#sqr_add_c(a,2,c2,c3,c1);
+	$UMULL		r7,r6,r6
+	$UMULH		r8,r6,r6
+	
+	addc		r10,r7,r10
+	adde		r11,r8,r11
+	addze		r9,r0
+						#sqr_add_c2(a,3,1,c2,c3,c1);
+	$LD		r6,`3*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$UMULL		r7,r5,r6
+	$UMULH		r8,r5,r6
+	
+	addc		r10,r7,r10
+	adde		r11,r8,r11
+	addze		r9,r9
+	
+	addc		r10,r7,r10
+	adde		r11,r8,r11
+	addze		r9,r9
+						#sqr_add_c2(a,4,0,c2,c3,c1);
+	$LD		r5,`0*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$LD		r6,`4*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$UMULL		r7,r5,r6
+	$UMULH		r8,r5,r6
+	
+	addc		r10,r7,r10
+	adde		r11,r8,r11
+	addze		r9,r9
+	
+	addc		r10,r7,r10
+	adde		r11,r8,r11
+	addze		r9,r9
+	$ST		r10,`4*$BNSZ`(r3)	#r[4]=c2;
+						#sqr_add_c2(a,5,0,c3,c1,c2);
+	$LD		r6,`5*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$UMULL		r7,r5,r6
+	$UMULH		r8,r5,r6
+	
+	addc		r11,r7,r11
+	adde		r9,r8,r9
+	addze		r10,r0
+	
+	addc		r11,r7,r11
+	adde		r9,r8,r9
+	addze		r10,r10
+						#sqr_add_c2(a,4,1,c3,c1,c2);
+	$LD		r5,`1*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$LD		r6,`4*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$UMULL		r7,r5,r6
+	$UMULH		r8,r5,r6
+	
+	addc		r11,r7,r11
+	adde		r9,r8,r9
+	addze		r10,r10
+	
+	addc		r11,r7,r11
+	adde		r9,r8,r9
+	addze		r10,r10
+						#sqr_add_c2(a,3,2,c3,c1,c2);
+	$LD		r5,`2*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$LD		r6,`3*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$UMULL		r7,r5,r6
+	$UMULH		r8,r5,r6
+	
+	addc		r11,r7,r11
+	adde		r9,r8,r9
+	addze		r10,r10
+	
+	addc		r11,r7,r11
+	adde		r9,r8,r9
+	addze		r10,r10
+	$ST		r11,`5*$BNSZ`(r3)	#r[5]=c3;
+						#sqr_add_c(a,3,c1,c2,c3);
+	$UMULL		r7,r6,r6
+	$UMULH		r8,r6,r6
+	addc		r9,r7,r9
+	adde		r10,r8,r10
+	addze		r11,r0
+						#sqr_add_c2(a,4,2,c1,c2,c3);
+	$LD		r6,`4*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$UMULL		r7,r5,r6
+	$UMULH		r8,r5,r6
+	
+	addc		r9,r7,r9
+	adde		r10,r8,r10
+	addze		r11,r11
+	
+	addc		r9,r7,r9
+	adde		r10,r8,r10
+	addze		r11,r11
+						#sqr_add_c2(a,5,1,c1,c2,c3);
+	$LD		r5,`1*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$LD		r6,`5*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$UMULL		r7,r5,r6
+	$UMULH		r8,r5,r6
+	
+	addc		r9,r7,r9
+	adde		r10,r8,r10
+	addze		r11,r11
+	
+	addc		r9,r7,r9
+	adde		r10,r8,r10
+	addze		r11,r11
+						#sqr_add_c2(a,6,0,c1,c2,c3);
+	$LD		r5,`0*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$LD		r6,`6*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$UMULL		r7,r5,r6
+	$UMULH		r8,r5,r6
+	addc		r9,r7,r9
+	adde		r10,r8,r10
+	addze		r11,r11
+	addc		r9,r7,r9
+	adde		r10,r8,r10
+	addze		r11,r11
+	$ST		r9,`6*$BNSZ`(r3)	#r[6]=c1;
+						#sqr_add_c2(a,7,0,c2,c3,c1);
+	$LD		r6,`7*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$UMULL		r7,r5,r6
+	$UMULH		r8,r5,r6
+	
+	addc		r10,r7,r10
+	adde		r11,r8,r11
+	addze		r9,r0
+	addc		r10,r7,r10
+	adde		r11,r8,r11
+	addze		r9,r9
+						#sqr_add_c2(a,6,1,c2,c3,c1);
+	$LD		r5,`1*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$LD		r6,`6*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$UMULL		r7,r5,r6
+	$UMULH		r8,r5,r6
+	
+	addc		r10,r7,r10
+	adde		r11,r8,r11
+	addze		r9,r9
+	addc		r10,r7,r10
+	adde		r11,r8,r11
+	addze		r9,r9
+						#sqr_add_c2(a,5,2,c2,c3,c1);
+	$LD		r5,`2*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$LD		r6,`5*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$UMULL		r7,r5,r6
+	$UMULH		r8,r5,r6
+	addc		r10,r7,r10
+	adde		r11,r8,r11
+	addze		r9,r9
+	addc		r10,r7,r10
+	adde		r11,r8,r11
+	addze		r9,r9
+						#sqr_add_c2(a,4,3,c2,c3,c1);
+	$LD		r5,`3*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$LD		r6,`4*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$UMULL		r7,r5,r6
+	$UMULH		r8,r5,r6
+	
+	addc		r10,r7,r10
+	adde		r11,r8,r11
+	addze		r9,r9
+	addc		r10,r7,r10
+	adde		r11,r8,r11
+	addze		r9,r9
+	$ST		r10,`7*$BNSZ`(r3)	#r[7]=c2;
+						#sqr_add_c(a,4,c3,c1,c2);
+	$UMULL		r7,r6,r6
+	$UMULH		r8,r6,r6
+	addc		r11,r7,r11
+	adde		r9,r8,r9
+	addze		r10,r0
+						#sqr_add_c2(a,5,3,c3,c1,c2);
+	$LD		r6,`5*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$UMULL		r7,r5,r6
+	$UMULH		r8,r5,r6
+	addc		r11,r7,r11
+	adde		r9,r8,r9
+	addze		r10,r10
+	addc		r11,r7,r11
+	adde		r9,r8,r9
+	addze		r10,r10
+						#sqr_add_c2(a,6,2,c3,c1,c2);
+	$LD		r5,`2*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$LD		r6,`6*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$UMULL		r7,r5,r6
+	$UMULH		r8,r5,r6
+	addc		r11,r7,r11
+	adde		r9,r8,r9
+	addze		r10,r10
+	
+	addc		r11,r7,r11
+	adde		r9,r8,r9
+	addze		r10,r10
+						#sqr_add_c2(a,7,1,c3,c1,c2);
+	$LD		r5,`1*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$LD		r6,`7*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$UMULL		r7,r5,r6
+	$UMULH		r8,r5,r6
+	addc		r11,r7,r11
+	adde		r9,r8,r9
+	addze		r10,r10
+	addc		r11,r7,r11
+	adde		r9,r8,r9
+	addze		r10,r10
+	$ST		r11,`8*$BNSZ`(r3)	#r[8]=c3;
+						#sqr_add_c2(a,7,2,c1,c2,c3);
+	$LD		r5,`2*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$UMULL		r7,r5,r6
+	$UMULH		r8,r5,r6
+	
+	addc		r9,r7,r9
+	adde		r10,r8,r10
+	addze		r11,r0
+	addc		r9,r7,r9
+	adde		r10,r8,r10
+	addze		r11,r11
+						#sqr_add_c2(a,6,3,c1,c2,c3);
+	$LD		r5,`3*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$LD		r6,`6*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$UMULL		r7,r5,r6
+	$UMULH		r8,r5,r6
+	addc		r9,r7,r9
+	adde		r10,r8,r10
+	addze		r11,r11
+	addc		r9,r7,r9
+	adde		r10,r8,r10
+	addze		r11,r11
+						#sqr_add_c2(a,5,4,c1,c2,c3);
+	$LD		r5,`4*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$LD		r6,`5*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$UMULL		r7,r5,r6
+	$UMULH		r8,r5,r6
+	addc		r9,r7,r9
+	adde		r10,r8,r10
+	addze		r11,r11
+	addc		r9,r7,r9
+	adde		r10,r8,r10
+	addze		r11,r11
+	$ST		r9,`9*$BNSZ`(r3)	#r[9]=c1;
+						#sqr_add_c(a,5,c2,c3,c1);
+	$UMULL		r7,r6,r6
+	$UMULH		r8,r6,r6
+	addc		r10,r7,r10
+	adde		r11,r8,r11
+	addze		r9,r0
+						#sqr_add_c2(a,6,4,c2,c3,c1);
+	$LD		r6,`6*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$UMULL		r7,r5,r6
+	$UMULH		r8,r5,r6
+	addc		r10,r7,r10
+	adde		r11,r8,r11
+	addze		r9,r9
+	addc		r10,r7,r10
+	adde		r11,r8,r11
+	addze		r9,r9
+						#sqr_add_c2(a,7,3,c2,c3,c1);
+	$LD		r5,`3*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$LD		r6,`7*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$UMULL		r7,r5,r6
+	$UMULH		r8,r5,r6
+	addc		r10,r7,r10
+	adde		r11,r8,r11
+	addze		r9,r9
+	addc		r10,r7,r10
+	adde		r11,r8,r11
+	addze		r9,r9
+	$ST		r10,`10*$BNSZ`(r3)	#r[10]=c2;
+						#sqr_add_c2(a,7,4,c3,c1,c2);
+	$LD		r5,`4*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$UMULL		r7,r5,r6
+	$UMULH		r8,r5,r6
+	addc		r11,r7,r11
+	adde		r9,r8,r9
+	addze		r10,r0
+	addc		r11,r7,r11
+	adde		r9,r8,r9
+	addze		r10,r10
+						#sqr_add_c2(a,6,5,c3,c1,c2);
+	$LD		r5,`5*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$LD		r6,`6*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$UMULL		r7,r5,r6
+	$UMULH		r8,r5,r6
+	addc		r11,r7,r11
+	adde		r9,r8,r9
+	addze		r10,r10
+	addc		r11,r7,r11
+	adde		r9,r8,r9
+	addze		r10,r10
+	$ST		r11,`11*$BNSZ`(r3)	#r[11]=c3;
+						#sqr_add_c(a,6,c1,c2,c3);
+	$UMULL		r7,r6,r6
+	$UMULH		r8,r6,r6
+	addc		r9,r7,r9
+	adde		r10,r8,r10
+	addze		r11,r0
+						#sqr_add_c2(a,7,5,c1,c2,c3)
+	$LD		r6,`7*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$UMULL		r7,r5,r6
+	$UMULH		r8,r5,r6
+	addc		r9,r7,r9
+	adde		r10,r8,r10
+	addze		r11,r11
+	addc		r9,r7,r9
+	adde		r10,r8,r10
+	addze		r11,r11
+	$ST		r9,`12*$BNSZ`(r3)	#r[12]=c1;
+	
+						#sqr_add_c2(a,7,6,c2,c3,c1)
+	$LD		r5,`6*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$UMULL		r7,r5,r6
+	$UMULH		r8,r5,r6
+	addc		r10,r7,r10
+	adde		r11,r8,r11
+	addze		r9,r0
+	addc		r10,r7,r10
+	adde		r11,r8,r11
+	addze		r9,r9
+	$ST		r10,`13*$BNSZ`(r3)	#r[13]=c2;
+						#sqr_add_c(a,7,c3,c1,c2);
+	$UMULL		r7,r6,r6
+	$UMULH		r8,r6,r6
+	addc		r11,r7,r11
+	adde		r9,r8,r9
+	$ST		r11,`14*$BNSZ`(r3)	#r[14]=c3;
+	$ST		r9, `15*$BNSZ`(r3)	#r[15]=c1;
+
+
+	blr
+	.long	0
+	.byte	0,12,0x14,0,0,0,2,0
+	.long	0
+.size	.bn_sqr_comba8,.-.bn_sqr_comba8
+
+#
+#	NOTE:	The following label name should be changed to
+#		"bn_mul_comba4" i.e. remove the first dot
+#		for the gcc compiler. This should be automatically
+#		done in the build
+#
+
+.align	4
+.bn_mul_comba4:
+#
+# This is an optimized version of the bn_mul_comba4 routine.
+#
+# void bn_mul_comba4(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b)
+# r3 contains r
+# r4 contains a
+# r5 contains b
+# r6, r7 are the 2 BN_ULONGs being multiplied.
+# r8, r9 are the results of the 32x32 giving 64 multiply.
+# r10, r11, r12 are the equivalents of c1, c2, and c3.
+#
+	xor	r0,r0,r0		#r0=0. Used in addze below.
+					#mul_add_c(a[0],b[0],c1,c2,c3);
+	$LD	r6,`0*$BNSZ`(r4)		
+	$LD	r7,`0*$BNSZ`(r5)		
+	$UMULL	r10,r6,r7		
+	$UMULH	r11,r6,r7		
+	$ST	r10,`0*$BNSZ`(r3)	#r[0]=c1
+					#mul_add_c(a[0],b[1],c2,c3,c1);
+	$LD	r7,`1*$BNSZ`(r5)		
+	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
+	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
+	addc	r11,r8,r11
+	adde	r12,r9,r0
+	addze	r10,r0
+					#mul_add_c(a[1],b[0],c2,c3,c1);
+	$LD	r6, `1*$BNSZ`(r4)		
+	$LD	r7, `0*$BNSZ`(r5)		
+	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
+	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
+	addc	r11,r8,r11
+	adde	r12,r9,r12
+	addze	r10,r10
+	$ST	r11,`1*$BNSZ`(r3)	#r[1]=c2
+					#mul_add_c(a[2],b[0],c3,c1,c2);
+	$LD	r6,`2*$BNSZ`(r4)		
+	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
+	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
+	addc	r12,r8,r12
+	adde	r10,r9,r10
+	addze	r11,r0
+					#mul_add_c(a[1],b[1],c3,c1,c2);
+	$LD	r6,`1*$BNSZ`(r4)		
+	$LD	r7,`1*$BNSZ`(r5)		
+	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
+	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
+	addc	r12,r8,r12
+	adde	r10,r9,r10
+	addze	r11,r11
+					#mul_add_c(a[0],b[2],c3,c1,c2);
+	$LD	r6,`0*$BNSZ`(r4)		
+	$LD	r7,`2*$BNSZ`(r5)		
+	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
+	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
+	addc	r12,r8,r12
+	adde	r10,r9,r10
+	addze	r11,r11
+	$ST	r12,`2*$BNSZ`(r3)	#r[2]=c3
+					#mul_add_c(a[0],b[3],c1,c2,c3);
+	$LD	r7,`3*$BNSZ`(r5)		
+	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
+	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
+	addc	r10,r8,r10
+	adde	r11,r9,r11
+	addze	r12,r0
+					#mul_add_c(a[1],b[2],c1,c2,c3);
+	$LD	r6,`1*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$LD	r7,`2*$BNSZ`(r5)
+	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
+	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
+	addc	r10,r8,r10
+	adde	r11,r9,r11
+	addze	r12,r12
+					#mul_add_c(a[2],b[1],c1,c2,c3);
+	$LD	r6,`2*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$LD	r7,`1*$BNSZ`(r5)
+	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
+	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
+	addc	r10,r8,r10
+	adde	r11,r9,r11
+	addze	r12,r12
+					#mul_add_c(a[3],b[0],c1,c2,c3);
+	$LD	r6,`3*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$LD	r7,`0*$BNSZ`(r5)
+	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
+	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
+	addc	r10,r8,r10
+	adde	r11,r9,r11
+	addze	r12,r12
+	$ST	r10,`3*$BNSZ`(r3)	#r[3]=c1
+					#mul_add_c(a[3],b[1],c2,c3,c1);
+	$LD	r7,`1*$BNSZ`(r5)		
+	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
+	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
+	addc	r11,r8,r11
+	adde	r12,r9,r12
+	addze	r10,r0
+					#mul_add_c(a[2],b[2],c2,c3,c1);
+	$LD	r6,`2*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$LD	r7,`2*$BNSZ`(r5)
+	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
+	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
+	addc	r11,r8,r11
+	adde	r12,r9,r12
+	addze	r10,r10
+					#mul_add_c(a[1],b[3],c2,c3,c1);
+	$LD	r6,`1*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$LD	r7,`3*$BNSZ`(r5)
+	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
+	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
+	addc	r11,r8,r11
+	adde	r12,r9,r12
+	addze	r10,r10
+	$ST	r11,`4*$BNSZ`(r3)	#r[4]=c2
+					#mul_add_c(a[2],b[3],c3,c1,c2);
+	$LD	r6,`2*$BNSZ`(r4)		
+	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
+	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
+	addc	r12,r8,r12
+	adde	r10,r9,r10
+	addze	r11,r0
+					#mul_add_c(a[3],b[2],c3,c1,c2);
+	$LD	r6,`3*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$LD	r7,`2*$BNSZ`(r5)
+	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
+	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
+	addc	r12,r8,r12
+	adde	r10,r9,r10
+	addze	r11,r11
+	$ST	r12,`5*$BNSZ`(r3)	#r[5]=c3
+					#mul_add_c(a[3],b[3],c1,c2,c3);
+	$LD	r7,`3*$BNSZ`(r5)		
+	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
+	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
+	addc	r10,r8,r10
+	adde	r11,r9,r11
+
+	$ST	r10,`6*$BNSZ`(r3)	#r[6]=c1
+	$ST	r11,`7*$BNSZ`(r3)	#r[7]=c2
+	blr
+	.long	0
+	.byte	0,12,0x14,0,0,0,3,0
+	.long	0
+.size	.bn_mul_comba4,.-.bn_mul_comba4
+
+#
+#	NOTE:	The following label name should be changed to
+#		"bn_mul_comba8" i.e. remove the first dot
+#		for the gcc compiler. This should be automatically
+#		done in the build
+#
+	
+.align	4
+.bn_mul_comba8:
+#
+# Optimized version of the bn_mul_comba8 routine.
+#
+# void bn_mul_comba8(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b)
+# r3 contains r
+# r4 contains a
+# r5 contains b
+# r6, r7 are the 2 BN_ULONGs being multiplied.
+# r8, r9 are the results of the 32x32 giving 64 multiply.
+# r10, r11, r12 are the equivalents of c1, c2, and c3.
+#
+	xor	r0,r0,r0		#r0=0. Used in addze below.
+	
+					#mul_add_c(a[0],b[0],c1,c2,c3);
+	$LD	r6,`0*$BNSZ`(r4)	#a[0]
+	$LD	r7,`0*$BNSZ`(r5)	#b[0]
+	$UMULL	r10,r6,r7
+	$UMULH	r11,r6,r7
+	$ST	r10,`0*$BNSZ`(r3)	#r[0]=c1;
+					#mul_add_c(a[0],b[1],c2,c3,c1);
+	$LD	r7,`1*$BNSZ`(r5)
+	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
+	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
+	addc	r11,r11,r8
+	addze	r12,r9			# since we didn't set r12 to zero before.
+	addze	r10,r0
+					#mul_add_c(a[1],b[0],c2,c3,c1);
+	$LD	r6,`1*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$LD	r7,`0*$BNSZ`(r5)
+	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
+	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
+	addc	r11,r11,r8
+	adde	r12,r12,r9
+	addze	r10,r10
+	$ST	r11,`1*$BNSZ`(r3)	#r[1]=c2;
+					#mul_add_c(a[2],b[0],c3,c1,c2);
+	$LD	r6,`2*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
+	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
+	addc	r12,r12,r8
+	adde	r10,r10,r9
+	addze	r11,r0
+					#mul_add_c(a[1],b[1],c3,c1,c2);
+	$LD	r6,`1*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$LD	r7,`1*$BNSZ`(r5)
+	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
+	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
+	addc	r12,r12,r8
+	adde	r10,r10,r9
+	addze	r11,r11
+					#mul_add_c(a[0],b[2],c3,c1,c2);
+	$LD	r6,`0*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$LD	r7,`2*$BNSZ`(r5)
+	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
+	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
+	addc	r12,r12,r8
+	adde	r10,r10,r9
+	addze	r11,r11
+	$ST	r12,`2*$BNSZ`(r3)	#r[2]=c3;
+					#mul_add_c(a[0],b[3],c1,c2,c3);
+	$LD	r7,`3*$BNSZ`(r5)
+	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
+	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
+	addc	r10,r10,r8
+	adde	r11,r11,r9
+	addze	r12,r0
+					#mul_add_c(a[1],b[2],c1,c2,c3);
+	$LD	r6,`1*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$LD	r7,`2*$BNSZ`(r5)
+	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
+	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
+	addc	r10,r10,r8
+	adde	r11,r11,r9
+	addze	r12,r12
+		
+					#mul_add_c(a[2],b[1],c1,c2,c3);
+	$LD	r6,`2*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$LD	r7,`1*$BNSZ`(r5)
+	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
+	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
+	addc	r10,r10,r8
+	adde	r11,r11,r9
+	addze	r12,r12
+					#mul_add_c(a[3],b[0],c1,c2,c3);
+	$LD	r6,`3*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$LD	r7,`0*$BNSZ`(r5)
+	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
+	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
+	addc	r10,r10,r8
+	adde	r11,r11,r9
+	addze	r12,r12
+	$ST	r10,`3*$BNSZ`(r3)	#r[3]=c1;
+					#mul_add_c(a[4],b[0],c2,c3,c1);
+	$LD	r6,`4*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
+	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
+	addc	r11,r11,r8
+	adde	r12,r12,r9
+	addze	r10,r0
+					#mul_add_c(a[3],b[1],c2,c3,c1);
+	$LD	r6,`3*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$LD	r7,`1*$BNSZ`(r5)
+	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
+	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
+	addc	r11,r11,r8
+	adde	r12,r12,r9
+	addze	r10,r10
+					#mul_add_c(a[2],b[2],c2,c3,c1);
+	$LD	r6,`2*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$LD	r7,`2*$BNSZ`(r5)
+	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
+	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
+	addc	r11,r11,r8
+	adde	r12,r12,r9
+	addze	r10,r10
+					#mul_add_c(a[1],b[3],c2,c3,c1);
+	$LD	r6,`1*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$LD	r7,`3*$BNSZ`(r5)
+	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
+	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
+	addc	r11,r11,r8
+	adde	r12,r12,r9
+	addze	r10,r10
+					#mul_add_c(a[0],b[4],c2,c3,c1);
+	$LD	r6,`0*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$LD	r7,`4*$BNSZ`(r5)
+	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
+	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
+	addc	r11,r11,r8
+	adde	r12,r12,r9
+	addze	r10,r10
+	$ST	r11,`4*$BNSZ`(r3)	#r[4]=c2;
+					#mul_add_c(a[0],b[5],c3,c1,c2);
+	$LD	r7,`5*$BNSZ`(r5)
+	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
+	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
+	addc	r12,r12,r8
+	adde	r10,r10,r9
+	addze	r11,r0
+					#mul_add_c(a[1],b[4],c3,c1,c2);
+	$LD	r6,`1*$BNSZ`(r4)		
+	$LD	r7,`4*$BNSZ`(r5)
+	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
+	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
+	addc	r12,r12,r8
+	adde	r10,r10,r9
+	addze	r11,r11
+					#mul_add_c(a[2],b[3],c3,c1,c2);
+	$LD	r6,`2*$BNSZ`(r4)		
+	$LD	r7,`3*$BNSZ`(r5)
+	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
+	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
+	addc	r12,r12,r8
+	adde	r10,r10,r9
+	addze	r11,r11
+					#mul_add_c(a[3],b[2],c3,c1,c2);
+	$LD	r6,`3*$BNSZ`(r4)		
+	$LD	r7,`2*$BNSZ`(r5)
+	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
+	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
+	addc	r12,r12,r8
+	adde	r10,r10,r9
+	addze	r11,r11
+					#mul_add_c(a[4],b[1],c3,c1,c2);
+	$LD	r6,`4*$BNSZ`(r4)		
+	$LD	r7,`1*$BNSZ`(r5)
+	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
+	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
+	addc	r12,r12,r8
+	adde	r10,r10,r9
+	addze	r11,r11
+					#mul_add_c(a[5],b[0],c3,c1,c2);
+	$LD	r6,`5*$BNSZ`(r4)		
+	$LD	r7,`0*$BNSZ`(r5)
+	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
+	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
+	addc	r12,r12,r8
+	adde	r10,r10,r9
+	addze	r11,r11
+	$ST	r12,`5*$BNSZ`(r3)	#r[5]=c3;
+					#mul_add_c(a[6],b[0],c1,c2,c3);
+	$LD	r6,`6*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
+	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
+	addc	r10,r10,r8
+	adde	r11,r11,r9
+	addze	r12,r0
+					#mul_add_c(a[5],b[1],c1,c2,c3);
+	$LD	r6,`5*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$LD	r7,`1*$BNSZ`(r5)
+	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
+	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
+	addc	r10,r10,r8
+	adde	r11,r11,r9
+	addze	r12,r12
+					#mul_add_c(a[4],b[2],c1,c2,c3);
+	$LD	r6,`4*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$LD	r7,`2*$BNSZ`(r5)
+	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
+	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
+	addc	r10,r10,r8
+	adde	r11,r11,r9
+	addze	r12,r12
+					#mul_add_c(a[3],b[3],c1,c2,c3);
+	$LD	r6,`3*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$LD	r7,`3*$BNSZ`(r5)
+	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
+	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
+	addc	r10,r10,r8
+	adde	r11,r11,r9
+	addze	r12,r12
+					#mul_add_c(a[2],b[4],c1,c2,c3);
+	$LD	r6,`2*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$LD	r7,`4*$BNSZ`(r5)
+	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
+	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
+	addc	r10,r10,r8
+	adde	r11,r11,r9
+	addze	r12,r12
+					#mul_add_c(a[1],b[5],c1,c2,c3);
+	$LD	r6,`1*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$LD	r7,`5*$BNSZ`(r5)
+	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
+	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
+	addc	r10,r10,r8
+	adde	r11,r11,r9
+	addze	r12,r12
+					#mul_add_c(a[0],b[6],c1,c2,c3);
+	$LD	r6,`0*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$LD	r7,`6*$BNSZ`(r5)
+	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
+	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
+	addc	r10,r10,r8
+	adde	r11,r11,r9
+	addze	r12,r12
+	$ST	r10,`6*$BNSZ`(r3)	#r[6]=c1;
+					#mul_add_c(a[0],b[7],c2,c3,c1);
+	$LD	r7,`7*$BNSZ`(r5)
+	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
+	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
+	addc	r11,r11,r8
+	adde	r12,r12,r9
+	addze	r10,r0
+					#mul_add_c(a[1],b[6],c2,c3,c1);
+	$LD	r6,`1*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$LD	r7,`6*$BNSZ`(r5)
+	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
+	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
+	addc	r11,r11,r8
+	adde	r12,r12,r9
+	addze	r10,r10
+					#mul_add_c(a[2],b[5],c2,c3,c1);
+	$LD	r6,`2*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$LD	r7,`5*$BNSZ`(r5)
+	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
+	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
+	addc	r11,r11,r8
+	adde	r12,r12,r9
+	addze	r10,r10
+					#mul_add_c(a[3],b[4],c2,c3,c1);
+	$LD	r6,`3*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$LD	r7,`4*$BNSZ`(r5)
+	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
+	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
+	addc	r11,r11,r8
+	adde	r12,r12,r9
+	addze	r10,r10
+					#mul_add_c(a[4],b[3],c2,c3,c1);
+	$LD	r6,`4*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$LD	r7,`3*$BNSZ`(r5)
+	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
+	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
+	addc	r11,r11,r8
+	adde	r12,r12,r9
+	addze	r10,r10
+					#mul_add_c(a[5],b[2],c2,c3,c1);
+	$LD	r6,`5*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$LD	r7,`2*$BNSZ`(r5)
+	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
+	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
+	addc	r11,r11,r8
+	adde	r12,r12,r9
+	addze	r10,r10
+					#mul_add_c(a[6],b[1],c2,c3,c1);
+	$LD	r6,`6*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$LD	r7,`1*$BNSZ`(r5)
+	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
+	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
+	addc	r11,r11,r8
+	adde	r12,r12,r9
+	addze	r10,r10
+					#mul_add_c(a[7],b[0],c2,c3,c1);
+	$LD	r6,`7*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$LD	r7,`0*$BNSZ`(r5)
+	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
+	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
+	addc	r11,r11,r8
+	adde	r12,r12,r9
+	addze	r10,r10
+	$ST	r11,`7*$BNSZ`(r3)	#r[7]=c2;
+					#mul_add_c(a[7],b[1],c3,c1,c2);
+	$LD	r7,`1*$BNSZ`(r5)
+	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
+	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
+	addc	r12,r12,r8
+	adde	r10,r10,r9
+	addze	r11,r0
+					#mul_add_c(a[6],b[2],c3,c1,c2);
+	$LD	r6,`6*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$LD	r7,`2*$BNSZ`(r5)
+	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
+	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
+	addc	r12,r12,r8
+	adde	r10,r10,r9
+	addze	r11,r11
+					#mul_add_c(a[5],b[3],c3,c1,c2);
+	$LD	r6,`5*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$LD	r7,`3*$BNSZ`(r5)
+	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
+	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
+	addc	r12,r12,r8
+	adde	r10,r10,r9
+	addze	r11,r11
+					#mul_add_c(a[4],b[4],c3,c1,c2);
+	$LD	r6,`4*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$LD	r7,`4*$BNSZ`(r5)
+	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
+	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
+	addc	r12,r12,r8
+	adde	r10,r10,r9
+	addze	r11,r11
+					#mul_add_c(a[3],b[5],c3,c1,c2);
+	$LD	r6,`3*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$LD	r7,`5*$BNSZ`(r5)
+	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
+	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
+	addc	r12,r12,r8
+	adde	r10,r10,r9
+	addze	r11,r11
+					#mul_add_c(a[2],b[6],c3,c1,c2);
+	$LD	r6,`2*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$LD	r7,`6*$BNSZ`(r5)
+	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
+	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
+	addc	r12,r12,r8
+	adde	r10,r10,r9
+	addze	r11,r11
+					#mul_add_c(a[1],b[7],c3,c1,c2);
+	$LD	r6,`1*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$LD	r7,`7*$BNSZ`(r5)
+	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
+	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
+	addc	r12,r12,r8
+	adde	r10,r10,r9
+	addze	r11,r11
+	$ST	r12,`8*$BNSZ`(r3)	#r[8]=c3;
+					#mul_add_c(a[2],b[7],c1,c2,c3);
+	$LD	r6,`2*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
+	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
+	addc	r10,r10,r8
+	adde	r11,r11,r9
+	addze	r12,r0
+					#mul_add_c(a[3],b[6],c1,c2,c3);
+	$LD	r6,`3*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$LD	r7,`6*$BNSZ`(r5)
+	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
+	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
+	addc	r10,r10,r8
+	adde	r11,r11,r9
+	addze	r12,r12
+					#mul_add_c(a[4],b[5],c1,c2,c3);
+	$LD	r6,`4*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$LD	r7,`5*$BNSZ`(r5)
+	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
+	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
+	addc	r10,r10,r8
+	adde	r11,r11,r9
+	addze	r12,r12
+					#mul_add_c(a[5],b[4],c1,c2,c3);
+	$LD	r6,`5*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$LD	r7,`4*$BNSZ`(r5)
+	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
+	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
+	addc	r10,r10,r8
+	adde	r11,r11,r9
+	addze	r12,r12
+					#mul_add_c(a[6],b[3],c1,c2,c3);
+	$LD	r6,`6*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$LD	r7,`3*$BNSZ`(r5)
+	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
+	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
+	addc	r10,r10,r8
+	adde	r11,r11,r9
+	addze	r12,r12
+					#mul_add_c(a[7],b[2],c1,c2,c3);
+	$LD	r6,`7*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$LD	r7,`2*$BNSZ`(r5)
+	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
+	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
+	addc	r10,r10,r8
+	adde	r11,r11,r9
+	addze	r12,r12
+	$ST	r10,`9*$BNSZ`(r3)	#r[9]=c1;
+					#mul_add_c(a[7],b[3],c2,c3,c1);
+	$LD	r7,`3*$BNSZ`(r5)
+	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
+	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
+	addc	r11,r11,r8
+	adde	r12,r12,r9
+	addze	r10,r0
+					#mul_add_c(a[6],b[4],c2,c3,c1);
+	$LD	r6,`6*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$LD	r7,`4*$BNSZ`(r5)
+	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
+	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
+	addc	r11,r11,r8
+	adde	r12,r12,r9
+	addze	r10,r10
+					#mul_add_c(a[5],b[5],c2,c3,c1);
+	$LD	r6,`5*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$LD	r7,`5*$BNSZ`(r5)
+	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
+	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
+	addc	r11,r11,r8
+	adde	r12,r12,r9
+	addze	r10,r10
+					#mul_add_c(a[4],b[6],c2,c3,c1);
+	$LD	r6,`4*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$LD	r7,`6*$BNSZ`(r5)
+	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
+	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
+	addc	r11,r11,r8
+	adde	r12,r12,r9
+	addze	r10,r10
+					#mul_add_c(a[3],b[7],c2,c3,c1);
+	$LD	r6,`3*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$LD	r7,`7*$BNSZ`(r5)
+	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
+	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
+	addc	r11,r11,r8
+	adde	r12,r12,r9
+	addze	r10,r10
+	$ST	r11,`10*$BNSZ`(r3)	#r[10]=c2;
+					#mul_add_c(a[4],b[7],c3,c1,c2);
+	$LD	r6,`4*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
+	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
+	addc	r12,r12,r8
+	adde	r10,r10,r9
+	addze	r11,r0
+					#mul_add_c(a[5],b[6],c3,c1,c2);
+	$LD	r6,`5*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$LD	r7,`6*$BNSZ`(r5)
+	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
+	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
+	addc	r12,r12,r8
+	adde	r10,r10,r9
+	addze	r11,r11
+					#mul_add_c(a[6],b[5],c3,c1,c2);
+	$LD	r6,`6*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$LD	r7,`5*$BNSZ`(r5)
+	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
+	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
+	addc	r12,r12,r8
+	adde	r10,r10,r9
+	addze	r11,r11
+					#mul_add_c(a[7],b[4],c3,c1,c2);
+	$LD	r6,`7*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$LD	r7,`4*$BNSZ`(r5)
+	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
+	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
+	addc	r12,r12,r8
+	adde	r10,r10,r9
+	addze	r11,r11
+	$ST	r12,`11*$BNSZ`(r3)	#r[11]=c3;
+					#mul_add_c(a[7],b[5],c1,c2,c3);
+	$LD	r7,`5*$BNSZ`(r5)
+	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
+	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
+	addc	r10,r10,r8
+	adde	r11,r11,r9
+	addze	r12,r0
+					#mul_add_c(a[6],b[6],c1,c2,c3);
+	$LD	r6,`6*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$LD	r7,`6*$BNSZ`(r5)
+	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
+	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
+	addc	r10,r10,r8
+	adde	r11,r11,r9
+	addze	r12,r12
+					#mul_add_c(a[5],b[7],c1,c2,c3);
+	$LD	r6,`5*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$LD	r7,`7*$BNSZ`(r5)
+	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
+	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
+	addc	r10,r10,r8
+	adde	r11,r11,r9
+	addze	r12,r12
+	$ST	r10,`12*$BNSZ`(r3)	#r[12]=c1;
+					#mul_add_c(a[6],b[7],c2,c3,c1);
+	$LD	r6,`6*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
+	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
+	addc	r11,r11,r8
+	adde	r12,r12,r9
+	addze	r10,r0
+					#mul_add_c(a[7],b[6],c2,c3,c1);
+	$LD	r6,`7*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$LD	r7,`6*$BNSZ`(r5)
+	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
+	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
+	addc	r11,r11,r8
+	adde	r12,r12,r9
+	addze	r10,r10
+	$ST	r11,`13*$BNSZ`(r3)	#r[13]=c2;
+					#mul_add_c(a[7],b[7],c3,c1,c2);
+	$LD	r7,`7*$BNSZ`(r5)
+	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
+	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
+	addc	r12,r12,r8
+	adde	r10,r10,r9
+	$ST	r12,`14*$BNSZ`(r3)	#r[14]=c3;
+	$ST	r10,`15*$BNSZ`(r3)	#r[15]=c1;
+	blr
+	.long	0
+	.byte	0,12,0x14,0,0,0,3,0
+	.long	0
+.size	.bn_mul_comba8,.-.bn_mul_comba8
+
+#
+#	NOTE:	The following label name should be changed to
+#		"bn_sub_words" i.e. remove the first dot
+#		for the gcc compiler. This should be automatically
+#		done in the build
+#
+#
+.align	4
+.bn_sub_words:
+#
+#	Handcoded version of bn_sub_words
+#
+#BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n)
+#
+#	r3 = r
+#	r4 = a
+#	r5 = b
+#	r6 = n
+#
+#       Note:	No loop unrolling done since this is not a performance
+#               critical loop.
+
+	xor	r0,r0,r0	#set r0 = 0
+#
+#	check for r6 = 0 AND set carry bit.
+#
+	subfc.	r7,r0,r6        # If r6 is 0 then result is 0.
+				# if r6 > 0 then result !=0
+				# In either case carry bit is set.
+	beq	Lppcasm_sub_adios
+	addi	r4,r4,-$BNSZ
+	addi	r3,r3,-$BNSZ
+	addi	r5,r5,-$BNSZ
+	mtctr	r6
+Lppcasm_sub_mainloop:	
+	$LDU	r7,$BNSZ(r4)
+	$LDU	r8,$BNSZ(r5)
+	subfe	r6,r8,r7	# r6 = r7+carry bit + onescomplement(r8)
+				# if carry = 1 this is r7-r8. Else it
+				# is r7-r8 -1 as we need.
+	$STU	r6,$BNSZ(r3)
+	bdnz	Lppcasm_sub_mainloop
+Lppcasm_sub_adios:	
+	subfze	r3,r0		# if carry bit is set then r3 = 0 else -1
+	andi.	r3,r3,1         # keep only last bit.
+	blr
+	.long	0
+	.byte	0,12,0x14,0,0,0,4,0
+	.long	0
+.size	.bn_sub_words,.-.bn_sub_words
+
+#
+#	NOTE:	The following label name should be changed to
+#		"bn_add_words" i.e. remove the first dot
+#		for the gcc compiler. This should be automatically
+#		done in the build
+#
+
+.align	4
+.bn_add_words:
+#
+#	Handcoded version of bn_add_words
+#
+#BN_ULONG bn_add_words(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n)
+#
+#	r3 = r
+#	r4 = a
+#	r5 = b
+#	r6 = n
+#
+#       Note:	No loop unrolling done since this is not a performance
+#               critical loop.
+
+	xor	r0,r0,r0
+#
+#	check for r6 = 0. Is this needed?
+#
+	addic.	r6,r6,0		#test r6 and clear carry bit.
+	beq	Lppcasm_add_adios
+	addi	r4,r4,-$BNSZ
+	addi	r3,r3,-$BNSZ
+	addi	r5,r5,-$BNSZ
+	mtctr	r6
+Lppcasm_add_mainloop:	
+	$LDU	r7,$BNSZ(r4)
+	$LDU	r8,$BNSZ(r5)
+	adde	r8,r7,r8
+	$STU	r8,$BNSZ(r3)
+	bdnz	Lppcasm_add_mainloop
+Lppcasm_add_adios:	
+	addze	r3,r0			#return carry bit.
+	blr
+	.long	0
+	.byte	0,12,0x14,0,0,0,4,0
+	.long	0
+.size	.bn_add_words,.-.bn_add_words
+
+#
+#	NOTE:	The following label name should be changed to
+#		"bn_div_words" i.e. remove the first dot
+#		for the gcc compiler. This should be automatically
+#		done in the build
+#
+
+.align	4
+.bn_div_words:
+#
+#	This is a cleaned up version of code generated by
+#	the AIX compiler. The only optimization is to use
+#	the PPC instruction to count leading zeros instead
+#	of call to num_bits_word. Since this was compiled
+#	only at level -O2 we can possibly squeeze it more?
+#	
+#	r3 = h
+#	r4 = l
+#	r5 = d
+	
+	$UCMPI	0,r5,0			# compare r5 and 0
+	bne	Lppcasm_div1		# proceed if d!=0
+	li	r3,-1			# d=0 return -1
+	blr
+Lppcasm_div1:
+	xor	r0,r0,r0		#r0=0
+	li	r8,$BITS
+	$CNTLZ.	r7,r5			#r7 = num leading 0s in d.
+	beq	Lppcasm_div2		#proceed if no leading zeros
+	subf	r8,r7,r8		#r8 = BN_num_bits_word(d)
+	$SHR.	r9,r3,r8		#are there any bits above r8'th?
+	$TR	16,r9,r0		#if there're, signal to dump core...
+Lppcasm_div2:
+	$UCMP	0,r3,r5			#h>=d?
+	blt	Lppcasm_div3		#goto Lppcasm_div3 if not
+	subf	r3,r5,r3		#h-=d ; 
+Lppcasm_div3:				#r7 = BN_BITS2-i. so r7=i
+	cmpi	0,0,r7,0		# is (i == 0)?
+	beq	Lppcasm_div4
+	$SHL	r3,r3,r7		# h = (h<< i)
+	$SHR	r8,r4,r8		# r8 = (l >> BN_BITS2 -i)
+	$SHL	r5,r5,r7		# d<<=i
+	or	r3,r3,r8		# h = (h<<i)|(l>>(BN_BITS2-i))
+	$SHL	r4,r4,r7		# l <<=i
+Lppcasm_div4:
+	$SHRI	r9,r5,`$BITS/2`		# r9 = dh
+					# dl will be computed when needed
+					# as it saves registers.
+	li	r6,2			#r6=2
+	mtctr	r6			#counter will be in count.
+Lppcasm_divouterloop: 
+	$SHRI	r8,r3,`$BITS/2`		#r8 = (h>>BN_BITS4)
+	$SHRI	r11,r4,`$BITS/2`	#r11= (l&BN_MASK2h)>>BN_BITS4
+					# compute here for innerloop.
+	$UCMP	0,r8,r9			# is (h>>BN_BITS4)==dh
+	bne	Lppcasm_div5		# goto Lppcasm_div5 if not
+
+	li	r8,-1
+	$CLRU	r8,r8,`$BITS/2`		#q = BN_MASK2l 
+	b	Lppcasm_div6
+Lppcasm_div5:
+	$UDIV	r8,r3,r9		#q = h/dh
+Lppcasm_div6:
+	$UMULL	r12,r9,r8		#th = q*dh
+	$CLRU	r10,r5,`$BITS/2`	#r10=dl
+	$UMULL	r6,r8,r10		#tl = q*dl
+	
+Lppcasm_divinnerloop:
+	subf	r10,r12,r3		#t = h -th
+	$SHRI	r7,r10,`$BITS/2`	#r7= (t &BN_MASK2H), sort of...
+	addic.	r7,r7,0			#test if r7 == 0. used below.
+					# now want to compute
+					# r7 = (t<<BN_BITS4)|((l&BN_MASK2h)>>BN_BITS4)
+					# the following 2 instructions do that
+	$SHLI	r7,r10,`$BITS/2`	# r7 = (t<<BN_BITS4)
+	or	r7,r7,r11		# r7|=((l&BN_MASK2h)>>BN_BITS4)
+	$UCMP	cr1,r6,r7		# compare (tl <= r7)
+	bne	Lppcasm_divinnerexit
+	ble	cr1,Lppcasm_divinnerexit
+	addi	r8,r8,-1		#q--
+	subf	r12,r9,r12		#th -=dh
+	$CLRU	r10,r5,`$BITS/2`	#r10=dl. t is no longer needed in loop.
+	subf	r6,r10,r6		#tl -=dl
+	b	Lppcasm_divinnerloop
+Lppcasm_divinnerexit:
+	$SHRI	r10,r6,`$BITS/2`	#t=(tl>>BN_BITS4)
+	$SHLI	r11,r6,`$BITS/2`	#tl=(tl<<BN_BITS4)&BN_MASK2h;
+	$UCMP	cr1,r4,r11		# compare l and tl
+	add	r12,r12,r10		# th+=t
+	bge	cr1,Lppcasm_div7	# if (l>=tl) goto Lppcasm_div7
+	addi	r12,r12,1		# th++
+Lppcasm_div7:
+	subf	r11,r11,r4		#r11=l-tl
+	$UCMP	cr1,r3,r12		#compare h and th
+	bge	cr1,Lppcasm_div8	#if (h>=th) goto Lppcasm_div8
+	addi	r8,r8,-1		# q--
+	add	r3,r5,r3		# h+=d
+Lppcasm_div8:
+	subf	r12,r12,r3		#r12 = h-th
+	$SHLI	r4,r11,`$BITS/2`	#l=(l&BN_MASK2l)<<BN_BITS4
+					# want to compute
+					# h = ((h<<BN_BITS4)|(l>>BN_BITS4))&BN_MASK2
+					# the following 2 instructions will do this.
+	$INSR	r11,r12,`$BITS/2`,`$BITS/2`	# r11 is the value we want rotated $BITS/2.
+	$ROTL	r3,r11,`$BITS/2`	# rotate by $BITS/2 and store in r3
+	bdz	Lppcasm_div9		#if (count==0) break ;
+	$SHLI	r0,r8,`$BITS/2`		#ret =q<<BN_BITS4
+	b	Lppcasm_divouterloop
+Lppcasm_div9:
+	or	r3,r8,r0
+	blr
+	.long	0
+	.byte	0,12,0x14,0,0,0,3,0
+	.long	0
+.size	.bn_div_words,.-.bn_div_words
+
+#
+#	NOTE:	The following label name should be changed to
+#		"bn_sqr_words" i.e. remove the first dot
+#		for the gcc compiler. This should be automatically
+#		done in the build
+#
+.align	4
+.bn_sqr_words:
+#
+#	Optimized version of bn_sqr_words
+#
+#	void bn_sqr_words(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, int n)
+#
+#	r3 = r
+#	r4 = a
+#	r5 = n
+#
+#	r6 = a[i].
+#	r7,r8 = product.
+#
+#	No unrolling done here. Not performance critical.
+
+	addic.	r5,r5,0			#test r5.
+	beq	Lppcasm_sqr_adios
+	addi	r4,r4,-$BNSZ
+	addi	r3,r3,-$BNSZ
+	mtctr	r5
+Lppcasm_sqr_mainloop:	
+					#sqr(r[0],r[1],a[0]);
+	$LDU	r6,$BNSZ(r4)
+	$UMULL	r7,r6,r6
+	$UMULH  r8,r6,r6
+	$STU	r7,$BNSZ(r3)
+	$STU	r8,$BNSZ(r3)
+	bdnz	Lppcasm_sqr_mainloop
+Lppcasm_sqr_adios:	
+	blr
+	.long	0
+	.byte	0,12,0x14,0,0,0,3,0
+	.long	0
+.size	.bn_sqr_words,.-.bn_sqr_words
+
+#
+#	NOTE:	The following label name should be changed to
+#		"bn_mul_words" i.e. remove the first dot
+#		for the gcc compiler. This should be automatically
+#		done in the build
+#
+
+.align	4	
+.bn_mul_words:
+#
+# BN_ULONG bn_mul_words(BN_ULONG *rp, BN_ULONG *ap, int num, BN_ULONG w)
+#
+# r3 = rp
+# r4 = ap
+# r5 = num
+# r6 = w
+	xor	r0,r0,r0
+	xor	r12,r12,r12		# used for carry
+	rlwinm.	r7,r5,30,2,31		# num >> 2
+	beq	Lppcasm_mw_REM
+	mtctr	r7
+Lppcasm_mw_LOOP:	
+					#mul(rp[0],ap[0],w,c1);
+	$LD	r8,`0*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$UMULL	r9,r6,r8
+	$UMULH  r10,r6,r8
+	addc	r9,r9,r12
+	#addze	r10,r10			#carry is NOT ignored.
+					#will be taken care of
+					#in second spin below
+					#using adde.
+	$ST	r9,`0*$BNSZ`(r3)
+					#mul(rp[1],ap[1],w,c1);
+	$LD	r8,`1*$BNSZ`(r4)	
+	$UMULL	r11,r6,r8
+	$UMULH  r12,r6,r8
+	adde	r11,r11,r10
+	#addze	r12,r12
+	$ST	r11,`1*$BNSZ`(r3)
+					#mul(rp[2],ap[2],w,c1);
+	$LD	r8,`2*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$UMULL	r9,r6,r8
+	$UMULH  r10,r6,r8
+	adde	r9,r9,r12
+	#addze	r10,r10
+	$ST	r9,`2*$BNSZ`(r3)
+					#mul_add(rp[3],ap[3],w,c1);
+	$LD	r8,`3*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$UMULL	r11,r6,r8
+	$UMULH  r12,r6,r8
+	adde	r11,r11,r10
+	addze	r12,r12			#this spin we collect carry into
+					#r12
+	$ST	r11,`3*$BNSZ`(r3)
+	
+	addi	r3,r3,`4*$BNSZ`
+	addi	r4,r4,`4*$BNSZ`
+	bdnz	Lppcasm_mw_LOOP
+
+Lppcasm_mw_REM:
+	andi.	r5,r5,0x3
+	beq	Lppcasm_mw_OVER
+					#mul(rp[0],ap[0],w,c1);
+	$LD	r8,`0*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$UMULL	r9,r6,r8
+	$UMULH  r10,r6,r8
+	addc	r9,r9,r12
+	addze	r10,r10
+	$ST	r9,`0*$BNSZ`(r3)
+	addi	r12,r10,0
+	
+	addi	r5,r5,-1
+	cmpli	0,0,r5,0
+	beq	Lppcasm_mw_OVER
+
+	
+					#mul(rp[1],ap[1],w,c1);
+	$LD	r8,`1*$BNSZ`(r4)	
+	$UMULL	r9,r6,r8
+	$UMULH  r10,r6,r8
+	addc	r9,r9,r12
+	addze	r10,r10
+	$ST	r9,`1*$BNSZ`(r3)
+	addi	r12,r10,0
+	
+	addi	r5,r5,-1
+	cmpli	0,0,r5,0
+	beq	Lppcasm_mw_OVER
+	
+					#mul_add(rp[2],ap[2],w,c1);
+	$LD	r8,`2*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$UMULL	r9,r6,r8
+	$UMULH  r10,r6,r8
+	addc	r9,r9,r12
+	addze	r10,r10
+	$ST	r9,`2*$BNSZ`(r3)
+	addi	r12,r10,0
+		
+Lppcasm_mw_OVER:	
+	addi	r3,r12,0
+	blr
+	.long	0
+	.byte	0,12,0x14,0,0,0,4,0
+	.long	0
+.size	bn_mul_words,.-bn_mul_words
+
+#
+#	NOTE:	The following label name should be changed to
+#		"bn_mul_add_words" i.e. remove the first dot
+#		for the gcc compiler. This should be automatically
+#		done in the build
+#
+
+.align	4
+.bn_mul_add_words:
+#
+# BN_ULONG bn_mul_add_words(BN_ULONG *rp, BN_ULONG *ap, int num, BN_ULONG w)
+#
+# r3 = rp
+# r4 = ap
+# r5 = num
+# r6 = w
+#
+# empirical evidence suggests that unrolled version performs best!!
+#
+	xor	r0,r0,r0		#r0 = 0
+	xor	r12,r12,r12  		#r12 = 0 . used for carry		
+	rlwinm.	r7,r5,30,2,31		# num >> 2
+	beq	Lppcasm_maw_leftover	# if (num < 4) go LPPCASM_maw_leftover
+	mtctr	r7
+Lppcasm_maw_mainloop:	
+					#mul_add(rp[0],ap[0],w,c1);
+	$LD	r8,`0*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$LD	r11,`0*$BNSZ`(r3)
+	$UMULL	r9,r6,r8
+	$UMULH  r10,r6,r8
+	addc	r9,r9,r12		#r12 is carry.
+	addze	r10,r10
+	addc	r9,r9,r11
+	#addze	r10,r10
+					#the above instruction addze
+					#is NOT needed. Carry will NOT
+					#be ignored. It's not affected
+					#by multiply and will be collected
+					#in the next spin
+	$ST	r9,`0*$BNSZ`(r3)
+	
+					#mul_add(rp[1],ap[1],w,c1);
+	$LD	r8,`1*$BNSZ`(r4)	
+	$LD	r9,`1*$BNSZ`(r3)
+	$UMULL	r11,r6,r8
+	$UMULH  r12,r6,r8
+	adde	r11,r11,r10		#r10 is carry.
+	addze	r12,r12
+	addc	r11,r11,r9
+	#addze	r12,r12
+	$ST	r11,`1*$BNSZ`(r3)
+	
+					#mul_add(rp[2],ap[2],w,c1);
+	$LD	r8,`2*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$UMULL	r9,r6,r8
+	$LD	r11,`2*$BNSZ`(r3)
+	$UMULH  r10,r6,r8
+	adde	r9,r9,r12
+	addze	r10,r10
+	addc	r9,r9,r11
+	#addze	r10,r10
+	$ST	r9,`2*$BNSZ`(r3)
+	
+					#mul_add(rp[3],ap[3],w,c1);
+	$LD	r8,`3*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$UMULL	r11,r6,r8
+	$LD	r9,`3*$BNSZ`(r3)
+	$UMULH  r12,r6,r8
+	adde	r11,r11,r10
+	addze	r12,r12
+	addc	r11,r11,r9
+	addze	r12,r12
+	$ST	r11,`3*$BNSZ`(r3)
+	addi	r3,r3,`4*$BNSZ`
+	addi	r4,r4,`4*$BNSZ`
+	bdnz	Lppcasm_maw_mainloop
+	
+Lppcasm_maw_leftover:
+	andi.	r5,r5,0x3
+	beq	Lppcasm_maw_adios
+	addi	r3,r3,-$BNSZ
+	addi	r4,r4,-$BNSZ
+					#mul_add(rp[0],ap[0],w,c1);
+	mtctr	r5
+	$LDU	r8,$BNSZ(r4)
+	$UMULL	r9,r6,r8
+	$UMULH  r10,r6,r8
+	$LDU	r11,$BNSZ(r3)
+	addc	r9,r9,r11
+	addze	r10,r10
+	addc	r9,r9,r12
+	addze	r12,r10
+	$ST	r9,0(r3)
+	
+	bdz	Lppcasm_maw_adios
+					#mul_add(rp[1],ap[1],w,c1);
+	$LDU	r8,$BNSZ(r4)	
+	$UMULL	r9,r6,r8
+	$UMULH  r10,r6,r8
+	$LDU	r11,$BNSZ(r3)
+	addc	r9,r9,r11
+	addze	r10,r10
+	addc	r9,r9,r12
+	addze	r12,r10
+	$ST	r9,0(r3)
+	
+	bdz	Lppcasm_maw_adios
+					#mul_add(rp[2],ap[2],w,c1);
+	$LDU	r8,$BNSZ(r4)
+	$UMULL	r9,r6,r8
+	$UMULH  r10,r6,r8
+	$LDU	r11,$BNSZ(r3)
+	addc	r9,r9,r11
+	addze	r10,r10
+	addc	r9,r9,r12
+	addze	r12,r10
+	$ST	r9,0(r3)
+		
+Lppcasm_maw_adios:	
+	addi	r3,r12,0
+	blr
+	.long	0
+	.byte	0,12,0x14,0,0,0,4,0
+	.long	0
+.size	.bn_mul_add_words,.-.bn_mul_add_words
+	.align	4
+EOF
+$data =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem;
+print $data;
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/ppc64-mont.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/ppc64-mont.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1e19c95
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/ppc64-mont.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,1635 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2007-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+
+# December 2007
+
+# The reason for undertaken effort is basically following. Even though
+# Power 6 CPU operates at incredible 4.7GHz clock frequency, its PKI
+# performance was observed to be less than impressive, essentially as
+# fast as 1.8GHz PPC970, or 2.6 times(!) slower than one would hope.
+# Well, it's not surprising that IBM had to make some sacrifices to
+# boost the clock frequency that much, but no overall improvement?
+# Having observed how much difference did switching to FPU make on
+# UltraSPARC, playing same stunt on Power 6 appeared appropriate...
+# Unfortunately the resulting performance improvement is not as
+# impressive, ~30%, and in absolute terms is still very far from what
+# one would expect from 4.7GHz CPU. There is a chance that I'm doing
+# something wrong, but in the lack of assembler level micro-profiling
+# data or at least decent platform guide I can't tell... Or better
+# results might be achieved with VMX... Anyway, this module provides
+# *worse* performance on other PowerPC implementations, ~40-15% slower
+# on PPC970 depending on key length and ~40% slower on Power 5 for all
+# key lengths. As it's obviously inappropriate as "best all-round"
+# alternative, it has to be complemented with run-time CPU family
+# detection. Oh! It should also be noted that unlike other PowerPC
+# implementation IALU ppc-mont.pl module performs *suboptimaly* on
+# >=1024-bit key lengths on Power 6. It should also be noted that
+# *everything* said so far applies to 64-bit builds! As far as 32-bit
+# application executed on 64-bit CPU goes, this module is likely to
+# become preferred choice, because it's easy to adapt it for such
+# case and *is* faster than 32-bit ppc-mont.pl on *all* processors.
+
+# February 2008
+
+# Micro-profiling assisted optimization results in ~15% improvement
+# over original ppc64-mont.pl version, or overall ~50% improvement
+# over ppc.pl module on Power 6. If compared to ppc-mont.pl on same
+# Power 6 CPU, this module is 5-150% faster depending on key length,
+# [hereafter] more for longer keys. But if compared to ppc-mont.pl
+# on 1.8GHz PPC970, it's only 5-55% faster. Still far from impressive
+# in absolute terms, but it's apparently the way Power 6 is...
+
+# December 2009
+
+# Adapted for 32-bit build this module delivers 25-120%, yes, more
+# than *twice* for longer keys, performance improvement over 32-bit
+# ppc-mont.pl on 1.8GHz PPC970. However! This implementation utilizes
+# even 64-bit integer operations and the trouble is that most PPC
+# operating systems don't preserve upper halves of general purpose
+# registers upon 32-bit signal delivery. They do preserve them upon
+# context switch, but not signalling:-( This means that asynchronous
+# signals have to be blocked upon entry to this subroutine. Signal
+# masking (and of course complementary unmasking) has quite an impact
+# on performance, naturally larger for shorter keys. It's so severe
+# that 512-bit key performance can be as low as 1/3 of expected one.
+# This is why this routine can be engaged for longer key operations
+# only on these OSes, see crypto/ppccap.c for further details. MacOS X
+# is an exception from this and doesn't require signal masking, and
+# that's where above improvement coefficients were collected. For
+# others alternative would be to break dependence on upper halves of
+# GPRs by sticking to 32-bit integer operations...
+
+# December 2012
+
+# Remove above mentioned dependence on GPRs' upper halves in 32-bit
+# build. No signal masking overhead, but integer instructions are
+# *more* numerous... It's still "universally" faster than 32-bit
+# ppc-mont.pl, but improvement coefficient is not as impressive
+# for longer keys...
+
+$flavour = shift;
+
+if ($flavour =~ /32/) {
+	$SIZE_T=4;
+	$RZONE=	224;
+	$fname=	"bn_mul_mont_fpu64";
+
+	$STUX=	"stwux";	# store indexed and update
+	$PUSH=	"stw";
+	$POP=	"lwz";
+} elsif ($flavour =~ /64/) {
+	$SIZE_T=8;
+	$RZONE=	288;
+	$fname=	"bn_mul_mont_fpu64";
+
+	# same as above, but 64-bit mnemonics...
+	$STUX=	"stdux";	# store indexed and update
+	$PUSH=	"std";
+	$POP=	"ld";
+} else { die "nonsense $flavour"; }
+
+$LITTLE_ENDIAN = ($flavour=~/le$/) ? 4 : 0;
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+( $xlate="${dir}ppc-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
+( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/ppc-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
+die "can't locate ppc-xlate.pl";
+
+open STDOUT,"| $^X $xlate $flavour ".shift || die "can't call $xlate: $!";
+
+$FRAME=64;	# padded frame header
+$TRANSFER=16*8;
+
+$carry="r0";
+$sp="r1";
+$toc="r2";
+$rp="r3";	$ovf="r3";
+$ap="r4";
+$bp="r5";
+$np="r6";
+$n0="r7";
+$num="r8";
+$rp="r9";	# $rp is reassigned
+$tp="r10";
+$j="r11";
+$i="r12";
+# non-volatile registers
+$c1="r19";
+$n1="r20";
+$a1="r21";
+$nap_d="r22";	# interleaved ap and np in double format
+$a0="r23";	# ap[0]
+$t0="r24";	# temporary registers
+$t1="r25";
+$t2="r26";
+$t3="r27";
+$t4="r28";
+$t5="r29";
+$t6="r30";
+$t7="r31";
+
+# PPC offers enough register bank capacity to unroll inner loops twice
+#
+#     ..A3A2A1A0
+#           dcba
+#    -----------
+#            A0a
+#           A0b
+#          A0c
+#         A0d
+#          A1a
+#         A1b
+#        A1c
+#       A1d
+#        A2a
+#       A2b
+#      A2c
+#     A2d
+#      A3a
+#     A3b
+#    A3c
+#   A3d
+#    ..a
+#   ..b
+#
+$ba="f0";	$bb="f1";	$bc="f2";	$bd="f3";
+$na="f4";	$nb="f5";	$nc="f6";	$nd="f7";
+$dota="f8";	$dotb="f9";
+$A0="f10";	$A1="f11";	$A2="f12";	$A3="f13";
+$N0="f20";	$N1="f21";	$N2="f22";	$N3="f23";
+$T0a="f24";	$T0b="f25";
+$T1a="f26";	$T1b="f27";
+$T2a="f28";	$T2b="f29";
+$T3a="f30";	$T3b="f31";
+
+# sp----------->+-------------------------------+
+#		| saved sp			|
+#		+-------------------------------+
+#		.				.
+#   +64		+-------------------------------+
+#		| 16 gpr<->fpr transfer zone	|
+#		.				.
+#		.				.
+#   +16*8	+-------------------------------+
+#		| __int64 tmp[-1]		|
+#		+-------------------------------+
+#		| __int64 tmp[num]		|
+#		.				.
+#		.				.
+#		.				.
+#   +(num+1)*8	+-------------------------------+
+#		| padding to 64 byte boundary	|
+#		.				.
+#   +X		+-------------------------------+
+#		| double nap_d[4*num]		|
+#		.				.
+#		.				.
+#		.				.
+#		+-------------------------------+
+#		.				.
+#   -13*size_t	+-------------------------------+
+#		| 13 saved gpr, r19-r31		|
+#		.				.
+#		.				.
+#   -12*8	+-------------------------------+
+#		| 12 saved fpr, f20-f31		|
+#		.				.
+#		.				.
+#		+-------------------------------+
+
+$code=<<___;
+.machine "any"
+.text
+
+.globl	.$fname
+.align	5
+.$fname:
+	cmpwi	$num,`3*8/$SIZE_T`
+	mr	$rp,r3		; $rp is reassigned
+	li	r3,0		; possible "not handled" return code
+	bltlr-
+	andi.	r0,$num,`16/$SIZE_T-1`		; $num has to be "even"
+	bnelr-
+
+	slwi	$num,$num,`log($SIZE_T)/log(2)`	; num*=sizeof(BN_LONG)
+	li	$i,-4096
+	slwi	$tp,$num,2	; place for {an}p_{lh}[num], i.e. 4*num
+	add	$tp,$tp,$num	; place for tp[num+1]
+	addi	$tp,$tp,`$FRAME+$TRANSFER+8+64+$RZONE`
+	subf	$tp,$tp,$sp	; $sp-$tp
+	and	$tp,$tp,$i	; minimize TLB usage
+	subf	$tp,$sp,$tp	; $tp-$sp
+	mr	$i,$sp
+	$STUX	$sp,$sp,$tp	; alloca
+
+	$PUSH	r19,`-12*8-13*$SIZE_T`($i)
+	$PUSH	r20,`-12*8-12*$SIZE_T`($i)
+	$PUSH	r21,`-12*8-11*$SIZE_T`($i)
+	$PUSH	r22,`-12*8-10*$SIZE_T`($i)
+	$PUSH	r23,`-12*8-9*$SIZE_T`($i)
+	$PUSH	r24,`-12*8-8*$SIZE_T`($i)
+	$PUSH	r25,`-12*8-7*$SIZE_T`($i)
+	$PUSH	r26,`-12*8-6*$SIZE_T`($i)
+	$PUSH	r27,`-12*8-5*$SIZE_T`($i)
+	$PUSH	r28,`-12*8-4*$SIZE_T`($i)
+	$PUSH	r29,`-12*8-3*$SIZE_T`($i)
+	$PUSH	r30,`-12*8-2*$SIZE_T`($i)
+	$PUSH	r31,`-12*8-1*$SIZE_T`($i)
+	stfd	f20,`-12*8`($i)
+	stfd	f21,`-11*8`($i)
+	stfd	f22,`-10*8`($i)
+	stfd	f23,`-9*8`($i)
+	stfd	f24,`-8*8`($i)
+	stfd	f25,`-7*8`($i)
+	stfd	f26,`-6*8`($i)
+	stfd	f27,`-5*8`($i)
+	stfd	f28,`-4*8`($i)
+	stfd	f29,`-3*8`($i)
+	stfd	f30,`-2*8`($i)
+	stfd	f31,`-1*8`($i)
+
+	addi	$tp,$sp,`$FRAME+$TRANSFER+8+64`
+	li	$i,-64
+	add	$nap_d,$tp,$num
+	and	$nap_d,$nap_d,$i	; align to 64 bytes
+	; nap_d is off by 1, because it's used with stfdu/lfdu
+	addi	$nap_d,$nap_d,-8
+	srwi	$j,$num,`3+1`	; counter register, num/2
+	addi	$j,$j,-1
+	addi	$tp,$sp,`$FRAME+$TRANSFER-8`
+	li	$carry,0
+	mtctr	$j
+___
+
+$code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==8);
+	ld	$a0,0($ap)		; pull ap[0] value
+	ld	$t3,0($bp)		; bp[0]
+	ld	$n0,0($n0)		; pull n0[0] value
+
+	mulld	$t7,$a0,$t3		; ap[0]*bp[0]
+	; transfer bp[0] to FPU as 4x16-bit values
+	extrdi	$t0,$t3,16,48
+	extrdi	$t1,$t3,16,32
+	extrdi	$t2,$t3,16,16
+	extrdi	$t3,$t3,16,0
+	std	$t0,`$FRAME+0`($sp)
+	std	$t1,`$FRAME+8`($sp)
+	std	$t2,`$FRAME+16`($sp)
+	std	$t3,`$FRAME+24`($sp)
+
+	mulld	$t7,$t7,$n0		; tp[0]*n0
+	; transfer (ap[0]*bp[0])*n0 to FPU as 4x16-bit values
+	extrdi	$t4,$t7,16,48
+	extrdi	$t5,$t7,16,32
+	extrdi	$t6,$t7,16,16
+	extrdi	$t7,$t7,16,0
+	std	$t4,`$FRAME+32`($sp)
+	std	$t5,`$FRAME+40`($sp)
+	std	$t6,`$FRAME+48`($sp)
+	std	$t7,`$FRAME+56`($sp)
+
+	extrdi	$t0,$a0,32,32		; lwz	$t0,4($ap)
+	extrdi	$t1,$a0,32,0		; lwz	$t1,0($ap)
+	lwz	$t2,`12^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($ap)	; load a[1] as 32-bit word pair
+	lwz	$t3,`8^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($ap)
+	lwz	$t4,`4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($np)	; load n[0] as 32-bit word pair
+	lwz	$t5,`0^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($np)
+	lwz	$t6,`12^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($np)	; load n[1] as 32-bit word pair
+	lwz	$t7,`8^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($np)
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==4);
+	lwz	$a0,0($ap)		; pull ap[0,1] value
+	mr	$n1,$n0
+	lwz	$a1,4($ap)
+	li	$c1,0
+	lwz	$t1,0($bp)		; bp[0,1]
+	lwz	$t3,4($bp)
+	lwz	$n0,0($n1)		; pull n0[0,1] value
+	lwz	$n1,4($n1)
+
+	mullw	$t4,$a0,$t1		; mulld ap[0]*bp[0]
+	mulhwu	$t5,$a0,$t1
+	mullw	$t6,$a1,$t1
+	mullw	$t7,$a0,$t3
+	add	$t5,$t5,$t6
+	add	$t5,$t5,$t7
+	; transfer bp[0] to FPU as 4x16-bit values
+	extrwi	$t0,$t1,16,16
+	extrwi	$t1,$t1,16,0
+	extrwi	$t2,$t3,16,16
+	extrwi	$t3,$t3,16,0
+	std	$t0,`$FRAME+0`($sp)	; yes, std in 32-bit build
+	std	$t1,`$FRAME+8`($sp)
+	std	$t2,`$FRAME+16`($sp)
+	std	$t3,`$FRAME+24`($sp)
+
+	mullw	$t0,$t4,$n0		; mulld tp[0]*n0
+	mulhwu	$t1,$t4,$n0
+	mullw	$t2,$t5,$n0
+	mullw	$t3,$t4,$n1
+	add	$t1,$t1,$t2
+	add	$t1,$t1,$t3
+	; transfer (ap[0]*bp[0])*n0 to FPU as 4x16-bit values
+	extrwi	$t4,$t0,16,16
+	extrwi	$t5,$t0,16,0
+	extrwi	$t6,$t1,16,16
+	extrwi	$t7,$t1,16,0
+	std	$t4,`$FRAME+32`($sp)	; yes, std in 32-bit build
+	std	$t5,`$FRAME+40`($sp)
+	std	$t6,`$FRAME+48`($sp)
+	std	$t7,`$FRAME+56`($sp)
+
+	mr	$t0,$a0			; lwz	$t0,0($ap)
+	mr	$t1,$a1			; lwz	$t1,4($ap)
+	lwz	$t2,8($ap)		; load a[j..j+3] as 32-bit word pairs
+	lwz	$t3,12($ap)
+	lwz	$t4,0($np)		; load n[j..j+3] as 32-bit word pairs
+	lwz	$t5,4($np)
+	lwz	$t6,8($np)
+	lwz	$t7,12($np)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	lfd	$ba,`$FRAME+0`($sp)
+	lfd	$bb,`$FRAME+8`($sp)
+	lfd	$bc,`$FRAME+16`($sp)
+	lfd	$bd,`$FRAME+24`($sp)
+	lfd	$na,`$FRAME+32`($sp)
+	lfd	$nb,`$FRAME+40`($sp)
+	lfd	$nc,`$FRAME+48`($sp)
+	lfd	$nd,`$FRAME+56`($sp)
+	std	$t0,`$FRAME+64`($sp)	; yes, std even in 32-bit build
+	std	$t1,`$FRAME+72`($sp)
+	std	$t2,`$FRAME+80`($sp)
+	std	$t3,`$FRAME+88`($sp)
+	std	$t4,`$FRAME+96`($sp)
+	std	$t5,`$FRAME+104`($sp)
+	std	$t6,`$FRAME+112`($sp)
+	std	$t7,`$FRAME+120`($sp)
+	fcfid	$ba,$ba
+	fcfid	$bb,$bb
+	fcfid	$bc,$bc
+	fcfid	$bd,$bd
+	fcfid	$na,$na
+	fcfid	$nb,$nb
+	fcfid	$nc,$nc
+	fcfid	$nd,$nd
+
+	lfd	$A0,`$FRAME+64`($sp)
+	lfd	$A1,`$FRAME+72`($sp)
+	lfd	$A2,`$FRAME+80`($sp)
+	lfd	$A3,`$FRAME+88`($sp)
+	lfd	$N0,`$FRAME+96`($sp)
+	lfd	$N1,`$FRAME+104`($sp)
+	lfd	$N2,`$FRAME+112`($sp)
+	lfd	$N3,`$FRAME+120`($sp)
+	fcfid	$A0,$A0
+	fcfid	$A1,$A1
+	fcfid	$A2,$A2
+	fcfid	$A3,$A3
+	fcfid	$N0,$N0
+	fcfid	$N1,$N1
+	fcfid	$N2,$N2
+	fcfid	$N3,$N3
+	addi	$ap,$ap,16
+	addi	$np,$np,16
+
+	fmul	$T1a,$A1,$ba
+	fmul	$T1b,$A1,$bb
+	stfd	$A0,8($nap_d)		; save a[j] in double format
+	stfd	$A1,16($nap_d)
+	fmul	$T2a,$A2,$ba
+	fmul	$T2b,$A2,$bb
+	stfd	$A2,24($nap_d)		; save a[j+1] in double format
+	stfd	$A3,32($nap_d)
+	fmul	$T3a,$A3,$ba
+	fmul	$T3b,$A3,$bb
+	stfd	$N0,40($nap_d)		; save n[j] in double format
+	stfd	$N1,48($nap_d)
+	fmul	$T0a,$A0,$ba
+	fmul	$T0b,$A0,$bb
+	stfd	$N2,56($nap_d)		; save n[j+1] in double format
+	stfdu	$N3,64($nap_d)
+
+	fmadd	$T1a,$A0,$bc,$T1a
+	fmadd	$T1b,$A0,$bd,$T1b
+	fmadd	$T2a,$A1,$bc,$T2a
+	fmadd	$T2b,$A1,$bd,$T2b
+	fmadd	$T3a,$A2,$bc,$T3a
+	fmadd	$T3b,$A2,$bd,$T3b
+	fmul	$dota,$A3,$bc
+	fmul	$dotb,$A3,$bd
+
+	fmadd	$T1a,$N1,$na,$T1a
+	fmadd	$T1b,$N1,$nb,$T1b
+	fmadd	$T2a,$N2,$na,$T2a
+	fmadd	$T2b,$N2,$nb,$T2b
+	fmadd	$T3a,$N3,$na,$T3a
+	fmadd	$T3b,$N3,$nb,$T3b
+	fmadd	$T0a,$N0,$na,$T0a
+	fmadd	$T0b,$N0,$nb,$T0b
+
+	fmadd	$T1a,$N0,$nc,$T1a
+	fmadd	$T1b,$N0,$nd,$T1b
+	fmadd	$T2a,$N1,$nc,$T2a
+	fmadd	$T2b,$N1,$nd,$T2b
+	fmadd	$T3a,$N2,$nc,$T3a
+	fmadd	$T3b,$N2,$nd,$T3b
+	fmadd	$dota,$N3,$nc,$dota
+	fmadd	$dotb,$N3,$nd,$dotb
+
+	fctid	$T0a,$T0a
+	fctid	$T0b,$T0b
+	fctid	$T1a,$T1a
+	fctid	$T1b,$T1b
+	fctid	$T2a,$T2a
+	fctid	$T2b,$T2b
+	fctid	$T3a,$T3a
+	fctid	$T3b,$T3b
+
+	stfd	$T0a,`$FRAME+0`($sp)
+	stfd	$T0b,`$FRAME+8`($sp)
+	stfd	$T1a,`$FRAME+16`($sp)
+	stfd	$T1b,`$FRAME+24`($sp)
+	stfd	$T2a,`$FRAME+32`($sp)
+	stfd	$T2b,`$FRAME+40`($sp)
+	stfd	$T3a,`$FRAME+48`($sp)
+	stfd	$T3b,`$FRAME+56`($sp)
+
+.align	5
+L1st:
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==8);
+	lwz	$t0,`4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($ap)	; load a[j] as 32-bit word pair
+	lwz	$t1,`0^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($ap)
+	lwz	$t2,`12^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($ap)	; load a[j+1] as 32-bit word pair
+	lwz	$t3,`8^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($ap)
+	lwz	$t4,`4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($np)	; load n[j] as 32-bit word pair
+	lwz	$t5,`0^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($np)
+	lwz	$t6,`12^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($np)	; load n[j+1] as 32-bit word pair
+	lwz	$t7,`8^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($np)
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==4);
+	lwz	$t0,0($ap)		; load a[j..j+3] as 32-bit word pairs
+	lwz	$t1,4($ap)
+	lwz	$t2,8($ap)
+	lwz	$t3,12($ap)
+	lwz	$t4,0($np)		; load n[j..j+3] as 32-bit word pairs
+	lwz	$t5,4($np)
+	lwz	$t6,8($np)
+	lwz	$t7,12($np)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	std	$t0,`$FRAME+64`($sp)	; yes, std even in 32-bit build
+	std	$t1,`$FRAME+72`($sp)
+	std	$t2,`$FRAME+80`($sp)
+	std	$t3,`$FRAME+88`($sp)
+	std	$t4,`$FRAME+96`($sp)
+	std	$t5,`$FRAME+104`($sp)
+	std	$t6,`$FRAME+112`($sp)
+	std	$t7,`$FRAME+120`($sp)
+___
+if ($SIZE_T==8 or $flavour =~ /osx/) {
+$code.=<<___;
+	ld	$t0,`$FRAME+0`($sp)
+	ld	$t1,`$FRAME+8`($sp)
+	ld	$t2,`$FRAME+16`($sp)
+	ld	$t3,`$FRAME+24`($sp)
+	ld	$t4,`$FRAME+32`($sp)
+	ld	$t5,`$FRAME+40`($sp)
+	ld	$t6,`$FRAME+48`($sp)
+	ld	$t7,`$FRAME+56`($sp)
+___
+} else {
+$code.=<<___;
+	lwz	$t1,`$FRAME+0^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+	lwz	$t0,`$FRAME+4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+	lwz	$t3,`$FRAME+8^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+	lwz	$t2,`$FRAME+12^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+	lwz	$t5,`$FRAME+16^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+	lwz	$t4,`$FRAME+20^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+	lwz	$t7,`$FRAME+24^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+	lwz	$t6,`$FRAME+28^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	lfd	$A0,`$FRAME+64`($sp)
+	lfd	$A1,`$FRAME+72`($sp)
+	lfd	$A2,`$FRAME+80`($sp)
+	lfd	$A3,`$FRAME+88`($sp)
+	lfd	$N0,`$FRAME+96`($sp)
+	lfd	$N1,`$FRAME+104`($sp)
+	lfd	$N2,`$FRAME+112`($sp)
+	lfd	$N3,`$FRAME+120`($sp)
+	fcfid	$A0,$A0
+	fcfid	$A1,$A1
+	fcfid	$A2,$A2
+	fcfid	$A3,$A3
+	fcfid	$N0,$N0
+	fcfid	$N1,$N1
+	fcfid	$N2,$N2
+	fcfid	$N3,$N3
+	addi	$ap,$ap,16
+	addi	$np,$np,16
+
+	fmul	$T1a,$A1,$ba
+	fmul	$T1b,$A1,$bb
+	fmul	$T2a,$A2,$ba
+	fmul	$T2b,$A2,$bb
+	stfd	$A0,8($nap_d)		; save a[j] in double format
+	stfd	$A1,16($nap_d)
+	fmul	$T3a,$A3,$ba
+	fmul	$T3b,$A3,$bb
+	fmadd	$T0a,$A0,$ba,$dota
+	fmadd	$T0b,$A0,$bb,$dotb
+	stfd	$A2,24($nap_d)		; save a[j+1] in double format
+	stfd	$A3,32($nap_d)
+___
+if ($SIZE_T==8 or $flavour =~ /osx/) {
+$code.=<<___;
+	fmadd	$T1a,$A0,$bc,$T1a
+	fmadd	$T1b,$A0,$bd,$T1b
+	fmadd	$T2a,$A1,$bc,$T2a
+	fmadd	$T2b,$A1,$bd,$T2b
+	stfd	$N0,40($nap_d)		; save n[j] in double format
+	stfd	$N1,48($nap_d)
+	fmadd	$T3a,$A2,$bc,$T3a
+	fmadd	$T3b,$A2,$bd,$T3b
+	 add	$t0,$t0,$carry		; can not overflow
+	fmul	$dota,$A3,$bc
+	fmul	$dotb,$A3,$bd
+	stfd	$N2,56($nap_d)		; save n[j+1] in double format
+	stfdu	$N3,64($nap_d)
+	 srdi	$carry,$t0,16
+	 add	$t1,$t1,$carry
+	 srdi	$carry,$t1,16
+
+	fmadd	$T1a,$N1,$na,$T1a
+	fmadd	$T1b,$N1,$nb,$T1b
+	 insrdi	$t0,$t1,16,32
+	fmadd	$T2a,$N2,$na,$T2a
+	fmadd	$T2b,$N2,$nb,$T2b
+	 add	$t2,$t2,$carry
+	fmadd	$T3a,$N3,$na,$T3a
+	fmadd	$T3b,$N3,$nb,$T3b
+	 srdi	$carry,$t2,16
+	fmadd	$T0a,$N0,$na,$T0a
+	fmadd	$T0b,$N0,$nb,$T0b
+	 insrdi	$t0,$t2,16,16
+	 add	$t3,$t3,$carry
+	 srdi	$carry,$t3,16
+
+	fmadd	$T1a,$N0,$nc,$T1a
+	fmadd	$T1b,$N0,$nd,$T1b
+	 insrdi	$t0,$t3,16,0		; 0..63 bits
+	fmadd	$T2a,$N1,$nc,$T2a
+	fmadd	$T2b,$N1,$nd,$T2b
+	 add	$t4,$t4,$carry
+	fmadd	$T3a,$N2,$nc,$T3a
+	fmadd	$T3b,$N2,$nd,$T3b
+	 srdi	$carry,$t4,16
+	fmadd	$dota,$N3,$nc,$dota
+	fmadd	$dotb,$N3,$nd,$dotb
+	 add	$t5,$t5,$carry
+	 srdi	$carry,$t5,16
+	 insrdi	$t4,$t5,16,32
+
+	fctid	$T0a,$T0a
+	fctid	$T0b,$T0b
+	 add	$t6,$t6,$carry
+	fctid	$T1a,$T1a
+	fctid	$T1b,$T1b
+	 srdi	$carry,$t6,16
+	fctid	$T2a,$T2a
+	fctid	$T2b,$T2b
+	 insrdi	$t4,$t6,16,16
+	fctid	$T3a,$T3a
+	fctid	$T3b,$T3b
+	 add	$t7,$t7,$carry
+	 insrdi	$t4,$t7,16,0		; 64..127 bits
+	 srdi	$carry,$t7,16		; upper 33 bits
+
+	stfd	$T0a,`$FRAME+0`($sp)
+	stfd	$T0b,`$FRAME+8`($sp)
+	stfd	$T1a,`$FRAME+16`($sp)
+	stfd	$T1b,`$FRAME+24`($sp)
+	stfd	$T2a,`$FRAME+32`($sp)
+	stfd	$T2b,`$FRAME+40`($sp)
+	stfd	$T3a,`$FRAME+48`($sp)
+	stfd	$T3b,`$FRAME+56`($sp)
+	 std	$t0,8($tp)		; tp[j-1]
+	 stdu	$t4,16($tp)		; tp[j]
+___
+} else {
+$code.=<<___;
+	fmadd	$T1a,$A0,$bc,$T1a
+	fmadd	$T1b,$A0,$bd,$T1b
+	 addc	$t0,$t0,$carry
+	 adde	$t1,$t1,$c1
+	 srwi	$carry,$t0,16
+	fmadd	$T2a,$A1,$bc,$T2a
+	fmadd	$T2b,$A1,$bd,$T2b
+	stfd	$N0,40($nap_d)		; save n[j] in double format
+	stfd	$N1,48($nap_d)
+	 srwi	$c1,$t1,16
+	 insrwi	$carry,$t1,16,0
+	fmadd	$T3a,$A2,$bc,$T3a
+	fmadd	$T3b,$A2,$bd,$T3b
+	 addc	$t2,$t2,$carry
+	 adde	$t3,$t3,$c1
+	 srwi	$carry,$t2,16
+	fmul	$dota,$A3,$bc
+	fmul	$dotb,$A3,$bd
+	stfd	$N2,56($nap_d)		; save n[j+1] in double format
+	stfdu	$N3,64($nap_d)
+	 insrwi	$t0,$t2,16,0		; 0..31 bits
+	 srwi	$c1,$t3,16
+	 insrwi	$carry,$t3,16,0
+
+	fmadd	$T1a,$N1,$na,$T1a
+	fmadd	$T1b,$N1,$nb,$T1b
+	 lwz	$t3,`$FRAME+32^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)	; permuted $t1
+	 lwz	$t2,`$FRAME+36^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)	; permuted $t0
+	 addc	$t4,$t4,$carry
+	 adde	$t5,$t5,$c1
+	 srwi	$carry,$t4,16
+	fmadd	$T2a,$N2,$na,$T2a
+	fmadd	$T2b,$N2,$nb,$T2b
+	 srwi	$c1,$t5,16
+	 insrwi	$carry,$t5,16,0
+	fmadd	$T3a,$N3,$na,$T3a
+	fmadd	$T3b,$N3,$nb,$T3b
+	 addc	$t6,$t6,$carry
+	 adde	$t7,$t7,$c1
+	 srwi	$carry,$t6,16
+	fmadd	$T0a,$N0,$na,$T0a
+	fmadd	$T0b,$N0,$nb,$T0b
+	 insrwi	$t4,$t6,16,0		; 32..63 bits
+	 srwi	$c1,$t7,16
+	 insrwi	$carry,$t7,16,0
+
+	fmadd	$T1a,$N0,$nc,$T1a
+	fmadd	$T1b,$N0,$nd,$T1b
+	 lwz	$t7,`$FRAME+40^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)	; permuted $t3
+	 lwz	$t6,`$FRAME+44^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)	; permuted $t2
+	 addc	$t2,$t2,$carry
+	 adde	$t3,$t3,$c1
+	 srwi	$carry,$t2,16
+	fmadd	$T2a,$N1,$nc,$T2a
+	fmadd	$T2b,$N1,$nd,$T2b
+	 stw	$t0,12($tp)		; tp[j-1]
+	 stw	$t4,8($tp)
+	 srwi	$c1,$t3,16
+	 insrwi	$carry,$t3,16,0
+	fmadd	$T3a,$N2,$nc,$T3a
+	fmadd	$T3b,$N2,$nd,$T3b
+	 lwz	$t1,`$FRAME+48^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)	; permuted $t5
+	 lwz	$t0,`$FRAME+52^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)	; permuted $t4
+	 addc	$t6,$t6,$carry
+	 adde	$t7,$t7,$c1
+	 srwi	$carry,$t6,16
+	fmadd	$dota,$N3,$nc,$dota
+	fmadd	$dotb,$N3,$nd,$dotb
+	 insrwi	$t2,$t6,16,0		; 64..95 bits
+	 srwi	$c1,$t7,16
+	 insrwi	$carry,$t7,16,0
+
+	fctid	$T0a,$T0a
+	fctid	$T0b,$T0b
+	 lwz	$t5,`$FRAME+56^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)	; permuted $t7
+	 lwz	$t4,`$FRAME+60^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)	; permuted $t6
+	 addc	$t0,$t0,$carry
+	 adde	$t1,$t1,$c1
+	 srwi	$carry,$t0,16
+	fctid	$T1a,$T1a
+	fctid	$T1b,$T1b
+	 srwi	$c1,$t1,16
+	 insrwi	$carry,$t1,16,0
+	fctid	$T2a,$T2a
+	fctid	$T2b,$T2b
+	 addc	$t4,$t4,$carry
+	 adde	$t5,$t5,$c1
+	 srwi	$carry,$t4,16
+	fctid	$T3a,$T3a
+	fctid	$T3b,$T3b
+	 insrwi	$t0,$t4,16,0		; 96..127 bits
+	 srwi	$c1,$t5,16
+	 insrwi	$carry,$t5,16,0
+
+	stfd	$T0a,`$FRAME+0`($sp)
+	stfd	$T0b,`$FRAME+8`($sp)
+	stfd	$T1a,`$FRAME+16`($sp)
+	stfd	$T1b,`$FRAME+24`($sp)
+	stfd	$T2a,`$FRAME+32`($sp)
+	stfd	$T2b,`$FRAME+40`($sp)
+	stfd	$T3a,`$FRAME+48`($sp)
+	stfd	$T3b,`$FRAME+56`($sp)
+	 stw	$t2,20($tp)		; tp[j]
+	 stwu	$t0,16($tp)
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	bdnz	L1st
+
+	fctid	$dota,$dota
+	fctid	$dotb,$dotb
+___
+if ($SIZE_T==8 or $flavour =~ /osx/) {
+$code.=<<___;
+	ld	$t0,`$FRAME+0`($sp)
+	ld	$t1,`$FRAME+8`($sp)
+	ld	$t2,`$FRAME+16`($sp)
+	ld	$t3,`$FRAME+24`($sp)
+	ld	$t4,`$FRAME+32`($sp)
+	ld	$t5,`$FRAME+40`($sp)
+	ld	$t6,`$FRAME+48`($sp)
+	ld	$t7,`$FRAME+56`($sp)
+	stfd	$dota,`$FRAME+64`($sp)
+	stfd	$dotb,`$FRAME+72`($sp)
+
+	add	$t0,$t0,$carry		; can not overflow
+	srdi	$carry,$t0,16
+	add	$t1,$t1,$carry
+	srdi	$carry,$t1,16
+	insrdi	$t0,$t1,16,32
+	add	$t2,$t2,$carry
+	srdi	$carry,$t2,16
+	insrdi	$t0,$t2,16,16
+	add	$t3,$t3,$carry
+	srdi	$carry,$t3,16
+	insrdi	$t0,$t3,16,0		; 0..63 bits
+	add	$t4,$t4,$carry
+	srdi	$carry,$t4,16
+	add	$t5,$t5,$carry
+	srdi	$carry,$t5,16
+	insrdi	$t4,$t5,16,32
+	add	$t6,$t6,$carry
+	srdi	$carry,$t6,16
+	insrdi	$t4,$t6,16,16
+	add	$t7,$t7,$carry
+	insrdi	$t4,$t7,16,0		; 64..127 bits
+	srdi	$carry,$t7,16		; upper 33 bits
+	ld	$t6,`$FRAME+64`($sp)
+	ld	$t7,`$FRAME+72`($sp)
+
+	std	$t0,8($tp)		; tp[j-1]
+	stdu	$t4,16($tp)		; tp[j]
+
+	add	$t6,$t6,$carry		; can not overflow
+	srdi	$carry,$t6,16
+	add	$t7,$t7,$carry
+	insrdi	$t6,$t7,48,0
+	srdi	$ovf,$t7,48
+	std	$t6,8($tp)		; tp[num-1]
+___
+} else {
+$code.=<<___;
+	lwz	$t1,`$FRAME+0^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+	lwz	$t0,`$FRAME+4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+	lwz	$t3,`$FRAME+8^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+	lwz	$t2,`$FRAME+12^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+	lwz	$t5,`$FRAME+16^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+	lwz	$t4,`$FRAME+20^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+	lwz	$t7,`$FRAME+24^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+	lwz	$t6,`$FRAME+28^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+	stfd	$dota,`$FRAME+64`($sp)
+	stfd	$dotb,`$FRAME+72`($sp)
+
+	addc	$t0,$t0,$carry
+	adde	$t1,$t1,$c1
+	srwi	$carry,$t0,16
+	insrwi	$carry,$t1,16,0
+	srwi	$c1,$t1,16
+	addc	$t2,$t2,$carry
+	adde	$t3,$t3,$c1
+	srwi	$carry,$t2,16
+	 insrwi	$t0,$t2,16,0		; 0..31 bits
+	insrwi	$carry,$t3,16,0
+	srwi	$c1,$t3,16
+	addc	$t4,$t4,$carry
+	adde	$t5,$t5,$c1
+	srwi	$carry,$t4,16
+	insrwi	$carry,$t5,16,0
+	srwi	$c1,$t5,16
+	addc	$t6,$t6,$carry
+	adde	$t7,$t7,$c1
+	srwi	$carry,$t6,16
+	 insrwi	$t4,$t6,16,0		; 32..63 bits
+	insrwi	$carry,$t7,16,0
+	srwi	$c1,$t7,16
+	 stw	$t0,12($tp)		; tp[j-1]
+	 stw	$t4,8($tp)
+
+	lwz	$t3,`$FRAME+32^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)	; permuted $t1
+	lwz	$t2,`$FRAME+36^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)	; permuted $t0
+	lwz	$t7,`$FRAME+40^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)	; permuted $t3
+	lwz	$t6,`$FRAME+44^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)	; permuted $t2
+	lwz	$t1,`$FRAME+48^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)	; permuted $t5
+	lwz	$t0,`$FRAME+52^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)	; permuted $t4
+	lwz	$t5,`$FRAME+56^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)	; permuted $t7
+	lwz	$t4,`$FRAME+60^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)	; permuted $t6
+
+	addc	$t2,$t2,$carry
+	adde	$t3,$t3,$c1
+	srwi	$carry,$t2,16
+	insrwi	$carry,$t3,16,0
+	srwi	$c1,$t3,16
+	addc	$t6,$t6,$carry
+	adde	$t7,$t7,$c1
+	srwi	$carry,$t6,16
+	 insrwi	$t2,$t6,16,0		; 64..95 bits
+	insrwi	$carry,$t7,16,0
+	srwi	$c1,$t7,16
+	addc	$t0,$t0,$carry
+	adde	$t1,$t1,$c1
+	srwi	$carry,$t0,16
+	insrwi	$carry,$t1,16,0
+	srwi	$c1,$t1,16
+	addc	$t4,$t4,$carry
+	adde	$t5,$t5,$c1
+	srwi	$carry,$t4,16
+	 insrwi	$t0,$t4,16,0		; 96..127 bits
+	insrwi	$carry,$t5,16,0
+	srwi	$c1,$t5,16
+	 stw	$t2,20($tp)		; tp[j]
+	 stwu	$t0,16($tp)
+
+	lwz	$t7,`$FRAME+64^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+	lwz	$t6,`$FRAME+68^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+	lwz	$t5,`$FRAME+72^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+	lwz	$t4,`$FRAME+76^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+
+	addc	$t6,$t6,$carry
+	adde	$t7,$t7,$c1
+	srwi	$carry,$t6,16
+	insrwi	$carry,$t7,16,0
+	srwi	$c1,$t7,16
+	addc	$t4,$t4,$carry
+	adde	$t5,$t5,$c1
+
+	insrwi	$t6,$t4,16,0
+	srwi	$t4,$t4,16
+	insrwi	$t4,$t5,16,0
+	srwi	$ovf,$t5,16
+	stw	$t6,12($tp)		; tp[num-1]
+	stw	$t4,8($tp)
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	slwi	$t7,$num,2
+	subf	$nap_d,$t7,$nap_d	; rewind pointer
+
+	li	$i,8			; i=1
+.align	5
+Louter:
+	addi	$tp,$sp,`$FRAME+$TRANSFER`
+	li	$carry,0
+	mtctr	$j
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==8);
+	ldx	$t3,$bp,$i		; bp[i]
+
+	ld	$t6,`$FRAME+$TRANSFER+8`($sp)	; tp[0]
+	mulld	$t7,$a0,$t3		; ap[0]*bp[i]
+	add	$t7,$t7,$t6		; ap[0]*bp[i]+tp[0]
+	; transfer bp[i] to FPU as 4x16-bit values
+	extrdi	$t0,$t3,16,48
+	extrdi	$t1,$t3,16,32
+	extrdi	$t2,$t3,16,16
+	extrdi	$t3,$t3,16,0
+	std	$t0,`$FRAME+0`($sp)
+	std	$t1,`$FRAME+8`($sp)
+	std	$t2,`$FRAME+16`($sp)
+	std	$t3,`$FRAME+24`($sp)
+
+	mulld	$t7,$t7,$n0		; tp[0]*n0
+	; transfer (ap[0]*bp[i]+tp[0])*n0 to FPU as 4x16-bit values
+	extrdi	$t4,$t7,16,48
+	extrdi	$t5,$t7,16,32
+	extrdi	$t6,$t7,16,16
+	extrdi	$t7,$t7,16,0
+	std	$t4,`$FRAME+32`($sp)
+	std	$t5,`$FRAME+40`($sp)
+	std	$t6,`$FRAME+48`($sp)
+	std	$t7,`$FRAME+56`($sp)
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==4);
+	add	$t0,$bp,$i
+	li	$c1,0
+	lwz	$t1,0($t0)		; bp[i,i+1]
+	lwz	$t3,4($t0)
+
+	mullw	$t4,$a0,$t1		; ap[0]*bp[i]
+	lwz	$t0,`$FRAME+$TRANSFER+8+4`($sp)	; tp[0]
+	mulhwu	$t5,$a0,$t1
+	lwz	$t2,`$FRAME+$TRANSFER+8`($sp)	; tp[0]
+	mullw	$t6,$a1,$t1
+	mullw	$t7,$a0,$t3
+	add	$t5,$t5,$t6
+	add	$t5,$t5,$t7
+	addc	$t4,$t4,$t0		; ap[0]*bp[i]+tp[0]
+	adde	$t5,$t5,$t2
+	; transfer bp[i] to FPU as 4x16-bit values
+	extrwi	$t0,$t1,16,16
+	extrwi	$t1,$t1,16,0
+	extrwi	$t2,$t3,16,16
+	extrwi	$t3,$t3,16,0
+	std	$t0,`$FRAME+0`($sp)	; yes, std in 32-bit build
+	std	$t1,`$FRAME+8`($sp)
+	std	$t2,`$FRAME+16`($sp)
+	std	$t3,`$FRAME+24`($sp)
+
+	mullw	$t0,$t4,$n0		; mulld tp[0]*n0
+	mulhwu	$t1,$t4,$n0
+	mullw	$t2,$t5,$n0
+	mullw	$t3,$t4,$n1
+	add	$t1,$t1,$t2
+	add	$t1,$t1,$t3
+	; transfer (ap[0]*bp[i]+tp[0])*n0 to FPU as 4x16-bit values
+	extrwi	$t4,$t0,16,16
+	extrwi	$t5,$t0,16,0
+	extrwi	$t6,$t1,16,16
+	extrwi	$t7,$t1,16,0
+	std	$t4,`$FRAME+32`($sp)	; yes, std in 32-bit build
+	std	$t5,`$FRAME+40`($sp)
+	std	$t6,`$FRAME+48`($sp)
+	std	$t7,`$FRAME+56`($sp)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	lfd	$A0,8($nap_d)		; load a[j] in double format
+	lfd	$A1,16($nap_d)
+	lfd	$A2,24($nap_d)		; load a[j+1] in double format
+	lfd	$A3,32($nap_d)
+	lfd	$N0,40($nap_d)		; load n[j] in double format
+	lfd	$N1,48($nap_d)
+	lfd	$N2,56($nap_d)		; load n[j+1] in double format
+	lfdu	$N3,64($nap_d)
+
+	lfd	$ba,`$FRAME+0`($sp)
+	lfd	$bb,`$FRAME+8`($sp)
+	lfd	$bc,`$FRAME+16`($sp)
+	lfd	$bd,`$FRAME+24`($sp)
+	lfd	$na,`$FRAME+32`($sp)
+	lfd	$nb,`$FRAME+40`($sp)
+	lfd	$nc,`$FRAME+48`($sp)
+	lfd	$nd,`$FRAME+56`($sp)
+
+	fcfid	$ba,$ba
+	fcfid	$bb,$bb
+	fcfid	$bc,$bc
+	fcfid	$bd,$bd
+	fcfid	$na,$na
+	fcfid	$nb,$nb
+	fcfid	$nc,$nc
+	fcfid	$nd,$nd
+
+	fmul	$T1a,$A1,$ba
+	fmul	$T1b,$A1,$bb
+	fmul	$T2a,$A2,$ba
+	fmul	$T2b,$A2,$bb
+	fmul	$T3a,$A3,$ba
+	fmul	$T3b,$A3,$bb
+	fmul	$T0a,$A0,$ba
+	fmul	$T0b,$A0,$bb
+
+	fmadd	$T1a,$A0,$bc,$T1a
+	fmadd	$T1b,$A0,$bd,$T1b
+	fmadd	$T2a,$A1,$bc,$T2a
+	fmadd	$T2b,$A1,$bd,$T2b
+	fmadd	$T3a,$A2,$bc,$T3a
+	fmadd	$T3b,$A2,$bd,$T3b
+	fmul	$dota,$A3,$bc
+	fmul	$dotb,$A3,$bd
+
+	fmadd	$T1a,$N1,$na,$T1a
+	fmadd	$T1b,$N1,$nb,$T1b
+	 lfd	$A0,8($nap_d)		; load a[j] in double format
+	 lfd	$A1,16($nap_d)
+	fmadd	$T2a,$N2,$na,$T2a
+	fmadd	$T2b,$N2,$nb,$T2b
+	 lfd	$A2,24($nap_d)		; load a[j+1] in double format
+	 lfd	$A3,32($nap_d)
+	fmadd	$T3a,$N3,$na,$T3a
+	fmadd	$T3b,$N3,$nb,$T3b
+	fmadd	$T0a,$N0,$na,$T0a
+	fmadd	$T0b,$N0,$nb,$T0b
+
+	fmadd	$T1a,$N0,$nc,$T1a
+	fmadd	$T1b,$N0,$nd,$T1b
+	fmadd	$T2a,$N1,$nc,$T2a
+	fmadd	$T2b,$N1,$nd,$T2b
+	fmadd	$T3a,$N2,$nc,$T3a
+	fmadd	$T3b,$N2,$nd,$T3b
+	fmadd	$dota,$N3,$nc,$dota
+	fmadd	$dotb,$N3,$nd,$dotb
+
+	fctid	$T0a,$T0a
+	fctid	$T0b,$T0b
+	fctid	$T1a,$T1a
+	fctid	$T1b,$T1b
+	fctid	$T2a,$T2a
+	fctid	$T2b,$T2b
+	fctid	$T3a,$T3a
+	fctid	$T3b,$T3b
+
+	stfd	$T0a,`$FRAME+0`($sp)
+	stfd	$T0b,`$FRAME+8`($sp)
+	stfd	$T1a,`$FRAME+16`($sp)
+	stfd	$T1b,`$FRAME+24`($sp)
+	stfd	$T2a,`$FRAME+32`($sp)
+	stfd	$T2b,`$FRAME+40`($sp)
+	stfd	$T3a,`$FRAME+48`($sp)
+	stfd	$T3b,`$FRAME+56`($sp)
+
+.align	5
+Linner:
+	fmul	$T1a,$A1,$ba
+	fmul	$T1b,$A1,$bb
+	fmul	$T2a,$A2,$ba
+	fmul	$T2b,$A2,$bb
+	lfd	$N0,40($nap_d)		; load n[j] in double format
+	lfd	$N1,48($nap_d)
+	fmul	$T3a,$A3,$ba
+	fmul	$T3b,$A3,$bb
+	fmadd	$T0a,$A0,$ba,$dota
+	fmadd	$T0b,$A0,$bb,$dotb
+	lfd	$N2,56($nap_d)		; load n[j+1] in double format
+	lfdu	$N3,64($nap_d)
+
+	fmadd	$T1a,$A0,$bc,$T1a
+	fmadd	$T1b,$A0,$bd,$T1b
+	fmadd	$T2a,$A1,$bc,$T2a
+	fmadd	$T2b,$A1,$bd,$T2b
+	 lfd	$A0,8($nap_d)		; load a[j] in double format
+	 lfd	$A1,16($nap_d)
+	fmadd	$T3a,$A2,$bc,$T3a
+	fmadd	$T3b,$A2,$bd,$T3b
+	fmul	$dota,$A3,$bc
+	fmul	$dotb,$A3,$bd
+	 lfd	$A2,24($nap_d)		; load a[j+1] in double format
+	 lfd	$A3,32($nap_d)
+___
+if ($SIZE_T==8 or $flavour =~ /osx/) {
+$code.=<<___;
+	fmadd	$T1a,$N1,$na,$T1a
+	fmadd	$T1b,$N1,$nb,$T1b
+	 ld	$t0,`$FRAME+0`($sp)
+	 ld	$t1,`$FRAME+8`($sp)
+	fmadd	$T2a,$N2,$na,$T2a
+	fmadd	$T2b,$N2,$nb,$T2b
+	 ld	$t2,`$FRAME+16`($sp)
+	 ld	$t3,`$FRAME+24`($sp)
+	fmadd	$T3a,$N3,$na,$T3a
+	fmadd	$T3b,$N3,$nb,$T3b
+	 add	$t0,$t0,$carry		; can not overflow
+	 ld	$t4,`$FRAME+32`($sp)
+	 ld	$t5,`$FRAME+40`($sp)
+	fmadd	$T0a,$N0,$na,$T0a
+	fmadd	$T0b,$N0,$nb,$T0b
+	 srdi	$carry,$t0,16
+	 add	$t1,$t1,$carry
+	 srdi	$carry,$t1,16
+	 ld	$t6,`$FRAME+48`($sp)
+	 ld	$t7,`$FRAME+56`($sp)
+
+	fmadd	$T1a,$N0,$nc,$T1a
+	fmadd	$T1b,$N0,$nd,$T1b
+	 insrdi	$t0,$t1,16,32
+	 ld	$t1,8($tp)		; tp[j]
+	fmadd	$T2a,$N1,$nc,$T2a
+	fmadd	$T2b,$N1,$nd,$T2b
+	 add	$t2,$t2,$carry
+	fmadd	$T3a,$N2,$nc,$T3a
+	fmadd	$T3b,$N2,$nd,$T3b
+	 srdi	$carry,$t2,16
+	 insrdi	$t0,$t2,16,16
+	fmadd	$dota,$N3,$nc,$dota
+	fmadd	$dotb,$N3,$nd,$dotb
+	 add	$t3,$t3,$carry
+	 ldu	$t2,16($tp)		; tp[j+1]
+	 srdi	$carry,$t3,16
+	 insrdi	$t0,$t3,16,0		; 0..63 bits
+	 add	$t4,$t4,$carry
+
+	fctid	$T0a,$T0a
+	fctid	$T0b,$T0b
+	 srdi	$carry,$t4,16
+	fctid	$T1a,$T1a
+	fctid	$T1b,$T1b
+	 add	$t5,$t5,$carry
+	fctid	$T2a,$T2a
+	fctid	$T2b,$T2b
+	 srdi	$carry,$t5,16
+	 insrdi	$t4,$t5,16,32
+	fctid	$T3a,$T3a
+	fctid	$T3b,$T3b
+	 add	$t6,$t6,$carry
+	 srdi	$carry,$t6,16
+	 insrdi	$t4,$t6,16,16
+
+	stfd	$T0a,`$FRAME+0`($sp)
+	stfd	$T0b,`$FRAME+8`($sp)
+	 add	$t7,$t7,$carry
+	 addc	$t3,$t0,$t1
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==4);		# adjust XER[CA]
+	extrdi	$t0,$t0,32,0
+	extrdi	$t1,$t1,32,0
+	adde	$t0,$t0,$t1
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	stfd	$T1a,`$FRAME+16`($sp)
+	stfd	$T1b,`$FRAME+24`($sp)
+	 insrdi	$t4,$t7,16,0		; 64..127 bits
+	 srdi	$carry,$t7,16		; upper 33 bits
+	stfd	$T2a,`$FRAME+32`($sp)
+	stfd	$T2b,`$FRAME+40`($sp)
+	 adde	$t5,$t4,$t2
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==4);		# adjust XER[CA]
+	extrdi	$t4,$t4,32,0
+	extrdi	$t2,$t2,32,0
+	adde	$t4,$t4,$t2
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	stfd	$T3a,`$FRAME+48`($sp)
+	stfd	$T3b,`$FRAME+56`($sp)
+	 addze	$carry,$carry
+	 std	$t3,-16($tp)		; tp[j-1]
+	 std	$t5,-8($tp)		; tp[j]
+___
+} else {
+$code.=<<___;
+	fmadd	$T1a,$N1,$na,$T1a
+	fmadd	$T1b,$N1,$nb,$T1b
+	 lwz	$t1,`$FRAME+0^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+	 lwz	$t0,`$FRAME+4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+	fmadd	$T2a,$N2,$na,$T2a
+	fmadd	$T2b,$N2,$nb,$T2b
+	 lwz	$t3,`$FRAME+8^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+	 lwz	$t2,`$FRAME+12^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+	fmadd	$T3a,$N3,$na,$T3a
+	fmadd	$T3b,$N3,$nb,$T3b
+	 lwz	$t5,`$FRAME+16^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+	 lwz	$t4,`$FRAME+20^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+	 addc	$t0,$t0,$carry
+	 adde	$t1,$t1,$c1
+	 srwi	$carry,$t0,16
+	fmadd	$T0a,$N0,$na,$T0a
+	fmadd	$T0b,$N0,$nb,$T0b
+	 lwz	$t7,`$FRAME+24^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+	 lwz	$t6,`$FRAME+28^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+	 srwi	$c1,$t1,16
+	 insrwi	$carry,$t1,16,0
+
+	fmadd	$T1a,$N0,$nc,$T1a
+	fmadd	$T1b,$N0,$nd,$T1b
+	 addc	$t2,$t2,$carry
+	 adde	$t3,$t3,$c1
+	 srwi	$carry,$t2,16
+	fmadd	$T2a,$N1,$nc,$T2a
+	fmadd	$T2b,$N1,$nd,$T2b
+	 insrwi	$t0,$t2,16,0		; 0..31 bits
+	 srwi	$c1,$t3,16
+	 insrwi	$carry,$t3,16,0
+	fmadd	$T3a,$N2,$nc,$T3a
+	fmadd	$T3b,$N2,$nd,$T3b
+	 lwz	$t2,12($tp)		; tp[j]
+	 lwz	$t3,8($tp)
+	 addc	$t4,$t4,$carry
+	 adde	$t5,$t5,$c1
+	 srwi	$carry,$t4,16
+	fmadd	$dota,$N3,$nc,$dota
+	fmadd	$dotb,$N3,$nd,$dotb
+	 srwi	$c1,$t5,16
+	 insrwi	$carry,$t5,16,0
+
+	fctid	$T0a,$T0a
+	 addc	$t6,$t6,$carry
+	 adde	$t7,$t7,$c1
+	 srwi	$carry,$t6,16
+	fctid	$T0b,$T0b
+	 insrwi	$t4,$t6,16,0		; 32..63 bits
+	 srwi	$c1,$t7,16
+	 insrwi	$carry,$t7,16,0
+	fctid	$T1a,$T1a
+	 addc	$t0,$t0,$t2
+	 adde	$t4,$t4,$t3
+	 lwz	$t3,`$FRAME+32^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)	; permuted $t1
+	 lwz	$t2,`$FRAME+36^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)	; permuted $t0
+	fctid	$T1b,$T1b
+	 addze	$carry,$carry
+	 addze	$c1,$c1
+	 stw	$t0,4($tp)		; tp[j-1]
+	 stw	$t4,0($tp)
+	fctid	$T2a,$T2a
+	 addc	$t2,$t2,$carry
+	 adde	$t3,$t3,$c1
+	 srwi	$carry,$t2,16
+	 lwz	$t7,`$FRAME+40^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)	; permuted $t3
+	 lwz	$t6,`$FRAME+44^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)	; permuted $t2
+	fctid	$T2b,$T2b
+	 srwi	$c1,$t3,16
+	 insrwi	$carry,$t3,16,0
+	 lwz	$t1,`$FRAME+48^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)	; permuted $t5
+	 lwz	$t0,`$FRAME+52^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)	; permuted $t4
+	fctid	$T3a,$T3a
+	 addc	$t6,$t6,$carry
+	 adde	$t7,$t7,$c1
+	 srwi	$carry,$t6,16
+	 lwz	$t5,`$FRAME+56^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)	; permuted $t7
+	 lwz	$t4,`$FRAME+60^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)	; permuted $t6
+	fctid	$T3b,$T3b
+
+	 insrwi	$t2,$t6,16,0		; 64..95 bits
+	insrwi	$carry,$t7,16,0
+	srwi	$c1,$t7,16
+	 lwz	$t6,20($tp)
+	 lwzu	$t7,16($tp)
+	addc	$t0,$t0,$carry
+	 stfd	$T0a,`$FRAME+0`($sp)
+	adde	$t1,$t1,$c1
+	srwi	$carry,$t0,16
+	 stfd	$T0b,`$FRAME+8`($sp)
+	insrwi	$carry,$t1,16,0
+	srwi	$c1,$t1,16
+	addc	$t4,$t4,$carry
+	 stfd	$T1a,`$FRAME+16`($sp)
+	adde	$t5,$t5,$c1
+	srwi	$carry,$t4,16
+	 insrwi	$t0,$t4,16,0		; 96..127 bits
+	 stfd	$T1b,`$FRAME+24`($sp)
+	insrwi	$carry,$t5,16,0
+	srwi	$c1,$t5,16
+
+	addc	$t2,$t2,$t6
+	 stfd	$T2a,`$FRAME+32`($sp)
+	adde	$t0,$t0,$t7
+	 stfd	$T2b,`$FRAME+40`($sp)
+	addze	$carry,$carry
+	 stfd	$T3a,`$FRAME+48`($sp)
+	addze	$c1,$c1
+	 stfd	$T3b,`$FRAME+56`($sp)
+	 stw	$t2,-4($tp)		; tp[j]
+	 stw	$t0,-8($tp)
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	bdnz	Linner
+
+	fctid	$dota,$dota
+	fctid	$dotb,$dotb
+___
+if ($SIZE_T==8 or $flavour =~ /osx/) {
+$code.=<<___;
+	ld	$t0,`$FRAME+0`($sp)
+	ld	$t1,`$FRAME+8`($sp)
+	ld	$t2,`$FRAME+16`($sp)
+	ld	$t3,`$FRAME+24`($sp)
+	ld	$t4,`$FRAME+32`($sp)
+	ld	$t5,`$FRAME+40`($sp)
+	ld	$t6,`$FRAME+48`($sp)
+	ld	$t7,`$FRAME+56`($sp)
+	stfd	$dota,`$FRAME+64`($sp)
+	stfd	$dotb,`$FRAME+72`($sp)
+
+	add	$t0,$t0,$carry		; can not overflow
+	srdi	$carry,$t0,16
+	add	$t1,$t1,$carry
+	srdi	$carry,$t1,16
+	insrdi	$t0,$t1,16,32
+	add	$t2,$t2,$carry
+	ld	$t1,8($tp)		; tp[j]
+	srdi	$carry,$t2,16
+	insrdi	$t0,$t2,16,16
+	add	$t3,$t3,$carry
+	ldu	$t2,16($tp)		; tp[j+1]
+	srdi	$carry,$t3,16
+	insrdi	$t0,$t3,16,0		; 0..63 bits
+	add	$t4,$t4,$carry
+	srdi	$carry,$t4,16
+	add	$t5,$t5,$carry
+	srdi	$carry,$t5,16
+	insrdi	$t4,$t5,16,32
+	add	$t6,$t6,$carry
+	srdi	$carry,$t6,16
+	insrdi	$t4,$t6,16,16
+	add	$t7,$t7,$carry
+	insrdi	$t4,$t7,16,0		; 64..127 bits
+	srdi	$carry,$t7,16		; upper 33 bits
+	ld	$t6,`$FRAME+64`($sp)
+	ld	$t7,`$FRAME+72`($sp)
+
+	addc	$t3,$t0,$t1
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==4);		# adjust XER[CA]
+	extrdi	$t0,$t0,32,0
+	extrdi	$t1,$t1,32,0
+	adde	$t0,$t0,$t1
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	adde	$t5,$t4,$t2
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==4);		# adjust XER[CA]
+	extrdi	$t4,$t4,32,0
+	extrdi	$t2,$t2,32,0
+	adde	$t4,$t4,$t2
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	addze	$carry,$carry
+
+	std	$t3,-16($tp)		; tp[j-1]
+	std	$t5,-8($tp)		; tp[j]
+
+	add	$carry,$carry,$ovf	; comsume upmost overflow
+	add	$t6,$t6,$carry		; can not overflow
+	srdi	$carry,$t6,16
+	add	$t7,$t7,$carry
+	insrdi	$t6,$t7,48,0
+	srdi	$ovf,$t7,48
+	std	$t6,0($tp)		; tp[num-1]
+___
+} else {
+$code.=<<___;
+	lwz	$t1,`$FRAME+0^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+	lwz	$t0,`$FRAME+4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+	lwz	$t3,`$FRAME+8^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+	lwz	$t2,`$FRAME+12^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+	lwz	$t5,`$FRAME+16^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+	lwz	$t4,`$FRAME+20^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+	lwz	$t7,`$FRAME+24^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+	lwz	$t6,`$FRAME+28^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+	stfd	$dota,`$FRAME+64`($sp)
+	stfd	$dotb,`$FRAME+72`($sp)
+
+	addc	$t0,$t0,$carry
+	adde	$t1,$t1,$c1
+	srwi	$carry,$t0,16
+	insrwi	$carry,$t1,16,0
+	srwi	$c1,$t1,16
+	addc	$t2,$t2,$carry
+	adde	$t3,$t3,$c1
+	srwi	$carry,$t2,16
+	 insrwi	$t0,$t2,16,0		; 0..31 bits
+	 lwz	$t2,12($tp)		; tp[j]
+	insrwi	$carry,$t3,16,0
+	srwi	$c1,$t3,16
+	 lwz	$t3,8($tp)
+	addc	$t4,$t4,$carry
+	adde	$t5,$t5,$c1
+	srwi	$carry,$t4,16
+	insrwi	$carry,$t5,16,0
+	srwi	$c1,$t5,16
+	addc	$t6,$t6,$carry
+	adde	$t7,$t7,$c1
+	srwi	$carry,$t6,16
+	 insrwi	$t4,$t6,16,0		; 32..63 bits
+	insrwi	$carry,$t7,16,0
+	srwi	$c1,$t7,16
+
+	addc	$t0,$t0,$t2
+	adde	$t4,$t4,$t3
+	addze	$carry,$carry
+	addze	$c1,$c1
+	 stw	$t0,4($tp)		; tp[j-1]
+	 stw	$t4,0($tp)
+
+	lwz	$t3,`$FRAME+32^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)	; permuted $t1
+	lwz	$t2,`$FRAME+36^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)	; permuted $t0
+	lwz	$t7,`$FRAME+40^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)	; permuted $t3
+	lwz	$t6,`$FRAME+44^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)	; permuted $t2
+	lwz	$t1,`$FRAME+48^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)	; permuted $t5
+	lwz	$t0,`$FRAME+52^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)	; permuted $t4
+	lwz	$t5,`$FRAME+56^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)	; permuted $t7
+	lwz	$t4,`$FRAME+60^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)	; permuted $t6
+
+	addc	$t2,$t2,$carry
+	adde	$t3,$t3,$c1
+	srwi	$carry,$t2,16
+	insrwi	$carry,$t3,16,0
+	srwi	$c1,$t3,16
+	addc	$t6,$t6,$carry
+	adde	$t7,$t7,$c1
+	srwi	$carry,$t6,16
+	 insrwi	$t2,$t6,16,0		; 64..95 bits
+	 lwz	$t6,20($tp)
+	insrwi	$carry,$t7,16,0
+	srwi	$c1,$t7,16
+	 lwzu	$t7,16($tp)
+	addc	$t0,$t0,$carry
+	adde	$t1,$t1,$c1
+	srwi	$carry,$t0,16
+	insrwi	$carry,$t1,16,0
+	srwi	$c1,$t1,16
+	addc	$t4,$t4,$carry
+	adde	$t5,$t5,$c1
+	srwi	$carry,$t4,16
+	 insrwi	$t0,$t4,16,0		; 96..127 bits
+	insrwi	$carry,$t5,16,0
+	srwi	$c1,$t5,16
+
+	addc	$t2,$t2,$t6
+	adde	$t0,$t0,$t7
+	 lwz	$t7,`$FRAME+64^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+	 lwz	$t6,`$FRAME+68^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+	addze	$carry,$carry
+	addze	$c1,$c1
+	 lwz	$t5,`$FRAME+72^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+	 lwz	$t4,`$FRAME+76^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+
+	addc	$t6,$t6,$carry
+	adde	$t7,$t7,$c1
+	 stw	$t2,-4($tp)		; tp[j]
+	 stw	$t0,-8($tp)
+	addc	$t6,$t6,$ovf
+	addze	$t7,$t7
+	srwi	$carry,$t6,16
+	insrwi	$carry,$t7,16,0
+	srwi	$c1,$t7,16
+	addc	$t4,$t4,$carry
+	adde	$t5,$t5,$c1
+
+	insrwi	$t6,$t4,16,0
+	srwi	$t4,$t4,16
+	insrwi	$t4,$t5,16,0
+	srwi	$ovf,$t5,16
+	stw	$t6,4($tp)		; tp[num-1]
+	stw	$t4,0($tp)
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	slwi	$t7,$num,2
+	addi	$i,$i,8
+	subf	$nap_d,$t7,$nap_d	; rewind pointer
+	cmpw	$i,$num
+	blt-	Louter
+___
+
+$code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==8);
+	subf	$np,$num,$np	; rewind np
+	addi	$j,$j,1		; restore counter
+	subfc	$i,$i,$i	; j=0 and "clear" XER[CA]
+	addi	$tp,$sp,`$FRAME+$TRANSFER+8`
+	addi	$t4,$sp,`$FRAME+$TRANSFER+16`
+	addi	$t5,$np,8
+	addi	$t6,$rp,8
+	mtctr	$j
+
+.align	4
+Lsub:	ldx	$t0,$tp,$i
+	ldx	$t1,$np,$i
+	ldx	$t2,$t4,$i
+	ldx	$t3,$t5,$i
+	subfe	$t0,$t1,$t0	; tp[j]-np[j]
+	subfe	$t2,$t3,$t2	; tp[j+1]-np[j+1]
+	stdx	$t0,$rp,$i
+	stdx	$t2,$t6,$i
+	addi	$i,$i,16
+	bdnz	Lsub
+
+	li	$i,0
+	subfe	$ovf,$i,$ovf	; handle upmost overflow bit
+	and	$ap,$tp,$ovf
+	andc	$np,$rp,$ovf
+	or	$ap,$ap,$np	; ap=borrow?tp:rp
+	addi	$t7,$ap,8
+	mtctr	$j
+
+.align	4
+Lcopy:				; copy or in-place refresh
+	ldx	$t0,$ap,$i
+	ldx	$t1,$t7,$i
+	std	$i,8($nap_d)	; zap nap_d
+	std	$i,16($nap_d)
+	std	$i,24($nap_d)
+	std	$i,32($nap_d)
+	std	$i,40($nap_d)
+	std	$i,48($nap_d)
+	std	$i,56($nap_d)
+	stdu	$i,64($nap_d)
+	stdx	$t0,$rp,$i
+	stdx	$t1,$t6,$i
+	stdx	$i,$tp,$i	; zap tp at once
+	stdx	$i,$t4,$i
+	addi	$i,$i,16
+	bdnz	Lcopy
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==4);
+	subf	$np,$num,$np	; rewind np
+	addi	$j,$j,1		; restore counter
+	subfc	$i,$i,$i	; j=0 and "clear" XER[CA]
+	addi	$tp,$sp,`$FRAME+$TRANSFER`
+	addi	$np,$np,-4
+	addi	$rp,$rp,-4
+	addi	$ap,$sp,`$FRAME+$TRANSFER+4`
+	mtctr	$j
+
+.align	4
+Lsub:	lwz	$t0,12($tp)	; load tp[j..j+3] in 64-bit word order
+	lwz	$t1,8($tp)
+	lwz	$t2,20($tp)
+	lwzu	$t3,16($tp)
+	lwz	$t4,4($np)	; load np[j..j+3] in 32-bit word order
+	lwz	$t5,8($np)
+	lwz	$t6,12($np)
+	lwzu	$t7,16($np)
+	subfe	$t4,$t4,$t0	; tp[j]-np[j]
+	 stw	$t0,4($ap)	; save tp[j..j+3] in 32-bit word order
+	subfe	$t5,$t5,$t1	; tp[j+1]-np[j+1]
+	 stw	$t1,8($ap)
+	subfe	$t6,$t6,$t2	; tp[j+2]-np[j+2]
+	 stw	$t2,12($ap)
+	subfe	$t7,$t7,$t3	; tp[j+3]-np[j+3]
+	 stwu	$t3,16($ap)
+	stw	$t4,4($rp)
+	stw	$t5,8($rp)
+	stw	$t6,12($rp)
+	stwu	$t7,16($rp)
+	bdnz	Lsub
+
+	li	$i,0
+	subfe	$ovf,$i,$ovf	; handle upmost overflow bit
+	addi	$tp,$sp,`$FRAME+$TRANSFER+4`
+	subf	$rp,$num,$rp	; rewind rp
+	and	$ap,$tp,$ovf
+	andc	$np,$rp,$ovf
+	or	$ap,$ap,$np	; ap=borrow?tp:rp
+	addi	$tp,$sp,`$FRAME+$TRANSFER`
+	mtctr	$j
+
+.align	4
+Lcopy:				; copy or in-place refresh
+	lwz	$t0,4($ap)
+	lwz	$t1,8($ap)
+	lwz	$t2,12($ap)
+	lwzu	$t3,16($ap)
+	std	$i,8($nap_d)	; zap nap_d
+	std	$i,16($nap_d)
+	std	$i,24($nap_d)
+	std	$i,32($nap_d)
+	std	$i,40($nap_d)
+	std	$i,48($nap_d)
+	std	$i,56($nap_d)
+	stdu	$i,64($nap_d)
+	stw	$t0,4($rp)
+	stw	$t1,8($rp)
+	stw	$t2,12($rp)
+	stwu	$t3,16($rp)
+	std	$i,8($tp)	; zap tp at once
+	stdu	$i,16($tp)
+	bdnz	Lcopy
+___
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	$POP	$i,0($sp)
+	li	r3,1	; signal "handled"
+	$POP	r19,`-12*8-13*$SIZE_T`($i)
+	$POP	r20,`-12*8-12*$SIZE_T`($i)
+	$POP	r21,`-12*8-11*$SIZE_T`($i)
+	$POP	r22,`-12*8-10*$SIZE_T`($i)
+	$POP	r23,`-12*8-9*$SIZE_T`($i)
+	$POP	r24,`-12*8-8*$SIZE_T`($i)
+	$POP	r25,`-12*8-7*$SIZE_T`($i)
+	$POP	r26,`-12*8-6*$SIZE_T`($i)
+	$POP	r27,`-12*8-5*$SIZE_T`($i)
+	$POP	r28,`-12*8-4*$SIZE_T`($i)
+	$POP	r29,`-12*8-3*$SIZE_T`($i)
+	$POP	r30,`-12*8-2*$SIZE_T`($i)
+	$POP	r31,`-12*8-1*$SIZE_T`($i)
+	lfd	f20,`-12*8`($i)
+	lfd	f21,`-11*8`($i)
+	lfd	f22,`-10*8`($i)
+	lfd	f23,`-9*8`($i)
+	lfd	f24,`-8*8`($i)
+	lfd	f25,`-7*8`($i)
+	lfd	f26,`-6*8`($i)
+	lfd	f27,`-5*8`($i)
+	lfd	f28,`-4*8`($i)
+	lfd	f29,`-3*8`($i)
+	lfd	f30,`-2*8`($i)
+	lfd	f31,`-1*8`($i)
+	mr	$sp,$i
+	blr
+	.long	0
+	.byte	0,12,4,0,0x8c,13,6,0
+	.long	0
+.size	.$fname,.-.$fname
+
+.asciz  "Montgomery Multiplication for PPC64, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+___
+
+$code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem;
+print $code;
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/rsaz-avx2.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/rsaz-avx2.pl
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..46d746b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/rsaz-avx2.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,1967 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2013-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+##############################################################################
+#                                                                            #
+#  Copyright (c) 2012, Intel Corporation                                     #
+#                                                                            #
+#  All rights reserved.                                                      #
+#                                                                            #
+#  Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without        #
+#  modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are    #
+#  met:                                                                      #
+#                                                                            #
+#  *  Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright         #
+#     notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.          #
+#                                                                            #
+#  *  Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright      #
+#     notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the    #
+#     documentation and/or other materials provided with the                 #
+#     distribution.                                                          #
+#                                                                            #
+#  *  Neither the name of the Intel Corporation nor the names of its         #
+#     contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from   #
+#     this software without specific prior written permission.               #
+#                                                                            #
+#                                                                            #
+#  THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY INTEL CORPORATION ""AS IS"" AND ANY          #
+#  EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE         #
+#  IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR        #
+#  PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL INTEL CORPORATION OR            #
+#  CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL,     #
+#  EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,       #
+#  PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR        #
+#  PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF    #
+#  LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING      #
+#  NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS        #
+#  SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.              #
+#                                                                            #
+##############################################################################
+# Developers and authors:                                                    #
+# Shay Gueron (1, 2), and Vlad Krasnov (1)                                   #
+# (1) Intel Corporation, Israel Development Center, Haifa, Israel            #
+# (2) University of Haifa, Israel                                            #
+##############################################################################
+# Reference:                                                                 #
+# [1] S. Gueron, V. Krasnov: "Software Implementation of Modular             #
+#     Exponentiation,  Using Advanced Vector Instructions Architectures",    #
+#     F. Ozbudak and F. Rodriguez-Henriquez (Eds.): WAIFI 2012, LNCS 7369,   #
+#     pp. 119?135, 2012. Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012              #
+# [2] S. Gueron: "Efficient Software Implementations of Modular              #
+#     Exponentiation", Journal of Cryptographic Engineering 2:31-43 (2012).  #
+# [3] S. Gueron, V. Krasnov: "Speeding up Big-numbers Squaring",IEEE         #
+#     Proceedings of 9th International Conference on Information Technology: #
+#     New Generations (ITNG 2012), pp.821-823 (2012)                         #
+# [4] S. Gueron, V. Krasnov: "[PATCH] Efficient and side channel analysis    #
+#     resistant 1024-bit modular exponentiation, for optimizing RSA2048      #
+#     on AVX2 capable x86_64 platforms",                                     #
+#     http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2850&user=guest&pass=guest#
+##############################################################################
+#
+# +13% improvement over original submission by <appro@openssl.org>
+#
+# rsa2048 sign/sec	OpenSSL 1.0.1	scalar(*)	this
+# 2.3GHz Haswell	621		765/+23%	1113/+79%
+# 2.3GHz Broadwell(**)	688		1200(***)/+74%	1120/+63%
+#
+# (*)	if system doesn't support AVX2, for reference purposes;
+# (**)	scaled to 2.3GHz to simplify comparison;
+# (***)	scalar AD*X code is faster than AVX2 and is preferred code
+#	path for Broadwell;
+
+$flavour = shift;
+$output  = shift;
+if ($flavour =~ /\./) { $output = $flavour; undef $flavour; }
+
+$win64=0; $win64=1 if ($flavour =~ /[nm]asm|mingw64/ || $output =~ /\.asm$/);
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+( $xlate="${dir}x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
+( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
+die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl";
+
+if (`$ENV{CC} -Wa,-v -c -o /dev/null -x assembler /dev/null 2>&1`
+		=~ /GNU assembler version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
+	$avx = ($1>=2.19) + ($1>=2.22);
+	$addx = ($1>=2.23);
+}
+
+if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /nasm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /nasm/) &&
+	    `nasm -v 2>&1` =~ /NASM version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
+	$avx = ($1>=2.09) + ($1>=2.10);
+	$addx = ($1>=2.10);
+}
+
+if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
+	    `ml64 2>&1` =~ /Version ([0-9]+)\./) {
+	$avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=11);
+	$addx = ($1>=11);
+}
+
+if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /(^clang version|based on LLVM) ([3-9])\.([0-9]+)/) {
+	my $ver = $2 + $3/100.0;	# 3.1->3.01, 3.10->3.10
+	$avx = ($ver>=3.0) + ($ver>=3.01);
+	$addx = ($ver>=3.03);
+}
+
+open OUT,"| \"$^X\" \"$xlate\" $flavour \"$output\"";
+*STDOUT = *OUT;
+
+if ($avx>1) {{{
+{ # void AMS_WW(
+my $rp="%rdi";	# BN_ULONG *rp,
+my $ap="%rsi";	# const BN_ULONG *ap,
+my $np="%rdx";	# const BN_ULONG *np,
+my $n0="%ecx";	# const BN_ULONG n0,
+my $rep="%r8d";	# int repeat);
+
+# The registers that hold the accumulated redundant result
+# The AMM works on 1024 bit operands, and redundant word size is 29
+# Therefore: ceil(1024/29)/4 = 9
+my $ACC0="%ymm0";
+my $ACC1="%ymm1";
+my $ACC2="%ymm2";
+my $ACC3="%ymm3";
+my $ACC4="%ymm4";
+my $ACC5="%ymm5";
+my $ACC6="%ymm6";
+my $ACC7="%ymm7";
+my $ACC8="%ymm8";
+my $ACC9="%ymm9";
+# Registers that hold the broadcasted words of bp, currently used
+my $B1="%ymm10";
+my $B2="%ymm11";
+# Registers that hold the broadcasted words of Y, currently used
+my $Y1="%ymm12";
+my $Y2="%ymm13";
+# Helper registers
+my $TEMP1="%ymm14";
+my $AND_MASK="%ymm15";
+# alu registers that hold the first words of the ACC
+my $r0="%r9";
+my $r1="%r10";
+my $r2="%r11";
+my $r3="%r12";
+
+my $i="%r14d";			# loop counter
+my $tmp = "%r15";
+
+my $FrameSize=32*18+32*8;	# place for A^2 and 2*A
+
+my $aap=$r0;
+my $tp0="%rbx";
+my $tp1=$r3;
+my $tpa=$tmp;
+
+$np="%r13";			# reassigned argument
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.text
+
+.globl	rsaz_1024_sqr_avx2
+.type	rsaz_1024_sqr_avx2,\@function,5
+.align	64
+rsaz_1024_sqr_avx2:		# 702 cycles, 14% faster than rsaz_1024_mul_avx2
+	lea	(%rsp), %rax
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+	vzeroupper
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	lea	-0xa8(%rsp),%rsp
+	vmovaps	%xmm6,-0xd8(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm7,-0xc8(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm8,-0xb8(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm9,-0xa8(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm10,-0x98(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm11,-0x88(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm12,-0x78(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm13,-0x68(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm14,-0x58(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm15,-0x48(%rax)
+.Lsqr_1024_body:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	%rax,%rbp
+	mov	%rdx, $np			# reassigned argument
+	sub	\$$FrameSize, %rsp
+	mov	$np, $tmp
+	sub	\$-128, $rp			# size optimization
+	sub	\$-128, $ap
+	sub	\$-128, $np
+
+	and	\$4095, $tmp			# see if $np crosses page
+	add	\$32*10, $tmp
+	shr	\$12, $tmp
+	vpxor	$ACC9,$ACC9,$ACC9
+	jz	.Lsqr_1024_no_n_copy
+
+	# unaligned 256-bit load that crosses page boundary can
+	# cause >2x performance degradation here, so if $np does
+	# cross page boundary, copy it to stack and make sure stack
+	# frame doesn't...
+	sub		\$32*10,%rsp
+	vmovdqu		32*0-128($np), $ACC0
+	and		\$-2048, %rsp
+	vmovdqu		32*1-128($np), $ACC1
+	vmovdqu		32*2-128($np), $ACC2
+	vmovdqu		32*3-128($np), $ACC3
+	vmovdqu		32*4-128($np), $ACC4
+	vmovdqu		32*5-128($np), $ACC5
+	vmovdqu		32*6-128($np), $ACC6
+	vmovdqu		32*7-128($np), $ACC7
+	vmovdqu		32*8-128($np), $ACC8
+	lea		$FrameSize+128(%rsp),$np
+	vmovdqu		$ACC0, 32*0-128($np)
+	vmovdqu		$ACC1, 32*1-128($np)
+	vmovdqu		$ACC2, 32*2-128($np)
+	vmovdqu		$ACC3, 32*3-128($np)
+	vmovdqu		$ACC4, 32*4-128($np)
+	vmovdqu		$ACC5, 32*5-128($np)
+	vmovdqu		$ACC6, 32*6-128($np)
+	vmovdqu		$ACC7, 32*7-128($np)
+	vmovdqu		$ACC8, 32*8-128($np)
+	vmovdqu		$ACC9, 32*9-128($np)	# $ACC9 is zero
+
+.Lsqr_1024_no_n_copy:
+	and		\$-1024, %rsp
+
+	vmovdqu		32*1-128($ap), $ACC1
+	vmovdqu		32*2-128($ap), $ACC2
+	vmovdqu		32*3-128($ap), $ACC3
+	vmovdqu		32*4-128($ap), $ACC4
+	vmovdqu		32*5-128($ap), $ACC5
+	vmovdqu		32*6-128($ap), $ACC6
+	vmovdqu		32*7-128($ap), $ACC7
+	vmovdqu		32*8-128($ap), $ACC8
+
+	lea	192(%rsp), $tp0			# 64+128=192
+	vmovdqu	.Land_mask(%rip), $AND_MASK
+	jmp	.LOOP_GRANDE_SQR_1024
+
+.align	32
+.LOOP_GRANDE_SQR_1024:
+	lea	32*18+128(%rsp), $aap		# size optimization
+	lea	448(%rsp), $tp1			# 64+128+256=448
+
+	# the squaring is performed as described in Variant B of
+	# "Speeding up Big-Number Squaring", so start by calculating
+	# the A*2=A+A vector
+	vpaddq		$ACC1, $ACC1, $ACC1
+	 vpbroadcastq	32*0-128($ap), $B1
+	vpaddq		$ACC2, $ACC2, $ACC2
+	vmovdqa		$ACC1, 32*0-128($aap)
+	vpaddq		$ACC3, $ACC3, $ACC3
+	vmovdqa		$ACC2, 32*1-128($aap)
+	vpaddq		$ACC4, $ACC4, $ACC4
+	vmovdqa		$ACC3, 32*2-128($aap)
+	vpaddq		$ACC5, $ACC5, $ACC5
+	vmovdqa		$ACC4, 32*3-128($aap)
+	vpaddq		$ACC6, $ACC6, $ACC6
+	vmovdqa		$ACC5, 32*4-128($aap)
+	vpaddq		$ACC7, $ACC7, $ACC7
+	vmovdqa		$ACC6, 32*5-128($aap)
+	vpaddq		$ACC8, $ACC8, $ACC8
+	vmovdqa		$ACC7, 32*6-128($aap)
+	vpxor		$ACC9, $ACC9, $ACC9
+	vmovdqa		$ACC8, 32*7-128($aap)
+
+	vpmuludq	32*0-128($ap), $B1, $ACC0
+	 vpbroadcastq	32*1-128($ap), $B2
+	 vmovdqu	$ACC9, 32*9-192($tp0)	# zero upper half
+	vpmuludq	$B1, $ACC1, $ACC1
+	 vmovdqu	$ACC9, 32*10-448($tp1)
+	vpmuludq	$B1, $ACC2, $ACC2
+	 vmovdqu	$ACC9, 32*11-448($tp1)
+	vpmuludq	$B1, $ACC3, $ACC3
+	 vmovdqu	$ACC9, 32*12-448($tp1)
+	vpmuludq	$B1, $ACC4, $ACC4
+	 vmovdqu	$ACC9, 32*13-448($tp1)
+	vpmuludq	$B1, $ACC5, $ACC5
+	 vmovdqu	$ACC9, 32*14-448($tp1)
+	vpmuludq	$B1, $ACC6, $ACC6
+	 vmovdqu	$ACC9, 32*15-448($tp1)
+	vpmuludq	$B1, $ACC7, $ACC7
+	 vmovdqu	$ACC9, 32*16-448($tp1)
+	vpmuludq	$B1, $ACC8, $ACC8
+	 vpbroadcastq	32*2-128($ap), $B1
+	 vmovdqu	$ACC9, 32*17-448($tp1)
+
+	mov	$ap, $tpa
+	mov 	\$4, $i
+	jmp	.Lsqr_entry_1024
+___
+$TEMP0=$Y1;
+$TEMP2=$Y2;
+$code.=<<___;
+.align	32
+.LOOP_SQR_1024:
+	 vpbroadcastq	32*1-128($tpa), $B2
+	vpmuludq	32*0-128($ap), $B1, $ACC0
+	vpaddq		32*0-192($tp0), $ACC0, $ACC0
+	vpmuludq	32*0-128($aap), $B1, $ACC1
+	vpaddq		32*1-192($tp0), $ACC1, $ACC1
+	vpmuludq	32*1-128($aap), $B1, $ACC2
+	vpaddq		32*2-192($tp0), $ACC2, $ACC2
+	vpmuludq	32*2-128($aap), $B1, $ACC3
+	vpaddq		32*3-192($tp0), $ACC3, $ACC3
+	vpmuludq	32*3-128($aap), $B1, $ACC4
+	vpaddq		32*4-192($tp0), $ACC4, $ACC4
+	vpmuludq	32*4-128($aap), $B1, $ACC5
+	vpaddq		32*5-192($tp0), $ACC5, $ACC5
+	vpmuludq	32*5-128($aap), $B1, $ACC6
+	vpaddq		32*6-192($tp0), $ACC6, $ACC6
+	vpmuludq	32*6-128($aap), $B1, $ACC7
+	vpaddq		32*7-192($tp0), $ACC7, $ACC7
+	vpmuludq	32*7-128($aap), $B1, $ACC8
+	 vpbroadcastq	32*2-128($tpa), $B1
+	vpaddq		32*8-192($tp0), $ACC8, $ACC8
+.Lsqr_entry_1024:
+	vmovdqu		$ACC0, 32*0-192($tp0)
+	vmovdqu		$ACC1, 32*1-192($tp0)
+
+	vpmuludq	32*1-128($ap), $B2, $TEMP0
+	vpaddq		$TEMP0, $ACC2, $ACC2
+	vpmuludq	32*1-128($aap), $B2, $TEMP1
+	vpaddq		$TEMP1, $ACC3, $ACC3
+	vpmuludq	32*2-128($aap), $B2, $TEMP2
+	vpaddq		$TEMP2, $ACC4, $ACC4
+	vpmuludq	32*3-128($aap), $B2, $TEMP0
+	vpaddq		$TEMP0, $ACC5, $ACC5
+	vpmuludq	32*4-128($aap), $B2, $TEMP1
+	vpaddq		$TEMP1, $ACC6, $ACC6
+	vpmuludq	32*5-128($aap), $B2, $TEMP2
+	vpaddq		$TEMP2, $ACC7, $ACC7
+	vpmuludq	32*6-128($aap), $B2, $TEMP0
+	vpaddq		$TEMP0, $ACC8, $ACC8
+	vpmuludq	32*7-128($aap), $B2, $ACC0
+	 vpbroadcastq	32*3-128($tpa), $B2
+	vpaddq		32*9-192($tp0), $ACC0, $ACC0
+
+	vmovdqu		$ACC2, 32*2-192($tp0)
+	vmovdqu		$ACC3, 32*3-192($tp0)
+
+	vpmuludq	32*2-128($ap), $B1, $TEMP2
+	vpaddq		$TEMP2, $ACC4, $ACC4
+	vpmuludq	32*2-128($aap), $B1, $TEMP0
+	vpaddq		$TEMP0, $ACC5, $ACC5
+	vpmuludq	32*3-128($aap), $B1, $TEMP1
+	vpaddq		$TEMP1, $ACC6, $ACC6
+	vpmuludq	32*4-128($aap), $B1, $TEMP2
+	vpaddq		$TEMP2, $ACC7, $ACC7
+	vpmuludq	32*5-128($aap), $B1, $TEMP0
+	vpaddq		$TEMP0, $ACC8, $ACC8
+	vpmuludq	32*6-128($aap), $B1, $TEMP1
+	vpaddq		$TEMP1, $ACC0, $ACC0
+	vpmuludq	32*7-128($aap), $B1, $ACC1
+	 vpbroadcastq	32*4-128($tpa), $B1
+	vpaddq		32*10-448($tp1), $ACC1, $ACC1
+
+	vmovdqu		$ACC4, 32*4-192($tp0)
+	vmovdqu		$ACC5, 32*5-192($tp0)
+
+	vpmuludq	32*3-128($ap), $B2, $TEMP0
+	vpaddq		$TEMP0, $ACC6, $ACC6
+	vpmuludq	32*3-128($aap), $B2, $TEMP1
+	vpaddq		$TEMP1, $ACC7, $ACC7
+	vpmuludq	32*4-128($aap), $B2, $TEMP2
+	vpaddq		$TEMP2, $ACC8, $ACC8
+	vpmuludq	32*5-128($aap), $B2, $TEMP0
+	vpaddq		$TEMP0, $ACC0, $ACC0
+	vpmuludq	32*6-128($aap), $B2, $TEMP1
+	vpaddq		$TEMP1, $ACC1, $ACC1
+	vpmuludq	32*7-128($aap), $B2, $ACC2
+	 vpbroadcastq	32*5-128($tpa), $B2
+	vpaddq		32*11-448($tp1), $ACC2, $ACC2	
+
+	vmovdqu		$ACC6, 32*6-192($tp0)
+	vmovdqu		$ACC7, 32*7-192($tp0)
+
+	vpmuludq	32*4-128($ap), $B1, $TEMP0
+	vpaddq		$TEMP0, $ACC8, $ACC8
+	vpmuludq	32*4-128($aap), $B1, $TEMP1
+	vpaddq		$TEMP1, $ACC0, $ACC0
+	vpmuludq	32*5-128($aap), $B1, $TEMP2
+	vpaddq		$TEMP2, $ACC1, $ACC1
+	vpmuludq	32*6-128($aap), $B1, $TEMP0
+	vpaddq		$TEMP0, $ACC2, $ACC2
+	vpmuludq	32*7-128($aap), $B1, $ACC3
+	 vpbroadcastq	32*6-128($tpa), $B1
+	vpaddq		32*12-448($tp1), $ACC3, $ACC3
+
+	vmovdqu		$ACC8, 32*8-192($tp0)
+	vmovdqu		$ACC0, 32*9-192($tp0)
+	lea		8($tp0), $tp0
+
+	vpmuludq	32*5-128($ap), $B2, $TEMP2
+	vpaddq		$TEMP2, $ACC1, $ACC1
+	vpmuludq	32*5-128($aap), $B2, $TEMP0
+	vpaddq		$TEMP0, $ACC2, $ACC2
+	vpmuludq	32*6-128($aap), $B2, $TEMP1
+	vpaddq		$TEMP1, $ACC3, $ACC3
+	vpmuludq	32*7-128($aap), $B2, $ACC4
+	 vpbroadcastq	32*7-128($tpa), $B2
+	vpaddq		32*13-448($tp1), $ACC4, $ACC4
+
+	vmovdqu		$ACC1, 32*10-448($tp1)
+	vmovdqu		$ACC2, 32*11-448($tp1)
+
+	vpmuludq	32*6-128($ap), $B1, $TEMP0
+	vpaddq		$TEMP0, $ACC3, $ACC3
+	vpmuludq	32*6-128($aap), $B1, $TEMP1
+	 vpbroadcastq	32*8-128($tpa), $ACC0		# borrow $ACC0 for $B1
+	vpaddq		$TEMP1, $ACC4, $ACC4
+	vpmuludq	32*7-128($aap), $B1, $ACC5
+	 vpbroadcastq	32*0+8-128($tpa), $B1		# for next iteration
+	vpaddq		32*14-448($tp1), $ACC5, $ACC5
+
+	vmovdqu		$ACC3, 32*12-448($tp1)
+	vmovdqu		$ACC4, 32*13-448($tp1)
+	lea		8($tpa), $tpa
+
+	vpmuludq	32*7-128($ap), $B2, $TEMP0
+	vpaddq		$TEMP0, $ACC5, $ACC5
+	vpmuludq	32*7-128($aap), $B2, $ACC6
+	vpaddq		32*15-448($tp1), $ACC6, $ACC6
+
+	vpmuludq	32*8-128($ap), $ACC0, $ACC7
+	vmovdqu		$ACC5, 32*14-448($tp1)
+	vpaddq		32*16-448($tp1), $ACC7, $ACC7
+	vmovdqu		$ACC6, 32*15-448($tp1)
+	vmovdqu		$ACC7, 32*16-448($tp1)
+	lea		8($tp1), $tp1
+
+	dec	$i        
+	jnz	.LOOP_SQR_1024
+___
+$ZERO = $ACC9;
+$TEMP0 = $B1;
+$TEMP2 = $B2;
+$TEMP3 = $Y1;
+$TEMP4 = $Y2;
+$code.=<<___;
+	# we need to fix indices 32-39 to avoid overflow
+	vmovdqu		32*8(%rsp), $ACC8		# 32*8-192($tp0),
+	vmovdqu		32*9(%rsp), $ACC1		# 32*9-192($tp0)
+	vmovdqu		32*10(%rsp), $ACC2		# 32*10-192($tp0)
+	lea		192(%rsp), $tp0			# 64+128=192
+
+	vpsrlq		\$29, $ACC8, $TEMP1
+	vpand		$AND_MASK, $ACC8, $ACC8
+	vpsrlq		\$29, $ACC1, $TEMP2
+	vpand		$AND_MASK, $ACC1, $ACC1
+
+	vpermq		\$0x93, $TEMP1, $TEMP1
+	vpxor		$ZERO, $ZERO, $ZERO
+	vpermq		\$0x93, $TEMP2, $TEMP2
+
+	vpblendd	\$3, $ZERO, $TEMP1, $TEMP0
+	vpblendd	\$3, $TEMP1, $TEMP2, $TEMP1
+	vpaddq		$TEMP0, $ACC8, $ACC8
+	vpblendd	\$3, $TEMP2, $ZERO, $TEMP2
+	vpaddq		$TEMP1, $ACC1, $ACC1
+	vpaddq		$TEMP2, $ACC2, $ACC2
+	vmovdqu		$ACC1, 32*9-192($tp0)
+	vmovdqu		$ACC2, 32*10-192($tp0)
+
+	mov	(%rsp), %rax
+	mov	8(%rsp), $r1
+	mov	16(%rsp), $r2
+	mov	24(%rsp), $r3
+	vmovdqu	32*1(%rsp), $ACC1
+	vmovdqu	32*2-192($tp0), $ACC2
+	vmovdqu	32*3-192($tp0), $ACC3
+	vmovdqu	32*4-192($tp0), $ACC4
+	vmovdqu	32*5-192($tp0), $ACC5
+	vmovdqu	32*6-192($tp0), $ACC6
+	vmovdqu	32*7-192($tp0), $ACC7
+
+	mov	%rax, $r0
+	imull	$n0, %eax
+	and	\$0x1fffffff, %eax
+	vmovd	%eax, $Y1
+
+	mov	%rax, %rdx
+	imulq	-128($np), %rax
+	 vpbroadcastq	$Y1, $Y1
+	add	%rax, $r0
+	mov	%rdx, %rax
+	imulq	8-128($np), %rax
+	shr	\$29, $r0
+	add	%rax, $r1
+	mov	%rdx, %rax
+	imulq	16-128($np), %rax
+	add	$r0, $r1
+	add	%rax, $r2
+	imulq	24-128($np), %rdx
+	add	%rdx, $r3
+
+	mov	$r1, %rax
+	imull	$n0, %eax
+	and	\$0x1fffffff, %eax
+
+	mov \$9, $i
+	jmp .LOOP_REDUCE_1024
+
+.align	32
+.LOOP_REDUCE_1024:
+	vmovd	%eax, $Y2
+	vpbroadcastq	$Y2, $Y2
+
+	vpmuludq	32*1-128($np), $Y1, $TEMP0
+	 mov	%rax, %rdx
+	 imulq	-128($np), %rax
+	vpaddq		$TEMP0, $ACC1, $ACC1
+	 add	%rax, $r1
+	vpmuludq	32*2-128($np), $Y1, $TEMP1
+	 mov	%rdx, %rax
+	 imulq	8-128($np), %rax
+	vpaddq		$TEMP1, $ACC2, $ACC2
+	vpmuludq	32*3-128($np), $Y1, $TEMP2
+	 .byte	0x67
+	 add	%rax, $r2
+	 .byte	0x67
+	 mov	%rdx, %rax
+	 imulq	16-128($np), %rax
+	 shr	\$29, $r1
+	vpaddq		$TEMP2, $ACC3, $ACC3
+	vpmuludq	32*4-128($np), $Y1, $TEMP0
+	 add	%rax, $r3
+	 add	$r1, $r2
+	vpaddq		$TEMP0, $ACC4, $ACC4
+	vpmuludq	32*5-128($np), $Y1, $TEMP1
+	 mov	$r2, %rax
+	 imull	$n0, %eax
+	vpaddq		$TEMP1, $ACC5, $ACC5
+	vpmuludq	32*6-128($np), $Y1, $TEMP2
+	 and	\$0x1fffffff, %eax
+	vpaddq		$TEMP2, $ACC6, $ACC6
+	vpmuludq	32*7-128($np), $Y1, $TEMP0
+	vpaddq		$TEMP0, $ACC7, $ACC7
+	vpmuludq	32*8-128($np), $Y1, $TEMP1
+	 vmovd	%eax, $Y1
+	 #vmovdqu	32*1-8-128($np), $TEMP2		# moved below
+	vpaddq		$TEMP1, $ACC8, $ACC8
+	 #vmovdqu	32*2-8-128($np), $TEMP0		# moved below
+	 vpbroadcastq	$Y1, $Y1
+
+	vpmuludq	32*1-8-128($np), $Y2, $TEMP2	# see above
+	vmovdqu		32*3-8-128($np), $TEMP1
+	 mov	%rax, %rdx
+	 imulq	-128($np), %rax
+	vpaddq		$TEMP2, $ACC1, $ACC1
+	vpmuludq	32*2-8-128($np), $Y2, $TEMP0	# see above
+	vmovdqu		32*4-8-128($np), $TEMP2
+	 add	%rax, $r2
+	 mov	%rdx, %rax
+	 imulq	8-128($np), %rax
+	vpaddq		$TEMP0, $ACC2, $ACC2
+	 add	$r3, %rax
+	 shr	\$29, $r2
+	vpmuludq	$Y2, $TEMP1, $TEMP1
+	vmovdqu		32*5-8-128($np), $TEMP0
+	 add	$r2, %rax
+	vpaddq		$TEMP1, $ACC3, $ACC3
+	vpmuludq	$Y2, $TEMP2, $TEMP2
+	vmovdqu		32*6-8-128($np), $TEMP1
+	 .byte	0x67
+	 mov	%rax, $r3
+	 imull	$n0, %eax
+	vpaddq		$TEMP2, $ACC4, $ACC4
+	vpmuludq	$Y2, $TEMP0, $TEMP0
+	.byte	0xc4,0x41,0x7e,0x6f,0x9d,0x58,0x00,0x00,0x00	# vmovdqu		32*7-8-128($np), $TEMP2
+	 and	\$0x1fffffff, %eax
+	vpaddq		$TEMP0, $ACC5, $ACC5
+	vpmuludq	$Y2, $TEMP1, $TEMP1
+	vmovdqu		32*8-8-128($np), $TEMP0
+	vpaddq		$TEMP1, $ACC6, $ACC6
+	vpmuludq	$Y2, $TEMP2, $TEMP2
+	vmovdqu		32*9-8-128($np), $ACC9
+	 vmovd	%eax, $ACC0			# borrow ACC0 for Y2
+	 imulq	-128($np), %rax
+	vpaddq		$TEMP2, $ACC7, $ACC7
+	vpmuludq	$Y2, $TEMP0, $TEMP0
+	 vmovdqu	32*1-16-128($np), $TEMP1
+	 vpbroadcastq	$ACC0, $ACC0
+	vpaddq		$TEMP0, $ACC8, $ACC8
+	vpmuludq	$Y2, $ACC9, $ACC9
+	 vmovdqu	32*2-16-128($np), $TEMP2
+	 add	%rax, $r3
+
+___
+($ACC0,$Y2)=($Y2,$ACC0);
+$code.=<<___;
+	 vmovdqu	32*1-24-128($np), $ACC0
+	vpmuludq	$Y1, $TEMP1, $TEMP1
+	vmovdqu		32*3-16-128($np), $TEMP0
+	vpaddq		$TEMP1, $ACC1, $ACC1
+	 vpmuludq	$Y2, $ACC0, $ACC0
+	vpmuludq	$Y1, $TEMP2, $TEMP2
+	.byte	0xc4,0x41,0x7e,0x6f,0xb5,0xf0,0xff,0xff,0xff	# vmovdqu		32*4-16-128($np), $TEMP1
+	 vpaddq		$ACC1, $ACC0, $ACC0
+	vpaddq		$TEMP2, $ACC2, $ACC2
+	vpmuludq	$Y1, $TEMP0, $TEMP0
+	vmovdqu		32*5-16-128($np), $TEMP2
+	 .byte	0x67
+	 vmovq		$ACC0, %rax
+	 vmovdqu	$ACC0, (%rsp)		# transfer $r0-$r3
+	vpaddq		$TEMP0, $ACC3, $ACC3
+	vpmuludq	$Y1, $TEMP1, $TEMP1
+	vmovdqu		32*6-16-128($np), $TEMP0
+	vpaddq		$TEMP1, $ACC4, $ACC4
+	vpmuludq	$Y1, $TEMP2, $TEMP2
+	vmovdqu		32*7-16-128($np), $TEMP1
+	vpaddq		$TEMP2, $ACC5, $ACC5
+	vpmuludq	$Y1, $TEMP0, $TEMP0
+	vmovdqu		32*8-16-128($np), $TEMP2
+	vpaddq		$TEMP0, $ACC6, $ACC6
+	vpmuludq	$Y1, $TEMP1, $TEMP1
+	 shr	\$29, $r3
+	vmovdqu		32*9-16-128($np), $TEMP0
+	 add	$r3, %rax
+	vpaddq		$TEMP1, $ACC7, $ACC7
+	vpmuludq	$Y1, $TEMP2, $TEMP2
+	 #vmovdqu	32*2-24-128($np), $TEMP1	# moved below
+	 mov	%rax, $r0
+	 imull	$n0, %eax
+	vpaddq		$TEMP2, $ACC8, $ACC8
+	vpmuludq	$Y1, $TEMP0, $TEMP0
+	 and	\$0x1fffffff, %eax
+	 vmovd	%eax, $Y1
+	 vmovdqu	32*3-24-128($np), $TEMP2
+	.byte	0x67
+	vpaddq		$TEMP0, $ACC9, $ACC9
+	 vpbroadcastq	$Y1, $Y1
+
+	vpmuludq	32*2-24-128($np), $Y2, $TEMP1	# see above
+	vmovdqu		32*4-24-128($np), $TEMP0
+	 mov	%rax, %rdx
+	 imulq	-128($np), %rax
+	 mov	8(%rsp), $r1
+	vpaddq		$TEMP1, $ACC2, $ACC1
+	vpmuludq	$Y2, $TEMP2, $TEMP2
+	vmovdqu		32*5-24-128($np), $TEMP1
+	 add	%rax, $r0
+	 mov	%rdx, %rax
+	 imulq	8-128($np), %rax
+	 .byte	0x67
+	 shr	\$29, $r0
+	 mov	16(%rsp), $r2
+	vpaddq		$TEMP2, $ACC3, $ACC2
+	vpmuludq	$Y2, $TEMP0, $TEMP0
+	vmovdqu		32*6-24-128($np), $TEMP2
+	 add	%rax, $r1
+	 mov	%rdx, %rax
+	 imulq	16-128($np), %rax
+	vpaddq		$TEMP0, $ACC4, $ACC3
+	vpmuludq	$Y2, $TEMP1, $TEMP1
+	vmovdqu		32*7-24-128($np), $TEMP0
+	 imulq	24-128($np), %rdx		# future $r3
+	 add	%rax, $r2
+	 lea	($r0,$r1), %rax
+	vpaddq		$TEMP1, $ACC5, $ACC4
+	vpmuludq	$Y2, $TEMP2, $TEMP2
+	vmovdqu		32*8-24-128($np), $TEMP1
+	 mov	%rax, $r1
+	 imull	$n0, %eax
+	vpmuludq	$Y2, $TEMP0, $TEMP0
+	vpaddq		$TEMP2, $ACC6, $ACC5
+	vmovdqu		32*9-24-128($np), $TEMP2
+	 and	\$0x1fffffff, %eax
+	vpaddq		$TEMP0, $ACC7, $ACC6
+	vpmuludq	$Y2, $TEMP1, $TEMP1
+	 add	24(%rsp), %rdx
+	vpaddq		$TEMP1, $ACC8, $ACC7
+	vpmuludq	$Y2, $TEMP2, $TEMP2
+	vpaddq		$TEMP2, $ACC9, $ACC8
+	 vmovq	$r3, $ACC9
+	 mov	%rdx, $r3
+
+	dec	$i
+	jnz	.LOOP_REDUCE_1024
+___
+($ACC0,$Y2)=($Y2,$ACC0);
+$code.=<<___;
+	lea	448(%rsp), $tp1			# size optimization
+	vpaddq	$ACC9, $Y2, $ACC0
+	vpxor	$ZERO, $ZERO, $ZERO
+
+	vpaddq		32*9-192($tp0), $ACC0, $ACC0
+	vpaddq		32*10-448($tp1), $ACC1, $ACC1
+	vpaddq		32*11-448($tp1), $ACC2, $ACC2
+	vpaddq		32*12-448($tp1), $ACC3, $ACC3
+	vpaddq		32*13-448($tp1), $ACC4, $ACC4
+	vpaddq		32*14-448($tp1), $ACC5, $ACC5
+	vpaddq		32*15-448($tp1), $ACC6, $ACC6
+	vpaddq		32*16-448($tp1), $ACC7, $ACC7
+	vpaddq		32*17-448($tp1), $ACC8, $ACC8
+
+	vpsrlq		\$29, $ACC0, $TEMP1
+	vpand		$AND_MASK, $ACC0, $ACC0
+	vpsrlq		\$29, $ACC1, $TEMP2
+	vpand		$AND_MASK, $ACC1, $ACC1
+	vpsrlq		\$29, $ACC2, $TEMP3
+	vpermq		\$0x93, $TEMP1, $TEMP1
+	vpand		$AND_MASK, $ACC2, $ACC2
+	vpsrlq		\$29, $ACC3, $TEMP4
+	vpermq		\$0x93, $TEMP2, $TEMP2
+	vpand		$AND_MASK, $ACC3, $ACC3
+	vpermq		\$0x93, $TEMP3, $TEMP3
+
+	vpblendd	\$3, $ZERO, $TEMP1, $TEMP0
+	vpermq		\$0x93, $TEMP4, $TEMP4
+	vpblendd	\$3, $TEMP1, $TEMP2, $TEMP1
+	vpaddq		$TEMP0, $ACC0, $ACC0
+	vpblendd	\$3, $TEMP2, $TEMP3, $TEMP2
+	vpaddq		$TEMP1, $ACC1, $ACC1
+	vpblendd	\$3, $TEMP3, $TEMP4, $TEMP3
+	vpaddq		$TEMP2, $ACC2, $ACC2
+	vpblendd	\$3, $TEMP4, $ZERO, $TEMP4
+	vpaddq		$TEMP3, $ACC3, $ACC3
+	vpaddq		$TEMP4, $ACC4, $ACC4
+
+	vpsrlq		\$29, $ACC0, $TEMP1
+	vpand		$AND_MASK, $ACC0, $ACC0
+	vpsrlq		\$29, $ACC1, $TEMP2
+	vpand		$AND_MASK, $ACC1, $ACC1
+	vpsrlq		\$29, $ACC2, $TEMP3
+	vpermq		\$0x93, $TEMP1, $TEMP1
+	vpand		$AND_MASK, $ACC2, $ACC2
+	vpsrlq		\$29, $ACC3, $TEMP4
+	vpermq		\$0x93, $TEMP2, $TEMP2
+	vpand		$AND_MASK, $ACC3, $ACC3
+	vpermq		\$0x93, $TEMP3, $TEMP3
+
+	vpblendd	\$3, $ZERO, $TEMP1, $TEMP0
+	vpermq		\$0x93, $TEMP4, $TEMP4
+	vpblendd	\$3, $TEMP1, $TEMP2, $TEMP1
+	vpaddq		$TEMP0, $ACC0, $ACC0
+	vpblendd	\$3, $TEMP2, $TEMP3, $TEMP2
+	vpaddq		$TEMP1, $ACC1, $ACC1
+	vmovdqu		$ACC0, 32*0-128($rp)
+	vpblendd	\$3, $TEMP3, $TEMP4, $TEMP3
+	vpaddq		$TEMP2, $ACC2, $ACC2
+	vmovdqu		$ACC1, 32*1-128($rp)
+	vpblendd	\$3, $TEMP4, $ZERO, $TEMP4
+	vpaddq		$TEMP3, $ACC3, $ACC3
+	vmovdqu		$ACC2, 32*2-128($rp)
+	vpaddq		$TEMP4, $ACC4, $ACC4
+	vmovdqu		$ACC3, 32*3-128($rp)
+___
+$TEMP5=$ACC0;
+$code.=<<___;
+	vpsrlq		\$29, $ACC4, $TEMP1
+	vpand		$AND_MASK, $ACC4, $ACC4
+	vpsrlq		\$29, $ACC5, $TEMP2
+	vpand		$AND_MASK, $ACC5, $ACC5
+	vpsrlq		\$29, $ACC6, $TEMP3
+	vpermq		\$0x93, $TEMP1, $TEMP1
+	vpand		$AND_MASK, $ACC6, $ACC6
+	vpsrlq		\$29, $ACC7, $TEMP4
+	vpermq		\$0x93, $TEMP2, $TEMP2
+	vpand		$AND_MASK, $ACC7, $ACC7
+	vpsrlq		\$29, $ACC8, $TEMP5
+	vpermq		\$0x93, $TEMP3, $TEMP3
+	vpand		$AND_MASK, $ACC8, $ACC8
+	vpermq		\$0x93, $TEMP4, $TEMP4
+
+	vpblendd	\$3, $ZERO, $TEMP1, $TEMP0
+	vpermq		\$0x93, $TEMP5, $TEMP5
+	vpblendd	\$3, $TEMP1, $TEMP2, $TEMP1
+	vpaddq		$TEMP0, $ACC4, $ACC4
+	vpblendd	\$3, $TEMP2, $TEMP3, $TEMP2
+	vpaddq		$TEMP1, $ACC5, $ACC5
+	vpblendd	\$3, $TEMP3, $TEMP4, $TEMP3
+	vpaddq		$TEMP2, $ACC6, $ACC6
+	vpblendd	\$3, $TEMP4, $TEMP5, $TEMP4
+	vpaddq		$TEMP3, $ACC7, $ACC7
+	vpaddq		$TEMP4, $ACC8, $ACC8
+     
+	vpsrlq		\$29, $ACC4, $TEMP1
+	vpand		$AND_MASK, $ACC4, $ACC4
+	vpsrlq		\$29, $ACC5, $TEMP2
+	vpand		$AND_MASK, $ACC5, $ACC5
+	vpsrlq		\$29, $ACC6, $TEMP3
+	vpermq		\$0x93, $TEMP1, $TEMP1
+	vpand		$AND_MASK, $ACC6, $ACC6
+	vpsrlq		\$29, $ACC7, $TEMP4
+	vpermq		\$0x93, $TEMP2, $TEMP2
+	vpand		$AND_MASK, $ACC7, $ACC7
+	vpsrlq		\$29, $ACC8, $TEMP5
+	vpermq		\$0x93, $TEMP3, $TEMP3
+	vpand		$AND_MASK, $ACC8, $ACC8
+	vpermq		\$0x93, $TEMP4, $TEMP4
+
+	vpblendd	\$3, $ZERO, $TEMP1, $TEMP0
+	vpermq		\$0x93, $TEMP5, $TEMP5
+	vpblendd	\$3, $TEMP1, $TEMP2, $TEMP1
+	vpaddq		$TEMP0, $ACC4, $ACC4
+	vpblendd	\$3, $TEMP2, $TEMP3, $TEMP2
+	vpaddq		$TEMP1, $ACC5, $ACC5
+	vmovdqu		$ACC4, 32*4-128($rp)
+	vpblendd	\$3, $TEMP3, $TEMP4, $TEMP3
+	vpaddq		$TEMP2, $ACC6, $ACC6
+	vmovdqu		$ACC5, 32*5-128($rp)
+	vpblendd	\$3, $TEMP4, $TEMP5, $TEMP4
+	vpaddq		$TEMP3, $ACC7, $ACC7
+	vmovdqu		$ACC6, 32*6-128($rp)
+	vpaddq		$TEMP4, $ACC8, $ACC8
+	vmovdqu		$ACC7, 32*7-128($rp)
+	vmovdqu		$ACC8, 32*8-128($rp)
+
+	mov	$rp, $ap
+	dec	$rep
+	jne	.LOOP_GRANDE_SQR_1024
+
+	vzeroall
+	mov	%rbp, %rax
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	movaps	-0xd8(%rax),%xmm6
+	movaps	-0xc8(%rax),%xmm7
+	movaps	-0xb8(%rax),%xmm8
+	movaps	-0xa8(%rax),%xmm9
+	movaps	-0x98(%rax),%xmm10
+	movaps	-0x88(%rax),%xmm11
+	movaps	-0x78(%rax),%xmm12
+	movaps	-0x68(%rax),%xmm13
+	movaps	-0x58(%rax),%xmm14
+	movaps	-0x48(%rax),%xmm15
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	-48(%rax),%r15
+	mov	-40(%rax),%r14
+	mov	-32(%rax),%r13
+	mov	-24(%rax),%r12
+	mov	-16(%rax),%rbp
+	mov	-8(%rax),%rbx
+	lea	(%rax),%rsp		# restore %rsp
+.Lsqr_1024_epilogue:
+	ret
+.size	rsaz_1024_sqr_avx2,.-rsaz_1024_sqr_avx2
+___
+}
+
+{ # void AMM_WW(
+my $rp="%rdi";	# BN_ULONG *rp,
+my $ap="%rsi";	# const BN_ULONG *ap,
+my $bp="%rdx";	# const BN_ULONG *bp,
+my $np="%rcx";	# const BN_ULONG *np,
+my $n0="%r8d";	# unsigned int n0);
+
+# The registers that hold the accumulated redundant result
+# The AMM works on 1024 bit operands, and redundant word size is 29
+# Therefore: ceil(1024/29)/4 = 9
+my $ACC0="%ymm0";
+my $ACC1="%ymm1";
+my $ACC2="%ymm2";
+my $ACC3="%ymm3";
+my $ACC4="%ymm4";
+my $ACC5="%ymm5";
+my $ACC6="%ymm6";
+my $ACC7="%ymm7";
+my $ACC8="%ymm8";
+my $ACC9="%ymm9";
+
+# Registers that hold the broadcasted words of multiplier, currently used
+my $Bi="%ymm10";
+my $Yi="%ymm11";
+
+# Helper registers
+my $TEMP0=$ACC0;
+my $TEMP1="%ymm12";
+my $TEMP2="%ymm13";
+my $ZERO="%ymm14";
+my $AND_MASK="%ymm15";
+
+# alu registers that hold the first words of the ACC
+my $r0="%r9";
+my $r1="%r10";
+my $r2="%r11";
+my $r3="%r12";
+
+my $i="%r14d";
+my $tmp="%r15";
+
+$bp="%r13";	# reassigned argument
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	rsaz_1024_mul_avx2
+.type	rsaz_1024_mul_avx2,\@function,5
+.align	64
+rsaz_1024_mul_avx2:
+	lea	(%rsp), %rax
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	vzeroupper
+	lea	-0xa8(%rsp),%rsp
+	vmovaps	%xmm6,-0xd8(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm7,-0xc8(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm8,-0xb8(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm9,-0xa8(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm10,-0x98(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm11,-0x88(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm12,-0x78(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm13,-0x68(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm14,-0x58(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm15,-0x48(%rax)
+.Lmul_1024_body:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	%rax,%rbp
+	vzeroall
+	mov	%rdx, $bp	# reassigned argument
+	sub	\$64,%rsp
+
+	# unaligned 256-bit load that crosses page boundary can
+	# cause severe performance degradation here, so if $ap does
+	# cross page boundary, swap it with $bp [meaning that caller
+	# is advised to lay down $ap and $bp next to each other, so
+	# that only one can cross page boundary].
+	.byte	0x67,0x67
+	mov	$ap, $tmp
+	and	\$4095, $tmp
+	add	\$32*10, $tmp
+	shr	\$12, $tmp
+	mov	$ap, $tmp
+	cmovnz	$bp, $ap
+	cmovnz	$tmp, $bp
+
+	mov	$np, $tmp
+	sub	\$-128,$ap	# size optimization
+	sub	\$-128,$np
+	sub	\$-128,$rp
+
+	and	\$4095, $tmp	# see if $np crosses page
+	add	\$32*10, $tmp
+	.byte	0x67,0x67
+	shr	\$12, $tmp
+	jz	.Lmul_1024_no_n_copy
+
+	# unaligned 256-bit load that crosses page boundary can
+	# cause severe performance degradation here, so if $np does
+	# cross page boundary, copy it to stack and make sure stack
+	# frame doesn't...
+	sub		\$32*10,%rsp
+	vmovdqu		32*0-128($np), $ACC0
+	and		\$-512, %rsp
+	vmovdqu		32*1-128($np), $ACC1
+	vmovdqu		32*2-128($np), $ACC2
+	vmovdqu		32*3-128($np), $ACC3
+	vmovdqu		32*4-128($np), $ACC4
+	vmovdqu		32*5-128($np), $ACC5
+	vmovdqu		32*6-128($np), $ACC6
+	vmovdqu		32*7-128($np), $ACC7
+	vmovdqu		32*8-128($np), $ACC8
+	lea		64+128(%rsp),$np
+	vmovdqu		$ACC0, 32*0-128($np)
+	vpxor		$ACC0, $ACC0, $ACC0
+	vmovdqu		$ACC1, 32*1-128($np)
+	vpxor		$ACC1, $ACC1, $ACC1
+	vmovdqu		$ACC2, 32*2-128($np)
+	vpxor		$ACC2, $ACC2, $ACC2
+	vmovdqu		$ACC3, 32*3-128($np)
+	vpxor		$ACC3, $ACC3, $ACC3
+	vmovdqu		$ACC4, 32*4-128($np)
+	vpxor		$ACC4, $ACC4, $ACC4
+	vmovdqu		$ACC5, 32*5-128($np)
+	vpxor		$ACC5, $ACC5, $ACC5
+	vmovdqu		$ACC6, 32*6-128($np)
+	vpxor		$ACC6, $ACC6, $ACC6
+	vmovdqu		$ACC7, 32*7-128($np)
+	vpxor		$ACC7, $ACC7, $ACC7
+	vmovdqu		$ACC8, 32*8-128($np)
+	vmovdqa		$ACC0, $ACC8
+	vmovdqu		$ACC9, 32*9-128($np)	# $ACC9 is zero after vzeroall
+.Lmul_1024_no_n_copy:
+	and	\$-64,%rsp
+
+	mov	($bp), %rbx
+	vpbroadcastq ($bp), $Bi
+	vmovdqu	$ACC0, (%rsp)			# clear top of stack
+	xor	$r0, $r0
+	.byte	0x67
+	xor	$r1, $r1
+	xor	$r2, $r2
+	xor	$r3, $r3
+
+	vmovdqu	.Land_mask(%rip), $AND_MASK
+	mov	\$9, $i
+	vmovdqu	$ACC9, 32*9-128($rp)		# $ACC9 is zero after vzeroall
+	jmp	.Loop_mul_1024
+
+.align	32
+.Loop_mul_1024:
+	 vpsrlq		\$29, $ACC3, $ACC9		# correct $ACC3(*)
+	mov	%rbx, %rax
+	imulq	-128($ap), %rax
+	add	$r0, %rax
+	mov	%rbx, $r1
+	imulq	8-128($ap), $r1
+	add	8(%rsp), $r1
+
+	mov	%rax, $r0
+	imull	$n0, %eax
+	and	\$0x1fffffff, %eax
+
+	 mov	%rbx, $r2
+	 imulq	16-128($ap), $r2
+	 add	16(%rsp), $r2
+
+	 mov	%rbx, $r3
+	 imulq	24-128($ap), $r3
+	 add	24(%rsp), $r3
+	vpmuludq	32*1-128($ap),$Bi,$TEMP0
+	 vmovd		%eax, $Yi
+	vpaddq		$TEMP0,$ACC1,$ACC1
+	vpmuludq	32*2-128($ap),$Bi,$TEMP1
+	 vpbroadcastq	$Yi, $Yi
+	vpaddq		$TEMP1,$ACC2,$ACC2
+	vpmuludq	32*3-128($ap),$Bi,$TEMP2
+	 vpand		$AND_MASK, $ACC3, $ACC3		# correct $ACC3
+	vpaddq		$TEMP2,$ACC3,$ACC3
+	vpmuludq	32*4-128($ap),$Bi,$TEMP0
+	vpaddq		$TEMP0,$ACC4,$ACC4
+	vpmuludq	32*5-128($ap),$Bi,$TEMP1
+	vpaddq		$TEMP1,$ACC5,$ACC5
+	vpmuludq	32*6-128($ap),$Bi,$TEMP2
+	vpaddq		$TEMP2,$ACC6,$ACC6
+	vpmuludq	32*7-128($ap),$Bi,$TEMP0
+	 vpermq		\$0x93, $ACC9, $ACC9		# correct $ACC3
+	vpaddq		$TEMP0,$ACC7,$ACC7
+	vpmuludq	32*8-128($ap),$Bi,$TEMP1
+	 vpbroadcastq	8($bp), $Bi
+	vpaddq		$TEMP1,$ACC8,$ACC8
+
+	mov	%rax,%rdx
+	imulq	-128($np),%rax
+	add	%rax,$r0
+	mov	%rdx,%rax
+	imulq	8-128($np),%rax
+	add	%rax,$r1
+	mov	%rdx,%rax
+	imulq	16-128($np),%rax
+	add	%rax,$r2
+	shr	\$29, $r0
+	imulq	24-128($np),%rdx
+	add	%rdx,$r3
+	add	$r0, $r1
+
+	vpmuludq	32*1-128($np),$Yi,$TEMP2
+	 vmovq		$Bi, %rbx
+	vpaddq		$TEMP2,$ACC1,$ACC1
+	vpmuludq	32*2-128($np),$Yi,$TEMP0
+	vpaddq		$TEMP0,$ACC2,$ACC2
+	vpmuludq	32*3-128($np),$Yi,$TEMP1
+	vpaddq		$TEMP1,$ACC3,$ACC3
+	vpmuludq	32*4-128($np),$Yi,$TEMP2
+	vpaddq		$TEMP2,$ACC4,$ACC4
+	vpmuludq	32*5-128($np),$Yi,$TEMP0
+	vpaddq		$TEMP0,$ACC5,$ACC5
+	vpmuludq	32*6-128($np),$Yi,$TEMP1
+	vpaddq		$TEMP1,$ACC6,$ACC6
+	vpmuludq	32*7-128($np),$Yi,$TEMP2
+	 vpblendd	\$3, $ZERO, $ACC9, $TEMP1	# correct $ACC3
+	vpaddq		$TEMP2,$ACC7,$ACC7
+	vpmuludq	32*8-128($np),$Yi,$TEMP0
+	 vpaddq		$TEMP1, $ACC3, $ACC3		# correct $ACC3
+	vpaddq		$TEMP0,$ACC8,$ACC8
+
+	mov	%rbx, %rax
+	imulq	-128($ap),%rax
+	add	%rax,$r1
+	 vmovdqu	-8+32*1-128($ap),$TEMP1
+	mov	%rbx, %rax
+	imulq	8-128($ap),%rax
+	add	%rax,$r2
+	 vmovdqu	-8+32*2-128($ap),$TEMP2
+
+	mov	$r1, %rax
+	 vpblendd	\$0xfc, $ZERO, $ACC9, $ACC9	# correct $ACC3
+	imull	$n0, %eax
+	 vpaddq		$ACC9,$ACC4,$ACC4		# correct $ACC3
+	and	\$0x1fffffff, %eax
+
+	 imulq	16-128($ap),%rbx
+	 add	%rbx,$r3
+	vpmuludq	$Bi,$TEMP1,$TEMP1
+	 vmovd		%eax, $Yi
+	vmovdqu		-8+32*3-128($ap),$TEMP0
+	vpaddq		$TEMP1,$ACC1,$ACC1
+	vpmuludq	$Bi,$TEMP2,$TEMP2
+	 vpbroadcastq	$Yi, $Yi
+	vmovdqu		-8+32*4-128($ap),$TEMP1
+	vpaddq		$TEMP2,$ACC2,$ACC2
+	vpmuludq	$Bi,$TEMP0,$TEMP0
+	vmovdqu		-8+32*5-128($ap),$TEMP2
+	vpaddq		$TEMP0,$ACC3,$ACC3
+	vpmuludq	$Bi,$TEMP1,$TEMP1
+	vmovdqu		-8+32*6-128($ap),$TEMP0
+	vpaddq		$TEMP1,$ACC4,$ACC4
+	vpmuludq	$Bi,$TEMP2,$TEMP2
+	vmovdqu		-8+32*7-128($ap),$TEMP1
+	vpaddq		$TEMP2,$ACC5,$ACC5
+	vpmuludq	$Bi,$TEMP0,$TEMP0
+	vmovdqu		-8+32*8-128($ap),$TEMP2
+	vpaddq		$TEMP0,$ACC6,$ACC6
+	vpmuludq	$Bi,$TEMP1,$TEMP1
+	vmovdqu		-8+32*9-128($ap),$ACC9
+	vpaddq		$TEMP1,$ACC7,$ACC7
+	vpmuludq	$Bi,$TEMP2,$TEMP2
+	vpaddq		$TEMP2,$ACC8,$ACC8
+	vpmuludq	$Bi,$ACC9,$ACC9
+	 vpbroadcastq	16($bp), $Bi
+
+	mov	%rax,%rdx
+	imulq	-128($np),%rax
+	add	%rax,$r1
+	 vmovdqu	-8+32*1-128($np),$TEMP0
+	mov	%rdx,%rax
+	imulq	8-128($np),%rax
+	add	%rax,$r2
+	 vmovdqu	-8+32*2-128($np),$TEMP1
+	shr	\$29, $r1
+	imulq	16-128($np),%rdx
+	add	%rdx,$r3
+	add	$r1, $r2
+
+	vpmuludq	$Yi,$TEMP0,$TEMP0
+	 vmovq		$Bi, %rbx
+	vmovdqu		-8+32*3-128($np),$TEMP2
+	vpaddq		$TEMP0,$ACC1,$ACC1
+	vpmuludq	$Yi,$TEMP1,$TEMP1
+	vmovdqu		-8+32*4-128($np),$TEMP0
+	vpaddq		$TEMP1,$ACC2,$ACC2
+	vpmuludq	$Yi,$TEMP2,$TEMP2
+	vmovdqu		-8+32*5-128($np),$TEMP1
+	vpaddq		$TEMP2,$ACC3,$ACC3
+	vpmuludq	$Yi,$TEMP0,$TEMP0
+	vmovdqu		-8+32*6-128($np),$TEMP2
+	vpaddq		$TEMP0,$ACC4,$ACC4
+	vpmuludq	$Yi,$TEMP1,$TEMP1
+	vmovdqu		-8+32*7-128($np),$TEMP0
+	vpaddq		$TEMP1,$ACC5,$ACC5
+	vpmuludq	$Yi,$TEMP2,$TEMP2
+	vmovdqu		-8+32*8-128($np),$TEMP1
+	vpaddq		$TEMP2,$ACC6,$ACC6
+	vpmuludq	$Yi,$TEMP0,$TEMP0
+	vmovdqu		-8+32*9-128($np),$TEMP2
+	vpaddq		$TEMP0,$ACC7,$ACC7
+	vpmuludq	$Yi,$TEMP1,$TEMP1
+	vpaddq		$TEMP1,$ACC8,$ACC8
+	vpmuludq	$Yi,$TEMP2,$TEMP2
+	vpaddq		$TEMP2,$ACC9,$ACC9
+
+	 vmovdqu	-16+32*1-128($ap),$TEMP0
+	mov	%rbx,%rax
+	imulq	-128($ap),%rax
+	add	$r2,%rax
+
+	 vmovdqu	-16+32*2-128($ap),$TEMP1
+	mov	%rax,$r2
+	imull	$n0, %eax
+	and	\$0x1fffffff, %eax
+
+	 imulq	8-128($ap),%rbx
+	 add	%rbx,$r3
+	vpmuludq	$Bi,$TEMP0,$TEMP0
+	 vmovd		%eax, $Yi
+	vmovdqu		-16+32*3-128($ap),$TEMP2
+	vpaddq		$TEMP0,$ACC1,$ACC1
+	vpmuludq	$Bi,$TEMP1,$TEMP1
+	 vpbroadcastq	$Yi, $Yi
+	vmovdqu		-16+32*4-128($ap),$TEMP0
+	vpaddq		$TEMP1,$ACC2,$ACC2
+	vpmuludq	$Bi,$TEMP2,$TEMP2
+	vmovdqu		-16+32*5-128($ap),$TEMP1
+	vpaddq		$TEMP2,$ACC3,$ACC3
+	vpmuludq	$Bi,$TEMP0,$TEMP0
+	vmovdqu		-16+32*6-128($ap),$TEMP2
+	vpaddq		$TEMP0,$ACC4,$ACC4
+	vpmuludq	$Bi,$TEMP1,$TEMP1
+	vmovdqu		-16+32*7-128($ap),$TEMP0
+	vpaddq		$TEMP1,$ACC5,$ACC5
+	vpmuludq	$Bi,$TEMP2,$TEMP2
+	vmovdqu		-16+32*8-128($ap),$TEMP1
+	vpaddq		$TEMP2,$ACC6,$ACC6
+	vpmuludq	$Bi,$TEMP0,$TEMP0
+	vmovdqu		-16+32*9-128($ap),$TEMP2
+	vpaddq		$TEMP0,$ACC7,$ACC7
+	vpmuludq	$Bi,$TEMP1,$TEMP1
+	vpaddq		$TEMP1,$ACC8,$ACC8
+	vpmuludq	$Bi,$TEMP2,$TEMP2
+	 vpbroadcastq	24($bp), $Bi
+	vpaddq		$TEMP2,$ACC9,$ACC9
+
+	 vmovdqu	-16+32*1-128($np),$TEMP0
+	mov	%rax,%rdx
+	imulq	-128($np),%rax
+	add	%rax,$r2
+	 vmovdqu	-16+32*2-128($np),$TEMP1
+	imulq	8-128($np),%rdx
+	add	%rdx,$r3
+	shr	\$29, $r2
+
+	vpmuludq	$Yi,$TEMP0,$TEMP0
+	 vmovq		$Bi, %rbx
+	vmovdqu		-16+32*3-128($np),$TEMP2
+	vpaddq		$TEMP0,$ACC1,$ACC1
+	vpmuludq	$Yi,$TEMP1,$TEMP1
+	vmovdqu		-16+32*4-128($np),$TEMP0
+	vpaddq		$TEMP1,$ACC2,$ACC2
+	vpmuludq	$Yi,$TEMP2,$TEMP2
+	vmovdqu		-16+32*5-128($np),$TEMP1
+	vpaddq		$TEMP2,$ACC3,$ACC3
+	vpmuludq	$Yi,$TEMP0,$TEMP0
+	vmovdqu		-16+32*6-128($np),$TEMP2
+	vpaddq		$TEMP0,$ACC4,$ACC4
+	vpmuludq	$Yi,$TEMP1,$TEMP1
+	vmovdqu		-16+32*7-128($np),$TEMP0
+	vpaddq		$TEMP1,$ACC5,$ACC5
+	vpmuludq	$Yi,$TEMP2,$TEMP2
+	vmovdqu		-16+32*8-128($np),$TEMP1
+	vpaddq		$TEMP2,$ACC6,$ACC6
+	vpmuludq	$Yi,$TEMP0,$TEMP0
+	vmovdqu		-16+32*9-128($np),$TEMP2
+	vpaddq		$TEMP0,$ACC7,$ACC7
+	vpmuludq	$Yi,$TEMP1,$TEMP1
+	 vmovdqu	-24+32*1-128($ap),$TEMP0
+	vpaddq		$TEMP1,$ACC8,$ACC8
+	vpmuludq	$Yi,$TEMP2,$TEMP2
+	 vmovdqu	-24+32*2-128($ap),$TEMP1
+	vpaddq		$TEMP2,$ACC9,$ACC9
+
+	add	$r2, $r3
+	imulq	-128($ap),%rbx
+	add	%rbx,$r3
+
+	mov	$r3, %rax
+	imull	$n0, %eax
+	and	\$0x1fffffff, %eax
+
+	vpmuludq	$Bi,$TEMP0,$TEMP0
+	 vmovd		%eax, $Yi
+	vmovdqu		-24+32*3-128($ap),$TEMP2
+	vpaddq		$TEMP0,$ACC1,$ACC1
+	vpmuludq	$Bi,$TEMP1,$TEMP1
+	 vpbroadcastq	$Yi, $Yi
+	vmovdqu		-24+32*4-128($ap),$TEMP0
+	vpaddq		$TEMP1,$ACC2,$ACC2
+	vpmuludq	$Bi,$TEMP2,$TEMP2
+	vmovdqu		-24+32*5-128($ap),$TEMP1
+	vpaddq		$TEMP2,$ACC3,$ACC3
+	vpmuludq	$Bi,$TEMP0,$TEMP0
+	vmovdqu		-24+32*6-128($ap),$TEMP2
+	vpaddq		$TEMP0,$ACC4,$ACC4
+	vpmuludq	$Bi,$TEMP1,$TEMP1
+	vmovdqu		-24+32*7-128($ap),$TEMP0
+	vpaddq		$TEMP1,$ACC5,$ACC5
+	vpmuludq	$Bi,$TEMP2,$TEMP2
+	vmovdqu		-24+32*8-128($ap),$TEMP1
+	vpaddq		$TEMP2,$ACC6,$ACC6
+	vpmuludq	$Bi,$TEMP0,$TEMP0
+	vmovdqu		-24+32*9-128($ap),$TEMP2
+	vpaddq		$TEMP0,$ACC7,$ACC7
+	vpmuludq	$Bi,$TEMP1,$TEMP1
+	vpaddq		$TEMP1,$ACC8,$ACC8
+	vpmuludq	$Bi,$TEMP2,$TEMP2
+	 vpbroadcastq	32($bp), $Bi
+	vpaddq		$TEMP2,$ACC9,$ACC9
+	 add		\$32, $bp			# $bp++
+
+	vmovdqu		-24+32*1-128($np),$TEMP0
+	imulq	-128($np),%rax
+	add	%rax,$r3
+	shr	\$29, $r3
+
+	vmovdqu		-24+32*2-128($np),$TEMP1
+	vpmuludq	$Yi,$TEMP0,$TEMP0
+	 vmovq		$Bi, %rbx
+	vmovdqu		-24+32*3-128($np),$TEMP2
+	vpaddq		$TEMP0,$ACC1,$ACC0		# $ACC0==$TEMP0
+	vpmuludq	$Yi,$TEMP1,$TEMP1
+	 vmovdqu	$ACC0, (%rsp)			# transfer $r0-$r3
+	vpaddq		$TEMP1,$ACC2,$ACC1
+	vmovdqu		-24+32*4-128($np),$TEMP0
+	vpmuludq	$Yi,$TEMP2,$TEMP2
+	vmovdqu		-24+32*5-128($np),$TEMP1
+	vpaddq		$TEMP2,$ACC3,$ACC2
+	vpmuludq	$Yi,$TEMP0,$TEMP0
+	vmovdqu		-24+32*6-128($np),$TEMP2
+	vpaddq		$TEMP0,$ACC4,$ACC3
+	vpmuludq	$Yi,$TEMP1,$TEMP1
+	vmovdqu		-24+32*7-128($np),$TEMP0
+	vpaddq		$TEMP1,$ACC5,$ACC4
+	vpmuludq	$Yi,$TEMP2,$TEMP2
+	vmovdqu		-24+32*8-128($np),$TEMP1
+	vpaddq		$TEMP2,$ACC6,$ACC5
+	vpmuludq	$Yi,$TEMP0,$TEMP0
+	vmovdqu		-24+32*9-128($np),$TEMP2
+	 mov	$r3, $r0
+	vpaddq		$TEMP0,$ACC7,$ACC6
+	vpmuludq	$Yi,$TEMP1,$TEMP1
+	 add	(%rsp), $r0
+	vpaddq		$TEMP1,$ACC8,$ACC7
+	vpmuludq	$Yi,$TEMP2,$TEMP2
+	 vmovq	$r3, $TEMP1
+	vpaddq		$TEMP2,$ACC9,$ACC8
+
+	dec	$i
+	jnz	.Loop_mul_1024
+___
+
+# (*)	Original implementation was correcting ACC1-ACC3 for overflow
+#	after 7 loop runs, or after 28 iterations, or 56 additions.
+#	But as we underutilize resources, it's possible to correct in
+#	each iteration with marginal performance loss. But then, as
+#	we do it in each iteration, we can correct less digits, and
+#	avoid performance penalties completely.
+
+$TEMP0 = $ACC9;
+$TEMP3 = $Bi;
+$TEMP4 = $Yi;
+$code.=<<___;
+	vpaddq		(%rsp), $TEMP1, $ACC0
+
+	vpsrlq		\$29, $ACC0, $TEMP1
+	vpand		$AND_MASK, $ACC0, $ACC0
+	vpsrlq		\$29, $ACC1, $TEMP2
+	vpand		$AND_MASK, $ACC1, $ACC1
+	vpsrlq		\$29, $ACC2, $TEMP3
+	vpermq		\$0x93, $TEMP1, $TEMP1
+	vpand		$AND_MASK, $ACC2, $ACC2
+	vpsrlq		\$29, $ACC3, $TEMP4
+	vpermq		\$0x93, $TEMP2, $TEMP2
+	vpand		$AND_MASK, $ACC3, $ACC3
+
+	vpblendd	\$3, $ZERO, $TEMP1, $TEMP0
+	vpermq		\$0x93, $TEMP3, $TEMP3
+	vpblendd	\$3, $TEMP1, $TEMP2, $TEMP1
+	vpermq		\$0x93, $TEMP4, $TEMP4
+	vpaddq		$TEMP0, $ACC0, $ACC0
+	vpblendd	\$3, $TEMP2, $TEMP3, $TEMP2
+	vpaddq		$TEMP1, $ACC1, $ACC1
+	vpblendd	\$3, $TEMP3, $TEMP4, $TEMP3
+	vpaddq		$TEMP2, $ACC2, $ACC2
+	vpblendd	\$3, $TEMP4, $ZERO, $TEMP4
+	vpaddq		$TEMP3, $ACC3, $ACC3
+	vpaddq		$TEMP4, $ACC4, $ACC4
+
+	vpsrlq		\$29, $ACC0, $TEMP1
+	vpand		$AND_MASK, $ACC0, $ACC0
+	vpsrlq		\$29, $ACC1, $TEMP2
+	vpand		$AND_MASK, $ACC1, $ACC1
+	vpsrlq		\$29, $ACC2, $TEMP3
+	vpermq		\$0x93, $TEMP1, $TEMP1
+	vpand		$AND_MASK, $ACC2, $ACC2
+	vpsrlq		\$29, $ACC3, $TEMP4
+	vpermq		\$0x93, $TEMP2, $TEMP2
+	vpand		$AND_MASK, $ACC3, $ACC3
+	vpermq		\$0x93, $TEMP3, $TEMP3
+
+	vpblendd	\$3, $ZERO, $TEMP1, $TEMP0
+	vpermq		\$0x93, $TEMP4, $TEMP4
+	vpblendd	\$3, $TEMP1, $TEMP2, $TEMP1
+	vpaddq		$TEMP0, $ACC0, $ACC0
+	vpblendd	\$3, $TEMP2, $TEMP3, $TEMP2
+	vpaddq		$TEMP1, $ACC1, $ACC1
+	vpblendd	\$3, $TEMP3, $TEMP4, $TEMP3
+	vpaddq		$TEMP2, $ACC2, $ACC2
+	vpblendd	\$3, $TEMP4, $ZERO, $TEMP4
+	vpaddq		$TEMP3, $ACC3, $ACC3
+	vpaddq		$TEMP4, $ACC4, $ACC4
+
+	vmovdqu		$ACC0, 0-128($rp)
+	vmovdqu		$ACC1, 32-128($rp)
+	vmovdqu		$ACC2, 64-128($rp)
+	vmovdqu		$ACC3, 96-128($rp)
+___
+
+$TEMP5=$ACC0;
+$code.=<<___;
+	vpsrlq		\$29, $ACC4, $TEMP1
+	vpand		$AND_MASK, $ACC4, $ACC4
+	vpsrlq		\$29, $ACC5, $TEMP2
+	vpand		$AND_MASK, $ACC5, $ACC5
+	vpsrlq		\$29, $ACC6, $TEMP3
+	vpermq		\$0x93, $TEMP1, $TEMP1
+	vpand		$AND_MASK, $ACC6, $ACC6
+	vpsrlq		\$29, $ACC7, $TEMP4
+	vpermq		\$0x93, $TEMP2, $TEMP2
+	vpand		$AND_MASK, $ACC7, $ACC7
+	vpsrlq		\$29, $ACC8, $TEMP5
+	vpermq		\$0x93, $TEMP3, $TEMP3
+	vpand		$AND_MASK, $ACC8, $ACC8
+	vpermq		\$0x93, $TEMP4, $TEMP4
+
+	vpblendd	\$3, $ZERO, $TEMP1, $TEMP0
+	vpermq		\$0x93, $TEMP5, $TEMP5
+	vpblendd	\$3, $TEMP1, $TEMP2, $TEMP1
+	vpaddq		$TEMP0, $ACC4, $ACC4
+	vpblendd	\$3, $TEMP2, $TEMP3, $TEMP2
+	vpaddq		$TEMP1, $ACC5, $ACC5
+	vpblendd	\$3, $TEMP3, $TEMP4, $TEMP3
+	vpaddq		$TEMP2, $ACC6, $ACC6
+	vpblendd	\$3, $TEMP4, $TEMP5, $TEMP4
+	vpaddq		$TEMP3, $ACC7, $ACC7
+	vpaddq		$TEMP4, $ACC8, $ACC8
+
+	vpsrlq		\$29, $ACC4, $TEMP1
+	vpand		$AND_MASK, $ACC4, $ACC4
+	vpsrlq		\$29, $ACC5, $TEMP2
+	vpand		$AND_MASK, $ACC5, $ACC5
+	vpsrlq		\$29, $ACC6, $TEMP3
+	vpermq		\$0x93, $TEMP1, $TEMP1
+	vpand		$AND_MASK, $ACC6, $ACC6
+	vpsrlq		\$29, $ACC7, $TEMP4
+	vpermq		\$0x93, $TEMP2, $TEMP2
+	vpand		$AND_MASK, $ACC7, $ACC7
+	vpsrlq		\$29, $ACC8, $TEMP5
+	vpermq		\$0x93, $TEMP3, $TEMP3
+	vpand		$AND_MASK, $ACC8, $ACC8
+	vpermq		\$0x93, $TEMP4, $TEMP4
+
+	vpblendd	\$3, $ZERO, $TEMP1, $TEMP0
+	vpermq		\$0x93, $TEMP5, $TEMP5
+	vpblendd	\$3, $TEMP1, $TEMP2, $TEMP1
+	vpaddq		$TEMP0, $ACC4, $ACC4
+	vpblendd	\$3, $TEMP2, $TEMP3, $TEMP2
+	vpaddq		$TEMP1, $ACC5, $ACC5
+	vpblendd	\$3, $TEMP3, $TEMP4, $TEMP3
+	vpaddq		$TEMP2, $ACC6, $ACC6
+	vpblendd	\$3, $TEMP4, $TEMP5, $TEMP4
+	vpaddq		$TEMP3, $ACC7, $ACC7
+	vpaddq		$TEMP4, $ACC8, $ACC8
+
+	vmovdqu		$ACC4, 128-128($rp)
+	vmovdqu		$ACC5, 160-128($rp)    
+	vmovdqu		$ACC6, 192-128($rp)
+	vmovdqu		$ACC7, 224-128($rp)
+	vmovdqu		$ACC8, 256-128($rp)
+	vzeroupper
+
+	mov	%rbp, %rax
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	movaps	-0xd8(%rax),%xmm6
+	movaps	-0xc8(%rax),%xmm7
+	movaps	-0xb8(%rax),%xmm8
+	movaps	-0xa8(%rax),%xmm9
+	movaps	-0x98(%rax),%xmm10
+	movaps	-0x88(%rax),%xmm11
+	movaps	-0x78(%rax),%xmm12
+	movaps	-0x68(%rax),%xmm13
+	movaps	-0x58(%rax),%xmm14
+	movaps	-0x48(%rax),%xmm15
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	-48(%rax),%r15
+	mov	-40(%rax),%r14
+	mov	-32(%rax),%r13
+	mov	-24(%rax),%r12
+	mov	-16(%rax),%rbp
+	mov	-8(%rax),%rbx
+	lea	(%rax),%rsp		# restore %rsp
+.Lmul_1024_epilogue:
+	ret
+.size	rsaz_1024_mul_avx2,.-rsaz_1024_mul_avx2
+___
+}
+{
+my ($out,$inp) = $win64 ? ("%rcx","%rdx") : ("%rdi","%rsi");
+my @T = map("%r$_",(8..11));
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	rsaz_1024_red2norm_avx2
+.type	rsaz_1024_red2norm_avx2,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	32
+rsaz_1024_red2norm_avx2:
+	sub	\$-128,$inp	# size optimization
+	xor	%rax,%rax
+___
+
+for ($j=0,$i=0; $i<16; $i++) {
+    my $k=0;
+    while (29*$j<64*($i+1)) {	# load data till boundary
+	$code.="	mov	`8*$j-128`($inp), @T[0]\n";
+	$j++; $k++; push(@T,shift(@T));
+    }
+    $l=$k;
+    while ($k>1) {		# shift loaded data but last value
+	$code.="	shl	\$`29*($j-$k)`,@T[-$k]\n";
+	$k--;
+    }
+    $code.=<<___;		# shift last value
+	mov	@T[-1], @T[0]
+	shl	\$`29*($j-1)`, @T[-1]
+	shr	\$`-29*($j-1)`, @T[0]
+___
+    while ($l) {		# accumulate all values
+	$code.="	add	@T[-$l], %rax\n";
+	$l--;
+    }
+	$code.=<<___;
+	adc	\$0, @T[0]	# consume eventual carry
+	mov	%rax, 8*$i($out)
+	mov	@T[0], %rax
+___
+    push(@T,shift(@T));
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	ret
+.size	rsaz_1024_red2norm_avx2,.-rsaz_1024_red2norm_avx2
+
+.globl	rsaz_1024_norm2red_avx2
+.type	rsaz_1024_norm2red_avx2,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	32
+rsaz_1024_norm2red_avx2:
+	sub	\$-128,$out	# size optimization
+	mov	($inp),@T[0]
+	mov	\$0x1fffffff,%eax
+___
+for ($j=0,$i=0; $i<16; $i++) {
+    $code.="	mov	`8*($i+1)`($inp),@T[1]\n"	if ($i<15);
+    $code.="	xor	@T[1],@T[1]\n"			if ($i==15);
+    my $k=1;
+    while (29*($j+1)<64*($i+1)) {
+    	$code.=<<___;
+	mov	@T[0],@T[-$k]
+	shr	\$`29*$j`,@T[-$k]
+	and	%rax,@T[-$k]				# &0x1fffffff
+	mov	@T[-$k],`8*$j-128`($out)
+___
+	$j++; $k++;
+    }
+    $code.=<<___;
+	shrd	\$`29*$j`,@T[1],@T[0]
+	and	%rax,@T[0]
+	mov	@T[0],`8*$j-128`($out)
+___
+    $j++;
+    push(@T,shift(@T));
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	@T[0],`8*$j-128`($out)			# zero
+	mov	@T[0],`8*($j+1)-128`($out)
+	mov	@T[0],`8*($j+2)-128`($out)
+	mov	@T[0],`8*($j+3)-128`($out)
+	ret
+.size	rsaz_1024_norm2red_avx2,.-rsaz_1024_norm2red_avx2
+___
+}
+{
+my ($out,$inp,$power) = $win64 ? ("%rcx","%rdx","%r8d") : ("%rdi","%rsi","%edx");
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2
+.type	rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	32
+rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2:
+	vzeroupper
+	vmovdqu	.Lscatter_permd(%rip),%ymm5
+	shl	\$4,$power
+	lea	($out,$power),$out
+	mov	\$9,%eax
+	jmp	.Loop_scatter_1024
+
+.align	32
+.Loop_scatter_1024:
+	vmovdqu		($inp),%ymm0
+	lea		32($inp),$inp
+	vpermd		%ymm0,%ymm5,%ymm0
+	vmovdqu		%xmm0,($out)
+	lea		16*32($out),$out
+	dec	%eax
+	jnz	.Loop_scatter_1024
+
+	vzeroupper
+	ret
+.size	rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2,.-rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2
+
+.globl	rsaz_1024_gather5_avx2
+.type	rsaz_1024_gather5_avx2,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	32
+rsaz_1024_gather5_avx2:
+	vzeroupper
+	mov	%rsp,%r11
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	lea	-0x88(%rsp),%rax
+.LSEH_begin_rsaz_1024_gather5:
+	# I can't trust assembler to use specific encoding:-(
+	.byte	0x48,0x8d,0x60,0xe0		# lea	-0x20(%rax),%rsp
+	.byte	0xc5,0xf8,0x29,0x70,0xe0	# vmovaps %xmm6,-0x20(%rax)
+	.byte	0xc5,0xf8,0x29,0x78,0xf0	# vmovaps %xmm7,-0x10(%rax)
+	.byte	0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x40,0x00	# vmovaps %xmm8,0(%rax)
+	.byte	0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x48,0x10	# vmovaps %xmm9,0x10(%rax)
+	.byte	0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x50,0x20	# vmovaps %xmm10,0x20(%rax)
+	.byte	0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x58,0x30	# vmovaps %xmm11,0x30(%rax)
+	.byte	0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x60,0x40	# vmovaps %xmm12,0x40(%rax)
+	.byte	0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x68,0x50	# vmovaps %xmm13,0x50(%rax)
+	.byte	0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x70,0x60	# vmovaps %xmm14,0x60(%rax)
+	.byte	0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x78,0x70	# vmovaps %xmm15,0x70(%rax)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	lea	-0x100(%rsp),%rsp
+	and	\$-32, %rsp
+	lea	.Linc(%rip), %r10
+	lea	-128(%rsp),%rax			# control u-op density
+
+	vmovd		$power, %xmm4
+	vmovdqa		(%r10),%ymm0
+	vmovdqa		32(%r10),%ymm1
+	vmovdqa		64(%r10),%ymm5
+	vpbroadcastd	%xmm4,%ymm4
+
+	vpaddd		%ymm5, %ymm0, %ymm2
+	vpcmpeqd	%ymm4, %ymm0, %ymm0
+	vpaddd		%ymm5, %ymm1, %ymm3
+	vpcmpeqd	%ymm4, %ymm1, %ymm1
+	vmovdqa		%ymm0, 32*0+128(%rax)
+	vpaddd		%ymm5, %ymm2, %ymm0
+	vpcmpeqd	%ymm4, %ymm2, %ymm2
+	vmovdqa		%ymm1, 32*1+128(%rax)
+	vpaddd		%ymm5, %ymm3, %ymm1
+	vpcmpeqd	%ymm4, %ymm3, %ymm3
+	vmovdqa		%ymm2, 32*2+128(%rax)
+	vpaddd		%ymm5, %ymm0, %ymm2
+	vpcmpeqd	%ymm4, %ymm0, %ymm0
+	vmovdqa		%ymm3, 32*3+128(%rax)
+	vpaddd		%ymm5, %ymm1, %ymm3
+	vpcmpeqd	%ymm4, %ymm1, %ymm1
+	vmovdqa		%ymm0, 32*4+128(%rax)
+	vpaddd		%ymm5, %ymm2, %ymm8
+	vpcmpeqd	%ymm4, %ymm2, %ymm2
+	vmovdqa		%ymm1, 32*5+128(%rax)
+	vpaddd		%ymm5, %ymm3, %ymm9
+	vpcmpeqd	%ymm4, %ymm3, %ymm3
+	vmovdqa		%ymm2, 32*6+128(%rax)
+	vpaddd		%ymm5, %ymm8, %ymm10
+	vpcmpeqd	%ymm4, %ymm8, %ymm8
+	vmovdqa		%ymm3, 32*7+128(%rax)
+	vpaddd		%ymm5, %ymm9, %ymm11
+	vpcmpeqd	%ymm4, %ymm9, %ymm9
+	vpaddd		%ymm5, %ymm10, %ymm12
+	vpcmpeqd	%ymm4, %ymm10, %ymm10
+	vpaddd		%ymm5, %ymm11, %ymm13
+	vpcmpeqd	%ymm4, %ymm11, %ymm11
+	vpaddd		%ymm5, %ymm12, %ymm14
+	vpcmpeqd	%ymm4, %ymm12, %ymm12
+	vpaddd		%ymm5, %ymm13, %ymm15
+	vpcmpeqd	%ymm4, %ymm13, %ymm13
+	vpcmpeqd	%ymm4, %ymm14, %ymm14
+	vpcmpeqd	%ymm4, %ymm15, %ymm15
+
+	vmovdqa	-32(%r10),%ymm7			# .Lgather_permd
+	lea	128($inp), $inp
+	mov	\$9,$power
+
+.Loop_gather_1024:
+	vmovdqa		32*0-128($inp),	%ymm0
+	vmovdqa		32*1-128($inp),	%ymm1
+	vmovdqa		32*2-128($inp),	%ymm2
+	vmovdqa		32*3-128($inp),	%ymm3
+	vpand		32*0+128(%rax),	%ymm0,	%ymm0
+	vpand		32*1+128(%rax),	%ymm1,	%ymm1
+	vpand		32*2+128(%rax),	%ymm2,	%ymm2
+	vpor		%ymm0, %ymm1, %ymm4
+	vpand		32*3+128(%rax),	%ymm3,	%ymm3
+	vmovdqa		32*4-128($inp),	%ymm0
+	vmovdqa		32*5-128($inp),	%ymm1
+	vpor		%ymm2, %ymm3, %ymm5
+	vmovdqa		32*6-128($inp),	%ymm2
+	vmovdqa		32*7-128($inp),	%ymm3
+	vpand		32*4+128(%rax),	%ymm0,	%ymm0
+	vpand		32*5+128(%rax),	%ymm1,	%ymm1
+	vpand		32*6+128(%rax),	%ymm2,	%ymm2
+	vpor		%ymm0, %ymm4, %ymm4
+	vpand		32*7+128(%rax),	%ymm3,	%ymm3
+	vpand		32*8-128($inp),	%ymm8,	%ymm0
+	vpor		%ymm1, %ymm5, %ymm5
+	vpand		32*9-128($inp),	%ymm9,	%ymm1
+	vpor		%ymm2, %ymm4, %ymm4
+	vpand		32*10-128($inp),%ymm10,	%ymm2
+	vpor		%ymm3, %ymm5, %ymm5
+	vpand		32*11-128($inp),%ymm11,	%ymm3
+	vpor		%ymm0, %ymm4, %ymm4
+	vpand		32*12-128($inp),%ymm12,	%ymm0
+	vpor		%ymm1, %ymm5, %ymm5
+	vpand		32*13-128($inp),%ymm13,	%ymm1
+	vpor		%ymm2, %ymm4, %ymm4
+	vpand		32*14-128($inp),%ymm14,	%ymm2
+	vpor		%ymm3, %ymm5, %ymm5
+	vpand		32*15-128($inp),%ymm15,	%ymm3
+	lea		32*16($inp), $inp
+	vpor		%ymm0, %ymm4, %ymm4
+	vpor		%ymm1, %ymm5, %ymm5
+	vpor		%ymm2, %ymm4, %ymm4
+	vpor		%ymm3, %ymm5, %ymm5
+
+	vpor		%ymm5, %ymm4, %ymm4
+	vextracti128	\$1, %ymm4, %xmm5	# upper half is cleared
+	vpor		%xmm4, %xmm5, %xmm5
+	vpermd		%ymm5,%ymm7,%ymm5
+	vmovdqu		%ymm5,($out)
+	lea		32($out),$out
+	dec	$power
+	jnz	.Loop_gather_1024
+
+	vpxor	%ymm0,%ymm0,%ymm0
+	vmovdqu	%ymm0,($out)
+	vzeroupper
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	movaps	-0xa8(%r11),%xmm6
+	movaps	-0x98(%r11),%xmm7
+	movaps	-0x88(%r11),%xmm8
+	movaps	-0x78(%r11),%xmm9
+	movaps	-0x68(%r11),%xmm10
+	movaps	-0x58(%r11),%xmm11
+	movaps	-0x48(%r11),%xmm12
+	movaps	-0x38(%r11),%xmm13
+	movaps	-0x28(%r11),%xmm14
+	movaps	-0x18(%r11),%xmm15
+.LSEH_end_rsaz_1024_gather5:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	lea	(%r11),%rsp
+	ret
+.size	rsaz_1024_gather5_avx2,.-rsaz_1024_gather5_avx2
+___
+}
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.extern	OPENSSL_ia32cap_P
+.globl	rsaz_avx2_eligible
+.type	rsaz_avx2_eligible,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	32
+rsaz_avx2_eligible:
+	mov	OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+8(%rip),%eax
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($addx);
+	mov	\$`1<<8|1<<19`,%ecx
+	mov	\$0,%edx
+	and	%eax,%ecx
+	cmp	\$`1<<8|1<<19`,%ecx	# check for BMI2+AD*X
+	cmove	%edx,%eax
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	and	\$`1<<5`,%eax
+	shr	\$5,%eax
+	ret
+.size	rsaz_avx2_eligible,.-rsaz_avx2_eligible
+
+.align	64
+.Land_mask:
+	.quad	0x1fffffff,0x1fffffff,0x1fffffff,0x1fffffff
+.Lscatter_permd:
+	.long	0,2,4,6,7,7,7,7
+.Lgather_permd:
+	.long	0,7,1,7,2,7,3,7
+.Linc:
+	.long	0,0,0,0, 1,1,1,1
+	.long	2,2,2,2, 3,3,3,3
+	.long	4,4,4,4, 4,4,4,4
+.align	64
+___
+
+if ($win64) {
+$rec="%rcx";
+$frame="%rdx";
+$context="%r8";
+$disp="%r9";
+
+$code.=<<___
+.extern	__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind
+.type	rsaz_se_handler,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+rsaz_se_handler:
+	push	%rsi
+	push	%rdi
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+	pushfq
+	sub	\$64,%rsp
+
+	mov	120($context),%rax	# pull context->Rax
+	mov	248($context),%rbx	# pull context->Rip
+
+	mov	8($disp),%rsi		# disp->ImageBase
+	mov	56($disp),%r11		# disp->HandlerData
+
+	mov	0(%r11),%r10d		# HandlerData[0]
+	lea	(%rsi,%r10),%r10	# prologue label
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip<prologue label
+	jb	.Lcommon_seh_tail
+
+	mov	152($context),%rax	# pull context->Rsp
+
+	mov	4(%r11),%r10d		# HandlerData[1]
+	lea	(%rsi,%r10),%r10	# epilogue label
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip>=epilogue label
+	jae	.Lcommon_seh_tail
+
+	mov	160($context),%rax	# pull context->Rbp
+
+	mov	-48(%rax),%r15
+	mov	-40(%rax),%r14
+	mov	-32(%rax),%r13
+	mov	-24(%rax),%r12
+	mov	-16(%rax),%rbp
+	mov	-8(%rax),%rbx
+	mov	%r15,240($context)
+	mov	%r14,232($context)
+	mov	%r13,224($context)
+	mov	%r12,216($context)
+	mov	%rbp,160($context)
+	mov	%rbx,144($context)
+
+	lea	-0xd8(%rax),%rsi	# %xmm save area
+	lea	512($context),%rdi	# & context.Xmm6
+	mov	\$20,%ecx		# 10*sizeof(%xmm0)/sizeof(%rax)
+	.long	0xa548f3fc		# cld; rep movsq
+
+.Lcommon_seh_tail:
+	mov	8(%rax),%rdi
+	mov	16(%rax),%rsi
+	mov	%rax,152($context)	# restore context->Rsp
+	mov	%rsi,168($context)	# restore context->Rsi
+	mov	%rdi,176($context)	# restore context->Rdi
+
+	mov	40($disp),%rdi		# disp->ContextRecord
+	mov	$context,%rsi		# context
+	mov	\$154,%ecx		# sizeof(CONTEXT)
+	.long	0xa548f3fc		# cld; rep movsq
+
+	mov	$disp,%rsi
+	xor	%rcx,%rcx		# arg1, UNW_FLAG_NHANDLER
+	mov	8(%rsi),%rdx		# arg2, disp->ImageBase
+	mov	0(%rsi),%r8		# arg3, disp->ControlPc
+	mov	16(%rsi),%r9		# arg4, disp->FunctionEntry
+	mov	40(%rsi),%r10		# disp->ContextRecord
+	lea	56(%rsi),%r11		# &disp->HandlerData
+	lea	24(%rsi),%r12		# &disp->EstablisherFrame
+	mov	%r10,32(%rsp)		# arg5
+	mov	%r11,40(%rsp)		# arg6
+	mov	%r12,48(%rsp)		# arg7
+	mov	%rcx,56(%rsp)		# arg8, (NULL)
+	call	*__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind(%rip)
+
+	mov	\$1,%eax		# ExceptionContinueSearch
+	add	\$64,%rsp
+	popfq
+	pop	%r15
+	pop	%r14
+	pop	%r13
+	pop	%r12
+	pop	%rbp
+	pop	%rbx
+	pop	%rdi
+	pop	%rsi
+	ret
+.size	rsaz_se_handler,.-rsaz_se_handler
+
+.section	.pdata
+.align	4
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_rsaz_1024_sqr_avx2
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_rsaz_1024_sqr_avx2
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_rsaz_1024_sqr_avx2
+
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_rsaz_1024_mul_avx2
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_rsaz_1024_mul_avx2
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_rsaz_1024_mul_avx2
+
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_rsaz_1024_gather5
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_rsaz_1024_gather5
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_rsaz_1024_gather5
+.section	.xdata
+.align	8
+.LSEH_info_rsaz_1024_sqr_avx2:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	rsaz_se_handler
+	.rva	.Lsqr_1024_body,.Lsqr_1024_epilogue
+.LSEH_info_rsaz_1024_mul_avx2:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	rsaz_se_handler
+	.rva	.Lmul_1024_body,.Lmul_1024_epilogue
+.LSEH_info_rsaz_1024_gather5:
+	.byte	0x01,0x36,0x17,0x0b
+	.byte	0x36,0xf8,0x09,0x00	# vmovaps 0x90(rsp),xmm15
+	.byte	0x31,0xe8,0x08,0x00	# vmovaps 0x80(rsp),xmm14
+	.byte	0x2c,0xd8,0x07,0x00	# vmovaps 0x70(rsp),xmm13
+	.byte	0x27,0xc8,0x06,0x00	# vmovaps 0x60(rsp),xmm12
+	.byte	0x22,0xb8,0x05,0x00	# vmovaps 0x50(rsp),xmm11
+	.byte	0x1d,0xa8,0x04,0x00	# vmovaps 0x40(rsp),xmm10
+	.byte	0x18,0x98,0x03,0x00	# vmovaps 0x30(rsp),xmm9
+	.byte	0x13,0x88,0x02,0x00	# vmovaps 0x20(rsp),xmm8
+	.byte	0x0e,0x78,0x01,0x00	# vmovaps 0x10(rsp),xmm7
+	.byte	0x09,0x68,0x00,0x00	# vmovaps 0x00(rsp),xmm6
+	.byte	0x04,0x01,0x15,0x00	# sub	  rsp,0xa8
+	.byte	0x00,0xb3,0x00,0x00	# set_frame r11
+___
+}
+
+foreach (split("\n",$code)) {
+	s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval($1)/ge;
+
+	s/\b(sh[rl]d?\s+\$)(-?[0-9]+)/$1.$2%64/ge		or
+
+	s/\b(vmov[dq])\b(.+)%ymm([0-9]+)/$1$2%xmm$3/go		or
+	s/\b(vmovdqu)\b(.+)%x%ymm([0-9]+)/$1$2%xmm$3/go		or
+	s/\b(vpinsr[qd])\b(.+)%ymm([0-9]+)/$1$2%xmm$3/go	or
+	s/\b(vpextr[qd])\b(.+)%ymm([0-9]+)/$1$2%xmm$3/go	or
+	s/\b(vpbroadcast[qd]\s+)%ymm([0-9]+)/$1%xmm$2/go;
+	print $_,"\n";
+}
+
+}}} else {{{
+print <<___;	# assembler is too old
+.text
+
+.globl	rsaz_avx2_eligible
+.type	rsaz_avx2_eligible,\@abi-omnipotent
+rsaz_avx2_eligible:
+	xor	%eax,%eax
+	ret
+.size	rsaz_avx2_eligible,.-rsaz_avx2_eligible
+
+.globl	rsaz_1024_sqr_avx2
+.globl	rsaz_1024_mul_avx2
+.globl	rsaz_1024_norm2red_avx2
+.globl	rsaz_1024_red2norm_avx2
+.globl	rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2
+.globl	rsaz_1024_gather5_avx2
+.type	rsaz_1024_sqr_avx2,\@abi-omnipotent
+rsaz_1024_sqr_avx2:
+rsaz_1024_mul_avx2:
+rsaz_1024_norm2red_avx2:
+rsaz_1024_red2norm_avx2:
+rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2:
+rsaz_1024_gather5_avx2:
+	.byte	0x0f,0x0b	# ud2
+	ret
+.size	rsaz_1024_sqr_avx2,.-rsaz_1024_sqr_avx2
+___
+}}}
+
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/rsaz-x86_64.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/rsaz-x86_64.pl
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..6f3b664
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/rsaz-x86_64.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,2358 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2013-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+##############################################################################
+#                                                                            #
+#  Copyright (c) 2012, Intel Corporation                                     #
+#                                                                            #
+#  All rights reserved.                                                      #
+#                                                                            #
+#  Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without        #
+#  modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are    #
+#  met:                                                                      #
+#                                                                            #
+#  *  Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright         #
+#     notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.          #
+#                                                                            #
+#  *  Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright      #
+#     notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the    #
+#     documentation and/or other materials provided with the                 #
+#     distribution.                                                          #
+#                                                                            #
+#  *  Neither the name of the Intel Corporation nor the names of its         #
+#     contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from   #
+#     this software without specific prior written permission.               #
+#                                                                            #
+#                                                                            #
+#  THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY INTEL CORPORATION ""AS IS"" AND ANY          #
+#  EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE         #
+#  IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR        #
+#  PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL INTEL CORPORATION OR            #
+#  CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL,     #
+#  EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,       #
+#  PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR        #
+#  PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF    #
+#  LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING      #
+#  NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS        #
+#  SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.              #
+#                                                                            #
+##############################################################################
+# Developers and authors:                                                    #
+# Shay Gueron (1, 2), and Vlad Krasnov (1)                                   #
+# (1) Intel Architecture Group, Microprocessor and Chipset Development,      #
+#     Israel Development Center, Haifa, Israel                               #
+# (2) University of Haifa                                                    #
+##############################################################################
+# Reference:                                                                 #
+# [1] S. Gueron, "Efficient Software Implementations of Modular              #
+#     Exponentiation", http://eprint.iacr.org/2011/239                       #
+# [2] S. Gueron, V. Krasnov. "Speeding up Big-Numbers Squaring".             #
+#     IEEE Proceedings of 9th International Conference on Information        #
+#     Technology: New Generations (ITNG 2012), 821-823 (2012).               #
+# [3] S. Gueron, Efficient Software Implementations of Modular Exponentiation#
+#     Journal of Cryptographic Engineering 2:31-43 (2012).                   #
+# [4] S. Gueron, V. Krasnov: "[PATCH] Efficient and side channel analysis    #
+#     resistant 512-bit and 1024-bit modular exponentiation for optimizing   #
+#     RSA1024 and RSA2048 on x86_64 platforms",                              #
+#     http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2582&user=guest&pass=guest#
+##############################################################################
+
+# While original submission covers 512- and 1024-bit exponentiation,
+# this module is limited to 512-bit version only (and as such
+# accelerates RSA1024 sign). This is because improvement for longer
+# keys is not high enough to justify the effort, highest measured
+# was ~5% on Westmere. [This is relative to OpenSSL 1.0.2, upcoming
+# for the moment of this writing!] Nor does this module implement
+# "monolithic" complete exponentiation jumbo-subroutine, but adheres
+# to more modular mixture of C and assembly. And it's optimized even
+# for processors other than Intel Core family (see table below for
+# improvement coefficients).
+# 						<appro@openssl.org>
+#
+# RSA1024 sign/sec	this/original	|this/rsax(*)	this/fips(*)
+#			----------------+---------------------------
+# Opteron		+13%		|+5%		+20%
+# Bulldozer		-0%		|-1%		+10%
+# P4			+11%		|+7%		+8%
+# Westmere		+5%		|+14%		+17%
+# Sandy Bridge		+2%		|+12%		+29%
+# Ivy Bridge		+1%		|+11%		+35%
+# Haswell(**)		-0%		|+12%		+39%
+# Atom			+13%		|+11%		+4%
+# VIA Nano		+70%		|+9%		+25%
+#
+# (*)	rsax engine and fips numbers are presented for reference
+#	purposes;
+# (**)	MULX was attempted, but found to give only marginal improvement;
+
+$flavour = shift;
+$output  = shift;
+if ($flavour =~ /\./) { $output = $flavour; undef $flavour; }
+
+$win64=0; $win64=1 if ($flavour =~ /[nm]asm|mingw64/ || $output =~ /\.asm$/);
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+( $xlate="${dir}x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
+( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
+die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl";
+
+open OUT,"| \"$^X\" \"$xlate\" $flavour \"$output\"";
+*STDOUT=*OUT;
+
+if (`$ENV{CC} -Wa,-v -c -o /dev/null -x assembler /dev/null 2>&1`
+		=~ /GNU assembler version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
+	$addx = ($1>=2.23);
+}
+
+if (!$addx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /nasm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /nasm/) &&
+	    `nasm -v 2>&1` =~ /NASM version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
+	$addx = ($1>=2.10);
+}
+
+if (!$addx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
+	    `ml64 2>&1` =~ /Version ([0-9]+)\./) {
+	$addx = ($1>=12);
+}
+
+if (!$addx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([3-9])\.([0-9]+)/) {
+	my $ver = $2 + $3/100.0;	# 3.1->3.01, 3.10->3.10
+	$addx = ($ver>=3.03);
+}
+
+($out, $inp, $mod) = ("%rdi", "%rsi", "%rbp");	# common internal API
+{
+my ($out,$inp,$mod,$n0,$times) = ("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx","%rcx","%r8d");
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.text
+
+.extern	OPENSSL_ia32cap_P
+
+.globl	rsaz_512_sqr
+.type	rsaz_512_sqr,\@function,5
+.align	32
+rsaz_512_sqr:				# 25-29% faster than rsaz_512_mul
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+
+	subq	\$128+24, %rsp
+.Lsqr_body:
+	movq	$mod, %rbp		# common argument
+	movq	($inp), %rdx
+	movq	8($inp), %rax
+	movq	$n0, 128(%rsp)
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($addx);
+	movl	\$0x80100,%r11d
+	andl	OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+8(%rip),%r11d
+	cmpl	\$0x80100,%r11d		# check for MULX and ADO/CX
+	je	.Loop_sqrx
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	jmp	.Loop_sqr
+
+.align	32
+.Loop_sqr:
+	movl	$times,128+8(%rsp)
+#first iteration
+	movq	%rdx, %rbx
+	mulq	%rdx
+	movq	%rax, %r8
+	movq	16($inp), %rax
+	movq	%rdx, %r9
+
+	mulq	%rbx
+	addq	%rax, %r9
+	movq	24($inp), %rax
+	movq	%rdx, %r10
+	adcq	\$0, %r10
+
+	mulq	%rbx
+	addq	%rax, %r10
+	movq	32($inp), %rax
+	movq	%rdx, %r11
+	adcq	\$0, %r11
+
+	mulq	%rbx
+	addq	%rax, %r11
+	movq	40($inp), %rax
+	movq	%rdx, %r12
+	adcq	\$0, %r12
+
+	mulq	%rbx
+	addq	%rax, %r12
+	movq	48($inp), %rax
+	movq	%rdx, %r13
+	adcq	\$0, %r13
+
+	mulq	%rbx
+	addq	%rax, %r13
+	movq	56($inp), %rax
+	movq	%rdx, %r14
+	adcq	\$0, %r14
+
+	mulq	%rbx
+	addq	%rax, %r14
+	movq	%rbx, %rax
+	movq	%rdx, %r15
+	adcq	\$0, %r15
+
+	addq	%r8, %r8		#shlq	\$1, %r8
+	movq	%r9, %rcx
+	adcq	%r9, %r9		#shld	\$1, %r8, %r9
+
+	mulq	%rax
+	movq	%rax, (%rsp)
+	addq	%rdx, %r8
+	adcq	\$0, %r9
+
+	movq	%r8, 8(%rsp)
+	shrq	\$63, %rcx
+
+#second iteration
+	movq	8($inp), %r8
+	movq	16($inp), %rax
+	mulq	%r8
+	addq	%rax, %r10
+	movq	24($inp), %rax
+	movq	%rdx, %rbx
+	adcq	\$0, %rbx
+
+	mulq	%r8
+	addq	%rax, %r11
+	movq	32($inp), %rax
+	adcq	\$0, %rdx
+	addq	%rbx, %r11
+	movq	%rdx, %rbx
+	adcq	\$0, %rbx
+
+	mulq	%r8
+	addq	%rax, %r12
+	movq	40($inp), %rax
+	adcq	\$0, %rdx
+	addq	%rbx, %r12
+	movq	%rdx, %rbx
+	adcq	\$0, %rbx
+
+	mulq	%r8
+	addq	%rax, %r13
+	movq	48($inp), %rax
+	adcq	\$0, %rdx
+	addq	%rbx, %r13
+	movq	%rdx, %rbx
+	adcq	\$0, %rbx
+
+	mulq	%r8
+	addq	%rax, %r14
+	movq	56($inp), %rax
+	adcq	\$0, %rdx
+	addq	%rbx, %r14
+	movq	%rdx, %rbx
+	adcq	\$0, %rbx
+
+	mulq	%r8
+	addq	%rax, %r15
+	movq	%r8, %rax
+	adcq	\$0, %rdx
+	addq	%rbx, %r15
+	movq	%rdx, %r8
+	movq	%r10, %rdx
+	adcq	\$0, %r8
+
+	add	%rdx, %rdx
+	lea	(%rcx,%r10,2), %r10	#shld	\$1, %rcx, %r10
+	movq	%r11, %rbx
+	adcq	%r11, %r11		#shld	\$1, %r10, %r11
+
+	mulq	%rax
+	addq	%rax, %r9
+	adcq	%rdx, %r10
+	adcq	\$0, %r11
+
+	movq	%r9, 16(%rsp)
+	movq	%r10, 24(%rsp)
+	shrq	\$63, %rbx
+	
+#third iteration
+	movq	16($inp), %r9	
+	movq	24($inp), %rax
+	mulq	%r9
+	addq	%rax, %r12
+	movq	32($inp), %rax
+	movq	%rdx, %rcx
+	adcq	\$0, %rcx
+
+	mulq	%r9
+	addq	%rax, %r13
+	movq	40($inp), %rax
+	adcq	\$0, %rdx
+	addq	%rcx, %r13
+	movq	%rdx, %rcx
+	adcq	\$0, %rcx
+
+	mulq	%r9
+	addq	%rax, %r14
+	movq	48($inp), %rax
+	adcq	\$0, %rdx
+	addq	%rcx, %r14
+	movq	%rdx, %rcx
+	adcq	\$0, %rcx
+
+	mulq	%r9
+	 movq	%r12, %r10
+	 lea	(%rbx,%r12,2), %r12	#shld	\$1, %rbx, %r12
+	addq	%rax, %r15
+	movq	56($inp), %rax
+	adcq	\$0, %rdx
+	addq	%rcx, %r15
+	movq	%rdx, %rcx
+	adcq	\$0, %rcx
+
+	mulq	%r9
+	 shrq	\$63, %r10
+	addq	%rax, %r8
+	movq	%r9, %rax
+	adcq	\$0, %rdx
+	addq	%rcx, %r8
+	movq	%rdx, %r9
+	adcq	\$0, %r9
+
+	movq	%r13, %rcx
+	leaq	(%r10,%r13,2), %r13	#shld	\$1, %r12, %r13
+
+	mulq	%rax
+	addq	%rax, %r11
+	adcq	%rdx, %r12
+	adcq	\$0, %r13
+
+	movq	%r11, 32(%rsp)
+	movq	%r12, 40(%rsp)
+	shrq	\$63, %rcx
+
+#fourth iteration
+	movq	24($inp), %r10
+	movq	32($inp), %rax
+	mulq	%r10
+	addq	%rax, %r14
+	movq	40($inp), %rax
+	movq	%rdx, %rbx
+	adcq	\$0, %rbx
+
+	mulq	%r10
+	addq	%rax, %r15
+	movq	48($inp), %rax
+	adcq	\$0, %rdx
+	addq	%rbx, %r15
+	movq	%rdx, %rbx
+	adcq	\$0, %rbx
+
+	mulq	%r10
+	 movq	%r14, %r12
+	 leaq	(%rcx,%r14,2), %r14	#shld	\$1, %rcx, %r14
+	addq	%rax, %r8
+	movq	56($inp), %rax
+	adcq	\$0, %rdx
+	addq	%rbx, %r8
+	movq	%rdx, %rbx
+	adcq	\$0, %rbx
+
+	mulq	%r10
+	 shrq	\$63, %r12
+	addq	%rax, %r9
+	movq	%r10, %rax
+	adcq	\$0, %rdx
+	addq	%rbx, %r9
+	movq	%rdx, %r10
+	adcq	\$0, %r10
+
+	movq	%r15, %rbx
+	leaq	(%r12,%r15,2),%r15	#shld	\$1, %r14, %r15
+
+	mulq	%rax
+	addq	%rax, %r13
+	adcq	%rdx, %r14
+	adcq	\$0, %r15
+
+	movq	%r13, 48(%rsp)
+	movq	%r14, 56(%rsp)
+	shrq	\$63, %rbx
+
+#fifth iteration
+	movq	32($inp), %r11
+	movq	40($inp), %rax
+	mulq	%r11
+	addq	%rax, %r8
+	movq	48($inp), %rax
+	movq	%rdx, %rcx
+	adcq	\$0, %rcx
+
+	mulq	%r11
+	addq	%rax, %r9
+	movq	56($inp), %rax
+	adcq	\$0, %rdx
+	 movq	%r8, %r12
+	 leaq	(%rbx,%r8,2), %r8	#shld	\$1, %rbx, %r8
+	addq	%rcx, %r9
+	movq	%rdx, %rcx
+	adcq	\$0, %rcx
+
+	mulq	%r11
+	 shrq	\$63, %r12
+	addq	%rax, %r10
+	movq	%r11, %rax
+	adcq	\$0, %rdx
+	addq	%rcx, %r10
+	movq	%rdx, %r11
+	adcq	\$0, %r11
+
+	movq	%r9, %rcx
+	leaq	(%r12,%r9,2), %r9	#shld	\$1, %r8, %r9
+
+	mulq	%rax
+	addq	%rax, %r15
+	adcq	%rdx, %r8
+	adcq	\$0, %r9
+
+	movq	%r15, 64(%rsp)
+	movq	%r8, 72(%rsp)
+	shrq	\$63, %rcx
+
+#sixth iteration
+	movq	40($inp), %r12
+	movq	48($inp), %rax
+	mulq	%r12
+	addq	%rax, %r10
+	movq	56($inp), %rax
+	movq	%rdx, %rbx
+	adcq	\$0, %rbx
+
+	mulq	%r12
+	addq	%rax, %r11
+	movq	%r12, %rax
+	 movq	%r10, %r15
+	 leaq	(%rcx,%r10,2), %r10	#shld	\$1, %rcx, %r10
+	adcq	\$0, %rdx
+	 shrq	\$63, %r15
+	addq	%rbx, %r11
+	movq	%rdx, %r12
+	adcq	\$0, %r12
+
+	movq	%r11, %rbx
+	leaq	(%r15,%r11,2), %r11	#shld	\$1, %r10, %r11
+
+	mulq	%rax
+	addq	%rax, %r9
+	adcq	%rdx, %r10
+	adcq	\$0, %r11
+
+	movq	%r9, 80(%rsp)
+	movq	%r10, 88(%rsp)
+
+#seventh iteration
+	movq	48($inp), %r13
+	movq	56($inp), %rax
+	mulq	%r13
+	addq	%rax, %r12
+	movq	%r13, %rax
+	movq	%rdx, %r13
+	adcq	\$0, %r13
+
+	xorq	%r14, %r14
+	shlq	\$1, %rbx
+	adcq	%r12, %r12		#shld	\$1, %rbx, %r12
+	adcq	%r13, %r13		#shld	\$1, %r12, %r13
+	adcq	%r14, %r14		#shld	\$1, %r13, %r14
+
+	mulq	%rax
+	addq	%rax, %r11
+	adcq	%rdx, %r12
+	adcq	\$0, %r13
+
+	movq	%r11, 96(%rsp)
+	movq	%r12, 104(%rsp)
+
+#eighth iteration
+	movq	56($inp), %rax
+	mulq	%rax
+	addq	%rax, %r13
+	adcq	\$0, %rdx
+
+	addq	%rdx, %r14
+
+	movq	%r13, 112(%rsp)
+	movq	%r14, 120(%rsp)
+
+	movq	(%rsp), %r8
+	movq	8(%rsp), %r9
+	movq	16(%rsp), %r10
+	movq	24(%rsp), %r11
+	movq	32(%rsp), %r12
+	movq	40(%rsp), %r13
+	movq	48(%rsp), %r14
+	movq	56(%rsp), %r15
+
+	call	__rsaz_512_reduce
+
+	addq	64(%rsp), %r8
+	adcq	72(%rsp), %r9
+	adcq	80(%rsp), %r10
+	adcq	88(%rsp), %r11
+	adcq	96(%rsp), %r12
+	adcq	104(%rsp), %r13
+	adcq	112(%rsp), %r14
+	adcq	120(%rsp), %r15
+	sbbq	%rcx, %rcx
+
+	call	__rsaz_512_subtract
+
+	movq	%r8, %rdx
+	movq	%r9, %rax
+	movl	128+8(%rsp), $times
+	movq	$out, $inp
+
+	decl	$times
+	jnz	.Loop_sqr
+___
+if ($addx) {
+$code.=<<___;
+	jmp	.Lsqr_tail
+
+.align	32
+.Loop_sqrx:
+	movl	$times,128+8(%rsp)
+	movq	$out, %xmm0		# off-load
+	movq	%rbp, %xmm1		# off-load
+#first iteration	
+	mulx	%rax, %r8, %r9
+
+	mulx	16($inp), %rcx, %r10
+	xor	%rbp, %rbp		# cf=0, of=0
+
+	mulx	24($inp), %rax, %r11
+	adcx	%rcx, %r9
+
+	mulx	32($inp), %rcx, %r12
+	adcx	%rax, %r10
+
+	mulx	40($inp), %rax, %r13
+	adcx	%rcx, %r11
+
+	.byte	0xc4,0x62,0xf3,0xf6,0xb6,0x30,0x00,0x00,0x00	# mulx	48($inp), %rcx, %r14
+	adcx	%rax, %r12
+	adcx	%rcx, %r13
+
+	.byte	0xc4,0x62,0xfb,0xf6,0xbe,0x38,0x00,0x00,0x00	# mulx	56($inp), %rax, %r15
+	adcx	%rax, %r14
+	adcx	%rbp, %r15		# %rbp is 0
+
+	mov	%r9, %rcx
+	shld	\$1, %r8, %r9
+	shl	\$1, %r8
+
+	xor	%ebp, %ebp
+	mulx	%rdx, %rax, %rdx
+	adcx	%rdx, %r8
+	 mov	8($inp), %rdx
+	adcx	%rbp, %r9
+
+	mov	%rax, (%rsp)
+	mov	%r8, 8(%rsp)
+
+#second iteration	
+	mulx	16($inp), %rax, %rbx
+	adox	%rax, %r10
+	adcx	%rbx, %r11
+
+	.byte	0xc4,0x62,0xc3,0xf6,0x86,0x18,0x00,0x00,0x00	# mulx	24($inp), $out, %r8
+	adox	$out, %r11
+	adcx	%r8, %r12
+
+	mulx	32($inp), %rax, %rbx
+	adox	%rax, %r12
+	adcx	%rbx, %r13
+
+	mulx	40($inp), $out, %r8
+	adox	$out, %r13
+	adcx	%r8, %r14
+
+	.byte	0xc4,0xe2,0xfb,0xf6,0x9e,0x30,0x00,0x00,0x00	# mulx	48($inp), %rax, %rbx
+	adox	%rax, %r14
+	adcx	%rbx, %r15
+
+	.byte	0xc4,0x62,0xc3,0xf6,0x86,0x38,0x00,0x00,0x00	# mulx	56($inp), $out, %r8
+	adox	$out, %r15
+	adcx	%rbp, %r8
+	adox	%rbp, %r8
+
+	mov	%r11, %rbx
+	shld	\$1, %r10, %r11
+	shld	\$1, %rcx, %r10
+
+	xor	%ebp,%ebp
+	mulx	%rdx, %rax, %rcx
+	 mov	16($inp), %rdx
+	adcx	%rax, %r9
+	adcx	%rcx, %r10
+	adcx	%rbp, %r11
+
+	mov	%r9, 16(%rsp)
+	.byte	0x4c,0x89,0x94,0x24,0x18,0x00,0x00,0x00		# mov	%r10, 24(%rsp)
+	
+#third iteration	
+	.byte	0xc4,0x62,0xc3,0xf6,0x8e,0x18,0x00,0x00,0x00	# mulx	24($inp), $out, %r9
+	adox	$out, %r12
+	adcx	%r9, %r13
+
+	mulx	32($inp), %rax, %rcx
+	adox	%rax, %r13
+	adcx	%rcx, %r14
+
+	mulx	40($inp), $out, %r9
+	adox	$out, %r14
+	adcx	%r9, %r15
+
+	.byte	0xc4,0xe2,0xfb,0xf6,0x8e,0x30,0x00,0x00,0x00	# mulx	48($inp), %rax, %rcx
+	adox	%rax, %r15
+	adcx	%rcx, %r8
+
+	.byte	0xc4,0x62,0xc3,0xf6,0x8e,0x38,0x00,0x00,0x00	# mulx	56($inp), $out, %r9
+	adox	$out, %r8
+	adcx	%rbp, %r9
+	adox	%rbp, %r9
+
+	mov	%r13, %rcx
+	shld	\$1, %r12, %r13
+	shld	\$1, %rbx, %r12
+
+	xor	%ebp, %ebp
+	mulx	%rdx, %rax, %rdx
+	adcx	%rax, %r11
+	adcx	%rdx, %r12
+	 mov	24($inp), %rdx
+	adcx	%rbp, %r13
+
+	mov	%r11, 32(%rsp)
+	.byte	0x4c,0x89,0xa4,0x24,0x28,0x00,0x00,0x00		# mov	%r12, 40(%rsp)
+	
+#fourth iteration	
+	.byte	0xc4,0xe2,0xfb,0xf6,0x9e,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00	# mulx	32($inp), %rax, %rbx
+	adox	%rax, %r14
+	adcx	%rbx, %r15
+
+	mulx	40($inp), $out, %r10
+	adox	$out, %r15
+	adcx	%r10, %r8
+
+	mulx	48($inp), %rax, %rbx
+	adox	%rax, %r8
+	adcx	%rbx, %r9
+
+	mulx	56($inp), $out, %r10
+	adox	$out, %r9
+	adcx	%rbp, %r10
+	adox	%rbp, %r10
+
+	.byte	0x66
+	mov	%r15, %rbx
+	shld	\$1, %r14, %r15
+	shld	\$1, %rcx, %r14
+
+	xor	%ebp, %ebp
+	mulx	%rdx, %rax, %rdx
+	adcx	%rax, %r13
+	adcx	%rdx, %r14
+	 mov	32($inp), %rdx
+	adcx	%rbp, %r15
+
+	mov	%r13, 48(%rsp)
+	mov	%r14, 56(%rsp)
+	
+#fifth iteration	
+	.byte	0xc4,0x62,0xc3,0xf6,0x9e,0x28,0x00,0x00,0x00	# mulx	40($inp), $out, %r11
+	adox	$out, %r8
+	adcx	%r11, %r9
+
+	mulx	48($inp), %rax, %rcx
+	adox	%rax, %r9
+	adcx	%rcx, %r10
+
+	mulx	56($inp), $out, %r11
+	adox	$out, %r10
+	adcx	%rbp, %r11
+	adox	%rbp, %r11
+
+	mov	%r9, %rcx
+	shld	\$1, %r8, %r9
+	shld	\$1, %rbx, %r8
+
+	xor	%ebp, %ebp
+	mulx	%rdx, %rax, %rdx
+	adcx	%rax, %r15
+	adcx	%rdx, %r8
+	 mov	40($inp), %rdx
+	adcx	%rbp, %r9
+
+	mov	%r15, 64(%rsp)
+	mov	%r8, 72(%rsp)
+	
+#sixth iteration	
+	.byte	0xc4,0xe2,0xfb,0xf6,0x9e,0x30,0x00,0x00,0x00	# mulx	48($inp), %rax, %rbx
+	adox	%rax, %r10
+	adcx	%rbx, %r11
+
+	.byte	0xc4,0x62,0xc3,0xf6,0xa6,0x38,0x00,0x00,0x00	# mulx	56($inp), $out, %r12
+	adox	$out, %r11
+	adcx	%rbp, %r12
+	adox	%rbp, %r12
+
+	mov	%r11, %rbx
+	shld	\$1, %r10, %r11
+	shld	\$1, %rcx, %r10
+
+	xor	%ebp, %ebp
+	mulx	%rdx, %rax, %rdx
+	adcx	%rax, %r9
+	adcx	%rdx, %r10
+	 mov	48($inp), %rdx
+	adcx	%rbp, %r11
+
+	mov	%r9, 80(%rsp)
+	mov	%r10, 88(%rsp)
+
+#seventh iteration
+	.byte	0xc4,0x62,0xfb,0xf6,0xae,0x38,0x00,0x00,0x00	# mulx	56($inp), %rax, %r13
+	adox	%rax, %r12
+	adox	%rbp, %r13
+
+	xor	%r14, %r14
+	shld	\$1, %r13, %r14
+	shld	\$1, %r12, %r13
+	shld	\$1, %rbx, %r12
+
+	xor	%ebp, %ebp
+	mulx	%rdx, %rax, %rdx
+	adcx	%rax, %r11
+	adcx	%rdx, %r12
+	 mov	56($inp), %rdx
+	adcx	%rbp, %r13
+
+	.byte	0x4c,0x89,0x9c,0x24,0x60,0x00,0x00,0x00		# mov	%r11, 96(%rsp)
+	.byte	0x4c,0x89,0xa4,0x24,0x68,0x00,0x00,0x00		# mov	%r12, 104(%rsp)
+
+#eighth iteration
+	mulx	%rdx, %rax, %rdx
+	adox	%rax, %r13
+	adox	%rbp, %rdx
+
+	.byte	0x66
+	add	%rdx, %r14
+
+	movq	%r13, 112(%rsp)
+	movq	%r14, 120(%rsp)
+	movq	%xmm0, $out
+	movq	%xmm1, %rbp
+
+	movq	128(%rsp), %rdx		# pull $n0
+	movq	(%rsp), %r8
+	movq	8(%rsp), %r9
+	movq	16(%rsp), %r10
+	movq	24(%rsp), %r11
+	movq	32(%rsp), %r12
+	movq	40(%rsp), %r13
+	movq	48(%rsp), %r14
+	movq	56(%rsp), %r15
+
+	call	__rsaz_512_reducex
+
+	addq	64(%rsp), %r8
+	adcq	72(%rsp), %r9
+	adcq	80(%rsp), %r10
+	adcq	88(%rsp), %r11
+	adcq	96(%rsp), %r12
+	adcq	104(%rsp), %r13
+	adcq	112(%rsp), %r14
+	adcq	120(%rsp), %r15
+	sbbq	%rcx, %rcx
+
+	call	__rsaz_512_subtract
+
+	movq	%r8, %rdx
+	movq	%r9, %rax
+	movl	128+8(%rsp), $times
+	movq	$out, $inp
+
+	decl	$times
+	jnz	.Loop_sqrx
+
+.Lsqr_tail:
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+
+	leaq	128+24+48(%rsp), %rax
+	movq	-48(%rax), %r15
+	movq	-40(%rax), %r14
+	movq	-32(%rax), %r13
+	movq	-24(%rax), %r12
+	movq	-16(%rax), %rbp
+	movq	-8(%rax), %rbx
+	leaq	(%rax), %rsp
+.Lsqr_epilogue:
+	ret
+.size	rsaz_512_sqr,.-rsaz_512_sqr
+___
+}
+{
+my ($out,$ap,$bp,$mod,$n0) = ("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx","%rcx","%r8");
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	rsaz_512_mul
+.type	rsaz_512_mul,\@function,5
+.align	32
+rsaz_512_mul:
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+
+	subq	\$128+24, %rsp
+.Lmul_body:
+	movq	$out, %xmm0		# off-load arguments
+	movq	$mod, %xmm1
+	movq	$n0, 128(%rsp)
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($addx);
+	movl	\$0x80100,%r11d
+	andl	OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+8(%rip),%r11d
+	cmpl	\$0x80100,%r11d		# check for MULX and ADO/CX
+	je	.Lmulx
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	movq	($bp), %rbx		# pass b[0]
+	movq	$bp, %rbp		# pass argument
+	call	__rsaz_512_mul
+
+	movq	%xmm0, $out
+	movq	%xmm1, %rbp
+
+	movq	(%rsp), %r8
+	movq	8(%rsp), %r9
+	movq	16(%rsp), %r10
+	movq	24(%rsp), %r11
+	movq	32(%rsp), %r12
+	movq	40(%rsp), %r13
+	movq	48(%rsp), %r14
+	movq	56(%rsp), %r15
+
+	call	__rsaz_512_reduce
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($addx);
+	jmp	.Lmul_tail
+
+.align	32
+.Lmulx:
+	movq	$bp, %rbp		# pass argument
+	movq	($bp), %rdx		# pass b[0]
+	call	__rsaz_512_mulx
+
+	movq	%xmm0, $out
+	movq	%xmm1, %rbp
+
+	movq	128(%rsp), %rdx		# pull $n0
+	movq	(%rsp), %r8
+	movq	8(%rsp), %r9
+	movq	16(%rsp), %r10
+	movq	24(%rsp), %r11
+	movq	32(%rsp), %r12
+	movq	40(%rsp), %r13
+	movq	48(%rsp), %r14
+	movq	56(%rsp), %r15
+
+	call	__rsaz_512_reducex
+.Lmul_tail:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	addq	64(%rsp), %r8
+	adcq	72(%rsp), %r9
+	adcq	80(%rsp), %r10
+	adcq	88(%rsp), %r11
+	adcq	96(%rsp), %r12
+	adcq	104(%rsp), %r13
+	adcq	112(%rsp), %r14
+	adcq	120(%rsp), %r15
+	sbbq	%rcx, %rcx
+
+	call	__rsaz_512_subtract
+
+	leaq	128+24+48(%rsp), %rax
+	movq	-48(%rax), %r15
+	movq	-40(%rax), %r14
+	movq	-32(%rax), %r13
+	movq	-24(%rax), %r12
+	movq	-16(%rax), %rbp
+	movq	-8(%rax), %rbx
+	leaq	(%rax), %rsp
+.Lmul_epilogue:
+	ret
+.size	rsaz_512_mul,.-rsaz_512_mul
+___
+}
+{
+my ($out,$ap,$bp,$mod,$n0,$pwr) = ("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx","%rcx","%r8","%r9d");
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	rsaz_512_mul_gather4
+.type	rsaz_512_mul_gather4,\@function,6
+.align	32
+rsaz_512_mul_gather4:
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+
+	subq	\$`128+24+($win64?0xb0:0)`, %rsp
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($win64);
+	movaps	%xmm6,0xa0(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm7,0xb0(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm8,0xc0(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm9,0xd0(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm10,0xe0(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm11,0xf0(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm12,0x100(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm13,0x110(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm14,0x120(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm15,0x130(%rsp)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+.Lmul_gather4_body:
+	movd	$pwr,%xmm8
+	movdqa	.Linc+16(%rip),%xmm1	# 00000002000000020000000200000002
+	movdqa	.Linc(%rip),%xmm0	# 00000001000000010000000000000000
+
+	pshufd	\$0,%xmm8,%xmm8		# broadcast $power
+	movdqa	%xmm1,%xmm7
+	movdqa	%xmm1,%xmm2
+___
+########################################################################
+# calculate mask by comparing 0..15 to $power
+#
+for($i=0;$i<4;$i++) {
+$code.=<<___;
+	paddd	%xmm`$i`,%xmm`$i+1`
+	pcmpeqd	%xmm8,%xmm`$i`
+	movdqa	%xmm7,%xmm`$i+3`
+___
+}
+for(;$i<7;$i++) {
+$code.=<<___;
+	paddd	%xmm`$i`,%xmm`$i+1`
+	pcmpeqd	%xmm8,%xmm`$i`
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	pcmpeqd	%xmm8,%xmm7
+
+	movdqa	16*0($bp),%xmm8
+	movdqa	16*1($bp),%xmm9
+	movdqa	16*2($bp),%xmm10
+	movdqa	16*3($bp),%xmm11
+	pand	%xmm0,%xmm8
+	movdqa	16*4($bp),%xmm12
+	pand	%xmm1,%xmm9
+	movdqa	16*5($bp),%xmm13
+	pand	%xmm2,%xmm10
+	movdqa	16*6($bp),%xmm14
+	pand	%xmm3,%xmm11
+	movdqa	16*7($bp),%xmm15
+	leaq	128($bp), %rbp
+	pand	%xmm4,%xmm12
+	pand	%xmm5,%xmm13
+	pand	%xmm6,%xmm14
+	pand	%xmm7,%xmm15
+	por	%xmm10,%xmm8
+	por	%xmm11,%xmm9
+	por	%xmm12,%xmm8
+	por	%xmm13,%xmm9
+	por	%xmm14,%xmm8
+	por	%xmm15,%xmm9
+
+	por	%xmm9,%xmm8
+	pshufd	\$0x4e,%xmm8,%xmm9
+	por	%xmm9,%xmm8
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($addx);
+	movl	\$0x80100,%r11d
+	andl	OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+8(%rip),%r11d
+	cmpl	\$0x80100,%r11d		# check for MULX and ADO/CX
+	je	.Lmulx_gather
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	movq	%xmm8,%rbx
+
+	movq	$n0, 128(%rsp)		# off-load arguments
+	movq	$out, 128+8(%rsp)
+	movq	$mod, 128+16(%rsp)
+
+	movq	($ap), %rax
+	 movq	8($ap), %rcx
+	mulq	%rbx			# 0 iteration
+	movq	%rax, (%rsp)
+	movq	%rcx, %rax
+	movq	%rdx, %r8
+
+	mulq	%rbx
+	addq	%rax, %r8
+	movq	16($ap), %rax
+	movq	%rdx, %r9
+	adcq	\$0, %r9
+
+	mulq	%rbx
+	addq	%rax, %r9
+	movq	24($ap), %rax
+	movq	%rdx, %r10
+	adcq	\$0, %r10
+
+	mulq	%rbx
+	addq	%rax, %r10
+	movq	32($ap), %rax
+	movq	%rdx, %r11
+	adcq	\$0, %r11
+
+	mulq	%rbx
+	addq	%rax, %r11
+	movq	40($ap), %rax
+	movq	%rdx, %r12
+	adcq	\$0, %r12
+
+	mulq	%rbx
+	addq	%rax, %r12
+	movq	48($ap), %rax
+	movq	%rdx, %r13
+	adcq	\$0, %r13
+
+	mulq	%rbx
+	addq	%rax, %r13
+	movq	56($ap), %rax
+	movq	%rdx, %r14
+	adcq	\$0, %r14
+	
+	mulq	%rbx
+	addq	%rax, %r14
+	 movq	($ap), %rax
+	movq	%rdx, %r15
+	adcq	\$0, %r15
+
+	leaq	8(%rsp), %rdi
+	movl	\$7, %ecx
+	jmp	.Loop_mul_gather
+
+.align	32
+.Loop_mul_gather:
+	movdqa	16*0(%rbp),%xmm8
+	movdqa	16*1(%rbp),%xmm9
+	movdqa	16*2(%rbp),%xmm10
+	movdqa	16*3(%rbp),%xmm11
+	pand	%xmm0,%xmm8
+	movdqa	16*4(%rbp),%xmm12
+	pand	%xmm1,%xmm9
+	movdqa	16*5(%rbp),%xmm13
+	pand	%xmm2,%xmm10
+	movdqa	16*6(%rbp),%xmm14
+	pand	%xmm3,%xmm11
+	movdqa	16*7(%rbp),%xmm15
+	leaq	128(%rbp), %rbp
+	pand	%xmm4,%xmm12
+	pand	%xmm5,%xmm13
+	pand	%xmm6,%xmm14
+	pand	%xmm7,%xmm15
+	por	%xmm10,%xmm8
+	por	%xmm11,%xmm9
+	por	%xmm12,%xmm8
+	por	%xmm13,%xmm9
+	por	%xmm14,%xmm8
+	por	%xmm15,%xmm9
+
+	por	%xmm9,%xmm8
+	pshufd	\$0x4e,%xmm8,%xmm9
+	por	%xmm9,%xmm8
+	movq	%xmm8,%rbx
+
+	mulq	%rbx
+	addq	%rax, %r8
+	movq	8($ap), %rax
+	movq	%r8, (%rdi)
+	movq	%rdx, %r8
+	adcq	\$0, %r8
+
+	mulq	%rbx
+	addq	%rax, %r9
+	movq	16($ap), %rax
+	adcq	\$0, %rdx
+	addq	%r9, %r8
+	movq	%rdx, %r9
+	adcq	\$0, %r9
+
+	mulq	%rbx
+	addq	%rax, %r10
+	movq	24($ap), %rax
+	adcq	\$0, %rdx
+	addq	%r10, %r9
+	movq	%rdx, %r10
+	adcq	\$0, %r10
+
+	mulq	%rbx
+	addq	%rax, %r11
+	movq	32($ap), %rax
+	adcq	\$0, %rdx
+	addq	%r11, %r10
+	movq	%rdx, %r11
+	adcq	\$0, %r11
+
+	mulq	%rbx
+	addq	%rax, %r12
+	movq	40($ap), %rax
+	adcq	\$0, %rdx
+	addq	%r12, %r11
+	movq	%rdx, %r12
+	adcq	\$0, %r12
+
+	mulq	%rbx
+	addq	%rax, %r13
+	movq	48($ap), %rax
+	adcq	\$0, %rdx
+	addq	%r13, %r12
+	movq	%rdx, %r13
+	adcq	\$0, %r13
+
+	mulq	%rbx
+	addq	%rax, %r14
+	movq	56($ap), %rax
+	adcq	\$0, %rdx
+	addq	%r14, %r13
+	movq	%rdx, %r14
+	adcq	\$0, %r14
+
+	mulq	%rbx
+	addq	%rax, %r15
+	 movq	($ap), %rax
+	adcq	\$0, %rdx
+	addq	%r15, %r14
+	movq	%rdx, %r15	
+	adcq	\$0, %r15
+
+	leaq	8(%rdi), %rdi
+
+	decl	%ecx
+	jnz	.Loop_mul_gather
+
+	movq	%r8, (%rdi)
+	movq	%r9, 8(%rdi)
+	movq	%r10, 16(%rdi)
+	movq	%r11, 24(%rdi)
+	movq	%r12, 32(%rdi)
+	movq	%r13, 40(%rdi)
+	movq	%r14, 48(%rdi)
+	movq	%r15, 56(%rdi)
+
+	movq	128+8(%rsp), $out
+	movq	128+16(%rsp), %rbp
+
+	movq	(%rsp), %r8
+	movq	8(%rsp), %r9
+	movq	16(%rsp), %r10
+	movq	24(%rsp), %r11
+	movq	32(%rsp), %r12
+	movq	40(%rsp), %r13
+	movq	48(%rsp), %r14
+	movq	56(%rsp), %r15
+
+	call	__rsaz_512_reduce
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($addx);
+	jmp	.Lmul_gather_tail
+
+.align	32
+.Lmulx_gather:
+	movq	%xmm8,%rdx
+
+	mov	$n0, 128(%rsp)		# off-load arguments
+	mov	$out, 128+8(%rsp)
+	mov	$mod, 128+16(%rsp)
+
+	mulx	($ap), %rbx, %r8	# 0 iteration
+	mov	%rbx, (%rsp)
+	xor	%edi, %edi		# cf=0, of=0
+
+	mulx	8($ap), %rax, %r9
+
+	mulx	16($ap), %rbx, %r10
+	adcx	%rax, %r8
+
+	mulx	24($ap), %rax, %r11
+	adcx	%rbx, %r9
+
+	mulx	32($ap), %rbx, %r12
+	adcx	%rax, %r10
+
+	mulx	40($ap), %rax, %r13
+	adcx	%rbx, %r11
+
+	mulx	48($ap), %rbx, %r14
+	adcx	%rax, %r12
+	
+	mulx	56($ap), %rax, %r15
+	adcx	%rbx, %r13
+	adcx	%rax, %r14
+	.byte	0x67
+	mov	%r8, %rbx
+	adcx	%rdi, %r15		# %rdi is 0
+
+	mov	\$-7, %rcx
+	jmp	.Loop_mulx_gather
+
+.align	32
+.Loop_mulx_gather:
+	movdqa	16*0(%rbp),%xmm8
+	movdqa	16*1(%rbp),%xmm9
+	movdqa	16*2(%rbp),%xmm10
+	movdqa	16*3(%rbp),%xmm11
+	pand	%xmm0,%xmm8
+	movdqa	16*4(%rbp),%xmm12
+	pand	%xmm1,%xmm9
+	movdqa	16*5(%rbp),%xmm13
+	pand	%xmm2,%xmm10
+	movdqa	16*6(%rbp),%xmm14
+	pand	%xmm3,%xmm11
+	movdqa	16*7(%rbp),%xmm15
+	leaq	128(%rbp), %rbp
+	pand	%xmm4,%xmm12
+	pand	%xmm5,%xmm13
+	pand	%xmm6,%xmm14
+	pand	%xmm7,%xmm15
+	por	%xmm10,%xmm8
+	por	%xmm11,%xmm9
+	por	%xmm12,%xmm8
+	por	%xmm13,%xmm9
+	por	%xmm14,%xmm8
+	por	%xmm15,%xmm9
+
+	por	%xmm9,%xmm8
+	pshufd	\$0x4e,%xmm8,%xmm9
+	por	%xmm9,%xmm8
+	movq	%xmm8,%rdx
+
+	.byte	0xc4,0x62,0xfb,0xf6,0x86,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00	# mulx	($ap), %rax, %r8
+	adcx	%rax, %rbx
+	adox	%r9, %r8
+
+	mulx	8($ap), %rax, %r9
+	adcx	%rax, %r8
+	adox	%r10, %r9
+
+	mulx	16($ap), %rax, %r10
+	adcx	%rax, %r9
+	adox	%r11, %r10
+
+	.byte	0xc4,0x62,0xfb,0xf6,0x9e,0x18,0x00,0x00,0x00	# mulx	24($ap), %rax, %r11
+	adcx	%rax, %r10
+	adox	%r12, %r11
+
+	mulx	32($ap), %rax, %r12
+	adcx	%rax, %r11
+	adox	%r13, %r12
+
+	mulx	40($ap), %rax, %r13
+	adcx	%rax, %r12
+	adox	%r14, %r13
+
+	.byte	0xc4,0x62,0xfb,0xf6,0xb6,0x30,0x00,0x00,0x00	# mulx	48($ap), %rax, %r14
+	adcx	%rax, %r13
+	.byte	0x67
+	adox	%r15, %r14
+
+	mulx	56($ap), %rax, %r15
+	 mov	%rbx, 64(%rsp,%rcx,8)
+	adcx	%rax, %r14
+	adox	%rdi, %r15
+	mov	%r8, %rbx
+	adcx	%rdi, %r15		# cf=0
+
+	inc	%rcx			# of=0
+	jnz	.Loop_mulx_gather
+
+	mov	%r8, 64(%rsp)
+	mov	%r9, 64+8(%rsp)
+	mov	%r10, 64+16(%rsp)
+	mov	%r11, 64+24(%rsp)
+	mov	%r12, 64+32(%rsp)
+	mov	%r13, 64+40(%rsp)
+	mov	%r14, 64+48(%rsp)
+	mov	%r15, 64+56(%rsp)
+
+	mov	128(%rsp), %rdx		# pull arguments
+	mov	128+8(%rsp), $out
+	mov	128+16(%rsp), %rbp
+
+	mov	(%rsp), %r8
+	mov	8(%rsp), %r9
+	mov	16(%rsp), %r10
+	mov	24(%rsp), %r11
+	mov	32(%rsp), %r12
+	mov	40(%rsp), %r13
+	mov	48(%rsp), %r14
+	mov	56(%rsp), %r15
+
+	call	__rsaz_512_reducex
+
+.Lmul_gather_tail:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	addq	64(%rsp), %r8
+	adcq	72(%rsp), %r9
+	adcq	80(%rsp), %r10
+	adcq	88(%rsp), %r11
+	adcq	96(%rsp), %r12
+	adcq	104(%rsp), %r13
+	adcq	112(%rsp), %r14
+	adcq	120(%rsp), %r15
+	sbbq	%rcx, %rcx
+
+	call	__rsaz_512_subtract
+
+	leaq	128+24+48(%rsp), %rax
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($win64);
+	movaps	0xa0-0xc8(%rax),%xmm6
+	movaps	0xb0-0xc8(%rax),%xmm7
+	movaps	0xc0-0xc8(%rax),%xmm8
+	movaps	0xd0-0xc8(%rax),%xmm9
+	movaps	0xe0-0xc8(%rax),%xmm10
+	movaps	0xf0-0xc8(%rax),%xmm11
+	movaps	0x100-0xc8(%rax),%xmm12
+	movaps	0x110-0xc8(%rax),%xmm13
+	movaps	0x120-0xc8(%rax),%xmm14
+	movaps	0x130-0xc8(%rax),%xmm15
+	lea	0xb0(%rax),%rax
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	movq	-48(%rax), %r15
+	movq	-40(%rax), %r14
+	movq	-32(%rax), %r13
+	movq	-24(%rax), %r12
+	movq	-16(%rax), %rbp
+	movq	-8(%rax), %rbx
+	leaq	(%rax), %rsp
+.Lmul_gather4_epilogue:
+	ret
+.size	rsaz_512_mul_gather4,.-rsaz_512_mul_gather4
+___
+}
+{
+my ($out,$ap,$mod,$n0,$tbl,$pwr) = ("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx","%rcx","%r8","%r9d");
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	rsaz_512_mul_scatter4
+.type	rsaz_512_mul_scatter4,\@function,6
+.align	32
+rsaz_512_mul_scatter4:
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+
+	mov	$pwr, $pwr
+	subq	\$128+24, %rsp
+.Lmul_scatter4_body:
+	leaq	($tbl,$pwr,8), $tbl
+	movq	$out, %xmm0		# off-load arguments
+	movq	$mod, %xmm1
+	movq	$tbl, %xmm2
+	movq	$n0, 128(%rsp)
+
+	movq	$out, %rbp
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($addx);
+	movl	\$0x80100,%r11d
+	andl	OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+8(%rip),%r11d
+	cmpl	\$0x80100,%r11d		# check for MULX and ADO/CX
+	je	.Lmulx_scatter
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	movq	($out),%rbx		# pass b[0]
+	call	__rsaz_512_mul
+
+	movq	%xmm0, $out
+	movq	%xmm1, %rbp
+
+	movq	(%rsp), %r8
+	movq	8(%rsp), %r9
+	movq	16(%rsp), %r10
+	movq	24(%rsp), %r11
+	movq	32(%rsp), %r12
+	movq	40(%rsp), %r13
+	movq	48(%rsp), %r14
+	movq	56(%rsp), %r15
+
+	call	__rsaz_512_reduce
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($addx);
+	jmp	.Lmul_scatter_tail
+	
+.align	32
+.Lmulx_scatter:
+	movq	($out), %rdx		# pass b[0]
+	call	__rsaz_512_mulx
+
+	movq	%xmm0, $out
+	movq	%xmm1, %rbp
+
+	movq	128(%rsp), %rdx		# pull $n0
+	movq	(%rsp), %r8
+	movq	8(%rsp), %r9
+	movq	16(%rsp), %r10
+	movq	24(%rsp), %r11
+	movq	32(%rsp), %r12
+	movq	40(%rsp), %r13
+	movq	48(%rsp), %r14
+	movq	56(%rsp), %r15
+
+	call	__rsaz_512_reducex
+
+.Lmul_scatter_tail:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	addq	64(%rsp), %r8
+	adcq	72(%rsp), %r9
+	adcq	80(%rsp), %r10
+	adcq	88(%rsp), %r11
+	adcq	96(%rsp), %r12
+	adcq	104(%rsp), %r13
+	adcq	112(%rsp), %r14
+	adcq	120(%rsp), %r15
+	movq	%xmm2, $inp
+	sbbq	%rcx, %rcx
+
+	call	__rsaz_512_subtract
+
+	movq	%r8, 128*0($inp)	# scatter
+	movq	%r9, 128*1($inp)
+	movq	%r10, 128*2($inp)
+	movq	%r11, 128*3($inp)
+	movq	%r12, 128*4($inp)
+	movq	%r13, 128*5($inp)
+	movq	%r14, 128*6($inp)
+	movq	%r15, 128*7($inp)
+
+	leaq	128+24+48(%rsp), %rax
+	movq	-48(%rax), %r15
+	movq	-40(%rax), %r14
+	movq	-32(%rax), %r13
+	movq	-24(%rax), %r12
+	movq	-16(%rax), %rbp
+	movq	-8(%rax), %rbx
+	leaq	(%rax), %rsp
+.Lmul_scatter4_epilogue:
+	ret
+.size	rsaz_512_mul_scatter4,.-rsaz_512_mul_scatter4
+___
+}
+{
+my ($out,$inp,$mod,$n0) = ("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx","%rcx");
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	rsaz_512_mul_by_one
+.type	rsaz_512_mul_by_one,\@function,4
+.align	32
+rsaz_512_mul_by_one:
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+
+	subq	\$128+24, %rsp
+.Lmul_by_one_body:
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($addx);
+	movl	OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+8(%rip),%eax
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	movq	$mod, %rbp	# reassign argument
+	movq	$n0, 128(%rsp)
+
+	movq	($inp), %r8
+	pxor	%xmm0, %xmm0
+	movq	8($inp), %r9
+	movq	16($inp), %r10
+	movq	24($inp), %r11
+	movq	32($inp), %r12
+	movq	40($inp), %r13
+	movq	48($inp), %r14
+	movq	56($inp), %r15
+
+	movdqa	%xmm0, (%rsp)
+	movdqa	%xmm0, 16(%rsp)
+	movdqa	%xmm0, 32(%rsp)
+	movdqa	%xmm0, 48(%rsp)
+	movdqa	%xmm0, 64(%rsp)
+	movdqa	%xmm0, 80(%rsp)
+	movdqa	%xmm0, 96(%rsp)
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($addx);
+	andl	\$0x80100,%eax
+	cmpl	\$0x80100,%eax		# check for MULX and ADO/CX
+	je	.Lby_one_callx
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	call	__rsaz_512_reduce
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($addx);
+	jmp	.Lby_one_tail
+.align	32
+.Lby_one_callx:
+	movq	128(%rsp), %rdx		# pull $n0
+	call	__rsaz_512_reducex
+.Lby_one_tail:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	movq	%r8, ($out)
+	movq	%r9, 8($out)
+	movq	%r10, 16($out)
+	movq	%r11, 24($out)
+	movq	%r12, 32($out)
+	movq	%r13, 40($out)
+	movq	%r14, 48($out)
+	movq	%r15, 56($out)
+
+	leaq	128+24+48(%rsp), %rax
+	movq	-48(%rax), %r15
+	movq	-40(%rax), %r14
+	movq	-32(%rax), %r13
+	movq	-24(%rax), %r12
+	movq	-16(%rax), %rbp
+	movq	-8(%rax), %rbx
+	leaq	(%rax), %rsp
+.Lmul_by_one_epilogue:
+	ret
+.size	rsaz_512_mul_by_one,.-rsaz_512_mul_by_one
+___
+}
+{	# __rsaz_512_reduce
+	#
+	# input:	%r8-%r15, %rbp - mod, 128(%rsp) - n0
+	# output:	%r8-%r15
+	# clobbers:	everything except %rbp and %rdi
+$code.=<<___;
+.type	__rsaz_512_reduce,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	32
+__rsaz_512_reduce:
+	movq	%r8, %rbx
+	imulq	128+8(%rsp), %rbx
+	movq	0(%rbp), %rax
+	movl	\$8, %ecx
+	jmp	.Lreduction_loop
+
+.align	32
+.Lreduction_loop:
+	mulq	%rbx
+	movq	8(%rbp), %rax
+	negq	%r8
+	movq	%rdx, %r8
+	adcq	\$0, %r8
+
+	mulq	%rbx
+	addq	%rax, %r9
+	movq	16(%rbp), %rax
+	adcq	\$0, %rdx
+	addq	%r9, %r8
+	movq	%rdx, %r9
+	adcq	\$0, %r9
+
+	mulq	%rbx
+	addq	%rax, %r10
+	movq	24(%rbp), %rax
+	adcq	\$0, %rdx
+	addq	%r10, %r9
+	movq	%rdx, %r10
+	adcq	\$0, %r10
+
+	mulq	%rbx
+	addq	%rax, %r11
+	movq	32(%rbp), %rax
+	adcq	\$0, %rdx
+	addq	%r11, %r10
+	 movq	128+8(%rsp), %rsi
+	#movq	%rdx, %r11
+	#adcq	\$0, %r11
+	adcq	\$0, %rdx
+	movq	%rdx, %r11
+
+	mulq	%rbx
+	addq	%rax, %r12
+	movq	40(%rbp), %rax
+	adcq	\$0, %rdx
+	 imulq	%r8, %rsi
+	addq	%r12, %r11
+	movq	%rdx, %r12
+	adcq	\$0, %r12
+
+	mulq	%rbx
+	addq	%rax, %r13
+	movq	48(%rbp), %rax
+	adcq	\$0, %rdx
+	addq	%r13, %r12
+	movq	%rdx, %r13
+	adcq	\$0, %r13
+
+	mulq	%rbx
+	addq	%rax, %r14
+	movq	56(%rbp), %rax
+	adcq	\$0, %rdx
+	addq	%r14, %r13
+	movq	%rdx, %r14
+	adcq	\$0, %r14
+
+	mulq	%rbx
+	 movq	%rsi, %rbx
+	addq	%rax, %r15
+	 movq	0(%rbp), %rax
+	adcq	\$0, %rdx
+	addq	%r15, %r14
+	movq	%rdx, %r15
+	adcq	\$0, %r15
+
+	decl	%ecx
+	jne	.Lreduction_loop
+
+	ret
+.size	__rsaz_512_reduce,.-__rsaz_512_reduce
+___
+}
+if ($addx) {
+	# __rsaz_512_reducex
+	#
+	# input:	%r8-%r15, %rbp - mod, 128(%rsp) - n0
+	# output:	%r8-%r15
+	# clobbers:	everything except %rbp and %rdi
+$code.=<<___;
+.type	__rsaz_512_reducex,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	32
+__rsaz_512_reducex:
+	#movq	128+8(%rsp), %rdx		# pull $n0
+	imulq	%r8, %rdx
+	xorq	%rsi, %rsi			# cf=0,of=0
+	movl	\$8, %ecx
+	jmp	.Lreduction_loopx
+
+.align	32
+.Lreduction_loopx:
+	mov	%r8, %rbx
+	mulx	0(%rbp), %rax, %r8
+	adcx	%rbx, %rax
+	adox	%r9, %r8
+
+	mulx	8(%rbp), %rax, %r9
+	adcx	%rax, %r8
+	adox	%r10, %r9
+
+	mulx	16(%rbp), %rbx, %r10
+	adcx	%rbx, %r9
+	adox	%r11, %r10
+
+	mulx	24(%rbp), %rbx, %r11
+	adcx	%rbx, %r10
+	adox	%r12, %r11
+
+	.byte	0xc4,0x62,0xe3,0xf6,0xa5,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00	# mulx	32(%rbp), %rbx, %r12
+	 mov	%rdx, %rax
+	 mov	%r8, %rdx
+	adcx	%rbx, %r11
+	adox	%r13, %r12
+
+	 mulx	128+8(%rsp), %rbx, %rdx
+	 mov	%rax, %rdx
+
+	mulx	40(%rbp), %rax, %r13
+	adcx	%rax, %r12
+	adox	%r14, %r13
+
+	.byte	0xc4,0x62,0xfb,0xf6,0xb5,0x30,0x00,0x00,0x00	# mulx	48(%rbp), %rax, %r14
+	adcx	%rax, %r13
+	adox	%r15, %r14
+
+	mulx	56(%rbp), %rax, %r15
+	 mov	%rbx, %rdx
+	adcx	%rax, %r14
+	adox	%rsi, %r15			# %rsi is 0
+	adcx	%rsi, %r15			# cf=0
+
+	decl	%ecx				# of=0
+	jne	.Lreduction_loopx
+
+	ret
+.size	__rsaz_512_reducex,.-__rsaz_512_reducex
+___
+}
+{	# __rsaz_512_subtract
+	# input: %r8-%r15, %rdi - $out, %rbp - $mod, %rcx - mask
+	# output:
+	# clobbers: everything but %rdi, %rsi and %rbp
+$code.=<<___;
+.type	__rsaz_512_subtract,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	32
+__rsaz_512_subtract:
+	movq	%r8, ($out)
+	movq	%r9, 8($out)
+	movq	%r10, 16($out)
+	movq	%r11, 24($out)
+	movq	%r12, 32($out)
+	movq	%r13, 40($out)
+	movq	%r14, 48($out)
+	movq	%r15, 56($out)
+
+	movq	0($mod), %r8
+	movq	8($mod), %r9
+	negq	%r8
+	notq	%r9
+	andq	%rcx, %r8
+	movq	16($mod), %r10
+	andq	%rcx, %r9
+	notq	%r10
+	movq	24($mod), %r11
+	andq	%rcx, %r10
+	notq	%r11
+	movq	32($mod), %r12
+	andq	%rcx, %r11
+	notq	%r12
+	movq	40($mod), %r13
+	andq	%rcx, %r12
+	notq	%r13
+	movq	48($mod), %r14
+	andq	%rcx, %r13
+	notq	%r14
+	movq	56($mod), %r15
+	andq	%rcx, %r14
+	notq	%r15
+	andq	%rcx, %r15
+
+	addq	($out), %r8
+	adcq	8($out), %r9
+	adcq	16($out), %r10
+	adcq	24($out), %r11
+	adcq	32($out), %r12
+	adcq	40($out), %r13
+	adcq	48($out), %r14
+	adcq	56($out), %r15
+
+	movq	%r8, ($out)
+	movq	%r9, 8($out)
+	movq	%r10, 16($out)
+	movq	%r11, 24($out)
+	movq	%r12, 32($out)
+	movq	%r13, 40($out)
+	movq	%r14, 48($out)
+	movq	%r15, 56($out)
+
+	ret
+.size	__rsaz_512_subtract,.-__rsaz_512_subtract
+___
+}
+{	# __rsaz_512_mul
+	#
+	# input: %rsi - ap, %rbp - bp
+	# output:
+	# clobbers: everything
+my ($ap,$bp) = ("%rsi","%rbp");
+$code.=<<___;
+.type	__rsaz_512_mul,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	32
+__rsaz_512_mul:
+	leaq	8(%rsp), %rdi
+
+	movq	($ap), %rax
+	mulq	%rbx
+	movq	%rax, (%rdi)
+	movq	8($ap), %rax
+	movq	%rdx, %r8
+
+	mulq	%rbx
+	addq	%rax, %r8
+	movq	16($ap), %rax
+	movq	%rdx, %r9
+	adcq	\$0, %r9
+
+	mulq	%rbx
+	addq	%rax, %r9
+	movq	24($ap), %rax
+	movq	%rdx, %r10
+	adcq	\$0, %r10
+
+	mulq	%rbx
+	addq	%rax, %r10
+	movq	32($ap), %rax
+	movq	%rdx, %r11
+	adcq	\$0, %r11
+
+	mulq	%rbx
+	addq	%rax, %r11
+	movq	40($ap), %rax
+	movq	%rdx, %r12
+	adcq	\$0, %r12
+
+	mulq	%rbx
+	addq	%rax, %r12
+	movq	48($ap), %rax
+	movq	%rdx, %r13
+	adcq	\$0, %r13
+
+	mulq	%rbx
+	addq	%rax, %r13
+	movq	56($ap), %rax
+	movq	%rdx, %r14
+	adcq	\$0, %r14
+	
+	mulq	%rbx
+	addq	%rax, %r14
+	 movq	($ap), %rax
+	movq	%rdx, %r15
+	adcq	\$0, %r15
+
+	leaq	8($bp), $bp
+	leaq	8(%rdi), %rdi
+
+	movl	\$7, %ecx
+	jmp	.Loop_mul
+
+.align	32
+.Loop_mul:
+	movq	($bp), %rbx
+	mulq	%rbx
+	addq	%rax, %r8
+	movq	8($ap), %rax
+	movq	%r8, (%rdi)
+	movq	%rdx, %r8
+	adcq	\$0, %r8
+
+	mulq	%rbx
+	addq	%rax, %r9
+	movq	16($ap), %rax
+	adcq	\$0, %rdx
+	addq	%r9, %r8
+	movq	%rdx, %r9
+	adcq	\$0, %r9
+
+	mulq	%rbx
+	addq	%rax, %r10
+	movq	24($ap), %rax
+	adcq	\$0, %rdx
+	addq	%r10, %r9
+	movq	%rdx, %r10
+	adcq	\$0, %r10
+
+	mulq	%rbx
+	addq	%rax, %r11
+	movq	32($ap), %rax
+	adcq	\$0, %rdx
+	addq	%r11, %r10
+	movq	%rdx, %r11
+	adcq	\$0, %r11
+
+	mulq	%rbx
+	addq	%rax, %r12
+	movq	40($ap), %rax
+	adcq	\$0, %rdx
+	addq	%r12, %r11
+	movq	%rdx, %r12
+	adcq	\$0, %r12
+
+	mulq	%rbx
+	addq	%rax, %r13
+	movq	48($ap), %rax
+	adcq	\$0, %rdx
+	addq	%r13, %r12
+	movq	%rdx, %r13
+	adcq	\$0, %r13
+
+	mulq	%rbx
+	addq	%rax, %r14
+	movq	56($ap), %rax
+	adcq	\$0, %rdx
+	addq	%r14, %r13
+	movq	%rdx, %r14
+	 leaq	8($bp), $bp
+	adcq	\$0, %r14
+
+	mulq	%rbx
+	addq	%rax, %r15
+	 movq	($ap), %rax
+	adcq	\$0, %rdx
+	addq	%r15, %r14
+	movq	%rdx, %r15	
+	adcq	\$0, %r15
+
+	leaq	8(%rdi), %rdi
+
+	decl	%ecx
+	jnz	.Loop_mul
+
+	movq	%r8, (%rdi)
+	movq	%r9, 8(%rdi)
+	movq	%r10, 16(%rdi)
+	movq	%r11, 24(%rdi)
+	movq	%r12, 32(%rdi)
+	movq	%r13, 40(%rdi)
+	movq	%r14, 48(%rdi)
+	movq	%r15, 56(%rdi)
+
+	ret
+.size	__rsaz_512_mul,.-__rsaz_512_mul
+___
+}
+if ($addx) {
+	# __rsaz_512_mulx
+	#
+	# input: %rsi - ap, %rbp - bp
+	# output:
+	# clobbers: everything
+my ($ap,$bp,$zero) = ("%rsi","%rbp","%rdi");
+$code.=<<___;
+.type	__rsaz_512_mulx,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	32
+__rsaz_512_mulx:
+	mulx	($ap), %rbx, %r8	# initial %rdx preloaded by caller
+	mov	\$-6, %rcx
+
+	mulx	8($ap), %rax, %r9
+	movq	%rbx, 8(%rsp)
+
+	mulx	16($ap), %rbx, %r10
+	adc	%rax, %r8
+
+	mulx	24($ap), %rax, %r11
+	adc	%rbx, %r9
+
+	mulx	32($ap), %rbx, %r12
+	adc	%rax, %r10
+
+	mulx	40($ap), %rax, %r13
+	adc	%rbx, %r11
+
+	mulx	48($ap), %rbx, %r14
+	adc	%rax, %r12
+
+	mulx	56($ap), %rax, %r15
+	 mov	8($bp), %rdx
+	adc	%rbx, %r13
+	adc	%rax, %r14
+	adc	\$0, %r15
+
+	xor	$zero, $zero		# cf=0,of=0
+	jmp	.Loop_mulx
+
+.align	32
+.Loop_mulx:
+	movq	%r8, %rbx
+	mulx	($ap), %rax, %r8
+	adcx	%rax, %rbx
+	adox	%r9, %r8
+
+	mulx	8($ap), %rax, %r9
+	adcx	%rax, %r8
+	adox	%r10, %r9
+
+	mulx	16($ap), %rax, %r10
+	adcx	%rax, %r9
+	adox	%r11, %r10
+
+	mulx	24($ap), %rax, %r11
+	adcx	%rax, %r10
+	adox	%r12, %r11
+
+	.byte	0x3e,0xc4,0x62,0xfb,0xf6,0xa6,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00	# mulx	32($ap), %rax, %r12
+	adcx	%rax, %r11
+	adox	%r13, %r12
+
+	mulx	40($ap), %rax, %r13
+	adcx	%rax, %r12
+	adox	%r14, %r13
+
+	mulx	48($ap), %rax, %r14
+	adcx	%rax, %r13
+	adox	%r15, %r14
+
+	mulx	56($ap), %rax, %r15
+	 movq	64($bp,%rcx,8), %rdx
+	 movq	%rbx, 8+64-8(%rsp,%rcx,8)
+	adcx	%rax, %r14
+	adox	$zero, %r15
+	adcx	$zero, %r15		# cf=0
+
+	inc	%rcx			# of=0
+	jnz	.Loop_mulx
+
+	movq	%r8, %rbx
+	mulx	($ap), %rax, %r8
+	adcx	%rax, %rbx
+	adox	%r9, %r8
+
+	.byte	0xc4,0x62,0xfb,0xf6,0x8e,0x08,0x00,0x00,0x00	# mulx	8($ap), %rax, %r9
+	adcx	%rax, %r8
+	adox	%r10, %r9
+
+	.byte	0xc4,0x62,0xfb,0xf6,0x96,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x00	# mulx	16($ap), %rax, %r10
+	adcx	%rax, %r9
+	adox	%r11, %r10
+
+	mulx	24($ap), %rax, %r11
+	adcx	%rax, %r10
+	adox	%r12, %r11
+
+	mulx	32($ap), %rax, %r12
+	adcx	%rax, %r11
+	adox	%r13, %r12
+
+	mulx	40($ap), %rax, %r13
+	adcx	%rax, %r12
+	adox	%r14, %r13
+
+	.byte	0xc4,0x62,0xfb,0xf6,0xb6,0x30,0x00,0x00,0x00	# mulx	48($ap), %rax, %r14
+	adcx	%rax, %r13
+	adox	%r15, %r14
+
+	.byte	0xc4,0x62,0xfb,0xf6,0xbe,0x38,0x00,0x00,0x00	# mulx	56($ap), %rax, %r15
+	adcx	%rax, %r14
+	adox	$zero, %r15
+	adcx	$zero, %r15
+
+	mov	%rbx, 8+64-8(%rsp)
+	mov	%r8, 8+64(%rsp)
+	mov	%r9, 8+64+8(%rsp)
+	mov	%r10, 8+64+16(%rsp)
+	mov	%r11, 8+64+24(%rsp)
+	mov	%r12, 8+64+32(%rsp)
+	mov	%r13, 8+64+40(%rsp)
+	mov	%r14, 8+64+48(%rsp)
+	mov	%r15, 8+64+56(%rsp)
+
+	ret
+.size	__rsaz_512_mulx,.-__rsaz_512_mulx
+___
+}
+{
+my ($out,$inp,$power)= $win64 ? ("%rcx","%rdx","%r8d") : ("%rdi","%rsi","%edx");
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	rsaz_512_scatter4
+.type	rsaz_512_scatter4,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+rsaz_512_scatter4:
+	leaq	($out,$power,8), $out
+	movl	\$8, %r9d
+	jmp	.Loop_scatter
+.align	16
+.Loop_scatter:
+	movq	($inp), %rax
+	leaq	8($inp), $inp
+	movq	%rax, ($out)
+	leaq	128($out), $out
+	decl	%r9d
+	jnz	.Loop_scatter
+	ret
+.size	rsaz_512_scatter4,.-rsaz_512_scatter4
+
+.globl	rsaz_512_gather4
+.type	rsaz_512_gather4,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+rsaz_512_gather4:
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($win64);
+.LSEH_begin_rsaz_512_gather4:
+	.byte	0x48,0x81,0xec,0xa8,0x00,0x00,0x00	# sub    $0xa8,%rsp
+	.byte	0x0f,0x29,0x34,0x24			# movaps %xmm6,(%rsp)
+	.byte	0x0f,0x29,0x7c,0x24,0x10		# movaps %xmm7,0x10(%rsp)
+	.byte	0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x44,0x24,0x20		# movaps %xmm8,0x20(%rsp)
+	.byte	0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x4c,0x24,0x30		# movaps %xmm9,0x30(%rsp)
+	.byte	0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x54,0x24,0x40		# movaps %xmm10,0x40(%rsp)
+	.byte	0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x5c,0x24,0x50		# movaps %xmm11,0x50(%rsp)
+	.byte	0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x64,0x24,0x60		# movaps %xmm12,0x60(%rsp)
+	.byte	0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x6c,0x24,0x70		# movaps %xmm13,0x70(%rsp)
+	.byte	0x44,0x0f,0x29,0xb4,0x24,0x80,0,0,0	# movaps %xmm14,0x80(%rsp)
+	.byte	0x44,0x0f,0x29,0xbc,0x24,0x90,0,0,0	# movaps %xmm15,0x90(%rsp)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	movd	$power,%xmm8
+	movdqa	.Linc+16(%rip),%xmm1	# 00000002000000020000000200000002
+	movdqa	.Linc(%rip),%xmm0	# 00000001000000010000000000000000
+
+	pshufd	\$0,%xmm8,%xmm8		# broadcast $power
+	movdqa	%xmm1,%xmm7
+	movdqa	%xmm1,%xmm2
+___
+########################################################################
+# calculate mask by comparing 0..15 to $power
+#
+for($i=0;$i<4;$i++) {
+$code.=<<___;
+	paddd	%xmm`$i`,%xmm`$i+1`
+	pcmpeqd	%xmm8,%xmm`$i`
+	movdqa	%xmm7,%xmm`$i+3`
+___
+}
+for(;$i<7;$i++) {
+$code.=<<___;
+	paddd	%xmm`$i`,%xmm`$i+1`
+	pcmpeqd	%xmm8,%xmm`$i`
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	pcmpeqd	%xmm8,%xmm7
+	movl	\$8, %r9d
+	jmp	.Loop_gather
+.align	16
+.Loop_gather:
+	movdqa	16*0($inp),%xmm8
+	movdqa	16*1($inp),%xmm9
+	movdqa	16*2($inp),%xmm10
+	movdqa	16*3($inp),%xmm11
+	pand	%xmm0,%xmm8
+	movdqa	16*4($inp),%xmm12
+	pand	%xmm1,%xmm9
+	movdqa	16*5($inp),%xmm13
+	pand	%xmm2,%xmm10
+	movdqa	16*6($inp),%xmm14
+	pand	%xmm3,%xmm11
+	movdqa	16*7($inp),%xmm15
+	leaq	128($inp), $inp
+	pand	%xmm4,%xmm12
+	pand	%xmm5,%xmm13
+	pand	%xmm6,%xmm14
+	pand	%xmm7,%xmm15
+	por	%xmm10,%xmm8
+	por	%xmm11,%xmm9
+	por	%xmm12,%xmm8
+	por	%xmm13,%xmm9
+	por	%xmm14,%xmm8
+	por	%xmm15,%xmm9
+
+	por	%xmm9,%xmm8
+	pshufd	\$0x4e,%xmm8,%xmm9
+	por	%xmm9,%xmm8
+	movq	%xmm8,($out)
+	leaq	8($out), $out
+	decl	%r9d
+	jnz	.Loop_gather
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($win64);
+	movaps	0x00(%rsp),%xmm6
+	movaps	0x10(%rsp),%xmm7
+	movaps	0x20(%rsp),%xmm8
+	movaps	0x30(%rsp),%xmm9
+	movaps	0x40(%rsp),%xmm10
+	movaps	0x50(%rsp),%xmm11
+	movaps	0x60(%rsp),%xmm12
+	movaps	0x70(%rsp),%xmm13
+	movaps	0x80(%rsp),%xmm14
+	movaps	0x90(%rsp),%xmm15
+	add	\$0xa8,%rsp
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	ret
+.LSEH_end_rsaz_512_gather4:
+.size	rsaz_512_gather4,.-rsaz_512_gather4
+
+.align	64
+.Linc:
+	.long	0,0, 1,1
+	.long	2,2, 2,2
+___
+}
+
+# EXCEPTION_DISPOSITION handler (EXCEPTION_RECORD *rec,ULONG64 frame,
+#		CONTEXT *context,DISPATCHER_CONTEXT *disp)
+if ($win64) {
+$rec="%rcx";
+$frame="%rdx";
+$context="%r8";
+$disp="%r9";
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.extern	__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind
+.type	se_handler,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+se_handler:
+	push	%rsi
+	push	%rdi
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+	pushfq
+	sub	\$64,%rsp
+
+	mov	120($context),%rax	# pull context->Rax
+	mov	248($context),%rbx	# pull context->Rip
+
+	mov	8($disp),%rsi		# disp->ImageBase
+	mov	56($disp),%r11		# disp->HandlerData
+
+	mov	0(%r11),%r10d		# HandlerData[0]
+	lea	(%rsi,%r10),%r10	# end of prologue label
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip<end of prologue label
+	jb	.Lcommon_seh_tail
+
+	mov	152($context),%rax	# pull context->Rsp
+
+	mov	4(%r11),%r10d		# HandlerData[1]
+	lea	(%rsi,%r10),%r10	# epilogue label
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip>=epilogue label
+	jae	.Lcommon_seh_tail
+
+	lea	128+24+48(%rax),%rax
+
+	lea	.Lmul_gather4_epilogue(%rip),%rbx
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx
+	jne	.Lse_not_in_mul_gather4
+
+	lea	0xb0(%rax),%rax
+
+	lea	-48-0xa8(%rax),%rsi
+	lea	512($context),%rdi
+	mov	\$20,%ecx
+	.long	0xa548f3fc		# cld; rep movsq
+
+.Lse_not_in_mul_gather4:
+	mov	-8(%rax),%rbx
+	mov	-16(%rax),%rbp
+	mov	-24(%rax),%r12
+	mov	-32(%rax),%r13
+	mov	-40(%rax),%r14
+	mov	-48(%rax),%r15
+	mov	%rbx,144($context)	# restore context->Rbx
+	mov	%rbp,160($context)	# restore context->Rbp
+	mov	%r12,216($context)	# restore context->R12
+	mov	%r13,224($context)	# restore context->R13
+	mov	%r14,232($context)	# restore context->R14
+	mov	%r15,240($context)	# restore context->R15
+
+.Lcommon_seh_tail:
+	mov	8(%rax),%rdi
+	mov	16(%rax),%rsi
+	mov	%rax,152($context)	# restore context->Rsp
+	mov	%rsi,168($context)	# restore context->Rsi
+	mov	%rdi,176($context)	# restore context->Rdi
+
+	mov	40($disp),%rdi		# disp->ContextRecord
+	mov	$context,%rsi		# context
+	mov	\$154,%ecx		# sizeof(CONTEXT)
+	.long	0xa548f3fc		# cld; rep movsq
+
+	mov	$disp,%rsi
+	xor	%rcx,%rcx		# arg1, UNW_FLAG_NHANDLER
+	mov	8(%rsi),%rdx		# arg2, disp->ImageBase
+	mov	0(%rsi),%r8		# arg3, disp->ControlPc
+	mov	16(%rsi),%r9		# arg4, disp->FunctionEntry
+	mov	40(%rsi),%r10		# disp->ContextRecord
+	lea	56(%rsi),%r11		# &disp->HandlerData
+	lea	24(%rsi),%r12		# &disp->EstablisherFrame
+	mov	%r10,32(%rsp)		# arg5
+	mov	%r11,40(%rsp)		# arg6
+	mov	%r12,48(%rsp)		# arg7
+	mov	%rcx,56(%rsp)		# arg8, (NULL)
+	call	*__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind(%rip)
+
+	mov	\$1,%eax		# ExceptionContinueSearch
+	add	\$64,%rsp
+	popfq
+	pop	%r15
+	pop	%r14
+	pop	%r13
+	pop	%r12
+	pop	%rbp
+	pop	%rbx
+	pop	%rdi
+	pop	%rsi
+	ret
+.size	se_handler,.-se_handler
+
+.section	.pdata
+.align	4
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_rsaz_512_sqr
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_rsaz_512_sqr
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_rsaz_512_sqr
+
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_rsaz_512_mul
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_rsaz_512_mul
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_rsaz_512_mul
+
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_rsaz_512_mul_gather4
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_rsaz_512_mul_gather4
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_rsaz_512_mul_gather4
+
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_rsaz_512_mul_scatter4
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_rsaz_512_mul_scatter4
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_rsaz_512_mul_scatter4
+
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_rsaz_512_mul_by_one
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_rsaz_512_mul_by_one
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_rsaz_512_mul_by_one
+
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_rsaz_512_gather4
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_rsaz_512_gather4
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_rsaz_512_gather4
+
+.section	.xdata
+.align	8
+.LSEH_info_rsaz_512_sqr:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	se_handler
+	.rva	.Lsqr_body,.Lsqr_epilogue			# HandlerData[]
+.LSEH_info_rsaz_512_mul:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	se_handler
+	.rva	.Lmul_body,.Lmul_epilogue			# HandlerData[]
+.LSEH_info_rsaz_512_mul_gather4:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	se_handler
+	.rva	.Lmul_gather4_body,.Lmul_gather4_epilogue	# HandlerData[]
+.LSEH_info_rsaz_512_mul_scatter4:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	se_handler
+	.rva	.Lmul_scatter4_body,.Lmul_scatter4_epilogue	# HandlerData[]
+.LSEH_info_rsaz_512_mul_by_one:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	se_handler
+	.rva	.Lmul_by_one_body,.Lmul_by_one_epilogue		# HandlerData[]
+.LSEH_info_rsaz_512_gather4:
+	.byte	0x01,0x46,0x16,0x00
+	.byte	0x46,0xf8,0x09,0x00	# vmovaps 0x90(rsp),xmm15
+	.byte	0x3d,0xe8,0x08,0x00	# vmovaps 0x80(rsp),xmm14
+	.byte	0x34,0xd8,0x07,0x00	# vmovaps 0x70(rsp),xmm13
+	.byte	0x2e,0xc8,0x06,0x00	# vmovaps 0x60(rsp),xmm12
+	.byte	0x28,0xb8,0x05,0x00	# vmovaps 0x50(rsp),xmm11
+	.byte	0x22,0xa8,0x04,0x00	# vmovaps 0x40(rsp),xmm10
+	.byte	0x1c,0x98,0x03,0x00	# vmovaps 0x30(rsp),xmm9
+	.byte	0x16,0x88,0x02,0x00	# vmovaps 0x20(rsp),xmm8
+	.byte	0x10,0x78,0x01,0x00	# vmovaps 0x10(rsp),xmm7
+	.byte	0x0b,0x68,0x00,0x00	# vmovaps 0x00(rsp),xmm6
+	.byte	0x07,0x01,0x15,0x00	# sub     rsp,0xa8
+___
+}
+
+$code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem;
+print $code;
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/s390x-gf2m.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/s390x-gf2m.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cbd16f4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/s390x-gf2m.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,228 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# May 2011
+#
+# The module implements bn_GF2m_mul_2x2 polynomial multiplication used
+# in bn_gf2m.c. It's kind of low-hanging mechanical port from C for
+# the time being... gcc 4.3 appeared to generate poor code, therefore
+# the effort. And indeed, the module delivers 55%-90%(*) improvement
+# on haviest ECDSA verify and ECDH benchmarks for 163- and 571-bit
+# key lengths on z990, 30%-55%(*) - on z10, and 70%-110%(*) - on z196.
+# This is for 64-bit build. In 32-bit "highgprs" case improvement is
+# even higher, for example on z990 it was measured 80%-150%. ECDSA
+# sign is modest 9%-12% faster. Keep in mind that these coefficients
+# are not ones for bn_GF2m_mul_2x2 itself, as not all CPU time is
+# burnt in it...
+#
+# (*)	gcc 4.1 was observed to deliver better results than gcc 4.3,
+#	so that improvement coefficients can vary from one specific
+#	setup to another.
+
+$flavour = shift;
+
+if ($flavour =~ /3[12]/) {
+        $SIZE_T=4;
+        $g="";
+} else {
+        $SIZE_T=8;
+        $g="g";
+}
+
+while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {}
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+$stdframe=16*$SIZE_T+4*8;
+
+$rp="%r2";
+$a1="%r3";
+$a0="%r4";
+$b1="%r5";
+$b0="%r6";
+
+$ra="%r14";
+$sp="%r15";
+
+@T=("%r0","%r1");
+@i=("%r12","%r13");
+
+($a1,$a2,$a4,$a8,$a12,$a48)=map("%r$_",(6..11));
+($lo,$hi,$b)=map("%r$_",(3..5)); $a=$lo; $mask=$a8;
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.text
+
+.type	_mul_1x1,\@function
+.align	16
+_mul_1x1:
+	lgr	$a1,$a
+	sllg	$a2,$a,1
+	sllg	$a4,$a,2
+	sllg	$a8,$a,3
+
+	srag	$lo,$a1,63			# broadcast 63rd bit
+	nihh	$a1,0x1fff
+	srag	@i[0],$a2,63			# broadcast 62nd bit
+	nihh	$a2,0x3fff
+	srag	@i[1],$a4,63			# broadcast 61st bit
+	nihh	$a4,0x7fff
+	ngr	$lo,$b
+	ngr	@i[0],$b
+	ngr	@i[1],$b
+
+	lghi	@T[0],0
+	lgr	$a12,$a1
+	stg	@T[0],`$stdframe+0*8`($sp)	# tab[0]=0
+	xgr	$a12,$a2
+	stg	$a1,`$stdframe+1*8`($sp)	# tab[1]=a1
+	 lgr	$a48,$a4
+	stg	$a2,`$stdframe+2*8`($sp)	# tab[2]=a2
+	 xgr	$a48,$a8
+	stg	$a12,`$stdframe+3*8`($sp)	# tab[3]=a1^a2
+	 xgr	$a1,$a4
+
+	stg	$a4,`$stdframe+4*8`($sp)	# tab[4]=a4
+	xgr	$a2,$a4
+	stg	$a1,`$stdframe+5*8`($sp)	# tab[5]=a1^a4
+	xgr	$a12,$a4
+	stg	$a2,`$stdframe+6*8`($sp)	# tab[6]=a2^a4
+	 xgr	$a1,$a48
+	stg	$a12,`$stdframe+7*8`($sp)	# tab[7]=a1^a2^a4
+	 xgr	$a2,$a48
+
+	stg	$a8,`$stdframe+8*8`($sp)	# tab[8]=a8
+	xgr	$a12,$a48
+	stg	$a1,`$stdframe+9*8`($sp)	# tab[9]=a1^a8
+	 xgr	$a1,$a4
+	stg	$a2,`$stdframe+10*8`($sp)	# tab[10]=a2^a8
+	 xgr	$a2,$a4
+	stg	$a12,`$stdframe+11*8`($sp)	# tab[11]=a1^a2^a8
+
+	xgr	$a12,$a4
+	stg	$a48,`$stdframe+12*8`($sp)	# tab[12]=a4^a8
+	 srlg	$hi,$lo,1
+	stg	$a1,`$stdframe+13*8`($sp)	# tab[13]=a1^a4^a8
+	 sllg	$lo,$lo,63
+	stg	$a2,`$stdframe+14*8`($sp)	# tab[14]=a2^a4^a8
+	 srlg	@T[0],@i[0],2
+	stg	$a12,`$stdframe+15*8`($sp)	# tab[15]=a1^a2^a4^a8
+
+	lghi	$mask,`0xf<<3`
+	sllg	$a1,@i[0],62
+	 sllg	@i[0],$b,3
+	srlg	@T[1],@i[1],3
+	 ngr	@i[0],$mask
+	sllg	$a2,@i[1],61
+	 srlg	@i[1],$b,4-3
+	xgr	$hi,@T[0]
+	 ngr	@i[1],$mask
+	xgr	$lo,$a1
+	xgr	$hi,@T[1]
+	xgr	$lo,$a2
+
+	xg	$lo,$stdframe(@i[0],$sp)
+	srlg	@i[0],$b,8-3
+	ngr	@i[0],$mask
+___
+for($n=1;$n<14;$n++) {
+$code.=<<___;
+	lg	@T[1],$stdframe(@i[1],$sp)
+	srlg	@i[1],$b,`($n+2)*4`-3
+	sllg	@T[0],@T[1],`$n*4`
+	ngr	@i[1],$mask
+	srlg	@T[1],@T[1],`64-$n*4`
+	xgr	$lo,@T[0]
+	xgr	$hi,@T[1]
+___
+	push(@i,shift(@i)); push(@T,shift(@T));
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	lg	@T[1],$stdframe(@i[1],$sp)
+	sllg	@T[0],@T[1],`$n*4`
+	srlg	@T[1],@T[1],`64-$n*4`
+	xgr	$lo,@T[0]
+	xgr	$hi,@T[1]
+
+	lg	@T[0],$stdframe(@i[0],$sp)
+	sllg	@T[1],@T[0],`($n+1)*4`
+	srlg	@T[0],@T[0],`64-($n+1)*4`
+	xgr	$lo,@T[1]
+	xgr	$hi,@T[0]
+
+	br	$ra
+.size	_mul_1x1,.-_mul_1x1
+
+.globl	bn_GF2m_mul_2x2
+.type	bn_GF2m_mul_2x2,\@function
+.align	16
+bn_GF2m_mul_2x2:
+	stm${g}	%r3,%r15,3*$SIZE_T($sp)
+
+	lghi	%r1,-$stdframe-128
+	la	%r0,0($sp)
+	la	$sp,0(%r1,$sp)			# alloca
+	st${g}	%r0,0($sp)			# back chain
+___
+if ($SIZE_T==8) {
+my @r=map("%r$_",(6..9));
+$code.=<<___;
+	bras	$ra,_mul_1x1			# a1·b1
+	stmg	$lo,$hi,16($rp)
+
+	lg	$a,`$stdframe+128+4*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+	lg	$b,`$stdframe+128+6*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+	bras	$ra,_mul_1x1			# a0·b0
+	stmg	$lo,$hi,0($rp)
+
+	lg	$a,`$stdframe+128+3*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+	lg	$b,`$stdframe+128+5*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+	xg	$a,`$stdframe+128+4*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+	xg	$b,`$stdframe+128+6*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+	bras	$ra,_mul_1x1			# (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)
+	lmg	@r[0],@r[3],0($rp)
+
+	xgr	$lo,$hi
+	xgr	$hi,@r[1]
+	xgr	$lo,@r[0]
+	xgr	$hi,@r[2]
+	xgr	$lo,@r[3]	
+	xgr	$hi,@r[3]
+	xgr	$lo,$hi
+	stg	$hi,16($rp)
+	stg	$lo,8($rp)
+___
+} else {
+$code.=<<___;
+	sllg	%r3,%r3,32
+	sllg	%r5,%r5,32
+	or	%r3,%r4
+	or	%r5,%r6
+	bras	$ra,_mul_1x1
+	rllg	$lo,$lo,32
+	rllg	$hi,$hi,32
+	stmg	$lo,$hi,0($rp)
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	lm${g}	%r6,%r15,`$stdframe+128+6*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+	br	$ra
+.size	bn_GF2m_mul_2x2,.-bn_GF2m_mul_2x2
+.string	"GF(2^m) Multiplication for s390x, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+___
+
+$code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval($1)/gem;
+print $code;
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/s390x-mont.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/s390x-mont.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2205bc2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/s390x-mont.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,284 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2007-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+
+# April 2007.
+#
+# Performance improvement over vanilla C code varies from 85% to 45%
+# depending on key length and benchmark. Unfortunately in this context
+# these are not very impressive results [for code that utilizes "wide"
+# 64x64=128-bit multiplication, which is not commonly available to C
+# programmers], at least hand-coded bn_asm.c replacement is known to
+# provide 30-40% better results for longest keys. Well, on a second
+# thought it's not very surprising, because z-CPUs are single-issue
+# and _strictly_ in-order execution, while bn_mul_mont is more or less
+# dependent on CPU ability to pipe-line instructions and have several
+# of them "in-flight" at the same time. I mean while other methods,
+# for example Karatsuba, aim to minimize amount of multiplications at
+# the cost of other operations increase, bn_mul_mont aim to neatly
+# "overlap" multiplications and the other operations [and on most
+# platforms even minimize the amount of the other operations, in
+# particular references to memory]. But it's possible to improve this
+# module performance by implementing dedicated squaring code-path and
+# possibly by unrolling loops...
+
+# January 2009.
+#
+# Reschedule to minimize/avoid Address Generation Interlock hazard,
+# make inner loops counter-based.
+
+# November 2010.
+#
+# Adapt for -m31 build. If kernel supports what's called "highgprs"
+# feature on Linux [see /proc/cpuinfo], it's possible to use 64-bit
+# instructions and achieve "64-bit" performance even in 31-bit legacy
+# application context. The feature is not specific to any particular
+# processor, as long as it's "z-CPU". Latter implies that the code
+# remains z/Architecture specific. Compatibility with 32-bit BN_ULONG
+# is achieved by swapping words after 64-bit loads, follow _dswap-s.
+# On z990 it was measured to perform 2.6-2.2 times better than
+# compiler-generated code, less for longer keys...
+
+$flavour = shift;
+
+if ($flavour =~ /3[12]/) {
+	$SIZE_T=4;
+	$g="";
+} else {
+	$SIZE_T=8;
+	$g="g";
+}
+
+while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {}
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+$stdframe=16*$SIZE_T+4*8;
+
+$mn0="%r0";
+$num="%r1";
+
+# int bn_mul_mont(
+$rp="%r2";		# BN_ULONG *rp,
+$ap="%r3";		# const BN_ULONG *ap,
+$bp="%r4";		# const BN_ULONG *bp,
+$np="%r5";		# const BN_ULONG *np,
+$n0="%r6";		# const BN_ULONG *n0,
+#$num="160(%r15)"	# int num);
+
+$bi="%r2";	# zaps rp
+$j="%r7";
+
+$ahi="%r8";
+$alo="%r9";
+$nhi="%r10";
+$nlo="%r11";
+$AHI="%r12";
+$NHI="%r13";
+$count="%r14";
+$sp="%r15";
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.text
+.globl	bn_mul_mont
+.type	bn_mul_mont,\@function
+bn_mul_mont:
+	lgf	$num,`$stdframe+$SIZE_T-4`($sp)	# pull $num
+	sla	$num,`log($SIZE_T)/log(2)`	# $num to enumerate bytes
+	la	$bp,0($num,$bp)
+
+	st${g}	%r2,2*$SIZE_T($sp)
+
+	cghi	$num,16		#
+	lghi	%r2,0		#
+	blr	%r14		# if($num<16) return 0;
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /3[12]/);
+	tmll	$num,4
+	bnzr	%r14		# if ($num&1) return 0;
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($flavour !~ /3[12]/);
+	cghi	$num,96		#
+	bhr	%r14		# if($num>96) return 0;
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	stm${g}	%r3,%r15,3*$SIZE_T($sp)
+
+	lghi	$rp,-$stdframe-8	# leave room for carry bit
+	lcgr	$j,$num		# -$num
+	lgr	%r0,$sp
+	la	$rp,0($rp,$sp)
+	la	$sp,0($j,$rp)	# alloca
+	st${g}	%r0,0($sp)	# back chain
+
+	sra	$num,3		# restore $num
+	la	$bp,0($j,$bp)	# restore $bp
+	ahi	$num,-1		# adjust $num for inner loop
+	lg	$n0,0($n0)	# pull n0
+	_dswap	$n0
+
+	lg	$bi,0($bp)
+	_dswap	$bi
+	lg	$alo,0($ap)
+	_dswap	$alo
+	mlgr	$ahi,$bi	# ap[0]*bp[0]
+	lgr	$AHI,$ahi
+
+	lgr	$mn0,$alo	# "tp[0]"*n0
+	msgr	$mn0,$n0
+
+	lg	$nlo,0($np)	#
+	_dswap	$nlo
+	mlgr	$nhi,$mn0	# np[0]*m1
+	algr	$nlo,$alo	# +="tp[0]"
+	lghi	$NHI,0
+	alcgr	$NHI,$nhi
+
+	la	$j,8(%r0)	# j=1
+	lr	$count,$num
+
+.align	16
+.L1st:
+	lg	$alo,0($j,$ap)
+	_dswap	$alo
+	mlgr	$ahi,$bi	# ap[j]*bp[0]
+	algr	$alo,$AHI
+	lghi	$AHI,0
+	alcgr	$AHI,$ahi
+
+	lg	$nlo,0($j,$np)
+	_dswap	$nlo
+	mlgr	$nhi,$mn0	# np[j]*m1
+	algr	$nlo,$NHI
+	lghi	$NHI,0
+	alcgr	$nhi,$NHI	# +="tp[j]"
+	algr	$nlo,$alo
+	alcgr	$NHI,$nhi
+
+	stg	$nlo,$stdframe-8($j,$sp)	# tp[j-1]=
+	la	$j,8($j)	# j++
+	brct	$count,.L1st
+
+	algr	$NHI,$AHI
+	lghi	$AHI,0
+	alcgr	$AHI,$AHI	# upmost overflow bit
+	stg	$NHI,$stdframe-8($j,$sp)
+	stg	$AHI,$stdframe($j,$sp)
+	la	$bp,8($bp)	# bp++
+
+.Louter:
+	lg	$bi,0($bp)	# bp[i]
+	_dswap	$bi
+	lg	$alo,0($ap)
+	_dswap	$alo
+	mlgr	$ahi,$bi	# ap[0]*bp[i]
+	alg	$alo,$stdframe($sp)	# +=tp[0]
+	lghi	$AHI,0
+	alcgr	$AHI,$ahi
+
+	lgr	$mn0,$alo
+	msgr	$mn0,$n0	# tp[0]*n0
+
+	lg	$nlo,0($np)	# np[0]
+	_dswap	$nlo
+	mlgr	$nhi,$mn0	# np[0]*m1
+	algr	$nlo,$alo	# +="tp[0]"
+	lghi	$NHI,0
+	alcgr	$NHI,$nhi
+
+	la	$j,8(%r0)	# j=1
+	lr	$count,$num
+
+.align	16
+.Linner:
+	lg	$alo,0($j,$ap)
+	_dswap	$alo
+	mlgr	$ahi,$bi	# ap[j]*bp[i]
+	algr	$alo,$AHI
+	lghi	$AHI,0
+	alcgr	$ahi,$AHI
+	alg	$alo,$stdframe($j,$sp)# +=tp[j]
+	alcgr	$AHI,$ahi
+
+	lg	$nlo,0($j,$np)
+	_dswap	$nlo
+	mlgr	$nhi,$mn0	# np[j]*m1
+	algr	$nlo,$NHI
+	lghi	$NHI,0
+	alcgr	$nhi,$NHI
+	algr	$nlo,$alo	# +="tp[j]"
+	alcgr	$NHI,$nhi
+
+	stg	$nlo,$stdframe-8($j,$sp)	# tp[j-1]=
+	la	$j,8($j)	# j++
+	brct	$count,.Linner
+
+	algr	$NHI,$AHI
+	lghi	$AHI,0
+	alcgr	$AHI,$AHI
+	alg	$NHI,$stdframe($j,$sp)# accumulate previous upmost overflow bit
+	lghi	$ahi,0
+	alcgr	$AHI,$ahi	# new upmost overflow bit
+	stg	$NHI,$stdframe-8($j,$sp)
+	stg	$AHI,$stdframe($j,$sp)
+
+	la	$bp,8($bp)	# bp++
+	cl${g}	$bp,`$stdframe+8+4*$SIZE_T`($j,$sp)	# compare to &bp[num]
+	jne	.Louter
+
+	l${g}	$rp,`$stdframe+8+2*$SIZE_T`($j,$sp)	# reincarnate rp
+	la	$ap,$stdframe($sp)
+	ahi	$num,1		# restore $num, incidentally clears "borrow"
+
+	la	$j,0(%r0)
+	lr	$count,$num
+.Lsub:	lg	$alo,0($j,$ap)
+	lg	$nlo,0($j,$np)
+	_dswap	$nlo
+	slbgr	$alo,$nlo
+	stg	$alo,0($j,$rp)
+	la	$j,8($j)
+	brct	$count,.Lsub
+	lghi	$ahi,0
+	slbgr	$AHI,$ahi	# handle upmost carry
+
+	ngr	$ap,$AHI
+	lghi	$np,-1
+	xgr	$np,$AHI
+	ngr	$np,$rp
+	ogr	$ap,$np		# ap=borrow?tp:rp
+
+	la	$j,0(%r0)
+	lgr	$count,$num
+.Lcopy:	lg	$alo,0($j,$ap)		# copy or in-place refresh
+	_dswap	$alo
+	stg	$j,$stdframe($j,$sp)	# zap tp
+	stg	$alo,0($j,$rp)
+	la	$j,8($j)
+	brct	$count,.Lcopy
+
+	la	%r1,`$stdframe+8+6*$SIZE_T`($j,$sp)
+	lm${g}	%r6,%r15,0(%r1)
+	lghi	%r2,1		# signal "processed"
+	br	%r14
+.size	bn_mul_mont,.-bn_mul_mont
+.string	"Montgomery Multiplication for s390x, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+___
+
+foreach (split("\n",$code)) {
+	s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/ge;
+	s/_dswap\s+(%r[0-9]+)/sprintf("rllg\t%s,%s,32",$1,$1) if($SIZE_T==4)/e;
+	print $_,"\n";
+}
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/s390x.S b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/s390x.S
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..292a7a9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/s390x.S
@@ -0,0 +1,713 @@
+.ident "s390x.S, version 1.1"
+// ====================================================================
+// Copyright 2007-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+//
+// Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+// this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+// in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+// https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+// ====================================================================
+
+.text
+
+#define zero	%r0
+
+// BN_ULONG bn_mul_add_words(BN_ULONG *r2,BN_ULONG *r3,int r4,BN_ULONG r5);
+.globl	bn_mul_add_words
+.type	bn_mul_add_words,@function
+.align	4
+bn_mul_add_words:
+	lghi	zero,0		// zero = 0
+	la	%r1,0(%r2)	// put rp aside [to give way to]
+	lghi	%r2,0		// return value
+	ltgfr	%r4,%r4
+	bler	%r14		// if (len<=0) return 0;
+
+	stmg	%r6,%r13,48(%r15)
+	lghi	%r2,3
+	lghi	%r12,0		// carry = 0
+	slgr	%r1,%r3		// rp-=ap
+	nr	%r2,%r4		// len%4
+	sra	%r4,2		// cnt=len/4
+	jz	.Loop1_madd	// carry is incidentally cleared if branch taken
+	algr	zero,zero	// clear carry
+
+	lg	%r7,0(%r3)	// ap[0]
+	lg	%r9,8(%r3)	// ap[1]
+	mlgr	%r6,%r5		// *=w
+	brct	%r4,.Loop4_madd
+	j	.Loop4_madd_tail
+
+.Loop4_madd:
+	mlgr	%r8,%r5
+	lg	%r11,16(%r3)	// ap[i+2]
+	alcgr	%r7,%r12	// +=carry
+	alcgr	%r6,zero
+	alg	%r7,0(%r3,%r1)	// +=rp[i]
+	stg	%r7,0(%r3,%r1)	// rp[i]=
+
+	mlgr	%r10,%r5
+	lg	%r13,24(%r3)
+	alcgr	%r9,%r6
+	alcgr	%r8,zero
+	alg	%r9,8(%r3,%r1)
+	stg	%r9,8(%r3,%r1)
+
+	mlgr	%r12,%r5
+	lg	%r7,32(%r3)
+	alcgr	%r11,%r8
+	alcgr	%r10,zero
+	alg	%r11,16(%r3,%r1)
+	stg	%r11,16(%r3,%r1)
+
+	mlgr	%r6,%r5
+	lg	%r9,40(%r3)
+	alcgr	%r13,%r10
+	alcgr	%r12,zero
+	alg	%r13,24(%r3,%r1)
+	stg	%r13,24(%r3,%r1)
+
+	la	%r3,32(%r3)	// i+=4
+	brct	%r4,.Loop4_madd
+
+.Loop4_madd_tail:
+	mlgr	%r8,%r5
+	lg	%r11,16(%r3)
+	alcgr	%r7,%r12	// +=carry
+	alcgr	%r6,zero
+	alg	%r7,0(%r3,%r1)	// +=rp[i]
+	stg	%r7,0(%r3,%r1)	// rp[i]=
+
+	mlgr	%r10,%r5
+	lg	%r13,24(%r3)
+	alcgr	%r9,%r6
+	alcgr	%r8,zero
+	alg	%r9,8(%r3,%r1)
+	stg	%r9,8(%r3,%r1)
+
+	mlgr	%r12,%r5
+	alcgr	%r11,%r8
+	alcgr	%r10,zero
+	alg	%r11,16(%r3,%r1)
+	stg	%r11,16(%r3,%r1)
+
+	alcgr	%r13,%r10
+	alcgr	%r12,zero
+	alg	%r13,24(%r3,%r1)
+	stg	%r13,24(%r3,%r1)
+
+	la	%r3,32(%r3)	// i+=4
+
+	la	%r2,1(%r2)	// see if len%4 is zero ...
+	brct	%r2,.Loop1_madd	// without touching condition code:-)
+
+.Lend_madd:
+	lgr	%r2,zero	// return value
+	alcgr	%r2,%r12	// collect even carry bit
+	lmg	%r6,%r13,48(%r15)
+	br	%r14
+
+.Loop1_madd:
+	lg	%r7,0(%r3)	// ap[i]
+	mlgr	%r6,%r5		// *=w
+	alcgr	%r7,%r12	// +=carry
+	alcgr	%r6,zero
+	alg	%r7,0(%r3,%r1)	// +=rp[i]
+	stg	%r7,0(%r3,%r1)	// rp[i]=
+
+	lgr	%r12,%r6
+	la	%r3,8(%r3)	// i++
+	brct	%r2,.Loop1_madd
+
+	j	.Lend_madd
+.size	bn_mul_add_words,.-bn_mul_add_words
+
+// BN_ULONG bn_mul_words(BN_ULONG *r2,BN_ULONG *r3,int r4,BN_ULONG r5);
+.globl	bn_mul_words
+.type	bn_mul_words,@function
+.align	4
+bn_mul_words:
+	lghi	zero,0		// zero = 0
+	la	%r1,0(%r2)	// put rp aside
+	lghi	%r2,0		// i=0;
+	ltgfr	%r4,%r4
+	bler	%r14		// if (len<=0) return 0;
+
+	stmg	%r6,%r10,48(%r15)
+	lghi	%r10,3
+	lghi	%r8,0		// carry = 0
+	nr	%r10,%r4	// len%4
+	sra	%r4,2		// cnt=len/4
+	jz	.Loop1_mul	// carry is incidentally cleared if branch taken
+	algr	zero,zero	// clear carry
+
+.Loop4_mul:
+	lg	%r7,0(%r2,%r3)	// ap[i]
+	mlgr	%r6,%r5		// *=w
+	alcgr	%r7,%r8		// +=carry
+	stg	%r7,0(%r2,%r1)	// rp[i]=
+
+	lg	%r9,8(%r2,%r3)
+	mlgr	%r8,%r5
+	alcgr	%r9,%r6
+	stg	%r9,8(%r2,%r1)
+
+	lg	%r7,16(%r2,%r3)
+	mlgr	%r6,%r5
+	alcgr	%r7,%r8
+	stg	%r7,16(%r2,%r1)
+
+	lg	%r9,24(%r2,%r3)
+	mlgr	%r8,%r5
+	alcgr	%r9,%r6
+	stg	%r9,24(%r2,%r1)
+
+	la	%r2,32(%r2)	// i+=4
+	brct	%r4,.Loop4_mul
+
+	la	%r10,1(%r10)		// see if len%4 is zero ...
+	brct	%r10,.Loop1_mul		// without touching condition code:-)
+
+.Lend_mul:
+	alcgr	%r8,zero	// collect carry bit
+	lgr	%r2,%r8
+	lmg	%r6,%r10,48(%r15)
+	br	%r14
+
+.Loop1_mul:
+	lg	%r7,0(%r2,%r3)	// ap[i]
+	mlgr	%r6,%r5		// *=w
+	alcgr	%r7,%r8		// +=carry
+	stg	%r7,0(%r2,%r1)	// rp[i]=
+
+	lgr	%r8,%r6
+	la	%r2,8(%r2)	// i++
+	brct	%r10,.Loop1_mul
+
+	j	.Lend_mul
+.size	bn_mul_words,.-bn_mul_words
+
+// void bn_sqr_words(BN_ULONG *r2,BN_ULONG *r2,int r4)
+.globl	bn_sqr_words
+.type	bn_sqr_words,@function
+.align	4
+bn_sqr_words:
+	ltgfr	%r4,%r4
+	bler	%r14
+
+	stmg	%r6,%r7,48(%r15)
+	srag	%r1,%r4,2	// cnt=len/4
+	jz	.Loop1_sqr
+
+.Loop4_sqr:
+	lg	%r7,0(%r3)
+	mlgr	%r6,%r7
+	stg	%r7,0(%r2)
+	stg	%r6,8(%r2)
+
+	lg	%r7,8(%r3)
+	mlgr	%r6,%r7
+	stg	%r7,16(%r2)
+	stg	%r6,24(%r2)
+
+	lg	%r7,16(%r3)
+	mlgr	%r6,%r7
+	stg	%r7,32(%r2)
+	stg	%r6,40(%r2)
+
+	lg	%r7,24(%r3)
+	mlgr	%r6,%r7
+	stg	%r7,48(%r2)
+	stg	%r6,56(%r2)
+
+	la	%r3,32(%r3)
+	la	%r2,64(%r2)
+	brct	%r1,.Loop4_sqr
+
+	lghi	%r1,3
+	nr	%r4,%r1		// cnt=len%4
+	jz	.Lend_sqr
+
+.Loop1_sqr:
+	lg	%r7,0(%r3)
+	mlgr	%r6,%r7
+	stg	%r7,0(%r2)
+	stg	%r6,8(%r2)
+
+	la	%r3,8(%r3)
+	la	%r2,16(%r2)
+	brct	%r4,.Loop1_sqr
+
+.Lend_sqr:
+	lmg	%r6,%r7,48(%r15)
+	br	%r14
+.size	bn_sqr_words,.-bn_sqr_words
+
+// BN_ULONG bn_div_words(BN_ULONG h,BN_ULONG l,BN_ULONG d);
+.globl	bn_div_words
+.type	bn_div_words,@function
+.align	4
+bn_div_words:
+	dlgr	%r2,%r4
+	lgr	%r2,%r3
+	br	%r14
+.size	bn_div_words,.-bn_div_words
+
+// BN_ULONG bn_add_words(BN_ULONG *r2,BN_ULONG *r3,BN_ULONG *r4,int r5);
+.globl	bn_add_words
+.type	bn_add_words,@function
+.align	4
+bn_add_words:
+	la	%r1,0(%r2)	// put rp aside
+	lghi	%r2,0		// i=0
+	ltgfr	%r5,%r5
+	bler	%r14		// if (len<=0) return 0;
+
+	stg	%r6,48(%r15)
+	lghi	%r6,3
+	nr	%r6,%r5		// len%4
+	sra	%r5,2		// len/4, use sra because it sets condition code
+	jz	.Loop1_add	// carry is incidentally cleared if branch taken
+	algr	%r2,%r2		// clear carry
+
+.Loop4_add:
+	lg	%r0,0(%r2,%r3)
+	alcg	%r0,0(%r2,%r4)
+	stg	%r0,0(%r2,%r1)
+	lg	%r0,8(%r2,%r3)
+	alcg	%r0,8(%r2,%r4)
+	stg	%r0,8(%r2,%r1)
+	lg	%r0,16(%r2,%r3)
+	alcg	%r0,16(%r2,%r4)
+	stg	%r0,16(%r2,%r1)
+	lg	%r0,24(%r2,%r3)
+	alcg	%r0,24(%r2,%r4)
+	stg	%r0,24(%r2,%r1)
+
+	la	%r2,32(%r2)	// i+=4
+	brct	%r5,.Loop4_add
+
+	la	%r6,1(%r6)	// see if len%4 is zero ...
+	brct	%r6,.Loop1_add	// without touching condition code:-)
+
+.Lexit_add:
+	lghi	%r2,0
+	alcgr	%r2,%r2
+	lg	%r6,48(%r15)
+	br	%r14
+
+.Loop1_add:
+	lg	%r0,0(%r2,%r3)
+	alcg	%r0,0(%r2,%r4)
+	stg	%r0,0(%r2,%r1)
+
+	la	%r2,8(%r2)	// i++
+	brct	%r6,.Loop1_add
+
+	j	.Lexit_add
+.size	bn_add_words,.-bn_add_words
+
+// BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *r2,BN_ULONG *r3,BN_ULONG *r4,int r5);
+.globl	bn_sub_words
+.type	bn_sub_words,@function
+.align	4
+bn_sub_words:
+	la	%r1,0(%r2)	// put rp aside
+	lghi	%r2,0		// i=0
+	ltgfr	%r5,%r5
+	bler	%r14		// if (len<=0) return 0;
+
+	stg	%r6,48(%r15)
+	lghi	%r6,3
+	nr	%r6,%r5		// len%4
+	sra	%r5,2		// len/4, use sra because it sets condition code
+	jnz	.Loop4_sub	// borrow is incidentally cleared if branch taken
+	slgr	%r2,%r2		// clear borrow
+
+.Loop1_sub:
+	lg	%r0,0(%r2,%r3)
+	slbg	%r0,0(%r2,%r4)
+	stg	%r0,0(%r2,%r1)
+
+	la	%r2,8(%r2)	// i++
+	brct	%r6,.Loop1_sub
+	j	.Lexit_sub
+
+.Loop4_sub:
+	lg	%r0,0(%r2,%r3)
+	slbg	%r0,0(%r2,%r4)
+	stg	%r0,0(%r2,%r1)
+	lg	%r0,8(%r2,%r3)
+	slbg	%r0,8(%r2,%r4)
+	stg	%r0,8(%r2,%r1)
+	lg	%r0,16(%r2,%r3)
+	slbg	%r0,16(%r2,%r4)
+	stg	%r0,16(%r2,%r1)
+	lg	%r0,24(%r2,%r3)
+	slbg	%r0,24(%r2,%r4)
+	stg	%r0,24(%r2,%r1)
+
+	la	%r2,32(%r2)	// i+=4
+	brct	%r5,.Loop4_sub
+
+	la	%r6,1(%r6)	// see if len%4 is zero ...
+	brct	%r6,.Loop1_sub	// without touching condition code:-)
+
+.Lexit_sub:
+	lghi	%r2,0
+	slbgr	%r2,%r2
+	lcgr	%r2,%r2
+	lg	%r6,48(%r15)
+	br	%r14
+.size	bn_sub_words,.-bn_sub_words
+
+#define c1	%r1
+#define c2	%r5
+#define c3	%r8
+
+#define mul_add_c(ai,bi,c1,c2,c3)	\
+	lg	%r7,ai*8(%r3);		\
+	mlg	%r6,bi*8(%r4);		\
+	algr	c1,%r7;			\
+	alcgr	c2,%r6;			\
+	alcgr	c3,zero
+
+// void bn_mul_comba8(BN_ULONG *r2,BN_ULONG *r3,BN_ULONG *r4);
+.globl	bn_mul_comba8
+.type	bn_mul_comba8,@function
+.align	4
+bn_mul_comba8:
+	stmg	%r6,%r8,48(%r15)
+
+	lghi	c1,0
+	lghi	c2,0
+	lghi	c3,0
+	lghi	zero,0
+
+	mul_add_c(0,0,c1,c2,c3);
+	stg	c1,0*8(%r2)
+	lghi	c1,0
+
+	mul_add_c(0,1,c2,c3,c1);
+	mul_add_c(1,0,c2,c3,c1);
+	stg	c2,1*8(%r2)
+	lghi	c2,0
+
+	mul_add_c(2,0,c3,c1,c2);
+	mul_add_c(1,1,c3,c1,c2);
+	mul_add_c(0,2,c3,c1,c2);
+	stg	c3,2*8(%r2)
+	lghi	c3,0
+
+	mul_add_c(0,3,c1,c2,c3);
+	mul_add_c(1,2,c1,c2,c3);
+	mul_add_c(2,1,c1,c2,c3);
+	mul_add_c(3,0,c1,c2,c3);
+	stg	c1,3*8(%r2)
+	lghi	c1,0
+
+	mul_add_c(4,0,c2,c3,c1);
+	mul_add_c(3,1,c2,c3,c1);
+	mul_add_c(2,2,c2,c3,c1);
+	mul_add_c(1,3,c2,c3,c1);
+	mul_add_c(0,4,c2,c3,c1);
+	stg	c2,4*8(%r2)
+	lghi	c2,0
+
+	mul_add_c(0,5,c3,c1,c2);
+	mul_add_c(1,4,c3,c1,c2);
+	mul_add_c(2,3,c3,c1,c2);
+	mul_add_c(3,2,c3,c1,c2);
+	mul_add_c(4,1,c3,c1,c2);
+	mul_add_c(5,0,c3,c1,c2);
+	stg	c3,5*8(%r2)
+	lghi	c3,0
+
+	mul_add_c(6,0,c1,c2,c3);
+	mul_add_c(5,1,c1,c2,c3);
+	mul_add_c(4,2,c1,c2,c3);
+	mul_add_c(3,3,c1,c2,c3);
+	mul_add_c(2,4,c1,c2,c3);
+	mul_add_c(1,5,c1,c2,c3);
+	mul_add_c(0,6,c1,c2,c3);
+	stg	c1,6*8(%r2)
+	lghi	c1,0
+
+	mul_add_c(0,7,c2,c3,c1);
+	mul_add_c(1,6,c2,c3,c1);
+	mul_add_c(2,5,c2,c3,c1);
+	mul_add_c(3,4,c2,c3,c1);
+	mul_add_c(4,3,c2,c3,c1);
+	mul_add_c(5,2,c2,c3,c1);
+	mul_add_c(6,1,c2,c3,c1);
+	mul_add_c(7,0,c2,c3,c1);
+	stg	c2,7*8(%r2)
+	lghi	c2,0
+
+	mul_add_c(7,1,c3,c1,c2);
+	mul_add_c(6,2,c3,c1,c2);
+	mul_add_c(5,3,c3,c1,c2);
+	mul_add_c(4,4,c3,c1,c2);
+	mul_add_c(3,5,c3,c1,c2);
+	mul_add_c(2,6,c3,c1,c2);
+	mul_add_c(1,7,c3,c1,c2);
+	stg	c3,8*8(%r2)
+	lghi	c3,0
+
+	mul_add_c(2,7,c1,c2,c3);
+	mul_add_c(3,6,c1,c2,c3);
+	mul_add_c(4,5,c1,c2,c3);
+	mul_add_c(5,4,c1,c2,c3);
+	mul_add_c(6,3,c1,c2,c3);
+	mul_add_c(7,2,c1,c2,c3);
+	stg	c1,9*8(%r2)
+	lghi	c1,0
+
+	mul_add_c(7,3,c2,c3,c1);
+	mul_add_c(6,4,c2,c3,c1);
+	mul_add_c(5,5,c2,c3,c1);
+	mul_add_c(4,6,c2,c3,c1);
+	mul_add_c(3,7,c2,c3,c1);
+	stg	c2,10*8(%r2)
+	lghi	c2,0
+
+	mul_add_c(4,7,c3,c1,c2);
+	mul_add_c(5,6,c3,c1,c2);
+	mul_add_c(6,5,c3,c1,c2);
+	mul_add_c(7,4,c3,c1,c2);
+	stg	c3,11*8(%r2)
+	lghi	c3,0
+
+	mul_add_c(7,5,c1,c2,c3);
+	mul_add_c(6,6,c1,c2,c3);
+	mul_add_c(5,7,c1,c2,c3);
+	stg	c1,12*8(%r2)
+	lghi	c1,0
+
+
+	mul_add_c(6,7,c2,c3,c1);
+	mul_add_c(7,6,c2,c3,c1);
+	stg	c2,13*8(%r2)
+	lghi	c2,0
+
+	mul_add_c(7,7,c3,c1,c2);
+	stg	c3,14*8(%r2)
+	stg	c1,15*8(%r2)
+
+	lmg	%r6,%r8,48(%r15)
+	br	%r14
+.size	bn_mul_comba8,.-bn_mul_comba8
+
+// void bn_mul_comba4(BN_ULONG *r2,BN_ULONG *r3,BN_ULONG *r4);
+.globl	bn_mul_comba4
+.type	bn_mul_comba4,@function
+.align	4
+bn_mul_comba4:
+	stmg	%r6,%r8,48(%r15)
+
+	lghi	c1,0
+	lghi	c2,0
+	lghi	c3,0
+	lghi	zero,0
+
+	mul_add_c(0,0,c1,c2,c3);
+	stg	c1,0*8(%r3)
+	lghi	c1,0
+
+	mul_add_c(0,1,c2,c3,c1);
+	mul_add_c(1,0,c2,c3,c1);
+	stg	c2,1*8(%r2)
+	lghi	c2,0
+
+	mul_add_c(2,0,c3,c1,c2);
+	mul_add_c(1,1,c3,c1,c2);
+	mul_add_c(0,2,c3,c1,c2);
+	stg	c3,2*8(%r2)
+	lghi	c3,0
+
+	mul_add_c(0,3,c1,c2,c3);
+	mul_add_c(1,2,c1,c2,c3);
+	mul_add_c(2,1,c1,c2,c3);
+	mul_add_c(3,0,c1,c2,c3);
+	stg	c1,3*8(%r2)
+	lghi	c1,0
+
+	mul_add_c(3,1,c2,c3,c1);
+	mul_add_c(2,2,c2,c3,c1);
+	mul_add_c(1,3,c2,c3,c1);
+	stg	c2,4*8(%r2)
+	lghi	c2,0
+
+	mul_add_c(2,3,c3,c1,c2);
+	mul_add_c(3,2,c3,c1,c2);
+	stg	c3,5*8(%r2)
+	lghi	c3,0
+
+	mul_add_c(3,3,c1,c2,c3);
+	stg	c1,6*8(%r2)
+	stg	c2,7*8(%r2)
+
+	stmg	%r6,%r8,48(%r15)
+	br	%r14
+.size	bn_mul_comba4,.-bn_mul_comba4
+
+#define sqr_add_c(ai,c1,c2,c3)		\
+	lg	%r7,ai*8(%r3);		\
+	mlgr	%r6,%r7;		\
+	algr	c1,%r7;			\
+	alcgr	c2,%r6;			\
+	alcgr	c3,zero
+
+#define sqr_add_c2(ai,aj,c1,c2,c3)	\
+	lg	%r7,ai*8(%r3);		\
+	mlg	%r6,aj*8(%r3);		\
+	algr	c1,%r7;			\
+	alcgr	c2,%r6;			\
+	alcgr	c3,zero;		\
+	algr	c1,%r7;			\
+	alcgr	c2,%r6;			\
+	alcgr	c3,zero
+
+// void bn_sqr_comba8(BN_ULONG *r2,BN_ULONG *r3);
+.globl	bn_sqr_comba8
+.type	bn_sqr_comba8,@function
+.align	4
+bn_sqr_comba8:
+	stmg	%r6,%r8,48(%r15)
+
+	lghi	c1,0
+	lghi	c2,0
+	lghi	c3,0
+	lghi	zero,0
+
+	sqr_add_c(0,c1,c2,c3);
+	stg	c1,0*8(%r2)
+	lghi	c1,0
+
+	sqr_add_c2(1,0,c2,c3,c1);
+	stg	c2,1*8(%r2)
+	lghi	c2,0
+
+	sqr_add_c(1,c3,c1,c2);
+	sqr_add_c2(2,0,c3,c1,c2);
+	stg	c3,2*8(%r2)
+	lghi	c3,0
+
+	sqr_add_c2(3,0,c1,c2,c3);
+	sqr_add_c2(2,1,c1,c2,c3);
+	stg	c1,3*8(%r2)
+	lghi	c1,0
+
+	sqr_add_c(2,c2,c3,c1);
+	sqr_add_c2(3,1,c2,c3,c1);
+	sqr_add_c2(4,0,c2,c3,c1);
+	stg	c2,4*8(%r2)
+	lghi	c2,0
+
+	sqr_add_c2(5,0,c3,c1,c2);
+	sqr_add_c2(4,1,c3,c1,c2);
+	sqr_add_c2(3,2,c3,c1,c2);
+	stg	c3,5*8(%r2)
+	lghi	c3,0
+
+	sqr_add_c(3,c1,c2,c3);
+	sqr_add_c2(4,2,c1,c2,c3);
+	sqr_add_c2(5,1,c1,c2,c3);
+	sqr_add_c2(6,0,c1,c2,c3);
+	stg	c1,6*8(%r2)
+	lghi	c1,0
+
+	sqr_add_c2(7,0,c2,c3,c1);
+	sqr_add_c2(6,1,c2,c3,c1);
+	sqr_add_c2(5,2,c2,c3,c1);
+	sqr_add_c2(4,3,c2,c3,c1);
+	stg	c2,7*8(%r2)
+	lghi	c2,0
+
+	sqr_add_c(4,c3,c1,c2);
+	sqr_add_c2(5,3,c3,c1,c2);
+	sqr_add_c2(6,2,c3,c1,c2);
+	sqr_add_c2(7,1,c3,c1,c2);
+	stg	c3,8*8(%r2)
+	lghi	c3,0
+
+	sqr_add_c2(7,2,c1,c2,c3);
+	sqr_add_c2(6,3,c1,c2,c3);
+	sqr_add_c2(5,4,c1,c2,c3);
+	stg	c1,9*8(%r2)
+	lghi	c1,0
+
+	sqr_add_c(5,c2,c3,c1);
+	sqr_add_c2(6,4,c2,c3,c1);
+	sqr_add_c2(7,3,c2,c3,c1);
+	stg	c2,10*8(%r2)
+	lghi	c2,0
+
+	sqr_add_c2(7,4,c3,c1,c2);
+	sqr_add_c2(6,5,c3,c1,c2);
+	stg	c3,11*8(%r2)
+	lghi	c3,0
+
+	sqr_add_c(6,c1,c2,c3);
+	sqr_add_c2(7,5,c1,c2,c3);
+	stg	c1,12*8(%r2)
+	lghi	c1,0
+
+	sqr_add_c2(7,6,c2,c3,c1);
+	stg	c2,13*8(%r2)
+	lghi	c2,0
+
+	sqr_add_c(7,c3,c1,c2);
+	stg	c3,14*8(%r2)
+	stg	c1,15*8(%r2)
+
+	lmg	%r6,%r8,48(%r15)
+	br	%r14
+.size	bn_sqr_comba8,.-bn_sqr_comba8
+
+// void bn_sqr_comba4(BN_ULONG *r2,BN_ULONG *r3);
+.globl bn_sqr_comba4
+.type	bn_sqr_comba4,@function
+.align	4
+bn_sqr_comba4:
+	stmg	%r6,%r8,48(%r15)
+
+	lghi	c1,0
+	lghi	c2,0
+	lghi	c3,0
+	lghi	zero,0
+
+	sqr_add_c(0,c1,c2,c3);
+	stg	c1,0*8(%r2)
+	lghi	c1,0
+
+	sqr_add_c2(1,0,c2,c3,c1);
+	stg	c2,1*8(%r2)
+	lghi	c2,0
+
+	sqr_add_c(1,c3,c1,c2);
+	sqr_add_c2(2,0,c3,c1,c2);
+	stg	c3,2*8(%r2)
+	lghi	c3,0
+
+	sqr_add_c2(3,0,c1,c2,c3);
+	sqr_add_c2(2,1,c1,c2,c3);
+	stg	c1,3*8(%r2)
+	lghi	c1,0
+
+	sqr_add_c(2,c2,c3,c1);
+	sqr_add_c2(3,1,c2,c3,c1);
+	stg	c2,4*8(%r2)
+	lghi	c2,0
+
+	sqr_add_c2(3,2,c3,c1,c2);
+	stg	c3,5*8(%r2)
+	lghi	c3,0
+
+	sqr_add_c(3,c1,c2,c3);
+	stg	c1,6*8(%r2)
+	stg	c2,7*8(%r2)
+
+	lmg	%r6,%r8,48(%r15)
+	br	%r14
+.size	bn_sqr_comba4,.-bn_sqr_comba4
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/sparct4-mont.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/sparct4-mont.pl
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..4faf66f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/sparct4-mont.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,1232 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2012-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by David S. Miller <davem@devemloft.net> and Andy Polyakov
+# <appro@openssl.org>. The module is licensed under 2-clause BSD
+# license. November 2012. All rights reserved.
+# ====================================================================
+
+######################################################################
+# Montgomery squaring-n-multiplication module for SPARC T4.
+#
+# The module consists of three parts:
+#
+# 1) collection of "single-op" subroutines that perform single
+#    operation, Montgomery squaring or multiplication, on 512-,
+#    1024-, 1536- and 2048-bit operands;
+# 2) collection of "multi-op" subroutines that perform 5 squaring and
+#    1 multiplication operations on operands of above lengths;
+# 3) fall-back and helper VIS3 subroutines.
+#
+# RSA sign is dominated by multi-op subroutine, while RSA verify and
+# DSA - by single-op. Special note about 4096-bit RSA verify result.
+# Operands are too long for dedicated hardware and it's handled by
+# VIS3 code, which is why you don't see any improvement. It's surely
+# possible to improve it [by deploying 'mpmul' instruction], maybe in
+# the future...
+#
+# Performance improvement.
+#
+# 64-bit process, VIS3:
+#                   sign    verify    sign/s verify/s
+# rsa 1024 bits 0.000628s 0.000028s   1592.4  35434.4
+# rsa 2048 bits 0.003282s 0.000106s    304.7   9438.3
+# rsa 4096 bits 0.025866s 0.000340s     38.7   2940.9
+# dsa 1024 bits 0.000301s 0.000332s   3323.7   3013.9
+# dsa 2048 bits 0.001056s 0.001233s    946.9    810.8
+#
+# 64-bit process, this module:
+#                   sign    verify    sign/s verify/s
+# rsa 1024 bits 0.000256s 0.000016s   3904.4  61411.9
+# rsa 2048 bits 0.000946s 0.000029s   1056.8  34292.7
+# rsa 4096 bits 0.005061s 0.000340s    197.6   2940.5
+# dsa 1024 bits 0.000176s 0.000195s   5674.7   5130.5
+# dsa 2048 bits 0.000296s 0.000354s   3383.2   2827.6
+#
+######################################################################
+# 32-bit process, VIS3:
+#                   sign    verify    sign/s verify/s
+# rsa 1024 bits 0.000665s 0.000028s   1504.8  35233.3
+# rsa 2048 bits 0.003349s 0.000106s    298.6   9433.4
+# rsa 4096 bits 0.025959s 0.000341s     38.5   2934.8
+# dsa 1024 bits 0.000320s 0.000341s   3123.3   2929.6
+# dsa 2048 bits 0.001101s 0.001260s    908.2    793.4
+#
+# 32-bit process, this module:
+#                   sign    verify    sign/s verify/s
+# rsa 1024 bits 0.000301s 0.000017s   3317.1  60240.0
+# rsa 2048 bits 0.001034s 0.000030s    966.9  33812.7
+# rsa 4096 bits 0.005244s 0.000341s    190.7   2935.4
+# dsa 1024 bits 0.000201s 0.000205s   4976.1   4879.2
+# dsa 2048 bits 0.000328s 0.000360s   3051.1   2774.2
+#
+# 32-bit code is prone to performance degradation as interrupt rate
+# dispatched to CPU executing the code grows. This is because in
+# standard process of handling interrupt in 32-bit process context
+# upper halves of most integer registers used as input or output are
+# zeroed. This renders result invalid, and operation has to be re-run.
+# If CPU is "bothered" with timer interrupts only, the penalty is
+# hardly measurable. But in order to mitigate this problem for higher
+# interrupt rates contemporary Linux kernel recognizes biased stack
+# even in 32-bit process context and preserves full register contents.
+# See http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=517ffce4e1a03aea979fe3a18a3dd1761a24fafb
+# for details.
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm");
+require "sparcv9_modes.pl";
+
+$output = pop;
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+$code.=<<___;
+#include "sparc_arch.h"
+
+#ifdef	__arch64__
+.register	%g2,#scratch
+.register	%g3,#scratch
+#endif
+
+.section	".text",#alloc,#execinstr
+
+#ifdef	__PIC__
+SPARC_PIC_THUNK(%g1)
+#endif
+___
+
+########################################################################
+# Register layout for mont[mul|sqr] instructions.
+# For details see "Oracle SPARC Architecture 2011" manual at
+# http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/server-storage/sun-sparc-enterprise/documentation/.
+#
+my @R=map("%f".2*$_,(0..11,30,31,12..29));
+my @N=(map("%l$_",(0..7)),map("%o$_",(0..5))); @N=(@N,@N,@N[0..3]);
+my @A=(@N[0..13],@R[14..31]);
+my @B=(map("%i$_",(0..5)),map("%l$_",(0..7))); @B=(@B,@B,map("%o$_",(0..3)));
+
+########################################################################
+# int bn_mul_mont_t4_$NUM(u64 *rp,const u64 *ap,const u64 *bp,
+#			  const u64 *np,const BN_ULONG *n0);
+#
+sub generate_bn_mul_mont_t4() {
+my $NUM=shift;
+my ($rp,$ap,$bp,$np,$sentinel)=map("%g$_",(1..5));
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	bn_mul_mont_t4_$NUM
+.align	32
+bn_mul_mont_t4_$NUM:
+#ifdef	__arch64__
+	mov	0,$sentinel
+	mov	-128,%g4
+#elif defined(SPARCV9_64BIT_STACK)
+	SPARC_LOAD_ADDRESS_LEAF(OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P,%g1,%g5)
+	ld	[%g1+0],%g1	! OPENSSL_sparcv9_P[0]
+	mov	-2047,%g4
+	and	%g1,SPARCV9_64BIT_STACK,%g1
+	movrz	%g1,0,%g4
+	mov	-1,$sentinel
+	add	%g4,-128,%g4
+#else
+	mov	-1,$sentinel
+	mov	-128,%g4
+#endif
+	sllx	$sentinel,32,$sentinel
+	save	%sp,%g4,%sp
+#ifndef	__arch64__
+	save	%sp,-128,%sp	! warm it up
+	save	%sp,-128,%sp
+	save	%sp,-128,%sp
+	save	%sp,-128,%sp
+	save	%sp,-128,%sp
+	save	%sp,-128,%sp
+	restore
+	restore
+	restore
+	restore
+	restore
+	restore
+#endif
+	and	%sp,1,%g4
+	or	$sentinel,%fp,%fp
+	or	%g4,$sentinel,$sentinel
+
+	! copy arguments to global registers
+	mov	%i0,$rp
+	mov	%i1,$ap
+	mov	%i2,$bp
+	mov	%i3,$np
+	ld	[%i4+0],%f1	! load *n0
+	ld	[%i4+4],%f0
+	fsrc2	%f0,%f60
+___
+
+# load ap[$NUM] ########################################################
+$code.=<<___;
+	save	%sp,-128,%sp;		or	$sentinel,%fp,%fp
+___
+for($i=0; $i<14 && $i<$NUM; $i++) {
+my $lo=$i<13?@A[$i+1]:"%o7";
+$code.=<<___;
+	ld	[$ap+$i*8+0],$lo
+	ld	[$ap+$i*8+4],@A[$i]
+	sllx	@A[$i],32,@A[$i]
+	or	$lo,@A[$i],@A[$i]
+___
+}
+for(; $i<$NUM; $i++) {
+my ($hi,$lo)=("%f".2*($i%4),"%f".(2*($i%4)+1));
+$code.=<<___;
+	ld	[$ap+$i*8+0],$lo
+	ld	[$ap+$i*8+4],$hi
+	fsrc2	$hi,@A[$i]
+___
+}
+# load np[$NUM] ########################################################
+$code.=<<___;
+	save	%sp,-128,%sp;		or	$sentinel,%fp,%fp
+___
+for($i=0; $i<14 && $i<$NUM; $i++) {
+my $lo=$i<13?@N[$i+1]:"%o7";
+$code.=<<___;
+	ld	[$np+$i*8+0],$lo
+	ld	[$np+$i*8+4],@N[$i]
+	sllx	@N[$i],32,@N[$i]
+	or	$lo,@N[$i],@N[$i]
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	save	%sp,-128,%sp;		or	$sentinel,%fp,%fp
+___
+for(; $i<28 && $i<$NUM; $i++) {
+my $lo=$i<27?@N[$i+1]:"%o7";
+$code.=<<___;
+	ld	[$np+$i*8+0],$lo
+	ld	[$np+$i*8+4],@N[$i]
+	sllx	@N[$i],32,@N[$i]
+	or	$lo,@N[$i],@N[$i]
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	save	%sp,-128,%sp;		or	$sentinel,%fp,%fp
+___
+for(; $i<$NUM; $i++) {
+my $lo=($i<$NUM-1)?@N[$i+1]:"%o7";
+$code.=<<___;
+	ld	[$np+$i*8+0],$lo
+	ld	[$np+$i*8+4],@N[$i]
+	sllx	@N[$i],32,@N[$i]
+	or	$lo,@N[$i],@N[$i]
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	cmp	$ap,$bp
+	be	SIZE_T_CC,.Lmsquare_$NUM
+	nop
+___
+
+# load bp[$NUM] ########################################################
+$code.=<<___;
+	save	%sp,-128,%sp;		or	$sentinel,%fp,%fp
+___
+for($i=0; $i<14 && $i<$NUM; $i++) {
+my $lo=$i<13?@B[$i+1]:"%o7";
+$code.=<<___;
+	ld	[$bp+$i*8+0],$lo
+	ld	[$bp+$i*8+4],@B[$i]
+	sllx	@B[$i],32,@B[$i]
+	or	$lo,@B[$i],@B[$i]
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	save	%sp,-128,%sp;		or	$sentinel,%fp,%fp
+___
+for(; $i<$NUM; $i++) {
+my $lo=($i<$NUM-1)?@B[$i+1]:"%o7";
+$code.=<<___;
+	ld	[$bp+$i*8+0],$lo
+	ld	[$bp+$i*8+4],@B[$i]
+	sllx	@B[$i],32,@B[$i]
+	or	$lo,@B[$i],@B[$i]
+___
+}
+# magic ################################################################
+$code.=<<___;
+	.word	0x81b02920+$NUM-1	! montmul	$NUM-1
+.Lmresume_$NUM:
+	fbu,pn	%fcc3,.Lmabort_$NUM
+#ifndef	__arch64__
+	and	%fp,$sentinel,$sentinel
+	brz,pn	$sentinel,.Lmabort_$NUM
+#endif
+	nop
+#ifdef	__arch64__
+	restore
+	restore
+	restore
+	restore
+	restore
+#else
+	restore;		and	%fp,$sentinel,$sentinel
+	restore;		and	%fp,$sentinel,$sentinel
+	restore;		and	%fp,$sentinel,$sentinel
+	restore;		and	%fp,$sentinel,$sentinel
+	 brz,pn	$sentinel,.Lmabort1_$NUM
+	restore
+#endif
+___
+
+# save tp[$NUM] ########################################################
+for($i=0; $i<14 && $i<$NUM; $i++) {
+$code.=<<___;
+	movxtod	@A[$i],@R[$i]
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+#ifdef	__arch64__
+	restore
+#else
+	 and	%fp,$sentinel,$sentinel
+	restore
+	 and	$sentinel,1,%o7
+	 and	%fp,$sentinel,$sentinel
+	 srl	%fp,0,%fp		! just in case?
+	 or	%o7,$sentinel,$sentinel
+	brz,a,pn $sentinel,.Lmdone_$NUM
+	mov	0,%i0		! return failure
+#endif
+___
+for($i=0; $i<12 && $i<$NUM; $i++) {
+@R[$i] =~ /%f([0-9]+)/;
+my $lo = "%f".($1+1);
+$code.=<<___;
+	st	$lo,[$rp+$i*8+0]
+	st	@R[$i],[$rp+$i*8+4]
+___
+}
+for(; $i<$NUM; $i++) {
+my ($hi,$lo)=("%f".2*($i%4),"%f".(2*($i%4)+1));
+$code.=<<___;
+	fsrc2	@R[$i],$hi
+	st	$lo,[$rp+$i*8+0]
+	st	$hi,[$rp+$i*8+4]
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	1,%i0		! return success
+.Lmdone_$NUM:
+	ret
+	restore
+
+.Lmabort_$NUM:
+	restore
+	restore
+	restore
+	restore
+	restore
+.Lmabort1_$NUM:
+	restore
+
+	mov	0,%i0		! return failure
+	ret
+	restore
+
+.align	32
+.Lmsquare_$NUM:
+	save	%sp,-128,%sp;		or	$sentinel,%fp,%fp
+	save	%sp,-128,%sp;		or	$sentinel,%fp,%fp
+	.word   0x81b02940+$NUM-1	! montsqr	$NUM-1
+	ba	.Lmresume_$NUM
+	nop
+.type	bn_mul_mont_t4_$NUM, #function
+.size	bn_mul_mont_t4_$NUM, .-bn_mul_mont_t4_$NUM
+___
+}
+
+for ($i=8;$i<=32;$i+=8) {
+	&generate_bn_mul_mont_t4($i);
+}
+
+########################################################################
+#
+sub load_ccr {
+my ($ptbl,$pwr,$ccr,$skip_wr)=@_;
+$code.=<<___;
+	srl	$pwr,	2,	%o4
+	and	$pwr,	3,	%o5
+	and	%o4,	7,	%o4
+	sll	%o5,	3,	%o5	! offset within first cache line
+	add	%o5,	$ptbl,	$ptbl	! of the pwrtbl
+	or	%g0,	1,	%o5
+	sll	%o5,	%o4,	$ccr
+___
+$code.=<<___	if (!$skip_wr);
+	wr	$ccr,	%g0,	%ccr
+___
+}
+sub load_b_pair {
+my ($pwrtbl,$B0,$B1)=@_;
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	ldx	[$pwrtbl+0*32],	$B0
+	ldx	[$pwrtbl+8*32],	$B1
+	ldx	[$pwrtbl+1*32],	%o4
+	ldx	[$pwrtbl+9*32],	%o5
+	movvs	%icc,	%o4,	$B0
+	ldx	[$pwrtbl+2*32],	%o4
+	movvs	%icc,	%o5,	$B1
+	ldx	[$pwrtbl+10*32],%o5
+	move	%icc,	%o4,	$B0
+	ldx	[$pwrtbl+3*32],	%o4
+	move	%icc,	%o5,	$B1
+	ldx	[$pwrtbl+11*32],%o5
+	movneg	%icc,	%o4,	$B0
+	ldx	[$pwrtbl+4*32],	%o4
+	movneg	%icc,	%o5,	$B1
+	ldx	[$pwrtbl+12*32],%o5
+	movcs	%xcc,	%o4,	$B0
+	ldx	[$pwrtbl+5*32],%o4
+	movcs	%xcc,	%o5,	$B1
+	ldx	[$pwrtbl+13*32],%o5
+	movvs	%xcc,	%o4,	$B0
+	ldx	[$pwrtbl+6*32],	%o4
+	movvs	%xcc,	%o5,	$B1
+	ldx	[$pwrtbl+14*32],%o5
+	move	%xcc,	%o4,	$B0
+	ldx	[$pwrtbl+7*32],	%o4
+	move	%xcc,	%o5,	$B1
+	ldx	[$pwrtbl+15*32],%o5
+	movneg	%xcc,	%o4,	$B0
+	add	$pwrtbl,16*32,	$pwrtbl
+	movneg	%xcc,	%o5,	$B1
+___
+}
+sub load_b {
+my ($pwrtbl,$Bi)=@_;
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	ldx	[$pwrtbl+0*32],	$Bi
+	ldx	[$pwrtbl+1*32],	%o4
+	ldx	[$pwrtbl+2*32],	%o5
+	movvs	%icc,	%o4,	$Bi
+	ldx	[$pwrtbl+3*32],	%o4
+	move	%icc,	%o5,	$Bi
+	ldx	[$pwrtbl+4*32],	%o5
+	movneg	%icc,	%o4,	$Bi
+	ldx	[$pwrtbl+5*32],	%o4
+	movcs	%xcc,	%o5,	$Bi
+	ldx	[$pwrtbl+6*32],	%o5
+	movvs	%xcc,	%o4,	$Bi
+	ldx	[$pwrtbl+7*32],	%o4
+	move	%xcc,	%o5,	$Bi
+	add	$pwrtbl,8*32,	$pwrtbl
+	movneg	%xcc,	%o4,	$Bi
+___
+}
+
+########################################################################
+# int bn_pwr5_mont_t4_$NUM(u64 *tp,const u64 *np,const BN_ULONG *n0,
+#			   const u64 *pwrtbl,int pwr,int stride);
+#
+sub generate_bn_pwr5_mont_t4() {
+my $NUM=shift;
+my ($tp,$np,$pwrtbl,$pwr,$sentinel)=map("%g$_",(1..5));
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	bn_pwr5_mont_t4_$NUM
+.align	32
+bn_pwr5_mont_t4_$NUM:
+#ifdef	__arch64__
+	mov	0,$sentinel
+	mov	-128,%g4
+#elif defined(SPARCV9_64BIT_STACK)
+	SPARC_LOAD_ADDRESS_LEAF(OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P,%g1,%g5)
+	ld	[%g1+0],%g1	! OPENSSL_sparcv9_P[0]
+	mov	-2047,%g4
+	and	%g1,SPARCV9_64BIT_STACK,%g1
+	movrz	%g1,0,%g4
+	mov	-1,$sentinel
+	add	%g4,-128,%g4
+#else
+	mov	-1,$sentinel
+	mov	-128,%g4
+#endif
+	sllx	$sentinel,32,$sentinel
+	save	%sp,%g4,%sp
+#ifndef	__arch64__
+	save	%sp,-128,%sp	! warm it up
+	save	%sp,-128,%sp
+	save	%sp,-128,%sp
+	save	%sp,-128,%sp
+	save	%sp,-128,%sp
+	save	%sp,-128,%sp
+	restore
+	restore
+	restore
+	restore
+	restore
+	restore
+#endif
+	and	%sp,1,%g4
+	or	$sentinel,%fp,%fp
+	or	%g4,$sentinel,$sentinel
+
+	! copy arguments to global registers
+	mov	%i0,$tp
+	mov	%i1,$np
+	ld	[%i2+0],%f1	! load *n0
+	ld	[%i2+4],%f0
+	mov	%i3,$pwrtbl
+	srl	%i4,%g0,%i4	! pack last arguments
+	sllx	%i5,32,$pwr
+	or	%i4,$pwr,$pwr
+	fsrc2	%f0,%f60
+___
+
+# load tp[$NUM] ########################################################
+$code.=<<___;
+	save	%sp,-128,%sp;		or	$sentinel,%fp,%fp
+___
+for($i=0; $i<14 && $i<$NUM; $i++) {
+$code.=<<___;
+	ldx	[$tp+$i*8],@A[$i]
+___
+}
+for(; $i<$NUM; $i++) {
+$code.=<<___;
+	ldd	[$tp+$i*8],@A[$i]
+___
+}
+# load np[$NUM] ########################################################
+$code.=<<___;
+	save	%sp,-128,%sp;		or	$sentinel,%fp,%fp
+___
+for($i=0; $i<14 && $i<$NUM; $i++) {
+$code.=<<___;
+	ldx	[$np+$i*8],@N[$i]
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	save	%sp,-128,%sp;		or	$sentinel,%fp,%fp
+___
+for(; $i<28 && $i<$NUM; $i++) {
+$code.=<<___;
+	ldx	[$np+$i*8],@N[$i]
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	save	%sp,-128,%sp;		or	$sentinel,%fp,%fp
+___
+for(; $i<$NUM; $i++) {
+$code.=<<___;
+	ldx	[$np+$i*8],@N[$i]
+___
+}
+# load pwrtbl[pwr] ########################################################
+$code.=<<___;
+	save	%sp,-128,%sp;		or	$sentinel,%fp,%fp
+
+	srlx	$pwr,	32,	%o4		! unpack $pwr
+	srl	$pwr,	%g0,	%o5
+	sub	%o4,	5,	%o4
+	mov	$pwrtbl,	%o7
+	sllx	%o4,	32,	$pwr		! re-pack $pwr
+	or	%o5,	$pwr,	$pwr
+	srl	%o5,	%o4,	%o5
+___
+	&load_ccr("%o7","%o5","%o4");
+$code.=<<___;
+	b	.Lstride_$NUM
+	nop
+.align	16
+.Lstride_$NUM:
+___
+for($i=0; $i<14 && $i<$NUM; $i+=2) {
+	&load_b_pair("%o7",@B[$i],@B[$i+1]);
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	save	%sp,-128,%sp;		or	$sentinel,%fp,%fp
+___
+for(; $i<$NUM; $i+=2) {
+	&load_b_pair("%i7",@B[$i],@B[$i+1]);
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	srax	$pwr,	32,	%o4		! unpack $pwr
+	srl	$pwr,	%g0,	%o5
+	sub	%o4,	5,	%o4
+	mov	$pwrtbl,	%i7
+	sllx	%o4,	32,	$pwr		! re-pack $pwr
+	or	%o5,	$pwr,	$pwr
+	srl	%o5,	%o4,	%o5
+___
+	&load_ccr("%i7","%o5","%o4",1);
+
+# magic ################################################################
+for($i=0; $i<5; $i++) {
+$code.=<<___;
+	.word	0x81b02940+$NUM-1	! montsqr	$NUM-1
+	fbu,pn	%fcc3,.Labort_$NUM
+#ifndef	__arch64__
+	and	%fp,$sentinel,$sentinel
+	brz,pn	$sentinel,.Labort_$NUM
+#endif
+	nop
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	wr	%o4,	%g0,	%ccr
+	.word	0x81b02920+$NUM-1	! montmul	$NUM-1
+	fbu,pn	%fcc3,.Labort_$NUM
+#ifndef	__arch64__
+	and	%fp,$sentinel,$sentinel
+	brz,pn	$sentinel,.Labort_$NUM
+#endif
+
+	srax	$pwr,	32,	%o4
+#ifdef	__arch64__
+	brgez	%o4,.Lstride_$NUM
+	restore
+	restore
+	restore
+	restore
+	restore
+#else
+	brgez	%o4,.Lstride_$NUM
+	restore;		and	%fp,$sentinel,$sentinel
+	restore;		and	%fp,$sentinel,$sentinel
+	restore;		and	%fp,$sentinel,$sentinel
+	restore;		and	%fp,$sentinel,$sentinel
+	 brz,pn	$sentinel,.Labort1_$NUM
+	restore
+#endif
+___
+
+# save tp[$NUM] ########################################################
+for($i=0; $i<14 && $i<$NUM; $i++) {
+$code.=<<___;
+	movxtod	@A[$i],@R[$i]
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+#ifdef	__arch64__
+	restore
+#else
+	 and	%fp,$sentinel,$sentinel
+	restore
+	 and	$sentinel,1,%o7
+	 and	%fp,$sentinel,$sentinel
+	 srl	%fp,0,%fp		! just in case?
+	 or	%o7,$sentinel,$sentinel
+	brz,a,pn $sentinel,.Ldone_$NUM
+	mov	0,%i0		! return failure
+#endif
+___
+for($i=0; $i<$NUM; $i++) {
+$code.=<<___;
+	std	@R[$i],[$tp+$i*8]
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	1,%i0		! return success
+.Ldone_$NUM:
+	ret
+	restore
+
+.Labort_$NUM:
+	restore
+	restore
+	restore
+	restore
+	restore
+.Labort1_$NUM:
+	restore
+
+	mov	0,%i0		! return failure
+	ret
+	restore
+.type	bn_pwr5_mont_t4_$NUM, #function
+.size	bn_pwr5_mont_t4_$NUM, .-bn_pwr5_mont_t4_$NUM
+___
+}
+
+for ($i=8;$i<=32;$i+=8) {
+	&generate_bn_pwr5_mont_t4($i);
+}
+
+{
+########################################################################
+# Fall-back subroutines
+#
+# copy of bn_mul_mont_vis3 adjusted for vectors of 64-bit values
+#
+($n0,$m0,$m1,$lo0,$hi0, $lo1,$hi1,$aj,$alo,$nj,$nlo,$tj)=
+	(map("%g$_",(1..5)),map("%o$_",(0..5,7)));
+
+# int bn_mul_mont(
+$rp="%o0";	# u64 *rp,
+$ap="%o1";	# const u64 *ap,
+$bp="%o2";	# const u64 *bp,
+$np="%o3";	# const u64 *np,
+$n0p="%o4";	# const BN_ULONG *n0,
+$num="%o5";	# int num);	# caller ensures that num is >=3
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	bn_mul_mont_t4
+.align	32
+bn_mul_mont_t4:
+	add	%sp,	STACK_BIAS,	%g4	! real top of stack
+	sll	$num,	3,	$num		! size in bytes
+	add	$num,	63,	%g1
+	andn	%g1,	63,	%g1		! buffer size rounded up to 64 bytes
+	sub	%g4,	%g1,	%g1
+	andn	%g1,	63,	%g1		! align at 64 byte
+	sub	%g1,	STACK_FRAME,	%g1	! new top of stack
+	sub	%g1,	%g4,	%g1
+
+	save	%sp,	%g1,	%sp
+___
+#	+-------------------------------+<-----	%sp
+#	.				.
+#	+-------------------------------+<-----	aligned at 64 bytes
+#	| __int64 tmp[0]		|
+#	+-------------------------------+
+#	.				.
+#	.				.
+#	+-------------------------------+<-----	aligned at 64 bytes
+#	.				.
+($rp,$ap,$bp,$np,$n0p,$num)=map("%i$_",(0..5));
+($t0,$t1,$t2,$t3,$cnt,$tp,$bufsz)=map("%l$_",(0..7));
+($ovf,$i)=($t0,$t1);
+$code.=<<___;
+	ld	[$n0p+0],	$t0	! pull n0[0..1] value
+	ld	[$n0p+4],	$t1
+	add	%sp, STACK_BIAS+STACK_FRAME, $tp
+	ldx	[$bp+0],	$m0	! m0=bp[0]
+	sllx	$t1,	32,	$n0
+	add	$bp,	8,	$bp
+	or	$t0,	$n0,	$n0
+
+	ldx	[$ap+0],	$aj	! ap[0]
+
+	mulx	$aj,	$m0,	$lo0	! ap[0]*bp[0]
+	umulxhi	$aj,	$m0,	$hi0
+
+	ldx	[$ap+8],	$aj	! ap[1]
+	add	$ap,	16,	$ap
+	ldx	[$np+0],	$nj	! np[0]
+
+	mulx	$lo0,	$n0,	$m1	! "tp[0]"*n0
+
+	mulx	$aj,	$m0,	$alo	! ap[1]*bp[0]
+	umulxhi	$aj,	$m0,	$aj	! ahi=aj
+
+	mulx	$nj,	$m1,	$lo1	! np[0]*m1
+	umulxhi	$nj,	$m1,	$hi1
+
+	ldx	[$np+8],	$nj	! np[1]
+
+	addcc	$lo0,	$lo1,	$lo1
+	add	$np,	16,	$np
+	addxc	%g0,	$hi1,	$hi1
+
+	mulx	$nj,	$m1,	$nlo	! np[1]*m1
+	umulxhi	$nj,	$m1,	$nj	! nhi=nj
+
+	ba	.L1st
+	sub	$num,	24,	$cnt	! cnt=num-3
+
+.align	16
+.L1st:
+	addcc	$alo,	$hi0,	$lo0
+	addxc	$aj,	%g0,	$hi0
+
+	ldx	[$ap+0],	$aj	! ap[j]
+	addcc	$nlo,	$hi1,	$lo1
+	add	$ap,	8,	$ap
+	addxc	$nj,	%g0,	$hi1	! nhi=nj
+
+	ldx	[$np+0],	$nj	! np[j]
+	mulx	$aj,	$m0,	$alo	! ap[j]*bp[0]
+	add	$np,	8,	$np
+	umulxhi	$aj,	$m0,	$aj	! ahi=aj
+
+	mulx	$nj,	$m1,	$nlo	! np[j]*m1
+	addcc	$lo0,	$lo1,	$lo1	! np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0]
+	umulxhi	$nj,	$m1,	$nj	! nhi=nj
+	addxc	%g0,	$hi1,	$hi1
+	stxa	$lo1,	[$tp]0xe2	! tp[j-1]
+	add	$tp,	8,	$tp	! tp++
+
+	brnz,pt	$cnt,	.L1st
+	sub	$cnt,	8,	$cnt	! j--
+!.L1st
+	addcc	$alo,	$hi0,	$lo0
+	addxc	$aj,	%g0,	$hi0	! ahi=aj
+
+	addcc	$nlo,	$hi1,	$lo1
+	addxc	$nj,	%g0,	$hi1
+	addcc	$lo0,	$lo1,	$lo1	! np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0]
+	addxc	%g0,	$hi1,	$hi1
+	stxa	$lo1,	[$tp]0xe2	! tp[j-1]
+	add	$tp,	8,	$tp
+
+	addcc	$hi0,	$hi1,	$hi1
+	addxc	%g0,	%g0,	$ovf	! upmost overflow bit
+	stxa	$hi1,	[$tp]0xe2
+	add	$tp,	8,	$tp
+
+	ba	.Louter
+	sub	$num,	16,	$i	! i=num-2
+
+.align	16
+.Louter:
+	ldx	[$bp+0],	$m0	! m0=bp[i]
+	add	$bp,	8,	$bp
+
+	sub	$ap,	$num,	$ap	! rewind
+	sub	$np,	$num,	$np
+	sub	$tp,	$num,	$tp
+
+	ldx	[$ap+0],	$aj	! ap[0]
+	ldx	[$np+0],	$nj	! np[0]
+
+	mulx	$aj,	$m0,	$lo0	! ap[0]*bp[i]
+	ldx	[$tp],		$tj	! tp[0]
+	umulxhi	$aj,	$m0,	$hi0
+	ldx	[$ap+8],	$aj	! ap[1]
+	addcc	$lo0,	$tj,	$lo0	! ap[0]*bp[i]+tp[0]
+	mulx	$aj,	$m0,	$alo	! ap[1]*bp[i]
+	addxc	%g0,	$hi0,	$hi0
+	mulx	$lo0,	$n0,	$m1	! tp[0]*n0
+	umulxhi	$aj,	$m0,	$aj	! ahi=aj
+	mulx	$nj,	$m1,	$lo1	! np[0]*m1
+	add	$ap,	16,	$ap
+	umulxhi	$nj,	$m1,	$hi1
+	ldx	[$np+8],	$nj	! np[1]
+	add	$np,	16,	$np
+	addcc	$lo1,	$lo0,	$lo1
+	mulx	$nj,	$m1,	$nlo	! np[1]*m1
+	addxc	%g0,	$hi1,	$hi1
+	umulxhi	$nj,	$m1,	$nj	! nhi=nj
+
+	ba	.Linner
+	sub	$num,	24,	$cnt	! cnt=num-3
+.align	16
+.Linner:
+	addcc	$alo,	$hi0,	$lo0
+	ldx	[$tp+8],	$tj	! tp[j]
+	addxc	$aj,	%g0,	$hi0	! ahi=aj
+	ldx	[$ap+0],	$aj	! ap[j]
+	add	$ap,	8,	$ap
+	addcc	$nlo,	$hi1,	$lo1
+	mulx	$aj,	$m0,	$alo	! ap[j]*bp[i]
+	addxc	$nj,	%g0,	$hi1	! nhi=nj
+	ldx	[$np+0],	$nj	! np[j]
+	add	$np,	8,	$np
+	umulxhi	$aj,	$m0,	$aj	! ahi=aj
+	addcc	$lo0,	$tj,	$lo0	! ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j]
+	mulx	$nj,	$m1,	$nlo	! np[j]*m1
+	addxc	%g0,	$hi0,	$hi0
+	umulxhi	$nj,	$m1,	$nj	! nhi=nj
+	addcc	$lo1,	$lo0,	$lo1	! np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j]
+	addxc	%g0,	$hi1,	$hi1
+	stx	$lo1,	[$tp]		! tp[j-1]
+	add	$tp,	8,	$tp
+	brnz,pt	$cnt,	.Linner
+	sub	$cnt,	8,	$cnt
+!.Linner
+	ldx	[$tp+8],	$tj	! tp[j]
+	addcc	$alo,	$hi0,	$lo0
+	addxc	$aj,	%g0,	$hi0	! ahi=aj
+	addcc	$lo0,	$tj,	$lo0	! ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j]
+	addxc	%g0,	$hi0,	$hi0
+
+	addcc	$nlo,	$hi1,	$lo1
+	addxc	$nj,	%g0,	$hi1	! nhi=nj
+	addcc	$lo1,	$lo0,	$lo1	! np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j]
+	addxc	%g0,	$hi1,	$hi1
+	stx	$lo1,	[$tp]		! tp[j-1]
+
+	subcc	%g0,	$ovf,	%g0	! move upmost overflow to CCR.xcc
+	addxccc	$hi1,	$hi0,	$hi1
+	addxc	%g0,	%g0,	$ovf
+	stx	$hi1,	[$tp+8]
+	add	$tp,	16,	$tp
+
+	brnz,pt	$i,	.Louter
+	sub	$i,	8,	$i
+
+	sub	$ap,	$num,	$ap	! rewind
+	sub	$np,	$num,	$np
+	sub	$tp,	$num,	$tp
+	ba	.Lsub
+	subcc	$num,	8,	$cnt	! cnt=num-1 and clear CCR.xcc
+
+.align	16
+.Lsub:
+	ldx	[$tp],		$tj
+	add	$tp,	8,	$tp
+	ldx	[$np+0],	$nj
+	add	$np,	8,	$np
+	subccc	$tj,	$nj,	$t2	! tp[j]-np[j]
+	srlx	$tj,	32,	$tj
+	srlx	$nj,	32,	$nj
+	subccc	$tj,	$nj,	$t3
+	add	$rp,	8,	$rp
+	st	$t2,	[$rp-4]		! reverse order
+	st	$t3,	[$rp-8]
+	brnz,pt	$cnt,	.Lsub
+	sub	$cnt,	8,	$cnt
+
+	sub	$np,	$num,	$np	! rewind
+	sub	$tp,	$num,	$tp
+	sub	$rp,	$num,	$rp
+
+	subc	$ovf,	%g0,	$ovf	! handle upmost overflow bit
+	and	$tp,	$ovf,	$ap
+	andn	$rp,	$ovf,	$np
+	or	$np,	$ap,	$ap	! ap=borrow?tp:rp
+	ba	.Lcopy
+	sub	$num,	8,	$cnt
+
+.align	16
+.Lcopy:					! copy or in-place refresh
+	ldx	[$ap+0],	$t2
+	add	$ap,	8,	$ap
+	stx	%g0,	[$tp]		! zap
+	add	$tp,	8,	$tp
+	stx	$t2,	[$rp+0]
+	add	$rp,	8,	$rp
+	brnz	$cnt,	.Lcopy
+	sub	$cnt,	8,	$cnt
+
+	mov	1,	%o0
+	ret
+	restore
+.type	bn_mul_mont_t4, #function
+.size	bn_mul_mont_t4, .-bn_mul_mont_t4
+___
+
+# int bn_mul_mont_gather5(
+$rp="%o0";	# u64 *rp,
+$ap="%o1";	# const u64 *ap,
+$bp="%o2";	# const u64 *pwrtbl,
+$np="%o3";	# const u64 *np,
+$n0p="%o4";	# const BN_ULONG *n0,
+$num="%o5";	# int num,	# caller ensures that num is >=3
+		# int power);
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	bn_mul_mont_gather5_t4
+.align	32
+bn_mul_mont_gather5_t4:
+	add	%sp,	STACK_BIAS,	%g4	! real top of stack
+	sll	$num,	3,	$num		! size in bytes
+	add	$num,	63,	%g1
+	andn	%g1,	63,	%g1		! buffer size rounded up to 64 bytes
+	sub	%g4,	%g1,	%g1
+	andn	%g1,	63,	%g1		! align at 64 byte
+	sub	%g1,	STACK_FRAME,	%g1	! new top of stack
+	sub	%g1,	%g4,	%g1
+	LDPTR	[%sp+STACK_7thARG],	%g4	! load power, 7th argument
+
+	save	%sp,	%g1,	%sp
+___
+#	+-------------------------------+<-----	%sp
+#	.				.
+#	+-------------------------------+<-----	aligned at 64 bytes
+#	| __int64 tmp[0]		|
+#	+-------------------------------+
+#	.				.
+#	.				.
+#	+-------------------------------+<-----	aligned at 64 bytes
+#	.				.
+($rp,$ap,$bp,$np,$n0p,$num)=map("%i$_",(0..5));
+($t0,$t1,$t2,$t3,$cnt,$tp,$bufsz,$ccr)=map("%l$_",(0..7));
+($ovf,$i)=($t0,$t1);
+	&load_ccr($bp,"%g4",$ccr);
+	&load_b($bp,$m0,"%o7");		# m0=bp[0]
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	ld	[$n0p+0],	$t0	! pull n0[0..1] value
+	ld	[$n0p+4],	$t1
+	add	%sp, STACK_BIAS+STACK_FRAME, $tp
+	sllx	$t1,	32,	$n0
+	or	$t0,	$n0,	$n0
+
+	ldx	[$ap+0],	$aj	! ap[0]
+
+	mulx	$aj,	$m0,	$lo0	! ap[0]*bp[0]
+	umulxhi	$aj,	$m0,	$hi0
+
+	ldx	[$ap+8],	$aj	! ap[1]
+	add	$ap,	16,	$ap
+	ldx	[$np+0],	$nj	! np[0]
+
+	mulx	$lo0,	$n0,	$m1	! "tp[0]"*n0
+
+	mulx	$aj,	$m0,	$alo	! ap[1]*bp[0]
+	umulxhi	$aj,	$m0,	$aj	! ahi=aj
+
+	mulx	$nj,	$m1,	$lo1	! np[0]*m1
+	umulxhi	$nj,	$m1,	$hi1
+
+	ldx	[$np+8],	$nj	! np[1]
+
+	addcc	$lo0,	$lo1,	$lo1
+	add	$np,	16,	$np
+	addxc	%g0,	$hi1,	$hi1
+
+	mulx	$nj,	$m1,	$nlo	! np[1]*m1
+	umulxhi	$nj,	$m1,	$nj	! nhi=nj
+
+	ba	.L1st_g5
+	sub	$num,	24,	$cnt	! cnt=num-3
+
+.align	16
+.L1st_g5:
+	addcc	$alo,	$hi0,	$lo0
+	addxc	$aj,	%g0,	$hi0
+
+	ldx	[$ap+0],	$aj	! ap[j]
+	addcc	$nlo,	$hi1,	$lo1
+	add	$ap,	8,	$ap
+	addxc	$nj,	%g0,	$hi1	! nhi=nj
+
+	ldx	[$np+0],	$nj	! np[j]
+	mulx	$aj,	$m0,	$alo	! ap[j]*bp[0]
+	add	$np,	8,	$np
+	umulxhi	$aj,	$m0,	$aj	! ahi=aj
+
+	mulx	$nj,	$m1,	$nlo	! np[j]*m1
+	addcc	$lo0,	$lo1,	$lo1	! np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0]
+	umulxhi	$nj,	$m1,	$nj	! nhi=nj
+	addxc	%g0,	$hi1,	$hi1
+	stxa	$lo1,	[$tp]0xe2	! tp[j-1]
+	add	$tp,	8,	$tp	! tp++
+
+	brnz,pt	$cnt,	.L1st_g5
+	sub	$cnt,	8,	$cnt	! j--
+!.L1st_g5
+	addcc	$alo,	$hi0,	$lo0
+	addxc	$aj,	%g0,	$hi0	! ahi=aj
+
+	addcc	$nlo,	$hi1,	$lo1
+	addxc	$nj,	%g0,	$hi1
+	addcc	$lo0,	$lo1,	$lo1	! np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0]
+	addxc	%g0,	$hi1,	$hi1
+	stxa	$lo1,	[$tp]0xe2	! tp[j-1]
+	add	$tp,	8,	$tp
+
+	addcc	$hi0,	$hi1,	$hi1
+	addxc	%g0,	%g0,	$ovf	! upmost overflow bit
+	stxa	$hi1,	[$tp]0xe2
+	add	$tp,	8,	$tp
+
+	ba	.Louter_g5
+	sub	$num,	16,	$i	! i=num-2
+
+.align	16
+.Louter_g5:
+	wr	$ccr,	%g0,	%ccr
+___
+	&load_b($bp,$m0);		# m0=bp[i]
+$code.=<<___;
+	sub	$ap,	$num,	$ap	! rewind
+	sub	$np,	$num,	$np
+	sub	$tp,	$num,	$tp
+
+	ldx	[$ap+0],	$aj	! ap[0]
+	ldx	[$np+0],	$nj	! np[0]
+
+	mulx	$aj,	$m0,	$lo0	! ap[0]*bp[i]
+	ldx	[$tp],		$tj	! tp[0]
+	umulxhi	$aj,	$m0,	$hi0
+	ldx	[$ap+8],	$aj	! ap[1]
+	addcc	$lo0,	$tj,	$lo0	! ap[0]*bp[i]+tp[0]
+	mulx	$aj,	$m0,	$alo	! ap[1]*bp[i]
+	addxc	%g0,	$hi0,	$hi0
+	mulx	$lo0,	$n0,	$m1	! tp[0]*n0
+	umulxhi	$aj,	$m0,	$aj	! ahi=aj
+	mulx	$nj,	$m1,	$lo1	! np[0]*m1
+	add	$ap,	16,	$ap
+	umulxhi	$nj,	$m1,	$hi1
+	ldx	[$np+8],	$nj	! np[1]
+	add	$np,	16,	$np
+	addcc	$lo1,	$lo0,	$lo1
+	mulx	$nj,	$m1,	$nlo	! np[1]*m1
+	addxc	%g0,	$hi1,	$hi1
+	umulxhi	$nj,	$m1,	$nj	! nhi=nj
+
+	ba	.Linner_g5
+	sub	$num,	24,	$cnt	! cnt=num-3
+.align	16
+.Linner_g5:
+	addcc	$alo,	$hi0,	$lo0
+	ldx	[$tp+8],	$tj	! tp[j]
+	addxc	$aj,	%g0,	$hi0	! ahi=aj
+	ldx	[$ap+0],	$aj	! ap[j]
+	add	$ap,	8,	$ap
+	addcc	$nlo,	$hi1,	$lo1
+	mulx	$aj,	$m0,	$alo	! ap[j]*bp[i]
+	addxc	$nj,	%g0,	$hi1	! nhi=nj
+	ldx	[$np+0],	$nj	! np[j]
+	add	$np,	8,	$np
+	umulxhi	$aj,	$m0,	$aj	! ahi=aj
+	addcc	$lo0,	$tj,	$lo0	! ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j]
+	mulx	$nj,	$m1,	$nlo	! np[j]*m1
+	addxc	%g0,	$hi0,	$hi0
+	umulxhi	$nj,	$m1,	$nj	! nhi=nj
+	addcc	$lo1,	$lo0,	$lo1	! np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j]
+	addxc	%g0,	$hi1,	$hi1
+	stx	$lo1,	[$tp]		! tp[j-1]
+	add	$tp,	8,	$tp
+	brnz,pt	$cnt,	.Linner_g5
+	sub	$cnt,	8,	$cnt
+!.Linner_g5
+	ldx	[$tp+8],	$tj	! tp[j]
+	addcc	$alo,	$hi0,	$lo0
+	addxc	$aj,	%g0,	$hi0	! ahi=aj
+	addcc	$lo0,	$tj,	$lo0	! ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j]
+	addxc	%g0,	$hi0,	$hi0
+
+	addcc	$nlo,	$hi1,	$lo1
+	addxc	$nj,	%g0,	$hi1	! nhi=nj
+	addcc	$lo1,	$lo0,	$lo1	! np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j]
+	addxc	%g0,	$hi1,	$hi1
+	stx	$lo1,	[$tp]		! tp[j-1]
+
+	subcc	%g0,	$ovf,	%g0	! move upmost overflow to CCR.xcc
+	addxccc	$hi1,	$hi0,	$hi1
+	addxc	%g0,	%g0,	$ovf
+	stx	$hi1,	[$tp+8]
+	add	$tp,	16,	$tp
+
+	brnz,pt	$i,	.Louter_g5
+	sub	$i,	8,	$i
+
+	sub	$ap,	$num,	$ap	! rewind
+	sub	$np,	$num,	$np
+	sub	$tp,	$num,	$tp
+	ba	.Lsub_g5
+	subcc	$num,	8,	$cnt	! cnt=num-1 and clear CCR.xcc
+
+.align	16
+.Lsub_g5:
+	ldx	[$tp],		$tj
+	add	$tp,	8,	$tp
+	ldx	[$np+0],	$nj
+	add	$np,	8,	$np
+	subccc	$tj,	$nj,	$t2	! tp[j]-np[j]
+	srlx	$tj,	32,	$tj
+	srlx	$nj,	32,	$nj
+	subccc	$tj,	$nj,	$t3
+	add	$rp,	8,	$rp
+	st	$t2,	[$rp-4]		! reverse order
+	st	$t3,	[$rp-8]
+	brnz,pt	$cnt,	.Lsub_g5
+	sub	$cnt,	8,	$cnt
+
+	sub	$np,	$num,	$np	! rewind
+	sub	$tp,	$num,	$tp
+	sub	$rp,	$num,	$rp
+
+	subc	$ovf,	%g0,	$ovf	! handle upmost overflow bit
+	and	$tp,	$ovf,	$ap
+	andn	$rp,	$ovf,	$np
+	or	$np,	$ap,	$ap	! ap=borrow?tp:rp
+	ba	.Lcopy_g5
+	sub	$num,	8,	$cnt
+
+.align	16
+.Lcopy_g5:				! copy or in-place refresh
+	ldx	[$ap+0],	$t2
+	add	$ap,	8,	$ap
+	stx	%g0,	[$tp]		! zap
+	add	$tp,	8,	$tp
+	stx	$t2,	[$rp+0]
+	add	$rp,	8,	$rp
+	brnz	$cnt,	.Lcopy_g5
+	sub	$cnt,	8,	$cnt
+
+	mov	1,	%o0
+	ret
+	restore
+.type	bn_mul_mont_gather5_t4, #function
+.size	bn_mul_mont_gather5_t4, .-bn_mul_mont_gather5_t4
+___
+}
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	bn_flip_t4
+.align	32
+bn_flip_t4:
+.Loop_flip:
+	ld	[%o1+0],	%o4
+	sub	%o2,	1,	%o2
+	ld	[%o1+4],	%o5
+	add	%o1,	8,	%o1
+	st	%o5,	[%o0+0]
+	st	%o4,	[%o0+4]
+	brnz	%o2,	.Loop_flip
+	add	%o0,	8,	%o0
+	retl
+	nop
+.type	bn_flip_t4, #function
+.size	bn_flip_t4, .-bn_flip_t4
+
+.globl	bn_flip_n_scatter5_t4
+.align	32
+bn_flip_n_scatter5_t4:
+	sll	%o3,	3,	%o3
+	srl	%o1,	1,	%o1
+	add	%o3,	%o2,	%o2	! &pwrtbl[pwr]
+	sub	%o1,	1,	%o1
+.Loop_flip_n_scatter5:
+	ld	[%o0+0],	%o4	! inp[i]
+	ld	[%o0+4],	%o5
+	add	%o0,	8,	%o0
+	sllx	%o5,	32,	%o5
+	or	%o4,	%o5,	%o5
+	stx	%o5,	[%o2]
+	add	%o2,	32*8,	%o2
+	brnz	%o1,	.Loop_flip_n_scatter5
+	sub	%o1,	1,	%o1
+	retl
+	nop
+.type	bn_flip_n_scatter5_t4, #function
+.size	bn_flip_n_scatter5_t4, .-bn_flip_n_scatter5_t4
+
+.globl	bn_gather5_t4
+.align	32
+bn_gather5_t4:
+___
+	&load_ccr("%o2","%o3","%g1");
+$code.=<<___;
+	sub	%o1,	1,	%o1
+.Loop_gather5:
+___
+	&load_b("%o2","%g1");
+$code.=<<___;
+	stx	%g1,	[%o0]
+	add	%o0,	8,	%o0
+	brnz	%o1,	.Loop_gather5
+	sub	%o1,	1,	%o1
+
+	retl
+	nop
+.type	bn_gather5_t4, #function
+.size	bn_gather5_t4, .-bn_gather5_t4
+
+.asciz	"Montgomery Multiplication for SPARC T4, David S. Miller, Andy Polyakov"
+.align	4
+___
+
+&emit_assembler();
+
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/sparcv8.S b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/sparcv8.S
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9c31073
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/sparcv8.S
@@ -0,0 +1,1458 @@
+.ident	"sparcv8.s, Version 1.4"
+.ident	"SPARC v8 ISA artwork by Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se>"
+
+/*
+ * ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ * ====================================================================
+ */
+
+/*
+ * This is my modest contributon to OpenSSL project (see
+ * http://www.openssl.org/ for more information about it) and is
+ * a drop-in SuperSPARC ISA replacement for crypto/bn/bn_asm.c
+ * module. For updates see http://fy.chalmers.se/~appro/hpe/.
+ *
+ * See bn_asm.sparc.v8plus.S for more details.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Revision history.
+ *
+ * 1.1	- new loop unrolling model(*);
+ * 1.2	- made gas friendly;
+ * 1.3	- fixed problem with /usr/ccs/lib/cpp;
+ * 1.4	- some retunes;
+ *
+ * (*)	see bn_asm.sparc.v8plus.S for details
+ */
+
+.section	".text",#alloc,#execinstr
+.file		"bn_asm.sparc.v8.S"
+
+.align	32
+
+.global bn_mul_add_words
+/*
+ * BN_ULONG bn_mul_add_words(rp,ap,num,w)
+ * BN_ULONG *rp,*ap;
+ * int num;
+ * BN_ULONG w;
+ */
+bn_mul_add_words:
+	cmp	%o2,0
+	bg,a	.L_bn_mul_add_words_proceed
+	ld	[%o1],%g2
+	retl
+	clr	%o0
+
+.L_bn_mul_add_words_proceed:
+	andcc	%o2,-4,%g0
+	bz	.L_bn_mul_add_words_tail
+	clr	%o5
+
+.L_bn_mul_add_words_loop:
+	ld	[%o0],%o4
+	ld	[%o1+4],%g3
+	umul	%o3,%g2,%g2
+	rd	%y,%g1
+	addcc	%o4,%o5,%o4
+	addx	%g1,0,%g1
+	addcc	%o4,%g2,%o4
+	st	%o4,[%o0]
+	addx	%g1,0,%o5
+
+	ld	[%o0+4],%o4
+	ld	[%o1+8],%g2
+	umul	%o3,%g3,%g3
+	dec	4,%o2
+	rd	%y,%g1
+	addcc	%o4,%o5,%o4
+	addx	%g1,0,%g1
+	addcc	%o4,%g3,%o4
+	st	%o4,[%o0+4]
+	addx	%g1,0,%o5
+
+	ld	[%o0+8],%o4
+	ld	[%o1+12],%g3
+	umul	%o3,%g2,%g2
+	inc	16,%o1
+	rd	%y,%g1
+	addcc	%o4,%o5,%o4
+	addx	%g1,0,%g1
+	addcc	%o4,%g2,%o4
+	st	%o4,[%o0+8]
+	addx	%g1,0,%o5
+
+	ld	[%o0+12],%o4
+	umul	%o3,%g3,%g3
+	inc	16,%o0
+	rd	%y,%g1
+	addcc	%o4,%o5,%o4
+	addx	%g1,0,%g1
+	addcc	%o4,%g3,%o4
+	st	%o4,[%o0-4]
+	addx	%g1,0,%o5
+	andcc	%o2,-4,%g0
+	bnz,a	.L_bn_mul_add_words_loop
+	ld	[%o1],%g2
+
+	tst	%o2
+	bnz,a	.L_bn_mul_add_words_tail
+	ld	[%o1],%g2
+.L_bn_mul_add_words_return:
+	retl
+	mov	%o5,%o0
+	nop
+
+.L_bn_mul_add_words_tail:
+	ld	[%o0],%o4
+	umul	%o3,%g2,%g2
+	addcc	%o4,%o5,%o4
+	rd	%y,%g1
+	addx	%g1,0,%g1
+	addcc	%o4,%g2,%o4
+	addx	%g1,0,%o5
+	deccc	%o2
+	bz	.L_bn_mul_add_words_return
+	st	%o4,[%o0]
+
+	ld	[%o1+4],%g2
+	ld	[%o0+4],%o4
+	umul	%o3,%g2,%g2
+	rd	%y,%g1
+	addcc	%o4,%o5,%o4
+	addx	%g1,0,%g1
+	addcc	%o4,%g2,%o4
+	addx	%g1,0,%o5
+	deccc	%o2
+	bz	.L_bn_mul_add_words_return
+	st	%o4,[%o0+4]
+
+	ld	[%o1+8],%g2
+	ld	[%o0+8],%o4
+	umul	%o3,%g2,%g2
+	rd	%y,%g1
+	addcc	%o4,%o5,%o4
+	addx	%g1,0,%g1
+	addcc	%o4,%g2,%o4
+	st	%o4,[%o0+8]
+	retl
+	addx	%g1,0,%o0
+
+.type	bn_mul_add_words,#function
+.size	bn_mul_add_words,(.-bn_mul_add_words)
+
+.align	32
+
+.global bn_mul_words
+/*
+ * BN_ULONG bn_mul_words(rp,ap,num,w)
+ * BN_ULONG *rp,*ap;
+ * int num;
+ * BN_ULONG w;
+ */
+bn_mul_words:
+	cmp	%o2,0
+	bg,a	.L_bn_mul_words_proceeed
+	ld	[%o1],%g2
+	retl
+	clr	%o0
+
+.L_bn_mul_words_proceeed:
+	andcc	%o2,-4,%g0
+	bz	.L_bn_mul_words_tail
+	clr	%o5
+
+.L_bn_mul_words_loop:
+	ld	[%o1+4],%g3
+	umul	%o3,%g2,%g2
+	addcc	%g2,%o5,%g2
+	rd	%y,%g1
+	addx	%g1,0,%o5
+	st	%g2,[%o0]
+
+	ld	[%o1+8],%g2
+	umul	%o3,%g3,%g3
+	addcc	%g3,%o5,%g3
+	rd	%y,%g1
+	dec	4,%o2
+	addx	%g1,0,%o5
+	st	%g3,[%o0+4]
+
+	ld	[%o1+12],%g3
+	umul	%o3,%g2,%g2
+	addcc	%g2,%o5,%g2
+	rd	%y,%g1
+	inc	16,%o1
+	st	%g2,[%o0+8]
+	addx	%g1,0,%o5
+
+	umul	%o3,%g3,%g3
+	addcc	%g3,%o5,%g3
+	rd	%y,%g1
+	inc	16,%o0
+	addx	%g1,0,%o5
+	st	%g3,[%o0-4]
+	andcc	%o2,-4,%g0
+	nop
+	bnz,a	.L_bn_mul_words_loop
+	ld	[%o1],%g2
+
+	tst	%o2
+	bnz,a	.L_bn_mul_words_tail
+	ld	[%o1],%g2
+.L_bn_mul_words_return:
+	retl
+	mov	%o5,%o0
+	nop
+
+.L_bn_mul_words_tail:
+	umul	%o3,%g2,%g2
+	addcc	%g2,%o5,%g2
+	rd	%y,%g1
+	addx	%g1,0,%o5
+	deccc	%o2
+	bz	.L_bn_mul_words_return
+	st	%g2,[%o0]
+	nop
+
+	ld	[%o1+4],%g2
+	umul	%o3,%g2,%g2
+	addcc	%g2,%o5,%g2
+	rd	%y,%g1
+	addx	%g1,0,%o5
+	deccc	%o2
+	bz	.L_bn_mul_words_return
+	st	%g2,[%o0+4]
+
+	ld	[%o1+8],%g2
+	umul	%o3,%g2,%g2
+	addcc	%g2,%o5,%g2
+	rd	%y,%g1
+	st	%g2,[%o0+8]
+	retl
+	addx	%g1,0,%o0
+
+.type	bn_mul_words,#function
+.size	bn_mul_words,(.-bn_mul_words)
+
+.align  32
+.global	bn_sqr_words
+/*
+ * void bn_sqr_words(r,a,n)
+ * BN_ULONG *r,*a;
+ * int n;
+ */
+bn_sqr_words:
+	cmp	%o2,0
+	bg,a	.L_bn_sqr_words_proceeed
+	ld	[%o1],%g2
+	retl
+	clr	%o0
+
+.L_bn_sqr_words_proceeed:
+	andcc	%o2,-4,%g0
+	bz	.L_bn_sqr_words_tail
+	clr	%o5
+
+.L_bn_sqr_words_loop:
+	ld	[%o1+4],%g3
+	umul	%g2,%g2,%o4
+	st	%o4,[%o0]
+	rd	%y,%o5
+	st	%o5,[%o0+4]
+
+	ld	[%o1+8],%g2
+	umul	%g3,%g3,%o4
+	dec	4,%o2
+	st	%o4,[%o0+8]
+	rd	%y,%o5
+	st	%o5,[%o0+12]
+	nop
+
+	ld	[%o1+12],%g3
+	umul	%g2,%g2,%o4
+	st	%o4,[%o0+16]
+	rd	%y,%o5
+	inc	16,%o1
+	st	%o5,[%o0+20]
+
+	umul	%g3,%g3,%o4
+	inc	32,%o0
+	st	%o4,[%o0-8]
+	rd	%y,%o5
+	st	%o5,[%o0-4]
+	andcc	%o2,-4,%g2
+	bnz,a	.L_bn_sqr_words_loop
+	ld	[%o1],%g2
+
+	tst	%o2
+	nop
+	bnz,a	.L_bn_sqr_words_tail
+	ld	[%o1],%g2
+.L_bn_sqr_words_return:
+	retl
+	clr	%o0
+
+.L_bn_sqr_words_tail:
+	umul	%g2,%g2,%o4
+	st	%o4,[%o0]
+	deccc	%o2
+	rd	%y,%o5
+	bz	.L_bn_sqr_words_return
+	st	%o5,[%o0+4]
+
+	ld	[%o1+4],%g2
+	umul	%g2,%g2,%o4
+	st	%o4,[%o0+8]
+	deccc	%o2
+	rd	%y,%o5
+	nop
+	bz	.L_bn_sqr_words_return
+	st	%o5,[%o0+12]
+
+	ld	[%o1+8],%g2
+	umul	%g2,%g2,%o4
+	st	%o4,[%o0+16]
+	rd	%y,%o5
+	st	%o5,[%o0+20]
+	retl
+	clr	%o0
+
+.type	bn_sqr_words,#function
+.size	bn_sqr_words,(.-bn_sqr_words)
+
+.align	32
+
+.global bn_div_words
+/*
+ * BN_ULONG bn_div_words(h,l,d)
+ * BN_ULONG h,l,d;
+ */
+bn_div_words:
+	wr	%o0,%y
+	udiv	%o1,%o2,%o0
+	retl
+	nop
+
+.type	bn_div_words,#function
+.size	bn_div_words,(.-bn_div_words)
+
+.align	32
+
+.global bn_add_words
+/*
+ * BN_ULONG bn_add_words(rp,ap,bp,n)
+ * BN_ULONG *rp,*ap,*bp;
+ * int n;
+ */
+bn_add_words:
+	cmp	%o3,0
+	bg,a	.L_bn_add_words_proceed
+	ld	[%o1],%o4
+	retl
+	clr	%o0
+
+.L_bn_add_words_proceed:
+	andcc	%o3,-4,%g0
+	bz	.L_bn_add_words_tail
+	clr	%g1
+	ba	.L_bn_add_words_warn_loop
+	addcc	%g0,0,%g0	! clear carry flag
+
+.L_bn_add_words_loop:
+	ld	[%o1],%o4
+.L_bn_add_words_warn_loop:
+	ld	[%o2],%o5
+	ld	[%o1+4],%g3
+	ld	[%o2+4],%g4
+	dec	4,%o3
+	addxcc	%o5,%o4,%o5
+	st	%o5,[%o0]
+
+	ld	[%o1+8],%o4
+	ld	[%o2+8],%o5
+	inc	16,%o1
+	addxcc	%g3,%g4,%g3
+	st	%g3,[%o0+4]
+	
+	ld	[%o1-4],%g3
+	ld	[%o2+12],%g4
+	inc	16,%o2
+	addxcc	%o5,%o4,%o5
+	st	%o5,[%o0+8]
+
+	inc	16,%o0
+	addxcc	%g3,%g4,%g3
+	st	%g3,[%o0-4]
+	addx	%g0,0,%g1
+	andcc	%o3,-4,%g0
+	bnz,a	.L_bn_add_words_loop
+	addcc	%g1,-1,%g0
+
+	tst	%o3
+	bnz,a	.L_bn_add_words_tail
+	ld	[%o1],%o4
+.L_bn_add_words_return:
+	retl
+	mov	%g1,%o0
+
+.L_bn_add_words_tail:
+	addcc	%g1,-1,%g0
+	ld	[%o2],%o5
+	addxcc	%o5,%o4,%o5
+	addx	%g0,0,%g1
+	deccc	%o3
+	bz	.L_bn_add_words_return
+	st	%o5,[%o0]
+
+	ld	[%o1+4],%o4
+	addcc	%g1,-1,%g0
+	ld	[%o2+4],%o5
+	addxcc	%o5,%o4,%o5
+	addx	%g0,0,%g1
+	deccc	%o3
+	bz	.L_bn_add_words_return
+	st	%o5,[%o0+4]
+
+	ld	[%o1+8],%o4
+	addcc	%g1,-1,%g0
+	ld	[%o2+8],%o5
+	addxcc	%o5,%o4,%o5
+	st	%o5,[%o0+8]
+	retl
+	addx	%g0,0,%o0
+
+.type	bn_add_words,#function
+.size	bn_add_words,(.-bn_add_words)
+
+.align	32
+
+.global bn_sub_words
+/*
+ * BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(rp,ap,bp,n)
+ * BN_ULONG *rp,*ap,*bp;
+ * int n;
+ */
+bn_sub_words:
+	cmp	%o3,0
+	bg,a	.L_bn_sub_words_proceed
+	ld	[%o1],%o4
+	retl
+	clr	%o0
+
+.L_bn_sub_words_proceed:
+	andcc	%o3,-4,%g0
+	bz	.L_bn_sub_words_tail
+	clr	%g1
+	ba	.L_bn_sub_words_warm_loop
+	addcc	%g0,0,%g0	! clear carry flag
+
+.L_bn_sub_words_loop:
+	ld	[%o1],%o4
+.L_bn_sub_words_warm_loop:
+	ld	[%o2],%o5
+	ld	[%o1+4],%g3
+	ld	[%o2+4],%g4
+	dec	4,%o3
+	subxcc	%o4,%o5,%o5
+	st	%o5,[%o0]
+
+	ld	[%o1+8],%o4
+	ld	[%o2+8],%o5
+	inc	16,%o1
+	subxcc	%g3,%g4,%g4
+	st	%g4,[%o0+4]
+	
+	ld	[%o1-4],%g3
+	ld	[%o2+12],%g4
+	inc	16,%o2
+	subxcc	%o4,%o5,%o5
+	st	%o5,[%o0+8]
+
+	inc	16,%o0
+	subxcc	%g3,%g4,%g4
+	st	%g4,[%o0-4]
+	addx	%g0,0,%g1
+	andcc	%o3,-4,%g0
+	bnz,a	.L_bn_sub_words_loop
+	addcc	%g1,-1,%g0
+
+	tst	%o3
+	nop
+	bnz,a	.L_bn_sub_words_tail
+	ld	[%o1],%o4
+.L_bn_sub_words_return:
+	retl
+	mov	%g1,%o0
+
+.L_bn_sub_words_tail:
+	addcc	%g1,-1,%g0
+	ld	[%o2],%o5
+	subxcc	%o4,%o5,%o5
+	addx	%g0,0,%g1
+	deccc	%o3
+	bz	.L_bn_sub_words_return
+	st	%o5,[%o0]
+	nop
+
+	ld	[%o1+4],%o4
+	addcc	%g1,-1,%g0
+	ld	[%o2+4],%o5
+	subxcc	%o4,%o5,%o5
+	addx	%g0,0,%g1
+	deccc	%o3
+	bz	.L_bn_sub_words_return
+	st	%o5,[%o0+4]
+
+	ld	[%o1+8],%o4
+	addcc	%g1,-1,%g0
+	ld	[%o2+8],%o5
+	subxcc	%o4,%o5,%o5
+	st	%o5,[%o0+8]
+	retl
+	addx	%g0,0,%o0
+
+.type	bn_sub_words,#function
+.size	bn_sub_words,(.-bn_sub_words)
+
+#define FRAME_SIZE	-96
+
+/*
+ * Here is register usage map for *all* routines below.
+ */
+#define t_1	%o0
+#define	t_2	%o1
+#define c_1	%o2
+#define c_2	%o3
+#define c_3	%o4
+
+#define ap(I)	[%i1+4*I]
+#define bp(I)	[%i2+4*I]
+#define rp(I)	[%i0+4*I]
+
+#define	a_0	%l0
+#define	a_1	%l1
+#define	a_2	%l2
+#define	a_3	%l3
+#define	a_4	%l4
+#define	a_5	%l5
+#define	a_6	%l6
+#define	a_7	%l7
+
+#define	b_0	%i3
+#define	b_1	%i4
+#define	b_2	%i5
+#define	b_3	%o5
+#define	b_4	%g1
+#define	b_5	%g2
+#define	b_6	%g3
+#define	b_7	%g4
+
+.align	32
+.global bn_mul_comba8
+/*
+ * void bn_mul_comba8(r,a,b)
+ * BN_ULONG *r,*a,*b;
+ */
+bn_mul_comba8:
+	save	%sp,FRAME_SIZE,%sp
+	ld	ap(0),a_0
+	ld	bp(0),b_0
+	umul	a_0,b_0,c_1	!=!mul_add_c(a[0],b[0],c1,c2,c3);
+	ld	bp(1),b_1
+	rd	%y,c_2
+	st	c_1,rp(0)	!r[0]=c1;
+
+	umul	a_0,b_1,t_1	!=!mul_add_c(a[0],b[1],c2,c3,c1);
+	ld	ap(1),a_1
+	addcc	c_2,t_1,c_2
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	%g0,t_2,c_3	!=
+	addx	%g0,%g0,c_1
+	ld	ap(2),a_2
+	umul	a_1,b_0,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[1],b[0],c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_2,t_1,c_2	!=
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	st	c_2,rp(1)	!r[1]=c2;
+	addx	c_1,%g0,c_1	!=
+
+	umul	a_2,b_0,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[2],b[0],c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_3,t_1,c_3
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_1,t_2,c_1	!=
+	addx	%g0,%g0,c_2
+	ld	bp(2),b_2
+	umul	a_1,b_1,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[1],b[1],c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_3,t_1,c_3	!=
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_1,t_2,c_1
+	ld	bp(3),b_3
+	addx	c_2,%g0,c_2	!=
+	umul	a_0,b_2,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[0],b[2],c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_3,t_1,c_3
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_1,t_2,c_1	!=
+	addx	c_2,%g0,c_2
+	st	c_3,rp(2)	!r[2]=c3;
+
+	umul	a_0,b_3,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[0],b[3],c1,c2,c3);
+	addcc	c_1,t_1,c_1	!=
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_2,t_2,c_2
+	addx	%g0,%g0,c_3
+	umul	a_1,b_2,t_1	!=!mul_add_c(a[1],b[2],c1,c2,c3);
+	addcc	c_1,t_1,c_1
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_2,t_2,c_2
+	addx	c_3,%g0,c_3	!=
+	ld	ap(3),a_3
+	umul	a_2,b_1,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[2],b[1],c1,c2,c3);
+	addcc	c_1,t_1,c_1
+	rd	%y,t_2		!=
+	addxcc	c_2,t_2,c_2
+	addx	c_3,%g0,c_3
+	ld	ap(4),a_4
+	umul	a_3,b_0,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[3],b[0],c1,c2,c3);!=
+	addcc	c_1,t_1,c_1
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_2,t_2,c_2
+	addx	c_3,%g0,c_3	!=
+	st	c_1,rp(3)	!r[3]=c1;
+
+	umul	a_4,b_0,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[4],b[0],c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_2,t_1,c_2
+	rd	%y,t_2		!=
+	addxcc	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	addx	%g0,%g0,c_1
+	umul	a_3,b_1,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[3],b[1],c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_2,t_1,c_2	!=
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	addx	c_1,%g0,c_1
+	umul	a_2,b_2,t_1	!=!mul_add_c(a[2],b[2],c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_2,t_1,c_2
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	addx	c_1,%g0,c_1	!=
+	ld	bp(4),b_4
+	umul	a_1,b_3,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[1],b[3],c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_2,t_1,c_2
+	rd	%y,t_2		!=
+	addxcc	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	addx	c_1,%g0,c_1
+	ld	bp(5),b_5
+	umul	a_0,b_4,t_1	!=!mul_add_c(a[0],b[4],c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_2,t_1,c_2
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	addx	c_1,%g0,c_1	!=
+	st	c_2,rp(4)	!r[4]=c2;
+
+	umul	a_0,b_5,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[0],b[5],c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_3,t_1,c_3
+	rd	%y,t_2		!=
+	addxcc	c_1,t_2,c_1
+	addx	%g0,%g0,c_2
+	umul	a_1,b_4,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[1],b[4],c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_3,t_1,c_3	!=
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_1,t_2,c_1
+	addx	c_2,%g0,c_2
+	umul	a_2,b_3,t_1	!=!mul_add_c(a[2],b[3],c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_3,t_1,c_3
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_1,t_2,c_1
+	addx	c_2,%g0,c_2	!=
+	umul	a_3,b_2,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[3],b[2],c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_3,t_1,c_3
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_1,t_2,c_1	!=
+	addx	c_2,%g0,c_2
+	ld	ap(5),a_5
+	umul	a_4,b_1,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[4],b[1],c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_3,t_1,c_3	!=
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_1,t_2,c_1
+	ld	ap(6),a_6
+	addx	c_2,%g0,c_2	!=
+	umul	a_5,b_0,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[5],b[0],c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_3,t_1,c_3
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_1,t_2,c_1	!=
+	addx	c_2,%g0,c_2
+	st	c_3,rp(5)	!r[5]=c3;
+
+	umul	a_6,b_0,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[6],b[0],c1,c2,c3);
+	addcc	c_1,t_1,c_1	!=
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_2,t_2,c_2
+	addx	%g0,%g0,c_3
+	umul	a_5,b_1,t_1	!=!mul_add_c(a[5],b[1],c1,c2,c3);
+	addcc	c_1,t_1,c_1
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_2,t_2,c_2
+	addx	c_3,%g0,c_3	!=
+	umul	a_4,b_2,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[4],b[2],c1,c2,c3);
+	addcc	c_1,t_1,c_1
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_2,t_2,c_2	!=
+	addx	c_3,%g0,c_3
+	umul	a_3,b_3,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[3],b[3],c1,c2,c3);
+	addcc	c_1,t_1,c_1
+	rd	%y,t_2		!=
+	addxcc	c_2,t_2,c_2
+	addx	c_3,%g0,c_3
+	umul	a_2,b_4,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[2],b[4],c1,c2,c3);
+	addcc	c_1,t_1,c_1	!=
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_2,t_2,c_2
+	ld	bp(6),b_6
+	addx	c_3,%g0,c_3	!=
+	umul	a_1,b_5,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[1],b[5],c1,c2,c3);
+	addcc	c_1,t_1,c_1
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_2,t_2,c_2	!=
+	addx	c_3,%g0,c_3
+	ld	bp(7),b_7
+	umul	a_0,b_6,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[0],b[6],c1,c2,c3);
+	addcc	c_1,t_1,c_1	!=
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_2,t_2,c_2
+	st	c_1,rp(6)	!r[6]=c1;
+	addx	c_3,%g0,c_3	!=
+
+	umul	a_0,b_7,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[0],b[7],c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_2,t_1,c_2
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_3,t_2,c_3	!=
+	addx	%g0,%g0,c_1
+	umul	a_1,b_6,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[1],b[6],c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_2,t_1,c_2
+	rd	%y,t_2		!=
+	addxcc	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	addx	c_1,%g0,c_1
+	umul	a_2,b_5,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[2],b[5],c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_2,t_1,c_2	!=
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	addx	c_1,%g0,c_1
+	umul	a_3,b_4,t_1	!=!mul_add_c(a[3],b[4],c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_2,t_1,c_2
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	addx	c_1,%g0,c_1	!=
+	umul	a_4,b_3,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[4],b[3],c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_2,t_1,c_2
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_3,t_2,c_3	!=
+	addx	c_1,%g0,c_1
+	umul	a_5,b_2,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[5],b[2],c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_2,t_1,c_2
+	rd	%y,t_2		!=
+	addxcc	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	addx	c_1,%g0,c_1
+	ld	ap(7),a_7
+	umul	a_6,b_1,t_1	!=!mul_add_c(a[6],b[1],c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_2,t_1,c_2
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	addx	c_1,%g0,c_1	!=
+	umul	a_7,b_0,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[7],b[0],c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_2,t_1,c_2
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_3,t_2,c_3	!=
+	addx	c_1,%g0,c_1
+	st	c_2,rp(7)	!r[7]=c2;
+
+	umul	a_7,b_1,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[7],b[1],c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_3,t_1,c_3	!=
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_1,t_2,c_1
+	addx	%g0,%g0,c_2
+	umul	a_6,b_2,t_1	!=!mul_add_c(a[6],b[2],c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_3,t_1,c_3
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_1,t_2,c_1
+	addx	c_2,%g0,c_2	!=
+	umul	a_5,b_3,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[5],b[3],c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_3,t_1,c_3
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_1,t_2,c_1	!=
+	addx	c_2,%g0,c_2
+	umul	a_4,b_4,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[4],b[4],c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_3,t_1,c_3
+	rd	%y,t_2		!=
+	addxcc	c_1,t_2,c_1
+	addx	c_2,%g0,c_2
+	umul	a_3,b_5,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[3],b[5],c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_3,t_1,c_3	!=
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_1,t_2,c_1
+	addx	c_2,%g0,c_2
+	umul	a_2,b_6,t_1	!=!mul_add_c(a[2],b[6],c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_3,t_1,c_3
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_1,t_2,c_1
+	addx	c_2,%g0,c_2	!=
+	umul	a_1,b_7,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[1],b[7],c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_3,t_1,c_3
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_1,t_2,c_1	!
+	addx	c_2,%g0,c_2
+	st	c_3,rp(8)	!r[8]=c3;
+
+	umul	a_2,b_7,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[2],b[7],c1,c2,c3);
+	addcc	c_1,t_1,c_1	!=
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_2,t_2,c_2
+	addx	%g0,%g0,c_3
+	umul	a_3,b_6,t_1	!=!mul_add_c(a[3],b[6],c1,c2,c3);
+	addcc	c_1,t_1,c_1
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_2,t_2,c_2
+	addx	c_3,%g0,c_3	!=
+	umul	a_4,b_5,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[4],b[5],c1,c2,c3);
+	addcc	c_1,t_1,c_1
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_2,t_2,c_2	!=
+	addx	c_3,%g0,c_3
+	umul	a_5,b_4,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[5],b[4],c1,c2,c3);
+	addcc	c_1,t_1,c_1
+	rd	%y,t_2		!=
+	addxcc	c_2,t_2,c_2
+	addx	c_3,%g0,c_3
+	umul	a_6,b_3,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[6],b[3],c1,c2,c3);
+	addcc	c_1,t_1,c_1	!=
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_2,t_2,c_2
+	addx	c_3,%g0,c_3
+	umul	a_7,b_2,t_1	!=!mul_add_c(a[7],b[2],c1,c2,c3);
+	addcc	c_1,t_1,c_1
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_2,t_2,c_2
+	addx	c_3,%g0,c_3	!=
+	st	c_1,rp(9)	!r[9]=c1;
+
+	umul	a_7,b_3,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[7],b[3],c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_2,t_1,c_2
+	rd	%y,t_2		!=
+	addxcc	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	addx	%g0,%g0,c_1
+	umul	a_6,b_4,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[6],b[4],c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_2,t_1,c_2	!=
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	addx	c_1,%g0,c_1
+	umul	a_5,b_5,t_1	!=!mul_add_c(a[5],b[5],c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_2,t_1,c_2
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	addx	c_1,%g0,c_1	!=
+	umul	a_4,b_6,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[4],b[6],c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_2,t_1,c_2
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_3,t_2,c_3	!=
+	addx	c_1,%g0,c_1
+	umul	a_3,b_7,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[3],b[7],c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_2,t_1,c_2
+	rd	%y,t_2		!=
+	addxcc	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	addx	c_1,%g0,c_1
+	st	c_2,rp(10)	!r[10]=c2;
+
+	umul	a_4,b_7,t_1	!=!mul_add_c(a[4],b[7],c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_3,t_1,c_3
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_1,t_2,c_1
+	addx	%g0,%g0,c_2	!=
+	umul	a_5,b_6,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[5],b[6],c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_3,t_1,c_3
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_1,t_2,c_1	!=
+	addx	c_2,%g0,c_2
+	umul	a_6,b_5,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[6],b[5],c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_3,t_1,c_3
+	rd	%y,t_2		!=
+	addxcc	c_1,t_2,c_1
+	addx	c_2,%g0,c_2
+	umul	a_7,b_4,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[7],b[4],c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_3,t_1,c_3	!=
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_1,t_2,c_1
+	st	c_3,rp(11)	!r[11]=c3;
+	addx	c_2,%g0,c_2	!=
+
+	umul	a_7,b_5,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[7],b[5],c1,c2,c3);
+	addcc	c_1,t_1,c_1
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_2,t_2,c_2	!=
+	addx	%g0,%g0,c_3
+	umul	a_6,b_6,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[6],b[6],c1,c2,c3);
+	addcc	c_1,t_1,c_1
+	rd	%y,t_2		!=
+	addxcc	c_2,t_2,c_2
+	addx	c_3,%g0,c_3
+	umul	a_5,b_7,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[5],b[7],c1,c2,c3);
+	addcc	c_1,t_1,c_1	!=
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_2,t_2,c_2
+	st	c_1,rp(12)	!r[12]=c1;
+	addx	c_3,%g0,c_3	!=
+
+	umul	a_6,b_7,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[6],b[7],c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_2,t_1,c_2
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_3,t_2,c_3	!=
+	addx	%g0,%g0,c_1
+	umul	a_7,b_6,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[7],b[6],c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_2,t_1,c_2
+	rd	%y,t_2		!=
+	addxcc	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	addx	c_1,%g0,c_1
+	st	c_2,rp(13)	!r[13]=c2;
+
+	umul	a_7,b_7,t_1	!=!mul_add_c(a[7],b[7],c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_3,t_1,c_3
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_1,t_2,c_1
+	nop			!=
+	st	c_3,rp(14)	!r[14]=c3;
+	st	c_1,rp(15)	!r[15]=c1;
+
+	ret
+	restore	%g0,%g0,%o0
+
+.type	bn_mul_comba8,#function
+.size	bn_mul_comba8,(.-bn_mul_comba8)
+
+.align	32
+
+.global bn_mul_comba4
+/*
+ * void bn_mul_comba4(r,a,b)
+ * BN_ULONG *r,*a,*b;
+ */
+bn_mul_comba4:
+	save	%sp,FRAME_SIZE,%sp
+	ld	ap(0),a_0
+	ld	bp(0),b_0
+	umul	a_0,b_0,c_1	!=!mul_add_c(a[0],b[0],c1,c2,c3);
+	ld	bp(1),b_1
+	rd	%y,c_2
+	st	c_1,rp(0)	!r[0]=c1;
+
+	umul	a_0,b_1,t_1	!=!mul_add_c(a[0],b[1],c2,c3,c1);
+	ld	ap(1),a_1
+	addcc	c_2,t_1,c_2
+	rd	%y,t_2		!=
+	addxcc	%g0,t_2,c_3
+	addx	%g0,%g0,c_1
+	ld	ap(2),a_2
+	umul	a_1,b_0,t_1	!=!mul_add_c(a[1],b[0],c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_2,t_1,c_2
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	addx	c_1,%g0,c_1	!=
+	st	c_2,rp(1)	!r[1]=c2;
+
+	umul	a_2,b_0,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[2],b[0],c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_3,t_1,c_3
+	rd	%y,t_2		!=
+	addxcc	c_1,t_2,c_1
+	addx	%g0,%g0,c_2
+	ld	bp(2),b_2
+	umul	a_1,b_1,t_1	!=!mul_add_c(a[1],b[1],c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_3,t_1,c_3
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_1,t_2,c_1
+	addx	c_2,%g0,c_2	!=
+	ld	bp(3),b_3
+	umul	a_0,b_2,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[0],b[2],c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_3,t_1,c_3
+	rd	%y,t_2		!=
+	addxcc	c_1,t_2,c_1
+	addx	c_2,%g0,c_2
+	st	c_3,rp(2)	!r[2]=c3;
+
+	umul	a_0,b_3,t_1	!=!mul_add_c(a[0],b[3],c1,c2,c3);
+	addcc	c_1,t_1,c_1
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_2,t_2,c_2
+	addx	%g0,%g0,c_3	!=
+	umul	a_1,b_2,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[1],b[2],c1,c2,c3);
+	addcc	c_1,t_1,c_1
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_2,t_2,c_2	!=
+	addx	c_3,%g0,c_3
+	ld	ap(3),a_3
+	umul	a_2,b_1,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[2],b[1],c1,c2,c3);
+	addcc	c_1,t_1,c_1	!=
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_2,t_2,c_2
+	addx	c_3,%g0,c_3
+	umul	a_3,b_0,t_1	!=!mul_add_c(a[3],b[0],c1,c2,c3);
+	addcc	c_1,t_1,c_1
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_2,t_2,c_2
+	addx	c_3,%g0,c_3	!=
+	st	c_1,rp(3)	!r[3]=c1;
+
+	umul	a_3,b_1,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[3],b[1],c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_2,t_1,c_2
+	rd	%y,t_2		!=
+	addxcc	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	addx	%g0,%g0,c_1
+	umul	a_2,b_2,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[2],b[2],c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_2,t_1,c_2	!=
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	addx	c_1,%g0,c_1
+	umul	a_1,b_3,t_1	!=!mul_add_c(a[1],b[3],c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_2,t_1,c_2
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	addx	c_1,%g0,c_1	!=
+	st	c_2,rp(4)	!r[4]=c2;
+
+	umul	a_2,b_3,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[2],b[3],c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_3,t_1,c_3
+	rd	%y,t_2		!=
+	addxcc	c_1,t_2,c_1
+	addx	%g0,%g0,c_2
+	umul	a_3,b_2,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[3],b[2],c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_3,t_1,c_3	!=
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_1,t_2,c_1
+	st	c_3,rp(5)	!r[5]=c3;
+	addx	c_2,%g0,c_2	!=
+
+	umul	a_3,b_3,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[3],b[3],c1,c2,c3);
+	addcc	c_1,t_1,c_1
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_2,t_2,c_2	!=
+	st	c_1,rp(6)	!r[6]=c1;
+	st	c_2,rp(7)	!r[7]=c2;
+	
+	ret
+	restore	%g0,%g0,%o0
+
+.type	bn_mul_comba4,#function
+.size	bn_mul_comba4,(.-bn_mul_comba4)
+
+.align	32
+
+.global bn_sqr_comba8
+bn_sqr_comba8:
+	save	%sp,FRAME_SIZE,%sp
+	ld	ap(0),a_0
+	ld	ap(1),a_1
+	umul	a_0,a_0,c_1	!=!sqr_add_c(a,0,c1,c2,c3);
+	rd	%y,c_2
+	st	c_1,rp(0)	!r[0]=c1;
+
+	ld	ap(2),a_2
+	umul	a_0,a_1,t_1	!=!sqr_add_c2(a,1,0,c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_2,t_1,c_2
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	%g0,t_2,c_3
+	addx	%g0,%g0,c_1	!=
+	addcc	c_2,t_1,c_2
+	addxcc	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	st	c_2,rp(1)	!r[1]=c2;
+	addx	c_1,%g0,c_1	!=
+
+	umul	a_2,a_0,t_1	!sqr_add_c2(a,2,0,c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_3,t_1,c_3
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_1,t_2,c_1	!=
+	addx	%g0,%g0,c_2
+	addcc	c_3,t_1,c_3
+	addxcc	c_1,t_2,c_1
+	addx	c_2,%g0,c_2	!=
+	ld	ap(3),a_3
+	umul	a_1,a_1,t_1	!sqr_add_c(a,1,c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_3,t_1,c_3
+	rd	%y,t_2		!=
+	addxcc	c_1,t_2,c_1
+	addx	c_2,%g0,c_2
+	st	c_3,rp(2)	!r[2]=c3;
+
+	umul	a_0,a_3,t_1	!=!sqr_add_c2(a,3,0,c1,c2,c3);
+	addcc	c_1,t_1,c_1
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_2,t_2,c_2
+	addx	%g0,%g0,c_3	!=
+	addcc	c_1,t_1,c_1
+	addxcc	c_2,t_2,c_2
+	ld	ap(4),a_4
+	addx	c_3,%g0,c_3	!=
+	umul	a_1,a_2,t_1	!sqr_add_c2(a,2,1,c1,c2,c3);
+	addcc	c_1,t_1,c_1
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_2,t_2,c_2	!=
+	addx	c_3,%g0,c_3
+	addcc	c_1,t_1,c_1
+	addxcc	c_2,t_2,c_2
+	addx	c_3,%g0,c_3	!=
+	st	c_1,rp(3)	!r[3]=c1;
+
+	umul	a_4,a_0,t_1	!sqr_add_c2(a,4,0,c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_2,t_1,c_2
+	rd	%y,t_2		!=
+	addxcc	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	addx	%g0,%g0,c_1
+	addcc	c_2,t_1,c_2
+	addxcc	c_3,t_2,c_3	!=
+	addx	c_1,%g0,c_1
+	umul	a_3,a_1,t_1	!sqr_add_c2(a,3,1,c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_2,t_1,c_2
+	rd	%y,t_2		!=
+	addxcc	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	addx	c_1,%g0,c_1
+	addcc	c_2,t_1,c_2
+	addxcc	c_3,t_2,c_3	!=
+	addx	c_1,%g0,c_1
+	ld	ap(5),a_5
+	umul	a_2,a_2,t_1	!sqr_add_c(a,2,c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_2,t_1,c_2	!=
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	st	c_2,rp(4)	!r[4]=c2;
+	addx	c_1,%g0,c_1	!=
+
+	umul	a_0,a_5,t_1	!sqr_add_c2(a,5,0,c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_3,t_1,c_3
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_1,t_2,c_1	!=
+	addx	%g0,%g0,c_2
+	addcc	c_3,t_1,c_3
+	addxcc	c_1,t_2,c_1
+	addx	c_2,%g0,c_2	!=
+	umul	a_1,a_4,t_1	!sqr_add_c2(a,4,1,c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_3,t_1,c_3
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_1,t_2,c_1	!=
+	addx	c_2,%g0,c_2
+	addcc	c_3,t_1,c_3
+	addxcc	c_1,t_2,c_1
+	addx	c_2,%g0,c_2	!=
+	ld	ap(6),a_6
+	umul	a_2,a_3,t_1	!sqr_add_c2(a,3,2,c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_3,t_1,c_3
+	rd	%y,t_2		!=
+	addxcc	c_1,t_2,c_1
+	addx	c_2,%g0,c_2
+	addcc	c_3,t_1,c_3
+	addxcc	c_1,t_2,c_1	!=
+	addx	c_2,%g0,c_2
+	st	c_3,rp(5)	!r[5]=c3;
+
+	umul	a_6,a_0,t_1	!sqr_add_c2(a,6,0,c1,c2,c3);
+	addcc	c_1,t_1,c_1	!=
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_2,t_2,c_2
+	addx	%g0,%g0,c_3
+	addcc	c_1,t_1,c_1	!=
+	addxcc	c_2,t_2,c_2
+	addx	c_3,%g0,c_3
+	umul	a_5,a_1,t_1	!sqr_add_c2(a,5,1,c1,c2,c3);
+	addcc	c_1,t_1,c_1	!=
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_2,t_2,c_2
+	addx	c_3,%g0,c_3
+	addcc	c_1,t_1,c_1	!=
+	addxcc	c_2,t_2,c_2
+	addx	c_3,%g0,c_3
+	umul	a_4,a_2,t_1	!sqr_add_c2(a,4,2,c1,c2,c3);
+	addcc	c_1,t_1,c_1	!=
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_2,t_2,c_2
+	addx	c_3,%g0,c_3
+	addcc	c_1,t_1,c_1	!=
+	addxcc	c_2,t_2,c_2
+	addx	c_3,%g0,c_3
+	ld	ap(7),a_7
+	umul	a_3,a_3,t_1	!=!sqr_add_c(a,3,c1,c2,c3);
+	addcc	c_1,t_1,c_1
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_2,t_2,c_2
+	addx	c_3,%g0,c_3	!=
+	st	c_1,rp(6)	!r[6]=c1;
+
+	umul	a_0,a_7,t_1	!sqr_add_c2(a,7,0,c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_2,t_1,c_2
+	rd	%y,t_2		!=
+	addxcc	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	addx	%g0,%g0,c_1
+	addcc	c_2,t_1,c_2
+	addxcc	c_3,t_2,c_3	!=
+	addx	c_1,%g0,c_1
+	umul	a_1,a_6,t_1	!sqr_add_c2(a,6,1,c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_2,t_1,c_2
+	rd	%y,t_2		!=
+	addxcc	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	addx	c_1,%g0,c_1
+	addcc	c_2,t_1,c_2
+	addxcc	c_3,t_2,c_3	!=
+	addx	c_1,%g0,c_1
+	umul	a_2,a_5,t_1	!sqr_add_c2(a,5,2,c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_2,t_1,c_2
+	rd	%y,t_2		!=
+	addxcc	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	addx	c_1,%g0,c_1
+	addcc	c_2,t_1,c_2
+	addxcc	c_3,t_2,c_3	!=
+	addx	c_1,%g0,c_1
+	umul	a_3,a_4,t_1	!sqr_add_c2(a,4,3,c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_2,t_1,c_2
+	rd	%y,t_2		!=
+	addxcc	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	addx	c_1,%g0,c_1
+	addcc	c_2,t_1,c_2
+	addxcc	c_3,t_2,c_3	!=
+	addx	c_1,%g0,c_1
+	st	c_2,rp(7)	!r[7]=c2;
+
+	umul	a_7,a_1,t_1	!sqr_add_c2(a,7,1,c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_3,t_1,c_3	!=
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_1,t_2,c_1
+	addx	%g0,%g0,c_2
+	addcc	c_3,t_1,c_3	!=
+	addxcc	c_1,t_2,c_1
+	addx	c_2,%g0,c_2
+	umul	a_6,a_2,t_1	!sqr_add_c2(a,6,2,c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_3,t_1,c_3	!=
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_1,t_2,c_1
+	addx	c_2,%g0,c_2
+	addcc	c_3,t_1,c_3	!=
+	addxcc	c_1,t_2,c_1
+	addx	c_2,%g0,c_2
+	umul	a_5,a_3,t_1	!sqr_add_c2(a,5,3,c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_3,t_1,c_3	!=
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_1,t_2,c_1
+	addx	c_2,%g0,c_2
+	addcc	c_3,t_1,c_3	!=
+	addxcc	c_1,t_2,c_1
+	addx	c_2,%g0,c_2
+	umul	a_4,a_4,t_1	!sqr_add_c(a,4,c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_3,t_1,c_3	!=
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_1,t_2,c_1
+	st	c_3,rp(8)	!r[8]=c3;
+	addx	c_2,%g0,c_2	!=
+
+	umul	a_2,a_7,t_1	!sqr_add_c2(a,7,2,c1,c2,c3);
+	addcc	c_1,t_1,c_1
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_2,t_2,c_2	!=
+	addx	%g0,%g0,c_3
+	addcc	c_1,t_1,c_1
+	addxcc	c_2,t_2,c_2
+	addx	c_3,%g0,c_3	!=
+	umul	a_3,a_6,t_1	!sqr_add_c2(a,6,3,c1,c2,c3);
+	addcc	c_1,t_1,c_1
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_2,t_2,c_2	!=
+	addx	c_3,%g0,c_3
+	addcc	c_1,t_1,c_1
+	addxcc	c_2,t_2,c_2
+	addx	c_3,%g0,c_3	!=
+	umul	a_4,a_5,t_1	!sqr_add_c2(a,5,4,c1,c2,c3);
+	addcc	c_1,t_1,c_1
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_2,t_2,c_2	!=
+	addx	c_3,%g0,c_3
+	addcc	c_1,t_1,c_1
+	addxcc	c_2,t_2,c_2
+	addx	c_3,%g0,c_3	!=
+	st	c_1,rp(9)	!r[9]=c1;
+
+	umul	a_7,a_3,t_1	!sqr_add_c2(a,7,3,c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_2,t_1,c_2
+	rd	%y,t_2		!=
+	addxcc	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	addx	%g0,%g0,c_1
+	addcc	c_2,t_1,c_2
+	addxcc	c_3,t_2,c_3	!=
+	addx	c_1,%g0,c_1
+	umul	a_6,a_4,t_1	!sqr_add_c2(a,6,4,c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_2,t_1,c_2
+	rd	%y,t_2		!=
+	addxcc	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	addx	c_1,%g0,c_1
+	addcc	c_2,t_1,c_2
+	addxcc	c_3,t_2,c_3	!=
+	addx	c_1,%g0,c_1
+	umul	a_5,a_5,t_1	!sqr_add_c(a,5,c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_2,t_1,c_2
+	rd	%y,t_2		!=
+	addxcc	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	addx	c_1,%g0,c_1
+	st	c_2,rp(10)	!r[10]=c2;
+
+	umul	a_4,a_7,t_1	!=!sqr_add_c2(a,7,4,c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_3,t_1,c_3
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_1,t_2,c_1
+	addx	%g0,%g0,c_2	!=
+	addcc	c_3,t_1,c_3
+	addxcc	c_1,t_2,c_1
+	addx	c_2,%g0,c_2
+	umul	a_5,a_6,t_1	!=!sqr_add_c2(a,6,5,c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_3,t_1,c_3
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_1,t_2,c_1
+	addx	c_2,%g0,c_2	!=
+	addcc	c_3,t_1,c_3
+	addxcc	c_1,t_2,c_1
+	st	c_3,rp(11)	!r[11]=c3;
+	addx	c_2,%g0,c_2	!=
+
+	umul	a_7,a_5,t_1	!sqr_add_c2(a,7,5,c1,c2,c3);
+	addcc	c_1,t_1,c_1
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_2,t_2,c_2	!=
+	addx	%g0,%g0,c_3
+	addcc	c_1,t_1,c_1
+	addxcc	c_2,t_2,c_2
+	addx	c_3,%g0,c_3	!=
+	umul	a_6,a_6,t_1	!sqr_add_c(a,6,c1,c2,c3);
+	addcc	c_1,t_1,c_1
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_2,t_2,c_2	!=
+	addx	c_3,%g0,c_3
+	st	c_1,rp(12)	!r[12]=c1;
+
+	umul	a_6,a_7,t_1	!sqr_add_c2(a,7,6,c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_2,t_1,c_2	!=
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	addx	%g0,%g0,c_1
+	addcc	c_2,t_1,c_2	!=
+	addxcc	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	st	c_2,rp(13)	!r[13]=c2;
+	addx	c_1,%g0,c_1	!=
+
+	umul	a_7,a_7,t_1	!sqr_add_c(a,7,c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_3,t_1,c_3
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_1,t_2,c_1	!=
+	st	c_3,rp(14)	!r[14]=c3;
+	st	c_1,rp(15)	!r[15]=c1;
+
+	ret
+	restore	%g0,%g0,%o0
+
+.type	bn_sqr_comba8,#function
+.size	bn_sqr_comba8,(.-bn_sqr_comba8)
+
+.align	32
+
+.global bn_sqr_comba4
+/*
+ * void bn_sqr_comba4(r,a)
+ * BN_ULONG *r,*a;
+ */
+bn_sqr_comba4:
+	save	%sp,FRAME_SIZE,%sp
+	ld	ap(0),a_0
+	umul	a_0,a_0,c_1	!sqr_add_c(a,0,c1,c2,c3);
+	ld	ap(1),a_1	!=
+	rd	%y,c_2
+	st	c_1,rp(0)	!r[0]=c1;
+
+	ld	ap(2),a_2
+	umul	a_0,a_1,t_1	!=!sqr_add_c2(a,1,0,c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_2,t_1,c_2
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	%g0,t_2,c_3
+	addx	%g0,%g0,c_1	!=
+	addcc	c_2,t_1,c_2
+	addxcc	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	addx	c_1,%g0,c_1	!=
+	st	c_2,rp(1)	!r[1]=c2;
+
+	umul	a_2,a_0,t_1	!sqr_add_c2(a,2,0,c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_3,t_1,c_3
+	rd	%y,t_2		!=
+	addxcc	c_1,t_2,c_1
+	addx	%g0,%g0,c_2
+	addcc	c_3,t_1,c_3
+	addxcc	c_1,t_2,c_1	!=
+	addx	c_2,%g0,c_2
+	ld	ap(3),a_3
+	umul	a_1,a_1,t_1	!sqr_add_c(a,1,c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_3,t_1,c_3	!=
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_1,t_2,c_1
+	st	c_3,rp(2)	!r[2]=c3;
+	addx	c_2,%g0,c_2	!=
+
+	umul	a_0,a_3,t_1	!sqr_add_c2(a,3,0,c1,c2,c3);
+	addcc	c_1,t_1,c_1
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_2,t_2,c_2	!=
+	addx	%g0,%g0,c_3
+	addcc	c_1,t_1,c_1
+	addxcc	c_2,t_2,c_2
+	addx	c_3,%g0,c_3	!=
+	umul	a_1,a_2,t_1	!sqr_add_c2(a,2,1,c1,c2,c3);
+	addcc	c_1,t_1,c_1
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_2,t_2,c_2	!=
+	addx	c_3,%g0,c_3
+	addcc	c_1,t_1,c_1
+	addxcc	c_2,t_2,c_2
+	addx	c_3,%g0,c_3	!=
+	st	c_1,rp(3)	!r[3]=c1;
+
+	umul	a_3,a_1,t_1	!sqr_add_c2(a,3,1,c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_2,t_1,c_2
+	rd	%y,t_2		!=
+	addxcc	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	addx	%g0,%g0,c_1
+	addcc	c_2,t_1,c_2
+	addxcc	c_3,t_2,c_3	!=
+	addx	c_1,%g0,c_1
+	umul	a_2,a_2,t_1	!sqr_add_c(a,2,c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_2,t_1,c_2
+	rd	%y,t_2		!=
+	addxcc	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	addx	c_1,%g0,c_1
+	st	c_2,rp(4)	!r[4]=c2;
+
+	umul	a_2,a_3,t_1	!=!sqr_add_c2(a,3,2,c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_3,t_1,c_3
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_1,t_2,c_1
+	addx	%g0,%g0,c_2	!=
+	addcc	c_3,t_1,c_3
+	addxcc	c_1,t_2,c_1
+	st	c_3,rp(5)	!r[5]=c3;
+	addx	c_2,%g0,c_2	!=
+
+	umul	a_3,a_3,t_1	!sqr_add_c(a,3,c1,c2,c3);
+	addcc	c_1,t_1,c_1
+	rd	%y,t_2
+	addxcc	c_2,t_2,c_2	!=
+	st	c_1,rp(6)	!r[6]=c1;
+	st	c_2,rp(7)	!r[7]=c2;
+	
+	ret
+	restore	%g0,%g0,%o0
+
+.type	bn_sqr_comba4,#function
+.size	bn_sqr_comba4,(.-bn_sqr_comba4)
+
+.align	32
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/sparcv8plus.S b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/sparcv8plus.S
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..714a136
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/sparcv8plus.S
@@ -0,0 +1,1562 @@
+.ident	"sparcv8plus.s, Version 1.4"
+.ident	"SPARC v9 ISA artwork by Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se>"
+
+/*
+ * ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ * ====================================================================
+ */
+
+/*
+ * This is my modest contributon to OpenSSL project (see
+ * http://www.openssl.org/ for more information about it) and is
+ * a drop-in UltraSPARC ISA replacement for crypto/bn/bn_asm.c
+ * module. For updates see http://fy.chalmers.se/~appro/hpe/.
+ *
+ * Questions-n-answers.
+ *
+ * Q. How to compile?
+ * A. With SC4.x/SC5.x:
+ *
+ *	cc -xarch=v8plus -c bn_asm.sparc.v8plus.S -o bn_asm.o
+ *
+ *    and with gcc:
+ *
+ *	gcc -mcpu=ultrasparc -c bn_asm.sparc.v8plus.S -o bn_asm.o
+ *
+ *    or if above fails (it does if you have gas installed):
+ *
+ *	gcc -E bn_asm.sparc.v8plus.S | as -xarch=v8plus /dev/fd/0 -o bn_asm.o
+ *
+ *    Quick-n-dirty way to fuse the module into the library.
+ *    Provided that the library is already configured and built
+ *    (in 0.9.2 case with no-asm option):
+ *
+ *	# cd crypto/bn
+ *	# cp /some/place/bn_asm.sparc.v8plus.S .
+ *	# cc -xarch=v8plus -c bn_asm.sparc.v8plus.S -o bn_asm.o
+ *	# make
+ *	# cd ../..
+ *	# make; make test
+ *
+ *    Quick-n-dirty way to get rid of it:
+ *
+ *	# cd crypto/bn
+ *	# touch bn_asm.c
+ *	# make
+ *	# cd ../..
+ *	# make; make test
+ *
+ * Q. V8plus architecture? What kind of beast is that?
+ * A. Well, it's rather a programming model than an architecture...
+ *    It's actually v9-compliant, i.e. *any* UltraSPARC, CPU under
+ *    special conditions, namely when kernel doesn't preserve upper
+ *    32 bits of otherwise 64-bit registers during a context switch.
+ *
+ * Q. Why just UltraSPARC? What about SuperSPARC?
+ * A. Original release did target UltraSPARC only. Now SuperSPARC
+ *    version is provided along. Both version share bn_*comba[48]
+ *    implementations (see comment later in code for explanation).
+ *    But what's so special about this UltraSPARC implementation?
+ *    Why didn't I let compiler do the job? Trouble is that most of
+ *    available compilers (well, SC5.0 is the only exception) don't
+ *    attempt to take advantage of UltraSPARC's 64-bitness under
+ *    32-bit kernels even though it's perfectly possible (see next
+ *    question).
+ *
+ * Q. 64-bit registers under 32-bit kernels? Didn't you just say it
+ *    doesn't work?
+ * A. You can't address *all* registers as 64-bit wide:-( The catch is
+ *    that you actually may rely upon %o0-%o5 and %g1-%g4 being fully
+ *    preserved if you're in a leaf function, i.e. such never calling
+ *    any other functions. All functions in this module are leaf and
+ *    10 registers is a handful. And as a matter of fact none-"comba"
+ *    routines don't require even that much and I could even afford to
+ *    not allocate own stack frame for 'em:-)
+ *
+ * Q. What about 64-bit kernels?
+ * A. What about 'em? Just kidding:-) Pure 64-bit version is currently
+ *    under evaluation and development...
+ *
+ * Q. What about shared libraries?
+ * A. What about 'em? Kidding again:-) Code does *not* contain any
+ *    code position dependencies and it's safe to include it into
+ *    shared library as is.
+ *
+ * Q. How much faster does it go?
+ * A. Do you have a good benchmark? In either case below is what I
+ *    experience with crypto/bn/expspeed.c test program:
+ *
+ *	v8plus module on U10/300MHz against bn_asm.c compiled with:
+ *
+ *	cc-5.0 -xarch=v8plus -xO5 -xdepend	+7-12%
+ *	cc-4.2 -xarch=v8plus -xO5 -xdepend	+25-35%
+ *	egcs-1.1.2 -mcpu=ultrasparc -O3		+35-45%
+ *
+ *	v8 module on SS10/60MHz against bn_asm.c compiled with:
+ *
+ *	cc-5.0 -xarch=v8 -xO5 -xdepend		+7-10%
+ *	cc-4.2 -xarch=v8 -xO5 -xdepend		+10%
+ *	egcs-1.1.2 -mv8 -O3			+35-45%
+ *
+ *    As you can see it's damn hard to beat the new Sun C compiler
+ *    and it's in first place GNU C users who will appreciate this
+ *    assembler implementation:-)	
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Revision history.
+ *
+ * 1.0	- initial release;
+ * 1.1	- new loop unrolling model(*);
+ *	- some more fine tuning;
+ * 1.2	- made gas friendly;
+ *	- updates to documentation concerning v9;
+ *	- new performance comparison matrix;
+ * 1.3	- fixed problem with /usr/ccs/lib/cpp;
+ * 1.4	- native V9 bn_*_comba[48] implementation (15% more efficient)
+ *	  resulting in slight overall performance kick;
+ *	- some retunes;
+ *	- support for GNU as added;
+ *
+ * (*)	Originally unrolled loop looked like this:
+ *	    for (;;) {
+ *		op(p+0); if (--n==0) break;
+ *		op(p+1); if (--n==0) break;
+ *		op(p+2); if (--n==0) break;
+ *		op(p+3); if (--n==0) break;
+ *		p+=4;
+ *	    }
+ *	I unroll according to following:
+ *	    while (n&~3) {
+ *		op(p+0); op(p+1); op(p+2); op(p+3);
+ *		p+=4; n=-4;
+ *	    }
+ *	    if (n) {
+ *		op(p+0); if (--n==0) return;
+ *		op(p+2); if (--n==0) return;
+ *		op(p+3); return;
+ *	    }
+ */
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPSCANISTER
+#include <openssl/fipssyms.h>
+#endif
+
+#if defined(__SUNPRO_C) && defined(__sparcv9)
+  /* They've said -xarch=v9 at command line */
+  .register	%g2,#scratch
+  .register	%g3,#scratch
+# define	FRAME_SIZE	-192
+#elif defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__arch64__)
+  /* They've said -m64 at command line */
+  .register	%g2,#scratch
+  .register	%g3,#scratch
+# define	FRAME_SIZE	-192
+#else 
+# define	FRAME_SIZE	-96
+#endif 
+/*
+ * GNU assembler can't stand stuw:-(
+ */
+#define stuw st
+
+.section	".text",#alloc,#execinstr
+.file		"bn_asm.sparc.v8plus.S"
+
+.align	32
+
+.global bn_mul_add_words
+/*
+ * BN_ULONG bn_mul_add_words(rp,ap,num,w)
+ * BN_ULONG *rp,*ap;
+ * int num;
+ * BN_ULONG w;
+ */
+bn_mul_add_words:
+	sra	%o2,%g0,%o2	! signx %o2
+	brgz,a	%o2,.L_bn_mul_add_words_proceed
+	lduw	[%o1],%g2
+	retl
+	clr	%o0
+	nop
+	nop
+	nop
+
+.L_bn_mul_add_words_proceed:
+	srl	%o3,%g0,%o3	! clruw	%o3
+	andcc	%o2,-4,%g0
+	bz,pn	%icc,.L_bn_mul_add_words_tail
+	clr	%o5
+
+.L_bn_mul_add_words_loop:	! wow! 32 aligned!
+	lduw	[%o0],%g1
+	lduw	[%o1+4],%g3
+	mulx	%o3,%g2,%g2
+	add	%g1,%o5,%o4
+	nop
+	add	%o4,%g2,%o4
+	stuw	%o4,[%o0]
+	srlx	%o4,32,%o5
+
+	lduw	[%o0+4],%g1
+	lduw	[%o1+8],%g2
+	mulx	%o3,%g3,%g3
+	add	%g1,%o5,%o4
+	dec	4,%o2
+	add	%o4,%g3,%o4
+	stuw	%o4,[%o0+4]
+	srlx	%o4,32,%o5
+
+	lduw	[%o0+8],%g1
+	lduw	[%o1+12],%g3
+	mulx	%o3,%g2,%g2
+	add	%g1,%o5,%o4
+	inc	16,%o1
+	add	%o4,%g2,%o4
+	stuw	%o4,[%o0+8]
+	srlx	%o4,32,%o5
+
+	lduw	[%o0+12],%g1
+	mulx	%o3,%g3,%g3
+	add	%g1,%o5,%o4
+	inc	16,%o0
+	add	%o4,%g3,%o4
+	andcc	%o2,-4,%g0
+	stuw	%o4,[%o0-4]
+	srlx	%o4,32,%o5
+	bnz,a,pt	%icc,.L_bn_mul_add_words_loop
+	lduw	[%o1],%g2
+
+	brnz,a,pn	%o2,.L_bn_mul_add_words_tail
+	lduw	[%o1],%g2
+.L_bn_mul_add_words_return:
+	retl
+	mov	%o5,%o0
+
+.L_bn_mul_add_words_tail:
+	lduw	[%o0],%g1
+	mulx	%o3,%g2,%g2
+	add	%g1,%o5,%o4
+	dec	%o2
+	add	%o4,%g2,%o4
+	srlx	%o4,32,%o5
+	brz,pt	%o2,.L_bn_mul_add_words_return
+	stuw	%o4,[%o0]
+
+	lduw	[%o1+4],%g2
+	lduw	[%o0+4],%g1
+	mulx	%o3,%g2,%g2
+	add	%g1,%o5,%o4
+	dec	%o2
+	add	%o4,%g2,%o4
+	srlx	%o4,32,%o5
+	brz,pt	%o2,.L_bn_mul_add_words_return
+	stuw	%o4,[%o0+4]
+
+	lduw	[%o1+8],%g2
+	lduw	[%o0+8],%g1
+	mulx	%o3,%g2,%g2
+	add	%g1,%o5,%o4
+	add	%o4,%g2,%o4
+	stuw	%o4,[%o0+8]
+	retl
+	srlx	%o4,32,%o0
+
+.type	bn_mul_add_words,#function
+.size	bn_mul_add_words,(.-bn_mul_add_words)
+
+.align	32
+
+.global bn_mul_words
+/*
+ * BN_ULONG bn_mul_words(rp,ap,num,w)
+ * BN_ULONG *rp,*ap;
+ * int num;
+ * BN_ULONG w;
+ */
+bn_mul_words:
+	sra	%o2,%g0,%o2	! signx %o2
+	brgz,a	%o2,.L_bn_mul_words_proceeed
+	lduw	[%o1],%g2
+	retl
+	clr	%o0
+	nop
+	nop
+	nop
+
+.L_bn_mul_words_proceeed:
+	srl	%o3,%g0,%o3	! clruw	%o3
+	andcc	%o2,-4,%g0
+	bz,pn	%icc,.L_bn_mul_words_tail
+	clr	%o5
+
+.L_bn_mul_words_loop:		! wow! 32 aligned!
+	lduw	[%o1+4],%g3
+	mulx	%o3,%g2,%g2
+	add	%g2,%o5,%o4
+	nop
+	stuw	%o4,[%o0]
+	srlx	%o4,32,%o5
+
+	lduw	[%o1+8],%g2
+	mulx	%o3,%g3,%g3
+	add	%g3,%o5,%o4
+	dec	4,%o2
+	stuw	%o4,[%o0+4]
+	srlx	%o4,32,%o5
+
+	lduw	[%o1+12],%g3
+	mulx	%o3,%g2,%g2
+	add	%g2,%o5,%o4
+	inc	16,%o1
+	stuw	%o4,[%o0+8]
+	srlx	%o4,32,%o5
+
+	mulx	%o3,%g3,%g3
+	add	%g3,%o5,%o4
+	inc	16,%o0
+	stuw	%o4,[%o0-4]
+	srlx	%o4,32,%o5
+	andcc	%o2,-4,%g0
+	bnz,a,pt	%icc,.L_bn_mul_words_loop
+	lduw	[%o1],%g2
+	nop
+	nop
+
+	brnz,a,pn	%o2,.L_bn_mul_words_tail
+	lduw	[%o1],%g2
+.L_bn_mul_words_return:
+	retl
+	mov	%o5,%o0
+
+.L_bn_mul_words_tail:
+	mulx	%o3,%g2,%g2
+	add	%g2,%o5,%o4
+	dec	%o2
+	srlx	%o4,32,%o5
+	brz,pt	%o2,.L_bn_mul_words_return
+	stuw	%o4,[%o0]
+
+	lduw	[%o1+4],%g2
+	mulx	%o3,%g2,%g2
+	add	%g2,%o5,%o4
+	dec	%o2
+	srlx	%o4,32,%o5
+	brz,pt	%o2,.L_bn_mul_words_return
+	stuw	%o4,[%o0+4]
+
+	lduw	[%o1+8],%g2
+	mulx	%o3,%g2,%g2
+	add	%g2,%o5,%o4
+	stuw	%o4,[%o0+8]
+	retl
+	srlx	%o4,32,%o0
+
+.type	bn_mul_words,#function
+.size	bn_mul_words,(.-bn_mul_words)
+
+.align  32
+.global	bn_sqr_words
+/*
+ * void bn_sqr_words(r,a,n)
+ * BN_ULONG *r,*a;
+ * int n;
+ */
+bn_sqr_words:
+	sra	%o2,%g0,%o2	! signx %o2
+	brgz,a	%o2,.L_bn_sqr_words_proceeed
+	lduw	[%o1],%g2
+	retl
+	clr	%o0
+	nop
+	nop
+	nop
+
+.L_bn_sqr_words_proceeed:
+	andcc	%o2,-4,%g0
+	nop
+	bz,pn	%icc,.L_bn_sqr_words_tail
+	nop
+
+.L_bn_sqr_words_loop:		! wow! 32 aligned!
+	lduw	[%o1+4],%g3
+	mulx	%g2,%g2,%o4
+	stuw	%o4,[%o0]
+	srlx	%o4,32,%o5
+	stuw	%o5,[%o0+4]
+	nop
+
+	lduw	[%o1+8],%g2
+	mulx	%g3,%g3,%o4
+	dec	4,%o2
+	stuw	%o4,[%o0+8]
+	srlx	%o4,32,%o5
+	stuw	%o5,[%o0+12]
+
+	lduw	[%o1+12],%g3
+	mulx	%g2,%g2,%o4
+	srlx	%o4,32,%o5
+	stuw	%o4,[%o0+16]
+	inc	16,%o1
+	stuw	%o5,[%o0+20]
+
+	mulx	%g3,%g3,%o4
+	inc	32,%o0
+	stuw	%o4,[%o0-8]
+	srlx	%o4,32,%o5
+	andcc	%o2,-4,%g2
+	stuw	%o5,[%o0-4]
+	bnz,a,pt	%icc,.L_bn_sqr_words_loop
+	lduw	[%o1],%g2
+	nop
+
+	brnz,a,pn	%o2,.L_bn_sqr_words_tail
+	lduw	[%o1],%g2
+.L_bn_sqr_words_return:
+	retl
+	clr	%o0
+
+.L_bn_sqr_words_tail:
+	mulx	%g2,%g2,%o4
+	dec	%o2
+	stuw	%o4,[%o0]
+	srlx	%o4,32,%o5
+	brz,pt	%o2,.L_bn_sqr_words_return
+	stuw	%o5,[%o0+4]
+
+	lduw	[%o1+4],%g2
+	mulx	%g2,%g2,%o4
+	dec	%o2
+	stuw	%o4,[%o0+8]
+	srlx	%o4,32,%o5
+	brz,pt	%o2,.L_bn_sqr_words_return
+	stuw	%o5,[%o0+12]
+
+	lduw	[%o1+8],%g2
+	mulx	%g2,%g2,%o4
+	srlx	%o4,32,%o5
+	stuw	%o4,[%o0+16]
+	stuw	%o5,[%o0+20]
+	retl
+	clr	%o0
+
+.type	bn_sqr_words,#function
+.size	bn_sqr_words,(.-bn_sqr_words)
+
+.align	32
+.global bn_div_words
+/*
+ * BN_ULONG bn_div_words(h,l,d)
+ * BN_ULONG h,l,d;
+ */
+bn_div_words:
+	sllx	%o0,32,%o0
+	or	%o0,%o1,%o0
+	udivx	%o0,%o2,%o0
+	retl
+	srl	%o0,%g0,%o0	! clruw	%o0
+
+.type	bn_div_words,#function
+.size	bn_div_words,(.-bn_div_words)
+
+.align	32
+
+.global bn_add_words
+/*
+ * BN_ULONG bn_add_words(rp,ap,bp,n)
+ * BN_ULONG *rp,*ap,*bp;
+ * int n;
+ */
+bn_add_words:
+	sra	%o3,%g0,%o3	! signx %o3
+	brgz,a	%o3,.L_bn_add_words_proceed
+	lduw	[%o1],%o4
+	retl
+	clr	%o0
+
+.L_bn_add_words_proceed:
+	andcc	%o3,-4,%g0
+	bz,pn	%icc,.L_bn_add_words_tail
+	addcc	%g0,0,%g0	! clear carry flag
+
+.L_bn_add_words_loop:		! wow! 32 aligned!
+	dec	4,%o3
+	lduw	[%o2],%o5
+	lduw	[%o1+4],%g1
+	lduw	[%o2+4],%g2
+	lduw	[%o1+8],%g3
+	lduw	[%o2+8],%g4
+	addccc	%o5,%o4,%o5
+	stuw	%o5,[%o0]
+
+	lduw	[%o1+12],%o4
+	lduw	[%o2+12],%o5
+	inc	16,%o1
+	addccc	%g1,%g2,%g1
+	stuw	%g1,[%o0+4]
+	
+	inc	16,%o2
+	addccc	%g3,%g4,%g3
+	stuw	%g3,[%o0+8]
+
+	inc	16,%o0
+	addccc	%o5,%o4,%o5
+	stuw	%o5,[%o0-4]
+	and	%o3,-4,%g1
+	brnz,a,pt	%g1,.L_bn_add_words_loop
+	lduw	[%o1],%o4
+
+	brnz,a,pn	%o3,.L_bn_add_words_tail
+	lduw	[%o1],%o4
+.L_bn_add_words_return:
+	clr	%o0
+	retl
+	movcs	%icc,1,%o0
+	nop
+
+.L_bn_add_words_tail:
+	lduw	[%o2],%o5
+	dec	%o3
+	addccc	%o5,%o4,%o5
+	brz,pt	%o3,.L_bn_add_words_return
+	stuw	%o5,[%o0]
+
+	lduw	[%o1+4],%o4
+	lduw	[%o2+4],%o5
+	dec	%o3
+	addccc	%o5,%o4,%o5
+	brz,pt	%o3,.L_bn_add_words_return
+	stuw	%o5,[%o0+4]
+
+	lduw	[%o1+8],%o4
+	lduw	[%o2+8],%o5
+	addccc	%o5,%o4,%o5
+	stuw	%o5,[%o0+8]
+	clr	%o0
+	retl
+	movcs	%icc,1,%o0
+
+.type	bn_add_words,#function
+.size	bn_add_words,(.-bn_add_words)
+
+.global bn_sub_words
+/*
+ * BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(rp,ap,bp,n)
+ * BN_ULONG *rp,*ap,*bp;
+ * int n;
+ */
+bn_sub_words:
+	sra	%o3,%g0,%o3	! signx %o3
+	brgz,a	%o3,.L_bn_sub_words_proceed
+	lduw	[%o1],%o4
+	retl
+	clr	%o0
+
+.L_bn_sub_words_proceed:
+	andcc	%o3,-4,%g0
+	bz,pn	%icc,.L_bn_sub_words_tail
+	addcc	%g0,0,%g0	! clear carry flag
+
+.L_bn_sub_words_loop:		! wow! 32 aligned!
+	dec	4,%o3
+	lduw	[%o2],%o5
+	lduw	[%o1+4],%g1
+	lduw	[%o2+4],%g2
+	lduw	[%o1+8],%g3
+	lduw	[%o2+8],%g4
+	subccc	%o4,%o5,%o5
+	stuw	%o5,[%o0]
+
+	lduw	[%o1+12],%o4
+	lduw	[%o2+12],%o5
+	inc	16,%o1
+	subccc	%g1,%g2,%g2
+	stuw	%g2,[%o0+4]
+
+	inc	16,%o2
+	subccc	%g3,%g4,%g4
+	stuw	%g4,[%o0+8]
+
+	inc	16,%o0
+	subccc	%o4,%o5,%o5
+	stuw	%o5,[%o0-4]
+	and	%o3,-4,%g1
+	brnz,a,pt	%g1,.L_bn_sub_words_loop
+	lduw	[%o1],%o4
+
+	brnz,a,pn	%o3,.L_bn_sub_words_tail
+	lduw	[%o1],%o4
+.L_bn_sub_words_return:
+	clr	%o0
+	retl
+	movcs	%icc,1,%o0
+	nop
+
+.L_bn_sub_words_tail:		! wow! 32 aligned!
+	lduw	[%o2],%o5
+	dec	%o3
+	subccc	%o4,%o5,%o5
+	brz,pt	%o3,.L_bn_sub_words_return
+	stuw	%o5,[%o0]
+
+	lduw	[%o1+4],%o4
+	lduw	[%o2+4],%o5
+	dec	%o3
+	subccc	%o4,%o5,%o5
+	brz,pt	%o3,.L_bn_sub_words_return
+	stuw	%o5,[%o0+4]
+
+	lduw	[%o1+8],%o4
+	lduw	[%o2+8],%o5
+	subccc	%o4,%o5,%o5
+	stuw	%o5,[%o0+8]
+	clr	%o0
+	retl
+	movcs	%icc,1,%o0
+
+.type	bn_sub_words,#function
+.size	bn_sub_words,(.-bn_sub_words)
+
+/*
+ * Code below depends on the fact that upper parts of the %l0-%l7
+ * and %i0-%i7 are zeroed by kernel after context switch. In
+ * previous versions this comment stated that "the trouble is that
+ * it's not feasible to implement the mumbo-jumbo in less V9
+ * instructions:-(" which apparently isn't true thanks to
+ * 'bcs,a %xcc,.+8; inc %rd' pair. But the performance improvement
+ * results not from the shorter code, but from elimination of
+ * multicycle none-pairable 'rd %y,%rd' instructions.
+ *
+ *							Andy.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Here is register usage map for *all* routines below.
+ */
+#define t_1	%o0
+#define	t_2	%o1
+#define c_12	%o2
+#define c_3	%o3
+
+#define ap(I)	[%i1+4*I]
+#define bp(I)	[%i2+4*I]
+#define rp(I)	[%i0+4*I]
+
+#define	a_0	%l0
+#define	a_1	%l1
+#define	a_2	%l2
+#define	a_3	%l3
+#define	a_4	%l4
+#define	a_5	%l5
+#define	a_6	%l6
+#define	a_7	%l7
+
+#define	b_0	%i3
+#define	b_1	%i4
+#define	b_2	%i5
+#define	b_3	%o4
+#define	b_4	%o5
+#define	b_5	%o7
+#define	b_6	%g1
+#define	b_7	%g4
+
+.align	32
+.global bn_mul_comba8
+/*
+ * void bn_mul_comba8(r,a,b)
+ * BN_ULONG *r,*a,*b;
+ */
+bn_mul_comba8:
+	save	%sp,FRAME_SIZE,%sp
+	mov	1,t_2
+	lduw	ap(0),a_0
+	sllx	t_2,32,t_2
+	lduw	bp(0),b_0	!=
+	lduw	bp(1),b_1
+	mulx	a_0,b_0,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[0],b[0],c1,c2,c3);
+	srlx	t_1,32,c_12
+	stuw	t_1,rp(0)	!=!r[0]=c1;
+
+	lduw	ap(1),a_1
+	mulx	a_0,b_1,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[0],b[1],c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	clr	c_3		!=
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	lduw	ap(2),a_2
+	mulx	a_1,b_0,t_1	!=!mul_add_c(a[1],b[0],c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,t_1
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	srlx	t_1,32,c_12	!=
+	stuw	t_1,rp(1)	!r[1]=c2;
+	or	c_12,c_3,c_12
+
+	mulx	a_2,b_0,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[2],b[0],c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12	!=
+	clr	c_3
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	lduw	bp(2),b_2	!=
+	mulx	a_1,b_1,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[1],b[1],c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3	!=
+	lduw	bp(3),b_3
+	mulx	a_0,b_2,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[0],b[2],c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,t_1
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8	!=
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	srlx	t_1,32,c_12
+	stuw	t_1,rp(2)	!r[2]=c3;
+	or	c_12,c_3,c_12	!=
+
+	mulx	a_0,b_3,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[0],b[3],c1,c2,c3);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	clr	c_3
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8	!=
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	mulx	a_1,b_2,t_1	!=!mul_add_c(a[1],b[2],c1,c2,c3);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8	!=
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	lduw	ap(3),a_3
+	mulx	a_2,b_1,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[2],b[1],c1,c2,c3);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12	!=
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	lduw	ap(4),a_4
+	mulx	a_3,b_0,t_1	!=!mul_add_c(a[3],b[0],c1,c2,c3);!=
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,t_1
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	srlx	t_1,32,c_12	!=
+	stuw	t_1,rp(3)	!r[3]=c1;
+	or	c_12,c_3,c_12
+
+	mulx	a_4,b_0,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[4],b[0],c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12	!=
+	clr	c_3
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	mulx	a_3,b_1,t_1	!=!mul_add_c(a[3],b[1],c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	mulx	a_2,b_2,t_1	!=!mul_add_c(a[2],b[2],c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	lduw	bp(4),b_4	!=
+	mulx	a_1,b_3,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[1],b[3],c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3	!=
+	lduw	bp(5),b_5
+	mulx	a_0,b_4,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[0],b[4],c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,t_1
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8	!=
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	srlx	t_1,32,c_12
+	stuw	t_1,rp(4)	!r[4]=c2;
+	or	c_12,c_3,c_12	!=
+
+	mulx	a_0,b_5,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[0],b[5],c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	clr	c_3
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8	!=
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	mulx	a_1,b_4,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[1],b[4],c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8	!=
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	mulx	a_2,b_3,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[2],b[3],c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8	!=
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	mulx	a_3,b_2,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[3],b[2],c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8	!=
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	lduw	ap(5),a_5
+	mulx	a_4,b_1,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[4],b[1],c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12	!=
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	lduw	ap(6),a_6
+	mulx	a_5,b_0,t_1	!=!mul_add_c(a[5],b[0],c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,t_1
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	srlx	t_1,32,c_12	!=
+	stuw	t_1,rp(5)	!r[5]=c3;
+	or	c_12,c_3,c_12
+
+	mulx	a_6,b_0,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[6],b[0],c1,c2,c3);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12	!=
+	clr	c_3
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	mulx	a_5,b_1,t_1	!=!mul_add_c(a[5],b[1],c1,c2,c3);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	mulx	a_4,b_2,t_1	!=!mul_add_c(a[4],b[2],c1,c2,c3);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	mulx	a_3,b_3,t_1	!=!mul_add_c(a[3],b[3],c1,c2,c3);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	mulx	a_2,b_4,t_1	!=!mul_add_c(a[2],b[4],c1,c2,c3);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	lduw	bp(6),b_6	!=
+	mulx	a_1,b_5,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[1],b[5],c1,c2,c3);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3	!=
+	lduw	bp(7),b_7
+	mulx	a_0,b_6,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[0],b[6],c1,c2,c3);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,t_1
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8	!=
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	srlx	t_1,32,c_12
+	stuw	t_1,rp(6)	!r[6]=c1;
+	or	c_12,c_3,c_12	!=
+
+	mulx	a_0,b_7,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[0],b[7],c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	clr	c_3
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8	!=
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	mulx	a_1,b_6,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[1],b[6],c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8	!=
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	mulx	a_2,b_5,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[2],b[5],c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8	!=
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	mulx	a_3,b_4,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[3],b[4],c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8	!=
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	mulx	a_4,b_3,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[4],b[3],c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8	!=
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	mulx	a_5,b_2,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[5],b[2],c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8	!=
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	lduw	ap(7),a_7
+	mulx	a_6,b_1,t_1	!=!mul_add_c(a[6],b[1],c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	mulx	a_7,b_0,t_1	!=!mul_add_c(a[7],b[0],c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,t_1
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	srlx	t_1,32,c_12	!=
+	stuw	t_1,rp(7)	!r[7]=c2;
+	or	c_12,c_3,c_12
+
+	mulx	a_7,b_1,t_1	!=!mul_add_c(a[7],b[1],c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	clr	c_3
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3	!=
+	mulx	a_6,b_2,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[6],b[2],c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3	!=
+	mulx	a_5,b_3,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[5],b[3],c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3	!=
+	mulx	a_4,b_4,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[4],b[4],c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3	!=
+	mulx	a_3,b_5,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[3],b[5],c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3	!=
+	mulx	a_2,b_6,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[2],b[6],c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3	!=
+	mulx	a_1,b_7,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[1],b[7],c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,t_1
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3	!=
+	srlx	t_1,32,c_12
+	stuw	t_1,rp(8)	!r[8]=c3;
+	or	c_12,c_3,c_12
+
+	mulx	a_2,b_7,t_1	!=!mul_add_c(a[2],b[7],c1,c2,c3);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	clr	c_3
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3	!=
+	mulx	a_3,b_6,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[3],b[6],c1,c2,c3);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8	!=
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	mulx	a_4,b_5,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[4],b[5],c1,c2,c3);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8	!=
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	mulx	a_5,b_4,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[5],b[4],c1,c2,c3);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8	!=
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	mulx	a_6,b_3,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[6],b[3],c1,c2,c3);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8	!=
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	mulx	a_7,b_2,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[7],b[2],c1,c2,c3);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,t_1
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8	!=
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	srlx	t_1,32,c_12
+	stuw	t_1,rp(9)	!r[9]=c1;
+	or	c_12,c_3,c_12	!=
+
+	mulx	a_7,b_3,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[7],b[3],c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	clr	c_3
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8	!=
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	mulx	a_6,b_4,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[6],b[4],c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8	!=
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	mulx	a_5,b_5,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[5],b[5],c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8	!=
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	mulx	a_4,b_6,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[4],b[6],c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8	!=
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	mulx	a_3,b_7,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[3],b[7],c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,t_1
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8	!=
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	srlx	t_1,32,c_12
+	stuw	t_1,rp(10)	!r[10]=c2;
+	or	c_12,c_3,c_12	!=
+
+	mulx	a_4,b_7,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[4],b[7],c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	clr	c_3
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8	!=
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	mulx	a_5,b_6,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[5],b[6],c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8	!=
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	mulx	a_6,b_5,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[6],b[5],c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8	!=
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	mulx	a_7,b_4,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[7],b[4],c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,t_1
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8	!=
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	srlx	t_1,32,c_12
+	stuw	t_1,rp(11)	!r[11]=c3;
+	or	c_12,c_3,c_12	!=
+
+	mulx	a_7,b_5,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[7],b[5],c1,c2,c3);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	clr	c_3
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8	!=
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	mulx	a_6,b_6,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[6],b[6],c1,c2,c3);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8	!=
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	mulx	a_5,b_7,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[5],b[7],c1,c2,c3);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,t_1
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8	!=
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	srlx	t_1,32,c_12
+	stuw	t_1,rp(12)	!r[12]=c1;
+	or	c_12,c_3,c_12	!=
+
+	mulx	a_6,b_7,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[6],b[7],c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	clr	c_3
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8	!=
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	mulx	a_7,b_6,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[7],b[6],c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,t_1
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8	!=
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	srlx	t_1,32,c_12
+	st	t_1,rp(13)	!r[13]=c2;
+	or	c_12,c_3,c_12	!=
+
+	mulx	a_7,b_7,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[7],b[7],c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,t_1
+	srlx	t_1,32,c_12	!=
+	stuw	t_1,rp(14)	!r[14]=c3;
+	stuw	c_12,rp(15)	!r[15]=c1;
+
+	ret
+	restore	%g0,%g0,%o0	!=
+
+.type	bn_mul_comba8,#function
+.size	bn_mul_comba8,(.-bn_mul_comba8)
+
+.align	32
+
+.global bn_mul_comba4
+/*
+ * void bn_mul_comba4(r,a,b)
+ * BN_ULONG *r,*a,*b;
+ */
+bn_mul_comba4:
+	save	%sp,FRAME_SIZE,%sp
+	lduw	ap(0),a_0
+	mov	1,t_2
+	lduw	bp(0),b_0
+	sllx	t_2,32,t_2	!=
+	lduw	bp(1),b_1
+	mulx	a_0,b_0,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[0],b[0],c1,c2,c3);
+	srlx	t_1,32,c_12
+	stuw	t_1,rp(0)	!=!r[0]=c1;
+
+	lduw	ap(1),a_1
+	mulx	a_0,b_1,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[0],b[1],c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	clr	c_3		!=
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	lduw	ap(2),a_2
+	mulx	a_1,b_0,t_1	!=!mul_add_c(a[1],b[0],c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,t_1
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	srlx	t_1,32,c_12	!=
+	stuw	t_1,rp(1)	!r[1]=c2;
+	or	c_12,c_3,c_12
+
+	mulx	a_2,b_0,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[2],b[0],c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12	!=
+	clr	c_3
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	lduw	bp(2),b_2	!=
+	mulx	a_1,b_1,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[1],b[1],c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3	!=
+	lduw	bp(3),b_3
+	mulx	a_0,b_2,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[0],b[2],c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,t_1
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8	!=
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	srlx	t_1,32,c_12
+	stuw	t_1,rp(2)	!r[2]=c3;
+	or	c_12,c_3,c_12	!=
+
+	mulx	a_0,b_3,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[0],b[3],c1,c2,c3);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	clr	c_3
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8	!=
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	mulx	a_1,b_2,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[1],b[2],c1,c2,c3);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8	!=
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	lduw	ap(3),a_3
+	mulx	a_2,b_1,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[2],b[1],c1,c2,c3);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12	!=
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	mulx	a_3,b_0,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[3],b[0],c1,c2,c3);!=
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,t_1	!=
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	srlx	t_1,32,c_12
+	stuw	t_1,rp(3)	!=!r[3]=c1;
+	or	c_12,c_3,c_12
+
+	mulx	a_3,b_1,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[3],b[1],c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	clr	c_3		!=
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	mulx	a_2,b_2,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[2],b[2],c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12	!=
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	mulx	a_1,b_3,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[1],b[3],c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,t_1	!=
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	srlx	t_1,32,c_12
+	stuw	t_1,rp(4)	!=!r[4]=c2;
+	or	c_12,c_3,c_12
+
+	mulx	a_2,b_3,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[2],b[3],c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	clr	c_3		!=
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	mulx	a_3,b_2,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[3],b[2],c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,t_1	!=
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	srlx	t_1,32,c_12
+	stuw	t_1,rp(5)	!=!r[5]=c3;
+	or	c_12,c_3,c_12
+
+	mulx	a_3,b_3,t_1	!mul_add_c(a[3],b[3],c1,c2,c3);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,t_1
+	srlx	t_1,32,c_12	!=
+	stuw	t_1,rp(6)	!r[6]=c1;
+	stuw	c_12,rp(7)	!r[7]=c2;
+	
+	ret
+	restore	%g0,%g0,%o0
+
+.type	bn_mul_comba4,#function
+.size	bn_mul_comba4,(.-bn_mul_comba4)
+
+.align	32
+
+.global bn_sqr_comba8
+bn_sqr_comba8:
+	save	%sp,FRAME_SIZE,%sp
+	mov	1,t_2
+	lduw	ap(0),a_0
+	sllx	t_2,32,t_2
+	lduw	ap(1),a_1
+	mulx	a_0,a_0,t_1	!sqr_add_c(a,0,c1,c2,c3);
+	srlx	t_1,32,c_12
+	stuw	t_1,rp(0)	!r[0]=c1;
+
+	lduw	ap(2),a_2
+	mulx	a_0,a_1,t_1	!=!sqr_add_c2(a,1,0,c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	clr	c_3
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,t_1
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	srlx	t_1,32,c_12
+	stuw	t_1,rp(1)	!r[1]=c2;
+	or	c_12,c_3,c_12
+
+	mulx	a_2,a_0,t_1	!sqr_add_c2(a,2,0,c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	clr	c_3
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	lduw	ap(3),a_3
+	mulx	a_1,a_1,t_1	!sqr_add_c(a,1,c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,t_1
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	srlx	t_1,32,c_12
+	stuw	t_1,rp(2)	!r[2]=c3;
+	or	c_12,c_3,c_12
+
+	mulx	a_0,a_3,t_1	!sqr_add_c2(a,3,0,c1,c2,c3);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	clr	c_3
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	lduw	ap(4),a_4
+	mulx	a_1,a_2,t_1	!sqr_add_c2(a,2,1,c1,c2,c3);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,t_1
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	srlx	t_1,32,c_12
+	st	t_1,rp(3)	!r[3]=c1;
+	or	c_12,c_3,c_12
+
+	mulx	a_4,a_0,t_1	!sqr_add_c2(a,4,0,c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	clr	c_3
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	mulx	a_3,a_1,t_1	!sqr_add_c2(a,3,1,c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	lduw	ap(5),a_5
+	mulx	a_2,a_2,t_1	!sqr_add_c(a,2,c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,t_1
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	srlx	t_1,32,c_12
+	stuw	t_1,rp(4)	!r[4]=c2;
+	or	c_12,c_3,c_12
+
+	mulx	a_0,a_5,t_1	!sqr_add_c2(a,5,0,c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	clr	c_3
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	mulx	a_1,a_4,t_1	!sqr_add_c2(a,4,1,c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	lduw	ap(6),a_6
+	mulx	a_2,a_3,t_1	!sqr_add_c2(a,3,2,c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,t_1
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	srlx	t_1,32,c_12
+	stuw	t_1,rp(5)	!r[5]=c3;
+	or	c_12,c_3,c_12
+
+	mulx	a_6,a_0,t_1	!sqr_add_c2(a,6,0,c1,c2,c3);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	clr	c_3
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	mulx	a_5,a_1,t_1	!sqr_add_c2(a,5,1,c1,c2,c3);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	mulx	a_4,a_2,t_1	!sqr_add_c2(a,4,2,c1,c2,c3);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	lduw	ap(7),a_7
+	mulx	a_3,a_3,t_1	!=!sqr_add_c(a,3,c1,c2,c3);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,t_1
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	srlx	t_1,32,c_12
+	stuw	t_1,rp(6)	!r[6]=c1;
+	or	c_12,c_3,c_12
+
+	mulx	a_0,a_7,t_1	!sqr_add_c2(a,7,0,c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	clr	c_3
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	mulx	a_1,a_6,t_1	!sqr_add_c2(a,6,1,c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	mulx	a_2,a_5,t_1	!sqr_add_c2(a,5,2,c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	mulx	a_3,a_4,t_1	!sqr_add_c2(a,4,3,c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,t_1
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	srlx	t_1,32,c_12
+	stuw	t_1,rp(7)	!r[7]=c2;
+	or	c_12,c_3,c_12
+
+	mulx	a_7,a_1,t_1	!sqr_add_c2(a,7,1,c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	clr	c_3
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	mulx	a_6,a_2,t_1	!sqr_add_c2(a,6,2,c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	mulx	a_5,a_3,t_1	!sqr_add_c2(a,5,3,c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	mulx	a_4,a_4,t_1	!sqr_add_c(a,4,c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,t_1
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	srlx	t_1,32,c_12
+	stuw	t_1,rp(8)	!r[8]=c3;
+	or	c_12,c_3,c_12
+
+	mulx	a_2,a_7,t_1	!sqr_add_c2(a,7,2,c1,c2,c3);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	clr	c_3
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	mulx	a_3,a_6,t_1	!sqr_add_c2(a,6,3,c1,c2,c3);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	mulx	a_4,a_5,t_1	!sqr_add_c2(a,5,4,c1,c2,c3);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,t_1
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	srlx	t_1,32,c_12
+	stuw	t_1,rp(9)	!r[9]=c1;
+	or	c_12,c_3,c_12
+
+	mulx	a_7,a_3,t_1	!sqr_add_c2(a,7,3,c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	clr	c_3
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	mulx	a_6,a_4,t_1	!sqr_add_c2(a,6,4,c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	mulx	a_5,a_5,t_1	!sqr_add_c(a,5,c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,t_1
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	srlx	t_1,32,c_12
+	stuw	t_1,rp(10)	!r[10]=c2;
+	or	c_12,c_3,c_12
+
+	mulx	a_4,a_7,t_1	!sqr_add_c2(a,7,4,c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	clr	c_3
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	mulx	a_5,a_6,t_1	!sqr_add_c2(a,6,5,c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,t_1
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	srlx	t_1,32,c_12
+	stuw	t_1,rp(11)	!r[11]=c3;
+	or	c_12,c_3,c_12
+
+	mulx	a_7,a_5,t_1	!sqr_add_c2(a,7,5,c1,c2,c3);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	clr	c_3
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	mulx	a_6,a_6,t_1	!sqr_add_c(a,6,c1,c2,c3);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,t_1
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	srlx	t_1,32,c_12
+	stuw	t_1,rp(12)	!r[12]=c1;
+	or	c_12,c_3,c_12
+
+	mulx	a_6,a_7,t_1	!sqr_add_c2(a,7,6,c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	clr	c_3
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,t_1
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	srlx	t_1,32,c_12
+	stuw	t_1,rp(13)	!r[13]=c2;
+	or	c_12,c_3,c_12
+
+	mulx	a_7,a_7,t_1	!sqr_add_c(a,7,c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,t_1
+	srlx	t_1,32,c_12
+	stuw	t_1,rp(14)	!r[14]=c3;
+	stuw	c_12,rp(15)	!r[15]=c1;
+
+	ret
+	restore	%g0,%g0,%o0
+
+.type	bn_sqr_comba8,#function
+.size	bn_sqr_comba8,(.-bn_sqr_comba8)
+
+.align	32
+
+.global bn_sqr_comba4
+/*
+ * void bn_sqr_comba4(r,a)
+ * BN_ULONG *r,*a;
+ */
+bn_sqr_comba4:
+	save	%sp,FRAME_SIZE,%sp
+	mov	1,t_2
+	lduw	ap(0),a_0
+	sllx	t_2,32,t_2
+	lduw	ap(1),a_1
+	mulx	a_0,a_0,t_1	!sqr_add_c(a,0,c1,c2,c3);
+	srlx	t_1,32,c_12
+	stuw	t_1,rp(0)	!r[0]=c1;
+
+	lduw	ap(2),a_2
+	mulx	a_0,a_1,t_1	!sqr_add_c2(a,1,0,c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	clr	c_3
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,t_1
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	srlx	t_1,32,c_12
+	stuw	t_1,rp(1)	!r[1]=c2;
+	or	c_12,c_3,c_12
+
+	mulx	a_2,a_0,t_1	!sqr_add_c2(a,2,0,c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	clr	c_3
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	lduw	ap(3),a_3
+	mulx	a_1,a_1,t_1	!sqr_add_c(a,1,c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,t_1
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	srlx	t_1,32,c_12
+	stuw	t_1,rp(2)	!r[2]=c3;
+	or	c_12,c_3,c_12
+
+	mulx	a_0,a_3,t_1	!sqr_add_c2(a,3,0,c1,c2,c3);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	clr	c_3
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	mulx	a_1,a_2,t_1	!sqr_add_c2(a,2,1,c1,c2,c3);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,t_1
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	srlx	t_1,32,c_12
+	stuw	t_1,rp(3)	!r[3]=c1;
+	or	c_12,c_3,c_12
+
+	mulx	a_3,a_1,t_1	!sqr_add_c2(a,3,1,c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	clr	c_3
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	mulx	a_2,a_2,t_1	!sqr_add_c(a,2,c2,c3,c1);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,t_1
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	srlx	t_1,32,c_12
+	stuw	t_1,rp(4)	!r[4]=c2;
+	or	c_12,c_3,c_12
+
+	mulx	a_2,a_3,t_1	!sqr_add_c2(a,3,2,c3,c1,c2);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,c_12
+	clr	c_3
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,t_1
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	c_3,t_2,c_3
+	srlx	t_1,32,c_12
+	stuw	t_1,rp(5)	!r[5]=c3;
+	or	c_12,c_3,c_12
+
+	mulx	a_3,a_3,t_1	!sqr_add_c(a,3,c1,c2,c3);
+	addcc	c_12,t_1,t_1
+	srlx	t_1,32,c_12
+	stuw	t_1,rp(6)	!r[6]=c1;
+	stuw	c_12,rp(7)	!r[7]=c2;
+	
+	ret
+	restore	%g0,%g0,%o0
+
+.type	bn_sqr_comba4,#function
+.size	bn_sqr_comba4,(.-bn_sqr_comba4)
+
+.align	32
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/sparcv9-gf2m.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/sparcv9-gf2m.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dcf11a8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/sparcv9-gf2m.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,200 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2012-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# October 2012
+#
+# The module implements bn_GF2m_mul_2x2 polynomial multiplication used
+# in bn_gf2m.c. It's kind of low-hanging mechanical port from C for
+# the time being... Except that it has two code paths: one suitable
+# for all SPARCv9 processors and one for VIS3-capable ones. Former
+# delivers ~25-45% more, more for longer keys, heaviest DH and DSA
+# verify operations on venerable UltraSPARC II. On T4 VIS3 code is
+# ~100-230% faster than gcc-generated code and ~35-90% faster than
+# the pure SPARCv9 code path.
+
+$output = pop;
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+$locals=16*8;
+
+$tab="%l0";
+
+@T=("%g2","%g3");
+@i=("%g4","%g5");
+
+($a1,$a2,$a4,$a8,$a12,$a48)=map("%o$_",(0..5));
+($lo,$hi,$b)=("%g1",$a8,"%o7"); $a=$lo;
+
+$code.=<<___;
+#include <sparc_arch.h>
+
+#ifdef __arch64__
+.register	%g2,#scratch
+.register	%g3,#scratch
+#endif
+
+#ifdef __PIC__
+SPARC_PIC_THUNK(%g1)
+#endif
+
+.globl	bn_GF2m_mul_2x2
+.align	16
+bn_GF2m_mul_2x2:
+        SPARC_LOAD_ADDRESS_LEAF(OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P,%g1,%g5)
+        ld	[%g1+0],%g1             	! OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0]
+
+        andcc	%g1, SPARCV9_VIS3, %g0
+        bz,pn	%icc,.Lsoftware
+        nop
+
+	sllx	%o1, 32, %o1
+	sllx	%o3, 32, %o3
+	or	%o2, %o1, %o1
+	or	%o4, %o3, %o3
+	.word	0x95b262ab			! xmulx   %o1, %o3, %o2
+	.word	0x99b262cb			! xmulxhi %o1, %o3, %o4
+	srlx	%o2, 32, %o1			! 13 cycles later
+	st	%o2, [%o0+0]
+	st	%o1, [%o0+4]
+	srlx	%o4, 32, %o3
+	st	%o4, [%o0+8]
+	retl
+	st	%o3, [%o0+12]
+
+.align	16
+.Lsoftware:
+	save	%sp,-STACK_FRAME-$locals,%sp
+
+	sllx	%i1,32,$a
+	mov	-1,$a12
+	sllx	%i3,32,$b
+	or	%i2,$a,$a
+	srlx	$a12,1,$a48			! 0x7fff...
+	or	%i4,$b,$b
+	srlx	$a12,2,$a12			! 0x3fff...
+	add	%sp,STACK_BIAS+STACK_FRAME,$tab
+
+	sllx	$a,2,$a4
+	mov	$a,$a1
+	sllx	$a,1,$a2
+
+	srax	$a4,63,@i[1]			! broadcast 61st bit
+	and	$a48,$a4,$a4			! (a<<2)&0x7fff...
+	srlx	$a48,2,$a48
+	srax	$a2,63,@i[0]			! broadcast 62nd bit
+	and	$a12,$a2,$a2			! (a<<1)&0x3fff...
+	srax	$a1,63,$lo			! broadcast 63rd bit
+	and	$a48,$a1,$a1			! (a<<0)&0x1fff...
+
+	sllx	$a1,3,$a8
+	and	$b,$lo,$lo
+	and	$b,@i[0],@i[0]
+	and	$b,@i[1],@i[1]
+
+	stx	%g0,[$tab+0*8]			! tab[0]=0
+	xor	$a1,$a2,$a12
+	stx	$a1,[$tab+1*8]			! tab[1]=a1
+	stx	$a2,[$tab+2*8]			! tab[2]=a2
+	 xor	$a4,$a8,$a48
+	stx	$a12,[$tab+3*8]			! tab[3]=a1^a2
+	 xor	$a4,$a1,$a1
+
+	stx	$a4,[$tab+4*8]			! tab[4]=a4
+	xor	$a4,$a2,$a2
+	stx	$a1,[$tab+5*8]			! tab[5]=a1^a4
+	xor	$a4,$a12,$a12
+	stx	$a2,[$tab+6*8]			! tab[6]=a2^a4
+	 xor	$a48,$a1,$a1
+	stx	$a12,[$tab+7*8]			! tab[7]=a1^a2^a4
+	 xor	$a48,$a2,$a2
+
+	stx	$a8,[$tab+8*8]			! tab[8]=a8
+	xor	$a48,$a12,$a12
+	stx	$a1,[$tab+9*8]			! tab[9]=a1^a8
+	 xor	$a4,$a1,$a1
+	stx	$a2,[$tab+10*8]			! tab[10]=a2^a8
+	 xor	$a4,$a2,$a2
+	stx	$a12,[$tab+11*8]		! tab[11]=a1^a2^a8
+
+	xor	$a4,$a12,$a12
+	stx	$a48,[$tab+12*8]		! tab[12]=a4^a8
+	 srlx	$lo,1,$hi
+	stx	$a1,[$tab+13*8]			! tab[13]=a1^a4^a8
+	 sllx	$lo,63,$lo
+	stx	$a2,[$tab+14*8]			! tab[14]=a2^a4^a8
+	 srlx	@i[0],2,@T[0]
+	stx	$a12,[$tab+15*8]		! tab[15]=a1^a2^a4^a8
+
+	sllx	@i[0],62,$a1
+	 sllx	$b,3,@i[0]
+	srlx	@i[1],3,@T[1]
+	 and	@i[0],`0xf<<3`,@i[0]
+	sllx	@i[1],61,$a2
+	 ldx	[$tab+@i[0]],@i[0]
+	 srlx	$b,4-3,@i[1]
+	xor	@T[0],$hi,$hi
+	 and	@i[1],`0xf<<3`,@i[1]
+	xor	$a1,$lo,$lo
+	 ldx	[$tab+@i[1]],@i[1]
+	xor	@T[1],$hi,$hi
+
+	xor	@i[0],$lo,$lo
+	srlx	$b,8-3,@i[0]
+	 xor	$a2,$lo,$lo
+	and	@i[0],`0xf<<3`,@i[0]
+___
+for($n=1;$n<14;$n++) {
+$code.=<<___;
+	sllx	@i[1],`$n*4`,@T[0]
+	ldx	[$tab+@i[0]],@i[0]
+	srlx	@i[1],`64-$n*4`,@T[1]
+	xor	@T[0],$lo,$lo
+	srlx	$b,`($n+2)*4`-3,@i[1]
+	xor	@T[1],$hi,$hi
+	and	@i[1],`0xf<<3`,@i[1]
+___
+	push(@i,shift(@i)); push(@T,shift(@T));
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	sllx	@i[1],`$n*4`,@T[0]
+	ldx	[$tab+@i[0]],@i[0]
+	srlx	@i[1],`64-$n*4`,@T[1]
+	xor	@T[0],$lo,$lo
+
+	sllx	@i[0],`($n+1)*4`,@T[0]
+	 xor	@T[1],$hi,$hi
+	srlx	@i[0],`64-($n+1)*4`,@T[1]
+	xor	@T[0],$lo,$lo
+	xor	@T[1],$hi,$hi
+
+	srlx	$lo,32,%i1
+	st	$lo,[%i0+0]
+	st	%i1,[%i0+4]
+	srlx	$hi,32,%i2
+	st	$hi,[%i0+8]
+	st	%i2,[%i0+12]
+
+	ret
+	restore
+.type	bn_GF2m_mul_2x2,#function
+.size	bn_GF2m_mul_2x2,.-bn_GF2m_mul_2x2
+.asciz	"GF(2^m) Multiplication for SPARCv9, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+.align	4
+___
+
+$code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval($1)/gem;
+print $code;
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/sparcv9-mont.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/sparcv9-mont.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6807c8b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/sparcv9-mont.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,619 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+
+# December 2005
+#
+# Pure SPARCv9/8+ and IALU-only bn_mul_mont implementation. The reasons
+# for undertaken effort are multiple. First of all, UltraSPARC is not
+# the whole SPARCv9 universe and other VIS-free implementations deserve
+# optimized code as much. Secondly, newly introduced UltraSPARC T1,
+# a.k.a. Niagara, has shared FPU and concurrent FPU-intensive paths,
+# such as sparcv9a-mont, will simply sink it. Yes, T1 is equipped with
+# several integrated RSA/DSA accelerator circuits accessible through
+# kernel driver [only(*)], but having decent user-land software
+# implementation is important too. Finally, reasons like desire to
+# experiment with dedicated squaring procedure. Yes, this module
+# implements one, because it was easiest to draft it in SPARCv9
+# instructions...
+
+# (*)	Engine accessing the driver in question is on my TODO list.
+#	For reference, accelerator is estimated to give 6 to 10 times
+#	improvement on single-threaded RSA sign. It should be noted
+#	that 6-10x improvement coefficient does not actually mean
+#	something extraordinary in terms of absolute [single-threaded]
+#	performance, as SPARCv9 instruction set is by all means least
+#	suitable for high performance crypto among other 64 bit
+#	platforms. 6-10x factor simply places T1 in same performance
+#	domain as say AMD64 and IA-64. Improvement of RSA verify don't
+#	appear impressive at all, but it's the sign operation which is
+#	far more critical/interesting.
+
+# You might notice that inner loops are modulo-scheduled:-) This has
+# essentially negligible impact on UltraSPARC performance, it's
+# Fujitsu SPARC64 V users who should notice and hopefully appreciate
+# the advantage... Currently this module surpasses sparcv9a-mont.pl
+# by ~20% on UltraSPARC-III and later cores, but recall that sparcv9a
+# module still have hidden potential [see TODO list there], which is
+# estimated to be larger than 20%...
+
+$output = pop;
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+# int bn_mul_mont(
+$rp="%i0";	# BN_ULONG *rp,
+$ap="%i1";	# const BN_ULONG *ap,
+$bp="%i2";	# const BN_ULONG *bp,
+$np="%i3";	# const BN_ULONG *np,
+$n0="%i4";	# const BN_ULONG *n0,
+$num="%i5";	# int num);
+
+$frame="STACK_FRAME";
+$bias="STACK_BIAS";
+
+$car0="%o0";
+$car1="%o1";
+$car2="%o2";	# 1 bit
+$acc0="%o3";
+$acc1="%o4";
+$mask="%g1";	# 32 bits, what a waste...
+$tmp0="%g4";
+$tmp1="%g5";
+
+$i="%l0";
+$j="%l1";
+$mul0="%l2";
+$mul1="%l3";
+$tp="%l4";
+$apj="%l5";
+$npj="%l6";
+$tpj="%l7";
+
+$fname="bn_mul_mont_int";
+
+$code=<<___;
+#include "sparc_arch.h"
+
+.section	".text",#alloc,#execinstr
+
+.global	$fname
+.align	32
+$fname:
+	cmp	%o5,4			! 128 bits minimum
+	bge,pt	%icc,.Lenter
+	sethi	%hi(0xffffffff),$mask
+	retl
+	clr	%o0
+.align	32
+.Lenter:
+	save	%sp,-$frame,%sp
+	sll	$num,2,$num		! num*=4
+	or	$mask,%lo(0xffffffff),$mask
+	ld	[$n0],$n0
+	cmp	$ap,$bp
+	and	$num,$mask,$num
+	ld	[$bp],$mul0		! bp[0]
+	nop
+
+	add	%sp,$bias,%o7		! real top of stack
+	ld	[$ap],$car0		! ap[0] ! redundant in squaring context
+	sub	%o7,$num,%o7
+	ld	[$ap+4],$apj		! ap[1]
+	and	%o7,-1024,%o7
+	ld	[$np],$car1		! np[0]
+	sub	%o7,$bias,%sp		! alloca
+	ld	[$np+4],$npj		! np[1]
+	be,pt	SIZE_T_CC,.Lbn_sqr_mont
+	mov	12,$j
+
+	mulx	$car0,$mul0,$car0	! ap[0]*bp[0]
+	mulx	$apj,$mul0,$tmp0	!prologue! ap[1]*bp[0]
+	and	$car0,$mask,$acc0
+	add	%sp,$bias+$frame,$tp
+	ld	[$ap+8],$apj		!prologue!
+
+	mulx	$n0,$acc0,$mul1		! "t[0]"*n0
+	and	$mul1,$mask,$mul1
+
+	mulx	$car1,$mul1,$car1	! np[0]*"t[0]"*n0
+	mulx	$npj,$mul1,$acc1	!prologue! np[1]*"t[0]"*n0
+	srlx	$car0,32,$car0
+	add	$acc0,$car1,$car1
+	ld	[$np+8],$npj		!prologue!
+	srlx	$car1,32,$car1
+	mov	$tmp0,$acc0		!prologue!
+
+.L1st:
+	mulx	$apj,$mul0,$tmp0
+	mulx	$npj,$mul1,$tmp1
+	add	$acc0,$car0,$car0
+	ld	[$ap+$j],$apj		! ap[j]
+	and	$car0,$mask,$acc0
+	add	$acc1,$car1,$car1
+	ld	[$np+$j],$npj		! np[j]
+	srlx	$car0,32,$car0
+	add	$acc0,$car1,$car1
+	add	$j,4,$j			! j++
+	mov	$tmp0,$acc0
+	st	$car1,[$tp]
+	cmp	$j,$num
+	mov	$tmp1,$acc1
+	srlx	$car1,32,$car1
+	bl	%icc,.L1st
+	add	$tp,4,$tp		! tp++
+!.L1st
+
+	mulx	$apj,$mul0,$tmp0	!epilogue!
+	mulx	$npj,$mul1,$tmp1
+	add	$acc0,$car0,$car0
+	and	$car0,$mask,$acc0
+	add	$acc1,$car1,$car1
+	srlx	$car0,32,$car0
+	add	$acc0,$car1,$car1
+	st	$car1,[$tp]
+	srlx	$car1,32,$car1
+
+	add	$tmp0,$car0,$car0
+	and	$car0,$mask,$acc0
+	add	$tmp1,$car1,$car1
+	srlx	$car0,32,$car0
+	add	$acc0,$car1,$car1
+	st	$car1,[$tp+4]
+	srlx	$car1,32,$car1
+
+	add	$car0,$car1,$car1
+	st	$car1,[$tp+8]
+	srlx	$car1,32,$car2
+
+	mov	4,$i			! i++
+	ld	[$bp+4],$mul0		! bp[1]
+.Louter:
+	add	%sp,$bias+$frame,$tp
+	ld	[$ap],$car0		! ap[0]
+	ld	[$ap+4],$apj		! ap[1]
+	ld	[$np],$car1		! np[0]
+	ld	[$np+4],$npj		! np[1]
+	ld	[$tp],$tmp1		! tp[0]
+	ld	[$tp+4],$tpj		! tp[1]
+	mov	12,$j
+
+	mulx	$car0,$mul0,$car0
+	mulx	$apj,$mul0,$tmp0	!prologue!
+	add	$tmp1,$car0,$car0
+	ld	[$ap+8],$apj		!prologue!
+	and	$car0,$mask,$acc0
+
+	mulx	$n0,$acc0,$mul1
+	and	$mul1,$mask,$mul1
+
+	mulx	$car1,$mul1,$car1
+	mulx	$npj,$mul1,$acc1	!prologue!
+	srlx	$car0,32,$car0
+	add	$acc0,$car1,$car1
+	ld	[$np+8],$npj		!prologue!
+	srlx	$car1,32,$car1
+	mov	$tmp0,$acc0		!prologue!
+
+.Linner:
+	mulx	$apj,$mul0,$tmp0
+	mulx	$npj,$mul1,$tmp1
+	add	$tpj,$car0,$car0
+	ld	[$ap+$j],$apj		! ap[j]
+	add	$acc0,$car0,$car0
+	add	$acc1,$car1,$car1
+	ld	[$np+$j],$npj		! np[j]
+	and	$car0,$mask,$acc0
+	ld	[$tp+8],$tpj		! tp[j]
+	srlx	$car0,32,$car0
+	add	$acc0,$car1,$car1
+	add	$j,4,$j			! j++
+	mov	$tmp0,$acc0
+	st	$car1,[$tp]		! tp[j-1]
+	srlx	$car1,32,$car1
+	mov	$tmp1,$acc1
+	cmp	$j,$num
+	bl	%icc,.Linner
+	add	$tp,4,$tp		! tp++
+!.Linner
+
+	mulx	$apj,$mul0,$tmp0	!epilogue!
+	mulx	$npj,$mul1,$tmp1
+	add	$tpj,$car0,$car0
+	add	$acc0,$car0,$car0
+	ld	[$tp+8],$tpj		! tp[j]
+	and	$car0,$mask,$acc0
+	add	$acc1,$car1,$car1
+	srlx	$car0,32,$car0
+	add	$acc0,$car1,$car1
+	st	$car1,[$tp]		! tp[j-1]
+	srlx	$car1,32,$car1
+
+	add	$tpj,$car0,$car0
+	add	$tmp0,$car0,$car0
+	and	$car0,$mask,$acc0
+	add	$tmp1,$car1,$car1
+	add	$acc0,$car1,$car1
+	st	$car1,[$tp+4]		! tp[j-1]
+	srlx	$car0,32,$car0
+	add	$i,4,$i			! i++
+	srlx	$car1,32,$car1
+
+	add	$car0,$car1,$car1
+	cmp	$i,$num
+	add	$car2,$car1,$car1
+	st	$car1,[$tp+8]
+
+	srlx	$car1,32,$car2
+	bl,a	%icc,.Louter
+	ld	[$bp+$i],$mul0		! bp[i]
+!.Louter
+
+	add	$tp,12,$tp
+
+.Ltail:
+	add	$np,$num,$np
+	add	$rp,$num,$rp
+	mov	$tp,$ap
+	sub	%g0,$num,%o7		! k=-num
+	ba	.Lsub
+	subcc	%g0,%g0,%g0		! clear %icc.c
+.align	16
+.Lsub:
+	ld	[$tp+%o7],%o0
+	ld	[$np+%o7],%o1
+	subccc	%o0,%o1,%o1		! tp[j]-np[j]
+	add	$rp,%o7,$i
+	add	%o7,4,%o7
+	brnz	%o7,.Lsub
+	st	%o1,[$i]
+	subc	$car2,0,$car2		! handle upmost overflow bit
+	and	$tp,$car2,$ap
+	andn	$rp,$car2,$np
+	or	$ap,$np,$ap
+	sub	%g0,$num,%o7
+
+.Lcopy:
+	ld	[$ap+%o7],%o0		! copy or in-place refresh
+	st	%g0,[$tp+%o7]		! zap tp
+	st	%o0,[$rp+%o7]
+	add	%o7,4,%o7
+	brnz	%o7,.Lcopy
+	nop
+	mov	1,%i0
+	ret
+	restore
+___
+
+########
+######## .Lbn_sqr_mont gives up to 20% *overall* improvement over
+######## code without following dedicated squaring procedure.
+########
+$sbit="%o5";
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.align	32
+.Lbn_sqr_mont:
+	mulx	$mul0,$mul0,$car0		! ap[0]*ap[0]
+	mulx	$apj,$mul0,$tmp0		!prologue!
+	and	$car0,$mask,$acc0
+	add	%sp,$bias+$frame,$tp
+	ld	[$ap+8],$apj			!prologue!
+
+	mulx	$n0,$acc0,$mul1			! "t[0]"*n0
+	srlx	$car0,32,$car0
+	and	$mul1,$mask,$mul1
+
+	mulx	$car1,$mul1,$car1		! np[0]*"t[0]"*n0
+	mulx	$npj,$mul1,$acc1		!prologue!
+	and	$car0,1,$sbit
+	ld	[$np+8],$npj			!prologue!
+	srlx	$car0,1,$car0
+	add	$acc0,$car1,$car1
+	srlx	$car1,32,$car1
+	mov	$tmp0,$acc0			!prologue!
+
+.Lsqr_1st:
+	mulx	$apj,$mul0,$tmp0
+	mulx	$npj,$mul1,$tmp1
+	add	$acc0,$car0,$car0		! ap[j]*a0+c0
+	add	$acc1,$car1,$car1
+	ld	[$ap+$j],$apj			! ap[j]
+	and	$car0,$mask,$acc0
+	ld	[$np+$j],$npj			! np[j]
+	srlx	$car0,32,$car0
+	add	$acc0,$acc0,$acc0
+	or	$sbit,$acc0,$acc0
+	mov	$tmp1,$acc1
+	srlx	$acc0,32,$sbit
+	add	$j,4,$j				! j++
+	and	$acc0,$mask,$acc0
+	cmp	$j,$num
+	add	$acc0,$car1,$car1
+	st	$car1,[$tp]
+	mov	$tmp0,$acc0
+	srlx	$car1,32,$car1
+	bl	%icc,.Lsqr_1st
+	add	$tp,4,$tp			! tp++
+!.Lsqr_1st
+
+	mulx	$apj,$mul0,$tmp0		! epilogue
+	mulx	$npj,$mul1,$tmp1
+	add	$acc0,$car0,$car0		! ap[j]*a0+c0
+	add	$acc1,$car1,$car1
+	and	$car0,$mask,$acc0
+	srlx	$car0,32,$car0
+	add	$acc0,$acc0,$acc0
+	or	$sbit,$acc0,$acc0
+	srlx	$acc0,32,$sbit
+	and	$acc0,$mask,$acc0
+	add	$acc0,$car1,$car1
+	st	$car1,[$tp]
+	srlx	$car1,32,$car1
+
+	add	$tmp0,$car0,$car0		! ap[j]*a0+c0
+	add	$tmp1,$car1,$car1
+	and	$car0,$mask,$acc0
+	srlx	$car0,32,$car0
+	add	$acc0,$acc0,$acc0
+	or	$sbit,$acc0,$acc0
+	srlx	$acc0,32,$sbit
+	and	$acc0,$mask,$acc0
+	add	$acc0,$car1,$car1
+	st	$car1,[$tp+4]
+	srlx	$car1,32,$car1
+
+	add	$car0,$car0,$car0
+	or	$sbit,$car0,$car0
+	add	$car0,$car1,$car1
+	st	$car1,[$tp+8]
+	srlx	$car1,32,$car2
+
+	ld	[%sp+$bias+$frame],$tmp0	! tp[0]
+	ld	[%sp+$bias+$frame+4],$tmp1	! tp[1]
+	ld	[%sp+$bias+$frame+8],$tpj	! tp[2]
+	ld	[$ap+4],$mul0			! ap[1]
+	ld	[$ap+8],$apj			! ap[2]
+	ld	[$np],$car1			! np[0]
+	ld	[$np+4],$npj			! np[1]
+	mulx	$n0,$tmp0,$mul1
+
+	mulx	$mul0,$mul0,$car0
+	and	$mul1,$mask,$mul1
+
+	mulx	$car1,$mul1,$car1
+	mulx	$npj,$mul1,$acc1
+	add	$tmp0,$car1,$car1
+	and	$car0,$mask,$acc0
+	ld	[$np+8],$npj			! np[2]
+	srlx	$car1,32,$car1
+	add	$tmp1,$car1,$car1
+	srlx	$car0,32,$car0
+	add	$acc0,$car1,$car1
+	and	$car0,1,$sbit
+	add	$acc1,$car1,$car1
+	srlx	$car0,1,$car0
+	mov	12,$j
+	st	$car1,[%sp+$bias+$frame]	! tp[0]=
+	srlx	$car1,32,$car1
+	add	%sp,$bias+$frame+4,$tp
+
+.Lsqr_2nd:
+	mulx	$apj,$mul0,$acc0
+	mulx	$npj,$mul1,$acc1
+	add	$acc0,$car0,$car0
+	add	$tpj,$sbit,$sbit
+	ld	[$ap+$j],$apj			! ap[j]
+	and	$car0,$mask,$acc0
+	ld	[$np+$j],$npj			! np[j]
+	srlx	$car0,32,$car0
+	add	$acc1,$car1,$car1
+	ld	[$tp+8],$tpj			! tp[j]
+	add	$acc0,$acc0,$acc0
+	add	$j,4,$j				! j++
+	add	$sbit,$acc0,$acc0
+	srlx	$acc0,32,$sbit
+	and	$acc0,$mask,$acc0
+	cmp	$j,$num
+	add	$acc0,$car1,$car1
+	st	$car1,[$tp]			! tp[j-1]
+	srlx	$car1,32,$car1
+	bl	%icc,.Lsqr_2nd
+	add	$tp,4,$tp			! tp++
+!.Lsqr_2nd
+
+	mulx	$apj,$mul0,$acc0
+	mulx	$npj,$mul1,$acc1
+	add	$acc0,$car0,$car0
+	add	$tpj,$sbit,$sbit
+	and	$car0,$mask,$acc0
+	srlx	$car0,32,$car0
+	add	$acc1,$car1,$car1
+	add	$acc0,$acc0,$acc0
+	add	$sbit,$acc0,$acc0
+	srlx	$acc0,32,$sbit
+	and	$acc0,$mask,$acc0
+	add	$acc0,$car1,$car1
+	st	$car1,[$tp]			! tp[j-1]
+	srlx	$car1,32,$car1
+
+	add	$car0,$car0,$car0
+	add	$sbit,$car0,$car0
+	add	$car0,$car1,$car1
+	add	$car2,$car1,$car1
+	st	$car1,[$tp+4]
+	srlx	$car1,32,$car2
+
+	ld	[%sp+$bias+$frame],$tmp1	! tp[0]
+	ld	[%sp+$bias+$frame+4],$tpj	! tp[1]
+	ld	[$ap+8],$mul0			! ap[2]
+	ld	[$np],$car1			! np[0]
+	ld	[$np+4],$npj			! np[1]
+	mulx	$n0,$tmp1,$mul1
+	and	$mul1,$mask,$mul1
+	mov	8,$i
+
+	mulx	$mul0,$mul0,$car0
+	mulx	$car1,$mul1,$car1
+	and	$car0,$mask,$acc0
+	add	$tmp1,$car1,$car1
+	srlx	$car0,32,$car0
+	add	%sp,$bias+$frame,$tp
+	srlx	$car1,32,$car1
+	and	$car0,1,$sbit
+	srlx	$car0,1,$car0
+	mov	4,$j
+
+.Lsqr_outer:
+.Lsqr_inner1:
+	mulx	$npj,$mul1,$acc1
+	add	$tpj,$car1,$car1
+	add	$j,4,$j
+	ld	[$tp+8],$tpj
+	cmp	$j,$i
+	add	$acc1,$car1,$car1
+	ld	[$np+$j],$npj
+	st	$car1,[$tp]
+	srlx	$car1,32,$car1
+	bl	%icc,.Lsqr_inner1
+	add	$tp,4,$tp
+!.Lsqr_inner1
+
+	add	$j,4,$j
+	ld	[$ap+$j],$apj			! ap[j]
+	mulx	$npj,$mul1,$acc1
+	add	$tpj,$car1,$car1
+	ld	[$np+$j],$npj			! np[j]
+	add	$acc0,$car1,$car1
+	ld	[$tp+8],$tpj			! tp[j]
+	add	$acc1,$car1,$car1
+	st	$car1,[$tp]
+	srlx	$car1,32,$car1
+
+	add	$j,4,$j
+	cmp	$j,$num
+	be,pn	%icc,.Lsqr_no_inner2
+	add	$tp,4,$tp
+
+.Lsqr_inner2:
+	mulx	$apj,$mul0,$acc0
+	mulx	$npj,$mul1,$acc1
+	add	$tpj,$sbit,$sbit
+	add	$acc0,$car0,$car0
+	ld	[$ap+$j],$apj			! ap[j]
+	and	$car0,$mask,$acc0
+	ld	[$np+$j],$npj			! np[j]
+	srlx	$car0,32,$car0
+	add	$acc0,$acc0,$acc0
+	ld	[$tp+8],$tpj			! tp[j]
+	add	$sbit,$acc0,$acc0
+	add	$j,4,$j				! j++
+	srlx	$acc0,32,$sbit
+	and	$acc0,$mask,$acc0
+	cmp	$j,$num
+	add	$acc0,$car1,$car1
+	add	$acc1,$car1,$car1
+	st	$car1,[$tp]			! tp[j-1]
+	srlx	$car1,32,$car1
+	bl	%icc,.Lsqr_inner2
+	add	$tp,4,$tp			! tp++
+
+.Lsqr_no_inner2:
+	mulx	$apj,$mul0,$acc0
+	mulx	$npj,$mul1,$acc1
+	add	$tpj,$sbit,$sbit
+	add	$acc0,$car0,$car0
+	and	$car0,$mask,$acc0
+	srlx	$car0,32,$car0
+	add	$acc0,$acc0,$acc0
+	add	$sbit,$acc0,$acc0
+	srlx	$acc0,32,$sbit
+	and	$acc0,$mask,$acc0
+	add	$acc0,$car1,$car1
+	add	$acc1,$car1,$car1
+	st	$car1,[$tp]			! tp[j-1]
+	srlx	$car1,32,$car1
+
+	add	$car0,$car0,$car0
+	add	$sbit,$car0,$car0
+	add	$car0,$car1,$car1
+	add	$car2,$car1,$car1
+	st	$car1,[$tp+4]
+	srlx	$car1,32,$car2
+
+	add	$i,4,$i				! i++
+	ld	[%sp+$bias+$frame],$tmp1	! tp[0]
+	ld	[%sp+$bias+$frame+4],$tpj	! tp[1]
+	ld	[$ap+$i],$mul0			! ap[j]
+	ld	[$np],$car1			! np[0]
+	ld	[$np+4],$npj			! np[1]
+	mulx	$n0,$tmp1,$mul1
+	and	$mul1,$mask,$mul1
+	add	$i,4,$tmp0
+
+	mulx	$mul0,$mul0,$car0
+	mulx	$car1,$mul1,$car1
+	and	$car0,$mask,$acc0
+	add	$tmp1,$car1,$car1
+	srlx	$car0,32,$car0
+	add	%sp,$bias+$frame,$tp
+	srlx	$car1,32,$car1
+	and	$car0,1,$sbit
+	srlx	$car0,1,$car0
+
+	cmp	$tmp0,$num			! i<num-1
+	bl	%icc,.Lsqr_outer
+	mov	4,$j
+
+.Lsqr_last:
+	mulx	$npj,$mul1,$acc1
+	add	$tpj,$car1,$car1
+	add	$j,4,$j
+	ld	[$tp+8],$tpj
+	cmp	$j,$i
+	add	$acc1,$car1,$car1
+	ld	[$np+$j],$npj
+	st	$car1,[$tp]
+	srlx	$car1,32,$car1
+	bl	%icc,.Lsqr_last
+	add	$tp,4,$tp
+!.Lsqr_last
+
+	mulx	$npj,$mul1,$acc1
+	add	$tpj,$acc0,$acc0
+	srlx	$acc0,32,$tmp0
+	and	$acc0,$mask,$acc0
+	add	$tmp0,$sbit,$sbit
+	add	$acc0,$car1,$car1
+	add	$acc1,$car1,$car1
+	st	$car1,[$tp]
+	srlx	$car1,32,$car1
+
+	add	$car0,$car0,$car0		! recover $car0
+	add	$sbit,$car0,$car0
+	add	$car0,$car1,$car1
+	add	$car2,$car1,$car1
+	st	$car1,[$tp+4]
+	srlx	$car1,32,$car2
+
+	ba	.Ltail
+	add	$tp,8,$tp
+.type	$fname,#function
+.size	$fname,(.-$fname)
+.asciz	"Montgomery Multipltication for SPARCv9, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+.align	32
+___
+$code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval($1)/gem;
+print $code;
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/sparcv9a-mont.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/sparcv9a-mont.pl
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..50b6906
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/sparcv9a-mont.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,887 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+
+# October 2005
+#
+# "Teaser" Montgomery multiplication module for UltraSPARC. Why FPU?
+# Because unlike integer multiplier, which simply stalls whole CPU,
+# FPU is fully pipelined and can effectively emit 48 bit partial
+# product every cycle. Why not blended SPARC v9? One can argue that
+# making this module dependent on UltraSPARC VIS extension limits its
+# binary compatibility. Well yes, it does exclude SPARC64 prior-V(!)
+# implementations from compatibility matrix. But the rest, whole Sun
+# UltraSPARC family and brand new Fujitsu's SPARC64 V, all support
+# VIS extension instructions used in this module. This is considered
+# good enough to not care about HAL SPARC64 users [if any] who have
+# integer-only pure SPARCv9 module to "fall down" to.
+
+# USI&II cores currently exhibit uniform 2x improvement [over pre-
+# bn_mul_mont codebase] for all key lengths and benchmarks. On USIII
+# performance improves few percents for shorter keys and worsens few
+# percents for longer keys. This is because USIII integer multiplier
+# is >3x faster than USI&II one, which is harder to match [but see
+# TODO list below]. It should also be noted that SPARC64 V features
+# out-of-order execution, which *might* mean that integer multiplier
+# is pipelined, which in turn *might* be impossible to match... On
+# additional note, SPARC64 V implements FP Multiply-Add instruction,
+# which is perfectly usable in this context... In other words, as far
+# as Fujitsu SPARC64 V goes, talk to the author:-)
+
+# The implementation implies following "non-natural" limitations on
+# input arguments:
+# - num may not be less than 4;
+# - num has to be even;
+# Failure to meet either condition has no fatal effects, simply
+# doesn't give any performance gain.
+
+# TODO:
+# - modulo-schedule inner loop for better performance (on in-order
+#   execution core such as UltraSPARC this shall result in further
+#   noticeable(!) improvement);
+# - dedicated squaring procedure[?];
+
+######################################################################
+# November 2006
+#
+# Modulo-scheduled inner loops allow to interleave floating point and
+# integer instructions and minimize Read-After-Write penalties. This
+# results in *further* 20-50% performance improvement [depending on
+# key length, more for longer keys] on USI&II cores and 30-80% - on
+# USIII&IV.
+
+$output = pop;
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+$fname="bn_mul_mont_fpu";
+
+$frame="STACK_FRAME";
+$bias="STACK_BIAS";
+$locals=64;
+
+# In order to provide for 32-/64-bit ABI duality, I keep integers wider
+# than 32 bit in %g1-%g4 and %o0-%o5. %l0-%l7 and %i0-%i5 are used
+# exclusively for pointers, indexes and other small values...
+# int bn_mul_mont(
+$rp="%i0";	# BN_ULONG *rp,
+$ap="%i1";	# const BN_ULONG *ap,
+$bp="%i2";	# const BN_ULONG *bp,
+$np="%i3";	# const BN_ULONG *np,
+$n0="%i4";	# const BN_ULONG *n0,
+$num="%i5";	# int num);
+
+$tp="%l0";	# t[num]
+$ap_l="%l1";	# a[num],n[num] are smashed to 32-bit words and saved
+$ap_h="%l2";	# to these four vectors as double-precision FP values.
+$np_l="%l3";	# This way a bunch of fxtods are eliminated in second
+$np_h="%l4";	# loop and L1-cache aliasing is minimized...
+$i="%l5";
+$j="%l6";
+$mask="%l7";	# 16-bit mask, 0xffff
+
+$n0="%g4";	# reassigned(!) to "64-bit" register
+$carry="%i4";	# %i4 reused(!) for a carry bit
+
+# FP register naming chart
+#
+#     ..HILO
+#       dcba
+#   --------
+#        LOa
+#       LOb
+#      LOc
+#     LOd
+#      HIa
+#     HIb
+#    HIc
+#   HId
+#    ..a
+#   ..b
+$ba="%f0";    $bb="%f2";    $bc="%f4";    $bd="%f6";
+$na="%f8";    $nb="%f10";   $nc="%f12";   $nd="%f14";
+$alo="%f16";  $alo_="%f17"; $ahi="%f18";  $ahi_="%f19";
+$nlo="%f20";  $nlo_="%f21"; $nhi="%f22";  $nhi_="%f23";
+
+$dota="%f24"; $dotb="%f26";
+
+$aloa="%f32"; $alob="%f34"; $aloc="%f36"; $alod="%f38";
+$ahia="%f40"; $ahib="%f42"; $ahic="%f44"; $ahid="%f46";
+$nloa="%f48"; $nlob="%f50"; $nloc="%f52"; $nlod="%f54";
+$nhia="%f56"; $nhib="%f58"; $nhic="%f60"; $nhid="%f62";
+
+$ASI_FL16_P=0xD2;	# magic ASI value to engage 16-bit FP load
+
+$code=<<___;
+#include "sparc_arch.h"
+
+.section	".text",#alloc,#execinstr
+
+.global $fname
+.align  32
+$fname:
+	save	%sp,-$frame-$locals,%sp
+
+	cmp	$num,4
+	bl,a,pn %icc,.Lret
+	clr	%i0
+	andcc	$num,1,%g0		! $num has to be even...
+	bnz,a,pn %icc,.Lret
+	clr	%i0			! signal "unsupported input value"
+
+	srl	$num,1,$num
+	sethi	%hi(0xffff),$mask
+	ld	[%i4+0],$n0		! $n0 reassigned, remember?
+	or	$mask,%lo(0xffff),$mask
+	ld	[%i4+4],%o0
+	sllx	%o0,32,%o0
+	or	%o0,$n0,$n0		! $n0=n0[1].n0[0]
+
+	sll	$num,3,$num		! num*=8
+
+	add	%sp,$bias,%o0		! real top of stack
+	sll	$num,2,%o1
+	add	%o1,$num,%o1		! %o1=num*5
+	sub	%o0,%o1,%o0
+	and	%o0,-2048,%o0		! optimize TLB utilization
+	sub	%o0,$bias,%sp		! alloca(5*num*8)
+
+	rd	%asi,%o7		! save %asi
+	add	%sp,$bias+$frame+$locals,$tp
+	add	$tp,$num,$ap_l
+	add	$ap_l,$num,$ap_l	! [an]p_[lh] point at the vectors' ends !
+	add	$ap_l,$num,$ap_h
+	add	$ap_h,$num,$np_l
+	add	$np_l,$num,$np_h
+
+	wr	%g0,$ASI_FL16_P,%asi	! setup %asi for 16-bit FP loads
+
+	add	$rp,$num,$rp		! readjust input pointers to point
+	add	$ap,$num,$ap		! at the ends too...
+	add	$bp,$num,$bp
+	add	$np,$num,$np
+
+	stx	%o7,[%sp+$bias+$frame+48]	! save %asi
+
+	sub	%g0,$num,$i		! i=-num
+	sub	%g0,$num,$j		! j=-num
+
+	add	$ap,$j,%o3
+	add	$bp,$i,%o4
+
+	ld	[%o3+4],%g1		! bp[0]
+	ld	[%o3+0],%o0
+	ld	[%o4+4],%g5		! ap[0]
+	sllx	%g1,32,%g1
+	ld	[%o4+0],%o1
+	sllx	%g5,32,%g5
+	or	%g1,%o0,%o0
+	or	%g5,%o1,%o1
+
+	add	$np,$j,%o5
+
+	mulx	%o1,%o0,%o0		! ap[0]*bp[0]
+	mulx	$n0,%o0,%o0		! ap[0]*bp[0]*n0
+	stx	%o0,[%sp+$bias+$frame+0]
+
+	ld	[%o3+0],$alo_	! load a[j] as pair of 32-bit words
+	fzeros	$alo
+	ld	[%o3+4],$ahi_
+	fzeros	$ahi
+	ld	[%o5+0],$nlo_	! load n[j] as pair of 32-bit words
+	fzeros	$nlo
+	ld	[%o5+4],$nhi_
+	fzeros	$nhi
+
+	! transfer b[i] to FPU as 4x16-bit values
+	ldda	[%o4+2]%asi,$ba
+	fxtod	$alo,$alo
+	ldda	[%o4+0]%asi,$bb
+	fxtod	$ahi,$ahi
+	ldda	[%o4+6]%asi,$bc
+	fxtod	$nlo,$nlo
+	ldda	[%o4+4]%asi,$bd
+	fxtod	$nhi,$nhi
+
+	! transfer ap[0]*b[0]*n0 to FPU as 4x16-bit values
+	ldda	[%sp+$bias+$frame+6]%asi,$na
+	fxtod	$ba,$ba
+	ldda	[%sp+$bias+$frame+4]%asi,$nb
+	fxtod	$bb,$bb
+	ldda	[%sp+$bias+$frame+2]%asi,$nc
+	fxtod	$bc,$bc
+	ldda	[%sp+$bias+$frame+0]%asi,$nd
+	fxtod	$bd,$bd
+
+	std	$alo,[$ap_l+$j]		! save smashed ap[j] in double format
+	fxtod	$na,$na
+	std	$ahi,[$ap_h+$j]
+	fxtod	$nb,$nb
+	std	$nlo,[$np_l+$j]		! save smashed np[j] in double format
+	fxtod	$nc,$nc
+	std	$nhi,[$np_h+$j]
+	fxtod	$nd,$nd
+
+		fmuld	$alo,$ba,$aloa
+		fmuld	$nlo,$na,$nloa
+		fmuld	$alo,$bb,$alob
+		fmuld	$nlo,$nb,$nlob
+		fmuld	$alo,$bc,$aloc
+	faddd	$aloa,$nloa,$nloa
+		fmuld	$nlo,$nc,$nloc
+		fmuld	$alo,$bd,$alod
+	faddd	$alob,$nlob,$nlob
+		fmuld	$nlo,$nd,$nlod
+		fmuld	$ahi,$ba,$ahia
+	faddd	$aloc,$nloc,$nloc
+		fmuld	$nhi,$na,$nhia
+		fmuld	$ahi,$bb,$ahib
+	faddd	$alod,$nlod,$nlod
+		fmuld	$nhi,$nb,$nhib
+		fmuld	$ahi,$bc,$ahic
+	faddd	$ahia,$nhia,$nhia
+		fmuld	$nhi,$nc,$nhic
+		fmuld	$ahi,$bd,$ahid
+	faddd	$ahib,$nhib,$nhib
+		fmuld	$nhi,$nd,$nhid
+
+	faddd	$ahic,$nhic,$dota	! $nhic
+	faddd	$ahid,$nhid,$dotb	! $nhid
+
+	faddd	$nloc,$nhia,$nloc
+	faddd	$nlod,$nhib,$nlod
+
+	fdtox	$nloa,$nloa
+	fdtox	$nlob,$nlob
+	fdtox	$nloc,$nloc
+	fdtox	$nlod,$nlod
+
+	std	$nloa,[%sp+$bias+$frame+0]
+	add	$j,8,$j
+	std	$nlob,[%sp+$bias+$frame+8]
+	add	$ap,$j,%o4
+	std	$nloc,[%sp+$bias+$frame+16]
+	add	$np,$j,%o5
+	std	$nlod,[%sp+$bias+$frame+24]
+
+	ld	[%o4+0],$alo_	! load a[j] as pair of 32-bit words
+	fzeros	$alo
+	ld	[%o4+4],$ahi_
+	fzeros	$ahi
+	ld	[%o5+0],$nlo_	! load n[j] as pair of 32-bit words
+	fzeros	$nlo
+	ld	[%o5+4],$nhi_
+	fzeros	$nhi
+
+	fxtod	$alo,$alo
+	fxtod	$ahi,$ahi
+	fxtod	$nlo,$nlo
+	fxtod	$nhi,$nhi
+
+	ldx	[%sp+$bias+$frame+0],%o0
+		fmuld	$alo,$ba,$aloa
+	ldx	[%sp+$bias+$frame+8],%o1
+		fmuld	$nlo,$na,$nloa
+	ldx	[%sp+$bias+$frame+16],%o2
+		fmuld	$alo,$bb,$alob
+	ldx	[%sp+$bias+$frame+24],%o3
+		fmuld	$nlo,$nb,$nlob
+
+	srlx	%o0,16,%o7
+	std	$alo,[$ap_l+$j]		! save smashed ap[j] in double format
+		fmuld	$alo,$bc,$aloc
+	add	%o7,%o1,%o1
+	std	$ahi,[$ap_h+$j]
+		faddd	$aloa,$nloa,$nloa
+		fmuld	$nlo,$nc,$nloc
+	srlx	%o1,16,%o7
+	std	$nlo,[$np_l+$j]		! save smashed np[j] in double format
+		fmuld	$alo,$bd,$alod
+	add	%o7,%o2,%o2
+	std	$nhi,[$np_h+$j]
+		faddd	$alob,$nlob,$nlob
+		fmuld	$nlo,$nd,$nlod
+	srlx	%o2,16,%o7
+		fmuld	$ahi,$ba,$ahia
+	add	%o7,%o3,%o3		! %o3.%o2[0..15].%o1[0..15].%o0[0..15]
+		faddd	$aloc,$nloc,$nloc
+		fmuld	$nhi,$na,$nhia
+	!and	%o0,$mask,%o0
+	!and	%o1,$mask,%o1
+	!and	%o2,$mask,%o2
+	!sllx	%o1,16,%o1
+	!sllx	%o2,32,%o2
+	!sllx	%o3,48,%o7
+	!or	%o1,%o0,%o0
+	!or	%o2,%o0,%o0
+	!or	%o7,%o0,%o0		! 64-bit result
+	srlx	%o3,16,%g1		! 34-bit carry
+		fmuld	$ahi,$bb,$ahib
+
+	faddd	$alod,$nlod,$nlod
+		fmuld	$nhi,$nb,$nhib
+		fmuld	$ahi,$bc,$ahic
+	faddd	$ahia,$nhia,$nhia
+		fmuld	$nhi,$nc,$nhic
+		fmuld	$ahi,$bd,$ahid
+	faddd	$ahib,$nhib,$nhib
+		fmuld	$nhi,$nd,$nhid
+
+	faddd	$dota,$nloa,$nloa
+	faddd	$dotb,$nlob,$nlob
+	faddd	$ahic,$nhic,$dota	! $nhic
+	faddd	$ahid,$nhid,$dotb	! $nhid
+
+	faddd	$nloc,$nhia,$nloc
+	faddd	$nlod,$nhib,$nlod
+
+	fdtox	$nloa,$nloa
+	fdtox	$nlob,$nlob
+	fdtox	$nloc,$nloc
+	fdtox	$nlod,$nlod
+
+	std	$nloa,[%sp+$bias+$frame+0]
+	std	$nlob,[%sp+$bias+$frame+8]
+	addcc	$j,8,$j
+	std	$nloc,[%sp+$bias+$frame+16]
+	bz,pn	%icc,.L1stskip
+	std	$nlod,[%sp+$bias+$frame+24]
+
+.align	32			! incidentally already aligned !
+.L1st:
+	add	$ap,$j,%o4
+	add	$np,$j,%o5
+	ld	[%o4+0],$alo_	! load a[j] as pair of 32-bit words
+	fzeros	$alo
+	ld	[%o4+4],$ahi_
+	fzeros	$ahi
+	ld	[%o5+0],$nlo_	! load n[j] as pair of 32-bit words
+	fzeros	$nlo
+	ld	[%o5+4],$nhi_
+	fzeros	$nhi
+
+	fxtod	$alo,$alo
+	fxtod	$ahi,$ahi
+	fxtod	$nlo,$nlo
+	fxtod	$nhi,$nhi
+
+	ldx	[%sp+$bias+$frame+0],%o0
+		fmuld	$alo,$ba,$aloa
+	ldx	[%sp+$bias+$frame+8],%o1
+		fmuld	$nlo,$na,$nloa
+	ldx	[%sp+$bias+$frame+16],%o2
+		fmuld	$alo,$bb,$alob
+	ldx	[%sp+$bias+$frame+24],%o3
+		fmuld	$nlo,$nb,$nlob
+
+	srlx	%o0,16,%o7
+	std	$alo,[$ap_l+$j]		! save smashed ap[j] in double format
+		fmuld	$alo,$bc,$aloc
+	add	%o7,%o1,%o1
+	std	$ahi,[$ap_h+$j]
+		faddd	$aloa,$nloa,$nloa
+		fmuld	$nlo,$nc,$nloc
+	srlx	%o1,16,%o7
+	std	$nlo,[$np_l+$j]		! save smashed np[j] in double format
+		fmuld	$alo,$bd,$alod
+	add	%o7,%o2,%o2
+	std	$nhi,[$np_h+$j]
+		faddd	$alob,$nlob,$nlob
+		fmuld	$nlo,$nd,$nlod
+	srlx	%o2,16,%o7
+		fmuld	$ahi,$ba,$ahia
+	add	%o7,%o3,%o3		! %o3.%o2[0..15].%o1[0..15].%o0[0..15]
+	and	%o0,$mask,%o0
+		faddd	$aloc,$nloc,$nloc
+		fmuld	$nhi,$na,$nhia
+	and	%o1,$mask,%o1
+	and	%o2,$mask,%o2
+		fmuld	$ahi,$bb,$ahib
+	sllx	%o1,16,%o1
+		faddd	$alod,$nlod,$nlod
+		fmuld	$nhi,$nb,$nhib
+	sllx	%o2,32,%o2
+		fmuld	$ahi,$bc,$ahic
+	sllx	%o3,48,%o7
+	or	%o1,%o0,%o0
+		faddd	$ahia,$nhia,$nhia
+		fmuld	$nhi,$nc,$nhic
+	or	%o2,%o0,%o0
+		fmuld	$ahi,$bd,$ahid
+	or	%o7,%o0,%o0		! 64-bit result
+		faddd	$ahib,$nhib,$nhib
+		fmuld	$nhi,$nd,$nhid
+	addcc	%g1,%o0,%o0
+		faddd	$dota,$nloa,$nloa
+	srlx	%o3,16,%g1		! 34-bit carry
+		faddd	$dotb,$nlob,$nlob
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	%g1,1,%g1
+
+	stx	%o0,[$tp]		! tp[j-1]=
+
+	faddd	$ahic,$nhic,$dota	! $nhic
+	faddd	$ahid,$nhid,$dotb	! $nhid
+
+	faddd	$nloc,$nhia,$nloc
+	faddd	$nlod,$nhib,$nlod
+
+	fdtox	$nloa,$nloa
+	fdtox	$nlob,$nlob
+	fdtox	$nloc,$nloc
+	fdtox	$nlod,$nlod
+
+	std	$nloa,[%sp+$bias+$frame+0]
+	std	$nlob,[%sp+$bias+$frame+8]
+	std	$nloc,[%sp+$bias+$frame+16]
+	std	$nlod,[%sp+$bias+$frame+24]
+
+	addcc	$j,8,$j
+	bnz,pt	%icc,.L1st
+	add	$tp,8,$tp
+
+.L1stskip:
+	fdtox	$dota,$dota
+	fdtox	$dotb,$dotb
+
+	ldx	[%sp+$bias+$frame+0],%o0
+	ldx	[%sp+$bias+$frame+8],%o1
+	ldx	[%sp+$bias+$frame+16],%o2
+	ldx	[%sp+$bias+$frame+24],%o3
+
+	srlx	%o0,16,%o7
+	std	$dota,[%sp+$bias+$frame+32]
+	add	%o7,%o1,%o1
+	std	$dotb,[%sp+$bias+$frame+40]
+	srlx	%o1,16,%o7
+	add	%o7,%o2,%o2
+	srlx	%o2,16,%o7
+	add	%o7,%o3,%o3		! %o3.%o2[0..15].%o1[0..15].%o0[0..15]
+	and	%o0,$mask,%o0
+	and	%o1,$mask,%o1
+	and	%o2,$mask,%o2
+	sllx	%o1,16,%o1
+	sllx	%o2,32,%o2
+	sllx	%o3,48,%o7
+	or	%o1,%o0,%o0
+	or	%o2,%o0,%o0
+	or	%o7,%o0,%o0		! 64-bit result
+	ldx	[%sp+$bias+$frame+32],%o4
+	addcc	%g1,%o0,%o0
+	ldx	[%sp+$bias+$frame+40],%o5
+	srlx	%o3,16,%g1		! 34-bit carry
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	%g1,1,%g1
+
+	stx	%o0,[$tp]		! tp[j-1]=
+	add	$tp,8,$tp
+
+	srlx	%o4,16,%o7
+	add	%o7,%o5,%o5
+	and	%o4,$mask,%o4
+	sllx	%o5,16,%o7
+	or	%o7,%o4,%o4
+	addcc	%g1,%o4,%o4
+	srlx	%o5,48,%g1
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	%g1,1,%g1
+
+	mov	%g1,$carry
+	stx	%o4,[$tp]		! tp[num-1]=
+
+	ba	.Louter
+	add	$i,8,$i
+.align	32
+.Louter:
+	sub	%g0,$num,$j		! j=-num
+	add	%sp,$bias+$frame+$locals,$tp
+
+	add	$ap,$j,%o3
+	add	$bp,$i,%o4
+
+	ld	[%o3+4],%g1		! bp[i]
+	ld	[%o3+0],%o0
+	ld	[%o4+4],%g5		! ap[0]
+	sllx	%g1,32,%g1
+	ld	[%o4+0],%o1
+	sllx	%g5,32,%g5
+	or	%g1,%o0,%o0
+	or	%g5,%o1,%o1
+
+	ldx	[$tp],%o2		! tp[0]
+	mulx	%o1,%o0,%o0
+	addcc	%o2,%o0,%o0
+	mulx	$n0,%o0,%o0		! (ap[0]*bp[i]+t[0])*n0
+	stx	%o0,[%sp+$bias+$frame+0]
+
+	! transfer b[i] to FPU as 4x16-bit values
+	ldda	[%o4+2]%asi,$ba
+	ldda	[%o4+0]%asi,$bb
+	ldda	[%o4+6]%asi,$bc
+	ldda	[%o4+4]%asi,$bd
+
+	! transfer (ap[0]*b[i]+t[0])*n0 to FPU as 4x16-bit values
+	ldda	[%sp+$bias+$frame+6]%asi,$na
+	fxtod	$ba,$ba
+	ldda	[%sp+$bias+$frame+4]%asi,$nb
+	fxtod	$bb,$bb
+	ldda	[%sp+$bias+$frame+2]%asi,$nc
+	fxtod	$bc,$bc
+	ldda	[%sp+$bias+$frame+0]%asi,$nd
+	fxtod	$bd,$bd
+	ldd	[$ap_l+$j],$alo		! load a[j] in double format
+	fxtod	$na,$na
+	ldd	[$ap_h+$j],$ahi
+	fxtod	$nb,$nb
+	ldd	[$np_l+$j],$nlo		! load n[j] in double format
+	fxtod	$nc,$nc
+	ldd	[$np_h+$j],$nhi
+	fxtod	$nd,$nd
+
+		fmuld	$alo,$ba,$aloa
+		fmuld	$nlo,$na,$nloa
+		fmuld	$alo,$bb,$alob
+		fmuld	$nlo,$nb,$nlob
+		fmuld	$alo,$bc,$aloc
+	faddd	$aloa,$nloa,$nloa
+		fmuld	$nlo,$nc,$nloc
+		fmuld	$alo,$bd,$alod
+	faddd	$alob,$nlob,$nlob
+		fmuld	$nlo,$nd,$nlod
+		fmuld	$ahi,$ba,$ahia
+	faddd	$aloc,$nloc,$nloc
+		fmuld	$nhi,$na,$nhia
+		fmuld	$ahi,$bb,$ahib
+	faddd	$alod,$nlod,$nlod
+		fmuld	$nhi,$nb,$nhib
+		fmuld	$ahi,$bc,$ahic
+	faddd	$ahia,$nhia,$nhia
+		fmuld	$nhi,$nc,$nhic
+		fmuld	$ahi,$bd,$ahid
+	faddd	$ahib,$nhib,$nhib
+		fmuld	$nhi,$nd,$nhid
+
+	faddd	$ahic,$nhic,$dota	! $nhic
+	faddd	$ahid,$nhid,$dotb	! $nhid
+
+	faddd	$nloc,$nhia,$nloc
+	faddd	$nlod,$nhib,$nlod
+
+	fdtox	$nloa,$nloa
+	fdtox	$nlob,$nlob
+	fdtox	$nloc,$nloc
+	fdtox	$nlod,$nlod
+
+	std	$nloa,[%sp+$bias+$frame+0]
+	std	$nlob,[%sp+$bias+$frame+8]
+	std	$nloc,[%sp+$bias+$frame+16]
+	add	$j,8,$j
+	std	$nlod,[%sp+$bias+$frame+24]
+
+	ldd	[$ap_l+$j],$alo		! load a[j] in double format
+	ldd	[$ap_h+$j],$ahi
+	ldd	[$np_l+$j],$nlo		! load n[j] in double format
+	ldd	[$np_h+$j],$nhi
+
+		fmuld	$alo,$ba,$aloa
+		fmuld	$nlo,$na,$nloa
+		fmuld	$alo,$bb,$alob
+		fmuld	$nlo,$nb,$nlob
+		fmuld	$alo,$bc,$aloc
+	ldx	[%sp+$bias+$frame+0],%o0
+		faddd	$aloa,$nloa,$nloa
+		fmuld	$nlo,$nc,$nloc
+	ldx	[%sp+$bias+$frame+8],%o1
+		fmuld	$alo,$bd,$alod
+	ldx	[%sp+$bias+$frame+16],%o2
+		faddd	$alob,$nlob,$nlob
+		fmuld	$nlo,$nd,$nlod
+	ldx	[%sp+$bias+$frame+24],%o3
+		fmuld	$ahi,$ba,$ahia
+
+	srlx	%o0,16,%o7
+		faddd	$aloc,$nloc,$nloc
+		fmuld	$nhi,$na,$nhia
+	add	%o7,%o1,%o1
+		fmuld	$ahi,$bb,$ahib
+	srlx	%o1,16,%o7
+		faddd	$alod,$nlod,$nlod
+		fmuld	$nhi,$nb,$nhib
+	add	%o7,%o2,%o2
+		fmuld	$ahi,$bc,$ahic
+	srlx	%o2,16,%o7
+		faddd	$ahia,$nhia,$nhia
+		fmuld	$nhi,$nc,$nhic
+	add	%o7,%o3,%o3		! %o3.%o2[0..15].%o1[0..15].%o0[0..15]
+	! why?
+	and	%o0,$mask,%o0
+		fmuld	$ahi,$bd,$ahid
+	and	%o1,$mask,%o1
+	and	%o2,$mask,%o2
+		faddd	$ahib,$nhib,$nhib
+		fmuld	$nhi,$nd,$nhid
+	sllx	%o1,16,%o1
+		faddd	$dota,$nloa,$nloa
+	sllx	%o2,32,%o2
+		faddd	$dotb,$nlob,$nlob
+	sllx	%o3,48,%o7
+	or	%o1,%o0,%o0
+		faddd	$ahic,$nhic,$dota	! $nhic
+	or	%o2,%o0,%o0
+		faddd	$ahid,$nhid,$dotb	! $nhid
+	or	%o7,%o0,%o0		! 64-bit result
+	ldx	[$tp],%o7
+		faddd	$nloc,$nhia,$nloc
+	addcc	%o7,%o0,%o0
+	! end-of-why?
+		faddd	$nlod,$nhib,$nlod
+	srlx	%o3,16,%g1		! 34-bit carry
+		fdtox	$nloa,$nloa
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	%g1,1,%g1
+
+	fdtox	$nlob,$nlob
+	fdtox	$nloc,$nloc
+	fdtox	$nlod,$nlod
+
+	std	$nloa,[%sp+$bias+$frame+0]
+	std	$nlob,[%sp+$bias+$frame+8]
+	addcc	$j,8,$j
+	std	$nloc,[%sp+$bias+$frame+16]
+	bz,pn	%icc,.Linnerskip
+	std	$nlod,[%sp+$bias+$frame+24]
+
+	ba	.Linner
+	nop
+.align	32
+.Linner:
+	ldd	[$ap_l+$j],$alo		! load a[j] in double format
+	ldd	[$ap_h+$j],$ahi
+	ldd	[$np_l+$j],$nlo		! load n[j] in double format
+	ldd	[$np_h+$j],$nhi
+
+		fmuld	$alo,$ba,$aloa
+		fmuld	$nlo,$na,$nloa
+		fmuld	$alo,$bb,$alob
+		fmuld	$nlo,$nb,$nlob
+		fmuld	$alo,$bc,$aloc
+	ldx	[%sp+$bias+$frame+0],%o0
+		faddd	$aloa,$nloa,$nloa
+		fmuld	$nlo,$nc,$nloc
+	ldx	[%sp+$bias+$frame+8],%o1
+		fmuld	$alo,$bd,$alod
+	ldx	[%sp+$bias+$frame+16],%o2
+		faddd	$alob,$nlob,$nlob
+		fmuld	$nlo,$nd,$nlod
+	ldx	[%sp+$bias+$frame+24],%o3
+		fmuld	$ahi,$ba,$ahia
+
+	srlx	%o0,16,%o7
+		faddd	$aloc,$nloc,$nloc
+		fmuld	$nhi,$na,$nhia
+	add	%o7,%o1,%o1
+		fmuld	$ahi,$bb,$ahib
+	srlx	%o1,16,%o7
+		faddd	$alod,$nlod,$nlod
+		fmuld	$nhi,$nb,$nhib
+	add	%o7,%o2,%o2
+		fmuld	$ahi,$bc,$ahic
+	srlx	%o2,16,%o7
+		faddd	$ahia,$nhia,$nhia
+		fmuld	$nhi,$nc,$nhic
+	add	%o7,%o3,%o3		! %o3.%o2[0..15].%o1[0..15].%o0[0..15]
+	and	%o0,$mask,%o0
+		fmuld	$ahi,$bd,$ahid
+	and	%o1,$mask,%o1
+	and	%o2,$mask,%o2
+		faddd	$ahib,$nhib,$nhib
+		fmuld	$nhi,$nd,$nhid
+	sllx	%o1,16,%o1
+		faddd	$dota,$nloa,$nloa
+	sllx	%o2,32,%o2
+		faddd	$dotb,$nlob,$nlob
+	sllx	%o3,48,%o7
+	or	%o1,%o0,%o0
+		faddd	$ahic,$nhic,$dota	! $nhic
+	or	%o2,%o0,%o0
+		faddd	$ahid,$nhid,$dotb	! $nhid
+	or	%o7,%o0,%o0		! 64-bit result
+		faddd	$nloc,$nhia,$nloc
+	addcc	%g1,%o0,%o0
+	ldx	[$tp+8],%o7		! tp[j]
+		faddd	$nlod,$nhib,$nlod
+	srlx	%o3,16,%g1		! 34-bit carry
+		fdtox	$nloa,$nloa
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	%g1,1,%g1
+		fdtox	$nlob,$nlob
+	addcc	%o7,%o0,%o0
+		fdtox	$nloc,$nloc
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	%g1,1,%g1
+
+	stx	%o0,[$tp]		! tp[j-1]
+		fdtox	$nlod,$nlod
+
+	std	$nloa,[%sp+$bias+$frame+0]
+	std	$nlob,[%sp+$bias+$frame+8]
+	std	$nloc,[%sp+$bias+$frame+16]
+	addcc	$j,8,$j
+	std	$nlod,[%sp+$bias+$frame+24]
+	bnz,pt	%icc,.Linner
+	add	$tp,8,$tp
+
+.Linnerskip:
+	fdtox	$dota,$dota
+	fdtox	$dotb,$dotb
+
+	ldx	[%sp+$bias+$frame+0],%o0
+	ldx	[%sp+$bias+$frame+8],%o1
+	ldx	[%sp+$bias+$frame+16],%o2
+	ldx	[%sp+$bias+$frame+24],%o3
+
+	srlx	%o0,16,%o7
+	std	$dota,[%sp+$bias+$frame+32]
+	add	%o7,%o1,%o1
+	std	$dotb,[%sp+$bias+$frame+40]
+	srlx	%o1,16,%o7
+	add	%o7,%o2,%o2
+	srlx	%o2,16,%o7
+	add	%o7,%o3,%o3		! %o3.%o2[0..15].%o1[0..15].%o0[0..15]
+	and	%o0,$mask,%o0
+	and	%o1,$mask,%o1
+	and	%o2,$mask,%o2
+	sllx	%o1,16,%o1
+	sllx	%o2,32,%o2
+	sllx	%o3,48,%o7
+	or	%o1,%o0,%o0
+	or	%o2,%o0,%o0
+	ldx	[%sp+$bias+$frame+32],%o4
+	or	%o7,%o0,%o0		! 64-bit result
+	ldx	[%sp+$bias+$frame+40],%o5
+	addcc	%g1,%o0,%o0
+	ldx	[$tp+8],%o7		! tp[j]
+	srlx	%o3,16,%g1		! 34-bit carry
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	%g1,1,%g1
+
+	addcc	%o7,%o0,%o0
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	%g1,1,%g1
+
+	stx	%o0,[$tp]		! tp[j-1]
+	add	$tp,8,$tp
+
+	srlx	%o4,16,%o7
+	add	%o7,%o5,%o5
+	and	%o4,$mask,%o4
+	sllx	%o5,16,%o7
+	or	%o7,%o4,%o4
+	addcc	%g1,%o4,%o4
+	srlx	%o5,48,%g1
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	%g1,1,%g1
+
+	addcc	$carry,%o4,%o4
+	stx	%o4,[$tp]		! tp[num-1]
+	mov	%g1,$carry
+	bcs,a	%xcc,.+8
+	add	$carry,1,$carry
+
+	addcc	$i,8,$i
+	bnz	%icc,.Louter
+	nop
+
+	add	$tp,8,$tp		! adjust tp to point at the end
+	orn	%g0,%g0,%g4
+	sub	%g0,$num,%o7		! n=-num
+	ba	.Lsub
+	subcc	%g0,%g0,%g0		! clear %icc.c
+
+.align	32
+.Lsub:
+	ldx	[$tp+%o7],%o0
+	add	$np,%o7,%g1
+	ld	[%g1+0],%o2
+	ld	[%g1+4],%o3
+	srlx	%o0,32,%o1
+	subccc	%o0,%o2,%o2
+	add	$rp,%o7,%g1
+	subccc	%o1,%o3,%o3
+	st	%o2,[%g1+0]
+	add	%o7,8,%o7
+	brnz,pt	%o7,.Lsub
+	st	%o3,[%g1+4]
+	subc	$carry,0,%g4
+	sub	%g0,$num,%o7		! n=-num
+	ba	.Lcopy
+	nop
+
+.align	32
+.Lcopy:
+	ldx	[$tp+%o7],%o0
+	add	$rp,%o7,%g1
+	ld	[%g1+0],%o2
+	ld	[%g1+4],%o3
+	stx	%g0,[$tp+%o7]
+	and	%o0,%g4,%o0
+	srlx	%o0,32,%o1
+	andn	%o2,%g4,%o2
+	andn	%o3,%g4,%o3
+	or	%o2,%o0,%o0
+	or	%o3,%o1,%o1
+	st	%o0,[%g1+0]
+	add	%o7,8,%o7
+	brnz,pt	%o7,.Lcopy
+	st	%o1,[%g1+4]
+	sub	%g0,$num,%o7		! n=-num
+
+.Lzap:
+	stx	%g0,[$ap_l+%o7]
+	stx	%g0,[$ap_h+%o7]
+	stx	%g0,[$np_l+%o7]
+	stx	%g0,[$np_h+%o7]
+	add	%o7,8,%o7
+	brnz,pt	%o7,.Lzap
+	nop
+
+	ldx	[%sp+$bias+$frame+48],%o7
+	wr	%g0,%o7,%asi		! restore %asi
+
+	mov	1,%i0
+.Lret:
+	ret
+	restore
+.type   $fname,#function
+.size	$fname,(.-$fname)
+.asciz	"Montgomery Multipltication for UltraSPARC, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+.align	32
+___
+
+$code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval($1)/gem;
+
+# Below substitution makes it possible to compile without demanding
+# VIS extensions on command line, e.g. -xarch=v9 vs. -xarch=v9a. I
+# dare to do this, because VIS capability is detected at run-time now
+# and this routine is not called on CPU not capable to execute it. Do
+# note that fzeros is not the only VIS dependency! Another dependency
+# is implicit and is just _a_ numerical value loaded to %asi register,
+# which assembler can't recognize as VIS specific...
+$code =~ s/fzeros\s+%f([0-9]+)/
+	   sprintf(".word\t0x%x\t! fzeros %%f%d",0x81b00c20|($1<<25),$1)
+	  /gem;
+
+print $code;
+# flush
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/via-mont.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/via-mont.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9f81bc8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/via-mont.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,254 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# Wrapper around 'rep montmul', VIA-specific instruction accessing
+# PadLock Montgomery Multiplier. The wrapper is designed as drop-in
+# replacement for OpenSSL bn_mul_mont [first implemented in 0.9.9].
+#
+# Below are interleaved outputs from 'openssl speed rsa dsa' for 4
+# different software configurations on 1.5GHz VIA Esther processor.
+# Lines marked with "software integer" denote performance of hand-
+# coded integer-only assembler found in OpenSSL 0.9.7. "Software SSE2"
+# refers to hand-coded SSE2 Montgomery multiplication procedure found
+# OpenSSL 0.9.9. "Hardware VIA SDK" refers to padlock_pmm routine from
+# Padlock SDK 2.0.1 available for download from VIA, which naturally
+# utilizes the magic 'repz montmul' instruction. And finally "hardware
+# this" refers to *this* implementation which also uses 'repz montmul'
+#
+#                   sign    verify    sign/s verify/s
+# rsa  512 bits 0.001720s 0.000140s    581.4   7149.7	software integer
+# rsa  512 bits 0.000690s 0.000086s   1450.3  11606.0	software SSE2
+# rsa  512 bits 0.006136s 0.000201s    163.0   4974.5	hardware VIA SDK
+# rsa  512 bits 0.000712s 0.000050s   1404.9  19858.5	hardware this
+#
+# rsa 1024 bits 0.008518s 0.000413s    117.4   2420.8	software integer
+# rsa 1024 bits 0.004275s 0.000277s    233.9   3609.7	software SSE2
+# rsa 1024 bits 0.012136s 0.000260s     82.4   3844.5	hardware VIA SDK
+# rsa 1024 bits 0.002522s 0.000116s    396.5   8650.9	hardware this
+#
+# rsa 2048 bits 0.050101s 0.001371s     20.0    729.6	software integer
+# rsa 2048 bits 0.030273s 0.001008s     33.0    991.9	software SSE2
+# rsa 2048 bits 0.030833s 0.000976s     32.4   1025.1	hardware VIA SDK
+# rsa 2048 bits 0.011879s 0.000342s     84.2   2921.7	hardware this
+#
+# rsa 4096 bits 0.327097s 0.004859s      3.1    205.8	software integer
+# rsa 4096 bits 0.229318s 0.003859s      4.4    259.2	software SSE2
+# rsa 4096 bits 0.233953s 0.003274s      4.3    305.4	hardware VIA SDK
+# rsa 4096 bits 0.070493s 0.001166s     14.2    857.6	hardware this
+#
+# dsa  512 bits 0.001342s 0.001651s    745.2    605.7	software integer
+# dsa  512 bits 0.000844s 0.000987s   1185.3   1013.1	software SSE2
+# dsa  512 bits 0.001902s 0.002247s    525.6    444.9	hardware VIA SDK
+# dsa  512 bits 0.000458s 0.000524s   2182.2   1909.1	hardware this
+#
+# dsa 1024 bits 0.003964s 0.004926s    252.3    203.0	software integer
+# dsa 1024 bits 0.002686s 0.003166s    372.3    315.8	software SSE2
+# dsa 1024 bits 0.002397s 0.002823s    417.1    354.3	hardware VIA SDK
+# dsa 1024 bits 0.000978s 0.001170s   1022.2    855.0	hardware this
+#
+# dsa 2048 bits 0.013280s 0.016518s     75.3     60.5	software integer
+# dsa 2048 bits 0.009911s 0.011522s    100.9     86.8	software SSE2
+# dsa 2048 bits 0.009542s 0.011763s    104.8     85.0	hardware VIA SDK
+# dsa 2048 bits 0.002884s 0.003352s    346.8    298.3	hardware this
+#
+# To give you some other reference point here is output for 2.4GHz P4
+# running hand-coded SSE2 bn_mul_mont found in 0.9.9, i.e. "software
+# SSE2" in above terms.
+#
+# rsa  512 bits 0.000407s 0.000047s   2454.2  21137.0
+# rsa 1024 bits 0.002426s 0.000141s    412.1   7100.0
+# rsa 2048 bits 0.015046s 0.000491s     66.5   2034.9
+# rsa 4096 bits 0.109770s 0.002379s      9.1    420.3
+# dsa  512 bits 0.000438s 0.000525s   2281.1   1904.1
+# dsa 1024 bits 0.001346s 0.001595s    742.7    627.0
+# dsa 2048 bits 0.004745s 0.005582s    210.7    179.1
+#
+# Conclusions: 
+# - VIA SDK leaves a *lot* of room for improvement (which this
+#   implementation successfully fills:-);
+# - 'rep montmul' gives up to >3x performance improvement depending on
+#   key length;
+# - in terms of absolute performance it delivers approximately as much
+#   as modern out-of-order 32-bit cores [again, for longer keys].
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm");
+require "x86asm.pl";
+
+$output = pop;
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+&asm_init($ARGV[0],"via-mont.pl");
+
+# int bn_mul_mont(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp, const BN_ULONG *np,const BN_ULONG *n0, int num);
+$func="bn_mul_mont_padlock";
+
+$pad=16*1;	# amount of reserved bytes on top of every vector
+
+# stack layout
+$mZeroPrime=&DWP(0,"esp");		# these are specified by VIA
+$A=&DWP(4,"esp");
+$B=&DWP(8,"esp");
+$T=&DWP(12,"esp");
+$M=&DWP(16,"esp");
+$scratch=&DWP(20,"esp");
+$rp=&DWP(24,"esp");			# these are mine
+$sp=&DWP(28,"esp");
+# &DWP(32,"esp")			# 32 byte scratch area
+# &DWP(64+(4*$num+$pad)*0,"esp")	# padded tp[num]
+# &DWP(64+(4*$num+$pad)*1,"esp")	# padded copy of ap[num]
+# &DWP(64+(4*$num+$pad)*2,"esp")	# padded copy of bp[num]
+# &DWP(64+(4*$num+$pad)*3,"esp")	# padded copy of np[num]
+# Note that SDK suggests to unconditionally allocate 2K per vector. This
+# has quite an impact on performance. It naturally depends on key length,
+# but to give an example 1024 bit private RSA key operations suffer >30%
+# penalty. I allocate only as much as actually required...
+
+&function_begin($func);
+	&xor	("eax","eax");
+	&mov	("ecx",&wparam(5));	# num
+	# meet VIA's limitations for num [note that the specification
+	# expresses them in bits, while we work with amount of 32-bit words]
+	&test	("ecx",3);
+	&jnz	(&label("leave"));	# num % 4 != 0
+	&cmp	("ecx",8);
+	&jb	(&label("leave"));	# num < 8
+	&cmp	("ecx",1024);
+	&ja	(&label("leave"));	# num > 1024
+
+	&pushf	();
+	&cld	();
+
+	&mov	("edi",&wparam(0));	# rp
+	&mov	("eax",&wparam(1));	# ap
+	&mov	("ebx",&wparam(2));	# bp
+	&mov	("edx",&wparam(3));	# np
+	&mov	("esi",&wparam(4));	# n0
+	&mov	("esi",&DWP(0,"esi"));	# *n0
+
+	&lea	("ecx",&DWP($pad,"","ecx",4));	# ecx becomes vector size in bytes
+	&lea	("ebp",&DWP(64,"","ecx",4));	# allocate 4 vectors + 64 bytes
+	&neg	("ebp");
+	&add	("ebp","esp");
+	&and	("ebp",-64);		# align to cache-line
+	&xchg	("ebp","esp");		# alloca
+
+	&mov	($rp,"edi");		# save rp
+	&mov	($sp,"ebp");		# save esp
+
+	&mov	($mZeroPrime,"esi");
+	&lea	("esi",&DWP(64,"esp"));	# tp
+	&mov	($T,"esi");
+	&lea	("edi",&DWP(32,"esp"));	# scratch area
+	&mov	($scratch,"edi");
+	&mov	("esi","eax");
+
+	&lea	("ebp",&DWP(-$pad,"ecx"));
+	&shr	("ebp",2);		# restore original num value in ebp
+
+	&xor	("eax","eax");
+
+	&mov	("ecx","ebp");
+	&lea	("ecx",&DWP((32+$pad)/4,"ecx"));# padded tp + scratch
+	&data_byte(0xf3,0xab);		# rep stosl, bzero
+
+	&mov	("ecx","ebp");
+	&lea	("edi",&DWP(64+$pad,"esp","ecx",4));# pointer to ap copy
+	&mov	($A,"edi");
+	&data_byte(0xf3,0xa5);		# rep movsl, memcpy
+	&mov	("ecx",$pad/4);
+	&data_byte(0xf3,0xab);		# rep stosl, bzero pad
+	# edi points at the end of padded ap copy...
+
+	&mov	("ecx","ebp");
+	&mov	("esi","ebx");
+	&mov	($B,"edi");
+	&data_byte(0xf3,0xa5);		# rep movsl, memcpy
+	&mov	("ecx",$pad/4);
+	&data_byte(0xf3,0xab);		# rep stosl, bzero pad
+	# edi points at the end of padded bp copy...
+
+	&mov	("ecx","ebp");
+	&mov	("esi","edx");
+	&mov	($M,"edi");
+	&data_byte(0xf3,0xa5);		# rep movsl, memcpy
+	&mov	("ecx",$pad/4);
+	&data_byte(0xf3,0xab);		# rep stosl, bzero pad
+	# edi points at the end of padded np copy...
+
+	# let magic happen...
+	&mov	("ecx","ebp");
+	&mov	("esi","esp");
+	&shl	("ecx",5);		# convert word counter to bit counter
+	&align	(4);
+	&data_byte(0xf3,0x0f,0xa6,0xc0);# rep montmul
+
+	&mov	("ecx","ebp");
+	&lea	("esi",&DWP(64,"esp"));		# tp
+	# edi still points at the end of padded np copy...
+	&neg	("ebp");
+	&lea	("ebp",&DWP(-$pad,"edi","ebp",4));	# so just "rewind"
+	&mov	("edi",$rp);			# restore rp
+	&xor	("edx","edx");			# i=0 and clear CF
+
+&set_label("sub",8);
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(0,"esi","edx",4));
+	&sbb	("eax",&DWP(0,"ebp","edx",4));
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,"edi","edx",4),"eax");	# rp[i]=tp[i]-np[i]
+	&lea	("edx",&DWP(1,"edx"));		# i++
+	&loop	(&label("sub"));		# doesn't affect CF!
+
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(0,"esi","edx",4));	# upmost overflow bit
+	&sbb	("eax",0);
+	&and	("esi","eax");
+	&not	("eax");
+	&mov	("ebp","edi");
+	&and	("ebp","eax");
+	&or	("esi","ebp");			# tp=carry?tp:rp
+
+	&mov	("ecx","edx");			# num
+	&xor	("edx","edx");			# i=0
+
+&set_label("copy",8);
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(0,"esi","edx",4));
+	&mov	(&DWP(64,"esp","edx",4),"ecx");	# zap tp
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,"edi","edx",4),"eax");
+	&lea	("edx",&DWP(1,"edx"));		# i++
+	&loop	(&label("copy"));
+
+	&mov	("ebp",$sp);
+	&xor	("eax","eax");
+
+	&mov	("ecx",64/4);
+	&mov	("edi","esp");		# zap frame including scratch area
+	&data_byte(0xf3,0xab);		# rep stosl, bzero
+
+	# zap copies of ap, bp and np
+	&lea	("edi",&DWP(64+$pad,"esp","edx",4));# pointer to ap
+	&lea	("ecx",&DWP(3*$pad/4,"edx","edx",2));
+	&data_byte(0xf3,0xab);		# rep stosl, bzero
+
+	&mov	("esp","ebp");
+	&inc	("eax");		# signal "done"
+	&popf	();
+&set_label("leave");
+&function_end($func);
+
+&asciz("Padlock Montgomery Multiplication, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>");
+
+&asm_finish();
+
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/vis3-mont.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/vis3-mont.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..64dba44
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/vis3-mont.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,384 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2012-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+
+# October 2012.
+#
+# SPARCv9 VIS3 Montgomery multiplicaion procedure suitable for T3 and
+# onward. There are three new instructions used here: umulxhi,
+# addxc[cc] and initializing store. On T3 RSA private key operations
+# are 1.54/1.87/2.11/2.26 times faster for 512/1024/2048/4096-bit key
+# lengths. This is without dedicated squaring procedure. On T4
+# corresponding coefficients are 1.47/2.10/2.80/2.90x, which is mostly
+# for reference purposes, because T4 has dedicated Montgomery
+# multiplication and squaring *instructions* that deliver even more.
+
+$output = pop;
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+$frame = "STACK_FRAME";
+$bias = "STACK_BIAS";
+
+$code.=<<___;
+#include "sparc_arch.h"
+
+#ifdef	__arch64__
+.register	%g2,#scratch
+.register	%g3,#scratch
+#endif
+
+.section	".text",#alloc,#execinstr
+___
+
+($n0,$m0,$m1,$lo0,$hi0, $lo1,$hi1,$aj,$alo,$nj,$nlo,$tj)=
+	(map("%g$_",(1..5)),map("%o$_",(0..5,7)));
+
+# int bn_mul_mont(
+$rp="%o0";	# BN_ULONG *rp,
+$ap="%o1";	# const BN_ULONG *ap,
+$bp="%o2";	# const BN_ULONG *bp,
+$np="%o3";	# const BN_ULONG *np,
+$n0p="%o4";	# const BN_ULONG *n0,
+$num="%o5";	# int num);	# caller ensures that num is even
+				# and >=6
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	bn_mul_mont_vis3
+.align	32
+bn_mul_mont_vis3:
+	add	%sp,	$bias,	%g4	! real top of stack
+	sll	$num,	2,	$num	! size in bytes
+	add	$num,	63,	%g5
+	andn	%g5,	63,	%g5	! buffer size rounded up to 64 bytes
+	add	%g5,	%g5,	%g1
+	add	%g5,	%g1,	%g1	! 3*buffer size
+	sub	%g4,	%g1,	%g1
+	andn	%g1,	63,	%g1	! align at 64 byte
+	sub	%g1,	$frame,	%g1	! new top of stack
+	sub	%g1,	%g4,	%g1
+
+	save	%sp,	%g1,	%sp
+___
+
+#	+-------------------------------+<-----	%sp
+#	.				.
+#	+-------------------------------+<-----	aligned at 64 bytes
+#	| __int64 tmp[0]		|
+#	+-------------------------------+
+#	.				.
+#	.				.
+#	+-------------------------------+<----- aligned at 64 bytes
+#	| __int64 ap[1..0]		|	converted ap[]
+#	+-------------------------------+
+#	| __int64 np[1..0]		|	converted np[]
+#	+-------------------------------+
+#	| __int64 ap[3..2]		|
+#	.				.
+#	.				.
+#	+-------------------------------+
+($rp,$ap,$bp,$np,$n0p,$num)=map("%i$_",(0..5));
+($t0,$t1,$t2,$t3,$cnt,$tp,$bufsz,$anp)=map("%l$_",(0..7));
+($ovf,$i)=($t0,$t1);
+$code.=<<___;
+	ld	[$n0p+0],	$t0	! pull n0[0..1] value
+	add	%sp, $bias+$frame, $tp
+	ld	[$n0p+4],	$t1
+	add	$tp,	%g5,	$anp
+	ld	[$bp+0],	$t2	! m0=bp[0]
+	sllx	$t1,	32,	$n0
+	ld	[$bp+4],	$t3
+	or	$t0,	$n0,	$n0
+	add	$bp,	8,	$bp
+
+	ld	[$ap+0],	$t0	! ap[0]
+	sllx	$t3,	32,	$m0
+	ld	[$ap+4],	$t1
+	or	$t2,	$m0,	$m0
+
+	ld	[$ap+8],	$t2	! ap[1]
+	sllx	$t1,	32,	$aj
+	ld	[$ap+12],	$t3
+	or	$t0,	$aj,	$aj
+	add	$ap,	16,	$ap
+	stx	$aj,	[$anp]		! converted ap[0]
+
+	mulx	$aj,	$m0,	$lo0	! ap[0]*bp[0]
+	umulxhi	$aj,	$m0,	$hi0
+
+	ld	[$np+0],	$t0	! np[0]
+	sllx	$t3,	32,	$aj
+	ld	[$np+4],	$t1
+	or	$t2,	$aj,	$aj
+
+	ld	[$np+8],	$t2	! np[1]
+	sllx	$t1,	32,	$nj
+	ld	[$np+12],	$t3
+	or	$t0, $nj,	$nj
+	add	$np,	16,	$np
+	stx	$nj,	[$anp+8]	! converted np[0]
+
+	mulx	$lo0,	$n0,	$m1	! "tp[0]"*n0
+	stx	$aj,	[$anp+16]	! converted ap[1]
+
+	mulx	$aj,	$m0,	$alo	! ap[1]*bp[0]
+	umulxhi	$aj,	$m0,	$aj	! ahi=aj
+
+	mulx	$nj,	$m1,	$lo1	! np[0]*m1
+	umulxhi	$nj,	$m1,	$hi1
+
+	sllx	$t3,	32,	$nj
+	or	$t2,	$nj,	$nj
+	stx	$nj,	[$anp+24]	! converted np[1]
+	add	$anp,	32,	$anp
+
+	addcc	$lo0,	$lo1,	$lo1
+	addxc	%g0,	$hi1,	$hi1
+
+	mulx	$nj,	$m1,	$nlo	! np[1]*m1
+	umulxhi	$nj,	$m1,	$nj	! nhi=nj
+
+	ba	.L1st
+	sub	$num,	24,	$cnt	! cnt=num-3
+
+.align	16
+.L1st:
+	ld	[$ap+0],	$t0	! ap[j]
+	addcc	$alo,	$hi0,	$lo0
+	ld	[$ap+4],	$t1
+	addxc	$aj,	%g0,	$hi0
+
+	sllx	$t1,	32,	$aj
+	add	$ap,	8,	$ap
+	or	$t0,	$aj,	$aj
+	stx	$aj,	[$anp]		! converted ap[j]
+
+	ld	[$np+0],	$t2	! np[j]
+	addcc	$nlo,	$hi1,	$lo1
+	ld	[$np+4],	$t3
+	addxc	$nj,	%g0,	$hi1	! nhi=nj
+
+	sllx	$t3,	32,	$nj
+	add	$np,	8,	$np
+	mulx	$aj,	$m0,	$alo	! ap[j]*bp[0]
+	or	$t2,	$nj,	$nj
+	umulxhi	$aj,	$m0,	$aj	! ahi=aj
+	stx	$nj,	[$anp+8]	! converted np[j]
+	add	$anp,	16,	$anp	! anp++
+
+	mulx	$nj,	$m1,	$nlo	! np[j]*m1
+	addcc	$lo0,	$lo1,	$lo1	! np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0]
+	umulxhi	$nj,	$m1,	$nj	! nhi=nj
+	addxc	%g0,	$hi1,	$hi1
+	stx	$lo1,	[$tp]		! tp[j-1]
+	add	$tp,	8,	$tp	! tp++
+
+	brnz,pt	$cnt,	.L1st
+	sub	$cnt,	8,	$cnt	! j--
+!.L1st
+	addcc	$alo,	$hi0,	$lo0
+	addxc	$aj,	%g0,	$hi0	! ahi=aj
+
+	addcc	$nlo,	$hi1,	$lo1
+	addxc	$nj,	%g0,	$hi1
+	addcc	$lo0,	$lo1,	$lo1	! np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0]
+	addxc	%g0,	$hi1,	$hi1
+	stx	$lo1,	[$tp]		! tp[j-1]
+	add	$tp,	8,	$tp
+
+	addcc	$hi0,	$hi1,	$hi1
+	addxc	%g0,	%g0,	$ovf	! upmost overflow bit
+	stx	$hi1,	[$tp]
+	add	$tp,	8,	$tp
+
+	ba	.Louter
+	sub	$num,	16,	$i	! i=num-2
+
+.align	16
+.Louter:
+	ld	[$bp+0],	$t2	! m0=bp[i]
+	ld	[$bp+4],	$t3
+
+	sub	$anp,	$num,	$anp	! rewind
+	sub	$tp,	$num,	$tp
+	sub	$anp,	$num,	$anp
+
+	add	$bp,	8,	$bp
+	sllx	$t3,	32,	$m0
+	ldx	[$anp+0],	$aj	! ap[0]
+	or	$t2,	$m0,	$m0
+	ldx	[$anp+8],	$nj	! np[0]
+
+	mulx	$aj,	$m0,	$lo0	! ap[0]*bp[i]
+	ldx	[$tp],		$tj	! tp[0]
+	umulxhi	$aj,	$m0,	$hi0
+	ldx	[$anp+16],	$aj	! ap[1]
+	addcc	$lo0,	$tj,	$lo0	! ap[0]*bp[i]+tp[0]
+	mulx	$aj,	$m0,	$alo	! ap[1]*bp[i]
+	addxc	%g0,	$hi0,	$hi0
+	mulx	$lo0,	$n0,	$m1	! tp[0]*n0
+	umulxhi	$aj,	$m0,	$aj	! ahi=aj
+	mulx	$nj,	$m1,	$lo1	! np[0]*m1
+	umulxhi	$nj,	$m1,	$hi1
+	ldx	[$anp+24],	$nj	! np[1]
+	add	$anp,	32,	$anp
+	addcc	$lo1,	$lo0,	$lo1
+	mulx	$nj,	$m1,	$nlo	! np[1]*m1
+	addxc	%g0,	$hi1,	$hi1
+	umulxhi	$nj,	$m1,	$nj	! nhi=nj
+
+	ba	.Linner
+	sub	$num,	24,	$cnt	! cnt=num-3
+.align	16
+.Linner:
+	addcc	$alo,	$hi0,	$lo0
+	ldx	[$tp+8],	$tj	! tp[j]
+	addxc	$aj,	%g0,	$hi0	! ahi=aj
+	ldx	[$anp+0],	$aj	! ap[j]
+	addcc	$nlo,	$hi1,	$lo1
+	mulx	$aj,	$m0,	$alo	! ap[j]*bp[i]
+	addxc	$nj,	%g0,	$hi1	! nhi=nj
+	ldx	[$anp+8],	$nj	! np[j]
+	add	$anp,	16,	$anp
+	umulxhi	$aj,	$m0,	$aj	! ahi=aj
+	addcc	$lo0,	$tj,	$lo0	! ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j]
+	mulx	$nj,	$m1,	$nlo	! np[j]*m1
+	addxc	%g0,	$hi0,	$hi0
+	umulxhi	$nj,	$m1,	$nj	! nhi=nj
+	addcc	$lo1,	$lo0,	$lo1	! np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j]
+	addxc	%g0,	$hi1,	$hi1
+	stx	$lo1,	[$tp]		! tp[j-1]
+	add	$tp,	8,	$tp
+	brnz,pt	$cnt,	.Linner
+	sub	$cnt,	8,	$cnt
+!.Linner
+	ldx	[$tp+8],	$tj	! tp[j]
+	addcc	$alo,	$hi0,	$lo0
+	addxc	$aj,	%g0,	$hi0	! ahi=aj
+	addcc	$lo0,	$tj,	$lo0	! ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j]
+	addxc	%g0,	$hi0,	$hi0
+
+	addcc	$nlo,	$hi1,	$lo1
+	addxc	$nj,	%g0,	$hi1	! nhi=nj
+	addcc	$lo1,	$lo0,	$lo1	! np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j]
+	addxc	%g0,	$hi1,	$hi1
+	stx	$lo1,	[$tp]		! tp[j-1]
+
+	subcc	%g0,	$ovf,	%g0	! move upmost overflow to CCR.xcc
+	addxccc	$hi1,	$hi0,	$hi1
+	addxc	%g0,	%g0,	$ovf
+	stx	$hi1,	[$tp+8]
+	add	$tp,	16,	$tp
+
+	brnz,pt	$i,	.Louter
+	sub	$i,	8,	$i
+
+	sub	$anp,	$num,	$anp	! rewind
+	sub	$tp,	$num,	$tp
+	sub	$anp,	$num,	$anp
+	ba	.Lsub
+	subcc	$num,	8,	$cnt	! cnt=num-1 and clear CCR.xcc
+
+.align	16
+.Lsub:
+	ldx	[$tp],		$tj
+	add	$tp,	8,	$tp
+	ldx	[$anp+8],	$nj
+	add	$anp,	16,	$anp
+	subccc	$tj,	$nj,	$t2	! tp[j]-np[j]
+	srlx	$tj,	32,	$tj
+	srlx	$nj,	32,	$nj
+	subccc	$tj,	$nj,	$t3
+	add	$rp,	8,	$rp
+	st	$t2,	[$rp-4]		! reverse order
+	st	$t3,	[$rp-8]
+	brnz,pt	$cnt,	.Lsub
+	sub	$cnt,	8,	$cnt
+
+	sub	$anp,	$num,	$anp	! rewind
+	sub	$tp,	$num,	$tp
+	sub	$anp,	$num,	$anp
+	sub	$rp,	$num,	$rp
+
+	subc	$ovf,	%g0,	$ovf	! handle upmost overflow bit
+	and	$tp,	$ovf,	$ap
+	andn	$rp,	$ovf,	$np
+	or	$np,	$ap,	$ap	! ap=borrow?tp:rp
+	ba	.Lcopy
+	sub	$num,	8,	$cnt
+
+.align	16
+.Lcopy:					! copy or in-place refresh
+	ld	[$ap+0],	$t2
+	ld	[$ap+4],	$t3
+	add	$ap,	8,	$ap
+	stx	%g0,	[$tp]		! zap
+	add	$tp,	8,	$tp
+	stx	%g0,	[$anp]		! zap
+	stx	%g0,	[$anp+8]
+	add	$anp,	16,	$anp
+	st	$t3,	[$rp+0]		! flip order
+	st	$t2,	[$rp+4]
+	add	$rp,	8,	$rp
+	brnz	$cnt,	.Lcopy
+	sub	$cnt,	8,	$cnt
+
+	mov	1,	%o0
+	ret
+	restore
+.type	bn_mul_mont_vis3, #function
+.size	bn_mul_mont_vis3, .-bn_mul_mont_vis3
+.asciz  "Montgomery Multiplication for SPARCv9 VIS3, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+.align	4
+___
+
+# Purpose of these subroutines is to explicitly encode VIS instructions,
+# so that one can compile the module without having to specify VIS
+# extensions on compiler command line, e.g. -xarch=v9 vs. -xarch=v9a.
+# Idea is to reserve for option to produce "universal" binary and let
+# programmer detect if current CPU is VIS capable at run-time.
+sub unvis3 {
+my ($mnemonic,$rs1,$rs2,$rd)=@_;
+my %bias = ( "g" => 0, "o" => 8, "l" => 16, "i" => 24 );
+my ($ref,$opf);
+my %visopf = (	"addxc"		=> 0x011,
+		"addxccc"	=> 0x013,
+		"umulxhi"	=> 0x016	);
+
+    $ref = "$mnemonic\t$rs1,$rs2,$rd";
+
+    if ($opf=$visopf{$mnemonic}) {
+	foreach ($rs1,$rs2,$rd) {
+	    return $ref if (!/%([goli])([0-9])/);
+	    $_=$bias{$1}+$2;
+	}
+
+	return	sprintf ".word\t0x%08x !%s",
+			0x81b00000|$rd<<25|$rs1<<14|$opf<<5|$rs2,
+			$ref;
+    } else {
+	return $ref;
+    }
+}
+
+foreach (split("\n",$code)) {
+	s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/ge;
+
+	s/\b(umulxhi|addxc[c]{0,2})\s+(%[goli][0-7]),\s*(%[goli][0-7]),\s*(%[goli][0-7])/
+		&unvis3($1,$2,$3,$4)
+	 /ge;
+
+	print $_,"\n";
+}
+
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/x86-gf2m.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/x86-gf2m.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f464368
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/x86-gf2m.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,325 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# May 2011
+#
+# The module implements bn_GF2m_mul_2x2 polynomial multiplication used
+# in bn_gf2m.c. It's kind of low-hanging mechanical port from C for
+# the time being... Except that it has three code paths: pure integer
+# code suitable for any x86 CPU, MMX code suitable for PIII and later
+# and PCLMULQDQ suitable for Westmere and later. Improvement varies
+# from one benchmark and µ-arch to another. Below are interval values
+# for 163- and 571-bit ECDH benchmarks relative to compiler-generated
+# code:
+#
+# PIII		16%-30%
+# P4		12%-12%
+# Opteron	18%-40%
+# Core2		19%-44%
+# Atom		38%-64%
+# Westmere	53%-121%(PCLMULQDQ)/20%-32%(MMX)
+# Sandy Bridge	72%-127%(PCLMULQDQ)/27%-23%(MMX)
+#
+# Note that above improvement coefficients are not coefficients for
+# bn_GF2m_mul_2x2 itself. For example 120% ECDH improvement is result
+# of bn_GF2m_mul_2x2 being >4x faster. As it gets faster, benchmark
+# is more and more dominated by other subroutines, most notably by
+# BN_GF2m_mod[_mul]_arr...
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm");
+require "x86asm.pl";
+
+$output = pop;
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+&asm_init($ARGV[0],$0,$x86only = $ARGV[$#ARGV] eq "386");
+
+$sse2=0;
+for (@ARGV) { $sse2=1 if (/-DOPENSSL_IA32_SSE2/); }
+
+&external_label("OPENSSL_ia32cap_P") if ($sse2);
+
+$a="eax";
+$b="ebx";
+($a1,$a2,$a4)=("ecx","edx","ebp");
+
+$R="mm0";
+@T=("mm1","mm2");
+($A,$B,$B30,$B31)=("mm2","mm3","mm4","mm5");
+@i=("esi","edi");
+
+					if (!$x86only) {
+&function_begin_B("_mul_1x1_mmx");
+	&sub	("esp",32+4);
+	 &mov	($a1,$a);
+	 &lea	($a2,&DWP(0,$a,$a));
+	 &and	($a1,0x3fffffff);
+	 &lea	($a4,&DWP(0,$a2,$a2));
+	 &mov	(&DWP(0*4,"esp"),0);
+	 &and	($a2,0x7fffffff);
+	&movd	($A,$a);
+	&movd	($B,$b);
+	 &mov	(&DWP(1*4,"esp"),$a1);	# a1
+	 &xor	($a1,$a2);		# a1^a2
+	&pxor	($B31,$B31);
+	&pxor	($B30,$B30);
+	 &mov	(&DWP(2*4,"esp"),$a2);	# a2
+	 &xor	($a2,$a4);		# a2^a4
+	 &mov	(&DWP(3*4,"esp"),$a1);	# a1^a2
+	&pcmpgtd($B31,$A);		# broadcast 31st bit
+	&paddd	($A,$A);		# $A<<=1
+	 &xor	($a1,$a2);		# a1^a4=a1^a2^a2^a4
+	 &mov	(&DWP(4*4,"esp"),$a4);	# a4
+	 &xor	($a4,$a2);		# a2=a4^a2^a4
+	&pand	($B31,$B);
+	&pcmpgtd($B30,$A);		# broadcast 30th bit
+	 &mov	(&DWP(5*4,"esp"),$a1);	# a1^a4
+	 &xor	($a4,$a1);		# a1^a2^a4
+	&psllq	($B31,31);
+	&pand	($B30,$B);
+	 &mov	(&DWP(6*4,"esp"),$a2);	# a2^a4
+	&mov	(@i[0],0x7);
+	 &mov	(&DWP(7*4,"esp"),$a4);	# a1^a2^a4
+	 &mov	($a4,@i[0]);
+	&and	(@i[0],$b);
+	&shr	($b,3);
+	&mov	(@i[1],$a4);
+	&psllq	($B30,30);
+	&and	(@i[1],$b);
+	&shr	($b,3);
+	&movd	($R,&DWP(0,"esp",@i[0],4));
+	&mov	(@i[0],$a4);
+	&and	(@i[0],$b);
+	&shr	($b,3);
+	for($n=1;$n<9;$n++) {
+		&movd	(@T[1],&DWP(0,"esp",@i[1],4));
+		&mov	(@i[1],$a4);
+		&psllq	(@T[1],3*$n);
+		&and	(@i[1],$b);
+		&shr	($b,3);
+		&pxor	($R,@T[1]);
+
+		push(@i,shift(@i)); push(@T,shift(@T));
+	}
+	&movd	(@T[1],&DWP(0,"esp",@i[1],4));
+	&pxor	($R,$B30);
+	&psllq	(@T[1],3*$n++);
+	&pxor	($R,@T[1]);
+
+	&movd	(@T[0],&DWP(0,"esp",@i[0],4));
+	&pxor	($R,$B31);
+	&psllq	(@T[0],3*$n);
+	&add	("esp",32+4);
+	&pxor	($R,@T[0]);
+	&ret	();
+&function_end_B("_mul_1x1_mmx");
+					}
+
+($lo,$hi)=("eax","edx");
+@T=("ecx","ebp");
+
+&function_begin_B("_mul_1x1_ialu");
+	&sub	("esp",32+4);
+	 &mov	($a1,$a);
+	 &lea	($a2,&DWP(0,$a,$a));
+	 &lea	($a4,&DWP(0,"",$a,4));
+	 &and	($a1,0x3fffffff);
+	&lea	(@i[1],&DWP(0,$lo,$lo));
+	&sar	($lo,31);		# broadcast 31st bit
+	 &mov	(&DWP(0*4,"esp"),0);
+	 &and	($a2,0x7fffffff);
+	 &mov	(&DWP(1*4,"esp"),$a1);	# a1
+	 &xor	($a1,$a2);		# a1^a2
+	 &mov	(&DWP(2*4,"esp"),$a2);	# a2
+	 &xor	($a2,$a4);		# a2^a4
+	 &mov	(&DWP(3*4,"esp"),$a1);	# a1^a2
+	 &xor	($a1,$a2);		# a1^a4=a1^a2^a2^a4
+	 &mov	(&DWP(4*4,"esp"),$a4);	# a4
+	 &xor	($a4,$a2);		# a2=a4^a2^a4
+	 &mov	(&DWP(5*4,"esp"),$a1);	# a1^a4
+	 &xor	($a4,$a1);		# a1^a2^a4
+	&sar	(@i[1],31);		# broardcast 30th bit
+	&and	($lo,$b);
+	 &mov	(&DWP(6*4,"esp"),$a2);	# a2^a4
+	&and	(@i[1],$b);
+	 &mov	(&DWP(7*4,"esp"),$a4);	# a1^a2^a4
+	&mov	($hi,$lo);
+	&shl	($lo,31);
+	&mov	(@T[0],@i[1]);
+	&shr	($hi,1);
+
+	 &mov	(@i[0],0x7);
+	&shl	(@i[1],30);
+	 &and	(@i[0],$b);
+	&shr	(@T[0],2);
+	&xor	($lo,@i[1]);
+
+	&shr	($b,3);
+	&mov	(@i[1],0x7);		# 5-byte instruction!?
+	&and	(@i[1],$b);
+	&shr	($b,3);
+	 &xor	($hi,@T[0]);
+	&xor	($lo,&DWP(0,"esp",@i[0],4));
+	&mov	(@i[0],0x7);
+	&and	(@i[0],$b);
+	&shr	($b,3);
+	for($n=1;$n<9;$n++) {
+		&mov	(@T[1],&DWP(0,"esp",@i[1],4));
+		&mov	(@i[1],0x7);
+		&mov	(@T[0],@T[1]);
+		&shl	(@T[1],3*$n);
+		&and	(@i[1],$b);
+		&shr	(@T[0],32-3*$n);
+		&xor	($lo,@T[1]);
+		&shr	($b,3);
+		&xor	($hi,@T[0]);
+
+		push(@i,shift(@i)); push(@T,shift(@T));
+	}
+	&mov	(@T[1],&DWP(0,"esp",@i[1],4));
+	&mov	(@T[0],@T[1]);
+	&shl	(@T[1],3*$n);
+	&mov	(@i[1],&DWP(0,"esp",@i[0],4));
+	&shr	(@T[0],32-3*$n);	$n++;
+	&mov	(@i[0],@i[1]);
+	&xor	($lo,@T[1]);
+	&shl	(@i[1],3*$n);
+	&xor	($hi,@T[0]);
+	&shr	(@i[0],32-3*$n);
+	&xor	($lo,@i[1]);
+	&xor	($hi,@i[0]);
+
+	&add	("esp",32+4);
+	&ret	();
+&function_end_B("_mul_1x1_ialu");
+
+# void bn_GF2m_mul_2x2(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG a1, BN_ULONG a0, BN_ULONG b1, BN_ULONG b0);
+&function_begin_B("bn_GF2m_mul_2x2");
+if (!$x86only) {
+	&picmeup("edx","OPENSSL_ia32cap_P");
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(0,"edx"));
+	&mov	("edx",&DWP(4,"edx"));
+	&test	("eax",1<<23);		# check MMX bit
+	&jz	(&label("ialu"));
+if ($sse2) {
+	&test	("eax",1<<24);		# check FXSR bit
+	&jz	(&label("mmx"));
+	&test	("edx",1<<1);		# check PCLMULQDQ bit
+	&jz	(&label("mmx"));
+
+	&movups		("xmm0",&QWP(8,"esp"));
+	&shufps		("xmm0","xmm0",0b10110001);
+	&pclmulqdq	("xmm0","xmm0",1);
+	&mov		("eax",&DWP(4,"esp"));
+	&movups		(&QWP(0,"eax"),"xmm0");
+	&ret	();
+
+&set_label("mmx",16);
+}
+	&push	("ebp");
+	&push	("ebx");
+	&push	("esi");
+	&push	("edi");
+	&mov	($a,&wparam(1));
+	&mov	($b,&wparam(3));
+	&call	("_mul_1x1_mmx");	# a1·b1
+	&movq	("mm7",$R);
+
+	&mov	($a,&wparam(2));
+	&mov	($b,&wparam(4));
+	&call	("_mul_1x1_mmx");	# a0·b0
+	&movq	("mm6",$R);
+
+	&mov	($a,&wparam(1));
+	&mov	($b,&wparam(3));
+	&xor	($a,&wparam(2));
+	&xor	($b,&wparam(4));
+	&call	("_mul_1x1_mmx");	# (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)
+	&pxor	($R,"mm7");
+	&mov	($a,&wparam(0));
+	&pxor	($R,"mm6");		# (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)-a1·b1-a0·b0
+
+	&movq	($A,$R);
+	&psllq	($R,32);
+	&pop	("edi");
+	&psrlq	($A,32);
+	&pop	("esi");
+	&pxor	($R,"mm6");
+	&pop	("ebx");
+	&pxor	($A,"mm7");
+	&movq	(&QWP(0,$a),$R);
+	&pop	("ebp");
+	&movq	(&QWP(8,$a),$A);
+	&emms	();
+	&ret	();
+&set_label("ialu",16);
+}
+	&push	("ebp");
+	&push	("ebx");
+	&push	("esi");
+	&push	("edi");
+	&stack_push(4+1);
+
+	&mov	($a,&wparam(1));
+	&mov	($b,&wparam(3));
+	&call	("_mul_1x1_ialu");	# a1·b1
+	&mov	(&DWP(8,"esp"),$lo);
+	&mov	(&DWP(12,"esp"),$hi);
+
+	&mov	($a,&wparam(2));
+	&mov	($b,&wparam(4));
+	&call	("_mul_1x1_ialu");	# a0·b0
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,"esp"),$lo);
+	&mov	(&DWP(4,"esp"),$hi);
+
+	&mov	($a,&wparam(1));
+	&mov	($b,&wparam(3));
+	&xor	($a,&wparam(2));
+	&xor	($b,&wparam(4));
+	&call	("_mul_1x1_ialu");	# (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)
+
+	&mov	("ebp",&wparam(0));
+		 @r=("ebx","ecx","edi","esi");
+	&mov	(@r[0],&DWP(0,"esp"));
+	&mov	(@r[1],&DWP(4,"esp"));
+	&mov	(@r[2],&DWP(8,"esp"));
+	&mov	(@r[3],&DWP(12,"esp"));
+
+	&xor	($lo,$hi);
+	&xor	($hi,@r[1]);
+	&xor	($lo,@r[0]);
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,"ebp"),@r[0]);
+	&xor	($hi,@r[2]);
+	&mov	(&DWP(12,"ebp"),@r[3]);
+	&xor	($lo,@r[3]);
+	&stack_pop(4+1);
+	&xor	($hi,@r[3]);
+	&pop	("edi");
+	&xor	($lo,$hi);
+	&pop	("esi");
+	&mov	(&DWP(8,"ebp"),$hi);
+	&pop	("ebx");
+	&mov	(&DWP(4,"ebp"),$lo);
+	&pop	("ebp");
+	&ret	();
+&function_end_B("bn_GF2m_mul_2x2");
+
+&asciz	("GF(2^m) Multiplication for x86, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>");
+
+&asm_finish();
+
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/x86-mont.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/x86-mont.pl
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..6787503
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/x86-mont.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,629 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+
+# October 2005
+#
+# This is a "teaser" code, as it can be improved in several ways...
+# First of all non-SSE2 path should be implemented (yes, for now it
+# performs Montgomery multiplication/convolution only on SSE2-capable
+# CPUs such as P4, others fall down to original code). Then inner loop
+# can be unrolled and modulo-scheduled to improve ILP and possibly
+# moved to 128-bit XMM register bank (though it would require input
+# rearrangement and/or increase bus bandwidth utilization). Dedicated
+# squaring procedure should give further performance improvement...
+# Yet, for being draft, the code improves rsa512 *sign* benchmark by
+# 110%(!), rsa1024 one - by 70% and rsa4096 - by 20%:-)
+
+# December 2006
+#
+# Modulo-scheduling SSE2 loops results in further 15-20% improvement.
+# Integer-only code [being equipped with dedicated squaring procedure]
+# gives ~40% on rsa512 sign benchmark...
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm");
+require "x86asm.pl";
+
+$output = pop;
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+ 
+&asm_init($ARGV[0],$0);
+
+$sse2=0;
+for (@ARGV) { $sse2=1 if (/-DOPENSSL_IA32_SSE2/); }
+
+&external_label("OPENSSL_ia32cap_P") if ($sse2);
+
+&function_begin("bn_mul_mont");
+
+$i="edx";
+$j="ecx";
+$ap="esi";	$tp="esi";		# overlapping variables!!!
+$rp="edi";	$bp="edi";		# overlapping variables!!!
+$np="ebp";
+$num="ebx";
+
+$_num=&DWP(4*0,"esp");			# stack top layout
+$_rp=&DWP(4*1,"esp");
+$_ap=&DWP(4*2,"esp");
+$_bp=&DWP(4*3,"esp");
+$_np=&DWP(4*4,"esp");
+$_n0=&DWP(4*5,"esp");	$_n0q=&QWP(4*5,"esp");
+$_sp=&DWP(4*6,"esp");
+$_bpend=&DWP(4*7,"esp");
+$frame=32;				# size of above frame rounded up to 16n
+
+	&xor	("eax","eax");
+	&mov	("edi",&wparam(5));	# int num
+	&cmp	("edi",4);
+	&jl	(&label("just_leave"));
+
+	&lea	("esi",&wparam(0));	# put aside pointer to argument block
+	&lea	("edx",&wparam(1));	# load ap
+	&add	("edi",2);		# extra two words on top of tp
+	&neg	("edi");
+	&lea	("ebp",&DWP(-$frame,"esp","edi",4));	# future alloca($frame+4*(num+2))
+	&neg	("edi");
+
+	# minimize cache contention by arraning 2K window between stack
+	# pointer and ap argument [np is also position sensitive vector,
+	# but it's assumed to be near ap, as it's allocated at ~same
+	# time].
+	&mov	("eax","ebp");
+	&sub	("eax","edx");
+	&and	("eax",2047);
+	&sub	("ebp","eax");		# this aligns sp and ap modulo 2048
+
+	&xor	("edx","ebp");
+	&and	("edx",2048);
+	&xor	("edx",2048);
+	&sub	("ebp","edx");		# this splits them apart modulo 4096
+
+	&and	("ebp",-64);		# align to cache line
+
+	# An OS-agnostic version of __chkstk.
+	#
+	# Some OSes (Windows) insist on stack being "wired" to
+	# physical memory in strictly sequential manner, i.e. if stack
+	# allocation spans two pages, then reference to farmost one can
+	# be punishable by SEGV. But page walking can do good even on
+	# other OSes, because it guarantees that villain thread hits
+	# the guard page before it can make damage to innocent one...
+	&mov	("eax","esp");
+	&sub	("eax","ebp");
+	&and	("eax",-4096);
+	&mov	("edx","esp");		# saved stack pointer!
+	&lea	("esp",&DWP(0,"ebp","eax"));
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(0,"esp"));
+	&cmp	("esp","ebp");
+	&ja	(&label("page_walk"));
+	&jmp	(&label("page_walk_done"));
+
+&set_label("page_walk",16);
+	&lea	("esp",&DWP(-4096,"esp"));
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(0,"esp"));
+	&cmp	("esp","ebp");
+	&ja	(&label("page_walk"));
+&set_label("page_walk_done");
+
+	################################# load argument block...
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(0*4,"esi"));# BN_ULONG *rp
+	&mov	("ebx",&DWP(1*4,"esi"));# const BN_ULONG *ap
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(2*4,"esi"));# const BN_ULONG *bp
+	&mov	("ebp",&DWP(3*4,"esi"));# const BN_ULONG *np
+	&mov	("esi",&DWP(4*4,"esi"));# const BN_ULONG *n0
+	#&mov	("edi",&DWP(5*4,"esi"));# int num
+
+	&mov	("esi",&DWP(0,"esi"));	# pull n0[0]
+	&mov	($_rp,"eax");		# ... save a copy of argument block
+	&mov	($_ap,"ebx");
+	&mov	($_bp,"ecx");
+	&mov	($_np,"ebp");
+	&mov	($_n0,"esi");
+	&lea	($num,&DWP(-3,"edi"));	# num=num-1 to assist modulo-scheduling
+	#&mov	($_num,$num);		# redundant as $num is not reused
+	&mov	($_sp,"edx");		# saved stack pointer!
+
+if($sse2) {
+$acc0="mm0";	# mmx register bank layout
+$acc1="mm1";
+$car0="mm2";
+$car1="mm3";
+$mul0="mm4";
+$mul1="mm5";
+$temp="mm6";
+$mask="mm7";
+
+	&picmeup("eax","OPENSSL_ia32cap_P");
+	&bt	(&DWP(0,"eax"),26);
+	&jnc	(&label("non_sse2"));
+
+	&mov	("eax",-1);
+	&movd	($mask,"eax");		# mask 32 lower bits
+
+	&mov	($ap,$_ap);		# load input pointers
+	&mov	($bp,$_bp);
+	&mov	($np,$_np);
+
+	&xor	($i,$i);		# i=0
+	&xor	($j,$j);		# j=0
+
+	&movd	($mul0,&DWP(0,$bp));		# bp[0]
+	&movd	($mul1,&DWP(0,$ap));		# ap[0]
+	&movd	($car1,&DWP(0,$np));		# np[0]
+
+	&pmuludq($mul1,$mul0);			# ap[0]*bp[0]
+	&movq	($car0,$mul1);
+	&movq	($acc0,$mul1);			# I wish movd worked for
+	&pand	($acc0,$mask);			# inter-register transfers
+
+	&pmuludq($mul1,$_n0q);			# *=n0
+
+	&pmuludq($car1,$mul1);			# "t[0]"*np[0]*n0
+	&paddq	($car1,$acc0);
+
+	&movd	($acc1,&DWP(4,$np));		# np[1]
+	&movd	($acc0,&DWP(4,$ap));		# ap[1]
+
+	&psrlq	($car0,32);
+	&psrlq	($car1,32);
+
+	&inc	($j);				# j++
+&set_label("1st",16);
+	&pmuludq($acc0,$mul0);			# ap[j]*bp[0]
+	&pmuludq($acc1,$mul1);			# np[j]*m1
+	&paddq	($car0,$acc0);			# +=c0
+	&paddq	($car1,$acc1);			# +=c1
+
+	&movq	($acc0,$car0);
+	&pand	($acc0,$mask);
+	&movd	($acc1,&DWP(4,$np,$j,4));	# np[j+1]
+	&paddq	($car1,$acc0);			# +=ap[j]*bp[0];
+	&movd	($acc0,&DWP(4,$ap,$j,4));	# ap[j+1]
+	&psrlq	($car0,32);
+	&movd	(&DWP($frame-4,"esp",$j,4),$car1);	# tp[j-1]=
+	&psrlq	($car1,32);
+
+	&lea	($j,&DWP(1,$j));
+	&cmp	($j,$num);
+	&jl	(&label("1st"));
+
+	&pmuludq($acc0,$mul0);			# ap[num-1]*bp[0]
+	&pmuludq($acc1,$mul1);			# np[num-1]*m1
+	&paddq	($car0,$acc0);			# +=c0
+	&paddq	($car1,$acc1);			# +=c1
+
+	&movq	($acc0,$car0);
+	&pand	($acc0,$mask);
+	&paddq	($car1,$acc0);			# +=ap[num-1]*bp[0];
+	&movd	(&DWP($frame-4,"esp",$j,4),$car1);	# tp[num-2]=
+
+	&psrlq	($car0,32);
+	&psrlq	($car1,32);
+
+	&paddq	($car1,$car0);
+	&movq	(&QWP($frame,"esp",$num,4),$car1);	# tp[num].tp[num-1]
+
+	&inc	($i);				# i++
+&set_label("outer");
+	&xor	($j,$j);			# j=0
+
+	&movd	($mul0,&DWP(0,$bp,$i,4));	# bp[i]
+	&movd	($mul1,&DWP(0,$ap));		# ap[0]
+	&movd	($temp,&DWP($frame,"esp"));	# tp[0]
+	&movd	($car1,&DWP(0,$np));		# np[0]
+	&pmuludq($mul1,$mul0);			# ap[0]*bp[i]
+
+	&paddq	($mul1,$temp);			# +=tp[0]
+	&movq	($acc0,$mul1);
+	&movq	($car0,$mul1);
+	&pand	($acc0,$mask);
+
+	&pmuludq($mul1,$_n0q);			# *=n0
+
+	&pmuludq($car1,$mul1);
+	&paddq	($car1,$acc0);
+
+	&movd	($temp,&DWP($frame+4,"esp"));	# tp[1]
+	&movd	($acc1,&DWP(4,$np));		# np[1]
+	&movd	($acc0,&DWP(4,$ap));		# ap[1]
+
+	&psrlq	($car0,32);
+	&psrlq	($car1,32);
+	&paddq	($car0,$temp);			# +=tp[1]
+
+	&inc	($j);				# j++
+	&dec	($num);
+&set_label("inner");
+	&pmuludq($acc0,$mul0);			# ap[j]*bp[i]
+	&pmuludq($acc1,$mul1);			# np[j]*m1
+	&paddq	($car0,$acc0);			# +=c0
+	&paddq	($car1,$acc1);			# +=c1
+
+	&movq	($acc0,$car0);
+	&movd	($temp,&DWP($frame+4,"esp",$j,4));# tp[j+1]
+	&pand	($acc0,$mask);
+	&movd	($acc1,&DWP(4,$np,$j,4));	# np[j+1]
+	&paddq	($car1,$acc0);			# +=ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j]
+	&movd	($acc0,&DWP(4,$ap,$j,4));	# ap[j+1]
+	&psrlq	($car0,32);
+	&movd	(&DWP($frame-4,"esp",$j,4),$car1);# tp[j-1]=
+	&psrlq	($car1,32);
+	&paddq	($car0,$temp);			# +=tp[j+1]
+
+	&dec	($num);
+	&lea	($j,&DWP(1,$j));		# j++
+	&jnz	(&label("inner"));
+
+	&mov	($num,$j);
+	&pmuludq($acc0,$mul0);			# ap[num-1]*bp[i]
+	&pmuludq($acc1,$mul1);			# np[num-1]*m1
+	&paddq	($car0,$acc0);			# +=c0
+	&paddq	($car1,$acc1);			# +=c1
+
+	&movq	($acc0,$car0);
+	&pand	($acc0,$mask);
+	&paddq	($car1,$acc0);			# +=ap[num-1]*bp[i]+tp[num-1]
+	&movd	(&DWP($frame-4,"esp",$j,4),$car1);	# tp[num-2]=
+	&psrlq	($car0,32);
+	&psrlq	($car1,32);
+
+	&movd	($temp,&DWP($frame+4,"esp",$num,4));	# += tp[num]
+	&paddq	($car1,$car0);
+	&paddq	($car1,$temp);
+	&movq	(&QWP($frame,"esp",$num,4),$car1);	# tp[num].tp[num-1]
+
+	&lea	($i,&DWP(1,$i));		# i++
+	&cmp	($i,$num);
+	&jle	(&label("outer"));
+
+	&emms	();				# done with mmx bank
+	&jmp	(&label("common_tail"));
+
+&set_label("non_sse2",16);
+}
+
+if (0) {
+	&mov	("esp",$_sp);
+	&xor	("eax","eax");	# signal "not fast enough [yet]"
+	&jmp	(&label("just_leave"));
+	# While the below code provides competitive performance for
+	# all key lengths on modern Intel cores, it's still more
+	# than 10% slower for 4096-bit key elsewhere:-( "Competitive"
+	# means compared to the original integer-only assembler.
+	# 512-bit RSA sign is better by ~40%, but that's about all
+	# one can say about all CPUs...
+} else {
+$inp="esi";	# integer path uses these registers differently
+$word="edi";
+$carry="ebp";
+
+	&mov	($inp,$_ap);
+	&lea	($carry,&DWP(1,$num));
+	&mov	($word,$_bp);
+	&xor	($j,$j);				# j=0
+	&mov	("edx",$inp);
+	&and	($carry,1);				# see if num is even
+	&sub	("edx",$word);				# see if ap==bp
+	&lea	("eax",&DWP(4,$word,$num,4));		# &bp[num]
+	&or	($carry,"edx");
+	&mov	($word,&DWP(0,$word));			# bp[0]
+	&jz	(&label("bn_sqr_mont"));
+	&mov	($_bpend,"eax");
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(0,$inp));
+	&xor	("edx","edx");
+
+&set_label("mull",16);
+	&mov	($carry,"edx");
+	&mul	($word);				# ap[j]*bp[0]
+	&add	($carry,"eax");
+	&lea	($j,&DWP(1,$j));
+	&adc	("edx",0);
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(0,$inp,$j,4));		# ap[j+1]
+	&cmp	($j,$num);
+	&mov	(&DWP($frame-4,"esp",$j,4),$carry);	# tp[j]=
+	&jl	(&label("mull"));
+
+	&mov	($carry,"edx");
+	&mul	($word);				# ap[num-1]*bp[0]
+	 &mov	($word,$_n0);
+	&add	("eax",$carry);
+	 &mov	($inp,$_np);
+	&adc	("edx",0);
+	 &imul	($word,&DWP($frame,"esp"));		# n0*tp[0]
+
+	&mov	(&DWP($frame,"esp",$num,4),"eax");	# tp[num-1]=
+	&xor	($j,$j);
+	&mov	(&DWP($frame+4,"esp",$num,4),"edx");	# tp[num]=
+	&mov	(&DWP($frame+8,"esp",$num,4),$j);	# tp[num+1]=
+
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(0,$inp));			# np[0]
+	&mul	($word);				# np[0]*m
+	&add	("eax",&DWP($frame,"esp"));		# +=tp[0]
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(4,$inp));			# np[1]
+	&adc	("edx",0);
+	&inc	($j);
+
+	&jmp	(&label("2ndmadd"));
+
+&set_label("1stmadd",16);
+	&mov	($carry,"edx");
+	&mul	($word);				# ap[j]*bp[i]
+	&add	($carry,&DWP($frame,"esp",$j,4));	# +=tp[j]
+	&lea	($j,&DWP(1,$j));
+	&adc	("edx",0);
+	&add	($carry,"eax");
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(0,$inp,$j,4));		# ap[j+1]
+	&adc	("edx",0);
+	&cmp	($j,$num);
+	&mov	(&DWP($frame-4,"esp",$j,4),$carry);	# tp[j]=
+	&jl	(&label("1stmadd"));
+
+	&mov	($carry,"edx");
+	&mul	($word);				# ap[num-1]*bp[i]
+	&add	("eax",&DWP($frame,"esp",$num,4));	# +=tp[num-1]
+	 &mov	($word,$_n0);
+	&adc	("edx",0);
+	 &mov	($inp,$_np);
+	&add	($carry,"eax");
+	&adc	("edx",0);
+	 &imul	($word,&DWP($frame,"esp"));		# n0*tp[0]
+
+	&xor	($j,$j);
+	&add	("edx",&DWP($frame+4,"esp",$num,4));	# carry+=tp[num]
+	&mov	(&DWP($frame,"esp",$num,4),$carry);	# tp[num-1]=
+	&adc	($j,0);
+	 &mov	("eax",&DWP(0,$inp));			# np[0]
+	&mov	(&DWP($frame+4,"esp",$num,4),"edx");	# tp[num]=
+	&mov	(&DWP($frame+8,"esp",$num,4),$j);	# tp[num+1]=
+
+	&mul	($word);				# np[0]*m
+	&add	("eax",&DWP($frame,"esp"));		# +=tp[0]
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(4,$inp));			# np[1]
+	&adc	("edx",0);
+	&mov	($j,1);
+
+&set_label("2ndmadd",16);
+	&mov	($carry,"edx");
+	&mul	($word);				# np[j]*m
+	&add	($carry,&DWP($frame,"esp",$j,4));	# +=tp[j]
+	&lea	($j,&DWP(1,$j));
+	&adc	("edx",0);
+	&add	($carry,"eax");
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(0,$inp,$j,4));		# np[j+1]
+	&adc	("edx",0);
+	&cmp	($j,$num);
+	&mov	(&DWP($frame-8,"esp",$j,4),$carry);	# tp[j-1]=
+	&jl	(&label("2ndmadd"));
+
+	&mov	($carry,"edx");
+	&mul	($word);				# np[j]*m
+	&add	($carry,&DWP($frame,"esp",$num,4));	# +=tp[num-1]
+	&adc	("edx",0);
+	&add	($carry,"eax");
+	&adc	("edx",0);
+	&mov	(&DWP($frame-4,"esp",$num,4),$carry);	# tp[num-2]=
+
+	&xor	("eax","eax");
+	 &mov	($j,$_bp);				# &bp[i]
+	&add	("edx",&DWP($frame+4,"esp",$num,4));	# carry+=tp[num]
+	&adc	("eax",&DWP($frame+8,"esp",$num,4));	# +=tp[num+1]
+	 &lea	($j,&DWP(4,$j));
+	&mov	(&DWP($frame,"esp",$num,4),"edx");	# tp[num-1]=
+	 &cmp	($j,$_bpend);
+	&mov	(&DWP($frame+4,"esp",$num,4),"eax");	# tp[num]=
+	&je	(&label("common_tail"));
+
+	&mov	($word,&DWP(0,$j));			# bp[i+1]
+	&mov	($inp,$_ap);
+	&mov	($_bp,$j);				# &bp[++i]
+	&xor	($j,$j);
+	&xor	("edx","edx");
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(0,$inp));
+	&jmp	(&label("1stmadd"));
+
+&set_label("bn_sqr_mont",16);
+$sbit=$num;
+	&mov	($_num,$num);
+	&mov	($_bp,$j);				# i=0
+
+	&mov	("eax",$word);				# ap[0]
+	&mul	($word);				# ap[0]*ap[0]
+	&mov	(&DWP($frame,"esp"),"eax");		# tp[0]=
+	&mov	($sbit,"edx");
+	&shr	("edx",1);
+	&and	($sbit,1);
+	&inc	($j);
+&set_label("sqr",16);
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(0,$inp,$j,4));		# ap[j]
+	&mov	($carry,"edx");
+	&mul	($word);				# ap[j]*ap[0]
+	&add	("eax",$carry);
+	&lea	($j,&DWP(1,$j));
+	&adc	("edx",0);
+	&lea	($carry,&DWP(0,$sbit,"eax",2));
+	&shr	("eax",31);
+	&cmp	($j,$_num);
+	&mov	($sbit,"eax");
+	&mov	(&DWP($frame-4,"esp",$j,4),$carry);	# tp[j]=
+	&jl	(&label("sqr"));
+
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(0,$inp,$j,4));		# ap[num-1]
+	&mov	($carry,"edx");
+	&mul	($word);				# ap[num-1]*ap[0]
+	&add	("eax",$carry);
+	 &mov	($word,$_n0);
+	&adc	("edx",0);
+	 &mov	($inp,$_np);
+	&lea	($carry,&DWP(0,$sbit,"eax",2));
+	 &imul	($word,&DWP($frame,"esp"));		# n0*tp[0]
+	&shr	("eax",31);
+	&mov	(&DWP($frame,"esp",$j,4),$carry);	# tp[num-1]=
+
+	&lea	($carry,&DWP(0,"eax","edx",2));
+	 &mov	("eax",&DWP(0,$inp));			# np[0]
+	&shr	("edx",31);
+	&mov	(&DWP($frame+4,"esp",$j,4),$carry);	# tp[num]=
+	&mov	(&DWP($frame+8,"esp",$j,4),"edx");	# tp[num+1]=
+
+	&mul	($word);				# np[0]*m
+	&add	("eax",&DWP($frame,"esp"));		# +=tp[0]
+	&mov	($num,$j);
+	&adc	("edx",0);
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(4,$inp));			# np[1]
+	&mov	($j,1);
+
+&set_label("3rdmadd",16);
+	&mov	($carry,"edx");
+	&mul	($word);				# np[j]*m
+	&add	($carry,&DWP($frame,"esp",$j,4));	# +=tp[j]
+	&adc	("edx",0);
+	&add	($carry,"eax");
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(4,$inp,$j,4));		# np[j+1]
+	&adc	("edx",0);
+	&mov	(&DWP($frame-4,"esp",$j,4),$carry);	# tp[j-1]=
+
+	&mov	($carry,"edx");
+	&mul	($word);				# np[j+1]*m
+	&add	($carry,&DWP($frame+4,"esp",$j,4));	# +=tp[j+1]
+	&lea	($j,&DWP(2,$j));
+	&adc	("edx",0);
+	&add	($carry,"eax");
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(0,$inp,$j,4));		# np[j+2]
+	&adc	("edx",0);
+	&cmp	($j,$num);
+	&mov	(&DWP($frame-8,"esp",$j,4),$carry);	# tp[j]=
+	&jl	(&label("3rdmadd"));
+
+	&mov	($carry,"edx");
+	&mul	($word);				# np[j]*m
+	&add	($carry,&DWP($frame,"esp",$num,4));	# +=tp[num-1]
+	&adc	("edx",0);
+	&add	($carry,"eax");
+	&adc	("edx",0);
+	&mov	(&DWP($frame-4,"esp",$num,4),$carry);	# tp[num-2]=
+
+	&mov	($j,$_bp);				# i
+	&xor	("eax","eax");
+	&mov	($inp,$_ap);
+	&add	("edx",&DWP($frame+4,"esp",$num,4));	# carry+=tp[num]
+	&adc	("eax",&DWP($frame+8,"esp",$num,4));	# +=tp[num+1]
+	&mov	(&DWP($frame,"esp",$num,4),"edx");	# tp[num-1]=
+	&cmp	($j,$num);
+	&mov	(&DWP($frame+4,"esp",$num,4),"eax");	# tp[num]=
+	&je	(&label("common_tail"));
+
+	&mov	($word,&DWP(4,$inp,$j,4));		# ap[i]
+	&lea	($j,&DWP(1,$j));
+	&mov	("eax",$word);
+	&mov	($_bp,$j);				# ++i
+	&mul	($word);				# ap[i]*ap[i]
+	&add	("eax",&DWP($frame,"esp",$j,4));	# +=tp[i]
+	&adc	("edx",0);
+	&mov	(&DWP($frame,"esp",$j,4),"eax");	# tp[i]=
+	&xor	($carry,$carry);
+	&cmp	($j,$num);
+	&lea	($j,&DWP(1,$j));
+	&je	(&label("sqrlast"));
+
+	&mov	($sbit,"edx");				# zaps $num
+	&shr	("edx",1);
+	&and	($sbit,1);
+&set_label("sqradd",16);
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(0,$inp,$j,4));		# ap[j]
+	&mov	($carry,"edx");
+	&mul	($word);				# ap[j]*ap[i]
+	&add	("eax",$carry);
+	&lea	($carry,&DWP(0,"eax","eax"));
+	&adc	("edx",0);
+	&shr	("eax",31);
+	&add	($carry,&DWP($frame,"esp",$j,4));	# +=tp[j]
+	&lea	($j,&DWP(1,$j));
+	&adc	("eax",0);
+	&add	($carry,$sbit);
+	&adc	("eax",0);
+	&cmp	($j,$_num);
+	&mov	(&DWP($frame-4,"esp",$j,4),$carry);	# tp[j]=
+	&mov	($sbit,"eax");
+	&jle	(&label("sqradd"));
+
+	&mov	($carry,"edx");
+	&add	("edx","edx");
+	&shr	($carry,31);
+	&add	("edx",$sbit);
+	&adc	($carry,0);
+&set_label("sqrlast");
+	&mov	($word,$_n0);
+	&mov	($inp,$_np);
+	&imul	($word,&DWP($frame,"esp"));		# n0*tp[0]
+
+	&add	("edx",&DWP($frame,"esp",$j,4));	# +=tp[num]
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(0,$inp));			# np[0]
+	&adc	($carry,0);
+	&mov	(&DWP($frame,"esp",$j,4),"edx");	# tp[num]=
+	&mov	(&DWP($frame+4,"esp",$j,4),$carry);	# tp[num+1]=
+
+	&mul	($word);				# np[0]*m
+	&add	("eax",&DWP($frame,"esp"));		# +=tp[0]
+	&lea	($num,&DWP(-1,$j));
+	&adc	("edx",0);
+	&mov	($j,1);
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(4,$inp));			# np[1]
+
+	&jmp	(&label("3rdmadd"));
+}
+
+&set_label("common_tail",16);
+	&mov	($np,$_np);			# load modulus pointer
+	&mov	($rp,$_rp);			# load result pointer
+	&lea	($tp,&DWP($frame,"esp"));	# [$ap and $bp are zapped]
+
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(0,$tp));		# tp[0]
+	&mov	($j,$num);			# j=num-1
+	&xor	($i,$i);			# i=0 and clear CF!
+
+&set_label("sub",16);
+	&sbb	("eax",&DWP(0,$np,$i,4));
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,$rp,$i,4),"eax");	# rp[i]=tp[i]-np[i]
+	&dec	($j);				# doesn't affect CF!
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(4,$tp,$i,4));	# tp[i+1]
+	&lea	($i,&DWP(1,$i));		# i++
+	&jge	(&label("sub"));
+
+	&sbb	("eax",0);			# handle upmost overflow bit
+	&and	($tp,"eax");
+	&not	("eax");
+	&mov	($np,$rp);
+	&and	($np,"eax");
+	&or	($tp,$np);			# tp=carry?tp:rp
+
+&set_label("copy",16);				# copy or in-place refresh
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(0,$tp,$num,4));
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,$rp,$num,4),"eax");	# rp[i]=tp[i]
+	&mov	(&DWP($frame,"esp",$num,4),$j);	# zap temporary vector
+	&dec	($num);
+	&jge	(&label("copy"));
+
+	&mov	("esp",$_sp);		# pull saved stack pointer
+	&mov	("eax",1);
+&set_label("just_leave");
+&function_end("bn_mul_mont");
+
+&asciz("Montgomery Multiplication for x86, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>");
+
+&asm_finish();
+
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0ff3805
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,649 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "../bn_lcl.h"
+#if !(defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2)
+# include "../bn_asm.c"         /* kind of dirty hack for Sun Studio */
+#else
+/*-
+ * x86_64 BIGNUM accelerator version 0.1, December 2002.
+ *
+ * Implemented by Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se> for the OpenSSL
+ * project.
+ *
+ * Rights for redistribution and usage in source and binary forms are
+ * granted according to the OpenSSL license. Warranty of any kind is
+ * disclaimed.
+ *
+ * Q. Version 0.1? It doesn't sound like Andy, he used to assign real
+ *    versions, like 1.0...
+ * A. Well, that's because this code is basically a quick-n-dirty
+ *    proof-of-concept hack. As you can see it's implemented with
+ *    inline assembler, which means that you're bound to GCC and that
+ *    there might be enough room for further improvement.
+ *
+ * Q. Why inline assembler?
+ * A. x86_64 features own ABI which I'm not familiar with. This is
+ *    why I decided to let the compiler take care of subroutine
+ *    prologue/epilogue as well as register allocation. For reference.
+ *    Win64 implements different ABI for AMD64, different from Linux.
+ *
+ * Q. How much faster does it get?
+ * A. 'apps/openssl speed rsa dsa' output with no-asm:
+ *
+ *                        sign    verify    sign/s verify/s
+ *      rsa  512 bits   0.0006s   0.0001s   1683.8  18456.2
+ *      rsa 1024 bits   0.0028s   0.0002s    356.0   6407.0
+ *      rsa 2048 bits   0.0172s   0.0005s     58.0   1957.8
+ *      rsa 4096 bits   0.1155s   0.0018s      8.7    555.6
+ *                        sign    verify    sign/s verify/s
+ *      dsa  512 bits   0.0005s   0.0006s   2100.8   1768.3
+ *      dsa 1024 bits   0.0014s   0.0018s    692.3    559.2
+ *      dsa 2048 bits   0.0049s   0.0061s    204.7    165.0
+ *
+ *    'apps/openssl speed rsa dsa' output with this module:
+ *
+ *                        sign    verify    sign/s verify/s
+ *      rsa  512 bits   0.0004s   0.0000s   2767.1  33297.9
+ *      rsa 1024 bits   0.0012s   0.0001s    867.4  14674.7
+ *      rsa 2048 bits   0.0061s   0.0002s    164.0   5270.0
+ *      rsa 4096 bits   0.0384s   0.0006s     26.1   1650.8
+ *                        sign    verify    sign/s verify/s
+ *      dsa  512 bits   0.0002s   0.0003s   4442.2   3786.3
+ *      dsa 1024 bits   0.0005s   0.0007s   1835.1   1497.4
+ *      dsa 2048 bits   0.0016s   0.0020s    620.4    504.6
+ *
+ *    For the reference. IA-32 assembler implementation performs
+ *    very much like 64-bit code compiled with no-asm on the same
+ *    machine.
+ */
+
+# if defined(_WIN64) || !defined(__LP64__)
+#  define BN_ULONG unsigned long long
+# else
+#  define BN_ULONG unsigned long
+# endif
+
+# undef mul
+# undef mul_add
+
+/*-
+ * "m"(a), "+m"(r)      is the way to favor DirectPath µ-code;
+ * "g"(0)               let the compiler to decide where does it
+ *                      want to keep the value of zero;
+ */
+# define mul_add(r,a,word,carry) do {   \
+        register BN_ULONG high,low;     \
+        asm ("mulq %3"                  \
+                : "=a"(low),"=d"(high)  \
+                : "a"(word),"m"(a)      \
+                : "cc");                \
+        asm ("addq %2,%0; adcq %3,%1"   \
+                : "+r"(carry),"+d"(high)\
+                : "a"(low),"g"(0)       \
+                : "cc");                \
+        asm ("addq %2,%0; adcq %3,%1"   \
+                : "+m"(r),"+d"(high)    \
+                : "r"(carry),"g"(0)     \
+                : "cc");                \
+        carry=high;                     \
+        } while (0)
+
+# define mul(r,a,word,carry) do {       \
+        register BN_ULONG high,low;     \
+        asm ("mulq %3"                  \
+                : "=a"(low),"=d"(high)  \
+                : "a"(word),"g"(a)      \
+                : "cc");                \
+        asm ("addq %2,%0; adcq %3,%1"   \
+                : "+r"(carry),"+d"(high)\
+                : "a"(low),"g"(0)       \
+                : "cc");                \
+        (r)=carry, carry=high;          \
+        } while (0)
+# undef sqr
+# define sqr(r0,r1,a)                   \
+        asm ("mulq %2"                  \
+                : "=a"(r0),"=d"(r1)     \
+                : "a"(a)                \
+                : "cc");
+
+BN_ULONG bn_mul_add_words(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, int num,
+                          BN_ULONG w)
+{
+    BN_ULONG c1 = 0;
+
+    if (num <= 0)
+        return (c1);
+
+    while (num & ~3) {
+        mul_add(rp[0], ap[0], w, c1);
+        mul_add(rp[1], ap[1], w, c1);
+        mul_add(rp[2], ap[2], w, c1);
+        mul_add(rp[3], ap[3], w, c1);
+        ap += 4;
+        rp += 4;
+        num -= 4;
+    }
+    if (num) {
+        mul_add(rp[0], ap[0], w, c1);
+        if (--num == 0)
+            return c1;
+        mul_add(rp[1], ap[1], w, c1);
+        if (--num == 0)
+            return c1;
+        mul_add(rp[2], ap[2], w, c1);
+        return c1;
+    }
+
+    return (c1);
+}
+
+BN_ULONG bn_mul_words(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, int num, BN_ULONG w)
+{
+    BN_ULONG c1 = 0;
+
+    if (num <= 0)
+        return (c1);
+
+    while (num & ~3) {
+        mul(rp[0], ap[0], w, c1);
+        mul(rp[1], ap[1], w, c1);
+        mul(rp[2], ap[2], w, c1);
+        mul(rp[3], ap[3], w, c1);
+        ap += 4;
+        rp += 4;
+        num -= 4;
+    }
+    if (num) {
+        mul(rp[0], ap[0], w, c1);
+        if (--num == 0)
+            return c1;
+        mul(rp[1], ap[1], w, c1);
+        if (--num == 0)
+            return c1;
+        mul(rp[2], ap[2], w, c1);
+    }
+    return (c1);
+}
+
+void bn_sqr_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, int n)
+{
+    if (n <= 0)
+        return;
+
+    while (n & ~3) {
+        sqr(r[0], r[1], a[0]);
+        sqr(r[2], r[3], a[1]);
+        sqr(r[4], r[5], a[2]);
+        sqr(r[6], r[7], a[3]);
+        a += 4;
+        r += 8;
+        n -= 4;
+    }
+    if (n) {
+        sqr(r[0], r[1], a[0]);
+        if (--n == 0)
+            return;
+        sqr(r[2], r[3], a[1]);
+        if (--n == 0)
+            return;
+        sqr(r[4], r[5], a[2]);
+    }
+}
+
+BN_ULONG bn_div_words(BN_ULONG h, BN_ULONG l, BN_ULONG d)
+{
+    BN_ULONG ret, waste;
+
+ asm("divq      %4":"=a"(ret), "=d"(waste)
+ :     "a"(l), "d"(h), "r"(d)
+ :     "cc");
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+BN_ULONG bn_add_words(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp,
+                      int n)
+{
+    BN_ULONG ret;
+    size_t i = 0;
+
+    if (n <= 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    asm volatile ("       subq    %0,%0           \n" /* clear carry */
+                  "       jmp     1f              \n"
+                  ".p2align 4                     \n"
+                  "1:     movq    (%4,%2,8),%0    \n"
+                  "       adcq    (%5,%2,8),%0    \n"
+                  "       movq    %0,(%3,%2,8)    \n"
+                  "       lea     1(%2),%2        \n"
+                  "       dec     %1              \n"
+                  "       jnz     1b              \n"
+                  "       sbbq    %0,%0           \n"
+                  :"=&r" (ret), "+c"(n), "+r"(i)
+                  :"r"(rp), "r"(ap), "r"(bp)
+                  :"cc", "memory");
+
+    return ret & 1;
+}
+
+# ifndef SIMICS
+BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp,
+                      int n)
+{
+    BN_ULONG ret;
+    size_t i = 0;
+
+    if (n <= 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    asm volatile ("       subq    %0,%0           \n" /* clear borrow */
+                  "       jmp     1f              \n"
+                  ".p2align 4                     \n"
+                  "1:     movq    (%4,%2,8),%0    \n"
+                  "       sbbq    (%5,%2,8),%0    \n"
+                  "       movq    %0,(%3,%2,8)    \n"
+                  "       lea     1(%2),%2        \n"
+                  "       dec     %1              \n"
+                  "       jnz     1b              \n"
+                  "       sbbq    %0,%0           \n"
+                  :"=&r" (ret), "+c"(n), "+r"(i)
+                  :"r"(rp), "r"(ap), "r"(bp)
+                  :"cc", "memory");
+
+    return ret & 1;
+}
+# else
+/* Simics 1.4<7 has buggy sbbq:-( */
+#  define BN_MASK2 0xffffffffffffffffL
+BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n)
+{
+    BN_ULONG t1, t2;
+    int c = 0;
+
+    if (n <= 0)
+        return ((BN_ULONG)0);
+
+    for (;;) {
+        t1 = a[0];
+        t2 = b[0];
+        r[0] = (t1 - t2 - c) & BN_MASK2;
+        if (t1 != t2)
+            c = (t1 < t2);
+        if (--n <= 0)
+            break;
+
+        t1 = a[1];
+        t2 = b[1];
+        r[1] = (t1 - t2 - c) & BN_MASK2;
+        if (t1 != t2)
+            c = (t1 < t2);
+        if (--n <= 0)
+            break;
+
+        t1 = a[2];
+        t2 = b[2];
+        r[2] = (t1 - t2 - c) & BN_MASK2;
+        if (t1 != t2)
+            c = (t1 < t2);
+        if (--n <= 0)
+            break;
+
+        t1 = a[3];
+        t2 = b[3];
+        r[3] = (t1 - t2 - c) & BN_MASK2;
+        if (t1 != t2)
+            c = (t1 < t2);
+        if (--n <= 0)
+            break;
+
+        a += 4;
+        b += 4;
+        r += 4;
+    }
+    return (c);
+}
+# endif
+
+/* mul_add_c(a,b,c0,c1,c2)  -- c+=a*b for three word number c=(c2,c1,c0) */
+/* mul_add_c2(a,b,c0,c1,c2) -- c+=2*a*b for three word number c=(c2,c1,c0) */
+/* sqr_add_c(a,i,c0,c1,c2)  -- c+=a[i]^2 for three word number c=(c2,c1,c0) */
+/*
+ * sqr_add_c2(a,i,c0,c1,c2) -- c+=2*a[i]*a[j] for three word number
+ * c=(c2,c1,c0)
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Keep in mind that carrying into high part of multiplication result
+ * can not overflow, because it cannot be all-ones.
+ */
+# if 0
+/* original macros are kept for reference purposes */
+#  define mul_add_c(a,b,c0,c1,c2)       do {    \
+        BN_ULONG ta = (a), tb = (b);            \
+        BN_ULONG lo, hi;                        \
+        BN_UMULT_LOHI(lo,hi,ta,tb);             \
+        c0 += lo; hi += (c0<lo)?1:0;            \
+        c1 += hi; c2 += (c1<hi)?1:0;            \
+        } while(0)
+
+#  define mul_add_c2(a,b,c0,c1,c2)      do {    \
+        BN_ULONG ta = (a), tb = (b);            \
+        BN_ULONG lo, hi, tt;                    \
+        BN_UMULT_LOHI(lo,hi,ta,tb);             \
+        c0 += lo; tt = hi+((c0<lo)?1:0);        \
+        c1 += tt; c2 += (c1<tt)?1:0;            \
+        c0 += lo; hi += (c0<lo)?1:0;            \
+        c1 += hi; c2 += (c1<hi)?1:0;            \
+        } while(0)
+
+#  define sqr_add_c(a,i,c0,c1,c2)       do {    \
+        BN_ULONG ta = (a)[i];                   \
+        BN_ULONG lo, hi;                        \
+        BN_UMULT_LOHI(lo,hi,ta,ta);             \
+        c0 += lo; hi += (c0<lo)?1:0;            \
+        c1 += hi; c2 += (c1<hi)?1:0;            \
+        } while(0)
+# else
+#  define mul_add_c(a,b,c0,c1,c2) do {  \
+        BN_ULONG t1,t2;                 \
+        asm ("mulq %3"                  \
+                : "=a"(t1),"=d"(t2)     \
+                : "a"(a),"m"(b)         \
+                : "cc");                \
+        asm ("addq %3,%0; adcq %4,%1; adcq %5,%2"       \
+                : "+r"(c0),"+r"(c1),"+r"(c2)            \
+                : "r"(t1),"r"(t2),"g"(0)                \
+                : "cc");                                \
+        } while (0)
+
+#  define sqr_add_c(a,i,c0,c1,c2) do {  \
+        BN_ULONG t1,t2;                 \
+        asm ("mulq %2"                  \
+                : "=a"(t1),"=d"(t2)     \
+                : "a"(a[i])             \
+                : "cc");                \
+        asm ("addq %3,%0; adcq %4,%1; adcq %5,%2"       \
+                : "+r"(c0),"+r"(c1),"+r"(c2)            \
+                : "r"(t1),"r"(t2),"g"(0)                \
+                : "cc");                                \
+        } while (0)
+
+#  define mul_add_c2(a,b,c0,c1,c2) do { \
+        BN_ULONG t1,t2;                 \
+        asm ("mulq %3"                  \
+                : "=a"(t1),"=d"(t2)     \
+                : "a"(a),"m"(b)         \
+                : "cc");                \
+        asm ("addq %3,%0; adcq %4,%1; adcq %5,%2"       \
+                : "+r"(c0),"+r"(c1),"+r"(c2)            \
+                : "r"(t1),"r"(t2),"g"(0)                \
+                : "cc");                                \
+        asm ("addq %3,%0; adcq %4,%1; adcq %5,%2"       \
+                : "+r"(c0),"+r"(c1),"+r"(c2)            \
+                : "r"(t1),"r"(t2),"g"(0)                \
+                : "cc");                                \
+        } while (0)
+# endif
+
+# define sqr_add_c2(a,i,j,c0,c1,c2)      \
+        mul_add_c2((a)[i],(a)[j],c0,c1,c2)
+
+void bn_mul_comba8(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b)
+{
+    BN_ULONG c1, c2, c3;
+
+    c1 = 0;
+    c2 = 0;
+    c3 = 0;
+    mul_add_c(a[0], b[0], c1, c2, c3);
+    r[0] = c1;
+    c1 = 0;
+    mul_add_c(a[0], b[1], c2, c3, c1);
+    mul_add_c(a[1], b[0], c2, c3, c1);
+    r[1] = c2;
+    c2 = 0;
+    mul_add_c(a[2], b[0], c3, c1, c2);
+    mul_add_c(a[1], b[1], c3, c1, c2);
+    mul_add_c(a[0], b[2], c3, c1, c2);
+    r[2] = c3;
+    c3 = 0;
+    mul_add_c(a[0], b[3], c1, c2, c3);
+    mul_add_c(a[1], b[2], c1, c2, c3);
+    mul_add_c(a[2], b[1], c1, c2, c3);
+    mul_add_c(a[3], b[0], c1, c2, c3);
+    r[3] = c1;
+    c1 = 0;
+    mul_add_c(a[4], b[0], c2, c3, c1);
+    mul_add_c(a[3], b[1], c2, c3, c1);
+    mul_add_c(a[2], b[2], c2, c3, c1);
+    mul_add_c(a[1], b[3], c2, c3, c1);
+    mul_add_c(a[0], b[4], c2, c3, c1);
+    r[4] = c2;
+    c2 = 0;
+    mul_add_c(a[0], b[5], c3, c1, c2);
+    mul_add_c(a[1], b[4], c3, c1, c2);
+    mul_add_c(a[2], b[3], c3, c1, c2);
+    mul_add_c(a[3], b[2], c3, c1, c2);
+    mul_add_c(a[4], b[1], c3, c1, c2);
+    mul_add_c(a[5], b[0], c3, c1, c2);
+    r[5] = c3;
+    c3 = 0;
+    mul_add_c(a[6], b[0], c1, c2, c3);
+    mul_add_c(a[5], b[1], c1, c2, c3);
+    mul_add_c(a[4], b[2], c1, c2, c3);
+    mul_add_c(a[3], b[3], c1, c2, c3);
+    mul_add_c(a[2], b[4], c1, c2, c3);
+    mul_add_c(a[1], b[5], c1, c2, c3);
+    mul_add_c(a[0], b[6], c1, c2, c3);
+    r[6] = c1;
+    c1 = 0;
+    mul_add_c(a[0], b[7], c2, c3, c1);
+    mul_add_c(a[1], b[6], c2, c3, c1);
+    mul_add_c(a[2], b[5], c2, c3, c1);
+    mul_add_c(a[3], b[4], c2, c3, c1);
+    mul_add_c(a[4], b[3], c2, c3, c1);
+    mul_add_c(a[5], b[2], c2, c3, c1);
+    mul_add_c(a[6], b[1], c2, c3, c1);
+    mul_add_c(a[7], b[0], c2, c3, c1);
+    r[7] = c2;
+    c2 = 0;
+    mul_add_c(a[7], b[1], c3, c1, c2);
+    mul_add_c(a[6], b[2], c3, c1, c2);
+    mul_add_c(a[5], b[3], c3, c1, c2);
+    mul_add_c(a[4], b[4], c3, c1, c2);
+    mul_add_c(a[3], b[5], c3, c1, c2);
+    mul_add_c(a[2], b[6], c3, c1, c2);
+    mul_add_c(a[1], b[7], c3, c1, c2);
+    r[8] = c3;
+    c3 = 0;
+    mul_add_c(a[2], b[7], c1, c2, c3);
+    mul_add_c(a[3], b[6], c1, c2, c3);
+    mul_add_c(a[4], b[5], c1, c2, c3);
+    mul_add_c(a[5], b[4], c1, c2, c3);
+    mul_add_c(a[6], b[3], c1, c2, c3);
+    mul_add_c(a[7], b[2], c1, c2, c3);
+    r[9] = c1;
+    c1 = 0;
+    mul_add_c(a[7], b[3], c2, c3, c1);
+    mul_add_c(a[6], b[4], c2, c3, c1);
+    mul_add_c(a[5], b[5], c2, c3, c1);
+    mul_add_c(a[4], b[6], c2, c3, c1);
+    mul_add_c(a[3], b[7], c2, c3, c1);
+    r[10] = c2;
+    c2 = 0;
+    mul_add_c(a[4], b[7], c3, c1, c2);
+    mul_add_c(a[5], b[6], c3, c1, c2);
+    mul_add_c(a[6], b[5], c3, c1, c2);
+    mul_add_c(a[7], b[4], c3, c1, c2);
+    r[11] = c3;
+    c3 = 0;
+    mul_add_c(a[7], b[5], c1, c2, c3);
+    mul_add_c(a[6], b[6], c1, c2, c3);
+    mul_add_c(a[5], b[7], c1, c2, c3);
+    r[12] = c1;
+    c1 = 0;
+    mul_add_c(a[6], b[7], c2, c3, c1);
+    mul_add_c(a[7], b[6], c2, c3, c1);
+    r[13] = c2;
+    c2 = 0;
+    mul_add_c(a[7], b[7], c3, c1, c2);
+    r[14] = c3;
+    r[15] = c1;
+}
+
+void bn_mul_comba4(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b)
+{
+    BN_ULONG c1, c2, c3;
+
+    c1 = 0;
+    c2 = 0;
+    c3 = 0;
+    mul_add_c(a[0], b[0], c1, c2, c3);
+    r[0] = c1;
+    c1 = 0;
+    mul_add_c(a[0], b[1], c2, c3, c1);
+    mul_add_c(a[1], b[0], c2, c3, c1);
+    r[1] = c2;
+    c2 = 0;
+    mul_add_c(a[2], b[0], c3, c1, c2);
+    mul_add_c(a[1], b[1], c3, c1, c2);
+    mul_add_c(a[0], b[2], c3, c1, c2);
+    r[2] = c3;
+    c3 = 0;
+    mul_add_c(a[0], b[3], c1, c2, c3);
+    mul_add_c(a[1], b[2], c1, c2, c3);
+    mul_add_c(a[2], b[1], c1, c2, c3);
+    mul_add_c(a[3], b[0], c1, c2, c3);
+    r[3] = c1;
+    c1 = 0;
+    mul_add_c(a[3], b[1], c2, c3, c1);
+    mul_add_c(a[2], b[2], c2, c3, c1);
+    mul_add_c(a[1], b[3], c2, c3, c1);
+    r[4] = c2;
+    c2 = 0;
+    mul_add_c(a[2], b[3], c3, c1, c2);
+    mul_add_c(a[3], b[2], c3, c1, c2);
+    r[5] = c3;
+    c3 = 0;
+    mul_add_c(a[3], b[3], c1, c2, c3);
+    r[6] = c1;
+    r[7] = c2;
+}
+
+void bn_sqr_comba8(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a)
+{
+    BN_ULONG c1, c2, c3;
+
+    c1 = 0;
+    c2 = 0;
+    c3 = 0;
+    sqr_add_c(a, 0, c1, c2, c3);
+    r[0] = c1;
+    c1 = 0;
+    sqr_add_c2(a, 1, 0, c2, c3, c1);
+    r[1] = c2;
+    c2 = 0;
+    sqr_add_c(a, 1, c3, c1, c2);
+    sqr_add_c2(a, 2, 0, c3, c1, c2);
+    r[2] = c3;
+    c3 = 0;
+    sqr_add_c2(a, 3, 0, c1, c2, c3);
+    sqr_add_c2(a, 2, 1, c1, c2, c3);
+    r[3] = c1;
+    c1 = 0;
+    sqr_add_c(a, 2, c2, c3, c1);
+    sqr_add_c2(a, 3, 1, c2, c3, c1);
+    sqr_add_c2(a, 4, 0, c2, c3, c1);
+    r[4] = c2;
+    c2 = 0;
+    sqr_add_c2(a, 5, 0, c3, c1, c2);
+    sqr_add_c2(a, 4, 1, c3, c1, c2);
+    sqr_add_c2(a, 3, 2, c3, c1, c2);
+    r[5] = c3;
+    c3 = 0;
+    sqr_add_c(a, 3, c1, c2, c3);
+    sqr_add_c2(a, 4, 2, c1, c2, c3);
+    sqr_add_c2(a, 5, 1, c1, c2, c3);
+    sqr_add_c2(a, 6, 0, c1, c2, c3);
+    r[6] = c1;
+    c1 = 0;
+    sqr_add_c2(a, 7, 0, c2, c3, c1);
+    sqr_add_c2(a, 6, 1, c2, c3, c1);
+    sqr_add_c2(a, 5, 2, c2, c3, c1);
+    sqr_add_c2(a, 4, 3, c2, c3, c1);
+    r[7] = c2;
+    c2 = 0;
+    sqr_add_c(a, 4, c3, c1, c2);
+    sqr_add_c2(a, 5, 3, c3, c1, c2);
+    sqr_add_c2(a, 6, 2, c3, c1, c2);
+    sqr_add_c2(a, 7, 1, c3, c1, c2);
+    r[8] = c3;
+    c3 = 0;
+    sqr_add_c2(a, 7, 2, c1, c2, c3);
+    sqr_add_c2(a, 6, 3, c1, c2, c3);
+    sqr_add_c2(a, 5, 4, c1, c2, c3);
+    r[9] = c1;
+    c1 = 0;
+    sqr_add_c(a, 5, c2, c3, c1);
+    sqr_add_c2(a, 6, 4, c2, c3, c1);
+    sqr_add_c2(a, 7, 3, c2, c3, c1);
+    r[10] = c2;
+    c2 = 0;
+    sqr_add_c2(a, 7, 4, c3, c1, c2);
+    sqr_add_c2(a, 6, 5, c3, c1, c2);
+    r[11] = c3;
+    c3 = 0;
+    sqr_add_c(a, 6, c1, c2, c3);
+    sqr_add_c2(a, 7, 5, c1, c2, c3);
+    r[12] = c1;
+    c1 = 0;
+    sqr_add_c2(a, 7, 6, c2, c3, c1);
+    r[13] = c2;
+    c2 = 0;
+    sqr_add_c(a, 7, c3, c1, c2);
+    r[14] = c3;
+    r[15] = c1;
+}
+
+void bn_sqr_comba4(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a)
+{
+    BN_ULONG c1, c2, c3;
+
+    c1 = 0;
+    c2 = 0;
+    c3 = 0;
+    sqr_add_c(a, 0, c1, c2, c3);
+    r[0] = c1;
+    c1 = 0;
+    sqr_add_c2(a, 1, 0, c2, c3, c1);
+    r[1] = c2;
+    c2 = 0;
+    sqr_add_c(a, 1, c3, c1, c2);
+    sqr_add_c2(a, 2, 0, c3, c1, c2);
+    r[2] = c3;
+    c3 = 0;
+    sqr_add_c2(a, 3, 0, c1, c2, c3);
+    sqr_add_c2(a, 2, 1, c1, c2, c3);
+    r[3] = c1;
+    c1 = 0;
+    sqr_add_c(a, 2, c2, c3, c1);
+    sqr_add_c2(a, 3, 1, c2, c3, c1);
+    r[4] = c2;
+    c2 = 0;
+    sqr_add_c2(a, 3, 2, c3, c1, c2);
+    r[5] = c3;
+    c3 = 0;
+    sqr_add_c(a, 3, c1, c2, c3);
+    r[6] = c1;
+    r[7] = c2;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gf2m.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gf2m.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d962f62
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gf2m.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,397 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# May 2011
+#
+# The module implements bn_GF2m_mul_2x2 polynomial multiplication used
+# in bn_gf2m.c. It's kind of low-hanging mechanical port from C for
+# the time being... Except that it has two code paths: code suitable
+# for any x86_64 CPU and PCLMULQDQ one suitable for Westmere and
+# later. Improvement varies from one benchmark and µ-arch to another.
+# Vanilla code path is at most 20% faster than compiler-generated code
+# [not very impressive], while PCLMULQDQ - whole 85%-160% better on
+# 163- and 571-bit ECDH benchmarks on Intel CPUs. Keep in mind that
+# these coefficients are not ones for bn_GF2m_mul_2x2 itself, as not
+# all CPU time is burnt in it...
+
+$flavour = shift;
+$output  = shift;
+if ($flavour =~ /\./) { $output = $flavour; undef $flavour; }
+
+$win64=0; $win64=1 if ($flavour =~ /[nm]asm|mingw64/ || $output =~ /\.asm$/);
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+( $xlate="${dir}x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
+( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
+die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl";
+
+open OUT,"| \"$^X\" \"$xlate\" $flavour \"$output\"";
+*STDOUT=*OUT;
+
+($lo,$hi)=("%rax","%rdx");	$a=$lo;
+($i0,$i1)=("%rsi","%rdi");
+($t0,$t1)=("%rbx","%rcx");
+($b,$mask)=("%rbp","%r8");
+($a1,$a2,$a4,$a8,$a12,$a48)=map("%r$_",(9..15));
+($R,$Tx)=("%xmm0","%xmm1");
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.text
+
+.type	_mul_1x1,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+_mul_1x1:
+	sub	\$128+8,%rsp
+	mov	\$-1,$a1
+	lea	($a,$a),$i0
+	shr	\$3,$a1
+	lea	(,$a,4),$i1
+	and	$a,$a1			# a1=a&0x1fffffffffffffff
+	lea	(,$a,8),$a8
+	sar	\$63,$a			# broadcast 63rd bit
+	lea	($a1,$a1),$a2
+	sar	\$63,$i0		# broadcast 62nd bit
+	lea	(,$a1,4),$a4
+	and	$b,$a
+	sar	\$63,$i1		# boardcast 61st bit
+	mov	$a,$hi			# $a is $lo
+	shl	\$63,$lo
+	and	$b,$i0
+	shr	\$1,$hi
+	mov	$i0,$t1
+	shl	\$62,$i0
+	and	$b,$i1
+	shr	\$2,$t1
+	xor	$i0,$lo
+	mov	$i1,$t0
+	shl	\$61,$i1
+	xor	$t1,$hi
+	shr	\$3,$t0
+	xor	$i1,$lo
+	xor	$t0,$hi
+
+	mov	$a1,$a12
+	movq	\$0,0(%rsp)		# tab[0]=0
+	xor	$a2,$a12		# a1^a2
+	mov	$a1,8(%rsp)		# tab[1]=a1
+	 mov	$a4,$a48
+	mov	$a2,16(%rsp)		# tab[2]=a2
+	 xor	$a8,$a48		# a4^a8
+	mov	$a12,24(%rsp)		# tab[3]=a1^a2
+
+	xor	$a4,$a1
+	mov	$a4,32(%rsp)		# tab[4]=a4
+	xor	$a4,$a2
+	mov	$a1,40(%rsp)		# tab[5]=a1^a4
+	xor	$a4,$a12
+	mov	$a2,48(%rsp)		# tab[6]=a2^a4
+	 xor	$a48,$a1		# a1^a4^a4^a8=a1^a8
+	mov	$a12,56(%rsp)		# tab[7]=a1^a2^a4
+	 xor	$a48,$a2		# a2^a4^a4^a8=a1^a8
+
+	mov	$a8,64(%rsp)		# tab[8]=a8
+	xor	$a48,$a12		# a1^a2^a4^a4^a8=a1^a2^a8
+	mov	$a1,72(%rsp)		# tab[9]=a1^a8
+	 xor	$a4,$a1			# a1^a8^a4
+	mov	$a2,80(%rsp)		# tab[10]=a2^a8
+	 xor	$a4,$a2			# a2^a8^a4
+	mov	$a12,88(%rsp)		# tab[11]=a1^a2^a8
+
+	xor	$a4,$a12		# a1^a2^a8^a4
+	mov	$a48,96(%rsp)		# tab[12]=a4^a8
+	 mov	$mask,$i0
+	mov	$a1,104(%rsp)		# tab[13]=a1^a4^a8
+	 and	$b,$i0
+	mov	$a2,112(%rsp)		# tab[14]=a2^a4^a8
+	 shr	\$4,$b
+	mov	$a12,120(%rsp)		# tab[15]=a1^a2^a4^a8
+	 mov	$mask,$i1
+	 and	$b,$i1
+	 shr	\$4,$b
+
+	movq	(%rsp,$i0,8),$R		# half of calculations is done in SSE2
+	mov	$mask,$i0
+	and	$b,$i0
+	shr	\$4,$b
+___
+    for ($n=1;$n<8;$n++) {
+	$code.=<<___;
+	mov	(%rsp,$i1,8),$t1
+	mov	$mask,$i1
+	mov	$t1,$t0
+	shl	\$`8*$n-4`,$t1
+	and	$b,$i1
+	 movq	(%rsp,$i0,8),$Tx
+	shr	\$`64-(8*$n-4)`,$t0
+	xor	$t1,$lo
+	 pslldq	\$$n,$Tx
+	 mov	$mask,$i0
+	shr	\$4,$b
+	xor	$t0,$hi
+	 and	$b,$i0
+	 shr	\$4,$b
+	 pxor	$Tx,$R
+___
+    }
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	(%rsp,$i1,8),$t1
+	mov	$t1,$t0
+	shl	\$`8*$n-4`,$t1
+	movq	$R,$i0
+	shr	\$`64-(8*$n-4)`,$t0
+	xor	$t1,$lo
+	psrldq	\$8,$R
+	xor	$t0,$hi
+	movq	$R,$i1
+	xor	$i0,$lo
+	xor	$i1,$hi
+
+	add	\$128+8,%rsp
+	ret
+.Lend_mul_1x1:
+.size	_mul_1x1,.-_mul_1x1
+___
+
+($rp,$a1,$a0,$b1,$b0) = $win64?	("%rcx","%rdx","%r8", "%r9","%r10") :	# Win64 order
+				("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx","%rcx","%r8");	# Unix order
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.extern	OPENSSL_ia32cap_P
+.globl	bn_GF2m_mul_2x2
+.type	bn_GF2m_mul_2x2,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+bn_GF2m_mul_2x2:
+	mov	OPENSSL_ia32cap_P(%rip),%rax
+	bt	\$33,%rax
+	jnc	.Lvanilla_mul_2x2
+
+	movq		$a1,%xmm0
+	movq		$b1,%xmm1
+	movq		$a0,%xmm2
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	movq		40(%rsp),%xmm3
+___
+$code.=<<___ if (!$win64);
+	movq		$b0,%xmm3
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	movdqa		%xmm0,%xmm4
+	movdqa		%xmm1,%xmm5
+	pclmulqdq	\$0,%xmm1,%xmm0	# a1·b1
+	pxor		%xmm2,%xmm4
+	pxor		%xmm3,%xmm5
+	pclmulqdq	\$0,%xmm3,%xmm2	# a0·b0
+	pclmulqdq	\$0,%xmm5,%xmm4	# (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)
+	xorps		%xmm0,%xmm4
+	xorps		%xmm2,%xmm4	# (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)-a0·b0-a1·b1
+	movdqa		%xmm4,%xmm5
+	pslldq		\$8,%xmm4
+	psrldq		\$8,%xmm5
+	pxor		%xmm4,%xmm2
+	pxor		%xmm5,%xmm0
+	movdqu		%xmm2,0($rp)
+	movdqu		%xmm0,16($rp)
+	ret
+
+.align	16
+.Lvanilla_mul_2x2:
+	lea	-8*17(%rsp),%rsp
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	mov	`8*17+40`(%rsp),$b0
+	mov	%rdi,8*15(%rsp)
+	mov	%rsi,8*16(%rsp)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	%r14,8*10(%rsp)
+	mov	%r13,8*11(%rsp)
+	mov	%r12,8*12(%rsp)
+	mov	%rbp,8*13(%rsp)
+	mov	%rbx,8*14(%rsp)
+.Lbody_mul_2x2:
+	mov	$rp,32(%rsp)		# save the arguments
+	mov	$a1,40(%rsp)
+	mov	$a0,48(%rsp)
+	mov	$b1,56(%rsp)
+	mov	$b0,64(%rsp)
+
+	mov	\$0xf,$mask
+	mov	$a1,$a
+	mov	$b1,$b
+	call	_mul_1x1		# a1·b1
+	mov	$lo,16(%rsp)
+	mov	$hi,24(%rsp)
+
+	mov	48(%rsp),$a
+	mov	64(%rsp),$b
+	call	_mul_1x1		# a0·b0
+	mov	$lo,0(%rsp)
+	mov	$hi,8(%rsp)
+
+	mov	40(%rsp),$a
+	mov	56(%rsp),$b
+	xor	48(%rsp),$a
+	xor	64(%rsp),$b
+	call	_mul_1x1		# (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)
+___
+	@r=("%rbx","%rcx","%rdi","%rsi");
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	0(%rsp),@r[0]
+	mov	8(%rsp),@r[1]
+	mov	16(%rsp),@r[2]
+	mov	24(%rsp),@r[3]
+	mov	32(%rsp),%rbp
+
+	xor	$hi,$lo
+	xor	@r[1],$hi
+	xor	@r[0],$lo
+	mov	@r[0],0(%rbp)
+	xor	@r[2],$hi
+	mov	@r[3],24(%rbp)
+	xor	@r[3],$lo
+	xor	@r[3],$hi
+	xor	$hi,$lo
+	mov	$hi,16(%rbp)
+	mov	$lo,8(%rbp)
+
+	mov	8*10(%rsp),%r14
+	mov	8*11(%rsp),%r13
+	mov	8*12(%rsp),%r12
+	mov	8*13(%rsp),%rbp
+	mov	8*14(%rsp),%rbx
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	mov	8*15(%rsp),%rdi
+	mov	8*16(%rsp),%rsi
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	lea	8*17(%rsp),%rsp
+	ret
+.Lend_mul_2x2:
+.size	bn_GF2m_mul_2x2,.-bn_GF2m_mul_2x2
+.asciz	"GF(2^m) Multiplication for x86_64, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+.align	16
+___
+
+# EXCEPTION_DISPOSITION handler (EXCEPTION_RECORD *rec,ULONG64 frame,
+#               CONTEXT *context,DISPATCHER_CONTEXT *disp)
+if ($win64) {
+$rec="%rcx";
+$frame="%rdx";
+$context="%r8";
+$disp="%r9";
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.extern __imp_RtlVirtualUnwind
+
+.type	se_handler,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+se_handler:
+	push	%rsi
+	push	%rdi
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+	pushfq
+	sub	\$64,%rsp
+
+	mov	152($context),%rax	# pull context->Rsp
+	mov	248($context),%rbx	# pull context->Rip
+
+	lea	.Lbody_mul_2x2(%rip),%r10
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip<"prologue" label
+	jb	.Lin_prologue
+
+	mov	8*10(%rax),%r14		# mimic epilogue
+	mov	8*11(%rax),%r13
+	mov	8*12(%rax),%r12
+	mov	8*13(%rax),%rbp
+	mov	8*14(%rax),%rbx
+	mov	8*15(%rax),%rdi
+	mov	8*16(%rax),%rsi
+
+	mov	%rbx,144($context)	# restore context->Rbx
+	mov	%rbp,160($context)	# restore context->Rbp
+	mov	%rsi,168($context)	# restore context->Rsi
+	mov	%rdi,176($context)	# restore context->Rdi
+	mov	%r12,216($context)	# restore context->R12
+	mov	%r13,224($context)	# restore context->R13
+	mov	%r14,232($context)	# restore context->R14
+
+.Lin_prologue:
+	lea	8*17(%rax),%rax
+	mov	%rax,152($context)	# restore context->Rsp
+
+	mov	40($disp),%rdi		# disp->ContextRecord
+	mov	$context,%rsi		# context
+	mov	\$154,%ecx		# sizeof(CONTEXT)
+	.long	0xa548f3fc		# cld; rep movsq
+
+	mov	$disp,%rsi
+	xor	%rcx,%rcx		# arg1, UNW_FLAG_NHANDLER
+	mov	8(%rsi),%rdx		# arg2, disp->ImageBase
+	mov	0(%rsi),%r8		# arg3, disp->ControlPc
+	mov	16(%rsi),%r9		# arg4, disp->FunctionEntry
+	mov	40(%rsi),%r10		# disp->ContextRecord
+	lea	56(%rsi),%r11		# &disp->HandlerData
+	lea	24(%rsi),%r12		# &disp->EstablisherFrame
+	mov	%r10,32(%rsp)		# arg5
+	mov	%r11,40(%rsp)		# arg6
+	mov	%r12,48(%rsp)		# arg7
+	mov	%rcx,56(%rsp)		# arg8, (NULL)
+	call	*__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind(%rip)
+
+	mov	\$1,%eax		# ExceptionContinueSearch
+	add	\$64,%rsp
+	popfq
+	pop	%r15
+	pop	%r14
+	pop	%r13
+	pop	%r12
+	pop	%rbp
+	pop	%rbx
+	pop	%rdi
+	pop	%rsi
+	ret
+.size	se_handler,.-se_handler
+
+.section	.pdata
+.align	4
+	.rva	_mul_1x1
+	.rva	.Lend_mul_1x1
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_1x1
+
+	.rva	.Lvanilla_mul_2x2
+	.rva	.Lend_mul_2x2
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_2x2
+.section	.xdata
+.align	8
+.LSEH_info_1x1:
+	.byte	0x01,0x07,0x02,0x00
+	.byte	0x07,0x01,0x11,0x00	# sub rsp,128+8
+.LSEH_info_2x2:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	se_handler
+___
+}
+
+$code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval($1)/gem;
+print $code;
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont.pl
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..df4cca5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,1521 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+
+# October 2005.
+#
+# Montgomery multiplication routine for x86_64. While it gives modest
+# 9% improvement of rsa4096 sign on Opteron, rsa512 sign runs more
+# than twice, >2x, as fast. Most common rsa1024 sign is improved by
+# respectful 50%. It remains to be seen if loop unrolling and
+# dedicated squaring routine can provide further improvement...
+
+# July 2011.
+#
+# Add dedicated squaring procedure. Performance improvement varies
+# from platform to platform, but in average it's ~5%/15%/25%/33%
+# for 512-/1024-/2048-/4096-bit RSA *sign* benchmarks respectively.
+
+# August 2011.
+#
+# Unroll and modulo-schedule inner loops in such manner that they
+# are "fallen through" for input lengths of 8, which is critical for
+# 1024-bit RSA *sign*. Average performance improvement in comparison
+# to *initial* version of this module from 2005 is ~0%/30%/40%/45%
+# for 512-/1024-/2048-/4096-bit RSA *sign* benchmarks respectively.
+
+# June 2013.
+#
+# Optimize reduction in squaring procedure and improve 1024+-bit RSA
+# sign performance by 10-16% on Intel Sandy Bridge and later
+# (virtually same on non-Intel processors).
+
+# August 2013.
+#
+# Add MULX/ADOX/ADCX code path.
+
+$flavour = shift;
+$output  = shift;
+if ($flavour =~ /\./) { $output = $flavour; undef $flavour; }
+
+$win64=0; $win64=1 if ($flavour =~ /[nm]asm|mingw64/ || $output =~ /\.asm$/);
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+( $xlate="${dir}x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
+( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
+die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl";
+
+open OUT,"| \"$^X\" \"$xlate\" $flavour \"$output\"";
+*STDOUT=*OUT;
+
+if (`$ENV{CC} -Wa,-v -c -o /dev/null -x assembler /dev/null 2>&1`
+		=~ /GNU assembler version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
+	$addx = ($1>=2.23);
+}
+
+if (!$addx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /nasm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /nasm/) &&
+	    `nasm -v 2>&1` =~ /NASM version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
+	$addx = ($1>=2.10);
+}
+
+if (!$addx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
+	    `ml64 2>&1` =~ /Version ([0-9]+)\./) {
+	$addx = ($1>=12);
+}
+
+if (!$addx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([3-9])\.([0-9]+)/) {
+	my $ver = $2 + $3/100.0;	# 3.1->3.01, 3.10->3.10
+	$addx = ($ver>=3.03);
+}
+
+# int bn_mul_mont(
+$rp="%rdi";	# BN_ULONG *rp,
+$ap="%rsi";	# const BN_ULONG *ap,
+$bp="%rdx";	# const BN_ULONG *bp,
+$np="%rcx";	# const BN_ULONG *np,
+$n0="%r8";	# const BN_ULONG *n0,
+$num="%r9";	# int num);
+$lo0="%r10";
+$hi0="%r11";
+$hi1="%r13";
+$i="%r14";
+$j="%r15";
+$m0="%rbx";
+$m1="%rbp";
+
+$code=<<___;
+.text
+
+.extern	OPENSSL_ia32cap_P
+
+.globl	bn_mul_mont
+.type	bn_mul_mont,\@function,6
+.align	16
+bn_mul_mont:
+	mov	${num}d,${num}d
+	mov	%rsp,%rax
+	test	\$3,${num}d
+	jnz	.Lmul_enter
+	cmp	\$8,${num}d
+	jb	.Lmul_enter
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($addx);
+	mov	OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+8(%rip),%r11d
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	cmp	$ap,$bp
+	jne	.Lmul4x_enter
+	test	\$7,${num}d
+	jz	.Lsqr8x_enter
+	jmp	.Lmul4x_enter
+
+.align	16
+.Lmul_enter:
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+
+	neg	$num
+	mov	%rsp,%r11
+	lea	-16(%rsp,$num,8),%r10	# future alloca(8*(num+2))
+	neg	$num			# restore $num
+	and	\$-1024,%r10		# minimize TLB usage
+
+	# An OS-agnostic version of __chkstk.
+	#
+	# Some OSes (Windows) insist on stack being "wired" to
+	# physical memory in strictly sequential manner, i.e. if stack
+	# allocation spans two pages, then reference to farmost one can
+	# be punishable by SEGV. But page walking can do good even on
+	# other OSes, because it guarantees that villain thread hits
+	# the guard page before it can make damage to innocent one...
+	sub	%r10,%r11
+	and	\$-4096,%r11
+	lea	(%r10,%r11),%rsp
+	mov	(%rsp),%r11
+	cmp	%r10,%rsp
+	ja	.Lmul_page_walk
+	jmp	.Lmul_page_walk_done
+
+.align	16
+.Lmul_page_walk:
+	lea	-4096(%rsp),%rsp
+	mov	(%rsp),%r11
+	cmp	%r10,%rsp
+	ja	.Lmul_page_walk
+.Lmul_page_walk_done:
+
+	mov	%rax,8(%rsp,$num,8)	# tp[num+1]=%rsp
+.Lmul_body:
+	mov	$bp,%r12		# reassign $bp
+___
+		$bp="%r12";
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	($n0),$n0		# pull n0[0] value
+	mov	($bp),$m0		# m0=bp[0]
+	mov	($ap),%rax
+
+	xor	$i,$i			# i=0
+	xor	$j,$j			# j=0
+
+	mov	$n0,$m1
+	mulq	$m0			# ap[0]*bp[0]
+	mov	%rax,$lo0
+	mov	($np),%rax
+
+	imulq	$lo0,$m1		# "tp[0]"*n0
+	mov	%rdx,$hi0
+
+	mulq	$m1			# np[0]*m1
+	add	%rax,$lo0		# discarded
+	mov	8($ap),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	mov	%rdx,$hi1
+
+	lea	1($j),$j		# j++
+	jmp	.L1st_enter
+
+.align	16
+.L1st:
+	add	%rax,$hi1
+	mov	($ap,$j,8),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	add	$hi0,$hi1		# np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0]
+	mov	$lo0,$hi0
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	mov	$hi1,-16(%rsp,$j,8)	# tp[j-1]
+	mov	%rdx,$hi1
+
+.L1st_enter:
+	mulq	$m0			# ap[j]*bp[0]
+	add	%rax,$hi0
+	mov	($np,$j,8),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	lea	1($j),$j		# j++
+	mov	%rdx,$lo0
+
+	mulq	$m1			# np[j]*m1
+	cmp	$num,$j
+	jne	.L1st
+
+	add	%rax,$hi1
+	mov	($ap),%rax		# ap[0]
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	add	$hi0,$hi1		# np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0]
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	mov	$hi1,-16(%rsp,$j,8)	# tp[j-1]
+	mov	%rdx,$hi1
+	mov	$lo0,$hi0
+
+	xor	%rdx,%rdx
+	add	$hi0,$hi1
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	mov	$hi1,-8(%rsp,$num,8)
+	mov	%rdx,(%rsp,$num,8)	# store upmost overflow bit
+
+	lea	1($i),$i		# i++
+	jmp	.Louter
+.align	16
+.Louter:
+	mov	($bp,$i,8),$m0		# m0=bp[i]
+	xor	$j,$j			# j=0
+	mov	$n0,$m1
+	mov	(%rsp),$lo0
+	mulq	$m0			# ap[0]*bp[i]
+	add	%rax,$lo0		# ap[0]*bp[i]+tp[0]
+	mov	($np),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+
+	imulq	$lo0,$m1		# tp[0]*n0
+	mov	%rdx,$hi0
+
+	mulq	$m1			# np[0]*m1
+	add	%rax,$lo0		# discarded
+	mov	8($ap),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	mov	8(%rsp),$lo0		# tp[1]
+	mov	%rdx,$hi1
+
+	lea	1($j),$j		# j++
+	jmp	.Linner_enter
+
+.align	16
+.Linner:
+	add	%rax,$hi1
+	mov	($ap,$j,8),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	add	$lo0,$hi1		# np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j]
+	mov	(%rsp,$j,8),$lo0
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	mov	$hi1,-16(%rsp,$j,8)	# tp[j-1]
+	mov	%rdx,$hi1
+
+.Linner_enter:
+	mulq	$m0			# ap[j]*bp[i]
+	add	%rax,$hi0
+	mov	($np,$j,8),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	add	$hi0,$lo0		# ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j]
+	mov	%rdx,$hi0
+	adc	\$0,$hi0
+	lea	1($j),$j		# j++
+
+	mulq	$m1			# np[j]*m1
+	cmp	$num,$j
+	jne	.Linner
+
+	add	%rax,$hi1
+	mov	($ap),%rax		# ap[0]
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	add	$lo0,$hi1		# np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j]
+	mov	(%rsp,$j,8),$lo0
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	mov	$hi1,-16(%rsp,$j,8)	# tp[j-1]
+	mov	%rdx,$hi1
+
+	xor	%rdx,%rdx
+	add	$hi0,$hi1
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	add	$lo0,$hi1		# pull upmost overflow bit
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	mov	$hi1,-8(%rsp,$num,8)
+	mov	%rdx,(%rsp,$num,8)	# store upmost overflow bit
+
+	lea	1($i),$i		# i++
+	cmp	$num,$i
+	jb	.Louter
+
+	xor	$i,$i			# i=0 and clear CF!
+	mov	(%rsp),%rax		# tp[0]
+	lea	(%rsp),$ap		# borrow ap for tp
+	mov	$num,$j			# j=num
+	jmp	.Lsub
+.align	16
+.Lsub:	sbb	($np,$i,8),%rax
+	mov	%rax,($rp,$i,8)		# rp[i]=tp[i]-np[i]
+	mov	8($ap,$i,8),%rax	# tp[i+1]
+	lea	1($i),$i		# i++
+	dec	$j			# doesnn't affect CF!
+	jnz	.Lsub
+
+	sbb	\$0,%rax		# handle upmost overflow bit
+	xor	$i,$i
+	and	%rax,$ap
+	not	%rax
+	mov	$rp,$np
+	and	%rax,$np
+	mov	$num,$j			# j=num
+	or	$np,$ap			# ap=borrow?tp:rp
+.align	16
+.Lcopy:					# copy or in-place refresh
+	mov	($ap,$i,8),%rax
+	mov	$i,(%rsp,$i,8)		# zap temporary vector
+	mov	%rax,($rp,$i,8)		# rp[i]=tp[i]
+	lea	1($i),$i
+	sub	\$1,$j
+	jnz	.Lcopy
+
+	mov	8(%rsp,$num,8),%rsi	# restore %rsp
+	mov	\$1,%rax
+	mov	-48(%rsi),%r15
+	mov	-40(%rsi),%r14
+	mov	-32(%rsi),%r13
+	mov	-24(%rsi),%r12
+	mov	-16(%rsi),%rbp
+	mov	-8(%rsi),%rbx
+	lea	(%rsi),%rsp
+.Lmul_epilogue:
+	ret
+.size	bn_mul_mont,.-bn_mul_mont
+___
+{{{
+my @A=("%r10","%r11");
+my @N=("%r13","%rdi");
+$code.=<<___;
+.type	bn_mul4x_mont,\@function,6
+.align	16
+bn_mul4x_mont:
+	mov	${num}d,${num}d
+	mov	%rsp,%rax
+.Lmul4x_enter:
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($addx);
+	and	\$0x80100,%r11d
+	cmp	\$0x80100,%r11d
+	je	.Lmulx4x_enter
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+
+	neg	$num
+	mov	%rsp,%r11
+	lea	-32(%rsp,$num,8),%r10	# future alloca(8*(num+4))
+	neg	$num			# restore
+	and	\$-1024,%r10		# minimize TLB usage
+
+	sub	%r10,%r11
+	and	\$-4096,%r11
+	lea	(%r10,%r11),%rsp
+	mov	(%rsp),%r11
+	cmp	%r10,%rsp
+	ja	.Lmul4x_page_walk
+	jmp	.Lmul4x_page_walk_done
+
+.Lmul4x_page_walk:
+	lea	-4096(%rsp),%rsp
+	mov	(%rsp),%r11
+	cmp	%r10,%rsp
+	ja	.Lmul4x_page_walk
+.Lmul4x_page_walk_done:
+
+	mov	%rax,8(%rsp,$num,8)	# tp[num+1]=%rsp
+.Lmul4x_body:
+	mov	$rp,16(%rsp,$num,8)	# tp[num+2]=$rp
+	mov	%rdx,%r12		# reassign $bp
+___
+		$bp="%r12";
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	($n0),$n0		# pull n0[0] value
+	mov	($bp),$m0		# m0=bp[0]
+	mov	($ap),%rax
+
+	xor	$i,$i			# i=0
+	xor	$j,$j			# j=0
+
+	mov	$n0,$m1
+	mulq	$m0			# ap[0]*bp[0]
+	mov	%rax,$A[0]
+	mov	($np),%rax
+
+	imulq	$A[0],$m1		# "tp[0]"*n0
+	mov	%rdx,$A[1]
+
+	mulq	$m1			# np[0]*m1
+	add	%rax,$A[0]		# discarded
+	mov	8($ap),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	mov	%rdx,$N[1]
+
+	mulq	$m0
+	add	%rax,$A[1]
+	mov	8($np),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	mov	%rdx,$A[0]
+
+	mulq	$m1
+	add	%rax,$N[1]
+	mov	16($ap),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	add	$A[1],$N[1]
+	lea	4($j),$j		# j++
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	mov	$N[1],(%rsp)
+	mov	%rdx,$N[0]
+	jmp	.L1st4x
+.align	16
+.L1st4x:
+	mulq	$m0			# ap[j]*bp[0]
+	add	%rax,$A[0]
+	mov	-16($np,$j,8),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	mov	%rdx,$A[1]
+
+	mulq	$m1			# np[j]*m1
+	add	%rax,$N[0]
+	mov	-8($ap,$j,8),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	add	$A[0],$N[0]		# np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0]
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	mov	$N[0],-24(%rsp,$j,8)	# tp[j-1]
+	mov	%rdx,$N[1]
+
+	mulq	$m0			# ap[j]*bp[0]
+	add	%rax,$A[1]
+	mov	-8($np,$j,8),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	mov	%rdx,$A[0]
+
+	mulq	$m1			# np[j]*m1
+	add	%rax,$N[1]
+	mov	($ap,$j,8),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	add	$A[1],$N[1]		# np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0]
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	mov	$N[1],-16(%rsp,$j,8)	# tp[j-1]
+	mov	%rdx,$N[0]
+
+	mulq	$m0			# ap[j]*bp[0]
+	add	%rax,$A[0]
+	mov	($np,$j,8),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	mov	%rdx,$A[1]
+
+	mulq	$m1			# np[j]*m1
+	add	%rax,$N[0]
+	mov	8($ap,$j,8),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	add	$A[0],$N[0]		# np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0]
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	mov	$N[0],-8(%rsp,$j,8)	# tp[j-1]
+	mov	%rdx,$N[1]
+
+	mulq	$m0			# ap[j]*bp[0]
+	add	%rax,$A[1]
+	mov	8($np,$j,8),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	lea	4($j),$j		# j++
+	mov	%rdx,$A[0]
+
+	mulq	$m1			# np[j]*m1
+	add	%rax,$N[1]
+	mov	-16($ap,$j,8),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	add	$A[1],$N[1]		# np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0]
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	mov	$N[1],-32(%rsp,$j,8)	# tp[j-1]
+	mov	%rdx,$N[0]
+	cmp	$num,$j
+	jb	.L1st4x
+
+	mulq	$m0			# ap[j]*bp[0]
+	add	%rax,$A[0]
+	mov	-16($np,$j,8),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	mov	%rdx,$A[1]
+
+	mulq	$m1			# np[j]*m1
+	add	%rax,$N[0]
+	mov	-8($ap,$j,8),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	add	$A[0],$N[0]		# np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0]
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	mov	$N[0],-24(%rsp,$j,8)	# tp[j-1]
+	mov	%rdx,$N[1]
+
+	mulq	$m0			# ap[j]*bp[0]
+	add	%rax,$A[1]
+	mov	-8($np,$j,8),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	mov	%rdx,$A[0]
+
+	mulq	$m1			# np[j]*m1
+	add	%rax,$N[1]
+	mov	($ap),%rax		# ap[0]
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	add	$A[1],$N[1]		# np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0]
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	mov	$N[1],-16(%rsp,$j,8)	# tp[j-1]
+	mov	%rdx,$N[0]
+
+	xor	$N[1],$N[1]
+	add	$A[0],$N[0]
+	adc	\$0,$N[1]
+	mov	$N[0],-8(%rsp,$j,8)
+	mov	$N[1],(%rsp,$j,8)	# store upmost overflow bit
+
+	lea	1($i),$i		# i++
+.align	4
+.Louter4x:
+	mov	($bp,$i,8),$m0		# m0=bp[i]
+	xor	$j,$j			# j=0
+	mov	(%rsp),$A[0]
+	mov	$n0,$m1
+	mulq	$m0			# ap[0]*bp[i]
+	add	%rax,$A[0]		# ap[0]*bp[i]+tp[0]
+	mov	($np),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+
+	imulq	$A[0],$m1		# tp[0]*n0
+	mov	%rdx,$A[1]
+
+	mulq	$m1			# np[0]*m1
+	add	%rax,$A[0]		# "$N[0]", discarded
+	mov	8($ap),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	mov	%rdx,$N[1]
+
+	mulq	$m0			# ap[j]*bp[i]
+	add	%rax,$A[1]
+	mov	8($np),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	add	8(%rsp),$A[1]		# +tp[1]
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	mov	%rdx,$A[0]
+
+	mulq	$m1			# np[j]*m1
+	add	%rax,$N[1]
+	mov	16($ap),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	add	$A[1],$N[1]		# np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j]
+	lea	4($j),$j		# j+=2
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	mov	$N[1],(%rsp)		# tp[j-1]
+	mov	%rdx,$N[0]
+	jmp	.Linner4x
+.align	16
+.Linner4x:
+	mulq	$m0			# ap[j]*bp[i]
+	add	%rax,$A[0]
+	mov	-16($np,$j,8),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	add	-16(%rsp,$j,8),$A[0]	# ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j]
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	mov	%rdx,$A[1]
+
+	mulq	$m1			# np[j]*m1
+	add	%rax,$N[0]
+	mov	-8($ap,$j,8),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	add	$A[0],$N[0]
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	mov	$N[0],-24(%rsp,$j,8)	# tp[j-1]
+	mov	%rdx,$N[1]
+
+	mulq	$m0			# ap[j]*bp[i]
+	add	%rax,$A[1]
+	mov	-8($np,$j,8),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	add	-8(%rsp,$j,8),$A[1]
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	mov	%rdx,$A[0]
+
+	mulq	$m1			# np[j]*m1
+	add	%rax,$N[1]
+	mov	($ap,$j,8),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	add	$A[1],$N[1]
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	mov	$N[1],-16(%rsp,$j,8)	# tp[j-1]
+	mov	%rdx,$N[0]
+
+	mulq	$m0			# ap[j]*bp[i]
+	add	%rax,$A[0]
+	mov	($np,$j,8),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	add	(%rsp,$j,8),$A[0]	# ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j]
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	mov	%rdx,$A[1]
+
+	mulq	$m1			# np[j]*m1
+	add	%rax,$N[0]
+	mov	8($ap,$j,8),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	add	$A[0],$N[0]
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	mov	$N[0],-8(%rsp,$j,8)	# tp[j-1]
+	mov	%rdx,$N[1]
+
+	mulq	$m0			# ap[j]*bp[i]
+	add	%rax,$A[1]
+	mov	8($np,$j,8),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	add	8(%rsp,$j,8),$A[1]
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	lea	4($j),$j		# j++
+	mov	%rdx,$A[0]
+
+	mulq	$m1			# np[j]*m1
+	add	%rax,$N[1]
+	mov	-16($ap,$j,8),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	add	$A[1],$N[1]
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	mov	$N[1],-32(%rsp,$j,8)	# tp[j-1]
+	mov	%rdx,$N[0]
+	cmp	$num,$j
+	jb	.Linner4x
+
+	mulq	$m0			# ap[j]*bp[i]
+	add	%rax,$A[0]
+	mov	-16($np,$j,8),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	add	-16(%rsp,$j,8),$A[0]	# ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j]
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	mov	%rdx,$A[1]
+
+	mulq	$m1			# np[j]*m1
+	add	%rax,$N[0]
+	mov	-8($ap,$j,8),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	add	$A[0],$N[0]
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	mov	$N[0],-24(%rsp,$j,8)	# tp[j-1]
+	mov	%rdx,$N[1]
+
+	mulq	$m0			# ap[j]*bp[i]
+	add	%rax,$A[1]
+	mov	-8($np,$j,8),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	add	-8(%rsp,$j,8),$A[1]
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	lea	1($i),$i		# i++
+	mov	%rdx,$A[0]
+
+	mulq	$m1			# np[j]*m1
+	add	%rax,$N[1]
+	mov	($ap),%rax		# ap[0]
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	add	$A[1],$N[1]
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	mov	$N[1],-16(%rsp,$j,8)	# tp[j-1]
+	mov	%rdx,$N[0]
+
+	xor	$N[1],$N[1]
+	add	$A[0],$N[0]
+	adc	\$0,$N[1]
+	add	(%rsp,$num,8),$N[0]	# pull upmost overflow bit
+	adc	\$0,$N[1]
+	mov	$N[0],-8(%rsp,$j,8)
+	mov	$N[1],(%rsp,$j,8)	# store upmost overflow bit
+
+	cmp	$num,$i
+	jb	.Louter4x
+___
+{
+my @ri=("%rax","%rdx",$m0,$m1);
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	16(%rsp,$num,8),$rp	# restore $rp
+	mov	0(%rsp),@ri[0]		# tp[0]
+	pxor	%xmm0,%xmm0
+	mov	8(%rsp),@ri[1]		# tp[1]
+	shr	\$2,$num		# num/=4
+	lea	(%rsp),$ap		# borrow ap for tp
+	xor	$i,$i			# i=0 and clear CF!
+
+	sub	0($np),@ri[0]
+	mov	16($ap),@ri[2]		# tp[2]
+	mov	24($ap),@ri[3]		# tp[3]
+	sbb	8($np),@ri[1]
+	lea	-1($num),$j		# j=num/4-1
+	jmp	.Lsub4x
+.align	16
+.Lsub4x:
+	mov	@ri[0],0($rp,$i,8)	# rp[i]=tp[i]-np[i]
+	mov	@ri[1],8($rp,$i,8)	# rp[i]=tp[i]-np[i]
+	sbb	16($np,$i,8),@ri[2]
+	mov	32($ap,$i,8),@ri[0]	# tp[i+1]
+	mov	40($ap,$i,8),@ri[1]
+	sbb	24($np,$i,8),@ri[3]
+	mov	@ri[2],16($rp,$i,8)	# rp[i]=tp[i]-np[i]
+	mov	@ri[3],24($rp,$i,8)	# rp[i]=tp[i]-np[i]
+	sbb	32($np,$i,8),@ri[0]
+	mov	48($ap,$i,8),@ri[2]
+	mov	56($ap,$i,8),@ri[3]
+	sbb	40($np,$i,8),@ri[1]
+	lea	4($i),$i		# i++
+	dec	$j			# doesnn't affect CF!
+	jnz	.Lsub4x
+
+	mov	@ri[0],0($rp,$i,8)	# rp[i]=tp[i]-np[i]
+	mov	32($ap,$i,8),@ri[0]	# load overflow bit
+	sbb	16($np,$i,8),@ri[2]
+	mov	@ri[1],8($rp,$i,8)	# rp[i]=tp[i]-np[i]
+	sbb	24($np,$i,8),@ri[3]
+	mov	@ri[2],16($rp,$i,8)	# rp[i]=tp[i]-np[i]
+
+	sbb	\$0,@ri[0]		# handle upmost overflow bit
+	mov	@ri[3],24($rp,$i,8)	# rp[i]=tp[i]-np[i]
+	xor	$i,$i			# i=0
+	and	@ri[0],$ap
+	not	@ri[0]
+	mov	$rp,$np
+	and	@ri[0],$np
+	lea	-1($num),$j
+	or	$np,$ap			# ap=borrow?tp:rp
+
+	movdqu	($ap),%xmm1
+	movdqa	%xmm0,(%rsp)
+	movdqu	%xmm1,($rp)
+	jmp	.Lcopy4x
+.align	16
+.Lcopy4x:					# copy or in-place refresh
+	movdqu	16($ap,$i),%xmm2
+	movdqu	32($ap,$i),%xmm1
+	movdqa	%xmm0,16(%rsp,$i)
+	movdqu	%xmm2,16($rp,$i)
+	movdqa	%xmm0,32(%rsp,$i)
+	movdqu	%xmm1,32($rp,$i)
+	lea	32($i),$i
+	dec	$j
+	jnz	.Lcopy4x
+
+	shl	\$2,$num
+	movdqu	16($ap,$i),%xmm2
+	movdqa	%xmm0,16(%rsp,$i)
+	movdqu	%xmm2,16($rp,$i)
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	8(%rsp,$num,8),%rsi	# restore %rsp
+	mov	\$1,%rax
+	mov	-48(%rsi),%r15
+	mov	-40(%rsi),%r14
+	mov	-32(%rsi),%r13
+	mov	-24(%rsi),%r12
+	mov	-16(%rsi),%rbp
+	mov	-8(%rsi),%rbx
+	lea	(%rsi),%rsp
+.Lmul4x_epilogue:
+	ret
+.size	bn_mul4x_mont,.-bn_mul4x_mont
+___
+}}}
+{{{
+######################################################################
+# void bn_sqr8x_mont(
+my $rptr="%rdi";	# const BN_ULONG *rptr,
+my $aptr="%rsi";	# const BN_ULONG *aptr,
+my $bptr="%rdx";	# not used
+my $nptr="%rcx";	# const BN_ULONG *nptr,
+my $n0  ="%r8";		# const BN_ULONG *n0);
+my $num ="%r9";		# int num, has to be divisible by 8
+
+my ($i,$j,$tptr)=("%rbp","%rcx",$rptr);
+my @A0=("%r10","%r11");
+my @A1=("%r12","%r13");
+my ($a0,$a1,$ai)=("%r14","%r15","%rbx");
+
+$code.=<<___	if ($addx);
+.extern	bn_sqrx8x_internal		# see x86_64-mont5 module
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+.extern	bn_sqr8x_internal		# see x86_64-mont5 module
+
+.type	bn_sqr8x_mont,\@function,6
+.align	32
+bn_sqr8x_mont:
+	mov	%rsp,%rax
+.Lsqr8x_enter:
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+.Lsqr8x_prologue:
+
+	mov	${num}d,%r10d
+	shl	\$3,${num}d		# convert $num to bytes
+	shl	\$3+2,%r10		# 4*$num
+	neg	$num
+
+	##############################################################
+	# ensure that stack frame doesn't alias with $aptr modulo
+	# 4096. this is done to allow memory disambiguation logic
+	# do its job.
+	#
+	lea	-64(%rsp,$num,2),%r11
+	mov	%rsp,%rbp
+	mov	($n0),$n0		# *n0
+	sub	$aptr,%r11
+	and	\$4095,%r11
+	cmp	%r11,%r10
+	jb	.Lsqr8x_sp_alt
+	sub	%r11,%rbp		# align with $aptr
+	lea	-64(%rbp,$num,2),%rbp	# future alloca(frame+2*$num)
+	jmp	.Lsqr8x_sp_done
+
+.align	32
+.Lsqr8x_sp_alt:
+	lea	4096-64(,$num,2),%r10	# 4096-frame-2*$num
+	lea	-64(%rbp,$num,2),%rbp	# future alloca(frame+2*$num)
+	sub	%r10,%r11
+	mov	\$0,%r10
+	cmovc	%r10,%r11
+	sub	%r11,%rbp
+.Lsqr8x_sp_done:
+	and	\$-64,%rbp
+	mov	%rsp,%r11
+	sub	%rbp,%r11
+	and	\$-4096,%r11
+	lea	(%rbp,%r11),%rsp
+	mov	(%rsp),%r10
+	cmp	%rbp,%rsp
+	ja	.Lsqr8x_page_walk
+	jmp	.Lsqr8x_page_walk_done
+
+.align	16
+.Lsqr8x_page_walk:
+	lea	-4096(%rsp),%rsp
+	mov	(%rsp),%r10
+	cmp	%rbp,%rsp
+	ja	.Lsqr8x_page_walk
+.Lsqr8x_page_walk_done:
+
+	mov	$num,%r10
+	neg	$num
+
+	mov	$n0,  32(%rsp)
+	mov	%rax, 40(%rsp)		# save original %rsp
+.Lsqr8x_body:
+
+	movq	$nptr, %xmm2		# save pointer to modulus
+	pxor	%xmm0,%xmm0
+	movq	$rptr,%xmm1		# save $rptr
+	movq	%r10, %xmm3		# -$num
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($addx);
+	mov	OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+8(%rip),%eax
+	and	\$0x80100,%eax
+	cmp	\$0x80100,%eax
+	jne	.Lsqr8x_nox
+
+	call	bn_sqrx8x_internal	# see x86_64-mont5 module
+					# %rax	top-most carry
+					# %rbp	nptr
+					# %rcx	-8*num
+					# %r8	end of tp[2*num]
+	lea	(%r8,%rcx),%rbx
+	mov	%rcx,$num
+	mov	%rcx,%rdx
+	movq	%xmm1,$rptr
+	sar	\$3+2,%rcx		# %cf=0
+	jmp	.Lsqr8x_sub
+
+.align	32
+.Lsqr8x_nox:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	call	bn_sqr8x_internal	# see x86_64-mont5 module
+					# %rax	top-most carry
+					# %rbp	nptr
+					# %r8	-8*num
+					# %rdi	end of tp[2*num]
+	lea	(%rdi,$num),%rbx
+	mov	$num,%rcx
+	mov	$num,%rdx
+	movq	%xmm1,$rptr
+	sar	\$3+2,%rcx		# %cf=0
+	jmp	.Lsqr8x_sub
+
+.align	32
+.Lsqr8x_sub:
+	mov	8*0(%rbx),%r12
+	mov	8*1(%rbx),%r13
+	mov	8*2(%rbx),%r14
+	mov	8*3(%rbx),%r15
+	lea	8*4(%rbx),%rbx
+	sbb	8*0(%rbp),%r12
+	sbb	8*1(%rbp),%r13
+	sbb	8*2(%rbp),%r14
+	sbb	8*3(%rbp),%r15
+	lea	8*4(%rbp),%rbp
+	mov	%r12,8*0($rptr)
+	mov	%r13,8*1($rptr)
+	mov	%r14,8*2($rptr)
+	mov	%r15,8*3($rptr)
+	lea	8*4($rptr),$rptr
+	inc	%rcx			# preserves %cf
+	jnz	.Lsqr8x_sub
+
+	sbb	\$0,%rax		# top-most carry
+	lea	(%rbx,$num),%rbx	# rewind
+	lea	($rptr,$num),$rptr	# rewind
+
+	movq	%rax,%xmm1
+	pxor	%xmm0,%xmm0
+	pshufd	\$0,%xmm1,%xmm1
+	mov	40(%rsp),%rsi		# restore %rsp
+	jmp	.Lsqr8x_cond_copy
+
+.align	32
+.Lsqr8x_cond_copy:
+	movdqa	16*0(%rbx),%xmm2
+	movdqa	16*1(%rbx),%xmm3
+	lea	16*2(%rbx),%rbx
+	movdqu	16*0($rptr),%xmm4
+	movdqu	16*1($rptr),%xmm5
+	lea	16*2($rptr),$rptr
+	movdqa	%xmm0,-16*2(%rbx)	# zero tp
+	movdqa	%xmm0,-16*1(%rbx)
+	movdqa	%xmm0,-16*2(%rbx,%rdx)
+	movdqa	%xmm0,-16*1(%rbx,%rdx)
+	pcmpeqd	%xmm1,%xmm0
+	pand	%xmm1,%xmm2
+	pand	%xmm1,%xmm3
+	pand	%xmm0,%xmm4
+	pand	%xmm0,%xmm5
+	pxor	%xmm0,%xmm0
+	por	%xmm2,%xmm4
+	por	%xmm3,%xmm5
+	movdqu	%xmm4,-16*2($rptr)
+	movdqu	%xmm5,-16*1($rptr)
+	add	\$32,$num
+	jnz	.Lsqr8x_cond_copy
+
+	mov	\$1,%rax
+	mov	-48(%rsi),%r15
+	mov	-40(%rsi),%r14
+	mov	-32(%rsi),%r13
+	mov	-24(%rsi),%r12
+	mov	-16(%rsi),%rbp
+	mov	-8(%rsi),%rbx
+	lea	(%rsi),%rsp
+.Lsqr8x_epilogue:
+	ret
+.size	bn_sqr8x_mont,.-bn_sqr8x_mont
+___
+}}}
+
+if ($addx) {{{
+my $bp="%rdx";	# original value
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.type	bn_mulx4x_mont,\@function,6
+.align	32
+bn_mulx4x_mont:
+	mov	%rsp,%rax
+.Lmulx4x_enter:
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+.Lmulx4x_prologue:
+
+	shl	\$3,${num}d		# convert $num to bytes
+	xor	%r10,%r10
+	sub	$num,%r10		# -$num
+	mov	($n0),$n0		# *n0
+	lea	-72(%rsp,%r10),%rbp	# future alloca(frame+$num+8)
+	and	\$-128,%rbp
+	mov	%rsp,%r11
+	sub	%rbp,%r11
+	and	\$-4096,%r11
+	lea	(%rbp,%r11),%rsp
+	mov	(%rsp),%r10
+	cmp	%rbp,%rsp
+	ja	.Lmulx4x_page_walk
+	jmp	.Lmulx4x_page_walk_done
+
+.align	16
+.Lmulx4x_page_walk:
+	lea	-4096(%rsp),%rsp
+	mov	(%rsp),%r10
+	cmp	%rbp,%rsp
+	ja	.Lmulx4x_page_walk
+.Lmulx4x_page_walk_done:
+
+	lea	($bp,$num),%r10
+	##############################################################
+	# Stack layout
+	# +0	num
+	# +8	off-loaded &b[i]
+	# +16	end of b[num]
+	# +24	saved n0
+	# +32	saved rp
+	# +40	saved %rsp
+	# +48	inner counter
+	# +56
+	# +64	tmp[num+1]
+	#
+	mov	$num,0(%rsp)		# save $num
+	shr	\$5,$num
+	mov	%r10,16(%rsp)		# end of b[num]
+	sub	\$1,$num
+	mov	$n0, 24(%rsp)		# save *n0
+	mov	$rp, 32(%rsp)		# save $rp
+	mov	%rax,40(%rsp)		# save original %rsp
+	mov	$num,48(%rsp)		# inner counter
+	jmp	.Lmulx4x_body
+
+.align	32
+.Lmulx4x_body:
+___
+my ($aptr, $bptr, $nptr, $tptr, $mi,  $bi,  $zero, $num)=
+   ("%rsi","%rdi","%rcx","%rbx","%r8","%r9","%rbp","%rax");
+my $rptr=$bptr;
+$code.=<<___;
+	lea	8($bp),$bptr
+	mov	($bp),%rdx		# b[0], $bp==%rdx actually
+	lea	64+32(%rsp),$tptr
+	mov	%rdx,$bi
+
+	mulx	0*8($aptr),$mi,%rax	# a[0]*b[0]
+	mulx	1*8($aptr),%r11,%r14	# a[1]*b[0]
+	add	%rax,%r11
+	mov	$bptr,8(%rsp)		# off-load &b[i]
+	mulx	2*8($aptr),%r12,%r13	# ...
+	adc	%r14,%r12
+	adc	\$0,%r13
+
+	mov	$mi,$bptr		# borrow $bptr
+	imulq	24(%rsp),$mi		# "t[0]"*n0
+	xor	$zero,$zero		# cf=0, of=0
+
+	mulx	3*8($aptr),%rax,%r14
+	 mov	$mi,%rdx
+	lea	4*8($aptr),$aptr
+	adcx	%rax,%r13
+	adcx	$zero,%r14		# cf=0
+
+	mulx	0*8($nptr),%rax,%r10
+	adcx	%rax,$bptr		# discarded
+	adox	%r11,%r10
+	mulx	1*8($nptr),%rax,%r11
+	adcx	%rax,%r10
+	adox	%r12,%r11
+	.byte	0xc4,0x62,0xfb,0xf6,0xa1,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x00	# mulx	2*8($nptr),%rax,%r12
+	mov	48(%rsp),$bptr		# counter value
+	mov	%r10,-4*8($tptr)
+	adcx	%rax,%r11
+	adox	%r13,%r12
+	mulx	3*8($nptr),%rax,%r15
+	 mov	$bi,%rdx
+	mov	%r11,-3*8($tptr)
+	adcx	%rax,%r12
+	adox	$zero,%r15		# of=0
+	lea	4*8($nptr),$nptr
+	mov	%r12,-2*8($tptr)
+
+	jmp	.Lmulx4x_1st
+
+.align	32
+.Lmulx4x_1st:
+	adcx	$zero,%r15		# cf=0, modulo-scheduled
+	mulx	0*8($aptr),%r10,%rax	# a[4]*b[0]
+	adcx	%r14,%r10
+	mulx	1*8($aptr),%r11,%r14	# a[5]*b[0]
+	adcx	%rax,%r11
+	mulx	2*8($aptr),%r12,%rax	# ...
+	adcx	%r14,%r12
+	mulx	3*8($aptr),%r13,%r14
+	 .byte	0x67,0x67
+	 mov	$mi,%rdx
+	adcx	%rax,%r13
+	adcx	$zero,%r14		# cf=0
+	lea	4*8($aptr),$aptr
+	lea	4*8($tptr),$tptr
+
+	adox	%r15,%r10
+	mulx	0*8($nptr),%rax,%r15
+	adcx	%rax,%r10
+	adox	%r15,%r11
+	mulx	1*8($nptr),%rax,%r15
+	adcx	%rax,%r11
+	adox	%r15,%r12
+	mulx	2*8($nptr),%rax,%r15
+	mov	%r10,-5*8($tptr)
+	adcx	%rax,%r12
+	mov	%r11,-4*8($tptr)
+	adox	%r15,%r13
+	mulx	3*8($nptr),%rax,%r15
+	 mov	$bi,%rdx
+	mov	%r12,-3*8($tptr)
+	adcx	%rax,%r13
+	adox	$zero,%r15
+	lea	4*8($nptr),$nptr
+	mov	%r13,-2*8($tptr)
+
+	dec	$bptr			# of=0, pass cf
+	jnz	.Lmulx4x_1st
+
+	mov	0(%rsp),$num		# load num
+	mov	8(%rsp),$bptr		# re-load &b[i]
+	adc	$zero,%r15		# modulo-scheduled
+	add	%r15,%r14
+	sbb	%r15,%r15		# top-most carry
+	mov	%r14,-1*8($tptr)
+	jmp	.Lmulx4x_outer
+
+.align	32
+.Lmulx4x_outer:
+	mov	($bptr),%rdx		# b[i]
+	lea	8($bptr),$bptr		# b++
+	sub	$num,$aptr		# rewind $aptr
+	mov	%r15,($tptr)		# save top-most carry
+	lea	64+4*8(%rsp),$tptr
+	sub	$num,$nptr		# rewind $nptr
+
+	mulx	0*8($aptr),$mi,%r11	# a[0]*b[i]
+	xor	%ebp,%ebp		# xor	$zero,$zero	# cf=0, of=0
+	mov	%rdx,$bi
+	mulx	1*8($aptr),%r14,%r12	# a[1]*b[i]
+	adox	-4*8($tptr),$mi
+	adcx	%r14,%r11
+	mulx	2*8($aptr),%r15,%r13	# ...
+	adox	-3*8($tptr),%r11
+	adcx	%r15,%r12
+	adox	-2*8($tptr),%r12
+	adcx	$zero,%r13
+	adox	$zero,%r13
+
+	mov	$bptr,8(%rsp)		# off-load &b[i]
+	mov	$mi,%r15
+	imulq	24(%rsp),$mi		# "t[0]"*n0
+	xor	%ebp,%ebp		# xor	$zero,$zero	# cf=0, of=0
+
+	mulx	3*8($aptr),%rax,%r14
+	 mov	$mi,%rdx
+	adcx	%rax,%r13
+	adox	-1*8($tptr),%r13
+	adcx	$zero,%r14
+	lea	4*8($aptr),$aptr
+	adox	$zero,%r14
+
+	mulx	0*8($nptr),%rax,%r10
+	adcx	%rax,%r15		# discarded
+	adox	%r11,%r10
+	mulx	1*8($nptr),%rax,%r11
+	adcx	%rax,%r10
+	adox	%r12,%r11
+	mulx	2*8($nptr),%rax,%r12
+	mov	%r10,-4*8($tptr)
+	adcx	%rax,%r11
+	adox	%r13,%r12
+	mulx	3*8($nptr),%rax,%r15
+	 mov	$bi,%rdx
+	mov	%r11,-3*8($tptr)
+	lea	4*8($nptr),$nptr
+	adcx	%rax,%r12
+	adox	$zero,%r15		# of=0
+	mov	48(%rsp),$bptr		# counter value
+	mov	%r12,-2*8($tptr)
+
+	jmp	.Lmulx4x_inner
+
+.align	32
+.Lmulx4x_inner:
+	mulx	0*8($aptr),%r10,%rax	# a[4]*b[i]
+	adcx	$zero,%r15		# cf=0, modulo-scheduled
+	adox	%r14,%r10
+	mulx	1*8($aptr),%r11,%r14	# a[5]*b[i]
+	adcx	0*8($tptr),%r10
+	adox	%rax,%r11
+	mulx	2*8($aptr),%r12,%rax	# ...
+	adcx	1*8($tptr),%r11
+	adox	%r14,%r12
+	mulx	3*8($aptr),%r13,%r14
+	 mov	$mi,%rdx
+	adcx	2*8($tptr),%r12
+	adox	%rax,%r13
+	adcx	3*8($tptr),%r13
+	adox	$zero,%r14		# of=0
+	lea	4*8($aptr),$aptr
+	lea	4*8($tptr),$tptr
+	adcx	$zero,%r14		# cf=0
+
+	adox	%r15,%r10
+	mulx	0*8($nptr),%rax,%r15
+	adcx	%rax,%r10
+	adox	%r15,%r11
+	mulx	1*8($nptr),%rax,%r15
+	adcx	%rax,%r11
+	adox	%r15,%r12
+	mulx	2*8($nptr),%rax,%r15
+	mov	%r10,-5*8($tptr)
+	adcx	%rax,%r12
+	adox	%r15,%r13
+	mulx	3*8($nptr),%rax,%r15
+	 mov	$bi,%rdx
+	mov	%r11,-4*8($tptr)
+	mov	%r12,-3*8($tptr)
+	adcx	%rax,%r13
+	adox	$zero,%r15
+	lea	4*8($nptr),$nptr
+	mov	%r13,-2*8($tptr)
+
+	dec	$bptr			# of=0, pass cf
+	jnz	.Lmulx4x_inner
+
+	mov	0(%rsp),$num		# load num
+	mov	8(%rsp),$bptr		# re-load &b[i]
+	adc	$zero,%r15		# modulo-scheduled
+	sub	0*8($tptr),$zero	# pull top-most carry
+	adc	%r15,%r14
+	sbb	%r15,%r15		# top-most carry
+	mov	%r14,-1*8($tptr)
+
+	cmp	16(%rsp),$bptr
+	jne	.Lmulx4x_outer
+
+	lea	64(%rsp),$tptr
+	sub	$num,$nptr		# rewind $nptr
+	neg	%r15
+	mov	$num,%rdx
+	shr	\$3+2,$num		# %cf=0
+	mov	32(%rsp),$rptr		# restore rp
+	jmp	.Lmulx4x_sub
+
+.align	32
+.Lmulx4x_sub:
+	mov	8*0($tptr),%r11
+	mov	8*1($tptr),%r12
+	mov	8*2($tptr),%r13
+	mov	8*3($tptr),%r14
+	lea	8*4($tptr),$tptr
+	sbb	8*0($nptr),%r11
+	sbb	8*1($nptr),%r12
+	sbb	8*2($nptr),%r13
+	sbb	8*3($nptr),%r14
+	lea	8*4($nptr),$nptr
+	mov	%r11,8*0($rptr)
+	mov	%r12,8*1($rptr)
+	mov	%r13,8*2($rptr)
+	mov	%r14,8*3($rptr)
+	lea	8*4($rptr),$rptr
+	dec	$num			# preserves %cf
+	jnz	.Lmulx4x_sub
+
+	sbb	\$0,%r15		# top-most carry
+	lea	64(%rsp),$tptr
+	sub	%rdx,$rptr		# rewind
+
+	movq	%r15,%xmm1
+	pxor	%xmm0,%xmm0
+	pshufd	\$0,%xmm1,%xmm1
+	mov	40(%rsp),%rsi		# restore %rsp
+	jmp	.Lmulx4x_cond_copy
+
+.align	32
+.Lmulx4x_cond_copy:
+	movdqa	16*0($tptr),%xmm2
+	movdqa	16*1($tptr),%xmm3
+	lea	16*2($tptr),$tptr
+	movdqu	16*0($rptr),%xmm4
+	movdqu	16*1($rptr),%xmm5
+	lea	16*2($rptr),$rptr
+	movdqa	%xmm0,-16*2($tptr)	# zero tp
+	movdqa	%xmm0,-16*1($tptr)
+	pcmpeqd	%xmm1,%xmm0
+	pand	%xmm1,%xmm2
+	pand	%xmm1,%xmm3
+	pand	%xmm0,%xmm4
+	pand	%xmm0,%xmm5
+	pxor	%xmm0,%xmm0
+	por	%xmm2,%xmm4
+	por	%xmm3,%xmm5
+	movdqu	%xmm4,-16*2($rptr)
+	movdqu	%xmm5,-16*1($rptr)
+	sub	\$32,%rdx
+	jnz	.Lmulx4x_cond_copy
+
+	mov	%rdx,($tptr)
+
+	mov	\$1,%rax
+	mov	-48(%rsi),%r15
+	mov	-40(%rsi),%r14
+	mov	-32(%rsi),%r13
+	mov	-24(%rsi),%r12
+	mov	-16(%rsi),%rbp
+	mov	-8(%rsi),%rbx
+	lea	(%rsi),%rsp
+.Lmulx4x_epilogue:
+	ret
+.size	bn_mulx4x_mont,.-bn_mulx4x_mont
+___
+}}}
+$code.=<<___;
+.asciz	"Montgomery Multiplication for x86_64, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+.align	16
+___
+
+# EXCEPTION_DISPOSITION handler (EXCEPTION_RECORD *rec,ULONG64 frame,
+#		CONTEXT *context,DISPATCHER_CONTEXT *disp)
+if ($win64) {
+$rec="%rcx";
+$frame="%rdx";
+$context="%r8";
+$disp="%r9";
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.extern	__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind
+.type	mul_handler,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+mul_handler:
+	push	%rsi
+	push	%rdi
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+	pushfq
+	sub	\$64,%rsp
+
+	mov	120($context),%rax	# pull context->Rax
+	mov	248($context),%rbx	# pull context->Rip
+
+	mov	8($disp),%rsi		# disp->ImageBase
+	mov	56($disp),%r11		# disp->HandlerData
+
+	mov	0(%r11),%r10d		# HandlerData[0]
+	lea	(%rsi,%r10),%r10	# end of prologue label
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip<end of prologue label
+	jb	.Lcommon_seh_tail
+
+	mov	152($context),%rax	# pull context->Rsp
+
+	mov	4(%r11),%r10d		# HandlerData[1]
+	lea	(%rsi,%r10),%r10	# epilogue label
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip>=epilogue label
+	jae	.Lcommon_seh_tail
+
+	mov	192($context),%r10	# pull $num
+	mov	8(%rax,%r10,8),%rax	# pull saved stack pointer
+
+	jmp	.Lcommon_pop_regs
+.size	mul_handler,.-mul_handler
+
+.type	sqr_handler,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+sqr_handler:
+	push	%rsi
+	push	%rdi
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+	pushfq
+	sub	\$64,%rsp
+
+	mov	120($context),%rax	# pull context->Rax
+	mov	248($context),%rbx	# pull context->Rip
+
+	mov	8($disp),%rsi		# disp->ImageBase
+	mov	56($disp),%r11		# disp->HandlerData
+
+	mov	0(%r11),%r10d		# HandlerData[0]
+	lea	(%rsi,%r10),%r10	# end of prologue label
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip<.Lsqr_body
+	jb	.Lcommon_seh_tail
+
+	mov	4(%r11),%r10d		# HandlerData[1]
+	lea	(%rsi,%r10),%r10	# body label
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip>=.Lsqr_epilogue
+	jb	.Lcommon_pop_regs
+
+	mov	152($context),%rax	# pull context->Rsp
+
+	mov	8(%r11),%r10d		# HandlerData[2]
+	lea	(%rsi,%r10),%r10	# epilogue label
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip>=.Lsqr_epilogue
+	jae	.Lcommon_seh_tail
+
+	mov	40(%rax),%rax		# pull saved stack pointer
+
+.Lcommon_pop_regs:
+	mov	-8(%rax),%rbx
+	mov	-16(%rax),%rbp
+	mov	-24(%rax),%r12
+	mov	-32(%rax),%r13
+	mov	-40(%rax),%r14
+	mov	-48(%rax),%r15
+	mov	%rbx,144($context)	# restore context->Rbx
+	mov	%rbp,160($context)	# restore context->Rbp
+	mov	%r12,216($context)	# restore context->R12
+	mov	%r13,224($context)	# restore context->R13
+	mov	%r14,232($context)	# restore context->R14
+	mov	%r15,240($context)	# restore context->R15
+
+.Lcommon_seh_tail:
+	mov	8(%rax),%rdi
+	mov	16(%rax),%rsi
+	mov	%rax,152($context)	# restore context->Rsp
+	mov	%rsi,168($context)	# restore context->Rsi
+	mov	%rdi,176($context)	# restore context->Rdi
+
+	mov	40($disp),%rdi		# disp->ContextRecord
+	mov	$context,%rsi		# context
+	mov	\$154,%ecx		# sizeof(CONTEXT)
+	.long	0xa548f3fc		# cld; rep movsq
+
+	mov	$disp,%rsi
+	xor	%rcx,%rcx		# arg1, UNW_FLAG_NHANDLER
+	mov	8(%rsi),%rdx		# arg2, disp->ImageBase
+	mov	0(%rsi),%r8		# arg3, disp->ControlPc
+	mov	16(%rsi),%r9		# arg4, disp->FunctionEntry
+	mov	40(%rsi),%r10		# disp->ContextRecord
+	lea	56(%rsi),%r11		# &disp->HandlerData
+	lea	24(%rsi),%r12		# &disp->EstablisherFrame
+	mov	%r10,32(%rsp)		# arg5
+	mov	%r11,40(%rsp)		# arg6
+	mov	%r12,48(%rsp)		# arg7
+	mov	%rcx,56(%rsp)		# arg8, (NULL)
+	call	*__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind(%rip)
+
+	mov	\$1,%eax		# ExceptionContinueSearch
+	add	\$64,%rsp
+	popfq
+	pop	%r15
+	pop	%r14
+	pop	%r13
+	pop	%r12
+	pop	%rbp
+	pop	%rbx
+	pop	%rdi
+	pop	%rsi
+	ret
+.size	sqr_handler,.-sqr_handler
+
+.section	.pdata
+.align	4
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_bn_mul_mont
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_bn_mul_mont
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_bn_mul_mont
+
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_bn_mul4x_mont
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_bn_mul4x_mont
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_bn_mul4x_mont
+
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_bn_sqr8x_mont
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_bn_sqr8x_mont
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_bn_sqr8x_mont
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($addx);
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_bn_mulx4x_mont
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_bn_mulx4x_mont
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_bn_mulx4x_mont
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+.section	.xdata
+.align	8
+.LSEH_info_bn_mul_mont:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	mul_handler
+	.rva	.Lmul_body,.Lmul_epilogue	# HandlerData[]
+.LSEH_info_bn_mul4x_mont:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	mul_handler
+	.rva	.Lmul4x_body,.Lmul4x_epilogue	# HandlerData[]
+.LSEH_info_bn_sqr8x_mont:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	sqr_handler
+	.rva	.Lsqr8x_prologue,.Lsqr8x_body,.Lsqr8x_epilogue		# HandlerData[]
+.align	8
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($addx);
+.LSEH_info_bn_mulx4x_mont:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	sqr_handler
+	.rva	.Lmulx4x_prologue,.Lmulx4x_body,.Lmulx4x_epilogue	# HandlerData[]
+.align	8
+___
+}
+
+print $code;
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..5779059
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,3835 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+
+# August 2011.
+#
+# Companion to x86_64-mont.pl that optimizes cache-timing attack
+# countermeasures. The subroutines are produced by replacing bp[i]
+# references in their x86_64-mont.pl counterparts with cache-neutral
+# references to powers table computed in BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime.
+# In addition subroutine that scatters elements of the powers table
+# is implemented, so that scatter-/gathering can be tuned without
+# bn_exp.c modifications.
+
+# August 2013.
+#
+# Add MULX/AD*X code paths and additional interfaces to optimize for
+# branch prediction unit. For input lengths that are multiples of 8
+# the np argument is not just modulus value, but one interleaved
+# with 0. This is to optimize post-condition...
+
+$flavour = shift;
+$output  = shift;
+if ($flavour =~ /\./) { $output = $flavour; undef $flavour; }
+
+$win64=0; $win64=1 if ($flavour =~ /[nm]asm|mingw64/ || $output =~ /\.asm$/);
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+( $xlate="${dir}x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
+( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
+die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl";
+
+open OUT,"| \"$^X\" \"$xlate\" $flavour \"$output\"";
+*STDOUT=*OUT;
+
+if (`$ENV{CC} -Wa,-v -c -o /dev/null -x assembler /dev/null 2>&1`
+		=~ /GNU assembler version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
+	$addx = ($1>=2.23);
+}
+
+if (!$addx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /nasm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /nasm/) &&
+	    `nasm -v 2>&1` =~ /NASM version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
+	$addx = ($1>=2.10);
+}
+
+if (!$addx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
+	    `ml64 2>&1` =~ /Version ([0-9]+)\./) {
+	$addx = ($1>=12);
+}
+
+if (!$addx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([3-9])\.([0-9]+)/) {
+	my $ver = $2 + $3/100.0;	# 3.1->3.01, 3.10->3.10
+	$addx = ($ver>=3.03);
+}
+
+# int bn_mul_mont_gather5(
+$rp="%rdi";	# BN_ULONG *rp,
+$ap="%rsi";	# const BN_ULONG *ap,
+$bp="%rdx";	# const BN_ULONG *bp,
+$np="%rcx";	# const BN_ULONG *np,
+$n0="%r8";	# const BN_ULONG *n0,
+$num="%r9";	# int num,
+		# int idx);	# 0 to 2^5-1, "index" in $bp holding
+				# pre-computed powers of a', interlaced
+				# in such manner that b[0] is $bp[idx],
+				# b[1] is [2^5+idx], etc.
+$lo0="%r10";
+$hi0="%r11";
+$hi1="%r13";
+$i="%r14";
+$j="%r15";
+$m0="%rbx";
+$m1="%rbp";
+
+$code=<<___;
+.text
+
+.extern	OPENSSL_ia32cap_P
+
+.globl	bn_mul_mont_gather5
+.type	bn_mul_mont_gather5,\@function,6
+.align	64
+bn_mul_mont_gather5:
+	mov	${num}d,${num}d
+	mov	%rsp,%rax
+	test	\$7,${num}d
+	jnz	.Lmul_enter
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($addx);
+	mov	OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+8(%rip),%r11d
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	jmp	.Lmul4x_enter
+
+.align	16
+.Lmul_enter:
+	movd	`($win64?56:8)`(%rsp),%xmm5	# load 7th argument
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+
+	neg	$num
+	mov	%rsp,%r11
+	lea	-280(%rsp,$num,8),%r10	# future alloca(8*(num+2)+256+8)
+	neg	$num			# restore $num
+	and	\$-1024,%r10		# minimize TLB usage
+
+	# An OS-agnostic version of __chkstk.
+	#
+	# Some OSes (Windows) insist on stack being "wired" to
+	# physical memory in strictly sequential manner, i.e. if stack
+	# allocation spans two pages, then reference to farmost one can
+	# be punishable by SEGV. But page walking can do good even on
+	# other OSes, because it guarantees that villain thread hits
+	# the guard page before it can make damage to innocent one...
+	sub	%r10,%r11
+	and	\$-4096,%r11
+	lea	(%r10,%r11),%rsp
+	mov	(%rsp),%r11
+	cmp	%r10,%rsp
+	ja	.Lmul_page_walk
+	jmp	.Lmul_page_walk_done
+
+.Lmul_page_walk:
+	lea	-4096(%rsp),%rsp
+	mov	(%rsp),%r11
+	cmp	%r10,%rsp
+	ja	.Lmul_page_walk
+.Lmul_page_walk_done:
+
+	lea	.Linc(%rip),%r10
+	mov	%rax,8(%rsp,$num,8)	# tp[num+1]=%rsp
+.Lmul_body:
+
+	lea	128($bp),%r12		# reassign $bp (+size optimization)
+___
+		$bp="%r12";
+		$STRIDE=2**5*8;		# 5 is "window size"
+		$N=$STRIDE/4;		# should match cache line size
+$code.=<<___;
+	movdqa	0(%r10),%xmm0		# 00000001000000010000000000000000
+	movdqa	16(%r10),%xmm1		# 00000002000000020000000200000002
+	lea	24-112(%rsp,$num,8),%r10# place the mask after tp[num+3] (+ICache optimization)
+	and	\$-16,%r10
+
+	pshufd	\$0,%xmm5,%xmm5		# broadcast index
+	movdqa	%xmm1,%xmm4
+	movdqa	%xmm1,%xmm2
+___
+########################################################################
+# calculate mask by comparing 0..31 to index and save result to stack
+#
+$code.=<<___;
+	paddd	%xmm0,%xmm1
+	pcmpeqd	%xmm5,%xmm0		# compare to 1,0
+	.byte	0x67
+	movdqa	%xmm4,%xmm3
+___
+for($k=0;$k<$STRIDE/16-4;$k+=4) {
+$code.=<<___;
+	paddd	%xmm1,%xmm2
+	pcmpeqd	%xmm5,%xmm1		# compare to 3,2
+	movdqa	%xmm0,`16*($k+0)+112`(%r10)
+	movdqa	%xmm4,%xmm0
+
+	paddd	%xmm2,%xmm3
+	pcmpeqd	%xmm5,%xmm2		# compare to 5,4
+	movdqa	%xmm1,`16*($k+1)+112`(%r10)
+	movdqa	%xmm4,%xmm1
+
+	paddd	%xmm3,%xmm0
+	pcmpeqd	%xmm5,%xmm3		# compare to 7,6
+	movdqa	%xmm2,`16*($k+2)+112`(%r10)
+	movdqa	%xmm4,%xmm2
+
+	paddd	%xmm0,%xmm1
+	pcmpeqd	%xmm5,%xmm0
+	movdqa	%xmm3,`16*($k+3)+112`(%r10)
+	movdqa	%xmm4,%xmm3
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;				# last iteration can be optimized
+	paddd	%xmm1,%xmm2
+	pcmpeqd	%xmm5,%xmm1
+	movdqa	%xmm0,`16*($k+0)+112`(%r10)
+
+	paddd	%xmm2,%xmm3
+	.byte	0x67
+	pcmpeqd	%xmm5,%xmm2
+	movdqa	%xmm1,`16*($k+1)+112`(%r10)
+
+	pcmpeqd	%xmm5,%xmm3
+	movdqa	%xmm2,`16*($k+2)+112`(%r10)
+	pand	`16*($k+0)-128`($bp),%xmm0	# while it's still in register
+
+	pand	`16*($k+1)-128`($bp),%xmm1
+	pand	`16*($k+2)-128`($bp),%xmm2
+	movdqa	%xmm3,`16*($k+3)+112`(%r10)
+	pand	`16*($k+3)-128`($bp),%xmm3
+	por	%xmm2,%xmm0
+	por	%xmm3,%xmm1
+___
+for($k=0;$k<$STRIDE/16-4;$k+=4) {
+$code.=<<___;
+	movdqa	`16*($k+0)-128`($bp),%xmm4
+	movdqa	`16*($k+1)-128`($bp),%xmm5
+	movdqa	`16*($k+2)-128`($bp),%xmm2
+	pand	`16*($k+0)+112`(%r10),%xmm4
+	movdqa	`16*($k+3)-128`($bp),%xmm3
+	pand	`16*($k+1)+112`(%r10),%xmm5
+	por	%xmm4,%xmm0
+	pand	`16*($k+2)+112`(%r10),%xmm2
+	por	%xmm5,%xmm1
+	pand	`16*($k+3)+112`(%r10),%xmm3
+	por	%xmm2,%xmm0
+	por	%xmm3,%xmm1
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	por	%xmm1,%xmm0
+	pshufd	\$0x4e,%xmm0,%xmm1
+	por	%xmm1,%xmm0
+	lea	$STRIDE($bp),$bp
+	movq	%xmm0,$m0		# m0=bp[0]
+
+	mov	($n0),$n0		# pull n0[0] value
+	mov	($ap),%rax
+
+	xor	$i,$i			# i=0
+	xor	$j,$j			# j=0
+
+	mov	$n0,$m1
+	mulq	$m0			# ap[0]*bp[0]
+	mov	%rax,$lo0
+	mov	($np),%rax
+
+	imulq	$lo0,$m1		# "tp[0]"*n0
+	mov	%rdx,$hi0
+
+	mulq	$m1			# np[0]*m1
+	add	%rax,$lo0		# discarded
+	mov	8($ap),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	mov	%rdx,$hi1
+
+	lea	1($j),$j		# j++
+	jmp	.L1st_enter
+
+.align	16
+.L1st:
+	add	%rax,$hi1
+	mov	($ap,$j,8),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	add	$hi0,$hi1		# np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0]
+	mov	$lo0,$hi0
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	mov	$hi1,-16(%rsp,$j,8)	# tp[j-1]
+	mov	%rdx,$hi1
+
+.L1st_enter:
+	mulq	$m0			# ap[j]*bp[0]
+	add	%rax,$hi0
+	mov	($np,$j,8),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	lea	1($j),$j		# j++
+	mov	%rdx,$lo0
+
+	mulq	$m1			# np[j]*m1
+	cmp	$num,$j
+	jne	.L1st			# note that upon exit $j==$num, so
+					# they can be used interchangeably
+
+	add	%rax,$hi1
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	add	$hi0,$hi1		# np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0]
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	mov	$hi1,-16(%rsp,$num,8)	# tp[num-1]
+	mov	%rdx,$hi1
+	mov	$lo0,$hi0
+
+	xor	%rdx,%rdx
+	add	$hi0,$hi1
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	mov	$hi1,-8(%rsp,$num,8)
+	mov	%rdx,(%rsp,$num,8)	# store upmost overflow bit
+
+	lea	1($i),$i		# i++
+	jmp	.Louter
+.align	16
+.Louter:
+	lea	24+128(%rsp,$num,8),%rdx	# where 256-byte mask is (+size optimization)
+	and	\$-16,%rdx
+	pxor	%xmm4,%xmm4
+	pxor	%xmm5,%xmm5
+___
+for($k=0;$k<$STRIDE/16;$k+=4) {
+$code.=<<___;
+	movdqa	`16*($k+0)-128`($bp),%xmm0
+	movdqa	`16*($k+1)-128`($bp),%xmm1
+	movdqa	`16*($k+2)-128`($bp),%xmm2
+	movdqa	`16*($k+3)-128`($bp),%xmm3
+	pand	`16*($k+0)-128`(%rdx),%xmm0
+	pand	`16*($k+1)-128`(%rdx),%xmm1
+	por	%xmm0,%xmm4
+	pand	`16*($k+2)-128`(%rdx),%xmm2
+	por	%xmm1,%xmm5
+	pand	`16*($k+3)-128`(%rdx),%xmm3
+	por	%xmm2,%xmm4
+	por	%xmm3,%xmm5
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	por	%xmm5,%xmm4
+	pshufd	\$0x4e,%xmm4,%xmm0
+	por	%xmm4,%xmm0
+	lea	$STRIDE($bp),$bp
+
+	mov	($ap),%rax		# ap[0]
+	movq	%xmm0,$m0		# m0=bp[i]
+
+	xor	$j,$j			# j=0
+	mov	$n0,$m1
+	mov	(%rsp),$lo0
+
+	mulq	$m0			# ap[0]*bp[i]
+	add	%rax,$lo0		# ap[0]*bp[i]+tp[0]
+	mov	($np),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+
+	imulq	$lo0,$m1		# tp[0]*n0
+	mov	%rdx,$hi0
+
+	mulq	$m1			# np[0]*m1
+	add	%rax,$lo0		# discarded
+	mov	8($ap),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	mov	8(%rsp),$lo0		# tp[1]
+	mov	%rdx,$hi1
+
+	lea	1($j),$j		# j++
+	jmp	.Linner_enter
+
+.align	16
+.Linner:
+	add	%rax,$hi1
+	mov	($ap,$j,8),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	add	$lo0,$hi1		# np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j]
+	mov	(%rsp,$j,8),$lo0
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	mov	$hi1,-16(%rsp,$j,8)	# tp[j-1]
+	mov	%rdx,$hi1
+
+.Linner_enter:
+	mulq	$m0			# ap[j]*bp[i]
+	add	%rax,$hi0
+	mov	($np,$j,8),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	add	$hi0,$lo0		# ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j]
+	mov	%rdx,$hi0
+	adc	\$0,$hi0
+	lea	1($j),$j		# j++
+
+	mulq	$m1			# np[j]*m1
+	cmp	$num,$j
+	jne	.Linner			# note that upon exit $j==$num, so
+					# they can be used interchangeably
+	add	%rax,$hi1
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	add	$lo0,$hi1		# np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j]
+	mov	(%rsp,$num,8),$lo0
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	mov	$hi1,-16(%rsp,$num,8)	# tp[num-1]
+	mov	%rdx,$hi1
+
+	xor	%rdx,%rdx
+	add	$hi0,$hi1
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	add	$lo0,$hi1		# pull upmost overflow bit
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	mov	$hi1,-8(%rsp,$num,8)
+	mov	%rdx,(%rsp,$num,8)	# store upmost overflow bit
+
+	lea	1($i),$i		# i++
+	cmp	$num,$i
+	jb	.Louter
+
+	xor	$i,$i			# i=0 and clear CF!
+	mov	(%rsp),%rax		# tp[0]
+	lea	(%rsp),$ap		# borrow ap for tp
+	mov	$num,$j			# j=num
+	jmp	.Lsub
+.align	16
+.Lsub:	sbb	($np,$i,8),%rax
+	mov	%rax,($rp,$i,8)		# rp[i]=tp[i]-np[i]
+	mov	8($ap,$i,8),%rax	# tp[i+1]
+	lea	1($i),$i		# i++
+	dec	$j			# doesnn't affect CF!
+	jnz	.Lsub
+
+	sbb	\$0,%rax		# handle upmost overflow bit
+	xor	$i,$i
+	and	%rax,$ap
+	not	%rax
+	mov	$rp,$np
+	and	%rax,$np
+	mov	$num,$j			# j=num
+	or	$np,$ap			# ap=borrow?tp:rp
+.align	16
+.Lcopy:					# copy or in-place refresh
+	mov	($ap,$i,8),%rax
+	mov	$i,(%rsp,$i,8)		# zap temporary vector
+	mov	%rax,($rp,$i,8)		# rp[i]=tp[i]
+	lea	1($i),$i
+	sub	\$1,$j
+	jnz	.Lcopy
+
+	mov	8(%rsp,$num,8),%rsi	# restore %rsp
+	mov	\$1,%rax
+
+	mov	-48(%rsi),%r15
+	mov	-40(%rsi),%r14
+	mov	-32(%rsi),%r13
+	mov	-24(%rsi),%r12
+	mov	-16(%rsi),%rbp
+	mov	-8(%rsi),%rbx
+	lea	(%rsi),%rsp
+.Lmul_epilogue:
+	ret
+.size	bn_mul_mont_gather5,.-bn_mul_mont_gather5
+___
+{{{
+my @A=("%r10","%r11");
+my @N=("%r13","%rdi");
+$code.=<<___;
+.type	bn_mul4x_mont_gather5,\@function,6
+.align	32
+bn_mul4x_mont_gather5:
+	.byte	0x67
+	mov	%rsp,%rax
+.Lmul4x_enter:
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($addx);
+	and	\$0x80108,%r11d
+	cmp	\$0x80108,%r11d		# check for AD*X+BMI2+BMI1
+	je	.Lmulx4x_enter
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+.Lmul4x_prologue:
+
+	.byte	0x67
+	shl	\$3,${num}d		# convert $num to bytes
+	lea	($num,$num,2),%r10	# 3*$num in bytes
+	neg	$num			# -$num
+
+	##############################################################
+	# Ensure that stack frame doesn't alias with $rptr+3*$num
+	# modulo 4096, which covers ret[num], am[num] and n[num]
+	# (see bn_exp.c). This is done to allow memory disambiguation
+	# logic do its magic. [Extra [num] is allocated in order
+	# to align with bn_power5's frame, which is cleansed after
+	# completing exponentiation. Extra 256 bytes is for power mask
+	# calculated from 7th argument, the index.]
+	#
+	lea	-320(%rsp,$num,2),%r11
+	mov	%rsp,%rbp
+	sub	$rp,%r11
+	and	\$4095,%r11
+	cmp	%r11,%r10
+	jb	.Lmul4xsp_alt
+	sub	%r11,%rbp		# align with $rp
+	lea	-320(%rbp,$num,2),%rbp	# future alloca(frame+2*num*8+256)
+	jmp	.Lmul4xsp_done
+
+.align	32
+.Lmul4xsp_alt:
+	lea	4096-320(,$num,2),%r10
+	lea	-320(%rbp,$num,2),%rbp	# future alloca(frame+2*num*8+256)
+	sub	%r10,%r11
+	mov	\$0,%r10
+	cmovc	%r10,%r11
+	sub	%r11,%rbp
+.Lmul4xsp_done:
+	and	\$-64,%rbp
+	mov	%rsp,%r11
+	sub	%rbp,%r11
+	and	\$-4096,%r11
+	lea	(%rbp,%r11),%rsp
+	mov	(%rsp),%r10
+	cmp	%rbp,%rsp
+	ja	.Lmul4x_page_walk
+	jmp	.Lmul4x_page_walk_done
+
+.Lmul4x_page_walk:
+	lea	-4096(%rsp),%rsp
+	mov	(%rsp),%r10
+	cmp	%rbp,%rsp
+	ja	.Lmul4x_page_walk
+.Lmul4x_page_walk_done:
+
+	neg	$num
+
+	mov	%rax,40(%rsp)
+.Lmul4x_body:
+
+	call	mul4x_internal
+
+	mov	40(%rsp),%rsi		# restore %rsp
+	mov	\$1,%rax
+
+	mov	-48(%rsi),%r15
+	mov	-40(%rsi),%r14
+	mov	-32(%rsi),%r13
+	mov	-24(%rsi),%r12
+	mov	-16(%rsi),%rbp
+	mov	-8(%rsi),%rbx
+	lea	(%rsi),%rsp
+.Lmul4x_epilogue:
+	ret
+.size	bn_mul4x_mont_gather5,.-bn_mul4x_mont_gather5
+
+.type	mul4x_internal,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	32
+mul4x_internal:
+	shl	\$5,$num		# $num was in bytes
+	movd	`($win64?56:8)`(%rax),%xmm5	# load 7th argument, index
+	lea	.Linc(%rip),%rax
+	lea	128(%rdx,$num),%r13	# end of powers table (+size optimization)
+	shr	\$5,$num		# restore $num
+___
+		$bp="%r12";
+		$STRIDE=2**5*8;		# 5 is "window size"
+		$N=$STRIDE/4;		# should match cache line size
+		$tp=$i;
+$code.=<<___;
+	movdqa	0(%rax),%xmm0		# 00000001000000010000000000000000
+	movdqa	16(%rax),%xmm1		# 00000002000000020000000200000002
+	lea	88-112(%rsp,$num),%r10	# place the mask after tp[num+1] (+ICache optimization)
+	lea	128(%rdx),$bp		# size optimization
+
+	pshufd	\$0,%xmm5,%xmm5		# broadcast index
+	movdqa	%xmm1,%xmm4
+	.byte	0x67,0x67
+	movdqa	%xmm1,%xmm2
+___
+########################################################################
+# calculate mask by comparing 0..31 to index and save result to stack
+#
+$code.=<<___;
+	paddd	%xmm0,%xmm1
+	pcmpeqd	%xmm5,%xmm0		# compare to 1,0
+	.byte	0x67
+	movdqa	%xmm4,%xmm3
+___
+for($i=0;$i<$STRIDE/16-4;$i+=4) {
+$code.=<<___;
+	paddd	%xmm1,%xmm2
+	pcmpeqd	%xmm5,%xmm1		# compare to 3,2
+	movdqa	%xmm0,`16*($i+0)+112`(%r10)
+	movdqa	%xmm4,%xmm0
+
+	paddd	%xmm2,%xmm3
+	pcmpeqd	%xmm5,%xmm2		# compare to 5,4
+	movdqa	%xmm1,`16*($i+1)+112`(%r10)
+	movdqa	%xmm4,%xmm1
+
+	paddd	%xmm3,%xmm0
+	pcmpeqd	%xmm5,%xmm3		# compare to 7,6
+	movdqa	%xmm2,`16*($i+2)+112`(%r10)
+	movdqa	%xmm4,%xmm2
+
+	paddd	%xmm0,%xmm1
+	pcmpeqd	%xmm5,%xmm0
+	movdqa	%xmm3,`16*($i+3)+112`(%r10)
+	movdqa	%xmm4,%xmm3
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;				# last iteration can be optimized
+	paddd	%xmm1,%xmm2
+	pcmpeqd	%xmm5,%xmm1
+	movdqa	%xmm0,`16*($i+0)+112`(%r10)
+
+	paddd	%xmm2,%xmm3
+	.byte	0x67
+	pcmpeqd	%xmm5,%xmm2
+	movdqa	%xmm1,`16*($i+1)+112`(%r10)
+
+	pcmpeqd	%xmm5,%xmm3
+	movdqa	%xmm2,`16*($i+2)+112`(%r10)
+	pand	`16*($i+0)-128`($bp),%xmm0	# while it's still in register
+
+	pand	`16*($i+1)-128`($bp),%xmm1
+	pand	`16*($i+2)-128`($bp),%xmm2
+	movdqa	%xmm3,`16*($i+3)+112`(%r10)
+	pand	`16*($i+3)-128`($bp),%xmm3
+	por	%xmm2,%xmm0
+	por	%xmm3,%xmm1
+___
+for($i=0;$i<$STRIDE/16-4;$i+=4) {
+$code.=<<___;
+	movdqa	`16*($i+0)-128`($bp),%xmm4
+	movdqa	`16*($i+1)-128`($bp),%xmm5
+	movdqa	`16*($i+2)-128`($bp),%xmm2
+	pand	`16*($i+0)+112`(%r10),%xmm4
+	movdqa	`16*($i+3)-128`($bp),%xmm3
+	pand	`16*($i+1)+112`(%r10),%xmm5
+	por	%xmm4,%xmm0
+	pand	`16*($i+2)+112`(%r10),%xmm2
+	por	%xmm5,%xmm1
+	pand	`16*($i+3)+112`(%r10),%xmm3
+	por	%xmm2,%xmm0
+	por	%xmm3,%xmm1
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	por	%xmm1,%xmm0
+	pshufd	\$0x4e,%xmm0,%xmm1
+	por	%xmm1,%xmm0
+	lea	$STRIDE($bp),$bp
+	movq	%xmm0,$m0		# m0=bp[0]
+
+	mov	%r13,16+8(%rsp)		# save end of b[num]
+	mov	$rp, 56+8(%rsp)		# save $rp
+
+	mov	($n0),$n0		# pull n0[0] value
+	mov	($ap),%rax
+	lea	($ap,$num),$ap		# end of a[num]
+	neg	$num
+
+	mov	$n0,$m1
+	mulq	$m0			# ap[0]*bp[0]
+	mov	%rax,$A[0]
+	mov	($np),%rax
+
+	imulq	$A[0],$m1		# "tp[0]"*n0
+	lea	64+8(%rsp),$tp
+	mov	%rdx,$A[1]
+
+	mulq	$m1			# np[0]*m1
+	add	%rax,$A[0]		# discarded
+	mov	8($ap,$num),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	mov	%rdx,$N[1]
+
+	mulq	$m0
+	add	%rax,$A[1]
+	mov	8*1($np),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	mov	%rdx,$A[0]
+
+	mulq	$m1
+	add	%rax,$N[1]
+	mov	16($ap,$num),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	add	$A[1],$N[1]
+	lea	4*8($num),$j		# j=4
+	lea	8*4($np),$np
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	mov	$N[1],($tp)
+	mov	%rdx,$N[0]
+	jmp	.L1st4x
+
+.align	32
+.L1st4x:
+	mulq	$m0			# ap[j]*bp[0]
+	add	%rax,$A[0]
+	mov	-8*2($np),%rax
+	lea	32($tp),$tp
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	mov	%rdx,$A[1]
+
+	mulq	$m1			# np[j]*m1
+	add	%rax,$N[0]
+	mov	-8($ap,$j),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	add	$A[0],$N[0]		# np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0]
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	mov	$N[0],-24($tp)		# tp[j-1]
+	mov	%rdx,$N[1]
+
+	mulq	$m0			# ap[j]*bp[0]
+	add	%rax,$A[1]
+	mov	-8*1($np),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	mov	%rdx,$A[0]
+
+	mulq	$m1			# np[j]*m1
+	add	%rax,$N[1]
+	mov	($ap,$j),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	add	$A[1],$N[1]		# np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0]
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	mov	$N[1],-16($tp)		# tp[j-1]
+	mov	%rdx,$N[0]
+
+	mulq	$m0			# ap[j]*bp[0]
+	add	%rax,$A[0]
+	mov	8*0($np),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	mov	%rdx,$A[1]
+
+	mulq	$m1			# np[j]*m1
+	add	%rax,$N[0]
+	mov	8($ap,$j),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	add	$A[0],$N[0]		# np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0]
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	mov	$N[0],-8($tp)		# tp[j-1]
+	mov	%rdx,$N[1]
+
+	mulq	$m0			# ap[j]*bp[0]
+	add	%rax,$A[1]
+	mov	8*1($np),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	mov	%rdx,$A[0]
+
+	mulq	$m1			# np[j]*m1
+	add	%rax,$N[1]
+	mov	16($ap,$j),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	add	$A[1],$N[1]		# np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0]
+	lea	8*4($np),$np
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	mov	$N[1],($tp)		# tp[j-1]
+	mov	%rdx,$N[0]
+
+	add	\$32,$j			# j+=4
+	jnz	.L1st4x
+
+	mulq	$m0			# ap[j]*bp[0]
+	add	%rax,$A[0]
+	mov	-8*2($np),%rax
+	lea	32($tp),$tp
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	mov	%rdx,$A[1]
+
+	mulq	$m1			# np[j]*m1
+	add	%rax,$N[0]
+	mov	-8($ap),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	add	$A[0],$N[0]		# np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0]
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	mov	$N[0],-24($tp)		# tp[j-1]
+	mov	%rdx,$N[1]
+
+	mulq	$m0			# ap[j]*bp[0]
+	add	%rax,$A[1]
+	mov	-8*1($np),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	mov	%rdx,$A[0]
+
+	mulq	$m1			# np[j]*m1
+	add	%rax,$N[1]
+	mov	($ap,$num),%rax		# ap[0]
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	add	$A[1],$N[1]		# np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0]
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	mov	$N[1],-16($tp)		# tp[j-1]
+	mov	%rdx,$N[0]
+
+	lea	($np,$num),$np		# rewind $np
+
+	xor	$N[1],$N[1]
+	add	$A[0],$N[0]
+	adc	\$0,$N[1]
+	mov	$N[0],-8($tp)
+
+	jmp	.Louter4x
+
+.align	32
+.Louter4x:
+	lea	16+128($tp),%rdx	# where 256-byte mask is (+size optimization)
+	pxor	%xmm4,%xmm4
+	pxor	%xmm5,%xmm5
+___
+for($i=0;$i<$STRIDE/16;$i+=4) {
+$code.=<<___;
+	movdqa	`16*($i+0)-128`($bp),%xmm0
+	movdqa	`16*($i+1)-128`($bp),%xmm1
+	movdqa	`16*($i+2)-128`($bp),%xmm2
+	movdqa	`16*($i+3)-128`($bp),%xmm3
+	pand	`16*($i+0)-128`(%rdx),%xmm0
+	pand	`16*($i+1)-128`(%rdx),%xmm1
+	por	%xmm0,%xmm4
+	pand	`16*($i+2)-128`(%rdx),%xmm2
+	por	%xmm1,%xmm5
+	pand	`16*($i+3)-128`(%rdx),%xmm3
+	por	%xmm2,%xmm4
+	por	%xmm3,%xmm5
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	por	%xmm5,%xmm4
+	pshufd	\$0x4e,%xmm4,%xmm0
+	por	%xmm4,%xmm0
+	lea	$STRIDE($bp),$bp
+	movq	%xmm0,$m0		# m0=bp[i]
+
+	mov	($tp,$num),$A[0]
+	mov	$n0,$m1
+	mulq	$m0			# ap[0]*bp[i]
+	add	%rax,$A[0]		# ap[0]*bp[i]+tp[0]
+	mov	($np),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+
+	imulq	$A[0],$m1		# tp[0]*n0
+	mov	%rdx,$A[1]
+	mov	$N[1],($tp)		# store upmost overflow bit
+
+	lea	($tp,$num),$tp		# rewind $tp
+
+	mulq	$m1			# np[0]*m1
+	add	%rax,$A[0]		# "$N[0]", discarded
+	mov	8($ap,$num),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	mov	%rdx,$N[1]
+
+	mulq	$m0			# ap[j]*bp[i]
+	add	%rax,$A[1]
+	mov	8*1($np),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	add	8($tp),$A[1]		# +tp[1]
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	mov	%rdx,$A[0]
+
+	mulq	$m1			# np[j]*m1
+	add	%rax,$N[1]
+	mov	16($ap,$num),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	add	$A[1],$N[1]		# np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j]
+	lea	4*8($num),$j		# j=4
+	lea	8*4($np),$np
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	mov	%rdx,$N[0]
+	jmp	.Linner4x
+
+.align	32
+.Linner4x:
+	mulq	$m0			# ap[j]*bp[i]
+	add	%rax,$A[0]
+	mov	-8*2($np),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	add	16($tp),$A[0]		# ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j]
+	lea	32($tp),$tp
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	mov	%rdx,$A[1]
+
+	mulq	$m1			# np[j]*m1
+	add	%rax,$N[0]
+	mov	-8($ap,$j),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	add	$A[0],$N[0]
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	mov	$N[1],-32($tp)		# tp[j-1]
+	mov	%rdx,$N[1]
+
+	mulq	$m0			# ap[j]*bp[i]
+	add	%rax,$A[1]
+	mov	-8*1($np),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	add	-8($tp),$A[1]
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	mov	%rdx,$A[0]
+
+	mulq	$m1			# np[j]*m1
+	add	%rax,$N[1]
+	mov	($ap,$j),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	add	$A[1],$N[1]
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	mov	$N[0],-24($tp)		# tp[j-1]
+	mov	%rdx,$N[0]
+
+	mulq	$m0			# ap[j]*bp[i]
+	add	%rax,$A[0]
+	mov	8*0($np),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	add	($tp),$A[0]		# ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j]
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	mov	%rdx,$A[1]
+
+	mulq	$m1			# np[j]*m1
+	add	%rax,$N[0]
+	mov	8($ap,$j),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	add	$A[0],$N[0]
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	mov	$N[1],-16($tp)		# tp[j-1]
+	mov	%rdx,$N[1]
+
+	mulq	$m0			# ap[j]*bp[i]
+	add	%rax,$A[1]
+	mov	8*1($np),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	add	8($tp),$A[1]
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	mov	%rdx,$A[0]
+
+	mulq	$m1			# np[j]*m1
+	add	%rax,$N[1]
+	mov	16($ap,$j),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	add	$A[1],$N[1]
+	lea	8*4($np),$np
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	mov	$N[0],-8($tp)		# tp[j-1]
+	mov	%rdx,$N[0]
+
+	add	\$32,$j			# j+=4
+	jnz	.Linner4x
+
+	mulq	$m0			# ap[j]*bp[i]
+	add	%rax,$A[0]
+	mov	-8*2($np),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	add	16($tp),$A[0]		# ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j]
+	lea	32($tp),$tp
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	mov	%rdx,$A[1]
+
+	mulq	$m1			# np[j]*m1
+	add	%rax,$N[0]
+	mov	-8($ap),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	add	$A[0],$N[0]
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	mov	$N[1],-32($tp)		# tp[j-1]
+	mov	%rdx,$N[1]
+
+	mulq	$m0			# ap[j]*bp[i]
+	add	%rax,$A[1]
+	mov	$m1,%rax
+	mov	-8*1($np),$m1
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	add	-8($tp),$A[1]
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	mov	%rdx,$A[0]
+
+	mulq	$m1			# np[j]*m1
+	add	%rax,$N[1]
+	mov	($ap,$num),%rax		# ap[0]
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	add	$A[1],$N[1]
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	mov	$N[0],-24($tp)		# tp[j-1]
+	mov	%rdx,$N[0]
+
+	mov	$N[1],-16($tp)		# tp[j-1]
+	lea	($np,$num),$np		# rewind $np
+
+	xor	$N[1],$N[1]
+	add	$A[0],$N[0]
+	adc	\$0,$N[1]
+	add	($tp),$N[0]		# pull upmost overflow bit
+	adc	\$0,$N[1]		# upmost overflow bit
+	mov	$N[0],-8($tp)
+
+	cmp	16+8(%rsp),$bp
+	jb	.Louter4x
+___
+if (1) {
+$code.=<<___;
+	xor	%rax,%rax
+	sub	$N[0],$m1		# compare top-most words
+	adc	$j,$j			# $j is zero
+	or	$j,$N[1]
+	sub	$N[1],%rax		# %rax=-$N[1]
+	lea	($tp,$num),%rbx		# tptr in .sqr4x_sub
+	mov	($np),%r12
+	lea	($np),%rbp		# nptr in .sqr4x_sub
+	mov	%r9,%rcx
+	sar	\$3+2,%rcx
+	mov	56+8(%rsp),%rdi		# rptr in .sqr4x_sub
+	dec	%r12			# so that after 'not' we get -n[0]
+	xor	%r10,%r10
+	mov	8*1(%rbp),%r13
+	mov	8*2(%rbp),%r14
+	mov	8*3(%rbp),%r15
+	jmp	.Lsqr4x_sub_entry
+___
+} else {
+my @ri=("%rax",$bp,$m0,$m1);
+my $rp="%rdx";
+$code.=<<___
+	xor	\$1,$N[1]
+	lea	($tp,$num),$tp		# rewind $tp
+	sar	\$5,$num		# cf=0
+	lea	($np,$N[1],8),$np
+	mov	56+8(%rsp),$rp		# restore $rp
+	jmp	.Lsub4x
+
+.align	32
+.Lsub4x:
+	.byte	0x66
+	mov	8*0($tp),@ri[0]
+	mov	8*1($tp),@ri[1]
+	.byte	0x66
+	sbb	16*0($np),@ri[0]
+	mov	8*2($tp),@ri[2]
+	sbb	16*1($np),@ri[1]
+	mov	3*8($tp),@ri[3]
+	lea	4*8($tp),$tp
+	sbb	16*2($np),@ri[2]
+	mov	@ri[0],8*0($rp)
+	sbb	16*3($np),@ri[3]
+	lea	16*4($np),$np
+	mov	@ri[1],8*1($rp)
+	mov	@ri[2],8*2($rp)
+	mov	@ri[3],8*3($rp)
+	lea	8*4($rp),$rp
+
+	inc	$num
+	jnz	.Lsub4x
+
+	ret
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+.size	mul4x_internal,.-mul4x_internal
+___
+}}}
+{{{
+######################################################################
+# void bn_power5(
+my $rptr="%rdi";	# BN_ULONG *rptr,
+my $aptr="%rsi";	# const BN_ULONG *aptr,
+my $bptr="%rdx";	# const void *table,
+my $nptr="%rcx";	# const BN_ULONG *nptr,
+my $n0  ="%r8";		# const BN_ULONG *n0);
+my $num ="%r9";		# int num, has to be divisible by 8
+			# int pwr 
+
+my ($i,$j,$tptr)=("%rbp","%rcx",$rptr);
+my @A0=("%r10","%r11");
+my @A1=("%r12","%r13");
+my ($a0,$a1,$ai)=("%r14","%r15","%rbx");
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	bn_power5
+.type	bn_power5,\@function,6
+.align	32
+bn_power5:
+	mov	%rsp,%rax
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($addx);
+	mov	OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+8(%rip),%r11d
+	and	\$0x80108,%r11d
+	cmp	\$0x80108,%r11d		# check for AD*X+BMI2+BMI1
+	je	.Lpowerx5_enter
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+.Lpower5_prologue:
+
+	shl	\$3,${num}d		# convert $num to bytes
+	lea	($num,$num,2),%r10d	# 3*$num
+	neg	$num
+	mov	($n0),$n0		# *n0
+
+	##############################################################
+	# Ensure that stack frame doesn't alias with $rptr+3*$num
+	# modulo 4096, which covers ret[num], am[num] and n[num]
+	# (see bn_exp.c). This is done to allow memory disambiguation
+	# logic do its magic. [Extra 256 bytes is for power mask
+	# calculated from 7th argument, the index.]
+	#
+	lea	-320(%rsp,$num,2),%r11
+	mov	%rsp,%rbp
+	sub	$rptr,%r11
+	and	\$4095,%r11
+	cmp	%r11,%r10
+	jb	.Lpwr_sp_alt
+	sub	%r11,%rbp		# align with $aptr
+	lea	-320(%rbp,$num,2),%rbp	# future alloca(frame+2*num*8+256)
+	jmp	.Lpwr_sp_done
+
+.align	32
+.Lpwr_sp_alt:
+	lea	4096-320(,$num,2),%r10
+	lea	-320(%rbp,$num,2),%rbp	# future alloca(frame+2*num*8+256)
+	sub	%r10,%r11
+	mov	\$0,%r10
+	cmovc	%r10,%r11
+	sub	%r11,%rbp
+.Lpwr_sp_done:
+	and	\$-64,%rbp
+	mov	%rsp,%r11
+	sub	%rbp,%r11
+	and	\$-4096,%r11
+	lea	(%rbp,%r11),%rsp
+	mov	(%rsp),%r10
+	cmp	%rbp,%rsp
+	ja	.Lpwr_page_walk
+	jmp	.Lpwr_page_walk_done
+
+.Lpwr_page_walk:
+	lea	-4096(%rsp),%rsp
+	mov	(%rsp),%r10
+	cmp	%rbp,%rsp
+	ja	.Lpwr_page_walk
+.Lpwr_page_walk_done:
+
+	mov	$num,%r10	
+	neg	$num
+
+	##############################################################
+	# Stack layout
+	#
+	# +0	saved $num, used in reduction section
+	# +8	&t[2*$num], used in reduction section
+	# +32	saved *n0
+	# +40	saved %rsp
+	# +48	t[2*$num]
+	#
+	mov	$n0,  32(%rsp)
+	mov	%rax, 40(%rsp)		# save original %rsp
+.Lpower5_body:
+	movq	$rptr,%xmm1		# save $rptr, used in sqr8x
+	movq	$nptr,%xmm2		# save $nptr
+	movq	%r10, %xmm3		# -$num, used in sqr8x
+	movq	$bptr,%xmm4
+
+	call	__bn_sqr8x_internal
+	call	__bn_post4x_internal
+	call	__bn_sqr8x_internal
+	call	__bn_post4x_internal
+	call	__bn_sqr8x_internal
+	call	__bn_post4x_internal
+	call	__bn_sqr8x_internal
+	call	__bn_post4x_internal
+	call	__bn_sqr8x_internal
+	call	__bn_post4x_internal
+
+	movq	%xmm2,$nptr
+	movq	%xmm4,$bptr
+	mov	$aptr,$rptr
+	mov	40(%rsp),%rax
+	lea	32(%rsp),$n0
+
+	call	mul4x_internal
+
+	mov	40(%rsp),%rsi		# restore %rsp
+	mov	\$1,%rax
+	mov	-48(%rsi),%r15
+	mov	-40(%rsi),%r14
+	mov	-32(%rsi),%r13
+	mov	-24(%rsi),%r12
+	mov	-16(%rsi),%rbp
+	mov	-8(%rsi),%rbx
+	lea	(%rsi),%rsp
+.Lpower5_epilogue:
+	ret
+.size	bn_power5,.-bn_power5
+
+.globl	bn_sqr8x_internal
+.hidden	bn_sqr8x_internal
+.type	bn_sqr8x_internal,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	32
+bn_sqr8x_internal:
+__bn_sqr8x_internal:
+	##############################################################
+	# Squaring part:
+	#
+	# a) multiply-n-add everything but a[i]*a[i];
+	# b) shift result of a) by 1 to the left and accumulate
+	#    a[i]*a[i] products;
+	#
+	##############################################################
+	#                                                     a[1]a[0]
+	#                                                 a[2]a[0]
+	#                                             a[3]a[0]
+	#                                             a[2]a[1]
+	#                                         a[4]a[0]
+	#                                         a[3]a[1]
+	#                                     a[5]a[0]
+	#                                     a[4]a[1]
+	#                                     a[3]a[2]
+	#                                 a[6]a[0]
+	#                                 a[5]a[1]
+	#                                 a[4]a[2]
+	#                             a[7]a[0]
+	#                             a[6]a[1]
+	#                             a[5]a[2]
+	#                             a[4]a[3]
+	#                         a[7]a[1]
+	#                         a[6]a[2]
+	#                         a[5]a[3]
+	#                     a[7]a[2]
+	#                     a[6]a[3]
+	#                     a[5]a[4]
+	#                 a[7]a[3]
+	#                 a[6]a[4]
+	#             a[7]a[4]
+	#             a[6]a[5]
+	#         a[7]a[5]
+	#     a[7]a[6]
+	#                                                     a[1]a[0]
+	#                                                 a[2]a[0]
+	#                                             a[3]a[0]
+	#                                         a[4]a[0]
+	#                                     a[5]a[0]
+	#                                 a[6]a[0]
+	#                             a[7]a[0]
+	#                                             a[2]a[1]
+	#                                         a[3]a[1]
+	#                                     a[4]a[1]
+	#                                 a[5]a[1]
+	#                             a[6]a[1]
+	#                         a[7]a[1]
+	#                                     a[3]a[2]
+	#                                 a[4]a[2]
+	#                             a[5]a[2]
+	#                         a[6]a[2]
+	#                     a[7]a[2]
+	#                             a[4]a[3]
+	#                         a[5]a[3]
+	#                     a[6]a[3]
+	#                 a[7]a[3]
+	#                     a[5]a[4]
+	#                 a[6]a[4]
+	#             a[7]a[4]
+	#             a[6]a[5]
+	#         a[7]a[5]
+	#     a[7]a[6]
+	#                                                         a[0]a[0]
+	#                                                 a[1]a[1]
+	#                                         a[2]a[2]
+	#                                 a[3]a[3]
+	#                         a[4]a[4]
+	#                 a[5]a[5]
+	#         a[6]a[6]
+	# a[7]a[7]
+
+	lea	32(%r10),$i		# $i=-($num-32)
+	lea	($aptr,$num),$aptr	# end of a[] buffer, ($aptr,$i)=&ap[2]
+
+	mov	$num,$j			# $j=$num
+
+					# comments apply to $num==8 case
+	mov	-32($aptr,$i),$a0	# a[0]
+	lea	48+8(%rsp,$num,2),$tptr	# end of tp[] buffer, &tp[2*$num]
+	mov	-24($aptr,$i),%rax	# a[1]
+	lea	-32($tptr,$i),$tptr	# end of tp[] window, &tp[2*$num-"$i"]
+	mov	-16($aptr,$i),$ai	# a[2]
+	mov	%rax,$a1
+
+	mul	$a0			# a[1]*a[0]
+	mov	%rax,$A0[0]		# a[1]*a[0]
+	 mov	$ai,%rax		# a[2]
+	mov	%rdx,$A0[1]
+	mov	$A0[0],-24($tptr,$i)	# t[1]
+
+	mul	$a0			# a[2]*a[0]
+	add	%rax,$A0[1]
+	 mov	$ai,%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	mov	$A0[1],-16($tptr,$i)	# t[2]
+	mov	%rdx,$A0[0]
+
+
+	 mov	-8($aptr,$i),$ai	# a[3]
+	mul	$a1			# a[2]*a[1]
+	mov	%rax,$A1[0]		# a[2]*a[1]+t[3]
+	 mov	$ai,%rax
+	mov	%rdx,$A1[1]
+
+	 lea	($i),$j
+	mul	$a0			# a[3]*a[0]
+	add	%rax,$A0[0]		# a[3]*a[0]+a[2]*a[1]+t[3]
+	 mov	$ai,%rax
+	mov	%rdx,$A0[1]
+	adc	\$0,$A0[1]
+	add	$A1[0],$A0[0]
+	adc	\$0,$A0[1]
+	mov	$A0[0],-8($tptr,$j)	# t[3]
+	jmp	.Lsqr4x_1st
+
+.align	32
+.Lsqr4x_1st:
+	 mov	($aptr,$j),$ai		# a[4]
+	mul	$a1			# a[3]*a[1]
+	add	%rax,$A1[1]		# a[3]*a[1]+t[4]
+	 mov	$ai,%rax
+	mov	%rdx,$A1[0]
+	adc	\$0,$A1[0]
+
+	mul	$a0			# a[4]*a[0]
+	add	%rax,$A0[1]		# a[4]*a[0]+a[3]*a[1]+t[4]
+	 mov	$ai,%rax		# a[3]
+	 mov	8($aptr,$j),$ai		# a[5]
+	mov	%rdx,$A0[0]
+	adc	\$0,$A0[0]
+	add	$A1[1],$A0[1]
+	adc	\$0,$A0[0]
+
+
+	mul	$a1			# a[4]*a[3]
+	add	%rax,$A1[0]		# a[4]*a[3]+t[5]
+	 mov	$ai,%rax
+	 mov	$A0[1],($tptr,$j)	# t[4]
+	mov	%rdx,$A1[1]
+	adc	\$0,$A1[1]
+
+	mul	$a0			# a[5]*a[2]
+	add	%rax,$A0[0]		# a[5]*a[2]+a[4]*a[3]+t[5]
+	 mov	$ai,%rax
+	 mov	16($aptr,$j),$ai	# a[6]
+	mov	%rdx,$A0[1]
+	adc	\$0,$A0[1]
+	add	$A1[0],$A0[0]
+	adc	\$0,$A0[1]
+
+	mul	$a1			# a[5]*a[3]
+	add	%rax,$A1[1]		# a[5]*a[3]+t[6]
+	 mov	$ai,%rax
+	 mov	$A0[0],8($tptr,$j)	# t[5]
+	mov	%rdx,$A1[0]
+	adc	\$0,$A1[0]
+
+	mul	$a0			# a[6]*a[2]
+	add	%rax,$A0[1]		# a[6]*a[2]+a[5]*a[3]+t[6]
+	 mov	$ai,%rax		# a[3]
+	 mov	24($aptr,$j),$ai	# a[7]
+	mov	%rdx,$A0[0]
+	adc	\$0,$A0[0]
+	add	$A1[1],$A0[1]
+	adc	\$0,$A0[0]
+
+
+	mul	$a1			# a[6]*a[5]
+	add	%rax,$A1[0]		# a[6]*a[5]+t[7]
+	 mov	$ai,%rax
+	 mov	$A0[1],16($tptr,$j)	# t[6]
+	mov	%rdx,$A1[1]
+	adc	\$0,$A1[1]
+	 lea	32($j),$j
+
+	mul	$a0			# a[7]*a[4]
+	add	%rax,$A0[0]		# a[7]*a[4]+a[6]*a[5]+t[6]
+	 mov	$ai,%rax
+	mov	%rdx,$A0[1]
+	adc	\$0,$A0[1]
+	add	$A1[0],$A0[0]
+	adc	\$0,$A0[1]
+	mov	$A0[0],-8($tptr,$j)	# t[7]
+
+	cmp	\$0,$j
+	jne	.Lsqr4x_1st
+
+	mul	$a1			# a[7]*a[5]
+	add	%rax,$A1[1]
+	lea	16($i),$i
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	add	$A0[1],$A1[1]
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+
+	mov	$A1[1],($tptr)		# t[8]
+	mov	%rdx,$A1[0]
+	mov	%rdx,8($tptr)		# t[9]
+	jmp	.Lsqr4x_outer
+
+.align	32
+.Lsqr4x_outer:				# comments apply to $num==6 case
+	mov	-32($aptr,$i),$a0	# a[0]
+	lea	48+8(%rsp,$num,2),$tptr	# end of tp[] buffer, &tp[2*$num]
+	mov	-24($aptr,$i),%rax	# a[1]
+	lea	-32($tptr,$i),$tptr	# end of tp[] window, &tp[2*$num-"$i"]
+	mov	-16($aptr,$i),$ai	# a[2]
+	mov	%rax,$a1
+
+	mul	$a0			# a[1]*a[0]
+	mov	-24($tptr,$i),$A0[0]	# t[1]
+	add	%rax,$A0[0]		# a[1]*a[0]+t[1]
+	 mov	$ai,%rax		# a[2]
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	mov	$A0[0],-24($tptr,$i)	# t[1]
+	mov	%rdx,$A0[1]
+
+	mul	$a0			# a[2]*a[0]
+	add	%rax,$A0[1]
+	 mov	$ai,%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	add	-16($tptr,$i),$A0[1]	# a[2]*a[0]+t[2]
+	mov	%rdx,$A0[0]
+	adc	\$0,$A0[0]
+	mov	$A0[1],-16($tptr,$i)	# t[2]
+
+	xor	$A1[0],$A1[0]
+
+	 mov	-8($aptr,$i),$ai	# a[3]
+	mul	$a1			# a[2]*a[1]
+	add	%rax,$A1[0]		# a[2]*a[1]+t[3]
+	 mov	$ai,%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	add	-8($tptr,$i),$A1[0]
+	mov	%rdx,$A1[1]
+	adc	\$0,$A1[1]
+
+	mul	$a0			# a[3]*a[0]
+	add	%rax,$A0[0]		# a[3]*a[0]+a[2]*a[1]+t[3]
+	 mov	$ai,%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	add	$A1[0],$A0[0]
+	mov	%rdx,$A0[1]
+	adc	\$0,$A0[1]
+	mov	$A0[0],-8($tptr,$i)	# t[3]
+
+	lea	($i),$j
+	jmp	.Lsqr4x_inner
+
+.align	32
+.Lsqr4x_inner:
+	 mov	($aptr,$j),$ai		# a[4]
+	mul	$a1			# a[3]*a[1]
+	add	%rax,$A1[1]		# a[3]*a[1]+t[4]
+	 mov	$ai,%rax
+	mov	%rdx,$A1[0]
+	adc	\$0,$A1[0]
+	add	($tptr,$j),$A1[1]
+	adc	\$0,$A1[0]
+
+	.byte	0x67
+	mul	$a0			# a[4]*a[0]
+	add	%rax,$A0[1]		# a[4]*a[0]+a[3]*a[1]+t[4]
+	 mov	$ai,%rax		# a[3]
+	 mov	8($aptr,$j),$ai		# a[5]
+	mov	%rdx,$A0[0]
+	adc	\$0,$A0[0]
+	add	$A1[1],$A0[1]
+	adc	\$0,$A0[0]
+
+	mul	$a1			# a[4]*a[3]
+	add	%rax,$A1[0]		# a[4]*a[3]+t[5]
+	mov	$A0[1],($tptr,$j)	# t[4]
+	 mov	$ai,%rax
+	mov	%rdx,$A1[1]
+	adc	\$0,$A1[1]
+	add	8($tptr,$j),$A1[0]
+	lea	16($j),$j		# j++
+	adc	\$0,$A1[1]
+
+	mul	$a0			# a[5]*a[2]
+	add	%rax,$A0[0]		# a[5]*a[2]+a[4]*a[3]+t[5]
+	 mov	$ai,%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	add	$A1[0],$A0[0]
+	mov	%rdx,$A0[1]
+	adc	\$0,$A0[1]
+	mov	$A0[0],-8($tptr,$j)	# t[5], "preloaded t[1]" below
+
+	cmp	\$0,$j
+	jne	.Lsqr4x_inner
+
+	.byte	0x67
+	mul	$a1			# a[5]*a[3]
+	add	%rax,$A1[1]
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	add	$A0[1],$A1[1]
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+
+	mov	$A1[1],($tptr)		# t[6], "preloaded t[2]" below
+	mov	%rdx,$A1[0]
+	mov	%rdx,8($tptr)		# t[7], "preloaded t[3]" below
+
+	add	\$16,$i
+	jnz	.Lsqr4x_outer
+
+					# comments apply to $num==4 case
+	mov	-32($aptr),$a0		# a[0]
+	lea	48+8(%rsp,$num,2),$tptr	# end of tp[] buffer, &tp[2*$num]
+	mov	-24($aptr),%rax		# a[1]
+	lea	-32($tptr,$i),$tptr	# end of tp[] window, &tp[2*$num-"$i"]
+	mov	-16($aptr),$ai		# a[2]
+	mov	%rax,$a1
+
+	mul	$a0			# a[1]*a[0]
+	add	%rax,$A0[0]		# a[1]*a[0]+t[1], preloaded t[1]
+	 mov	$ai,%rax		# a[2]
+	mov	%rdx,$A0[1]
+	adc	\$0,$A0[1]
+
+	mul	$a0			# a[2]*a[0]
+	add	%rax,$A0[1]
+	 mov	$ai,%rax
+	 mov	$A0[0],-24($tptr)	# t[1]
+	mov	%rdx,$A0[0]
+	adc	\$0,$A0[0]
+	add	$A1[1],$A0[1]		# a[2]*a[0]+t[2], preloaded t[2]
+	 mov	-8($aptr),$ai		# a[3]
+	adc	\$0,$A0[0]
+
+	mul	$a1			# a[2]*a[1]
+	add	%rax,$A1[0]		# a[2]*a[1]+t[3], preloaded t[3]
+	 mov	$ai,%rax
+	 mov	$A0[1],-16($tptr)	# t[2]
+	mov	%rdx,$A1[1]
+	adc	\$0,$A1[1]
+
+	mul	$a0			# a[3]*a[0]
+	add	%rax,$A0[0]		# a[3]*a[0]+a[2]*a[1]+t[3]
+	 mov	$ai,%rax
+	mov	%rdx,$A0[1]
+	adc	\$0,$A0[1]
+	add	$A1[0],$A0[0]
+	adc	\$0,$A0[1]
+	mov	$A0[0],-8($tptr)	# t[3]
+
+	mul	$a1			# a[3]*a[1]
+	add	%rax,$A1[1]
+	 mov	-16($aptr),%rax		# a[2]
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	add	$A0[1],$A1[1]
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+
+	mov	$A1[1],($tptr)		# t[4]
+	mov	%rdx,$A1[0]
+	mov	%rdx,8($tptr)		# t[5]
+
+	mul	$ai			# a[2]*a[3]
+___
+{
+my ($shift,$carry)=($a0,$a1);
+my @S=(@A1,$ai,$n0);
+$code.=<<___;
+	 add	\$16,$i
+	 xor	$shift,$shift
+	 sub	$num,$i			# $i=16-$num
+	 xor	$carry,$carry
+
+	add	$A1[0],%rax		# t[5]
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	mov	%rax,8($tptr)		# t[5]
+	mov	%rdx,16($tptr)		# t[6]
+	mov	$carry,24($tptr)	# t[7]
+
+	 mov	-16($aptr,$i),%rax	# a[0]
+	lea	48+8(%rsp),$tptr
+	 xor	$A0[0],$A0[0]		# t[0]
+	 mov	8($tptr),$A0[1]		# t[1]
+
+	lea	($shift,$A0[0],2),$S[0]	# t[2*i]<<1 | shift
+	shr	\$63,$A0[0]
+	lea	($j,$A0[1],2),$S[1]	# t[2*i+1]<<1 |
+	shr	\$63,$A0[1]
+	or	$A0[0],$S[1]		# | t[2*i]>>63
+	 mov	16($tptr),$A0[0]	# t[2*i+2]	# prefetch
+	mov	$A0[1],$shift		# shift=t[2*i+1]>>63
+	mul	%rax			# a[i]*a[i]
+	neg	$carry			# mov $carry,cf
+	 mov	24($tptr),$A0[1]	# t[2*i+2+1]	# prefetch
+	adc	%rax,$S[0]
+	 mov	-8($aptr,$i),%rax	# a[i+1]	# prefetch
+	mov	$S[0],($tptr)
+	adc	%rdx,$S[1]
+
+	lea	($shift,$A0[0],2),$S[2]	# t[2*i]<<1 | shift
+	 mov	$S[1],8($tptr)
+	 sbb	$carry,$carry		# mov cf,$carry
+	shr	\$63,$A0[0]
+	lea	($j,$A0[1],2),$S[3]	# t[2*i+1]<<1 |
+	shr	\$63,$A0[1]
+	or	$A0[0],$S[3]		# | t[2*i]>>63
+	 mov	32($tptr),$A0[0]	# t[2*i+2]	# prefetch
+	mov	$A0[1],$shift		# shift=t[2*i+1]>>63
+	mul	%rax			# a[i]*a[i]
+	neg	$carry			# mov $carry,cf
+	 mov	40($tptr),$A0[1]	# t[2*i+2+1]	# prefetch
+	adc	%rax,$S[2]
+	 mov	0($aptr,$i),%rax	# a[i+1]	# prefetch
+	mov	$S[2],16($tptr)
+	adc	%rdx,$S[3]
+	lea	16($i),$i
+	mov	$S[3],24($tptr)
+	sbb	$carry,$carry		# mov cf,$carry
+	lea	64($tptr),$tptr
+	jmp	.Lsqr4x_shift_n_add
+
+.align	32
+.Lsqr4x_shift_n_add:
+	lea	($shift,$A0[0],2),$S[0]	# t[2*i]<<1 | shift
+	shr	\$63,$A0[0]
+	lea	($j,$A0[1],2),$S[1]	# t[2*i+1]<<1 |
+	shr	\$63,$A0[1]
+	or	$A0[0],$S[1]		# | t[2*i]>>63
+	 mov	-16($tptr),$A0[0]	# t[2*i+2]	# prefetch
+	mov	$A0[1],$shift		# shift=t[2*i+1]>>63
+	mul	%rax			# a[i]*a[i]
+	neg	$carry			# mov $carry,cf
+	 mov	-8($tptr),$A0[1]	# t[2*i+2+1]	# prefetch
+	adc	%rax,$S[0]
+	 mov	-8($aptr,$i),%rax	# a[i+1]	# prefetch
+	mov	$S[0],-32($tptr)
+	adc	%rdx,$S[1]
+
+	lea	($shift,$A0[0],2),$S[2]	# t[2*i]<<1 | shift
+	 mov	$S[1],-24($tptr)
+	 sbb	$carry,$carry		# mov cf,$carry
+	shr	\$63,$A0[0]
+	lea	($j,$A0[1],2),$S[3]	# t[2*i+1]<<1 |
+	shr	\$63,$A0[1]
+	or	$A0[0],$S[3]		# | t[2*i]>>63
+	 mov	0($tptr),$A0[0]		# t[2*i+2]	# prefetch
+	mov	$A0[1],$shift		# shift=t[2*i+1]>>63
+	mul	%rax			# a[i]*a[i]
+	neg	$carry			# mov $carry,cf
+	 mov	8($tptr),$A0[1]		# t[2*i+2+1]	# prefetch
+	adc	%rax,$S[2]
+	 mov	0($aptr,$i),%rax	# a[i+1]	# prefetch
+	mov	$S[2],-16($tptr)
+	adc	%rdx,$S[3]
+
+	lea	($shift,$A0[0],2),$S[0]	# t[2*i]<<1 | shift
+	 mov	$S[3],-8($tptr)
+	 sbb	$carry,$carry		# mov cf,$carry
+	shr	\$63,$A0[0]
+	lea	($j,$A0[1],2),$S[1]	# t[2*i+1]<<1 |
+	shr	\$63,$A0[1]
+	or	$A0[0],$S[1]		# | t[2*i]>>63
+	 mov	16($tptr),$A0[0]	# t[2*i+2]	# prefetch
+	mov	$A0[1],$shift		# shift=t[2*i+1]>>63
+	mul	%rax			# a[i]*a[i]
+	neg	$carry			# mov $carry,cf
+	 mov	24($tptr),$A0[1]	# t[2*i+2+1]	# prefetch
+	adc	%rax,$S[0]
+	 mov	8($aptr,$i),%rax	# a[i+1]	# prefetch
+	mov	$S[0],0($tptr)
+	adc	%rdx,$S[1]
+
+	lea	($shift,$A0[0],2),$S[2]	# t[2*i]<<1 | shift
+	 mov	$S[1],8($tptr)
+	 sbb	$carry,$carry		# mov cf,$carry
+	shr	\$63,$A0[0]
+	lea	($j,$A0[1],2),$S[3]	# t[2*i+1]<<1 |
+	shr	\$63,$A0[1]
+	or	$A0[0],$S[3]		# | t[2*i]>>63
+	 mov	32($tptr),$A0[0]	# t[2*i+2]	# prefetch
+	mov	$A0[1],$shift		# shift=t[2*i+1]>>63
+	mul	%rax			# a[i]*a[i]
+	neg	$carry			# mov $carry,cf
+	 mov	40($tptr),$A0[1]	# t[2*i+2+1]	# prefetch
+	adc	%rax,$S[2]
+	 mov	16($aptr,$i),%rax	# a[i+1]	# prefetch
+	mov	$S[2],16($tptr)
+	adc	%rdx,$S[3]
+	mov	$S[3],24($tptr)
+	sbb	$carry,$carry		# mov cf,$carry
+	lea	64($tptr),$tptr
+	add	\$32,$i
+	jnz	.Lsqr4x_shift_n_add
+
+	lea	($shift,$A0[0],2),$S[0]	# t[2*i]<<1 | shift
+	.byte	0x67
+	shr	\$63,$A0[0]
+	lea	($j,$A0[1],2),$S[1]	# t[2*i+1]<<1 |
+	shr	\$63,$A0[1]
+	or	$A0[0],$S[1]		# | t[2*i]>>63
+	 mov	-16($tptr),$A0[0]	# t[2*i+2]	# prefetch
+	mov	$A0[1],$shift		# shift=t[2*i+1]>>63
+	mul	%rax			# a[i]*a[i]
+	neg	$carry			# mov $carry,cf
+	 mov	-8($tptr),$A0[1]	# t[2*i+2+1]	# prefetch
+	adc	%rax,$S[0]
+	 mov	-8($aptr),%rax		# a[i+1]	# prefetch
+	mov	$S[0],-32($tptr)
+	adc	%rdx,$S[1]
+
+	lea	($shift,$A0[0],2),$S[2]	# t[2*i]<<1|shift
+	 mov	$S[1],-24($tptr)
+	 sbb	$carry,$carry		# mov cf,$carry
+	shr	\$63,$A0[0]
+	lea	($j,$A0[1],2),$S[3]	# t[2*i+1]<<1 |
+	shr	\$63,$A0[1]
+	or	$A0[0],$S[3]		# | t[2*i]>>63
+	mul	%rax			# a[i]*a[i]
+	neg	$carry			# mov $carry,cf
+	adc	%rax,$S[2]
+	adc	%rdx,$S[3]
+	mov	$S[2],-16($tptr)
+	mov	$S[3],-8($tptr)
+___
+}
+######################################################################
+# Montgomery reduction part, "word-by-word" algorithm.
+#
+# This new path is inspired by multiple submissions from Intel, by
+# Shay Gueron, Vlad Krasnov, Erdinc Ozturk, James Guilford,
+# Vinodh Gopal...
+{
+my ($nptr,$tptr,$carry,$m0)=("%rbp","%rdi","%rsi","%rbx");
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	movq	%xmm2,$nptr
+__bn_sqr8x_reduction:
+	xor	%rax,%rax
+	lea	($nptr,$num),%rcx	# end of n[]
+	lea	48+8(%rsp,$num,2),%rdx	# end of t[] buffer
+	mov	%rcx,0+8(%rsp)
+	lea	48+8(%rsp,$num),$tptr	# end of initial t[] window
+	mov	%rdx,8+8(%rsp)
+	neg	$num
+	jmp	.L8x_reduction_loop
+
+.align	32
+.L8x_reduction_loop:
+	lea	($tptr,$num),$tptr	# start of current t[] window
+	.byte	0x66
+	mov	8*0($tptr),$m0
+	mov	8*1($tptr),%r9
+	mov	8*2($tptr),%r10
+	mov	8*3($tptr),%r11
+	mov	8*4($tptr),%r12
+	mov	8*5($tptr),%r13
+	mov	8*6($tptr),%r14
+	mov	8*7($tptr),%r15
+	mov	%rax,(%rdx)		# store top-most carry bit
+	lea	8*8($tptr),$tptr
+
+	.byte	0x67
+	mov	$m0,%r8
+	imulq	32+8(%rsp),$m0		# n0*a[0]
+	mov	8*0($nptr),%rax		# n[0]
+	mov	\$8,%ecx
+	jmp	.L8x_reduce
+
+.align	32
+.L8x_reduce:
+	mulq	$m0
+	 mov	8*1($nptr),%rax		# n[1]
+	neg	%r8
+	mov	%rdx,%r8
+	adc	\$0,%r8
+
+	mulq	$m0
+	add	%rax,%r9
+	 mov	8*2($nptr),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	add	%r9,%r8
+	 mov	$m0,48-8+8(%rsp,%rcx,8)	# put aside n0*a[i]
+	mov	%rdx,%r9
+	adc	\$0,%r9
+
+	mulq	$m0
+	add	%rax,%r10
+	 mov	8*3($nptr),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	add	%r10,%r9
+	 mov	32+8(%rsp),$carry	# pull n0, borrow $carry
+	mov	%rdx,%r10
+	adc	\$0,%r10
+
+	mulq	$m0
+	add	%rax,%r11
+	 mov	8*4($nptr),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	 imulq	%r8,$carry		# modulo-scheduled
+	add	%r11,%r10
+	mov	%rdx,%r11
+	adc	\$0,%r11
+
+	mulq	$m0
+	add	%rax,%r12
+	 mov	8*5($nptr),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	add	%r12,%r11
+	mov	%rdx,%r12
+	adc	\$0,%r12
+
+	mulq	$m0
+	add	%rax,%r13
+	 mov	8*6($nptr),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	add	%r13,%r12
+	mov	%rdx,%r13
+	adc	\$0,%r13
+
+	mulq	$m0
+	add	%rax,%r14
+	 mov	8*7($nptr),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	add	%r14,%r13
+	mov	%rdx,%r14
+	adc	\$0,%r14
+
+	mulq	$m0
+	 mov	$carry,$m0		# n0*a[i]
+	add	%rax,%r15
+	 mov	8*0($nptr),%rax		# n[0]
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	add	%r15,%r14
+	mov	%rdx,%r15
+	adc	\$0,%r15
+
+	dec	%ecx
+	jnz	.L8x_reduce
+
+	lea	8*8($nptr),$nptr
+	xor	%rax,%rax
+	mov	8+8(%rsp),%rdx		# pull end of t[]
+	cmp	0+8(%rsp),$nptr		# end of n[]?
+	jae	.L8x_no_tail
+
+	.byte	0x66
+	add	8*0($tptr),%r8
+	adc	8*1($tptr),%r9
+	adc	8*2($tptr),%r10
+	adc	8*3($tptr),%r11
+	adc	8*4($tptr),%r12
+	adc	8*5($tptr),%r13
+	adc	8*6($tptr),%r14
+	adc	8*7($tptr),%r15
+	sbb	$carry,$carry		# top carry
+
+	mov	48+56+8(%rsp),$m0	# pull n0*a[0]
+	mov	\$8,%ecx
+	mov	8*0($nptr),%rax
+	jmp	.L8x_tail
+
+.align	32
+.L8x_tail:
+	mulq	$m0
+	add	%rax,%r8
+	 mov	8*1($nptr),%rax
+	 mov	%r8,($tptr)		# save result
+	mov	%rdx,%r8
+	adc	\$0,%r8
+
+	mulq	$m0
+	add	%rax,%r9
+	 mov	8*2($nptr),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	add	%r9,%r8
+	 lea	8($tptr),$tptr		# $tptr++
+	mov	%rdx,%r9
+	adc	\$0,%r9
+
+	mulq	$m0
+	add	%rax,%r10
+	 mov	8*3($nptr),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	add	%r10,%r9
+	mov	%rdx,%r10
+	adc	\$0,%r10
+
+	mulq	$m0
+	add	%rax,%r11
+	 mov	8*4($nptr),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	add	%r11,%r10
+	mov	%rdx,%r11
+	adc	\$0,%r11
+
+	mulq	$m0
+	add	%rax,%r12
+	 mov	8*5($nptr),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	add	%r12,%r11
+	mov	%rdx,%r12
+	adc	\$0,%r12
+
+	mulq	$m0
+	add	%rax,%r13
+	 mov	8*6($nptr),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	add	%r13,%r12
+	mov	%rdx,%r13
+	adc	\$0,%r13
+
+	mulq	$m0
+	add	%rax,%r14
+	 mov	8*7($nptr),%rax
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	add	%r14,%r13
+	mov	%rdx,%r14
+	adc	\$0,%r14
+
+	mulq	$m0
+	 mov	48-16+8(%rsp,%rcx,8),$m0# pull n0*a[i]
+	add	%rax,%r15
+	adc	\$0,%rdx
+	add	%r15,%r14
+	 mov	8*0($nptr),%rax		# pull n[0]
+	mov	%rdx,%r15
+	adc	\$0,%r15
+
+	dec	%ecx
+	jnz	.L8x_tail
+
+	lea	8*8($nptr),$nptr
+	mov	8+8(%rsp),%rdx		# pull end of t[]
+	cmp	0+8(%rsp),$nptr		# end of n[]?
+	jae	.L8x_tail_done		# break out of loop
+
+	 mov	48+56+8(%rsp),$m0	# pull n0*a[0]
+	neg	$carry
+	 mov	8*0($nptr),%rax		# pull n[0]
+	adc	8*0($tptr),%r8
+	adc	8*1($tptr),%r9
+	adc	8*2($tptr),%r10
+	adc	8*3($tptr),%r11
+	adc	8*4($tptr),%r12
+	adc	8*5($tptr),%r13
+	adc	8*6($tptr),%r14
+	adc	8*7($tptr),%r15
+	sbb	$carry,$carry		# top carry
+
+	mov	\$8,%ecx
+	jmp	.L8x_tail
+
+.align	32
+.L8x_tail_done:
+	xor	%rax,%rax
+	add	(%rdx),%r8		# can this overflow?
+	adc	\$0,%r9
+	adc	\$0,%r10
+	adc	\$0,%r11
+	adc	\$0,%r12
+	adc	\$0,%r13
+	adc	\$0,%r14
+	adc	\$0,%r15
+	adc	\$0,%rax
+
+	neg	$carry
+.L8x_no_tail:
+	adc	8*0($tptr),%r8
+	adc	8*1($tptr),%r9
+	adc	8*2($tptr),%r10
+	adc	8*3($tptr),%r11
+	adc	8*4($tptr),%r12
+	adc	8*5($tptr),%r13
+	adc	8*6($tptr),%r14
+	adc	8*7($tptr),%r15
+	adc	\$0,%rax		# top-most carry
+	 mov	-8($nptr),%rcx		# np[num-1]
+	 xor	$carry,$carry
+
+	movq	%xmm2,$nptr		# restore $nptr
+
+	mov	%r8,8*0($tptr)		# store top 512 bits
+	mov	%r9,8*1($tptr)
+	 movq	%xmm3,$num		# $num is %r9, can't be moved upwards
+	mov	%r10,8*2($tptr)
+	mov	%r11,8*3($tptr)
+	mov	%r12,8*4($tptr)
+	mov	%r13,8*5($tptr)
+	mov	%r14,8*6($tptr)
+	mov	%r15,8*7($tptr)
+	lea	8*8($tptr),$tptr
+
+	cmp	%rdx,$tptr		# end of t[]?
+	jb	.L8x_reduction_loop
+	ret
+.size	bn_sqr8x_internal,.-bn_sqr8x_internal
+___
+}
+##############################################################
+# Post-condition, 4x unrolled
+#
+{
+my ($tptr,$nptr)=("%rbx","%rbp");
+$code.=<<___;
+.type	__bn_post4x_internal,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	32
+__bn_post4x_internal:
+	mov	8*0($nptr),%r12
+	lea	(%rdi,$num),$tptr	# %rdi was $tptr above
+	mov	$num,%rcx
+	movq	%xmm1,$rptr		# restore $rptr
+	neg	%rax
+	movq	%xmm1,$aptr		# prepare for back-to-back call
+	sar	\$3+2,%rcx
+	dec	%r12			# so that after 'not' we get -n[0]
+	xor	%r10,%r10
+	mov	8*1($nptr),%r13
+	mov	8*2($nptr),%r14
+	mov	8*3($nptr),%r15
+	jmp	.Lsqr4x_sub_entry
+
+.align	16
+.Lsqr4x_sub:
+	mov	8*0($nptr),%r12
+	mov	8*1($nptr),%r13
+	mov	8*2($nptr),%r14
+	mov	8*3($nptr),%r15
+.Lsqr4x_sub_entry:
+	lea	8*4($nptr),$nptr
+	not	%r12
+	not	%r13
+	not	%r14
+	not	%r15
+	and	%rax,%r12
+	and	%rax,%r13
+	and	%rax,%r14
+	and	%rax,%r15
+
+	neg	%r10			# mov %r10,%cf
+	adc	8*0($tptr),%r12
+	adc	8*1($tptr),%r13
+	adc	8*2($tptr),%r14
+	adc	8*3($tptr),%r15
+	mov	%r12,8*0($rptr)
+	lea	8*4($tptr),$tptr
+	mov	%r13,8*1($rptr)
+	sbb	%r10,%r10		# mov %cf,%r10
+	mov	%r14,8*2($rptr)
+	mov	%r15,8*3($rptr)
+	lea	8*4($rptr),$rptr
+
+	inc	%rcx			# pass %cf
+	jnz	.Lsqr4x_sub
+
+	mov	$num,%r10		# prepare for back-to-back call
+	neg	$num			# restore $num	
+	ret
+.size	__bn_post4x_internal,.-__bn_post4x_internal
+___
+}
+{
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	bn_from_montgomery
+.type	bn_from_montgomery,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	32
+bn_from_montgomery:
+	testl	\$7,`($win64?"48(%rsp)":"%r9d")`
+	jz	bn_from_mont8x
+	xor	%eax,%eax
+	ret
+.size	bn_from_montgomery,.-bn_from_montgomery
+
+.type	bn_from_mont8x,\@function,6
+.align	32
+bn_from_mont8x:
+	.byte	0x67
+	mov	%rsp,%rax
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+.Lfrom_prologue:
+
+	shl	\$3,${num}d		# convert $num to bytes
+	lea	($num,$num,2),%r10	# 3*$num in bytes
+	neg	$num
+	mov	($n0),$n0		# *n0
+
+	##############################################################
+	# Ensure that stack frame doesn't alias with $rptr+3*$num
+	# modulo 4096, which covers ret[num], am[num] and n[num]
+	# (see bn_exp.c). The stack is allocated to aligned with
+	# bn_power5's frame, and as bn_from_montgomery happens to be
+	# last operation, we use the opportunity to cleanse it.
+	#
+	lea	-320(%rsp,$num,2),%r11
+	mov	%rsp,%rbp
+	sub	$rptr,%r11
+	and	\$4095,%r11
+	cmp	%r11,%r10
+	jb	.Lfrom_sp_alt
+	sub	%r11,%rbp		# align with $aptr
+	lea	-320(%rbp,$num,2),%rbp	# future alloca(frame+2*$num*8+256)
+	jmp	.Lfrom_sp_done
+
+.align	32
+.Lfrom_sp_alt:
+	lea	4096-320(,$num,2),%r10
+	lea	-320(%rbp,$num,2),%rbp	# future alloca(frame+2*$num*8+256)
+	sub	%r10,%r11
+	mov	\$0,%r10
+	cmovc	%r10,%r11
+	sub	%r11,%rbp
+.Lfrom_sp_done:
+	and	\$-64,%rbp
+	mov	%rsp,%r11
+	sub	%rbp,%r11
+	and	\$-4096,%r11
+	lea	(%rbp,%r11),%rsp
+	mov	(%rsp),%r10
+	cmp	%rbp,%rsp
+	ja	.Lfrom_page_walk
+	jmp	.Lfrom_page_walk_done
+
+.Lfrom_page_walk:
+	lea	-4096(%rsp),%rsp
+	mov	(%rsp),%r10
+	cmp	%rbp,%rsp
+	ja	.Lfrom_page_walk
+.Lfrom_page_walk_done:
+
+	mov	$num,%r10
+	neg	$num
+
+	##############################################################
+	# Stack layout
+	#
+	# +0	saved $num, used in reduction section
+	# +8	&t[2*$num], used in reduction section
+	# +32	saved *n0
+	# +40	saved %rsp
+	# +48	t[2*$num]
+	#
+	mov	$n0,  32(%rsp)
+	mov	%rax, 40(%rsp)		# save original %rsp
+.Lfrom_body:
+	mov	$num,%r11
+	lea	48(%rsp),%rax
+	pxor	%xmm0,%xmm0
+	jmp	.Lmul_by_1
+
+.align	32
+.Lmul_by_1:
+	movdqu	($aptr),%xmm1
+	movdqu	16($aptr),%xmm2
+	movdqu	32($aptr),%xmm3
+	movdqa	%xmm0,(%rax,$num)
+	movdqu	48($aptr),%xmm4
+	movdqa	%xmm0,16(%rax,$num)
+	.byte	0x48,0x8d,0xb6,0x40,0x00,0x00,0x00	# lea	64($aptr),$aptr
+	movdqa	%xmm1,(%rax)
+	movdqa	%xmm0,32(%rax,$num)
+	movdqa	%xmm2,16(%rax)
+	movdqa	%xmm0,48(%rax,$num)
+	movdqa	%xmm3,32(%rax)
+	movdqa	%xmm4,48(%rax)
+	lea	64(%rax),%rax
+	sub	\$64,%r11
+	jnz	.Lmul_by_1
+
+	movq	$rptr,%xmm1
+	movq	$nptr,%xmm2
+	.byte	0x67
+	mov	$nptr,%rbp
+	movq	%r10, %xmm3		# -num
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($addx);
+	mov	OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+8(%rip),%r11d
+	and	\$0x80108,%r11d
+	cmp	\$0x80108,%r11d		# check for AD*X+BMI2+BMI1
+	jne	.Lfrom_mont_nox
+
+	lea	(%rax,$num),$rptr
+	call	__bn_sqrx8x_reduction
+	call	__bn_postx4x_internal
+
+	pxor	%xmm0,%xmm0
+	lea	48(%rsp),%rax
+	mov	40(%rsp),%rsi		# restore %rsp
+	jmp	.Lfrom_mont_zero
+
+.align	32
+.Lfrom_mont_nox:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	call	__bn_sqr8x_reduction
+	call	__bn_post4x_internal
+
+	pxor	%xmm0,%xmm0
+	lea	48(%rsp),%rax
+	mov	40(%rsp),%rsi		# restore %rsp
+	jmp	.Lfrom_mont_zero
+
+.align	32
+.Lfrom_mont_zero:
+	movdqa	%xmm0,16*0(%rax)
+	movdqa	%xmm0,16*1(%rax)
+	movdqa	%xmm0,16*2(%rax)
+	movdqa	%xmm0,16*3(%rax)
+	lea	16*4(%rax),%rax
+	sub	\$32,$num
+	jnz	.Lfrom_mont_zero
+
+	mov	\$1,%rax
+	mov	-48(%rsi),%r15
+	mov	-40(%rsi),%r14
+	mov	-32(%rsi),%r13
+	mov	-24(%rsi),%r12
+	mov	-16(%rsi),%rbp
+	mov	-8(%rsi),%rbx
+	lea	(%rsi),%rsp
+.Lfrom_epilogue:
+	ret
+.size	bn_from_mont8x,.-bn_from_mont8x
+___
+}
+}}}
+
+if ($addx) {{{
+my $bp="%rdx";	# restore original value
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.type	bn_mulx4x_mont_gather5,\@function,6
+.align	32
+bn_mulx4x_mont_gather5:
+	mov	%rsp,%rax
+.Lmulx4x_enter:
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+.Lmulx4x_prologue:
+
+	shl	\$3,${num}d		# convert $num to bytes
+	lea	($num,$num,2),%r10	# 3*$num in bytes
+	neg	$num			# -$num
+	mov	($n0),$n0		# *n0
+
+	##############################################################
+	# Ensure that stack frame doesn't alias with $rptr+3*$num
+	# modulo 4096, which covers ret[num], am[num] and n[num]
+	# (see bn_exp.c). This is done to allow memory disambiguation
+	# logic do its magic. [Extra [num] is allocated in order
+	# to align with bn_power5's frame, which is cleansed after
+	# completing exponentiation. Extra 256 bytes is for power mask
+	# calculated from 7th argument, the index.]
+	#
+	lea	-320(%rsp,$num,2),%r11
+	mov	%rsp,%rbp
+	sub	$rp,%r11
+	and	\$4095,%r11
+	cmp	%r11,%r10
+	jb	.Lmulx4xsp_alt
+	sub	%r11,%rbp		# align with $aptr
+	lea	-320(%rbp,$num,2),%rbp	# future alloca(frame+2*$num*8+256)
+	jmp	.Lmulx4xsp_done
+
+.Lmulx4xsp_alt:
+	lea	4096-320(,$num,2),%r10
+	lea	-320(%rbp,$num,2),%rbp	# future alloca(frame+2*$num*8+256)
+	sub	%r10,%r11
+	mov	\$0,%r10
+	cmovc	%r10,%r11
+	sub	%r11,%rbp
+.Lmulx4xsp_done:	
+	and	\$-64,%rbp		# ensure alignment
+	mov	%rsp,%r11
+	sub	%rbp,%r11
+	and	\$-4096,%r11
+	lea	(%rbp,%r11),%rsp
+	mov	(%rsp),%r10
+	cmp	%rbp,%rsp
+	ja	.Lmulx4x_page_walk
+	jmp	.Lmulx4x_page_walk_done
+
+.Lmulx4x_page_walk:
+	lea	-4096(%rsp),%rsp
+	mov	(%rsp),%r10
+	cmp	%rbp,%rsp
+	ja	.Lmulx4x_page_walk
+.Lmulx4x_page_walk_done:
+
+	##############################################################
+	# Stack layout
+	# +0	-num
+	# +8	off-loaded &b[i]
+	# +16	end of b[num]
+	# +24	inner counter
+	# +32	saved n0
+	# +40	saved %rsp
+	# +48
+	# +56	saved rp
+	# +64	tmp[num+1]
+	#
+	mov	$n0, 32(%rsp)		# save *n0
+	mov	%rax,40(%rsp)		# save original %rsp
+.Lmulx4x_body:
+	call	mulx4x_internal
+
+	mov	40(%rsp),%rsi		# restore %rsp
+	mov	\$1,%rax
+
+	mov	-48(%rsi),%r15
+	mov	-40(%rsi),%r14
+	mov	-32(%rsi),%r13
+	mov	-24(%rsi),%r12
+	mov	-16(%rsi),%rbp
+	mov	-8(%rsi),%rbx
+	lea	(%rsi),%rsp
+.Lmulx4x_epilogue:
+	ret
+.size	bn_mulx4x_mont_gather5,.-bn_mulx4x_mont_gather5
+
+.type	mulx4x_internal,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	32
+mulx4x_internal:
+	mov	$num,8(%rsp)		# save -$num (it was in bytes)
+	mov	$num,%r10
+	neg	$num			# restore $num
+	shl	\$5,$num
+	neg	%r10			# restore $num
+	lea	128($bp,$num),%r13	# end of powers table (+size optimization)
+	shr	\$5+5,$num
+	movd	`($win64?56:8)`(%rax),%xmm5	# load 7th argument
+	sub	\$1,$num
+	lea	.Linc(%rip),%rax
+	mov	%r13,16+8(%rsp)		# end of b[num]
+	mov	$num,24+8(%rsp)		# inner counter
+	mov	$rp, 56+8(%rsp)		# save $rp
+___
+my ($aptr, $bptr, $nptr, $tptr, $mi,  $bi,  $zero, $num)=
+   ("%rsi","%rdi","%rcx","%rbx","%r8","%r9","%rbp","%rax");
+my $rptr=$bptr;
+my $STRIDE=2**5*8;		# 5 is "window size"
+my $N=$STRIDE/4;		# should match cache line size
+$code.=<<___;
+	movdqa	0(%rax),%xmm0		# 00000001000000010000000000000000
+	movdqa	16(%rax),%xmm1		# 00000002000000020000000200000002
+	lea	88-112(%rsp,%r10),%r10	# place the mask after tp[num+1] (+ICache optimizaton)
+	lea	128($bp),$bptr		# size optimization
+
+	pshufd	\$0,%xmm5,%xmm5		# broadcast index
+	movdqa	%xmm1,%xmm4
+	.byte	0x67
+	movdqa	%xmm1,%xmm2
+___
+########################################################################
+# calculate mask by comparing 0..31 to index and save result to stack
+#
+$code.=<<___;
+	.byte	0x67
+	paddd	%xmm0,%xmm1
+	pcmpeqd	%xmm5,%xmm0		# compare to 1,0
+	movdqa	%xmm4,%xmm3
+___
+for($i=0;$i<$STRIDE/16-4;$i+=4) {
+$code.=<<___;
+	paddd	%xmm1,%xmm2
+	pcmpeqd	%xmm5,%xmm1		# compare to 3,2
+	movdqa	%xmm0,`16*($i+0)+112`(%r10)
+	movdqa	%xmm4,%xmm0
+
+	paddd	%xmm2,%xmm3
+	pcmpeqd	%xmm5,%xmm2		# compare to 5,4
+	movdqa	%xmm1,`16*($i+1)+112`(%r10)
+	movdqa	%xmm4,%xmm1
+
+	paddd	%xmm3,%xmm0
+	pcmpeqd	%xmm5,%xmm3		# compare to 7,6
+	movdqa	%xmm2,`16*($i+2)+112`(%r10)
+	movdqa	%xmm4,%xmm2
+
+	paddd	%xmm0,%xmm1
+	pcmpeqd	%xmm5,%xmm0
+	movdqa	%xmm3,`16*($i+3)+112`(%r10)
+	movdqa	%xmm4,%xmm3
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;				# last iteration can be optimized
+	.byte	0x67
+	paddd	%xmm1,%xmm2
+	pcmpeqd	%xmm5,%xmm1
+	movdqa	%xmm0,`16*($i+0)+112`(%r10)
+
+	paddd	%xmm2,%xmm3
+	pcmpeqd	%xmm5,%xmm2
+	movdqa	%xmm1,`16*($i+1)+112`(%r10)
+
+	pcmpeqd	%xmm5,%xmm3
+	movdqa	%xmm2,`16*($i+2)+112`(%r10)
+
+	pand	`16*($i+0)-128`($bptr),%xmm0	# while it's still in register
+	pand	`16*($i+1)-128`($bptr),%xmm1
+	pand	`16*($i+2)-128`($bptr),%xmm2
+	movdqa	%xmm3,`16*($i+3)+112`(%r10)
+	pand	`16*($i+3)-128`($bptr),%xmm3
+	por	%xmm2,%xmm0
+	por	%xmm3,%xmm1
+___
+for($i=0;$i<$STRIDE/16-4;$i+=4) {
+$code.=<<___;
+	movdqa	`16*($i+0)-128`($bptr),%xmm4
+	movdqa	`16*($i+1)-128`($bptr),%xmm5
+	movdqa	`16*($i+2)-128`($bptr),%xmm2
+	pand	`16*($i+0)+112`(%r10),%xmm4
+	movdqa	`16*($i+3)-128`($bptr),%xmm3
+	pand	`16*($i+1)+112`(%r10),%xmm5
+	por	%xmm4,%xmm0
+	pand	`16*($i+2)+112`(%r10),%xmm2
+	por	%xmm5,%xmm1
+	pand	`16*($i+3)+112`(%r10),%xmm3
+	por	%xmm2,%xmm0
+	por	%xmm3,%xmm1
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	pxor	%xmm1,%xmm0
+	pshufd	\$0x4e,%xmm0,%xmm1
+	por	%xmm1,%xmm0
+	lea	$STRIDE($bptr),$bptr
+	movq	%xmm0,%rdx		# bp[0]
+	lea	64+8*4+8(%rsp),$tptr
+
+	mov	%rdx,$bi
+	mulx	0*8($aptr),$mi,%rax	# a[0]*b[0]
+	mulx	1*8($aptr),%r11,%r12	# a[1]*b[0]
+	add	%rax,%r11
+	mulx	2*8($aptr),%rax,%r13	# ...
+	adc	%rax,%r12
+	adc	\$0,%r13
+	mulx	3*8($aptr),%rax,%r14
+
+	mov	$mi,%r15
+	imulq	32+8(%rsp),$mi		# "t[0]"*n0
+	xor	$zero,$zero		# cf=0, of=0
+	mov	$mi,%rdx
+
+	mov	$bptr,8+8(%rsp)		# off-load &b[i]
+
+	lea	4*8($aptr),$aptr
+	adcx	%rax,%r13
+	adcx	$zero,%r14		# cf=0
+
+	mulx	0*8($nptr),%rax,%r10
+	adcx	%rax,%r15		# discarded
+	adox	%r11,%r10
+	mulx	1*8($nptr),%rax,%r11
+	adcx	%rax,%r10
+	adox	%r12,%r11
+	mulx	2*8($nptr),%rax,%r12
+	mov	24+8(%rsp),$bptr	# counter value
+	mov	%r10,-8*4($tptr)
+	adcx	%rax,%r11
+	adox	%r13,%r12
+	mulx	3*8($nptr),%rax,%r15
+	 mov	$bi,%rdx
+	mov	%r11,-8*3($tptr)
+	adcx	%rax,%r12
+	adox	$zero,%r15		# of=0
+	lea	4*8($nptr),$nptr
+	mov	%r12,-8*2($tptr)
+	jmp	.Lmulx4x_1st
+
+.align	32
+.Lmulx4x_1st:
+	adcx	$zero,%r15		# cf=0, modulo-scheduled
+	mulx	0*8($aptr),%r10,%rax	# a[4]*b[0]
+	adcx	%r14,%r10
+	mulx	1*8($aptr),%r11,%r14	# a[5]*b[0]
+	adcx	%rax,%r11
+	mulx	2*8($aptr),%r12,%rax	# ...
+	adcx	%r14,%r12
+	mulx	3*8($aptr),%r13,%r14
+	 .byte	0x67,0x67
+	 mov	$mi,%rdx
+	adcx	%rax,%r13
+	adcx	$zero,%r14		# cf=0
+	lea	4*8($aptr),$aptr
+	lea	4*8($tptr),$tptr
+
+	adox	%r15,%r10
+	mulx	0*8($nptr),%rax,%r15
+	adcx	%rax,%r10
+	adox	%r15,%r11
+	mulx	1*8($nptr),%rax,%r15
+	adcx	%rax,%r11
+	adox	%r15,%r12
+	mulx	2*8($nptr),%rax,%r15
+	mov	%r10,-5*8($tptr)
+	adcx	%rax,%r12
+	mov	%r11,-4*8($tptr)
+	adox	%r15,%r13
+	mulx	3*8($nptr),%rax,%r15
+	 mov	$bi,%rdx
+	mov	%r12,-3*8($tptr)
+	adcx	%rax,%r13
+	adox	$zero,%r15
+	lea	4*8($nptr),$nptr
+	mov	%r13,-2*8($tptr)
+
+	dec	$bptr			# of=0, pass cf
+	jnz	.Lmulx4x_1st
+
+	mov	8(%rsp),$num		# load -num
+	adc	$zero,%r15		# modulo-scheduled
+	lea	($aptr,$num),$aptr	# rewind $aptr
+	add	%r15,%r14
+	mov	8+8(%rsp),$bptr		# re-load &b[i]
+	adc	$zero,$zero		# top-most carry
+	mov	%r14,-1*8($tptr)
+	jmp	.Lmulx4x_outer
+
+.align	32
+.Lmulx4x_outer:
+	lea	16-256($tptr),%r10	# where 256-byte mask is (+density control)
+	pxor	%xmm4,%xmm4
+	.byte	0x67,0x67
+	pxor	%xmm5,%xmm5
+___
+for($i=0;$i<$STRIDE/16;$i+=4) {
+$code.=<<___;
+	movdqa	`16*($i+0)-128`($bptr),%xmm0
+	movdqa	`16*($i+1)-128`($bptr),%xmm1
+	movdqa	`16*($i+2)-128`($bptr),%xmm2
+	pand	`16*($i+0)+256`(%r10),%xmm0
+	movdqa	`16*($i+3)-128`($bptr),%xmm3
+	pand	`16*($i+1)+256`(%r10),%xmm1
+	por	%xmm0,%xmm4
+	pand	`16*($i+2)+256`(%r10),%xmm2
+	por	%xmm1,%xmm5
+	pand	`16*($i+3)+256`(%r10),%xmm3
+	por	%xmm2,%xmm4
+	por	%xmm3,%xmm5
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	por	%xmm5,%xmm4
+	pshufd	\$0x4e,%xmm4,%xmm0
+	por	%xmm4,%xmm0
+	lea	$STRIDE($bptr),$bptr
+	movq	%xmm0,%rdx		# m0=bp[i]
+
+	mov	$zero,($tptr)		# save top-most carry
+	lea	4*8($tptr,$num),$tptr	# rewind $tptr
+	mulx	0*8($aptr),$mi,%r11	# a[0]*b[i]
+	xor	$zero,$zero		# cf=0, of=0
+	mov	%rdx,$bi
+	mulx	1*8($aptr),%r14,%r12	# a[1]*b[i]
+	adox	-4*8($tptr),$mi		# +t[0]
+	adcx	%r14,%r11
+	mulx	2*8($aptr),%r15,%r13	# ...
+	adox	-3*8($tptr),%r11
+	adcx	%r15,%r12
+	mulx	3*8($aptr),%rdx,%r14
+	adox	-2*8($tptr),%r12
+	adcx	%rdx,%r13
+	lea	($nptr,$num),$nptr	# rewind $nptr
+	lea	4*8($aptr),$aptr
+	adox	-1*8($tptr),%r13
+	adcx	$zero,%r14
+	adox	$zero,%r14
+
+	mov	$mi,%r15
+	imulq	32+8(%rsp),$mi		# "t[0]"*n0
+
+	mov	$mi,%rdx
+	xor	$zero,$zero		# cf=0, of=0
+	mov	$bptr,8+8(%rsp)		# off-load &b[i]
+
+	mulx	0*8($nptr),%rax,%r10
+	adcx	%rax,%r15		# discarded
+	adox	%r11,%r10
+	mulx	1*8($nptr),%rax,%r11
+	adcx	%rax,%r10
+	adox	%r12,%r11
+	mulx	2*8($nptr),%rax,%r12
+	adcx	%rax,%r11
+	adox	%r13,%r12
+	mulx	3*8($nptr),%rax,%r15
+	 mov	$bi,%rdx
+	mov	24+8(%rsp),$bptr	# counter value
+	mov	%r10,-8*4($tptr)
+	adcx	%rax,%r12
+	mov	%r11,-8*3($tptr)
+	adox	$zero,%r15		# of=0
+	mov	%r12,-8*2($tptr)
+	lea	4*8($nptr),$nptr
+	jmp	.Lmulx4x_inner
+
+.align	32
+.Lmulx4x_inner:
+	mulx	0*8($aptr),%r10,%rax	# a[4]*b[i]
+	adcx	$zero,%r15		# cf=0, modulo-scheduled
+	adox	%r14,%r10
+	mulx	1*8($aptr),%r11,%r14	# a[5]*b[i]
+	adcx	0*8($tptr),%r10
+	adox	%rax,%r11
+	mulx	2*8($aptr),%r12,%rax	# ...
+	adcx	1*8($tptr),%r11
+	adox	%r14,%r12
+	mulx	3*8($aptr),%r13,%r14
+	 mov	$mi,%rdx
+	adcx	2*8($tptr),%r12
+	adox	%rax,%r13
+	adcx	3*8($tptr),%r13
+	adox	$zero,%r14		# of=0
+	lea	4*8($aptr),$aptr
+	lea	4*8($tptr),$tptr
+	adcx	$zero,%r14		# cf=0
+
+	adox	%r15,%r10
+	mulx	0*8($nptr),%rax,%r15
+	adcx	%rax,%r10
+	adox	%r15,%r11
+	mulx	1*8($nptr),%rax,%r15
+	adcx	%rax,%r11
+	adox	%r15,%r12
+	mulx	2*8($nptr),%rax,%r15
+	mov	%r10,-5*8($tptr)
+	adcx	%rax,%r12
+	adox	%r15,%r13
+	mov	%r11,-4*8($tptr)
+	mulx	3*8($nptr),%rax,%r15
+	 mov	$bi,%rdx
+	lea	4*8($nptr),$nptr
+	mov	%r12,-3*8($tptr)
+	adcx	%rax,%r13
+	adox	$zero,%r15
+	mov	%r13,-2*8($tptr)
+
+	dec	$bptr			# of=0, pass cf
+	jnz	.Lmulx4x_inner
+
+	mov	0+8(%rsp),$num		# load -num
+	adc	$zero,%r15		# modulo-scheduled
+	sub	0*8($tptr),$bptr	# pull top-most carry to %cf
+	mov	8+8(%rsp),$bptr		# re-load &b[i]
+	mov	16+8(%rsp),%r10
+	adc	%r15,%r14
+	lea	($aptr,$num),$aptr	# rewind $aptr
+	adc	$zero,$zero		# top-most carry
+	mov	%r14,-1*8($tptr)
+
+	cmp	%r10,$bptr
+	jb	.Lmulx4x_outer
+
+	mov	-8($nptr),%r10
+	mov	$zero,%r8
+	mov	($nptr,$num),%r12
+	lea	($nptr,$num),%rbp	# rewind $nptr
+	mov	$num,%rcx
+	lea	($tptr,$num),%rdi	# rewind $tptr
+	xor	%eax,%eax
+	xor	%r15,%r15
+	sub	%r14,%r10		# compare top-most words
+	adc	%r15,%r15
+	or	%r15,%r8
+	sar	\$3+2,%rcx
+	sub	%r8,%rax		# %rax=-%r8
+	mov	56+8(%rsp),%rdx		# restore rp
+	dec	%r12			# so that after 'not' we get -n[0]
+	mov	8*1(%rbp),%r13
+	xor	%r8,%r8
+	mov	8*2(%rbp),%r14
+	mov	8*3(%rbp),%r15
+	jmp	.Lsqrx4x_sub_entry	# common post-condition
+.size	mulx4x_internal,.-mulx4x_internal
+___
+}{
+######################################################################
+# void bn_power5(
+my $rptr="%rdi";	# BN_ULONG *rptr,
+my $aptr="%rsi";	# const BN_ULONG *aptr,
+my $bptr="%rdx";	# const void *table,
+my $nptr="%rcx";	# const BN_ULONG *nptr,
+my $n0  ="%r8";		# const BN_ULONG *n0);
+my $num ="%r9";		# int num, has to be divisible by 8
+			# int pwr);
+
+my ($i,$j,$tptr)=("%rbp","%rcx",$rptr);
+my @A0=("%r10","%r11");
+my @A1=("%r12","%r13");
+my ($a0,$a1,$ai)=("%r14","%r15","%rbx");
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.type	bn_powerx5,\@function,6
+.align	32
+bn_powerx5:
+	mov	%rsp,%rax
+.Lpowerx5_enter:
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+.Lpowerx5_prologue:
+
+	shl	\$3,${num}d		# convert $num to bytes
+	lea	($num,$num,2),%r10	# 3*$num in bytes
+	neg	$num
+	mov	($n0),$n0		# *n0
+
+	##############################################################
+	# Ensure that stack frame doesn't alias with $rptr+3*$num
+	# modulo 4096, which covers ret[num], am[num] and n[num]
+	# (see bn_exp.c). This is done to allow memory disambiguation
+	# logic do its magic. [Extra 256 bytes is for power mask
+	# calculated from 7th argument, the index.]
+	#
+	lea	-320(%rsp,$num,2),%r11
+	mov	%rsp,%rbp
+	sub	$rptr,%r11
+	and	\$4095,%r11
+	cmp	%r11,%r10
+	jb	.Lpwrx_sp_alt
+	sub	%r11,%rbp		# align with $aptr
+	lea	-320(%rbp,$num,2),%rbp	# future alloca(frame+2*$num*8+256)
+	jmp	.Lpwrx_sp_done
+
+.align	32
+.Lpwrx_sp_alt:
+	lea	4096-320(,$num,2),%r10
+	lea	-320(%rbp,$num,2),%rbp	# alloca(frame+2*$num*8+256)
+	sub	%r10,%r11
+	mov	\$0,%r10
+	cmovc	%r10,%r11
+	sub	%r11,%rbp
+.Lpwrx_sp_done:
+	and	\$-64,%rbp
+	mov	%rsp,%r11
+	sub	%rbp,%r11
+	and	\$-4096,%r11
+	lea	(%rbp,%r11),%rsp
+	mov	(%rsp),%r10
+	cmp	%rbp,%rsp
+	ja	.Lpwrx_page_walk
+	jmp	.Lpwrx_page_walk_done
+
+.Lpwrx_page_walk:
+	lea	-4096(%rsp),%rsp
+	mov	(%rsp),%r10
+	cmp	%rbp,%rsp
+	ja	.Lpwrx_page_walk
+.Lpwrx_page_walk_done:
+
+	mov	$num,%r10	
+	neg	$num
+
+	##############################################################
+	# Stack layout
+	#
+	# +0	saved $num, used in reduction section
+	# +8	&t[2*$num], used in reduction section
+	# +16	intermediate carry bit
+	# +24	top-most carry bit, used in reduction section
+	# +32	saved *n0
+	# +40	saved %rsp
+	# +48	t[2*$num]
+	#
+	pxor	%xmm0,%xmm0
+	movq	$rptr,%xmm1		# save $rptr
+	movq	$nptr,%xmm2		# save $nptr
+	movq	%r10, %xmm3		# -$num
+	movq	$bptr,%xmm4
+	mov	$n0,  32(%rsp)
+	mov	%rax, 40(%rsp)		# save original %rsp
+.Lpowerx5_body:
+
+	call	__bn_sqrx8x_internal
+	call	__bn_postx4x_internal
+	call	__bn_sqrx8x_internal
+	call	__bn_postx4x_internal
+	call	__bn_sqrx8x_internal
+	call	__bn_postx4x_internal
+	call	__bn_sqrx8x_internal
+	call	__bn_postx4x_internal
+	call	__bn_sqrx8x_internal
+	call	__bn_postx4x_internal
+
+	mov	%r10,$num		# -num
+	mov	$aptr,$rptr
+	movq	%xmm2,$nptr
+	movq	%xmm4,$bptr
+	mov	40(%rsp),%rax
+
+	call	mulx4x_internal
+
+	mov	40(%rsp),%rsi		# restore %rsp
+	mov	\$1,%rax
+
+	mov	-48(%rsi),%r15
+	mov	-40(%rsi),%r14
+	mov	-32(%rsi),%r13
+	mov	-24(%rsi),%r12
+	mov	-16(%rsi),%rbp
+	mov	-8(%rsi),%rbx
+	lea	(%rsi),%rsp
+.Lpowerx5_epilogue:
+	ret
+.size	bn_powerx5,.-bn_powerx5
+
+.globl	bn_sqrx8x_internal
+.hidden	bn_sqrx8x_internal
+.type	bn_sqrx8x_internal,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	32
+bn_sqrx8x_internal:
+__bn_sqrx8x_internal:
+	##################################################################
+	# Squaring part:
+	#
+	# a) multiply-n-add everything but a[i]*a[i];
+	# b) shift result of a) by 1 to the left and accumulate
+	#    a[i]*a[i] products;
+	#
+	##################################################################
+	# a[7]a[7]a[6]a[6]a[5]a[5]a[4]a[4]a[3]a[3]a[2]a[2]a[1]a[1]a[0]a[0]
+	#                                                     a[1]a[0]
+	#                                                 a[2]a[0]
+	#                                             a[3]a[0]
+	#                                             a[2]a[1]
+	#                                         a[3]a[1]
+	#                                     a[3]a[2]
+	#
+	#                                         a[4]a[0]
+	#                                     a[5]a[0]
+	#                                 a[6]a[0]
+	#                             a[7]a[0]
+	#                                     a[4]a[1]
+	#                                 a[5]a[1]
+	#                             a[6]a[1]
+	#                         a[7]a[1]
+	#                                 a[4]a[2]
+	#                             a[5]a[2]
+	#                         a[6]a[2]
+	#                     a[7]a[2]
+	#                             a[4]a[3]
+	#                         a[5]a[3]
+	#                     a[6]a[3]
+	#                 a[7]a[3]
+	#
+	#                     a[5]a[4]
+	#                 a[6]a[4]
+	#             a[7]a[4]
+	#             a[6]a[5]
+	#         a[7]a[5]
+	#     a[7]a[6]
+	# a[7]a[7]a[6]a[6]a[5]a[5]a[4]a[4]a[3]a[3]a[2]a[2]a[1]a[1]a[0]a[0]
+___
+{
+my ($zero,$carry)=("%rbp","%rcx");
+my $aaptr=$zero;
+$code.=<<___;
+	lea	48+8(%rsp),$tptr
+	lea	($aptr,$num),$aaptr
+	mov	$num,0+8(%rsp)			# save $num
+	mov	$aaptr,8+8(%rsp)		# save end of $aptr
+	jmp	.Lsqr8x_zero_start
+
+.align	32
+.byte	0x66,0x66,0x66,0x2e,0x0f,0x1f,0x84,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00
+.Lsqrx8x_zero:
+	.byte	0x3e
+	movdqa	%xmm0,0*8($tptr)
+	movdqa	%xmm0,2*8($tptr)
+	movdqa	%xmm0,4*8($tptr)
+	movdqa	%xmm0,6*8($tptr)
+.Lsqr8x_zero_start:			# aligned at 32
+	movdqa	%xmm0,8*8($tptr)
+	movdqa	%xmm0,10*8($tptr)
+	movdqa	%xmm0,12*8($tptr)
+	movdqa	%xmm0,14*8($tptr)
+	lea	16*8($tptr),$tptr
+	sub	\$64,$num
+	jnz	.Lsqrx8x_zero
+
+	mov	0*8($aptr),%rdx		# a[0], modulo-scheduled
+	#xor	%r9,%r9			# t[1], ex-$num, zero already
+	xor	%r10,%r10
+	xor	%r11,%r11
+	xor	%r12,%r12
+	xor	%r13,%r13
+	xor	%r14,%r14
+	xor	%r15,%r15
+	lea	48+8(%rsp),$tptr
+	xor	$zero,$zero		# cf=0, cf=0
+	jmp	.Lsqrx8x_outer_loop
+
+.align	32
+.Lsqrx8x_outer_loop:
+	mulx	1*8($aptr),%r8,%rax	# a[1]*a[0]
+	adcx	%r9,%r8			# a[1]*a[0]+=t[1]
+	adox	%rax,%r10
+	mulx	2*8($aptr),%r9,%rax	# a[2]*a[0]
+	adcx	%r10,%r9
+	adox	%rax,%r11
+	.byte	0xc4,0xe2,0xab,0xf6,0x86,0x18,0x00,0x00,0x00	# mulx	3*8($aptr),%r10,%rax	# ...
+	adcx	%r11,%r10
+	adox	%rax,%r12
+	.byte	0xc4,0xe2,0xa3,0xf6,0x86,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00	# mulx	4*8($aptr),%r11,%rax
+	adcx	%r12,%r11
+	adox	%rax,%r13
+	mulx	5*8($aptr),%r12,%rax
+	adcx	%r13,%r12
+	adox	%rax,%r14
+	mulx	6*8($aptr),%r13,%rax
+	adcx	%r14,%r13
+	adox	%r15,%rax
+	mulx	7*8($aptr),%r14,%r15
+	 mov	1*8($aptr),%rdx		# a[1]
+	adcx	%rax,%r14
+	adox	$zero,%r15
+	adc	8*8($tptr),%r15
+	mov	%r8,1*8($tptr)		# t[1]
+	mov	%r9,2*8($tptr)		# t[2]
+	sbb	$carry,$carry		# mov %cf,$carry
+	xor	$zero,$zero		# cf=0, of=0
+
+
+	mulx	2*8($aptr),%r8,%rbx	# a[2]*a[1]
+	mulx	3*8($aptr),%r9,%rax	# a[3]*a[1]
+	adcx	%r10,%r8
+	adox	%rbx,%r9
+	mulx	4*8($aptr),%r10,%rbx	# ...
+	adcx	%r11,%r9
+	adox	%rax,%r10
+	.byte	0xc4,0xe2,0xa3,0xf6,0x86,0x28,0x00,0x00,0x00	# mulx	5*8($aptr),%r11,%rax
+	adcx	%r12,%r10
+	adox	%rbx,%r11
+	.byte	0xc4,0xe2,0x9b,0xf6,0x9e,0x30,0x00,0x00,0x00	# mulx	6*8($aptr),%r12,%rbx
+	adcx	%r13,%r11
+	adox	%r14,%r12
+	.byte	0xc4,0x62,0x93,0xf6,0xb6,0x38,0x00,0x00,0x00	# mulx	7*8($aptr),%r13,%r14
+	 mov	2*8($aptr),%rdx		# a[2]
+	adcx	%rax,%r12
+	adox	%rbx,%r13
+	adcx	%r15,%r13
+	adox	$zero,%r14		# of=0
+	adcx	$zero,%r14		# cf=0
+
+	mov	%r8,3*8($tptr)		# t[3]
+	mov	%r9,4*8($tptr)		# t[4]
+
+	mulx	3*8($aptr),%r8,%rbx	# a[3]*a[2]
+	mulx	4*8($aptr),%r9,%rax	# a[4]*a[2]
+	adcx	%r10,%r8
+	adox	%rbx,%r9
+	mulx	5*8($aptr),%r10,%rbx	# ...
+	adcx	%r11,%r9
+	adox	%rax,%r10
+	.byte	0xc4,0xe2,0xa3,0xf6,0x86,0x30,0x00,0x00,0x00	# mulx	6*8($aptr),%r11,%rax
+	adcx	%r12,%r10
+	adox	%r13,%r11
+	.byte	0xc4,0x62,0x9b,0xf6,0xae,0x38,0x00,0x00,0x00	# mulx	7*8($aptr),%r12,%r13
+	.byte	0x3e
+	 mov	3*8($aptr),%rdx		# a[3]
+	adcx	%rbx,%r11
+	adox	%rax,%r12
+	adcx	%r14,%r12
+	mov	%r8,5*8($tptr)		# t[5]
+	mov	%r9,6*8($tptr)		# t[6]
+	 mulx	4*8($aptr),%r8,%rax	# a[4]*a[3]
+	adox	$zero,%r13		# of=0
+	adcx	$zero,%r13		# cf=0
+
+	mulx	5*8($aptr),%r9,%rbx	# a[5]*a[3]
+	adcx	%r10,%r8
+	adox	%rax,%r9
+	mulx	6*8($aptr),%r10,%rax	# ...
+	adcx	%r11,%r9
+	adox	%r12,%r10
+	mulx	7*8($aptr),%r11,%r12
+	 mov	4*8($aptr),%rdx		# a[4]
+	 mov	5*8($aptr),%r14		# a[5]
+	adcx	%rbx,%r10
+	adox	%rax,%r11
+	 mov	6*8($aptr),%r15		# a[6]
+	adcx	%r13,%r11
+	adox	$zero,%r12		# of=0
+	adcx	$zero,%r12		# cf=0
+
+	mov	%r8,7*8($tptr)		# t[7]
+	mov	%r9,8*8($tptr)		# t[8]
+
+	mulx	%r14,%r9,%rax		# a[5]*a[4]
+	 mov	7*8($aptr),%r8		# a[7]
+	adcx	%r10,%r9
+	mulx	%r15,%r10,%rbx		# a[6]*a[4]
+	adox	%rax,%r10
+	adcx	%r11,%r10
+	mulx	%r8,%r11,%rax		# a[7]*a[4]
+	 mov	%r14,%rdx		# a[5]
+	adox	%rbx,%r11
+	adcx	%r12,%r11
+	#adox	$zero,%rax		# of=0
+	adcx	$zero,%rax		# cf=0
+
+	mulx	%r15,%r14,%rbx		# a[6]*a[5]
+	mulx	%r8,%r12,%r13		# a[7]*a[5]
+	 mov	%r15,%rdx		# a[6]
+	 lea	8*8($aptr),$aptr
+	adcx	%r14,%r11
+	adox	%rbx,%r12
+	adcx	%rax,%r12
+	adox	$zero,%r13
+
+	.byte	0x67,0x67
+	mulx	%r8,%r8,%r14		# a[7]*a[6]
+	adcx	%r8,%r13
+	adcx	$zero,%r14
+
+	cmp	8+8(%rsp),$aptr
+	je	.Lsqrx8x_outer_break
+
+	neg	$carry			# mov $carry,%cf
+	mov	\$-8,%rcx
+	mov	$zero,%r15
+	mov	8*8($tptr),%r8
+	adcx	9*8($tptr),%r9		# +=t[9]
+	adcx	10*8($tptr),%r10	# ...
+	adcx	11*8($tptr),%r11
+	adc	12*8($tptr),%r12
+	adc	13*8($tptr),%r13
+	adc	14*8($tptr),%r14
+	adc	15*8($tptr),%r15
+	lea	($aptr),$aaptr
+	lea	2*64($tptr),$tptr
+	sbb	%rax,%rax		# mov %cf,$carry
+
+	mov	-64($aptr),%rdx		# a[0]
+	mov	%rax,16+8(%rsp)		# offload $carry
+	mov	$tptr,24+8(%rsp)
+
+	#lea	8*8($tptr),$tptr	# see 2*8*8($tptr) above
+	xor	%eax,%eax		# cf=0, of=0
+	jmp	.Lsqrx8x_loop
+
+.align	32
+.Lsqrx8x_loop:
+	mov	%r8,%rbx
+	mulx	0*8($aaptr),%rax,%r8	# a[8]*a[i]
+	adcx	%rax,%rbx		# +=t[8]
+	adox	%r9,%r8
+
+	mulx	1*8($aaptr),%rax,%r9	# ...
+	adcx	%rax,%r8
+	adox	%r10,%r9
+
+	mulx	2*8($aaptr),%rax,%r10
+	adcx	%rax,%r9
+	adox	%r11,%r10
+
+	mulx	3*8($aaptr),%rax,%r11
+	adcx	%rax,%r10
+	adox	%r12,%r11
+
+	.byte	0xc4,0x62,0xfb,0xf6,0xa5,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00	# mulx	4*8($aaptr),%rax,%r12
+	adcx	%rax,%r11
+	adox	%r13,%r12
+
+	mulx	5*8($aaptr),%rax,%r13
+	adcx	%rax,%r12
+	adox	%r14,%r13
+
+	mulx	6*8($aaptr),%rax,%r14
+	 mov	%rbx,($tptr,%rcx,8)	# store t[8+i]
+	 mov	\$0,%ebx
+	adcx	%rax,%r13
+	adox	%r15,%r14
+
+	.byte	0xc4,0x62,0xfb,0xf6,0xbd,0x38,0x00,0x00,0x00	# mulx	7*8($aaptr),%rax,%r15
+	 mov	8($aptr,%rcx,8),%rdx	# a[i]
+	adcx	%rax,%r14
+	adox	%rbx,%r15		# %rbx is 0, of=0
+	adcx	%rbx,%r15		# cf=0
+
+	.byte	0x67
+	inc	%rcx			# of=0
+	jnz	.Lsqrx8x_loop
+
+	lea	8*8($aaptr),$aaptr
+	mov	\$-8,%rcx
+	cmp	8+8(%rsp),$aaptr	# done?
+	je	.Lsqrx8x_break
+
+	sub	16+8(%rsp),%rbx		# mov 16(%rsp),%cf
+	.byte	0x66
+	mov	-64($aptr),%rdx
+	adcx	0*8($tptr),%r8
+	adcx	1*8($tptr),%r9
+	adc	2*8($tptr),%r10
+	adc	3*8($tptr),%r11
+	adc	4*8($tptr),%r12
+	adc	5*8($tptr),%r13
+	adc	6*8($tptr),%r14
+	adc	7*8($tptr),%r15
+	lea	8*8($tptr),$tptr
+	.byte	0x67
+	sbb	%rax,%rax		# mov %cf,%rax
+	xor	%ebx,%ebx		# cf=0, of=0
+	mov	%rax,16+8(%rsp)		# offload carry
+	jmp	.Lsqrx8x_loop
+
+.align	32
+.Lsqrx8x_break:
+	xor	$zero,$zero
+	sub	16+8(%rsp),%rbx		# mov 16(%rsp),%cf
+	adcx	$zero,%r8
+	mov	24+8(%rsp),$carry	# initial $tptr, borrow $carry
+	adcx	$zero,%r9
+	mov	0*8($aptr),%rdx		# a[8], modulo-scheduled
+	adc	\$0,%r10
+	mov	%r8,0*8($tptr)
+	adc	\$0,%r11
+	adc	\$0,%r12
+	adc	\$0,%r13
+	adc	\$0,%r14
+	adc	\$0,%r15
+	cmp	$carry,$tptr		# cf=0, of=0
+	je	.Lsqrx8x_outer_loop
+
+	mov	%r9,1*8($tptr)
+	 mov	1*8($carry),%r9
+	mov	%r10,2*8($tptr)
+	 mov	2*8($carry),%r10
+	mov	%r11,3*8($tptr)
+	 mov	3*8($carry),%r11
+	mov	%r12,4*8($tptr)
+	 mov	4*8($carry),%r12
+	mov	%r13,5*8($tptr)
+	 mov	5*8($carry),%r13
+	mov	%r14,6*8($tptr)
+	 mov	6*8($carry),%r14
+	mov	%r15,7*8($tptr)
+	 mov	7*8($carry),%r15
+	mov	$carry,$tptr
+	jmp	.Lsqrx8x_outer_loop
+
+.align	32
+.Lsqrx8x_outer_break:
+	mov	%r9,9*8($tptr)		# t[9]
+	 movq	%xmm3,%rcx		# -$num
+	mov	%r10,10*8($tptr)	# ...
+	mov	%r11,11*8($tptr)
+	mov	%r12,12*8($tptr)
+	mov	%r13,13*8($tptr)
+	mov	%r14,14*8($tptr)
+___
+}{
+my $i="%rcx";
+$code.=<<___;
+	lea	48+8(%rsp),$tptr
+	mov	($aptr,$i),%rdx		# a[0]
+
+	mov	8($tptr),$A0[1]		# t[1]
+	xor	$A0[0],$A0[0]		# t[0], of=0, cf=0
+	mov	0+8(%rsp),$num		# restore $num
+	adox	$A0[1],$A0[1]
+	 mov	16($tptr),$A1[0]	# t[2]	# prefetch
+	 mov	24($tptr),$A1[1]	# t[3]	# prefetch
+	#jmp	.Lsqrx4x_shift_n_add	# happens to be aligned
+
+.align	32
+.Lsqrx4x_shift_n_add:
+	mulx	%rdx,%rax,%rbx
+	 adox	$A1[0],$A1[0]
+	adcx	$A0[0],%rax
+	 .byte	0x48,0x8b,0x94,0x0e,0x08,0x00,0x00,0x00	# mov	8($aptr,$i),%rdx	# a[i+1]	# prefetch
+	 .byte	0x4c,0x8b,0x97,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00	# mov	32($tptr),$A0[0]	# t[2*i+4]	# prefetch
+	 adox	$A1[1],$A1[1]
+	adcx	$A0[1],%rbx
+	 mov	40($tptr),$A0[1]		# t[2*i+4+1]	# prefetch
+	mov	%rax,0($tptr)
+	mov	%rbx,8($tptr)
+
+	mulx	%rdx,%rax,%rbx
+	 adox	$A0[0],$A0[0]
+	adcx	$A1[0],%rax
+	 mov	16($aptr,$i),%rdx	# a[i+2]	# prefetch
+	 mov	48($tptr),$A1[0]	# t[2*i+6]	# prefetch
+	 adox	$A0[1],$A0[1]
+	adcx	$A1[1],%rbx
+	 mov	56($tptr),$A1[1]	# t[2*i+6+1]	# prefetch
+	mov	%rax,16($tptr)
+	mov	%rbx,24($tptr)
+
+	mulx	%rdx,%rax,%rbx
+	 adox	$A1[0],$A1[0]
+	adcx	$A0[0],%rax
+	 mov	24($aptr,$i),%rdx	# a[i+3]	# prefetch
+	 lea	32($i),$i
+	 mov	64($tptr),$A0[0]	# t[2*i+8]	# prefetch
+	 adox	$A1[1],$A1[1]
+	adcx	$A0[1],%rbx
+	 mov	72($tptr),$A0[1]	# t[2*i+8+1]	# prefetch
+	mov	%rax,32($tptr)
+	mov	%rbx,40($tptr)
+
+	mulx	%rdx,%rax,%rbx
+	 adox	$A0[0],$A0[0]
+	adcx	$A1[0],%rax
+	jrcxz	.Lsqrx4x_shift_n_add_break
+	 .byte	0x48,0x8b,0x94,0x0e,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00	# mov	0($aptr,$i),%rdx	# a[i+4]	# prefetch
+	 adox	$A0[1],$A0[1]
+	adcx	$A1[1],%rbx
+	 mov	80($tptr),$A1[0]	# t[2*i+10]	# prefetch
+	 mov	88($tptr),$A1[1]	# t[2*i+10+1]	# prefetch
+	mov	%rax,48($tptr)
+	mov	%rbx,56($tptr)
+	lea	64($tptr),$tptr
+	nop
+	jmp	.Lsqrx4x_shift_n_add
+
+.align	32
+.Lsqrx4x_shift_n_add_break:
+	adcx	$A1[1],%rbx
+	mov	%rax,48($tptr)
+	mov	%rbx,56($tptr)
+	lea	64($tptr),$tptr		# end of t[] buffer
+___
+}
+######################################################################
+# Montgomery reduction part, "word-by-word" algorithm.
+#
+# This new path is inspired by multiple submissions from Intel, by
+# Shay Gueron, Vlad Krasnov, Erdinc Ozturk, James Guilford,
+# Vinodh Gopal...
+{
+my ($nptr,$carry,$m0)=("%rbp","%rsi","%rdx");
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	movq	%xmm2,$nptr
+__bn_sqrx8x_reduction:
+	xor	%eax,%eax		# initial top-most carry bit
+	mov	32+8(%rsp),%rbx		# n0
+	mov	48+8(%rsp),%rdx		# "%r8", 8*0($tptr)
+	lea	-8*8($nptr,$num),%rcx	# end of n[]
+	#lea	48+8(%rsp,$num,2),$tptr	# end of t[] buffer
+	mov	%rcx, 0+8(%rsp)		# save end of n[]
+	mov	$tptr,8+8(%rsp)		# save end of t[]
+
+	lea	48+8(%rsp),$tptr		# initial t[] window
+	jmp	.Lsqrx8x_reduction_loop
+
+.align	32
+.Lsqrx8x_reduction_loop:
+	mov	8*1($tptr),%r9
+	mov	8*2($tptr),%r10
+	mov	8*3($tptr),%r11
+	mov	8*4($tptr),%r12
+	mov	%rdx,%r8
+	imulq	%rbx,%rdx		# n0*a[i]
+	mov	8*5($tptr),%r13
+	mov	8*6($tptr),%r14
+	mov	8*7($tptr),%r15
+	mov	%rax,24+8(%rsp)		# store top-most carry bit
+
+	lea	8*8($tptr),$tptr
+	xor	$carry,$carry		# cf=0,of=0
+	mov	\$-8,%rcx
+	jmp	.Lsqrx8x_reduce
+
+.align	32
+.Lsqrx8x_reduce:
+	mov	%r8, %rbx
+	mulx	8*0($nptr),%rax,%r8	# n[0]
+	adcx	%rbx,%rax		# discarded
+	adox	%r9,%r8
+
+	mulx	8*1($nptr),%rbx,%r9	# n[1]
+	adcx	%rbx,%r8
+	adox	%r10,%r9
+
+	mulx	8*2($nptr),%rbx,%r10
+	adcx	%rbx,%r9
+	adox	%r11,%r10
+
+	mulx	8*3($nptr),%rbx,%r11
+	adcx	%rbx,%r10
+	adox	%r12,%r11
+
+	.byte	0xc4,0x62,0xe3,0xf6,0xa5,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00	# mulx	8*4($nptr),%rbx,%r12
+	 mov	%rdx,%rax
+	 mov	%r8,%rdx
+	adcx	%rbx,%r11
+	adox	%r13,%r12
+
+	 mulx	32+8(%rsp),%rbx,%rdx	# %rdx discarded
+	 mov	%rax,%rdx
+	 mov	%rax,64+48+8(%rsp,%rcx,8)	# put aside n0*a[i]
+
+	mulx	8*5($nptr),%rax,%r13
+	adcx	%rax,%r12
+	adox	%r14,%r13
+
+	mulx	8*6($nptr),%rax,%r14
+	adcx	%rax,%r13
+	adox	%r15,%r14
+
+	mulx	8*7($nptr),%rax,%r15
+	 mov	%rbx,%rdx
+	adcx	%rax,%r14
+	adox	$carry,%r15		# $carry is 0
+	adcx	$carry,%r15		# cf=0
+
+	.byte	0x67,0x67,0x67
+	inc	%rcx			# of=0
+	jnz	.Lsqrx8x_reduce
+
+	mov	$carry,%rax		# xor	%rax,%rax
+	cmp	0+8(%rsp),$nptr		# end of n[]?
+	jae	.Lsqrx8x_no_tail
+
+	mov	48+8(%rsp),%rdx		# pull n0*a[0]
+	add	8*0($tptr),%r8
+	lea	8*8($nptr),$nptr
+	mov	\$-8,%rcx
+	adcx	8*1($tptr),%r9
+	adcx	8*2($tptr),%r10
+	adc	8*3($tptr),%r11
+	adc	8*4($tptr),%r12
+	adc	8*5($tptr),%r13
+	adc	8*6($tptr),%r14
+	adc	8*7($tptr),%r15
+	lea	8*8($tptr),$tptr
+	sbb	%rax,%rax		# top carry
+
+	xor	$carry,$carry		# of=0, cf=0
+	mov	%rax,16+8(%rsp)
+	jmp	.Lsqrx8x_tail
+
+.align	32
+.Lsqrx8x_tail:
+	mov	%r8,%rbx
+	mulx	8*0($nptr),%rax,%r8
+	adcx	%rax,%rbx
+	adox	%r9,%r8
+
+	mulx	8*1($nptr),%rax,%r9
+	adcx	%rax,%r8
+	adox	%r10,%r9
+
+	mulx	8*2($nptr),%rax,%r10
+	adcx	%rax,%r9
+	adox	%r11,%r10
+
+	mulx	8*3($nptr),%rax,%r11
+	adcx	%rax,%r10
+	adox	%r12,%r11
+
+	.byte	0xc4,0x62,0xfb,0xf6,0xa5,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00	# mulx	8*4($nptr),%rax,%r12
+	adcx	%rax,%r11
+	adox	%r13,%r12
+
+	mulx	8*5($nptr),%rax,%r13
+	adcx	%rax,%r12
+	adox	%r14,%r13
+
+	mulx	8*6($nptr),%rax,%r14
+	adcx	%rax,%r13
+	adox	%r15,%r14
+
+	mulx	8*7($nptr),%rax,%r15
+	 mov	72+48+8(%rsp,%rcx,8),%rdx	# pull n0*a[i]
+	adcx	%rax,%r14
+	adox	$carry,%r15
+	 mov	%rbx,($tptr,%rcx,8)	# save result
+	 mov	%r8,%rbx
+	adcx	$carry,%r15		# cf=0
+
+	inc	%rcx			# of=0
+	jnz	.Lsqrx8x_tail
+
+	cmp	0+8(%rsp),$nptr		# end of n[]?
+	jae	.Lsqrx8x_tail_done	# break out of loop
+
+	sub	16+8(%rsp),$carry	# mov 16(%rsp),%cf
+	 mov	48+8(%rsp),%rdx		# pull n0*a[0]
+	 lea	8*8($nptr),$nptr
+	adc	8*0($tptr),%r8
+	adc	8*1($tptr),%r9
+	adc	8*2($tptr),%r10
+	adc	8*3($tptr),%r11
+	adc	8*4($tptr),%r12
+	adc	8*5($tptr),%r13
+	adc	8*6($tptr),%r14
+	adc	8*7($tptr),%r15
+	lea	8*8($tptr),$tptr
+	sbb	%rax,%rax
+	sub	\$8,%rcx		# mov	\$-8,%rcx
+
+	xor	$carry,$carry		# of=0, cf=0
+	mov	%rax,16+8(%rsp)
+	jmp	.Lsqrx8x_tail
+
+.align	32
+.Lsqrx8x_tail_done:
+	xor	%rax,%rax
+	add	24+8(%rsp),%r8		# can this overflow?
+	adc	\$0,%r9
+	adc	\$0,%r10
+	adc	\$0,%r11
+	adc	\$0,%r12
+	adc	\$0,%r13
+	adc	\$0,%r14
+	adc	\$0,%r15
+	adc	\$0,%rax
+
+	sub	16+8(%rsp),$carry	# mov 16(%rsp),%cf
+.Lsqrx8x_no_tail:			# %cf is 0 if jumped here
+	adc	8*0($tptr),%r8
+	 movq	%xmm3,%rcx
+	adc	8*1($tptr),%r9
+	 mov	8*7($nptr),$carry
+	 movq	%xmm2,$nptr		# restore $nptr
+	adc	8*2($tptr),%r10
+	adc	8*3($tptr),%r11
+	adc	8*4($tptr),%r12
+	adc	8*5($tptr),%r13
+	adc	8*6($tptr),%r14
+	adc	8*7($tptr),%r15
+	adc	\$0,%rax		# top-most carry
+
+	mov	32+8(%rsp),%rbx		# n0
+	mov	8*8($tptr,%rcx),%rdx	# modulo-scheduled "%r8"
+
+	mov	%r8,8*0($tptr)		# store top 512 bits
+	 lea	8*8($tptr),%r8		# borrow %r8
+	mov	%r9,8*1($tptr)
+	mov	%r10,8*2($tptr)
+	mov	%r11,8*3($tptr)
+	mov	%r12,8*4($tptr)
+	mov	%r13,8*5($tptr)
+	mov	%r14,8*6($tptr)
+	mov	%r15,8*7($tptr)
+
+	lea	8*8($tptr,%rcx),$tptr	# start of current t[] window
+	cmp	8+8(%rsp),%r8		# end of t[]?
+	jb	.Lsqrx8x_reduction_loop
+	ret
+.size	bn_sqrx8x_internal,.-bn_sqrx8x_internal
+___
+}
+##############################################################
+# Post-condition, 4x unrolled
+#
+{
+my ($rptr,$nptr)=("%rdx","%rbp");
+$code.=<<___;
+.align	32
+__bn_postx4x_internal:
+	mov	8*0($nptr),%r12
+	mov	%rcx,%r10		# -$num
+	mov	%rcx,%r9		# -$num
+	neg	%rax
+	sar	\$3+2,%rcx
+	#lea	48+8(%rsp,%r9),$tptr
+	movq	%xmm1,$rptr		# restore $rptr
+	movq	%xmm1,$aptr		# prepare for back-to-back call
+	dec	%r12			# so that after 'not' we get -n[0]
+	mov	8*1($nptr),%r13
+	xor	%r8,%r8
+	mov	8*2($nptr),%r14
+	mov	8*3($nptr),%r15
+	jmp	.Lsqrx4x_sub_entry
+
+.align	16
+.Lsqrx4x_sub:
+	mov	8*0($nptr),%r12
+	mov	8*1($nptr),%r13
+	mov	8*2($nptr),%r14
+	mov	8*3($nptr),%r15
+.Lsqrx4x_sub_entry:
+	andn	%rax,%r12,%r12
+	lea	8*4($nptr),$nptr
+	andn	%rax,%r13,%r13
+	andn	%rax,%r14,%r14
+	andn	%rax,%r15,%r15
+
+	neg	%r8			# mov %r8,%cf
+	adc	8*0($tptr),%r12
+	adc	8*1($tptr),%r13
+	adc	8*2($tptr),%r14
+	adc	8*3($tptr),%r15
+	mov	%r12,8*0($rptr)
+	lea	8*4($tptr),$tptr
+	mov	%r13,8*1($rptr)
+	sbb	%r8,%r8			# mov %cf,%r8
+	mov	%r14,8*2($rptr)
+	mov	%r15,8*3($rptr)
+	lea	8*4($rptr),$rptr
+
+	inc	%rcx
+	jnz	.Lsqrx4x_sub
+
+	neg	%r9			# restore $num
+
+	ret
+.size	__bn_postx4x_internal,.-__bn_postx4x_internal
+___
+}
+}}}
+{
+my ($inp,$num,$tbl,$idx)=$win64?("%rcx","%edx","%r8", "%r9d") : # Win64 order
+				("%rdi","%esi","%rdx","%ecx");  # Unix order
+my $out=$inp;
+my $STRIDE=2**5*8;
+my $N=$STRIDE/4;
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	bn_get_bits5
+.type	bn_get_bits5,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+bn_get_bits5:
+	lea	0($inp),%r10
+	lea	1($inp),%r11
+	mov	$num,%ecx
+	shr	\$4,$num
+	and	\$15,%ecx
+	lea	-8(%ecx),%eax
+	cmp	\$11,%ecx
+	cmova	%r11,%r10
+	cmova	%eax,%ecx
+	movzw	(%r10,$num,2),%eax
+	shrl	%cl,%eax
+	and	\$31,%eax
+	ret
+.size	bn_get_bits5,.-bn_get_bits5
+
+.globl	bn_scatter5
+.type	bn_scatter5,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+bn_scatter5:
+	cmp	\$0, $num
+	jz	.Lscatter_epilogue
+	lea	($tbl,$idx,8),$tbl
+.Lscatter:
+	mov	($inp),%rax
+	lea	8($inp),$inp
+	mov	%rax,($tbl)
+	lea	32*8($tbl),$tbl
+	sub	\$1,$num
+	jnz	.Lscatter
+.Lscatter_epilogue:
+	ret
+.size	bn_scatter5,.-bn_scatter5
+
+.globl	bn_gather5
+.type	bn_gather5,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	32
+bn_gather5:
+.LSEH_begin_bn_gather5:			# Win64 thing, but harmless in other cases
+	# I can't trust assembler to use specific encoding:-(
+	.byte	0x4c,0x8d,0x14,0x24			#lea    (%rsp),%r10
+	.byte	0x48,0x81,0xec,0x08,0x01,0x00,0x00	#sub	$0x108,%rsp
+	lea	.Linc(%rip),%rax
+	and	\$-16,%rsp		# shouldn't be formally required
+
+	movd	$idx,%xmm5
+	movdqa	0(%rax),%xmm0		# 00000001000000010000000000000000
+	movdqa	16(%rax),%xmm1		# 00000002000000020000000200000002
+	lea	128($tbl),%r11		# size optimization
+	lea	128(%rsp),%rax		# size optimization
+
+	pshufd	\$0,%xmm5,%xmm5		# broadcast $idx
+	movdqa	%xmm1,%xmm4
+	movdqa	%xmm1,%xmm2
+___
+########################################################################
+# calculate mask by comparing 0..31 to $idx and save result to stack
+#
+for($i=0;$i<$STRIDE/16;$i+=4) {
+$code.=<<___;
+	paddd	%xmm0,%xmm1
+	pcmpeqd	%xmm5,%xmm0		# compare to 1,0
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($i);
+	movdqa	%xmm3,`16*($i-1)-128`(%rax)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	movdqa	%xmm4,%xmm3
+
+	paddd	%xmm1,%xmm2
+	pcmpeqd	%xmm5,%xmm1		# compare to 3,2
+	movdqa	%xmm0,`16*($i+0)-128`(%rax)
+	movdqa	%xmm4,%xmm0
+
+	paddd	%xmm2,%xmm3
+	pcmpeqd	%xmm5,%xmm2		# compare to 5,4
+	movdqa	%xmm1,`16*($i+1)-128`(%rax)
+	movdqa	%xmm4,%xmm1
+
+	paddd	%xmm3,%xmm0
+	pcmpeqd	%xmm5,%xmm3		# compare to 7,6
+	movdqa	%xmm2,`16*($i+2)-128`(%rax)
+	movdqa	%xmm4,%xmm2
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	movdqa	%xmm3,`16*($i-1)-128`(%rax)
+	jmp	.Lgather
+
+.align	32
+.Lgather:
+	pxor	%xmm4,%xmm4
+	pxor	%xmm5,%xmm5
+___
+for($i=0;$i<$STRIDE/16;$i+=4) {
+$code.=<<___;
+	movdqa	`16*($i+0)-128`(%r11),%xmm0
+	movdqa	`16*($i+1)-128`(%r11),%xmm1
+	movdqa	`16*($i+2)-128`(%r11),%xmm2
+	pand	`16*($i+0)-128`(%rax),%xmm0
+	movdqa	`16*($i+3)-128`(%r11),%xmm3
+	pand	`16*($i+1)-128`(%rax),%xmm1
+	por	%xmm0,%xmm4
+	pand	`16*($i+2)-128`(%rax),%xmm2
+	por	%xmm1,%xmm5
+	pand	`16*($i+3)-128`(%rax),%xmm3
+	por	%xmm2,%xmm4
+	por	%xmm3,%xmm5
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	por	%xmm5,%xmm4
+	lea	$STRIDE(%r11),%r11
+	pshufd	\$0x4e,%xmm4,%xmm0
+	por	%xmm4,%xmm0
+	movq	%xmm0,($out)		# m0=bp[0]
+	lea	8($out),$out
+	sub	\$1,$num
+	jnz	.Lgather
+
+	lea	(%r10),%rsp
+	ret
+.LSEH_end_bn_gather5:
+.size	bn_gather5,.-bn_gather5
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+.align	64
+.Linc:
+	.long	0,0, 1,1
+	.long	2,2, 2,2
+.asciz	"Montgomery Multiplication with scatter/gather for x86_64, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+___
+
+# EXCEPTION_DISPOSITION handler (EXCEPTION_RECORD *rec,ULONG64 frame,
+#		CONTEXT *context,DISPATCHER_CONTEXT *disp)
+if ($win64) {
+$rec="%rcx";
+$frame="%rdx";
+$context="%r8";
+$disp="%r9";
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.extern	__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind
+.type	mul_handler,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+mul_handler:
+	push	%rsi
+	push	%rdi
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+	pushfq
+	sub	\$64,%rsp
+
+	mov	120($context),%rax	# pull context->Rax
+	mov	248($context),%rbx	# pull context->Rip
+
+	mov	8($disp),%rsi		# disp->ImageBase
+	mov	56($disp),%r11		# disp->HandlerData
+
+	mov	0(%r11),%r10d		# HandlerData[0]
+	lea	(%rsi,%r10),%r10	# end of prologue label
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip<end of prologue label
+	jb	.Lcommon_seh_tail
+
+	mov	4(%r11),%r10d		# HandlerData[1]
+	lea	(%rsi,%r10),%r10	# epilogue label
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip>=epilogue label
+	jb	.Lcommon_pop_regs
+
+	mov	152($context),%rax	# pull context->Rsp
+
+	mov	8(%r11),%r10d		# HandlerData[2]
+	lea	(%rsi,%r10),%r10	# epilogue label
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip>=epilogue label
+	jae	.Lcommon_seh_tail
+
+	lea	.Lmul_epilogue(%rip),%r10
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx
+	ja	.Lbody_40
+
+	mov	192($context),%r10	# pull $num
+	mov	8(%rax,%r10,8),%rax	# pull saved stack pointer
+
+	jmp	.Lcommon_pop_regs
+
+.Lbody_40:
+	mov	40(%rax),%rax		# pull saved stack pointer
+.Lcommon_pop_regs:
+	mov	-8(%rax),%rbx
+	mov	-16(%rax),%rbp
+	mov	-24(%rax),%r12
+	mov	-32(%rax),%r13
+	mov	-40(%rax),%r14
+	mov	-48(%rax),%r15
+	mov	%rbx,144($context)	# restore context->Rbx
+	mov	%rbp,160($context)	# restore context->Rbp
+	mov	%r12,216($context)	# restore context->R12
+	mov	%r13,224($context)	# restore context->R13
+	mov	%r14,232($context)	# restore context->R14
+	mov	%r15,240($context)	# restore context->R15
+
+.Lcommon_seh_tail:
+	mov	8(%rax),%rdi
+	mov	16(%rax),%rsi
+	mov	%rax,152($context)	# restore context->Rsp
+	mov	%rsi,168($context)	# restore context->Rsi
+	mov	%rdi,176($context)	# restore context->Rdi
+
+	mov	40($disp),%rdi		# disp->ContextRecord
+	mov	$context,%rsi		# context
+	mov	\$154,%ecx		# sizeof(CONTEXT)
+	.long	0xa548f3fc		# cld; rep movsq
+
+	mov	$disp,%rsi
+	xor	%rcx,%rcx		# arg1, UNW_FLAG_NHANDLER
+	mov	8(%rsi),%rdx		# arg2, disp->ImageBase
+	mov	0(%rsi),%r8		# arg3, disp->ControlPc
+	mov	16(%rsi),%r9		# arg4, disp->FunctionEntry
+	mov	40(%rsi),%r10		# disp->ContextRecord
+	lea	56(%rsi),%r11		# &disp->HandlerData
+	lea	24(%rsi),%r12		# &disp->EstablisherFrame
+	mov	%r10,32(%rsp)		# arg5
+	mov	%r11,40(%rsp)		# arg6
+	mov	%r12,48(%rsp)		# arg7
+	mov	%rcx,56(%rsp)		# arg8, (NULL)
+	call	*__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind(%rip)
+
+	mov	\$1,%eax		# ExceptionContinueSearch
+	add	\$64,%rsp
+	popfq
+	pop	%r15
+	pop	%r14
+	pop	%r13
+	pop	%r12
+	pop	%rbp
+	pop	%rbx
+	pop	%rdi
+	pop	%rsi
+	ret
+.size	mul_handler,.-mul_handler
+
+.section	.pdata
+.align	4
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_bn_mul_mont_gather5
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_bn_mul_mont_gather5
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_bn_mul_mont_gather5
+
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_bn_mul4x_mont_gather5
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_bn_mul4x_mont_gather5
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_bn_mul4x_mont_gather5
+
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_bn_power5
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_bn_power5
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_bn_power5
+
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_bn_from_mont8x
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_bn_from_mont8x
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_bn_from_mont8x
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($addx);
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_bn_mulx4x_mont_gather5
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_bn_mulx4x_mont_gather5
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_bn_mulx4x_mont_gather5
+
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_bn_powerx5
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_bn_powerx5
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_bn_powerx5
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_bn_gather5
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_bn_gather5
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_bn_gather5
+
+.section	.xdata
+.align	8
+.LSEH_info_bn_mul_mont_gather5:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	mul_handler
+	.rva	.Lmul_body,.Lmul_body,.Lmul_epilogue		# HandlerData[]
+.align	8
+.LSEH_info_bn_mul4x_mont_gather5:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	mul_handler
+	.rva	.Lmul4x_prologue,.Lmul4x_body,.Lmul4x_epilogue		# HandlerData[]
+.align	8
+.LSEH_info_bn_power5:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	mul_handler
+	.rva	.Lpower5_prologue,.Lpower5_body,.Lpower5_epilogue	# HandlerData[]
+.align	8
+.LSEH_info_bn_from_mont8x:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	mul_handler
+	.rva	.Lfrom_prologue,.Lfrom_body,.Lfrom_epilogue		# HandlerData[]
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($addx);
+.align	8
+.LSEH_info_bn_mulx4x_mont_gather5:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	mul_handler
+	.rva	.Lmulx4x_prologue,.Lmulx4x_body,.Lmulx4x_epilogue	# HandlerData[]
+.align	8
+.LSEH_info_bn_powerx5:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	mul_handler
+	.rva	.Lpowerx5_prologue,.Lpowerx5_body,.Lpowerx5_epilogue	# HandlerData[]
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+.align	8
+.LSEH_info_bn_gather5:
+	.byte	0x01,0x0b,0x03,0x0a
+	.byte	0x0b,0x01,0x21,0x00	# sub	rsp,0x108
+	.byte	0x04,0xa3,0x00,0x00	# lea	r10,(rsp)
+.align	8
+___
+}
+
+$code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval($1)/gem;
+
+print $code;
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_add.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_add.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7cdefa7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_add.c
@@ -0,0 +1,209 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "bn_lcl.h"
+
+/* r can == a or b */
+int BN_add(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b)
+{
+    int a_neg = a->neg, ret;
+
+    bn_check_top(a);
+    bn_check_top(b);
+
+    /*-
+     *  a +  b      a+b
+     *  a + -b      a-b
+     * -a +  b      b-a
+     * -a + -b      -(a+b)
+     */
+    if (a_neg ^ b->neg) {
+        /* only one is negative */
+        if (a_neg) {
+            const BIGNUM *tmp;
+
+            tmp = a;
+            a = b;
+            b = tmp;
+        }
+
+        /* we are now a - b */
+
+        if (BN_ucmp(a, b) < 0) {
+            if (!BN_usub(r, b, a))
+                return 0;
+            r->neg = 1;
+        } else {
+            if (!BN_usub(r, a, b))
+                return 0;
+            r->neg = 0;
+        }
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    ret = BN_uadd(r, a, b);
+    r->neg = a_neg;
+    bn_check_top(r);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/* unsigned add of b to a */
+int BN_uadd(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b)
+{
+    int max, min, dif;
+    const BN_ULONG *ap, *bp;
+    BN_ULONG *rp, carry, t1, t2;
+
+    bn_check_top(a);
+    bn_check_top(b);
+
+    if (a->top < b->top) {
+        const BIGNUM *tmp;
+
+        tmp = a;
+        a = b;
+        b = tmp;
+    }
+    max = a->top;
+    min = b->top;
+    dif = max - min;
+
+    if (bn_wexpand(r, max + 1) == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    r->top = max;
+
+    ap = a->d;
+    bp = b->d;
+    rp = r->d;
+
+    carry = bn_add_words(rp, ap, bp, min);
+    rp += min;
+    ap += min;
+
+    while (dif) {
+        dif--;
+        t1 = *(ap++);
+        t2 = (t1 + carry) & BN_MASK2;
+        *(rp++) = t2;
+        carry &= (t2 == 0);
+    }
+    *rp = carry;
+    r->top += carry;
+
+    r->neg = 0;
+    bn_check_top(r);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* unsigned subtraction of b from a, a must be larger than b. */
+int BN_usub(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b)
+{
+    int max, min, dif;
+    BN_ULONG t1, t2, borrow, *rp;
+    const BN_ULONG *ap, *bp;
+
+    bn_check_top(a);
+    bn_check_top(b);
+
+    max = a->top;
+    min = b->top;
+    dif = max - min;
+
+    if (dif < 0) {              /* hmm... should not be happening */
+        BNerr(BN_F_BN_USUB, BN_R_ARG2_LT_ARG3);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (bn_wexpand(r, max) == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    ap = a->d;
+    bp = b->d;
+    rp = r->d;
+
+    borrow = bn_sub_words(rp, ap, bp, min);
+    ap += min;
+    rp += min;
+
+    while (dif) {
+        dif--;
+        t1 = *(ap++);
+        t2 = (t1 - borrow) & BN_MASK2;
+        *(rp++) = t2;
+        borrow &= (t1 == 0);
+    }
+
+    while (max && *--rp == 0)
+        max--;
+
+    r->top = max;
+    r->neg = 0;
+    bn_pollute(r);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int BN_sub(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b)
+{
+    int max;
+    int add = 0, neg = 0;
+
+    bn_check_top(a);
+    bn_check_top(b);
+
+    /*-
+     *  a -  b      a-b
+     *  a - -b      a+b
+     * -a -  b      -(a+b)
+     * -a - -b      b-a
+     */
+    if (a->neg) {
+        if (b->neg) {
+            const BIGNUM *tmp;
+
+            tmp = a;
+            a = b;
+            b = tmp;
+        } else {
+            add = 1;
+            neg = 1;
+        }
+    } else {
+        if (b->neg) {
+            add = 1;
+            neg = 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (add) {
+        if (!BN_uadd(r, a, b))
+            return 0;
+        r->neg = neg;
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    /* We are actually doing a - b :-) */
+
+    max = (a->top > b->top) ? a->top : b->top;
+    if (bn_wexpand(r, max) == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    if (BN_ucmp(a, b) < 0) {
+        if (!BN_usub(r, b, a))
+            return 0;
+        r->neg = 1;
+    } else {
+        if (!BN_usub(r, a, b))
+            return 0;
+        r->neg = 0;
+    }
+    bn_check_top(r);
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_asm.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_asm.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..39c6c21
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_asm.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1039 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "bn_lcl.h"
+
+#if defined(BN_LLONG) || defined(BN_UMULT_HIGH)
+
+BN_ULONG bn_mul_add_words(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, int num,
+                          BN_ULONG w)
+{
+    BN_ULONG c1 = 0;
+
+    assert(num >= 0);
+    if (num <= 0)
+        return (c1);
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT
+    while (num & ~3) {
+        mul_add(rp[0], ap[0], w, c1);
+        mul_add(rp[1], ap[1], w, c1);
+        mul_add(rp[2], ap[2], w, c1);
+        mul_add(rp[3], ap[3], w, c1);
+        ap += 4;
+        rp += 4;
+        num -= 4;
+    }
+# endif
+    while (num) {
+        mul_add(rp[0], ap[0], w, c1);
+        ap++;
+        rp++;
+        num--;
+    }
+
+    return (c1);
+}
+
+BN_ULONG bn_mul_words(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, int num, BN_ULONG w)
+{
+    BN_ULONG c1 = 0;
+
+    assert(num >= 0);
+    if (num <= 0)
+        return (c1);
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT
+    while (num & ~3) {
+        mul(rp[0], ap[0], w, c1);
+        mul(rp[1], ap[1], w, c1);
+        mul(rp[2], ap[2], w, c1);
+        mul(rp[3], ap[3], w, c1);
+        ap += 4;
+        rp += 4;
+        num -= 4;
+    }
+# endif
+    while (num) {
+        mul(rp[0], ap[0], w, c1);
+        ap++;
+        rp++;
+        num--;
+    }
+    return (c1);
+}
+
+void bn_sqr_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, int n)
+{
+    assert(n >= 0);
+    if (n <= 0)
+        return;
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT
+    while (n & ~3) {
+        sqr(r[0], r[1], a[0]);
+        sqr(r[2], r[3], a[1]);
+        sqr(r[4], r[5], a[2]);
+        sqr(r[6], r[7], a[3]);
+        a += 4;
+        r += 8;
+        n -= 4;
+    }
+# endif
+    while (n) {
+        sqr(r[0], r[1], a[0]);
+        a++;
+        r += 2;
+        n--;
+    }
+}
+
+#else                           /* !(defined(BN_LLONG) ||
+                                 * defined(BN_UMULT_HIGH)) */
+
+BN_ULONG bn_mul_add_words(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, int num,
+                          BN_ULONG w)
+{
+    BN_ULONG c = 0;
+    BN_ULONG bl, bh;
+
+    assert(num >= 0);
+    if (num <= 0)
+        return ((BN_ULONG)0);
+
+    bl = LBITS(w);
+    bh = HBITS(w);
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT
+    while (num & ~3) {
+        mul_add(rp[0], ap[0], bl, bh, c);
+        mul_add(rp[1], ap[1], bl, bh, c);
+        mul_add(rp[2], ap[2], bl, bh, c);
+        mul_add(rp[3], ap[3], bl, bh, c);
+        ap += 4;
+        rp += 4;
+        num -= 4;
+    }
+# endif
+    while (num) {
+        mul_add(rp[0], ap[0], bl, bh, c);
+        ap++;
+        rp++;
+        num--;
+    }
+    return (c);
+}
+
+BN_ULONG bn_mul_words(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, int num, BN_ULONG w)
+{
+    BN_ULONG carry = 0;
+    BN_ULONG bl, bh;
+
+    assert(num >= 0);
+    if (num <= 0)
+        return ((BN_ULONG)0);
+
+    bl = LBITS(w);
+    bh = HBITS(w);
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT
+    while (num & ~3) {
+        mul(rp[0], ap[0], bl, bh, carry);
+        mul(rp[1], ap[1], bl, bh, carry);
+        mul(rp[2], ap[2], bl, bh, carry);
+        mul(rp[3], ap[3], bl, bh, carry);
+        ap += 4;
+        rp += 4;
+        num -= 4;
+    }
+# endif
+    while (num) {
+        mul(rp[0], ap[0], bl, bh, carry);
+        ap++;
+        rp++;
+        num--;
+    }
+    return (carry);
+}
+
+void bn_sqr_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, int n)
+{
+    assert(n >= 0);
+    if (n <= 0)
+        return;
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT
+    while (n & ~3) {
+        sqr64(r[0], r[1], a[0]);
+        sqr64(r[2], r[3], a[1]);
+        sqr64(r[4], r[5], a[2]);
+        sqr64(r[6], r[7], a[3]);
+        a += 4;
+        r += 8;
+        n -= 4;
+    }
+# endif
+    while (n) {
+        sqr64(r[0], r[1], a[0]);
+        a++;
+        r += 2;
+        n--;
+    }
+}
+
+#endif                          /* !(defined(BN_LLONG) ||
+                                 * defined(BN_UMULT_HIGH)) */
+
+#if defined(BN_LLONG) && defined(BN_DIV2W)
+
+BN_ULONG bn_div_words(BN_ULONG h, BN_ULONG l, BN_ULONG d)
+{
+    return ((BN_ULONG)(((((BN_ULLONG) h) << BN_BITS2) | l) / (BN_ULLONG) d));
+}
+
+#else
+
+/* Divide h,l by d and return the result. */
+/* I need to test this some more :-( */
+BN_ULONG bn_div_words(BN_ULONG h, BN_ULONG l, BN_ULONG d)
+{
+    BN_ULONG dh, dl, q, ret = 0, th, tl, t;
+    int i, count = 2;
+
+    if (d == 0)
+        return (BN_MASK2);
+
+    i = BN_num_bits_word(d);
+    assert((i == BN_BITS2) || (h <= (BN_ULONG)1 << i));
+
+    i = BN_BITS2 - i;
+    if (h >= d)
+        h -= d;
+
+    if (i) {
+        d <<= i;
+        h = (h << i) | (l >> (BN_BITS2 - i));
+        l <<= i;
+    }
+    dh = (d & BN_MASK2h) >> BN_BITS4;
+    dl = (d & BN_MASK2l);
+    for (;;) {
+        if ((h >> BN_BITS4) == dh)
+            q = BN_MASK2l;
+        else
+            q = h / dh;
+
+        th = q * dh;
+        tl = dl * q;
+        for (;;) {
+            t = h - th;
+            if ((t & BN_MASK2h) ||
+                ((tl) <= ((t << BN_BITS4) | ((l & BN_MASK2h) >> BN_BITS4))))
+                break;
+            q--;
+            th -= dh;
+            tl -= dl;
+        }
+        t = (tl >> BN_BITS4);
+        tl = (tl << BN_BITS4) & BN_MASK2h;
+        th += t;
+
+        if (l < tl)
+            th++;
+        l -= tl;
+        if (h < th) {
+            h += d;
+            q--;
+        }
+        h -= th;
+
+        if (--count == 0)
+            break;
+
+        ret = q << BN_BITS4;
+        h = ((h << BN_BITS4) | (l >> BN_BITS4)) & BN_MASK2;
+        l = (l & BN_MASK2l) << BN_BITS4;
+    }
+    ret |= q;
+    return (ret);
+}
+#endif                          /* !defined(BN_LLONG) && defined(BN_DIV2W) */
+
+#ifdef BN_LLONG
+BN_ULONG bn_add_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b,
+                      int n)
+{
+    BN_ULLONG ll = 0;
+
+    assert(n >= 0);
+    if (n <= 0)
+        return ((BN_ULONG)0);
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT
+    while (n & ~3) {
+        ll += (BN_ULLONG) a[0] + b[0];
+        r[0] = (BN_ULONG)ll & BN_MASK2;
+        ll >>= BN_BITS2;
+        ll += (BN_ULLONG) a[1] + b[1];
+        r[1] = (BN_ULONG)ll & BN_MASK2;
+        ll >>= BN_BITS2;
+        ll += (BN_ULLONG) a[2] + b[2];
+        r[2] = (BN_ULONG)ll & BN_MASK2;
+        ll >>= BN_BITS2;
+        ll += (BN_ULLONG) a[3] + b[3];
+        r[3] = (BN_ULONG)ll & BN_MASK2;
+        ll >>= BN_BITS2;
+        a += 4;
+        b += 4;
+        r += 4;
+        n -= 4;
+    }
+# endif
+    while (n) {
+        ll += (BN_ULLONG) a[0] + b[0];
+        r[0] = (BN_ULONG)ll & BN_MASK2;
+        ll >>= BN_BITS2;
+        a++;
+        b++;
+        r++;
+        n--;
+    }
+    return ((BN_ULONG)ll);
+}
+#else                           /* !BN_LLONG */
+BN_ULONG bn_add_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b,
+                      int n)
+{
+    BN_ULONG c, l, t;
+
+    assert(n >= 0);
+    if (n <= 0)
+        return ((BN_ULONG)0);
+
+    c = 0;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT
+    while (n & ~3) {
+        t = a[0];
+        t = (t + c) & BN_MASK2;
+        c = (t < c);
+        l = (t + b[0]) & BN_MASK2;
+        c += (l < t);
+        r[0] = l;
+        t = a[1];
+        t = (t + c) & BN_MASK2;
+        c = (t < c);
+        l = (t + b[1]) & BN_MASK2;
+        c += (l < t);
+        r[1] = l;
+        t = a[2];
+        t = (t + c) & BN_MASK2;
+        c = (t < c);
+        l = (t + b[2]) & BN_MASK2;
+        c += (l < t);
+        r[2] = l;
+        t = a[3];
+        t = (t + c) & BN_MASK2;
+        c = (t < c);
+        l = (t + b[3]) & BN_MASK2;
+        c += (l < t);
+        r[3] = l;
+        a += 4;
+        b += 4;
+        r += 4;
+        n -= 4;
+    }
+# endif
+    while (n) {
+        t = a[0];
+        t = (t + c) & BN_MASK2;
+        c = (t < c);
+        l = (t + b[0]) & BN_MASK2;
+        c += (l < t);
+        r[0] = l;
+        a++;
+        b++;
+        r++;
+        n--;
+    }
+    return ((BN_ULONG)c);
+}
+#endif                          /* !BN_LLONG */
+
+BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b,
+                      int n)
+{
+    BN_ULONG t1, t2;
+    int c = 0;
+
+    assert(n >= 0);
+    if (n <= 0)
+        return ((BN_ULONG)0);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT
+    while (n & ~3) {
+        t1 = a[0];
+        t2 = b[0];
+        r[0] = (t1 - t2 - c) & BN_MASK2;
+        if (t1 != t2)
+            c = (t1 < t2);
+        t1 = a[1];
+        t2 = b[1];
+        r[1] = (t1 - t2 - c) & BN_MASK2;
+        if (t1 != t2)
+            c = (t1 < t2);
+        t1 = a[2];
+        t2 = b[2];
+        r[2] = (t1 - t2 - c) & BN_MASK2;
+        if (t1 != t2)
+            c = (t1 < t2);
+        t1 = a[3];
+        t2 = b[3];
+        r[3] = (t1 - t2 - c) & BN_MASK2;
+        if (t1 != t2)
+            c = (t1 < t2);
+        a += 4;
+        b += 4;
+        r += 4;
+        n -= 4;
+    }
+#endif
+    while (n) {
+        t1 = a[0];
+        t2 = b[0];
+        r[0] = (t1 - t2 - c) & BN_MASK2;
+        if (t1 != t2)
+            c = (t1 < t2);
+        a++;
+        b++;
+        r++;
+        n--;
+    }
+    return (c);
+}
+
+#if defined(BN_MUL_COMBA) && !defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT)
+
+# undef bn_mul_comba8
+# undef bn_mul_comba4
+# undef bn_sqr_comba8
+# undef bn_sqr_comba4
+
+/* mul_add_c(a,b,c0,c1,c2)  -- c+=a*b for three word number c=(c2,c1,c0) */
+/* mul_add_c2(a,b,c0,c1,c2) -- c+=2*a*b for three word number c=(c2,c1,c0) */
+/* sqr_add_c(a,i,c0,c1,c2)  -- c+=a[i]^2 for three word number c=(c2,c1,c0) */
+/*
+ * sqr_add_c2(a,i,c0,c1,c2) -- c+=2*a[i]*a[j] for three word number
+ * c=(c2,c1,c0)
+ */
+
+# ifdef BN_LLONG
+/*
+ * Keep in mind that additions to multiplication result can not
+ * overflow, because its high half cannot be all-ones.
+ */
+#  define mul_add_c(a,b,c0,c1,c2)       do {    \
+        BN_ULONG hi;                            \
+        BN_ULLONG t = (BN_ULLONG)(a)*(b);       \
+        t += c0;                /* no carry */  \
+        c0 = (BN_ULONG)Lw(t);                   \
+        hi = (BN_ULONG)Hw(t);                   \
+        c1 = (c1+hi)&BN_MASK2; if (c1<hi) c2++; \
+        } while(0)
+
+#  define mul_add_c2(a,b,c0,c1,c2)      do {    \
+        BN_ULONG hi;                            \
+        BN_ULLONG t = (BN_ULLONG)(a)*(b);       \
+        BN_ULLONG tt = t+c0;    /* no carry */  \
+        c0 = (BN_ULONG)Lw(tt);                  \
+        hi = (BN_ULONG)Hw(tt);                  \
+        c1 = (c1+hi)&BN_MASK2; if (c1<hi) c2++; \
+        t += c0;                /* no carry */  \
+        c0 = (BN_ULONG)Lw(t);                   \
+        hi = (BN_ULONG)Hw(t);                   \
+        c1 = (c1+hi)&BN_MASK2; if (c1<hi) c2++; \
+        } while(0)
+
+#  define sqr_add_c(a,i,c0,c1,c2)       do {    \
+        BN_ULONG hi;                            \
+        BN_ULLONG t = (BN_ULLONG)a[i]*a[i];     \
+        t += c0;                /* no carry */  \
+        c0 = (BN_ULONG)Lw(t);                   \
+        hi = (BN_ULONG)Hw(t);                   \
+        c1 = (c1+hi)&BN_MASK2; if (c1<hi) c2++; \
+        } while(0)
+
+#  define sqr_add_c2(a,i,j,c0,c1,c2) \
+        mul_add_c2((a)[i],(a)[j],c0,c1,c2)
+
+# elif defined(BN_UMULT_LOHI)
+/*
+ * Keep in mind that additions to hi can not overflow, because
+ * the high word of a multiplication result cannot be all-ones.
+ */
+#  define mul_add_c(a,b,c0,c1,c2)       do {    \
+        BN_ULONG ta = (a), tb = (b);            \
+        BN_ULONG lo, hi;                        \
+        BN_UMULT_LOHI(lo,hi,ta,tb);             \
+        c0 += lo; hi += (c0<lo)?1:0;            \
+        c1 += hi; c2 += (c1<hi)?1:0;            \
+        } while(0)
+
+#  define mul_add_c2(a,b,c0,c1,c2)      do {    \
+        BN_ULONG ta = (a), tb = (b);            \
+        BN_ULONG lo, hi, tt;                    \
+        BN_UMULT_LOHI(lo,hi,ta,tb);             \
+        c0 += lo; tt = hi+((c0<lo)?1:0);        \
+        c1 += tt; c2 += (c1<tt)?1:0;            \
+        c0 += lo; hi += (c0<lo)?1:0;            \
+        c1 += hi; c2 += (c1<hi)?1:0;            \
+        } while(0)
+
+#  define sqr_add_c(a,i,c0,c1,c2)       do {    \
+        BN_ULONG ta = (a)[i];                   \
+        BN_ULONG lo, hi;                        \
+        BN_UMULT_LOHI(lo,hi,ta,ta);             \
+        c0 += lo; hi += (c0<lo)?1:0;            \
+        c1 += hi; c2 += (c1<hi)?1:0;            \
+        } while(0)
+
+#  define sqr_add_c2(a,i,j,c0,c1,c2)    \
+        mul_add_c2((a)[i],(a)[j],c0,c1,c2)
+
+# elif defined(BN_UMULT_HIGH)
+/*
+ * Keep in mind that additions to hi can not overflow, because
+ * the high word of a multiplication result cannot be all-ones.
+ */
+#  define mul_add_c(a,b,c0,c1,c2)       do {    \
+        BN_ULONG ta = (a), tb = (b);            \
+        BN_ULONG lo = ta * tb;                  \
+        BN_ULONG hi = BN_UMULT_HIGH(ta,tb);     \
+        c0 += lo; hi += (c0<lo)?1:0;            \
+        c1 += hi; c2 += (c1<hi)?1:0;            \
+        } while(0)
+
+#  define mul_add_c2(a,b,c0,c1,c2)      do {    \
+        BN_ULONG ta = (a), tb = (b), tt;        \
+        BN_ULONG lo = ta * tb;                  \
+        BN_ULONG hi = BN_UMULT_HIGH(ta,tb);     \
+        c0 += lo; tt = hi + ((c0<lo)?1:0);      \
+        c1 += tt; c2 += (c1<tt)?1:0;            \
+        c0 += lo; hi += (c0<lo)?1:0;            \
+        c1 += hi; c2 += (c1<hi)?1:0;            \
+        } while(0)
+
+#  define sqr_add_c(a,i,c0,c1,c2)       do {    \
+        BN_ULONG ta = (a)[i];                   \
+        BN_ULONG lo = ta * ta;                  \
+        BN_ULONG hi = BN_UMULT_HIGH(ta,ta);     \
+        c0 += lo; hi += (c0<lo)?1:0;            \
+        c1 += hi; c2 += (c1<hi)?1:0;            \
+        } while(0)
+
+#  define sqr_add_c2(a,i,j,c0,c1,c2)      \
+        mul_add_c2((a)[i],(a)[j],c0,c1,c2)
+
+# else                          /* !BN_LLONG */
+/*
+ * Keep in mind that additions to hi can not overflow, because
+ * the high word of a multiplication result cannot be all-ones.
+ */
+#  define mul_add_c(a,b,c0,c1,c2)       do {    \
+        BN_ULONG lo = LBITS(a), hi = HBITS(a);  \
+        BN_ULONG bl = LBITS(b), bh = HBITS(b);  \
+        mul64(lo,hi,bl,bh);                     \
+        c0 = (c0+lo)&BN_MASK2; if (c0<lo) hi++; \
+        c1 = (c1+hi)&BN_MASK2; if (c1<hi) c2++; \
+        } while(0)
+
+#  define mul_add_c2(a,b,c0,c1,c2)      do {    \
+        BN_ULONG tt;                            \
+        BN_ULONG lo = LBITS(a), hi = HBITS(a);  \
+        BN_ULONG bl = LBITS(b), bh = HBITS(b);  \
+        mul64(lo,hi,bl,bh);                     \
+        tt = hi;                                \
+        c0 = (c0+lo)&BN_MASK2; if (c0<lo) tt++; \
+        c1 = (c1+tt)&BN_MASK2; if (c1<tt) c2++; \
+        c0 = (c0+lo)&BN_MASK2; if (c0<lo) hi++; \
+        c1 = (c1+hi)&BN_MASK2; if (c1<hi) c2++; \
+        } while(0)
+
+#  define sqr_add_c(a,i,c0,c1,c2)       do {    \
+        BN_ULONG lo, hi;                        \
+        sqr64(lo,hi,(a)[i]);                    \
+        c0 = (c0+lo)&BN_MASK2; if (c0<lo) hi++; \
+        c1 = (c1+hi)&BN_MASK2; if (c1<hi) c2++; \
+        } while(0)
+
+#  define sqr_add_c2(a,i,j,c0,c1,c2) \
+        mul_add_c2((a)[i],(a)[j],c0,c1,c2)
+# endif                         /* !BN_LLONG */
+
+void bn_mul_comba8(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b)
+{
+    BN_ULONG c1, c2, c3;
+
+    c1 = 0;
+    c2 = 0;
+    c3 = 0;
+    mul_add_c(a[0], b[0], c1, c2, c3);
+    r[0] = c1;
+    c1 = 0;
+    mul_add_c(a[0], b[1], c2, c3, c1);
+    mul_add_c(a[1], b[0], c2, c3, c1);
+    r[1] = c2;
+    c2 = 0;
+    mul_add_c(a[2], b[0], c3, c1, c2);
+    mul_add_c(a[1], b[1], c3, c1, c2);
+    mul_add_c(a[0], b[2], c3, c1, c2);
+    r[2] = c3;
+    c3 = 0;
+    mul_add_c(a[0], b[3], c1, c2, c3);
+    mul_add_c(a[1], b[2], c1, c2, c3);
+    mul_add_c(a[2], b[1], c1, c2, c3);
+    mul_add_c(a[3], b[0], c1, c2, c3);
+    r[3] = c1;
+    c1 = 0;
+    mul_add_c(a[4], b[0], c2, c3, c1);
+    mul_add_c(a[3], b[1], c2, c3, c1);
+    mul_add_c(a[2], b[2], c2, c3, c1);
+    mul_add_c(a[1], b[3], c2, c3, c1);
+    mul_add_c(a[0], b[4], c2, c3, c1);
+    r[4] = c2;
+    c2 = 0;
+    mul_add_c(a[0], b[5], c3, c1, c2);
+    mul_add_c(a[1], b[4], c3, c1, c2);
+    mul_add_c(a[2], b[3], c3, c1, c2);
+    mul_add_c(a[3], b[2], c3, c1, c2);
+    mul_add_c(a[4], b[1], c3, c1, c2);
+    mul_add_c(a[5], b[0], c3, c1, c2);
+    r[5] = c3;
+    c3 = 0;
+    mul_add_c(a[6], b[0], c1, c2, c3);
+    mul_add_c(a[5], b[1], c1, c2, c3);
+    mul_add_c(a[4], b[2], c1, c2, c3);
+    mul_add_c(a[3], b[3], c1, c2, c3);
+    mul_add_c(a[2], b[4], c1, c2, c3);
+    mul_add_c(a[1], b[5], c1, c2, c3);
+    mul_add_c(a[0], b[6], c1, c2, c3);
+    r[6] = c1;
+    c1 = 0;
+    mul_add_c(a[0], b[7], c2, c3, c1);
+    mul_add_c(a[1], b[6], c2, c3, c1);
+    mul_add_c(a[2], b[5], c2, c3, c1);
+    mul_add_c(a[3], b[4], c2, c3, c1);
+    mul_add_c(a[4], b[3], c2, c3, c1);
+    mul_add_c(a[5], b[2], c2, c3, c1);
+    mul_add_c(a[6], b[1], c2, c3, c1);
+    mul_add_c(a[7], b[0], c2, c3, c1);
+    r[7] = c2;
+    c2 = 0;
+    mul_add_c(a[7], b[1], c3, c1, c2);
+    mul_add_c(a[6], b[2], c3, c1, c2);
+    mul_add_c(a[5], b[3], c3, c1, c2);
+    mul_add_c(a[4], b[4], c3, c1, c2);
+    mul_add_c(a[3], b[5], c3, c1, c2);
+    mul_add_c(a[2], b[6], c3, c1, c2);
+    mul_add_c(a[1], b[7], c3, c1, c2);
+    r[8] = c3;
+    c3 = 0;
+    mul_add_c(a[2], b[7], c1, c2, c3);
+    mul_add_c(a[3], b[6], c1, c2, c3);
+    mul_add_c(a[4], b[5], c1, c2, c3);
+    mul_add_c(a[5], b[4], c1, c2, c3);
+    mul_add_c(a[6], b[3], c1, c2, c3);
+    mul_add_c(a[7], b[2], c1, c2, c3);
+    r[9] = c1;
+    c1 = 0;
+    mul_add_c(a[7], b[3], c2, c3, c1);
+    mul_add_c(a[6], b[4], c2, c3, c1);
+    mul_add_c(a[5], b[5], c2, c3, c1);
+    mul_add_c(a[4], b[6], c2, c3, c1);
+    mul_add_c(a[3], b[7], c2, c3, c1);
+    r[10] = c2;
+    c2 = 0;
+    mul_add_c(a[4], b[7], c3, c1, c2);
+    mul_add_c(a[5], b[6], c3, c1, c2);
+    mul_add_c(a[6], b[5], c3, c1, c2);
+    mul_add_c(a[7], b[4], c3, c1, c2);
+    r[11] = c3;
+    c3 = 0;
+    mul_add_c(a[7], b[5], c1, c2, c3);
+    mul_add_c(a[6], b[6], c1, c2, c3);
+    mul_add_c(a[5], b[7], c1, c2, c3);
+    r[12] = c1;
+    c1 = 0;
+    mul_add_c(a[6], b[7], c2, c3, c1);
+    mul_add_c(a[7], b[6], c2, c3, c1);
+    r[13] = c2;
+    c2 = 0;
+    mul_add_c(a[7], b[7], c3, c1, c2);
+    r[14] = c3;
+    r[15] = c1;
+}
+
+void bn_mul_comba4(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b)
+{
+    BN_ULONG c1, c2, c3;
+
+    c1 = 0;
+    c2 = 0;
+    c3 = 0;
+    mul_add_c(a[0], b[0], c1, c2, c3);
+    r[0] = c1;
+    c1 = 0;
+    mul_add_c(a[0], b[1], c2, c3, c1);
+    mul_add_c(a[1], b[0], c2, c3, c1);
+    r[1] = c2;
+    c2 = 0;
+    mul_add_c(a[2], b[0], c3, c1, c2);
+    mul_add_c(a[1], b[1], c3, c1, c2);
+    mul_add_c(a[0], b[2], c3, c1, c2);
+    r[2] = c3;
+    c3 = 0;
+    mul_add_c(a[0], b[3], c1, c2, c3);
+    mul_add_c(a[1], b[2], c1, c2, c3);
+    mul_add_c(a[2], b[1], c1, c2, c3);
+    mul_add_c(a[3], b[0], c1, c2, c3);
+    r[3] = c1;
+    c1 = 0;
+    mul_add_c(a[3], b[1], c2, c3, c1);
+    mul_add_c(a[2], b[2], c2, c3, c1);
+    mul_add_c(a[1], b[3], c2, c3, c1);
+    r[4] = c2;
+    c2 = 0;
+    mul_add_c(a[2], b[3], c3, c1, c2);
+    mul_add_c(a[3], b[2], c3, c1, c2);
+    r[5] = c3;
+    c3 = 0;
+    mul_add_c(a[3], b[3], c1, c2, c3);
+    r[6] = c1;
+    r[7] = c2;
+}
+
+void bn_sqr_comba8(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a)
+{
+    BN_ULONG c1, c2, c3;
+
+    c1 = 0;
+    c2 = 0;
+    c3 = 0;
+    sqr_add_c(a, 0, c1, c2, c3);
+    r[0] = c1;
+    c1 = 0;
+    sqr_add_c2(a, 1, 0, c2, c3, c1);
+    r[1] = c2;
+    c2 = 0;
+    sqr_add_c(a, 1, c3, c1, c2);
+    sqr_add_c2(a, 2, 0, c3, c1, c2);
+    r[2] = c3;
+    c3 = 0;
+    sqr_add_c2(a, 3, 0, c1, c2, c3);
+    sqr_add_c2(a, 2, 1, c1, c2, c3);
+    r[3] = c1;
+    c1 = 0;
+    sqr_add_c(a, 2, c2, c3, c1);
+    sqr_add_c2(a, 3, 1, c2, c3, c1);
+    sqr_add_c2(a, 4, 0, c2, c3, c1);
+    r[4] = c2;
+    c2 = 0;
+    sqr_add_c2(a, 5, 0, c3, c1, c2);
+    sqr_add_c2(a, 4, 1, c3, c1, c2);
+    sqr_add_c2(a, 3, 2, c3, c1, c2);
+    r[5] = c3;
+    c3 = 0;
+    sqr_add_c(a, 3, c1, c2, c3);
+    sqr_add_c2(a, 4, 2, c1, c2, c3);
+    sqr_add_c2(a, 5, 1, c1, c2, c3);
+    sqr_add_c2(a, 6, 0, c1, c2, c3);
+    r[6] = c1;
+    c1 = 0;
+    sqr_add_c2(a, 7, 0, c2, c3, c1);
+    sqr_add_c2(a, 6, 1, c2, c3, c1);
+    sqr_add_c2(a, 5, 2, c2, c3, c1);
+    sqr_add_c2(a, 4, 3, c2, c3, c1);
+    r[7] = c2;
+    c2 = 0;
+    sqr_add_c(a, 4, c3, c1, c2);
+    sqr_add_c2(a, 5, 3, c3, c1, c2);
+    sqr_add_c2(a, 6, 2, c3, c1, c2);
+    sqr_add_c2(a, 7, 1, c3, c1, c2);
+    r[8] = c3;
+    c3 = 0;
+    sqr_add_c2(a, 7, 2, c1, c2, c3);
+    sqr_add_c2(a, 6, 3, c1, c2, c3);
+    sqr_add_c2(a, 5, 4, c1, c2, c3);
+    r[9] = c1;
+    c1 = 0;
+    sqr_add_c(a, 5, c2, c3, c1);
+    sqr_add_c2(a, 6, 4, c2, c3, c1);
+    sqr_add_c2(a, 7, 3, c2, c3, c1);
+    r[10] = c2;
+    c2 = 0;
+    sqr_add_c2(a, 7, 4, c3, c1, c2);
+    sqr_add_c2(a, 6, 5, c3, c1, c2);
+    r[11] = c3;
+    c3 = 0;
+    sqr_add_c(a, 6, c1, c2, c3);
+    sqr_add_c2(a, 7, 5, c1, c2, c3);
+    r[12] = c1;
+    c1 = 0;
+    sqr_add_c2(a, 7, 6, c2, c3, c1);
+    r[13] = c2;
+    c2 = 0;
+    sqr_add_c(a, 7, c3, c1, c2);
+    r[14] = c3;
+    r[15] = c1;
+}
+
+void bn_sqr_comba4(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a)
+{
+    BN_ULONG c1, c2, c3;
+
+    c1 = 0;
+    c2 = 0;
+    c3 = 0;
+    sqr_add_c(a, 0, c1, c2, c3);
+    r[0] = c1;
+    c1 = 0;
+    sqr_add_c2(a, 1, 0, c2, c3, c1);
+    r[1] = c2;
+    c2 = 0;
+    sqr_add_c(a, 1, c3, c1, c2);
+    sqr_add_c2(a, 2, 0, c3, c1, c2);
+    r[2] = c3;
+    c3 = 0;
+    sqr_add_c2(a, 3, 0, c1, c2, c3);
+    sqr_add_c2(a, 2, 1, c1, c2, c3);
+    r[3] = c1;
+    c1 = 0;
+    sqr_add_c(a, 2, c2, c3, c1);
+    sqr_add_c2(a, 3, 1, c2, c3, c1);
+    r[4] = c2;
+    c2 = 0;
+    sqr_add_c2(a, 3, 2, c3, c1, c2);
+    r[5] = c3;
+    c3 = 0;
+    sqr_add_c(a, 3, c1, c2, c3);
+    r[6] = c1;
+    r[7] = c2;
+}
+
+# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ASM
+#  ifdef OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT
+#   include <alloca.h>
+/*
+ * This is essentially reference implementation, which may or may not
+ * result in performance improvement. E.g. on IA-32 this routine was
+ * observed to give 40% faster rsa1024 private key operations and 10%
+ * faster rsa4096 ones, while on AMD64 it improves rsa1024 sign only
+ * by 10% and *worsens* rsa4096 sign by 15%. Once again, it's a
+ * reference implementation, one to be used as starting point for
+ * platform-specific assembler. Mentioned numbers apply to compiler
+ * generated code compiled with and without -DOPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT and
+ * can vary not only from platform to platform, but even for compiler
+ * versions. Assembler vs. assembler improvement coefficients can
+ * [and are known to] differ and are to be documented elsewhere.
+ */
+int bn_mul_mont(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp,
+                const BN_ULONG *np, const BN_ULONG *n0p, int num)
+{
+    BN_ULONG c0, c1, ml, *tp, n0;
+#   ifdef mul64
+    BN_ULONG mh;
+#   endif
+    volatile BN_ULONG *vp;
+    int i = 0, j;
+
+#   if 0                        /* template for platform-specific
+                                 * implementation */
+    if (ap == bp)
+        return bn_sqr_mont(rp, ap, np, n0p, num);
+#   endif
+    vp = tp = alloca((num + 2) * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
+
+    n0 = *n0p;
+
+    c0 = 0;
+    ml = bp[0];
+#   ifdef mul64
+    mh = HBITS(ml);
+    ml = LBITS(ml);
+    for (j = 0; j < num; ++j)
+        mul(tp[j], ap[j], ml, mh, c0);
+#   else
+    for (j = 0; j < num; ++j)
+        mul(tp[j], ap[j], ml, c0);
+#   endif
+
+    tp[num] = c0;
+    tp[num + 1] = 0;
+    goto enter;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
+        c0 = 0;
+        ml = bp[i];
+#   ifdef mul64
+        mh = HBITS(ml);
+        ml = LBITS(ml);
+        for (j = 0; j < num; ++j)
+            mul_add(tp[j], ap[j], ml, mh, c0);
+#   else
+        for (j = 0; j < num; ++j)
+            mul_add(tp[j], ap[j], ml, c0);
+#   endif
+        c1 = (tp[num] + c0) & BN_MASK2;
+        tp[num] = c1;
+        tp[num + 1] = (c1 < c0 ? 1 : 0);
+ enter:
+        c1 = tp[0];
+        ml = (c1 * n0) & BN_MASK2;
+        c0 = 0;
+#   ifdef mul64
+        mh = HBITS(ml);
+        ml = LBITS(ml);
+        mul_add(c1, np[0], ml, mh, c0);
+#   else
+        mul_add(c1, ml, np[0], c0);
+#   endif
+        for (j = 1; j < num; j++) {
+            c1 = tp[j];
+#   ifdef mul64
+            mul_add(c1, np[j], ml, mh, c0);
+#   else
+            mul_add(c1, ml, np[j], c0);
+#   endif
+            tp[j - 1] = c1 & BN_MASK2;
+        }
+        c1 = (tp[num] + c0) & BN_MASK2;
+        tp[num - 1] = c1;
+        tp[num] = tp[num + 1] + (c1 < c0 ? 1 : 0);
+    }
+
+    if (tp[num] != 0 || tp[num - 1] >= np[num - 1]) {
+        c0 = bn_sub_words(rp, tp, np, num);
+        if (tp[num] != 0 || c0 == 0) {
+            for (i = 0; i < num + 2; i++)
+                vp[i] = 0;
+            return 1;
+        }
+    }
+    for (i = 0; i < num; i++)
+        rp[i] = tp[i], vp[i] = 0;
+    vp[num] = 0;
+    vp[num + 1] = 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+#  else
+/*
+ * Return value of 0 indicates that multiplication/convolution was not
+ * performed to signal the caller to fall down to alternative/original
+ * code-path.
+ */
+int bn_mul_mont(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp,
+                const BN_ULONG *np, const BN_ULONG *n0, int num)
+{
+    return 0;
+}
+#  endif                        /* OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT */
+# endif
+
+#else                           /* !BN_MUL_COMBA */
+
+/* hmm... is it faster just to do a multiply? */
+# undef bn_sqr_comba4
+# undef bn_sqr_comba8
+void bn_sqr_comba4(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a)
+{
+    BN_ULONG t[8];
+    bn_sqr_normal(r, a, 4, t);
+}
+
+void bn_sqr_comba8(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a)
+{
+    BN_ULONG t[16];
+    bn_sqr_normal(r, a, 8, t);
+}
+
+void bn_mul_comba4(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b)
+{
+    r[4] = bn_mul_words(&(r[0]), a, 4, b[0]);
+    r[5] = bn_mul_add_words(&(r[1]), a, 4, b[1]);
+    r[6] = bn_mul_add_words(&(r[2]), a, 4, b[2]);
+    r[7] = bn_mul_add_words(&(r[3]), a, 4, b[3]);
+}
+
+void bn_mul_comba8(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b)
+{
+    r[8] = bn_mul_words(&(r[0]), a, 8, b[0]);
+    r[9] = bn_mul_add_words(&(r[1]), a, 8, b[1]);
+    r[10] = bn_mul_add_words(&(r[2]), a, 8, b[2]);
+    r[11] = bn_mul_add_words(&(r[3]), a, 8, b[3]);
+    r[12] = bn_mul_add_words(&(r[4]), a, 8, b[4]);
+    r[13] = bn_mul_add_words(&(r[5]), a, 8, b[5]);
+    r[14] = bn_mul_add_words(&(r[6]), a, 8, b[6]);
+    r[15] = bn_mul_add_words(&(r[7]), a, 8, b[7]);
+}
+
+# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ASM
+#  ifdef OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT
+#   include <alloca.h>
+int bn_mul_mont(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp,
+                const BN_ULONG *np, const BN_ULONG *n0p, int num)
+{
+    BN_ULONG c0, c1, *tp, n0 = *n0p;
+    volatile BN_ULONG *vp;
+    int i = 0, j;
+
+    vp = tp = alloca((num + 2) * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
+
+    for (i = 0; i <= num; i++)
+        tp[i] = 0;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
+        c0 = bn_mul_add_words(tp, ap, num, bp[i]);
+        c1 = (tp[num] + c0) & BN_MASK2;
+        tp[num] = c1;
+        tp[num + 1] = (c1 < c0 ? 1 : 0);
+
+        c0 = bn_mul_add_words(tp, np, num, tp[0] * n0);
+        c1 = (tp[num] + c0) & BN_MASK2;
+        tp[num] = c1;
+        tp[num + 1] += (c1 < c0 ? 1 : 0);
+        for (j = 0; j <= num; j++)
+            tp[j] = tp[j + 1];
+    }
+
+    if (tp[num] != 0 || tp[num - 1] >= np[num - 1]) {
+        c0 = bn_sub_words(rp, tp, np, num);
+        if (tp[num] != 0 || c0 == 0) {
+            for (i = 0; i < num + 2; i++)
+                vp[i] = 0;
+            return 1;
+        }
+    }
+    for (i = 0; i < num; i++)
+        rp[i] = tp[i], vp[i] = 0;
+    vp[num] = 0;
+    vp[num + 1] = 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+#  else
+int bn_mul_mont(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp,
+                const BN_ULONG *np, const BN_ULONG *n0, int num)
+{
+    return 0;
+}
+#  endif                        /* OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT */
+# endif
+
+#endif                          /* !BN_MUL_COMBA */
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..24d1383
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c
@@ -0,0 +1,289 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1998-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "bn_lcl.h"
+
+#define BN_BLINDING_COUNTER     32
+
+struct bn_blinding_st {
+    BIGNUM *A;
+    BIGNUM *Ai;
+    BIGNUM *e;
+    BIGNUM *mod;                /* just a reference */
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_ID tid;
+    int counter;
+    unsigned long flags;
+    BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx;
+    int (*bn_mod_exp) (BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
+                       const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx);
+    CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock;
+};
+
+BN_BLINDING *BN_BLINDING_new(const BIGNUM *A, const BIGNUM *Ai, BIGNUM *mod)
+{
+    BN_BLINDING *ret = NULL;
+
+    bn_check_top(mod);
+
+    if ((ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret))) == NULL) {
+        BNerr(BN_F_BN_BLINDING_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
+    if (ret->lock == NULL) {
+        BNerr(BN_F_BN_BLINDING_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        OPENSSL_free(ret);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    BN_BLINDING_set_current_thread(ret);
+
+    if (A != NULL) {
+        if ((ret->A = BN_dup(A)) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (Ai != NULL) {
+        if ((ret->Ai = BN_dup(Ai)) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* save a copy of mod in the BN_BLINDING structure */
+    if ((ret->mod = BN_dup(mod)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (BN_get_flags(mod, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0)
+        BN_set_flags(ret->mod, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+    /*
+     * Set the counter to the special value -1 to indicate that this is
+     * never-used fresh blinding that does not need updating before first
+     * use.
+     */
+    ret->counter = -1;
+
+    return ret;
+
+ err:
+    BN_BLINDING_free(ret);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+void BN_BLINDING_free(BN_BLINDING *r)
+{
+    if (r == NULL)
+        return;
+
+    BN_free(r->A);
+    BN_free(r->Ai);
+    BN_free(r->e);
+    BN_free(r->mod);
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(r->lock);
+    OPENSSL_free(r);
+}
+
+int BN_BLINDING_update(BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    if ((b->A == NULL) || (b->Ai == NULL)) {
+        BNerr(BN_F_BN_BLINDING_UPDATE, BN_R_NOT_INITIALIZED);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (b->counter == -1)
+        b->counter = 0;
+
+    if (++b->counter == BN_BLINDING_COUNTER && b->e != NULL &&
+        !(b->flags & BN_BLINDING_NO_RECREATE)) {
+        /* re-create blinding parameters */
+        if (!BN_BLINDING_create_param(b, NULL, NULL, ctx, NULL, NULL))
+            goto err;
+    } else if (!(b->flags & BN_BLINDING_NO_UPDATE)) {
+        if (!BN_mod_mul(b->A, b->A, b->A, b->mod, ctx))
+            goto err;
+        if (!BN_mod_mul(b->Ai, b->Ai, b->Ai, b->mod, ctx))
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    if (b->counter == BN_BLINDING_COUNTER)
+        b->counter = 0;
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+int BN_BLINDING_convert(BIGNUM *n, BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(n, NULL, b, ctx);
+}
+
+int BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *r, BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int ret = 1;
+
+    bn_check_top(n);
+
+    if ((b->A == NULL) || (b->Ai == NULL)) {
+        BNerr(BN_F_BN_BLINDING_CONVERT_EX, BN_R_NOT_INITIALIZED);
+        return (0);
+    }
+
+    if (b->counter == -1)
+        /* Fresh blinding, doesn't need updating. */
+        b->counter = 0;
+    else if (!BN_BLINDING_update(b, ctx))
+        return (0);
+
+    if (r != NULL) {
+        if (!BN_copy(r, b->Ai))
+            ret = 0;
+    }
+
+    if (!BN_mod_mul(n, n, b->A, b->mod, ctx))
+        ret = 0;
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int BN_BLINDING_invert(BIGNUM *n, BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(n, NULL, b, ctx);
+}
+
+int BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(BIGNUM *n, const BIGNUM *r, BN_BLINDING *b,
+                          BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int ret;
+
+    bn_check_top(n);
+
+    if (r != NULL)
+        ret = BN_mod_mul(n, n, r, b->mod, ctx);
+    else {
+        if (b->Ai == NULL) {
+            BNerr(BN_F_BN_BLINDING_INVERT_EX, BN_R_NOT_INITIALIZED);
+            return (0);
+        }
+        ret = BN_mod_mul(n, n, b->Ai, b->mod, ctx);
+    }
+
+    bn_check_top(n);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+int BN_BLINDING_is_current_thread(BN_BLINDING *b)
+{
+    return CRYPTO_THREAD_compare_id(CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id(), b->tid);
+}
+
+void BN_BLINDING_set_current_thread(BN_BLINDING *b)
+{
+    b->tid = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id();
+}
+
+int BN_BLINDING_lock(BN_BLINDING *b)
+{
+    return CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(b->lock);
+}
+
+int BN_BLINDING_unlock(BN_BLINDING *b)
+{
+    return CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(b->lock);
+}
+
+unsigned long BN_BLINDING_get_flags(const BN_BLINDING *b)
+{
+    return b->flags;
+}
+
+void BN_BLINDING_set_flags(BN_BLINDING *b, unsigned long flags)
+{
+    b->flags = flags;
+}
+
+BN_BLINDING *BN_BLINDING_create_param(BN_BLINDING *b,
+                                      const BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx,
+                                      int (*bn_mod_exp) (BIGNUM *r,
+                                                         const BIGNUM *a,
+                                                         const BIGNUM *p,
+                                                         const BIGNUM *m,
+                                                         BN_CTX *ctx,
+                                                         BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx),
+                                      BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx)
+{
+    int retry_counter = 32;
+    BN_BLINDING *ret = NULL;
+
+    if (b == NULL)
+        ret = BN_BLINDING_new(NULL, NULL, m);
+    else
+        ret = b;
+
+    if (ret == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (ret->A == NULL && (ret->A = BN_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (ret->Ai == NULL && (ret->Ai = BN_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (e != NULL) {
+        BN_free(ret->e);
+        ret->e = BN_dup(e);
+    }
+    if (ret->e == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (bn_mod_exp != NULL)
+        ret->bn_mod_exp = bn_mod_exp;
+    if (m_ctx != NULL)
+        ret->m_ctx = m_ctx;
+
+    do {
+        int rv;
+        if (!BN_rand_range(ret->A, ret->mod))
+            goto err;
+        if (!int_bn_mod_inverse(ret->Ai, ret->A, ret->mod, ctx, &rv)) {
+            /*
+             * this should almost never happen for good RSA keys
+             */
+            if (rv) {
+                if (retry_counter-- == 0) {
+                    BNerr(BN_F_BN_BLINDING_CREATE_PARAM,
+                          BN_R_TOO_MANY_ITERATIONS);
+                    goto err;
+                }
+            } else
+                goto err;
+        } else
+            break;
+    } while (1);
+
+    if (ret->bn_mod_exp != NULL && ret->m_ctx != NULL) {
+        if (!ret->bn_mod_exp
+            (ret->A, ret->A, ret->e, ret->mod, ctx, ret->m_ctx))
+            goto err;
+    } else {
+        if (!BN_mod_exp(ret->A, ret->A, ret->e, ret->mod, ctx))
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    return ret;
+ err:
+    if (b == NULL) {
+        BN_BLINDING_free(ret);
+        ret = NULL;
+    }
+
+    return ret;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_const.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_const.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..39dd612
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_const.c
@@ -0,0 +1,553 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+/*-
+ * "First Oakley Default Group" from RFC2409, section 6.1.
+ *
+ * The prime is: 2^768 - 2 ^704 - 1 + 2^64 * { [2^638 pi] + 149686 }
+ *
+ * RFC2409 specifies a generator of 2.
+ * RFC2412 specifies a generator of of 22.
+ */
+
+BIGNUM *BN_get_rfc2409_prime_768(BIGNUM *bn)
+{
+    static const unsigned char RFC2409_PRIME_768[] = {
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0xC9, 0x0F, 0xDA, 0xA2, 0x21, 0x68, 0xC2, 0x34,
+        0xC4, 0xC6, 0x62, 0x8B, 0x80, 0xDC, 0x1C, 0xD1,
+        0x29, 0x02, 0x4E, 0x08, 0x8A, 0x67, 0xCC, 0x74,
+        0x02, 0x0B, 0xBE, 0xA6, 0x3B, 0x13, 0x9B, 0x22,
+        0x51, 0x4A, 0x08, 0x79, 0x8E, 0x34, 0x04, 0xDD,
+        0xEF, 0x95, 0x19, 0xB3, 0xCD, 0x3A, 0x43, 0x1B,
+        0x30, 0x2B, 0x0A, 0x6D, 0xF2, 0x5F, 0x14, 0x37,
+        0x4F, 0xE1, 0x35, 0x6D, 0x6D, 0x51, 0xC2, 0x45,
+        0xE4, 0x85, 0xB5, 0x76, 0x62, 0x5E, 0x7E, 0xC6,
+        0xF4, 0x4C, 0x42, 0xE9, 0xA6, 0x3A, 0x36, 0x20,
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+    };
+    return BN_bin2bn(RFC2409_PRIME_768, sizeof(RFC2409_PRIME_768), bn);
+}
+
+/*-
+ * "Second Oakley Default Group" from RFC2409, section 6.2.
+ *
+ * The prime is: 2^1024 - 2^960 - 1 + 2^64 * { [2^894 pi] + 129093 }.
+ *
+ * RFC2409 specifies a generator of 2.
+ * RFC2412 specifies a generator of 22.
+ */
+
+BIGNUM *BN_get_rfc2409_prime_1024(BIGNUM *bn)
+{
+    static const unsigned char RFC2409_PRIME_1024[] = {
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0xC9, 0x0F, 0xDA, 0xA2, 0x21, 0x68, 0xC2, 0x34,
+        0xC4, 0xC6, 0x62, 0x8B, 0x80, 0xDC, 0x1C, 0xD1,
+        0x29, 0x02, 0x4E, 0x08, 0x8A, 0x67, 0xCC, 0x74,
+        0x02, 0x0B, 0xBE, 0xA6, 0x3B, 0x13, 0x9B, 0x22,
+        0x51, 0x4A, 0x08, 0x79, 0x8E, 0x34, 0x04, 0xDD,
+        0xEF, 0x95, 0x19, 0xB3, 0xCD, 0x3A, 0x43, 0x1B,
+        0x30, 0x2B, 0x0A, 0x6D, 0xF2, 0x5F, 0x14, 0x37,
+        0x4F, 0xE1, 0x35, 0x6D, 0x6D, 0x51, 0xC2, 0x45,
+        0xE4, 0x85, 0xB5, 0x76, 0x62, 0x5E, 0x7E, 0xC6,
+        0xF4, 0x4C, 0x42, 0xE9, 0xA6, 0x37, 0xED, 0x6B,
+        0x0B, 0xFF, 0x5C, 0xB6, 0xF4, 0x06, 0xB7, 0xED,
+        0xEE, 0x38, 0x6B, 0xFB, 0x5A, 0x89, 0x9F, 0xA5,
+        0xAE, 0x9F, 0x24, 0x11, 0x7C, 0x4B, 0x1F, 0xE6,
+        0x49, 0x28, 0x66, 0x51, 0xEC, 0xE6, 0x53, 0x81,
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+    };
+    return BN_bin2bn(RFC2409_PRIME_1024, sizeof(RFC2409_PRIME_1024), bn);
+}
+
+/*-
+ * "1536-bit MODP Group" from RFC3526, Section 2.
+ *
+ * The prime is: 2^1536 - 2^1472 - 1 + 2^64 * { [2^1406 pi] + 741804 }
+ *
+ * RFC3526 specifies a generator of 2.
+ * RFC2312 specifies a generator of 22.
+ */
+
+BIGNUM *BN_get_rfc3526_prime_1536(BIGNUM *bn)
+{
+    static const unsigned char RFC3526_PRIME_1536[] = {
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0xC9, 0x0F, 0xDA, 0xA2, 0x21, 0x68, 0xC2, 0x34,
+        0xC4, 0xC6, 0x62, 0x8B, 0x80, 0xDC, 0x1C, 0xD1,
+        0x29, 0x02, 0x4E, 0x08, 0x8A, 0x67, 0xCC, 0x74,
+        0x02, 0x0B, 0xBE, 0xA6, 0x3B, 0x13, 0x9B, 0x22,
+        0x51, 0x4A, 0x08, 0x79, 0x8E, 0x34, 0x04, 0xDD,
+        0xEF, 0x95, 0x19, 0xB3, 0xCD, 0x3A, 0x43, 0x1B,
+        0x30, 0x2B, 0x0A, 0x6D, 0xF2, 0x5F, 0x14, 0x37,
+        0x4F, 0xE1, 0x35, 0x6D, 0x6D, 0x51, 0xC2, 0x45,
+        0xE4, 0x85, 0xB5, 0x76, 0x62, 0x5E, 0x7E, 0xC6,
+        0xF4, 0x4C, 0x42, 0xE9, 0xA6, 0x37, 0xED, 0x6B,
+        0x0B, 0xFF, 0x5C, 0xB6, 0xF4, 0x06, 0xB7, 0xED,
+        0xEE, 0x38, 0x6B, 0xFB, 0x5A, 0x89, 0x9F, 0xA5,
+        0xAE, 0x9F, 0x24, 0x11, 0x7C, 0x4B, 0x1F, 0xE6,
+        0x49, 0x28, 0x66, 0x51, 0xEC, 0xE4, 0x5B, 0x3D,
+        0xC2, 0x00, 0x7C, 0xB8, 0xA1, 0x63, 0xBF, 0x05,
+        0x98, 0xDA, 0x48, 0x36, 0x1C, 0x55, 0xD3, 0x9A,
+        0x69, 0x16, 0x3F, 0xA8, 0xFD, 0x24, 0xCF, 0x5F,
+        0x83, 0x65, 0x5D, 0x23, 0xDC, 0xA3, 0xAD, 0x96,
+        0x1C, 0x62, 0xF3, 0x56, 0x20, 0x85, 0x52, 0xBB,
+        0x9E, 0xD5, 0x29, 0x07, 0x70, 0x96, 0x96, 0x6D,
+        0x67, 0x0C, 0x35, 0x4E, 0x4A, 0xBC, 0x98, 0x04,
+        0xF1, 0x74, 0x6C, 0x08, 0xCA, 0x23, 0x73, 0x27,
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+    };
+    return BN_bin2bn(RFC3526_PRIME_1536, sizeof(RFC3526_PRIME_1536), bn);
+}
+
+/*-
+ * "2048-bit MODP Group" from RFC3526, Section 3.
+ *
+ * The prime is: 2^2048 - 2^1984 - 1 + 2^64 * { [2^1918 pi] + 124476 }
+ *
+ * RFC3526 specifies a generator of 2.
+ */
+
+BIGNUM *BN_get_rfc3526_prime_2048(BIGNUM *bn)
+{
+    static const unsigned char RFC3526_PRIME_2048[] = {
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0xC9, 0x0F, 0xDA, 0xA2, 0x21, 0x68, 0xC2, 0x34,
+        0xC4, 0xC6, 0x62, 0x8B, 0x80, 0xDC, 0x1C, 0xD1,
+        0x29, 0x02, 0x4E, 0x08, 0x8A, 0x67, 0xCC, 0x74,
+        0x02, 0x0B, 0xBE, 0xA6, 0x3B, 0x13, 0x9B, 0x22,
+        0x51, 0x4A, 0x08, 0x79, 0x8E, 0x34, 0x04, 0xDD,
+        0xEF, 0x95, 0x19, 0xB3, 0xCD, 0x3A, 0x43, 0x1B,
+        0x30, 0x2B, 0x0A, 0x6D, 0xF2, 0x5F, 0x14, 0x37,
+        0x4F, 0xE1, 0x35, 0x6D, 0x6D, 0x51, 0xC2, 0x45,
+        0xE4, 0x85, 0xB5, 0x76, 0x62, 0x5E, 0x7E, 0xC6,
+        0xF4, 0x4C, 0x42, 0xE9, 0xA6, 0x37, 0xED, 0x6B,
+        0x0B, 0xFF, 0x5C, 0xB6, 0xF4, 0x06, 0xB7, 0xED,
+        0xEE, 0x38, 0x6B, 0xFB, 0x5A, 0x89, 0x9F, 0xA5,
+        0xAE, 0x9F, 0x24, 0x11, 0x7C, 0x4B, 0x1F, 0xE6,
+        0x49, 0x28, 0x66, 0x51, 0xEC, 0xE4, 0x5B, 0x3D,
+        0xC2, 0x00, 0x7C, 0xB8, 0xA1, 0x63, 0xBF, 0x05,
+        0x98, 0xDA, 0x48, 0x36, 0x1C, 0x55, 0xD3, 0x9A,
+        0x69, 0x16, 0x3F, 0xA8, 0xFD, 0x24, 0xCF, 0x5F,
+        0x83, 0x65, 0x5D, 0x23, 0xDC, 0xA3, 0xAD, 0x96,
+        0x1C, 0x62, 0xF3, 0x56, 0x20, 0x85, 0x52, 0xBB,
+        0x9E, 0xD5, 0x29, 0x07, 0x70, 0x96, 0x96, 0x6D,
+        0x67, 0x0C, 0x35, 0x4E, 0x4A, 0xBC, 0x98, 0x04,
+        0xF1, 0x74, 0x6C, 0x08, 0xCA, 0x18, 0x21, 0x7C,
+        0x32, 0x90, 0x5E, 0x46, 0x2E, 0x36, 0xCE, 0x3B,
+        0xE3, 0x9E, 0x77, 0x2C, 0x18, 0x0E, 0x86, 0x03,
+        0x9B, 0x27, 0x83, 0xA2, 0xEC, 0x07, 0xA2, 0x8F,
+        0xB5, 0xC5, 0x5D, 0xF0, 0x6F, 0x4C, 0x52, 0xC9,
+        0xDE, 0x2B, 0xCB, 0xF6, 0x95, 0x58, 0x17, 0x18,
+        0x39, 0x95, 0x49, 0x7C, 0xEA, 0x95, 0x6A, 0xE5,
+        0x15, 0xD2, 0x26, 0x18, 0x98, 0xFA, 0x05, 0x10,
+        0x15, 0x72, 0x8E, 0x5A, 0x8A, 0xAC, 0xAA, 0x68,
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+    };
+    return BN_bin2bn(RFC3526_PRIME_2048, sizeof(RFC3526_PRIME_2048), bn);
+}
+
+/*-
+ * "3072-bit MODP Group" from RFC3526, Section 4.
+ *
+ * The prime is: 2^3072 - 2^3008 - 1 + 2^64 * { [2^2942 pi] + 1690314 }
+ *
+ * RFC3526 specifies a generator of 2.
+ */
+
+BIGNUM *BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(BIGNUM *bn)
+{
+    static const unsigned char RFC3526_PRIME_3072[] = {
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0xC9, 0x0F, 0xDA, 0xA2, 0x21, 0x68, 0xC2, 0x34,
+        0xC4, 0xC6, 0x62, 0x8B, 0x80, 0xDC, 0x1C, 0xD1,
+        0x29, 0x02, 0x4E, 0x08, 0x8A, 0x67, 0xCC, 0x74,
+        0x02, 0x0B, 0xBE, 0xA6, 0x3B, 0x13, 0x9B, 0x22,
+        0x51, 0x4A, 0x08, 0x79, 0x8E, 0x34, 0x04, 0xDD,
+        0xEF, 0x95, 0x19, 0xB3, 0xCD, 0x3A, 0x43, 0x1B,
+        0x30, 0x2B, 0x0A, 0x6D, 0xF2, 0x5F, 0x14, 0x37,
+        0x4F, 0xE1, 0x35, 0x6D, 0x6D, 0x51, 0xC2, 0x45,
+        0xE4, 0x85, 0xB5, 0x76, 0x62, 0x5E, 0x7E, 0xC6,
+        0xF4, 0x4C, 0x42, 0xE9, 0xA6, 0x37, 0xED, 0x6B,
+        0x0B, 0xFF, 0x5C, 0xB6, 0xF4, 0x06, 0xB7, 0xED,
+        0xEE, 0x38, 0x6B, 0xFB, 0x5A, 0x89, 0x9F, 0xA5,
+        0xAE, 0x9F, 0x24, 0x11, 0x7C, 0x4B, 0x1F, 0xE6,
+        0x49, 0x28, 0x66, 0x51, 0xEC, 0xE4, 0x5B, 0x3D,
+        0xC2, 0x00, 0x7C, 0xB8, 0xA1, 0x63, 0xBF, 0x05,
+        0x98, 0xDA, 0x48, 0x36, 0x1C, 0x55, 0xD3, 0x9A,
+        0x69, 0x16, 0x3F, 0xA8, 0xFD, 0x24, 0xCF, 0x5F,
+        0x83, 0x65, 0x5D, 0x23, 0xDC, 0xA3, 0xAD, 0x96,
+        0x1C, 0x62, 0xF3, 0x56, 0x20, 0x85, 0x52, 0xBB,
+        0x9E, 0xD5, 0x29, 0x07, 0x70, 0x96, 0x96, 0x6D,
+        0x67, 0x0C, 0x35, 0x4E, 0x4A, 0xBC, 0x98, 0x04,
+        0xF1, 0x74, 0x6C, 0x08, 0xCA, 0x18, 0x21, 0x7C,
+        0x32, 0x90, 0x5E, 0x46, 0x2E, 0x36, 0xCE, 0x3B,
+        0xE3, 0x9E, 0x77, 0x2C, 0x18, 0x0E, 0x86, 0x03,
+        0x9B, 0x27, 0x83, 0xA2, 0xEC, 0x07, 0xA2, 0x8F,
+        0xB5, 0xC5, 0x5D, 0xF0, 0x6F, 0x4C, 0x52, 0xC9,
+        0xDE, 0x2B, 0xCB, 0xF6, 0x95, 0x58, 0x17, 0x18,
+        0x39, 0x95, 0x49, 0x7C, 0xEA, 0x95, 0x6A, 0xE5,
+        0x15, 0xD2, 0x26, 0x18, 0x98, 0xFA, 0x05, 0x10,
+        0x15, 0x72, 0x8E, 0x5A, 0x8A, 0xAA, 0xC4, 0x2D,
+        0xAD, 0x33, 0x17, 0x0D, 0x04, 0x50, 0x7A, 0x33,
+        0xA8, 0x55, 0x21, 0xAB, 0xDF, 0x1C, 0xBA, 0x64,
+        0xEC, 0xFB, 0x85, 0x04, 0x58, 0xDB, 0xEF, 0x0A,
+        0x8A, 0xEA, 0x71, 0x57, 0x5D, 0x06, 0x0C, 0x7D,
+        0xB3, 0x97, 0x0F, 0x85, 0xA6, 0xE1, 0xE4, 0xC7,
+        0xAB, 0xF5, 0xAE, 0x8C, 0xDB, 0x09, 0x33, 0xD7,
+        0x1E, 0x8C, 0x94, 0xE0, 0x4A, 0x25, 0x61, 0x9D,
+        0xCE, 0xE3, 0xD2, 0x26, 0x1A, 0xD2, 0xEE, 0x6B,
+        0xF1, 0x2F, 0xFA, 0x06, 0xD9, 0x8A, 0x08, 0x64,
+        0xD8, 0x76, 0x02, 0x73, 0x3E, 0xC8, 0x6A, 0x64,
+        0x52, 0x1F, 0x2B, 0x18, 0x17, 0x7B, 0x20, 0x0C,
+        0xBB, 0xE1, 0x17, 0x57, 0x7A, 0x61, 0x5D, 0x6C,
+        0x77, 0x09, 0x88, 0xC0, 0xBA, 0xD9, 0x46, 0xE2,
+        0x08, 0xE2, 0x4F, 0xA0, 0x74, 0xE5, 0xAB, 0x31,
+        0x43, 0xDB, 0x5B, 0xFC, 0xE0, 0xFD, 0x10, 0x8E,
+        0x4B, 0x82, 0xD1, 0x20, 0xA9, 0x3A, 0xD2, 0xCA,
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+    };
+    return BN_bin2bn(RFC3526_PRIME_3072, sizeof(RFC3526_PRIME_3072), bn);
+}
+
+/*-
+ * "4096-bit MODP Group" from RFC3526, Section 5.
+ *
+ * The prime is: 2^4096 - 2^4032 - 1 + 2^64 * { [2^3966 pi] + 240904 }
+ *
+ * RFC3526 specifies a generator of 2.
+ */
+
+BIGNUM *BN_get_rfc3526_prime_4096(BIGNUM *bn)
+{
+    static const unsigned char RFC3526_PRIME_4096[] = {
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0xC9, 0x0F, 0xDA, 0xA2, 0x21, 0x68, 0xC2, 0x34,
+        0xC4, 0xC6, 0x62, 0x8B, 0x80, 0xDC, 0x1C, 0xD1,
+        0x29, 0x02, 0x4E, 0x08, 0x8A, 0x67, 0xCC, 0x74,
+        0x02, 0x0B, 0xBE, 0xA6, 0x3B, 0x13, 0x9B, 0x22,
+        0x51, 0x4A, 0x08, 0x79, 0x8E, 0x34, 0x04, 0xDD,
+        0xEF, 0x95, 0x19, 0xB3, 0xCD, 0x3A, 0x43, 0x1B,
+        0x30, 0x2B, 0x0A, 0x6D, 0xF2, 0x5F, 0x14, 0x37,
+        0x4F, 0xE1, 0x35, 0x6D, 0x6D, 0x51, 0xC2, 0x45,
+        0xE4, 0x85, 0xB5, 0x76, 0x62, 0x5E, 0x7E, 0xC6,
+        0xF4, 0x4C, 0x42, 0xE9, 0xA6, 0x37, 0xED, 0x6B,
+        0x0B, 0xFF, 0x5C, 0xB6, 0xF4, 0x06, 0xB7, 0xED,
+        0xEE, 0x38, 0x6B, 0xFB, 0x5A, 0x89, 0x9F, 0xA5,
+        0xAE, 0x9F, 0x24, 0x11, 0x7C, 0x4B, 0x1F, 0xE6,
+        0x49, 0x28, 0x66, 0x51, 0xEC, 0xE4, 0x5B, 0x3D,
+        0xC2, 0x00, 0x7C, 0xB8, 0xA1, 0x63, 0xBF, 0x05,
+        0x98, 0xDA, 0x48, 0x36, 0x1C, 0x55, 0xD3, 0x9A,
+        0x69, 0x16, 0x3F, 0xA8, 0xFD, 0x24, 0xCF, 0x5F,
+        0x83, 0x65, 0x5D, 0x23, 0xDC, 0xA3, 0xAD, 0x96,
+        0x1C, 0x62, 0xF3, 0x56, 0x20, 0x85, 0x52, 0xBB,
+        0x9E, 0xD5, 0x29, 0x07, 0x70, 0x96, 0x96, 0x6D,
+        0x67, 0x0C, 0x35, 0x4E, 0x4A, 0xBC, 0x98, 0x04,
+        0xF1, 0x74, 0x6C, 0x08, 0xCA, 0x18, 0x21, 0x7C,
+        0x32, 0x90, 0x5E, 0x46, 0x2E, 0x36, 0xCE, 0x3B,
+        0xE3, 0x9E, 0x77, 0x2C, 0x18, 0x0E, 0x86, 0x03,
+        0x9B, 0x27, 0x83, 0xA2, 0xEC, 0x07, 0xA2, 0x8F,
+        0xB5, 0xC5, 0x5D, 0xF0, 0x6F, 0x4C, 0x52, 0xC9,
+        0xDE, 0x2B, 0xCB, 0xF6, 0x95, 0x58, 0x17, 0x18,
+        0x39, 0x95, 0x49, 0x7C, 0xEA, 0x95, 0x6A, 0xE5,
+        0x15, 0xD2, 0x26, 0x18, 0x98, 0xFA, 0x05, 0x10,
+        0x15, 0x72, 0x8E, 0x5A, 0x8A, 0xAA, 0xC4, 0x2D,
+        0xAD, 0x33, 0x17, 0x0D, 0x04, 0x50, 0x7A, 0x33,
+        0xA8, 0x55, 0x21, 0xAB, 0xDF, 0x1C, 0xBA, 0x64,
+        0xEC, 0xFB, 0x85, 0x04, 0x58, 0xDB, 0xEF, 0x0A,
+        0x8A, 0xEA, 0x71, 0x57, 0x5D, 0x06, 0x0C, 0x7D,
+        0xB3, 0x97, 0x0F, 0x85, 0xA6, 0xE1, 0xE4, 0xC7,
+        0xAB, 0xF5, 0xAE, 0x8C, 0xDB, 0x09, 0x33, 0xD7,
+        0x1E, 0x8C, 0x94, 0xE0, 0x4A, 0x25, 0x61, 0x9D,
+        0xCE, 0xE3, 0xD2, 0x26, 0x1A, 0xD2, 0xEE, 0x6B,
+        0xF1, 0x2F, 0xFA, 0x06, 0xD9, 0x8A, 0x08, 0x64,
+        0xD8, 0x76, 0x02, 0x73, 0x3E, 0xC8, 0x6A, 0x64,
+        0x52, 0x1F, 0x2B, 0x18, 0x17, 0x7B, 0x20, 0x0C,
+        0xBB, 0xE1, 0x17, 0x57, 0x7A, 0x61, 0x5D, 0x6C,
+        0x77, 0x09, 0x88, 0xC0, 0xBA, 0xD9, 0x46, 0xE2,
+        0x08, 0xE2, 0x4F, 0xA0, 0x74, 0xE5, 0xAB, 0x31,
+        0x43, 0xDB, 0x5B, 0xFC, 0xE0, 0xFD, 0x10, 0x8E,
+        0x4B, 0x82, 0xD1, 0x20, 0xA9, 0x21, 0x08, 0x01,
+        0x1A, 0x72, 0x3C, 0x12, 0xA7, 0x87, 0xE6, 0xD7,
+        0x88, 0x71, 0x9A, 0x10, 0xBD, 0xBA, 0x5B, 0x26,
+        0x99, 0xC3, 0x27, 0x18, 0x6A, 0xF4, 0xE2, 0x3C,
+        0x1A, 0x94, 0x68, 0x34, 0xB6, 0x15, 0x0B, 0xDA,
+        0x25, 0x83, 0xE9, 0xCA, 0x2A, 0xD4, 0x4C, 0xE8,
+        0xDB, 0xBB, 0xC2, 0xDB, 0x04, 0xDE, 0x8E, 0xF9,
+        0x2E, 0x8E, 0xFC, 0x14, 0x1F, 0xBE, 0xCA, 0xA6,
+        0x28, 0x7C, 0x59, 0x47, 0x4E, 0x6B, 0xC0, 0x5D,
+        0x99, 0xB2, 0x96, 0x4F, 0xA0, 0x90, 0xC3, 0xA2,
+        0x23, 0x3B, 0xA1, 0x86, 0x51, 0x5B, 0xE7, 0xED,
+        0x1F, 0x61, 0x29, 0x70, 0xCE, 0xE2, 0xD7, 0xAF,
+        0xB8, 0x1B, 0xDD, 0x76, 0x21, 0x70, 0x48, 0x1C,
+        0xD0, 0x06, 0x91, 0x27, 0xD5, 0xB0, 0x5A, 0xA9,
+        0x93, 0xB4, 0xEA, 0x98, 0x8D, 0x8F, 0xDD, 0xC1,
+        0x86, 0xFF, 0xB7, 0xDC, 0x90, 0xA6, 0xC0, 0x8F,
+        0x4D, 0xF4, 0x35, 0xC9, 0x34, 0x06, 0x31, 0x99,
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+    };
+    return BN_bin2bn(RFC3526_PRIME_4096, sizeof(RFC3526_PRIME_4096), bn);
+}
+
+/*-
+ * "6144-bit MODP Group" from RFC3526, Section 6.
+ *
+ * The prime is: 2^6144 - 2^6080 - 1 + 2^64 * { [2^6014 pi] + 929484 }
+ *
+ * RFC3526 specifies a generator of 2.
+ */
+
+BIGNUM *BN_get_rfc3526_prime_6144(BIGNUM *bn)
+{
+    static const unsigned char RFC3526_PRIME_6144[] = {
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0xC9, 0x0F, 0xDA, 0xA2, 0x21, 0x68, 0xC2, 0x34,
+        0xC4, 0xC6, 0x62, 0x8B, 0x80, 0xDC, 0x1C, 0xD1,
+        0x29, 0x02, 0x4E, 0x08, 0x8A, 0x67, 0xCC, 0x74,
+        0x02, 0x0B, 0xBE, 0xA6, 0x3B, 0x13, 0x9B, 0x22,
+        0x51, 0x4A, 0x08, 0x79, 0x8E, 0x34, 0x04, 0xDD,
+        0xEF, 0x95, 0x19, 0xB3, 0xCD, 0x3A, 0x43, 0x1B,
+        0x30, 0x2B, 0x0A, 0x6D, 0xF2, 0x5F, 0x14, 0x37,
+        0x4F, 0xE1, 0x35, 0x6D, 0x6D, 0x51, 0xC2, 0x45,
+        0xE4, 0x85, 0xB5, 0x76, 0x62, 0x5E, 0x7E, 0xC6,
+        0xF4, 0x4C, 0x42, 0xE9, 0xA6, 0x37, 0xED, 0x6B,
+        0x0B, 0xFF, 0x5C, 0xB6, 0xF4, 0x06, 0xB7, 0xED,
+        0xEE, 0x38, 0x6B, 0xFB, 0x5A, 0x89, 0x9F, 0xA5,
+        0xAE, 0x9F, 0x24, 0x11, 0x7C, 0x4B, 0x1F, 0xE6,
+        0x49, 0x28, 0x66, 0x51, 0xEC, 0xE4, 0x5B, 0x3D,
+        0xC2, 0x00, 0x7C, 0xB8, 0xA1, 0x63, 0xBF, 0x05,
+        0x98, 0xDA, 0x48, 0x36, 0x1C, 0x55, 0xD3, 0x9A,
+        0x69, 0x16, 0x3F, 0xA8, 0xFD, 0x24, 0xCF, 0x5F,
+        0x83, 0x65, 0x5D, 0x23, 0xDC, 0xA3, 0xAD, 0x96,
+        0x1C, 0x62, 0xF3, 0x56, 0x20, 0x85, 0x52, 0xBB,
+        0x9E, 0xD5, 0x29, 0x07, 0x70, 0x96, 0x96, 0x6D,
+        0x67, 0x0C, 0x35, 0x4E, 0x4A, 0xBC, 0x98, 0x04,
+        0xF1, 0x74, 0x6C, 0x08, 0xCA, 0x18, 0x21, 0x7C,
+        0x32, 0x90, 0x5E, 0x46, 0x2E, 0x36, 0xCE, 0x3B,
+        0xE3, 0x9E, 0x77, 0x2C, 0x18, 0x0E, 0x86, 0x03,
+        0x9B, 0x27, 0x83, 0xA2, 0xEC, 0x07, 0xA2, 0x8F,
+        0xB5, 0xC5, 0x5D, 0xF0, 0x6F, 0x4C, 0x52, 0xC9,
+        0xDE, 0x2B, 0xCB, 0xF6, 0x95, 0x58, 0x17, 0x18,
+        0x39, 0x95, 0x49, 0x7C, 0xEA, 0x95, 0x6A, 0xE5,
+        0x15, 0xD2, 0x26, 0x18, 0x98, 0xFA, 0x05, 0x10,
+        0x15, 0x72, 0x8E, 0x5A, 0x8A, 0xAA, 0xC4, 0x2D,
+        0xAD, 0x33, 0x17, 0x0D, 0x04, 0x50, 0x7A, 0x33,
+        0xA8, 0x55, 0x21, 0xAB, 0xDF, 0x1C, 0xBA, 0x64,
+        0xEC, 0xFB, 0x85, 0x04, 0x58, 0xDB, 0xEF, 0x0A,
+        0x8A, 0xEA, 0x71, 0x57, 0x5D, 0x06, 0x0C, 0x7D,
+        0xB3, 0x97, 0x0F, 0x85, 0xA6, 0xE1, 0xE4, 0xC7,
+        0xAB, 0xF5, 0xAE, 0x8C, 0xDB, 0x09, 0x33, 0xD7,
+        0x1E, 0x8C, 0x94, 0xE0, 0x4A, 0x25, 0x61, 0x9D,
+        0xCE, 0xE3, 0xD2, 0x26, 0x1A, 0xD2, 0xEE, 0x6B,
+        0xF1, 0x2F, 0xFA, 0x06, 0xD9, 0x8A, 0x08, 0x64,
+        0xD8, 0x76, 0x02, 0x73, 0x3E, 0xC8, 0x6A, 0x64,
+        0x52, 0x1F, 0x2B, 0x18, 0x17, 0x7B, 0x20, 0x0C,
+        0xBB, 0xE1, 0x17, 0x57, 0x7A, 0x61, 0x5D, 0x6C,
+        0x77, 0x09, 0x88, 0xC0, 0xBA, 0xD9, 0x46, 0xE2,
+        0x08, 0xE2, 0x4F, 0xA0, 0x74, 0xE5, 0xAB, 0x31,
+        0x43, 0xDB, 0x5B, 0xFC, 0xE0, 0xFD, 0x10, 0x8E,
+        0x4B, 0x82, 0xD1, 0x20, 0xA9, 0x21, 0x08, 0x01,
+        0x1A, 0x72, 0x3C, 0x12, 0xA7, 0x87, 0xE6, 0xD7,
+        0x88, 0x71, 0x9A, 0x10, 0xBD, 0xBA, 0x5B, 0x26,
+        0x99, 0xC3, 0x27, 0x18, 0x6A, 0xF4, 0xE2, 0x3C,
+        0x1A, 0x94, 0x68, 0x34, 0xB6, 0x15, 0x0B, 0xDA,
+        0x25, 0x83, 0xE9, 0xCA, 0x2A, 0xD4, 0x4C, 0xE8,
+        0xDB, 0xBB, 0xC2, 0xDB, 0x04, 0xDE, 0x8E, 0xF9,
+        0x2E, 0x8E, 0xFC, 0x14, 0x1F, 0xBE, 0xCA, 0xA6,
+        0x28, 0x7C, 0x59, 0x47, 0x4E, 0x6B, 0xC0, 0x5D,
+        0x99, 0xB2, 0x96, 0x4F, 0xA0, 0x90, 0xC3, 0xA2,
+        0x23, 0x3B, 0xA1, 0x86, 0x51, 0x5B, 0xE7, 0xED,
+        0x1F, 0x61, 0x29, 0x70, 0xCE, 0xE2, 0xD7, 0xAF,
+        0xB8, 0x1B, 0xDD, 0x76, 0x21, 0x70, 0x48, 0x1C,
+        0xD0, 0x06, 0x91, 0x27, 0xD5, 0xB0, 0x5A, 0xA9,
+        0x93, 0xB4, 0xEA, 0x98, 0x8D, 0x8F, 0xDD, 0xC1,
+        0x86, 0xFF, 0xB7, 0xDC, 0x90, 0xA6, 0xC0, 0x8F,
+        0x4D, 0xF4, 0x35, 0xC9, 0x34, 0x02, 0x84, 0x92,
+        0x36, 0xC3, 0xFA, 0xB4, 0xD2, 0x7C, 0x70, 0x26,
+        0xC1, 0xD4, 0xDC, 0xB2, 0x60, 0x26, 0x46, 0xDE,
+        0xC9, 0x75, 0x1E, 0x76, 0x3D, 0xBA, 0x37, 0xBD,
+        0xF8, 0xFF, 0x94, 0x06, 0xAD, 0x9E, 0x53, 0x0E,
+        0xE5, 0xDB, 0x38, 0x2F, 0x41, 0x30, 0x01, 0xAE,
+        0xB0, 0x6A, 0x53, 0xED, 0x90, 0x27, 0xD8, 0x31,
+        0x17, 0x97, 0x27, 0xB0, 0x86, 0x5A, 0x89, 0x18,
+        0xDA, 0x3E, 0xDB, 0xEB, 0xCF, 0x9B, 0x14, 0xED,
+        0x44, 0xCE, 0x6C, 0xBA, 0xCE, 0xD4, 0xBB, 0x1B,
+        0xDB, 0x7F, 0x14, 0x47, 0xE6, 0xCC, 0x25, 0x4B,
+        0x33, 0x20, 0x51, 0x51, 0x2B, 0xD7, 0xAF, 0x42,
+        0x6F, 0xB8, 0xF4, 0x01, 0x37, 0x8C, 0xD2, 0xBF,
+        0x59, 0x83, 0xCA, 0x01, 0xC6, 0x4B, 0x92, 0xEC,
+        0xF0, 0x32, 0xEA, 0x15, 0xD1, 0x72, 0x1D, 0x03,
+        0xF4, 0x82, 0xD7, 0xCE, 0x6E, 0x74, 0xFE, 0xF6,
+        0xD5, 0x5E, 0x70, 0x2F, 0x46, 0x98, 0x0C, 0x82,
+        0xB5, 0xA8, 0x40, 0x31, 0x90, 0x0B, 0x1C, 0x9E,
+        0x59, 0xE7, 0xC9, 0x7F, 0xBE, 0xC7, 0xE8, 0xF3,
+        0x23, 0xA9, 0x7A, 0x7E, 0x36, 0xCC, 0x88, 0xBE,
+        0x0F, 0x1D, 0x45, 0xB7, 0xFF, 0x58, 0x5A, 0xC5,
+        0x4B, 0xD4, 0x07, 0xB2, 0x2B, 0x41, 0x54, 0xAA,
+        0xCC, 0x8F, 0x6D, 0x7E, 0xBF, 0x48, 0xE1, 0xD8,
+        0x14, 0xCC, 0x5E, 0xD2, 0x0F, 0x80, 0x37, 0xE0,
+        0xA7, 0x97, 0x15, 0xEE, 0xF2, 0x9B, 0xE3, 0x28,
+        0x06, 0xA1, 0xD5, 0x8B, 0xB7, 0xC5, 0xDA, 0x76,
+        0xF5, 0x50, 0xAA, 0x3D, 0x8A, 0x1F, 0xBF, 0xF0,
+        0xEB, 0x19, 0xCC, 0xB1, 0xA3, 0x13, 0xD5, 0x5C,
+        0xDA, 0x56, 0xC9, 0xEC, 0x2E, 0xF2, 0x96, 0x32,
+        0x38, 0x7F, 0xE8, 0xD7, 0x6E, 0x3C, 0x04, 0x68,
+        0x04, 0x3E, 0x8F, 0x66, 0x3F, 0x48, 0x60, 0xEE,
+        0x12, 0xBF, 0x2D, 0x5B, 0x0B, 0x74, 0x74, 0xD6,
+        0xE6, 0x94, 0xF9, 0x1E, 0x6D, 0xCC, 0x40, 0x24,
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+    };
+    return BN_bin2bn(RFC3526_PRIME_6144, sizeof(RFC3526_PRIME_6144), bn);
+}
+
+/*-
+ * "8192-bit MODP Group" from RFC3526, Section 7.
+ *
+ * The prime is: 2^8192 - 2^8128 - 1 + 2^64 * { [2^8062 pi] + 4743158 }
+ *
+ * RFC3526 specifies a generator of 2.
+ */
+
+BIGNUM *BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(BIGNUM *bn)
+{
+    static const unsigned char RFC3526_PRIME_8192[] = {
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0xC9, 0x0F, 0xDA, 0xA2, 0x21, 0x68, 0xC2, 0x34,
+        0xC4, 0xC6, 0x62, 0x8B, 0x80, 0xDC, 0x1C, 0xD1,
+        0x29, 0x02, 0x4E, 0x08, 0x8A, 0x67, 0xCC, 0x74,
+        0x02, 0x0B, 0xBE, 0xA6, 0x3B, 0x13, 0x9B, 0x22,
+        0x51, 0x4A, 0x08, 0x79, 0x8E, 0x34, 0x04, 0xDD,
+        0xEF, 0x95, 0x19, 0xB3, 0xCD, 0x3A, 0x43, 0x1B,
+        0x30, 0x2B, 0x0A, 0x6D, 0xF2, 0x5F, 0x14, 0x37,
+        0x4F, 0xE1, 0x35, 0x6D, 0x6D, 0x51, 0xC2, 0x45,
+        0xE4, 0x85, 0xB5, 0x76, 0x62, 0x5E, 0x7E, 0xC6,
+        0xF4, 0x4C, 0x42, 0xE9, 0xA6, 0x37, 0xED, 0x6B,
+        0x0B, 0xFF, 0x5C, 0xB6, 0xF4, 0x06, 0xB7, 0xED,
+        0xEE, 0x38, 0x6B, 0xFB, 0x5A, 0x89, 0x9F, 0xA5,
+        0xAE, 0x9F, 0x24, 0x11, 0x7C, 0x4B, 0x1F, 0xE6,
+        0x49, 0x28, 0x66, 0x51, 0xEC, 0xE4, 0x5B, 0x3D,
+        0xC2, 0x00, 0x7C, 0xB8, 0xA1, 0x63, 0xBF, 0x05,
+        0x98, 0xDA, 0x48, 0x36, 0x1C, 0x55, 0xD3, 0x9A,
+        0x69, 0x16, 0x3F, 0xA8, 0xFD, 0x24, 0xCF, 0x5F,
+        0x83, 0x65, 0x5D, 0x23, 0xDC, 0xA3, 0xAD, 0x96,
+        0x1C, 0x62, 0xF3, 0x56, 0x20, 0x85, 0x52, 0xBB,
+        0x9E, 0xD5, 0x29, 0x07, 0x70, 0x96, 0x96, 0x6D,
+        0x67, 0x0C, 0x35, 0x4E, 0x4A, 0xBC, 0x98, 0x04,
+        0xF1, 0x74, 0x6C, 0x08, 0xCA, 0x18, 0x21, 0x7C,
+        0x32, 0x90, 0x5E, 0x46, 0x2E, 0x36, 0xCE, 0x3B,
+        0xE3, 0x9E, 0x77, 0x2C, 0x18, 0x0E, 0x86, 0x03,
+        0x9B, 0x27, 0x83, 0xA2, 0xEC, 0x07, 0xA2, 0x8F,
+        0xB5, 0xC5, 0x5D, 0xF0, 0x6F, 0x4C, 0x52, 0xC9,
+        0xDE, 0x2B, 0xCB, 0xF6, 0x95, 0x58, 0x17, 0x18,
+        0x39, 0x95, 0x49, 0x7C, 0xEA, 0x95, 0x6A, 0xE5,
+        0x15, 0xD2, 0x26, 0x18, 0x98, 0xFA, 0x05, 0x10,
+        0x15, 0x72, 0x8E, 0x5A, 0x8A, 0xAA, 0xC4, 0x2D,
+        0xAD, 0x33, 0x17, 0x0D, 0x04, 0x50, 0x7A, 0x33,
+        0xA8, 0x55, 0x21, 0xAB, 0xDF, 0x1C, 0xBA, 0x64,
+        0xEC, 0xFB, 0x85, 0x04, 0x58, 0xDB, 0xEF, 0x0A,
+        0x8A, 0xEA, 0x71, 0x57, 0x5D, 0x06, 0x0C, 0x7D,
+        0xB3, 0x97, 0x0F, 0x85, 0xA6, 0xE1, 0xE4, 0xC7,
+        0xAB, 0xF5, 0xAE, 0x8C, 0xDB, 0x09, 0x33, 0xD7,
+        0x1E, 0x8C, 0x94, 0xE0, 0x4A, 0x25, 0x61, 0x9D,
+        0xCE, 0xE3, 0xD2, 0x26, 0x1A, 0xD2, 0xEE, 0x6B,
+        0xF1, 0x2F, 0xFA, 0x06, 0xD9, 0x8A, 0x08, 0x64,
+        0xD8, 0x76, 0x02, 0x73, 0x3E, 0xC8, 0x6A, 0x64,
+        0x52, 0x1F, 0x2B, 0x18, 0x17, 0x7B, 0x20, 0x0C,
+        0xBB, 0xE1, 0x17, 0x57, 0x7A, 0x61, 0x5D, 0x6C,
+        0x77, 0x09, 0x88, 0xC0, 0xBA, 0xD9, 0x46, 0xE2,
+        0x08, 0xE2, 0x4F, 0xA0, 0x74, 0xE5, 0xAB, 0x31,
+        0x43, 0xDB, 0x5B, 0xFC, 0xE0, 0xFD, 0x10, 0x8E,
+        0x4B, 0x82, 0xD1, 0x20, 0xA9, 0x21, 0x08, 0x01,
+        0x1A, 0x72, 0x3C, 0x12, 0xA7, 0x87, 0xE6, 0xD7,
+        0x88, 0x71, 0x9A, 0x10, 0xBD, 0xBA, 0x5B, 0x26,
+        0x99, 0xC3, 0x27, 0x18, 0x6A, 0xF4, 0xE2, 0x3C,
+        0x1A, 0x94, 0x68, 0x34, 0xB6, 0x15, 0x0B, 0xDA,
+        0x25, 0x83, 0xE9, 0xCA, 0x2A, 0xD4, 0x4C, 0xE8,
+        0xDB, 0xBB, 0xC2, 0xDB, 0x04, 0xDE, 0x8E, 0xF9,
+        0x2E, 0x8E, 0xFC, 0x14, 0x1F, 0xBE, 0xCA, 0xA6,
+        0x28, 0x7C, 0x59, 0x47, 0x4E, 0x6B, 0xC0, 0x5D,
+        0x99, 0xB2, 0x96, 0x4F, 0xA0, 0x90, 0xC3, 0xA2,
+        0x23, 0x3B, 0xA1, 0x86, 0x51, 0x5B, 0xE7, 0xED,
+        0x1F, 0x61, 0x29, 0x70, 0xCE, 0xE2, 0xD7, 0xAF,
+        0xB8, 0x1B, 0xDD, 0x76, 0x21, 0x70, 0x48, 0x1C,
+        0xD0, 0x06, 0x91, 0x27, 0xD5, 0xB0, 0x5A, 0xA9,
+        0x93, 0xB4, 0xEA, 0x98, 0x8D, 0x8F, 0xDD, 0xC1,
+        0x86, 0xFF, 0xB7, 0xDC, 0x90, 0xA6, 0xC0, 0x8F,
+        0x4D, 0xF4, 0x35, 0xC9, 0x34, 0x02, 0x84, 0x92,
+        0x36, 0xC3, 0xFA, 0xB4, 0xD2, 0x7C, 0x70, 0x26,
+        0xC1, 0xD4, 0xDC, 0xB2, 0x60, 0x26, 0x46, 0xDE,
+        0xC9, 0x75, 0x1E, 0x76, 0x3D, 0xBA, 0x37, 0xBD,
+        0xF8, 0xFF, 0x94, 0x06, 0xAD, 0x9E, 0x53, 0x0E,
+        0xE5, 0xDB, 0x38, 0x2F, 0x41, 0x30, 0x01, 0xAE,
+        0xB0, 0x6A, 0x53, 0xED, 0x90, 0x27, 0xD8, 0x31,
+        0x17, 0x97, 0x27, 0xB0, 0x86, 0x5A, 0x89, 0x18,
+        0xDA, 0x3E, 0xDB, 0xEB, 0xCF, 0x9B, 0x14, 0xED,
+        0x44, 0xCE, 0x6C, 0xBA, 0xCE, 0xD4, 0xBB, 0x1B,
+        0xDB, 0x7F, 0x14, 0x47, 0xE6, 0xCC, 0x25, 0x4B,
+        0x33, 0x20, 0x51, 0x51, 0x2B, 0xD7, 0xAF, 0x42,
+        0x6F, 0xB8, 0xF4, 0x01, 0x37, 0x8C, 0xD2, 0xBF,
+        0x59, 0x83, 0xCA, 0x01, 0xC6, 0x4B, 0x92, 0xEC,
+        0xF0, 0x32, 0xEA, 0x15, 0xD1, 0x72, 0x1D, 0x03,
+        0xF4, 0x82, 0xD7, 0xCE, 0x6E, 0x74, 0xFE, 0xF6,
+        0xD5, 0x5E, 0x70, 0x2F, 0x46, 0x98, 0x0C, 0x82,
+        0xB5, 0xA8, 0x40, 0x31, 0x90, 0x0B, 0x1C, 0x9E,
+        0x59, 0xE7, 0xC9, 0x7F, 0xBE, 0xC7, 0xE8, 0xF3,
+        0x23, 0xA9, 0x7A, 0x7E, 0x36, 0xCC, 0x88, 0xBE,
+        0x0F, 0x1D, 0x45, 0xB7, 0xFF, 0x58, 0x5A, 0xC5,
+        0x4B, 0xD4, 0x07, 0xB2, 0x2B, 0x41, 0x54, 0xAA,
+        0xCC, 0x8F, 0x6D, 0x7E, 0xBF, 0x48, 0xE1, 0xD8,
+        0x14, 0xCC, 0x5E, 0xD2, 0x0F, 0x80, 0x37, 0xE0,
+        0xA7, 0x97, 0x15, 0xEE, 0xF2, 0x9B, 0xE3, 0x28,
+        0x06, 0xA1, 0xD5, 0x8B, 0xB7, 0xC5, 0xDA, 0x76,
+        0xF5, 0x50, 0xAA, 0x3D, 0x8A, 0x1F, 0xBF, 0xF0,
+        0xEB, 0x19, 0xCC, 0xB1, 0xA3, 0x13, 0xD5, 0x5C,
+        0xDA, 0x56, 0xC9, 0xEC, 0x2E, 0xF2, 0x96, 0x32,
+        0x38, 0x7F, 0xE8, 0xD7, 0x6E, 0x3C, 0x04, 0x68,
+        0x04, 0x3E, 0x8F, 0x66, 0x3F, 0x48, 0x60, 0xEE,
+        0x12, 0xBF, 0x2D, 0x5B, 0x0B, 0x74, 0x74, 0xD6,
+        0xE6, 0x94, 0xF9, 0x1E, 0x6D, 0xBE, 0x11, 0x59,
+        0x74, 0xA3, 0x92, 0x6F, 0x12, 0xFE, 0xE5, 0xE4,
+        0x38, 0x77, 0x7C, 0xB6, 0xA9, 0x32, 0xDF, 0x8C,
+        0xD8, 0xBE, 0xC4, 0xD0, 0x73, 0xB9, 0x31, 0xBA,
+        0x3B, 0xC8, 0x32, 0xB6, 0x8D, 0x9D, 0xD3, 0x00,
+        0x74, 0x1F, 0xA7, 0xBF, 0x8A, 0xFC, 0x47, 0xED,
+        0x25, 0x76, 0xF6, 0x93, 0x6B, 0xA4, 0x24, 0x66,
+        0x3A, 0xAB, 0x63, 0x9C, 0x5A, 0xE4, 0xF5, 0x68,
+        0x34, 0x23, 0xB4, 0x74, 0x2B, 0xF1, 0xC9, 0x78,
+        0x23, 0x8F, 0x16, 0xCB, 0xE3, 0x9D, 0x65, 0x2D,
+        0xE3, 0xFD, 0xB8, 0xBE, 0xFC, 0x84, 0x8A, 0xD9,
+        0x22, 0x22, 0x2E, 0x04, 0xA4, 0x03, 0x7C, 0x07,
+        0x13, 0xEB, 0x57, 0xA8, 0x1A, 0x23, 0xF0, 0xC7,
+        0x34, 0x73, 0xFC, 0x64, 0x6C, 0xEA, 0x30, 0x6B,
+        0x4B, 0xCB, 0xC8, 0x86, 0x2F, 0x83, 0x85, 0xDD,
+        0xFA, 0x9D, 0x4B, 0x7F, 0xA2, 0xC0, 0x87, 0xE8,
+        0x79, 0x68, 0x33, 0x03, 0xED, 0x5B, 0xDD, 0x3A,
+        0x06, 0x2B, 0x3C, 0xF5, 0xB3, 0xA2, 0x78, 0xA6,
+        0x6D, 0x2A, 0x13, 0xF8, 0x3F, 0x44, 0xF8, 0x2D,
+        0xDF, 0x31, 0x0E, 0xE0, 0x74, 0xAB, 0x6A, 0x36,
+        0x45, 0x97, 0xE8, 0x99, 0xA0, 0x25, 0x5D, 0xC1,
+        0x64, 0xF3, 0x1C, 0xC5, 0x08, 0x46, 0x85, 0x1D,
+        0xF9, 0xAB, 0x48, 0x19, 0x5D, 0xED, 0x7E, 0xA1,
+        0xB1, 0xD5, 0x10, 0xBD, 0x7E, 0xE7, 0x4D, 0x73,
+        0xFA, 0xF3, 0x6B, 0xC3, 0x1E, 0xCF, 0xA2, 0x68,
+        0x35, 0x90, 0x46, 0xF4, 0xEB, 0x87, 0x9F, 0x92,
+        0x40, 0x09, 0x43, 0x8B, 0x48, 0x1C, 0x6C, 0xD7,
+        0x88, 0x9A, 0x00, 0x2E, 0xD5, 0xEE, 0x38, 0x2B,
+        0xC9, 0x19, 0x0D, 0xA6, 0xFC, 0x02, 0x6E, 0x47,
+        0x95, 0x58, 0xE4, 0x47, 0x56, 0x77, 0xE9, 0xAA,
+        0x9E, 0x30, 0x50, 0xE2, 0x76, 0x56, 0x94, 0xDF,
+        0xC8, 0x1F, 0x56, 0xE8, 0x80, 0xB9, 0x6E, 0x71,
+        0x60, 0xC9, 0x80, 0xDD, 0x98, 0xED, 0xD3, 0xDF,
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+    };
+    return BN_bin2bn(RFC3526_PRIME_8192, sizeof(RFC3526_PRIME_8192), bn);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_ctx.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_ctx.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..68c0468
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_ctx.c
@@ -0,0 +1,353 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "bn_lcl.h"
+
+/*-
+ * TODO list
+ *
+ * 1. Check a bunch of "(words+1)" type hacks in various bignum functions and
+ * check they can be safely removed.
+ *  - Check +1 and other ugliness in BN_from_montgomery()
+ *
+ * 2. Consider allowing a BN_new_ex() that, at least, lets you specify an
+ * appropriate 'block' size that will be honoured by bn_expand_internal() to
+ * prevent piddly little reallocations. OTOH, profiling bignum expansions in
+ * BN_CTX doesn't show this to be a big issue.
+ */
+
+/* How many bignums are in each "pool item"; */
+#define BN_CTX_POOL_SIZE        16
+/* The stack frame info is resizing, set a first-time expansion size; */
+#define BN_CTX_START_FRAMES     32
+
+/***********/
+/* BN_POOL */
+/***********/
+
+/* A bundle of bignums that can be linked with other bundles */
+typedef struct bignum_pool_item {
+    /* The bignum values */
+    BIGNUM vals[BN_CTX_POOL_SIZE];
+    /* Linked-list admin */
+    struct bignum_pool_item *prev, *next;
+} BN_POOL_ITEM;
+/* A linked-list of bignums grouped in bundles */
+typedef struct bignum_pool {
+    /* Linked-list admin */
+    BN_POOL_ITEM *head, *current, *tail;
+    /* Stack depth and allocation size */
+    unsigned used, size;
+} BN_POOL;
+static void BN_POOL_init(BN_POOL *);
+static void BN_POOL_finish(BN_POOL *);
+static BIGNUM *BN_POOL_get(BN_POOL *, int);
+static void BN_POOL_release(BN_POOL *, unsigned int);
+
+/************/
+/* BN_STACK */
+/************/
+
+/* A wrapper to manage the "stack frames" */
+typedef struct bignum_ctx_stack {
+    /* Array of indexes into the bignum stack */
+    unsigned int *indexes;
+    /* Number of stack frames, and the size of the allocated array */
+    unsigned int depth, size;
+} BN_STACK;
+static void BN_STACK_init(BN_STACK *);
+static void BN_STACK_finish(BN_STACK *);
+static int BN_STACK_push(BN_STACK *, unsigned int);
+static unsigned int BN_STACK_pop(BN_STACK *);
+
+/**********/
+/* BN_CTX */
+/**********/
+
+/* The opaque BN_CTX type */
+struct bignum_ctx {
+    /* The bignum bundles */
+    BN_POOL pool;
+    /* The "stack frames", if you will */
+    BN_STACK stack;
+    /* The number of bignums currently assigned */
+    unsigned int used;
+    /* Depth of stack overflow */
+    int err_stack;
+    /* Block "gets" until an "end" (compatibility behaviour) */
+    int too_many;
+    /* Flags. */
+    int flags;
+};
+
+/* Enable this to find BN_CTX bugs */
+#ifdef BN_CTX_DEBUG
+static const char *ctxdbg_cur = NULL;
+static void ctxdbg(BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    unsigned int bnidx = 0, fpidx = 0;
+    BN_POOL_ITEM *item = ctx->pool.head;
+    BN_STACK *stack = &ctx->stack;
+    fprintf(stderr, "(%16p): ", ctx);
+    while (bnidx < ctx->used) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "%03x ", item->vals[bnidx++ % BN_CTX_POOL_SIZE].dmax);
+        if (!(bnidx % BN_CTX_POOL_SIZE))
+            item = item->next;
+    }
+    fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+    bnidx = 0;
+    fprintf(stderr, "          : ");
+    while (fpidx < stack->depth) {
+        while (bnidx++ < stack->indexes[fpidx])
+            fprintf(stderr, "    ");
+        fprintf(stderr, "^^^ ");
+        bnidx++;
+        fpidx++;
+    }
+    fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+}
+
+# define CTXDBG_ENTRY(str, ctx)  do { \
+                                ctxdbg_cur = (str); \
+                                fprintf(stderr,"Starting %s\n", ctxdbg_cur); \
+                                ctxdbg(ctx); \
+                                } while(0)
+# define CTXDBG_EXIT(ctx)        do { \
+                                fprintf(stderr,"Ending %s\n", ctxdbg_cur); \
+                                ctxdbg(ctx); \
+                                } while(0)
+# define CTXDBG_RET(ctx,ret)
+#else
+# define CTXDBG_ENTRY(str, ctx)
+# define CTXDBG_EXIT(ctx)
+# define CTXDBG_RET(ctx,ret)
+#endif
+
+
+BN_CTX *BN_CTX_new(void)
+{
+    BN_CTX *ret;
+
+    if ((ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret))) == NULL) {
+        BNerr(BN_F_BN_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    /* Initialise the structure */
+    BN_POOL_init(&ret->pool);
+    BN_STACK_init(&ret->stack);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+BN_CTX *BN_CTX_secure_new(void)
+{
+    BN_CTX *ret = BN_CTX_new();
+
+    if (ret != NULL)
+        ret->flags = BN_FLG_SECURE;
+    return ret;
+}
+
+void BN_CTX_free(BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        return;
+#ifdef BN_CTX_DEBUG
+    {
+        BN_POOL_ITEM *pool = ctx->pool.head;
+        fprintf(stderr, "BN_CTX_free, stack-size=%d, pool-bignums=%d\n",
+                ctx->stack.size, ctx->pool.size);
+        fprintf(stderr, "dmaxs: ");
+        while (pool) {
+            unsigned loop = 0;
+            while (loop < BN_CTX_POOL_SIZE)
+                fprintf(stderr, "%02x ", pool->vals[loop++].dmax);
+            pool = pool->next;
+        }
+        fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+    }
+#endif
+    BN_STACK_finish(&ctx->stack);
+    BN_POOL_finish(&ctx->pool);
+    OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+}
+
+void BN_CTX_start(BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    CTXDBG_ENTRY("BN_CTX_start", ctx);
+    /* If we're already overflowing ... */
+    if (ctx->err_stack || ctx->too_many)
+        ctx->err_stack++;
+    /* (Try to) get a new frame pointer */
+    else if (!BN_STACK_push(&ctx->stack, ctx->used)) {
+        BNerr(BN_F_BN_CTX_START, BN_R_TOO_MANY_TEMPORARY_VARIABLES);
+        ctx->err_stack++;
+    }
+    CTXDBG_EXIT(ctx);
+}
+
+void BN_CTX_end(BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    CTXDBG_ENTRY("BN_CTX_end", ctx);
+    if (ctx->err_stack)
+        ctx->err_stack--;
+    else {
+        unsigned int fp = BN_STACK_pop(&ctx->stack);
+        /* Does this stack frame have anything to release? */
+        if (fp < ctx->used)
+            BN_POOL_release(&ctx->pool, ctx->used - fp);
+        ctx->used = fp;
+        /* Unjam "too_many" in case "get" had failed */
+        ctx->too_many = 0;
+    }
+    CTXDBG_EXIT(ctx);
+}
+
+BIGNUM *BN_CTX_get(BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    BIGNUM *ret;
+
+    CTXDBG_ENTRY("BN_CTX_get", ctx);
+    if (ctx->err_stack || ctx->too_many)
+        return NULL;
+    if ((ret = BN_POOL_get(&ctx->pool, ctx->flags)) == NULL) {
+        /*
+         * Setting too_many prevents repeated "get" attempts from cluttering
+         * the error stack.
+         */
+        ctx->too_many = 1;
+        BNerr(BN_F_BN_CTX_GET, BN_R_TOO_MANY_TEMPORARY_VARIABLES);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    /* OK, make sure the returned bignum is "zero" */
+    BN_zero(ret);
+    ctx->used++;
+    CTXDBG_RET(ctx, ret);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/************/
+/* BN_STACK */
+/************/
+
+static void BN_STACK_init(BN_STACK *st)
+{
+    st->indexes = NULL;
+    st->depth = st->size = 0;
+}
+
+static void BN_STACK_finish(BN_STACK *st)
+{
+    OPENSSL_free(st->indexes);
+    st->indexes = NULL;
+}
+
+
+static int BN_STACK_push(BN_STACK *st, unsigned int idx)
+{
+    if (st->depth == st->size) {
+        /* Need to expand */
+        unsigned int newsize =
+            st->size ? (st->size * 3 / 2) : BN_CTX_START_FRAMES;
+        unsigned int *newitems = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*newitems) * newsize);
+        if (newitems == NULL)
+            return 0;
+        if (st->depth)
+            memcpy(newitems, st->indexes, sizeof(*newitems) * st->depth);
+        OPENSSL_free(st->indexes);
+        st->indexes = newitems;
+        st->size = newsize;
+    }
+    st->indexes[(st->depth)++] = idx;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static unsigned int BN_STACK_pop(BN_STACK *st)
+{
+    return st->indexes[--(st->depth)];
+}
+
+/***********/
+/* BN_POOL */
+/***********/
+
+static void BN_POOL_init(BN_POOL *p)
+{
+    p->head = p->current = p->tail = NULL;
+    p->used = p->size = 0;
+}
+
+static void BN_POOL_finish(BN_POOL *p)
+{
+    unsigned int loop;
+    BIGNUM *bn;
+
+    while (p->head) {
+        for (loop = 0, bn = p->head->vals; loop++ < BN_CTX_POOL_SIZE; bn++)
+            if (bn->d)
+                BN_clear_free(bn);
+        p->current = p->head->next;
+        OPENSSL_free(p->head);
+        p->head = p->current;
+    }
+}
+
+
+static BIGNUM *BN_POOL_get(BN_POOL *p, int flag)
+{
+    BIGNUM *bn;
+    unsigned int loop;
+
+    /* Full; allocate a new pool item and link it in. */
+    if (p->used == p->size) {
+        BN_POOL_ITEM *item = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*item));
+        if (item == NULL)
+            return NULL;
+        for (loop = 0, bn = item->vals; loop++ < BN_CTX_POOL_SIZE; bn++) {
+            bn_init(bn);
+            if ((flag & BN_FLG_SECURE) != 0)
+                BN_set_flags(bn, BN_FLG_SECURE);
+        }
+        item->prev = p->tail;
+        item->next = NULL;
+
+        if (p->head == NULL)
+            p->head = p->current = p->tail = item;
+        else {
+            p->tail->next = item;
+            p->tail = item;
+            p->current = item;
+        }
+        p->size += BN_CTX_POOL_SIZE;
+        p->used++;
+        /* Return the first bignum from the new pool */
+        return item->vals;
+    }
+
+    if (!p->used)
+        p->current = p->head;
+    else if ((p->used % BN_CTX_POOL_SIZE) == 0)
+        p->current = p->current->next;
+    return p->current->vals + ((p->used++) % BN_CTX_POOL_SIZE);
+}
+
+static void BN_POOL_release(BN_POOL *p, unsigned int num)
+{
+    unsigned int offset = (p->used - 1) % BN_CTX_POOL_SIZE;
+
+    p->used -= num;
+    while (num--) {
+        bn_check_top(p->current->vals + offset);
+        if (offset == 0) {
+            offset = BN_CTX_POOL_SIZE - 1;
+            p->current = p->current->prev;
+        } else
+            offset--;
+    }
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_depr.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_depr.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7d89214
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_depr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Support for deprecated functions goes here - static linkage will only
+ * slurp this code if applications are using them directly.
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT >= 0x00908000L
+NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT
+#else
+
+# include <stdio.h>
+# include <time.h>
+# include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+# include "bn_lcl.h"
+
+BIGNUM *BN_generate_prime(BIGNUM *ret, int bits, int safe,
+                          const BIGNUM *add, const BIGNUM *rem,
+                          void (*callback) (int, int, void *), void *cb_arg)
+{
+    BN_GENCB cb;
+    BIGNUM *rnd = NULL;
+
+    BN_GENCB_set_old(&cb, callback, cb_arg);
+
+    if (ret == NULL) {
+        if ((rnd = BN_new()) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+    } else
+        rnd = ret;
+    if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(rnd, bits, safe, add, rem, &cb))
+        goto err;
+
+    /* we have a prime :-) */
+    return ret;
+ err:
+    BN_free(rnd);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+int BN_is_prime(const BIGNUM *a, int checks,
+                void (*callback) (int, int, void *), BN_CTX *ctx_passed,
+                void *cb_arg)
+{
+    BN_GENCB cb;
+    BN_GENCB_set_old(&cb, callback, cb_arg);
+    return BN_is_prime_ex(a, checks, ctx_passed, &cb);
+}
+
+int BN_is_prime_fasttest(const BIGNUM *a, int checks,
+                         void (*callback) (int, int, void *),
+                         BN_CTX *ctx_passed, void *cb_arg,
+                         int do_trial_division)
+{
+    BN_GENCB cb;
+    BN_GENCB_set_old(&cb, callback, cb_arg);
+    return BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(a, checks, ctx_passed,
+                                   do_trial_division, &cb);
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_dh.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_dh.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..17d0559
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_dh.c
@@ -0,0 +1,220 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2014-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "bn_lcl.h"
+#include "e_os.h"
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#include "internal/bn_dh.h"
+/* DH parameters from RFC5114 */
+
+# if BN_BITS2 == 64
+static const BN_ULONG dh1024_160_p[] = {
+    0xDF1FB2BC2E4A4371ULL, 0xE68CFDA76D4DA708ULL, 0x45BF37DF365C1A65ULL,
+    0xA151AF5F0DC8B4BDULL, 0xFAA31A4FF55BCCC0ULL, 0x4EFFD6FAE5644738ULL,
+    0x98488E9C219A7372ULL, 0xACCBDD7D90C4BD70ULL, 0x24975C3CD49B83BFULL,
+    0x13ECB4AEA9061123ULL, 0x9838EF1E2EE652C0ULL, 0x6073E28675A23D18ULL,
+    0x9A6A9DCA52D23B61ULL, 0x52C99FBCFB06A3C6ULL, 0xDE92DE5EAE5D54ECULL,
+    0xB10B8F96A080E01DULL
+};
+
+static const BN_ULONG dh1024_160_g[] = {
+    0x855E6EEB22B3B2E5ULL, 0x858F4DCEF97C2A24ULL, 0x2D779D5918D08BC8ULL,
+    0xD662A4D18E73AFA3ULL, 0x1DBF0A0169B6A28AULL, 0xA6A24C087A091F53ULL,
+    0x909D0D2263F80A76ULL, 0xD7FBD7D3B9A92EE1ULL, 0x5E91547F9E2749F4ULL,
+    0x160217B4B01B886AULL, 0x777E690F5504F213ULL, 0x266FEA1E5C41564BULL,
+    0xD6406CFF14266D31ULL, 0xF8104DD258AC507FULL, 0x6765A442EFB99905ULL,
+    0xA4D1CBD5C3FD3412ULL
+};
+
+static const BN_ULONG dh1024_160_q[] = {
+    0x64B7CB9D49462353ULL, 0x81A8DF278ABA4E7DULL, 0x00000000F518AA87ULL
+};
+
+static const BN_ULONG dh2048_224_p[] = {
+    0x0AC4DFFE0C10E64FULL, 0xCF9DE5384E71B81CULL, 0x7EF363E2FFA31F71ULL,
+    0xE3FB73C16B8E75B9ULL, 0xC9B53DCF4BA80A29ULL, 0x23F10B0E16E79763ULL,
+    0xC52172E413042E9BULL, 0xBE60E69CC928B2B9ULL, 0x80CD86A1B9E587E8ULL,
+    0x315D75E198C641A4ULL, 0xCDF93ACC44328387ULL, 0x15987D9ADC0A486DULL,
+    0x7310F7121FD5A074ULL, 0x278273C7DE31EFDCULL, 0x1602E714415D9330ULL,
+    0x81286130BC8985DBULL, 0xB3BF8A3170918836ULL, 0x6A00E0A0B9C49708ULL,
+    0xC6BA0B2C8BBC27BEULL, 0xC9F98D11ED34DBF6ULL, 0x7AD5B7D0B6C12207ULL,
+    0xD91E8FEF55B7394BULL, 0x9037C9EDEFDA4DF8ULL, 0x6D3F8152AD6AC212ULL,
+    0x1DE6B85A1274A0A6ULL, 0xEB3D688A309C180EULL, 0xAF9A3C407BA1DF15ULL,
+    0xE6FA141DF95A56DBULL, 0xB54B1597B61D0A75ULL, 0xA20D64E5683B9FD1ULL,
+    0xD660FAA79559C51FULL, 0xAD107E1E9123A9D0ULL
+};
+
+static const BN_ULONG dh2048_224_g[] = {
+    0x84B890D3191F2BFAULL, 0x81BC087F2A7065B3ULL, 0x19C418E1F6EC0179ULL,
+    0x7B5A0F1C71CFFF4CULL, 0xEDFE72FE9B6AA4BDULL, 0x81E1BCFE94B30269ULL,
+    0x566AFBB48D6C0191ULL, 0xB539CCE3409D13CDULL, 0x6AA21E7F5F2FF381ULL,
+    0xD9E263E4770589EFULL, 0x10E183EDD19963DDULL, 0xB70A8137150B8EEBULL,
+    0x051AE3D428C8F8ACULL, 0xBB77A86F0C1AB15BULL, 0x6E3025E316A330EFULL,
+    0x19529A45D6F83456ULL, 0xF180EB34118E98D1ULL, 0xB5F6C6B250717CBEULL,
+    0x09939D54DA7460CDULL, 0xE247150422EA1ED4ULL, 0xB8A762D0521BC98AULL,
+    0xF4D027275AC1348BULL, 0xC17669101999024AULL, 0xBE5E9001A8D66AD7ULL,
+    0xC57DB17C620A8652ULL, 0xAB739D7700C29F52ULL, 0xDD921F01A70C4AFAULL,
+    0xA6824A4E10B9A6F0ULL, 0x74866A08CFE4FFE3ULL, 0x6CDEBE7B89998CAFULL,
+    0x9DF30B5C8FFDAC50ULL, 0xAC4032EF4F2D9AE3ULL
+};
+
+static const BN_ULONG dh2048_224_q[] = {
+    0xBF389A99B36371EBULL, 0x1F80535A4738CEBCULL, 0xC58D93FE99717710ULL,
+    0x00000000801C0D34ULL
+};
+
+static const BN_ULONG dh2048_256_p[] = {
+    0xDB094AE91E1A1597ULL, 0x693877FAD7EF09CAULL, 0x6116D2276E11715FULL,
+    0xA4B54330C198AF12ULL, 0x75F26375D7014103ULL, 0xC3A3960A54E710C3ULL,
+    0xDED4010ABD0BE621ULL, 0xC0B857F689962856ULL, 0xB3CA3F7971506026ULL,
+    0x1CCACB83E6B486F6ULL, 0x67E144E514056425ULL, 0xF6A167B5A41825D9ULL,
+    0x3AD8347796524D8EULL, 0xF13C6D9A51BFA4ABULL, 0x2D52526735488A0EULL,
+    0xB63ACAE1CAA6B790ULL, 0x4FDB70C581B23F76ULL, 0xBC39A0BF12307F5CULL,
+    0xB941F54EB1E59BB8ULL, 0x6C5BFC11D45F9088ULL, 0x22E0B1EF4275BF7BULL,
+    0x91F9E6725B4758C0ULL, 0x5A8A9D306BCF67EDULL, 0x209E0C6497517ABDULL,
+    0x3BF4296D830E9A7CULL, 0x16C3D91134096FAAULL, 0xFAF7DF4561B2AA30ULL,
+    0xE00DF8F1D61957D4ULL, 0x5D2CEED4435E3B00ULL, 0x8CEEF608660DD0F2ULL,
+    0xFFBBD19C65195999ULL, 0x87A8E61DB4B6663CULL
+};
+
+static const BN_ULONG dh2048_256_g[] = {
+    0x664B4C0F6CC41659ULL, 0x5E2327CFEF98C582ULL, 0xD647D148D4795451ULL,
+    0x2F63078490F00EF8ULL, 0x184B523D1DB246C3ULL, 0xC7891428CDC67EB6ULL,
+    0x7FD028370DF92B52ULL, 0xB3353BBB64E0EC37ULL, 0xECD06E1557CD0915ULL,
+    0xB7D2BBD2DF016199ULL, 0xC8484B1E052588B9ULL, 0xDB2A3B7313D3FE14ULL,
+    0xD052B985D182EA0AULL, 0xA4BD1BFFE83B9C80ULL, 0xDFC967C1FB3F2E55ULL,
+    0xB5045AF2767164E1ULL, 0x1D14348F6F2F9193ULL, 0x64E67982428EBC83ULL,
+    0x8AC376D282D6ED38ULL, 0x777DE62AAAB8A862ULL, 0xDDF463E5E9EC144BULL,
+    0x0196F931C77A57F2ULL, 0xA55AE31341000A65ULL, 0x901228F8C28CBB18ULL,
+    0xBC3773BF7E8C6F62ULL, 0xBE3A6C1B0C6B47B1ULL, 0xFF4FED4AAC0BB555ULL,
+    0x10DBC15077BE463FULL, 0x07F4793A1A0BA125ULL, 0x4CA7B18F21EF2054ULL,
+    0x2E77506660EDBD48ULL, 0x3FB32C9B73134D0BULL
+};
+
+static const BN_ULONG dh2048_256_q[] = {
+    0xA308B0FE64F5FBD3ULL, 0x99B1A47D1EB3750BULL, 0xB447997640129DA2ULL,
+    0x8CF83642A709A097ULL
+};
+
+# elif BN_BITS2 == 32
+
+static const BN_ULONG dh1024_160_p[] = {
+    0x2E4A4371, 0xDF1FB2BC, 0x6D4DA708, 0xE68CFDA7, 0x365C1A65, 0x45BF37DF,
+    0x0DC8B4BD, 0xA151AF5F, 0xF55BCCC0, 0xFAA31A4F, 0xE5644738, 0x4EFFD6FA,
+    0x219A7372, 0x98488E9C, 0x90C4BD70, 0xACCBDD7D, 0xD49B83BF, 0x24975C3C,
+    0xA9061123, 0x13ECB4AE, 0x2EE652C0, 0x9838EF1E, 0x75A23D18, 0x6073E286,
+    0x52D23B61, 0x9A6A9DCA, 0xFB06A3C6, 0x52C99FBC, 0xAE5D54EC, 0xDE92DE5E,
+    0xA080E01D, 0xB10B8F96
+};
+
+static const BN_ULONG dh1024_160_g[] = {
+    0x22B3B2E5, 0x855E6EEB, 0xF97C2A24, 0x858F4DCE, 0x18D08BC8, 0x2D779D59,
+    0x8E73AFA3, 0xD662A4D1, 0x69B6A28A, 0x1DBF0A01, 0x7A091F53, 0xA6A24C08,
+    0x63F80A76, 0x909D0D22, 0xB9A92EE1, 0xD7FBD7D3, 0x9E2749F4, 0x5E91547F,
+    0xB01B886A, 0x160217B4, 0x5504F213, 0x777E690F, 0x5C41564B, 0x266FEA1E,
+    0x14266D31, 0xD6406CFF, 0x58AC507F, 0xF8104DD2, 0xEFB99905, 0x6765A442,
+    0xC3FD3412, 0xA4D1CBD5
+};
+
+static const BN_ULONG dh1024_160_q[] = {
+    0x49462353, 0x64B7CB9D, 0x8ABA4E7D, 0x81A8DF27, 0xF518AA87
+};
+
+static const BN_ULONG dh2048_224_p[] = {
+    0x0C10E64F, 0x0AC4DFFE, 0x4E71B81C, 0xCF9DE538, 0xFFA31F71, 0x7EF363E2,
+    0x6B8E75B9, 0xE3FB73C1, 0x4BA80A29, 0xC9B53DCF, 0x16E79763, 0x23F10B0E,
+    0x13042E9B, 0xC52172E4, 0xC928B2B9, 0xBE60E69C, 0xB9E587E8, 0x80CD86A1,
+    0x98C641A4, 0x315D75E1, 0x44328387, 0xCDF93ACC, 0xDC0A486D, 0x15987D9A,
+    0x1FD5A074, 0x7310F712, 0xDE31EFDC, 0x278273C7, 0x415D9330, 0x1602E714,
+    0xBC8985DB, 0x81286130, 0x70918836, 0xB3BF8A31, 0xB9C49708, 0x6A00E0A0,
+    0x8BBC27BE, 0xC6BA0B2C, 0xED34DBF6, 0xC9F98D11, 0xB6C12207, 0x7AD5B7D0,
+    0x55B7394B, 0xD91E8FEF, 0xEFDA4DF8, 0x9037C9ED, 0xAD6AC212, 0x6D3F8152,
+    0x1274A0A6, 0x1DE6B85A, 0x309C180E, 0xEB3D688A, 0x7BA1DF15, 0xAF9A3C40,
+    0xF95A56DB, 0xE6FA141D, 0xB61D0A75, 0xB54B1597, 0x683B9FD1, 0xA20D64E5,
+    0x9559C51F, 0xD660FAA7, 0x9123A9D0, 0xAD107E1E
+};
+
+static const BN_ULONG dh2048_224_g[] = {
+    0x191F2BFA, 0x84B890D3, 0x2A7065B3, 0x81BC087F, 0xF6EC0179, 0x19C418E1,
+    0x71CFFF4C, 0x7B5A0F1C, 0x9B6AA4BD, 0xEDFE72FE, 0x94B30269, 0x81E1BCFE,
+    0x8D6C0191, 0x566AFBB4, 0x409D13CD, 0xB539CCE3, 0x5F2FF381, 0x6AA21E7F,
+    0x770589EF, 0xD9E263E4, 0xD19963DD, 0x10E183ED, 0x150B8EEB, 0xB70A8137,
+    0x28C8F8AC, 0x051AE3D4, 0x0C1AB15B, 0xBB77A86F, 0x16A330EF, 0x6E3025E3,
+    0xD6F83456, 0x19529A45, 0x118E98D1, 0xF180EB34, 0x50717CBE, 0xB5F6C6B2,
+    0xDA7460CD, 0x09939D54, 0x22EA1ED4, 0xE2471504, 0x521BC98A, 0xB8A762D0,
+    0x5AC1348B, 0xF4D02727, 0x1999024A, 0xC1766910, 0xA8D66AD7, 0xBE5E9001,
+    0x620A8652, 0xC57DB17C, 0x00C29F52, 0xAB739D77, 0xA70C4AFA, 0xDD921F01,
+    0x10B9A6F0, 0xA6824A4E, 0xCFE4FFE3, 0x74866A08, 0x89998CAF, 0x6CDEBE7B,
+    0x8FFDAC50, 0x9DF30B5C, 0x4F2D9AE3, 0xAC4032EF
+};
+
+static const BN_ULONG dh2048_224_q[] = {
+    0xB36371EB, 0xBF389A99, 0x4738CEBC, 0x1F80535A, 0x99717710, 0xC58D93FE,
+    0x801C0D34
+};
+
+static const BN_ULONG dh2048_256_p[] = {
+    0x1E1A1597, 0xDB094AE9, 0xD7EF09CA, 0x693877FA, 0x6E11715F, 0x6116D227,
+    0xC198AF12, 0xA4B54330, 0xD7014103, 0x75F26375, 0x54E710C3, 0xC3A3960A,
+    0xBD0BE621, 0xDED4010A, 0x89962856, 0xC0B857F6, 0x71506026, 0xB3CA3F79,
+    0xE6B486F6, 0x1CCACB83, 0x14056425, 0x67E144E5, 0xA41825D9, 0xF6A167B5,
+    0x96524D8E, 0x3AD83477, 0x51BFA4AB, 0xF13C6D9A, 0x35488A0E, 0x2D525267,
+    0xCAA6B790, 0xB63ACAE1, 0x81B23F76, 0x4FDB70C5, 0x12307F5C, 0xBC39A0BF,
+    0xB1E59BB8, 0xB941F54E, 0xD45F9088, 0x6C5BFC11, 0x4275BF7B, 0x22E0B1EF,
+    0x5B4758C0, 0x91F9E672, 0x6BCF67ED, 0x5A8A9D30, 0x97517ABD, 0x209E0C64,
+    0x830E9A7C, 0x3BF4296D, 0x34096FAA, 0x16C3D911, 0x61B2AA30, 0xFAF7DF45,
+    0xD61957D4, 0xE00DF8F1, 0x435E3B00, 0x5D2CEED4, 0x660DD0F2, 0x8CEEF608,
+    0x65195999, 0xFFBBD19C, 0xB4B6663C, 0x87A8E61D
+};
+
+static const BN_ULONG dh2048_256_g[] = {
+    0x6CC41659, 0x664B4C0F, 0xEF98C582, 0x5E2327CF, 0xD4795451, 0xD647D148,
+    0x90F00EF8, 0x2F630784, 0x1DB246C3, 0x184B523D, 0xCDC67EB6, 0xC7891428,
+    0x0DF92B52, 0x7FD02837, 0x64E0EC37, 0xB3353BBB, 0x57CD0915, 0xECD06E15,
+    0xDF016199, 0xB7D2BBD2, 0x052588B9, 0xC8484B1E, 0x13D3FE14, 0xDB2A3B73,
+    0xD182EA0A, 0xD052B985, 0xE83B9C80, 0xA4BD1BFF, 0xFB3F2E55, 0xDFC967C1,
+    0x767164E1, 0xB5045AF2, 0x6F2F9193, 0x1D14348F, 0x428EBC83, 0x64E67982,
+    0x82D6ED38, 0x8AC376D2, 0xAAB8A862, 0x777DE62A, 0xE9EC144B, 0xDDF463E5,
+    0xC77A57F2, 0x0196F931, 0x41000A65, 0xA55AE313, 0xC28CBB18, 0x901228F8,
+    0x7E8C6F62, 0xBC3773BF, 0x0C6B47B1, 0xBE3A6C1B, 0xAC0BB555, 0xFF4FED4A,
+    0x77BE463F, 0x10DBC150, 0x1A0BA125, 0x07F4793A, 0x21EF2054, 0x4CA7B18F,
+    0x60EDBD48, 0x2E775066, 0x73134D0B, 0x3FB32C9B
+};
+
+static const BN_ULONG dh2048_256_q[] = {
+    0x64F5FBD3, 0xA308B0FE, 0x1EB3750B, 0x99B1A47D, 0x40129DA2, 0xB4479976,
+    0xA709A097, 0x8CF83642
+};
+
+# else
+#  error "unsupported BN_BITS2"
+# endif
+
+/* Macro to make a BIGNUM from static data */
+
+# define make_dh_bn(x) extern const BIGNUM _bignum_##x; \
+                       const BIGNUM _bignum_##x = { (BN_ULONG *) x, \
+                        OSSL_NELEM(x),\
+                        OSSL_NELEM(x),\
+                        0, BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA };
+
+
+make_dh_bn(dh1024_160_p)
+make_dh_bn(dh1024_160_g)
+make_dh_bn(dh1024_160_q)
+make_dh_bn(dh2048_224_p)
+make_dh_bn(dh2048_224_g)
+make_dh_bn(dh2048_224_q)
+make_dh_bn(dh2048_256_p)
+make_dh_bn(dh2048_256_g)
+make_dh_bn(dh2048_256_q)
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_div.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_div.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5e620b2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_div.c
@@ -0,0 +1,423 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "bn_lcl.h"
+
+/* The old slow way */
+#if 0
+int BN_div(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *m, const BIGNUM *d,
+           BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int i, nm, nd;
+    int ret = 0;
+    BIGNUM *D;
+
+    bn_check_top(m);
+    bn_check_top(d);
+    if (BN_is_zero(d)) {
+        BNerr(BN_F_BN_DIV, BN_R_DIV_BY_ZERO);
+        return (0);
+    }
+
+    if (BN_ucmp(m, d) < 0) {
+        if (rem != NULL) {
+            if (BN_copy(rem, m) == NULL)
+                return (0);
+        }
+        if (dv != NULL)
+            BN_zero(dv);
+        return (1);
+    }
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    D = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (dv == NULL)
+        dv = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (rem == NULL)
+        rem = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (D == NULL || dv == NULL || rem == NULL)
+        goto end;
+
+    nd = BN_num_bits(d);
+    nm = BN_num_bits(m);
+    if (BN_copy(D, d) == NULL)
+        goto end;
+    if (BN_copy(rem, m) == NULL)
+        goto end;
+
+    /*
+     * The next 2 are needed so we can do a dv->d[0]|=1 later since
+     * BN_lshift1 will only work once there is a value :-)
+     */
+    BN_zero(dv);
+    if (bn_wexpand(dv, 1) == NULL)
+        goto end;
+    dv->top = 1;
+
+    if (!BN_lshift(D, D, nm - nd))
+        goto end;
+    for (i = nm - nd; i >= 0; i--) {
+        if (!BN_lshift1(dv, dv))
+            goto end;
+        if (BN_ucmp(rem, D) >= 0) {
+            dv->d[0] |= 1;
+            if (!BN_usub(rem, rem, D))
+                goto end;
+        }
+/* CAN IMPROVE (and have now :=) */
+        if (!BN_rshift1(D, D))
+            goto end;
+    }
+    rem->neg = BN_is_zero(rem) ? 0 : m->neg;
+    dv->neg = m->neg ^ d->neg;
+    ret = 1;
+ end:
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+#else
+
+# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_INLINE_ASM) \
+    && !defined(PEDANTIC) && !defined(BN_DIV3W)
+#  if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2
+#   if defined(__i386) || defined (__i386__)
+   /*-
+    * There were two reasons for implementing this template:
+    * - GNU C generates a call to a function (__udivdi3 to be exact)
+    *   in reply to ((((BN_ULLONG)n0)<<BN_BITS2)|n1)/d0 (I fail to
+    *   understand why...);
+    * - divl doesn't only calculate quotient, but also leaves
+    *   remainder in %edx which we can definitely use here:-)
+    *
+    *                                   <appro@fy.chalmers.se>
+    */
+#    undef bn_div_words
+#    define bn_div_words(n0,n1,d0)                \
+        ({  asm volatile (                      \
+                "divl   %4"                     \
+                : "=a"(q), "=d"(rem)            \
+                : "a"(n1), "d"(n0), "r"(d0)     \
+                : "cc");                        \
+            q;                                  \
+        })
+#    define REMAINDER_IS_ALREADY_CALCULATED
+#   elif defined(__x86_64) && defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG)
+   /*
+    * Same story here, but it's 128-bit by 64-bit division. Wow!
+    *                                   <appro@fy.chalmers.se>
+    */
+#    undef bn_div_words
+#    define bn_div_words(n0,n1,d0)                \
+        ({  asm volatile (                      \
+                "divq   %4"                     \
+                : "=a"(q), "=d"(rem)            \
+                : "a"(n1), "d"(n0), "r"(d0)     \
+                : "cc");                        \
+            q;                                  \
+        })
+#    define REMAINDER_IS_ALREADY_CALCULATED
+#   endif                       /* __<cpu> */
+#  endif                        /* __GNUC__ */
+# endif                         /* OPENSSL_NO_ASM */
+
+/*-
+ * BN_div computes  dv := num / divisor, rounding towards
+ * zero, and sets up rm  such that  dv*divisor + rm = num  holds.
+ * Thus:
+ *     dv->neg == num->neg ^ divisor->neg  (unless the result is zero)
+ *     rm->neg == num->neg                 (unless the remainder is zero)
+ * If 'dv' or 'rm' is NULL, the respective value is not returned.
+ */
+int BN_div(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rm, const BIGNUM *num, const BIGNUM *divisor,
+           BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int norm_shift, i, loop;
+    BIGNUM *tmp, wnum, *snum, *sdiv, *res;
+    BN_ULONG *resp, *wnump;
+    BN_ULONG d0, d1;
+    int num_n, div_n;
+    int no_branch = 0;
+
+    /*
+     * Invalid zero-padding would have particularly bad consequences so don't
+     * just rely on bn_check_top() here (bn_check_top() works only for
+     * BN_DEBUG builds)
+     */
+    if ((num->top > 0 && num->d[num->top - 1] == 0) ||
+        (divisor->top > 0 && divisor->d[divisor->top - 1] == 0)) {
+        BNerr(BN_F_BN_DIV, BN_R_NOT_INITIALIZED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    bn_check_top(num);
+    bn_check_top(divisor);
+
+    if ((BN_get_flags(num, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0)
+        || (BN_get_flags(divisor, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0)) {
+        no_branch = 1;
+    }
+
+    bn_check_top(dv);
+    bn_check_top(rm);
+    /*- bn_check_top(num); *//*
+     * 'num' has been checked already
+     */
+    /*- bn_check_top(divisor); *//*
+     * 'divisor' has been checked already
+     */
+
+    if (BN_is_zero(divisor)) {
+        BNerr(BN_F_BN_DIV, BN_R_DIV_BY_ZERO);
+        return (0);
+    }
+
+    if (!no_branch && BN_ucmp(num, divisor) < 0) {
+        if (rm != NULL) {
+            if (BN_copy(rm, num) == NULL)
+                return (0);
+        }
+        if (dv != NULL)
+            BN_zero(dv);
+        return (1);
+    }
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    snum = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    sdiv = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (dv == NULL)
+        res = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    else
+        res = dv;
+    if (sdiv == NULL || res == NULL || tmp == NULL || snum == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* First we normalise the numbers */
+    norm_shift = BN_BITS2 - ((BN_num_bits(divisor)) % BN_BITS2);
+    if (!(BN_lshift(sdiv, divisor, norm_shift)))
+        goto err;
+    sdiv->neg = 0;
+    norm_shift += BN_BITS2;
+    if (!(BN_lshift(snum, num, norm_shift)))
+        goto err;
+    snum->neg = 0;
+
+    if (no_branch) {
+        /*
+         * Since we don't know whether snum is larger than sdiv, we pad snum
+         * with enough zeroes without changing its value.
+         */
+        if (snum->top <= sdiv->top + 1) {
+            if (bn_wexpand(snum, sdiv->top + 2) == NULL)
+                goto err;
+            for (i = snum->top; i < sdiv->top + 2; i++)
+                snum->d[i] = 0;
+            snum->top = sdiv->top + 2;
+        } else {
+            if (bn_wexpand(snum, snum->top + 1) == NULL)
+                goto err;
+            snum->d[snum->top] = 0;
+            snum->top++;
+        }
+    }
+
+    div_n = sdiv->top;
+    num_n = snum->top;
+    loop = num_n - div_n;
+    /*
+     * Lets setup a 'window' into snum This is the part that corresponds to
+     * the current 'area' being divided
+     */
+    wnum.neg = 0;
+    wnum.d = &(snum->d[loop]);
+    wnum.top = div_n;
+    /*
+     * only needed when BN_ucmp messes up the values between top and max
+     */
+    wnum.dmax = snum->dmax - loop; /* so we don't step out of bounds */
+
+    /* Get the top 2 words of sdiv */
+    /* div_n=sdiv->top; */
+    d0 = sdiv->d[div_n - 1];
+    d1 = (div_n == 1) ? 0 : sdiv->d[div_n - 2];
+
+    /* pointer to the 'top' of snum */
+    wnump = &(snum->d[num_n - 1]);
+
+    /* Setup to 'res' */
+    if (!bn_wexpand(res, (loop + 1)))
+        goto err;
+    res->neg = (num->neg ^ divisor->neg);
+    res->top = loop - no_branch;
+    resp = &(res->d[loop - 1]);
+
+    /* space for temp */
+    if (!bn_wexpand(tmp, (div_n + 1)))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!no_branch) {
+        if (BN_ucmp(&wnum, sdiv) >= 0) {
+            /*
+             * If BN_DEBUG_RAND is defined BN_ucmp changes (via bn_pollute)
+             * the const bignum arguments => clean the values between top and
+             * max again
+             */
+            bn_clear_top2max(&wnum);
+            bn_sub_words(wnum.d, wnum.d, sdiv->d, div_n);
+            *resp = 1;
+        } else
+            res->top--;
+    }
+
+    /* Increase the resp pointer so that we never create an invalid pointer. */
+    resp++;
+
+    /*
+     * if res->top == 0 then clear the neg value otherwise decrease the resp
+     * pointer
+     */
+    if (res->top == 0)
+        res->neg = 0;
+    else
+        resp--;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < loop - 1; i++, wnump--) {
+        BN_ULONG q, l0;
+        /*
+         * the first part of the loop uses the top two words of snum and sdiv
+         * to calculate a BN_ULONG q such that | wnum - sdiv * q | < sdiv
+         */
+# if defined(BN_DIV3W) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM)
+        BN_ULONG bn_div_3_words(BN_ULONG *, BN_ULONG, BN_ULONG);
+        q = bn_div_3_words(wnump, d1, d0);
+# else
+        BN_ULONG n0, n1, rem = 0;
+
+        n0 = wnump[0];
+        n1 = wnump[-1];
+        if (n0 == d0)
+            q = BN_MASK2;
+        else {                  /* n0 < d0 */
+
+#  ifdef BN_LLONG
+            BN_ULLONG t2;
+
+#   if defined(BN_LLONG) && defined(BN_DIV2W) && !defined(bn_div_words)
+            q = (BN_ULONG)(((((BN_ULLONG) n0) << BN_BITS2) | n1) / d0);
+#   else
+            q = bn_div_words(n0, n1, d0);
+#   endif
+
+#   ifndef REMAINDER_IS_ALREADY_CALCULATED
+            /*
+             * rem doesn't have to be BN_ULLONG. The least we
+             * know it's less that d0, isn't it?
+             */
+            rem = (n1 - q * d0) & BN_MASK2;
+#   endif
+            t2 = (BN_ULLONG) d1 *q;
+
+            for (;;) {
+                if (t2 <= ((((BN_ULLONG) rem) << BN_BITS2) | wnump[-2]))
+                    break;
+                q--;
+                rem += d0;
+                if (rem < d0)
+                    break;      /* don't let rem overflow */
+                t2 -= d1;
+            }
+#  else                         /* !BN_LLONG */
+            BN_ULONG t2l, t2h;
+
+            q = bn_div_words(n0, n1, d0);
+#   ifndef REMAINDER_IS_ALREADY_CALCULATED
+            rem = (n1 - q * d0) & BN_MASK2;
+#   endif
+
+#   if defined(BN_UMULT_LOHI)
+            BN_UMULT_LOHI(t2l, t2h, d1, q);
+#   elif defined(BN_UMULT_HIGH)
+            t2l = d1 * q;
+            t2h = BN_UMULT_HIGH(d1, q);
+#   else
+            {
+                BN_ULONG ql, qh;
+                t2l = LBITS(d1);
+                t2h = HBITS(d1);
+                ql = LBITS(q);
+                qh = HBITS(q);
+                mul64(t2l, t2h, ql, qh); /* t2=(BN_ULLONG)d1*q; */
+            }
+#   endif
+
+            for (;;) {
+                if ((t2h < rem) || ((t2h == rem) && (t2l <= wnump[-2])))
+                    break;
+                q--;
+                rem += d0;
+                if (rem < d0)
+                    break;      /* don't let rem overflow */
+                if (t2l < d1)
+                    t2h--;
+                t2l -= d1;
+            }
+#  endif                        /* !BN_LLONG */
+        }
+# endif                         /* !BN_DIV3W */
+
+        l0 = bn_mul_words(tmp->d, sdiv->d, div_n, q);
+        tmp->d[div_n] = l0;
+        wnum.d--;
+        /*
+         * ingore top values of the bignums just sub the two BN_ULONG arrays
+         * with bn_sub_words
+         */
+        if (bn_sub_words(wnum.d, wnum.d, tmp->d, div_n + 1)) {
+            /*
+             * Note: As we have considered only the leading two BN_ULONGs in
+             * the calculation of q, sdiv * q might be greater than wnum (but
+             * then (q-1) * sdiv is less or equal than wnum)
+             */
+            q--;
+            if (bn_add_words(wnum.d, wnum.d, sdiv->d, div_n))
+                /*
+                 * we can't have an overflow here (assuming that q != 0, but
+                 * if q == 0 then tmp is zero anyway)
+                 */
+                (*wnump)++;
+        }
+        /* store part of the result */
+        resp--;
+        *resp = q;
+    }
+    bn_correct_top(snum);
+    if (rm != NULL) {
+        /*
+         * Keep a copy of the neg flag in num because if rm==num BN_rshift()
+         * will overwrite it.
+         */
+        int neg = num->neg;
+        BN_rshift(rm, snum, norm_shift);
+        if (!BN_is_zero(rm))
+            rm->neg = neg;
+        bn_check_top(rm);
+    }
+    if (no_branch)
+        bn_correct_top(res);
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    return (1);
+ err:
+    bn_check_top(rm);
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    return (0);
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_err.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_err.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5fe9db9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_err.c
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+/*
+ * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+
+# define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_BN,func,0)
+# define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_BN,0,reason)
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA BN_str_functs[] = {
+    {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BNRAND), "bnrand"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_BLINDING_CONVERT_EX), "BN_BLINDING_convert_ex"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_BLINDING_CREATE_PARAM), "BN_BLINDING_create_param"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_BLINDING_INVERT_EX), "BN_BLINDING_invert_ex"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_BLINDING_NEW), "BN_BLINDING_new"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_BLINDING_UPDATE), "BN_BLINDING_update"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_BN2DEC), "BN_bn2dec"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_BN2HEX), "BN_bn2hex"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_COMPUTE_WNAF), "bn_compute_wNAF"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_CTX_GET), "BN_CTX_get"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_CTX_NEW), "BN_CTX_new"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_CTX_START), "BN_CTX_start"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_DIV), "BN_div"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_DIV_RECP), "BN_div_recp"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_EXP), "BN_exp"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_EXPAND_INTERNAL), "bn_expand_internal"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_GENCB_NEW), "BN_GENCB_new"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_GENERATE_DSA_NONCE), "BN_generate_dsa_nonce"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_GENERATE_PRIME_EX), "BN_generate_prime_ex"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD), "BN_GF2m_mod"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_EXP), "BN_GF2m_mod_exp"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_MUL), "BN_GF2m_mod_mul"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_SOLVE_QUAD), "BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_SOLVE_QUAD_ARR), "BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad_arr"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_SQR), "BN_GF2m_mod_sqr"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_SQRT), "BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_LSHIFT), "BN_lshift"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP2_MONT), "BN_mod_exp2_mont"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_MONT), "BN_mod_exp_mont"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_MONT_CONSTTIME), "BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_MONT_WORD), "BN_mod_exp_mont_word"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_RECP), "BN_mod_exp_recp"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_SIMPLE), "BN_mod_exp_simple"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_MOD_INVERSE), "BN_mod_inverse"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_MOD_INVERSE_NO_BRANCH), "BN_mod_inverse_no_branch"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_MOD_LSHIFT_QUICK), "BN_mod_lshift_quick"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_MOD_SQRT), "BN_mod_sqrt"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_MPI2BN), "BN_mpi2bn"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_NEW), "BN_new"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_RAND), "BN_rand"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_RAND_RANGE), "BN_rand_range"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_RSHIFT), "BN_rshift"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_SET_WORDS), "bn_set_words"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_USUB), "BN_usub"},
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA BN_str_reasons[] = {
+    {ERR_REASON(BN_R_ARG2_LT_ARG3), "arg2 lt arg3"},
+    {ERR_REASON(BN_R_BAD_RECIPROCAL), "bad reciprocal"},
+    {ERR_REASON(BN_R_BIGNUM_TOO_LONG), "bignum too long"},
+    {ERR_REASON(BN_R_BITS_TOO_SMALL), "bits too small"},
+    {ERR_REASON(BN_R_CALLED_WITH_EVEN_MODULUS), "called with even modulus"},
+    {ERR_REASON(BN_R_DIV_BY_ZERO), "div by zero"},
+    {ERR_REASON(BN_R_ENCODING_ERROR), "encoding error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(BN_R_EXPAND_ON_STATIC_BIGNUM_DATA),
+     "expand on static bignum data"},
+    {ERR_REASON(BN_R_INPUT_NOT_REDUCED), "input not reduced"},
+    {ERR_REASON(BN_R_INVALID_LENGTH), "invalid length"},
+    {ERR_REASON(BN_R_INVALID_RANGE), "invalid range"},
+    {ERR_REASON(BN_R_INVALID_SHIFT), "invalid shift"},
+    {ERR_REASON(BN_R_NOT_A_SQUARE), "not a square"},
+    {ERR_REASON(BN_R_NOT_INITIALIZED), "not initialized"},
+    {ERR_REASON(BN_R_NO_INVERSE), "no inverse"},
+    {ERR_REASON(BN_R_NO_SOLUTION), "no solution"},
+    {ERR_REASON(BN_R_PRIVATE_KEY_TOO_LARGE), "private key too large"},
+    {ERR_REASON(BN_R_P_IS_NOT_PRIME), "p is not prime"},
+    {ERR_REASON(BN_R_TOO_MANY_ITERATIONS), "too many iterations"},
+    {ERR_REASON(BN_R_TOO_MANY_TEMPORARY_VARIABLES),
+     "too many temporary variables"},
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+
+#endif
+
+int ERR_load_BN_strings(void)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+
+    if (ERR_func_error_string(BN_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) {
+        ERR_load_strings(0, BN_str_functs);
+        ERR_load_strings(0, BN_str_reasons);
+    }
+#endif
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0d2d1ec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1376 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
+#include "bn_lcl.h"
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#ifdef _WIN32
+# include <malloc.h>
+# ifndef alloca
+#  define alloca _alloca
+# endif
+#elif defined(__GNUC__)
+# ifndef alloca
+#  define alloca(s) __builtin_alloca((s))
+# endif
+#elif defined(__sun)
+# include <alloca.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "rsaz_exp.h"
+
+#undef SPARC_T4_MONT
+#if defined(OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT) && (defined(__sparc__) || defined(__sparc))
+# include "sparc_arch.h"
+extern unsigned int OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[];
+# define SPARC_T4_MONT
+#endif
+
+/* maximum precomputation table size for *variable* sliding windows */
+#define TABLE_SIZE      32
+
+/* this one works - simple but works */
+int BN_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int i, bits, ret = 0;
+    BIGNUM *v, *rr;
+
+    if (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0
+            || BN_get_flags(a, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) {
+        /* BN_FLG_CONSTTIME only supported by BN_mod_exp_mont() */
+        BNerr(BN_F_BN_EXP, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    if ((r == a) || (r == p))
+        rr = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    else
+        rr = r;
+    v = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (rr == NULL || v == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (BN_copy(v, a) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    bits = BN_num_bits(p);
+
+    if (BN_is_odd(p)) {
+        if (BN_copy(rr, a) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+    } else {
+        if (!BN_one(rr))
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    for (i = 1; i < bits; i++) {
+        if (!BN_sqr(v, v, ctx))
+            goto err;
+        if (BN_is_bit_set(p, i)) {
+            if (!BN_mul(rr, rr, v, ctx))
+                goto err;
+        }
+    }
+    if (r != rr && BN_copy(r, rr) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    bn_check_top(r);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+int BN_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m,
+               BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int ret;
+
+    bn_check_top(a);
+    bn_check_top(p);
+    bn_check_top(m);
+
+    /*-
+     * For even modulus  m = 2^k*m_odd, it might make sense to compute
+     * a^p mod m_odd  and  a^p mod 2^k  separately (with Montgomery
+     * exponentiation for the odd part), using appropriate exponent
+     * reductions, and combine the results using the CRT.
+     *
+     * For now, we use Montgomery only if the modulus is odd; otherwise,
+     * exponentiation using the reciprocal-based quick remaindering
+     * algorithm is used.
+     *
+     * (Timing obtained with expspeed.c [computations  a^p mod m
+     * where  a, p, m  are of the same length: 256, 512, 1024, 2048,
+     * 4096, 8192 bits], compared to the running time of the
+     * standard algorithm:
+     *
+     *   BN_mod_exp_mont   33 .. 40 %  [AMD K6-2, Linux, debug configuration]
+     *                     55 .. 77 %  [UltraSparc processor, but
+     *                                  debug-solaris-sparcv8-gcc conf.]
+     *
+     *   BN_mod_exp_recp   50 .. 70 %  [AMD K6-2, Linux, debug configuration]
+     *                     62 .. 118 % [UltraSparc, debug-solaris-sparcv8-gcc]
+     *
+     * On the Sparc, BN_mod_exp_recp was faster than BN_mod_exp_mont
+     * at 2048 and more bits, but at 512 and 1024 bits, it was
+     * slower even than the standard algorithm!
+     *
+     * "Real" timings [linux-elf, solaris-sparcv9-gcc configurations]
+     * should be obtained when the new Montgomery reduction code
+     * has been integrated into OpenSSL.)
+     */
+
+#define MONT_MUL_MOD
+#define MONT_EXP_WORD
+#define RECP_MUL_MOD
+
+#ifdef MONT_MUL_MOD
+    /*
+     * I have finally been able to take out this pre-condition of the top bit
+     * being set.  It was caused by an error in BN_div with negatives.  There
+     * was also another problem when for a^b%m a >= m.  eay 07-May-97
+     */
+    /* if ((m->d[m->top-1]&BN_TBIT) && BN_is_odd(m)) */
+
+    if (BN_is_odd(m)) {
+# ifdef MONT_EXP_WORD
+        if (a->top == 1 && !a->neg
+            && (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) == 0)
+            && (BN_get_flags(a, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) == 0)
+            && (BN_get_flags(m, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) == 0)) {
+            BN_ULONG A = a->d[0];
+            ret = BN_mod_exp_mont_word(r, A, p, m, ctx, NULL);
+        } else
+# endif
+            ret = BN_mod_exp_mont(r, a, p, m, ctx, NULL);
+    } else
+#endif
+#ifdef RECP_MUL_MOD
+    {
+        ret = BN_mod_exp_recp(r, a, p, m, ctx);
+    }
+#else
+    {
+        ret = BN_mod_exp_simple(r, a, p, m, ctx);
+    }
+#endif
+
+    bn_check_top(r);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+int BN_mod_exp_recp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
+                    const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int i, j, bits, ret = 0, wstart, wend, window, wvalue;
+    int start = 1;
+    BIGNUM *aa;
+    /* Table of variables obtained from 'ctx' */
+    BIGNUM *val[TABLE_SIZE];
+    BN_RECP_CTX recp;
+
+    if (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0
+            || BN_get_flags(a, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0
+            || BN_get_flags(m, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) {
+        /* BN_FLG_CONSTTIME only supported by BN_mod_exp_mont() */
+        BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_RECP, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    bits = BN_num_bits(p);
+    if (bits == 0) {
+        /* x**0 mod 1 is still zero. */
+        if (BN_is_one(m)) {
+            ret = 1;
+            BN_zero(r);
+        } else {
+            ret = BN_one(r);
+        }
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    aa = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    val[0] = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (!aa || !val[0])
+        goto err;
+
+    BN_RECP_CTX_init(&recp);
+    if (m->neg) {
+        /* ignore sign of 'm' */
+        if (!BN_copy(aa, m))
+            goto err;
+        aa->neg = 0;
+        if (BN_RECP_CTX_set(&recp, aa, ctx) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+    } else {
+        if (BN_RECP_CTX_set(&recp, m, ctx) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!BN_nnmod(val[0], a, m, ctx))
+        goto err;               /* 1 */
+    if (BN_is_zero(val[0])) {
+        BN_zero(r);
+        ret = 1;
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    window = BN_window_bits_for_exponent_size(bits);
+    if (window > 1) {
+        if (!BN_mod_mul_reciprocal(aa, val[0], val[0], &recp, ctx))
+            goto err;           /* 2 */
+        j = 1 << (window - 1);
+        for (i = 1; i < j; i++) {
+            if (((val[i] = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) ||
+                !BN_mod_mul_reciprocal(val[i], val[i - 1], aa, &recp, ctx))
+                goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    start = 1;                  /* This is used to avoid multiplication etc
+                                 * when there is only the value '1' in the
+                                 * buffer. */
+    wvalue = 0;                 /* The 'value' of the window */
+    wstart = bits - 1;          /* The top bit of the window */
+    wend = 0;                   /* The bottom bit of the window */
+
+    if (!BN_one(r))
+        goto err;
+
+    for (;;) {
+        if (BN_is_bit_set(p, wstart) == 0) {
+            if (!start)
+                if (!BN_mod_mul_reciprocal(r, r, r, &recp, ctx))
+                    goto err;
+            if (wstart == 0)
+                break;
+            wstart--;
+            continue;
+        }
+        /*
+         * We now have wstart on a 'set' bit, we now need to work out how bit
+         * a window to do.  To do this we need to scan forward until the last
+         * set bit before the end of the window
+         */
+        j = wstart;
+        wvalue = 1;
+        wend = 0;
+        for (i = 1; i < window; i++) {
+            if (wstart - i < 0)
+                break;
+            if (BN_is_bit_set(p, wstart - i)) {
+                wvalue <<= (i - wend);
+                wvalue |= 1;
+                wend = i;
+            }
+        }
+
+        /* wend is the size of the current window */
+        j = wend + 1;
+        /* add the 'bytes above' */
+        if (!start)
+            for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
+                if (!BN_mod_mul_reciprocal(r, r, r, &recp, ctx))
+                    goto err;
+            }
+
+        /* wvalue will be an odd number < 2^window */
+        if (!BN_mod_mul_reciprocal(r, r, val[wvalue >> 1], &recp, ctx))
+            goto err;
+
+        /* move the 'window' down further */
+        wstart -= wend + 1;
+        wvalue = 0;
+        start = 0;
+        if (wstart < 0)
+            break;
+    }
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    BN_RECP_CTX_free(&recp);
+    bn_check_top(r);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+int BN_mod_exp_mont(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
+                    const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont)
+{
+    int i, j, bits, ret = 0, wstart, wend, window, wvalue;
+    int start = 1;
+    BIGNUM *d, *r;
+    const BIGNUM *aa;
+    /* Table of variables obtained from 'ctx' */
+    BIGNUM *val[TABLE_SIZE];
+    BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL;
+
+    if (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0
+            || BN_get_flags(a, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0
+            || BN_get_flags(m, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) {
+        return BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(rr, a, p, m, ctx, in_mont);
+    }
+
+    bn_check_top(a);
+    bn_check_top(p);
+    bn_check_top(m);
+
+    if (!BN_is_odd(m)) {
+        BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_MONT, BN_R_CALLED_WITH_EVEN_MODULUS);
+        return (0);
+    }
+    bits = BN_num_bits(p);
+    if (bits == 0) {
+        /* x**0 mod 1 is still zero. */
+        if (BN_is_one(m)) {
+            ret = 1;
+            BN_zero(rr);
+        } else {
+            ret = BN_one(rr);
+        }
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    d = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    r = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    val[0] = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (!d || !r || !val[0])
+        goto err;
+
+    /*
+     * If this is not done, things will break in the montgomery part
+     */
+
+    if (in_mont != NULL)
+        mont = in_mont;
+    else {
+        if ((mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont, m, ctx))
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (a->neg || BN_ucmp(a, m) >= 0) {
+        if (!BN_nnmod(val[0], a, m, ctx))
+            goto err;
+        aa = val[0];
+    } else
+        aa = a;
+    if (BN_is_zero(aa)) {
+        BN_zero(rr);
+        ret = 1;
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (!BN_to_montgomery(val[0], aa, mont, ctx))
+        goto err;               /* 1 */
+
+    window = BN_window_bits_for_exponent_size(bits);
+    if (window > 1) {
+        if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(d, val[0], val[0], mont, ctx))
+            goto err;           /* 2 */
+        j = 1 << (window - 1);
+        for (i = 1; i < j; i++) {
+            if (((val[i] = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) ||
+                !BN_mod_mul_montgomery(val[i], val[i - 1], d, mont, ctx))
+                goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    start = 1;                  /* This is used to avoid multiplication etc
+                                 * when there is only the value '1' in the
+                                 * buffer. */
+    wvalue = 0;                 /* The 'value' of the window */
+    wstart = bits - 1;          /* The top bit of the window */
+    wend = 0;                   /* The bottom bit of the window */
+
+#if 1                           /* by Shay Gueron's suggestion */
+    j = m->top;                 /* borrow j */
+    if (m->d[j - 1] & (((BN_ULONG)1) << (BN_BITS2 - 1))) {
+        if (bn_wexpand(r, j) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        /* 2^(top*BN_BITS2) - m */
+        r->d[0] = (0 - m->d[0]) & BN_MASK2;
+        for (i = 1; i < j; i++)
+            r->d[i] = (~m->d[i]) & BN_MASK2;
+        r->top = j;
+        /*
+         * Upper words will be zero if the corresponding words of 'm' were
+         * 0xfff[...], so decrement r->top accordingly.
+         */
+        bn_correct_top(r);
+    } else
+#endif
+    if (!BN_to_montgomery(r, BN_value_one(), mont, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    for (;;) {
+        if (BN_is_bit_set(p, wstart) == 0) {
+            if (!start) {
+                if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(r, r, r, mont, ctx))
+                    goto err;
+            }
+            if (wstart == 0)
+                break;
+            wstart--;
+            continue;
+        }
+        /*
+         * We now have wstart on a 'set' bit, we now need to work out how bit
+         * a window to do.  To do this we need to scan forward until the last
+         * set bit before the end of the window
+         */
+        j = wstart;
+        wvalue = 1;
+        wend = 0;
+        for (i = 1; i < window; i++) {
+            if (wstart - i < 0)
+                break;
+            if (BN_is_bit_set(p, wstart - i)) {
+                wvalue <<= (i - wend);
+                wvalue |= 1;
+                wend = i;
+            }
+        }
+
+        /* wend is the size of the current window */
+        j = wend + 1;
+        /* add the 'bytes above' */
+        if (!start)
+            for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
+                if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(r, r, r, mont, ctx))
+                    goto err;
+            }
+
+        /* wvalue will be an odd number < 2^window */
+        if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(r, r, val[wvalue >> 1], mont, ctx))
+            goto err;
+
+        /* move the 'window' down further */
+        wstart -= wend + 1;
+        wvalue = 0;
+        start = 0;
+        if (wstart < 0)
+            break;
+    }
+#if defined(SPARC_T4_MONT)
+    if (OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] & (SPARCV9_VIS3 | SPARCV9_PREFER_FPU)) {
+        j = mont->N.top;        /* borrow j */
+        val[0]->d[0] = 1;       /* borrow val[0] */
+        for (i = 1; i < j; i++)
+            val[0]->d[i] = 0;
+        val[0]->top = j;
+        if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(rr, r, val[0], mont, ctx))
+            goto err;
+    } else
+#endif
+    if (!BN_from_montgomery(rr, r, mont, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    if (in_mont == NULL)
+        BN_MONT_CTX_free(mont);
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    bn_check_top(rr);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+#if defined(SPARC_T4_MONT)
+static BN_ULONG bn_get_bits(const BIGNUM *a, int bitpos)
+{
+    BN_ULONG ret = 0;
+    int wordpos;
+
+    wordpos = bitpos / BN_BITS2;
+    bitpos %= BN_BITS2;
+    if (wordpos >= 0 && wordpos < a->top) {
+        ret = a->d[wordpos] & BN_MASK2;
+        if (bitpos) {
+            ret >>= bitpos;
+            if (++wordpos < a->top)
+                ret |= a->d[wordpos] << (BN_BITS2 - bitpos);
+        }
+    }
+
+    return ret & BN_MASK2;
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime() stores the precomputed powers in a specific
+ * layout so that accessing any of these table values shows the same access
+ * pattern as far as cache lines are concerned.  The following functions are
+ * used to transfer a BIGNUM from/to that table.
+ */
+
+static int MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_TO_PREBUF(const BIGNUM *b, int top,
+                                        unsigned char *buf, int idx,
+                                        int window)
+{
+    int i, j;
+    int width = 1 << window;
+    BN_ULONG *table = (BN_ULONG *)buf;
+
+    if (top > b->top)
+        top = b->top;           /* this works because 'buf' is explicitly
+                                 * zeroed */
+    for (i = 0, j = idx; i < top; i++, j += width) {
+        table[j] = b->d[i];
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_FROM_PREBUF(BIGNUM *b, int top,
+                                          unsigned char *buf, int idx,
+                                          int window)
+{
+    int i, j;
+    int width = 1 << window;
+    /*
+     * We declare table 'volatile' in order to discourage compiler
+     * from reordering loads from the table. Concern is that if
+     * reordered in specific manner loads might give away the
+     * information we are trying to conceal. Some would argue that
+     * compiler can reorder them anyway, but it can as well be
+     * argued that doing so would be violation of standard...
+     */
+    volatile BN_ULONG *table = (volatile BN_ULONG *)buf;
+
+    if (bn_wexpand(b, top) == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    if (window <= 3) {
+        for (i = 0; i < top; i++, table += width) {
+            BN_ULONG acc = 0;
+
+            for (j = 0; j < width; j++) {
+                acc |= table[j] &
+                       ((BN_ULONG)0 - (constant_time_eq_int(j,idx)&1));
+            }
+
+            b->d[i] = acc;
+        }
+    } else {
+        int xstride = 1 << (window - 2);
+        BN_ULONG y0, y1, y2, y3;
+
+        i = idx >> (window - 2);        /* equivalent of idx / xstride */
+        idx &= xstride - 1;             /* equivalent of idx % xstride */
+
+        y0 = (BN_ULONG)0 - (constant_time_eq_int(i,0)&1);
+        y1 = (BN_ULONG)0 - (constant_time_eq_int(i,1)&1);
+        y2 = (BN_ULONG)0 - (constant_time_eq_int(i,2)&1);
+        y3 = (BN_ULONG)0 - (constant_time_eq_int(i,3)&1);
+
+        for (i = 0; i < top; i++, table += width) {
+            BN_ULONG acc = 0;
+
+            for (j = 0; j < xstride; j++) {
+                acc |= ( (table[j + 0 * xstride] & y0) |
+                         (table[j + 1 * xstride] & y1) |
+                         (table[j + 2 * xstride] & y2) |
+                         (table[j + 3 * xstride] & y3) )
+                       & ((BN_ULONG)0 - (constant_time_eq_int(j,idx)&1));
+            }
+
+            b->d[i] = acc;
+        }
+    }
+
+    b->top = top;
+    bn_correct_top(b);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Given a pointer value, compute the next address that is a cache line
+ * multiple.
+ */
+#define MOD_EXP_CTIME_ALIGN(x_) \
+        ((unsigned char*)(x_) + (MOD_EXP_CTIME_MIN_CACHE_LINE_WIDTH - (((size_t)(x_)) & (MOD_EXP_CTIME_MIN_CACHE_LINE_MASK))))
+
+/*
+ * This variant of BN_mod_exp_mont() uses fixed windows and the special
+ * precomputation memory layout to limit data-dependency to a minimum to
+ * protect secret exponents (cf. the hyper-threading timing attacks pointed
+ * out by Colin Percival,
+ * http://www.daemonology.net/hyperthreading-considered-harmful/)
+ */
+int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
+                              const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx,
+                              BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont)
+{
+    int i, bits, ret = 0, window, wvalue;
+    int top;
+    BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL;
+
+    int numPowers;
+    unsigned char *powerbufFree = NULL;
+    int powerbufLen = 0;
+    unsigned char *powerbuf = NULL;
+    BIGNUM tmp, am;
+#if defined(SPARC_T4_MONT)
+    unsigned int t4 = 0;
+#endif
+
+    bn_check_top(a);
+    bn_check_top(p);
+    bn_check_top(m);
+
+    if (!BN_is_odd(m)) {
+        BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_MONT_CONSTTIME, BN_R_CALLED_WITH_EVEN_MODULUS);
+        return (0);
+    }
+
+    top = m->top;
+
+    /*
+     * Use all bits stored in |p|, rather than |BN_num_bits|, so we do not leak
+     * whether the top bits are zero.
+     */
+    bits = p->top * BN_BITS2;
+    if (bits == 0) {
+        /* x**0 mod 1 is still zero. */
+        if (BN_is_one(m)) {
+            ret = 1;
+            BN_zero(rr);
+        } else {
+            ret = BN_one(rr);
+        }
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+
+    /*
+     * Allocate a montgomery context if it was not supplied by the caller. If
+     * this is not done, things will break in the montgomery part.
+     */
+    if (in_mont != NULL)
+        mont = in_mont;
+    else {
+        if ((mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont, m, ctx))
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+#ifdef RSAZ_ENABLED
+    /*
+     * If the size of the operands allow it, perform the optimized
+     * RSAZ exponentiation. For further information see
+     * crypto/bn/rsaz_exp.c and accompanying assembly modules.
+     */
+    if ((16 == a->top) && (16 == p->top) && (BN_num_bits(m) == 1024)
+        && rsaz_avx2_eligible()) {
+        if (NULL == bn_wexpand(rr, 16))
+            goto err;
+        RSAZ_1024_mod_exp_avx2(rr->d, a->d, p->d, m->d, mont->RR.d,
+                               mont->n0[0]);
+        rr->top = 16;
+        rr->neg = 0;
+        bn_correct_top(rr);
+        ret = 1;
+        goto err;
+    } else if ((8 == a->top) && (8 == p->top) && (BN_num_bits(m) == 512)) {
+        if (NULL == bn_wexpand(rr, 8))
+            goto err;
+        RSAZ_512_mod_exp(rr->d, a->d, p->d, m->d, mont->n0[0], mont->RR.d);
+        rr->top = 8;
+        rr->neg = 0;
+        bn_correct_top(rr);
+        ret = 1;
+        goto err;
+    }
+#endif
+
+    /* Get the window size to use with size of p. */
+    window = BN_window_bits_for_ctime_exponent_size(bits);
+#if defined(SPARC_T4_MONT)
+    if (window >= 5 && (top & 15) == 0 && top <= 64 &&
+        (OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[1] & (CFR_MONTMUL | CFR_MONTSQR)) ==
+        (CFR_MONTMUL | CFR_MONTSQR) && (t4 = OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0]))
+        window = 5;
+    else
+#endif
+#if defined(OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT5)
+    if (window >= 5) {
+        window = 5;             /* ~5% improvement for RSA2048 sign, and even
+                                 * for RSA4096 */
+        /* reserve space for mont->N.d[] copy */
+        powerbufLen += top * sizeof(mont->N.d[0]);
+    }
+#endif
+    (void)0;
+
+    /*
+     * Allocate a buffer large enough to hold all of the pre-computed powers
+     * of am, am itself and tmp.
+     */
+    numPowers = 1 << window;
+    powerbufLen += sizeof(m->d[0]) * (top * numPowers +
+                                      ((2 * top) >
+                                       numPowers ? (2 * top) : numPowers));
+#ifdef alloca
+    if (powerbufLen < 3072)
+        powerbufFree =
+            alloca(powerbufLen + MOD_EXP_CTIME_MIN_CACHE_LINE_WIDTH);
+    else
+#endif
+        if ((powerbufFree =
+             OPENSSL_malloc(powerbufLen + MOD_EXP_CTIME_MIN_CACHE_LINE_WIDTH))
+            == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    powerbuf = MOD_EXP_CTIME_ALIGN(powerbufFree);
+    memset(powerbuf, 0, powerbufLen);
+
+#ifdef alloca
+    if (powerbufLen < 3072)
+        powerbufFree = NULL;
+#endif
+
+    /* lay down tmp and am right after powers table */
+    tmp.d = (BN_ULONG *)(powerbuf + sizeof(m->d[0]) * top * numPowers);
+    am.d = tmp.d + top;
+    tmp.top = am.top = 0;
+    tmp.dmax = am.dmax = top;
+    tmp.neg = am.neg = 0;
+    tmp.flags = am.flags = BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA;
+
+    /* prepare a^0 in Montgomery domain */
+#if 1                           /* by Shay Gueron's suggestion */
+    if (m->d[top - 1] & (((BN_ULONG)1) << (BN_BITS2 - 1))) {
+        /* 2^(top*BN_BITS2) - m */
+        tmp.d[0] = (0 - m->d[0]) & BN_MASK2;
+        for (i = 1; i < top; i++)
+            tmp.d[i] = (~m->d[i]) & BN_MASK2;
+        tmp.top = top;
+    } else
+#endif
+    if (!BN_to_montgomery(&tmp, BN_value_one(), mont, ctx))
+        goto err;
+
+    /* prepare a^1 in Montgomery domain */
+    if (a->neg || BN_ucmp(a, m) >= 0) {
+        if (!BN_mod(&am, a, m, ctx))
+            goto err;
+        if (!BN_to_montgomery(&am, &am, mont, ctx))
+            goto err;
+    } else if (!BN_to_montgomery(&am, a, mont, ctx))
+        goto err;
+
+#if defined(SPARC_T4_MONT)
+    if (t4) {
+        typedef int (*bn_pwr5_mont_f) (BN_ULONG *tp, const BN_ULONG *np,
+                                       const BN_ULONG *n0, const void *table,
+                                       int power, int bits);
+        int bn_pwr5_mont_t4_8(BN_ULONG *tp, const BN_ULONG *np,
+                              const BN_ULONG *n0, const void *table,
+                              int power, int bits);
+        int bn_pwr5_mont_t4_16(BN_ULONG *tp, const BN_ULONG *np,
+                               const BN_ULONG *n0, const void *table,
+                               int power, int bits);
+        int bn_pwr5_mont_t4_24(BN_ULONG *tp, const BN_ULONG *np,
+                               const BN_ULONG *n0, const void *table,
+                               int power, int bits);
+        int bn_pwr5_mont_t4_32(BN_ULONG *tp, const BN_ULONG *np,
+                               const BN_ULONG *n0, const void *table,
+                               int power, int bits);
+        static const bn_pwr5_mont_f pwr5_funcs[4] = {
+            bn_pwr5_mont_t4_8, bn_pwr5_mont_t4_16,
+            bn_pwr5_mont_t4_24, bn_pwr5_mont_t4_32
+        };
+        bn_pwr5_mont_f pwr5_worker = pwr5_funcs[top / 16 - 1];
+
+        typedef int (*bn_mul_mont_f) (BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap,
+                                      const void *bp, const BN_ULONG *np,
+                                      const BN_ULONG *n0);
+        int bn_mul_mont_t4_8(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const void *bp,
+                             const BN_ULONG *np, const BN_ULONG *n0);
+        int bn_mul_mont_t4_16(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap,
+                              const void *bp, const BN_ULONG *np,
+                              const BN_ULONG *n0);
+        int bn_mul_mont_t4_24(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap,
+                              const void *bp, const BN_ULONG *np,
+                              const BN_ULONG *n0);
+        int bn_mul_mont_t4_32(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap,
+                              const void *bp, const BN_ULONG *np,
+                              const BN_ULONG *n0);
+        static const bn_mul_mont_f mul_funcs[4] = {
+            bn_mul_mont_t4_8, bn_mul_mont_t4_16,
+            bn_mul_mont_t4_24, bn_mul_mont_t4_32
+        };
+        bn_mul_mont_f mul_worker = mul_funcs[top / 16 - 1];
+
+        void bn_mul_mont_vis3(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap,
+                              const void *bp, const BN_ULONG *np,
+                              const BN_ULONG *n0, int num);
+        void bn_mul_mont_t4(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap,
+                            const void *bp, const BN_ULONG *np,
+                            const BN_ULONG *n0, int num);
+        void bn_mul_mont_gather5_t4(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap,
+                                    const void *table, const BN_ULONG *np,
+                                    const BN_ULONG *n0, int num, int power);
+        void bn_flip_n_scatter5_t4(const BN_ULONG *inp, size_t num,
+                                   void *table, size_t power);
+        void bn_gather5_t4(BN_ULONG *out, size_t num,
+                           void *table, size_t power);
+        void bn_flip_t4(BN_ULONG *dst, BN_ULONG *src, size_t num);
+
+        BN_ULONG *np = mont->N.d, *n0 = mont->n0;
+        int stride = 5 * (6 - (top / 16 - 1)); /* multiple of 5, but less
+                                                * than 32 */
+
+        /*
+         * BN_to_montgomery can contaminate words above .top [in
+         * BN_DEBUG[_DEBUG] build]...
+         */
+        for (i = am.top; i < top; i++)
+            am.d[i] = 0;
+        for (i = tmp.top; i < top; i++)
+            tmp.d[i] = 0;
+
+        bn_flip_n_scatter5_t4(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, 0);
+        bn_flip_n_scatter5_t4(am.d, top, powerbuf, 1);
+        if (!(*mul_worker) (tmp.d, am.d, am.d, np, n0) &&
+            !(*mul_worker) (tmp.d, am.d, am.d, np, n0))
+            bn_mul_mont_vis3(tmp.d, am.d, am.d, np, n0, top);
+        bn_flip_n_scatter5_t4(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, 2);
+
+        for (i = 3; i < 32; i++) {
+            /* Calculate a^i = a^(i-1) * a */
+            if (!(*mul_worker) (tmp.d, tmp.d, am.d, np, n0) &&
+                !(*mul_worker) (tmp.d, tmp.d, am.d, np, n0))
+                bn_mul_mont_vis3(tmp.d, tmp.d, am.d, np, n0, top);
+            bn_flip_n_scatter5_t4(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, i);
+        }
+
+        /* switch to 64-bit domain */
+        np = alloca(top * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
+        top /= 2;
+        bn_flip_t4(np, mont->N.d, top);
+
+        bits--;
+        for (wvalue = 0, i = bits % 5; i >= 0; i--, bits--)
+            wvalue = (wvalue << 1) + BN_is_bit_set(p, bits);
+        bn_gather5_t4(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, wvalue);
+
+        /*
+         * Scan the exponent one window at a time starting from the most
+         * significant bits.
+         */
+        while (bits >= 0) {
+            if (bits < stride)
+                stride = bits + 1;
+            bits -= stride;
+            wvalue = bn_get_bits(p, bits + 1);
+
+            if ((*pwr5_worker) (tmp.d, np, n0, powerbuf, wvalue, stride))
+                continue;
+            /* retry once and fall back */
+            if ((*pwr5_worker) (tmp.d, np, n0, powerbuf, wvalue, stride))
+                continue;
+
+            bits += stride - 5;
+            wvalue >>= stride - 5;
+            wvalue &= 31;
+            bn_mul_mont_t4(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top);
+            bn_mul_mont_t4(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top);
+            bn_mul_mont_t4(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top);
+            bn_mul_mont_t4(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top);
+            bn_mul_mont_t4(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top);
+            bn_mul_mont_gather5_t4(tmp.d, tmp.d, powerbuf, np, n0, top,
+                                   wvalue);
+        }
+
+        bn_flip_t4(tmp.d, tmp.d, top);
+        top *= 2;
+        /* back to 32-bit domain */
+        tmp.top = top;
+        bn_correct_top(&tmp);
+        OPENSSL_cleanse(np, top * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
+    } else
+#endif
+#if defined(OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT5)
+    if (window == 5 && top > 1) {
+        /*
+         * This optimization uses ideas from http://eprint.iacr.org/2011/239,
+         * specifically optimization of cache-timing attack countermeasures
+         * and pre-computation optimization.
+         */
+
+        /*
+         * Dedicated window==4 case improves 512-bit RSA sign by ~15%, but as
+         * 512-bit RSA is hardly relevant, we omit it to spare size...
+         */
+        void bn_mul_mont_gather5(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap,
+                                 const void *table, const BN_ULONG *np,
+                                 const BN_ULONG *n0, int num, int power);
+        void bn_scatter5(const BN_ULONG *inp, size_t num,
+                         void *table, size_t power);
+        void bn_gather5(BN_ULONG *out, size_t num, void *table, size_t power);
+        void bn_power5(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap,
+                       const void *table, const BN_ULONG *np,
+                       const BN_ULONG *n0, int num, int power);
+        int bn_get_bits5(const BN_ULONG *ap, int off);
+        int bn_from_montgomery(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap,
+                               const BN_ULONG *not_used, const BN_ULONG *np,
+                               const BN_ULONG *n0, int num);
+
+        BN_ULONG *n0 = mont->n0, *np;
+
+        /*
+         * BN_to_montgomery can contaminate words above .top [in
+         * BN_DEBUG[_DEBUG] build]...
+         */
+        for (i = am.top; i < top; i++)
+            am.d[i] = 0;
+        for (i = tmp.top; i < top; i++)
+            tmp.d[i] = 0;
+
+        /*
+         * copy mont->N.d[] to improve cache locality
+         */
+        for (np = am.d + top, i = 0; i < top; i++)
+            np[i] = mont->N.d[i];
+
+        bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, 0);
+        bn_scatter5(am.d, am.top, powerbuf, 1);
+        bn_mul_mont(tmp.d, am.d, am.d, np, n0, top);
+        bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, 2);
+
+# if 0
+        for (i = 3; i < 32; i++) {
+            /* Calculate a^i = a^(i-1) * a */
+            bn_mul_mont_gather5(tmp.d, am.d, powerbuf, np, n0, top, i - 1);
+            bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, i);
+        }
+# else
+        /* same as above, but uses squaring for 1/2 of operations */
+        for (i = 4; i < 32; i *= 2) {
+            bn_mul_mont(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top);
+            bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, i);
+        }
+        for (i = 3; i < 8; i += 2) {
+            int j;
+            bn_mul_mont_gather5(tmp.d, am.d, powerbuf, np, n0, top, i - 1);
+            bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, i);
+            for (j = 2 * i; j < 32; j *= 2) {
+                bn_mul_mont(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top);
+                bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, j);
+            }
+        }
+        for (; i < 16; i += 2) {
+            bn_mul_mont_gather5(tmp.d, am.d, powerbuf, np, n0, top, i - 1);
+            bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, i);
+            bn_mul_mont(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top);
+            bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, 2 * i);
+        }
+        for (; i < 32; i += 2) {
+            bn_mul_mont_gather5(tmp.d, am.d, powerbuf, np, n0, top, i - 1);
+            bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, i);
+        }
+# endif
+        bits--;
+        for (wvalue = 0, i = bits % 5; i >= 0; i--, bits--)
+            wvalue = (wvalue << 1) + BN_is_bit_set(p, bits);
+        bn_gather5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, wvalue);
+
+        /*
+         * Scan the exponent one window at a time starting from the most
+         * significant bits.
+         */
+        if (top & 7)
+            while (bits >= 0) {
+                for (wvalue = 0, i = 0; i < 5; i++, bits--)
+                    wvalue = (wvalue << 1) + BN_is_bit_set(p, bits);
+
+                bn_mul_mont(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top);
+                bn_mul_mont(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top);
+                bn_mul_mont(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top);
+                bn_mul_mont(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top);
+                bn_mul_mont(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top);
+                bn_mul_mont_gather5(tmp.d, tmp.d, powerbuf, np, n0, top,
+                                    wvalue);
+        } else {
+            while (bits >= 0) {
+                wvalue = bn_get_bits5(p->d, bits - 4);
+                bits -= 5;
+                bn_power5(tmp.d, tmp.d, powerbuf, np, n0, top, wvalue);
+            }
+        }
+
+        ret = bn_from_montgomery(tmp.d, tmp.d, NULL, np, n0, top);
+        tmp.top = top;
+        bn_correct_top(&tmp);
+        if (ret) {
+            if (!BN_copy(rr, &tmp))
+                ret = 0;
+            goto err;           /* non-zero ret means it's not error */
+        }
+    } else
+#endif
+    {
+        if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_TO_PREBUF(&tmp, top, powerbuf, 0, window))
+            goto err;
+        if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_TO_PREBUF(&am, top, powerbuf, 1, window))
+            goto err;
+
+        /*
+         * If the window size is greater than 1, then calculate
+         * val[i=2..2^winsize-1]. Powers are computed as a*a^(i-1) (even
+         * powers could instead be computed as (a^(i/2))^2 to use the slight
+         * performance advantage of sqr over mul).
+         */
+        if (window > 1) {
+            if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(&tmp, &am, &am, mont, ctx))
+                goto err;
+            if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_TO_PREBUF(&tmp, top, powerbuf, 2,
+                                              window))
+                goto err;
+            for (i = 3; i < numPowers; i++) {
+                /* Calculate a^i = a^(i-1) * a */
+                if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(&tmp, &am, &tmp, mont, ctx))
+                    goto err;
+                if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_TO_PREBUF(&tmp, top, powerbuf, i,
+                                                  window))
+                    goto err;
+            }
+        }
+
+        bits--;
+        for (wvalue = 0, i = bits % window; i >= 0; i--, bits--)
+            wvalue = (wvalue << 1) + BN_is_bit_set(p, bits);
+        if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_FROM_PREBUF(&tmp, top, powerbuf, wvalue,
+                                            window))
+            goto err;
+
+        /*
+         * Scan the exponent one window at a time starting from the most
+         * significant bits.
+         */
+        while (bits >= 0) {
+            wvalue = 0;         /* The 'value' of the window */
+
+            /* Scan the window, squaring the result as we go */
+            for (i = 0; i < window; i++, bits--) {
+                if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(&tmp, &tmp, &tmp, mont, ctx))
+                    goto err;
+                wvalue = (wvalue << 1) + BN_is_bit_set(p, bits);
+            }
+
+            /*
+             * Fetch the appropriate pre-computed value from the pre-buf
+             */
+            if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_FROM_PREBUF(&am, top, powerbuf, wvalue,
+                                                window))
+                goto err;
+
+            /* Multiply the result into the intermediate result */
+            if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(&tmp, &tmp, &am, mont, ctx))
+                goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* Convert the final result from montgomery to standard format */
+#if defined(SPARC_T4_MONT)
+    if (OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] & (SPARCV9_VIS3 | SPARCV9_PREFER_FPU)) {
+        am.d[0] = 1;            /* borrow am */
+        for (i = 1; i < top; i++)
+            am.d[i] = 0;
+        if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(rr, &tmp, &am, mont, ctx))
+            goto err;
+    } else
+#endif
+    if (!BN_from_montgomery(rr, &tmp, mont, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    if (in_mont == NULL)
+        BN_MONT_CTX_free(mont);
+    if (powerbuf != NULL) {
+        OPENSSL_cleanse(powerbuf, powerbufLen);
+        OPENSSL_free(powerbufFree);
+    }
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+int BN_mod_exp_mont_word(BIGNUM *rr, BN_ULONG a, const BIGNUM *p,
+                         const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont)
+{
+    BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL;
+    int b, bits, ret = 0;
+    int r_is_one;
+    BN_ULONG w, next_w;
+    BIGNUM *d, *r, *t;
+    BIGNUM *swap_tmp;
+#define BN_MOD_MUL_WORD(r, w, m) \
+                (BN_mul_word(r, (w)) && \
+                (/* BN_ucmp(r, (m)) < 0 ? 1 :*/  \
+                        (BN_mod(t, r, m, ctx) && (swap_tmp = r, r = t, t = swap_tmp, 1))))
+    /*
+     * BN_MOD_MUL_WORD is only used with 'w' large, so the BN_ucmp test is
+     * probably more overhead than always using BN_mod (which uses BN_copy if
+     * a similar test returns true).
+     */
+    /*
+     * We can use BN_mod and do not need BN_nnmod because our accumulator is
+     * never negative (the result of BN_mod does not depend on the sign of
+     * the modulus).
+     */
+#define BN_TO_MONTGOMERY_WORD(r, w, mont) \
+                (BN_set_word(r, (w)) && BN_to_montgomery(r, r, (mont), ctx))
+
+    if (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0
+            || BN_get_flags(m, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) {
+        /* BN_FLG_CONSTTIME only supported by BN_mod_exp_mont() */
+        BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_MONT_WORD, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    bn_check_top(p);
+    bn_check_top(m);
+
+    if (!BN_is_odd(m)) {
+        BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_MONT_WORD, BN_R_CALLED_WITH_EVEN_MODULUS);
+        return (0);
+    }
+    if (m->top == 1)
+        a %= m->d[0];           /* make sure that 'a' is reduced */
+
+    bits = BN_num_bits(p);
+    if (bits == 0) {
+        /* x**0 mod 1 is still zero. */
+        if (BN_is_one(m)) {
+            ret = 1;
+            BN_zero(rr);
+        } else {
+            ret = BN_one(rr);
+        }
+        return ret;
+    }
+    if (a == 0) {
+        BN_zero(rr);
+        ret = 1;
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    d = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    r = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    t = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (d == NULL || r == NULL || t == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (in_mont != NULL)
+        mont = in_mont;
+    else {
+        if ((mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont, m, ctx))
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    r_is_one = 1;               /* except for Montgomery factor */
+
+    /* bits-1 >= 0 */
+
+    /* The result is accumulated in the product r*w. */
+    w = a;                      /* bit 'bits-1' of 'p' is always set */
+    for (b = bits - 2; b >= 0; b--) {
+        /* First, square r*w. */
+        next_w = w * w;
+        if ((next_w / w) != w) { /* overflow */
+            if (r_is_one) {
+                if (!BN_TO_MONTGOMERY_WORD(r, w, mont))
+                    goto err;
+                r_is_one = 0;
+            } else {
+                if (!BN_MOD_MUL_WORD(r, w, m))
+                    goto err;
+            }
+            next_w = 1;
+        }
+        w = next_w;
+        if (!r_is_one) {
+            if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(r, r, r, mont, ctx))
+                goto err;
+        }
+
+        /* Second, multiply r*w by 'a' if exponent bit is set. */
+        if (BN_is_bit_set(p, b)) {
+            next_w = w * a;
+            if ((next_w / a) != w) { /* overflow */
+                if (r_is_one) {
+                    if (!BN_TO_MONTGOMERY_WORD(r, w, mont))
+                        goto err;
+                    r_is_one = 0;
+                } else {
+                    if (!BN_MOD_MUL_WORD(r, w, m))
+                        goto err;
+                }
+                next_w = a;
+            }
+            w = next_w;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* Finally, set r:=r*w. */
+    if (w != 1) {
+        if (r_is_one) {
+            if (!BN_TO_MONTGOMERY_WORD(r, w, mont))
+                goto err;
+            r_is_one = 0;
+        } else {
+            if (!BN_MOD_MUL_WORD(r, w, m))
+                goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (r_is_one) {             /* can happen only if a == 1 */
+        if (!BN_one(rr))
+            goto err;
+    } else {
+        if (!BN_from_montgomery(rr, r, mont, ctx))
+            goto err;
+    }
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    if (in_mont == NULL)
+        BN_MONT_CTX_free(mont);
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    bn_check_top(rr);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+/* The old fallback, simple version :-) */
+int BN_mod_exp_simple(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
+                      const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int i, j, bits, ret = 0, wstart, wend, window, wvalue;
+    int start = 1;
+    BIGNUM *d;
+    /* Table of variables obtained from 'ctx' */
+    BIGNUM *val[TABLE_SIZE];
+
+    if (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0
+            || BN_get_flags(a, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0
+            || BN_get_flags(m, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) {
+        /* BN_FLG_CONSTTIME only supported by BN_mod_exp_mont() */
+        BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_SIMPLE, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    bits = BN_num_bits(p);
+   if (bits == 0) {
+        /* x**0 mod 1 is still zero. */
+        if (BN_is_one(m)) {
+            ret = 1;
+            BN_zero(r);
+        } else {
+            ret = BN_one(r);
+        }
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    d = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    val[0] = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (!d || !val[0])
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!BN_nnmod(val[0], a, m, ctx))
+        goto err;               /* 1 */
+    if (BN_is_zero(val[0])) {
+        BN_zero(r);
+        ret = 1;
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    window = BN_window_bits_for_exponent_size(bits);
+    if (window > 1) {
+        if (!BN_mod_mul(d, val[0], val[0], m, ctx))
+            goto err;           /* 2 */
+        j = 1 << (window - 1);
+        for (i = 1; i < j; i++) {
+            if (((val[i] = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) ||
+                !BN_mod_mul(val[i], val[i - 1], d, m, ctx))
+                goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    start = 1;                  /* This is used to avoid multiplication etc
+                                 * when there is only the value '1' in the
+                                 * buffer. */
+    wvalue = 0;                 /* The 'value' of the window */
+    wstart = bits - 1;          /* The top bit of the window */
+    wend = 0;                   /* The bottom bit of the window */
+
+    if (!BN_one(r))
+        goto err;
+
+    for (;;) {
+        if (BN_is_bit_set(p, wstart) == 0) {
+            if (!start)
+                if (!BN_mod_mul(r, r, r, m, ctx))
+                    goto err;
+            if (wstart == 0)
+                break;
+            wstart--;
+            continue;
+        }
+        /*
+         * We now have wstart on a 'set' bit, we now need to work out how bit
+         * a window to do.  To do this we need to scan forward until the last
+         * set bit before the end of the window
+         */
+        j = wstart;
+        wvalue = 1;
+        wend = 0;
+        for (i = 1; i < window; i++) {
+            if (wstart - i < 0)
+                break;
+            if (BN_is_bit_set(p, wstart - i)) {
+                wvalue <<= (i - wend);
+                wvalue |= 1;
+                wend = i;
+            }
+        }
+
+        /* wend is the size of the current window */
+        j = wend + 1;
+        /* add the 'bytes above' */
+        if (!start)
+            for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
+                if (!BN_mod_mul(r, r, r, m, ctx))
+                    goto err;
+            }
+
+        /* wvalue will be an odd number < 2^window */
+        if (!BN_mod_mul(r, r, val[wvalue >> 1], m, ctx))
+            goto err;
+
+        /* move the 'window' down further */
+        wstart -= wend + 1;
+        wvalue = 0;
+        start = 0;
+        if (wstart < 0)
+            break;
+    }
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    bn_check_top(r);
+    return (ret);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_exp2.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_exp2.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5141c21
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_exp2.c
@@ -0,0 +1,201 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "bn_lcl.h"
+
+#define TABLE_SIZE      32
+
+int BN_mod_exp2_mont(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a1, const BIGNUM *p1,
+                     const BIGNUM *a2, const BIGNUM *p2, const BIGNUM *m,
+                     BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont)
+{
+    int i, j, bits, b, bits1, bits2, ret =
+        0, wpos1, wpos2, window1, window2, wvalue1, wvalue2;
+    int r_is_one = 1;
+    BIGNUM *d, *r;
+    const BIGNUM *a_mod_m;
+    /* Tables of variables obtained from 'ctx' */
+    BIGNUM *val1[TABLE_SIZE], *val2[TABLE_SIZE];
+    BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL;
+
+    bn_check_top(a1);
+    bn_check_top(p1);
+    bn_check_top(a2);
+    bn_check_top(p2);
+    bn_check_top(m);
+
+    if (!(m->d[0] & 1)) {
+        BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP2_MONT, BN_R_CALLED_WITH_EVEN_MODULUS);
+        return (0);
+    }
+    bits1 = BN_num_bits(p1);
+    bits2 = BN_num_bits(p2);
+    if ((bits1 == 0) && (bits2 == 0)) {
+        ret = BN_one(rr);
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    bits = (bits1 > bits2) ? bits1 : bits2;
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    d = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    r = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    val1[0] = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    val2[0] = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (!d || !r || !val1[0] || !val2[0])
+        goto err;
+
+    if (in_mont != NULL)
+        mont = in_mont;
+    else {
+        if ((mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont, m, ctx))
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    window1 = BN_window_bits_for_exponent_size(bits1);
+    window2 = BN_window_bits_for_exponent_size(bits2);
+
+    /*
+     * Build table for a1:   val1[i] := a1^(2*i + 1) mod m  for i = 0 .. 2^(window1-1)
+     */
+    if (a1->neg || BN_ucmp(a1, m) >= 0) {
+        if (!BN_mod(val1[0], a1, m, ctx))
+            goto err;
+        a_mod_m = val1[0];
+    } else
+        a_mod_m = a1;
+    if (BN_is_zero(a_mod_m)) {
+        BN_zero(rr);
+        ret = 1;
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!BN_to_montgomery(val1[0], a_mod_m, mont, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    if (window1 > 1) {
+        if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(d, val1[0], val1[0], mont, ctx))
+            goto err;
+
+        j = 1 << (window1 - 1);
+        for (i = 1; i < j; i++) {
+            if (((val1[i] = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) ||
+                !BN_mod_mul_montgomery(val1[i], val1[i - 1], d, mont, ctx))
+                goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Build table for a2:   val2[i] := a2^(2*i + 1) mod m  for i = 0 .. 2^(window2-1)
+     */
+    if (a2->neg || BN_ucmp(a2, m) >= 0) {
+        if (!BN_mod(val2[0], a2, m, ctx))
+            goto err;
+        a_mod_m = val2[0];
+    } else
+        a_mod_m = a2;
+    if (BN_is_zero(a_mod_m)) {
+        BN_zero(rr);
+        ret = 1;
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (!BN_to_montgomery(val2[0], a_mod_m, mont, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    if (window2 > 1) {
+        if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(d, val2[0], val2[0], mont, ctx))
+            goto err;
+
+        j = 1 << (window2 - 1);
+        for (i = 1; i < j; i++) {
+            if (((val2[i] = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) ||
+                !BN_mod_mul_montgomery(val2[i], val2[i - 1], d, mont, ctx))
+                goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* Now compute the power product, using independent windows. */
+    r_is_one = 1;
+    wvalue1 = 0;                /* The 'value' of the first window */
+    wvalue2 = 0;                /* The 'value' of the second window */
+    wpos1 = 0;                  /* If wvalue1 > 0, the bottom bit of the
+                                 * first window */
+    wpos2 = 0;                  /* If wvalue2 > 0, the bottom bit of the
+                                 * second window */
+
+    if (!BN_to_montgomery(r, BN_value_one(), mont, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    for (b = bits - 1; b >= 0; b--) {
+        if (!r_is_one) {
+            if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(r, r, r, mont, ctx))
+                goto err;
+        }
+
+        if (!wvalue1)
+            if (BN_is_bit_set(p1, b)) {
+                /*
+                 * consider bits b-window1+1 .. b for this window
+                 */
+                i = b - window1 + 1;
+                while (!BN_is_bit_set(p1, i)) /* works for i<0 */
+                    i++;
+                wpos1 = i;
+                wvalue1 = 1;
+                for (i = b - 1; i >= wpos1; i--) {
+                    wvalue1 <<= 1;
+                    if (BN_is_bit_set(p1, i))
+                        wvalue1++;
+                }
+            }
+
+        if (!wvalue2)
+            if (BN_is_bit_set(p2, b)) {
+                /*
+                 * consider bits b-window2+1 .. b for this window
+                 */
+                i = b - window2 + 1;
+                while (!BN_is_bit_set(p2, i))
+                    i++;
+                wpos2 = i;
+                wvalue2 = 1;
+                for (i = b - 1; i >= wpos2; i--) {
+                    wvalue2 <<= 1;
+                    if (BN_is_bit_set(p2, i))
+                        wvalue2++;
+                }
+            }
+
+        if (wvalue1 && b == wpos1) {
+            /* wvalue1 is odd and < 2^window1 */
+            if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(r, r, val1[wvalue1 >> 1], mont, ctx))
+                goto err;
+            wvalue1 = 0;
+            r_is_one = 0;
+        }
+
+        if (wvalue2 && b == wpos2) {
+            /* wvalue2 is odd and < 2^window2 */
+            if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(r, r, val2[wvalue2 >> 1], mont, ctx))
+                goto err;
+            wvalue2 = 0;
+            r_is_one = 0;
+        }
+    }
+    if (!BN_from_montgomery(rr, r, mont, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    if (in_mont == NULL)
+        BN_MONT_CTX_free(mont);
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    bn_check_top(rr);
+    return (ret);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0676426
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c
@@ -0,0 +1,616 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "bn_lcl.h"
+
+static BIGNUM *euclid(BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b);
+
+int BN_gcd(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *in_a, const BIGNUM *in_b, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    BIGNUM *a, *b, *t;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    bn_check_top(in_a);
+    bn_check_top(in_b);
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    a = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    b = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (a == NULL || b == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (BN_copy(a, in_a) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (BN_copy(b, in_b) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    a->neg = 0;
+    b->neg = 0;
+
+    if (BN_cmp(a, b) < 0) {
+        t = a;
+        a = b;
+        b = t;
+    }
+    t = euclid(a, b);
+    if (t == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (BN_copy(r, t) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    bn_check_top(r);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static BIGNUM *euclid(BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b)
+{
+    BIGNUM *t;
+    int shifts = 0;
+
+    bn_check_top(a);
+    bn_check_top(b);
+
+    /* 0 <= b <= a */
+    while (!BN_is_zero(b)) {
+        /* 0 < b <= a */
+
+        if (BN_is_odd(a)) {
+            if (BN_is_odd(b)) {
+                if (!BN_sub(a, a, b))
+                    goto err;
+                if (!BN_rshift1(a, a))
+                    goto err;
+                if (BN_cmp(a, b) < 0) {
+                    t = a;
+                    a = b;
+                    b = t;
+                }
+            } else {            /* a odd - b even */
+
+                if (!BN_rshift1(b, b))
+                    goto err;
+                if (BN_cmp(a, b) < 0) {
+                    t = a;
+                    a = b;
+                    b = t;
+                }
+            }
+        } else {                /* a is even */
+
+            if (BN_is_odd(b)) {
+                if (!BN_rshift1(a, a))
+                    goto err;
+                if (BN_cmp(a, b) < 0) {
+                    t = a;
+                    a = b;
+                    b = t;
+                }
+            } else {            /* a even - b even */
+
+                if (!BN_rshift1(a, a))
+                    goto err;
+                if (!BN_rshift1(b, b))
+                    goto err;
+                shifts++;
+            }
+        }
+        /* 0 <= b <= a */
+    }
+
+    if (shifts) {
+        if (!BN_lshift(a, a, shifts))
+            goto err;
+    }
+    bn_check_top(a);
+    return (a);
+ err:
+    return (NULL);
+}
+
+/* solves ax == 1 (mod n) */
+static BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse_no_branch(BIGNUM *in,
+                                        const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n,
+                                        BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *in,
+                       const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    BIGNUM *rv;
+    int noinv;
+    rv = int_bn_mod_inverse(in, a, n, ctx, &noinv);
+    if (noinv)
+        BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_INVERSE, BN_R_NO_INVERSE);
+    return rv;
+}
+
+BIGNUM *int_bn_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *in,
+                           const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n, BN_CTX *ctx,
+                           int *pnoinv)
+{
+    BIGNUM *A, *B, *X, *Y, *M, *D, *T, *R = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *ret = NULL;
+    int sign;
+
+    if (pnoinv)
+        *pnoinv = 0;
+
+    if ((BN_get_flags(a, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0)
+        || (BN_get_flags(n, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0)) {
+        return BN_mod_inverse_no_branch(in, a, n, ctx);
+    }
+
+    bn_check_top(a);
+    bn_check_top(n);
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    A = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    B = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    X = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    D = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    M = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    Y = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    T = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (T == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (in == NULL)
+        R = BN_new();
+    else
+        R = in;
+    if (R == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    BN_one(X);
+    BN_zero(Y);
+    if (BN_copy(B, a) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (BN_copy(A, n) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    A->neg = 0;
+    if (B->neg || (BN_ucmp(B, A) >= 0)) {
+        if (!BN_nnmod(B, B, A, ctx))
+            goto err;
+    }
+    sign = -1;
+    /*-
+     * From  B = a mod |n|,  A = |n|  it follows that
+     *
+     *      0 <= B < A,
+     *     -sign*X*a  ==  B   (mod |n|),
+     *      sign*Y*a  ==  A   (mod |n|).
+     */
+
+    if (BN_is_odd(n) && (BN_num_bits(n) <= 2048)) {
+        /*
+         * Binary inversion algorithm; requires odd modulus. This is faster
+         * than the general algorithm if the modulus is sufficiently small
+         * (about 400 .. 500 bits on 32-bit systems, but much more on 64-bit
+         * systems)
+         */
+        int shift;
+
+        while (!BN_is_zero(B)) {
+            /*-
+             *      0 < B < |n|,
+             *      0 < A <= |n|,
+             * (1) -sign*X*a  ==  B   (mod |n|),
+             * (2)  sign*Y*a  ==  A   (mod |n|)
+             */
+
+            /*
+             * Now divide B by the maximum possible power of two in the
+             * integers, and divide X by the same value mod |n|. When we're
+             * done, (1) still holds.
+             */
+            shift = 0;
+            while (!BN_is_bit_set(B, shift)) { /* note that 0 < B */
+                shift++;
+
+                if (BN_is_odd(X)) {
+                    if (!BN_uadd(X, X, n))
+                        goto err;
+                }
+                /*
+                 * now X is even, so we can easily divide it by two
+                 */
+                if (!BN_rshift1(X, X))
+                    goto err;
+            }
+            if (shift > 0) {
+                if (!BN_rshift(B, B, shift))
+                    goto err;
+            }
+
+            /*
+             * Same for A and Y.  Afterwards, (2) still holds.
+             */
+            shift = 0;
+            while (!BN_is_bit_set(A, shift)) { /* note that 0 < A */
+                shift++;
+
+                if (BN_is_odd(Y)) {
+                    if (!BN_uadd(Y, Y, n))
+                        goto err;
+                }
+                /* now Y is even */
+                if (!BN_rshift1(Y, Y))
+                    goto err;
+            }
+            if (shift > 0) {
+                if (!BN_rshift(A, A, shift))
+                    goto err;
+            }
+
+            /*-
+             * We still have (1) and (2).
+             * Both  A  and  B  are odd.
+             * The following computations ensure that
+             *
+             *     0 <= B < |n|,
+             *      0 < A < |n|,
+             * (1) -sign*X*a  ==  B   (mod |n|),
+             * (2)  sign*Y*a  ==  A   (mod |n|),
+             *
+             * and that either  A  or  B  is even in the next iteration.
+             */
+            if (BN_ucmp(B, A) >= 0) {
+                /* -sign*(X + Y)*a == B - A  (mod |n|) */
+                if (!BN_uadd(X, X, Y))
+                    goto err;
+                /*
+                 * NB: we could use BN_mod_add_quick(X, X, Y, n), but that
+                 * actually makes the algorithm slower
+                 */
+                if (!BN_usub(B, B, A))
+                    goto err;
+            } else {
+                /*  sign*(X + Y)*a == A - B  (mod |n|) */
+                if (!BN_uadd(Y, Y, X))
+                    goto err;
+                /*
+                 * as above, BN_mod_add_quick(Y, Y, X, n) would slow things down
+                 */
+                if (!BN_usub(A, A, B))
+                    goto err;
+            }
+        }
+    } else {
+        /* general inversion algorithm */
+
+        while (!BN_is_zero(B)) {
+            BIGNUM *tmp;
+
+            /*-
+             *      0 < B < A,
+             * (*) -sign*X*a  ==  B   (mod |n|),
+             *      sign*Y*a  ==  A   (mod |n|)
+             */
+
+            /* (D, M) := (A/B, A%B) ... */
+            if (BN_num_bits(A) == BN_num_bits(B)) {
+                if (!BN_one(D))
+                    goto err;
+                if (!BN_sub(M, A, B))
+                    goto err;
+            } else if (BN_num_bits(A) == BN_num_bits(B) + 1) {
+                /* A/B is 1, 2, or 3 */
+                if (!BN_lshift1(T, B))
+                    goto err;
+                if (BN_ucmp(A, T) < 0) {
+                    /* A < 2*B, so D=1 */
+                    if (!BN_one(D))
+                        goto err;
+                    if (!BN_sub(M, A, B))
+                        goto err;
+                } else {
+                    /* A >= 2*B, so D=2 or D=3 */
+                    if (!BN_sub(M, A, T))
+                        goto err;
+                    if (!BN_add(D, T, B))
+                        goto err; /* use D (:= 3*B) as temp */
+                    if (BN_ucmp(A, D) < 0) {
+                        /* A < 3*B, so D=2 */
+                        if (!BN_set_word(D, 2))
+                            goto err;
+                        /*
+                         * M (= A - 2*B) already has the correct value
+                         */
+                    } else {
+                        /* only D=3 remains */
+                        if (!BN_set_word(D, 3))
+                            goto err;
+                        /*
+                         * currently M = A - 2*B, but we need M = A - 3*B
+                         */
+                        if (!BN_sub(M, M, B))
+                            goto err;
+                    }
+                }
+            } else {
+                if (!BN_div(D, M, A, B, ctx))
+                    goto err;
+            }
+
+            /*-
+             * Now
+             *      A = D*B + M;
+             * thus we have
+             * (**)  sign*Y*a  ==  D*B + M   (mod |n|).
+             */
+
+            tmp = A;    /* keep the BIGNUM object, the value does not matter */
+
+            /* (A, B) := (B, A mod B) ... */
+            A = B;
+            B = M;
+            /* ... so we have  0 <= B < A  again */
+
+            /*-
+             * Since the former  M  is now  B  and the former  B  is now  A,
+             * (**) translates into
+             *       sign*Y*a  ==  D*A + B    (mod |n|),
+             * i.e.
+             *       sign*Y*a - D*A  ==  B    (mod |n|).
+             * Similarly, (*) translates into
+             *      -sign*X*a  ==  A          (mod |n|).
+             *
+             * Thus,
+             *   sign*Y*a + D*sign*X*a  ==  B  (mod |n|),
+             * i.e.
+             *        sign*(Y + D*X)*a  ==  B  (mod |n|).
+             *
+             * So if we set  (X, Y, sign) := (Y + D*X, X, -sign), we arrive back at
+             *      -sign*X*a  ==  B   (mod |n|),
+             *       sign*Y*a  ==  A   (mod |n|).
+             * Note that  X  and  Y  stay non-negative all the time.
+             */
+
+            /*
+             * most of the time D is very small, so we can optimize tmp := D*X+Y
+             */
+            if (BN_is_one(D)) {
+                if (!BN_add(tmp, X, Y))
+                    goto err;
+            } else {
+                if (BN_is_word(D, 2)) {
+                    if (!BN_lshift1(tmp, X))
+                        goto err;
+                } else if (BN_is_word(D, 4)) {
+                    if (!BN_lshift(tmp, X, 2))
+                        goto err;
+                } else if (D->top == 1) {
+                    if (!BN_copy(tmp, X))
+                        goto err;
+                    if (!BN_mul_word(tmp, D->d[0]))
+                        goto err;
+                } else {
+                    if (!BN_mul(tmp, D, X, ctx))
+                        goto err;
+                }
+                if (!BN_add(tmp, tmp, Y))
+                    goto err;
+            }
+
+            M = Y;      /* keep the BIGNUM object, the value does not matter */
+            Y = X;
+            X = tmp;
+            sign = -sign;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /*-
+     * The while loop (Euclid's algorithm) ends when
+     *      A == gcd(a,n);
+     * we have
+     *       sign*Y*a  ==  A  (mod |n|),
+     * where  Y  is non-negative.
+     */
+
+    if (sign < 0) {
+        if (!BN_sub(Y, n, Y))
+            goto err;
+    }
+    /* Now  Y*a  ==  A  (mod |n|).  */
+
+    if (BN_is_one(A)) {
+        /* Y*a == 1  (mod |n|) */
+        if (!Y->neg && BN_ucmp(Y, n) < 0) {
+            if (!BN_copy(R, Y))
+                goto err;
+        } else {
+            if (!BN_nnmod(R, Y, n, ctx))
+                goto err;
+        }
+    } else {
+        if (pnoinv)
+            *pnoinv = 1;
+        goto err;
+    }
+    ret = R;
+ err:
+    if ((ret == NULL) && (in == NULL))
+        BN_free(R);
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    bn_check_top(ret);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+/*
+ * BN_mod_inverse_no_branch is a special version of BN_mod_inverse. It does
+ * not contain branches that may leak sensitive information.
+ */
+static BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse_no_branch(BIGNUM *in,
+                                        const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n,
+                                        BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    BIGNUM *A, *B, *X, *Y, *M, *D, *T, *R = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *ret = NULL;
+    int sign;
+
+    bn_check_top(a);
+    bn_check_top(n);
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    A = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    B = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    X = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    D = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    M = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    Y = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    T = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (T == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (in == NULL)
+        R = BN_new();
+    else
+        R = in;
+    if (R == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    BN_one(X);
+    BN_zero(Y);
+    if (BN_copy(B, a) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (BN_copy(A, n) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    A->neg = 0;
+
+    if (B->neg || (BN_ucmp(B, A) >= 0)) {
+        /*
+         * Turn BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on, so that when BN_div is invoked,
+         * BN_div_no_branch will be called eventually.
+         */
+         {
+            BIGNUM local_B;
+            bn_init(&local_B);
+            BN_with_flags(&local_B, B, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+            if (!BN_nnmod(B, &local_B, A, ctx))
+                goto err;
+            /* Ensure local_B goes out of scope before any further use of B */
+        }
+    }
+    sign = -1;
+    /*-
+     * From  B = a mod |n|,  A = |n|  it follows that
+     *
+     *      0 <= B < A,
+     *     -sign*X*a  ==  B   (mod |n|),
+     *      sign*Y*a  ==  A   (mod |n|).
+     */
+
+    while (!BN_is_zero(B)) {
+        BIGNUM *tmp;
+
+        /*-
+         *      0 < B < A,
+         * (*) -sign*X*a  ==  B   (mod |n|),
+         *      sign*Y*a  ==  A   (mod |n|)
+         */
+
+        /*
+         * Turn BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on, so that when BN_div is invoked,
+         * BN_div_no_branch will be called eventually.
+         */
+        {
+            BIGNUM local_A;
+            bn_init(&local_A);
+            BN_with_flags(&local_A, A, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+            /* (D, M) := (A/B, A%B) ... */
+            if (!BN_div(D, M, &local_A, B, ctx))
+                goto err;
+            /* Ensure local_A goes out of scope before any further use of A */
+        }
+
+        /*-
+         * Now
+         *      A = D*B + M;
+         * thus we have
+         * (**)  sign*Y*a  ==  D*B + M   (mod |n|).
+         */
+
+        tmp = A;                /* keep the BIGNUM object, the value does not
+                                 * matter */
+
+        /* (A, B) := (B, A mod B) ... */
+        A = B;
+        B = M;
+        /* ... so we have  0 <= B < A  again */
+
+        /*-
+         * Since the former  M  is now  B  and the former  B  is now  A,
+         * (**) translates into
+         *       sign*Y*a  ==  D*A + B    (mod |n|),
+         * i.e.
+         *       sign*Y*a - D*A  ==  B    (mod |n|).
+         * Similarly, (*) translates into
+         *      -sign*X*a  ==  A          (mod |n|).
+         *
+         * Thus,
+         *   sign*Y*a + D*sign*X*a  ==  B  (mod |n|),
+         * i.e.
+         *        sign*(Y + D*X)*a  ==  B  (mod |n|).
+         *
+         * So if we set  (X, Y, sign) := (Y + D*X, X, -sign), we arrive back at
+         *      -sign*X*a  ==  B   (mod |n|),
+         *       sign*Y*a  ==  A   (mod |n|).
+         * Note that  X  and  Y  stay non-negative all the time.
+         */
+
+        if (!BN_mul(tmp, D, X, ctx))
+            goto err;
+        if (!BN_add(tmp, tmp, Y))
+            goto err;
+
+        M = Y;                  /* keep the BIGNUM object, the value does not
+                                 * matter */
+        Y = X;
+        X = tmp;
+        sign = -sign;
+    }
+
+    /*-
+     * The while loop (Euclid's algorithm) ends when
+     *      A == gcd(a,n);
+     * we have
+     *       sign*Y*a  ==  A  (mod |n|),
+     * where  Y  is non-negative.
+     */
+
+    if (sign < 0) {
+        if (!BN_sub(Y, n, Y))
+            goto err;
+    }
+    /* Now  Y*a  ==  A  (mod |n|).  */
+
+    if (BN_is_one(A)) {
+        /* Y*a == 1  (mod |n|) */
+        if (!Y->neg && BN_ucmp(Y, n) < 0) {
+            if (!BN_copy(R, Y))
+                goto err;
+        } else {
+            if (!BN_nnmod(R, Y, n, ctx))
+                goto err;
+        }
+    } else {
+        BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_INVERSE_NO_BRANCH, BN_R_NO_INVERSE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    ret = R;
+ err:
+    if ((ret == NULL) && (in == NULL))
+        BN_free(R);
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    bn_check_top(ret);
+    return (ret);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b1987f5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1224 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ *
+ * The Elliptic Curve Public-Key Crypto Library (ECC Code) included
+ * herein is developed by SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and is contributed
+ * to the OpenSSL project.
+ *
+ * The ECC Code is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license provided below.
+ */
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "bn_lcl.h"
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+
+/*
+ * Maximum number of iterations before BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad_arr should
+ * fail.
+ */
+# define MAX_ITERATIONS 50
+
+static const BN_ULONG SQR_tb[16] = { 0, 1, 4, 5, 16, 17, 20, 21,
+    64, 65, 68, 69, 80, 81, 84, 85
+};
+
+/* Platform-specific macros to accelerate squaring. */
+# if defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT) || defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG)
+#  define SQR1(w) \
+    SQR_tb[(w) >> 60 & 0xF] << 56 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 56 & 0xF] << 48 | \
+    SQR_tb[(w) >> 52 & 0xF] << 40 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 48 & 0xF] << 32 | \
+    SQR_tb[(w) >> 44 & 0xF] << 24 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 40 & 0xF] << 16 | \
+    SQR_tb[(w) >> 36 & 0xF] <<  8 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 32 & 0xF]
+#  define SQR0(w) \
+    SQR_tb[(w) >> 28 & 0xF] << 56 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 24 & 0xF] << 48 | \
+    SQR_tb[(w) >> 20 & 0xF] << 40 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 16 & 0xF] << 32 | \
+    SQR_tb[(w) >> 12 & 0xF] << 24 | SQR_tb[(w) >>  8 & 0xF] << 16 | \
+    SQR_tb[(w) >>  4 & 0xF] <<  8 | SQR_tb[(w)       & 0xF]
+# endif
+# ifdef THIRTY_TWO_BIT
+#  define SQR1(w) \
+    SQR_tb[(w) >> 28 & 0xF] << 24 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 24 & 0xF] << 16 | \
+    SQR_tb[(w) >> 20 & 0xF] <<  8 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 16 & 0xF]
+#  define SQR0(w) \
+    SQR_tb[(w) >> 12 & 0xF] << 24 | SQR_tb[(w) >>  8 & 0xF] << 16 | \
+    SQR_tb[(w) >>  4 & 0xF] <<  8 | SQR_tb[(w)       & 0xF]
+# endif
+
+# if !defined(OPENSSL_BN_ASM_GF2m)
+/*
+ * Product of two polynomials a, b each with degree < BN_BITS2 - 1, result is
+ * a polynomial r with degree < 2 * BN_BITS - 1 The caller MUST ensure that
+ * the variables have the right amount of space allocated.
+ */
+#  ifdef THIRTY_TWO_BIT
+static void bn_GF2m_mul_1x1(BN_ULONG *r1, BN_ULONG *r0, const BN_ULONG a,
+                            const BN_ULONG b)
+{
+    register BN_ULONG h, l, s;
+    BN_ULONG tab[8], top2b = a >> 30;
+    register BN_ULONG a1, a2, a4;
+
+    a1 = a & (0x3FFFFFFF);
+    a2 = a1 << 1;
+    a4 = a2 << 1;
+
+    tab[0] = 0;
+    tab[1] = a1;
+    tab[2] = a2;
+    tab[3] = a1 ^ a2;
+    tab[4] = a4;
+    tab[5] = a1 ^ a4;
+    tab[6] = a2 ^ a4;
+    tab[7] = a1 ^ a2 ^ a4;
+
+    s = tab[b & 0x7];
+    l = s;
+    s = tab[b >> 3 & 0x7];
+    l ^= s << 3;
+    h = s >> 29;
+    s = tab[b >> 6 & 0x7];
+    l ^= s << 6;
+    h ^= s >> 26;
+    s = tab[b >> 9 & 0x7];
+    l ^= s << 9;
+    h ^= s >> 23;
+    s = tab[b >> 12 & 0x7];
+    l ^= s << 12;
+    h ^= s >> 20;
+    s = tab[b >> 15 & 0x7];
+    l ^= s << 15;
+    h ^= s >> 17;
+    s = tab[b >> 18 & 0x7];
+    l ^= s << 18;
+    h ^= s >> 14;
+    s = tab[b >> 21 & 0x7];
+    l ^= s << 21;
+    h ^= s >> 11;
+    s = tab[b >> 24 & 0x7];
+    l ^= s << 24;
+    h ^= s >> 8;
+    s = tab[b >> 27 & 0x7];
+    l ^= s << 27;
+    h ^= s >> 5;
+    s = tab[b >> 30];
+    l ^= s << 30;
+    h ^= s >> 2;
+
+    /* compensate for the top two bits of a */
+
+    if (top2b & 01) {
+        l ^= b << 30;
+        h ^= b >> 2;
+    }
+    if (top2b & 02) {
+        l ^= b << 31;
+        h ^= b >> 1;
+    }
+
+    *r1 = h;
+    *r0 = l;
+}
+#  endif
+#  if defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT) || defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG)
+static void bn_GF2m_mul_1x1(BN_ULONG *r1, BN_ULONG *r0, const BN_ULONG a,
+                            const BN_ULONG b)
+{
+    register BN_ULONG h, l, s;
+    BN_ULONG tab[16], top3b = a >> 61;
+    register BN_ULONG a1, a2, a4, a8;
+
+    a1 = a & (0x1FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL);
+    a2 = a1 << 1;
+    a4 = a2 << 1;
+    a8 = a4 << 1;
+
+    tab[0] = 0;
+    tab[1] = a1;
+    tab[2] = a2;
+    tab[3] = a1 ^ a2;
+    tab[4] = a4;
+    tab[5] = a1 ^ a4;
+    tab[6] = a2 ^ a4;
+    tab[7] = a1 ^ a2 ^ a4;
+    tab[8] = a8;
+    tab[9] = a1 ^ a8;
+    tab[10] = a2 ^ a8;
+    tab[11] = a1 ^ a2 ^ a8;
+    tab[12] = a4 ^ a8;
+    tab[13] = a1 ^ a4 ^ a8;
+    tab[14] = a2 ^ a4 ^ a8;
+    tab[15] = a1 ^ a2 ^ a4 ^ a8;
+
+    s = tab[b & 0xF];
+    l = s;
+    s = tab[b >> 4 & 0xF];
+    l ^= s << 4;
+    h = s >> 60;
+    s = tab[b >> 8 & 0xF];
+    l ^= s << 8;
+    h ^= s >> 56;
+    s = tab[b >> 12 & 0xF];
+    l ^= s << 12;
+    h ^= s >> 52;
+    s = tab[b >> 16 & 0xF];
+    l ^= s << 16;
+    h ^= s >> 48;
+    s = tab[b >> 20 & 0xF];
+    l ^= s << 20;
+    h ^= s >> 44;
+    s = tab[b >> 24 & 0xF];
+    l ^= s << 24;
+    h ^= s >> 40;
+    s = tab[b >> 28 & 0xF];
+    l ^= s << 28;
+    h ^= s >> 36;
+    s = tab[b >> 32 & 0xF];
+    l ^= s << 32;
+    h ^= s >> 32;
+    s = tab[b >> 36 & 0xF];
+    l ^= s << 36;
+    h ^= s >> 28;
+    s = tab[b >> 40 & 0xF];
+    l ^= s << 40;
+    h ^= s >> 24;
+    s = tab[b >> 44 & 0xF];
+    l ^= s << 44;
+    h ^= s >> 20;
+    s = tab[b >> 48 & 0xF];
+    l ^= s << 48;
+    h ^= s >> 16;
+    s = tab[b >> 52 & 0xF];
+    l ^= s << 52;
+    h ^= s >> 12;
+    s = tab[b >> 56 & 0xF];
+    l ^= s << 56;
+    h ^= s >> 8;
+    s = tab[b >> 60];
+    l ^= s << 60;
+    h ^= s >> 4;
+
+    /* compensate for the top three bits of a */
+
+    if (top3b & 01) {
+        l ^= b << 61;
+        h ^= b >> 3;
+    }
+    if (top3b & 02) {
+        l ^= b << 62;
+        h ^= b >> 2;
+    }
+    if (top3b & 04) {
+        l ^= b << 63;
+        h ^= b >> 1;
+    }
+
+    *r1 = h;
+    *r0 = l;
+}
+#  endif
+
+/*
+ * Product of two polynomials a, b each with degree < 2 * BN_BITS2 - 1,
+ * result is a polynomial r with degree < 4 * BN_BITS2 - 1 The caller MUST
+ * ensure that the variables have the right amount of space allocated.
+ */
+static void bn_GF2m_mul_2x2(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG a1, const BN_ULONG a0,
+                            const BN_ULONG b1, const BN_ULONG b0)
+{
+    BN_ULONG m1, m0;
+    /* r[3] = h1, r[2] = h0; r[1] = l1; r[0] = l0 */
+    bn_GF2m_mul_1x1(r + 3, r + 2, a1, b1);
+    bn_GF2m_mul_1x1(r + 1, r, a0, b0);
+    bn_GF2m_mul_1x1(&m1, &m0, a0 ^ a1, b0 ^ b1);
+    /* Correction on m1 ^= l1 ^ h1; m0 ^= l0 ^ h0; */
+    r[2] ^= m1 ^ r[1] ^ r[3];   /* h0 ^= m1 ^ l1 ^ h1; */
+    r[1] = r[3] ^ r[2] ^ r[0] ^ m1 ^ m0; /* l1 ^= l0 ^ h0 ^ m0; */
+}
+# else
+void bn_GF2m_mul_2x2(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG a1, BN_ULONG a0, BN_ULONG b1,
+                     BN_ULONG b0);
+# endif
+
+/*
+ * Add polynomials a and b and store result in r; r could be a or b, a and b
+ * could be equal; r is the bitwise XOR of a and b.
+ */
+int BN_GF2m_add(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b)
+{
+    int i;
+    const BIGNUM *at, *bt;
+
+    bn_check_top(a);
+    bn_check_top(b);
+
+    if (a->top < b->top) {
+        at = b;
+        bt = a;
+    } else {
+        at = a;
+        bt = b;
+    }
+
+    if (bn_wexpand(r, at->top) == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < bt->top; i++) {
+        r->d[i] = at->d[i] ^ bt->d[i];
+    }
+    for (; i < at->top; i++) {
+        r->d[i] = at->d[i];
+    }
+
+    r->top = at->top;
+    bn_correct_top(r);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Some functions allow for representation of the irreducible polynomials
+ * as an int[], say p.  The irreducible f(t) is then of the form:
+ *     t^p[0] + t^p[1] + ... + t^p[k]
+ * where m = p[0] > p[1] > ... > p[k] = 0.
+ */
+
+/* Performs modular reduction of a and store result in r.  r could be a. */
+int BN_GF2m_mod_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const int p[])
+{
+    int j, k;
+    int n, dN, d0, d1;
+    BN_ULONG zz, *z;
+
+    bn_check_top(a);
+
+    if (!p[0]) {
+        /* reduction mod 1 => return 0 */
+        BN_zero(r);
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Since the algorithm does reduction in the r value, if a != r, copy the
+     * contents of a into r so we can do reduction in r.
+     */
+    if (a != r) {
+        if (!bn_wexpand(r, a->top))
+            return 0;
+        for (j = 0; j < a->top; j++) {
+            r->d[j] = a->d[j];
+        }
+        r->top = a->top;
+    }
+    z = r->d;
+
+    /* start reduction */
+    dN = p[0] / BN_BITS2;
+    for (j = r->top - 1; j > dN;) {
+        zz = z[j];
+        if (z[j] == 0) {
+            j--;
+            continue;
+        }
+        z[j] = 0;
+
+        for (k = 1; p[k] != 0; k++) {
+            /* reducing component t^p[k] */
+            n = p[0] - p[k];
+            d0 = n % BN_BITS2;
+            d1 = BN_BITS2 - d0;
+            n /= BN_BITS2;
+            z[j - n] ^= (zz >> d0);
+            if (d0)
+                z[j - n - 1] ^= (zz << d1);
+        }
+
+        /* reducing component t^0 */
+        n = dN;
+        d0 = p[0] % BN_BITS2;
+        d1 = BN_BITS2 - d0;
+        z[j - n] ^= (zz >> d0);
+        if (d0)
+            z[j - n - 1] ^= (zz << d1);
+    }
+
+    /* final round of reduction */
+    while (j == dN) {
+
+        d0 = p[0] % BN_BITS2;
+        zz = z[dN] >> d0;
+        if (zz == 0)
+            break;
+        d1 = BN_BITS2 - d0;
+
+        /* clear up the top d1 bits */
+        if (d0)
+            z[dN] = (z[dN] << d1) >> d1;
+        else
+            z[dN] = 0;
+        z[0] ^= zz;             /* reduction t^0 component */
+
+        for (k = 1; p[k] != 0; k++) {
+            BN_ULONG tmp_ulong;
+
+            /* reducing component t^p[k] */
+            n = p[k] / BN_BITS2;
+            d0 = p[k] % BN_BITS2;
+            d1 = BN_BITS2 - d0;
+            z[n] ^= (zz << d0);
+            if (d0 && (tmp_ulong = zz >> d1))
+                z[n + 1] ^= tmp_ulong;
+        }
+
+    }
+
+    bn_correct_top(r);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Performs modular reduction of a by p and store result in r.  r could be a.
+ * This function calls down to the BN_GF2m_mod_arr implementation; this wrapper
+ * function is only provided for convenience; for best performance, use the
+ * BN_GF2m_mod_arr function.
+ */
+int BN_GF2m_mod(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    int arr[6];
+    bn_check_top(a);
+    bn_check_top(p);
+    ret = BN_GF2m_poly2arr(p, arr, OSSL_NELEM(arr));
+    if (!ret || ret > (int)OSSL_NELEM(arr)) {
+        BNerr(BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD, BN_R_INVALID_LENGTH);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    ret = BN_GF2m_mod_arr(r, a, arr);
+    bn_check_top(r);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compute the product of two polynomials a and b, reduce modulo p, and store
+ * the result in r.  r could be a or b; a could be b.
+ */
+int BN_GF2m_mod_mul_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
+                        const int p[], BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int zlen, i, j, k, ret = 0;
+    BIGNUM *s;
+    BN_ULONG x1, x0, y1, y0, zz[4];
+
+    bn_check_top(a);
+    bn_check_top(b);
+
+    if (a == b) {
+        return BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr(r, a, p, ctx);
+    }
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    if ((s = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    zlen = a->top + b->top + 4;
+    if (!bn_wexpand(s, zlen))
+        goto err;
+    s->top = zlen;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < zlen; i++)
+        s->d[i] = 0;
+
+    for (j = 0; j < b->top; j += 2) {
+        y0 = b->d[j];
+        y1 = ((j + 1) == b->top) ? 0 : b->d[j + 1];
+        for (i = 0; i < a->top; i += 2) {
+            x0 = a->d[i];
+            x1 = ((i + 1) == a->top) ? 0 : a->d[i + 1];
+            bn_GF2m_mul_2x2(zz, x1, x0, y1, y0);
+            for (k = 0; k < 4; k++)
+                s->d[i + j + k] ^= zz[k];
+        }
+    }
+
+    bn_correct_top(s);
+    if (BN_GF2m_mod_arr(r, s, p))
+        ret = 1;
+    bn_check_top(r);
+
+ err:
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compute the product of two polynomials a and b, reduce modulo p, and store
+ * the result in r.  r could be a or b; a could equal b. This function calls
+ * down to the BN_GF2m_mod_mul_arr implementation; this wrapper function is
+ * only provided for convenience; for best performance, use the
+ * BN_GF2m_mod_mul_arr function.
+ */
+int BN_GF2m_mod_mul(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
+                    const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    const int max = BN_num_bits(p) + 1;
+    int *arr = NULL;
+    bn_check_top(a);
+    bn_check_top(b);
+    bn_check_top(p);
+    if ((arr = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*arr) * max)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    ret = BN_GF2m_poly2arr(p, arr, max);
+    if (!ret || ret > max) {
+        BNerr(BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_MUL, BN_R_INVALID_LENGTH);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    ret = BN_GF2m_mod_mul_arr(r, a, b, arr, ctx);
+    bn_check_top(r);
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_free(arr);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/* Square a, reduce the result mod p, and store it in a.  r could be a. */
+int BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const int p[],
+                        BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int i, ret = 0;
+    BIGNUM *s;
+
+    bn_check_top(a);
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    if ((s = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (!bn_wexpand(s, 2 * a->top))
+        goto err;
+
+    for (i = a->top - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+        s->d[2 * i + 1] = SQR1(a->d[i]);
+        s->d[2 * i] = SQR0(a->d[i]);
+    }
+
+    s->top = 2 * a->top;
+    bn_correct_top(s);
+    if (!BN_GF2m_mod_arr(r, s, p))
+        goto err;
+    bn_check_top(r);
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Square a, reduce the result mod p, and store it in a.  r could be a. This
+ * function calls down to the BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr implementation; this
+ * wrapper function is only provided for convenience; for best performance,
+ * use the BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr function.
+ */
+int BN_GF2m_mod_sqr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    const int max = BN_num_bits(p) + 1;
+    int *arr = NULL;
+
+    bn_check_top(a);
+    bn_check_top(p);
+    if ((arr = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*arr) * max)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    ret = BN_GF2m_poly2arr(p, arr, max);
+    if (!ret || ret > max) {
+        BNerr(BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_SQR, BN_R_INVALID_LENGTH);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    ret = BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr(r, a, arr, ctx);
+    bn_check_top(r);
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_free(arr);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Invert a, reduce modulo p, and store the result in r. r could be a. Uses
+ * Modified Almost Inverse Algorithm (Algorithm 10) from Hankerson, D.,
+ * Hernandez, J.L., and Menezes, A.  "Software Implementation of Elliptic
+ * Curve Cryptography Over Binary Fields".
+ */
+int BN_GF2m_mod_inv(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    BIGNUM *b, *c = NULL, *u = NULL, *v = NULL, *tmp;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    bn_check_top(a);
+    bn_check_top(p);
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+
+    if ((b = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if ((c = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if ((u = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if ((v = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!BN_GF2m_mod(u, a, p))
+        goto err;
+    if (BN_is_zero(u))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!BN_copy(v, p))
+        goto err;
+# if 0
+    if (!BN_one(b))
+        goto err;
+
+    while (1) {
+        while (!BN_is_odd(u)) {
+            if (BN_is_zero(u))
+                goto err;
+            if (!BN_rshift1(u, u))
+                goto err;
+            if (BN_is_odd(b)) {
+                if (!BN_GF2m_add(b, b, p))
+                    goto err;
+            }
+            if (!BN_rshift1(b, b))
+                goto err;
+        }
+
+        if (BN_abs_is_word(u, 1))
+            break;
+
+        if (BN_num_bits(u) < BN_num_bits(v)) {
+            tmp = u;
+            u = v;
+            v = tmp;
+            tmp = b;
+            b = c;
+            c = tmp;
+        }
+
+        if (!BN_GF2m_add(u, u, v))
+            goto err;
+        if (!BN_GF2m_add(b, b, c))
+            goto err;
+    }
+# else
+    {
+        int i;
+        int ubits = BN_num_bits(u);
+        int vbits = BN_num_bits(v); /* v is copy of p */
+        int top = p->top;
+        BN_ULONG *udp, *bdp, *vdp, *cdp;
+
+        if (!bn_wexpand(u, top))
+            goto err;
+        udp = u->d;
+        for (i = u->top; i < top; i++)
+            udp[i] = 0;
+        u->top = top;
+        if (!bn_wexpand(b, top))
+          goto err;
+        bdp = b->d;
+        bdp[0] = 1;
+        for (i = 1; i < top; i++)
+            bdp[i] = 0;
+        b->top = top;
+        if (!bn_wexpand(c, top))
+          goto err;
+        cdp = c->d;
+        for (i = 0; i < top; i++)
+            cdp[i] = 0;
+        c->top = top;
+        vdp = v->d;             /* It pays off to "cache" *->d pointers,
+                                 * because it allows optimizer to be more
+                                 * aggressive. But we don't have to "cache"
+                                 * p->d, because *p is declared 'const'... */
+        while (1) {
+            while (ubits && !(udp[0] & 1)) {
+                BN_ULONG u0, u1, b0, b1, mask;
+
+                u0 = udp[0];
+                b0 = bdp[0];
+                mask = (BN_ULONG)0 - (b0 & 1);
+                b0 ^= p->d[0] & mask;
+                for (i = 0; i < top - 1; i++) {
+                    u1 = udp[i + 1];
+                    udp[i] = ((u0 >> 1) | (u1 << (BN_BITS2 - 1))) & BN_MASK2;
+                    u0 = u1;
+                    b1 = bdp[i + 1] ^ (p->d[i + 1] & mask);
+                    bdp[i] = ((b0 >> 1) | (b1 << (BN_BITS2 - 1))) & BN_MASK2;
+                    b0 = b1;
+                }
+                udp[i] = u0 >> 1;
+                bdp[i] = b0 >> 1;
+                ubits--;
+            }
+
+            if (ubits <= BN_BITS2) {
+                if (udp[0] == 0) /* poly was reducible */
+                    goto err;
+                if (udp[0] == 1)
+                    break;
+            }
+
+            if (ubits < vbits) {
+                i = ubits;
+                ubits = vbits;
+                vbits = i;
+                tmp = u;
+                u = v;
+                v = tmp;
+                tmp = b;
+                b = c;
+                c = tmp;
+                udp = vdp;
+                vdp = v->d;
+                bdp = cdp;
+                cdp = c->d;
+            }
+            for (i = 0; i < top; i++) {
+                udp[i] ^= vdp[i];
+                bdp[i] ^= cdp[i];
+            }
+            if (ubits == vbits) {
+                BN_ULONG ul;
+                int utop = (ubits - 1) / BN_BITS2;
+
+                while ((ul = udp[utop]) == 0 && utop)
+                    utop--;
+                ubits = utop * BN_BITS2 + BN_num_bits_word(ul);
+            }
+        }
+        bn_correct_top(b);
+    }
+# endif
+
+    if (!BN_copy(r, b))
+        goto err;
+    bn_check_top(r);
+    ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+# ifdef BN_DEBUG                /* BN_CTX_end would complain about the
+                                 * expanded form */
+    bn_correct_top(c);
+    bn_correct_top(u);
+    bn_correct_top(v);
+# endif
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Invert xx, reduce modulo p, and store the result in r. r could be xx.
+ * This function calls down to the BN_GF2m_mod_inv implementation; this
+ * wrapper function is only provided for convenience; for best performance,
+ * use the BN_GF2m_mod_inv function.
+ */
+int BN_GF2m_mod_inv_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *xx, const int p[],
+                        BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    BIGNUM *field;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    bn_check_top(xx);
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    if ((field = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (!BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p, field))
+        goto err;
+
+    ret = BN_GF2m_mod_inv(r, xx, field, ctx);
+    bn_check_top(r);
+
+ err:
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_SUN_GF2M_DIV
+/*
+ * Divide y by x, reduce modulo p, and store the result in r. r could be x
+ * or y, x could equal y.
+ */
+int BN_GF2m_mod_div(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *y, const BIGNUM *x,
+                    const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    BIGNUM *xinv = NULL;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    bn_check_top(y);
+    bn_check_top(x);
+    bn_check_top(p);
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    xinv = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (xinv == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!BN_GF2m_mod_inv(xinv, x, p, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    if (!BN_GF2m_mod_mul(r, y, xinv, p, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    bn_check_top(r);
+    ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    return ret;
+}
+# else
+/*
+ * Divide y by x, reduce modulo p, and store the result in r. r could be x
+ * or y, x could equal y. Uses algorithm Modular_Division_GF(2^m) from
+ * Chang-Shantz, S.  "From Euclid's GCD to Montgomery Multiplication to the
+ * Great Divide".
+ */
+int BN_GF2m_mod_div(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *y, const BIGNUM *x,
+                    const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    BIGNUM *a, *b, *u, *v;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    bn_check_top(y);
+    bn_check_top(x);
+    bn_check_top(p);
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+
+    a = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    b = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    u = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    v = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (v == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* reduce x and y mod p */
+    if (!BN_GF2m_mod(u, y, p))
+        goto err;
+    if (!BN_GF2m_mod(a, x, p))
+        goto err;
+    if (!BN_copy(b, p))
+        goto err;
+
+    while (!BN_is_odd(a)) {
+        if (!BN_rshift1(a, a))
+            goto err;
+        if (BN_is_odd(u))
+            if (!BN_GF2m_add(u, u, p))
+                goto err;
+        if (!BN_rshift1(u, u))
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    do {
+        if (BN_GF2m_cmp(b, a) > 0) {
+            if (!BN_GF2m_add(b, b, a))
+                goto err;
+            if (!BN_GF2m_add(v, v, u))
+                goto err;
+            do {
+                if (!BN_rshift1(b, b))
+                    goto err;
+                if (BN_is_odd(v))
+                    if (!BN_GF2m_add(v, v, p))
+                        goto err;
+                if (!BN_rshift1(v, v))
+                    goto err;
+            } while (!BN_is_odd(b));
+        } else if (BN_abs_is_word(a, 1))
+            break;
+        else {
+            if (!BN_GF2m_add(a, a, b))
+                goto err;
+            if (!BN_GF2m_add(u, u, v))
+                goto err;
+            do {
+                if (!BN_rshift1(a, a))
+                    goto err;
+                if (BN_is_odd(u))
+                    if (!BN_GF2m_add(u, u, p))
+                        goto err;
+                if (!BN_rshift1(u, u))
+                    goto err;
+            } while (!BN_is_odd(a));
+        }
+    } while (1);
+
+    if (!BN_copy(r, u))
+        goto err;
+    bn_check_top(r);
+    ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    return ret;
+}
+# endif
+
+/*
+ * Divide yy by xx, reduce modulo p, and store the result in r. r could be xx
+ * * or yy, xx could equal yy. This function calls down to the
+ * BN_GF2m_mod_div implementation; this wrapper function is only provided for
+ * convenience; for best performance, use the BN_GF2m_mod_div function.
+ */
+int BN_GF2m_mod_div_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *yy, const BIGNUM *xx,
+                        const int p[], BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    BIGNUM *field;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    bn_check_top(yy);
+    bn_check_top(xx);
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    if ((field = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (!BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p, field))
+        goto err;
+
+    ret = BN_GF2m_mod_div(r, yy, xx, field, ctx);
+    bn_check_top(r);
+
+ err:
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compute the bth power of a, reduce modulo p, and store the result in r.  r
+ * could be a. Uses simple square-and-multiply algorithm A.5.1 from IEEE
+ * P1363.
+ */
+int BN_GF2m_mod_exp_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
+                        const int p[], BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int ret = 0, i, n;
+    BIGNUM *u;
+
+    bn_check_top(a);
+    bn_check_top(b);
+
+    if (BN_is_zero(b))
+        return (BN_one(r));
+
+    if (BN_abs_is_word(b, 1))
+        return (BN_copy(r, a) != NULL);
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    if ((u = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!BN_GF2m_mod_arr(u, a, p))
+        goto err;
+
+    n = BN_num_bits(b) - 1;
+    for (i = n - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+        if (!BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr(u, u, p, ctx))
+            goto err;
+        if (BN_is_bit_set(b, i)) {
+            if (!BN_GF2m_mod_mul_arr(u, u, a, p, ctx))
+                goto err;
+        }
+    }
+    if (!BN_copy(r, u))
+        goto err;
+    bn_check_top(r);
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compute the bth power of a, reduce modulo p, and store the result in r.  r
+ * could be a. This function calls down to the BN_GF2m_mod_exp_arr
+ * implementation; this wrapper function is only provided for convenience;
+ * for best performance, use the BN_GF2m_mod_exp_arr function.
+ */
+int BN_GF2m_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
+                    const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    const int max = BN_num_bits(p) + 1;
+    int *arr = NULL;
+    bn_check_top(a);
+    bn_check_top(b);
+    bn_check_top(p);
+    if ((arr = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*arr) * max)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    ret = BN_GF2m_poly2arr(p, arr, max);
+    if (!ret || ret > max) {
+        BNerr(BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_EXP, BN_R_INVALID_LENGTH);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    ret = BN_GF2m_mod_exp_arr(r, a, b, arr, ctx);
+    bn_check_top(r);
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_free(arr);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compute the square root of a, reduce modulo p, and store the result in r.
+ * r could be a. Uses exponentiation as in algorithm A.4.1 from IEEE P1363.
+ */
+int BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const int p[],
+                         BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    BIGNUM *u;
+
+    bn_check_top(a);
+
+    if (!p[0]) {
+        /* reduction mod 1 => return 0 */
+        BN_zero(r);
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    if ((u = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!BN_set_bit(u, p[0] - 1))
+        goto err;
+    ret = BN_GF2m_mod_exp_arr(r, a, u, p, ctx);
+    bn_check_top(r);
+
+ err:
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compute the square root of a, reduce modulo p, and store the result in r.
+ * r could be a. This function calls down to the BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt_arr
+ * implementation; this wrapper function is only provided for convenience;
+ * for best performance, use the BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt_arr function.
+ */
+int BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    const int max = BN_num_bits(p) + 1;
+    int *arr = NULL;
+    bn_check_top(a);
+    bn_check_top(p);
+    if ((arr = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*arr) * max)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    ret = BN_GF2m_poly2arr(p, arr, max);
+    if (!ret || ret > max) {
+        BNerr(BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_SQRT, BN_R_INVALID_LENGTH);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    ret = BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt_arr(r, a, arr, ctx);
+    bn_check_top(r);
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_free(arr);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Find r such that r^2 + r = a mod p.  r could be a. If no r exists returns
+ * 0. Uses algorithms A.4.7 and A.4.6 from IEEE P1363.
+ */
+int BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a_, const int p[],
+                               BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int ret = 0, count = 0, j;
+    BIGNUM *a, *z, *rho, *w, *w2, *tmp;
+
+    bn_check_top(a_);
+
+    if (!p[0]) {
+        /* reduction mod 1 => return 0 */
+        BN_zero(r);
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    a = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    z = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    w = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (w == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!BN_GF2m_mod_arr(a, a_, p))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (BN_is_zero(a)) {
+        BN_zero(r);
+        ret = 1;
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (p[0] & 0x1) {           /* m is odd */
+        /* compute half-trace of a */
+        if (!BN_copy(z, a))
+            goto err;
+        for (j = 1; j <= (p[0] - 1) / 2; j++) {
+            if (!BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr(z, z, p, ctx))
+                goto err;
+            if (!BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr(z, z, p, ctx))
+                goto err;
+            if (!BN_GF2m_add(z, z, a))
+                goto err;
+        }
+
+    } else {                    /* m is even */
+
+        rho = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+        w2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+        tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+        if (tmp == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        do {
+            if (!BN_rand(rho, p[0], BN_RAND_TOP_ONE, BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ANY))
+                goto err;
+            if (!BN_GF2m_mod_arr(rho, rho, p))
+                goto err;
+            BN_zero(z);
+            if (!BN_copy(w, rho))
+                goto err;
+            for (j = 1; j <= p[0] - 1; j++) {
+                if (!BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr(z, z, p, ctx))
+                    goto err;
+                if (!BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr(w2, w, p, ctx))
+                    goto err;
+                if (!BN_GF2m_mod_mul_arr(tmp, w2, a, p, ctx))
+                    goto err;
+                if (!BN_GF2m_add(z, z, tmp))
+                    goto err;
+                if (!BN_GF2m_add(w, w2, rho))
+                    goto err;
+            }
+            count++;
+        } while (BN_is_zero(w) && (count < MAX_ITERATIONS));
+        if (BN_is_zero(w)) {
+            BNerr(BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_SOLVE_QUAD_ARR, BN_R_TOO_MANY_ITERATIONS);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (!BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr(w, z, p, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    if (!BN_GF2m_add(w, z, w))
+        goto err;
+    if (BN_GF2m_cmp(w, a)) {
+        BNerr(BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_SOLVE_QUAD_ARR, BN_R_NO_SOLUTION);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!BN_copy(r, z))
+        goto err;
+    bn_check_top(r);
+
+    ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Find r such that r^2 + r = a mod p.  r could be a. If no r exists returns
+ * 0. This function calls down to the BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad_arr
+ * implementation; this wrapper function is only provided for convenience;
+ * for best performance, use the BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad_arr function.
+ */
+int BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
+                           BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    const int max = BN_num_bits(p) + 1;
+    int *arr = NULL;
+    bn_check_top(a);
+    bn_check_top(p);
+    if ((arr = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*arr) * max)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    ret = BN_GF2m_poly2arr(p, arr, max);
+    if (!ret || ret > max) {
+        BNerr(BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_SOLVE_QUAD, BN_R_INVALID_LENGTH);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    ret = BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad_arr(r, a, arr, ctx);
+    bn_check_top(r);
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_free(arr);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convert the bit-string representation of a polynomial ( \sum_{i=0}^n a_i *
+ * x^i) into an array of integers corresponding to the bits with non-zero
+ * coefficient.  Array is terminated with -1. Up to max elements of the array
+ * will be filled.  Return value is total number of array elements that would
+ * be filled if array was large enough.
+ */
+int BN_GF2m_poly2arr(const BIGNUM *a, int p[], int max)
+{
+    int i, j, k = 0;
+    BN_ULONG mask;
+
+    if (BN_is_zero(a))
+        return 0;
+
+    for (i = a->top - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+        if (!a->d[i])
+            /* skip word if a->d[i] == 0 */
+            continue;
+        mask = BN_TBIT;
+        for (j = BN_BITS2 - 1; j >= 0; j--) {
+            if (a->d[i] & mask) {
+                if (k < max)
+                    p[k] = BN_BITS2 * i + j;
+                k++;
+            }
+            mask >>= 1;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (k < max) {
+        p[k] = -1;
+        k++;
+    }
+
+    return k;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convert the coefficient array representation of a polynomial to a
+ * bit-string.  The array must be terminated by -1.
+ */
+int BN_GF2m_arr2poly(const int p[], BIGNUM *a)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    bn_check_top(a);
+    BN_zero(a);
+    for (i = 0; p[i] != -1; i++) {
+        if (BN_set_bit(a, p[i]) == 0)
+            return 0;
+    }
+    bn_check_top(a);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_intern.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_intern.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2c97064
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_intern.c
@@ -0,0 +1,210 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2014-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "bn_lcl.h"
+
+/*
+ * Determine the modified width-(w+1) Non-Adjacent Form (wNAF) of 'scalar'.
+ * This is an array  r[]  of values that are either zero or odd with an
+ * absolute value less than  2^w  satisfying
+ *     scalar = \sum_j r[j]*2^j
+ * where at most one of any  w+1  consecutive digits is non-zero
+ * with the exception that the most significant digit may be only
+ * w-1 zeros away from that next non-zero digit.
+ */
+signed char *bn_compute_wNAF(const BIGNUM *scalar, int w, size_t *ret_len)
+{
+    int window_val;
+    signed char *r = NULL;
+    int sign = 1;
+    int bit, next_bit, mask;
+    size_t len = 0, j;
+
+    if (BN_is_zero(scalar)) {
+        r = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
+        if (r == NULL) {
+            BNerr(BN_F_BN_COMPUTE_WNAF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        r[0] = 0;
+        *ret_len = 1;
+        return r;
+    }
+
+    if (w <= 0 || w > 7) {      /* 'signed char' can represent integers with
+                                 * absolute values less than 2^7 */
+        BNerr(BN_F_BN_COMPUTE_WNAF, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    bit = 1 << w;               /* at most 128 */
+    next_bit = bit << 1;        /* at most 256 */
+    mask = next_bit - 1;        /* at most 255 */
+
+    if (BN_is_negative(scalar)) {
+        sign = -1;
+    }
+
+    if (scalar->d == NULL || scalar->top == 0) {
+        BNerr(BN_F_BN_COMPUTE_WNAF, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    len = BN_num_bits(scalar);
+    r = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1); /*
+                                  * Modified wNAF may be one digit longer than binary representation
+                                  * (*ret_len will be set to the actual length, i.e. at most
+                                  * BN_num_bits(scalar) + 1)
+                                  */
+    if (r == NULL) {
+        BNerr(BN_F_BN_COMPUTE_WNAF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    window_val = scalar->d[0] & mask;
+    j = 0;
+    while ((window_val != 0) || (j + w + 1 < len)) { /* if j+w+1 >= len,
+                                                      * window_val will not
+                                                      * increase */
+        int digit = 0;
+
+        /* 0 <= window_val <= 2^(w+1) */
+
+        if (window_val & 1) {
+            /* 0 < window_val < 2^(w+1) */
+
+            if (window_val & bit) {
+                digit = window_val - next_bit; /* -2^w < digit < 0 */
+
+#if 1                           /* modified wNAF */
+                if (j + w + 1 >= len) {
+                    /*
+                     * Special case for generating modified wNAFs:
+                     * no new bits will be added into window_val,
+                     * so using a positive digit here will decrease
+                     * the total length of the representation
+                     */
+
+                    digit = window_val & (mask >> 1); /* 0 < digit < 2^w */
+                }
+#endif
+            } else {
+                digit = window_val; /* 0 < digit < 2^w */
+            }
+
+            if (digit <= -bit || digit >= bit || !(digit & 1)) {
+                BNerr(BN_F_BN_COMPUTE_WNAF, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                goto err;
+            }
+
+            window_val -= digit;
+
+            /*
+             * now window_val is 0 or 2^(w+1) in standard wNAF generation;
+             * for modified window NAFs, it may also be 2^w
+             */
+            if (window_val != 0 && window_val != next_bit
+                && window_val != bit) {
+                BNerr(BN_F_BN_COMPUTE_WNAF, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                goto err;
+            }
+        }
+
+        r[j++] = sign * digit;
+
+        window_val >>= 1;
+        window_val += bit * BN_is_bit_set(scalar, j + w);
+
+        if (window_val > next_bit) {
+            BNerr(BN_F_BN_COMPUTE_WNAF, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (j > len + 1) {
+        BNerr(BN_F_BN_COMPUTE_WNAF, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    *ret_len = j;
+    return r;
+
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_free(r);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+int bn_get_top(const BIGNUM *a)
+{
+    return a->top;
+}
+
+void bn_set_top(BIGNUM *a, int top)
+{
+    a->top = top;
+}
+
+int bn_get_dmax(const BIGNUM *a)
+{
+    return a->dmax;
+}
+
+void bn_set_all_zero(BIGNUM *a)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    for (i = a->top; i < a->dmax; i++)
+        a->d[i] = 0;
+}
+
+int bn_copy_words(BN_ULONG *out, const BIGNUM *in, int size)
+{
+    if (in->top > size)
+        return 0;
+
+    memset(out, 0, sizeof(*out) * size);
+    if (in->d != NULL)
+        memcpy(out, in->d, sizeof(*out) * in->top);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+BN_ULONG *bn_get_words(const BIGNUM *a)
+{
+    return a->d;
+}
+
+void bn_set_static_words(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG *words, int size)
+{
+    a->d = words;
+    a->dmax = a->top = size;
+    a->neg = 0;
+    a->flags |= BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA;
+    bn_correct_top(a);
+}
+
+int bn_set_words(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG *words, int num_words)
+{
+    if (bn_wexpand(a, num_words) == NULL) {
+        BNerr(BN_F_BN_SET_WORDS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    memcpy(a->d, words, sizeof(BN_ULONG) * num_words);
+    a->top = num_words;
+    bn_correct_top(a);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+size_t bn_sizeof_BIGNUM(void)
+{
+    return sizeof(BIGNUM);
+}
+
+BIGNUM *bn_array_el(BIGNUM *base, int el)
+{
+    return &base[el];
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_kron.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_kron.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b9bc6cc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_kron.c
@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "bn_lcl.h"
+
+/* least significant word */
+#define BN_lsw(n) (((n)->top == 0) ? (BN_ULONG) 0 : (n)->d[0])
+
+/* Returns -2 for errors because both -1 and 0 are valid results. */
+int BN_kronecker(const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int i;
+    int ret = -2;               /* avoid 'uninitialized' warning */
+    int err = 0;
+    BIGNUM *A, *B, *tmp;
+    /*-
+     * In 'tab', only odd-indexed entries are relevant:
+     * For any odd BIGNUM n,
+     *     tab[BN_lsw(n) & 7]
+     * is $(-1)^{(n^2-1)/8}$ (using TeX notation).
+     * Note that the sign of n does not matter.
+     */
+    static const int tab[8] = { 0, 1, 0, -1, 0, -1, 0, 1 };
+
+    bn_check_top(a);
+    bn_check_top(b);
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    A = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    B = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (B == NULL)
+        goto end;
+
+    err = !BN_copy(A, a);
+    if (err)
+        goto end;
+    err = !BN_copy(B, b);
+    if (err)
+        goto end;
+
+    /*
+     * Kronecker symbol, implemented according to Henri Cohen,
+     * "A Course in Computational Algebraic Number Theory"
+     * (algorithm 1.4.10).
+     */
+
+    /* Cohen's step 1: */
+
+    if (BN_is_zero(B)) {
+        ret = BN_abs_is_word(A, 1);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    /* Cohen's step 2: */
+
+    if (!BN_is_odd(A) && !BN_is_odd(B)) {
+        ret = 0;
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    /* now  B  is non-zero */
+    i = 0;
+    while (!BN_is_bit_set(B, i))
+        i++;
+    err = !BN_rshift(B, B, i);
+    if (err)
+        goto end;
+    if (i & 1) {
+        /* i is odd */
+        /* (thus  B  was even, thus  A  must be odd!)  */
+
+        /* set 'ret' to $(-1)^{(A^2-1)/8}$ */
+        ret = tab[BN_lsw(A) & 7];
+    } else {
+        /* i is even */
+        ret = 1;
+    }
+
+    if (B->neg) {
+        B->neg = 0;
+        if (A->neg)
+            ret = -ret;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * now B is positive and odd, so what remains to be done is to compute
+     * the Jacobi symbol (A/B) and multiply it by 'ret'
+     */
+
+    while (1) {
+        /* Cohen's step 3: */
+
+        /*  B  is positive and odd */
+
+        if (BN_is_zero(A)) {
+            ret = BN_is_one(B) ? ret : 0;
+            goto end;
+        }
+
+        /* now  A  is non-zero */
+        i = 0;
+        while (!BN_is_bit_set(A, i))
+            i++;
+        err = !BN_rshift(A, A, i);
+        if (err)
+            goto end;
+        if (i & 1) {
+            /* i is odd */
+            /* multiply 'ret' by  $(-1)^{(B^2-1)/8}$ */
+            ret = ret * tab[BN_lsw(B) & 7];
+        }
+
+        /* Cohen's step 4: */
+        /* multiply 'ret' by  $(-1)^{(A-1)(B-1)/4}$ */
+        if ((A->neg ? ~BN_lsw(A) : BN_lsw(A)) & BN_lsw(B) & 2)
+            ret = -ret;
+
+        /* (A, B) := (B mod |A|, |A|) */
+        err = !BN_nnmod(B, B, A, ctx);
+        if (err)
+            goto end;
+        tmp = A;
+        A = B;
+        B = tmp;
+        tmp->neg = 0;
+    }
+ end:
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    if (err)
+        return -2;
+    else
+        return ret;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5fb3814
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h
@@ -0,0 +1,689 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_BN_LCL_H
+# define HEADER_BN_LCL_H
+
+/*
+ * The EDK2 build doesn't use bn_conf.h; it sets THIRTY_TWO_BIT or
+ * SIXTY_FOUR_BIT in its own environment since it doesn't re-run our
+ * Configure script and needs to support both 32-bit and 64-bit.
+ */
+# include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+
+# if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI)
+#  include "internal/bn_conf.h"
+# endif
+
+# include "internal/bn_int.h"
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * These preprocessor symbols control various aspects of the bignum headers
+ * and library code. They're not defined by any "normal" configuration, as
+ * they are intended for development and testing purposes. NB: defining all
+ * three can be useful for debugging application code as well as openssl
+ * itself. BN_DEBUG - turn on various debugging alterations to the bignum
+ * code BN_DEBUG_RAND - uses random poisoning of unused words to trip up
+ * mismanagement of bignum internals. You must also define BN_DEBUG.
+ */
+/* #define BN_DEBUG */
+/* #define BN_DEBUG_RAND */
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT
+#  define BN_MUL_COMBA
+#  define BN_SQR_COMBA
+#  define BN_RECURSION
+# endif
+
+/*
+ * This next option uses the C libraries (2 word)/(1 word) function. If it is
+ * not defined, I use my C version (which is slower). The reason for this
+ * flag is that when the particular C compiler library routine is used, and
+ * the library is linked with a different compiler, the library is missing.
+ * This mostly happens when the library is built with gcc and then linked
+ * using normal cc.  This would be a common occurrence because gcc normally
+ * produces code that is 2 times faster than system compilers for the big
+ * number stuff. For machines with only one compiler (or shared libraries),
+ * this should be on.  Again this in only really a problem on machines using
+ * "long long's", are 32bit, and are not using my assembler code.
+ */
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || \
+    defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) || defined(linux)
+#  define BN_DIV2W
+# endif
+
+/*
+ * 64-bit processor with LP64 ABI
+ */
+# ifdef SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG
+#  define BN_ULLONG       unsigned long long
+#  define BN_BITS4        32
+#  define BN_MASK2        (0xffffffffffffffffL)
+#  define BN_MASK2l       (0xffffffffL)
+#  define BN_MASK2h       (0xffffffff00000000L)
+#  define BN_MASK2h1      (0xffffffff80000000L)
+#  define BN_DEC_CONV     (10000000000000000000UL)
+#  define BN_DEC_NUM      19
+#  define BN_DEC_FMT1     "%lu"
+#  define BN_DEC_FMT2     "%019lu"
+# endif
+
+/*
+ * 64-bit processor other than LP64 ABI
+ */
+# ifdef SIXTY_FOUR_BIT
+#  undef BN_LLONG
+#  undef BN_ULLONG
+#  define BN_BITS4        32
+#  define BN_MASK2        (0xffffffffffffffffLL)
+#  define BN_MASK2l       (0xffffffffL)
+#  define BN_MASK2h       (0xffffffff00000000LL)
+#  define BN_MASK2h1      (0xffffffff80000000LL)
+#  define BN_DEC_CONV     (10000000000000000000ULL)
+#  define BN_DEC_NUM      19
+#  define BN_DEC_FMT1     "%llu"
+#  define BN_DEC_FMT2     "%019llu"
+# endif
+
+# ifdef THIRTY_TWO_BIT
+#  ifdef BN_LLONG
+#   if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(__GNUC__)
+#    define BN_ULLONG     unsigned __int64
+#   else
+#    define BN_ULLONG     unsigned long long
+#   endif
+#  endif
+#  define BN_BITS4        16
+#  define BN_MASK2        (0xffffffffL)
+#  define BN_MASK2l       (0xffff)
+#  define BN_MASK2h1      (0xffff8000L)
+#  define BN_MASK2h       (0xffff0000L)
+#  define BN_DEC_CONV     (1000000000L)
+#  define BN_DEC_NUM      9
+#  define BN_DEC_FMT1     "%u"
+#  define BN_DEC_FMT2     "%09u"
+# endif
+
+
+/*-
+ * Bignum consistency macros
+ * There is one "API" macro, bn_fix_top(), for stripping leading zeroes from
+ * bignum data after direct manipulations on the data. There is also an
+ * "internal" macro, bn_check_top(), for verifying that there are no leading
+ * zeroes. Unfortunately, some auditing is required due to the fact that
+ * bn_fix_top() has become an overabused duct-tape because bignum data is
+ * occasionally passed around in an inconsistent state. So the following
+ * changes have been made to sort this out;
+ * - bn_fix_top()s implementation has been moved to bn_correct_top()
+ * - if BN_DEBUG isn't defined, bn_fix_top() maps to bn_correct_top(), and
+ *   bn_check_top() is as before.
+ * - if BN_DEBUG *is* defined;
+ *   - bn_check_top() tries to pollute unused words even if the bignum 'top' is
+ *     consistent. (ed: only if BN_DEBUG_RAND is defined)
+ *   - bn_fix_top() maps to bn_check_top() rather than "fixing" anything.
+ * The idea is to have debug builds flag up inconsistent bignums when they
+ * occur. If that occurs in a bn_fix_top(), we examine the code in question; if
+ * the use of bn_fix_top() was appropriate (ie. it follows directly after code
+ * that manipulates the bignum) it is converted to bn_correct_top(), and if it
+ * was not appropriate, we convert it permanently to bn_check_top() and track
+ * down the cause of the bug. Eventually, no internal code should be using the
+ * bn_fix_top() macro. External applications and libraries should try this with
+ * their own code too, both in terms of building against the openssl headers
+ * with BN_DEBUG defined *and* linking with a version of OpenSSL built with it
+ * defined. This not only improves external code, it provides more test
+ * coverage for openssl's own code.
+ */
+
+# ifdef BN_DEBUG
+
+#  ifdef BN_DEBUG_RAND
+/* To avoid "make update" cvs wars due to BN_DEBUG, use some tricks */
+#   ifndef RAND_bytes
+int RAND_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
+#    define BN_DEBUG_TRIX
+#   endif
+#   define bn_pollute(a) \
+        do { \
+            const BIGNUM *_bnum1 = (a); \
+            if (_bnum1->top < _bnum1->dmax) { \
+                unsigned char _tmp_char; \
+                /* We cast away const without the compiler knowing, any \
+                 * *genuinely* constant variables that aren't mutable \
+                 * wouldn't be constructed with top!=dmax. */ \
+                BN_ULONG *_not_const; \
+                memcpy(&_not_const, &_bnum1->d, sizeof(_not_const)); \
+                RAND_bytes(&_tmp_char, 1); /* Debug only - safe to ignore error return */\
+                memset(_not_const + _bnum1->top, _tmp_char, \
+                       sizeof(*_not_const) * (_bnum1->dmax - _bnum1->top)); \
+            } \
+        } while(0)
+#   ifdef BN_DEBUG_TRIX
+#    undef RAND_bytes
+#   endif
+#  else
+#   define bn_pollute(a)
+#  endif
+#  define bn_check_top(a) \
+        do { \
+                const BIGNUM *_bnum2 = (a); \
+                if (_bnum2 != NULL) { \
+                        OPENSSL_assert(((_bnum2->top == 0) && !_bnum2->neg) || \
+                                (_bnum2->top && (_bnum2->d[_bnum2->top - 1] != 0))); \
+                        bn_pollute(_bnum2); \
+                } \
+        } while(0)
+
+#  define bn_fix_top(a)           bn_check_top(a)
+
+#  define bn_check_size(bn, bits) bn_wcheck_size(bn, ((bits+BN_BITS2-1))/BN_BITS2)
+#  define bn_wcheck_size(bn, words) \
+        do { \
+                const BIGNUM *_bnum2 = (bn); \
+                OPENSSL_assert((words) <= (_bnum2)->dmax && \
+                        (words) >= (_bnum2)->top); \
+                /* avoid unused variable warning with NDEBUG */ \
+                (void)(_bnum2); \
+        } while(0)
+
+# else                          /* !BN_DEBUG */
+
+#  define bn_pollute(a)
+#  define bn_check_top(a)
+#  define bn_fix_top(a)           bn_correct_top(a)
+#  define bn_check_size(bn, bits)
+#  define bn_wcheck_size(bn, words)
+
+# endif
+
+BN_ULONG bn_mul_add_words(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, int num,
+                          BN_ULONG w);
+BN_ULONG bn_mul_words(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, int num, BN_ULONG w);
+void bn_sqr_words(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, int num);
+BN_ULONG bn_div_words(BN_ULONG h, BN_ULONG l, BN_ULONG d);
+BN_ULONG bn_add_words(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp,
+                      int num);
+BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp,
+                      int num);
+
+struct bignum_st {
+    BN_ULONG *d;                /* Pointer to an array of 'BN_BITS2' bit
+                                 * chunks. */
+    int top;                    /* Index of last used d +1. */
+    /* The next are internal book keeping for bn_expand. */
+    int dmax;                   /* Size of the d array. */
+    int neg;                    /* one if the number is negative */
+    int flags;
+};
+
+/* Used for montgomery multiplication */
+struct bn_mont_ctx_st {
+    int ri;                     /* number of bits in R */
+    BIGNUM RR;                  /* used to convert to montgomery form */
+    BIGNUM N;                   /* The modulus */
+    BIGNUM Ni;                  /* R*(1/R mod N) - N*Ni = 1 (Ni is only
+                                 * stored for bignum algorithm) */
+    BN_ULONG n0[2];             /* least significant word(s) of Ni; (type
+                                 * changed with 0.9.9, was "BN_ULONG n0;"
+                                 * before) */
+    int flags;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Used for reciprocal division/mod functions It cannot be shared between
+ * threads
+ */
+struct bn_recp_ctx_st {
+    BIGNUM N;                   /* the divisor */
+    BIGNUM Nr;                  /* the reciprocal */
+    int num_bits;
+    int shift;
+    int flags;
+};
+
+/* Used for slow "generation" functions. */
+struct bn_gencb_st {
+    unsigned int ver;           /* To handle binary (in)compatibility */
+    void *arg;                  /* callback-specific data */
+    union {
+        /* if (ver==1) - handles old style callbacks */
+        void (*cb_1) (int, int, void *);
+        /* if (ver==2) - new callback style */
+        int (*cb_2) (int, int, BN_GENCB *);
+    } cb;
+};
+
+/*-
+ * BN_window_bits_for_exponent_size -- macro for sliding window mod_exp functions
+ *
+ *
+ * For window size 'w' (w >= 2) and a random 'b' bits exponent,
+ * the number of multiplications is a constant plus on average
+ *
+ *    2^(w-1) + (b-w)/(w+1);
+ *
+ * here  2^(w-1)  is for precomputing the table (we actually need
+ * entries only for windows that have the lowest bit set), and
+ * (b-w)/(w+1)  is an approximation for the expected number of
+ * w-bit windows, not counting the first one.
+ *
+ * Thus we should use
+ *
+ *    w >= 6  if        b > 671
+ *     w = 5  if  671 > b > 239
+ *     w = 4  if  239 > b >  79
+ *     w = 3  if   79 > b >  23
+ *    w <= 2  if   23 > b
+ *
+ * (with draws in between).  Very small exponents are often selected
+ * with low Hamming weight, so we use  w = 1  for b <= 23.
+ */
+# define BN_window_bits_for_exponent_size(b) \
+                ((b) > 671 ? 6 : \
+                 (b) > 239 ? 5 : \
+                 (b) >  79 ? 4 : \
+                 (b) >  23 ? 3 : 1)
+
+/*
+ * BN_mod_exp_mont_conttime is based on the assumption that the L1 data cache
+ * line width of the target processor is at least the following value.
+ */
+# define MOD_EXP_CTIME_MIN_CACHE_LINE_WIDTH      ( 64 )
+# define MOD_EXP_CTIME_MIN_CACHE_LINE_MASK       (MOD_EXP_CTIME_MIN_CACHE_LINE_WIDTH - 1)
+
+/*
+ * Window sizes optimized for fixed window size modular exponentiation
+ * algorithm (BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime). To achieve the security goals of
+ * BN_mode_exp_mont_consttime, the maximum size of the window must not exceed
+ * log_2(MOD_EXP_CTIME_MIN_CACHE_LINE_WIDTH). Window size thresholds are
+ * defined for cache line sizes of 32 and 64, cache line sizes where
+ * log_2(32)=5 and log_2(64)=6 respectively. A window size of 7 should only be
+ * used on processors that have a 128 byte or greater cache line size.
+ */
+# if MOD_EXP_CTIME_MIN_CACHE_LINE_WIDTH == 64
+
+#  define BN_window_bits_for_ctime_exponent_size(b) \
+                ((b) > 937 ? 6 : \
+                 (b) > 306 ? 5 : \
+                 (b) >  89 ? 4 : \
+                 (b) >  22 ? 3 : 1)
+#  define BN_MAX_WINDOW_BITS_FOR_CTIME_EXPONENT_SIZE    (6)
+
+# elif MOD_EXP_CTIME_MIN_CACHE_LINE_WIDTH == 32
+
+#  define BN_window_bits_for_ctime_exponent_size(b) \
+                ((b) > 306 ? 5 : \
+                 (b) >  89 ? 4 : \
+                 (b) >  22 ? 3 : 1)
+#  define BN_MAX_WINDOW_BITS_FOR_CTIME_EXPONENT_SIZE    (5)
+
+# endif
+
+/* Pentium pro 16,16,16,32,64 */
+/* Alpha       16,16,16,16.64 */
+# define BN_MULL_SIZE_NORMAL                     (16)/* 32 */
+# define BN_MUL_RECURSIVE_SIZE_NORMAL            (16)/* 32 less than */
+# define BN_SQR_RECURSIVE_SIZE_NORMAL            (16)/* 32 */
+# define BN_MUL_LOW_RECURSIVE_SIZE_NORMAL        (32)/* 32 */
+# define BN_MONT_CTX_SET_SIZE_WORD               (64)/* 32 */
+
+/*
+ * 2011-02-22 SMS. In various places, a size_t variable or a type cast to
+ * size_t was used to perform integer-only operations on pointers.  This
+ * failed on VMS with 64-bit pointers (CC /POINTER_SIZE = 64) because size_t
+ * is still only 32 bits.  What's needed in these cases is an integer type
+ * with the same size as a pointer, which size_t is not certain to be. The
+ * only fix here is VMS-specific.
+ */
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
+#  if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64
+#   define PTR_SIZE_INT long long
+#  else                         /* __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 */
+#   define PTR_SIZE_INT int
+#  endif                        /* __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 [else] */
+# elif !defined(PTR_SIZE_INT)   /* defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) */
+#  define PTR_SIZE_INT size_t
+# endif                         /* defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) [else] */
+
+# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_INLINE_ASM) && !defined(PEDANTIC)
+/*
+ * BN_UMULT_HIGH section.
+ *
+ * No, I'm not trying to overwhelm you when stating that the
+ * product of N-bit numbers is 2*N bits wide:-) No, I don't expect
+ * you to be impressed when I say that if the compiler doesn't
+ * support 2*N integer type, then you have to replace every N*N
+ * multiplication with 4 (N/2)*(N/2) accompanied by some shifts
+ * and additions which unavoidably results in severe performance
+ * penalties. Of course provided that the hardware is capable of
+ * producing 2*N result... That's when you normally start
+ * considering assembler implementation. However! It should be
+ * pointed out that some CPUs (most notably Alpha, PowerPC and
+ * upcoming IA-64 family:-) provide *separate* instruction
+ * calculating the upper half of the product placing the result
+ * into a general purpose register. Now *if* the compiler supports
+ * inline assembler, then it's not impossible to implement the
+ * "bignum" routines (and have the compiler optimize 'em)
+ * exhibiting "native" performance in C. That's what BN_UMULT_HIGH
+ * macro is about:-)
+ *
+ *                                      <appro@fy.chalmers.se>
+ */
+#  if defined(__alpha) && (defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG) || defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT))
+#   if defined(__DECC)
+#    include <c_asm.h>
+#    define BN_UMULT_HIGH(a,b)   (BN_ULONG)asm("umulh %a0,%a1,%v0",(a),(b))
+#   elif defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2
+#    define BN_UMULT_HIGH(a,b)   ({      \
+        register BN_ULONG ret;          \
+        asm ("umulh     %1,%2,%0"       \
+             : "=r"(ret)                \
+             : "r"(a), "r"(b));         \
+        ret;                    })
+#   endif                       /* compiler */
+#  elif defined(_ARCH_PPC) && defined(__64BIT__) && defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG)
+#   if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2
+#    define BN_UMULT_HIGH(a,b)   ({      \
+        register BN_ULONG ret;          \
+        asm ("mulhdu    %0,%1,%2"       \
+             : "=r"(ret)                \
+             : "r"(a), "r"(b));         \
+        ret;                    })
+#   endif                       /* compiler */
+#  elif (defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__)) && \
+       (defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG) || defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT))
+#   if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2
+#    define BN_UMULT_HIGH(a,b)   ({      \
+        register BN_ULONG ret,discard;  \
+        asm ("mulq      %3"             \
+             : "=a"(discard),"=d"(ret)  \
+             : "a"(a), "g"(b)           \
+             : "cc");                   \
+        ret;                    })
+#    define BN_UMULT_LOHI(low,high,a,b)  \
+        asm ("mulq      %3"             \
+                : "=a"(low),"=d"(high)  \
+                : "a"(a),"g"(b)         \
+                : "cc");
+#   endif
+#  elif (defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64)) && defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT)
+#   if defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER>=1400
+unsigned __int64 __umulh(unsigned __int64 a, unsigned __int64 b);
+unsigned __int64 _umul128(unsigned __int64 a, unsigned __int64 b,
+                          unsigned __int64 *h);
+#    pragma intrinsic(__umulh,_umul128)
+#    define BN_UMULT_HIGH(a,b)           __umulh((a),(b))
+#    define BN_UMULT_LOHI(low,high,a,b)  ((low)=_umul128((a),(b),&(high)))
+#   endif
+#  elif defined(__mips) && (defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT) || defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG))
+#   if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2
+#    if defined(__SIZEOF_INT128__) && __SIZEOF_INT128__==16
+      /* "h" constraint is not an option on R6 and was removed in 4.4 */
+#     define BN_UMULT_HIGH(a,b)          (((__uint128_t)(a)*(b))>>64)
+#     define BN_UMULT_LOHI(low,high,a,b) ({     \
+        __uint128_t ret=(__uint128_t)(a)*(b);   \
+        (high)=ret>>64; (low)=ret;       })
+#    else
+#     define BN_UMULT_HIGH(a,b) ({      \
+        register BN_ULONG ret;          \
+        asm ("dmultu    %1,%2"          \
+             : "=h"(ret)                \
+             : "r"(a), "r"(b) : "l");   \
+        ret;                    })
+#     define BN_UMULT_LOHI(low,high,a,b)\
+        asm ("dmultu    %2,%3"          \
+             : "=l"(low),"=h"(high)     \
+             : "r"(a), "r"(b));
+#    endif
+#   endif
+#  elif defined(__aarch64__) && defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG)
+#   if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2
+#    define BN_UMULT_HIGH(a,b)   ({      \
+        register BN_ULONG ret;          \
+        asm ("umulh     %0,%1,%2"       \
+             : "=r"(ret)                \
+             : "r"(a), "r"(b));         \
+        ret;                    })
+#   endif
+#  endif                        /* cpu */
+# endif                         /* OPENSSL_NO_ASM */
+
+/*************************************************************
+ * Using the long long type
+ */
+# define Lw(t)    (((BN_ULONG)(t))&BN_MASK2)
+# define Hw(t)    (((BN_ULONG)((t)>>BN_BITS2))&BN_MASK2)
+
+# ifdef BN_DEBUG_RAND
+#  define bn_clear_top2max(a) \
+        { \
+        int      ind = (a)->dmax - (a)->top; \
+        BN_ULONG *ftl = &(a)->d[(a)->top-1]; \
+        for (; ind != 0; ind--) \
+                *(++ftl) = 0x0; \
+        }
+# else
+#  define bn_clear_top2max(a)
+# endif
+
+# ifdef BN_LLONG
+#  define mul_add(r,a,w,c) { \
+        BN_ULLONG t; \
+        t=(BN_ULLONG)w * (a) + (r) + (c); \
+        (r)= Lw(t); \
+        (c)= Hw(t); \
+        }
+
+#  define mul(r,a,w,c) { \
+        BN_ULLONG t; \
+        t=(BN_ULLONG)w * (a) + (c); \
+        (r)= Lw(t); \
+        (c)= Hw(t); \
+        }
+
+#  define sqr(r0,r1,a) { \
+        BN_ULLONG t; \
+        t=(BN_ULLONG)(a)*(a); \
+        (r0)=Lw(t); \
+        (r1)=Hw(t); \
+        }
+
+# elif defined(BN_UMULT_LOHI)
+#  define mul_add(r,a,w,c) {              \
+        BN_ULONG high,low,ret,tmp=(a);  \
+        ret =  (r);                     \
+        BN_UMULT_LOHI(low,high,w,tmp);  \
+        ret += (c);                     \
+        (c) =  (ret<(c))?1:0;           \
+        (c) += high;                    \
+        ret += low;                     \
+        (c) += (ret<low)?1:0;           \
+        (r) =  ret;                     \
+        }
+
+#  define mul(r,a,w,c)    {               \
+        BN_ULONG high,low,ret,ta=(a);   \
+        BN_UMULT_LOHI(low,high,w,ta);   \
+        ret =  low + (c);               \
+        (c) =  high;                    \
+        (c) += (ret<low)?1:0;           \
+        (r) =  ret;                     \
+        }
+
+#  define sqr(r0,r1,a)    {               \
+        BN_ULONG tmp=(a);               \
+        BN_UMULT_LOHI(r0,r1,tmp,tmp);   \
+        }
+
+# elif defined(BN_UMULT_HIGH)
+#  define mul_add(r,a,w,c) {              \
+        BN_ULONG high,low,ret,tmp=(a);  \
+        ret =  (r);                     \
+        high=  BN_UMULT_HIGH(w,tmp);    \
+        ret += (c);                     \
+        low =  (w) * tmp;               \
+        (c) =  (ret<(c))?1:0;           \
+        (c) += high;                    \
+        ret += low;                     \
+        (c) += (ret<low)?1:0;           \
+        (r) =  ret;                     \
+        }
+
+#  define mul(r,a,w,c)    {               \
+        BN_ULONG high,low,ret,ta=(a);   \
+        low =  (w) * ta;                \
+        high=  BN_UMULT_HIGH(w,ta);     \
+        ret =  low + (c);               \
+        (c) =  high;                    \
+        (c) += (ret<low)?1:0;           \
+        (r) =  ret;                     \
+        }
+
+#  define sqr(r0,r1,a)    {               \
+        BN_ULONG tmp=(a);               \
+        (r0) = tmp * tmp;               \
+        (r1) = BN_UMULT_HIGH(tmp,tmp);  \
+        }
+
+# else
+/*************************************************************
+ * No long long type
+ */
+
+#  define LBITS(a)        ((a)&BN_MASK2l)
+#  define HBITS(a)        (((a)>>BN_BITS4)&BN_MASK2l)
+#  define L2HBITS(a)      (((a)<<BN_BITS4)&BN_MASK2)
+
+#  define LLBITS(a)       ((a)&BN_MASKl)
+#  define LHBITS(a)       (((a)>>BN_BITS2)&BN_MASKl)
+#  define LL2HBITS(a)     ((BN_ULLONG)((a)&BN_MASKl)<<BN_BITS2)
+
+#  define mul64(l,h,bl,bh) \
+        { \
+        BN_ULONG m,m1,lt,ht; \
+ \
+        lt=l; \
+        ht=h; \
+        m =(bh)*(lt); \
+        lt=(bl)*(lt); \
+        m1=(bl)*(ht); \
+        ht =(bh)*(ht); \
+        m=(m+m1)&BN_MASK2; if (m < m1) ht+=L2HBITS((BN_ULONG)1); \
+        ht+=HBITS(m); \
+        m1=L2HBITS(m); \
+        lt=(lt+m1)&BN_MASK2; if (lt < m1) ht++; \
+        (l)=lt; \
+        (h)=ht; \
+        }
+
+#  define sqr64(lo,ho,in) \
+        { \
+        BN_ULONG l,h,m; \
+ \
+        h=(in); \
+        l=LBITS(h); \
+        h=HBITS(h); \
+        m =(l)*(h); \
+        l*=l; \
+        h*=h; \
+        h+=(m&BN_MASK2h1)>>(BN_BITS4-1); \
+        m =(m&BN_MASK2l)<<(BN_BITS4+1); \
+        l=(l+m)&BN_MASK2; if (l < m) h++; \
+        (lo)=l; \
+        (ho)=h; \
+        }
+
+#  define mul_add(r,a,bl,bh,c) { \
+        BN_ULONG l,h; \
+ \
+        h= (a); \
+        l=LBITS(h); \
+        h=HBITS(h); \
+        mul64(l,h,(bl),(bh)); \
+ \
+        /* non-multiply part */ \
+        l=(l+(c))&BN_MASK2; if (l < (c)) h++; \
+        (c)=(r); \
+        l=(l+(c))&BN_MASK2; if (l < (c)) h++; \
+        (c)=h&BN_MASK2; \
+        (r)=l; \
+        }
+
+#  define mul(r,a,bl,bh,c) { \
+        BN_ULONG l,h; \
+ \
+        h= (a); \
+        l=LBITS(h); \
+        h=HBITS(h); \
+        mul64(l,h,(bl),(bh)); \
+ \
+        /* non-multiply part */ \
+        l+=(c); if ((l&BN_MASK2) < (c)) h++; \
+        (c)=h&BN_MASK2; \
+        (r)=l&BN_MASK2; \
+        }
+# endif                         /* !BN_LLONG */
+
+void BN_RECP_CTX_init(BN_RECP_CTX *recp);
+void BN_MONT_CTX_init(BN_MONT_CTX *ctx);
+
+void bn_init(BIGNUM *a);
+void bn_mul_normal(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, int na, BN_ULONG *b, int nb);
+void bn_mul_comba8(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b);
+void bn_mul_comba4(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b);
+void bn_sqr_normal(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, int n, BN_ULONG *tmp);
+void bn_sqr_comba8(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a);
+void bn_sqr_comba4(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a);
+int bn_cmp_words(const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b, int n);
+int bn_cmp_part_words(const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b, int cl, int dl);
+void bn_mul_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n2,
+                      int dna, int dnb, BN_ULONG *t);
+void bn_mul_part_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b,
+                           int n, int tna, int tnb, BN_ULONG *t);
+void bn_sqr_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, int n2, BN_ULONG *t);
+void bn_mul_low_normal(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n);
+void bn_mul_low_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n2,
+                          BN_ULONG *t);
+void bn_mul_high(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, BN_ULONG *l, int n2,
+                 BN_ULONG *t);
+BN_ULONG bn_add_part_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b,
+                           int cl, int dl);
+BN_ULONG bn_sub_part_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b,
+                           int cl, int dl);
+int bn_mul_mont(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp,
+                const BN_ULONG *np, const BN_ULONG *n0, int num);
+
+BIGNUM *int_bn_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *in,
+                           const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n, BN_CTX *ctx,
+                           int *noinv);
+
+int bn_probable_prime_dh(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits,
+                         const BIGNUM *add, const BIGNUM *rem, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int bn_probable_prime_dh_retry(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int bn_probable_prime_dh_coprime(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+static ossl_inline BIGNUM *bn_expand(BIGNUM *a, int bits)
+{
+    if (bits > (INT_MAX - BN_BITS2 + 1))
+        return NULL;
+
+    if (((bits+BN_BITS2-1)/BN_BITS2) <= (a)->dmax)
+        return a;
+
+    return bn_expand2((a),(bits+BN_BITS2-1)/BN_BITS2);
+}
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7058494
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1016 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "bn_lcl.h"
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+
+/* This stuff appears to be completely unused, so is deprecated */
+#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x00908000L
+/*-
+ * For a 32 bit machine
+ * 2 -   4 ==  128
+ * 3 -   8 ==  256
+ * 4 -  16 ==  512
+ * 5 -  32 == 1024
+ * 6 -  64 == 2048
+ * 7 - 128 == 4096
+ * 8 - 256 == 8192
+ */
+static int bn_limit_bits = 0;
+static int bn_limit_num = 8;    /* (1<<bn_limit_bits) */
+static int bn_limit_bits_low = 0;
+static int bn_limit_num_low = 8; /* (1<<bn_limit_bits_low) */
+static int bn_limit_bits_high = 0;
+static int bn_limit_num_high = 8; /* (1<<bn_limit_bits_high) */
+static int bn_limit_bits_mont = 0;
+static int bn_limit_num_mont = 8; /* (1<<bn_limit_bits_mont) */
+
+void BN_set_params(int mult, int high, int low, int mont)
+{
+    if (mult >= 0) {
+        if (mult > (int)(sizeof(int) * 8) - 1)
+            mult = sizeof(int) * 8 - 1;
+        bn_limit_bits = mult;
+        bn_limit_num = 1 << mult;
+    }
+    if (high >= 0) {
+        if (high > (int)(sizeof(int) * 8) - 1)
+            high = sizeof(int) * 8 - 1;
+        bn_limit_bits_high = high;
+        bn_limit_num_high = 1 << high;
+    }
+    if (low >= 0) {
+        if (low > (int)(sizeof(int) * 8) - 1)
+            low = sizeof(int) * 8 - 1;
+        bn_limit_bits_low = low;
+        bn_limit_num_low = 1 << low;
+    }
+    if (mont >= 0) {
+        if (mont > (int)(sizeof(int) * 8) - 1)
+            mont = sizeof(int) * 8 - 1;
+        bn_limit_bits_mont = mont;
+        bn_limit_num_mont = 1 << mont;
+    }
+}
+
+int BN_get_params(int which)
+{
+    if (which == 0)
+        return (bn_limit_bits);
+    else if (which == 1)
+        return (bn_limit_bits_high);
+    else if (which == 2)
+        return (bn_limit_bits_low);
+    else if (which == 3)
+        return (bn_limit_bits_mont);
+    else
+        return (0);
+}
+#endif
+
+const BIGNUM *BN_value_one(void)
+{
+    static const BN_ULONG data_one = 1L;
+    static const BIGNUM const_one =
+        { (BN_ULONG *)&data_one, 1, 1, 0, BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA };
+
+    return (&const_one);
+}
+
+int BN_num_bits_word(BN_ULONG l)
+{
+    BN_ULONG x, mask;
+    int bits = (l != 0);
+
+#if BN_BITS2 > 32
+    x = l >> 32;
+    mask = (0 - x) & BN_MASK2;
+    mask = (0 - (mask >> (BN_BITS2 - 1)));
+    bits += 32 & mask;
+    l ^= (x ^ l) & mask;
+#endif
+
+    x = l >> 16;
+    mask = (0 - x) & BN_MASK2;
+    mask = (0 - (mask >> (BN_BITS2 - 1)));
+    bits += 16 & mask;
+    l ^= (x ^ l) & mask;
+
+    x = l >> 8;
+    mask = (0 - x) & BN_MASK2;
+    mask = (0 - (mask >> (BN_BITS2 - 1)));
+    bits += 8 & mask;
+    l ^= (x ^ l) & mask;
+
+    x = l >> 4;
+    mask = (0 - x) & BN_MASK2;
+    mask = (0 - (mask >> (BN_BITS2 - 1)));
+    bits += 4 & mask;
+    l ^= (x ^ l) & mask;
+
+    x = l >> 2;
+    mask = (0 - x) & BN_MASK2;
+    mask = (0 - (mask >> (BN_BITS2 - 1)));
+    bits += 2 & mask;
+    l ^= (x ^ l) & mask;
+
+    x = l >> 1;
+    mask = (0 - x) & BN_MASK2;
+    mask = (0 - (mask >> (BN_BITS2 - 1)));
+    bits += 1 & mask;
+
+    return bits;
+}
+
+int BN_num_bits(const BIGNUM *a)
+{
+    int i = a->top - 1;
+    bn_check_top(a);
+
+    if (BN_is_zero(a))
+        return 0;
+    return ((i * BN_BITS2) + BN_num_bits_word(a->d[i]));
+}
+
+static void bn_free_d(BIGNUM *a)
+{
+    if (BN_get_flags(a, BN_FLG_SECURE))
+        OPENSSL_secure_free(a->d);
+    else
+        OPENSSL_free(a->d);
+}
+
+
+void BN_clear_free(BIGNUM *a)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    if (a == NULL)
+        return;
+    bn_check_top(a);
+    if (a->d != NULL) {
+        OPENSSL_cleanse(a->d, a->dmax * sizeof(a->d[0]));
+        if (!BN_get_flags(a, BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA))
+            bn_free_d(a);
+    }
+    i = BN_get_flags(a, BN_FLG_MALLOCED);
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(a, sizeof(*a));
+    if (i)
+        OPENSSL_free(a);
+}
+
+void BN_free(BIGNUM *a)
+{
+    if (a == NULL)
+        return;
+    bn_check_top(a);
+    if (!BN_get_flags(a, BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA))
+        bn_free_d(a);
+    if (a->flags & BN_FLG_MALLOCED)
+        OPENSSL_free(a);
+    else {
+#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x00908000L
+        a->flags |= BN_FLG_FREE;
+#endif
+        a->d = NULL;
+    }
+}
+
+void bn_init(BIGNUM *a)
+{
+    static BIGNUM nilbn;
+
+    *a = nilbn;
+    bn_check_top(a);
+}
+
+BIGNUM *BN_new(void)
+{
+    BIGNUM *ret;
+
+    if ((ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret))) == NULL) {
+        BNerr(BN_F_BN_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+    ret->flags = BN_FLG_MALLOCED;
+    bn_check_top(ret);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+ BIGNUM *BN_secure_new(void)
+ {
+     BIGNUM *ret = BN_new();
+     if (ret != NULL)
+         ret->flags |= BN_FLG_SECURE;
+     return (ret);
+ }
+
+/* This is used by bn_expand2() */
+/* The caller MUST check that words > b->dmax before calling this */
+static BN_ULONG *bn_expand_internal(const BIGNUM *b, int words)
+{
+    BN_ULONG *A, *a = NULL;
+    const BN_ULONG *B;
+    int i;
+
+    bn_check_top(b);
+
+    if (words > (INT_MAX / (4 * BN_BITS2))) {
+        BNerr(BN_F_BN_EXPAND_INTERNAL, BN_R_BIGNUM_TOO_LONG);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    if (BN_get_flags(b, BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA)) {
+        BNerr(BN_F_BN_EXPAND_INTERNAL, BN_R_EXPAND_ON_STATIC_BIGNUM_DATA);
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+    if (BN_get_flags(b, BN_FLG_SECURE))
+        a = A = OPENSSL_secure_zalloc(words * sizeof(*a));
+    else
+        a = A = OPENSSL_zalloc(words * sizeof(*a));
+    if (A == NULL) {
+        BNerr(BN_F_BN_EXPAND_INTERNAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+
+#if 1
+    B = b->d;
+    /* Check if the previous number needs to be copied */
+    if (B != NULL) {
+        for (i = b->top >> 2; i > 0; i--, A += 4, B += 4) {
+            /*
+             * The fact that the loop is unrolled
+             * 4-wise is a tribute to Intel. It's
+             * the one that doesn't have enough
+             * registers to accommodate more data.
+             * I'd unroll it 8-wise otherwise:-)
+             *
+             *              <appro@fy.chalmers.se>
+             */
+            BN_ULONG a0, a1, a2, a3;
+            a0 = B[0];
+            a1 = B[1];
+            a2 = B[2];
+            a3 = B[3];
+            A[0] = a0;
+            A[1] = a1;
+            A[2] = a2;
+            A[3] = a3;
+        }
+        switch (b->top & 3) {
+        case 3:
+            A[2] = B[2];
+            /* fall thru */
+        case 2:
+            A[1] = B[1];
+            /* fall thru */
+        case 1:
+            A[0] = B[0];
+            /* fall thru */
+        case 0:
+            /* Without the "case 0" some old optimizers got this wrong. */
+            ;
+        }
+    }
+#else
+    memset(A, 0, sizeof(*A) * words);
+    memcpy(A, b->d, sizeof(b->d[0]) * b->top);
+#endif
+
+    return (a);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is an internal function that should not be used in applications. It
+ * ensures that 'b' has enough room for a 'words' word number and initialises
+ * any unused part of b->d with leading zeros. It is mostly used by the
+ * various BIGNUM routines. If there is an error, NULL is returned. If not,
+ * 'b' is returned.
+ */
+
+BIGNUM *bn_expand2(BIGNUM *b, int words)
+{
+    bn_check_top(b);
+
+    if (words > b->dmax) {
+        BN_ULONG *a = bn_expand_internal(b, words);
+        if (!a)
+            return NULL;
+        if (b->d) {
+            OPENSSL_cleanse(b->d, b->dmax * sizeof(b->d[0]));
+            bn_free_d(b);
+        }
+        b->d = a;
+        b->dmax = words;
+    }
+
+    bn_check_top(b);
+    return b;
+}
+
+BIGNUM *BN_dup(const BIGNUM *a)
+{
+    BIGNUM *t;
+
+    if (a == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    bn_check_top(a);
+
+    t = BN_get_flags(a, BN_FLG_SECURE) ? BN_secure_new() : BN_new();
+    if (t == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    if (!BN_copy(t, a)) {
+        BN_free(t);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    bn_check_top(t);
+    return t;
+}
+
+BIGNUM *BN_copy(BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b)
+{
+    int i;
+    BN_ULONG *A;
+    const BN_ULONG *B;
+
+    bn_check_top(b);
+
+    if (a == b)
+        return (a);
+    if (bn_wexpand(a, b->top) == NULL)
+        return (NULL);
+
+#if 1
+    A = a->d;
+    B = b->d;
+    for (i = b->top >> 2; i > 0; i--, A += 4, B += 4) {
+        BN_ULONG a0, a1, a2, a3;
+        a0 = B[0];
+        a1 = B[1];
+        a2 = B[2];
+        a3 = B[3];
+        A[0] = a0;
+        A[1] = a1;
+        A[2] = a2;
+        A[3] = a3;
+    }
+    /* ultrix cc workaround, see comments in bn_expand_internal */
+    switch (b->top & 3) {
+    case 3:
+        A[2] = B[2];
+        /* fall thru */
+    case 2:
+        A[1] = B[1];
+        /* fall thru */
+    case 1:
+        A[0] = B[0];
+        /* fall thru */
+    case 0:;
+    }
+#else
+    memcpy(a->d, b->d, sizeof(b->d[0]) * b->top);
+#endif
+
+    a->top = b->top;
+    a->neg = b->neg;
+    bn_check_top(a);
+    return (a);
+}
+
+void BN_swap(BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b)
+{
+    int flags_old_a, flags_old_b;
+    BN_ULONG *tmp_d;
+    int tmp_top, tmp_dmax, tmp_neg;
+
+    bn_check_top(a);
+    bn_check_top(b);
+
+    flags_old_a = a->flags;
+    flags_old_b = b->flags;
+
+    tmp_d = a->d;
+    tmp_top = a->top;
+    tmp_dmax = a->dmax;
+    tmp_neg = a->neg;
+
+    a->d = b->d;
+    a->top = b->top;
+    a->dmax = b->dmax;
+    a->neg = b->neg;
+
+    b->d = tmp_d;
+    b->top = tmp_top;
+    b->dmax = tmp_dmax;
+    b->neg = tmp_neg;
+
+    a->flags =
+        (flags_old_a & BN_FLG_MALLOCED) | (flags_old_b & BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA);
+    b->flags =
+        (flags_old_b & BN_FLG_MALLOCED) | (flags_old_a & BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA);
+    bn_check_top(a);
+    bn_check_top(b);
+}
+
+void BN_clear(BIGNUM *a)
+{
+    bn_check_top(a);
+    if (a->d != NULL)
+        OPENSSL_cleanse(a->d, sizeof(*a->d) * a->dmax);
+    a->top = 0;
+    a->neg = 0;
+}
+
+BN_ULONG BN_get_word(const BIGNUM *a)
+{
+    if (a->top > 1)
+        return BN_MASK2;
+    else if (a->top == 1)
+        return a->d[0];
+    /* a->top == 0 */
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int BN_set_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w)
+{
+    bn_check_top(a);
+    if (bn_expand(a, (int)sizeof(BN_ULONG) * 8) == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    a->neg = 0;
+    a->d[0] = w;
+    a->top = (w ? 1 : 0);
+    bn_check_top(a);
+    return (1);
+}
+
+BIGNUM *BN_bin2bn(const unsigned char *s, int len, BIGNUM *ret)
+{
+    unsigned int i, m;
+    unsigned int n;
+    BN_ULONG l;
+    BIGNUM *bn = NULL;
+
+    if (ret == NULL)
+        ret = bn = BN_new();
+    if (ret == NULL)
+        return (NULL);
+    bn_check_top(ret);
+    /* Skip leading zero's. */
+    for ( ; len > 0 && *s == 0; s++, len--)
+        continue;
+    n = len;
+    if (n == 0) {
+        ret->top = 0;
+        return (ret);
+    }
+    i = ((n - 1) / BN_BYTES) + 1;
+    m = ((n - 1) % (BN_BYTES));
+    if (bn_wexpand(ret, (int)i) == NULL) {
+        BN_free(bn);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    ret->top = i;
+    ret->neg = 0;
+    l = 0;
+    while (n--) {
+        l = (l << 8L) | *(s++);
+        if (m-- == 0) {
+            ret->d[--i] = l;
+            l = 0;
+            m = BN_BYTES - 1;
+        }
+    }
+    /*
+     * need to call this due to clear byte at top if avoiding having the top
+     * bit set (-ve number)
+     */
+    bn_correct_top(ret);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+/* ignore negative */
+static int bn2binpad(const BIGNUM *a, unsigned char *to, int tolen)
+{
+    int i;
+    BN_ULONG l;
+
+    bn_check_top(a);
+    i = BN_num_bytes(a);
+    if (tolen == -1)
+        tolen = i;
+    else if (tolen < i)
+        return -1;
+    /* Add leading zeroes if necessary */
+    if (tolen > i) {
+        memset(to, 0, tolen - i);
+        to += tolen - i;
+    }
+    while (i--) {
+        l = a->d[i / BN_BYTES];
+        *(to++) = (unsigned char)(l >> (8 * (i % BN_BYTES))) & 0xff;
+    }
+    return tolen;
+}
+
+int BN_bn2binpad(const BIGNUM *a, unsigned char *to, int tolen)
+{
+    if (tolen < 0)
+        return -1;
+    return bn2binpad(a, to, tolen);
+}
+
+int BN_bn2bin(const BIGNUM *a, unsigned char *to)
+{
+    return bn2binpad(a, to, -1);
+}
+
+BIGNUM *BN_lebin2bn(const unsigned char *s, int len, BIGNUM *ret)
+{
+    unsigned int i, m;
+    unsigned int n;
+    BN_ULONG l;
+    BIGNUM *bn = NULL;
+
+    if (ret == NULL)
+        ret = bn = BN_new();
+    if (ret == NULL)
+        return (NULL);
+    bn_check_top(ret);
+    s += len;
+    /* Skip trailing zeroes. */
+    for ( ; len > 0 && s[-1] == 0; s--, len--)
+        continue;
+    n = len;
+    if (n == 0) {
+        ret->top = 0;
+        return ret;
+    }
+    i = ((n - 1) / BN_BYTES) + 1;
+    m = ((n - 1) % (BN_BYTES));
+    if (bn_wexpand(ret, (int)i) == NULL) {
+        BN_free(bn);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    ret->top = i;
+    ret->neg = 0;
+    l = 0;
+    while (n--) {
+        s--;
+        l = (l << 8L) | *s;
+        if (m-- == 0) {
+            ret->d[--i] = l;
+            l = 0;
+            m = BN_BYTES - 1;
+        }
+    }
+    /*
+     * need to call this due to clear byte at top if avoiding having the top
+     * bit set (-ve number)
+     */
+    bn_correct_top(ret);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int BN_bn2lebinpad(const BIGNUM *a, unsigned char *to, int tolen)
+{
+    int i;
+    BN_ULONG l;
+    bn_check_top(a);
+    i = BN_num_bytes(a);
+    if (tolen < i)
+        return -1;
+    /* Add trailing zeroes if necessary */
+    if (tolen > i)
+        memset(to + i, 0, tolen - i);
+    to += i;
+    while (i--) {
+        l = a->d[i / BN_BYTES];
+        to--;
+        *to = (unsigned char)(l >> (8 * (i % BN_BYTES))) & 0xff;
+    }
+    return tolen;
+}
+
+int BN_ucmp(const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b)
+{
+    int i;
+    BN_ULONG t1, t2, *ap, *bp;
+
+    bn_check_top(a);
+    bn_check_top(b);
+
+    i = a->top - b->top;
+    if (i != 0)
+        return (i);
+    ap = a->d;
+    bp = b->d;
+    for (i = a->top - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+        t1 = ap[i];
+        t2 = bp[i];
+        if (t1 != t2)
+            return ((t1 > t2) ? 1 : -1);
+    }
+    return (0);
+}
+
+int BN_cmp(const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b)
+{
+    int i;
+    int gt, lt;
+    BN_ULONG t1, t2;
+
+    if ((a == NULL) || (b == NULL)) {
+        if (a != NULL)
+            return (-1);
+        else if (b != NULL)
+            return (1);
+        else
+            return (0);
+    }
+
+    bn_check_top(a);
+    bn_check_top(b);
+
+    if (a->neg != b->neg) {
+        if (a->neg)
+            return (-1);
+        else
+            return (1);
+    }
+    if (a->neg == 0) {
+        gt = 1;
+        lt = -1;
+    } else {
+        gt = -1;
+        lt = 1;
+    }
+
+    if (a->top > b->top)
+        return (gt);
+    if (a->top < b->top)
+        return (lt);
+    for (i = a->top - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+        t1 = a->d[i];
+        t2 = b->d[i];
+        if (t1 > t2)
+            return (gt);
+        if (t1 < t2)
+            return (lt);
+    }
+    return (0);
+}
+
+int BN_set_bit(BIGNUM *a, int n)
+{
+    int i, j, k;
+
+    if (n < 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    i = n / BN_BITS2;
+    j = n % BN_BITS2;
+    if (a->top <= i) {
+        if (bn_wexpand(a, i + 1) == NULL)
+            return (0);
+        for (k = a->top; k < i + 1; k++)
+            a->d[k] = 0;
+        a->top = i + 1;
+    }
+
+    a->d[i] |= (((BN_ULONG)1) << j);
+    bn_check_top(a);
+    return (1);
+}
+
+int BN_clear_bit(BIGNUM *a, int n)
+{
+    int i, j;
+
+    bn_check_top(a);
+    if (n < 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    i = n / BN_BITS2;
+    j = n % BN_BITS2;
+    if (a->top <= i)
+        return (0);
+
+    a->d[i] &= (~(((BN_ULONG)1) << j));
+    bn_correct_top(a);
+    return (1);
+}
+
+int BN_is_bit_set(const BIGNUM *a, int n)
+{
+    int i, j;
+
+    bn_check_top(a);
+    if (n < 0)
+        return 0;
+    i = n / BN_BITS2;
+    j = n % BN_BITS2;
+    if (a->top <= i)
+        return 0;
+    return (int)(((a->d[i]) >> j) & ((BN_ULONG)1));
+}
+
+int BN_mask_bits(BIGNUM *a, int n)
+{
+    int b, w;
+
+    bn_check_top(a);
+    if (n < 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    w = n / BN_BITS2;
+    b = n % BN_BITS2;
+    if (w >= a->top)
+        return 0;
+    if (b == 0)
+        a->top = w;
+    else {
+        a->top = w + 1;
+        a->d[w] &= ~(BN_MASK2 << b);
+    }
+    bn_correct_top(a);
+    return (1);
+}
+
+void BN_set_negative(BIGNUM *a, int b)
+{
+    if (b && !BN_is_zero(a))
+        a->neg = 1;
+    else
+        a->neg = 0;
+}
+
+int bn_cmp_words(const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b, int n)
+{
+    int i;
+    BN_ULONG aa, bb;
+
+    aa = a[n - 1];
+    bb = b[n - 1];
+    if (aa != bb)
+        return ((aa > bb) ? 1 : -1);
+    for (i = n - 2; i >= 0; i--) {
+        aa = a[i];
+        bb = b[i];
+        if (aa != bb)
+            return ((aa > bb) ? 1 : -1);
+    }
+    return (0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Here follows a specialised variants of bn_cmp_words().  It has the
+ * capability of performing the operation on arrays of different sizes. The
+ * sizes of those arrays is expressed through cl, which is the common length
+ * ( basically, min(len(a),len(b)) ), and dl, which is the delta between the
+ * two lengths, calculated as len(a)-len(b). All lengths are the number of
+ * BN_ULONGs...
+ */
+
+int bn_cmp_part_words(const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b, int cl, int dl)
+{
+    int n, i;
+    n = cl - 1;
+
+    if (dl < 0) {
+        for (i = dl; i < 0; i++) {
+            if (b[n - i] != 0)
+                return -1;      /* a < b */
+        }
+    }
+    if (dl > 0) {
+        for (i = dl; i > 0; i--) {
+            if (a[n + i] != 0)
+                return 1;       /* a > b */
+        }
+    }
+    return bn_cmp_words(a, b, cl);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Constant-time conditional swap of a and b.
+ * a and b are swapped if condition is not 0.  The code assumes that at most one bit of condition is set.
+ * nwords is the number of words to swap.  The code assumes that at least nwords are allocated in both a and b,
+ * and that no more than nwords are used by either a or b.
+ * a and b cannot be the same number
+ */
+void BN_consttime_swap(BN_ULONG condition, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, int nwords)
+{
+    BN_ULONG t;
+    int i;
+
+    bn_wcheck_size(a, nwords);
+    bn_wcheck_size(b, nwords);
+
+    assert(a != b);
+    assert((condition & (condition - 1)) == 0);
+    assert(sizeof(BN_ULONG) >= sizeof(int));
+
+    condition = ((condition - 1) >> (BN_BITS2 - 1)) - 1;
+
+    t = (a->top ^ b->top) & condition;
+    a->top ^= t;
+    b->top ^= t;
+
+#define BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(ind) \
+        do { \
+                t = (a->d[ind] ^ b->d[ind]) & condition; \
+                a->d[ind] ^= t; \
+                b->d[ind] ^= t; \
+        } while (0)
+
+    switch (nwords) {
+    default:
+        for (i = 10; i < nwords; i++)
+            BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(i);
+        /* Fallthrough */
+    case 10:
+        BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(9);   /* Fallthrough */
+    case 9:
+        BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(8);   /* Fallthrough */
+    case 8:
+        BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(7);   /* Fallthrough */
+    case 7:
+        BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(6);   /* Fallthrough */
+    case 6:
+        BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(5);   /* Fallthrough */
+    case 5:
+        BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(4);   /* Fallthrough */
+    case 4:
+        BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(3);   /* Fallthrough */
+    case 3:
+        BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(2);   /* Fallthrough */
+    case 2:
+        BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(1);   /* Fallthrough */
+    case 1:
+        BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(0);
+    }
+#undef BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP
+}
+
+/* Bits of security, see SP800-57 */
+
+int BN_security_bits(int L, int N)
+{
+    int secbits, bits;
+    if (L >= 15360)
+        secbits = 256;
+    else if (L >= 7680)
+        secbits = 192;
+    else if (L >= 3072)
+        secbits = 128;
+    else if (L >= 2048)
+        secbits = 112;
+    else if (L >= 1024)
+        secbits = 80;
+    else
+        return 0;
+    if (N == -1)
+        return secbits;
+    bits = N / 2;
+    if (bits < 80)
+        return 0;
+    return bits >= secbits ? secbits : bits;
+}
+
+void BN_zero_ex(BIGNUM *a)
+{
+    a->top = 0;
+    a->neg = 0;
+}
+
+int BN_abs_is_word(const BIGNUM *a, const BN_ULONG w)
+{
+    return ((a->top == 1) && (a->d[0] == w)) || ((w == 0) && (a->top == 0));
+}
+
+int BN_is_zero(const BIGNUM *a)
+{
+    return a->top == 0;
+}
+
+int BN_is_one(const BIGNUM *a)
+{
+    return BN_abs_is_word(a, 1) && !a->neg;
+}
+
+int BN_is_word(const BIGNUM *a, const BN_ULONG w)
+{
+    return BN_abs_is_word(a, w) && (!w || !a->neg);
+}
+
+int BN_is_odd(const BIGNUM *a)
+{
+    return (a->top > 0) && (a->d[0] & 1);
+}
+
+int BN_is_negative(const BIGNUM *a)
+{
+    return (a->neg != 0);
+}
+
+int BN_to_montgomery(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_MONT_CTX *mont,
+                     BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return BN_mod_mul_montgomery(r, a, &(mont->RR), mont, ctx);
+}
+
+void BN_with_flags(BIGNUM *dest, const BIGNUM *b, int flags)
+{
+    dest->d = b->d;
+    dest->top = b->top;
+    dest->dmax = b->dmax;
+    dest->neg = b->neg;
+    dest->flags = ((dest->flags & BN_FLG_MALLOCED)
+                   | (b->flags & ~BN_FLG_MALLOCED)
+                   | BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA | flags);
+}
+
+BN_GENCB *BN_GENCB_new(void)
+{
+    BN_GENCB *ret;
+
+    if ((ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ret))) == NULL) {
+        BNerr(BN_F_BN_GENCB_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+void BN_GENCB_free(BN_GENCB *cb)
+{
+    if (cb == NULL)
+        return;
+    OPENSSL_free(cb);
+}
+
+void BN_set_flags(BIGNUM *b, int n)
+{
+    b->flags |= n;
+}
+
+int BN_get_flags(const BIGNUM *b, int n)
+{
+    return b->flags & n;
+}
+
+/* Populate a BN_GENCB structure with an "old"-style callback */
+void BN_GENCB_set_old(BN_GENCB *gencb, void (*callback) (int, int, void *),
+                      void *cb_arg)
+{
+    BN_GENCB *tmp_gencb = gencb;
+    tmp_gencb->ver = 1;
+    tmp_gencb->arg = cb_arg;
+    tmp_gencb->cb.cb_1 = callback;
+}
+
+/* Populate a BN_GENCB structure with a "new"-style callback */
+void BN_GENCB_set(BN_GENCB *gencb, int (*callback) (int, int, BN_GENCB *),
+                  void *cb_arg)
+{
+    BN_GENCB *tmp_gencb = gencb;
+    tmp_gencb->ver = 2;
+    tmp_gencb->arg = cb_arg;
+    tmp_gencb->cb.cb_2 = callback;
+}
+
+void *BN_GENCB_get_arg(BN_GENCB *cb)
+{
+    return cb->arg;
+}
+
+BIGNUM *bn_wexpand(BIGNUM *a, int words)
+{
+    return (words <= a->dmax) ? a : bn_expand2(a, words);
+}
+
+void bn_correct_top(BIGNUM *a)
+{
+    BN_ULONG *ftl;
+    int tmp_top = a->top;
+
+    if (tmp_top > 0) {
+        for (ftl = &(a->d[tmp_top]); tmp_top > 0; tmp_top--) {
+            ftl--;
+            if (*ftl != 0)
+                break;
+        }
+        a->top = tmp_top;
+    }
+    if (a->top == 0)
+        a->neg = 0;
+    bn_pollute(a);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_mod.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_mod.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..13b583f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_mod.c
@@ -0,0 +1,201 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1998-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "bn_lcl.h"
+
+int BN_nnmod(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *m, const BIGNUM *d, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    /*
+     * like BN_mod, but returns non-negative remainder (i.e., 0 <= r < |d|
+     * always holds)
+     */
+
+    if (!(BN_mod(r, m, d, ctx)))
+        return 0;
+    if (!r->neg)
+        return 1;
+    /* now   -|d| < r < 0,  so we have to set  r := r + |d| */
+    return (d->neg ? BN_sub : BN_add) (r, r, d);
+}
+
+int BN_mod_add(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *m,
+               BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    if (!BN_add(r, a, b))
+        return 0;
+    return BN_nnmod(r, r, m, ctx);
+}
+
+/*
+ * BN_mod_add variant that may be used if both a and b are non-negative and
+ * less than m
+ */
+int BN_mod_add_quick(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
+                     const BIGNUM *m)
+{
+    if (!BN_uadd(r, a, b))
+        return 0;
+    if (BN_ucmp(r, m) >= 0)
+        return BN_usub(r, r, m);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int BN_mod_sub(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *m,
+               BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    if (!BN_sub(r, a, b))
+        return 0;
+    return BN_nnmod(r, r, m, ctx);
+}
+
+/*
+ * BN_mod_sub variant that may be used if both a and b are non-negative and
+ * less than m
+ */
+int BN_mod_sub_quick(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
+                     const BIGNUM *m)
+{
+    if (!BN_sub(r, a, b))
+        return 0;
+    if (r->neg)
+        return BN_add(r, r, m);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* slow but works */
+int BN_mod_mul(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *m,
+               BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    BIGNUM *t;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    bn_check_top(a);
+    bn_check_top(b);
+    bn_check_top(m);
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    if ((t = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (a == b) {
+        if (!BN_sqr(t, a, ctx))
+            goto err;
+    } else {
+        if (!BN_mul(t, a, b, ctx))
+            goto err;
+    }
+    if (!BN_nnmod(r, t, m, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    bn_check_top(r);
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+int BN_mod_sqr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    if (!BN_sqr(r, a, ctx))
+        return 0;
+    /* r->neg == 0,  thus we don't need BN_nnmod */
+    return BN_mod(r, r, m, ctx);
+}
+
+int BN_mod_lshift1(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    if (!BN_lshift1(r, a))
+        return 0;
+    bn_check_top(r);
+    return BN_nnmod(r, r, m, ctx);
+}
+
+/*
+ * BN_mod_lshift1 variant that may be used if a is non-negative and less than
+ * m
+ */
+int BN_mod_lshift1_quick(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *m)
+{
+    if (!BN_lshift1(r, a))
+        return 0;
+    bn_check_top(r);
+    if (BN_cmp(r, m) >= 0)
+        return BN_sub(r, r, m);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int BN_mod_lshift(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, int n, const BIGNUM *m,
+                  BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    BIGNUM *abs_m = NULL;
+    int ret;
+
+    if (!BN_nnmod(r, a, m, ctx))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (m->neg) {
+        abs_m = BN_dup(m);
+        if (abs_m == NULL)
+            return 0;
+        abs_m->neg = 0;
+    }
+
+    ret = BN_mod_lshift_quick(r, r, n, (abs_m ? abs_m : m));
+    bn_check_top(r);
+
+    BN_free(abs_m);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * BN_mod_lshift variant that may be used if a is non-negative and less than
+ * m
+ */
+int BN_mod_lshift_quick(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, int n, const BIGNUM *m)
+{
+    if (r != a) {
+        if (BN_copy(r, a) == NULL)
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    while (n > 0) {
+        int max_shift;
+
+        /* 0 < r < m */
+        max_shift = BN_num_bits(m) - BN_num_bits(r);
+        /* max_shift >= 0 */
+
+        if (max_shift < 0) {
+            BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_LSHIFT_QUICK, BN_R_INPUT_NOT_REDUCED);
+            return 0;
+        }
+
+        if (max_shift > n)
+            max_shift = n;
+
+        if (max_shift) {
+            if (!BN_lshift(r, r, max_shift))
+                return 0;
+            n -= max_shift;
+        } else {
+            if (!BN_lshift1(r, r))
+                return 0;
+            --n;
+        }
+
+        /* BN_num_bits(r) <= BN_num_bits(m) */
+
+        if (BN_cmp(r, m) >= 0) {
+            if (!BN_sub(r, r, m))
+                return 0;
+        }
+    }
+    bn_check_top(r);
+
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..faef581
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c
@@ -0,0 +1,422 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Details about Montgomery multiplication algorithms can be found at
+ * http://security.ece.orst.edu/publications.html, e.g.
+ * http://security.ece.orst.edu/koc/papers/j37acmon.pdf and
+ * sections 3.8 and 4.2 in http://security.ece.orst.edu/koc/papers/r01rsasw.pdf
+ */
+
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "bn_lcl.h"
+
+#define MONT_WORD               /* use the faster word-based algorithm */
+
+#ifdef MONT_WORD
+static int BN_from_montgomery_word(BIGNUM *ret, BIGNUM *r, BN_MONT_CTX *mont);
+#endif
+
+int BN_mod_mul_montgomery(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
+                          BN_MONT_CTX *mont, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    BIGNUM *tmp;
+    int ret = 0;
+#if defined(OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT) && defined(MONT_WORD)
+    int num = mont->N.top;
+
+    if (num > 1 && a->top == num && b->top == num) {
+        if (bn_wexpand(r, num) == NULL)
+            return (0);
+        if (bn_mul_mont(r->d, a->d, b->d, mont->N.d, mont->n0, num)) {
+            r->neg = a->neg ^ b->neg;
+            r->top = num;
+            bn_correct_top(r);
+            return (1);
+        }
+    }
+#endif
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (tmp == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    bn_check_top(tmp);
+    if (a == b) {
+        if (!BN_sqr(tmp, a, ctx))
+            goto err;
+    } else {
+        if (!BN_mul(tmp, a, b, ctx))
+            goto err;
+    }
+    /* reduce from aRR to aR */
+#ifdef MONT_WORD
+    if (!BN_from_montgomery_word(r, tmp, mont))
+        goto err;
+#else
+    if (!BN_from_montgomery(r, tmp, mont, ctx))
+        goto err;
+#endif
+    bn_check_top(r);
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+#ifdef MONT_WORD
+static int BN_from_montgomery_word(BIGNUM *ret, BIGNUM *r, BN_MONT_CTX *mont)
+{
+    BIGNUM *n;
+    BN_ULONG *ap, *np, *rp, n0, v, carry;
+    int nl, max, i;
+
+    n = &(mont->N);
+    nl = n->top;
+    if (nl == 0) {
+        ret->top = 0;
+        return (1);
+    }
+
+    max = (2 * nl);             /* carry is stored separately */
+    if (bn_wexpand(r, max) == NULL)
+        return (0);
+
+    r->neg ^= n->neg;
+    np = n->d;
+    rp = r->d;
+
+    /* clear the top words of T */
+    i = max - r->top;
+    if (i)
+        memset(&rp[r->top], 0, sizeof(*rp) * i);
+
+    r->top = max;
+    n0 = mont->n0[0];
+
+    /*
+     * Add multiples of |n| to |r| until R = 2^(nl * BN_BITS2) divides it. On
+     * input, we had |r| < |n| * R, so now |r| < 2 * |n| * R. Note that |r|
+     * includes |carry| which is stored separately.
+     */
+    for (carry = 0, i = 0; i < nl; i++, rp++) {
+        v = bn_mul_add_words(rp, np, nl, (rp[0] * n0) & BN_MASK2);
+        v = (v + carry + rp[nl]) & BN_MASK2;
+        carry |= (v != rp[nl]);
+        carry &= (v <= rp[nl]);
+        rp[nl] = v;
+    }
+
+    if (bn_wexpand(ret, nl) == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    ret->top = nl;
+    ret->neg = r->neg;
+
+    rp = ret->d;
+
+    /*
+     * Shift |nl| words to divide by R. We have |ap| < 2 * |n|. Note that |ap|
+     * includes |carry| which is stored separately.
+     */
+    ap = &(r->d[nl]);
+
+    /*
+     * |v| is one if |ap| - |np| underflowed or zero if it did not. Note |v|
+     * cannot be -1. That would imply the subtraction did not fit in |nl| words,
+     * and we know at most one subtraction is needed.
+     */
+    v = bn_sub_words(rp, ap, np, nl) - carry;
+    v = 0 - v;
+    for (i = 0; i < nl; i++) {
+        rp[i] = (v & ap[i]) | (~v & rp[i]);
+        ap[i] = 0;
+    }
+    bn_correct_top(r);
+    bn_correct_top(ret);
+    bn_check_top(ret);
+
+    return (1);
+}
+#endif                          /* MONT_WORD */
+
+int BN_from_montgomery(BIGNUM *ret, const BIGNUM *a, BN_MONT_CTX *mont,
+                       BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int retn = 0;
+#ifdef MONT_WORD
+    BIGNUM *t;
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    if ((t = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) && BN_copy(t, a))
+        retn = BN_from_montgomery_word(ret, t, mont);
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+#else                           /* !MONT_WORD */
+    BIGNUM *t1, *t2;
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    t1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    t2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (t1 == NULL || t2 == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!BN_copy(t1, a))
+        goto err;
+    BN_mask_bits(t1, mont->ri);
+
+    if (!BN_mul(t2, t1, &mont->Ni, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    BN_mask_bits(t2, mont->ri);
+
+    if (!BN_mul(t1, t2, &mont->N, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    if (!BN_add(t2, a, t1))
+        goto err;
+    if (!BN_rshift(ret, t2, mont->ri))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (BN_ucmp(ret, &(mont->N)) >= 0) {
+        if (!BN_usub(ret, ret, &(mont->N)))
+            goto err;
+    }
+    retn = 1;
+    bn_check_top(ret);
+ err:
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+#endif                          /* MONT_WORD */
+    return (retn);
+}
+
+BN_MONT_CTX *BN_MONT_CTX_new(void)
+{
+    BN_MONT_CTX *ret;
+
+    if ((ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ret))) == NULL)
+        return (NULL);
+
+    BN_MONT_CTX_init(ret);
+    ret->flags = BN_FLG_MALLOCED;
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+void BN_MONT_CTX_init(BN_MONT_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    ctx->ri = 0;
+    bn_init(&(ctx->RR));
+    bn_init(&(ctx->N));
+    bn_init(&(ctx->Ni));
+    ctx->n0[0] = ctx->n0[1] = 0;
+    ctx->flags = 0;
+}
+
+void BN_MONT_CTX_free(BN_MONT_CTX *mont)
+{
+    if (mont == NULL)
+        return;
+
+    BN_clear_free(&(mont->RR));
+    BN_clear_free(&(mont->N));
+    BN_clear_free(&(mont->Ni));
+    if (mont->flags & BN_FLG_MALLOCED)
+        OPENSSL_free(mont);
+}
+
+int BN_MONT_CTX_set(BN_MONT_CTX *mont, const BIGNUM *mod, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    BIGNUM *Ri, *R;
+
+    if (BN_is_zero(mod))
+        return 0;
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    if ((Ri = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    R = &(mont->RR);            /* grab RR as a temp */
+    if (!BN_copy(&(mont->N), mod))
+        goto err;               /* Set N */
+    if (BN_get_flags(mod, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0)
+        BN_set_flags(&(mont->N), BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+    mont->N.neg = 0;
+
+#ifdef MONT_WORD
+    {
+        BIGNUM tmod;
+        BN_ULONG buf[2];
+
+        bn_init(&tmod);
+        tmod.d = buf;
+        tmod.dmax = 2;
+        tmod.neg = 0;
+
+        if (BN_get_flags(mod, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0)
+            BN_set_flags(&tmod, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+        mont->ri = (BN_num_bits(mod) + (BN_BITS2 - 1)) / BN_BITS2 * BN_BITS2;
+
+# if defined(OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT) && (BN_BITS2<=32)
+        /*
+         * Only certain BN_BITS2<=32 platforms actually make use of n0[1],
+         * and we could use the #else case (with a shorter R value) for the
+         * others.  However, currently only the assembler files do know which
+         * is which.
+         */
+
+        BN_zero(R);
+        if (!(BN_set_bit(R, 2 * BN_BITS2)))
+            goto err;
+
+        tmod.top = 0;
+        if ((buf[0] = mod->d[0]))
+            tmod.top = 1;
+        if ((buf[1] = mod->top > 1 ? mod->d[1] : 0))
+            tmod.top = 2;
+
+        if ((BN_mod_inverse(Ri, R, &tmod, ctx)) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        if (!BN_lshift(Ri, Ri, 2 * BN_BITS2))
+            goto err;           /* R*Ri */
+        if (!BN_is_zero(Ri)) {
+            if (!BN_sub_word(Ri, 1))
+                goto err;
+        } else {                /* if N mod word size == 1 */
+
+            if (bn_expand(Ri, (int)sizeof(BN_ULONG) * 2) == NULL)
+                goto err;
+            /* Ri-- (mod double word size) */
+            Ri->neg = 0;
+            Ri->d[0] = BN_MASK2;
+            Ri->d[1] = BN_MASK2;
+            Ri->top = 2;
+        }
+        if (!BN_div(Ri, NULL, Ri, &tmod, ctx))
+            goto err;
+        /*
+         * Ni = (R*Ri-1)/N, keep only couple of least significant words:
+         */
+        mont->n0[0] = (Ri->top > 0) ? Ri->d[0] : 0;
+        mont->n0[1] = (Ri->top > 1) ? Ri->d[1] : 0;
+# else
+        BN_zero(R);
+        if (!(BN_set_bit(R, BN_BITS2)))
+            goto err;           /* R */
+
+        buf[0] = mod->d[0];     /* tmod = N mod word size */
+        buf[1] = 0;
+        tmod.top = buf[0] != 0 ? 1 : 0;
+        /* Ri = R^-1 mod N */
+        if ((BN_mod_inverse(Ri, R, &tmod, ctx)) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        if (!BN_lshift(Ri, Ri, BN_BITS2))
+            goto err;           /* R*Ri */
+        if (!BN_is_zero(Ri)) {
+            if (!BN_sub_word(Ri, 1))
+                goto err;
+        } else {                /* if N mod word size == 1 */
+
+            if (!BN_set_word(Ri, BN_MASK2))
+                goto err;       /* Ri-- (mod word size) */
+        }
+        if (!BN_div(Ri, NULL, Ri, &tmod, ctx))
+            goto err;
+        /*
+         * Ni = (R*Ri-1)/N, keep only least significant word:
+         */
+        mont->n0[0] = (Ri->top > 0) ? Ri->d[0] : 0;
+        mont->n0[1] = 0;
+# endif
+    }
+#else                           /* !MONT_WORD */
+    {                           /* bignum version */
+        mont->ri = BN_num_bits(&mont->N);
+        BN_zero(R);
+        if (!BN_set_bit(R, mont->ri))
+            goto err;           /* R = 2^ri */
+        /* Ri = R^-1 mod N */
+        if ((BN_mod_inverse(Ri, R, &mont->N, ctx)) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        if (!BN_lshift(Ri, Ri, mont->ri))
+            goto err;           /* R*Ri */
+        if (!BN_sub_word(Ri, 1))
+            goto err;
+        /*
+         * Ni = (R*Ri-1) / N
+         */
+        if (!BN_div(&(mont->Ni), NULL, Ri, &mont->N, ctx))
+            goto err;
+    }
+#endif
+
+    /* setup RR for conversions */
+    BN_zero(&(mont->RR));
+    if (!BN_set_bit(&(mont->RR), mont->ri * 2))
+        goto err;
+    if (!BN_mod(&(mont->RR), &(mont->RR), &(mont->N), ctx))
+        goto err;
+
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+BN_MONT_CTX *BN_MONT_CTX_copy(BN_MONT_CTX *to, BN_MONT_CTX *from)
+{
+    if (to == from)
+        return (to);
+
+    if (!BN_copy(&(to->RR), &(from->RR)))
+        return NULL;
+    if (!BN_copy(&(to->N), &(from->N)))
+        return NULL;
+    if (!BN_copy(&(to->Ni), &(from->Ni)))
+        return NULL;
+    to->ri = from->ri;
+    to->n0[0] = from->n0[0];
+    to->n0[1] = from->n0[1];
+    return (to);
+}
+
+BN_MONT_CTX *BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(BN_MONT_CTX **pmont, CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock,
+                                    const BIGNUM *mod, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    BN_MONT_CTX *ret;
+
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(lock);
+    ret = *pmont;
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(lock);
+    if (ret)
+        return ret;
+
+    /*
+     * We don't want to serialise globally while doing our lazy-init math in
+     * BN_MONT_CTX_set. That punishes threads that are doing independent
+     * things. Instead, punish the case where more than one thread tries to
+     * lazy-init the same 'pmont', by having each do the lazy-init math work
+     * independently and only use the one from the thread that wins the race
+     * (the losers throw away the work they've done).
+     */
+    ret = BN_MONT_CTX_new();
+    if (ret == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(ret, mod, ctx)) {
+        BN_MONT_CTX_free(ret);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    /* The locked compare-and-set, after the local work is done. */
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(lock);
+    if (*pmont) {
+        BN_MONT_CTX_free(ret);
+        ret = *pmont;
+    } else
+        *pmont = ret;
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(lock);
+    return ret;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_mpi.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_mpi.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..043e21d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_mpi.c
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "bn_lcl.h"
+
+int BN_bn2mpi(const BIGNUM *a, unsigned char *d)
+{
+    int bits;
+    int num = 0;
+    int ext = 0;
+    long l;
+
+    bits = BN_num_bits(a);
+    num = (bits + 7) / 8;
+    if (bits > 0) {
+        ext = ((bits & 0x07) == 0);
+    }
+    if (d == NULL)
+        return (num + 4 + ext);
+
+    l = num + ext;
+    d[0] = (unsigned char)(l >> 24) & 0xff;
+    d[1] = (unsigned char)(l >> 16) & 0xff;
+    d[2] = (unsigned char)(l >> 8) & 0xff;
+    d[3] = (unsigned char)(l) & 0xff;
+    if (ext)
+        d[4] = 0;
+    num = BN_bn2bin(a, &(d[4 + ext]));
+    if (a->neg)
+        d[4] |= 0x80;
+    return (num + 4 + ext);
+}
+
+BIGNUM *BN_mpi2bn(const unsigned char *d, int n, BIGNUM *ain)
+{
+    long len;
+    int neg = 0;
+    BIGNUM *a = NULL;
+
+    if (n < 4) {
+        BNerr(BN_F_BN_MPI2BN, BN_R_INVALID_LENGTH);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    len = ((long)d[0] << 24) | ((long)d[1] << 16) | ((int)d[2] << 8) | (int)
+        d[3];
+    if ((len + 4) != n) {
+        BNerr(BN_F_BN_MPI2BN, BN_R_ENCODING_ERROR);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    if (ain == NULL)
+        a = BN_new();
+    else
+        a = ain;
+
+    if (a == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+
+    if (len == 0) {
+        a->neg = 0;
+        a->top = 0;
+        return a;
+    }
+    d += 4;
+    if ((*d) & 0x80)
+        neg = 1;
+    if (BN_bin2bn(d, (int)len, a) == NULL) {
+        if (ain == NULL)
+            BN_free(a);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    a->neg = neg;
+    if (neg) {
+        BN_clear_bit(a, BN_num_bits(a) - 1);
+    }
+    bn_check_top(a);
+    return a;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_mul.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_mul.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a1abc5b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_mul.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1011 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "bn_lcl.h"
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) || !defined(OPENSSL_BN_ASM_PART_WORDS)
+/*
+ * Here follows specialised variants of bn_add_words() and bn_sub_words().
+ * They have the property performing operations on arrays of different sizes.
+ * The sizes of those arrays is expressed through cl, which is the common
+ * length ( basically, min(len(a),len(b)) ), and dl, which is the delta
+ * between the two lengths, calculated as len(a)-len(b). All lengths are the
+ * number of BN_ULONGs...  For the operations that require a result array as
+ * parameter, it must have the length cl+abs(dl). These functions should
+ * probably end up in bn_asm.c as soon as there are assembler counterparts
+ * for the systems that use assembler files.
+ */
+
+BN_ULONG bn_sub_part_words(BN_ULONG *r,
+                           const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b,
+                           int cl, int dl)
+{
+    BN_ULONG c, t;
+
+    assert(cl >= 0);
+    c = bn_sub_words(r, a, b, cl);
+
+    if (dl == 0)
+        return c;
+
+    r += cl;
+    a += cl;
+    b += cl;
+
+    if (dl < 0) {
+        for (;;) {
+            t = b[0];
+            r[0] = (0 - t - c) & BN_MASK2;
+            if (t != 0)
+                c = 1;
+            if (++dl >= 0)
+                break;
+
+            t = b[1];
+            r[1] = (0 - t - c) & BN_MASK2;
+            if (t != 0)
+                c = 1;
+            if (++dl >= 0)
+                break;
+
+            t = b[2];
+            r[2] = (0 - t - c) & BN_MASK2;
+            if (t != 0)
+                c = 1;
+            if (++dl >= 0)
+                break;
+
+            t = b[3];
+            r[3] = (0 - t - c) & BN_MASK2;
+            if (t != 0)
+                c = 1;
+            if (++dl >= 0)
+                break;
+
+            b += 4;
+            r += 4;
+        }
+    } else {
+        int save_dl = dl;
+        while (c) {
+            t = a[0];
+            r[0] = (t - c) & BN_MASK2;
+            if (t != 0)
+                c = 0;
+            if (--dl <= 0)
+                break;
+
+            t = a[1];
+            r[1] = (t - c) & BN_MASK2;
+            if (t != 0)
+                c = 0;
+            if (--dl <= 0)
+                break;
+
+            t = a[2];
+            r[2] = (t - c) & BN_MASK2;
+            if (t != 0)
+                c = 0;
+            if (--dl <= 0)
+                break;
+
+            t = a[3];
+            r[3] = (t - c) & BN_MASK2;
+            if (t != 0)
+                c = 0;
+            if (--dl <= 0)
+                break;
+
+            save_dl = dl;
+            a += 4;
+            r += 4;
+        }
+        if (dl > 0) {
+            if (save_dl > dl) {
+                switch (save_dl - dl) {
+                case 1:
+                    r[1] = a[1];
+                    if (--dl <= 0)
+                        break;
+                    /* fall thru */
+                case 2:
+                    r[2] = a[2];
+                    if (--dl <= 0)
+                        break;
+                    /* fall thru */
+                case 3:
+                    r[3] = a[3];
+                    if (--dl <= 0)
+                        break;
+                }
+                a += 4;
+                r += 4;
+            }
+        }
+        if (dl > 0) {
+            for (;;) {
+                r[0] = a[0];
+                if (--dl <= 0)
+                    break;
+                r[1] = a[1];
+                if (--dl <= 0)
+                    break;
+                r[2] = a[2];
+                if (--dl <= 0)
+                    break;
+                r[3] = a[3];
+                if (--dl <= 0)
+                    break;
+
+                a += 4;
+                r += 4;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    return c;
+}
+#endif
+
+BN_ULONG bn_add_part_words(BN_ULONG *r,
+                           const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b,
+                           int cl, int dl)
+{
+    BN_ULONG c, l, t;
+
+    assert(cl >= 0);
+    c = bn_add_words(r, a, b, cl);
+
+    if (dl == 0)
+        return c;
+
+    r += cl;
+    a += cl;
+    b += cl;
+
+    if (dl < 0) {
+        int save_dl = dl;
+        while (c) {
+            l = (c + b[0]) & BN_MASK2;
+            c = (l < c);
+            r[0] = l;
+            if (++dl >= 0)
+                break;
+
+            l = (c + b[1]) & BN_MASK2;
+            c = (l < c);
+            r[1] = l;
+            if (++dl >= 0)
+                break;
+
+            l = (c + b[2]) & BN_MASK2;
+            c = (l < c);
+            r[2] = l;
+            if (++dl >= 0)
+                break;
+
+            l = (c + b[3]) & BN_MASK2;
+            c = (l < c);
+            r[3] = l;
+            if (++dl >= 0)
+                break;
+
+            save_dl = dl;
+            b += 4;
+            r += 4;
+        }
+        if (dl < 0) {
+            if (save_dl < dl) {
+                switch (dl - save_dl) {
+                case 1:
+                    r[1] = b[1];
+                    if (++dl >= 0)
+                        break;
+                    /* fall thru */
+                case 2:
+                    r[2] = b[2];
+                    if (++dl >= 0)
+                        break;
+                    /* fall thru */
+                case 3:
+                    r[3] = b[3];
+                    if (++dl >= 0)
+                        break;
+                }
+                b += 4;
+                r += 4;
+            }
+        }
+        if (dl < 0) {
+            for (;;) {
+                r[0] = b[0];
+                if (++dl >= 0)
+                    break;
+                r[1] = b[1];
+                if (++dl >= 0)
+                    break;
+                r[2] = b[2];
+                if (++dl >= 0)
+                    break;
+                r[3] = b[3];
+                if (++dl >= 0)
+                    break;
+
+                b += 4;
+                r += 4;
+            }
+        }
+    } else {
+        int save_dl = dl;
+        while (c) {
+            t = (a[0] + c) & BN_MASK2;
+            c = (t < c);
+            r[0] = t;
+            if (--dl <= 0)
+                break;
+
+            t = (a[1] + c) & BN_MASK2;
+            c = (t < c);
+            r[1] = t;
+            if (--dl <= 0)
+                break;
+
+            t = (a[2] + c) & BN_MASK2;
+            c = (t < c);
+            r[2] = t;
+            if (--dl <= 0)
+                break;
+
+            t = (a[3] + c) & BN_MASK2;
+            c = (t < c);
+            r[3] = t;
+            if (--dl <= 0)
+                break;
+
+            save_dl = dl;
+            a += 4;
+            r += 4;
+        }
+        if (dl > 0) {
+            if (save_dl > dl) {
+                switch (save_dl - dl) {
+                case 1:
+                    r[1] = a[1];
+                    if (--dl <= 0)
+                        break;
+                    /* fall thru */
+                case 2:
+                    r[2] = a[2];
+                    if (--dl <= 0)
+                        break;
+                    /* fall thru */
+                case 3:
+                    r[3] = a[3];
+                    if (--dl <= 0)
+                        break;
+                }
+                a += 4;
+                r += 4;
+            }
+        }
+        if (dl > 0) {
+            for (;;) {
+                r[0] = a[0];
+                if (--dl <= 0)
+                    break;
+                r[1] = a[1];
+                if (--dl <= 0)
+                    break;
+                r[2] = a[2];
+                if (--dl <= 0)
+                    break;
+                r[3] = a[3];
+                if (--dl <= 0)
+                    break;
+
+                a += 4;
+                r += 4;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    return c;
+}
+
+#ifdef BN_RECURSION
+/*
+ * Karatsuba recursive multiplication algorithm (cf. Knuth, The Art of
+ * Computer Programming, Vol. 2)
+ */
+
+/*-
+ * r is 2*n2 words in size,
+ * a and b are both n2 words in size.
+ * n2 must be a power of 2.
+ * We multiply and return the result.
+ * t must be 2*n2 words in size
+ * We calculate
+ * a[0]*b[0]
+ * a[0]*b[0]+a[1]*b[1]+(a[0]-a[1])*(b[1]-b[0])
+ * a[1]*b[1]
+ */
+/* dnX may not be positive, but n2/2+dnX has to be */
+void bn_mul_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n2,
+                      int dna, int dnb, BN_ULONG *t)
+{
+    int n = n2 / 2, c1, c2;
+    int tna = n + dna, tnb = n + dnb;
+    unsigned int neg, zero;
+    BN_ULONG ln, lo, *p;
+
+# ifdef BN_MUL_COMBA
+#  if 0
+    if (n2 == 4) {
+        bn_mul_comba4(r, a, b);
+        return;
+    }
+#  endif
+    /*
+     * Only call bn_mul_comba 8 if n2 == 8 and the two arrays are complete
+     * [steve]
+     */
+    if (n2 == 8 && dna == 0 && dnb == 0) {
+        bn_mul_comba8(r, a, b);
+        return;
+    }
+# endif                         /* BN_MUL_COMBA */
+    /* Else do normal multiply */
+    if (n2 < BN_MUL_RECURSIVE_SIZE_NORMAL) {
+        bn_mul_normal(r, a, n2 + dna, b, n2 + dnb);
+        if ((dna + dnb) < 0)
+            memset(&r[2 * n2 + dna + dnb], 0,
+                   sizeof(BN_ULONG) * -(dna + dnb));
+        return;
+    }
+    /* r=(a[0]-a[1])*(b[1]-b[0]) */
+    c1 = bn_cmp_part_words(a, &(a[n]), tna, n - tna);
+    c2 = bn_cmp_part_words(&(b[n]), b, tnb, tnb - n);
+    zero = neg = 0;
+    switch (c1 * 3 + c2) {
+    case -4:
+        bn_sub_part_words(t, &(a[n]), a, tna, tna - n); /* - */
+        bn_sub_part_words(&(t[n]), b, &(b[n]), tnb, n - tnb); /* - */
+        break;
+    case -3:
+        zero = 1;
+        break;
+    case -2:
+        bn_sub_part_words(t, &(a[n]), a, tna, tna - n); /* - */
+        bn_sub_part_words(&(t[n]), &(b[n]), b, tnb, tnb - n); /* + */
+        neg = 1;
+        break;
+    case -1:
+    case 0:
+    case 1:
+        zero = 1;
+        break;
+    case 2:
+        bn_sub_part_words(t, a, &(a[n]), tna, n - tna); /* + */
+        bn_sub_part_words(&(t[n]), b, &(b[n]), tnb, n - tnb); /* - */
+        neg = 1;
+        break;
+    case 3:
+        zero = 1;
+        break;
+    case 4:
+        bn_sub_part_words(t, a, &(a[n]), tna, n - tna);
+        bn_sub_part_words(&(t[n]), &(b[n]), b, tnb, tnb - n);
+        break;
+    }
+
+# ifdef BN_MUL_COMBA
+    if (n == 4 && dna == 0 && dnb == 0) { /* XXX: bn_mul_comba4 could take
+                                           * extra args to do this well */
+        if (!zero)
+            bn_mul_comba4(&(t[n2]), t, &(t[n]));
+        else
+            memset(&t[n2], 0, sizeof(*t) * 8);
+
+        bn_mul_comba4(r, a, b);
+        bn_mul_comba4(&(r[n2]), &(a[n]), &(b[n]));
+    } else if (n == 8 && dna == 0 && dnb == 0) { /* XXX: bn_mul_comba8 could
+                                                  * take extra args to do
+                                                  * this well */
+        if (!zero)
+            bn_mul_comba8(&(t[n2]), t, &(t[n]));
+        else
+            memset(&t[n2], 0, sizeof(*t) * 16);
+
+        bn_mul_comba8(r, a, b);
+        bn_mul_comba8(&(r[n2]), &(a[n]), &(b[n]));
+    } else
+# endif                         /* BN_MUL_COMBA */
+    {
+        p = &(t[n2 * 2]);
+        if (!zero)
+            bn_mul_recursive(&(t[n2]), t, &(t[n]), n, 0, 0, p);
+        else
+            memset(&t[n2], 0, sizeof(*t) * n2);
+        bn_mul_recursive(r, a, b, n, 0, 0, p);
+        bn_mul_recursive(&(r[n2]), &(a[n]), &(b[n]), n, dna, dnb, p);
+    }
+
+    /*-
+     * t[32] holds (a[0]-a[1])*(b[1]-b[0]), c1 is the sign
+     * r[10] holds (a[0]*b[0])
+     * r[32] holds (b[1]*b[1])
+     */
+
+    c1 = (int)(bn_add_words(t, r, &(r[n2]), n2));
+
+    if (neg) {                  /* if t[32] is negative */
+        c1 -= (int)(bn_sub_words(&(t[n2]), t, &(t[n2]), n2));
+    } else {
+        /* Might have a carry */
+        c1 += (int)(bn_add_words(&(t[n2]), &(t[n2]), t, n2));
+    }
+
+    /*-
+     * t[32] holds (a[0]-a[1])*(b[1]-b[0])+(a[0]*b[0])+(a[1]*b[1])
+     * r[10] holds (a[0]*b[0])
+     * r[32] holds (b[1]*b[1])
+     * c1 holds the carry bits
+     */
+    c1 += (int)(bn_add_words(&(r[n]), &(r[n]), &(t[n2]), n2));
+    if (c1) {
+        p = &(r[n + n2]);
+        lo = *p;
+        ln = (lo + c1) & BN_MASK2;
+        *p = ln;
+
+        /*
+         * The overflow will stop before we over write words we should not
+         * overwrite
+         */
+        if (ln < (BN_ULONG)c1) {
+            do {
+                p++;
+                lo = *p;
+                ln = (lo + 1) & BN_MASK2;
+                *p = ln;
+            } while (ln == 0);
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * n+tn is the word length t needs to be n*4 is size, as does r
+ */
+/* tnX may not be negative but less than n */
+void bn_mul_part_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n,
+                           int tna, int tnb, BN_ULONG *t)
+{
+    int i, j, n2 = n * 2;
+    int c1, c2, neg;
+    BN_ULONG ln, lo, *p;
+
+    if (n < 8) {
+        bn_mul_normal(r, a, n + tna, b, n + tnb);
+        return;
+    }
+
+    /* r=(a[0]-a[1])*(b[1]-b[0]) */
+    c1 = bn_cmp_part_words(a, &(a[n]), tna, n - tna);
+    c2 = bn_cmp_part_words(&(b[n]), b, tnb, tnb - n);
+    neg = 0;
+    switch (c1 * 3 + c2) {
+    case -4:
+        bn_sub_part_words(t, &(a[n]), a, tna, tna - n); /* - */
+        bn_sub_part_words(&(t[n]), b, &(b[n]), tnb, n - tnb); /* - */
+        break;
+    case -3:
+        /* break; */
+    case -2:
+        bn_sub_part_words(t, &(a[n]), a, tna, tna - n); /* - */
+        bn_sub_part_words(&(t[n]), &(b[n]), b, tnb, tnb - n); /* + */
+        neg = 1;
+        break;
+    case -1:
+    case 0:
+    case 1:
+        /* break; */
+    case 2:
+        bn_sub_part_words(t, a, &(a[n]), tna, n - tna); /* + */
+        bn_sub_part_words(&(t[n]), b, &(b[n]), tnb, n - tnb); /* - */
+        neg = 1;
+        break;
+    case 3:
+        /* break; */
+    case 4:
+        bn_sub_part_words(t, a, &(a[n]), tna, n - tna);
+        bn_sub_part_words(&(t[n]), &(b[n]), b, tnb, tnb - n);
+        break;
+    }
+    /*
+     * The zero case isn't yet implemented here. The speedup would probably
+     * be negligible.
+     */
+# if 0
+    if (n == 4) {
+        bn_mul_comba4(&(t[n2]), t, &(t[n]));
+        bn_mul_comba4(r, a, b);
+        bn_mul_normal(&(r[n2]), &(a[n]), tn, &(b[n]), tn);
+        memset(&r[n2 + tn * 2], 0, sizeof(*r) * (n2 - tn * 2));
+    } else
+# endif
+    if (n == 8) {
+        bn_mul_comba8(&(t[n2]), t, &(t[n]));
+        bn_mul_comba8(r, a, b);
+        bn_mul_normal(&(r[n2]), &(a[n]), tna, &(b[n]), tnb);
+        memset(&r[n2 + tna + tnb], 0, sizeof(*r) * (n2 - tna - tnb));
+    } else {
+        p = &(t[n2 * 2]);
+        bn_mul_recursive(&(t[n2]), t, &(t[n]), n, 0, 0, p);
+        bn_mul_recursive(r, a, b, n, 0, 0, p);
+        i = n / 2;
+        /*
+         * If there is only a bottom half to the number, just do it
+         */
+        if (tna > tnb)
+            j = tna - i;
+        else
+            j = tnb - i;
+        if (j == 0) {
+            bn_mul_recursive(&(r[n2]), &(a[n]), &(b[n]),
+                             i, tna - i, tnb - i, p);
+            memset(&r[n2 + i * 2], 0, sizeof(*r) * (n2 - i * 2));
+        } else if (j > 0) {     /* eg, n == 16, i == 8 and tn == 11 */
+            bn_mul_part_recursive(&(r[n2]), &(a[n]), &(b[n]),
+                                  i, tna - i, tnb - i, p);
+            memset(&(r[n2 + tna + tnb]), 0,
+                   sizeof(BN_ULONG) * (n2 - tna - tnb));
+        } else {                /* (j < 0) eg, n == 16, i == 8 and tn == 5 */
+
+            memset(&r[n2], 0, sizeof(*r) * n2);
+            if (tna < BN_MUL_RECURSIVE_SIZE_NORMAL
+                && tnb < BN_MUL_RECURSIVE_SIZE_NORMAL) {
+                bn_mul_normal(&(r[n2]), &(a[n]), tna, &(b[n]), tnb);
+            } else {
+                for (;;) {
+                    i /= 2;
+                    /*
+                     * these simplified conditions work exclusively because
+                     * difference between tna and tnb is 1 or 0
+                     */
+                    if (i < tna || i < tnb) {
+                        bn_mul_part_recursive(&(r[n2]),
+                                              &(a[n]), &(b[n]),
+                                              i, tna - i, tnb - i, p);
+                        break;
+                    } else if (i == tna || i == tnb) {
+                        bn_mul_recursive(&(r[n2]),
+                                         &(a[n]), &(b[n]),
+                                         i, tna - i, tnb - i, p);
+                        break;
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    /*-
+     * t[32] holds (a[0]-a[1])*(b[1]-b[0]), c1 is the sign
+     * r[10] holds (a[0]*b[0])
+     * r[32] holds (b[1]*b[1])
+     */
+
+    c1 = (int)(bn_add_words(t, r, &(r[n2]), n2));
+
+    if (neg) {                  /* if t[32] is negative */
+        c1 -= (int)(bn_sub_words(&(t[n2]), t, &(t[n2]), n2));
+    } else {
+        /* Might have a carry */
+        c1 += (int)(bn_add_words(&(t[n2]), &(t[n2]), t, n2));
+    }
+
+    /*-
+     * t[32] holds (a[0]-a[1])*(b[1]-b[0])+(a[0]*b[0])+(a[1]*b[1])
+     * r[10] holds (a[0]*b[0])
+     * r[32] holds (b[1]*b[1])
+     * c1 holds the carry bits
+     */
+    c1 += (int)(bn_add_words(&(r[n]), &(r[n]), &(t[n2]), n2));
+    if (c1) {
+        p = &(r[n + n2]);
+        lo = *p;
+        ln = (lo + c1) & BN_MASK2;
+        *p = ln;
+
+        /*
+         * The overflow will stop before we over write words we should not
+         * overwrite
+         */
+        if (ln < (BN_ULONG)c1) {
+            do {
+                p++;
+                lo = *p;
+                ln = (lo + 1) & BN_MASK2;
+                *p = ln;
+            } while (ln == 0);
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/*-
+ * a and b must be the same size, which is n2.
+ * r needs to be n2 words and t needs to be n2*2
+ */
+void bn_mul_low_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n2,
+                          BN_ULONG *t)
+{
+    int n = n2 / 2;
+
+    bn_mul_recursive(r, a, b, n, 0, 0, &(t[0]));
+    if (n >= BN_MUL_LOW_RECURSIVE_SIZE_NORMAL) {
+        bn_mul_low_recursive(&(t[0]), &(a[0]), &(b[n]), n, &(t[n2]));
+        bn_add_words(&(r[n]), &(r[n]), &(t[0]), n);
+        bn_mul_low_recursive(&(t[0]), &(a[n]), &(b[0]), n, &(t[n2]));
+        bn_add_words(&(r[n]), &(r[n]), &(t[0]), n);
+    } else {
+        bn_mul_low_normal(&(t[0]), &(a[0]), &(b[n]), n);
+        bn_mul_low_normal(&(t[n]), &(a[n]), &(b[0]), n);
+        bn_add_words(&(r[n]), &(r[n]), &(t[0]), n);
+        bn_add_words(&(r[n]), &(r[n]), &(t[n]), n);
+    }
+}
+
+/*-
+ * a and b must be the same size, which is n2.
+ * r needs to be n2 words and t needs to be n2*2
+ * l is the low words of the output.
+ * t needs to be n2*3
+ */
+void bn_mul_high(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, BN_ULONG *l, int n2,
+                 BN_ULONG *t)
+{
+    int i, n;
+    int c1, c2;
+    int neg, oneg, zero;
+    BN_ULONG ll, lc, *lp, *mp;
+
+    n = n2 / 2;
+
+    /* Calculate (al-ah)*(bh-bl) */
+    neg = zero = 0;
+    c1 = bn_cmp_words(&(a[0]), &(a[n]), n);
+    c2 = bn_cmp_words(&(b[n]), &(b[0]), n);
+    switch (c1 * 3 + c2) {
+    case -4:
+        bn_sub_words(&(r[0]), &(a[n]), &(a[0]), n);
+        bn_sub_words(&(r[n]), &(b[0]), &(b[n]), n);
+        break;
+    case -3:
+        zero = 1;
+        break;
+    case -2:
+        bn_sub_words(&(r[0]), &(a[n]), &(a[0]), n);
+        bn_sub_words(&(r[n]), &(b[n]), &(b[0]), n);
+        neg = 1;
+        break;
+    case -1:
+    case 0:
+    case 1:
+        zero = 1;
+        break;
+    case 2:
+        bn_sub_words(&(r[0]), &(a[0]), &(a[n]), n);
+        bn_sub_words(&(r[n]), &(b[0]), &(b[n]), n);
+        neg = 1;
+        break;
+    case 3:
+        zero = 1;
+        break;
+    case 4:
+        bn_sub_words(&(r[0]), &(a[0]), &(a[n]), n);
+        bn_sub_words(&(r[n]), &(b[n]), &(b[0]), n);
+        break;
+    }
+
+    oneg = neg;
+    /* t[10] = (a[0]-a[1])*(b[1]-b[0]) */
+    /* r[10] = (a[1]*b[1]) */
+# ifdef BN_MUL_COMBA
+    if (n == 8) {
+        bn_mul_comba8(&(t[0]), &(r[0]), &(r[n]));
+        bn_mul_comba8(r, &(a[n]), &(b[n]));
+    } else
+# endif
+    {
+        bn_mul_recursive(&(t[0]), &(r[0]), &(r[n]), n, 0, 0, &(t[n2]));
+        bn_mul_recursive(r, &(a[n]), &(b[n]), n, 0, 0, &(t[n2]));
+    }
+
+    /*-
+     * s0 == low(al*bl)
+     * s1 == low(ah*bh)+low((al-ah)*(bh-bl))+low(al*bl)+high(al*bl)
+     * We know s0 and s1 so the only unknown is high(al*bl)
+     * high(al*bl) == s1 - low(ah*bh+s0+(al-ah)*(bh-bl))
+     * high(al*bl) == s1 - (r[0]+l[0]+t[0])
+     */
+    if (l != NULL) {
+        lp = &(t[n2 + n]);
+        bn_add_words(lp, &(r[0]), &(l[0]), n);
+    } else {
+        lp = &(r[0]);
+    }
+
+    if (neg)
+        neg = (int)(bn_sub_words(&(t[n2]), lp, &(t[0]), n));
+    else {
+        bn_add_words(&(t[n2]), lp, &(t[0]), n);
+        neg = 0;
+    }
+
+    if (l != NULL) {
+        bn_sub_words(&(t[n2 + n]), &(l[n]), &(t[n2]), n);
+    } else {
+        lp = &(t[n2 + n]);
+        mp = &(t[n2]);
+        for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
+            lp[i] = ((~mp[i]) + 1) & BN_MASK2;
+    }
+
+    /*-
+     * s[0] = low(al*bl)
+     * t[3] = high(al*bl)
+     * t[10] = (a[0]-a[1])*(b[1]-b[0]) neg is the sign
+     * r[10] = (a[1]*b[1])
+     */
+    /*-
+     * R[10] = al*bl
+     * R[21] = al*bl + ah*bh + (a[0]-a[1])*(b[1]-b[0])
+     * R[32] = ah*bh
+     */
+    /*-
+     * R[1]=t[3]+l[0]+r[0](+-)t[0] (have carry/borrow)
+     * R[2]=r[0]+t[3]+r[1](+-)t[1] (have carry/borrow)
+     * R[3]=r[1]+(carry/borrow)
+     */
+    if (l != NULL) {
+        lp = &(t[n2]);
+        c1 = (int)(bn_add_words(lp, &(t[n2 + n]), &(l[0]), n));
+    } else {
+        lp = &(t[n2 + n]);
+        c1 = 0;
+    }
+    c1 += (int)(bn_add_words(&(t[n2]), lp, &(r[0]), n));
+    if (oneg)
+        c1 -= (int)(bn_sub_words(&(t[n2]), &(t[n2]), &(t[0]), n));
+    else
+        c1 += (int)(bn_add_words(&(t[n2]), &(t[n2]), &(t[0]), n));
+
+    c2 = (int)(bn_add_words(&(r[0]), &(r[0]), &(t[n2 + n]), n));
+    c2 += (int)(bn_add_words(&(r[0]), &(r[0]), &(r[n]), n));
+    if (oneg)
+        c2 -= (int)(bn_sub_words(&(r[0]), &(r[0]), &(t[n]), n));
+    else
+        c2 += (int)(bn_add_words(&(r[0]), &(r[0]), &(t[n]), n));
+
+    if (c1 != 0) {              /* Add starting at r[0], could be +ve or -ve */
+        i = 0;
+        if (c1 > 0) {
+            lc = c1;
+            do {
+                ll = (r[i] + lc) & BN_MASK2;
+                r[i++] = ll;
+                lc = (lc > ll);
+            } while (lc);
+        } else {
+            lc = -c1;
+            do {
+                ll = r[i];
+                r[i++] = (ll - lc) & BN_MASK2;
+                lc = (lc > ll);
+            } while (lc);
+        }
+    }
+    if (c2 != 0) {              /* Add starting at r[1] */
+        i = n;
+        if (c2 > 0) {
+            lc = c2;
+            do {
+                ll = (r[i] + lc) & BN_MASK2;
+                r[i++] = ll;
+                lc = (lc > ll);
+            } while (lc);
+        } else {
+            lc = -c2;
+            do {
+                ll = r[i];
+                r[i++] = (ll - lc) & BN_MASK2;
+                lc = (lc > ll);
+            } while (lc);
+        }
+    }
+}
+#endif                          /* BN_RECURSION */
+
+int BN_mul(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    int top, al, bl;
+    BIGNUM *rr;
+#if defined(BN_MUL_COMBA) || defined(BN_RECURSION)
+    int i;
+#endif
+#ifdef BN_RECURSION
+    BIGNUM *t = NULL;
+    int j = 0, k;
+#endif
+
+    bn_check_top(a);
+    bn_check_top(b);
+    bn_check_top(r);
+
+    al = a->top;
+    bl = b->top;
+
+    if ((al == 0) || (bl == 0)) {
+        BN_zero(r);
+        return (1);
+    }
+    top = al + bl;
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    if ((r == a) || (r == b)) {
+        if ((rr = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+    } else
+        rr = r;
+
+#if defined(BN_MUL_COMBA) || defined(BN_RECURSION)
+    i = al - bl;
+#endif
+#ifdef BN_MUL_COMBA
+    if (i == 0) {
+# if 0
+        if (al == 4) {
+            if (bn_wexpand(rr, 8) == NULL)
+                goto err;
+            rr->top = 8;
+            bn_mul_comba4(rr->d, a->d, b->d);
+            goto end;
+        }
+# endif
+        if (al == 8) {
+            if (bn_wexpand(rr, 16) == NULL)
+                goto err;
+            rr->top = 16;
+            bn_mul_comba8(rr->d, a->d, b->d);
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+#endif                          /* BN_MUL_COMBA */
+#ifdef BN_RECURSION
+    if ((al >= BN_MULL_SIZE_NORMAL) && (bl >= BN_MULL_SIZE_NORMAL)) {
+        if (i >= -1 && i <= 1) {
+            /*
+             * Find out the power of two lower or equal to the longest of the
+             * two numbers
+             */
+            if (i >= 0) {
+                j = BN_num_bits_word((BN_ULONG)al);
+            }
+            if (i == -1) {
+                j = BN_num_bits_word((BN_ULONG)bl);
+            }
+            j = 1 << (j - 1);
+            assert(j <= al || j <= bl);
+            k = j + j;
+            t = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+            if (t == NULL)
+                goto err;
+            if (al > j || bl > j) {
+                if (bn_wexpand(t, k * 4) == NULL)
+                    goto err;
+                if (bn_wexpand(rr, k * 4) == NULL)
+                    goto err;
+                bn_mul_part_recursive(rr->d, a->d, b->d,
+                                      j, al - j, bl - j, t->d);
+            } else {            /* al <= j || bl <= j */
+
+                if (bn_wexpand(t, k * 2) == NULL)
+                    goto err;
+                if (bn_wexpand(rr, k * 2) == NULL)
+                    goto err;
+                bn_mul_recursive(rr->d, a->d, b->d, j, al - j, bl - j, t->d);
+            }
+            rr->top = top;
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+#endif                          /* BN_RECURSION */
+    if (bn_wexpand(rr, top) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    rr->top = top;
+    bn_mul_normal(rr->d, a->d, al, b->d, bl);
+
+#if defined(BN_MUL_COMBA) || defined(BN_RECURSION)
+ end:
+#endif
+    rr->neg = a->neg ^ b->neg;
+    bn_correct_top(rr);
+    if (r != rr && BN_copy(r, rr) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    bn_check_top(r);
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+void bn_mul_normal(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, int na, BN_ULONG *b, int nb)
+{
+    BN_ULONG *rr;
+
+    if (na < nb) {
+        int itmp;
+        BN_ULONG *ltmp;
+
+        itmp = na;
+        na = nb;
+        nb = itmp;
+        ltmp = a;
+        a = b;
+        b = ltmp;
+
+    }
+    rr = &(r[na]);
+    if (nb <= 0) {
+        (void)bn_mul_words(r, a, na, 0);
+        return;
+    } else
+        rr[0] = bn_mul_words(r, a, na, b[0]);
+
+    for (;;) {
+        if (--nb <= 0)
+            return;
+        rr[1] = bn_mul_add_words(&(r[1]), a, na, b[1]);
+        if (--nb <= 0)
+            return;
+        rr[2] = bn_mul_add_words(&(r[2]), a, na, b[2]);
+        if (--nb <= 0)
+            return;
+        rr[3] = bn_mul_add_words(&(r[3]), a, na, b[3]);
+        if (--nb <= 0)
+            return;
+        rr[4] = bn_mul_add_words(&(r[4]), a, na, b[4]);
+        rr += 4;
+        r += 4;
+        b += 4;
+    }
+}
+
+void bn_mul_low_normal(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n)
+{
+    bn_mul_words(r, a, n, b[0]);
+
+    for (;;) {
+        if (--n <= 0)
+            return;
+        bn_mul_add_words(&(r[1]), a, n, b[1]);
+        if (--n <= 0)
+            return;
+        bn_mul_add_words(&(r[2]), a, n, b[2]);
+        if (--n <= 0)
+            return;
+        bn_mul_add_words(&(r[3]), a, n, b[3]);
+        if (--n <= 0)
+            return;
+        bn_mul_add_words(&(r[4]), a, n, b[4]);
+        r += 4;
+        b += 4;
+    }
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_nist.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_nist.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..53598f9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_nist.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1239 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "bn_lcl.h"
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+
+#define BN_NIST_192_TOP (192+BN_BITS2-1)/BN_BITS2
+#define BN_NIST_224_TOP (224+BN_BITS2-1)/BN_BITS2
+#define BN_NIST_256_TOP (256+BN_BITS2-1)/BN_BITS2
+#define BN_NIST_384_TOP (384+BN_BITS2-1)/BN_BITS2
+#define BN_NIST_521_TOP (521+BN_BITS2-1)/BN_BITS2
+
+/* pre-computed tables are "carry-less" values of modulus*(i+1) */
+#if BN_BITS2 == 64
+static const BN_ULONG _nist_p_192[][BN_NIST_192_TOP] = {
+    {0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFEULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL},
+    {0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFEULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFDULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL},
+    {0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFDULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFCULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL}
+};
+
+static const BN_ULONG _nist_p_192_sqr[] = {
+    0x0000000000000001ULL, 0x0000000000000002ULL, 0x0000000000000001ULL,
+    0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFEULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFDULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL
+};
+
+static const BN_ULONG _nist_p_224[][BN_NIST_224_TOP] = {
+    {0x0000000000000001ULL, 0xFFFFFFFF00000000ULL,
+     0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL, 0x00000000FFFFFFFFULL},
+    {0x0000000000000002ULL, 0xFFFFFFFE00000000ULL,
+     0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL, 0x00000001FFFFFFFFULL} /* this one is
+                                                    * "carry-full" */
+};
+
+static const BN_ULONG _nist_p_224_sqr[] = {
+    0x0000000000000001ULL, 0xFFFFFFFE00000000ULL,
+    0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL, 0x0000000200000000ULL,
+    0x0000000000000000ULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFEULL,
+    0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL
+};
+
+static const BN_ULONG _nist_p_256[][BN_NIST_256_TOP] = {
+    {0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL, 0x00000000FFFFFFFFULL,
+     0x0000000000000000ULL, 0xFFFFFFFF00000001ULL},
+    {0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFEULL, 0x00000001FFFFFFFFULL,
+     0x0000000000000000ULL, 0xFFFFFFFE00000002ULL},
+    {0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFDULL, 0x00000002FFFFFFFFULL,
+     0x0000000000000000ULL, 0xFFFFFFFD00000003ULL},
+    {0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFCULL, 0x00000003FFFFFFFFULL,
+     0x0000000000000000ULL, 0xFFFFFFFC00000004ULL},
+    {0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFBULL, 0x00000004FFFFFFFFULL,
+     0x0000000000000000ULL, 0xFFFFFFFB00000005ULL},
+};
+
+static const BN_ULONG _nist_p_256_sqr[] = {
+    0x0000000000000001ULL, 0xFFFFFFFE00000000ULL,
+    0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL, 0x00000001FFFFFFFEULL,
+    0x00000001FFFFFFFEULL, 0x00000001FFFFFFFEULL,
+    0xFFFFFFFE00000001ULL, 0xFFFFFFFE00000002ULL
+};
+
+static const BN_ULONG _nist_p_384[][BN_NIST_384_TOP] = {
+    {0x00000000FFFFFFFFULL, 0xFFFFFFFF00000000ULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFEULL,
+     0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL},
+    {0x00000001FFFFFFFEULL, 0xFFFFFFFE00000000ULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFDULL,
+     0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL},
+    {0x00000002FFFFFFFDULL, 0xFFFFFFFD00000000ULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFCULL,
+     0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL},
+    {0x00000003FFFFFFFCULL, 0xFFFFFFFC00000000ULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFBULL,
+     0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL},
+    {0x00000004FFFFFFFBULL, 0xFFFFFFFB00000000ULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFAULL,
+     0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL},
+};
+
+static const BN_ULONG _nist_p_384_sqr[] = {
+    0xFFFFFFFE00000001ULL, 0x0000000200000000ULL, 0xFFFFFFFE00000000ULL,
+    0x0000000200000000ULL, 0x0000000000000001ULL, 0x0000000000000000ULL,
+    0x00000001FFFFFFFEULL, 0xFFFFFFFE00000000ULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFDULL,
+    0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL
+};
+
+static const BN_ULONG _nist_p_521[] =
+    { 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL,
+    0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL,
+    0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL,
+    0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL,
+    0x00000000000001FFULL
+};
+
+static const BN_ULONG _nist_p_521_sqr[] = {
+    0x0000000000000001ULL, 0x0000000000000000ULL, 0x0000000000000000ULL,
+    0x0000000000000000ULL, 0x0000000000000000ULL, 0x0000000000000000ULL,
+    0x0000000000000000ULL, 0x0000000000000000ULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFC00ULL,
+    0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL,
+    0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL,
+    0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL, 0x000000000003FFFFULL
+};
+#elif BN_BITS2 == 32
+static const BN_ULONG _nist_p_192[][BN_NIST_192_TOP] = {
+    {0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFE, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF},
+    {0xFFFFFFFE, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFD, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF},
+    {0xFFFFFFFD, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFC, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF}
+};
+
+static const BN_ULONG _nist_p_192_sqr[] = {
+    0x00000001, 0x00000000, 0x00000002, 0x00000000, 0x00000001, 0x00000000,
+    0xFFFFFFFE, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFD, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF
+};
+
+static const BN_ULONG _nist_p_224[][BN_NIST_224_TOP] = {
+    {0x00000001, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0xFFFFFFFF,
+     0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF},
+    {0x00000002, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0xFFFFFFFE,
+     0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF}
+};
+
+static const BN_ULONG _nist_p_224_sqr[] = {
+    0x00000001, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0xFFFFFFFE,
+    0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0x00000000, 0x00000002,
+    0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0xFFFFFFFE, 0xFFFFFFFF,
+    0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF
+};
+
+static const BN_ULONG _nist_p_256[][BN_NIST_256_TOP] = {
+    {0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0x00000000,
+     0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000001, 0xFFFFFFFF},
+    {0xFFFFFFFE, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0x00000001,
+     0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000002, 0xFFFFFFFE},
+    {0xFFFFFFFD, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0x00000002,
+     0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000003, 0xFFFFFFFD},
+    {0xFFFFFFFC, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0x00000003,
+     0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000004, 0xFFFFFFFC},
+    {0xFFFFFFFB, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0x00000004,
+     0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000005, 0xFFFFFFFB},
+};
+
+static const BN_ULONG _nist_p_256_sqr[] = {
+    0x00000001, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0xFFFFFFFE,
+    0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFE, 0x00000001,
+    0xFFFFFFFE, 0x00000001, 0xFFFFFFFE, 0x00000001,
+    0x00000001, 0xFFFFFFFE, 0x00000002, 0xFFFFFFFE
+};
+
+static const BN_ULONG _nist_p_384[][BN_NIST_384_TOP] = {
+    {0xFFFFFFFF, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFE, 0xFFFFFFFF,
+     0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF},
+    {0xFFFFFFFE, 0x00000001, 0x00000000, 0xFFFFFFFE, 0xFFFFFFFD, 0xFFFFFFFF,
+     0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF},
+    {0xFFFFFFFD, 0x00000002, 0x00000000, 0xFFFFFFFD, 0xFFFFFFFC, 0xFFFFFFFF,
+     0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF},
+    {0xFFFFFFFC, 0x00000003, 0x00000000, 0xFFFFFFFC, 0xFFFFFFFB, 0xFFFFFFFF,
+     0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF},
+    {0xFFFFFFFB, 0x00000004, 0x00000000, 0xFFFFFFFB, 0xFFFFFFFA, 0xFFFFFFFF,
+     0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF},
+};
+
+static const BN_ULONG _nist_p_384_sqr[] = {
+    0x00000001, 0xFFFFFFFE, 0x00000000, 0x00000002, 0x00000000, 0xFFFFFFFE,
+    0x00000000, 0x00000002, 0x00000001, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000,
+    0xFFFFFFFE, 0x00000001, 0x00000000, 0xFFFFFFFE, 0xFFFFFFFD, 0xFFFFFFFF,
+    0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF
+};
+
+static const BN_ULONG _nist_p_521[] = { 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF,
+    0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF,
+    0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF,
+    0xFFFFFFFF, 0x000001FF
+};
+
+static const BN_ULONG _nist_p_521_sqr[] = {
+    0x00000001, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000,
+    0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000,
+    0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0xFFFFFC00, 0xFFFFFFFF,
+    0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF,
+    0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF,
+    0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0x0003FFFF
+};
+#else
+# error "unsupported BN_BITS2"
+#endif
+
+static const BIGNUM _bignum_nist_p_192 = {
+    (BN_ULONG *)_nist_p_192[0],
+    BN_NIST_192_TOP,
+    BN_NIST_192_TOP,
+    0,
+    BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA
+};
+
+static const BIGNUM _bignum_nist_p_224 = {
+    (BN_ULONG *)_nist_p_224[0],
+    BN_NIST_224_TOP,
+    BN_NIST_224_TOP,
+    0,
+    BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA
+};
+
+static const BIGNUM _bignum_nist_p_256 = {
+    (BN_ULONG *)_nist_p_256[0],
+    BN_NIST_256_TOP,
+    BN_NIST_256_TOP,
+    0,
+    BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA
+};
+
+static const BIGNUM _bignum_nist_p_384 = {
+    (BN_ULONG *)_nist_p_384[0],
+    BN_NIST_384_TOP,
+    BN_NIST_384_TOP,
+    0,
+    BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA
+};
+
+static const BIGNUM _bignum_nist_p_521 = {
+    (BN_ULONG *)_nist_p_521,
+    BN_NIST_521_TOP,
+    BN_NIST_521_TOP,
+    0,
+    BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA
+};
+
+const BIGNUM *BN_get0_nist_prime_192(void)
+{
+    return &_bignum_nist_p_192;
+}
+
+const BIGNUM *BN_get0_nist_prime_224(void)
+{
+    return &_bignum_nist_p_224;
+}
+
+const BIGNUM *BN_get0_nist_prime_256(void)
+{
+    return &_bignum_nist_p_256;
+}
+
+const BIGNUM *BN_get0_nist_prime_384(void)
+{
+    return &_bignum_nist_p_384;
+}
+
+const BIGNUM *BN_get0_nist_prime_521(void)
+{
+    return &_bignum_nist_p_521;
+}
+
+static void nist_cp_bn_0(BN_ULONG *dst, const BN_ULONG *src, int top, int max)
+{
+    int i;
+
+#ifdef BN_DEBUG
+    OPENSSL_assert(top <= max);
+#endif
+    for (i = 0; i < top; i++)
+        dst[i] = src[i];
+    for (; i < max; i++)
+        dst[i] = 0;
+}
+
+static void nist_cp_bn(BN_ULONG *dst, const BN_ULONG *src, int top)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < top; i++)
+        dst[i] = src[i];
+}
+
+#if BN_BITS2 == 64
+# define bn_cp_64(to, n, from, m)        (to)[n] = (m>=0)?((from)[m]):0;
+# define bn_64_set_0(to, n)              (to)[n] = (BN_ULONG)0;
+/*
+ * two following macros are implemented under assumption that they
+ * are called in a sequence with *ascending* n, i.e. as they are...
+ */
+# define bn_cp_32_naked(to, n, from, m)  (((n)&1)?(to[(n)/2]|=((m)&1)?(from[(m)/2]&BN_MASK2h):(from[(m)/2]<<32))\
+                                                :(to[(n)/2] =((m)&1)?(from[(m)/2]>>32):(from[(m)/2]&BN_MASK2l)))
+# define bn_32_set_0(to, n)              (((n)&1)?(to[(n)/2]&=BN_MASK2l):(to[(n)/2]=0));
+# define bn_cp_32(to,n,from,m)           ((m)>=0)?bn_cp_32_naked(to,n,from,m):bn_32_set_0(to,n)
+# if defined(L_ENDIAN)
+#  if defined(__arch64__)
+#   define NIST_INT64 long
+#  else
+#   define NIST_INT64 long long
+#  endif
+# endif
+#else
+# define bn_cp_64(to, n, from, m) \
+        { \
+        bn_cp_32(to, (n)*2, from, (m)*2); \
+        bn_cp_32(to, (n)*2+1, from, (m)*2+1); \
+        }
+# define bn_64_set_0(to, n) \
+        { \
+        bn_32_set_0(to, (n)*2); \
+        bn_32_set_0(to, (n)*2+1); \
+        }
+# define bn_cp_32(to, n, from, m)        (to)[n] = (m>=0)?((from)[m]):0;
+# define bn_32_set_0(to, n)              (to)[n] = (BN_ULONG)0;
+# if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(__GNUC__)
+#  define NIST_INT64 __int64
+# elif defined(BN_LLONG)
+#  define NIST_INT64 long long
+# endif
+#endif                          /* BN_BITS2 != 64 */
+
+#define nist_set_192(to, from, a1, a2, a3) \
+        { \
+        bn_cp_64(to, 0, from, (a3) - 3) \
+        bn_cp_64(to, 1, from, (a2) - 3) \
+        bn_cp_64(to, 2, from, (a1) - 3) \
+        }
+
+int BN_nist_mod_192(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *field,
+                    BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int top = a->top, i;
+    int carry;
+    register BN_ULONG *r_d, *a_d = a->d;
+    union {
+        BN_ULONG bn[BN_NIST_192_TOP];
+        unsigned int ui[BN_NIST_192_TOP * sizeof(BN_ULONG) /
+                        sizeof(unsigned int)];
+    } buf;
+    BN_ULONG c_d[BN_NIST_192_TOP], *res;
+    PTR_SIZE_INT mask;
+    static const BIGNUM _bignum_nist_p_192_sqr = {
+        (BN_ULONG *)_nist_p_192_sqr,
+        OSSL_NELEM(_nist_p_192_sqr),
+        OSSL_NELEM(_nist_p_192_sqr),
+        0, BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA
+    };
+
+    field = &_bignum_nist_p_192; /* just to make sure */
+
+    if (BN_is_negative(a) || BN_ucmp(a, &_bignum_nist_p_192_sqr) >= 0)
+        return BN_nnmod(r, a, field, ctx);
+
+    i = BN_ucmp(field, a);
+    if (i == 0) {
+        BN_zero(r);
+        return 1;
+    } else if (i > 0)
+        return (r == a) ? 1 : (BN_copy(r, a) != NULL);
+
+    if (r != a) {
+        if (!bn_wexpand(r, BN_NIST_192_TOP))
+            return 0;
+        r_d = r->d;
+        nist_cp_bn(r_d, a_d, BN_NIST_192_TOP);
+    } else
+        r_d = a_d;
+
+    nist_cp_bn_0(buf.bn, a_d + BN_NIST_192_TOP, top - BN_NIST_192_TOP,
+                 BN_NIST_192_TOP);
+
+#if defined(NIST_INT64)
+    {
+        NIST_INT64 acc;         /* accumulator */
+        unsigned int *rp = (unsigned int *)r_d;
+        const unsigned int *bp = (const unsigned int *)buf.ui;
+
+        acc = rp[0];
+        acc += bp[3 * 2 - 6];
+        acc += bp[5 * 2 - 6];
+        rp[0] = (unsigned int)acc;
+        acc >>= 32;
+
+        acc += rp[1];
+        acc += bp[3 * 2 - 5];
+        acc += bp[5 * 2 - 5];
+        rp[1] = (unsigned int)acc;
+        acc >>= 32;
+
+        acc += rp[2];
+        acc += bp[3 * 2 - 6];
+        acc += bp[4 * 2 - 6];
+        acc += bp[5 * 2 - 6];
+        rp[2] = (unsigned int)acc;
+        acc >>= 32;
+
+        acc += rp[3];
+        acc += bp[3 * 2 - 5];
+        acc += bp[4 * 2 - 5];
+        acc += bp[5 * 2 - 5];
+        rp[3] = (unsigned int)acc;
+        acc >>= 32;
+
+        acc += rp[4];
+        acc += bp[4 * 2 - 6];
+        acc += bp[5 * 2 - 6];
+        rp[4] = (unsigned int)acc;
+        acc >>= 32;
+
+        acc += rp[5];
+        acc += bp[4 * 2 - 5];
+        acc += bp[5 * 2 - 5];
+        rp[5] = (unsigned int)acc;
+
+        carry = (int)(acc >> 32);
+    }
+#else
+    {
+        BN_ULONG t_d[BN_NIST_192_TOP];
+
+        nist_set_192(t_d, buf.bn, 0, 3, 3);
+        carry = (int)bn_add_words(r_d, r_d, t_d, BN_NIST_192_TOP);
+        nist_set_192(t_d, buf.bn, 4, 4, 0);
+        carry += (int)bn_add_words(r_d, r_d, t_d, BN_NIST_192_TOP);
+        nist_set_192(t_d, buf.bn, 5, 5, 5)
+            carry += (int)bn_add_words(r_d, r_d, t_d, BN_NIST_192_TOP);
+    }
+#endif
+    if (carry > 0)
+        carry =
+            (int)bn_sub_words(r_d, r_d, _nist_p_192[carry - 1],
+                              BN_NIST_192_TOP);
+    else
+        carry = 1;
+
+    /*
+     * we need 'if (carry==0 || result>=modulus) result-=modulus;'
+     * as comparison implies subtraction, we can write
+     * 'tmp=result-modulus; if (!carry || !borrow) result=tmp;'
+     * this is what happens below, but without explicit if:-) a.
+     */
+    mask =
+        0 - (PTR_SIZE_INT) bn_sub_words(c_d, r_d, _nist_p_192[0],
+                                        BN_NIST_192_TOP);
+    mask &= 0 - (PTR_SIZE_INT) carry;
+    res = c_d;
+    res = (BN_ULONG *)
+        (((PTR_SIZE_INT) res & ~mask) | ((PTR_SIZE_INT) r_d & mask));
+    nist_cp_bn(r_d, res, BN_NIST_192_TOP);
+    r->top = BN_NIST_192_TOP;
+    bn_correct_top(r);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+typedef BN_ULONG (*bn_addsub_f) (BN_ULONG *, const BN_ULONG *,
+                                 const BN_ULONG *, int);
+
+#define nist_set_224(to, from, a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6, a7) \
+        { \
+        bn_cp_32(to, 0, from, (a7) - 7) \
+        bn_cp_32(to, 1, from, (a6) - 7) \
+        bn_cp_32(to, 2, from, (a5) - 7) \
+        bn_cp_32(to, 3, from, (a4) - 7) \
+        bn_cp_32(to, 4, from, (a3) - 7) \
+        bn_cp_32(to, 5, from, (a2) - 7) \
+        bn_cp_32(to, 6, from, (a1) - 7) \
+        }
+
+int BN_nist_mod_224(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *field,
+                    BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int top = a->top, i;
+    int carry;
+    BN_ULONG *r_d, *a_d = a->d;
+    union {
+        BN_ULONG bn[BN_NIST_224_TOP];
+        unsigned int ui[BN_NIST_224_TOP * sizeof(BN_ULONG) /
+                        sizeof(unsigned int)];
+    } buf;
+    BN_ULONG c_d[BN_NIST_224_TOP], *res;
+    PTR_SIZE_INT mask;
+    union {
+        bn_addsub_f f;
+        PTR_SIZE_INT p;
+    } u;
+    static const BIGNUM _bignum_nist_p_224_sqr = {
+        (BN_ULONG *)_nist_p_224_sqr,
+        OSSL_NELEM(_nist_p_224_sqr),
+        OSSL_NELEM(_nist_p_224_sqr),
+        0, BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA
+    };
+
+    field = &_bignum_nist_p_224; /* just to make sure */
+
+    if (BN_is_negative(a) || BN_ucmp(a, &_bignum_nist_p_224_sqr) >= 0)
+        return BN_nnmod(r, a, field, ctx);
+
+    i = BN_ucmp(field, a);
+    if (i == 0) {
+        BN_zero(r);
+        return 1;
+    } else if (i > 0)
+        return (r == a) ? 1 : (BN_copy(r, a) != NULL);
+
+    if (r != a) {
+        if (!bn_wexpand(r, BN_NIST_224_TOP))
+            return 0;
+        r_d = r->d;
+        nist_cp_bn(r_d, a_d, BN_NIST_224_TOP);
+    } else
+        r_d = a_d;
+
+#if BN_BITS2==64
+    /* copy upper 256 bits of 448 bit number ... */
+    nist_cp_bn_0(c_d, a_d + (BN_NIST_224_TOP - 1),
+                 top - (BN_NIST_224_TOP - 1), BN_NIST_224_TOP);
+    /* ... and right shift by 32 to obtain upper 224 bits */
+    nist_set_224(buf.bn, c_d, 14, 13, 12, 11, 10, 9, 8);
+    /* truncate lower part to 224 bits too */
+    r_d[BN_NIST_224_TOP - 1] &= BN_MASK2l;
+#else
+    nist_cp_bn_0(buf.bn, a_d + BN_NIST_224_TOP, top - BN_NIST_224_TOP,
+                 BN_NIST_224_TOP);
+#endif
+
+#if defined(NIST_INT64) && BN_BITS2!=64
+    {
+        NIST_INT64 acc;         /* accumulator */
+        unsigned int *rp = (unsigned int *)r_d;
+        const unsigned int *bp = (const unsigned int *)buf.ui;
+
+        acc = rp[0];
+        acc -= bp[7 - 7];
+        acc -= bp[11 - 7];
+        rp[0] = (unsigned int)acc;
+        acc >>= 32;
+
+        acc += rp[1];
+        acc -= bp[8 - 7];
+        acc -= bp[12 - 7];
+        rp[1] = (unsigned int)acc;
+        acc >>= 32;
+
+        acc += rp[2];
+        acc -= bp[9 - 7];
+        acc -= bp[13 - 7];
+        rp[2] = (unsigned int)acc;
+        acc >>= 32;
+
+        acc += rp[3];
+        acc += bp[7 - 7];
+        acc += bp[11 - 7];
+        acc -= bp[10 - 7];
+        rp[3] = (unsigned int)acc;
+        acc >>= 32;
+
+        acc += rp[4];
+        acc += bp[8 - 7];
+        acc += bp[12 - 7];
+        acc -= bp[11 - 7];
+        rp[4] = (unsigned int)acc;
+        acc >>= 32;
+
+        acc += rp[5];
+        acc += bp[9 - 7];
+        acc += bp[13 - 7];
+        acc -= bp[12 - 7];
+        rp[5] = (unsigned int)acc;
+        acc >>= 32;
+
+        acc += rp[6];
+        acc += bp[10 - 7];
+        acc -= bp[13 - 7];
+        rp[6] = (unsigned int)acc;
+
+        carry = (int)(acc >> 32);
+# if BN_BITS2==64
+        rp[7] = carry;
+# endif
+    }
+#else
+    {
+        BN_ULONG t_d[BN_NIST_224_TOP];
+
+        nist_set_224(t_d, buf.bn, 10, 9, 8, 7, 0, 0, 0);
+        carry = (int)bn_add_words(r_d, r_d, t_d, BN_NIST_224_TOP);
+        nist_set_224(t_d, buf.bn, 0, 13, 12, 11, 0, 0, 0);
+        carry += (int)bn_add_words(r_d, r_d, t_d, BN_NIST_224_TOP);
+        nist_set_224(t_d, buf.bn, 13, 12, 11, 10, 9, 8, 7);
+        carry -= (int)bn_sub_words(r_d, r_d, t_d, BN_NIST_224_TOP);
+        nist_set_224(t_d, buf.bn, 0, 0, 0, 0, 13, 12, 11);
+        carry -= (int)bn_sub_words(r_d, r_d, t_d, BN_NIST_224_TOP);
+
+# if BN_BITS2==64
+        carry = (int)(r_d[BN_NIST_224_TOP - 1] >> 32);
+# endif
+    }
+#endif
+    u.f = bn_sub_words;
+    if (carry > 0) {
+        carry =
+            (int)bn_sub_words(r_d, r_d, _nist_p_224[carry - 1],
+                              BN_NIST_224_TOP);
+#if BN_BITS2==64
+        carry = (int)(~(r_d[BN_NIST_224_TOP - 1] >> 32)) & 1;
+#endif
+    } else if (carry < 0) {
+        /*
+         * it's a bit more complicated logic in this case. if bn_add_words
+         * yields no carry, then result has to be adjusted by unconditionally
+         * *adding* the modulus. but if it does, then result has to be
+         * compared to the modulus and conditionally adjusted by
+         * *subtracting* the latter.
+         */
+        carry =
+            (int)bn_add_words(r_d, r_d, _nist_p_224[-carry - 1],
+                              BN_NIST_224_TOP);
+        mask = 0 - (PTR_SIZE_INT) carry;
+        u.p = ((PTR_SIZE_INT) bn_sub_words & mask) |
+            ((PTR_SIZE_INT) bn_add_words & ~mask);
+    } else
+        carry = 1;
+
+    /* otherwise it's effectively same as in BN_nist_mod_192... */
+    mask =
+        0 - (PTR_SIZE_INT) (*u.f) (c_d, r_d, _nist_p_224[0], BN_NIST_224_TOP);
+    mask &= 0 - (PTR_SIZE_INT) carry;
+    res = c_d;
+    res = (BN_ULONG *)(((PTR_SIZE_INT) res & ~mask) |
+                       ((PTR_SIZE_INT) r_d & mask));
+    nist_cp_bn(r_d, res, BN_NIST_224_TOP);
+    r->top = BN_NIST_224_TOP;
+    bn_correct_top(r);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+#define nist_set_256(to, from, a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6, a7, a8) \
+        { \
+        bn_cp_32(to, 0, from, (a8) - 8) \
+        bn_cp_32(to, 1, from, (a7) - 8) \
+        bn_cp_32(to, 2, from, (a6) - 8) \
+        bn_cp_32(to, 3, from, (a5) - 8) \
+        bn_cp_32(to, 4, from, (a4) - 8) \
+        bn_cp_32(to, 5, from, (a3) - 8) \
+        bn_cp_32(to, 6, from, (a2) - 8) \
+        bn_cp_32(to, 7, from, (a1) - 8) \
+        }
+
+int BN_nist_mod_256(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *field,
+                    BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int i, top = a->top;
+    int carry = 0;
+    register BN_ULONG *a_d = a->d, *r_d;
+    union {
+        BN_ULONG bn[BN_NIST_256_TOP];
+        unsigned int ui[BN_NIST_256_TOP * sizeof(BN_ULONG) /
+                        sizeof(unsigned int)];
+    } buf;
+    BN_ULONG c_d[BN_NIST_256_TOP], *res;
+    PTR_SIZE_INT mask;
+    union {
+        bn_addsub_f f;
+        PTR_SIZE_INT p;
+    } u;
+    static const BIGNUM _bignum_nist_p_256_sqr = {
+        (BN_ULONG *)_nist_p_256_sqr,
+        OSSL_NELEM(_nist_p_256_sqr),
+        OSSL_NELEM(_nist_p_256_sqr),
+        0, BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA
+    };
+
+    field = &_bignum_nist_p_256; /* just to make sure */
+
+    if (BN_is_negative(a) || BN_ucmp(a, &_bignum_nist_p_256_sqr) >= 0)
+        return BN_nnmod(r, a, field, ctx);
+
+    i = BN_ucmp(field, a);
+    if (i == 0) {
+        BN_zero(r);
+        return 1;
+    } else if (i > 0)
+        return (r == a) ? 1 : (BN_copy(r, a) != NULL);
+
+    if (r != a) {
+        if (!bn_wexpand(r, BN_NIST_256_TOP))
+            return 0;
+        r_d = r->d;
+        nist_cp_bn(r_d, a_d, BN_NIST_256_TOP);
+    } else
+        r_d = a_d;
+
+    nist_cp_bn_0(buf.bn, a_d + BN_NIST_256_TOP, top - BN_NIST_256_TOP,
+                 BN_NIST_256_TOP);
+
+#if defined(NIST_INT64)
+    {
+        NIST_INT64 acc;         /* accumulator */
+        unsigned int *rp = (unsigned int *)r_d;
+        const unsigned int *bp = (const unsigned int *)buf.ui;
+
+        acc = rp[0];
+        acc += bp[8 - 8];
+        acc += bp[9 - 8];
+        acc -= bp[11 - 8];
+        acc -= bp[12 - 8];
+        acc -= bp[13 - 8];
+        acc -= bp[14 - 8];
+        rp[0] = (unsigned int)acc;
+        acc >>= 32;
+
+        acc += rp[1];
+        acc += bp[9 - 8];
+        acc += bp[10 - 8];
+        acc -= bp[12 - 8];
+        acc -= bp[13 - 8];
+        acc -= bp[14 - 8];
+        acc -= bp[15 - 8];
+        rp[1] = (unsigned int)acc;
+        acc >>= 32;
+
+        acc += rp[2];
+        acc += bp[10 - 8];
+        acc += bp[11 - 8];
+        acc -= bp[13 - 8];
+        acc -= bp[14 - 8];
+        acc -= bp[15 - 8];
+        rp[2] = (unsigned int)acc;
+        acc >>= 32;
+
+        acc += rp[3];
+        acc += bp[11 - 8];
+        acc += bp[11 - 8];
+        acc += bp[12 - 8];
+        acc += bp[12 - 8];
+        acc += bp[13 - 8];
+        acc -= bp[15 - 8];
+        acc -= bp[8 - 8];
+        acc -= bp[9 - 8];
+        rp[3] = (unsigned int)acc;
+        acc >>= 32;
+
+        acc += rp[4];
+        acc += bp[12 - 8];
+        acc += bp[12 - 8];
+        acc += bp[13 - 8];
+        acc += bp[13 - 8];
+        acc += bp[14 - 8];
+        acc -= bp[9 - 8];
+        acc -= bp[10 - 8];
+        rp[4] = (unsigned int)acc;
+        acc >>= 32;
+
+        acc += rp[5];
+        acc += bp[13 - 8];
+        acc += bp[13 - 8];
+        acc += bp[14 - 8];
+        acc += bp[14 - 8];
+        acc += bp[15 - 8];
+        acc -= bp[10 - 8];
+        acc -= bp[11 - 8];
+        rp[5] = (unsigned int)acc;
+        acc >>= 32;
+
+        acc += rp[6];
+        acc += bp[14 - 8];
+        acc += bp[14 - 8];
+        acc += bp[15 - 8];
+        acc += bp[15 - 8];
+        acc += bp[14 - 8];
+        acc += bp[13 - 8];
+        acc -= bp[8 - 8];
+        acc -= bp[9 - 8];
+        rp[6] = (unsigned int)acc;
+        acc >>= 32;
+
+        acc += rp[7];
+        acc += bp[15 - 8];
+        acc += bp[15 - 8];
+        acc += bp[15 - 8];
+        acc += bp[8 - 8];
+        acc -= bp[10 - 8];
+        acc -= bp[11 - 8];
+        acc -= bp[12 - 8];
+        acc -= bp[13 - 8];
+        rp[7] = (unsigned int)acc;
+
+        carry = (int)(acc >> 32);
+    }
+#else
+    {
+        BN_ULONG t_d[BN_NIST_256_TOP];
+
+        /*
+         * S1
+         */
+        nist_set_256(t_d, buf.bn, 15, 14, 13, 12, 11, 0, 0, 0);
+        /*
+         * S2
+         */
+        nist_set_256(c_d, buf.bn, 0, 15, 14, 13, 12, 0, 0, 0);
+        carry = (int)bn_add_words(t_d, t_d, c_d, BN_NIST_256_TOP);
+        /* left shift */
+        {
+            register BN_ULONG *ap, t, c;
+            ap = t_d;
+            c = 0;
+            for (i = BN_NIST_256_TOP; i != 0; --i) {
+                t = *ap;
+                *(ap++) = ((t << 1) | c) & BN_MASK2;
+                c = (t & BN_TBIT) ? 1 : 0;
+            }
+            carry <<= 1;
+            carry |= c;
+        }
+        carry += (int)bn_add_words(r_d, r_d, t_d, BN_NIST_256_TOP);
+        /*
+         * S3
+         */
+        nist_set_256(t_d, buf.bn, 15, 14, 0, 0, 0, 10, 9, 8);
+        carry += (int)bn_add_words(r_d, r_d, t_d, BN_NIST_256_TOP);
+        /*
+         * S4
+         */
+        nist_set_256(t_d, buf.bn, 8, 13, 15, 14, 13, 11, 10, 9);
+        carry += (int)bn_add_words(r_d, r_d, t_d, BN_NIST_256_TOP);
+        /*
+         * D1
+         */
+        nist_set_256(t_d, buf.bn, 10, 8, 0, 0, 0, 13, 12, 11);
+        carry -= (int)bn_sub_words(r_d, r_d, t_d, BN_NIST_256_TOP);
+        /*
+         * D2
+         */
+        nist_set_256(t_d, buf.bn, 11, 9, 0, 0, 15, 14, 13, 12);
+        carry -= (int)bn_sub_words(r_d, r_d, t_d, BN_NIST_256_TOP);
+        /*
+         * D3
+         */
+        nist_set_256(t_d, buf.bn, 12, 0, 10, 9, 8, 15, 14, 13);
+        carry -= (int)bn_sub_words(r_d, r_d, t_d, BN_NIST_256_TOP);
+        /*
+         * D4
+         */
+        nist_set_256(t_d, buf.bn, 13, 0, 11, 10, 9, 0, 15, 14);
+        carry -= (int)bn_sub_words(r_d, r_d, t_d, BN_NIST_256_TOP);
+
+    }
+#endif
+    /* see BN_nist_mod_224 for explanation */
+    u.f = bn_sub_words;
+    if (carry > 0)
+        carry =
+            (int)bn_sub_words(r_d, r_d, _nist_p_256[carry - 1],
+                              BN_NIST_256_TOP);
+    else if (carry < 0) {
+        carry =
+            (int)bn_add_words(r_d, r_d, _nist_p_256[-carry - 1],
+                              BN_NIST_256_TOP);
+        mask = 0 - (PTR_SIZE_INT) carry;
+        u.p = ((PTR_SIZE_INT) bn_sub_words & mask) |
+            ((PTR_SIZE_INT) bn_add_words & ~mask);
+    } else
+        carry = 1;
+
+    mask =
+        0 - (PTR_SIZE_INT) (*u.f) (c_d, r_d, _nist_p_256[0], BN_NIST_256_TOP);
+    mask &= 0 - (PTR_SIZE_INT) carry;
+    res = c_d;
+    res = (BN_ULONG *)(((PTR_SIZE_INT) res & ~mask) |
+                       ((PTR_SIZE_INT) r_d & mask));
+    nist_cp_bn(r_d, res, BN_NIST_256_TOP);
+    r->top = BN_NIST_256_TOP;
+    bn_correct_top(r);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+#define nist_set_384(to,from,a1,a2,a3,a4,a5,a6,a7,a8,a9,a10,a11,a12) \
+        { \
+        bn_cp_32(to, 0, from,  (a12) - 12) \
+        bn_cp_32(to, 1, from,  (a11) - 12) \
+        bn_cp_32(to, 2, from,  (a10) - 12) \
+        bn_cp_32(to, 3, from,  (a9) - 12)  \
+        bn_cp_32(to, 4, from,  (a8) - 12)  \
+        bn_cp_32(to, 5, from,  (a7) - 12)  \
+        bn_cp_32(to, 6, from,  (a6) - 12)  \
+        bn_cp_32(to, 7, from,  (a5) - 12)  \
+        bn_cp_32(to, 8, from,  (a4) - 12)  \
+        bn_cp_32(to, 9, from,  (a3) - 12)  \
+        bn_cp_32(to, 10, from, (a2) - 12)  \
+        bn_cp_32(to, 11, from, (a1) - 12)  \
+        }
+
+int BN_nist_mod_384(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *field,
+                    BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int i, top = a->top;
+    int carry = 0;
+    register BN_ULONG *r_d, *a_d = a->d;
+    union {
+        BN_ULONG bn[BN_NIST_384_TOP];
+        unsigned int ui[BN_NIST_384_TOP * sizeof(BN_ULONG) /
+                        sizeof(unsigned int)];
+    } buf;
+    BN_ULONG c_d[BN_NIST_384_TOP], *res;
+    PTR_SIZE_INT mask;
+    union {
+        bn_addsub_f f;
+        PTR_SIZE_INT p;
+    } u;
+    static const BIGNUM _bignum_nist_p_384_sqr = {
+        (BN_ULONG *)_nist_p_384_sqr,
+        OSSL_NELEM(_nist_p_384_sqr),
+        OSSL_NELEM(_nist_p_384_sqr),
+        0, BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA
+    };
+
+    field = &_bignum_nist_p_384; /* just to make sure */
+
+    if (BN_is_negative(a) || BN_ucmp(a, &_bignum_nist_p_384_sqr) >= 0)
+        return BN_nnmod(r, a, field, ctx);
+
+    i = BN_ucmp(field, a);
+    if (i == 0) {
+        BN_zero(r);
+        return 1;
+    } else if (i > 0)
+        return (r == a) ? 1 : (BN_copy(r, a) != NULL);
+
+    if (r != a) {
+        if (!bn_wexpand(r, BN_NIST_384_TOP))
+            return 0;
+        r_d = r->d;
+        nist_cp_bn(r_d, a_d, BN_NIST_384_TOP);
+    } else
+        r_d = a_d;
+
+    nist_cp_bn_0(buf.bn, a_d + BN_NIST_384_TOP, top - BN_NIST_384_TOP,
+                 BN_NIST_384_TOP);
+
+#if defined(NIST_INT64)
+    {
+        NIST_INT64 acc;         /* accumulator */
+        unsigned int *rp = (unsigned int *)r_d;
+        const unsigned int *bp = (const unsigned int *)buf.ui;
+
+        acc = rp[0];
+        acc += bp[12 - 12];
+        acc += bp[21 - 12];
+        acc += bp[20 - 12];
+        acc -= bp[23 - 12];
+        rp[0] = (unsigned int)acc;
+        acc >>= 32;
+
+        acc += rp[1];
+        acc += bp[13 - 12];
+        acc += bp[22 - 12];
+        acc += bp[23 - 12];
+        acc -= bp[12 - 12];
+        acc -= bp[20 - 12];
+        rp[1] = (unsigned int)acc;
+        acc >>= 32;
+
+        acc += rp[2];
+        acc += bp[14 - 12];
+        acc += bp[23 - 12];
+        acc -= bp[13 - 12];
+        acc -= bp[21 - 12];
+        rp[2] = (unsigned int)acc;
+        acc >>= 32;
+
+        acc += rp[3];
+        acc += bp[15 - 12];
+        acc += bp[12 - 12];
+        acc += bp[20 - 12];
+        acc += bp[21 - 12];
+        acc -= bp[14 - 12];
+        acc -= bp[22 - 12];
+        acc -= bp[23 - 12];
+        rp[3] = (unsigned int)acc;
+        acc >>= 32;
+
+        acc += rp[4];
+        acc += bp[21 - 12];
+        acc += bp[21 - 12];
+        acc += bp[16 - 12];
+        acc += bp[13 - 12];
+        acc += bp[12 - 12];
+        acc += bp[20 - 12];
+        acc += bp[22 - 12];
+        acc -= bp[15 - 12];
+        acc -= bp[23 - 12];
+        acc -= bp[23 - 12];
+        rp[4] = (unsigned int)acc;
+        acc >>= 32;
+
+        acc += rp[5];
+        acc += bp[22 - 12];
+        acc += bp[22 - 12];
+        acc += bp[17 - 12];
+        acc += bp[14 - 12];
+        acc += bp[13 - 12];
+        acc += bp[21 - 12];
+        acc += bp[23 - 12];
+        acc -= bp[16 - 12];
+        rp[5] = (unsigned int)acc;
+        acc >>= 32;
+
+        acc += rp[6];
+        acc += bp[23 - 12];
+        acc += bp[23 - 12];
+        acc += bp[18 - 12];
+        acc += bp[15 - 12];
+        acc += bp[14 - 12];
+        acc += bp[22 - 12];
+        acc -= bp[17 - 12];
+        rp[6] = (unsigned int)acc;
+        acc >>= 32;
+
+        acc += rp[7];
+        acc += bp[19 - 12];
+        acc += bp[16 - 12];
+        acc += bp[15 - 12];
+        acc += bp[23 - 12];
+        acc -= bp[18 - 12];
+        rp[7] = (unsigned int)acc;
+        acc >>= 32;
+
+        acc += rp[8];
+        acc += bp[20 - 12];
+        acc += bp[17 - 12];
+        acc += bp[16 - 12];
+        acc -= bp[19 - 12];
+        rp[8] = (unsigned int)acc;
+        acc >>= 32;
+
+        acc += rp[9];
+        acc += bp[21 - 12];
+        acc += bp[18 - 12];
+        acc += bp[17 - 12];
+        acc -= bp[20 - 12];
+        rp[9] = (unsigned int)acc;
+        acc >>= 32;
+
+        acc += rp[10];
+        acc += bp[22 - 12];
+        acc += bp[19 - 12];
+        acc += bp[18 - 12];
+        acc -= bp[21 - 12];
+        rp[10] = (unsigned int)acc;
+        acc >>= 32;
+
+        acc += rp[11];
+        acc += bp[23 - 12];
+        acc += bp[20 - 12];
+        acc += bp[19 - 12];
+        acc -= bp[22 - 12];
+        rp[11] = (unsigned int)acc;
+
+        carry = (int)(acc >> 32);
+    }
+#else
+    {
+        BN_ULONG t_d[BN_NIST_384_TOP];
+
+        /*
+         * S1
+         */
+        nist_set_256(t_d, buf.bn, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 23 - 4, 22 - 4, 21 - 4);
+        /* left shift */
+        {
+            register BN_ULONG *ap, t, c;
+            ap = t_d;
+            c = 0;
+            for (i = 3; i != 0; --i) {
+                t = *ap;
+                *(ap++) = ((t << 1) | c) & BN_MASK2;
+                c = (t & BN_TBIT) ? 1 : 0;
+            }
+            *ap = c;
+        }
+        carry =
+            (int)bn_add_words(r_d + (128 / BN_BITS2), r_d + (128 / BN_BITS2),
+                              t_d, BN_NIST_256_TOP);
+        /*
+         * S2
+         */
+        carry += (int)bn_add_words(r_d, r_d, buf.bn, BN_NIST_384_TOP);
+        /*
+         * S3
+         */
+        nist_set_384(t_d, buf.bn, 20, 19, 18, 17, 16, 15, 14, 13, 12, 23, 22,
+                     21);
+        carry += (int)bn_add_words(r_d, r_d, t_d, BN_NIST_384_TOP);
+        /*
+         * S4
+         */
+        nist_set_384(t_d, buf.bn, 19, 18, 17, 16, 15, 14, 13, 12, 20, 0, 23,
+                     0);
+        carry += (int)bn_add_words(r_d, r_d, t_d, BN_NIST_384_TOP);
+        /*
+         * S5
+         */
+        nist_set_384(t_d, buf.bn, 0, 0, 0, 0, 23, 22, 21, 20, 0, 0, 0, 0);
+        carry += (int)bn_add_words(r_d, r_d, t_d, BN_NIST_384_TOP);
+        /*
+         * S6
+         */
+        nist_set_384(t_d, buf.bn, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 23, 22, 21, 0, 0, 20);
+        carry += (int)bn_add_words(r_d, r_d, t_d, BN_NIST_384_TOP);
+        /*
+         * D1
+         */
+        nist_set_384(t_d, buf.bn, 22, 21, 20, 19, 18, 17, 16, 15, 14, 13, 12,
+                     23);
+        carry -= (int)bn_sub_words(r_d, r_d, t_d, BN_NIST_384_TOP);
+        /*
+         * D2
+         */
+        nist_set_384(t_d, buf.bn, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 23, 22, 21, 20, 0);
+        carry -= (int)bn_sub_words(r_d, r_d, t_d, BN_NIST_384_TOP);
+        /*
+         * D3
+         */
+        nist_set_384(t_d, buf.bn, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 23, 23, 0, 0, 0);
+        carry -= (int)bn_sub_words(r_d, r_d, t_d, BN_NIST_384_TOP);
+
+    }
+#endif
+    /* see BN_nist_mod_224 for explanation */
+    u.f = bn_sub_words;
+    if (carry > 0)
+        carry =
+            (int)bn_sub_words(r_d, r_d, _nist_p_384[carry - 1],
+                              BN_NIST_384_TOP);
+    else if (carry < 0) {
+        carry =
+            (int)bn_add_words(r_d, r_d, _nist_p_384[-carry - 1],
+                              BN_NIST_384_TOP);
+        mask = 0 - (PTR_SIZE_INT) carry;
+        u.p = ((PTR_SIZE_INT) bn_sub_words & mask) |
+            ((PTR_SIZE_INT) bn_add_words & ~mask);
+    } else
+        carry = 1;
+
+    mask =
+        0 - (PTR_SIZE_INT) (*u.f) (c_d, r_d, _nist_p_384[0], BN_NIST_384_TOP);
+    mask &= 0 - (PTR_SIZE_INT) carry;
+    res = c_d;
+    res = (BN_ULONG *)(((PTR_SIZE_INT) res & ~mask) |
+                       ((PTR_SIZE_INT) r_d & mask));
+    nist_cp_bn(r_d, res, BN_NIST_384_TOP);
+    r->top = BN_NIST_384_TOP;
+    bn_correct_top(r);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+#define BN_NIST_521_RSHIFT      (521%BN_BITS2)
+#define BN_NIST_521_LSHIFT      (BN_BITS2-BN_NIST_521_RSHIFT)
+#define BN_NIST_521_TOP_MASK    ((BN_ULONG)BN_MASK2>>BN_NIST_521_LSHIFT)
+
+int BN_nist_mod_521(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *field,
+                    BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int top = a->top, i;
+    BN_ULONG *r_d, *a_d = a->d, t_d[BN_NIST_521_TOP], val, tmp, *res;
+    PTR_SIZE_INT mask;
+    static const BIGNUM _bignum_nist_p_521_sqr = {
+        (BN_ULONG *)_nist_p_521_sqr,
+        OSSL_NELEM(_nist_p_521_sqr),
+        OSSL_NELEM(_nist_p_521_sqr),
+        0, BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA
+    };
+
+    field = &_bignum_nist_p_521; /* just to make sure */
+
+    if (BN_is_negative(a) || BN_ucmp(a, &_bignum_nist_p_521_sqr) >= 0)
+        return BN_nnmod(r, a, field, ctx);
+
+    i = BN_ucmp(field, a);
+    if (i == 0) {
+        BN_zero(r);
+        return 1;
+    } else if (i > 0)
+        return (r == a) ? 1 : (BN_copy(r, a) != NULL);
+
+    if (r != a) {
+        if (!bn_wexpand(r, BN_NIST_521_TOP))
+            return 0;
+        r_d = r->d;
+        nist_cp_bn(r_d, a_d, BN_NIST_521_TOP);
+    } else
+        r_d = a_d;
+
+    /* upper 521 bits, copy ... */
+    nist_cp_bn_0(t_d, a_d + (BN_NIST_521_TOP - 1),
+                 top - (BN_NIST_521_TOP - 1), BN_NIST_521_TOP);
+    /* ... and right shift */
+    for (val = t_d[0], i = 0; i < BN_NIST_521_TOP - 1; i++) {
+#if 0
+        /*
+         * MSC ARM compiler [version 2013, presumably even earlier,
+         * much earlier] miscompiles this code, but not one in
+         * #else section. See RT#3541.
+         */
+        tmp = val >> BN_NIST_521_RSHIFT;
+        val = t_d[i + 1];
+        t_d[i] = (tmp | val << BN_NIST_521_LSHIFT) & BN_MASK2;
+#else
+        t_d[i] = (val >> BN_NIST_521_RSHIFT |
+                  (tmp = t_d[i + 1]) << BN_NIST_521_LSHIFT) & BN_MASK2;
+        val = tmp;
+#endif
+    }
+    t_d[i] = val >> BN_NIST_521_RSHIFT;
+    /* lower 521 bits */
+    r_d[i] &= BN_NIST_521_TOP_MASK;
+
+    bn_add_words(r_d, r_d, t_d, BN_NIST_521_TOP);
+    mask =
+        0 - (PTR_SIZE_INT) bn_sub_words(t_d, r_d, _nist_p_521,
+                                        BN_NIST_521_TOP);
+    res = t_d;
+    res = (BN_ULONG *)(((PTR_SIZE_INT) res & ~mask) |
+                       ((PTR_SIZE_INT) r_d & mask));
+    nist_cp_bn(r_d, res, BN_NIST_521_TOP);
+    r->top = BN_NIST_521_TOP;
+    bn_correct_top(r);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int (*BN_nist_mod_func(const BIGNUM *p)) (BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
+                                          const BIGNUM *field, BN_CTX *ctx) {
+    if (BN_ucmp(&_bignum_nist_p_192, p) == 0)
+        return BN_nist_mod_192;
+    if (BN_ucmp(&_bignum_nist_p_224, p) == 0)
+        return BN_nist_mod_224;
+    if (BN_ucmp(&_bignum_nist_p_256, p) == 0)
+        return BN_nist_mod_256;
+    if (BN_ucmp(&_bignum_nist_p_384, p) == 0)
+        return BN_nist_mod_384;
+    if (BN_ucmp(&_bignum_nist_p_521, p) == 0)
+        return BN_nist_mod_521;
+    return 0;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_prime.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_prime.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..616389c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_prime.c
@@ -0,0 +1,596 @@
+/*
+ * WARNING: do not edit!
+ * Generated by crypto/bn/bn_prime.pl
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "bn_lcl.h"
+
+/*
+ * The quick sieve algorithm approach to weeding out primes is Philip
+ * Zimmermann's, as implemented in PGP.  I have had a read of his comments
+ * and implemented my own version.
+ */
+#include "bn_prime.h"
+
+static int witness(BIGNUM *w, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *a1,
+                   const BIGNUM *a1_odd, int k, BN_CTX *ctx,
+                   BN_MONT_CTX *mont);
+static int probable_prime(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, prime_t *mods);
+static int probable_prime_dh_safe(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits,
+                                  const BIGNUM *add, const BIGNUM *rem,
+                                  BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+static const int prime_offsets[480] = {
+    13, 17, 19, 23, 29, 31, 37, 41, 43, 47, 53, 59, 61, 67, 71, 73, 79, 83,
+    89, 97, 101, 103, 107, 109, 113, 127, 131, 137, 139, 149, 151, 157, 163,
+    167, 169, 173, 179, 181, 191, 193, 197, 199, 211, 221, 223, 227, 229,
+    233, 239, 241, 247, 251, 257, 263, 269, 271, 277, 281, 283, 289, 293,
+    299, 307, 311, 313, 317, 323, 331, 337, 347, 349, 353, 359, 361, 367,
+    373, 377, 379, 383, 389, 391, 397, 401, 403, 409, 419, 421, 431, 433,
+    437, 439, 443, 449, 457, 461, 463, 467, 479, 481, 487, 491, 493, 499,
+    503, 509, 521, 523, 527, 529, 533, 541, 547, 551, 557, 559, 563, 569,
+    571, 577, 587, 589, 593, 599, 601, 607, 611, 613, 617, 619, 629, 631,
+    641, 643, 647, 653, 659, 661, 667, 673, 677, 683, 689, 691, 697, 701,
+    703, 709, 713, 719, 727, 731, 733, 739, 743, 751, 757, 761, 767, 769,
+    773, 779, 787, 793, 797, 799, 809, 811, 817, 821, 823, 827, 829, 839,
+    841, 851, 853, 857, 859, 863, 871, 877, 881, 883, 887, 893, 899, 901,
+    907, 911, 919, 923, 929, 937, 941, 943, 947, 949, 953, 961, 967, 971,
+    977, 983, 989, 991, 997, 1003, 1007, 1009, 1013, 1019, 1021, 1027, 1031,
+    1033, 1037, 1039, 1049, 1051, 1061, 1063, 1069, 1073, 1079, 1081, 1087,
+    1091, 1093, 1097, 1103, 1109, 1117, 1121, 1123, 1129, 1139, 1147, 1151,
+    1153, 1157, 1159, 1163, 1171, 1181, 1187, 1189, 1193, 1201, 1207, 1213,
+    1217, 1219, 1223, 1229, 1231, 1237, 1241, 1247, 1249, 1259, 1261, 1271,
+    1273, 1277, 1279, 1283, 1289, 1291, 1297, 1301, 1303, 1307, 1313, 1319,
+    1321, 1327, 1333, 1339, 1343, 1349, 1357, 1361, 1363, 1367, 1369, 1373,
+    1381, 1387, 1391, 1399, 1403, 1409, 1411, 1417, 1423, 1427, 1429, 1433,
+    1439, 1447, 1451, 1453, 1457, 1459, 1469, 1471, 1481, 1483, 1487, 1489,
+    1493, 1499, 1501, 1511, 1513, 1517, 1523, 1531, 1537, 1541, 1543, 1549,
+    1553, 1559, 1567, 1571, 1577, 1579, 1583, 1591, 1597, 1601, 1607, 1609,
+    1613, 1619, 1621, 1627, 1633, 1637, 1643, 1649, 1651, 1657, 1663, 1667,
+    1669, 1679, 1681, 1691, 1693, 1697, 1699, 1703, 1709, 1711, 1717, 1721,
+    1723, 1733, 1739, 1741, 1747, 1751, 1753, 1759, 1763, 1769, 1777, 1781,
+    1783, 1787, 1789, 1801, 1807, 1811, 1817, 1819, 1823, 1829, 1831, 1843,
+    1847, 1849, 1853, 1861, 1867, 1871, 1873, 1877, 1879, 1889, 1891, 1901,
+    1907, 1909, 1913, 1919, 1921, 1927, 1931, 1933, 1937, 1943, 1949, 1951,
+    1957, 1961, 1963, 1973, 1979, 1987, 1993, 1997, 1999, 2003, 2011, 2017,
+    2021, 2027, 2029, 2033, 2039, 2041, 2047, 2053, 2059, 2063, 2069, 2071,
+    2077, 2081, 2083, 2087, 2089, 2099, 2111, 2113, 2117, 2119, 2129, 2131,
+    2137, 2141, 2143, 2147, 2153, 2159, 2161, 2171, 2173, 2179, 2183, 2197,
+    2201, 2203, 2207, 2209, 2213, 2221, 2227, 2231, 2237, 2239, 2243, 2249,
+    2251, 2257, 2263, 2267, 2269, 2273, 2279, 2281, 2287, 2291, 2293, 2297,
+    2309, 2311
+};
+
+static const int prime_offset_count = 480;
+static const int prime_multiplier = 2310;
+static const int prime_multiplier_bits = 11; /* 2^|prime_multiplier_bits| <=
+                                              * |prime_multiplier| */
+static const int first_prime_index = 5;
+
+int BN_GENCB_call(BN_GENCB *cb, int a, int b)
+{
+    /* No callback means continue */
+    if (!cb)
+        return 1;
+    switch (cb->ver) {
+    case 1:
+        /* Deprecated-style callbacks */
+        if (!cb->cb.cb_1)
+            return 1;
+        cb->cb.cb_1(a, b, cb->arg);
+        return 1;
+    case 2:
+        /* New-style callbacks */
+        return cb->cb.cb_2(a, b, cb);
+    default:
+        break;
+    }
+    /* Unrecognised callback type */
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int BN_generate_prime_ex(BIGNUM *ret, int bits, int safe,
+                         const BIGNUM *add, const BIGNUM *rem, BN_GENCB *cb)
+{
+    BIGNUM *t;
+    int found = 0;
+    int i, j, c1 = 0;
+    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+    prime_t *mods = NULL;
+    int checks = BN_prime_checks_for_size(bits);
+
+    if (bits < 2) {
+        /* There are no prime numbers this small. */
+        BNerr(BN_F_BN_GENERATE_PRIME_EX, BN_R_BITS_TOO_SMALL);
+        return 0;
+    } else if (bits == 2 && safe) {
+        /* The smallest safe prime (7) is three bits. */
+        BNerr(BN_F_BN_GENERATE_PRIME_EX, BN_R_BITS_TOO_SMALL);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    mods = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*mods) * NUMPRIMES);
+    if (mods == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    t = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (!t)
+        goto err;
+ loop:
+    /* make a random number and set the top and bottom bits */
+    if (add == NULL) {
+        if (!probable_prime(ret, bits, mods))
+            goto err;
+    } else {
+        if (safe) {
+            if (!probable_prime_dh_safe(ret, bits, add, rem, ctx))
+                goto err;
+        } else {
+            if (!bn_probable_prime_dh(ret, bits, add, rem, ctx))
+                goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 0, c1++))
+        /* aborted */
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!safe) {
+        i = BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(ret, checks, ctx, 0, cb);
+        if (i == -1)
+            goto err;
+        if (i == 0)
+            goto loop;
+    } else {
+        /*
+         * for "safe prime" generation, check that (p-1)/2 is prime. Since a
+         * prime is odd, We just need to divide by 2
+         */
+        if (!BN_rshift1(t, ret))
+            goto err;
+
+        for (i = 0; i < checks; i++) {
+            j = BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(ret, 1, ctx, 0, cb);
+            if (j == -1)
+                goto err;
+            if (j == 0)
+                goto loop;
+
+            j = BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(t, 1, ctx, 0, cb);
+            if (j == -1)
+                goto err;
+            if (j == 0)
+                goto loop;
+
+            if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, c1 - 1))
+                goto err;
+            /* We have a safe prime test pass */
+        }
+    }
+    /* we have a prime :-) */
+    found = 1;
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_free(mods);
+    if (ctx != NULL)
+        BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+    bn_check_top(ret);
+    return found;
+}
+
+int BN_is_prime_ex(const BIGNUM *a, int checks, BN_CTX *ctx_passed,
+                   BN_GENCB *cb)
+{
+    return BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(a, checks, ctx_passed, 0, cb);
+}
+
+int BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(const BIGNUM *a, int checks, BN_CTX *ctx_passed,
+                            int do_trial_division, BN_GENCB *cb)
+{
+    int i, j, ret = -1;
+    int k;
+    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *A1, *A1_odd, *check; /* taken from ctx */
+    BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL;
+
+    if (BN_cmp(a, BN_value_one()) <= 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    if (checks == BN_prime_checks)
+        checks = BN_prime_checks_for_size(BN_num_bits(a));
+
+    /* first look for small factors */
+    if (!BN_is_odd(a))
+        /* a is even => a is prime if and only if a == 2 */
+        return BN_is_word(a, 2);
+    if (do_trial_division) {
+        for (i = 1; i < NUMPRIMES; i++) {
+            BN_ULONG mod = BN_mod_word(a, primes[i]);
+            if (mod == (BN_ULONG)-1)
+                goto err;
+            if (mod == 0)
+                return 0;
+        }
+        if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 1, -1))
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (ctx_passed != NULL)
+        ctx = ctx_passed;
+    else if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+
+    A1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    A1_odd = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    check = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (check == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* compute A1 := a - 1 */
+    if (!BN_copy(A1, a))
+        goto err;
+    if (!BN_sub_word(A1, 1))
+        goto err;
+    if (BN_is_zero(A1)) {
+        ret = 0;
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* write  A1  as  A1_odd * 2^k */
+    k = 1;
+    while (!BN_is_bit_set(A1, k))
+        k++;
+    if (!BN_rshift(A1_odd, A1, k))
+        goto err;
+
+    /* Montgomery setup for computations mod a */
+    mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new();
+    if (mont == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont, a, ctx))
+        goto err;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < checks; i++) {
+        if (!BN_pseudo_rand_range(check, A1))
+            goto err;
+        if (!BN_add_word(check, 1))
+            goto err;
+        /* now 1 <= check < a */
+
+        j = witness(check, a, A1, A1_odd, k, ctx, mont);
+        if (j == -1)
+            goto err;
+        if (j) {
+            ret = 0;
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 1, i))
+            goto err;
+    }
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    if (ctx != NULL) {
+        BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+        if (ctx_passed == NULL)
+            BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+    }
+    BN_MONT_CTX_free(mont);
+
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+int bn_probable_prime_dh_retry(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int i;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+ loop:
+    if (!BN_rand(rnd, bits, BN_RAND_TOP_ONE, BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ODD))
+        goto err;
+
+    /* we now have a random number 'rand' to test. */
+
+    for (i = 1; i < NUMPRIMES; i++) {
+        /* check that rnd is a prime */
+        BN_ULONG mod = BN_mod_word(rnd, (BN_ULONG)primes[i]);
+        if (mod == (BN_ULONG)-1)
+            goto err;
+        if (mod <= 1) {
+            goto loop;
+        }
+    }
+    ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+    bn_check_top(rnd);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+int bn_probable_prime_dh_coprime(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int i;
+    BIGNUM *offset_index;
+    BIGNUM *offset_count;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    OPENSSL_assert(bits > prime_multiplier_bits);
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    if ((offset_index = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if ((offset_count = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!BN_add_word(offset_count, prime_offset_count))
+        goto err;
+
+ loop:
+    if (!BN_rand(rnd, bits - prime_multiplier_bits,
+                 BN_RAND_TOP_ONE, BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ODD))
+        goto err;
+    if (BN_is_bit_set(rnd, bits))
+        goto loop;
+    if (!BN_rand_range(offset_index, offset_count))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!BN_mul_word(rnd, prime_multiplier)
+        || !BN_add_word(rnd, prime_offsets[BN_get_word(offset_index)]))
+        goto err;
+
+    /* we now have a random number 'rand' to test. */
+
+    /* skip coprimes */
+    for (i = first_prime_index; i < NUMPRIMES; i++) {
+        /* check that rnd is a prime */
+        BN_ULONG mod = BN_mod_word(rnd, (BN_ULONG)primes[i]);
+        if (mod == (BN_ULONG)-1)
+            goto err;
+        if (mod <= 1)
+            goto loop;
+    }
+    ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    bn_check_top(rnd);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int witness(BIGNUM *w, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *a1,
+                   const BIGNUM *a1_odd, int k, BN_CTX *ctx,
+                   BN_MONT_CTX *mont)
+{
+    if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(w, w, a1_odd, a, ctx, mont)) /* w := w^a1_odd mod a */
+        return -1;
+    if (BN_is_one(w))
+        return 0;               /* probably prime */
+    if (BN_cmp(w, a1) == 0)
+        return 0;               /* w == -1 (mod a), 'a' is probably prime */
+    while (--k) {
+        if (!BN_mod_mul(w, w, w, a, ctx)) /* w := w^2 mod a */
+            return -1;
+        if (BN_is_one(w))
+            return 1;           /* 'a' is composite, otherwise a previous 'w'
+                                 * would have been == -1 (mod 'a') */
+        if (BN_cmp(w, a1) == 0)
+            return 0;           /* w == -1 (mod a), 'a' is probably prime */
+    }
+    /*
+     * If we get here, 'w' is the (a-1)/2-th power of the original 'w', and
+     * it is neither -1 nor +1 -- so 'a' cannot be prime
+     */
+    bn_check_top(w);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int probable_prime(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, prime_t *mods)
+{
+    int i;
+    BN_ULONG delta;
+    BN_ULONG maxdelta = BN_MASK2 - primes[NUMPRIMES - 1];
+    char is_single_word = bits <= BN_BITS2;
+
+ again:
+    if (!BN_rand(rnd, bits, BN_RAND_TOP_TWO, BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ODD))
+        return (0);
+    /* we now have a random number 'rnd' to test. */
+    for (i = 1; i < NUMPRIMES; i++) {
+        BN_ULONG mod = BN_mod_word(rnd, (BN_ULONG)primes[i]);
+        if (mod == (BN_ULONG)-1)
+            return 0;
+        mods[i] = (prime_t) mod;
+    }
+    /*
+     * If bits is so small that it fits into a single word then we
+     * additionally don't want to exceed that many bits.
+     */
+    if (is_single_word) {
+        BN_ULONG size_limit;
+
+        if (bits == BN_BITS2) {
+            /*
+             * Shifting by this much has undefined behaviour so we do it a
+             * different way
+             */
+            size_limit = ~((BN_ULONG)0) - BN_get_word(rnd);
+        } else {
+            size_limit = (((BN_ULONG)1) << bits) - BN_get_word(rnd) - 1;
+        }
+        if (size_limit < maxdelta)
+            maxdelta = size_limit;
+    }
+    delta = 0;
+ loop:
+    if (is_single_word) {
+        BN_ULONG rnd_word = BN_get_word(rnd);
+
+        /*-
+         * In the case that the candidate prime is a single word then
+         * we check that:
+         *   1) It's greater than primes[i] because we shouldn't reject
+         *      3 as being a prime number because it's a multiple of
+         *      three.
+         *   2) That it's not a multiple of a known prime. We don't
+         *      check that rnd-1 is also coprime to all the known
+         *      primes because there aren't many small primes where
+         *      that's true.
+         */
+        for (i = 1; i < NUMPRIMES && primes[i] < rnd_word; i++) {
+            if ((mods[i] + delta) % primes[i] == 0) {
+                delta += 2;
+                if (delta > maxdelta)
+                    goto again;
+                goto loop;
+            }
+        }
+    } else {
+        for (i = 1; i < NUMPRIMES; i++) {
+            /*
+             * check that rnd is not a prime and also that gcd(rnd-1,primes)
+             * == 1 (except for 2)
+             */
+            if (((mods[i] + delta) % primes[i]) <= 1) {
+                delta += 2;
+                if (delta > maxdelta)
+                    goto again;
+                goto loop;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    if (!BN_add_word(rnd, delta))
+        return (0);
+    if (BN_num_bits(rnd) != bits)
+        goto again;
+    bn_check_top(rnd);
+    return (1);
+}
+
+int bn_probable_prime_dh(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits,
+                         const BIGNUM *add, const BIGNUM *rem, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int i, ret = 0;
+    BIGNUM *t1;
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    if ((t1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!BN_rand(rnd, bits, BN_RAND_TOP_ONE, BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ODD))
+        goto err;
+
+    /* we need ((rnd-rem) % add) == 0 */
+
+    if (!BN_mod(t1, rnd, add, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    if (!BN_sub(rnd, rnd, t1))
+        goto err;
+    if (rem == NULL) {
+        if (!BN_add_word(rnd, 1))
+            goto err;
+    } else {
+        if (!BN_add(rnd, rnd, rem))
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* we now have a random number 'rand' to test. */
+
+ loop:
+    for (i = 1; i < NUMPRIMES; i++) {
+        /* check that rnd is a prime */
+        BN_ULONG mod = BN_mod_word(rnd, (BN_ULONG)primes[i]);
+        if (mod == (BN_ULONG)-1)
+            goto err;
+        if (mod <= 1) {
+            if (!BN_add(rnd, rnd, add))
+                goto err;
+            goto loop;
+        }
+    }
+    ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    bn_check_top(rnd);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static int probable_prime_dh_safe(BIGNUM *p, int bits, const BIGNUM *padd,
+                                  const BIGNUM *rem, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int i, ret = 0;
+    BIGNUM *t1, *qadd, *q;
+
+    bits--;
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    t1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    q = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    qadd = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (qadd == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!BN_rshift1(qadd, padd))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!BN_rand(q, bits, BN_RAND_TOP_ONE, BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ODD))
+        goto err;
+
+    /* we need ((rnd-rem) % add) == 0 */
+    if (!BN_mod(t1, q, qadd, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    if (!BN_sub(q, q, t1))
+        goto err;
+    if (rem == NULL) {
+        if (!BN_add_word(q, 1))
+            goto err;
+    } else {
+        if (!BN_rshift1(t1, rem))
+            goto err;
+        if (!BN_add(q, q, t1))
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* we now have a random number 'rand' to test. */
+    if (!BN_lshift1(p, q))
+        goto err;
+    if (!BN_add_word(p, 1))
+        goto err;
+
+ loop:
+    for (i = 1; i < NUMPRIMES; i++) {
+        /* check that p and q are prime */
+        /*
+         * check that for p and q gcd(p-1,primes) == 1 (except for 2)
+         */
+        BN_ULONG pmod = BN_mod_word(p, (BN_ULONG)primes[i]);
+        BN_ULONG qmod = BN_mod_word(q, (BN_ULONG)primes[i]);
+        if (pmod == (BN_ULONG)-1 || qmod == (BN_ULONG)-1)
+            goto err;
+        if (pmod == 0 || qmod == 0) {
+            if (!BN_add(p, p, padd))
+                goto err;
+            if (!BN_add(q, q, qadd))
+                goto err;
+            goto loop;
+        }
+    }
+    ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    bn_check_top(p);
+    return (ret);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_prime.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_prime.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..41440fa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_prime.h
@@ -0,0 +1,274 @@
+/*
+ * WARNING: do not edit!
+ * Generated by crypto/bn/bn_prime.pl
+ *
+ * Copyright 1998-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+typedef unsigned short prime_t;
+# define NUMPRIMES 2048
+
+static const prime_t primes[2048] = {
+
+       2,    3,    5,    7,   11,   13,   17,   19, 
+      23,   29,   31,   37,   41,   43,   47,   53, 
+      59,   61,   67,   71,   73,   79,   83,   89, 
+      97,  101,  103,  107,  109,  113,  127,  131, 
+     137,  139,  149,  151,  157,  163,  167,  173, 
+     179,  181,  191,  193,  197,  199,  211,  223, 
+     227,  229,  233,  239,  241,  251,  257,  263, 
+     269,  271,  277,  281,  283,  293,  307,  311, 
+     313,  317,  331,  337,  347,  349,  353,  359, 
+     367,  373,  379,  383,  389,  397,  401,  409, 
+     419,  421,  431,  433,  439,  443,  449,  457, 
+     461,  463,  467,  479,  487,  491,  499,  503, 
+     509,  521,  523,  541,  547,  557,  563,  569, 
+     571,  577,  587,  593,  599,  601,  607,  613, 
+     617,  619,  631,  641,  643,  647,  653,  659, 
+     661,  673,  677,  683,  691,  701,  709,  719, 
+     727,  733,  739,  743,  751,  757,  761,  769, 
+     773,  787,  797,  809,  811,  821,  823,  827, 
+     829,  839,  853,  857,  859,  863,  877,  881, 
+     883,  887,  907,  911,  919,  929,  937,  941, 
+     947,  953,  967,  971,  977,  983,  991,  997, 
+    1009, 1013, 1019, 1021, 1031, 1033, 1039, 1049, 
+    1051, 1061, 1063, 1069, 1087, 1091, 1093, 1097, 
+    1103, 1109, 1117, 1123, 1129, 1151, 1153, 1163, 
+    1171, 1181, 1187, 1193, 1201, 1213, 1217, 1223, 
+    1229, 1231, 1237, 1249, 1259, 1277, 1279, 1283, 
+    1289, 1291, 1297, 1301, 1303, 1307, 1319, 1321, 
+    1327, 1361, 1367, 1373, 1381, 1399, 1409, 1423, 
+    1427, 1429, 1433, 1439, 1447, 1451, 1453, 1459, 
+    1471, 1481, 1483, 1487, 1489, 1493, 1499, 1511, 
+    1523, 1531, 1543, 1549, 1553, 1559, 1567, 1571, 
+    1579, 1583, 1597, 1601, 1607, 1609, 1613, 1619, 
+    1621, 1627, 1637, 1657, 1663, 1667, 1669, 1693, 
+    1697, 1699, 1709, 1721, 1723, 1733, 1741, 1747, 
+    1753, 1759, 1777, 1783, 1787, 1789, 1801, 1811, 
+    1823, 1831, 1847, 1861, 1867, 1871, 1873, 1877, 
+    1879, 1889, 1901, 1907, 1913, 1931, 1933, 1949, 
+    1951, 1973, 1979, 1987, 1993, 1997, 1999, 2003, 
+    2011, 2017, 2027, 2029, 2039, 2053, 2063, 2069, 
+    2081, 2083, 2087, 2089, 2099, 2111, 2113, 2129, 
+    2131, 2137, 2141, 2143, 2153, 2161, 2179, 2203, 
+    2207, 2213, 2221, 2237, 2239, 2243, 2251, 2267, 
+    2269, 2273, 2281, 2287, 2293, 2297, 2309, 2311, 
+    2333, 2339, 2341, 2347, 2351, 2357, 2371, 2377, 
+    2381, 2383, 2389, 2393, 2399, 2411, 2417, 2423, 
+    2437, 2441, 2447, 2459, 2467, 2473, 2477, 2503, 
+    2521, 2531, 2539, 2543, 2549, 2551, 2557, 2579, 
+    2591, 2593, 2609, 2617, 2621, 2633, 2647, 2657, 
+    2659, 2663, 2671, 2677, 2683, 2687, 2689, 2693, 
+    2699, 2707, 2711, 2713, 2719, 2729, 2731, 2741, 
+    2749, 2753, 2767, 2777, 2789, 2791, 2797, 2801, 
+    2803, 2819, 2833, 2837, 2843, 2851, 2857, 2861, 
+    2879, 2887, 2897, 2903, 2909, 2917, 2927, 2939, 
+    2953, 2957, 2963, 2969, 2971, 2999, 3001, 3011, 
+    3019, 3023, 3037, 3041, 3049, 3061, 3067, 3079, 
+    3083, 3089, 3109, 3119, 3121, 3137, 3163, 3167, 
+    3169, 3181, 3187, 3191, 3203, 3209, 3217, 3221, 
+    3229, 3251, 3253, 3257, 3259, 3271, 3299, 3301, 
+    3307, 3313, 3319, 3323, 3329, 3331, 3343, 3347, 
+    3359, 3361, 3371, 3373, 3389, 3391, 3407, 3413, 
+    3433, 3449, 3457, 3461, 3463, 3467, 3469, 3491, 
+    3499, 3511, 3517, 3527, 3529, 3533, 3539, 3541, 
+    3547, 3557, 3559, 3571, 3581, 3583, 3593, 3607, 
+    3613, 3617, 3623, 3631, 3637, 3643, 3659, 3671, 
+    3673, 3677, 3691, 3697, 3701, 3709, 3719, 3727, 
+    3733, 3739, 3761, 3767, 3769, 3779, 3793, 3797, 
+    3803, 3821, 3823, 3833, 3847, 3851, 3853, 3863, 
+    3877, 3881, 3889, 3907, 3911, 3917, 3919, 3923, 
+    3929, 3931, 3943, 3947, 3967, 3989, 4001, 4003, 
+    4007, 4013, 4019, 4021, 4027, 4049, 4051, 4057, 
+    4073, 4079, 4091, 4093, 4099, 4111, 4127, 4129, 
+    4133, 4139, 4153, 4157, 4159, 4177, 4201, 4211, 
+    4217, 4219, 4229, 4231, 4241, 4243, 4253, 4259, 
+    4261, 4271, 4273, 4283, 4289, 4297, 4327, 4337, 
+    4339, 4349, 4357, 4363, 4373, 4391, 4397, 4409, 
+    4421, 4423, 4441, 4447, 4451, 4457, 4463, 4481, 
+    4483, 4493, 4507, 4513, 4517, 4519, 4523, 4547, 
+    4549, 4561, 4567, 4583, 4591, 4597, 4603, 4621, 
+    4637, 4639, 4643, 4649, 4651, 4657, 4663, 4673, 
+    4679, 4691, 4703, 4721, 4723, 4729, 4733, 4751, 
+    4759, 4783, 4787, 4789, 4793, 4799, 4801, 4813, 
+    4817, 4831, 4861, 4871, 4877, 4889, 4903, 4909, 
+    4919, 4931, 4933, 4937, 4943, 4951, 4957, 4967, 
+    4969, 4973, 4987, 4993, 4999, 5003, 5009, 5011, 
+    5021, 5023, 5039, 5051, 5059, 5077, 5081, 5087, 
+    5099, 5101, 5107, 5113, 5119, 5147, 5153, 5167, 
+    5171, 5179, 5189, 5197, 5209, 5227, 5231, 5233, 
+    5237, 5261, 5273, 5279, 5281, 5297, 5303, 5309, 
+    5323, 5333, 5347, 5351, 5381, 5387, 5393, 5399, 
+    5407, 5413, 5417, 5419, 5431, 5437, 5441, 5443, 
+    5449, 5471, 5477, 5479, 5483, 5501, 5503, 5507, 
+    5519, 5521, 5527, 5531, 5557, 5563, 5569, 5573, 
+    5581, 5591, 5623, 5639, 5641, 5647, 5651, 5653, 
+    5657, 5659, 5669, 5683, 5689, 5693, 5701, 5711, 
+    5717, 5737, 5741, 5743, 5749, 5779, 5783, 5791, 
+    5801, 5807, 5813, 5821, 5827, 5839, 5843, 5849, 
+    5851, 5857, 5861, 5867, 5869, 5879, 5881, 5897, 
+    5903, 5923, 5927, 5939, 5953, 5981, 5987, 6007, 
+    6011, 6029, 6037, 6043, 6047, 6053, 6067, 6073, 
+    6079, 6089, 6091, 6101, 6113, 6121, 6131, 6133, 
+    6143, 6151, 6163, 6173, 6197, 6199, 6203, 6211, 
+    6217, 6221, 6229, 6247, 6257, 6263, 6269, 6271, 
+    6277, 6287, 6299, 6301, 6311, 6317, 6323, 6329, 
+    6337, 6343, 6353, 6359, 6361, 6367, 6373, 6379, 
+    6389, 6397, 6421, 6427, 6449, 6451, 6469, 6473, 
+    6481, 6491, 6521, 6529, 6547, 6551, 6553, 6563, 
+    6569, 6571, 6577, 6581, 6599, 6607, 6619, 6637, 
+    6653, 6659, 6661, 6673, 6679, 6689, 6691, 6701, 
+    6703, 6709, 6719, 6733, 6737, 6761, 6763, 6779, 
+    6781, 6791, 6793, 6803, 6823, 6827, 6829, 6833, 
+    6841, 6857, 6863, 6869, 6871, 6883, 6899, 6907, 
+    6911, 6917, 6947, 6949, 6959, 6961, 6967, 6971, 
+    6977, 6983, 6991, 6997, 7001, 7013, 7019, 7027, 
+    7039, 7043, 7057, 7069, 7079, 7103, 7109, 7121, 
+    7127, 7129, 7151, 7159, 7177, 7187, 7193, 7207, 
+    7211, 7213, 7219, 7229, 7237, 7243, 7247, 7253, 
+    7283, 7297, 7307, 7309, 7321, 7331, 7333, 7349, 
+    7351, 7369, 7393, 7411, 7417, 7433, 7451, 7457, 
+    7459, 7477, 7481, 7487, 7489, 7499, 7507, 7517, 
+    7523, 7529, 7537, 7541, 7547, 7549, 7559, 7561, 
+    7573, 7577, 7583, 7589, 7591, 7603, 7607, 7621, 
+    7639, 7643, 7649, 7669, 7673, 7681, 7687, 7691, 
+    7699, 7703, 7717, 7723, 7727, 7741, 7753, 7757, 
+    7759, 7789, 7793, 7817, 7823, 7829, 7841, 7853, 
+    7867, 7873, 7877, 7879, 7883, 7901, 7907, 7919, 
+    7927, 7933, 7937, 7949, 7951, 7963, 7993, 8009, 
+    8011, 8017, 8039, 8053, 8059, 8069, 8081, 8087, 
+    8089, 8093, 8101, 8111, 8117, 8123, 8147, 8161, 
+    8167, 8171, 8179, 8191, 8209, 8219, 8221, 8231, 
+    8233, 8237, 8243, 8263, 8269, 8273, 8287, 8291, 
+    8293, 8297, 8311, 8317, 8329, 8353, 8363, 8369, 
+    8377, 8387, 8389, 8419, 8423, 8429, 8431, 8443, 
+    8447, 8461, 8467, 8501, 8513, 8521, 8527, 8537, 
+    8539, 8543, 8563, 8573, 8581, 8597, 8599, 8609, 
+    8623, 8627, 8629, 8641, 8647, 8663, 8669, 8677, 
+    8681, 8689, 8693, 8699, 8707, 8713, 8719, 8731, 
+    8737, 8741, 8747, 8753, 8761, 8779, 8783, 8803, 
+    8807, 8819, 8821, 8831, 8837, 8839, 8849, 8861, 
+    8863, 8867, 8887, 8893, 8923, 8929, 8933, 8941, 
+    8951, 8963, 8969, 8971, 8999, 9001, 9007, 9011, 
+    9013, 9029, 9041, 9043, 9049, 9059, 9067, 9091, 
+    9103, 9109, 9127, 9133, 9137, 9151, 9157, 9161, 
+    9173, 9181, 9187, 9199, 9203, 9209, 9221, 9227, 
+    9239, 9241, 9257, 9277, 9281, 9283, 9293, 9311, 
+    9319, 9323, 9337, 9341, 9343, 9349, 9371, 9377, 
+    9391, 9397, 9403, 9413, 9419, 9421, 9431, 9433, 
+    9437, 9439, 9461, 9463, 9467, 9473, 9479, 9491, 
+    9497, 9511, 9521, 9533, 9539, 9547, 9551, 9587, 
+    9601, 9613, 9619, 9623, 9629, 9631, 9643, 9649, 
+    9661, 9677, 9679, 9689, 9697, 9719, 9721, 9733, 
+    9739, 9743, 9749, 9767, 9769, 9781, 9787, 9791, 
+    9803, 9811, 9817, 9829, 9833, 9839, 9851, 9857, 
+    9859, 9871, 9883, 9887, 9901, 9907, 9923, 9929, 
+    9931, 9941, 9949, 9967, 9973, 10007, 10009, 10037, 
+    10039, 10061, 10067, 10069, 10079, 10091, 10093, 10099, 
+    10103, 10111, 10133, 10139, 10141, 10151, 10159, 10163, 
+    10169, 10177, 10181, 10193, 10211, 10223, 10243, 10247, 
+    10253, 10259, 10267, 10271, 10273, 10289, 10301, 10303, 
+    10313, 10321, 10331, 10333, 10337, 10343, 10357, 10369, 
+    10391, 10399, 10427, 10429, 10433, 10453, 10457, 10459, 
+    10463, 10477, 10487, 10499, 10501, 10513, 10529, 10531, 
+    10559, 10567, 10589, 10597, 10601, 10607, 10613, 10627, 
+    10631, 10639, 10651, 10657, 10663, 10667, 10687, 10691, 
+    10709, 10711, 10723, 10729, 10733, 10739, 10753, 10771, 
+    10781, 10789, 10799, 10831, 10837, 10847, 10853, 10859, 
+    10861, 10867, 10883, 10889, 10891, 10903, 10909, 10937, 
+    10939, 10949, 10957, 10973, 10979, 10987, 10993, 11003, 
+    11027, 11047, 11057, 11059, 11069, 11071, 11083, 11087, 
+    11093, 11113, 11117, 11119, 11131, 11149, 11159, 11161, 
+    11171, 11173, 11177, 11197, 11213, 11239, 11243, 11251, 
+    11257, 11261, 11273, 11279, 11287, 11299, 11311, 11317, 
+    11321, 11329, 11351, 11353, 11369, 11383, 11393, 11399, 
+    11411, 11423, 11437, 11443, 11447, 11467, 11471, 11483, 
+    11489, 11491, 11497, 11503, 11519, 11527, 11549, 11551, 
+    11579, 11587, 11593, 11597, 11617, 11621, 11633, 11657, 
+    11677, 11681, 11689, 11699, 11701, 11717, 11719, 11731, 
+    11743, 11777, 11779, 11783, 11789, 11801, 11807, 11813, 
+    11821, 11827, 11831, 11833, 11839, 11863, 11867, 11887, 
+    11897, 11903, 11909, 11923, 11927, 11933, 11939, 11941, 
+    11953, 11959, 11969, 11971, 11981, 11987, 12007, 12011, 
+    12037, 12041, 12043, 12049, 12071, 12073, 12097, 12101, 
+    12107, 12109, 12113, 12119, 12143, 12149, 12157, 12161, 
+    12163, 12197, 12203, 12211, 12227, 12239, 12241, 12251, 
+    12253, 12263, 12269, 12277, 12281, 12289, 12301, 12323, 
+    12329, 12343, 12347, 12373, 12377, 12379, 12391, 12401, 
+    12409, 12413, 12421, 12433, 12437, 12451, 12457, 12473, 
+    12479, 12487, 12491, 12497, 12503, 12511, 12517, 12527, 
+    12539, 12541, 12547, 12553, 12569, 12577, 12583, 12589, 
+    12601, 12611, 12613, 12619, 12637, 12641, 12647, 12653, 
+    12659, 12671, 12689, 12697, 12703, 12713, 12721, 12739, 
+    12743, 12757, 12763, 12781, 12791, 12799, 12809, 12821, 
+    12823, 12829, 12841, 12853, 12889, 12893, 12899, 12907, 
+    12911, 12917, 12919, 12923, 12941, 12953, 12959, 12967, 
+    12973, 12979, 12983, 13001, 13003, 13007, 13009, 13033, 
+    13037, 13043, 13049, 13063, 13093, 13099, 13103, 13109, 
+    13121, 13127, 13147, 13151, 13159, 13163, 13171, 13177, 
+    13183, 13187, 13217, 13219, 13229, 13241, 13249, 13259, 
+    13267, 13291, 13297, 13309, 13313, 13327, 13331, 13337, 
+    13339, 13367, 13381, 13397, 13399, 13411, 13417, 13421, 
+    13441, 13451, 13457, 13463, 13469, 13477, 13487, 13499, 
+    13513, 13523, 13537, 13553, 13567, 13577, 13591, 13597, 
+    13613, 13619, 13627, 13633, 13649, 13669, 13679, 13681, 
+    13687, 13691, 13693, 13697, 13709, 13711, 13721, 13723, 
+    13729, 13751, 13757, 13759, 13763, 13781, 13789, 13799, 
+    13807, 13829, 13831, 13841, 13859, 13873, 13877, 13879, 
+    13883, 13901, 13903, 13907, 13913, 13921, 13931, 13933, 
+    13963, 13967, 13997, 13999, 14009, 14011, 14029, 14033, 
+    14051, 14057, 14071, 14081, 14083, 14087, 14107, 14143, 
+    14149, 14153, 14159, 14173, 14177, 14197, 14207, 14221, 
+    14243, 14249, 14251, 14281, 14293, 14303, 14321, 14323, 
+    14327, 14341, 14347, 14369, 14387, 14389, 14401, 14407, 
+    14411, 14419, 14423, 14431, 14437, 14447, 14449, 14461, 
+    14479, 14489, 14503, 14519, 14533, 14537, 14543, 14549, 
+    14551, 14557, 14561, 14563, 14591, 14593, 14621, 14627, 
+    14629, 14633, 14639, 14653, 14657, 14669, 14683, 14699, 
+    14713, 14717, 14723, 14731, 14737, 14741, 14747, 14753, 
+    14759, 14767, 14771, 14779, 14783, 14797, 14813, 14821, 
+    14827, 14831, 14843, 14851, 14867, 14869, 14879, 14887, 
+    14891, 14897, 14923, 14929, 14939, 14947, 14951, 14957, 
+    14969, 14983, 15013, 15017, 15031, 15053, 15061, 15073, 
+    15077, 15083, 15091, 15101, 15107, 15121, 15131, 15137, 
+    15139, 15149, 15161, 15173, 15187, 15193, 15199, 15217, 
+    15227, 15233, 15241, 15259, 15263, 15269, 15271, 15277, 
+    15287, 15289, 15299, 15307, 15313, 15319, 15329, 15331, 
+    15349, 15359, 15361, 15373, 15377, 15383, 15391, 15401, 
+    15413, 15427, 15439, 15443, 15451, 15461, 15467, 15473, 
+    15493, 15497, 15511, 15527, 15541, 15551, 15559, 15569, 
+    15581, 15583, 15601, 15607, 15619, 15629, 15641, 15643, 
+    15647, 15649, 15661, 15667, 15671, 15679, 15683, 15727, 
+    15731, 15733, 15737, 15739, 15749, 15761, 15767, 15773, 
+    15787, 15791, 15797, 15803, 15809, 15817, 15823, 15859, 
+    15877, 15881, 15887, 15889, 15901, 15907, 15913, 15919, 
+    15923, 15937, 15959, 15971, 15973, 15991, 16001, 16007, 
+    16033, 16057, 16061, 16063, 16067, 16069, 16073, 16087, 
+    16091, 16097, 16103, 16111, 16127, 16139, 16141, 16183, 
+    16187, 16189, 16193, 16217, 16223, 16229, 16231, 16249, 
+    16253, 16267, 16273, 16301, 16319, 16333, 16339, 16349, 
+    16361, 16363, 16369, 16381, 16411, 16417, 16421, 16427, 
+    16433, 16447, 16451, 16453, 16477, 16481, 16487, 16493, 
+    16519, 16529, 16547, 16553, 16561, 16567, 16573, 16603, 
+    16607, 16619, 16631, 16633, 16649, 16651, 16657, 16661, 
+    16673, 16691, 16693, 16699, 16703, 16729, 16741, 16747, 
+    16759, 16763, 16787, 16811, 16823, 16829, 16831, 16843, 
+    16871, 16879, 16883, 16889, 16901, 16903, 16921, 16927, 
+    16931, 16937, 16943, 16963, 16979, 16981, 16987, 16993, 
+    17011, 17021, 17027, 17029, 17033, 17041, 17047, 17053, 
+    17077, 17093, 17099, 17107, 17117, 17123, 17137, 17159, 
+    17167, 17183, 17189, 17191, 17203, 17207, 17209, 17231, 
+    17239, 17257, 17291, 17293, 17299, 17317, 17321, 17327, 
+    17333, 17341, 17351, 17359, 17377, 17383, 17387, 17389, 
+    17393, 17401, 17417, 17419, 17431, 17443, 17449, 17467, 
+    17471, 17477, 17483, 17489, 17491, 17497, 17509, 17519, 
+    17539, 17551, 17569, 17573, 17579, 17581, 17597, 17599, 
+    17609, 17623, 17627, 17657, 17659, 17669, 17681, 17683, 
+    17707, 17713, 17729, 17737, 17747, 17749, 17761, 17783, 
+    17789, 17791, 17807, 17827, 17837, 17839, 17851, 17863, 
+};
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_prime.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_prime.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..163d4a9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_prime.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 1998-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+print <<"EOF";
+/*
+ * WARNING: do not edit!
+ * Generated by crypto/bn/bn_prime.pl
+ *
+ * Copyright 1998-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+EOF
+
+
+my $num = shift || 2048;
+my @primes = ( 2 );
+my $p = 1;
+loop: while ($#primes < $num-1) {
+    $p += 2;
+    my $s = int(sqrt($p));
+
+    for (my $i = 0; defined($primes[$i]) && $primes[$i] <= $s; $i++) {
+        next loop if ($p % $primes[$i]) == 0;
+    }
+    push(@primes, $p);
+}
+
+print "typedef unsigned short prime_t;\n";
+printf "# define NUMPRIMES %d\n\n", $num;
+
+printf "static const prime_t primes[%d] = {\n", $num;
+for (my $i = 0; $i <= $#primes; $i++) {
+    printf "\n    " if ($i % 8) == 0;
+    printf "%4d, ", $primes[$i];
+}
+print "\n};\n";
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_print.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_print.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5ffe2fc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_print.c
@@ -0,0 +1,343 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include "bn_lcl.h"
+
+static const char Hex[] = "0123456789ABCDEF";
+
+/* Must 'OPENSSL_free' the returned data */
+char *BN_bn2hex(const BIGNUM *a)
+{
+    int i, j, v, z = 0;
+    char *buf;
+    char *p;
+
+    if (BN_is_zero(a))
+        return OPENSSL_strdup("0");
+    buf = OPENSSL_malloc(a->top * BN_BYTES * 2 + 2);
+    if (buf == NULL) {
+        BNerr(BN_F_BN_BN2HEX, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    p = buf;
+    if (a->neg)
+        *(p++) = '-';
+    for (i = a->top - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+        for (j = BN_BITS2 - 8; j >= 0; j -= 8) {
+            /* strip leading zeros */
+            v = ((int)(a->d[i] >> (long)j)) & 0xff;
+            if (z || (v != 0)) {
+                *(p++) = Hex[v >> 4];
+                *(p++) = Hex[v & 0x0f];
+                z = 1;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    *p = '\0';
+ err:
+    return (buf);
+}
+
+/* Must 'OPENSSL_free' the returned data */
+char *BN_bn2dec(const BIGNUM *a)
+{
+    int i = 0, num, ok = 0;
+    char *buf = NULL;
+    char *p;
+    BIGNUM *t = NULL;
+    BN_ULONG *bn_data = NULL, *lp;
+    int bn_data_num;
+
+    /*-
+     * get an upper bound for the length of the decimal integer
+     * num <= (BN_num_bits(a) + 1) * log(2)
+     *     <= 3 * BN_num_bits(a) * 0.101 + log(2) + 1     (rounding error)
+     *     <= 3 * BN_num_bits(a) / 10 + 3 * BN_num_bits / 1000 + 1 + 1
+     */
+    i = BN_num_bits(a) * 3;
+    num = (i / 10 + i / 1000 + 1) + 1;
+    bn_data_num = num / BN_DEC_NUM + 1;
+    bn_data = OPENSSL_malloc(bn_data_num * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
+    buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num + 3);
+    if ((buf == NULL) || (bn_data == NULL)) {
+        BNerr(BN_F_BN_BN2DEC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if ((t = BN_dup(a)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+#define BUF_REMAIN (num+3 - (size_t)(p - buf))
+    p = buf;
+    lp = bn_data;
+    if (BN_is_zero(t)) {
+        *(p++) = '0';
+        *(p++) = '\0';
+    } else {
+        if (BN_is_negative(t))
+            *p++ = '-';
+
+        while (!BN_is_zero(t)) {
+            if (lp - bn_data >= bn_data_num)
+                goto err;
+            *lp = BN_div_word(t, BN_DEC_CONV);
+            if (*lp == (BN_ULONG)-1)
+                goto err;
+            lp++;
+        }
+        lp--;
+        /*
+         * We now have a series of blocks, BN_DEC_NUM chars in length, where
+         * the last one needs truncation. The blocks need to be reversed in
+         * order.
+         */
+        BIO_snprintf(p, BUF_REMAIN, BN_DEC_FMT1, *lp);
+        while (*p)
+            p++;
+        while (lp != bn_data) {
+            lp--;
+            BIO_snprintf(p, BUF_REMAIN, BN_DEC_FMT2, *lp);
+            while (*p)
+                p++;
+        }
+    }
+    ok = 1;
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_free(bn_data);
+    BN_free(t);
+    if (ok)
+        return buf;
+    OPENSSL_free(buf);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+int BN_hex2bn(BIGNUM **bn, const char *a)
+{
+    BIGNUM *ret = NULL;
+    BN_ULONG l = 0;
+    int neg = 0, h, m, i, j, k, c;
+    int num;
+
+    if ((a == NULL) || (*a == '\0'))
+        return (0);
+
+    if (*a == '-') {
+        neg = 1;
+        a++;
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0; i <= (INT_MAX/4) && isxdigit((unsigned char)a[i]); i++)
+        continue;
+
+    if (i == 0 || i > INT_MAX/4)
+        goto err;
+
+    num = i + neg;
+    if (bn == NULL)
+        return (num);
+
+    /* a is the start of the hex digits, and it is 'i' long */
+    if (*bn == NULL) {
+        if ((ret = BN_new()) == NULL)
+            return (0);
+    } else {
+        ret = *bn;
+        BN_zero(ret);
+    }
+
+    /* i is the number of hex digits */
+    if (bn_expand(ret, i * 4) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    j = i;                      /* least significant 'hex' */
+    m = 0;
+    h = 0;
+    while (j > 0) {
+        m = ((BN_BYTES * 2) <= j) ? (BN_BYTES * 2) : j;
+        l = 0;
+        for (;;) {
+            c = a[j - m];
+            k = OPENSSL_hexchar2int(c);
+            if (k < 0)
+                k = 0;          /* paranoia */
+            l = (l << 4) | k;
+
+            if (--m <= 0) {
+                ret->d[h++] = l;
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+        j -= (BN_BYTES * 2);
+    }
+    ret->top = h;
+    bn_correct_top(ret);
+
+    *bn = ret;
+    bn_check_top(ret);
+    /* Don't set the negative flag if it's zero. */
+    if (ret->top != 0)
+        ret->neg = neg;
+    return (num);
+ err:
+    if (*bn == NULL)
+        BN_free(ret);
+    return (0);
+}
+
+int BN_dec2bn(BIGNUM **bn, const char *a)
+{
+    BIGNUM *ret = NULL;
+    BN_ULONG l = 0;
+    int neg = 0, i, j;
+    int num;
+
+    if ((a == NULL) || (*a == '\0'))
+        return (0);
+    if (*a == '-') {
+        neg = 1;
+        a++;
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0; i <= (INT_MAX/4) && isdigit((unsigned char)a[i]); i++)
+        continue;
+
+    if (i == 0 || i > INT_MAX/4)
+        goto err;
+
+    num = i + neg;
+    if (bn == NULL)
+        return (num);
+
+    /*
+     * a is the start of the digits, and it is 'i' long. We chop it into
+     * BN_DEC_NUM digits at a time
+     */
+    if (*bn == NULL) {
+        if ((ret = BN_new()) == NULL)
+            return (0);
+    } else {
+        ret = *bn;
+        BN_zero(ret);
+    }
+
+    /* i is the number of digits, a bit of an over expand */
+    if (bn_expand(ret, i * 4) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    j = BN_DEC_NUM - (i % BN_DEC_NUM);
+    if (j == BN_DEC_NUM)
+        j = 0;
+    l = 0;
+    while (--i >= 0) {
+        l *= 10;
+        l += *a - '0';
+        a++;
+        if (++j == BN_DEC_NUM) {
+            if (!BN_mul_word(ret, BN_DEC_CONV)
+                || !BN_add_word(ret, l))
+                goto err;
+            l = 0;
+            j = 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    bn_correct_top(ret);
+    *bn = ret;
+    bn_check_top(ret);
+    /* Don't set the negative flag if it's zero. */
+    if (ret->top != 0)
+        ret->neg = neg;
+    return (num);
+ err:
+    if (*bn == NULL)
+        BN_free(ret);
+    return (0);
+}
+
+int BN_asc2bn(BIGNUM **bn, const char *a)
+{
+    const char *p = a;
+
+    if (*p == '-')
+        p++;
+
+    if (p[0] == '0' && (p[1] == 'X' || p[1] == 'x')) {
+        if (!BN_hex2bn(bn, p + 2))
+            return 0;
+    } else {
+        if (!BN_dec2bn(bn, p))
+            return 0;
+    }
+    /* Don't set the negative flag if it's zero. */
+    if (*a == '-' && (*bn)->top != 0)
+        (*bn)->neg = 1;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+int BN_print_fp(FILE *fp, const BIGNUM *a)
+{
+    BIO *b;
+    int ret;
+
+    if ((b = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    BIO_set_fp(b, fp, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+    ret = BN_print(b, a);
+    BIO_free(b);
+    return (ret);
+}
+# endif
+
+int BN_print(BIO *bp, const BIGNUM *a)
+{
+    int i, j, v, z = 0;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    if ((a->neg) && (BIO_write(bp, "-", 1) != 1))
+        goto end;
+    if (BN_is_zero(a) && (BIO_write(bp, "0", 1) != 1))
+        goto end;
+    for (i = a->top - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+        for (j = BN_BITS2 - 4; j >= 0; j -= 4) {
+            /* strip leading zeros */
+            v = ((int)(a->d[i] >> (long)j)) & 0x0f;
+            if (z || (v != 0)) {
+                if (BIO_write(bp, &(Hex[v]), 1) != 1)
+                    goto end;
+                z = 1;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    ret = 1;
+ end:
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+char *BN_options(void)
+{
+    static int init = 0;
+    static char data[16];
+
+    if (!init) {
+        init++;
+#ifdef BN_LLONG
+        BIO_snprintf(data, sizeof(data), "bn(%d,%d)",
+                     (int)sizeof(BN_ULLONG) * 8, (int)sizeof(BN_ULONG) * 8);
+#else
+        BIO_snprintf(data, sizeof(data), "bn(%d,%d)",
+                     (int)sizeof(BN_ULONG) * 8, (int)sizeof(BN_ULONG) * 8);
+#endif
+    }
+    return (data);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_rand.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_rand.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9ce4c5f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_rand.c
@@ -0,0 +1,258 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "bn_lcl.h"
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
+
+static int bnrand(int pseudorand, BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom)
+{
+    unsigned char *buf = NULL;
+    int ret = 0, bit, bytes, mask;
+    time_t tim;
+
+    if (bits == 0) {
+        if (top != BN_RAND_TOP_ANY || bottom != BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ANY)
+            goto toosmall;
+        BN_zero(rnd);
+        return 1;
+    }
+    if (bits < 0 || (bits == 1 && top > 0))
+        goto toosmall;
+
+    bytes = (bits + 7) / 8;
+    bit = (bits - 1) % 8;
+    mask = 0xff << (bit + 1);
+
+    buf = OPENSSL_malloc(bytes);
+    if (buf == NULL) {
+        BNerr(BN_F_BNRAND, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* make a random number and set the top and bottom bits */
+    time(&tim);
+    RAND_add(&tim, sizeof(tim), 0.0);
+
+    if (RAND_bytes(buf, bytes) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (pseudorand == 2) {
+        /*
+         * generate patterns that are more likely to trigger BN library bugs
+         */
+        int i;
+        unsigned char c;
+
+        for (i = 0; i < bytes; i++) {
+            if (RAND_bytes(&c, 1) <= 0)
+                goto err;
+            if (c >= 128 && i > 0)
+                buf[i] = buf[i - 1];
+            else if (c < 42)
+                buf[i] = 0;
+            else if (c < 84)
+                buf[i] = 255;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (top >= 0) {
+        if (top) {
+            if (bit == 0) {
+                buf[0] = 1;
+                buf[1] |= 0x80;
+            } else {
+                buf[0] |= (3 << (bit - 1));
+            }
+        } else {
+            buf[0] |= (1 << bit);
+        }
+    }
+    buf[0] &= ~mask;
+    if (bottom)                 /* set bottom bit if requested */
+        buf[bytes - 1] |= 1;
+    if (!BN_bin2bn(buf, bytes, rnd))
+        goto err;
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(buf, bytes);
+    bn_check_top(rnd);
+    return (ret);
+
+toosmall:
+    BNerr(BN_F_BNRAND, BN_R_BITS_TOO_SMALL);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int BN_rand(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom)
+{
+    return bnrand(0, rnd, bits, top, bottom);
+}
+
+int BN_pseudo_rand(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom)
+{
+    return bnrand(1, rnd, bits, top, bottom);
+}
+
+int BN_bntest_rand(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom)
+{
+    return bnrand(2, rnd, bits, top, bottom);
+}
+
+/* random number r:  0 <= r < range */
+static int bn_rand_range(int pseudo, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *range)
+{
+    int (*bn_rand) (BIGNUM *, int, int, int) =
+        pseudo ? BN_pseudo_rand : BN_rand;
+    int n;
+    int count = 100;
+
+    if (range->neg || BN_is_zero(range)) {
+        BNerr(BN_F_BN_RAND_RANGE, BN_R_INVALID_RANGE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    n = BN_num_bits(range);     /* n > 0 */
+
+    /* BN_is_bit_set(range, n - 1) always holds */
+
+    if (n == 1)
+        BN_zero(r);
+    else if (!BN_is_bit_set(range, n - 2) && !BN_is_bit_set(range, n - 3)) {
+        /*
+         * range = 100..._2, so 3*range (= 11..._2) is exactly one bit longer
+         * than range
+         */
+        do {
+            if (!bn_rand(r, n + 1, BN_RAND_TOP_ANY, BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ANY))
+                return 0;
+            /*
+             * If r < 3*range, use r := r MOD range (which is either r, r -
+             * range, or r - 2*range). Otherwise, iterate once more. Since
+             * 3*range = 11..._2, each iteration succeeds with probability >=
+             * .75.
+             */
+            if (BN_cmp(r, range) >= 0) {
+                if (!BN_sub(r, r, range))
+                    return 0;
+                if (BN_cmp(r, range) >= 0)
+                    if (!BN_sub(r, r, range))
+                        return 0;
+            }
+
+            if (!--count) {
+                BNerr(BN_F_BN_RAND_RANGE, BN_R_TOO_MANY_ITERATIONS);
+                return 0;
+            }
+
+        }
+        while (BN_cmp(r, range) >= 0);
+    } else {
+        do {
+            /* range = 11..._2  or  range = 101..._2 */
+            if (!bn_rand(r, n, BN_RAND_TOP_ANY, BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ANY))
+                return 0;
+
+            if (!--count) {
+                BNerr(BN_F_BN_RAND_RANGE, BN_R_TOO_MANY_ITERATIONS);
+                return 0;
+            }
+        }
+        while (BN_cmp(r, range) >= 0);
+    }
+
+    bn_check_top(r);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int BN_rand_range(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *range)
+{
+    return bn_rand_range(0, r, range);
+}
+
+int BN_pseudo_rand_range(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *range)
+{
+    return bn_rand_range(1, r, range);
+}
+
+/*
+ * BN_generate_dsa_nonce generates a random number 0 <= out < range. Unlike
+ * BN_rand_range, it also includes the contents of |priv| and |message| in
+ * the generation so that an RNG failure isn't fatal as long as |priv|
+ * remains secret. This is intended for use in DSA and ECDSA where an RNG
+ * weakness leads directly to private key exposure unless this function is
+ * used.
+ */
+int BN_generate_dsa_nonce(BIGNUM *out, const BIGNUM *range,
+                          const BIGNUM *priv, const unsigned char *message,
+                          size_t message_len, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    SHA512_CTX sha;
+    /*
+     * We use 512 bits of random data per iteration to ensure that we have at
+     * least |range| bits of randomness.
+     */
+    unsigned char random_bytes[64];
+    unsigned char digest[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+    unsigned done, todo;
+    /* We generate |range|+8 bytes of random output. */
+    const unsigned num_k_bytes = BN_num_bytes(range) + 8;
+    unsigned char private_bytes[96];
+    unsigned char *k_bytes;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    k_bytes = OPENSSL_malloc(num_k_bytes);
+    if (k_bytes == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* We copy |priv| into a local buffer to avoid exposing its length. */
+    todo = sizeof(priv->d[0]) * priv->top;
+    if (todo > sizeof(private_bytes)) {
+        /*
+         * No reasonable DSA or ECDSA key should have a private key this
+         * large and we don't handle this case in order to avoid leaking the
+         * length of the private key.
+         */
+        BNerr(BN_F_BN_GENERATE_DSA_NONCE, BN_R_PRIVATE_KEY_TOO_LARGE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    memcpy(private_bytes, priv->d, todo);
+    memset(private_bytes + todo, 0, sizeof(private_bytes) - todo);
+
+    for (done = 0; done < num_k_bytes;) {
+        if (RAND_bytes(random_bytes, sizeof(random_bytes)) != 1)
+            goto err;
+        SHA512_Init(&sha);
+        SHA512_Update(&sha, &done, sizeof(done));
+        SHA512_Update(&sha, private_bytes, sizeof(private_bytes));
+        SHA512_Update(&sha, message, message_len);
+        SHA512_Update(&sha, random_bytes, sizeof(random_bytes));
+        SHA512_Final(digest, &sha);
+
+        todo = num_k_bytes - done;
+        if (todo > SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH)
+            todo = SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+        memcpy(k_bytes + done, digest, todo);
+        done += todo;
+    }
+
+    if (!BN_bin2bn(k_bytes, num_k_bytes, out))
+        goto err;
+    if (BN_mod(out, out, range, ctx) != 1)
+        goto err;
+    ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_free(k_bytes);
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(private_bytes, sizeof(private_bytes));
+    return ret;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_recp.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_recp.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..20585b9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_recp.c
@@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "bn_lcl.h"
+
+void BN_RECP_CTX_init(BN_RECP_CTX *recp)
+{
+    memset(recp, 0, sizeof(*recp));
+    bn_init(&(recp->N));
+    bn_init(&(recp->Nr));
+}
+
+BN_RECP_CTX *BN_RECP_CTX_new(void)
+{
+    BN_RECP_CTX *ret;
+
+    if ((ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret))) == NULL)
+        return (NULL);
+
+    bn_init(&(ret->N));
+    bn_init(&(ret->Nr));
+    ret->flags = BN_FLG_MALLOCED;
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+void BN_RECP_CTX_free(BN_RECP_CTX *recp)
+{
+    if (recp == NULL)
+        return;
+
+    BN_free(&(recp->N));
+    BN_free(&(recp->Nr));
+    if (recp->flags & BN_FLG_MALLOCED)
+        OPENSSL_free(recp);
+}
+
+int BN_RECP_CTX_set(BN_RECP_CTX *recp, const BIGNUM *d, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    if (!BN_copy(&(recp->N), d))
+        return 0;
+    BN_zero(&(recp->Nr));
+    recp->num_bits = BN_num_bits(d);
+    recp->shift = 0;
+    return (1);
+}
+
+int BN_mod_mul_reciprocal(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y,
+                          BN_RECP_CTX *recp, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    BIGNUM *a;
+    const BIGNUM *ca;
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    if ((a = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (y != NULL) {
+        if (x == y) {
+            if (!BN_sqr(a, x, ctx))
+                goto err;
+        } else {
+            if (!BN_mul(a, x, y, ctx))
+                goto err;
+        }
+        ca = a;
+    } else
+        ca = x;                 /* Just do the mod */
+
+    ret = BN_div_recp(NULL, r, ca, recp, ctx);
+ err:
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    bn_check_top(r);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+int BN_div_recp(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *m,
+                BN_RECP_CTX *recp, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int i, j, ret = 0;
+    BIGNUM *a, *b, *d, *r;
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    a = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    b = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (dv != NULL)
+        d = dv;
+    else
+        d = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (rem != NULL)
+        r = rem;
+    else
+        r = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (a == NULL || b == NULL || d == NULL || r == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (BN_ucmp(m, &(recp->N)) < 0) {
+        BN_zero(d);
+        if (!BN_copy(r, m)) {
+            BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+        return (1);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * We want the remainder Given input of ABCDEF / ab we need multiply
+     * ABCDEF by 3 digests of the reciprocal of ab
+     */
+
+    /* i := max(BN_num_bits(m), 2*BN_num_bits(N)) */
+    i = BN_num_bits(m);
+    j = recp->num_bits << 1;
+    if (j > i)
+        i = j;
+
+    /* Nr := round(2^i / N) */
+    if (i != recp->shift)
+        recp->shift = BN_reciprocal(&(recp->Nr), &(recp->N), i, ctx);
+    /* BN_reciprocal could have returned -1 for an error */
+    if (recp->shift == -1)
+        goto err;
+
+    /*-
+     * d := |round(round(m / 2^BN_num_bits(N)) * recp->Nr / 2^(i - BN_num_bits(N)))|
+     *    = |round(round(m / 2^BN_num_bits(N)) * round(2^i / N) / 2^(i - BN_num_bits(N)))|
+     *   <= |(m / 2^BN_num_bits(N)) * (2^i / N) * (2^BN_num_bits(N) / 2^i)|
+     *    = |m/N|
+     */
+    if (!BN_rshift(a, m, recp->num_bits))
+        goto err;
+    if (!BN_mul(b, a, &(recp->Nr), ctx))
+        goto err;
+    if (!BN_rshift(d, b, i - recp->num_bits))
+        goto err;
+    d->neg = 0;
+
+    if (!BN_mul(b, &(recp->N), d, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    if (!BN_usub(r, m, b))
+        goto err;
+    r->neg = 0;
+
+    j = 0;
+    while (BN_ucmp(r, &(recp->N)) >= 0) {
+        if (j++ > 2) {
+            BNerr(BN_F_BN_DIV_RECP, BN_R_BAD_RECIPROCAL);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (!BN_usub(r, r, &(recp->N)))
+            goto err;
+        if (!BN_add_word(d, 1))
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    r->neg = BN_is_zero(r) ? 0 : m->neg;
+    d->neg = m->neg ^ recp->N.neg;
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    bn_check_top(dv);
+    bn_check_top(rem);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+/*
+ * len is the expected size of the result We actually calculate with an extra
+ * word of precision, so we can do faster division if the remainder is not
+ * required.
+ */
+/* r := 2^len / m */
+int BN_reciprocal(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *m, int len, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int ret = -1;
+    BIGNUM *t;
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    if ((t = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!BN_set_bit(t, len))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!BN_div(r, NULL, t, m, ctx))
+        goto err;
+
+    ret = len;
+ err:
+    bn_check_top(r);
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    return (ret);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_shift.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_shift.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6a1eec8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_shift.c
@@ -0,0 +1,175 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "bn_lcl.h"
+
+int BN_lshift1(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a)
+{
+    register BN_ULONG *ap, *rp, t, c;
+    int i;
+
+    bn_check_top(r);
+    bn_check_top(a);
+
+    if (r != a) {
+        r->neg = a->neg;
+        if (bn_wexpand(r, a->top + 1) == NULL)
+            return (0);
+        r->top = a->top;
+    } else {
+        if (bn_wexpand(r, a->top + 1) == NULL)
+            return (0);
+    }
+    ap = a->d;
+    rp = r->d;
+    c = 0;
+    for (i = 0; i < a->top; i++) {
+        t = *(ap++);
+        *(rp++) = ((t << 1) | c) & BN_MASK2;
+        c = (t & BN_TBIT) ? 1 : 0;
+    }
+    if (c) {
+        *rp = 1;
+        r->top++;
+    }
+    bn_check_top(r);
+    return (1);
+}
+
+int BN_rshift1(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a)
+{
+    BN_ULONG *ap, *rp, t, c;
+    int i, j;
+
+    bn_check_top(r);
+    bn_check_top(a);
+
+    if (BN_is_zero(a)) {
+        BN_zero(r);
+        return (1);
+    }
+    i = a->top;
+    ap = a->d;
+    j = i - (ap[i - 1] == 1);
+    if (a != r) {
+        if (bn_wexpand(r, j) == NULL)
+            return (0);
+        r->neg = a->neg;
+    }
+    rp = r->d;
+    t = ap[--i];
+    c = (t & 1) ? BN_TBIT : 0;
+    if (t >>= 1)
+        rp[i] = t;
+    while (i > 0) {
+        t = ap[--i];
+        rp[i] = ((t >> 1) & BN_MASK2) | c;
+        c = (t & 1) ? BN_TBIT : 0;
+    }
+    r->top = j;
+    if (!r->top)
+        r->neg = 0; /* don't allow negative zero */
+    bn_check_top(r);
+    return (1);
+}
+
+int BN_lshift(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, int n)
+{
+    int i, nw, lb, rb;
+    BN_ULONG *t, *f;
+    BN_ULONG l;
+
+    bn_check_top(r);
+    bn_check_top(a);
+
+    if (n < 0) {
+        BNerr(BN_F_BN_LSHIFT, BN_R_INVALID_SHIFT);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    nw = n / BN_BITS2;
+    if (bn_wexpand(r, a->top + nw + 1) == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    r->neg = a->neg;
+    lb = n % BN_BITS2;
+    rb = BN_BITS2 - lb;
+    f = a->d;
+    t = r->d;
+    t[a->top + nw] = 0;
+    if (lb == 0)
+        for (i = a->top - 1; i >= 0; i--)
+            t[nw + i] = f[i];
+    else
+        for (i = a->top - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+            l = f[i];
+            t[nw + i + 1] |= (l >> rb) & BN_MASK2;
+            t[nw + i] = (l << lb) & BN_MASK2;
+        }
+    memset(t, 0, sizeof(*t) * nw);
+    r->top = a->top + nw + 1;
+    bn_correct_top(r);
+    bn_check_top(r);
+    return (1);
+}
+
+int BN_rshift(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, int n)
+{
+    int i, j, nw, lb, rb;
+    BN_ULONG *t, *f;
+    BN_ULONG l, tmp;
+
+    bn_check_top(r);
+    bn_check_top(a);
+
+    if (n < 0) {
+        BNerr(BN_F_BN_RSHIFT, BN_R_INVALID_SHIFT);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    nw = n / BN_BITS2;
+    rb = n % BN_BITS2;
+    lb = BN_BITS2 - rb;
+    if (nw >= a->top || a->top == 0) {
+        BN_zero(r);
+        return (1);
+    }
+    i = (BN_num_bits(a) - n + (BN_BITS2 - 1)) / BN_BITS2;
+    if (r != a) {
+        if (bn_wexpand(r, i) == NULL)
+            return (0);
+        r->neg = a->neg;
+    } else {
+        if (n == 0)
+            return 1;           /* or the copying loop will go berserk */
+    }
+
+    f = &(a->d[nw]);
+    t = r->d;
+    j = a->top - nw;
+    r->top = i;
+
+    if (rb == 0) {
+        for (i = j; i != 0; i--)
+            *(t++) = *(f++);
+    } else {
+        l = *(f++);
+        for (i = j - 1; i != 0; i--) {
+            tmp = (l >> rb) & BN_MASK2;
+            l = *(f++);
+            *(t++) = (tmp | (l << lb)) & BN_MASK2;
+        }
+        if ((l = (l >> rb) & BN_MASK2))
+            *(t) = l;
+    }
+    if (!r->top)
+        r->neg = 0; /* don't allow negative zero */
+    bn_check_top(r);
+    return (1);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_sqr.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_sqr.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..44e7332
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_sqr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,235 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "bn_lcl.h"
+
+/* r must not be a */
+/*
+ * I've just gone over this and it is now %20 faster on x86 - eay - 27 Jun 96
+ */
+int BN_sqr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int max, al;
+    int ret = 0;
+    BIGNUM *tmp, *rr;
+
+    bn_check_top(a);
+
+    al = a->top;
+    if (al <= 0) {
+        r->top = 0;
+        r->neg = 0;
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    rr = (a != r) ? r : BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (!rr || !tmp)
+        goto err;
+
+    max = 2 * al;               /* Non-zero (from above) */
+    if (bn_wexpand(rr, max) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (al == 4) {
+#ifndef BN_SQR_COMBA
+        BN_ULONG t[8];
+        bn_sqr_normal(rr->d, a->d, 4, t);
+#else
+        bn_sqr_comba4(rr->d, a->d);
+#endif
+    } else if (al == 8) {
+#ifndef BN_SQR_COMBA
+        BN_ULONG t[16];
+        bn_sqr_normal(rr->d, a->d, 8, t);
+#else
+        bn_sqr_comba8(rr->d, a->d);
+#endif
+    } else {
+#if defined(BN_RECURSION)
+        if (al < BN_SQR_RECURSIVE_SIZE_NORMAL) {
+            BN_ULONG t[BN_SQR_RECURSIVE_SIZE_NORMAL * 2];
+            bn_sqr_normal(rr->d, a->d, al, t);
+        } else {
+            int j, k;
+
+            j = BN_num_bits_word((BN_ULONG)al);
+            j = 1 << (j - 1);
+            k = j + j;
+            if (al == j) {
+                if (bn_wexpand(tmp, k * 2) == NULL)
+                    goto err;
+                bn_sqr_recursive(rr->d, a->d, al, tmp->d);
+            } else {
+                if (bn_wexpand(tmp, max) == NULL)
+                    goto err;
+                bn_sqr_normal(rr->d, a->d, al, tmp->d);
+            }
+        }
+#else
+        if (bn_wexpand(tmp, max) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        bn_sqr_normal(rr->d, a->d, al, tmp->d);
+#endif
+    }
+
+    rr->neg = 0;
+    /*
+     * If the most-significant half of the top word of 'a' is zero, then the
+     * square of 'a' will max-1 words.
+     */
+    if (a->d[al - 1] == (a->d[al - 1] & BN_MASK2l))
+        rr->top = max - 1;
+    else
+        rr->top = max;
+    if (r != rr && BN_copy(r, rr) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    bn_check_top(rr);
+    bn_check_top(tmp);
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+/* tmp must have 2*n words */
+void bn_sqr_normal(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, int n, BN_ULONG *tmp)
+{
+    int i, j, max;
+    const BN_ULONG *ap;
+    BN_ULONG *rp;
+
+    max = n * 2;
+    ap = a;
+    rp = r;
+    rp[0] = rp[max - 1] = 0;
+    rp++;
+    j = n;
+
+    if (--j > 0) {
+        ap++;
+        rp[j] = bn_mul_words(rp, ap, j, ap[-1]);
+        rp += 2;
+    }
+
+    for (i = n - 2; i > 0; i--) {
+        j--;
+        ap++;
+        rp[j] = bn_mul_add_words(rp, ap, j, ap[-1]);
+        rp += 2;
+    }
+
+    bn_add_words(r, r, r, max);
+
+    /* There will not be a carry */
+
+    bn_sqr_words(tmp, a, n);
+
+    bn_add_words(r, r, tmp, max);
+}
+
+#ifdef BN_RECURSION
+/*-
+ * r is 2*n words in size,
+ * a and b are both n words in size.    (There's not actually a 'b' here ...)
+ * n must be a power of 2.
+ * We multiply and return the result.
+ * t must be 2*n words in size
+ * We calculate
+ * a[0]*b[0]
+ * a[0]*b[0]+a[1]*b[1]+(a[0]-a[1])*(b[1]-b[0])
+ * a[1]*b[1]
+ */
+void bn_sqr_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, int n2, BN_ULONG *t)
+{
+    int n = n2 / 2;
+    int zero, c1;
+    BN_ULONG ln, lo, *p;
+
+    if (n2 == 4) {
+# ifndef BN_SQR_COMBA
+        bn_sqr_normal(r, a, 4, t);
+# else
+        bn_sqr_comba4(r, a);
+# endif
+        return;
+    } else if (n2 == 8) {
+# ifndef BN_SQR_COMBA
+        bn_sqr_normal(r, a, 8, t);
+# else
+        bn_sqr_comba8(r, a);
+# endif
+        return;
+    }
+    if (n2 < BN_SQR_RECURSIVE_SIZE_NORMAL) {
+        bn_sqr_normal(r, a, n2, t);
+        return;
+    }
+    /* r=(a[0]-a[1])*(a[1]-a[0]) */
+    c1 = bn_cmp_words(a, &(a[n]), n);
+    zero = 0;
+    if (c1 > 0)
+        bn_sub_words(t, a, &(a[n]), n);
+    else if (c1 < 0)
+        bn_sub_words(t, &(a[n]), a, n);
+    else
+        zero = 1;
+
+    /* The result will always be negative unless it is zero */
+    p = &(t[n2 * 2]);
+
+    if (!zero)
+        bn_sqr_recursive(&(t[n2]), t, n, p);
+    else
+        memset(&t[n2], 0, sizeof(*t) * n2);
+    bn_sqr_recursive(r, a, n, p);
+    bn_sqr_recursive(&(r[n2]), &(a[n]), n, p);
+
+    /*-
+     * t[32] holds (a[0]-a[1])*(a[1]-a[0]), it is negative or zero
+     * r[10] holds (a[0]*b[0])
+     * r[32] holds (b[1]*b[1])
+     */
+
+    c1 = (int)(bn_add_words(t, r, &(r[n2]), n2));
+
+    /* t[32] is negative */
+    c1 -= (int)(bn_sub_words(&(t[n2]), t, &(t[n2]), n2));
+
+    /*-
+     * t[32] holds (a[0]-a[1])*(a[1]-a[0])+(a[0]*a[0])+(a[1]*a[1])
+     * r[10] holds (a[0]*a[0])
+     * r[32] holds (a[1]*a[1])
+     * c1 holds the carry bits
+     */
+    c1 += (int)(bn_add_words(&(r[n]), &(r[n]), &(t[n2]), n2));
+    if (c1) {
+        p = &(r[n + n2]);
+        lo = *p;
+        ln = (lo + c1) & BN_MASK2;
+        *p = ln;
+
+        /*
+         * The overflow will stop before we over write words we should not
+         * overwrite
+         */
+        if (ln < (BN_ULONG)c1) {
+            do {
+                p++;
+                lo = *p;
+                ln = (lo + 1) & BN_MASK2;
+                *p = ln;
+            } while (ln == 0);
+        }
+    }
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_sqrt.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_sqrt.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..84376c7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_sqrt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,358 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "bn_lcl.h"
+
+BIGNUM *BN_mod_sqrt(BIGNUM *in, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
+/*
+ * Returns 'ret' such that ret^2 == a (mod p), using the Tonelli/Shanks
+ * algorithm (cf. Henri Cohen, "A Course in Algebraic Computational Number
+ * Theory", algorithm 1.5.1). 'p' must be prime!
+ */
+{
+    BIGNUM *ret = in;
+    int err = 1;
+    int r;
+    BIGNUM *A, *b, *q, *t, *x, *y;
+    int e, i, j;
+
+    if (!BN_is_odd(p) || BN_abs_is_word(p, 1)) {
+        if (BN_abs_is_word(p, 2)) {
+            if (ret == NULL)
+                ret = BN_new();
+            if (ret == NULL)
+                goto end;
+            if (!BN_set_word(ret, BN_is_bit_set(a, 0))) {
+                if (ret != in)
+                    BN_free(ret);
+                return NULL;
+            }
+            bn_check_top(ret);
+            return ret;
+        }
+
+        BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_SQRT, BN_R_P_IS_NOT_PRIME);
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+
+    if (BN_is_zero(a) || BN_is_one(a)) {
+        if (ret == NULL)
+            ret = BN_new();
+        if (ret == NULL)
+            goto end;
+        if (!BN_set_word(ret, BN_is_one(a))) {
+            if (ret != in)
+                BN_free(ret);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+        bn_check_top(ret);
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    A = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    b = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    q = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    t = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    x = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    y = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (y == NULL)
+        goto end;
+
+    if (ret == NULL)
+        ret = BN_new();
+    if (ret == NULL)
+        goto end;
+
+    /* A = a mod p */
+    if (!BN_nnmod(A, a, p, ctx))
+        goto end;
+
+    /* now write  |p| - 1  as  2^e*q  where  q  is odd */
+    e = 1;
+    while (!BN_is_bit_set(p, e))
+        e++;
+    /* we'll set  q  later (if needed) */
+
+    if (e == 1) {
+        /*-
+         * The easy case:  (|p|-1)/2  is odd, so 2 has an inverse
+         * modulo  (|p|-1)/2,  and square roots can be computed
+         * directly by modular exponentiation.
+         * We have
+         *     2 * (|p|+1)/4 == 1   (mod (|p|-1)/2),
+         * so we can use exponent  (|p|+1)/4,  i.e.  (|p|-3)/4 + 1.
+         */
+        if (!BN_rshift(q, p, 2))
+            goto end;
+        q->neg = 0;
+        if (!BN_add_word(q, 1))
+            goto end;
+        if (!BN_mod_exp(ret, A, q, p, ctx))
+            goto end;
+        err = 0;
+        goto vrfy;
+    }
+
+    if (e == 2) {
+        /*-
+         * |p| == 5  (mod 8)
+         *
+         * In this case  2  is always a non-square since
+         * Legendre(2,p) = (-1)^((p^2-1)/8)  for any odd prime.
+         * So if  a  really is a square, then  2*a  is a non-square.
+         * Thus for
+         *      b := (2*a)^((|p|-5)/8),
+         *      i := (2*a)*b^2
+         * we have
+         *     i^2 = (2*a)^((1 + (|p|-5)/4)*2)
+         *         = (2*a)^((p-1)/2)
+         *         = -1;
+         * so if we set
+         *      x := a*b*(i-1),
+         * then
+         *     x^2 = a^2 * b^2 * (i^2 - 2*i + 1)
+         *         = a^2 * b^2 * (-2*i)
+         *         = a*(-i)*(2*a*b^2)
+         *         = a*(-i)*i
+         *         = a.
+         *
+         * (This is due to A.O.L. Atkin,
+         * <URL: http://listserv.nodak.edu/scripts/wa.exe?A2=ind9211&L=nmbrthry&O=T&P=562>,
+         * November 1992.)
+         */
+
+        /* t := 2*a */
+        if (!BN_mod_lshift1_quick(t, A, p))
+            goto end;
+
+        /* b := (2*a)^((|p|-5)/8) */
+        if (!BN_rshift(q, p, 3))
+            goto end;
+        q->neg = 0;
+        if (!BN_mod_exp(b, t, q, p, ctx))
+            goto end;
+
+        /* y := b^2 */
+        if (!BN_mod_sqr(y, b, p, ctx))
+            goto end;
+
+        /* t := (2*a)*b^2 - 1 */
+        if (!BN_mod_mul(t, t, y, p, ctx))
+            goto end;
+        if (!BN_sub_word(t, 1))
+            goto end;
+
+        /* x = a*b*t */
+        if (!BN_mod_mul(x, A, b, p, ctx))
+            goto end;
+        if (!BN_mod_mul(x, x, t, p, ctx))
+            goto end;
+
+        if (!BN_copy(ret, x))
+            goto end;
+        err = 0;
+        goto vrfy;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * e > 2, so we really have to use the Tonelli/Shanks algorithm. First,
+     * find some y that is not a square.
+     */
+    if (!BN_copy(q, p))
+        goto end;               /* use 'q' as temp */
+    q->neg = 0;
+    i = 2;
+    do {
+        /*
+         * For efficiency, try small numbers first; if this fails, try random
+         * numbers.
+         */
+        if (i < 22) {
+            if (!BN_set_word(y, i))
+                goto end;
+        } else {
+            if (!BN_pseudo_rand(y, BN_num_bits(p), 0, 0))
+                goto end;
+            if (BN_ucmp(y, p) >= 0) {
+                if (!(p->neg ? BN_add : BN_sub) (y, y, p))
+                    goto end;
+            }
+            /* now 0 <= y < |p| */
+            if (BN_is_zero(y))
+                if (!BN_set_word(y, i))
+                    goto end;
+        }
+
+        r = BN_kronecker(y, q, ctx); /* here 'q' is |p| */
+        if (r < -1)
+            goto end;
+        if (r == 0) {
+            /* m divides p */
+            BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_SQRT, BN_R_P_IS_NOT_PRIME);
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+    while (r == 1 && ++i < 82);
+
+    if (r != -1) {
+        /*
+         * Many rounds and still no non-square -- this is more likely a bug
+         * than just bad luck. Even if p is not prime, we should have found
+         * some y such that r == -1.
+         */
+        BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_SQRT, BN_R_TOO_MANY_ITERATIONS);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    /* Here's our actual 'q': */
+    if (!BN_rshift(q, q, e))
+        goto end;
+
+    /*
+     * Now that we have some non-square, we can find an element of order 2^e
+     * by computing its q'th power.
+     */
+    if (!BN_mod_exp(y, y, q, p, ctx))
+        goto end;
+    if (BN_is_one(y)) {
+        BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_SQRT, BN_R_P_IS_NOT_PRIME);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    /*-
+     * Now we know that (if  p  is indeed prime) there is an integer
+     * k,  0 <= k < 2^e,  such that
+     *
+     *      a^q * y^k == 1   (mod p).
+     *
+     * As  a^q  is a square and  y  is not,  k  must be even.
+     * q+1  is even, too, so there is an element
+     *
+     *     X := a^((q+1)/2) * y^(k/2),
+     *
+     * and it satisfies
+     *
+     *     X^2 = a^q * a     * y^k
+     *         = a,
+     *
+     * so it is the square root that we are looking for.
+     */
+
+    /* t := (q-1)/2  (note that  q  is odd) */
+    if (!BN_rshift1(t, q))
+        goto end;
+
+    /* x := a^((q-1)/2) */
+    if (BN_is_zero(t)) {        /* special case: p = 2^e + 1 */
+        if (!BN_nnmod(t, A, p, ctx))
+            goto end;
+        if (BN_is_zero(t)) {
+            /* special case: a == 0  (mod p) */
+            BN_zero(ret);
+            err = 0;
+            goto end;
+        } else if (!BN_one(x))
+            goto end;
+    } else {
+        if (!BN_mod_exp(x, A, t, p, ctx))
+            goto end;
+        if (BN_is_zero(x)) {
+            /* special case: a == 0  (mod p) */
+            BN_zero(ret);
+            err = 0;
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* b := a*x^2  (= a^q) */
+    if (!BN_mod_sqr(b, x, p, ctx))
+        goto end;
+    if (!BN_mod_mul(b, b, A, p, ctx))
+        goto end;
+
+    /* x := a*x    (= a^((q+1)/2)) */
+    if (!BN_mod_mul(x, x, A, p, ctx))
+        goto end;
+
+    while (1) {
+        /*-
+         * Now  b  is  a^q * y^k  for some even  k  (0 <= k < 2^E
+         * where  E  refers to the original value of  e,  which we
+         * don't keep in a variable),  and  x  is  a^((q+1)/2) * y^(k/2).
+         *
+         * We have  a*b = x^2,
+         *    y^2^(e-1) = -1,
+         *    b^2^(e-1) = 1.
+         */
+
+        if (BN_is_one(b)) {
+            if (!BN_copy(ret, x))
+                goto end;
+            err = 0;
+            goto vrfy;
+        }
+
+        /* find smallest  i  such that  b^(2^i) = 1 */
+        i = 1;
+        if (!BN_mod_sqr(t, b, p, ctx))
+            goto end;
+        while (!BN_is_one(t)) {
+            i++;
+            if (i == e) {
+                BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_SQRT, BN_R_NOT_A_SQUARE);
+                goto end;
+            }
+            if (!BN_mod_mul(t, t, t, p, ctx))
+                goto end;
+        }
+
+        /* t := y^2^(e - i - 1) */
+        if (!BN_copy(t, y))
+            goto end;
+        for (j = e - i - 1; j > 0; j--) {
+            if (!BN_mod_sqr(t, t, p, ctx))
+                goto end;
+        }
+        if (!BN_mod_mul(y, t, t, p, ctx))
+            goto end;
+        if (!BN_mod_mul(x, x, t, p, ctx))
+            goto end;
+        if (!BN_mod_mul(b, b, y, p, ctx))
+            goto end;
+        e = i;
+    }
+
+ vrfy:
+    if (!err) {
+        /*
+         * verify the result -- the input might have been not a square (test
+         * added in 0.9.8)
+         */
+
+        if (!BN_mod_sqr(x, ret, p, ctx))
+            err = 1;
+
+        if (!err && 0 != BN_cmp(x, A)) {
+            BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_SQRT, BN_R_NOT_A_SQUARE);
+            err = 1;
+        }
+    }
+
+ end:
+    if (err) {
+        if (ret != in)
+            BN_clear_free(ret);
+        ret = NULL;
+    }
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    bn_check_top(ret);
+    return ret;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_srp.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_srp.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..58b1691
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_srp.c
@@ -0,0 +1,545 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2014-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "bn_lcl.h"
+#include "e_os.h"
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+
+#include <openssl/srp.h>
+#include <internal/bn_srp.h>
+
+# if (BN_BYTES == 8)
+#  if (defined(_WIN32) || defined(_WIN64)) && !defined(__MINGW32__)
+#   define bn_pack4(a1,a2,a3,a4) ((a1##UI64<<48)|(a2##UI64<<32)|(a3##UI64<<16)|a4##UI64)
+#  elif defined(__arch64__)
+#   define bn_pack4(a1,a2,a3,a4) ((a1##UL<<48)|(a2##UL<<32)|(a3##UL<<16)|a4##UL)
+#  else
+#   define bn_pack4(a1,a2,a3,a4) ((a1##ULL<<48)|(a2##ULL<<32)|(a3##ULL<<16)|a4##ULL)
+#  endif
+# elif (BN_BYTES == 4)
+#  define bn_pack4(a1,a2,a3,a4)  ((a3##UL<<16)|a4##UL), ((a1##UL<<16)|a2##UL)
+# else
+#  error "unsupported BN_BYTES"
+# endif
+
+static const BN_ULONG bn_group_1024_value[] = {
+    bn_pack4(0x9FC6, 0x1D2F, 0xC0EB, 0x06E3),
+    bn_pack4(0xFD51, 0x38FE, 0x8376, 0x435B),
+    bn_pack4(0x2FD4, 0xCBF4, 0x976E, 0xAA9A),
+    bn_pack4(0x68ED, 0xBC3C, 0x0572, 0x6CC0),
+    bn_pack4(0xC529, 0xF566, 0x660E, 0x57EC),
+    bn_pack4(0x8255, 0x9B29, 0x7BCF, 0x1885),
+    bn_pack4(0xCE8E, 0xF4AD, 0x69B1, 0x5D49),
+    bn_pack4(0x5DC7, 0xD7B4, 0x6154, 0xD6B6),
+    bn_pack4(0x8E49, 0x5C1D, 0x6089, 0xDAD1),
+    bn_pack4(0xE0D5, 0xD8E2, 0x50B9, 0x8BE4),
+    bn_pack4(0x383B, 0x4813, 0xD692, 0xC6E0),
+    bn_pack4(0xD674, 0xDF74, 0x96EA, 0x81D3),
+    bn_pack4(0x9EA2, 0x314C, 0x9C25, 0x6576),
+    bn_pack4(0x6072, 0x6187, 0x75FF, 0x3C0B),
+    bn_pack4(0x9C33, 0xF80A, 0xFA8F, 0xC5E8),
+    bn_pack4(0xEEAF, 0x0AB9, 0xADB3, 0x8DD6)
+};
+
+const BIGNUM bn_group_1024 = {
+    (BN_ULONG *)bn_group_1024_value,
+    OSSL_NELEM(bn_group_1024_value),
+    OSSL_NELEM(bn_group_1024_value),
+    0,
+    BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA
+};
+
+static const BN_ULONG bn_group_1536_value[] = {
+    bn_pack4(0xCF76, 0xE3FE, 0xD135, 0xF9BB),
+    bn_pack4(0x1518, 0x0F93, 0x499A, 0x234D),
+    bn_pack4(0x8CE7, 0xA28C, 0x2442, 0xC6F3),
+    bn_pack4(0x5A02, 0x1FFF, 0x5E91, 0x479E),
+    bn_pack4(0x7F8A, 0x2FE9, 0xB8B5, 0x292E),
+    bn_pack4(0x837C, 0x264A, 0xE3A9, 0xBEB8),
+    bn_pack4(0xE442, 0x734A, 0xF7CC, 0xB7AE),
+    bn_pack4(0x6577, 0x2E43, 0x7D6C, 0x7F8C),
+    bn_pack4(0xDB2F, 0xD53D, 0x24B7, 0xC486),
+    bn_pack4(0x6EDF, 0x0195, 0x3934, 0x9627),
+    bn_pack4(0x158B, 0xFD3E, 0x2B9C, 0x8CF5),
+    bn_pack4(0x764E, 0x3F4B, 0x53DD, 0x9DA1),
+    bn_pack4(0x4754, 0x8381, 0xDBC5, 0xB1FC),
+    bn_pack4(0x9B60, 0x9E0B, 0xE3BA, 0xB63D),
+    bn_pack4(0x8134, 0xB1C8, 0xB979, 0x8914),
+    bn_pack4(0xDF02, 0x8A7C, 0xEC67, 0xF0D0),
+    bn_pack4(0x80B6, 0x55BB, 0x9A22, 0xE8DC),
+    bn_pack4(0x1558, 0x903B, 0xA0D0, 0xF843),
+    bn_pack4(0x51C6, 0xA94B, 0xE460, 0x7A29),
+    bn_pack4(0x5F4F, 0x5F55, 0x6E27, 0xCBDE),
+    bn_pack4(0xBEEE, 0xA961, 0x4B19, 0xCC4D),
+    bn_pack4(0xDBA5, 0x1DF4, 0x99AC, 0x4C80),
+    bn_pack4(0xB1F1, 0x2A86, 0x17A4, 0x7BBB),
+    bn_pack4(0x9DEF, 0x3CAF, 0xB939, 0x277A)
+};
+
+const BIGNUM bn_group_1536 = {
+    (BN_ULONG *)bn_group_1536_value,
+    OSSL_NELEM(bn_group_1536_value),
+    OSSL_NELEM(bn_group_1536_value),
+    0,
+    BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA
+};
+
+static const BN_ULONG bn_group_2048_value[] = {
+    bn_pack4(0x0FA7, 0x111F, 0x9E4A, 0xFF73),
+    bn_pack4(0x9B65, 0xE372, 0xFCD6, 0x8EF2),
+    bn_pack4(0x35DE, 0x236D, 0x525F, 0x5475),
+    bn_pack4(0x94B5, 0xC803, 0xD89F, 0x7AE4),
+    bn_pack4(0x71AE, 0x35F8, 0xE9DB, 0xFBB6),
+    bn_pack4(0x2A56, 0x98F3, 0xA8D0, 0xC382),
+    bn_pack4(0x9CCC, 0x041C, 0x7BC3, 0x08D8),
+    bn_pack4(0xAF87, 0x4E73, 0x03CE, 0x5329),
+    bn_pack4(0x6160, 0x2790, 0x04E5, 0x7AE6),
+    bn_pack4(0x032C, 0xFBDB, 0xF52F, 0xB378),
+    bn_pack4(0x5EA7, 0x7A27, 0x75D2, 0xECFA),
+    bn_pack4(0x5445, 0x23B5, 0x24B0, 0xD57D),
+    bn_pack4(0x5B9D, 0x32E6, 0x88F8, 0x7748),
+    bn_pack4(0xF1D2, 0xB907, 0x8717, 0x461A),
+    bn_pack4(0x76BD, 0x207A, 0x436C, 0x6481),
+    bn_pack4(0xCA97, 0xB43A, 0x23FB, 0x8016),
+    bn_pack4(0x1D28, 0x1E44, 0x6B14, 0x773B),
+    bn_pack4(0x7359, 0xD041, 0xD5C3, 0x3EA7),
+    bn_pack4(0xA80D, 0x740A, 0xDBF4, 0xFF74),
+    bn_pack4(0x55F9, 0x7993, 0xEC97, 0x5EEA),
+    bn_pack4(0x2918, 0xA996, 0x2F0B, 0x93B8),
+    bn_pack4(0x661A, 0x05FB, 0xD5FA, 0xAAE8),
+    bn_pack4(0xCF60, 0x9517, 0x9A16, 0x3AB3),
+    bn_pack4(0xE808, 0x3969, 0xEDB7, 0x67B0),
+    bn_pack4(0xCD7F, 0x48A9, 0xDA04, 0xFD50),
+    bn_pack4(0xD523, 0x12AB, 0x4B03, 0x310D),
+    bn_pack4(0x8193, 0xE075, 0x7767, 0xA13D),
+    bn_pack4(0xA373, 0x29CB, 0xB4A0, 0x99ED),
+    bn_pack4(0xFC31, 0x9294, 0x3DB5, 0x6050),
+    bn_pack4(0xAF72, 0xB665, 0x1987, 0xEE07),
+    bn_pack4(0xF166, 0xDE5E, 0x1389, 0x582F),
+    bn_pack4(0xAC6B, 0xDB41, 0x324A, 0x9A9B)
+};
+
+const BIGNUM bn_group_2048 = {
+    (BN_ULONG *)bn_group_2048_value,
+    OSSL_NELEM(bn_group_2048_value),
+    OSSL_NELEM(bn_group_2048_value),
+    0,
+    BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA
+};
+
+static const BN_ULONG bn_group_3072_value[] = {
+    bn_pack4(0xFFFF, 0xFFFF, 0xFFFF, 0xFFFF),
+    bn_pack4(0x4B82, 0xD120, 0xA93A, 0xD2CA),
+    bn_pack4(0x43DB, 0x5BFC, 0xE0FD, 0x108E),
+    bn_pack4(0x08E2, 0x4FA0, 0x74E5, 0xAB31),
+    bn_pack4(0x7709, 0x88C0, 0xBAD9, 0x46E2),
+    bn_pack4(0xBBE1, 0x1757, 0x7A61, 0x5D6C),
+    bn_pack4(0x521F, 0x2B18, 0x177B, 0x200C),
+    bn_pack4(0xD876, 0x0273, 0x3EC8, 0x6A64),
+    bn_pack4(0xF12F, 0xFA06, 0xD98A, 0x0864),
+    bn_pack4(0xCEE3, 0xD226, 0x1AD2, 0xEE6B),
+    bn_pack4(0x1E8C, 0x94E0, 0x4A25, 0x619D),
+    bn_pack4(0xABF5, 0xAE8C, 0xDB09, 0x33D7),
+    bn_pack4(0xB397, 0x0F85, 0xA6E1, 0xE4C7),
+    bn_pack4(0x8AEA, 0x7157, 0x5D06, 0x0C7D),
+    bn_pack4(0xECFB, 0x8504, 0x58DB, 0xEF0A),
+    bn_pack4(0xA855, 0x21AB, 0xDF1C, 0xBA64),
+    bn_pack4(0xAD33, 0x170D, 0x0450, 0x7A33),
+    bn_pack4(0x1572, 0x8E5A, 0x8AAA, 0xC42D),
+    bn_pack4(0x15D2, 0x2618, 0x98FA, 0x0510),
+    bn_pack4(0x3995, 0x497C, 0xEA95, 0x6AE5),
+    bn_pack4(0xDE2B, 0xCBF6, 0x9558, 0x1718),
+    bn_pack4(0xB5C5, 0x5DF0, 0x6F4C, 0x52C9),
+    bn_pack4(0x9B27, 0x83A2, 0xEC07, 0xA28F),
+    bn_pack4(0xE39E, 0x772C, 0x180E, 0x8603),
+    bn_pack4(0x3290, 0x5E46, 0x2E36, 0xCE3B),
+    bn_pack4(0xF174, 0x6C08, 0xCA18, 0x217C),
+    bn_pack4(0x670C, 0x354E, 0x4ABC, 0x9804),
+    bn_pack4(0x9ED5, 0x2907, 0x7096, 0x966D),
+    bn_pack4(0x1C62, 0xF356, 0x2085, 0x52BB),
+    bn_pack4(0x8365, 0x5D23, 0xDCA3, 0xAD96),
+    bn_pack4(0x6916, 0x3FA8, 0xFD24, 0xCF5F),
+    bn_pack4(0x98DA, 0x4836, 0x1C55, 0xD39A),
+    bn_pack4(0xC200, 0x7CB8, 0xA163, 0xBF05),
+    bn_pack4(0x4928, 0x6651, 0xECE4, 0x5B3D),
+    bn_pack4(0xAE9F, 0x2411, 0x7C4B, 0x1FE6),
+    bn_pack4(0xEE38, 0x6BFB, 0x5A89, 0x9FA5),
+    bn_pack4(0x0BFF, 0x5CB6, 0xF406, 0xB7ED),
+    bn_pack4(0xF44C, 0x42E9, 0xA637, 0xED6B),
+    bn_pack4(0xE485, 0xB576, 0x625E, 0x7EC6),
+    bn_pack4(0x4FE1, 0x356D, 0x6D51, 0xC245),
+    bn_pack4(0x302B, 0x0A6D, 0xF25F, 0x1437),
+    bn_pack4(0xEF95, 0x19B3, 0xCD3A, 0x431B),
+    bn_pack4(0x514A, 0x0879, 0x8E34, 0x04DD),
+    bn_pack4(0x020B, 0xBEA6, 0x3B13, 0x9B22),
+    bn_pack4(0x2902, 0x4E08, 0x8A67, 0xCC74),
+    bn_pack4(0xC4C6, 0x628B, 0x80DC, 0x1CD1),
+    bn_pack4(0xC90F, 0xDAA2, 0x2168, 0xC234),
+    bn_pack4(0xFFFF, 0xFFFF, 0xFFFF, 0xFFFF)
+};
+
+const BIGNUM bn_group_3072 = {
+    (BN_ULONG *)bn_group_3072_value,
+    OSSL_NELEM(bn_group_3072_value),
+    OSSL_NELEM(bn_group_3072_value),
+    0,
+    BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA
+};
+
+static const BN_ULONG bn_group_4096_value[] = {
+    bn_pack4(0xFFFF, 0xFFFF, 0xFFFF, 0xFFFF),
+    bn_pack4(0x4DF4, 0x35C9, 0x3406, 0x3199),
+    bn_pack4(0x86FF, 0xB7DC, 0x90A6, 0xC08F),
+    bn_pack4(0x93B4, 0xEA98, 0x8D8F, 0xDDC1),
+    bn_pack4(0xD006, 0x9127, 0xD5B0, 0x5AA9),
+    bn_pack4(0xB81B, 0xDD76, 0x2170, 0x481C),
+    bn_pack4(0x1F61, 0x2970, 0xCEE2, 0xD7AF),
+    bn_pack4(0x233B, 0xA186, 0x515B, 0xE7ED),
+    bn_pack4(0x99B2, 0x964F, 0xA090, 0xC3A2),
+    bn_pack4(0x287C, 0x5947, 0x4E6B, 0xC05D),
+    bn_pack4(0x2E8E, 0xFC14, 0x1FBE, 0xCAA6),
+    bn_pack4(0xDBBB, 0xC2DB, 0x04DE, 0x8EF9),
+    bn_pack4(0x2583, 0xE9CA, 0x2AD4, 0x4CE8),
+    bn_pack4(0x1A94, 0x6834, 0xB615, 0x0BDA),
+    bn_pack4(0x99C3, 0x2718, 0x6AF4, 0xE23C),
+    bn_pack4(0x8871, 0x9A10, 0xBDBA, 0x5B26),
+    bn_pack4(0x1A72, 0x3C12, 0xA787, 0xE6D7),
+    bn_pack4(0x4B82, 0xD120, 0xA921, 0x0801),
+    bn_pack4(0x43DB, 0x5BFC, 0xE0FD, 0x108E),
+    bn_pack4(0x08E2, 0x4FA0, 0x74E5, 0xAB31),
+    bn_pack4(0x7709, 0x88C0, 0xBAD9, 0x46E2),
+    bn_pack4(0xBBE1, 0x1757, 0x7A61, 0x5D6C),
+    bn_pack4(0x521F, 0x2B18, 0x177B, 0x200C),
+    bn_pack4(0xD876, 0x0273, 0x3EC8, 0x6A64),
+    bn_pack4(0xF12F, 0xFA06, 0xD98A, 0x0864),
+    bn_pack4(0xCEE3, 0xD226, 0x1AD2, 0xEE6B),
+    bn_pack4(0x1E8C, 0x94E0, 0x4A25, 0x619D),
+    bn_pack4(0xABF5, 0xAE8C, 0xDB09, 0x33D7),
+    bn_pack4(0xB397, 0x0F85, 0xA6E1, 0xE4C7),
+    bn_pack4(0x8AEA, 0x7157, 0x5D06, 0x0C7D),
+    bn_pack4(0xECFB, 0x8504, 0x58DB, 0xEF0A),
+    bn_pack4(0xA855, 0x21AB, 0xDF1C, 0xBA64),
+    bn_pack4(0xAD33, 0x170D, 0x0450, 0x7A33),
+    bn_pack4(0x1572, 0x8E5A, 0x8AAA, 0xC42D),
+    bn_pack4(0x15D2, 0x2618, 0x98FA, 0x0510),
+    bn_pack4(0x3995, 0x497C, 0xEA95, 0x6AE5),
+    bn_pack4(0xDE2B, 0xCBF6, 0x9558, 0x1718),
+    bn_pack4(0xB5C5, 0x5DF0, 0x6F4C, 0x52C9),
+    bn_pack4(0x9B27, 0x83A2, 0xEC07, 0xA28F),
+    bn_pack4(0xE39E, 0x772C, 0x180E, 0x8603),
+    bn_pack4(0x3290, 0x5E46, 0x2E36, 0xCE3B),
+    bn_pack4(0xF174, 0x6C08, 0xCA18, 0x217C),
+    bn_pack4(0x670C, 0x354E, 0x4ABC, 0x9804),
+    bn_pack4(0x9ED5, 0x2907, 0x7096, 0x966D),
+    bn_pack4(0x1C62, 0xF356, 0x2085, 0x52BB),
+    bn_pack4(0x8365, 0x5D23, 0xDCA3, 0xAD96),
+    bn_pack4(0x6916, 0x3FA8, 0xFD24, 0xCF5F),
+    bn_pack4(0x98DA, 0x4836, 0x1C55, 0xD39A),
+    bn_pack4(0xC200, 0x7CB8, 0xA163, 0xBF05),
+    bn_pack4(0x4928, 0x6651, 0xECE4, 0x5B3D),
+    bn_pack4(0xAE9F, 0x2411, 0x7C4B, 0x1FE6),
+    bn_pack4(0xEE38, 0x6BFB, 0x5A89, 0x9FA5),
+    bn_pack4(0x0BFF, 0x5CB6, 0xF406, 0xB7ED),
+    bn_pack4(0xF44C, 0x42E9, 0xA637, 0xED6B),
+    bn_pack4(0xE485, 0xB576, 0x625E, 0x7EC6),
+    bn_pack4(0x4FE1, 0x356D, 0x6D51, 0xC245),
+    bn_pack4(0x302B, 0x0A6D, 0xF25F, 0x1437),
+    bn_pack4(0xEF95, 0x19B3, 0xCD3A, 0x431B),
+    bn_pack4(0x514A, 0x0879, 0x8E34, 0x04DD),
+    bn_pack4(0x020B, 0xBEA6, 0x3B13, 0x9B22),
+    bn_pack4(0x2902, 0x4E08, 0x8A67, 0xCC74),
+    bn_pack4(0xC4C6, 0x628B, 0x80DC, 0x1CD1),
+    bn_pack4(0xC90F, 0xDAA2, 0x2168, 0xC234),
+    bn_pack4(0xFFFF, 0xFFFF, 0xFFFF, 0xFFFF)
+};
+
+const BIGNUM bn_group_4096 = {
+    (BN_ULONG *)bn_group_4096_value,
+    OSSL_NELEM(bn_group_4096_value),
+    OSSL_NELEM(bn_group_4096_value),
+    0,
+    BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA
+};
+
+static const BN_ULONG bn_group_6144_value[] = {
+    bn_pack4(0xFFFF, 0xFFFF, 0xFFFF, 0xFFFF),
+    bn_pack4(0xE694, 0xF91E, 0x6DCC, 0x4024),
+    bn_pack4(0x12BF, 0x2D5B, 0x0B74, 0x74D6),
+    bn_pack4(0x043E, 0x8F66, 0x3F48, 0x60EE),
+    bn_pack4(0x387F, 0xE8D7, 0x6E3C, 0x0468),
+    bn_pack4(0xDA56, 0xC9EC, 0x2EF2, 0x9632),
+    bn_pack4(0xEB19, 0xCCB1, 0xA313, 0xD55C),
+    bn_pack4(0xF550, 0xAA3D, 0x8A1F, 0xBFF0),
+    bn_pack4(0x06A1, 0xD58B, 0xB7C5, 0xDA76),
+    bn_pack4(0xA797, 0x15EE, 0xF29B, 0xE328),
+    bn_pack4(0x14CC, 0x5ED2, 0x0F80, 0x37E0),
+    bn_pack4(0xCC8F, 0x6D7E, 0xBF48, 0xE1D8),
+    bn_pack4(0x4BD4, 0x07B2, 0x2B41, 0x54AA),
+    bn_pack4(0x0F1D, 0x45B7, 0xFF58, 0x5AC5),
+    bn_pack4(0x23A9, 0x7A7E, 0x36CC, 0x88BE),
+    bn_pack4(0x59E7, 0xC97F, 0xBEC7, 0xE8F3),
+    bn_pack4(0xB5A8, 0x4031, 0x900B, 0x1C9E),
+    bn_pack4(0xD55E, 0x702F, 0x4698, 0x0C82),
+    bn_pack4(0xF482, 0xD7CE, 0x6E74, 0xFEF6),
+    bn_pack4(0xF032, 0xEA15, 0xD172, 0x1D03),
+    bn_pack4(0x5983, 0xCA01, 0xC64B, 0x92EC),
+    bn_pack4(0x6FB8, 0xF401, 0x378C, 0xD2BF),
+    bn_pack4(0x3320, 0x5151, 0x2BD7, 0xAF42),
+    bn_pack4(0xDB7F, 0x1447, 0xE6CC, 0x254B),
+    bn_pack4(0x44CE, 0x6CBA, 0xCED4, 0xBB1B),
+    bn_pack4(0xDA3E, 0xDBEB, 0xCF9B, 0x14ED),
+    bn_pack4(0x1797, 0x27B0, 0x865A, 0x8918),
+    bn_pack4(0xB06A, 0x53ED, 0x9027, 0xD831),
+    bn_pack4(0xE5DB, 0x382F, 0x4130, 0x01AE),
+    bn_pack4(0xF8FF, 0x9406, 0xAD9E, 0x530E),
+    bn_pack4(0xC975, 0x1E76, 0x3DBA, 0x37BD),
+    bn_pack4(0xC1D4, 0xDCB2, 0x6026, 0x46DE),
+    bn_pack4(0x36C3, 0xFAB4, 0xD27C, 0x7026),
+    bn_pack4(0x4DF4, 0x35C9, 0x3402, 0x8492),
+    bn_pack4(0x86FF, 0xB7DC, 0x90A6, 0xC08F),
+    bn_pack4(0x93B4, 0xEA98, 0x8D8F, 0xDDC1),
+    bn_pack4(0xD006, 0x9127, 0xD5B0, 0x5AA9),
+    bn_pack4(0xB81B, 0xDD76, 0x2170, 0x481C),
+    bn_pack4(0x1F61, 0x2970, 0xCEE2, 0xD7AF),
+    bn_pack4(0x233B, 0xA186, 0x515B, 0xE7ED),
+    bn_pack4(0x99B2, 0x964F, 0xA090, 0xC3A2),
+    bn_pack4(0x287C, 0x5947, 0x4E6B, 0xC05D),
+    bn_pack4(0x2E8E, 0xFC14, 0x1FBE, 0xCAA6),
+    bn_pack4(0xDBBB, 0xC2DB, 0x04DE, 0x8EF9),
+    bn_pack4(0x2583, 0xE9CA, 0x2AD4, 0x4CE8),
+    bn_pack4(0x1A94, 0x6834, 0xB615, 0x0BDA),
+    bn_pack4(0x99C3, 0x2718, 0x6AF4, 0xE23C),
+    bn_pack4(0x8871, 0x9A10, 0xBDBA, 0x5B26),
+    bn_pack4(0x1A72, 0x3C12, 0xA787, 0xE6D7),
+    bn_pack4(0x4B82, 0xD120, 0xA921, 0x0801),
+    bn_pack4(0x43DB, 0x5BFC, 0xE0FD, 0x108E),
+    bn_pack4(0x08E2, 0x4FA0, 0x74E5, 0xAB31),
+    bn_pack4(0x7709, 0x88C0, 0xBAD9, 0x46E2),
+    bn_pack4(0xBBE1, 0x1757, 0x7A61, 0x5D6C),
+    bn_pack4(0x521F, 0x2B18, 0x177B, 0x200C),
+    bn_pack4(0xD876, 0x0273, 0x3EC8, 0x6A64),
+    bn_pack4(0xF12F, 0xFA06, 0xD98A, 0x0864),
+    bn_pack4(0xCEE3, 0xD226, 0x1AD2, 0xEE6B),
+    bn_pack4(0x1E8C, 0x94E0, 0x4A25, 0x619D),
+    bn_pack4(0xABF5, 0xAE8C, 0xDB09, 0x33D7),
+    bn_pack4(0xB397, 0x0F85, 0xA6E1, 0xE4C7),
+    bn_pack4(0x8AEA, 0x7157, 0x5D06, 0x0C7D),
+    bn_pack4(0xECFB, 0x8504, 0x58DB, 0xEF0A),
+    bn_pack4(0xA855, 0x21AB, 0xDF1C, 0xBA64),
+    bn_pack4(0xAD33, 0x170D, 0x0450, 0x7A33),
+    bn_pack4(0x1572, 0x8E5A, 0x8AAA, 0xC42D),
+    bn_pack4(0x15D2, 0x2618, 0x98FA, 0x0510),
+    bn_pack4(0x3995, 0x497C, 0xEA95, 0x6AE5),
+    bn_pack4(0xDE2B, 0xCBF6, 0x9558, 0x1718),
+    bn_pack4(0xB5C5, 0x5DF0, 0x6F4C, 0x52C9),
+    bn_pack4(0x9B27, 0x83A2, 0xEC07, 0xA28F),
+    bn_pack4(0xE39E, 0x772C, 0x180E, 0x8603),
+    bn_pack4(0x3290, 0x5E46, 0x2E36, 0xCE3B),
+    bn_pack4(0xF174, 0x6C08, 0xCA18, 0x217C),
+    bn_pack4(0x670C, 0x354E, 0x4ABC, 0x9804),
+    bn_pack4(0x9ED5, 0x2907, 0x7096, 0x966D),
+    bn_pack4(0x1C62, 0xF356, 0x2085, 0x52BB),
+    bn_pack4(0x8365, 0x5D23, 0xDCA3, 0xAD96),
+    bn_pack4(0x6916, 0x3FA8, 0xFD24, 0xCF5F),
+    bn_pack4(0x98DA, 0x4836, 0x1C55, 0xD39A),
+    bn_pack4(0xC200, 0x7CB8, 0xA163, 0xBF05),
+    bn_pack4(0x4928, 0x6651, 0xECE4, 0x5B3D),
+    bn_pack4(0xAE9F, 0x2411, 0x7C4B, 0x1FE6),
+    bn_pack4(0xEE38, 0x6BFB, 0x5A89, 0x9FA5),
+    bn_pack4(0x0BFF, 0x5CB6, 0xF406, 0xB7ED),
+    bn_pack4(0xF44C, 0x42E9, 0xA637, 0xED6B),
+    bn_pack4(0xE485, 0xB576, 0x625E, 0x7EC6),
+    bn_pack4(0x4FE1, 0x356D, 0x6D51, 0xC245),
+    bn_pack4(0x302B, 0x0A6D, 0xF25F, 0x1437),
+    bn_pack4(0xEF95, 0x19B3, 0xCD3A, 0x431B),
+    bn_pack4(0x514A, 0x0879, 0x8E34, 0x04DD),
+    bn_pack4(0x020B, 0xBEA6, 0x3B13, 0x9B22),
+    bn_pack4(0x2902, 0x4E08, 0x8A67, 0xCC74),
+    bn_pack4(0xC4C6, 0x628B, 0x80DC, 0x1CD1),
+    bn_pack4(0xC90F, 0xDAA2, 0x2168, 0xC234),
+    bn_pack4(0xFFFF, 0xFFFF, 0xFFFF, 0xFFFF)
+};
+
+const BIGNUM bn_group_6144 = {
+    (BN_ULONG *)bn_group_6144_value,
+    OSSL_NELEM(bn_group_6144_value),
+    OSSL_NELEM(bn_group_6144_value),
+    0,
+    BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA
+};
+
+static const BN_ULONG bn_group_8192_value[] = {
+    bn_pack4(0xFFFF, 0xFFFF, 0xFFFF, 0xFFFF),
+    bn_pack4(0x60C9, 0x80DD, 0x98ED, 0xD3DF),
+    bn_pack4(0xC81F, 0x56E8, 0x80B9, 0x6E71),
+    bn_pack4(0x9E30, 0x50E2, 0x7656, 0x94DF),
+    bn_pack4(0x9558, 0xE447, 0x5677, 0xE9AA),
+    bn_pack4(0xC919, 0x0DA6, 0xFC02, 0x6E47),
+    bn_pack4(0x889A, 0x002E, 0xD5EE, 0x382B),
+    bn_pack4(0x4009, 0x438B, 0x481C, 0x6CD7),
+    bn_pack4(0x3590, 0x46F4, 0xEB87, 0x9F92),
+    bn_pack4(0xFAF3, 0x6BC3, 0x1ECF, 0xA268),
+    bn_pack4(0xB1D5, 0x10BD, 0x7EE7, 0x4D73),
+    bn_pack4(0xF9AB, 0x4819, 0x5DED, 0x7EA1),
+    bn_pack4(0x64F3, 0x1CC5, 0x0846, 0x851D),
+    bn_pack4(0x4597, 0xE899, 0xA025, 0x5DC1),
+    bn_pack4(0xDF31, 0x0EE0, 0x74AB, 0x6A36),
+    bn_pack4(0x6D2A, 0x13F8, 0x3F44, 0xF82D),
+    bn_pack4(0x062B, 0x3CF5, 0xB3A2, 0x78A6),
+    bn_pack4(0x7968, 0x3303, 0xED5B, 0xDD3A),
+    bn_pack4(0xFA9D, 0x4B7F, 0xA2C0, 0x87E8),
+    bn_pack4(0x4BCB, 0xC886, 0x2F83, 0x85DD),
+    bn_pack4(0x3473, 0xFC64, 0x6CEA, 0x306B),
+    bn_pack4(0x13EB, 0x57A8, 0x1A23, 0xF0C7),
+    bn_pack4(0x2222, 0x2E04, 0xA403, 0x7C07),
+    bn_pack4(0xE3FD, 0xB8BE, 0xFC84, 0x8AD9),
+    bn_pack4(0x238F, 0x16CB, 0xE39D, 0x652D),
+    bn_pack4(0x3423, 0xB474, 0x2BF1, 0xC978),
+    bn_pack4(0x3AAB, 0x639C, 0x5AE4, 0xF568),
+    bn_pack4(0x2576, 0xF693, 0x6BA4, 0x2466),
+    bn_pack4(0x741F, 0xA7BF, 0x8AFC, 0x47ED),
+    bn_pack4(0x3BC8, 0x32B6, 0x8D9D, 0xD300),
+    bn_pack4(0xD8BE, 0xC4D0, 0x73B9, 0x31BA),
+    bn_pack4(0x3877, 0x7CB6, 0xA932, 0xDF8C),
+    bn_pack4(0x74A3, 0x926F, 0x12FE, 0xE5E4),
+    bn_pack4(0xE694, 0xF91E, 0x6DBE, 0x1159),
+    bn_pack4(0x12BF, 0x2D5B, 0x0B74, 0x74D6),
+    bn_pack4(0x043E, 0x8F66, 0x3F48, 0x60EE),
+    bn_pack4(0x387F, 0xE8D7, 0x6E3C, 0x0468),
+    bn_pack4(0xDA56, 0xC9EC, 0x2EF2, 0x9632),
+    bn_pack4(0xEB19, 0xCCB1, 0xA313, 0xD55C),
+    bn_pack4(0xF550, 0xAA3D, 0x8A1F, 0xBFF0),
+    bn_pack4(0x06A1, 0xD58B, 0xB7C5, 0xDA76),
+    bn_pack4(0xA797, 0x15EE, 0xF29B, 0xE328),
+    bn_pack4(0x14CC, 0x5ED2, 0x0F80, 0x37E0),
+    bn_pack4(0xCC8F, 0x6D7E, 0xBF48, 0xE1D8),
+    bn_pack4(0x4BD4, 0x07B2, 0x2B41, 0x54AA),
+    bn_pack4(0x0F1D, 0x45B7, 0xFF58, 0x5AC5),
+    bn_pack4(0x23A9, 0x7A7E, 0x36CC, 0x88BE),
+    bn_pack4(0x59E7, 0xC97F, 0xBEC7, 0xE8F3),
+    bn_pack4(0xB5A8, 0x4031, 0x900B, 0x1C9E),
+    bn_pack4(0xD55E, 0x702F, 0x4698, 0x0C82),
+    bn_pack4(0xF482, 0xD7CE, 0x6E74, 0xFEF6),
+    bn_pack4(0xF032, 0xEA15, 0xD172, 0x1D03),
+    bn_pack4(0x5983, 0xCA01, 0xC64B, 0x92EC),
+    bn_pack4(0x6FB8, 0xF401, 0x378C, 0xD2BF),
+    bn_pack4(0x3320, 0x5151, 0x2BD7, 0xAF42),
+    bn_pack4(0xDB7F, 0x1447, 0xE6CC, 0x254B),
+    bn_pack4(0x44CE, 0x6CBA, 0xCED4, 0xBB1B),
+    bn_pack4(0xDA3E, 0xDBEB, 0xCF9B, 0x14ED),
+    bn_pack4(0x1797, 0x27B0, 0x865A, 0x8918),
+    bn_pack4(0xB06A, 0x53ED, 0x9027, 0xD831),
+    bn_pack4(0xE5DB, 0x382F, 0x4130, 0x01AE),
+    bn_pack4(0xF8FF, 0x9406, 0xAD9E, 0x530E),
+    bn_pack4(0xC975, 0x1E76, 0x3DBA, 0x37BD),
+    bn_pack4(0xC1D4, 0xDCB2, 0x6026, 0x46DE),
+    bn_pack4(0x36C3, 0xFAB4, 0xD27C, 0x7026),
+    bn_pack4(0x4DF4, 0x35C9, 0x3402, 0x8492),
+    bn_pack4(0x86FF, 0xB7DC, 0x90A6, 0xC08F),
+    bn_pack4(0x93B4, 0xEA98, 0x8D8F, 0xDDC1),
+    bn_pack4(0xD006, 0x9127, 0xD5B0, 0x5AA9),
+    bn_pack4(0xB81B, 0xDD76, 0x2170, 0x481C),
+    bn_pack4(0x1F61, 0x2970, 0xCEE2, 0xD7AF),
+    bn_pack4(0x233B, 0xA186, 0x515B, 0xE7ED),
+    bn_pack4(0x99B2, 0x964F, 0xA090, 0xC3A2),
+    bn_pack4(0x287C, 0x5947, 0x4E6B, 0xC05D),
+    bn_pack4(0x2E8E, 0xFC14, 0x1FBE, 0xCAA6),
+    bn_pack4(0xDBBB, 0xC2DB, 0x04DE, 0x8EF9),
+    bn_pack4(0x2583, 0xE9CA, 0x2AD4, 0x4CE8),
+    bn_pack4(0x1A94, 0x6834, 0xB615, 0x0BDA),
+    bn_pack4(0x99C3, 0x2718, 0x6AF4, 0xE23C),
+    bn_pack4(0x8871, 0x9A10, 0xBDBA, 0x5B26),
+    bn_pack4(0x1A72, 0x3C12, 0xA787, 0xE6D7),
+    bn_pack4(0x4B82, 0xD120, 0xA921, 0x0801),
+    bn_pack4(0x43DB, 0x5BFC, 0xE0FD, 0x108E),
+    bn_pack4(0x08E2, 0x4FA0, 0x74E5, 0xAB31),
+    bn_pack4(0x7709, 0x88C0, 0xBAD9, 0x46E2),
+    bn_pack4(0xBBE1, 0x1757, 0x7A61, 0x5D6C),
+    bn_pack4(0x521F, 0x2B18, 0x177B, 0x200C),
+    bn_pack4(0xD876, 0x0273, 0x3EC8, 0x6A64),
+    bn_pack4(0xF12F, 0xFA06, 0xD98A, 0x0864),
+    bn_pack4(0xCEE3, 0xD226, 0x1AD2, 0xEE6B),
+    bn_pack4(0x1E8C, 0x94E0, 0x4A25, 0x619D),
+    bn_pack4(0xABF5, 0xAE8C, 0xDB09, 0x33D7),
+    bn_pack4(0xB397, 0x0F85, 0xA6E1, 0xE4C7),
+    bn_pack4(0x8AEA, 0x7157, 0x5D06, 0x0C7D),
+    bn_pack4(0xECFB, 0x8504, 0x58DB, 0xEF0A),
+    bn_pack4(0xA855, 0x21AB, 0xDF1C, 0xBA64),
+    bn_pack4(0xAD33, 0x170D, 0x0450, 0x7A33),
+    bn_pack4(0x1572, 0x8E5A, 0x8AAA, 0xC42D),
+    bn_pack4(0x15D2, 0x2618, 0x98FA, 0x0510),
+    bn_pack4(0x3995, 0x497C, 0xEA95, 0x6AE5),
+    bn_pack4(0xDE2B, 0xCBF6, 0x9558, 0x1718),
+    bn_pack4(0xB5C5, 0x5DF0, 0x6F4C, 0x52C9),
+    bn_pack4(0x9B27, 0x83A2, 0xEC07, 0xA28F),
+    bn_pack4(0xE39E, 0x772C, 0x180E, 0x8603),
+    bn_pack4(0x3290, 0x5E46, 0x2E36, 0xCE3B),
+    bn_pack4(0xF174, 0x6C08, 0xCA18, 0x217C),
+    bn_pack4(0x670C, 0x354E, 0x4ABC, 0x9804),
+    bn_pack4(0x9ED5, 0x2907, 0x7096, 0x966D),
+    bn_pack4(0x1C62, 0xF356, 0x2085, 0x52BB),
+    bn_pack4(0x8365, 0x5D23, 0xDCA3, 0xAD96),
+    bn_pack4(0x6916, 0x3FA8, 0xFD24, 0xCF5F),
+    bn_pack4(0x98DA, 0x4836, 0x1C55, 0xD39A),
+    bn_pack4(0xC200, 0x7CB8, 0xA163, 0xBF05),
+    bn_pack4(0x4928, 0x6651, 0xECE4, 0x5B3D),
+    bn_pack4(0xAE9F, 0x2411, 0x7C4B, 0x1FE6),
+    bn_pack4(0xEE38, 0x6BFB, 0x5A89, 0x9FA5),
+    bn_pack4(0x0BFF, 0x5CB6, 0xF406, 0xB7ED),
+    bn_pack4(0xF44C, 0x42E9, 0xA637, 0xED6B),
+    bn_pack4(0xE485, 0xB576, 0x625E, 0x7EC6),
+    bn_pack4(0x4FE1, 0x356D, 0x6D51, 0xC245),
+    bn_pack4(0x302B, 0x0A6D, 0xF25F, 0x1437),
+    bn_pack4(0xEF95, 0x19B3, 0xCD3A, 0x431B),
+    bn_pack4(0x514A, 0x0879, 0x8E34, 0x04DD),
+    bn_pack4(0x020B, 0xBEA6, 0x3B13, 0x9B22),
+    bn_pack4(0x2902, 0x4E08, 0x8A67, 0xCC74),
+    bn_pack4(0xC4C6, 0x628B, 0x80DC, 0x1CD1),
+    bn_pack4(0xC90F, 0xDAA2, 0x2168, 0xC234),
+    bn_pack4(0xFFFF, 0xFFFF, 0xFFFF, 0xFFFF)
+};
+
+const BIGNUM bn_group_8192 = {
+    (BN_ULONG *)bn_group_8192_value,
+    OSSL_NELEM(bn_group_8192_value),
+    OSSL_NELEM(bn_group_8192_value),
+    0,
+    BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA
+};
+
+static const BN_ULONG bn_generator_19_value[] = { 19 };
+
+const BIGNUM bn_generator_19 = {
+    (BN_ULONG *)bn_generator_19_value,
+    1,
+    1,
+    0,
+    BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA
+};
+static const BN_ULONG bn_generator_5_value[] = { 5 };
+
+const BIGNUM bn_generator_5 = {
+    (BN_ULONG *)bn_generator_5_value,
+    1,
+    1,
+    0,
+    BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA
+};
+static const BN_ULONG bn_generator_2_value[] = { 2 };
+
+const BIGNUM bn_generator_2 = {
+    (BN_ULONG *)bn_generator_2_value,
+    1,
+    1,
+    0,
+    BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA
+};
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_word.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_word.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1af13a5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_word.c
@@ -0,0 +1,201 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "bn_lcl.h"
+
+BN_ULONG BN_mod_word(const BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w)
+{
+#ifndef BN_LLONG
+    BN_ULONG ret = 0;
+#else
+    BN_ULLONG ret = 0;
+#endif
+    int i;
+
+    if (w == 0)
+        return (BN_ULONG)-1;
+
+#ifndef BN_LLONG
+    /*
+     * If |w| is too long and we don't have BN_ULLONG then we need to fall
+     * back to using BN_div_word
+     */
+    if (w > ((BN_ULONG)1 << BN_BITS4)) {
+        BIGNUM *tmp = BN_dup(a);
+        if (tmp == NULL)
+            return (BN_ULONG)-1;
+
+        ret = BN_div_word(tmp, w);
+        BN_free(tmp);
+
+        return ret;
+    }
+#endif
+
+    bn_check_top(a);
+    w &= BN_MASK2;
+    for (i = a->top - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+#ifndef BN_LLONG
+        /*
+         * We can assume here that | w <= ((BN_ULONG)1 << BN_BITS4) | and so
+         * | ret < ((BN_ULONG)1 << BN_BITS4) | and therefore the shifts here are
+         * safe and will not overflow
+         */
+        ret = ((ret << BN_BITS4) | ((a->d[i] >> BN_BITS4) & BN_MASK2l)) % w;
+        ret = ((ret << BN_BITS4) | (a->d[i] & BN_MASK2l)) % w;
+#else
+        ret = (BN_ULLONG) (((ret << (BN_ULLONG) BN_BITS2) | a->d[i]) %
+                           (BN_ULLONG) w);
+#endif
+    }
+    return ((BN_ULONG)ret);
+}
+
+BN_ULONG BN_div_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w)
+{
+    BN_ULONG ret = 0;
+    int i, j;
+
+    bn_check_top(a);
+    w &= BN_MASK2;
+
+    if (!w)
+        /* actually this an error (division by zero) */
+        return (BN_ULONG)-1;
+    if (a->top == 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    /* normalize input (so bn_div_words doesn't complain) */
+    j = BN_BITS2 - BN_num_bits_word(w);
+    w <<= j;
+    if (!BN_lshift(a, a, j))
+        return (BN_ULONG)-1;
+
+    for (i = a->top - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+        BN_ULONG l, d;
+
+        l = a->d[i];
+        d = bn_div_words(ret, l, w);
+        ret = (l - ((d * w) & BN_MASK2)) & BN_MASK2;
+        a->d[i] = d;
+    }
+    if ((a->top > 0) && (a->d[a->top - 1] == 0))
+        a->top--;
+    ret >>= j;
+    if (!a->top)
+        a->neg = 0; /* don't allow negative zero */
+    bn_check_top(a);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+int BN_add_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w)
+{
+    BN_ULONG l;
+    int i;
+
+    bn_check_top(a);
+    w &= BN_MASK2;
+
+    /* degenerate case: w is zero */
+    if (!w)
+        return 1;
+    /* degenerate case: a is zero */
+    if (BN_is_zero(a))
+        return BN_set_word(a, w);
+    /* handle 'a' when negative */
+    if (a->neg) {
+        a->neg = 0;
+        i = BN_sub_word(a, w);
+        if (!BN_is_zero(a))
+            a->neg = !(a->neg);
+        return (i);
+    }
+    for (i = 0; w != 0 && i < a->top; i++) {
+        a->d[i] = l = (a->d[i] + w) & BN_MASK2;
+        w = (w > l) ? 1 : 0;
+    }
+    if (w && i == a->top) {
+        if (bn_wexpand(a, a->top + 1) == NULL)
+            return 0;
+        a->top++;
+        a->d[i] = w;
+    }
+    bn_check_top(a);
+    return (1);
+}
+
+int BN_sub_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    bn_check_top(a);
+    w &= BN_MASK2;
+
+    /* degenerate case: w is zero */
+    if (!w)
+        return 1;
+    /* degenerate case: a is zero */
+    if (BN_is_zero(a)) {
+        i = BN_set_word(a, w);
+        if (i != 0)
+            BN_set_negative(a, 1);
+        return i;
+    }
+    /* handle 'a' when negative */
+    if (a->neg) {
+        a->neg = 0;
+        i = BN_add_word(a, w);
+        a->neg = 1;
+        return (i);
+    }
+
+    if ((a->top == 1) && (a->d[0] < w)) {
+        a->d[0] = w - a->d[0];
+        a->neg = 1;
+        return (1);
+    }
+    i = 0;
+    for (;;) {
+        if (a->d[i] >= w) {
+            a->d[i] -= w;
+            break;
+        } else {
+            a->d[i] = (a->d[i] - w) & BN_MASK2;
+            i++;
+            w = 1;
+        }
+    }
+    if ((a->d[i] == 0) && (i == (a->top - 1)))
+        a->top--;
+    bn_check_top(a);
+    return (1);
+}
+
+int BN_mul_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w)
+{
+    BN_ULONG ll;
+
+    bn_check_top(a);
+    w &= BN_MASK2;
+    if (a->top) {
+        if (w == 0)
+            BN_zero(a);
+        else {
+            ll = bn_mul_words(a->d, a->d, a->top, w);
+            if (ll) {
+                if (bn_wexpand(a, a->top + 1) == NULL)
+                    return (0);
+                a->d[a->top++] = ll;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    bn_check_top(a);
+    return (1);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_x931p.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_x931p.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8bfbcac
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/bn_x931p.c
@@ -0,0 +1,242 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include "bn_lcl.h"
+
+/* X9.31 routines for prime derivation */
+
+/*
+ * X9.31 prime derivation. This is used to generate the primes pi (p1, p2,
+ * q1, q2) from a parameter Xpi by checking successive odd integers.
+ */
+
+static int bn_x931_derive_pi(BIGNUM *pi, const BIGNUM *Xpi, BN_CTX *ctx,
+                             BN_GENCB *cb)
+{
+    int i = 0, is_prime;
+    if (!BN_copy(pi, Xpi))
+        return 0;
+    if (!BN_is_odd(pi) && !BN_add_word(pi, 1))
+        return 0;
+    for (;;) {
+        i++;
+        BN_GENCB_call(cb, 0, i);
+        /* NB 27 MR is specified in X9.31 */
+        is_prime = BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(pi, 27, ctx, 1, cb);
+        if (is_prime < 0)
+            return 0;
+        if (is_prime)
+            break;
+        if (!BN_add_word(pi, 2))
+            return 0;
+    }
+    BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, i);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is the main X9.31 prime derivation function. From parameters Xp1, Xp2
+ * and Xp derive the prime p. If the parameters p1 or p2 are not NULL they
+ * will be returned too: this is needed for testing.
+ */
+
+int BN_X931_derive_prime_ex(BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *p1, BIGNUM *p2,
+                            const BIGNUM *Xp, const BIGNUM *Xp1,
+                            const BIGNUM *Xp2, const BIGNUM *e, BN_CTX *ctx,
+                            BN_GENCB *cb)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    BIGNUM *t, *p1p2, *pm1;
+
+    /* Only even e supported */
+    if (!BN_is_odd(e))
+        return 0;
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    if (!p1)
+        p1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+
+    if (!p2)
+        p2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+
+    t = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+
+    p1p2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+
+    pm1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+
+    if (pm1 == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!bn_x931_derive_pi(p1, Xp1, ctx, cb))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!bn_x931_derive_pi(p2, Xp2, ctx, cb))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!BN_mul(p1p2, p1, p2, ctx))
+        goto err;
+
+    /* First set p to value of Rp */
+
+    if (!BN_mod_inverse(p, p2, p1, ctx))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!BN_mul(p, p, p2, ctx))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!BN_mod_inverse(t, p1, p2, ctx))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!BN_mul(t, t, p1, ctx))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!BN_sub(p, p, t))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (p->neg && !BN_add(p, p, p1p2))
+        goto err;
+
+    /* p now equals Rp */
+
+    if (!BN_mod_sub(p, p, Xp, p1p2, ctx))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!BN_add(p, p, Xp))
+        goto err;
+
+    /* p now equals Yp0 */
+
+    for (;;) {
+        int i = 1;
+        BN_GENCB_call(cb, 0, i++);
+        if (!BN_copy(pm1, p))
+            goto err;
+        if (!BN_sub_word(pm1, 1))
+            goto err;
+        if (!BN_gcd(t, pm1, e, ctx))
+            goto err;
+        if (BN_is_one(t)) {
+            /*
+             * X9.31 specifies 8 MR and 1 Lucas test or any prime test
+             * offering similar or better guarantees 50 MR is considerably
+             * better.
+             */
+            int r = BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(p, 50, ctx, 1, cb);
+            if (r < 0)
+                goto err;
+            if (r)
+                break;
+        }
+        if (!BN_add(p, p, p1p2))
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 0);
+
+    ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generate pair of parameters Xp, Xq for X9.31 prime generation. Note: nbits
+ * parameter is sum of number of bits in both.
+ */
+
+int BN_X931_generate_Xpq(BIGNUM *Xp, BIGNUM *Xq, int nbits, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    BIGNUM *t;
+    int i;
+    /*
+     * Number of bits for each prime is of the form 512+128s for s = 0, 1,
+     * ...
+     */
+    if ((nbits < 1024) || (nbits & 0xff))
+        return 0;
+    nbits >>= 1;
+    /*
+     * The random value Xp must be between sqrt(2) * 2^(nbits-1) and 2^nbits
+     * - 1. By setting the top two bits we ensure that the lower bound is
+     * exceeded.
+     */
+    if (!BN_rand(Xp, nbits, BN_RAND_TOP_TWO, BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ANY))
+        goto err;
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    t = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (t == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < 1000; i++) {
+        if (!BN_rand(Xq, nbits, BN_RAND_TOP_TWO, BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ANY))
+            goto err;
+        /* Check that |Xp - Xq| > 2^(nbits - 100) */
+        BN_sub(t, Xp, Xq);
+        if (BN_num_bits(t) > (nbits - 100))
+            break;
+    }
+
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+
+    if (i < 1000)
+        return 1;
+
+    return 0;
+
+ err:
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generate primes using X9.31 algorithm. Of the values p, p1, p2, Xp1 and
+ * Xp2 only 'p' needs to be non-NULL. If any of the others are not NULL the
+ * relevant parameter will be stored in it. Due to the fact that |Xp - Xq| >
+ * 2^(nbits - 100) must be satisfied Xp and Xq are generated using the
+ * previous function and supplied as input.
+ */
+
+int BN_X931_generate_prime_ex(BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *p1, BIGNUM *p2,
+                              BIGNUM *Xp1, BIGNUM *Xp2,
+                              const BIGNUM *Xp,
+                              const BIGNUM *e, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_GENCB *cb)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    if (Xp1 == NULL)
+        Xp1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (Xp2 == NULL)
+        Xp2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (Xp1 == NULL || Xp2 == NULL)
+        goto error;
+
+    if (!BN_rand(Xp1, 101, BN_RAND_TOP_ONE, BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ANY))
+        goto error;
+    if (!BN_rand(Xp2, 101, BN_RAND_TOP_ONE, BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ANY))
+        goto error;
+    if (!BN_X931_derive_prime_ex(p, p1, p2, Xp, Xp1, Xp2, e, ctx, cb))
+        goto error;
+
+    ret = 1;
+
+ error:
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+
+    return ret;
+
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/build.info b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/build.info
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c608ecc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/build.info
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+LIBS=../../libcrypto
+SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
+        bn_add.c bn_div.c bn_exp.c bn_lib.c bn_ctx.c bn_mul.c bn_mod.c \
+        bn_print.c bn_rand.c bn_shift.c bn_word.c bn_blind.c \
+        bn_kron.c bn_sqrt.c bn_gcd.c bn_prime.c bn_err.c bn_sqr.c \
+        {- $target{bn_asm_src} -} \
+        bn_recp.c bn_mont.c bn_mpi.c bn_exp2.c bn_gf2m.c bn_nist.c \
+        bn_depr.c bn_const.c bn_x931p.c bn_intern.c bn_dh.c bn_srp.c
+INCLUDE[../../libcrypto]=../../crypto/include
+
+INCLUDE[bn_exp.o]=..
+
+GENERATE[bn-586.s]=asm/bn-586.pl \
+	$(PERLASM_SCHEME) $(CFLAGS) $(LIB_CFLAGS) $(PROCESSOR)
+DEPEND[bn-586.s]=../perlasm/x86asm.pl
+GENERATE[co-586.s]=asm/co-586.pl \
+	$(PERLASM_SCHEME) $(CFLAGS) $(LIB_CFLAGS) $(PROCESSOR)
+DEPEND[co-586.s]=../perlasm/x86asm.pl
+GENERATE[x86-mont.s]=asm/x86-mont.pl \
+	$(PERLASM_SCHEME) $(CFLAGS) $(LIB_CFLAGS) $(PROCESSOR)
+DEPEND[x86-mont.s]=../perlasm/x86asm.pl
+GENERATE[x86-gf2m.s]=asm/x86-gf2m.pl \
+	$(PERLASM_SCHEME) $(CFLAGS) $(LIB_CFLAGS) $(PROCESSOR)
+DEPEND[x86-gf2m.s]=../perlasm/x86asm.pl
+
+GENERATE[sparcv9a-mont.S]=asm/sparcv9a-mont.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+INCLUDE[sparcv9a-mont.o]=..
+GENERATE[sparcv9-mont.S]=asm/sparcv9-mont.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+INCLUDE[sparcv9-mont.o]=..
+GENERATE[vis3-mont.S]=asm/vis3-mont.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+INCLUDE[vis3-mont.o]=..
+GENERATE[sparct4-mont.S]=asm/sparct4-mont.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+INCLUDE[sparct4-mont.o]=..
+GENERATE[sparcv9-gf2m.S]=asm/sparcv9-gf2m.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+INCLUDE[sparcv9-gf2m.o]=..
+
+GENERATE[bn-mips.s]=asm/mips.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+GENERATE[mips-mont.s]=asm/mips-mont.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+
+GENERATE[s390x-mont.S]=asm/s390x-mont.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+GENERATE[s390x-gf2m.s]=asm/s390x-gf2m.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+
+GENERATE[x86_64-mont.s]=asm/x86_64-mont.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+GENERATE[x86_64-mont5.s]=asm/x86_64-mont5.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+GENERATE[x86_64-gf2m.s]=asm/x86_64-gf2m.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+GENERATE[rsaz-x86_64.s]=asm/rsaz-x86_64.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+GENERATE[rsaz-avx2.s]=asm/rsaz-avx2.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+
+GENERATE[bn-ia64.s]=asm/ia64.S
+GENERATE[ia64-mont.s]=asm/ia64-mont.pl $(CFLAGS) $(LIB_CFLAGS)
+
+GENERATE[parisc-mont.s]=asm/parisc-mont.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+
+# ppc - AIX, Linux, MacOS X...
+GENERATE[bn-ppc.s]=asm/ppc.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+GENERATE[ppc-mont.s]=asm/ppc-mont.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+GENERATE[ppc64-mont.s]=asm/ppc64-mont.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+
+GENERATE[alpha-mont.S]=asm/alpha-mont.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+
+GENERATE[armv4-mont.S]=asm/armv4-mont.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+INCLUDE[armv4-mont.o]=..
+GENERATE[armv4-gf2m.S]=asm/armv4-gf2m.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+INCLUDE[armv4-gf2m.o]=..
+GENERATE[armv8-mont.S]=asm/armv8-mont.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+
+OVERRIDES=bn-mips3.o pa-risc2W.o pa-risc2.c
+BEGINRAW[Makefile]
+##### BN assembler implementations
+
+{- $builddir -}/bn-mips3.o:	{- $sourcedir -}/asm/mips3.s
+	@if [ "$(CC)" = "gcc" ]; then \
+		ABI=`expr "$(CFLAGS)" : ".*-mabi=\([n3264]*\)"` && \
+		as -$$ABI -O -o $@ {- $sourcedir -}/asm/mips3.s; \
+	else	$(CC) -c $(CFLAGS) $(LIB_CFLAGS) -o $@ {- $sourcedir -}/asm/mips3.s; fi
+
+# GNU assembler fails to compile PA-RISC2 modules, insist on calling
+# vendor assembler...
+{- $builddir -}/pa-risc2W.o: {- $sourcedir -}/asm/pa-risc2W.s
+	CC="$(CC)" $(PERL) $(SRCDIR)/util/fipsas.pl $(SRCDIR) $< /usr/ccs/bin/as -o pa-risc2W.o {- $sourcedir -}/asm/pa-risc2W.s
+{- $builddir -}/pa-risc2.o: {- $sourcedir -}/asm/pa-risc2.s
+	CC="$(CC)" $(PERL) $(SRCDIR)/util/fipsas.pl $(SRCDIR) $< /usr/ccs/bin/as -o pa-risc2.o {- $sourcedir -}/asm/pa-risc2.s
+
+ENDRAW[Makefile]
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/rsaz_exp.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/rsaz_exp.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1a70f6c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/rsaz_exp.c
@@ -0,0 +1,352 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2013-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*****************************************************************************
+*                                                                            *
+*  Copyright (c) 2012, Intel Corporation                                     *
+*                                                                            *
+*  All rights reserved.                                                      *
+*                                                                            *
+*  Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without        *
+*  modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are    *
+*  met:                                                                      *
+*                                                                            *
+*  *  Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright         *
+*     notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.          *
+*                                                                            *
+*  *  Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright      *
+*     notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the    *
+*     documentation and/or other materials provided with the                 *
+*     distribution.                                                          *
+*                                                                            *
+*  *  Neither the name of the Intel Corporation nor the names of its         *
+*     contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from   *
+*     this software without specific prior written permission.               *
+*                                                                            *
+*                                                                            *
+*  THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY INTEL CORPORATION ""AS IS"" AND ANY          *
+*  EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE         *
+*  IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR        *
+*  PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL INTEL CORPORATION OR            *
+*  CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL,     *
+*  EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,       *
+*  PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR        *
+*  PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF    *
+*  LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING      *
+*  NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS        *
+*  SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.              *
+*                                                                            *
+******************************************************************************
+* Developers and authors:                                                    *
+* Shay Gueron (1, 2), and Vlad Krasnov (1)                                   *
+* (1) Intel Corporation, Israel Development Center, Haifa, Israel            *
+* (2) University of Haifa, Israel                                            *
+*****************************************************************************/
+
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+#include "rsaz_exp.h"
+
+#ifndef RSAZ_ENABLED
+NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT
+#else
+
+/*
+ * See crypto/bn/asm/rsaz-avx2.pl for further details.
+ */
+void rsaz_1024_norm2red_avx2(void *red, const void *norm);
+void rsaz_1024_mul_avx2(void *ret, const void *a, const void *b,
+                        const void *n, BN_ULONG k);
+void rsaz_1024_sqr_avx2(void *ret, const void *a, const void *n, BN_ULONG k,
+                        int cnt);
+void rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2(void *tbl, const void *val, int i);
+void rsaz_1024_gather5_avx2(void *val, const void *tbl, int i);
+void rsaz_1024_red2norm_avx2(void *norm, const void *red);
+
+#if defined(__GNUC__)
+# define ALIGN64        __attribute__((aligned(64)))
+#elif defined(_MSC_VER)
+# define ALIGN64        __declspec(align(64))
+#elif defined(__SUNPRO_C)
+# define ALIGN64
+# pragma align 64(one,two80)
+#else
+/* not fatal, might hurt performance a little */
+# define ALIGN64
+#endif
+
+ALIGN64 static const BN_ULONG one[40] = {
+    1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+    0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
+};
+
+ALIGN64 static const BN_ULONG two80[40] = {
+    0, 0, 1 << 22, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+    0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
+};
+
+void RSAZ_1024_mod_exp_avx2(BN_ULONG result_norm[16],
+                            const BN_ULONG base_norm[16],
+                            const BN_ULONG exponent[16],
+                            const BN_ULONG m_norm[16], const BN_ULONG RR[16],
+                            BN_ULONG k0)
+{
+    unsigned char storage[320 * 3 + 32 * 9 * 16 + 64]; /* 5.5KB */
+    unsigned char *p_str = storage + (64 - ((size_t)storage % 64));
+    unsigned char *a_inv, *m, *result;
+    unsigned char *table_s = p_str + 320 * 3;
+    unsigned char *R2 = table_s; /* borrow */
+    int index;
+    int wvalue;
+
+    if ((((size_t)p_str & 4095) + 320) >> 12) {
+        result = p_str;
+        a_inv = p_str + 320;
+        m = p_str + 320 * 2;    /* should not cross page */
+    } else {
+        m = p_str;              /* should not cross page */
+        result = p_str + 320;
+        a_inv = p_str + 320 * 2;
+    }
+
+    rsaz_1024_norm2red_avx2(m, m_norm);
+    rsaz_1024_norm2red_avx2(a_inv, base_norm);
+    rsaz_1024_norm2red_avx2(R2, RR);
+
+    rsaz_1024_mul_avx2(R2, R2, R2, m, k0);
+    rsaz_1024_mul_avx2(R2, R2, two80, m, k0);
+
+    /* table[0] = 1 */
+    rsaz_1024_mul_avx2(result, R2, one, m, k0);
+    /* table[1] = a_inv^1 */
+    rsaz_1024_mul_avx2(a_inv, a_inv, R2, m, k0);
+
+    rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2(table_s, result, 0);
+    rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2(table_s, a_inv, 1);
+
+    /* table[2] = a_inv^2 */
+    rsaz_1024_sqr_avx2(result, a_inv, m, k0, 1);
+    rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2(table_s, result, 2);
+#if 0
+    /* this is almost 2x smaller and less than 1% slower */
+    for (index = 3; index < 32; index++) {
+        rsaz_1024_mul_avx2(result, result, a_inv, m, k0);
+        rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2(table_s, result, index);
+    }
+#else
+    /* table[4] = a_inv^4 */
+    rsaz_1024_sqr_avx2(result, result, m, k0, 1);
+    rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2(table_s, result, 4);
+    /* table[8] = a_inv^8 */
+    rsaz_1024_sqr_avx2(result, result, m, k0, 1);
+    rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2(table_s, result, 8);
+    /* table[16] = a_inv^16 */
+    rsaz_1024_sqr_avx2(result, result, m, k0, 1);
+    rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2(table_s, result, 16);
+    /* table[17] = a_inv^17 */
+    rsaz_1024_mul_avx2(result, result, a_inv, m, k0);
+    rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2(table_s, result, 17);
+
+    /* table[3] */
+    rsaz_1024_gather5_avx2(result, table_s, 2);
+    rsaz_1024_mul_avx2(result, result, a_inv, m, k0);
+    rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2(table_s, result, 3);
+    /* table[6] */
+    rsaz_1024_sqr_avx2(result, result, m, k0, 1);
+    rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2(table_s, result, 6);
+    /* table[12] */
+    rsaz_1024_sqr_avx2(result, result, m, k0, 1);
+    rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2(table_s, result, 12);
+    /* table[24] */
+    rsaz_1024_sqr_avx2(result, result, m, k0, 1);
+    rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2(table_s, result, 24);
+    /* table[25] */
+    rsaz_1024_mul_avx2(result, result, a_inv, m, k0);
+    rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2(table_s, result, 25);
+
+    /* table[5] */
+    rsaz_1024_gather5_avx2(result, table_s, 4);
+    rsaz_1024_mul_avx2(result, result, a_inv, m, k0);
+    rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2(table_s, result, 5);
+    /* table[10] */
+    rsaz_1024_sqr_avx2(result, result, m, k0, 1);
+    rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2(table_s, result, 10);
+    /* table[20] */
+    rsaz_1024_sqr_avx2(result, result, m, k0, 1);
+    rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2(table_s, result, 20);
+    /* table[21] */
+    rsaz_1024_mul_avx2(result, result, a_inv, m, k0);
+    rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2(table_s, result, 21);
+
+    /* table[7] */
+    rsaz_1024_gather5_avx2(result, table_s, 6);
+    rsaz_1024_mul_avx2(result, result, a_inv, m, k0);
+    rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2(table_s, result, 7);
+    /* table[14] */
+    rsaz_1024_sqr_avx2(result, result, m, k0, 1);
+    rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2(table_s, result, 14);
+    /* table[28] */
+    rsaz_1024_sqr_avx2(result, result, m, k0, 1);
+    rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2(table_s, result, 28);
+    /* table[29] */
+    rsaz_1024_mul_avx2(result, result, a_inv, m, k0);
+    rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2(table_s, result, 29);
+
+    /* table[9] */
+    rsaz_1024_gather5_avx2(result, table_s, 8);
+    rsaz_1024_mul_avx2(result, result, a_inv, m, k0);
+    rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2(table_s, result, 9);
+    /* table[18] */
+    rsaz_1024_sqr_avx2(result, result, m, k0, 1);
+    rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2(table_s, result, 18);
+    /* table[19] */
+    rsaz_1024_mul_avx2(result, result, a_inv, m, k0);
+    rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2(table_s, result, 19);
+
+    /* table[11] */
+    rsaz_1024_gather5_avx2(result, table_s, 10);
+    rsaz_1024_mul_avx2(result, result, a_inv, m, k0);
+    rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2(table_s, result, 11);
+    /* table[22] */
+    rsaz_1024_sqr_avx2(result, result, m, k0, 1);
+    rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2(table_s, result, 22);
+    /* table[23] */
+    rsaz_1024_mul_avx2(result, result, a_inv, m, k0);
+    rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2(table_s, result, 23);
+
+    /* table[13] */
+    rsaz_1024_gather5_avx2(result, table_s, 12);
+    rsaz_1024_mul_avx2(result, result, a_inv, m, k0);
+    rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2(table_s, result, 13);
+    /* table[26] */
+    rsaz_1024_sqr_avx2(result, result, m, k0, 1);
+    rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2(table_s, result, 26);
+    /* table[27] */
+    rsaz_1024_mul_avx2(result, result, a_inv, m, k0);
+    rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2(table_s, result, 27);
+
+    /* table[15] */
+    rsaz_1024_gather5_avx2(result, table_s, 14);
+    rsaz_1024_mul_avx2(result, result, a_inv, m, k0);
+    rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2(table_s, result, 15);
+    /* table[30] */
+    rsaz_1024_sqr_avx2(result, result, m, k0, 1);
+    rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2(table_s, result, 30);
+    /* table[31] */
+    rsaz_1024_mul_avx2(result, result, a_inv, m, k0);
+    rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2(table_s, result, 31);
+#endif
+
+    /* load first window */
+    p_str = (unsigned char *)exponent;
+    wvalue = p_str[127] >> 3;
+    rsaz_1024_gather5_avx2(result, table_s, wvalue);
+
+    index = 1014;
+
+    while (index > -1) {        /* loop for the remaining 127 windows */
+
+        rsaz_1024_sqr_avx2(result, result, m, k0, 5);
+
+        wvalue = (p_str[(index / 8) + 1] << 8) | p_str[index / 8];
+        wvalue = (wvalue >> (index % 8)) & 31;
+        index -= 5;
+
+        rsaz_1024_gather5_avx2(a_inv, table_s, wvalue); /* borrow a_inv */
+        rsaz_1024_mul_avx2(result, result, a_inv, m, k0);
+    }
+
+    /* square four times */
+    rsaz_1024_sqr_avx2(result, result, m, k0, 4);
+
+    wvalue = p_str[0] & 15;
+
+    rsaz_1024_gather5_avx2(a_inv, table_s, wvalue); /* borrow a_inv */
+    rsaz_1024_mul_avx2(result, result, a_inv, m, k0);
+
+    /* from Montgomery */
+    rsaz_1024_mul_avx2(result, result, one, m, k0);
+
+    rsaz_1024_red2norm_avx2(result_norm, result);
+
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(storage, sizeof(storage));
+}
+
+/*
+ * See crypto/bn/rsaz-x86_64.pl for further details.
+ */
+void rsaz_512_mul(void *ret, const void *a, const void *b, const void *n,
+                  BN_ULONG k);
+void rsaz_512_mul_scatter4(void *ret, const void *a, const void *n,
+                           BN_ULONG k, const void *tbl, unsigned int power);
+void rsaz_512_mul_gather4(void *ret, const void *a, const void *tbl,
+                          const void *n, BN_ULONG k, unsigned int power);
+void rsaz_512_mul_by_one(void *ret, const void *a, const void *n, BN_ULONG k);
+void rsaz_512_sqr(void *ret, const void *a, const void *n, BN_ULONG k,
+                  int cnt);
+void rsaz_512_scatter4(void *tbl, const BN_ULONG *val, int power);
+void rsaz_512_gather4(BN_ULONG *val, const void *tbl, int power);
+
+void RSAZ_512_mod_exp(BN_ULONG result[8],
+                      const BN_ULONG base[8], const BN_ULONG exponent[8],
+                      const BN_ULONG m[8], BN_ULONG k0, const BN_ULONG RR[8])
+{
+    unsigned char storage[16 * 8 * 8 + 64 * 2 + 64]; /* 1.2KB */
+    unsigned char *table = storage + (64 - ((size_t)storage % 64));
+    BN_ULONG *a_inv = (BN_ULONG *)(table + 16 * 8 * 8);
+    BN_ULONG *temp = (BN_ULONG *)(table + 16 * 8 * 8 + 8 * 8);
+    unsigned char *p_str = (unsigned char *)exponent;
+    int index;
+    unsigned int wvalue;
+
+    /* table[0] = 1_inv */
+    temp[0] = 0 - m[0];
+    temp[1] = ~m[1];
+    temp[2] = ~m[2];
+    temp[3] = ~m[3];
+    temp[4] = ~m[4];
+    temp[5] = ~m[5];
+    temp[6] = ~m[6];
+    temp[7] = ~m[7];
+    rsaz_512_scatter4(table, temp, 0);
+
+    /* table [1] = a_inv^1 */
+    rsaz_512_mul(a_inv, base, RR, m, k0);
+    rsaz_512_scatter4(table, a_inv, 1);
+
+    /* table [2] = a_inv^2 */
+    rsaz_512_sqr(temp, a_inv, m, k0, 1);
+    rsaz_512_scatter4(table, temp, 2);
+
+    for (index = 3; index < 16; index++)
+        rsaz_512_mul_scatter4(temp, a_inv, m, k0, table, index);
+
+    /* load first window */
+    wvalue = p_str[63];
+
+    rsaz_512_gather4(temp, table, wvalue >> 4);
+    rsaz_512_sqr(temp, temp, m, k0, 4);
+    rsaz_512_mul_gather4(temp, temp, table, m, k0, wvalue & 0xf);
+
+    for (index = 62; index >= 0; index--) {
+        wvalue = p_str[index];
+
+        rsaz_512_sqr(temp, temp, m, k0, 4);
+        rsaz_512_mul_gather4(temp, temp, table, m, k0, wvalue >> 4);
+
+        rsaz_512_sqr(temp, temp, m, k0, 4);
+        rsaz_512_mul_gather4(temp, temp, table, m, k0, wvalue & 0x0f);
+    }
+
+    /* from Montgomery */
+    rsaz_512_mul_by_one(result, temp, m, k0);
+
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(storage, sizeof(storage));
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/rsaz_exp.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/rsaz_exp.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9501cc8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/bn/rsaz_exp.h
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2013-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*****************************************************************************
+*                                                                            *
+*  Copyright (c) 2012, Intel Corporation                                     *
+*                                                                            *
+*  All rights reserved.                                                      *
+*                                                                            *
+*  Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without        *
+*  modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are    *
+*  met:                                                                      *
+*                                                                            *
+*  *  Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright         *
+*     notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.          *
+*                                                                            *
+*  *  Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright      *
+*     notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the    *
+*     documentation and/or other materials provided with the                 *
+*     distribution.                                                          *
+*                                                                            *
+*  *  Neither the name of the Intel Corporation nor the names of its         *
+*     contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from   *
+*     this software without specific prior written permission.               *
+*                                                                            *
+*                                                                            *
+*  THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY INTEL CORPORATION ""AS IS"" AND ANY          *
+*  EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE         *
+*  IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR        *
+*  PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL INTEL CORPORATION OR            *
+*  CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL,     *
+*  EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,       *
+*  PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR        *
+*  PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF    *
+*  LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING      *
+*  NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS        *
+*  SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.              *
+*                                                                            *
+******************************************************************************
+* Developers and authors:                                                    *
+* Shay Gueron (1, 2), and Vlad Krasnov (1)                                   *
+* (1) Intel Corporation, Israel Development Center, Haifa, Israel            *
+* (2) University of Haifa, Israel                                            *
+*****************************************************************************/
+
+#ifndef RSAZ_EXP_H
+# define RSAZ_EXP_H
+
+# undef RSAZ_ENABLED
+# if defined(OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT) && \
+        (defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
+         defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64))
+#  define RSAZ_ENABLED
+
+#  include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+void RSAZ_1024_mod_exp_avx2(BN_ULONG result[16],
+                            const BN_ULONG base_norm[16],
+                            const BN_ULONG exponent[16],
+                            const BN_ULONG m_norm[16], const BN_ULONG RR[16],
+                            BN_ULONG k0);
+int rsaz_avx2_eligible();
+
+void RSAZ_512_mod_exp(BN_ULONG result[8],
+                      const BN_ULONG base_norm[8], const BN_ULONG exponent[8],
+                      const BN_ULONG m_norm[8], BN_ULONG k0,
+                      const BN_ULONG RR[8]);
+
+# endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/buffer/buf_err.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/buffer/buf_err.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a6a2ab8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/buffer/buf_err.c
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+/*
+ * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+
+# define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_BUF,func,0)
+# define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_BUF,0,reason)
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA BUF_str_functs[] = {
+    {ERR_FUNC(BUF_F_BUF_MEM_GROW), "BUF_MEM_grow"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BUF_F_BUF_MEM_GROW_CLEAN), "BUF_MEM_grow_clean"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BUF_F_BUF_MEM_NEW), "BUF_MEM_new"},
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA BUF_str_reasons[] = {
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+
+#endif
+
+int ERR_load_BUF_strings(void)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+
+    if (ERR_func_error_string(BUF_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) {
+        ERR_load_strings(0, BUF_str_functs);
+        ERR_load_strings(0, BUF_str_reasons);
+    }
+#endif
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/buffer/buffer.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/buffer/buffer.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f3f8a1b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/buffer/buffer.c
@@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+
+/*
+ * LIMIT_BEFORE_EXPANSION is the maximum n such that (n+3)/3*4 < 2**31. That
+ * function is applied in several functions in this file and this limit
+ * ensures that the result fits in an int.
+ */
+#define LIMIT_BEFORE_EXPANSION 0x5ffffffc
+
+BUF_MEM *BUF_MEM_new_ex(unsigned long flags)
+{
+    BUF_MEM *ret;
+
+    ret = BUF_MEM_new();
+    if (ret != NULL)
+        ret->flags = flags;
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+BUF_MEM *BUF_MEM_new(void)
+{
+    BUF_MEM *ret;
+
+    ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
+    if (ret == NULL) {
+        BUFerr(BUF_F_BUF_MEM_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+void BUF_MEM_free(BUF_MEM *a)
+{
+    if (a == NULL)
+        return;
+
+    if (a->data != NULL) {
+        if (a->flags & BUF_MEM_FLAG_SECURE)
+            OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(a->data, a->max);
+        else
+            OPENSSL_clear_free(a->data, a->max);
+    }
+    OPENSSL_free(a);
+}
+
+/* Allocate a block of secure memory; copy over old data if there
+ * was any, and then free it. */
+static char *sec_alloc_realloc(BUF_MEM *str, size_t len)
+{
+    char *ret;
+
+    ret = OPENSSL_secure_malloc(len);
+    if (str->data != NULL) {
+        if (ret != NULL) {
+            memcpy(ret, str->data, str->length);
+            OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(str->data, str->length);
+            str->data = NULL;
+        }
+    }
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+size_t BUF_MEM_grow(BUF_MEM *str, size_t len)
+{
+    char *ret;
+    size_t n;
+
+    if (str->length >= len) {
+        str->length = len;
+        return (len);
+    }
+    if (str->max >= len) {
+        if (str->data != NULL)
+            memset(&str->data[str->length], 0, len - str->length);
+        str->length = len;
+        return (len);
+    }
+    /* This limit is sufficient to ensure (len+3)/3*4 < 2**31 */
+    if (len > LIMIT_BEFORE_EXPANSION) {
+        BUFerr(BUF_F_BUF_MEM_GROW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    n = (len + 3) / 3 * 4;
+    if ((str->flags & BUF_MEM_FLAG_SECURE))
+        ret = sec_alloc_realloc(str, n);
+    else
+        ret = OPENSSL_realloc(str->data, n);
+    if (ret == NULL) {
+        BUFerr(BUF_F_BUF_MEM_GROW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        len = 0;
+    } else {
+        str->data = ret;
+        str->max = n;
+        memset(&str->data[str->length], 0, len - str->length);
+        str->length = len;
+    }
+    return (len);
+}
+
+size_t BUF_MEM_grow_clean(BUF_MEM *str, size_t len)
+{
+    char *ret;
+    size_t n;
+
+    if (str->length >= len) {
+        if (str->data != NULL)
+            memset(&str->data[len], 0, str->length - len);
+        str->length = len;
+        return (len);
+    }
+    if (str->max >= len) {
+        memset(&str->data[str->length], 0, len - str->length);
+        str->length = len;
+        return (len);
+    }
+    /* This limit is sufficient to ensure (len+3)/3*4 < 2**31 */
+    if (len > LIMIT_BEFORE_EXPANSION) {
+        BUFerr(BUF_F_BUF_MEM_GROW_CLEAN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    n = (len + 3) / 3 * 4;
+    if ((str->flags & BUF_MEM_FLAG_SECURE))
+        ret = sec_alloc_realloc(str, n);
+    else
+        ret = OPENSSL_clear_realloc(str->data, str->max, n);
+    if (ret == NULL) {
+        BUFerr(BUF_F_BUF_MEM_GROW_CLEAN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        len = 0;
+    } else {
+        str->data = ret;
+        str->max = n;
+        memset(&str->data[str->length], 0, len - str->length);
+        str->length = len;
+    }
+    return (len);
+}
+
+void BUF_reverse(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t size)
+{
+    size_t i;
+    if (in) {
+        out += size - 1;
+        for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
+            *out-- = *in++;
+    } else {
+        unsigned char *q;
+        char c;
+        q = out + size - 1;
+        for (i = 0; i < size / 2; i++) {
+            c = *q;
+            *q-- = *out;
+            *out++ = c;
+        }
+    }
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/buffer/build.info b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/buffer/build.info
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..54da1f9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/buffer/build.info
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+LIBS=../../libcrypto
+SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=buffer.c buf_err.c
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/build.info b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/build.info
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..916d24f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/build.info
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+{- use File::Spec::Functions qw/catdir catfile/; -}
+LIBS=../libcrypto
+SOURCE[../libcrypto]=\
+        cryptlib.c mem.c mem_dbg.c cversion.c ex_data.c cpt_err.c \
+        ebcdic.c uid.c o_time.c o_str.c o_dir.c o_fopen.c \
+        threads_pthread.c threads_win.c threads_none.c \
+        o_init.c o_fips.c mem_sec.c init.c {- $target{cpuid_asm_src} -} \
+        {- $target{uplink_aux_src} -}
+EXTRA=  ../ms/uplink-x86.pl ../ms/uplink.c ../ms/applink.c \
+        x86cpuid.pl x86_64cpuid.pl ia64cpuid.S \
+        ppccpuid.pl pariscid.pl alphacpuid.pl arm64cpuid.pl armv4cpuid.pl
+
+DEPEND[cversion.o]=buildinf.h
+GENERATE[buildinf.h]=../util/mkbuildinf.pl "$(CC) $(CFLAGS_Q)" "$(PLATFORM)"
+DEPEND[buildinf.h]=../configdata.pm
+
+GENERATE[uplink-x86.s]=../ms/uplink-x86.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+GENERATE[uplink-x86_64.s]=../ms/uplink-x86_64.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+GENERATE[uplink-ia64.s]=../ms/uplink-ia64.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+
+GENERATE[x86cpuid.s]=x86cpuid.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $(CFLAGS) $(LIB_CFLAGS) $(PROCESSOR)
+DEPEND[x86cpuid.s]=perlasm/x86asm.pl
+
+GENERATE[x86_64cpuid.s]=x86_64cpuid.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+
+GENERATE[ia64cpuid.s]=ia64cpuid.S
+GENERATE[ppccpuid.s]=ppccpuid.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+GENERATE[pariscid.s]=pariscid.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+GENERATE[alphacpuid.s]=alphacpuid.pl
+GENERATE[arm64cpuid.S]=arm64cpuid.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+INCLUDE[arm64cpuid.o]=.
+GENERATE[armv4cpuid.S]=armv4cpuid.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+INCLUDE[armv4cpuid.o]=.
+
+IF[{- $config{target} =~ /^(?:Cygwin|mingw|VC-)/ -}]
+  SHARED_SOURCE[../libcrypto]=dllmain.c
+ENDIF
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/c64xpluscpuid.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/c64xpluscpuid.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9efe120
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/c64xpluscpuid.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,287 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2012-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {}
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	.text
+
+	.if	.ASSEMBLER_VERSION<7000000
+	.asg	0,__TI_EABI__
+	.endif
+	.if	__TI_EABI__
+	.asg	OPENSSL_rdtsc,_OPENSSL_rdtsc
+	.asg	OPENSSL_cleanse,_OPENSSL_cleanse
+	.asg	CRYPTO_memcmp,_CRYPTO_memcmp
+	.asg	OPENSSL_atomic_add,_OPENSSL_atomic_add
+	.asg	OPENSSL_wipe_cpu,_OPENSSL_wipe_cpu
+	.asg	OPENSSL_instrument_bus,_OPENSSL_instrument_bus
+	.asg	OPENSSL_instrument_bus2,_OPENSSL_instrument_bus2
+	.endif
+
+	.asg	B3,RA
+
+	.global	_OPENSSL_rdtsc
+_OPENSSL_rdtsc:
+	.asmfunc
+	B	RA
+	MVC	TSCL,B0
+	MVC	TSCH,B1
+  [!B0]	MVC	B0,TSCL		; start TSC
+	MV	B0,A4
+	MV	B1,A5
+	.endasmfunc
+
+	.global	_OPENSSL_cleanse
+_OPENSSL_cleanse:
+	.asmfunc
+	ZERO	A3:A2
+||	ZERO	B2
+||	SHRU	B4,3,B0		; is length >= 8
+||	ADD	1,A4,B6
+  [!B0]	BNOP	RA
+||	ZERO	A1
+||	ZERO	B1
+   [B0]	MVC	B0,ILC
+||[!B0]	CMPLT	0,B4,A1
+||[!B0]	CMPLT	1,B4,B1
+   [A1]	STB	A2,*A4++[2]
+|| [B1] STB	B2,*B6++[2]
+||[!B0]	CMPLT	2,B4,A1
+||[!B0]	CMPLT	3,B4,B1
+   [A1]	STB	A2,*A4++[2]
+|| [B1] STB	B2,*B6++[2]
+||[!B0]	CMPLT	4,B4,A1
+||[!B0]	CMPLT	5,B4,B1
+   [A1]	STB	A2,*A4++[2]
+|| [B1] STB	B2,*B6++[2]
+||[!B0]	CMPLT	6,B4,A1
+   [A1]	STB	A2,*A4++[2]
+
+	SPLOOP	1
+	STNDW	A3:A2,*A4++
+||	SUB	B4,8,B4
+	SPKERNEL
+
+	MV	B4,B0		; remaining bytes
+||	ADD	1,A4,B6
+||	BNOP	RA
+   [B0]	CMPLT	0,B0,A1
+|| [B0]	CMPLT	1,B0,B1
+   [A1]	STB	A2,*A4++[2]
+|| [B1] STB	B2,*B6++[2]
+|| [B0]	CMPLT	2,B0,A1
+|| [B0]	CMPLT	3,B0,B1
+   [A1]	STB	A2,*A4++[2]
+|| [B1] STB	B2,*B6++[2]
+|| [B0]	CMPLT	4,B0,A1
+|| [B0]	CMPLT	5,B0,B1
+   [A1]	STB	A2,*A4++[2]
+|| [B1] STB	B2,*B6++[2]
+|| [B0]	CMPLT	6,B0,A1
+   [A1]	STB	A2,*A4++[2]
+	.endasmfunc
+
+	.global	_CRYPTO_memcmp
+_CRYPTO_memcmp:
+	.asmfunc
+	MV	A6,B0
+  [!B0]	BNOP	RA
+||[!B0]	ZERO	A4
+   [B0]	MVC	B0,ILC
+|| [B0]	ZERO	A0
+	NOP	4
+
+	SPLOOP	1
+	LDBU	*A4++,A1
+||	LDBU	*B4++,B1
+	NOP	4
+	XOR.L	B1,A1,A2
+	SPKERNEL 1,0
+||	OR.S	A2,A0,A0
+
+	BNOP	RA,3
+	ZERO.L	A4
+  [A0]	MVK	1,A4
+	.endasmfunc
+
+	.global	_OPENSSL_atomic_add
+_OPENSSL_atomic_add:
+	.asmfunc
+	MV	A4,B0
+atomic_add?:
+	LL	*B0,B5
+	NOP	4
+	ADD	B4,B5,B5
+	SL	B5,*B0
+	CMTL	*B0,B1
+	NOP	4
+  [!B1]	B	atomic_add?
+   [B1]	BNOP	RA,4
+	MV	B5,A4
+	.endasmfunc
+
+	.global	_OPENSSL_wipe_cpu
+_OPENSSL_wipe_cpu:
+	.asmfunc
+	ZERO	A0
+||	ZERO	B0
+||	ZERO	A1
+||	ZERO	B1
+	ZERO	A3:A2
+||	MVD	B0,B2
+||	ZERO	A4
+||	ZERO	B4
+||	ZERO	A5
+||	ZERO	B5
+||	BNOP	RA
+	ZERO	A7:A6
+||	ZERO	B7:B6
+||	ZERO	A8
+||	ZERO	B8
+||	ZERO	A9
+||	ZERO	B9
+	ZERO	A17:A16
+||	ZERO	B17:B16
+||	ZERO	A18
+||	ZERO	B18
+||	ZERO	A19
+||	ZERO	B19
+	ZERO	A21:A20
+||	ZERO	B21:B20
+||	ZERO	A22
+||	ZERO	B22
+||	ZERO	A23
+||	ZERO	B23
+	ZERO	A25:A24
+||	ZERO	B25:B24
+||	ZERO	A26
+||	ZERO	B26
+||	ZERO	A27
+||	ZERO	B27
+	ZERO	A29:A28
+||	ZERO	B29:B28
+||	ZERO	A30
+||	ZERO	B30
+||	ZERO	A31
+||	ZERO	B31
+	.endasmfunc
+
+CLFLUSH	.macro	CONTROL,ADDR,LEN
+	B	passthrough?
+||	STW	ADDR,*CONTROL[0]
+	STW	LEN,*CONTROL[1]
+spinlock?:
+	LDW	*CONTROL[1],A0
+	NOP	3
+passthrough?:
+	NOP
+  [A0]	BNOP	spinlock?,5
+	.endm
+
+	.global	_OPENSSL_instrument_bus
+_OPENSSL_instrument_bus:
+	.asmfunc
+	MV	B4,B0			; reassign sizeof(output)
+||	MV	A4,B4			; reassign output
+||	MVK	0x00004030,A3
+	MV	B0,A4			; return value
+||	MVK	1,A1
+||	MVKH	0x01840000,A3		; L1DWIBAR
+	MVC	TSCL,B8			; collect 1st tick
+||	MVK	0x00004010,A5
+	MV	B8,B9			; lasttick = tick
+||	MVK	0,B7			; lastdiff = 0
+||	MVKH	0x01840000,A5		; L2WIBAR
+	CLFLUSH	A3,B4,A1		; write-back and invalidate L1D line
+	CLFLUSH	A5,B4,A1		; write-back and invalidate L2 line
+	LL	*B4,B5
+	NOP	4
+	ADD	B7,B5,B5
+	SL	B5,*B4
+	CMTL	*B4,B1
+	NOP	4
+	STW	B5,*B4
+bus_loop1?:
+	MVC	TSCL,B8
+|| [B0]	SUB	B0,1,B0
+	SUB	B8,B9,B7		; lastdiff = tick - lasttick
+||	MV	B8,B9			; lasttick = tick
+	CLFLUSH	A3,B4,A1		; write-back and invalidate L1D line
+	CLFLUSH	A5,B4,A1		; write-back and invalidate L2 line
+	LL	*B4,B5
+	NOP	4
+	ADD	B7,B5,B5
+	SL	B5,*B4
+	CMTL	*B4,B1
+	STW	B5,*B4			; [!B1] is removed to flatten samples
+||	ADDK	4,B4
+|| [B0]	BNOP	bus_loop1?,5
+
+	BNOP	RA,5
+	.endasmfunc
+
+	.global	_OPENSSL_instrument_bus2
+_OPENSSL_instrument_bus2:
+	.asmfunc
+	MV	A6,B0			; reassign max
+||	MV	B4,A6			; reassing sizeof(output)
+||	MVK	0x00004030,A3
+	MV	A4,B4			; reassign output
+||	MVK	0,A4			; return value
+||	MVK	1,A1
+||	MVKH	0x01840000,A3		; L1DWIBAR
+
+	MVC	TSCL,B8			; collect 1st tick
+||	MVK	0x00004010,A5
+	MV	B8,B9			; lasttick = tick
+||	MVK	0,B7			; lastdiff = 0
+||	MVKH	0x01840000,A5		; L2WIBAR
+	CLFLUSH	A3,B4,A1		; write-back and invalidate L1D line
+	CLFLUSH	A5,B4,A1		; write-back and invalidate L2 line
+	LL	*B4,B5
+	NOP	4
+	ADD	B7,B5,B5
+	SL	B5,*B4
+	CMTL	*B4,B1
+	NOP	4
+	STW	B5,*B4
+
+	MVC	TSCL,B8			; collect 1st diff
+	SUB	B8,B9,B7		; lastdiff = tick - lasttick
+||	MV	B8,B9			; lasttick = tick
+||	SUB	B0,1,B0
+bus_loop2?:
+	CLFLUSH	A3,B4,A1		; write-back and invalidate L1D line
+	CLFLUSH	A5,B4,A1		; write-back and invalidate L2 line
+	LL	*B4,B5
+	NOP	4
+	ADD	B7,B5,B5
+	SL	B5,*B4
+	CMTL	*B4,B1
+	STW	B5,*B4			; [!B1] is removed to flatten samples
+||[!B0]	BNOP	bus_loop2_done?,2
+||	SUB	B0,1,B0
+	MVC	TSCL,B8
+	SUB	B8,B9,B8
+||	MV	B8,B9
+	CMPEQ	B8,B7,B2
+||	MV	B8,B7
+  [!B2]	ADDAW	B4,1,B4
+||[!B2]	ADDK	1,A4
+	CMPEQ	A4,A6,A2
+  [!A2]	BNOP	bus_loop2?,5
+
+bus_loop2_done?:
+	BNOP	RA,5
+	.endasmfunc
+___
+
+print $code;
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/camellia/asm/cmll-x86.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/camellia/asm/cmll-x86.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..59f9ed9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/camellia/asm/cmll-x86.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,1150 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+# ====================================================================
+# Copyright (c) 2008 Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
+#
+# This module may be used under the terms of either the GNU General
+# Public License version 2 or later, the GNU Lesser General Public
+# License version 2.1 or later, the Mozilla Public License version
+# 1.1 or the BSD License. The exact terms of either license are
+# distributed along with this module. For further details see
+# http://www.openssl.org/~appro/camellia/.
+# ====================================================================
+
+# Performance in cycles per processed byte (less is better) in
+# 'openssl speed ...' benchmark:
+#
+#			AMD K8	Core2	PIII	P4
+# -evp camellia-128-ecb	21.5	22.8	27.0	28.9
+# + over gcc 3.4.6	+90/11% +70/10%	+53/4%	+160/64%
+# + over icc 8.0	+48/19% +21/15%	+21/17%	+55/37%
+#
+# camellia-128-cbc	17.3	21.1	23.9	25.9
+#
+# 128-bit key setup	196	280	256	240	cycles/key
+# + over gcc 3.4.6	+30/0%	+17/11%	+11/0%	+63/40%
+# + over icc 8.0	+18/3%	+10/0%	+10/3%	+21/10%
+#
+# Pairs of numbers in "+" rows represent performance improvement over
+# compiler generated position-independent code, PIC, and non-PIC
+# respectively. PIC results are of greater relevance, as this module
+# is position-independent, i.e. suitable for a shared library or PIE.
+# Position independence "costs" one register, which is why compilers
+# are so close with non-PIC results, they have an extra register to
+# spare. CBC results are better than ECB ones thanks to "zero-copy"
+# private _x86_* interface, and are ~30-40% better than with compiler
+# generated cmll_cbc.o, and reach ~80-90% of x86_64 performance on
+# same CPU (where applicable).
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm");
+require "x86asm.pl";
+
+$OPENSSL=1;
+
+$output = pop;
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+&asm_init($ARGV[0],"cmll-586.pl",$ARGV[$#ARGV] eq "386");
+
+@T=("eax","ebx","ecx","edx");
+$idx="esi";
+$key="edi";
+$Tbl="ebp";
+
+# stack frame layout in _x86_Camellia_* routines, frame is allocated
+# by caller
+$__ra=&DWP(0,"esp");	# return address
+$__s0=&DWP(4,"esp");	# s0 backing store
+$__s1=&DWP(8,"esp");	# s1 backing store
+$__s2=&DWP(12,"esp");	# s2 backing store
+$__s3=&DWP(16,"esp");	# s3 backing store
+$__end=&DWP(20,"esp");	# pointer to end/start of key schedule
+
+# stack frame layout in Camellia_[en|crypt] routines, which differs from
+# above by 4 and overlaps by pointer to end/start of key schedule
+$_end=&DWP(16,"esp");
+$_esp=&DWP(20,"esp");
+
+# const unsigned int Camellia_SBOX[4][256];
+# Well, sort of... Camellia_SBOX[0][] is interleaved with [1][],
+# and [2][] - with [3][]. This is done to optimize code size.
+$SBOX1_1110=0;		# Camellia_SBOX[0]
+$SBOX4_4404=4;		# Camellia_SBOX[1]
+$SBOX2_0222=2048;	# Camellia_SBOX[2]
+$SBOX3_3033=2052;	# Camellia_SBOX[3]
+&static_label("Camellia_SIGMA");
+&static_label("Camellia_SBOX");
+
+sub Camellia_Feistel {
+my $i=@_[0];
+my $seed=defined(@_[1])?@_[1]:0;
+my $scale=$seed<0?-8:8;
+my $frame=defined(@_[2])?@_[2]:0;
+my $j=($i&1)*2;
+my $t0=@T[($j)%4],$t1=@T[($j+1)%4],$t2=@T[($j+2)%4],$t3=@T[($j+3)%4];
+
+	&xor	($t0,$idx);				# t0^=key[0]
+	&xor	($t1,&DWP($seed+$i*$scale+4,$key));	# t1^=key[1]
+	&movz	($idx,&HB($t0));			# (t0>>8)&0xff
+	&mov	($t3,&DWP($SBOX3_3033,$Tbl,$idx,8));	# t3=SBOX3_3033[0]
+	&movz	($idx,&LB($t0));			# (t0>>0)&0xff
+	&xor	($t3,&DWP($SBOX4_4404,$Tbl,$idx,8));	# t3^=SBOX4_4404[0]
+	&shr	($t0,16);
+	&movz	($idx,&LB($t1));			# (t1>>0)&0xff
+	&mov	($t2,&DWP($SBOX1_1110,$Tbl,$idx,8));	# t2=SBOX1_1110[1]
+	&movz	($idx,&HB($t0));			# (t0>>24)&0xff
+	&xor	($t3,&DWP($SBOX1_1110,$Tbl,$idx,8));	# t3^=SBOX1_1110[0]
+	&movz	($idx,&HB($t1));			# (t1>>8)&0xff
+	&xor	($t2,&DWP($SBOX4_4404,$Tbl,$idx,8));	# t2^=SBOX4_4404[1]
+	&shr	($t1,16);
+	&movz	($t0,&LB($t0));				# (t0>>16)&0xff
+	&xor	($t3,&DWP($SBOX2_0222,$Tbl,$t0,8));	# t3^=SBOX2_0222[0]
+	&movz	($idx,&HB($t1));			# (t1>>24)&0xff
+	&mov	($t0,&DWP($frame+4*(($j+3)%4),"esp"));	# prefetch "s3"
+	&xor	($t2,$t3);				# t2^=t3
+	&rotr	($t3,8);				# t3=RightRotate(t3,8)
+	&xor	($t2,&DWP($SBOX2_0222,$Tbl,$idx,8));	# t2^=SBOX2_0222[1]
+	&movz	($idx,&LB($t1));			# (t1>>16)&0xff
+	&mov	($t1,&DWP($frame+4*(($j+2)%4),"esp"));	# prefetch "s2"
+	&xor	($t3,$t0);				# t3^=s3
+	&xor	($t2,&DWP($SBOX3_3033,$Tbl,$idx,8));	# t2^=SBOX3_3033[1]
+	&mov	($idx,&DWP($seed+($i+1)*$scale,$key));	# prefetch key[i+1]
+	&xor	($t3,$t2);				# t3^=t2
+	&mov	(&DWP($frame+4*(($j+3)%4),"esp"),$t3);	# s3=t3
+	&xor	($t2,$t1);				# t2^=s2
+	&mov	(&DWP($frame+4*(($j+2)%4),"esp"),$t2);	# s2=t2
+}
+
+# void Camellia_EncryptBlock_Rounds(
+#		int grandRounds,
+#		const Byte plaintext[],
+#		const KEY_TABLE_TYPE keyTable,
+#		Byte ciphertext[])
+&function_begin("Camellia_EncryptBlock_Rounds");
+	&mov	("eax",&wparam(0));	# load grandRounds
+	&mov	($idx,&wparam(1));	# load plaintext pointer
+	&mov	($key,&wparam(2));	# load key schedule pointer
+
+	&mov	("ebx","esp");
+	&sub	("esp",7*4);		# place for s[0-3],keyEnd,esp and ra
+	&and	("esp",-64);
+
+	# place stack frame just "above mod 1024" the key schedule
+	# this ensures that cache associativity of 2 suffices
+	&lea	("ecx",&DWP(-64-63,$key));
+	&sub	("ecx","esp");
+	&neg	("ecx");
+	&and	("ecx",0x3C0);	# modulo 1024, but aligned to cache-line
+	&sub	("esp","ecx");
+	&add	("esp",4);	# 4 is reserved for callee's return address
+
+	&shl	("eax",6);
+	&lea	("eax",&DWP(0,$key,"eax"));
+	&mov	($_esp,"ebx");	# save %esp
+	&mov	($_end,"eax");	# save keyEnd
+
+	&call	(&label("pic_point"));
+	&set_label("pic_point");
+	&blindpop($Tbl);
+	&lea	($Tbl,&DWP(&label("Camellia_SBOX")."-".&label("pic_point"),$Tbl));
+
+	&mov	(@T[0],&DWP(0,$idx));	# load plaintext
+	&mov	(@T[1],&DWP(4,$idx));
+	&mov	(@T[2],&DWP(8,$idx));
+	&bswap	(@T[0]);
+	&mov	(@T[3],&DWP(12,$idx));
+	&bswap	(@T[1]);
+	&bswap	(@T[2]);
+	&bswap	(@T[3]);
+
+	&call	("_x86_Camellia_encrypt");
+
+	&mov	("esp",$_esp);
+	&bswap	(@T[0]);
+	&mov	($idx,&wparam(3));	# load ciphertext pointer
+	&bswap	(@T[1]);
+	&bswap	(@T[2]);
+	&bswap	(@T[3]);
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,$idx),@T[0]);	# write ciphertext
+	&mov	(&DWP(4,$idx),@T[1]);
+	&mov	(&DWP(8,$idx),@T[2]);
+	&mov	(&DWP(12,$idx),@T[3]);
+&function_end("Camellia_EncryptBlock_Rounds");
+# V1.x API
+&function_begin_B("Camellia_EncryptBlock");
+	&mov	("eax",128);
+	&sub	("eax",&wparam(0));	# load keyBitLength
+	&mov	("eax",3);
+	&adc	("eax",0);		# keyBitLength==128?3:4
+	&mov	(&wparam(0),"eax");
+	&jmp	(&label("Camellia_EncryptBlock_Rounds"));
+&function_end_B("Camellia_EncryptBlock");
+
+if ($OPENSSL) {
+# void Camellia_encrypt(
+#		const unsigned char *in,
+#		unsigned char *out,
+#		const CAMELLIA_KEY *key)
+&function_begin("Camellia_encrypt");
+	&mov	($idx,&wparam(0));	# load plaintext pointer
+	&mov	($key,&wparam(2));	# load key schedule pointer
+
+	&mov	("ebx","esp");
+	&sub	("esp",7*4);		# place for s[0-3],keyEnd,esp and ra
+	&and	("esp",-64);
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(272,$key));	# load grandRounds counter
+
+	# place stack frame just "above mod 1024" the key schedule
+	# this ensures that cache associativity of 2 suffices
+	&lea	("ecx",&DWP(-64-63,$key));
+	&sub	("ecx","esp");
+	&neg	("ecx");
+	&and	("ecx",0x3C0);	# modulo 1024, but aligned to cache-line
+	&sub	("esp","ecx");
+	&add	("esp",4);	# 4 is reserved for callee's return address
+
+	&shl	("eax",6);
+	&lea	("eax",&DWP(0,$key,"eax"));
+	&mov	($_esp,"ebx");	# save %esp
+	&mov	($_end,"eax");	# save keyEnd
+
+	&call	(&label("pic_point"));
+	&set_label("pic_point");
+	&blindpop($Tbl);
+	&lea	($Tbl,&DWP(&label("Camellia_SBOX")."-".&label("pic_point"),$Tbl));
+
+	&mov	(@T[0],&DWP(0,$idx));	# load plaintext
+	&mov	(@T[1],&DWP(4,$idx));
+	&mov	(@T[2],&DWP(8,$idx));
+	&bswap	(@T[0]);
+	&mov	(@T[3],&DWP(12,$idx));
+	&bswap	(@T[1]);
+	&bswap	(@T[2]);
+	&bswap	(@T[3]);
+
+	&call	("_x86_Camellia_encrypt");
+
+	&mov	("esp",$_esp);
+	&bswap	(@T[0]);
+	&mov	($idx,&wparam(1));	# load ciphertext pointer
+	&bswap	(@T[1]);
+	&bswap	(@T[2]);
+	&bswap	(@T[3]);
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,$idx),@T[0]);	# write ciphertext
+	&mov	(&DWP(4,$idx),@T[1]);
+	&mov	(&DWP(8,$idx),@T[2]);
+	&mov	(&DWP(12,$idx),@T[3]);
+&function_end("Camellia_encrypt");
+}
+
+&function_begin_B("_x86_Camellia_encrypt");
+	&xor	(@T[0],&DWP(0,$key));	# ^=key[0-3]
+	&xor	(@T[1],&DWP(4,$key));
+	&xor	(@T[2],&DWP(8,$key));
+	&xor	(@T[3],&DWP(12,$key));
+	&mov	($idx,&DWP(16,$key));	# prefetch key[4]
+
+	&mov	($__s0,@T[0]);		# save s[0-3]
+	&mov	($__s1,@T[1]);
+	&mov	($__s2,@T[2]);
+	&mov	($__s3,@T[3]);
+
+&set_label("loop",16);
+	for ($i=0;$i<6;$i++) { Camellia_Feistel($i,16,4); }
+
+	&add	($key,16*4);
+	&cmp	($key,$__end);
+	&je	(&label("done"));
+
+	# @T[0-1] are preloaded, $idx is preloaded with key[0]
+	&and	($idx,@T[0]);
+	 &mov	 (@T[3],$__s3);
+	&rotl	($idx,1);
+	 &mov	 (@T[2],@T[3]);
+	&xor	(@T[1],$idx);
+	 &or	 (@T[2],&DWP(12,$key));
+	&mov	($__s1,@T[1]);		# s1^=LeftRotate(s0&key[0],1);
+	 &xor	 (@T[2],$__s2);
+
+	&mov	($idx,&DWP(4,$key));
+	 &mov	 ($__s2,@T[2]);		# s2^=s3|key[3];
+	&or	($idx,@T[1]);
+	 &and	 (@T[2],&DWP(8,$key));
+	&xor	(@T[0],$idx);
+	 &rotl	 (@T[2],1);
+	&mov	($__s0,@T[0]);		# s0^=s1|key[1];
+	 &xor	 (@T[3],@T[2]);
+	&mov	($idx,&DWP(16,$key));		# prefetch key[4]
+	 &mov	 ($__s3,@T[3]);		# s3^=LeftRotate(s2&key[2],1);
+	&jmp	(&label("loop"));
+
+&set_label("done",8);
+	&mov	(@T[2],@T[0]);		# SwapHalf
+	&mov	(@T[3],@T[1]);
+	&mov	(@T[0],$__s2);
+	&mov	(@T[1],$__s3);
+	&xor	(@T[0],$idx);		# $idx is preloaded with key[0]
+	&xor	(@T[1],&DWP(4,$key));
+	&xor	(@T[2],&DWP(8,$key));
+	&xor	(@T[3],&DWP(12,$key));
+	&ret	();
+&function_end_B("_x86_Camellia_encrypt");
+
+# void Camellia_DecryptBlock_Rounds(
+#		int grandRounds,
+#		const Byte ciphertext[],
+#		const KEY_TABLE_TYPE keyTable,
+#		Byte plaintext[])
+&function_begin("Camellia_DecryptBlock_Rounds");
+	&mov	("eax",&wparam(0));	# load grandRounds
+	&mov	($idx,&wparam(1));	# load ciphertext pointer
+	&mov	($key,&wparam(2));	# load key schedule pointer
+
+	&mov	("ebx","esp");
+	&sub	("esp",7*4);		# place for s[0-3],keyEnd,esp and ra
+	&and	("esp",-64);
+
+	# place stack frame just "above mod 1024" the key schedule
+	# this ensures that cache associativity of 2 suffices
+	&lea	("ecx",&DWP(-64-63,$key));
+	&sub	("ecx","esp");
+	&neg	("ecx");
+	&and	("ecx",0x3C0);	# modulo 1024, but aligned to cache-line
+	&sub	("esp","ecx");
+	&add	("esp",4);	# 4 is reserved for callee's return address
+
+	&shl	("eax",6);
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*4,"esp"),$key);	# save keyStart
+	&lea	($key,&DWP(0,$key,"eax"));
+	&mov	(&DWP(5*4,"esp"),"ebx");# save %esp
+
+	&call	(&label("pic_point"));
+	&set_label("pic_point");
+	&blindpop($Tbl);
+	&lea	($Tbl,&DWP(&label("Camellia_SBOX")."-".&label("pic_point"),$Tbl));
+
+	&mov	(@T[0],&DWP(0,$idx));	# load ciphertext
+	&mov	(@T[1],&DWP(4,$idx));
+	&mov	(@T[2],&DWP(8,$idx));
+	&bswap	(@T[0]);
+	&mov	(@T[3],&DWP(12,$idx));
+	&bswap	(@T[1]);
+	&bswap	(@T[2]);
+	&bswap	(@T[3]);
+
+	&call	("_x86_Camellia_decrypt");
+
+	&mov	("esp",&DWP(5*4,"esp"));
+	&bswap	(@T[0]);
+	&mov	($idx,&wparam(3));	# load plaintext pointer
+	&bswap	(@T[1]);
+	&bswap	(@T[2]);
+	&bswap	(@T[3]);
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,$idx),@T[0]);	# write plaintext
+	&mov	(&DWP(4,$idx),@T[1]);
+	&mov	(&DWP(8,$idx),@T[2]);
+	&mov	(&DWP(12,$idx),@T[3]);
+&function_end("Camellia_DecryptBlock_Rounds");
+# V1.x API
+&function_begin_B("Camellia_DecryptBlock");
+	&mov	("eax",128);
+	&sub	("eax",&wparam(0));	# load keyBitLength
+	&mov	("eax",3);
+	&adc	("eax",0);		# keyBitLength==128?3:4
+	&mov	(&wparam(0),"eax");
+	&jmp	(&label("Camellia_DecryptBlock_Rounds"));
+&function_end_B("Camellia_DecryptBlock");
+
+if ($OPENSSL) {
+# void Camellia_decrypt(
+#		const unsigned char *in,
+#		unsigned char *out,
+#		const CAMELLIA_KEY *key)
+&function_begin("Camellia_decrypt");
+	&mov	($idx,&wparam(0));	# load ciphertext pointer
+	&mov	($key,&wparam(2));	# load key schedule pointer
+
+	&mov	("ebx","esp");
+	&sub	("esp",7*4);		# place for s[0-3],keyEnd,esp and ra
+	&and	("esp",-64);
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(272,$key));	# load grandRounds counter
+
+	# place stack frame just "above mod 1024" the key schedule
+	# this ensures that cache associativity of 2 suffices
+	&lea	("ecx",&DWP(-64-63,$key));
+	&sub	("ecx","esp");
+	&neg	("ecx");
+	&and	("ecx",0x3C0);	# modulo 1024, but aligned to cache-line
+	&sub	("esp","ecx");
+	&add	("esp",4);	# 4 is reserved for callee's return address
+
+	&shl	("eax",6);
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*4,"esp"),$key);	# save keyStart
+	&lea	($key,&DWP(0,$key,"eax"));
+	&mov	(&DWP(5*4,"esp"),"ebx");# save %esp
+
+	&call	(&label("pic_point"));
+	&set_label("pic_point");
+	&blindpop($Tbl);
+	&lea	($Tbl,&DWP(&label("Camellia_SBOX")."-".&label("pic_point"),$Tbl));
+
+	&mov	(@T[0],&DWP(0,$idx));	# load ciphertext
+	&mov	(@T[1],&DWP(4,$idx));
+	&mov	(@T[2],&DWP(8,$idx));
+	&bswap	(@T[0]);
+	&mov	(@T[3],&DWP(12,$idx));
+	&bswap	(@T[1]);
+	&bswap	(@T[2]);
+	&bswap	(@T[3]);
+
+	&call	("_x86_Camellia_decrypt");
+
+	&mov	("esp",&DWP(5*4,"esp"));
+	&bswap	(@T[0]);
+	&mov	($idx,&wparam(1));	# load plaintext pointer
+	&bswap	(@T[1]);
+	&bswap	(@T[2]);
+	&bswap	(@T[3]);
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,$idx),@T[0]);	# write plaintext
+	&mov	(&DWP(4,$idx),@T[1]);
+	&mov	(&DWP(8,$idx),@T[2]);
+	&mov	(&DWP(12,$idx),@T[3]);
+&function_end("Camellia_decrypt");
+}
+
+&function_begin_B("_x86_Camellia_decrypt");
+	&xor	(@T[0],&DWP(0,$key));	# ^=key[0-3]
+	&xor	(@T[1],&DWP(4,$key));
+	&xor	(@T[2],&DWP(8,$key));
+	&xor	(@T[3],&DWP(12,$key));
+	&mov	($idx,&DWP(-8,$key));	# prefetch key[-2]
+
+	&mov	($__s0,@T[0]);		# save s[0-3]
+	&mov	($__s1,@T[1]);
+	&mov	($__s2,@T[2]);
+	&mov	($__s3,@T[3]);
+
+&set_label("loop",16);
+	for ($i=0;$i<6;$i++) { Camellia_Feistel($i,-8,4); }
+
+	&sub	($key,16*4);
+	&cmp	($key,$__end);
+	&je	(&label("done"));
+
+	# @T[0-1] are preloaded, $idx is preloaded with key[2]
+	&and	($idx,@T[0]);
+	 &mov	 (@T[3],$__s3);
+	&rotl	($idx,1);
+	 &mov	 (@T[2],@T[3]);
+	&xor	(@T[1],$idx);
+	 &or	 (@T[2],&DWP(4,$key));
+	&mov	($__s1,@T[1]);		# s1^=LeftRotate(s0&key[0],1);
+	 &xor	 (@T[2],$__s2);
+
+	&mov	($idx,&DWP(12,$key));
+	 &mov	 ($__s2,@T[2]);		# s2^=s3|key[3];
+	&or	($idx,@T[1]);
+	 &and	 (@T[2],&DWP(0,$key));
+	&xor	(@T[0],$idx);
+	 &rotl	 (@T[2],1);
+	&mov	($__s0,@T[0]);		# s0^=s1|key[1];
+	 &xor	 (@T[3],@T[2]);
+	&mov	($idx,&DWP(-8,$key));	# prefetch key[4]
+	 &mov	 ($__s3,@T[3]);		# s3^=LeftRotate(s2&key[2],1);
+	&jmp	(&label("loop"));
+
+&set_label("done",8);
+	&mov	(@T[2],@T[0]);		# SwapHalf
+	&mov	(@T[3],@T[1]);
+	&mov	(@T[0],$__s2);
+	&mov	(@T[1],$__s3);
+	&xor	(@T[2],$idx);		# $idx is preloaded with key[2]
+	&xor	(@T[3],&DWP(12,$key));
+	&xor	(@T[0],&DWP(0,$key));
+	&xor	(@T[1],&DWP(4,$key));
+	&ret	();
+&function_end_B("_x86_Camellia_decrypt");
+
+# shld is very slow on Intel P4 family. Even on AMD it limits
+# instruction decode rate [because it's VectorPath] and consequently
+# performance. PIII, PM and Core[2] seem to be the only ones which
+# execute this code ~7% faster...
+sub __rotl128 {
+  my ($i0,$i1,$i2,$i3,$rot,$rnd,@T)=@_;
+
+    $rnd *= 2;
+    if ($rot) {
+	&mov	($idx,$i0);
+	&shld	($i0,$i1,$rot);
+	&shld	($i1,$i2,$rot);
+	&shld	($i2,$i3,$rot);
+	&shld	($i3,$idx,$rot);
+    }
+    &mov	(&DWP(-128+4*$rnd++,$key),shift(@T))	if ($i0 eq @T[0]);
+    &mov	(&DWP(-128+4*$rnd++,$key),shift(@T))	if ($i1 eq @T[0]);
+    &mov	(&DWP(-128+4*$rnd++,$key),shift(@T))	if ($i2 eq @T[0]);
+    &mov	(&DWP(-128+4*$rnd++,$key),shift(@T))	if ($i3 eq @T[0]);
+}
+
+# ... Implementing 128-bit rotate without shld gives >3x performance
+# improvement on P4, only ~7% degradation on other Intel CPUs and
+# not worse performance on AMD. This is therefore preferred.
+sub _rotl128 {
+  my ($i0,$i1,$i2,$i3,$rot,$rnd,@T)=@_;
+
+    $rnd *= 2;
+    if ($rot) {
+	&mov	($Tbl,$i0);
+	&shl	($i0,$rot);
+	&mov	($idx,$i1);
+	&shr	($idx,32-$rot);
+	&shl	($i1,$rot);
+	&or	($i0,$idx);
+	&mov	($idx,$i2);
+	&shl	($i2,$rot);
+	&mov	(&DWP(-128+4*$rnd++,$key),shift(@T))	if ($i0 eq @T[0]);
+	&shr	($idx,32-$rot);
+	&or	($i1,$idx);
+	&shr	($Tbl,32-$rot);
+	&mov	($idx,$i3);
+	&shr	($idx,32-$rot);
+	&mov	(&DWP(-128+4*$rnd++,$key),shift(@T))	if ($i1 eq @T[0]);
+	&shl	($i3,$rot);
+	&or	($i2,$idx);
+	&or	($i3,$Tbl);
+	&mov	(&DWP(-128+4*$rnd++,$key),shift(@T))	if ($i2 eq @T[0]);
+	&mov	(&DWP(-128+4*$rnd++,$key),shift(@T))	if ($i3 eq @T[0]);
+    } else {
+	&mov	(&DWP(-128+4*$rnd++,$key),shift(@T))	if ($i0 eq @T[0]);
+	&mov	(&DWP(-128+4*$rnd++,$key),shift(@T))	if ($i1 eq @T[0]);
+	&mov	(&DWP(-128+4*$rnd++,$key),shift(@T))	if ($i2 eq @T[0]);
+	&mov	(&DWP(-128+4*$rnd++,$key),shift(@T))	if ($i3 eq @T[0]);
+    }
+}
+
+sub _saveround {
+my ($rnd,$key,@T)=@_;
+my $bias=int(@T[0])?shift(@T):0;
+
+	&mov	(&DWP($bias+$rnd*8+0,$key),@T[0]);
+	&mov	(&DWP($bias+$rnd*8+4,$key),@T[1])	if ($#T>=1);
+	&mov	(&DWP($bias+$rnd*8+8,$key),@T[2])	if ($#T>=2);
+	&mov	(&DWP($bias+$rnd*8+12,$key),@T[3])	if ($#T>=3);
+}
+
+sub _loadround {
+my ($rnd,$key,@T)=@_;
+my $bias=int(@T[0])?shift(@T):0;
+
+	&mov	(@T[0],&DWP($bias+$rnd*8+0,$key));
+	&mov	(@T[1],&DWP($bias+$rnd*8+4,$key))	if ($#T>=1);
+	&mov	(@T[2],&DWP($bias+$rnd*8+8,$key))	if ($#T>=2);
+	&mov	(@T[3],&DWP($bias+$rnd*8+12,$key))	if ($#T>=3);
+}
+
+# void Camellia_Ekeygen(
+#		const int keyBitLength,
+#		const Byte *rawKey,
+#		KEY_TABLE_TYPE keyTable)
+&function_begin("Camellia_Ekeygen");
+{ my $step=0;
+
+	&stack_push(4);				# place for s[0-3]
+
+	&mov	($Tbl,&wparam(0));		# load arguments
+	&mov	($idx,&wparam(1));
+	&mov	($key,&wparam(2));
+
+	&mov	(@T[0],&DWP(0,$idx));		# load 0-127 bits
+	&mov	(@T[1],&DWP(4,$idx));
+	&mov	(@T[2],&DWP(8,$idx));
+	&mov	(@T[3],&DWP(12,$idx));
+
+	&bswap	(@T[0]);
+	&bswap	(@T[1]);
+	&bswap	(@T[2]);
+	&bswap	(@T[3]);
+
+	&_saveround	(0,$key,@T);		# KL<<<0
+
+	&cmp	($Tbl,128);
+	&je	(&label("1st128"));
+
+	&mov	(@T[0],&DWP(16,$idx));		# load 128-191 bits
+	&mov	(@T[1],&DWP(20,$idx));
+	&cmp	($Tbl,192);
+	&je	(&label("1st192"));
+	&mov	(@T[2],&DWP(24,$idx));		# load 192-255 bits
+	&mov	(@T[3],&DWP(28,$idx));
+	&jmp	(&label("1st256"));
+&set_label("1st192",4);
+	&mov	(@T[2],@T[0]);
+	&mov	(@T[3],@T[1]);
+	&not	(@T[2]);
+	&not	(@T[3]);
+&set_label("1st256",4);
+	&bswap	(@T[0]);
+	&bswap	(@T[1]);
+	&bswap	(@T[2]);
+	&bswap	(@T[3]);
+
+	&_saveround	(4,$key,@T);		# temporary storage for KR!
+
+	&xor	(@T[0],&DWP(0*8+0,$key));	# KR^KL
+	&xor	(@T[1],&DWP(0*8+4,$key));
+	&xor	(@T[2],&DWP(1*8+0,$key));
+	&xor	(@T[3],&DWP(1*8+4,$key));
+
+&set_label("1st128",4);
+	&call	(&label("pic_point"));
+	&set_label("pic_point");
+	&blindpop($Tbl);
+	&lea	($Tbl,&DWP(&label("Camellia_SBOX")."-".&label("pic_point"),$Tbl));
+	&lea	($key,&DWP(&label("Camellia_SIGMA")."-".&label("Camellia_SBOX"),$Tbl));
+
+	&mov	($idx,&DWP($step*8,$key));	# prefetch SIGMA[0]
+	&mov	(&swtmp(0),@T[0]);		# save s[0-3]
+	&mov	(&swtmp(1),@T[1]);
+	&mov	(&swtmp(2),@T[2]);
+	&mov	(&swtmp(3),@T[3]);
+	&Camellia_Feistel($step++);
+	&Camellia_Feistel($step++);
+	&mov	(@T[2],&swtmp(2));
+	&mov	(@T[3],&swtmp(3));
+
+	&mov	($idx,&wparam(2));
+	&xor	(@T[0],&DWP(0*8+0,$idx));	# ^KL
+	&xor	(@T[1],&DWP(0*8+4,$idx));
+	&xor	(@T[2],&DWP(1*8+0,$idx));
+	&xor	(@T[3],&DWP(1*8+4,$idx));
+
+	&mov	($idx,&DWP($step*8,$key));	# prefetch SIGMA[4]
+	&mov	(&swtmp(0),@T[0]);		# save s[0-3]
+	&mov	(&swtmp(1),@T[1]);
+	&mov	(&swtmp(2),@T[2]);
+	&mov	(&swtmp(3),@T[3]);
+	&Camellia_Feistel($step++);
+	&Camellia_Feistel($step++);
+	&mov	(@T[2],&swtmp(2));
+	&mov	(@T[3],&swtmp(3));
+
+	&mov	($idx,&wparam(0));
+	&cmp	($idx,128);
+	&jne	(&label("2nd256"));
+
+	&mov	($key,&wparam(2));
+	&lea	($key,&DWP(128,$key));		# size optimization
+
+	####### process KA
+	&_saveround	(2,$key,-128,@T);	# KA<<<0
+	&_rotl128	(@T,15,6,@T);		# KA<<<15
+	&_rotl128	(@T,15,8,@T);		# KA<<<(15+15=30)
+	&_rotl128	(@T,15,12,@T[0],@T[1]);	# KA<<<(30+15=45)
+	&_rotl128	(@T,15,14,@T);		# KA<<<(45+15=60)
+	push		(@T,shift(@T));		# rotl128(@T,32);
+	&_rotl128	(@T,2,20,@T);		# KA<<<(60+32+2=94)
+	&_rotl128	(@T,17,24,@T);		# KA<<<(94+17=111)
+
+	####### process KL
+	&_loadround	(0,$key,-128,@T);	# load KL
+	&_rotl128	(@T,15,4,@T);		# KL<<<15
+	&_rotl128	(@T,30,10,@T);		# KL<<<(15+30=45)
+	&_rotl128	(@T,15,13,@T[2],@T[3]);	# KL<<<(45+15=60)
+	&_rotl128	(@T,17,16,@T);		# KL<<<(60+17=77)
+	&_rotl128	(@T,17,18,@T);		# KL<<<(77+17=94)
+	&_rotl128	(@T,17,22,@T);		# KL<<<(94+17=111)
+
+	while (@T[0] ne "eax")			# restore order
+	{   unshift	(@T,pop(@T));   }
+
+	&mov	("eax",3);			# 3 grandRounds
+	&jmp	(&label("done"));
+
+&set_label("2nd256",16);
+	&mov	($idx,&wparam(2));
+	&_saveround	(6,$idx,@T);		# temporary storage for KA!
+
+	&xor	(@T[0],&DWP(4*8+0,$idx));	# KA^KR
+	&xor	(@T[1],&DWP(4*8+4,$idx));
+	&xor	(@T[2],&DWP(5*8+0,$idx));
+	&xor	(@T[3],&DWP(5*8+4,$idx));
+
+	&mov	($idx,&DWP($step*8,$key));	# prefetch SIGMA[8]
+	&mov	(&swtmp(0),@T[0]);		# save s[0-3]
+	&mov	(&swtmp(1),@T[1]);
+	&mov	(&swtmp(2),@T[2]);
+	&mov	(&swtmp(3),@T[3]);
+	&Camellia_Feistel($step++);
+	&Camellia_Feistel($step++);
+	&mov	(@T[2],&swtmp(2));
+	&mov	(@T[3],&swtmp(3));
+
+	&mov	($key,&wparam(2));
+	&lea	($key,&DWP(128,$key));		# size optimization
+
+	####### process KB
+	&_saveround	(2,$key,-128,@T);	# KB<<<0
+	&_rotl128	(@T,30,10,@T);		# KB<<<30
+	&_rotl128	(@T,30,20,@T);		# KB<<<(30+30=60)
+	push		(@T,shift(@T));		# rotl128(@T,32);
+	&_rotl128	(@T,19,32,@T);		# KB<<<(60+32+19=111)
+
+	####### process KR
+	&_loadround	(4,$key,-128,@T);	# load KR
+	&_rotl128	(@T,15,4,@T);		# KR<<<15
+	&_rotl128	(@T,15,8,@T);		# KR<<<(15+15=30)
+	&_rotl128	(@T,30,18,@T);		# KR<<<(30+30=60)
+	push		(@T,shift(@T));		# rotl128(@T,32);
+	&_rotl128	(@T,2,26,@T);		# KR<<<(60+32+2=94)
+
+	####### process KA
+	&_loadround	(6,$key,-128,@T);	# load KA
+	&_rotl128	(@T,15,6,@T);		# KA<<<15
+	&_rotl128	(@T,30,14,@T);		# KA<<<(15+30=45)
+	push		(@T,shift(@T));		# rotl128(@T,32);
+	&_rotl128	(@T,0,24,@T);		# KA<<<(45+32+0=77)
+	&_rotl128	(@T,17,28,@T);		# KA<<<(77+17=94)
+
+	####### process KL
+	&_loadround	(0,$key,-128,@T);	# load KL
+	push		(@T,shift(@T));		# rotl128(@T,32);
+	&_rotl128	(@T,13,12,@T);		# KL<<<(32+13=45)
+	&_rotl128	(@T,15,16,@T);		# KL<<<(45+15=60)
+	&_rotl128	(@T,17,22,@T);		# KL<<<(60+17=77)
+	push		(@T,shift(@T));		# rotl128(@T,32);
+	&_rotl128	(@T,2,30,@T);		# KL<<<(77+32+2=111)
+
+	while (@T[0] ne "eax")			# restore order
+	{   unshift	(@T,pop(@T));   }
+
+	&mov	("eax",4);			# 4 grandRounds
+&set_label("done");
+	&lea	("edx",&DWP(272-128,$key));	# end of key schedule
+	&stack_pop(4);
+}
+&function_end("Camellia_Ekeygen");
+
+if ($OPENSSL) {
+# int Camellia_set_key (
+#		const unsigned char *userKey,
+#		int bits,
+#		CAMELLIA_KEY *key)
+&function_begin_B("Camellia_set_key");
+	&push	("ebx");
+	&mov	("ecx",&wparam(0));	# pull arguments
+	&mov	("ebx",&wparam(1));
+	&mov	("edx",&wparam(2));
+
+	&mov	("eax",-1);
+	&test	("ecx","ecx");
+	&jz	(&label("done"));	# userKey==NULL?
+	&test	("edx","edx");
+	&jz	(&label("done"));	# key==NULL?
+
+	&mov	("eax",-2);
+	&cmp	("ebx",256);
+	&je	(&label("arg_ok"));	# bits==256?
+	&cmp	("ebx",192);
+	&je	(&label("arg_ok"));	# bits==192?
+	&cmp	("ebx",128);
+	&jne	(&label("done"));	# bits!=128?
+&set_label("arg_ok",4);
+
+	&push	("edx");		# push arguments
+	&push	("ecx");
+	&push	("ebx");
+	&call	("Camellia_Ekeygen");
+	&stack_pop(3);
+
+	# eax holds grandRounds and edx points at where to put it
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,"edx"),"eax");
+	&xor	("eax","eax");
+&set_label("done",4);
+	&pop	("ebx");
+	&ret	();
+&function_end_B("Camellia_set_key");
+}
+
+@SBOX=(
+112,130, 44,236,179, 39,192,229,228,133, 87, 53,234, 12,174, 65,
+ 35,239,107,147, 69, 25,165, 33,237, 14, 79, 78, 29,101,146,189,
+134,184,175,143,124,235, 31,206, 62, 48,220, 95, 94,197, 11, 26,
+166,225, 57,202,213, 71, 93, 61,217,  1, 90,214, 81, 86,108, 77,
+139, 13,154,102,251,204,176, 45,116, 18, 43, 32,240,177,132,153,
+223, 76,203,194, 52,126,118,  5,109,183,169, 49,209, 23,  4,215,
+ 20, 88, 58, 97,222, 27, 17, 28, 50, 15,156, 22, 83, 24,242, 34,
+254, 68,207,178,195,181,122,145, 36,  8,232,168, 96,252,105, 80,
+170,208,160,125,161,137, 98,151, 84, 91, 30,149,224,255,100,210,
+ 16,196,  0, 72,163,247,117,219,138,  3,230,218,  9, 63,221,148,
+135, 92,131,  2,205, 74,144, 51,115,103,246,243,157,127,191,226,
+ 82,155,216, 38,200, 55,198, 59,129,150,111, 75, 19,190, 99, 46,
+233,121,167,140,159,110,188,142, 41,245,249,182, 47,253,180, 89,
+120,152,  6,106,231, 70,113,186,212, 37,171, 66,136,162,141,250,
+114,  7,185, 85,248,238,172, 10, 54, 73, 42,104, 60, 56,241,164,
+ 64, 40,211,123,187,201, 67,193, 21,227,173,244,119,199,128,158);
+
+sub S1110 { my $i=shift; $i=@SBOX[$i]; return $i<<24|$i<<16|$i<<8; }
+sub S4404 { my $i=shift; $i=($i<<1|$i>>7)&0xff; $i=@SBOX[$i]; return $i<<24|$i<<16|$i; }	
+sub S0222 { my $i=shift; $i=@SBOX[$i]; $i=($i<<1|$i>>7)&0xff; return $i<<16|$i<<8|$i; }	
+sub S3033 { my $i=shift; $i=@SBOX[$i]; $i=($i>>1|$i<<7)&0xff; return $i<<24|$i<<8|$i; }	
+
+&set_label("Camellia_SIGMA",64);
+&data_word(
+    0xa09e667f, 0x3bcc908b, 0xb67ae858, 0x4caa73b2,
+    0xc6ef372f, 0xe94f82be, 0x54ff53a5, 0xf1d36f1c,
+    0x10e527fa, 0xde682d1d, 0xb05688c2, 0xb3e6c1fd,
+    0,          0,          0,          0);
+&set_label("Camellia_SBOX",64);
+# tables are interleaved, remember?
+for ($i=0;$i<256;$i++) { &data_word(&S1110($i),&S4404($i)); }
+for ($i=0;$i<256;$i++) { &data_word(&S0222($i),&S3033($i)); }
+
+# void Camellia_cbc_encrypt (const void char *inp, unsigned char *out,
+#			size_t length, const CAMELLIA_KEY *key,
+#			unsigned char *ivp,const int enc);
+{
+# stack frame layout
+#             -4(%esp)		# return address	 0(%esp)
+#              0(%esp)		# s0			 4(%esp)
+#              4(%esp)		# s1			 8(%esp)
+#              8(%esp)		# s2			12(%esp)
+#             12(%esp)		# s3			16(%esp)
+#             16(%esp)		# end of key schedule	20(%esp)
+#             20(%esp)		# %esp backup
+my $_inp=&DWP(24,"esp");	#copy of wparam(0)
+my $_out=&DWP(28,"esp");	#copy of wparam(1)
+my $_len=&DWP(32,"esp");	#copy of wparam(2)
+my $_key=&DWP(36,"esp");	#copy of wparam(3)
+my $_ivp=&DWP(40,"esp");	#copy of wparam(4)
+my $ivec=&DWP(44,"esp");	#ivec[16]
+my $_tmp=&DWP(44,"esp");	#volatile variable [yes, aliases with ivec]
+my ($s0,$s1,$s2,$s3) = @T;
+
+&function_begin("Camellia_cbc_encrypt");
+	&mov	($s2 eq "ecx"? $s2 : "",&wparam(2));	# load len
+	&cmp	($s2,0);
+	&je	(&label("enc_out"));
+
+	&pushf	();
+	&cld	();
+
+	&mov	($s0,&wparam(0));	# load inp
+	&mov	($s1,&wparam(1));	# load out
+	#&mov	($s2,&wparam(2));	# load len
+	&mov	($s3,&wparam(3));	# load key
+	&mov	($Tbl,&wparam(4));	# load ivp
+
+	# allocate aligned stack frame...
+	&lea	($idx,&DWP(-64,"esp"));
+	&and	($idx,-64);
+
+	# place stack frame just "above mod 1024" the key schedule
+	# this ensures that cache associativity of 2 suffices
+	&lea	($key,&DWP(-64-63,$s3));
+	&sub	($key,$idx);
+	&neg	($key);
+	&and	($key,0x3C0);	# modulo 1024, but aligned to cache-line
+	&sub	($idx,$key);
+
+	&mov	($key,&wparam(5));	# load enc
+
+	&exch	("esp",$idx);
+	&add	("esp",4);		# reserve for return address!
+	&mov	($_esp,$idx);		# save %esp
+
+	&mov	($_inp,$s0);		# save copy of inp
+	&mov	($_out,$s1);		# save copy of out
+	&mov	($_len,$s2);		# save copy of len
+	&mov	($_key,$s3);		# save copy of key
+	&mov	($_ivp,$Tbl);		# save copy of ivp
+
+	&call   (&label("pic_point"));	# make it PIC!
+	&set_label("pic_point");
+	&blindpop($Tbl);
+	&lea    ($Tbl,&DWP(&label("Camellia_SBOX")."-".&label("pic_point"),$Tbl));
+
+	&mov	($idx,32);
+	&set_label("prefetch_sbox",4);
+		&mov	($s0,&DWP(0,$Tbl));
+		&mov	($s1,&DWP(32,$Tbl));
+		&mov	($s2,&DWP(64,$Tbl));
+		&mov	($s3,&DWP(96,$Tbl));
+		&lea	($Tbl,&DWP(128,$Tbl));
+		&dec	($idx);
+	&jnz	(&label("prefetch_sbox"));
+	&mov	($s0,$_key);
+	&sub	($Tbl,4096);
+	&mov	($idx,$_inp);
+	&mov	($s3,&DWP(272,$s0));		# load grandRounds
+
+	&cmp	($key,0);
+	&je	(&label("DECRYPT"));
+
+	&mov	($s2,$_len);
+	&mov	($key,$_ivp);
+	&shl	($s3,6);
+	&lea	($s3,&DWP(0,$s0,$s3));
+	&mov	($_end,$s3);
+
+	&test	($s2,0xFFFFFFF0);
+	&jz	(&label("enc_tail"));		# short input...
+
+	&mov	($s0,&DWP(0,$key));		# load iv
+	&mov	($s1,&DWP(4,$key));
+
+	&set_label("enc_loop",4);
+		&mov	($s2,&DWP(8,$key));
+		&mov	($s3,&DWP(12,$key));
+
+		&xor	($s0,&DWP(0,$idx));	# xor input data
+		&xor	($s1,&DWP(4,$idx));
+		&xor	($s2,&DWP(8,$idx));
+		&bswap	($s0);
+		&xor	($s3,&DWP(12,$idx));
+		&bswap	($s1);
+		&mov	($key,$_key);		# load key
+		&bswap	($s2);
+		&bswap	($s3);
+
+		&call	("_x86_Camellia_encrypt");
+
+		&mov	($idx,$_inp);		# load inp
+		&mov	($key,$_out);		# load out
+
+		&bswap	($s0);
+		&bswap	($s1);
+		&bswap	($s2);
+		&mov	(&DWP(0,$key),$s0);	# save output data
+		&bswap	($s3);
+		&mov	(&DWP(4,$key),$s1);
+		&mov	(&DWP(8,$key),$s2);
+		&mov	(&DWP(12,$key),$s3);
+
+		&mov	($s2,$_len);		# load len
+
+		&lea	($idx,&DWP(16,$idx));
+		&mov	($_inp,$idx);		# save inp
+
+		&lea	($s3,&DWP(16,$key));
+		&mov	($_out,$s3);		# save out
+
+		&sub	($s2,16);
+		&test	($s2,0xFFFFFFF0);
+		&mov	($_len,$s2);		# save len
+	&jnz	(&label("enc_loop"));
+	&test	($s2,15);
+	&jnz	(&label("enc_tail"));
+	&mov	($idx,$_ivp);		# load ivp
+	&mov	($s2,&DWP(8,$key));	# restore last dwords
+	&mov	($s3,&DWP(12,$key));
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,$idx),$s0);	# save ivec
+	&mov	(&DWP(4,$idx),$s1);
+	&mov	(&DWP(8,$idx),$s2);
+	&mov	(&DWP(12,$idx),$s3);
+
+	&mov	("esp",$_esp);
+	&popf	();
+    &set_label("enc_out");
+	&function_end_A();
+	&pushf	();			# kludge, never executed
+
+    &set_label("enc_tail",4);
+	&mov	($s0,$key eq "edi" ? $key : "");
+	&mov	($key,$_out);			# load out
+	&push	($s0);				# push ivp
+	&mov	($s1,16);
+	&sub	($s1,$s2);
+	&cmp	($key,$idx);			# compare with inp
+	&je	(&label("enc_in_place"));
+	&align	(4);
+	&data_word(0xA4F3F689);	# rep movsb	# copy input
+	&jmp	(&label("enc_skip_in_place"));
+    &set_label("enc_in_place");
+	&lea	($key,&DWP(0,$key,$s2));
+    &set_label("enc_skip_in_place");
+	&mov	($s2,$s1);
+	&xor	($s0,$s0);
+	&align	(4);
+	&data_word(0xAAF3F689);	# rep stosb	# zero tail
+	&pop	($key);				# pop ivp
+
+	&mov	($idx,$_out);			# output as input
+	&mov	($s0,&DWP(0,$key));
+	&mov	($s1,&DWP(4,$key));
+	&mov	($_len,16);			# len=16
+	&jmp	(&label("enc_loop"));		# one more spin...
+
+#----------------------------- DECRYPT -----------------------------#
+&set_label("DECRYPT",16);
+	&shl	($s3,6);
+	&lea	($s3,&DWP(0,$s0,$s3));
+	&mov	($_end,$s0);
+	&mov	($_key,$s3);
+
+	&cmp	($idx,$_out);
+	&je	(&label("dec_in_place"));	# in-place processing...
+
+	&mov	($key,$_ivp);			# load ivp
+	&mov	($_tmp,$key);
+
+	&set_label("dec_loop",4);
+		&mov	($s0,&DWP(0,$idx));	# read input
+		&mov	($s1,&DWP(4,$idx));
+		&mov	($s2,&DWP(8,$idx));
+		&bswap	($s0);
+		&mov	($s3,&DWP(12,$idx));
+		&bswap	($s1);
+		&mov	($key,$_key);		# load key
+		&bswap	($s2);
+		&bswap	($s3);
+
+		&call	("_x86_Camellia_decrypt");
+
+		&mov	($key,$_tmp);		# load ivp
+		&mov	($idx,$_len);		# load len
+
+		&bswap	($s0);
+		&bswap	($s1);
+		&bswap	($s2);
+		&xor	($s0,&DWP(0,$key));	# xor iv
+		&bswap	($s3);
+		&xor	($s1,&DWP(4,$key));
+		&xor	($s2,&DWP(8,$key));
+		&xor	($s3,&DWP(12,$key));
+
+		&sub	($idx,16);
+		&jc	(&label("dec_partial"));
+		&mov	($_len,$idx);		# save len
+		&mov	($idx,$_inp);		# load inp
+		&mov	($key,$_out);		# load out
+
+		&mov	(&DWP(0,$key),$s0);	# write output
+		&mov	(&DWP(4,$key),$s1);
+		&mov	(&DWP(8,$key),$s2);
+		&mov	(&DWP(12,$key),$s3);
+
+		&mov	($_tmp,$idx);		# save ivp
+		&lea	($idx,&DWP(16,$idx));
+		&mov	($_inp,$idx);		# save inp
+
+		&lea	($key,&DWP(16,$key));
+		&mov	($_out,$key);		# save out
+
+	&jnz	(&label("dec_loop"));
+	&mov	($key,$_tmp);		# load temp ivp
+    &set_label("dec_end");
+	&mov	($idx,$_ivp);		# load user ivp
+	&mov	($s0,&DWP(0,$key));	# load iv
+	&mov	($s1,&DWP(4,$key));
+	&mov	($s2,&DWP(8,$key));
+	&mov	($s3,&DWP(12,$key));
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,$idx),$s0);	# copy back to user
+	&mov	(&DWP(4,$idx),$s1);
+	&mov	(&DWP(8,$idx),$s2);
+	&mov	(&DWP(12,$idx),$s3);
+	&jmp	(&label("dec_out"));
+
+    &set_label("dec_partial",4);
+	&lea	($key,$ivec);
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,$key),$s0);	# dump output to stack
+	&mov	(&DWP(4,$key),$s1);
+	&mov	(&DWP(8,$key),$s2);
+	&mov	(&DWP(12,$key),$s3);
+	&lea	($s2 eq "ecx" ? $s2 : "",&DWP(16,$idx));
+	&mov	($idx eq "esi" ? $idx : "",$key);
+	&mov	($key eq "edi" ? $key : "",$_out);	# load out
+	&data_word(0xA4F3F689);	# rep movsb		# copy output
+	&mov	($key,$_inp);				# use inp as temp ivp
+	&jmp	(&label("dec_end"));
+
+    &set_label("dec_in_place",4);
+	&set_label("dec_in_place_loop");
+		&lea	($key,$ivec);
+		&mov	($s0,&DWP(0,$idx));	# read input
+		&mov	($s1,&DWP(4,$idx));
+		&mov	($s2,&DWP(8,$idx));
+		&mov	($s3,&DWP(12,$idx));
+
+		&mov	(&DWP(0,$key),$s0);	# copy to temp
+		&mov	(&DWP(4,$key),$s1);
+		&mov	(&DWP(8,$key),$s2);
+		&bswap	($s0);
+		&mov	(&DWP(12,$key),$s3);
+		&bswap	($s1);
+		&mov	($key,$_key);		# load key
+		&bswap	($s2);
+		&bswap	($s3);
+
+		&call	("_x86_Camellia_decrypt");
+
+		&mov	($key,$_ivp);		# load ivp
+		&mov	($idx,$_out);		# load out
+
+		&bswap	($s0);
+		&bswap	($s1);
+		&bswap	($s2);
+		&xor	($s0,&DWP(0,$key));	# xor iv
+		&bswap	($s3);
+		&xor	($s1,&DWP(4,$key));
+		&xor	($s2,&DWP(8,$key));
+		&xor	($s3,&DWP(12,$key));
+
+		&mov	(&DWP(0,$idx),$s0);	# write output
+		&mov	(&DWP(4,$idx),$s1);
+		&mov	(&DWP(8,$idx),$s2);
+		&mov	(&DWP(12,$idx),$s3);
+
+		&lea	($idx,&DWP(16,$idx));
+		&mov	($_out,$idx);		# save out
+
+		&lea	($idx,$ivec);
+		&mov	($s0,&DWP(0,$idx));	# read temp
+		&mov	($s1,&DWP(4,$idx));
+		&mov	($s2,&DWP(8,$idx));
+		&mov	($s3,&DWP(12,$idx));
+
+		&mov	(&DWP(0,$key),$s0);	# copy iv
+		&mov	(&DWP(4,$key),$s1);
+		&mov	(&DWP(8,$key),$s2);
+		&mov	(&DWP(12,$key),$s3);
+
+		&mov	($idx,$_inp);		# load inp
+
+		&lea	($idx,&DWP(16,$idx));
+		&mov	($_inp,$idx);		# save inp
+
+		&mov	($s2,$_len);		# load len
+		&sub	($s2,16);
+		&jc	(&label("dec_in_place_partial"));
+		&mov	($_len,$s2);		# save len
+	&jnz	(&label("dec_in_place_loop"));
+	&jmp	(&label("dec_out"));
+
+    &set_label("dec_in_place_partial",4);
+	# one can argue if this is actually required...
+	&mov	($key eq "edi" ? $key : "",$_out);
+	&lea	($idx eq "esi" ? $idx : "",$ivec);
+	&lea	($key,&DWP(0,$key,$s2));
+	&lea	($idx,&DWP(16,$idx,$s2));
+	&neg	($s2 eq "ecx" ? $s2 : "");
+	&data_word(0xA4F3F689);	# rep movsb	# restore tail
+
+    &set_label("dec_out",4);
+    &mov	("esp",$_esp);
+    &popf	();
+&function_end("Camellia_cbc_encrypt");
+}
+
+&asciz("Camellia for x86 by <appro\@openssl.org>");
+
+&asm_finish();
+
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/camellia/asm/cmll-x86_64.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/camellia/asm/cmll-x86_64.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..da5ad7b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/camellia/asm/cmll-x86_64.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,1088 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+# ====================================================================
+# Copyright (c) 2008 Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
+#
+# This module may be used under the terms of either the GNU General
+# Public License version 2 or later, the GNU Lesser General Public
+# License version 2.1 or later, the Mozilla Public License version
+# 1.1 or the BSD License. The exact terms of either license are
+# distributed along with this module. For further details see
+# http://www.openssl.org/~appro/camellia/.
+# ====================================================================
+
+# Performance in cycles per processed byte (less is better) in
+# 'openssl speed ...' benchmark:
+#
+#			AMD64	Core2	EM64T
+# -evp camellia-128-ecb	16.7	21.0	22.7
+# + over gcc 3.4.6	+25%	+5%	0%
+#
+# camellia-128-cbc	15.7	20.4	21.1
+#
+# 128-bit key setup	128	216	205	cycles/key
+# + over gcc 3.4.6	+54%	+39%	+15%
+#
+# Numbers in "+" rows represent performance improvement over compiler
+# generated code. Key setup timings are impressive on AMD and Core2
+# thanks to 64-bit operations being covertly deployed. Improvement on
+# EM64T, pre-Core2 Intel x86_64 CPU, is not as impressive, because it
+# apparently emulates some of 64-bit operations in [32-bit] microcode.
+
+$flavour = shift;
+$output  = shift;
+if ($flavour =~ /\./) { $output = $flavour; undef $flavour; }
+
+$win64=0; $win64=1 if ($flavour =~ /[nm]asm|mingw64/ || $output =~ /\.asm$/);
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+( $xlate="${dir}x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
+( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
+die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl";
+
+open OUT,"| \"$^X\" \"$xlate\" $flavour \"$output\"";
+*STDOUT=*OUT;
+
+sub hi() { my $r=shift; $r =~ s/%[er]([a-d])x/%\1h/;    $r; }
+sub lo() { my $r=shift; $r =~ s/%[er]([a-d])x/%\1l/;
+                        $r =~ s/%[er]([sd]i)/%\1l/;
+                        $r =~ s/%(r[0-9]+)[d]?/%\1b/;   $r; }
+
+$t0="%eax";$t1="%ebx";$t2="%ecx";$t3="%edx";
+@S=("%r8d","%r9d","%r10d","%r11d");
+$i0="%esi";
+$i1="%edi";
+$Tbl="%rbp";	# size optimization
+$inp="%r12";
+$out="%r13";
+$key="%r14";
+$keyend="%r15";
+$arg0d=$win64?"%ecx":"%edi";
+
+# const unsigned int Camellia_SBOX[4][256];
+# Well, sort of... Camellia_SBOX[0][] is interleaved with [1][],
+# and [2][] - with [3][]. This is done to minimize code size.
+$SBOX1_1110=0;		# Camellia_SBOX[0]
+$SBOX4_4404=4;		# Camellia_SBOX[1]
+$SBOX2_0222=2048;	# Camellia_SBOX[2]
+$SBOX3_3033=2052;	# Camellia_SBOX[3]
+
+sub Camellia_Feistel {
+my $i=@_[0];
+my $seed=defined(@_[1])?@_[1]:0;
+my $scale=$seed<0?-8:8;
+my $j=($i&1)*2;
+my ($s0,$s1,$s2,$s3)=(@S[($j)%4],@S[($j+1)%4],@S[($j+2)%4],@S[($j+3)%4]);
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	xor	$s0,$t0				# t0^=key[0]
+	xor	$s1,$t1				# t1^=key[1]
+	movz	`&hi("$t0")`,$i0		# (t0>>8)&0xff
+	movz	`&lo("$t1")`,$i1		# (t1>>0)&0xff
+	mov	$SBOX3_3033($Tbl,$i0,8),$t3	# t3=SBOX3_3033[0]
+	mov	$SBOX1_1110($Tbl,$i1,8),$t2	# t2=SBOX1_1110[1]
+	movz	`&lo("$t0")`,$i0		# (t0>>0)&0xff
+	shr	\$16,$t0
+	movz	`&hi("$t1")`,$i1		# (t1>>8)&0xff
+	xor	$SBOX4_4404($Tbl,$i0,8),$t3	# t3^=SBOX4_4404[0]
+	shr	\$16,$t1
+	xor	$SBOX4_4404($Tbl,$i1,8),$t2	# t2^=SBOX4_4404[1]
+	movz	`&hi("$t0")`,$i0		# (t0>>24)&0xff
+	movz	`&lo("$t1")`,$i1		# (t1>>16)&0xff
+	xor	$SBOX1_1110($Tbl,$i0,8),$t3	# t3^=SBOX1_1110[0]
+	xor	$SBOX3_3033($Tbl,$i1,8),$t2	# t2^=SBOX3_3033[1]
+	movz	`&lo("$t0")`,$i0		# (t0>>16)&0xff
+	movz	`&hi("$t1")`,$i1		# (t1>>24)&0xff
+	xor	$SBOX2_0222($Tbl,$i0,8),$t3	# t3^=SBOX2_0222[0]
+	xor	$SBOX2_0222($Tbl,$i1,8),$t2	# t2^=SBOX2_0222[1]
+	mov	`$seed+($i+1)*$scale`($key),$t1	# prefetch key[i+1]
+	mov	`$seed+($i+1)*$scale+4`($key),$t0
+	xor	$t3,$t2				# t2^=t3
+	ror	\$8,$t3				# t3=RightRotate(t3,8)
+	xor	$t2,$s2
+	xor	$t2,$s3
+	xor	$t3,$s3
+___
+}
+
+# void Camellia_EncryptBlock_Rounds(
+#		int grandRounds,
+#		const Byte plaintext[],
+#		const KEY_TABLE_TYPE keyTable,
+#		Byte ciphertext[])
+$code=<<___;
+.text
+
+# V1.x API
+.globl	Camellia_EncryptBlock
+.type	Camellia_EncryptBlock,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+Camellia_EncryptBlock:
+	movl	\$128,%eax
+	subl	$arg0d,%eax
+	movl	\$3,$arg0d
+	adcl	\$0,$arg0d	# keyBitLength==128?3:4
+	jmp	.Lenc_rounds
+.size	Camellia_EncryptBlock,.-Camellia_EncryptBlock
+# V2
+.globl	Camellia_EncryptBlock_Rounds
+.type	Camellia_EncryptBlock_Rounds,\@function,4
+.align	16
+.Lenc_rounds:
+Camellia_EncryptBlock_Rounds:
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+.Lenc_prologue:
+
+	#mov	%rsi,$inp		# put away arguments
+	mov	%rcx,$out
+	mov	%rdx,$key
+
+	shl	\$6,%edi		# process grandRounds
+	lea	.LCamellia_SBOX(%rip),$Tbl
+	lea	($key,%rdi),$keyend
+
+	mov	0(%rsi),@S[0]		# load plaintext
+	mov	4(%rsi),@S[1]
+	mov	8(%rsi),@S[2]
+	bswap	@S[0]
+	mov	12(%rsi),@S[3]
+	bswap	@S[1]
+	bswap	@S[2]
+	bswap	@S[3]
+
+	call	_x86_64_Camellia_encrypt
+
+	bswap	@S[0]
+	bswap	@S[1]
+	bswap	@S[2]
+	mov	@S[0],0($out)
+	bswap	@S[3]
+	mov	@S[1],4($out)
+	mov	@S[2],8($out)
+	mov	@S[3],12($out)
+
+	mov	0(%rsp),%r15
+	mov	8(%rsp),%r14
+	mov	16(%rsp),%r13
+	mov	24(%rsp),%rbp
+	mov	32(%rsp),%rbx
+	lea	40(%rsp),%rsp
+.Lenc_epilogue:
+	ret
+.size	Camellia_EncryptBlock_Rounds,.-Camellia_EncryptBlock_Rounds
+
+.type	_x86_64_Camellia_encrypt,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+_x86_64_Camellia_encrypt:
+	xor	0($key),@S[1]
+	xor	4($key),@S[0]		# ^=key[0-3]
+	xor	8($key),@S[3]
+	xor	12($key),@S[2]
+.align	16
+.Leloop:
+	mov	16($key),$t1		# prefetch key[4-5]
+	mov	20($key),$t0
+
+___
+	for ($i=0;$i<6;$i++) { Camellia_Feistel($i,16); }
+$code.=<<___;
+	lea	16*4($key),$key
+	cmp	$keyend,$key
+	mov	8($key),$t3		# prefetch key[2-3]
+	mov	12($key),$t2
+	je	.Ledone
+
+	and	@S[0],$t0
+	or	@S[3],$t3
+	rol	\$1,$t0
+	xor	$t3,@S[2]		# s2^=s3|key[3];
+	xor	$t0,@S[1]		# s1^=LeftRotate(s0&key[0],1);
+	and	@S[2],$t2
+	or	@S[1],$t1
+	rol	\$1,$t2
+	xor	$t1,@S[0]		# s0^=s1|key[1];
+	xor	$t2,@S[3]		# s3^=LeftRotate(s2&key[2],1);
+	jmp	.Leloop
+
+.align	16
+.Ledone:
+	xor	@S[2],$t0		# SwapHalf
+	xor	@S[3],$t1
+	xor	@S[0],$t2
+	xor	@S[1],$t3
+
+	mov	$t0,@S[0]
+	mov	$t1,@S[1]
+	mov	$t2,@S[2]
+	mov	$t3,@S[3]
+
+	.byte	0xf3,0xc3		# rep ret
+.size	_x86_64_Camellia_encrypt,.-_x86_64_Camellia_encrypt
+
+# V1.x API
+.globl	Camellia_DecryptBlock
+.type	Camellia_DecryptBlock,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+Camellia_DecryptBlock:
+	movl	\$128,%eax
+	subl	$arg0d,%eax
+	movl	\$3,$arg0d
+	adcl	\$0,$arg0d	# keyBitLength==128?3:4
+	jmp	.Ldec_rounds
+.size	Camellia_DecryptBlock,.-Camellia_DecryptBlock
+# V2
+.globl	Camellia_DecryptBlock_Rounds
+.type	Camellia_DecryptBlock_Rounds,\@function,4
+.align	16
+.Ldec_rounds:
+Camellia_DecryptBlock_Rounds:
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+.Ldec_prologue:
+
+	#mov	%rsi,$inp		# put away arguments
+	mov	%rcx,$out
+	mov	%rdx,$keyend
+
+	shl	\$6,%edi		# process grandRounds
+	lea	.LCamellia_SBOX(%rip),$Tbl
+	lea	($keyend,%rdi),$key
+
+	mov	0(%rsi),@S[0]		# load plaintext
+	mov	4(%rsi),@S[1]
+	mov	8(%rsi),@S[2]
+	bswap	@S[0]
+	mov	12(%rsi),@S[3]
+	bswap	@S[1]
+	bswap	@S[2]
+	bswap	@S[3]
+
+	call	_x86_64_Camellia_decrypt
+
+	bswap	@S[0]
+	bswap	@S[1]
+	bswap	@S[2]
+	mov	@S[0],0($out)
+	bswap	@S[3]
+	mov	@S[1],4($out)
+	mov	@S[2],8($out)
+	mov	@S[3],12($out)
+
+	mov	0(%rsp),%r15
+	mov	8(%rsp),%r14
+	mov	16(%rsp),%r13
+	mov	24(%rsp),%rbp
+	mov	32(%rsp),%rbx
+	lea	40(%rsp),%rsp
+.Ldec_epilogue:
+	ret
+.size	Camellia_DecryptBlock_Rounds,.-Camellia_DecryptBlock_Rounds
+
+.type	_x86_64_Camellia_decrypt,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+_x86_64_Camellia_decrypt:
+	xor	0($key),@S[1]
+	xor	4($key),@S[0]		# ^=key[0-3]
+	xor	8($key),@S[3]
+	xor	12($key),@S[2]
+.align	16
+.Ldloop:
+	mov	-8($key),$t1		# prefetch key[4-5]
+	mov	-4($key),$t0
+
+___
+	for ($i=0;$i<6;$i++) { Camellia_Feistel($i,-8); }
+$code.=<<___;
+	lea	-16*4($key),$key
+	cmp	$keyend,$key
+	mov	0($key),$t3		# prefetch key[2-3]
+	mov	4($key),$t2
+	je	.Lddone
+
+	and	@S[0],$t0
+	or	@S[3],$t3
+	rol	\$1,$t0
+	xor	$t3,@S[2]		# s2^=s3|key[3];
+	xor	$t0,@S[1]		# s1^=LeftRotate(s0&key[0],1);
+	and	@S[2],$t2
+	or	@S[1],$t1
+	rol	\$1,$t2
+	xor	$t1,@S[0]		# s0^=s1|key[1];
+	xor	$t2,@S[3]		# s3^=LeftRotate(s2&key[2],1);
+
+	jmp	.Ldloop
+
+.align	16
+.Lddone:
+	xor	@S[2],$t2
+	xor	@S[3],$t3
+	xor	@S[0],$t0
+	xor	@S[1],$t1
+
+	mov	$t2,@S[0]		# SwapHalf
+	mov	$t3,@S[1]
+	mov	$t0,@S[2]
+	mov	$t1,@S[3]
+
+	.byte	0xf3,0xc3		# rep ret
+.size	_x86_64_Camellia_decrypt,.-_x86_64_Camellia_decrypt
+___
+
+sub _saveround {
+my ($rnd,$key,@T)=@_;
+my $bias=int(@T[0])?shift(@T):0;
+
+    if ($#T==3) {
+	$code.=<<___;
+	mov	@T[1],`$bias+$rnd*8+0`($key)
+	mov	@T[0],`$bias+$rnd*8+4`($key)
+	mov	@T[3],`$bias+$rnd*8+8`($key)
+	mov	@T[2],`$bias+$rnd*8+12`($key)
+___
+    } else {
+	$code.="	mov	@T[0],`$bias+$rnd*8+0`($key)\n";
+	$code.="	mov	@T[1],`$bias+$rnd*8+8`($key)\n"	if ($#T>=1);
+    }
+}
+
+sub _loadround {
+my ($rnd,$key,@T)=@_;
+my $bias=int(@T[0])?shift(@T):0;
+
+$code.="	mov	`$bias+$rnd*8+0`($key),@T[0]\n";
+$code.="	mov	`$bias+$rnd*8+8`($key),@T[1]\n"	if ($#T>=1);
+}
+
+# shld is very slow on Intel EM64T family. Even on AMD it limits
+# instruction decode rate [because it's VectorPath] and consequently
+# performance...
+sub __rotl128 {
+my ($i0,$i1,$rot)=@_;
+
+    if ($rot) {
+	$code.=<<___;
+	mov	$i0,%r11
+	shld	\$$rot,$i1,$i0
+	shld	\$$rot,%r11,$i1
+___
+    }
+}
+
+# ... Implementing 128-bit rotate without shld gives 80% better
+# performance EM64T, +15% on AMD64 and only ~7% degradation on
+# Core2. This is therefore preferred.
+sub _rotl128 {
+my ($i0,$i1,$rot)=@_;
+
+    if ($rot) {
+	$code.=<<___;
+	mov	$i0,%r11
+	shl	\$$rot,$i0
+	mov	$i1,%r9
+	shr	\$`64-$rot`,%r9
+	shr	\$`64-$rot`,%r11
+	or	%r9,$i0
+	shl	\$$rot,$i1
+	or	%r11,$i1
+___
+    }
+}
+
+{ my $step=0;
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	Camellia_Ekeygen
+.type	Camellia_Ekeygen,\@function,3
+.align	16
+Camellia_Ekeygen:
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+.Lkey_prologue:
+
+	mov	%edi,${keyend}d		# put away arguments, keyBitLength
+	mov	%rdx,$out		# keyTable
+
+	mov	0(%rsi),@S[0]		# load 0-127 bits
+	mov	4(%rsi),@S[1]
+	mov	8(%rsi),@S[2]
+	mov	12(%rsi),@S[3]
+
+	bswap	@S[0]
+	bswap	@S[1]
+	bswap	@S[2]
+	bswap	@S[3]
+___
+	&_saveround	(0,$out,@S);	# KL<<<0
+$code.=<<___;
+	cmp	\$128,$keyend		# check keyBitLength
+	je	.L1st128
+
+	mov	16(%rsi),@S[0]		# load 128-191 bits
+	mov	20(%rsi),@S[1]
+	cmp	\$192,$keyend
+	je	.L1st192
+	mov	24(%rsi),@S[2]		# load 192-255 bits
+	mov	28(%rsi),@S[3]
+	jmp	.L1st256
+.L1st192:
+	mov	@S[0],@S[2]
+	mov	@S[1],@S[3]
+	not	@S[2]
+	not	@S[3]
+.L1st256:
+	bswap	@S[0]
+	bswap	@S[1]
+	bswap	@S[2]
+	bswap	@S[3]
+___
+	&_saveround	(4,$out,@S);	# temp storage for KR!
+$code.=<<___;
+	xor	0($out),@S[1]		# KR^KL
+	xor	4($out),@S[0]
+	xor	8($out),@S[3]
+	xor	12($out),@S[2]
+
+.L1st128:
+	lea	.LCamellia_SIGMA(%rip),$key
+	lea	.LCamellia_SBOX(%rip),$Tbl
+
+	mov	0($key),$t1
+	mov	4($key),$t0
+___
+	&Camellia_Feistel($step++);
+	&Camellia_Feistel($step++);
+$code.=<<___;
+	xor	0($out),@S[1]		# ^KL
+	xor	4($out),@S[0]
+	xor	8($out),@S[3]
+	xor	12($out),@S[2]
+___
+	&Camellia_Feistel($step++);
+	&Camellia_Feistel($step++);
+$code.=<<___;
+	cmp	\$128,$keyend
+	jne	.L2nd256
+
+	lea	128($out),$out		# size optimization
+	shl	\$32,%r8		# @S[0]||
+	shl	\$32,%r10		# @S[2]||
+	or	%r9,%r8			# ||@S[1]
+	or	%r11,%r10		# ||@S[3]
+___
+	&_loadround	(0,$out,-128,"%rax","%rbx");	# KL
+	&_saveround	(2,$out,-128,"%r8","%r10");	# KA<<<0
+	&_rotl128	("%rax","%rbx",15);
+	&_saveround	(4,$out,-128,"%rax","%rbx");	# KL<<<15
+	&_rotl128	("%r8","%r10",15);
+	&_saveround	(6,$out,-128,"%r8","%r10");	# KA<<<15
+	&_rotl128	("%r8","%r10",15);		# 15+15=30
+	&_saveround	(8,$out,-128,"%r8","%r10");	# KA<<<30
+	&_rotl128	("%rax","%rbx",30);		# 15+30=45
+	&_saveround	(10,$out,-128,"%rax","%rbx");	# KL<<<45
+	&_rotl128	("%r8","%r10",15);		# 30+15=45
+	&_saveround	(12,$out,-128,"%r8");		# KA<<<45
+	&_rotl128	("%rax","%rbx",15);		# 45+15=60
+	&_saveround	(13,$out,-128,"%rbx");		# KL<<<60
+	&_rotl128	("%r8","%r10",15);		# 45+15=60
+	&_saveround	(14,$out,-128,"%r8","%r10");	# KA<<<60
+	&_rotl128	("%rax","%rbx",17);		# 60+17=77
+	&_saveround	(16,$out,-128,"%rax","%rbx");	# KL<<<77
+	&_rotl128	("%rax","%rbx",17);		# 77+17=94
+	&_saveround	(18,$out,-128,"%rax","%rbx");	# KL<<<94
+	&_rotl128	("%r8","%r10",34);		# 60+34=94
+	&_saveround	(20,$out,-128,"%r8","%r10");	# KA<<<94
+	&_rotl128	("%rax","%rbx",17);		# 94+17=111
+	&_saveround	(22,$out,-128,"%rax","%rbx");	# KL<<<111
+	&_rotl128	("%r8","%r10",17);		# 94+17=111
+	&_saveround	(24,$out,-128,"%r8","%r10");	# KA<<<111
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	\$3,%eax
+	jmp	.Ldone
+.align	16
+.L2nd256:
+___
+	&_saveround	(6,$out,@S);	# temp storage for KA!
+$code.=<<___;
+	xor	`4*8+0`($out),@S[1]	# KA^KR
+	xor	`4*8+4`($out),@S[0]
+	xor	`5*8+0`($out),@S[3]
+	xor	`5*8+4`($out),@S[2]
+___
+	&Camellia_Feistel($step++);
+	&Camellia_Feistel($step++);
+
+	&_loadround	(0,$out,"%rax","%rbx");	# KL
+	&_loadround	(4,$out,"%rcx","%rdx");	# KR
+	&_loadround	(6,$out,"%r14","%r15");	# KA
+$code.=<<___;
+	lea	128($out),$out		# size optimization
+	shl	\$32,%r8		# @S[0]||
+	shl	\$32,%r10		# @S[2]||
+	or	%r9,%r8			# ||@S[1]
+	or	%r11,%r10		# ||@S[3]
+___
+	&_saveround	(2,$out,-128,"%r8","%r10");	# KB<<<0
+	&_rotl128	("%rcx","%rdx",15);
+	&_saveround	(4,$out,-128,"%rcx","%rdx");	# KR<<<15
+	&_rotl128	("%r14","%r15",15);
+	&_saveround	(6,$out,-128,"%r14","%r15");	# KA<<<15
+	&_rotl128	("%rcx","%rdx",15);		# 15+15=30
+	&_saveround	(8,$out,-128,"%rcx","%rdx");	# KR<<<30
+	&_rotl128	("%r8","%r10",30);
+	&_saveround	(10,$out,-128,"%r8","%r10");	# KB<<<30
+	&_rotl128	("%rax","%rbx",45);
+	&_saveround	(12,$out,-128,"%rax","%rbx");	# KL<<<45
+	&_rotl128	("%r14","%r15",30);		# 15+30=45
+	&_saveround	(14,$out,-128,"%r14","%r15");	# KA<<<45
+	&_rotl128	("%rax","%rbx",15);		# 45+15=60
+	&_saveround	(16,$out,-128,"%rax","%rbx");	# KL<<<60
+	&_rotl128	("%rcx","%rdx",30);		# 30+30=60
+	&_saveround	(18,$out,-128,"%rcx","%rdx");	# KR<<<60
+	&_rotl128	("%r8","%r10",30);		# 30+30=60
+	&_saveround	(20,$out,-128,"%r8","%r10");	# KB<<<60
+	&_rotl128	("%rax","%rbx",17);		# 60+17=77
+	&_saveround	(22,$out,-128,"%rax","%rbx");	# KL<<<77
+	&_rotl128	("%r14","%r15",32);		# 45+32=77
+	&_saveround	(24,$out,-128,"%r14","%r15");	# KA<<<77
+	&_rotl128	("%rcx","%rdx",34);		# 60+34=94
+	&_saveround	(26,$out,-128,"%rcx","%rdx");	# KR<<<94
+	&_rotl128	("%r14","%r15",17);		# 77+17=94
+	&_saveround	(28,$out,-128,"%r14","%r15");	# KA<<<77
+	&_rotl128	("%rax","%rbx",34);		# 77+34=111
+	&_saveround	(30,$out,-128,"%rax","%rbx");	# KL<<<111
+	&_rotl128	("%r8","%r10",51);		# 60+51=111
+	&_saveround	(32,$out,-128,"%r8","%r10");	# KB<<<111
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	\$4,%eax
+.Ldone:
+	mov	0(%rsp),%r15
+	mov	8(%rsp),%r14
+	mov	16(%rsp),%r13
+	mov	24(%rsp),%rbp
+	mov	32(%rsp),%rbx
+	lea	40(%rsp),%rsp
+.Lkey_epilogue:
+	ret
+.size	Camellia_Ekeygen,.-Camellia_Ekeygen
+___
+}
+
+@SBOX=(
+112,130, 44,236,179, 39,192,229,228,133, 87, 53,234, 12,174, 65,
+ 35,239,107,147, 69, 25,165, 33,237, 14, 79, 78, 29,101,146,189,
+134,184,175,143,124,235, 31,206, 62, 48,220, 95, 94,197, 11, 26,
+166,225, 57,202,213, 71, 93, 61,217,  1, 90,214, 81, 86,108, 77,
+139, 13,154,102,251,204,176, 45,116, 18, 43, 32,240,177,132,153,
+223, 76,203,194, 52,126,118,  5,109,183,169, 49,209, 23,  4,215,
+ 20, 88, 58, 97,222, 27, 17, 28, 50, 15,156, 22, 83, 24,242, 34,
+254, 68,207,178,195,181,122,145, 36,  8,232,168, 96,252,105, 80,
+170,208,160,125,161,137, 98,151, 84, 91, 30,149,224,255,100,210,
+ 16,196,  0, 72,163,247,117,219,138,  3,230,218,  9, 63,221,148,
+135, 92,131,  2,205, 74,144, 51,115,103,246,243,157,127,191,226,
+ 82,155,216, 38,200, 55,198, 59,129,150,111, 75, 19,190, 99, 46,
+233,121,167,140,159,110,188,142, 41,245,249,182, 47,253,180, 89,
+120,152,  6,106,231, 70,113,186,212, 37,171, 66,136,162,141,250,
+114,  7,185, 85,248,238,172, 10, 54, 73, 42,104, 60, 56,241,164,
+ 64, 40,211,123,187,201, 67,193, 21,227,173,244,119,199,128,158);
+
+sub S1110 { my $i=shift; $i=@SBOX[$i]; $i=$i<<24|$i<<16|$i<<8; sprintf("0x%08x",$i); }
+sub S4404 { my $i=shift; $i=($i<<1|$i>>7)&0xff; $i=@SBOX[$i]; $i=$i<<24|$i<<16|$i; sprintf("0x%08x",$i); }
+sub S0222 { my $i=shift; $i=@SBOX[$i]; $i=($i<<1|$i>>7)&0xff; $i=$i<<16|$i<<8|$i; sprintf("0x%08x",$i); }
+sub S3033 { my $i=shift; $i=@SBOX[$i]; $i=($i>>1|$i<<7)&0xff; $i=$i<<24|$i<<8|$i; sprintf("0x%08x",$i); }
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.align	64
+.LCamellia_SIGMA:
+.long	0x3bcc908b, 0xa09e667f, 0x4caa73b2, 0xb67ae858
+.long	0xe94f82be, 0xc6ef372f, 0xf1d36f1c, 0x54ff53a5
+.long	0xde682d1d, 0x10e527fa, 0xb3e6c1fd, 0xb05688c2
+.long	0,          0,          0,          0
+.LCamellia_SBOX:
+___
+# tables are interleaved, remember?
+sub data_word { $code.=".long\t".join(',',@_)."\n"; }
+for ($i=0;$i<256;$i++) { &data_word(&S1110($i),&S4404($i)); }
+for ($i=0;$i<256;$i++) { &data_word(&S0222($i),&S3033($i)); }
+
+# void Camellia_cbc_encrypt (const void char *inp, unsigned char *out,
+#			size_t length, const CAMELLIA_KEY *key,
+#			unsigned char *ivp,const int enc);
+{
+$_key="0(%rsp)";
+$_end="8(%rsp)";	# inp+len&~15
+$_res="16(%rsp)";	# len&15
+$ivec="24(%rsp)";
+$_ivp="40(%rsp)";
+$_rsp="48(%rsp)";
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	Camellia_cbc_encrypt
+.type	Camellia_cbc_encrypt,\@function,6
+.align	16
+Camellia_cbc_encrypt:
+	cmp	\$0,%rdx
+	je	.Lcbc_abort
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+.Lcbc_prologue:
+
+	mov	%rsp,%rbp
+	sub	\$64,%rsp
+	and	\$-64,%rsp
+
+	# place stack frame just "above mod 1024" the key schedule,
+	# this ensures that cache associativity suffices
+	lea	-64-63(%rcx),%r10
+	sub	%rsp,%r10
+	neg	%r10
+	and	\$0x3C0,%r10
+	sub	%r10,%rsp
+	#add	\$8,%rsp		# 8 is reserved for callee's ra
+
+	mov	%rdi,$inp		# inp argument
+	mov	%rsi,$out		# out argument
+	mov	%r8,%rbx		# ivp argument
+	mov	%rcx,$key		# key argument
+	mov	272(%rcx),${keyend}d	# grandRounds
+
+	mov	%r8,$_ivp
+	mov	%rbp,$_rsp
+
+.Lcbc_body:
+	lea	.LCamellia_SBOX(%rip),$Tbl
+
+	mov	\$32,%ecx
+.align	4
+.Lcbc_prefetch_sbox:
+	mov	0($Tbl),%rax
+	mov	32($Tbl),%rsi
+	mov	64($Tbl),%rdi
+	mov	96($Tbl),%r11
+	lea	128($Tbl),$Tbl
+	loop	.Lcbc_prefetch_sbox
+	sub	\$4096,$Tbl
+	shl	\$6,$keyend
+	mov	%rdx,%rcx		# len argument
+	lea	($key,$keyend),$keyend
+
+	cmp	\$0,%r9d		# enc argument
+	je	.LCBC_DECRYPT
+
+	and	\$-16,%rdx
+	and	\$15,%rcx		# length residue
+	lea	($inp,%rdx),%rdx
+	mov	$key,$_key
+	mov	%rdx,$_end
+	mov	%rcx,$_res
+
+	cmp	$inp,%rdx
+	mov	0(%rbx),@S[0]		# load IV
+	mov	4(%rbx),@S[1]
+	mov	8(%rbx),@S[2]
+	mov	12(%rbx),@S[3]
+	je	.Lcbc_enc_tail
+	jmp	.Lcbc_eloop
+
+.align	16
+.Lcbc_eloop:
+	xor	0($inp),@S[0]
+	xor	4($inp),@S[1]
+	xor	8($inp),@S[2]
+	bswap	@S[0]
+	xor	12($inp),@S[3]
+	bswap	@S[1]
+	bswap	@S[2]
+	bswap	@S[3]
+
+	call	_x86_64_Camellia_encrypt
+
+	mov	$_key,$key		# "rewind" the key
+	bswap	@S[0]
+	mov	$_end,%rdx
+	bswap	@S[1]
+	mov	$_res,%rcx
+	bswap	@S[2]
+	mov	@S[0],0($out)
+	bswap	@S[3]
+	mov	@S[1],4($out)
+	mov	@S[2],8($out)
+	lea	16($inp),$inp
+	mov	@S[3],12($out)
+	cmp	%rdx,$inp
+	lea	16($out),$out
+	jne	.Lcbc_eloop
+
+	cmp	\$0,%rcx
+	jne	.Lcbc_enc_tail
+
+	mov	$_ivp,$out
+	mov	@S[0],0($out)		# write out IV residue
+	mov	@S[1],4($out)
+	mov	@S[2],8($out)
+	mov	@S[3],12($out)
+	jmp	.Lcbc_done
+
+.align	16
+.Lcbc_enc_tail:
+	xor	%rax,%rax
+	mov	%rax,0+$ivec
+	mov	%rax,8+$ivec
+	mov	%rax,$_res
+
+.Lcbc_enc_pushf:
+	pushfq
+	cld
+	mov	$inp,%rsi
+	lea	8+$ivec,%rdi
+	.long	0x9066A4F3		# rep movsb
+	popfq
+.Lcbc_enc_popf:
+
+	lea	$ivec,$inp
+	lea	16+$ivec,%rax
+	mov	%rax,$_end
+	jmp	.Lcbc_eloop		# one more time
+
+.align	16
+.LCBC_DECRYPT:
+	xchg	$key,$keyend
+	add	\$15,%rdx
+	and	\$15,%rcx		# length residue
+	and	\$-16,%rdx
+	mov	$key,$_key
+	lea	($inp,%rdx),%rdx
+	mov	%rdx,$_end
+	mov	%rcx,$_res
+
+	mov	(%rbx),%rax		# load IV
+	mov	8(%rbx),%rbx
+	jmp	.Lcbc_dloop
+.align	16
+.Lcbc_dloop:
+	mov	0($inp),@S[0]
+	mov	4($inp),@S[1]
+	mov	8($inp),@S[2]
+	bswap	@S[0]
+	mov	12($inp),@S[3]
+	bswap	@S[1]
+	mov	%rax,0+$ivec		# save IV to temporary storage
+	bswap	@S[2]
+	mov	%rbx,8+$ivec
+	bswap	@S[3]
+
+	call	_x86_64_Camellia_decrypt
+
+	mov	$_key,$key		# "rewind" the key
+	mov	$_end,%rdx
+	mov	$_res,%rcx
+
+	bswap	@S[0]
+	mov	($inp),%rax		# load IV for next iteration
+	bswap	@S[1]
+	mov	8($inp),%rbx
+	bswap	@S[2]
+	xor	0+$ivec,@S[0]
+	bswap	@S[3]
+	xor	4+$ivec,@S[1]
+	xor	8+$ivec,@S[2]
+	lea	16($inp),$inp
+	xor	12+$ivec,@S[3]
+	cmp	%rdx,$inp
+	je	.Lcbc_ddone
+
+	mov	@S[0],0($out)
+	mov	@S[1],4($out)
+	mov	@S[2],8($out)
+	mov	@S[3],12($out)
+
+	lea	16($out),$out
+	jmp	.Lcbc_dloop
+
+.align	16
+.Lcbc_ddone:
+	mov	$_ivp,%rdx
+	cmp	\$0,%rcx
+	jne	.Lcbc_dec_tail
+
+	mov	@S[0],0($out)
+	mov	@S[1],4($out)
+	mov	@S[2],8($out)
+	mov	@S[3],12($out)
+
+	mov	%rax,(%rdx)		# write out IV residue
+	mov	%rbx,8(%rdx)
+	jmp	.Lcbc_done
+.align	16
+.Lcbc_dec_tail:
+	mov	@S[0],0+$ivec
+	mov	@S[1],4+$ivec
+	mov	@S[2],8+$ivec
+	mov	@S[3],12+$ivec
+
+.Lcbc_dec_pushf:
+	pushfq
+	cld
+	lea	8+$ivec,%rsi
+	lea	($out),%rdi
+	.long	0x9066A4F3		# rep movsb
+	popfq
+.Lcbc_dec_popf:
+
+	mov	%rax,(%rdx)		# write out IV residue
+	mov	%rbx,8(%rdx)
+	jmp	.Lcbc_done
+
+.align	16
+.Lcbc_done:
+	mov	$_rsp,%rcx
+	mov	0(%rcx),%r15
+	mov	8(%rcx),%r14
+	mov	16(%rcx),%r13
+	mov	24(%rcx),%r12
+	mov	32(%rcx),%rbp
+	mov	40(%rcx),%rbx
+	lea	48(%rcx),%rsp
+.Lcbc_abort:
+	ret
+.size	Camellia_cbc_encrypt,.-Camellia_cbc_encrypt
+
+.asciz	"Camellia for x86_64 by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+___
+}
+
+# EXCEPTION_DISPOSITION handler (EXCEPTION_RECORD *rec,ULONG64 frame,
+#		CONTEXT *context,DISPATCHER_CONTEXT *disp)
+if ($win64) {
+$rec="%rcx";
+$frame="%rdx";
+$context="%r8";
+$disp="%r9";
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.extern	__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind
+.type	common_se_handler,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+common_se_handler:
+	push	%rsi
+	push	%rdi
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+	pushfq
+	lea	-64(%rsp),%rsp
+
+	mov	120($context),%rax	# pull context->Rax
+	mov	248($context),%rbx	# pull context->Rip
+
+	mov	8($disp),%rsi		# disp->ImageBase
+	mov	56($disp),%r11		# disp->HandlerData
+
+	mov	0(%r11),%r10d		# HandlerData[0]
+	lea	(%rsi,%r10),%r10	# prologue label
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip<prologue label
+	jb	.Lin_prologue
+
+	mov	152($context),%rax	# pull context->Rsp
+
+	mov	4(%r11),%r10d		# HandlerData[1]
+	lea	(%rsi,%r10),%r10	# epilogue label
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip>=epilogue label
+	jae	.Lin_prologue
+
+	lea	40(%rax),%rax
+	mov	-8(%rax),%rbx
+	mov	-16(%rax),%rbp
+	mov	-24(%rax),%r13
+	mov	-32(%rax),%r14
+	mov	-40(%rax),%r15
+	mov	%rbx,144($context)	# restore context->Rbx
+	mov	%rbp,160($context)	# restore context->Rbp
+	mov	%r13,224($context)	# restore context->R13
+	mov	%r14,232($context)	# restore context->R14
+	mov	%r15,240($context)	# restore context->R15
+
+.Lin_prologue:
+	mov	8(%rax),%rdi
+	mov	16(%rax),%rsi
+	mov	%rax,152($context)	# restore context->Rsp
+	mov	%rsi,168($context)	# restore context->Rsi
+	mov	%rdi,176($context)	# restore context->Rdi
+
+	jmp	.Lcommon_seh_exit
+.size	common_se_handler,.-common_se_handler
+
+.type	cbc_se_handler,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+cbc_se_handler:
+	push	%rsi
+	push	%rdi
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+	pushfq
+	lea	-64(%rsp),%rsp
+
+	mov	120($context),%rax	# pull context->Rax
+	mov	248($context),%rbx	# pull context->Rip
+
+	lea	.Lcbc_prologue(%rip),%r10
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip<.Lcbc_prologue
+	jb	.Lin_cbc_prologue
+
+	lea	.Lcbc_body(%rip),%r10
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip<.Lcbc_body
+	jb	.Lin_cbc_frame_setup
+
+	mov	152($context),%rax	# pull context->Rsp
+
+	lea	.Lcbc_abort(%rip),%r10
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip>=.Lcbc_abort
+	jae	.Lin_cbc_prologue
+
+	# handle pushf/popf in Camellia_cbc_encrypt
+	lea	.Lcbc_enc_pushf(%rip),%r10
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip<=.Lcbc_enc_pushf
+	jbe	.Lin_cbc_no_flag
+	lea	8(%rax),%rax
+	lea	.Lcbc_enc_popf(%rip),%r10
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip<.Lcbc_enc_popf
+	jb	.Lin_cbc_no_flag
+	lea	-8(%rax),%rax
+	lea	.Lcbc_dec_pushf(%rip),%r10
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip<=.Lcbc_dec_pushf
+	jbe	.Lin_cbc_no_flag
+	lea	8(%rax),%rax
+	lea	.Lcbc_dec_popf(%rip),%r10
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip<.Lcbc_dec_popf
+	jb	.Lin_cbc_no_flag
+	lea	-8(%rax),%rax
+
+.Lin_cbc_no_flag:
+	mov	48(%rax),%rax		# $_rsp
+	lea	48(%rax),%rax
+
+.Lin_cbc_frame_setup:
+	mov	-8(%rax),%rbx
+	mov	-16(%rax),%rbp
+	mov	-24(%rax),%r12
+	mov	-32(%rax),%r13
+	mov	-40(%rax),%r14
+	mov	-48(%rax),%r15
+	mov	%rbx,144($context)	# restore context->Rbx
+	mov	%rbp,160($context)	# restore context->Rbp
+	mov	%r12,216($context)	# restore context->R12
+	mov	%r13,224($context)	# restore context->R13
+	mov	%r14,232($context)	# restore context->R14
+	mov	%r15,240($context)	# restore context->R15
+
+.Lin_cbc_prologue:
+	mov	8(%rax),%rdi
+	mov	16(%rax),%rsi
+	mov	%rax,152($context)	# restore context->Rsp
+	mov	%rsi,168($context)	# restore context->Rsi
+	mov	%rdi,176($context)	# restore context->Rdi
+
+.align	4
+.Lcommon_seh_exit:
+
+	mov	40($disp),%rdi		# disp->ContextRecord
+	mov	$context,%rsi		# context
+	mov	\$`1232/8`,%ecx		# sizeof(CONTEXT)
+	.long	0xa548f3fc		# cld; rep movsq
+
+	mov	$disp,%rsi
+	xor	%rcx,%rcx		# arg1, UNW_FLAG_NHANDLER
+	mov	8(%rsi),%rdx		# arg2, disp->ImageBase
+	mov	0(%rsi),%r8		# arg3, disp->ControlPc
+	mov	16(%rsi),%r9		# arg4, disp->FunctionEntry
+	mov	40(%rsi),%r10		# disp->ContextRecord
+	lea	56(%rsi),%r11		# &disp->HandlerData
+	lea	24(%rsi),%r12		# &disp->EstablisherFrame
+	mov	%r10,32(%rsp)		# arg5
+	mov	%r11,40(%rsp)		# arg6
+	mov	%r12,48(%rsp)		# arg7
+	mov	%rcx,56(%rsp)		# arg8, (NULL)
+	call	*__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind(%rip)
+
+	mov	\$1,%eax		# ExceptionContinueSearch
+	lea	64(%rsp),%rsp
+	popfq
+	pop	%r15
+	pop	%r14
+	pop	%r13
+	pop	%r12
+	pop	%rbp
+	pop	%rbx
+	pop	%rdi
+	pop	%rsi
+	ret
+.size	cbc_se_handler,.-cbc_se_handler
+
+.section	.pdata
+.align	4
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_Camellia_EncryptBlock_Rounds
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_Camellia_EncryptBlock_Rounds
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_Camellia_EncryptBlock_Rounds
+
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_Camellia_DecryptBlock_Rounds
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_Camellia_DecryptBlock_Rounds
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_Camellia_DecryptBlock_Rounds
+
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_Camellia_Ekeygen
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_Camellia_Ekeygen
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_Camellia_Ekeygen
+
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_Camellia_cbc_encrypt
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_Camellia_cbc_encrypt
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_Camellia_cbc_encrypt
+
+.section	.xdata
+.align	8
+.LSEH_info_Camellia_EncryptBlock_Rounds:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	common_se_handler
+	.rva	.Lenc_prologue,.Lenc_epilogue	# HandlerData[]
+.LSEH_info_Camellia_DecryptBlock_Rounds:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	common_se_handler
+	.rva	.Ldec_prologue,.Ldec_epilogue	# HandlerData[]
+.LSEH_info_Camellia_Ekeygen:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	common_se_handler
+	.rva	.Lkey_prologue,.Lkey_epilogue	# HandlerData[]
+.LSEH_info_Camellia_cbc_encrypt:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	cbc_se_handler
+___
+}
+
+$code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem;
+print $code;
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/camellia/asm/cmllt4-sparcv9.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/camellia/asm/cmllt4-sparcv9.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ffe4a7d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/camellia/asm/cmllt4-sparcv9.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,939 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2012-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by David S. Miller <davem@devemloft.net> and Andy Polyakov
+# <appro@openssl.org>. The module is licensed under 2-clause BSD
+# license. October 2012. All rights reserved.
+# ====================================================================
+
+######################################################################
+# Camellia for SPARC T4.
+#
+# As with AES below results [for aligned data] are virtually identical
+# to critical path lenths for 3-cycle instruction latency:
+#
+#		128-bit key	192/256-
+# CBC encrypt	4.14/4.21(*)	5.46/5.52
+#			 (*) numbers after slash are for
+#			     misaligned data.
+#
+# As with Intel AES-NI, question is if it's possible to improve
+# performance of parallelizeable modes by interleaving round
+# instructions. In Camellia every instruction is dependent on
+# previous, which means that there is place for 2 additional ones
+# in between two dependent. Can we expect 3x performance improvement?
+# At least one can argue that it should be possible to break 2x
+# barrier... For some reason not even 2x appears to be possible:
+#
+#		128-bit key	192/256-
+# CBC decrypt	2.21/2.74	2.99/3.40
+# CTR		2.15/2.68(*)	2.93/3.34
+#			 (*) numbers after slash are for
+#			     misaligned data.
+#
+# This is for 2x interleave. But compared to 1x interleave CBC decrypt
+# improved by ... 0% for 128-bit key, and 11% for 192/256-bit one.
+# So that out-of-order execution logic can take non-interleaved code
+# to 1.87x, but can't take 2x interleaved one any further. There
+# surely is some explanation... As result 3x interleave was not even
+# attempted. Instead an effort was made to share specific modes
+# implementations with AES module (therefore sparct4_modes.pl).
+#
+# To anchor to something else, software C implementation processes
+# one byte in 38 cycles with 128-bit key on same processor.
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm");
+require "sparcv9_modes.pl";
+
+$output = pop;
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+$::evp=1;	# if $evp is set to 0, script generates module with
+# Camellia_[en|de]crypt, Camellia_set_key and Camellia_cbc_encrypt
+# entry points. These are fully compatible with openssl/camellia.h.
+
+######################################################################
+# single-round subroutines
+#
+{
+my ($inp,$out,$key,$rounds,$tmp,$mask)=map("%o$_",(0..5));
+
+$code=<<___;
+#include "sparc_arch.h"
+
+.text
+
+.globl	cmll_t4_encrypt
+.align	32
+cmll_t4_encrypt:
+	andcc		$inp, 7, %g1		! is input aligned?
+	andn		$inp, 7, $inp
+
+	ldx		[$key + 0], %g4
+	ldx		[$key + 8], %g5
+
+	ldx		[$inp + 0], %o4
+	bz,pt		%icc, 1f
+	ldx		[$inp + 8], %o5
+	ldx		[$inp + 16], $inp
+	sll		%g1, 3, %g1
+	sub		%g0, %g1, %o3
+	sllx		%o4, %g1, %o4
+	sllx		%o5, %g1, %g1
+	srlx		%o5, %o3, %o5
+	srlx		$inp, %o3, %o3
+	or		%o5, %o4, %o4
+	or		%o3, %g1, %o5
+1:
+	ld		[$key + 272], $rounds	! grandRounds, 3 or 4
+	ldd		[$key + 16], %f12
+	ldd		[$key + 24], %f14
+	xor		%g4, %o4, %o4
+	xor		%g5, %o5, %o5
+	ldd		[$key + 32], %f16
+	ldd		[$key + 40], %f18
+	movxtod		%o4, %f0
+	movxtod		%o5, %f2
+	ldd		[$key + 48], %f20
+	ldd		[$key + 56], %f22
+	sub		$rounds, 1, $rounds
+	ldd		[$key + 64], %f24
+	ldd		[$key + 72], %f26
+	add		$key, 80, $key
+
+.Lenc:
+	camellia_f	%f12, %f2, %f0, %f2
+	ldd		[$key + 0], %f12
+	sub		$rounds,1,$rounds
+	camellia_f	%f14, %f0, %f2, %f0
+	ldd		[$key + 8], %f14
+	camellia_f	%f16, %f2, %f0, %f2
+	ldd		[$key + 16], %f16
+	camellia_f	%f18, %f0, %f2, %f0
+	ldd		[$key + 24], %f18
+	camellia_f	%f20, %f2, %f0, %f2
+	ldd		[$key + 32], %f20
+	camellia_f	%f22, %f0, %f2, %f0
+	ldd		[$key + 40], %f22
+	camellia_fl	%f24, %f0, %f0
+	ldd		[$key + 48], %f24
+	camellia_fli	%f26, %f2, %f2
+	ldd		[$key + 56], %f26
+	brnz,pt		$rounds, .Lenc
+	add		$key, 64, $key
+
+	andcc		$out, 7, $tmp		! is output aligned?
+	camellia_f	%f12, %f2, %f0, %f2
+	camellia_f	%f14, %f0, %f2, %f0
+	camellia_f	%f16, %f2, %f0, %f2
+	camellia_f	%f18, %f0, %f2, %f0
+	camellia_f	%f20, %f2, %f0, %f4
+	camellia_f	%f22, %f0, %f4, %f2
+	fxor		%f24, %f4, %f0
+	fxor		%f26, %f2, %f2
+
+	bnz,pn		%icc, 2f
+	nop
+
+	std		%f0, [$out + 0]
+	retl
+	std		%f2, [$out + 8]
+
+2:	alignaddrl	$out, %g0, $out
+	mov		0xff, $mask
+	srl		$mask, $tmp, $mask
+
+	faligndata	%f0, %f0, %f4
+	faligndata	%f0, %f2, %f6
+	faligndata	%f2, %f2, %f8
+
+	stda		%f4, [$out + $mask]0xc0	! partial store
+	std		%f6, [$out + 8]
+	add		$out, 16, $out
+	orn		%g0, $mask, $mask
+	retl
+	stda		%f8, [$out + $mask]0xc0	! partial store
+.type	cmll_t4_encrypt,#function
+.size	cmll_t4_encrypt,.-cmll_t4_encrypt
+
+.globl	cmll_t4_decrypt
+.align	32
+cmll_t4_decrypt:
+	ld		[$key + 272], $rounds	! grandRounds, 3 or 4
+	andcc		$inp, 7, %g1		! is input aligned?
+	andn		$inp, 7, $inp
+
+	sll		$rounds, 6, $rounds
+	add		$rounds, $key, $key
+
+	ldx		[$inp + 0], %o4
+	bz,pt		%icc, 1f
+	ldx		[$inp + 8], %o5
+	ldx		[$inp + 16], $inp
+	sll		%g1, 3, %g1
+	sub		%g0, %g1, %g4
+	sllx		%o4, %g1, %o4
+	sllx		%o5, %g1, %g1
+	srlx		%o5, %g4, %o5
+	srlx		$inp, %g4, %g4
+	or		%o5, %o4, %o4
+	or		%g4, %g1, %o5
+1:
+	ldx		[$key + 0], %g4
+	ldx		[$key + 8], %g5
+	ldd		[$key - 8], %f12
+	ldd		[$key - 16], %f14
+	xor		%g4, %o4, %o4
+	xor		%g5, %o5, %o5
+	ldd		[$key - 24], %f16
+	ldd		[$key - 32], %f18
+	movxtod		%o4, %f0
+	movxtod		%o5, %f2
+	ldd		[$key - 40], %f20
+	ldd		[$key - 48], %f22
+	sub		$rounds, 64, $rounds
+	ldd		[$key - 56], %f24
+	ldd		[$key - 64], %f26
+	sub		$key, 64, $key
+
+.Ldec:
+	camellia_f	%f12, %f2, %f0, %f2
+	ldd		[$key - 8], %f12
+	sub		$rounds, 64, $rounds
+	camellia_f	%f14, %f0, %f2, %f0
+	ldd		[$key - 16], %f14
+	camellia_f	%f16, %f2, %f0, %f2
+	ldd		[$key - 24], %f16
+	camellia_f	%f18, %f0, %f2, %f0
+	ldd		[$key - 32], %f18
+	camellia_f	%f20, %f2, %f0, %f2
+	ldd		[$key - 40], %f20
+	camellia_f	%f22, %f0, %f2, %f0
+	ldd		[$key - 48], %f22
+	camellia_fl	%f24, %f0, %f0
+	ldd		[$key - 56], %f24
+	camellia_fli	%f26, %f2, %f2
+	ldd		[$key - 64], %f26
+	brnz,pt		$rounds, .Ldec
+	sub		$key, 64, $key
+
+	andcc		$out, 7, $tmp		! is output aligned?
+	camellia_f	%f12, %f2, %f0, %f2
+	camellia_f	%f14, %f0, %f2, %f0
+	camellia_f	%f16, %f2, %f0, %f2
+	camellia_f	%f18, %f0, %f2, %f0
+	camellia_f	%f20, %f2, %f0, %f4
+	camellia_f	%f22, %f0, %f4, %f2
+	fxor		%f26, %f4, %f0
+	fxor		%f24, %f2, %f2
+
+	bnz,pn		%icc, 2f
+	nop
+
+	std		%f0, [$out + 0]
+	retl
+	std		%f2, [$out + 8]
+
+2:	alignaddrl	$out, %g0, $out
+	mov		0xff, $mask
+	srl		$mask, $tmp, $mask
+
+	faligndata	%f0, %f0, %f4
+	faligndata	%f0, %f2, %f6
+	faligndata	%f2, %f2, %f8
+
+	stda		%f4, [$out + $mask]0xc0	! partial store
+	std		%f6, [$out + 8]
+	add		$out, 16, $out
+	orn		%g0, $mask, $mask
+	retl
+	stda		%f8, [$out + $mask]0xc0	! partial store
+.type	cmll_t4_decrypt,#function
+.size	cmll_t4_decrypt,.-cmll_t4_decrypt
+___
+}
+
+######################################################################
+# key setup subroutines
+#
+{
+sub ROTL128 {
+  my $rot = shift;
+
+	"srlx	%o4, 64-$rot, %g4\n\t".
+	"sllx	%o4, $rot, %o4\n\t".
+	"srlx	%o5, 64-$rot, %g5\n\t".
+	"sllx	%o5, $rot, %o5\n\t".
+	"or	%o4, %g5, %o4\n\t".
+	"or	%o5, %g4, %o5";
+}
+
+my ($inp,$bits,$out,$tmp)=map("%o$_",(0..5));
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	cmll_t4_set_key
+.align	32
+cmll_t4_set_key:
+	and		$inp, 7, $tmp
+	alignaddr	$inp, %g0, $inp
+	cmp		$bits, 192
+	ldd		[$inp + 0], %f0
+	bl,pt		%icc,.L128
+	ldd		[$inp + 8], %f2
+
+	be,pt		%icc,.L192
+	ldd		[$inp + 16], %f4
+
+	brz,pt		$tmp, .L256aligned
+	ldd		[$inp + 24], %f6
+
+	ldd		[$inp + 32], %f8
+	faligndata	%f0, %f2, %f0
+	faligndata	%f2, %f4, %f2
+	faligndata	%f4, %f6, %f4
+	b		.L256aligned
+	faligndata	%f6, %f8, %f6
+
+.align	16
+.L192:
+	brz,a,pt	$tmp, .L256aligned
+	fnot2		%f4, %f6
+
+	ldd		[$inp + 24], %f6
+	nop
+	faligndata	%f0, %f2, %f0
+	faligndata	%f2, %f4, %f2
+	faligndata	%f4, %f6, %f4
+	fnot2		%f4, %f6
+
+.L256aligned:
+	std		%f0, [$out + 0]		! k[0, 1]
+	fsrc2		%f0, %f28
+	std		%f2, [$out + 8]		! k[2, 3]
+	fsrc2		%f2, %f30
+	fxor		%f4, %f0, %f0
+	b		.L128key
+	fxor		%f6, %f2, %f2
+
+.align	16
+.L128:
+	brz,pt		$tmp, .L128aligned
+	nop
+
+	ldd		[$inp + 16], %f4
+	nop
+	faligndata	%f0, %f2, %f0
+	faligndata	%f2, %f4, %f2
+
+.L128aligned:
+	std		%f0, [$out + 0]		! k[0, 1]
+	fsrc2		%f0, %f28
+	std		%f2, [$out + 8]		! k[2, 3]
+	fsrc2		%f2, %f30
+
+.L128key:
+	mov		%o7, %o5
+1:	call		.+8
+	add		%o7, SIGMA-1b, %o4
+	mov		%o5, %o7
+
+	ldd		[%o4 + 0], %f16
+	ldd		[%o4 + 8], %f18
+	ldd		[%o4 + 16], %f20
+	ldd		[%o4 + 24], %f22
+
+	camellia_f	%f16, %f2, %f0, %f2
+	camellia_f	%f18, %f0, %f2, %f0
+	fxor		%f28, %f0, %f0
+	fxor		%f30, %f2, %f2
+	camellia_f	%f20, %f2, %f0, %f2
+	camellia_f	%f22, %f0, %f2, %f0
+
+	bge,pn		%icc, .L256key
+	nop
+	std	%f0, [$out + 0x10]	! k[ 4,  5]
+	std	%f2, [$out + 0x18]	! k[ 6,  7]
+
+	movdtox	%f0, %o4
+	movdtox	%f2, %o5
+	`&ROTL128(15)`
+	stx	%o4, [$out + 0x30]	! k[12, 13]
+	stx	%o5, [$out + 0x38]	! k[14, 15]
+	`&ROTL128(15)`
+	stx	%o4, [$out + 0x40]	! k[16, 17]
+	stx	%o5, [$out + 0x48]	! k[18, 19]
+	`&ROTL128(15)`
+	stx	%o4, [$out + 0x60]	! k[24, 25]
+	`&ROTL128(15)`
+	stx	%o4, [$out + 0x70]	! k[28, 29]
+	stx	%o5, [$out + 0x78]	! k[30, 31]
+	`&ROTL128(34)`
+	stx	%o4, [$out + 0xa0]	! k[40, 41]
+	stx	%o5, [$out + 0xa8]	! k[42, 43]
+	`&ROTL128(17)`
+	stx	%o4, [$out + 0xc0]	! k[48, 49]
+	stx	%o5, [$out + 0xc8]	! k[50, 51]
+
+	movdtox	%f28, %o4		! k[ 0,  1]
+	movdtox	%f30, %o5		! k[ 2,  3]
+	`&ROTL128(15)`
+	stx	%o4, [$out + 0x20]	! k[ 8,  9]
+	stx	%o5, [$out + 0x28]	! k[10, 11]
+	`&ROTL128(30)`
+	stx	%o4, [$out + 0x50]	! k[20, 21]
+	stx	%o5, [$out + 0x58]	! k[22, 23]
+	`&ROTL128(15)`
+	stx	%o5, [$out + 0x68]	! k[26, 27]
+	`&ROTL128(17)`
+	stx	%o4, [$out + 0x80]	! k[32, 33]
+	stx	%o5, [$out + 0x88]	! k[34, 35]
+	`&ROTL128(17)`
+	stx	%o4, [$out + 0x90]	! k[36, 37]
+	stx	%o5, [$out + 0x98]	! k[38, 39]
+	`&ROTL128(17)`
+	stx	%o4, [$out + 0xb0]	! k[44, 45]
+	stx	%o5, [$out + 0xb8]	! k[46, 47]
+
+	mov		3, $tmp
+	st		$tmp, [$out + 0x110]
+	retl
+	xor		%o0, %o0, %o0
+
+.align	16
+.L256key:
+	ldd		[%o4 + 32], %f24
+	ldd		[%o4 + 40], %f26
+
+	std		%f0, [$out + 0x30]	! k[12, 13]
+	std		%f2, [$out + 0x38]	! k[14, 15]
+
+	fxor		%f4, %f0, %f0
+	fxor		%f6, %f2, %f2
+	camellia_f	%f24, %f2, %f0, %f2
+	camellia_f	%f26, %f0, %f2, %f0
+
+	std	%f0, [$out + 0x10]	! k[ 4,  5]
+	std	%f2, [$out + 0x18]	! k[ 6,  7]
+
+	movdtox	%f0, %o4
+	movdtox	%f2, %o5
+	`&ROTL128(30)`
+	stx	%o4, [$out + 0x50]	! k[20, 21]
+	stx	%o5, [$out + 0x58]	! k[22, 23]
+	`&ROTL128(30)`
+	stx	%o4, [$out + 0xa0]	! k[40, 41]
+	stx	%o5, [$out + 0xa8]	! k[42, 43]
+	`&ROTL128(51)`
+	stx	%o4, [$out + 0x100]	! k[64, 65]
+	stx	%o5, [$out + 0x108]	! k[66, 67]
+
+	movdtox	%f4, %o4		! k[ 8,  9]
+	movdtox	%f6, %o5		! k[10, 11]
+	`&ROTL128(15)`
+	stx	%o4, [$out + 0x20]	! k[ 8,  9]
+	stx	%o5, [$out + 0x28]	! k[10, 11]
+	`&ROTL128(15)`
+	stx	%o4, [$out + 0x40]	! k[16, 17]
+	stx	%o5, [$out + 0x48]	! k[18, 19]
+	`&ROTL128(30)`
+	stx	%o4, [$out + 0x90]	! k[36, 37]
+	stx	%o5, [$out + 0x98]	! k[38, 39]
+	`&ROTL128(34)`
+	stx	%o4, [$out + 0xd0]	! k[52, 53]
+	stx	%o5, [$out + 0xd8]	! k[54, 55]
+	ldx	[$out + 0x30], %o4	! k[12, 13]
+	ldx	[$out + 0x38], %o5	! k[14, 15]
+	`&ROTL128(15)`
+	stx	%o4, [$out + 0x30]	! k[12, 13]
+	stx	%o5, [$out + 0x38]	! k[14, 15]
+	`&ROTL128(30)`
+	stx	%o4, [$out + 0x70]	! k[28, 29]
+	stx	%o5, [$out + 0x78]	! k[30, 31]
+	srlx	%o4, 32, %g4
+	srlx	%o5, 32, %g5
+	st	%o4, [$out + 0xc0]	! k[48]
+	st	%g5, [$out + 0xc4]	! k[49]
+	st	%o5, [$out + 0xc8]	! k[50]
+	st	%g4, [$out + 0xcc]	! k[51]
+	`&ROTL128(49)`
+	stx	%o4, [$out + 0xe0]	! k[56, 57]
+	stx	%o5, [$out + 0xe8]	! k[58, 59]
+
+	movdtox	%f28, %o4		! k[ 0,  1]
+	movdtox	%f30, %o5		! k[ 2,  3]
+	`&ROTL128(45)`
+	stx	%o4, [$out + 0x60]	! k[24, 25]
+	stx	%o5, [$out + 0x68]	! k[26, 27]
+	`&ROTL128(15)`
+	stx	%o4, [$out + 0x80]	! k[32, 33]
+	stx	%o5, [$out + 0x88]	! k[34, 35]
+	`&ROTL128(17)`
+	stx	%o4, [$out + 0xb0]	! k[44, 45]
+	stx	%o5, [$out + 0xb8]	! k[46, 47]
+	`&ROTL128(34)`
+	stx	%o4, [$out + 0xf0]	! k[60, 61]
+	stx	%o5, [$out + 0xf8]	! k[62, 63]
+
+	mov		4, $tmp
+	st		$tmp, [$out + 0x110]
+	retl
+	xor		%o0, %o0, %o0
+.type	cmll_t4_set_key,#function
+.size	cmll_t4_set_key,.-cmll_t4_set_key
+.align	32
+SIGMA:
+	.long	0xa09e667f, 0x3bcc908b, 0xb67ae858, 0x4caa73b2
+	.long	0xc6ef372f, 0xe94f82be, 0x54ff53a5, 0xf1d36f1c
+	.long	0x10e527fa, 0xde682d1d, 0xb05688c2, 0xb3e6c1fd
+.type	SIGMA,#object
+.size	SIGMA,.-SIGMA
+.asciz	"Camellia for SPARC T4, David S. Miller, Andy Polyakov"
+___
+}
+
+{{{
+my ($inp,$out,$len,$key,$ivec,$enc)=map("%i$_",(0..5));
+my ($ileft,$iright,$ooff,$omask,$ivoff)=map("%l$_",(1..7));
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.align	32
+_cmll128_load_enckey:
+	ldx		[$key + 0], %g4
+	ldx		[$key + 8], %g5
+___
+for ($i=2; $i<26;$i++) {			# load key schedule
+    $code.=<<___;
+	ldd		[$key + `8*$i`], %f`12+2*$i`
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	retl
+	nop
+.type	_cmll128_load_enckey,#function
+.size	_cmll128_load_enckey,.-_cmll128_load_enckey
+_cmll256_load_enckey=_cmll128_load_enckey
+
+.align	32
+_cmll256_load_deckey:
+	ldd		[$key + 64], %f62
+	ldd		[$key + 72], %f60
+	b		.Load_deckey
+	add		$key, 64, $key
+_cmll128_load_deckey:
+	ldd		[$key + 0], %f60
+	ldd		[$key + 8], %f62
+.Load_deckey:
+___
+for ($i=2; $i<24;$i++) {			# load key schedule
+    $code.=<<___;
+	ldd		[$key + `8*$i`], %f`62-2*$i`
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	ldx		[$key + 192], %g4
+	retl
+	ldx		[$key + 200], %g5
+.type	_cmll256_load_deckey,#function
+.size	_cmll256_load_deckey,.-_cmll256_load_deckey
+
+.align	32
+_cmll128_encrypt_1x:
+___
+for ($i=0; $i<3; $i++) {
+    $code.=<<___;
+	camellia_f	%f`16+16*$i+0`, %f2, %f0, %f2
+	camellia_f	%f`16+16*$i+2`, %f0, %f2, %f0
+	camellia_f	%f`16+16*$i+4`, %f2, %f0, %f2
+	camellia_f	%f`16+16*$i+6`, %f0, %f2, %f0
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i<2);
+	camellia_f	%f`16+16*$i+8`, %f2, %f0, %f2
+	camellia_f	%f`16+16*$i+10`, %f0, %f2, %f0
+	camellia_fl	%f`16+16*$i+12`, %f0,      %f0
+	camellia_fli	%f`16+16*$i+14`, %f2,      %f2
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	camellia_f	%f56, %f2, %f0, %f4
+	camellia_f	%f58, %f0, %f4, %f2
+	fxor		%f60, %f4, %f0
+	retl
+	fxor		%f62, %f2, %f2
+.type	_cmll128_encrypt_1x,#function
+.size	_cmll128_encrypt_1x,.-_cmll128_encrypt_1x
+_cmll128_decrypt_1x=_cmll128_encrypt_1x
+
+.align	32
+_cmll128_encrypt_2x:
+___
+for ($i=0; $i<3; $i++) {
+    $code.=<<___;
+	camellia_f	%f`16+16*$i+0`, %f2, %f0, %f2
+	camellia_f	%f`16+16*$i+0`, %f6, %f4, %f6
+	camellia_f	%f`16+16*$i+2`, %f0, %f2, %f0
+	camellia_f	%f`16+16*$i+2`, %f4, %f6, %f4
+	camellia_f	%f`16+16*$i+4`, %f2, %f0, %f2
+	camellia_f	%f`16+16*$i+4`, %f6, %f4, %f6
+	camellia_f	%f`16+16*$i+6`, %f0, %f2, %f0
+	camellia_f	%f`16+16*$i+6`, %f4, %f6, %f4
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i<2);
+	camellia_f	%f`16+16*$i+8`, %f2, %f0, %f2
+	camellia_f	%f`16+16*$i+8`, %f6, %f4, %f6
+	camellia_f	%f`16+16*$i+10`, %f0, %f2, %f0
+	camellia_f	%f`16+16*$i+10`, %f4, %f6, %f4
+	camellia_fl	%f`16+16*$i+12`, %f0,      %f0
+	camellia_fl	%f`16+16*$i+12`, %f4,      %f4
+	camellia_fli	%f`16+16*$i+14`, %f2,      %f2
+	camellia_fli	%f`16+16*$i+14`, %f6,      %f6
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	camellia_f	%f56, %f2, %f0, %f8
+	camellia_f	%f56, %f6, %f4, %f10
+	camellia_f	%f58, %f0, %f8, %f2
+	camellia_f	%f58, %f4, %f10, %f6
+	fxor		%f60, %f8, %f0
+	fxor		%f60, %f10, %f4
+	fxor		%f62, %f2, %f2
+	retl
+	fxor		%f62, %f6, %f6
+.type	_cmll128_encrypt_2x,#function
+.size	_cmll128_encrypt_2x,.-_cmll128_encrypt_2x
+_cmll128_decrypt_2x=_cmll128_encrypt_2x
+
+.align	32
+_cmll256_encrypt_1x:
+	camellia_f	%f16, %f2, %f0, %f2
+	camellia_f	%f18, %f0, %f2, %f0
+	ldd		[$key + 208], %f16
+	ldd		[$key + 216], %f18
+	camellia_f	%f20, %f2, %f0, %f2
+	camellia_f	%f22, %f0, %f2, %f0
+	ldd		[$key + 224], %f20
+	ldd		[$key + 232], %f22
+	camellia_f	%f24, %f2, %f0, %f2
+	camellia_f	%f26, %f0, %f2, %f0
+	ldd		[$key + 240], %f24
+	ldd		[$key + 248], %f26
+	camellia_fl	%f28, %f0, %f0
+	camellia_fli	%f30, %f2, %f2
+	ldd		[$key + 256], %f28
+	ldd		[$key + 264], %f30
+___
+for ($i=1; $i<3; $i++) {
+    $code.=<<___;
+	camellia_f	%f`16+16*$i+0`, %f2, %f0, %f2
+	camellia_f	%f`16+16*$i+2`, %f0, %f2, %f0
+	camellia_f	%f`16+16*$i+4`, %f2, %f0, %f2
+	camellia_f	%f`16+16*$i+6`, %f0, %f2, %f0
+	camellia_f	%f`16+16*$i+8`, %f2, %f0, %f2
+	camellia_f	%f`16+16*$i+10`, %f0, %f2, %f0
+	camellia_fl	%f`16+16*$i+12`, %f0,      %f0
+	camellia_fli	%f`16+16*$i+14`, %f2,      %f2
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	camellia_f	%f16, %f2, %f0, %f2
+	camellia_f	%f18, %f0, %f2, %f0
+	ldd		[$key + 16], %f16
+	ldd		[$key + 24], %f18
+	camellia_f	%f20, %f2, %f0, %f2
+	camellia_f	%f22, %f0, %f2, %f0
+	ldd		[$key + 32], %f20
+	ldd		[$key + 40], %f22
+	camellia_f	%f24, %f2, %f0, %f4
+	camellia_f	%f26, %f0, %f4, %f2
+	ldd		[$key + 48], %f24
+	ldd		[$key + 56], %f26
+	fxor		%f28, %f4, %f0
+	fxor		%f30, %f2, %f2
+	ldd		[$key + 64], %f28
+	retl
+	ldd		[$key + 72], %f30
+.type	_cmll256_encrypt_1x,#function
+.size	_cmll256_encrypt_1x,.-_cmll256_encrypt_1x
+
+.align	32
+_cmll256_encrypt_2x:
+	camellia_f	%f16, %f2, %f0, %f2
+	camellia_f	%f16, %f6, %f4, %f6
+	camellia_f	%f18, %f0, %f2, %f0
+	camellia_f	%f18, %f4, %f6, %f4
+	ldd		[$key + 208], %f16
+	ldd		[$key + 216], %f18
+	camellia_f	%f20, %f2, %f0, %f2
+	camellia_f	%f20, %f6, %f4, %f6
+	camellia_f	%f22, %f0, %f2, %f0
+	camellia_f	%f22, %f4, %f6, %f4
+	ldd		[$key + 224], %f20
+	ldd		[$key + 232], %f22
+	camellia_f	%f24, %f2, %f0, %f2
+	camellia_f	%f24, %f6, %f4, %f6
+	camellia_f	%f26, %f0, %f2, %f0
+	camellia_f	%f26, %f4, %f6, %f4
+	ldd		[$key + 240], %f24
+	ldd		[$key + 248], %f26
+	camellia_fl	%f28, %f0, %f0
+	camellia_fl	%f28, %f4, %f4
+	camellia_fli	%f30, %f2, %f2
+	camellia_fli	%f30, %f6, %f6
+	ldd		[$key + 256], %f28
+	ldd		[$key + 264], %f30
+___
+for ($i=1; $i<3; $i++) {
+    $code.=<<___;
+	camellia_f	%f`16+16*$i+0`, %f2, %f0, %f2
+	camellia_f	%f`16+16*$i+0`, %f6, %f4, %f6
+	camellia_f	%f`16+16*$i+2`, %f0, %f2, %f0
+	camellia_f	%f`16+16*$i+2`, %f4, %f6, %f4
+	camellia_f	%f`16+16*$i+4`, %f2, %f0, %f2
+	camellia_f	%f`16+16*$i+4`, %f6, %f4, %f6
+	camellia_f	%f`16+16*$i+6`, %f0, %f2, %f0
+	camellia_f	%f`16+16*$i+6`, %f4, %f6, %f4
+	camellia_f	%f`16+16*$i+8`, %f2, %f0, %f2
+	camellia_f	%f`16+16*$i+8`, %f6, %f4, %f6
+	camellia_f	%f`16+16*$i+10`, %f0, %f2, %f0
+	camellia_f	%f`16+16*$i+10`, %f4, %f6, %f4
+	camellia_fl	%f`16+16*$i+12`, %f0,      %f0
+	camellia_fl	%f`16+16*$i+12`, %f4,      %f4
+	camellia_fli	%f`16+16*$i+14`, %f2,      %f2
+	camellia_fli	%f`16+16*$i+14`, %f6,      %f6
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	camellia_f	%f16, %f2, %f0, %f2
+	camellia_f	%f16, %f6, %f4, %f6
+	camellia_f	%f18, %f0, %f2, %f0
+	camellia_f	%f18, %f4, %f6, %f4
+	ldd		[$key + 16], %f16
+	ldd		[$key + 24], %f18
+	camellia_f	%f20, %f2, %f0, %f2
+	camellia_f	%f20, %f6, %f4, %f6
+	camellia_f	%f22, %f0, %f2, %f0
+	camellia_f	%f22, %f4, %f6, %f4
+	ldd		[$key + 32], %f20
+	ldd		[$key + 40], %f22
+	camellia_f	%f24, %f2, %f0, %f8
+	camellia_f	%f24, %f6, %f4, %f10
+	camellia_f	%f26, %f0, %f8, %f2
+	camellia_f	%f26, %f4, %f10, %f6
+	ldd		[$key + 48], %f24
+	ldd		[$key + 56], %f26
+	fxor		%f28, %f8, %f0
+	fxor		%f28, %f10, %f4
+	fxor		%f30, %f2, %f2
+	fxor		%f30, %f6, %f6
+	ldd		[$key + 64], %f28
+	retl
+	ldd		[$key + 72], %f30
+.type	_cmll256_encrypt_2x,#function
+.size	_cmll256_encrypt_2x,.-_cmll256_encrypt_2x
+
+.align	32
+_cmll256_decrypt_1x:
+	camellia_f	%f16, %f2, %f0, %f2
+	camellia_f	%f18, %f0, %f2, %f0
+	ldd		[$key - 8], %f16
+	ldd		[$key - 16], %f18
+	camellia_f	%f20, %f2, %f0, %f2
+	camellia_f	%f22, %f0, %f2, %f0
+	ldd		[$key - 24], %f20
+	ldd		[$key - 32], %f22
+	camellia_f	%f24, %f2, %f0, %f2
+	camellia_f	%f26, %f0, %f2, %f0
+	ldd		[$key - 40], %f24
+	ldd		[$key - 48], %f26
+	camellia_fl	%f28, %f0, %f0
+	camellia_fli	%f30, %f2, %f2
+	ldd		[$key - 56], %f28
+	ldd		[$key - 64], %f30
+___
+for ($i=1; $i<3; $i++) {
+    $code.=<<___;
+	camellia_f	%f`16+16*$i+0`, %f2, %f0, %f2
+	camellia_f	%f`16+16*$i+2`, %f0, %f2, %f0
+	camellia_f	%f`16+16*$i+4`, %f2, %f0, %f2
+	camellia_f	%f`16+16*$i+6`, %f0, %f2, %f0
+	camellia_f	%f`16+16*$i+8`, %f2, %f0, %f2
+	camellia_f	%f`16+16*$i+10`, %f0, %f2, %f0
+	camellia_fl	%f`16+16*$i+12`, %f0,      %f0
+	camellia_fli	%f`16+16*$i+14`, %f2,      %f2
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	camellia_f	%f16, %f2, %f0, %f2
+	camellia_f	%f18, %f0, %f2, %f0
+	ldd		[$key + 184], %f16
+	ldd		[$key + 176], %f18
+	camellia_f	%f20, %f2, %f0, %f2
+	camellia_f	%f22, %f0, %f2, %f0
+	ldd		[$key + 168], %f20
+	ldd		[$key + 160], %f22
+	camellia_f	%f24, %f2, %f0, %f4
+	camellia_f	%f26, %f0, %f4, %f2
+	ldd		[$key + 152], %f24
+	ldd		[$key + 144], %f26
+	fxor		%f30, %f4, %f0
+	fxor		%f28, %f2, %f2
+	ldd		[$key + 136], %f28
+	retl
+	ldd		[$key + 128], %f30
+.type	_cmll256_decrypt_1x,#function
+.size	_cmll256_decrypt_1x,.-_cmll256_decrypt_1x
+
+.align	32
+_cmll256_decrypt_2x:
+	camellia_f	%f16, %f2, %f0, %f2
+	camellia_f	%f16, %f6, %f4, %f6
+	camellia_f	%f18, %f0, %f2, %f0
+	camellia_f	%f18, %f4, %f6, %f4
+	ldd		[$key - 8], %f16
+	ldd		[$key - 16], %f18
+	camellia_f	%f20, %f2, %f0, %f2
+	camellia_f	%f20, %f6, %f4, %f6
+	camellia_f	%f22, %f0, %f2, %f0
+	camellia_f	%f22, %f4, %f6, %f4
+	ldd		[$key - 24], %f20
+	ldd		[$key - 32], %f22
+	camellia_f	%f24, %f2, %f0, %f2
+	camellia_f	%f24, %f6, %f4, %f6
+	camellia_f	%f26, %f0, %f2, %f0
+	camellia_f	%f26, %f4, %f6, %f4
+	ldd		[$key - 40], %f24
+	ldd		[$key - 48], %f26
+	camellia_fl	%f28, %f0, %f0
+	camellia_fl	%f28, %f4, %f4
+	camellia_fli	%f30, %f2, %f2
+	camellia_fli	%f30, %f6, %f6
+	ldd		[$key - 56], %f28
+	ldd		[$key - 64], %f30
+___
+for ($i=1; $i<3; $i++) {
+    $code.=<<___;
+	camellia_f	%f`16+16*$i+0`, %f2, %f0, %f2
+	camellia_f	%f`16+16*$i+0`, %f6, %f4, %f6
+	camellia_f	%f`16+16*$i+2`, %f0, %f2, %f0
+	camellia_f	%f`16+16*$i+2`, %f4, %f6, %f4
+	camellia_f	%f`16+16*$i+4`, %f2, %f0, %f2
+	camellia_f	%f`16+16*$i+4`, %f6, %f4, %f6
+	camellia_f	%f`16+16*$i+6`, %f0, %f2, %f0
+	camellia_f	%f`16+16*$i+6`, %f4, %f6, %f4
+	camellia_f	%f`16+16*$i+8`, %f2, %f0, %f2
+	camellia_f	%f`16+16*$i+8`, %f6, %f4, %f6
+	camellia_f	%f`16+16*$i+10`, %f0, %f2, %f0
+	camellia_f	%f`16+16*$i+10`, %f4, %f6, %f4
+	camellia_fl	%f`16+16*$i+12`, %f0,      %f0
+	camellia_fl	%f`16+16*$i+12`, %f4,      %f4
+	camellia_fli	%f`16+16*$i+14`, %f2,      %f2
+	camellia_fli	%f`16+16*$i+14`, %f6,      %f6
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	camellia_f	%f16, %f2, %f0, %f2
+	camellia_f	%f16, %f6, %f4, %f6
+	camellia_f	%f18, %f0, %f2, %f0
+	camellia_f	%f18, %f4, %f6, %f4
+	ldd		[$key + 184], %f16
+	ldd		[$key + 176], %f18
+	camellia_f	%f20, %f2, %f0, %f2
+	camellia_f	%f20, %f6, %f4, %f6
+	camellia_f	%f22, %f0, %f2, %f0
+	camellia_f	%f22, %f4, %f6, %f4
+	ldd		[$key + 168], %f20
+	ldd		[$key + 160], %f22
+	camellia_f	%f24, %f2, %f0, %f8
+	camellia_f	%f24, %f6, %f4, %f10
+	camellia_f	%f26, %f0, %f8, %f2
+	camellia_f	%f26, %f4, %f10, %f6
+	ldd		[$key + 152], %f24
+	ldd		[$key + 144], %f26
+	fxor		%f30, %f8, %f0
+	fxor		%f30, %f10, %f4
+	fxor		%f28, %f2, %f2
+	fxor		%f28, %f6, %f6
+	ldd		[$key + 136], %f28
+	retl
+	ldd		[$key + 128], %f30
+.type	_cmll256_decrypt_2x,#function
+.size	_cmll256_decrypt_2x,.-_cmll256_decrypt_2x
+___
+
+&alg_cbc_encrypt_implement("cmll",128);
+&alg_cbc_encrypt_implement("cmll",256);
+
+&alg_cbc_decrypt_implement("cmll",128);
+&alg_cbc_decrypt_implement("cmll",256);
+
+if ($::evp) {
+    &alg_ctr32_implement("cmll",128);
+    &alg_ctr32_implement("cmll",256);
+}
+}}}
+
+if (!$::evp) {
+$code.=<<___;
+.global	Camellia_encrypt
+Camellia_encrypt=cmll_t4_encrypt
+.global	Camellia_decrypt
+Camellia_decrypt=cmll_t4_decrypt
+.global	Camellia_set_key
+.align	32
+Camellia_set_key:
+	andcc		%o2, 7, %g0		! double-check alignment
+	bnz,a,pn	%icc, 1f
+	mov		-1, %o0
+	brz,a,pn	%o0, 1f
+	mov		-1, %o0
+	brz,a,pn	%o2, 1f
+	mov		-1, %o0
+	andncc		%o1, 0x1c0, %g0
+	bnz,a,pn	%icc, 1f
+	mov		-2, %o0
+	cmp		%o1, 128
+	bl,a,pn		%icc, 1f
+	mov		-2, %o0
+	b		cmll_t4_set_key
+	nop
+1:	retl
+	nop
+.type	Camellia_set_key,#function
+.size	Camellia_set_key,.-Camellia_set_key
+___
+
+my ($inp,$out,$len,$key,$ivec,$enc)=map("%o$_",(0..5));
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	Camellia_cbc_encrypt
+.align	32
+Camellia_cbc_encrypt:
+	ld		[$key + 272], %g1
+	nop
+	brz		$enc, .Lcbc_decrypt
+	cmp		%g1, 3
+
+	be,pt		%icc, cmll128_t4_cbc_encrypt
+	nop
+	ba		cmll256_t4_cbc_encrypt
+	nop
+
+.Lcbc_decrypt:
+	be,pt		%icc, cmll128_t4_cbc_decrypt
+	nop
+	ba		cmll256_t4_cbc_decrypt
+	nop
+.type	Camellia_cbc_encrypt,#function
+.size	Camellia_cbc_encrypt,.-Camellia_cbc_encrypt
+___
+}
+
+&emit_assembler();
+
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/camellia/build.info b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/camellia/build.info
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fd78272
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/camellia/build.info
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+LIBS=../../libcrypto
+SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
+        cmll_ecb.c cmll_ofb.c cmll_cfb.c cmll_ctr.c \
+        {- $target{cmll_asm_src} -}
+
+GENERATE[cmll-x86.s]=asm/cmll-x86.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $(CFLAGS) $(LIB_CFLAGS) $(PROCESSOR)
+DEPEND[cmll-x86.s]=../perlasm/x86asm.pl
+GENERATE[cmll-x86_64.s]=asm/cmll-x86_64.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+GENERATE[cmllt4-sparcv9.S]=asm/cmllt4-sparcv9.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+INCLUDE[cmllt4-sparcv9.o]=..
+DEPEND[cmllt4-sparcv9.S]=../perlasm/sparcv9_modes.pl
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/camellia/camellia.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/camellia/camellia.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6641a62
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/camellia/camellia.c
@@ -0,0 +1,541 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2006 NTT (Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation) .
+ * ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ *
+ * Intellectual Property information for Camellia:
+ *     http://info.isl.ntt.co.jp/crypt/eng/info/chiteki.html
+ *
+ * News Release for Announcement of Camellia open source:
+ *     http://www.ntt.co.jp/news/news06e/0604/060413a.html
+ *
+ * The Camellia Code included herein is developed by
+ * NTT (Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation), and is contributed
+ * to the OpenSSL project.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Algorithm Specification
+ * http://info.isl.ntt.co.jp/crypt/eng/camellia/specifications.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * This release balances code size and performance. In particular key
+ * schedule setup is fully unrolled, because doing so *significantly*
+ * reduces amount of instructions per setup round and code increase is
+ * justifiable. In block functions on the other hand only inner loops
+ * are unrolled, as full unroll gives only nominal performance boost,
+ * while code size grows 4 or 7 times. Also, unlike previous versions
+ * this one "encourages" compiler to keep intermediate variables in
+ * registers, which should give better "all round" results, in other
+ * words reasonable performance even with not so modern compilers.
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/camellia.h>
+#include "cmll_locl.h"
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+/* 32-bit rotations */
+#if !defined(PEDANTIC) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_INLINE_ASM)
+# if defined(_MSC_VER) && (defined(_M_IX86) || defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64))
+#  define RightRotate(x, s) _lrotr(x, s)
+#  define LeftRotate(x, s)  _lrotl(x, s)
+#  if _MSC_VER >= 1400
+#   define SWAP(x) _byteswap_ulong(x)
+#  else
+#   define SWAP(x) (_lrotl(x, 8) & 0x00ff00ff | _lrotr(x, 8) & 0xff00ff00)
+#  endif
+#  define GETU32(p)   SWAP(*((u32 *)(p)))
+#  define PUTU32(p,v) (*((u32 *)(p)) = SWAP((v)))
+# elif defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2
+#  if defined(__i386) || defined(__x86_64)
+#   define RightRotate(x,s) ({u32 ret; asm ("rorl %1,%0":"=r"(ret):"I"(s),"0"(x):"cc"); ret; })
+#   define LeftRotate(x,s)  ({u32 ret; asm ("roll %1,%0":"=r"(ret):"I"(s),"0"(x):"cc"); ret; })
+#   if defined(B_ENDIAN)        /* stratus.com does it */
+#    define GETU32(p)   (*(u32 *)(p))
+#    define PUTU32(p,v) (*(u32 *)(p)=(v))
+#   else
+#    define GETU32(p)   ({u32 r=*(const u32 *)(p); asm("bswapl %0":"=r"(r):"0"(r)); r; })
+#    define PUTU32(p,v) ({u32 r=(v); asm("bswapl %0":"=r"(r):"0"(r)); *(u32 *)(p)=r; })
+#   endif
+#  elif defined(_ARCH_PPC) || defined(_ARCH_PPC64) || \
+        defined(__powerpc) || defined(__ppc__) || defined(__powerpc64__)
+#   define LeftRotate(x,s)  ({u32 ret; asm ("rlwinm %0,%1,%2,0,31":"=r"(ret):"r"(x),"I"(s)); ret; })
+#   define RightRotate(x,s) LeftRotate(x,(32-s))
+#  elif defined(__s390x__)
+#   define LeftRotate(x,s)  ({u32 ret; asm ("rll %0,%1,%2":"=r"(ret):"r"(x),"I"(s)); ret; })
+#   define RightRotate(x,s) LeftRotate(x,(32-s))
+#   define GETU32(p)   (*(u32 *)(p))
+#   define PUTU32(p,v) (*(u32 *)(p)=(v))
+#  endif
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(RightRotate) && !defined(LeftRotate)
+# define RightRotate(x, s) ( ((x) >> (s)) + ((x) << (32 - s)) )
+# define LeftRotate(x, s)  ( ((x) << (s)) + ((x) >> (32 - s)) )
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(GETU32) && !defined(PUTU32)
+# define GETU32(p)   (((u32)(p)[0] << 24) ^ ((u32)(p)[1] << 16) ^ ((u32)(p)[2] <<  8) ^ ((u32)(p)[3]))
+# define PUTU32(p,v) ((p)[0] = (u8)((v) >> 24), (p)[1] = (u8)((v) >> 16), (p)[2] = (u8)((v) >>  8), (p)[3] = (u8)(v))
+#endif
+
+/* S-box data */
+#define SBOX1_1110 Camellia_SBOX[0]
+#define SBOX4_4404 Camellia_SBOX[1]
+#define SBOX2_0222 Camellia_SBOX[2]
+#define SBOX3_3033 Camellia_SBOX[3]
+static const u32 Camellia_SBOX[][256] = {
+    {0x70707000, 0x82828200, 0x2c2c2c00, 0xececec00, 0xb3b3b300, 0x27272700,
+     0xc0c0c000, 0xe5e5e500, 0xe4e4e400, 0x85858500, 0x57575700, 0x35353500,
+     0xeaeaea00, 0x0c0c0c00, 0xaeaeae00, 0x41414100, 0x23232300, 0xefefef00,
+     0x6b6b6b00, 0x93939300, 0x45454500, 0x19191900, 0xa5a5a500, 0x21212100,
+     0xededed00, 0x0e0e0e00, 0x4f4f4f00, 0x4e4e4e00, 0x1d1d1d00, 0x65656500,
+     0x92929200, 0xbdbdbd00, 0x86868600, 0xb8b8b800, 0xafafaf00, 0x8f8f8f00,
+     0x7c7c7c00, 0xebebeb00, 0x1f1f1f00, 0xcecece00, 0x3e3e3e00, 0x30303000,
+     0xdcdcdc00, 0x5f5f5f00, 0x5e5e5e00, 0xc5c5c500, 0x0b0b0b00, 0x1a1a1a00,
+     0xa6a6a600, 0xe1e1e100, 0x39393900, 0xcacaca00, 0xd5d5d500, 0x47474700,
+     0x5d5d5d00, 0x3d3d3d00, 0xd9d9d900, 0x01010100, 0x5a5a5a00, 0xd6d6d600,
+     0x51515100, 0x56565600, 0x6c6c6c00, 0x4d4d4d00, 0x8b8b8b00, 0x0d0d0d00,
+     0x9a9a9a00, 0x66666600, 0xfbfbfb00, 0xcccccc00, 0xb0b0b000, 0x2d2d2d00,
+     0x74747400, 0x12121200, 0x2b2b2b00, 0x20202000, 0xf0f0f000, 0xb1b1b100,
+     0x84848400, 0x99999900, 0xdfdfdf00, 0x4c4c4c00, 0xcbcbcb00, 0xc2c2c200,
+     0x34343400, 0x7e7e7e00, 0x76767600, 0x05050500, 0x6d6d6d00, 0xb7b7b700,
+     0xa9a9a900, 0x31313100, 0xd1d1d100, 0x17171700, 0x04040400, 0xd7d7d700,
+     0x14141400, 0x58585800, 0x3a3a3a00, 0x61616100, 0xdedede00, 0x1b1b1b00,
+     0x11111100, 0x1c1c1c00, 0x32323200, 0x0f0f0f00, 0x9c9c9c00, 0x16161600,
+     0x53535300, 0x18181800, 0xf2f2f200, 0x22222200, 0xfefefe00, 0x44444400,
+     0xcfcfcf00, 0xb2b2b200, 0xc3c3c300, 0xb5b5b500, 0x7a7a7a00, 0x91919100,
+     0x24242400, 0x08080800, 0xe8e8e800, 0xa8a8a800, 0x60606000, 0xfcfcfc00,
+     0x69696900, 0x50505000, 0xaaaaaa00, 0xd0d0d000, 0xa0a0a000, 0x7d7d7d00,
+     0xa1a1a100, 0x89898900, 0x62626200, 0x97979700, 0x54545400, 0x5b5b5b00,
+     0x1e1e1e00, 0x95959500, 0xe0e0e000, 0xffffff00, 0x64646400, 0xd2d2d200,
+     0x10101000, 0xc4c4c400, 0x00000000, 0x48484800, 0xa3a3a300, 0xf7f7f700,
+     0x75757500, 0xdbdbdb00, 0x8a8a8a00, 0x03030300, 0xe6e6e600, 0xdadada00,
+     0x09090900, 0x3f3f3f00, 0xdddddd00, 0x94949400, 0x87878700, 0x5c5c5c00,
+     0x83838300, 0x02020200, 0xcdcdcd00, 0x4a4a4a00, 0x90909000, 0x33333300,
+     0x73737300, 0x67676700, 0xf6f6f600, 0xf3f3f300, 0x9d9d9d00, 0x7f7f7f00,
+     0xbfbfbf00, 0xe2e2e200, 0x52525200, 0x9b9b9b00, 0xd8d8d800, 0x26262600,
+     0xc8c8c800, 0x37373700, 0xc6c6c600, 0x3b3b3b00, 0x81818100, 0x96969600,
+     0x6f6f6f00, 0x4b4b4b00, 0x13131300, 0xbebebe00, 0x63636300, 0x2e2e2e00,
+     0xe9e9e900, 0x79797900, 0xa7a7a700, 0x8c8c8c00, 0x9f9f9f00, 0x6e6e6e00,
+     0xbcbcbc00, 0x8e8e8e00, 0x29292900, 0xf5f5f500, 0xf9f9f900, 0xb6b6b600,
+     0x2f2f2f00, 0xfdfdfd00, 0xb4b4b400, 0x59595900, 0x78787800, 0x98989800,
+     0x06060600, 0x6a6a6a00, 0xe7e7e700, 0x46464600, 0x71717100, 0xbababa00,
+     0xd4d4d400, 0x25252500, 0xababab00, 0x42424200, 0x88888800, 0xa2a2a200,
+     0x8d8d8d00, 0xfafafa00, 0x72727200, 0x07070700, 0xb9b9b900, 0x55555500,
+     0xf8f8f800, 0xeeeeee00, 0xacacac00, 0x0a0a0a00, 0x36363600, 0x49494900,
+     0x2a2a2a00, 0x68686800, 0x3c3c3c00, 0x38383800, 0xf1f1f100, 0xa4a4a400,
+     0x40404000, 0x28282800, 0xd3d3d300, 0x7b7b7b00, 0xbbbbbb00, 0xc9c9c900,
+     0x43434300, 0xc1c1c100, 0x15151500, 0xe3e3e300, 0xadadad00, 0xf4f4f400,
+     0x77777700, 0xc7c7c700, 0x80808000, 0x9e9e9e00},
+    {0x70700070, 0x2c2c002c, 0xb3b300b3, 0xc0c000c0, 0xe4e400e4, 0x57570057,
+     0xeaea00ea, 0xaeae00ae, 0x23230023, 0x6b6b006b, 0x45450045, 0xa5a500a5,
+     0xeded00ed, 0x4f4f004f, 0x1d1d001d, 0x92920092, 0x86860086, 0xafaf00af,
+     0x7c7c007c, 0x1f1f001f, 0x3e3e003e, 0xdcdc00dc, 0x5e5e005e, 0x0b0b000b,
+     0xa6a600a6, 0x39390039, 0xd5d500d5, 0x5d5d005d, 0xd9d900d9, 0x5a5a005a,
+     0x51510051, 0x6c6c006c, 0x8b8b008b, 0x9a9a009a, 0xfbfb00fb, 0xb0b000b0,
+     0x74740074, 0x2b2b002b, 0xf0f000f0, 0x84840084, 0xdfdf00df, 0xcbcb00cb,
+     0x34340034, 0x76760076, 0x6d6d006d, 0xa9a900a9, 0xd1d100d1, 0x04040004,
+     0x14140014, 0x3a3a003a, 0xdede00de, 0x11110011, 0x32320032, 0x9c9c009c,
+     0x53530053, 0xf2f200f2, 0xfefe00fe, 0xcfcf00cf, 0xc3c300c3, 0x7a7a007a,
+     0x24240024, 0xe8e800e8, 0x60600060, 0x69690069, 0xaaaa00aa, 0xa0a000a0,
+     0xa1a100a1, 0x62620062, 0x54540054, 0x1e1e001e, 0xe0e000e0, 0x64640064,
+     0x10100010, 0x00000000, 0xa3a300a3, 0x75750075, 0x8a8a008a, 0xe6e600e6,
+     0x09090009, 0xdddd00dd, 0x87870087, 0x83830083, 0xcdcd00cd, 0x90900090,
+     0x73730073, 0xf6f600f6, 0x9d9d009d, 0xbfbf00bf, 0x52520052, 0xd8d800d8,
+     0xc8c800c8, 0xc6c600c6, 0x81810081, 0x6f6f006f, 0x13130013, 0x63630063,
+     0xe9e900e9, 0xa7a700a7, 0x9f9f009f, 0xbcbc00bc, 0x29290029, 0xf9f900f9,
+     0x2f2f002f, 0xb4b400b4, 0x78780078, 0x06060006, 0xe7e700e7, 0x71710071,
+     0xd4d400d4, 0xabab00ab, 0x88880088, 0x8d8d008d, 0x72720072, 0xb9b900b9,
+     0xf8f800f8, 0xacac00ac, 0x36360036, 0x2a2a002a, 0x3c3c003c, 0xf1f100f1,
+     0x40400040, 0xd3d300d3, 0xbbbb00bb, 0x43430043, 0x15150015, 0xadad00ad,
+     0x77770077, 0x80800080, 0x82820082, 0xecec00ec, 0x27270027, 0xe5e500e5,
+     0x85850085, 0x35350035, 0x0c0c000c, 0x41410041, 0xefef00ef, 0x93930093,
+     0x19190019, 0x21210021, 0x0e0e000e, 0x4e4e004e, 0x65650065, 0xbdbd00bd,
+     0xb8b800b8, 0x8f8f008f, 0xebeb00eb, 0xcece00ce, 0x30300030, 0x5f5f005f,
+     0xc5c500c5, 0x1a1a001a, 0xe1e100e1, 0xcaca00ca, 0x47470047, 0x3d3d003d,
+     0x01010001, 0xd6d600d6, 0x56560056, 0x4d4d004d, 0x0d0d000d, 0x66660066,
+     0xcccc00cc, 0x2d2d002d, 0x12120012, 0x20200020, 0xb1b100b1, 0x99990099,
+     0x4c4c004c, 0xc2c200c2, 0x7e7e007e, 0x05050005, 0xb7b700b7, 0x31310031,
+     0x17170017, 0xd7d700d7, 0x58580058, 0x61610061, 0x1b1b001b, 0x1c1c001c,
+     0x0f0f000f, 0x16160016, 0x18180018, 0x22220022, 0x44440044, 0xb2b200b2,
+     0xb5b500b5, 0x91910091, 0x08080008, 0xa8a800a8, 0xfcfc00fc, 0x50500050,
+     0xd0d000d0, 0x7d7d007d, 0x89890089, 0x97970097, 0x5b5b005b, 0x95950095,
+     0xffff00ff, 0xd2d200d2, 0xc4c400c4, 0x48480048, 0xf7f700f7, 0xdbdb00db,
+     0x03030003, 0xdada00da, 0x3f3f003f, 0x94940094, 0x5c5c005c, 0x02020002,
+     0x4a4a004a, 0x33330033, 0x67670067, 0xf3f300f3, 0x7f7f007f, 0xe2e200e2,
+     0x9b9b009b, 0x26260026, 0x37370037, 0x3b3b003b, 0x96960096, 0x4b4b004b,
+     0xbebe00be, 0x2e2e002e, 0x79790079, 0x8c8c008c, 0x6e6e006e, 0x8e8e008e,
+     0xf5f500f5, 0xb6b600b6, 0xfdfd00fd, 0x59590059, 0x98980098, 0x6a6a006a,
+     0x46460046, 0xbaba00ba, 0x25250025, 0x42420042, 0xa2a200a2, 0xfafa00fa,
+     0x07070007, 0x55550055, 0xeeee00ee, 0x0a0a000a, 0x49490049, 0x68680068,
+     0x38380038, 0xa4a400a4, 0x28280028, 0x7b7b007b, 0xc9c900c9, 0xc1c100c1,
+     0xe3e300e3, 0xf4f400f4, 0xc7c700c7, 0x9e9e009e},
+    {0x00e0e0e0, 0x00050505, 0x00585858, 0x00d9d9d9, 0x00676767, 0x004e4e4e,
+     0x00818181, 0x00cbcbcb, 0x00c9c9c9, 0x000b0b0b, 0x00aeaeae, 0x006a6a6a,
+     0x00d5d5d5, 0x00181818, 0x005d5d5d, 0x00828282, 0x00464646, 0x00dfdfdf,
+     0x00d6d6d6, 0x00272727, 0x008a8a8a, 0x00323232, 0x004b4b4b, 0x00424242,
+     0x00dbdbdb, 0x001c1c1c, 0x009e9e9e, 0x009c9c9c, 0x003a3a3a, 0x00cacaca,
+     0x00252525, 0x007b7b7b, 0x000d0d0d, 0x00717171, 0x005f5f5f, 0x001f1f1f,
+     0x00f8f8f8, 0x00d7d7d7, 0x003e3e3e, 0x009d9d9d, 0x007c7c7c, 0x00606060,
+     0x00b9b9b9, 0x00bebebe, 0x00bcbcbc, 0x008b8b8b, 0x00161616, 0x00343434,
+     0x004d4d4d, 0x00c3c3c3, 0x00727272, 0x00959595, 0x00ababab, 0x008e8e8e,
+     0x00bababa, 0x007a7a7a, 0x00b3b3b3, 0x00020202, 0x00b4b4b4, 0x00adadad,
+     0x00a2a2a2, 0x00acacac, 0x00d8d8d8, 0x009a9a9a, 0x00171717, 0x001a1a1a,
+     0x00353535, 0x00cccccc, 0x00f7f7f7, 0x00999999, 0x00616161, 0x005a5a5a,
+     0x00e8e8e8, 0x00242424, 0x00565656, 0x00404040, 0x00e1e1e1, 0x00636363,
+     0x00090909, 0x00333333, 0x00bfbfbf, 0x00989898, 0x00979797, 0x00858585,
+     0x00686868, 0x00fcfcfc, 0x00ececec, 0x000a0a0a, 0x00dadada, 0x006f6f6f,
+     0x00535353, 0x00626262, 0x00a3a3a3, 0x002e2e2e, 0x00080808, 0x00afafaf,
+     0x00282828, 0x00b0b0b0, 0x00747474, 0x00c2c2c2, 0x00bdbdbd, 0x00363636,
+     0x00222222, 0x00383838, 0x00646464, 0x001e1e1e, 0x00393939, 0x002c2c2c,
+     0x00a6a6a6, 0x00303030, 0x00e5e5e5, 0x00444444, 0x00fdfdfd, 0x00888888,
+     0x009f9f9f, 0x00656565, 0x00878787, 0x006b6b6b, 0x00f4f4f4, 0x00232323,
+     0x00484848, 0x00101010, 0x00d1d1d1, 0x00515151, 0x00c0c0c0, 0x00f9f9f9,
+     0x00d2d2d2, 0x00a0a0a0, 0x00555555, 0x00a1a1a1, 0x00414141, 0x00fafafa,
+     0x00434343, 0x00131313, 0x00c4c4c4, 0x002f2f2f, 0x00a8a8a8, 0x00b6b6b6,
+     0x003c3c3c, 0x002b2b2b, 0x00c1c1c1, 0x00ffffff, 0x00c8c8c8, 0x00a5a5a5,
+     0x00202020, 0x00898989, 0x00000000, 0x00909090, 0x00474747, 0x00efefef,
+     0x00eaeaea, 0x00b7b7b7, 0x00151515, 0x00060606, 0x00cdcdcd, 0x00b5b5b5,
+     0x00121212, 0x007e7e7e, 0x00bbbbbb, 0x00292929, 0x000f0f0f, 0x00b8b8b8,
+     0x00070707, 0x00040404, 0x009b9b9b, 0x00949494, 0x00212121, 0x00666666,
+     0x00e6e6e6, 0x00cecece, 0x00ededed, 0x00e7e7e7, 0x003b3b3b, 0x00fefefe,
+     0x007f7f7f, 0x00c5c5c5, 0x00a4a4a4, 0x00373737, 0x00b1b1b1, 0x004c4c4c,
+     0x00919191, 0x006e6e6e, 0x008d8d8d, 0x00767676, 0x00030303, 0x002d2d2d,
+     0x00dedede, 0x00969696, 0x00262626, 0x007d7d7d, 0x00c6c6c6, 0x005c5c5c,
+     0x00d3d3d3, 0x00f2f2f2, 0x004f4f4f, 0x00191919, 0x003f3f3f, 0x00dcdcdc,
+     0x00797979, 0x001d1d1d, 0x00525252, 0x00ebebeb, 0x00f3f3f3, 0x006d6d6d,
+     0x005e5e5e, 0x00fbfbfb, 0x00696969, 0x00b2b2b2, 0x00f0f0f0, 0x00313131,
+     0x000c0c0c, 0x00d4d4d4, 0x00cfcfcf, 0x008c8c8c, 0x00e2e2e2, 0x00757575,
+     0x00a9a9a9, 0x004a4a4a, 0x00575757, 0x00848484, 0x00111111, 0x00454545,
+     0x001b1b1b, 0x00f5f5f5, 0x00e4e4e4, 0x000e0e0e, 0x00737373, 0x00aaaaaa,
+     0x00f1f1f1, 0x00dddddd, 0x00595959, 0x00141414, 0x006c6c6c, 0x00929292,
+     0x00545454, 0x00d0d0d0, 0x00787878, 0x00707070, 0x00e3e3e3, 0x00494949,
+     0x00808080, 0x00505050, 0x00a7a7a7, 0x00f6f6f6, 0x00777777, 0x00939393,
+     0x00868686, 0x00838383, 0x002a2a2a, 0x00c7c7c7, 0x005b5b5b, 0x00e9e9e9,
+     0x00eeeeee, 0x008f8f8f, 0x00010101, 0x003d3d3d},
+    {0x38003838, 0x41004141, 0x16001616, 0x76007676, 0xd900d9d9, 0x93009393,
+     0x60006060, 0xf200f2f2, 0x72007272, 0xc200c2c2, 0xab00abab, 0x9a009a9a,
+     0x75007575, 0x06000606, 0x57005757, 0xa000a0a0, 0x91009191, 0xf700f7f7,
+     0xb500b5b5, 0xc900c9c9, 0xa200a2a2, 0x8c008c8c, 0xd200d2d2, 0x90009090,
+     0xf600f6f6, 0x07000707, 0xa700a7a7, 0x27002727, 0x8e008e8e, 0xb200b2b2,
+     0x49004949, 0xde00dede, 0x43004343, 0x5c005c5c, 0xd700d7d7, 0xc700c7c7,
+     0x3e003e3e, 0xf500f5f5, 0x8f008f8f, 0x67006767, 0x1f001f1f, 0x18001818,
+     0x6e006e6e, 0xaf00afaf, 0x2f002f2f, 0xe200e2e2, 0x85008585, 0x0d000d0d,
+     0x53005353, 0xf000f0f0, 0x9c009c9c, 0x65006565, 0xea00eaea, 0xa300a3a3,
+     0xae00aeae, 0x9e009e9e, 0xec00ecec, 0x80008080, 0x2d002d2d, 0x6b006b6b,
+     0xa800a8a8, 0x2b002b2b, 0x36003636, 0xa600a6a6, 0xc500c5c5, 0x86008686,
+     0x4d004d4d, 0x33003333, 0xfd00fdfd, 0x66006666, 0x58005858, 0x96009696,
+     0x3a003a3a, 0x09000909, 0x95009595, 0x10001010, 0x78007878, 0xd800d8d8,
+     0x42004242, 0xcc00cccc, 0xef00efef, 0x26002626, 0xe500e5e5, 0x61006161,
+     0x1a001a1a, 0x3f003f3f, 0x3b003b3b, 0x82008282, 0xb600b6b6, 0xdb00dbdb,
+     0xd400d4d4, 0x98009898, 0xe800e8e8, 0x8b008b8b, 0x02000202, 0xeb00ebeb,
+     0x0a000a0a, 0x2c002c2c, 0x1d001d1d, 0xb000b0b0, 0x6f006f6f, 0x8d008d8d,
+     0x88008888, 0x0e000e0e, 0x19001919, 0x87008787, 0x4e004e4e, 0x0b000b0b,
+     0xa900a9a9, 0x0c000c0c, 0x79007979, 0x11001111, 0x7f007f7f, 0x22002222,
+     0xe700e7e7, 0x59005959, 0xe100e1e1, 0xda00dada, 0x3d003d3d, 0xc800c8c8,
+     0x12001212, 0x04000404, 0x74007474, 0x54005454, 0x30003030, 0x7e007e7e,
+     0xb400b4b4, 0x28002828, 0x55005555, 0x68006868, 0x50005050, 0xbe00bebe,
+     0xd000d0d0, 0xc400c4c4, 0x31003131, 0xcb00cbcb, 0x2a002a2a, 0xad00adad,
+     0x0f000f0f, 0xca00caca, 0x70007070, 0xff00ffff, 0x32003232, 0x69006969,
+     0x08000808, 0x62006262, 0x00000000, 0x24002424, 0xd100d1d1, 0xfb00fbfb,
+     0xba00baba, 0xed00eded, 0x45004545, 0x81008181, 0x73007373, 0x6d006d6d,
+     0x84008484, 0x9f009f9f, 0xee00eeee, 0x4a004a4a, 0xc300c3c3, 0x2e002e2e,
+     0xc100c1c1, 0x01000101, 0xe600e6e6, 0x25002525, 0x48004848, 0x99009999,
+     0xb900b9b9, 0xb300b3b3, 0x7b007b7b, 0xf900f9f9, 0xce00cece, 0xbf00bfbf,
+     0xdf00dfdf, 0x71007171, 0x29002929, 0xcd00cdcd, 0x6c006c6c, 0x13001313,
+     0x64006464, 0x9b009b9b, 0x63006363, 0x9d009d9d, 0xc000c0c0, 0x4b004b4b,
+     0xb700b7b7, 0xa500a5a5, 0x89008989, 0x5f005f5f, 0xb100b1b1, 0x17001717,
+     0xf400f4f4, 0xbc00bcbc, 0xd300d3d3, 0x46004646, 0xcf00cfcf, 0x37003737,
+     0x5e005e5e, 0x47004747, 0x94009494, 0xfa00fafa, 0xfc00fcfc, 0x5b005b5b,
+     0x97009797, 0xfe00fefe, 0x5a005a5a, 0xac00acac, 0x3c003c3c, 0x4c004c4c,
+     0x03000303, 0x35003535, 0xf300f3f3, 0x23002323, 0xb800b8b8, 0x5d005d5d,
+     0x6a006a6a, 0x92009292, 0xd500d5d5, 0x21002121, 0x44004444, 0x51005151,
+     0xc600c6c6, 0x7d007d7d, 0x39003939, 0x83008383, 0xdc00dcdc, 0xaa00aaaa,
+     0x7c007c7c, 0x77007777, 0x56005656, 0x05000505, 0x1b001b1b, 0xa400a4a4,
+     0x15001515, 0x34003434, 0x1e001e1e, 0x1c001c1c, 0xf800f8f8, 0x52005252,
+     0x20002020, 0x14001414, 0xe900e9e9, 0xbd00bdbd, 0xdd00dddd, 0xe400e4e4,
+     0xa100a1a1, 0xe000e0e0, 0x8a008a8a, 0xf100f1f1, 0xd600d6d6, 0x7a007a7a,
+     0xbb00bbbb, 0xe300e3e3, 0x40004040, 0x4f004f4f}
+};
+
+/* Key generation constants */
+static const u32 SIGMA[] = {
+    0xa09e667f, 0x3bcc908b, 0xb67ae858, 0x4caa73b2, 0xc6ef372f, 0xe94f82be,
+    0x54ff53a5, 0xf1d36f1c, 0x10e527fa, 0xde682d1d, 0xb05688c2, 0xb3e6c1fd
+};
+
+/* The phi algorithm given in C.2.7 of the Camellia spec document. */
+/*
+ * This version does not attempt to minimize amount of temporary
+ * variables, but instead explicitly exposes algorithm's parallelism.
+ * It is therefore most appropriate for platforms with not less than
+ * ~16 registers. For platforms with less registers [well, x86 to be
+ * specific] assembler version should be/is provided anyway...
+ */
+#define Camellia_Feistel(_s0,_s1,_s2,_s3,_key) do {\
+        register u32 _t0,_t1,_t2,_t3;\
+\
+        _t0  = _s0 ^ (_key)[0];\
+        _t3  = SBOX4_4404[_t0&0xff];\
+        _t1  = _s1 ^ (_key)[1];\
+        _t3 ^= SBOX3_3033[(_t0 >> 8)&0xff];\
+        _t2  = SBOX1_1110[_t1&0xff];\
+        _t3 ^= SBOX2_0222[(_t0 >> 16)&0xff];\
+        _t2 ^= SBOX4_4404[(_t1 >> 8)&0xff];\
+        _t3 ^= SBOX1_1110[(_t0 >> 24)];\
+        _t2 ^= _t3;\
+        _t3  = RightRotate(_t3,8);\
+        _t2 ^= SBOX3_3033[(_t1 >> 16)&0xff];\
+        _s3 ^= _t3;\
+        _t2 ^= SBOX2_0222[(_t1 >> 24)];\
+        _s2 ^= _t2; \
+        _s3 ^= _t2;\
+} while(0)
+
+/*
+ * Note that n has to be less than 32. Rotations for larger amount
+ * of bits are achieved by "rotating" order of s-elements and
+ * adjusting n accordingly, e.g. RotLeft128(s1,s2,s3,s0,n-32).
+ */
+#define RotLeft128(_s0,_s1,_s2,_s3,_n) do {\
+        u32 _t0=_s0>>(32-_n);\
+        _s0 = (_s0<<_n) | (_s1>>(32-_n));\
+        _s1 = (_s1<<_n) | (_s2>>(32-_n));\
+        _s2 = (_s2<<_n) | (_s3>>(32-_n));\
+        _s3 = (_s3<<_n) | _t0;\
+} while (0)
+
+int Camellia_Ekeygen(int keyBitLength, const u8 *rawKey, KEY_TABLE_TYPE k)
+{
+    register u32 s0, s1, s2, s3;
+
+    k[0] = s0 = GETU32(rawKey);
+    k[1] = s1 = GETU32(rawKey + 4);
+    k[2] = s2 = GETU32(rawKey + 8);
+    k[3] = s3 = GETU32(rawKey + 12);
+
+    if (keyBitLength != 128) {
+        k[8] = s0 = GETU32(rawKey + 16);
+        k[9] = s1 = GETU32(rawKey + 20);
+        if (keyBitLength == 192) {
+            k[10] = s2 = ~s0;
+            k[11] = s3 = ~s1;
+        } else {
+            k[10] = s2 = GETU32(rawKey + 24);
+            k[11] = s3 = GETU32(rawKey + 28);
+        }
+        s0 ^= k[0], s1 ^= k[1], s2 ^= k[2], s3 ^= k[3];
+    }
+
+    /* Use the Feistel routine to scramble the key material */
+    Camellia_Feistel(s0, s1, s2, s3, SIGMA + 0);
+    Camellia_Feistel(s2, s3, s0, s1, SIGMA + 2);
+
+    s0 ^= k[0], s1 ^= k[1], s2 ^= k[2], s3 ^= k[3];
+    Camellia_Feistel(s0, s1, s2, s3, SIGMA + 4);
+    Camellia_Feistel(s2, s3, s0, s1, SIGMA + 6);
+
+    /* Fill the keyTable. Requires many block rotations. */
+    if (keyBitLength == 128) {
+        k[4] = s0, k[5] = s1, k[6] = s2, k[7] = s3;
+        RotLeft128(s0, s1, s2, s3, 15); /* KA <<< 15 */
+        k[12] = s0, k[13] = s1, k[14] = s2, k[15] = s3;
+        RotLeft128(s0, s1, s2, s3, 15); /* KA <<< 30 */
+        k[16] = s0, k[17] = s1, k[18] = s2, k[19] = s3;
+        RotLeft128(s0, s1, s2, s3, 15); /* KA <<< 45 */
+        k[24] = s0, k[25] = s1;
+        RotLeft128(s0, s1, s2, s3, 15); /* KA <<< 60 */
+        k[28] = s0, k[29] = s1, k[30] = s2, k[31] = s3;
+        RotLeft128(s1, s2, s3, s0, 2); /* KA <<< 94 */
+        k[40] = s1, k[41] = s2, k[42] = s3, k[43] = s0;
+        RotLeft128(s1, s2, s3, s0, 17); /* KA <<<111 */
+        k[48] = s1, k[49] = s2, k[50] = s3, k[51] = s0;
+
+        s0 = k[0], s1 = k[1], s2 = k[2], s3 = k[3];
+        RotLeft128(s0, s1, s2, s3, 15); /* KL <<< 15 */
+        k[8] = s0, k[9] = s1, k[10] = s2, k[11] = s3;
+        RotLeft128(s0, s1, s2, s3, 30); /* KL <<< 45 */
+        k[20] = s0, k[21] = s1, k[22] = s2, k[23] = s3;
+        RotLeft128(s0, s1, s2, s3, 15); /* KL <<< 60 */
+        k[26] = s2, k[27] = s3;
+        RotLeft128(s0, s1, s2, s3, 17); /* KL <<< 77 */
+        k[32] = s0, k[33] = s1, k[34] = s2, k[35] = s3;
+        RotLeft128(s0, s1, s2, s3, 17); /* KL <<< 94 */
+        k[36] = s0, k[37] = s1, k[38] = s2, k[39] = s3;
+        RotLeft128(s0, s1, s2, s3, 17); /* KL <<<111 */
+        k[44] = s0, k[45] = s1, k[46] = s2, k[47] = s3;
+
+        return 3;               /* grand rounds */
+    } else {
+        k[12] = s0, k[13] = s1, k[14] = s2, k[15] = s3;
+        s0 ^= k[8], s1 ^= k[9], s2 ^= k[10], s3 ^= k[11];
+        Camellia_Feistel(s0, s1, s2, s3, (SIGMA + 8));
+        Camellia_Feistel(s2, s3, s0, s1, (SIGMA + 10));
+
+        k[4] = s0, k[5] = s1, k[6] = s2, k[7] = s3;
+        RotLeft128(s0, s1, s2, s3, 30); /* KB <<< 30 */
+        k[20] = s0, k[21] = s1, k[22] = s2, k[23] = s3;
+        RotLeft128(s0, s1, s2, s3, 30); /* KB <<< 60 */
+        k[40] = s0, k[41] = s1, k[42] = s2, k[43] = s3;
+        RotLeft128(s1, s2, s3, s0, 19); /* KB <<<111 */
+        k[64] = s1, k[65] = s2, k[66] = s3, k[67] = s0;
+
+        s0 = k[8], s1 = k[9], s2 = k[10], s3 = k[11];
+        RotLeft128(s0, s1, s2, s3, 15); /* KR <<< 15 */
+        k[8] = s0, k[9] = s1, k[10] = s2, k[11] = s3;
+        RotLeft128(s0, s1, s2, s3, 15); /* KR <<< 30 */
+        k[16] = s0, k[17] = s1, k[18] = s2, k[19] = s3;
+        RotLeft128(s0, s1, s2, s3, 30); /* KR <<< 60 */
+        k[36] = s0, k[37] = s1, k[38] = s2, k[39] = s3;
+        RotLeft128(s1, s2, s3, s0, 2); /* KR <<< 94 */
+        k[52] = s1, k[53] = s2, k[54] = s3, k[55] = s0;
+
+        s0 = k[12], s1 = k[13], s2 = k[14], s3 = k[15];
+        RotLeft128(s0, s1, s2, s3, 15); /* KA <<< 15 */
+        k[12] = s0, k[13] = s1, k[14] = s2, k[15] = s3;
+        RotLeft128(s0, s1, s2, s3, 30); /* KA <<< 45 */
+        k[28] = s0, k[29] = s1, k[30] = s2, k[31] = s3;
+        /* KA <<< 77 */
+        k[48] = s1, k[49] = s2, k[50] = s3, k[51] = s0;
+        RotLeft128(s1, s2, s3, s0, 17); /* KA <<< 94 */
+        k[56] = s1, k[57] = s2, k[58] = s3, k[59] = s0;
+
+        s0 = k[0], s1 = k[1], s2 = k[2], s3 = k[3];
+        RotLeft128(s1, s2, s3, s0, 13); /* KL <<< 45 */
+        k[24] = s1, k[25] = s2, k[26] = s3, k[27] = s0;
+        RotLeft128(s1, s2, s3, s0, 15); /* KL <<< 60 */
+        k[32] = s1, k[33] = s2, k[34] = s3, k[35] = s0;
+        RotLeft128(s1, s2, s3, s0, 17); /* KL <<< 77 */
+        k[44] = s1, k[45] = s2, k[46] = s3, k[47] = s0;
+        RotLeft128(s2, s3, s0, s1, 2); /* KL <<<111 */
+        k[60] = s2, k[61] = s3, k[62] = s0, k[63] = s1;
+
+        return 4;               /* grand rounds */
+    }
+    /*
+     * It is possible to perform certain precalculations, which
+     * would spare few cycles in block procedure. It's not done,
+     * because it upsets the performance balance between key
+     * setup and block procedures, negatively affecting overall
+     * throughput in applications operating on short messages
+     * and volatile keys.
+     */
+}
+
+void Camellia_EncryptBlock_Rounds(int grandRounds, const u8 plaintext[],
+                                  const KEY_TABLE_TYPE keyTable,
+                                  u8 ciphertext[])
+{
+    register u32 s0, s1, s2, s3;
+    const u32 *k = keyTable, *kend = keyTable + grandRounds * 16;
+
+    s0 = GETU32(plaintext) ^ k[0];
+    s1 = GETU32(plaintext + 4) ^ k[1];
+    s2 = GETU32(plaintext + 8) ^ k[2];
+    s3 = GETU32(plaintext + 12) ^ k[3];
+    k += 4;
+
+    while (1) {
+        /* Camellia makes 6 Feistel rounds */
+        Camellia_Feistel(s0, s1, s2, s3, k + 0);
+        Camellia_Feistel(s2, s3, s0, s1, k + 2);
+        Camellia_Feistel(s0, s1, s2, s3, k + 4);
+        Camellia_Feistel(s2, s3, s0, s1, k + 6);
+        Camellia_Feistel(s0, s1, s2, s3, k + 8);
+        Camellia_Feistel(s2, s3, s0, s1, k + 10);
+        k += 12;
+
+        if (k == kend)
+            break;
+
+        /*
+         * This is the same function as the diffusion function D of the
+         * accompanying documentation. See section 3.2 for properties of the
+         * FLlayer function.
+         */
+        s1 ^= LeftRotate(s0 & k[0], 1);
+        s2 ^= s3 | k[3];
+        s0 ^= s1 | k[1];
+        s3 ^= LeftRotate(s2 & k[2], 1);
+        k += 4;
+    }
+
+    s2 ^= k[0], s3 ^= k[1], s0 ^= k[2], s1 ^= k[3];
+
+    PUTU32(ciphertext, s2);
+    PUTU32(ciphertext + 4, s3);
+    PUTU32(ciphertext + 8, s0);
+    PUTU32(ciphertext + 12, s1);
+}
+
+void Camellia_EncryptBlock(int keyBitLength, const u8 plaintext[],
+                           const KEY_TABLE_TYPE keyTable, u8 ciphertext[])
+{
+    Camellia_EncryptBlock_Rounds(keyBitLength == 128 ? 3 : 4,
+                                 plaintext, keyTable, ciphertext);
+}
+
+void Camellia_DecryptBlock_Rounds(int grandRounds, const u8 ciphertext[],
+                                  const KEY_TABLE_TYPE keyTable,
+                                  u8 plaintext[])
+{
+    u32 s0, s1, s2, s3;
+    const u32 *k = keyTable + grandRounds * 16, *kend = keyTable + 4;
+
+    s0 = GETU32(ciphertext) ^ k[0];
+    s1 = GETU32(ciphertext + 4) ^ k[1];
+    s2 = GETU32(ciphertext + 8) ^ k[2];
+    s3 = GETU32(ciphertext + 12) ^ k[3];
+
+    while (1) {
+        /* Camellia makes 6 Feistel rounds */
+        k -= 12;
+        Camellia_Feistel(s0, s1, s2, s3, k + 10);
+        Camellia_Feistel(s2, s3, s0, s1, k + 8);
+        Camellia_Feistel(s0, s1, s2, s3, k + 6);
+        Camellia_Feistel(s2, s3, s0, s1, k + 4);
+        Camellia_Feistel(s0, s1, s2, s3, k + 2);
+        Camellia_Feistel(s2, s3, s0, s1, k + 0);
+
+        if (k == kend)
+            break;
+
+        /*
+         * This is the same function as the diffusion function D of the
+         * accompanying documentation. See section 3.2 for properties of the
+         * FLlayer function.
+         */
+        k -= 4;
+        s1 ^= LeftRotate(s0 & k[2], 1);
+        s2 ^= s3 | k[1];
+        s0 ^= s1 | k[3];
+        s3 ^= LeftRotate(s2 & k[0], 1);
+    }
+
+    k -= 4;
+    s2 ^= k[0], s3 ^= k[1], s0 ^= k[2], s1 ^= k[3];
+
+    PUTU32(plaintext, s2);
+    PUTU32(plaintext + 4, s3);
+    PUTU32(plaintext + 8, s0);
+    PUTU32(plaintext + 12, s1);
+}
+
+void Camellia_DecryptBlock(int keyBitLength, const u8 plaintext[],
+                           const KEY_TABLE_TYPE keyTable, u8 ciphertext[])
+{
+    Camellia_DecryptBlock_Rounds(keyBitLength == 128 ? 3 : 4,
+                                 plaintext, keyTable, ciphertext);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/camellia/cmll_cbc.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/camellia/cmll_cbc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b19171d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/camellia/cmll_cbc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/camellia.h>
+#include <openssl/modes.h>
+
+void Camellia_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                          size_t len, const CAMELLIA_KEY *key,
+                          unsigned char *ivec, const int enc)
+{
+
+    if (enc)
+        CRYPTO_cbc128_encrypt(in, out, len, key, ivec,
+                              (block128_f) Camellia_encrypt);
+    else
+        CRYPTO_cbc128_decrypt(in, out, len, key, ivec,
+                              (block128_f) Camellia_decrypt);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/camellia/cmll_cfb.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/camellia/cmll_cfb.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4f49ead
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/camellia/cmll_cfb.c
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/camellia.h>
+#include <openssl/modes.h>
+
+/*
+ * The input and output encrypted as though 128bit cfb mode is being used.
+ * The extra state information to record how much of the 128bit block we have
+ * used is contained in *num;
+ */
+
+void Camellia_cfb128_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                             size_t length, const CAMELLIA_KEY *key,
+                             unsigned char *ivec, int *num, const int enc)
+{
+
+    CRYPTO_cfb128_encrypt(in, out, length, key, ivec, num, enc,
+                          (block128_f) Camellia_encrypt);
+}
+
+/* N.B. This expects the input to be packed, MS bit first */
+void Camellia_cfb1_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                           size_t length, const CAMELLIA_KEY *key,
+                           unsigned char *ivec, int *num, const int enc)
+{
+    CRYPTO_cfb128_1_encrypt(in, out, length, key, ivec, num, enc,
+                            (block128_f) Camellia_encrypt);
+}
+
+void Camellia_cfb8_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                           size_t length, const CAMELLIA_KEY *key,
+                           unsigned char *ivec, int *num, const int enc)
+{
+    CRYPTO_cfb128_8_encrypt(in, out, length, key, ivec, num, enc,
+                            (block128_f) Camellia_encrypt);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/camellia/cmll_ctr.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/camellia/cmll_ctr.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..161d1e1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/camellia/cmll_ctr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/camellia.h>
+#include <openssl/modes.h>
+
+void Camellia_ctr128_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                             size_t length, const CAMELLIA_KEY *key,
+                             unsigned char ivec[CAMELLIA_BLOCK_SIZE],
+                             unsigned char ecount_buf[CAMELLIA_BLOCK_SIZE],
+                             unsigned int *num)
+{
+
+    CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt(in, out, length, key, ivec, ecount_buf, num,
+                          (block128_f) Camellia_encrypt);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/camellia/cmll_ecb.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/camellia/cmll_ecb.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d932f1b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/camellia/cmll_ecb.c
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/camellia.h>
+#include "cmll_locl.h"
+
+void Camellia_ecb_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                          const CAMELLIA_KEY *key, const int enc)
+{
+    if (CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT == enc)
+        Camellia_encrypt(in, out, key);
+    else
+        Camellia_decrypt(in, out, key);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/camellia/cmll_locl.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/camellia/cmll_locl.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6403b39
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/camellia/cmll_locl.h
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2006 NTT (Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation) .
+ * ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ *
+ * Intellectual Property information for Camellia:
+ *     http://info.isl.ntt.co.jp/crypt/eng/info/chiteki.html
+ *
+ * News Release for Announcement of Camellia open source:
+ *     http://www.ntt.co.jp/news/news06e/0604/060413a.html
+ *
+ * The Camellia Code included herein is developed by
+ * NTT (Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation), and is contributed
+ * to the OpenSSL project.
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_CAMELLIA_LOCL_H
+# define HEADER_CAMELLIA_LOCL_H
+
+typedef unsigned int u32;
+typedef unsigned char u8;
+
+int Camellia_Ekeygen(int keyBitLength, const u8 *rawKey,
+                     KEY_TABLE_TYPE keyTable);
+void Camellia_EncryptBlock_Rounds(int grandRounds, const u8 plaintext[],
+                                  const KEY_TABLE_TYPE keyTable,
+                                  u8 ciphertext[]);
+void Camellia_DecryptBlock_Rounds(int grandRounds, const u8 ciphertext[],
+                                  const KEY_TABLE_TYPE keyTable,
+                                  u8 plaintext[]);
+void Camellia_EncryptBlock(int keyBitLength, const u8 plaintext[],
+                           const KEY_TABLE_TYPE keyTable, u8 ciphertext[]);
+void Camellia_DecryptBlock(int keyBitLength, const u8 ciphertext[],
+                           const KEY_TABLE_TYPE keyTable, u8 plaintext[]);
+#endif                          /* #ifndef HEADER_CAMELLIA_LOCL_H */
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/camellia/cmll_misc.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/camellia/cmll_misc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e5f014b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/camellia/cmll_misc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+#include <openssl/camellia.h>
+#include "cmll_locl.h"
+
+int Camellia_set_key(const unsigned char *userKey, const int bits,
+                     CAMELLIA_KEY *key)
+{
+    if (!userKey || !key)
+        return -1;
+    if (bits != 128 && bits != 192 && bits != 256)
+        return -2;
+    key->grand_rounds = Camellia_Ekeygen(bits, userKey, key->u.rd_key);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+void Camellia_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                      const CAMELLIA_KEY *key)
+{
+    Camellia_EncryptBlock_Rounds(key->grand_rounds, in, key->u.rd_key, out);
+}
+
+void Camellia_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                      const CAMELLIA_KEY *key)
+{
+    Camellia_DecryptBlock_Rounds(key->grand_rounds, in, key->u.rd_key, out);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/camellia/cmll_ofb.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/camellia/cmll_ofb.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b43c685
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/camellia/cmll_ofb.c
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/camellia.h>
+#include <openssl/modes.h>
+
+/*
+ * The input and output encrypted as though 128bit ofb mode is being used.
+ * The extra state information to record how much of the 128bit block we have
+ * used is contained in *num;
+ */
+void Camellia_ofb128_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                             size_t length, const CAMELLIA_KEY *key,
+                             unsigned char *ivec, int *num)
+{
+    CRYPTO_ofb128_encrypt(in, out, length, key, ivec, num,
+                          (block128_f) Camellia_encrypt);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cast/asm/cast-586.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cast/asm/cast-586.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6beb9c5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cast/asm/cast-586.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,192 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+# This flag makes the inner loop one cycle longer, but generates 
+# code that runs %30 faster on the pentium pro/II, 44% faster
+# of PIII, while only %7 slower on the pentium.
+# By default, this flag is on.
+$ppro=1;
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm");
+require "x86asm.pl";
+require "cbc.pl";
+
+$output=pop;
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+&asm_init($ARGV[0],"cast-586.pl",$ARGV[$#ARGV] eq "386");
+
+$CAST_ROUNDS=16;
+$L="edi";
+$R="esi";
+$K="ebp";
+$tmp1="ecx";
+$tmp2="ebx";
+$tmp3="eax";
+$tmp4="edx";
+$S1="CAST_S_table0";
+$S2="CAST_S_table1";
+$S3="CAST_S_table2";
+$S4="CAST_S_table3";
+
+@F1=("add","xor","sub");
+@F2=("xor","sub","add");
+@F3=("sub","add","xor");
+
+&CAST_encrypt("CAST_encrypt",1);
+&CAST_encrypt("CAST_decrypt",0);
+&cbc("CAST_cbc_encrypt","CAST_encrypt","CAST_decrypt",1,4,5,3,-1,-1);
+
+&asm_finish();
+
+close STDOUT;
+
+sub CAST_encrypt {
+    local($name,$enc)=@_;
+
+    local($win_ex)=<<"EOF";
+EXTERN	_CAST_S_table0:DWORD
+EXTERN	_CAST_S_table1:DWORD
+EXTERN	_CAST_S_table2:DWORD
+EXTERN	_CAST_S_table3:DWORD
+EOF
+    &main::external_label(
+			  "CAST_S_table0",
+			  "CAST_S_table1",
+			  "CAST_S_table2",
+			  "CAST_S_table3",
+			  );
+
+    &function_begin_B($name,$win_ex);
+
+    &comment("");
+
+    &push("ebp");
+    &push("ebx");
+    &mov($tmp2,&wparam(0));
+    &mov($K,&wparam(1));
+    &push("esi");
+    &push("edi");
+
+    &comment("Load the 2 words");
+    &mov($L,&DWP(0,$tmp2,"",0));
+    &mov($R,&DWP(4,$tmp2,"",0));
+
+    &comment('Get short key flag');
+    &mov($tmp3,&DWP(128,$K,"",0));
+    if($enc) {
+	&push($tmp3);
+    } else {
+	&or($tmp3,$tmp3);
+	&jnz(&label('cast_dec_skip'));
+    }
+
+    &xor($tmp3,	$tmp3);
+
+    # encrypting part
+
+    if ($enc) {
+	&E_CAST( 0,$S,$L,$R,$K,@F1,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3,$tmp4);
+	&E_CAST( 1,$S,$R,$L,$K,@F2,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3,$tmp4);
+	&E_CAST( 2,$S,$L,$R,$K,@F3,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3,$tmp4);
+	&E_CAST( 3,$S,$R,$L,$K,@F1,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3,$tmp4);
+	&E_CAST( 4,$S,$L,$R,$K,@F2,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3,$tmp4);
+	&E_CAST( 5,$S,$R,$L,$K,@F3,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3,$tmp4);
+	&E_CAST( 6,$S,$L,$R,$K,@F1,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3,$tmp4);
+	&E_CAST( 7,$S,$R,$L,$K,@F2,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3,$tmp4);
+	&E_CAST( 8,$S,$L,$R,$K,@F3,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3,$tmp4);
+	&E_CAST( 9,$S,$R,$L,$K,@F1,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3,$tmp4);
+	&E_CAST(10,$S,$L,$R,$K,@F2,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3,$tmp4);
+	&E_CAST(11,$S,$R,$L,$K,@F3,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3,$tmp4);
+	&comment('test short key flag');
+	&pop($tmp4);
+	&or($tmp4,$tmp4);
+	&jnz(&label('cast_enc_done'));
+	&E_CAST(12,$S,$L,$R,$K,@F1,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3,$tmp4);
+	&E_CAST(13,$S,$R,$L,$K,@F2,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3,$tmp4);
+	&E_CAST(14,$S,$L,$R,$K,@F3,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3,$tmp4);
+	&E_CAST(15,$S,$R,$L,$K,@F1,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3,$tmp4);
+    } else {
+	&E_CAST(15,$S,$L,$R,$K,@F1,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3,$tmp4);
+	&E_CAST(14,$S,$R,$L,$K,@F3,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3,$tmp4);
+	&E_CAST(13,$S,$L,$R,$K,@F2,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3,$tmp4);
+	&E_CAST(12,$S,$R,$L,$K,@F1,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3,$tmp4);
+	&set_label('cast_dec_skip');
+	&E_CAST(11,$S,$L,$R,$K,@F3,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3,$tmp4);
+	&E_CAST(10,$S,$R,$L,$K,@F2,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3,$tmp4);
+	&E_CAST( 9,$S,$L,$R,$K,@F1,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3,$tmp4);
+	&E_CAST( 8,$S,$R,$L,$K,@F3,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3,$tmp4);
+	&E_CAST( 7,$S,$L,$R,$K,@F2,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3,$tmp4);
+	&E_CAST( 6,$S,$R,$L,$K,@F1,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3,$tmp4);
+	&E_CAST( 5,$S,$L,$R,$K,@F3,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3,$tmp4);
+	&E_CAST( 4,$S,$R,$L,$K,@F2,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3,$tmp4);
+	&E_CAST( 3,$S,$L,$R,$K,@F1,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3,$tmp4);
+	&E_CAST( 2,$S,$R,$L,$K,@F3,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3,$tmp4);
+	&E_CAST( 1,$S,$L,$R,$K,@F2,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3,$tmp4);
+	&E_CAST( 0,$S,$R,$L,$K,@F1,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3,$tmp4);
+    }
+
+    &set_label('cast_enc_done') if $enc;
+# Why the nop? - Ben 17/1/99
+    &nop();
+    &mov($tmp3,&wparam(0));
+    &mov(&DWP(4,$tmp3,"",0),$L);
+    &mov(&DWP(0,$tmp3,"",0),$R);
+    &function_end($name);
+}
+
+sub E_CAST {
+    local($i,$S,$L,$R,$K,$OP1,$OP2,$OP3,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3,$tmp4)=@_;
+    # Ri needs to have 16 pre added.
+
+    &comment("round $i");
+    &mov(	$tmp4,		&DWP($i*8,$K,"",1));
+
+    &mov(	$tmp1,		&DWP($i*8+4,$K,"",1));
+    &$OP1(	$tmp4,		$R);
+
+    &rotl(	$tmp4,		&LB($tmp1));
+
+    if ($ppro) {
+	&xor(	$tmp1,		$tmp1);
+	&mov(	$tmp2,		0xff);
+	
+	&movb(	&LB($tmp1),	&HB($tmp4));	# A
+	&and(	$tmp2,		$tmp4);
+
+	&shr(	$tmp4,		16); 		#
+	&xor(	$tmp3,		$tmp3);
+    } else {
+	&mov(	$tmp2,		$tmp4);		# B
+	&movb(	&LB($tmp1),	&HB($tmp4));	# A	# BAD BAD BAD
+	
+	&shr(	$tmp4,		16); 		#
+	&and(	$tmp2,		0xff);
+    }
+
+    &movb(	&LB($tmp3),	&HB($tmp4));	# C	# BAD BAD BAD
+    &and(	$tmp4,		0xff);		# D
+
+    &mov(	$tmp1,		&DWP($S1,"",$tmp1,4));
+    &mov(	$tmp2,		&DWP($S2,"",$tmp2,4));
+
+    &$OP2(	$tmp1,		$tmp2);
+    &mov(	$tmp2,		&DWP($S3,"",$tmp3,4));
+
+    &$OP3(	$tmp1,		$tmp2);
+    &mov(	$tmp2,		&DWP($S4,"",$tmp4,4));
+
+    &$OP1(	$tmp1,		$tmp2);
+    # XXX
+
+    &xor(	$L,		$tmp1);
+    # XXX
+}
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cast/build.info b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cast/build.info
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f6a25c9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cast/build.info
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+LIBS=../../libcrypto
+SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
+        c_skey.c c_ecb.c {- $target{cast_asm_src} -} c_cfb64.c c_ofb64.c
+
+GENERATE[cast-586.s]=asm/cast-586.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $(CFLAGS) $(LIB_CFLAGS) $(PROCESSOR)
+DEPEND[cast-586.s]=../perlasm/x86asm.pl ../perlasm/cbc.pl
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cast/c_cfb64.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cast/c_cfb64.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bd7cb2f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cast/c_cfb64.c
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/cast.h>
+#include "cast_lcl.h"
+
+/*
+ * The input and output encrypted as though 64bit cfb mode is being used.
+ * The extra state information to record how much of the 64bit block we have
+ * used is contained in *num;
+ */
+
+void CAST_cfb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                        long length, const CAST_KEY *schedule,
+                        unsigned char *ivec, int *num, int enc)
+{
+    register CAST_LONG v0, v1, t;
+    register int n = *num;
+    register long l = length;
+    CAST_LONG ti[2];
+    unsigned char *iv, c, cc;
+
+    iv = ivec;
+    if (enc) {
+        while (l--) {
+            if (n == 0) {
+                n2l(iv, v0);
+                ti[0] = v0;
+                n2l(iv, v1);
+                ti[1] = v1;
+                CAST_encrypt((CAST_LONG *)ti, schedule);
+                iv = ivec;
+                t = ti[0];
+                l2n(t, iv);
+                t = ti[1];
+                l2n(t, iv);
+                iv = ivec;
+            }
+            c = *(in++) ^ iv[n];
+            *(out++) = c;
+            iv[n] = c;
+            n = (n + 1) & 0x07;
+        }
+    } else {
+        while (l--) {
+            if (n == 0) {
+                n2l(iv, v0);
+                ti[0] = v0;
+                n2l(iv, v1);
+                ti[1] = v1;
+                CAST_encrypt((CAST_LONG *)ti, schedule);
+                iv = ivec;
+                t = ti[0];
+                l2n(t, iv);
+                t = ti[1];
+                l2n(t, iv);
+                iv = ivec;
+            }
+            cc = *(in++);
+            c = iv[n];
+            iv[n] = cc;
+            *(out++) = c ^ cc;
+            n = (n + 1) & 0x07;
+        }
+    }
+    v0 = v1 = ti[0] = ti[1] = t = c = cc = 0;
+    *num = n;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cast/c_ecb.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cast/c_ecb.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..da41794
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cast/c_ecb.c
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/cast.h>
+#include "cast_lcl.h"
+#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+
+void CAST_ecb_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                      const CAST_KEY *ks, int enc)
+{
+    CAST_LONG l, d[2];
+
+    n2l(in, l);
+    d[0] = l;
+    n2l(in, l);
+    d[1] = l;
+    if (enc)
+        CAST_encrypt(d, ks);
+    else
+        CAST_decrypt(d, ks);
+    l = d[0];
+    l2n(l, out);
+    l = d[1];
+    l2n(l, out);
+    l = d[0] = d[1] = 0;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cast/c_enc.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cast/c_enc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..700b6d1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cast/c_enc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/cast.h>
+#include "cast_lcl.h"
+
+void CAST_encrypt(CAST_LONG *data, const CAST_KEY *key)
+{
+    CAST_LONG l, r, t;
+    const CAST_LONG *k;
+
+    k = &(key->data[0]);
+    l = data[0];
+    r = data[1];
+
+    E_CAST(0, k, l, r, +, ^, -);
+    E_CAST(1, k, r, l, ^, -, +);
+    E_CAST(2, k, l, r, -, +, ^);
+    E_CAST(3, k, r, l, +, ^, -);
+    E_CAST(4, k, l, r, ^, -, +);
+    E_CAST(5, k, r, l, -, +, ^);
+    E_CAST(6, k, l, r, +, ^, -);
+    E_CAST(7, k, r, l, ^, -, +);
+    E_CAST(8, k, l, r, -, +, ^);
+    E_CAST(9, k, r, l, +, ^, -);
+    E_CAST(10, k, l, r, ^, -, +);
+    E_CAST(11, k, r, l, -, +, ^);
+    if (!key->short_key) {
+        E_CAST(12, k, l, r, +, ^, -);
+        E_CAST(13, k, r, l, ^, -, +);
+        E_CAST(14, k, l, r, -, +, ^);
+        E_CAST(15, k, r, l, +, ^, -);
+    }
+
+    data[1] = l & 0xffffffffL;
+    data[0] = r & 0xffffffffL;
+}
+
+void CAST_decrypt(CAST_LONG *data, const CAST_KEY *key)
+{
+    CAST_LONG l, r, t;
+    const CAST_LONG *k;
+
+    k = &(key->data[0]);
+    l = data[0];
+    r = data[1];
+
+    if (!key->short_key) {
+        E_CAST(15, k, l, r, +, ^, -);
+        E_CAST(14, k, r, l, -, +, ^);
+        E_CAST(13, k, l, r, ^, -, +);
+        E_CAST(12, k, r, l, +, ^, -);
+    }
+    E_CAST(11, k, l, r, -, +, ^);
+    E_CAST(10, k, r, l, ^, -, +);
+    E_CAST(9, k, l, r, +, ^, -);
+    E_CAST(8, k, r, l, -, +, ^);
+    E_CAST(7, k, l, r, ^, -, +);
+    E_CAST(6, k, r, l, +, ^, -);
+    E_CAST(5, k, l, r, -, +, ^);
+    E_CAST(4, k, r, l, ^, -, +);
+    E_CAST(3, k, l, r, +, ^, -);
+    E_CAST(2, k, r, l, -, +, ^);
+    E_CAST(1, k, l, r, ^, -, +);
+    E_CAST(0, k, r, l, +, ^, -);
+
+    data[1] = l & 0xffffffffL;
+    data[0] = r & 0xffffffffL;
+}
+
+void CAST_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                      long length, const CAST_KEY *ks, unsigned char *iv,
+                      int enc)
+{
+    register CAST_LONG tin0, tin1;
+    register CAST_LONG tout0, tout1, xor0, xor1;
+    register long l = length;
+    CAST_LONG tin[2];
+
+    if (enc) {
+        n2l(iv, tout0);
+        n2l(iv, tout1);
+        iv -= 8;
+        for (l -= 8; l >= 0; l -= 8) {
+            n2l(in, tin0);
+            n2l(in, tin1);
+            tin0 ^= tout0;
+            tin1 ^= tout1;
+            tin[0] = tin0;
+            tin[1] = tin1;
+            CAST_encrypt(tin, ks);
+            tout0 = tin[0];
+            tout1 = tin[1];
+            l2n(tout0, out);
+            l2n(tout1, out);
+        }
+        if (l != -8) {
+            n2ln(in, tin0, tin1, l + 8);
+            tin0 ^= tout0;
+            tin1 ^= tout1;
+            tin[0] = tin0;
+            tin[1] = tin1;
+            CAST_encrypt(tin, ks);
+            tout0 = tin[0];
+            tout1 = tin[1];
+            l2n(tout0, out);
+            l2n(tout1, out);
+        }
+        l2n(tout0, iv);
+        l2n(tout1, iv);
+    } else {
+        n2l(iv, xor0);
+        n2l(iv, xor1);
+        iv -= 8;
+        for (l -= 8; l >= 0; l -= 8) {
+            n2l(in, tin0);
+            n2l(in, tin1);
+            tin[0] = tin0;
+            tin[1] = tin1;
+            CAST_decrypt(tin, ks);
+            tout0 = tin[0] ^ xor0;
+            tout1 = tin[1] ^ xor1;
+            l2n(tout0, out);
+            l2n(tout1, out);
+            xor0 = tin0;
+            xor1 = tin1;
+        }
+        if (l != -8) {
+            n2l(in, tin0);
+            n2l(in, tin1);
+            tin[0] = tin0;
+            tin[1] = tin1;
+            CAST_decrypt(tin, ks);
+            tout0 = tin[0] ^ xor0;
+            tout1 = tin[1] ^ xor1;
+            l2nn(tout0, tout1, out, l + 8);
+            xor0 = tin0;
+            xor1 = tin1;
+        }
+        l2n(xor0, iv);
+        l2n(xor1, iv);
+    }
+    tin0 = tin1 = tout0 = tout1 = xor0 = xor1 = 0;
+    tin[0] = tin[1] = 0;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cast/c_ofb64.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cast/c_ofb64.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dffb074
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cast/c_ofb64.c
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/cast.h>
+#include "cast_lcl.h"
+
+/*
+ * The input and output encrypted as though 64bit ofb mode is being used.
+ * The extra state information to record how much of the 64bit block we have
+ * used is contained in *num;
+ */
+void CAST_ofb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                        long length, const CAST_KEY *schedule,
+                        unsigned char *ivec, int *num)
+{
+    register CAST_LONG v0, v1, t;
+    register int n = *num;
+    register long l = length;
+    unsigned char d[8];
+    register char *dp;
+    CAST_LONG ti[2];
+    unsigned char *iv;
+    int save = 0;
+
+    iv = ivec;
+    n2l(iv, v0);
+    n2l(iv, v1);
+    ti[0] = v0;
+    ti[1] = v1;
+    dp = (char *)d;
+    l2n(v0, dp);
+    l2n(v1, dp);
+    while (l--) {
+        if (n == 0) {
+            CAST_encrypt((CAST_LONG *)ti, schedule);
+            dp = (char *)d;
+            t = ti[0];
+            l2n(t, dp);
+            t = ti[1];
+            l2n(t, dp);
+            save++;
+        }
+        *(out++) = *(in++) ^ d[n];
+        n = (n + 1) & 0x07;
+    }
+    if (save) {
+        v0 = ti[0];
+        v1 = ti[1];
+        iv = ivec;
+        l2n(v0, iv);
+        l2n(v1, iv);
+    }
+    t = v0 = v1 = ti[0] = ti[1] = 0;
+    *num = n;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cast/c_skey.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cast/c_skey.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..962d2a6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cast/c_skey.c
@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/cast.h>
+#include "cast_lcl.h"
+#include "cast_s.h"
+
+#define CAST_exp(l,A,a,n) \
+        A[n/4]=l; \
+        a[n+3]=(l    )&0xff; \
+        a[n+2]=(l>> 8)&0xff; \
+        a[n+1]=(l>>16)&0xff; \
+        a[n+0]=(l>>24)&0xff;
+
+#define S4 CAST_S_table4
+#define S5 CAST_S_table5
+#define S6 CAST_S_table6
+#define S7 CAST_S_table7
+
+void CAST_set_key(CAST_KEY *key, int len, const unsigned char *data)
+{
+    CAST_LONG x[16];
+    CAST_LONG z[16];
+    CAST_LONG k[32];
+    CAST_LONG X[4], Z[4];
+    CAST_LONG l, *K;
+    int i;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+        x[i] = 0;
+    if (len > 16)
+        len = 16;
+    for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
+        x[i] = data[i];
+    if (len <= 10)
+        key->short_key = 1;
+    else
+        key->short_key = 0;
+
+    K = &k[0];
+    X[0] = ((x[0] << 24) | (x[1] << 16) | (x[2] << 8) | x[3]) & 0xffffffffL;
+    X[1] = ((x[4] << 24) | (x[5] << 16) | (x[6] << 8) | x[7]) & 0xffffffffL;
+    X[2] = ((x[8] << 24) | (x[9] << 16) | (x[10] << 8) | x[11]) & 0xffffffffL;
+    X[3] =
+        ((x[12] << 24) | (x[13] << 16) | (x[14] << 8) | x[15]) & 0xffffffffL;
+
+    for (;;) {
+        l = X[0] ^ S4[x[13]] ^ S5[x[15]] ^ S6[x[12]] ^ S7[x[14]] ^ S6[x[8]];
+        CAST_exp(l, Z, z, 0);
+        l = X[2] ^ S4[z[0]] ^ S5[z[2]] ^ S6[z[1]] ^ S7[z[3]] ^ S7[x[10]];
+        CAST_exp(l, Z, z, 4);
+        l = X[3] ^ S4[z[7]] ^ S5[z[6]] ^ S6[z[5]] ^ S7[z[4]] ^ S4[x[9]];
+        CAST_exp(l, Z, z, 8);
+        l = X[1] ^ S4[z[10]] ^ S5[z[9]] ^ S6[z[11]] ^ S7[z[8]] ^ S5[x[11]];
+        CAST_exp(l, Z, z, 12);
+
+        K[0] = S4[z[8]] ^ S5[z[9]] ^ S6[z[7]] ^ S7[z[6]] ^ S4[z[2]];
+        K[1] = S4[z[10]] ^ S5[z[11]] ^ S6[z[5]] ^ S7[z[4]] ^ S5[z[6]];
+        K[2] = S4[z[12]] ^ S5[z[13]] ^ S6[z[3]] ^ S7[z[2]] ^ S6[z[9]];
+        K[3] = S4[z[14]] ^ S5[z[15]] ^ S6[z[1]] ^ S7[z[0]] ^ S7[z[12]];
+
+        l = Z[2] ^ S4[z[5]] ^ S5[z[7]] ^ S6[z[4]] ^ S7[z[6]] ^ S6[z[0]];
+        CAST_exp(l, X, x, 0);
+        l = Z[0] ^ S4[x[0]] ^ S5[x[2]] ^ S6[x[1]] ^ S7[x[3]] ^ S7[z[2]];
+        CAST_exp(l, X, x, 4);
+        l = Z[1] ^ S4[x[7]] ^ S5[x[6]] ^ S6[x[5]] ^ S7[x[4]] ^ S4[z[1]];
+        CAST_exp(l, X, x, 8);
+        l = Z[3] ^ S4[x[10]] ^ S5[x[9]] ^ S6[x[11]] ^ S7[x[8]] ^ S5[z[3]];
+        CAST_exp(l, X, x, 12);
+
+        K[4] = S4[x[3]] ^ S5[x[2]] ^ S6[x[12]] ^ S7[x[13]] ^ S4[x[8]];
+        K[5] = S4[x[1]] ^ S5[x[0]] ^ S6[x[14]] ^ S7[x[15]] ^ S5[x[13]];
+        K[6] = S4[x[7]] ^ S5[x[6]] ^ S6[x[8]] ^ S7[x[9]] ^ S6[x[3]];
+        K[7] = S4[x[5]] ^ S5[x[4]] ^ S6[x[10]] ^ S7[x[11]] ^ S7[x[7]];
+
+        l = X[0] ^ S4[x[13]] ^ S5[x[15]] ^ S6[x[12]] ^ S7[x[14]] ^ S6[x[8]];
+        CAST_exp(l, Z, z, 0);
+        l = X[2] ^ S4[z[0]] ^ S5[z[2]] ^ S6[z[1]] ^ S7[z[3]] ^ S7[x[10]];
+        CAST_exp(l, Z, z, 4);
+        l = X[3] ^ S4[z[7]] ^ S5[z[6]] ^ S6[z[5]] ^ S7[z[4]] ^ S4[x[9]];
+        CAST_exp(l, Z, z, 8);
+        l = X[1] ^ S4[z[10]] ^ S5[z[9]] ^ S6[z[11]] ^ S7[z[8]] ^ S5[x[11]];
+        CAST_exp(l, Z, z, 12);
+
+        K[8] = S4[z[3]] ^ S5[z[2]] ^ S6[z[12]] ^ S7[z[13]] ^ S4[z[9]];
+        K[9] = S4[z[1]] ^ S5[z[0]] ^ S6[z[14]] ^ S7[z[15]] ^ S5[z[12]];
+        K[10] = S4[z[7]] ^ S5[z[6]] ^ S6[z[8]] ^ S7[z[9]] ^ S6[z[2]];
+        K[11] = S4[z[5]] ^ S5[z[4]] ^ S6[z[10]] ^ S7[z[11]] ^ S7[z[6]];
+
+        l = Z[2] ^ S4[z[5]] ^ S5[z[7]] ^ S6[z[4]] ^ S7[z[6]] ^ S6[z[0]];
+        CAST_exp(l, X, x, 0);
+        l = Z[0] ^ S4[x[0]] ^ S5[x[2]] ^ S6[x[1]] ^ S7[x[3]] ^ S7[z[2]];
+        CAST_exp(l, X, x, 4);
+        l = Z[1] ^ S4[x[7]] ^ S5[x[6]] ^ S6[x[5]] ^ S7[x[4]] ^ S4[z[1]];
+        CAST_exp(l, X, x, 8);
+        l = Z[3] ^ S4[x[10]] ^ S5[x[9]] ^ S6[x[11]] ^ S7[x[8]] ^ S5[z[3]];
+        CAST_exp(l, X, x, 12);
+
+        K[12] = S4[x[8]] ^ S5[x[9]] ^ S6[x[7]] ^ S7[x[6]] ^ S4[x[3]];
+        K[13] = S4[x[10]] ^ S5[x[11]] ^ S6[x[5]] ^ S7[x[4]] ^ S5[x[7]];
+        K[14] = S4[x[12]] ^ S5[x[13]] ^ S6[x[3]] ^ S7[x[2]] ^ S6[x[8]];
+        K[15] = S4[x[14]] ^ S5[x[15]] ^ S6[x[1]] ^ S7[x[0]] ^ S7[x[13]];
+        if (K != k)
+            break;
+        K += 16;
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
+        key->data[i * 2] = k[i];
+        key->data[i * 2 + 1] = ((k[i + 16]) + 16) & 0x1f;
+    }
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cast/cast_lcl.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cast/cast_lcl.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e8cf322
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cast/cast_lcl.h
@@ -0,0 +1,190 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "e_os.h"
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
+# include <stdlib.h>
+#endif
+
+#undef c2l
+#define c2l(c,l)        (l =((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))    , \
+                         l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<< 8L, \
+                         l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<16L, \
+                         l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<24L)
+
+/* NOTE - c is not incremented as per c2l */
+#undef c2ln
+#define c2ln(c,l1,l2,n) { \
+                        c+=n; \
+                        l1=l2=0; \
+                        switch (n) { \
+                        case 8: l2 =((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<24L; \
+                        case 7: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<16L; \
+                        case 6: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<< 8L; \
+                        case 5: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))));     \
+                        case 4: l1 =((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<24L; \
+                        case 3: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<16L; \
+                        case 2: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<< 8L; \
+                        case 1: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))));     \
+                                } \
+                        }
+
+#undef l2c
+#define l2c(l,c)        (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)     )&0xff), \
+                         *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8L)&0xff), \
+                         *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16L)&0xff), \
+                         *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24L)&0xff))
+
+/* NOTE - c is not incremented as per l2c */
+#undef l2cn
+#define l2cn(l1,l2,c,n) { \
+                        c+=n; \
+                        switch (n) { \
+                        case 8: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>>24L)&0xff); \
+                        case 7: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>>16L)&0xff); \
+                        case 6: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>> 8L)&0xff); \
+                        case 5: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)     )&0xff); \
+                        case 4: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>>24L)&0xff); \
+                        case 3: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>>16L)&0xff); \
+                        case 2: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>> 8L)&0xff); \
+                        case 1: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)     )&0xff); \
+                                } \
+                        }
+
+/* NOTE - c is not incremented as per n2l */
+#define n2ln(c,l1,l2,n) { \
+                        c+=n; \
+                        l1=l2=0; \
+                        switch (n) { \
+                        case 8: l2 =((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))    ; \
+                        /* fall thru */                              \
+                        case 7: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<< 8; \
+                        /* fall thru */                              \
+                        case 6: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<16; \
+                        /* fall thru */                              \
+                        case 5: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<24; \
+                        /* fall thru */                              \
+                        case 4: l1 =((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))    ; \
+                        /* fall thru */                              \
+                        case 3: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<< 8; \
+                        /* fall thru */                              \
+                        case 2: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<16; \
+                        /* fall thru */                              \
+                        case 1: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<24; \
+                                } \
+                        }
+
+/* NOTE - c is not incremented as per l2n */
+#define l2nn(l1,l2,c,n) { \
+                        c+=n; \
+                        switch (n) { \
+                        case 8: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)    )&0xff); \
+                        /* fall thru */                                    \
+                        case 7: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>> 8)&0xff); \
+                        /* fall thru */                                    \
+                        case 6: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>>16)&0xff); \
+                        /* fall thru */                                    \
+                        case 5: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>>24)&0xff); \
+                        /* fall thru */                                    \
+                        case 4: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)    )&0xff); \
+                        /* fall thru */                                    \
+                        case 3: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>> 8)&0xff); \
+                        /* fall thru */                                    \
+                        case 2: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>>16)&0xff); \
+                        /* fall thru */                                    \
+                        case 1: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>>24)&0xff); \
+                                } \
+                        }
+
+#undef n2l
+#define n2l(c,l)        (l =((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<24L, \
+                         l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<16L, \
+                         l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<< 8L, \
+                         l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++))))
+
+#undef l2n
+#define l2n(l,c)        (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24L)&0xff), \
+                         *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16L)&0xff), \
+                         *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8L)&0xff), \
+                         *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)     )&0xff))
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) && defined(_MSC_VER)
+# define ROTL(a,n)     (_lrotl(a,n))
+#else
+# define ROTL(a,n)     ((((a)<<(n))&0xffffffffL)|((a)>>((32-(n))&31)))
+#endif
+
+#define C_M    0x3fc
+#define C_0    22L
+#define C_1    14L
+#define C_2     6L
+#define C_3     2L              /* left shift */
+
+/* The rotate has an extra 16 added to it to help the x86 asm */
+#if defined(CAST_PTR)
+# define E_CAST(n,key,L,R,OP1,OP2,OP3) \
+        { \
+        int i; \
+        t=(key[n*2] OP1 R)&0xffffffffL; \
+        i=key[n*2+1]; \
+        t=ROTL(t,i); \
+        L^= (((((*(CAST_LONG *)((unsigned char *) \
+                        CAST_S_table0+((t>>C_2)&C_M)) OP2 \
+                *(CAST_LONG *)((unsigned char *) \
+                        CAST_S_table1+((t<<C_3)&C_M)))&0xffffffffL) OP3 \
+                *(CAST_LONG *)((unsigned char *) \
+                        CAST_S_table2+((t>>C_0)&C_M)))&0xffffffffL) OP1 \
+                *(CAST_LONG *)((unsigned char *) \
+                        CAST_S_table3+((t>>C_1)&C_M)))&0xffffffffL; \
+        }
+#elif defined(CAST_PTR2)
+# define E_CAST(n,key,L,R,OP1,OP2,OP3) \
+        { \
+        int i; \
+        CAST_LONG u,v,w; \
+        w=(key[n*2] OP1 R)&0xffffffffL; \
+        i=key[n*2+1]; \
+        w=ROTL(w,i); \
+        u=w>>C_2; \
+        v=w<<C_3; \
+        u&=C_M; \
+        v&=C_M; \
+        t= *(CAST_LONG *)((unsigned char *)CAST_S_table0+u); \
+        u=w>>C_0; \
+        t=(t OP2 *(CAST_LONG *)((unsigned char *)CAST_S_table1+v))&0xffffffffL;\
+        v=w>>C_1; \
+        u&=C_M; \
+        v&=C_M; \
+        t=(t OP3 *(CAST_LONG *)((unsigned char *)CAST_S_table2+u)&0xffffffffL);\
+        t=(t OP1 *(CAST_LONG *)((unsigned char *)CAST_S_table3+v)&0xffffffffL);\
+        L^=(t&0xffffffff); \
+        }
+#else
+# define E_CAST(n,key,L,R,OP1,OP2,OP3) \
+        { \
+        CAST_LONG a,b,c,d; \
+        t=(key[n*2] OP1 R)&0xffffffff; \
+        t=ROTL(t,(key[n*2+1])); \
+        a=CAST_S_table0[(t>> 8)&0xff]; \
+        b=CAST_S_table1[(t    )&0xff]; \
+        c=CAST_S_table2[(t>>24)&0xff]; \
+        d=CAST_S_table3[(t>>16)&0xff]; \
+        L^=(((((a OP2 b)&0xffffffffL) OP3 c)&0xffffffffL) OP1 d)&0xffffffffL; \
+        }
+#endif
+
+extern const CAST_LONG CAST_S_table0[256];
+extern const CAST_LONG CAST_S_table1[256];
+extern const CAST_LONG CAST_S_table2[256];
+extern const CAST_LONG CAST_S_table3[256];
+extern const CAST_LONG CAST_S_table4[256];
+extern const CAST_LONG CAST_S_table5[256];
+extern const CAST_LONG CAST_S_table6[256];
+extern const CAST_LONG CAST_S_table7[256];
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cast/cast_s.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cast/cast_s.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d9fd6ac
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cast/cast_s.h
@@ -0,0 +1,544 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+OPENSSL_GLOBAL const CAST_LONG CAST_S_table0[256] = {
+    0x30fb40d4, 0x9fa0ff0b, 0x6beccd2f, 0x3f258c7a,
+    0x1e213f2f, 0x9c004dd3, 0x6003e540, 0xcf9fc949,
+    0xbfd4af27, 0x88bbbdb5, 0xe2034090, 0x98d09675,
+    0x6e63a0e0, 0x15c361d2, 0xc2e7661d, 0x22d4ff8e,
+    0x28683b6f, 0xc07fd059, 0xff2379c8, 0x775f50e2,
+    0x43c340d3, 0xdf2f8656, 0x887ca41a, 0xa2d2bd2d,
+    0xa1c9e0d6, 0x346c4819, 0x61b76d87, 0x22540f2f,
+    0x2abe32e1, 0xaa54166b, 0x22568e3a, 0xa2d341d0,
+    0x66db40c8, 0xa784392f, 0x004dff2f, 0x2db9d2de,
+    0x97943fac, 0x4a97c1d8, 0x527644b7, 0xb5f437a7,
+    0xb82cbaef, 0xd751d159, 0x6ff7f0ed, 0x5a097a1f,
+    0x827b68d0, 0x90ecf52e, 0x22b0c054, 0xbc8e5935,
+    0x4b6d2f7f, 0x50bb64a2, 0xd2664910, 0xbee5812d,
+    0xb7332290, 0xe93b159f, 0xb48ee411, 0x4bff345d,
+    0xfd45c240, 0xad31973f, 0xc4f6d02e, 0x55fc8165,
+    0xd5b1caad, 0xa1ac2dae, 0xa2d4b76d, 0xc19b0c50,
+    0x882240f2, 0x0c6e4f38, 0xa4e4bfd7, 0x4f5ba272,
+    0x564c1d2f, 0xc59c5319, 0xb949e354, 0xb04669fe,
+    0xb1b6ab8a, 0xc71358dd, 0x6385c545, 0x110f935d,
+    0x57538ad5, 0x6a390493, 0xe63d37e0, 0x2a54f6b3,
+    0x3a787d5f, 0x6276a0b5, 0x19a6fcdf, 0x7a42206a,
+    0x29f9d4d5, 0xf61b1891, 0xbb72275e, 0xaa508167,
+    0x38901091, 0xc6b505eb, 0x84c7cb8c, 0x2ad75a0f,
+    0x874a1427, 0xa2d1936b, 0x2ad286af, 0xaa56d291,
+    0xd7894360, 0x425c750d, 0x93b39e26, 0x187184c9,
+    0x6c00b32d, 0x73e2bb14, 0xa0bebc3c, 0x54623779,
+    0x64459eab, 0x3f328b82, 0x7718cf82, 0x59a2cea6,
+    0x04ee002e, 0x89fe78e6, 0x3fab0950, 0x325ff6c2,
+    0x81383f05, 0x6963c5c8, 0x76cb5ad6, 0xd49974c9,
+    0xca180dcf, 0x380782d5, 0xc7fa5cf6, 0x8ac31511,
+    0x35e79e13, 0x47da91d0, 0xf40f9086, 0xa7e2419e,
+    0x31366241, 0x051ef495, 0xaa573b04, 0x4a805d8d,
+    0x548300d0, 0x00322a3c, 0xbf64cddf, 0xba57a68e,
+    0x75c6372b, 0x50afd341, 0xa7c13275, 0x915a0bf5,
+    0x6b54bfab, 0x2b0b1426, 0xab4cc9d7, 0x449ccd82,
+    0xf7fbf265, 0xab85c5f3, 0x1b55db94, 0xaad4e324,
+    0xcfa4bd3f, 0x2deaa3e2, 0x9e204d02, 0xc8bd25ac,
+    0xeadf55b3, 0xd5bd9e98, 0xe31231b2, 0x2ad5ad6c,
+    0x954329de, 0xadbe4528, 0xd8710f69, 0xaa51c90f,
+    0xaa786bf6, 0x22513f1e, 0xaa51a79b, 0x2ad344cc,
+    0x7b5a41f0, 0xd37cfbad, 0x1b069505, 0x41ece491,
+    0xb4c332e6, 0x032268d4, 0xc9600acc, 0xce387e6d,
+    0xbf6bb16c, 0x6a70fb78, 0x0d03d9c9, 0xd4df39de,
+    0xe01063da, 0x4736f464, 0x5ad328d8, 0xb347cc96,
+    0x75bb0fc3, 0x98511bfb, 0x4ffbcc35, 0xb58bcf6a,
+    0xe11f0abc, 0xbfc5fe4a, 0xa70aec10, 0xac39570a,
+    0x3f04442f, 0x6188b153, 0xe0397a2e, 0x5727cb79,
+    0x9ceb418f, 0x1cacd68d, 0x2ad37c96, 0x0175cb9d,
+    0xc69dff09, 0xc75b65f0, 0xd9db40d8, 0xec0e7779,
+    0x4744ead4, 0xb11c3274, 0xdd24cb9e, 0x7e1c54bd,
+    0xf01144f9, 0xd2240eb1, 0x9675b3fd, 0xa3ac3755,
+    0xd47c27af, 0x51c85f4d, 0x56907596, 0xa5bb15e6,
+    0x580304f0, 0xca042cf1, 0x011a37ea, 0x8dbfaadb,
+    0x35ba3e4a, 0x3526ffa0, 0xc37b4d09, 0xbc306ed9,
+    0x98a52666, 0x5648f725, 0xff5e569d, 0x0ced63d0,
+    0x7c63b2cf, 0x700b45e1, 0xd5ea50f1, 0x85a92872,
+    0xaf1fbda7, 0xd4234870, 0xa7870bf3, 0x2d3b4d79,
+    0x42e04198, 0x0cd0ede7, 0x26470db8, 0xf881814c,
+    0x474d6ad7, 0x7c0c5e5c, 0xd1231959, 0x381b7298,
+    0xf5d2f4db, 0xab838653, 0x6e2f1e23, 0x83719c9e,
+    0xbd91e046, 0x9a56456e, 0xdc39200c, 0x20c8c571,
+    0x962bda1c, 0xe1e696ff, 0xb141ab08, 0x7cca89b9,
+    0x1a69e783, 0x02cc4843, 0xa2f7c579, 0x429ef47d,
+    0x427b169c, 0x5ac9f049, 0xdd8f0f00, 0x5c8165bf,
+};
+
+OPENSSL_GLOBAL const CAST_LONG CAST_S_table1[256] = {
+    0x1f201094, 0xef0ba75b, 0x69e3cf7e, 0x393f4380,
+    0xfe61cf7a, 0xeec5207a, 0x55889c94, 0x72fc0651,
+    0xada7ef79, 0x4e1d7235, 0xd55a63ce, 0xde0436ba,
+    0x99c430ef, 0x5f0c0794, 0x18dcdb7d, 0xa1d6eff3,
+    0xa0b52f7b, 0x59e83605, 0xee15b094, 0xe9ffd909,
+    0xdc440086, 0xef944459, 0xba83ccb3, 0xe0c3cdfb,
+    0xd1da4181, 0x3b092ab1, 0xf997f1c1, 0xa5e6cf7b,
+    0x01420ddb, 0xe4e7ef5b, 0x25a1ff41, 0xe180f806,
+    0x1fc41080, 0x179bee7a, 0xd37ac6a9, 0xfe5830a4,
+    0x98de8b7f, 0x77e83f4e, 0x79929269, 0x24fa9f7b,
+    0xe113c85b, 0xacc40083, 0xd7503525, 0xf7ea615f,
+    0x62143154, 0x0d554b63, 0x5d681121, 0xc866c359,
+    0x3d63cf73, 0xcee234c0, 0xd4d87e87, 0x5c672b21,
+    0x071f6181, 0x39f7627f, 0x361e3084, 0xe4eb573b,
+    0x602f64a4, 0xd63acd9c, 0x1bbc4635, 0x9e81032d,
+    0x2701f50c, 0x99847ab4, 0xa0e3df79, 0xba6cf38c,
+    0x10843094, 0x2537a95e, 0xf46f6ffe, 0xa1ff3b1f,
+    0x208cfb6a, 0x8f458c74, 0xd9e0a227, 0x4ec73a34,
+    0xfc884f69, 0x3e4de8df, 0xef0e0088, 0x3559648d,
+    0x8a45388c, 0x1d804366, 0x721d9bfd, 0xa58684bb,
+    0xe8256333, 0x844e8212, 0x128d8098, 0xfed33fb4,
+    0xce280ae1, 0x27e19ba5, 0xd5a6c252, 0xe49754bd,
+    0xc5d655dd, 0xeb667064, 0x77840b4d, 0xa1b6a801,
+    0x84db26a9, 0xe0b56714, 0x21f043b7, 0xe5d05860,
+    0x54f03084, 0x066ff472, 0xa31aa153, 0xdadc4755,
+    0xb5625dbf, 0x68561be6, 0x83ca6b94, 0x2d6ed23b,
+    0xeccf01db, 0xa6d3d0ba, 0xb6803d5c, 0xaf77a709,
+    0x33b4a34c, 0x397bc8d6, 0x5ee22b95, 0x5f0e5304,
+    0x81ed6f61, 0x20e74364, 0xb45e1378, 0xde18639b,
+    0x881ca122, 0xb96726d1, 0x8049a7e8, 0x22b7da7b,
+    0x5e552d25, 0x5272d237, 0x79d2951c, 0xc60d894c,
+    0x488cb402, 0x1ba4fe5b, 0xa4b09f6b, 0x1ca815cf,
+    0xa20c3005, 0x8871df63, 0xb9de2fcb, 0x0cc6c9e9,
+    0x0beeff53, 0xe3214517, 0xb4542835, 0x9f63293c,
+    0xee41e729, 0x6e1d2d7c, 0x50045286, 0x1e6685f3,
+    0xf33401c6, 0x30a22c95, 0x31a70850, 0x60930f13,
+    0x73f98417, 0xa1269859, 0xec645c44, 0x52c877a9,
+    0xcdff33a6, 0xa02b1741, 0x7cbad9a2, 0x2180036f,
+    0x50d99c08, 0xcb3f4861, 0xc26bd765, 0x64a3f6ab,
+    0x80342676, 0x25a75e7b, 0xe4e6d1fc, 0x20c710e6,
+    0xcdf0b680, 0x17844d3b, 0x31eef84d, 0x7e0824e4,
+    0x2ccb49eb, 0x846a3bae, 0x8ff77888, 0xee5d60f6,
+    0x7af75673, 0x2fdd5cdb, 0xa11631c1, 0x30f66f43,
+    0xb3faec54, 0x157fd7fa, 0xef8579cc, 0xd152de58,
+    0xdb2ffd5e, 0x8f32ce19, 0x306af97a, 0x02f03ef8,
+    0x99319ad5, 0xc242fa0f, 0xa7e3ebb0, 0xc68e4906,
+    0xb8da230c, 0x80823028, 0xdcdef3c8, 0xd35fb171,
+    0x088a1bc8, 0xbec0c560, 0x61a3c9e8, 0xbca8f54d,
+    0xc72feffa, 0x22822e99, 0x82c570b4, 0xd8d94e89,
+    0x8b1c34bc, 0x301e16e6, 0x273be979, 0xb0ffeaa6,
+    0x61d9b8c6, 0x00b24869, 0xb7ffce3f, 0x08dc283b,
+    0x43daf65a, 0xf7e19798, 0x7619b72f, 0x8f1c9ba4,
+    0xdc8637a0, 0x16a7d3b1, 0x9fc393b7, 0xa7136eeb,
+    0xc6bcc63e, 0x1a513742, 0xef6828bc, 0x520365d6,
+    0x2d6a77ab, 0x3527ed4b, 0x821fd216, 0x095c6e2e,
+    0xdb92f2fb, 0x5eea29cb, 0x145892f5, 0x91584f7f,
+    0x5483697b, 0x2667a8cc, 0x85196048, 0x8c4bacea,
+    0x833860d4, 0x0d23e0f9, 0x6c387e8a, 0x0ae6d249,
+    0xb284600c, 0xd835731d, 0xdcb1c647, 0xac4c56ea,
+    0x3ebd81b3, 0x230eabb0, 0x6438bc87, 0xf0b5b1fa,
+    0x8f5ea2b3, 0xfc184642, 0x0a036b7a, 0x4fb089bd,
+    0x649da589, 0xa345415e, 0x5c038323, 0x3e5d3bb9,
+    0x43d79572, 0x7e6dd07c, 0x06dfdf1e, 0x6c6cc4ef,
+    0x7160a539, 0x73bfbe70, 0x83877605, 0x4523ecf1,
+};
+
+OPENSSL_GLOBAL const CAST_LONG CAST_S_table2[256] = {
+    0x8defc240, 0x25fa5d9f, 0xeb903dbf, 0xe810c907,
+    0x47607fff, 0x369fe44b, 0x8c1fc644, 0xaececa90,
+    0xbeb1f9bf, 0xeefbcaea, 0xe8cf1950, 0x51df07ae,
+    0x920e8806, 0xf0ad0548, 0xe13c8d83, 0x927010d5,
+    0x11107d9f, 0x07647db9, 0xb2e3e4d4, 0x3d4f285e,
+    0xb9afa820, 0xfade82e0, 0xa067268b, 0x8272792e,
+    0x553fb2c0, 0x489ae22b, 0xd4ef9794, 0x125e3fbc,
+    0x21fffcee, 0x825b1bfd, 0x9255c5ed, 0x1257a240,
+    0x4e1a8302, 0xbae07fff, 0x528246e7, 0x8e57140e,
+    0x3373f7bf, 0x8c9f8188, 0xa6fc4ee8, 0xc982b5a5,
+    0xa8c01db7, 0x579fc264, 0x67094f31, 0xf2bd3f5f,
+    0x40fff7c1, 0x1fb78dfc, 0x8e6bd2c1, 0x437be59b,
+    0x99b03dbf, 0xb5dbc64b, 0x638dc0e6, 0x55819d99,
+    0xa197c81c, 0x4a012d6e, 0xc5884a28, 0xccc36f71,
+    0xb843c213, 0x6c0743f1, 0x8309893c, 0x0feddd5f,
+    0x2f7fe850, 0xd7c07f7e, 0x02507fbf, 0x5afb9a04,
+    0xa747d2d0, 0x1651192e, 0xaf70bf3e, 0x58c31380,
+    0x5f98302e, 0x727cc3c4, 0x0a0fb402, 0x0f7fef82,
+    0x8c96fdad, 0x5d2c2aae, 0x8ee99a49, 0x50da88b8,
+    0x8427f4a0, 0x1eac5790, 0x796fb449, 0x8252dc15,
+    0xefbd7d9b, 0xa672597d, 0xada840d8, 0x45f54504,
+    0xfa5d7403, 0xe83ec305, 0x4f91751a, 0x925669c2,
+    0x23efe941, 0xa903f12e, 0x60270df2, 0x0276e4b6,
+    0x94fd6574, 0x927985b2, 0x8276dbcb, 0x02778176,
+    0xf8af918d, 0x4e48f79e, 0x8f616ddf, 0xe29d840e,
+    0x842f7d83, 0x340ce5c8, 0x96bbb682, 0x93b4b148,
+    0xef303cab, 0x984faf28, 0x779faf9b, 0x92dc560d,
+    0x224d1e20, 0x8437aa88, 0x7d29dc96, 0x2756d3dc,
+    0x8b907cee, 0xb51fd240, 0xe7c07ce3, 0xe566b4a1,
+    0xc3e9615e, 0x3cf8209d, 0x6094d1e3, 0xcd9ca341,
+    0x5c76460e, 0x00ea983b, 0xd4d67881, 0xfd47572c,
+    0xf76cedd9, 0xbda8229c, 0x127dadaa, 0x438a074e,
+    0x1f97c090, 0x081bdb8a, 0x93a07ebe, 0xb938ca15,
+    0x97b03cff, 0x3dc2c0f8, 0x8d1ab2ec, 0x64380e51,
+    0x68cc7bfb, 0xd90f2788, 0x12490181, 0x5de5ffd4,
+    0xdd7ef86a, 0x76a2e214, 0xb9a40368, 0x925d958f,
+    0x4b39fffa, 0xba39aee9, 0xa4ffd30b, 0xfaf7933b,
+    0x6d498623, 0x193cbcfa, 0x27627545, 0x825cf47a,
+    0x61bd8ba0, 0xd11e42d1, 0xcead04f4, 0x127ea392,
+    0x10428db7, 0x8272a972, 0x9270c4a8, 0x127de50b,
+    0x285ba1c8, 0x3c62f44f, 0x35c0eaa5, 0xe805d231,
+    0x428929fb, 0xb4fcdf82, 0x4fb66a53, 0x0e7dc15b,
+    0x1f081fab, 0x108618ae, 0xfcfd086d, 0xf9ff2889,
+    0x694bcc11, 0x236a5cae, 0x12deca4d, 0x2c3f8cc5,
+    0xd2d02dfe, 0xf8ef5896, 0xe4cf52da, 0x95155b67,
+    0x494a488c, 0xb9b6a80c, 0x5c8f82bc, 0x89d36b45,
+    0x3a609437, 0xec00c9a9, 0x44715253, 0x0a874b49,
+    0xd773bc40, 0x7c34671c, 0x02717ef6, 0x4feb5536,
+    0xa2d02fff, 0xd2bf60c4, 0xd43f03c0, 0x50b4ef6d,
+    0x07478cd1, 0x006e1888, 0xa2e53f55, 0xb9e6d4bc,
+    0xa2048016, 0x97573833, 0xd7207d67, 0xde0f8f3d,
+    0x72f87b33, 0xabcc4f33, 0x7688c55d, 0x7b00a6b0,
+    0x947b0001, 0x570075d2, 0xf9bb88f8, 0x8942019e,
+    0x4264a5ff, 0x856302e0, 0x72dbd92b, 0xee971b69,
+    0x6ea22fde, 0x5f08ae2b, 0xaf7a616d, 0xe5c98767,
+    0xcf1febd2, 0x61efc8c2, 0xf1ac2571, 0xcc8239c2,
+    0x67214cb8, 0xb1e583d1, 0xb7dc3e62, 0x7f10bdce,
+    0xf90a5c38, 0x0ff0443d, 0x606e6dc6, 0x60543a49,
+    0x5727c148, 0x2be98a1d, 0x8ab41738, 0x20e1be24,
+    0xaf96da0f, 0x68458425, 0x99833be5, 0x600d457d,
+    0x282f9350, 0x8334b362, 0xd91d1120, 0x2b6d8da0,
+    0x642b1e31, 0x9c305a00, 0x52bce688, 0x1b03588a,
+    0xf7baefd5, 0x4142ed9c, 0xa4315c11, 0x83323ec5,
+    0xdfef4636, 0xa133c501, 0xe9d3531c, 0xee353783,
+};
+
+OPENSSL_GLOBAL const CAST_LONG CAST_S_table3[256] = {
+    0x9db30420, 0x1fb6e9de, 0xa7be7bef, 0xd273a298,
+    0x4a4f7bdb, 0x64ad8c57, 0x85510443, 0xfa020ed1,
+    0x7e287aff, 0xe60fb663, 0x095f35a1, 0x79ebf120,
+    0xfd059d43, 0x6497b7b1, 0xf3641f63, 0x241e4adf,
+    0x28147f5f, 0x4fa2b8cd, 0xc9430040, 0x0cc32220,
+    0xfdd30b30, 0xc0a5374f, 0x1d2d00d9, 0x24147b15,
+    0xee4d111a, 0x0fca5167, 0x71ff904c, 0x2d195ffe,
+    0x1a05645f, 0x0c13fefe, 0x081b08ca, 0x05170121,
+    0x80530100, 0xe83e5efe, 0xac9af4f8, 0x7fe72701,
+    0xd2b8ee5f, 0x06df4261, 0xbb9e9b8a, 0x7293ea25,
+    0xce84ffdf, 0xf5718801, 0x3dd64b04, 0xa26f263b,
+    0x7ed48400, 0x547eebe6, 0x446d4ca0, 0x6cf3d6f5,
+    0x2649abdf, 0xaea0c7f5, 0x36338cc1, 0x503f7e93,
+    0xd3772061, 0x11b638e1, 0x72500e03, 0xf80eb2bb,
+    0xabe0502e, 0xec8d77de, 0x57971e81, 0xe14f6746,
+    0xc9335400, 0x6920318f, 0x081dbb99, 0xffc304a5,
+    0x4d351805, 0x7f3d5ce3, 0xa6c866c6, 0x5d5bcca9,
+    0xdaec6fea, 0x9f926f91, 0x9f46222f, 0x3991467d,
+    0xa5bf6d8e, 0x1143c44f, 0x43958302, 0xd0214eeb,
+    0x022083b8, 0x3fb6180c, 0x18f8931e, 0x281658e6,
+    0x26486e3e, 0x8bd78a70, 0x7477e4c1, 0xb506e07c,
+    0xf32d0a25, 0x79098b02, 0xe4eabb81, 0x28123b23,
+    0x69dead38, 0x1574ca16, 0xdf871b62, 0x211c40b7,
+    0xa51a9ef9, 0x0014377b, 0x041e8ac8, 0x09114003,
+    0xbd59e4d2, 0xe3d156d5, 0x4fe876d5, 0x2f91a340,
+    0x557be8de, 0x00eae4a7, 0x0ce5c2ec, 0x4db4bba6,
+    0xe756bdff, 0xdd3369ac, 0xec17b035, 0x06572327,
+    0x99afc8b0, 0x56c8c391, 0x6b65811c, 0x5e146119,
+    0x6e85cb75, 0xbe07c002, 0xc2325577, 0x893ff4ec,
+    0x5bbfc92d, 0xd0ec3b25, 0xb7801ab7, 0x8d6d3b24,
+    0x20c763ef, 0xc366a5fc, 0x9c382880, 0x0ace3205,
+    0xaac9548a, 0xeca1d7c7, 0x041afa32, 0x1d16625a,
+    0x6701902c, 0x9b757a54, 0x31d477f7, 0x9126b031,
+    0x36cc6fdb, 0xc70b8b46, 0xd9e66a48, 0x56e55a79,
+    0x026a4ceb, 0x52437eff, 0x2f8f76b4, 0x0df980a5,
+    0x8674cde3, 0xedda04eb, 0x17a9be04, 0x2c18f4df,
+    0xb7747f9d, 0xab2af7b4, 0xefc34d20, 0x2e096b7c,
+    0x1741a254, 0xe5b6a035, 0x213d42f6, 0x2c1c7c26,
+    0x61c2f50f, 0x6552daf9, 0xd2c231f8, 0x25130f69,
+    0xd8167fa2, 0x0418f2c8, 0x001a96a6, 0x0d1526ab,
+    0x63315c21, 0x5e0a72ec, 0x49bafefd, 0x187908d9,
+    0x8d0dbd86, 0x311170a7, 0x3e9b640c, 0xcc3e10d7,
+    0xd5cad3b6, 0x0caec388, 0xf73001e1, 0x6c728aff,
+    0x71eae2a1, 0x1f9af36e, 0xcfcbd12f, 0xc1de8417,
+    0xac07be6b, 0xcb44a1d8, 0x8b9b0f56, 0x013988c3,
+    0xb1c52fca, 0xb4be31cd, 0xd8782806, 0x12a3a4e2,
+    0x6f7de532, 0x58fd7eb6, 0xd01ee900, 0x24adffc2,
+    0xf4990fc5, 0x9711aac5, 0x001d7b95, 0x82e5e7d2,
+    0x109873f6, 0x00613096, 0xc32d9521, 0xada121ff,
+    0x29908415, 0x7fbb977f, 0xaf9eb3db, 0x29c9ed2a,
+    0x5ce2a465, 0xa730f32c, 0xd0aa3fe8, 0x8a5cc091,
+    0xd49e2ce7, 0x0ce454a9, 0xd60acd86, 0x015f1919,
+    0x77079103, 0xdea03af6, 0x78a8565e, 0xdee356df,
+    0x21f05cbe, 0x8b75e387, 0xb3c50651, 0xb8a5c3ef,
+    0xd8eeb6d2, 0xe523be77, 0xc2154529, 0x2f69efdf,
+    0xafe67afb, 0xf470c4b2, 0xf3e0eb5b, 0xd6cc9876,
+    0x39e4460c, 0x1fda8538, 0x1987832f, 0xca007367,
+    0xa99144f8, 0x296b299e, 0x492fc295, 0x9266beab,
+    0xb5676e69, 0x9bd3ddda, 0xdf7e052f, 0xdb25701c,
+    0x1b5e51ee, 0xf65324e6, 0x6afce36c, 0x0316cc04,
+    0x8644213e, 0xb7dc59d0, 0x7965291f, 0xccd6fd43,
+    0x41823979, 0x932bcdf6, 0xb657c34d, 0x4edfd282,
+    0x7ae5290c, 0x3cb9536b, 0x851e20fe, 0x9833557e,
+    0x13ecf0b0, 0xd3ffb372, 0x3f85c5c1, 0x0aef7ed2,
+};
+
+OPENSSL_GLOBAL const CAST_LONG CAST_S_table4[256] = {
+    0x7ec90c04, 0x2c6e74b9, 0x9b0e66df, 0xa6337911,
+    0xb86a7fff, 0x1dd358f5, 0x44dd9d44, 0x1731167f,
+    0x08fbf1fa, 0xe7f511cc, 0xd2051b00, 0x735aba00,
+    0x2ab722d8, 0x386381cb, 0xacf6243a, 0x69befd7a,
+    0xe6a2e77f, 0xf0c720cd, 0xc4494816, 0xccf5c180,
+    0x38851640, 0x15b0a848, 0xe68b18cb, 0x4caadeff,
+    0x5f480a01, 0x0412b2aa, 0x259814fc, 0x41d0efe2,
+    0x4e40b48d, 0x248eb6fb, 0x8dba1cfe, 0x41a99b02,
+    0x1a550a04, 0xba8f65cb, 0x7251f4e7, 0x95a51725,
+    0xc106ecd7, 0x97a5980a, 0xc539b9aa, 0x4d79fe6a,
+    0xf2f3f763, 0x68af8040, 0xed0c9e56, 0x11b4958b,
+    0xe1eb5a88, 0x8709e6b0, 0xd7e07156, 0x4e29fea7,
+    0x6366e52d, 0x02d1c000, 0xc4ac8e05, 0x9377f571,
+    0x0c05372a, 0x578535f2, 0x2261be02, 0xd642a0c9,
+    0xdf13a280, 0x74b55bd2, 0x682199c0, 0xd421e5ec,
+    0x53fb3ce8, 0xc8adedb3, 0x28a87fc9, 0x3d959981,
+    0x5c1ff900, 0xfe38d399, 0x0c4eff0b, 0x062407ea,
+    0xaa2f4fb1, 0x4fb96976, 0x90c79505, 0xb0a8a774,
+    0xef55a1ff, 0xe59ca2c2, 0xa6b62d27, 0xe66a4263,
+    0xdf65001f, 0x0ec50966, 0xdfdd55bc, 0x29de0655,
+    0x911e739a, 0x17af8975, 0x32c7911c, 0x89f89468,
+    0x0d01e980, 0x524755f4, 0x03b63cc9, 0x0cc844b2,
+    0xbcf3f0aa, 0x87ac36e9, 0xe53a7426, 0x01b3d82b,
+    0x1a9e7449, 0x64ee2d7e, 0xcddbb1da, 0x01c94910,
+    0xb868bf80, 0x0d26f3fd, 0x9342ede7, 0x04a5c284,
+    0x636737b6, 0x50f5b616, 0xf24766e3, 0x8eca36c1,
+    0x136e05db, 0xfef18391, 0xfb887a37, 0xd6e7f7d4,
+    0xc7fb7dc9, 0x3063fcdf, 0xb6f589de, 0xec2941da,
+    0x26e46695, 0xb7566419, 0xf654efc5, 0xd08d58b7,
+    0x48925401, 0xc1bacb7f, 0xe5ff550f, 0xb6083049,
+    0x5bb5d0e8, 0x87d72e5a, 0xab6a6ee1, 0x223a66ce,
+    0xc62bf3cd, 0x9e0885f9, 0x68cb3e47, 0x086c010f,
+    0xa21de820, 0xd18b69de, 0xf3f65777, 0xfa02c3f6,
+    0x407edac3, 0xcbb3d550, 0x1793084d, 0xb0d70eba,
+    0x0ab378d5, 0xd951fb0c, 0xded7da56, 0x4124bbe4,
+    0x94ca0b56, 0x0f5755d1, 0xe0e1e56e, 0x6184b5be,
+    0x580a249f, 0x94f74bc0, 0xe327888e, 0x9f7b5561,
+    0xc3dc0280, 0x05687715, 0x646c6bd7, 0x44904db3,
+    0x66b4f0a3, 0xc0f1648a, 0x697ed5af, 0x49e92ff6,
+    0x309e374f, 0x2cb6356a, 0x85808573, 0x4991f840,
+    0x76f0ae02, 0x083be84d, 0x28421c9a, 0x44489406,
+    0x736e4cb8, 0xc1092910, 0x8bc95fc6, 0x7d869cf4,
+    0x134f616f, 0x2e77118d, 0xb31b2be1, 0xaa90b472,
+    0x3ca5d717, 0x7d161bba, 0x9cad9010, 0xaf462ba2,
+    0x9fe459d2, 0x45d34559, 0xd9f2da13, 0xdbc65487,
+    0xf3e4f94e, 0x176d486f, 0x097c13ea, 0x631da5c7,
+    0x445f7382, 0x175683f4, 0xcdc66a97, 0x70be0288,
+    0xb3cdcf72, 0x6e5dd2f3, 0x20936079, 0x459b80a5,
+    0xbe60e2db, 0xa9c23101, 0xeba5315c, 0x224e42f2,
+    0x1c5c1572, 0xf6721b2c, 0x1ad2fff3, 0x8c25404e,
+    0x324ed72f, 0x4067b7fd, 0x0523138e, 0x5ca3bc78,
+    0xdc0fd66e, 0x75922283, 0x784d6b17, 0x58ebb16e,
+    0x44094f85, 0x3f481d87, 0xfcfeae7b, 0x77b5ff76,
+    0x8c2302bf, 0xaaf47556, 0x5f46b02a, 0x2b092801,
+    0x3d38f5f7, 0x0ca81f36, 0x52af4a8a, 0x66d5e7c0,
+    0xdf3b0874, 0x95055110, 0x1b5ad7a8, 0xf61ed5ad,
+    0x6cf6e479, 0x20758184, 0xd0cefa65, 0x88f7be58,
+    0x4a046826, 0x0ff6f8f3, 0xa09c7f70, 0x5346aba0,
+    0x5ce96c28, 0xe176eda3, 0x6bac307f, 0x376829d2,
+    0x85360fa9, 0x17e3fe2a, 0x24b79767, 0xf5a96b20,
+    0xd6cd2595, 0x68ff1ebf, 0x7555442c, 0xf19f06be,
+    0xf9e0659a, 0xeeb9491d, 0x34010718, 0xbb30cab8,
+    0xe822fe15, 0x88570983, 0x750e6249, 0xda627e55,
+    0x5e76ffa8, 0xb1534546, 0x6d47de08, 0xefe9e7d4,
+};
+
+OPENSSL_GLOBAL const CAST_LONG CAST_S_table5[256] = {
+    0xf6fa8f9d, 0x2cac6ce1, 0x4ca34867, 0xe2337f7c,
+    0x95db08e7, 0x016843b4, 0xeced5cbc, 0x325553ac,
+    0xbf9f0960, 0xdfa1e2ed, 0x83f0579d, 0x63ed86b9,
+    0x1ab6a6b8, 0xde5ebe39, 0xf38ff732, 0x8989b138,
+    0x33f14961, 0xc01937bd, 0xf506c6da, 0xe4625e7e,
+    0xa308ea99, 0x4e23e33c, 0x79cbd7cc, 0x48a14367,
+    0xa3149619, 0xfec94bd5, 0xa114174a, 0xeaa01866,
+    0xa084db2d, 0x09a8486f, 0xa888614a, 0x2900af98,
+    0x01665991, 0xe1992863, 0xc8f30c60, 0x2e78ef3c,
+    0xd0d51932, 0xcf0fec14, 0xf7ca07d2, 0xd0a82072,
+    0xfd41197e, 0x9305a6b0, 0xe86be3da, 0x74bed3cd,
+    0x372da53c, 0x4c7f4448, 0xdab5d440, 0x6dba0ec3,
+    0x083919a7, 0x9fbaeed9, 0x49dbcfb0, 0x4e670c53,
+    0x5c3d9c01, 0x64bdb941, 0x2c0e636a, 0xba7dd9cd,
+    0xea6f7388, 0xe70bc762, 0x35f29adb, 0x5c4cdd8d,
+    0xf0d48d8c, 0xb88153e2, 0x08a19866, 0x1ae2eac8,
+    0x284caf89, 0xaa928223, 0x9334be53, 0x3b3a21bf,
+    0x16434be3, 0x9aea3906, 0xefe8c36e, 0xf890cdd9,
+    0x80226dae, 0xc340a4a3, 0xdf7e9c09, 0xa694a807,
+    0x5b7c5ecc, 0x221db3a6, 0x9a69a02f, 0x68818a54,
+    0xceb2296f, 0x53c0843a, 0xfe893655, 0x25bfe68a,
+    0xb4628abc, 0xcf222ebf, 0x25ac6f48, 0xa9a99387,
+    0x53bddb65, 0xe76ffbe7, 0xe967fd78, 0x0ba93563,
+    0x8e342bc1, 0xe8a11be9, 0x4980740d, 0xc8087dfc,
+    0x8de4bf99, 0xa11101a0, 0x7fd37975, 0xda5a26c0,
+    0xe81f994f, 0x9528cd89, 0xfd339fed, 0xb87834bf,
+    0x5f04456d, 0x22258698, 0xc9c4c83b, 0x2dc156be,
+    0x4f628daa, 0x57f55ec5, 0xe2220abe, 0xd2916ebf,
+    0x4ec75b95, 0x24f2c3c0, 0x42d15d99, 0xcd0d7fa0,
+    0x7b6e27ff, 0xa8dc8af0, 0x7345c106, 0xf41e232f,
+    0x35162386, 0xe6ea8926, 0x3333b094, 0x157ec6f2,
+    0x372b74af, 0x692573e4, 0xe9a9d848, 0xf3160289,
+    0x3a62ef1d, 0xa787e238, 0xf3a5f676, 0x74364853,
+    0x20951063, 0x4576698d, 0xb6fad407, 0x592af950,
+    0x36f73523, 0x4cfb6e87, 0x7da4cec0, 0x6c152daa,
+    0xcb0396a8, 0xc50dfe5d, 0xfcd707ab, 0x0921c42f,
+    0x89dff0bb, 0x5fe2be78, 0x448f4f33, 0x754613c9,
+    0x2b05d08d, 0x48b9d585, 0xdc049441, 0xc8098f9b,
+    0x7dede786, 0xc39a3373, 0x42410005, 0x6a091751,
+    0x0ef3c8a6, 0x890072d6, 0x28207682, 0xa9a9f7be,
+    0xbf32679d, 0xd45b5b75, 0xb353fd00, 0xcbb0e358,
+    0x830f220a, 0x1f8fb214, 0xd372cf08, 0xcc3c4a13,
+    0x8cf63166, 0x061c87be, 0x88c98f88, 0x6062e397,
+    0x47cf8e7a, 0xb6c85283, 0x3cc2acfb, 0x3fc06976,
+    0x4e8f0252, 0x64d8314d, 0xda3870e3, 0x1e665459,
+    0xc10908f0, 0x513021a5, 0x6c5b68b7, 0x822f8aa0,
+    0x3007cd3e, 0x74719eef, 0xdc872681, 0x073340d4,
+    0x7e432fd9, 0x0c5ec241, 0x8809286c, 0xf592d891,
+    0x08a930f6, 0x957ef305, 0xb7fbffbd, 0xc266e96f,
+    0x6fe4ac98, 0xb173ecc0, 0xbc60b42a, 0x953498da,
+    0xfba1ae12, 0x2d4bd736, 0x0f25faab, 0xa4f3fceb,
+    0xe2969123, 0x257f0c3d, 0x9348af49, 0x361400bc,
+    0xe8816f4a, 0x3814f200, 0xa3f94043, 0x9c7a54c2,
+    0xbc704f57, 0xda41e7f9, 0xc25ad33a, 0x54f4a084,
+    0xb17f5505, 0x59357cbe, 0xedbd15c8, 0x7f97c5ab,
+    0xba5ac7b5, 0xb6f6deaf, 0x3a479c3a, 0x5302da25,
+    0x653d7e6a, 0x54268d49, 0x51a477ea, 0x5017d55b,
+    0xd7d25d88, 0x44136c76, 0x0404a8c8, 0xb8e5a121,
+    0xb81a928a, 0x60ed5869, 0x97c55b96, 0xeaec991b,
+    0x29935913, 0x01fdb7f1, 0x088e8dfa, 0x9ab6f6f5,
+    0x3b4cbf9f, 0x4a5de3ab, 0xe6051d35, 0xa0e1d855,
+    0xd36b4cf1, 0xf544edeb, 0xb0e93524, 0xbebb8fbd,
+    0xa2d762cf, 0x49c92f54, 0x38b5f331, 0x7128a454,
+    0x48392905, 0xa65b1db8, 0x851c97bd, 0xd675cf2f,
+};
+
+OPENSSL_GLOBAL const CAST_LONG CAST_S_table6[256] = {
+    0x85e04019, 0x332bf567, 0x662dbfff, 0xcfc65693,
+    0x2a8d7f6f, 0xab9bc912, 0xde6008a1, 0x2028da1f,
+    0x0227bce7, 0x4d642916, 0x18fac300, 0x50f18b82,
+    0x2cb2cb11, 0xb232e75c, 0x4b3695f2, 0xb28707de,
+    0xa05fbcf6, 0xcd4181e9, 0xe150210c, 0xe24ef1bd,
+    0xb168c381, 0xfde4e789, 0x5c79b0d8, 0x1e8bfd43,
+    0x4d495001, 0x38be4341, 0x913cee1d, 0x92a79c3f,
+    0x089766be, 0xbaeeadf4, 0x1286becf, 0xb6eacb19,
+    0x2660c200, 0x7565bde4, 0x64241f7a, 0x8248dca9,
+    0xc3b3ad66, 0x28136086, 0x0bd8dfa8, 0x356d1cf2,
+    0x107789be, 0xb3b2e9ce, 0x0502aa8f, 0x0bc0351e,
+    0x166bf52a, 0xeb12ff82, 0xe3486911, 0xd34d7516,
+    0x4e7b3aff, 0x5f43671b, 0x9cf6e037, 0x4981ac83,
+    0x334266ce, 0x8c9341b7, 0xd0d854c0, 0xcb3a6c88,
+    0x47bc2829, 0x4725ba37, 0xa66ad22b, 0x7ad61f1e,
+    0x0c5cbafa, 0x4437f107, 0xb6e79962, 0x42d2d816,
+    0x0a961288, 0xe1a5c06e, 0x13749e67, 0x72fc081a,
+    0xb1d139f7, 0xf9583745, 0xcf19df58, 0xbec3f756,
+    0xc06eba30, 0x07211b24, 0x45c28829, 0xc95e317f,
+    0xbc8ec511, 0x38bc46e9, 0xc6e6fa14, 0xbae8584a,
+    0xad4ebc46, 0x468f508b, 0x7829435f, 0xf124183b,
+    0x821dba9f, 0xaff60ff4, 0xea2c4e6d, 0x16e39264,
+    0x92544a8b, 0x009b4fc3, 0xaba68ced, 0x9ac96f78,
+    0x06a5b79a, 0xb2856e6e, 0x1aec3ca9, 0xbe838688,
+    0x0e0804e9, 0x55f1be56, 0xe7e5363b, 0xb3a1f25d,
+    0xf7debb85, 0x61fe033c, 0x16746233, 0x3c034c28,
+    0xda6d0c74, 0x79aac56c, 0x3ce4e1ad, 0x51f0c802,
+    0x98f8f35a, 0x1626a49f, 0xeed82b29, 0x1d382fe3,
+    0x0c4fb99a, 0xbb325778, 0x3ec6d97b, 0x6e77a6a9,
+    0xcb658b5c, 0xd45230c7, 0x2bd1408b, 0x60c03eb7,
+    0xb9068d78, 0xa33754f4, 0xf430c87d, 0xc8a71302,
+    0xb96d8c32, 0xebd4e7be, 0xbe8b9d2d, 0x7979fb06,
+    0xe7225308, 0x8b75cf77, 0x11ef8da4, 0xe083c858,
+    0x8d6b786f, 0x5a6317a6, 0xfa5cf7a0, 0x5dda0033,
+    0xf28ebfb0, 0xf5b9c310, 0xa0eac280, 0x08b9767a,
+    0xa3d9d2b0, 0x79d34217, 0x021a718d, 0x9ac6336a,
+    0x2711fd60, 0x438050e3, 0x069908a8, 0x3d7fedc4,
+    0x826d2bef, 0x4eeb8476, 0x488dcf25, 0x36c9d566,
+    0x28e74e41, 0xc2610aca, 0x3d49a9cf, 0xbae3b9df,
+    0xb65f8de6, 0x92aeaf64, 0x3ac7d5e6, 0x9ea80509,
+    0xf22b017d, 0xa4173f70, 0xdd1e16c3, 0x15e0d7f9,
+    0x50b1b887, 0x2b9f4fd5, 0x625aba82, 0x6a017962,
+    0x2ec01b9c, 0x15488aa9, 0xd716e740, 0x40055a2c,
+    0x93d29a22, 0xe32dbf9a, 0x058745b9, 0x3453dc1e,
+    0xd699296e, 0x496cff6f, 0x1c9f4986, 0xdfe2ed07,
+    0xb87242d1, 0x19de7eae, 0x053e561a, 0x15ad6f8c,
+    0x66626c1c, 0x7154c24c, 0xea082b2a, 0x93eb2939,
+    0x17dcb0f0, 0x58d4f2ae, 0x9ea294fb, 0x52cf564c,
+    0x9883fe66, 0x2ec40581, 0x763953c3, 0x01d6692e,
+    0xd3a0c108, 0xa1e7160e, 0xe4f2dfa6, 0x693ed285,
+    0x74904698, 0x4c2b0edd, 0x4f757656, 0x5d393378,
+    0xa132234f, 0x3d321c5d, 0xc3f5e194, 0x4b269301,
+    0xc79f022f, 0x3c997e7e, 0x5e4f9504, 0x3ffafbbd,
+    0x76f7ad0e, 0x296693f4, 0x3d1fce6f, 0xc61e45be,
+    0xd3b5ab34, 0xf72bf9b7, 0x1b0434c0, 0x4e72b567,
+    0x5592a33d, 0xb5229301, 0xcfd2a87f, 0x60aeb767,
+    0x1814386b, 0x30bcc33d, 0x38a0c07d, 0xfd1606f2,
+    0xc363519b, 0x589dd390, 0x5479f8e6, 0x1cb8d647,
+    0x97fd61a9, 0xea7759f4, 0x2d57539d, 0x569a58cf,
+    0xe84e63ad, 0x462e1b78, 0x6580f87e, 0xf3817914,
+    0x91da55f4, 0x40a230f3, 0xd1988f35, 0xb6e318d2,
+    0x3ffa50bc, 0x3d40f021, 0xc3c0bdae, 0x4958c24c,
+    0x518f36b2, 0x84b1d370, 0x0fedce83, 0x878ddada,
+    0xf2a279c7, 0x94e01be8, 0x90716f4b, 0x954b8aa3,
+};
+
+OPENSSL_GLOBAL const CAST_LONG CAST_S_table7[256] = {
+    0xe216300d, 0xbbddfffc, 0xa7ebdabd, 0x35648095,
+    0x7789f8b7, 0xe6c1121b, 0x0e241600, 0x052ce8b5,
+    0x11a9cfb0, 0xe5952f11, 0xece7990a, 0x9386d174,
+    0x2a42931c, 0x76e38111, 0xb12def3a, 0x37ddddfc,
+    0xde9adeb1, 0x0a0cc32c, 0xbe197029, 0x84a00940,
+    0xbb243a0f, 0xb4d137cf, 0xb44e79f0, 0x049eedfd,
+    0x0b15a15d, 0x480d3168, 0x8bbbde5a, 0x669ded42,
+    0xc7ece831, 0x3f8f95e7, 0x72df191b, 0x7580330d,
+    0x94074251, 0x5c7dcdfa, 0xabbe6d63, 0xaa402164,
+    0xb301d40a, 0x02e7d1ca, 0x53571dae, 0x7a3182a2,
+    0x12a8ddec, 0xfdaa335d, 0x176f43e8, 0x71fb46d4,
+    0x38129022, 0xce949ad4, 0xb84769ad, 0x965bd862,
+    0x82f3d055, 0x66fb9767, 0x15b80b4e, 0x1d5b47a0,
+    0x4cfde06f, 0xc28ec4b8, 0x57e8726e, 0x647a78fc,
+    0x99865d44, 0x608bd593, 0x6c200e03, 0x39dc5ff6,
+    0x5d0b00a3, 0xae63aff2, 0x7e8bd632, 0x70108c0c,
+    0xbbd35049, 0x2998df04, 0x980cf42a, 0x9b6df491,
+    0x9e7edd53, 0x06918548, 0x58cb7e07, 0x3b74ef2e,
+    0x522fffb1, 0xd24708cc, 0x1c7e27cd, 0xa4eb215b,
+    0x3cf1d2e2, 0x19b47a38, 0x424f7618, 0x35856039,
+    0x9d17dee7, 0x27eb35e6, 0xc9aff67b, 0x36baf5b8,
+    0x09c467cd, 0xc18910b1, 0xe11dbf7b, 0x06cd1af8,
+    0x7170c608, 0x2d5e3354, 0xd4de495a, 0x64c6d006,
+    0xbcc0c62c, 0x3dd00db3, 0x708f8f34, 0x77d51b42,
+    0x264f620f, 0x24b8d2bf, 0x15c1b79e, 0x46a52564,
+    0xf8d7e54e, 0x3e378160, 0x7895cda5, 0x859c15a5,
+    0xe6459788, 0xc37bc75f, 0xdb07ba0c, 0x0676a3ab,
+    0x7f229b1e, 0x31842e7b, 0x24259fd7, 0xf8bef472,
+    0x835ffcb8, 0x6df4c1f2, 0x96f5b195, 0xfd0af0fc,
+    0xb0fe134c, 0xe2506d3d, 0x4f9b12ea, 0xf215f225,
+    0xa223736f, 0x9fb4c428, 0x25d04979, 0x34c713f8,
+    0xc4618187, 0xea7a6e98, 0x7cd16efc, 0x1436876c,
+    0xf1544107, 0xbedeee14, 0x56e9af27, 0xa04aa441,
+    0x3cf7c899, 0x92ecbae6, 0xdd67016d, 0x151682eb,
+    0xa842eedf, 0xfdba60b4, 0xf1907b75, 0x20e3030f,
+    0x24d8c29e, 0xe139673b, 0xefa63fb8, 0x71873054,
+    0xb6f2cf3b, 0x9f326442, 0xcb15a4cc, 0xb01a4504,
+    0xf1e47d8d, 0x844a1be5, 0xbae7dfdc, 0x42cbda70,
+    0xcd7dae0a, 0x57e85b7a, 0xd53f5af6, 0x20cf4d8c,
+    0xcea4d428, 0x79d130a4, 0x3486ebfb, 0x33d3cddc,
+    0x77853b53, 0x37effcb5, 0xc5068778, 0xe580b3e6,
+    0x4e68b8f4, 0xc5c8b37e, 0x0d809ea2, 0x398feb7c,
+    0x132a4f94, 0x43b7950e, 0x2fee7d1c, 0x223613bd,
+    0xdd06caa2, 0x37df932b, 0xc4248289, 0xacf3ebc3,
+    0x5715f6b7, 0xef3478dd, 0xf267616f, 0xc148cbe4,
+    0x9052815e, 0x5e410fab, 0xb48a2465, 0x2eda7fa4,
+    0xe87b40e4, 0xe98ea084, 0x5889e9e1, 0xefd390fc,
+    0xdd07d35b, 0xdb485694, 0x38d7e5b2, 0x57720101,
+    0x730edebc, 0x5b643113, 0x94917e4f, 0x503c2fba,
+    0x646f1282, 0x7523d24a, 0xe0779695, 0xf9c17a8f,
+    0x7a5b2121, 0xd187b896, 0x29263a4d, 0xba510cdf,
+    0x81f47c9f, 0xad1163ed, 0xea7b5965, 0x1a00726e,
+    0x11403092, 0x00da6d77, 0x4a0cdd61, 0xad1f4603,
+    0x605bdfb0, 0x9eedc364, 0x22ebe6a8, 0xcee7d28a,
+    0xa0e736a0, 0x5564a6b9, 0x10853209, 0xc7eb8f37,
+    0x2de705ca, 0x8951570f, 0xdf09822b, 0xbd691a6c,
+    0xaa12e4f2, 0x87451c0f, 0xe0f6a27a, 0x3ada4819,
+    0x4cf1764f, 0x0d771c2b, 0x67cdb156, 0x350d8384,
+    0x5938fa0f, 0x42399ef3, 0x36997b07, 0x0e84093d,
+    0x4aa93e61, 0x8360d87b, 0x1fa98b0c, 0x1149382c,
+    0xe97625a5, 0x0614d1b7, 0x0e25244b, 0x0c768347,
+    0x589e8d82, 0x0d2059d1, 0xa466bb1e, 0xf8da0a82,
+    0x04f19130, 0xba6e4ec0, 0x99265164, 0x1ee7230d,
+    0x50b2ad80, 0xeaee6801, 0x8db2a283, 0xea8bf59e,
+};
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/chacha/asm/chacha-armv4.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/chacha/asm/chacha-armv4.pl
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..b5e21e4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/chacha/asm/chacha-armv4.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,1158 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# December 2014
+# 
+# ChaCha20 for ARMv4.
+#
+# Performance in cycles per byte out of large buffer.
+#
+#			IALU/gcc-4.4    1xNEON      3xNEON+1xIALU
+#
+# Cortex-A5		19.3(*)/+95%    21.8        14.1
+# Cortex-A8		10.5(*)/+160%   13.9        6.35
+# Cortex-A9		12.9(**)/+110%  14.3        6.50
+# Cortex-A15		11.0/+40%       16.0        5.00
+# Snapdragon S4		11.5/+125%      13.6        4.90
+#
+# (*)	most "favourable" result for aligned data on little-endian
+#	processor, result for misaligned data is 10-15% lower;
+# (**)	this result is a trade-off: it can be improved by 20%,
+#	but then Snapdragon S4 and Cortex-A8 results get
+#	20-25% worse;
+
+$flavour = shift;
+if ($flavour=~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/) { $output=$flavour; undef $flavour; }
+else { while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {} }
+
+if ($flavour && $flavour ne "void") {
+    $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+    ( $xlate="${dir}arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
+    ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
+    die "can't locate arm-xlate.pl";
+
+    open STDOUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output";
+} else {
+    open STDOUT,">$output";
+}
+
+sub AUTOLOAD()		# thunk [simplified] x86-style perlasm
+{ my $opcode = $AUTOLOAD; $opcode =~ s/.*:://; $opcode =~ s/_/\./;
+  my $arg = pop;
+    $arg = "#$arg" if ($arg*1 eq $arg);
+    $code .= "\t$opcode\t".join(',',@_,$arg)."\n";
+}
+
+my @x=map("r$_",(0..7,"x","x","x","x",12,"x",14,"x"));
+my @t=map("r$_",(8..11));
+
+sub ROUND {
+my ($a0,$b0,$c0,$d0)=@_;
+my ($a1,$b1,$c1,$d1)=map(($_&~3)+(($_+1)&3),($a0,$b0,$c0,$d0));
+my ($a2,$b2,$c2,$d2)=map(($_&~3)+(($_+1)&3),($a1,$b1,$c1,$d1));
+my ($a3,$b3,$c3,$d3)=map(($_&~3)+(($_+1)&3),($a2,$b2,$c2,$d2));
+my $odd = $d0&1;
+my ($xc,$xc_) = (@t[0..1]);
+my ($xd,$xd_) = $odd ? (@t[2],@x[$d1]) : (@x[$d0],@t[2]);
+my @ret;
+
+	# Consider order in which variables are addressed by their
+	# index:
+	#
+	#       a   b   c   d
+	#
+	#       0   4   8  12 < even round
+	#       1   5   9  13
+	#       2   6  10  14
+	#       3   7  11  15
+	#       0   5  10  15 < odd round
+	#       1   6  11  12
+	#       2   7   8  13
+	#       3   4   9  14
+	#
+	# 'a', 'b' are permanently allocated in registers, @x[0..7],
+	# while 'c's and pair of 'd's are maintained in memory. If
+	# you observe 'c' column, you'll notice that pair of 'c's is
+	# invariant between rounds. This means that we have to reload
+	# them once per round, in the middle. This is why you'll see
+	# bunch of 'c' stores and loads in the middle, but none in
+	# the beginning or end. If you observe 'd' column, you'll
+	# notice that 15 and 13 are reused in next pair of rounds.
+	# This is why these two are chosen for offloading to memory,
+	# to make loads count more.
+							push @ret,(
+	"&add	(@x[$a0],@x[$a0],@x[$b0])",
+	"&mov	($xd,$xd,'ror#16')",
+	 "&add	(@x[$a1],@x[$a1],@x[$b1])",
+	 "&mov	($xd_,$xd_,'ror#16')",
+	"&eor	($xd,$xd,@x[$a0],'ror#16')",
+	 "&eor	($xd_,$xd_,@x[$a1],'ror#16')",
+
+	"&add	($xc,$xc,$xd)",
+	"&mov	(@x[$b0],@x[$b0],'ror#20')",
+	 "&add	($xc_,$xc_,$xd_)",
+	 "&mov	(@x[$b1],@x[$b1],'ror#20')",
+	"&eor	(@x[$b0],@x[$b0],$xc,'ror#20')",
+	 "&eor	(@x[$b1],@x[$b1],$xc_,'ror#20')",
+
+	"&add	(@x[$a0],@x[$a0],@x[$b0])",
+	"&mov	($xd,$xd,'ror#24')",
+	 "&add	(@x[$a1],@x[$a1],@x[$b1])",
+	 "&mov	($xd_,$xd_,'ror#24')",
+	"&eor	($xd,$xd,@x[$a0],'ror#24')",
+	 "&eor	($xd_,$xd_,@x[$a1],'ror#24')",
+
+	"&add	($xc,$xc,$xd)",
+	"&mov	(@x[$b0],@x[$b0],'ror#25')"		);
+							push @ret,(
+	"&str	($xd,'[sp,#4*(16+$d0)]')",
+	"&ldr	($xd,'[sp,#4*(16+$d2)]')"		) if ($odd);
+							push @ret,(
+	 "&add	($xc_,$xc_,$xd_)",
+	 "&mov	(@x[$b1],@x[$b1],'ror#25')"		);
+							push @ret,(
+	 "&str	($xd_,'[sp,#4*(16+$d1)]')",
+	 "&ldr	($xd_,'[sp,#4*(16+$d3)]')"		) if (!$odd);
+							push @ret,(
+	"&eor	(@x[$b0],@x[$b0],$xc,'ror#25')",
+	 "&eor	(@x[$b1],@x[$b1],$xc_,'ror#25')"	);
+
+	$xd=@x[$d2]					if (!$odd);
+	$xd_=@x[$d3]					if ($odd);
+							push @ret,(
+	"&str	($xc,'[sp,#4*(16+$c0)]')",
+	"&ldr	($xc,'[sp,#4*(16+$c2)]')",
+	"&add	(@x[$a2],@x[$a2],@x[$b2])",
+	"&mov	($xd,$xd,'ror#16')",
+	 "&str	($xc_,'[sp,#4*(16+$c1)]')",
+	 "&ldr	($xc_,'[sp,#4*(16+$c3)]')",
+	 "&add	(@x[$a3],@x[$a3],@x[$b3])",
+	 "&mov	($xd_,$xd_,'ror#16')",
+	"&eor	($xd,$xd,@x[$a2],'ror#16')",
+	 "&eor	($xd_,$xd_,@x[$a3],'ror#16')",
+
+	"&add	($xc,$xc,$xd)",
+	"&mov	(@x[$b2],@x[$b2],'ror#20')",
+	 "&add	($xc_,$xc_,$xd_)",
+	 "&mov	(@x[$b3],@x[$b3],'ror#20')",
+	"&eor	(@x[$b2],@x[$b2],$xc,'ror#20')",
+	 "&eor	(@x[$b3],@x[$b3],$xc_,'ror#20')",
+
+	"&add	(@x[$a2],@x[$a2],@x[$b2])",
+	"&mov	($xd,$xd,'ror#24')",
+	 "&add	(@x[$a3],@x[$a3],@x[$b3])",
+	 "&mov	($xd_,$xd_,'ror#24')",
+	"&eor	($xd,$xd,@x[$a2],'ror#24')",
+	 "&eor	($xd_,$xd_,@x[$a3],'ror#24')",
+
+	"&add	($xc,$xc,$xd)",
+	"&mov	(@x[$b2],@x[$b2],'ror#25')",
+	 "&add	($xc_,$xc_,$xd_)",
+	 "&mov	(@x[$b3],@x[$b3],'ror#25')",
+	"&eor	(@x[$b2],@x[$b2],$xc,'ror#25')",
+	 "&eor	(@x[$b3],@x[$b3],$xc_,'ror#25')"	);
+
+	@ret;
+}
+
+$code.=<<___;
+#include "arm_arch.h"
+
+.text
+#if defined(__thumb2__)
+.syntax	unified
+.thumb
+#else
+.code	32
+#endif
+
+#if defined(__thumb2__) || defined(__clang__)
+#define ldrhsb	ldrbhs
+#endif
+
+.align	5
+.Lsigma:
+.long	0x61707865,0x3320646e,0x79622d32,0x6b206574	@ endian-neutral
+.Lone:
+.long	1,0,0,0
+#if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7
+.LOPENSSL_armcap:
+.word   OPENSSL_armcap_P-.LChaCha20_ctr32
+#else
+.word	-1
+#endif
+
+.globl	ChaCha20_ctr32
+.type	ChaCha20_ctr32,%function
+.align	5
+ChaCha20_ctr32:
+.LChaCha20_ctr32:
+	ldr	r12,[sp,#0]		@ pull pointer to counter and nonce
+	stmdb	sp!,{r0-r2,r4-r11,lr}
+#if __ARM_ARCH__<7 && !defined(__thumb2__)
+	sub	r14,pc,#16		@ ChaCha20_ctr32
+#else
+	adr	r14,.LChaCha20_ctr32
+#endif
+	cmp	r2,#0			@ len==0?
+#ifdef	__thumb2__
+	itt	eq
+#endif
+	addeq	sp,sp,#4*3
+	beq	.Lno_data
+#if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7
+	cmp	r2,#192			@ test len
+	bls	.Lshort
+	ldr	r4,[r14,#-32]
+	ldr	r4,[r14,r4]
+# ifdef	__APPLE__
+	ldr	r4,[r4]
+# endif
+	tst	r4,#ARMV7_NEON
+	bne	.LChaCha20_neon
+.Lshort:
+#endif
+	ldmia	r12,{r4-r7}		@ load counter and nonce
+	sub	sp,sp,#4*(16)		@ off-load area
+	sub	r14,r14,#64		@ .Lsigma
+	stmdb	sp!,{r4-r7}		@ copy counter and nonce
+	ldmia	r3,{r4-r11}		@ load key
+	ldmia	r14,{r0-r3}		@ load sigma
+	stmdb	sp!,{r4-r11}		@ copy key
+	stmdb	sp!,{r0-r3}		@ copy sigma
+	str	r10,[sp,#4*(16+10)]	@ off-load "@x[10]"
+	str	r11,[sp,#4*(16+11)]	@ off-load "@x[11]"
+	b	.Loop_outer_enter
+
+.align	4
+.Loop_outer:
+	ldmia	sp,{r0-r9}		@ load key material
+	str	@t[3],[sp,#4*(32+2)]	@ save len
+	str	r12,  [sp,#4*(32+1)]	@ save inp
+	str	r14,  [sp,#4*(32+0)]	@ save out
+.Loop_outer_enter:
+	ldr	@t[3], [sp,#4*(15)]
+	ldr	@x[12],[sp,#4*(12)]	@ modulo-scheduled load
+	ldr	@t[2], [sp,#4*(13)]
+	ldr	@x[14],[sp,#4*(14)]
+	str	@t[3], [sp,#4*(16+15)]
+	mov	@t[3],#10
+	b	.Loop
+
+.align	4
+.Loop:
+	subs	@t[3],@t[3],#1
+___
+	foreach (&ROUND(0, 4, 8,12)) { eval; }
+	foreach (&ROUND(0, 5,10,15)) { eval; }
+$code.=<<___;
+	bne	.Loop
+
+	ldr	@t[3],[sp,#4*(32+2)]	@ load len
+
+	str	@t[0], [sp,#4*(16+8)]	@ modulo-scheduled store
+	str	@t[1], [sp,#4*(16+9)]
+	str	@x[12],[sp,#4*(16+12)]
+	str	@t[2], [sp,#4*(16+13)]
+	str	@x[14],[sp,#4*(16+14)]
+
+	@ at this point we have first half of 512-bit result in
+	@ @x[0-7] and second half at sp+4*(16+8)
+
+	cmp	@t[3],#64		@ done yet?
+#ifdef	__thumb2__
+	itete	lo
+#endif
+	addlo	r12,sp,#4*(0)		@ shortcut or ...
+	ldrhs	r12,[sp,#4*(32+1)]	@ ... load inp
+	addlo	r14,sp,#4*(0)		@ shortcut or ...
+	ldrhs	r14,[sp,#4*(32+0)]	@ ... load out
+
+	ldr	@t[0],[sp,#4*(0)]	@ load key material
+	ldr	@t[1],[sp,#4*(1)]
+
+#if __ARM_ARCH__>=6 || !defined(__ARMEB__)
+# if __ARM_ARCH__<7
+	orr	@t[2],r12,r14
+	tst	@t[2],#3		@ are input and output aligned?
+	ldr	@t[2],[sp,#4*(2)]
+	bne	.Lunaligned
+	cmp	@t[3],#64		@ restore flags
+# else
+	ldr	@t[2],[sp,#4*(2)]
+# endif
+	ldr	@t[3],[sp,#4*(3)]
+
+	add	@x[0],@x[0],@t[0]	@ accumulate key material
+	add	@x[1],@x[1],@t[1]
+# ifdef	__thumb2__
+	itt	hs
+# endif
+	ldrhs	@t[0],[r12],#16		@ load input
+	ldrhs	@t[1],[r12,#-12]
+
+	add	@x[2],@x[2],@t[2]
+	add	@x[3],@x[3],@t[3]
+# ifdef	__thumb2__
+	itt	hs
+# endif
+	ldrhs	@t[2],[r12,#-8]
+	ldrhs	@t[3],[r12,#-4]
+# if __ARM_ARCH__>=6 && defined(__ARMEB__)
+	rev	@x[0],@x[0]
+	rev	@x[1],@x[1]
+	rev	@x[2],@x[2]
+	rev	@x[3],@x[3]
+# endif
+# ifdef	__thumb2__
+	itt	hs
+# endif
+	eorhs	@x[0],@x[0],@t[0]	@ xor with input
+	eorhs	@x[1],@x[1],@t[1]
+	 add	@t[0],sp,#4*(4)
+	str	@x[0],[r14],#16		@ store output
+# ifdef	__thumb2__
+	itt	hs
+# endif
+	eorhs	@x[2],@x[2],@t[2]
+	eorhs	@x[3],@x[3],@t[3]
+	 ldmia	@t[0],{@t[0]-@t[3]}	@ load key material
+	str	@x[1],[r14,#-12]
+	str	@x[2],[r14,#-8]
+	str	@x[3],[r14,#-4]
+
+	add	@x[4],@x[4],@t[0]	@ accumulate key material
+	add	@x[5],@x[5],@t[1]
+# ifdef	__thumb2__
+	itt	hs
+# endif
+	ldrhs	@t[0],[r12],#16		@ load input
+	ldrhs	@t[1],[r12,#-12]
+	add	@x[6],@x[6],@t[2]
+	add	@x[7],@x[7],@t[3]
+# ifdef	__thumb2__
+	itt	hs
+# endif
+	ldrhs	@t[2],[r12,#-8]
+	ldrhs	@t[3],[r12,#-4]
+# if __ARM_ARCH__>=6 && defined(__ARMEB__)
+	rev	@x[4],@x[4]
+	rev	@x[5],@x[5]
+	rev	@x[6],@x[6]
+	rev	@x[7],@x[7]
+# endif
+# ifdef	__thumb2__
+	itt	hs
+# endif
+	eorhs	@x[4],@x[4],@t[0]
+	eorhs	@x[5],@x[5],@t[1]
+	 add	@t[0],sp,#4*(8)
+	str	@x[4],[r14],#16		@ store output
+# ifdef	__thumb2__
+	itt	hs
+# endif
+	eorhs	@x[6],@x[6],@t[2]
+	eorhs	@x[7],@x[7],@t[3]
+	str	@x[5],[r14,#-12]
+	 ldmia	@t[0],{@t[0]-@t[3]}	@ load key material
+	str	@x[6],[r14,#-8]
+	 add	@x[0],sp,#4*(16+8)
+	str	@x[7],[r14,#-4]
+
+	ldmia	@x[0],{@x[0]-@x[7]}	@ load second half
+
+	add	@x[0],@x[0],@t[0]	@ accumulate key material
+	add	@x[1],@x[1],@t[1]
+# ifdef	__thumb2__
+	itt	hs
+# endif
+	ldrhs	@t[0],[r12],#16		@ load input
+	ldrhs	@t[1],[r12,#-12]
+# ifdef	__thumb2__
+	itt	hi
+# endif
+	 strhi	@t[2],[sp,#4*(16+10)]	@ copy "@x[10]" while at it
+	 strhi	@t[3],[sp,#4*(16+11)]	@ copy "@x[11]" while at it
+	add	@x[2],@x[2],@t[2]
+	add	@x[3],@x[3],@t[3]
+# ifdef	__thumb2__
+	itt	hs
+# endif
+	ldrhs	@t[2],[r12,#-8]
+	ldrhs	@t[3],[r12,#-4]
+# if __ARM_ARCH__>=6 && defined(__ARMEB__)
+	rev	@x[0],@x[0]
+	rev	@x[1],@x[1]
+	rev	@x[2],@x[2]
+	rev	@x[3],@x[3]
+# endif
+# ifdef	__thumb2__
+	itt	hs
+# endif
+	eorhs	@x[0],@x[0],@t[0]
+	eorhs	@x[1],@x[1],@t[1]
+	 add	@t[0],sp,#4*(12)
+	str	@x[0],[r14],#16		@ store output
+# ifdef	__thumb2__
+	itt	hs
+# endif
+	eorhs	@x[2],@x[2],@t[2]
+	eorhs	@x[3],@x[3],@t[3]
+	str	@x[1],[r14,#-12]
+	 ldmia	@t[0],{@t[0]-@t[3]}	@ load key material
+	str	@x[2],[r14,#-8]
+	str	@x[3],[r14,#-4]
+
+	add	@x[4],@x[4],@t[0]	@ accumulate key material
+	add	@x[5],@x[5],@t[1]
+# ifdef	__thumb2__
+	itt	hi
+# endif
+	 addhi	@t[0],@t[0],#1		@ next counter value
+	 strhi	@t[0],[sp,#4*(12)]	@ save next counter value
+# ifdef	__thumb2__
+	itt	hs
+# endif
+	ldrhs	@t[0],[r12],#16		@ load input
+	ldrhs	@t[1],[r12,#-12]
+	add	@x[6],@x[6],@t[2]
+	add	@x[7],@x[7],@t[3]
+# ifdef	__thumb2__
+	itt	hs
+# endif
+	ldrhs	@t[2],[r12,#-8]
+	ldrhs	@t[3],[r12,#-4]
+# if __ARM_ARCH__>=6 && defined(__ARMEB__)
+	rev	@x[4],@x[4]
+	rev	@x[5],@x[5]
+	rev	@x[6],@x[6]
+	rev	@x[7],@x[7]
+# endif
+# ifdef	__thumb2__
+	itt	hs
+# endif
+	eorhs	@x[4],@x[4],@t[0]
+	eorhs	@x[5],@x[5],@t[1]
+# ifdef	__thumb2__
+	 it	ne
+# endif
+	 ldrne	@t[0],[sp,#4*(32+2)]	@ re-load len
+# ifdef	__thumb2__
+	itt	hs
+# endif
+	eorhs	@x[6],@x[6],@t[2]
+	eorhs	@x[7],@x[7],@t[3]
+	str	@x[4],[r14],#16		@ store output
+	str	@x[5],[r14,#-12]
+# ifdef	__thumb2__
+	it	hs
+# endif
+	 subhs	@t[3],@t[0],#64		@ len-=64
+	str	@x[6],[r14,#-8]
+	str	@x[7],[r14,#-4]
+	bhi	.Loop_outer
+
+	beq	.Ldone
+# if __ARM_ARCH__<7
+	b	.Ltail
+
+.align	4
+.Lunaligned:				@ unaligned endian-neutral path
+	cmp	@t[3],#64		@ restore flags
+# endif
+#endif
+#if __ARM_ARCH__<7
+	ldr	@t[3],[sp,#4*(3)]
+___
+for ($i=0;$i<16;$i+=4) {
+my $j=$i&0x7;
+
+$code.=<<___	if ($i==4);
+	add	@x[0],sp,#4*(16+8)
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($i==8);
+	ldmia	@x[0],{@x[0]-@x[7]}		@ load second half
+# ifdef	__thumb2__
+	itt	hi
+# endif
+	strhi	@t[2],[sp,#4*(16+10)]		@ copy "@x[10]"
+	strhi	@t[3],[sp,#4*(16+11)]		@ copy "@x[11]"
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	add	@x[$j+0],@x[$j+0],@t[0]		@ accumulate key material
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($i==12);
+# ifdef	__thumb2__
+	itt	hi
+# endif
+	addhi	@t[0],@t[0],#1			@ next counter value
+	strhi	@t[0],[sp,#4*(12)]		@ save next counter value
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	add	@x[$j+1],@x[$j+1],@t[1]
+	add	@x[$j+2],@x[$j+2],@t[2]
+# ifdef	__thumb2__
+	itete	lo
+# endif
+	eorlo	@t[0],@t[0],@t[0]		@ zero or ...
+	ldrhsb	@t[0],[r12],#16			@ ... load input
+	eorlo	@t[1],@t[1],@t[1]
+	ldrhsb	@t[1],[r12,#-12]
+
+	add	@x[$j+3],@x[$j+3],@t[3]
+# ifdef	__thumb2__
+	itete	lo
+# endif
+	eorlo	@t[2],@t[2],@t[2]
+	ldrhsb	@t[2],[r12,#-8]
+	eorlo	@t[3],@t[3],@t[3]
+	ldrhsb	@t[3],[r12,#-4]
+
+	eor	@x[$j+0],@t[0],@x[$j+0]		@ xor with input (or zero)
+	eor	@x[$j+1],@t[1],@x[$j+1]
+# ifdef	__thumb2__
+	itt	hs
+# endif
+	ldrhsb	@t[0],[r12,#-15]		@ load more input
+	ldrhsb	@t[1],[r12,#-11]
+	eor	@x[$j+2],@t[2],@x[$j+2]
+	 strb	@x[$j+0],[r14],#16		@ store output
+	eor	@x[$j+3],@t[3],@x[$j+3]
+# ifdef	__thumb2__
+	itt	hs
+# endif
+	ldrhsb	@t[2],[r12,#-7]
+	ldrhsb	@t[3],[r12,#-3]
+	 strb	@x[$j+1],[r14,#-12]
+	eor	@x[$j+0],@t[0],@x[$j+0],lsr#8
+	 strb	@x[$j+2],[r14,#-8]
+	eor	@x[$j+1],@t[1],@x[$j+1],lsr#8
+# ifdef	__thumb2__
+	itt	hs
+# endif
+	ldrhsb	@t[0],[r12,#-14]		@ load more input
+	ldrhsb	@t[1],[r12,#-10]
+	 strb	@x[$j+3],[r14,#-4]
+	eor	@x[$j+2],@t[2],@x[$j+2],lsr#8
+	 strb	@x[$j+0],[r14,#-15]
+	eor	@x[$j+3],@t[3],@x[$j+3],lsr#8
+# ifdef	__thumb2__
+	itt	hs
+# endif
+	ldrhsb	@t[2],[r12,#-6]
+	ldrhsb	@t[3],[r12,#-2]
+	 strb	@x[$j+1],[r14,#-11]
+	eor	@x[$j+0],@t[0],@x[$j+0],lsr#8
+	 strb	@x[$j+2],[r14,#-7]
+	eor	@x[$j+1],@t[1],@x[$j+1],lsr#8
+# ifdef	__thumb2__
+	itt	hs
+# endif
+	ldrhsb	@t[0],[r12,#-13]		@ load more input
+	ldrhsb	@t[1],[r12,#-9]
+	 strb	@x[$j+3],[r14,#-3]
+	eor	@x[$j+2],@t[2],@x[$j+2],lsr#8
+	 strb	@x[$j+0],[r14,#-14]
+	eor	@x[$j+3],@t[3],@x[$j+3],lsr#8
+# ifdef	__thumb2__
+	itt	hs
+# endif
+	ldrhsb	@t[2],[r12,#-5]
+	ldrhsb	@t[3],[r12,#-1]
+	 strb	@x[$j+1],[r14,#-10]
+	 strb	@x[$j+2],[r14,#-6]
+	eor	@x[$j+0],@t[0],@x[$j+0],lsr#8
+	 strb	@x[$j+3],[r14,#-2]
+	eor	@x[$j+1],@t[1],@x[$j+1],lsr#8
+	 strb	@x[$j+0],[r14,#-13]
+	eor	@x[$j+2],@t[2],@x[$j+2],lsr#8
+	 strb	@x[$j+1],[r14,#-9]
+	eor	@x[$j+3],@t[3],@x[$j+3],lsr#8
+	 strb	@x[$j+2],[r14,#-5]
+	 strb	@x[$j+3],[r14,#-1]
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($i<12);
+	add	@t[0],sp,#4*(4+$i)
+	ldmia	@t[0],{@t[0]-@t[3]}		@ load key material
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+# ifdef	__thumb2__
+	it	ne
+# endif
+	ldrne	@t[0],[sp,#4*(32+2)]		@ re-load len
+# ifdef	__thumb2__
+	it	hs
+# endif
+	subhs	@t[3],@t[0],#64			@ len-=64
+	bhi	.Loop_outer
+
+	beq	.Ldone
+#endif
+
+.Ltail:
+	ldr	r12,[sp,#4*(32+1)]	@ load inp
+	add	@t[1],sp,#4*(0)
+	ldr	r14,[sp,#4*(32+0)]	@ load out
+
+.Loop_tail:
+	ldrb	@t[2],[@t[1]],#1	@ read buffer on stack
+	ldrb	@t[3],[r12],#1		@ read input
+	subs	@t[0],@t[0],#1
+	eor	@t[3],@t[3],@t[2]
+	strb	@t[3],[r14],#1		@ store output
+	bne	.Loop_tail
+
+.Ldone:
+	add	sp,sp,#4*(32+3)
+.Lno_data:
+	ldmia	sp!,{r4-r11,pc}
+.size	ChaCha20_ctr32,.-ChaCha20_ctr32
+___
+
+{{{
+my ($a0,$b0,$c0,$d0,$a1,$b1,$c1,$d1,$a2,$b2,$c2,$d2,$t0,$t1,$t2,$t3) =
+    map("q$_",(0..15));
+
+sub NEONROUND {
+my $odd = pop;
+my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$t)=@_;
+
+	(
+	"&vadd_i32	($a,$a,$b)",
+	"&veor		($d,$d,$a)",
+	"&vrev32_16	($d,$d)",	# vrot ($d,16)
+
+	"&vadd_i32	($c,$c,$d)",
+	"&veor		($t,$b,$c)",
+	"&vshr_u32	($b,$t,20)",
+	"&vsli_32	($b,$t,12)",
+
+	"&vadd_i32	($a,$a,$b)",
+	"&veor		($t,$d,$a)",
+	"&vshr_u32	($d,$t,24)",
+	"&vsli_32	($d,$t,8)",
+
+	"&vadd_i32	($c,$c,$d)",
+	"&veor		($t,$b,$c)",
+	"&vshr_u32	($b,$t,25)",
+	"&vsli_32	($b,$t,7)",
+
+	"&vext_8	($c,$c,$c,8)",
+	"&vext_8	($b,$b,$b,$odd?12:4)",
+	"&vext_8	($d,$d,$d,$odd?4:12)"
+	);
+}
+
+$code.=<<___;
+#if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7
+.arch	armv7-a
+.fpu	neon
+
+.type	ChaCha20_neon,%function
+.align	5
+ChaCha20_neon:
+	ldr		r12,[sp,#0]		@ pull pointer to counter and nonce
+	stmdb		sp!,{r0-r2,r4-r11,lr}
+.LChaCha20_neon:
+	adr		r14,.Lsigma
+	vstmdb		sp!,{d8-d15}		@ ABI spec says so
+	stmdb		sp!,{r0-r3}
+
+	vld1.32		{$b0-$c0},[r3]		@ load key
+	ldmia		r3,{r4-r11}		@ load key
+
+	sub		sp,sp,#4*(16+16)
+	vld1.32		{$d0},[r12]		@ load counter and nonce
+	add		r12,sp,#4*8
+	ldmia		r14,{r0-r3}		@ load sigma
+	vld1.32		{$a0},[r14]!		@ load sigma
+	vld1.32		{$t0},[r14]		@ one
+	vst1.32		{$c0-$d0},[r12]		@ copy 1/2key|counter|nonce
+	vst1.32		{$a0-$b0},[sp]		@ copy sigma|1/2key
+
+	str		r10,[sp,#4*(16+10)]	@ off-load "@x[10]"
+	str		r11,[sp,#4*(16+11)]	@ off-load "@x[11]"
+	vshl.i32	$t1#lo,$t0#lo,#1	@ two
+	vstr		$t0#lo,[sp,#4*(16+0)]
+	vshl.i32	$t2#lo,$t0#lo,#2	@ four
+	vstr		$t1#lo,[sp,#4*(16+2)]
+	vmov		$a1,$a0
+	vstr		$t2#lo,[sp,#4*(16+4)]
+	vmov		$a2,$a0
+	vmov		$b1,$b0
+	vmov		$b2,$b0
+	b		.Loop_neon_enter
+
+.align	4
+.Loop_neon_outer:
+	ldmia		sp,{r0-r9}		@ load key material
+	cmp		@t[3],#64*2		@ if len<=64*2
+	bls		.Lbreak_neon		@ switch to integer-only
+	vmov		$a1,$a0
+	str		@t[3],[sp,#4*(32+2)]	@ save len
+	vmov		$a2,$a0
+	str		r12,  [sp,#4*(32+1)]	@ save inp
+	vmov		$b1,$b0
+	str		r14,  [sp,#4*(32+0)]	@ save out
+	vmov		$b2,$b0
+.Loop_neon_enter:
+	ldr		@t[3], [sp,#4*(15)]
+	vadd.i32	$d1,$d0,$t0		@ counter+1
+	ldr		@x[12],[sp,#4*(12)]	@ modulo-scheduled load
+	vmov		$c1,$c0
+	ldr		@t[2], [sp,#4*(13)]
+	vmov		$c2,$c0
+	ldr		@x[14],[sp,#4*(14)]
+	vadd.i32	$d2,$d1,$t0		@ counter+2
+	str		@t[3], [sp,#4*(16+15)]
+	mov		@t[3],#10
+	add		@x[12],@x[12],#3	@ counter+3 
+	b		.Loop_neon
+
+.align	4
+.Loop_neon:
+	subs		@t[3],@t[3],#1
+___
+	my @thread0=&NEONROUND($a0,$b0,$c0,$d0,$t0,0);
+	my @thread1=&NEONROUND($a1,$b1,$c1,$d1,$t1,0);
+	my @thread2=&NEONROUND($a2,$b2,$c2,$d2,$t2,0);
+	my @thread3=&ROUND(0,4,8,12);
+
+	foreach (@thread0) {
+		eval;			eval(shift(@thread3));
+		eval(shift(@thread1));	eval(shift(@thread3));
+		eval(shift(@thread2));	eval(shift(@thread3));
+	}
+
+	@thread0=&NEONROUND($a0,$b0,$c0,$d0,$t0,1);
+	@thread1=&NEONROUND($a1,$b1,$c1,$d1,$t1,1);
+	@thread2=&NEONROUND($a2,$b2,$c2,$d2,$t2,1);
+	@thread3=&ROUND(0,5,10,15);
+
+	foreach (@thread0) {
+		eval;			eval(shift(@thread3));
+		eval(shift(@thread1));	eval(shift(@thread3));
+		eval(shift(@thread2));	eval(shift(@thread3));
+	}
+$code.=<<___;
+	bne		.Loop_neon
+
+	add		@t[3],sp,#32
+	vld1.32		{$t0-$t1},[sp]		@ load key material
+	vld1.32		{$t2-$t3},[@t[3]]
+
+	ldr		@t[3],[sp,#4*(32+2)]	@ load len
+
+	str		@t[0], [sp,#4*(16+8)]	@ modulo-scheduled store
+	str		@t[1], [sp,#4*(16+9)]
+	str		@x[12],[sp,#4*(16+12)]
+	str		@t[2], [sp,#4*(16+13)]
+	str		@x[14],[sp,#4*(16+14)]
+
+	@ at this point we have first half of 512-bit result in
+	@ @x[0-7] and second half at sp+4*(16+8)
+
+	ldr		r12,[sp,#4*(32+1)]	@ load inp
+	ldr		r14,[sp,#4*(32+0)]	@ load out
+
+	vadd.i32	$a0,$a0,$t0		@ accumulate key material
+	vadd.i32	$a1,$a1,$t0
+	vadd.i32	$a2,$a2,$t0
+	vldr		$t0#lo,[sp,#4*(16+0)]	@ one
+
+	vadd.i32	$b0,$b0,$t1
+	vadd.i32	$b1,$b1,$t1
+	vadd.i32	$b2,$b2,$t1
+	vldr		$t1#lo,[sp,#4*(16+2)]	@ two
+
+	vadd.i32	$c0,$c0,$t2
+	vadd.i32	$c1,$c1,$t2
+	vadd.i32	$c2,$c2,$t2
+	vadd.i32	$d1#lo,$d1#lo,$t0#lo	@ counter+1
+	vadd.i32	$d2#lo,$d2#lo,$t1#lo	@ counter+2
+
+	vadd.i32	$d0,$d0,$t3
+	vadd.i32	$d1,$d1,$t3
+	vadd.i32	$d2,$d2,$t3
+
+	cmp		@t[3],#64*4
+	blo		.Ltail_neon
+
+	vld1.8		{$t0-$t1},[r12]!	@ load input
+	 mov		@t[3],sp
+	vld1.8		{$t2-$t3},[r12]!
+	veor		$a0,$a0,$t0		@ xor with input
+	veor		$b0,$b0,$t1
+	vld1.8		{$t0-$t1},[r12]!
+	veor		$c0,$c0,$t2
+	veor		$d0,$d0,$t3
+	vld1.8		{$t2-$t3},[r12]!
+
+	veor		$a1,$a1,$t0
+	 vst1.8		{$a0-$b0},[r14]!	@ store output
+	veor		$b1,$b1,$t1
+	vld1.8		{$t0-$t1},[r12]!
+	veor		$c1,$c1,$t2
+	 vst1.8		{$c0-$d0},[r14]!
+	veor		$d1,$d1,$t3
+	vld1.8		{$t2-$t3},[r12]!
+
+	veor		$a2,$a2,$t0
+	 vld1.32	{$a0-$b0},[@t[3]]!	@ load for next iteration
+	 veor		$t0#hi,$t0#hi,$t0#hi
+	 vldr		$t0#lo,[sp,#4*(16+4)]	@ four
+	veor		$b2,$b2,$t1
+	 vld1.32	{$c0-$d0},[@t[3]]
+	veor		$c2,$c2,$t2
+	 vst1.8		{$a1-$b1},[r14]!
+	veor		$d2,$d2,$t3
+	 vst1.8		{$c1-$d1},[r14]!
+
+	vadd.i32	$d0#lo,$d0#lo,$t0#lo	@ next counter value
+	vldr		$t0#lo,[sp,#4*(16+0)]	@ one
+
+	ldmia		sp,{@t[0]-@t[3]}	@ load key material
+	add		@x[0],@x[0],@t[0]	@ accumulate key material
+	ldr		@t[0],[r12],#16		@ load input
+	 vst1.8		{$a2-$b2},[r14]!
+	add		@x[1],@x[1],@t[1]
+	ldr		@t[1],[r12,#-12]
+	 vst1.8		{$c2-$d2},[r14]!
+	add		@x[2],@x[2],@t[2]
+	ldr		@t[2],[r12,#-8]
+	add		@x[3],@x[3],@t[3]
+	ldr		@t[3],[r12,#-4]
+# ifdef	__ARMEB__
+	rev		@x[0],@x[0]
+	rev		@x[1],@x[1]
+	rev		@x[2],@x[2]
+	rev		@x[3],@x[3]
+# endif
+	eor		@x[0],@x[0],@t[0]	@ xor with input
+	 add		@t[0],sp,#4*(4)
+	eor		@x[1],@x[1],@t[1]
+	str		@x[0],[r14],#16		@ store output
+	eor		@x[2],@x[2],@t[2]
+	str		@x[1],[r14,#-12]
+	eor		@x[3],@x[3],@t[3]
+	 ldmia		@t[0],{@t[0]-@t[3]}	@ load key material
+	str		@x[2],[r14,#-8]
+	str		@x[3],[r14,#-4]
+
+	add		@x[4],@x[4],@t[0]	@ accumulate key material
+	ldr		@t[0],[r12],#16		@ load input
+	add		@x[5],@x[5],@t[1]
+	ldr		@t[1],[r12,#-12]
+	add		@x[6],@x[6],@t[2]
+	ldr		@t[2],[r12,#-8]
+	add		@x[7],@x[7],@t[3]
+	ldr		@t[3],[r12,#-4]
+# ifdef	__ARMEB__
+	rev		@x[4],@x[4]
+	rev		@x[5],@x[5]
+	rev		@x[6],@x[6]
+	rev		@x[7],@x[7]
+# endif
+	eor		@x[4],@x[4],@t[0]
+	 add		@t[0],sp,#4*(8)
+	eor		@x[5],@x[5],@t[1]
+	str		@x[4],[r14],#16		@ store output
+	eor		@x[6],@x[6],@t[2]
+	str		@x[5],[r14,#-12]
+	eor		@x[7],@x[7],@t[3]
+	 ldmia		@t[0],{@t[0]-@t[3]}	@ load key material
+	str		@x[6],[r14,#-8]
+	 add		@x[0],sp,#4*(16+8)
+	str		@x[7],[r14,#-4]
+
+	ldmia		@x[0],{@x[0]-@x[7]}	@ load second half
+
+	add		@x[0],@x[0],@t[0]	@ accumulate key material
+	ldr		@t[0],[r12],#16		@ load input
+	add		@x[1],@x[1],@t[1]
+	ldr		@t[1],[r12,#-12]
+# ifdef	__thumb2__
+	it	hi
+# endif
+	 strhi		@t[2],[sp,#4*(16+10)]	@ copy "@x[10]" while at it
+	add		@x[2],@x[2],@t[2]
+	ldr		@t[2],[r12,#-8]
+# ifdef	__thumb2__
+	it	hi
+# endif
+	 strhi		@t[3],[sp,#4*(16+11)]	@ copy "@x[11]" while at it
+	add		@x[3],@x[3],@t[3]
+	ldr		@t[3],[r12,#-4]
+# ifdef	__ARMEB__
+	rev		@x[0],@x[0]
+	rev		@x[1],@x[1]
+	rev		@x[2],@x[2]
+	rev		@x[3],@x[3]
+# endif
+	eor		@x[0],@x[0],@t[0]
+	 add		@t[0],sp,#4*(12)
+	eor		@x[1],@x[1],@t[1]
+	str		@x[0],[r14],#16		@ store output
+	eor		@x[2],@x[2],@t[2]
+	str		@x[1],[r14,#-12]
+	eor		@x[3],@x[3],@t[3]
+	 ldmia		@t[0],{@t[0]-@t[3]}	@ load key material
+	str		@x[2],[r14,#-8]
+	str		@x[3],[r14,#-4]
+
+	add		@x[4],@x[4],@t[0]	@ accumulate key material
+	 add		@t[0],@t[0],#4		@ next counter value
+	add		@x[5],@x[5],@t[1]
+	 str		@t[0],[sp,#4*(12)]	@ save next counter value
+	ldr		@t[0],[r12],#16		@ load input
+	add		@x[6],@x[6],@t[2]
+	 add		@x[4],@x[4],#3		@ counter+3
+	ldr		@t[1],[r12,#-12]
+	add		@x[7],@x[7],@t[3]
+	ldr		@t[2],[r12,#-8]
+	ldr		@t[3],[r12,#-4]
+# ifdef	__ARMEB__
+	rev		@x[4],@x[4]
+	rev		@x[5],@x[5]
+	rev		@x[6],@x[6]
+	rev		@x[7],@x[7]
+# endif
+	eor		@x[4],@x[4],@t[0]
+# ifdef	__thumb2__
+	it	hi
+# endif
+	 ldrhi		@t[0],[sp,#4*(32+2)]	@ re-load len
+	eor		@x[5],@x[5],@t[1]
+	eor		@x[6],@x[6],@t[2]
+	str		@x[4],[r14],#16		@ store output
+	eor		@x[7],@x[7],@t[3]
+	str		@x[5],[r14,#-12]
+	 sub		@t[3],@t[0],#64*4	@ len-=64*4
+	str		@x[6],[r14,#-8]
+	str		@x[7],[r14,#-4]
+	bhi		.Loop_neon_outer
+
+	b		.Ldone_neon
+
+.align	4
+.Lbreak_neon:
+	@ harmonize NEON and integer-only stack frames: load data
+	@ from NEON frame, but save to integer-only one; distance
+	@ between the two is 4*(32+4+16-32)=4*(20).
+
+	str		@t[3], [sp,#4*(20+32+2)]	@ save len
+	 add		@t[3],sp,#4*(32+4)
+	str		r12,   [sp,#4*(20+32+1)]	@ save inp
+	str		r14,   [sp,#4*(20+32+0)]	@ save out
+
+	ldr		@x[12],[sp,#4*(16+10)]
+	ldr		@x[14],[sp,#4*(16+11)]
+	 vldmia		@t[3],{d8-d15}			@ fulfill ABI requirement
+	str		@x[12],[sp,#4*(20+16+10)]	@ copy "@x[10]"
+	str		@x[14],[sp,#4*(20+16+11)]	@ copy "@x[11]"
+
+	ldr		@t[3], [sp,#4*(15)]
+	ldr		@x[12],[sp,#4*(12)]		@ modulo-scheduled load
+	ldr		@t[2], [sp,#4*(13)]
+	ldr		@x[14],[sp,#4*(14)]
+	str		@t[3], [sp,#4*(20+16+15)]
+	add		@t[3],sp,#4*(20)
+	vst1.32		{$a0-$b0},[@t[3]]!		@ copy key
+	add		sp,sp,#4*(20)			@ switch frame
+	vst1.32		{$c0-$d0},[@t[3]]
+	mov		@t[3],#10
+	b		.Loop				@ go integer-only
+
+.align	4
+.Ltail_neon:
+	cmp		@t[3],#64*3
+	bhs		.L192_or_more_neon
+	cmp		@t[3],#64*2
+	bhs		.L128_or_more_neon
+	cmp		@t[3],#64*1
+	bhs		.L64_or_more_neon
+
+	add		@t[0],sp,#4*(8)
+	vst1.8		{$a0-$b0},[sp]
+	add		@t[2],sp,#4*(0)
+	vst1.8		{$c0-$d0},[@t[0]]
+	b		.Loop_tail_neon
+
+.align	4
+.L64_or_more_neon:
+	vld1.8		{$t0-$t1},[r12]!
+	vld1.8		{$t2-$t3},[r12]!
+	veor		$a0,$a0,$t0
+	veor		$b0,$b0,$t1
+	veor		$c0,$c0,$t2
+	veor		$d0,$d0,$t3
+	vst1.8		{$a0-$b0},[r14]!
+	vst1.8		{$c0-$d0},[r14]!
+
+	beq		.Ldone_neon
+
+	add		@t[0],sp,#4*(8)
+	vst1.8		{$a1-$b1},[sp]
+	add		@t[2],sp,#4*(0)
+	vst1.8		{$c1-$d1},[@t[0]]
+	sub		@t[3],@t[3],#64*1	@ len-=64*1
+	b		.Loop_tail_neon
+
+.align	4
+.L128_or_more_neon:
+	vld1.8		{$t0-$t1},[r12]!
+	vld1.8		{$t2-$t3},[r12]!
+	veor		$a0,$a0,$t0
+	veor		$b0,$b0,$t1
+	vld1.8		{$t0-$t1},[r12]!
+	veor		$c0,$c0,$t2
+	veor		$d0,$d0,$t3
+	vld1.8		{$t2-$t3},[r12]!
+
+	veor		$a1,$a1,$t0
+	veor		$b1,$b1,$t1
+	 vst1.8		{$a0-$b0},[r14]!
+	veor		$c1,$c1,$t2
+	 vst1.8		{$c0-$d0},[r14]!
+	veor		$d1,$d1,$t3
+	vst1.8		{$a1-$b1},[r14]!
+	vst1.8		{$c1-$d1},[r14]!
+
+	beq		.Ldone_neon
+
+	add		@t[0],sp,#4*(8)
+	vst1.8		{$a2-$b2},[sp]
+	add		@t[2],sp,#4*(0)
+	vst1.8		{$c2-$d2},[@t[0]]
+	sub		@t[3],@t[3],#64*2	@ len-=64*2
+	b		.Loop_tail_neon
+
+.align	4
+.L192_or_more_neon:
+	vld1.8		{$t0-$t1},[r12]!
+	vld1.8		{$t2-$t3},[r12]!
+	veor		$a0,$a0,$t0
+	veor		$b0,$b0,$t1
+	vld1.8		{$t0-$t1},[r12]!
+	veor		$c0,$c0,$t2
+	veor		$d0,$d0,$t3
+	vld1.8		{$t2-$t3},[r12]!
+
+	veor		$a1,$a1,$t0
+	veor		$b1,$b1,$t1
+	vld1.8		{$t0-$t1},[r12]!
+	veor		$c1,$c1,$t2
+	 vst1.8		{$a0-$b0},[r14]!
+	veor		$d1,$d1,$t3
+	vld1.8		{$t2-$t3},[r12]!
+
+	veor		$a2,$a2,$t0
+	 vst1.8		{$c0-$d0},[r14]!
+	veor		$b2,$b2,$t1
+	 vst1.8		{$a1-$b1},[r14]!
+	veor		$c2,$c2,$t2
+	 vst1.8		{$c1-$d1},[r14]!
+	veor		$d2,$d2,$t3
+	vst1.8		{$a2-$b2},[r14]!
+	vst1.8		{$c2-$d2},[r14]!
+
+	beq		.Ldone_neon
+
+	ldmia		sp,{@t[0]-@t[3]}	@ load key material
+	add		@x[0],@x[0],@t[0]	@ accumulate key material
+	 add		@t[0],sp,#4*(4)
+	add		@x[1],@x[1],@t[1]
+	add		@x[2],@x[2],@t[2]
+	add		@x[3],@x[3],@t[3]
+	 ldmia		@t[0],{@t[0]-@t[3]}	@ load key material
+
+	add		@x[4],@x[4],@t[0]	@ accumulate key material
+	 add		@t[0],sp,#4*(8)
+	add		@x[5],@x[5],@t[1]
+	add		@x[6],@x[6],@t[2]
+	add		@x[7],@x[7],@t[3]
+	 ldmia		@t[0],{@t[0]-@t[3]}	@ load key material
+# ifdef	__ARMEB__
+	rev		@x[0],@x[0]
+	rev		@x[1],@x[1]
+	rev		@x[2],@x[2]
+	rev		@x[3],@x[3]
+	rev		@x[4],@x[4]
+	rev		@x[5],@x[5]
+	rev		@x[6],@x[6]
+	rev		@x[7],@x[7]
+# endif
+	stmia		sp,{@x[0]-@x[7]}
+	 add		@x[0],sp,#4*(16+8)
+
+	ldmia		@x[0],{@x[0]-@x[7]}	@ load second half
+
+	add		@x[0],@x[0],@t[0]	@ accumulate key material
+	 add		@t[0],sp,#4*(12)
+	add		@x[1],@x[1],@t[1]
+	add		@x[2],@x[2],@t[2]
+	add		@x[3],@x[3],@t[3]
+	 ldmia		@t[0],{@t[0]-@t[3]}	@ load key material
+
+	add		@x[4],@x[4],@t[0]	@ accumulate key material
+	 add		@t[0],sp,#4*(8)
+	add		@x[5],@x[5],@t[1]
+	 add		@x[4],@x[4],#3		@ counter+3
+	add		@x[6],@x[6],@t[2]
+	add		@x[7],@x[7],@t[3]
+	 ldr		@t[3],[sp,#4*(32+2)]	@ re-load len
+# ifdef	__ARMEB__
+	rev		@x[0],@x[0]
+	rev		@x[1],@x[1]
+	rev		@x[2],@x[2]
+	rev		@x[3],@x[3]
+	rev		@x[4],@x[4]
+	rev		@x[5],@x[5]
+	rev		@x[6],@x[6]
+	rev		@x[7],@x[7]
+# endif
+	stmia		@t[0],{@x[0]-@x[7]}
+	 add		@t[2],sp,#4*(0)
+	 sub		@t[3],@t[3],#64*3	@ len-=64*3
+
+.Loop_tail_neon:
+	ldrb		@t[0],[@t[2]],#1	@ read buffer on stack
+	ldrb		@t[1],[r12],#1		@ read input
+	subs		@t[3],@t[3],#1
+	eor		@t[0],@t[0],@t[1]
+	strb		@t[0],[r14],#1		@ store output
+	bne		.Loop_tail_neon
+
+.Ldone_neon:
+	add		sp,sp,#4*(32+4)
+	vldmia		sp,{d8-d15}
+	add		sp,sp,#4*(16+3)
+	ldmia		sp!,{r4-r11,pc}
+.size	ChaCha20_neon,.-ChaCha20_neon
+.comm	OPENSSL_armcap_P,4,4
+#endif
+___
+}}}
+
+foreach (split("\n",$code)) {
+	s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/geo;
+
+	s/\bq([0-9]+)#(lo|hi)/sprintf "d%d",2*$1+($2 eq "hi")/geo;
+
+	print $_,"\n";
+}
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/chacha/asm/chacha-armv8.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/chacha/asm/chacha-armv8.pl
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..f7e1074
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/chacha/asm/chacha-armv8.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,1135 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# June 2015
+# 
+# ChaCha20 for ARMv8.
+#
+# Performance in cycles per byte out of large buffer.
+#
+#			IALU/gcc-4.9    3xNEON+1xIALU	6xNEON+2xIALU
+#
+# Apple A7		5.50/+49%       3.33            1.70
+# Cortex-A53		8.40/+80%       4.72		4.72(*)
+# Cortex-A57		8.06/+43%       4.90            4.43(**)
+# Denver		4.50/+82%       2.63		2.67(*)
+# X-Gene		9.50/+46%       8.82		8.89(*)
+# Mongoose		8.00/+44%	3.64		3.25
+#
+# (*)	it's expected that doubling interleave factor doesn't help
+#	all processors, only those with higher NEON latency and
+#	higher instruction issue rate;
+# (**)	expected improvement was actually higher;
+
+$flavour=shift;
+$output=shift;
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+( $xlate="${dir}arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
+( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
+die "can't locate arm-xlate.pl";
+
+open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output";
+*STDOUT=*OUT;
+
+sub AUTOLOAD()		# thunk [simplified] x86-style perlasm
+{ my $opcode = $AUTOLOAD; $opcode =~ s/.*:://; $opcode =~ s/_/\./;
+  my $arg = pop;
+    $arg = "#$arg" if ($arg*1 eq $arg);
+    $code .= "\t$opcode\t".join(',',@_,$arg)."\n";
+}
+
+my ($out,$inp,$len,$key,$ctr) = map("x$_",(0..4));
+
+my @x=map("x$_",(5..17,19..21));
+my @d=map("x$_",(22..28,30));
+
+sub ROUND {
+my ($a0,$b0,$c0,$d0)=@_;
+my ($a1,$b1,$c1,$d1)=map(($_&~3)+(($_+1)&3),($a0,$b0,$c0,$d0));
+my ($a2,$b2,$c2,$d2)=map(($_&~3)+(($_+1)&3),($a1,$b1,$c1,$d1));
+my ($a3,$b3,$c3,$d3)=map(($_&~3)+(($_+1)&3),($a2,$b2,$c2,$d2));
+
+    (
+	"&add_32	(@x[$a0],@x[$a0],@x[$b0])",
+	 "&add_32	(@x[$a1],@x[$a1],@x[$b1])",
+	  "&add_32	(@x[$a2],@x[$a2],@x[$b2])",
+	   "&add_32	(@x[$a3],@x[$a3],@x[$b3])",
+	"&eor_32	(@x[$d0],@x[$d0],@x[$a0])",
+	 "&eor_32	(@x[$d1],@x[$d1],@x[$a1])",
+	  "&eor_32	(@x[$d2],@x[$d2],@x[$a2])",
+	   "&eor_32	(@x[$d3],@x[$d3],@x[$a3])",
+	"&ror_32	(@x[$d0],@x[$d0],16)",
+	 "&ror_32	(@x[$d1],@x[$d1],16)",
+	  "&ror_32	(@x[$d2],@x[$d2],16)",
+	   "&ror_32	(@x[$d3],@x[$d3],16)",
+
+	"&add_32	(@x[$c0],@x[$c0],@x[$d0])",
+	 "&add_32	(@x[$c1],@x[$c1],@x[$d1])",
+	  "&add_32	(@x[$c2],@x[$c2],@x[$d2])",
+	   "&add_32	(@x[$c3],@x[$c3],@x[$d3])",
+	"&eor_32	(@x[$b0],@x[$b0],@x[$c0])",
+	 "&eor_32	(@x[$b1],@x[$b1],@x[$c1])",
+	  "&eor_32	(@x[$b2],@x[$b2],@x[$c2])",
+	   "&eor_32	(@x[$b3],@x[$b3],@x[$c3])",
+	"&ror_32	(@x[$b0],@x[$b0],20)",
+	 "&ror_32	(@x[$b1],@x[$b1],20)",
+	  "&ror_32	(@x[$b2],@x[$b2],20)",
+	   "&ror_32	(@x[$b3],@x[$b3],20)",
+
+	"&add_32	(@x[$a0],@x[$a0],@x[$b0])",
+	 "&add_32	(@x[$a1],@x[$a1],@x[$b1])",
+	  "&add_32	(@x[$a2],@x[$a2],@x[$b2])",
+	   "&add_32	(@x[$a3],@x[$a3],@x[$b3])",
+	"&eor_32	(@x[$d0],@x[$d0],@x[$a0])",
+	 "&eor_32	(@x[$d1],@x[$d1],@x[$a1])",
+	  "&eor_32	(@x[$d2],@x[$d2],@x[$a2])",
+	   "&eor_32	(@x[$d3],@x[$d3],@x[$a3])",
+	"&ror_32	(@x[$d0],@x[$d0],24)",
+	 "&ror_32	(@x[$d1],@x[$d1],24)",
+	  "&ror_32	(@x[$d2],@x[$d2],24)",
+	   "&ror_32	(@x[$d3],@x[$d3],24)",
+
+	"&add_32	(@x[$c0],@x[$c0],@x[$d0])",
+	 "&add_32	(@x[$c1],@x[$c1],@x[$d1])",
+	  "&add_32	(@x[$c2],@x[$c2],@x[$d2])",
+	   "&add_32	(@x[$c3],@x[$c3],@x[$d3])",
+	"&eor_32	(@x[$b0],@x[$b0],@x[$c0])",
+	 "&eor_32	(@x[$b1],@x[$b1],@x[$c1])",
+	  "&eor_32	(@x[$b2],@x[$b2],@x[$c2])",
+	   "&eor_32	(@x[$b3],@x[$b3],@x[$c3])",
+	"&ror_32	(@x[$b0],@x[$b0],25)",
+	 "&ror_32	(@x[$b1],@x[$b1],25)",
+	  "&ror_32	(@x[$b2],@x[$b2],25)",
+	   "&ror_32	(@x[$b3],@x[$b3],25)"
+    );
+}
+
+$code.=<<___;
+#include "arm_arch.h"
+
+.text
+
+.extern	OPENSSL_armcap_P
+
+.align	5
+.Lsigma:
+.quad	0x3320646e61707865,0x6b20657479622d32		// endian-neutral
+.Lone:
+.long	1,0,0,0
+.LOPENSSL_armcap_P:
+#ifdef	__ILP32__
+.long	OPENSSL_armcap_P-.
+#else
+.quad	OPENSSL_armcap_P-.
+#endif
+.asciz	"ChaCha20 for ARMv8, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+
+.globl	ChaCha20_ctr32
+.type	ChaCha20_ctr32,%function
+.align	5
+ChaCha20_ctr32:
+	cbz	$len,.Labort
+	adr	@x[0],.LOPENSSL_armcap_P
+	cmp	$len,#192
+	b.lo	.Lshort
+#ifdef	__ILP32__
+	ldrsw	@x[1],[@x[0]]
+#else
+	ldr	@x[1],[@x[0]]
+#endif
+	ldr	w17,[@x[1],@x[0]]
+	tst	w17,#ARMV7_NEON
+	b.ne	ChaCha20_neon
+
+.Lshort:
+	stp	x29,x30,[sp,#-96]!
+	add	x29,sp,#0
+
+	adr	@x[0],.Lsigma
+	stp	x19,x20,[sp,#16]
+	stp	x21,x22,[sp,#32]
+	stp	x23,x24,[sp,#48]
+	stp	x25,x26,[sp,#64]
+	stp	x27,x28,[sp,#80]
+	sub	sp,sp,#64
+
+	ldp	@d[0],@d[1],[@x[0]]		// load sigma
+	ldp	@d[2],@d[3],[$key]		// load key
+	ldp	@d[4],@d[5],[$key,#16]
+	ldp	@d[6],@d[7],[$ctr]		// load counter
+#ifdef	__ARMEB__
+	ror	@d[2],@d[2],#32
+	ror	@d[3],@d[3],#32
+	ror	@d[4],@d[4],#32
+	ror	@d[5],@d[5],#32
+	ror	@d[6],@d[6],#32
+	ror	@d[7],@d[7],#32
+#endif
+
+.Loop_outer:
+	mov.32	@x[0],@d[0]			// unpack key block
+	lsr	@x[1],@d[0],#32
+	mov.32	@x[2],@d[1]
+	lsr	@x[3],@d[1],#32
+	mov.32	@x[4],@d[2]
+	lsr	@x[5],@d[2],#32
+	mov.32	@x[6],@d[3]
+	lsr	@x[7],@d[3],#32
+	mov.32	@x[8],@d[4]
+	lsr	@x[9],@d[4],#32
+	mov.32	@x[10],@d[5]
+	lsr	@x[11],@d[5],#32
+	mov.32	@x[12],@d[6]
+	lsr	@x[13],@d[6],#32
+	mov.32	@x[14],@d[7]
+	lsr	@x[15],@d[7],#32
+
+	mov	$ctr,#10
+	subs	$len,$len,#64
+.Loop:
+	sub	$ctr,$ctr,#1	
+___
+	foreach (&ROUND(0, 4, 8,12)) { eval; }
+	foreach (&ROUND(0, 5,10,15)) { eval; }
+$code.=<<___;
+	cbnz	$ctr,.Loop
+
+	add.32	@x[0],@x[0],@d[0]		// accumulate key block
+	add	@x[1],@x[1],@d[0],lsr#32
+	add.32	@x[2],@x[2],@d[1]
+	add	@x[3],@x[3],@d[1],lsr#32
+	add.32	@x[4],@x[4],@d[2]
+	add	@x[5],@x[5],@d[2],lsr#32
+	add.32	@x[6],@x[6],@d[3]
+	add	@x[7],@x[7],@d[3],lsr#32
+	add.32	@x[8],@x[8],@d[4]
+	add	@x[9],@x[9],@d[4],lsr#32
+	add.32	@x[10],@x[10],@d[5]
+	add	@x[11],@x[11],@d[5],lsr#32
+	add.32	@x[12],@x[12],@d[6]
+	add	@x[13],@x[13],@d[6],lsr#32
+	add.32	@x[14],@x[14],@d[7]
+	add	@x[15],@x[15],@d[7],lsr#32
+
+	b.lo	.Ltail
+
+	add	@x[0],@x[0],@x[1],lsl#32	// pack
+	add	@x[2],@x[2],@x[3],lsl#32
+	ldp	@x[1],@x[3],[$inp,#0]		// load input
+	add	@x[4],@x[4],@x[5],lsl#32
+	add	@x[6],@x[6],@x[7],lsl#32
+	ldp	@x[5],@x[7],[$inp,#16]
+	add	@x[8],@x[8],@x[9],lsl#32
+	add	@x[10],@x[10],@x[11],lsl#32
+	ldp	@x[9],@x[11],[$inp,#32]
+	add	@x[12],@x[12],@x[13],lsl#32
+	add	@x[14],@x[14],@x[15],lsl#32
+	ldp	@x[13],@x[15],[$inp,#48]
+	add	$inp,$inp,#64
+#ifdef	__ARMEB__
+	rev	@x[0],@x[0]
+	rev	@x[2],@x[2]
+	rev	@x[4],@x[4]
+	rev	@x[6],@x[6]
+	rev	@x[8],@x[8]
+	rev	@x[10],@x[10]
+	rev	@x[12],@x[12]
+	rev	@x[14],@x[14]
+#endif
+	eor	@x[0],@x[0],@x[1]
+	eor	@x[2],@x[2],@x[3]
+	eor	@x[4],@x[4],@x[5]
+	eor	@x[6],@x[6],@x[7]
+	eor	@x[8],@x[8],@x[9]
+	eor	@x[10],@x[10],@x[11]
+	eor	@x[12],@x[12],@x[13]
+	eor	@x[14],@x[14],@x[15]
+
+	stp	@x[0],@x[2],[$out,#0]		// store output
+	 add	@d[6],@d[6],#1			// increment counter
+	stp	@x[4],@x[6],[$out,#16]
+	stp	@x[8],@x[10],[$out,#32]
+	stp	@x[12],@x[14],[$out,#48]
+	add	$out,$out,#64
+
+	b.hi	.Loop_outer
+
+	ldp	x19,x20,[x29,#16]
+	add	sp,sp,#64
+	ldp	x21,x22,[x29,#32]
+	ldp	x23,x24,[x29,#48]
+	ldp	x25,x26,[x29,#64]
+	ldp	x27,x28,[x29,#80]
+	ldp	x29,x30,[sp],#96
+.Labort:
+	ret
+
+.align	4
+.Ltail:
+	add	$len,$len,#64
+.Less_than_64:
+	sub	$out,$out,#1
+	add	$inp,$inp,$len
+	add	$out,$out,$len
+	add	$ctr,sp,$len
+	neg	$len,$len
+
+	add	@x[0],@x[0],@x[1],lsl#32	// pack
+	add	@x[2],@x[2],@x[3],lsl#32
+	add	@x[4],@x[4],@x[5],lsl#32
+	add	@x[6],@x[6],@x[7],lsl#32
+	add	@x[8],@x[8],@x[9],lsl#32
+	add	@x[10],@x[10],@x[11],lsl#32
+	add	@x[12],@x[12],@x[13],lsl#32
+	add	@x[14],@x[14],@x[15],lsl#32
+#ifdef	__ARMEB__
+	rev	@x[0],@x[0]
+	rev	@x[2],@x[2]
+	rev	@x[4],@x[4]
+	rev	@x[6],@x[6]
+	rev	@x[8],@x[8]
+	rev	@x[10],@x[10]
+	rev	@x[12],@x[12]
+	rev	@x[14],@x[14]
+#endif
+	stp	@x[0],@x[2],[sp,#0]
+	stp	@x[4],@x[6],[sp,#16]
+	stp	@x[8],@x[10],[sp,#32]
+	stp	@x[12],@x[14],[sp,#48]
+
+.Loop_tail:
+	ldrb	w10,[$inp,$len]
+	ldrb	w11,[$ctr,$len]
+	add	$len,$len,#1
+	eor	w10,w10,w11
+	strb	w10,[$out,$len]
+	cbnz	$len,.Loop_tail
+
+	stp	xzr,xzr,[sp,#0]
+	stp	xzr,xzr,[sp,#16]
+	stp	xzr,xzr,[sp,#32]
+	stp	xzr,xzr,[sp,#48]
+
+	ldp	x19,x20,[x29,#16]
+	add	sp,sp,#64
+	ldp	x21,x22,[x29,#32]
+	ldp	x23,x24,[x29,#48]
+	ldp	x25,x26,[x29,#64]
+	ldp	x27,x28,[x29,#80]
+	ldp	x29,x30,[sp],#96
+	ret
+.size	ChaCha20_ctr32,.-ChaCha20_ctr32
+___
+
+{{{
+my ($A0,$B0,$C0,$D0,$A1,$B1,$C1,$D1,$A2,$B2,$C2,$D2,$T0,$T1,$T2,$T3) =
+    map("v$_.4s",(0..7,16..23));
+my (@K)=map("v$_.4s",(24..30));
+my $ONE="v31.4s";
+
+sub NEONROUND {
+my $odd = pop;
+my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$t)=@_;
+
+	(
+	"&add		('$a','$a','$b')",
+	"&eor		('$d','$d','$a')",
+	"&rev32_16	('$d','$d')",		# vrot ($d,16)
+
+	"&add		('$c','$c','$d')",
+	"&eor		('$t','$b','$c')",
+	"&ushr		('$b','$t',20)",
+	"&sli		('$b','$t',12)",
+
+	"&add		('$a','$a','$b')",
+	"&eor		('$t','$d','$a')",
+	"&ushr		('$d','$t',24)",
+	"&sli		('$d','$t',8)",
+
+	"&add		('$c','$c','$d')",
+	"&eor		('$t','$b','$c')",
+	"&ushr		('$b','$t',25)",
+	"&sli		('$b','$t',7)",
+
+	"&ext		('$c','$c','$c',8)",
+	"&ext		('$d','$d','$d',$odd?4:12)",
+	"&ext		('$b','$b','$b',$odd?12:4)"
+	);
+}
+
+$code.=<<___;
+
+.type	ChaCha20_neon,%function
+.align	5
+ChaCha20_neon:
+	stp	x29,x30,[sp,#-96]!
+	add	x29,sp,#0
+
+	adr	@x[0],.Lsigma
+	stp	x19,x20,[sp,#16]
+	stp	x21,x22,[sp,#32]
+	stp	x23,x24,[sp,#48]
+	stp	x25,x26,[sp,#64]
+	stp	x27,x28,[sp,#80]
+	cmp	$len,#512
+	b.hs	.L512_or_more_neon
+
+	sub	sp,sp,#64
+
+	ldp	@d[0],@d[1],[@x[0]]		// load sigma
+	ld1	{@K[0]},[@x[0]],#16
+	ldp	@d[2],@d[3],[$key]		// load key
+	ldp	@d[4],@d[5],[$key,#16]
+	ld1	{@K[1],@K[2]},[$key]
+	ldp	@d[6],@d[7],[$ctr]		// load counter
+	ld1	{@K[3]},[$ctr]
+	ld1	{$ONE},[@x[0]]
+#ifdef	__ARMEB__
+	rev64	@K[0],@K[0]
+	ror	@d[2],@d[2],#32
+	ror	@d[3],@d[3],#32
+	ror	@d[4],@d[4],#32
+	ror	@d[5],@d[5],#32
+	ror	@d[6],@d[6],#32
+	ror	@d[7],@d[7],#32
+#endif
+	add	@K[3],@K[3],$ONE		// += 1
+	add	@K[4],@K[3],$ONE
+	add	@K[5],@K[4],$ONE
+	shl	$ONE,$ONE,#2			// 1 -> 4
+
+.Loop_outer_neon:
+	mov.32	@x[0],@d[0]			// unpack key block
+	lsr	@x[1],@d[0],#32
+	 mov	$A0,@K[0]
+	mov.32	@x[2],@d[1]
+	lsr	@x[3],@d[1],#32
+	 mov	$A1,@K[0]
+	mov.32	@x[4],@d[2]
+	lsr	@x[5],@d[2],#32
+	 mov	$A2,@K[0]
+	mov.32	@x[6],@d[3]
+	 mov	$B0,@K[1]
+	lsr	@x[7],@d[3],#32
+	 mov	$B1,@K[1]
+	mov.32	@x[8],@d[4]
+	 mov	$B2,@K[1]
+	lsr	@x[9],@d[4],#32
+	 mov	$D0,@K[3]
+	mov.32	@x[10],@d[5]
+	 mov	$D1,@K[4]
+	lsr	@x[11],@d[5],#32
+	 mov	$D2,@K[5]
+	mov.32	@x[12],@d[6]
+	 mov	$C0,@K[2]
+	lsr	@x[13],@d[6],#32
+	 mov	$C1,@K[2]
+	mov.32	@x[14],@d[7]
+	 mov	$C2,@K[2]
+	lsr	@x[15],@d[7],#32
+
+	mov	$ctr,#10
+	subs	$len,$len,#256
+.Loop_neon:
+	sub	$ctr,$ctr,#1
+___
+	my @thread0=&NEONROUND($A0,$B0,$C0,$D0,$T0,0);
+	my @thread1=&NEONROUND($A1,$B1,$C1,$D1,$T1,0);
+	my @thread2=&NEONROUND($A2,$B2,$C2,$D2,$T2,0);
+	my @thread3=&ROUND(0,4,8,12);
+
+	foreach (@thread0) {
+		eval;			eval(shift(@thread3));
+		eval(shift(@thread1));	eval(shift(@thread3));
+		eval(shift(@thread2));	eval(shift(@thread3));
+	}
+
+	@thread0=&NEONROUND($A0,$B0,$C0,$D0,$T0,1);
+	@thread1=&NEONROUND($A1,$B1,$C1,$D1,$T1,1);
+	@thread2=&NEONROUND($A2,$B2,$C2,$D2,$T2,1);
+	@thread3=&ROUND(0,5,10,15);
+
+	foreach (@thread0) {
+		eval;			eval(shift(@thread3));
+		eval(shift(@thread1));	eval(shift(@thread3));
+		eval(shift(@thread2));	eval(shift(@thread3));
+	}
+$code.=<<___;
+	cbnz	$ctr,.Loop_neon
+
+	add.32	@x[0],@x[0],@d[0]		// accumulate key block
+	 add	$A0,$A0,@K[0]
+	add	@x[1],@x[1],@d[0],lsr#32
+	 add	$A1,$A1,@K[0]
+	add.32	@x[2],@x[2],@d[1]
+	 add	$A2,$A2,@K[0]
+	add	@x[3],@x[3],@d[1],lsr#32
+	 add	$C0,$C0,@K[2]
+	add.32	@x[4],@x[4],@d[2]
+	 add	$C1,$C1,@K[2]
+	add	@x[5],@x[5],@d[2],lsr#32
+	 add	$C2,$C2,@K[2]
+	add.32	@x[6],@x[6],@d[3]
+	 add	$D0,$D0,@K[3]
+	add	@x[7],@x[7],@d[3],lsr#32
+	add.32	@x[8],@x[8],@d[4]
+	 add	$D1,$D1,@K[4]
+	add	@x[9],@x[9],@d[4],lsr#32
+	add.32	@x[10],@x[10],@d[5]
+	 add	$D2,$D2,@K[5]
+	add	@x[11],@x[11],@d[5],lsr#32
+	add.32	@x[12],@x[12],@d[6]
+	 add	$B0,$B0,@K[1]
+	add	@x[13],@x[13],@d[6],lsr#32
+	add.32	@x[14],@x[14],@d[7]
+	 add	$B1,$B1,@K[1]
+	add	@x[15],@x[15],@d[7],lsr#32
+	 add	$B2,$B2,@K[1]
+
+	b.lo	.Ltail_neon
+
+	add	@x[0],@x[0],@x[1],lsl#32	// pack
+	add	@x[2],@x[2],@x[3],lsl#32
+	ldp	@x[1],@x[3],[$inp,#0]		// load input
+	add	@x[4],@x[4],@x[5],lsl#32
+	add	@x[6],@x[6],@x[7],lsl#32
+	ldp	@x[5],@x[7],[$inp,#16]
+	add	@x[8],@x[8],@x[9],lsl#32
+	add	@x[10],@x[10],@x[11],lsl#32
+	ldp	@x[9],@x[11],[$inp,#32]
+	add	@x[12],@x[12],@x[13],lsl#32
+	add	@x[14],@x[14],@x[15],lsl#32
+	ldp	@x[13],@x[15],[$inp,#48]
+	add	$inp,$inp,#64
+#ifdef	__ARMEB__
+	rev	@x[0],@x[0]
+	rev	@x[2],@x[2]
+	rev	@x[4],@x[4]
+	rev	@x[6],@x[6]
+	rev	@x[8],@x[8]
+	rev	@x[10],@x[10]
+	rev	@x[12],@x[12]
+	rev	@x[14],@x[14]
+#endif
+	ld1.8	{$T0-$T3},[$inp],#64
+	eor	@x[0],@x[0],@x[1]
+	eor	@x[2],@x[2],@x[3]
+	eor	@x[4],@x[4],@x[5]
+	eor	@x[6],@x[6],@x[7]
+	eor	@x[8],@x[8],@x[9]
+	 eor	$A0,$A0,$T0
+	eor	@x[10],@x[10],@x[11]
+	 eor	$B0,$B0,$T1
+	eor	@x[12],@x[12],@x[13]
+	 eor	$C0,$C0,$T2
+	eor	@x[14],@x[14],@x[15]
+	 eor	$D0,$D0,$T3
+	 ld1.8	{$T0-$T3},[$inp],#64
+
+	stp	@x[0],@x[2],[$out,#0]		// store output
+	 add	@d[6],@d[6],#4			// increment counter
+	stp	@x[4],@x[6],[$out,#16]
+	 add	@K[3],@K[3],$ONE		// += 4
+	stp	@x[8],@x[10],[$out,#32]
+	 add	@K[4],@K[4],$ONE
+	stp	@x[12],@x[14],[$out,#48]
+	 add	@K[5],@K[5],$ONE
+	add	$out,$out,#64
+
+	st1.8	{$A0-$D0},[$out],#64
+	ld1.8	{$A0-$D0},[$inp],#64
+
+	eor	$A1,$A1,$T0
+	eor	$B1,$B1,$T1
+	eor	$C1,$C1,$T2
+	eor	$D1,$D1,$T3
+	st1.8	{$A1-$D1},[$out],#64
+
+	eor	$A2,$A2,$A0
+	eor	$B2,$B2,$B0
+	eor	$C2,$C2,$C0
+	eor	$D2,$D2,$D0
+	st1.8	{$A2-$D2},[$out],#64
+
+	b.hi	.Loop_outer_neon
+
+	ldp	x19,x20,[x29,#16]
+	add	sp,sp,#64
+	ldp	x21,x22,[x29,#32]
+	ldp	x23,x24,[x29,#48]
+	ldp	x25,x26,[x29,#64]
+	ldp	x27,x28,[x29,#80]
+	ldp	x29,x30,[sp],#96
+	ret
+
+.Ltail_neon:
+	add	$len,$len,#256
+	cmp	$len,#64
+	b.lo	.Less_than_64
+
+	add	@x[0],@x[0],@x[1],lsl#32	// pack
+	add	@x[2],@x[2],@x[3],lsl#32
+	ldp	@x[1],@x[3],[$inp,#0]		// load input
+	add	@x[4],@x[4],@x[5],lsl#32
+	add	@x[6],@x[6],@x[7],lsl#32
+	ldp	@x[5],@x[7],[$inp,#16]
+	add	@x[8],@x[8],@x[9],lsl#32
+	add	@x[10],@x[10],@x[11],lsl#32
+	ldp	@x[9],@x[11],[$inp,#32]
+	add	@x[12],@x[12],@x[13],lsl#32
+	add	@x[14],@x[14],@x[15],lsl#32
+	ldp	@x[13],@x[15],[$inp,#48]
+	add	$inp,$inp,#64
+#ifdef	__ARMEB__
+	rev	@x[0],@x[0]
+	rev	@x[2],@x[2]
+	rev	@x[4],@x[4]
+	rev	@x[6],@x[6]
+	rev	@x[8],@x[8]
+	rev	@x[10],@x[10]
+	rev	@x[12],@x[12]
+	rev	@x[14],@x[14]
+#endif
+	eor	@x[0],@x[0],@x[1]
+	eor	@x[2],@x[2],@x[3]
+	eor	@x[4],@x[4],@x[5]
+	eor	@x[6],@x[6],@x[7]
+	eor	@x[8],@x[8],@x[9]
+	eor	@x[10],@x[10],@x[11]
+	eor	@x[12],@x[12],@x[13]
+	eor	@x[14],@x[14],@x[15]
+
+	stp	@x[0],@x[2],[$out,#0]		// store output
+	 add	@d[6],@d[6],#4			// increment counter
+	stp	@x[4],@x[6],[$out,#16]
+	stp	@x[8],@x[10],[$out,#32]
+	stp	@x[12],@x[14],[$out,#48]
+	add	$out,$out,#64
+	b.eq	.Ldone_neon
+	sub	$len,$len,#64
+	cmp	$len,#64
+	b.lo	.Less_than_128
+
+	ld1.8	{$T0-$T3},[$inp],#64
+	eor	$A0,$A0,$T0
+	eor	$B0,$B0,$T1
+	eor	$C0,$C0,$T2
+	eor	$D0,$D0,$T3
+	st1.8	{$A0-$D0},[$out],#64
+	b.eq	.Ldone_neon
+	sub	$len,$len,#64
+	cmp	$len,#64
+	b.lo	.Less_than_192
+
+	ld1.8	{$T0-$T3},[$inp],#64
+	eor	$A1,$A1,$T0
+	eor	$B1,$B1,$T1
+	eor	$C1,$C1,$T2
+	eor	$D1,$D1,$T3
+	st1.8	{$A1-$D1},[$out],#64
+	b.eq	.Ldone_neon
+	sub	$len,$len,#64
+
+	st1.8	{$A2-$D2},[sp]
+	b	.Last_neon
+
+.Less_than_128:
+	st1.8	{$A0-$D0},[sp]
+	b	.Last_neon
+.Less_than_192:
+	st1.8	{$A1-$D1},[sp]
+	b	.Last_neon
+
+.align	4
+.Last_neon:
+	sub	$out,$out,#1
+	add	$inp,$inp,$len
+	add	$out,$out,$len
+	add	$ctr,sp,$len
+	neg	$len,$len
+
+.Loop_tail_neon:
+	ldrb	w10,[$inp,$len]
+	ldrb	w11,[$ctr,$len]
+	add	$len,$len,#1
+	eor	w10,w10,w11
+	strb	w10,[$out,$len]
+	cbnz	$len,.Loop_tail_neon
+
+	stp	xzr,xzr,[sp,#0]
+	stp	xzr,xzr,[sp,#16]
+	stp	xzr,xzr,[sp,#32]
+	stp	xzr,xzr,[sp,#48]
+
+.Ldone_neon:
+	ldp	x19,x20,[x29,#16]
+	add	sp,sp,#64
+	ldp	x21,x22,[x29,#32]
+	ldp	x23,x24,[x29,#48]
+	ldp	x25,x26,[x29,#64]
+	ldp	x27,x28,[x29,#80]
+	ldp	x29,x30,[sp],#96
+	ret
+.size	ChaCha20_neon,.-ChaCha20_neon
+___
+{
+my ($T0,$T1,$T2,$T3,$T4,$T5)=@K;
+my ($A0,$B0,$C0,$D0,$A1,$B1,$C1,$D1,$A2,$B2,$C2,$D2,
+    $A3,$B3,$C3,$D3,$A4,$B4,$C4,$D4,$A5,$B5,$C5,$D5) = map("v$_.4s",(0..23));
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.type	ChaCha20_512_neon,%function
+.align	5
+ChaCha20_512_neon:
+	stp	x29,x30,[sp,#-96]!
+	add	x29,sp,#0
+
+	adr	@x[0],.Lsigma
+	stp	x19,x20,[sp,#16]
+	stp	x21,x22,[sp,#32]
+	stp	x23,x24,[sp,#48]
+	stp	x25,x26,[sp,#64]
+	stp	x27,x28,[sp,#80]
+
+.L512_or_more_neon:
+	sub	sp,sp,#128+64
+
+	ldp	@d[0],@d[1],[@x[0]]		// load sigma
+	ld1	{@K[0]},[@x[0]],#16
+	ldp	@d[2],@d[3],[$key]		// load key
+	ldp	@d[4],@d[5],[$key,#16]
+	ld1	{@K[1],@K[2]},[$key]
+	ldp	@d[6],@d[7],[$ctr]		// load counter
+	ld1	{@K[3]},[$ctr]
+	ld1	{$ONE},[@x[0]]
+#ifdef	__ARMEB__
+	rev64	@K[0],@K[0]
+	ror	@d[2],@d[2],#32
+	ror	@d[3],@d[3],#32
+	ror	@d[4],@d[4],#32
+	ror	@d[5],@d[5],#32
+	ror	@d[6],@d[6],#32
+	ror	@d[7],@d[7],#32
+#endif
+	add	@K[3],@K[3],$ONE		// += 1
+	stp	@K[0],@K[1],[sp,#0]		// off-load key block, invariant part
+	add	@K[3],@K[3],$ONE		// not typo
+	str	@K[2],[sp,#32]
+	add	@K[4],@K[3],$ONE
+	add	@K[5],@K[4],$ONE
+	add	@K[6],@K[5],$ONE
+	shl	$ONE,$ONE,#2			// 1 -> 4
+
+	stp	d8,d9,[sp,#128+0]		// meet ABI requirements
+	stp	d10,d11,[sp,#128+16]
+	stp	d12,d13,[sp,#128+32]
+	stp	d14,d15,[sp,#128+48]
+
+	sub	$len,$len,#512			// not typo
+
+.Loop_outer_512_neon:
+	 mov	$A0,@K[0]
+	 mov	$A1,@K[0]
+	 mov	$A2,@K[0]
+	 mov	$A3,@K[0]
+	 mov	$A4,@K[0]
+	 mov	$A5,@K[0]
+	 mov	$B0,@K[1]
+	mov.32	@x[0],@d[0]			// unpack key block
+	 mov	$B1,@K[1]
+	lsr	@x[1],@d[0],#32
+	 mov	$B2,@K[1]
+	mov.32	@x[2],@d[1]
+	 mov	$B3,@K[1]
+	lsr	@x[3],@d[1],#32
+	 mov	$B4,@K[1]
+	mov.32	@x[4],@d[2]
+	 mov	$B5,@K[1]
+	lsr	@x[5],@d[2],#32
+	 mov	$D0,@K[3]
+	mov.32	@x[6],@d[3]
+	 mov	$D1,@K[4]
+	lsr	@x[7],@d[3],#32
+	 mov	$D2,@K[5]
+	mov.32	@x[8],@d[4]
+	 mov	$D3,@K[6]
+	lsr	@x[9],@d[4],#32
+	 mov	$C0,@K[2]
+	mov.32	@x[10],@d[5]
+	 mov	$C1,@K[2]
+	lsr	@x[11],@d[5],#32
+	 add	$D4,$D0,$ONE			// +4
+	mov.32	@x[12],@d[6]
+	 add	$D5,$D1,$ONE			// +4
+	lsr	@x[13],@d[6],#32
+	 mov	$C2,@K[2]
+	mov.32	@x[14],@d[7]
+	 mov	$C3,@K[2]
+	lsr	@x[15],@d[7],#32
+	 mov	$C4,@K[2]
+	 stp	@K[3],@K[4],[sp,#48]		// off-load key block, variable part
+	 mov	$C5,@K[2]
+	 str	@K[5],[sp,#80]
+
+	mov	$ctr,#5
+	subs	$len,$len,#512
+.Loop_upper_neon:
+	sub	$ctr,$ctr,#1
+___
+	my @thread0=&NEONROUND($A0,$B0,$C0,$D0,$T0,0);
+	my @thread1=&NEONROUND($A1,$B1,$C1,$D1,$T1,0);
+	my @thread2=&NEONROUND($A2,$B2,$C2,$D2,$T2,0);
+	my @thread3=&NEONROUND($A3,$B3,$C3,$D3,$T3,0);
+	my @thread4=&NEONROUND($A4,$B4,$C4,$D4,$T4,0);
+	my @thread5=&NEONROUND($A5,$B5,$C5,$D5,$T5,0);
+	my @thread67=(&ROUND(0,4,8,12),&ROUND(0,5,10,15));
+	my $diff = ($#thread0+1)*6 - $#thread67 - 1;
+	my $i = 0;
+
+	foreach (@thread0) {
+		eval;			eval(shift(@thread67));
+		eval(shift(@thread1));	eval(shift(@thread67));
+		eval(shift(@thread2));	eval(shift(@thread67));
+		eval(shift(@thread3));	eval(shift(@thread67));
+		eval(shift(@thread4));	eval(shift(@thread67));
+		eval(shift(@thread5));	eval(shift(@thread67));
+	}
+
+	@thread0=&NEONROUND($A0,$B0,$C0,$D0,$T0,1);
+	@thread1=&NEONROUND($A1,$B1,$C1,$D1,$T1,1);
+	@thread2=&NEONROUND($A2,$B2,$C2,$D2,$T2,1);
+	@thread3=&NEONROUND($A3,$B3,$C3,$D3,$T3,1);
+	@thread4=&NEONROUND($A4,$B4,$C4,$D4,$T4,1);
+	@thread5=&NEONROUND($A5,$B5,$C5,$D5,$T5,1);
+	@thread67=(&ROUND(0,4,8,12),&ROUND(0,5,10,15));
+
+	foreach (@thread0) {
+		eval;			eval(shift(@thread67));
+		eval(shift(@thread1));	eval(shift(@thread67));
+		eval(shift(@thread2));	eval(shift(@thread67));
+		eval(shift(@thread3));	eval(shift(@thread67));
+		eval(shift(@thread4));	eval(shift(@thread67));
+		eval(shift(@thread5));	eval(shift(@thread67));
+	}
+$code.=<<___;
+	cbnz	$ctr,.Loop_upper_neon
+
+	add.32	@x[0],@x[0],@d[0]		// accumulate key block
+	add	@x[1],@x[1],@d[0],lsr#32
+	add.32	@x[2],@x[2],@d[1]
+	add	@x[3],@x[3],@d[1],lsr#32
+	add.32	@x[4],@x[4],@d[2]
+	add	@x[5],@x[5],@d[2],lsr#32
+	add.32	@x[6],@x[6],@d[3]
+	add	@x[7],@x[7],@d[3],lsr#32
+	add.32	@x[8],@x[8],@d[4]
+	add	@x[9],@x[9],@d[4],lsr#32
+	add.32	@x[10],@x[10],@d[5]
+	add	@x[11],@x[11],@d[5],lsr#32
+	add.32	@x[12],@x[12],@d[6]
+	add	@x[13],@x[13],@d[6],lsr#32
+	add.32	@x[14],@x[14],@d[7]
+	add	@x[15],@x[15],@d[7],lsr#32
+
+	add	@x[0],@x[0],@x[1],lsl#32	// pack
+	add	@x[2],@x[2],@x[3],lsl#32
+	ldp	@x[1],@x[3],[$inp,#0]		// load input
+	add	@x[4],@x[4],@x[5],lsl#32
+	add	@x[6],@x[6],@x[7],lsl#32
+	ldp	@x[5],@x[7],[$inp,#16]
+	add	@x[8],@x[8],@x[9],lsl#32
+	add	@x[10],@x[10],@x[11],lsl#32
+	ldp	@x[9],@x[11],[$inp,#32]
+	add	@x[12],@x[12],@x[13],lsl#32
+	add	@x[14],@x[14],@x[15],lsl#32
+	ldp	@x[13],@x[15],[$inp,#48]
+	add	$inp,$inp,#64
+#ifdef	__ARMEB__
+	rev	@x[0],@x[0]
+	rev	@x[2],@x[2]
+	rev	@x[4],@x[4]
+	rev	@x[6],@x[6]
+	rev	@x[8],@x[8]
+	rev	@x[10],@x[10]
+	rev	@x[12],@x[12]
+	rev	@x[14],@x[14]
+#endif
+	eor	@x[0],@x[0],@x[1]
+	eor	@x[2],@x[2],@x[3]
+	eor	@x[4],@x[4],@x[5]
+	eor	@x[6],@x[6],@x[7]
+	eor	@x[8],@x[8],@x[9]
+	eor	@x[10],@x[10],@x[11]
+	eor	@x[12],@x[12],@x[13]
+	eor	@x[14],@x[14],@x[15]
+
+	 stp	@x[0],@x[2],[$out,#0]		// store output
+	 add	@d[6],@d[6],#1			// increment counter
+	mov.32	@x[0],@d[0]			// unpack key block
+	lsr	@x[1],@d[0],#32
+	 stp	@x[4],@x[6],[$out,#16]
+	mov.32	@x[2],@d[1]
+	lsr	@x[3],@d[1],#32
+	 stp	@x[8],@x[10],[$out,#32]
+	mov.32	@x[4],@d[2]
+	lsr	@x[5],@d[2],#32
+	 stp	@x[12],@x[14],[$out,#48]
+	 add	$out,$out,#64
+	mov.32	@x[6],@d[3]
+	lsr	@x[7],@d[3],#32
+	mov.32	@x[8],@d[4]
+	lsr	@x[9],@d[4],#32
+	mov.32	@x[10],@d[5]
+	lsr	@x[11],@d[5],#32
+	mov.32	@x[12],@d[6]
+	lsr	@x[13],@d[6],#32
+	mov.32	@x[14],@d[7]
+	lsr	@x[15],@d[7],#32
+
+	mov	$ctr,#5
+.Loop_lower_neon:
+	sub	$ctr,$ctr,#1
+___
+	@thread0=&NEONROUND($A0,$B0,$C0,$D0,$T0,0);
+	@thread1=&NEONROUND($A1,$B1,$C1,$D1,$T1,0);
+	@thread2=&NEONROUND($A2,$B2,$C2,$D2,$T2,0);
+	@thread3=&NEONROUND($A3,$B3,$C3,$D3,$T3,0);
+	@thread4=&NEONROUND($A4,$B4,$C4,$D4,$T4,0);
+	@thread5=&NEONROUND($A5,$B5,$C5,$D5,$T5,0);
+	@thread67=(&ROUND(0,4,8,12),&ROUND(0,5,10,15));
+
+	foreach (@thread0) {
+		eval;			eval(shift(@thread67));
+		eval(shift(@thread1));	eval(shift(@thread67));
+		eval(shift(@thread2));	eval(shift(@thread67));
+		eval(shift(@thread3));	eval(shift(@thread67));
+		eval(shift(@thread4));	eval(shift(@thread67));
+		eval(shift(@thread5));	eval(shift(@thread67));
+	}
+
+	@thread0=&NEONROUND($A0,$B0,$C0,$D0,$T0,1);
+	@thread1=&NEONROUND($A1,$B1,$C1,$D1,$T1,1);
+	@thread2=&NEONROUND($A2,$B2,$C2,$D2,$T2,1);
+	@thread3=&NEONROUND($A3,$B3,$C3,$D3,$T3,1);
+	@thread4=&NEONROUND($A4,$B4,$C4,$D4,$T4,1);
+	@thread5=&NEONROUND($A5,$B5,$C5,$D5,$T5,1);
+	@thread67=(&ROUND(0,4,8,12),&ROUND(0,5,10,15));
+
+	foreach (@thread0) {
+		eval;			eval(shift(@thread67));
+		eval(shift(@thread1));	eval(shift(@thread67));
+		eval(shift(@thread2));	eval(shift(@thread67));
+		eval(shift(@thread3));	eval(shift(@thread67));
+		eval(shift(@thread4));	eval(shift(@thread67));
+		eval(shift(@thread5));	eval(shift(@thread67));
+	}
+$code.=<<___;
+	cbnz	$ctr,.Loop_lower_neon
+
+	add.32	@x[0],@x[0],@d[0]		// accumulate key block
+	 ldp	@K[0],@K[1],[sp,#0]
+	add	@x[1],@x[1],@d[0],lsr#32
+	 ldp	@K[2],@K[3],[sp,#32]
+	add.32	@x[2],@x[2],@d[1]
+	 ldp	@K[4],@K[5],[sp,#64]
+	add	@x[3],@x[3],@d[1],lsr#32
+	 add	$A0,$A0,@K[0]
+	add.32	@x[4],@x[4],@d[2]
+	 add	$A1,$A1,@K[0]
+	add	@x[5],@x[5],@d[2],lsr#32
+	 add	$A2,$A2,@K[0]
+	add.32	@x[6],@x[6],@d[3]
+	 add	$A3,$A3,@K[0]
+	add	@x[7],@x[7],@d[3],lsr#32
+	 add	$A4,$A4,@K[0]
+	add.32	@x[8],@x[8],@d[4]
+	 add	$A5,$A5,@K[0]
+	add	@x[9],@x[9],@d[4],lsr#32
+	 add	$C0,$C0,@K[2]
+	add.32	@x[10],@x[10],@d[5]
+	 add	$C1,$C1,@K[2]
+	add	@x[11],@x[11],@d[5],lsr#32
+	 add	$C2,$C2,@K[2]
+	add.32	@x[12],@x[12],@d[6]
+	 add	$C3,$C3,@K[2]
+	add	@x[13],@x[13],@d[6],lsr#32
+	 add	$C4,$C4,@K[2]
+	add.32	@x[14],@x[14],@d[7]
+	 add	$C5,$C5,@K[2]
+	add	@x[15],@x[15],@d[7],lsr#32
+	 add	$D4,$D4,$ONE			// +4
+	add	@x[0],@x[0],@x[1],lsl#32	// pack
+	 add	$D5,$D5,$ONE			// +4
+	add	@x[2],@x[2],@x[3],lsl#32
+	 add	$D0,$D0,@K[3]
+	ldp	@x[1],@x[3],[$inp,#0]		// load input
+	 add	$D1,$D1,@K[4]
+	add	@x[4],@x[4],@x[5],lsl#32
+	 add	$D2,$D2,@K[5]
+	add	@x[6],@x[6],@x[7],lsl#32
+	 add	$D3,$D3,@K[6]
+	ldp	@x[5],@x[7],[$inp,#16]
+	 add	$D4,$D4,@K[3]
+	add	@x[8],@x[8],@x[9],lsl#32
+	 add	$D5,$D5,@K[4]
+	add	@x[10],@x[10],@x[11],lsl#32
+	 add	$B0,$B0,@K[1]
+	ldp	@x[9],@x[11],[$inp,#32]
+	 add	$B1,$B1,@K[1]
+	add	@x[12],@x[12],@x[13],lsl#32
+	 add	$B2,$B2,@K[1]
+	add	@x[14],@x[14],@x[15],lsl#32
+	 add	$B3,$B3,@K[1]
+	ldp	@x[13],@x[15],[$inp,#48]
+	 add	$B4,$B4,@K[1]
+	add	$inp,$inp,#64
+	 add	$B5,$B5,@K[1]
+
+#ifdef	__ARMEB__
+	rev	@x[0],@x[0]
+	rev	@x[2],@x[2]
+	rev	@x[4],@x[4]
+	rev	@x[6],@x[6]
+	rev	@x[8],@x[8]
+	rev	@x[10],@x[10]
+	rev	@x[12],@x[12]
+	rev	@x[14],@x[14]
+#endif
+	ld1.8	{$T0-$T3},[$inp],#64
+	eor	@x[0],@x[0],@x[1]
+	eor	@x[2],@x[2],@x[3]
+	eor	@x[4],@x[4],@x[5]
+	eor	@x[6],@x[6],@x[7]
+	eor	@x[8],@x[8],@x[9]
+	 eor	$A0,$A0,$T0
+	eor	@x[10],@x[10],@x[11]
+	 eor	$B0,$B0,$T1
+	eor	@x[12],@x[12],@x[13]
+	 eor	$C0,$C0,$T2
+	eor	@x[14],@x[14],@x[15]
+	 eor	$D0,$D0,$T3
+	 ld1.8	{$T0-$T3},[$inp],#64
+
+	stp	@x[0],@x[2],[$out,#0]		// store output
+	 add	@d[6],@d[6],#7			// increment counter
+	stp	@x[4],@x[6],[$out,#16]
+	stp	@x[8],@x[10],[$out,#32]
+	stp	@x[12],@x[14],[$out,#48]
+	add	$out,$out,#64
+	st1.8	{$A0-$D0},[$out],#64
+
+	ld1.8	{$A0-$D0},[$inp],#64
+	eor	$A1,$A1,$T0
+	eor	$B1,$B1,$T1
+	eor	$C1,$C1,$T2
+	eor	$D1,$D1,$T3
+	st1.8	{$A1-$D1},[$out],#64
+
+	ld1.8	{$A1-$D1},[$inp],#64
+	eor	$A2,$A2,$A0
+	 ldp	@K[0],@K[1],[sp,#0]
+	eor	$B2,$B2,$B0
+	 ldp	@K[2],@K[3],[sp,#32]
+	eor	$C2,$C2,$C0
+	eor	$D2,$D2,$D0
+	st1.8	{$A2-$D2},[$out],#64
+
+	ld1.8	{$A2-$D2},[$inp],#64
+	eor	$A3,$A3,$A1
+	eor	$B3,$B3,$B1
+	eor	$C3,$C3,$C1
+	eor	$D3,$D3,$D1
+	st1.8	{$A3-$D3},[$out],#64
+
+	ld1.8	{$A3-$D3},[$inp],#64
+	eor	$A4,$A4,$A2
+	eor	$B4,$B4,$B2
+	eor	$C4,$C4,$C2
+	eor	$D4,$D4,$D2
+	st1.8	{$A4-$D4},[$out],#64
+
+	shl	$A0,$ONE,#1			// 4 -> 8
+	eor	$A5,$A5,$A3
+	eor	$B5,$B5,$B3
+	eor	$C5,$C5,$C3
+	eor	$D5,$D5,$D3
+	st1.8	{$A5-$D5},[$out],#64
+
+	add	@K[3],@K[3],$A0			// += 8
+	add	@K[4],@K[4],$A0
+	add	@K[5],@K[5],$A0
+	add	@K[6],@K[6],$A0
+
+	b.hs	.Loop_outer_512_neon
+
+	adds	$len,$len,#512
+	ushr	$A0,$ONE,#2			// 4 -> 1
+
+	ldp	d8,d9,[sp,#128+0]		// meet ABI requirements
+	ldp	d10,d11,[sp,#128+16]
+	ldp	d12,d13,[sp,#128+32]
+	ldp	d14,d15,[sp,#128+48]
+
+	stp	@K[0],$ONE,[sp,#0]		// wipe off-load area
+	stp	@K[0],$ONE,[sp,#32]
+	stp	@K[0],$ONE,[sp,#64]
+
+	b.eq	.Ldone_512_neon
+
+	cmp	$len,#192
+	sub	@K[3],@K[3],$A0			// -= 1
+	sub	@K[4],@K[4],$A0
+	sub	@K[5],@K[5],$A0
+	add	sp,sp,#128
+	b.hs	.Loop_outer_neon
+
+	eor	@K[1],@K[1],@K[1]
+	eor	@K[2],@K[2],@K[2]
+	eor	@K[3],@K[3],@K[3]
+	eor	@K[4],@K[4],@K[4]
+	eor	@K[5],@K[5],@K[5]
+	eor	@K[6],@K[6],@K[6]
+	b	.Loop_outer
+
+.Ldone_512_neon:
+	ldp	x19,x20,[x29,#16]
+	add	sp,sp,#128+64
+	ldp	x21,x22,[x29,#32]
+	ldp	x23,x24,[x29,#48]
+	ldp	x25,x26,[x29,#64]
+	ldp	x27,x28,[x29,#80]
+	ldp	x29,x30,[sp],#96
+	ret
+.size	ChaCha20_512_neon,.-ChaCha20_512_neon
+___
+}
+}}}
+
+foreach (split("\n",$code)) {
+	s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/geo;
+
+	(s/\b([a-z]+)\.32\b/$1/ and (s/x([0-9]+)/w$1/g or 1))	or
+	(m/\b(eor|ext|mov)\b/ and (s/\.4s/\.16b/g or 1))	or
+	(s/\b((?:ld|st)1)\.8\b/$1/ and (s/\.4s/\.16b/g or 1))	or
+	(m/\b(ld|st)[rp]\b/ and (s/v([0-9]+)\.4s/q$1/g or 1))	or
+	(s/\brev32\.16\b/rev32/ and (s/\.4s/\.8h/g or 1));
+
+	#s/\bq([0-9]+)#(lo|hi)/sprintf "d%d",2*$1+($2 eq "hi")/geo;
+
+	print $_,"\n";
+}
+close STDOUT;	# flush
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/chacha/asm/chacha-c64xplus.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/chacha/asm/chacha-c64xplus.pl
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..bdb3804
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/chacha/asm/chacha-c64xplus.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,926 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# ChaCha20 for C64x+.
+#
+# October 2015
+#
+# Performance is 3.54 cycles per processed byte, which is ~4.3 times
+# faster than code generated by TI compiler. Compiler also disables
+# interrupts for some reason, thus making interrupt response time
+# dependent on input length. This module on the other hand is free
+# from such limiation.
+
+$output=pop;
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+($OUT,$INP,$LEN,$KEYB,$COUNTERA)=("A4","B4","A6","B6","A8");
+($KEYA,$COUNTERB,$STEP)=("A7","B7","A3");
+
+@X=  ("A16","B16","A17","B17","A18","B18","A19","B19",
+      "A20","B20","A21","B21","A22","B22","A23","B23");
+@Y=  ("A24","B24","A25","B25","A26","B26","A27","B27",
+      "A28","B28","A29","B29","A30","B30","A31","B31");
+@DAT=("A6", "A7", "B6", "B7", "A8", "A9", "B8", "B9",
+      "A10","A11","B10","B11","A12","A13","B12","B13");
+
+# yes, overlaps with @DAT, used only in 2x interleave code path...
+@K2x=("A6", "B6", "A7", "B7", "A8", "B8", "A9", "B9",
+      "A10","B10","A11","B11","A2", "B2", "A13","B13");
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	.text
+
+	.if	.ASSEMBLER_VERSION<7000000
+	.asg	0,__TI_EABI__
+	.endif
+	.if	__TI_EABI__
+	.asg	ChaCha20_ctr32,_ChaCha20_ctr32
+	.endif
+
+	.asg	B3,RA
+	.asg	A15,FP
+	.asg	B15,SP
+
+	.global	_ChaCha20_ctr32
+	.align	32
+_ChaCha20_ctr32:
+	.asmfunc	stack_usage(40+64)
+	MV	$LEN,A0			; reassign
+  [!A0]	BNOP	RA			; no data
+|| [A0]	STW	FP,*SP--(40+64)		; save frame pointer and alloca(40+64)
+|| [A0]	MV	SP,FP
+   [A0]	STDW	B13:B12,*SP[4+8]	; ABI says so
+|| [A0]	MV	$KEYB,$KEYA
+|| [A0]	MV	$COUNTERA,$COUNTERB
+   [A0]	STDW	B11:B10,*SP[3+8]
+|| [A0]	STDW	A13:A12,*FP[-3]
+   [A0]	STDW	A11:A10,*FP[-4]
+|| [A0]	MVK	128,$STEP		; 2 * input block size
+
+   [A0]	LDW	*${KEYA}[0],@Y[4]	; load key
+|| [A0]	LDW	*${KEYB}[1],@Y[5]
+|| [A0]	MVK	0x00007865,@Y[0]	; synthesize sigma
+|| [A0]	MVK	0x0000646e,@Y[1]
+   [A0]	LDW	*${KEYA}[2],@Y[6]
+|| [A0]	LDW	*${KEYB}[3],@Y[7]
+|| [A0]	MVKH	0x61700000,@Y[0]
+|| [A0]	MVKH	0x33200000,@Y[1]
+	LDW	*${KEYA}[4],@Y[8]
+||	LDW	*${KEYB}[5],@Y[9]
+||	MVK	0x00002d32,@Y[2]
+||	MVK	0x00006574,@Y[3]
+	LDW	*${KEYA}[6],@Y[10]
+||	LDW	*${KEYB}[7],@Y[11]
+||	MVKH	0x79620000,@Y[2]
+||	MVKH	0x6b200000,@Y[3]
+	LDW	*${COUNTERA}[0],@Y[12]	; load counter||nonce
+||	LDW	*${COUNTERB}[1],@Y[13]
+||	CMPLTU	A0,$STEP,A1		; is length < 2*blocks?
+	LDW	*${COUNTERA}[2],@Y[14]
+||	LDW	*${COUNTERB}[3],@Y[15]
+|| [A1]	BNOP	top1x?
+   [A1]	MVK	64,$STEP		; input block size
+||	MVK	10,B0			; inner loop counter
+
+	DMV	@Y[2],@Y[0],@X[2]:@X[0]	; copy block
+||	DMV	@Y[3],@Y[1],@X[3]:@X[1]
+||[!A1]	STDW	@Y[2]:@Y[0],*FP[-12]	; offload key material to stack
+||[!A1]	STDW	@Y[3]:@Y[1],*SP[2]
+	DMV	@Y[6],@Y[4],@X[6]:@X[4]
+||	DMV	@Y[7],@Y[5],@X[7]:@X[5]
+||[!A1]	STDW	@Y[6]:@Y[4],*FP[-10]
+||[!A1]	STDW	@Y[7]:@Y[5],*SP[4]
+	DMV	@Y[10],@Y[8],@X[10]:@X[8]
+||	DMV	@Y[11],@Y[9],@X[11]:@X[9]
+||[!A1]	STDW	@Y[10]:@Y[8],*FP[-8]
+||[!A1]	STDW	@Y[11]:@Y[9],*SP[6]
+	DMV	@Y[14],@Y[12],@X[14]:@X[12]
+||	DMV	@Y[15],@Y[13],@X[15]:@X[13]
+||[!A1]	MV	@Y[12],@K2x[12]		; counter
+||[!A1]	MV	@Y[13],@K2x[13]
+||[!A1]	STW	@Y[14],*FP[-6*2]
+||[!A1]	STW	@Y[15],*SP[8*2]
+___
+{	################################################################
+	# 2x interleave gives 50% performance improvement
+	#
+my ($a0,$a1,$a2,$a3) = (0..3);
+my ($b0,$b1,$b2,$b3) = (4..7);
+my ($c0,$c1,$c2,$c3) = (8..11);
+my ($d0,$d1,$d2,$d3) = (12..15);
+
+$code.=<<___;
+outer2x?:
+	ADD	@X[$b1],@X[$a1],@X[$a1]
+||	ADD	@X[$b2],@X[$a2],@X[$a2]
+||	ADD	@X[$b0],@X[$a0],@X[$a0]
+||	ADD	@X[$b3],@X[$a3],@X[$a3]
+||	 DMV	@Y[2],@Y[0],@K2x[2]:@K2x[0]
+||	 DMV	@Y[3],@Y[1],@K2x[3]:@K2x[1]
+	XOR	@X[$a1],@X[$d1],@X[$d1]
+||	XOR	@X[$a2],@X[$d2],@X[$d2]
+||	XOR	@X[$a0],@X[$d0],@X[$d0]
+||	XOR	@X[$a3],@X[$d3],@X[$d3]
+||	 DMV	@Y[6],@Y[4],@K2x[6]:@K2x[4]
+||	 DMV	@Y[7],@Y[5],@K2x[7]:@K2x[5]
+	SWAP2	@X[$d1],@X[$d1]		; rotate by 16
+||	SWAP2	@X[$d2],@X[$d2]
+||	SWAP2	@X[$d0],@X[$d0]
+||	SWAP2	@X[$d3],@X[$d3]
+
+	ADD	@X[$d1],@X[$c1],@X[$c1]
+||	ADD	@X[$d2],@X[$c2],@X[$c2]
+||	ADD	@X[$d0],@X[$c0],@X[$c0]
+||	ADD	@X[$d3],@X[$c3],@X[$c3]
+||	 DMV	@Y[10],@Y[8],@K2x[10]:@K2x[8]
+||	 DMV	@Y[11],@Y[9],@K2x[11]:@K2x[9]
+	XOR	@X[$c1],@X[$b1],@X[$b1]
+||	XOR	@X[$c2],@X[$b2],@X[$b2]
+||	XOR	@X[$c0],@X[$b0],@X[$b0]
+||	XOR	@X[$c3],@X[$b3],@X[$b3]
+||	 ADD	1,@Y[12],@Y[12]		; adjust counter for 2nd block
+	ROTL	@X[$b1],12,@X[$b1]
+||	ROTL	@X[$b2],12,@X[$b2]
+||	 MV	@Y[14],@K2x[14]
+||	 MV	@Y[15],@K2x[15]
+top2x?:
+	ROTL	@X[$b0],12,@X[$b0]
+||	ROTL	@X[$b3],12,@X[$b3]
+||	 ADD	@Y[$b1],@Y[$a1],@Y[$a1]
+||	 ADD	@Y[$b2],@Y[$a2],@Y[$a2]
+	 ADD	@Y[$b0],@Y[$a0],@Y[$a0]
+||	 ADD	@Y[$b3],@Y[$a3],@Y[$a3]
+
+||	ADD	@X[$b1],@X[$a1],@X[$a1]
+||	ADD	@X[$b2],@X[$a2],@X[$a2]
+||	 XOR	@Y[$a1],@Y[$d1],@Y[$d1]
+||	 XOR	@Y[$a2],@Y[$d2],@Y[$d2]
+	 XOR	@Y[$a0],@Y[$d0],@Y[$d0]
+||	 XOR	@Y[$a3],@Y[$d3],@Y[$d3]
+||	ADD	@X[$b0],@X[$a0],@X[$a0]
+||	ADD	@X[$b3],@X[$a3],@X[$a3]
+||	XOR	@X[$a1],@X[$d1],@X[$d1]
+||	XOR	@X[$a2],@X[$d2],@X[$d2]
+	XOR	@X[$a0],@X[$d0],@X[$d0]
+||	XOR	@X[$a3],@X[$d3],@X[$d3]
+||	ROTL	@X[$d1],8,@X[$d1]
+||	ROTL	@X[$d2],8,@X[$d2]
+||	 SWAP2	@Y[$d1],@Y[$d1]		; rotate by 16
+||	 SWAP2	@Y[$d2],@Y[$d2]
+||	 SWAP2	@Y[$d0],@Y[$d0]
+||	 SWAP2	@Y[$d3],@Y[$d3]
+	ROTL	@X[$d0],8,@X[$d0]
+||	ROTL	@X[$d3],8,@X[$d3]
+||	 ADD	@Y[$d1],@Y[$c1],@Y[$c1]
+||	 ADD	@Y[$d2],@Y[$c2],@Y[$c2]
+||	 ADD	@Y[$d0],@Y[$c0],@Y[$c0]
+||	 ADD	@Y[$d3],@Y[$c3],@Y[$c3]
+||	BNOP	middle2x1?		; protect from interrupt
+
+	ADD	@X[$d1],@X[$c1],@X[$c1]
+||	ADD	@X[$d2],@X[$c2],@X[$c2]
+||	 XOR	@Y[$c1],@Y[$b1],@Y[$b1]
+||	 XOR	@Y[$c2],@Y[$b2],@Y[$b2]
+||	 XOR	@Y[$c0],@Y[$b0],@Y[$b0]
+||	 XOR	@Y[$c3],@Y[$b3],@Y[$b3]
+	ADD	@X[$d0],@X[$c0],@X[$c0]
+||	ADD	@X[$d3],@X[$c3],@X[$c3]
+||	XOR	@X[$c1],@X[$b1],@X[$b1]
+||	XOR	@X[$c2],@X[$b2],@X[$b2]
+||	ROTL	@X[$d1],0,@X[$d2]	; moved to avoid cross-path stall
+||	ROTL	@X[$d2],0,@X[$d3]
+	XOR	@X[$c0],@X[$b0],@X[$b0]
+||	XOR	@X[$c3],@X[$b3],@X[$b3]
+||	MV	@X[$d0],@X[$d1]
+||	MV	@X[$d3],@X[$d0]
+||	 ROTL	@Y[$b1],12,@Y[$b1]
+||	 ROTL	@Y[$b2],12,@Y[$b2]
+	ROTL	@X[$b1],7,@X[$b0]	; avoided cross-path stall
+||	ROTL	@X[$b2],7,@X[$b1]
+	ROTL	@X[$b0],7,@X[$b3]
+||	ROTL	@X[$b3],7,@X[$b2]
+middle2x1?:
+
+	 ROTL	@Y[$b0],12,@Y[$b0]
+||	 ROTL	@Y[$b3],12,@Y[$b3]
+||	ADD	@X[$b0],@X[$a0],@X[$a0]
+||	ADD	@X[$b1],@X[$a1],@X[$a1]
+	ADD	@X[$b2],@X[$a2],@X[$a2]
+||	ADD	@X[$b3],@X[$a3],@X[$a3]
+
+||	 ADD	@Y[$b1],@Y[$a1],@Y[$a1]
+||	 ADD	@Y[$b2],@Y[$a2],@Y[$a2]
+||	XOR	@X[$a0],@X[$d0],@X[$d0]
+||	XOR	@X[$a1],@X[$d1],@X[$d1]
+	XOR	@X[$a2],@X[$d2],@X[$d2]
+||	XOR	@X[$a3],@X[$d3],@X[$d3]
+||	 ADD	@Y[$b0],@Y[$a0],@Y[$a0]
+||	 ADD	@Y[$b3],@Y[$a3],@Y[$a3]
+||	 XOR	@Y[$a1],@Y[$d1],@Y[$d1]
+||	 XOR	@Y[$a2],@Y[$d2],@Y[$d2]
+	 XOR	@Y[$a0],@Y[$d0],@Y[$d0]
+||	 XOR	@Y[$a3],@Y[$d3],@Y[$d3]
+||	 ROTL	@Y[$d1],8,@Y[$d1]
+||	 ROTL	@Y[$d2],8,@Y[$d2]
+||	SWAP2	@X[$d0],@X[$d0]		; rotate by 16
+||	SWAP2	@X[$d1],@X[$d1]
+||	SWAP2	@X[$d2],@X[$d2]
+||	SWAP2	@X[$d3],@X[$d3]
+	 ROTL	@Y[$d0],8,@Y[$d0]
+||	 ROTL	@Y[$d3],8,@Y[$d3]
+||	ADD	@X[$d0],@X[$c2],@X[$c2]
+||	ADD	@X[$d1],@X[$c3],@X[$c3]
+||	ADD	@X[$d2],@X[$c0],@X[$c0]
+||	ADD	@X[$d3],@X[$c1],@X[$c1]
+||	BNOP	middle2x2?		; protect from interrupt
+
+	 ADD	@Y[$d1],@Y[$c1],@Y[$c1]
+||	 ADD	@Y[$d2],@Y[$c2],@Y[$c2]
+||	XOR	@X[$c2],@X[$b0],@X[$b0]
+||	XOR	@X[$c3],@X[$b1],@X[$b1]
+||	XOR	@X[$c0],@X[$b2],@X[$b2]
+||	XOR	@X[$c1],@X[$b3],@X[$b3]
+	 ADD	@Y[$d0],@Y[$c0],@Y[$c0]
+||	 ADD	@Y[$d3],@Y[$c3],@Y[$c3]
+||	 XOR	@Y[$c1],@Y[$b1],@Y[$b1]
+||	 XOR	@Y[$c2],@Y[$b2],@Y[$b2]
+||	 ROTL	@Y[$d1],0,@Y[$d2]	; moved to avoid cross-path stall
+||	 ROTL	@Y[$d2],0,@Y[$d3]
+	 XOR	@Y[$c0],@Y[$b0],@Y[$b0]
+||	 XOR	@Y[$c3],@Y[$b3],@Y[$b3]
+||	 MV	@Y[$d0],@Y[$d1]
+||	 MV	@Y[$d3],@Y[$d0]
+||	ROTL	@X[$b0],12,@X[$b0]
+||	ROTL	@X[$b1],12,@X[$b1]
+	 ROTL	@Y[$b1],7,@Y[$b0]	; avoided cross-path stall
+||	 ROTL	@Y[$b2],7,@Y[$b1]
+	 ROTL	@Y[$b0],7,@Y[$b3]
+||	 ROTL	@Y[$b3],7,@Y[$b2]
+middle2x2?:
+
+	ROTL	@X[$b2],12,@X[$b2]
+||	ROTL	@X[$b3],12,@X[$b3]
+||	 ADD	@Y[$b0],@Y[$a0],@Y[$a0]
+||	 ADD	@Y[$b1],@Y[$a1],@Y[$a1]
+	 ADD	@Y[$b2],@Y[$a2],@Y[$a2]
+||	 ADD	@Y[$b3],@Y[$a3],@Y[$a3]
+
+||	ADD	@X[$b0],@X[$a0],@X[$a0]
+||	ADD	@X[$b1],@X[$a1],@X[$a1]
+||	 XOR	@Y[$a0],@Y[$d0],@Y[$d0]
+||	 XOR	@Y[$a1],@Y[$d1],@Y[$d1]
+	 XOR	@Y[$a2],@Y[$d2],@Y[$d2]
+||	 XOR	@Y[$a3],@Y[$d3],@Y[$d3]
+||	ADD	@X[$b2],@X[$a2],@X[$a2]
+||	ADD	@X[$b3],@X[$a3],@X[$a3]
+||	XOR	@X[$a0],@X[$d0],@X[$d0]
+||	XOR	@X[$a1],@X[$d1],@X[$d1]
+	XOR	@X[$a2],@X[$d2],@X[$d2]
+||	XOR	@X[$a3],@X[$d3],@X[$d3]
+||	ROTL	@X[$d0],8,@X[$d0]
+||	ROTL	@X[$d1],8,@X[$d1]
+||	 SWAP2	@Y[$d0],@Y[$d0]		; rotate by 16
+||	 SWAP2	@Y[$d1],@Y[$d1]
+||	 SWAP2	@Y[$d2],@Y[$d2]
+||	 SWAP2	@Y[$d3],@Y[$d3]
+	ROTL	@X[$d2],8,@X[$d2]
+||	ROTL	@X[$d3],8,@X[$d3]
+||	 ADD	@Y[$d0],@Y[$c2],@Y[$c2]
+||	 ADD	@Y[$d1],@Y[$c3],@Y[$c3]
+||	 ADD	@Y[$d2],@Y[$c0],@Y[$c0]
+||	 ADD	@Y[$d3],@Y[$c1],@Y[$c1]
+||	BNOP	bottom2x1?		; protect from interrupt
+
+	ADD	@X[$d0],@X[$c2],@X[$c2]
+||	ADD	@X[$d1],@X[$c3],@X[$c3]
+||	 XOR	@Y[$c2],@Y[$b0],@Y[$b0]
+||	 XOR	@Y[$c3],@Y[$b1],@Y[$b1]
+||	 XOR	@Y[$c0],@Y[$b2],@Y[$b2]
+||	 XOR	@Y[$c1],@Y[$b3],@Y[$b3]
+	ADD	@X[$d2],@X[$c0],@X[$c0]
+||	ADD	@X[$d3],@X[$c1],@X[$c1]
+||	XOR	@X[$c2],@X[$b0],@X[$b0]
+||	XOR	@X[$c3],@X[$b1],@X[$b1]
+||	ROTL	@X[$d0],0,@X[$d3]	; moved to avoid cross-path stall
+||	ROTL	@X[$d1],0,@X[$d0]
+	XOR	@X[$c0],@X[$b2],@X[$b2]
+||	XOR	@X[$c1],@X[$b3],@X[$b3]
+||	MV	@X[$d2],@X[$d1]
+||	MV	@X[$d3],@X[$d2]
+||	 ROTL	@Y[$b0],12,@Y[$b0]
+||	 ROTL	@Y[$b1],12,@Y[$b1]
+	ROTL	@X[$b0],7,@X[$b1]	; avoided cross-path stall
+||	ROTL	@X[$b1],7,@X[$b2]
+	ROTL	@X[$b2],7,@X[$b3]
+||	ROTL	@X[$b3],7,@X[$b0]
+|| [B0]	SUB	B0,1,B0			; decrement inner loop counter
+bottom2x1?:
+
+	 ROTL	@Y[$b2],12,@Y[$b2]
+||	 ROTL	@Y[$b3],12,@Y[$b3]
+|| [B0]	ADD	@X[$b1],@X[$a1],@X[$a1]	; modulo-scheduled
+|| [B0]	ADD	@X[$b2],@X[$a2],@X[$a2]
+   [B0]	ADD	@X[$b0],@X[$a0],@X[$a0]
+|| [B0]	ADD	@X[$b3],@X[$a3],@X[$a3]
+
+||	 ADD	@Y[$b0],@Y[$a0],@Y[$a0]
+||	 ADD	@Y[$b1],@Y[$a1],@Y[$a1]
+|| [B0]	XOR	@X[$a1],@X[$d1],@X[$d1]
+|| [B0]	XOR	@X[$a2],@X[$d2],@X[$d2]
+   [B0]	XOR	@X[$a0],@X[$d0],@X[$d0]
+|| [B0]	XOR	@X[$a3],@X[$d3],@X[$d3]
+||	 ADD	@Y[$b2],@Y[$a2],@Y[$a2]
+||	 ADD	@Y[$b3],@Y[$a3],@Y[$a3]
+||	 XOR	@Y[$a0],@Y[$d0],@Y[$d0]
+||	 XOR	@Y[$a1],@Y[$d1],@Y[$d1]
+	 XOR	@Y[$a2],@Y[$d2],@Y[$d2]
+||	 XOR	@Y[$a3],@Y[$d3],@Y[$d3]
+||	 ROTL	@Y[$d0],8,@Y[$d0]
+||	 ROTL	@Y[$d1],8,@Y[$d1]
+|| [B0]	SWAP2	@X[$d1],@X[$d1]		; rotate by 16
+|| [B0]	SWAP2	@X[$d2],@X[$d2]
+|| [B0]	SWAP2	@X[$d0],@X[$d0]
+|| [B0]	SWAP2	@X[$d3],@X[$d3]
+	 ROTL	@Y[$d2],8,@Y[$d2]
+||	 ROTL	@Y[$d3],8,@Y[$d3]
+|| [B0]	ADD	@X[$d1],@X[$c1],@X[$c1]
+|| [B0]	ADD	@X[$d2],@X[$c2],@X[$c2]
+|| [B0]	ADD	@X[$d0],@X[$c0],@X[$c0]
+|| [B0]	ADD	@X[$d3],@X[$c3],@X[$c3]
+|| [B0]	BNOP	top2x?			; even protects from interrupt
+
+	 ADD	@Y[$d0],@Y[$c2],@Y[$c2]
+||	 ADD	@Y[$d1],@Y[$c3],@Y[$c3]
+|| [B0]	XOR	@X[$c1],@X[$b1],@X[$b1]
+|| [B0]	XOR	@X[$c2],@X[$b2],@X[$b2]
+|| [B0]	XOR	@X[$c0],@X[$b0],@X[$b0]
+|| [B0]	XOR	@X[$c3],@X[$b3],@X[$b3]
+	 ADD	@Y[$d2],@Y[$c0],@Y[$c0]
+||	 ADD	@Y[$d3],@Y[$c1],@Y[$c1]
+||	 XOR	@Y[$c2],@Y[$b0],@Y[$b0]
+||	 XOR	@Y[$c3],@Y[$b1],@Y[$b1]
+||	 ROTL	@Y[$d0],0,@Y[$d3]	; moved to avoid cross-path stall
+||	 ROTL	@Y[$d1],0,@Y[$d0]
+	 XOR	@Y[$c0],@Y[$b2],@Y[$b2]
+||	 XOR	@Y[$c1],@Y[$b3],@Y[$b3]
+||	 MV	@Y[$d2],@Y[$d1]
+||	 MV	@Y[$d3],@Y[$d2]
+|| [B0]	ROTL	@X[$b1],12,@X[$b1]
+|| [B0]	ROTL	@X[$b2],12,@X[$b2]
+	 ROTL	@Y[$b0],7,@Y[$b1]	; avoided cross-path stall
+||	 ROTL	@Y[$b1],7,@Y[$b2]
+	 ROTL	@Y[$b2],7,@Y[$b3]
+||	 ROTL	@Y[$b3],7,@Y[$b0]
+bottom2x2?:
+___
+}
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	ADD	@K2x[0],@X[0],@X[0]	; accumulate key material
+||	ADD	@K2x[1],@X[1],@X[1]
+||	ADD	@K2x[2],@X[2],@X[2]
+||	ADD	@K2x[3],@X[3],@X[3]
+	 ADD	@K2x[0],@Y[0],@Y[0]
+||	 ADD	@K2x[1],@Y[1],@Y[1]
+||	 ADD	@K2x[2],@Y[2],@Y[2]
+||	 ADD	@K2x[3],@Y[3],@Y[3]
+||	LDNDW	*${INP}++[8],@DAT[1]:@DAT[0]
+	ADD	@K2x[4],@X[4],@X[4]
+||	ADD	@K2x[5],@X[5],@X[5]
+||	ADD	@K2x[6],@X[6],@X[6]
+||	ADD	@K2x[7],@X[7],@X[7]
+||	LDNDW	*${INP}[-7],@DAT[3]:@DAT[2]
+	 ADD	@K2x[4],@Y[4],@Y[4]
+||	 ADD	@K2x[5],@Y[5],@Y[5]
+||	 ADD	@K2x[6],@Y[6],@Y[6]
+||	 ADD	@K2x[7],@Y[7],@Y[7]
+||	LDNDW	*${INP}[-6],@DAT[5]:@DAT[4]
+	ADD	@K2x[8],@X[8],@X[8]
+||	ADD	@K2x[9],@X[9],@X[9]
+||	ADD	@K2x[10],@X[10],@X[10]
+||	ADD	@K2x[11],@X[11],@X[11]
+||	LDNDW	*${INP}[-5],@DAT[7]:@DAT[6]
+	 ADD	@K2x[8],@Y[8],@Y[8]
+||	 ADD	@K2x[9],@Y[9],@Y[9]
+||	 ADD	@K2x[10],@Y[10],@Y[10]
+||	 ADD	@K2x[11],@Y[11],@Y[11]
+||	LDNDW	*${INP}[-4],@DAT[9]:@DAT[8]
+	ADD	@K2x[12],@X[12],@X[12]
+||	ADD	@K2x[13],@X[13],@X[13]
+||	ADD	@K2x[14],@X[14],@X[14]
+||	ADD	@K2x[15],@X[15],@X[15]
+||	LDNDW	*${INP}[-3],@DAT[11]:@DAT[10]
+	 ADD	@K2x[12],@Y[12],@Y[12]
+||	 ADD	@K2x[13],@Y[13],@Y[13]
+||	 ADD	@K2x[14],@Y[14],@Y[14]
+||	 ADD	@K2x[15],@Y[15],@Y[15]
+||	LDNDW	*${INP}[-2],@DAT[13]:@DAT[12]
+	 ADD	1,@Y[12],@Y[12]		; adjust counter for 2nd block
+||	ADD	2,@K2x[12],@K2x[12]	; increment counter
+||	LDNDW	*${INP}[-1],@DAT[15]:@DAT[14]
+
+	.if	.BIG_ENDIAN
+	SWAP2	@X[0],@X[0]
+||	SWAP2	@X[1],@X[1]
+||	SWAP2	@X[2],@X[2]
+||	SWAP2	@X[3],@X[3]
+	SWAP2	@X[4],@X[4]
+||	SWAP2	@X[5],@X[5]
+||	SWAP2	@X[6],@X[6]
+||	SWAP2	@X[7],@X[7]
+	SWAP2	@X[8],@X[8]
+||	SWAP2	@X[9],@X[9]
+||	SWAP4	@X[0],@X[1]
+||	SWAP4	@X[1],@X[0]
+	SWAP2	@X[10],@X[10]
+||	SWAP2	@X[11],@X[11]
+||	SWAP4	@X[2],@X[3]
+||	SWAP4	@X[3],@X[2]
+	SWAP2	@X[12],@X[12]
+||	SWAP2	@X[13],@X[13]
+||	SWAP4	@X[4],@X[5]
+||	SWAP4	@X[5],@X[4]
+	SWAP2	@X[14],@X[14]
+||	SWAP2	@X[15],@X[15]
+||	SWAP4	@X[6],@X[7]
+||	SWAP4	@X[7],@X[6]
+	SWAP4	@X[8],@X[9]
+||	SWAP4	@X[9],@X[8]
+||	 SWAP2	@Y[0],@Y[0]
+||	 SWAP2	@Y[1],@Y[1]
+	SWAP4	@X[10],@X[11]
+||	SWAP4	@X[11],@X[10]
+||	 SWAP2	@Y[2],@Y[2]
+||	 SWAP2	@Y[3],@Y[3]
+	SWAP4	@X[12],@X[13]
+||	SWAP4	@X[13],@X[12]
+||	 SWAP2	@Y[4],@Y[4]
+||	 SWAP2	@Y[5],@Y[5]
+	SWAP4	@X[14],@X[15]
+||	SWAP4	@X[15],@X[14]
+||	 SWAP2	@Y[6],@Y[6]
+||	 SWAP2	@Y[7],@Y[7]
+	 SWAP2	@Y[8],@Y[8]
+||	 SWAP2	@Y[9],@Y[9]
+||	 SWAP4	@Y[0],@Y[1]
+||	 SWAP4	@Y[1],@Y[0]
+	 SWAP2	@Y[10],@Y[10]
+||	 SWAP2	@Y[11],@Y[11]
+||	 SWAP4	@Y[2],@Y[3]
+||	 SWAP4	@Y[3],@Y[2]
+	 SWAP2	@Y[12],@Y[12]
+||	 SWAP2	@Y[13],@Y[13]
+||	 SWAP4	@Y[4],@Y[5]
+||	 SWAP4	@Y[5],@Y[4]
+	 SWAP2	@Y[14],@Y[14]
+||	 SWAP2	@Y[15],@Y[15]
+||	 SWAP4	@Y[6],@Y[7]
+||	 SWAP4	@Y[7],@Y[6]
+	 SWAP4	@Y[8],@Y[9]
+||	 SWAP4	@Y[9],@Y[8]
+	 SWAP4	@Y[10],@Y[11]
+||	 SWAP4	@Y[11],@Y[10]
+	 SWAP4	@Y[12],@Y[13]
+||	 SWAP4	@Y[13],@Y[12]
+	 SWAP4	@Y[14],@Y[15]
+||	 SWAP4	@Y[15],@Y[14]
+	.endif
+
+	XOR	@DAT[0],@X[0],@X[0]	; xor 1st block
+||	XOR	@DAT[3],@X[3],@X[3]
+||	XOR	@DAT[2],@X[2],@X[1]
+||	XOR	@DAT[1],@X[1],@X[2]
+||	LDNDW	*${INP}++[8],@DAT[1]:@DAT[0]
+	XOR	@DAT[4],@X[4],@X[4]
+||	XOR	@DAT[7],@X[7],@X[7]
+||	LDNDW	*${INP}[-7],@DAT[3]:@DAT[2]
+	XOR	@DAT[6],@X[6],@X[5]
+||	XOR	@DAT[5],@X[5],@X[6]
+||	LDNDW	*${INP}[-6],@DAT[5]:@DAT[4]
+	XOR	@DAT[8],@X[8],@X[8]
+||	XOR	@DAT[11],@X[11],@X[11]
+||	LDNDW	*${INP}[-5],@DAT[7]:@DAT[6]
+	XOR	@DAT[10],@X[10],@X[9]
+||	XOR	@DAT[9],@X[9],@X[10]
+||	LDNDW	*${INP}[-4],@DAT[9]:@DAT[8]
+	XOR	@DAT[12],@X[12],@X[12]
+||	XOR	@DAT[15],@X[15],@X[15]
+||	LDNDW	*${INP}[-3],@DAT[11]:@DAT[10]
+	XOR	@DAT[14],@X[14],@X[13]
+||	XOR	@DAT[13],@X[13],@X[14]
+||	LDNDW	*${INP}[-2],@DAT[13]:@DAT[12]
+   [A0]	SUB	A0,$STEP,A0		; SUB	A0,128,A0
+||	LDNDW	*${INP}[-1],@DAT[15]:@DAT[14]
+
+	XOR	@Y[0],@DAT[0],@DAT[0]	; xor 2nd block
+||	XOR	@Y[1],@DAT[1],@DAT[1]
+||	STNDW	@X[2]:@X[0],*${OUT}++[8]
+	XOR	@Y[2],@DAT[2],@DAT[2]
+||	XOR	@Y[3],@DAT[3],@DAT[3]
+||	STNDW	@X[3]:@X[1],*${OUT}[-7]
+	XOR	@Y[4],@DAT[4],@DAT[4]
+|| [A0]	LDDW	*FP[-12],@X[2]:@X[0]	; re-load key material from stack
+|| [A0]	LDDW	*SP[2],  @X[3]:@X[1]
+	XOR	@Y[5],@DAT[5],@DAT[5]
+||	STNDW	@X[6]:@X[4],*${OUT}[-6]
+	XOR	@Y[6],@DAT[6],@DAT[6]
+||	XOR	@Y[7],@DAT[7],@DAT[7]
+||	STNDW	@X[7]:@X[5],*${OUT}[-5]
+	XOR	@Y[8],@DAT[8],@DAT[8]
+|| [A0]	LDDW	*FP[-10],@X[6]:@X[4]
+|| [A0]	LDDW	*SP[4],  @X[7]:@X[5]
+	XOR	@Y[9],@DAT[9],@DAT[9]
+||	STNDW	@X[10]:@X[8],*${OUT}[-4]
+	XOR	@Y[10],@DAT[10],@DAT[10]
+||	XOR	@Y[11],@DAT[11],@DAT[11]
+||	STNDW	@X[11]:@X[9],*${OUT}[-3]
+	XOR	@Y[12],@DAT[12],@DAT[12]
+|| [A0]	LDDW	*FP[-8], @X[10]:@X[8]
+|| [A0]	LDDW	*SP[6],  @X[11]:@X[9]
+	XOR	@Y[13],@DAT[13],@DAT[13]
+||	STNDW	@X[14]:@X[12],*${OUT}[-2]
+	XOR	@Y[14],@DAT[14],@DAT[14]
+||	XOR	@Y[15],@DAT[15],@DAT[15]
+||	STNDW	@X[15]:@X[13],*${OUT}[-1]
+
+   [A0]	MV	@K2x[12],@X[12]
+|| [A0]	MV	@K2x[13],@X[13]
+|| [A0]	LDW	*FP[-6*2], @X[14]
+|| [A0]	LDW	*SP[8*2],  @X[15]
+
+   [A0]	DMV	@X[2],@X[0],@Y[2]:@Y[0]	; duplicate key material
+||	STNDW	@DAT[1]:@DAT[0],*${OUT}++[8]
+   [A0]	DMV	@X[3],@X[1],@Y[3]:@Y[1]
+||	STNDW	@DAT[3]:@DAT[2],*${OUT}[-7]
+   [A0]	DMV	@X[6],@X[4],@Y[6]:@Y[4]
+||	STNDW	@DAT[5]:@DAT[4],*${OUT}[-6]
+||	CMPLTU	A0,$STEP,A1		; is remaining length < 2*blocks?
+||[!A0]	BNOP	epilogue?
+   [A0]	DMV	@X[7],@X[5],@Y[7]:@Y[5]
+||	STNDW	@DAT[7]:@DAT[6],*${OUT}[-5]
+||[!A1]	BNOP	outer2x?
+   [A0]	DMV	@X[10],@X[8],@Y[10]:@Y[8]
+||	STNDW	@DAT[9]:@DAT[8],*${OUT}[-4]
+   [A0]	DMV	@X[11],@X[9],@Y[11]:@Y[9]
+||	STNDW	@DAT[11]:@DAT[10],*${OUT}[-3]
+   [A0]	DMV	@X[14],@X[12],@Y[14]:@Y[12]
+||	STNDW	@DAT[13]:@DAT[12],*${OUT}[-2]
+   [A0]	DMV	@X[15],@X[13],@Y[15]:@Y[13]
+||	STNDW	@DAT[15]:@DAT[14],*${OUT}[-1]
+;;===== branch to epilogue? is taken here
+   [A1]	MVK	64,$STEP
+|| [A0]	MVK	10,B0			; inner loop counter
+;;===== branch to outer2x? is taken here
+___
+{
+my ($a0,$a1,$a2,$a3) = (0..3);
+my ($b0,$b1,$b2,$b3) = (4..7);
+my ($c0,$c1,$c2,$c3) = (8..11);
+my ($d0,$d1,$d2,$d3) = (12..15);
+
+$code.=<<___;
+top1x?:
+	ADD	@X[$b1],@X[$a1],@X[$a1]
+||	ADD	@X[$b2],@X[$a2],@X[$a2]
+	ADD	@X[$b0],@X[$a0],@X[$a0]
+||	ADD	@X[$b3],@X[$a3],@X[$a3]
+||	XOR	@X[$a1],@X[$d1],@X[$d1]
+||	XOR	@X[$a2],@X[$d2],@X[$d2]
+	XOR	@X[$a0],@X[$d0],@X[$d0]
+||	XOR	@X[$a3],@X[$d3],@X[$d3]
+||	SWAP2	@X[$d1],@X[$d1]		; rotate by 16
+||	SWAP2	@X[$d2],@X[$d2]
+	SWAP2	@X[$d0],@X[$d0]
+||	SWAP2	@X[$d3],@X[$d3]
+
+||	ADD	@X[$d1],@X[$c1],@X[$c1]
+||	ADD	@X[$d2],@X[$c2],@X[$c2]
+	ADD	@X[$d0],@X[$c0],@X[$c0]
+||	ADD	@X[$d3],@X[$c3],@X[$c3]
+||	XOR	@X[$c1],@X[$b1],@X[$b1]
+||	XOR	@X[$c2],@X[$b2],@X[$b2]
+	XOR	@X[$c0],@X[$b0],@X[$b0]
+||	XOR	@X[$c3],@X[$b3],@X[$b3]
+||	ROTL	@X[$b1],12,@X[$b1]
+||	ROTL	@X[$b2],12,@X[$b2]
+	ROTL	@X[$b0],12,@X[$b0]
+||	ROTL	@X[$b3],12,@X[$b3]
+
+	ADD	@X[$b1],@X[$a1],@X[$a1]
+||	ADD	@X[$b2],@X[$a2],@X[$a2]
+	ADD	@X[$b0],@X[$a0],@X[$a0]
+||	ADD	@X[$b3],@X[$a3],@X[$a3]
+||	XOR	@X[$a1],@X[$d1],@X[$d1]
+||	XOR	@X[$a2],@X[$d2],@X[$d2]
+	XOR	@X[$a0],@X[$d0],@X[$d0]
+||	XOR	@X[$a3],@X[$d3],@X[$d3]
+||	ROTL	@X[$d1],8,@X[$d1]
+||	ROTL	@X[$d2],8,@X[$d2]
+	ROTL	@X[$d0],8,@X[$d0]
+||	ROTL	@X[$d3],8,@X[$d3]
+||	BNOP	middle1x?		; protect from interrupt
+
+	ADD	@X[$d1],@X[$c1],@X[$c1]
+||	ADD	@X[$d2],@X[$c2],@X[$c2]
+	ADD	@X[$d0],@X[$c0],@X[$c0]
+||	ADD	@X[$d3],@X[$c3],@X[$c3]
+||	XOR	@X[$c1],@X[$b1],@X[$b1]
+||	XOR	@X[$c2],@X[$b2],@X[$b2]
+||	ROTL	@X[$d1],0,@X[$d2]	; moved to avoid cross-path stall
+||	ROTL	@X[$d2],0,@X[$d3]
+	XOR	@X[$c0],@X[$b0],@X[$b0]
+||	XOR	@X[$c3],@X[$b3],@X[$b3]
+||	ROTL	@X[$d0],0,@X[$d1]
+||	ROTL	@X[$d3],0,@X[$d0]
+	ROTL	@X[$b1],7,@X[$b0]	; avoided cross-path stall
+||	ROTL	@X[$b2],7,@X[$b1]
+	ROTL	@X[$b0],7,@X[$b3]
+||	ROTL	@X[$b3],7,@X[$b2]
+middle1x?:
+
+	ADD	@X[$b0],@X[$a0],@X[$a0]
+||	ADD	@X[$b1],@X[$a1],@X[$a1]
+	ADD	@X[$b2],@X[$a2],@X[$a2]
+||	ADD	@X[$b3],@X[$a3],@X[$a3]
+||	XOR	@X[$a0],@X[$d0],@X[$d0]
+||	XOR	@X[$a1],@X[$d1],@X[$d1]
+	XOR	@X[$a2],@X[$d2],@X[$d2]
+||	XOR	@X[$a3],@X[$d3],@X[$d3]
+||	SWAP2	@X[$d0],@X[$d0]		; rotate by 16
+||	SWAP2	@X[$d1],@X[$d1]
+	SWAP2	@X[$d2],@X[$d2]
+||	SWAP2	@X[$d3],@X[$d3]
+
+||	ADD	@X[$d0],@X[$c2],@X[$c2]
+||	ADD	@X[$d1],@X[$c3],@X[$c3]
+	ADD	@X[$d2],@X[$c0],@X[$c0]
+||	ADD	@X[$d3],@X[$c1],@X[$c1]
+||	XOR	@X[$c2],@X[$b0],@X[$b0]
+||	XOR	@X[$c3],@X[$b1],@X[$b1]
+	XOR	@X[$c0],@X[$b2],@X[$b2]
+||	XOR	@X[$c1],@X[$b3],@X[$b3]
+||	ROTL	@X[$b0],12,@X[$b0]
+||	ROTL	@X[$b1],12,@X[$b1]
+	ROTL	@X[$b2],12,@X[$b2]
+||	ROTL	@X[$b3],12,@X[$b3]
+
+	ADD	@X[$b0],@X[$a0],@X[$a0]
+||	ADD	@X[$b1],@X[$a1],@X[$a1]
+|| [B0]	SUB	B0,1,B0			; decrement inner loop counter
+	ADD	@X[$b2],@X[$a2],@X[$a2]
+||	ADD	@X[$b3],@X[$a3],@X[$a3]
+||	XOR	@X[$a0],@X[$d0],@X[$d0]
+||	XOR	@X[$a1],@X[$d1],@X[$d1]
+	XOR	@X[$a2],@X[$d2],@X[$d2]
+||	XOR	@X[$a3],@X[$d3],@X[$d3]
+||	ROTL	@X[$d0],8,@X[$d0]
+||	ROTL	@X[$d1],8,@X[$d1]
+	ROTL	@X[$d2],8,@X[$d2]
+||	ROTL	@X[$d3],8,@X[$d3]
+|| [B0]	BNOP	top1x?			; even protects from interrupt
+
+	ADD	@X[$d0],@X[$c2],@X[$c2]
+||	ADD	@X[$d1],@X[$c3],@X[$c3]
+	ADD	@X[$d2],@X[$c0],@X[$c0]
+||	ADD	@X[$d3],@X[$c1],@X[$c1]
+||	XOR	@X[$c2],@X[$b0],@X[$b0]
+||	XOR	@X[$c3],@X[$b1],@X[$b1]
+||	ROTL	@X[$d0],0,@X[$d3]	; moved to avoid cross-path stall
+||	ROTL	@X[$d1],0,@X[$d0]
+	XOR	@X[$c0],@X[$b2],@X[$b2]
+||	XOR	@X[$c1],@X[$b3],@X[$b3]
+||	ROTL	@X[$d2],0,@X[$d1]
+||	ROTL	@X[$d3],0,@X[$d2]
+	ROTL	@X[$b0],7,@X[$b1]	; avoided cross-path stall
+||	ROTL	@X[$b1],7,@X[$b2]
+	ROTL	@X[$b2],7,@X[$b3]
+||	ROTL	@X[$b3],7,@X[$b0]
+||[!B0]	CMPLTU	A0,$STEP,A1		; less than 64 bytes left?
+bottom1x?:
+___
+}
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	ADD	@Y[0],@X[0],@X[0]	; accumulate key material
+||	ADD	@Y[1],@X[1],@X[1]
+||	ADD	@Y[2],@X[2],@X[2]
+||	ADD	@Y[3],@X[3],@X[3]
+||[!A1]	LDNDW	*${INP}++[8],@DAT[1]:@DAT[0]
+|| [A1]	BNOP	tail?
+	ADD	@Y[4],@X[4],@X[4]
+||	ADD	@Y[5],@X[5],@X[5]
+||	ADD	@Y[6],@X[6],@X[6]
+||	ADD	@Y[7],@X[7],@X[7]
+||[!A1]	LDNDW	*${INP}[-7],@DAT[3]:@DAT[2]
+	ADD	@Y[8],@X[8],@X[8]
+||	ADD	@Y[9],@X[9],@X[9]
+||	ADD	@Y[10],@X[10],@X[10]
+||	ADD	@Y[11],@X[11],@X[11]
+||[!A1]	LDNDW	*${INP}[-6],@DAT[5]:@DAT[4]
+	ADD	@Y[12],@X[12],@X[12]
+||	ADD	@Y[13],@X[13],@X[13]
+||	ADD	@Y[14],@X[14],@X[14]
+||	ADD	@Y[15],@X[15],@X[15]
+||[!A1]	LDNDW	*${INP}[-5],@DAT[7]:@DAT[6]
+  [!A1]	LDNDW	*${INP}[-4],@DAT[9]:@DAT[8]
+  [!A1]	LDNDW	*${INP}[-3],@DAT[11]:@DAT[10]
+	LDNDW	*${INP}[-2],@DAT[13]:@DAT[12]
+	LDNDW	*${INP}[-1],@DAT[15]:@DAT[14]
+
+	.if	.BIG_ENDIAN
+	SWAP2	@X[0],@X[0]
+||	SWAP2	@X[1],@X[1]
+||	SWAP2	@X[2],@X[2]
+||	SWAP2	@X[3],@X[3]
+	SWAP2	@X[4],@X[4]
+||	SWAP2	@X[5],@X[5]
+||	SWAP2	@X[6],@X[6]
+||	SWAP2	@X[7],@X[7]
+	SWAP2	@X[8],@X[8]
+||	SWAP2	@X[9],@X[9]
+||	SWAP4	@X[0],@X[1]
+||	SWAP4	@X[1],@X[0]
+	SWAP2	@X[10],@X[10]
+||	SWAP2	@X[11],@X[11]
+||	SWAP4	@X[2],@X[3]
+||	SWAP4	@X[3],@X[2]
+	SWAP2	@X[12],@X[12]
+||	SWAP2	@X[13],@X[13]
+||	SWAP4	@X[4],@X[5]
+||	SWAP4	@X[5],@X[4]
+	SWAP2	@X[14],@X[14]
+||	SWAP2	@X[15],@X[15]
+||	SWAP4	@X[6],@X[7]
+||	SWAP4	@X[7],@X[6]
+	SWAP4	@X[8],@X[9]
+||	SWAP4	@X[9],@X[8]
+	SWAP4	@X[10],@X[11]
+||	SWAP4	@X[11],@X[10]
+	SWAP4	@X[12],@X[13]
+||	SWAP4	@X[13],@X[12]
+	SWAP4	@X[14],@X[15]
+||	SWAP4	@X[15],@X[14]
+	.else
+	NOP	1
+	.endif
+
+	XOR	@X[0],@DAT[0],@DAT[0]	; xor with input
+||	XOR	@X[1],@DAT[1],@DAT[1]
+||	XOR	@X[2],@DAT[2],@DAT[2]
+||	XOR	@X[3],@DAT[3],@DAT[3]
+|| [A0]	SUB	A0,$STEP,A0		; SUB	A0,64,A0
+	XOR	@X[4],@DAT[4],@DAT[4]
+||	XOR	@X[5],@DAT[5],@DAT[5]
+||	XOR	@X[6],@DAT[6],@DAT[6]
+||	XOR	@X[7],@DAT[7],@DAT[7]
+||	STNDW	@DAT[1]:@DAT[0],*${OUT}++[8]
+	XOR	@X[8],@DAT[8],@DAT[8]
+||	XOR	@X[9],@DAT[9],@DAT[9]
+||	XOR	@X[10],@DAT[10],@DAT[10]
+||	XOR	@X[11],@DAT[11],@DAT[11]
+||	STNDW	@DAT[3]:@DAT[2],*${OUT}[-7]
+	XOR	@X[12],@DAT[12],@DAT[12]
+||	XOR	@X[13],@DAT[13],@DAT[13]
+||	XOR	@X[14],@DAT[14],@DAT[14]
+||	XOR	@X[15],@DAT[15],@DAT[15]
+||	STNDW	@DAT[5]:@DAT[4],*${OUT}[-6]
+|| [A0]	BNOP	top1x?
+   [A0]	DMV	@Y[2],@Y[0],@X[2]:@X[0]	; duplicate key material
+|| [A0]	DMV	@Y[3],@Y[1],@X[3]:@X[1]
+||	STNDW	@DAT[7]:@DAT[6],*${OUT}[-5]
+   [A0]	DMV	@Y[6],@Y[4],@X[6]:@X[4]
+|| [A0]	DMV	@Y[7],@Y[5],@X[7]:@X[5]
+||	STNDW	@DAT[9]:@DAT[8],*${OUT}[-4]
+   [A0]	DMV	@Y[10],@Y[8],@X[10]:@X[8]
+|| [A0]	DMV	@Y[11],@Y[9],@X[11]:@X[9]
+|| [A0]	ADD	1,@Y[12],@Y[12]		; increment counter
+||	STNDW	@DAT[11]:@DAT[10],*${OUT}[-3]
+   [A0]	DMV	@Y[14],@Y[12],@X[14]:@X[12]
+|| [A0]	DMV	@Y[15],@Y[13],@X[15]:@X[13]
+||	STNDW	@DAT[13]:@DAT[12],*${OUT}[-2]
+   [A0]	MVK	10,B0			; inner loop counter
+||	STNDW	@DAT[15]:@DAT[14],*${OUT}[-1]
+;;===== branch to top1x? is taken here
+
+epilogue?:
+	LDDW	*FP[-4],A11:A10		; ABI says so
+	LDDW	*FP[-3],A13:A12
+||	LDDW	*SP[3+8],B11:B10
+	LDDW	*SP[4+8],B13:B12
+||	BNOP	RA
+	LDW	*++SP(40+64),FP		; restore frame pointer
+	NOP	4
+
+tail?:
+	LDBU	*${INP}++[1],B24	; load byte by byte
+||	SUB	A0,1,A0
+||	SUB	A0,1,B1
+  [!B1]	BNOP	epilogue?		; interrupts are disabled for whole time
+|| [A0] LDBU	*${INP}++[1],B24
+|| [A0]	SUB	A0,1,A0
+||	SUB	B1,1,B1
+  [!B1]	BNOP	epilogue?
+|| [A0] LDBU	*${INP}++[1],B24
+|| [A0]	SUB	A0,1,A0
+||	SUB	B1,1,B1
+  [!B1]	BNOP	epilogue?
+||	ROTL	@X[0],0,A24
+|| [A0] LDBU	*${INP}++[1],B24
+|| [A0]	SUB	A0,1,A0
+||	SUB	B1,1,B1
+  [!B1]	BNOP	epilogue?
+||	ROTL	@X[0],24,A24
+|| [A0] LDBU	*${INP}++[1],A24
+|| [A0]	SUB	A0,1,A0
+||	SUB	B1,1,B1
+  [!B1]	BNOP	epilogue?
+||	ROTL	@X[0],16,A24
+|| [A0] LDBU	*${INP}++[1],A24
+|| [A0]	SUB	A0,1,A0
+||	SUB	B1,1,B1
+||	XOR	A24,B24,B25
+	STB	B25,*${OUT}++[1]	; store byte by byte
+||[!B1]	BNOP	epilogue?
+||	ROTL	@X[0],8,A24
+|| [A0] LDBU	*${INP}++[1],A24
+|| [A0]	SUB	A0,1,A0
+||	SUB	B1,1,B1
+||	XOR	A24,B24,B25
+	STB	B25,*${OUT}++[1]
+___
+sub TAIL_STEP {
+my $Xi= shift;
+my $T = ($Xi=~/^B/?"B24":"A24");	# match @X[i] to avoid cross path
+my $D = $T; $D=~tr/AB/BA/;
+my $O = $D; $O=~s/24/25/;
+
+$code.=<<___;
+||[!B1]	BNOP	epilogue?
+||	ROTL	$Xi,0,$T
+|| [A0] LDBU	*${INP}++[1],$D
+|| [A0]	SUB	A0,1,A0
+||	SUB	B1,1,B1
+||	XOR	A24,B24,$O
+	STB	$O,*${OUT}++[1]
+||[!B1]	BNOP	epilogue?
+||	ROTL	$Xi,24,$T
+|| [A0] LDBU	*${INP}++[1],$T
+|| [A0]	SUB	A0,1,A0
+||	SUB	B1,1,B1
+||	XOR	A24,B24,$O
+	STB	$O,*${OUT}++[1]
+||[!B1]	BNOP	epilogue?
+||	ROTL	$Xi,16,$T
+|| [A0] LDBU	*${INP}++[1],$T
+|| [A0]	SUB	A0,1,A0
+||	SUB	B1,1,B1
+||	XOR	A24,B24,$O
+	STB	$O,*${OUT}++[1]
+||[!B1]	BNOP	epilogue?
+||	ROTL	$Xi,8,$T
+|| [A0] LDBU	*${INP}++[1],$T
+|| [A0]	SUB	A0,1,A0
+||	SUB	B1,1,B1
+||	XOR	A24,B24,$O
+	STB	$O,*${OUT}++[1]
+___
+}
+	foreach (1..14) { TAIL_STEP(@X[$_]); }
+$code.=<<___;
+||[!B1]	BNOP	epilogue?
+||	ROTL	@X[15],0,B24
+||	XOR	A24,B24,A25
+	STB	A25,*${OUT}++[1]
+||	ROTL	@X[15],24,B24
+||	XOR	A24,B24,A25
+	STB	A25,*${OUT}++[1]
+||	ROTL	@X[15],16,B24
+||	XOR	A24,B24,A25
+	STB	A25,*${OUT}++[1]
+||	XOR	A24,B24,A25
+	STB	A25,*${OUT}++[1]
+||	XOR	A24,B24,B25
+	STB	B25,*${OUT}++[1]
+	.endasmfunc
+
+	.sect	.const
+	.cstring "ChaCha20 for C64x+, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+	.align	4
+___
+
+print $code;
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/chacha/asm/chacha-ppc.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/chacha/asm/chacha-ppc.pl
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..181decd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/chacha/asm/chacha-ppc.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,953 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# October 2015
+# 
+# ChaCha20 for PowerPC/AltiVec.
+#
+# Performance in cycles per byte out of large buffer.
+#
+#			IALU/gcc-4.x    3xAltiVec+1xIALU
+#
+# Freescale e300	13.6/+115%	-
+# PPC74x0/G4e		6.81/+310%	4.66
+# PPC970/G5		9.29/+160%	4.60
+# POWER7		8.62/+61%	4.27
+# POWER8		8.70/+51%	3.96
+
+$flavour = shift;
+
+if ($flavour =~ /64/) {
+	$SIZE_T	=8;
+	$LRSAVE	=2*$SIZE_T;
+	$STU	="stdu";
+	$POP	="ld";
+	$PUSH	="std";
+	$UCMP	="cmpld";
+} elsif ($flavour =~ /32/) {
+	$SIZE_T	=4;
+	$LRSAVE	=$SIZE_T;
+	$STU	="stwu";
+	$POP	="lwz";
+	$PUSH	="stw";
+	$UCMP	="cmplw";
+} else { die "nonsense $flavour"; }
+
+$LITTLE_ENDIAN = ($flavour=~/le$/) ? 1 : 0;
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+( $xlate="${dir}ppc-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
+( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/ppc-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
+die "can't locate ppc-xlate.pl";
+
+open STDOUT,"| $^X $xlate $flavour ".shift || die "can't call $xlate: $!";
+
+$LOCALS=6*$SIZE_T;
+$FRAME=$LOCALS+64+18*$SIZE_T;	# 64 is for local variables
+
+sub AUTOLOAD()		# thunk [simplified] x86-style perlasm
+{ my $opcode = $AUTOLOAD; $opcode =~ s/.*:://; $opcode =~ s/_/\./;
+    $code .= "\t$opcode\t".join(',',@_)."\n";
+}
+
+my $sp = "r1";
+
+my ($out,$inp,$len,$key,$ctr) = map("r$_",(3..7));
+
+my @x=map("r$_",(16..31));
+my @d=map("r$_",(11,12,14,15));
+my @t=map("r$_",(7..10));
+
+sub ROUND {
+my ($a0,$b0,$c0,$d0)=@_;
+my ($a1,$b1,$c1,$d1)=map(($_&~3)+(($_+1)&3),($a0,$b0,$c0,$d0));
+my ($a2,$b2,$c2,$d2)=map(($_&~3)+(($_+1)&3),($a1,$b1,$c1,$d1));
+my ($a3,$b3,$c3,$d3)=map(($_&~3)+(($_+1)&3),($a2,$b2,$c2,$d2));
+
+    (
+	"&add		(@x[$a0],@x[$a0],@x[$b0])",
+	 "&add		(@x[$a1],@x[$a1],@x[$b1])",
+	  "&add		(@x[$a2],@x[$a2],@x[$b2])",
+	   "&add	(@x[$a3],@x[$a3],@x[$b3])",
+	"&xor		(@x[$d0],@x[$d0],@x[$a0])",
+	 "&xor		(@x[$d1],@x[$d1],@x[$a1])",
+	  "&xor		(@x[$d2],@x[$d2],@x[$a2])",
+	   "&xor	(@x[$d3],@x[$d3],@x[$a3])",
+	"&rotlwi	(@x[$d0],@x[$d0],16)",
+	 "&rotlwi	(@x[$d1],@x[$d1],16)",
+	  "&rotlwi	(@x[$d2],@x[$d2],16)",
+	   "&rotlwi	(@x[$d3],@x[$d3],16)",
+
+	"&add		(@x[$c0],@x[$c0],@x[$d0])",
+	 "&add		(@x[$c1],@x[$c1],@x[$d1])",
+	  "&add		(@x[$c2],@x[$c2],@x[$d2])",
+	   "&add	(@x[$c3],@x[$c3],@x[$d3])",
+	"&xor		(@x[$b0],@x[$b0],@x[$c0])",
+	 "&xor		(@x[$b1],@x[$b1],@x[$c1])",
+	  "&xor		(@x[$b2],@x[$b2],@x[$c2])",
+	   "&xor	(@x[$b3],@x[$b3],@x[$c3])",
+	"&rotlwi	(@x[$b0],@x[$b0],12)",
+	 "&rotlwi	(@x[$b1],@x[$b1],12)",
+	  "&rotlwi	(@x[$b2],@x[$b2],12)",
+	   "&rotlwi	(@x[$b3],@x[$b3],12)",
+
+	"&add		(@x[$a0],@x[$a0],@x[$b0])",
+	 "&add		(@x[$a1],@x[$a1],@x[$b1])",
+	  "&add		(@x[$a2],@x[$a2],@x[$b2])",
+	   "&add	(@x[$a3],@x[$a3],@x[$b3])",
+	"&xor		(@x[$d0],@x[$d0],@x[$a0])",
+	 "&xor		(@x[$d1],@x[$d1],@x[$a1])",
+	  "&xor		(@x[$d2],@x[$d2],@x[$a2])",
+	   "&xor	(@x[$d3],@x[$d3],@x[$a3])",
+	"&rotlwi	(@x[$d0],@x[$d0],8)",
+	 "&rotlwi	(@x[$d1],@x[$d1],8)",
+	  "&rotlwi	(@x[$d2],@x[$d2],8)",
+	   "&rotlwi	(@x[$d3],@x[$d3],8)",
+
+	"&add		(@x[$c0],@x[$c0],@x[$d0])",
+	 "&add		(@x[$c1],@x[$c1],@x[$d1])",
+	  "&add		(@x[$c2],@x[$c2],@x[$d2])",
+	   "&add	(@x[$c3],@x[$c3],@x[$d3])",
+	"&xor		(@x[$b0],@x[$b0],@x[$c0])",
+	 "&xor		(@x[$b1],@x[$b1],@x[$c1])",
+	  "&xor		(@x[$b2],@x[$b2],@x[$c2])",
+	   "&xor	(@x[$b3],@x[$b3],@x[$c3])",
+	"&rotlwi	(@x[$b0],@x[$b0],7)",
+	 "&rotlwi	(@x[$b1],@x[$b1],7)",
+	  "&rotlwi	(@x[$b2],@x[$b2],7)",
+	   "&rotlwi	(@x[$b3],@x[$b3],7)"
+    );
+}
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.machine	"any"
+.text
+
+.globl	.ChaCha20_ctr32_int
+.align	5
+.ChaCha20_ctr32_int:
+__ChaCha20_ctr32_int:
+	${UCMP}i $len,0
+	beqlr-
+
+	$STU	$sp,-$FRAME($sp)
+	mflr	r0
+
+	$PUSH	r14,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*18`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r15,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*17`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r16,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*16`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r17,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*15`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r18,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*14`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r19,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*13`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r20,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*12`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r21,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*11`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r22,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*10`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r23,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*9`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r24,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*8`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r25,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*7`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r26,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*6`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r27,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*5`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r28,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*4`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r29,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*3`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r30,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*2`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r31,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*1`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r0,`$FRAME+$LRSAVE`($sp)
+
+	lwz	@d[0],0($ctr)			# load counter
+	lwz	@d[1],4($ctr)
+	lwz	@d[2],8($ctr)
+	lwz	@d[3],12($ctr)
+
+	bl	__ChaCha20_1x
+
+	$POP	r0,`$FRAME+$LRSAVE`($sp)
+	$POP	r14,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*18`($sp)
+	$POP	r15,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*17`($sp)
+	$POP	r16,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*16`($sp)
+	$POP	r17,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*15`($sp)
+	$POP	r18,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*14`($sp)
+	$POP	r19,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*13`($sp)
+	$POP	r20,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*12`($sp)
+	$POP	r21,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*11`($sp)
+	$POP	r22,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*10`($sp)
+	$POP	r23,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*9`($sp)
+	$POP	r24,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*8`($sp)
+	$POP	r25,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*7`($sp)
+	$POP	r26,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*6`($sp)
+	$POP	r27,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*5`($sp)
+	$POP	r28,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*4`($sp)
+	$POP	r29,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*3`($sp)
+	$POP	r30,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*2`($sp)
+	$POP	r31,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*1`($sp)
+	mtlr	r0
+	addi	$sp,$sp,$FRAME
+	blr
+	.long	0
+	.byte	0,12,4,1,0x80,18,5,0
+	.long	0
+.size	.ChaCha20_ctr32_int,.-.ChaCha20_ctr32_int
+
+.align	5
+__ChaCha20_1x:
+Loop_outer:
+	lis	@x[0],0x6170			# synthesize sigma
+	lis	@x[1],0x3320
+	lis	@x[2],0x7962
+	lis	@x[3],0x6b20
+	ori	@x[0],@x[0],0x7865
+	ori	@x[1],@x[1],0x646e
+	ori	@x[2],@x[2],0x2d32
+	ori	@x[3],@x[3],0x6574
+
+	li	r0,10				# inner loop counter
+	lwz	@x[4],0($key)			# load key
+	lwz	@x[5],4($key)
+	lwz	@x[6],8($key)
+	lwz	@x[7],12($key)
+	lwz	@x[8],16($key)
+	mr	@x[12],@d[0]			# copy counter
+	lwz	@x[9],20($key)
+	mr	@x[13],@d[1]
+	lwz	@x[10],24($key)
+	mr	@x[14],@d[2]
+	lwz	@x[11],28($key)
+	mr	@x[15],@d[3]
+
+	mr	@t[0],@x[4]
+	mr	@t[1],@x[5]
+	mr	@t[2],@x[6]
+	mr	@t[3],@x[7]
+
+	mtctr	r0
+Loop:
+___
+	foreach (&ROUND(0, 4, 8,12)) { eval; }
+	foreach (&ROUND(0, 5,10,15)) { eval; }
+$code.=<<___;
+	bdnz	Loop
+
+	subic	$len,$len,64			# $len-=64
+	addi	@x[0],@x[0],0x7865		# accumulate key block
+	addi	@x[1],@x[1],0x646e
+	addi	@x[2],@x[2],0x2d32
+	addi	@x[3],@x[3],0x6574
+	addis	@x[0],@x[0],0x6170
+	addis	@x[1],@x[1],0x3320
+	addis	@x[2],@x[2],0x7962
+	addis	@x[3],@x[3],0x6b20
+
+	subfe.	r0,r0,r0			# borrow?-1:0
+	add	@x[4],@x[4],@t[0]
+	lwz	@t[0],16($key)
+	add	@x[5],@x[5],@t[1]
+	lwz	@t[1],20($key)
+	add	@x[6],@x[6],@t[2]
+	lwz	@t[2],24($key)
+	add	@x[7],@x[7],@t[3]
+	lwz	@t[3],28($key)
+	add	@x[8],@x[8],@t[0]
+	add	@x[9],@x[9],@t[1]
+	add	@x[10],@x[10],@t[2]
+	add	@x[11],@x[11],@t[3]
+
+	add	@x[12],@x[12],@d[0]
+	add	@x[13],@x[13],@d[1]
+	add	@x[14],@x[14],@d[2]
+	add	@x[15],@x[15],@d[3]
+	addi	@d[0],@d[0],1			# increment counter
+___
+if (!$LITTLE_ENDIAN) { for($i=0;$i<16;$i++) {	# flip byte order
+$code.=<<___;
+	mr	@t[$i&3],@x[$i]
+	rotlwi	@x[$i],@x[$i],8
+	rlwimi	@x[$i],@t[$i&3],24,0,7
+	rlwimi	@x[$i],@t[$i&3],24,16,23
+___
+} }
+$code.=<<___;
+	bne	Ltail				# $len-=64 borrowed
+
+	lwz	@t[0],0($inp)			# load input, aligned or not
+	lwz	@t[1],4($inp)
+	${UCMP}i $len,0				# done already?
+	lwz	@t[2],8($inp)
+	lwz	@t[3],12($inp)
+	xor	@x[0],@x[0],@t[0]		# xor with input
+	lwz	@t[0],16($inp)
+	xor	@x[1],@x[1],@t[1]
+	lwz	@t[1],20($inp)
+	xor	@x[2],@x[2],@t[2]
+	lwz	@t[2],24($inp)
+	xor	@x[3],@x[3],@t[3]
+	lwz	@t[3],28($inp)
+	xor	@x[4],@x[4],@t[0]
+	lwz	@t[0],32($inp)
+	xor	@x[5],@x[5],@t[1]
+	lwz	@t[1],36($inp)
+	xor	@x[6],@x[6],@t[2]
+	lwz	@t[2],40($inp)
+	xor	@x[7],@x[7],@t[3]
+	lwz	@t[3],44($inp)
+	xor	@x[8],@x[8],@t[0]
+	lwz	@t[0],48($inp)
+	xor	@x[9],@x[9],@t[1]
+	lwz	@t[1],52($inp)
+	xor	@x[10],@x[10],@t[2]
+	lwz	@t[2],56($inp)
+	xor	@x[11],@x[11],@t[3]
+	lwz	@t[3],60($inp)
+	xor	@x[12],@x[12],@t[0]
+	stw	@x[0],0($out)			# store output, aligned or not
+	xor	@x[13],@x[13],@t[1]
+	stw	@x[1],4($out)
+	xor	@x[14],@x[14],@t[2]
+	stw	@x[2],8($out)
+	xor	@x[15],@x[15],@t[3]
+	stw	@x[3],12($out)
+	stw	@x[4],16($out)
+	stw	@x[5],20($out)
+	stw	@x[6],24($out)
+	stw	@x[7],28($out)
+	stw	@x[8],32($out)
+	stw	@x[9],36($out)
+	stw	@x[10],40($out)
+	stw	@x[11],44($out)
+	stw	@x[12],48($out)
+	stw	@x[13],52($out)
+	stw	@x[14],56($out)
+	addi	$inp,$inp,64
+	stw	@x[15],60($out)
+	addi	$out,$out,64
+
+	bne	Loop_outer
+
+	blr
+
+.align	4
+Ltail:
+	addi	$len,$len,64			# restore tail length
+	subi	$inp,$inp,1			# prepare for *++ptr
+	subi	$out,$out,1
+	addi	@t[0],$sp,$LOCALS-1
+	mtctr	$len
+
+	stw	@x[0],`$LOCALS+0`($sp)		# save whole block to stack
+	stw	@x[1],`$LOCALS+4`($sp)
+	stw	@x[2],`$LOCALS+8`($sp)
+	stw	@x[3],`$LOCALS+12`($sp)
+	stw	@x[4],`$LOCALS+16`($sp)
+	stw	@x[5],`$LOCALS+20`($sp)
+	stw	@x[6],`$LOCALS+24`($sp)
+	stw	@x[7],`$LOCALS+28`($sp)
+	stw	@x[8],`$LOCALS+32`($sp)
+	stw	@x[9],`$LOCALS+36`($sp)
+	stw	@x[10],`$LOCALS+40`($sp)
+	stw	@x[11],`$LOCALS+44`($sp)
+	stw	@x[12],`$LOCALS+48`($sp)
+	stw	@x[13],`$LOCALS+52`($sp)
+	stw	@x[14],`$LOCALS+56`($sp)
+	stw	@x[15],`$LOCALS+60`($sp)
+
+Loop_tail:					# byte-by-byte loop
+	lbzu	@d[0],1($inp)
+	lbzu	@x[0],1(@t[0])
+	xor	@d[1],@d[0],@x[0]
+	stbu	@d[1],1($out)
+	bdnz	Loop_tail
+
+	stw	$sp,`$LOCALS+0`($sp)		# wipe block on stack
+	stw	$sp,`$LOCALS+4`($sp)
+	stw	$sp,`$LOCALS+8`($sp)
+	stw	$sp,`$LOCALS+12`($sp)
+	stw	$sp,`$LOCALS+16`($sp)
+	stw	$sp,`$LOCALS+20`($sp)
+	stw	$sp,`$LOCALS+24`($sp)
+	stw	$sp,`$LOCALS+28`($sp)
+	stw	$sp,`$LOCALS+32`($sp)
+	stw	$sp,`$LOCALS+36`($sp)
+	stw	$sp,`$LOCALS+40`($sp)
+	stw	$sp,`$LOCALS+44`($sp)
+	stw	$sp,`$LOCALS+48`($sp)
+	stw	$sp,`$LOCALS+52`($sp)
+	stw	$sp,`$LOCALS+56`($sp)
+	stw	$sp,`$LOCALS+60`($sp)
+
+	blr
+	.long	0
+	.byte	0,12,0x14,0,0,0,0,0
+___
+
+{{{
+my ($A0,$B0,$C0,$D0,$A1,$B1,$C1,$D1,$A2,$B2,$C2,$D2,$T0,$T1,$T2) =
+    map("v$_",(0..14));
+my (@K)=map("v$_",(15..20));
+my ($FOUR,$sixteen,$twenty4,$twenty,$twelve,$twenty5,$seven) =
+    map("v$_",(21..27));
+my ($inpperm,$outperm,$outmask) = map("v$_",(28..30));
+my @D=("v31",$seven,$T0,$T1,$T2);
+
+my $FRAME=$LOCALS+64+13*16+18*$SIZE_T;	# 13*16 is for v20-v31 offload
+
+sub VMXROUND {
+my $odd = pop;
+my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$t)=@_;
+
+	(
+	"&vadduwm	('$a','$a','$b')",
+	"&vxor		('$d','$d','$a')",
+	"&vperm		('$d','$d','$d','$sixteen')",
+
+	"&vadduwm	('$c','$c','$d')",
+	"&vxor		('$t','$b','$c')",
+	"&vsrw		('$b','$t','$twenty')",
+	"&vslw		('$t','$t','$twelve')",
+	"&vor		('$b','$b','$t')",
+
+	"&vadduwm	('$a','$a','$b')",
+	"&vxor		('$d','$d','$a')",
+	"&vperm		('$d','$d','$d','$twenty4')",
+
+	"&vadduwm	('$c','$c','$d')",
+	"&vxor		('$t','$b','$c')",
+	"&vsrw		('$b','$t','$twenty5')",
+	"&vslw		('$t','$t','$seven')",
+	"&vor		('$b','$b','$t')",
+
+	"&vsldoi	('$c','$c','$c',8)",
+	"&vsldoi	('$b','$b','$b',$odd?4:12)",
+	"&vsldoi	('$d','$d','$d',$odd?12:4)"
+	);
+}
+
+$code.=<<___;
+
+.globl	.ChaCha20_ctr32_vmx
+.align	5
+.ChaCha20_ctr32_vmx:
+	${UCMP}i $len,256
+	blt	__ChaCha20_ctr32_int
+
+	$STU	$sp,-$FRAME($sp)
+	mflr	r0
+	li	r10,`15+$LOCALS+64`
+	li	r11,`31+$LOCALS+64`
+	mfspr	r12,256
+	stvx	v20,r10,$sp
+	addi	r10,r10,32
+	stvx	v21,r11,$sp
+	addi	r11,r11,32
+	stvx	v22,r10,$sp
+	addi	r10,r10,32
+	stvx	v23,r11,$sp
+	addi	r11,r11,32
+	stvx	v24,r10,$sp
+	addi	r10,r10,32
+	stvx	v25,r11,$sp
+	addi	r11,r11,32
+	stvx	v26,r10,$sp
+	addi	r10,r10,32
+	stvx	v27,r11,$sp
+	addi	r11,r11,32
+	stvx	v28,r10,$sp
+	addi	r10,r10,32
+	stvx	v29,r11,$sp
+	addi	r11,r11,32
+	stvx	v30,r10,$sp
+	stvx	v31,r11,$sp
+	stw	r12,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*18-4`($sp)	# save vrsave
+	$PUSH	r14,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*18`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r15,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*17`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r16,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*16`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r17,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*15`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r18,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*14`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r19,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*13`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r20,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*12`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r21,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*11`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r22,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*10`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r23,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*9`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r24,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*8`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r25,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*7`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r26,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*6`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r27,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*5`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r28,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*4`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r29,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*3`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r30,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*2`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r31,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*1`($sp)
+	li	r12,-1
+	$PUSH	r0, `$FRAME+$LRSAVE`($sp)
+	mtspr	256,r12				# preserve all AltiVec registers
+
+	bl	Lconsts				# returns pointer Lsigma in r12
+	li	@x[0],16
+	li	@x[1],32
+	li	@x[2],48
+	li	@x[3],64
+	li	@x[4],31			# 31 is not a typo
+	li	@x[5],15			# nor is 15
+
+	lvx	@K[1],0,$key			# load key
+	?lvsr	$T0,0,$key			# prepare unaligned load
+	lvx	@K[2],@x[0],$key
+	lvx	@D[0],@x[4],$key
+
+	lvx	@K[3],0,$ctr			# load counter
+	?lvsr	$T1,0,$ctr			# prepare unaligned load
+	lvx	@D[1],@x[5],$ctr
+
+	lvx	@K[0],0,r12			# load constants
+	lvx	@K[5],@x[0],r12			# one
+	lvx	$FOUR,@x[1],r12
+	lvx	$sixteen,@x[2],r12
+	lvx	$twenty4,@x[3],r12
+
+	?vperm	@K[1],@K[2],@K[1],$T0		# align key
+	?vperm	@K[2],@D[0],@K[2],$T0
+	?vperm	@K[3],@D[1],@K[3],$T1		# align counter
+
+	lwz	@d[0],0($ctr)			# load counter to GPR
+	lwz	@d[1],4($ctr)
+	vadduwm	@K[3],@K[3],@K[5]		# adjust AltiVec counter
+	lwz	@d[2],8($ctr)
+	vadduwm	@K[4],@K[3],@K[5]
+	lwz	@d[3],12($ctr)
+	vadduwm	@K[5],@K[4],@K[5]
+
+	vspltisw $twenty,-12			# synthesize constants 
+	vspltisw $twelve,12
+	vspltisw $twenty5,-7
+	#vspltisw $seven,7			# synthesized in the loop
+
+	vxor	$T0,$T0,$T0			# 0x00..00
+	vspltisw $outmask,-1			# 0xff..ff
+	?lvsr	$inpperm,0,$inp			# prepare for unaligned load
+	?lvsl	$outperm,0,$out			# prepare for unaligned store
+	?vperm	$outmask,$outmask,$T0,$outperm
+
+	be?lvsl	$T0,0,@x[0]			# 0x00..0f
+	be?vspltisb $T1,3			# 0x03..03
+	be?vxor	$T0,$T0,$T1			# swap bytes within words
+	be?vxor	$outperm,$outperm,$T1
+	be?vperm $inpperm,$inpperm,$inpperm,$T0
+
+	b	Loop_outer_vmx
+
+.align	4
+Loop_outer_vmx:
+	lis	@x[0],0x6170			# synthesize sigma
+	lis	@x[1],0x3320
+	 vmr	$A0,@K[0]
+	lis	@x[2],0x7962
+	lis	@x[3],0x6b20
+	 vmr	$A1,@K[0]
+	ori	@x[0],@x[0],0x7865
+	ori	@x[1],@x[1],0x646e
+	 vmr	$A2,@K[0]
+	ori	@x[2],@x[2],0x2d32
+	ori	@x[3],@x[3],0x6574
+	 vmr	$B0,@K[1]
+
+	li	r0,10				# inner loop counter
+	lwz	@x[4],0($key)			# load key to GPR
+	 vmr	$B1,@K[1]
+	lwz	@x[5],4($key)
+	 vmr	$B2,@K[1]
+	lwz	@x[6],8($key)
+	 vmr	$C0,@K[2]
+	lwz	@x[7],12($key)
+	 vmr	$C1,@K[2]
+	lwz	@x[8],16($key)
+	 vmr	$C2,@K[2]
+	mr	@x[12],@d[0]			# copy GPR counter
+	lwz	@x[9],20($key)
+	 vmr	$D0,@K[3]
+	mr	@x[13],@d[1]
+	lwz	@x[10],24($key)
+	 vmr	$D1,@K[4]
+	mr	@x[14],@d[2]
+	lwz	@x[11],28($key)
+	 vmr	$D2,@K[5]
+	mr	@x[15],@d[3]
+
+	mr	@t[0],@x[4]
+	mr	@t[1],@x[5]
+	mr	@t[2],@x[6]
+	mr	@t[3],@x[7]
+	vspltisw $seven,7
+
+	mtctr	r0
+	nop
+Loop_vmx:
+___
+	my @thread0=&VMXROUND($A0,$B0,$C0,$D0,$T0,0);
+	my @thread1=&VMXROUND($A1,$B1,$C1,$D1,$T1,0);
+	my @thread2=&VMXROUND($A2,$B2,$C2,$D2,$T2,0);
+	my @thread3=&ROUND(0,4,8,12);
+
+	foreach (@thread0) {
+		eval;			eval(shift(@thread3));
+		eval(shift(@thread1));	eval(shift(@thread3));
+		eval(shift(@thread2));	eval(shift(@thread3));
+	}
+
+	@thread0=&VMXROUND($A0,$B0,$C0,$D0,$T0,1);
+	@thread1=&VMXROUND($A1,$B1,$C1,$D1,$T1,1);
+	@thread2=&VMXROUND($A2,$B2,$C2,$D2,$T2,1);
+	@thread3=&ROUND(0,5,10,15);
+
+	foreach (@thread0) {
+		eval;			eval(shift(@thread3));
+		eval(shift(@thread1));	eval(shift(@thread3));
+		eval(shift(@thread2));	eval(shift(@thread3));
+	}
+$code.=<<___;
+	bdnz	Loop_vmx
+
+	subi	$len,$len,256			# $len-=256
+	addi	@x[0],@x[0],0x7865		# accumulate key block
+	addi	@x[1],@x[1],0x646e
+	addi	@x[2],@x[2],0x2d32
+	addi	@x[3],@x[3],0x6574
+	addis	@x[0],@x[0],0x6170
+	addis	@x[1],@x[1],0x3320
+	addis	@x[2],@x[2],0x7962
+	addis	@x[3],@x[3],0x6b20
+	add	@x[4],@x[4],@t[0]
+	lwz	@t[0],16($key)
+	add	@x[5],@x[5],@t[1]
+	lwz	@t[1],20($key)
+	add	@x[6],@x[6],@t[2]
+	lwz	@t[2],24($key)
+	add	@x[7],@x[7],@t[3]
+	lwz	@t[3],28($key)
+	add	@x[8],@x[8],@t[0]
+	add	@x[9],@x[9],@t[1]
+	add	@x[10],@x[10],@t[2]
+	add	@x[11],@x[11],@t[3]
+	add	@x[12],@x[12],@d[0]
+	add	@x[13],@x[13],@d[1]
+	add	@x[14],@x[14],@d[2]
+	add	@x[15],@x[15],@d[3]
+
+	vadduwm	$A0,$A0,@K[0]			# accumulate key block
+	vadduwm	$A1,$A1,@K[0]
+	vadduwm	$A2,$A2,@K[0]
+	vadduwm	$B0,$B0,@K[1]
+	vadduwm	$B1,$B1,@K[1]
+	vadduwm	$B2,$B2,@K[1]
+	vadduwm	$C0,$C0,@K[2]
+	vadduwm	$C1,$C1,@K[2]
+	vadduwm	$C2,$C2,@K[2]
+	vadduwm	$D0,$D0,@K[3]
+	vadduwm	$D1,$D1,@K[4]
+	vadduwm	$D2,$D2,@K[5]
+
+	addi	@d[0],@d[0],4			# increment counter
+	vadduwm	@K[3],@K[3],$FOUR
+	vadduwm	@K[4],@K[4],$FOUR
+	vadduwm	@K[5],@K[5],$FOUR
+
+___
+if (!$LITTLE_ENDIAN) { for($i=0;$i<16;$i++) {	# flip byte order
+$code.=<<___;
+	mr	@t[$i&3],@x[$i]
+	rotlwi	@x[$i],@x[$i],8
+	rlwimi	@x[$i],@t[$i&3],24,0,7
+	rlwimi	@x[$i],@t[$i&3],24,16,23
+___
+} }
+$code.=<<___;
+	lwz	@t[0],0($inp)			# load input, aligned or not
+	lwz	@t[1],4($inp)
+	lwz	@t[2],8($inp)
+	lwz	@t[3],12($inp)
+	xor	@x[0],@x[0],@t[0]		# xor with input
+	lwz	@t[0],16($inp)
+	xor	@x[1],@x[1],@t[1]
+	lwz	@t[1],20($inp)
+	xor	@x[2],@x[2],@t[2]
+	lwz	@t[2],24($inp)
+	xor	@x[3],@x[3],@t[3]
+	lwz	@t[3],28($inp)
+	xor	@x[4],@x[4],@t[0]
+	lwz	@t[0],32($inp)
+	xor	@x[5],@x[5],@t[1]
+	lwz	@t[1],36($inp)
+	xor	@x[6],@x[6],@t[2]
+	lwz	@t[2],40($inp)
+	xor	@x[7],@x[7],@t[3]
+	lwz	@t[3],44($inp)
+	xor	@x[8],@x[8],@t[0]
+	lwz	@t[0],48($inp)
+	xor	@x[9],@x[9],@t[1]
+	lwz	@t[1],52($inp)
+	xor	@x[10],@x[10],@t[2]
+	lwz	@t[2],56($inp)
+	xor	@x[11],@x[11],@t[3]
+	lwz	@t[3],60($inp)
+	xor	@x[12],@x[12],@t[0]
+	stw	@x[0],0($out)			# store output, aligned or not
+	xor	@x[13],@x[13],@t[1]
+	stw	@x[1],4($out)
+	xor	@x[14],@x[14],@t[2]
+	stw	@x[2],8($out)
+	xor	@x[15],@x[15],@t[3]
+	stw	@x[3],12($out)
+	addi	$inp,$inp,64
+	stw	@x[4],16($out)
+	li	@t[0],16
+	stw	@x[5],20($out)
+	li	@t[1],32
+	stw	@x[6],24($out)
+	li	@t[2],48
+	stw	@x[7],28($out)
+	li	@t[3],64
+	stw	@x[8],32($out)
+	stw	@x[9],36($out)
+	stw	@x[10],40($out)
+	stw	@x[11],44($out)
+	stw	@x[12],48($out)
+	stw	@x[13],52($out)
+	stw	@x[14],56($out)
+	stw	@x[15],60($out)
+	addi	$out,$out,64
+
+	lvx	@D[0],0,$inp			# load input
+	lvx	@D[1],@t[0],$inp
+	lvx	@D[2],@t[1],$inp
+	lvx	@D[3],@t[2],$inp
+	lvx	@D[4],@t[3],$inp
+	addi	$inp,$inp,64
+
+	?vperm	@D[0],@D[1],@D[0],$inpperm	# align input
+	?vperm	@D[1],@D[2],@D[1],$inpperm
+	?vperm	@D[2],@D[3],@D[2],$inpperm
+	?vperm	@D[3],@D[4],@D[3],$inpperm
+	vxor	$A0,$A0,@D[0]			# xor with input
+	vxor	$B0,$B0,@D[1]
+	lvx	@D[1],@t[0],$inp		# keep loading input
+	vxor	$C0,$C0,@D[2]
+	lvx	@D[2],@t[1],$inp
+	vxor	$D0,$D0,@D[3]
+	lvx	@D[3],@t[2],$inp
+	lvx	@D[0],@t[3],$inp
+	addi	$inp,$inp,64
+	li	@t[3],63			# 63 is not a typo
+	vperm	$A0,$A0,$A0,$outperm		# pre-misalign output
+	vperm	$B0,$B0,$B0,$outperm
+	vperm	$C0,$C0,$C0,$outperm
+	vperm	$D0,$D0,$D0,$outperm
+
+	?vperm	@D[4],@D[1],@D[4],$inpperm	# align input
+	?vperm	@D[1],@D[2],@D[1],$inpperm
+	?vperm	@D[2],@D[3],@D[2],$inpperm
+	?vperm	@D[3],@D[0],@D[3],$inpperm
+	vxor	$A1,$A1,@D[4]
+	vxor	$B1,$B1,@D[1]
+	lvx	@D[1],@t[0],$inp		# keep loading input
+	vxor	$C1,$C1,@D[2]
+	lvx	@D[2],@t[1],$inp
+	vxor	$D1,$D1,@D[3]
+	lvx	@D[3],@t[2],$inp
+	lvx	@D[4],@t[3],$inp		# redundant in aligned case
+	addi	$inp,$inp,64
+	vperm	$A1,$A1,$A1,$outperm		# pre-misalign output
+	vperm	$B1,$B1,$B1,$outperm
+	vperm	$C1,$C1,$C1,$outperm
+	vperm	$D1,$D1,$D1,$outperm
+
+	?vperm	@D[0],@D[1],@D[0],$inpperm	# align input
+	?vperm	@D[1],@D[2],@D[1],$inpperm
+	?vperm	@D[2],@D[3],@D[2],$inpperm
+	?vperm	@D[3],@D[4],@D[3],$inpperm
+	vxor	$A2,$A2,@D[0]
+	vxor	$B2,$B2,@D[1]
+	vxor	$C2,$C2,@D[2]
+	vxor	$D2,$D2,@D[3]
+	vperm	$A2,$A2,$A2,$outperm		# pre-misalign output
+	vperm	$B2,$B2,$B2,$outperm
+	vperm	$C2,$C2,$C2,$outperm
+	vperm	$D2,$D2,$D2,$outperm
+
+	andi.	@x[1],$out,15			# is $out aligned?
+	mr	@x[0],$out
+
+	vsel	@D[0],$A0,$B0,$outmask		# collect pre-misaligned output
+	vsel	@D[1],$B0,$C0,$outmask
+	vsel	@D[2],$C0,$D0,$outmask
+	vsel	@D[3],$D0,$A1,$outmask
+	vsel	$B0,$A1,$B1,$outmask
+	vsel	$C0,$B1,$C1,$outmask
+	vsel	$D0,$C1,$D1,$outmask
+	vsel	$A1,$D1,$A2,$outmask
+	vsel	$B1,$A2,$B2,$outmask
+	vsel	$C1,$B2,$C2,$outmask
+	vsel	$D1,$C2,$D2,$outmask
+
+	#stvx	$A0,0,$out			# take it easy on the edges
+	stvx	@D[0],@t[0],$out		# store output
+	stvx	@D[1],@t[1],$out
+	stvx	@D[2],@t[2],$out
+	addi	$out,$out,64
+	stvx	@D[3],0,$out
+	stvx	$B0,@t[0],$out
+	stvx	$C0,@t[1],$out
+	stvx	$D0,@t[2],$out
+	addi	$out,$out,64
+	stvx	$A1,0,$out
+	stvx	$B1,@t[0],$out
+	stvx	$C1,@t[1],$out
+	stvx	$D1,@t[2],$out
+	addi	$out,$out,64
+
+	beq	Laligned_vmx
+
+	sub	@x[2],$out,@x[1]		# in misaligned case edges
+	li	@x[3],0				# are written byte-by-byte
+Lunaligned_tail_vmx:
+	stvebx	$D2,@x[3],@x[2]
+	addi	@x[3],@x[3],1
+	cmpw	@x[3],@x[1]
+	bne	Lunaligned_tail_vmx
+
+	sub	@x[2],@x[0],@x[1]
+Lunaligned_head_vmx:
+	stvebx	$A0,@x[1],@x[2]
+	cmpwi	@x[1],15
+	addi	@x[1],@x[1],1
+	bne	Lunaligned_head_vmx
+
+	${UCMP}i $len,255			# done with 256-byte blocks yet?
+	bgt	Loop_outer_vmx
+
+	b	Ldone_vmx
+
+.align	4
+Laligned_vmx:
+	stvx	$A0,0,@x[0]			# head hexaword was not stored
+
+	${UCMP}i $len,255			# done with 256-byte blocks yet?
+	bgt	Loop_outer_vmx
+	nop
+
+Ldone_vmx:
+	${UCMP}i $len,0				# done yet?
+	bnel	__ChaCha20_1x
+
+	lwz	r12,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*18-4`($sp)	# pull vrsave
+	li	r10,`15+$LOCALS+64`
+	li	r11,`31+$LOCALS+64`
+	mtspr	256,r12				# restore vrsave
+	lvx	v20,r10,$sp
+	addi	r10,r10,32
+	lvx	v21,r11,$sp
+	addi	r11,r11,32
+	lvx	v22,r10,$sp
+	addi	r10,r10,32
+	lvx	v23,r11,$sp
+	addi	r11,r11,32
+	lvx	v24,r10,$sp
+	addi	r10,r10,32
+	lvx	v25,r11,$sp
+	addi	r11,r11,32
+	lvx	v26,r10,$sp
+	addi	r10,r10,32
+	lvx	v27,r11,$sp
+	addi	r11,r11,32
+	lvx	v28,r10,$sp
+	addi	r10,r10,32
+	lvx	v29,r11,$sp
+	addi	r11,r11,32
+	lvx	v30,r10,$sp
+	lvx	v31,r11,$sp
+	$POP	r0, `$FRAME+$LRSAVE`($sp)
+	$POP	r14,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*18`($sp)
+	$POP	r15,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*17`($sp)
+	$POP	r16,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*16`($sp)
+	$POP	r17,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*15`($sp)
+	$POP	r18,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*14`($sp)
+	$POP	r19,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*13`($sp)
+	$POP	r20,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*12`($sp)
+	$POP	r21,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*11`($sp)
+	$POP	r22,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*10`($sp)
+	$POP	r23,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*9`($sp)
+	$POP	r24,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*8`($sp)
+	$POP	r25,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*7`($sp)
+	$POP	r26,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*6`($sp)
+	$POP	r27,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*5`($sp)
+	$POP	r28,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*4`($sp)
+	$POP	r29,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*3`($sp)
+	$POP	r30,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*2`($sp)
+	$POP	r31,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*1`($sp)
+	mtlr	r0
+	addi	$sp,$sp,$FRAME
+	blr
+	.long	0
+	.byte	0,12,0x04,1,0x80,18,5,0
+	.long	0
+.size	.ChaCha20_ctr32_vmx,.-.ChaCha20_ctr32_vmx
+
+.align	5
+Lconsts:
+	mflr	r0
+	bcl	20,31,\$+4
+	mflr	r12	#vvvvv "distance between . and _vpaes_consts
+	addi	r12,r12,`64-8`
+	mtlr	r0
+	blr
+	.long	0
+	.byte	0,12,0x14,0,0,0,0,0
+	.space	`64-9*4`
+Lsigma:
+	.long   0x61707865,0x3320646e,0x79622d32,0x6b206574
+	.long	1,0,0,0
+	.long	4,0,0,0
+___
+$code.=<<___ 	if ($LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+	.long	0x0e0f0c0d,0x0a0b0809,0x06070405,0x02030001
+	.long	0x0d0e0f0c,0x090a0b08,0x05060704,0x01020300
+___
+$code.=<<___ 	if (!$LITTLE_ENDIAN);	# flipped words
+	.long	0x02030001,0x06070405,0x0a0b0809,0x0e0f0c0d
+	.long	0x01020300,0x05060704,0x090a0b08,0x0d0e0f0c
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+.asciz  "ChaCha20 for PowerPC/AltiVec, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+.align	2
+___
+}}}
+
+foreach (split("\n",$code)) {
+	s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/ge;
+
+	# instructions prefixed with '?' are endian-specific and need
+	# to be adjusted accordingly...
+	if ($flavour !~ /le$/) {	# big-endian
+	    s/be\?//		or
+	    s/le\?/#le#/	or
+	    s/\?lvsr/lvsl/	or
+	    s/\?lvsl/lvsr/	or
+	    s/\?(vperm\s+v[0-9]+,\s*)(v[0-9]+,\s*)(v[0-9]+,\s*)(v[0-9]+)/$1$3$2$4/ or
+	    s/(vsldoi\s+v[0-9]+,\s*)(v[0-9]+,)\s*(v[0-9]+,\s*)([0-9]+)/$1$3$2 16-$4/;
+	} else {			# little-endian
+	    s/le\?//		or
+	    s/be\?/#be#/	or
+	    s/\?([a-z]+)/$1/;
+	}
+
+	print $_,"\n";
+}
+
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/chacha/asm/chacha-s390x.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/chacha/asm/chacha-s390x.pl
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..c315264
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/chacha/asm/chacha-s390x.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,326 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# December 2015
+#
+# ChaCha20 for s390x.
+#
+# 3 times faster than compiler-generated code.
+
+$flavour = shift;
+
+if ($flavour =~ /3[12]/) {
+	$SIZE_T=4;
+	$g="";
+} else {
+	$SIZE_T=8;
+	$g="g";
+}
+
+while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {}
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+sub AUTOLOAD()		# thunk [simplified] x86-style perlasm
+{ my $opcode = $AUTOLOAD; $opcode =~ s/.*:://;
+    $code .= "\t$opcode\t".join(',',@_)."\n";
+}
+
+my $sp="%r15";
+
+my $stdframe=16*$SIZE_T+4*8;
+my $frame=$stdframe+4*20;
+
+my ($out,$inp,$len,$key,$counter)=map("%r$_",(2..6));
+
+my @x=map("%r$_",(0..7,"x","x","x","x",(10..13)));
+my @t=map("%r$_",(8,9));
+
+sub ROUND {
+my ($a0,$b0,$c0,$d0)=@_;
+my ($a1,$b1,$c1,$d1)=map(($_&~3)+(($_+1)&3),($a0,$b0,$c0,$d0));
+my ($a2,$b2,$c2,$d2)=map(($_&~3)+(($_+1)&3),($a1,$b1,$c1,$d1));
+my ($a3,$b3,$c3,$d3)=map(($_&~3)+(($_+1)&3),($a2,$b2,$c2,$d2));
+my ($xc,$xc_)=map("\"$_\"",@t);
+my @x=map("\"$_\"",@x);
+
+	# Consider order in which variables are addressed by their
+	# index:
+	#
+	#	a   b   c   d
+	#
+	#	0   4   8  12 < even round
+	#	1   5   9  13
+	#	2   6  10  14
+	#	3   7  11  15
+	#	0   5  10  15 < odd round
+	#	1   6  11  12
+	#	2   7   8  13
+	#	3   4   9  14
+	#
+	# 'a', 'b' and 'd's are permanently allocated in registers,
+	# @x[0..7,12..15], while 'c's are maintained in memory. If
+	# you observe 'c' column, you'll notice that pair of 'c's is
+	# invariant between rounds. This means that we have to reload
+	# them once per round, in the middle. This is why you'll see
+	# 'c' stores and loads in the middle, but none in the beginning
+	# or end.
+
+	(
+	"&alr	(@x[$a0],@x[$b0])",	# Q1
+	 "&alr	(@x[$a1],@x[$b1])",	# Q2
+	"&xr	(@x[$d0],@x[$a0])",
+	 "&xr	(@x[$d1],@x[$a1])",
+	"&rll	(@x[$d0],@x[$d0],16)",
+	 "&rll	(@x[$d1],@x[$d1],16)",
+
+	"&alr	($xc,@x[$d0])",
+	 "&alr	($xc_,@x[$d1])",
+	"&xr	(@x[$b0],$xc)",
+	 "&xr	(@x[$b1],$xc_)",
+	"&rll	(@x[$b0],@x[$b0],12)",
+	 "&rll	(@x[$b1],@x[$b1],12)",
+
+	"&alr	(@x[$a0],@x[$b0])",
+	 "&alr	(@x[$a1],@x[$b1])",
+	"&xr	(@x[$d0],@x[$a0])",
+	 "&xr	(@x[$d1],@x[$a1])",
+	"&rll	(@x[$d0],@x[$d0],8)",
+	 "&rll	(@x[$d1],@x[$d1],8)",
+
+	"&alr	($xc,@x[$d0])",
+	 "&alr	($xc_,@x[$d1])",
+	"&xr	(@x[$b0],$xc)",
+	 "&xr	(@x[$b1],$xc_)",
+	"&rll	(@x[$b0],@x[$b0],7)",
+	 "&rll	(@x[$b1],@x[$b1],7)",
+
+	"&stm	($xc,$xc_,'$stdframe+4*8+4*$c0($sp)')",	# reload pair of 'c's
+	"&lm	($xc,$xc_,'$stdframe+4*8+4*$c2($sp)')",
+
+	"&alr	(@x[$a2],@x[$b2])",	# Q3
+	 "&alr	(@x[$a3],@x[$b3])",	# Q4
+	"&xr	(@x[$d2],@x[$a2])",
+	 "&xr	(@x[$d3],@x[$a3])",
+	"&rll	(@x[$d2],@x[$d2],16)",
+	 "&rll	(@x[$d3],@x[$d3],16)",
+
+	"&alr	($xc,@x[$d2])",
+	 "&alr	($xc_,@x[$d3])",
+	"&xr	(@x[$b2],$xc)",
+	 "&xr	(@x[$b3],$xc_)",
+	"&rll	(@x[$b2],@x[$b2],12)",
+	 "&rll	(@x[$b3],@x[$b3],12)",
+
+	"&alr	(@x[$a2],@x[$b2])",
+	 "&alr	(@x[$a3],@x[$b3])",
+	"&xr	(@x[$d2],@x[$a2])",
+	 "&xr	(@x[$d3],@x[$a3])",
+	"&rll	(@x[$d2],@x[$d2],8)",
+	 "&rll	(@x[$d3],@x[$d3],8)",
+
+	"&alr	($xc,@x[$d2])",
+	 "&alr	($xc_,@x[$d3])",
+	"&xr	(@x[$b2],$xc)",
+	 "&xr	(@x[$b3],$xc_)",
+	"&rll	(@x[$b2],@x[$b2],7)",
+	 "&rll	(@x[$b3],@x[$b3],7)"
+	);
+}
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.text
+
+.globl	ChaCha20_ctr32
+.type	ChaCha20_ctr32,\@function
+.align	32
+ChaCha20_ctr32:
+	lt${g}r	$len,$len			# $len==0?
+	bzr	%r14
+	a${g}hi	$len,-64
+	l${g}hi	%r1,-$frame
+	stm${g}	%r6,%r15,`6*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+	sl${g}r	$out,$inp			# difference
+	la	$len,0($inp,$len)		# end of input minus 64
+	larl	%r7,.Lsigma
+	lgr	%r0,$sp
+	la	$sp,0(%r1,$sp)
+	st${g}	%r0,0($sp)
+
+	lmg	%r8,%r11,0($key)		# load key
+	lmg	%r12,%r13,0($counter)		# load counter
+	lmg	%r6,%r7,0(%r7)			# load sigma constant
+
+	la	%r14,0($inp)
+	st${g}	$out,$frame+3*$SIZE_T($sp)
+	st${g}	$len,$frame+4*$SIZE_T($sp)
+	stmg	%r6,%r13,$stdframe($sp)		# copy key schedule to stack
+	srlg	@x[12],%r12,32			# 32-bit counter value
+	j	.Loop_outer
+
+.align	16
+.Loop_outer:
+	lm	@x[0],@x[7],$stdframe+4*0($sp)		# load x[0]-x[7]
+	lm	@t[0],@t[1],$stdframe+4*10($sp)		# load x[10]-x[11]
+	lm	@x[13],@x[15],$stdframe+4*13($sp)	# load x[13]-x[15]
+	stm	@t[0],@t[1],$stdframe+4*8+4*10($sp)	# offload x[10]-x[11]
+	lm	@t[0],@t[1],$stdframe+4*8($sp)		# load x[8]-x[9]
+	st	@x[12],$stdframe+4*12($sp)		# save counter
+	st${g}	%r14,$frame+2*$SIZE_T($sp)		# save input pointer
+	lhi	%r14,10
+	j	.Loop
+
+.align	4
+.Loop:
+___
+	foreach (&ROUND(0, 4, 8,12)) { eval; }
+	foreach (&ROUND(0, 5,10,15)) { eval; }
+$code.=<<___;
+	brct	%r14,.Loop
+
+	l${g}	%r14,$frame+2*$SIZE_T($sp)		# pull input pointer
+	stm	@t[0],@t[1],$stdframe+4*8+4*8($sp)	# offload x[8]-x[9]
+	lm${g}	@t[0],@t[1],$frame+3*$SIZE_T($sp)
+
+	al	@x[0],$stdframe+4*0($sp)	# accumulate key schedule
+	al	@x[1],$stdframe+4*1($sp)
+	al	@x[2],$stdframe+4*2($sp)
+	al	@x[3],$stdframe+4*3($sp)
+	al	@x[4],$stdframe+4*4($sp)
+	al	@x[5],$stdframe+4*5($sp)
+	al	@x[6],$stdframe+4*6($sp)
+	al	@x[7],$stdframe+4*7($sp)
+	lrvr	@x[0],@x[0]
+	lrvr	@x[1],@x[1]
+	lrvr	@x[2],@x[2]
+	lrvr	@x[3],@x[3]
+	lrvr	@x[4],@x[4]
+	lrvr	@x[5],@x[5]
+	lrvr	@x[6],@x[6]
+	lrvr	@x[7],@x[7]
+	al	@x[12],$stdframe+4*12($sp)
+	al	@x[13],$stdframe+4*13($sp)
+	al	@x[14],$stdframe+4*14($sp)
+	al	@x[15],$stdframe+4*15($sp)
+	lrvr	@x[12],@x[12]
+	lrvr	@x[13],@x[13]
+	lrvr	@x[14],@x[14]
+	lrvr	@x[15],@x[15]
+
+	la	@t[0],0(@t[0],%r14)		# reconstruct output pointer
+	cl${g}r	%r14,@t[1]
+	jh	.Ltail
+
+	x	@x[0],4*0(%r14)			# xor with input
+	x	@x[1],4*1(%r14)
+	st	@x[0],4*0(@t[0])		# store output
+	x	@x[2],4*2(%r14)
+	st	@x[1],4*1(@t[0])
+	x	@x[3],4*3(%r14)
+	st	@x[2],4*2(@t[0])
+	x	@x[4],4*4(%r14)
+	st	@x[3],4*3(@t[0])
+	 lm	@x[0],@x[3],$stdframe+4*8+4*8($sp)	# load x[8]-x[11]
+	x	@x[5],4*5(%r14)
+	st	@x[4],4*4(@t[0])
+	x	@x[6],4*6(%r14)
+	 al	@x[0],$stdframe+4*8($sp)
+	st	@x[5],4*5(@t[0])
+	x	@x[7],4*7(%r14)
+	 al	@x[1],$stdframe+4*9($sp)
+	st	@x[6],4*6(@t[0])
+	x	@x[12],4*12(%r14)
+	 al	@x[2],$stdframe+4*10($sp)
+	st	@x[7],4*7(@t[0])
+	x	@x[13],4*13(%r14)
+	 al	@x[3],$stdframe+4*11($sp)
+	st	@x[12],4*12(@t[0])
+	x	@x[14],4*14(%r14)
+	st	@x[13],4*13(@t[0])
+	x	@x[15],4*15(%r14)
+	st	@x[14],4*14(@t[0])
+	 lrvr	@x[0],@x[0]
+	st	@x[15],4*15(@t[0])
+	 lrvr	@x[1],@x[1]
+	 lrvr	@x[2],@x[2]
+	 lrvr	@x[3],@x[3]
+	lhi	@x[12],1
+	 x	@x[0],4*8(%r14)
+	al	@x[12],$stdframe+4*12($sp)	# increment counter
+	 x	@x[1],4*9(%r14)
+	 st	@x[0],4*8(@t[0])
+	 x	@x[2],4*10(%r14)
+	 st	@x[1],4*9(@t[0])
+	 x	@x[3],4*11(%r14)
+	 st	@x[2],4*10(@t[0])
+	 st	@x[3],4*11(@t[0])
+
+	cl${g}r	%r14,@t[1]			# done yet?
+	la	%r14,64(%r14)
+	jl	.Loop_outer
+
+.Ldone:
+	xgr	%r0,%r0
+	xgr	%r1,%r1
+	xgr	%r2,%r2
+	xgr	%r3,%r3
+	stmg	%r0,%r3,$stdframe+4*4($sp)	# wipe key copy
+	stmg	%r0,%r3,$stdframe+4*12($sp)
+
+	lm${g}	%r6,%r15,`$frame+6*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+	br	%r14
+
+.align	16
+.Ltail:
+	la	@t[1],64($t[1])
+	stm	@x[0],@x[7],$stdframe+4*0($sp)
+	sl${g}r	@t[1],%r14
+	lm	@x[0],@x[3],$stdframe+4*8+4*8($sp)
+	l${g}hi	@x[6],0
+	stm	@x[12],@x[15],$stdframe+4*12($sp)
+	al	@x[0],$stdframe+4*8($sp)
+	al	@x[1],$stdframe+4*9($sp)
+	al	@x[2],$stdframe+4*10($sp)
+	al	@x[3],$stdframe+4*11($sp)
+	lrvr	@x[0],@x[0]
+	lrvr	@x[1],@x[1]
+	lrvr	@x[2],@x[2]
+	lrvr	@x[3],@x[3]
+	stm	@x[0],@x[3],$stdframe+4*8($sp)
+
+.Loop_tail:
+	llgc	@x[4],0(@x[6],%r14)
+	llgc	@x[5],$stdframe(@x[6],$sp)
+	xr	@x[5],@x[4]
+	stc	@x[5],0(@x[6],@t[0])
+	la	@x[6],1(@x[6])
+	brct	@t[1],.Loop_tail
+
+	j	.Ldone
+.size	ChaCha20_ctr32,.-ChaCha20_ctr32
+
+.align	32
+.Lsigma:
+.long	0x61707865,0x3320646e,0x79622d32,0x6b206574	# endian-neutral
+.asciz	"ChaCha20 for s390x, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+.align	4
+___
+
+foreach (split("\n",$code)) {
+	s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/ge;
+
+	print $_,"\n";
+}
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/chacha/asm/chacha-x86.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/chacha/asm/chacha-x86.pl
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..61b3286
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/chacha/asm/chacha-x86.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,1154 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# January 2015
+#
+# ChaCha20 for x86.
+#
+# Performance in cycles per byte out of large buffer.
+#
+#		1xIALU/gcc	4xSSSE3
+# Pentium	17.5/+80%
+# PIII		14.2/+60%
+# P4		18.6/+84%
+# Core2		9.56/+89%	4.83
+# Westmere	9.50/+45%	3.35
+# Sandy Bridge	10.5/+47%	3.20
+# Haswell	8.15/+50%	2.83
+# Silvermont	17.4/+36%	8.35
+# Goldmont	13.4/+40%	4.36
+# Sledgehammer	10.2/+54%
+# Bulldozer	13.4/+50%	4.38(*)
+#
+# (*)	Bulldozer actually executes 4xXOP code path that delivers 3.55;
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm");
+require "x86asm.pl";
+
+$output=pop;
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+&asm_init($ARGV[0],"chacha-x86.pl",$ARGV[$#ARGV] eq "386");
+
+$xmm=$ymm=0;
+for (@ARGV) { $xmm=1 if (/-DOPENSSL_IA32_SSE2/); }
+
+$ymm=1 if ($xmm &&
+		`$ENV{CC} -Wa,-v -c -o /dev/null -x assembler /dev/null 2>&1`
+			=~ /GNU assembler version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/ &&
+		($gasver=$1)>=2.19);	# first version supporting AVX
+
+$ymm=1 if ($xmm && !$ymm && $ARGV[0] eq "win32n" &&
+		`nasm -v 2>&1` =~ /NASM version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/ &&
+		$1>=2.03);	# first version supporting AVX
+
+$ymm=1 if ($xmm && !$ymm && $ARGV[0] eq "win32" &&
+		`ml 2>&1` =~ /Version ([0-9]+)\./ &&
+		$1>=10);	# first version supporting AVX
+
+$ymm=1 if ($xmm && !$ymm &&
+		`$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /(^clang version|based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/ &&
+		$2>=3.0);	# first version supporting AVX
+
+$a="eax";
+($b,$b_)=("ebx","ebp");
+($c,$c_)=("ecx","esi");
+($d,$d_)=("edx","edi");
+
+sub QUARTERROUND {
+my ($ai,$bi,$ci,$di,$i)=@_;
+my ($an,$bn,$cn,$dn)=map(($_&~3)+(($_+1)&3),($ai,$bi,$ci,$di));	# next
+my ($ap,$bp,$cp,$dp)=map(($_&~3)+(($_-1)&3),($ai,$bi,$ci,$di));	# previous
+
+	#       a   b   c   d
+	#
+	#       0   4   8  12 < even round
+	#       1   5   9  13
+	#       2   6  10  14
+	#       3   7  11  15
+	#       0   5  10  15 < odd round
+	#       1   6  11  12
+	#       2   7   8  13
+	#       3   4   9  14
+
+	if ($i==0) {
+            my $j=4;
+	    ($ap,$bp,$cp,$dp)=map(($_&~3)+(($_-$j--)&3),($ap,$bp,$cp,$dp));
+	} elsif ($i==3) {
+            my $j=0;
+	    ($an,$bn,$cn,$dn)=map(($_&~3)+(($_+$j++)&3),($an,$bn,$cn,$dn));
+	} elsif ($i==4) {
+            my $j=4;
+	    ($ap,$bp,$cp,$dp)=map(($_&~3)+(($_+$j--)&3),($ap,$bp,$cp,$dp));
+	} elsif ($i==7) {
+            my $j=0;
+	    ($an,$bn,$cn,$dn)=map(($_&~3)+(($_-$j++)&3),($an,$bn,$cn,$dn));
+	}
+
+	#&add	($a,$b);			# see elsewhere
+	&xor	($d,$a);
+	 &mov	(&DWP(4*$cp,"esp"),$c_)		if ($ai>0 && $ai<3);
+	&rol	($d,16);
+	 &mov	(&DWP(4*$bp,"esp"),$b_)		if ($i!=0);
+	&add	($c,$d);
+	 &mov	($c_,&DWP(4*$cn,"esp"))		if ($ai>0 && $ai<3);
+	&xor	($b,$c);
+	 &mov	($d_,&DWP(4*$dn,"esp"))		if ($di!=$dn);
+	&rol	($b,12);
+	 &mov	($b_,&DWP(4*$bn,"esp"))		if ($i<7);
+	 &mov	($b_,&DWP(128,"esp"))		if ($i==7);	# loop counter
+	&add	($a,$b);
+	&xor	($d,$a);
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*$ai,"esp"),$a);
+	&rol	($d,8);
+	&mov	($a,&DWP(4*$an,"esp"));
+	&add	($c,$d);
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*$di,"esp"),$d)		if ($di!=$dn);
+	&mov	($d_,$d)			if ($di==$dn);
+	&xor	($b,$c);
+	 &add	($a,$b_)			if ($i<7);	# elsewhere
+	&rol	($b,7);
+
+	($b,$b_)=($b_,$b);
+	($c,$c_)=($c_,$c);
+	($d,$d_)=($d_,$d);
+}
+
+&static_label("ssse3_shortcut");
+&static_label("xop_shortcut");
+&static_label("ssse3_data");
+&static_label("pic_point");
+
+&function_begin("ChaCha20_ctr32");
+	&xor	("eax","eax");
+	&cmp	("eax",&wparam(2));		# len==0?
+	&je	(&label("no_data"));
+if ($xmm) {
+	&call	(&label("pic_point"));
+&set_label("pic_point");
+	&blindpop("eax");
+	&picmeup("ebp","OPENSSL_ia32cap_P","eax",&label("pic_point"));
+	&test	(&DWP(0,"ebp"),1<<24);		# test FXSR bit
+	&jz	(&label("x86"));
+	&test	(&DWP(4,"ebp"),1<<9);		# test SSSE3 bit
+	&jz	(&label("x86"));
+	&jmp	(&label("ssse3_shortcut"));
+&set_label("x86");
+}
+	&mov	("esi",&wparam(3));		# key
+	&mov	("edi",&wparam(4));		# counter and nonce
+
+	&stack_push(33);
+
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(4*0,"esi"));	# copy key
+	&mov	("ebx",&DWP(4*1,"esi"));
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(4*2,"esi"));
+	&mov	("edx",&DWP(4*3,"esi"));
+	&mov	(&DWP(64+4*4,"esp"),"eax");
+	&mov	(&DWP(64+4*5,"esp"),"ebx");
+	&mov	(&DWP(64+4*6,"esp"),"ecx");
+	&mov	(&DWP(64+4*7,"esp"),"edx");
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(4*4,"esi"));
+	&mov	("ebx",&DWP(4*5,"esi"));
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(4*6,"esi"));
+	&mov	("edx",&DWP(4*7,"esi"));
+	&mov	(&DWP(64+4*8,"esp"),"eax");
+	&mov	(&DWP(64+4*9,"esp"),"ebx");
+	&mov	(&DWP(64+4*10,"esp"),"ecx");
+	&mov	(&DWP(64+4*11,"esp"),"edx");
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(4*0,"edi"));	# copy counter and nonce
+	&mov	("ebx",&DWP(4*1,"edi"));
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(4*2,"edi"));
+	&mov	("edx",&DWP(4*3,"edi"));
+	&sub	("eax",1);
+	&mov	(&DWP(64+4*12,"esp"),"eax");
+	&mov	(&DWP(64+4*13,"esp"),"ebx");
+	&mov	(&DWP(64+4*14,"esp"),"ecx");
+	&mov	(&DWP(64+4*15,"esp"),"edx");
+	&jmp	(&label("entry"));
+
+&set_label("outer_loop",16);
+	&mov	(&wparam(1),$b);		# save input
+	&mov	(&wparam(0),$a);		# save output
+	&mov	(&wparam(2),$c);		# save len
+&set_label("entry");
+	&mov	($a,0x61707865);
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*1,"esp"),0x3320646e);
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*2,"esp"),0x79622d32);
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*3,"esp"),0x6b206574);
+
+	&mov	($b, &DWP(64+4*5,"esp"));	# copy key material
+	&mov	($b_,&DWP(64+4*6,"esp"));
+	&mov	($c, &DWP(64+4*10,"esp"));
+	&mov	($c_,&DWP(64+4*11,"esp"));
+	&mov	($d, &DWP(64+4*13,"esp"));
+	&mov	($d_,&DWP(64+4*14,"esp"));
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*5,"esp"),$b);
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*6,"esp"),$b_);
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*10,"esp"),$c);
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*11,"esp"),$c_);
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*13,"esp"),$d);
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*14,"esp"),$d_);
+
+	&mov	($b, &DWP(64+4*7,"esp"));
+	&mov	($d_,&DWP(64+4*15,"esp"));
+	&mov	($d, &DWP(64+4*12,"esp"));
+	&mov	($b_,&DWP(64+4*4,"esp"));
+	&mov	($c, &DWP(64+4*8,"esp"));
+	&mov	($c_,&DWP(64+4*9,"esp"));
+	&add	($d,1);				# counter value
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*7,"esp"),$b);
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*15,"esp"),$d_);
+	&mov	(&DWP(64+4*12,"esp"),$d);	# save counter value
+
+	&mov	($b,10);			# loop counter
+	&jmp	(&label("loop"));
+
+&set_label("loop",16);
+	&add	($a,$b_);			# elsewhere
+	&mov	(&DWP(128,"esp"),$b);		# save loop counter
+	&mov	($b,$b_);
+	&QUARTERROUND(0, 4, 8, 12, 0);
+	&QUARTERROUND(1, 5, 9, 13, 1);
+	&QUARTERROUND(2, 6,10, 14, 2);
+	&QUARTERROUND(3, 7,11, 15, 3);
+	&QUARTERROUND(0, 5,10, 15, 4);
+	&QUARTERROUND(1, 6,11, 12, 5);
+	&QUARTERROUND(2, 7, 8, 13, 6);
+	&QUARTERROUND(3, 4, 9, 14, 7);
+	&dec	($b);
+	&jnz	(&label("loop"));
+
+	&mov	($b,&wparam(2));		# load len
+
+	&add	($a,0x61707865);		# accumulate key material
+	&add	($b_,&DWP(64+4*4,"esp"));
+	&add	($c, &DWP(64+4*8,"esp"));
+	&add	($c_,&DWP(64+4*9,"esp"));
+
+	&cmp	($b,64);
+	&jb	(&label("tail"));
+
+	&mov	($b,&wparam(1));		# load input pointer
+	&add	($d, &DWP(64+4*12,"esp"));
+	&add	($d_,&DWP(64+4*14,"esp"));
+
+	&xor	($a, &DWP(4*0,$b));		# xor with input
+	&xor	($b_,&DWP(4*4,$b));
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*0,"esp"),$a);
+	&mov	($a,&wparam(0));		# load output pointer
+	&xor	($c, &DWP(4*8,$b));
+	&xor	($c_,&DWP(4*9,$b));
+	&xor	($d, &DWP(4*12,$b));
+	&xor	($d_,&DWP(4*14,$b));
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*4,$a),$b_);		# write output
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*8,$a),$c);
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*9,$a),$c_);
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*12,$a),$d);
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*14,$a),$d_);
+
+	&mov	($b_,&DWP(4*1,"esp"));
+	&mov	($c, &DWP(4*2,"esp"));
+	&mov	($c_,&DWP(4*3,"esp"));
+	&mov	($d, &DWP(4*5,"esp"));
+	&mov	($d_,&DWP(4*6,"esp"));
+	&add	($b_,0x3320646e);		# accumulate key material
+	&add	($c, 0x79622d32);
+	&add	($c_,0x6b206574);
+	&add	($d, &DWP(64+4*5,"esp"));
+	&add	($d_,&DWP(64+4*6,"esp"));
+	&xor	($b_,&DWP(4*1,$b));
+	&xor	($c, &DWP(4*2,$b));
+	&xor	($c_,&DWP(4*3,$b));
+	&xor	($d, &DWP(4*5,$b));
+	&xor	($d_,&DWP(4*6,$b));
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*1,$a),$b_);
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*2,$a),$c);
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*3,$a),$c_);
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*5,$a),$d);
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*6,$a),$d_);
+
+	&mov	($b_,&DWP(4*7,"esp"));
+	&mov	($c, &DWP(4*10,"esp"));
+	&mov	($c_,&DWP(4*11,"esp"));
+	&mov	($d, &DWP(4*13,"esp"));
+	&mov	($d_,&DWP(4*15,"esp"));
+	&add	($b_,&DWP(64+4*7,"esp"));
+	&add	($c, &DWP(64+4*10,"esp"));
+	&add	($c_,&DWP(64+4*11,"esp"));
+	&add	($d, &DWP(64+4*13,"esp"));
+	&add	($d_,&DWP(64+4*15,"esp"));
+	&xor	($b_,&DWP(4*7,$b));
+	&xor	($c, &DWP(4*10,$b));
+	&xor	($c_,&DWP(4*11,$b));
+	&xor	($d, &DWP(4*13,$b));
+	&xor	($d_,&DWP(4*15,$b));
+	&lea	($b,&DWP(4*16,$b));
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*7,$a),$b_);
+	&mov	($b_,&DWP(4*0,"esp"));
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*10,$a),$c);
+	&mov	($c,&wparam(2));		# len
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*11,$a),$c_);
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*13,$a),$d);
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*15,$a),$d_);
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*0,$a),$b_);
+	&lea	($a,&DWP(4*16,$a));
+	&sub	($c,64);
+	&jnz	(&label("outer_loop"));
+
+	&jmp	(&label("done"));
+
+&set_label("tail");
+	&add	($d, &DWP(64+4*12,"esp"));
+	&add	($d_,&DWP(64+4*14,"esp"));
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*0,"esp"),$a);
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*4,"esp"),$b_);
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*8,"esp"),$c);
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*9,"esp"),$c_);
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*12,"esp"),$d);
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*14,"esp"),$d_);
+
+	&mov	($b_,&DWP(4*1,"esp"));
+	&mov	($c, &DWP(4*2,"esp"));
+	&mov	($c_,&DWP(4*3,"esp"));
+	&mov	($d, &DWP(4*5,"esp"));
+	&mov	($d_,&DWP(4*6,"esp"));
+	&add	($b_,0x3320646e);		# accumulate key material
+	&add	($c, 0x79622d32);
+	&add	($c_,0x6b206574);
+	&add	($d, &DWP(64+4*5,"esp"));
+	&add	($d_,&DWP(64+4*6,"esp"));
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*1,"esp"),$b_);
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*2,"esp"),$c);
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*3,"esp"),$c_);
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*5,"esp"),$d);
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*6,"esp"),$d_);
+
+	&mov	($b_,&DWP(4*7,"esp"));
+	&mov	($c, &DWP(4*10,"esp"));
+	&mov	($c_,&DWP(4*11,"esp"));
+	&mov	($d, &DWP(4*13,"esp"));
+	&mov	($d_,&DWP(4*15,"esp"));
+	&add	($b_,&DWP(64+4*7,"esp"));
+	&add	($c, &DWP(64+4*10,"esp"));
+	&add	($c_,&DWP(64+4*11,"esp"));
+	&add	($d, &DWP(64+4*13,"esp"));
+	&add	($d_,&DWP(64+4*15,"esp"));
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*7,"esp"),$b_);
+	&mov	($b_,&wparam(1));		# load input
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*10,"esp"),$c);
+	&mov	($c,&wparam(0));		# load output
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*11,"esp"),$c_);
+	&xor	($c_,$c_);
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*13,"esp"),$d);
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*15,"esp"),$d_);
+
+	&xor	("eax","eax");
+	&xor	("edx","edx");
+&set_label("tail_loop");
+	&movb	("al",&BP(0,$c_,$b_));
+	&movb	("dl",&BP(0,"esp",$c_));
+	&lea	($c_,&DWP(1,$c_));
+	&xor	("al","dl");
+	&mov	(&BP(-1,$c,$c_),"al");
+	&dec	($b);
+	&jnz	(&label("tail_loop"));
+
+&set_label("done");
+	&stack_pop(33);
+&set_label("no_data");
+&function_end("ChaCha20_ctr32");
+
+if ($xmm) {
+my ($xa,$xa_,$xb,$xb_,$xc,$xc_,$xd,$xd_)=map("xmm$_",(0..7));
+my ($out,$inp,$len)=("edi","esi","ecx");
+
+sub QUARTERROUND_SSSE3 {
+my ($ai,$bi,$ci,$di,$i)=@_;
+my ($an,$bn,$cn,$dn)=map(($_&~3)+(($_+1)&3),($ai,$bi,$ci,$di));	# next
+my ($ap,$bp,$cp,$dp)=map(($_&~3)+(($_-1)&3),($ai,$bi,$ci,$di));	# previous
+
+	#       a   b   c   d
+	#
+	#       0   4   8  12 < even round
+	#       1   5   9  13
+	#       2   6  10  14
+	#       3   7  11  15
+	#       0   5  10  15 < odd round
+	#       1   6  11  12
+	#       2   7   8  13
+	#       3   4   9  14
+
+	if ($i==0) {
+            my $j=4;
+	    ($ap,$bp,$cp,$dp)=map(($_&~3)+(($_-$j--)&3),($ap,$bp,$cp,$dp));
+	} elsif ($i==3) {
+            my $j=0;
+	    ($an,$bn,$cn,$dn)=map(($_&~3)+(($_+$j++)&3),($an,$bn,$cn,$dn));
+	} elsif ($i==4) {
+            my $j=4;
+	    ($ap,$bp,$cp,$dp)=map(($_&~3)+(($_+$j--)&3),($ap,$bp,$cp,$dp));
+	} elsif ($i==7) {
+            my $j=0;
+	    ($an,$bn,$cn,$dn)=map(($_&~3)+(($_-$j++)&3),($an,$bn,$cn,$dn));
+	}
+
+	#&paddd	($xa,$xb);			# see elsewhere
+	#&pxor	($xd,$xa);			# see elsewhere
+	 &movdqa(&QWP(16*$cp-128,"ebx"),$xc_)	if ($ai>0 && $ai<3);
+	&pshufb	($xd,&QWP(0,"eax"));		# rot16
+	 &movdqa(&QWP(16*$bp-128,"ebx"),$xb_)	if ($i!=0);
+	&paddd	($xc,$xd);
+	 &movdqa($xc_,&QWP(16*$cn-128,"ebx"))	if ($ai>0 && $ai<3);
+	&pxor	($xb,$xc);
+	 &movdqa($xb_,&QWP(16*$bn-128,"ebx"))	if ($i<7);
+	&movdqa	($xa_,$xb);			# borrow as temporary
+	&pslld	($xb,12);
+	&psrld	($xa_,20);
+	&por	($xb,$xa_);
+	 &movdqa($xa_,&QWP(16*$an-128,"ebx"));
+	&paddd	($xa,$xb);
+	 &movdqa($xd_,&QWP(16*$dn-128,"ebx"))	if ($di!=$dn);
+	&pxor	($xd,$xa);
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(16*$ai-128,"ebx"),$xa);
+	&pshufb	($xd,&QWP(16,"eax"));		# rot8
+	&paddd	($xc,$xd);
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(16*$di-128,"ebx"),$xd)	if ($di!=$dn);
+	&movdqa	($xd_,$xd)			if ($di==$dn);
+	&pxor	($xb,$xc);
+	 &paddd	($xa_,$xb_)			if ($i<7);	# elsewhere
+	&movdqa	($xa,$xb);			# borrow as temporary
+	&pslld	($xb,7);
+	&psrld	($xa,25);
+	 &pxor	($xd_,$xa_)			if ($i<7);	# elsewhere
+	&por	($xb,$xa);
+
+	($xa,$xa_)=($xa_,$xa);
+	($xb,$xb_)=($xb_,$xb);
+	($xc,$xc_)=($xc_,$xc);
+	($xd,$xd_)=($xd_,$xd);
+}
+
+&function_begin("ChaCha20_ssse3");
+&set_label("ssse3_shortcut");
+if ($ymm) {
+	&test		(&DWP(4,"ebp"),1<<11);		# test XOP bit
+	&jnz		(&label("xop_shortcut"));
+}
+
+	&mov		($out,&wparam(0));
+	&mov		($inp,&wparam(1));
+	&mov		($len,&wparam(2));
+	&mov		("edx",&wparam(3));		# key
+	&mov		("ebx",&wparam(4));		# counter and nonce
+
+	&mov		("ebp","esp");
+	&stack_push	(131);
+	&and		("esp",-64);
+	&mov		(&DWP(512,"esp"),"ebp");
+
+	&lea		("eax",&DWP(&label("ssse3_data")."-".
+				    &label("pic_point"),"eax"));
+	&movdqu		("xmm3",&QWP(0,"ebx"));		# counter and nonce
+
+if (defined($gasver) && $gasver>=2.17) {		# even though we encode
+							# pshufb manually, we
+							# handle only register
+							# operands, while this
+							# segment uses memory
+							# operand...
+	&cmp		($len,64*4);
+	&jb		(&label("1x"));
+
+	&mov		(&DWP(512+4,"esp"),"edx");	# offload pointers
+	&mov		(&DWP(512+8,"esp"),"ebx");
+	&sub		($len,64*4);			# bias len
+	&lea		("ebp",&DWP(256+128,"esp"));	# size optimization
+
+	&movdqu		("xmm7",&QWP(0,"edx"));		# key
+	&pshufd		("xmm0","xmm3",0x00);
+	&pshufd		("xmm1","xmm3",0x55);
+	&pshufd		("xmm2","xmm3",0xaa);
+	&pshufd		("xmm3","xmm3",0xff);
+	 &paddd		("xmm0",&QWP(16*3,"eax"));	# fix counters
+	&pshufd		("xmm4","xmm7",0x00);
+	&pshufd		("xmm5","xmm7",0x55);
+	 &psubd		("xmm0",&QWP(16*4,"eax"));
+	&pshufd		("xmm6","xmm7",0xaa);
+	&pshufd		("xmm7","xmm7",0xff);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*12-128,"ebp"),"xmm0");
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*13-128,"ebp"),"xmm1");
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*14-128,"ebp"),"xmm2");
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*15-128,"ebp"),"xmm3");
+	 &movdqu	("xmm3",&QWP(16,"edx"));	# key
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*4-128,"ebp"),"xmm4");
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*5-128,"ebp"),"xmm5");
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*6-128,"ebp"),"xmm6");
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*7-128,"ebp"),"xmm7");
+	 &movdqa	("xmm7",&QWP(16*2,"eax"));	# sigma
+	 &lea		("ebx",&DWP(128,"esp"));	# size optimization
+
+	&pshufd		("xmm0","xmm3",0x00);
+	&pshufd		("xmm1","xmm3",0x55);
+	&pshufd		("xmm2","xmm3",0xaa);
+	&pshufd		("xmm3","xmm3",0xff);
+	&pshufd		("xmm4","xmm7",0x00);
+	&pshufd		("xmm5","xmm7",0x55);
+	&pshufd		("xmm6","xmm7",0xaa);
+	&pshufd		("xmm7","xmm7",0xff);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*8-128,"ebp"),"xmm0");
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*9-128,"ebp"),"xmm1");
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*10-128,"ebp"),"xmm2");
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*11-128,"ebp"),"xmm3");
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*0-128,"ebp"),"xmm4");
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*1-128,"ebp"),"xmm5");
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*2-128,"ebp"),"xmm6");
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*3-128,"ebp"),"xmm7");
+
+	&lea		($inp,&DWP(128,$inp));		# size optimization
+	&lea		($out,&DWP(128,$out));		# size optimization
+	&jmp		(&label("outer_loop"));
+
+&set_label("outer_loop",16);
+	#&movdqa	("xmm0",&QWP(16*0-128,"ebp"));	# copy key material
+	&movdqa		("xmm1",&QWP(16*1-128,"ebp"));
+	&movdqa		("xmm2",&QWP(16*2-128,"ebp"));
+	&movdqa		("xmm3",&QWP(16*3-128,"ebp"));
+	#&movdqa	("xmm4",&QWP(16*4-128,"ebp"));
+	&movdqa		("xmm5",&QWP(16*5-128,"ebp"));
+	&movdqa		("xmm6",&QWP(16*6-128,"ebp"));
+	&movdqa		("xmm7",&QWP(16*7-128,"ebp"));
+	#&movdqa	(&QWP(16*0-128,"ebx"),"xmm0");
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*1-128,"ebx"),"xmm1");
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*2-128,"ebx"),"xmm2");
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*3-128,"ebx"),"xmm3");
+	#&movdqa	(&QWP(16*4-128,"ebx"),"xmm4");
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*5-128,"ebx"),"xmm5");
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*6-128,"ebx"),"xmm6");
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*7-128,"ebx"),"xmm7");
+	#&movdqa	("xmm0",&QWP(16*8-128,"ebp"));
+	#&movdqa	("xmm1",&QWP(16*9-128,"ebp"));
+	&movdqa		("xmm2",&QWP(16*10-128,"ebp"));
+	&movdqa		("xmm3",&QWP(16*11-128,"ebp"));
+	&movdqa		("xmm4",&QWP(16*12-128,"ebp"));
+	&movdqa		("xmm5",&QWP(16*13-128,"ebp"));
+	&movdqa		("xmm6",&QWP(16*14-128,"ebp"));
+	&movdqa		("xmm7",&QWP(16*15-128,"ebp"));
+	&paddd		("xmm4",&QWP(16*4,"eax"));	# counter value
+	#&movdqa	(&QWP(16*8-128,"ebx"),"xmm0");
+	#&movdqa	(&QWP(16*9-128,"ebx"),"xmm1");
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*10-128,"ebx"),"xmm2");
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*11-128,"ebx"),"xmm3");
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*12-128,"ebx"),"xmm4");
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*13-128,"ebx"),"xmm5");
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*14-128,"ebx"),"xmm6");
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*15-128,"ebx"),"xmm7");
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*12-128,"ebp"),"xmm4");	# save counter value
+
+	&movdqa		($xa, &QWP(16*0-128,"ebp"));
+	&movdqa		($xd, "xmm4");
+	&movdqa		($xb_,&QWP(16*4-128,"ebp"));
+	&movdqa		($xc, &QWP(16*8-128,"ebp"));
+	&movdqa		($xc_,&QWP(16*9-128,"ebp"));
+
+	&mov		("edx",10);			# loop counter
+	&nop		();
+
+&set_label("loop",16);
+	&paddd		($xa,$xb_);			# elsewhere
+	&movdqa		($xb,$xb_);
+	&pxor		($xd,$xa);			# elsewhere
+	&QUARTERROUND_SSSE3(0, 4, 8, 12, 0);
+	&QUARTERROUND_SSSE3(1, 5, 9, 13, 1);
+	&QUARTERROUND_SSSE3(2, 6,10, 14, 2);
+	&QUARTERROUND_SSSE3(3, 7,11, 15, 3);
+	&QUARTERROUND_SSSE3(0, 5,10, 15, 4);
+	&QUARTERROUND_SSSE3(1, 6,11, 12, 5);
+	&QUARTERROUND_SSSE3(2, 7, 8, 13, 6);
+	&QUARTERROUND_SSSE3(3, 4, 9, 14, 7);
+	&dec		("edx");
+	&jnz		(&label("loop"));
+
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*4-128,"ebx"),$xb_);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*8-128,"ebx"),$xc);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*9-128,"ebx"),$xc_);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*12-128,"ebx"),$xd);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*14-128,"ebx"),$xd_);
+
+    my ($xa0,$xa1,$xa2,$xa3,$xt0,$xt1,$xt2,$xt3)=map("xmm$_",(0..7));
+
+	#&movdqa	($xa0,&QWP(16*0-128,"ebx"));	# it's there
+	&movdqa		($xa1,&QWP(16*1-128,"ebx"));
+	&movdqa		($xa2,&QWP(16*2-128,"ebx"));
+	&movdqa		($xa3,&QWP(16*3-128,"ebx"));
+
+    for($i=0;$i<256;$i+=64) {
+	&paddd		($xa0,&QWP($i+16*0-128,"ebp"));	# accumulate key material
+	&paddd		($xa1,&QWP($i+16*1-128,"ebp"));
+	&paddd		($xa2,&QWP($i+16*2-128,"ebp"));
+	&paddd		($xa3,&QWP($i+16*3-128,"ebp"));
+
+	&movdqa		($xt2,$xa0);		# "de-interlace" data
+	&punpckldq	($xa0,$xa1);
+	&movdqa		($xt3,$xa2);
+	&punpckldq	($xa2,$xa3);
+	&punpckhdq	($xt2,$xa1);
+	&punpckhdq	($xt3,$xa3);
+	&movdqa		($xa1,$xa0);
+	&punpcklqdq	($xa0,$xa2);		# "a0"
+	&movdqa		($xa3,$xt2);
+	&punpcklqdq	($xt2,$xt3);		# "a2"
+	&punpckhqdq	($xa1,$xa2);		# "a1"
+	&punpckhqdq	($xa3,$xt3);		# "a3"
+
+	#($xa2,$xt2)=($xt2,$xa2);
+
+	&movdqu		($xt0,&QWP(64*0-128,$inp));	# load input
+	&movdqu		($xt1,&QWP(64*1-128,$inp));
+	&movdqu		($xa2,&QWP(64*2-128,$inp));
+	&movdqu		($xt3,&QWP(64*3-128,$inp));
+	&lea		($inp,&QWP($i<192?16:(64*4-16*3),$inp));
+	&pxor		($xt0,$xa0);
+	&movdqa		($xa0,&QWP($i+16*4-128,"ebx"))	if ($i<192);
+	&pxor		($xt1,$xa1);
+	&movdqa		($xa1,&QWP($i+16*5-128,"ebx"))	if ($i<192);
+	&pxor		($xt2,$xa2);
+	&movdqa		($xa2,&QWP($i+16*6-128,"ebx"))	if ($i<192);
+	&pxor		($xt3,$xa3);
+	&movdqa		($xa3,&QWP($i+16*7-128,"ebx"))	if ($i<192);
+	&movdqu		(&QWP(64*0-128,$out),$xt0);	# store output
+	&movdqu		(&QWP(64*1-128,$out),$xt1);
+	&movdqu		(&QWP(64*2-128,$out),$xt2);
+	&movdqu		(&QWP(64*3-128,$out),$xt3);
+	&lea		($out,&QWP($i<192?16:(64*4-16*3),$out));
+    }
+	&sub		($len,64*4);
+	&jnc		(&label("outer_loop"));
+
+	&add		($len,64*4);
+	&jz		(&label("done"));
+
+	&mov		("ebx",&DWP(512+8,"esp"));	# restore pointers
+	&lea		($inp,&DWP(-128,$inp));
+	&mov		("edx",&DWP(512+4,"esp"));
+	&lea		($out,&DWP(-128,$out));
+
+	&movd		("xmm2",&DWP(16*12-128,"ebp"));	# counter value
+	&movdqu		("xmm3",&QWP(0,"ebx"));
+	&paddd		("xmm2",&QWP(16*6,"eax"));	# +four
+	&pand		("xmm3",&QWP(16*7,"eax"));
+	&por		("xmm3","xmm2");		# counter value
+}
+{
+my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$t,$t1,$rot16,$rot24)=map("xmm$_",(0..7));
+
+sub SSSE3ROUND {	# critical path is 20 "SIMD ticks" per round
+	&paddd		($a,$b);
+	&pxor		($d,$a);
+	&pshufb		($d,$rot16);
+
+	&paddd		($c,$d);
+	&pxor		($b,$c);
+	&movdqa		($t,$b);
+	&psrld		($b,20);
+	&pslld		($t,12);
+	&por		($b,$t);
+
+	&paddd		($a,$b);
+	&pxor		($d,$a);
+	&pshufb		($d,$rot24);
+
+	&paddd		($c,$d);
+	&pxor		($b,$c);
+	&movdqa		($t,$b);
+	&psrld		($b,25);
+	&pslld		($t,7);
+	&por		($b,$t);
+}
+
+&set_label("1x");
+	&movdqa		($a,&QWP(16*2,"eax"));		# sigma
+	&movdqu		($b,&QWP(0,"edx"));
+	&movdqu		($c,&QWP(16,"edx"));
+	#&movdqu	($d,&QWP(0,"ebx"));		# already loaded
+	&movdqa		($rot16,&QWP(0,"eax"));
+	&movdqa		($rot24,&QWP(16,"eax"));
+	&mov		(&DWP(16*3,"esp"),"ebp");
+
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*0,"esp"),$a);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*1,"esp"),$b);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*2,"esp"),$c);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*3,"esp"),$d);
+	&mov		("edx",10);
+	&jmp		(&label("loop1x"));
+
+&set_label("outer1x",16);
+	&movdqa		($d,&QWP(16*5,"eax"));		# one
+	&movdqa		($a,&QWP(16*0,"esp"));
+	&movdqa		($b,&QWP(16*1,"esp"));
+	&movdqa		($c,&QWP(16*2,"esp"));
+	&paddd		($d,&QWP(16*3,"esp"));
+	&mov		("edx",10);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*3,"esp"),$d);
+	&jmp		(&label("loop1x"));
+
+&set_label("loop1x",16);
+	&SSSE3ROUND();
+	&pshufd	($c,$c,0b01001110);
+	&pshufd	($b,$b,0b00111001);
+	&pshufd	($d,$d,0b10010011);
+	&nop	();
+
+	&SSSE3ROUND();
+	&pshufd	($c,$c,0b01001110);
+	&pshufd	($b,$b,0b10010011);
+	&pshufd	($d,$d,0b00111001);
+
+	&dec		("edx");
+	&jnz		(&label("loop1x"));
+
+	&paddd		($a,&QWP(16*0,"esp"));
+	&paddd		($b,&QWP(16*1,"esp"));
+	&paddd		($c,&QWP(16*2,"esp"));
+	&paddd		($d,&QWP(16*3,"esp"));
+
+	&cmp		($len,64);
+	&jb		(&label("tail"));
+
+	&movdqu		($t,&QWP(16*0,$inp));
+	&movdqu		($t1,&QWP(16*1,$inp));
+	&pxor		($a,$t);		# xor with input
+	&movdqu		($t,&QWP(16*2,$inp));
+	&pxor		($b,$t1);
+	&movdqu		($t1,&QWP(16*3,$inp));
+	&pxor		($c,$t);
+	&pxor		($d,$t1);
+	&lea		($inp,&DWP(16*4,$inp));	# inp+=64
+
+	&movdqu		(&QWP(16*0,$out),$a);	# write output
+	&movdqu		(&QWP(16*1,$out),$b);
+	&movdqu		(&QWP(16*2,$out),$c);
+	&movdqu		(&QWP(16*3,$out),$d);
+	&lea		($out,&DWP(16*4,$out));	# inp+=64
+
+	&sub		($len,64);
+	&jnz		(&label("outer1x"));
+
+	&jmp		(&label("done"));
+
+&set_label("tail");
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*0,"esp"),$a);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*1,"esp"),$b);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*2,"esp"),$c);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*3,"esp"),$d);
+
+	&xor		("eax","eax");
+	&xor		("edx","edx");
+	&xor		("ebp","ebp");
+
+&set_label("tail_loop");
+	&movb		("al",&BP(0,"esp","ebp"));
+	&movb		("dl",&BP(0,$inp,"ebp"));
+	&lea		("ebp",&DWP(1,"ebp"));
+	&xor		("al","dl");
+	&movb		(&BP(-1,$out,"ebp"),"al");
+	&dec		($len);
+	&jnz		(&label("tail_loop"));
+}
+&set_label("done");
+	&mov		("esp",&DWP(512,"esp"));
+&function_end("ChaCha20_ssse3");
+
+&align	(64);
+&set_label("ssse3_data");
+&data_byte(0x2,0x3,0x0,0x1, 0x6,0x7,0x4,0x5, 0xa,0xb,0x8,0x9, 0xe,0xf,0xc,0xd);
+&data_byte(0x3,0x0,0x1,0x2, 0x7,0x4,0x5,0x6, 0xb,0x8,0x9,0xa, 0xf,0xc,0xd,0xe);
+&data_word(0x61707865,0x3320646e,0x79622d32,0x6b206574);
+&data_word(0,1,2,3);
+&data_word(4,4,4,4);
+&data_word(1,0,0,0);
+&data_word(4,0,0,0);
+&data_word(0,-1,-1,-1);
+&align	(64);
+}
+&asciz	("ChaCha20 for x86, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>");
+
+if ($ymm) {
+my ($xa,$xa_,$xb,$xb_,$xc,$xc_,$xd,$xd_)=map("xmm$_",(0..7));
+my ($out,$inp,$len)=("edi","esi","ecx");
+
+sub QUARTERROUND_XOP {
+my ($ai,$bi,$ci,$di,$i)=@_;
+my ($an,$bn,$cn,$dn)=map(($_&~3)+(($_+1)&3),($ai,$bi,$ci,$di));	# next
+my ($ap,$bp,$cp,$dp)=map(($_&~3)+(($_-1)&3),($ai,$bi,$ci,$di));	# previous
+
+	#       a   b   c   d
+	#
+	#       0   4   8  12 < even round
+	#       1   5   9  13
+	#       2   6  10  14
+	#       3   7  11  15
+	#       0   5  10  15 < odd round
+	#       1   6  11  12
+	#       2   7   8  13
+	#       3   4   9  14
+
+	if ($i==0) {
+            my $j=4;
+	    ($ap,$bp,$cp,$dp)=map(($_&~3)+(($_-$j--)&3),($ap,$bp,$cp,$dp));
+	} elsif ($i==3) {
+            my $j=0;
+	    ($an,$bn,$cn,$dn)=map(($_&~3)+(($_+$j++)&3),($an,$bn,$cn,$dn));
+	} elsif ($i==4) {
+            my $j=4;
+	    ($ap,$bp,$cp,$dp)=map(($_&~3)+(($_+$j--)&3),($ap,$bp,$cp,$dp));
+	} elsif ($i==7) {
+            my $j=0;
+	    ($an,$bn,$cn,$dn)=map(($_&~3)+(($_-$j++)&3),($an,$bn,$cn,$dn));
+	}
+
+	#&vpaddd	($xa,$xa,$xb);			# see elsewhere
+	#&vpxor		($xd,$xd,$xa);			# see elsewhere
+	 &vmovdqa	(&QWP(16*$cp-128,"ebx"),$xc_)	if ($ai>0 && $ai<3);
+	&vprotd		($xd,$xd,16);
+	 &vmovdqa	(&QWP(16*$bp-128,"ebx"),$xb_)	if ($i!=0);
+	&vpaddd		($xc,$xc,$xd);
+	 &vmovdqa	($xc_,&QWP(16*$cn-128,"ebx"))	if ($ai>0 && $ai<3);
+	&vpxor		($xb,$i!=0?$xb:$xb_,$xc);
+	 &vmovdqa	($xa_,&QWP(16*$an-128,"ebx"));
+	&vprotd		($xb,$xb,12);
+	 &vmovdqa	($xb_,&QWP(16*$bn-128,"ebx"))	if ($i<7);
+	&vpaddd		($xa,$xa,$xb);
+	 &vmovdqa	($xd_,&QWP(16*$dn-128,"ebx"))	if ($di!=$dn);
+	&vpxor		($xd,$xd,$xa);
+	 &vpaddd	($xa_,$xa_,$xb_)		if ($i<7);	# elsewhere
+	&vprotd		($xd,$xd,8);
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(16*$ai-128,"ebx"),$xa);
+	&vpaddd		($xc,$xc,$xd);
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(16*$di-128,"ebx"),$xd)	if ($di!=$dn);
+	&vpxor		($xb,$xb,$xc);
+	 &vpxor		($xd_,$di==$dn?$xd:$xd_,$xa_)	if ($i<7);	# elsewhere
+	&vprotd		($xb,$xb,7);
+
+	($xa,$xa_)=($xa_,$xa);
+	($xb,$xb_)=($xb_,$xb);
+	($xc,$xc_)=($xc_,$xc);
+	($xd,$xd_)=($xd_,$xd);
+}
+
+&function_begin("ChaCha20_xop");
+&set_label("xop_shortcut");
+	&mov		($out,&wparam(0));
+	&mov		($inp,&wparam(1));
+	&mov		($len,&wparam(2));
+	&mov		("edx",&wparam(3));		# key
+	&mov		("ebx",&wparam(4));		# counter and nonce
+	&vzeroupper	();
+
+	&mov		("ebp","esp");
+	&stack_push	(131);
+	&and		("esp",-64);
+	&mov		(&DWP(512,"esp"),"ebp");
+
+	&lea		("eax",&DWP(&label("ssse3_data")."-".
+				    &label("pic_point"),"eax"));
+	&vmovdqu	("xmm3",&QWP(0,"ebx"));		# counter and nonce
+
+	&cmp		($len,64*4);
+	&jb		(&label("1x"));
+
+	&mov		(&DWP(512+4,"esp"),"edx");	# offload pointers
+	&mov		(&DWP(512+8,"esp"),"ebx");
+	&sub		($len,64*4);			# bias len
+	&lea		("ebp",&DWP(256+128,"esp"));	# size optimization
+
+	&vmovdqu	("xmm7",&QWP(0,"edx"));		# key
+	&vpshufd	("xmm0","xmm3",0x00);
+	&vpshufd	("xmm1","xmm3",0x55);
+	&vpshufd	("xmm2","xmm3",0xaa);
+	&vpshufd	("xmm3","xmm3",0xff);
+	 &vpaddd	("xmm0","xmm0",&QWP(16*3,"eax"));	# fix counters
+	&vpshufd	("xmm4","xmm7",0x00);
+	&vpshufd	("xmm5","xmm7",0x55);
+	 &vpsubd	("xmm0","xmm0",&QWP(16*4,"eax"));
+	&vpshufd	("xmm6","xmm7",0xaa);
+	&vpshufd	("xmm7","xmm7",0xff);
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(16*12-128,"ebp"),"xmm0");
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(16*13-128,"ebp"),"xmm1");
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(16*14-128,"ebp"),"xmm2");
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(16*15-128,"ebp"),"xmm3");
+	 &vmovdqu	("xmm3",&QWP(16,"edx"));	# key
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(16*4-128,"ebp"),"xmm4");
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(16*5-128,"ebp"),"xmm5");
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(16*6-128,"ebp"),"xmm6");
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(16*7-128,"ebp"),"xmm7");
+	 &vmovdqa	("xmm7",&QWP(16*2,"eax"));	# sigma
+	 &lea		("ebx",&DWP(128,"esp"));	# size optimization
+
+	&vpshufd	("xmm0","xmm3",0x00);
+	&vpshufd	("xmm1","xmm3",0x55);
+	&vpshufd	("xmm2","xmm3",0xaa);
+	&vpshufd	("xmm3","xmm3",0xff);
+	&vpshufd	("xmm4","xmm7",0x00);
+	&vpshufd	("xmm5","xmm7",0x55);
+	&vpshufd	("xmm6","xmm7",0xaa);
+	&vpshufd	("xmm7","xmm7",0xff);
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(16*8-128,"ebp"),"xmm0");
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(16*9-128,"ebp"),"xmm1");
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(16*10-128,"ebp"),"xmm2");
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(16*11-128,"ebp"),"xmm3");
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(16*0-128,"ebp"),"xmm4");
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(16*1-128,"ebp"),"xmm5");
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(16*2-128,"ebp"),"xmm6");
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(16*3-128,"ebp"),"xmm7");
+
+	&lea		($inp,&DWP(128,$inp));		# size optimization
+	&lea		($out,&DWP(128,$out));		# size optimization
+	&jmp		(&label("outer_loop"));
+
+&set_label("outer_loop",32);
+	#&vmovdqa	("xmm0",&QWP(16*0-128,"ebp"));	# copy key material
+	&vmovdqa	("xmm1",&QWP(16*1-128,"ebp"));
+	&vmovdqa	("xmm2",&QWP(16*2-128,"ebp"));
+	&vmovdqa	("xmm3",&QWP(16*3-128,"ebp"));
+	#&vmovdqa	("xmm4",&QWP(16*4-128,"ebp"));
+	&vmovdqa	("xmm5",&QWP(16*5-128,"ebp"));
+	&vmovdqa	("xmm6",&QWP(16*6-128,"ebp"));
+	&vmovdqa	("xmm7",&QWP(16*7-128,"ebp"));
+	#&vmovdqa	(&QWP(16*0-128,"ebx"),"xmm0");
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(16*1-128,"ebx"),"xmm1");
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(16*2-128,"ebx"),"xmm2");
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(16*3-128,"ebx"),"xmm3");
+	#&vmovdqa	(&QWP(16*4-128,"ebx"),"xmm4");
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(16*5-128,"ebx"),"xmm5");
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(16*6-128,"ebx"),"xmm6");
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(16*7-128,"ebx"),"xmm7");
+	#&vmovdqa	("xmm0",&QWP(16*8-128,"ebp"));
+	#&vmovdqa	("xmm1",&QWP(16*9-128,"ebp"));
+	&vmovdqa	("xmm2",&QWP(16*10-128,"ebp"));
+	&vmovdqa	("xmm3",&QWP(16*11-128,"ebp"));
+	&vmovdqa	("xmm4",&QWP(16*12-128,"ebp"));
+	&vmovdqa	("xmm5",&QWP(16*13-128,"ebp"));
+	&vmovdqa	("xmm6",&QWP(16*14-128,"ebp"));
+	&vmovdqa	("xmm7",&QWP(16*15-128,"ebp"));
+	&vpaddd		("xmm4","xmm4",&QWP(16*4,"eax"));	# counter value
+	#&vmovdqa	(&QWP(16*8-128,"ebx"),"xmm0");
+	#&vmovdqa	(&QWP(16*9-128,"ebx"),"xmm1");
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(16*10-128,"ebx"),"xmm2");
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(16*11-128,"ebx"),"xmm3");
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(16*12-128,"ebx"),"xmm4");
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(16*13-128,"ebx"),"xmm5");
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(16*14-128,"ebx"),"xmm6");
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(16*15-128,"ebx"),"xmm7");
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(16*12-128,"ebp"),"xmm4");	# save counter value
+
+	&vmovdqa	($xa, &QWP(16*0-128,"ebp"));
+	&vmovdqa	($xd, "xmm4");
+	&vmovdqa	($xb_,&QWP(16*4-128,"ebp"));
+	&vmovdqa	($xc, &QWP(16*8-128,"ebp"));
+	&vmovdqa	($xc_,&QWP(16*9-128,"ebp"));
+
+	&mov		("edx",10);			# loop counter
+	&nop		();
+
+&set_label("loop",32);
+	&vpaddd		($xa,$xa,$xb_);			# elsewhere
+	&vpxor		($xd,$xd,$xa);			# elsewhere
+	&QUARTERROUND_XOP(0, 4, 8, 12, 0);
+	&QUARTERROUND_XOP(1, 5, 9, 13, 1);
+	&QUARTERROUND_XOP(2, 6,10, 14, 2);
+	&QUARTERROUND_XOP(3, 7,11, 15, 3);
+	&QUARTERROUND_XOP(0, 5,10, 15, 4);
+	&QUARTERROUND_XOP(1, 6,11, 12, 5);
+	&QUARTERROUND_XOP(2, 7, 8, 13, 6);
+	&QUARTERROUND_XOP(3, 4, 9, 14, 7);
+	&dec		("edx");
+	&jnz		(&label("loop"));
+
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(16*4-128,"ebx"),$xb_);
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(16*8-128,"ebx"),$xc);
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(16*9-128,"ebx"),$xc_);
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(16*12-128,"ebx"),$xd);
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(16*14-128,"ebx"),$xd_);
+
+    my ($xa0,$xa1,$xa2,$xa3,$xt0,$xt1,$xt2,$xt3)=map("xmm$_",(0..7));
+
+	#&vmovdqa	($xa0,&QWP(16*0-128,"ebx"));	# it's there
+	&vmovdqa	($xa1,&QWP(16*1-128,"ebx"));
+	&vmovdqa	($xa2,&QWP(16*2-128,"ebx"));
+	&vmovdqa	($xa3,&QWP(16*3-128,"ebx"));
+
+    for($i=0;$i<256;$i+=64) {
+	&vpaddd		($xa0,$xa0,&QWP($i+16*0-128,"ebp"));	# accumulate key material
+	&vpaddd		($xa1,$xa1,&QWP($i+16*1-128,"ebp"));
+	&vpaddd		($xa2,$xa2,&QWP($i+16*2-128,"ebp"));
+	&vpaddd		($xa3,$xa3,&QWP($i+16*3-128,"ebp"));
+
+	&vpunpckldq	($xt2,$xa0,$xa1);	# "de-interlace" data
+	&vpunpckldq	($xt3,$xa2,$xa3);
+	&vpunpckhdq	($xa0,$xa0,$xa1);
+	&vpunpckhdq	($xa2,$xa2,$xa3);
+	&vpunpcklqdq	($xa1,$xt2,$xt3);	# "a0"
+	&vpunpckhqdq	($xt2,$xt2,$xt3);	# "a1"
+	&vpunpcklqdq	($xt3,$xa0,$xa2);	# "a2"
+	&vpunpckhqdq	($xa3,$xa0,$xa2);	# "a3"
+
+	&vpxor		($xt0,$xa1,&QWP(64*0-128,$inp));
+	&vpxor		($xt1,$xt2,&QWP(64*1-128,$inp));
+	&vpxor		($xt2,$xt3,&QWP(64*2-128,$inp));
+	&vpxor		($xt3,$xa3,&QWP(64*3-128,$inp));
+	&lea		($inp,&QWP($i<192?16:(64*4-16*3),$inp));
+	&vmovdqa	($xa0,&QWP($i+16*4-128,"ebx"))	if ($i<192);
+	&vmovdqa	($xa1,&QWP($i+16*5-128,"ebx"))	if ($i<192);
+	&vmovdqa	($xa2,&QWP($i+16*6-128,"ebx"))	if ($i<192);
+	&vmovdqa	($xa3,&QWP($i+16*7-128,"ebx"))	if ($i<192);
+	&vmovdqu	(&QWP(64*0-128,$out),$xt0);	# store output
+	&vmovdqu	(&QWP(64*1-128,$out),$xt1);
+	&vmovdqu	(&QWP(64*2-128,$out),$xt2);
+	&vmovdqu	(&QWP(64*3-128,$out),$xt3);
+	&lea		($out,&QWP($i<192?16:(64*4-16*3),$out));
+    }
+	&sub		($len,64*4);
+	&jnc		(&label("outer_loop"));
+
+	&add		($len,64*4);
+	&jz		(&label("done"));
+
+	&mov		("ebx",&DWP(512+8,"esp"));	# restore pointers
+	&lea		($inp,&DWP(-128,$inp));
+	&mov		("edx",&DWP(512+4,"esp"));
+	&lea		($out,&DWP(-128,$out));
+
+	&vmovd		("xmm2",&DWP(16*12-128,"ebp"));	# counter value
+	&vmovdqu	("xmm3",&QWP(0,"ebx"));
+	&vpaddd		("xmm2","xmm2",&QWP(16*6,"eax"));# +four
+	&vpand		("xmm3","xmm3",&QWP(16*7,"eax"));
+	&vpor		("xmm3","xmm3","xmm2");		# counter value
+{
+my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$t,$t1,$rot16,$rot24)=map("xmm$_",(0..7));
+
+sub XOPROUND {
+	&vpaddd		($a,$a,$b);
+	&vpxor		($d,$d,$a);
+	&vprotd		($d,$d,16);
+
+	&vpaddd		($c,$c,$d);
+	&vpxor		($b,$b,$c);
+	&vprotd		($b,$b,12);
+
+	&vpaddd		($a,$a,$b);
+	&vpxor		($d,$d,$a);
+	&vprotd		($d,$d,8);
+
+	&vpaddd		($c,$c,$d);
+	&vpxor		($b,$b,$c);
+	&vprotd		($b,$b,7);
+}
+
+&set_label("1x");
+	&vmovdqa	($a,&QWP(16*2,"eax"));		# sigma
+	&vmovdqu	($b,&QWP(0,"edx"));
+	&vmovdqu	($c,&QWP(16,"edx"));
+	#&vmovdqu	($d,&QWP(0,"ebx"));		# already loaded
+	&vmovdqa	($rot16,&QWP(0,"eax"));
+	&vmovdqa	($rot24,&QWP(16,"eax"));
+	&mov		(&DWP(16*3,"esp"),"ebp");
+
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(16*0,"esp"),$a);
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(16*1,"esp"),$b);
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(16*2,"esp"),$c);
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(16*3,"esp"),$d);
+	&mov		("edx",10);
+	&jmp		(&label("loop1x"));
+
+&set_label("outer1x",16);
+	&vmovdqa	($d,&QWP(16*5,"eax"));		# one
+	&vmovdqa	($a,&QWP(16*0,"esp"));
+	&vmovdqa	($b,&QWP(16*1,"esp"));
+	&vmovdqa	($c,&QWP(16*2,"esp"));
+	&vpaddd		($d,$d,&QWP(16*3,"esp"));
+	&mov		("edx",10);
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(16*3,"esp"),$d);
+	&jmp		(&label("loop1x"));
+
+&set_label("loop1x",16);
+	&XOPROUND();
+	&vpshufd	($c,$c,0b01001110);
+	&vpshufd	($b,$b,0b00111001);
+	&vpshufd	($d,$d,0b10010011);
+
+	&XOPROUND();
+	&vpshufd	($c,$c,0b01001110);
+	&vpshufd	($b,$b,0b10010011);
+	&vpshufd	($d,$d,0b00111001);
+
+	&dec		("edx");
+	&jnz		(&label("loop1x"));
+
+	&vpaddd		($a,$a,&QWP(16*0,"esp"));
+	&vpaddd		($b,$b,&QWP(16*1,"esp"));
+	&vpaddd		($c,$c,&QWP(16*2,"esp"));
+	&vpaddd		($d,$d,&QWP(16*3,"esp"));
+
+	&cmp		($len,64);
+	&jb		(&label("tail"));
+
+	&vpxor		($a,$a,&QWP(16*0,$inp));	# xor with input
+	&vpxor		($b,$b,&QWP(16*1,$inp));
+	&vpxor		($c,$c,&QWP(16*2,$inp));
+	&vpxor		($d,$d,&QWP(16*3,$inp));
+	&lea		($inp,&DWP(16*4,$inp));		# inp+=64
+
+	&vmovdqu	(&QWP(16*0,$out),$a);		# write output
+	&vmovdqu	(&QWP(16*1,$out),$b);
+	&vmovdqu	(&QWP(16*2,$out),$c);
+	&vmovdqu	(&QWP(16*3,$out),$d);
+	&lea		($out,&DWP(16*4,$out));		# inp+=64
+
+	&sub		($len,64);
+	&jnz		(&label("outer1x"));
+
+	&jmp		(&label("done"));
+
+&set_label("tail");
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(16*0,"esp"),$a);
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(16*1,"esp"),$b);
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(16*2,"esp"),$c);
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(16*3,"esp"),$d);
+
+	&xor		("eax","eax");
+	&xor		("edx","edx");
+	&xor		("ebp","ebp");
+
+&set_label("tail_loop");
+	&movb		("al",&BP(0,"esp","ebp"));
+	&movb		("dl",&BP(0,$inp,"ebp"));
+	&lea		("ebp",&DWP(1,"ebp"));
+	&xor		("al","dl");
+	&movb		(&BP(-1,$out,"ebp"),"al");
+	&dec		($len);
+	&jnz		(&label("tail_loop"));
+}
+&set_label("done");
+	&vzeroupper	();
+	&mov		("esp",&DWP(512,"esp"));
+&function_end("ChaCha20_xop");
+}
+
+&asm_finish();
+
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/chacha/asm/chacha-x86_64.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/chacha/asm/chacha-x86_64.pl
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..347dfcb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/chacha/asm/chacha-x86_64.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,2245 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# November 2014
+#
+# ChaCha20 for x86_64.
+#
+# Performance in cycles per byte out of large buffer.
+#
+#		IALU/gcc 4.8(i)	1xSSSE3/SSE2	4xSSSE3	    8xAVX2
+#
+# P4		9.48/+99%	-/22.7(ii)	-
+# Core2		7.83/+55%	7.90/8.08	4.35
+# Westmere	7.19/+50%	5.60/6.70	3.00
+# Sandy Bridge	8.31/+42%	5.45/6.76	2.72
+# Ivy Bridge	6.71/+46%	5.40/6.49	2.41
+# Haswell	5.92/+43%	5.20/6.45	2.42	    1.23
+# Silvermont	12.0/+33%	7.75/7.40	7.03(iii)
+# Goldmont	10.6/+17%	5.10/-		3.28
+# Sledgehammer	7.28/+52%	-/14.2(ii)	-
+# Bulldozer	9.66/+28%	9.85/11.1	3.06(iv)
+# VIA Nano	10.5/+46%	6.72/8.60	6.05
+#
+# (i)	compared to older gcc 3.x one can observe >2x improvement on
+#	most platforms;
+# (ii)	as it can be seen, SSE2 performance is too low on legacy
+#	processors; NxSSE2 results are naturally better, but not
+#	impressively better than IALU ones, which is why you won't
+#	find SSE2 code below;
+# (iii)	this is not optimal result for Atom because of MSROM
+#	limitations, SSE2 can do better, but gain is considered too
+#	low to justify the [maintenance] effort;
+# (iv)	Bulldozer actually executes 4xXOP code path that delivers 2.20;
+
+$flavour = shift;
+$output  = shift;
+if ($flavour =~ /\./) { $output = $flavour; undef $flavour; }
+
+$win64=0; $win64=1 if ($flavour =~ /[nm]asm|mingw64/ || $output =~ /\.asm$/);
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+( $xlate="${dir}x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
+( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
+die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl";
+
+if (`$ENV{CC} -Wa,-v -c -o /dev/null -x assembler /dev/null 2>&1`
+		=~ /GNU assembler version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
+	$avx = ($1>=2.19) + ($1>=2.22);
+}
+
+if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /nasm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /nasm/) &&
+	   `nasm -v 2>&1` =~ /NASM version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
+	$avx = ($1>=2.09) + ($1>=2.10);
+}
+
+if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
+	   `ml64 2>&1` =~ /Version ([0-9]+)\./) {
+	$avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=11);
+}
+
+if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
+	$avx = ($2>=3.0) + ($2>3.0);
+}
+
+open OUT,"| \"$^X\" \"$xlate\" $flavour \"$output\"";
+*STDOUT=*OUT;
+
+# input parameter block
+($out,$inp,$len,$key,$counter)=("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx","%rcx","%r8");
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.text
+
+.extern OPENSSL_ia32cap_P
+
+.align	64
+.Lzero:
+.long	0,0,0,0
+.Lone:
+.long	1,0,0,0
+.Linc:
+.long	0,1,2,3
+.Lfour:
+.long	4,4,4,4
+.Lincy:
+.long	0,2,4,6,1,3,5,7
+.Leight:
+.long	8,8,8,8,8,8,8,8
+.Lrot16:
+.byte	0x2,0x3,0x0,0x1, 0x6,0x7,0x4,0x5, 0xa,0xb,0x8,0x9, 0xe,0xf,0xc,0xd
+.Lrot24:
+.byte	0x3,0x0,0x1,0x2, 0x7,0x4,0x5,0x6, 0xb,0x8,0x9,0xa, 0xf,0xc,0xd,0xe
+.Lsigma:
+.asciz	"expand 32-byte k"
+.asciz	"ChaCha20 for x86_64, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+___
+
+sub AUTOLOAD()          # thunk [simplified] 32-bit style perlasm
+{ my $opcode = $AUTOLOAD; $opcode =~ s/.*:://;
+  my $arg = pop;
+    $arg = "\$$arg" if ($arg*1 eq $arg);
+    $code .= "\t$opcode\t".join(',',$arg,reverse @_)."\n";
+}
+
+@x=("%eax","%ebx","%ecx","%edx",map("%r${_}d",(8..11)),
+    "%nox","%nox","%nox","%nox",map("%r${_}d",(12..15)));
+@t=("%esi","%edi");
+
+sub ROUND {			# critical path is 24 cycles per round
+my ($a0,$b0,$c0,$d0)=@_;
+my ($a1,$b1,$c1,$d1)=map(($_&~3)+(($_+1)&3),($a0,$b0,$c0,$d0));
+my ($a2,$b2,$c2,$d2)=map(($_&~3)+(($_+1)&3),($a1,$b1,$c1,$d1));
+my ($a3,$b3,$c3,$d3)=map(($_&~3)+(($_+1)&3),($a2,$b2,$c2,$d2));
+my ($xc,$xc_)=map("\"$_\"",@t);
+my @x=map("\"$_\"",@x);
+
+	# Consider order in which variables are addressed by their
+	# index:
+	#
+	#	a   b   c   d
+	#
+	#	0   4   8  12 < even round
+	#	1   5   9  13
+	#	2   6  10  14
+	#	3   7  11  15
+	#	0   5  10  15 < odd round
+	#	1   6  11  12
+	#	2   7   8  13
+	#	3   4   9  14
+	#
+	# 'a', 'b' and 'd's are permanently allocated in registers,
+	# @x[0..7,12..15], while 'c's are maintained in memory. If
+	# you observe 'c' column, you'll notice that pair of 'c's is
+	# invariant between rounds. This means that we have to reload
+	# them once per round, in the middle. This is why you'll see
+	# bunch of 'c' stores and loads in the middle, but none in
+	# the beginning or end.
+
+	# Normally instructions would be interleaved to favour in-order
+	# execution. Generally out-of-order cores manage it gracefully,
+	# but not this time for some reason. As in-order execution
+	# cores are dying breed, old Atom is the only one around,
+	# instructions are left uninterleaved. Besides, Atom is better
+	# off executing 1xSSSE3 code anyway...
+
+	(
+	"&add	(@x[$a0],@x[$b0])",	# Q1
+	"&xor	(@x[$d0],@x[$a0])",
+	"&rol	(@x[$d0],16)",
+	 "&add	(@x[$a1],@x[$b1])",	# Q2
+	 "&xor	(@x[$d1],@x[$a1])",
+	 "&rol	(@x[$d1],16)",
+
+	"&add	($xc,@x[$d0])",
+	"&xor	(@x[$b0],$xc)",
+	"&rol	(@x[$b0],12)",
+	 "&add	($xc_,@x[$d1])",
+	 "&xor	(@x[$b1],$xc_)",
+	 "&rol	(@x[$b1],12)",
+
+	"&add	(@x[$a0],@x[$b0])",
+	"&xor	(@x[$d0],@x[$a0])",
+	"&rol	(@x[$d0],8)",
+	 "&add	(@x[$a1],@x[$b1])",
+	 "&xor	(@x[$d1],@x[$a1])",
+	 "&rol	(@x[$d1],8)",
+
+	"&add	($xc,@x[$d0])",
+	"&xor	(@x[$b0],$xc)",
+	"&rol	(@x[$b0],7)",
+	 "&add	($xc_,@x[$d1])",
+	 "&xor	(@x[$b1],$xc_)",
+	 "&rol	(@x[$b1],7)",
+
+	"&mov	(\"4*$c0(%rsp)\",$xc)",	# reload pair of 'c's
+	 "&mov	(\"4*$c1(%rsp)\",$xc_)",
+	"&mov	($xc,\"4*$c2(%rsp)\")",
+	 "&mov	($xc_,\"4*$c3(%rsp)\")",
+
+	"&add	(@x[$a2],@x[$b2])",	# Q3
+	"&xor	(@x[$d2],@x[$a2])",
+	"&rol	(@x[$d2],16)",
+	 "&add	(@x[$a3],@x[$b3])",	# Q4
+	 "&xor	(@x[$d3],@x[$a3])",
+	 "&rol	(@x[$d3],16)",
+
+	"&add	($xc,@x[$d2])",
+	"&xor	(@x[$b2],$xc)",
+	"&rol	(@x[$b2],12)",
+	 "&add	($xc_,@x[$d3])",
+	 "&xor	(@x[$b3],$xc_)",
+	 "&rol	(@x[$b3],12)",
+
+	"&add	(@x[$a2],@x[$b2])",
+	"&xor	(@x[$d2],@x[$a2])",
+	"&rol	(@x[$d2],8)",
+	 "&add	(@x[$a3],@x[$b3])",
+	 "&xor	(@x[$d3],@x[$a3])",
+	 "&rol	(@x[$d3],8)",
+
+	"&add	($xc,@x[$d2])",
+	"&xor	(@x[$b2],$xc)",
+	"&rol	(@x[$b2],7)",
+	 "&add	($xc_,@x[$d3])",
+	 "&xor	(@x[$b3],$xc_)",
+	 "&rol	(@x[$b3],7)"
+	);
+}
+
+########################################################################
+# Generic code path that handles all lengths on pre-SSSE3 processors.
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	ChaCha20_ctr32
+.type	ChaCha20_ctr32,\@function,5
+.align	64
+ChaCha20_ctr32:
+	cmp	\$0,$len
+	je	.Lno_data
+	mov	OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+4(%rip),%r10
+	test	\$`1<<(41-32)`,%r10d
+	jnz	.LChaCha20_ssse3
+
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+	sub	\$64+24,%rsp
+
+	#movdqa	.Lsigma(%rip),%xmm0
+	movdqu	($key),%xmm1
+	movdqu	16($key),%xmm2
+	movdqu	($counter),%xmm3
+	movdqa	.Lone(%rip),%xmm4
+
+	#movdqa	%xmm0,4*0(%rsp)		# key[0]
+	movdqa	%xmm1,4*4(%rsp)		# key[1]
+	movdqa	%xmm2,4*8(%rsp)		# key[2]
+	movdqa	%xmm3,4*12(%rsp)	# key[3]
+	mov	$len,%rbp		# reassign $len
+	jmp	.Loop_outer
+
+.align	32
+.Loop_outer:
+	mov	\$0x61707865,@x[0]      # 'expa'
+	mov	\$0x3320646e,@x[1]      # 'nd 3'
+	mov	\$0x79622d32,@x[2]      # '2-by'
+	mov	\$0x6b206574,@x[3]      # 'te k'
+	mov	4*4(%rsp),@x[4]
+	mov	4*5(%rsp),@x[5]
+	mov	4*6(%rsp),@x[6]
+	mov	4*7(%rsp),@x[7]
+	movd	%xmm3,@x[12]
+	mov	4*13(%rsp),@x[13]
+	mov	4*14(%rsp),@x[14]
+	mov	4*15(%rsp),@x[15]
+
+	mov	%rbp,64+0(%rsp)		# save len
+	mov	\$10,%ebp
+	mov	$inp,64+8(%rsp)		# save inp
+	movq	%xmm2,%rsi		# "@x[8]"
+	mov	$out,64+16(%rsp)	# save out
+	mov	%rsi,%rdi
+	shr	\$32,%rdi		# "@x[9]"
+	jmp	.Loop
+
+.align	32
+.Loop:
+___
+	foreach (&ROUND (0, 4, 8,12)) { eval; }
+	foreach (&ROUND	(0, 5,10,15)) { eval; }
+	&dec	("%ebp");
+	&jnz	(".Loop");
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	@t[1],4*9(%rsp)		# modulo-scheduled
+	mov	@t[0],4*8(%rsp)
+	mov	64(%rsp),%rbp		# load len
+	movdqa	%xmm2,%xmm1
+	mov	64+8(%rsp),$inp		# load inp
+	paddd	%xmm4,%xmm3		# increment counter
+	mov	64+16(%rsp),$out	# load out
+
+	add	\$0x61707865,@x[0]      # 'expa'
+	add	\$0x3320646e,@x[1]      # 'nd 3'
+	add	\$0x79622d32,@x[2]      # '2-by'
+	add	\$0x6b206574,@x[3]      # 'te k'
+	add	4*4(%rsp),@x[4]
+	add	4*5(%rsp),@x[5]
+	add	4*6(%rsp),@x[6]
+	add	4*7(%rsp),@x[7]
+	add	4*12(%rsp),@x[12]
+	add	4*13(%rsp),@x[13]
+	add	4*14(%rsp),@x[14]
+	add	4*15(%rsp),@x[15]
+	paddd	4*8(%rsp),%xmm1
+
+	cmp	\$64,%rbp
+	jb	.Ltail
+
+	xor	4*0($inp),@x[0]		# xor with input
+	xor	4*1($inp),@x[1]
+	xor	4*2($inp),@x[2]
+	xor	4*3($inp),@x[3]
+	xor	4*4($inp),@x[4]
+	xor	4*5($inp),@x[5]
+	xor	4*6($inp),@x[6]
+	xor	4*7($inp),@x[7]
+	movdqu	4*8($inp),%xmm0
+	xor	4*12($inp),@x[12]
+	xor	4*13($inp),@x[13]
+	xor	4*14($inp),@x[14]
+	xor	4*15($inp),@x[15]
+	lea	4*16($inp),$inp		# inp+=64
+	pxor	%xmm1,%xmm0
+
+	movdqa	%xmm2,4*8(%rsp)
+	movd	%xmm3,4*12(%rsp)
+
+	mov	@x[0],4*0($out)		# write output
+	mov	@x[1],4*1($out)
+	mov	@x[2],4*2($out)
+	mov	@x[3],4*3($out)
+	mov	@x[4],4*4($out)
+	mov	@x[5],4*5($out)
+	mov	@x[6],4*6($out)
+	mov	@x[7],4*7($out)
+	movdqu	%xmm0,4*8($out)
+	mov	@x[12],4*12($out)
+	mov	@x[13],4*13($out)
+	mov	@x[14],4*14($out)
+	mov	@x[15],4*15($out)
+	lea	4*16($out),$out		# out+=64
+
+	sub	\$64,%rbp
+	jnz	.Loop_outer
+
+	jmp	.Ldone
+
+.align	16
+.Ltail:
+	mov	@x[0],4*0(%rsp)
+	mov	@x[1],4*1(%rsp)
+	xor	%rbx,%rbx
+	mov	@x[2],4*2(%rsp)
+	mov	@x[3],4*3(%rsp)
+	mov	@x[4],4*4(%rsp)
+	mov	@x[5],4*5(%rsp)
+	mov	@x[6],4*6(%rsp)
+	mov	@x[7],4*7(%rsp)
+	movdqa	%xmm1,4*8(%rsp)
+	mov	@x[12],4*12(%rsp)
+	mov	@x[13],4*13(%rsp)
+	mov	@x[14],4*14(%rsp)
+	mov	@x[15],4*15(%rsp)
+
+.Loop_tail:
+	movzb	($inp,%rbx),%eax
+	movzb	(%rsp,%rbx),%edx
+	lea	1(%rbx),%rbx
+	xor	%edx,%eax
+	mov	%al,-1($out,%rbx)
+	dec	%rbp
+	jnz	.Loop_tail
+
+.Ldone:
+	add	\$64+24,%rsp
+	pop	%r15
+	pop	%r14
+	pop	%r13
+	pop	%r12
+	pop	%rbp
+	pop	%rbx
+.Lno_data:
+	ret
+.size	ChaCha20_ctr32,.-ChaCha20_ctr32
+___
+
+########################################################################
+# SSSE3 code path that handles shorter lengths
+{
+my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$t,$t1,$rot16,$rot24)=map("%xmm$_",(0..7));
+
+sub SSSE3ROUND {	# critical path is 20 "SIMD ticks" per round
+	&paddd	($a,$b);
+	&pxor	($d,$a);
+	&pshufb	($d,$rot16);
+
+	&paddd	($c,$d);
+	&pxor	($b,$c);
+	&movdqa	($t,$b);
+	&psrld	($b,20);
+	&pslld	($t,12);
+	&por	($b,$t);
+
+	&paddd	($a,$b);
+	&pxor	($d,$a);
+	&pshufb	($d,$rot24);
+
+	&paddd	($c,$d);
+	&pxor	($b,$c);
+	&movdqa	($t,$b);
+	&psrld	($b,25);
+	&pslld	($t,7);
+	&por	($b,$t);
+}
+
+my $xframe = $win64 ? 32+32+8 : 24;
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.type	ChaCha20_ssse3,\@function,5
+.align	32
+ChaCha20_ssse3:
+.LChaCha20_ssse3:
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($avx);
+	test	\$`1<<(43-32)`,%r10d
+	jnz	.LChaCha20_4xop		# XOP is fastest even if we use 1/4
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	cmp	\$128,$len		# we might throw away some data,
+	ja	.LChaCha20_4x		# but overall it won't be slower
+
+.Ldo_sse3_after_all:
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+
+	sub	\$64+$xframe,%rsp
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($win64);
+	movaps	%xmm6,64+32(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm7,64+48(%rsp)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	movdqa	.Lsigma(%rip),$a
+	movdqu	($key),$b
+	movdqu	16($key),$c
+	movdqu	($counter),$d
+	movdqa	.Lrot16(%rip),$rot16
+	movdqa	.Lrot24(%rip),$rot24
+
+	movdqa	$a,0x00(%rsp)
+	movdqa	$b,0x10(%rsp)
+	movdqa	$c,0x20(%rsp)
+	movdqa	$d,0x30(%rsp)
+	mov	\$10,%ebp
+	jmp	.Loop_ssse3
+
+.align	32
+.Loop_outer_ssse3:
+	movdqa	.Lone(%rip),$d
+	movdqa	0x00(%rsp),$a
+	movdqa	0x10(%rsp),$b
+	movdqa	0x20(%rsp),$c
+	paddd	0x30(%rsp),$d
+	mov	\$10,%ebp
+	movdqa	$d,0x30(%rsp)
+	jmp	.Loop_ssse3
+
+.align	32
+.Loop_ssse3:
+___
+	&SSSE3ROUND();
+	&pshufd	($c,$c,0b01001110);
+	&pshufd	($b,$b,0b00111001);
+	&pshufd	($d,$d,0b10010011);
+	&nop	();
+
+	&SSSE3ROUND();
+	&pshufd	($c,$c,0b01001110);
+	&pshufd	($b,$b,0b10010011);
+	&pshufd	($d,$d,0b00111001);
+
+	&dec	("%ebp");
+	&jnz	(".Loop_ssse3");
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	paddd	0x00(%rsp),$a
+	paddd	0x10(%rsp),$b
+	paddd	0x20(%rsp),$c
+	paddd	0x30(%rsp),$d
+
+	cmp	\$64,$len
+	jb	.Ltail_ssse3
+
+	movdqu	0x00($inp),$t
+	movdqu	0x10($inp),$t1
+	pxor	$t,$a			# xor with input
+	movdqu	0x20($inp),$t
+	pxor	$t1,$b
+	movdqu	0x30($inp),$t1
+	lea	0x40($inp),$inp		# inp+=64
+	pxor	$t,$c
+	pxor	$t1,$d
+
+	movdqu	$a,0x00($out)		# write output
+	movdqu	$b,0x10($out)
+	movdqu	$c,0x20($out)
+	movdqu	$d,0x30($out)
+	lea	0x40($out),$out		# out+=64
+
+	sub	\$64,$len
+	jnz	.Loop_outer_ssse3
+
+	jmp	.Ldone_ssse3
+
+.align	16
+.Ltail_ssse3:
+	movdqa	$a,0x00(%rsp)
+	movdqa	$b,0x10(%rsp)
+	movdqa	$c,0x20(%rsp)
+	movdqa	$d,0x30(%rsp)
+	xor	%rbx,%rbx
+
+.Loop_tail_ssse3:
+	movzb	($inp,%rbx),%eax
+	movzb	(%rsp,%rbx),%ecx
+	lea	1(%rbx),%rbx
+	xor	%ecx,%eax
+	mov	%al,-1($out,%rbx)
+	dec	$len
+	jnz	.Loop_tail_ssse3
+
+.Ldone_ssse3:
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($win64);
+	movaps	64+32(%rsp),%xmm6
+	movaps	64+48(%rsp),%xmm7
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	add	\$64+$xframe,%rsp
+	pop	%r15
+	pop	%r14
+	pop	%r13
+	pop	%r12
+	pop	%rbp
+	pop	%rbx
+	ret
+.size	ChaCha20_ssse3,.-ChaCha20_ssse3
+___
+}
+
+########################################################################
+# SSSE3 code path that handles longer messages.
+{
+# assign variables to favor Atom front-end
+my ($xd0,$xd1,$xd2,$xd3, $xt0,$xt1,$xt2,$xt3,
+    $xa0,$xa1,$xa2,$xa3, $xb0,$xb1,$xb2,$xb3)=map("%xmm$_",(0..15));
+my  @xx=($xa0,$xa1,$xa2,$xa3, $xb0,$xb1,$xb2,$xb3,
+	"%nox","%nox","%nox","%nox", $xd0,$xd1,$xd2,$xd3);
+
+sub SSSE3_lane_ROUND {
+my ($a0,$b0,$c0,$d0)=@_;
+my ($a1,$b1,$c1,$d1)=map(($_&~3)+(($_+1)&3),($a0,$b0,$c0,$d0));
+my ($a2,$b2,$c2,$d2)=map(($_&~3)+(($_+1)&3),($a1,$b1,$c1,$d1));
+my ($a3,$b3,$c3,$d3)=map(($_&~3)+(($_+1)&3),($a2,$b2,$c2,$d2));
+my ($xc,$xc_,$t0,$t1)=map("\"$_\"",$xt0,$xt1,$xt2,$xt3);
+my @x=map("\"$_\"",@xx);
+
+	# Consider order in which variables are addressed by their
+	# index:
+	#
+	#	a   b   c   d
+	#
+	#	0   4   8  12 < even round
+	#	1   5   9  13
+	#	2   6  10  14
+	#	3   7  11  15
+	#	0   5  10  15 < odd round
+	#	1   6  11  12
+	#	2   7   8  13
+	#	3   4   9  14
+	#
+	# 'a', 'b' and 'd's are permanently allocated in registers,
+	# @x[0..7,12..15], while 'c's are maintained in memory. If
+	# you observe 'c' column, you'll notice that pair of 'c's is
+	# invariant between rounds. This means that we have to reload
+	# them once per round, in the middle. This is why you'll see
+	# bunch of 'c' stores and loads in the middle, but none in
+	# the beginning or end.
+
+	(
+	"&paddd		(@x[$a0],@x[$b0])",	# Q1
+	 "&paddd	(@x[$a1],@x[$b1])",	# Q2
+	"&pxor		(@x[$d0],@x[$a0])",
+	 "&pxor		(@x[$d1],@x[$a1])",
+	"&pshufb	(@x[$d0],$t1)",
+	 "&pshufb	(@x[$d1],$t1)",
+
+	"&paddd		($xc,@x[$d0])",
+	 "&paddd	($xc_,@x[$d1])",
+	"&pxor		(@x[$b0],$xc)",
+	 "&pxor		(@x[$b1],$xc_)",
+	"&movdqa	($t0,@x[$b0])",
+	"&pslld		(@x[$b0],12)",
+	"&psrld		($t0,20)",
+	 "&movdqa	($t1,@x[$b1])",
+	 "&pslld	(@x[$b1],12)",
+	"&por		(@x[$b0],$t0)",
+	 "&psrld	($t1,20)",
+	"&movdqa	($t0,'(%r11)')",	# .Lrot24(%rip)
+	 "&por		(@x[$b1],$t1)",
+
+	"&paddd		(@x[$a0],@x[$b0])",
+	 "&paddd	(@x[$a1],@x[$b1])",
+	"&pxor		(@x[$d0],@x[$a0])",
+	 "&pxor		(@x[$d1],@x[$a1])",
+	"&pshufb	(@x[$d0],$t0)",
+	 "&pshufb	(@x[$d1],$t0)",
+
+	"&paddd		($xc,@x[$d0])",
+	 "&paddd	($xc_,@x[$d1])",
+	"&pxor		(@x[$b0],$xc)",
+	 "&pxor		(@x[$b1],$xc_)",
+	"&movdqa	($t1,@x[$b0])",
+	"&pslld		(@x[$b0],7)",
+	"&psrld		($t1,25)",
+	 "&movdqa	($t0,@x[$b1])",
+	 "&pslld	(@x[$b1],7)",
+	"&por		(@x[$b0],$t1)",
+	 "&psrld	($t0,25)",
+	"&movdqa	($t1,'(%r10)')",	# .Lrot16(%rip)
+	 "&por		(@x[$b1],$t0)",
+
+	"&movdqa	(\"`16*($c0-8)`(%rsp)\",$xc)",	# reload pair of 'c's
+	 "&movdqa	(\"`16*($c1-8)`(%rsp)\",$xc_)",
+	"&movdqa	($xc,\"`16*($c2-8)`(%rsp)\")",
+	 "&movdqa	($xc_,\"`16*($c3-8)`(%rsp)\")",
+
+	"&paddd		(@x[$a2],@x[$b2])",	# Q3
+	 "&paddd	(@x[$a3],@x[$b3])",	# Q4
+	"&pxor		(@x[$d2],@x[$a2])",
+	 "&pxor		(@x[$d3],@x[$a3])",
+	"&pshufb	(@x[$d2],$t1)",
+	 "&pshufb	(@x[$d3],$t1)",
+
+	"&paddd		($xc,@x[$d2])",
+	 "&paddd	($xc_,@x[$d3])",
+	"&pxor		(@x[$b2],$xc)",
+	 "&pxor		(@x[$b3],$xc_)",
+	"&movdqa	($t0,@x[$b2])",
+	"&pslld		(@x[$b2],12)",
+	"&psrld		($t0,20)",
+	 "&movdqa	($t1,@x[$b3])",
+	 "&pslld	(@x[$b3],12)",
+	"&por		(@x[$b2],$t0)",
+	 "&psrld	($t1,20)",
+	"&movdqa	($t0,'(%r11)')",	# .Lrot24(%rip)
+	 "&por		(@x[$b3],$t1)",
+
+	"&paddd		(@x[$a2],@x[$b2])",
+	 "&paddd	(@x[$a3],@x[$b3])",
+	"&pxor		(@x[$d2],@x[$a2])",
+	 "&pxor		(@x[$d3],@x[$a3])",
+	"&pshufb	(@x[$d2],$t0)",
+	 "&pshufb	(@x[$d3],$t0)",
+
+	"&paddd		($xc,@x[$d2])",
+	 "&paddd	($xc_,@x[$d3])",
+	"&pxor		(@x[$b2],$xc)",
+	 "&pxor		(@x[$b3],$xc_)",
+	"&movdqa	($t1,@x[$b2])",
+	"&pslld		(@x[$b2],7)",
+	"&psrld		($t1,25)",
+	 "&movdqa	($t0,@x[$b3])",
+	 "&pslld	(@x[$b3],7)",
+	"&por		(@x[$b2],$t1)",
+	 "&psrld	($t0,25)",
+	"&movdqa	($t1,'(%r10)')",	# .Lrot16(%rip)
+	 "&por		(@x[$b3],$t0)"
+	);
+}
+
+my $xframe = $win64 ? 0xa0 : 0;
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.type	ChaCha20_4x,\@function,5
+.align	32
+ChaCha20_4x:
+.LChaCha20_4x:
+	mov		%r10,%r11
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($avx>1);
+	shr		\$32,%r10		# OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+8
+	test		\$`1<<5`,%r10		# test AVX2
+	jnz		.LChaCha20_8x
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	cmp		\$192,$len
+	ja		.Lproceed4x
+
+	and		\$`1<<26|1<<22`,%r11	# isolate XSAVE+MOVBE
+	cmp		\$`1<<22`,%r11		# check for MOVBE without XSAVE
+	je		.Ldo_sse3_after_all	# to detect Atom
+
+.Lproceed4x:
+	lea		-0x78(%rsp),%r11
+	sub		\$0x148+$xframe,%rsp
+___
+	################ stack layout
+	# +0x00		SIMD equivalent of @x[8-12]
+	# ...
+	# +0x40		constant copy of key[0-2] smashed by lanes
+	# ...
+	# +0x100	SIMD counters (with nonce smashed by lanes)
+	# ...
+	# +0x140
+$code.=<<___	if ($win64);
+	movaps		%xmm6,-0x30(%r11)
+	movaps		%xmm7,-0x20(%r11)
+	movaps		%xmm8,-0x10(%r11)
+	movaps		%xmm9,0x00(%r11)
+	movaps		%xmm10,0x10(%r11)
+	movaps		%xmm11,0x20(%r11)
+	movaps		%xmm12,0x30(%r11)
+	movaps		%xmm13,0x40(%r11)
+	movaps		%xmm14,0x50(%r11)
+	movaps		%xmm15,0x60(%r11)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	movdqa		.Lsigma(%rip),$xa3	# key[0]
+	movdqu		($key),$xb3		# key[1]
+	movdqu		16($key),$xt3		# key[2]
+	movdqu		($counter),$xd3		# key[3]
+	lea		0x100(%rsp),%rcx	# size optimization
+	lea		.Lrot16(%rip),%r10
+	lea		.Lrot24(%rip),%r11
+
+	pshufd		\$0x00,$xa3,$xa0	# smash key by lanes...
+	pshufd		\$0x55,$xa3,$xa1
+	movdqa		$xa0,0x40(%rsp)		# ... and offload
+	pshufd		\$0xaa,$xa3,$xa2
+	movdqa		$xa1,0x50(%rsp)
+	pshufd		\$0xff,$xa3,$xa3
+	movdqa		$xa2,0x60(%rsp)
+	movdqa		$xa3,0x70(%rsp)
+
+	pshufd		\$0x00,$xb3,$xb0
+	pshufd		\$0x55,$xb3,$xb1
+	movdqa		$xb0,0x80-0x100(%rcx)
+	pshufd		\$0xaa,$xb3,$xb2
+	movdqa		$xb1,0x90-0x100(%rcx)
+	pshufd		\$0xff,$xb3,$xb3
+	movdqa		$xb2,0xa0-0x100(%rcx)
+	movdqa		$xb3,0xb0-0x100(%rcx)
+
+	pshufd		\$0x00,$xt3,$xt0	# "$xc0"
+	pshufd		\$0x55,$xt3,$xt1	# "$xc1"
+	movdqa		$xt0,0xc0-0x100(%rcx)
+	pshufd		\$0xaa,$xt3,$xt2	# "$xc2"
+	movdqa		$xt1,0xd0-0x100(%rcx)
+	pshufd		\$0xff,$xt3,$xt3	# "$xc3"
+	movdqa		$xt2,0xe0-0x100(%rcx)
+	movdqa		$xt3,0xf0-0x100(%rcx)
+
+	pshufd		\$0x00,$xd3,$xd0
+	pshufd		\$0x55,$xd3,$xd1
+	paddd		.Linc(%rip),$xd0	# don't save counters yet
+	pshufd		\$0xaa,$xd3,$xd2
+	movdqa		$xd1,0x110-0x100(%rcx)
+	pshufd		\$0xff,$xd3,$xd3
+	movdqa		$xd2,0x120-0x100(%rcx)
+	movdqa		$xd3,0x130-0x100(%rcx)
+
+	jmp		.Loop_enter4x
+
+.align	32
+.Loop_outer4x:
+	movdqa		0x40(%rsp),$xa0		# re-load smashed key
+	movdqa		0x50(%rsp),$xa1
+	movdqa		0x60(%rsp),$xa2
+	movdqa		0x70(%rsp),$xa3
+	movdqa		0x80-0x100(%rcx),$xb0
+	movdqa		0x90-0x100(%rcx),$xb1
+	movdqa		0xa0-0x100(%rcx),$xb2
+	movdqa		0xb0-0x100(%rcx),$xb3
+	movdqa		0xc0-0x100(%rcx),$xt0	# "$xc0"
+	movdqa		0xd0-0x100(%rcx),$xt1	# "$xc1"
+	movdqa		0xe0-0x100(%rcx),$xt2	# "$xc2"
+	movdqa		0xf0-0x100(%rcx),$xt3	# "$xc3"
+	movdqa		0x100-0x100(%rcx),$xd0
+	movdqa		0x110-0x100(%rcx),$xd1
+	movdqa		0x120-0x100(%rcx),$xd2
+	movdqa		0x130-0x100(%rcx),$xd3
+	paddd		.Lfour(%rip),$xd0	# next SIMD counters
+
+.Loop_enter4x:
+	movdqa		$xt2,0x20(%rsp)		# SIMD equivalent of "@x[10]"
+	movdqa		$xt3,0x30(%rsp)		# SIMD equivalent of "@x[11]"
+	movdqa		(%r10),$xt3		# .Lrot16(%rip)
+	mov		\$10,%eax
+	movdqa		$xd0,0x100-0x100(%rcx)	# save SIMD counters
+	jmp		.Loop4x
+
+.align	32
+.Loop4x:
+___
+	foreach (&SSSE3_lane_ROUND(0, 4, 8,12)) { eval; }
+	foreach (&SSSE3_lane_ROUND(0, 5,10,15)) { eval; }
+$code.=<<___;
+	dec		%eax
+	jnz		.Loop4x
+
+	paddd		0x40(%rsp),$xa0		# accumulate key material
+	paddd		0x50(%rsp),$xa1
+	paddd		0x60(%rsp),$xa2
+	paddd		0x70(%rsp),$xa3
+
+	movdqa		$xa0,$xt2		# "de-interlace" data
+	punpckldq	$xa1,$xa0
+	movdqa		$xa2,$xt3
+	punpckldq	$xa3,$xa2
+	punpckhdq	$xa1,$xt2
+	punpckhdq	$xa3,$xt3
+	movdqa		$xa0,$xa1
+	punpcklqdq	$xa2,$xa0		# "a0"
+	movdqa		$xt2,$xa3
+	punpcklqdq	$xt3,$xt2		# "a2"
+	punpckhqdq	$xa2,$xa1		# "a1"
+	punpckhqdq	$xt3,$xa3		# "a3"
+___
+	($xa2,$xt2)=($xt2,$xa2);
+$code.=<<___;
+	paddd		0x80-0x100(%rcx),$xb0
+	paddd		0x90-0x100(%rcx),$xb1
+	paddd		0xa0-0x100(%rcx),$xb2
+	paddd		0xb0-0x100(%rcx),$xb3
+
+	movdqa		$xa0,0x00(%rsp)		# offload $xaN
+	movdqa		$xa1,0x10(%rsp)
+	movdqa		0x20(%rsp),$xa0		# "xc2"
+	movdqa		0x30(%rsp),$xa1		# "xc3"
+
+	movdqa		$xb0,$xt2
+	punpckldq	$xb1,$xb0
+	movdqa		$xb2,$xt3
+	punpckldq	$xb3,$xb2
+	punpckhdq	$xb1,$xt2
+	punpckhdq	$xb3,$xt3
+	movdqa		$xb0,$xb1
+	punpcklqdq	$xb2,$xb0		# "b0"
+	movdqa		$xt2,$xb3
+	punpcklqdq	$xt3,$xt2		# "b2"
+	punpckhqdq	$xb2,$xb1		# "b1"
+	punpckhqdq	$xt3,$xb3		# "b3"
+___
+	($xb2,$xt2)=($xt2,$xb2);
+	my ($xc0,$xc1,$xc2,$xc3)=($xt0,$xt1,$xa0,$xa1);
+$code.=<<___;
+	paddd		0xc0-0x100(%rcx),$xc0
+	paddd		0xd0-0x100(%rcx),$xc1
+	paddd		0xe0-0x100(%rcx),$xc2
+	paddd		0xf0-0x100(%rcx),$xc3
+
+	movdqa		$xa2,0x20(%rsp)		# keep offloading $xaN
+	movdqa		$xa3,0x30(%rsp)
+
+	movdqa		$xc0,$xt2
+	punpckldq	$xc1,$xc0
+	movdqa		$xc2,$xt3
+	punpckldq	$xc3,$xc2
+	punpckhdq	$xc1,$xt2
+	punpckhdq	$xc3,$xt3
+	movdqa		$xc0,$xc1
+	punpcklqdq	$xc2,$xc0		# "c0"
+	movdqa		$xt2,$xc3
+	punpcklqdq	$xt3,$xt2		# "c2"
+	punpckhqdq	$xc2,$xc1		# "c1"
+	punpckhqdq	$xt3,$xc3		# "c3"
+___
+	($xc2,$xt2)=($xt2,$xc2);
+	($xt0,$xt1)=($xa2,$xa3);		# use $xaN as temporary
+$code.=<<___;
+	paddd		0x100-0x100(%rcx),$xd0
+	paddd		0x110-0x100(%rcx),$xd1
+	paddd		0x120-0x100(%rcx),$xd2
+	paddd		0x130-0x100(%rcx),$xd3
+
+	movdqa		$xd0,$xt2
+	punpckldq	$xd1,$xd0
+	movdqa		$xd2,$xt3
+	punpckldq	$xd3,$xd2
+	punpckhdq	$xd1,$xt2
+	punpckhdq	$xd3,$xt3
+	movdqa		$xd0,$xd1
+	punpcklqdq	$xd2,$xd0		# "d0"
+	movdqa		$xt2,$xd3
+	punpcklqdq	$xt3,$xt2		# "d2"
+	punpckhqdq	$xd2,$xd1		# "d1"
+	punpckhqdq	$xt3,$xd3		# "d3"
+___
+	($xd2,$xt2)=($xt2,$xd2);
+$code.=<<___;
+	cmp		\$64*4,$len
+	jb		.Ltail4x
+
+	movdqu		0x00($inp),$xt0		# xor with input
+	movdqu		0x10($inp),$xt1
+	movdqu		0x20($inp),$xt2
+	movdqu		0x30($inp),$xt3
+	pxor		0x00(%rsp),$xt0		# $xaN is offloaded, remember?
+	pxor		$xb0,$xt1
+	pxor		$xc0,$xt2
+	pxor		$xd0,$xt3
+
+	 movdqu		$xt0,0x00($out)
+	movdqu		0x40($inp),$xt0
+	 movdqu		$xt1,0x10($out)
+	movdqu		0x50($inp),$xt1
+	 movdqu		$xt2,0x20($out)
+	movdqu		0x60($inp),$xt2
+	 movdqu		$xt3,0x30($out)
+	movdqu		0x70($inp),$xt3
+	lea		0x80($inp),$inp		# size optimization
+	pxor		0x10(%rsp),$xt0
+	pxor		$xb1,$xt1
+	pxor		$xc1,$xt2
+	pxor		$xd1,$xt3
+
+	 movdqu		$xt0,0x40($out)
+	movdqu		0x00($inp),$xt0
+	 movdqu		$xt1,0x50($out)
+	movdqu		0x10($inp),$xt1
+	 movdqu		$xt2,0x60($out)
+	movdqu		0x20($inp),$xt2
+	 movdqu		$xt3,0x70($out)
+	 lea		0x80($out),$out		# size optimization
+	movdqu		0x30($inp),$xt3
+	pxor		0x20(%rsp),$xt0
+	pxor		$xb2,$xt1
+	pxor		$xc2,$xt2
+	pxor		$xd2,$xt3
+
+	 movdqu		$xt0,0x00($out)
+	movdqu		0x40($inp),$xt0
+	 movdqu		$xt1,0x10($out)
+	movdqu		0x50($inp),$xt1
+	 movdqu		$xt2,0x20($out)
+	movdqu		0x60($inp),$xt2
+	 movdqu		$xt3,0x30($out)
+	movdqu		0x70($inp),$xt3
+	lea		0x80($inp),$inp		# inp+=64*4
+	pxor		0x30(%rsp),$xt0
+	pxor		$xb3,$xt1
+	pxor		$xc3,$xt2
+	pxor		$xd3,$xt3
+	movdqu		$xt0,0x40($out)
+	movdqu		$xt1,0x50($out)
+	movdqu		$xt2,0x60($out)
+	movdqu		$xt3,0x70($out)
+	lea		0x80($out),$out		# out+=64*4
+
+	sub		\$64*4,$len
+	jnz		.Loop_outer4x
+
+	jmp		.Ldone4x
+
+.Ltail4x:
+	cmp		\$192,$len
+	jae		.L192_or_more4x
+	cmp		\$128,$len
+	jae		.L128_or_more4x
+	cmp		\$64,$len
+	jae		.L64_or_more4x
+
+	#movdqa		0x00(%rsp),$xt0		# $xaN is offloaded, remember?
+	xor		%r10,%r10
+	#movdqa		$xt0,0x00(%rsp)
+	movdqa		$xb0,0x10(%rsp)
+	movdqa		$xc0,0x20(%rsp)
+	movdqa		$xd0,0x30(%rsp)
+	jmp		.Loop_tail4x
+
+.align	32
+.L64_or_more4x:
+	movdqu		0x00($inp),$xt0		# xor with input
+	movdqu		0x10($inp),$xt1
+	movdqu		0x20($inp),$xt2
+	movdqu		0x30($inp),$xt3
+	pxor		0x00(%rsp),$xt0		# $xaxN is offloaded, remember?
+	pxor		$xb0,$xt1
+	pxor		$xc0,$xt2
+	pxor		$xd0,$xt3
+	movdqu		$xt0,0x00($out)
+	movdqu		$xt1,0x10($out)
+	movdqu		$xt2,0x20($out)
+	movdqu		$xt3,0x30($out)
+	je		.Ldone4x
+
+	movdqa		0x10(%rsp),$xt0		# $xaN is offloaded, remember?
+	lea		0x40($inp),$inp		# inp+=64*1
+	xor		%r10,%r10
+	movdqa		$xt0,0x00(%rsp)
+	movdqa		$xb1,0x10(%rsp)
+	lea		0x40($out),$out		# out+=64*1
+	movdqa		$xc1,0x20(%rsp)
+	sub		\$64,$len		# len-=64*1
+	movdqa		$xd1,0x30(%rsp)
+	jmp		.Loop_tail4x
+
+.align	32
+.L128_or_more4x:
+	movdqu		0x00($inp),$xt0		# xor with input
+	movdqu		0x10($inp),$xt1
+	movdqu		0x20($inp),$xt2
+	movdqu		0x30($inp),$xt3
+	pxor		0x00(%rsp),$xt0		# $xaN is offloaded, remember?
+	pxor		$xb0,$xt1
+	pxor		$xc0,$xt2
+	pxor		$xd0,$xt3
+
+	 movdqu		$xt0,0x00($out)
+	movdqu		0x40($inp),$xt0
+	 movdqu		$xt1,0x10($out)
+	movdqu		0x50($inp),$xt1
+	 movdqu		$xt2,0x20($out)
+	movdqu		0x60($inp),$xt2
+	 movdqu		$xt3,0x30($out)
+	movdqu		0x70($inp),$xt3
+	pxor		0x10(%rsp),$xt0
+	pxor		$xb1,$xt1
+	pxor		$xc1,$xt2
+	pxor		$xd1,$xt3
+	movdqu		$xt0,0x40($out)
+	movdqu		$xt1,0x50($out)
+	movdqu		$xt2,0x60($out)
+	movdqu		$xt3,0x70($out)
+	je		.Ldone4x
+
+	movdqa		0x20(%rsp),$xt0		# $xaN is offloaded, remember?
+	lea		0x80($inp),$inp		# inp+=64*2
+	xor		%r10,%r10
+	movdqa		$xt0,0x00(%rsp)
+	movdqa		$xb2,0x10(%rsp)
+	lea		0x80($out),$out		# out+=64*2
+	movdqa		$xc2,0x20(%rsp)
+	sub		\$128,$len		# len-=64*2
+	movdqa		$xd2,0x30(%rsp)
+	jmp		.Loop_tail4x
+
+.align	32
+.L192_or_more4x:
+	movdqu		0x00($inp),$xt0		# xor with input
+	movdqu		0x10($inp),$xt1
+	movdqu		0x20($inp),$xt2
+	movdqu		0x30($inp),$xt3
+	pxor		0x00(%rsp),$xt0		# $xaN is offloaded, remember?
+	pxor		$xb0,$xt1
+	pxor		$xc0,$xt2
+	pxor		$xd0,$xt3
+
+	 movdqu		$xt0,0x00($out)
+	movdqu		0x40($inp),$xt0
+	 movdqu		$xt1,0x10($out)
+	movdqu		0x50($inp),$xt1
+	 movdqu		$xt2,0x20($out)
+	movdqu		0x60($inp),$xt2
+	 movdqu		$xt3,0x30($out)
+	movdqu		0x70($inp),$xt3
+	lea		0x80($inp),$inp		# size optimization
+	pxor		0x10(%rsp),$xt0
+	pxor		$xb1,$xt1
+	pxor		$xc1,$xt2
+	pxor		$xd1,$xt3
+
+	 movdqu		$xt0,0x40($out)
+	movdqu		0x00($inp),$xt0
+	 movdqu		$xt1,0x50($out)
+	movdqu		0x10($inp),$xt1
+	 movdqu		$xt2,0x60($out)
+	movdqu		0x20($inp),$xt2
+	 movdqu		$xt3,0x70($out)
+	 lea		0x80($out),$out		# size optimization
+	movdqu		0x30($inp),$xt3
+	pxor		0x20(%rsp),$xt0
+	pxor		$xb2,$xt1
+	pxor		$xc2,$xt2
+	pxor		$xd2,$xt3
+	movdqu		$xt0,0x00($out)
+	movdqu		$xt1,0x10($out)
+	movdqu		$xt2,0x20($out)
+	movdqu		$xt3,0x30($out)
+	je		.Ldone4x
+
+	movdqa		0x30(%rsp),$xt0		# $xaN is offloaded, remember?
+	lea		0x40($inp),$inp		# inp+=64*3
+	xor		%r10,%r10
+	movdqa		$xt0,0x00(%rsp)
+	movdqa		$xb3,0x10(%rsp)
+	lea		0x40($out),$out		# out+=64*3
+	movdqa		$xc3,0x20(%rsp)
+	sub		\$192,$len		# len-=64*3
+	movdqa		$xd3,0x30(%rsp)
+
+.Loop_tail4x:
+	movzb		($inp,%r10),%eax
+	movzb		(%rsp,%r10),%ecx
+	lea		1(%r10),%r10
+	xor		%ecx,%eax
+	mov		%al,-1($out,%r10)
+	dec		$len
+	jnz		.Loop_tail4x
+
+.Ldone4x:
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($win64);
+	lea		0x140+0x30(%rsp),%r11
+	movaps		-0x30(%r11),%xmm6
+	movaps		-0x20(%r11),%xmm7
+	movaps		-0x10(%r11),%xmm8
+	movaps		0x00(%r11),%xmm9
+	movaps		0x10(%r11),%xmm10
+	movaps		0x20(%r11),%xmm11
+	movaps		0x30(%r11),%xmm12
+	movaps		0x40(%r11),%xmm13
+	movaps		0x50(%r11),%xmm14
+	movaps		0x60(%r11),%xmm15
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	add		\$0x148+$xframe,%rsp
+	ret
+.size	ChaCha20_4x,.-ChaCha20_4x
+___
+}
+
+########################################################################
+# XOP code path that handles all lengths.
+if ($avx) {
+# There is some "anomaly" observed depending on instructions' size or
+# alignment. If you look closely at below code you'll notice that
+# sometimes argument order varies. The order affects instruction
+# encoding by making it larger, and such fiddling gives 5% performance
+# improvement. This is on FX-4100...
+
+my ($xb0,$xb1,$xb2,$xb3, $xd0,$xd1,$xd2,$xd3,
+    $xa0,$xa1,$xa2,$xa3, $xt0,$xt1,$xt2,$xt3)=map("%xmm$_",(0..15));
+my  @xx=($xa0,$xa1,$xa2,$xa3, $xb0,$xb1,$xb2,$xb3,
+	 $xt0,$xt1,$xt2,$xt3, $xd0,$xd1,$xd2,$xd3);
+
+sub XOP_lane_ROUND {
+my ($a0,$b0,$c0,$d0)=@_;
+my ($a1,$b1,$c1,$d1)=map(($_&~3)+(($_+1)&3),($a0,$b0,$c0,$d0));
+my ($a2,$b2,$c2,$d2)=map(($_&~3)+(($_+1)&3),($a1,$b1,$c1,$d1));
+my ($a3,$b3,$c3,$d3)=map(($_&~3)+(($_+1)&3),($a2,$b2,$c2,$d2));
+my @x=map("\"$_\"",@xx);
+
+	(
+	"&vpaddd	(@x[$a0],@x[$a0],@x[$b0])",	# Q1
+	 "&vpaddd	(@x[$a1],@x[$a1],@x[$b1])",	# Q2
+	  "&vpaddd	(@x[$a2],@x[$a2],@x[$b2])",	# Q3
+	   "&vpaddd	(@x[$a3],@x[$a3],@x[$b3])",	# Q4
+	"&vpxor		(@x[$d0],@x[$a0],@x[$d0])",
+	 "&vpxor	(@x[$d1],@x[$a1],@x[$d1])",
+	  "&vpxor	(@x[$d2],@x[$a2],@x[$d2])",
+	   "&vpxor	(@x[$d3],@x[$a3],@x[$d3])",
+	"&vprotd	(@x[$d0],@x[$d0],16)",
+	 "&vprotd	(@x[$d1],@x[$d1],16)",
+	  "&vprotd	(@x[$d2],@x[$d2],16)",
+	   "&vprotd	(@x[$d3],@x[$d3],16)",
+
+	"&vpaddd	(@x[$c0],@x[$c0],@x[$d0])",
+	 "&vpaddd	(@x[$c1],@x[$c1],@x[$d1])",
+	  "&vpaddd	(@x[$c2],@x[$c2],@x[$d2])",
+	   "&vpaddd	(@x[$c3],@x[$c3],@x[$d3])",
+	"&vpxor		(@x[$b0],@x[$c0],@x[$b0])",
+	 "&vpxor	(@x[$b1],@x[$c1],@x[$b1])",
+	  "&vpxor	(@x[$b2],@x[$b2],@x[$c2])",	# flip
+	   "&vpxor	(@x[$b3],@x[$b3],@x[$c3])",	# flip
+	"&vprotd	(@x[$b0],@x[$b0],12)",
+	 "&vprotd	(@x[$b1],@x[$b1],12)",
+	  "&vprotd	(@x[$b2],@x[$b2],12)",
+	   "&vprotd	(@x[$b3],@x[$b3],12)",
+
+	"&vpaddd	(@x[$a0],@x[$b0],@x[$a0])",	# flip
+	 "&vpaddd	(@x[$a1],@x[$b1],@x[$a1])",	# flip
+	  "&vpaddd	(@x[$a2],@x[$a2],@x[$b2])",
+	   "&vpaddd	(@x[$a3],@x[$a3],@x[$b3])",
+	"&vpxor		(@x[$d0],@x[$a0],@x[$d0])",
+	 "&vpxor	(@x[$d1],@x[$a1],@x[$d1])",
+	  "&vpxor	(@x[$d2],@x[$a2],@x[$d2])",
+	   "&vpxor	(@x[$d3],@x[$a3],@x[$d3])",
+	"&vprotd	(@x[$d0],@x[$d0],8)",
+	 "&vprotd	(@x[$d1],@x[$d1],8)",
+	  "&vprotd	(@x[$d2],@x[$d2],8)",
+	   "&vprotd	(@x[$d3],@x[$d3],8)",
+
+	"&vpaddd	(@x[$c0],@x[$c0],@x[$d0])",
+	 "&vpaddd	(@x[$c1],@x[$c1],@x[$d1])",
+	  "&vpaddd	(@x[$c2],@x[$c2],@x[$d2])",
+	   "&vpaddd	(@x[$c3],@x[$c3],@x[$d3])",
+	"&vpxor		(@x[$b0],@x[$c0],@x[$b0])",
+	 "&vpxor	(@x[$b1],@x[$c1],@x[$b1])",
+	  "&vpxor	(@x[$b2],@x[$b2],@x[$c2])",	# flip
+	   "&vpxor	(@x[$b3],@x[$b3],@x[$c3])",	# flip
+	"&vprotd	(@x[$b0],@x[$b0],7)",
+	 "&vprotd	(@x[$b1],@x[$b1],7)",
+	  "&vprotd	(@x[$b2],@x[$b2],7)",
+	   "&vprotd	(@x[$b3],@x[$b3],7)"
+	);
+}
+
+my $xframe = $win64 ? 0xa0 : 0;
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.type	ChaCha20_4xop,\@function,5
+.align	32
+ChaCha20_4xop:
+.LChaCha20_4xop:
+	lea		-0x78(%rsp),%r11
+	sub		\$0x148+$xframe,%rsp
+___
+	################ stack layout
+	# +0x00		SIMD equivalent of @x[8-12]
+	# ...
+	# +0x40		constant copy of key[0-2] smashed by lanes
+	# ...
+	# +0x100	SIMD counters (with nonce smashed by lanes)
+	# ...
+	# +0x140
+$code.=<<___	if ($win64);
+	movaps		%xmm6,-0x30(%r11)
+	movaps		%xmm7,-0x20(%r11)
+	movaps		%xmm8,-0x10(%r11)
+	movaps		%xmm9,0x00(%r11)
+	movaps		%xmm10,0x10(%r11)
+	movaps		%xmm11,0x20(%r11)
+	movaps		%xmm12,0x30(%r11)
+	movaps		%xmm13,0x40(%r11)
+	movaps		%xmm14,0x50(%r11)
+	movaps		%xmm15,0x60(%r11)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	vzeroupper
+
+	vmovdqa		.Lsigma(%rip),$xa3	# key[0]
+	vmovdqu		($key),$xb3		# key[1]
+	vmovdqu		16($key),$xt3		# key[2]
+	vmovdqu		($counter),$xd3		# key[3]
+	lea		0x100(%rsp),%rcx	# size optimization
+
+	vpshufd		\$0x00,$xa3,$xa0	# smash key by lanes...
+	vpshufd		\$0x55,$xa3,$xa1
+	vmovdqa		$xa0,0x40(%rsp)		# ... and offload
+	vpshufd		\$0xaa,$xa3,$xa2
+	vmovdqa		$xa1,0x50(%rsp)
+	vpshufd		\$0xff,$xa3,$xa3
+	vmovdqa		$xa2,0x60(%rsp)
+	vmovdqa		$xa3,0x70(%rsp)
+
+	vpshufd		\$0x00,$xb3,$xb0
+	vpshufd		\$0x55,$xb3,$xb1
+	vmovdqa		$xb0,0x80-0x100(%rcx)
+	vpshufd		\$0xaa,$xb3,$xb2
+	vmovdqa		$xb1,0x90-0x100(%rcx)
+	vpshufd		\$0xff,$xb3,$xb3
+	vmovdqa		$xb2,0xa0-0x100(%rcx)
+	vmovdqa		$xb3,0xb0-0x100(%rcx)
+
+	vpshufd		\$0x00,$xt3,$xt0	# "$xc0"
+	vpshufd		\$0x55,$xt3,$xt1	# "$xc1"
+	vmovdqa		$xt0,0xc0-0x100(%rcx)
+	vpshufd		\$0xaa,$xt3,$xt2	# "$xc2"
+	vmovdqa		$xt1,0xd0-0x100(%rcx)
+	vpshufd		\$0xff,$xt3,$xt3	# "$xc3"
+	vmovdqa		$xt2,0xe0-0x100(%rcx)
+	vmovdqa		$xt3,0xf0-0x100(%rcx)
+
+	vpshufd		\$0x00,$xd3,$xd0
+	vpshufd		\$0x55,$xd3,$xd1
+	vpaddd		.Linc(%rip),$xd0,$xd0	# don't save counters yet
+	vpshufd		\$0xaa,$xd3,$xd2
+	vmovdqa		$xd1,0x110-0x100(%rcx)
+	vpshufd		\$0xff,$xd3,$xd3
+	vmovdqa		$xd2,0x120-0x100(%rcx)
+	vmovdqa		$xd3,0x130-0x100(%rcx)
+
+	jmp		.Loop_enter4xop
+
+.align	32
+.Loop_outer4xop:
+	vmovdqa		0x40(%rsp),$xa0		# re-load smashed key
+	vmovdqa		0x50(%rsp),$xa1
+	vmovdqa		0x60(%rsp),$xa2
+	vmovdqa		0x70(%rsp),$xa3
+	vmovdqa		0x80-0x100(%rcx),$xb0
+	vmovdqa		0x90-0x100(%rcx),$xb1
+	vmovdqa		0xa0-0x100(%rcx),$xb2
+	vmovdqa		0xb0-0x100(%rcx),$xb3
+	vmovdqa		0xc0-0x100(%rcx),$xt0	# "$xc0"
+	vmovdqa		0xd0-0x100(%rcx),$xt1	# "$xc1"
+	vmovdqa		0xe0-0x100(%rcx),$xt2	# "$xc2"
+	vmovdqa		0xf0-0x100(%rcx),$xt3	# "$xc3"
+	vmovdqa		0x100-0x100(%rcx),$xd0
+	vmovdqa		0x110-0x100(%rcx),$xd1
+	vmovdqa		0x120-0x100(%rcx),$xd2
+	vmovdqa		0x130-0x100(%rcx),$xd3
+	vpaddd		.Lfour(%rip),$xd0,$xd0	# next SIMD counters
+
+.Loop_enter4xop:
+	mov		\$10,%eax
+	vmovdqa		$xd0,0x100-0x100(%rcx)	# save SIMD counters
+	jmp		.Loop4xop
+
+.align	32
+.Loop4xop:
+___
+	foreach (&XOP_lane_ROUND(0, 4, 8,12)) { eval; }
+	foreach (&XOP_lane_ROUND(0, 5,10,15)) { eval; }
+$code.=<<___;
+	dec		%eax
+	jnz		.Loop4xop
+
+	vpaddd		0x40(%rsp),$xa0,$xa0	# accumulate key material
+	vpaddd		0x50(%rsp),$xa1,$xa1
+	vpaddd		0x60(%rsp),$xa2,$xa2
+	vpaddd		0x70(%rsp),$xa3,$xa3
+
+	vmovdqa		$xt2,0x20(%rsp)		# offload $xc2,3
+	vmovdqa		$xt3,0x30(%rsp)
+
+	vpunpckldq	$xa1,$xa0,$xt2		# "de-interlace" data
+	vpunpckldq	$xa3,$xa2,$xt3
+	vpunpckhdq	$xa1,$xa0,$xa0
+	vpunpckhdq	$xa3,$xa2,$xa2
+	vpunpcklqdq	$xt3,$xt2,$xa1		# "a0"
+	vpunpckhqdq	$xt3,$xt2,$xt2		# "a1"
+	vpunpcklqdq	$xa2,$xa0,$xa3		# "a2"
+	vpunpckhqdq	$xa2,$xa0,$xa0		# "a3"
+___
+        ($xa0,$xa1,$xa2,$xa3,$xt2)=($xa1,$xt2,$xa3,$xa0,$xa2);
+$code.=<<___;
+	vpaddd		0x80-0x100(%rcx),$xb0,$xb0
+	vpaddd		0x90-0x100(%rcx),$xb1,$xb1
+	vpaddd		0xa0-0x100(%rcx),$xb2,$xb2
+	vpaddd		0xb0-0x100(%rcx),$xb3,$xb3
+
+	vmovdqa		$xa0,0x00(%rsp)		# offload $xa0,1
+	vmovdqa		$xa1,0x10(%rsp)
+	vmovdqa		0x20(%rsp),$xa0		# "xc2"
+	vmovdqa		0x30(%rsp),$xa1		# "xc3"
+
+	vpunpckldq	$xb1,$xb0,$xt2
+	vpunpckldq	$xb3,$xb2,$xt3
+	vpunpckhdq	$xb1,$xb0,$xb0
+	vpunpckhdq	$xb3,$xb2,$xb2
+	vpunpcklqdq	$xt3,$xt2,$xb1		# "b0"
+	vpunpckhqdq	$xt3,$xt2,$xt2		# "b1"
+	vpunpcklqdq	$xb2,$xb0,$xb3		# "b2"
+	vpunpckhqdq	$xb2,$xb0,$xb0		# "b3"
+___
+	($xb0,$xb1,$xb2,$xb3,$xt2)=($xb1,$xt2,$xb3,$xb0,$xb2);
+	my ($xc0,$xc1,$xc2,$xc3)=($xt0,$xt1,$xa0,$xa1);
+$code.=<<___;
+	vpaddd		0xc0-0x100(%rcx),$xc0,$xc0
+	vpaddd		0xd0-0x100(%rcx),$xc1,$xc1
+	vpaddd		0xe0-0x100(%rcx),$xc2,$xc2
+	vpaddd		0xf0-0x100(%rcx),$xc3,$xc3
+
+	vpunpckldq	$xc1,$xc0,$xt2
+	vpunpckldq	$xc3,$xc2,$xt3
+	vpunpckhdq	$xc1,$xc0,$xc0
+	vpunpckhdq	$xc3,$xc2,$xc2
+	vpunpcklqdq	$xt3,$xt2,$xc1		# "c0"
+	vpunpckhqdq	$xt3,$xt2,$xt2		# "c1"
+	vpunpcklqdq	$xc2,$xc0,$xc3		# "c2"
+	vpunpckhqdq	$xc2,$xc0,$xc0		# "c3"
+___
+	($xc0,$xc1,$xc2,$xc3,$xt2)=($xc1,$xt2,$xc3,$xc0,$xc2);
+$code.=<<___;
+	vpaddd		0x100-0x100(%rcx),$xd0,$xd0
+	vpaddd		0x110-0x100(%rcx),$xd1,$xd1
+	vpaddd		0x120-0x100(%rcx),$xd2,$xd2
+	vpaddd		0x130-0x100(%rcx),$xd3,$xd3
+
+	vpunpckldq	$xd1,$xd0,$xt2
+	vpunpckldq	$xd3,$xd2,$xt3
+	vpunpckhdq	$xd1,$xd0,$xd0
+	vpunpckhdq	$xd3,$xd2,$xd2
+	vpunpcklqdq	$xt3,$xt2,$xd1		# "d0"
+	vpunpckhqdq	$xt3,$xt2,$xt2		# "d1"
+	vpunpcklqdq	$xd2,$xd0,$xd3		# "d2"
+	vpunpckhqdq	$xd2,$xd0,$xd0		# "d3"
+___
+	($xd0,$xd1,$xd2,$xd3,$xt2)=($xd1,$xt2,$xd3,$xd0,$xd2);
+	($xa0,$xa1)=($xt2,$xt3);
+$code.=<<___;
+	vmovdqa		0x00(%rsp),$xa0		# restore $xa0,1
+	vmovdqa		0x10(%rsp),$xa1
+
+	cmp		\$64*4,$len
+	jb		.Ltail4xop
+
+	vpxor		0x00($inp),$xa0,$xa0	# xor with input
+	vpxor		0x10($inp),$xb0,$xb0
+	vpxor		0x20($inp),$xc0,$xc0
+	vpxor		0x30($inp),$xd0,$xd0
+	vpxor		0x40($inp),$xa1,$xa1
+	vpxor		0x50($inp),$xb1,$xb1
+	vpxor		0x60($inp),$xc1,$xc1
+	vpxor		0x70($inp),$xd1,$xd1
+	lea		0x80($inp),$inp		# size optimization
+	vpxor		0x00($inp),$xa2,$xa2
+	vpxor		0x10($inp),$xb2,$xb2
+	vpxor		0x20($inp),$xc2,$xc2
+	vpxor		0x30($inp),$xd2,$xd2
+	vpxor		0x40($inp),$xa3,$xa3
+	vpxor		0x50($inp),$xb3,$xb3
+	vpxor		0x60($inp),$xc3,$xc3
+	vpxor		0x70($inp),$xd3,$xd3
+	lea		0x80($inp),$inp		# inp+=64*4
+
+	vmovdqu		$xa0,0x00($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xb0,0x10($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xc0,0x20($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xd0,0x30($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xa1,0x40($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xb1,0x50($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xc1,0x60($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xd1,0x70($out)
+	lea		0x80($out),$out		# size optimization
+	vmovdqu		$xa2,0x00($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xb2,0x10($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xc2,0x20($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xd2,0x30($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xa3,0x40($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xb3,0x50($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xc3,0x60($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xd3,0x70($out)
+	lea		0x80($out),$out		# out+=64*4
+
+	sub		\$64*4,$len
+	jnz		.Loop_outer4xop
+
+	jmp		.Ldone4xop
+
+.align	32
+.Ltail4xop:
+	cmp		\$192,$len
+	jae		.L192_or_more4xop
+	cmp		\$128,$len
+	jae		.L128_or_more4xop
+	cmp		\$64,$len
+	jae		.L64_or_more4xop
+
+	xor		%r10,%r10
+	vmovdqa		$xa0,0x00(%rsp)
+	vmovdqa		$xb0,0x10(%rsp)
+	vmovdqa		$xc0,0x20(%rsp)
+	vmovdqa		$xd0,0x30(%rsp)
+	jmp		.Loop_tail4xop
+
+.align	32
+.L64_or_more4xop:
+	vpxor		0x00($inp),$xa0,$xa0	# xor with input
+	vpxor		0x10($inp),$xb0,$xb0
+	vpxor		0x20($inp),$xc0,$xc0
+	vpxor		0x30($inp),$xd0,$xd0
+	vmovdqu		$xa0,0x00($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xb0,0x10($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xc0,0x20($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xd0,0x30($out)
+	je		.Ldone4xop
+
+	lea		0x40($inp),$inp		# inp+=64*1
+	vmovdqa		$xa1,0x00(%rsp)
+	xor		%r10,%r10
+	vmovdqa		$xb1,0x10(%rsp)
+	lea		0x40($out),$out		# out+=64*1
+	vmovdqa		$xc1,0x20(%rsp)
+	sub		\$64,$len		# len-=64*1
+	vmovdqa		$xd1,0x30(%rsp)
+	jmp		.Loop_tail4xop
+
+.align	32
+.L128_or_more4xop:
+	vpxor		0x00($inp),$xa0,$xa0	# xor with input
+	vpxor		0x10($inp),$xb0,$xb0
+	vpxor		0x20($inp),$xc0,$xc0
+	vpxor		0x30($inp),$xd0,$xd0
+	vpxor		0x40($inp),$xa1,$xa1
+	vpxor		0x50($inp),$xb1,$xb1
+	vpxor		0x60($inp),$xc1,$xc1
+	vpxor		0x70($inp),$xd1,$xd1
+
+	vmovdqu		$xa0,0x00($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xb0,0x10($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xc0,0x20($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xd0,0x30($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xa1,0x40($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xb1,0x50($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xc1,0x60($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xd1,0x70($out)
+	je		.Ldone4xop
+
+	lea		0x80($inp),$inp		# inp+=64*2
+	vmovdqa		$xa2,0x00(%rsp)
+	xor		%r10,%r10
+	vmovdqa		$xb2,0x10(%rsp)
+	lea		0x80($out),$out		# out+=64*2
+	vmovdqa		$xc2,0x20(%rsp)
+	sub		\$128,$len		# len-=64*2
+	vmovdqa		$xd2,0x30(%rsp)
+	jmp		.Loop_tail4xop
+
+.align	32
+.L192_or_more4xop:
+	vpxor		0x00($inp),$xa0,$xa0	# xor with input
+	vpxor		0x10($inp),$xb0,$xb0
+	vpxor		0x20($inp),$xc0,$xc0
+	vpxor		0x30($inp),$xd0,$xd0
+	vpxor		0x40($inp),$xa1,$xa1
+	vpxor		0x50($inp),$xb1,$xb1
+	vpxor		0x60($inp),$xc1,$xc1
+	vpxor		0x70($inp),$xd1,$xd1
+	lea		0x80($inp),$inp		# size optimization
+	vpxor		0x00($inp),$xa2,$xa2
+	vpxor		0x10($inp),$xb2,$xb2
+	vpxor		0x20($inp),$xc2,$xc2
+	vpxor		0x30($inp),$xd2,$xd2
+
+	vmovdqu		$xa0,0x00($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xb0,0x10($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xc0,0x20($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xd0,0x30($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xa1,0x40($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xb1,0x50($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xc1,0x60($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xd1,0x70($out)
+	lea		0x80($out),$out		# size optimization
+	vmovdqu		$xa2,0x00($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xb2,0x10($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xc2,0x20($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xd2,0x30($out)
+	je		.Ldone4xop
+
+	lea		0x40($inp),$inp		# inp+=64*3
+	vmovdqa		$xa3,0x00(%rsp)
+	xor		%r10,%r10
+	vmovdqa		$xb3,0x10(%rsp)
+	lea		0x40($out),$out		# out+=64*3
+	vmovdqa		$xc3,0x20(%rsp)
+	sub		\$192,$len		# len-=64*3
+	vmovdqa		$xd3,0x30(%rsp)
+
+.Loop_tail4xop:
+	movzb		($inp,%r10),%eax
+	movzb		(%rsp,%r10),%ecx
+	lea		1(%r10),%r10
+	xor		%ecx,%eax
+	mov		%al,-1($out,%r10)
+	dec		$len
+	jnz		.Loop_tail4xop
+
+.Ldone4xop:
+	vzeroupper
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($win64);
+	lea		0x140+0x30(%rsp),%r11
+	movaps		-0x30(%r11),%xmm6
+	movaps		-0x20(%r11),%xmm7
+	movaps		-0x10(%r11),%xmm8
+	movaps		0x00(%r11),%xmm9
+	movaps		0x10(%r11),%xmm10
+	movaps		0x20(%r11),%xmm11
+	movaps		0x30(%r11),%xmm12
+	movaps		0x40(%r11),%xmm13
+	movaps		0x50(%r11),%xmm14
+	movaps		0x60(%r11),%xmm15
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	add		\$0x148+$xframe,%rsp
+	ret
+.size	ChaCha20_4xop,.-ChaCha20_4xop
+___
+}
+
+########################################################################
+# AVX2 code path
+if ($avx>1) {
+my ($xb0,$xb1,$xb2,$xb3, $xd0,$xd1,$xd2,$xd3,
+    $xa0,$xa1,$xa2,$xa3, $xt0,$xt1,$xt2,$xt3)=map("%ymm$_",(0..15));
+my @xx=($xa0,$xa1,$xa2,$xa3, $xb0,$xb1,$xb2,$xb3,
+	"%nox","%nox","%nox","%nox", $xd0,$xd1,$xd2,$xd3);
+
+sub AVX2_lane_ROUND {
+my ($a0,$b0,$c0,$d0)=@_;
+my ($a1,$b1,$c1,$d1)=map(($_&~3)+(($_+1)&3),($a0,$b0,$c0,$d0));
+my ($a2,$b2,$c2,$d2)=map(($_&~3)+(($_+1)&3),($a1,$b1,$c1,$d1));
+my ($a3,$b3,$c3,$d3)=map(($_&~3)+(($_+1)&3),($a2,$b2,$c2,$d2));
+my ($xc,$xc_,$t0,$t1)=map("\"$_\"",$xt0,$xt1,$xt2,$xt3);
+my @x=map("\"$_\"",@xx);
+
+	# Consider order in which variables are addressed by their
+	# index:
+	#
+	#	a   b   c   d
+	#
+	#	0   4   8  12 < even round
+	#	1   5   9  13
+	#	2   6  10  14
+	#	3   7  11  15
+	#	0   5  10  15 < odd round
+	#	1   6  11  12
+	#	2   7   8  13
+	#	3   4   9  14
+	#
+	# 'a', 'b' and 'd's are permanently allocated in registers,
+	# @x[0..7,12..15], while 'c's are maintained in memory. If
+	# you observe 'c' column, you'll notice that pair of 'c's is
+	# invariant between rounds. This means that we have to reload
+	# them once per round, in the middle. This is why you'll see
+	# bunch of 'c' stores and loads in the middle, but none in
+	# the beginning or end.
+
+	(
+	"&vpaddd	(@x[$a0],@x[$a0],@x[$b0])",	# Q1
+	"&vpxor		(@x[$d0],@x[$a0],@x[$d0])",
+	"&vpshufb	(@x[$d0],@x[$d0],$t1)",
+	 "&vpaddd	(@x[$a1],@x[$a1],@x[$b1])",	# Q2
+	 "&vpxor	(@x[$d1],@x[$a1],@x[$d1])",
+	 "&vpshufb	(@x[$d1],@x[$d1],$t1)",
+
+	"&vpaddd	($xc,$xc,@x[$d0])",
+	"&vpxor		(@x[$b0],$xc,@x[$b0])",
+	"&vpslld	($t0,@x[$b0],12)",
+	"&vpsrld	(@x[$b0],@x[$b0],20)",
+	"&vpor		(@x[$b0],$t0,@x[$b0])",
+	"&vbroadcasti128($t0,'(%r11)')",		# .Lrot24(%rip)
+	 "&vpaddd	($xc_,$xc_,@x[$d1])",
+	 "&vpxor	(@x[$b1],$xc_,@x[$b1])",
+	 "&vpslld	($t1,@x[$b1],12)",
+	 "&vpsrld	(@x[$b1],@x[$b1],20)",
+	 "&vpor		(@x[$b1],$t1,@x[$b1])",
+
+	"&vpaddd	(@x[$a0],@x[$a0],@x[$b0])",
+	"&vpxor		(@x[$d0],@x[$a0],@x[$d0])",
+	"&vpshufb	(@x[$d0],@x[$d0],$t0)",
+	 "&vpaddd	(@x[$a1],@x[$a1],@x[$b1])",
+	 "&vpxor	(@x[$d1],@x[$a1],@x[$d1])",
+	 "&vpshufb	(@x[$d1],@x[$d1],$t0)",
+
+	"&vpaddd	($xc,$xc,@x[$d0])",
+	"&vpxor		(@x[$b0],$xc,@x[$b0])",
+	"&vpslld	($t1,@x[$b0],7)",
+	"&vpsrld	(@x[$b0],@x[$b0],25)",
+	"&vpor		(@x[$b0],$t1,@x[$b0])",
+	"&vbroadcasti128($t1,'(%r10)')",		# .Lrot16(%rip)
+	 "&vpaddd	($xc_,$xc_,@x[$d1])",
+	 "&vpxor	(@x[$b1],$xc_,@x[$b1])",
+	 "&vpslld	($t0,@x[$b1],7)",
+	 "&vpsrld	(@x[$b1],@x[$b1],25)",
+	 "&vpor		(@x[$b1],$t0,@x[$b1])",
+
+	"&vmovdqa	(\"`32*($c0-8)`(%rsp)\",$xc)",	# reload pair of 'c's
+	 "&vmovdqa	(\"`32*($c1-8)`(%rsp)\",$xc_)",
+	"&vmovdqa	($xc,\"`32*($c2-8)`(%rsp)\")",
+	 "&vmovdqa	($xc_,\"`32*($c3-8)`(%rsp)\")",
+
+	"&vpaddd	(@x[$a2],@x[$a2],@x[$b2])",	# Q3
+	"&vpxor		(@x[$d2],@x[$a2],@x[$d2])",
+	"&vpshufb	(@x[$d2],@x[$d2],$t1)",
+	 "&vpaddd	(@x[$a3],@x[$a3],@x[$b3])",	# Q4
+	 "&vpxor	(@x[$d3],@x[$a3],@x[$d3])",
+	 "&vpshufb	(@x[$d3],@x[$d3],$t1)",
+
+	"&vpaddd	($xc,$xc,@x[$d2])",
+	"&vpxor		(@x[$b2],$xc,@x[$b2])",
+	"&vpslld	($t0,@x[$b2],12)",
+	"&vpsrld	(@x[$b2],@x[$b2],20)",
+	"&vpor		(@x[$b2],$t0,@x[$b2])",
+	"&vbroadcasti128($t0,'(%r11)')",		# .Lrot24(%rip)
+	 "&vpaddd	($xc_,$xc_,@x[$d3])",
+	 "&vpxor	(@x[$b3],$xc_,@x[$b3])",
+	 "&vpslld	($t1,@x[$b3],12)",
+	 "&vpsrld	(@x[$b3],@x[$b3],20)",
+	 "&vpor		(@x[$b3],$t1,@x[$b3])",
+
+	"&vpaddd	(@x[$a2],@x[$a2],@x[$b2])",
+	"&vpxor		(@x[$d2],@x[$a2],@x[$d2])",
+	"&vpshufb	(@x[$d2],@x[$d2],$t0)",
+	 "&vpaddd	(@x[$a3],@x[$a3],@x[$b3])",
+	 "&vpxor	(@x[$d3],@x[$a3],@x[$d3])",
+	 "&vpshufb	(@x[$d3],@x[$d3],$t0)",
+
+	"&vpaddd	($xc,$xc,@x[$d2])",
+	"&vpxor		(@x[$b2],$xc,@x[$b2])",
+	"&vpslld	($t1,@x[$b2],7)",
+	"&vpsrld	(@x[$b2],@x[$b2],25)",
+	"&vpor		(@x[$b2],$t1,@x[$b2])",
+	"&vbroadcasti128($t1,'(%r10)')",		# .Lrot16(%rip)
+	 "&vpaddd	($xc_,$xc_,@x[$d3])",
+	 "&vpxor	(@x[$b3],$xc_,@x[$b3])",
+	 "&vpslld	($t0,@x[$b3],7)",
+	 "&vpsrld	(@x[$b3],@x[$b3],25)",
+	 "&vpor		(@x[$b3],$t0,@x[$b3])"
+	);
+}
+
+my $xframe = $win64 ? 0xb0 : 8;
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.type	ChaCha20_8x,\@function,5
+.align	32
+ChaCha20_8x:
+.LChaCha20_8x:
+	mov		%rsp,%r10
+	sub		\$0x280+$xframe,%rsp
+	and		\$-32,%rsp
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($win64);
+	lea		0x290+0x30(%rsp),%r11
+	movaps		%xmm6,-0x30(%r11)
+	movaps		%xmm7,-0x20(%r11)
+	movaps		%xmm8,-0x10(%r11)
+	movaps		%xmm9,0x00(%r11)
+	movaps		%xmm10,0x10(%r11)
+	movaps		%xmm11,0x20(%r11)
+	movaps		%xmm12,0x30(%r11)
+	movaps		%xmm13,0x40(%r11)
+	movaps		%xmm14,0x50(%r11)
+	movaps		%xmm15,0x60(%r11)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	vzeroupper
+	mov		%r10,0x280(%rsp)
+
+	################ stack layout
+	# +0x00		SIMD equivalent of @x[8-12]
+	# ...
+	# +0x80		constant copy of key[0-2] smashed by lanes
+	# ...
+	# +0x200	SIMD counters (with nonce smashed by lanes)
+	# ...
+	# +0x280	saved %rsp
+
+	vbroadcasti128	.Lsigma(%rip),$xa3	# key[0]
+	vbroadcasti128	($key),$xb3		# key[1]
+	vbroadcasti128	16($key),$xt3		# key[2]
+	vbroadcasti128	($counter),$xd3		# key[3]
+	lea		0x100(%rsp),%rcx	# size optimization
+	lea		0x200(%rsp),%rax	# size optimization
+	lea		.Lrot16(%rip),%r10
+	lea		.Lrot24(%rip),%r11
+
+	vpshufd		\$0x00,$xa3,$xa0	# smash key by lanes...
+	vpshufd		\$0x55,$xa3,$xa1
+	vmovdqa		$xa0,0x80-0x100(%rcx)	# ... and offload
+	vpshufd		\$0xaa,$xa3,$xa2
+	vmovdqa		$xa1,0xa0-0x100(%rcx)
+	vpshufd		\$0xff,$xa3,$xa3
+	vmovdqa		$xa2,0xc0-0x100(%rcx)
+	vmovdqa		$xa3,0xe0-0x100(%rcx)
+
+	vpshufd		\$0x00,$xb3,$xb0
+	vpshufd		\$0x55,$xb3,$xb1
+	vmovdqa		$xb0,0x100-0x100(%rcx)
+	vpshufd		\$0xaa,$xb3,$xb2
+	vmovdqa		$xb1,0x120-0x100(%rcx)
+	vpshufd		\$0xff,$xb3,$xb3
+	vmovdqa		$xb2,0x140-0x100(%rcx)
+	vmovdqa		$xb3,0x160-0x100(%rcx)
+
+	vpshufd		\$0x00,$xt3,$xt0	# "xc0"
+	vpshufd		\$0x55,$xt3,$xt1	# "xc1"
+	vmovdqa		$xt0,0x180-0x200(%rax)
+	vpshufd		\$0xaa,$xt3,$xt2	# "xc2"
+	vmovdqa		$xt1,0x1a0-0x200(%rax)
+	vpshufd		\$0xff,$xt3,$xt3	# "xc3"
+	vmovdqa		$xt2,0x1c0-0x200(%rax)
+	vmovdqa		$xt3,0x1e0-0x200(%rax)
+
+	vpshufd		\$0x00,$xd3,$xd0
+	vpshufd		\$0x55,$xd3,$xd1
+	vpaddd		.Lincy(%rip),$xd0,$xd0	# don't save counters yet
+	vpshufd		\$0xaa,$xd3,$xd2
+	vmovdqa		$xd1,0x220-0x200(%rax)
+	vpshufd		\$0xff,$xd3,$xd3
+	vmovdqa		$xd2,0x240-0x200(%rax)
+	vmovdqa		$xd3,0x260-0x200(%rax)
+
+	jmp		.Loop_enter8x
+
+.align	32
+.Loop_outer8x:
+	vmovdqa		0x80-0x100(%rcx),$xa0	# re-load smashed key
+	vmovdqa		0xa0-0x100(%rcx),$xa1
+	vmovdqa		0xc0-0x100(%rcx),$xa2
+	vmovdqa		0xe0-0x100(%rcx),$xa3
+	vmovdqa		0x100-0x100(%rcx),$xb0
+	vmovdqa		0x120-0x100(%rcx),$xb1
+	vmovdqa		0x140-0x100(%rcx),$xb2
+	vmovdqa		0x160-0x100(%rcx),$xb3
+	vmovdqa		0x180-0x200(%rax),$xt0	# "xc0"
+	vmovdqa		0x1a0-0x200(%rax),$xt1	# "xc1"
+	vmovdqa		0x1c0-0x200(%rax),$xt2	# "xc2"
+	vmovdqa		0x1e0-0x200(%rax),$xt3	# "xc3"
+	vmovdqa		0x200-0x200(%rax),$xd0
+	vmovdqa		0x220-0x200(%rax),$xd1
+	vmovdqa		0x240-0x200(%rax),$xd2
+	vmovdqa		0x260-0x200(%rax),$xd3
+	vpaddd		.Leight(%rip),$xd0,$xd0	# next SIMD counters
+
+.Loop_enter8x:
+	vmovdqa		$xt2,0x40(%rsp)		# SIMD equivalent of "@x[10]"
+	vmovdqa		$xt3,0x60(%rsp)		# SIMD equivalent of "@x[11]"
+	vbroadcasti128	(%r10),$xt3
+	vmovdqa		$xd0,0x200-0x200(%rax)	# save SIMD counters
+	mov		\$10,%eax
+	jmp		.Loop8x
+
+.align	32
+.Loop8x:
+___
+	foreach (&AVX2_lane_ROUND(0, 4, 8,12)) { eval; }
+	foreach (&AVX2_lane_ROUND(0, 5,10,15)) { eval; }
+$code.=<<___;
+	dec		%eax
+	jnz		.Loop8x
+
+	lea		0x200(%rsp),%rax	# size optimization
+	vpaddd		0x80-0x100(%rcx),$xa0,$xa0	# accumulate key
+	vpaddd		0xa0-0x100(%rcx),$xa1,$xa1
+	vpaddd		0xc0-0x100(%rcx),$xa2,$xa2
+	vpaddd		0xe0-0x100(%rcx),$xa3,$xa3
+
+	vpunpckldq	$xa1,$xa0,$xt2		# "de-interlace" data
+	vpunpckldq	$xa3,$xa2,$xt3
+	vpunpckhdq	$xa1,$xa0,$xa0
+	vpunpckhdq	$xa3,$xa2,$xa2
+	vpunpcklqdq	$xt3,$xt2,$xa1		# "a0"
+	vpunpckhqdq	$xt3,$xt2,$xt2		# "a1"
+	vpunpcklqdq	$xa2,$xa0,$xa3		# "a2"
+	vpunpckhqdq	$xa2,$xa0,$xa0		# "a3"
+___
+	($xa0,$xa1,$xa2,$xa3,$xt2)=($xa1,$xt2,$xa3,$xa0,$xa2);
+$code.=<<___;
+	vpaddd		0x100-0x100(%rcx),$xb0,$xb0
+	vpaddd		0x120-0x100(%rcx),$xb1,$xb1
+	vpaddd		0x140-0x100(%rcx),$xb2,$xb2
+	vpaddd		0x160-0x100(%rcx),$xb3,$xb3
+
+	vpunpckldq	$xb1,$xb0,$xt2
+	vpunpckldq	$xb3,$xb2,$xt3
+	vpunpckhdq	$xb1,$xb0,$xb0
+	vpunpckhdq	$xb3,$xb2,$xb2
+	vpunpcklqdq	$xt3,$xt2,$xb1		# "b0"
+	vpunpckhqdq	$xt3,$xt2,$xt2		# "b1"
+	vpunpcklqdq	$xb2,$xb0,$xb3		# "b2"
+	vpunpckhqdq	$xb2,$xb0,$xb0		# "b3"
+___
+	($xb0,$xb1,$xb2,$xb3,$xt2)=($xb1,$xt2,$xb3,$xb0,$xb2);
+$code.=<<___;
+	vperm2i128	\$0x20,$xb0,$xa0,$xt3	# "de-interlace" further
+	vperm2i128	\$0x31,$xb0,$xa0,$xb0
+	vperm2i128	\$0x20,$xb1,$xa1,$xa0
+	vperm2i128	\$0x31,$xb1,$xa1,$xb1
+	vperm2i128	\$0x20,$xb2,$xa2,$xa1
+	vperm2i128	\$0x31,$xb2,$xa2,$xb2
+	vperm2i128	\$0x20,$xb3,$xa3,$xa2
+	vperm2i128	\$0x31,$xb3,$xa3,$xb3
+___
+	($xa0,$xa1,$xa2,$xa3,$xt3)=($xt3,$xa0,$xa1,$xa2,$xa3);
+	my ($xc0,$xc1,$xc2,$xc3)=($xt0,$xt1,$xa0,$xa1);
+$code.=<<___;
+	vmovdqa		$xa0,0x00(%rsp)		# offload $xaN
+	vmovdqa		$xa1,0x20(%rsp)
+	vmovdqa		0x40(%rsp),$xc2		# $xa0
+	vmovdqa		0x60(%rsp),$xc3		# $xa1
+
+	vpaddd		0x180-0x200(%rax),$xc0,$xc0
+	vpaddd		0x1a0-0x200(%rax),$xc1,$xc1
+	vpaddd		0x1c0-0x200(%rax),$xc2,$xc2
+	vpaddd		0x1e0-0x200(%rax),$xc3,$xc3
+
+	vpunpckldq	$xc1,$xc0,$xt2
+	vpunpckldq	$xc3,$xc2,$xt3
+	vpunpckhdq	$xc1,$xc0,$xc0
+	vpunpckhdq	$xc3,$xc2,$xc2
+	vpunpcklqdq	$xt3,$xt2,$xc1		# "c0"
+	vpunpckhqdq	$xt3,$xt2,$xt2		# "c1"
+	vpunpcklqdq	$xc2,$xc0,$xc3		# "c2"
+	vpunpckhqdq	$xc2,$xc0,$xc0		# "c3"
+___
+	($xc0,$xc1,$xc2,$xc3,$xt2)=($xc1,$xt2,$xc3,$xc0,$xc2);
+$code.=<<___;
+	vpaddd		0x200-0x200(%rax),$xd0,$xd0
+	vpaddd		0x220-0x200(%rax),$xd1,$xd1
+	vpaddd		0x240-0x200(%rax),$xd2,$xd2
+	vpaddd		0x260-0x200(%rax),$xd3,$xd3
+
+	vpunpckldq	$xd1,$xd0,$xt2
+	vpunpckldq	$xd3,$xd2,$xt3
+	vpunpckhdq	$xd1,$xd0,$xd0
+	vpunpckhdq	$xd3,$xd2,$xd2
+	vpunpcklqdq	$xt3,$xt2,$xd1		# "d0"
+	vpunpckhqdq	$xt3,$xt2,$xt2		# "d1"
+	vpunpcklqdq	$xd2,$xd0,$xd3		# "d2"
+	vpunpckhqdq	$xd2,$xd0,$xd0		# "d3"
+___
+	($xd0,$xd1,$xd2,$xd3,$xt2)=($xd1,$xt2,$xd3,$xd0,$xd2);
+$code.=<<___;
+	vperm2i128	\$0x20,$xd0,$xc0,$xt3	# "de-interlace" further
+	vperm2i128	\$0x31,$xd0,$xc0,$xd0
+	vperm2i128	\$0x20,$xd1,$xc1,$xc0
+	vperm2i128	\$0x31,$xd1,$xc1,$xd1
+	vperm2i128	\$0x20,$xd2,$xc2,$xc1
+	vperm2i128	\$0x31,$xd2,$xc2,$xd2
+	vperm2i128	\$0x20,$xd3,$xc3,$xc2
+	vperm2i128	\$0x31,$xd3,$xc3,$xd3
+___
+	($xc0,$xc1,$xc2,$xc3,$xt3)=($xt3,$xc0,$xc1,$xc2,$xc3);
+	($xb0,$xb1,$xb2,$xb3,$xc0,$xc1,$xc2,$xc3)=
+	($xc0,$xc1,$xc2,$xc3,$xb0,$xb1,$xb2,$xb3);
+	($xa0,$xa1)=($xt2,$xt3);
+$code.=<<___;
+	vmovdqa		0x00(%rsp),$xa0		# $xaN was offloaded, remember?
+	vmovdqa		0x20(%rsp),$xa1
+
+	cmp		\$64*8,$len
+	jb		.Ltail8x
+
+	vpxor		0x00($inp),$xa0,$xa0	# xor with input
+	vpxor		0x20($inp),$xb0,$xb0
+	vpxor		0x40($inp),$xc0,$xc0
+	vpxor		0x60($inp),$xd0,$xd0
+	lea		0x80($inp),$inp		# size optimization
+	vmovdqu		$xa0,0x00($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xb0,0x20($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xc0,0x40($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xd0,0x60($out)
+	lea		0x80($out),$out		# size optimization
+
+	vpxor		0x00($inp),$xa1,$xa1
+	vpxor		0x20($inp),$xb1,$xb1
+	vpxor		0x40($inp),$xc1,$xc1
+	vpxor		0x60($inp),$xd1,$xd1
+	lea		0x80($inp),$inp		# size optimization
+	vmovdqu		$xa1,0x00($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xb1,0x20($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xc1,0x40($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xd1,0x60($out)
+	lea		0x80($out),$out		# size optimization
+
+	vpxor		0x00($inp),$xa2,$xa2
+	vpxor		0x20($inp),$xb2,$xb2
+	vpxor		0x40($inp),$xc2,$xc2
+	vpxor		0x60($inp),$xd2,$xd2
+	lea		0x80($inp),$inp		# size optimization
+	vmovdqu		$xa2,0x00($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xb2,0x20($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xc2,0x40($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xd2,0x60($out)
+	lea		0x80($out),$out		# size optimization
+
+	vpxor		0x00($inp),$xa3,$xa3
+	vpxor		0x20($inp),$xb3,$xb3
+	vpxor		0x40($inp),$xc3,$xc3
+	vpxor		0x60($inp),$xd3,$xd3
+	lea		0x80($inp),$inp		# size optimization
+	vmovdqu		$xa3,0x00($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xb3,0x20($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xc3,0x40($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xd3,0x60($out)
+	lea		0x80($out),$out		# size optimization
+
+	sub		\$64*8,$len
+	jnz		.Loop_outer8x
+
+	jmp		.Ldone8x
+
+.Ltail8x:
+	cmp		\$448,$len
+	jae		.L448_or_more8x
+	cmp		\$384,$len
+	jae		.L384_or_more8x
+	cmp		\$320,$len
+	jae		.L320_or_more8x
+	cmp		\$256,$len
+	jae		.L256_or_more8x
+	cmp		\$192,$len
+	jae		.L192_or_more8x
+	cmp		\$128,$len
+	jae		.L128_or_more8x
+	cmp		\$64,$len
+	jae		.L64_or_more8x
+
+	xor		%r10,%r10
+	vmovdqa		$xa0,0x00(%rsp)
+	vmovdqa		$xb0,0x20(%rsp)
+	jmp		.Loop_tail8x
+
+.align	32
+.L64_or_more8x:
+	vpxor		0x00($inp),$xa0,$xa0	# xor with input
+	vpxor		0x20($inp),$xb0,$xb0
+	vmovdqu		$xa0,0x00($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xb0,0x20($out)
+	je		.Ldone8x
+
+	lea		0x40($inp),$inp		# inp+=64*1
+	xor		%r10,%r10
+	vmovdqa		$xc0,0x00(%rsp)
+	lea		0x40($out),$out		# out+=64*1
+	sub		\$64,$len		# len-=64*1
+	vmovdqa		$xd0,0x20(%rsp)
+	jmp		.Loop_tail8x
+
+.align	32
+.L128_or_more8x:
+	vpxor		0x00($inp),$xa0,$xa0	# xor with input
+	vpxor		0x20($inp),$xb0,$xb0
+	vpxor		0x40($inp),$xc0,$xc0
+	vpxor		0x60($inp),$xd0,$xd0
+	vmovdqu		$xa0,0x00($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xb0,0x20($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xc0,0x40($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xd0,0x60($out)
+	je		.Ldone8x
+
+	lea		0x80($inp),$inp		# inp+=64*2
+	xor		%r10,%r10
+	vmovdqa		$xa1,0x00(%rsp)
+	lea		0x80($out),$out		# out+=64*2
+	sub		\$128,$len		# len-=64*2
+	vmovdqa		$xb1,0x20(%rsp)
+	jmp		.Loop_tail8x
+
+.align	32
+.L192_or_more8x:
+	vpxor		0x00($inp),$xa0,$xa0	# xor with input
+	vpxor		0x20($inp),$xb0,$xb0
+	vpxor		0x40($inp),$xc0,$xc0
+	vpxor		0x60($inp),$xd0,$xd0
+	vpxor		0x80($inp),$xa1,$xa1
+	vpxor		0xa0($inp),$xb1,$xb1
+	vmovdqu		$xa0,0x00($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xb0,0x20($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xc0,0x40($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xd0,0x60($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xa1,0x80($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xb1,0xa0($out)
+	je		.Ldone8x
+
+	lea		0xc0($inp),$inp		# inp+=64*3
+	xor		%r10,%r10
+	vmovdqa		$xc1,0x00(%rsp)
+	lea		0xc0($out),$out		# out+=64*3
+	sub		\$192,$len		# len-=64*3
+	vmovdqa		$xd1,0x20(%rsp)
+	jmp		.Loop_tail8x
+
+.align	32
+.L256_or_more8x:
+	vpxor		0x00($inp),$xa0,$xa0	# xor with input
+	vpxor		0x20($inp),$xb0,$xb0
+	vpxor		0x40($inp),$xc0,$xc0
+	vpxor		0x60($inp),$xd0,$xd0
+	vpxor		0x80($inp),$xa1,$xa1
+	vpxor		0xa0($inp),$xb1,$xb1
+	vpxor		0xc0($inp),$xc1,$xc1
+	vpxor		0xe0($inp),$xd1,$xd1
+	vmovdqu		$xa0,0x00($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xb0,0x20($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xc0,0x40($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xd0,0x60($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xa1,0x80($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xb1,0xa0($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xc1,0xc0($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xd1,0xe0($out)
+	je		.Ldone8x
+
+	lea		0x100($inp),$inp	# inp+=64*4
+	xor		%r10,%r10
+	vmovdqa		$xa2,0x00(%rsp)
+	lea		0x100($out),$out	# out+=64*4
+	sub		\$256,$len		# len-=64*4
+	vmovdqa		$xb2,0x20(%rsp)
+	jmp		.Loop_tail8x
+
+.align	32
+.L320_or_more8x:
+	vpxor		0x00($inp),$xa0,$xa0	# xor with input
+	vpxor		0x20($inp),$xb0,$xb0
+	vpxor		0x40($inp),$xc0,$xc0
+	vpxor		0x60($inp),$xd0,$xd0
+	vpxor		0x80($inp),$xa1,$xa1
+	vpxor		0xa0($inp),$xb1,$xb1
+	vpxor		0xc0($inp),$xc1,$xc1
+	vpxor		0xe0($inp),$xd1,$xd1
+	vpxor		0x100($inp),$xa2,$xa2
+	vpxor		0x120($inp),$xb2,$xb2
+	vmovdqu		$xa0,0x00($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xb0,0x20($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xc0,0x40($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xd0,0x60($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xa1,0x80($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xb1,0xa0($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xc1,0xc0($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xd1,0xe0($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xa2,0x100($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xb2,0x120($out)
+	je		.Ldone8x
+
+	lea		0x140($inp),$inp	# inp+=64*5
+	xor		%r10,%r10
+	vmovdqa		$xc2,0x00(%rsp)
+	lea		0x140($out),$out	# out+=64*5
+	sub		\$320,$len		# len-=64*5
+	vmovdqa		$xd2,0x20(%rsp)
+	jmp		.Loop_tail8x
+
+.align	32
+.L384_or_more8x:
+	vpxor		0x00($inp),$xa0,$xa0	# xor with input
+	vpxor		0x20($inp),$xb0,$xb0
+	vpxor		0x40($inp),$xc0,$xc0
+	vpxor		0x60($inp),$xd0,$xd0
+	vpxor		0x80($inp),$xa1,$xa1
+	vpxor		0xa0($inp),$xb1,$xb1
+	vpxor		0xc0($inp),$xc1,$xc1
+	vpxor		0xe0($inp),$xd1,$xd1
+	vpxor		0x100($inp),$xa2,$xa2
+	vpxor		0x120($inp),$xb2,$xb2
+	vpxor		0x140($inp),$xc2,$xc2
+	vpxor		0x160($inp),$xd2,$xd2
+	vmovdqu		$xa0,0x00($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xb0,0x20($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xc0,0x40($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xd0,0x60($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xa1,0x80($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xb1,0xa0($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xc1,0xc0($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xd1,0xe0($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xa2,0x100($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xb2,0x120($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xc2,0x140($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xd2,0x160($out)
+	je		.Ldone8x
+
+	lea		0x180($inp),$inp	# inp+=64*6
+	xor		%r10,%r10
+	vmovdqa		$xa3,0x00(%rsp)
+	lea		0x180($out),$out	# out+=64*6
+	sub		\$384,$len		# len-=64*6
+	vmovdqa		$xb3,0x20(%rsp)
+	jmp		.Loop_tail8x
+
+.align	32
+.L448_or_more8x:
+	vpxor		0x00($inp),$xa0,$xa0	# xor with input
+	vpxor		0x20($inp),$xb0,$xb0
+	vpxor		0x40($inp),$xc0,$xc0
+	vpxor		0x60($inp),$xd0,$xd0
+	vpxor		0x80($inp),$xa1,$xa1
+	vpxor		0xa0($inp),$xb1,$xb1
+	vpxor		0xc0($inp),$xc1,$xc1
+	vpxor		0xe0($inp),$xd1,$xd1
+	vpxor		0x100($inp),$xa2,$xa2
+	vpxor		0x120($inp),$xb2,$xb2
+	vpxor		0x140($inp),$xc2,$xc2
+	vpxor		0x160($inp),$xd2,$xd2
+	vpxor		0x180($inp),$xa3,$xa3
+	vpxor		0x1a0($inp),$xb3,$xb3
+	vmovdqu		$xa0,0x00($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xb0,0x20($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xc0,0x40($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xd0,0x60($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xa1,0x80($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xb1,0xa0($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xc1,0xc0($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xd1,0xe0($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xa2,0x100($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xb2,0x120($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xc2,0x140($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xd2,0x160($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xa3,0x180($out)
+	vmovdqu		$xb3,0x1a0($out)
+	je		.Ldone8x
+
+	lea		0x1c0($inp),$inp	# inp+=64*7
+	xor		%r10,%r10
+	vmovdqa		$xc3,0x00(%rsp)
+	lea		0x1c0($out),$out	# out+=64*7
+	sub		\$448,$len		# len-=64*7
+	vmovdqa		$xd3,0x20(%rsp)
+
+.Loop_tail8x:
+	movzb		($inp,%r10),%eax
+	movzb		(%rsp,%r10),%ecx
+	lea		1(%r10),%r10
+	xor		%ecx,%eax
+	mov		%al,-1($out,%r10)
+	dec		$len
+	jnz		.Loop_tail8x
+
+.Ldone8x:
+	vzeroall
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($win64);
+	lea		0x290+0x30(%rsp),%r11
+	movaps		-0x30(%r11),%xmm6
+	movaps		-0x20(%r11),%xmm7
+	movaps		-0x10(%r11),%xmm8
+	movaps		0x00(%r11),%xmm9
+	movaps		0x10(%r11),%xmm10
+	movaps		0x20(%r11),%xmm11
+	movaps		0x30(%r11),%xmm12
+	movaps		0x40(%r11),%xmm13
+	movaps		0x50(%r11),%xmm14
+	movaps		0x60(%r11),%xmm15
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov		0x280(%rsp),%rsp
+	ret
+.size	ChaCha20_8x,.-ChaCha20_8x
+___
+}
+
+foreach (split("\n",$code)) {
+	s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/geo;
+
+	s/%x#%y/%x/go;
+
+	print $_,"\n";
+}
+
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/chacha/build.info b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/chacha/build.info
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f99114c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/chacha/build.info
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+LIBS=../../libcrypto
+SOURCE[../../libcrypto]={- $target{chacha_asm_src} -}
+
+GENERATE[chacha-x86.s]=asm/chacha-x86.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $(CFLAGS) $(LIB_CFLAGS) $(PROCESSOR)
+GENERATE[chacha-x86_64.s]=asm/chacha-x86_64.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+GENERATE[chacha-ppc.s]=asm/chacha-ppc.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+GENERATE[chacha-armv4.S]=asm/chacha-armv4.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+INCLUDE[chacha-armv4.o]=..
+GENERATE[chacha-armv8.S]=asm/chacha-armv8.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+INCLUDE[chacha-armv8.o]=..
+
+BEGINRAW[Makefile(unix)]
+##### CHACHA assembler implementations
+
+{- $builddir -}/chacha-%.S:	{- $sourcedir -}/asm/chacha-%.pl
+	CC="$(CC)" $(PERL) $< $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $@
+ENDRAW[Makefile(unix)]
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/chacha/chacha_enc.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/chacha/chacha_enc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..239f68a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/chacha/chacha_enc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* Adapted from the public domain code by D. Bernstein from SUPERCOP. */
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "internal/chacha.h"
+
+typedef unsigned int u32;
+typedef unsigned char u8;
+typedef union {
+    u32 u[16];
+    u8 c[64];
+} chacha_buf;
+
+# define ROTATE(v, n) (((v) << (n)) | ((v) >> (32 - (n))))
+
+# define U32TO8_LITTLE(p, v) do { \
+                                (p)[0] = (u8)(v >>  0); \
+                                (p)[1] = (u8)(v >>  8); \
+                                (p)[2] = (u8)(v >> 16); \
+                                (p)[3] = (u8)(v >> 24); \
+                                } while(0)
+
+/* QUARTERROUND updates a, b, c, d with a ChaCha "quarter" round. */
+# define QUARTERROUND(a,b,c,d) ( \
+                x[a] += x[b], x[d] = ROTATE((x[d] ^ x[a]),16), \
+                x[c] += x[d], x[b] = ROTATE((x[b] ^ x[c]),12), \
+                x[a] += x[b], x[d] = ROTATE((x[d] ^ x[a]), 8), \
+                x[c] += x[d], x[b] = ROTATE((x[b] ^ x[c]), 7)  )
+
+/* chacha_core performs 20 rounds of ChaCha on the input words in
+ * |input| and writes the 64 output bytes to |output|. */
+static void chacha20_core(chacha_buf *output, const u32 input[16])
+{
+    u32 x[16];
+    int i;
+    const union {
+        long one;
+        char little;
+    } is_endian = { 1 };
+
+    memcpy(x, input, sizeof(x));
+
+    for (i = 20; i > 0; i -= 2) {
+        QUARTERROUND(0, 4, 8, 12);
+        QUARTERROUND(1, 5, 9, 13);
+        QUARTERROUND(2, 6, 10, 14);
+        QUARTERROUND(3, 7, 11, 15);
+        QUARTERROUND(0, 5, 10, 15);
+        QUARTERROUND(1, 6, 11, 12);
+        QUARTERROUND(2, 7, 8, 13);
+        QUARTERROUND(3, 4, 9, 14);
+    }
+
+    if (is_endian.little) {
+        for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i)
+            output->u[i] = x[i] + input[i];
+    } else {
+        for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i)
+            U32TO8_LITTLE(output->c + 4 * i, (x[i] + input[i]));
+    }
+}
+
+void ChaCha20_ctr32(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *inp,
+                    size_t len, const unsigned int key[8],
+                    const unsigned int counter[4])
+{
+    u32 input[16];
+    chacha_buf buf;
+    size_t todo, i;
+
+    /* sigma constant "expand 32-byte k" in little-endian encoding */
+    input[0] = ((u32)'e') | ((u32)'x'<<8) | ((u32)'p'<<16) | ((u32)'a'<<24);
+    input[1] = ((u32)'n') | ((u32)'d'<<8) | ((u32)' '<<16) | ((u32)'3'<<24);
+    input[2] = ((u32)'2') | ((u32)'-'<<8) | ((u32)'b'<<16) | ((u32)'y'<<24);
+    input[3] = ((u32)'t') | ((u32)'e'<<8) | ((u32)' '<<16) | ((u32)'k'<<24);
+
+    input[4] = key[0];
+    input[5] = key[1];
+    input[6] = key[2];
+    input[7] = key[3];
+    input[8] = key[4];
+    input[9] = key[5];
+    input[10] = key[6];
+    input[11] = key[7];
+
+    input[12] = counter[0];
+    input[13] = counter[1];
+    input[14] = counter[2];
+    input[15] = counter[3];
+
+    while (len > 0) {
+        todo = sizeof(buf);
+        if (len < todo)
+            todo = len;
+
+        chacha20_core(&buf, input);
+
+        for (i = 0; i < todo; i++)
+            out[i] = inp[i] ^ buf.c[i];
+        out += todo;
+        inp += todo;
+        len -= todo;
+
+        /*
+         * Advance 32-bit counter. Note that as subroutine is so to
+         * say nonce-agnostic, this limited counter width doesn't
+         * prevent caller from implementing wider counter. It would
+         * simply take two calls split on counter overflow...
+         */
+        input[12]++;
+    }
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cmac/build.info b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cmac/build.info
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c8a4949
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cmac/build.info
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+LIBS=../../libcrypto
+SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=cmac.c cm_ameth.c cm_pmeth.c
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cmac/cm_ameth.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cmac/cm_ameth.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a58454a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cmac/cm_ameth.c
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2010-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/cmac.h>
+#include "internal/asn1_int.h"
+
+/*
+ * CMAC "ASN1" method. This is just here to indicate the maximum CMAC output
+ * length and to free up a CMAC key.
+ */
+
+static int cmac_size(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    return EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH;
+}
+
+static void cmac_key_free(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    CMAC_CTX *cmctx = EVP_PKEY_get0(pkey);
+    CMAC_CTX_free(cmctx);
+}
+
+const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD cmac_asn1_meth = {
+    EVP_PKEY_CMAC,
+    EVP_PKEY_CMAC,
+    0,
+
+    "CMAC",
+    "OpenSSL CMAC method",
+
+    0, 0, 0, 0,
+
+    0, 0, 0,
+
+    cmac_size,
+    0, 0,
+    0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+
+    cmac_key_free,
+    0,
+    0, 0
+};
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cmac/cm_pmeth.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cmac/cm_pmeth.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..10748f1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cmac/cm_pmeth.c
@@ -0,0 +1,161 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2010-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/cmac.h>
+#include "internal/evp_int.h"
+
+/* The context structure and "key" is simply a CMAC_CTX */
+
+static int pkey_cmac_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    ctx->data = CMAC_CTX_new();
+    if (ctx->data == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    ctx->keygen_info_count = 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int pkey_cmac_copy(EVP_PKEY_CTX *dst, EVP_PKEY_CTX *src)
+{
+    if (!pkey_cmac_init(dst))
+        return 0;
+    if (!CMAC_CTX_copy(dst->data, src->data))
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static void pkey_cmac_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    CMAC_CTX_free(ctx->data);
+}
+
+static int pkey_cmac_keygen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    CMAC_CTX *cmkey = CMAC_CTX_new();
+    CMAC_CTX *cmctx = ctx->data;
+    if (cmkey == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    if (!CMAC_CTX_copy(cmkey, cmctx)) {
+        CMAC_CTX_free(cmkey);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, EVP_PKEY_CMAC, cmkey);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int int_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count)
+{
+    if (!CMAC_Update(EVP_MD_CTX_pkey_ctx(ctx)->data, data, count))
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int cmac_signctx_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_MD_CTX *mctx)
+{
+    EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(mctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NO_INIT);
+    EVP_MD_CTX_set_update_fn(mctx, int_update);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int cmac_signctx(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen,
+                        EVP_MD_CTX *mctx)
+{
+    return CMAC_Final(ctx->data, sig, siglen);
+}
+
+static int pkey_cmac_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2)
+{
+    CMAC_CTX *cmctx = ctx->data;
+    switch (type) {
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_MAC_KEY:
+        if (!p2 || p1 < 0)
+            return 0;
+        if (!CMAC_Init(cmctx, p2, p1, NULL, NULL))
+            return 0;
+        break;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CIPHER:
+        if (!CMAC_Init(cmctx, NULL, 0, p2, ctx->engine))
+            return 0;
+        break;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_MD:
+        if (ctx->pkey && !CMAC_CTX_copy(ctx->data,
+                                        (CMAC_CTX *)ctx->pkey->pkey.ptr))
+            return 0;
+        if (!CMAC_Init(cmctx, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL))
+            return 0;
+        break;
+
+    default:
+        return -2;
+
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int pkey_cmac_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                              const char *type, const char *value)
+{
+    if (!value) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (strcmp(type, "cipher") == 0) {
+        const EVP_CIPHER *c;
+        c = EVP_get_cipherbyname(value);
+        if (!c)
+            return 0;
+        return pkey_cmac_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CIPHER, -1, (void *)c);
+    }
+    if (strcmp(type, "key") == 0)
+        return EVP_PKEY_CTX_str2ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_MAC_KEY, value);
+    if (strcmp(type, "hexkey") == 0)
+        return EVP_PKEY_CTX_hex2ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_MAC_KEY, value);
+    return -2;
+}
+
+const EVP_PKEY_METHOD cmac_pkey_meth = {
+    EVP_PKEY_CMAC,
+    EVP_PKEY_FLAG_SIGCTX_CUSTOM,
+    pkey_cmac_init,
+    pkey_cmac_copy,
+    pkey_cmac_cleanup,
+
+    0, 0,
+
+    0,
+    pkey_cmac_keygen,
+
+    0, 0,
+
+    0, 0,
+
+    0, 0,
+
+    cmac_signctx_init,
+    cmac_signctx,
+
+    0, 0,
+
+    0, 0,
+
+    0, 0,
+
+    0, 0,
+
+    pkey_cmac_ctrl,
+    pkey_cmac_ctrl_str
+};
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cmac/cmac.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cmac/cmac.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..46e3cb7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cmac/cmac.c
@@ -0,0 +1,224 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2010-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/cmac.h>
+
+struct CMAC_CTX_st {
+    /* Cipher context to use */
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cctx;
+    /* Keys k1 and k2 */
+    unsigned char k1[EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
+    unsigned char k2[EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
+    /* Temporary block */
+    unsigned char tbl[EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
+    /* Last (possibly partial) block */
+    unsigned char last_block[EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
+    /* Number of bytes in last block: -1 means context not initialised */
+    int nlast_block;
+};
+
+/* Make temporary keys K1 and K2 */
+
+static void make_kn(unsigned char *k1, const unsigned char *l, int bl)
+{
+    int i;
+    unsigned char c = l[0], carry = c >> 7, cnext;
+
+    /* Shift block to left, including carry */
+    for (i = 0; i < bl - 1; i++, c = cnext)
+        k1[i] = (c << 1) | ((cnext = l[i + 1]) >> 7);
+
+    /* If MSB set fixup with R */
+    k1[i] = (c << 1) ^ ((0 - carry) & (bl == 16 ? 0x87 : 0x1b));
+}
+
+CMAC_CTX *CMAC_CTX_new(void)
+{
+    CMAC_CTX *ctx;
+
+    ctx = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ctx));
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    ctx->cctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+    if (ctx->cctx == NULL) {
+        OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    ctx->nlast_block = -1;
+    return ctx;
+}
+
+void CMAC_CTX_cleanup(CMAC_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(ctx->cctx);
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->tbl, EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH);
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->k1, EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH);
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->k2, EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH);
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->last_block, EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH);
+    ctx->nlast_block = -1;
+}
+
+EVP_CIPHER_CTX *CMAC_CTX_get0_cipher_ctx(CMAC_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->cctx;
+}
+
+void CMAC_CTX_free(CMAC_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    if (!ctx)
+        return;
+    CMAC_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx->cctx);
+    OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+}
+
+int CMAC_CTX_copy(CMAC_CTX *out, const CMAC_CTX *in)
+{
+    int bl;
+    if (in->nlast_block == -1)
+        return 0;
+    if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_copy(out->cctx, in->cctx))
+        return 0;
+    bl = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(in->cctx);
+    memcpy(out->k1, in->k1, bl);
+    memcpy(out->k2, in->k2, bl);
+    memcpy(out->tbl, in->tbl, bl);
+    memcpy(out->last_block, in->last_block, bl);
+    out->nlast_block = in->nlast_block;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int CMAC_Init(CMAC_CTX *ctx, const void *key, size_t keylen,
+              const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, ENGINE *impl)
+{
+    static const unsigned char zero_iv[EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH] = { 0 };
+    /* All zeros means restart */
+    if (!key && !cipher && !impl && keylen == 0) {
+        /* Not initialised */
+        if (ctx->nlast_block == -1)
+            return 0;
+        if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx->cctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, zero_iv))
+            return 0;
+        memset(ctx->tbl, 0, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(ctx->cctx));
+        ctx->nlast_block = 0;
+        return 1;
+    }
+    /* Initialise context */
+    if (cipher && !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx->cctx, cipher, impl, NULL, NULL))
+        return 0;
+    /* Non-NULL key means initialisation complete */
+    if (key) {
+        int bl;
+        if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx->cctx))
+            return 0;
+        if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(ctx->cctx, keylen))
+            return 0;
+        if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx->cctx, NULL, NULL, key, zero_iv))
+            return 0;
+        bl = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(ctx->cctx);
+        if (!EVP_Cipher(ctx->cctx, ctx->tbl, zero_iv, bl))
+            return 0;
+        make_kn(ctx->k1, ctx->tbl, bl);
+        make_kn(ctx->k2, ctx->k1, bl);
+        OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->tbl, bl);
+        /* Reset context again ready for first data block */
+        if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx->cctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, zero_iv))
+            return 0;
+        /* Zero tbl so resume works */
+        memset(ctx->tbl, 0, bl);
+        ctx->nlast_block = 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int CMAC_Update(CMAC_CTX *ctx, const void *in, size_t dlen)
+{
+    const unsigned char *data = in;
+    size_t bl;
+    if (ctx->nlast_block == -1)
+        return 0;
+    if (dlen == 0)
+        return 1;
+    bl = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(ctx->cctx);
+    /* Copy into partial block if we need to */
+    if (ctx->nlast_block > 0) {
+        size_t nleft;
+        nleft = bl - ctx->nlast_block;
+        if (dlen < nleft)
+            nleft = dlen;
+        memcpy(ctx->last_block + ctx->nlast_block, data, nleft);
+        dlen -= nleft;
+        ctx->nlast_block += nleft;
+        /* If no more to process return */
+        if (dlen == 0)
+            return 1;
+        data += nleft;
+        /* Else not final block so encrypt it */
+        if (!EVP_Cipher(ctx->cctx, ctx->tbl, ctx->last_block, bl))
+            return 0;
+    }
+    /* Encrypt all but one of the complete blocks left */
+    while (dlen > bl) {
+        if (!EVP_Cipher(ctx->cctx, ctx->tbl, data, bl))
+            return 0;
+        dlen -= bl;
+        data += bl;
+    }
+    /* Copy any data left to last block buffer */
+    memcpy(ctx->last_block, data, dlen);
+    ctx->nlast_block = dlen;
+    return 1;
+
+}
+
+int CMAC_Final(CMAC_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *poutlen)
+{
+    int i, bl, lb;
+    if (ctx->nlast_block == -1)
+        return 0;
+    bl = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(ctx->cctx);
+    *poutlen = (size_t)bl;
+    if (!out)
+        return 1;
+    lb = ctx->nlast_block;
+    /* Is last block complete? */
+    if (lb == bl) {
+        for (i = 0; i < bl; i++)
+            out[i] = ctx->last_block[i] ^ ctx->k1[i];
+    } else {
+        ctx->last_block[lb] = 0x80;
+        if (bl - lb > 1)
+            memset(ctx->last_block + lb + 1, 0, bl - lb - 1);
+        for (i = 0; i < bl; i++)
+            out[i] = ctx->last_block[i] ^ ctx->k2[i];
+    }
+    if (!EVP_Cipher(ctx->cctx, out, out, bl)) {
+        OPENSSL_cleanse(out, bl);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int CMAC_resume(CMAC_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    if (ctx->nlast_block == -1)
+        return 0;
+    /*
+     * The buffer "tbl" contains the last fully encrypted block which is the
+     * last IV (or all zeroes if no last encrypted block). The last block has
+     * not been modified since CMAC_final(). So reinitialising using the last
+     * decrypted block will allow CMAC to continue after calling
+     * CMAC_Final().
+     */
+    return EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx->cctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, ctx->tbl);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cms/build.info b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cms/build.info
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cb67543
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cms/build.info
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+LIBS=../../libcrypto
+SOURCE[../../libcrypto]= \
+        cms_lib.c cms_asn1.c cms_att.c cms_io.c cms_smime.c cms_err.c \
+        cms_sd.c cms_dd.c cms_cd.c cms_env.c cms_enc.c cms_ess.c \
+        cms_pwri.c cms_kari.c
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cms/cms_asn1.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cms/cms_asn1.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0a594f4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cms/cms_asn1.c
@@ -0,0 +1,403 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/cms.h>
+#include "cms_lcl.h"
+
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(CMS_IssuerAndSerialNumber) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_IssuerAndSerialNumber, issuer, X509_NAME),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_IssuerAndSerialNumber, serialNumber, ASN1_INTEGER)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(CMS_IssuerAndSerialNumber)
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(CMS_OtherCertificateFormat) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_OtherCertificateFormat, otherCertFormat, ASN1_OBJECT),
+        ASN1_OPT(CMS_OtherCertificateFormat, otherCert, ASN1_ANY)
+} static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(CMS_OtherCertificateFormat)
+
+ASN1_CHOICE(CMS_CertificateChoices) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_CertificateChoices, d.certificate, X509),
+        ASN1_IMP(CMS_CertificateChoices, d.extendedCertificate, ASN1_SEQUENCE, 0),
+        ASN1_IMP(CMS_CertificateChoices, d.v1AttrCert, ASN1_SEQUENCE, 1),
+        ASN1_IMP(CMS_CertificateChoices, d.v2AttrCert, ASN1_SEQUENCE, 2),
+        ASN1_IMP(CMS_CertificateChoices, d.other, CMS_OtherCertificateFormat, 3)
+} ASN1_CHOICE_END(CMS_CertificateChoices)
+
+ASN1_CHOICE(CMS_SignerIdentifier) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_SignerIdentifier, d.issuerAndSerialNumber, CMS_IssuerAndSerialNumber),
+        ASN1_IMP(CMS_SignerIdentifier, d.subjectKeyIdentifier, ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 0)
+} static_ASN1_CHOICE_END(CMS_SignerIdentifier)
+
+ASN1_NDEF_SEQUENCE(CMS_EncapsulatedContentInfo) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_EncapsulatedContentInfo, eContentType, ASN1_OBJECT),
+        ASN1_NDEF_EXP_OPT(CMS_EncapsulatedContentInfo, eContent, ASN1_OCTET_STRING_NDEF, 0)
+} static_ASN1_NDEF_SEQUENCE_END(CMS_EncapsulatedContentInfo)
+
+/* Minor tweak to operation: free up signer key, cert */
+static int cms_si_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+                     void *exarg)
+{
+    if (operation == ASN1_OP_FREE_POST) {
+        CMS_SignerInfo *si = (CMS_SignerInfo *)*pval;
+        EVP_PKEY_free(si->pkey);
+        X509_free(si->signer);
+        EVP_MD_CTX_free(si->mctx);
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE_cb(CMS_SignerInfo, cms_si_cb) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_SignerInfo, version, LONG),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_SignerInfo, sid, CMS_SignerIdentifier),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_SignerInfo, digestAlgorithm, X509_ALGOR),
+        ASN1_IMP_SET_OF_OPT(CMS_SignerInfo, signedAttrs, X509_ATTRIBUTE, 0),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_SignerInfo, signatureAlgorithm, X509_ALGOR),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_SignerInfo, signature, ASN1_OCTET_STRING),
+        ASN1_IMP_SET_OF_OPT(CMS_SignerInfo, unsignedAttrs, X509_ATTRIBUTE, 1)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_cb(CMS_SignerInfo, CMS_SignerInfo)
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(CMS_OtherRevocationInfoFormat) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_OtherRevocationInfoFormat, otherRevInfoFormat, ASN1_OBJECT),
+        ASN1_OPT(CMS_OtherRevocationInfoFormat, otherRevInfo, ASN1_ANY)
+} static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(CMS_OtherRevocationInfoFormat)
+
+ASN1_CHOICE(CMS_RevocationInfoChoice) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_RevocationInfoChoice, d.crl, X509_CRL),
+        ASN1_IMP(CMS_RevocationInfoChoice, d.other, CMS_OtherRevocationInfoFormat, 1)
+} ASN1_CHOICE_END(CMS_RevocationInfoChoice)
+
+ASN1_NDEF_SEQUENCE(CMS_SignedData) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_SignedData, version, LONG),
+        ASN1_SET_OF(CMS_SignedData, digestAlgorithms, X509_ALGOR),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_SignedData, encapContentInfo, CMS_EncapsulatedContentInfo),
+        ASN1_IMP_SET_OF_OPT(CMS_SignedData, certificates, CMS_CertificateChoices, 0),
+        ASN1_IMP_SET_OF_OPT(CMS_SignedData, crls, CMS_RevocationInfoChoice, 1),
+        ASN1_SET_OF(CMS_SignedData, signerInfos, CMS_SignerInfo)
+} ASN1_NDEF_SEQUENCE_END(CMS_SignedData)
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(CMS_OriginatorInfo) = {
+        ASN1_IMP_SET_OF_OPT(CMS_OriginatorInfo, certificates, CMS_CertificateChoices, 0),
+        ASN1_IMP_SET_OF_OPT(CMS_OriginatorInfo, crls, CMS_RevocationInfoChoice, 1)
+} static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(CMS_OriginatorInfo)
+
+ASN1_NDEF_SEQUENCE(CMS_EncryptedContentInfo) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_EncryptedContentInfo, contentType, ASN1_OBJECT),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_EncryptedContentInfo, contentEncryptionAlgorithm, X509_ALGOR),
+        ASN1_IMP_OPT(CMS_EncryptedContentInfo, encryptedContent, ASN1_OCTET_STRING_NDEF, 0)
+} static_ASN1_NDEF_SEQUENCE_END(CMS_EncryptedContentInfo)
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(CMS_KeyTransRecipientInfo) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_KeyTransRecipientInfo, version, LONG),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_KeyTransRecipientInfo, rid, CMS_SignerIdentifier),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_KeyTransRecipientInfo, keyEncryptionAlgorithm, X509_ALGOR),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_KeyTransRecipientInfo, encryptedKey, ASN1_OCTET_STRING)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(CMS_KeyTransRecipientInfo)
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(CMS_OtherKeyAttribute) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_OtherKeyAttribute, keyAttrId, ASN1_OBJECT),
+        ASN1_OPT(CMS_OtherKeyAttribute, keyAttr, ASN1_ANY)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(CMS_OtherKeyAttribute)
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(CMS_RecipientKeyIdentifier) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_RecipientKeyIdentifier, subjectKeyIdentifier, ASN1_OCTET_STRING),
+        ASN1_OPT(CMS_RecipientKeyIdentifier, date, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME),
+        ASN1_OPT(CMS_RecipientKeyIdentifier, other, CMS_OtherKeyAttribute)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(CMS_RecipientKeyIdentifier)
+
+ASN1_CHOICE(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier) = {
+  ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier, d.issuerAndSerialNumber, CMS_IssuerAndSerialNumber),
+  ASN1_IMP(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier, d.rKeyId, CMS_RecipientKeyIdentifier, 0)
+} static_ASN1_CHOICE_END(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier)
+
+static int cms_rek_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+                      void *exarg)
+{
+    CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek = (CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *)*pval;
+    if (operation == ASN1_OP_FREE_POST) {
+        EVP_PKEY_free(rek->pkey);
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE_cb(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey, cms_rek_cb) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey, rid, CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey, encryptedKey, ASN1_OCTET_STRING)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_cb(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey, CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey)
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(CMS_OriginatorPublicKey) = {
+  ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_OriginatorPublicKey, algorithm, X509_ALGOR),
+  ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_OriginatorPublicKey, publicKey, ASN1_BIT_STRING)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(CMS_OriginatorPublicKey)
+
+ASN1_CHOICE(CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey) = {
+  ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey, d.issuerAndSerialNumber, CMS_IssuerAndSerialNumber),
+  ASN1_IMP(CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey, d.subjectKeyIdentifier, ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 0),
+  ASN1_IMP(CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey, d.originatorKey, CMS_OriginatorPublicKey, 1)
+} static_ASN1_CHOICE_END(CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey)
+
+static int cms_kari_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+                       void *exarg)
+{
+    CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari = (CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *)*pval;
+    if (operation == ASN1_OP_NEW_POST) {
+        kari->ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+        if (kari->ctx == NULL)
+            return 0;
+        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_flags(kari->ctx, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_FLAG_WRAP_ALLOW);
+        kari->pctx = NULL;
+    } else if (operation == ASN1_OP_FREE_POST) {
+        EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(kari->pctx);
+        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(kari->ctx);
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE_cb(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo, cms_kari_cb) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo, version, LONG),
+        ASN1_EXP(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo, originator, CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey, 0),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo, ukm, ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 1),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo, keyEncryptionAlgorithm, X509_ALGOR),
+        ASN1_SEQUENCE_OF(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo, recipientEncryptedKeys, CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_cb(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo, CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo)
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(CMS_KEKIdentifier) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_KEKIdentifier, keyIdentifier, ASN1_OCTET_STRING),
+        ASN1_OPT(CMS_KEKIdentifier, date, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME),
+        ASN1_OPT(CMS_KEKIdentifier, other, CMS_OtherKeyAttribute)
+} static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(CMS_KEKIdentifier)
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(CMS_KEKRecipientInfo) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_KEKRecipientInfo, version, LONG),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_KEKRecipientInfo, kekid, CMS_KEKIdentifier),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_KEKRecipientInfo, keyEncryptionAlgorithm, X509_ALGOR),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_KEKRecipientInfo, encryptedKey, ASN1_OCTET_STRING)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(CMS_KEKRecipientInfo)
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(CMS_PasswordRecipientInfo) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_PasswordRecipientInfo, version, LONG),
+        ASN1_IMP_OPT(CMS_PasswordRecipientInfo, keyDerivationAlgorithm, X509_ALGOR, 0),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_PasswordRecipientInfo, keyEncryptionAlgorithm, X509_ALGOR),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_PasswordRecipientInfo, encryptedKey, ASN1_OCTET_STRING)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(CMS_PasswordRecipientInfo)
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(CMS_OtherRecipientInfo) = {
+  ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_OtherRecipientInfo, oriType, ASN1_OBJECT),
+  ASN1_OPT(CMS_OtherRecipientInfo, oriValue, ASN1_ANY)
+} static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(CMS_OtherRecipientInfo)
+
+/* Free up RecipientInfo additional data */
+static int cms_ri_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+                     void *exarg)
+{
+    if (operation == ASN1_OP_FREE_PRE) {
+        CMS_RecipientInfo *ri = (CMS_RecipientInfo *)*pval;
+        if (ri->type == CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS) {
+            CMS_KeyTransRecipientInfo *ktri = ri->d.ktri;
+            EVP_PKEY_free(ktri->pkey);
+            X509_free(ktri->recip);
+            EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ktri->pctx);
+        } else if (ri->type == CMS_RECIPINFO_KEK) {
+            CMS_KEKRecipientInfo *kekri = ri->d.kekri;
+            OPENSSL_clear_free(kekri->key, kekri->keylen);
+        } else if (ri->type == CMS_RECIPINFO_PASS) {
+            CMS_PasswordRecipientInfo *pwri = ri->d.pwri;
+            OPENSSL_clear_free(pwri->pass, pwri->passlen);
+        }
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+ASN1_CHOICE_cb(CMS_RecipientInfo, cms_ri_cb) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_RecipientInfo, d.ktri, CMS_KeyTransRecipientInfo),
+        ASN1_IMP(CMS_RecipientInfo, d.kari, CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo, 1),
+        ASN1_IMP(CMS_RecipientInfo, d.kekri, CMS_KEKRecipientInfo, 2),
+        ASN1_IMP(CMS_RecipientInfo, d.pwri, CMS_PasswordRecipientInfo, 3),
+        ASN1_IMP(CMS_RecipientInfo, d.ori, CMS_OtherRecipientInfo, 4)
+} ASN1_CHOICE_END_cb(CMS_RecipientInfo, CMS_RecipientInfo, type)
+
+ASN1_NDEF_SEQUENCE(CMS_EnvelopedData) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_EnvelopedData, version, LONG),
+        ASN1_IMP_OPT(CMS_EnvelopedData, originatorInfo, CMS_OriginatorInfo, 0),
+        ASN1_SET_OF(CMS_EnvelopedData, recipientInfos, CMS_RecipientInfo),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_EnvelopedData, encryptedContentInfo, CMS_EncryptedContentInfo),
+        ASN1_IMP_SET_OF_OPT(CMS_EnvelopedData, unprotectedAttrs, X509_ATTRIBUTE, 1)
+} ASN1_NDEF_SEQUENCE_END(CMS_EnvelopedData)
+
+ASN1_NDEF_SEQUENCE(CMS_DigestedData) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_DigestedData, version, LONG),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_DigestedData, digestAlgorithm, X509_ALGOR),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_DigestedData, encapContentInfo, CMS_EncapsulatedContentInfo),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_DigestedData, digest, ASN1_OCTET_STRING)
+} ASN1_NDEF_SEQUENCE_END(CMS_DigestedData)
+
+ASN1_NDEF_SEQUENCE(CMS_EncryptedData) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_EncryptedData, version, LONG),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_EncryptedData, encryptedContentInfo, CMS_EncryptedContentInfo),
+        ASN1_IMP_SET_OF_OPT(CMS_EncryptedData, unprotectedAttrs, X509_ATTRIBUTE, 1)
+} ASN1_NDEF_SEQUENCE_END(CMS_EncryptedData)
+
+ASN1_NDEF_SEQUENCE(CMS_AuthenticatedData) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_AuthenticatedData, version, LONG),
+        ASN1_IMP_OPT(CMS_AuthenticatedData, originatorInfo, CMS_OriginatorInfo, 0),
+        ASN1_SET_OF(CMS_AuthenticatedData, recipientInfos, CMS_RecipientInfo),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_AuthenticatedData, macAlgorithm, X509_ALGOR),
+        ASN1_IMP(CMS_AuthenticatedData, digestAlgorithm, X509_ALGOR, 1),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_AuthenticatedData, encapContentInfo, CMS_EncapsulatedContentInfo),
+        ASN1_IMP_SET_OF_OPT(CMS_AuthenticatedData, authAttrs, X509_ALGOR, 2),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_AuthenticatedData, mac, ASN1_OCTET_STRING),
+        ASN1_IMP_SET_OF_OPT(CMS_AuthenticatedData, unauthAttrs, X509_ALGOR, 3)
+} static_ASN1_NDEF_SEQUENCE_END(CMS_AuthenticatedData)
+
+ASN1_NDEF_SEQUENCE(CMS_CompressedData) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_CompressedData, version, LONG),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_CompressedData, compressionAlgorithm, X509_ALGOR),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_CompressedData, encapContentInfo, CMS_EncapsulatedContentInfo),
+} ASN1_NDEF_SEQUENCE_END(CMS_CompressedData)
+
+/* This is the ANY DEFINED BY table for the top level ContentInfo structure */
+
+ASN1_ADB_TEMPLATE(cms_default) = ASN1_EXP(CMS_ContentInfo, d.other, ASN1_ANY, 0);
+
+ASN1_ADB(CMS_ContentInfo) = {
+        ADB_ENTRY(NID_pkcs7_data, ASN1_NDEF_EXP(CMS_ContentInfo, d.data, ASN1_OCTET_STRING_NDEF, 0)),
+        ADB_ENTRY(NID_pkcs7_signed, ASN1_NDEF_EXP(CMS_ContentInfo, d.signedData, CMS_SignedData, 0)),
+        ADB_ENTRY(NID_pkcs7_enveloped, ASN1_NDEF_EXP(CMS_ContentInfo, d.envelopedData, CMS_EnvelopedData, 0)),
+        ADB_ENTRY(NID_pkcs7_digest, ASN1_NDEF_EXP(CMS_ContentInfo, d.digestedData, CMS_DigestedData, 0)),
+        ADB_ENTRY(NID_pkcs7_encrypted, ASN1_NDEF_EXP(CMS_ContentInfo, d.encryptedData, CMS_EncryptedData, 0)),
+        ADB_ENTRY(NID_id_smime_ct_authData, ASN1_NDEF_EXP(CMS_ContentInfo, d.authenticatedData, CMS_AuthenticatedData, 0)),
+        ADB_ENTRY(NID_id_smime_ct_compressedData, ASN1_NDEF_EXP(CMS_ContentInfo, d.compressedData, CMS_CompressedData, 0)),
+} ASN1_ADB_END(CMS_ContentInfo, 0, contentType, 0, &cms_default_tt, NULL);
+
+/* CMS streaming support */
+static int cms_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+                  void *exarg)
+{
+    ASN1_STREAM_ARG *sarg = exarg;
+    CMS_ContentInfo *cms = NULL;
+    if (pval)
+        cms = (CMS_ContentInfo *)*pval;
+    else
+        return 1;
+    switch (operation) {
+
+    case ASN1_OP_STREAM_PRE:
+        if (CMS_stream(&sarg->boundary, cms) <= 0)
+            return 0;
+        /* fall thru */
+    case ASN1_OP_DETACHED_PRE:
+        sarg->ndef_bio = CMS_dataInit(cms, sarg->out);
+        if (!sarg->ndef_bio)
+            return 0;
+        break;
+
+    case ASN1_OP_STREAM_POST:
+    case ASN1_OP_DETACHED_POST:
+        if (CMS_dataFinal(cms, sarg->ndef_bio) <= 0)
+            return 0;
+        break;
+
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+ASN1_NDEF_SEQUENCE_cb(CMS_ContentInfo, cms_cb) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_ContentInfo, contentType, ASN1_OBJECT),
+        ASN1_ADB_OBJECT(CMS_ContentInfo)
+} ASN1_NDEF_SEQUENCE_END_cb(CMS_ContentInfo, CMS_ContentInfo)
+
+/* Specials for signed attributes */
+
+/*
+ * When signing attributes we want to reorder them to match the sorted
+ * encoding.
+ */
+
+ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE(CMS_Attributes_Sign) =
+        ASN1_EX_TEMPLATE_TYPE(ASN1_TFLG_SET_ORDER, 0, CMS_ATTRIBUTES, X509_ATTRIBUTE)
+ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE_END(CMS_Attributes_Sign)
+
+/*
+ * When verifying attributes we need to use the received order. So we use
+ * SEQUENCE OF and tag it to SET OF
+ */
+
+ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE(CMS_Attributes_Verify) =
+        ASN1_EX_TEMPLATE_TYPE(ASN1_TFLG_SEQUENCE_OF | ASN1_TFLG_IMPTAG | ASN1_TFLG_UNIVERSAL,
+                                V_ASN1_SET, CMS_ATTRIBUTES, X509_ATTRIBUTE)
+ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE_END(CMS_Attributes_Verify)
+
+
+
+ASN1_CHOICE(CMS_ReceiptsFrom) = {
+  ASN1_IMP(CMS_ReceiptsFrom, d.allOrFirstTier, LONG, 0),
+  ASN1_IMP_SEQUENCE_OF(CMS_ReceiptsFrom, d.receiptList, GENERAL_NAMES, 1)
+} static_ASN1_CHOICE_END(CMS_ReceiptsFrom)
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(CMS_ReceiptRequest) = {
+  ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_ReceiptRequest, signedContentIdentifier, ASN1_OCTET_STRING),
+  ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_ReceiptRequest, receiptsFrom, CMS_ReceiptsFrom),
+  ASN1_SEQUENCE_OF(CMS_ReceiptRequest, receiptsTo, GENERAL_NAMES)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(CMS_ReceiptRequest)
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(CMS_Receipt) = {
+  ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_Receipt, version, LONG),
+  ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_Receipt, contentType, ASN1_OBJECT),
+  ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_Receipt, signedContentIdentifier, ASN1_OCTET_STRING),
+  ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_Receipt, originatorSignatureValue, ASN1_OCTET_STRING)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(CMS_Receipt)
+
+/*
+ * Utilities to encode the CMS_SharedInfo structure used during key
+ * derivation.
+ */
+
+typedef struct {
+    X509_ALGOR *keyInfo;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *entityUInfo;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *suppPubInfo;
+} CMS_SharedInfo;
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(CMS_SharedInfo) = {
+  ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_SharedInfo, keyInfo, X509_ALGOR),
+  ASN1_EXP_OPT(CMS_SharedInfo, entityUInfo, ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 0),
+  ASN1_EXP_OPT(CMS_SharedInfo, suppPubInfo, ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 2),
+} static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(CMS_SharedInfo)
+
+int CMS_SharedInfo_encode(unsigned char **pder, X509_ALGOR *kekalg,
+                          ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ukm, int keylen)
+{
+    union {
+        CMS_SharedInfo *pecsi;
+        ASN1_VALUE *a;
+    } intsi = {
+        NULL
+    };
+
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING oklen;
+    unsigned char kl[4];
+    CMS_SharedInfo ecsi;
+
+    keylen <<= 3;
+    kl[0] = (keylen >> 24) & 0xff;
+    kl[1] = (keylen >> 16) & 0xff;
+    kl[2] = (keylen >> 8) & 0xff;
+    kl[3] = keylen & 0xff;
+    oklen.length = 4;
+    oklen.data = kl;
+    oklen.type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
+    oklen.flags = 0;
+    ecsi.keyInfo = kekalg;
+    ecsi.entityUInfo = ukm;
+    ecsi.suppPubInfo = &oklen;
+    intsi.pecsi = &ecsi;
+    return ASN1_item_i2d(intsi.a, pder, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(CMS_SharedInfo));
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cms/cms_att.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cms/cms_att.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..664e649
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cms/cms_att.c
@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/cms.h>
+#include "cms_lcl.h"
+
+/* CMS SignedData Attribute utilities */
+
+int CMS_signed_get_attr_count(const CMS_SignerInfo *si)
+{
+    return X509at_get_attr_count(si->signedAttrs);
+}
+
+int CMS_signed_get_attr_by_NID(const CMS_SignerInfo *si, int nid, int lastpos)
+{
+    return X509at_get_attr_by_NID(si->signedAttrs, nid, lastpos);
+}
+
+int CMS_signed_get_attr_by_OBJ(const CMS_SignerInfo *si, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj,
+                               int lastpos)
+{
+    return X509at_get_attr_by_OBJ(si->signedAttrs, obj, lastpos);
+}
+
+X509_ATTRIBUTE *CMS_signed_get_attr(const CMS_SignerInfo *si, int loc)
+{
+    return X509at_get_attr(si->signedAttrs, loc);
+}
+
+X509_ATTRIBUTE *CMS_signed_delete_attr(CMS_SignerInfo *si, int loc)
+{
+    return X509at_delete_attr(si->signedAttrs, loc);
+}
+
+int CMS_signed_add1_attr(CMS_SignerInfo *si, X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr)
+{
+    if (X509at_add1_attr(&si->signedAttrs, attr))
+        return 1;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int CMS_signed_add1_attr_by_OBJ(CMS_SignerInfo *si,
+                                const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int type,
+                                const void *bytes, int len)
+{
+    if (X509at_add1_attr_by_OBJ(&si->signedAttrs, obj, type, bytes, len))
+        return 1;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int CMS_signed_add1_attr_by_NID(CMS_SignerInfo *si,
+                                int nid, int type, const void *bytes, int len)
+{
+    if (X509at_add1_attr_by_NID(&si->signedAttrs, nid, type, bytes, len))
+        return 1;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int CMS_signed_add1_attr_by_txt(CMS_SignerInfo *si,
+                                const char *attrname, int type,
+                                const void *bytes, int len)
+{
+    if (X509at_add1_attr_by_txt(&si->signedAttrs, attrname, type, bytes, len))
+        return 1;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+void *CMS_signed_get0_data_by_OBJ(CMS_SignerInfo *si, const ASN1_OBJECT *oid,
+                                  int lastpos, int type)
+{
+    return X509at_get0_data_by_OBJ(si->signedAttrs, oid, lastpos, type);
+}
+
+int CMS_unsigned_get_attr_count(const CMS_SignerInfo *si)
+{
+    return X509at_get_attr_count(si->unsignedAttrs);
+}
+
+int CMS_unsigned_get_attr_by_NID(const CMS_SignerInfo *si, int nid,
+                                 int lastpos)
+{
+    return X509at_get_attr_by_NID(si->unsignedAttrs, nid, lastpos);
+}
+
+int CMS_unsigned_get_attr_by_OBJ(const CMS_SignerInfo *si,
+                                 const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int lastpos)
+{
+    return X509at_get_attr_by_OBJ(si->unsignedAttrs, obj, lastpos);
+}
+
+X509_ATTRIBUTE *CMS_unsigned_get_attr(const CMS_SignerInfo *si, int loc)
+{
+    return X509at_get_attr(si->unsignedAttrs, loc);
+}
+
+X509_ATTRIBUTE *CMS_unsigned_delete_attr(CMS_SignerInfo *si, int loc)
+{
+    return X509at_delete_attr(si->unsignedAttrs, loc);
+}
+
+int CMS_unsigned_add1_attr(CMS_SignerInfo *si, X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr)
+{
+    if (X509at_add1_attr(&si->unsignedAttrs, attr))
+        return 1;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int CMS_unsigned_add1_attr_by_OBJ(CMS_SignerInfo *si,
+                                  const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int type,
+                                  const void *bytes, int len)
+{
+    if (X509at_add1_attr_by_OBJ(&si->unsignedAttrs, obj, type, bytes, len))
+        return 1;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int CMS_unsigned_add1_attr_by_NID(CMS_SignerInfo *si,
+                                  int nid, int type,
+                                  const void *bytes, int len)
+{
+    if (X509at_add1_attr_by_NID(&si->unsignedAttrs, nid, type, bytes, len))
+        return 1;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int CMS_unsigned_add1_attr_by_txt(CMS_SignerInfo *si,
+                                  const char *attrname, int type,
+                                  const void *bytes, int len)
+{
+    if (X509at_add1_attr_by_txt(&si->unsignedAttrs, attrname,
+                                type, bytes, len))
+        return 1;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+void *CMS_unsigned_get0_data_by_OBJ(CMS_SignerInfo *si, ASN1_OBJECT *oid,
+                                    int lastpos, int type)
+{
+    return X509at_get0_data_by_OBJ(si->unsignedAttrs, oid, lastpos, type);
+}
+
+/* Specific attribute cases */
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cms/cms_cd.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cms/cms_cd.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f05e308
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cms/cms_cd.c
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/cms.h>
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/comp.h>
+#include "cms_lcl.h"
+
+#ifdef ZLIB
+
+/* CMS CompressedData Utilities */
+
+CMS_ContentInfo *cms_CompressedData_create(int comp_nid)
+{
+    CMS_ContentInfo *cms;
+    CMS_CompressedData *cd;
+    /*
+     * Will need something cleverer if there is ever more than one
+     * compression algorithm or parameters have some meaning...
+     */
+    if (comp_nid != NID_zlib_compression) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_COMPRESSEDDATA_CREATE,
+               CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    cms = CMS_ContentInfo_new();
+    if (cms == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+
+    cd = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_CompressedData);
+
+    if (cd == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    cms->contentType = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_id_smime_ct_compressedData);
+    cms->d.compressedData = cd;
+
+    cd->version = 0;
+
+    X509_ALGOR_set0(cd->compressionAlgorithm,
+                    OBJ_nid2obj(NID_zlib_compression), V_ASN1_UNDEF, NULL);
+
+    cd->encapContentInfo->eContentType = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs7_data);
+
+    return cms;
+
+ err:
+    CMS_ContentInfo_free(cms);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+BIO *cms_CompressedData_init_bio(CMS_ContentInfo *cms)
+{
+    CMS_CompressedData *cd;
+    const ASN1_OBJECT *compoid;
+    if (OBJ_obj2nid(cms->contentType) != NID_id_smime_ct_compressedData) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_COMPRESSEDDATA_INIT_BIO,
+               CMS_R_CONTENT_TYPE_NOT_COMPRESSED_DATA);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    cd = cms->d.compressedData;
+    X509_ALGOR_get0(&compoid, NULL, NULL, cd->compressionAlgorithm);
+    if (OBJ_obj2nid(compoid) != NID_zlib_compression) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_COMPRESSEDDATA_INIT_BIO,
+               CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    return BIO_new(BIO_f_zlib());
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cms/cms_dd.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cms/cms_dd.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5da6802
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cms/cms_dd.c
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/cms.h>
+#include "cms_lcl.h"
+
+/* CMS DigestedData Utilities */
+
+CMS_ContentInfo *cms_DigestedData_create(const EVP_MD *md)
+{
+    CMS_ContentInfo *cms;
+    CMS_DigestedData *dd;
+    cms = CMS_ContentInfo_new();
+    if (cms == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+
+    dd = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_DigestedData);
+
+    if (dd == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    cms->contentType = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs7_digest);
+    cms->d.digestedData = dd;
+
+    dd->version = 0;
+    dd->encapContentInfo->eContentType = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs7_data);
+
+    X509_ALGOR_set_md(dd->digestAlgorithm, md);
+
+    return cms;
+
+ err:
+    CMS_ContentInfo_free(cms);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+BIO *cms_DigestedData_init_bio(CMS_ContentInfo *cms)
+{
+    CMS_DigestedData *dd;
+    dd = cms->d.digestedData;
+    return cms_DigestAlgorithm_init_bio(dd->digestAlgorithm);
+}
+
+int cms_DigestedData_do_final(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, BIO *chain, int verify)
+{
+    EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+    unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+    unsigned int mdlen;
+    int r = 0;
+    CMS_DigestedData *dd;
+
+    if (mctx == NULL) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DIGESTEDDATA_DO_FINAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    dd = cms->d.digestedData;
+
+    if (!cms_DigestAlgorithm_find_ctx(mctx, chain, dd->digestAlgorithm))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mctx, md, &mdlen) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (verify) {
+        if (mdlen != (unsigned int)dd->digest->length) {
+            CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DIGESTEDDATA_DO_FINAL,
+                   CMS_R_MESSAGEDIGEST_WRONG_LENGTH);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        if (memcmp(md, dd->digest->data, mdlen))
+            CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DIGESTEDDATA_DO_FINAL,
+                   CMS_R_VERIFICATION_FAILURE);
+        else
+            r = 1;
+    } else {
+        if (!ASN1_STRING_set(dd->digest, md, mdlen))
+            goto err;
+        r = 1;
+    }
+
+ err:
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
+
+    return r;
+
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cms/cms_enc.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cms/cms_enc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ed91342
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cms/cms_enc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,212 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/cms.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include "cms_lcl.h"
+
+/* CMS EncryptedData Utilities */
+
+/* Return BIO based on EncryptedContentInfo and key */
+
+BIO *cms_EncryptedContent_init_bio(CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec)
+{
+    BIO *b;
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
+    const EVP_CIPHER *ciph;
+    X509_ALGOR *calg = ec->contentEncryptionAlgorithm;
+    unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH], *piv = NULL;
+    unsigned char *tkey = NULL;
+    size_t tkeylen = 0;
+
+    int ok = 0;
+
+    int enc, keep_key = 0;
+
+    enc = ec->cipher ? 1 : 0;
+
+    b = BIO_new(BIO_f_cipher());
+    if (b == NULL) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    BIO_get_cipher_ctx(b, &ctx);
+
+    if (enc) {
+        ciph = ec->cipher;
+        /*
+         * If not keeping key set cipher to NULL so subsequent calls decrypt.
+         */
+        if (ec->key)
+            ec->cipher = NULL;
+    } else {
+        ciph = EVP_get_cipherbyobj(calg->algorithm);
+
+        if (!ciph) {
+            CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO, CMS_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, ciph, NULL, NULL, NULL, enc) <= 0) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO,
+               CMS_R_CIPHER_INITIALISATION_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (enc) {
+        int ivlen;
+        calg->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_type(ctx));
+        /* Generate a random IV if we need one */
+        ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
+        if (ivlen > 0) {
+            if (RAND_bytes(iv, ivlen) <= 0)
+                goto err;
+            piv = iv;
+        }
+    } else if (EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param(ctx, calg->parameter) <= 0) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO,
+               CMS_R_CIPHER_PARAMETER_INITIALISATION_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    tkeylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
+    /* Generate random session key */
+    if (!enc || !ec->key) {
+        tkey = OPENSSL_malloc(tkeylen);
+        if (tkey == NULL) {
+            CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key(ctx, tkey) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!ec->key) {
+        ec->key = tkey;
+        ec->keylen = tkeylen;
+        tkey = NULL;
+        if (enc)
+            keep_key = 1;
+        else
+            ERR_clear_error();
+
+    }
+
+    if (ec->keylen != tkeylen) {
+        /* If necessary set key length */
+        if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(ctx, ec->keylen) <= 0) {
+            /*
+             * Only reveal failure if debugging so we don't leak information
+             * which may be useful in MMA.
+             */
+            if (enc || ec->debug) {
+                CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO,
+                       CMS_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
+                goto err;
+            } else {
+                /* Use random key */
+                OPENSSL_clear_free(ec->key, ec->keylen);
+                ec->key = tkey;
+                ec->keylen = tkeylen;
+                tkey = NULL;
+                ERR_clear_error();
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, ec->key, piv, enc) <= 0) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO,
+               CMS_R_CIPHER_INITIALISATION_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (enc) {
+        calg->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new();
+        if (calg->parameter == NULL) {
+            CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (EVP_CIPHER_param_to_asn1(ctx, calg->parameter) <= 0) {
+            CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO,
+                   CMS_R_CIPHER_PARAMETER_INITIALISATION_ERROR);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        /* If parameter type not set omit parameter */
+        if (calg->parameter->type == V_ASN1_UNDEF) {
+            ASN1_TYPE_free(calg->parameter);
+            calg->parameter = NULL;
+        }
+    }
+    ok = 1;
+
+ err:
+    if (!keep_key || !ok) {
+        OPENSSL_clear_free(ec->key, ec->keylen);
+        ec->key = NULL;
+    }
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(tkey, tkeylen);
+    if (ok)
+        return b;
+    BIO_free(b);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+int cms_EncryptedContent_init(CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec,
+                              const EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
+                              const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen)
+{
+    ec->cipher = cipher;
+    if (key) {
+        ec->key = OPENSSL_malloc(keylen);
+        if (ec->key == NULL)
+            return 0;
+        memcpy(ec->key, key, keylen);
+    }
+    ec->keylen = keylen;
+    if (cipher)
+        ec->contentType = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs7_data);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int CMS_EncryptedData_set1_key(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, const EVP_CIPHER *ciph,
+                               const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen)
+{
+    CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec;
+    if (!key || !keylen) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDDATA_SET1_KEY, CMS_R_NO_KEY);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (ciph) {
+        cms->d.encryptedData = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_EncryptedData);
+        if (!cms->d.encryptedData) {
+            CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDDATA_SET1_KEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        cms->contentType = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs7_encrypted);
+        cms->d.encryptedData->version = 0;
+    } else if (OBJ_obj2nid(cms->contentType) != NID_pkcs7_encrypted) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDDATA_SET1_KEY, CMS_R_NOT_ENCRYPTED_DATA);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    ec = cms->d.encryptedData->encryptedContentInfo;
+    return cms_EncryptedContent_init(ec, ciph, key, keylen);
+}
+
+BIO *cms_EncryptedData_init_bio(CMS_ContentInfo *cms)
+{
+    CMS_EncryptedData *enc = cms->d.encryptedData;
+    if (enc->encryptedContentInfo->cipher && enc->unprotectedAttrs)
+        enc->version = 2;
+    return cms_EncryptedContent_init_bio(enc->encryptedContentInfo);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cms/cms_env.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cms/cms_env.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8d45943
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cms/cms_env.c
@@ -0,0 +1,902 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/cms.h>
+#include <openssl/aes.h>
+#include "cms_lcl.h"
+#include "internal/asn1_int.h"
+#include "internal/evp_int.h"
+
+/* CMS EnvelopedData Utilities */
+
+CMS_EnvelopedData *cms_get0_enveloped(CMS_ContentInfo *cms)
+{
+    if (OBJ_obj2nid(cms->contentType) != NID_pkcs7_enveloped) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_GET0_ENVELOPED,
+               CMS_R_CONTENT_TYPE_NOT_ENVELOPED_DATA);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    return cms->d.envelopedData;
+}
+
+static CMS_EnvelopedData *cms_enveloped_data_init(CMS_ContentInfo *cms)
+{
+    if (cms->d.other == NULL) {
+        cms->d.envelopedData = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_EnvelopedData);
+        if (!cms->d.envelopedData) {
+            CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENVELOPED_DATA_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+        cms->d.envelopedData->version = 0;
+        cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->contentType =
+            OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs7_data);
+        ASN1_OBJECT_free(cms->contentType);
+        cms->contentType = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs7_enveloped);
+        return cms->d.envelopedData;
+    }
+    return cms_get0_enveloped(cms);
+}
+
+int cms_env_asn1_ctrl(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, int cmd)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+    int i;
+    if (ri->type == CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS)
+        pkey = ri->d.ktri->pkey;
+    else if (ri->type == CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) {
+        EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = ri->d.kari->pctx;
+        if (!pctx)
+            return 0;
+        pkey = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(pctx);
+        if (!pkey)
+            return 0;
+    } else
+        return 0;
+    if (!pkey->ameth || !pkey->ameth->pkey_ctrl)
+        return 1;
+    i = pkey->ameth->pkey_ctrl(pkey, ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_ENVELOPE, cmd, ri);
+    if (i == -2) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENV_ASN1_CTRL,
+               CMS_R_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEY_TYPE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (i <= 0) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENV_ASN1_CTRL, CMS_R_CTRL_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientInfo) *CMS_get0_RecipientInfos(CMS_ContentInfo *cms)
+{
+    CMS_EnvelopedData *env;
+    env = cms_get0_enveloped(cms);
+    if (!env)
+        return NULL;
+    return env->recipientInfos;
+}
+
+int CMS_RecipientInfo_type(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
+{
+    return ri->type;
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY_CTX *CMS_RecipientInfo_get0_pkey_ctx(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
+{
+    if (ri->type == CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS)
+        return ri->d.ktri->pctx;
+    else if (ri->type == CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE)
+        return ri->d.kari->pctx;
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+CMS_ContentInfo *CMS_EnvelopedData_create(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher)
+{
+    CMS_ContentInfo *cms;
+    CMS_EnvelopedData *env;
+    cms = CMS_ContentInfo_new();
+    if (cms == NULL)
+        goto merr;
+    env = cms_enveloped_data_init(cms);
+    if (env == NULL)
+        goto merr;
+    if (!cms_EncryptedContent_init(env->encryptedContentInfo,
+                                   cipher, NULL, 0))
+        goto merr;
+    return cms;
+ merr:
+    CMS_ContentInfo_free(cms);
+    CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENVELOPEDDATA_CREATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+/* Key Transport Recipient Info (KTRI) routines */
+
+/* Initialise a ktri based on passed certificate and key */
+
+static int cms_RecipientInfo_ktri_init(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509 *recip,
+                                       EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned int flags)
+{
+    CMS_KeyTransRecipientInfo *ktri;
+    int idtype;
+
+    ri->d.ktri = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_KeyTransRecipientInfo);
+    if (!ri->d.ktri)
+        return 0;
+    ri->type = CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS;
+
+    ktri = ri->d.ktri;
+
+    if (flags & CMS_USE_KEYID) {
+        ktri->version = 2;
+        idtype = CMS_RECIPINFO_KEYIDENTIFIER;
+    } else {
+        ktri->version = 0;
+        idtype = CMS_RECIPINFO_ISSUER_SERIAL;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Not a typo: RecipientIdentifier and SignerIdentifier are the same
+     * structure.
+     */
+
+    if (!cms_set1_SignerIdentifier(ktri->rid, recip, idtype))
+        return 0;
+
+    X509_up_ref(recip);
+    EVP_PKEY_up_ref(pk);
+
+    ktri->pkey = pk;
+    ktri->recip = recip;
+
+    if (flags & CMS_KEY_PARAM) {
+        ktri->pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(ktri->pkey, NULL);
+        if (ktri->pctx == NULL)
+            return 0;
+        if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(ktri->pctx) <= 0)
+            return 0;
+    } else if (!cms_env_asn1_ctrl(ri, 0))
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Add a recipient certificate using appropriate type of RecipientInfo
+ */
+
+CMS_RecipientInfo *CMS_add1_recipient_cert(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
+                                           X509 *recip, unsigned int flags)
+{
+    CMS_RecipientInfo *ri = NULL;
+    CMS_EnvelopedData *env;
+    EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL;
+    env = cms_get0_enveloped(cms);
+    if (!env)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* Initialize recipient info */
+    ri = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_RecipientInfo);
+    if (!ri)
+        goto merr;
+
+    pk = X509_get0_pubkey(recip);
+    if (!pk) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD1_RECIPIENT_CERT, CMS_R_ERROR_GETTING_PUBLIC_KEY);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    switch (cms_pkey_get_ri_type(pk)) {
+
+    case CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS:
+        if (!cms_RecipientInfo_ktri_init(ri, recip, pk, flags))
+            goto err;
+        break;
+
+    case CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE:
+        if (!cms_RecipientInfo_kari_init(ri, recip, pk, flags))
+            goto err;
+        break;
+
+    default:
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD1_RECIPIENT_CERT,
+               CMS_R_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEY_TYPE);
+        goto err;
+
+    }
+
+    if (!sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_push(env->recipientInfos, ri))
+        goto merr;
+
+    return ri;
+
+ merr:
+    CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD1_RECIPIENT_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ err:
+    M_ASN1_free_of(ri, CMS_RecipientInfo);
+    return NULL;
+
+}
+
+int CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_get0_algs(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
+                                     EVP_PKEY **pk, X509 **recip,
+                                     X509_ALGOR **palg)
+{
+    CMS_KeyTransRecipientInfo *ktri;
+    if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KTRI_GET0_ALGS,
+               CMS_R_NOT_KEY_TRANSPORT);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    ktri = ri->d.ktri;
+
+    if (pk)
+        *pk = ktri->pkey;
+    if (recip)
+        *recip = ktri->recip;
+    if (palg)
+        *palg = ktri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_get0_signer_id(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
+                                          ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid,
+                                          X509_NAME **issuer,
+                                          ASN1_INTEGER **sno)
+{
+    CMS_KeyTransRecipientInfo *ktri;
+    if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KTRI_GET0_SIGNER_ID,
+               CMS_R_NOT_KEY_TRANSPORT);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    ktri = ri->d.ktri;
+
+    return cms_SignerIdentifier_get0_signer_id(ktri->rid, keyid, issuer, sno);
+}
+
+int CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_cert_cmp(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509 *cert)
+{
+    if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KTRI_CERT_CMP,
+               CMS_R_NOT_KEY_TRANSPORT);
+        return -2;
+    }
+    return cms_SignerIdentifier_cert_cmp(ri->d.ktri->rid, cert);
+}
+
+int CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_pkey(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_SET0_PKEY, CMS_R_NOT_KEY_TRANSPORT);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    ri->d.ktri->pkey = pkey;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Encrypt content key in key transport recipient info */
+
+static int cms_RecipientInfo_ktri_encrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
+                                          CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
+{
+    CMS_KeyTransRecipientInfo *ktri;
+    CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec;
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx;
+    unsigned char *ek = NULL;
+    size_t eklen;
+
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KTRI_ENCRYPT, CMS_R_NOT_KEY_TRANSPORT);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    ktri = ri->d.ktri;
+    ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo;
+
+    pctx = ktri->pctx;
+
+    if (pctx) {
+        if (!cms_env_asn1_ctrl(ri, 0))
+            goto err;
+    } else {
+        pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(ktri->pkey, NULL);
+        if (pctx == NULL)
+            return 0;
+
+        if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
+                          EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_ENCRYPT, 0, ri) <= 0) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KTRI_ENCRYPT, CMS_R_CTRL_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &eklen, ec->key, ec->keylen) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    ek = OPENSSL_malloc(eklen);
+
+    if (ek == NULL) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KTRI_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, ek, &eklen, ec->key, ec->keylen) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    ASN1_STRING_set0(ktri->encryptedKey, ek, eklen);
+    ek = NULL;
+
+    ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+    ktri->pctx = NULL;
+    OPENSSL_free(ek);
+    return ret;
+
+}
+
+/* Decrypt content key from KTRI */
+
+static int cms_RecipientInfo_ktri_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
+                                          CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
+{
+    CMS_KeyTransRecipientInfo *ktri = ri->d.ktri;
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey = ktri->pkey;
+    unsigned char *ek = NULL;
+    size_t eklen;
+    int ret = 0;
+    CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec;
+    ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo;
+
+    if (ktri->pkey == NULL) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KTRI_DECRYPT, CMS_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    ktri->pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
+    if (ktri->pctx == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(ktri->pctx) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!cms_env_asn1_ctrl(ri, 1))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ktri->pctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_DECRYPT,
+                          EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_DECRYPT, 0, ri) <= 0) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KTRI_DECRYPT, CMS_R_CTRL_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(ktri->pctx, NULL, &eklen,
+                         ktri->encryptedKey->data,
+                         ktri->encryptedKey->length) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    ek = OPENSSL_malloc(eklen);
+
+    if (ek == NULL) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KTRI_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(ktri->pctx, ek, &eklen,
+                         ktri->encryptedKey->data,
+                         ktri->encryptedKey->length) <= 0) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KTRI_DECRYPT, CMS_R_CMS_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    ret = 1;
+
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(ec->key, ec->keylen);
+    ec->key = ek;
+    ec->keylen = eklen;
+
+ err:
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ktri->pctx);
+    ktri->pctx = NULL;
+    if (!ret)
+        OPENSSL_free(ek);
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/* Key Encrypted Key (KEK) RecipientInfo routines */
+
+int CMS_RecipientInfo_kekri_id_cmp(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
+                                   const unsigned char *id, size_t idlen)
+{
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING tmp_os;
+    CMS_KEKRecipientInfo *kekri;
+    if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_KEK) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KEKRI_ID_CMP, CMS_R_NOT_KEK);
+        return -2;
+    }
+    kekri = ri->d.kekri;
+    tmp_os.type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
+    tmp_os.flags = 0;
+    tmp_os.data = (unsigned char *)id;
+    tmp_os.length = (int)idlen;
+    return ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(&tmp_os, kekri->kekid->keyIdentifier);
+}
+
+/* For now hard code AES key wrap info */
+
+static size_t aes_wrap_keylen(int nid)
+{
+    switch (nid) {
+    case NID_id_aes128_wrap:
+        return 16;
+
+    case NID_id_aes192_wrap:
+        return 24;
+
+    case NID_id_aes256_wrap:
+        return 32;
+
+    default:
+        return 0;
+    }
+}
+
+CMS_RecipientInfo *CMS_add0_recipient_key(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, int nid,
+                                          unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
+                                          unsigned char *id, size_t idlen,
+                                          ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *date,
+                                          ASN1_OBJECT *otherTypeId,
+                                          ASN1_TYPE *otherType)
+{
+    CMS_RecipientInfo *ri = NULL;
+    CMS_EnvelopedData *env;
+    CMS_KEKRecipientInfo *kekri;
+    env = cms_get0_enveloped(cms);
+    if (!env)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (nid == NID_undef) {
+        switch (keylen) {
+        case 16:
+            nid = NID_id_aes128_wrap;
+            break;
+
+        case 24:
+            nid = NID_id_aes192_wrap;
+            break;
+
+        case 32:
+            nid = NID_id_aes256_wrap;
+            break;
+
+        default:
+            CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_KEY, CMS_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+    } else {
+
+        size_t exp_keylen = aes_wrap_keylen(nid);
+
+        if (!exp_keylen) {
+            CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_KEY,
+                   CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEK_ALGORITHM);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        if (keylen != exp_keylen) {
+            CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_KEY, CMS_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+    }
+
+    /* Initialize recipient info */
+    ri = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_RecipientInfo);
+    if (!ri)
+        goto merr;
+
+    ri->d.kekri = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_KEKRecipientInfo);
+    if (!ri->d.kekri)
+        goto merr;
+    ri->type = CMS_RECIPINFO_KEK;
+
+    kekri = ri->d.kekri;
+
+    if (otherTypeId) {
+        kekri->kekid->other = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_OtherKeyAttribute);
+        if (kekri->kekid->other == NULL)
+            goto merr;
+    }
+
+    if (!sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_push(env->recipientInfos, ri))
+        goto merr;
+
+    /* After this point no calls can fail */
+
+    kekri->version = 4;
+
+    kekri->key = key;
+    kekri->keylen = keylen;
+
+    ASN1_STRING_set0(kekri->kekid->keyIdentifier, id, idlen);
+
+    kekri->kekid->date = date;
+
+    if (kekri->kekid->other) {
+        kekri->kekid->other->keyAttrId = otherTypeId;
+        kekri->kekid->other->keyAttr = otherType;
+    }
+
+    X509_ALGOR_set0(kekri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm,
+                    OBJ_nid2obj(nid), V_ASN1_UNDEF, NULL);
+
+    return ri;
+
+ merr:
+    CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_KEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ err:
+    M_ASN1_free_of(ri, CMS_RecipientInfo);
+    return NULL;
+
+}
+
+int CMS_RecipientInfo_kekri_get0_id(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
+                                    X509_ALGOR **palg,
+                                    ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pid,
+                                    ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **pdate,
+                                    ASN1_OBJECT **potherid,
+                                    ASN1_TYPE **pothertype)
+{
+    CMS_KEKIdentifier *rkid;
+    if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_KEK) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KEKRI_GET0_ID, CMS_R_NOT_KEK);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    rkid = ri->d.kekri->kekid;
+    if (palg)
+        *palg = ri->d.kekri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm;
+    if (pid)
+        *pid = rkid->keyIdentifier;
+    if (pdate)
+        *pdate = rkid->date;
+    if (potherid) {
+        if (rkid->other)
+            *potherid = rkid->other->keyAttrId;
+        else
+            *potherid = NULL;
+    }
+    if (pothertype) {
+        if (rkid->other)
+            *pothertype = rkid->other->keyAttr;
+        else
+            *pothertype = NULL;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_key(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
+                               unsigned char *key, size_t keylen)
+{
+    CMS_KEKRecipientInfo *kekri;
+    if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_KEK) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_SET0_KEY, CMS_R_NOT_KEK);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    kekri = ri->d.kekri;
+    kekri->key = key;
+    kekri->keylen = keylen;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Encrypt content key in KEK recipient info */
+
+static int cms_RecipientInfo_kekri_encrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
+                                           CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
+{
+    CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec;
+    CMS_KEKRecipientInfo *kekri;
+    AES_KEY actx;
+    unsigned char *wkey = NULL;
+    int wkeylen;
+    int r = 0;
+
+    ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo;
+
+    kekri = ri->d.kekri;
+
+    if (!kekri->key) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KEKRI_ENCRYPT, CMS_R_NO_KEY);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (AES_set_encrypt_key(kekri->key, kekri->keylen << 3, &actx)) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KEKRI_ENCRYPT,
+               CMS_R_ERROR_SETTING_KEY);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    wkey = OPENSSL_malloc(ec->keylen + 8);
+
+    if (wkey == NULL) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KEKRI_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    wkeylen = AES_wrap_key(&actx, NULL, wkey, ec->key, ec->keylen);
+
+    if (wkeylen <= 0) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KEKRI_ENCRYPT, CMS_R_WRAP_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    ASN1_STRING_set0(kekri->encryptedKey, wkey, wkeylen);
+
+    r = 1;
+
+ err:
+
+    if (!r)
+        OPENSSL_free(wkey);
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(&actx, sizeof(actx));
+
+    return r;
+
+}
+
+/* Decrypt content key in KEK recipient info */
+
+static int cms_RecipientInfo_kekri_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
+                                           CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
+{
+    CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec;
+    CMS_KEKRecipientInfo *kekri;
+    AES_KEY actx;
+    unsigned char *ukey = NULL;
+    int ukeylen;
+    int r = 0, wrap_nid;
+
+    ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo;
+
+    kekri = ri->d.kekri;
+
+    if (!kekri->key) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KEKRI_DECRYPT, CMS_R_NO_KEY);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    wrap_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(kekri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm->algorithm);
+    if (aes_wrap_keylen(wrap_nid) != kekri->keylen) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KEKRI_DECRYPT,
+               CMS_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* If encrypted key length is invalid don't bother */
+
+    if (kekri->encryptedKey->length < 16) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KEKRI_DECRYPT,
+               CMS_R_INVALID_ENCRYPTED_KEY_LENGTH);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (AES_set_decrypt_key(kekri->key, kekri->keylen << 3, &actx)) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KEKRI_DECRYPT,
+               CMS_R_ERROR_SETTING_KEY);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    ukey = OPENSSL_malloc(kekri->encryptedKey->length - 8);
+
+    if (ukey == NULL) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KEKRI_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    ukeylen = AES_unwrap_key(&actx, NULL, ukey,
+                             kekri->encryptedKey->data,
+                             kekri->encryptedKey->length);
+
+    if (ukeylen <= 0) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KEKRI_DECRYPT, CMS_R_UNWRAP_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    ec->key = ukey;
+    ec->keylen = ukeylen;
+
+    r = 1;
+
+ err:
+
+    if (!r)
+        OPENSSL_free(ukey);
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(&actx, sizeof(actx));
+
+    return r;
+
+}
+
+int CMS_RecipientInfo_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
+{
+    switch (ri->type) {
+    case CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS:
+        return cms_RecipientInfo_ktri_decrypt(cms, ri);
+
+    case CMS_RECIPINFO_KEK:
+        return cms_RecipientInfo_kekri_decrypt(cms, ri);
+
+    case CMS_RECIPINFO_PASS:
+        return cms_RecipientInfo_pwri_crypt(cms, ri, 0);
+
+    default:
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_DECRYPT,
+               CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_RECPIENTINFO_TYPE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+}
+
+int CMS_RecipientInfo_encrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
+{
+    switch (ri->type) {
+    case CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS:
+        return cms_RecipientInfo_ktri_encrypt(cms, ri);
+
+    case CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE:
+        return cms_RecipientInfo_kari_encrypt(cms, ri);
+
+    case CMS_RECIPINFO_KEK:
+        return cms_RecipientInfo_kekri_encrypt(cms, ri);
+
+    case CMS_RECIPINFO_PASS:
+        return cms_RecipientInfo_pwri_crypt(cms, ri, 1);
+
+    default:
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_ENCRYPT,
+               CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_RECIPIENT_TYPE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+}
+
+/* Check structures and fixup version numbers (if necessary) */
+
+static void cms_env_set_originfo_version(CMS_EnvelopedData *env)
+{
+    CMS_OriginatorInfo *org = env->originatorInfo;
+    int i;
+    if (org == NULL)
+        return;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_CertificateChoices_num(org->certificates); i++) {
+        CMS_CertificateChoices *cch;
+        cch = sk_CMS_CertificateChoices_value(org->certificates, i);
+        if (cch->type == CMS_CERTCHOICE_OTHER) {
+            env->version = 4;
+            return;
+        } else if (cch->type == CMS_CERTCHOICE_V2ACERT) {
+            if (env->version < 3)
+                env->version = 3;
+        }
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_RevocationInfoChoice_num(org->crls); i++) {
+        CMS_RevocationInfoChoice *rch;
+        rch = sk_CMS_RevocationInfoChoice_value(org->crls, i);
+        if (rch->type == CMS_REVCHOICE_OTHER) {
+            env->version = 4;
+            return;
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+static void cms_env_set_version(CMS_EnvelopedData *env)
+{
+    int i;
+    CMS_RecipientInfo *ri;
+
+    /*
+     * Can't set version higher than 4 so if 4 or more already nothing to do.
+     */
+    if (env->version >= 4)
+        return;
+
+    cms_env_set_originfo_version(env);
+
+    if (env->version >= 3)
+        return;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_num(env->recipientInfos); i++) {
+        ri = sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_value(env->recipientInfos, i);
+        if (ri->type == CMS_RECIPINFO_PASS || ri->type == CMS_RECIPINFO_OTHER) {
+            env->version = 3;
+            return;
+        } else if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS
+                   || ri->d.ktri->version != 0) {
+            env->version = 2;
+        }
+    }
+    if (env->originatorInfo || env->unprotectedAttrs)
+        env->version = 2;
+    if (env->version == 2)
+        return;
+    env->version = 0;
+}
+
+BIO *cms_EnvelopedData_init_bio(CMS_ContentInfo *cms)
+{
+    CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec;
+    STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientInfo) *rinfos;
+    CMS_RecipientInfo *ri;
+    int i, ok = 0;
+    BIO *ret;
+
+    /* Get BIO first to set up key */
+
+    ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo;
+    ret = cms_EncryptedContent_init_bio(ec);
+
+    /* If error or no cipher end of processing */
+
+    if (!ret || !ec->cipher)
+        return ret;
+
+    /* Now encrypt content key according to each RecipientInfo type */
+
+    rinfos = cms->d.envelopedData->recipientInfos;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_num(rinfos); i++) {
+        ri = sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_value(rinfos, i);
+        if (CMS_RecipientInfo_encrypt(cms, ri) <= 0) {
+            CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENVELOPEDDATA_INIT_BIO,
+                   CMS_R_ERROR_SETTING_RECIPIENTINFO);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+    cms_env_set_version(cms->d.envelopedData);
+
+    ok = 1;
+
+ err:
+    ec->cipher = NULL;
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(ec->key, ec->keylen);
+    ec->key = NULL;
+    ec->keylen = 0;
+    if (ok)
+        return ret;
+    BIO_free(ret);
+    return NULL;
+
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get RecipientInfo type (if any) supported by a key (public or private). To
+ * retain compatibility with previous behaviour if the ctrl value isn't
+ * supported we assume key transport.
+ */
+int cms_pkey_get_ri_type(EVP_PKEY *pk)
+{
+    if (pk->ameth && pk->ameth->pkey_ctrl) {
+        int i, r;
+        i = pk->ameth->pkey_ctrl(pk, ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_RI_TYPE, 0, &r);
+        if (i > 0)
+            return r;
+    }
+    return CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cms/cms_err.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cms/cms_err.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c6df1b5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cms/cms_err.c
@@ -0,0 +1,258 @@
+/*
+ * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/cms.h>
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+
+# define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMS,func,0)
+# define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMS,0,reason)
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA CMS_str_functs[] = {
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CHECK_CONTENT), "check_content"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_CERT), "CMS_add0_cert"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_KEY), "CMS_add0_recipient_key"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_PASSWORD),
+     "CMS_add0_recipient_password"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_ADD1_RECEIPTREQUEST), "CMS_add1_ReceiptRequest"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_ADD1_RECIPIENT_CERT), "CMS_add1_recipient_cert"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_ADD1_SIGNER), "CMS_add1_signer"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_ADD1_SIGNINGTIME), "cms_add1_signingTime"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_COMPRESS), "CMS_compress"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_COMPRESSEDDATA_CREATE), "cms_CompressedData_create"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_COMPRESSEDDATA_INIT_BIO),
+     "cms_CompressedData_init_bio"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_COPY_CONTENT), "cms_copy_content"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_COPY_MESSAGEDIGEST), "cms_copy_messageDigest"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_DATA), "CMS_data"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_DATAFINAL), "CMS_dataFinal"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_DATAINIT), "CMS_dataInit"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_DECRYPT), "CMS_decrypt"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_DECRYPT_SET1_KEY), "CMS_decrypt_set1_key"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_DECRYPT_SET1_PASSWORD), "CMS_decrypt_set1_password"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_DECRYPT_SET1_PKEY), "CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_DIGESTALGORITHM_FIND_CTX),
+     "cms_DigestAlgorithm_find_ctx"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_DIGESTALGORITHM_INIT_BIO),
+     "cms_DigestAlgorithm_init_bio"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_DIGESTEDDATA_DO_FINAL), "cms_DigestedData_do_final"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_DIGEST_VERIFY), "CMS_digest_verify"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_ENCODE_RECEIPT), "cms_encode_Receipt"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPT), "CMS_encrypt"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO),
+     "cms_EncryptedContent_init_bio"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDDATA_DECRYPT), "CMS_EncryptedData_decrypt"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDDATA_ENCRYPT), "CMS_EncryptedData_encrypt"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDDATA_SET1_KEY),
+     "CMS_EncryptedData_set1_key"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_ENVELOPEDDATA_CREATE), "CMS_EnvelopedData_create"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_ENVELOPEDDATA_INIT_BIO),
+     "cms_EnvelopedData_init_bio"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_ENVELOPED_DATA_INIT), "cms_enveloped_data_init"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_ENV_ASN1_CTRL), "cms_env_asn1_ctrl"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_FINAL), "CMS_final"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_GET0_CERTIFICATE_CHOICES),
+     "cms_get0_certificate_choices"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_GET0_CONTENT), "CMS_get0_content"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_GET0_ECONTENT_TYPE), "cms_get0_econtent_type"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_GET0_ENVELOPED), "cms_get0_enveloped"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_GET0_REVOCATION_CHOICES),
+     "cms_get0_revocation_choices"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_GET0_SIGNED), "cms_get0_signed"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_MSGSIGDIGEST_ADD1), "cms_msgSigDigest_add1"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_RECEIPTREQUEST_CREATE0),
+     "CMS_ReceiptRequest_create0"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_RECEIPT_VERIFY), "cms_Receipt_verify"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_DECRYPT), "CMS_RecipientInfo_decrypt"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_ENCRYPT), "CMS_RecipientInfo_encrypt"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_ENCRYPT),
+     "cms_RecipientInfo_kari_encrypt"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_GET0_ALG),
+     "CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_alg"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_GET0_ORIG_ID),
+     "CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_orig_id"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_GET0_REKS),
+     "CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_reks"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_ORIG_ID_CMP),
+     "CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_orig_id_cmp"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KEKRI_DECRYPT),
+     "cms_RecipientInfo_kekri_decrypt"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KEKRI_ENCRYPT),
+     "cms_RecipientInfo_kekri_encrypt"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KEKRI_GET0_ID),
+     "CMS_RecipientInfo_kekri_get0_id"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KEKRI_ID_CMP),
+     "CMS_RecipientInfo_kekri_id_cmp"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KTRI_CERT_CMP),
+     "CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_cert_cmp"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KTRI_DECRYPT),
+     "cms_RecipientInfo_ktri_decrypt"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KTRI_ENCRYPT),
+     "cms_RecipientInfo_ktri_encrypt"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KTRI_GET0_ALGS),
+     "CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_get0_algs"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KTRI_GET0_SIGNER_ID),
+     "CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_get0_signer_id"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_PWRI_CRYPT),
+     "cms_RecipientInfo_pwri_crypt"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_SET0_KEY),
+     "CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_key"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_SET0_PASSWORD),
+     "CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_password"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_SET0_PKEY),
+     "CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_pkey"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_SD_ASN1_CTRL), "cms_sd_asn1_ctrl"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_SET1_IAS), "cms_set1_ias"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_SET1_KEYID), "cms_set1_keyid"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_SET1_SIGNERIDENTIFIER), "cms_set1_SignerIdentifier"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_SET_DETACHED), "CMS_set_detached"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_SIGN), "CMS_sign"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_SIGNED_DATA_INIT), "cms_signed_data_init"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_SIGNERINFO_CONTENT_SIGN),
+     "cms_SignerInfo_content_sign"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_SIGNERINFO_SIGN), "CMS_SignerInfo_sign"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_SIGNERINFO_VERIFY), "CMS_SignerInfo_verify"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_SIGNERINFO_VERIFY_CERT),
+     "cms_signerinfo_verify_cert"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_SIGNERINFO_VERIFY_CONTENT),
+     "CMS_SignerInfo_verify_content"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_SIGN_RECEIPT), "CMS_sign_receipt"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_STREAM), "CMS_stream"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_UNCOMPRESS), "CMS_uncompress"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_VERIFY), "CMS_verify"},
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA CMS_str_reasons[] = {
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_ADD_SIGNER_ERROR), "add signer error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_CERTIFICATE_ALREADY_PRESENT),
+     "certificate already present"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_CERTIFICATE_HAS_NO_KEYID), "certificate has no keyid"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR), "certificate verify error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_CIPHER_INITIALISATION_ERROR),
+     "cipher initialisation error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_CIPHER_PARAMETER_INITIALISATION_ERROR),
+     "cipher parameter initialisation error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_CMS_DATAFINAL_ERROR), "cms datafinal error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_CMS_LIB), "cms lib"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_CONTENTIDENTIFIER_MISMATCH),
+     "contentidentifier mismatch"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_CONTENT_NOT_FOUND), "content not found"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_CONTENT_TYPE_MISMATCH), "content type mismatch"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_CONTENT_TYPE_NOT_COMPRESSED_DATA),
+     "content type not compressed data"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_CONTENT_TYPE_NOT_ENVELOPED_DATA),
+     "content type not enveloped data"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_CONTENT_TYPE_NOT_SIGNED_DATA),
+     "content type not signed data"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_CONTENT_VERIFY_ERROR), "content verify error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_CTRL_ERROR), "ctrl error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_CTRL_FAILURE), "ctrl failure"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_DECRYPT_ERROR), "decrypt error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_ERROR_GETTING_PUBLIC_KEY), "error getting public key"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_ERROR_READING_MESSAGEDIGEST_ATTRIBUTE),
+     "error reading messagedigest attribute"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_ERROR_SETTING_KEY), "error setting key"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_ERROR_SETTING_RECIPIENTINFO),
+     "error setting recipientinfo"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_INVALID_ENCRYPTED_KEY_LENGTH),
+     "invalid encrypted key length"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_INVALID_KEY_ENCRYPTION_PARAMETER),
+     "invalid key encryption parameter"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH), "invalid key length"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_MD_BIO_INIT_ERROR), "md bio init error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_MESSAGEDIGEST_ATTRIBUTE_WRONG_LENGTH),
+     "messagedigest attribute wrong length"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_MESSAGEDIGEST_WRONG_LENGTH),
+     "messagedigest wrong length"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_MSGSIGDIGEST_ERROR), "msgsigdigest error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_MSGSIGDIGEST_VERIFICATION_FAILURE),
+     "msgsigdigest verification failure"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_MSGSIGDIGEST_WRONG_LENGTH),
+     "msgsigdigest wrong length"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_NEED_ONE_SIGNER), "need one signer"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_NOT_A_SIGNED_RECEIPT), "not a signed receipt"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_NOT_ENCRYPTED_DATA), "not encrypted data"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_NOT_KEK), "not kek"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT), "not key agreement"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_NOT_KEY_TRANSPORT), "not key transport"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_NOT_PWRI), "not pwri"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEY_TYPE),
+     "not supported for this key type"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_NO_CIPHER), "no cipher"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_NO_CONTENT), "no content"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_NO_CONTENT_TYPE), "no content type"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_NO_DEFAULT_DIGEST), "no default digest"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_NO_DIGEST_SET), "no digest set"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_NO_KEY), "no key"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_NO_KEY_OR_CERT), "no key or cert"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_NO_MATCHING_DIGEST), "no matching digest"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_NO_MATCHING_RECIPIENT), "no matching recipient"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_NO_MATCHING_SIGNATURE), "no matching signature"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_NO_MSGSIGDIGEST), "no msgsigdigest"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_NO_PASSWORD), "no password"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY), "no private key"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_NO_PUBLIC_KEY), "no public key"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_NO_RECEIPT_REQUEST), "no receipt request"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_NO_SIGNERS), "no signers"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DOES_NOT_MATCH_CERTIFICATE),
+     "private key does not match certificate"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_RECEIPT_DECODE_ERROR), "receipt decode error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_RECIPIENT_ERROR), "recipient error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_SIGNER_CERTIFICATE_NOT_FOUND),
+     "signer certificate not found"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_SIGNFINAL_ERROR), "signfinal error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_SMIME_TEXT_ERROR), "smime text error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_STORE_INIT_ERROR), "store init error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_TYPE_NOT_COMPRESSED_DATA), "type not compressed data"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_TYPE_NOT_DATA), "type not data"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_TYPE_NOT_DIGESTED_DATA), "type not digested data"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_TYPE_NOT_ENCRYPTED_DATA), "type not encrypted data"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_TYPE_NOT_ENVELOPED_DATA), "type not enveloped data"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_UNABLE_TO_FINALIZE_CONTEXT),
+     "unable to finalize context"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER), "unknown cipher"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST_ALGORIHM), "unknown digest algorihm"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_UNKNOWN_ID), "unknown id"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM),
+     "unsupported compression algorithm"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_CONTENT_TYPE), "unsupported content type"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEK_ALGORITHM),
+     "unsupported kek algorithm"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM),
+     "unsupported key encryption algorithm"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_RECIPIENT_TYPE),
+     "unsupported recipient type"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_RECPIENTINFO_TYPE),
+     "unsupported recpientinfo type"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_TYPE), "unsupported type"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_UNWRAP_ERROR), "unwrap error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_UNWRAP_FAILURE), "unwrap failure"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_VERIFICATION_FAILURE), "verification failure"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_WRAP_ERROR), "wrap error"},
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+
+#endif
+
+int ERR_load_CMS_strings(void)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+
+    if (ERR_func_error_string(CMS_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) {
+        ERR_load_strings(0, CMS_str_functs);
+        ERR_load_strings(0, CMS_str_reasons);
+    }
+#endif
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cms/cms_ess.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cms/cms_ess.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4780231
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cms/cms_ess.c
@@ -0,0 +1,337 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/cms.h>
+#include "cms_lcl.h"
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(CMS_ReceiptRequest)
+
+/* ESS services: for now just Signed Receipt related */
+
+int CMS_get1_ReceiptRequest(CMS_SignerInfo *si, CMS_ReceiptRequest **prr)
+{
+    ASN1_STRING *str;
+    CMS_ReceiptRequest *rr = NULL;
+    if (prr)
+        *prr = NULL;
+    str = CMS_signed_get0_data_by_OBJ(si,
+                                      OBJ_nid2obj
+                                      (NID_id_smime_aa_receiptRequest), -3,
+                                      V_ASN1_SEQUENCE);
+    if (!str)
+        return 0;
+
+    rr = ASN1_item_unpack(str, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(CMS_ReceiptRequest));
+    if (!rr)
+        return -1;
+    if (prr)
+        *prr = rr;
+    else
+        CMS_ReceiptRequest_free(rr);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+CMS_ReceiptRequest *CMS_ReceiptRequest_create0(unsigned char *id, int idlen,
+                                               int allorfirst,
+                                               STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAMES)
+                                               *receiptList, STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAMES)
+                                               *receiptsTo)
+{
+    CMS_ReceiptRequest *rr = NULL;
+
+    rr = CMS_ReceiptRequest_new();
+    if (rr == NULL)
+        goto merr;
+    if (id)
+        ASN1_STRING_set0(rr->signedContentIdentifier, id, idlen);
+    else {
+        if (!ASN1_STRING_set(rr->signedContentIdentifier, NULL, 32))
+            goto merr;
+        if (RAND_bytes(rr->signedContentIdentifier->data, 32) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    sk_GENERAL_NAMES_pop_free(rr->receiptsTo, GENERAL_NAMES_free);
+    rr->receiptsTo = receiptsTo;
+
+    if (receiptList) {
+        rr->receiptsFrom->type = 1;
+        rr->receiptsFrom->d.receiptList = receiptList;
+    } else {
+        rr->receiptsFrom->type = 0;
+        rr->receiptsFrom->d.allOrFirstTier = allorfirst;
+    }
+
+    return rr;
+
+ merr:
+    CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECEIPTREQUEST_CREATE0, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+
+ err:
+    CMS_ReceiptRequest_free(rr);
+    return NULL;
+
+}
+
+int CMS_add1_ReceiptRequest(CMS_SignerInfo *si, CMS_ReceiptRequest *rr)
+{
+    unsigned char *rrder = NULL;
+    int rrderlen, r = 0;
+
+    rrderlen = i2d_CMS_ReceiptRequest(rr, &rrder);
+    if (rrderlen < 0)
+        goto merr;
+
+    if (!CMS_signed_add1_attr_by_NID(si, NID_id_smime_aa_receiptRequest,
+                                     V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, rrder, rrderlen))
+        goto merr;
+
+    r = 1;
+
+ merr:
+    if (!r)
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD1_RECEIPTREQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+
+    OPENSSL_free(rrder);
+
+    return r;
+
+}
+
+void CMS_ReceiptRequest_get0_values(CMS_ReceiptRequest *rr,
+                                    ASN1_STRING **pcid,
+                                    int *pallorfirst,
+                                    STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAMES) **plist,
+                                    STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAMES) **prto)
+{
+    if (pcid)
+        *pcid = rr->signedContentIdentifier;
+    if (rr->receiptsFrom->type == 0) {
+        if (pallorfirst)
+            *pallorfirst = (int)rr->receiptsFrom->d.allOrFirstTier;
+        if (plist)
+            *plist = NULL;
+    } else {
+        if (pallorfirst)
+            *pallorfirst = -1;
+        if (plist)
+            *plist = rr->receiptsFrom->d.receiptList;
+    }
+    if (prto)
+        *prto = rr->receiptsTo;
+}
+
+/* Digest a SignerInfo structure for msgSigDigest attribute processing */
+
+static int cms_msgSigDigest(CMS_SignerInfo *si,
+                            unsigned char *dig, unsigned int *diglen)
+{
+    const EVP_MD *md;
+    md = EVP_get_digestbyobj(si->digestAlgorithm->algorithm);
+    if (md == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    if (!ASN1_item_digest(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(CMS_Attributes_Verify), md,
+                          si->signedAttrs, dig, diglen))
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Add a msgSigDigest attribute to a SignerInfo */
+
+int cms_msgSigDigest_add1(CMS_SignerInfo *dest, CMS_SignerInfo *src)
+{
+    unsigned char dig[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+    unsigned int diglen;
+    if (!cms_msgSigDigest(src, dig, &diglen)) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_MSGSIGDIGEST_ADD1, CMS_R_MSGSIGDIGEST_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (!CMS_signed_add1_attr_by_NID(dest, NID_id_smime_aa_msgSigDigest,
+                                     V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, dig, diglen)) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_MSGSIGDIGEST_ADD1, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Verify signed receipt after it has already passed normal CMS verify */
+
+int cms_Receipt_verify(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, CMS_ContentInfo *req_cms)
+{
+    int r = 0, i;
+    CMS_ReceiptRequest *rr = NULL;
+    CMS_Receipt *rct = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(CMS_SignerInfo) *sis, *osis;
+    CMS_SignerInfo *si, *osi = NULL;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *msig, **pcont;
+    ASN1_OBJECT *octype;
+    unsigned char dig[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+    unsigned int diglen;
+
+    /* Get SignerInfos, also checks SignedData content type */
+    osis = CMS_get0_SignerInfos(req_cms);
+    sis = CMS_get0_SignerInfos(cms);
+    if (!osis || !sis)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (sk_CMS_SignerInfo_num(sis) != 1) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECEIPT_VERIFY, CMS_R_NEED_ONE_SIGNER);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* Check receipt content type */
+    if (OBJ_obj2nid(CMS_get0_eContentType(cms)) != NID_id_smime_ct_receipt) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECEIPT_VERIFY, CMS_R_NOT_A_SIGNED_RECEIPT);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* Extract and decode receipt content */
+    pcont = CMS_get0_content(cms);
+    if (!pcont || !*pcont) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECEIPT_VERIFY, CMS_R_NO_CONTENT);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    rct = ASN1_item_unpack(*pcont, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(CMS_Receipt));
+
+    if (!rct) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECEIPT_VERIFY, CMS_R_RECEIPT_DECODE_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* Locate original request */
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_SignerInfo_num(osis); i++) {
+        osi = sk_CMS_SignerInfo_value(osis, i);
+        if (!ASN1_STRING_cmp(osi->signature, rct->originatorSignatureValue))
+            break;
+    }
+
+    if (i == sk_CMS_SignerInfo_num(osis)) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECEIPT_VERIFY, CMS_R_NO_MATCHING_SIGNATURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    si = sk_CMS_SignerInfo_value(sis, 0);
+
+    /* Get msgSigDigest value and compare */
+
+    msig = CMS_signed_get0_data_by_OBJ(si,
+                                       OBJ_nid2obj
+                                       (NID_id_smime_aa_msgSigDigest), -3,
+                                       V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
+
+    if (!msig) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECEIPT_VERIFY, CMS_R_NO_MSGSIGDIGEST);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!cms_msgSigDigest(osi, dig, &diglen)) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECEIPT_VERIFY, CMS_R_MSGSIGDIGEST_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (diglen != (unsigned int)msig->length) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECEIPT_VERIFY, CMS_R_MSGSIGDIGEST_WRONG_LENGTH);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (memcmp(dig, msig->data, diglen)) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECEIPT_VERIFY,
+               CMS_R_MSGSIGDIGEST_VERIFICATION_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* Compare content types */
+
+    octype = CMS_signed_get0_data_by_OBJ(osi,
+                                         OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs9_contentType),
+                                         -3, V_ASN1_OBJECT);
+    if (!octype) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECEIPT_VERIFY, CMS_R_NO_CONTENT_TYPE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* Compare details in receipt request */
+
+    if (OBJ_cmp(octype, rct->contentType)) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECEIPT_VERIFY, CMS_R_CONTENT_TYPE_MISMATCH);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* Get original receipt request details */
+
+    if (CMS_get1_ReceiptRequest(osi, &rr) <= 0) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECEIPT_VERIFY, CMS_R_NO_RECEIPT_REQUEST);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (ASN1_STRING_cmp(rr->signedContentIdentifier,
+                        rct->signedContentIdentifier)) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECEIPT_VERIFY, CMS_R_CONTENTIDENTIFIER_MISMATCH);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    r = 1;
+
+ err:
+    CMS_ReceiptRequest_free(rr);
+    M_ASN1_free_of(rct, CMS_Receipt);
+    return r;
+
+}
+
+/*
+ * Encode a Receipt into an OCTET STRING read for including into content of a
+ * SignedData ContentInfo.
+ */
+
+ASN1_OCTET_STRING *cms_encode_Receipt(CMS_SignerInfo *si)
+{
+    CMS_Receipt rct;
+    CMS_ReceiptRequest *rr = NULL;
+    ASN1_OBJECT *ctype;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os = NULL;
+
+    /* Get original receipt request */
+
+    /* Get original receipt request details */
+
+    if (CMS_get1_ReceiptRequest(si, &rr) <= 0) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCODE_RECEIPT, CMS_R_NO_RECEIPT_REQUEST);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* Get original content type */
+
+    ctype = CMS_signed_get0_data_by_OBJ(si,
+                                        OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs9_contentType),
+                                        -3, V_ASN1_OBJECT);
+    if (!ctype) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCODE_RECEIPT, CMS_R_NO_CONTENT_TYPE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    rct.version = 1;
+    rct.contentType = ctype;
+    rct.signedContentIdentifier = rr->signedContentIdentifier;
+    rct.originatorSignatureValue = si->signature;
+
+    os = ASN1_item_pack(&rct, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(CMS_Receipt), NULL);
+
+ err:
+    CMS_ReceiptRequest_free(rr);
+    return os;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cms/cms_io.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cms/cms_io.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d18f980
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cms/cms_io.c
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/cms.h>
+#include "cms_lcl.h"
+
+int CMS_stream(unsigned char ***boundary, CMS_ContentInfo *cms)
+{
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pos;
+    pos = CMS_get0_content(cms);
+    if (pos == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    if (*pos == NULL)
+        *pos = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
+    if (*pos != NULL) {
+        (*pos)->flags |= ASN1_STRING_FLAG_NDEF;
+        (*pos)->flags &= ~ASN1_STRING_FLAG_CONT;
+        *boundary = &(*pos)->data;
+        return 1;
+    }
+    CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_STREAM, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+CMS_ContentInfo *d2i_CMS_bio(BIO *bp, CMS_ContentInfo **cms)
+{
+    return ASN1_item_d2i_bio(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(CMS_ContentInfo), bp, cms);
+}
+
+int i2d_CMS_bio(BIO *bp, CMS_ContentInfo *cms)
+{
+    return ASN1_item_i2d_bio(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(CMS_ContentInfo), bp, cms);
+}
+
+IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw_const(CMS, CMS_ContentInfo, PEM_STRING_CMS, CMS_ContentInfo)
+
+BIO *BIO_new_CMS(BIO *out, CMS_ContentInfo *cms)
+{
+    return BIO_new_NDEF(out, (ASN1_VALUE *)cms,
+                        ASN1_ITEM_rptr(CMS_ContentInfo));
+}
+
+/* CMS wrappers round generalised stream and MIME routines */
+
+int i2d_CMS_bio_stream(BIO *out, CMS_ContentInfo *cms, BIO *in, int flags)
+{
+    return i2d_ASN1_bio_stream(out, (ASN1_VALUE *)cms, in, flags,
+                               ASN1_ITEM_rptr(CMS_ContentInfo));
+}
+
+int PEM_write_bio_CMS_stream(BIO *out, CMS_ContentInfo *cms, BIO *in,
+                             int flags)
+{
+    return PEM_write_bio_ASN1_stream(out, (ASN1_VALUE *)cms, in, flags,
+                                     "CMS", ASN1_ITEM_rptr(CMS_ContentInfo));
+}
+
+int SMIME_write_CMS(BIO *bio, CMS_ContentInfo *cms, BIO *data, int flags)
+{
+    STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) *mdalgs;
+    int ctype_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(cms->contentType);
+    int econt_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(CMS_get0_eContentType(cms));
+    if (ctype_nid == NID_pkcs7_signed)
+        mdalgs = cms->d.signedData->digestAlgorithms;
+    else
+        mdalgs = NULL;
+
+    return SMIME_write_ASN1(bio, (ASN1_VALUE *)cms, data, flags,
+                            ctype_nid, econt_nid, mdalgs,
+                            ASN1_ITEM_rptr(CMS_ContentInfo));
+}
+
+CMS_ContentInfo *SMIME_read_CMS(BIO *bio, BIO **bcont)
+{
+    return (CMS_ContentInfo *)SMIME_read_ASN1(bio, bcont,
+                                              ASN1_ITEM_rptr
+                                              (CMS_ContentInfo));
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cms/cms_kari.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cms/cms_kari.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3bc46fe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cms/cms_kari.c
@@ -0,0 +1,411 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2013-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/cms.h>
+#include <openssl/aes.h>
+#include "cms_lcl.h"
+#include "internal/asn1_int.h"
+
+/* Key Agreement Recipient Info (KARI) routines */
+
+int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_alg(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
+                                    X509_ALGOR **palg,
+                                    ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pukm)
+{
+    if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_GET0_ALG,
+               CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (palg)
+        *palg = ri->d.kari->keyEncryptionAlgorithm;
+    if (pukm)
+        *pukm = ri->d.kari->ukm;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Retrieve recipient encrypted keys from a kari */
+
+STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey)
+*CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_reks(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
+{
+    if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_GET0_REKS,
+               CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    return ri->d.kari->recipientEncryptedKeys;
+}
+
+int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_orig_id(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
+                                        X509_ALGOR **pubalg,
+                                        ASN1_BIT_STRING **pubkey,
+                                        ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid,
+                                        X509_NAME **issuer,
+                                        ASN1_INTEGER **sno)
+{
+    CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey *oik;
+    if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_GET0_ORIG_ID,
+               CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    oik = ri->d.kari->originator;
+    if (issuer)
+        *issuer = NULL;
+    if (sno)
+        *sno = NULL;
+    if (keyid)
+        *keyid = NULL;
+    if (pubalg)
+        *pubalg = NULL;
+    if (pubkey)
+        *pubkey = NULL;
+    if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_ISSUER_SERIAL) {
+        if (issuer)
+            *issuer = oik->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->issuer;
+        if (sno)
+            *sno = oik->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->serialNumber;
+    } else if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_KEYIDENTIFIER) {
+        if (keyid)
+            *keyid = oik->d.subjectKeyIdentifier;
+    } else if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_PUBKEY) {
+        if (pubalg)
+            *pubalg = oik->d.originatorKey->algorithm;
+        if (pubkey)
+            *pubkey = oik->d.originatorKey->publicKey;
+    } else
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_orig_id_cmp(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509 *cert)
+{
+    CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey *oik;
+    if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_ORIG_ID_CMP,
+               CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT);
+        return -2;
+    }
+    oik = ri->d.kari->originator;
+    if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_ISSUER_SERIAL)
+        return cms_ias_cert_cmp(oik->d.issuerAndSerialNumber, cert);
+    else if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_KEYIDENTIFIER)
+        return cms_keyid_cert_cmp(oik->d.subjectKeyIdentifier, cert);
+    return -1;
+}
+
+int CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_get0_id(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek,
+                                      ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid,
+                                      ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **tm,
+                                      CMS_OtherKeyAttribute **other,
+                                      X509_NAME **issuer, ASN1_INTEGER **sno)
+{
+    CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier *rid = rek->rid;
+    if (rid->type == CMS_REK_ISSUER_SERIAL) {
+        if (issuer)
+            *issuer = rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->issuer;
+        if (sno)
+            *sno = rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->serialNumber;
+        if (keyid)
+            *keyid = NULL;
+        if (tm)
+            *tm = NULL;
+        if (other)
+            *other = NULL;
+    } else if (rid->type == CMS_REK_KEYIDENTIFIER) {
+        if (keyid)
+            *keyid = rid->d.rKeyId->subjectKeyIdentifier;
+        if (tm)
+            *tm = rid->d.rKeyId->date;
+        if (other)
+            *other = rid->d.rKeyId->other;
+        if (issuer)
+            *issuer = NULL;
+        if (sno)
+            *sno = NULL;
+    } else
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_cert_cmp(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek,
+                                       X509 *cert)
+{
+    CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier *rid = rek->rid;
+    if (rid->type == CMS_REK_ISSUER_SERIAL)
+        return cms_ias_cert_cmp(rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber, cert);
+    else if (rid->type == CMS_REK_KEYIDENTIFIER)
+        return cms_keyid_cert_cmp(rid->d.rKeyId->subjectKeyIdentifier, cert);
+    else
+        return -1;
+}
+
+int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_set0_pkey(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, EVP_PKEY *pk)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx;
+    CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari = ri->d.kari;
+
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(kari->pctx);
+    kari->pctx = NULL;
+    if (!pk)
+        return 1;
+    pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
+    if (!pctx || !EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx))
+        goto err;
+    kari->pctx = pctx;
+    return 1;
+ err:
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+EVP_CIPHER_CTX *CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_ctx(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
+{
+    if (ri->type == CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE)
+        return ri->d.kari->ctx;
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Derive KEK and decrypt/encrypt with it to produce either the original CEK
+ * or the encrypted CEK.
+ */
+
+static int cms_kek_cipher(unsigned char **pout, size_t *poutlen,
+                          const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen,
+                          CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari, int enc)
+{
+    /* Key encryption key */
+    unsigned char kek[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
+    size_t keklen;
+    int rv = 0;
+    unsigned char *out = NULL;
+    int outlen;
+    keklen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(kari->ctx);
+    if (keklen > EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH)
+        return 0;
+    /* Derive KEK */
+    if (EVP_PKEY_derive(kari->pctx, kek, &keklen) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    /* Set KEK in context */
+    if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(kari->ctx, NULL, NULL, kek, NULL, enc))
+        goto err;
+    /* obtain output length of ciphered key */
+    if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(kari->ctx, NULL, &outlen, in, inlen))
+        goto err;
+    out = OPENSSL_malloc(outlen);
+    if (out == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(kari->ctx, out, &outlen, in, inlen))
+        goto err;
+    *pout = out;
+    *poutlen = (size_t)outlen;
+    rv = 1;
+
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(kek, keklen);
+    if (!rv)
+        OPENSSL_free(out);
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(kari->ctx);
+    /* FIXME: WHY IS kari->pctx freed here?  /RL */
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(kari->pctx);
+    kari->pctx = NULL;
+    return rv;
+}
+
+int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
+                                   CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
+                                   CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek)
+{
+    int rv = 0;
+    unsigned char *enckey = NULL, *cek = NULL;
+    size_t enckeylen;
+    size_t ceklen;
+    CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec;
+    enckeylen = rek->encryptedKey->length;
+    enckey = rek->encryptedKey->data;
+    /* Setup all parameters to derive KEK */
+    if (!cms_env_asn1_ctrl(ri, 1))
+        goto err;
+    /* Attempt to decrypt CEK */
+    if (!cms_kek_cipher(&cek, &ceklen, enckey, enckeylen, ri->d.kari, 0))
+        goto err;
+    ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo;
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(ec->key, ec->keylen);
+    ec->key = cek;
+    ec->keylen = ceklen;
+    cek = NULL;
+    rv = 1;
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_free(cek);
+    return rv;
+}
+
+/* Create ephemeral key and initialise context based on it */
+static int cms_kari_create_ephemeral_key(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari,
+                                         EVP_PKEY *pk)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
+    EVP_PKEY *ekey = NULL;
+    int rv = 0;
+    pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
+    if (!pctx)
+        goto err;
+    if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(pctx) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    if (EVP_PKEY_keygen(pctx, &ekey) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+    pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(ekey, NULL);
+    if (!pctx)
+        goto err;
+    if (EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    kari->pctx = pctx;
+    rv = 1;
+ err:
+    if (!rv)
+        EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(ekey);
+    return rv;
+}
+
+/* Initialise a ktri based on passed certificate and key */
+
+int cms_RecipientInfo_kari_init(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509 *recip,
+                                EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned int flags)
+{
+    CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari;
+    CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek = NULL;
+
+    ri->d.kari = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo);
+    if (!ri->d.kari)
+        return 0;
+    ri->type = CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE;
+
+    kari = ri->d.kari;
+    kari->version = 3;
+
+    rek = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey);
+    if (!sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_push(kari->recipientEncryptedKeys, rek)) {
+        M_ASN1_free_of(rek, CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (flags & CMS_USE_KEYID) {
+        rek->rid->type = CMS_REK_KEYIDENTIFIER;
+        rek->rid->d.rKeyId = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_RecipientKeyIdentifier);
+        if (rek->rid->d.rKeyId == NULL)
+            return 0;
+        if (!cms_set1_keyid(&rek->rid->d.rKeyId->subjectKeyIdentifier, recip))
+            return 0;
+    } else {
+        rek->rid->type = CMS_REK_ISSUER_SERIAL;
+        if (!cms_set1_ias(&rek->rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber, recip))
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* Create ephemeral key */
+    if (!cms_kari_create_ephemeral_key(kari, pk))
+        return 0;
+
+    EVP_PKEY_up_ref(pk);
+    rek->pkey = pk;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int cms_wrap_init(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari,
+                         const EVP_CIPHER *cipher)
+{
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = kari->ctx;
+    const EVP_CIPHER *kekcipher;
+    int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher);
+    /* If a suitable wrap algorithm is already set nothing to do */
+    kekcipher = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx);
+
+    if (kekcipher) {
+        if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx) != EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE)
+            return 0;
+        return 1;
+    }
+    /*
+     * Pick a cipher based on content encryption cipher. If it is DES3 use
+     * DES3 wrap otherwise use AES wrap similar to key size.
+     */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
+    if (EVP_CIPHER_type(cipher) == NID_des_ede3_cbc)
+        kekcipher = EVP_des_ede3_wrap();
+    else
+#endif
+    if (keylen <= 16)
+        kekcipher = EVP_aes_128_wrap();
+    else if (keylen <= 24)
+        kekcipher = EVP_aes_192_wrap();
+    else
+        kekcipher = EVP_aes_256_wrap();
+    return EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, kekcipher, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+}
+
+/* Encrypt content key in key agreement recipient info */
+
+int cms_RecipientInfo_kari_encrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
+                                   CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
+{
+    CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari;
+    CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec;
+    CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek;
+    STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey) *reks;
+    int i;
+
+    if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_ENCRYPT, CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    kari = ri->d.kari;
+    reks = kari->recipientEncryptedKeys;
+    ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo;
+    /* Initialise wrap algorithm parameters */
+    if (!cms_wrap_init(kari, ec->cipher))
+        return 0;
+    /*
+     * If no originator key set up initialise for ephemeral key the public key
+     * ASN1 structure will set the actual public key value.
+     */
+    if (kari->originator->type == -1) {
+        CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey *oik = kari->originator;
+        oik->type = CMS_OIK_PUBKEY;
+        oik->d.originatorKey = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_OriginatorPublicKey);
+        if (!oik->d.originatorKey)
+            return 0;
+    }
+    /* Initialise KDF algorithm */
+    if (!cms_env_asn1_ctrl(ri, 0))
+        return 0;
+    /* For each rek, derive KEK, encrypt CEK */
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_num(reks); i++) {
+        unsigned char *enckey;
+        size_t enckeylen;
+        rek = sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_value(reks, i);
+        if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(kari->pctx, rek->pkey) <= 0)
+            return 0;
+        if (!cms_kek_cipher(&enckey, &enckeylen, ec->key, ec->keylen,
+                            kari, 1))
+            return 0;
+        ASN1_STRING_set0(rek->encryptedKey, enckey, enckeylen);
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cms/cms_lcl.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cms/cms_lcl.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d0c0e81
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cms/cms_lcl.h
@@ -0,0 +1,444 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_CMS_LCL_H
+# define HEADER_CMS_LCL_H
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+# include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+/*
+ * Cryptographic message syntax (CMS) structures: taken from RFC3852
+ */
+
+/* Forward references */
+
+typedef struct CMS_IssuerAndSerialNumber_st CMS_IssuerAndSerialNumber;
+typedef struct CMS_EncapsulatedContentInfo_st CMS_EncapsulatedContentInfo;
+typedef struct CMS_SignerIdentifier_st CMS_SignerIdentifier;
+typedef struct CMS_SignedData_st CMS_SignedData;
+typedef struct CMS_OtherRevocationInfoFormat_st CMS_OtherRevocationInfoFormat;
+typedef struct CMS_OriginatorInfo_st CMS_OriginatorInfo;
+typedef struct CMS_EncryptedContentInfo_st CMS_EncryptedContentInfo;
+typedef struct CMS_EnvelopedData_st CMS_EnvelopedData;
+typedef struct CMS_DigestedData_st CMS_DigestedData;
+typedef struct CMS_EncryptedData_st CMS_EncryptedData;
+typedef struct CMS_AuthenticatedData_st CMS_AuthenticatedData;
+typedef struct CMS_CompressedData_st CMS_CompressedData;
+typedef struct CMS_OtherCertificateFormat_st CMS_OtherCertificateFormat;
+typedef struct CMS_KeyTransRecipientInfo_st CMS_KeyTransRecipientInfo;
+typedef struct CMS_OriginatorPublicKey_st CMS_OriginatorPublicKey;
+typedef struct CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey_st CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey;
+typedef struct CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo_st CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo;
+typedef struct CMS_RecipientKeyIdentifier_st CMS_RecipientKeyIdentifier;
+typedef struct CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier_st
+    CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier;
+typedef struct CMS_KEKIdentifier_st CMS_KEKIdentifier;
+typedef struct CMS_KEKRecipientInfo_st CMS_KEKRecipientInfo;
+typedef struct CMS_PasswordRecipientInfo_st CMS_PasswordRecipientInfo;
+typedef struct CMS_OtherRecipientInfo_st CMS_OtherRecipientInfo;
+typedef struct CMS_ReceiptsFrom_st CMS_ReceiptsFrom;
+
+struct CMS_ContentInfo_st {
+    ASN1_OBJECT *contentType;
+    union {
+        ASN1_OCTET_STRING *data;
+        CMS_SignedData *signedData;
+        CMS_EnvelopedData *envelopedData;
+        CMS_DigestedData *digestedData;
+        CMS_EncryptedData *encryptedData;
+        CMS_AuthenticatedData *authenticatedData;
+        CMS_CompressedData *compressedData;
+        ASN1_TYPE *other;
+        /* Other types ... */
+        void *otherData;
+    } d;
+};
+
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(CMS_CertificateChoices)
+
+struct CMS_SignedData_st {
+    long version;
+    STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) *digestAlgorithms;
+    CMS_EncapsulatedContentInfo *encapContentInfo;
+    STACK_OF(CMS_CertificateChoices) *certificates;
+    STACK_OF(CMS_RevocationInfoChoice) *crls;
+    STACK_OF(CMS_SignerInfo) *signerInfos;
+};
+
+struct CMS_EncapsulatedContentInfo_st {
+    ASN1_OBJECT *eContentType;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *eContent;
+    /* Set to 1 if incomplete structure only part set up */
+    int partial;
+};
+
+struct CMS_SignerInfo_st {
+    long version;
+    CMS_SignerIdentifier *sid;
+    X509_ALGOR *digestAlgorithm;
+    STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *signedAttrs;
+    X509_ALGOR *signatureAlgorithm;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *signature;
+    STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *unsignedAttrs;
+    /* Signing certificate and key */
+    X509 *signer;
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+    /* Digest and public key context for alternative parameters */
+    EVP_MD_CTX *mctx;
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx;
+};
+
+struct CMS_SignerIdentifier_st {
+    int type;
+    union {
+        CMS_IssuerAndSerialNumber *issuerAndSerialNumber;
+        ASN1_OCTET_STRING *subjectKeyIdentifier;
+    } d;
+};
+
+struct CMS_EnvelopedData_st {
+    long version;
+    CMS_OriginatorInfo *originatorInfo;
+    STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientInfo) *recipientInfos;
+    CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *encryptedContentInfo;
+    STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *unprotectedAttrs;
+};
+
+struct CMS_OriginatorInfo_st {
+    STACK_OF(CMS_CertificateChoices) *certificates;
+    STACK_OF(CMS_RevocationInfoChoice) *crls;
+};
+
+struct CMS_EncryptedContentInfo_st {
+    ASN1_OBJECT *contentType;
+    X509_ALGOR *contentEncryptionAlgorithm;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *encryptedContent;
+    /* Content encryption algorithm and key */
+    const EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
+    unsigned char *key;
+    size_t keylen;
+    /* Set to 1 if we are debugging decrypt and don't fake keys for MMA */
+    int debug;
+};
+
+struct CMS_RecipientInfo_st {
+    int type;
+    union {
+        CMS_KeyTransRecipientInfo *ktri;
+        CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari;
+        CMS_KEKRecipientInfo *kekri;
+        CMS_PasswordRecipientInfo *pwri;
+        CMS_OtherRecipientInfo *ori;
+    } d;
+};
+
+typedef CMS_SignerIdentifier CMS_RecipientIdentifier;
+
+struct CMS_KeyTransRecipientInfo_st {
+    long version;
+    CMS_RecipientIdentifier *rid;
+    X509_ALGOR *keyEncryptionAlgorithm;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *encryptedKey;
+    /* Recipient Key and cert */
+    X509 *recip;
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+    /* Public key context for this operation */
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx;
+};
+
+struct CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo_st {
+    long version;
+    CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey *originator;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ukm;
+    X509_ALGOR *keyEncryptionAlgorithm;
+    STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey) *recipientEncryptedKeys;
+    /* Public key context associated with current operation */
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx;
+    /* Cipher context for CEK wrapping */
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
+};
+
+struct CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey_st {
+    int type;
+    union {
+        CMS_IssuerAndSerialNumber *issuerAndSerialNumber;
+        ASN1_OCTET_STRING *subjectKeyIdentifier;
+        CMS_OriginatorPublicKey *originatorKey;
+    } d;
+};
+
+struct CMS_OriginatorPublicKey_st {
+    X509_ALGOR *algorithm;
+    ASN1_BIT_STRING *publicKey;
+};
+
+struct CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_st {
+    CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier *rid;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *encryptedKey;
+    /* Public key associated with this recipient */
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+};
+
+struct CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier_st {
+    int type;
+    union {
+        CMS_IssuerAndSerialNumber *issuerAndSerialNumber;
+        CMS_RecipientKeyIdentifier *rKeyId;
+    } d;
+};
+
+struct CMS_RecipientKeyIdentifier_st {
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *subjectKeyIdentifier;
+    ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *date;
+    CMS_OtherKeyAttribute *other;
+};
+
+struct CMS_KEKRecipientInfo_st {
+    long version;
+    CMS_KEKIdentifier *kekid;
+    X509_ALGOR *keyEncryptionAlgorithm;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *encryptedKey;
+    /* Extra info: symmetric key to use */
+    unsigned char *key;
+    size_t keylen;
+};
+
+struct CMS_KEKIdentifier_st {
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *keyIdentifier;
+    ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *date;
+    CMS_OtherKeyAttribute *other;
+};
+
+struct CMS_PasswordRecipientInfo_st {
+    long version;
+    X509_ALGOR *keyDerivationAlgorithm;
+    X509_ALGOR *keyEncryptionAlgorithm;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *encryptedKey;
+    /* Extra info: password to use */
+    unsigned char *pass;
+    size_t passlen;
+};
+
+struct CMS_OtherRecipientInfo_st {
+    ASN1_OBJECT *oriType;
+    ASN1_TYPE *oriValue;
+};
+
+struct CMS_DigestedData_st {
+    long version;
+    X509_ALGOR *digestAlgorithm;
+    CMS_EncapsulatedContentInfo *encapContentInfo;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *digest;
+};
+
+struct CMS_EncryptedData_st {
+    long version;
+    CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *encryptedContentInfo;
+    STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *unprotectedAttrs;
+};
+
+struct CMS_AuthenticatedData_st {
+    long version;
+    CMS_OriginatorInfo *originatorInfo;
+    STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientInfo) *recipientInfos;
+    X509_ALGOR *macAlgorithm;
+    X509_ALGOR *digestAlgorithm;
+    CMS_EncapsulatedContentInfo *encapContentInfo;
+    STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *authAttrs;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *mac;
+    STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *unauthAttrs;
+};
+
+struct CMS_CompressedData_st {
+    long version;
+    X509_ALGOR *compressionAlgorithm;
+    STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientInfo) *recipientInfos;
+    CMS_EncapsulatedContentInfo *encapContentInfo;
+};
+
+struct CMS_RevocationInfoChoice_st {
+    int type;
+    union {
+        X509_CRL *crl;
+        CMS_OtherRevocationInfoFormat *other;
+    } d;
+};
+
+# define CMS_REVCHOICE_CRL               0
+# define CMS_REVCHOICE_OTHER             1
+
+struct CMS_OtherRevocationInfoFormat_st {
+    ASN1_OBJECT *otherRevInfoFormat;
+    ASN1_TYPE *otherRevInfo;
+};
+
+struct CMS_CertificateChoices {
+    int type;
+    union {
+        X509 *certificate;
+        ASN1_STRING *extendedCertificate; /* Obsolete */
+        ASN1_STRING *v1AttrCert; /* Left encoded for now */
+        ASN1_STRING *v2AttrCert; /* Left encoded for now */
+        CMS_OtherCertificateFormat *other;
+    } d;
+};
+
+# define CMS_CERTCHOICE_CERT             0
+# define CMS_CERTCHOICE_EXCERT           1
+# define CMS_CERTCHOICE_V1ACERT          2
+# define CMS_CERTCHOICE_V2ACERT          3
+# define CMS_CERTCHOICE_OTHER            4
+
+struct CMS_OtherCertificateFormat_st {
+    ASN1_OBJECT *otherCertFormat;
+    ASN1_TYPE *otherCert;
+};
+
+/*
+ * This is also defined in pkcs7.h but we duplicate it to allow the CMS code
+ * to be independent of PKCS#7
+ */
+
+struct CMS_IssuerAndSerialNumber_st {
+    X509_NAME *issuer;
+    ASN1_INTEGER *serialNumber;
+};
+
+struct CMS_OtherKeyAttribute_st {
+    ASN1_OBJECT *keyAttrId;
+    ASN1_TYPE *keyAttr;
+};
+
+/* ESS structures */
+
+# ifdef HEADER_X509V3_H
+
+struct CMS_ReceiptRequest_st {
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *signedContentIdentifier;
+    CMS_ReceiptsFrom *receiptsFrom;
+    STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAMES) *receiptsTo;
+};
+
+struct CMS_ReceiptsFrom_st {
+    int type;
+    union {
+        long allOrFirstTier;
+        STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAMES) *receiptList;
+    } d;
+};
+# endif
+
+struct CMS_Receipt_st {
+    long version;
+    ASN1_OBJECT *contentType;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *signedContentIdentifier;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *originatorSignatureValue;
+};
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(CMS_ContentInfo)
+DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_SignerInfo)
+DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_IssuerAndSerialNumber)
+DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_Attributes_Sign)
+DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_Attributes_Verify)
+DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_RecipientInfo)
+DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_PasswordRecipientInfo)
+DECLARE_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(CMS_IssuerAndSerialNumber)
+
+# define CMS_SIGNERINFO_ISSUER_SERIAL    0
+# define CMS_SIGNERINFO_KEYIDENTIFIER    1
+
+# define CMS_RECIPINFO_ISSUER_SERIAL     0
+# define CMS_RECIPINFO_KEYIDENTIFIER     1
+
+# define CMS_REK_ISSUER_SERIAL           0
+# define CMS_REK_KEYIDENTIFIER           1
+
+# define CMS_OIK_ISSUER_SERIAL           0
+# define CMS_OIK_KEYIDENTIFIER           1
+# define CMS_OIK_PUBKEY                  2
+
+BIO *cms_content_bio(CMS_ContentInfo *cms);
+
+CMS_ContentInfo *cms_Data_create(void);
+
+CMS_ContentInfo *cms_DigestedData_create(const EVP_MD *md);
+BIO *cms_DigestedData_init_bio(CMS_ContentInfo *cms);
+int cms_DigestedData_do_final(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, BIO *chain, int verify);
+
+BIO *cms_SignedData_init_bio(CMS_ContentInfo *cms);
+int cms_SignedData_final(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, BIO *chain);
+int cms_set1_SignerIdentifier(CMS_SignerIdentifier *sid, X509 *cert,
+                              int type);
+int cms_SignerIdentifier_get0_signer_id(CMS_SignerIdentifier *sid,
+                                        ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid,
+                                        X509_NAME **issuer,
+                                        ASN1_INTEGER **sno);
+int cms_SignerIdentifier_cert_cmp(CMS_SignerIdentifier *sid, X509 *cert);
+
+CMS_ContentInfo *cms_CompressedData_create(int comp_nid);
+BIO *cms_CompressedData_init_bio(CMS_ContentInfo *cms);
+
+BIO *cms_DigestAlgorithm_init_bio(X509_ALGOR *digestAlgorithm);
+int cms_DigestAlgorithm_find_ctx(EVP_MD_CTX *mctx, BIO *chain,
+                                 X509_ALGOR *mdalg);
+
+int cms_ias_cert_cmp(CMS_IssuerAndSerialNumber *ias, X509 *cert);
+int cms_keyid_cert_cmp(ASN1_OCTET_STRING *keyid, X509 *cert);
+int cms_set1_ias(CMS_IssuerAndSerialNumber **pias, X509 *cert);
+int cms_set1_keyid(ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pkeyid, X509 *cert);
+
+BIO *cms_EncryptedContent_init_bio(CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec);
+BIO *cms_EncryptedData_init_bio(CMS_ContentInfo *cms);
+int cms_EncryptedContent_init(CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec,
+                              const EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
+                              const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen);
+
+int cms_Receipt_verify(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, CMS_ContentInfo *req_cms);
+int cms_msgSigDigest_add1(CMS_SignerInfo *dest, CMS_SignerInfo *src);
+ASN1_OCTET_STRING *cms_encode_Receipt(CMS_SignerInfo *si);
+
+BIO *cms_EnvelopedData_init_bio(CMS_ContentInfo *cms);
+CMS_EnvelopedData *cms_get0_enveloped(CMS_ContentInfo *cms);
+int cms_env_asn1_ctrl(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, int cmd);
+int cms_pkey_get_ri_type(EVP_PKEY *pk);
+/* KARI routines */
+int cms_RecipientInfo_kari_init(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509 *recip,
+                                EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned int flags);
+int cms_RecipientInfo_kari_encrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
+                                   CMS_RecipientInfo *ri);
+
+/* PWRI routines */
+int cms_RecipientInfo_pwri_crypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
+                                 int en_de);
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_CertificateChoices)
+DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_DigestedData)
+DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_EncryptedData)
+DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_EnvelopedData)
+DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_KEKRecipientInfo)
+DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo)
+DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_KeyTransRecipientInfo)
+DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_OriginatorPublicKey)
+DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_OtherKeyAttribute)
+DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_Receipt)
+DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_ReceiptRequest)
+DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey)
+DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_RecipientKeyIdentifier)
+DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_RevocationInfoChoice)
+DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_SignedData)
+DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_CompressedData)
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cms/cms_lib.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cms/cms_lib.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7395684
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cms/cms_lib.c
@@ -0,0 +1,587 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/cms.h>
+#include "cms_lcl.h"
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(CMS_ContentInfo)
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_PRINT_FUNCTION(CMS_ContentInfo)
+
+const ASN1_OBJECT *CMS_get0_type(const CMS_ContentInfo *cms)
+{
+    return cms->contentType;
+}
+
+CMS_ContentInfo *cms_Data_create(void)
+{
+    CMS_ContentInfo *cms;
+    cms = CMS_ContentInfo_new();
+    if (cms != NULL) {
+        cms->contentType = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs7_data);
+        /* Never detached */
+        CMS_set_detached(cms, 0);
+    }
+    return cms;
+}
+
+BIO *cms_content_bio(CMS_ContentInfo *cms)
+{
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pos = CMS_get0_content(cms);
+    if (!pos)
+        return NULL;
+    /* If content detached data goes nowhere: create NULL BIO */
+    if (!*pos)
+        return BIO_new(BIO_s_null());
+    /*
+     * If content not detached and created return memory BIO
+     */
+    if (!*pos || ((*pos)->flags == ASN1_STRING_FLAG_CONT))
+        return BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+    /* Else content was read in: return read only BIO for it */
+    return BIO_new_mem_buf((*pos)->data, (*pos)->length);
+}
+
+BIO *CMS_dataInit(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, BIO *icont)
+{
+    BIO *cmsbio, *cont;
+    if (icont)
+        cont = icont;
+    else
+        cont = cms_content_bio(cms);
+    if (!cont) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DATAINIT, CMS_R_NO_CONTENT);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    switch (OBJ_obj2nid(cms->contentType)) {
+
+    case NID_pkcs7_data:
+        return cont;
+
+    case NID_pkcs7_signed:
+        cmsbio = cms_SignedData_init_bio(cms);
+        break;
+
+    case NID_pkcs7_digest:
+        cmsbio = cms_DigestedData_init_bio(cms);
+        break;
+#ifdef ZLIB
+    case NID_id_smime_ct_compressedData:
+        cmsbio = cms_CompressedData_init_bio(cms);
+        break;
+#endif
+
+    case NID_pkcs7_encrypted:
+        cmsbio = cms_EncryptedData_init_bio(cms);
+        break;
+
+    case NID_pkcs7_enveloped:
+        cmsbio = cms_EnvelopedData_init_bio(cms);
+        break;
+
+    default:
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DATAINIT, CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_TYPE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    if (cmsbio)
+        return BIO_push(cmsbio, cont);
+
+    if (!icont)
+        BIO_free(cont);
+    return NULL;
+
+}
+
+int CMS_dataFinal(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, BIO *cmsbio)
+{
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pos = CMS_get0_content(cms);
+    if (!pos)
+        return 0;
+    /* If embedded content find memory BIO and set content */
+    if (*pos && ((*pos)->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_CONT)) {
+        BIO *mbio;
+        unsigned char *cont;
+        long contlen;
+        mbio = BIO_find_type(cmsbio, BIO_TYPE_MEM);
+        if (!mbio) {
+            CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DATAFINAL, CMS_R_CONTENT_NOT_FOUND);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        contlen = BIO_get_mem_data(mbio, &cont);
+        /* Set bio as read only so its content can't be clobbered */
+        BIO_set_flags(mbio, BIO_FLAGS_MEM_RDONLY);
+        BIO_set_mem_eof_return(mbio, 0);
+        ASN1_STRING_set0(*pos, cont, contlen);
+        (*pos)->flags &= ~ASN1_STRING_FLAG_CONT;
+    }
+
+    switch (OBJ_obj2nid(cms->contentType)) {
+
+    case NID_pkcs7_data:
+    case NID_pkcs7_enveloped:
+    case NID_pkcs7_encrypted:
+    case NID_id_smime_ct_compressedData:
+        /* Nothing to do */
+        return 1;
+
+    case NID_pkcs7_signed:
+        return cms_SignedData_final(cms, cmsbio);
+
+    case NID_pkcs7_digest:
+        return cms_DigestedData_do_final(cms, cmsbio, 0);
+
+    default:
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DATAFINAL, CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_TYPE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return an OCTET STRING pointer to content. This allows it to be accessed
+ * or set later.
+ */
+
+ASN1_OCTET_STRING **CMS_get0_content(CMS_ContentInfo *cms)
+{
+    switch (OBJ_obj2nid(cms->contentType)) {
+
+    case NID_pkcs7_data:
+        return &cms->d.data;
+
+    case NID_pkcs7_signed:
+        return &cms->d.signedData->encapContentInfo->eContent;
+
+    case NID_pkcs7_enveloped:
+        return &cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->encryptedContent;
+
+    case NID_pkcs7_digest:
+        return &cms->d.digestedData->encapContentInfo->eContent;
+
+    case NID_pkcs7_encrypted:
+        return &cms->d.encryptedData->encryptedContentInfo->encryptedContent;
+
+    case NID_id_smime_ct_authData:
+        return &cms->d.authenticatedData->encapContentInfo->eContent;
+
+    case NID_id_smime_ct_compressedData:
+        return &cms->d.compressedData->encapContentInfo->eContent;
+
+    default:
+        if (cms->d.other->type == V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)
+            return &cms->d.other->value.octet_string;
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_GET0_CONTENT, CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_CONTENT_TYPE);
+        return NULL;
+
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return an ASN1_OBJECT pointer to content type. This allows it to be
+ * accessed or set later.
+ */
+
+static ASN1_OBJECT **cms_get0_econtent_type(CMS_ContentInfo *cms)
+{
+    switch (OBJ_obj2nid(cms->contentType)) {
+
+    case NID_pkcs7_signed:
+        return &cms->d.signedData->encapContentInfo->eContentType;
+
+    case NID_pkcs7_enveloped:
+        return &cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->contentType;
+
+    case NID_pkcs7_digest:
+        return &cms->d.digestedData->encapContentInfo->eContentType;
+
+    case NID_pkcs7_encrypted:
+        return &cms->d.encryptedData->encryptedContentInfo->contentType;
+
+    case NID_id_smime_ct_authData:
+        return &cms->d.authenticatedData->encapContentInfo->eContentType;
+
+    case NID_id_smime_ct_compressedData:
+        return &cms->d.compressedData->encapContentInfo->eContentType;
+
+    default:
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_GET0_ECONTENT_TYPE, CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_CONTENT_TYPE);
+        return NULL;
+
+    }
+}
+
+const ASN1_OBJECT *CMS_get0_eContentType(CMS_ContentInfo *cms)
+{
+    ASN1_OBJECT **petype;
+    petype = cms_get0_econtent_type(cms);
+    if (petype)
+        return *petype;
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+int CMS_set1_eContentType(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, const ASN1_OBJECT *oid)
+{
+    ASN1_OBJECT **petype, *etype;
+    petype = cms_get0_econtent_type(cms);
+    if (!petype)
+        return 0;
+    if (!oid)
+        return 1;
+    etype = OBJ_dup(oid);
+    if (!etype)
+        return 0;
+    ASN1_OBJECT_free(*petype);
+    *petype = etype;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int CMS_is_detached(CMS_ContentInfo *cms)
+{
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pos;
+    pos = CMS_get0_content(cms);
+    if (!pos)
+        return -1;
+    if (*pos)
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int CMS_set_detached(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, int detached)
+{
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pos;
+    pos = CMS_get0_content(cms);
+    if (!pos)
+        return 0;
+    if (detached) {
+        ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(*pos);
+        *pos = NULL;
+        return 1;
+    }
+    if (*pos == NULL)
+        *pos = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
+    if (*pos != NULL) {
+        /*
+         * NB: special flag to show content is created and not read in.
+         */
+        (*pos)->flags |= ASN1_STRING_FLAG_CONT;
+        return 1;
+    }
+    CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SET_DETACHED, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/* Create a digest BIO from an X509_ALGOR structure */
+
+BIO *cms_DigestAlgorithm_init_bio(X509_ALGOR *digestAlgorithm)
+{
+    BIO *mdbio = NULL;
+    const ASN1_OBJECT *digestoid;
+    const EVP_MD *digest;
+    X509_ALGOR_get0(&digestoid, NULL, NULL, digestAlgorithm);
+    digest = EVP_get_digestbyobj(digestoid);
+    if (!digest) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DIGESTALGORITHM_INIT_BIO,
+               CMS_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST_ALGORIHM);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    mdbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_md());
+    if (mdbio == NULL || !BIO_set_md(mdbio, digest)) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DIGESTALGORITHM_INIT_BIO, CMS_R_MD_BIO_INIT_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    return mdbio;
+ err:
+    BIO_free(mdbio);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+/* Locate a message digest content from a BIO chain based on SignerInfo */
+
+int cms_DigestAlgorithm_find_ctx(EVP_MD_CTX *mctx, BIO *chain,
+                                 X509_ALGOR *mdalg)
+{
+    int nid;
+    const ASN1_OBJECT *mdoid;
+    X509_ALGOR_get0(&mdoid, NULL, NULL, mdalg);
+    nid = OBJ_obj2nid(mdoid);
+    /* Look for digest type to match signature */
+    for (;;) {
+        EVP_MD_CTX *mtmp;
+        chain = BIO_find_type(chain, BIO_TYPE_MD);
+        if (chain == NULL) {
+            CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DIGESTALGORITHM_FIND_CTX,
+                   CMS_R_NO_MATCHING_DIGEST);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        BIO_get_md_ctx(chain, &mtmp);
+        if (EVP_MD_CTX_type(mtmp) == nid
+            /*
+             * Workaround for broken implementations that use signature
+             * algorithm OID instead of digest.
+             */
+            || EVP_MD_pkey_type(EVP_MD_CTX_md(mtmp)) == nid)
+            return EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(mctx, mtmp);
+        chain = BIO_next(chain);
+    }
+}
+
+static STACK_OF(CMS_CertificateChoices)
+**cms_get0_certificate_choices(CMS_ContentInfo *cms)
+{
+    switch (OBJ_obj2nid(cms->contentType)) {
+
+    case NID_pkcs7_signed:
+        return &cms->d.signedData->certificates;
+
+    case NID_pkcs7_enveloped:
+        if (cms->d.envelopedData->originatorInfo == NULL)
+            return NULL;
+        return &cms->d.envelopedData->originatorInfo->certificates;
+
+    default:
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_GET0_CERTIFICATE_CHOICES,
+               CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_CONTENT_TYPE);
+        return NULL;
+
+    }
+}
+
+CMS_CertificateChoices *CMS_add0_CertificateChoices(CMS_ContentInfo *cms)
+{
+    STACK_OF(CMS_CertificateChoices) **pcerts;
+    CMS_CertificateChoices *cch;
+    pcerts = cms_get0_certificate_choices(cms);
+    if (!pcerts)
+        return NULL;
+    if (!*pcerts)
+        *pcerts = sk_CMS_CertificateChoices_new_null();
+    if (!*pcerts)
+        return NULL;
+    cch = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_CertificateChoices);
+    if (!cch)
+        return NULL;
+    if (!sk_CMS_CertificateChoices_push(*pcerts, cch)) {
+        M_ASN1_free_of(cch, CMS_CertificateChoices);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    return cch;
+}
+
+int CMS_add0_cert(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, X509 *cert)
+{
+    CMS_CertificateChoices *cch;
+    STACK_OF(CMS_CertificateChoices) **pcerts;
+    int i;
+    pcerts = cms_get0_certificate_choices(cms);
+    if (!pcerts)
+        return 0;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_CertificateChoices_num(*pcerts); i++) {
+        cch = sk_CMS_CertificateChoices_value(*pcerts, i);
+        if (cch->type == CMS_CERTCHOICE_CERT) {
+            if (!X509_cmp(cch->d.certificate, cert)) {
+                CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_CERT,
+                       CMS_R_CERTIFICATE_ALREADY_PRESENT);
+                return 0;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    cch = CMS_add0_CertificateChoices(cms);
+    if (!cch)
+        return 0;
+    cch->type = CMS_CERTCHOICE_CERT;
+    cch->d.certificate = cert;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int CMS_add1_cert(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, X509 *cert)
+{
+    int r;
+    r = CMS_add0_cert(cms, cert);
+    if (r > 0)
+        X509_up_ref(cert);
+    return r;
+}
+
+static STACK_OF(CMS_RevocationInfoChoice)
+**cms_get0_revocation_choices(CMS_ContentInfo *cms)
+{
+    switch (OBJ_obj2nid(cms->contentType)) {
+
+    case NID_pkcs7_signed:
+        return &cms->d.signedData->crls;
+
+    case NID_pkcs7_enveloped:
+        if (cms->d.envelopedData->originatorInfo == NULL)
+            return NULL;
+        return &cms->d.envelopedData->originatorInfo->crls;
+
+    default:
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_GET0_REVOCATION_CHOICES,
+               CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_CONTENT_TYPE);
+        return NULL;
+
+    }
+}
+
+CMS_RevocationInfoChoice *CMS_add0_RevocationInfoChoice(CMS_ContentInfo *cms)
+{
+    STACK_OF(CMS_RevocationInfoChoice) **pcrls;
+    CMS_RevocationInfoChoice *rch;
+    pcrls = cms_get0_revocation_choices(cms);
+    if (!pcrls)
+        return NULL;
+    if (!*pcrls)
+        *pcrls = sk_CMS_RevocationInfoChoice_new_null();
+    if (!*pcrls)
+        return NULL;
+    rch = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_RevocationInfoChoice);
+    if (!rch)
+        return NULL;
+    if (!sk_CMS_RevocationInfoChoice_push(*pcrls, rch)) {
+        M_ASN1_free_of(rch, CMS_RevocationInfoChoice);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    return rch;
+}
+
+int CMS_add0_crl(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, X509_CRL *crl)
+{
+    CMS_RevocationInfoChoice *rch;
+    rch = CMS_add0_RevocationInfoChoice(cms);
+    if (!rch)
+        return 0;
+    rch->type = CMS_REVCHOICE_CRL;
+    rch->d.crl = crl;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int CMS_add1_crl(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, X509_CRL *crl)
+{
+    int r;
+    r = CMS_add0_crl(cms, crl);
+    if (r > 0)
+        X509_CRL_up_ref(crl);
+    return r;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509) *CMS_get1_certs(CMS_ContentInfo *cms)
+{
+    STACK_OF(X509) *certs = NULL;
+    CMS_CertificateChoices *cch;
+    STACK_OF(CMS_CertificateChoices) **pcerts;
+    int i;
+    pcerts = cms_get0_certificate_choices(cms);
+    if (!pcerts)
+        return NULL;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_CertificateChoices_num(*pcerts); i++) {
+        cch = sk_CMS_CertificateChoices_value(*pcerts, i);
+        if (cch->type == 0) {
+            if (!certs) {
+                certs = sk_X509_new_null();
+                if (!certs)
+                    return NULL;
+            }
+            if (!sk_X509_push(certs, cch->d.certificate)) {
+                sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
+                return NULL;
+            }
+            X509_up_ref(cch->d.certificate);
+        }
+    }
+    return certs;
+
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *CMS_get1_crls(CMS_ContentInfo *cms)
+{
+    STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(CMS_RevocationInfoChoice) **pcrls;
+    CMS_RevocationInfoChoice *rch;
+    int i;
+    pcrls = cms_get0_revocation_choices(cms);
+    if (!pcrls)
+        return NULL;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_RevocationInfoChoice_num(*pcrls); i++) {
+        rch = sk_CMS_RevocationInfoChoice_value(*pcrls, i);
+        if (rch->type == 0) {
+            if (!crls) {
+                crls = sk_X509_CRL_new_null();
+                if (!crls)
+                    return NULL;
+            }
+            if (!sk_X509_CRL_push(crls, rch->d.crl)) {
+                sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(crls, X509_CRL_free);
+                return NULL;
+            }
+            X509_CRL_up_ref(rch->d.crl);
+        }
+    }
+    return crls;
+}
+
+int cms_ias_cert_cmp(CMS_IssuerAndSerialNumber *ias, X509 *cert)
+{
+    int ret;
+    ret = X509_NAME_cmp(ias->issuer, X509_get_issuer_name(cert));
+    if (ret)
+        return ret;
+    return ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(ias->serialNumber, X509_get_serialNumber(cert));
+}
+
+int cms_keyid_cert_cmp(ASN1_OCTET_STRING *keyid, X509 *cert)
+{
+    const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *cert_keyid = X509_get0_subject_key_id(cert);
+
+    if (cert_keyid == NULL)
+        return -1;
+    return ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(keyid, cert_keyid);
+}
+
+int cms_set1_ias(CMS_IssuerAndSerialNumber **pias, X509 *cert)
+{
+    CMS_IssuerAndSerialNumber *ias;
+    ias = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_IssuerAndSerialNumber);
+    if (!ias)
+        goto err;
+    if (!X509_NAME_set(&ias->issuer, X509_get_issuer_name(cert)))
+        goto err;
+    if (!ASN1_STRING_copy(ias->serialNumber, X509_get_serialNumber(cert)))
+        goto err;
+    M_ASN1_free_of(*pias, CMS_IssuerAndSerialNumber);
+    *pias = ias;
+    return 1;
+ err:
+    M_ASN1_free_of(ias, CMS_IssuerAndSerialNumber);
+    CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SET1_IAS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int cms_set1_keyid(ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pkeyid, X509 *cert)
+{
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *keyid = NULL;
+    const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *cert_keyid;
+    cert_keyid = X509_get0_subject_key_id(cert);
+    if (cert_keyid == NULL) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SET1_KEYID, CMS_R_CERTIFICATE_HAS_NO_KEYID);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    keyid = ASN1_STRING_dup(cert_keyid);
+    if (!keyid) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SET1_KEYID, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(*pkeyid);
+    *pkeyid = keyid;
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0571bb8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c
@@ -0,0 +1,392 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2009-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/cms.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/aes.h>
+#include "cms_lcl.h"
+#include "internal/asn1_int.h"
+
+int CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_password(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
+                                    unsigned char *pass, ossl_ssize_t passlen)
+{
+    CMS_PasswordRecipientInfo *pwri;
+    if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_PASS) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_SET0_PASSWORD, CMS_R_NOT_PWRI);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    pwri = ri->d.pwri;
+    pwri->pass = pass;
+    if (pass && passlen < 0)
+        passlen = strlen((char *)pass);
+    pwri->passlen = passlen;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+CMS_RecipientInfo *CMS_add0_recipient_password(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
+                                               int iter, int wrap_nid,
+                                               int pbe_nid,
+                                               unsigned char *pass,
+                                               ossl_ssize_t passlen,
+                                               const EVP_CIPHER *kekciph)
+{
+    CMS_RecipientInfo *ri = NULL;
+    CMS_EnvelopedData *env;
+    CMS_PasswordRecipientInfo *pwri;
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+    X509_ALGOR *encalg = NULL;
+    unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+    int ivlen;
+
+    env = cms_get0_enveloped(cms);
+    if (!env)
+        return NULL;
+
+    if (wrap_nid <= 0)
+        wrap_nid = NID_id_alg_PWRI_KEK;
+
+    if (pbe_nid <= 0)
+        pbe_nid = NID_id_pbkdf2;
+
+    /* Get from enveloped data */
+    if (kekciph == NULL)
+        kekciph = env->encryptedContentInfo->cipher;
+
+    if (kekciph == NULL) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_PASSWORD, CMS_R_NO_CIPHER);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    if (wrap_nid != NID_id_alg_PWRI_KEK) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_PASSWORD,
+               CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    /* Setup algorithm identifier for cipher */
+    encalg = X509_ALGOR_new();
+    if (encalg == NULL) {
+        goto merr;
+    }
+    ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+
+    if (EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, kekciph, NULL, NULL, NULL) <= 0) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_PASSWORD, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
+
+    if (ivlen > 0) {
+        if (RAND_bytes(iv, ivlen) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+        if (EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv) <= 0) {
+            CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_PASSWORD, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        encalg->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new();
+        if (!encalg->parameter) {
+            CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_PASSWORD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (EVP_CIPHER_param_to_asn1(ctx, encalg->parameter) <= 0) {
+            CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_PASSWORD,
+                   CMS_R_CIPHER_PARAMETER_INITIALISATION_ERROR);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    encalg->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_type(ctx));
+
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
+    ctx = NULL;
+
+    /* Initialize recipient info */
+    ri = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_RecipientInfo);
+    if (ri == NULL)
+        goto merr;
+
+    ri->d.pwri = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_PasswordRecipientInfo);
+    if (ri->d.pwri == NULL)
+        goto merr;
+    ri->type = CMS_RECIPINFO_PASS;
+
+    pwri = ri->d.pwri;
+    /* Since this is overwritten, free up empty structure already there */
+    X509_ALGOR_free(pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm);
+    pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm = X509_ALGOR_new();
+    if (pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm == NULL)
+        goto merr;
+    pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(wrap_nid);
+    pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new();
+    if (pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm->parameter == NULL)
+        goto merr;
+
+    if (!ASN1_item_pack(encalg, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_ALGOR),
+                        &pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm->parameter->
+                        value.sequence))
+         goto merr;
+    pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm->parameter->type = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE;
+
+    X509_ALGOR_free(encalg);
+    encalg = NULL;
+
+    /* Setup PBE algorithm */
+
+    pwri->keyDerivationAlgorithm = PKCS5_pbkdf2_set(iter, NULL, 0, -1, -1);
+
+    if (!pwri->keyDerivationAlgorithm)
+        goto err;
+
+    CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_password(ri, pass, passlen);
+    pwri->version = 0;
+
+    if (!sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_push(env->recipientInfos, ri))
+        goto merr;
+
+    return ri;
+
+ merr:
+    CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_PASSWORD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ err:
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
+    if (ri)
+        M_ASN1_free_of(ri, CMS_RecipientInfo);
+    X509_ALGOR_free(encalg);
+    return NULL;
+
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is an implementation of the key wrapping mechanism in RFC3211, at
+ * some point this should go into EVP.
+ */
+
+static int kek_unwrap_key(unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
+                          const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen,
+                          EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    size_t blocklen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(ctx);
+    unsigned char *tmp;
+    int outl, rv = 0;
+    if (inlen < 2 * blocklen) {
+        /* too small */
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (inlen % blocklen) {
+        /* Invalid size */
+        return 0;
+    }
+    tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(inlen);
+    if (tmp == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    /* setup IV by decrypting last two blocks */
+    if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, tmp + inlen - 2 * blocklen, &outl,
+                           in + inlen - 2 * blocklen, blocklen * 2)
+        /*
+         * Do a decrypt of last decrypted block to set IV to correct value
+         * output it to start of buffer so we don't corrupt decrypted block
+         * this works because buffer is at least two block lengths long.
+         */
+        || !EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, tmp, &outl,
+                              tmp + inlen - blocklen, blocklen)
+        /* Can now decrypt first n - 1 blocks */
+        || !EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, tmp, &outl, in, inlen - blocklen)
+
+        /* Reset IV to original value */
+        || !EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)
+        /* Decrypt again */
+        || !EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, tmp, &outl, tmp, inlen))
+        goto err;
+    /* Check check bytes */
+    if (((tmp[1] ^ tmp[4]) & (tmp[2] ^ tmp[5]) & (tmp[3] ^ tmp[6])) != 0xff) {
+        /* Check byte failure */
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (inlen < (size_t)(tmp[0] - 4)) {
+        /* Invalid length value */
+        goto err;
+    }
+    *outlen = (size_t)tmp[0];
+    memcpy(out, tmp + 4, *outlen);
+    rv = 1;
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(tmp, inlen);
+    return rv;
+
+}
+
+static int kek_wrap_key(unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
+                        const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen,
+                        EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    size_t blocklen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(ctx);
+    size_t olen;
+    int dummy;
+    /*
+     * First decide length of output buffer: need header and round up to
+     * multiple of block length.
+     */
+    olen = (inlen + 4 + blocklen - 1) / blocklen;
+    olen *= blocklen;
+    if (olen < 2 * blocklen) {
+        /* Key too small */
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (inlen > 0xFF) {
+        /* Key too large */
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (out) {
+        /* Set header */
+        out[0] = (unsigned char)inlen;
+        out[1] = in[0] ^ 0xFF;
+        out[2] = in[1] ^ 0xFF;
+        out[3] = in[2] ^ 0xFF;
+        memcpy(out + 4, in, inlen);
+        /* Add random padding to end */
+        if (olen > inlen + 4
+            && RAND_bytes(out + 4 + inlen, olen - 4 - inlen) <= 0)
+            return 0;
+        /* Encrypt twice */
+        if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, out, &dummy, out, olen)
+            || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, out, &dummy, out, olen))
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    *outlen = olen;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Encrypt/Decrypt content key in PWRI recipient info */
+
+int cms_RecipientInfo_pwri_crypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
+                                 int en_de)
+{
+    CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec;
+    CMS_PasswordRecipientInfo *pwri;
+    int r = 0;
+    X509_ALGOR *algtmp, *kekalg = NULL;
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *kekctx = NULL;
+    const EVP_CIPHER *kekcipher;
+    unsigned char *key = NULL;
+    size_t keylen;
+
+    ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo;
+
+    pwri = ri->d.pwri;
+
+    if (!pwri->pass) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_PWRI_CRYPT, CMS_R_NO_PASSWORD);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    algtmp = pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm;
+
+    if (!algtmp || OBJ_obj2nid(algtmp->algorithm) != NID_id_alg_PWRI_KEK) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_PWRI_CRYPT,
+               CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    kekalg = ASN1_TYPE_unpack_sequence(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_ALGOR),
+                                       algtmp->parameter);
+
+    if (kekalg == NULL) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_PWRI_CRYPT,
+               CMS_R_INVALID_KEY_ENCRYPTION_PARAMETER);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    kekcipher = EVP_get_cipherbyobj(kekalg->algorithm);
+
+    if (!kekcipher) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_PWRI_CRYPT, CMS_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    kekctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+    if (kekctx == NULL) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_PWRI_CRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    /* Fixup cipher based on AlgorithmIdentifier to set IV etc */
+    if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(kekctx, kekcipher, NULL, NULL, NULL, en_de))
+        goto err;
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(kekctx, 0);
+    if (EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param(kekctx, kekalg->parameter) < 0) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_PWRI_CRYPT,
+               CMS_R_CIPHER_PARAMETER_INITIALISATION_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    algtmp = pwri->keyDerivationAlgorithm;
+
+    /* Finish password based key derivation to setup key in "ctx" */
+
+    if (EVP_PBE_CipherInit(algtmp->algorithm,
+                           (char *)pwri->pass, pwri->passlen,
+                           algtmp->parameter, kekctx, en_de) < 0) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_PWRI_CRYPT, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* Finally wrap/unwrap the key */
+
+    if (en_de) {
+
+        if (!kek_wrap_key(NULL, &keylen, ec->key, ec->keylen, kekctx))
+            goto err;
+
+        key = OPENSSL_malloc(keylen);
+
+        if (key == NULL)
+            goto err;
+
+        if (!kek_wrap_key(key, &keylen, ec->key, ec->keylen, kekctx))
+            goto err;
+        pwri->encryptedKey->data = key;
+        pwri->encryptedKey->length = keylen;
+    } else {
+        key = OPENSSL_malloc(pwri->encryptedKey->length);
+
+        if (key == NULL) {
+            CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_PWRI_CRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (!kek_unwrap_key(key, &keylen,
+                            pwri->encryptedKey->data,
+                            pwri->encryptedKey->length, kekctx)) {
+            CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_PWRI_CRYPT, CMS_R_UNWRAP_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        ec->key = key;
+        ec->keylen = keylen;
+
+    }
+
+    r = 1;
+
+ err:
+
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(kekctx);
+
+    if (!r)
+        OPENSSL_free(key);
+    X509_ALGOR_free(kekalg);
+
+    return r;
+
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cms/cms_sd.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cms/cms_sd.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4108fe7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cms/cms_sd.c
@@ -0,0 +1,925 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/cms.h>
+#include "cms_lcl.h"
+#include "internal/asn1_int.h"
+#include "internal/evp_int.h"
+
+/* CMS SignedData Utilities */
+
+static CMS_SignedData *cms_get0_signed(CMS_ContentInfo *cms)
+{
+    if (OBJ_obj2nid(cms->contentType) != NID_pkcs7_signed) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_GET0_SIGNED, CMS_R_CONTENT_TYPE_NOT_SIGNED_DATA);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    return cms->d.signedData;
+}
+
+static CMS_SignedData *cms_signed_data_init(CMS_ContentInfo *cms)
+{
+    if (cms->d.other == NULL) {
+        cms->d.signedData = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_SignedData);
+        if (!cms->d.signedData) {
+            CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SIGNED_DATA_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+        cms->d.signedData->version = 1;
+        cms->d.signedData->encapContentInfo->eContentType =
+            OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs7_data);
+        cms->d.signedData->encapContentInfo->partial = 1;
+        ASN1_OBJECT_free(cms->contentType);
+        cms->contentType = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs7_signed);
+        return cms->d.signedData;
+    }
+    return cms_get0_signed(cms);
+}
+
+/* Just initialise SignedData e.g. for certs only structure */
+
+int CMS_SignedData_init(CMS_ContentInfo *cms)
+{
+    if (cms_signed_data_init(cms))
+        return 1;
+    else
+        return 0;
+}
+
+/* Check structures and fixup version numbers (if necessary) */
+
+static void cms_sd_set_version(CMS_SignedData *sd)
+{
+    int i;
+    CMS_CertificateChoices *cch;
+    CMS_RevocationInfoChoice *rch;
+    CMS_SignerInfo *si;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_CertificateChoices_num(sd->certificates); i++) {
+        cch = sk_CMS_CertificateChoices_value(sd->certificates, i);
+        if (cch->type == CMS_CERTCHOICE_OTHER) {
+            if (sd->version < 5)
+                sd->version = 5;
+        } else if (cch->type == CMS_CERTCHOICE_V2ACERT) {
+            if (sd->version < 4)
+                sd->version = 4;
+        } else if (cch->type == CMS_CERTCHOICE_V1ACERT) {
+            if (sd->version < 3)
+                sd->version = 3;
+        }
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_RevocationInfoChoice_num(sd->crls); i++) {
+        rch = sk_CMS_RevocationInfoChoice_value(sd->crls, i);
+        if (rch->type == CMS_REVCHOICE_OTHER) {
+            if (sd->version < 5)
+                sd->version = 5;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if ((OBJ_obj2nid(sd->encapContentInfo->eContentType) != NID_pkcs7_data)
+        && (sd->version < 3))
+        sd->version = 3;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_SignerInfo_num(sd->signerInfos); i++) {
+        si = sk_CMS_SignerInfo_value(sd->signerInfos, i);
+        if (si->sid->type == CMS_SIGNERINFO_KEYIDENTIFIER) {
+            if (si->version < 3)
+                si->version = 3;
+            if (sd->version < 3)
+                sd->version = 3;
+        } else if (si->version < 1)
+            si->version = 1;
+    }
+
+    if (sd->version < 1)
+        sd->version = 1;
+
+}
+
+/* Copy an existing messageDigest value */
+
+static int cms_copy_messageDigest(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, CMS_SignerInfo *si)
+{
+    STACK_OF(CMS_SignerInfo) *sinfos;
+    CMS_SignerInfo *sitmp;
+    int i;
+    sinfos = CMS_get0_SignerInfos(cms);
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_SignerInfo_num(sinfos); i++) {
+        ASN1_OCTET_STRING *messageDigest;
+        sitmp = sk_CMS_SignerInfo_value(sinfos, i);
+        if (sitmp == si)
+            continue;
+        if (CMS_signed_get_attr_count(sitmp) < 0)
+            continue;
+        if (OBJ_cmp(si->digestAlgorithm->algorithm,
+                    sitmp->digestAlgorithm->algorithm))
+            continue;
+        messageDigest = CMS_signed_get0_data_by_OBJ(sitmp,
+                                                    OBJ_nid2obj
+                                                    (NID_pkcs9_messageDigest),
+                                                    -3, V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
+        if (!messageDigest) {
+            CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_COPY_MESSAGEDIGEST,
+                   CMS_R_ERROR_READING_MESSAGEDIGEST_ATTRIBUTE);
+            return 0;
+        }
+
+        if (CMS_signed_add1_attr_by_NID(si, NID_pkcs9_messageDigest,
+                                        V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+                                        messageDigest, -1))
+            return 1;
+        else
+            return 0;
+    }
+    CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_COPY_MESSAGEDIGEST, CMS_R_NO_MATCHING_DIGEST);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int cms_set1_SignerIdentifier(CMS_SignerIdentifier *sid, X509 *cert, int type)
+{
+    switch (type) {
+    case CMS_SIGNERINFO_ISSUER_SERIAL:
+        if (!cms_set1_ias(&sid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber, cert))
+            return 0;
+        break;
+
+    case CMS_SIGNERINFO_KEYIDENTIFIER:
+        if (!cms_set1_keyid(&sid->d.subjectKeyIdentifier, cert))
+            return 0;
+        break;
+
+    default:
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SET1_SIGNERIDENTIFIER, CMS_R_UNKNOWN_ID);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    sid->type = type;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int cms_SignerIdentifier_get0_signer_id(CMS_SignerIdentifier *sid,
+                                        ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid,
+                                        X509_NAME **issuer,
+                                        ASN1_INTEGER **sno)
+{
+    if (sid->type == CMS_SIGNERINFO_ISSUER_SERIAL) {
+        if (issuer)
+            *issuer = sid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->issuer;
+        if (sno)
+            *sno = sid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->serialNumber;
+    } else if (sid->type == CMS_SIGNERINFO_KEYIDENTIFIER) {
+        if (keyid)
+            *keyid = sid->d.subjectKeyIdentifier;
+    } else
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int cms_SignerIdentifier_cert_cmp(CMS_SignerIdentifier *sid, X509 *cert)
+{
+    if (sid->type == CMS_SIGNERINFO_ISSUER_SERIAL)
+        return cms_ias_cert_cmp(sid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber, cert);
+    else if (sid->type == CMS_SIGNERINFO_KEYIDENTIFIER)
+        return cms_keyid_cert_cmp(sid->d.subjectKeyIdentifier, cert);
+    else
+        return -1;
+}
+
+static int cms_sd_asn1_ctrl(CMS_SignerInfo *si, int cmd)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey = si->pkey;
+    int i;
+    if (!pkey->ameth || !pkey->ameth->pkey_ctrl)
+        return 1;
+    i = pkey->ameth->pkey_ctrl(pkey, ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_SIGN, cmd, si);
+    if (i == -2) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SD_ASN1_CTRL, CMS_R_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEY_TYPE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (i <= 0) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SD_ASN1_CTRL, CMS_R_CTRL_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+CMS_SignerInfo *CMS_add1_signer(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
+                                X509 *signer, EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md,
+                                unsigned int flags)
+{
+    CMS_SignedData *sd;
+    CMS_SignerInfo *si = NULL;
+    X509_ALGOR *alg;
+    int i, type;
+    if (!X509_check_private_key(signer, pk)) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD1_SIGNER,
+               CMS_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DOES_NOT_MATCH_CERTIFICATE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    sd = cms_signed_data_init(cms);
+    if (!sd)
+        goto err;
+    si = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_SignerInfo);
+    if (!si)
+        goto merr;
+    /* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */
+    X509_check_purpose(signer, -1, -1);
+
+    X509_up_ref(signer);
+    EVP_PKEY_up_ref(pk);
+
+    si->pkey = pk;
+    si->signer = signer;
+    si->mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+    si->pctx = NULL;
+
+    if (si->mctx == NULL) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD1_SIGNER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (flags & CMS_USE_KEYID) {
+        si->version = 3;
+        if (sd->version < 3)
+            sd->version = 3;
+        type = CMS_SIGNERINFO_KEYIDENTIFIER;
+    } else {
+        type = CMS_SIGNERINFO_ISSUER_SERIAL;
+        si->version = 1;
+    }
+
+    if (!cms_set1_SignerIdentifier(si->sid, signer, type))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (md == NULL) {
+        int def_nid;
+        if (EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid(pk, &def_nid) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+        md = EVP_get_digestbynid(def_nid);
+        if (md == NULL) {
+            CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD1_SIGNER, CMS_R_NO_DEFAULT_DIGEST);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (!md) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD1_SIGNER, CMS_R_NO_DIGEST_SET);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    X509_ALGOR_set_md(si->digestAlgorithm, md);
+
+    /* See if digest is present in digestAlgorithms */
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_ALGOR_num(sd->digestAlgorithms); i++) {
+        const ASN1_OBJECT *aoid;
+        alg = sk_X509_ALGOR_value(sd->digestAlgorithms, i);
+        X509_ALGOR_get0(&aoid, NULL, NULL, alg);
+        if (OBJ_obj2nid(aoid) == EVP_MD_type(md))
+            break;
+    }
+
+    if (i == sk_X509_ALGOR_num(sd->digestAlgorithms)) {
+        alg = X509_ALGOR_new();
+        if (alg == NULL)
+            goto merr;
+        X509_ALGOR_set_md(alg, md);
+        if (!sk_X509_ALGOR_push(sd->digestAlgorithms, alg)) {
+            X509_ALGOR_free(alg);
+            goto merr;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (!(flags & CMS_KEY_PARAM) && !cms_sd_asn1_ctrl(si, 0))
+        goto err;
+    if (!(flags & CMS_NOATTR)) {
+        /*
+         * Initialize signed attributes structure so other attributes
+         * such as signing time etc are added later even if we add none here.
+         */
+        if (!si->signedAttrs) {
+            si->signedAttrs = sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_new_null();
+            if (!si->signedAttrs)
+                goto merr;
+        }
+
+        if (!(flags & CMS_NOSMIMECAP)) {
+            STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) *smcap = NULL;
+            i = CMS_add_standard_smimecap(&smcap);
+            if (i)
+                i = CMS_add_smimecap(si, smcap);
+            sk_X509_ALGOR_pop_free(smcap, X509_ALGOR_free);
+            if (!i)
+                goto merr;
+        }
+        if (flags & CMS_REUSE_DIGEST) {
+            if (!cms_copy_messageDigest(cms, si))
+                goto err;
+            if (!(flags & (CMS_PARTIAL | CMS_KEY_PARAM)) &&
+                !CMS_SignerInfo_sign(si))
+                goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (!(flags & CMS_NOCERTS)) {
+        /* NB ignore -1 return for duplicate cert */
+        if (!CMS_add1_cert(cms, signer))
+            goto merr;
+    }
+
+    if (flags & CMS_KEY_PARAM) {
+        if (flags & CMS_NOATTR) {
+            si->pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(si->pkey, NULL);
+            if (si->pctx == NULL)
+                goto err;
+            if (EVP_PKEY_sign_init(si->pctx) <= 0)
+                goto err;
+            if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(si->pctx, md) <= 0)
+                goto err;
+        } else if (EVP_DigestSignInit(si->mctx, &si->pctx, md, NULL, pk) <=
+                   0)
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!sd->signerInfos)
+        sd->signerInfos = sk_CMS_SignerInfo_new_null();
+    if (!sd->signerInfos || !sk_CMS_SignerInfo_push(sd->signerInfos, si))
+        goto merr;
+
+    return si;
+
+ merr:
+    CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD1_SIGNER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ err:
+    M_ASN1_free_of(si, CMS_SignerInfo);
+    return NULL;
+
+}
+
+static int cms_add1_signingTime(CMS_SignerInfo *si, ASN1_TIME *t)
+{
+    ASN1_TIME *tt;
+    int r = 0;
+    if (t)
+        tt = t;
+    else
+        tt = X509_gmtime_adj(NULL, 0);
+
+    if (!tt)
+        goto merr;
+
+    if (CMS_signed_add1_attr_by_NID(si, NID_pkcs9_signingTime,
+                                    tt->type, tt, -1) <= 0)
+        goto merr;
+
+    r = 1;
+
+ merr:
+
+    if (!t)
+        ASN1_TIME_free(tt);
+
+    if (!r)
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD1_SIGNINGTIME, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+
+    return r;
+
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY_CTX *CMS_SignerInfo_get0_pkey_ctx(CMS_SignerInfo *si)
+{
+    return si->pctx;
+}
+
+EVP_MD_CTX *CMS_SignerInfo_get0_md_ctx(CMS_SignerInfo *si)
+{
+    return si->mctx;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(CMS_SignerInfo) *CMS_get0_SignerInfos(CMS_ContentInfo *cms)
+{
+    CMS_SignedData *sd;
+    sd = cms_get0_signed(cms);
+    if (!sd)
+        return NULL;
+    return sd->signerInfos;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509) *CMS_get0_signers(CMS_ContentInfo *cms)
+{
+    STACK_OF(X509) *signers = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(CMS_SignerInfo) *sinfos;
+    CMS_SignerInfo *si;
+    int i;
+    sinfos = CMS_get0_SignerInfos(cms);
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_SignerInfo_num(sinfos); i++) {
+        si = sk_CMS_SignerInfo_value(sinfos, i);
+        if (si->signer) {
+            if (!signers) {
+                signers = sk_X509_new_null();
+                if (!signers)
+                    return NULL;
+            }
+            if (!sk_X509_push(signers, si->signer)) {
+                sk_X509_free(signers);
+                return NULL;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    return signers;
+}
+
+void CMS_SignerInfo_set1_signer_cert(CMS_SignerInfo *si, X509 *signer)
+{
+    if (signer) {
+        X509_up_ref(signer);
+        EVP_PKEY_free(si->pkey);
+        si->pkey = X509_get_pubkey(signer);
+    }
+    X509_free(si->signer);
+    si->signer = signer;
+}
+
+int CMS_SignerInfo_get0_signer_id(CMS_SignerInfo *si,
+                                  ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid,
+                                  X509_NAME **issuer, ASN1_INTEGER **sno)
+{
+    return cms_SignerIdentifier_get0_signer_id(si->sid, keyid, issuer, sno);
+}
+
+int CMS_SignerInfo_cert_cmp(CMS_SignerInfo *si, X509 *cert)
+{
+    return cms_SignerIdentifier_cert_cmp(si->sid, cert);
+}
+
+int CMS_set1_signers_certs(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, STACK_OF(X509) *scerts,
+                           unsigned int flags)
+{
+    CMS_SignedData *sd;
+    CMS_SignerInfo *si;
+    CMS_CertificateChoices *cch;
+    STACK_OF(CMS_CertificateChoices) *certs;
+    X509 *x;
+    int i, j;
+    int ret = 0;
+    sd = cms_get0_signed(cms);
+    if (!sd)
+        return -1;
+    certs = sd->certificates;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_SignerInfo_num(sd->signerInfos); i++) {
+        si = sk_CMS_SignerInfo_value(sd->signerInfos, i);
+        if (si->signer)
+            continue;
+
+        for (j = 0; j < sk_X509_num(scerts); j++) {
+            x = sk_X509_value(scerts, j);
+            if (CMS_SignerInfo_cert_cmp(si, x) == 0) {
+                CMS_SignerInfo_set1_signer_cert(si, x);
+                ret++;
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+
+        if (si->signer || (flags & CMS_NOINTERN))
+            continue;
+
+        for (j = 0; j < sk_CMS_CertificateChoices_num(certs); j++) {
+            cch = sk_CMS_CertificateChoices_value(certs, j);
+            if (cch->type != 0)
+                continue;
+            x = cch->d.certificate;
+            if (CMS_SignerInfo_cert_cmp(si, x) == 0) {
+                CMS_SignerInfo_set1_signer_cert(si, x);
+                ret++;
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+void CMS_SignerInfo_get0_algs(CMS_SignerInfo *si, EVP_PKEY **pk,
+                              X509 **signer, X509_ALGOR **pdig,
+                              X509_ALGOR **psig)
+{
+    if (pk)
+        *pk = si->pkey;
+    if (signer)
+        *signer = si->signer;
+    if (pdig)
+        *pdig = si->digestAlgorithm;
+    if (psig)
+        *psig = si->signatureAlgorithm;
+}
+
+ASN1_OCTET_STRING *CMS_SignerInfo_get0_signature(CMS_SignerInfo *si)
+{
+    return si->signature;
+}
+
+static int cms_SignerInfo_content_sign(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
+                                       CMS_SignerInfo *si, BIO *chain)
+{
+    EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+    int r = 0;
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
+
+    if (mctx == NULL) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SIGNERINFO_CONTENT_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (!si->pkey) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SIGNERINFO_CONTENT_SIGN, CMS_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!cms_DigestAlgorithm_find_ctx(mctx, chain, si->digestAlgorithm))
+        goto err;
+    /* Set SignerInfo algorithm details if we used custom parameter */
+    if (si->pctx && !cms_sd_asn1_ctrl(si, 0))
+        goto err;
+
+    /*
+     * If any signed attributes calculate and add messageDigest attribute
+     */
+
+    if (CMS_signed_get_attr_count(si) >= 0) {
+        ASN1_OBJECT *ctype =
+            cms->d.signedData->encapContentInfo->eContentType;
+        unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+        unsigned int mdlen;
+        if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mctx, md, &mdlen))
+            goto err;
+        if (!CMS_signed_add1_attr_by_NID(si, NID_pkcs9_messageDigest,
+                                         V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, md, mdlen))
+            goto err;
+        /* Copy content type across */
+        if (CMS_signed_add1_attr_by_NID(si, NID_pkcs9_contentType,
+                                        V_ASN1_OBJECT, ctype, -1) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+        if (!CMS_SignerInfo_sign(si))
+            goto err;
+    } else if (si->pctx) {
+        unsigned char *sig;
+        size_t siglen;
+        unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+        unsigned int mdlen;
+        pctx = si->pctx;
+        if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mctx, md, &mdlen))
+            goto err;
+        siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(si->pkey);
+        sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen);
+        if (sig == NULL) {
+            CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SIGNERINFO_CONTENT_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (EVP_PKEY_sign(pctx, sig, &siglen, md, mdlen) <= 0) {
+            OPENSSL_free(sig);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        ASN1_STRING_set0(si->signature, sig, siglen);
+    } else {
+        unsigned char *sig;
+        unsigned int siglen;
+        sig = OPENSSL_malloc(EVP_PKEY_size(si->pkey));
+        if (sig == NULL) {
+            CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SIGNERINFO_CONTENT_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (!EVP_SignFinal(mctx, sig, &siglen, si->pkey)) {
+            CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SIGNERINFO_CONTENT_SIGN, CMS_R_SIGNFINAL_ERROR);
+            OPENSSL_free(sig);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        ASN1_STRING_set0(si->signature, sig, siglen);
+    }
+
+    r = 1;
+
+ err:
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+    return r;
+
+}
+
+int cms_SignedData_final(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, BIO *chain)
+{
+    STACK_OF(CMS_SignerInfo) *sinfos;
+    CMS_SignerInfo *si;
+    int i;
+    sinfos = CMS_get0_SignerInfos(cms);
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_SignerInfo_num(sinfos); i++) {
+        si = sk_CMS_SignerInfo_value(sinfos, i);
+        if (!cms_SignerInfo_content_sign(cms, si, chain))
+            return 0;
+    }
+    cms->d.signedData->encapContentInfo->partial = 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int CMS_SignerInfo_sign(CMS_SignerInfo *si)
+{
+    EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = si->mctx;
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx;
+    unsigned char *abuf = NULL;
+    int alen;
+    size_t siglen;
+    const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
+
+    md = EVP_get_digestbyobj(si->digestAlgorithm->algorithm);
+    if (md == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    if (CMS_signed_get_attr_by_NID(si, NID_pkcs9_signingTime, -1) < 0) {
+        if (!cms_add1_signingTime(si, NULL))
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (si->pctx)
+        pctx = si->pctx;
+    else {
+        EVP_MD_CTX_reset(mctx);
+        if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, si->pkey) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN,
+                          EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_SIGN, 0, si) <= 0) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SIGNERINFO_SIGN, CMS_R_CTRL_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    alen = ASN1_item_i2d((ASN1_VALUE *)si->signedAttrs, &abuf,
+                         ASN1_ITEM_rptr(CMS_Attributes_Sign));
+    if (!abuf)
+        goto err;
+    if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx, abuf, alen) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    if (EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, NULL, &siglen) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    OPENSSL_free(abuf);
+    abuf = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen);
+    if (abuf == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, abuf, &siglen) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN,
+                          EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_SIGN, 1, si) <= 0) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SIGNERINFO_SIGN, CMS_R_CTRL_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    EVP_MD_CTX_reset(mctx);
+
+    ASN1_STRING_set0(si->signature, abuf, siglen);
+
+    return 1;
+
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_free(abuf);
+    EVP_MD_CTX_reset(mctx);
+    return 0;
+
+}
+
+int CMS_SignerInfo_verify(CMS_SignerInfo *si)
+{
+    EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL;
+    unsigned char *abuf = NULL;
+    int alen, r = -1;
+    const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
+
+    if (!si->pkey) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SIGNERINFO_VERIFY, CMS_R_NO_PUBLIC_KEY);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    md = EVP_get_digestbyobj(si->digestAlgorithm->algorithm);
+    if (md == NULL)
+        return -1;
+    if (si->mctx == NULL && (si->mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SIGNERINFO_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return -1;
+    }
+    mctx = si->mctx;
+    if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, &si->pctx, md, NULL, si->pkey) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!cms_sd_asn1_ctrl(si, 1))
+        goto err;
+
+    alen = ASN1_item_i2d((ASN1_VALUE *)si->signedAttrs, &abuf,
+                         ASN1_ITEM_rptr(CMS_Attributes_Verify));
+    if (!abuf)
+        goto err;
+    r = EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(mctx, abuf, alen);
+    OPENSSL_free(abuf);
+    if (r <= 0) {
+        r = -1;
+        goto err;
+    }
+    r = EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mctx,
+                              si->signature->data, si->signature->length);
+    if (r <= 0)
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SIGNERINFO_VERIFY, CMS_R_VERIFICATION_FAILURE);
+ err:
+    EVP_MD_CTX_reset(mctx);
+    return r;
+}
+
+/* Create a chain of digest BIOs from a CMS ContentInfo */
+
+BIO *cms_SignedData_init_bio(CMS_ContentInfo *cms)
+{
+    int i;
+    CMS_SignedData *sd;
+    BIO *chain = NULL;
+    sd = cms_get0_signed(cms);
+    if (!sd)
+        return NULL;
+    if (cms->d.signedData->encapContentInfo->partial)
+        cms_sd_set_version(sd);
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_ALGOR_num(sd->digestAlgorithms); i++) {
+        X509_ALGOR *digestAlgorithm;
+        BIO *mdbio;
+        digestAlgorithm = sk_X509_ALGOR_value(sd->digestAlgorithms, i);
+        mdbio = cms_DigestAlgorithm_init_bio(digestAlgorithm);
+        if (!mdbio)
+            goto err;
+        if (chain)
+            BIO_push(chain, mdbio);
+        else
+            chain = mdbio;
+    }
+    return chain;
+ err:
+    BIO_free_all(chain);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+int CMS_SignerInfo_verify_content(CMS_SignerInfo *si, BIO *chain)
+{
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os = NULL;
+    EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx = NULL;
+    int r = -1;
+    unsigned char mval[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+    unsigned int mlen;
+
+    if (mctx == NULL) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SIGNERINFO_VERIFY_CONTENT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    /* If we have any signed attributes look for messageDigest value */
+    if (CMS_signed_get_attr_count(si) >= 0) {
+        os = CMS_signed_get0_data_by_OBJ(si,
+                                         OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs9_messageDigest),
+                                         -3, V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
+        if (!os) {
+            CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SIGNERINFO_VERIFY_CONTENT,
+                   CMS_R_ERROR_READING_MESSAGEDIGEST_ATTRIBUTE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (!cms_DigestAlgorithm_find_ctx(mctx, chain, si->digestAlgorithm))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mctx, mval, &mlen) <= 0) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SIGNERINFO_VERIFY_CONTENT,
+               CMS_R_UNABLE_TO_FINALIZE_CONTEXT);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* If messageDigest found compare it */
+
+    if (os) {
+        if (mlen != (unsigned int)os->length) {
+            CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SIGNERINFO_VERIFY_CONTENT,
+                   CMS_R_MESSAGEDIGEST_ATTRIBUTE_WRONG_LENGTH);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        if (memcmp(mval, os->data, mlen)) {
+            CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SIGNERINFO_VERIFY_CONTENT,
+                   CMS_R_VERIFICATION_FAILURE);
+            r = 0;
+        } else
+            r = 1;
+    } else {
+        const EVP_MD *md = EVP_MD_CTX_md(mctx);
+        pkctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(si->pkey, NULL);
+        if (pkctx == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        if (EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pkctx) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+        if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pkctx, md) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+        si->pctx = pkctx;
+        if (!cms_sd_asn1_ctrl(si, 1))
+            goto err;
+        r = EVP_PKEY_verify(pkctx, si->signature->data,
+                            si->signature->length, mval, mlen);
+        if (r <= 0) {
+            CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SIGNERINFO_VERIFY_CONTENT,
+                   CMS_R_VERIFICATION_FAILURE);
+            r = 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+ err:
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkctx);
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
+    return r;
+
+}
+
+int CMS_add_smimecap(CMS_SignerInfo *si, STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) *algs)
+{
+    unsigned char *smder = NULL;
+    int smderlen, r;
+    smderlen = i2d_X509_ALGORS(algs, &smder);
+    if (smderlen <= 0)
+        return 0;
+    r = CMS_signed_add1_attr_by_NID(si, NID_SMIMECapabilities,
+                                    V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, smder, smderlen);
+    OPENSSL_free(smder);
+    return r;
+}
+
+int CMS_add_simple_smimecap(STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) **algs,
+                            int algnid, int keysize)
+{
+    X509_ALGOR *alg;
+    ASN1_INTEGER *key = NULL;
+    if (keysize > 0) {
+        key = ASN1_INTEGER_new();
+        if (key == NULL || !ASN1_INTEGER_set(key, keysize))
+            return 0;
+    }
+    alg = X509_ALGOR_new();
+    if (alg == NULL) {
+        ASN1_INTEGER_free(key);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    X509_ALGOR_set0(alg, OBJ_nid2obj(algnid),
+                    key ? V_ASN1_INTEGER : V_ASN1_UNDEF, key);
+    if (*algs == NULL)
+        *algs = sk_X509_ALGOR_new_null();
+    if (*algs == NULL || !sk_X509_ALGOR_push(*algs, alg)) {
+        X509_ALGOR_free(alg);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Check to see if a cipher exists and if so add S/MIME capabilities */
+
+static int cms_add_cipher_smcap(STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) **sk, int nid, int arg)
+{
+    if (EVP_get_cipherbynid(nid))
+        return CMS_add_simple_smimecap(sk, nid, arg);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int cms_add_digest_smcap(STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) **sk, int nid, int arg)
+{
+    if (EVP_get_digestbynid(nid))
+        return CMS_add_simple_smimecap(sk, nid, arg);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int CMS_add_standard_smimecap(STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) **smcap)
+{
+    if (!cms_add_cipher_smcap(smcap, NID_aes_256_cbc, -1)
+        || !cms_add_digest_smcap(smcap, NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, -1)
+        || !cms_add_digest_smcap(smcap, NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, -1)
+        || !cms_add_digest_smcap(smcap, NID_id_GostR3411_94, -1)
+        || !cms_add_cipher_smcap(smcap, NID_id_Gost28147_89, -1)
+        || !cms_add_cipher_smcap(smcap, NID_aes_192_cbc, -1)
+        || !cms_add_cipher_smcap(smcap, NID_aes_128_cbc, -1)
+        || !cms_add_cipher_smcap(smcap, NID_des_ede3_cbc, -1)
+        || !cms_add_cipher_smcap(smcap, NID_rc2_cbc, 128)
+        || !cms_add_cipher_smcap(smcap, NID_rc2_cbc, 64)
+        || !cms_add_cipher_smcap(smcap, NID_des_cbc, -1)
+        || !cms_add_cipher_smcap(smcap, NID_rc2_cbc, 40))
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7e7b6e5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c
@@ -0,0 +1,842 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/cms.h>
+#include "cms_lcl.h"
+#include "internal/asn1_int.h"
+
+static BIO *cms_get_text_bio(BIO *out, unsigned int flags)
+{
+    BIO *rbio;
+    if (out == NULL)
+        rbio = BIO_new(BIO_s_null());
+    else if (flags & CMS_TEXT) {
+        rbio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+        BIO_set_mem_eof_return(rbio, 0);
+    } else
+        rbio = out;
+    return rbio;
+}
+
+static int cms_copy_content(BIO *out, BIO *in, unsigned int flags)
+{
+    unsigned char buf[4096];
+    int r = 0, i;
+    BIO *tmpout;
+
+    tmpout = cms_get_text_bio(out, flags);
+
+    if (tmpout == NULL) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_COPY_CONTENT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* Read all content through chain to process digest, decrypt etc */
+    for (;;) {
+        i = BIO_read(in, buf, sizeof(buf));
+        if (i <= 0) {
+            if (BIO_method_type(in) == BIO_TYPE_CIPHER) {
+                if (!BIO_get_cipher_status(in))
+                    goto err;
+            }
+            if (i < 0)
+                goto err;
+            break;
+        }
+
+        if (tmpout && (BIO_write(tmpout, buf, i) != i))
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (flags & CMS_TEXT) {
+        if (!SMIME_text(tmpout, out)) {
+            CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_COPY_CONTENT, CMS_R_SMIME_TEXT_ERROR);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    r = 1;
+
+ err:
+    if (tmpout != out)
+        BIO_free(tmpout);
+    return r;
+
+}
+
+static int check_content(CMS_ContentInfo *cms)
+{
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pos = CMS_get0_content(cms);
+    if (!pos || !*pos) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CHECK_CONTENT, CMS_R_NO_CONTENT);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static void do_free_upto(BIO *f, BIO *upto)
+{
+    if (upto) {
+        BIO *tbio;
+        do {
+            tbio = BIO_pop(f);
+            BIO_free(f);
+            f = tbio;
+        }
+        while (f && f != upto);
+    } else
+        BIO_free_all(f);
+}
+
+int CMS_data(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, BIO *out, unsigned int flags)
+{
+    BIO *cont;
+    int r;
+    if (OBJ_obj2nid(CMS_get0_type(cms)) != NID_pkcs7_data) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DATA, CMS_R_TYPE_NOT_DATA);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    cont = CMS_dataInit(cms, NULL);
+    if (!cont)
+        return 0;
+    r = cms_copy_content(out, cont, flags);
+    BIO_free_all(cont);
+    return r;
+}
+
+CMS_ContentInfo *CMS_data_create(BIO *in, unsigned int flags)
+{
+    CMS_ContentInfo *cms;
+    cms = cms_Data_create();
+    if (!cms)
+        return NULL;
+
+    if ((flags & CMS_STREAM) || CMS_final(cms, in, NULL, flags))
+        return cms;
+
+    CMS_ContentInfo_free(cms);
+
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+int CMS_digest_verify(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, BIO *dcont, BIO *out,
+                      unsigned int flags)
+{
+    BIO *cont;
+    int r;
+    if (OBJ_obj2nid(CMS_get0_type(cms)) != NID_pkcs7_digest) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DIGEST_VERIFY, CMS_R_TYPE_NOT_DIGESTED_DATA);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (!dcont && !check_content(cms))
+        return 0;
+
+    cont = CMS_dataInit(cms, dcont);
+    if (!cont)
+        return 0;
+    r = cms_copy_content(out, cont, flags);
+    if (r)
+        r = cms_DigestedData_do_final(cms, cont, 1);
+    do_free_upto(cont, dcont);
+    return r;
+}
+
+CMS_ContentInfo *CMS_digest_create(BIO *in, const EVP_MD *md,
+                                   unsigned int flags)
+{
+    CMS_ContentInfo *cms;
+    if (!md)
+        md = EVP_sha1();
+    cms = cms_DigestedData_create(md);
+    if (!cms)
+        return NULL;
+
+    if (!(flags & CMS_DETACHED))
+        CMS_set_detached(cms, 0);
+
+    if ((flags & CMS_STREAM) || CMS_final(cms, in, NULL, flags))
+        return cms;
+
+    CMS_ContentInfo_free(cms);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+int CMS_EncryptedData_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
+                              const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
+                              BIO *dcont, BIO *out, unsigned int flags)
+{
+    BIO *cont;
+    int r;
+    if (OBJ_obj2nid(CMS_get0_type(cms)) != NID_pkcs7_encrypted) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDDATA_DECRYPT,
+               CMS_R_TYPE_NOT_ENCRYPTED_DATA);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (!dcont && !check_content(cms))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (CMS_EncryptedData_set1_key(cms, NULL, key, keylen) <= 0)
+        return 0;
+    cont = CMS_dataInit(cms, dcont);
+    if (!cont)
+        return 0;
+    r = cms_copy_content(out, cont, flags);
+    do_free_upto(cont, dcont);
+    return r;
+}
+
+CMS_ContentInfo *CMS_EncryptedData_encrypt(BIO *in, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
+                                           const unsigned char *key,
+                                           size_t keylen, unsigned int flags)
+{
+    CMS_ContentInfo *cms;
+    if (!cipher) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDDATA_ENCRYPT, CMS_R_NO_CIPHER);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    cms = CMS_ContentInfo_new();
+    if (cms == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    if (!CMS_EncryptedData_set1_key(cms, cipher, key, keylen))
+        return NULL;
+
+    if (!(flags & CMS_DETACHED))
+        CMS_set_detached(cms, 0);
+
+    if ((flags & (CMS_STREAM | CMS_PARTIAL))
+        || CMS_final(cms, in, NULL, flags))
+        return cms;
+
+    CMS_ContentInfo_free(cms);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+static int cms_signerinfo_verify_cert(CMS_SignerInfo *si,
+                                      X509_STORE *store,
+                                      STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
+                                      STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
+{
+    X509_STORE_CTX *ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
+    X509 *signer;
+    int i, j, r = 0;
+
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SIGNERINFO_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    CMS_SignerInfo_get0_algs(si, NULL, &signer, NULL, NULL);
+    if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, store, signer, certs)) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SIGNERINFO_VERIFY_CERT, CMS_R_STORE_INIT_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(ctx, "smime_sign");
+    if (crls)
+        X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(ctx, crls);
+
+    i = X509_verify_cert(ctx);
+    if (i <= 0) {
+        j = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SIGNERINFO_VERIFY_CERT,
+               CMS_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR);
+        ERR_add_error_data(2, "Verify error:",
+                           X509_verify_cert_error_string(j));
+        goto err;
+    }
+    r = 1;
+ err:
+    X509_STORE_CTX_free(ctx);
+    return r;
+
+}
+
+int CMS_verify(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
+               X509_STORE *store, BIO *dcont, BIO *out, unsigned int flags)
+{
+    CMS_SignerInfo *si;
+    STACK_OF(CMS_SignerInfo) *sinfos;
+    STACK_OF(X509) *cms_certs = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls = NULL;
+    X509 *signer;
+    int i, scount = 0, ret = 0;
+    BIO *cmsbio = NULL, *tmpin = NULL, *tmpout = NULL;
+
+    if (!dcont && !check_content(cms))
+        return 0;
+    if (dcont && !(flags & CMS_BINARY)) {
+        const ASN1_OBJECT *coid = CMS_get0_eContentType(cms);
+        if (OBJ_obj2nid(coid) == NID_id_ct_asciiTextWithCRLF)
+            flags |= CMS_ASCIICRLF;
+    }
+
+    /* Attempt to find all signer certificates */
+
+    sinfos = CMS_get0_SignerInfos(cms);
+
+    if (sk_CMS_SignerInfo_num(sinfos) <= 0) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_VERIFY, CMS_R_NO_SIGNERS);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_SignerInfo_num(sinfos); i++) {
+        si = sk_CMS_SignerInfo_value(sinfos, i);
+        CMS_SignerInfo_get0_algs(si, NULL, &signer, NULL, NULL);
+        if (signer)
+            scount++;
+    }
+
+    if (scount != sk_CMS_SignerInfo_num(sinfos))
+        scount += CMS_set1_signers_certs(cms, certs, flags);
+
+    if (scount != sk_CMS_SignerInfo_num(sinfos)) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_VERIFY, CMS_R_SIGNER_CERTIFICATE_NOT_FOUND);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* Attempt to verify all signers certs */
+
+    if (!(flags & CMS_NO_SIGNER_CERT_VERIFY)) {
+        cms_certs = CMS_get1_certs(cms);
+        if (!(flags & CMS_NOCRL))
+            crls = CMS_get1_crls(cms);
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_SignerInfo_num(sinfos); i++) {
+            si = sk_CMS_SignerInfo_value(sinfos, i);
+            if (!cms_signerinfo_verify_cert(si, store, cms_certs, crls))
+                goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* Attempt to verify all SignerInfo signed attribute signatures */
+
+    if (!(flags & CMS_NO_ATTR_VERIFY)) {
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_SignerInfo_num(sinfos); i++) {
+            si = sk_CMS_SignerInfo_value(sinfos, i);
+            if (CMS_signed_get_attr_count(si) < 0)
+                continue;
+            if (CMS_SignerInfo_verify(si) <= 0)
+                goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Performance optimization: if the content is a memory BIO then store
+     * its contents in a temporary read only memory BIO. This avoids
+     * potentially large numbers of slow copies of data which will occur when
+     * reading from a read write memory BIO when signatures are calculated.
+     */
+
+    if (dcont && (BIO_method_type(dcont) == BIO_TYPE_MEM)) {
+        char *ptr;
+        long len;
+        len = BIO_get_mem_data(dcont, &ptr);
+        tmpin = BIO_new_mem_buf(ptr, len);
+        if (tmpin == NULL) {
+            CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err2;
+        }
+    } else
+        tmpin = dcont;
+    /*
+     * If not binary mode and detached generate digests by *writing* through
+     * the BIO. That makes it possible to canonicalise the input.
+     */
+    if (!(flags & SMIME_BINARY) && dcont) {
+        /*
+         * Create output BIO so we can either handle text or to ensure
+         * included content doesn't override detached content.
+         */
+        tmpout = cms_get_text_bio(out, flags);
+        if (!tmpout) {
+            CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        cmsbio = CMS_dataInit(cms, tmpout);
+        if (!cmsbio)
+            goto err;
+        /*
+         * Don't use SMIME_TEXT for verify: it adds headers and we want to
+         * remove them.
+         */
+        SMIME_crlf_copy(dcont, cmsbio, flags & ~SMIME_TEXT);
+
+        if (flags & CMS_TEXT) {
+            if (!SMIME_text(tmpout, out)) {
+                CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_VERIFY, CMS_R_SMIME_TEXT_ERROR);
+                goto err;
+            }
+        }
+    } else {
+        cmsbio = CMS_dataInit(cms, tmpin);
+        if (!cmsbio)
+            goto err;
+
+        if (!cms_copy_content(out, cmsbio, flags))
+            goto err;
+
+    }
+    if (!(flags & CMS_NO_CONTENT_VERIFY)) {
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_SignerInfo_num(sinfos); i++) {
+            si = sk_CMS_SignerInfo_value(sinfos, i);
+            if (CMS_SignerInfo_verify_content(si, cmsbio) <= 0) {
+                CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_VERIFY, CMS_R_CONTENT_VERIFY_ERROR);
+                goto err;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+    if (!(flags & SMIME_BINARY) && dcont) {
+        do_free_upto(cmsbio, tmpout);
+        if (tmpin != dcont)
+            BIO_free(tmpin);
+    } else {
+        if (dcont && (tmpin == dcont))
+            do_free_upto(cmsbio, dcont);
+        else
+            BIO_free_all(cmsbio);
+    }
+
+    if (out != tmpout)
+        BIO_free_all(tmpout);
+
+ err2:
+    sk_X509_pop_free(cms_certs, X509_free);
+    sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(crls, X509_CRL_free);
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int CMS_verify_receipt(CMS_ContentInfo *rcms, CMS_ContentInfo *ocms,
+                       STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
+                       X509_STORE *store, unsigned int flags)
+{
+    int r;
+    flags &= ~(CMS_DETACHED | CMS_TEXT);
+    r = CMS_verify(rcms, certs, store, NULL, NULL, flags);
+    if (r <= 0)
+        return r;
+    return cms_Receipt_verify(rcms, ocms);
+}
+
+CMS_ContentInfo *CMS_sign(X509 *signcert, EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+                          STACK_OF(X509) *certs, BIO *data,
+                          unsigned int flags)
+{
+    CMS_ContentInfo *cms;
+    int i;
+
+    cms = CMS_ContentInfo_new();
+    if (cms == NULL || !CMS_SignedData_init(cms))
+        goto merr;
+    if (flags & CMS_ASCIICRLF
+        && !CMS_set1_eContentType(cms,
+                                  OBJ_nid2obj(NID_id_ct_asciiTextWithCRLF)))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (pkey && !CMS_add1_signer(cms, signcert, pkey, NULL, flags)) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SIGN, CMS_R_ADD_SIGNER_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
+        X509 *x = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
+        if (!CMS_add1_cert(cms, x))
+            goto merr;
+    }
+
+    if (!(flags & CMS_DETACHED))
+        CMS_set_detached(cms, 0);
+
+    if ((flags & (CMS_STREAM | CMS_PARTIAL))
+        || CMS_final(cms, data, NULL, flags))
+        return cms;
+    else
+        goto err;
+
+ merr:
+    CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+
+ err:
+    CMS_ContentInfo_free(cms);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+CMS_ContentInfo *CMS_sign_receipt(CMS_SignerInfo *si,
+                                  X509 *signcert, EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+                                  STACK_OF(X509) *certs, unsigned int flags)
+{
+    CMS_SignerInfo *rct_si;
+    CMS_ContentInfo *cms = NULL;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pos, *os;
+    BIO *rct_cont = NULL;
+    int r = 0;
+
+    flags &= ~(CMS_STREAM | CMS_TEXT);
+    /* Not really detached but avoids content being allocated */
+    flags |= CMS_PARTIAL | CMS_BINARY | CMS_DETACHED;
+    if (!pkey || !signcert) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SIGN_RECEIPT, CMS_R_NO_KEY_OR_CERT);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    /* Initialize signed data */
+
+    cms = CMS_sign(NULL, NULL, certs, NULL, flags);
+    if (!cms)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* Set inner content type to signed receipt */
+    if (!CMS_set1_eContentType(cms, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_id_smime_ct_receipt)))
+        goto err;
+
+    rct_si = CMS_add1_signer(cms, signcert, pkey, NULL, flags);
+    if (!rct_si) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SIGN_RECEIPT, CMS_R_ADD_SIGNER_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    os = cms_encode_Receipt(si);
+
+    if (!os)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* Set content to digest */
+    rct_cont = BIO_new_mem_buf(os->data, os->length);
+    if (!rct_cont)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* Add msgSigDigest attribute */
+
+    if (!cms_msgSigDigest_add1(rct_si, si))
+        goto err;
+
+    /* Finalize structure */
+    if (!CMS_final(cms, rct_cont, NULL, flags))
+        goto err;
+
+    /* Set embedded content */
+    pos = CMS_get0_content(cms);
+    *pos = os;
+
+    r = 1;
+
+ err:
+    BIO_free(rct_cont);
+    if (r)
+        return cms;
+    CMS_ContentInfo_free(cms);
+    return NULL;
+
+}
+
+CMS_ContentInfo *CMS_encrypt(STACK_OF(X509) *certs, BIO *data,
+                             const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, unsigned int flags)
+{
+    CMS_ContentInfo *cms;
+    int i;
+    X509 *recip;
+    cms = CMS_EnvelopedData_create(cipher);
+    if (!cms)
+        goto merr;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
+        recip = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
+        if (!CMS_add1_recipient_cert(cms, recip, flags)) {
+            CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPT, CMS_R_RECIPIENT_ERROR);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (!(flags & CMS_DETACHED))
+        CMS_set_detached(cms, 0);
+
+    if ((flags & (CMS_STREAM | CMS_PARTIAL))
+        || CMS_final(cms, data, NULL, flags))
+        return cms;
+    else
+        goto err;
+
+ merr:
+    CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ err:
+    CMS_ContentInfo_free(cms);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+static int cms_kari_set1_pkey(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
+                              EVP_PKEY *pk, X509 *cert)
+{
+    int i;
+    STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey) *reks;
+    CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek;
+    reks = CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_reks(ri);
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_num(reks); i++) {
+        int rv;
+        rek = sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_value(reks, i);
+        if (cert != NULL && CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_cert_cmp(rek, cert))
+            continue;
+        CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_set0_pkey(ri, pk);
+        rv = CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_decrypt(cms, ri, rek);
+        CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_set0_pkey(ri, NULL);
+        if (rv > 0)
+            return 1;
+        return cert == NULL ? 0 : -1;
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, EVP_PKEY *pk, X509 *cert)
+{
+    STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientInfo) *ris;
+    CMS_RecipientInfo *ri;
+    int i, r, ri_type;
+    int debug = 0, match_ri = 0;
+    ris = CMS_get0_RecipientInfos(cms);
+    if (ris)
+        debug = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->debug;
+    ri_type = cms_pkey_get_ri_type(pk);
+    if (ri_type == CMS_RECIPINFO_NONE) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DECRYPT_SET1_PKEY,
+               CMS_R_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEY_TYPE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_num(ris); i++) {
+        ri = sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_value(ris, i);
+        if (CMS_RecipientInfo_type(ri) != ri_type)
+            continue;
+        match_ri = 1;
+        if (ri_type == CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) {
+            r = cms_kari_set1_pkey(cms, ri, pk, cert);
+            if (r > 0)
+                return 1;
+            if (r < 0)
+                return 0;
+        }
+        /*
+         * If we have a cert try matching RecipientInfo otherwise try them
+         * all.
+         */
+        else if (!cert || !CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_cert_cmp(ri, cert)) {
+            CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_pkey(ri, pk);
+            r = CMS_RecipientInfo_decrypt(cms, ri);
+            CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_pkey(ri, NULL);
+            if (cert) {
+                /*
+                 * If not debugging clear any error and return success to
+                 * avoid leaking of information useful to MMA
+                 */
+                if (!debug) {
+                    ERR_clear_error();
+                    return 1;
+                }
+                if (r > 0)
+                    return 1;
+                CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DECRYPT_SET1_PKEY, CMS_R_DECRYPT_ERROR);
+                return 0;
+            }
+            /*
+             * If no cert and not debugging don't leave loop after first
+             * successful decrypt. Always attempt to decrypt all recipients
+             * to avoid leaking timing of a successful decrypt.
+             */
+            else if (r > 0 && debug)
+                return 1;
+        }
+    }
+    /* If no cert, key transport and not debugging always return success */
+    if (cert == NULL && ri_type == CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS && match_ri && !debug) {
+        ERR_clear_error();
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DECRYPT_SET1_PKEY, CMS_R_NO_MATCHING_RECIPIENT);
+    return 0;
+
+}
+
+int CMS_decrypt_set1_key(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
+                         unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
+                         const unsigned char *id, size_t idlen)
+{
+    STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientInfo) *ris;
+    CMS_RecipientInfo *ri;
+    int i, r;
+    ris = CMS_get0_RecipientInfos(cms);
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_num(ris); i++) {
+        ri = sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_value(ris, i);
+        if (CMS_RecipientInfo_type(ri) != CMS_RECIPINFO_KEK)
+            continue;
+
+        /*
+         * If we have an id try matching RecipientInfo otherwise try them
+         * all.
+         */
+        if (!id || (CMS_RecipientInfo_kekri_id_cmp(ri, id, idlen) == 0)) {
+            CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_key(ri, key, keylen);
+            r = CMS_RecipientInfo_decrypt(cms, ri);
+            CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_key(ri, NULL, 0);
+            if (r > 0)
+                return 1;
+            if (id) {
+                CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DECRYPT_SET1_KEY, CMS_R_DECRYPT_ERROR);
+                return 0;
+            }
+            ERR_clear_error();
+        }
+    }
+
+    CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DECRYPT_SET1_KEY, CMS_R_NO_MATCHING_RECIPIENT);
+    return 0;
+
+}
+
+int CMS_decrypt_set1_password(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
+                              unsigned char *pass, ossl_ssize_t passlen)
+{
+    STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientInfo) *ris;
+    CMS_RecipientInfo *ri;
+    int i, r;
+    ris = CMS_get0_RecipientInfos(cms);
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_num(ris); i++) {
+        ri = sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_value(ris, i);
+        if (CMS_RecipientInfo_type(ri) != CMS_RECIPINFO_PASS)
+            continue;
+        CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_password(ri, pass, passlen);
+        r = CMS_RecipientInfo_decrypt(cms, ri);
+        CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_password(ri, NULL, 0);
+        if (r > 0)
+            return 1;
+    }
+
+    CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DECRYPT_SET1_PASSWORD, CMS_R_NO_MATCHING_RECIPIENT);
+    return 0;
+
+}
+
+int CMS_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, EVP_PKEY *pk, X509 *cert,
+                BIO *dcont, BIO *out, unsigned int flags)
+{
+    int r;
+    BIO *cont;
+    if (OBJ_obj2nid(CMS_get0_type(cms)) != NID_pkcs7_enveloped) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DECRYPT, CMS_R_TYPE_NOT_ENVELOPED_DATA);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (!dcont && !check_content(cms))
+        return 0;
+    if (flags & CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT)
+        cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->debug = 1;
+    else
+        cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->debug = 0;
+    if (!pk && !cert && !dcont && !out)
+        return 1;
+    if (pk && !CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey(cms, pk, cert))
+        return 0;
+    cont = CMS_dataInit(cms, dcont);
+    if (!cont)
+        return 0;
+    r = cms_copy_content(out, cont, flags);
+    do_free_upto(cont, dcont);
+    return r;
+}
+
+int CMS_final(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, BIO *data, BIO *dcont, unsigned int flags)
+{
+    BIO *cmsbio;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    if ((cmsbio = CMS_dataInit(cms, dcont)) == NULL) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_FINAL, CMS_R_CMS_LIB);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    SMIME_crlf_copy(data, cmsbio, flags);
+
+    (void)BIO_flush(cmsbio);
+
+    if (!CMS_dataFinal(cms, cmsbio)) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_FINAL, CMS_R_CMS_DATAFINAL_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+    do_free_upto(cmsbio, dcont);
+
+    return ret;
+
+}
+
+#ifdef ZLIB
+
+int CMS_uncompress(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, BIO *dcont, BIO *out,
+                   unsigned int flags)
+{
+    BIO *cont;
+    int r;
+    if (OBJ_obj2nid(CMS_get0_type(cms)) != NID_id_smime_ct_compressedData) {
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_UNCOMPRESS, CMS_R_TYPE_NOT_COMPRESSED_DATA);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (!dcont && !check_content(cms))
+        return 0;
+
+    cont = CMS_dataInit(cms, dcont);
+    if (!cont)
+        return 0;
+    r = cms_copy_content(out, cont, flags);
+    do_free_upto(cont, dcont);
+    return r;
+}
+
+CMS_ContentInfo *CMS_compress(BIO *in, int comp_nid, unsigned int flags)
+{
+    CMS_ContentInfo *cms;
+    if (comp_nid <= 0)
+        comp_nid = NID_zlib_compression;
+    cms = cms_CompressedData_create(comp_nid);
+    if (!cms)
+        return NULL;
+
+    if (!(flags & CMS_DETACHED))
+        CMS_set_detached(cms, 0);
+
+    if ((flags & CMS_STREAM) || CMS_final(cms, in, NULL, flags))
+        return cms;
+
+    CMS_ContentInfo_free(cms);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+#else
+
+int CMS_uncompress(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, BIO *dcont, BIO *out,
+                   unsigned int flags)
+{
+    CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_UNCOMPRESS, CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+CMS_ContentInfo *CMS_compress(BIO *in, int comp_nid, unsigned int flags)
+{
+    CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_COMPRESS, CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/comp/build.info b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/comp/build.info
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..65df46a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/comp/build.info
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+LIBS=../../libcrypto
+SOURCE[../../libcrypto]= \
+        comp_lib.c comp_err.c \
+        c_zlib.c
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/comp/c_zlib.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/comp/c_zlib.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..821dc09
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/comp/c_zlib.c
@@ -0,0 +1,615 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1998-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include "internal/comp.h"
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib_int.h"
+#include "internal/bio.h"
+#include "comp_lcl.h"
+
+COMP_METHOD *COMP_zlib(void);
+
+static COMP_METHOD zlib_method_nozlib = {
+    NID_undef,
+    "(undef)",
+    NULL,
+    NULL,
+    NULL,
+    NULL,
+};
+
+#ifndef ZLIB
+# undef ZLIB_SHARED
+#else
+
+# include <zlib.h>
+
+static int zlib_stateful_init(COMP_CTX *ctx);
+static void zlib_stateful_finish(COMP_CTX *ctx);
+static int zlib_stateful_compress_block(COMP_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                                        unsigned int olen, unsigned char *in,
+                                        unsigned int ilen);
+static int zlib_stateful_expand_block(COMP_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                                      unsigned int olen, unsigned char *in,
+                                      unsigned int ilen);
+
+/* memory allocations functions for zlib initialisation */
+static void *zlib_zalloc(void *opaque, unsigned int no, unsigned int size)
+{
+    void *p;
+
+    p = OPENSSL_zalloc(no * size);
+    return p;
+}
+
+static void zlib_zfree(void *opaque, void *address)
+{
+    OPENSSL_free(address);
+}
+
+
+static COMP_METHOD zlib_stateful_method = {
+    NID_zlib_compression,
+    LN_zlib_compression,
+    zlib_stateful_init,
+    zlib_stateful_finish,
+    zlib_stateful_compress_block,
+    zlib_stateful_expand_block
+};
+
+/*
+ * When OpenSSL is built on Windows, we do not want to require that
+ * the ZLIB.DLL be available in order for the OpenSSL DLLs to
+ * work.  Therefore, all ZLIB routines are loaded at run time
+ * and we do not link to a .LIB file when ZLIB_SHARED is set.
+ */
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32)
+#  include <windows.h>
+# endif                         /* !(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS ||
+                                 * OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) */
+
+# ifdef ZLIB_SHARED
+#  include "internal/dso.h"
+
+/* Function pointers */
+typedef int (*compress_ft) (Bytef *dest, uLongf * destLen,
+                            const Bytef *source, uLong sourceLen);
+typedef int (*inflateEnd_ft) (z_streamp strm);
+typedef int (*inflate_ft) (z_streamp strm, int flush);
+typedef int (*inflateInit__ft) (z_streamp strm,
+                                const char *version, int stream_size);
+typedef int (*deflateEnd_ft) (z_streamp strm);
+typedef int (*deflate_ft) (z_streamp strm, int flush);
+typedef int (*deflateInit__ft) (z_streamp strm, int level,
+                                const char *version, int stream_size);
+typedef const char *(*zError__ft) (int err);
+static compress_ft p_compress = NULL;
+static inflateEnd_ft p_inflateEnd = NULL;
+static inflate_ft p_inflate = NULL;
+static inflateInit__ft p_inflateInit_ = NULL;
+static deflateEnd_ft p_deflateEnd = NULL;
+static deflate_ft p_deflate = NULL;
+static deflateInit__ft p_deflateInit_ = NULL;
+static zError__ft p_zError = NULL;
+
+static int zlib_loaded = 0;     /* only attempt to init func pts once */
+static DSO *zlib_dso = NULL;
+
+#  define compress                p_compress
+#  define inflateEnd              p_inflateEnd
+#  define inflate                 p_inflate
+#  define inflateInit_            p_inflateInit_
+#  define deflateEnd              p_deflateEnd
+#  define deflate                 p_deflate
+#  define deflateInit_            p_deflateInit_
+#  define zError                  p_zError
+# endif                         /* ZLIB_SHARED */
+
+struct zlib_state {
+    z_stream istream;
+    z_stream ostream;
+};
+
+static int zlib_stateful_init(COMP_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int err;
+    struct zlib_state *state = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*state));
+
+    if (state == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    state->istream.zalloc = zlib_zalloc;
+    state->istream.zfree = zlib_zfree;
+    state->istream.opaque = Z_NULL;
+    state->istream.next_in = Z_NULL;
+    state->istream.next_out = Z_NULL;
+    err = inflateInit_(&state->istream, ZLIB_VERSION, sizeof(z_stream));
+    if (err != Z_OK)
+        goto err;
+
+    state->ostream.zalloc = zlib_zalloc;
+    state->ostream.zfree = zlib_zfree;
+    state->ostream.opaque = Z_NULL;
+    state->ostream.next_in = Z_NULL;
+    state->ostream.next_out = Z_NULL;
+    err = deflateInit_(&state->ostream, Z_DEFAULT_COMPRESSION,
+                       ZLIB_VERSION, sizeof(z_stream));
+    if (err != Z_OK)
+        goto err;
+
+    ctx->data = state;
+    return 1;
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_free(state);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static void zlib_stateful_finish(COMP_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    struct zlib_state *state = ctx->data;
+    inflateEnd(&state->istream);
+    deflateEnd(&state->ostream);
+    OPENSSL_free(state);
+}
+
+static int zlib_stateful_compress_block(COMP_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                                        unsigned int olen, unsigned char *in,
+                                        unsigned int ilen)
+{
+    int err = Z_OK;
+    struct zlib_state *state = ctx->data;
+
+    if (state == NULL)
+        return -1;
+
+    state->ostream.next_in = in;
+    state->ostream.avail_in = ilen;
+    state->ostream.next_out = out;
+    state->ostream.avail_out = olen;
+    if (ilen > 0)
+        err = deflate(&state->ostream, Z_SYNC_FLUSH);
+    if (err != Z_OK)
+        return -1;
+    return olen - state->ostream.avail_out;
+}
+
+static int zlib_stateful_expand_block(COMP_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                                      unsigned int olen, unsigned char *in,
+                                      unsigned int ilen)
+{
+    int err = Z_OK;
+    struct zlib_state *state = ctx->data;
+
+    if (state == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    state->istream.next_in = in;
+    state->istream.avail_in = ilen;
+    state->istream.next_out = out;
+    state->istream.avail_out = olen;
+    if (ilen > 0)
+        err = inflate(&state->istream, Z_SYNC_FLUSH);
+    if (err != Z_OK)
+        return -1;
+    return olen - state->istream.avail_out;
+}
+
+#endif
+
+COMP_METHOD *COMP_zlib(void)
+{
+    COMP_METHOD *meth = &zlib_method_nozlib;
+
+#ifdef ZLIB_SHARED
+    /* LIBZ may be externally defined, and we should respect that value */
+# ifndef LIBZ
+#  if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32)
+#   define LIBZ "ZLIB1"
+#  elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
+#   define LIBZ "LIBZ"
+#  else
+#   define LIBZ "z"
+#  endif
+# endif
+
+    if (!zlib_loaded) {
+        zlib_dso = DSO_load(NULL, LIBZ, NULL, 0);
+        if (zlib_dso != NULL) {
+            p_compress = (compress_ft) DSO_bind_func(zlib_dso, "compress");
+            p_inflateEnd
+                = (inflateEnd_ft) DSO_bind_func(zlib_dso, "inflateEnd");
+            p_inflate = (inflate_ft) DSO_bind_func(zlib_dso, "inflate");
+            p_inflateInit_
+                = (inflateInit__ft) DSO_bind_func(zlib_dso, "inflateInit_");
+            p_deflateEnd
+                = (deflateEnd_ft) DSO_bind_func(zlib_dso, "deflateEnd");
+            p_deflate = (deflate_ft) DSO_bind_func(zlib_dso, "deflate");
+            p_deflateInit_
+                = (deflateInit__ft) DSO_bind_func(zlib_dso, "deflateInit_");
+            p_zError = (zError__ft) DSO_bind_func(zlib_dso, "zError");
+
+            if (p_compress && p_inflateEnd && p_inflate
+                && p_inflateInit_ && p_deflateEnd
+                && p_deflate && p_deflateInit_ && p_zError)
+                zlib_loaded++;
+
+            if (!OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_ZLIB, NULL)) {
+                comp_zlib_cleanup_int();
+                return meth;
+            }
+            if (zlib_loaded)
+                meth = &zlib_stateful_method;
+        }
+    }
+#endif
+#if defined(ZLIB)
+    meth = &zlib_stateful_method;
+#endif
+
+    return (meth);
+}
+
+void comp_zlib_cleanup_int(void)
+{
+#ifdef ZLIB_SHARED
+    if (zlib_dso != NULL)
+        DSO_free(zlib_dso);
+    zlib_dso = NULL;
+#endif
+}
+
+#ifdef ZLIB
+
+/* Zlib based compression/decompression filter BIO */
+
+typedef struct {
+    unsigned char *ibuf;        /* Input buffer */
+    int ibufsize;               /* Buffer size */
+    z_stream zin;               /* Input decompress context */
+    unsigned char *obuf;        /* Output buffer */
+    int obufsize;               /* Output buffer size */
+    unsigned char *optr;        /* Position in output buffer */
+    int ocount;                 /* Amount of data in output buffer */
+    int odone;                  /* deflate EOF */
+    int comp_level;             /* Compression level to use */
+    z_stream zout;              /* Output compression context */
+} BIO_ZLIB_CTX;
+
+# define ZLIB_DEFAULT_BUFSIZE 1024
+
+static int bio_zlib_new(BIO *bi);
+static int bio_zlib_free(BIO *bi);
+static int bio_zlib_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl);
+static int bio_zlib_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl);
+static long bio_zlib_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr);
+static long bio_zlib_callback_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, BIO_info_cb *fp);
+
+static const BIO_METHOD bio_meth_zlib = {
+    BIO_TYPE_COMP,
+    "zlib",
+    bio_zlib_write,
+    bio_zlib_read,
+    NULL,                      /* bio_zlib_puts, */
+    NULL,                      /* bio_zlib_gets, */
+    bio_zlib_ctrl,
+    bio_zlib_new,
+    bio_zlib_free,
+    bio_zlib_callback_ctrl
+};
+
+const BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_zlib(void)
+{
+    return &bio_meth_zlib;
+}
+
+static int bio_zlib_new(BIO *bi)
+{
+    BIO_ZLIB_CTX *ctx;
+# ifdef ZLIB_SHARED
+    (void)COMP_zlib();
+    if (!zlib_loaded) {
+        COMPerr(COMP_F_BIO_ZLIB_NEW, COMP_R_ZLIB_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+# endif
+    ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx));
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+        COMPerr(COMP_F_BIO_ZLIB_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    ctx->ibufsize = ZLIB_DEFAULT_BUFSIZE;
+    ctx->obufsize = ZLIB_DEFAULT_BUFSIZE;
+    ctx->zin.zalloc = Z_NULL;
+    ctx->zin.zfree = Z_NULL;
+    ctx->zout.zalloc = Z_NULL;
+    ctx->zout.zfree = Z_NULL;
+    ctx->comp_level = Z_DEFAULT_COMPRESSION;
+    BIO_set_init(bi, 1);
+    BIO_set_data(bi, ctx);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int bio_zlib_free(BIO *bi)
+{
+    BIO_ZLIB_CTX *ctx;
+    if (!bi)
+        return 0;
+    ctx = BIO_get_data(bi);
+    if (ctx->ibuf) {
+        /* Destroy decompress context */
+        inflateEnd(&ctx->zin);
+        OPENSSL_free(ctx->ibuf);
+    }
+    if (ctx->obuf) {
+        /* Destroy compress context */
+        deflateEnd(&ctx->zout);
+        OPENSSL_free(ctx->obuf);
+    }
+    OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+    BIO_set_data(bi, NULL);
+    BIO_set_init(bi, 0);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int bio_zlib_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
+{
+    BIO_ZLIB_CTX *ctx;
+    int ret;
+    z_stream *zin;
+    BIO *next = BIO_next(b);
+
+    if (!out || !outl)
+        return 0;
+    ctx = BIO_get_data(b);
+    zin = &ctx->zin;
+    BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+    if (!ctx->ibuf) {
+        ctx->ibuf = OPENSSL_malloc(ctx->ibufsize);
+        if (ctx->ibuf == NULL) {
+            COMPerr(COMP_F_BIO_ZLIB_READ, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        inflateInit(zin);
+        zin->next_in = ctx->ibuf;
+        zin->avail_in = 0;
+    }
+
+    /* Copy output data directly to supplied buffer */
+    zin->next_out = (unsigned char *)out;
+    zin->avail_out = (unsigned int)outl;
+    for (;;) {
+        /* Decompress while data available */
+        while (zin->avail_in) {
+            ret = inflate(zin, 0);
+            if ((ret != Z_OK) && (ret != Z_STREAM_END)) {
+                COMPerr(COMP_F_BIO_ZLIB_READ, COMP_R_ZLIB_INFLATE_ERROR);
+                ERR_add_error_data(2, "zlib error:", zError(ret));
+                return 0;
+            }
+            /* If EOF or we've read everything then return */
+            if ((ret == Z_STREAM_END) || !zin->avail_out)
+                return outl - zin->avail_out;
+        }
+
+        /*
+         * No data in input buffer try to read some in, if an error then
+         * return the total data read.
+         */
+        ret = BIO_read(next, ctx->ibuf, ctx->ibufsize);
+        if (ret <= 0) {
+            /* Total data read */
+            int tot = outl - zin->avail_out;
+            BIO_copy_next_retry(b);
+            if (ret < 0)
+                return (tot > 0) ? tot : ret;
+            return tot;
+        }
+        zin->avail_in = ret;
+        zin->next_in = ctx->ibuf;
+    }
+}
+
+static int bio_zlib_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl)
+{
+    BIO_ZLIB_CTX *ctx;
+    int ret;
+    z_stream *zout;
+    BIO *next = BIO_next(b);
+
+    if (!in || !inl)
+        return 0;
+    ctx = BIO_get_data(b);
+    if (ctx->odone)
+        return 0;
+    zout = &ctx->zout;
+    BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+    if (!ctx->obuf) {
+        ctx->obuf = OPENSSL_malloc(ctx->obufsize);
+        /* Need error here */
+        if (ctx->obuf == NULL) {
+            COMPerr(COMP_F_BIO_ZLIB_WRITE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        ctx->optr = ctx->obuf;
+        ctx->ocount = 0;
+        deflateInit(zout, ctx->comp_level);
+        zout->next_out = ctx->obuf;
+        zout->avail_out = ctx->obufsize;
+    }
+    /* Obtain input data directly from supplied buffer */
+    zout->next_in = (void *)in;
+    zout->avail_in = inl;
+    for (;;) {
+        /* If data in output buffer write it first */
+        while (ctx->ocount) {
+            ret = BIO_write(next, ctx->optr, ctx->ocount);
+            if (ret <= 0) {
+                /* Total data written */
+                int tot = inl - zout->avail_in;
+                BIO_copy_next_retry(b);
+                if (ret < 0)
+                    return (tot > 0) ? tot : ret;
+                return tot;
+            }
+            ctx->optr += ret;
+            ctx->ocount -= ret;
+        }
+
+        /* Have we consumed all supplied data? */
+        if (!zout->avail_in)
+            return inl;
+
+        /* Compress some more */
+
+        /* Reset buffer */
+        ctx->optr = ctx->obuf;
+        zout->next_out = ctx->obuf;
+        zout->avail_out = ctx->obufsize;
+        /* Compress some more */
+        ret = deflate(zout, 0);
+        if (ret != Z_OK) {
+            COMPerr(COMP_F_BIO_ZLIB_WRITE, COMP_R_ZLIB_DEFLATE_ERROR);
+            ERR_add_error_data(2, "zlib error:", zError(ret));
+            return 0;
+        }
+        ctx->ocount = ctx->obufsize - zout->avail_out;
+    }
+}
+
+static int bio_zlib_flush(BIO *b)
+{
+    BIO_ZLIB_CTX *ctx;
+    int ret;
+    z_stream *zout;
+    BIO *next = BIO_next(b);
+
+    ctx = BIO_get_data(b);
+    /* If no data written or already flush show success */
+    if (!ctx->obuf || (ctx->odone && !ctx->ocount))
+        return 1;
+    zout = &ctx->zout;
+    BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+    /* No more input data */
+    zout->next_in = NULL;
+    zout->avail_in = 0;
+    for (;;) {
+        /* If data in output buffer write it first */
+        while (ctx->ocount) {
+            ret = BIO_write(next, ctx->optr, ctx->ocount);
+            if (ret <= 0) {
+                BIO_copy_next_retry(b);
+                return ret;
+            }
+            ctx->optr += ret;
+            ctx->ocount -= ret;
+        }
+        if (ctx->odone)
+            return 1;
+
+        /* Compress some more */
+
+        /* Reset buffer */
+        ctx->optr = ctx->obuf;
+        zout->next_out = ctx->obuf;
+        zout->avail_out = ctx->obufsize;
+        /* Compress some more */
+        ret = deflate(zout, Z_FINISH);
+        if (ret == Z_STREAM_END)
+            ctx->odone = 1;
+        else if (ret != Z_OK) {
+            COMPerr(COMP_F_BIO_ZLIB_FLUSH, COMP_R_ZLIB_DEFLATE_ERROR);
+            ERR_add_error_data(2, "zlib error:", zError(ret));
+            return 0;
+        }
+        ctx->ocount = ctx->obufsize - zout->avail_out;
+    }
+}
+
+static long bio_zlib_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
+{
+    BIO_ZLIB_CTX *ctx;
+    int ret, *ip;
+    int ibs, obs;
+    BIO *next = BIO_next(b);
+
+    if (next == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    ctx = BIO_get_data(b);
+    switch (cmd) {
+
+    case BIO_CTRL_RESET:
+        ctx->ocount = 0;
+        ctx->odone = 0;
+        ret = 1;
+        break;
+
+    case BIO_CTRL_FLUSH:
+        ret = bio_zlib_flush(b);
+        if (ret > 0)
+            ret = BIO_flush(next);
+        break;
+
+    case BIO_C_SET_BUFF_SIZE:
+        ibs = -1;
+        obs = -1;
+        if (ptr != NULL) {
+            ip = ptr;
+            if (*ip == 0)
+                ibs = (int)num;
+            else
+                obs = (int)num;
+        } else {
+            ibs = (int)num;
+            obs = ibs;
+        }
+
+        if (ibs != -1) {
+            OPENSSL_free(ctx->ibuf);
+            ctx->ibuf = NULL;
+            ctx->ibufsize = ibs;
+        }
+
+        if (obs != -1) {
+            OPENSSL_free(ctx->obuf);
+            ctx->obuf = NULL;
+            ctx->obufsize = obs;
+        }
+        ret = 1;
+        break;
+
+    case BIO_C_DO_STATE_MACHINE:
+        BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+        ret = BIO_ctrl(next, cmd, num, ptr);
+        BIO_copy_next_retry(b);
+        break;
+
+    default:
+        ret = BIO_ctrl(next, cmd, num, ptr);
+        break;
+
+    }
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static long bio_zlib_callback_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, BIO_info_cb *fp)
+{
+    BIO *next = BIO_next(b);
+    if (next == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    return BIO_callback_ctrl(next, cmd, fp);
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/comp/comp_err.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/comp/comp_err.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8e2e695
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/comp/comp_err.c
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+/*
+ * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/comp.h>
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+
+# define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_COMP,func,0)
+# define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_COMP,0,reason)
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA COMP_str_functs[] = {
+    {ERR_FUNC(COMP_F_BIO_ZLIB_FLUSH), "bio_zlib_flush"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(COMP_F_BIO_ZLIB_NEW), "bio_zlib_new"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(COMP_F_BIO_ZLIB_READ), "bio_zlib_read"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(COMP_F_BIO_ZLIB_WRITE), "bio_zlib_write"},
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA COMP_str_reasons[] = {
+    {ERR_REASON(COMP_R_ZLIB_DEFLATE_ERROR), "zlib deflate error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(COMP_R_ZLIB_INFLATE_ERROR), "zlib inflate error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(COMP_R_ZLIB_NOT_SUPPORTED), "zlib not supported"},
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+
+#endif
+
+int ERR_load_COMP_strings(void)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+
+    if (ERR_func_error_string(COMP_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) {
+        ERR_load_strings(0, COMP_str_functs);
+        ERR_load_strings(0, COMP_str_reasons);
+    }
+#endif
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/comp/comp_lcl.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/comp/comp_lcl.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..aa45fca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/comp/comp_lcl.h
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+struct comp_method_st {
+    int type;                   /* NID for compression library */
+    const char *name;           /* A text string to identify the library */
+    int (*init) (COMP_CTX *ctx);
+    void (*finish) (COMP_CTX *ctx);
+    int (*compress) (COMP_CTX *ctx,
+                     unsigned char *out, unsigned int olen,
+                     unsigned char *in, unsigned int ilen);
+    int (*expand) (COMP_CTX *ctx,
+                   unsigned char *out, unsigned int olen,
+                   unsigned char *in, unsigned int ilen);
+};
+
+struct comp_ctx_st {
+    struct comp_method_st *meth;
+    unsigned long compress_in;
+    unsigned long compress_out;
+    unsigned long expand_in;
+    unsigned long expand_out;
+    void* data;
+};
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/comp/comp_lib.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/comp/comp_lib.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..32afd0d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/comp/comp_lib.c
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1998-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/comp.h>
+#include "comp_lcl.h"
+
+COMP_CTX *COMP_CTX_new(COMP_METHOD *meth)
+{
+    COMP_CTX *ret;
+
+    if ((ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret))) == NULL)
+        return (NULL);
+    ret->meth = meth;
+    if ((ret->meth->init != NULL) && !ret->meth->init(ret)) {
+        OPENSSL_free(ret);
+        ret = NULL;
+    }
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+const COMP_METHOD *COMP_CTX_get_method(const COMP_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->meth;
+}
+
+int COMP_get_type(const COMP_METHOD *meth)
+{
+    return meth->type;
+}
+
+const char *COMP_get_name(const COMP_METHOD *meth)
+{
+    return meth->name;
+}
+
+void COMP_CTX_free(COMP_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        return;
+
+    if (ctx->meth->finish != NULL)
+        ctx->meth->finish(ctx);
+
+    OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+}
+
+int COMP_compress_block(COMP_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int olen,
+                        unsigned char *in, int ilen)
+{
+    int ret;
+    if (ctx->meth->compress == NULL) {
+        return (-1);
+    }
+    ret = ctx->meth->compress(ctx, out, olen, in, ilen);
+    if (ret > 0) {
+        ctx->compress_in += ilen;
+        ctx->compress_out += ret;
+    }
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+int COMP_expand_block(COMP_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int olen,
+                      unsigned char *in, int ilen)
+{
+    int ret;
+
+    if (ctx->meth->expand == NULL) {
+        return (-1);
+    }
+    ret = ctx->meth->expand(ctx, out, olen, in, ilen);
+    if (ret > 0) {
+        ctx->expand_in += ilen;
+        ctx->expand_out += ret;
+    }
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+int COMP_CTX_get_type(const COMP_CTX* comp)
+{
+    return comp->meth ? comp->meth->type : NID_undef;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/conf/build.info b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/conf/build.info
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4438eb4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/conf/build.info
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+LIBS=../../libcrypto
+SOURCE[../../libcrypto]= \
+        conf_err.c conf_lib.c conf_api.c conf_def.c conf_mod.c \
+        conf_mall.c conf_sap.c
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/conf/conf_api.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/conf/conf_api.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5535416
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/conf/conf_api.c
@@ -0,0 +1,214 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* Part of the code in here was originally in conf.c, which is now removed */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/conf.h>
+#include <openssl/conf_api.h>
+#include "e_os.h"
+
+static void value_free_hash(const CONF_VALUE *a, LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *conf);
+static void value_free_stack_doall(CONF_VALUE *a);
+
+/* Up until OpenSSL 0.9.5a, this was get_section */
+CONF_VALUE *_CONF_get_section(const CONF *conf, const char *section)
+{
+    CONF_VALUE *v, vv;
+
+    if ((conf == NULL) || (section == NULL))
+        return (NULL);
+    vv.name = NULL;
+    vv.section = (char *)section;
+    v = lh_CONF_VALUE_retrieve(conf->data, &vv);
+    return (v);
+}
+
+/* Up until OpenSSL 0.9.5a, this was CONF_get_section */
+STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *_CONF_get_section_values(const CONF *conf,
+                                               const char *section)
+{
+    CONF_VALUE *v;
+
+    v = _CONF_get_section(conf, section);
+    if (v != NULL)
+        return ((STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *)v->value);
+    else
+        return (NULL);
+}
+
+int _CONF_add_string(CONF *conf, CONF_VALUE *section, CONF_VALUE *value)
+{
+    CONF_VALUE *v = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *ts;
+
+    ts = (STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *)section->value;
+
+    value->section = section->section;
+    if (!sk_CONF_VALUE_push(ts, value)) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    v = lh_CONF_VALUE_insert(conf->data, value);
+    if (v != NULL) {
+        (void)sk_CONF_VALUE_delete_ptr(ts, v);
+        OPENSSL_free(v->name);
+        OPENSSL_free(v->value);
+        OPENSSL_free(v);
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+char *_CONF_get_string(const CONF *conf, const char *section,
+                       const char *name)
+{
+    CONF_VALUE *v, vv;
+    char *p;
+
+    if (name == NULL)
+        return (NULL);
+    if (conf != NULL) {
+        if (section != NULL) {
+            vv.name = (char *)name;
+            vv.section = (char *)section;
+            v = lh_CONF_VALUE_retrieve(conf->data, &vv);
+            if (v != NULL)
+                return (v->value);
+            if (strcmp(section, "ENV") == 0) {
+                p = getenv(name);
+                if (p != NULL)
+                    return (p);
+            }
+        }
+        vv.section = "default";
+        vv.name = (char *)name;
+        v = lh_CONF_VALUE_retrieve(conf->data, &vv);
+        if (v != NULL)
+            return (v->value);
+        else
+            return (NULL);
+    } else
+        return (getenv(name));
+}
+
+static unsigned long conf_value_hash(const CONF_VALUE *v)
+{
+    return (OPENSSL_LH_strhash(v->section) << 2) ^ OPENSSL_LH_strhash(v->name);
+}
+
+static int conf_value_cmp(const CONF_VALUE *a, const CONF_VALUE *b)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    if (a->section != b->section) {
+        i = strcmp(a->section, b->section);
+        if (i)
+            return (i);
+    }
+
+    if ((a->name != NULL) && (b->name != NULL)) {
+        i = strcmp(a->name, b->name);
+        return (i);
+    } else if (a->name == b->name)
+        return (0);
+    else
+        return ((a->name == NULL) ? -1 : 1);
+}
+
+int _CONF_new_data(CONF *conf)
+{
+    if (conf == NULL) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (conf->data == NULL) {
+        conf->data = lh_CONF_VALUE_new(conf_value_hash, conf_value_cmp);
+        if (conf->data == NULL)
+            return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+typedef LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) LH_CONF_VALUE;
+
+IMPLEMENT_LHASH_DOALL_ARG_CONST(CONF_VALUE, LH_CONF_VALUE);
+
+void _CONF_free_data(CONF *conf)
+{
+    if (conf == NULL || conf->data == NULL)
+        return;
+
+    /* evil thing to make sure the 'OPENSSL_free()' works as expected */
+    lh_CONF_VALUE_set_down_load(conf->data, 0);
+    lh_CONF_VALUE_doall_LH_CONF_VALUE(conf->data, value_free_hash, conf->data);
+
+    /*
+     * We now have only 'section' entries in the hash table. Due to problems
+     * with
+     */
+
+    lh_CONF_VALUE_doall(conf->data, value_free_stack_doall);
+    lh_CONF_VALUE_free(conf->data);
+}
+
+static void value_free_hash(const CONF_VALUE *a, LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *conf)
+{
+    if (a->name != NULL)
+        (void)lh_CONF_VALUE_delete(conf, a);
+}
+
+static void value_free_stack_doall(CONF_VALUE *a)
+{
+    CONF_VALUE *vv;
+    STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *sk;
+    int i;
+
+    if (a->name != NULL)
+        return;
+
+    sk = (STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *)a->value;
+    for (i = sk_CONF_VALUE_num(sk) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+        vv = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(sk, i);
+        OPENSSL_free(vv->value);
+        OPENSSL_free(vv->name);
+        OPENSSL_free(vv);
+    }
+    sk_CONF_VALUE_free(sk);
+    OPENSSL_free(a->section);
+    OPENSSL_free(a);
+}
+
+/* Up until OpenSSL 0.9.5a, this was new_section */
+CONF_VALUE *_CONF_new_section(CONF *conf, const char *section)
+{
+    STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *sk = NULL;
+    int i;
+    CONF_VALUE *v = NULL, *vv;
+
+    if ((sk = sk_CONF_VALUE_new_null()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if ((v = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*v))) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    i = strlen(section) + 1;
+    if ((v->section = OPENSSL_malloc(i)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    memcpy(v->section, section, i);
+    v->name = NULL;
+    v->value = (char *)sk;
+
+    vv = lh_CONF_VALUE_insert(conf->data, v);
+    OPENSSL_assert(vv == NULL);
+    return v;
+
+ err:
+    sk_CONF_VALUE_free(sk);
+    OPENSSL_free(v);
+    return NULL;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/conf/conf_def.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/conf/conf_def.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b443903
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/conf/conf_def.c
@@ -0,0 +1,642 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* Part of the code in here was originally in conf.c, which is now removed */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/stack.h>
+#include <openssl/lhash.h>
+#include <openssl/conf.h>
+#include <openssl/conf_api.h>
+#include "conf_def.h"
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+/*
+ * The maximum length we can grow a value to after variable expansion. 64k
+ * should be more than enough for all reasonable uses.
+ */
+#define MAX_CONF_VALUE_LENGTH       65536
+
+static char *eat_ws(CONF *conf, char *p);
+static char *eat_alpha_numeric(CONF *conf, char *p);
+static void clear_comments(CONF *conf, char *p);
+static int str_copy(CONF *conf, char *section, char **to, char *from);
+static char *scan_quote(CONF *conf, char *p);
+static char *scan_dquote(CONF *conf, char *p);
+#define scan_esc(conf,p)        (((IS_EOF((conf),(p)[1]))?((p)+1):((p)+2)))
+
+static CONF *def_create(CONF_METHOD *meth);
+static int def_init_default(CONF *conf);
+static int def_init_WIN32(CONF *conf);
+static int def_destroy(CONF *conf);
+static int def_destroy_data(CONF *conf);
+static int def_load(CONF *conf, const char *name, long *eline);
+static int def_load_bio(CONF *conf, BIO *bp, long *eline);
+static int def_dump(const CONF *conf, BIO *bp);
+static int def_is_number(const CONF *conf, char c);
+static int def_to_int(const CONF *conf, char c);
+
+static CONF_METHOD default_method = {
+    "OpenSSL default",
+    def_create,
+    def_init_default,
+    def_destroy,
+    def_destroy_data,
+    def_load_bio,
+    def_dump,
+    def_is_number,
+    def_to_int,
+    def_load
+};
+
+static CONF_METHOD WIN32_method = {
+    "WIN32",
+    def_create,
+    def_init_WIN32,
+    def_destroy,
+    def_destroy_data,
+    def_load_bio,
+    def_dump,
+    def_is_number,
+    def_to_int,
+    def_load
+};
+
+CONF_METHOD *NCONF_default()
+{
+    return &default_method;
+}
+
+CONF_METHOD *NCONF_WIN32()
+{
+    return &WIN32_method;
+}
+
+static CONF *def_create(CONF_METHOD *meth)
+{
+    CONF *ret;
+
+    ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ret));
+    if (ret != NULL)
+        if (meth->init(ret) == 0) {
+            OPENSSL_free(ret);
+            ret = NULL;
+        }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int def_init_default(CONF *conf)
+{
+    if (conf == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    conf->meth = &default_method;
+    conf->meth_data = (void *)CONF_type_default;
+    conf->data = NULL;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int def_init_WIN32(CONF *conf)
+{
+    if (conf == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    conf->meth = &WIN32_method;
+    conf->meth_data = (void *)CONF_type_win32;
+    conf->data = NULL;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int def_destroy(CONF *conf)
+{
+    if (def_destroy_data(conf)) {
+        OPENSSL_free(conf);
+        return 1;
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int def_destroy_data(CONF *conf)
+{
+    if (conf == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    _CONF_free_data(conf);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int def_load(CONF *conf, const char *name, long *line)
+{
+    int ret;
+    BIO *in = NULL;
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+    in = BIO_new_file(name, "r");
+#else
+    in = BIO_new_file(name, "rb");
+#endif
+    if (in == NULL) {
+        if (ERR_GET_REASON(ERR_peek_last_error()) == BIO_R_NO_SUCH_FILE)
+            CONFerr(CONF_F_DEF_LOAD, CONF_R_NO_SUCH_FILE);
+        else
+            CONFerr(CONF_F_DEF_LOAD, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    ret = def_load_bio(conf, in, line);
+    BIO_free(in);
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int def_load_bio(CONF *conf, BIO *in, long *line)
+{
+/* The macro BUFSIZE conflicts with a system macro in VxWorks */
+#define CONFBUFSIZE     512
+    int bufnum = 0, i, ii;
+    BUF_MEM *buff = NULL;
+    char *s, *p, *end;
+    int again;
+    long eline = 0;
+    char btmp[DECIMAL_SIZE(eline) + 1];
+    CONF_VALUE *v = NULL, *tv;
+    CONF_VALUE *sv = NULL;
+    char *section = NULL, *buf;
+    char *start, *psection, *pname;
+    void *h = (void *)(conf->data);
+
+    if ((buff = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
+        CONFerr(CONF_F_DEF_LOAD_BIO, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    section = OPENSSL_strdup("default");
+    if (section == NULL) {
+        CONFerr(CONF_F_DEF_LOAD_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (_CONF_new_data(conf) == 0) {
+        CONFerr(CONF_F_DEF_LOAD_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    sv = _CONF_new_section(conf, section);
+    if (sv == NULL) {
+        CONFerr(CONF_F_DEF_LOAD_BIO, CONF_R_UNABLE_TO_CREATE_NEW_SECTION);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    bufnum = 0;
+    again = 0;
+    for (;;) {
+        if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buff, bufnum + CONFBUFSIZE)) {
+            CONFerr(CONF_F_DEF_LOAD_BIO, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        p = &(buff->data[bufnum]);
+        *p = '\0';
+        BIO_gets(in, p, CONFBUFSIZE - 1);
+        p[CONFBUFSIZE - 1] = '\0';
+        ii = i = strlen(p);
+        if (i == 0 && !again)
+            break;
+        again = 0;
+        while (i > 0) {
+            if ((p[i - 1] != '\r') && (p[i - 1] != '\n'))
+                break;
+            else
+                i--;
+        }
+        /*
+         * we removed some trailing stuff so there is a new line on the end.
+         */
+        if (ii && i == ii)
+            again = 1;          /* long line */
+        else {
+            p[i] = '\0';
+            eline++;            /* another input line */
+        }
+
+        /* we now have a line with trailing \r\n removed */
+
+        /* i is the number of bytes */
+        bufnum += i;
+
+        v = NULL;
+        /* check for line continuation */
+        if (bufnum >= 1) {
+            /*
+             * If we have bytes and the last char '\\' and second last char
+             * is not '\\'
+             */
+            p = &(buff->data[bufnum - 1]);
+            if (IS_ESC(conf, p[0]) && ((bufnum <= 1) || !IS_ESC(conf, p[-1]))) {
+                bufnum--;
+                again = 1;
+            }
+        }
+        if (again)
+            continue;
+        bufnum = 0;
+        buf = buff->data;
+
+        clear_comments(conf, buf);
+        s = eat_ws(conf, buf);
+        if (IS_EOF(conf, *s))
+            continue;           /* blank line */
+        if (*s == '[') {
+            char *ss;
+
+            s++;
+            start = eat_ws(conf, s);
+            ss = start;
+ again:
+            end = eat_alpha_numeric(conf, ss);
+            p = eat_ws(conf, end);
+            if (*p != ']') {
+                if (*p != '\0' && ss != p) {
+                    ss = p;
+                    goto again;
+                }
+                CONFerr(CONF_F_DEF_LOAD_BIO,
+                        CONF_R_MISSING_CLOSE_SQUARE_BRACKET);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            *end = '\0';
+            if (!str_copy(conf, NULL, &section, start))
+                goto err;
+            if ((sv = _CONF_get_section(conf, section)) == NULL)
+                sv = _CONF_new_section(conf, section);
+            if (sv == NULL) {
+                CONFerr(CONF_F_DEF_LOAD_BIO,
+                        CONF_R_UNABLE_TO_CREATE_NEW_SECTION);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            continue;
+        } else {
+            pname = s;
+            psection = NULL;
+            end = eat_alpha_numeric(conf, s);
+            if ((end[0] == ':') && (end[1] == ':')) {
+                *end = '\0';
+                end += 2;
+                psection = pname;
+                pname = end;
+                end = eat_alpha_numeric(conf, end);
+            }
+            p = eat_ws(conf, end);
+            if (*p != '=') {
+                CONFerr(CONF_F_DEF_LOAD_BIO, CONF_R_MISSING_EQUAL_SIGN);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            *end = '\0';
+            p++;
+            start = eat_ws(conf, p);
+            while (!IS_EOF(conf, *p))
+                p++;
+            p--;
+            while ((p != start) && (IS_WS(conf, *p)))
+                p--;
+            p++;
+            *p = '\0';
+
+            if ((v = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*v))) == NULL) {
+                CONFerr(CONF_F_DEF_LOAD_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            if (psection == NULL)
+                psection = section;
+            v->name = OPENSSL_malloc(strlen(pname) + 1);
+            v->value = NULL;
+            if (v->name == NULL) {
+                CONFerr(CONF_F_DEF_LOAD_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            OPENSSL_strlcpy(v->name, pname, strlen(pname) + 1);
+            if (!str_copy(conf, psection, &(v->value), start))
+                goto err;
+
+            if (strcmp(psection, section) != 0) {
+                if ((tv = _CONF_get_section(conf, psection))
+                    == NULL)
+                    tv = _CONF_new_section(conf, psection);
+                if (tv == NULL) {
+                    CONFerr(CONF_F_DEF_LOAD_BIO,
+                            CONF_R_UNABLE_TO_CREATE_NEW_SECTION);
+                    goto err;
+                }
+            } else
+                tv = sv;
+            if (_CONF_add_string(conf, tv, v) == 0) {
+                CONFerr(CONF_F_DEF_LOAD_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            v = NULL;
+        }
+    }
+    BUF_MEM_free(buff);
+    OPENSSL_free(section);
+    return (1);
+ err:
+    BUF_MEM_free(buff);
+    OPENSSL_free(section);
+    if (line != NULL)
+        *line = eline;
+    BIO_snprintf(btmp, sizeof(btmp), "%ld", eline);
+    ERR_add_error_data(2, "line ", btmp);
+    if (h != conf->data) {
+        CONF_free(conf->data);
+        conf->data = NULL;
+    }
+    if (v != NULL) {
+        OPENSSL_free(v->name);
+        OPENSSL_free(v->value);
+        OPENSSL_free(v);
+    }
+    return (0);
+}
+
+static void clear_comments(CONF *conf, char *p)
+{
+    for (;;) {
+        if (IS_FCOMMENT(conf, *p)) {
+            *p = '\0';
+            return;
+        }
+        if (!IS_WS(conf, *p)) {
+            break;
+        }
+        p++;
+    }
+
+    for (;;) {
+        if (IS_COMMENT(conf, *p)) {
+            *p = '\0';
+            return;
+        }
+        if (IS_DQUOTE(conf, *p)) {
+            p = scan_dquote(conf, p);
+            continue;
+        }
+        if (IS_QUOTE(conf, *p)) {
+            p = scan_quote(conf, p);
+            continue;
+        }
+        if (IS_ESC(conf, *p)) {
+            p = scan_esc(conf, p);
+            continue;
+        }
+        if (IS_EOF(conf, *p))
+            return;
+        else
+            p++;
+    }
+}
+
+static int str_copy(CONF *conf, char *section, char **pto, char *from)
+{
+    int q, r, rr = 0, to = 0, len = 0;
+    char *s, *e, *rp, *p, *rrp, *np, *cp, v;
+    BUF_MEM *buf;
+
+    if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
+        return (0);
+
+    len = strlen(from) + 1;
+    if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, len))
+        goto err;
+
+    for (;;) {
+        if (IS_QUOTE(conf, *from)) {
+            q = *from;
+            from++;
+            while (!IS_EOF(conf, *from) && (*from != q)) {
+                if (IS_ESC(conf, *from)) {
+                    from++;
+                    if (IS_EOF(conf, *from))
+                        break;
+                }
+                buf->data[to++] = *(from++);
+            }
+            if (*from == q)
+                from++;
+        } else if (IS_DQUOTE(conf, *from)) {
+            q = *from;
+            from++;
+            while (!IS_EOF(conf, *from)) {
+                if (*from == q) {
+                    if (*(from + 1) == q) {
+                        from++;
+                    } else {
+                        break;
+                    }
+                }
+                buf->data[to++] = *(from++);
+            }
+            if (*from == q)
+                from++;
+        } else if (IS_ESC(conf, *from)) {
+            from++;
+            v = *(from++);
+            if (IS_EOF(conf, v))
+                break;
+            else if (v == 'r')
+                v = '\r';
+            else if (v == 'n')
+                v = '\n';
+            else if (v == 'b')
+                v = '\b';
+            else if (v == 't')
+                v = '\t';
+            buf->data[to++] = v;
+        } else if (IS_EOF(conf, *from))
+            break;
+        else if (*from == '$') {
+            size_t newsize;
+
+            /* try to expand it */
+            rrp = NULL;
+            s = &(from[1]);
+            if (*s == '{')
+                q = '}';
+            else if (*s == '(')
+                q = ')';
+            else
+                q = 0;
+
+            if (q)
+                s++;
+            cp = section;
+            e = np = s;
+            while (IS_ALPHA_NUMERIC(conf, *e))
+                e++;
+            if ((e[0] == ':') && (e[1] == ':')) {
+                cp = np;
+                rrp = e;
+                rr = *e;
+                *rrp = '\0';
+                e += 2;
+                np = e;
+                while (IS_ALPHA_NUMERIC(conf, *e))
+                    e++;
+            }
+            r = *e;
+            *e = '\0';
+            rp = e;
+            if (q) {
+                if (r != q) {
+                    CONFerr(CONF_F_STR_COPY, CONF_R_NO_CLOSE_BRACE);
+                    goto err;
+                }
+                e++;
+            }
+            /*-
+             * So at this point we have
+             * np which is the start of the name string which is
+             *   '\0' terminated.
+             * cp which is the start of the section string which is
+             *   '\0' terminated.
+             * e is the 'next point after'.
+             * r and rr are the chars replaced by the '\0'
+             * rp and rrp is where 'r' and 'rr' came from.
+             */
+            p = _CONF_get_string(conf, cp, np);
+            if (rrp != NULL)
+                *rrp = rr;
+            *rp = r;
+            if (p == NULL) {
+                CONFerr(CONF_F_STR_COPY, CONF_R_VARIABLE_HAS_NO_VALUE);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            newsize = strlen(p) + buf->length - (e - from);
+            if (newsize > MAX_CONF_VALUE_LENGTH) {
+                CONFerr(CONF_F_STR_COPY, CONF_R_VARIABLE_EXPANSION_TOO_LONG);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, newsize)) {
+                CONFerr(CONF_F_STR_COPY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            while (*p)
+                buf->data[to++] = *(p++);
+
+            /*
+             * Since we change the pointer 'from', we also have to change the
+             * perceived length of the string it points at.  /RL
+             */
+            len -= e - from;
+            from = e;
+
+            /*
+             * In case there were no braces or parenthesis around the
+             * variable reference, we have to put back the character that was
+             * replaced with a '\0'.  /RL
+             */
+            *rp = r;
+        } else
+            buf->data[to++] = *(from++);
+    }
+    buf->data[to] = '\0';
+    OPENSSL_free(*pto);
+    *pto = buf->data;
+    OPENSSL_free(buf);
+    return (1);
+ err:
+    BUF_MEM_free(buf);
+    return (0);
+}
+
+static char *eat_ws(CONF *conf, char *p)
+{
+    while (IS_WS(conf, *p) && (!IS_EOF(conf, *p)))
+        p++;
+    return (p);
+}
+
+static char *eat_alpha_numeric(CONF *conf, char *p)
+{
+    for (;;) {
+        if (IS_ESC(conf, *p)) {
+            p = scan_esc(conf, p);
+            continue;
+        }
+        if (!IS_ALPHA_NUMERIC_PUNCT(conf, *p))
+            return (p);
+        p++;
+    }
+}
+
+static char *scan_quote(CONF *conf, char *p)
+{
+    int q = *p;
+
+    p++;
+    while (!(IS_EOF(conf, *p)) && (*p != q)) {
+        if (IS_ESC(conf, *p)) {
+            p++;
+            if (IS_EOF(conf, *p))
+                return (p);
+        }
+        p++;
+    }
+    if (*p == q)
+        p++;
+    return (p);
+}
+
+static char *scan_dquote(CONF *conf, char *p)
+{
+    int q = *p;
+
+    p++;
+    while (!(IS_EOF(conf, *p))) {
+        if (*p == q) {
+            if (*(p + 1) == q) {
+                p++;
+            } else {
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+        p++;
+    }
+    if (*p == q)
+        p++;
+    return (p);
+}
+
+static void dump_value_doall_arg(const CONF_VALUE *a, BIO *out)
+{
+    if (a->name)
+        BIO_printf(out, "[%s] %s=%s\n", a->section, a->name, a->value);
+    else
+        BIO_printf(out, "[[%s]]\n", a->section);
+}
+
+IMPLEMENT_LHASH_DOALL_ARG_CONST(CONF_VALUE, BIO);
+
+static int def_dump(const CONF *conf, BIO *out)
+{
+    lh_CONF_VALUE_doall_BIO(conf->data, dump_value_doall_arg, out);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int def_is_number(const CONF *conf, char c)
+{
+    return IS_NUMBER(conf, c);
+}
+
+static int def_to_int(const CONF *conf, char c)
+{
+    return c - '0';
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/conf/conf_def.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/conf/conf_def.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..da4767e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/conf/conf_def.h
@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
+/*
+ * WARNING: do not edit!
+ * Generated by crypto/conf/keysets.pl
+ *
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#define CONF_NUMBER             1
+#define CONF_UPPER              2
+#define CONF_LOWER              4
+#define CONF_UNDER              256
+#define CONF_PUNCTUATION        512
+#define CONF_WS                 16
+#define CONF_ESC                32
+#define CONF_QUOTE              64
+#define CONF_DQUOTE             1024
+#define CONF_COMMENT            128
+#define CONF_FCOMMENT           2048
+#define CONF_EOF                8
+#define CONF_HIGHBIT            4096
+#define CONF_ALPHA              (CONF_UPPER|CONF_LOWER)
+#define CONF_ALPHA_NUMERIC      (CONF_ALPHA|CONF_NUMBER|CONF_UNDER)
+#define CONF_ALPHA_NUMERIC_PUNCT (CONF_ALPHA|CONF_NUMBER|CONF_UNDER| \
+                                        CONF_PUNCTUATION)
+
+#define KEYTYPES(c)             ((const unsigned short *)((c)->meth_data))
+#ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+# define IS_COMMENT(c,a)         (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_COMMENT)
+# define IS_FCOMMENT(c,a)        (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_FCOMMENT)
+# define IS_EOF(c,a)             (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_EOF)
+# define IS_ESC(c,a)             (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_ESC)
+# define IS_NUMBER(c,a)          (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_NUMBER)
+# define IS_WS(c,a)              (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_WS)
+# define IS_ALPHA_NUMERIC(c,a)   (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_ALPHA_NUMERIC)
+# define IS_ALPHA_NUMERIC_PUNCT(c,a) \
+                                (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_ALPHA_NUMERIC_PUNCT)
+# define IS_QUOTE(c,a)           (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_QUOTE)
+# define IS_DQUOTE(c,a)          (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_DQUOTE)
+# define IS_HIGHBIT(c,a)         (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_HIGHBIT)
+
+#else                           /* CHARSET_EBCDIC */
+
+# define IS_COMMENT(c,a)         (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a & 0xff]]&CONF_COMMENT)
+# define IS_FCOMMENT(c,a)        (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a & 0xff]]&CONF_FCOMMENT)
+# define IS_EOF(c,a)             (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a & 0xff]]&CONF_EOF)
+# define IS_ESC(c,a)             (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a & 0xff]]&CONF_ESC)
+# define IS_NUMBER(c,a)          (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a & 0xff]]&CONF_NUMBER)
+# define IS_WS(c,a)              (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a & 0xff]]&CONF_WS)
+# define IS_ALPHA_NUMERIC(c,a)   (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a & 0xff]]&CONF_ALPHA_NUMERIC)
+# define IS_ALPHA_NUMERIC_PUNCT(c,a) \
+                                (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a & 0xff]]&CONF_ALPHA_NUMERIC_PUNCT)
+# define IS_QUOTE(c,a)           (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a & 0xff]]&CONF_QUOTE)
+# define IS_DQUOTE(c,a)          (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a & 0xff]]&CONF_DQUOTE)
+# define IS_HIGHBIT(c,a)         (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a & 0xff]]&CONF_HIGHBIT)
+#endif                          /* CHARSET_EBCDIC */
+
+static const unsigned short CONF_type_default[256] = {
+    0x0008, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000,
+    0x0000, 0x0010, 0x0010, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0010, 0x0000, 0x0000,
+    0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000,
+    0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000,
+    0x0010, 0x0200, 0x0040, 0x0080, 0x0000, 0x0200, 0x0200, 0x0040,
+    0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0200, 0x0200, 0x0200, 0x0200, 0x0200, 0x0200,
+    0x0001, 0x0001, 0x0001, 0x0001, 0x0001, 0x0001, 0x0001, 0x0001,
+    0x0001, 0x0001, 0x0000, 0x0200, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0200,
+    0x0200, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002,
+    0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002,
+    0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002,
+    0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0000, 0x0020, 0x0000, 0x0200, 0x0100,
+    0x0040, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004,
+    0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004,
+    0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004,
+    0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0000, 0x0200, 0x0000, 0x0200, 0x0000,
+    0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000,
+    0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000,
+    0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000,
+    0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000,
+    0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000,
+    0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000,
+    0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000,
+    0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000,
+    0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000,
+    0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000,
+    0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000,
+    0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000,
+    0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000,
+    0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000,
+    0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000,
+    0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000,
+};
+
+static const unsigned short CONF_type_win32[256] = {
+    0x0008, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000,
+    0x0000, 0x0010, 0x0010, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0010, 0x0000, 0x0000,
+    0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000,
+    0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000,
+    0x0010, 0x0200, 0x0400, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0200, 0x0200, 0x0000,
+    0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0200, 0x0200, 0x0200, 0x0200, 0x0200, 0x0200,
+    0x0001, 0x0001, 0x0001, 0x0001, 0x0001, 0x0001, 0x0001, 0x0001,
+    0x0001, 0x0001, 0x0000, 0x0A00, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0200,
+    0x0200, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002,
+    0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002,
+    0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002,
+    0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0200, 0x0100,
+    0x0000, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004,
+    0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004,
+    0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004,
+    0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0000, 0x0200, 0x0000, 0x0200, 0x0000,
+    0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000,
+    0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000,
+    0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000,
+    0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000,
+    0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000,
+    0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000,
+    0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000,
+    0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000,
+    0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000,
+    0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000,
+    0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000,
+    0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000,
+    0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000,
+    0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000,
+    0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000,
+    0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000,
+};
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/conf/conf_err.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/conf/conf_err.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0863bc4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/conf/conf_err.c
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+/*
+ * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
+ * Copyright 1995-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/conf.h>
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+
+# define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CONF,func,0)
+# define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CONF,0,reason)
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA CONF_str_functs[] = {
+    {ERR_FUNC(CONF_F_CONF_DUMP_FP), "CONF_dump_fp"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CONF_F_CONF_LOAD), "CONF_load"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CONF_F_CONF_LOAD_FP), "CONF_load_fp"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CONF_F_CONF_PARSE_LIST), "CONF_parse_list"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CONF_F_DEF_LOAD), "def_load"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CONF_F_DEF_LOAD_BIO), "def_load_bio"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CONF_F_MODULE_INIT), "module_init"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CONF_F_MODULE_LOAD_DSO), "module_load_dso"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CONF_F_MODULE_RUN), "module_run"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CONF_F_NCONF_DUMP_BIO), "NCONF_dump_bio"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CONF_F_NCONF_DUMP_FP), "NCONF_dump_fp"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CONF_F_NCONF_GET_NUMBER_E), "NCONF_get_number_e"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CONF_F_NCONF_GET_SECTION), "NCONF_get_section"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CONF_F_NCONF_GET_STRING), "NCONF_get_string"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CONF_F_NCONF_LOAD), "NCONF_load"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CONF_F_NCONF_LOAD_BIO), "NCONF_load_bio"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CONF_F_NCONF_LOAD_FP), "NCONF_load_fp"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CONF_F_NCONF_NEW), "NCONF_new"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CONF_F_STR_COPY), "str_copy"},
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA CONF_str_reasons[] = {
+    {ERR_REASON(CONF_R_ERROR_LOADING_DSO), "error loading dso"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CONF_R_LIST_CANNOT_BE_NULL), "list cannot be null"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CONF_R_MISSING_CLOSE_SQUARE_BRACKET),
+     "missing close square bracket"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CONF_R_MISSING_EQUAL_SIGN), "missing equal sign"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CONF_R_MISSING_INIT_FUNCTION), "missing init function"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CONF_R_MODULE_INITIALIZATION_ERROR),
+     "module initialization error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CONF_R_NO_CLOSE_BRACE), "no close brace"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CONF_R_NO_CONF), "no conf"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CONF_R_NO_CONF_OR_ENVIRONMENT_VARIABLE),
+     "no conf or environment variable"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CONF_R_NO_SECTION), "no section"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CONF_R_NO_SUCH_FILE), "no such file"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CONF_R_NO_VALUE), "no value"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CONF_R_UNABLE_TO_CREATE_NEW_SECTION),
+     "unable to create new section"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CONF_R_UNKNOWN_MODULE_NAME), "unknown module name"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CONF_R_VARIABLE_EXPANSION_TOO_LONG),
+     "variable expansion too long"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CONF_R_VARIABLE_HAS_NO_VALUE), "variable has no value"},
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+
+#endif
+
+int ERR_load_CONF_strings(void)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+
+    if (ERR_func_error_string(CONF_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) {
+        ERR_load_strings(0, CONF_str_functs);
+        ERR_load_strings(0, CONF_str_reasons);
+    }
+#endif
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/conf/conf_lib.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/conf/conf_lib.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3532114
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/conf/conf_lib.c
@@ -0,0 +1,365 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <internal/conf.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/conf.h>
+#include <openssl/conf_api.h>
+#include <openssl/lhash.h>
+#include "e_os.h"
+
+static CONF_METHOD *default_CONF_method = NULL;
+
+/* Init a 'CONF' structure from an old LHASH */
+
+void CONF_set_nconf(CONF *conf, LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *hash)
+{
+    if (default_CONF_method == NULL)
+        default_CONF_method = NCONF_default();
+
+    default_CONF_method->init(conf);
+    conf->data = hash;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The following section contains the "CONF classic" functions, rewritten in
+ * terms of the new CONF interface.
+ */
+
+int CONF_set_default_method(CONF_METHOD *meth)
+{
+    default_CONF_method = meth;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *CONF_load(LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *conf, const char *file,
+                                long *eline)
+{
+    LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *ltmp;
+    BIO *in = NULL;
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+    in = BIO_new_file(file, "r");
+#else
+    in = BIO_new_file(file, "rb");
+#endif
+    if (in == NULL) {
+        CONFerr(CONF_F_CONF_LOAD, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    ltmp = CONF_load_bio(conf, in, eline);
+    BIO_free(in);
+
+    return ltmp;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *CONF_load_fp(LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *conf, FILE *fp,
+                                   long *eline)
+{
+    BIO *btmp;
+    LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *ltmp;
+    if ((btmp = BIO_new_fp(fp, BIO_NOCLOSE)) == NULL) {
+        CONFerr(CONF_F_CONF_LOAD_FP, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    ltmp = CONF_load_bio(conf, btmp, eline);
+    BIO_free(btmp);
+    return ltmp;
+}
+#endif
+
+LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *CONF_load_bio(LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *conf, BIO *bp,
+                                    long *eline)
+{
+    CONF ctmp;
+    int ret;
+
+    CONF_set_nconf(&ctmp, conf);
+
+    ret = NCONF_load_bio(&ctmp, bp, eline);
+    if (ret)
+        return ctmp.data;
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *CONF_get_section(LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *conf,
+                                       const char *section)
+{
+    if (conf == NULL) {
+        return NULL;
+    } else {
+        CONF ctmp;
+        CONF_set_nconf(&ctmp, conf);
+        return NCONF_get_section(&ctmp, section);
+    }
+}
+
+char *CONF_get_string(LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *conf, const char *group,
+                      const char *name)
+{
+    if (conf == NULL) {
+        return NCONF_get_string(NULL, group, name);
+    } else {
+        CONF ctmp;
+        CONF_set_nconf(&ctmp, conf);
+        return NCONF_get_string(&ctmp, group, name);
+    }
+}
+
+long CONF_get_number(LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *conf, const char *group,
+                     const char *name)
+{
+    int status;
+    long result = 0;
+
+    if (conf == NULL) {
+        status = NCONF_get_number_e(NULL, group, name, &result);
+    } else {
+        CONF ctmp;
+        CONF_set_nconf(&ctmp, conf);
+        status = NCONF_get_number_e(&ctmp, group, name, &result);
+    }
+
+    if (status == 0) {
+        /* This function does not believe in errors... */
+        ERR_clear_error();
+    }
+    return result;
+}
+
+void CONF_free(LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *conf)
+{
+    CONF ctmp;
+    CONF_set_nconf(&ctmp, conf);
+    NCONF_free_data(&ctmp);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+int CONF_dump_fp(LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *conf, FILE *out)
+{
+    BIO *btmp;
+    int ret;
+
+    if ((btmp = BIO_new_fp(out, BIO_NOCLOSE)) == NULL) {
+        CONFerr(CONF_F_CONF_DUMP_FP, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    ret = CONF_dump_bio(conf, btmp);
+    BIO_free(btmp);
+    return ret;
+}
+#endif
+
+int CONF_dump_bio(LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *conf, BIO *out)
+{
+    CONF ctmp;
+    CONF_set_nconf(&ctmp, conf);
+    return NCONF_dump_bio(&ctmp, out);
+}
+
+/*
+ * The following section contains the "New CONF" functions.  They are
+ * completely centralised around a new CONF structure that may contain
+ * basically anything, but at least a method pointer and a table of data.
+ * These functions are also written in terms of the bridge functions used by
+ * the "CONF classic" functions, for consistency.
+ */
+
+CONF *NCONF_new(CONF_METHOD *meth)
+{
+    CONF *ret;
+
+    if (meth == NULL)
+        meth = NCONF_default();
+
+    ret = meth->create(meth);
+    if (ret == NULL) {
+        CONFerr(CONF_F_NCONF_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+void NCONF_free(CONF *conf)
+{
+    if (conf == NULL)
+        return;
+    conf->meth->destroy(conf);
+}
+
+void NCONF_free_data(CONF *conf)
+{
+    if (conf == NULL)
+        return;
+    conf->meth->destroy_data(conf);
+}
+
+int NCONF_load(CONF *conf, const char *file, long *eline)
+{
+    if (conf == NULL) {
+        CONFerr(CONF_F_NCONF_LOAD, CONF_R_NO_CONF);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return conf->meth->load(conf, file, eline);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+int NCONF_load_fp(CONF *conf, FILE *fp, long *eline)
+{
+    BIO *btmp;
+    int ret;
+    if ((btmp = BIO_new_fp(fp, BIO_NOCLOSE)) == NULL) {
+        CONFerr(CONF_F_NCONF_LOAD_FP, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    ret = NCONF_load_bio(conf, btmp, eline);
+    BIO_free(btmp);
+    return ret;
+}
+#endif
+
+int NCONF_load_bio(CONF *conf, BIO *bp, long *eline)
+{
+    if (conf == NULL) {
+        CONFerr(CONF_F_NCONF_LOAD_BIO, CONF_R_NO_CONF);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return conf->meth->load_bio(conf, bp, eline);
+}
+
+STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *NCONF_get_section(const CONF *conf, const char *section)
+{
+    if (conf == NULL) {
+        CONFerr(CONF_F_NCONF_GET_SECTION, CONF_R_NO_CONF);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    if (section == NULL) {
+        CONFerr(CONF_F_NCONF_GET_SECTION, CONF_R_NO_SECTION);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    return _CONF_get_section_values(conf, section);
+}
+
+char *NCONF_get_string(const CONF *conf, const char *group, const char *name)
+{
+    char *s = _CONF_get_string(conf, group, name);
+
+    /*
+     * Since we may get a value from an environment variable even if conf is
+     * NULL, let's check the value first
+     */
+    if (s)
+        return s;
+
+    if (conf == NULL) {
+        CONFerr(CONF_F_NCONF_GET_STRING,
+                CONF_R_NO_CONF_OR_ENVIRONMENT_VARIABLE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    CONFerr(CONF_F_NCONF_GET_STRING, CONF_R_NO_VALUE);
+    ERR_add_error_data(4, "group=", group, " name=", name);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+int NCONF_get_number_e(const CONF *conf, const char *group, const char *name,
+                       long *result)
+{
+    char *str;
+
+    if (result == NULL) {
+        CONFerr(CONF_F_NCONF_GET_NUMBER_E, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    str = NCONF_get_string(conf, group, name);
+
+    if (str == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    for (*result = 0; conf->meth->is_number(conf, *str);) {
+        *result = (*result) * 10 + conf->meth->to_int(conf, *str);
+        str++;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+int NCONF_dump_fp(const CONF *conf, FILE *out)
+{
+    BIO *btmp;
+    int ret;
+    if ((btmp = BIO_new_fp(out, BIO_NOCLOSE)) == NULL) {
+        CONFerr(CONF_F_NCONF_DUMP_FP, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    ret = NCONF_dump_bio(conf, btmp);
+    BIO_free(btmp);
+    return ret;
+}
+#endif
+
+int NCONF_dump_bio(const CONF *conf, BIO *out)
+{
+    if (conf == NULL) {
+        CONFerr(CONF_F_NCONF_DUMP_BIO, CONF_R_NO_CONF);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return conf->meth->dump(conf, out);
+}
+
+/*
+ * These routines call the C malloc/free, to avoid intermixing with
+ * OpenSSL function pointers before the library is initialized.
+ */
+OPENSSL_INIT_SETTINGS *OPENSSL_INIT_new(void)
+{
+    OPENSSL_INIT_SETTINGS *ret = malloc(sizeof(*ret));
+
+    if (ret != NULL)
+        memset(ret, 0, sizeof(*ret));
+    return ret;
+}
+
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+int OPENSSL_INIT_set_config_appname(OPENSSL_INIT_SETTINGS *settings,
+                                    const char *appname)
+{
+    char *newappname = NULL;
+
+    if (appname != NULL) {
+        newappname = strdup(appname);
+        if (newappname == NULL)
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    free(settings->appname);
+    settings->appname = newappname;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+#endif
+
+void OPENSSL_INIT_free(OPENSSL_INIT_SETTINGS *settings)
+{
+    free(settings->appname);
+    free(settings);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/conf/conf_mall.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/conf/conf_mall.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4e7a434
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/conf/conf_mall.c
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/conf.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+
+/* Load all OpenSSL builtin modules */
+
+void OPENSSL_load_builtin_modules(void)
+{
+    /* Add builtin modules here */
+    ASN1_add_oid_module();
+    ASN1_add_stable_module();
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    ENGINE_add_conf_module();
+#endif
+    EVP_add_alg_module();
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/conf/conf_mod.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/conf/conf_mod.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..543a8ea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/conf/conf_mod.c
@@ -0,0 +1,549 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "internal/conf.h"
+#include "internal/dso.h"
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+#define DSO_mod_init_name "OPENSSL_init"
+#define DSO_mod_finish_name "OPENSSL_finish"
+
+/*
+ * This structure contains a data about supported modules. entries in this
+ * table correspond to either dynamic or static modules.
+ */
+
+struct conf_module_st {
+    /* DSO of this module or NULL if static */
+    DSO *dso;
+    /* Name of the module */
+    char *name;
+    /* Init function */
+    conf_init_func *init;
+    /* Finish function */
+    conf_finish_func *finish;
+    /* Number of successfully initialized modules */
+    int links;
+    void *usr_data;
+};
+
+/*
+ * This structure contains information about modules that have been
+ * successfully initialized. There may be more than one entry for a given
+ * module.
+ */
+
+struct conf_imodule_st {
+    CONF_MODULE *pmod;
+    char *name;
+    char *value;
+    unsigned long flags;
+    void *usr_data;
+};
+
+static STACK_OF(CONF_MODULE) *supported_modules = NULL;
+static STACK_OF(CONF_IMODULE) *initialized_modules = NULL;
+
+static void module_free(CONF_MODULE *md);
+static void module_finish(CONF_IMODULE *imod);
+static int module_run(const CONF *cnf, const char *name, const char *value,
+                      unsigned long flags);
+static CONF_MODULE *module_add(DSO *dso, const char *name,
+                               conf_init_func *ifunc,
+                               conf_finish_func *ffunc);
+static CONF_MODULE *module_find(const char *name);
+static int module_init(CONF_MODULE *pmod, const char *name, const char *value,
+                       const CONF *cnf);
+static CONF_MODULE *module_load_dso(const CONF *cnf, const char *name,
+                                    const char *value);
+
+/* Main function: load modules from a CONF structure */
+
+int CONF_modules_load(const CONF *cnf, const char *appname,
+                      unsigned long flags)
+{
+    STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *values;
+    CONF_VALUE *vl;
+    char *vsection = NULL;
+
+    int ret, i;
+
+    if (!cnf)
+        return 1;
+
+    if (appname)
+        vsection = NCONF_get_string(cnf, NULL, appname);
+
+    if (!appname || (!vsection && (flags & CONF_MFLAGS_DEFAULT_SECTION)))
+        vsection = NCONF_get_string(cnf, NULL, "openssl_conf");
+
+    if (!vsection) {
+        ERR_clear_error();
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    values = NCONF_get_section(cnf, vsection);
+
+    if (!values)
+        return 0;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(values); i++) {
+        vl = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(values, i);
+        ret = module_run(cnf, vl->name, vl->value, flags);
+        if (ret <= 0)
+            if (!(flags & CONF_MFLAGS_IGNORE_ERRORS))
+                return ret;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+
+}
+
+int CONF_modules_load_file(const char *filename, const char *appname,
+                           unsigned long flags)
+{
+    char *file = NULL;
+    CONF *conf = NULL;
+    int ret = 0;
+    conf = NCONF_new(NULL);
+    if (conf == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (filename == NULL) {
+        file = CONF_get1_default_config_file();
+        if (!file)
+            goto err;
+    } else
+        file = (char *)filename;
+
+    if (NCONF_load(conf, file, NULL) <= 0) {
+        if ((flags & CONF_MFLAGS_IGNORE_MISSING_FILE) &&
+            (ERR_GET_REASON(ERR_peek_last_error()) == CONF_R_NO_SUCH_FILE)) {
+            ERR_clear_error();
+            ret = 1;
+        }
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    ret = CONF_modules_load(conf, appname, flags);
+
+ err:
+    if (filename == NULL)
+        OPENSSL_free(file);
+    NCONF_free(conf);
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int module_run(const CONF *cnf, const char *name, const char *value,
+                      unsigned long flags)
+{
+    CONF_MODULE *md;
+    int ret;
+
+    md = module_find(name);
+
+    /* Module not found: try to load DSO */
+    if (!md && !(flags & CONF_MFLAGS_NO_DSO))
+        md = module_load_dso(cnf, name, value);
+
+    if (!md) {
+        if (!(flags & CONF_MFLAGS_SILENT)) {
+            CONFerr(CONF_F_MODULE_RUN, CONF_R_UNKNOWN_MODULE_NAME);
+            ERR_add_error_data(2, "module=", name);
+        }
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    ret = module_init(md, name, value, cnf);
+
+    if (ret <= 0) {
+        if (!(flags & CONF_MFLAGS_SILENT)) {
+            char rcode[DECIMAL_SIZE(ret) + 1];
+            CONFerr(CONF_F_MODULE_RUN, CONF_R_MODULE_INITIALIZATION_ERROR);
+            BIO_snprintf(rcode, sizeof(rcode), "%-8d", ret);
+            ERR_add_error_data(6, "module=", name, ", value=", value,
+                               ", retcode=", rcode);
+        }
+    }
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/* Load a module from a DSO */
+static CONF_MODULE *module_load_dso(const CONF *cnf,
+                                    const char *name, const char *value)
+{
+    DSO *dso = NULL;
+    conf_init_func *ifunc;
+    conf_finish_func *ffunc;
+    const char *path = NULL;
+    int errcode = 0;
+    CONF_MODULE *md;
+    /* Look for alternative path in module section */
+    path = NCONF_get_string(cnf, value, "path");
+    if (!path) {
+        ERR_clear_error();
+        path = name;
+    }
+    dso = DSO_load(NULL, path, NULL, 0);
+    if (!dso) {
+        errcode = CONF_R_ERROR_LOADING_DSO;
+        goto err;
+    }
+    ifunc = (conf_init_func *)DSO_bind_func(dso, DSO_mod_init_name);
+    if (!ifunc) {
+        errcode = CONF_R_MISSING_INIT_FUNCTION;
+        goto err;
+    }
+    ffunc = (conf_finish_func *)DSO_bind_func(dso, DSO_mod_finish_name);
+    /* All OK, add module */
+    md = module_add(dso, name, ifunc, ffunc);
+
+    if (!md)
+        goto err;
+
+    return md;
+
+ err:
+    DSO_free(dso);
+    CONFerr(CONF_F_MODULE_LOAD_DSO, errcode);
+    ERR_add_error_data(4, "module=", name, ", path=", path);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+/* add module to list */
+static CONF_MODULE *module_add(DSO *dso, const char *name,
+                               conf_init_func *ifunc, conf_finish_func *ffunc)
+{
+    CONF_MODULE *tmod = NULL;
+    if (supported_modules == NULL)
+        supported_modules = sk_CONF_MODULE_new_null();
+    if (supported_modules == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    tmod = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*tmod));
+    if (tmod == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+
+    tmod->dso = dso;
+    tmod->name = OPENSSL_strdup(name);
+    tmod->init = ifunc;
+    tmod->finish = ffunc;
+    if (tmod->name == NULL) {
+        OPENSSL_free(tmod);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    if (!sk_CONF_MODULE_push(supported_modules, tmod)) {
+        OPENSSL_free(tmod->name);
+        OPENSSL_free(tmod);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    return tmod;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Find a module from the list. We allow module names of the form
+ * modname.XXXX to just search for modname to allow the same module to be
+ * initialized more than once.
+ */
+
+static CONF_MODULE *module_find(const char *name)
+{
+    CONF_MODULE *tmod;
+    int i, nchar;
+    char *p;
+    p = strrchr(name, '.');
+
+    if (p)
+        nchar = p - name;
+    else
+        nchar = strlen(name);
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_MODULE_num(supported_modules); i++) {
+        tmod = sk_CONF_MODULE_value(supported_modules, i);
+        if (strncmp(tmod->name, name, nchar) == 0)
+            return tmod;
+    }
+
+    return NULL;
+
+}
+
+/* initialize a module */
+static int module_init(CONF_MODULE *pmod, const char *name, const char *value,
+                       const CONF *cnf)
+{
+    int ret = 1;
+    int init_called = 0;
+    CONF_IMODULE *imod = NULL;
+
+    /* Otherwise add initialized module to list */
+    imod = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*imod));
+    if (imod == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    imod->pmod = pmod;
+    imod->name = OPENSSL_strdup(name);
+    imod->value = OPENSSL_strdup(value);
+    imod->usr_data = NULL;
+
+    if (!imod->name || !imod->value)
+        goto memerr;
+
+    /* Try to initialize module */
+    if (pmod->init) {
+        ret = pmod->init(imod, cnf);
+        init_called = 1;
+        /* Error occurred, exit */
+        if (ret <= 0)
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (initialized_modules == NULL) {
+        initialized_modules = sk_CONF_IMODULE_new_null();
+        if (!initialized_modules) {
+            CONFerr(CONF_F_MODULE_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (!sk_CONF_IMODULE_push(initialized_modules, imod)) {
+        CONFerr(CONF_F_MODULE_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    pmod->links++;
+
+    return ret;
+
+ err:
+
+    /* We've started the module so we'd better finish it */
+    if (pmod->finish && init_called)
+        pmod->finish(imod);
+
+ memerr:
+    if (imod) {
+        OPENSSL_free(imod->name);
+        OPENSSL_free(imod->value);
+        OPENSSL_free(imod);
+    }
+
+    return -1;
+
+}
+
+/*
+ * Unload any dynamic modules that have a link count of zero: i.e. have no
+ * active initialized modules. If 'all' is set then all modules are unloaded
+ * including static ones.
+ */
+
+void CONF_modules_unload(int all)
+{
+    int i;
+    CONF_MODULE *md;
+    CONF_modules_finish();
+    /* unload modules in reverse order */
+    for (i = sk_CONF_MODULE_num(supported_modules) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+        md = sk_CONF_MODULE_value(supported_modules, i);
+        /* If static or in use and 'all' not set ignore it */
+        if (((md->links > 0) || !md->dso) && !all)
+            continue;
+        /* Since we're working in reverse this is OK */
+        (void)sk_CONF_MODULE_delete(supported_modules, i);
+        module_free(md);
+    }
+    if (sk_CONF_MODULE_num(supported_modules) == 0) {
+        sk_CONF_MODULE_free(supported_modules);
+        supported_modules = NULL;
+    }
+}
+
+/* unload a single module */
+static void module_free(CONF_MODULE *md)
+{
+    DSO_free(md->dso);
+    OPENSSL_free(md->name);
+    OPENSSL_free(md);
+}
+
+/* finish and free up all modules instances */
+
+void CONF_modules_finish(void)
+{
+    CONF_IMODULE *imod;
+    while (sk_CONF_IMODULE_num(initialized_modules) > 0) {
+        imod = sk_CONF_IMODULE_pop(initialized_modules);
+        module_finish(imod);
+    }
+    sk_CONF_IMODULE_free(initialized_modules);
+    initialized_modules = NULL;
+}
+
+/* finish a module instance */
+
+static void module_finish(CONF_IMODULE *imod)
+{
+    if (!imod)
+        return;
+    if (imod->pmod->finish)
+        imod->pmod->finish(imod);
+    imod->pmod->links--;
+    OPENSSL_free(imod->name);
+    OPENSSL_free(imod->value);
+    OPENSSL_free(imod);
+}
+
+/* Add a static module to OpenSSL */
+
+int CONF_module_add(const char *name, conf_init_func *ifunc,
+                    conf_finish_func *ffunc)
+{
+    if (module_add(NULL, name, ifunc, ffunc))
+        return 1;
+    else
+        return 0;
+}
+
+void conf_modules_free_int(void)
+{
+    CONF_modules_finish();
+    CONF_modules_unload(1);
+}
+
+/* Utility functions */
+
+const char *CONF_imodule_get_name(const CONF_IMODULE *md)
+{
+    return md->name;
+}
+
+const char *CONF_imodule_get_value(const CONF_IMODULE *md)
+{
+    return md->value;
+}
+
+void *CONF_imodule_get_usr_data(const CONF_IMODULE *md)
+{
+    return md->usr_data;
+}
+
+void CONF_imodule_set_usr_data(CONF_IMODULE *md, void *usr_data)
+{
+    md->usr_data = usr_data;
+}
+
+CONF_MODULE *CONF_imodule_get_module(const CONF_IMODULE *md)
+{
+    return md->pmod;
+}
+
+unsigned long CONF_imodule_get_flags(const CONF_IMODULE *md)
+{
+    return md->flags;
+}
+
+void CONF_imodule_set_flags(CONF_IMODULE *md, unsigned long flags)
+{
+    md->flags = flags;
+}
+
+void *CONF_module_get_usr_data(CONF_MODULE *pmod)
+{
+    return pmod->usr_data;
+}
+
+void CONF_module_set_usr_data(CONF_MODULE *pmod, void *usr_data)
+{
+    pmod->usr_data = usr_data;
+}
+
+/* Return default config file name */
+
+char *CONF_get1_default_config_file(void)
+{
+    char *file;
+    int len;
+
+    file = getenv("OPENSSL_CONF");
+    if (file)
+        return OPENSSL_strdup(file);
+
+    len = strlen(X509_get_default_cert_area());
+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+    len++;
+#endif
+    len += strlen(OPENSSL_CONF);
+
+    file = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1);
+
+    if (file == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    OPENSSL_strlcpy(file, X509_get_default_cert_area(), len + 1);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+    OPENSSL_strlcat(file, "/", len + 1);
+#endif
+    OPENSSL_strlcat(file, OPENSSL_CONF, len + 1);
+
+    return file;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function takes a list separated by 'sep' and calls the callback
+ * function giving the start and length of each member optionally stripping
+ * leading and trailing whitespace. This can be used to parse comma separated
+ * lists for example.
+ */
+
+int CONF_parse_list(const char *list_, int sep, int nospc,
+                    int (*list_cb) (const char *elem, int len, void *usr),
+                    void *arg)
+{
+    int ret;
+    const char *lstart, *tmpend, *p;
+
+    if (list_ == NULL) {
+        CONFerr(CONF_F_CONF_PARSE_LIST, CONF_R_LIST_CANNOT_BE_NULL);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    lstart = list_;
+    for (;;) {
+        if (nospc) {
+            while (*lstart && isspace((unsigned char)*lstart))
+                lstart++;
+        }
+        p = strchr(lstart, sep);
+        if (p == lstart || !*lstart)
+            ret = list_cb(NULL, 0, arg);
+        else {
+            if (p)
+                tmpend = p - 1;
+            else
+                tmpend = lstart + strlen(lstart) - 1;
+            if (nospc) {
+                while (isspace((unsigned char)*tmpend))
+                    tmpend--;
+            }
+            ret = list_cb(lstart, tmpend - lstart + 1, arg);
+        }
+        if (ret <= 0)
+            return ret;
+        if (p == NULL)
+            return 1;
+        lstart = p + 1;
+    }
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/conf/conf_sap.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/conf/conf_sap.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bed95ab
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/conf/conf_sap.c
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <internal/conf.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+
+/*
+ * This is the automatic configuration loader: it is called automatically by
+ * OpenSSL when any of a number of standard initialisation functions are
+ * called, unless this is overridden by calling OPENSSL_no_config()
+ */
+
+static int openssl_configured = 0;
+
+#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+void OPENSSL_config(const char *appname)
+{
+    OPENSSL_INIT_SETTINGS settings;
+
+    memset(&settings, 0, sizeof(settings));
+    if (appname != NULL)
+        settings.appname = strdup(appname);
+    OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_CONFIG, &settings);
+}
+#endif
+
+void openssl_config_int(const char *appname)
+{
+    if (openssl_configured)
+        return;
+
+    OPENSSL_load_builtin_modules();
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    /* Need to load ENGINEs */
+    ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
+#endif
+    ERR_clear_error();
+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI
+    CONF_modules_load_file(NULL, appname,
+                               CONF_MFLAGS_DEFAULT_SECTION |
+                               CONF_MFLAGS_IGNORE_MISSING_FILE);
+#endif
+    openssl_configured = 1;
+}
+
+void openssl_no_config_int(void)
+{
+    openssl_configured = 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/conf/keysets.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/conf/keysets.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5af08ae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/conf/keysets.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+$NUMBER=0x01;
+$UPPER=0x02;
+$LOWER=0x04;
+$UNDER=0x100;
+$PUNCTUATION=0x200;
+$WS=0x10;
+$ESC=0x20;
+$QUOTE=0x40;
+$DQUOTE=0x400;
+$COMMENT=0x80;
+$FCOMMENT=0x800;
+$EOF=0x08;
+$HIGHBIT=0x1000;
+
+foreach (0 .. 255)
+	{
+	$v=0;
+	$c=sprintf("%c",$_);
+	$v|=$NUMBER	if ($c =~ /[0-9]/);
+	$v|=$UPPER	if ($c =~ /[A-Z]/);
+	$v|=$LOWER	if ($c =~ /[a-z]/);
+	$v|=$UNDER	if ($c =~ /_/);
+	$v|=$PUNCTUATION if ($c =~ /[!\.%&\*\+,\/;\?\@\^\~\|-]/);
+	$v|=$WS		if ($c =~ /[ \t\r\n]/);
+	$v|=$ESC	if ($c =~ /\\/);
+	$v|=$QUOTE	if ($c =~ /['`"]/); # for emacs: "`'}/)
+	$v|=$COMMENT	if ($c =~ /\#/);
+	$v|=$EOF	if ($c =~ /\0/);
+	$v|=$HIGHBIT	if ($c =~/[\x80-\xff]/);
+
+	push(@V_def,$v);
+	}
+
+foreach (0 .. 255)
+	{
+	$v=0;
+	$c=sprintf("%c",$_);
+	$v|=$NUMBER	if ($c =~ /[0-9]/);
+	$v|=$UPPER	if ($c =~ /[A-Z]/);
+	$v|=$LOWER	if ($c =~ /[a-z]/);
+	$v|=$UNDER	if ($c =~ /_/);
+	$v|=$PUNCTUATION if ($c =~ /[!\.%&\*\+,\/;\?\@\^\~\|-]/);
+	$v|=$WS		if ($c =~ /[ \t\r\n]/);
+	$v|=$DQUOTE	if ($c =~ /["]/); # for emacs: "}/)
+	$v|=$FCOMMENT	if ($c =~ /;/);
+	$v|=$EOF	if ($c =~ /\0/);
+	$v|=$HIGHBIT	if ($c =~/[\x80-\xff]/);
+
+	push(@V_w32,$v);
+	}
+
+print <<"EOF";
+/*
+ * WARNING: do not edit!
+ * Generated by crypto/conf/keysets.pl
+ *
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#define CONF_NUMBER             $NUMBER
+#define CONF_UPPER              $UPPER
+#define CONF_LOWER              $LOWER
+#define CONF_UNDER              $UNDER
+#define CONF_PUNCTUATION        $PUNCTUATION
+#define CONF_WS                 $WS
+#define CONF_ESC                $ESC
+#define CONF_QUOTE              $QUOTE
+#define CONF_DQUOTE             $DQUOTE
+#define CONF_COMMENT            $COMMENT
+#define CONF_FCOMMENT           $FCOMMENT
+#define CONF_EOF                $EOF
+#define CONF_HIGHBIT            $HIGHBIT
+#define CONF_ALPHA              (CONF_UPPER|CONF_LOWER)
+#define CONF_ALPHA_NUMERIC      (CONF_ALPHA|CONF_NUMBER|CONF_UNDER)
+#define CONF_ALPHA_NUMERIC_PUNCT (CONF_ALPHA|CONF_NUMBER|CONF_UNDER| \\
+                                        CONF_PUNCTUATION)
+
+#define KEYTYPES(c)             ((const unsigned short *)((c)->meth_data))
+#ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+# define IS_COMMENT(c,a)         (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_COMMENT)
+# define IS_FCOMMENT(c,a)        (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_FCOMMENT)
+# define IS_EOF(c,a)             (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_EOF)
+# define IS_ESC(c,a)             (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_ESC)
+# define IS_NUMBER(c,a)          (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_NUMBER)
+# define IS_WS(c,a)              (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_WS)
+# define IS_ALPHA_NUMERIC(c,a)   (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_ALPHA_NUMERIC)
+# define IS_ALPHA_NUMERIC_PUNCT(c,a) \\
+                                (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_ALPHA_NUMERIC_PUNCT)
+# define IS_QUOTE(c,a)           (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_QUOTE)
+# define IS_DQUOTE(c,a)          (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_DQUOTE)
+# define IS_HIGHBIT(c,a)         (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_HIGHBIT)
+
+#else                           /* CHARSET_EBCDIC */
+
+# define IS_COMMENT(c,a)         (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a & 0xff]]&CONF_COMMENT)
+# define IS_FCOMMENT(c,a)        (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a & 0xff]]&CONF_FCOMMENT)
+# define IS_EOF(c,a)             (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a & 0xff]]&CONF_EOF)
+# define IS_ESC(c,a)             (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a & 0xff]]&CONF_ESC)
+# define IS_NUMBER(c,a)          (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a & 0xff]]&CONF_NUMBER)
+# define IS_WS(c,a)              (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a & 0xff]]&CONF_WS)
+# define IS_ALPHA_NUMERIC(c,a)   (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a & 0xff]]&CONF_ALPHA_NUMERIC)
+# define IS_ALPHA_NUMERIC_PUNCT(c,a) \\
+                                (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a & 0xff]]&CONF_ALPHA_NUMERIC_PUNCT)
+# define IS_QUOTE(c,a)           (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a & 0xff]]&CONF_QUOTE)
+# define IS_DQUOTE(c,a)          (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a & 0xff]]&CONF_DQUOTE)
+# define IS_HIGHBIT(c,a)         (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a & 0xff]]&CONF_HIGHBIT)
+#endif                          /* CHARSET_EBCDIC */
+
+EOF
+
+print "static const unsigned short CONF_type_default[256] = {";
+
+for ($i=0; $i<256; $i++)
+	{
+	print "\n   " if ($i % 8) == 0;
+	printf " 0x%04X,",$V_def[$i];
+	}
+
+print "\n};\n\n";
+
+print "static const unsigned short CONF_type_win32[256] = {";
+
+for ($i=0; $i<256; $i++)
+	{
+	print "\n   " if ($i % 8) == 0;
+	printf " 0x%04X,",$V_w32[$i];
+	}
+
+print "\n};\n";
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cpt_err.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cpt_err.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c28dcf1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cpt_err.c
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+/*
+ * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+
+# define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CRYPTO,func,0)
+# define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CRYPTO,0,reason)
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA CRYPTO_str_functs[] = {
+    {ERR_FUNC(CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_DUP_EX_DATA), "CRYPTO_dup_ex_data"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_FREE_EX_DATA), "CRYPTO_free_ex_data"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_GET_EX_NEW_INDEX), "CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_MEMDUP), "CRYPTO_memdup"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_NEW_EX_DATA), "CRYPTO_new_ex_data"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_SET_EX_DATA), "CRYPTO_set_ex_data"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CRYPTO_F_FIPS_MODE_SET), "FIPS_mode_set"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CRYPTO_F_GET_AND_LOCK), "get_and_lock"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CRYPTO_F_OPENSSL_BUF2HEXSTR), "OPENSSL_buf2hexstr"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CRYPTO_F_OPENSSL_HEXSTR2BUF), "OPENSSL_hexstr2buf"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CRYPTO_F_OPENSSL_INIT_CRYPTO), "OPENSSL_init_crypto"},
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA CRYPTO_str_reasons[] = {
+    {ERR_REASON(CRYPTO_R_FIPS_MODE_NOT_SUPPORTED), "fips mode not supported"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CRYPTO_R_ILLEGAL_HEX_DIGIT), "illegal hex digit"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CRYPTO_R_ODD_NUMBER_OF_DIGITS), "odd number of digits"},
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+
+#endif
+
+int ERR_load_CRYPTO_strings(void)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+
+    if (ERR_func_error_string(CRYPTO_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) {
+        ERR_load_strings(0, CRYPTO_str_functs);
+        ERR_load_strings(0, CRYPTO_str_reasons);
+    }
+#endif
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cryptlib.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cryptlib.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d93bcd3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cryptlib.c
@@ -0,0 +1,356 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ * ECDH support in OpenSSL originally developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ */
+
+#include "internal/cryptlib_int.h"
+#include <openssl/safestack.h>
+
+#if     defined(__i386)   || defined(__i386__)   || defined(_M_IX86) || \
+        defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
+        defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64)
+
+extern unsigned int OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[4];
+
+# if defined(OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && !defined(I386_ONLY)
+#include <stdio.h>
+#  define OPENSSL_CPUID_SETUP
+typedef uint64_t IA32CAP;
+void OPENSSL_cpuid_setup(void)
+{
+    static int trigger = 0;
+    IA32CAP OPENSSL_ia32_cpuid(unsigned int *);
+    IA32CAP vec;
+    char *env;
+
+    if (trigger)
+        return;
+
+    trigger = 1;
+    if ((env = getenv("OPENSSL_ia32cap"))) {
+        int off = (env[0] == '~') ? 1 : 0;
+#  if defined(_WIN32)
+        if (!sscanf(env + off, "%I64i", &vec))
+            vec = strtoul(env + off, NULL, 0);
+#  else
+        if (!sscanf(env + off, "%lli", (long long *)&vec))
+            vec = strtoul(env + off, NULL, 0);
+#  endif
+        if (off) {
+            IA32CAP mask = vec;
+            vec = OPENSSL_ia32_cpuid(OPENSSL_ia32cap_P) & ~mask;
+            if (mask & (1<<24)) {
+                /*
+                 * User disables FXSR bit, mask even other capabilities
+                 * that operate exclusively on XMM, so we don't have to
+                 * double-check all the time. We mask PCLMULQDQ, AMD XOP,
+                 * AES-NI and AVX. Formally speaking we don't have to
+                 * do it in x86_64 case, but we can safely assume that
+                 * x86_64 users won't actually flip this flag.
+                 */
+                vec &= ~((IA32CAP)(1<<1|1<<11|1<<25|1<<28) << 32);
+            }
+        } else if (env[0] == ':') {
+            vec = OPENSSL_ia32_cpuid(OPENSSL_ia32cap_P);
+        }
+
+        if ((env = strchr(env, ':'))) {
+            unsigned int vecx;
+            env++;
+            off = (env[0] == '~') ? 1 : 0;
+            vecx = strtoul(env + off, NULL, 0);
+            if (off)
+                OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[2] &= ~vecx;
+            else
+                OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[2] = vecx;
+        } else {
+            OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[2] = 0;
+        }
+    } else {
+        vec = OPENSSL_ia32_cpuid(OPENSSL_ia32cap_P);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * |(1<<10) sets a reserved bit to signal that variable
+     * was initialized already... This is to avoid interference
+     * with cpuid snippets in ELF .init segment.
+     */
+    OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[0] = (unsigned int)vec | (1 << 10);
+    OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] = (unsigned int)(vec >> 32);
+}
+# else
+unsigned int OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[4];
+# endif
+#endif
+int OPENSSL_NONPIC_relocated = 0;
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_CPUID_SETUP) && !defined(OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ)
+void OPENSSL_cpuid_setup(void)
+{
+}
+#endif
+
+#if defined(_WIN32)
+# include <tchar.h>
+# include <signal.h>
+# ifdef __WATCOMC__
+#  if defined(_UNICODE) || defined(__UNICODE__)
+#   define _vsntprintf _vsnwprintf
+#  else
+#   define _vsntprintf _vsnprintf
+#  endif
+# endif
+# ifdef _MSC_VER
+#  define alloca _alloca
+# endif
+
+# if defined(_WIN32_WINNT) && _WIN32_WINNT>=0x0333
+int OPENSSL_isservice(void)
+{
+    HWINSTA h;
+    DWORD len;
+    WCHAR *name;
+    static union {
+        void *p;
+        FARPROC f;
+    } _OPENSSL_isservice = {
+        NULL
+    };
+
+    if (_OPENSSL_isservice.p == NULL) {
+        HANDLE mod = GetModuleHandle(NULL);
+        if (mod != NULL)
+            _OPENSSL_isservice.f = GetProcAddress(mod, "_OPENSSL_isservice");
+        if (_OPENSSL_isservice.p == NULL)
+            _OPENSSL_isservice.p = (void *)-1;
+    }
+
+    if (_OPENSSL_isservice.p != (void *)-1)
+        return (*_OPENSSL_isservice.f) ();
+
+    h = GetProcessWindowStation();
+    if (h == NULL)
+        return -1;
+
+    if (GetUserObjectInformationW(h, UOI_NAME, NULL, 0, &len) ||
+        GetLastError() != ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_BUFFER)
+        return -1;
+
+    if (len > 512)
+        return -1;              /* paranoia */
+    len++, len &= ~1;           /* paranoia */
+    name = (WCHAR *)alloca(len + sizeof(WCHAR));
+    if (!GetUserObjectInformationW(h, UOI_NAME, name, len, &len))
+        return -1;
+
+    len++, len &= ~1;           /* paranoia */
+    name[len / sizeof(WCHAR)] = L'\0'; /* paranoia */
+#  if 1
+    /*
+     * This doesn't cover "interactive" services [working with real
+     * WinSta0's] nor programs started non-interactively by Task Scheduler
+     * [those are working with SAWinSta].
+     */
+    if (wcsstr(name, L"Service-0x"))
+        return 1;
+#  else
+    /* This covers all non-interactive programs such as services. */
+    if (!wcsstr(name, L"WinSta0"))
+        return 1;
+#  endif
+    else
+        return 0;
+}
+# else
+int OPENSSL_isservice(void)
+{
+    return 0;
+}
+# endif
+
+void OPENSSL_showfatal(const char *fmta, ...)
+{
+    va_list ap;
+    TCHAR buf[256];
+    const TCHAR *fmt;
+# ifdef STD_ERROR_HANDLE        /* what a dirty trick! */
+    HANDLE h;
+
+    if ((h = GetStdHandle(STD_ERROR_HANDLE)) != NULL &&
+        GetFileType(h) != FILE_TYPE_UNKNOWN) {
+        /* must be console application */
+        int len;
+        DWORD out;
+
+        va_start(ap, fmta);
+        len = _vsnprintf((char *)buf, sizeof(buf), fmta, ap);
+        WriteFile(h, buf, len < 0 ? sizeof(buf) : (DWORD) len, &out, NULL);
+        va_end(ap);
+        return;
+    }
+# endif
+
+    if (sizeof(TCHAR) == sizeof(char))
+        fmt = (const TCHAR *)fmta;
+    else
+        do {
+            int keepgoing;
+            size_t len_0 = strlen(fmta) + 1, i;
+            WCHAR *fmtw;
+
+            fmtw = (WCHAR *)alloca(len_0 * sizeof(WCHAR));
+            if (fmtw == NULL) {
+                fmt = (const TCHAR *)L"no stack?";
+                break;
+            }
+            if (!MultiByteToWideChar(CP_ACP, 0, fmta, len_0, fmtw, len_0))
+                for (i = 0; i < len_0; i++)
+                    fmtw[i] = (WCHAR)fmta[i];
+            for (i = 0; i < len_0; i++) {
+                if (fmtw[i] == L'%')
+                    do {
+                        keepgoing = 0;
+                        switch (fmtw[i + 1]) {
+                        case L'0':
+                        case L'1':
+                        case L'2':
+                        case L'3':
+                        case L'4':
+                        case L'5':
+                        case L'6':
+                        case L'7':
+                        case L'8':
+                        case L'9':
+                        case L'.':
+                        case L'*':
+                        case L'-':
+                            i++;
+                            keepgoing = 1;
+                            break;
+                        case L's':
+                            fmtw[i + 1] = L'S';
+                            break;
+                        case L'S':
+                            fmtw[i + 1] = L's';
+                            break;
+                        case L'c':
+                            fmtw[i + 1] = L'C';
+                            break;
+                        case L'C':
+                            fmtw[i + 1] = L'c';
+                            break;
+                        }
+                    } while (keepgoing);
+            }
+            fmt = (const TCHAR *)fmtw;
+        } while (0);
+
+    va_start(ap, fmta);
+    _vsntprintf(buf, OSSL_NELEM(buf) - 1, fmt, ap);
+    buf[OSSL_NELEM(buf) - 1] = _T('\0');
+    va_end(ap);
+
+# if defined(_WIN32_WINNT) && _WIN32_WINNT>=0x0333
+    /* this -------------v--- guards NT-specific calls */
+    if (check_winnt() && OPENSSL_isservice() > 0) {
+        HANDLE hEventLog = RegisterEventSource(NULL, _T("OpenSSL"));
+
+        if (hEventLog != NULL) {
+            const TCHAR *pmsg = buf;
+
+            if (!ReportEvent(hEventLog, EVENTLOG_ERROR_TYPE, 0, 0, NULL,
+                             1, 0, &pmsg, NULL)) {
+#if defined(DEBUG)
+                /*
+                 * We are in a situation where we tried to report a critical
+                 * error and this failed for some reason. As a last resort,
+                 * in debug builds, send output to the debugger or any other
+                 * tool like DebugView which can monitor the output.
+                 */
+                OutputDebugString(pmsg);
+#endif
+            }
+
+            (void)DeregisterEventSource(hEventLog);
+        }
+    } else
+# endif
+        MessageBox(NULL, buf, _T("OpenSSL: FATAL"), MB_OK | MB_ICONERROR);
+}
+#else
+void OPENSSL_showfatal(const char *fmta, ...)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+    va_list ap;
+
+    va_start(ap, fmta);
+    vfprintf(stderr, fmta, ap);
+    va_end(ap);
+#endif
+}
+
+int OPENSSL_isservice(void)
+{
+    return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+void OPENSSL_die(const char *message, const char *file, int line)
+{
+    OPENSSL_showfatal("%s:%d: OpenSSL internal error: %s\n",
+                      file, line, message);
+#if !defined(_WIN32)
+    abort();
+#else
+    /*
+     * Win32 abort() customarily shows a dialog, but we just did that...
+     */
+# if !defined(_WIN32_WCE)
+    raise(SIGABRT);
+# endif
+    _exit(3);
+#endif
+}
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ)
+/* volatile unsigned char* pointers are there because
+ * 1. Accessing a variable declared volatile via a pointer
+ *    that lacks a volatile qualifier causes undefined behavior.
+ * 2. When the variable itself is not volatile the compiler is
+ *    not required to keep all those reads and can convert
+ *    this into canonical memcmp() which doesn't read the whole block.
+ * Pointers to volatile resolve the first problem fully. The second
+ * problem cannot be resolved in any Standard-compliant way but this
+ * works the problem around. Compilers typically react to
+ * pointers to volatile by preserving the reads and writes through them.
+ * The latter is not required by the Standard if the memory pointed to
+ * is not volatile.
+ * Pointers themselves are volatile in the function signature to work
+ * around a subtle bug in gcc 4.6+ which causes writes through
+ * pointers to volatile to not be emitted in some rare,
+ * never needed in real life, pieces of code.
+ */
+int CRYPTO_memcmp(const volatile void * volatile in_a,
+                  const volatile void * volatile in_b,
+                  size_t len)
+{
+    size_t i;
+    const volatile unsigned char *a = in_a;
+    const volatile unsigned char *b = in_b;
+    unsigned char x = 0;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
+        x |= a[i] ^ b[i];
+
+    return x;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ct/build.info b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ct/build.info
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3ca0e31
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ct/build.info
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+LIBS=../../libcrypto
+SOURCE[../../libcrypto]= ct_b64.c ct_err.c ct_log.c ct_oct.c ct_policy.c \
+                         ct_prn.c ct_sct.c ct_sct_ctx.c ct_vfy.c ct_x509v3.c
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ct/ct_b64.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ct/ct_b64.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f0bf3af
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ct/ct_b64.c
@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/ct.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+#include "ct_locl.h"
+
+/*
+ * Decodes the base64 string |in| into |out|.
+ * A new string will be malloc'd and assigned to |out|. This will be owned by
+ * the caller. Do not provide a pre-allocated string in |out|.
+ */
+static int ct_base64_decode(const char *in, unsigned char **out)
+{
+    size_t inlen = strlen(in);
+    int outlen;
+    unsigned char *outbuf = NULL;
+
+    if (inlen == 0) {
+        *out = NULL;
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    outlen = (inlen / 4) * 3;
+    outbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(outlen);
+    if (outbuf == NULL) {
+        CTerr(CT_F_CT_BASE64_DECODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    outlen = EVP_DecodeBlock(outbuf, (unsigned char *)in, inlen);
+    if (outlen < 0) {
+        CTerr(CT_F_CT_BASE64_DECODE, CT_R_BASE64_DECODE_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* Subtract padding bytes from |outlen| */
+    while (in[--inlen] == '=') {
+        --outlen;
+    }
+
+    *out = outbuf;
+    return outlen;
+err:
+    OPENSSL_free(outbuf);
+    return -1;
+}
+
+SCT *SCT_new_from_base64(unsigned char version, const char *logid_base64,
+                         ct_log_entry_type_t entry_type, uint64_t timestamp,
+                         const char *extensions_base64,
+                         const char *signature_base64)
+{
+    SCT *sct = SCT_new();
+    unsigned char *dec = NULL;
+    const unsigned char* p = NULL;
+    int declen;
+
+    if (sct == NULL) {
+        CTerr(CT_F_SCT_NEW_FROM_BASE64, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * RFC6962 section 4.1 says we "MUST NOT expect this to be 0", but we
+     * can only construct SCT versions that have been defined.
+     */
+    if (!SCT_set_version(sct, version)) {
+        CTerr(CT_F_SCT_NEW_FROM_BASE64, CT_R_SCT_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    declen = ct_base64_decode(logid_base64, &dec);
+    if (declen < 0) {
+        CTerr(CT_F_SCT_NEW_FROM_BASE64, X509_R_BASE64_DECODE_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (!SCT_set0_log_id(sct, dec, declen))
+        goto err;
+    dec = NULL;
+
+    declen = ct_base64_decode(extensions_base64, &dec);
+    if (declen < 0) {
+        CTerr(CT_F_SCT_NEW_FROM_BASE64, X509_R_BASE64_DECODE_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    SCT_set0_extensions(sct, dec, declen);
+    dec = NULL;
+
+    declen = ct_base64_decode(signature_base64, &dec);
+    if (declen < 0) {
+        CTerr(CT_F_SCT_NEW_FROM_BASE64, X509_R_BASE64_DECODE_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    p = dec;
+    if (o2i_SCT_signature(sct, &p, declen) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    OPENSSL_free(dec);
+    dec = NULL;
+
+    SCT_set_timestamp(sct, timestamp);
+
+    if (!SCT_set_log_entry_type(sct, entry_type))
+        goto err;
+
+    return sct;
+
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_free(dec);
+    SCT_free(sct);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Allocate, build and returns a new |ct_log| from input |pkey_base64|
+ * It returns 1 on success,
+ * 0 on decoding failure, or invalid parameter if any
+ * -1 on internal (malloc) failure
+ */
+int CTLOG_new_from_base64(CTLOG **ct_log, const char *pkey_base64, const char *name)
+{
+    unsigned char *pkey_der = NULL;
+    int pkey_der_len = ct_base64_decode(pkey_base64, &pkey_der);
+    const unsigned char *p;
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+
+    if (ct_log == NULL) {
+        CTerr(CT_F_CTLOG_NEW_FROM_BASE64, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (pkey_der_len <= 0) {
+        CTerr(CT_F_CTLOG_NEW_FROM_BASE64, CT_R_LOG_CONF_INVALID_KEY);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    p = pkey_der;
+    pkey = d2i_PUBKEY(NULL, &p, pkey_der_len);
+    OPENSSL_free(pkey_der);
+    if (pkey == NULL) {
+        CTerr(CT_F_CTLOG_NEW_FROM_BASE64, CT_R_LOG_CONF_INVALID_KEY);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    *ct_log = CTLOG_new(pkey, name);
+    if (*ct_log == NULL) {
+        EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ct/ct_err.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ct/ct_err.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fe0778b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ct/ct_err.c
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+/*
+ * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/ct.h>
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+
+# define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CT,func,0)
+# define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CT,0,reason)
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA CT_str_functs[] = {
+    {ERR_FUNC(CT_F_CTLOG_NEW), "CTLOG_new"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CT_F_CTLOG_NEW_FROM_BASE64), "CTLOG_new_from_base64"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CT_F_CTLOG_NEW_FROM_CONF), "ctlog_new_from_conf"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CT_F_CTLOG_STORE_LOAD_CTX_NEW), "ctlog_store_load_ctx_new"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CT_F_CTLOG_STORE_LOAD_FILE), "CTLOG_STORE_load_file"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CT_F_CTLOG_STORE_LOAD_LOG), "ctlog_store_load_log"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CT_F_CTLOG_STORE_NEW), "CTLOG_STORE_new"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CT_F_CT_BASE64_DECODE), "ct_base64_decode"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CT_F_CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_NEW), "CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_new"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CT_F_CT_V1_LOG_ID_FROM_PKEY), "ct_v1_log_id_from_pkey"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CT_F_I2O_SCT), "i2o_SCT"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CT_F_I2O_SCT_LIST), "i2o_SCT_LIST"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CT_F_I2O_SCT_SIGNATURE), "i2o_SCT_signature"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CT_F_O2I_SCT), "o2i_SCT"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CT_F_O2I_SCT_LIST), "o2i_SCT_LIST"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CT_F_O2I_SCT_SIGNATURE), "o2i_SCT_signature"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CT_F_SCT_CTX_NEW), "SCT_CTX_new"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CT_F_SCT_CTX_VERIFY), "SCT_CTX_verify"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CT_F_SCT_NEW), "SCT_new"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CT_F_SCT_NEW_FROM_BASE64), "SCT_new_from_base64"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CT_F_SCT_SET0_LOG_ID), "SCT_set0_log_id"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CT_F_SCT_SET1_EXTENSIONS), "SCT_set1_extensions"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CT_F_SCT_SET1_LOG_ID), "SCT_set1_log_id"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CT_F_SCT_SET1_SIGNATURE), "SCT_set1_signature"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CT_F_SCT_SET_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE), "SCT_set_log_entry_type"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CT_F_SCT_SET_SIGNATURE_NID), "SCT_set_signature_nid"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CT_F_SCT_SET_VERSION), "SCT_set_version"},
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA CT_str_reasons[] = {
+    {ERR_REASON(CT_R_BASE64_DECODE_ERROR), "base64 decode error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CT_R_INVALID_LOG_ID_LENGTH), "invalid log id length"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CT_R_LOG_CONF_INVALID), "log conf invalid"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CT_R_LOG_CONF_INVALID_KEY), "log conf invalid key"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CT_R_LOG_CONF_MISSING_DESCRIPTION),
+     "log conf missing description"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CT_R_LOG_CONF_MISSING_KEY), "log conf missing key"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CT_R_LOG_KEY_INVALID), "log key invalid"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CT_R_SCT_FUTURE_TIMESTAMP), "sct future timestamp"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CT_R_SCT_INVALID), "sct invalid"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CT_R_SCT_INVALID_SIGNATURE), "sct invalid signature"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CT_R_SCT_LIST_INVALID), "sct list invalid"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CT_R_SCT_LOG_ID_MISMATCH), "sct log id mismatch"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CT_R_SCT_NOT_SET), "sct not set"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CT_R_SCT_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION), "sct unsupported version"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CT_R_UNRECOGNIZED_SIGNATURE_NID),
+     "unrecognized signature nid"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CT_R_UNSUPPORTED_ENTRY_TYPE), "unsupported entry type"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CT_R_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION), "unsupported version"},
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+
+#endif
+
+int ERR_load_CT_strings(void)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+
+    if (ERR_func_error_string(CT_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) {
+        ERR_load_strings(0, CT_str_functs);
+        ERR_load_strings(0, CT_str_reasons);
+    }
+#endif
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ct/ct_locl.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ct/ct_locl.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9f983c9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ct/ct_locl.h
@@ -0,0 +1,216 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <openssl/ct.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/safestack.h>
+
+/*
+ * From RFC6962: opaque SerializedSCT<1..2^16-1>; struct { SerializedSCT
+ * sct_list <1..2^16-1>; } SignedCertificateTimestampList;
+ */
+# define MAX_SCT_SIZE            65535
+# define MAX_SCT_LIST_SIZE       MAX_SCT_SIZE
+
+/*
+ * Macros to read and write integers in network-byte order.
+ */
+
+#define n2s(c,s)        ((s=(((unsigned int)((c)[0]))<< 8)| \
+                            (((unsigned int)((c)[1]))    )),c+=2)
+
+#define s2n(s,c)        ((c[0]=(unsigned char)(((s)>> 8)&0xff), \
+                          c[1]=(unsigned char)(((s)    )&0xff)),c+=2)
+
+#define l2n3(l,c)       ((c[0]=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \
+                          c[1]=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \
+                          c[2]=(unsigned char)(((l)    )&0xff)),c+=3)
+
+#define n2l8(c,l)       (l =((uint64_t)(*((c)++)))<<56, \
+                         l|=((uint64_t)(*((c)++)))<<48, \
+                         l|=((uint64_t)(*((c)++)))<<40, \
+                         l|=((uint64_t)(*((c)++)))<<32, \
+                         l|=((uint64_t)(*((c)++)))<<24, \
+                         l|=((uint64_t)(*((c)++)))<<16, \
+                         l|=((uint64_t)(*((c)++)))<< 8, \
+                         l|=((uint64_t)(*((c)++))))
+
+#define l2n8(l,c)       (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>56)&0xff), \
+                         *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>48)&0xff), \
+                         *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>40)&0xff), \
+                         *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>32)&0xff), \
+                         *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24)&0xff), \
+                         *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \
+                         *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \
+                         *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)    )&0xff))
+
+/* Signed Certificate Timestamp */
+struct sct_st {
+    sct_version_t version;
+    /* If version is not SCT_VERSION_V1, this contains the encoded SCT */
+    unsigned char *sct;
+    size_t sct_len;
+    /* If version is SCT_VERSION_V1, fields below contain components of the SCT */
+    unsigned char *log_id;
+    size_t log_id_len;
+    /*
+    * Note, we cannot distinguish between an unset timestamp, and one
+    * that is set to 0.  However since CT didn't exist in 1970, no real
+    * SCT should ever be set as such.
+    */
+    uint64_t timestamp;
+    unsigned char *ext;
+    size_t ext_len;
+    unsigned char hash_alg;
+    unsigned char sig_alg;
+    unsigned char *sig;
+    size_t sig_len;
+    /* Log entry type */
+    ct_log_entry_type_t entry_type;
+    /* Where this SCT was found, e.g. certificate, OCSP response, etc. */
+    sct_source_t source;
+    /* The result of the last attempt to validate this SCT. */
+    sct_validation_status_t validation_status;
+};
+
+/* Miscellaneous data that is useful when verifying an SCT  */
+struct sct_ctx_st {
+    /* Public key */
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+    /* Hash of public key */
+    unsigned char *pkeyhash;
+    size_t pkeyhashlen;
+    /* For pre-certificate: issuer public key hash */
+    unsigned char *ihash;
+    size_t ihashlen;
+    /* certificate encoding */
+    unsigned char *certder;
+    size_t certderlen;
+    /* pre-certificate encoding */
+    unsigned char *preder;
+    size_t prederlen;
+    /* milliseconds since epoch (to check that the SCT isn't from the future) */
+    uint64_t epoch_time_in_ms;
+};
+
+/* Context when evaluating whether a Certificate Transparency policy is met */
+struct ct_policy_eval_ctx_st {
+    X509 *cert;
+    X509 *issuer;
+    CTLOG_STORE *log_store;
+    /* milliseconds since epoch (to check that SCTs aren't from the future) */
+    uint64_t epoch_time_in_ms;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Creates a new context for verifying an SCT.
+ */
+SCT_CTX *SCT_CTX_new(void);
+/*
+ * Deletes an SCT verification context.
+ */
+void SCT_CTX_free(SCT_CTX *sctx);
+
+/*
+ * Sets the certificate that the SCT was created for.
+ * If *cert does not have a poison extension, presigner must be NULL.
+ * If *cert does not have a poison extension, it may have a single SCT
+ * (NID_ct_precert_scts) extension.
+ * If either *cert or *presigner have an AKID (NID_authority_key_identifier)
+ * extension, both must have one.
+ * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
+ */
+__owur int SCT_CTX_set1_cert(SCT_CTX *sctx, X509 *cert, X509 *presigner);
+
+/*
+ * Sets the issuer of the certificate that the SCT was created for.
+ * This is just a convenience method to save extracting the public key and
+ * calling SCT_CTX_set1_issuer_pubkey().
+ * Issuer must not be NULL.
+ * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
+ */
+__owur int SCT_CTX_set1_issuer(SCT_CTX *sctx, const X509 *issuer);
+
+/*
+ * Sets the public key of the issuer of the certificate that the SCT was created
+ * for.
+ * The public key must not be NULL.
+ * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
+ */
+__owur int SCT_CTX_set1_issuer_pubkey(SCT_CTX *sctx, X509_PUBKEY *pubkey);
+
+/*
+ * Sets the public key of the CT log that the SCT is from.
+ * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
+ */
+__owur int SCT_CTX_set1_pubkey(SCT_CTX *sctx, X509_PUBKEY *pubkey);
+
+/*
+ * Sets the time to evaluate the SCT against, in milliseconds since the Unix
+ * epoch. If the SCT's timestamp is after this time, it will be interpreted as
+ * having been issued in the future. RFC6962 states that "TLS clients MUST
+ * reject SCTs whose timestamp is in the future", so an SCT will not validate
+ * in this case.
+ */
+void SCT_CTX_set_time(SCT_CTX *sctx, uint64_t time_in_ms);
+
+/*
+ * Verifies an SCT with the given context.
+ * Returns 1 if the SCT verifies successfully; any other value indicates
+ * failure. See EVP_DigestVerifyFinal() for the meaning of those values.
+ */
+__owur int SCT_CTX_verify(const SCT_CTX *sctx, const SCT *sct);
+
+/*
+ * Does this SCT have the minimum fields populated to be usable?
+ * Returns 1 if so, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+__owur int SCT_is_complete(const SCT *sct);
+
+/*
+ * Does this SCT have the signature-related fields populated?
+ * Returns 1 if so, 0 otherwise.
+ * This checks that the signature and hash algorithms are set to supported
+ * values and that the signature field is set.
+ */
+__owur int SCT_signature_is_complete(const SCT *sct);
+
+/*
+ * TODO(RJPercival): Create an SCT_signature struct and make i2o_SCT_signature
+ * and o2i_SCT_signature conform to the i2d/d2i conventions.
+ */
+
+/*
+* Serialize (to TLS format) an |sct| signature and write it to |out|.
+* If |out| is null, no signature will be output but the length will be returned.
+* If |out| points to a null pointer, a string will be allocated to hold the
+* TLS-format signature. It is the responsibility of the caller to free it.
+* If |out| points to an allocated string, the signature will be written to it.
+* The length of the signature in TLS format will be returned.
+*/
+__owur int i2o_SCT_signature(const SCT *sct, unsigned char **out);
+
+/*
+* Parses an SCT signature in TLS format and populates the |sct| with it.
+* |in| should be a pointer to a string containing the TLS-format signature.
+* |in| will be advanced to the end of the signature if parsing succeeds.
+* |len| should be the length of the signature in |in|.
+* Returns the number of bytes parsed, or a negative integer if an error occurs.
+* If an error occurs, the SCT's signature NID may be updated whilst the
+* signature field itself remains unset.
+*/
+__owur int o2i_SCT_signature(SCT *sct, const unsigned char **in, size_t len);
+
+/*
+ * Handlers for Certificate Transparency X509v3/OCSP extensions
+ */
+extern const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_ct_scts[3];
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ct/ct_log.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ct/ct_log.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d442322
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ct/ct_log.c
@@ -0,0 +1,306 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/conf.h>
+#include <openssl/ct.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/safestack.h>
+
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+
+/*
+ * Information about a CT log server.
+ */
+struct ctlog_st {
+    char *name;
+    uint8_t log_id[CT_V1_HASHLEN];
+    EVP_PKEY *public_key;
+};
+
+/*
+ * A store for multiple CTLOG instances.
+ * It takes ownership of any CTLOG instances added to it.
+ */
+struct ctlog_store_st {
+    STACK_OF(CTLOG) *logs;
+};
+
+/* The context when loading a CT log list from a CONF file. */
+typedef struct ctlog_store_load_ctx_st {
+    CTLOG_STORE *log_store;
+    CONF *conf;
+    size_t invalid_log_entries;
+} CTLOG_STORE_LOAD_CTX;
+
+/*
+ * Creates an empty context for loading a CT log store.
+ * It should be populated before use.
+ */
+static CTLOG_STORE_LOAD_CTX *ctlog_store_load_ctx_new();
+
+/*
+ * Deletes a CT log store load context.
+ * Does not delete any of the fields.
+ */
+static void ctlog_store_load_ctx_free(CTLOG_STORE_LOAD_CTX* ctx);
+
+static CTLOG_STORE_LOAD_CTX *ctlog_store_load_ctx_new()
+{
+    CTLOG_STORE_LOAD_CTX *ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx));
+
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        CTerr(CT_F_CTLOG_STORE_LOAD_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+
+    return ctx;
+}
+
+static void ctlog_store_load_ctx_free(CTLOG_STORE_LOAD_CTX* ctx)
+{
+    OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+}
+
+/* Converts a log's public key into a SHA256 log ID */
+static int ct_v1_log_id_from_pkey(EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+                                  unsigned char log_id[CT_V1_HASHLEN])
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    unsigned char *pkey_der = NULL;
+    int pkey_der_len = i2d_PUBKEY(pkey, &pkey_der);
+
+    if (pkey_der_len <= 0) {
+        CTerr(CT_F_CT_V1_LOG_ID_FROM_PKEY, CT_R_LOG_KEY_INVALID);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    SHA256(pkey_der, pkey_der_len, log_id);
+    ret = 1;
+err:
+    OPENSSL_free(pkey_der);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+CTLOG_STORE *CTLOG_STORE_new(void)
+{
+    CTLOG_STORE *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
+
+    if (ret == NULL) {
+        CTerr(CT_F_CTLOG_STORE_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    ret->logs = sk_CTLOG_new_null();
+    if (ret->logs == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    return ret;
+err:
+    OPENSSL_free(ret);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+void CTLOG_STORE_free(CTLOG_STORE *store)
+{
+    if (store != NULL) {
+        sk_CTLOG_pop_free(store->logs, CTLOG_free);
+        OPENSSL_free(store);
+    }
+}
+
+static int ctlog_new_from_conf(CTLOG **ct_log, const CONF *conf, const char *section)
+{
+    const char *description = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, "description");
+    char *pkey_base64;
+
+    if (description == NULL) {
+        CTerr(CT_F_CTLOG_NEW_FROM_CONF, CT_R_LOG_CONF_MISSING_DESCRIPTION);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    pkey_base64 = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, "key");
+    if (pkey_base64 == NULL) {
+        CTerr(CT_F_CTLOG_NEW_FROM_CONF, CT_R_LOG_CONF_MISSING_KEY);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return CTLOG_new_from_base64(ct_log, pkey_base64, description);
+}
+
+int CTLOG_STORE_load_default_file(CTLOG_STORE *store)
+{
+    const char *fpath = getenv(CTLOG_FILE_EVP);
+
+    if (fpath == NULL)
+      fpath = CTLOG_FILE;
+
+    return CTLOG_STORE_load_file(store, fpath);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called by CONF_parse_list, which stops if this returns <= 0,
+ * Otherwise, one bad log entry would stop loading of any of
+ * the following log entries.
+ * It may stop parsing and returns -1 on any internal (malloc) error.
+ */
+static int ctlog_store_load_log(const char *log_name, int log_name_len,
+                                void *arg)
+{
+    CTLOG_STORE_LOAD_CTX *load_ctx = arg;
+    CTLOG *ct_log = NULL;
+    /* log_name may not be null-terminated, so fix that before using it */
+    char *tmp;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    /* log_name will be NULL for empty list entries */
+    if (log_name == NULL)
+        return 1;
+
+    tmp = OPENSSL_strndup(log_name, log_name_len);
+    if (tmp == NULL)
+        goto mem_err;
+
+    ret = ctlog_new_from_conf(&ct_log, load_ctx->conf, tmp);
+    OPENSSL_free(tmp);
+
+    if (ret < 0) {
+        /* Propagate any internal error */
+        return ret;
+    }
+    if (ret == 0) {
+        /* If we can't load this log, record that fact and skip it */
+        ++load_ctx->invalid_log_entries;
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    if (!sk_CTLOG_push(load_ctx->log_store->logs, ct_log)) {
+        goto mem_err;
+    }
+    return 1;
+
+mem_err:
+    CTLOG_free(ct_log);
+    CTerr(CT_F_CTLOG_STORE_LOAD_LOG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return -1;
+}
+
+int CTLOG_STORE_load_file(CTLOG_STORE *store, const char *file)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    char *enabled_logs;
+    CTLOG_STORE_LOAD_CTX* load_ctx = ctlog_store_load_ctx_new();
+
+    if (load_ctx == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    load_ctx->log_store = store;
+    load_ctx->conf = NCONF_new(NULL);
+    if (load_ctx->conf == NULL)
+        goto end;
+
+    if (NCONF_load(load_ctx->conf, file, NULL) <= 0) {
+        CTerr(CT_F_CTLOG_STORE_LOAD_FILE, CT_R_LOG_CONF_INVALID);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    enabled_logs = NCONF_get_string(load_ctx->conf, NULL, "enabled_logs");
+    if (enabled_logs == NULL) {
+        CTerr(CT_F_CTLOG_STORE_LOAD_FILE, CT_R_LOG_CONF_INVALID);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (!CONF_parse_list(enabled_logs, ',', 1, ctlog_store_load_log, load_ctx) ||
+        load_ctx->invalid_log_entries > 0) {
+        CTerr(CT_F_CTLOG_STORE_LOAD_FILE, CT_R_LOG_CONF_INVALID);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    ret = 1;
+end:
+    NCONF_free(load_ctx->conf);
+    ctlog_store_load_ctx_free(load_ctx);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initialize a new CTLOG object.
+ * Takes ownership of the public key.
+ * Copies the name.
+ */
+CTLOG *CTLOG_new(EVP_PKEY *public_key, const char *name)
+{
+    CTLOG *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
+
+    if (ret == NULL) {
+        CTerr(CT_F_CTLOG_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    ret->name = OPENSSL_strdup(name);
+    if (ret->name == NULL) {
+        CTerr(CT_F_CTLOG_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (ct_v1_log_id_from_pkey(public_key, ret->log_id) != 1)
+        goto err;
+
+    ret->public_key = public_key;
+    return ret;
+err:
+    CTLOG_free(ret);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+/* Frees CT log and associated structures */
+void CTLOG_free(CTLOG *log)
+{
+    if (log != NULL) {
+        OPENSSL_free(log->name);
+        EVP_PKEY_free(log->public_key);
+        OPENSSL_free(log);
+    }
+}
+
+const char *CTLOG_get0_name(const CTLOG *log)
+{
+    return log->name;
+}
+
+void CTLOG_get0_log_id(const CTLOG *log, const uint8_t **log_id,
+                       size_t *log_id_len)
+{
+    *log_id = log->log_id;
+    *log_id_len = CT_V1_HASHLEN;
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY *CTLOG_get0_public_key(const CTLOG *log)
+{
+    return log->public_key;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Given a log ID, finds the matching log.
+ * Returns NULL if no match found.
+ */
+const CTLOG *CTLOG_STORE_get0_log_by_id(const CTLOG_STORE *store,
+                                        const uint8_t *log_id,
+                                        size_t log_id_len)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_CTLOG_num(store->logs); ++i) {
+        const CTLOG *log = sk_CTLOG_value(store->logs, i);
+        if (memcmp(log->log_id, log_id, log_id_len) == 0)
+            return log;
+    }
+
+    return NULL;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ct/ct_oct.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ct/ct_oct.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0dd691c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ct/ct_oct.c
@@ -0,0 +1,407 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CT
+# error "CT is disabled"
+#endif
+
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/ct.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+#include "ct_locl.h"
+
+int o2i_SCT_signature(SCT *sct, const unsigned char **in, size_t len)
+{
+    size_t siglen;
+    size_t len_remaining = len;
+    const unsigned char *p;
+
+    if (sct->version != SCT_VERSION_V1) {
+        CTerr(CT_F_O2I_SCT_SIGNATURE, CT_R_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION);
+        return -1;
+    }
+    /*
+     * digitally-signed struct header: (1 byte) Hash algorithm (1 byte)
+     * Signature algorithm (2 bytes + ?) Signature
+     *
+     * This explicitly rejects empty signatures: they're invalid for
+     * all supported algorithms.
+     */
+    if (len <= 4) {
+        CTerr(CT_F_O2I_SCT_SIGNATURE, CT_R_SCT_INVALID_SIGNATURE);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    p = *in;
+    /* Get hash and signature algorithm */
+    sct->hash_alg = *p++;
+    sct->sig_alg = *p++;
+    if (SCT_get_signature_nid(sct) == NID_undef) {
+        CTerr(CT_F_O2I_SCT_SIGNATURE, CT_R_SCT_INVALID_SIGNATURE);
+        return -1;
+    }
+    /* Retrieve signature and check it is consistent with the buffer length */
+    n2s(p, siglen);
+    len_remaining -= (p - *in);
+    if (siglen > len_remaining) {
+        CTerr(CT_F_O2I_SCT_SIGNATURE, CT_R_SCT_INVALID_SIGNATURE);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (SCT_set1_signature(sct, p, siglen) != 1)
+        return -1;
+    len_remaining -= siglen;
+    *in = p + siglen;
+
+    return len - len_remaining;
+}
+
+SCT *o2i_SCT(SCT **psct, const unsigned char **in, size_t len)
+{
+    SCT *sct = NULL;
+    const unsigned char *p;
+
+    if (len == 0 || len > MAX_SCT_SIZE) {
+        CTerr(CT_F_O2I_SCT, CT_R_SCT_INVALID);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if ((sct = SCT_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    p = *in;
+
+    sct->version = *p;
+    if (sct->version == SCT_VERSION_V1) {
+        int sig_len;
+        size_t len2;
+        /*-
+         * Fixed-length header:
+         *   struct {
+         *     Version sct_version;     (1 byte)
+         *     log_id id;               (32 bytes)
+         *     uint64 timestamp;        (8 bytes)
+         *     CtExtensions extensions; (2 bytes + ?)
+         *   }
+         */
+        if (len < 43) {
+            CTerr(CT_F_O2I_SCT, CT_R_SCT_INVALID);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        len -= 43;
+        p++;
+        sct->log_id = BUF_memdup(p, CT_V1_HASHLEN);
+        if (sct->log_id == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        sct->log_id_len = CT_V1_HASHLEN;
+        p += CT_V1_HASHLEN;
+
+        n2l8(p, sct->timestamp);
+
+        n2s(p, len2);
+        if (len < len2) {
+            CTerr(CT_F_O2I_SCT, CT_R_SCT_INVALID);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (len2 > 0) {
+            sct->ext = BUF_memdup(p, len2);
+            if (sct->ext == NULL)
+                goto err;
+        }
+        sct->ext_len = len2;
+        p += len2;
+        len -= len2;
+
+        sig_len = o2i_SCT_signature(sct, &p, len);
+        if (sig_len <= 0) {
+            CTerr(CT_F_O2I_SCT, CT_R_SCT_INVALID);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        len -= sig_len;
+        *in = p + len;
+    } else {
+        /* If not V1 just cache encoding */
+        sct->sct = BUF_memdup(p, len);
+        if (sct->sct == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        sct->sct_len = len;
+        *in = p + len;
+    }
+
+    if (psct != NULL) {
+        SCT_free(*psct);
+        *psct = sct;
+    }
+
+    return sct;
+err:
+    SCT_free(sct);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+int i2o_SCT_signature(const SCT *sct, unsigned char **out)
+{
+    size_t len;
+    unsigned char *p = NULL, *pstart = NULL;
+
+    if (!SCT_signature_is_complete(sct)) {
+        CTerr(CT_F_I2O_SCT_SIGNATURE, CT_R_SCT_INVALID_SIGNATURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (sct->version != SCT_VERSION_V1) {
+        CTerr(CT_F_I2O_SCT_SIGNATURE, CT_R_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /*
+    * (1 byte) Hash algorithm
+    * (1 byte) Signature algorithm
+    * (2 bytes + ?) Signature
+    */
+    len = 4 + sct->sig_len;
+
+    if (out != NULL) {
+        if (*out != NULL) {
+            p = *out;
+            *out += len;
+        } else {
+            pstart = p = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
+            if (p == NULL) {
+                CTerr(CT_F_I2O_SCT_SIGNATURE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            *out = p;
+        }
+
+        *p++ = sct->hash_alg;
+        *p++ = sct->sig_alg;
+        s2n(sct->sig_len, p);
+        memcpy(p, sct->sig, sct->sig_len);
+    }
+
+    return len;
+err:
+    OPENSSL_free(pstart);
+    return -1;
+}
+
+int i2o_SCT(const SCT *sct, unsigned char **out)
+{
+    size_t len;
+    unsigned char *p = NULL, *pstart = NULL;
+
+    if (!SCT_is_complete(sct)) {
+        CTerr(CT_F_I2O_SCT, CT_R_SCT_NOT_SET);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    /*
+     * Fixed-length header: struct { (1 byte) Version sct_version; (32 bytes)
+     * log_id id; (8 bytes) uint64 timestamp; (2 bytes + ?) CtExtensions
+     * extensions; (1 byte) Hash algorithm (1 byte) Signature algorithm (2
+     * bytes + ?) Signature
+     */
+    if (sct->version == SCT_VERSION_V1)
+        len = 43 + sct->ext_len + 4 + sct->sig_len;
+    else
+        len = sct->sct_len;
+
+    if (out == NULL)
+        return len;
+
+    if (*out != NULL) {
+        p = *out;
+        *out += len;
+    } else {
+        pstart = p = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
+        if (p == NULL) {
+            CTerr(CT_F_I2O_SCT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        *out = p;
+    }
+
+    if (sct->version == SCT_VERSION_V1) {
+        *p++ = sct->version;
+        memcpy(p, sct->log_id, CT_V1_HASHLEN);
+        p += CT_V1_HASHLEN;
+        l2n8(sct->timestamp, p);
+        s2n(sct->ext_len, p);
+        if (sct->ext_len > 0) {
+            memcpy(p, sct->ext, sct->ext_len);
+            p += sct->ext_len;
+        }
+        if (i2o_SCT_signature(sct, &p) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+    } else {
+        memcpy(p, sct->sct, len);
+    }
+
+    return len;
+err:
+    OPENSSL_free(pstart);
+    return -1;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(SCT) *o2i_SCT_LIST(STACK_OF(SCT) **a, const unsigned char **pp,
+                            size_t len)
+{
+    STACK_OF(SCT) *sk = NULL;
+    size_t list_len, sct_len;
+
+    if (len < 2 || len > MAX_SCT_LIST_SIZE) {
+        CTerr(CT_F_O2I_SCT_LIST, CT_R_SCT_LIST_INVALID);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    n2s(*pp, list_len);
+    if (list_len != len - 2) {
+        CTerr(CT_F_O2I_SCT_LIST, CT_R_SCT_LIST_INVALID);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    if (a == NULL || *a == NULL) {
+        sk = sk_SCT_new_null();
+        if (sk == NULL)
+            return NULL;
+    } else {
+        SCT *sct;
+
+        /* Use the given stack, but empty it first. */
+        sk = *a;
+        while ((sct = sk_SCT_pop(sk)) != NULL)
+            SCT_free(sct);
+    }
+
+    while (list_len > 0) {
+        SCT *sct;
+
+        if (list_len < 2) {
+            CTerr(CT_F_O2I_SCT_LIST, CT_R_SCT_LIST_INVALID);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        n2s(*pp, sct_len);
+        list_len -= 2;
+
+        if (sct_len == 0 || sct_len > list_len) {
+            CTerr(CT_F_O2I_SCT_LIST, CT_R_SCT_LIST_INVALID);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        list_len -= sct_len;
+
+        if ((sct = o2i_SCT(NULL, pp, sct_len)) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        if (!sk_SCT_push(sk, sct)) {
+            SCT_free(sct);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (a != NULL && *a == NULL)
+        *a = sk;
+    return sk;
+
+ err:
+    if (a == NULL || *a == NULL)
+        SCT_LIST_free(sk);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+int i2o_SCT_LIST(const STACK_OF(SCT) *a, unsigned char **pp)
+{
+    int len, sct_len, i, is_pp_new = 0;
+    size_t len2;
+    unsigned char *p = NULL, *p2;
+
+    if (pp != NULL) {
+        if (*pp == NULL) {
+            if ((len = i2o_SCT_LIST(a, NULL)) == -1) {
+                CTerr(CT_F_I2O_SCT_LIST, CT_R_SCT_LIST_INVALID);
+                return -1;
+            }
+            if ((*pp = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) {
+                CTerr(CT_F_I2O_SCT_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                return -1;
+            }
+            is_pp_new = 1;
+        }
+        p = *pp + 2;
+    }
+
+    len2 = 2;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_SCT_num(a); i++) {
+        if (pp != NULL) {
+            p2 = p;
+            p += 2;
+            if ((sct_len = i2o_SCT(sk_SCT_value(a, i), &p)) == -1)
+                goto err;
+            s2n(sct_len, p2);
+        } else {
+          if ((sct_len = i2o_SCT(sk_SCT_value(a, i), NULL)) == -1)
+              goto err;
+        }
+        len2 += 2 + sct_len;
+    }
+
+    if (len2 > MAX_SCT_LIST_SIZE)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (pp != NULL) {
+        p = *pp;
+        s2n(len2 - 2, p);
+        if (!is_pp_new)
+            *pp += len2;
+    }
+    return len2;
+
+ err:
+    if (is_pp_new) {
+        OPENSSL_free(*pp);
+        *pp = NULL;
+    }
+    return -1;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(SCT) *d2i_SCT_LIST(STACK_OF(SCT) **a, const unsigned char **pp,
+                            long len)
+{
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *oct = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(SCT) *sk = NULL;
+    const unsigned char *p;
+
+    p = *pp;
+    if (d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(&oct, &p, len) == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+
+    p = oct->data;
+    if ((sk = o2i_SCT_LIST(a, &p, oct->length)) != NULL)
+        *pp += len;
+
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(oct);
+    return sk;
+}
+
+int i2d_SCT_LIST(const STACK_OF(SCT) *a, unsigned char **out)
+{
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING oct;
+    int len;
+
+    oct.data = NULL;
+    if ((oct.length = i2o_SCT_LIST(a, &oct.data)) == -1)
+        return -1;
+
+    len = i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(&oct, out);
+    OPENSSL_free(oct.data);
+    return len;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ct/ct_policy.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ct/ct_policy.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0d7b346
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ct/ct_policy.c
@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CT
+# error "CT is disabled"
+#endif
+
+#include <openssl/ct.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <time.h>
+
+#include "ct_locl.h"
+
+/*
+ * Number of seconds in the future that an SCT timestamp can be, by default,
+ * without being considered invalid. This is added to time() when setting a
+ * default value for CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX.epoch_time_in_ms.
+ * It can be overridden by calling CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set_time().
+ */
+static const time_t SCT_CLOCK_DRIFT_TOLERANCE = 300;
+
+CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_new(void)
+{
+    CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX));
+
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+        CTerr(CT_F_CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    /* time(NULL) shouldn't ever fail, so don't bother checking for -1. */
+    ctx->epoch_time_in_ms = (uint64_t)(time(NULL) + SCT_CLOCK_DRIFT_TOLERANCE) *
+            1000;
+
+    return ctx;
+}
+
+void CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_free(CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        return;
+    X509_free(ctx->cert);
+    X509_free(ctx->issuer);
+    OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+}
+
+int CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set1_cert(CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
+{
+    if (!X509_up_ref(cert))
+        return 0;
+    ctx->cert = cert;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set1_issuer(CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx, X509 *issuer)
+{
+    if (!X509_up_ref(issuer))
+        return 0;
+    ctx->issuer = issuer;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+void CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set_shared_CTLOG_STORE(CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx,
+                                               CTLOG_STORE *log_store)
+{
+    ctx->log_store = log_store;
+}
+
+void CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set_time(CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx, uint64_t time_in_ms)
+{
+    ctx->epoch_time_in_ms = time_in_ms;
+}
+
+X509* CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_get0_cert(const CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->cert;
+}
+
+X509* CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_get0_issuer(const CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->issuer;
+}
+
+const CTLOG_STORE *CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_get0_log_store(const CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->log_store;
+}
+
+uint64_t CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_get_time(const CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->epoch_time_in_ms;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ct/ct_prn.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ct/ct_prn.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..376e045
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ct/ct_prn.c
@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CT
+# error "CT is disabled"
+#endif
+
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+
+#include "ct_locl.h"
+
+static void SCT_signature_algorithms_print(const SCT *sct, BIO *out)
+{
+    int nid = SCT_get_signature_nid(sct);
+
+    if (nid == NID_undef)
+        BIO_printf(out, "%02X%02X", sct->hash_alg, sct->sig_alg);
+    else
+        BIO_printf(out, "%s", OBJ_nid2ln(nid));
+}
+
+static void timestamp_print(uint64_t timestamp, BIO *out)
+{
+    ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *gen = ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_new();
+    char genstr[20];
+
+    if (gen == NULL)
+        return;
+    ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(gen, (time_t)0,
+                             (int)(timestamp / 86400000),
+                             (timestamp % 86400000) / 1000);
+    /*
+     * Note GeneralizedTime from ASN1_GENERALIZETIME_adj is always 15
+     * characters long with a final Z. Update it with fractional seconds.
+     */
+    BIO_snprintf(genstr, sizeof(genstr), "%.14s.%03dZ",
+                 ASN1_STRING_get0_data(gen), (unsigned int)(timestamp % 1000));
+    if (ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set_string(gen, genstr))
+        ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(out, gen);
+    ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_free(gen);
+}
+
+const char *SCT_validation_status_string(const SCT *sct)
+{
+
+    switch (SCT_get_validation_status(sct)) {
+    case SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET:
+        return "not set";
+    case SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN_VERSION:
+        return "unknown version";
+    case SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN_LOG:
+        return "unknown log";
+    case SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_UNVERIFIED:
+        return "unverified";
+    case SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_INVALID:
+        return "invalid";
+    case SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_VALID:
+        return "valid";
+    }
+    return "unknown status";
+}
+
+void SCT_print(const SCT *sct, BIO *out, int indent,
+               const CTLOG_STORE *log_store)
+{
+    const CTLOG *log = NULL;
+
+    if (log_store != NULL) {
+        log = CTLOG_STORE_get0_log_by_id(log_store, sct->log_id,
+                                         sct->log_id_len);
+    }
+
+    BIO_printf(out, "%*sSigned Certificate Timestamp:", indent, "");
+    BIO_printf(out, "\n%*sVersion   : ", indent + 4, "");
+
+    if (sct->version != SCT_VERSION_V1) {
+        BIO_printf(out, "unknown\n%*s", indent + 16, "");
+        BIO_hex_string(out, indent + 16, 16, sct->sct, sct->sct_len);
+        return;
+    }
+
+    BIO_printf(out, "v1 (0x0)");
+
+    if (log != NULL) {
+        BIO_printf(out, "\n%*sLog       : %s", indent + 4, "",
+                   CTLOG_get0_name(log));
+    }
+
+    BIO_printf(out, "\n%*sLog ID    : ", indent + 4, "");
+    BIO_hex_string(out, indent + 16, 16, sct->log_id, sct->log_id_len);
+
+    BIO_printf(out, "\n%*sTimestamp : ", indent + 4, "");
+    timestamp_print(sct->timestamp, out);
+
+    BIO_printf(out, "\n%*sExtensions: ", indent + 4, "");
+    if (sct->ext_len == 0)
+        BIO_printf(out, "none");
+    else
+        BIO_hex_string(out, indent + 16, 16, sct->ext, sct->ext_len);
+
+    BIO_printf(out, "\n%*sSignature : ", indent + 4, "");
+    SCT_signature_algorithms_print(sct, out);
+    BIO_printf(out, "\n%*s            ", indent + 4, "");
+    BIO_hex_string(out, indent + 16, 16, sct->sig, sct->sig_len);
+}
+
+void SCT_LIST_print(const STACK_OF(SCT) *sct_list, BIO *out, int indent,
+                    const char *separator, const CTLOG_STORE *log_store)
+{
+    int sct_count = sk_SCT_num(sct_list);
+    int i;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sct_count; ++i) {
+        SCT *sct = sk_SCT_value(sct_list, i);
+
+        SCT_print(sct, out, indent, log_store);
+        if (i < sk_SCT_num(sct_list) - 1)
+            BIO_printf(out, "%s", separator);
+    }
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ct/ct_sct.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ct/ct_sct.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cd2cf60
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ct/ct_sct.c
@@ -0,0 +1,393 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CT
+# error "CT disabled"
+#endif
+
+#include <openssl/ct.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/tls1.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+#include "ct_locl.h"
+
+SCT *SCT_new(void)
+{
+    SCT *sct = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*sct));
+
+    if (sct == NULL) {
+        CTerr(CT_F_SCT_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    sct->entry_type = CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_NOT_SET;
+    sct->version = SCT_VERSION_NOT_SET;
+    return sct;
+}
+
+void SCT_free(SCT *sct)
+{
+    if (sct == NULL)
+        return;
+
+    OPENSSL_free(sct->log_id);
+    OPENSSL_free(sct->ext);
+    OPENSSL_free(sct->sig);
+    OPENSSL_free(sct->sct);
+    OPENSSL_free(sct);
+}
+
+void SCT_LIST_free(STACK_OF(SCT) *a)
+{
+    sk_SCT_pop_free(a, SCT_free);
+}
+
+int SCT_set_version(SCT *sct, sct_version_t version)
+{
+    if (version != SCT_VERSION_V1) {
+        CTerr(CT_F_SCT_SET_VERSION, CT_R_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    sct->version = version;
+    sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int SCT_set_log_entry_type(SCT *sct, ct_log_entry_type_t entry_type)
+{
+    sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET;
+
+    switch (entry_type) {
+    case CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_X509:
+    case CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_PRECERT:
+        sct->entry_type = entry_type;
+        return 1;
+    default:
+        CTerr(CT_F_SCT_SET_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE, CT_R_UNSUPPORTED_ENTRY_TYPE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+}
+
+int SCT_set0_log_id(SCT *sct, unsigned char *log_id, size_t log_id_len)
+{
+    if (sct->version == SCT_VERSION_V1 && log_id_len != CT_V1_HASHLEN) {
+        CTerr(CT_F_SCT_SET0_LOG_ID, CT_R_INVALID_LOG_ID_LENGTH);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    OPENSSL_free(sct->log_id);
+    sct->log_id = log_id;
+    sct->log_id_len = log_id_len;
+    sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int SCT_set1_log_id(SCT *sct, const unsigned char *log_id, size_t log_id_len)
+{
+    if (sct->version == SCT_VERSION_V1 && log_id_len != CT_V1_HASHLEN) {
+        CTerr(CT_F_SCT_SET1_LOG_ID, CT_R_INVALID_LOG_ID_LENGTH);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    OPENSSL_free(sct->log_id);
+    sct->log_id = NULL;
+    sct->log_id_len = 0;
+    sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET;
+
+    if (log_id != NULL && log_id_len > 0) {
+        sct->log_id = OPENSSL_memdup(log_id, log_id_len);
+        if (sct->log_id == NULL) {
+            CTerr(CT_F_SCT_SET1_LOG_ID, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        sct->log_id_len = log_id_len;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+
+void SCT_set_timestamp(SCT *sct, uint64_t timestamp)
+{
+    sct->timestamp = timestamp;
+    sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET;
+}
+
+int SCT_set_signature_nid(SCT *sct, int nid)
+{
+    switch (nid) {
+    case NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption:
+        sct->hash_alg = TLSEXT_hash_sha256;
+        sct->sig_alg = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
+        sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET;
+        return 1;
+    case NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256:
+        sct->hash_alg = TLSEXT_hash_sha256;
+        sct->sig_alg = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
+        sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET;
+        return 1;
+    default:
+        CTerr(CT_F_SCT_SET_SIGNATURE_NID, CT_R_UNRECOGNIZED_SIGNATURE_NID);
+        return 0;
+    }
+}
+
+void SCT_set0_extensions(SCT *sct, unsigned char *ext, size_t ext_len)
+{
+    OPENSSL_free(sct->ext);
+    sct->ext = ext;
+    sct->ext_len = ext_len;
+    sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET;
+}
+
+int SCT_set1_extensions(SCT *sct, const unsigned char *ext, size_t ext_len)
+{
+    OPENSSL_free(sct->ext);
+    sct->ext = NULL;
+    sct->ext_len = 0;
+    sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET;
+
+    if (ext != NULL && ext_len > 0) {
+        sct->ext = OPENSSL_memdup(ext, ext_len);
+        if (sct->ext == NULL) {
+            CTerr(CT_F_SCT_SET1_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        sct->ext_len = ext_len;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+void SCT_set0_signature(SCT *sct, unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len)
+{
+    OPENSSL_free(sct->sig);
+    sct->sig = sig;
+    sct->sig_len = sig_len;
+    sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET;
+}
+
+int SCT_set1_signature(SCT *sct, const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len)
+{
+    OPENSSL_free(sct->sig);
+    sct->sig = NULL;
+    sct->sig_len = 0;
+    sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET;
+
+    if (sig != NULL && sig_len > 0) {
+        sct->sig = OPENSSL_memdup(sig, sig_len);
+        if (sct->sig == NULL) {
+            CTerr(CT_F_SCT_SET1_SIGNATURE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        sct->sig_len = sig_len;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+sct_version_t SCT_get_version(const SCT *sct)
+{
+    return sct->version;
+}
+
+ct_log_entry_type_t SCT_get_log_entry_type(const SCT *sct)
+{
+    return sct->entry_type;
+}
+
+size_t SCT_get0_log_id(const SCT *sct, unsigned char **log_id)
+{
+    *log_id = sct->log_id;
+    return sct->log_id_len;
+}
+
+uint64_t SCT_get_timestamp(const SCT *sct)
+{
+    return sct->timestamp;
+}
+
+int SCT_get_signature_nid(const SCT *sct)
+{
+    if (sct->version == SCT_VERSION_V1) {
+        if (sct->hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
+            switch (sct->sig_alg) {
+            case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
+                return NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
+            case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
+                return NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption;
+            default:
+                return NID_undef;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    return NID_undef;
+}
+
+size_t SCT_get0_extensions(const SCT *sct, unsigned char **ext)
+{
+    *ext = sct->ext;
+    return sct->ext_len;
+}
+
+size_t SCT_get0_signature(const SCT *sct, unsigned char **sig)
+{
+    *sig = sct->sig;
+    return sct->sig_len;
+}
+
+int SCT_is_complete(const SCT *sct)
+{
+    switch (sct->version) {
+    case SCT_VERSION_NOT_SET:
+        return 0;
+    case SCT_VERSION_V1:
+        return sct->log_id != NULL && SCT_signature_is_complete(sct);
+    default:
+        return sct->sct != NULL; /* Just need cached encoding */
+    }
+}
+
+int SCT_signature_is_complete(const SCT *sct)
+{
+    return SCT_get_signature_nid(sct) != NID_undef &&
+        sct->sig != NULL && sct->sig_len > 0;
+}
+
+sct_source_t SCT_get_source(const SCT *sct)
+{
+    return sct->source;
+}
+
+int SCT_set_source(SCT *sct, sct_source_t source)
+{
+    sct->source = source;
+    sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET;
+    switch (source) {
+    case SCT_SOURCE_TLS_EXTENSION:
+    case SCT_SOURCE_OCSP_STAPLED_RESPONSE:
+        return SCT_set_log_entry_type(sct, CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_X509);
+    case SCT_SOURCE_X509V3_EXTENSION:
+        return SCT_set_log_entry_type(sct, CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_PRECERT);
+    default: /* if we aren't sure, leave the log entry type alone */
+        return 1;
+    }
+}
+
+sct_validation_status_t SCT_get_validation_status(const SCT *sct)
+{
+    return sct->validation_status;
+}
+
+int SCT_validate(SCT *sct, const CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int is_sct_valid = -1;
+    SCT_CTX *sctx = NULL;
+    X509_PUBKEY *pub = NULL, *log_pkey = NULL;
+    const CTLOG *log;
+
+    /*
+     * With an unrecognized SCT version we don't know what such an SCT means,
+     * let alone validate one.  So we return validation failure (0).
+     */
+    if (sct->version != SCT_VERSION_V1) {
+        sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN_VERSION;
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    log = CTLOG_STORE_get0_log_by_id(ctx->log_store,
+                                     sct->log_id, sct->log_id_len);
+
+    /* Similarly, an SCT from an unknown log also cannot be validated. */
+    if (log == NULL) {
+        sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN_LOG;
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    sctx = SCT_CTX_new();
+    if (sctx == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (X509_PUBKEY_set(&log_pkey, CTLOG_get0_public_key(log)) != 1)
+        goto err;
+    if (SCT_CTX_set1_pubkey(sctx, log_pkey) != 1)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (SCT_get_log_entry_type(sct) == CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_PRECERT) {
+        EVP_PKEY *issuer_pkey;
+
+        if (ctx->issuer == NULL) {
+            sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_UNVERIFIED;
+            goto end;
+        }
+
+        issuer_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(ctx->issuer);
+
+        if (X509_PUBKEY_set(&pub, issuer_pkey) != 1)
+            goto err;
+        if (SCT_CTX_set1_issuer_pubkey(sctx, pub) != 1)
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    SCT_CTX_set_time(sctx, ctx->epoch_time_in_ms);
+
+    /*
+     * XXX: Potential for optimization.  This repeats some idempotent heavy
+     * lifting on the certificate for each candidate SCT, and appears to not
+     * use any information in the SCT itself, only the certificate is
+     * processed.  So it may make more sense to to do this just once, perhaps
+     * associated with the shared (by all SCTs) policy eval ctx.
+     *
+     * XXX: Failure here is global (SCT independent) and represents either an
+     * issue with the certificate (e.g. duplicate extensions) or an out of
+     * memory condition.  When the certificate is incompatible with CT, we just
+     * mark the SCTs invalid, rather than report a failure to determine the
+     * validation status.  That way, callbacks that want to do "soft" SCT
+     * processing will not abort handshakes with false positive internal
+     * errors.  Since the function does not distinguish between certificate
+     * issues (peer's fault) and internal problems (out fault) the safe thing
+     * to do is to report a validation failure and let the callback or
+     * application decide what to do.
+     */
+    if (SCT_CTX_set1_cert(sctx, ctx->cert, NULL) != 1)
+        sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_UNVERIFIED;
+    else
+        sct->validation_status = SCT_CTX_verify(sctx, sct) == 1 ?
+            SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_VALID : SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_INVALID;
+
+end:
+    is_sct_valid = sct->validation_status == SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_VALID;
+err:
+    X509_PUBKEY_free(pub);
+    X509_PUBKEY_free(log_pkey);
+    SCT_CTX_free(sctx);
+
+    return is_sct_valid;
+}
+
+int SCT_LIST_validate(const STACK_OF(SCT) *scts, CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int are_scts_valid = 1;
+    int sct_count = scts != NULL ? sk_SCT_num(scts) : 0;
+    int i;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sct_count; ++i) {
+        int is_sct_valid = -1;
+        SCT *sct = sk_SCT_value(scts, i);
+
+        if (sct == NULL)
+            continue;
+
+        is_sct_valid = SCT_validate(sct, ctx);
+        if (is_sct_valid < 0)
+            return is_sct_valid;
+        are_scts_valid &= is_sct_valid;
+    }
+
+    return are_scts_valid;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ct/ct_sct_ctx.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ct/ct_sct_ctx.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..75a5027
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ct/ct_sct_ctx.c
@@ -0,0 +1,263 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CT
+# error "CT is disabled"
+#endif
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/obj_mac.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+#include "ct_locl.h"
+
+SCT_CTX *SCT_CTX_new(void)
+{
+    SCT_CTX *sctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*sctx));
+
+    if (sctx == NULL)
+        CTerr(CT_F_SCT_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+
+    return sctx;
+}
+
+void SCT_CTX_free(SCT_CTX *sctx)
+{
+    if (sctx == NULL)
+        return;
+    EVP_PKEY_free(sctx->pkey);
+    OPENSSL_free(sctx->pkeyhash);
+    OPENSSL_free(sctx->ihash);
+    OPENSSL_free(sctx->certder);
+    OPENSSL_free(sctx->preder);
+    OPENSSL_free(sctx);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Finds the index of the first extension with the given NID in cert.
+ * If there is more than one extension with that NID, *is_duplicated is set to
+ * 1, otherwise 0 (unless it is NULL).
+ */
+static int ct_x509_get_ext(X509 *cert, int nid, int *is_duplicated)
+{
+    int ret = X509_get_ext_by_NID(cert, nid, -1);
+
+    if (is_duplicated != NULL)
+        *is_duplicated = ret >= 0 && X509_get_ext_by_NID(cert, nid, ret) >= 0;
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Modifies a certificate by deleting extensions and copying the issuer and
+ * AKID from the presigner certificate, if necessary.
+ * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+__owur static int ct_x509_cert_fixup(X509 *cert, X509 *presigner)
+{
+    int preidx, certidx;
+    int pre_akid_ext_is_dup, cert_akid_ext_is_dup;
+
+    if (presigner == NULL)
+        return 1;
+
+    preidx = ct_x509_get_ext(presigner, NID_authority_key_identifier,
+                             &pre_akid_ext_is_dup);
+    certidx = ct_x509_get_ext(cert, NID_authority_key_identifier,
+                              &cert_akid_ext_is_dup);
+
+    /* An error occurred whilst searching for the extension */
+    if (preidx < -1 || certidx < -1)
+        return 0;
+    /* Invalid certificate if they contain duplicate extensions */
+    if (pre_akid_ext_is_dup || cert_akid_ext_is_dup)
+        return 0;
+    /* AKID must be present in both certificate or absent in both */
+    if (preidx >= 0 && certidx == -1)
+        return 0;
+    if (preidx == -1 && certidx >= 0)
+        return 0;
+    /* Copy issuer name */
+    if (!X509_set_issuer_name(cert, X509_get_issuer_name(presigner)))
+        return 0;
+    if (preidx != -1) {
+        /* Retrieve and copy AKID encoding */
+        X509_EXTENSION *preext = X509_get_ext(presigner, preidx);
+        X509_EXTENSION *certext = X509_get_ext(cert, certidx);
+        ASN1_OCTET_STRING *preextdata;
+
+        /* Should never happen */
+        if (preext == NULL || certext == NULL)
+            return 0;
+        preextdata = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(preext);
+        if (preextdata == NULL ||
+            !X509_EXTENSION_set_data(certext, preextdata))
+            return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int SCT_CTX_set1_cert(SCT_CTX *sctx, X509 *cert, X509 *presigner)
+{
+    unsigned char *certder = NULL, *preder = NULL;
+    X509 *pretmp = NULL;
+    int certderlen = 0, prederlen = 0;
+    int idx = -1;
+    int poison_ext_is_dup, sct_ext_is_dup;
+    int poison_idx = ct_x509_get_ext(cert, NID_ct_precert_poison, &poison_ext_is_dup);
+
+    /* Duplicate poison extensions are present - error */
+    if (poison_ext_is_dup)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* If *cert doesn't have a poison extension, it isn't a precert */
+    if (poison_idx == -1) {
+        /* cert isn't a precert, so we shouldn't have a presigner */
+        if (presigner != NULL)
+            goto err;
+
+        certderlen = i2d_X509(cert, &certder);
+        if (certderlen < 0)
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* See if cert has a precert SCTs extension */
+    idx = ct_x509_get_ext(cert, NID_ct_precert_scts, &sct_ext_is_dup);
+    /* Duplicate SCT extensions are present - error */
+    if (sct_ext_is_dup)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (idx >= 0 && poison_idx >= 0) {
+        /*
+         * cert can't both contain SCTs (i.e. have an SCT extension) and be a
+         * precert (i.e. have a poison extension).
+         */
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (idx == -1) {
+        idx = poison_idx;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * If either a poison or SCT extension is present, remove it before encoding
+     * cert. This, along with ct_x509_cert_fixup(), gets a TBSCertificate (see
+     * RFC5280) from cert, which is what the CT log signed when it produced the
+     * SCT.
+     */
+    if (idx >= 0) {
+        X509_EXTENSION *ext;
+
+        /* Take a copy of certificate so we don't modify passed version */
+        pretmp = X509_dup(cert);
+        if (pretmp == NULL)
+            goto err;
+
+        ext = X509_delete_ext(pretmp, idx);
+        X509_EXTENSION_free(ext);
+
+        if (!ct_x509_cert_fixup(pretmp, presigner))
+            goto err;
+
+        prederlen = i2d_re_X509_tbs(pretmp, &preder);
+        if (prederlen <= 0)
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    X509_free(pretmp);
+
+    OPENSSL_free(sctx->certder);
+    sctx->certder = certder;
+    sctx->certderlen = certderlen;
+
+    OPENSSL_free(sctx->preder);
+    sctx->preder = preder;
+    sctx->prederlen = prederlen;
+
+    return 1;
+err:
+    OPENSSL_free(certder);
+    OPENSSL_free(preder);
+    X509_free(pretmp);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+__owur static int ct_public_key_hash(X509_PUBKEY *pkey, unsigned char **hash,
+                                     size_t *hash_len)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    unsigned char *md = NULL, *der = NULL;
+    int der_len;
+    unsigned int md_len;
+
+    /* Reuse buffer if possible */
+    if (*hash != NULL && *hash_len >= SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) {
+        md = *hash;
+    } else {
+        md = OPENSSL_malloc(SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+        if (md == NULL)
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* Calculate key hash */
+    der_len = i2d_X509_PUBKEY(pkey, &der);
+    if (der_len <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!EVP_Digest(der, der_len, md, &md_len, EVP_sha256(), NULL))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (md != *hash) {
+        OPENSSL_free(*hash);
+        *hash = md;
+        *hash_len = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+    }
+
+    md = NULL;
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_free(md);
+    OPENSSL_free(der);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int SCT_CTX_set1_issuer(SCT_CTX *sctx, const X509 *issuer)
+{
+    return SCT_CTX_set1_issuer_pubkey(sctx, X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(issuer));
+}
+
+int SCT_CTX_set1_issuer_pubkey(SCT_CTX *sctx, X509_PUBKEY *pubkey)
+{
+    return ct_public_key_hash(pubkey, &sctx->ihash, &sctx->ihashlen);
+}
+
+int SCT_CTX_set1_pubkey(SCT_CTX *sctx, X509_PUBKEY *pubkey)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_PUBKEY_get(pubkey);
+
+    if (pkey == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    if (!ct_public_key_hash(pubkey, &sctx->pkeyhash, &sctx->pkeyhashlen)) {
+        EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    EVP_PKEY_free(sctx->pkey);
+    sctx->pkey = pkey;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+void SCT_CTX_set_time(SCT_CTX *sctx, uint64_t time_in_ms)
+{
+    sctx->epoch_time_in_ms = time_in_ms;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ct/ct_vfy.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ct/ct_vfy.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cabcf57
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ct/ct_vfy.c
@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/ct.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+#include "ct_locl.h"
+
+typedef enum sct_signature_type_t {
+    SIGNATURE_TYPE_NOT_SET = -1,
+    SIGNATURE_TYPE_CERT_TIMESTAMP,
+    SIGNATURE_TYPE_TREE_HASH
+} SCT_SIGNATURE_TYPE;
+
+/*
+ * Update encoding for SCT signature verification/generation to supplied
+ * EVP_MD_CTX.
+ */
+static int sct_ctx_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const SCT_CTX *sctx, const SCT *sct)
+{
+    unsigned char tmpbuf[12];
+    unsigned char *p, *der;
+    size_t derlen;
+    /*+
+     * digitally-signed struct {
+     *   (1 byte) Version sct_version;
+     *   (1 byte) SignatureType signature_type = certificate_timestamp;
+     *   (8 bytes) uint64 timestamp;
+     *   (2 bytes) LogEntryType entry_type;
+     *   (? bytes) select(entry_type) {
+     *     case x509_entry: ASN.1Cert;
+     *     case precert_entry: PreCert;
+     *   } signed_entry;
+     *   (2 bytes + sct->ext_len) CtExtensions extensions;
+     * }
+     */
+    if (sct->entry_type == CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_NOT_SET)
+        return 0;
+    if (sct->entry_type == CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_PRECERT && sctx->ihash == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    p = tmpbuf;
+    *p++ = sct->version;
+    *p++ = SIGNATURE_TYPE_CERT_TIMESTAMP;
+    l2n8(sct->timestamp, p);
+    s2n(sct->entry_type, p);
+
+    if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, tmpbuf, p - tmpbuf))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (sct->entry_type == CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_X509) {
+        der = sctx->certder;
+        derlen = sctx->certderlen;
+    } else {
+        if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, sctx->ihash, sctx->ihashlen))
+            return 0;
+        der = sctx->preder;
+        derlen = sctx->prederlen;
+    }
+
+    /* If no encoding available, fatal error */
+    if (der == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    /* Include length first */
+    p = tmpbuf;
+    l2n3(derlen, p);
+
+    if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, tmpbuf, 3))
+        return 0;
+    if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, der, derlen))
+        return 0;
+
+    /* Add any extensions */
+    p = tmpbuf;
+    s2n(sct->ext_len, p);
+    if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, tmpbuf, 2))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (sct->ext_len && !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, sct->ext, sct->ext_len))
+        return 0;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int SCT_CTX_verify(const SCT_CTX *sctx, const SCT *sct)
+{
+    EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    if (!SCT_is_complete(sct) || sctx->pkey == NULL ||
+        sct->entry_type == CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_NOT_SET ||
+        (sct->entry_type == CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_PRECERT && sctx->ihash == NULL)) {
+        CTerr(CT_F_SCT_CTX_VERIFY, CT_R_SCT_NOT_SET);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (sct->version != SCT_VERSION_V1) {
+        CTerr(CT_F_SCT_CTX_VERIFY, CT_R_SCT_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (sct->log_id_len != sctx->pkeyhashlen ||
+        memcmp(sct->log_id, sctx->pkeyhash, sctx->pkeyhashlen) != 0) {
+        CTerr(CT_F_SCT_CTX_VERIFY, CT_R_SCT_LOG_ID_MISMATCH);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (sct->timestamp > sctx->epoch_time_in_ms) {
+        CTerr(CT_F_SCT_CTX_VERIFY, CT_R_SCT_FUTURE_TIMESTAMP);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        goto end;
+
+    if (!EVP_DigestVerifyInit(ctx, NULL, EVP_sha256(), NULL, sctx->pkey))
+        goto end;
+
+    if (!sct_ctx_update(ctx, sctx, sct))
+        goto end;
+
+    /* Verify signature */
+    ret = EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(ctx, sct->sig, sct->sig_len);
+    /* If ret < 0 some other error: fall through without setting error */
+    if (ret == 0)
+        CTerr(CT_F_SCT_CTX_VERIFY, CT_R_SCT_INVALID_SIGNATURE);
+
+end:
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
+    return ret;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ct/ct_x509v3.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ct/ct_x509v3.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ec186d1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ct/ct_x509v3.c
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CT
+# error "CT is disabled"
+#endif
+
+#include "ct_locl.h"
+
+static char *i2s_poison(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, void *val)
+{
+    return OPENSSL_strdup("NULL");
+}
+
+static void *s2i_poison(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, X509V3_CTX *ctx, const char *str)
+{
+   return ASN1_NULL_new();
+}
+
+static int i2r_SCT_LIST(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, STACK_OF(SCT) *sct_list,
+                 BIO *out, int indent)
+{
+    SCT_LIST_print(sct_list, out, indent, "\n", NULL);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int set_sct_list_source(STACK_OF(SCT) *s, sct_source_t source)
+{
+    if (s != NULL) {
+        int i;
+
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_SCT_num(s); i++) {
+            int res = SCT_set_source(sk_SCT_value(s, i), source);
+
+            if (res != 1) {
+                return 0;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static STACK_OF(SCT) *x509_ext_d2i_SCT_LIST(STACK_OF(SCT) **a,
+                                            const unsigned char **pp,
+                                            long len)
+{
+     STACK_OF(SCT) *s = d2i_SCT_LIST(a, pp, len);
+
+     if (set_sct_list_source(s, SCT_SOURCE_X509V3_EXTENSION) != 1) {
+         SCT_LIST_free(s);
+         *a = NULL;
+         return NULL;
+     }
+     return s;
+}
+
+static STACK_OF(SCT) *ocsp_ext_d2i_SCT_LIST(STACK_OF(SCT) **a,
+                                            const unsigned char **pp,
+                                            long len)
+{
+    STACK_OF(SCT) *s = d2i_SCT_LIST(a, pp, len);
+
+    if (set_sct_list_source(s, SCT_SOURCE_OCSP_STAPLED_RESPONSE) != 1) {
+        SCT_LIST_free(s);
+        *a = NULL;
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    return s;
+}
+
+/* Handlers for X509v3/OCSP Certificate Transparency extensions */
+const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_ct_scts[3] = {
+    /* X509v3 extension in certificates that contains SCTs */
+    { NID_ct_precert_scts, 0, NULL,
+    NULL, (X509V3_EXT_FREE)SCT_LIST_free,
+    (X509V3_EXT_D2I)x509_ext_d2i_SCT_LIST, (X509V3_EXT_I2D)i2d_SCT_LIST,
+    NULL, NULL,
+    NULL, NULL,
+    (X509V3_EXT_I2R)i2r_SCT_LIST, NULL,
+    NULL },
+
+    /* X509v3 extension to mark a certificate as a pre-certificate */
+    { NID_ct_precert_poison, 0, ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_NULL),
+    NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
+    i2s_poison, s2i_poison,
+    NULL, NULL,
+    NULL, NULL,
+    NULL },
+
+    /* OCSP extension that contains SCTs */
+    { NID_ct_cert_scts, 0, NULL,
+    0, (X509V3_EXT_FREE)SCT_LIST_free,
+    (X509V3_EXT_D2I)ocsp_ext_d2i_SCT_LIST, (X509V3_EXT_I2D)i2d_SCT_LIST,
+    NULL, NULL,
+    NULL, NULL,
+    (X509V3_EXT_I2R)i2r_SCT_LIST, NULL,
+    NULL },
+};
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cversion.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cversion.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..96d8a5b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/cversion.c
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+
+#ifndef NO_WINDOWS_BRAINDEATH
+# include "buildinf.h"
+#endif
+
+unsigned long OpenSSL_version_num(void)
+{
+    return OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER;
+}
+
+const char *OpenSSL_version(int t)
+{
+    if (t == OPENSSL_VERSION)
+        return OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT;
+    if (t == OPENSSL_BUILT_ON) {
+#ifdef DATE
+# ifdef OPENSSL_USE_BUILD_DATE
+        return (DATE);
+# else
+        return ("built on: reproducible build, date unspecified");
+# endif
+#else
+        return ("built on: date not available");
+#endif
+    }
+    if (t == OPENSSL_CFLAGS) {
+#ifdef CFLAGS
+        return (CFLAGS);
+#else
+        return ("compiler: information not available");
+#endif
+    }
+    if (t == OPENSSL_PLATFORM) {
+#ifdef PLATFORM
+        return (PLATFORM);
+#else
+        return ("platform: information not available");
+#endif
+    }
+    if (t == OPENSSL_DIR) {
+#ifdef OPENSSLDIR
+        return "OPENSSLDIR: \"" OPENSSLDIR "\"";
+#else
+        return "OPENSSLDIR: N/A";
+#endif
+    }
+    if (t == OPENSSL_ENGINES_DIR) {
+#ifdef ENGINESDIR
+        return "ENGINESDIR: \"" ENGINESDIR "\"";
+#else
+        return "ENGINESDIR: N/A";
+#endif
+    }
+    return ("not available");
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/asm/crypt586.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/asm/crypt586.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d5911a1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/asm/crypt586.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,217 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+# The inner loop instruction sequence and the IP/FP modifications are from
+# Svend Olaf Mikkelsen <svolaf@inet.uni-c.dk>
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm");
+require "x86asm.pl";
+
+$output=pop;
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+&asm_init($ARGV[0],"crypt586.pl");
+
+$L="edi";
+$R="esi";
+
+&external_label("DES_SPtrans");
+&fcrypt_body("fcrypt_body");
+&asm_finish();
+
+close STDOUT;
+
+sub fcrypt_body
+	{
+	local($name,$do_ip)=@_;
+
+	&function_begin($name);
+
+	&comment("");
+	&comment("Load the 2 words");
+	$trans="ebp";
+
+	&xor(	$L,	$L);
+	&xor(	$R,	$R);
+
+	# PIC-ification:-)
+	&picmeup("edx","DES_SPtrans");
+	#if ($cpp)	{ &picmeup("edx","DES_SPtrans");   }
+	#else		{ &lea("edx",&DWP("DES_SPtrans")); }
+	&push("edx");	# becomes &swtmp(1)
+	#
+	&mov($trans,&wparam(1)); # reloaded with DES_SPtrans in D_ENCRYPT
+
+	&push(&DWC(25)); # add a variable
+
+	&set_label("start");
+	for ($i=0; $i<16; $i+=2)
+		{
+		&comment("");
+		&comment("Round $i");
+		&D_ENCRYPT($i,$L,$R,$i*2,$trans,"eax","ebx","ecx","edx");
+
+		&comment("");
+		&comment("Round ".sprintf("%d",$i+1));
+		&D_ENCRYPT($i+1,$R,$L,($i+1)*2,$trans,"eax","ebx","ecx","edx");
+		}
+	 &mov("ebx",	&swtmp(0));
+	&mov("eax",	$L);
+	 &dec("ebx");
+	&mov($L,	$R);
+	 &mov($R,	"eax");
+	&mov(&swtmp(0),	"ebx");
+	 &jnz(&label("start"));
+
+	&comment("");
+	&comment("FP");
+	&mov("edx",&wparam(0));
+
+	&FP_new($R,$L,"eax",3);
+	&mov(&DWP(0,"edx","",0),"eax");
+	&mov(&DWP(4,"edx","",0),$L);
+
+	&add("esp",8);	# remove variables
+
+	&function_end($name);
+	}
+
+sub D_ENCRYPT
+	{
+	local($r,$L,$R,$S,$trans,$u,$tmp1,$tmp2,$t)=@_;
+
+	&mov(	$u,		&wparam(2));			# 2
+	&mov(	$t,		$R);
+	&shr(	$t,		16);				# 1
+	&mov(	$tmp2,		&wparam(3));			# 2
+	&xor(	$t,		$R);				# 1
+
+	&and(	$u,		$t);				# 2
+	&and(	$t,		$tmp2);				# 2
+
+	&mov(	$tmp1,		$u);
+	&shl(	$tmp1,		16); 				# 1
+	&mov(	$tmp2,		$t);
+	&shl(	$tmp2,		16); 				# 1
+	&xor(	$u,		$tmp1);				# 2
+	&xor(	$t,		$tmp2);				# 2
+	&mov(	$tmp1,		&DWP(&n2a($S*4),$trans,"",0));	# 2
+	&xor(	$u,		$tmp1);
+	&mov(	$tmp2,		&DWP(&n2a(($S+1)*4),$trans,"",0));	# 2
+	&xor(	$u,		$R);
+	&xor(	$t,		$R);
+	&xor(	$t,		$tmp2);
+
+	&and(	$u,		"0xfcfcfcfc"	);		# 2
+	&xor(	$tmp1,		$tmp1);				# 1
+	&and(	$t,		"0xcfcfcfcf"	);		# 2
+	&xor(	$tmp2,		$tmp2);	
+	&movb(	&LB($tmp1),	&LB($u)	);
+	&movb(	&LB($tmp2),	&HB($u)	);
+	&rotr(	$t,		4		);
+	&mov(	$trans,		&swtmp(1));
+	&xor(	$L,		&DWP("     ",$trans,$tmp1,0));
+	&movb(	&LB($tmp1),	&LB($t)	);
+	&xor(	$L,		&DWP("0x200",$trans,$tmp2,0));
+	&movb(	&LB($tmp2),	&HB($t)	);
+	&shr(	$u,		16);
+	&xor(	$L,		&DWP("0x100",$trans,$tmp1,0));
+	&movb(	&LB($tmp1),	&HB($u)	);
+	&shr(	$t,		16);
+	&xor(	$L,		&DWP("0x300",$trans,$tmp2,0));
+	&movb(	&LB($tmp2),	&HB($t)	);
+	&and(	$u,		"0xff"	);
+	&and(	$t,		"0xff"	);
+	&mov(	$tmp1,		&DWP("0x600",$trans,$tmp1,0));
+	&xor(	$L,		$tmp1);
+	&mov(	$tmp1,		&DWP("0x700",$trans,$tmp2,0));
+	&xor(	$L,		$tmp1);
+	&mov(	$tmp1,		&DWP("0x400",$trans,$u,0));
+	&xor(	$L,		$tmp1);
+	&mov(	$tmp1,		&DWP("0x500",$trans,$t,0));
+	&xor(	$L,		$tmp1);
+	&mov(	$trans,		&wparam(1));
+	}
+
+sub n2a
+	{
+	sprintf("%d",$_[0]);
+	}
+
+# now has a side affect of rotating $a by $shift
+sub R_PERM_OP
+	{
+	local($a,$b,$tt,$shift,$mask,$last)=@_;
+
+	&rotl(	$a,		$shift		) if ($shift != 0);
+	&mov(	$tt,		$a		);
+	&xor(	$a,		$b		);
+	&and(	$a,		$mask		);
+	if ($notlast eq $b)
+		{
+		&xor(	$b,		$a		);
+		&xor(	$tt,		$a		);
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		&xor(	$tt,		$a		);
+		&xor(	$b,		$a		);
+		}
+	&comment("");
+	}
+
+sub IP_new
+	{
+	local($l,$r,$tt,$lr)=@_;
+
+	&R_PERM_OP($l,$r,$tt, 4,"0xf0f0f0f0",$l);
+	&R_PERM_OP($r,$tt,$l,20,"0xfff0000f",$l);
+	&R_PERM_OP($l,$tt,$r,14,"0x33333333",$r);
+	&R_PERM_OP($tt,$r,$l,22,"0x03fc03fc",$r);
+	&R_PERM_OP($l,$r,$tt, 9,"0xaaaaaaaa",$r);
+	
+	if ($lr != 3)
+		{
+		if (($lr-3) < 0)
+			{ &rotr($tt,	3-$lr); }
+		else	{ &rotl($tt,	$lr-3); }
+		}
+	if ($lr != 2)
+		{
+		if (($lr-2) < 0)
+			{ &rotr($r,	2-$lr); }
+		else	{ &rotl($r,	$lr-2); }
+		}
+	}
+
+sub FP_new
+	{
+	local($l,$r,$tt,$lr)=@_;
+
+	if ($lr != 2)
+		{
+		if (($lr-2) < 0)
+			{ &rotl($r,	2-$lr); }
+		else	{ &rotr($r,	$lr-2); }
+		}
+	if ($lr != 3)
+		{
+		if (($lr-3) < 0)
+			{ &rotl($l,	3-$lr); }
+		else	{ &rotr($l,	$lr-3); }
+		}
+
+	&R_PERM_OP($l,$r,$tt, 0,"0xaaaaaaaa",$r);
+	&R_PERM_OP($tt,$r,$l,23,"0x03fc03fc",$r);
+	&R_PERM_OP($l,$r,$tt,10,"0x33333333",$l);
+	&R_PERM_OP($r,$tt,$l,18,"0xfff0000f",$l);
+	&R_PERM_OP($l,$tt,$r,12,"0xf0f0f0f0",$r);
+	&rotr($tt	, 4);
+	}
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/asm/des-586.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/asm/des-586.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3d7c7f1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/asm/des-586.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,465 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+# The inner loop instruction sequence and the IP/FP modifications are from
+# Svend Olaf Mikkelsen <svolaf@inet.uni-c.dk>
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm");
+require "x86asm.pl";
+require "cbc.pl";
+require "desboth.pl";
+
+# base code is in microsft
+# op dest, source
+# format.
+#
+
+$output=pop;
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+&asm_init($ARGV[0],"des-586.pl");
+
+$L="edi";
+$R="esi";
+$trans="ebp";
+$small_footprint=1 if (grep(/\-DOPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT/,@ARGV));
+# one can discuss setting this variable to 1 unconditionally, as
+# the folded loop is only 3% slower than unrolled, but >7 times smaller
+
+&public_label("DES_SPtrans");
+&static_label("des_sptrans");
+
+&DES_encrypt_internal();
+&DES_decrypt_internal();
+&DES_encrypt("DES_encrypt1",1);
+&DES_encrypt("DES_encrypt2",0);
+&DES_encrypt3("DES_encrypt3",1);
+&DES_encrypt3("DES_decrypt3",0);
+&cbc("DES_ncbc_encrypt","DES_encrypt1","DES_encrypt1",0,4,5,3,5,-1);
+&cbc("DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt","DES_encrypt3","DES_decrypt3",0,6,7,3,4,5);
+&DES_SPtrans();
+
+&asm_finish();
+
+close STDOUT;
+
+sub DES_encrypt_internal()
+	{
+	&function_begin_B("_x86_DES_encrypt");
+
+	if ($small_footprint)
+	    {
+	    &lea("edx",&DWP(128,"ecx"));
+	    &push("edx");
+	    &push("ecx");
+	    &set_label("eloop");
+		&D_ENCRYPT(0,$L,$R,0,$trans,"eax","ebx","ecx","edx",&swtmp(0));
+		&comment("");
+		&D_ENCRYPT(1,$R,$L,2,$trans,"eax","ebx","ecx","edx",&swtmp(0));
+		&comment("");
+		&add("ecx",16);
+		&cmp("ecx",&swtmp(1));
+		&mov(&swtmp(0),"ecx");
+		&jb(&label("eloop"));
+	    &add("esp",8);
+	    }
+	else
+	    {
+	    &push("ecx");
+	    for ($i=0; $i<16; $i+=2)
+		{
+		&comment("Round $i");
+		&D_ENCRYPT($i,$L,$R,$i*2,$trans,"eax","ebx","ecx","edx",&swtmp(0));
+		&comment("Round ".sprintf("%d",$i+1));
+		&D_ENCRYPT($i+1,$R,$L,($i+1)*2,$trans,"eax","ebx","ecx","edx",&swtmp(0));
+		}
+	    &add("esp",4);
+	}
+	&ret();
+
+	&function_end_B("_x86_DES_encrypt");
+	}
+	
+sub DES_decrypt_internal()
+	{
+	&function_begin_B("_x86_DES_decrypt");
+
+	if ($small_footprint)
+	    {
+	    &push("ecx");
+	    &lea("ecx",&DWP(128,"ecx"));
+	    &push("ecx");
+	    &set_label("dloop");
+		&D_ENCRYPT(0,$L,$R,-2,$trans,"eax","ebx","ecx","edx",&swtmp(0));
+		&comment("");
+		&D_ENCRYPT(1,$R,$L,-4,$trans,"eax","ebx","ecx","edx",&swtmp(0));
+		&comment("");
+		&sub("ecx",16);
+		&cmp("ecx",&swtmp(1));
+		&mov(&swtmp(0),"ecx");
+		&ja(&label("dloop"));
+	    &add("esp",8);
+	    }
+	else
+	    {
+	    &push("ecx");
+	    for ($i=15; $i>0; $i-=2)
+		{
+		&comment("Round $i");
+		&D_ENCRYPT(15-$i,$L,$R,$i*2,$trans,"eax","ebx","ecx","edx",&swtmp(0));
+		&comment("Round ".sprintf("%d",$i-1));
+		&D_ENCRYPT(15-$i+1,$R,$L,($i-1)*2,$trans,"eax","ebx","ecx","edx",&swtmp(0));
+		}
+	    &add("esp",4);
+	    }
+	&ret();
+
+	&function_end_B("_x86_DES_decrypt");
+	}
+	
+sub DES_encrypt
+	{
+	local($name,$do_ip)=@_;
+
+	&function_begin_B($name);
+
+	&push("esi");
+	&push("edi");
+
+	&comment("");
+	&comment("Load the 2 words");
+
+	if ($do_ip)
+		{
+		&mov($R,&wparam(0));
+		 &xor(	"ecx",		"ecx"		);
+
+		&push("ebx");
+		&push("ebp");
+
+		&mov("eax",&DWP(0,$R,"",0));
+		 &mov("ebx",&wparam(2));	# get encrypt flag
+		&mov($L,&DWP(4,$R,"",0));
+		&comment("");
+		&comment("IP");
+		&IP_new("eax",$L,$R,3);
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		&mov("eax",&wparam(0));
+		 &xor(	"ecx",		"ecx"		);
+
+		&push("ebx");
+		&push("ebp");
+
+		&mov($R,&DWP(0,"eax","",0));
+		 &mov("ebx",&wparam(2));	# get encrypt flag
+		&rotl($R,3);
+		&mov($L,&DWP(4,"eax","",0));
+		&rotl($L,3);
+		}
+
+	# PIC-ification:-)
+	&call	(&label("pic_point"));
+	&set_label("pic_point");
+	&blindpop($trans);
+	&lea	($trans,&DWP(&label("des_sptrans")."-".&label("pic_point"),$trans));
+
+	&mov(	"ecx",	&wparam(1)	);
+
+	&cmp("ebx","0");
+	&je(&label("decrypt"));
+	&call("_x86_DES_encrypt");
+	&jmp(&label("done"));
+	&set_label("decrypt");
+	&call("_x86_DES_decrypt");
+	&set_label("done");
+
+	if ($do_ip)
+		{
+		&comment("");
+		&comment("FP");
+		&mov("edx",&wparam(0));
+		&FP_new($L,$R,"eax",3);
+
+		&mov(&DWP(0,"edx","",0),"eax");
+		&mov(&DWP(4,"edx","",0),$R);
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		&comment("");
+		&comment("Fixup");
+		&rotr($L,3);		# r
+		 &mov("eax",&wparam(0));
+		&rotr($R,3);		# l
+		 &mov(&DWP(0,"eax","",0),$L);
+		 &mov(&DWP(4,"eax","",0),$R);
+		}
+
+	&pop("ebp");
+	&pop("ebx");
+	&pop("edi");
+	&pop("esi");
+	&ret();
+
+	&function_end_B($name);
+	}
+
+sub D_ENCRYPT
+	{
+	local($r,$L,$R,$S,$trans,$u,$tmp1,$tmp2,$t,$wp1)=@_;
+
+	 &mov(	$u,		&DWP(&n2a($S*4),$tmp2,"",0));
+	&xor(	$tmp1,		$tmp1);
+	 &mov(	$t,		&DWP(&n2a(($S+1)*4),$tmp2,"",0));
+	&xor(	$u,		$R);
+	&xor(	$tmp2,		$tmp2);
+	 &xor(	$t,		$R);
+	&and(	$u,		"0xfcfcfcfc"	);
+	 &and(	$t,		"0xcfcfcfcf"	);
+	&movb(	&LB($tmp1),	&LB($u)	);
+	 &movb(	&LB($tmp2),	&HB($u)	);
+	&rotr(	$t,		4		);
+	&xor(	$L,		&DWP("     ",$trans,$tmp1,0));
+	 &movb(	&LB($tmp1),	&LB($t)	);
+	 &xor(	$L,		&DWP("0x200",$trans,$tmp2,0));
+	 &movb(	&LB($tmp2),	&HB($t)	);
+	&shr(	$u,		16);
+	 &xor(	$L,		&DWP("0x100",$trans,$tmp1,0));
+	 &movb(	&LB($tmp1),	&HB($u)	);
+	&shr(	$t,		16);
+	 &xor(	$L,		&DWP("0x300",$trans,$tmp2,0));
+	&movb(	&LB($tmp2),	&HB($t)	);
+	 &and(	$u,		"0xff"	);
+	&and(	$t,		"0xff"	);
+	 &xor(	$L,		&DWP("0x600",$trans,$tmp1,0));
+	 &xor(	$L,		&DWP("0x700",$trans,$tmp2,0));
+	&mov(	$tmp2,		$wp1	);
+	 &xor(	$L,		&DWP("0x400",$trans,$u,0));
+	 &xor(	$L,		&DWP("0x500",$trans,$t,0));
+	}
+
+sub n2a
+	{
+	sprintf("%d",$_[0]);
+	}
+
+# now has a side affect of rotating $a by $shift
+sub R_PERM_OP
+	{
+	local($a,$b,$tt,$shift,$mask,$last)=@_;
+
+	&rotl(	$a,		$shift		) if ($shift != 0);
+	&mov(	$tt,		$a		);
+	&xor(	$a,		$b		);
+	&and(	$a,		$mask		);
+	# This can never succeed, and besides it is difficult to see what the
+	# idea was - Ben 13 Feb 99
+	if (!$last eq $b)
+		{
+		&xor(	$b,		$a		);
+		&xor(	$tt,		$a		);
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		&xor(	$tt,		$a		);
+		&xor(	$b,		$a		);
+		}
+	&comment("");
+	}
+
+sub IP_new
+	{
+	local($l,$r,$tt,$lr)=@_;
+
+	&R_PERM_OP($l,$r,$tt, 4,"0xf0f0f0f0",$l);
+	&R_PERM_OP($r,$tt,$l,20,"0xfff0000f",$l);
+	&R_PERM_OP($l,$tt,$r,14,"0x33333333",$r);
+	&R_PERM_OP($tt,$r,$l,22,"0x03fc03fc",$r);
+	&R_PERM_OP($l,$r,$tt, 9,"0xaaaaaaaa",$r);
+	
+	if ($lr != 3)
+		{
+		if (($lr-3) < 0)
+			{ &rotr($tt,	3-$lr); }
+		else	{ &rotl($tt,	$lr-3); }
+		}
+	if ($lr != 2)
+		{
+		if (($lr-2) < 0)
+			{ &rotr($r,	2-$lr); }
+		else	{ &rotl($r,	$lr-2); }
+		}
+	}
+
+sub FP_new
+	{
+	local($l,$r,$tt,$lr)=@_;
+
+	if ($lr != 2)
+		{
+		if (($lr-2) < 0)
+			{ &rotl($r,	2-$lr); }
+		else	{ &rotr($r,	$lr-2); }
+		}
+	if ($lr != 3)
+		{
+		if (($lr-3) < 0)
+			{ &rotl($l,	3-$lr); }
+		else	{ &rotr($l,	$lr-3); }
+		}
+
+	&R_PERM_OP($l,$r,$tt, 0,"0xaaaaaaaa",$r);
+	&R_PERM_OP($tt,$r,$l,23,"0x03fc03fc",$r);
+	&R_PERM_OP($l,$r,$tt,10,"0x33333333",$l);
+	&R_PERM_OP($r,$tt,$l,18,"0xfff0000f",$l);
+	&R_PERM_OP($l,$tt,$r,12,"0xf0f0f0f0",$r);
+	&rotr($tt	, 4);
+	}
+
+sub DES_SPtrans
+	{
+	&set_label("DES_SPtrans",64);
+	&set_label("des_sptrans");
+	&data_word(0x02080800, 0x00080000, 0x02000002, 0x02080802);
+	&data_word(0x02000000, 0x00080802, 0x00080002, 0x02000002);
+	&data_word(0x00080802, 0x02080800, 0x02080000, 0x00000802);
+	&data_word(0x02000802, 0x02000000, 0x00000000, 0x00080002);
+	&data_word(0x00080000, 0x00000002, 0x02000800, 0x00080800);
+	&data_word(0x02080802, 0x02080000, 0x00000802, 0x02000800);
+	&data_word(0x00000002, 0x00000800, 0x00080800, 0x02080002);
+	&data_word(0x00000800, 0x02000802, 0x02080002, 0x00000000);
+	&data_word(0x00000000, 0x02080802, 0x02000800, 0x00080002);
+	&data_word(0x02080800, 0x00080000, 0x00000802, 0x02000800);
+	&data_word(0x02080002, 0x00000800, 0x00080800, 0x02000002);
+	&data_word(0x00080802, 0x00000002, 0x02000002, 0x02080000);
+	&data_word(0x02080802, 0x00080800, 0x02080000, 0x02000802);
+	&data_word(0x02000000, 0x00000802, 0x00080002, 0x00000000);
+	&data_word(0x00080000, 0x02000000, 0x02000802, 0x02080800);
+	&data_word(0x00000002, 0x02080002, 0x00000800, 0x00080802);
+	# nibble 1
+	&data_word(0x40108010, 0x00000000, 0x00108000, 0x40100000);
+	&data_word(0x40000010, 0x00008010, 0x40008000, 0x00108000);
+	&data_word(0x00008000, 0x40100010, 0x00000010, 0x40008000);
+	&data_word(0x00100010, 0x40108000, 0x40100000, 0x00000010);
+	&data_word(0x00100000, 0x40008010, 0x40100010, 0x00008000);
+	&data_word(0x00108010, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, 0x00100010);
+	&data_word(0x40008010, 0x00108010, 0x40108000, 0x40000010);
+	&data_word(0x40000000, 0x00100000, 0x00008010, 0x40108010);
+	&data_word(0x00100010, 0x40108000, 0x40008000, 0x00108010);
+	&data_word(0x40108010, 0x00100010, 0x40000010, 0x00000000);
+	&data_word(0x40000000, 0x00008010, 0x00100000, 0x40100010);
+	&data_word(0x00008000, 0x40000000, 0x00108010, 0x40008010);
+	&data_word(0x40108000, 0x00008000, 0x00000000, 0x40000010);
+	&data_word(0x00000010, 0x40108010, 0x00108000, 0x40100000);
+	&data_word(0x40100010, 0x00100000, 0x00008010, 0x40008000);
+	&data_word(0x40008010, 0x00000010, 0x40100000, 0x00108000);
+	# nibble 2
+	&data_word(0x04000001, 0x04040100, 0x00000100, 0x04000101);
+	&data_word(0x00040001, 0x04000000, 0x04000101, 0x00040100);
+	&data_word(0x04000100, 0x00040000, 0x04040000, 0x00000001);
+	&data_word(0x04040101, 0x00000101, 0x00000001, 0x04040001);
+	&data_word(0x00000000, 0x00040001, 0x04040100, 0x00000100);
+	&data_word(0x00000101, 0x04040101, 0x00040000, 0x04000001);
+	&data_word(0x04040001, 0x04000100, 0x00040101, 0x04040000);
+	&data_word(0x00040100, 0x00000000, 0x04000000, 0x00040101);
+	&data_word(0x04040100, 0x00000100, 0x00000001, 0x00040000);
+	&data_word(0x00000101, 0x00040001, 0x04040000, 0x04000101);
+	&data_word(0x00000000, 0x04040100, 0x00040100, 0x04040001);
+	&data_word(0x00040001, 0x04000000, 0x04040101, 0x00000001);
+	&data_word(0x00040101, 0x04000001, 0x04000000, 0x04040101);
+	&data_word(0x00040000, 0x04000100, 0x04000101, 0x00040100);
+	&data_word(0x04000100, 0x00000000, 0x04040001, 0x00000101);
+	&data_word(0x04000001, 0x00040101, 0x00000100, 0x04040000);
+	# nibble 3
+	&data_word(0x00401008, 0x10001000, 0x00000008, 0x10401008);
+	&data_word(0x00000000, 0x10400000, 0x10001008, 0x00400008);
+	&data_word(0x10401000, 0x10000008, 0x10000000, 0x00001008);
+	&data_word(0x10000008, 0x00401008, 0x00400000, 0x10000000);
+	&data_word(0x10400008, 0x00401000, 0x00001000, 0x00000008);
+	&data_word(0x00401000, 0x10001008, 0x10400000, 0x00001000);
+	&data_word(0x00001008, 0x00000000, 0x00400008, 0x10401000);
+	&data_word(0x10001000, 0x10400008, 0x10401008, 0x00400000);
+	&data_word(0x10400008, 0x00001008, 0x00400000, 0x10000008);
+	&data_word(0x00401000, 0x10001000, 0x00000008, 0x10400000);
+	&data_word(0x10001008, 0x00000000, 0x00001000, 0x00400008);
+	&data_word(0x00000000, 0x10400008, 0x10401000, 0x00001000);
+	&data_word(0x10000000, 0x10401008, 0x00401008, 0x00400000);
+	&data_word(0x10401008, 0x00000008, 0x10001000, 0x00401008);
+	&data_word(0x00400008, 0x00401000, 0x10400000, 0x10001008);
+	&data_word(0x00001008, 0x10000000, 0x10000008, 0x10401000);
+	# nibble 4
+	&data_word(0x08000000, 0x00010000, 0x00000400, 0x08010420);
+	&data_word(0x08010020, 0x08000400, 0x00010420, 0x08010000);
+	&data_word(0x00010000, 0x00000020, 0x08000020, 0x00010400);
+	&data_word(0x08000420, 0x08010020, 0x08010400, 0x00000000);
+	&data_word(0x00010400, 0x08000000, 0x00010020, 0x00000420);
+	&data_word(0x08000400, 0x00010420, 0x00000000, 0x08000020);
+	&data_word(0x00000020, 0x08000420, 0x08010420, 0x00010020);
+	&data_word(0x08010000, 0x00000400, 0x00000420, 0x08010400);
+	&data_word(0x08010400, 0x08000420, 0x00010020, 0x08010000);
+	&data_word(0x00010000, 0x00000020, 0x08000020, 0x08000400);
+	&data_word(0x08000000, 0x00010400, 0x08010420, 0x00000000);
+	&data_word(0x00010420, 0x08000000, 0x00000400, 0x00010020);
+	&data_word(0x08000420, 0x00000400, 0x00000000, 0x08010420);
+	&data_word(0x08010020, 0x08010400, 0x00000420, 0x00010000);
+	&data_word(0x00010400, 0x08010020, 0x08000400, 0x00000420);
+	&data_word(0x00000020, 0x00010420, 0x08010000, 0x08000020);
+	# nibble 5
+	&data_word(0x80000040, 0x00200040, 0x00000000, 0x80202000);
+	&data_word(0x00200040, 0x00002000, 0x80002040, 0x00200000);
+	&data_word(0x00002040, 0x80202040, 0x00202000, 0x80000000);
+	&data_word(0x80002000, 0x80000040, 0x80200000, 0x00202040);
+	&data_word(0x00200000, 0x80002040, 0x80200040, 0x00000000);
+	&data_word(0x00002000, 0x00000040, 0x80202000, 0x80200040);
+	&data_word(0x80202040, 0x80200000, 0x80000000, 0x00002040);
+	&data_word(0x00000040, 0x00202000, 0x00202040, 0x80002000);
+	&data_word(0x00002040, 0x80000000, 0x80002000, 0x00202040);
+	&data_word(0x80202000, 0x00200040, 0x00000000, 0x80002000);
+	&data_word(0x80000000, 0x00002000, 0x80200040, 0x00200000);
+	&data_word(0x00200040, 0x80202040, 0x00202000, 0x00000040);
+	&data_word(0x80202040, 0x00202000, 0x00200000, 0x80002040);
+	&data_word(0x80000040, 0x80200000, 0x00202040, 0x00000000);
+	&data_word(0x00002000, 0x80000040, 0x80002040, 0x80202000);
+	&data_word(0x80200000, 0x00002040, 0x00000040, 0x80200040);
+	# nibble 6
+	&data_word(0x00004000, 0x00000200, 0x01000200, 0x01000004);
+	&data_word(0x01004204, 0x00004004, 0x00004200, 0x00000000);
+	&data_word(0x01000000, 0x01000204, 0x00000204, 0x01004000);
+	&data_word(0x00000004, 0x01004200, 0x01004000, 0x00000204);
+	&data_word(0x01000204, 0x00004000, 0x00004004, 0x01004204);
+	&data_word(0x00000000, 0x01000200, 0x01000004, 0x00004200);
+	&data_word(0x01004004, 0x00004204, 0x01004200, 0x00000004);
+	&data_word(0x00004204, 0x01004004, 0x00000200, 0x01000000);
+	&data_word(0x00004204, 0x01004000, 0x01004004, 0x00000204);
+	&data_word(0x00004000, 0x00000200, 0x01000000, 0x01004004);
+	&data_word(0x01000204, 0x00004204, 0x00004200, 0x00000000);
+	&data_word(0x00000200, 0x01000004, 0x00000004, 0x01000200);
+	&data_word(0x00000000, 0x01000204, 0x01000200, 0x00004200);
+	&data_word(0x00000204, 0x00004000, 0x01004204, 0x01000000);
+	&data_word(0x01004200, 0x00000004, 0x00004004, 0x01004204);
+	&data_word(0x01000004, 0x01004200, 0x01004000, 0x00004004);
+	# nibble 7
+	&data_word(0x20800080, 0x20820000, 0x00020080, 0x00000000);
+	&data_word(0x20020000, 0x00800080, 0x20800000, 0x20820080);
+	&data_word(0x00000080, 0x20000000, 0x00820000, 0x00020080);
+	&data_word(0x00820080, 0x20020080, 0x20000080, 0x20800000);
+	&data_word(0x00020000, 0x00820080, 0x00800080, 0x20020000);
+	&data_word(0x20820080, 0x20000080, 0x00000000, 0x00820000);
+	&data_word(0x20000000, 0x00800000, 0x20020080, 0x20800080);
+	&data_word(0x00800000, 0x00020000, 0x20820000, 0x00000080);
+	&data_word(0x00800000, 0x00020000, 0x20000080, 0x20820080);
+	&data_word(0x00020080, 0x20000000, 0x00000000, 0x00820000);
+	&data_word(0x20800080, 0x20020080, 0x20020000, 0x00800080);
+	&data_word(0x20820000, 0x00000080, 0x00800080, 0x20020000);
+	&data_word(0x20820080, 0x00800000, 0x20800000, 0x20000080);
+	&data_word(0x00820000, 0x00020080, 0x20020080, 0x20800000);
+	&data_word(0x00000080, 0x20820000, 0x00820080, 0x00000000);
+	&data_word(0x20000000, 0x20800080, 0x00020000, 0x00820080);
+	}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/asm/des_enc.m4 b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/asm/des_enc.m4
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2d794d3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/asm/des_enc.m4
@@ -0,0 +1,1972 @@
+! Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+!
+! Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+! this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+! in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+! https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+!
+!  To expand the m4 macros: m4 -B 8192 des_enc.m4 > des_enc.S
+!
+!  Global registers 1 to 5 are used. This is the same as done by the
+!  cc compiler. The UltraSPARC load/store little endian feature is used.
+!
+!  Instruction grouping often refers to one CPU cycle.
+!
+!  Assemble through gcc: gcc -c -mcpu=ultrasparc -o des_enc.o des_enc.S
+!
+!  Assemble through cc:  cc -c -xarch=v8plusa -o des_enc.o des_enc.S
+!
+!  Performance improvement according to './apps/openssl speed des'
+!
+!	32-bit build:
+!		23%  faster than cc-5.2 -xarch=v8plus -xO5
+!		115% faster than gcc-3.2.1 -m32 -mcpu=ultrasparc -O5
+!	64-bit build:
+!		50%  faster than cc-5.2 -xarch=v9 -xO5
+!		100% faster than gcc-3.2.1 -m64 -mcpu=ultrasparc -O5
+!
+
+.ident "des_enc.m4 2.1"
+.file  "des_enc-sparc.S"
+
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPSCANISTER
+#include <openssl/fipssyms.h>
+#endif
+
+#if defined(__SUNPRO_C) && defined(__sparcv9)
+# define ABI64  /* They've said -xarch=v9 at command line */
+#elif defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__arch64__)
+# define ABI64  /* They've said -m64 at command line */
+#endif
+
+#ifdef ABI64
+  .register	%g2,#scratch
+  .register	%g3,#scratch
+# define	FRAME	-192
+# define	BIAS	2047
+# define	LDPTR	ldx
+# define	STPTR	stx
+# define	ARG0	128
+# define	ARGSZ	8
+#else
+# define	FRAME	-96
+# define	BIAS	0
+# define	LDPTR	ld
+# define	STPTR	st
+# define	ARG0	68
+# define	ARGSZ	4
+#endif
+
+#define LOOPS 7
+
+#define global0 %g0
+#define global1 %g1
+#define global2 %g2
+#define global3 %g3
+#define global4 %g4
+#define global5 %g5
+
+#define local0 %l0
+#define local1 %l1
+#define local2 %l2
+#define local3 %l3
+#define local4 %l4
+#define local5 %l5
+#define local7 %l6
+#define local6 %l7
+
+#define in0 %i0
+#define in1 %i1
+#define in2 %i2
+#define in3 %i3
+#define in4 %i4
+#define in5 %i5
+#define in6 %i6
+#define in7 %i7
+
+#define out0 %o0
+#define out1 %o1
+#define out2 %o2
+#define out3 %o3
+#define out4 %o4
+#define out5 %o5
+#define out6 %o6
+#define out7 %o7
+
+#define stub stb
+
+changequote({,})
+
+
+! Macro definitions:
+
+
+! {ip_macro}
+!
+! The logic used in initial and final permutations is the same as in
+! the C code. The permutations are done with a clever shift, xor, and
+! technique.
+!
+! The macro also loads address sbox 1 to 5 to global 1 to 5, address
+! sbox 6 to local6, and addres sbox 8 to out3.
+!
+! Rotates the halfs 3 left to bring the sbox bits in convenient positions.
+!
+! Loads key first round from address in parameter 5 to out0, out1.
+!
+! After the the original LibDES initial permutation, the resulting left
+! is in the variable initially used for right and vice versa. The macro
+! implements the possibility to keep the halfs in the original registers.
+!
+! parameter 1  left
+! parameter 2  right
+! parameter 3  result left (modify in first round)
+! parameter 4  result right (use in first round)
+! parameter 5  key address
+! parameter 6  1/2 for include encryption/decryption
+! parameter 7  1 for move in1 to in3
+! parameter 8  1 for move in3 to in4, 2 for move in4 to in3
+! parameter 9  1 for load ks3 and ks2 to in4 and in3
+
+define(ip_macro, {
+
+! {ip_macro}
+! $1 $2 $4 $3 $5 $6 $7 $8 $9
+
+	ld	[out2+256], local1
+	srl	$2, 4, local4
+
+	xor	local4, $1, local4
+	ifelse($7,1,{mov in1, in3},{nop})
+
+	ld	[out2+260], local2
+	and	local4, local1, local4
+	ifelse($8,1,{mov in3, in4},{})
+	ifelse($8,2,{mov in4, in3},{})
+
+	ld	[out2+280], out4          ! loop counter
+	sll	local4, 4, local1
+	xor	$1, local4, $1
+
+	ld	[out2+264], local3
+	srl	$1, 16, local4
+	xor	$2, local1, $2
+
+	ifelse($9,1,{LDPTR	KS3, in4},{})
+	xor	local4, $2, local4
+	nop	!sethi	%hi(DES_SPtrans), global1 ! sbox addr
+
+	ifelse($9,1,{LDPTR	KS2, in3},{})
+	and	local4, local2, local4
+	nop	!or	global1, %lo(DES_SPtrans), global1   ! sbox addr
+
+	sll	local4, 16, local1
+	xor	$2, local4, $2
+
+	srl	$2, 2, local4
+	xor	$1, local1, $1
+
+	sethi	%hi(16711680), local5
+	xor	local4, $1, local4
+
+	and	local4, local3, local4
+	or	local5, 255, local5
+
+	sll	local4, 2, local2
+	xor	$1, local4, $1
+
+	srl	$1, 8, local4
+	xor	$2, local2, $2
+
+	xor	local4, $2, local4
+	add	global1, 768, global4
+
+	and	local4, local5, local4
+	add	global1, 1024, global5
+
+	ld	[out2+272], local7
+	sll	local4, 8, local1
+	xor	$2, local4, $2
+
+	srl	$2, 1, local4
+	xor	$1, local1, $1
+
+	ld	[$5], out0                ! key 7531
+	xor	local4, $1, local4
+	add	global1, 256, global2
+
+	ld	[$5+4], out1              ! key 8642
+	and	local4, local7, local4
+	add	global1, 512, global3
+
+	sll	local4, 1, local1
+	xor	$1, local4, $1
+
+	sll	$1, 3, local3
+	xor	$2, local1, $2
+
+	sll	$2, 3, local2
+	add	global1, 1280, local6     ! address sbox 8
+
+	srl	$1, 29, local4
+	add	global1, 1792, out3       ! address sbox 8
+
+	srl	$2, 29, local1
+	or	local4, local3, $4
+
+	or	local2, local1, $3
+
+	ifelse($6, 1, {
+
+		ld	[out2+284], local5     ! 0x0000FC00 used in the rounds
+		or	local2, local1, $3
+		xor	$4, out0, local1
+
+		call .des_enc.1
+		and	local1, 252, local1
+
+	},{})
+
+	ifelse($6, 2, {
+
+		ld	[out2+284], local5     ! 0x0000FC00 used in the rounds
+		or	local2, local1, $3
+		xor	$4, out0, local1
+
+		call .des_dec.1
+		and	local1, 252, local1
+
+	},{})
+})
+
+
+! {rounds_macro}
+!
+! The logic used in the DES rounds is the same as in the C code,
+! except that calculations for sbox 1 and sbox 5 begin before
+! the previous round is finished.
+!
+! In each round one half (work) is modified based on key and the
+! other half (use).
+!
+! In this version we do two rounds in a loop repeated 7 times
+! and two rounds separately.
+!
+! One half has the bits for the sboxes in the following positions:
+!
+!	777777xx555555xx333333xx111111xx
+!
+!	88xx666666xx444444xx222222xx8888
+!
+! The bits for each sbox are xor-ed with the key bits for that box.
+! The above xx bits are cleared, and the result used for lookup in
+! the sbox table. Each sbox entry contains the 4 output bits permuted
+! into 32 bits according to the P permutation.
+!
+! In the description of DES, left and right are switched after
+! each round, except after last round. In this code the original
+! left and right are kept in the same register in all rounds, meaning
+! that after the 16 rounds the result for right is in the register
+! originally used for left.
+!
+! parameter 1  first work (left in first round)
+! parameter 2  first use (right in first round)
+! parameter 3  enc/dec  1/-1
+! parameter 4  loop label
+! parameter 5  key address register
+! parameter 6  optional address for key next encryption/decryption
+! parameter 7  not empty for include retl
+!
+! also compares in2 to 8
+
+define(rounds_macro, {
+
+! {rounds_macro}
+! $1 $2 $3 $4 $5 $6 $7 $8 $9
+
+	xor	$2, out0, local1
+
+	ld	[out2+284], local5        ! 0x0000FC00
+	ba	$4
+	and	local1, 252, local1
+
+	.align 32
+
+$4:
+	! local6 is address sbox 6
+	! out3   is address sbox 8
+	! out4   is loop counter
+
+	ld	[global1+local1], local1
+	xor	$2, out1, out1            ! 8642
+	xor	$2, out0, out0            ! 7531
+	! fmovs	%f0, %f0                  ! fxor used for alignment
+
+	srl	out1, 4, local0           ! rotate 4 right
+	and	out0, local5, local3      ! 3
+	! fmovs	%f0, %f0
+
+	ld	[$5+$3*8], local7         ! key 7531 next round
+	srl	local3, 8, local3         ! 3
+	and	local0, 252, local2       ! 2
+	! fmovs	%f0, %f0
+
+	ld	[global3+local3],local3   ! 3
+	sll	out1, 28, out1            ! rotate
+	xor	$1, local1, $1            ! 1 finished, local1 now sbox 7
+
+	ld	[global2+local2], local2  ! 2 
+	srl	out0, 24, local1          ! 7
+	or	out1, local0, out1        ! rotate
+
+	ldub	[out2+local1], local1     ! 7 (and 0xFC)
+	srl	out1, 24, local0          ! 8
+	and	out1, local5, local4      ! 4
+
+	ldub	[out2+local0], local0     ! 8 (and 0xFC)
+	srl	local4, 8, local4         ! 4
+	xor	$1, local2, $1            ! 2 finished local2 now sbox 6
+
+	ld	[global4+local4],local4   ! 4
+	srl	out1, 16, local2          ! 6
+	xor	$1, local3, $1            ! 3 finished local3 now sbox 5
+
+	ld	[out3+local0],local0      ! 8
+	and	local2, 252, local2       ! 6
+	add	global1, 1536, local5     ! address sbox 7
+
+	ld	[local6+local2], local2   ! 6
+	srl	out0, 16, local3          ! 5
+	xor	$1, local4, $1            ! 4 finished
+
+	ld	[local5+local1],local1    ! 7
+	and	local3, 252, local3       ! 5
+	xor	$1, local0, $1            ! 8 finished
+
+	ld	[global5+local3],local3   ! 5
+	xor	$1, local2, $1            ! 6 finished
+	subcc	out4, 1, out4
+
+	ld	[$5+$3*8+4], out0         ! key 8642 next round
+	xor	$1, local7, local2        ! sbox 5 next round
+	xor	$1, local1, $1            ! 7 finished
+
+	srl	local2, 16, local2        ! sbox 5 next round
+	xor	$1, local3, $1            ! 5 finished
+
+	ld	[$5+$3*16+4], out1        ! key 8642 next round again
+	and	local2, 252, local2       ! sbox5 next round
+! next round
+	xor	$1, local7, local7        ! 7531
+
+	ld	[global5+local2], local2  ! 5
+	srl	local7, 24, local3        ! 7
+	xor	$1, out0, out0            ! 8642
+
+	ldub	[out2+local3], local3     ! 7 (and 0xFC)
+	srl	out0, 4, local0           ! rotate 4 right
+	and	local7, 252, local1       ! 1
+
+	sll	out0, 28, out0            ! rotate
+	xor	$2, local2, $2            ! 5 finished local2 used
+
+	srl	local0, 8, local4         ! 4
+	and	local0, 252, local2       ! 2
+	ld	[local5+local3], local3   ! 7
+
+	srl	local0, 16, local5        ! 6
+	or	out0, local0, out0        ! rotate
+	ld	[global2+local2], local2  ! 2
+
+	srl	out0, 24, local0
+	ld	[$5+$3*16], out0          ! key 7531 next round
+	and	local4, 252, local4	  ! 4
+
+	and	local5, 252, local5       ! 6
+	ld	[global4+local4], local4  ! 4
+	xor	$2, local3, $2            ! 7 finished local3 used
+
+	and	local0, 252, local0       ! 8
+	ld	[local6+local5], local5   ! 6
+	xor	$2, local2, $2            ! 2 finished local2 now sbox 3
+
+	srl	local7, 8, local2         ! 3 start
+	ld	[out3+local0], local0     ! 8
+	xor	$2, local4, $2            ! 4 finished
+
+	and	local2, 252, local2       ! 3
+	ld	[global1+local1], local1  ! 1
+	xor	$2, local5, $2            ! 6 finished local5 used
+
+	ld	[global3+local2], local2  ! 3
+	xor	$2, local0, $2            ! 8 finished
+	add	$5, $3*16, $5             ! enc add 8, dec add -8 to key pointer
+
+	ld	[out2+284], local5        ! 0x0000FC00
+	xor	$2, out0, local4          ! sbox 1 next round
+	xor	$2, local1, $2            ! 1 finished
+
+	xor	$2, local2, $2            ! 3 finished
+	bne	$4
+	and	local4, 252, local1       ! sbox 1 next round
+
+! two rounds more:
+
+	ld	[global1+local1], local1
+	xor	$2, out1, out1
+	xor	$2, out0, out0
+
+	srl	out1, 4, local0           ! rotate
+	and	out0, local5, local3
+
+	ld	[$5+$3*8], local7         ! key 7531
+	srl	local3, 8, local3
+	and	local0, 252, local2
+
+	ld	[global3+local3],local3
+	sll	out1, 28, out1            ! rotate
+	xor	$1, local1, $1            ! 1 finished, local1 now sbox 7
+
+	ld	[global2+local2], local2
+	srl	out0, 24, local1
+	or	out1, local0, out1        ! rotate
+
+	ldub	[out2+local1], local1
+	srl	out1, 24, local0
+	and	out1, local5, local4
+
+	ldub	[out2+local0], local0
+	srl	local4, 8, local4
+	xor	$1, local2, $1            ! 2 finished local2 now sbox 6
+
+	ld	[global4+local4],local4
+	srl	out1, 16, local2
+	xor	$1, local3, $1            ! 3 finished local3 now sbox 5
+
+	ld	[out3+local0],local0
+	and	local2, 252, local2
+	add	global1, 1536, local5     ! address sbox 7
+
+	ld	[local6+local2], local2
+	srl	out0, 16, local3
+	xor	$1, local4, $1            ! 4 finished
+
+	ld	[local5+local1],local1
+	and	local3, 252, local3
+	xor	$1, local0, $1
+
+	ld	[global5+local3],local3
+	xor	$1, local2, $1            ! 6 finished
+	cmp	in2, 8
+
+	ifelse($6,{}, {}, {ld	[out2+280], out4})  ! loop counter
+	xor	$1, local7, local2        ! sbox 5 next round
+	xor	$1, local1, $1            ! 7 finished
+
+	ld	[$5+$3*8+4], out0
+	srl	local2, 16, local2        ! sbox 5 next round
+	xor	$1, local3, $1            ! 5 finished
+
+	and	local2, 252, local2
+! next round (two rounds more)
+	xor	$1, local7, local7        ! 7531
+
+	ld	[global5+local2], local2
+	srl	local7, 24, local3
+	xor	$1, out0, out0            ! 8642
+
+	ldub	[out2+local3], local3
+	srl	out0, 4, local0           ! rotate
+	and	local7, 252, local1
+
+	sll	out0, 28, out0            ! rotate
+	xor	$2, local2, $2            ! 5 finished local2 used
+
+	srl	local0, 8, local4
+	and	local0, 252, local2
+	ld	[local5+local3], local3
+
+	srl	local0, 16, local5
+	or	out0, local0, out0        ! rotate
+	ld	[global2+local2], local2
+
+	srl	out0, 24, local0
+	ifelse($6,{}, {}, {ld	[$6], out0})   ! key next encryption/decryption
+	and	local4, 252, local4
+
+	and	local5, 252, local5
+	ld	[global4+local4], local4
+	xor	$2, local3, $2            ! 7 finished local3 used
+
+	and	local0, 252, local0
+	ld	[local6+local5], local5
+	xor	$2, local2, $2            ! 2 finished local2 now sbox 3
+
+	srl	local7, 8, local2         ! 3 start
+	ld	[out3+local0], local0
+	xor	$2, local4, $2
+
+	and	local2, 252, local2
+	ld	[global1+local1], local1
+	xor	$2, local5, $2            ! 6 finished local5 used
+
+	ld	[global3+local2], local2
+	srl	$1, 3, local3
+	xor	$2, local0, $2
+
+	ifelse($6,{}, {}, {ld	[$6+4], out1}) ! key next encryption/decryption
+	sll	$1, 29, local4
+	xor	$2, local1, $2
+
+	ifelse($7,{}, {}, {retl})
+	xor	$2, local2, $2
+})
+
+
+! {fp_macro}
+!
+!  parameter 1   right (original left)
+!  parameter 2   left (original right)
+!  parameter 3   1 for optional store to [in0]
+!  parameter 4   1 for load input/output address to local5/7
+!
+!  The final permutation logic switches the halfes, meaning that
+!  left and right ends up the the registers originally used.
+
+define(fp_macro, {
+
+! {fp_macro}
+! $1 $2 $3 $4 $5 $6 $7 $8 $9
+
+	! initially undo the rotate 3 left done after initial permutation
+	! original left is received shifted 3 right and 29 left in local3/4
+
+	sll	$2, 29, local1
+	or	local3, local4, $1
+
+	srl	$2, 3, $2
+	sethi	%hi(0x55555555), local2
+
+	or	$2, local1, $2
+	or	local2, %lo(0x55555555), local2
+
+	srl	$2, 1, local3
+	sethi	%hi(0x00ff00ff), local1
+	xor	local3, $1, local3
+	or	local1, %lo(0x00ff00ff), local1
+	and	local3, local2, local3
+	sethi	%hi(0x33333333), local4
+	sll	local3, 1, local2
+
+	xor	$1, local3, $1
+
+	srl	$1, 8, local3
+	xor	$2, local2, $2
+	xor	local3, $2, local3
+	or	local4, %lo(0x33333333), local4
+	and	local3, local1, local3
+	sethi	%hi(0x0000ffff), local1
+	sll	local3, 8, local2
+
+	xor	$2, local3, $2
+
+	srl	$2, 2, local3
+	xor	$1, local2, $1
+	xor	local3, $1, local3
+	or	local1, %lo(0x0000ffff), local1
+	and	local3, local4, local3
+	sethi	%hi(0x0f0f0f0f), local4
+	sll	local3, 2, local2
+
+	ifelse($4,1, {LDPTR INPUT, local5})
+	xor	$1, local3, $1
+
+	ifelse($4,1, {LDPTR OUTPUT, local7})
+	srl	$1, 16, local3
+	xor	$2, local2, $2
+	xor	local3, $2, local3
+	or	local4, %lo(0x0f0f0f0f), local4
+	and	local3, local1, local3
+	sll	local3, 16, local2
+
+	xor	$2, local3, local1
+
+	srl	local1, 4, local3
+	xor	$1, local2, $1
+	xor	local3, $1, local3
+	and	local3, local4, local3
+	sll	local3, 4, local2
+
+	xor	$1, local3, $1
+
+	! optional store:
+
+	ifelse($3,1, {st $1, [in0]})
+
+	xor	local1, local2, $2
+
+	ifelse($3,1, {st $2, [in0+4]})
+
+})
+
+
+! {fp_ip_macro}
+!
+! Does initial permutation for next block mixed with
+! final permutation for current block.
+!
+! parameter 1   original left
+! parameter 2   original right
+! parameter 3   left ip
+! parameter 4   right ip
+! parameter 5   1: load ks1/ks2 to in3/in4, add 120 to in4
+!                2: mov in4 to in3
+!
+! also adds -8 to length in2 and loads loop counter to out4
+
+define(fp_ip_macro, {
+
+! {fp_ip_macro}
+! $1 $2 $3 $4 $5 $6 $7 $8 $9
+
+	define({temp1},{out4})
+	define({temp2},{local3})
+
+	define({ip1},{local1})
+	define({ip2},{local2})
+	define({ip4},{local4})
+	define({ip5},{local5})
+
+	! $1 in local3, local4
+
+	ld	[out2+256], ip1
+	sll	out5, 29, temp1
+	or	local3, local4, $1
+
+	srl	out5, 3, $2
+	ifelse($5,2,{mov in4, in3})
+
+	ld	[out2+272], ip5
+	srl	$4, 4, local0
+	or	$2, temp1, $2
+
+	srl	$2, 1, temp1
+	xor	temp1, $1, temp1
+
+	and	temp1, ip5, temp1
+	xor	local0, $3, local0
+
+	sll	temp1, 1, temp2
+	xor	$1, temp1, $1
+
+	and	local0, ip1, local0
+	add	in2, -8, in2
+
+	sll	local0, 4, local7
+	xor	$3, local0, $3
+
+	ld	[out2+268], ip4
+	srl	$1, 8, temp1
+	xor	$2, temp2, $2
+	ld	[out2+260], ip2
+	srl	$3, 16, local0
+	xor	$4, local7, $4
+	xor	temp1, $2, temp1
+	xor	local0, $4, local0
+	and	temp1, ip4, temp1
+	and	local0, ip2, local0
+	sll	temp1, 8, temp2
+	xor	$2, temp1, $2
+	sll	local0, 16, local7
+	xor	$4, local0, $4
+
+	srl	$2, 2, temp1
+	xor	$1, temp2, $1
+
+	ld	[out2+264], temp2         ! ip3
+	srl	$4, 2, local0
+	xor	$3, local7, $3
+	xor	temp1, $1, temp1
+	xor	local0, $3, local0
+	and	temp1, temp2, temp1
+	and	local0, temp2, local0
+	sll	temp1, 2, temp2
+	xor	$1, temp1, $1
+	sll	local0, 2, local7
+	xor	$3, local0, $3
+
+	srl	$1, 16, temp1
+	xor	$2, temp2, $2
+	srl	$3, 8, local0
+	xor	$4, local7, $4
+	xor	temp1, $2, temp1
+	xor	local0, $4, local0
+	and	temp1, ip2, temp1
+	and	local0, ip4, local0
+	sll	temp1, 16, temp2
+	xor	$2, temp1, local4
+	sll	local0, 8, local7
+	xor	$4, local0, $4
+
+	srl	$4, 1, local0
+	xor	$3, local7, $3
+
+	srl	local4, 4, temp1
+	xor	local0, $3, local0
+
+	xor	$1, temp2, $1
+	and	local0, ip5, local0
+
+	sll	local0, 1, local7
+	xor	temp1, $1, temp1
+
+	xor	$3, local0, $3
+	xor	$4, local7, $4
+
+	sll	$3, 3, local5
+	and	temp1, ip1, temp1
+
+	sll	temp1, 4, temp2
+	xor	$1, temp1, $1
+
+	ifelse($5,1,{LDPTR	KS2, in4})
+	sll	$4, 3, local2
+	xor	local4, temp2, $2
+
+	! reload since used as temporar:
+
+	ld	[out2+280], out4          ! loop counter
+
+	srl	$3, 29, local0
+	ifelse($5,1,{add in4, 120, in4})
+
+	ifelse($5,1,{LDPTR	KS1, in3})
+	srl	$4, 29, local7
+
+	or	local0, local5, $4
+	or	local2, local7, $3
+
+})
+
+
+
+! {load_little_endian}
+!
+! parameter 1  address
+! parameter 2  destination left
+! parameter 3  destination right
+! parameter 4  temporar
+! parameter 5  label
+
+define(load_little_endian, {
+
+! {load_little_endian}
+! $1 $2 $3 $4 $5 $6 $7 $8 $9
+
+	! first in memory to rightmost in register
+
+$5:
+	ldub	[$1+3], $2
+
+	ldub	[$1+2], $4
+	sll	$2, 8, $2
+	or	$2, $4, $2
+
+	ldub	[$1+1], $4
+	sll	$2, 8, $2
+	or	$2, $4, $2
+
+	ldub	[$1+0], $4
+	sll	$2, 8, $2
+	or	$2, $4, $2
+
+
+	ldub	[$1+3+4], $3
+
+	ldub	[$1+2+4], $4
+	sll	$3, 8, $3
+	or	$3, $4, $3
+
+	ldub	[$1+1+4], $4
+	sll	$3, 8, $3
+	or	$3, $4, $3
+
+	ldub	[$1+0+4], $4
+	sll	$3, 8, $3
+	or	$3, $4, $3
+$5a:
+
+})
+
+
+! {load_little_endian_inc}
+!
+! parameter 1  address
+! parameter 2  destination left
+! parameter 3  destination right
+! parameter 4  temporar
+! parameter 4  label
+!
+! adds 8 to address
+
+define(load_little_endian_inc, {
+
+! {load_little_endian_inc}
+! $1 $2 $3 $4 $5 $6 $7 $8 $9
+
+	! first in memory to rightmost in register
+
+$5:
+	ldub	[$1+3], $2
+
+	ldub	[$1+2], $4
+	sll	$2, 8, $2
+	or	$2, $4, $2
+
+	ldub	[$1+1], $4
+	sll	$2, 8, $2
+	or	$2, $4, $2
+
+	ldub	[$1+0], $4
+	sll	$2, 8, $2
+	or	$2, $4, $2
+
+	ldub	[$1+3+4], $3
+	add	$1, 8, $1
+
+	ldub	[$1+2+4-8], $4
+	sll	$3, 8, $3
+	or	$3, $4, $3
+
+	ldub	[$1+1+4-8], $4
+	sll	$3, 8, $3
+	or	$3, $4, $3
+
+	ldub	[$1+0+4-8], $4
+	sll	$3, 8, $3
+	or	$3, $4, $3
+$5a:
+
+})
+
+
+! {load_n_bytes}
+!
+! Loads 1 to 7 bytes little endian
+! Remaining bytes are zeroed.
+!
+! parameter 1  address
+! parameter 2  length
+! parameter 3  destination register left
+! parameter 4  destination register right
+! parameter 5  temp
+! parameter 6  temp2
+! parameter 7  label
+! parameter 8  return label
+
+define(load_n_bytes, {
+
+! {load_n_bytes}
+! $1 $2 $5 $6 $7 $8 $7 $8 $9
+
+$7.0:	call	.+8
+	sll	$2, 2, $6
+
+	add	%o7,$7.jmp.table-$7.0,$5
+
+	add	$5, $6, $5
+	mov	0, $4
+
+	ld	[$5], $5
+
+	jmp	%o7+$5
+	mov	0, $3
+
+$7.7:
+	ldub	[$1+6], $5
+	sll	$5, 16, $5
+	or	$3, $5, $3
+$7.6:
+	ldub	[$1+5], $5
+	sll	$5, 8, $5
+	or	$3, $5, $3
+$7.5:
+	ldub	[$1+4], $5
+	or	$3, $5, $3
+$7.4:
+	ldub	[$1+3], $5
+	sll	$5, 24, $5
+	or	$4, $5, $4
+$7.3:
+	ldub	[$1+2], $5
+	sll	$5, 16, $5
+	or	$4, $5, $4
+$7.2:
+	ldub	[$1+1], $5
+	sll	$5, 8, $5
+	or	$4, $5, $4
+$7.1:
+	ldub	[$1+0], $5
+	ba	$8
+	or	$4, $5, $4
+
+	.align 4
+
+$7.jmp.table:
+	.word	0
+	.word	$7.1-$7.0
+	.word	$7.2-$7.0
+	.word	$7.3-$7.0
+	.word	$7.4-$7.0
+	.word	$7.5-$7.0
+	.word	$7.6-$7.0
+	.word	$7.7-$7.0
+})
+
+
+! {store_little_endian}
+!
+! parameter 1  address
+! parameter 2  source left
+! parameter 3  source right
+! parameter 4  temporar
+
+define(store_little_endian, {
+
+! {store_little_endian}
+! $1 $2 $3 $4 $5 $6 $7 $8 $9
+
+	! rightmost in register to first in memory
+
+$5:
+	and	$2, 255, $4
+	stub	$4, [$1+0]
+
+	srl	$2, 8, $4
+	and	$4, 255, $4
+	stub	$4, [$1+1]
+
+	srl	$2, 16, $4
+	and	$4, 255, $4
+	stub	$4, [$1+2]
+
+	srl	$2, 24, $4
+	stub	$4, [$1+3]
+
+
+	and	$3, 255, $4
+	stub	$4, [$1+0+4]
+
+	srl	$3, 8, $4
+	and	$4, 255, $4
+	stub	$4, [$1+1+4]
+
+	srl	$3, 16, $4
+	and	$4, 255, $4
+	stub	$4, [$1+2+4]
+
+	srl	$3, 24, $4
+	stub	$4, [$1+3+4]
+
+$5a:
+
+})
+
+
+! {store_n_bytes}
+!
+! Stores 1 to 7 bytes little endian
+!
+! parameter 1  address
+! parameter 2  length
+! parameter 3  source register left
+! parameter 4  source register right
+! parameter 5  temp
+! parameter 6  temp2
+! parameter 7  label
+! parameter 8  return label
+
+define(store_n_bytes, {
+
+! {store_n_bytes}
+! $1 $2 $5 $6 $7 $8 $7 $8 $9
+
+$7.0:	call	.+8
+	sll	$2, 2, $6
+
+	add	%o7,$7.jmp.table-$7.0,$5
+
+	add	$5, $6, $5
+
+	ld	[$5], $5
+
+	jmp	%o7+$5
+	nop
+
+$7.7:
+	srl	$3, 16, $5
+	and	$5, 0xff, $5
+	stub	$5, [$1+6]
+$7.6:
+	srl	$3, 8, $5
+	and	$5, 0xff, $5
+	stub	$5, [$1+5]
+$7.5:
+	and	$3, 0xff, $5
+	stub	$5, [$1+4]
+$7.4:
+	srl	$4, 24, $5
+	stub	$5, [$1+3]
+$7.3:
+	srl	$4, 16, $5
+	and	$5, 0xff, $5
+	stub	$5, [$1+2]
+$7.2:
+	srl	$4, 8, $5
+	and	$5, 0xff, $5
+	stub	$5, [$1+1]
+$7.1:
+	and	$4, 0xff, $5
+
+
+	ba	$8
+	stub	$5, [$1]
+
+	.align 4
+
+$7.jmp.table:
+
+	.word	0
+	.word	$7.1-$7.0
+	.word	$7.2-$7.0
+	.word	$7.3-$7.0
+	.word	$7.4-$7.0
+	.word	$7.5-$7.0
+	.word	$7.6-$7.0
+	.word	$7.7-$7.0
+})
+
+
+define(testvalue,{1})
+
+define(register_init, {
+
+! For test purposes:
+
+	sethi	%hi(testvalue), local0
+	or	local0, %lo(testvalue), local0
+
+	ifelse($1,{},{}, {mov	local0, $1})
+	ifelse($2,{},{}, {mov	local0, $2})
+	ifelse($3,{},{}, {mov	local0, $3})
+	ifelse($4,{},{}, {mov	local0, $4})
+	ifelse($5,{},{}, {mov	local0, $5})
+	ifelse($6,{},{}, {mov	local0, $6})
+	ifelse($7,{},{}, {mov	local0, $7})
+	ifelse($8,{},{}, {mov	local0, $8})
+
+	mov	local0, local1
+	mov	local0, local2
+	mov	local0, local3
+	mov	local0, local4
+	mov	local0, local5
+	mov	local0, local7
+	mov	local0, local6
+	mov	local0, out0
+	mov	local0, out1
+	mov	local0, out2
+	mov	local0, out3
+	mov	local0, out4
+	mov	local0, out5
+	mov	local0, global1
+	mov	local0, global2
+	mov	local0, global3
+	mov	local0, global4
+	mov	local0, global5
+
+})
+
+.section	".text"
+
+	.align 32
+
+.des_enc:
+
+	! key address in3
+	! loads key next encryption/decryption first round from [in4]
+
+	rounds_macro(in5, out5, 1, .des_enc.1, in3, in4, retl)
+
+
+	.align 32
+
+.des_dec:
+
+	! implemented with out5 as first parameter to avoid
+	! register exchange in ede modes
+
+	! key address in4
+	! loads key next encryption/decryption first round from [in3]
+
+	rounds_macro(out5, in5, -1, .des_dec.1, in4, in3, retl)
+
+
+
+! void DES_encrypt1(data, ks, enc)
+! *******************************
+
+	.align 32
+	.global DES_encrypt1
+	.type	 DES_encrypt1,#function
+
+DES_encrypt1:
+
+	save	%sp, FRAME, %sp
+
+	sethi	%hi(.PIC.DES_SPtrans-1f),global1
+	or	global1,%lo(.PIC.DES_SPtrans-1f),global1
+1:	call	.+8
+	add	%o7,global1,global1
+	sub	global1,.PIC.DES_SPtrans-.des_and,out2
+
+	ld	[in0], in5                ! left
+	cmp	in2, 0                    ! enc
+
+	be	.encrypt.dec
+	ld	[in0+4], out5             ! right
+
+	! parameter 6  1/2 for include encryption/decryption
+	! parameter 7  1 for move in1 to in3
+	! parameter 8  1 for move in3 to in4, 2 for move in4 to in3
+
+	ip_macro(in5, out5, in5, out5, in3, 0, 1, 1)
+
+	rounds_macro(in5, out5, 1, .des_encrypt1.1, in3, in4) ! in4 not used
+
+	fp_macro(in5, out5, 1)            ! 1 for store to [in0]
+
+	ret
+	restore
+
+.encrypt.dec:
+
+	add	in1, 120, in3             ! use last subkey for first round
+
+	! parameter 6  1/2 for include encryption/decryption
+	! parameter 7  1 for move in1 to in3
+	! parameter 8  1 for move in3 to in4, 2 for move in4 to in3
+
+	ip_macro(in5, out5, out5, in5, in4, 2, 0, 1) ! include dec,  ks in4
+
+	fp_macro(out5, in5, 1)            ! 1 for store to [in0]
+
+	ret
+	restore
+
+.DES_encrypt1.end:
+	.size	 DES_encrypt1,.DES_encrypt1.end-DES_encrypt1
+
+
+! void DES_encrypt2(data, ks, enc)
+!*********************************
+
+	! encrypts/decrypts without initial/final permutation
+
+	.align 32
+	.global DES_encrypt2
+	.type	 DES_encrypt2,#function
+
+DES_encrypt2:
+
+	save	%sp, FRAME, %sp
+
+	sethi	%hi(.PIC.DES_SPtrans-1f),global1
+	or	global1,%lo(.PIC.DES_SPtrans-1f),global1
+1:	call	.+8
+	add	%o7,global1,global1
+	sub	global1,.PIC.DES_SPtrans-.des_and,out2
+
+	! Set sbox address 1 to 6 and rotate halfs 3 left
+	! Errors caught by destest? Yes. Still? *NO*
+
+	!sethi	%hi(DES_SPtrans), global1 ! address sbox 1
+
+	!or	global1, %lo(DES_SPtrans), global1  ! sbox 1
+
+	add	global1, 256, global2     ! sbox 2
+	add	global1, 512, global3     ! sbox 3
+
+	ld	[in0], out5               ! right
+	add	global1, 768, global4     ! sbox 4
+	add	global1, 1024, global5    ! sbox 5
+
+	ld	[in0+4], in5              ! left
+	add	global1, 1280, local6     ! sbox 6
+	add	global1, 1792, out3       ! sbox 8
+
+	! rotate
+
+	sll	in5, 3, local5
+	mov	in1, in3                  ! key address to in3
+
+	sll	out5, 3, local7
+	srl	in5, 29, in5
+
+	srl	out5, 29, out5
+	add	in5, local5, in5
+
+	add	out5, local7, out5
+	cmp	in2, 0
+
+	! we use our own stackframe
+
+	be	.encrypt2.dec
+	STPTR	in0, [%sp+BIAS+ARG0+0*ARGSZ]
+
+	ld	[in3], out0               ! key 7531 first round
+	mov	LOOPS, out4               ! loop counter
+
+	ld	[in3+4], out1             ! key 8642 first round
+	sethi	%hi(0x0000FC00), local5
+
+	call .des_enc
+	mov	in3, in4
+
+	! rotate
+	sll	in5, 29, in0
+	srl	in5, 3, in5
+	sll	out5, 29, in1
+	add	in5, in0, in5
+	srl	out5, 3, out5
+	LDPTR	[%sp+BIAS+ARG0+0*ARGSZ], in0
+	add	out5, in1, out5
+	st	in5, [in0]
+	st	out5, [in0+4]
+
+	ret
+	restore
+
+
+.encrypt2.dec:
+
+	add in3, 120, in4
+
+	ld	[in4], out0               ! key 7531 first round
+	mov	LOOPS, out4               ! loop counter
+
+	ld	[in4+4], out1             ! key 8642 first round
+	sethi	%hi(0x0000FC00), local5
+
+	mov	in5, local1               ! left expected in out5
+	mov	out5, in5
+
+	call .des_dec
+	mov	local1, out5
+
+.encrypt2.finish:
+
+	! rotate
+	sll	in5, 29, in0
+	srl	in5, 3, in5
+	sll	out5, 29, in1
+	add	in5, in0, in5
+	srl	out5, 3, out5
+	LDPTR	[%sp+BIAS+ARG0+0*ARGSZ], in0
+	add	out5, in1, out5
+	st	out5, [in0]
+	st	in5, [in0+4]
+
+	ret
+	restore
+
+.DES_encrypt2.end:
+	.size	 DES_encrypt2, .DES_encrypt2.end-DES_encrypt2
+
+
+! void DES_encrypt3(data, ks1, ks2, ks3)
+! **************************************
+
+	.align 32
+	.global DES_encrypt3
+	.type	 DES_encrypt3,#function
+
+DES_encrypt3:
+
+	save	%sp, FRAME, %sp
+	
+	sethi	%hi(.PIC.DES_SPtrans-1f),global1
+	or	global1,%lo(.PIC.DES_SPtrans-1f),global1
+1:	call	.+8
+	add	%o7,global1,global1
+	sub	global1,.PIC.DES_SPtrans-.des_and,out2
+
+	ld	[in0], in5                ! left
+	add	in2, 120, in4             ! ks2
+
+	ld	[in0+4], out5             ! right
+	mov	in3, in2                  ! save ks3
+
+	! parameter 6  1/2 for include encryption/decryption
+	! parameter 7  1 for mov in1 to in3
+	! parameter 8  1 for mov in3 to in4
+	! parameter 9  1 for load ks3 and ks2 to in4 and in3
+
+	ip_macro(in5, out5, in5, out5, in3, 1, 1, 0, 0)
+
+	call	.des_dec
+	mov	in2, in3                  ! preload ks3
+
+	call	.des_enc
+	nop
+
+	fp_macro(in5, out5, 1)
+
+	ret
+	restore
+
+.DES_encrypt3.end:
+	.size	 DES_encrypt3,.DES_encrypt3.end-DES_encrypt3
+
+
+! void DES_decrypt3(data, ks1, ks2, ks3)
+! **************************************
+
+	.align 32
+	.global DES_decrypt3
+	.type	 DES_decrypt3,#function
+
+DES_decrypt3:
+
+	save	%sp, FRAME, %sp
+	
+	sethi	%hi(.PIC.DES_SPtrans-1f),global1
+	or	global1,%lo(.PIC.DES_SPtrans-1f),global1
+1:	call	.+8
+	add	%o7,global1,global1
+	sub	global1,.PIC.DES_SPtrans-.des_and,out2
+
+	ld	[in0], in5                ! left
+	add	in3, 120, in4             ! ks3
+
+	ld	[in0+4], out5             ! right
+	mov	in2, in3                  ! ks2
+
+	! parameter 6  1/2 for include encryption/decryption
+	! parameter 7  1 for mov in1 to in3
+	! parameter 8  1 for mov in3 to in4
+	! parameter 9  1 for load ks3 and ks2 to in4 and in3
+
+	ip_macro(in5, out5, out5, in5, in4, 2, 0, 0, 0)
+
+	call	.des_enc
+	add	in1, 120, in4             ! preload ks1
+
+	call	.des_dec
+	nop
+
+	fp_macro(out5, in5, 1)
+
+	ret
+	restore
+
+.DES_decrypt3.end:
+	.size	 DES_decrypt3,.DES_decrypt3.end-DES_decrypt3
+
+! void DES_ncbc_encrypt(input, output, length, schedule, ivec, enc)
+! *****************************************************************
+
+
+	.align 32
+	.global DES_ncbc_encrypt
+	.type	 DES_ncbc_encrypt,#function
+
+DES_ncbc_encrypt:
+
+	save	%sp, FRAME, %sp
+	
+	define({INPUT},  { [%sp+BIAS+ARG0+0*ARGSZ] })
+	define({OUTPUT}, { [%sp+BIAS+ARG0+1*ARGSZ] })
+	define({IVEC},   { [%sp+BIAS+ARG0+4*ARGSZ] })
+
+	sethi	%hi(.PIC.DES_SPtrans-1f),global1
+	or	global1,%lo(.PIC.DES_SPtrans-1f),global1
+1:	call	.+8
+	add	%o7,global1,global1
+	sub	global1,.PIC.DES_SPtrans-.des_and,out2
+
+	cmp	in5, 0                    ! enc   
+
+	be	.ncbc.dec
+	STPTR	in4, IVEC
+
+	! addr  left  right  temp  label
+	load_little_endian(in4, in5, out5, local3, .LLE1)  ! iv
+
+	addcc	in2, -8, in2              ! bytes missing when first block done
+
+	bl	.ncbc.enc.seven.or.less
+	mov	in3, in4                  ! schedule
+
+.ncbc.enc.next.block:
+
+	load_little_endian(in0, out4, global4, local3, .LLE2)  ! block
+
+.ncbc.enc.next.block_1:
+
+	xor	in5, out4, in5            ! iv xor
+	xor	out5, global4, out5       ! iv xor
+
+	! parameter 8  1 for move in3 to in4, 2 for move in4 to in3
+	ip_macro(in5, out5, in5, out5, in3, 0, 0, 2)
+
+.ncbc.enc.next.block_2:
+
+!//	call .des_enc                     ! compares in2 to 8
+!	rounds inlined for alignment purposes
+
+	add	global1, 768, global4     ! address sbox 4 since register used below
+
+	rounds_macro(in5, out5, 1, .ncbc.enc.1, in3, in4) ! include encryption  ks in3
+
+	bl	.ncbc.enc.next.block_fp
+	add	in0, 8, in0               ! input address
+
+	! If 8 or more bytes are to be encrypted after this block,
+	! we combine final permutation for this block with initial
+	! permutation for next block. Load next block:
+
+	load_little_endian(in0, global3, global4, local5, .LLE12)
+
+	!  parameter 1   original left
+	!  parameter 2   original right
+	!  parameter 3   left ip
+	!  parameter 4   right ip
+	!  parameter 5   1: load ks1/ks2 to in3/in4, add 120 to in4
+	!                2: mov in4 to in3
+	!
+	! also adds -8 to length in2 and loads loop counter to out4
+
+	fp_ip_macro(out0, out1, global3, global4, 2)
+
+	store_little_endian(in1, out0, out1, local3, .SLE10)  ! block
+
+	ld	[in3], out0               ! key 7531 first round next block
+	mov 	in5, local1
+	xor	global3, out5, in5        ! iv xor next block
+
+	ld	[in3+4], out1             ! key 8642
+	add	global1, 512, global3     ! address sbox 3 since register used
+	xor	global4, local1, out5     ! iv xor next block
+
+	ba	.ncbc.enc.next.block_2
+	add	in1, 8, in1               ! output address
+
+.ncbc.enc.next.block_fp:
+
+	fp_macro(in5, out5)
+
+	store_little_endian(in1, in5, out5, local3, .SLE1)  ! block
+
+	addcc   in2, -8, in2              ! bytes missing when next block done
+
+	bpos	.ncbc.enc.next.block
+	add	in1, 8, in1
+
+.ncbc.enc.seven.or.less:
+
+	cmp	in2, -8
+
+	ble	.ncbc.enc.finish
+	nop
+
+	add	in2, 8, local1            ! bytes to load
+
+	! addr, length, dest left, dest right, temp, temp2, label, ret label
+	load_n_bytes(in0, local1, global4, out4, local2, local3, .LNB1, .ncbc.enc.next.block_1)
+
+	! Loads 1 to 7 bytes little endian to global4, out4
+
+
+.ncbc.enc.finish:
+
+	LDPTR	IVEC, local4
+	store_little_endian(local4, in5, out5, local5, .SLE2)  ! ivec
+
+	ret
+	restore
+
+
+.ncbc.dec:
+
+	STPTR	in0, INPUT
+	cmp	in2, 0                    ! length
+	add	in3, 120, in3
+
+	LDPTR	IVEC, local7              ! ivec
+	ble	.ncbc.dec.finish
+	mov	in3, in4                  ! schedule
+
+	STPTR	in1, OUTPUT
+	mov	in0, local5               ! input
+
+	load_little_endian(local7, in0, in1, local3, .LLE3)   ! ivec
+
+.ncbc.dec.next.block:
+
+	load_little_endian(local5, in5, out5, local3, .LLE4)  ! block
+
+	! parameter 6  1/2 for include encryption/decryption
+	! parameter 7  1 for mov in1 to in3
+	! parameter 8  1 for mov in3 to in4
+
+	ip_macro(in5, out5, out5, in5, in4, 2, 0, 1) ! include decryprion  ks in4
+
+	fp_macro(out5, in5, 0, 1) ! 1 for input and output address to local5/7
+
+	! in2 is bytes left to be stored
+	! in2 is compared to 8 in the rounds
+
+	xor	out5, in0, out4           ! iv xor
+	bl	.ncbc.dec.seven.or.less
+	xor	in5, in1, global4         ! iv xor
+
+	! Load ivec next block now, since input and output address might be the same.
+
+	load_little_endian_inc(local5, in0, in1, local3, .LLE5)  ! iv
+
+	store_little_endian(local7, out4, global4, local3, .SLE3)
+
+	STPTR	local5, INPUT
+	add	local7, 8, local7
+	addcc   in2, -8, in2
+
+	bg	.ncbc.dec.next.block
+	STPTR	local7, OUTPUT
+
+
+.ncbc.dec.store.iv:
+
+	LDPTR	IVEC, local4              ! ivec
+	store_little_endian(local4, in0, in1, local5, .SLE4)
+
+.ncbc.dec.finish:
+
+	ret
+	restore
+
+.ncbc.dec.seven.or.less:
+
+	load_little_endian_inc(local5, in0, in1, local3, .LLE13)     ! ivec
+
+	store_n_bytes(local7, in2, global4, out4, local3, local4, .SNB1, .ncbc.dec.store.iv)
+
+
+.DES_ncbc_encrypt.end:
+	.size	 DES_ncbc_encrypt, .DES_ncbc_encrypt.end-DES_ncbc_encrypt
+
+
+! void DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt(input, output, lenght, ks1, ks2, ks3, ivec, enc)
+! **************************************************************************
+
+
+	.align 32
+	.global DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt
+	.type	 DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt,#function
+
+DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt:
+
+	save	%sp, FRAME, %sp
+
+	define({KS1}, { [%sp+BIAS+ARG0+3*ARGSZ] })
+	define({KS2}, { [%sp+BIAS+ARG0+4*ARGSZ] })
+	define({KS3}, { [%sp+BIAS+ARG0+5*ARGSZ] })
+
+	sethi	%hi(.PIC.DES_SPtrans-1f),global1
+	or	global1,%lo(.PIC.DES_SPtrans-1f),global1
+1:	call	.+8
+	add	%o7,global1,global1
+	sub	global1,.PIC.DES_SPtrans-.des_and,out2
+
+	LDPTR	[%fp+BIAS+ARG0+7*ARGSZ], local3          ! enc
+	LDPTR	[%fp+BIAS+ARG0+6*ARGSZ], local4          ! ivec
+	cmp	local3, 0                 ! enc
+
+	be	.ede3.dec
+	STPTR	in4, KS2
+
+	STPTR	in5, KS3
+
+	load_little_endian(local4, in5, out5, local3, .LLE6)  ! ivec
+
+	addcc	in2, -8, in2              ! bytes missing after next block
+
+	bl	.ede3.enc.seven.or.less
+	STPTR	in3, KS1
+
+.ede3.enc.next.block:
+
+	load_little_endian(in0, out4, global4, local3, .LLE7)
+
+.ede3.enc.next.block_1:
+
+	LDPTR	KS2, in4
+	xor	in5, out4, in5            ! iv xor
+	xor	out5, global4, out5       ! iv xor
+
+	LDPTR	KS1, in3
+	add	in4, 120, in4             ! for decryption we use last subkey first
+	nop
+
+	ip_macro(in5, out5, in5, out5, in3)
+
+.ede3.enc.next.block_2:
+
+	call .des_enc                     ! ks1 in3
+	nop
+
+	call .des_dec                     ! ks2 in4
+	LDPTR	KS3, in3
+
+	call .des_enc                     ! ks3 in3  compares in2 to 8
+	nop
+
+	bl	.ede3.enc.next.block_fp
+	add	in0, 8, in0
+
+	! If 8 or more bytes are to be encrypted after this block,
+	! we combine final permutation for this block with initial
+	! permutation for next block. Load next block:
+
+	load_little_endian(in0, global3, global4, local5, .LLE11)
+
+	!  parameter 1   original left
+	!  parameter 2   original right
+	!  parameter 3   left ip
+	!  parameter 4   right ip
+	!  parameter 5   1: load ks1/ks2 to in3/in4, add 120 to in4
+	!                2: mov in4 to in3
+	!
+	! also adds -8 to length in2 and loads loop counter to out4
+
+	fp_ip_macro(out0, out1, global3, global4, 1)
+
+	store_little_endian(in1, out0, out1, local3, .SLE9)  ! block
+
+	mov 	in5, local1
+	xor	global3, out5, in5        ! iv xor next block
+
+	ld	[in3], out0               ! key 7531
+	add	global1, 512, global3     ! address sbox 3
+	xor	global4, local1, out5     ! iv xor next block
+
+	ld	[in3+4], out1             ! key 8642
+	add	global1, 768, global4     ! address sbox 4
+	ba	.ede3.enc.next.block_2
+	add	in1, 8, in1
+
+.ede3.enc.next.block_fp:
+
+	fp_macro(in5, out5)
+
+	store_little_endian(in1, in5, out5, local3, .SLE5)  ! block
+
+	addcc   in2, -8, in2              ! bytes missing when next block done
+
+	bpos	.ede3.enc.next.block
+	add	in1, 8, in1
+
+.ede3.enc.seven.or.less:
+
+	cmp	in2, -8
+
+	ble	.ede3.enc.finish
+	nop
+
+	add	in2, 8, local1            ! bytes to load
+
+	! addr, length, dest left, dest right, temp, temp2, label, ret label
+	load_n_bytes(in0, local1, global4, out4, local2, local3, .LNB2, .ede3.enc.next.block_1)
+
+.ede3.enc.finish:
+
+	LDPTR	[%fp+BIAS+ARG0+6*ARGSZ], local4          ! ivec
+	store_little_endian(local4, in5, out5, local5, .SLE6)  ! ivec
+
+	ret
+	restore
+
+.ede3.dec:
+
+	STPTR	in0, INPUT
+	add	in5, 120, in5
+
+	STPTR	in1, OUTPUT
+	mov	in0, local5
+	add	in3, 120, in3
+
+	STPTR	in3, KS1
+	cmp	in2, 0
+
+	ble	.ede3.dec.finish
+	STPTR	in5, KS3
+
+	LDPTR	[%fp+BIAS+ARG0+6*ARGSZ], local7          ! iv
+	load_little_endian(local7, in0, in1, local3, .LLE8)
+
+.ede3.dec.next.block:
+
+	load_little_endian(local5, in5, out5, local3, .LLE9)
+
+	! parameter 6  1/2 for include encryption/decryption
+	! parameter 7  1 for mov in1 to in3
+	! parameter 8  1 for mov in3 to in4
+	! parameter 9  1 for load ks3 and ks2 to in4 and in3
+
+	ip_macro(in5, out5, out5, in5, in4, 2, 0, 0, 1) ! inc .des_dec ks3 in4
+
+	call .des_enc                     ! ks2 in3
+	LDPTR	KS1, in4
+
+	call .des_dec                     ! ks1 in4
+	nop
+
+	fp_macro(out5, in5, 0, 1)   ! 1 for input and output address local5/7
+
+	! in2 is bytes left to be stored
+	! in2 is compared to 8 in the rounds
+
+	xor	out5, in0, out4
+	bl	.ede3.dec.seven.or.less
+	xor	in5, in1, global4
+
+	load_little_endian_inc(local5, in0, in1, local3, .LLE10)   ! iv next block
+
+	store_little_endian(local7, out4, global4, local3, .SLE7)  ! block
+
+	STPTR	local5, INPUT
+	addcc   in2, -8, in2
+	add	local7, 8, local7
+
+	bg	.ede3.dec.next.block
+	STPTR	local7, OUTPUT
+
+.ede3.dec.store.iv:
+
+	LDPTR	[%fp+BIAS+ARG0+6*ARGSZ], local4          ! ivec
+	store_little_endian(local4, in0, in1, local5, .SLE8)  ! ivec
+
+.ede3.dec.finish:
+
+	ret
+	restore
+
+.ede3.dec.seven.or.less:
+
+	load_little_endian_inc(local5, in0, in1, local3, .LLE14)     ! iv
+
+	store_n_bytes(local7, in2, global4, out4, local3, local4, .SNB2, .ede3.dec.store.iv)
+
+
+.DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt.end:
+	.size	 DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt,.DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt.end-DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt
+
+	.align	256
+	.type	 .des_and,#object
+	.size	 .des_and,284
+
+.des_and:
+
+! This table is used for AND 0xFC when it is known that register
+! bits 8-31 are zero. Makes it possible to do three arithmetic
+! operations in one cycle.
+
+	.byte  0, 0, 0, 0, 4, 4, 4, 4
+	.byte  8, 8, 8, 8, 12, 12, 12, 12
+	.byte  16, 16, 16, 16, 20, 20, 20, 20
+	.byte  24, 24, 24, 24, 28, 28, 28, 28
+	.byte  32, 32, 32, 32, 36, 36, 36, 36
+	.byte  40, 40, 40, 40, 44, 44, 44, 44
+	.byte  48, 48, 48, 48, 52, 52, 52, 52
+	.byte  56, 56, 56, 56, 60, 60, 60, 60
+	.byte  64, 64, 64, 64, 68, 68, 68, 68
+	.byte  72, 72, 72, 72, 76, 76, 76, 76
+	.byte  80, 80, 80, 80, 84, 84, 84, 84
+	.byte  88, 88, 88, 88, 92, 92, 92, 92
+	.byte  96, 96, 96, 96, 100, 100, 100, 100
+	.byte  104, 104, 104, 104, 108, 108, 108, 108
+	.byte  112, 112, 112, 112, 116, 116, 116, 116
+	.byte  120, 120, 120, 120, 124, 124, 124, 124
+	.byte  128, 128, 128, 128, 132, 132, 132, 132
+	.byte  136, 136, 136, 136, 140, 140, 140, 140
+	.byte  144, 144, 144, 144, 148, 148, 148, 148
+	.byte  152, 152, 152, 152, 156, 156, 156, 156
+	.byte  160, 160, 160, 160, 164, 164, 164, 164
+	.byte  168, 168, 168, 168, 172, 172, 172, 172
+	.byte  176, 176, 176, 176, 180, 180, 180, 180
+	.byte  184, 184, 184, 184, 188, 188, 188, 188
+	.byte  192, 192, 192, 192, 196, 196, 196, 196
+	.byte  200, 200, 200, 200, 204, 204, 204, 204
+	.byte  208, 208, 208, 208, 212, 212, 212, 212
+	.byte  216, 216, 216, 216, 220, 220, 220, 220
+	.byte  224, 224, 224, 224, 228, 228, 228, 228
+	.byte  232, 232, 232, 232, 236, 236, 236, 236
+	.byte  240, 240, 240, 240, 244, 244, 244, 244
+	.byte  248, 248, 248, 248, 252, 252, 252, 252
+
+	! 5 numbers for initil/final permutation
+
+	.word   0x0f0f0f0f                ! offset 256
+	.word	0x0000ffff                ! 260
+	.word	0x33333333                ! 264
+	.word	0x00ff00ff                ! 268
+	.word	0x55555555                ! 272
+
+	.word	0                         ! 276
+	.word	LOOPS                     ! 280
+	.word	0x0000FC00                ! 284
+
+	.global	DES_SPtrans
+	.type	DES_SPtrans,#object
+	.size	DES_SPtrans,2048
+.align	64
+DES_SPtrans:
+.PIC.DES_SPtrans:
+	! nibble 0
+	.word	0x02080800, 0x00080000, 0x02000002, 0x02080802
+	.word	0x02000000, 0x00080802, 0x00080002, 0x02000002
+	.word	0x00080802, 0x02080800, 0x02080000, 0x00000802
+	.word	0x02000802, 0x02000000, 0x00000000, 0x00080002
+	.word	0x00080000, 0x00000002, 0x02000800, 0x00080800
+	.word	0x02080802, 0x02080000, 0x00000802, 0x02000800
+	.word	0x00000002, 0x00000800, 0x00080800, 0x02080002
+	.word	0x00000800, 0x02000802, 0x02080002, 0x00000000
+	.word	0x00000000, 0x02080802, 0x02000800, 0x00080002
+	.word	0x02080800, 0x00080000, 0x00000802, 0x02000800
+	.word	0x02080002, 0x00000800, 0x00080800, 0x02000002
+	.word	0x00080802, 0x00000002, 0x02000002, 0x02080000
+	.word	0x02080802, 0x00080800, 0x02080000, 0x02000802
+	.word	0x02000000, 0x00000802, 0x00080002, 0x00000000
+	.word	0x00080000, 0x02000000, 0x02000802, 0x02080800
+	.word	0x00000002, 0x02080002, 0x00000800, 0x00080802
+	! nibble 1
+	.word	0x40108010, 0x00000000, 0x00108000, 0x40100000
+	.word	0x40000010, 0x00008010, 0x40008000, 0x00108000
+	.word	0x00008000, 0x40100010, 0x00000010, 0x40008000
+	.word	0x00100010, 0x40108000, 0x40100000, 0x00000010
+	.word	0x00100000, 0x40008010, 0x40100010, 0x00008000
+	.word	0x00108010, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, 0x00100010
+	.word	0x40008010, 0x00108010, 0x40108000, 0x40000010
+	.word	0x40000000, 0x00100000, 0x00008010, 0x40108010
+	.word	0x00100010, 0x40108000, 0x40008000, 0x00108010
+	.word	0x40108010, 0x00100010, 0x40000010, 0x00000000
+	.word	0x40000000, 0x00008010, 0x00100000, 0x40100010
+	.word	0x00008000, 0x40000000, 0x00108010, 0x40008010
+	.word	0x40108000, 0x00008000, 0x00000000, 0x40000010
+	.word	0x00000010, 0x40108010, 0x00108000, 0x40100000
+	.word	0x40100010, 0x00100000, 0x00008010, 0x40008000
+	.word	0x40008010, 0x00000010, 0x40100000, 0x00108000
+	! nibble 2
+	.word	0x04000001, 0x04040100, 0x00000100, 0x04000101
+	.word	0x00040001, 0x04000000, 0x04000101, 0x00040100
+	.word	0x04000100, 0x00040000, 0x04040000, 0x00000001
+	.word	0x04040101, 0x00000101, 0x00000001, 0x04040001
+	.word	0x00000000, 0x00040001, 0x04040100, 0x00000100
+	.word	0x00000101, 0x04040101, 0x00040000, 0x04000001
+	.word	0x04040001, 0x04000100, 0x00040101, 0x04040000
+	.word	0x00040100, 0x00000000, 0x04000000, 0x00040101
+	.word	0x04040100, 0x00000100, 0x00000001, 0x00040000
+	.word	0x00000101, 0x00040001, 0x04040000, 0x04000101
+	.word	0x00000000, 0x04040100, 0x00040100, 0x04040001
+	.word	0x00040001, 0x04000000, 0x04040101, 0x00000001
+	.word	0x00040101, 0x04000001, 0x04000000, 0x04040101
+	.word	0x00040000, 0x04000100, 0x04000101, 0x00040100
+	.word	0x04000100, 0x00000000, 0x04040001, 0x00000101
+	.word	0x04000001, 0x00040101, 0x00000100, 0x04040000
+	! nibble 3
+	.word	0x00401008, 0x10001000, 0x00000008, 0x10401008
+	.word	0x00000000, 0x10400000, 0x10001008, 0x00400008
+	.word	0x10401000, 0x10000008, 0x10000000, 0x00001008
+	.word	0x10000008, 0x00401008, 0x00400000, 0x10000000
+	.word	0x10400008, 0x00401000, 0x00001000, 0x00000008
+	.word	0x00401000, 0x10001008, 0x10400000, 0x00001000
+	.word	0x00001008, 0x00000000, 0x00400008, 0x10401000
+	.word	0x10001000, 0x10400008, 0x10401008, 0x00400000
+	.word	0x10400008, 0x00001008, 0x00400000, 0x10000008
+	.word	0x00401000, 0x10001000, 0x00000008, 0x10400000
+	.word	0x10001008, 0x00000000, 0x00001000, 0x00400008
+	.word	0x00000000, 0x10400008, 0x10401000, 0x00001000
+	.word	0x10000000, 0x10401008, 0x00401008, 0x00400000
+	.word	0x10401008, 0x00000008, 0x10001000, 0x00401008
+	.word	0x00400008, 0x00401000, 0x10400000, 0x10001008
+	.word	0x00001008, 0x10000000, 0x10000008, 0x10401000
+	! nibble 4
+	.word	0x08000000, 0x00010000, 0x00000400, 0x08010420
+	.word	0x08010020, 0x08000400, 0x00010420, 0x08010000
+	.word	0x00010000, 0x00000020, 0x08000020, 0x00010400
+	.word	0x08000420, 0x08010020, 0x08010400, 0x00000000
+	.word	0x00010400, 0x08000000, 0x00010020, 0x00000420
+	.word	0x08000400, 0x00010420, 0x00000000, 0x08000020
+	.word	0x00000020, 0x08000420, 0x08010420, 0x00010020
+	.word	0x08010000, 0x00000400, 0x00000420, 0x08010400
+	.word	0x08010400, 0x08000420, 0x00010020, 0x08010000
+	.word	0x00010000, 0x00000020, 0x08000020, 0x08000400
+	.word	0x08000000, 0x00010400, 0x08010420, 0x00000000
+	.word	0x00010420, 0x08000000, 0x00000400, 0x00010020
+	.word	0x08000420, 0x00000400, 0x00000000, 0x08010420
+	.word	0x08010020, 0x08010400, 0x00000420, 0x00010000
+	.word	0x00010400, 0x08010020, 0x08000400, 0x00000420
+	.word	0x00000020, 0x00010420, 0x08010000, 0x08000020
+	! nibble 5
+	.word	0x80000040, 0x00200040, 0x00000000, 0x80202000
+	.word	0x00200040, 0x00002000, 0x80002040, 0x00200000
+	.word	0x00002040, 0x80202040, 0x00202000, 0x80000000
+	.word	0x80002000, 0x80000040, 0x80200000, 0x00202040
+	.word	0x00200000, 0x80002040, 0x80200040, 0x00000000
+	.word	0x00002000, 0x00000040, 0x80202000, 0x80200040
+	.word	0x80202040, 0x80200000, 0x80000000, 0x00002040
+	.word	0x00000040, 0x00202000, 0x00202040, 0x80002000
+	.word	0x00002040, 0x80000000, 0x80002000, 0x00202040
+	.word	0x80202000, 0x00200040, 0x00000000, 0x80002000
+	.word	0x80000000, 0x00002000, 0x80200040, 0x00200000
+	.word	0x00200040, 0x80202040, 0x00202000, 0x00000040
+	.word	0x80202040, 0x00202000, 0x00200000, 0x80002040
+	.word	0x80000040, 0x80200000, 0x00202040, 0x00000000
+	.word	0x00002000, 0x80000040, 0x80002040, 0x80202000
+	.word	0x80200000, 0x00002040, 0x00000040, 0x80200040
+	! nibble 6
+	.word	0x00004000, 0x00000200, 0x01000200, 0x01000004
+	.word	0x01004204, 0x00004004, 0x00004200, 0x00000000
+	.word	0x01000000, 0x01000204, 0x00000204, 0x01004000
+	.word	0x00000004, 0x01004200, 0x01004000, 0x00000204
+	.word	0x01000204, 0x00004000, 0x00004004, 0x01004204
+	.word	0x00000000, 0x01000200, 0x01000004, 0x00004200
+	.word	0x01004004, 0x00004204, 0x01004200, 0x00000004
+	.word	0x00004204, 0x01004004, 0x00000200, 0x01000000
+	.word	0x00004204, 0x01004000, 0x01004004, 0x00000204
+	.word	0x00004000, 0x00000200, 0x01000000, 0x01004004
+	.word	0x01000204, 0x00004204, 0x00004200, 0x00000000
+	.word	0x00000200, 0x01000004, 0x00000004, 0x01000200
+	.word	0x00000000, 0x01000204, 0x01000200, 0x00004200
+	.word	0x00000204, 0x00004000, 0x01004204, 0x01000000
+	.word	0x01004200, 0x00000004, 0x00004004, 0x01004204
+	.word	0x01000004, 0x01004200, 0x01004000, 0x00004004
+	! nibble 7
+	.word	0x20800080, 0x20820000, 0x00020080, 0x00000000
+	.word	0x20020000, 0x00800080, 0x20800000, 0x20820080
+	.word	0x00000080, 0x20000000, 0x00820000, 0x00020080
+	.word	0x00820080, 0x20020080, 0x20000080, 0x20800000
+	.word	0x00020000, 0x00820080, 0x00800080, 0x20020000
+	.word	0x20820080, 0x20000080, 0x00000000, 0x00820000
+	.word	0x20000000, 0x00800000, 0x20020080, 0x20800080
+	.word	0x00800000, 0x00020000, 0x20820000, 0x00000080
+	.word	0x00800000, 0x00020000, 0x20000080, 0x20820080
+	.word	0x00020080, 0x20000000, 0x00000000, 0x00820000
+	.word	0x20800080, 0x20020080, 0x20020000, 0x00800080
+	.word	0x20820000, 0x00000080, 0x00800080, 0x20020000
+	.word	0x20820080, 0x00800000, 0x20800000, 0x20000080
+	.word	0x00820000, 0x00020080, 0x20020080, 0x20800000
+	.word	0x00000080, 0x20820000, 0x00820080, 0x00000000
+	.word	0x20000000, 0x20800080, 0x00020000, 0x00820080
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/asm/desboth.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/asm/desboth.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..76759fb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/asm/desboth.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+$L="edi";
+$R="esi";
+
+sub DES_encrypt3
+	{
+	local($name,$enc)=@_;
+
+	&function_begin_B($name,"");
+	&push("ebx");
+	&mov("ebx",&wparam(0));
+
+	&push("ebp");
+	&push("esi");
+
+	&push("edi");
+
+	&comment("");
+	&comment("Load the data words");
+	&mov($L,&DWP(0,"ebx","",0));
+	&mov($R,&DWP(4,"ebx","",0));
+	&stack_push(3);
+
+	&comment("");
+	&comment("IP");
+	&IP_new($L,$R,"edx",0);
+
+	# put them back
+	
+	if ($enc)
+		{
+		&mov(&DWP(4,"ebx","",0),$R);
+		 &mov("eax",&wparam(1));
+		&mov(&DWP(0,"ebx","",0),"edx");
+		 &mov("edi",&wparam(2));
+		 &mov("esi",&wparam(3));
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		&mov(&DWP(4,"ebx","",0),$R);
+		 &mov("esi",&wparam(1));
+		&mov(&DWP(0,"ebx","",0),"edx");
+		 &mov("edi",&wparam(2));
+		 &mov("eax",&wparam(3));
+		}
+	&mov(&swtmp(2),	(DWC(($enc)?"1":"0")));
+	&mov(&swtmp(1),	"eax");
+	&mov(&swtmp(0),	"ebx");
+	&call("DES_encrypt2");
+	&mov(&swtmp(2),	(DWC(($enc)?"0":"1")));
+	&mov(&swtmp(1),	"edi");
+	&mov(&swtmp(0),	"ebx");
+	&call("DES_encrypt2");
+	&mov(&swtmp(2),	(DWC(($enc)?"1":"0")));
+	&mov(&swtmp(1),	"esi");
+	&mov(&swtmp(0),	"ebx");
+	&call("DES_encrypt2");
+
+	&stack_pop(3);
+	&mov($L,&DWP(0,"ebx","",0));
+	&mov($R,&DWP(4,"ebx","",0));
+
+	&comment("");
+	&comment("FP");
+	&FP_new($L,$R,"eax",0);
+
+	&mov(&DWP(0,"ebx","",0),"eax");
+	&mov(&DWP(4,"ebx","",0),$R);
+
+	&pop("edi");
+	&pop("esi");
+	&pop("ebp");
+	&pop("ebx");
+	&ret();
+	&function_end_B($name);
+	}
+
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/asm/dest4-sparcv9.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/asm/dest4-sparcv9.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4a6e29f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/asm/dest4-sparcv9.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,627 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2013-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by David S. Miller <davem@devemloft.net> and Andy Polyakov
+# <appro@openssl.org>. The module is licensed under 2-clause BSD
+# license. March 2013. All rights reserved.
+# ====================================================================
+
+######################################################################
+# DES for SPARC T4.
+#
+# As with other hardware-assisted ciphers CBC encrypt results [for
+# aligned data] are virtually identical to critical path lengths:
+#
+#		DES		Triple-DES
+# CBC encrypt	4.14/4.15(*)	11.7/11.7
+# CBC decrypt	1.77/4.11(**)	6.42/7.47
+#
+#			 (*)	numbers after slash are for
+#				misaligned data;
+#			 (**)	this is result for largest
+#				block size, unlike all other
+#				cases smaller blocks results
+#				are better[?];
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm");
+require "sparcv9_modes.pl";
+
+$output=pop;
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+$code.=<<___;
+#include "sparc_arch.h"
+
+#ifdef	__arch64__
+.register       %g2,#scratch
+.register       %g3,#scratch
+#endif
+
+.text
+___
+
+{ my ($inp,$out)=("%o0","%o1");
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.align	32
+.globl	des_t4_key_expand
+.type	des_t4_key_expand,#function
+des_t4_key_expand:
+	andcc		$inp, 0x7, %g0
+	alignaddr	$inp, %g0, $inp
+	bz,pt		%icc, 1f
+	ldd		[$inp + 0x00], %f0
+	ldd		[$inp + 0x08], %f2
+	faligndata	%f0, %f2, %f0
+1:	des_kexpand	%f0, 0, %f0
+	des_kexpand	%f0, 1, %f2
+	std		%f0, [$out + 0x00]
+	des_kexpand	%f2, 3, %f6
+	std		%f2, [$out + 0x08]
+	des_kexpand	%f2, 2, %f4
+	des_kexpand	%f6, 3, %f10
+	std		%f6, [$out + 0x18]
+	des_kexpand	%f6, 2, %f8
+	std		%f4, [$out + 0x10]
+	des_kexpand	%f10, 3, %f14
+	std		%f10, [$out + 0x28]
+	des_kexpand	%f10, 2, %f12
+	std		%f8, [$out + 0x20]
+	des_kexpand	%f14, 1, %f16
+	std		%f14, [$out + 0x38]
+	des_kexpand	%f16, 3, %f20
+	std		%f12, [$out + 0x30]
+	des_kexpand	%f16, 2, %f18
+	std		%f16, [$out + 0x40]
+	des_kexpand	%f20, 3, %f24
+	std		%f20, [$out + 0x50]
+	des_kexpand	%f20, 2, %f22
+	std		%f18, [$out + 0x48]
+	des_kexpand	%f24, 3, %f28
+	std		%f24, [$out + 0x60]
+	des_kexpand	%f24, 2, %f26
+	std		%f22, [$out + 0x58]
+	des_kexpand	%f28, 1, %f30
+	std		%f28, [$out + 0x70]
+	std		%f26, [$out + 0x68]
+	retl
+	std		%f30, [$out + 0x78]
+.size	des_t4_key_expand,.-des_t4_key_expand
+___
+}
+{ my ($inp,$out,$len,$key,$ivec) = map("%o$_",(0..4));
+  my ($ileft,$iright,$omask) = map("%g$_",(1..3));
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	des_t4_cbc_encrypt
+.align	32
+des_t4_cbc_encrypt:
+	cmp		$len, 0
+	be,pn		$::size_t_cc, .Lcbc_abort
+	srln		$len, 0, $len		! needed on v8+, "nop" on v9
+	ld		[$ivec + 0], %f0	! load ivec
+	ld		[$ivec + 4], %f1
+
+	and		$inp, 7, $ileft
+	andn		$inp, 7, $inp
+	sll		$ileft, 3, $ileft
+	mov		0xff, $omask
+	prefetch	[$inp], 20
+	prefetch	[$inp + 63], 20
+	sub		%g0, $ileft, $iright
+	and		$out, 7, %g4
+	alignaddrl	$out, %g0, $out
+	srl		$omask, %g4, $omask
+	srlx		$len, 3, $len
+	movrz		%g4, 0, $omask
+	prefetch	[$out], 22
+
+	ldd		[$key + 0x00], %f4	! load key schedule
+	ldd		[$key + 0x08], %f6
+	ldd		[$key + 0x10], %f8
+	ldd		[$key + 0x18], %f10
+	ldd		[$key + 0x20], %f12
+	ldd		[$key + 0x28], %f14
+	ldd		[$key + 0x30], %f16
+	ldd		[$key + 0x38], %f18
+	ldd		[$key + 0x40], %f20
+	ldd		[$key + 0x48], %f22
+	ldd		[$key + 0x50], %f24
+	ldd		[$key + 0x58], %f26
+	ldd		[$key + 0x60], %f28
+	ldd		[$key + 0x68], %f30
+	ldd		[$key + 0x70], %f32
+	ldd		[$key + 0x78], %f34
+
+.Ldes_cbc_enc_loop:
+	ldx		[$inp + 0], %g4
+	brz,pt		$ileft, 4f
+	nop
+
+	ldx		[$inp + 8], %g5
+	sllx		%g4, $ileft, %g4
+	srlx		%g5, $iright, %g5
+	or		%g5, %g4, %g4
+4:
+	movxtod		%g4, %f2
+	prefetch	[$inp + 8+63], 20
+	add		$inp, 8, $inp
+	fxor		%f2, %f0, %f0		! ^= ivec
+	prefetch	[$out + 63], 22
+
+	des_ip		%f0, %f0
+	des_round	%f4, %f6, %f0, %f0
+	des_round	%f8, %f10, %f0, %f0
+	des_round	%f12, %f14, %f0, %f0
+	des_round	%f16, %f18, %f0, %f0
+	des_round	%f20, %f22, %f0, %f0
+	des_round	%f24, %f26, %f0, %f0
+	des_round	%f28, %f30, %f0, %f0
+	des_round	%f32, %f34, %f0, %f0
+	des_iip		%f0, %f0
+
+	brnz,pn		$omask, 2f
+	sub		$len, 1, $len
+
+	std		%f0, [$out + 0]
+	brnz,pt		$len, .Ldes_cbc_enc_loop
+	add		$out, 8, $out
+
+	st		%f0, [$ivec + 0]	! write out ivec
+	retl
+	st		%f1, [$ivec + 4]
+.Lcbc_abort:
+	retl
+	nop
+
+.align	16
+2:	ldxa		[$inp]0x82, %g4		! avoid read-after-write hazard
+						! and ~4x deterioration
+						! in inp==out case
+	faligndata	%f0, %f0, %f2		! handle unaligned output
+
+	stda		%f2, [$out + $omask]0xc0	! partial store
+	add		$out, 8, $out
+	orn		%g0, $omask, $omask
+	stda		%f2, [$out + $omask]0xc0	! partial store
+
+	brnz,pt		$len, .Ldes_cbc_enc_loop+4
+	orn		%g0, $omask, $omask
+
+	st		%f0, [$ivec + 0]	! write out ivec
+	retl
+	st		%f1, [$ivec + 4]
+.type	des_t4_cbc_encrypt,#function
+.size	des_t4_cbc_encrypt,.-des_t4_cbc_encrypt
+
+.globl	des_t4_cbc_decrypt
+.align	32
+des_t4_cbc_decrypt:
+	cmp		$len, 0
+	be,pn		$::size_t_cc, .Lcbc_abort
+	srln		$len, 0, $len		! needed on v8+, "nop" on v9
+	ld		[$ivec + 0], %f2	! load ivec
+	ld		[$ivec + 4], %f3
+
+	and		$inp, 7, $ileft
+	andn		$inp, 7, $inp
+	sll		$ileft, 3, $ileft
+	mov		0xff, $omask
+	prefetch	[$inp], 20
+	prefetch	[$inp + 63], 20
+	sub		%g0, $ileft, $iright
+	and		$out, 7, %g4
+	alignaddrl	$out, %g0, $out
+	srl		$omask, %g4, $omask
+	srlx		$len, 3, $len
+	movrz		%g4, 0, $omask
+	prefetch	[$out], 22
+
+	ldd		[$key + 0x78], %f4	! load key schedule
+	ldd		[$key + 0x70], %f6
+	ldd		[$key + 0x68], %f8
+	ldd		[$key + 0x60], %f10
+	ldd		[$key + 0x58], %f12
+	ldd		[$key + 0x50], %f14
+	ldd		[$key + 0x48], %f16
+	ldd		[$key + 0x40], %f18
+	ldd		[$key + 0x38], %f20
+	ldd		[$key + 0x30], %f22
+	ldd		[$key + 0x28], %f24
+	ldd		[$key + 0x20], %f26
+	ldd		[$key + 0x18], %f28
+	ldd		[$key + 0x10], %f30
+	ldd		[$key + 0x08], %f32
+	ldd		[$key + 0x00], %f34
+
+.Ldes_cbc_dec_loop:
+	ldx		[$inp + 0], %g4
+	brz,pt		$ileft, 4f
+	nop
+
+	ldx		[$inp + 8], %g5
+	sllx		%g4, $ileft, %g4
+	srlx		%g5, $iright, %g5
+	or		%g5, %g4, %g4
+4:
+	movxtod		%g4, %f0
+	prefetch	[$inp + 8+63], 20
+	add		$inp, 8, $inp
+	prefetch	[$out + 63], 22
+
+	des_ip		%f0, %f0
+	des_round	%f4, %f6, %f0, %f0
+	des_round	%f8, %f10, %f0, %f0
+	des_round	%f12, %f14, %f0, %f0
+	des_round	%f16, %f18, %f0, %f0
+	des_round	%f20, %f22, %f0, %f0
+	des_round	%f24, %f26, %f0, %f0
+	des_round	%f28, %f30, %f0, %f0
+	des_round	%f32, %f34, %f0, %f0
+	des_iip		%f0, %f0
+
+	fxor		%f2, %f0, %f0		! ^= ivec
+	movxtod		%g4, %f2
+
+	brnz,pn		$omask, 2f
+	sub		$len, 1, $len
+
+	std		%f0, [$out + 0]
+	brnz,pt		$len, .Ldes_cbc_dec_loop
+	add		$out, 8, $out
+
+	st		%f2, [$ivec + 0]	! write out ivec
+	retl
+	st		%f3, [$ivec + 4]
+
+.align	16
+2:	ldxa		[$inp]0x82, %g4		! avoid read-after-write hazard
+						! and ~4x deterioration
+						! in inp==out case
+	faligndata	%f0, %f0, %f0		! handle unaligned output
+
+	stda		%f0, [$out + $omask]0xc0	! partial store
+	add		$out, 8, $out
+	orn		%g0, $omask, $omask
+	stda		%f0, [$out + $omask]0xc0	! partial store
+
+	brnz,pt		$len, .Ldes_cbc_dec_loop+4
+	orn		%g0, $omask, $omask
+
+	st		%f2, [$ivec + 0]	! write out ivec
+	retl
+	st		%f3, [$ivec + 4]
+.type	des_t4_cbc_decrypt,#function
+.size	des_t4_cbc_decrypt,.-des_t4_cbc_decrypt
+___
+
+# One might wonder why does one have back-to-back des_iip/des_ip
+# pairs between EDE passes. Indeed, aren't they inverse of each other?
+# They almost are. Outcome of the pair is 32-bit words being swapped
+# in target register. Consider pair of des_iip/des_ip as a way to
+# perform the due swap, it's actually fastest way in this case.
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	des_t4_ede3_cbc_encrypt
+.align	32
+des_t4_ede3_cbc_encrypt:
+	cmp		$len, 0
+	be,pn		$::size_t_cc, .Lcbc_abort
+	srln		$len, 0, $len		! needed on v8+, "nop" on v9
+	ld		[$ivec + 0], %f0	! load ivec
+	ld		[$ivec + 4], %f1
+
+	and		$inp, 7, $ileft
+	andn		$inp, 7, $inp
+	sll		$ileft, 3, $ileft
+	mov		0xff, $omask
+	prefetch	[$inp], 20
+	prefetch	[$inp + 63], 20
+	sub		%g0, $ileft, $iright
+	and		$out, 7, %g4
+	alignaddrl	$out, %g0, $out
+	srl		$omask, %g4, $omask
+	srlx		$len, 3, $len
+	movrz		%g4, 0, $omask
+	prefetch	[$out], 22
+
+	ldd		[$key + 0x00], %f4	! load key schedule
+	ldd		[$key + 0x08], %f6
+	ldd		[$key + 0x10], %f8
+	ldd		[$key + 0x18], %f10
+	ldd		[$key + 0x20], %f12
+	ldd		[$key + 0x28], %f14
+	ldd		[$key + 0x30], %f16
+	ldd		[$key + 0x38], %f18
+	ldd		[$key + 0x40], %f20
+	ldd		[$key + 0x48], %f22
+	ldd		[$key + 0x50], %f24
+	ldd		[$key + 0x58], %f26
+	ldd		[$key + 0x60], %f28
+	ldd		[$key + 0x68], %f30
+	ldd		[$key + 0x70], %f32
+	ldd		[$key + 0x78], %f34
+
+.Ldes_ede3_cbc_enc_loop:
+	ldx		[$inp + 0], %g4
+	brz,pt		$ileft, 4f
+	nop
+
+	ldx		[$inp + 8], %g5
+	sllx		%g4, $ileft, %g4
+	srlx		%g5, $iright, %g5
+	or		%g5, %g4, %g4
+4:
+	movxtod		%g4, %f2
+	prefetch	[$inp + 8+63], 20
+	add		$inp, 8, $inp
+	fxor		%f2, %f0, %f0		! ^= ivec
+	prefetch	[$out + 63], 22
+
+	des_ip		%f0, %f0
+	des_round	%f4, %f6, %f0, %f0
+	des_round	%f8, %f10, %f0, %f0
+	des_round	%f12, %f14, %f0, %f0
+	des_round	%f16, %f18, %f0, %f0
+	ldd		[$key + 0x100-0x08], %f36
+	ldd		[$key + 0x100-0x10], %f38
+	des_round	%f20, %f22, %f0, %f0
+	ldd		[$key + 0x100-0x18], %f40
+	ldd		[$key + 0x100-0x20], %f42
+	des_round	%f24, %f26, %f0, %f0
+	ldd		[$key + 0x100-0x28], %f44
+	ldd		[$key + 0x100-0x30], %f46
+	des_round	%f28, %f30, %f0, %f0
+	ldd		[$key + 0x100-0x38], %f48
+	ldd		[$key + 0x100-0x40], %f50
+	des_round	%f32, %f34, %f0, %f0
+	ldd		[$key + 0x100-0x48], %f52
+	ldd		[$key + 0x100-0x50], %f54
+	des_iip		%f0, %f0
+
+	ldd		[$key + 0x100-0x58], %f56
+	ldd		[$key + 0x100-0x60], %f58
+	des_ip		%f0, %f0
+	ldd		[$key + 0x100-0x68], %f60
+	ldd		[$key + 0x100-0x70], %f62
+	des_round	%f36, %f38, %f0, %f0
+	ldd		[$key + 0x100-0x78], %f36
+	ldd		[$key + 0x100-0x80], %f38
+	des_round	%f40, %f42, %f0, %f0
+	des_round	%f44, %f46, %f0, %f0
+	des_round	%f48, %f50, %f0, %f0
+	ldd		[$key + 0x100+0x00], %f40
+	ldd		[$key + 0x100+0x08], %f42
+	des_round	%f52, %f54, %f0, %f0
+	ldd		[$key + 0x100+0x10], %f44
+	ldd		[$key + 0x100+0x18], %f46
+	des_round	%f56, %f58, %f0, %f0
+	ldd		[$key + 0x100+0x20], %f48
+	ldd		[$key + 0x100+0x28], %f50
+	des_round	%f60, %f62, %f0, %f0
+	ldd		[$key + 0x100+0x30], %f52
+	ldd		[$key + 0x100+0x38], %f54
+	des_round	%f36, %f38, %f0, %f0
+	ldd		[$key + 0x100+0x40], %f56
+	ldd		[$key + 0x100+0x48], %f58
+	des_iip		%f0, %f0
+
+	ldd		[$key + 0x100+0x50], %f60
+	ldd		[$key + 0x100+0x58], %f62
+	des_ip		%f0, %f0
+	ldd		[$key + 0x100+0x60], %f36
+	ldd		[$key + 0x100+0x68], %f38
+	des_round	%f40, %f42, %f0, %f0
+	ldd		[$key + 0x100+0x70], %f40
+	ldd		[$key + 0x100+0x78], %f42
+	des_round	%f44, %f46, %f0, %f0
+	des_round	%f48, %f50, %f0, %f0
+	des_round	%f52, %f54, %f0, %f0
+	des_round	%f56, %f58, %f0, %f0
+	des_round	%f60, %f62, %f0, %f0
+	des_round	%f36, %f38, %f0, %f0
+	des_round	%f40, %f42, %f0, %f0
+	des_iip		%f0, %f0
+
+	brnz,pn		$omask, 2f
+	sub		$len, 1, $len
+
+	std		%f0, [$out + 0]
+	brnz,pt		$len, .Ldes_ede3_cbc_enc_loop
+	add		$out, 8, $out
+
+	st		%f0, [$ivec + 0]	! write out ivec
+	retl
+	st		%f1, [$ivec + 4]
+
+.align	16
+2:	ldxa		[$inp]0x82, %g4		! avoid read-after-write hazard
+						! and ~2x deterioration
+						! in inp==out case
+	faligndata	%f0, %f0, %f2		! handle unaligned output
+
+	stda		%f2, [$out + $omask]0xc0	! partial store
+	add		$out, 8, $out
+	orn		%g0, $omask, $omask
+	stda		%f2, [$out + $omask]0xc0	! partial store
+
+	brnz,pt		$len, .Ldes_ede3_cbc_enc_loop+4
+	orn		%g0, $omask, $omask
+
+	st		%f0, [$ivec + 0]	! write out ivec
+	retl
+	st		%f1, [$ivec + 4]
+.type	des_t4_ede3_cbc_encrypt,#function
+.size	des_t4_ede3_cbc_encrypt,.-des_t4_ede3_cbc_encrypt
+
+.globl	des_t4_ede3_cbc_decrypt
+.align	32
+des_t4_ede3_cbc_decrypt:
+	cmp		$len, 0
+	be,pn		$::size_t_cc, .Lcbc_abort
+	srln		$len, 0, $len		! needed on v8+, "nop" on v9
+	ld		[$ivec + 0], %f2	! load ivec
+	ld		[$ivec + 4], %f3
+
+	and		$inp, 7, $ileft
+	andn		$inp, 7, $inp
+	sll		$ileft, 3, $ileft
+	mov		0xff, $omask
+	prefetch	[$inp], 20
+	prefetch	[$inp + 63], 20
+	sub		%g0, $ileft, $iright
+	and		$out, 7, %g4
+	alignaddrl	$out, %g0, $out
+	srl		$omask, %g4, $omask
+	srlx		$len, 3, $len
+	movrz		%g4, 0, $omask
+	prefetch	[$out], 22
+
+	ldd		[$key + 0x100+0x78], %f4	! load key schedule
+	ldd		[$key + 0x100+0x70], %f6
+	ldd		[$key + 0x100+0x68], %f8
+	ldd		[$key + 0x100+0x60], %f10
+	ldd		[$key + 0x100+0x58], %f12
+	ldd		[$key + 0x100+0x50], %f14
+	ldd		[$key + 0x100+0x48], %f16
+	ldd		[$key + 0x100+0x40], %f18
+	ldd		[$key + 0x100+0x38], %f20
+	ldd		[$key + 0x100+0x30], %f22
+	ldd		[$key + 0x100+0x28], %f24
+	ldd		[$key + 0x100+0x20], %f26
+	ldd		[$key + 0x100+0x18], %f28
+	ldd		[$key + 0x100+0x10], %f30
+	ldd		[$key + 0x100+0x08], %f32
+	ldd		[$key + 0x100+0x00], %f34
+
+.Ldes_ede3_cbc_dec_loop:
+	ldx		[$inp + 0], %g4
+	brz,pt		$ileft, 4f
+	nop
+
+	ldx		[$inp + 8], %g5
+	sllx		%g4, $ileft, %g4
+	srlx		%g5, $iright, %g5
+	or		%g5, %g4, %g4
+4:
+	movxtod		%g4, %f0
+	prefetch	[$inp + 8+63], 20
+	add		$inp, 8, $inp
+	prefetch	[$out + 63], 22
+
+	des_ip		%f0, %f0
+	des_round	%f4, %f6, %f0, %f0
+	des_round	%f8, %f10, %f0, %f0
+	des_round	%f12, %f14, %f0, %f0
+	des_round	%f16, %f18, %f0, %f0
+	ldd		[$key + 0x80+0x00], %f36
+	ldd		[$key + 0x80+0x08], %f38
+	des_round	%f20, %f22, %f0, %f0
+	ldd		[$key + 0x80+0x10], %f40
+	ldd		[$key + 0x80+0x18], %f42
+	des_round	%f24, %f26, %f0, %f0
+	ldd		[$key + 0x80+0x20], %f44
+	ldd		[$key + 0x80+0x28], %f46
+	des_round	%f28, %f30, %f0, %f0
+	ldd		[$key + 0x80+0x30], %f48
+	ldd		[$key + 0x80+0x38], %f50
+	des_round	%f32, %f34, %f0, %f0
+	ldd		[$key + 0x80+0x40], %f52
+	ldd		[$key + 0x80+0x48], %f54
+	des_iip		%f0, %f0
+
+	ldd		[$key + 0x80+0x50], %f56
+	ldd		[$key + 0x80+0x58], %f58
+	des_ip		%f0, %f0
+	ldd		[$key + 0x80+0x60], %f60
+	ldd		[$key + 0x80+0x68], %f62
+	des_round	%f36, %f38, %f0, %f0
+	ldd		[$key + 0x80+0x70], %f36
+	ldd		[$key + 0x80+0x78], %f38
+	des_round	%f40, %f42, %f0, %f0
+	des_round	%f44, %f46, %f0, %f0
+	des_round	%f48, %f50, %f0, %f0
+	ldd		[$key + 0x80-0x08], %f40
+	ldd		[$key + 0x80-0x10], %f42
+	des_round	%f52, %f54, %f0, %f0
+	ldd		[$key + 0x80-0x18], %f44
+	ldd		[$key + 0x80-0x20], %f46
+	des_round	%f56, %f58, %f0, %f0
+	ldd		[$key + 0x80-0x28], %f48
+	ldd		[$key + 0x80-0x30], %f50
+	des_round	%f60, %f62, %f0, %f0
+	ldd		[$key + 0x80-0x38], %f52
+	ldd		[$key + 0x80-0x40], %f54
+	des_round	%f36, %f38, %f0, %f0
+	ldd		[$key + 0x80-0x48], %f56
+	ldd		[$key + 0x80-0x50], %f58
+	des_iip		%f0, %f0
+
+	ldd		[$key + 0x80-0x58], %f60
+	ldd		[$key + 0x80-0x60], %f62
+	des_ip		%f0, %f0
+	ldd		[$key + 0x80-0x68], %f36
+	ldd		[$key + 0x80-0x70], %f38
+	des_round	%f40, %f42, %f0, %f0
+	ldd		[$key + 0x80-0x78], %f40
+	ldd		[$key + 0x80-0x80], %f42
+	des_round	%f44, %f46, %f0, %f0
+	des_round	%f48, %f50, %f0, %f0
+	des_round	%f52, %f54, %f0, %f0
+	des_round	%f56, %f58, %f0, %f0
+	des_round	%f60, %f62, %f0, %f0
+	des_round	%f36, %f38, %f0, %f0
+	des_round	%f40, %f42, %f0, %f0
+	des_iip		%f0, %f0
+
+	fxor		%f2, %f0, %f0		! ^= ivec
+	movxtod		%g4, %f2
+
+	brnz,pn		$omask, 2f
+	sub		$len, 1, $len
+
+	std		%f0, [$out + 0]
+	brnz,pt		$len, .Ldes_ede3_cbc_dec_loop
+	add		$out, 8, $out
+
+	st		%f2, [$ivec + 0]	! write out ivec
+	retl
+	st		%f3, [$ivec + 4]
+
+.align	16
+2:	ldxa		[$inp]0x82, %g4		! avoid read-after-write hazard
+						! and ~3x deterioration
+						! in inp==out case
+	faligndata	%f0, %f0, %f0		! handle unaligned output
+
+	stda		%f0, [$out + $omask]0xc0	! partial store
+	add		$out, 8, $out
+	orn		%g0, $omask, $omask
+	stda		%f0, [$out + $omask]0xc0	! partial store
+
+	brnz,pt		$len, .Ldes_ede3_cbc_dec_loop+4
+	orn		%g0, $omask, $omask
+
+	st		%f2, [$ivec + 0]	! write out ivec
+	retl
+	st		%f3, [$ivec + 4]
+.type	des_t4_ede3_cbc_decrypt,#function
+.size	des_t4_ede3_cbc_decrypt,.-des_t4_ede3_cbc_decrypt
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+.asciz  "DES for SPARC T4, David S. Miller, Andy Polyakov"
+.align  4
+___
+
+&emit_assembler();
+
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/build.info b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/build.info
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c0306cf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/build.info
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+LIBS=../../libcrypto
+SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
+        set_key.c  ecb_enc.c  cbc_enc.c \
+        ecb3_enc.c cfb64enc.c cfb64ede.c cfb_enc.c \
+        ofb64ede.c ofb64enc.c ofb_enc.c \
+        str2key.c  pcbc_enc.c qud_cksm.c rand_key.c \
+        {- $target{des_asm_src} -} \
+        fcrypt.c xcbc_enc.c rpc_enc.c  cbc_cksm.c
+
+GENERATE[des_enc-sparc.S]=asm/des_enc.m4
+GENERATE[dest4-sparcv9.S]=asm/dest4-sparcv9.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+INCLUDE[dest4-sparcv9.o]=..
+
+GENERATE[des-586.s]=asm/des-586.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $(CFLAGS) $(LIB_CFLAGS)
+DEPEND[des-586.s]=../perlasm/x86asm.pl ../perlasm/cbc.pl
+GENERATE[crypt586.s]=asm/crypt586.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $(CFLAGS) $(LIB_CFLAGS)
+DEPEND[crypt586.s]=../perlasm/x86asm.pl ../perlasm/cbc.pl
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/cbc_cksm.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/cbc_cksm.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a7bf068
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/cbc_cksm.c
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "des_locl.h"
+
+DES_LONG DES_cbc_cksum(const unsigned char *in, DES_cblock *output,
+                       long length, DES_key_schedule *schedule,
+                       const_DES_cblock *ivec)
+{
+    register DES_LONG tout0, tout1, tin0, tin1;
+    register long l = length;
+    DES_LONG tin[2];
+    unsigned char *out = &(*output)[0];
+    const unsigned char *iv = &(*ivec)[0];
+
+    c2l(iv, tout0);
+    c2l(iv, tout1);
+    for (; l > 0; l -= 8) {
+        if (l >= 8) {
+            c2l(in, tin0);
+            c2l(in, tin1);
+        } else
+            c2ln(in, tin0, tin1, l);
+
+        tin0 ^= tout0;
+        tin[0] = tin0;
+        tin1 ^= tout1;
+        tin[1] = tin1;
+        DES_encrypt1((DES_LONG *)tin, schedule, DES_ENCRYPT);
+        /* fix 15/10/91 eay - thanks to keithr@sco.COM */
+        tout0 = tin[0];
+        tout1 = tin[1];
+    }
+    if (out != NULL) {
+        l2c(tout0, out);
+        l2c(tout1, out);
+    }
+    tout0 = tin0 = tin1 = tin[0] = tin[1] = 0;
+    /*
+     * Transform the data in tout1 so that it will match the return value
+     * that the MIT Kerberos mit_des_cbc_cksum API returns.
+     */
+    tout1 = ((tout1 >> 24L) & 0x000000FF)
+        | ((tout1 >> 8L) & 0x0000FF00)
+        | ((tout1 << 8L) & 0x00FF0000)
+        | ((tout1 << 24L) & 0xFF000000);
+    return (tout1);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/cbc_enc.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/cbc_enc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..92e773f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/cbc_enc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#define CBC_ENC_C__DONT_UPDATE_IV
+
+#include "ncbc_enc.c"           /* des_cbc_encrypt */
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/cfb64ede.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/cfb64ede.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5edb979
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/cfb64ede.c
@@ -0,0 +1,190 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "des_locl.h"
+#include "e_os.h"
+
+/*
+ * The input and output encrypted as though 64bit cfb mode is being used.
+ * The extra state information to record how much of the 64bit block we have
+ * used is contained in *num;
+ */
+
+void DES_ede3_cfb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                            long length, DES_key_schedule *ks1,
+                            DES_key_schedule *ks2, DES_key_schedule *ks3,
+                            DES_cblock *ivec, int *num, int enc)
+{
+    register DES_LONG v0, v1;
+    register long l = length;
+    register int n = *num;
+    DES_LONG ti[2];
+    unsigned char *iv, c, cc;
+
+    iv = &(*ivec)[0];
+    if (enc) {
+        while (l--) {
+            if (n == 0) {
+                c2l(iv, v0);
+                c2l(iv, v1);
+
+                ti[0] = v0;
+                ti[1] = v1;
+                DES_encrypt3(ti, ks1, ks2, ks3);
+                v0 = ti[0];
+                v1 = ti[1];
+
+                iv = &(*ivec)[0];
+                l2c(v0, iv);
+                l2c(v1, iv);
+                iv = &(*ivec)[0];
+            }
+            c = *(in++) ^ iv[n];
+            *(out++) = c;
+            iv[n] = c;
+            n = (n + 1) & 0x07;
+        }
+    } else {
+        while (l--) {
+            if (n == 0) {
+                c2l(iv, v0);
+                c2l(iv, v1);
+
+                ti[0] = v0;
+                ti[1] = v1;
+                DES_encrypt3(ti, ks1, ks2, ks3);
+                v0 = ti[0];
+                v1 = ti[1];
+
+                iv = &(*ivec)[0];
+                l2c(v0, iv);
+                l2c(v1, iv);
+                iv = &(*ivec)[0];
+            }
+            cc = *(in++);
+            c = iv[n];
+            iv[n] = cc;
+            *(out++) = c ^ cc;
+            n = (n + 1) & 0x07;
+        }
+    }
+    v0 = v1 = ti[0] = ti[1] = c = cc = 0;
+    *num = n;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is compatible with the single key CFB-r for DES, even thought that's
+ * not what EVP needs.
+ */
+
+void DES_ede3_cfb_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                          int numbits, long length, DES_key_schedule *ks1,
+                          DES_key_schedule *ks2, DES_key_schedule *ks3,
+                          DES_cblock *ivec, int enc)
+{
+    register DES_LONG d0, d1, v0, v1;
+    register unsigned long l = length, n = ((unsigned int)numbits + 7) / 8;
+    register int num = numbits, i;
+    DES_LONG ti[2];
+    unsigned char *iv;
+    unsigned char ovec[16];
+
+    if (num > 64)
+        return;
+    iv = &(*ivec)[0];
+    c2l(iv, v0);
+    c2l(iv, v1);
+    if (enc) {
+        while (l >= n) {
+            l -= n;
+            ti[0] = v0;
+            ti[1] = v1;
+            DES_encrypt3(ti, ks1, ks2, ks3);
+            c2ln(in, d0, d1, n);
+            in += n;
+            d0 ^= ti[0];
+            d1 ^= ti[1];
+            l2cn(d0, d1, out, n);
+            out += n;
+            /*
+             * 30-08-94 - eay - changed because l>>32 and l<<32 are bad under
+             * gcc :-(
+             */
+            if (num == 32) {
+                v0 = v1;
+                v1 = d0;
+            } else if (num == 64) {
+                v0 = d0;
+                v1 = d1;
+            } else {
+                iv = &ovec[0];
+                l2c(v0, iv);
+                l2c(v1, iv);
+                l2c(d0, iv);
+                l2c(d1, iv);
+                /* shift ovec left most of the bits... */
+                memmove(ovec, ovec + num / 8, 8 + (num % 8 ? 1 : 0));
+                /* now the remaining bits */
+                if (num % 8 != 0)
+                    for (i = 0; i < 8; ++i) {
+                        ovec[i] <<= num % 8;
+                        ovec[i] |= ovec[i + 1] >> (8 - num % 8);
+                    }
+                iv = &ovec[0];
+                c2l(iv, v0);
+                c2l(iv, v1);
+            }
+        }
+    } else {
+        while (l >= n) {
+            l -= n;
+            ti[0] = v0;
+            ti[1] = v1;
+            DES_encrypt3(ti, ks1, ks2, ks3);
+            c2ln(in, d0, d1, n);
+            in += n;
+            /*
+             * 30-08-94 - eay - changed because l>>32 and l<<32 are bad under
+             * gcc :-(
+             */
+            if (num == 32) {
+                v0 = v1;
+                v1 = d0;
+            } else if (num == 64) {
+                v0 = d0;
+                v1 = d1;
+            } else {
+                iv = &ovec[0];
+                l2c(v0, iv);
+                l2c(v1, iv);
+                l2c(d0, iv);
+                l2c(d1, iv);
+                /* shift ovec left most of the bits... */
+                memmove(ovec, ovec + num / 8, 8 + (num % 8 ? 1 : 0));
+                /* now the remaining bits */
+                if (num % 8 != 0)
+                    for (i = 0; i < 8; ++i) {
+                        ovec[i] <<= num % 8;
+                        ovec[i] |= ovec[i + 1] >> (8 - num % 8);
+                    }
+                iv = &ovec[0];
+                c2l(iv, v0);
+                c2l(iv, v1);
+            }
+            d0 ^= ti[0];
+            d1 ^= ti[1];
+            l2cn(d0, d1, out, n);
+            out += n;
+        }
+    }
+    iv = &(*ivec)[0];
+    l2c(v0, iv);
+    l2c(v1, iv);
+    v0 = v1 = d0 = d1 = ti[0] = ti[1] = 0;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/cfb64enc.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/cfb64enc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..96de51b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/cfb64enc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "des_locl.h"
+
+/*
+ * The input and output encrypted as though 64bit cfb mode is being used.
+ * The extra state information to record how much of the 64bit block we have
+ * used is contained in *num;
+ */
+
+void DES_cfb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                       long length, DES_key_schedule *schedule,
+                       DES_cblock *ivec, int *num, int enc)
+{
+    register DES_LONG v0, v1;
+    register long l = length;
+    register int n = *num;
+    DES_LONG ti[2];
+    unsigned char *iv, c, cc;
+
+    iv = &(*ivec)[0];
+    if (enc) {
+        while (l--) {
+            if (n == 0) {
+                c2l(iv, v0);
+                ti[0] = v0;
+                c2l(iv, v1);
+                ti[1] = v1;
+                DES_encrypt1(ti, schedule, DES_ENCRYPT);
+                iv = &(*ivec)[0];
+                v0 = ti[0];
+                l2c(v0, iv);
+                v0 = ti[1];
+                l2c(v0, iv);
+                iv = &(*ivec)[0];
+            }
+            c = *(in++) ^ iv[n];
+            *(out++) = c;
+            iv[n] = c;
+            n = (n + 1) & 0x07;
+        }
+    } else {
+        while (l--) {
+            if (n == 0) {
+                c2l(iv, v0);
+                ti[0] = v0;
+                c2l(iv, v1);
+                ti[1] = v1;
+                DES_encrypt1(ti, schedule, DES_ENCRYPT);
+                iv = &(*ivec)[0];
+                v0 = ti[0];
+                l2c(v0, iv);
+                v0 = ti[1];
+                l2c(v0, iv);
+                iv = &(*ivec)[0];
+            }
+            cc = *(in++);
+            c = iv[n];
+            iv[n] = cc;
+            *(out++) = c ^ cc;
+            n = (n + 1) & 0x07;
+        }
+    }
+    v0 = v1 = ti[0] = ti[1] = c = cc = 0;
+    *num = n;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/cfb_enc.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/cfb_enc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6c428ba
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/cfb_enc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "e_os.h"
+#include "des_locl.h"
+#include <assert.h>
+
+/*
+ * The input and output are loaded in multiples of 8 bits. What this means is
+ * that if you hame numbits=12 and length=2 the first 12 bits will be
+ * retrieved from the first byte and half the second.  The second 12 bits
+ * will come from the 3rd and half the 4th byte.
+ */
+/*
+ * Until Aug 1 2003 this function did not correctly implement CFB-r, so it
+ * will not be compatible with any encryption prior to that date. Ben.
+ */
+void DES_cfb_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, int numbits,
+                     long length, DES_key_schedule *schedule,
+                     DES_cblock *ivec, int enc)
+{
+    register DES_LONG d0, d1, v0, v1;
+    register unsigned long l = length;
+    register int num = numbits / 8, n = (numbits + 7) / 8, i, rem =
+        numbits % 8;
+    DES_LONG ti[2];
+    unsigned char *iv;
+#ifndef L_ENDIAN
+    unsigned char ovec[16];
+#else
+    unsigned int sh[4];
+    unsigned char *ovec = (unsigned char *)sh;
+
+    /* I kind of count that compiler optimizes away this assertioni, */
+    assert(sizeof(sh[0]) == 4); /* as this holds true for all, */
+    /* but 16-bit platforms...      */
+
+#endif
+
+    if (numbits <= 0 || numbits > 64)
+        return;
+    iv = &(*ivec)[0];
+    c2l(iv, v0);
+    c2l(iv, v1);
+    if (enc) {
+        while (l >= (unsigned long)n) {
+            l -= n;
+            ti[0] = v0;
+            ti[1] = v1;
+            DES_encrypt1((DES_LONG *)ti, schedule, DES_ENCRYPT);
+            c2ln(in, d0, d1, n);
+            in += n;
+            d0 ^= ti[0];
+            d1 ^= ti[1];
+            l2cn(d0, d1, out, n);
+            out += n;
+            /*
+             * 30-08-94 - eay - changed because l>>32 and l<<32 are bad under
+             * gcc :-(
+             */
+            if (numbits == 32) {
+                v0 = v1;
+                v1 = d0;
+            } else if (numbits == 64) {
+                v0 = d0;
+                v1 = d1;
+            } else {
+#ifndef L_ENDIAN
+                iv = &ovec[0];
+                l2c(v0, iv);
+                l2c(v1, iv);
+                l2c(d0, iv);
+                l2c(d1, iv);
+#else
+                sh[0] = v0, sh[1] = v1, sh[2] = d0, sh[3] = d1;
+#endif
+                if (rem == 0)
+                    memmove(ovec, ovec + num, 8);
+                else
+                    for (i = 0; i < 8; ++i)
+                        ovec[i] = ovec[i + num] << rem |
+                            ovec[i + num + 1] >> (8 - rem);
+#ifdef L_ENDIAN
+                v0 = sh[0], v1 = sh[1];
+#else
+                iv = &ovec[0];
+                c2l(iv, v0);
+                c2l(iv, v1);
+#endif
+            }
+        }
+    } else {
+        while (l >= (unsigned long)n) {
+            l -= n;
+            ti[0] = v0;
+            ti[1] = v1;
+            DES_encrypt1((DES_LONG *)ti, schedule, DES_ENCRYPT);
+            c2ln(in, d0, d1, n);
+            in += n;
+            /*
+             * 30-08-94 - eay - changed because l>>32 and l<<32 are bad under
+             * gcc :-(
+             */
+            if (numbits == 32) {
+                v0 = v1;
+                v1 = d0;
+            } else if (numbits == 64) {
+                v0 = d0;
+                v1 = d1;
+            } else {
+#ifndef L_ENDIAN
+                iv = &ovec[0];
+                l2c(v0, iv);
+                l2c(v1, iv);
+                l2c(d0, iv);
+                l2c(d1, iv);
+#else
+                sh[0] = v0, sh[1] = v1, sh[2] = d0, sh[3] = d1;
+#endif
+                if (rem == 0)
+                    memmove(ovec, ovec + num, 8);
+                else
+                    for (i = 0; i < 8; ++i)
+                        ovec[i] = ovec[i + num] << rem |
+                            ovec[i + num + 1] >> (8 - rem);
+#ifdef L_ENDIAN
+                v0 = sh[0], v1 = sh[1];
+#else
+                iv = &ovec[0];
+                c2l(iv, v0);
+                c2l(iv, v1);
+#endif
+            }
+            d0 ^= ti[0];
+            d1 ^= ti[1];
+            l2cn(d0, d1, out, n);
+            out += n;
+        }
+    }
+    iv = &(*ivec)[0];
+    l2c(v0, iv);
+    l2c(v1, iv);
+    v0 = v1 = d0 = d1 = ti[0] = ti[1] = 0;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/des_enc.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/des_enc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..600f6df
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/des_enc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,301 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include "des_locl.h"
+#include "spr.h"
+
+void DES_encrypt1(DES_LONG *data, DES_key_schedule *ks, int enc)
+{
+    register DES_LONG l, r, t, u;
+    register DES_LONG *s;
+
+    r = data[0];
+    l = data[1];
+
+    IP(r, l);
+    /*
+     * Things have been modified so that the initial rotate is done outside
+     * the loop.  This required the DES_SPtrans values in sp.h to be rotated
+     * 1 bit to the right. One perl script later and things have a 5% speed
+     * up on a sparc2. Thanks to Richard Outerbridge
+     * <71755.204@CompuServe.COM> for pointing this out.
+     */
+    /* clear the top bits on machines with 8byte longs */
+    /* shift left by 2 */
+    r = ROTATE(r, 29) & 0xffffffffL;
+    l = ROTATE(l, 29) & 0xffffffffL;
+
+    s = ks->ks->deslong;
+    /*
+     * I don't know if it is worth the effort of loop unrolling the inner
+     * loop
+     */
+    if (enc) {
+        D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 0);     /* 1 */
+        D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 2);     /* 2 */
+        D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 4);     /* 3 */
+        D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 6);     /* 4 */
+        D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 8);     /* 5 */
+        D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 10);    /* 6 */
+        D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 12);    /* 7 */
+        D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 14);    /* 8 */
+        D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 16);    /* 9 */
+        D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 18);    /* 10 */
+        D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 20);    /* 11 */
+        D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 22);    /* 12 */
+        D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 24);    /* 13 */
+        D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 26);    /* 14 */
+        D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 28);    /* 15 */
+        D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 30);    /* 16 */
+    } else {
+        D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 30);    /* 16 */
+        D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 28);    /* 15 */
+        D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 26);    /* 14 */
+        D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 24);    /* 13 */
+        D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 22);    /* 12 */
+        D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 20);    /* 11 */
+        D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 18);    /* 10 */
+        D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 16);    /* 9 */
+        D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 14);    /* 8 */
+        D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 12);    /* 7 */
+        D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 10);    /* 6 */
+        D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 8);     /* 5 */
+        D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 6);     /* 4 */
+        D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 4);     /* 3 */
+        D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 2);     /* 2 */
+        D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 0);     /* 1 */
+    }
+
+    /* rotate and clear the top bits on machines with 8byte longs */
+    l = ROTATE(l, 3) & 0xffffffffL;
+    r = ROTATE(r, 3) & 0xffffffffL;
+
+    FP(r, l);
+    data[0] = l;
+    data[1] = r;
+    l = r = t = u = 0;
+}
+
+void DES_encrypt2(DES_LONG *data, DES_key_schedule *ks, int enc)
+{
+    register DES_LONG l, r, t, u;
+    register DES_LONG *s;
+
+    r = data[0];
+    l = data[1];
+
+    /*
+     * Things have been modified so that the initial rotate is done outside
+     * the loop.  This required the DES_SPtrans values in sp.h to be rotated
+     * 1 bit to the right. One perl script later and things have a 5% speed
+     * up on a sparc2. Thanks to Richard Outerbridge
+     * <71755.204@CompuServe.COM> for pointing this out.
+     */
+    /* clear the top bits on machines with 8byte longs */
+    r = ROTATE(r, 29) & 0xffffffffL;
+    l = ROTATE(l, 29) & 0xffffffffL;
+
+    s = ks->ks->deslong;
+    /*
+     * I don't know if it is worth the effort of loop unrolling the inner
+     * loop
+     */
+    if (enc) {
+        D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 0);     /* 1 */
+        D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 2);     /* 2 */
+        D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 4);     /* 3 */
+        D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 6);     /* 4 */
+        D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 8);     /* 5 */
+        D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 10);    /* 6 */
+        D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 12);    /* 7 */
+        D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 14);    /* 8 */
+        D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 16);    /* 9 */
+        D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 18);    /* 10 */
+        D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 20);    /* 11 */
+        D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 22);    /* 12 */
+        D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 24);    /* 13 */
+        D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 26);    /* 14 */
+        D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 28);    /* 15 */
+        D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 30);    /* 16 */
+    } else {
+        D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 30);    /* 16 */
+        D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 28);    /* 15 */
+        D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 26);    /* 14 */
+        D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 24);    /* 13 */
+        D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 22);    /* 12 */
+        D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 20);    /* 11 */
+        D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 18);    /* 10 */
+        D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 16);    /* 9 */
+        D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 14);    /* 8 */
+        D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 12);    /* 7 */
+        D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 10);    /* 6 */
+        D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 8);     /* 5 */
+        D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 6);     /* 4 */
+        D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 4);     /* 3 */
+        D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 2);     /* 2 */
+        D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 0);     /* 1 */
+    }
+    /* rotate and clear the top bits on machines with 8byte longs */
+    data[0] = ROTATE(l, 3) & 0xffffffffL;
+    data[1] = ROTATE(r, 3) & 0xffffffffL;
+    l = r = t = u = 0;
+}
+
+void DES_encrypt3(DES_LONG *data, DES_key_schedule *ks1,
+                  DES_key_schedule *ks2, DES_key_schedule *ks3)
+{
+    register DES_LONG l, r;
+
+    l = data[0];
+    r = data[1];
+    IP(l, r);
+    data[0] = l;
+    data[1] = r;
+    DES_encrypt2((DES_LONG *)data, ks1, DES_ENCRYPT);
+    DES_encrypt2((DES_LONG *)data, ks2, DES_DECRYPT);
+    DES_encrypt2((DES_LONG *)data, ks3, DES_ENCRYPT);
+    l = data[0];
+    r = data[1];
+    FP(r, l);
+    data[0] = l;
+    data[1] = r;
+}
+
+void DES_decrypt3(DES_LONG *data, DES_key_schedule *ks1,
+                  DES_key_schedule *ks2, DES_key_schedule *ks3)
+{
+    register DES_LONG l, r;
+
+    l = data[0];
+    r = data[1];
+    IP(l, r);
+    data[0] = l;
+    data[1] = r;
+    DES_encrypt2((DES_LONG *)data, ks3, DES_DECRYPT);
+    DES_encrypt2((DES_LONG *)data, ks2, DES_ENCRYPT);
+    DES_encrypt2((DES_LONG *)data, ks1, DES_DECRYPT);
+    l = data[0];
+    r = data[1];
+    FP(r, l);
+    data[0] = l;
+    data[1] = r;
+}
+
+#ifndef DES_DEFAULT_OPTIONS
+
+# undef CBC_ENC_C__DONT_UPDATE_IV
+# include "ncbc_enc.c"          /* DES_ncbc_encrypt */
+
+void DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output,
+                          long length, DES_key_schedule *ks1,
+                          DES_key_schedule *ks2, DES_key_schedule *ks3,
+                          DES_cblock *ivec, int enc)
+{
+    register DES_LONG tin0, tin1;
+    register DES_LONG tout0, tout1, xor0, xor1;
+    register const unsigned char *in;
+    unsigned char *out;
+    register long l = length;
+    DES_LONG tin[2];
+    unsigned char *iv;
+
+    in = input;
+    out = output;
+    iv = &(*ivec)[0];
+
+    if (enc) {
+        c2l(iv, tout0);
+        c2l(iv, tout1);
+        for (l -= 8; l >= 0; l -= 8) {
+            c2l(in, tin0);
+            c2l(in, tin1);
+            tin0 ^= tout0;
+            tin1 ^= tout1;
+
+            tin[0] = tin0;
+            tin[1] = tin1;
+            DES_encrypt3((DES_LONG *)tin, ks1, ks2, ks3);
+            tout0 = tin[0];
+            tout1 = tin[1];
+
+            l2c(tout0, out);
+            l2c(tout1, out);
+        }
+        if (l != -8) {
+            c2ln(in, tin0, tin1, l + 8);
+            tin0 ^= tout0;
+            tin1 ^= tout1;
+
+            tin[0] = tin0;
+            tin[1] = tin1;
+            DES_encrypt3((DES_LONG *)tin, ks1, ks2, ks3);
+            tout0 = tin[0];
+            tout1 = tin[1];
+
+            l2c(tout0, out);
+            l2c(tout1, out);
+        }
+        iv = &(*ivec)[0];
+        l2c(tout0, iv);
+        l2c(tout1, iv);
+    } else {
+        register DES_LONG t0, t1;
+
+        c2l(iv, xor0);
+        c2l(iv, xor1);
+        for (l -= 8; l >= 0; l -= 8) {
+            c2l(in, tin0);
+            c2l(in, tin1);
+
+            t0 = tin0;
+            t1 = tin1;
+
+            tin[0] = tin0;
+            tin[1] = tin1;
+            DES_decrypt3((DES_LONG *)tin, ks1, ks2, ks3);
+            tout0 = tin[0];
+            tout1 = tin[1];
+
+            tout0 ^= xor0;
+            tout1 ^= xor1;
+            l2c(tout0, out);
+            l2c(tout1, out);
+            xor0 = t0;
+            xor1 = t1;
+        }
+        if (l != -8) {
+            c2l(in, tin0);
+            c2l(in, tin1);
+
+            t0 = tin0;
+            t1 = tin1;
+
+            tin[0] = tin0;
+            tin[1] = tin1;
+            DES_decrypt3((DES_LONG *)tin, ks1, ks2, ks3);
+            tout0 = tin[0];
+            tout1 = tin[1];
+
+            tout0 ^= xor0;
+            tout1 ^= xor1;
+            l2cn(tout0, tout1, out, l + 8);
+            xor0 = t0;
+            xor1 = t1;
+        }
+
+        iv = &(*ivec)[0];
+        l2c(xor0, iv);
+        l2c(xor1, iv);
+    }
+    tin0 = tin1 = tout0 = tout1 = xor0 = xor1 = 0;
+    tin[0] = tin[1] = 0;
+}
+
+#endif                          /* DES_DEFAULT_OPTIONS */
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/des_locl.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/des_locl.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1fe4768
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/des_locl.h
@@ -0,0 +1,231 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_DES_LOCL_H
+# define HEADER_DES_LOCL_H
+
+# include <openssl/e_os2.h>
+
+# include <stdio.h>
+# include <stdlib.h>
+# include <string.h>
+
+# include <openssl/des.h>
+
+# ifdef OPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBCRYPTO
+#  undef OPENSSL_EXTERN
+#  define OPENSSL_EXTERN OPENSSL_EXPORT
+# endif
+
+# define ITERATIONS 16
+# define HALF_ITERATIONS 8
+
+/* used in des_read and des_write */
+# define MAXWRITE        (1024*16)
+# define BSIZE           (MAXWRITE+4)
+
+# define c2l(c,l)        (l =((DES_LONG)(*((c)++)))    , \
+                         l|=((DES_LONG)(*((c)++)))<< 8L, \
+                         l|=((DES_LONG)(*((c)++)))<<16L, \
+                         l|=((DES_LONG)(*((c)++)))<<24L)
+
+/* NOTE - c is not incremented as per c2l */
+# define c2ln(c,l1,l2,n) { \
+                        c+=n; \
+                        l1=l2=0; \
+                        switch (n) { \
+                        case 8: l2 =((DES_LONG)(*(--(c))))<<24L; \
+                        /* fall thru */                          \
+                        case 7: l2|=((DES_LONG)(*(--(c))))<<16L; \
+                        /* fall thru */                          \
+                        case 6: l2|=((DES_LONG)(*(--(c))))<< 8L; \
+                        /* fall thru */                          \
+                        case 5: l2|=((DES_LONG)(*(--(c))));      \
+                        /* fall thru */                          \
+                        case 4: l1 =((DES_LONG)(*(--(c))))<<24L; \
+                        /* fall thru */                          \
+                        case 3: l1|=((DES_LONG)(*(--(c))))<<16L; \
+                        /* fall thru */                          \
+                        case 2: l1|=((DES_LONG)(*(--(c))))<< 8L; \
+                        /* fall thru */                          \
+                        case 1: l1|=((DES_LONG)(*(--(c))));      \
+                                } \
+                        }
+
+# define l2c(l,c)        (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)     )&0xff), \
+                         *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8L)&0xff), \
+                         *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16L)&0xff), \
+                         *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24L)&0xff))
+
+/*
+ * replacements for htonl and ntohl since I have no idea what to do when
+ * faced with machines with 8 byte longs.
+ */
+# define HDRSIZE 4
+
+# define n2l(c,l)        (l =((DES_LONG)(*((c)++)))<<24L, \
+                         l|=((DES_LONG)(*((c)++)))<<16L, \
+                         l|=((DES_LONG)(*((c)++)))<< 8L, \
+                         l|=((DES_LONG)(*((c)++))))
+
+# define l2n(l,c)        (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24L)&0xff), \
+                         *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16L)&0xff), \
+                         *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8L)&0xff), \
+                         *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)     )&0xff))
+
+/* NOTE - c is not incremented as per l2c */
+# define l2cn(l1,l2,c,n) { \
+                        c+=n; \
+                        switch (n) { \
+                        case 8: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>>24L)&0xff); \
+                        /* fall thru */                                     \
+                        case 7: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>>16L)&0xff); \
+                        /* fall thru */                                     \
+                        case 6: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>> 8L)&0xff); \
+                        /* fall thru */                                     \
+                        case 5: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)     )&0xff); \
+                        /* fall thru */                                     \
+                        case 4: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>>24L)&0xff); \
+                        /* fall thru */                                     \
+                        case 3: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>>16L)&0xff); \
+                        /* fall thru */                                     \
+                        case 2: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>> 8L)&0xff); \
+                        /* fall thru */                                     \
+                        case 1: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)     )&0xff); \
+                                } \
+                        }
+
+# if (defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) && defined(_MSC_VER))
+#  define ROTATE(a,n)     (_lrotr(a,n))
+# elif defined(__ICC)
+#  define ROTATE(a,n)     (_rotr(a,n))
+# elif defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 && !defined(__STRICT_ANSI__) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_INLINE_ASM) && !defined(PEDANTIC)
+#  if defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__)
+#   define ROTATE(a,n)   ({ register unsigned int ret;   \
+                                asm ("rorl %1,%0"       \
+                                        : "=r"(ret)     \
+                                        : "I"(n),"0"(a) \
+                                        : "cc");        \
+                           ret;                         \
+                        })
+#  endif
+# endif
+# ifndef ROTATE
+#  define ROTATE(a,n)     (((a)>>(n))+((a)<<(32-(n))))
+# endif
+
+/*
+ * Don't worry about the LOAD_DATA() stuff, that is used by fcrypt() to add
+ * it's little bit to the front
+ */
+
+# ifdef DES_FCRYPT
+
+#  define LOAD_DATA_tmp(R,S,u,t,E0,E1) \
+        { DES_LONG tmp; LOAD_DATA(R,S,u,t,E0,E1,tmp); }
+
+#  define LOAD_DATA(R,S,u,t,E0,E1,tmp) \
+        t=R^(R>>16L); \
+        u=t&E0; t&=E1; \
+        tmp=(u<<16); u^=R^s[S  ]; u^=tmp; \
+        tmp=(t<<16); t^=R^s[S+1]; t^=tmp
+# else
+#  define LOAD_DATA_tmp(a,b,c,d,e,f) LOAD_DATA(a,b,c,d,e,f,g)
+#  define LOAD_DATA(R,S,u,t,E0,E1,tmp) \
+        u=R^s[S  ]; \
+        t=R^s[S+1]
+# endif
+
+/*
+ * It recently occurred to me that 0^0^0^0^0^0^0 == 0, so there is no reason
+ * to not xor all the sub items together.  This potentially saves a register
+ * since things can be xored directly into L
+ */
+
+# define D_ENCRYPT(LL,R,S) { \
+        LOAD_DATA_tmp(R,S,u,t,E0,E1); \
+        t=ROTATE(t,4); \
+        LL^= \
+            DES_SPtrans[0][(u>> 2L)&0x3f]^ \
+            DES_SPtrans[2][(u>>10L)&0x3f]^ \
+            DES_SPtrans[4][(u>>18L)&0x3f]^ \
+            DES_SPtrans[6][(u>>26L)&0x3f]^ \
+            DES_SPtrans[1][(t>> 2L)&0x3f]^ \
+            DES_SPtrans[3][(t>>10L)&0x3f]^ \
+            DES_SPtrans[5][(t>>18L)&0x3f]^ \
+            DES_SPtrans[7][(t>>26L)&0x3f]; }
+
+        /*-
+         * IP and FP
+         * The problem is more of a geometric problem that random bit fiddling.
+         0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7      62 54 46 38 30 22 14  6
+         8  9 10 11 12 13 14 15      60 52 44 36 28 20 12  4
+        16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23      58 50 42 34 26 18 10  2
+        24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31  to  56 48 40 32 24 16  8  0
+
+        32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39      63 55 47 39 31 23 15  7
+        40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47      61 53 45 37 29 21 13  5
+        48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55      59 51 43 35 27 19 11  3
+        56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63      57 49 41 33 25 17  9  1
+
+        The output has been subject to swaps of the form
+        0 1 -> 3 1 but the odd and even bits have been put into
+        2 3    2 0
+        different words.  The main trick is to remember that
+        t=((l>>size)^r)&(mask);
+        r^=t;
+        l^=(t<<size);
+        can be used to swap and move bits between words.
+
+        So l =  0  1  2  3  r = 16 17 18 19
+                4  5  6  7      20 21 22 23
+                8  9 10 11      24 25 26 27
+               12 13 14 15      28 29 30 31
+        becomes (for size == 2 and mask == 0x3333)
+           t =   2^16  3^17 -- --   l =  0  1 16 17  r =  2  3 18 19
+                 6^20  7^21 -- --        4  5 20 21       6  7 22 23
+                10^24 11^25 -- --        8  9 24 25      10 11 24 25
+                14^28 15^29 -- --       12 13 28 29      14 15 28 29
+
+        Thanks for hints from Richard Outerbridge - he told me IP&FP
+        could be done in 15 xor, 10 shifts and 5 ands.
+        When I finally started to think of the problem in 2D
+        I first got ~42 operations without xors.  When I remembered
+        how to use xors :-) I got it to its final state.
+        */
+# define PERM_OP(a,b,t,n,m) ((t)=((((a)>>(n))^(b))&(m)),\
+        (b)^=(t),\
+        (a)^=((t)<<(n)))
+
+# define IP(l,r) \
+        { \
+        register DES_LONG tt; \
+        PERM_OP(r,l,tt, 4,0x0f0f0f0fL); \
+        PERM_OP(l,r,tt,16,0x0000ffffL); \
+        PERM_OP(r,l,tt, 2,0x33333333L); \
+        PERM_OP(l,r,tt, 8,0x00ff00ffL); \
+        PERM_OP(r,l,tt, 1,0x55555555L); \
+        }
+
+# define FP(l,r) \
+        { \
+        register DES_LONG tt; \
+        PERM_OP(l,r,tt, 1,0x55555555L); \
+        PERM_OP(r,l,tt, 8,0x00ff00ffL); \
+        PERM_OP(l,r,tt, 2,0x33333333L); \
+        PERM_OP(r,l,tt,16,0x0000ffffL); \
+        PERM_OP(l,r,tt, 4,0x0f0f0f0fL); \
+        }
+
+extern const DES_LONG DES_SPtrans[8][64];
+
+void fcrypt_body(DES_LONG *out, DES_key_schedule *ks,
+                 DES_LONG Eswap0, DES_LONG Eswap1);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/ecb3_enc.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/ecb3_enc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6ac89d4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/ecb3_enc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "des_locl.h"
+
+void DES_ecb3_encrypt(const_DES_cblock *input, DES_cblock *output,
+                      DES_key_schedule *ks1, DES_key_schedule *ks2,
+                      DES_key_schedule *ks3, int enc)
+{
+    register DES_LONG l0, l1;
+    DES_LONG ll[2];
+    const unsigned char *in = &(*input)[0];
+    unsigned char *out = &(*output)[0];
+
+    c2l(in, l0);
+    c2l(in, l1);
+    ll[0] = l0;
+    ll[1] = l1;
+    if (enc)
+        DES_encrypt3(ll, ks1, ks2, ks3);
+    else
+        DES_decrypt3(ll, ks1, ks2, ks3);
+    l0 = ll[0];
+    l1 = ll[1];
+    l2c(l0, out);
+    l2c(l1, out);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/ecb_enc.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/ecb_enc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..32df460
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/ecb_enc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "des_locl.h"
+#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+
+
+const char *DES_options(void)
+{
+    static int init = 1;
+    static char buf[32];
+
+    if (init) {
+        const char *size;
+
+        if (sizeof(DES_LONG) != sizeof(long))
+            size = "int";
+        else
+            size = "long";
+        BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "des(%s)", size);
+        init = 0;
+    }
+    return (buf);
+}
+
+void DES_ecb_encrypt(const_DES_cblock *input, DES_cblock *output,
+                     DES_key_schedule *ks, int enc)
+{
+    register DES_LONG l;
+    DES_LONG ll[2];
+    const unsigned char *in = &(*input)[0];
+    unsigned char *out = &(*output)[0];
+
+    c2l(in, l);
+    ll[0] = l;
+    c2l(in, l);
+    ll[1] = l;
+    DES_encrypt1(ll, ks, enc);
+    l = ll[0];
+    l2c(l, out);
+    l = ll[1];
+    l2c(l, out);
+    l = ll[0] = ll[1] = 0;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/fcrypt.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/fcrypt.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..baede4f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/fcrypt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1998-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* NOCW */
+#include <stdio.h>
+#ifdef _OSD_POSIX
+# ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+#  define CHARSET_EBCDIC 1
+# endif
+#endif
+#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+# include <openssl/ebcdic.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include "des_locl.h"
+
+/*
+ * Added more values to handle illegal salt values the way normal crypt()
+ * implementations do.  The patch was sent by Bjorn Gronvall <bg@sics.se>
+ */
+static unsigned const char con_salt[128] = {
+    0xD2, 0xD3, 0xD4, 0xD5, 0xD6, 0xD7, 0xD8, 0xD9,
+    0xDA, 0xDB, 0xDC, 0xDD, 0xDE, 0xDF, 0xE0, 0xE1,
+    0xE2, 0xE3, 0xE4, 0xE5, 0xE6, 0xE7, 0xE8, 0xE9,
+    0xEA, 0xEB, 0xEC, 0xED, 0xEE, 0xEF, 0xF0, 0xF1,
+    0xF2, 0xF3, 0xF4, 0xF5, 0xF6, 0xF7, 0xF8, 0xF9,
+    0xFA, 0xFB, 0xFC, 0xFD, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x01,
+    0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09,
+    0x0A, 0x0B, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0A,
+    0x0B, 0x0C, 0x0D, 0x0E, 0x0F, 0x10, 0x11, 0x12,
+    0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17, 0x18, 0x19, 0x1A,
+    0x1B, 0x1C, 0x1D, 0x1E, 0x1F, 0x20, 0x21, 0x22,
+    0x23, 0x24, 0x25, 0x20, 0x21, 0x22, 0x23, 0x24,
+    0x25, 0x26, 0x27, 0x28, 0x29, 0x2A, 0x2B, 0x2C,
+    0x2D, 0x2E, 0x2F, 0x30, 0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0x34,
+    0x35, 0x36, 0x37, 0x38, 0x39, 0x3A, 0x3B, 0x3C,
+    0x3D, 0x3E, 0x3F, 0x40, 0x41, 0x42, 0x43, 0x44,
+};
+
+static unsigned const char cov_2char[64] = {
+    0x2E, 0x2F, 0x30, 0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0x34, 0x35,
+    0x36, 0x37, 0x38, 0x39, 0x41, 0x42, 0x43, 0x44,
+    0x45, 0x46, 0x47, 0x48, 0x49, 0x4A, 0x4B, 0x4C,
+    0x4D, 0x4E, 0x4F, 0x50, 0x51, 0x52, 0x53, 0x54,
+    0x55, 0x56, 0x57, 0x58, 0x59, 0x5A, 0x61, 0x62,
+    0x63, 0x64, 0x65, 0x66, 0x67, 0x68, 0x69, 0x6A,
+    0x6B, 0x6C, 0x6D, 0x6E, 0x6F, 0x70, 0x71, 0x72,
+    0x73, 0x74, 0x75, 0x76, 0x77, 0x78, 0x79, 0x7A
+};
+
+char *DES_crypt(const char *buf, const char *salt)
+{
+    static char buff[14];
+
+#ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+    return (DES_fcrypt(buf, salt, buff));
+#else
+    char e_salt[2 + 1];
+    char e_buf[32 + 1];         /* replace 32 by 8 ? */
+    char *ret;
+
+    if (salt[0] == '\0' || salt[1] == '\0')
+        return NULL;
+
+    /* Copy salt, convert to ASCII. */
+    e_salt[0] = salt[0];
+    e_salt[1] = salt[1];
+    e_salt[2] = '\0';
+    ebcdic2ascii(e_salt, e_salt, sizeof(e_salt));
+
+    /* Convert password to ASCII. */
+    OPENSSL_strlcpy(e_buf, buf, sizeof(e_buf));
+    ebcdic2ascii(e_buf, e_buf, sizeof(e_buf));
+
+    /* Encrypt it (from/to ASCII); if it worked, convert back. */
+    ret = DES_fcrypt(e_buf, e_salt, buff);
+    if (ret != NULL)
+        ascii2ebcdic(ret, ret, strlen(ret));
+
+    return ret;
+#endif
+}
+
+char *DES_fcrypt(const char *buf, const char *salt, char *ret)
+{
+    unsigned int i, j, x, y;
+    DES_LONG Eswap0, Eswap1;
+    DES_LONG out[2], ll;
+    DES_cblock key;
+    DES_key_schedule ks;
+    unsigned char bb[9];
+    unsigned char *b = bb;
+    unsigned char c, u;
+
+    x = ret[0] = salt[0];
+    if (x == 0 || x >= sizeof(con_salt))
+        return NULL;
+    Eswap0 = con_salt[x] << 2;
+    x = ret[1] = salt[1];
+    if (x == 0 || x >= sizeof(con_salt))
+        return NULL;
+    Eswap1 = con_salt[x] << 6;
+
+    /*
+     * EAY r=strlen(buf); r=(r+7)/8;
+     */
+    for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+        c = *(buf++);
+        if (!c)
+            break;
+        key[i] = (c << 1);
+    }
+    for (; i < 8; i++)
+        key[i] = 0;
+
+    DES_set_key_unchecked(&key, &ks);
+    fcrypt_body(&(out[0]), &ks, Eswap0, Eswap1);
+
+    ll = out[0];
+    l2c(ll, b);
+    ll = out[1];
+    l2c(ll, b);
+    y = 0;
+    u = 0x80;
+    bb[8] = 0;
+    for (i = 2; i < 13; i++) {
+        c = 0;
+        for (j = 0; j < 6; j++) {
+            c <<= 1;
+            if (bb[y] & u)
+                c |= 1;
+            u >>= 1;
+            if (!u) {
+                y++;
+                u = 0x80;
+            }
+        }
+        ret[i] = cov_2char[c];
+    }
+    ret[13] = '\0';
+    return (ret);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/fcrypt_b.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/fcrypt_b.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fe2369a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/fcrypt_b.c
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+#define DES_FCRYPT
+#include "des_locl.h"
+#undef DES_FCRYPT
+
+#undef PERM_OP
+#define PERM_OP(a,b,t,n,m) ((t)=((((a)>>(n))^(b))&(m)),\
+        (b)^=(t),\
+        (a)^=((t)<<(n)))
+
+#undef HPERM_OP
+#define HPERM_OP(a,t,n,m) ((t)=((((a)<<(16-(n)))^(a))&(m)),\
+        (a)=(a)^(t)^(t>>(16-(n))))\
+
+void fcrypt_body(DES_LONG *out, DES_key_schedule *ks, DES_LONG Eswap0,
+                 DES_LONG Eswap1)
+{
+    register DES_LONG l, r, t, u;
+    register DES_LONG *s;
+    register int j;
+    register DES_LONG E0, E1;
+
+    l = 0;
+    r = 0;
+
+    s = (DES_LONG *)ks;
+    E0 = Eswap0;
+    E1 = Eswap1;
+
+    for (j = 0; j < 25; j++) {
+        D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 0);     /* 1 */
+        D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 2);     /* 2 */
+        D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 4);     /* 3 */
+        D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 6);     /* 4 */
+        D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 8);     /* 5 */
+        D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 10);    /* 6 */
+        D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 12);    /* 7 */
+        D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 14);    /* 8 */
+        D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 16);    /* 9 */
+        D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 18);    /* 10 */
+        D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 20);    /* 11 */
+        D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 22);    /* 12 */
+        D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 24);    /* 13 */
+        D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 26);    /* 14 */
+        D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 28);    /* 15 */
+        D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 30);    /* 16 */
+        t = l;
+        l = r;
+        r = t;
+    }
+    l = ROTATE(l, 3) & 0xffffffffL;
+    r = ROTATE(r, 3) & 0xffffffffL;
+
+    PERM_OP(l, r, t,  1, 0x55555555L);
+    PERM_OP(r, l, t,  8, 0x00ff00ffL);
+    PERM_OP(l, r, t,  2, 0x33333333L);
+    PERM_OP(r, l, t, 16, 0x0000ffffL);
+    PERM_OP(l, r, t,  4, 0x0f0f0f0fL);
+
+    out[0] = r;
+    out[1] = l;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/ncbc_enc.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/ncbc_enc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..244f15c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/ncbc_enc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1998-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*-
+ * #included by:
+ *    cbc_enc.c  (DES_cbc_encrypt)
+ *    des_enc.c  (DES_ncbc_encrypt)
+ */
+
+#include "des_locl.h"
+
+#ifdef CBC_ENC_C__DONT_UPDATE_IV
+void DES_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, long length,
+                     DES_key_schedule *_schedule, DES_cblock *ivec, int enc)
+#else
+void DES_ncbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                      long length, DES_key_schedule *_schedule,
+                      DES_cblock *ivec, int enc)
+#endif
+{
+    register DES_LONG tin0, tin1;
+    register DES_LONG tout0, tout1, xor0, xor1;
+    register long l = length;
+    DES_LONG tin[2];
+    unsigned char *iv;
+
+    iv = &(*ivec)[0];
+
+    if (enc) {
+        c2l(iv, tout0);
+        c2l(iv, tout1);
+        for (l -= 8; l >= 0; l -= 8) {
+            c2l(in, tin0);
+            c2l(in, tin1);
+            tin0 ^= tout0;
+            tin[0] = tin0;
+            tin1 ^= tout1;
+            tin[1] = tin1;
+            DES_encrypt1((DES_LONG *)tin, _schedule, DES_ENCRYPT);
+            tout0 = tin[0];
+            l2c(tout0, out);
+            tout1 = tin[1];
+            l2c(tout1, out);
+        }
+        if (l != -8) {
+            c2ln(in, tin0, tin1, l + 8);
+            tin0 ^= tout0;
+            tin[0] = tin0;
+            tin1 ^= tout1;
+            tin[1] = tin1;
+            DES_encrypt1((DES_LONG *)tin, _schedule, DES_ENCRYPT);
+            tout0 = tin[0];
+            l2c(tout0, out);
+            tout1 = tin[1];
+            l2c(tout1, out);
+        }
+#ifndef CBC_ENC_C__DONT_UPDATE_IV
+        iv = &(*ivec)[0];
+        l2c(tout0, iv);
+        l2c(tout1, iv);
+#endif
+    } else {
+        c2l(iv, xor0);
+        c2l(iv, xor1);
+        for (l -= 8; l >= 0; l -= 8) {
+            c2l(in, tin0);
+            tin[0] = tin0;
+            c2l(in, tin1);
+            tin[1] = tin1;
+            DES_encrypt1((DES_LONG *)tin, _schedule, DES_DECRYPT);
+            tout0 = tin[0] ^ xor0;
+            tout1 = tin[1] ^ xor1;
+            l2c(tout0, out);
+            l2c(tout1, out);
+            xor0 = tin0;
+            xor1 = tin1;
+        }
+        if (l != -8) {
+            c2l(in, tin0);
+            tin[0] = tin0;
+            c2l(in, tin1);
+            tin[1] = tin1;
+            DES_encrypt1((DES_LONG *)tin, _schedule, DES_DECRYPT);
+            tout0 = tin[0] ^ xor0;
+            tout1 = tin[1] ^ xor1;
+            l2cn(tout0, tout1, out, l + 8);
+#ifndef CBC_ENC_C__DONT_UPDATE_IV
+            xor0 = tin0;
+            xor1 = tin1;
+#endif
+        }
+#ifndef CBC_ENC_C__DONT_UPDATE_IV
+        iv = &(*ivec)[0];
+        l2c(xor0, iv);
+        l2c(xor1, iv);
+#endif
+    }
+    tin0 = tin1 = tout0 = tout1 = xor0 = xor1 = 0;
+    tin[0] = tin[1] = 0;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/ofb64ede.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/ofb64ede.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a551a07
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/ofb64ede.c
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "des_locl.h"
+
+/*
+ * The input and output encrypted as though 64bit ofb mode is being used.
+ * The extra state information to record how much of the 64bit block we have
+ * used is contained in *num;
+ */
+void DES_ede3_ofb64_encrypt(register const unsigned char *in,
+                            register unsigned char *out, long length,
+                            DES_key_schedule *k1, DES_key_schedule *k2,
+                            DES_key_schedule *k3, DES_cblock *ivec, int *num)
+{
+    register DES_LONG v0, v1;
+    register int n = *num;
+    register long l = length;
+    DES_cblock d;
+    register char *dp;
+    DES_LONG ti[2];
+    unsigned char *iv;
+    int save = 0;
+
+    iv = &(*ivec)[0];
+    c2l(iv, v0);
+    c2l(iv, v1);
+    ti[0] = v0;
+    ti[1] = v1;
+    dp = (char *)d;
+    l2c(v0, dp);
+    l2c(v1, dp);
+    while (l--) {
+        if (n == 0) {
+            /* ti[0]=v0; */
+            /* ti[1]=v1; */
+            DES_encrypt3(ti, k1, k2, k3);
+            v0 = ti[0];
+            v1 = ti[1];
+
+            dp = (char *)d;
+            l2c(v0, dp);
+            l2c(v1, dp);
+            save++;
+        }
+        *(out++) = *(in++) ^ d[n];
+        n = (n + 1) & 0x07;
+    }
+    if (save) {
+        iv = &(*ivec)[0];
+        l2c(v0, iv);
+        l2c(v1, iv);
+    }
+    v0 = v1 = ti[0] = ti[1] = 0;
+    *num = n;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/ofb64enc.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/ofb64enc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..30976c8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/ofb64enc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "des_locl.h"
+
+/*
+ * The input and output encrypted as though 64bit ofb mode is being used.
+ * The extra state information to record how much of the 64bit block we have
+ * used is contained in *num;
+ */
+void DES_ofb64_encrypt(register const unsigned char *in,
+                       register unsigned char *out, long length,
+                       DES_key_schedule *schedule, DES_cblock *ivec, int *num)
+{
+    register DES_LONG v0, v1, t;
+    register int n = *num;
+    register long l = length;
+    DES_cblock d;
+    register unsigned char *dp;
+    DES_LONG ti[2];
+    unsigned char *iv;
+    int save = 0;
+
+    iv = &(*ivec)[0];
+    c2l(iv, v0);
+    c2l(iv, v1);
+    ti[0] = v0;
+    ti[1] = v1;
+    dp = d;
+    l2c(v0, dp);
+    l2c(v1, dp);
+    while (l--) {
+        if (n == 0) {
+            DES_encrypt1(ti, schedule, DES_ENCRYPT);
+            dp = d;
+            t = ti[0];
+            l2c(t, dp);
+            t = ti[1];
+            l2c(t, dp);
+            save++;
+        }
+        *(out++) = *(in++) ^ d[n];
+        n = (n + 1) & 0x07;
+    }
+    if (save) {
+        v0 = ti[0];
+        v1 = ti[1];
+        iv = &(*ivec)[0];
+        l2c(v0, iv);
+        l2c(v1, iv);
+    }
+    t = v0 = v1 = ti[0] = ti[1] = 0;
+    *num = n;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/ofb_enc.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/ofb_enc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..65a9b86
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/ofb_enc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "des_locl.h"
+
+/*
+ * The input and output are loaded in multiples of 8 bits. What this means is
+ * that if you have numbits=12 and length=2 the first 12 bits will be
+ * retrieved from the first byte and half the second.  The second 12 bits
+ * will come from the 3rd and half the 4th byte.
+ */
+void DES_ofb_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, int numbits,
+                     long length, DES_key_schedule *schedule,
+                     DES_cblock *ivec)
+{
+    register DES_LONG d0, d1, vv0, vv1, v0, v1, n = (numbits + 7) / 8;
+    register DES_LONG mask0, mask1;
+    register long l = length;
+    register int num = numbits;
+    DES_LONG ti[2];
+    unsigned char *iv;
+
+    if (num > 64)
+        return;
+    if (num > 32) {
+        mask0 = 0xffffffffL;
+        if (num >= 64)
+            mask1 = mask0;
+        else
+            mask1 = (1L << (num - 32)) - 1;
+    } else {
+        if (num == 32)
+            mask0 = 0xffffffffL;
+        else
+            mask0 = (1L << num) - 1;
+        mask1 = 0x00000000L;
+    }
+
+    iv = &(*ivec)[0];
+    c2l(iv, v0);
+    c2l(iv, v1);
+    ti[0] = v0;
+    ti[1] = v1;
+    while (l-- > 0) {
+        ti[0] = v0;
+        ti[1] = v1;
+        DES_encrypt1((DES_LONG *)ti, schedule, DES_ENCRYPT);
+        vv0 = ti[0];
+        vv1 = ti[1];
+        c2ln(in, d0, d1, n);
+        in += n;
+        d0 = (d0 ^ vv0) & mask0;
+        d1 = (d1 ^ vv1) & mask1;
+        l2cn(d0, d1, out, n);
+        out += n;
+
+        if (num == 32) {
+            v0 = v1;
+            v1 = vv0;
+        } else if (num == 64) {
+            v0 = vv0;
+            v1 = vv1;
+        } else if (num > 32) {  /* && num != 64 */
+            v0 = ((v1 >> (num - 32)) | (vv0 << (64 - num))) & 0xffffffffL;
+            v1 = ((vv0 >> (num - 32)) | (vv1 << (64 - num))) & 0xffffffffL;
+        } else {                /* num < 32 */
+
+            v0 = ((v0 >> num) | (v1 << (32 - num))) & 0xffffffffL;
+            v1 = ((v1 >> num) | (vv0 << (32 - num))) & 0xffffffffL;
+        }
+    }
+    iv = &(*ivec)[0];
+    l2c(v0, iv);
+    l2c(v1, iv);
+    v0 = v1 = d0 = d1 = ti[0] = ti[1] = vv0 = vv1 = 0;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/pcbc_enc.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/pcbc_enc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0fa058f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/pcbc_enc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "des_locl.h"
+
+void DES_pcbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output,
+                      long length, DES_key_schedule *schedule,
+                      DES_cblock *ivec, int enc)
+{
+    register DES_LONG sin0, sin1, xor0, xor1, tout0, tout1;
+    DES_LONG tin[2];
+    const unsigned char *in;
+    unsigned char *out, *iv;
+
+    in = input;
+    out = output;
+    iv = &(*ivec)[0];
+
+    if (enc) {
+        c2l(iv, xor0);
+        c2l(iv, xor1);
+        for (; length > 0; length -= 8) {
+            if (length >= 8) {
+                c2l(in, sin0);
+                c2l(in, sin1);
+            } else
+                c2ln(in, sin0, sin1, length);
+            tin[0] = sin0 ^ xor0;
+            tin[1] = sin1 ^ xor1;
+            DES_encrypt1((DES_LONG *)tin, schedule, DES_ENCRYPT);
+            tout0 = tin[0];
+            tout1 = tin[1];
+            xor0 = sin0 ^ tout0;
+            xor1 = sin1 ^ tout1;
+            l2c(tout0, out);
+            l2c(tout1, out);
+        }
+    } else {
+        c2l(iv, xor0);
+        c2l(iv, xor1);
+        for (; length > 0; length -= 8) {
+            c2l(in, sin0);
+            c2l(in, sin1);
+            tin[0] = sin0;
+            tin[1] = sin1;
+            DES_encrypt1((DES_LONG *)tin, schedule, DES_DECRYPT);
+            tout0 = tin[0] ^ xor0;
+            tout1 = tin[1] ^ xor1;
+            if (length >= 8) {
+                l2c(tout0, out);
+                l2c(tout1, out);
+            } else
+                l2cn(tout0, tout1, out, length);
+            xor0 = tout0 ^ sin0;
+            xor1 = tout1 ^ sin1;
+        }
+    }
+    tin[0] = tin[1] = 0;
+    sin0 = sin1 = xor0 = xor1 = tout0 = tout1 = 0;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/qud_cksm.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/qud_cksm.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8710cec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/qud_cksm.c
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * From "Message Authentication" R.R. Jueneman, S.M. Matyas, C.H. Meyer IEEE
+ * Communications Magazine Sept 1985 Vol. 23 No. 9 p 29-40 This module in
+ * only based on the code in this paper and is almost definitely not the same
+ * as the MIT implementation.
+ */
+#include "des_locl.h"
+
+/* bug fix for dos - 7/6/91 - Larry hughes@logos.ucs.indiana.edu */
+#define Q_B0(a) (((DES_LONG)(a)))
+#define Q_B1(a) (((DES_LONG)(a))<<8)
+#define Q_B2(a) (((DES_LONG)(a))<<16)
+#define Q_B3(a) (((DES_LONG)(a))<<24)
+
+/* used to scramble things a bit */
+/* Got the value MIT uses via brute force :-) 2/10/90 eay */
+#define NOISE   ((DES_LONG)83653421L)
+
+DES_LONG DES_quad_cksum(const unsigned char *input, DES_cblock output[],
+                        long length, int out_count, DES_cblock *seed)
+{
+    DES_LONG z0, z1, t0, t1;
+    int i;
+    long l;
+    const unsigned char *cp;
+    DES_LONG *lp;
+
+    if (out_count < 1)
+        out_count = 1;
+    lp = (DES_LONG *)&(output[0])[0];
+
+    z0 = Q_B0((*seed)[0]) | Q_B1((*seed)[1]) | Q_B2((*seed)[2]) |
+        Q_B3((*seed)[3]);
+    z1 = Q_B0((*seed)[4]) | Q_B1((*seed)[5]) | Q_B2((*seed)[6]) |
+        Q_B3((*seed)[7]);
+
+    for (i = 0; ((i < 4) && (i < out_count)); i++) {
+        cp = input;
+        l = length;
+        while (l > 0) {
+            if (l > 1) {
+                t0 = (DES_LONG)(*(cp++));
+                t0 |= (DES_LONG)Q_B1(*(cp++));
+                l--;
+            } else
+                t0 = (DES_LONG)(*(cp++));
+            l--;
+            /* add */
+            t0 += z0;
+            t0 &= 0xffffffffL;
+            t1 = z1;
+            /* square, well sort of square */
+            z0 = ((((t0 * t0) & 0xffffffffL) + ((t1 * t1) & 0xffffffffL))
+                  & 0xffffffffL) % 0x7fffffffL;
+            z1 = ((t0 * ((t1 + NOISE) & 0xffffffffL)) & 0xffffffffL) %
+                0x7fffffffL;
+        }
+        if (lp != NULL) {
+            /*
+             * The MIT library assumes that the checksum is composed of
+             * 2*out_count 32 bit ints
+             */
+            *lp++ = z0;
+            *lp++ = z1;
+        }
+    }
+    return (z0);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/rand_key.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/rand_key.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..61e4f9d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/rand_key.c
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1998-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/des.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+int DES_random_key(DES_cblock *ret)
+{
+    do {
+        if (RAND_bytes((unsigned char *)ret, sizeof(DES_cblock)) != 1)
+            return (0);
+    } while (DES_is_weak_key(ret));
+    DES_set_odd_parity(ret);
+    return (1);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/rpc_des.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/rpc_des.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fe59e22
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/rpc_des.h
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*  @(#)des.h   2.2 88/08/10 4.0 RPCSRC; from 2.7 88/02/08 SMI  */
+/*-
+ * Sun RPC is a product of Sun Microsystems, Inc. and is provided for
+ * unrestricted use provided that this legend is included on all tape
+ * media and as a part of the software program in whole or part.  Users
+ * may copy or modify Sun RPC without charge, but are not authorized
+ * to license or distribute it to anyone else except as part of a product or
+ * program developed by the user.
+ *
+ * SUN RPC IS PROVIDED AS IS WITH NO WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND INCLUDING THE
+ * WARRANTIES OF DESIGN, MERCHANTIBILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE, OR ARISING FROM A COURSE OF DEALING, USAGE OR TRADE PRACTICE.
+ *
+ * Sun RPC is provided with no support and without any obligation on the
+ * part of Sun Microsystems, Inc. to assist in its use, correction,
+ * modification or enhancement.
+ *
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC. SHALL HAVE NO LIABILITY WITH RESPECT TO THE
+ * INFRINGEMENT OF COPYRIGHTS, TRADE SECRETS OR ANY PATENTS BY SUN RPC
+ * OR ANY PART THEREOF.
+ *
+ * In no event will Sun Microsystems, Inc. be liable for any lost revenue
+ * or profits or other special, indirect and consequential damages, even if
+ * Sun has been advised of the possibility of such damages.
+ *
+ * Sun Microsystems, Inc.
+ * 2550 Garcia Avenue
+ * Mountain View, California  94043
+ */
+/*
+ * Generic DES driver interface
+ * Keep this file hardware independent!
+ * Copyright (c) 1986 by Sun Microsystems, Inc.
+ */
+
+#define DES_MAXLEN      65536   /* maximum # of bytes to encrypt */
+#define DES_QUICKLEN    16      /* maximum # of bytes to encrypt quickly */
+
+enum desdir { ENCRYPT, DECRYPT };
+enum desmode { CBC, ECB };
+
+/*
+ * parameters to ioctl call
+ */
+struct desparams {
+    unsigned char des_key[8];   /* key (with low bit parity) */
+    enum desdir des_dir;        /* direction */
+    enum desmode des_mode;      /* mode */
+    unsigned char des_ivec[8];  /* input vector */
+    unsigned des_len;           /* number of bytes to crypt */
+    union {
+        unsigned char UDES_data[DES_QUICKLEN];
+        unsigned char *UDES_buf;
+    } UDES;
+#define des_data UDES.UDES_data /* direct data here if quick */
+#define des_buf  UDES.UDES_buf  /* otherwise, pointer to data */
+};
+
+/*
+ * Encrypt an arbitrary sized buffer
+ */
+#define DESIOCBLOCK     _IOWR('d', 6, struct desparams)
+
+/*
+ * Encrypt of small amount of data, quickly
+ */
+#define DESIOCQUICK     _IOWR('d', 7, struct desparams)
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/rpc_enc.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/rpc_enc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bfa8511
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/rpc_enc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "rpc_des.h"
+#include "des_locl.h"
+
+int _des_crypt(char *buf, int len, struct desparams *desp);
+int _des_crypt(char *buf, int len, struct desparams *desp)
+{
+    DES_key_schedule ks;
+    int enc;
+
+    DES_set_key_unchecked(&desp->des_key, &ks);
+    enc = (desp->des_dir == ENCRYPT) ? DES_ENCRYPT : DES_DECRYPT;
+
+    if (desp->des_mode == CBC)
+        DES_ecb_encrypt((const_DES_cblock *)desp->UDES.UDES_buf,
+                        (DES_cblock *)desp->UDES.UDES_buf, &ks, enc);
+    else {
+        DES_ncbc_encrypt(desp->UDES.UDES_buf, desp->UDES.UDES_buf,
+                         len, &ks, &desp->des_ivec, enc);
+    }
+    return (1);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/set_key.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/set_key.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dc88b8d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/set_key.c
@@ -0,0 +1,389 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*-
+ * set_key.c v 1.4 eay 24/9/91
+ * 1.4 Speed up by 400% :-)
+ * 1.3 added register declarations.
+ * 1.2 unrolled make_key_sched a bit more
+ * 1.1 added norm_expand_bits
+ * 1.0 First working version
+ */
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include "des_locl.h"
+
+OPENSSL_IMPLEMENT_GLOBAL(int, DES_check_key, 0)
+                                                    /*
+                                                     * defaults to false
+                                                     */
+static const unsigned char odd_parity[256] = {
+    1, 1, 2, 2, 4, 4, 7, 7, 8, 8, 11, 11, 13, 13, 14, 14,
+    16, 16, 19, 19, 21, 21, 22, 22, 25, 25, 26, 26, 28, 28, 31, 31,
+    32, 32, 35, 35, 37, 37, 38, 38, 41, 41, 42, 42, 44, 44, 47, 47,
+    49, 49, 50, 50, 52, 52, 55, 55, 56, 56, 59, 59, 61, 61, 62, 62,
+    64, 64, 67, 67, 69, 69, 70, 70, 73, 73, 74, 74, 76, 76, 79, 79,
+    81, 81, 82, 82, 84, 84, 87, 87, 88, 88, 91, 91, 93, 93, 94, 94,
+    97, 97, 98, 98, 100, 100, 103, 103, 104, 104, 107, 107, 109, 109, 110,
+    110,
+    112, 112, 115, 115, 117, 117, 118, 118, 121, 121, 122, 122, 124, 124, 127,
+    127,
+    128, 128, 131, 131, 133, 133, 134, 134, 137, 137, 138, 138, 140, 140, 143,
+    143,
+    145, 145, 146, 146, 148, 148, 151, 151, 152, 152, 155, 155, 157, 157, 158,
+    158,
+    161, 161, 162, 162, 164, 164, 167, 167, 168, 168, 171, 171, 173, 173, 174,
+    174,
+    176, 176, 179, 179, 181, 181, 182, 182, 185, 185, 186, 186, 188, 188, 191,
+    191,
+    193, 193, 194, 194, 196, 196, 199, 199, 200, 200, 203, 203, 205, 205, 206,
+    206,
+    208, 208, 211, 211, 213, 213, 214, 214, 217, 217, 218, 218, 220, 220, 223,
+    223,
+    224, 224, 227, 227, 229, 229, 230, 230, 233, 233, 234, 234, 236, 236, 239,
+    239,
+    241, 241, 242, 242, 244, 244, 247, 247, 248, 248, 251, 251, 253, 253, 254,
+    254
+};
+
+void DES_set_odd_parity(DES_cblock *key)
+{
+    unsigned int i;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < DES_KEY_SZ; i++)
+        (*key)[i] = odd_parity[(*key)[i]];
+}
+
+int DES_check_key_parity(const_DES_cblock *key)
+{
+    unsigned int i;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < DES_KEY_SZ; i++) {
+        if ((*key)[i] != odd_parity[(*key)[i]])
+            return (0);
+    }
+    return (1);
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Weak and semi weak keys as taken from
+ * %A D.W. Davies
+ * %A W.L. Price
+ * %T Security for Computer Networks
+ * %I John Wiley & Sons
+ * %D 1984
+ * Many thanks to smb@ulysses.att.com (Steven Bellovin) for the reference
+ * (and actual cblock values).
+ */
+#define NUM_WEAK_KEY    16
+static const DES_cblock weak_keys[NUM_WEAK_KEY] = {
+    /* weak keys */
+    {0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01},
+    {0xFE, 0xFE, 0xFE, 0xFE, 0xFE, 0xFE, 0xFE, 0xFE},
+    {0x1F, 0x1F, 0x1F, 0x1F, 0x0E, 0x0E, 0x0E, 0x0E},
+    {0xE0, 0xE0, 0xE0, 0xE0, 0xF1, 0xF1, 0xF1, 0xF1},
+    /* semi-weak keys */
+    {0x01, 0xFE, 0x01, 0xFE, 0x01, 0xFE, 0x01, 0xFE},
+    {0xFE, 0x01, 0xFE, 0x01, 0xFE, 0x01, 0xFE, 0x01},
+    {0x1F, 0xE0, 0x1F, 0xE0, 0x0E, 0xF1, 0x0E, 0xF1},
+    {0xE0, 0x1F, 0xE0, 0x1F, 0xF1, 0x0E, 0xF1, 0x0E},
+    {0x01, 0xE0, 0x01, 0xE0, 0x01, 0xF1, 0x01, 0xF1},
+    {0xE0, 0x01, 0xE0, 0x01, 0xF1, 0x01, 0xF1, 0x01},
+    {0x1F, 0xFE, 0x1F, 0xFE, 0x0E, 0xFE, 0x0E, 0xFE},
+    {0xFE, 0x1F, 0xFE, 0x1F, 0xFE, 0x0E, 0xFE, 0x0E},
+    {0x01, 0x1F, 0x01, 0x1F, 0x01, 0x0E, 0x01, 0x0E},
+    {0x1F, 0x01, 0x1F, 0x01, 0x0E, 0x01, 0x0E, 0x01},
+    {0xE0, 0xFE, 0xE0, 0xFE, 0xF1, 0xFE, 0xF1, 0xFE},
+    {0xFE, 0xE0, 0xFE, 0xE0, 0xFE, 0xF1, 0xFE, 0xF1}
+};
+
+int DES_is_weak_key(const_DES_cblock *key)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < NUM_WEAK_KEY; i++)
+        /*
+         * Added == 0 to comparison, I obviously don't run this section very
+         * often :-(, thanks to engineering@MorningStar.Com for the fix eay
+         * 93/06/29 Another problem, I was comparing only the first 4 bytes,
+         * 97/03/18
+         */
+        if (memcmp(weak_keys[i], key, sizeof(DES_cblock)) == 0)
+            return (1);
+    return (0);
+}
+
+/*-
+ * NOW DEFINED IN des_local.h
+ * See ecb_encrypt.c for a pseudo description of these macros.
+ * #define PERM_OP(a,b,t,n,m) ((t)=((((a)>>(n))^(b))&(m)),\
+ *      (b)^=(t),\
+ *      (a)=((a)^((t)<<(n))))
+ */
+
+#define HPERM_OP(a,t,n,m) ((t)=((((a)<<(16-(n)))^(a))&(m)),\
+        (a)=(a)^(t)^(t>>(16-(n))))
+
+static const DES_LONG des_skb[8][64] = {
+    {
+     /* for C bits (numbered as per FIPS 46) 1 2 3 4 5 6 */
+     0x00000000L, 0x00000010L, 0x20000000L, 0x20000010L,
+     0x00010000L, 0x00010010L, 0x20010000L, 0x20010010L,
+     0x00000800L, 0x00000810L, 0x20000800L, 0x20000810L,
+     0x00010800L, 0x00010810L, 0x20010800L, 0x20010810L,
+     0x00000020L, 0x00000030L, 0x20000020L, 0x20000030L,
+     0x00010020L, 0x00010030L, 0x20010020L, 0x20010030L,
+     0x00000820L, 0x00000830L, 0x20000820L, 0x20000830L,
+     0x00010820L, 0x00010830L, 0x20010820L, 0x20010830L,
+     0x00080000L, 0x00080010L, 0x20080000L, 0x20080010L,
+     0x00090000L, 0x00090010L, 0x20090000L, 0x20090010L,
+     0x00080800L, 0x00080810L, 0x20080800L, 0x20080810L,
+     0x00090800L, 0x00090810L, 0x20090800L, 0x20090810L,
+     0x00080020L, 0x00080030L, 0x20080020L, 0x20080030L,
+     0x00090020L, 0x00090030L, 0x20090020L, 0x20090030L,
+     0x00080820L, 0x00080830L, 0x20080820L, 0x20080830L,
+     0x00090820L, 0x00090830L, 0x20090820L, 0x20090830L,
+     },
+    {
+     /* for C bits (numbered as per FIPS 46) 7 8 10 11 12 13 */
+     0x00000000L, 0x02000000L, 0x00002000L, 0x02002000L,
+     0x00200000L, 0x02200000L, 0x00202000L, 0x02202000L,
+     0x00000004L, 0x02000004L, 0x00002004L, 0x02002004L,
+     0x00200004L, 0x02200004L, 0x00202004L, 0x02202004L,
+     0x00000400L, 0x02000400L, 0x00002400L, 0x02002400L,
+     0x00200400L, 0x02200400L, 0x00202400L, 0x02202400L,
+     0x00000404L, 0x02000404L, 0x00002404L, 0x02002404L,
+     0x00200404L, 0x02200404L, 0x00202404L, 0x02202404L,
+     0x10000000L, 0x12000000L, 0x10002000L, 0x12002000L,
+     0x10200000L, 0x12200000L, 0x10202000L, 0x12202000L,
+     0x10000004L, 0x12000004L, 0x10002004L, 0x12002004L,
+     0x10200004L, 0x12200004L, 0x10202004L, 0x12202004L,
+     0x10000400L, 0x12000400L, 0x10002400L, 0x12002400L,
+     0x10200400L, 0x12200400L, 0x10202400L, 0x12202400L,
+     0x10000404L, 0x12000404L, 0x10002404L, 0x12002404L,
+     0x10200404L, 0x12200404L, 0x10202404L, 0x12202404L,
+     },
+    {
+     /* for C bits (numbered as per FIPS 46) 14 15 16 17 19 20 */
+     0x00000000L, 0x00000001L, 0x00040000L, 0x00040001L,
+     0x01000000L, 0x01000001L, 0x01040000L, 0x01040001L,
+     0x00000002L, 0x00000003L, 0x00040002L, 0x00040003L,
+     0x01000002L, 0x01000003L, 0x01040002L, 0x01040003L,
+     0x00000200L, 0x00000201L, 0x00040200L, 0x00040201L,
+     0x01000200L, 0x01000201L, 0x01040200L, 0x01040201L,
+     0x00000202L, 0x00000203L, 0x00040202L, 0x00040203L,
+     0x01000202L, 0x01000203L, 0x01040202L, 0x01040203L,
+     0x08000000L, 0x08000001L, 0x08040000L, 0x08040001L,
+     0x09000000L, 0x09000001L, 0x09040000L, 0x09040001L,
+     0x08000002L, 0x08000003L, 0x08040002L, 0x08040003L,
+     0x09000002L, 0x09000003L, 0x09040002L, 0x09040003L,
+     0x08000200L, 0x08000201L, 0x08040200L, 0x08040201L,
+     0x09000200L, 0x09000201L, 0x09040200L, 0x09040201L,
+     0x08000202L, 0x08000203L, 0x08040202L, 0x08040203L,
+     0x09000202L, 0x09000203L, 0x09040202L, 0x09040203L,
+     },
+    {
+     /* for C bits (numbered as per FIPS 46) 21 23 24 26 27 28 */
+     0x00000000L, 0x00100000L, 0x00000100L, 0x00100100L,
+     0x00000008L, 0x00100008L, 0x00000108L, 0x00100108L,
+     0x00001000L, 0x00101000L, 0x00001100L, 0x00101100L,
+     0x00001008L, 0x00101008L, 0x00001108L, 0x00101108L,
+     0x04000000L, 0x04100000L, 0x04000100L, 0x04100100L,
+     0x04000008L, 0x04100008L, 0x04000108L, 0x04100108L,
+     0x04001000L, 0x04101000L, 0x04001100L, 0x04101100L,
+     0x04001008L, 0x04101008L, 0x04001108L, 0x04101108L,
+     0x00020000L, 0x00120000L, 0x00020100L, 0x00120100L,
+     0x00020008L, 0x00120008L, 0x00020108L, 0x00120108L,
+     0x00021000L, 0x00121000L, 0x00021100L, 0x00121100L,
+     0x00021008L, 0x00121008L, 0x00021108L, 0x00121108L,
+     0x04020000L, 0x04120000L, 0x04020100L, 0x04120100L,
+     0x04020008L, 0x04120008L, 0x04020108L, 0x04120108L,
+     0x04021000L, 0x04121000L, 0x04021100L, 0x04121100L,
+     0x04021008L, 0x04121008L, 0x04021108L, 0x04121108L,
+     },
+    {
+     /* for D bits (numbered as per FIPS 46) 1 2 3 4 5 6 */
+     0x00000000L, 0x10000000L, 0x00010000L, 0x10010000L,
+     0x00000004L, 0x10000004L, 0x00010004L, 0x10010004L,
+     0x20000000L, 0x30000000L, 0x20010000L, 0x30010000L,
+     0x20000004L, 0x30000004L, 0x20010004L, 0x30010004L,
+     0x00100000L, 0x10100000L, 0x00110000L, 0x10110000L,
+     0x00100004L, 0x10100004L, 0x00110004L, 0x10110004L,
+     0x20100000L, 0x30100000L, 0x20110000L, 0x30110000L,
+     0x20100004L, 0x30100004L, 0x20110004L, 0x30110004L,
+     0x00001000L, 0x10001000L, 0x00011000L, 0x10011000L,
+     0x00001004L, 0x10001004L, 0x00011004L, 0x10011004L,
+     0x20001000L, 0x30001000L, 0x20011000L, 0x30011000L,
+     0x20001004L, 0x30001004L, 0x20011004L, 0x30011004L,
+     0x00101000L, 0x10101000L, 0x00111000L, 0x10111000L,
+     0x00101004L, 0x10101004L, 0x00111004L, 0x10111004L,
+     0x20101000L, 0x30101000L, 0x20111000L, 0x30111000L,
+     0x20101004L, 0x30101004L, 0x20111004L, 0x30111004L,
+     },
+    {
+     /* for D bits (numbered as per FIPS 46) 8 9 11 12 13 14 */
+     0x00000000L, 0x08000000L, 0x00000008L, 0x08000008L,
+     0x00000400L, 0x08000400L, 0x00000408L, 0x08000408L,
+     0x00020000L, 0x08020000L, 0x00020008L, 0x08020008L,
+     0x00020400L, 0x08020400L, 0x00020408L, 0x08020408L,
+     0x00000001L, 0x08000001L, 0x00000009L, 0x08000009L,
+     0x00000401L, 0x08000401L, 0x00000409L, 0x08000409L,
+     0x00020001L, 0x08020001L, 0x00020009L, 0x08020009L,
+     0x00020401L, 0x08020401L, 0x00020409L, 0x08020409L,
+     0x02000000L, 0x0A000000L, 0x02000008L, 0x0A000008L,
+     0x02000400L, 0x0A000400L, 0x02000408L, 0x0A000408L,
+     0x02020000L, 0x0A020000L, 0x02020008L, 0x0A020008L,
+     0x02020400L, 0x0A020400L, 0x02020408L, 0x0A020408L,
+     0x02000001L, 0x0A000001L, 0x02000009L, 0x0A000009L,
+     0x02000401L, 0x0A000401L, 0x02000409L, 0x0A000409L,
+     0x02020001L, 0x0A020001L, 0x02020009L, 0x0A020009L,
+     0x02020401L, 0x0A020401L, 0x02020409L, 0x0A020409L,
+     },
+    {
+     /* for D bits (numbered as per FIPS 46) 16 17 18 19 20 21 */
+     0x00000000L, 0x00000100L, 0x00080000L, 0x00080100L,
+     0x01000000L, 0x01000100L, 0x01080000L, 0x01080100L,
+     0x00000010L, 0x00000110L, 0x00080010L, 0x00080110L,
+     0x01000010L, 0x01000110L, 0x01080010L, 0x01080110L,
+     0x00200000L, 0x00200100L, 0x00280000L, 0x00280100L,
+     0x01200000L, 0x01200100L, 0x01280000L, 0x01280100L,
+     0x00200010L, 0x00200110L, 0x00280010L, 0x00280110L,
+     0x01200010L, 0x01200110L, 0x01280010L, 0x01280110L,
+     0x00000200L, 0x00000300L, 0x00080200L, 0x00080300L,
+     0x01000200L, 0x01000300L, 0x01080200L, 0x01080300L,
+     0x00000210L, 0x00000310L, 0x00080210L, 0x00080310L,
+     0x01000210L, 0x01000310L, 0x01080210L, 0x01080310L,
+     0x00200200L, 0x00200300L, 0x00280200L, 0x00280300L,
+     0x01200200L, 0x01200300L, 0x01280200L, 0x01280300L,
+     0x00200210L, 0x00200310L, 0x00280210L, 0x00280310L,
+     0x01200210L, 0x01200310L, 0x01280210L, 0x01280310L,
+     },
+    {
+     /* for D bits (numbered as per FIPS 46) 22 23 24 25 27 28 */
+     0x00000000L, 0x04000000L, 0x00040000L, 0x04040000L,
+     0x00000002L, 0x04000002L, 0x00040002L, 0x04040002L,
+     0x00002000L, 0x04002000L, 0x00042000L, 0x04042000L,
+     0x00002002L, 0x04002002L, 0x00042002L, 0x04042002L,
+     0x00000020L, 0x04000020L, 0x00040020L, 0x04040020L,
+     0x00000022L, 0x04000022L, 0x00040022L, 0x04040022L,
+     0x00002020L, 0x04002020L, 0x00042020L, 0x04042020L,
+     0x00002022L, 0x04002022L, 0x00042022L, 0x04042022L,
+     0x00000800L, 0x04000800L, 0x00040800L, 0x04040800L,
+     0x00000802L, 0x04000802L, 0x00040802L, 0x04040802L,
+     0x00002800L, 0x04002800L, 0x00042800L, 0x04042800L,
+     0x00002802L, 0x04002802L, 0x00042802L, 0x04042802L,
+     0x00000820L, 0x04000820L, 0x00040820L, 0x04040820L,
+     0x00000822L, 0x04000822L, 0x00040822L, 0x04040822L,
+     0x00002820L, 0x04002820L, 0x00042820L, 0x04042820L,
+     0x00002822L, 0x04002822L, 0x00042822L, 0x04042822L,
+     }
+};
+
+int DES_set_key(const_DES_cblock *key, DES_key_schedule *schedule)
+{
+    if (DES_check_key) {
+        return DES_set_key_checked(key, schedule);
+    } else {
+        DES_set_key_unchecked(key, schedule);
+        return 0;
+    }
+}
+
+/*-
+ * return 0 if key parity is odd (correct),
+ * return -1 if key parity error,
+ * return -2 if illegal weak key.
+ */
+int DES_set_key_checked(const_DES_cblock *key, DES_key_schedule *schedule)
+{
+    if (!DES_check_key_parity(key))
+        return (-1);
+    if (DES_is_weak_key(key))
+        return (-2);
+    DES_set_key_unchecked(key, schedule);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+void DES_set_key_unchecked(const_DES_cblock *key, DES_key_schedule *schedule)
+{
+    static const int shifts2[16] =
+        { 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0 };
+    register DES_LONG c, d, t, s, t2;
+    register const unsigned char *in;
+    register DES_LONG *k;
+    register int i;
+
+#ifdef OPENBSD_DEV_CRYPTO
+    memcpy(schedule->key, key, sizeof(schedule->key));
+    schedule->session = NULL;
+#endif
+    k = &schedule->ks->deslong[0];
+    in = &(*key)[0];
+
+    c2l(in, c);
+    c2l(in, d);
+
+    /*
+     * do PC1 in 47 simple operations :-) Thanks to John Fletcher
+     * (john_fletcher@lccmail.ocf.llnl.gov) for the inspiration. :-)
+     */
+    PERM_OP(d, c, t, 4, 0x0f0f0f0fL);
+    HPERM_OP(c, t, -2, 0xcccc0000L);
+    HPERM_OP(d, t, -2, 0xcccc0000L);
+    PERM_OP(d, c, t, 1, 0x55555555L);
+    PERM_OP(c, d, t, 8, 0x00ff00ffL);
+    PERM_OP(d, c, t, 1, 0x55555555L);
+    d = (((d & 0x000000ffL) << 16L) | (d & 0x0000ff00L) |
+         ((d & 0x00ff0000L) >> 16L) | ((c & 0xf0000000L) >> 4L));
+    c &= 0x0fffffffL;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < ITERATIONS; i++) {
+        if (shifts2[i]) {
+            c = ((c >> 2L) | (c << 26L));
+            d = ((d >> 2L) | (d << 26L));
+        } else {
+            c = ((c >> 1L) | (c << 27L));
+            d = ((d >> 1L) | (d << 27L));
+        }
+        c &= 0x0fffffffL;
+        d &= 0x0fffffffL;
+        /*
+         * could be a few less shifts but I am to lazy at this point in time
+         * to investigate
+         */
+        s = des_skb[0][(c) & 0x3f] |
+            des_skb[1][((c >> 6L) & 0x03) | ((c >> 7L) & 0x3c)] |
+            des_skb[2][((c >> 13L) & 0x0f) | ((c >> 14L) & 0x30)] |
+            des_skb[3][((c >> 20L) & 0x01) | ((c >> 21L) & 0x06) |
+                       ((c >> 22L) & 0x38)];
+        t = des_skb[4][(d) & 0x3f] |
+            des_skb[5][((d >> 7L) & 0x03) | ((d >> 8L) & 0x3c)] |
+            des_skb[6][(d >> 15L) & 0x3f] |
+            des_skb[7][((d >> 21L) & 0x0f) | ((d >> 22L) & 0x30)];
+
+        /* table contained 0213 4657 */
+        t2 = ((t << 16L) | (s & 0x0000ffffL)) & 0xffffffffL;
+        *(k++) = ROTATE(t2, 30) & 0xffffffffL;
+
+        t2 = ((s >> 16L) | (t & 0xffff0000L));
+        *(k++) = ROTATE(t2, 26) & 0xffffffffL;
+    }
+}
+
+int DES_key_sched(const_DES_cblock *key, DES_key_schedule *schedule)
+{
+    return (DES_set_key(key, schedule));
+}
+
+/*-
+#undef des_fixup_key_parity
+void des_fixup_key_parity(des_cblock *key)
+        {
+        des_set_odd_parity(key);
+        }
+*/
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/spr.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/spr.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..42adfbf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/spr.h
@@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+OPENSSL_GLOBAL const DES_LONG DES_SPtrans[8][64] = {
+    {
+        /* nibble 0 */
+        0x02080800L, 0x00080000L, 0x02000002L, 0x02080802L,
+        0x02000000L, 0x00080802L, 0x00080002L, 0x02000002L,
+        0x00080802L, 0x02080800L, 0x02080000L, 0x00000802L,
+        0x02000802L, 0x02000000L, 0x00000000L, 0x00080002L,
+        0x00080000L, 0x00000002L, 0x02000800L, 0x00080800L,
+        0x02080802L, 0x02080000L, 0x00000802L, 0x02000800L,
+        0x00000002L, 0x00000800L, 0x00080800L, 0x02080002L,
+        0x00000800L, 0x02000802L, 0x02080002L, 0x00000000L,
+        0x00000000L, 0x02080802L, 0x02000800L, 0x00080002L,
+        0x02080800L, 0x00080000L, 0x00000802L, 0x02000800L,
+        0x02080002L, 0x00000800L, 0x00080800L, 0x02000002L,
+        0x00080802L, 0x00000002L, 0x02000002L, 0x02080000L,
+        0x02080802L, 0x00080800L, 0x02080000L, 0x02000802L,
+        0x02000000L, 0x00000802L, 0x00080002L, 0x00000000L,
+        0x00080000L, 0x02000000L, 0x02000802L, 0x02080800L,
+        0x00000002L, 0x02080002L, 0x00000800L, 0x00080802L,
+    },
+    {
+        /* nibble 1 */
+        0x40108010L, 0x00000000L, 0x00108000L, 0x40100000L,
+        0x40000010L, 0x00008010L, 0x40008000L, 0x00108000L,
+        0x00008000L, 0x40100010L, 0x00000010L, 0x40008000L,
+        0x00100010L, 0x40108000L, 0x40100000L, 0x00000010L,
+        0x00100000L, 0x40008010L, 0x40100010L, 0x00008000L,
+        0x00108010L, 0x40000000L, 0x00000000L, 0x00100010L,
+        0x40008010L, 0x00108010L, 0x40108000L, 0x40000010L,
+        0x40000000L, 0x00100000L, 0x00008010L, 0x40108010L,
+        0x00100010L, 0x40108000L, 0x40008000L, 0x00108010L,
+        0x40108010L, 0x00100010L, 0x40000010L, 0x00000000L,
+        0x40000000L, 0x00008010L, 0x00100000L, 0x40100010L,
+        0x00008000L, 0x40000000L, 0x00108010L, 0x40008010L,
+        0x40108000L, 0x00008000L, 0x00000000L, 0x40000010L,
+        0x00000010L, 0x40108010L, 0x00108000L, 0x40100000L,
+        0x40100010L, 0x00100000L, 0x00008010L, 0x40008000L,
+        0x40008010L, 0x00000010L, 0x40100000L, 0x00108000L,
+    },
+    {
+        /* nibble 2 */
+        0x04000001L, 0x04040100L, 0x00000100L, 0x04000101L,
+        0x00040001L, 0x04000000L, 0x04000101L, 0x00040100L,
+        0x04000100L, 0x00040000L, 0x04040000L, 0x00000001L,
+        0x04040101L, 0x00000101L, 0x00000001L, 0x04040001L,
+        0x00000000L, 0x00040001L, 0x04040100L, 0x00000100L,
+        0x00000101L, 0x04040101L, 0x00040000L, 0x04000001L,
+        0x04040001L, 0x04000100L, 0x00040101L, 0x04040000L,
+        0x00040100L, 0x00000000L, 0x04000000L, 0x00040101L,
+        0x04040100L, 0x00000100L, 0x00000001L, 0x00040000L,
+        0x00000101L, 0x00040001L, 0x04040000L, 0x04000101L,
+        0x00000000L, 0x04040100L, 0x00040100L, 0x04040001L,
+        0x00040001L, 0x04000000L, 0x04040101L, 0x00000001L,
+        0x00040101L, 0x04000001L, 0x04000000L, 0x04040101L,
+        0x00040000L, 0x04000100L, 0x04000101L, 0x00040100L,
+        0x04000100L, 0x00000000L, 0x04040001L, 0x00000101L,
+        0x04000001L, 0x00040101L, 0x00000100L, 0x04040000L,
+    },
+    {
+        /* nibble 3 */
+        0x00401008L, 0x10001000L, 0x00000008L, 0x10401008L,
+        0x00000000L, 0x10400000L, 0x10001008L, 0x00400008L,
+        0x10401000L, 0x10000008L, 0x10000000L, 0x00001008L,
+        0x10000008L, 0x00401008L, 0x00400000L, 0x10000000L,
+        0x10400008L, 0x00401000L, 0x00001000L, 0x00000008L,
+        0x00401000L, 0x10001008L, 0x10400000L, 0x00001000L,
+        0x00001008L, 0x00000000L, 0x00400008L, 0x10401000L,
+        0x10001000L, 0x10400008L, 0x10401008L, 0x00400000L,
+        0x10400008L, 0x00001008L, 0x00400000L, 0x10000008L,
+        0x00401000L, 0x10001000L, 0x00000008L, 0x10400000L,
+        0x10001008L, 0x00000000L, 0x00001000L, 0x00400008L,
+        0x00000000L, 0x10400008L, 0x10401000L, 0x00001000L,
+        0x10000000L, 0x10401008L, 0x00401008L, 0x00400000L,
+        0x10401008L, 0x00000008L, 0x10001000L, 0x00401008L,
+        0x00400008L, 0x00401000L, 0x10400000L, 0x10001008L,
+        0x00001008L, 0x10000000L, 0x10000008L, 0x10401000L,
+    },
+    {
+        /* nibble 4 */
+        0x08000000L, 0x00010000L, 0x00000400L, 0x08010420L,
+        0x08010020L, 0x08000400L, 0x00010420L, 0x08010000L,
+        0x00010000L, 0x00000020L, 0x08000020L, 0x00010400L,
+        0x08000420L, 0x08010020L, 0x08010400L, 0x00000000L,
+        0x00010400L, 0x08000000L, 0x00010020L, 0x00000420L,
+        0x08000400L, 0x00010420L, 0x00000000L, 0x08000020L,
+        0x00000020L, 0x08000420L, 0x08010420L, 0x00010020L,
+        0x08010000L, 0x00000400L, 0x00000420L, 0x08010400L,
+        0x08010400L, 0x08000420L, 0x00010020L, 0x08010000L,
+        0x00010000L, 0x00000020L, 0x08000020L, 0x08000400L,
+        0x08000000L, 0x00010400L, 0x08010420L, 0x00000000L,
+        0x00010420L, 0x08000000L, 0x00000400L, 0x00010020L,
+        0x08000420L, 0x00000400L, 0x00000000L, 0x08010420L,
+        0x08010020L, 0x08010400L, 0x00000420L, 0x00010000L,
+        0x00010400L, 0x08010020L, 0x08000400L, 0x00000420L,
+        0x00000020L, 0x00010420L, 0x08010000L, 0x08000020L,
+    },
+    {
+        /* nibble 5 */
+        0x80000040L, 0x00200040L, 0x00000000L, 0x80202000L,
+        0x00200040L, 0x00002000L, 0x80002040L, 0x00200000L,
+        0x00002040L, 0x80202040L, 0x00202000L, 0x80000000L,
+        0x80002000L, 0x80000040L, 0x80200000L, 0x00202040L,
+        0x00200000L, 0x80002040L, 0x80200040L, 0x00000000L,
+        0x00002000L, 0x00000040L, 0x80202000L, 0x80200040L,
+        0x80202040L, 0x80200000L, 0x80000000L, 0x00002040L,
+        0x00000040L, 0x00202000L, 0x00202040L, 0x80002000L,
+        0x00002040L, 0x80000000L, 0x80002000L, 0x00202040L,
+        0x80202000L, 0x00200040L, 0x00000000L, 0x80002000L,
+        0x80000000L, 0x00002000L, 0x80200040L, 0x00200000L,
+        0x00200040L, 0x80202040L, 0x00202000L, 0x00000040L,
+        0x80202040L, 0x00202000L, 0x00200000L, 0x80002040L,
+        0x80000040L, 0x80200000L, 0x00202040L, 0x00000000L,
+        0x00002000L, 0x80000040L, 0x80002040L, 0x80202000L,
+        0x80200000L, 0x00002040L, 0x00000040L, 0x80200040L,
+    },
+    {
+        /* nibble 6 */
+        0x00004000L, 0x00000200L, 0x01000200L, 0x01000004L,
+        0x01004204L, 0x00004004L, 0x00004200L, 0x00000000L,
+        0x01000000L, 0x01000204L, 0x00000204L, 0x01004000L,
+        0x00000004L, 0x01004200L, 0x01004000L, 0x00000204L,
+        0x01000204L, 0x00004000L, 0x00004004L, 0x01004204L,
+        0x00000000L, 0x01000200L, 0x01000004L, 0x00004200L,
+        0x01004004L, 0x00004204L, 0x01004200L, 0x00000004L,
+        0x00004204L, 0x01004004L, 0x00000200L, 0x01000000L,
+        0x00004204L, 0x01004000L, 0x01004004L, 0x00000204L,
+        0x00004000L, 0x00000200L, 0x01000000L, 0x01004004L,
+        0x01000204L, 0x00004204L, 0x00004200L, 0x00000000L,
+        0x00000200L, 0x01000004L, 0x00000004L, 0x01000200L,
+        0x00000000L, 0x01000204L, 0x01000200L, 0x00004200L,
+        0x00000204L, 0x00004000L, 0x01004204L, 0x01000000L,
+        0x01004200L, 0x00000004L, 0x00004004L, 0x01004204L,
+        0x01000004L, 0x01004200L, 0x01004000L, 0x00004004L,
+    },
+    {
+        /* nibble 7 */
+        0x20800080L, 0x20820000L, 0x00020080L, 0x00000000L,
+        0x20020000L, 0x00800080L, 0x20800000L, 0x20820080L,
+        0x00000080L, 0x20000000L, 0x00820000L, 0x00020080L,
+        0x00820080L, 0x20020080L, 0x20000080L, 0x20800000L,
+        0x00020000L, 0x00820080L, 0x00800080L, 0x20020000L,
+        0x20820080L, 0x20000080L, 0x00000000L, 0x00820000L,
+        0x20000000L, 0x00800000L, 0x20020080L, 0x20800080L,
+        0x00800000L, 0x00020000L, 0x20820000L, 0x00000080L,
+        0x00800000L, 0x00020000L, 0x20000080L, 0x20820080L,
+        0x00020080L, 0x20000000L, 0x00000000L, 0x00820000L,
+        0x20800080L, 0x20020080L, 0x20020000L, 0x00800080L,
+        0x20820000L, 0x00000080L, 0x00800080L, 0x20020000L,
+        0x20820080L, 0x00800000L, 0x20800000L, 0x20000080L,
+        0x00820000L, 0x00020080L, 0x20020080L, 0x20800000L,
+        0x00000080L, 0x20820000L, 0x00820080L, 0x00000000L,
+        0x20000000L, 0x20800080L, 0x00020000L, 0x00820080L,
+    }
+};
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/str2key.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/str2key.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..78998a1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/str2key.c
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include "des_locl.h"
+
+void DES_string_to_key(const char *str, DES_cblock *key)
+{
+    DES_key_schedule ks;
+    int i, length;
+
+    memset(key, 0, 8);
+    length = strlen(str);
+#ifdef OLD_STR_TO_KEY
+    for (i = 0; i < length; i++)
+        (*key)[i % 8] ^= (str[i] << 1);
+#else                           /* MIT COMPATIBLE */
+    for (i = 0; i < length; i++) {
+        register unsigned char j = str[i];
+
+        if ((i % 16) < 8)
+            (*key)[i % 8] ^= (j << 1);
+        else {
+            /* Reverse the bit order 05/05/92 eay */
+            j = ((j << 4) & 0xf0) | ((j >> 4) & 0x0f);
+            j = ((j << 2) & 0xcc) | ((j >> 2) & 0x33);
+            j = ((j << 1) & 0xaa) | ((j >> 1) & 0x55);
+            (*key)[7 - (i % 8)] ^= j;
+        }
+    }
+#endif
+    DES_set_odd_parity(key);
+    DES_set_key_unchecked(key, &ks);
+    DES_cbc_cksum((const unsigned char *)str, key, length, &ks, key);
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(&ks, sizeof(ks));
+    DES_set_odd_parity(key);
+}
+
+void DES_string_to_2keys(const char *str, DES_cblock *key1, DES_cblock *key2)
+{
+    DES_key_schedule ks;
+    int i, length;
+
+    memset(key1, 0, 8);
+    memset(key2, 0, 8);
+    length = strlen(str);
+#ifdef OLD_STR_TO_KEY
+    if (length <= 8) {
+        for (i = 0; i < length; i++) {
+            (*key2)[i] = (*key1)[i] = (str[i] << 1);
+        }
+    } else {
+        for (i = 0; i < length; i++) {
+            if ((i / 8) & 1)
+                (*key2)[i % 8] ^= (str[i] << 1);
+            else
+                (*key1)[i % 8] ^= (str[i] << 1);
+        }
+    }
+#else                           /* MIT COMPATIBLE */
+    for (i = 0; i < length; i++) {
+        register unsigned char j = str[i];
+
+        if ((i % 32) < 16) {
+            if ((i % 16) < 8)
+                (*key1)[i % 8] ^= (j << 1);
+            else
+                (*key2)[i % 8] ^= (j << 1);
+        } else {
+            j = ((j << 4) & 0xf0) | ((j >> 4) & 0x0f);
+            j = ((j << 2) & 0xcc) | ((j >> 2) & 0x33);
+            j = ((j << 1) & 0xaa) | ((j >> 1) & 0x55);
+            if ((i % 16) < 8)
+                (*key1)[7 - (i % 8)] ^= j;
+            else
+                (*key2)[7 - (i % 8)] ^= j;
+        }
+    }
+    if (length <= 8)
+        memcpy(key2, key1, 8);
+#endif
+    DES_set_odd_parity(key1);
+    DES_set_odd_parity(key2);
+    DES_set_key_unchecked(key1, &ks);
+    DES_cbc_cksum((const unsigned char *)str, key1, length, &ks, key1);
+    DES_set_key_unchecked(key2, &ks);
+    DES_cbc_cksum((const unsigned char *)str, key2, length, &ks, key2);
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(&ks, sizeof(ks));
+    DES_set_odd_parity(key1);
+    DES_set_odd_parity(key2);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/xcbc_enc.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/xcbc_enc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c4e455d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/des/xcbc_enc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "des_locl.h"
+
+/* RSA's DESX */
+
+void DES_xcbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                      long length, DES_key_schedule *schedule,
+                      DES_cblock *ivec, const_DES_cblock *inw,
+                      const_DES_cblock *outw, int enc)
+{
+    register DES_LONG tin0, tin1;
+    register DES_LONG tout0, tout1, xor0, xor1;
+    register DES_LONG inW0, inW1, outW0, outW1;
+    register const unsigned char *in2;
+    register long l = length;
+    DES_LONG tin[2];
+    unsigned char *iv;
+
+    in2 = &(*inw)[0];
+    c2l(in2, inW0);
+    c2l(in2, inW1);
+    in2 = &(*outw)[0];
+    c2l(in2, outW0);
+    c2l(in2, outW1);
+
+    iv = &(*ivec)[0];
+
+    if (enc) {
+        c2l(iv, tout0);
+        c2l(iv, tout1);
+        for (l -= 8; l >= 0; l -= 8) {
+            c2l(in, tin0);
+            c2l(in, tin1);
+            tin0 ^= tout0 ^ inW0;
+            tin[0] = tin0;
+            tin1 ^= tout1 ^ inW1;
+            tin[1] = tin1;
+            DES_encrypt1(tin, schedule, DES_ENCRYPT);
+            tout0 = tin[0] ^ outW0;
+            l2c(tout0, out);
+            tout1 = tin[1] ^ outW1;
+            l2c(tout1, out);
+        }
+        if (l != -8) {
+            c2ln(in, tin0, tin1, l + 8);
+            tin0 ^= tout0 ^ inW0;
+            tin[0] = tin0;
+            tin1 ^= tout1 ^ inW1;
+            tin[1] = tin1;
+            DES_encrypt1(tin, schedule, DES_ENCRYPT);
+            tout0 = tin[0] ^ outW0;
+            l2c(tout0, out);
+            tout1 = tin[1] ^ outW1;
+            l2c(tout1, out);
+        }
+        iv = &(*ivec)[0];
+        l2c(tout0, iv);
+        l2c(tout1, iv);
+    } else {
+        c2l(iv, xor0);
+        c2l(iv, xor1);
+        for (l -= 8; l > 0; l -= 8) {
+            c2l(in, tin0);
+            tin[0] = tin0 ^ outW0;
+            c2l(in, tin1);
+            tin[1] = tin1 ^ outW1;
+            DES_encrypt1(tin, schedule, DES_DECRYPT);
+            tout0 = tin[0] ^ xor0 ^ inW0;
+            tout1 = tin[1] ^ xor1 ^ inW1;
+            l2c(tout0, out);
+            l2c(tout1, out);
+            xor0 = tin0;
+            xor1 = tin1;
+        }
+        if (l != -8) {
+            c2l(in, tin0);
+            tin[0] = tin0 ^ outW0;
+            c2l(in, tin1);
+            tin[1] = tin1 ^ outW1;
+            DES_encrypt1(tin, schedule, DES_DECRYPT);
+            tout0 = tin[0] ^ xor0 ^ inW0;
+            tout1 = tin[1] ^ xor1 ^ inW1;
+            l2cn(tout0, tout1, out, l + 8);
+            xor0 = tin0;
+            xor1 = tin1;
+        }
+
+        iv = &(*ivec)[0];
+        l2c(xor0, iv);
+        l2c(xor1, iv);
+    }
+    tin0 = tin1 = tout0 = tout1 = xor0 = xor1 = 0;
+    inW0 = inW1 = outW0 = outW1 = 0;
+    tin[0] = tin[1] = 0;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dh/build.info b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dh/build.info
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dba9306
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dh/build.info
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+LIBS=../../libcrypto
+SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
+        dh_asn1.c dh_gen.c dh_key.c dh_lib.c dh_check.c dh_err.c dh_depr.c \
+        dh_ameth.c dh_pmeth.c dh_prn.c dh_rfc5114.c dh_kdf.c dh_meth.c
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dh/dh1024.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dh/dh1024.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..81d43f6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dh/dh1024.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+-----BEGIN DH PARAMETERS-----
+MIGHAoGBAJf2QmHKtQXdKCjhPx1ottPb0PMTBH9A6FbaWMsTuKG/K3g6TG1Z1fkq
+/Gz/PWk/eLI9TzFgqVAuPvr3q14a1aZeVUMTgo2oO5/y2UHe6VaJ+trqCTat3xlx
+/mNbIK9HA2RgPC3gWfVLZQrY+gz3ASHHR5nXWHEyvpuZm7m3h+irAgEC
+-----END DH PARAMETERS-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dh/dh192.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dh/dh192.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..521c072
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dh/dh192.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+-----BEGIN DH PARAMETERS-----
+MB4CGQDUoLoCULb9LsYm5+/WN992xxbiLQlEuIsCAQM=
+-----END DH PARAMETERS-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dh/dh2048.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dh/dh2048.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..295460f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dh/dh2048.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+-----BEGIN DH PARAMETERS-----
+MIIBCAKCAQEA7ZKJNYJFVcs7+6J2WmkEYb8h86tT0s0h2v94GRFS8Q7B4lW9aG9o
+AFO5Imov5Jo0H2XMWTKKvbHbSe3fpxJmw/0hBHAY8H/W91hRGXKCeyKpNBgdL8sh
+z22SrkO2qCnHJ6PLAMXy5fsKpFmFor2tRfCzrfnggTXu2YOzzK7q62bmqVdmufEo
+pT8igNcLpvZxk5uBDvhakObMym9mX3rAEBoe8PwttggMYiiw7NuJKO4MqD1llGkW
+aVM8U2ATsCun1IKHrRxynkE1/MJ86VHeYYX8GZt2YA8z+GuzylIOKcMH6JAWzMwA
+Gbatw6QwizOhr9iMjZ0B26TE3X8LvW84wwIBAg==
+-----END DH PARAMETERS-----
+-----BEGIN DH PARAMETERS-----
+MIIBCAKCAQEArtA3w73zP6Lu3EOQtwogiXt3AXXpuS6yD4BhzNS1pZFyPHk0/an5
+8ydEkPhQZHKDW+BZJxxPLANaTudWo2YT8TgtvUdN6KSgMiEi6McwqDw+SADuvW+F
+SKUYFxG6VFIxyEP6xBdf+vhJxEDbRG2EYsHDRRtJ76gp9cSKTHusf2R+4AAVGqnt
+gRAbNqtcOar/7FSj+Pl8G3v0Bty0LcCSpbqgYlnv6z+rErQmmC6PPvSz97TDMCok
+yKpCE9hFA1zkqK3TH4FmFvGeIaXJUIBZf4mArWuBTjWFW3nmhESRUn1VK3K3x42N
+a5k6c2+EhrMFiLjxuH6JZoqL0/E93FF9SwIBAg==
+-----END DH PARAMETERS-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dh/dh4096.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dh/dh4096.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..390943a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dh/dh4096.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+-----BEGIN DH PARAMETERS-----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=
+-----END DH PARAMETERS-----
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dh/dh512.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dh/dh512.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0a4d863
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dh/dh512.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+-----BEGIN DH PARAMETERS-----
+MEYCQQDaWDwW2YUiidDkr3VvTMqS3UvlM7gE+w/tlO+cikQD7VdGUNNpmdsp13Yn
+a6LT1BLiGPTdHghM9tgAPnxHdOgzAgEC
+-----END DH PARAMETERS-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dh/dh_ameth.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dh/dh_ameth.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cd77867
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dh/dh_ameth.c
@@ -0,0 +1,870 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include "dh_locl.h"
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include "internal/asn1_int.h"
+#include "internal/evp_int.h"
+#include <openssl/cms.h>
+
+/*
+ * i2d/d2i like DH parameter functions which use the appropriate routine for
+ * PKCS#3 DH or X9.42 DH.
+ */
+
+static DH *d2i_dhp(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, const unsigned char **pp,
+                   long length)
+{
+    if (pkey->ameth == &dhx_asn1_meth)
+        return d2i_DHxparams(NULL, pp, length);
+    return d2i_DHparams(NULL, pp, length);
+}
+
+static int i2d_dhp(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, const DH *a, unsigned char **pp)
+{
+    if (pkey->ameth == &dhx_asn1_meth)
+        return i2d_DHxparams(a, pp);
+    return i2d_DHparams(a, pp);
+}
+
+static void int_dh_free(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    DH_free(pkey->pkey.dh);
+}
+
+static int dh_pub_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509_PUBKEY *pubkey)
+{
+    const unsigned char *p, *pm;
+    int pklen, pmlen;
+    int ptype;
+    const void *pval;
+    const ASN1_STRING *pstr;
+    X509_ALGOR *palg;
+    ASN1_INTEGER *public_key = NULL;
+
+    DH *dh = NULL;
+
+    if (!X509_PUBKEY_get0_param(NULL, &p, &pklen, &palg, pubkey))
+        return 0;
+    X509_ALGOR_get0(NULL, &ptype, &pval, palg);
+
+    if (ptype != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) {
+        DHerr(DH_F_DH_PUB_DECODE, DH_R_PARAMETER_ENCODING_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    pstr = pval;
+    pm = pstr->data;
+    pmlen = pstr->length;
+
+    if ((dh = d2i_dhp(pkey, &pm, pmlen)) == NULL) {
+        DHerr(DH_F_DH_PUB_DECODE, DH_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if ((public_key = d2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, &p, pklen)) == NULL) {
+        DHerr(DH_F_DH_PUB_DECODE, DH_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* We have parameters now set public key */
+    if ((dh->pub_key = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(public_key, NULL)) == NULL) {
+        DHerr(DH_F_DH_PUB_DECODE, DH_R_BN_DECODE_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    ASN1_INTEGER_free(public_key);
+    EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, pkey->ameth->pkey_id, dh);
+    return 1;
+
+ err:
+    ASN1_INTEGER_free(public_key);
+    DH_free(dh);
+    return 0;
+
+}
+
+static int dh_pub_encode(X509_PUBKEY *pk, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    DH *dh;
+    int ptype;
+    unsigned char *penc = NULL;
+    int penclen;
+    ASN1_STRING *str;
+    ASN1_INTEGER *pub_key = NULL;
+
+    dh = pkey->pkey.dh;
+
+    str = ASN1_STRING_new();
+    if (str == NULL) {
+        DHerr(DH_F_DH_PUB_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    str->length = i2d_dhp(pkey, dh, &str->data);
+    if (str->length <= 0) {
+        DHerr(DH_F_DH_PUB_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    ptype = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE;
+
+    pub_key = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(dh->pub_key, NULL);
+    if (!pub_key)
+        goto err;
+
+    penclen = i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(pub_key, &penc);
+
+    ASN1_INTEGER_free(pub_key);
+
+    if (penclen <= 0) {
+        DHerr(DH_F_DH_PUB_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (X509_PUBKEY_set0_param(pk, OBJ_nid2obj(pkey->ameth->pkey_id),
+                               ptype, str, penc, penclen))
+        return 1;
+
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_free(penc);
+    ASN1_STRING_free(str);
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * PKCS#8 DH is defined in PKCS#11 of all places. It is similar to DH in that
+ * the AlgorithmIdentifier contains the parameters, the private key is
+ * explicitly included and the pubkey must be recalculated.
+ */
+
+static int dh_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, const PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8)
+{
+    const unsigned char *p, *pm;
+    int pklen, pmlen;
+    int ptype;
+    const void *pval;
+    const ASN1_STRING *pstr;
+    const X509_ALGOR *palg;
+    ASN1_INTEGER *privkey = NULL;
+
+    DH *dh = NULL;
+
+    if (!PKCS8_pkey_get0(NULL, &p, &pklen, &palg, p8))
+        return 0;
+
+    X509_ALGOR_get0(NULL, &ptype, &pval, palg);
+
+    if (ptype != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
+        goto decerr;
+    if ((privkey = d2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, &p, pklen)) == NULL)
+        goto decerr;
+
+    pstr = pval;
+    pm = pstr->data;
+    pmlen = pstr->length;
+    if ((dh = d2i_dhp(pkey, &pm, pmlen)) == NULL)
+        goto decerr;
+
+    /* We have parameters now set private key */
+    if ((dh->priv_key = BN_secure_new()) == NULL
+        || !ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(privkey, dh->priv_key)) {
+        DHerr(DH_F_DH_PRIV_DECODE, DH_R_BN_ERROR);
+        goto dherr;
+    }
+    /* Calculate public key */
+    if (!DH_generate_key(dh))
+        goto dherr;
+
+    EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, pkey->ameth->pkey_id, dh);
+
+    ASN1_STRING_clear_free(privkey);
+
+    return 1;
+
+ decerr:
+    DHerr(DH_F_DH_PRIV_DECODE, EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ dherr:
+    DH_free(dh);
+    ASN1_STRING_clear_free(privkey);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int dh_priv_encode(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    ASN1_STRING *params = NULL;
+    ASN1_INTEGER *prkey = NULL;
+    unsigned char *dp = NULL;
+    int dplen;
+
+    params = ASN1_STRING_new();
+
+    if (params == NULL) {
+        DHerr(DH_F_DH_PRIV_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    params->length = i2d_dhp(pkey, pkey->pkey.dh, &params->data);
+    if (params->length <= 0) {
+        DHerr(DH_F_DH_PRIV_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    params->type = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE;
+
+    /* Get private key into integer */
+    prkey = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(pkey->pkey.dh->priv_key, NULL);
+
+    if (!prkey) {
+        DHerr(DH_F_DH_PRIV_ENCODE, DH_R_BN_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    dplen = i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(prkey, &dp);
+
+    ASN1_STRING_clear_free(prkey);
+    prkey = NULL;
+
+    if (!PKCS8_pkey_set0(p8, OBJ_nid2obj(pkey->ameth->pkey_id), 0,
+                         V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, params, dp, dplen))
+        goto err;
+
+    return 1;
+
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_free(dp);
+    ASN1_STRING_free(params);
+    ASN1_STRING_clear_free(prkey);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int dh_param_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+                           const unsigned char **pder, int derlen)
+{
+    DH *dh;
+
+    if ((dh = d2i_dhp(pkey, pder, derlen)) == NULL) {
+        DHerr(DH_F_DH_PARAM_DECODE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, pkey->ameth->pkey_id, dh);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int dh_param_encode(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, unsigned char **pder)
+{
+    return i2d_dhp(pkey, pkey->pkey.dh, pder);
+}
+
+static int do_dh_print(BIO *bp, const DH *x, int indent, int ptype)
+{
+    int reason = ERR_R_BUF_LIB;
+    const char *ktype = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *priv_key, *pub_key;
+
+    if (ptype == 2)
+        priv_key = x->priv_key;
+    else
+        priv_key = NULL;
+
+    if (ptype > 0)
+        pub_key = x->pub_key;
+    else
+        pub_key = NULL;
+
+    if (x->p == NULL || (ptype == 2 && priv_key == NULL)
+            || (ptype > 0 && pub_key == NULL)) {
+        reason = ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER;
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (ptype == 2)
+        ktype = "DH Private-Key";
+    else if (ptype == 1)
+        ktype = "DH Public-Key";
+    else
+        ktype = "DH Parameters";
+
+    BIO_indent(bp, indent, 128);
+    if (BIO_printf(bp, "%s: (%d bit)\n", ktype, BN_num_bits(x->p)) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    indent += 4;
+
+    if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "private-key:", priv_key, NULL, indent))
+        goto err;
+    if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "public-key:", pub_key, NULL, indent))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "prime:", x->p, NULL, indent))
+        goto err;
+    if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "generator:", x->g, NULL, indent))
+        goto err;
+    if (x->q && !ASN1_bn_print(bp, "subgroup order:", x->q, NULL, indent))
+        goto err;
+    if (x->j && !ASN1_bn_print(bp, "subgroup factor:", x->j, NULL, indent))
+        goto err;
+    if (x->seed) {
+        int i;
+        BIO_indent(bp, indent, 128);
+        BIO_puts(bp, "seed:");
+        for (i = 0; i < x->seedlen; i++) {
+            if ((i % 15) == 0) {
+                if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n") <= 0
+                    || !BIO_indent(bp, indent + 4, 128))
+                    goto err;
+            }
+            if (BIO_printf(bp, "%02x%s", x->seed[i],
+                           ((i + 1) == x->seedlen) ? "" : ":") <= 0)
+                goto err;
+        }
+        if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) <= 0)
+            return (0);
+    }
+    if (x->counter && !ASN1_bn_print(bp, "counter:", x->counter, NULL, indent))
+        goto err;
+    if (x->length != 0) {
+        BIO_indent(bp, indent, 128);
+        if (BIO_printf(bp, "recommended-private-length: %d bits\n",
+                       (int)x->length) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+
+ err:
+    DHerr(DH_F_DO_DH_PRINT, reason);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int int_dh_size(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    return (DH_size(pkey->pkey.dh));
+}
+
+static int dh_bits(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    return BN_num_bits(pkey->pkey.dh->p);
+}
+
+static int dh_security_bits(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    return DH_security_bits(pkey->pkey.dh);
+}
+
+static int dh_cmp_parameters(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b)
+{
+    if (BN_cmp(a->pkey.dh->p, b->pkey.dh->p) ||
+        BN_cmp(a->pkey.dh->g, b->pkey.dh->g))
+        return 0;
+    else if (a->ameth == &dhx_asn1_meth) {
+        if (BN_cmp(a->pkey.dh->q, b->pkey.dh->q))
+            return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int int_dh_bn_cpy(BIGNUM **dst, const BIGNUM *src)
+{
+    BIGNUM *a;
+    if (src) {
+        a = BN_dup(src);
+        if (!a)
+            return 0;
+    } else
+        a = NULL;
+    BN_free(*dst);
+    *dst = a;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int int_dh_param_copy(DH *to, const DH *from, int is_x942)
+{
+    if (is_x942 == -1)
+        is_x942 = ! !from->q;
+    if (!int_dh_bn_cpy(&to->p, from->p))
+        return 0;
+    if (!int_dh_bn_cpy(&to->g, from->g))
+        return 0;
+    if (is_x942) {
+        if (!int_dh_bn_cpy(&to->q, from->q))
+            return 0;
+        if (!int_dh_bn_cpy(&to->j, from->j))
+            return 0;
+        OPENSSL_free(to->seed);
+        to->seed = NULL;
+        to->seedlen = 0;
+        if (from->seed) {
+            to->seed = OPENSSL_memdup(from->seed, from->seedlen);
+            if (!to->seed)
+                return 0;
+            to->seedlen = from->seedlen;
+        }
+    } else
+        to->length = from->length;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+DH *DHparams_dup(DH *dh)
+{
+    DH *ret;
+    ret = DH_new();
+    if (ret == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    if (!int_dh_param_copy(ret, dh, -1)) {
+        DH_free(ret);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int dh_copy_parameters(EVP_PKEY *to, const EVP_PKEY *from)
+{
+    if (to->pkey.dh == NULL) {
+        to->pkey.dh = DH_new();
+        if (to->pkey.dh == NULL)
+            return 0;
+    }
+    return int_dh_param_copy(to->pkey.dh, from->pkey.dh,
+                             from->ameth == &dhx_asn1_meth);
+}
+
+static int dh_missing_parameters(const EVP_PKEY *a)
+{
+    if (a->pkey.dh == NULL || a->pkey.dh->p == NULL || a->pkey.dh->g == NULL)
+        return 1;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int dh_pub_cmp(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b)
+{
+    if (dh_cmp_parameters(a, b) == 0)
+        return 0;
+    if (BN_cmp(b->pkey.dh->pub_key, a->pkey.dh->pub_key) != 0)
+        return 0;
+    else
+        return 1;
+}
+
+static int dh_param_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent,
+                          ASN1_PCTX *ctx)
+{
+    return do_dh_print(bp, pkey->pkey.dh, indent, 0);
+}
+
+static int dh_public_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent,
+                           ASN1_PCTX *ctx)
+{
+    return do_dh_print(bp, pkey->pkey.dh, indent, 1);
+}
+
+static int dh_private_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent,
+                            ASN1_PCTX *ctx)
+{
+    return do_dh_print(bp, pkey->pkey.dh, indent, 2);
+}
+
+int DHparams_print(BIO *bp, const DH *x)
+{
+    return do_dh_print(bp, x, 4, 0);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
+static int dh_cms_decrypt(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri);
+static int dh_cms_encrypt(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri);
+#endif
+
+static int dh_pkey_ctrl(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int op, long arg1, void *arg2)
+{
+    switch (op) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
+
+    case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_ENVELOPE:
+        if (arg1 == 1)
+            return dh_cms_decrypt(arg2);
+        else if (arg1 == 0)
+            return dh_cms_encrypt(arg2);
+        return -2;
+
+    case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_RI_TYPE:
+        *(int *)arg2 = CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE;
+        return 1;
+#endif
+    default:
+        return -2;
+    }
+
+}
+
+const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD dh_asn1_meth = {
+    EVP_PKEY_DH,
+    EVP_PKEY_DH,
+    0,
+
+    "DH",
+    "OpenSSL PKCS#3 DH method",
+
+    dh_pub_decode,
+    dh_pub_encode,
+    dh_pub_cmp,
+    dh_public_print,
+
+    dh_priv_decode,
+    dh_priv_encode,
+    dh_private_print,
+
+    int_dh_size,
+    dh_bits,
+    dh_security_bits,
+
+    dh_param_decode,
+    dh_param_encode,
+    dh_missing_parameters,
+    dh_copy_parameters,
+    dh_cmp_parameters,
+    dh_param_print,
+    0,
+
+    int_dh_free,
+    0
+};
+
+const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD dhx_asn1_meth = {
+    EVP_PKEY_DHX,
+    EVP_PKEY_DHX,
+    0,
+
+    "X9.42 DH",
+    "OpenSSL X9.42 DH method",
+
+    dh_pub_decode,
+    dh_pub_encode,
+    dh_pub_cmp,
+    dh_public_print,
+
+    dh_priv_decode,
+    dh_priv_encode,
+    dh_private_print,
+
+    int_dh_size,
+    dh_bits,
+    dh_security_bits,
+
+    dh_param_decode,
+    dh_param_encode,
+    dh_missing_parameters,
+    dh_copy_parameters,
+    dh_cmp_parameters,
+    dh_param_print,
+    0,
+
+    int_dh_free,
+    dh_pkey_ctrl
+};
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
+
+static int dh_cms_set_peerkey(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx,
+                              X509_ALGOR *alg, ASN1_BIT_STRING *pubkey)
+{
+    const ASN1_OBJECT *aoid;
+    int atype;
+    const void *aval;
+    ASN1_INTEGER *public_key = NULL;
+    int rv = 0;
+    EVP_PKEY *pkpeer = NULL, *pk = NULL;
+    DH *dhpeer = NULL;
+    const unsigned char *p;
+    int plen;
+
+    X509_ALGOR_get0(&aoid, &atype, &aval, alg);
+    if (OBJ_obj2nid(aoid) != NID_dhpublicnumber)
+        goto err;
+    /* Only absent parameters allowed in RFC XXXX */
+    if (atype != V_ASN1_UNDEF && atype == V_ASN1_NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    pk = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(pctx);
+    if (!pk)
+        goto err;
+    if (pk->type != EVP_PKEY_DHX)
+        goto err;
+    /* Get parameters from parent key */
+    dhpeer = DHparams_dup(pk->pkey.dh);
+    /* We have parameters now set public key */
+    plen = ASN1_STRING_length(pubkey);
+    p = ASN1_STRING_get0_data(pubkey);
+    if (!p || !plen)
+        goto err;
+
+    if ((public_key = d2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, &p, plen)) == NULL) {
+        DHerr(DH_F_DH_CMS_SET_PEERKEY, DH_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* We have parameters now set public key */
+    if ((dhpeer->pub_key = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(public_key, NULL)) == NULL) {
+        DHerr(DH_F_DH_CMS_SET_PEERKEY, DH_R_BN_DECODE_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    pkpeer = EVP_PKEY_new();
+    if (pkpeer == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    EVP_PKEY_assign(pkpeer, pk->ameth->pkey_id, dhpeer);
+    dhpeer = NULL;
+    if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pctx, pkpeer) > 0)
+        rv = 1;
+ err:
+    ASN1_INTEGER_free(public_key);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(pkpeer);
+    DH_free(dhpeer);
+    return rv;
+}
+
+static int dh_cms_set_shared_info(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx, CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
+{
+    int rv = 0;
+
+    X509_ALGOR *alg, *kekalg = NULL;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ukm;
+    const unsigned char *p;
+    unsigned char *dukm = NULL;
+    size_t dukmlen = 0;
+    int keylen, plen;
+    const EVP_CIPHER *kekcipher;
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *kekctx;
+
+    if (!CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_alg(ri, &alg, &ukm))
+        goto err;
+
+    /*
+     * For DH we only have one OID permissible. If ever any more get defined
+     * we will need something cleverer.
+     */
+    if (OBJ_obj2nid(alg->algorithm) != NID_id_smime_alg_ESDH) {
+        DHerr(DH_F_DH_CMS_SET_SHARED_INFO, DH_R_KDF_PARAMETER_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_kdf_type(pctx, EVP_PKEY_DH_KDF_X9_42) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_kdf_md(pctx, EVP_sha1()) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (alg->parameter->type != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
+        goto err;
+
+    p = alg->parameter->value.sequence->data;
+    plen = alg->parameter->value.sequence->length;
+    kekalg = d2i_X509_ALGOR(NULL, &p, plen);
+    if (!kekalg)
+        goto err;
+    kekctx = CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_ctx(ri);
+    if (!kekctx)
+        goto err;
+    kekcipher = EVP_get_cipherbyobj(kekalg->algorithm);
+    if (!kekcipher || EVP_CIPHER_mode(kekcipher) != EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE)
+        goto err;
+    if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(kekctx, kekcipher, NULL, NULL, NULL))
+        goto err;
+    if (EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param(kekctx, kekalg->parameter) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(kekctx);
+    if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_kdf_outlen(pctx, keylen) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    /* Use OBJ_nid2obj to ensure we use built in OID that isn't freed */
+    if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_dh_kdf_oid(pctx,
+                                     OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_CIPHER_type(kekcipher)))
+        <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (ukm) {
+        dukmlen = ASN1_STRING_length(ukm);
+        dukm = OPENSSL_memdup(ASN1_STRING_get0_data(ukm), dukmlen);
+        if (!dukm)
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_dh_kdf_ukm(pctx, dukm, dukmlen) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    dukm = NULL;
+
+    rv = 1;
+ err:
+    X509_ALGOR_free(kekalg);
+    OPENSSL_free(dukm);
+    return rv;
+}
+
+static int dh_cms_decrypt(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx;
+    pctx = CMS_RecipientInfo_get0_pkey_ctx(ri);
+    if (!pctx)
+        return 0;
+    /* See if we need to set peer key */
+    if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_peerkey(pctx)) {
+        X509_ALGOR *alg;
+        ASN1_BIT_STRING *pubkey;
+        if (!CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_orig_id(ri, &alg, &pubkey,
+                                                 NULL, NULL, NULL))
+            return 0;
+        if (!alg || !pubkey)
+            return 0;
+        if (!dh_cms_set_peerkey(pctx, alg, pubkey)) {
+            DHerr(DH_F_DH_CMS_DECRYPT, DH_R_PEER_KEY_ERROR);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+    /* Set DH derivation parameters and initialise unwrap context */
+    if (!dh_cms_set_shared_info(pctx, ri)) {
+        DHerr(DH_F_DH_CMS_DECRYPT, DH_R_SHARED_INFO_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int dh_cms_encrypt(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx;
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
+    int keylen;
+    X509_ALGOR *talg, *wrap_alg = NULL;
+    const ASN1_OBJECT *aoid;
+    ASN1_BIT_STRING *pubkey;
+    ASN1_STRING *wrap_str;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ukm;
+    unsigned char *penc = NULL, *dukm = NULL;
+    int penclen;
+    size_t dukmlen = 0;
+    int rv = 0;
+    int kdf_type, wrap_nid;
+    const EVP_MD *kdf_md;
+    pctx = CMS_RecipientInfo_get0_pkey_ctx(ri);
+    if (!pctx)
+        return 0;
+    /* Get ephemeral key */
+    pkey = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(pctx);
+    if (!CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_orig_id(ri, &talg, &pubkey,
+                                             NULL, NULL, NULL))
+        goto err;
+    X509_ALGOR_get0(&aoid, NULL, NULL, talg);
+    /* Is everything uninitialised? */
+    if (aoid == OBJ_nid2obj(NID_undef)) {
+        ASN1_INTEGER *pubk = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(pkey->pkey.dh->pub_key, NULL);
+        if (!pubk)
+            goto err;
+        /* Set the key */
+
+        penclen = i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(pubk, &penc);
+        ASN1_INTEGER_free(pubk);
+        if (penclen <= 0)
+            goto err;
+        ASN1_STRING_set0(pubkey, penc, penclen);
+        pubkey->flags &= ~(ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT | 0x07);
+        pubkey->flags |= ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT;
+
+        penc = NULL;
+        X509_ALGOR_set0(talg, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_dhpublicnumber),
+                        V_ASN1_UNDEF, NULL);
+    }
+
+    /* See if custom parameters set */
+    kdf_type = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_dh_kdf_type(pctx);
+    if (kdf_type <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_dh_kdf_md(pctx, &kdf_md))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (kdf_type == EVP_PKEY_DH_KDF_NONE) {
+        kdf_type = EVP_PKEY_DH_KDF_X9_42;
+        if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_kdf_type(pctx, kdf_type) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+    } else if (kdf_type != EVP_PKEY_DH_KDF_X9_42)
+        /* Unknown KDF */
+        goto err;
+    if (kdf_md == NULL) {
+        /* Only SHA1 supported */
+        kdf_md = EVP_sha1();
+        if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_kdf_md(pctx, kdf_md) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+    } else if (EVP_MD_type(kdf_md) != NID_sha1)
+        /* Unsupported digest */
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_alg(ri, &talg, &ukm))
+        goto err;
+
+    /* Get wrap NID */
+    ctx = CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_ctx(ri);
+    wrap_nid = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_type(ctx);
+    if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_dh_kdf_oid(pctx, OBJ_nid2obj(wrap_nid)) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
+
+    /* Package wrap algorithm in an AlgorithmIdentifier */
+
+    wrap_alg = X509_ALGOR_new();
+    if (wrap_alg == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    wrap_alg->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(wrap_nid);
+    wrap_alg->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new();
+    if (wrap_alg->parameter == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (EVP_CIPHER_param_to_asn1(ctx, wrap_alg->parameter) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    if (ASN1_TYPE_get(wrap_alg->parameter) == NID_undef) {
+        ASN1_TYPE_free(wrap_alg->parameter);
+        wrap_alg->parameter = NULL;
+    }
+
+    if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_kdf_outlen(pctx, keylen) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (ukm) {
+        dukmlen = ASN1_STRING_length(ukm);
+        dukm = OPENSSL_memdup(ASN1_STRING_get0_data(ukm), dukmlen);
+        if (!dukm)
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_dh_kdf_ukm(pctx, dukm, dukmlen) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    dukm = NULL;
+
+    /*
+     * Now need to wrap encoding of wrap AlgorithmIdentifier into parameter
+     * of another AlgorithmIdentifier.
+     */
+    penc = NULL;
+    penclen = i2d_X509_ALGOR(wrap_alg, &penc);
+    if (!penc || !penclen)
+        goto err;
+    wrap_str = ASN1_STRING_new();
+    if (wrap_str == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    ASN1_STRING_set0(wrap_str, penc, penclen);
+    penc = NULL;
+    X509_ALGOR_set0(talg, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_id_smime_alg_ESDH),
+                    V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, wrap_str);
+
+    rv = 1;
+
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_free(penc);
+    X509_ALGOR_free(wrap_alg);
+    return rv;
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dh/dh_asn1.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dh/dh_asn1.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7c72fd6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dh/dh_asn1.c
@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include "dh_locl.h"
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+
+/* Override the default free and new methods */
+static int dh_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+                 void *exarg)
+{
+    if (operation == ASN1_OP_NEW_PRE) {
+        *pval = (ASN1_VALUE *)DH_new();
+        if (*pval != NULL)
+            return 2;
+        return 0;
+    } else if (operation == ASN1_OP_FREE_PRE) {
+        DH_free((DH *)*pval);
+        *pval = NULL;
+        return 2;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE_cb(DHparams, dh_cb) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(DH, p, BIGNUM),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(DH, g, BIGNUM),
+        ASN1_OPT(DH, length, ZLONG),
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_cb(DH, DHparams)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const_fname(DH, DHparams, DHparams)
+
+/*
+ * Internal only structures for handling X9.42 DH: this gets translated to or
+ * from a DH structure straight away.
+ */
+
+typedef struct {
+    ASN1_BIT_STRING *seed;
+    BIGNUM *counter;
+} int_dhvparams;
+
+typedef struct {
+    BIGNUM *p;
+    BIGNUM *q;
+    BIGNUM *g;
+    BIGNUM *j;
+    int_dhvparams *vparams;
+} int_dhx942_dh;
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(DHvparams) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(int_dhvparams, seed, ASN1_BIT_STRING),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(int_dhvparams, counter, BIGNUM)
+} static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_name(int_dhvparams, DHvparams)
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(DHxparams) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(int_dhx942_dh, p, BIGNUM),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(int_dhx942_dh, g, BIGNUM),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(int_dhx942_dh, q, BIGNUM),
+        ASN1_OPT(int_dhx942_dh, j, BIGNUM),
+        ASN1_OPT(int_dhx942_dh, vparams, DHvparams),
+} static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_name(int_dhx942_dh, DHxparams)
+
+int_dhx942_dh *d2i_int_dhx(int_dhx942_dh **a,
+                           const unsigned char **pp, long length);
+int i2d_int_dhx(const int_dhx942_dh *a, unsigned char **pp);
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const_fname(int_dhx942_dh, DHxparams, int_dhx)
+
+/* Application public function: read in X9.42 DH parameters into DH structure */
+
+DH *d2i_DHxparams(DH **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length)
+{
+    int_dhx942_dh *dhx = NULL;
+    DH *dh = NULL;
+    dh = DH_new();
+    if (dh == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    dhx = d2i_int_dhx(NULL, pp, length);
+    if (dhx == NULL) {
+        DH_free(dh);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    if (a) {
+        DH_free(*a);
+        *a = dh;
+    }
+
+    dh->p = dhx->p;
+    dh->q = dhx->q;
+    dh->g = dhx->g;
+    dh->j = dhx->j;
+
+    if (dhx->vparams) {
+        dh->seed = dhx->vparams->seed->data;
+        dh->seedlen = dhx->vparams->seed->length;
+        dh->counter = dhx->vparams->counter;
+        dhx->vparams->seed->data = NULL;
+        ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(dhx->vparams->seed);
+        OPENSSL_free(dhx->vparams);
+        dhx->vparams = NULL;
+    }
+
+    OPENSSL_free(dhx);
+    return dh;
+}
+
+int i2d_DHxparams(const DH *dh, unsigned char **pp)
+{
+    int_dhx942_dh dhx;
+    int_dhvparams dhv;
+    ASN1_BIT_STRING bs;
+    dhx.p = dh->p;
+    dhx.g = dh->g;
+    dhx.q = dh->q;
+    dhx.j = dh->j;
+    if (dh->counter && dh->seed && dh->seedlen > 0) {
+        bs.flags = ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT;
+        bs.data = dh->seed;
+        bs.length = dh->seedlen;
+        dhv.seed = &bs;
+        dhv.counter = dh->counter;
+        dhx.vparams = &dhv;
+    } else
+        dhx.vparams = NULL;
+
+    return i2d_int_dhx(&dhx, pp);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dh/dh_check.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3b0fa59
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
@@ -0,0 +1,183 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include "dh_locl.h"
+
+/*-
+ * Check that p and g are suitable enough
+ *
+ * p is odd
+ * 1 < g < p - 1
+ */
+
+int DH_check_params(const DH *dh, int *ret)
+{
+    int ok = 0;
+    BIGNUM *tmp = NULL;
+    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+
+    *ret = 0;
+    ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (tmp == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!BN_is_odd(dh->p))
+        *ret |= DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME;
+    if (BN_is_negative(dh->g) || BN_is_zero(dh->g) || BN_is_one(dh->g))
+        *ret |= DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR;
+    if (BN_copy(tmp, dh->p) == NULL || !BN_sub_word(tmp, 1))
+        goto err;
+    if (BN_cmp(dh->g, tmp) >= 0)
+        *ret |= DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR;
+
+    ok = 1;
+ err:
+    if (ctx != NULL) {
+        BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+        BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+    }
+    return (ok);
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Check that p is a safe prime and
+ * if g is 2, 3 or 5, check that it is a suitable generator
+ * where
+ * for 2, p mod 24 == 11
+ * for 3, p mod 12 == 5
+ * for 5, p mod 10 == 3 or 7
+ * should hold.
+ */
+
+int DH_check(const DH *dh, int *ret)
+{
+    int ok = 0, r;
+    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+    BN_ULONG l;
+    BIGNUM *t1 = NULL, *t2 = NULL;
+
+    *ret = 0;
+    ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    t1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (t1 == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    t2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (t2 == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (dh->q) {
+        if (BN_cmp(dh->g, BN_value_one()) <= 0)
+            *ret |= DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR;
+        else if (BN_cmp(dh->g, dh->p) >= 0)
+            *ret |= DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR;
+        else {
+            /* Check g^q == 1 mod p */
+            if (!BN_mod_exp(t1, dh->g, dh->q, dh->p, ctx))
+                goto err;
+            if (!BN_is_one(t1))
+                *ret |= DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR;
+        }
+        r = BN_is_prime_ex(dh->q, BN_prime_checks, ctx, NULL);
+        if (r < 0)
+            goto err;
+        if (!r)
+            *ret |= DH_CHECK_Q_NOT_PRIME;
+        /* Check p == 1 mod q  i.e. q divides p - 1 */
+        if (!BN_div(t1, t2, dh->p, dh->q, ctx))
+            goto err;
+        if (!BN_is_one(t2))
+            *ret |= DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE;
+        if (dh->j && BN_cmp(dh->j, t1))
+            *ret |= DH_CHECK_INVALID_J_VALUE;
+
+    } else if (BN_is_word(dh->g, DH_GENERATOR_2)) {
+        l = BN_mod_word(dh->p, 24);
+        if (l == (BN_ULONG)-1)
+            goto err;
+        if (l != 11)
+            *ret |= DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR;
+    } else if (BN_is_word(dh->g, DH_GENERATOR_5)) {
+        l = BN_mod_word(dh->p, 10);
+        if (l == (BN_ULONG)-1)
+            goto err;
+        if ((l != 3) && (l != 7))
+            *ret |= DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR;
+    } else
+        *ret |= DH_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR;
+
+    r = BN_is_prime_ex(dh->p, BN_prime_checks, ctx, NULL);
+    if (r < 0)
+        goto err;
+    if (!r)
+        *ret |= DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME;
+    else if (!dh->q) {
+        if (!BN_rshift1(t1, dh->p))
+            goto err;
+        r = BN_is_prime_ex(t1, BN_prime_checks, ctx, NULL);
+        if (r < 0)
+            goto err;
+	if (!r)
+            *ret |= DH_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME;
+    }
+    ok = 1;
+ err:
+    if (ctx != NULL) {
+        BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+        BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+    }
+    return (ok);
+}
+
+int DH_check_pub_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM *pub_key, int *ret)
+{
+    int ok = 0;
+    BIGNUM *tmp = NULL;
+    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+
+    *ret = 0;
+    ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (tmp == NULL || !BN_set_word(tmp, 1))
+        goto err;
+    if (BN_cmp(pub_key, tmp) <= 0)
+        *ret |= DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_SMALL;
+    if (BN_copy(tmp, dh->p) == NULL || !BN_sub_word(tmp, 1))
+        goto err;
+    if (BN_cmp(pub_key, tmp) >= 0)
+        *ret |= DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_LARGE;
+
+    if (dh->q != NULL) {
+        /* Check pub_key^q == 1 mod p */
+        if (!BN_mod_exp(tmp, pub_key, dh->q, dh->p, ctx))
+            goto err;
+        if (!BN_is_one(tmp))
+            *ret |= DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID;
+    }
+
+    ok = 1;
+ err:
+    if (ctx != NULL) {
+        BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+        BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+    }
+    return (ok);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dh/dh_depr.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dh/dh_depr.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f8ed1b7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dh/dh_depr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* This file contains deprecated functions as wrappers to the new ones */
+
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT >= 0x00908000L
+NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT
+#else
+
+# include <stdio.h>
+# include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+# include <openssl/bn.h>
+# include <openssl/dh.h>
+
+DH *DH_generate_parameters(int prime_len, int generator,
+                           void (*callback) (int, int, void *), void *cb_arg)
+{
+    BN_GENCB *cb;
+    DH *ret = NULL;
+
+    if ((ret = DH_new()) == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    cb = BN_GENCB_new();
+    if (cb == NULL) {
+        DH_free(ret);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    BN_GENCB_set_old(cb, callback, cb_arg);
+
+    if (DH_generate_parameters_ex(ret, prime_len, generator, cb)) {
+        BN_GENCB_free(cb);
+        return ret;
+    }
+    BN_GENCB_free(cb);
+    DH_free(ret);
+    return NULL;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dh/dh_err.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dh/dh_err.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4e21f28
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dh/dh_err.c
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+/*
+ * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+
+# define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH,func,0)
+# define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH,0,reason)
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA DH_str_functs[] = {
+    {ERR_FUNC(DH_F_COMPUTE_KEY), "compute_key"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DH_F_DHPARAMS_PRINT_FP), "DHparams_print_fp"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DH_F_DH_BUILTIN_GENPARAMS), "dh_builtin_genparams"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DH_F_DH_CMS_DECRYPT), "dh_cms_decrypt"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DH_F_DH_CMS_SET_PEERKEY), "dh_cms_set_peerkey"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DH_F_DH_CMS_SET_SHARED_INFO), "dh_cms_set_shared_info"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DH_F_DH_METH_DUP), "DH_meth_dup"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DH_F_DH_METH_NEW), "DH_meth_new"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DH_F_DH_METH_SET1_NAME), "DH_meth_set1_name"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DH_F_DH_NEW_METHOD), "DH_new_method"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DH_F_DH_PARAM_DECODE), "dh_param_decode"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DH_F_DH_PRIV_DECODE), "dh_priv_decode"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DH_F_DH_PRIV_ENCODE), "dh_priv_encode"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DH_F_DH_PUB_DECODE), "dh_pub_decode"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DH_F_DH_PUB_ENCODE), "dh_pub_encode"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DH_F_DO_DH_PRINT), "do_dh_print"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DH_F_GENERATE_KEY), "generate_key"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DH_F_PKEY_DH_DERIVE), "pkey_dh_derive"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DH_F_PKEY_DH_KEYGEN), "pkey_dh_keygen"},
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA DH_str_reasons[] = {
+    {ERR_REASON(DH_R_BAD_GENERATOR), "bad generator"},
+    {ERR_REASON(DH_R_BN_DECODE_ERROR), "bn decode error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(DH_R_BN_ERROR), "bn error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(DH_R_DECODE_ERROR), "decode error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(DH_R_INVALID_PUBKEY), "invalid public key"},
+    {ERR_REASON(DH_R_KDF_PARAMETER_ERROR), "kdf parameter error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(DH_R_KEYS_NOT_SET), "keys not set"},
+    {ERR_REASON(DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE), "modulus too large"},
+    {ERR_REASON(DH_R_NO_PARAMETERS_SET), "no parameters set"},
+    {ERR_REASON(DH_R_NO_PRIVATE_VALUE), "no private value"},
+    {ERR_REASON(DH_R_PARAMETER_ENCODING_ERROR), "parameter encoding error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(DH_R_PEER_KEY_ERROR), "peer key error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(DH_R_SHARED_INFO_ERROR), "shared info error"},
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+
+#endif
+
+int ERR_load_DH_strings(void)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+
+    if (ERR_func_error_string(DH_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) {
+        ERR_load_strings(0, DH_str_functs);
+        ERR_load_strings(0, DH_str_reasons);
+    }
+#endif
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dh/dh_gen.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dh/dh_gen.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..27ecb98
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dh/dh_gen.c
@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * NB: These functions have been upgraded - the previous prototypes are in
+ * dh_depr.c as wrappers to these ones.  - Geoff
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include "dh_locl.h"
+
+static int dh_builtin_genparams(DH *ret, int prime_len, int generator,
+                                BN_GENCB *cb);
+
+int DH_generate_parameters_ex(DH *ret, int prime_len, int generator,
+                              BN_GENCB *cb)
+{
+    if (ret->meth->generate_params)
+        return ret->meth->generate_params(ret, prime_len, generator, cb);
+    return dh_builtin_genparams(ret, prime_len, generator, cb);
+}
+
+/*-
+ * We generate DH parameters as follows
+ * find a prime q which is prime_len/2 bits long.
+ * p=(2*q)+1 or (p-1)/2 = q
+ * For this case, g is a generator if
+ * g^((p-1)/q) mod p != 1 for values of q which are the factors of p-1.
+ * Since the factors of p-1 are q and 2, we just need to check
+ * g^2 mod p != 1 and g^q mod p != 1.
+ *
+ * Having said all that,
+ * there is another special case method for the generators 2, 3 and 5.
+ * for 2, p mod 24 == 11
+ * for 3, p mod 12 == 5  <<<<< does not work for safe primes.
+ * for 5, p mod 10 == 3 or 7
+ *
+ * Thanks to Phil Karn <karn@qualcomm.com> for the pointers about the
+ * special generators and for answering some of my questions.
+ *
+ * I've implemented the second simple method :-).
+ * Since DH should be using a safe prime (both p and q are prime),
+ * this generator function can take a very very long time to run.
+ */
+/*
+ * Actually there is no reason to insist that 'generator' be a generator.
+ * It's just as OK (and in some sense better) to use a generator of the
+ * order-q subgroup.
+ */
+static int dh_builtin_genparams(DH *ret, int prime_len, int generator,
+                                BN_GENCB *cb)
+{
+    BIGNUM *t1, *t2;
+    int g, ok = -1;
+    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+
+    ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    t1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    t2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (t1 == NULL || t2 == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* Make sure 'ret' has the necessary elements */
+    if (!ret->p && ((ret->p = BN_new()) == NULL))
+        goto err;
+    if (!ret->g && ((ret->g = BN_new()) == NULL))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (generator <= 1) {
+        DHerr(DH_F_DH_BUILTIN_GENPARAMS, DH_R_BAD_GENERATOR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (generator == DH_GENERATOR_2) {
+        if (!BN_set_word(t1, 24))
+            goto err;
+        if (!BN_set_word(t2, 11))
+            goto err;
+        g = 2;
+    } else if (generator == DH_GENERATOR_5) {
+        if (!BN_set_word(t1, 10))
+            goto err;
+        if (!BN_set_word(t2, 3))
+            goto err;
+        /*
+         * BN_set_word(t3,7); just have to miss out on these ones :-(
+         */
+        g = 5;
+    } else {
+        /*
+         * in the general case, don't worry if 'generator' is a generator or
+         * not: since we are using safe primes, it will generate either an
+         * order-q or an order-2q group, which both is OK
+         */
+        if (!BN_set_word(t1, 2))
+            goto err;
+        if (!BN_set_word(t2, 1))
+            goto err;
+        g = generator;
+    }
+
+    if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(ret->p, prime_len, 1, t1, t2, cb))
+        goto err;
+    if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 0))
+        goto err;
+    if (!BN_set_word(ret->g, g))
+        goto err;
+    ok = 1;
+ err:
+    if (ok == -1) {
+        DHerr(DH_F_DH_BUILTIN_GENPARAMS, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+        ok = 0;
+    }
+
+    if (ctx != NULL) {
+        BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+        BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+    }
+    return ok;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dh/dh_kdf.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dh/dh_kdf.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2782eee
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dh/dh_kdf.c
@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2013-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <e_os.h>
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/cms.h>
+
+
+/* Key derivation from X9.42/RFC2631 */
+/* Uses CMS functions, hence the #ifdef wrapper. */
+
+#define DH_KDF_MAX      (1L << 30)
+
+/* Skip past an ASN1 structure: for OBJECT skip content octets too */
+
+static int skip_asn1(unsigned char **pp, long *plen, int exptag)
+{
+    const unsigned char *q = *pp;
+    int i, tag, xclass;
+    long tmplen;
+    i = ASN1_get_object(&q, &tmplen, &tag, &xclass, *plen);
+    if (i & 0x80)
+        return 0;
+    if (tag != exptag || xclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL)
+        return 0;
+    if (tag == V_ASN1_OBJECT)
+        q += tmplen;
+    *plen -= q - *pp;
+    *pp = (unsigned char *)q;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Encode the DH shared info structure, return an offset to the counter value
+ * so we can update the structure without reencoding it.
+ */
+
+static int dh_sharedinfo_encode(unsigned char **pder, unsigned char **pctr,
+                                ASN1_OBJECT *key_oid, size_t outlen,
+                                const unsigned char *ukm, size_t ukmlen)
+{
+    unsigned char *p;
+    int derlen;
+    long tlen;
+    /* "magic" value to check offset is sane */
+    static unsigned char ctr[4] = { 0xF3, 0x17, 0x22, 0x53 };
+    X509_ALGOR atmp;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING ctr_oct, ukm_oct, *pukm_oct;
+    ASN1_TYPE ctr_atype;
+    if (ukmlen > DH_KDF_MAX || outlen > DH_KDF_MAX)
+        return 0;
+    ctr_oct.data = ctr;
+    ctr_oct.length = 4;
+    ctr_oct.flags = 0;
+    ctr_oct.type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
+    ctr_atype.type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
+    ctr_atype.value.octet_string = &ctr_oct;
+    atmp.algorithm = key_oid;
+    atmp.parameter = &ctr_atype;
+    if (ukm) {
+        ukm_oct.type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
+        ukm_oct.flags = 0;
+        ukm_oct.data = (unsigned char *)ukm;
+        ukm_oct.length = ukmlen;
+        pukm_oct = &ukm_oct;
+    } else
+        pukm_oct = NULL;
+    derlen = CMS_SharedInfo_encode(pder, &atmp, pukm_oct, outlen);
+    if (derlen <= 0)
+        return 0;
+    p = *pder;
+    tlen = derlen;
+    if (!skip_asn1(&p, &tlen, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE))
+        return 0;
+    if (!skip_asn1(&p, &tlen, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE))
+        return 0;
+    if (!skip_asn1(&p, &tlen, V_ASN1_OBJECT))
+        return 0;
+    if (!skip_asn1(&p, &tlen, V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING))
+        return 0;
+    if (CRYPTO_memcmp(p, ctr, 4))
+        return 0;
+    *pctr = p;
+    return derlen;
+}
+
+int DH_KDF_X9_42(unsigned char *out, size_t outlen,
+                 const unsigned char *Z, size_t Zlen,
+                 ASN1_OBJECT *key_oid,
+                 const unsigned char *ukm, size_t ukmlen, const EVP_MD *md)
+{
+    EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL;
+    int rv = 0;
+    unsigned int i;
+    size_t mdlen;
+    unsigned char *der = NULL, *ctr;
+    int derlen;
+    if (Zlen > DH_KDF_MAX)
+        return 0;
+    mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+    if (mctx == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    mdlen = EVP_MD_size(md);
+    derlen = dh_sharedinfo_encode(&der, &ctr, key_oid, outlen, ukm, ukmlen);
+    if (derlen == 0)
+        goto err;
+    for (i = 1;; i++) {
+        unsigned char mtmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+        if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL)
+            || !EVP_DigestUpdate(mctx, Z, Zlen))
+            goto err;
+        ctr[3] = i & 0xFF;
+        ctr[2] = (i >> 8) & 0xFF;
+        ctr[1] = (i >> 16) & 0xFF;
+        ctr[0] = (i >> 24) & 0xFF;
+        if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(mctx, der, derlen))
+            goto err;
+        if (outlen >= mdlen) {
+            if (!EVP_DigestFinal(mctx, out, NULL))
+                goto err;
+            outlen -= mdlen;
+            if (outlen == 0)
+                break;
+            out += mdlen;
+        } else {
+            if (!EVP_DigestFinal(mctx, mtmp, NULL))
+                goto err;
+            memcpy(out, mtmp, outlen);
+            OPENSSL_cleanse(mtmp, mdlen);
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    rv = 1;
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_free(der);
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
+    return rv;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dh/dh_key.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fce9ff4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
@@ -0,0 +1,227 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "dh_locl.h"
+#include "internal/bn_int.h"
+
+static int generate_key(DH *dh);
+static int compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh);
+static int dh_bn_mod_exp(const DH *dh, BIGNUM *r,
+                         const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
+                         const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx);
+static int dh_init(DH *dh);
+static int dh_finish(DH *dh);
+
+int DH_generate_key(DH *dh)
+{
+    return dh->meth->generate_key(dh);
+}
+
+int DH_compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh)
+{
+    return dh->meth->compute_key(key, pub_key, dh);
+}
+
+int DH_compute_key_padded(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh)
+{
+    int rv, pad;
+    rv = dh->meth->compute_key(key, pub_key, dh);
+    if (rv <= 0)
+        return rv;
+    pad = BN_num_bytes(dh->p) - rv;
+    if (pad > 0) {
+        memmove(key + pad, key, rv);
+        memset(key, 0, pad);
+    }
+    return rv + pad;
+}
+
+static DH_METHOD dh_ossl = {
+    "OpenSSL DH Method",
+    generate_key,
+    compute_key,
+    dh_bn_mod_exp,
+    dh_init,
+    dh_finish,
+    DH_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD,
+    NULL,
+    NULL
+};
+
+static const DH_METHOD *default_DH_method = &dh_ossl;
+
+const DH_METHOD *DH_OpenSSL(void)
+{
+    return &dh_ossl;
+}
+
+void DH_set_default_method(const DH_METHOD *meth)
+{
+    default_DH_method = meth;
+}
+
+const DH_METHOD *DH_get_default_method(void)
+{
+    return default_DH_method;
+}
+
+static int generate_key(DH *dh)
+{
+    int ok = 0;
+    int generate_new_key = 0;
+    unsigned l;
+    BN_CTX *ctx;
+    BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL, *priv_key = NULL;
+
+    ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (dh->priv_key == NULL) {
+        priv_key = BN_secure_new();
+        if (priv_key == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        generate_new_key = 1;
+    } else
+        priv_key = dh->priv_key;
+
+    if (dh->pub_key == NULL) {
+        pub_key = BN_new();
+        if (pub_key == NULL)
+            goto err;
+    } else
+        pub_key = dh->pub_key;
+
+    if (dh->flags & DH_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P) {
+        mont = BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dh->method_mont_p,
+                                      dh->lock, dh->p, ctx);
+        if (!mont)
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (generate_new_key) {
+        if (dh->q) {
+            do {
+                if (!BN_rand_range(priv_key, dh->q))
+                    goto err;
+            }
+            while (BN_is_zero(priv_key) || BN_is_one(priv_key));
+        } else {
+            /* secret exponent length */
+            l = dh->length ? dh->length : BN_num_bits(dh->p) - 1;
+            if (!BN_rand(priv_key, l, BN_RAND_TOP_ONE, BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ANY))
+                goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    {
+        BIGNUM *prk = BN_new();
+
+        if (prk == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        BN_with_flags(prk, priv_key, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+        if (!dh->meth->bn_mod_exp(dh, pub_key, dh->g, prk, dh->p, ctx, mont)) {
+            BN_free(prk);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        /* We MUST free prk before any further use of priv_key */
+        BN_free(prk);
+    }
+
+    dh->pub_key = pub_key;
+    dh->priv_key = priv_key;
+    ok = 1;
+ err:
+    if (ok != 1)
+        DHerr(DH_F_GENERATE_KEY, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+
+    if (pub_key != dh->pub_key)
+        BN_free(pub_key);
+    if (priv_key != dh->priv_key)
+        BN_free(priv_key);
+    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+    return (ok);
+}
+
+static int compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh)
+{
+    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+    BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *tmp;
+    int ret = -1;
+    int check_result;
+
+    if (BN_num_bits(dh->p) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
+        DHerr(DH_F_COMPUTE_KEY, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (tmp == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (dh->priv_key == NULL) {
+        DHerr(DH_F_COMPUTE_KEY, DH_R_NO_PRIVATE_VALUE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (dh->flags & DH_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P) {
+        mont = BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dh->method_mont_p,
+                                      dh->lock, dh->p, ctx);
+        BN_set_flags(dh->priv_key, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+        if (!mont)
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!DH_check_pub_key(dh, pub_key, &check_result) || check_result) {
+        DHerr(DH_F_COMPUTE_KEY, DH_R_INVALID_PUBKEY);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!dh->
+        meth->bn_mod_exp(dh, tmp, pub_key, dh->priv_key, dh->p, ctx, mont)) {
+        DHerr(DH_F_COMPUTE_KEY, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    ret = BN_bn2bin(tmp, key);
+ err:
+    if (ctx != NULL) {
+        BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+        BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+    }
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static int dh_bn_mod_exp(const DH *dh, BIGNUM *r,
+                         const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
+                         const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx)
+{
+    return BN_mod_exp_mont(r, a, p, m, ctx, m_ctx);
+}
+
+static int dh_init(DH *dh)
+{
+    dh->flags |= DH_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P;
+    return (1);
+}
+
+static int dh_finish(DH *dh)
+{
+    BN_MONT_CTX_free(dh->method_mont_p);
+    return (1);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dh/dh_lib.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dh/dh_lib.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..716f4a4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dh/dh_lib.c
@@ -0,0 +1,263 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include "dh_locl.h"
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+
+int DH_set_method(DH *dh, const DH_METHOD *meth)
+{
+    /*
+     * NB: The caller is specifically setting a method, so it's not up to us
+     * to deal with which ENGINE it comes from.
+     */
+    const DH_METHOD *mtmp;
+    mtmp = dh->meth;
+    if (mtmp->finish)
+        mtmp->finish(dh);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    ENGINE_finish(dh->engine);
+    dh->engine = NULL;
+#endif
+    dh->meth = meth;
+    if (meth->init)
+        meth->init(dh);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+DH *DH_new(void)
+{
+    return DH_new_method(NULL);
+}
+
+DH *DH_new_method(ENGINE *engine)
+{
+    DH *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
+
+    if (ret == NULL) {
+        DHerr(DH_F_DH_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    ret->references = 1;
+    ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
+    if (ret->lock == NULL) {
+        DHerr(DH_F_DH_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        OPENSSL_free(ret);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    ret->meth = DH_get_default_method();
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    ret->flags = ret->meth->flags;  /* early default init */
+    if (engine) {
+        if (!ENGINE_init(engine)) {
+            DHerr(DH_F_DH_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        ret->engine = engine;
+    } else
+        ret->engine = ENGINE_get_default_DH();
+    if (ret->engine) {
+        ret->meth = ENGINE_get_DH(ret->engine);
+        if (ret->meth == NULL) {
+            DHerr(DH_F_DH_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+#endif
+
+    ret->flags = ret->meth->flags;
+
+    if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_DH, ret, &ret->ex_data))
+        goto err;
+
+    if ((ret->meth->init != NULL) && !ret->meth->init(ret)) {
+        DHerr(DH_F_DH_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_INIT_FAIL);
+err:
+        DH_free(ret);
+        ret = NULL;
+    }
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+void DH_free(DH *r)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    if (r == NULL)
+        return;
+
+    CRYPTO_atomic_add(&r->references, -1, &i, r->lock);
+    REF_PRINT_COUNT("DH", r);
+    if (i > 0)
+        return;
+    REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0);
+
+    if (r->meth->finish)
+        r->meth->finish(r);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    ENGINE_finish(r->engine);
+#endif
+
+    CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_DH, r, &r->ex_data);
+
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(r->lock);
+
+    BN_clear_free(r->p);
+    BN_clear_free(r->g);
+    BN_clear_free(r->q);
+    BN_clear_free(r->j);
+    OPENSSL_free(r->seed);
+    BN_clear_free(r->counter);
+    BN_clear_free(r->pub_key);
+    BN_clear_free(r->priv_key);
+    OPENSSL_free(r);
+}
+
+int DH_up_ref(DH *r)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    if (CRYPTO_atomic_add(&r->references, 1, &i, r->lock) <= 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    REF_PRINT_COUNT("DH", r);
+    REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 2);
+    return ((i > 1) ? 1 : 0);
+}
+
+int DH_set_ex_data(DH *d, int idx, void *arg)
+{
+    return (CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&d->ex_data, idx, arg));
+}
+
+void *DH_get_ex_data(DH *d, int idx)
+{
+    return (CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&d->ex_data, idx));
+}
+
+int DH_bits(const DH *dh)
+{
+    return BN_num_bits(dh->p);
+}
+
+int DH_size(const DH *dh)
+{
+    return (BN_num_bytes(dh->p));
+}
+
+int DH_security_bits(const DH *dh)
+{
+    int N;
+    if (dh->q)
+        N = BN_num_bits(dh->q);
+    else if (dh->length)
+        N = dh->length;
+    else
+        N = -1;
+    return BN_security_bits(BN_num_bits(dh->p), N);
+}
+
+
+void DH_get0_pqg(const DH *dh,
+                 const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q, const BIGNUM **g)
+{
+    if (p != NULL)
+        *p = dh->p;
+    if (q != NULL)
+        *q = dh->q;
+    if (g != NULL)
+        *g = dh->g;
+}
+
+int DH_set0_pqg(DH *dh, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g)
+{
+    /* If the fields p and g in d are NULL, the corresponding input
+     * parameters MUST be non-NULL.  q may remain NULL.
+     */
+    if ((dh->p == NULL && p == NULL)
+        || (dh->g == NULL && g == NULL))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (p != NULL) {
+        BN_free(dh->p);
+        dh->p = p;
+    }
+    if (q != NULL) {
+        BN_free(dh->q);
+        dh->q = q;
+    }
+    if (g != NULL) {
+        BN_free(dh->g);
+        dh->g = g;
+    }
+
+    if (q != NULL) {
+        dh->length = BN_num_bits(q);
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+long DH_get_length(const DH *dh)
+{
+    return dh->length;
+}
+
+int DH_set_length(DH *dh, long length)
+{
+    dh->length = length;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+void DH_get0_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM **pub_key, const BIGNUM **priv_key)
+{
+    if (pub_key != NULL)
+        *pub_key = dh->pub_key;
+    if (priv_key != NULL)
+        *priv_key = dh->priv_key;
+}
+
+int DH_set0_key(DH *dh, BIGNUM *pub_key, BIGNUM *priv_key)
+{
+    if (pub_key != NULL) {
+        BN_free(dh->pub_key);
+        dh->pub_key = pub_key;
+    }
+    if (priv_key != NULL) {
+        BN_free(dh->priv_key);
+        dh->priv_key = priv_key;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+void DH_clear_flags(DH *dh, int flags)
+{
+    dh->flags &= ~flags;
+}
+
+int DH_test_flags(const DH *dh, int flags)
+{
+    return dh->flags & flags;
+}
+
+void DH_set_flags(DH *dh, int flags)
+{
+    dh->flags |= flags;
+}
+
+ENGINE *DH_get0_engine(DH *dh)
+{
+    return dh->engine;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dh/dh_locl.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dh/dh_locl.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..19301c3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dh/dh_locl.h
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+
+struct dh_st {
+    /*
+     * This first argument is used to pick up errors when a DH is passed
+     * instead of a EVP_PKEY
+     */
+    int pad;
+    int version;
+    BIGNUM *p;
+    BIGNUM *g;
+    long length;                /* optional */
+    BIGNUM *pub_key;            /* g^x % p */
+    BIGNUM *priv_key;           /* x */
+    int flags;
+    BN_MONT_CTX *method_mont_p;
+    /* Place holders if we want to do X9.42 DH */
+    BIGNUM *q;
+    BIGNUM *j;
+    unsigned char *seed;
+    int seedlen;
+    BIGNUM *counter;
+    int references;
+    CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data;
+    const DH_METHOD *meth;
+    ENGINE *engine;
+    CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock;
+};
+
+struct dh_method {
+    char *name;
+    /* Methods here */
+    int (*generate_key) (DH *dh);
+    int (*compute_key) (unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh);
+
+    /* Can be null */
+    int (*bn_mod_exp) (const DH *dh, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
+                       const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx,
+                       BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx);
+    int (*init) (DH *dh);
+    int (*finish) (DH *dh);
+    int flags;
+    char *app_data;
+    /* If this is non-NULL, it will be used to generate parameters */
+    int (*generate_params) (DH *dh, int prime_len, int generator,
+                            BN_GENCB *cb);
+};
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dh/dh_meth.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dh/dh_meth.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ce6114c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dh/dh_meth.c
@@ -0,0 +1,173 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "dh_locl.h"
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+DH_METHOD *DH_meth_new(const char *name, int flags)
+{
+    DH_METHOD *dhm = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*dhm));
+
+    if (dhm != NULL) {
+        dhm->flags = flags;
+
+        dhm->name = OPENSSL_strdup(name);
+        if (dhm->name != NULL)
+            return dhm;
+
+        OPENSSL_free(dhm);
+    }
+
+    DHerr(DH_F_DH_METH_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+void DH_meth_free(DH_METHOD *dhm)
+{
+    if (dhm != NULL) {
+        OPENSSL_free(dhm->name);
+        OPENSSL_free(dhm);
+    }
+}
+
+DH_METHOD *DH_meth_dup(const DH_METHOD *dhm)
+{
+    DH_METHOD *ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ret));
+
+    if (ret != NULL) {
+        memcpy(ret, dhm, sizeof(*dhm));
+
+        ret->name = OPENSSL_strdup(dhm->name);
+        if (ret->name != NULL)
+            return ret;
+
+        OPENSSL_free(ret);
+    }
+
+    DHerr(DH_F_DH_METH_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+const char *DH_meth_get0_name(const DH_METHOD *dhm)
+{
+    return dhm->name;
+}
+
+int DH_meth_set1_name(DH_METHOD *dhm, const char *name)
+{
+    char *tmpname = OPENSSL_strdup(name);
+
+    if (tmpname == NULL) {
+        DHerr(DH_F_DH_METH_SET1_NAME, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    OPENSSL_free(dhm->name);
+    dhm->name = tmpname;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int DH_meth_get_flags(DH_METHOD *dhm)
+{
+    return dhm->flags;
+}
+
+int DH_meth_set_flags(DH_METHOD *dhm, int flags)
+{
+    dhm->flags = flags;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+void *DH_meth_get0_app_data(const DH_METHOD *dhm)
+{
+    return dhm->app_data;
+}
+
+int DH_meth_set0_app_data(DH_METHOD *dhm, void *app_data)
+{
+    dhm->app_data = app_data;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int (*DH_meth_get_generate_key(const DH_METHOD *dhm)) (DH *)
+{
+    return dhm->generate_key;
+}
+
+int DH_meth_set_generate_key(DH_METHOD *dhm, int (*generate_key) (DH *))
+{
+    dhm->generate_key = generate_key;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int (*DH_meth_get_compute_key(const DH_METHOD *dhm))
+        (unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh)
+{
+    return dhm->compute_key;
+}
+
+int DH_meth_set_compute_key(DH_METHOD *dhm,
+        int (*compute_key) (unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh))
+{
+    dhm->compute_key = compute_key;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+
+int (*DH_meth_get_bn_mod_exp(const DH_METHOD *dhm))
+    (const DH *, BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *,
+     BN_CTX *, BN_MONT_CTX *)
+{
+    return dhm->bn_mod_exp;
+}
+
+int DH_meth_set_bn_mod_exp(DH_METHOD *dhm,
+    int (*bn_mod_exp) (const DH *, BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *,
+                       const BIGNUM *, BN_CTX *, BN_MONT_CTX *))
+{
+    dhm->bn_mod_exp = bn_mod_exp;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int (*DH_meth_get_init(const DH_METHOD *dhm))(DH *)
+{
+    return dhm->init;
+}
+
+int DH_meth_set_init(DH_METHOD *dhm, int (*init)(DH *))
+{
+    dhm->init = init;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int (*DH_meth_get_finish(const DH_METHOD *dhm)) (DH *)
+{
+    return dhm->finish;
+}
+
+int DH_meth_set_finish(DH_METHOD *dhm, int (*finish) (DH *))
+{
+    dhm->finish = finish;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int (*DH_meth_get_generate_params(const DH_METHOD *dhm))
+        (DH *, int, int, BN_GENCB *)
+{
+    return dhm->generate_params;
+}
+
+int DH_meth_set_generate_params(DH_METHOD *dhm,
+        int (*generate_params) (DH *, int, int, BN_GENCB *))
+{
+    dhm->generate_params = generate_params;
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dh/dh_pmeth.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dh/dh_pmeth.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c3e03c7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dh/dh_pmeth.c
@@ -0,0 +1,501 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include "dh_locl.h"
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include "internal/evp_int.h"
+
+/* DH pkey context structure */
+
+typedef struct {
+    /* Parameter gen parameters */
+    int prime_len;
+    int generator;
+    int use_dsa;
+    int subprime_len;
+    /* message digest used for parameter generation */
+    const EVP_MD *md;
+    int rfc5114_param;
+    /* Keygen callback info */
+    int gentmp[2];
+    /* KDF (if any) to use for DH */
+    char kdf_type;
+    /* OID to use for KDF */
+    ASN1_OBJECT *kdf_oid;
+    /* Message digest to use for key derivation */
+    const EVP_MD *kdf_md;
+    /* User key material */
+    unsigned char *kdf_ukm;
+    size_t kdf_ukmlen;
+    /* KDF output length */
+    size_t kdf_outlen;
+} DH_PKEY_CTX;
+
+static int pkey_dh_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    DH_PKEY_CTX *dctx;
+
+    dctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*dctx));
+    if (dctx == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    dctx->prime_len = 1024;
+    dctx->subprime_len = -1;
+    dctx->generator = 2;
+    dctx->kdf_type = EVP_PKEY_DH_KDF_NONE;
+
+    ctx->data = dctx;
+    ctx->keygen_info = dctx->gentmp;
+    ctx->keygen_info_count = 2;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static void pkey_dh_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    DH_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data;
+    if (dctx != NULL) {
+        OPENSSL_free(dctx->kdf_ukm);
+        ASN1_OBJECT_free(dctx->kdf_oid);
+        OPENSSL_free(dctx);
+    }
+}
+
+
+static int pkey_dh_copy(EVP_PKEY_CTX *dst, EVP_PKEY_CTX *src)
+{
+    DH_PKEY_CTX *dctx, *sctx;
+    if (!pkey_dh_init(dst))
+        return 0;
+    sctx = src->data;
+    dctx = dst->data;
+    dctx->prime_len = sctx->prime_len;
+    dctx->subprime_len = sctx->subprime_len;
+    dctx->generator = sctx->generator;
+    dctx->use_dsa = sctx->use_dsa;
+    dctx->md = sctx->md;
+    dctx->rfc5114_param = sctx->rfc5114_param;
+
+    dctx->kdf_type = sctx->kdf_type;
+    dctx->kdf_oid = OBJ_dup(sctx->kdf_oid);
+    if (dctx->kdf_oid == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    dctx->kdf_md = sctx->kdf_md;
+    if (sctx->kdf_ukm != NULL) {
+        dctx->kdf_ukm = OPENSSL_memdup(sctx->kdf_ukm, sctx->kdf_ukmlen);
+        if (dctx->kdf_ukm == NULL)
+          return 0;
+        dctx->kdf_ukmlen = sctx->kdf_ukmlen;
+    }
+    dctx->kdf_outlen = sctx->kdf_outlen;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int pkey_dh_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2)
+{
+    DH_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data;
+    switch (type) {
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_PARAMGEN_PRIME_LEN:
+        if (p1 < 256)
+            return -2;
+        dctx->prime_len = p1;
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_PARAMGEN_SUBPRIME_LEN:
+        if (dctx->use_dsa == 0)
+            return -2;
+        dctx->subprime_len = p1;
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_PARAMGEN_GENERATOR:
+        if (dctx->use_dsa)
+            return -2;
+        dctx->generator = p1;
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_PARAMGEN_TYPE:
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+        if (p1 != 0)
+            return -2;
+#else
+        if (p1 < 0 || p1 > 2)
+            return -2;
+#endif
+        dctx->use_dsa = p1;
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_RFC5114:
+        if (p1 < 1 || p1 > 3)
+            return -2;
+        dctx->rfc5114_param = p1;
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY:
+        /* Default behaviour is OK */
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_KDF_TYPE:
+        if (p1 == -2)
+            return dctx->kdf_type;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
+        if (p1 != EVP_PKEY_DH_KDF_NONE)
+#else
+        if (p1 != EVP_PKEY_DH_KDF_NONE && p1 != EVP_PKEY_DH_KDF_X9_42)
+#endif
+            return -2;
+        dctx->kdf_type = p1;
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_KDF_MD:
+        dctx->kdf_md = p2;
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_DH_KDF_MD:
+        *(const EVP_MD **)p2 = dctx->kdf_md;
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_KDF_OUTLEN:
+        if (p1 <= 0)
+            return -2;
+        dctx->kdf_outlen = (size_t)p1;
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_DH_KDF_OUTLEN:
+        *(int *)p2 = dctx->kdf_outlen;
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_KDF_UKM:
+        OPENSSL_free(dctx->kdf_ukm);
+        dctx->kdf_ukm = p2;
+        if (p2)
+            dctx->kdf_ukmlen = p1;
+        else
+            dctx->kdf_ukmlen = 0;
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_DH_KDF_UKM:
+        *(unsigned char **)p2 = dctx->kdf_ukm;
+        return dctx->kdf_ukmlen;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_KDF_OID:
+        ASN1_OBJECT_free(dctx->kdf_oid);
+        dctx->kdf_oid = p2;
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_DH_KDF_OID:
+        *(ASN1_OBJECT **)p2 = dctx->kdf_oid;
+        return 1;
+
+    default:
+        return -2;
+
+    }
+}
+
+static int pkey_dh_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                            const char *type, const char *value)
+{
+    if (strcmp(type, "dh_paramgen_prime_len") == 0) {
+        int len;
+        len = atoi(value);
+        return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_paramgen_prime_len(ctx, len);
+    }
+    if (strcmp(type, "dh_rfc5114") == 0) {
+        DH_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data;
+        int len;
+        len = atoi(value);
+        if (len < 0 || len > 3)
+            return -2;
+        dctx->rfc5114_param = len;
+        return 1;
+    }
+    if (strcmp(type, "dh_paramgen_generator") == 0) {
+        int len;
+        len = atoi(value);
+        return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_paramgen_generator(ctx, len);
+    }
+    if (strcmp(type, "dh_paramgen_subprime_len") == 0) {
+        int len;
+        len = atoi(value);
+        return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_paramgen_subprime_len(ctx, len);
+    }
+    if (strcmp(type, "dh_paramgen_type") == 0) {
+        int typ;
+        typ = atoi(value);
+        return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_paramgen_type(ctx, typ);
+    }
+    return -2;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+
+extern int dsa_builtin_paramgen(DSA *ret, size_t bits, size_t qbits,
+                                const EVP_MD *evpmd,
+                                const unsigned char *seed_in, size_t seed_len,
+                                unsigned char *seed_out, int *counter_ret,
+                                unsigned long *h_ret, BN_GENCB *cb);
+
+extern int dsa_builtin_paramgen2(DSA *ret, size_t L, size_t N,
+                                 const EVP_MD *evpmd,
+                                 const unsigned char *seed_in,
+                                 size_t seed_len, int idx,
+                                 unsigned char *seed_out, int *counter_ret,
+                                 unsigned long *h_ret, BN_GENCB *cb);
+
+static DSA *dsa_dh_generate(DH_PKEY_CTX *dctx, BN_GENCB *pcb)
+{
+    DSA *ret;
+    int rv = 0;
+    int prime_len = dctx->prime_len;
+    int subprime_len = dctx->subprime_len;
+    const EVP_MD *md = dctx->md;
+    if (dctx->use_dsa > 2)
+        return NULL;
+    ret = DSA_new();
+    if (ret == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    if (subprime_len == -1) {
+        if (prime_len >= 2048)
+            subprime_len = 256;
+        else
+            subprime_len = 160;
+    }
+    if (md == NULL) {
+        if (prime_len >= 2048)
+            md = EVP_sha256();
+        else
+            md = EVP_sha1();
+    }
+    if (dctx->use_dsa == 1)
+        rv = dsa_builtin_paramgen(ret, prime_len, subprime_len, md,
+                                  NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, pcb);
+    else if (dctx->use_dsa == 2)
+        rv = dsa_builtin_paramgen2(ret, prime_len, subprime_len, md,
+                                   NULL, 0, -1, NULL, NULL, NULL, pcb);
+    if (rv <= 0) {
+        DSA_free(ret);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+#endif
+
+static int pkey_dh_paramgen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    DH *dh = NULL;
+    DH_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data;
+    BN_GENCB *pcb;
+    int ret;
+    if (dctx->rfc5114_param) {
+        switch (dctx->rfc5114_param) {
+        case 1:
+            dh = DH_get_1024_160();
+            break;
+
+        case 2:
+            dh = DH_get_2048_224();
+            break;
+
+        case 3:
+            dh = DH_get_2048_256();
+            break;
+
+        default:
+            return -2;
+        }
+        EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, EVP_PKEY_DHX, dh);
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    if (ctx->pkey_gencb) {
+        pcb = BN_GENCB_new();
+        if (pcb == NULL)
+            return 0;
+        evp_pkey_set_cb_translate(pcb, ctx);
+    } else
+        pcb = NULL;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+    if (dctx->use_dsa) {
+        DSA *dsa_dh;
+        dsa_dh = dsa_dh_generate(dctx, pcb);
+        BN_GENCB_free(pcb);
+        if (dsa_dh == NULL)
+            return 0;
+        dh = DSA_dup_DH(dsa_dh);
+        DSA_free(dsa_dh);
+        if (!dh)
+            return 0;
+        EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, EVP_PKEY_DHX, dh);
+        return 1;
+    }
+#endif
+    dh = DH_new();
+    if (dh == NULL) {
+        BN_GENCB_free(pcb);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    ret = DH_generate_parameters_ex(dh,
+                                    dctx->prime_len, dctx->generator, pcb);
+    BN_GENCB_free(pcb);
+    if (ret)
+        EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkey, dh);
+    else
+        DH_free(dh);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int pkey_dh_keygen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    DH *dh = NULL;
+    if (ctx->pkey == NULL) {
+        DHerr(DH_F_PKEY_DH_KEYGEN, DH_R_NO_PARAMETERS_SET);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    dh = DH_new();
+    if (dh == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, ctx->pmeth->pkey_id, dh);
+    /* Note: if error return, pkey is freed by parent routine */
+    if (!EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, ctx->pkey))
+        return 0;
+    return DH_generate_key(pkey->pkey.dh);
+}
+
+static int pkey_dh_derive(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key,
+                          size_t *keylen)
+{
+    int ret;
+    DH *dh;
+    DH_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data;
+    BIGNUM *dhpub;
+    if (!ctx->pkey || !ctx->peerkey) {
+        DHerr(DH_F_PKEY_DH_DERIVE, DH_R_KEYS_NOT_SET);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    dh = ctx->pkey->pkey.dh;
+    dhpub = ctx->peerkey->pkey.dh->pub_key;
+    if (dctx->kdf_type == EVP_PKEY_DH_KDF_NONE) {
+        if (key == NULL) {
+            *keylen = DH_size(dh);
+            return 1;
+        }
+        ret = DH_compute_key(key, dhpub, dh);
+        if (ret < 0)
+            return ret;
+        *keylen = ret;
+        return 1;
+    }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
+    else if (dctx->kdf_type == EVP_PKEY_DH_KDF_X9_42) {
+
+        unsigned char *Z = NULL;
+        size_t Zlen = 0;
+        if (!dctx->kdf_outlen || !dctx->kdf_oid)
+            return 0;
+        if (key == NULL) {
+            *keylen = dctx->kdf_outlen;
+            return 1;
+        }
+        if (*keylen != dctx->kdf_outlen)
+            return 0;
+        ret = 0;
+        Zlen = DH_size(dh);
+        Z = OPENSSL_malloc(Zlen);
+        if (Z == NULL) {
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (DH_compute_key_padded(Z, dhpub, dh) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+        if (!DH_KDF_X9_42(key, *keylen, Z, Zlen, dctx->kdf_oid,
+                          dctx->kdf_ukm, dctx->kdf_ukmlen, dctx->kdf_md))
+            goto err;
+        *keylen = dctx->kdf_outlen;
+        ret = 1;
+ err:
+        OPENSSL_clear_free(Z, Zlen);
+        return ret;
+    }
+#endif
+    return 0;
+}
+
+const EVP_PKEY_METHOD dh_pkey_meth = {
+    EVP_PKEY_DH,
+    0,
+    pkey_dh_init,
+    pkey_dh_copy,
+    pkey_dh_cleanup,
+
+    0,
+    pkey_dh_paramgen,
+
+    0,
+    pkey_dh_keygen,
+
+    0,
+    0,
+
+    0,
+    0,
+
+    0, 0,
+
+    0, 0, 0, 0,
+
+    0, 0,
+
+    0, 0,
+
+    0,
+    pkey_dh_derive,
+
+    pkey_dh_ctrl,
+    pkey_dh_ctrl_str
+};
+
+const EVP_PKEY_METHOD dhx_pkey_meth = {
+    EVP_PKEY_DHX,
+    0,
+    pkey_dh_init,
+    pkey_dh_copy,
+    pkey_dh_cleanup,
+
+    0,
+    pkey_dh_paramgen,
+
+    0,
+    pkey_dh_keygen,
+
+    0,
+    0,
+
+    0,
+    0,
+
+    0, 0,
+
+    0, 0, 0, 0,
+
+    0, 0,
+
+    0, 0,
+
+    0,
+    pkey_dh_derive,
+
+    pkey_dh_ctrl,
+    pkey_dh_ctrl_str
+};
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dh/dh_prn.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dh/dh_prn.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..283fb0f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dh/dh_prn.c
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+int DHparams_print_fp(FILE *fp, const DH *x)
+{
+    BIO *b;
+    int ret;
+
+    if ((b = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL) {
+        DHerr(DH_F_DHPARAMS_PRINT_FP, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+        return (0);
+    }
+    BIO_set_fp(b, fp, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+    ret = DHparams_print(b, x);
+    BIO_free(b);
+    return (ret);
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dh/dh_rfc5114.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dh/dh_rfc5114.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c4a2195
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dh/dh_rfc5114.c
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "dh_locl.h"
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include "internal/bn_dh.h"
+
+/*
+ * Macro to make a DH structure from BIGNUM data. NB: although just copying
+ * the BIGNUM static pointers would be more efficient, we can't do that
+ * because they get wiped using BN_clear_free() when DH_free() is called.
+ */
+
+#define make_dh(x) \
+DH *DH_get_##x(void) \
+{ \
+    DH *dh = DH_new(); \
+\
+    if (dh == NULL) \
+        return NULL; \
+    dh->p = BN_dup(&_bignum_dh##x##_p); \
+    dh->g = BN_dup(&_bignum_dh##x##_g); \
+    dh->q = BN_dup(&_bignum_dh##x##_q); \
+    if (dh->p == NULL || dh->q == NULL || dh->g == NULL) {\
+        DH_free(dh); \
+        return NULL; \
+    } \
+    return dh; \
+}
+
+make_dh(1024_160)
+make_dh(2048_224)
+make_dh(2048_256)
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dllmain.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dllmain.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..91904aa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dllmain.c
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "internal/cryptlib_int.h"
+
+#if defined(_WIN32) || defined(__CYGWIN__)
+# ifdef __CYGWIN__
+/* pick DLL_[PROCESS|THREAD]_[ATTACH|DETACH] definitions */
+#  include <windows.h>
+/*
+ * this has side-effect of _WIN32 getting defined, which otherwise is
+ * mutually exclusive with __CYGWIN__...
+ */
+# endif
+
+/*
+ * All we really need to do is remove the 'error' state when a thread
+ * detaches
+ */
+
+BOOL WINAPI DllMain(HINSTANCE hinstDLL, DWORD fdwReason, LPVOID lpvReserved);
+BOOL WINAPI DllMain(HINSTANCE hinstDLL, DWORD fdwReason, LPVOID lpvReserved)
+{
+    switch (fdwReason) {
+    case DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH:
+        OPENSSL_cpuid_setup();
+# if defined(_WIN32_WINNT)
+        {
+            IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *dos_header = (IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *) hinstDLL;
+            IMAGE_NT_HEADERS *nt_headers;
+
+            if (dos_header->e_magic == IMAGE_DOS_SIGNATURE) {
+                nt_headers = (IMAGE_NT_HEADERS *) ((char *)dos_header
+                                                   + dos_header->e_lfanew);
+                if (nt_headers->Signature == IMAGE_NT_SIGNATURE &&
+                    hinstDLL !=
+                    (HINSTANCE) (nt_headers->OptionalHeader.ImageBase))
+                    OPENSSL_NONPIC_relocated = 1;
+            }
+        }
+# endif
+        break;
+    case DLL_THREAD_ATTACH:
+        break;
+    case DLL_THREAD_DETACH:
+        OPENSSL_thread_stop();
+        break;
+    case DLL_PROCESS_DETACH:
+        break;
+    }
+    return (TRUE);
+}
+#endif
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dsa/build.info b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dsa/build.info
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2e75985
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dsa/build.info
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+LIBS=../../libcrypto
+SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
+        dsa_gen.c dsa_key.c dsa_lib.c dsa_asn1.c dsa_vrf.c dsa_sign.c \
+        dsa_err.c dsa_ossl.c dsa_depr.c dsa_ameth.c dsa_pmeth.c dsa_prn.c \
+        dsa_meth.c
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d4e4066
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c
@@ -0,0 +1,572 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include "dsa_locl.h"
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/cms.h>
+#include "internal/asn1_int.h"
+#include "internal/evp_int.h"
+
+static int dsa_pub_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509_PUBKEY *pubkey)
+{
+    const unsigned char *p, *pm;
+    int pklen, pmlen;
+    int ptype;
+    const void *pval;
+    const ASN1_STRING *pstr;
+    X509_ALGOR *palg;
+    ASN1_INTEGER *public_key = NULL;
+
+    DSA *dsa = NULL;
+
+    if (!X509_PUBKEY_get0_param(NULL, &p, &pklen, &palg, pubkey))
+        return 0;
+    X509_ALGOR_get0(NULL, &ptype, &pval, palg);
+
+    if (ptype == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) {
+        pstr = pval;
+        pm = pstr->data;
+        pmlen = pstr->length;
+
+        if ((dsa = d2i_DSAparams(NULL, &pm, pmlen)) == NULL) {
+            DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PUB_DECODE, DSA_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+    } else if ((ptype == V_ASN1_NULL) || (ptype == V_ASN1_UNDEF)) {
+        if ((dsa = DSA_new()) == NULL) {
+            DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PUB_DECODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    } else {
+        DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PUB_DECODE, DSA_R_PARAMETER_ENCODING_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if ((public_key = d2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, &p, pklen)) == NULL) {
+        DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PUB_DECODE, DSA_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if ((dsa->pub_key = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(public_key, NULL)) == NULL) {
+        DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PUB_DECODE, DSA_R_BN_DECODE_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    ASN1_INTEGER_free(public_key);
+    EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(pkey, dsa);
+    return 1;
+
+ err:
+    ASN1_INTEGER_free(public_key);
+    DSA_free(dsa);
+    return 0;
+
+}
+
+static int dsa_pub_encode(X509_PUBKEY *pk, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    DSA *dsa;
+    int ptype;
+    unsigned char *penc = NULL;
+    int penclen;
+    ASN1_STRING *str = NULL;
+    ASN1_INTEGER *pubint = NULL;
+    ASN1_OBJECT *aobj;
+
+    dsa = pkey->pkey.dsa;
+    if (pkey->save_parameters && dsa->p && dsa->q && dsa->g) {
+        str = ASN1_STRING_new();
+        if (str == NULL) {
+            DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PUB_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        str->length = i2d_DSAparams(dsa, &str->data);
+        if (str->length <= 0) {
+            DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PUB_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        ptype = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE;
+    } else
+        ptype = V_ASN1_UNDEF;
+
+    pubint = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(dsa->pub_key, NULL);
+
+    if (pubint == NULL) {
+        DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PUB_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    penclen = i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(pubint, &penc);
+    ASN1_INTEGER_free(pubint);
+
+    if (penclen <= 0) {
+        DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PUB_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    aobj = OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_PKEY_DSA);
+    if (aobj == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (X509_PUBKEY_set0_param(pk, aobj, ptype, str, penc, penclen))
+        return 1;
+
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_free(penc);
+    ASN1_STRING_free(str);
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * In PKCS#8 DSA: you just get a private key integer and parameters in the
+ * AlgorithmIdentifier the pubkey must be recalculated.
+ */
+
+static int dsa_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, const PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8)
+{
+    const unsigned char *p, *pm;
+    int pklen, pmlen;
+    int ptype;
+    const void *pval;
+    const ASN1_STRING *pstr;
+    const X509_ALGOR *palg;
+    ASN1_INTEGER *privkey = NULL;
+    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+
+    DSA *dsa = NULL;
+
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    if (!PKCS8_pkey_get0(NULL, &p, &pklen, &palg, p8))
+        return 0;
+    X509_ALGOR_get0(NULL, &ptype, &pval, palg);
+
+    if ((privkey = d2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, &p, pklen)) == NULL)
+        goto decerr;
+    if (privkey->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER || ptype != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
+        goto decerr;
+
+    pstr = pval;
+    pm = pstr->data;
+    pmlen = pstr->length;
+    if ((dsa = d2i_DSAparams(NULL, &pm, pmlen)) == NULL)
+        goto decerr;
+    /* We have parameters now set private key */
+    if ((dsa->priv_key = BN_secure_new()) == NULL
+        || !ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(privkey, dsa->priv_key)) {
+        DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_DECODE, DSA_R_BN_ERROR);
+        goto dsaerr;
+    }
+    /* Calculate public key */
+    if ((dsa->pub_key = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+        DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_DECODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto dsaerr;
+    }
+    if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
+        DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_DECODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto dsaerr;
+    }
+
+    BN_set_flags(dsa->priv_key, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+    if (!BN_mod_exp(dsa->pub_key, dsa->g, dsa->priv_key, dsa->p, ctx)) {
+        DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_DECODE, DSA_R_BN_ERROR);
+        goto dsaerr;
+    }
+
+    EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(pkey, dsa);
+
+    ret = 1;
+    goto done;
+
+ decerr:
+    DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_DECODE, DSA_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ dsaerr:
+    DSA_free(dsa);
+ done:
+    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+    ASN1_STRING_clear_free(privkey);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int dsa_priv_encode(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    ASN1_STRING *params = NULL;
+    ASN1_INTEGER *prkey = NULL;
+    unsigned char *dp = NULL;
+    int dplen;
+
+    if (!pkey->pkey.dsa || !pkey->pkey.dsa->priv_key) {
+        DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_ENCODE, DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    params = ASN1_STRING_new();
+
+    if (params == NULL) {
+        DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    params->length = i2d_DSAparams(pkey->pkey.dsa, &params->data);
+    if (params->length <= 0) {
+        DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    params->type = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE;
+
+    /* Get private key into integer */
+    prkey = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(pkey->pkey.dsa->priv_key, NULL);
+
+    if (!prkey) {
+        DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_ENCODE, DSA_R_BN_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    dplen = i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(prkey, &dp);
+
+    ASN1_STRING_clear_free(prkey);
+    prkey = NULL;
+
+    if (!PKCS8_pkey_set0(p8, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_dsa), 0,
+                         V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, params, dp, dplen))
+        goto err;
+
+    return 1;
+
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_free(dp);
+    ASN1_STRING_free(params);
+    ASN1_STRING_clear_free(prkey);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int int_dsa_size(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    return (DSA_size(pkey->pkey.dsa));
+}
+
+static int dsa_bits(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    return DSA_bits(pkey->pkey.dsa);
+}
+
+static int dsa_security_bits(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    return DSA_security_bits(pkey->pkey.dsa);
+}
+
+static int dsa_missing_parameters(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    DSA *dsa;
+    dsa = pkey->pkey.dsa;
+    if (dsa == NULL || dsa->p == NULL || dsa->q == NULL || dsa->g == NULL)
+        return 1;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int dsa_copy_parameters(EVP_PKEY *to, const EVP_PKEY *from)
+{
+    BIGNUM *a;
+
+    if (to->pkey.dsa == NULL) {
+        to->pkey.dsa = DSA_new();
+        if (to->pkey.dsa == NULL)
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    if ((a = BN_dup(from->pkey.dsa->p)) == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    BN_free(to->pkey.dsa->p);
+    to->pkey.dsa->p = a;
+
+    if ((a = BN_dup(from->pkey.dsa->q)) == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    BN_free(to->pkey.dsa->q);
+    to->pkey.dsa->q = a;
+
+    if ((a = BN_dup(from->pkey.dsa->g)) == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    BN_free(to->pkey.dsa->g);
+    to->pkey.dsa->g = a;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int dsa_cmp_parameters(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b)
+{
+    if (BN_cmp(a->pkey.dsa->p, b->pkey.dsa->p) ||
+        BN_cmp(a->pkey.dsa->q, b->pkey.dsa->q) ||
+        BN_cmp(a->pkey.dsa->g, b->pkey.dsa->g))
+        return 0;
+    else
+        return 1;
+}
+
+static int dsa_pub_cmp(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b)
+{
+    if (BN_cmp(b->pkey.dsa->pub_key, a->pkey.dsa->pub_key) != 0)
+        return 0;
+    else
+        return 1;
+}
+
+static void int_dsa_free(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    DSA_free(pkey->pkey.dsa);
+}
+
+static int do_dsa_print(BIO *bp, const DSA *x, int off, int ptype)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    const char *ktype = NULL;
+    const BIGNUM *priv_key, *pub_key;
+
+    if (ptype == 2)
+        priv_key = x->priv_key;
+    else
+        priv_key = NULL;
+
+    if (ptype > 0)
+        pub_key = x->pub_key;
+    else
+        pub_key = NULL;
+
+    if (ptype == 2)
+        ktype = "Private-Key";
+    else if (ptype == 1)
+        ktype = "Public-Key";
+    else
+        ktype = "DSA-Parameters";
+
+    if (priv_key) {
+        if (!BIO_indent(bp, off, 128))
+            goto err;
+        if (BIO_printf(bp, "%s: (%d bit)\n", ktype, BN_num_bits(x->p))
+            <= 0)
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "priv:", priv_key, NULL, off))
+        goto err;
+    if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "pub: ", pub_key, NULL, off))
+        goto err;
+    if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "P:   ", x->p, NULL, off))
+        goto err;
+    if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "Q:   ", x->q, NULL, off))
+        goto err;
+    if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "G:   ", x->g, NULL, off))
+        goto err;
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static int dsa_param_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+                            const unsigned char **pder, int derlen)
+{
+    DSA *dsa;
+
+    if ((dsa = d2i_DSAparams(NULL, pder, derlen)) == NULL) {
+        DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PARAM_DECODE, ERR_R_DSA_LIB);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(pkey, dsa);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int dsa_param_encode(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, unsigned char **pder)
+{
+    return i2d_DSAparams(pkey->pkey.dsa, pder);
+}
+
+static int dsa_param_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent,
+                           ASN1_PCTX *ctx)
+{
+    return do_dsa_print(bp, pkey->pkey.dsa, indent, 0);
+}
+
+static int dsa_pub_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent,
+                         ASN1_PCTX *ctx)
+{
+    return do_dsa_print(bp, pkey->pkey.dsa, indent, 1);
+}
+
+static int dsa_priv_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent,
+                          ASN1_PCTX *ctx)
+{
+    return do_dsa_print(bp, pkey->pkey.dsa, indent, 2);
+}
+
+static int old_dsa_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+                               const unsigned char **pder, int derlen)
+{
+    DSA *dsa;
+
+    if ((dsa = d2i_DSAPrivateKey(NULL, pder, derlen)) == NULL) {
+        DSAerr(DSA_F_OLD_DSA_PRIV_DECODE, ERR_R_DSA_LIB);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(pkey, dsa);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int old_dsa_priv_encode(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, unsigned char **pder)
+{
+    return i2d_DSAPrivateKey(pkey->pkey.dsa, pder);
+}
+
+static int dsa_sig_print(BIO *bp, const X509_ALGOR *sigalg,
+                         const ASN1_STRING *sig, int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx)
+{
+    DSA_SIG *dsa_sig;
+    const unsigned char *p;
+
+    if (!sig) {
+        if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n") <= 0)
+            return 0;
+        else
+            return 1;
+    }
+    p = sig->data;
+    dsa_sig = d2i_DSA_SIG(NULL, &p, sig->length);
+    if (dsa_sig) {
+        int rv = 0;
+        const BIGNUM *r, *s;
+
+        DSA_SIG_get0(dsa_sig, &r, &s);
+
+        if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) != 1)
+            goto err;
+
+        if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "r:   ", r, NULL, indent))
+            goto err;
+        if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "s:   ", s, NULL, indent))
+            goto err;
+        rv = 1;
+ err:
+        DSA_SIG_free(dsa_sig);
+        return rv;
+    }
+    return X509_signature_dump(bp, sig, indent);
+}
+
+static int dsa_pkey_ctrl(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int op, long arg1, void *arg2)
+{
+    switch (op) {
+    case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN:
+        if (arg1 == 0) {
+            int snid, hnid;
+            X509_ALGOR *alg1, *alg2;
+            PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_get0_algs(arg2, NULL, &alg1, &alg2);
+            if (alg1 == NULL || alg1->algorithm == NULL)
+                return -1;
+            hnid = OBJ_obj2nid(alg1->algorithm);
+            if (hnid == NID_undef)
+                return -1;
+            if (!OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(&snid, hnid, EVP_PKEY_id(pkey)))
+                return -1;
+            X509_ALGOR_set0(alg2, OBJ_nid2obj(snid), V_ASN1_UNDEF, 0);
+        }
+        return 1;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
+    case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_SIGN:
+        if (arg1 == 0) {
+            int snid, hnid;
+            X509_ALGOR *alg1, *alg2;
+            CMS_SignerInfo_get0_algs(arg2, NULL, NULL, &alg1, &alg2);
+            if (alg1 == NULL || alg1->algorithm == NULL)
+                return -1;
+            hnid = OBJ_obj2nid(alg1->algorithm);
+            if (hnid == NID_undef)
+                return -1;
+            if (!OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(&snid, hnid, EVP_PKEY_id(pkey)))
+                return -1;
+            X509_ALGOR_set0(alg2, OBJ_nid2obj(snid), V_ASN1_UNDEF, 0);
+        }
+        return 1;
+
+    case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_RI_TYPE:
+        *(int *)arg2 = CMS_RECIPINFO_NONE;
+        return 1;
+#endif
+
+    case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_DEFAULT_MD_NID:
+        *(int *)arg2 = NID_sha256;
+        return 2;
+
+    default:
+        return -2;
+
+    }
+
+}
+
+/* NB these are sorted in pkey_id order, lowest first */
+
+const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD dsa_asn1_meths[5] = {
+
+    {
+     EVP_PKEY_DSA2,
+     EVP_PKEY_DSA,
+     ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS},
+
+    {
+     EVP_PKEY_DSA1,
+     EVP_PKEY_DSA,
+     ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS},
+
+    {
+     EVP_PKEY_DSA4,
+     EVP_PKEY_DSA,
+     ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS},
+
+    {
+     EVP_PKEY_DSA3,
+     EVP_PKEY_DSA,
+     ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS},
+
+    {
+     EVP_PKEY_DSA,
+     EVP_PKEY_DSA,
+     0,
+
+     "DSA",
+     "OpenSSL DSA method",
+
+     dsa_pub_decode,
+     dsa_pub_encode,
+     dsa_pub_cmp,
+     dsa_pub_print,
+
+     dsa_priv_decode,
+     dsa_priv_encode,
+     dsa_priv_print,
+
+     int_dsa_size,
+     dsa_bits,
+     dsa_security_bits,
+
+     dsa_param_decode,
+     dsa_param_encode,
+     dsa_missing_parameters,
+     dsa_copy_parameters,
+     dsa_cmp_parameters,
+     dsa_param_print,
+     dsa_sig_print,
+
+     int_dsa_free,
+     dsa_pkey_ctrl,
+     old_dsa_priv_decode,
+     old_dsa_priv_encode}
+};
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dsa/dsa_asn1.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dsa/dsa_asn1.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..551c107
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dsa/dsa_asn1.c
@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "dsa_locl.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(DSA_SIG) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(DSA_SIG, r, CBIGNUM),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(DSA_SIG, s, CBIGNUM)
+} static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(DSA_SIG)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const_fname(DSA_SIG, DSA_SIG, DSA_SIG)
+
+DSA_SIG *DSA_SIG_new(void)
+{
+    DSA_SIG *sig = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*sig));
+    if (sig == NULL)
+        DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_SIG_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return sig;
+}
+
+void DSA_SIG_free(DSA_SIG *sig)
+{
+    if (sig == NULL)
+        return;
+    BN_clear_free(sig->r);
+    BN_clear_free(sig->s);
+    OPENSSL_free(sig);
+}
+
+void DSA_SIG_get0(const DSA_SIG *sig, const BIGNUM **pr, const BIGNUM **ps)
+{
+    if (pr != NULL)
+        *pr = sig->r;
+    if (ps != NULL)
+        *ps = sig->s;
+}
+
+int DSA_SIG_set0(DSA_SIG *sig, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *s)
+{
+    if (r == NULL || s == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    BN_clear_free(sig->r);
+    BN_clear_free(sig->s);
+    sig->r = r;
+    sig->s = s;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Override the default free and new methods */
+static int dsa_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+                  void *exarg)
+{
+    if (operation == ASN1_OP_NEW_PRE) {
+        *pval = (ASN1_VALUE *)DSA_new();
+        if (*pval != NULL)
+            return 2;
+        return 0;
+    } else if (operation == ASN1_OP_FREE_PRE) {
+        DSA_free((DSA *)*pval);
+        *pval = NULL;
+        return 2;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE_cb(DSAPrivateKey, dsa_cb) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(DSA, version, LONG),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(DSA, p, BIGNUM),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(DSA, q, BIGNUM),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(DSA, g, BIGNUM),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(DSA, pub_key, BIGNUM),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(DSA, priv_key, CBIGNUM)
+} static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_cb(DSA, DSAPrivateKey)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const_fname(DSA, DSAPrivateKey, DSAPrivateKey)
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE_cb(DSAparams, dsa_cb) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(DSA, p, BIGNUM),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(DSA, q, BIGNUM),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(DSA, g, BIGNUM),
+} static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_cb(DSA, DSAparams)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const_fname(DSA, DSAparams, DSAparams)
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE_cb(DSAPublicKey, dsa_cb) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(DSA, pub_key, BIGNUM),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(DSA, p, BIGNUM),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(DSA, q, BIGNUM),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(DSA, g, BIGNUM)
+} static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_cb(DSA, DSAPublicKey)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const_fname(DSA, DSAPublicKey, DSAPublicKey)
+
+DSA *DSAparams_dup(DSA *dsa)
+{
+    return ASN1_item_dup(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(DSAparams), dsa);
+}
+
+int DSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen,
+             unsigned char *sig, unsigned int *siglen, DSA *dsa)
+{
+    DSA_SIG *s;
+    RAND_seed(dgst, dlen);
+    s = DSA_do_sign(dgst, dlen, dsa);
+    if (s == NULL) {
+        *siglen = 0;
+        return (0);
+    }
+    *siglen = i2d_DSA_SIG(s, &sig);
+    DSA_SIG_free(s);
+    return (1);
+}
+
+/* data has already been hashed (probably with SHA or SHA-1). */
+/*-
+ * returns
+ *      1: correct signature
+ *      0: incorrect signature
+ *     -1: error
+ */
+int DSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
+               const unsigned char *sigbuf, int siglen, DSA *dsa)
+{
+    DSA_SIG *s;
+    const unsigned char *p = sigbuf;
+    unsigned char *der = NULL;
+    int derlen = -1;
+    int ret = -1;
+
+    s = DSA_SIG_new();
+    if (s == NULL)
+        return (ret);
+    if (d2i_DSA_SIG(&s, &p, siglen) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    /* Ensure signature uses DER and doesn't have trailing garbage */
+    derlen = i2d_DSA_SIG(s, &der);
+    if (derlen != siglen || memcmp(sigbuf, der, derlen))
+        goto err;
+    ret = DSA_do_verify(dgst, dgst_len, s, dsa);
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(der, derlen);
+    DSA_SIG_free(s);
+    return (ret);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dsa/dsa_depr.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dsa/dsa_depr.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f51aea7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dsa/dsa_depr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * This file contains deprecated function(s) that are now wrappers to the new
+ * version(s).
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Parameter generation follows the updated Appendix 2.2 for FIPS PUB 186,
+ * also Appendix 2.2 of FIPS PUB 186-1 (i.e. use SHA as defined in FIPS PUB
+ * 180-1)
+ */
+#define xxxHASH    EVP_sha1()
+
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT >= 0x00908000L
+NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT
+#else
+
+# include <stdio.h>
+# include <time.h>
+# include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+# include <openssl/evp.h>
+# include <openssl/bn.h>
+# include <openssl/dsa.h>
+# include <openssl/sha.h>
+
+DSA *DSA_generate_parameters(int bits,
+                             unsigned char *seed_in, int seed_len,
+                             int *counter_ret, unsigned long *h_ret,
+                             void (*callback) (int, int, void *),
+                             void *cb_arg)
+{
+    BN_GENCB *cb;
+    DSA *ret;
+
+    if ((ret = DSA_new()) == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    cb = BN_GENCB_new();
+    if (cb == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    BN_GENCB_set_old(cb, callback, cb_arg);
+
+    if (DSA_generate_parameters_ex(ret, bits, seed_in, seed_len,
+                                   counter_ret, h_ret, cb)) {
+        BN_GENCB_free(cb);
+        return ret;
+    }
+    BN_GENCB_free(cb);
+err:
+    DSA_free(ret);
+    return NULL;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dsa/dsa_err.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dsa/dsa_err.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b8f0af4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dsa/dsa_err.c
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+/*
+ * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+
+# define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DSA,func,0)
+# define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DSA,0,reason)
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA DSA_str_functs[] = {
+    {ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_DSAPARAMS_PRINT), "DSAparams_print"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_DSAPARAMS_PRINT_FP), "DSAparams_print_fp"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_DSA_BUILTIN_PARAMGEN), "dsa_builtin_paramgen"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_DSA_BUILTIN_PARAMGEN2), "dsa_builtin_paramgen2"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_DSA_DO_SIGN), "DSA_do_sign"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY), "DSA_do_verify"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_DSA_METH_DUP), "DSA_meth_dup"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_DSA_METH_NEW), "DSA_meth_new"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_DSA_METH_SET1_NAME), "DSA_meth_set1_name"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_DSA_NEW_METHOD), "DSA_new_method"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_DSA_PARAM_DECODE), "dsa_param_decode"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_DSA_PRINT_FP), "DSA_print_fp"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_DECODE), "dsa_priv_decode"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_ENCODE), "dsa_priv_encode"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_DSA_PUB_DECODE), "dsa_pub_decode"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_DSA_PUB_ENCODE), "dsa_pub_encode"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_DSA_SIGN), "DSA_sign"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_DSA_SIGN_SETUP), "DSA_sign_setup"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_DSA_SIG_NEW), "DSA_SIG_new"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_OLD_DSA_PRIV_DECODE), "old_dsa_priv_decode"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_PKEY_DSA_CTRL), "pkey_dsa_ctrl"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_PKEY_DSA_KEYGEN), "pkey_dsa_keygen"},
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA DSA_str_reasons[] = {
+    {ERR_REASON(DSA_R_BAD_Q_VALUE), "bad q value"},
+    {ERR_REASON(DSA_R_BN_DECODE_ERROR), "bn decode error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(DSA_R_BN_ERROR), "bn error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(DSA_R_DECODE_ERROR), "decode error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(DSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_TYPE), "invalid digest type"},
+    {ERR_REASON(DSA_R_INVALID_PARAMETERS), "invalid parameters"},
+    {ERR_REASON(DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS), "missing parameters"},
+    {ERR_REASON(DSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE), "modulus too large"},
+    {ERR_REASON(DSA_R_NO_PARAMETERS_SET), "no parameters set"},
+    {ERR_REASON(DSA_R_PARAMETER_ENCODING_ERROR), "parameter encoding error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(DSA_R_Q_NOT_PRIME), "q not prime"},
+    {ERR_REASON(DSA_R_SEED_LEN_SMALL),
+     "seed_len is less than the length of q"},
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+
+#endif
+
+int ERR_load_DSA_strings(void)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+
+    if (ERR_func_error_string(DSA_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) {
+        ERR_load_strings(0, DSA_str_functs);
+        ERR_load_strings(0, DSA_str_reasons);
+    }
+#endif
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e58ad8d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c
@@ -0,0 +1,603 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Parameter generation follows the updated Appendix 2.2 for FIPS PUB 186,
+ * also Appendix 2.2 of FIPS PUB 186-1 (i.e. use SHA as defined in FIPS PUB
+ * 180-1)
+ */
+#define xxxHASH    EVP_sha1()
+
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
+#include "dsa_locl.h"
+
+int DSA_generate_parameters_ex(DSA *ret, int bits,
+                               const unsigned char *seed_in, int seed_len,
+                               int *counter_ret, unsigned long *h_ret,
+                               BN_GENCB *cb)
+{
+    if (ret->meth->dsa_paramgen)
+        return ret->meth->dsa_paramgen(ret, bits, seed_in, seed_len,
+                                       counter_ret, h_ret, cb);
+    else {
+        const EVP_MD *evpmd = bits >= 2048 ? EVP_sha256() : EVP_sha1();
+        size_t qbits = EVP_MD_size(evpmd) * 8;
+
+        return dsa_builtin_paramgen(ret, bits, qbits, evpmd,
+                                    seed_in, seed_len, NULL, counter_ret,
+                                    h_ret, cb);
+    }
+}
+
+int dsa_builtin_paramgen(DSA *ret, size_t bits, size_t qbits,
+                         const EVP_MD *evpmd, const unsigned char *seed_in,
+                         size_t seed_len, unsigned char *seed_out,
+                         int *counter_ret, unsigned long *h_ret, BN_GENCB *cb)
+{
+    int ok = 0;
+    unsigned char seed[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+    unsigned char md[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+    unsigned char buf[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH], buf2[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+    BIGNUM *r0, *W, *X, *c, *test;
+    BIGNUM *g = NULL, *q = NULL, *p = NULL;
+    BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL;
+    int i, k, n = 0, m = 0, qsize = qbits >> 3;
+    int counter = 0;
+    int r = 0;
+    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+    unsigned int h = 2;
+
+    if (qsize != SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH && qsize != SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH &&
+        qsize != SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)
+        /* invalid q size */
+        return 0;
+
+    if (evpmd == NULL)
+        /* use SHA1 as default */
+        evpmd = EVP_sha1();
+
+    if (bits < 512)
+        bits = 512;
+
+    bits = (bits + 63) / 64 * 64;
+
+    if (seed_in != NULL) {
+        if (seed_len < (size_t)qsize) {
+            DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_BUILTIN_PARAMGEN, DSA_R_SEED_LEN_SMALL);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        if (seed_len > (size_t)qsize) {
+            /* Only consume as much seed as is expected. */
+            seed_len = qsize;
+        }
+        memcpy(seed, seed_in, seed_len);
+    }
+
+    if ((mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+
+    r0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    g = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    W = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    q = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    X = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    c = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    p = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    test = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+
+    if (test == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!BN_lshift(test, BN_value_one(), bits - 1))
+        goto err;
+
+    for (;;) {
+        for (;;) {              /* find q */
+            int use_random_seed = (seed_in == NULL);
+
+            /* step 1 */
+            if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 0, m++))
+                goto err;
+
+            if (use_random_seed) {
+                if (RAND_bytes(seed, qsize) <= 0)
+                    goto err;
+            } else {
+                /* If we come back through, use random seed next time. */
+                seed_in = NULL;
+            }
+            memcpy(buf, seed, qsize);
+            memcpy(buf2, seed, qsize);
+            /* precompute "SEED + 1" for step 7: */
+            for (i = qsize - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+                buf[i]++;
+                if (buf[i] != 0)
+                    break;
+            }
+
+            /* step 2 */
+            if (!EVP_Digest(seed, qsize, md, NULL, evpmd, NULL))
+                goto err;
+            if (!EVP_Digest(buf, qsize, buf2, NULL, evpmd, NULL))
+                goto err;
+            for (i = 0; i < qsize; i++)
+                md[i] ^= buf2[i];
+
+            /* step 3 */
+            md[0] |= 0x80;
+            md[qsize - 1] |= 0x01;
+            if (!BN_bin2bn(md, qsize, q))
+                goto err;
+
+            /* step 4 */
+            r = BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(q, DSS_prime_checks, ctx,
+                                        use_random_seed, cb);
+            if (r > 0)
+                break;
+            if (r != 0)
+                goto err;
+
+            /* do a callback call */
+            /* step 5 */
+        }
+
+        if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, 0))
+            goto err;
+        if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 0))
+            goto err;
+
+        /* step 6 */
+        counter = 0;
+        /* "offset = 2" */
+
+        n = (bits - 1) / 160;
+
+        for (;;) {
+            if ((counter != 0) && !BN_GENCB_call(cb, 0, counter))
+                goto err;
+
+            /* step 7 */
+            BN_zero(W);
+            /* now 'buf' contains "SEED + offset - 1" */
+            for (k = 0; k <= n; k++) {
+                /*
+                 * obtain "SEED + offset + k" by incrementing:
+                 */
+                for (i = qsize - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+                    buf[i]++;
+                    if (buf[i] != 0)
+                        break;
+                }
+
+                if (!EVP_Digest(buf, qsize, md, NULL, evpmd, NULL))
+                    goto err;
+
+                /* step 8 */
+                if (!BN_bin2bn(md, qsize, r0))
+                    goto err;
+                if (!BN_lshift(r0, r0, (qsize << 3) * k))
+                    goto err;
+                if (!BN_add(W, W, r0))
+                    goto err;
+            }
+
+            /* more of step 8 */
+            if (!BN_mask_bits(W, bits - 1))
+                goto err;
+            if (!BN_copy(X, W))
+                goto err;
+            if (!BN_add(X, X, test))
+                goto err;
+
+            /* step 9 */
+            if (!BN_lshift1(r0, q))
+                goto err;
+            if (!BN_mod(c, X, r0, ctx))
+                goto err;
+            if (!BN_sub(r0, c, BN_value_one()))
+                goto err;
+            if (!BN_sub(p, X, r0))
+                goto err;
+
+            /* step 10 */
+            if (BN_cmp(p, test) >= 0) {
+                /* step 11 */
+                r = BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(p, DSS_prime_checks, ctx, 1, cb);
+                if (r > 0)
+                    goto end;   /* found it */
+                if (r != 0)
+                    goto err;
+            }
+
+            /* step 13 */
+            counter++;
+            /* "offset = offset + n + 1" */
+
+            /* step 14 */
+            if (counter >= 4096)
+                break;
+        }
+    }
+ end:
+    if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, 1))
+        goto err;
+
+    /* We now need to generate g */
+    /* Set r0=(p-1)/q */
+    if (!BN_sub(test, p, BN_value_one()))
+        goto err;
+    if (!BN_div(r0, NULL, test, q, ctx))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!BN_set_word(test, h))
+        goto err;
+    if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont, p, ctx))
+        goto err;
+
+    for (;;) {
+        /* g=test^r0%p */
+        if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(g, test, r0, p, ctx, mont))
+            goto err;
+        if (!BN_is_one(g))
+            break;
+        if (!BN_add(test, test, BN_value_one()))
+            goto err;
+        h++;
+    }
+
+    if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 1))
+        goto err;
+
+    ok = 1;
+ err:
+    if (ok) {
+        BN_free(ret->p);
+        BN_free(ret->q);
+        BN_free(ret->g);
+        ret->p = BN_dup(p);
+        ret->q = BN_dup(q);
+        ret->g = BN_dup(g);
+        if (ret->p == NULL || ret->q == NULL || ret->g == NULL) {
+            ok = 0;
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (counter_ret != NULL)
+            *counter_ret = counter;
+        if (h_ret != NULL)
+            *h_ret = h;
+        if (seed_out)
+            memcpy(seed_out, seed, qsize);
+    }
+    if (ctx)
+        BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+    BN_MONT_CTX_free(mont);
+    return ok;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is a parameter generation algorithm for the DSA2 algorithm as
+ * described in FIPS 186-3.
+ */
+
+int dsa_builtin_paramgen2(DSA *ret, size_t L, size_t N,
+                          const EVP_MD *evpmd, const unsigned char *seed_in,
+                          size_t seed_len, int idx, unsigned char *seed_out,
+                          int *counter_ret, unsigned long *h_ret,
+                          BN_GENCB *cb)
+{
+    int ok = -1;
+    unsigned char *seed = NULL, *seed_tmp = NULL;
+    unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+    int mdsize;
+    BIGNUM *r0, *W, *X, *c, *test;
+    BIGNUM *g = NULL, *q = NULL, *p = NULL;
+    BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL;
+    int i, k, n = 0, m = 0, qsize = N >> 3;
+    int counter = 0;
+    int r = 0;
+    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+    EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+    unsigned int h = 2;
+
+    if (mctx == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (evpmd == NULL) {
+        if (N == 160)
+            evpmd = EVP_sha1();
+        else if (N == 224)
+            evpmd = EVP_sha224();
+        else
+            evpmd = EVP_sha256();
+    }
+
+    mdsize = EVP_MD_size(evpmd);
+    /* If unverifiable g generation only don't need seed */
+    if (!ret->p || !ret->q || idx >= 0) {
+        if (seed_len == 0)
+            seed_len = mdsize;
+
+        seed = OPENSSL_malloc(seed_len);
+
+        if (seed_out)
+            seed_tmp = seed_out;
+        else
+            seed_tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(seed_len);
+
+        if (seed == NULL || seed_tmp == NULL)
+            goto err;
+
+        if (seed_in)
+            memcpy(seed, seed_in, seed_len);
+
+    }
+
+    if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if ((mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    r0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    g = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    W = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    X = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    c = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    test = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (test == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* if p, q already supplied generate g only */
+    if (ret->p && ret->q) {
+        p = ret->p;
+        q = ret->q;
+        if (idx >= 0)
+            memcpy(seed_tmp, seed, seed_len);
+        goto g_only;
+    } else {
+        p = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+        q = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+        if (q == NULL)
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!BN_lshift(test, BN_value_one(), L - 1))
+        goto err;
+    for (;;) {
+        for (;;) {              /* find q */
+            unsigned char *pmd;
+            /* step 1 */
+            if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 0, m++))
+                goto err;
+
+            if (!seed_in) {
+                if (RAND_bytes(seed, seed_len) <= 0)
+                    goto err;
+            }
+            /* step 2 */
+            if (!EVP_Digest(seed, seed_len, md, NULL, evpmd, NULL))
+                goto err;
+            /* Take least significant bits of md */
+            if (mdsize > qsize)
+                pmd = md + mdsize - qsize;
+            else
+                pmd = md;
+
+            if (mdsize < qsize)
+                memset(md + mdsize, 0, qsize - mdsize);
+
+            /* step 3 */
+            pmd[0] |= 0x80;
+            pmd[qsize - 1] |= 0x01;
+            if (!BN_bin2bn(pmd, qsize, q))
+                goto err;
+
+            /* step 4 */
+            r = BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(q, DSS_prime_checks, ctx,
+                                        seed_in ? 1 : 0, cb);
+            if (r > 0)
+                break;
+            if (r != 0)
+                goto err;
+            /* Provided seed didn't produce a prime: error */
+            if (seed_in) {
+                ok = 0;
+                DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_BUILTIN_PARAMGEN2, DSA_R_Q_NOT_PRIME);
+                goto err;
+            }
+
+            /* do a callback call */
+            /* step 5 */
+        }
+        /* Copy seed to seed_out before we mess with it */
+        if (seed_out)
+            memcpy(seed_out, seed, seed_len);
+
+        if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, 0))
+            goto err;
+        if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 0))
+            goto err;
+
+        /* step 6 */
+        counter = 0;
+        /* "offset = 1" */
+
+        n = (L - 1) / (mdsize << 3);
+
+        for (;;) {
+            if ((counter != 0) && !BN_GENCB_call(cb, 0, counter))
+                goto err;
+
+            /* step 7 */
+            BN_zero(W);
+            /* now 'buf' contains "SEED + offset - 1" */
+            for (k = 0; k <= n; k++) {
+                /*
+                 * obtain "SEED + offset + k" by incrementing:
+                 */
+                for (i = seed_len - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+                    seed[i]++;
+                    if (seed[i] != 0)
+                        break;
+                }
+
+                if (!EVP_Digest(seed, seed_len, md, NULL, evpmd, NULL))
+                    goto err;
+
+                /* step 8 */
+                if (!BN_bin2bn(md, mdsize, r0))
+                    goto err;
+                if (!BN_lshift(r0, r0, (mdsize << 3) * k))
+                    goto err;
+                if (!BN_add(W, W, r0))
+                    goto err;
+            }
+
+            /* more of step 8 */
+            if (!BN_mask_bits(W, L - 1))
+                goto err;
+            if (!BN_copy(X, W))
+                goto err;
+            if (!BN_add(X, X, test))
+                goto err;
+
+            /* step 9 */
+            if (!BN_lshift1(r0, q))
+                goto err;
+            if (!BN_mod(c, X, r0, ctx))
+                goto err;
+            if (!BN_sub(r0, c, BN_value_one()))
+                goto err;
+            if (!BN_sub(p, X, r0))
+                goto err;
+
+            /* step 10 */
+            if (BN_cmp(p, test) >= 0) {
+                /* step 11 */
+                r = BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(p, DSS_prime_checks, ctx, 1, cb);
+                if (r > 0)
+                    goto end;   /* found it */
+                if (r != 0)
+                    goto err;
+            }
+
+            /* step 13 */
+            counter++;
+            /* "offset = offset + n + 1" */
+
+            /* step 14 */
+            if (counter >= (int)(4 * L))
+                break;
+        }
+        if (seed_in) {
+            ok = 0;
+            DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_BUILTIN_PARAMGEN2, DSA_R_INVALID_PARAMETERS);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+ end:
+    if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, 1))
+        goto err;
+
+ g_only:
+
+    /* We now need to generate g */
+    /* Set r0=(p-1)/q */
+    if (!BN_sub(test, p, BN_value_one()))
+        goto err;
+    if (!BN_div(r0, NULL, test, q, ctx))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (idx < 0) {
+        if (!BN_set_word(test, h))
+            goto err;
+    } else
+        h = 1;
+    if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont, p, ctx))
+        goto err;
+
+    for (;;) {
+        static const unsigned char ggen[4] = { 0x67, 0x67, 0x65, 0x6e };
+        if (idx >= 0) {
+            md[0] = idx & 0xff;
+            md[1] = (h >> 8) & 0xff;
+            md[2] = h & 0xff;
+            if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(mctx, evpmd, NULL))
+                goto err;
+            if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(mctx, seed_tmp, seed_len))
+                goto err;
+            if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(mctx, ggen, sizeof(ggen)))
+                goto err;
+            if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(mctx, md, 3))
+                goto err;
+            if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mctx, md, NULL))
+                goto err;
+            if (!BN_bin2bn(md, mdsize, test))
+                goto err;
+        }
+        /* g=test^r0%p */
+        if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(g, test, r0, p, ctx, mont))
+            goto err;
+        if (!BN_is_one(g))
+            break;
+        if (idx < 0 && !BN_add(test, test, BN_value_one()))
+            goto err;
+        h++;
+        if (idx >= 0 && h > 0xffff)
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 1))
+        goto err;
+
+    ok = 1;
+ err:
+    if (ok == 1) {
+        if (p != ret->p) {
+            BN_free(ret->p);
+            ret->p = BN_dup(p);
+        }
+        if (q != ret->q) {
+            BN_free(ret->q);
+            ret->q = BN_dup(q);
+        }
+        BN_free(ret->g);
+        ret->g = BN_dup(g);
+        if (ret->p == NULL || ret->q == NULL || ret->g == NULL) {
+            ok = -1;
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (counter_ret != NULL)
+            *counter_ret = counter;
+        if (h_ret != NULL)
+            *h_ret = h;
+    }
+    OPENSSL_free(seed);
+    if (seed_out != seed_tmp)
+        OPENSSL_free(seed_tmp);
+    if (ctx)
+        BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+    BN_MONT_CTX_free(mont);
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
+    return ok;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dsa/dsa_key.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dsa/dsa_key.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..31442b1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dsa/dsa_key.c
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include "dsa_locl.h"
+
+static int dsa_builtin_keygen(DSA *dsa);
+
+int DSA_generate_key(DSA *dsa)
+{
+    if (dsa->meth->dsa_keygen)
+        return dsa->meth->dsa_keygen(dsa);
+    return dsa_builtin_keygen(dsa);
+}
+
+static int dsa_builtin_keygen(DSA *dsa)
+{
+    int ok = 0;
+    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL, *priv_key = NULL;
+
+    if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (dsa->priv_key == NULL) {
+        if ((priv_key = BN_secure_new()) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+    } else
+        priv_key = dsa->priv_key;
+
+    do
+        if (!BN_rand_range(priv_key, dsa->q))
+            goto err;
+    while (BN_is_zero(priv_key)) ;
+
+    if (dsa->pub_key == NULL) {
+        if ((pub_key = BN_new()) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+    } else
+        pub_key = dsa->pub_key;
+
+    {
+        BIGNUM *prk = BN_new();
+
+        if (prk == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        BN_with_flags(prk, priv_key, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+        if (!BN_mod_exp(pub_key, dsa->g, prk, dsa->p, ctx)) {
+            BN_free(prk);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        /* We MUST free prk before any further use of priv_key */
+        BN_free(prk);
+    }
+
+    dsa->priv_key = priv_key;
+    dsa->pub_key = pub_key;
+    ok = 1;
+
+ err:
+    if (pub_key != dsa->pub_key)
+        BN_free(pub_key);
+    if (priv_key != dsa->priv_key)
+        BN_free(priv_key);
+    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+    return (ok);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dsa/dsa_lib.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dsa/dsa_lib.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9598846
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dsa/dsa_lib.c
@@ -0,0 +1,332 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* Original version from Steven Schoch <schoch@sheba.arc.nasa.gov> */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include "dsa_locl.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+
+DSA *DSA_new(void)
+{
+    return DSA_new_method(NULL);
+}
+
+int DSA_set_method(DSA *dsa, const DSA_METHOD *meth)
+{
+    /*
+     * NB: The caller is specifically setting a method, so it's not up to us
+     * to deal with which ENGINE it comes from.
+     */
+    const DSA_METHOD *mtmp;
+    mtmp = dsa->meth;
+    if (mtmp->finish)
+        mtmp->finish(dsa);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    ENGINE_finish(dsa->engine);
+    dsa->engine = NULL;
+#endif
+    dsa->meth = meth;
+    if (meth->init)
+        meth->init(dsa);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+const DSA_METHOD *DSA_get_method(DSA *d)
+{
+    return d->meth;
+}
+
+DSA *DSA_new_method(ENGINE *engine)
+{
+    DSA *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
+
+    if (ret == NULL) {
+        DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    ret->references = 1;
+    ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
+    if (ret->lock == NULL) {
+        DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        OPENSSL_free(ret);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    ret->meth = DSA_get_default_method();
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    ret->flags = ret->meth->flags & ~DSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW; /* early default init */
+    if (engine) {
+        if (!ENGINE_init(engine)) {
+            DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        ret->engine = engine;
+    } else
+        ret->engine = ENGINE_get_default_DSA();
+    if (ret->engine) {
+        ret->meth = ENGINE_get_DSA(ret->engine);
+        if (ret->meth == NULL) {
+            DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+#endif
+
+    ret->flags = ret->meth->flags & ~DSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW;
+
+    if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_DSA, ret, &ret->ex_data))
+        goto err;
+
+    if ((ret->meth->init != NULL) && !ret->meth->init(ret)) {
+        DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_INIT_FAIL);
+err:
+        DSA_free(ret);
+        ret = NULL;
+    }
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+void DSA_free(DSA *r)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    if (r == NULL)
+        return;
+
+    CRYPTO_atomic_add(&r->references, -1, &i, r->lock);
+    REF_PRINT_COUNT("DSA", r);
+    if (i > 0)
+        return;
+    REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0);
+
+    if (r->meth->finish)
+        r->meth->finish(r);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    ENGINE_finish(r->engine);
+#endif
+
+    CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_DSA, r, &r->ex_data);
+
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(r->lock);
+
+    BN_clear_free(r->p);
+    BN_clear_free(r->q);
+    BN_clear_free(r->g);
+    BN_clear_free(r->pub_key);
+    BN_clear_free(r->priv_key);
+    OPENSSL_free(r);
+}
+
+int DSA_up_ref(DSA *r)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    if (CRYPTO_atomic_add(&r->references, 1, &i, r->lock) <= 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    REF_PRINT_COUNT("DSA", r);
+    REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 2);
+    return ((i > 1) ? 1 : 0);
+}
+
+int DSA_size(const DSA *r)
+{
+    int ret, i;
+    ASN1_INTEGER bs;
+    unsigned char buf[4];       /* 4 bytes looks really small. However,
+                                 * i2d_ASN1_INTEGER() will not look beyond
+                                 * the first byte, as long as the second
+                                 * parameter is NULL. */
+
+    i = BN_num_bits(r->q);
+    bs.length = (i + 7) / 8;
+    bs.data = buf;
+    bs.type = V_ASN1_INTEGER;
+    /* If the top bit is set the asn1 encoding is 1 larger. */
+    buf[0] = 0xff;
+
+    i = i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(&bs, NULL);
+    i += i;                     /* r and s */
+    ret = ASN1_object_size(1, i, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+int DSA_set_ex_data(DSA *d, int idx, void *arg)
+{
+    return (CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&d->ex_data, idx, arg));
+}
+
+void *DSA_get_ex_data(DSA *d, int idx)
+{
+    return (CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&d->ex_data, idx));
+}
+
+int DSA_security_bits(const DSA *d)
+{
+    if (d->p && d->q)
+        return BN_security_bits(BN_num_bits(d->p), BN_num_bits(d->q));
+    return -1;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+DH *DSA_dup_DH(const DSA *r)
+{
+    /*
+     * DSA has p, q, g, optional pub_key, optional priv_key. DH has p,
+     * optional length, g, optional pub_key, optional priv_key, optional q.
+     */
+
+    DH *ret = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL, *g = NULL, *pub_key = NULL, *priv_key = NULL;
+
+    if (r == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    ret = DH_new();
+    if (ret == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (r->p != NULL || r->g != NULL || r->q != NULL) {
+        if (r->p == NULL || r->g == NULL || r->q == NULL) {
+            /* Shouldn't happen */
+            goto err;
+        }
+        p = BN_dup(r->p);
+        g = BN_dup(r->g);
+        q = BN_dup(r->q);
+        if (p == NULL || g == NULL || q == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(ret, p, q, g))
+            goto err;
+        p = g = q = NULL;
+    }
+
+    if (r->pub_key != NULL) {
+        pub_key = BN_dup(r->pub_key);
+        if (pub_key == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        if (r->priv_key != NULL) {
+            priv_key = BN_dup(r->priv_key);
+            if (priv_key == NULL)
+                goto err;
+        }
+        if (!DH_set0_key(ret, pub_key, priv_key))
+            goto err;
+    } else if (r->priv_key != NULL) {
+        /* Shouldn't happen */
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    return ret;
+
+ err:
+    BN_free(p);
+    BN_free(g);
+    BN_free(q);
+    BN_free(pub_key);
+    BN_free(priv_key);
+    DH_free(ret);
+    return NULL;
+}
+#endif
+
+void DSA_get0_pqg(const DSA *d,
+                  const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q, const BIGNUM **g)
+{
+    if (p != NULL)
+        *p = d->p;
+    if (q != NULL)
+        *q = d->q;
+    if (g != NULL)
+        *g = d->g;
+}
+
+int DSA_set0_pqg(DSA *d, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g)
+{
+    /* If the fields p, q and g in d are NULL, the corresponding input
+     * parameters MUST be non-NULL.
+     */
+    if ((d->p == NULL && p == NULL)
+        || (d->q == NULL && q == NULL)
+        || (d->g == NULL && g == NULL))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (p != NULL) {
+        BN_free(d->p);
+        d->p = p;
+    }
+    if (q != NULL) {
+        BN_free(d->q);
+        d->q = q;
+    }
+    if (g != NULL) {
+        BN_free(d->g);
+        d->g = g;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+void DSA_get0_key(const DSA *d,
+                  const BIGNUM **pub_key, const BIGNUM **priv_key)
+{
+    if (pub_key != NULL)
+        *pub_key = d->pub_key;
+    if (priv_key != NULL)
+        *priv_key = d->priv_key;
+}
+
+int DSA_set0_key(DSA *d, BIGNUM *pub_key, BIGNUM *priv_key)
+{
+    /* If the field pub_key in d is NULL, the corresponding input
+     * parameters MUST be non-NULL.  The priv_key field may
+     * be left NULL.
+     */
+    if (d->pub_key == NULL && pub_key == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    if (pub_key != NULL) {
+        BN_free(d->pub_key);
+        d->pub_key = pub_key;
+    }
+    if (priv_key != NULL) {
+        BN_free(d->priv_key);
+        d->priv_key = priv_key;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+void DSA_clear_flags(DSA *d, int flags)
+{
+    d->flags &= ~flags;
+}
+
+int DSA_test_flags(const DSA *d, int flags)
+{
+    return d->flags & flags;
+}
+
+void DSA_set_flags(DSA *d, int flags)
+{
+    d->flags |= flags;
+}
+
+ENGINE *DSA_get0_engine(DSA *d)
+{
+    return d->engine;
+}
+
+int DSA_bits(const DSA *dsa)
+{
+    return BN_num_bits(dsa->p);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dsa/dsa_locl.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dsa/dsa_locl.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9021fce
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dsa/dsa_locl.h
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2007-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
+
+struct dsa_st {
+    /*
+     * This first variable is used to pick up errors where a DSA is passed
+     * instead of of a EVP_PKEY
+     */
+    int pad;
+    long version;
+    BIGNUM *p;
+    BIGNUM *q;                  /* == 20 */
+    BIGNUM *g;
+    BIGNUM *pub_key;            /* y public key */
+    BIGNUM *priv_key;           /* x private key */
+    int flags;
+    /* Normally used to cache montgomery values */
+    BN_MONT_CTX *method_mont_p;
+    int references;
+    CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data;
+    const DSA_METHOD *meth;
+    /* functional reference if 'meth' is ENGINE-provided */
+    ENGINE *engine;
+    CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock;
+};
+
+struct DSA_SIG_st {
+    BIGNUM *r;
+    BIGNUM *s;
+};
+
+struct dsa_method {
+    char *name;
+    DSA_SIG *(*dsa_do_sign) (const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa);
+    int (*dsa_sign_setup) (DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
+                           BIGNUM **rp);
+    int (*dsa_do_verify) (const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
+                          DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa);
+    int (*dsa_mod_exp) (DSA *dsa, BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a1,
+                        const BIGNUM *p1, const BIGNUM *a2, const BIGNUM *p2,
+                        const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont);
+    /* Can be null */
+    int (*bn_mod_exp) (DSA *dsa, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
+                       const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx);
+    int (*init) (DSA *dsa);
+    int (*finish) (DSA *dsa);
+    int flags;
+    void *app_data;
+    /* If this is non-NULL, it is used to generate DSA parameters */
+    int (*dsa_paramgen) (DSA *dsa, int bits,
+                         const unsigned char *seed, int seed_len,
+                         int *counter_ret, unsigned long *h_ret,
+                         BN_GENCB *cb);
+    /* If this is non-NULL, it is used to generate DSA keys */
+    int (*dsa_keygen) (DSA *dsa);
+};
+
+int dsa_builtin_paramgen(DSA *ret, size_t bits, size_t qbits,
+                         const EVP_MD *evpmd, const unsigned char *seed_in,
+                         size_t seed_len, unsigned char *seed_out,
+                         int *counter_ret, unsigned long *h_ret,
+                         BN_GENCB *cb);
+
+int dsa_builtin_paramgen2(DSA *ret, size_t L, size_t N,
+                          const EVP_MD *evpmd, const unsigned char *seed_in,
+                          size_t seed_len, int idx, unsigned char *seed_out,
+                          int *counter_ret, unsigned long *h_ret,
+                          BN_GENCB *cb);
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dsa/dsa_meth.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dsa/dsa_meth.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f0188f2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dsa/dsa_meth.c
@@ -0,0 +1,224 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL licenses, (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ * or in the file LICENSE in the source distribution.
+ */
+
+#include "dsa_locl.h"
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+DSA_METHOD *DSA_meth_new(const char *name, int flags)
+{
+    DSA_METHOD *dsam = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*dsam));
+
+    if (dsam != NULL) {
+        dsam->flags = flags;
+
+        dsam->name = OPENSSL_strdup(name);
+        if (dsam->name != NULL)
+            return dsam;
+
+        OPENSSL_free(dsam);
+    }
+
+    DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_METH_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+void DSA_meth_free(DSA_METHOD *dsam)
+{
+    if (dsam != NULL) {
+        OPENSSL_free(dsam->name);
+        OPENSSL_free(dsam);
+    }
+}
+
+DSA_METHOD *DSA_meth_dup(const DSA_METHOD *dsam)
+{
+    DSA_METHOD *ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ret));
+
+    if (ret != NULL) {
+        memcpy(ret, dsam, sizeof(*dsam));
+
+        ret->name = OPENSSL_strdup(dsam->name);
+        if (ret->name != NULL)
+            return ret;
+
+        OPENSSL_free(ret);
+    }
+
+    DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_METH_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+const char *DSA_meth_get0_name(const DSA_METHOD *dsam)
+{
+    return dsam->name;
+}
+
+int DSA_meth_set1_name(DSA_METHOD *dsam, const char *name)
+{
+    char *tmpname = OPENSSL_strdup(name);
+
+    if (tmpname == NULL) {
+        DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_METH_SET1_NAME, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    OPENSSL_free(dsam->name);
+    dsam->name = tmpname;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int DSA_meth_get_flags(DSA_METHOD *dsam)
+{
+    return dsam->flags;
+}
+
+int DSA_meth_set_flags(DSA_METHOD *dsam, int flags)
+{
+    dsam->flags = flags;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+void *DSA_meth_get0_app_data(const DSA_METHOD *dsam)
+{
+    return dsam->app_data;
+}
+
+int DSA_meth_set0_app_data(DSA_METHOD *dsam, void *app_data)
+{
+    dsam->app_data = app_data;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+DSA_SIG *(*DSA_meth_get_sign(const DSA_METHOD *dsam))
+        (const unsigned char *, int, DSA *)
+{
+    return dsam->dsa_do_sign;
+}
+
+int DSA_meth_set_sign(DSA_METHOD *dsam,
+                       DSA_SIG *(*sign) (const unsigned char *, int, DSA *))
+{
+    dsam->dsa_do_sign = sign;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int (*DSA_meth_get_sign_setup(const DSA_METHOD *dsam))
+        (DSA *, BN_CTX *, BIGNUM **, BIGNUM **)
+{
+    return dsam->dsa_sign_setup;
+}
+
+int DSA_meth_set_sign_setup(DSA_METHOD *dsam,
+        int (*sign_setup) (DSA *, BN_CTX *, BIGNUM **, BIGNUM **))
+{
+    dsam->dsa_sign_setup = sign_setup;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int (*DSA_meth_get_verify(const DSA_METHOD *dsam))
+        (const unsigned char *, int , DSA_SIG *, DSA *)
+{
+    return dsam->dsa_do_verify;
+}
+
+int DSA_meth_set_verify(DSA_METHOD *dsam,
+    int (*verify) (const unsigned char *, int, DSA_SIG *, DSA *))
+{
+    dsam->dsa_do_verify = verify;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int (*DSA_meth_get_mod_exp(const DSA_METHOD *dsam))
+        (DSA *, BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *,
+         const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, BN_CTX *, BN_MONT_CTX *)
+{
+    return dsam->dsa_mod_exp;
+}
+
+int DSA_meth_set_mod_exp(DSA_METHOD *dsam,
+    int (*mod_exp) (DSA *, BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *,
+                    const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, BN_CTX *,
+                    BN_MONT_CTX *))
+{
+    dsam->dsa_mod_exp = mod_exp;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int (*DSA_meth_get_bn_mod_exp(const DSA_METHOD *dsam))
+    (DSA *, BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, BN_CTX *,
+     BN_MONT_CTX *)
+{
+    return dsam->bn_mod_exp;
+}
+
+int DSA_meth_set_bn_mod_exp(DSA_METHOD *dsam,
+    int (*bn_mod_exp) (DSA *, BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *,
+                       const BIGNUM *, BN_CTX *, BN_MONT_CTX *))
+{
+    dsam->bn_mod_exp = bn_mod_exp;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int (*DSA_meth_get_init(const DSA_METHOD *dsam))(DSA *)
+{
+    return dsam->init;
+}
+
+int DSA_meth_set_init(DSA_METHOD *dsam, int (*init)(DSA *))
+{
+    dsam->init = init;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int (*DSA_meth_get_finish(const DSA_METHOD *dsam)) (DSA *)
+{
+    return dsam->finish;
+}
+
+int DSA_meth_set_finish(DSA_METHOD *dsam, int (*finish) (DSA *))
+{
+    dsam->finish = finish;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int (*DSA_meth_get_paramgen(const DSA_METHOD *dsam))
+        (DSA *, int, const unsigned char *, int, int *, unsigned long *,
+         BN_GENCB *)
+{
+    return dsam->dsa_paramgen;
+}
+
+int DSA_meth_set_paramgen(DSA_METHOD *dsam,
+        int (*paramgen) (DSA *, int, const unsigned char *, int, int *,
+                         unsigned long *, BN_GENCB *))
+{
+    dsam->dsa_paramgen = paramgen;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int (*DSA_meth_get_keygen(const DSA_METHOD *dsam)) (DSA *)
+{
+    return dsam->dsa_keygen;
+}
+
+int DSA_meth_set_keygen(DSA_METHOD *dsam, int (*keygen) (DSA *))
+{
+    dsam->dsa_keygen = keygen;
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7f48cf2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,365 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* Original version from Steven Schoch <schoch@sheba.arc.nasa.gov> */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
+#include "dsa_locl.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+
+static DSA_SIG *dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa);
+static int dsa_sign_setup_no_digest(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
+                                    BIGNUM **rp);
+static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
+                          BIGNUM **rp, const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen);
+static int dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
+                         DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa);
+static int dsa_init(DSA *dsa);
+static int dsa_finish(DSA *dsa);
+
+static DSA_METHOD openssl_dsa_meth = {
+    "OpenSSL DSA method",
+    dsa_do_sign,
+    dsa_sign_setup_no_digest,
+    dsa_do_verify,
+    NULL,                       /* dsa_mod_exp, */
+    NULL,                       /* dsa_bn_mod_exp, */
+    dsa_init,
+    dsa_finish,
+    DSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD,
+    NULL,
+    NULL,
+    NULL
+};
+
+static const DSA_METHOD *default_DSA_method = &openssl_dsa_meth;
+
+void DSA_set_default_method(const DSA_METHOD *meth)
+{
+    default_DSA_method = meth;
+}
+
+const DSA_METHOD *DSA_get_default_method(void)
+{
+    return default_DSA_method;
+}
+
+const DSA_METHOD *DSA_OpenSSL(void)
+{
+    return &openssl_dsa_meth;
+}
+
+static DSA_SIG *dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa)
+{
+    BIGNUM *kinv = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *m;
+    BIGNUM *xr;
+    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+    int reason = ERR_R_BN_LIB;
+    DSA_SIG *ret = NULL;
+    int rv = 0;
+
+    m = BN_new();
+    xr = BN_new();
+    if (m == NULL || xr == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g) {
+        reason = DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS;
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    ret = DSA_SIG_new();
+    if (ret == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    ret->r = BN_new();
+    ret->s = BN_new();
+    if (ret->r == NULL || ret->s == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        goto err;
+ redo:
+    if (!dsa_sign_setup(dsa, ctx, &kinv, &ret->r, dgst, dlen))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (dlen > BN_num_bytes(dsa->q))
+        /*
+         * if the digest length is greater than the size of q use the
+         * BN_num_bits(dsa->q) leftmost bits of the digest, see fips 186-3,
+         * 4.2
+         */
+        dlen = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q);
+    if (BN_bin2bn(dgst, dlen, m) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* Compute  s = inv(k) (m + xr) mod q */
+    if (!BN_mod_mul(xr, dsa->priv_key, ret->r, dsa->q, ctx))
+        goto err;               /* s = xr */
+    if (!BN_add(ret->s, xr, m))
+        goto err;               /* s = m + xr */
+    if (BN_cmp(ret->s, dsa->q) > 0)
+        if (!BN_sub(ret->s, ret->s, dsa->q))
+            goto err;
+    if (!BN_mod_mul(ret->s, ret->s, kinv, dsa->q, ctx))
+        goto err;
+
+    /*
+     * Redo if r or s is zero as required by FIPS 186-3: this is very
+     * unlikely.
+     */
+    if (BN_is_zero(ret->r) || BN_is_zero(ret->s))
+        goto redo;
+
+    rv = 1;
+
+ err:
+    if (rv == 0) {
+        DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_SIGN, reason);
+        DSA_SIG_free(ret);
+        ret = NULL;
+    }
+    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+    BN_clear_free(m);
+    BN_clear_free(xr);
+    BN_clear_free(kinv);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int dsa_sign_setup_no_digest(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in,
+                                    BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp)
+{
+    return dsa_sign_setup(dsa, ctx_in, kinvp, rp, NULL, 0);
+}
+
+static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in,
+                          BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp,
+                          const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen)
+{
+    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *k, *kinv = NULL, *r = *rp;
+    BIGNUM *l, *m;
+    int ret = 0;
+    int q_bits;
+
+    if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g) {
+        DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_SIGN_SETUP, DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    k = BN_new();
+    l = BN_new();
+    m = BN_new();
+    if (k == NULL || l == NULL || m == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (ctx_in == NULL) {
+        if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+    } else
+        ctx = ctx_in;
+
+    /* Preallocate space */
+    q_bits = BN_num_bits(dsa->q);
+    if (!BN_set_bit(k, q_bits)
+        || !BN_set_bit(l, q_bits)
+        || !BN_set_bit(m, q_bits))
+        goto err;
+
+    /* Get random k */
+    do {
+        if (dgst != NULL) {
+            /*
+             * We calculate k from SHA512(private_key + H(message) + random).
+             * This protects the private key from a weak PRNG.
+             */
+            if (!BN_generate_dsa_nonce(k, dsa->q, dsa->priv_key, dgst,
+                                       dlen, ctx))
+                goto err;
+        } else if (!BN_rand_range(k, dsa->q))
+            goto err;
+    } while (BN_is_zero(k));
+
+    BN_set_flags(k, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+    if (dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P) {
+        if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dsa->method_mont_p,
+                                    dsa->lock, dsa->p, ctx))
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* Compute r = (g^k mod p) mod q */
+
+    /*
+     * We do not want timing information to leak the length of k, so we
+     * compute G^k using an equivalent scalar of fixed bit-length.
+     *
+     * We unconditionally perform both of these additions to prevent a
+     * small timing information leakage.  We then choose the sum that is
+     * one bit longer than the modulus.
+     *
+     * TODO: revisit the BN_copy aiming for a memory access agnostic
+     * conditional copy.
+     */
+    if (!BN_add(l, k, dsa->q)
+        || !BN_add(m, l, dsa->q)
+        || !BN_copy(k, BN_num_bits(l) > q_bits ? l : m))
+        goto err;
+
+    if ((dsa)->meth->bn_mod_exp != NULL) {
+            if (!dsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(dsa, r, dsa->g, k, dsa->p, ctx,
+                                       dsa->method_mont_p))
+                goto err;
+    } else {
+            if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(r, dsa->g, k, dsa->p, ctx, dsa->method_mont_p))
+                goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!BN_mod(r, r, dsa->q, ctx))
+        goto err;
+
+    /* Compute  part of 's = inv(k) (m + xr) mod q' */
+    if ((kinv = BN_mod_inverse(NULL, k, dsa->q, ctx)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    BN_clear_free(*kinvp);
+    *kinvp = kinv;
+    kinv = NULL;
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    if (!ret)
+        DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+    if (ctx != ctx_in)
+        BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+    BN_clear_free(k);
+    BN_clear_free(l);
+    BN_clear_free(m);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
+                         DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa)
+{
+    BN_CTX *ctx;
+    BIGNUM *u1, *u2, *t1;
+    BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL;
+    const BIGNUM *r, *s;
+    int ret = -1, i;
+    if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g) {
+        DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY, DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    i = BN_num_bits(dsa->q);
+    /* fips 186-3 allows only different sizes for q */
+    if (i != 160 && i != 224 && i != 256) {
+        DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY, DSA_R_BAD_Q_VALUE);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (BN_num_bits(dsa->p) > OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
+        DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY, DSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
+        return -1;
+    }
+    u1 = BN_new();
+    u2 = BN_new();
+    t1 = BN_new();
+    ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+    if (u1 == NULL || u2 == NULL || t1 == NULL || ctx == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    DSA_SIG_get0(sig, &r, &s);
+
+    if (BN_is_zero(r) || BN_is_negative(r) ||
+        BN_ucmp(r, dsa->q) >= 0) {
+        ret = 0;
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (BN_is_zero(s) || BN_is_negative(s) ||
+        BN_ucmp(s, dsa->q) >= 0) {
+        ret = 0;
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Calculate W = inv(S) mod Q save W in u2
+     */
+    if ((BN_mod_inverse(u2, s, dsa->q, ctx)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* save M in u1 */
+    if (dgst_len > (i >> 3))
+        /*
+         * if the digest length is greater than the size of q use the
+         * BN_num_bits(dsa->q) leftmost bits of the digest, see fips 186-3,
+         * 4.2
+         */
+        dgst_len = (i >> 3);
+    if (BN_bin2bn(dgst, dgst_len, u1) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* u1 = M * w mod q */
+    if (!BN_mod_mul(u1, u1, u2, dsa->q, ctx))
+        goto err;
+
+    /* u2 = r * w mod q */
+    if (!BN_mod_mul(u2, r, u2, dsa->q, ctx))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P) {
+        mont = BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dsa->method_mont_p,
+                                      dsa->lock, dsa->p, ctx);
+        if (!mont)
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (dsa->meth->dsa_mod_exp != NULL) {
+        if (!dsa->meth->dsa_mod_exp(dsa, t1, dsa->g, u1, dsa->pub_key, u2,
+                                    dsa->p, ctx, mont))
+            goto err;
+    } else {
+        if (!BN_mod_exp2_mont(t1, dsa->g, u1, dsa->pub_key, u2, dsa->p, ctx,
+                              mont))
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* let u1 = u1 mod q */
+    if (!BN_mod(u1, t1, dsa->q, ctx))
+        goto err;
+
+    /*
+     * V is now in u1.  If the signature is correct, it will be equal to R.
+     */
+    ret = (BN_ucmp(u1, r) == 0);
+
+ err:
+    if (ret < 0)
+        DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+    BN_free(u1);
+    BN_free(u2);
+    BN_free(t1);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static int dsa_init(DSA *dsa)
+{
+    dsa->flags |= DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P;
+    return (1);
+}
+
+static int dsa_finish(DSA *dsa)
+{
+    BN_MONT_CTX_free(dsa->method_mont_p);
+    return (1);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dsa/dsa_pmeth.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dsa/dsa_pmeth.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..95f088a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dsa/dsa_pmeth.c
@@ -0,0 +1,273 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include "internal/evp_int.h"
+#include "dsa_locl.h"
+
+/* DSA pkey context structure */
+
+typedef struct {
+    /* Parameter gen parameters */
+    int nbits;                  /* size of p in bits (default: 1024) */
+    int qbits;                  /* size of q in bits (default: 160) */
+    const EVP_MD *pmd;          /* MD for parameter generation */
+    /* Keygen callback info */
+    int gentmp[2];
+    /* message digest */
+    const EVP_MD *md;           /* MD for the signature */
+} DSA_PKEY_CTX;
+
+static int pkey_dsa_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    DSA_PKEY_CTX *dctx;
+    dctx = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*dctx));
+    if (dctx == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    dctx->nbits = 1024;
+    dctx->qbits = 160;
+    dctx->pmd = NULL;
+    dctx->md = NULL;
+
+    ctx->data = dctx;
+    ctx->keygen_info = dctx->gentmp;
+    ctx->keygen_info_count = 2;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int pkey_dsa_copy(EVP_PKEY_CTX *dst, EVP_PKEY_CTX *src)
+{
+    DSA_PKEY_CTX *dctx, *sctx;
+    if (!pkey_dsa_init(dst))
+        return 0;
+    sctx = src->data;
+    dctx = dst->data;
+    dctx->nbits = sctx->nbits;
+    dctx->qbits = sctx->qbits;
+    dctx->pmd = sctx->pmd;
+    dctx->md = sctx->md;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static void pkey_dsa_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    DSA_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data;
+    OPENSSL_free(dctx);
+}
+
+static int pkey_dsa_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig,
+                         size_t *siglen, const unsigned char *tbs,
+                         size_t tbslen)
+{
+    int ret;
+    unsigned int sltmp;
+    DSA_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data;
+    DSA *dsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.dsa;
+
+    if (dctx->md) {
+        if (tbslen != (size_t)EVP_MD_size(dctx->md))
+            return 0;
+    } else {
+        if (tbslen != SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH)
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    ret = DSA_sign(0, tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp, dsa);
+
+    if (ret <= 0)
+        return ret;
+    *siglen = sltmp;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int pkey_dsa_verify(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                           const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen,
+                           const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)
+{
+    int ret;
+    DSA_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data;
+    DSA *dsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.dsa;
+
+    if (dctx->md) {
+        if (tbslen != (size_t)EVP_MD_size(dctx->md))
+            return 0;
+    } else {
+        if (tbslen != SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH)
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    ret = DSA_verify(0, tbs, tbslen, sig, siglen, dsa);
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int pkey_dsa_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2)
+{
+    DSA_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data;
+    switch (type) {
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DSA_PARAMGEN_BITS:
+        if (p1 < 256)
+            return -2;
+        dctx->nbits = p1;
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DSA_PARAMGEN_Q_BITS:
+        if (p1 != 160 && p1 != 224 && p1 && p1 != 256)
+            return -2;
+        dctx->qbits = p1;
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DSA_PARAMGEN_MD:
+        if (EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_sha1 &&
+            EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_sha224 &&
+            EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_sha256) {
+            DSAerr(DSA_F_PKEY_DSA_CTRL, DSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_TYPE);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        dctx->pmd = p2;
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_MD:
+        if (EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_sha1 &&
+            EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_dsa &&
+            EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_dsaWithSHA &&
+            EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_sha224 &&
+            EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_sha256 &&
+            EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_sha384 &&
+            EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_sha512) {
+            DSAerr(DSA_F_PKEY_DSA_CTRL, DSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_TYPE);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        dctx->md = p2;
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_MD:
+        *(const EVP_MD **)p2 = dctx->md;
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DIGESTINIT:
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN:
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_SIGN:
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY:
+        DSAerr(DSA_F_PKEY_DSA_CTRL,
+               EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
+        return -2;
+    default:
+        return -2;
+
+    }
+}
+
+static int pkey_dsa_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                             const char *type, const char *value)
+{
+    if (strcmp(type, "dsa_paramgen_bits") == 0) {
+        int nbits;
+        nbits = atoi(value);
+        return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dsa_paramgen_bits(ctx, nbits);
+    }
+    if (strcmp(type, "dsa_paramgen_q_bits") == 0) {
+        int qbits = atoi(value);
+        return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_DSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_PARAMGEN,
+                                 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DSA_PARAMGEN_Q_BITS, qbits,
+                                 NULL);
+    }
+    if (strcmp(type, "dsa_paramgen_md") == 0) {
+        return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_DSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_PARAMGEN,
+                                 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DSA_PARAMGEN_MD, 0,
+                                 (void *)EVP_get_digestbyname(value));
+    }
+    return -2;
+}
+
+static int pkey_dsa_paramgen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    DSA *dsa = NULL;
+    DSA_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data;
+    BN_GENCB *pcb;
+    int ret;
+    if (ctx->pkey_gencb) {
+        pcb = BN_GENCB_new();
+        if (pcb == NULL)
+            return 0;
+        evp_pkey_set_cb_translate(pcb, ctx);
+    } else
+        pcb = NULL;
+    dsa = DSA_new();
+    if (dsa == NULL) {
+        BN_GENCB_free(pcb);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    ret = dsa_builtin_paramgen(dsa, dctx->nbits, dctx->qbits, dctx->pmd,
+                               NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, pcb);
+    BN_GENCB_free(pcb);
+    if (ret)
+        EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(pkey, dsa);
+    else
+        DSA_free(dsa);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int pkey_dsa_keygen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    DSA *dsa = NULL;
+    if (ctx->pkey == NULL) {
+        DSAerr(DSA_F_PKEY_DSA_KEYGEN, DSA_R_NO_PARAMETERS_SET);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    dsa = DSA_new();
+    if (dsa == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(pkey, dsa);
+    /* Note: if error return, pkey is freed by parent routine */
+    if (!EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, ctx->pkey))
+        return 0;
+    return DSA_generate_key(pkey->pkey.dsa);
+}
+
+const EVP_PKEY_METHOD dsa_pkey_meth = {
+    EVP_PKEY_DSA,
+    EVP_PKEY_FLAG_AUTOARGLEN,
+    pkey_dsa_init,
+    pkey_dsa_copy,
+    pkey_dsa_cleanup,
+
+    0,
+    pkey_dsa_paramgen,
+
+    0,
+    pkey_dsa_keygen,
+
+    0,
+    pkey_dsa_sign,
+
+    0,
+    pkey_dsa_verify,
+
+    0, 0,
+
+    0, 0, 0, 0,
+
+    0, 0,
+
+    0, 0,
+
+    0, 0,
+
+    pkey_dsa_ctrl,
+    pkey_dsa_ctrl_str
+};
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dsa/dsa_prn.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dsa/dsa_prn.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f3c20ea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dsa/dsa_prn.c
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+int DSA_print_fp(FILE *fp, const DSA *x, int off)
+{
+    BIO *b;
+    int ret;
+
+    if ((b = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL) {
+        DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PRINT_FP, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+        return (0);
+    }
+    BIO_set_fp(b, fp, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+    ret = DSA_print(b, x, off);
+    BIO_free(b);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+int DSAparams_print_fp(FILE *fp, const DSA *x)
+{
+    BIO *b;
+    int ret;
+
+    if ((b = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL) {
+        DSAerr(DSA_F_DSAPARAMS_PRINT_FP, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+        return (0);
+    }
+    BIO_set_fp(b, fp, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+    ret = DSAparams_print(b, x);
+    BIO_free(b);
+    return (ret);
+}
+#endif
+
+int DSA_print(BIO *bp, const DSA *x, int off)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY *pk;
+    int ret;
+    pk = EVP_PKEY_new();
+    if (pk == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(pk, (DSA *)x))
+        return 0;
+    ret = EVP_PKEY_print_private(bp, pk, off, NULL);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int DSAparams_print(BIO *bp, const DSA *x)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY *pk;
+    int ret;
+    pk = EVP_PKEY_new();
+    if (pk == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(pk, (DSA *)x))
+        return 0;
+    ret = EVP_PKEY_print_params(bp, pk, 4, NULL);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
+    return ret;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dsa/dsa_sign.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dsa/dsa_sign.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2e29d40
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dsa/dsa_sign.c
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* Original version from Steven Schoch <schoch@sheba.arc.nasa.gov> */
+
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "dsa_locl.h"
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+DSA_SIG *DSA_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa)
+{
+    return dsa->meth->dsa_do_sign(dgst, dlen, dsa);
+}
+
+int DSA_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp)
+{
+    return dsa->meth->dsa_sign_setup(dsa, ctx_in, kinvp, rp);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dsa/dsa_vrf.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dsa/dsa_vrf.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a84d521
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dsa/dsa_vrf.c
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* Original version from Steven Schoch <schoch@sheba.arc.nasa.gov> */
+
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "dsa_locl.h"
+
+int DSA_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, DSA_SIG *sig,
+                  DSA *dsa)
+{
+    return dsa->meth->dsa_do_verify(dgst, dgst_len, sig, dsa);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dso/build.info b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dso/build.info
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..82b592d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dso/build.info
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+LIBS=../../libcrypto
+SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
+        dso_dl.c dso_dlfcn.c dso_err.c dso_lib.c \
+        dso_openssl.c dso_win32.c dso_vms.c
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dso/dso_dl.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dso/dso_dl.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d80bf56
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dso/dso_dl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,279 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "dso_locl.h"
+
+#ifdef DSO_DL
+
+# include <dl.h>
+
+/* Part of the hack in "dl_load" ... */
+# define DSO_MAX_TRANSLATED_SIZE 256
+
+static int dl_load(DSO *dso);
+static int dl_unload(DSO *dso);
+static DSO_FUNC_TYPE dl_bind_func(DSO *dso, const char *symname);
+static char *dl_name_converter(DSO *dso, const char *filename);
+static char *dl_merger(DSO *dso, const char *filespec1,
+                       const char *filespec2);
+static int dl_pathbyaddr(void *addr, char *path, int sz);
+static void *dl_globallookup(const char *name);
+
+static DSO_METHOD dso_meth_dl = {
+    "OpenSSL 'dl' shared library method",
+    dl_load,
+    dl_unload,
+    dl_bind_func,
+    NULL,                       /* ctrl */
+    dl_name_converter,
+    dl_merger,
+    NULL,                       /* init */
+    NULL,                       /* finish */
+    dl_pathbyaddr,
+    dl_globallookup
+};
+
+DSO_METHOD *DSO_METHOD_openssl(void)
+{
+    return &dso_meth_dl;
+}
+
+/*
+ * For this DSO_METHOD, our meth_data STACK will contain; (i) the handle
+ * (shl_t) returned from shl_load(). NB: I checked on HPUX11 and shl_t is
+ * itself a pointer type so the cast is safe.
+ */
+
+static int dl_load(DSO *dso)
+{
+    shl_t ptr = NULL;
+    /*
+     * We don't do any fancy retries or anything, just take the method's (or
+     * DSO's if it has the callback set) best translation of the
+     * platform-independent filename and try once with that.
+     */
+    char *filename = DSO_convert_filename(dso, NULL);
+
+    if (filename == NULL) {
+        DSOerr(DSO_F_DL_LOAD, DSO_R_NO_FILENAME);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    ptr = shl_load(filename, BIND_IMMEDIATE |
+                   (dso->flags & DSO_FLAG_NO_NAME_TRANSLATION ? 0 :
+                    DYNAMIC_PATH), 0L);
+    if (ptr == NULL) {
+        char errbuf[160];
+        DSOerr(DSO_F_DL_LOAD, DSO_R_LOAD_FAILED);
+        if (openssl_strerror_r(errno, errbuf, sizeof(errbuf)))
+            ERR_add_error_data(4, "filename(", filename, "): ", errbuf);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (!sk_push(dso->meth_data, (char *)ptr)) {
+        DSOerr(DSO_F_DL_LOAD, DSO_R_STACK_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    /*
+     * Success, stick the converted filename we've loaded under into the DSO
+     * (it also serves as the indicator that we are currently loaded).
+     */
+    dso->loaded_filename = filename;
+    return (1);
+ err:
+    /* Cleanup! */
+    OPENSSL_free(filename);
+    if (ptr != NULL)
+        shl_unload(ptr);
+    return (0);
+}
+
+static int dl_unload(DSO *dso)
+{
+    shl_t ptr;
+    if (dso == NULL) {
+        DSOerr(DSO_F_DL_UNLOAD, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+        return (0);
+    }
+    if (sk_num(dso->meth_data) < 1)
+        return (1);
+    /* Is this statement legal? */
+    ptr = (shl_t) sk_pop(dso->meth_data);
+    if (ptr == NULL) {
+        DSOerr(DSO_F_DL_UNLOAD, DSO_R_NULL_HANDLE);
+        /*
+         * Should push the value back onto the stack in case of a retry.
+         */
+        sk_push(dso->meth_data, (char *)ptr);
+        return (0);
+    }
+    shl_unload(ptr);
+    return (1);
+}
+
+static DSO_FUNC_TYPE dl_bind_func(DSO *dso, const char *symname)
+{
+    shl_t ptr;
+    void *sym;
+
+    if ((dso == NULL) || (symname == NULL)) {
+        DSOerr(DSO_F_DL_BIND_FUNC, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+    if (sk_num(dso->meth_data) < 1) {
+        DSOerr(DSO_F_DL_BIND_FUNC, DSO_R_STACK_ERROR);
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+    ptr = (shl_t) sk_value(dso->meth_data, sk_num(dso->meth_data) - 1);
+    if (ptr == NULL) {
+        DSOerr(DSO_F_DL_BIND_FUNC, DSO_R_NULL_HANDLE);
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+    if (shl_findsym(&ptr, symname, TYPE_UNDEFINED, &sym) < 0) {
+        char errbuf[160];
+        DSOerr(DSO_F_DL_BIND_FUNC, DSO_R_SYM_FAILURE);
+        if (openssl_strerror_r(errno, errbuf, sizeof(errbuf)))
+            ERR_add_error_data(4, "symname(", symname, "): ", errbuf);
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+    return ((DSO_FUNC_TYPE)sym);
+}
+
+static char *dl_merger(DSO *dso, const char *filespec1, const char *filespec2)
+{
+    char *merged;
+
+    if (!filespec1 && !filespec2) {
+        DSOerr(DSO_F_DL_MERGER, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+    /*
+     * If the first file specification is a rooted path, it rules. same goes
+     * if the second file specification is missing.
+     */
+    if (!filespec2 || filespec1[0] == '/') {
+        merged = OPENSSL_strdup(filespec1);
+        if (merged == NULL) {
+            DSOerr(DSO_F_DL_MERGER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            return (NULL);
+        }
+    }
+    /*
+     * If the first file specification is missing, the second one rules.
+     */
+    else if (!filespec1) {
+        merged = OPENSSL_strdup(filespec2);
+        if (merged == NULL) {
+            DSOerr(DSO_F_DL_MERGER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            return (NULL);
+        }
+    } else
+        /*
+         * This part isn't as trivial as it looks.  It assumes that the
+         * second file specification really is a directory, and makes no
+         * checks whatsoever.  Therefore, the result becomes the
+         * concatenation of filespec2 followed by a slash followed by
+         * filespec1.
+         */
+    {
+        int spec2len, len;
+
+        spec2len = (filespec2 ? strlen(filespec2) : 0);
+        len = spec2len + (filespec1 ? strlen(filespec1) : 0);
+
+        if (spec2len && filespec2[spec2len - 1] == '/') {
+            spec2len--;
+            len--;
+        }
+        merged = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 2);
+        if (merged == NULL) {
+            DSOerr(DSO_F_DL_MERGER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            return (NULL);
+        }
+        strcpy(merged, filespec2);
+        merged[spec2len] = '/';
+        strcpy(&merged[spec2len + 1], filespec1);
+    }
+    return (merged);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function is identical to the one in dso_dlfcn.c, but as it is highly
+ * unlikely that both the "dl" *and* "dlfcn" variants are being compiled at
+ * the same time, there's no great duplicating the code. Figuring out an
+ * elegant way to share one copy of the code would be more difficult and
+ * would not leave the implementations independent.
+ */
+static char *dl_name_converter(DSO *dso, const char *filename)
+{
+    char *translated;
+    int len, rsize, transform;
+
+    len = strlen(filename);
+    rsize = len + 1;
+    transform = (strstr(filename, "/") == NULL);
+    {
+        /* We will convert this to "%s.s?" or "lib%s.s?" */
+        rsize += strlen(DSO_EXTENSION); /* The length of ".s?" */
+        if ((DSO_flags(dso) & DSO_FLAG_NAME_TRANSLATION_EXT_ONLY) == 0)
+            rsize += 3;         /* The length of "lib" */
+    }
+    translated = OPENSSL_malloc(rsize);
+    if (translated == NULL) {
+        DSOerr(DSO_F_DL_NAME_CONVERTER, DSO_R_NAME_TRANSLATION_FAILED);
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+    if (transform) {
+        if ((DSO_flags(dso) & DSO_FLAG_NAME_TRANSLATION_EXT_ONLY) == 0)
+            sprintf(translated, "lib%s%s", filename, DSO_EXTENSION);
+        else
+            sprintf(translated, "%s%s", filename, DSO_EXTENSION);
+    } else
+        sprintf(translated, "%s", filename);
+    return (translated);
+}
+
+static int dl_pathbyaddr(void *addr, char *path, int sz)
+{
+    struct shl_descriptor inf;
+    int i, len;
+
+    if (addr == NULL) {
+        union {
+            int (*f) (void *, char *, int);
+            void *p;
+        } t = {
+            dl_pathbyaddr
+        };
+        addr = t.p;
+    }
+
+    for (i = -1; shl_get_r(i, &inf) == 0; i++) {
+        if (((size_t)addr >= inf.tstart && (size_t)addr < inf.tend) ||
+            ((size_t)addr >= inf.dstart && (size_t)addr < inf.dend)) {
+            len = (int)strlen(inf.filename);
+            if (sz <= 0)
+                return len + 1;
+            if (len >= sz)
+                len = sz - 1;
+            memcpy(path, inf.filename, len);
+            path[len++] = 0;
+            return len;
+        }
+    }
+
+    return -1;
+}
+
+static void *dl_globallookup(const char *name)
+{
+    void *ret;
+    shl_t h = NULL;
+
+    return shl_findsym(&h, name, TYPE_UNDEFINED, &ret) ? NULL : ret;
+}
+#endif                          /* DSO_DL */
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dso/dso_dlfcn.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dso/dso_dlfcn.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a4b0cdd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dso/dso_dlfcn.c
@@ -0,0 +1,354 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * We need to do this early, because stdio.h includes the header files that
+ * handle _GNU_SOURCE and other similar macros.  Defining it later is simply
+ * too late, because those headers are protected from re- inclusion.
+ */
+#ifndef _GNU_SOURCE
+# define _GNU_SOURCE            /* make sure dladdr is declared */
+#endif
+
+#include "dso_locl.h"
+
+#ifdef DSO_DLFCN
+
+# ifdef HAVE_DLFCN_H
+#  ifdef __osf__
+#   define __EXTENSIONS__
+#  endif
+#  include <dlfcn.h>
+#  define HAVE_DLINFO 1
+#  if defined(_AIX) || defined(__CYGWIN__) || \
+     defined(__SCO_VERSION__) || defined(_SCO_ELF) || \
+     (defined(__osf__) && !defined(RTLD_NEXT))     || \
+     (defined(__OpenBSD__) && !defined(RTLD_SELF)) || \
+        defined(__ANDROID__)
+#   undef HAVE_DLINFO
+#  endif
+# endif
+
+/* Part of the hack in "dlfcn_load" ... */
+# define DSO_MAX_TRANSLATED_SIZE 256
+
+static int dlfcn_load(DSO *dso);
+static int dlfcn_unload(DSO *dso);
+static DSO_FUNC_TYPE dlfcn_bind_func(DSO *dso, const char *symname);
+static char *dlfcn_name_converter(DSO *dso, const char *filename);
+static char *dlfcn_merger(DSO *dso, const char *filespec1,
+                          const char *filespec2);
+static int dlfcn_pathbyaddr(void *addr, char *path, int sz);
+static void *dlfcn_globallookup(const char *name);
+
+static DSO_METHOD dso_meth_dlfcn = {
+    "OpenSSL 'dlfcn' shared library method",
+    dlfcn_load,
+    dlfcn_unload,
+    dlfcn_bind_func,
+    NULL,                       /* ctrl */
+    dlfcn_name_converter,
+    dlfcn_merger,
+    NULL,                       /* init */
+    NULL,                       /* finish */
+    dlfcn_pathbyaddr,
+    dlfcn_globallookup
+};
+
+DSO_METHOD *DSO_METHOD_openssl(void)
+{
+    return &dso_meth_dlfcn;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Prior to using the dlopen() function, we should decide on the flag we
+ * send. There's a few different ways of doing this and it's a messy
+ * venn-diagram to match up which platforms support what. So as we don't have
+ * autoconf yet, I'm implementing a hack that could be hacked further
+ * relatively easily to deal with cases as we find them. Initially this is to
+ * cope with OpenBSD.
+ */
+# if defined(__OpenBSD__) || defined(__NetBSD__)
+#  ifdef DL_LAZY
+#   define DLOPEN_FLAG DL_LAZY
+#  else
+#   ifdef RTLD_NOW
+#    define DLOPEN_FLAG RTLD_NOW
+#   else
+#    define DLOPEN_FLAG 0
+#   endif
+#  endif
+# else
+#  define DLOPEN_FLAG RTLD_NOW  /* Hope this works everywhere else */
+# endif
+
+/*
+ * For this DSO_METHOD, our meth_data STACK will contain; (i) the handle
+ * (void*) returned from dlopen().
+ */
+
+static int dlfcn_load(DSO *dso)
+{
+    void *ptr = NULL;
+    /* See applicable comments in dso_dl.c */
+    char *filename = DSO_convert_filename(dso, NULL);
+    int flags = DLOPEN_FLAG;
+
+    if (filename == NULL) {
+        DSOerr(DSO_F_DLFCN_LOAD, DSO_R_NO_FILENAME);
+        goto err;
+    }
+# ifdef RTLD_GLOBAL
+    if (dso->flags & DSO_FLAG_GLOBAL_SYMBOLS)
+        flags |= RTLD_GLOBAL;
+# endif
+    ptr = dlopen(filename, flags);
+    if (ptr == NULL) {
+        DSOerr(DSO_F_DLFCN_LOAD, DSO_R_LOAD_FAILED);
+        ERR_add_error_data(4, "filename(", filename, "): ", dlerror());
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (!sk_void_push(dso->meth_data, (char *)ptr)) {
+        DSOerr(DSO_F_DLFCN_LOAD, DSO_R_STACK_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    /* Success */
+    dso->loaded_filename = filename;
+    return (1);
+ err:
+    /* Cleanup! */
+    OPENSSL_free(filename);
+    if (ptr != NULL)
+        dlclose(ptr);
+    return (0);
+}
+
+static int dlfcn_unload(DSO *dso)
+{
+    void *ptr;
+    if (dso == NULL) {
+        DSOerr(DSO_F_DLFCN_UNLOAD, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+        return (0);
+    }
+    if (sk_void_num(dso->meth_data) < 1)
+        return (1);
+    ptr = sk_void_pop(dso->meth_data);
+    if (ptr == NULL) {
+        DSOerr(DSO_F_DLFCN_UNLOAD, DSO_R_NULL_HANDLE);
+        /*
+         * Should push the value back onto the stack in case of a retry.
+         */
+        sk_void_push(dso->meth_data, ptr);
+        return (0);
+    }
+    /* For now I'm not aware of any errors associated with dlclose() */
+    dlclose(ptr);
+    return (1);
+}
+
+static DSO_FUNC_TYPE dlfcn_bind_func(DSO *dso, const char *symname)
+{
+    void *ptr;
+    union {
+        DSO_FUNC_TYPE sym;
+        void *dlret;
+    } u;
+
+    if ((dso == NULL) || (symname == NULL)) {
+        DSOerr(DSO_F_DLFCN_BIND_FUNC, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+    if (sk_void_num(dso->meth_data) < 1) {
+        DSOerr(DSO_F_DLFCN_BIND_FUNC, DSO_R_STACK_ERROR);
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+    ptr = sk_void_value(dso->meth_data, sk_void_num(dso->meth_data) - 1);
+    if (ptr == NULL) {
+        DSOerr(DSO_F_DLFCN_BIND_FUNC, DSO_R_NULL_HANDLE);
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+    u.dlret = dlsym(ptr, symname);
+    if (u.dlret == NULL) {
+        DSOerr(DSO_F_DLFCN_BIND_FUNC, DSO_R_SYM_FAILURE);
+        ERR_add_error_data(4, "symname(", symname, "): ", dlerror());
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+    return u.sym;
+}
+
+static char *dlfcn_merger(DSO *dso, const char *filespec1,
+                          const char *filespec2)
+{
+    char *merged;
+
+    if (!filespec1 && !filespec2) {
+        DSOerr(DSO_F_DLFCN_MERGER, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+    /*
+     * If the first file specification is a rooted path, it rules. same goes
+     * if the second file specification is missing.
+     */
+    if (!filespec2 || (filespec1 != NULL && filespec1[0] == '/')) {
+        merged = OPENSSL_strdup(filespec1);
+        if (merged == NULL) {
+            DSOerr(DSO_F_DLFCN_MERGER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            return (NULL);
+        }
+    }
+    /*
+     * If the first file specification is missing, the second one rules.
+     */
+    else if (!filespec1) {
+        merged = OPENSSL_strdup(filespec2);
+        if (merged == NULL) {
+            DSOerr(DSO_F_DLFCN_MERGER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            return (NULL);
+        }
+    } else {
+        /*
+         * This part isn't as trivial as it looks.  It assumes that the
+         * second file specification really is a directory, and makes no
+         * checks whatsoever.  Therefore, the result becomes the
+         * concatenation of filespec2 followed by a slash followed by
+         * filespec1.
+         */
+        int spec2len, len;
+
+        spec2len = strlen(filespec2);
+        len = spec2len + strlen(filespec1);
+
+        if (spec2len && filespec2[spec2len - 1] == '/') {
+            spec2len--;
+            len--;
+        }
+        merged = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 2);
+        if (merged == NULL) {
+            DSOerr(DSO_F_DLFCN_MERGER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            return (NULL);
+        }
+        strcpy(merged, filespec2);
+        merged[spec2len] = '/';
+        strcpy(&merged[spec2len + 1], filespec1);
+    }
+    return (merged);
+}
+
+static char *dlfcn_name_converter(DSO *dso, const char *filename)
+{
+    char *translated;
+    int len, rsize, transform;
+
+    len = strlen(filename);
+    rsize = len + 1;
+    transform = (strstr(filename, "/") == NULL);
+    if (transform) {
+        /* We will convert this to "%s.so" or "lib%s.so" etc */
+        rsize += strlen(DSO_EXTENSION);    /* The length of ".so" */
+        if ((DSO_flags(dso) & DSO_FLAG_NAME_TRANSLATION_EXT_ONLY) == 0)
+            rsize += 3;         /* The length of "lib" */
+    }
+    translated = OPENSSL_malloc(rsize);
+    if (translated == NULL) {
+        DSOerr(DSO_F_DLFCN_NAME_CONVERTER, DSO_R_NAME_TRANSLATION_FAILED);
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+    if (transform) {
+        if ((DSO_flags(dso) & DSO_FLAG_NAME_TRANSLATION_EXT_ONLY) == 0)
+            sprintf(translated, "lib%s" DSO_EXTENSION, filename);
+        else
+            sprintf(translated, "%s" DSO_EXTENSION, filename);
+    } else
+        sprintf(translated, "%s", filename);
+    return (translated);
+}
+
+# ifdef __sgi
+/*-
+This is a quote from IRIX manual for dladdr(3c):
+
+     <dlfcn.h> does not contain a prototype for dladdr or definition of
+     Dl_info.  The #include <dlfcn.h>  in the SYNOPSIS line is traditional,
+     but contains no dladdr prototype and no IRIX library contains an
+     implementation.  Write your own declaration based on the code below.
+
+     The following code is dependent on internal interfaces that are not
+     part of the IRIX compatibility guarantee; however, there is no future
+     intention to change this interface, so on a practical level, the code
+     below is safe to use on IRIX.
+*/
+#  include <rld_interface.h>
+#  ifndef _RLD_INTERFACE_DLFCN_H_DLADDR
+#   define _RLD_INTERFACE_DLFCN_H_DLADDR
+typedef struct Dl_info {
+    const char *dli_fname;
+    void *dli_fbase;
+    const char *dli_sname;
+    void *dli_saddr;
+    int dli_version;
+    int dli_reserved1;
+    long dli_reserved[4];
+} Dl_info;
+#  else
+typedef struct Dl_info Dl_info;
+#  endif
+#  define _RLD_DLADDR             14
+
+static int dladdr(void *address, Dl_info *dl)
+{
+    void *v;
+    v = _rld_new_interface(_RLD_DLADDR, address, dl);
+    return (int)v;
+}
+# endif                         /* __sgi */
+
+static int dlfcn_pathbyaddr(void *addr, char *path, int sz)
+{
+# ifdef HAVE_DLINFO
+    Dl_info dli;
+    int len;
+
+    if (addr == NULL) {
+        union {
+            int (*f) (void *, char *, int);
+            void *p;
+        } t = {
+            dlfcn_pathbyaddr
+        };
+        addr = t.p;
+    }
+
+    if (dladdr(addr, &dli)) {
+        len = (int)strlen(dli.dli_fname);
+        if (sz <= 0)
+            return len + 1;
+        if (len >= sz)
+            len = sz - 1;
+        memcpy(path, dli.dli_fname, len);
+        path[len++] = 0;
+        return len;
+    }
+
+    ERR_add_error_data(2, "dlfcn_pathbyaddr(): ", dlerror());
+# endif
+    return -1;
+}
+
+static void *dlfcn_globallookup(const char *name)
+{
+    void *ret = NULL, *handle = dlopen(NULL, RTLD_LAZY);
+
+    if (handle) {
+        ret = dlsym(handle, name);
+        dlclose(handle);
+    }
+
+    return ret;
+}
+#endif                          /* DSO_DLFCN */
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dso/dso_err.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dso/dso_err.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..07588d5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dso/dso_err.c
@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+/*
+ * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include "internal/dso.h"
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+
+# define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DSO,func,0)
+# define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DSO,0,reason)
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA DSO_str_functs[] = {
+    {ERR_FUNC(DSO_F_DLFCN_BIND_FUNC), "dlfcn_bind_func"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DSO_F_DLFCN_LOAD), "dlfcn_load"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DSO_F_DLFCN_MERGER), "dlfcn_merger"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DSO_F_DLFCN_NAME_CONVERTER), "dlfcn_name_converter"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DSO_F_DLFCN_UNLOAD), "dlfcn_unload"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DSO_F_DL_BIND_FUNC), "dl_bind_func"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DSO_F_DL_LOAD), "dl_load"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DSO_F_DL_MERGER), "dl_merger"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DSO_F_DL_NAME_CONVERTER), "dl_name_converter"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DSO_F_DL_UNLOAD), "dl_unload"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DSO_F_DSO_BIND_FUNC), "DSO_bind_func"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DSO_F_DSO_CONVERT_FILENAME), "DSO_convert_filename"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DSO_F_DSO_CTRL), "DSO_ctrl"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DSO_F_DSO_FREE), "DSO_free"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DSO_F_DSO_GET_FILENAME), "DSO_get_filename"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DSO_F_DSO_GLOBAL_LOOKUP), "DSO_global_lookup"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DSO_F_DSO_LOAD), "DSO_load"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DSO_F_DSO_MERGE), "DSO_merge"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DSO_F_DSO_NEW_METHOD), "DSO_new_method"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DSO_F_DSO_PATHBYADDR), "DSO_pathbyaddr"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DSO_F_DSO_SET_FILENAME), "DSO_set_filename"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DSO_F_DSO_UP_REF), "DSO_up_ref"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DSO_F_VMS_BIND_SYM), "vms_bind_sym"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DSO_F_VMS_LOAD), "vms_load"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DSO_F_VMS_MERGER), "vms_merger"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DSO_F_VMS_UNLOAD), "vms_unload"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DSO_F_WIN32_BIND_FUNC), "win32_bind_func"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DSO_F_WIN32_GLOBALLOOKUP), "win32_globallookup"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DSO_F_WIN32_JOINER), "win32_joiner"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DSO_F_WIN32_LOAD), "win32_load"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DSO_F_WIN32_MERGER), "win32_merger"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DSO_F_WIN32_NAME_CONVERTER), "win32_name_converter"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DSO_F_WIN32_PATHBYADDR), "win32_pathbyaddr"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DSO_F_WIN32_SPLITTER), "win32_splitter"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DSO_F_WIN32_UNLOAD), "win32_unload"},
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA DSO_str_reasons[] = {
+    {ERR_REASON(DSO_R_CTRL_FAILED), "control command failed"},
+    {ERR_REASON(DSO_R_DSO_ALREADY_LOADED), "dso already loaded"},
+    {ERR_REASON(DSO_R_EMPTY_FILE_STRUCTURE), "empty file structure"},
+    {ERR_REASON(DSO_R_FAILURE), "failure"},
+    {ERR_REASON(DSO_R_FILENAME_TOO_BIG), "filename too big"},
+    {ERR_REASON(DSO_R_FINISH_FAILED), "cleanup method function failed"},
+    {ERR_REASON(DSO_R_INCORRECT_FILE_SYNTAX), "incorrect file syntax"},
+    {ERR_REASON(DSO_R_LOAD_FAILED), "could not load the shared library"},
+    {ERR_REASON(DSO_R_NAME_TRANSLATION_FAILED), "name translation failed"},
+    {ERR_REASON(DSO_R_NO_FILENAME), "no filename"},
+    {ERR_REASON(DSO_R_NULL_HANDLE), "a null shared library handle was used"},
+    {ERR_REASON(DSO_R_SET_FILENAME_FAILED), "set filename failed"},
+    {ERR_REASON(DSO_R_STACK_ERROR), "the meth_data stack is corrupt"},
+    {ERR_REASON(DSO_R_SYM_FAILURE),
+     "could not bind to the requested symbol name"},
+    {ERR_REASON(DSO_R_UNLOAD_FAILED), "could not unload the shared library"},
+    {ERR_REASON(DSO_R_UNSUPPORTED), "functionality not supported"},
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+
+#endif
+
+int ERR_load_DSO_strings(void)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+
+    if (ERR_func_error_string(DSO_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) {
+        ERR_load_strings(0, DSO_str_functs);
+        ERR_load_strings(0, DSO_str_reasons);
+    }
+#endif
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dso/dso_lib.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dso/dso_lib.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f58237d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dso/dso_lib.c
@@ -0,0 +1,349 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "dso_locl.h"
+
+static DSO_METHOD *default_DSO_meth = NULL;
+
+static DSO *DSO_new_method(DSO_METHOD *meth)
+{
+    DSO *ret;
+
+    if (default_DSO_meth == NULL) {
+        /*
+         * We default to DSO_METH_openssl() which in turn defaults to
+         * stealing the "best available" method. Will fallback to
+         * DSO_METH_null() in the worst case.
+         */
+        default_DSO_meth = DSO_METHOD_openssl();
+    }
+    ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
+    if (ret == NULL) {
+        DSOerr(DSO_F_DSO_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+    ret->meth_data = sk_void_new_null();
+    if (ret->meth_data == NULL) {
+        /* sk_new doesn't generate any errors so we do */
+        DSOerr(DSO_F_DSO_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        OPENSSL_free(ret);
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+    ret->meth = default_DSO_meth;
+    ret->references = 1;
+    ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
+    if (ret->lock == NULL) {
+        DSOerr(DSO_F_DSO_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        sk_void_free(ret->meth_data);
+        OPENSSL_free(ret);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    if ((ret->meth->init != NULL) && !ret->meth->init(ret)) {
+        DSO_free(ret);
+        ret = NULL;
+    }
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+DSO *DSO_new(void)
+{
+    return DSO_new_method(NULL);
+}
+
+int DSO_free(DSO *dso)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    if (dso == NULL)
+        return (1);
+
+    if (CRYPTO_atomic_add(&dso->references, -1, &i, dso->lock) <= 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    REF_PRINT_COUNT("DSO", dso);
+    if (i > 0)
+        return 1;
+    REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0);
+
+    if ((dso->flags & DSO_FLAG_NO_UNLOAD_ON_FREE) == 0) {
+        if ((dso->meth->dso_unload != NULL) && !dso->meth->dso_unload(dso)) {
+            DSOerr(DSO_F_DSO_FREE, DSO_R_UNLOAD_FAILED);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if ((dso->meth->finish != NULL) && !dso->meth->finish(dso)) {
+        DSOerr(DSO_F_DSO_FREE, DSO_R_FINISH_FAILED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    sk_void_free(dso->meth_data);
+    OPENSSL_free(dso->filename);
+    OPENSSL_free(dso->loaded_filename);
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(dso->lock);
+    OPENSSL_free(dso);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int DSO_flags(DSO *dso)
+{
+    return ((dso == NULL) ? 0 : dso->flags);
+}
+
+int DSO_up_ref(DSO *dso)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    if (dso == NULL) {
+        DSOerr(DSO_F_DSO_UP_REF, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (CRYPTO_atomic_add(&dso->references, 1, &i, dso->lock) <= 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    REF_PRINT_COUNT("DSO", r);
+    REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 2);
+    return ((i > 1) ? 1 : 0);
+}
+
+DSO *DSO_load(DSO *dso, const char *filename, DSO_METHOD *meth, int flags)
+{
+    DSO *ret;
+    int allocated = 0;
+
+    if (dso == NULL) {
+        ret = DSO_new_method(meth);
+        if (ret == NULL) {
+            DSOerr(DSO_F_DSO_LOAD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        allocated = 1;
+        /* Pass the provided flags to the new DSO object */
+        if (DSO_ctrl(ret, DSO_CTRL_SET_FLAGS, flags, NULL) < 0) {
+            DSOerr(DSO_F_DSO_LOAD, DSO_R_CTRL_FAILED);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    } else
+        ret = dso;
+    /* Don't load if we're currently already loaded */
+    if (ret->filename != NULL) {
+        DSOerr(DSO_F_DSO_LOAD, DSO_R_DSO_ALREADY_LOADED);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    /*
+     * filename can only be NULL if we were passed a dso that already has one
+     * set.
+     */
+    if (filename != NULL)
+        if (!DSO_set_filename(ret, filename)) {
+            DSOerr(DSO_F_DSO_LOAD, DSO_R_SET_FILENAME_FAILED);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    filename = ret->filename;
+    if (filename == NULL) {
+        DSOerr(DSO_F_DSO_LOAD, DSO_R_NO_FILENAME);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (ret->meth->dso_load == NULL) {
+        DSOerr(DSO_F_DSO_LOAD, DSO_R_UNSUPPORTED);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (!ret->meth->dso_load(ret)) {
+        DSOerr(DSO_F_DSO_LOAD, DSO_R_LOAD_FAILED);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    /* Load succeeded */
+    return (ret);
+ err:
+    if (allocated)
+        DSO_free(ret);
+    return (NULL);
+}
+
+DSO_FUNC_TYPE DSO_bind_func(DSO *dso, const char *symname)
+{
+    DSO_FUNC_TYPE ret = NULL;
+
+    if ((dso == NULL) || (symname == NULL)) {
+        DSOerr(DSO_F_DSO_BIND_FUNC, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+    if (dso->meth->dso_bind_func == NULL) {
+        DSOerr(DSO_F_DSO_BIND_FUNC, DSO_R_UNSUPPORTED);
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+    if ((ret = dso->meth->dso_bind_func(dso, symname)) == NULL) {
+        DSOerr(DSO_F_DSO_BIND_FUNC, DSO_R_SYM_FAILURE);
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+    /* Success */
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+/*
+ * I don't really like these *_ctrl functions very much to be perfectly
+ * honest. For one thing, I think I have to return a negative value for any
+ * error because possible DSO_ctrl() commands may return values such as
+ * "size"s that can legitimately be zero (making the standard
+ * "if (DSO_cmd(...))" form that works almost everywhere else fail at odd
+ * times. I'd prefer "output" values to be passed by reference and the return
+ * value as success/failure like usual ... but we conform when we must... :-)
+ */
+long DSO_ctrl(DSO *dso, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
+{
+    if (dso == NULL) {
+        DSOerr(DSO_F_DSO_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+        return (-1);
+    }
+    /*
+     * We should intercept certain generic commands and only pass control to
+     * the method-specific ctrl() function if it's something we don't handle.
+     */
+    switch (cmd) {
+    case DSO_CTRL_GET_FLAGS:
+        return dso->flags;
+    case DSO_CTRL_SET_FLAGS:
+        dso->flags = (int)larg;
+        return (0);
+    case DSO_CTRL_OR_FLAGS:
+        dso->flags |= (int)larg;
+        return (0);
+    default:
+        break;
+    }
+    if ((dso->meth == NULL) || (dso->meth->dso_ctrl == NULL)) {
+        DSOerr(DSO_F_DSO_CTRL, DSO_R_UNSUPPORTED);
+        return (-1);
+    }
+    return (dso->meth->dso_ctrl(dso, cmd, larg, parg));
+}
+
+const char *DSO_get_filename(DSO *dso)
+{
+    if (dso == NULL) {
+        DSOerr(DSO_F_DSO_GET_FILENAME, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+    return (dso->filename);
+}
+
+int DSO_set_filename(DSO *dso, const char *filename)
+{
+    char *copied;
+
+    if ((dso == NULL) || (filename == NULL)) {
+        DSOerr(DSO_F_DSO_SET_FILENAME, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+        return (0);
+    }
+    if (dso->loaded_filename) {
+        DSOerr(DSO_F_DSO_SET_FILENAME, DSO_R_DSO_ALREADY_LOADED);
+        return (0);
+    }
+    /* We'll duplicate filename */
+    copied = OPENSSL_strdup(filename);
+    if (copied == NULL) {
+        DSOerr(DSO_F_DSO_SET_FILENAME, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return (0);
+    }
+    OPENSSL_free(dso->filename);
+    dso->filename = copied;
+    return (1);
+}
+
+char *DSO_merge(DSO *dso, const char *filespec1, const char *filespec2)
+{
+    char *result = NULL;
+
+    if (dso == NULL || filespec1 == NULL) {
+        DSOerr(DSO_F_DSO_MERGE, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+    if ((dso->flags & DSO_FLAG_NO_NAME_TRANSLATION) == 0) {
+        if (dso->merger != NULL)
+            result = dso->merger(dso, filespec1, filespec2);
+        else if (dso->meth->dso_merger != NULL)
+            result = dso->meth->dso_merger(dso, filespec1, filespec2);
+    }
+    return (result);
+}
+
+char *DSO_convert_filename(DSO *dso, const char *filename)
+{
+    char *result = NULL;
+
+    if (dso == NULL) {
+        DSOerr(DSO_F_DSO_CONVERT_FILENAME, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+    if (filename == NULL)
+        filename = dso->filename;
+    if (filename == NULL) {
+        DSOerr(DSO_F_DSO_CONVERT_FILENAME, DSO_R_NO_FILENAME);
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+    if ((dso->flags & DSO_FLAG_NO_NAME_TRANSLATION) == 0) {
+        if (dso->name_converter != NULL)
+            result = dso->name_converter(dso, filename);
+        else if (dso->meth->dso_name_converter != NULL)
+            result = dso->meth->dso_name_converter(dso, filename);
+    }
+    if (result == NULL) {
+        result = OPENSSL_strdup(filename);
+        if (result == NULL) {
+            DSOerr(DSO_F_DSO_CONVERT_FILENAME, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            return (NULL);
+        }
+    }
+    return (result);
+}
+
+int DSO_pathbyaddr(void *addr, char *path, int sz)
+{
+    DSO_METHOD *meth = default_DSO_meth;
+    if (meth == NULL)
+        meth = DSO_METHOD_openssl();
+    if (meth->pathbyaddr == NULL) {
+        DSOerr(DSO_F_DSO_PATHBYADDR, DSO_R_UNSUPPORTED);
+        return -1;
+    }
+    return (*meth->pathbyaddr) (addr, path, sz);
+}
+
+DSO *DSO_dsobyaddr(void *addr, int flags)
+{
+    DSO *ret = NULL;
+    char *filename = NULL;
+    int len = DSO_pathbyaddr(addr, NULL, 0);
+
+    if (len < 0)
+        return NULL;
+
+    filename = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
+    if (filename != NULL
+            && DSO_pathbyaddr(addr, filename, len) == len)
+        ret = DSO_load(NULL, filename, NULL, flags);
+
+    OPENSSL_free(filename);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+void *DSO_global_lookup(const char *name)
+{
+    DSO_METHOD *meth = default_DSO_meth;
+    if (meth == NULL)
+        meth = DSO_METHOD_openssl();
+    if (meth->globallookup == NULL) {
+        DSOerr(DSO_F_DSO_GLOBAL_LOOKUP, DSO_R_UNSUPPORTED);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    return (*meth->globallookup) (name);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dso/dso_locl.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dso/dso_locl.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fbfad05
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dso/dso_locl.h
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "internal/dso.h"
+#include "internal/dso_conf.h"
+
+/**********************************************************************/
+/* The low-level handle type used to refer to a loaded shared library */
+
+struct dso_st {
+    DSO_METHOD *meth;
+    /*
+     * Standard dlopen uses a (void *). Win32 uses a HANDLE. VMS doesn't use
+     * anything but will need to cache the filename for use in the dso_bind
+     * handler. All in all, let each method control its own destiny.
+     * "Handles" and such go in a STACK.
+     */
+    STACK_OF(void) *meth_data;
+    int references;
+    int flags;
+    /*
+     * For use by applications etc ... use this for your bits'n'pieces, don't
+     * touch meth_data!
+     */
+    CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data;
+    /*
+     * If this callback function pointer is set to non-NULL, then it will be
+     * used in DSO_load() in place of meth->dso_name_converter. NB: This
+     * should normally set using DSO_set_name_converter().
+     */
+    DSO_NAME_CONVERTER_FUNC name_converter;
+    /*
+     * If this callback function pointer is set to non-NULL, then it will be
+     * used in DSO_load() in place of meth->dso_merger. NB: This should
+     * normally set using DSO_set_merger().
+     */
+    DSO_MERGER_FUNC merger;
+    /*
+     * This is populated with (a copy of) the platform-independent filename
+     * used for this DSO.
+     */
+    char *filename;
+    /*
+     * This is populated with (a copy of) the translated filename by which
+     * the DSO was actually loaded. It is NULL iff the DSO is not currently
+     * loaded. NB: This is here because the filename translation process may
+     * involve a callback being invoked more than once not only to convert to
+     * a platform-specific form, but also to try different filenames in the
+     * process of trying to perform a load. As such, this variable can be
+     * used to indicate (a) whether this DSO structure corresponds to a
+     * loaded library or not, and (b) the filename with which it was actually
+     * loaded.
+     */
+    char *loaded_filename;
+    CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock;
+};
+
+struct dso_meth_st {
+    const char *name;
+    /*
+     * Loads a shared library, NB: new DSO_METHODs must ensure that a
+     * successful load populates the loaded_filename field, and likewise a
+     * successful unload OPENSSL_frees and NULLs it out.
+     */
+    int (*dso_load) (DSO *dso);
+    /* Unloads a shared library */
+    int (*dso_unload) (DSO *dso);
+    /*
+     * Binds a function - assumes a return type of DSO_FUNC_TYPE. This should
+     * be cast to the real function prototype by the caller. Platforms that
+     * don't have compatible representations for different prototypes (this
+     * is possible within ANSI C) are highly unlikely to have shared
+     * libraries at all, let alone a DSO_METHOD implemented for them.
+     */
+    DSO_FUNC_TYPE (*dso_bind_func) (DSO *dso, const char *symname);
+    /*
+     * The generic (yuck) "ctrl()" function. NB: Negative return values
+     * (rather than zero) indicate errors.
+     */
+    long (*dso_ctrl) (DSO *dso, int cmd, long larg, void *parg);
+    /*
+     * The default DSO_METHOD-specific function for converting filenames to a
+     * canonical native form.
+     */
+    DSO_NAME_CONVERTER_FUNC dso_name_converter;
+    /*
+     * The default DSO_METHOD-specific function for converting filenames to a
+     * canonical native form.
+     */
+    DSO_MERGER_FUNC dso_merger;
+    /* [De]Initialisation handlers. */
+    int (*init) (DSO *dso);
+    int (*finish) (DSO *dso);
+    /* Return pathname of the module containing location */
+    int (*pathbyaddr) (void *addr, char *path, int sz);
+    /* Perform global symbol lookup, i.e. among *all* modules */
+    void *(*globallookup) (const char *symname);
+};
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dso/dso_openssl.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dso/dso_openssl.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6626331
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dso/dso_openssl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "dso_locl.h"
+
+#if !defined(DSO_VMS) && !defined(DSO_DLCFN) && !defined(DSO_DL) && !defined(DSO_WIN32) && !defined(DSO_DLFCN)
+
+static DSO_METHOD dso_meth_null = {
+    "NULL shared library method"
+};
+
+DSO_METHOD *DSO_METHOD_openssl(void)
+{
+    return &dso_meth_null;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dso/dso_vms.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dso/dso_vms.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b9a98dd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dso/dso_vms.c
@@ -0,0 +1,468 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "dso_locl.h"
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+
+# pragma message disable DOLLARID
+# include <errno.h>
+# include <rms.h>
+# include <lib$routines.h>
+# include <libfisdef.h>
+# include <stsdef.h>
+# include <descrip.h>
+# include <starlet.h>
+# include "../vms_rms.h"
+
+/* Some compiler options may mask the declaration of "_malloc32". */
+# if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE && defined _ANSI_C_SOURCE
+#  if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64
+#   pragma pointer_size save
+#   pragma pointer_size 32
+void *_malloc32(__size_t);
+#   pragma pointer_size restore
+#  endif                        /* __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 */
+# endif                         /* __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE && defined
+                                 * _ANSI_C_SOURCE */
+
+# pragma message disable DOLLARID
+
+static int vms_load(DSO *dso);
+static int vms_unload(DSO *dso);
+static DSO_FUNC_TYPE vms_bind_func(DSO *dso, const char *symname);
+static char *vms_name_converter(DSO *dso, const char *filename);
+static char *vms_merger(DSO *dso, const char *filespec1,
+                        const char *filespec2);
+
+static DSO_METHOD dso_meth_vms = {
+    "OpenSSL 'VMS' shared library method",
+    vms_load,
+    NULL,                       /* unload */
+    vms_bind_func,
+    NULL,                       /* ctrl */
+    vms_name_converter,
+    vms_merger,
+    NULL,                       /* init */
+    NULL,                       /* finish */
+    NULL,                       /* pathbyaddr */
+    NULL                        /* globallookup */
+};
+
+/*
+ * On VMS, the only "handle" is the file name.  LIB$FIND_IMAGE_SYMBOL depends
+ * on the reference to the file name being the same for all calls regarding
+ * one shared image, so we'll just store it in an instance of the following
+ * structure and put a pointer to that instance in the meth_data stack.
+ */
+typedef struct dso_internal_st {
+    /*
+     * This should contain the name only, no directory, no extension, nothing
+     * but a name.
+     */
+    struct dsc$descriptor_s filename_dsc;
+    char filename[NAMX_MAXRSS + 1];
+    /*
+     * This contains whatever is not in filename, if needed. Normally not
+     * defined.
+     */
+    struct dsc$descriptor_s imagename_dsc;
+    char imagename[NAMX_MAXRSS + 1];
+} DSO_VMS_INTERNAL;
+
+DSO_METHOD *DSO_METHOD_openssl(void)
+{
+    return &dso_meth_vms;
+}
+
+static int vms_load(DSO *dso)
+{
+    void *ptr = NULL;
+    /* See applicable comments in dso_dl.c */
+    char *filename = DSO_convert_filename(dso, NULL);
+
+/* Ensure 32-bit pointer for "p", and appropriate malloc() function. */
+# if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64
+#  define DSO_MALLOC _malloc32
+#  pragma pointer_size save
+#  pragma pointer_size 32
+# else                          /* __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 */
+#  define DSO_MALLOC OPENSSL_malloc
+# endif                         /* __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 [else] */
+
+    DSO_VMS_INTERNAL *p = NULL;
+
+# if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64
+#  pragma pointer_size restore
+# endif                         /* __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 */
+
+    const char *sp1, *sp2;      /* Search result */
+    const char *ext = NULL;     /* possible extension to add */
+
+    if (filename == NULL) {
+        DSOerr(DSO_F_VMS_LOAD, DSO_R_NO_FILENAME);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /*-
+     * A file specification may look like this:
+     *
+     *      node::dev:[dir-spec]name.type;ver
+     *
+     * or (for compatibility with TOPS-20):
+     *
+     *      node::dev:<dir-spec>name.type;ver
+     *
+     * and the dir-spec uses '.' as separator.  Also, a dir-spec
+     * may consist of several parts, with mixed use of [] and <>:
+     *
+     *      [dir1.]<dir2>
+     *
+     * We need to split the file specification into the name and
+     * the rest (both before and after the name itself).
+     */
+    /*
+     * Start with trying to find the end of a dir-spec, and save the position
+     * of the byte after in sp1
+     */
+    sp1 = strrchr(filename, ']');
+    sp2 = strrchr(filename, '>');
+    if (sp1 == NULL)
+        sp1 = sp2;
+    if (sp2 != NULL && sp2 > sp1)
+        sp1 = sp2;
+    if (sp1 == NULL)
+        sp1 = strrchr(filename, ':');
+    if (sp1 == NULL)
+        sp1 = filename;
+    else
+        sp1++;                  /* The byte after the found character */
+    /* Now, let's see if there's a type, and save the position in sp2 */
+    sp2 = strchr(sp1, '.');
+    /*
+     * If there is a period and the next character is a semi-colon,
+     * we need to add an extension
+     */
+    if (sp2 != NULL && sp2[1] == ';')
+        ext = ".EXE";
+    /*
+     * If we found it, that's where we'll cut.  Otherwise, look for a version
+     * number and save the position in sp2
+     */
+    if (sp2 == NULL) {
+        sp2 = strchr(sp1, ';');
+        ext = ".EXE";
+    }
+    /*
+     * If there was still nothing to find, set sp2 to point at the end of the
+     * string
+     */
+    if (sp2 == NULL)
+        sp2 = sp1 + strlen(sp1);
+
+    /* Check that we won't get buffer overflows */
+    if (sp2 - sp1 > FILENAME_MAX
+        || (sp1 - filename) + strlen(sp2) > FILENAME_MAX) {
+        DSOerr(DSO_F_VMS_LOAD, DSO_R_FILENAME_TOO_BIG);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    p = DSO_MALLOC(sizeof(*p));
+    if (p == NULL) {
+        DSOerr(DSO_F_VMS_LOAD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    strncpy(p->filename, sp1, sp2 - sp1);
+    p->filename[sp2 - sp1] = '\0';
+
+    strncpy(p->imagename, filename, sp1 - filename);
+    p->imagename[sp1 - filename] = '\0';
+    if (ext) {
+        strcat(p->imagename, ext);
+        if (*sp2 == '.')
+            sp2++;
+    }
+    strcat(p->imagename, sp2);
+
+    p->filename_dsc.dsc$w_length = strlen(p->filename);
+    p->filename_dsc.dsc$b_dtype = DSC$K_DTYPE_T;
+    p->filename_dsc.dsc$b_class = DSC$K_CLASS_S;
+    p->filename_dsc.dsc$a_pointer = p->filename;
+    p->imagename_dsc.dsc$w_length = strlen(p->imagename);
+    p->imagename_dsc.dsc$b_dtype = DSC$K_DTYPE_T;
+    p->imagename_dsc.dsc$b_class = DSC$K_CLASS_S;
+    p->imagename_dsc.dsc$a_pointer = p->imagename;
+
+    if (!sk_void_push(dso->meth_data, (char *)p)) {
+        DSOerr(DSO_F_VMS_LOAD, DSO_R_STACK_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* Success (for now, we lie.  We actually do not know...) */
+    dso->loaded_filename = filename;
+    return (1);
+ err:
+    /* Cleanup! */
+    OPENSSL_free(p);
+    OPENSSL_free(filename);
+    return (0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note that this doesn't actually unload the shared image, as there is no
+ * such thing in VMS.  Next time it get loaded again, a new copy will
+ * actually be loaded.
+ */
+static int vms_unload(DSO *dso)
+{
+    DSO_VMS_INTERNAL *p;
+    if (dso == NULL) {
+        DSOerr(DSO_F_VMS_UNLOAD, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+        return (0);
+    }
+    if (sk_void_num(dso->meth_data) < 1)
+        return (1);
+    p = (DSO_VMS_INTERNAL *)sk_void_pop(dso->meth_data);
+    if (p == NULL) {
+        DSOerr(DSO_F_VMS_UNLOAD, DSO_R_NULL_HANDLE);
+        return (0);
+    }
+    /* Cleanup */
+    OPENSSL_free(p);
+    return (1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * We must do this in a separate function because of the way the exception
+ * handler works (it makes this function return
+ */
+static int do_find_symbol(DSO_VMS_INTERNAL *ptr,
+                          struct dsc$descriptor_s *symname_dsc, void **sym,
+                          unsigned long flags)
+{
+    /*
+     * Make sure that signals are caught and returned instead of aborting the
+     * program.  The exception handler gets unestablished automatically on
+     * return from this function.
+     */
+    lib$establish(lib$sig_to_ret);
+
+    if (ptr->imagename_dsc.dsc$w_length)
+        return lib$find_image_symbol(&ptr->filename_dsc,
+                                     symname_dsc, sym,
+                                     &ptr->imagename_dsc, flags);
+    else
+        return lib$find_image_symbol(&ptr->filename_dsc,
+                                     symname_dsc, sym, 0, flags);
+}
+
+void vms_bind_sym(DSO *dso, const char *symname, void **sym)
+{
+    DSO_VMS_INTERNAL *ptr;
+    int status;
+# ifdef LIB$M_FIS_MIXEDCASE
+    int flags = LIB$M_FIS_MIXEDCASE;
+# else
+    int flags = (1 << 4);
+# endif
+    struct dsc$descriptor_s symname_dsc;
+
+/* Arrange 32-bit pointer to (copied) string storage, if needed. */
+# if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64
+#  define SYMNAME symname_32p
+#  pragma pointer_size save
+#  pragma pointer_size 32
+    char *symname_32p;
+#  pragma pointer_size restore
+    char symname_32[NAMX_MAXRSS + 1];
+# else                          /* __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 */
+#  define SYMNAME ((char *) symname)
+# endif                         /* __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 [else] */
+
+    *sym = NULL;
+
+    if ((dso == NULL) || (symname == NULL)) {
+        DSOerr(DSO_F_VMS_BIND_SYM, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+        return;
+    }
+# if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64
+    /* Copy the symbol name to storage with a 32-bit pointer. */
+    symname_32p = symname_32;
+    strcpy(symname_32p, symname);
+# endif                         /* __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 [else] */
+
+    symname_dsc.dsc$w_length = strlen(SYMNAME);
+    symname_dsc.dsc$b_dtype = DSC$K_DTYPE_T;
+    symname_dsc.dsc$b_class = DSC$K_CLASS_S;
+    symname_dsc.dsc$a_pointer = SYMNAME;
+
+    if (sk_void_num(dso->meth_data) < 1) {
+        DSOerr(DSO_F_VMS_BIND_SYM, DSO_R_STACK_ERROR);
+        return;
+    }
+    ptr = (DSO_VMS_INTERNAL *)sk_void_value(dso->meth_data,
+                                            sk_void_num(dso->meth_data) - 1);
+    if (ptr == NULL) {
+        DSOerr(DSO_F_VMS_BIND_SYM, DSO_R_NULL_HANDLE);
+        return;
+    }
+
+    if (dso->flags & DSO_FLAG_UPCASE_SYMBOL)
+        flags = 0;
+
+    status = do_find_symbol(ptr, &symname_dsc, sym, flags);
+
+    if (!$VMS_STATUS_SUCCESS(status)) {
+        unsigned short length;
+        char errstring[257];
+        struct dsc$descriptor_s errstring_dsc;
+
+        errstring_dsc.dsc$w_length = sizeof(errstring);
+        errstring_dsc.dsc$b_dtype = DSC$K_DTYPE_T;
+        errstring_dsc.dsc$b_class = DSC$K_CLASS_S;
+        errstring_dsc.dsc$a_pointer = errstring;
+
+        *sym = NULL;
+
+        status = sys$getmsg(status, &length, &errstring_dsc, 1, 0);
+
+        if (!$VMS_STATUS_SUCCESS(status))
+            lib$signal(status); /* This is really bad.  Abort! */
+        else {
+            errstring[length] = '\0';
+
+            DSOerr(DSO_F_VMS_BIND_SYM, DSO_R_SYM_FAILURE);
+            if (ptr->imagename_dsc.dsc$w_length)
+                ERR_add_error_data(9,
+                                   "Symbol ", symname,
+                                   " in ", ptr->filename,
+                                   " (", ptr->imagename, ")",
+                                   ": ", errstring);
+            else
+                ERR_add_error_data(6,
+                                   "Symbol ", symname,
+                                   " in ", ptr->filename, ": ", errstring);
+        }
+        return;
+    }
+    return;
+}
+
+static DSO_FUNC_TYPE vms_bind_func(DSO *dso, const char *symname)
+{
+    DSO_FUNC_TYPE sym = 0;
+    vms_bind_sym(dso, symname, (void **)&sym);
+    return sym;
+}
+
+static char *vms_merger(DSO *dso, const char *filespec1,
+                        const char *filespec2)
+{
+    int status;
+    int filespec1len, filespec2len;
+    struct FAB fab;
+    struct NAMX_STRUCT nam;
+    char esa[NAMX_MAXRSS + 1];
+    char *merged;
+
+/* Arrange 32-bit pointer to (copied) string storage, if needed. */
+# if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64
+#  define FILESPEC1 filespec1_32p;
+#  define FILESPEC2 filespec2_32p;
+#  pragma pointer_size save
+#  pragma pointer_size 32
+    char *filespec1_32p;
+    char *filespec2_32p;
+#  pragma pointer_size restore
+    char filespec1_32[NAMX_MAXRSS + 1];
+    char filespec2_32[NAMX_MAXRSS + 1];
+# else                          /* __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 */
+#  define FILESPEC1 ((char *) filespec1)
+#  define FILESPEC2 ((char *) filespec2)
+# endif                         /* __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 [else] */
+
+    if (!filespec1)
+        filespec1 = "";
+    if (!filespec2)
+        filespec2 = "";
+    filespec1len = strlen(filespec1);
+    filespec2len = strlen(filespec2);
+
+# if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64
+    /* Copy the file names to storage with a 32-bit pointer. */
+    filespec1_32p = filespec1_32;
+    filespec2_32p = filespec2_32;
+    strcpy(filespec1_32p, filespec1);
+    strcpy(filespec2_32p, filespec2);
+# endif                         /* __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 [else] */
+
+    fab = cc$rms_fab;
+    nam = CC_RMS_NAMX;
+
+    FAB_OR_NAML(fab, nam).FAB_OR_NAML_FNA = FILESPEC1;
+    FAB_OR_NAML(fab, nam).FAB_OR_NAML_FNS = filespec1len;
+    FAB_OR_NAML(fab, nam).FAB_OR_NAML_DNA = FILESPEC2;
+    FAB_OR_NAML(fab, nam).FAB_OR_NAML_DNS = filespec2len;
+    NAMX_DNA_FNA_SET(fab)
+
+        nam.NAMX_ESA = esa;
+    nam.NAMX_ESS = NAMX_MAXRSS;
+    nam.NAMX_NOP = NAM$M_SYNCHK | NAM$M_PWD;
+    SET_NAMX_NO_SHORT_UPCASE(nam);
+
+    fab.FAB_NAMX = &nam;
+
+    status = sys$parse(&fab, 0, 0);
+
+    if (!$VMS_STATUS_SUCCESS(status)) {
+        unsigned short length;
+        char errstring[257];
+        struct dsc$descriptor_s errstring_dsc;
+
+        errstring_dsc.dsc$w_length = sizeof(errstring);
+        errstring_dsc.dsc$b_dtype = DSC$K_DTYPE_T;
+        errstring_dsc.dsc$b_class = DSC$K_CLASS_S;
+        errstring_dsc.dsc$a_pointer = errstring;
+
+        status = sys$getmsg(status, &length, &errstring_dsc, 1, 0);
+
+        if (!$VMS_STATUS_SUCCESS(status))
+            lib$signal(status); /* This is really bad.  Abort! */
+        else {
+            errstring[length] = '\0';
+
+            DSOerr(DSO_F_VMS_MERGER, DSO_R_FAILURE);
+            ERR_add_error_data(7,
+                               "filespec \"", filespec1, "\", ",
+                               "defaults \"", filespec2, "\": ", errstring);
+        }
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+
+    merged = OPENSSL_malloc(nam.NAMX_ESL + 1);
+    if (merged == NULL)
+        goto malloc_err;
+    strncpy(merged, nam.NAMX_ESA, nam.NAMX_ESL);
+    merged[nam.NAMX_ESL] = '\0';
+    return (merged);
+ malloc_err:
+    DSOerr(DSO_F_VMS_MERGER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+}
+
+static char *vms_name_converter(DSO *dso, const char *filename)
+{
+    int len = strlen(filename);
+    char *not_translated = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1);
+    if (not_translated != NULL)
+        strcpy(not_translated, filename);
+    return (not_translated);
+}
+
+#endif                          /* OPENSSL_SYS_VMS */
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dso/dso_win32.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dso/dso_win32.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4a4c34a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/dso/dso_win32.c
@@ -0,0 +1,573 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "dso_locl.h"
+
+#if defined(DSO_WIN32)
+
+# ifdef _WIN32_WCE
+#  if _WIN32_WCE < 300
+static FARPROC GetProcAddressA(HMODULE hModule, LPCSTR lpProcName)
+{
+    WCHAR lpProcNameW[64];
+    int i;
+
+    for (i = 0; lpProcName[i] && i < 64; i++)
+        lpProcNameW[i] = (WCHAR)lpProcName[i];
+    if (i == 64)
+        return NULL;
+    lpProcNameW[i] = 0;
+
+    return GetProcAddressW(hModule, lpProcNameW);
+}
+#  endif
+#  undef GetProcAddress
+#  define GetProcAddress GetProcAddressA
+
+static HINSTANCE LoadLibraryA(LPCSTR lpLibFileName)
+{
+    WCHAR *fnamw;
+    size_t len_0 = strlen(lpLibFileName) + 1, i;
+
+#  ifdef _MSC_VER
+    fnamw = (WCHAR *)_alloca(len_0 * sizeof(WCHAR));
+#  else
+    fnamw = (WCHAR *)alloca(len_0 * sizeof(WCHAR));
+#  endif
+    if (fnamw == NULL) {
+        SetLastError(ERROR_NOT_ENOUGH_MEMORY);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+#  if defined(_WIN32_WCE) && _WIN32_WCE>=101
+    if (!MultiByteToWideChar(CP_ACP, 0, lpLibFileName, len_0, fnamw, len_0))
+#  endif
+        for (i = 0; i < len_0; i++)
+            fnamw[i] = (WCHAR)lpLibFileName[i];
+
+    return LoadLibraryW(fnamw);
+}
+# endif
+
+/* Part of the hack in "win32_load" ... */
+# define DSO_MAX_TRANSLATED_SIZE 256
+
+static int win32_load(DSO *dso);
+static int win32_unload(DSO *dso);
+static DSO_FUNC_TYPE win32_bind_func(DSO *dso, const char *symname);
+static char *win32_name_converter(DSO *dso, const char *filename);
+static char *win32_merger(DSO *dso, const char *filespec1,
+                          const char *filespec2);
+static void *win32_globallookup(const char *name);
+
+static const char *openssl_strnchr(const char *string, int c, size_t len);
+
+static DSO_METHOD dso_meth_win32 = {
+    "OpenSSL 'win32' shared library method",
+    win32_load,
+    win32_unload,
+    win32_bind_func,
+    NULL,                       /* ctrl */
+    win32_name_converter,
+    win32_merger,
+    NULL,                       /* init */
+    NULL,                       /* finish */
+    NULL,                       /* pathbyaddr */
+    win32_globallookup
+};
+
+DSO_METHOD *DSO_METHOD_openssl(void)
+{
+    return &dso_meth_win32;
+}
+
+/*
+ * For this DSO_METHOD, our meth_data STACK will contain; (i) a pointer to
+ * the handle (HINSTANCE) returned from LoadLibrary(), and copied.
+ */
+
+static int win32_load(DSO *dso)
+{
+    HINSTANCE h = NULL, *p = NULL;
+    /* See applicable comments from dso_dl.c */
+    char *filename = DSO_convert_filename(dso, NULL);
+
+    if (filename == NULL) {
+        DSOerr(DSO_F_WIN32_LOAD, DSO_R_NO_FILENAME);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    h = LoadLibraryA(filename);
+    if (h == NULL) {
+        DSOerr(DSO_F_WIN32_LOAD, DSO_R_LOAD_FAILED);
+        ERR_add_error_data(3, "filename(", filename, ")");
+        goto err;
+    }
+    p = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*p));
+    if (p == NULL) {
+        DSOerr(DSO_F_WIN32_LOAD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    *p = h;
+    if (!sk_void_push(dso->meth_data, p)) {
+        DSOerr(DSO_F_WIN32_LOAD, DSO_R_STACK_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    /* Success */
+    dso->loaded_filename = filename;
+    return (1);
+ err:
+    /* Cleanup ! */
+    OPENSSL_free(filename);
+    OPENSSL_free(p);
+    if (h != NULL)
+        FreeLibrary(h);
+    return (0);
+}
+
+static int win32_unload(DSO *dso)
+{
+    HINSTANCE *p;
+    if (dso == NULL) {
+        DSOerr(DSO_F_WIN32_UNLOAD, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+        return (0);
+    }
+    if (sk_void_num(dso->meth_data) < 1)
+        return (1);
+    p = sk_void_pop(dso->meth_data);
+    if (p == NULL) {
+        DSOerr(DSO_F_WIN32_UNLOAD, DSO_R_NULL_HANDLE);
+        return (0);
+    }
+    if (!FreeLibrary(*p)) {
+        DSOerr(DSO_F_WIN32_UNLOAD, DSO_R_UNLOAD_FAILED);
+        /*
+         * We should push the value back onto the stack in case of a retry.
+         */
+        sk_void_push(dso->meth_data, p);
+        return (0);
+    }
+    /* Cleanup */
+    OPENSSL_free(p);
+    return (1);
+}
+
+static DSO_FUNC_TYPE win32_bind_func(DSO *dso, const char *symname)
+{
+    HINSTANCE *ptr;
+    union {
+        void *p;
+        FARPROC f;
+    } sym;
+
+    if ((dso == NULL) || (symname == NULL)) {
+        DSOerr(DSO_F_WIN32_BIND_FUNC, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+    if (sk_void_num(dso->meth_data) < 1) {
+        DSOerr(DSO_F_WIN32_BIND_FUNC, DSO_R_STACK_ERROR);
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+    ptr = sk_void_value(dso->meth_data, sk_void_num(dso->meth_data) - 1);
+    if (ptr == NULL) {
+        DSOerr(DSO_F_WIN32_BIND_FUNC, DSO_R_NULL_HANDLE);
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+    sym.f = GetProcAddress(*ptr, symname);
+    if (sym.p == NULL) {
+        DSOerr(DSO_F_WIN32_BIND_FUNC, DSO_R_SYM_FAILURE);
+        ERR_add_error_data(3, "symname(", symname, ")");
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+    return ((DSO_FUNC_TYPE)sym.f);
+}
+
+struct file_st {
+    const char *node;
+    int nodelen;
+    const char *device;
+    int devicelen;
+    const char *predir;
+    int predirlen;
+    const char *dir;
+    int dirlen;
+    const char *file;
+    int filelen;
+};
+
+static struct file_st *win32_splitter(DSO *dso, const char *filename,
+                                      int assume_last_is_dir)
+{
+    struct file_st *result = NULL;
+    enum { IN_NODE, IN_DEVICE, IN_FILE } position;
+    const char *start = filename;
+    char last;
+
+    if (!filename) {
+        DSOerr(DSO_F_WIN32_SPLITTER, DSO_R_NO_FILENAME);
+        /*
+         * goto err;
+         */
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+
+    result = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*result));
+    if (result == NULL) {
+        DSOerr(DSO_F_WIN32_SPLITTER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+
+    position = IN_DEVICE;
+
+    if ((filename[0] == '\\' && filename[1] == '\\')
+        || (filename[0] == '/' && filename[1] == '/')) {
+        position = IN_NODE;
+        filename += 2;
+        start = filename;
+        result->node = start;
+    }
+
+    do {
+        last = filename[0];
+        switch (last) {
+        case ':':
+            if (position != IN_DEVICE) {
+                DSOerr(DSO_F_WIN32_SPLITTER, DSO_R_INCORRECT_FILE_SYNTAX);
+                /*
+                 * goto err;
+                 */
+                OPENSSL_free(result);
+                return (NULL);
+            }
+            result->device = start;
+            result->devicelen = (int)(filename - start);
+            position = IN_FILE;
+            start = ++filename;
+            result->dir = start;
+            break;
+        case '\\':
+        case '/':
+            if (position == IN_NODE) {
+                result->nodelen = (int)(filename - start);
+                position = IN_FILE;
+                start = ++filename;
+                result->dir = start;
+            } else if (position == IN_DEVICE) {
+                position = IN_FILE;
+                filename++;
+                result->dir = start;
+                result->dirlen = (int)(filename - start);
+                start = filename;
+            } else {
+                filename++;
+                result->dirlen += (int)(filename - start);
+                start = filename;
+            }
+            break;
+        case '\0':
+            if (position == IN_NODE) {
+                result->nodelen = (int)(filename - start);
+            } else {
+                if (filename - start > 0) {
+                    if (assume_last_is_dir) {
+                        if (position == IN_DEVICE) {
+                            result->dir = start;
+                            result->dirlen = 0;
+                        }
+                        result->dirlen += (int)(filename - start);
+                    } else {
+                        result->file = start;
+                        result->filelen = (int)(filename - start);
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+            break;
+        default:
+            filename++;
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    while (last);
+
+    if (!result->nodelen)
+        result->node = NULL;
+    if (!result->devicelen)
+        result->device = NULL;
+    if (!result->dirlen)
+        result->dir = NULL;
+    if (!result->filelen)
+        result->file = NULL;
+
+    return (result);
+}
+
+static char *win32_joiner(DSO *dso, const struct file_st *file_split)
+{
+    int len = 0, offset = 0;
+    char *result = NULL;
+    const char *start;
+
+    if (!file_split) {
+        DSOerr(DSO_F_WIN32_JOINER, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+    if (file_split->node) {
+        len += 2 + file_split->nodelen; /* 2 for starting \\ */
+        if (file_split->predir || file_split->dir || file_split->file)
+            len++;              /* 1 for ending \ */
+    } else if (file_split->device) {
+        len += file_split->devicelen + 1; /* 1 for ending : */
+    }
+    len += file_split->predirlen;
+    if (file_split->predir && (file_split->dir || file_split->file)) {
+        len++;                  /* 1 for ending \ */
+    }
+    len += file_split->dirlen;
+    if (file_split->dir && file_split->file) {
+        len++;                  /* 1 for ending \ */
+    }
+    len += file_split->filelen;
+
+    if (!len) {
+        DSOerr(DSO_F_WIN32_JOINER, DSO_R_EMPTY_FILE_STRUCTURE);
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+
+    result = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1);
+    if (result == NULL) {
+        DSOerr(DSO_F_WIN32_JOINER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+
+    if (file_split->node) {
+        strcpy(&result[offset], "\\\\");
+        offset += 2;
+        strncpy(&result[offset], file_split->node, file_split->nodelen);
+        offset += file_split->nodelen;
+        if (file_split->predir || file_split->dir || file_split->file) {
+            result[offset] = '\\';
+            offset++;
+        }
+    } else if (file_split->device) {
+        strncpy(&result[offset], file_split->device, file_split->devicelen);
+        offset += file_split->devicelen;
+        result[offset] = ':';
+        offset++;
+    }
+    start = file_split->predir;
+    while (file_split->predirlen > (start - file_split->predir)) {
+        const char *end = openssl_strnchr(start, '/',
+                                          file_split->predirlen - (start -
+                                                                   file_split->predir));
+        if (!end)
+            end = start
+                + file_split->predirlen - (start - file_split->predir);
+        strncpy(&result[offset], start, end - start);
+        offset += (int)(end - start);
+        result[offset] = '\\';
+        offset++;
+        start = end + 1;
+    }
+    start = file_split->dir;
+    while (file_split->dirlen > (start - file_split->dir)) {
+        const char *end = openssl_strnchr(start, '/',
+                                          file_split->dirlen - (start -
+                                                                file_split->dir));
+        if (!end)
+            end = start + file_split->dirlen - (start - file_split->dir);
+        strncpy(&result[offset], start, end - start);
+        offset += (int)(end - start);
+        result[offset] = '\\';
+        offset++;
+        start = end + 1;
+    }
+    strncpy(&result[offset], file_split->file, file_split->filelen);
+    offset += file_split->filelen;
+    result[offset] = '\0';
+    return (result);
+}
+
+static char *win32_merger(DSO *dso, const char *filespec1,
+                          const char *filespec2)
+{
+    char *merged = NULL;
+    struct file_st *filespec1_split = NULL;
+    struct file_st *filespec2_split = NULL;
+
+    if (!filespec1 && !filespec2) {
+        DSOerr(DSO_F_WIN32_MERGER, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+    if (!filespec2) {
+        merged = OPENSSL_malloc(strlen(filespec1) + 1);
+        if (merged == NULL) {
+            DSOerr(DSO_F_WIN32_MERGER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            return (NULL);
+        }
+        strcpy(merged, filespec1);
+    } else if (!filespec1) {
+        merged = OPENSSL_malloc(strlen(filespec2) + 1);
+        if (merged == NULL) {
+            DSOerr(DSO_F_WIN32_MERGER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            return (NULL);
+        }
+        strcpy(merged, filespec2);
+    } else {
+        filespec1_split = win32_splitter(dso, filespec1, 0);
+        if (!filespec1_split) {
+            DSOerr(DSO_F_WIN32_MERGER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            return (NULL);
+        }
+        filespec2_split = win32_splitter(dso, filespec2, 1);
+        if (!filespec2_split) {
+            DSOerr(DSO_F_WIN32_MERGER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            OPENSSL_free(filespec1_split);
+            return (NULL);
+        }
+
+        /* Fill in into filespec1_split */
+        if (!filespec1_split->node && !filespec1_split->device) {
+            filespec1_split->node = filespec2_split->node;
+            filespec1_split->nodelen = filespec2_split->nodelen;
+            filespec1_split->device = filespec2_split->device;
+            filespec1_split->devicelen = filespec2_split->devicelen;
+        }
+        if (!filespec1_split->dir) {
+            filespec1_split->dir = filespec2_split->dir;
+            filespec1_split->dirlen = filespec2_split->dirlen;
+        } else if (filespec1_split->dir[0] != '\\'
+                   && filespec1_split->dir[0] != '/') {
+            filespec1_split->predir = filespec2_split->dir;
+            filespec1_split->predirlen = filespec2_split->dirlen;
+        }
+        if (!filespec1_split->file) {
+            filespec1_split->file = filespec2_split->file;
+            filespec1_split->filelen = filespec2_split->filelen;
+        }
+
+        merged = win32_joiner(dso, filespec1_split);
+    }
+    OPENSSL_free(filespec1_split);
+    OPENSSL_free(filespec2_split);
+    return (merged);
+}
+
+static char *win32_name_converter(DSO *dso, const char *filename)
+{
+    char *translated;
+    int len, transform;
+
+    len = strlen(filename);
+    transform = ((strstr(filename, "/") == NULL) &&
+                 (strstr(filename, "\\") == NULL) &&
+                 (strstr(filename, ":") == NULL));
+    if (transform)
+        /* We will convert this to "%s.dll" */
+        translated = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 5);
+    else
+        /* We will simply duplicate filename */
+        translated = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1);
+    if (translated == NULL) {
+        DSOerr(DSO_F_WIN32_NAME_CONVERTER, DSO_R_NAME_TRANSLATION_FAILED);
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+    if (transform)
+        sprintf(translated, "%s.dll", filename);
+    else
+        sprintf(translated, "%s", filename);
+    return (translated);
+}
+
+static const char *openssl_strnchr(const char *string, int c, size_t len)
+{
+    size_t i;
+    const char *p;
+    for (i = 0, p = string; i < len && *p; i++, p++) {
+        if (*p == c)
+            return p;
+    }
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+# include <tlhelp32.h>
+# ifdef _WIN32_WCE
+#  define DLLNAME "TOOLHELP.DLL"
+# else
+#  ifdef MODULEENTRY32
+#   undef MODULEENTRY32         /* unmask the ASCII version! */
+#  endif
+#  define DLLNAME "KERNEL32.DLL"
+# endif
+
+typedef HANDLE(WINAPI *CREATETOOLHELP32SNAPSHOT) (DWORD, DWORD);
+typedef BOOL(WINAPI *CLOSETOOLHELP32SNAPSHOT) (HANDLE);
+typedef BOOL(WINAPI *MODULE32) (HANDLE, MODULEENTRY32 *);
+
+static void *win32_globallookup(const char *name)
+{
+    HMODULE dll;
+    HANDLE hModuleSnap = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
+    MODULEENTRY32 me32;
+    CREATETOOLHELP32SNAPSHOT create_snap;
+    CLOSETOOLHELP32SNAPSHOT close_snap;
+    MODULE32 module_first, module_next;
+    union {
+        void *p;
+        FARPROC f;
+    } ret = { NULL };
+
+    dll = LoadLibrary(TEXT(DLLNAME));
+    if (dll == NULL) {
+        DSOerr(DSO_F_WIN32_GLOBALLOOKUP, DSO_R_UNSUPPORTED);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    create_snap = (CREATETOOLHELP32SNAPSHOT)
+        GetProcAddress(dll, "CreateToolhelp32Snapshot");
+    if (create_snap == NULL) {
+        FreeLibrary(dll);
+        DSOerr(DSO_F_WIN32_GLOBALLOOKUP, DSO_R_UNSUPPORTED);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    /* We take the rest for granted... */
+# ifdef _WIN32_WCE
+    close_snap = (CLOSETOOLHELP32SNAPSHOT)
+        GetProcAddress(dll, "CloseToolhelp32Snapshot");
+# else
+    close_snap = (CLOSETOOLHELP32SNAPSHOT) CloseHandle;
+# endif
+    module_first = (MODULE32) GetProcAddress(dll, "Module32First");
+    module_next = (MODULE32) GetProcAddress(dll, "Module32Next");
+
+    hModuleSnap = (*create_snap) (TH32CS_SNAPMODULE, 0);
+    if (hModuleSnap == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
+        FreeLibrary(dll);
+        DSOerr(DSO_F_WIN32_GLOBALLOOKUP, DSO_R_UNSUPPORTED);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    me32.dwSize = sizeof(me32);
+
+    if (!(*module_first) (hModuleSnap, &me32)) {
+        (*close_snap) (hModuleSnap);
+        FreeLibrary(dll);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    do {
+        if ((ret.f = GetProcAddress(me32.hModule, name))) {
+            (*close_snap) (hModuleSnap);
+            FreeLibrary(dll);
+            return ret.p;
+        }
+    } while ((*module_next) (hModuleSnap, &me32));
+
+    (*close_snap) (hModuleSnap);
+    FreeLibrary(dll);
+    return NULL;
+}
+#endif                          /* DSO_WIN32 */
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ebcdic.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ebcdic.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6871953
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ebcdic.c
@@ -0,0 +1,366 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+# include <openssl/e_os2.h>
+#ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT
+#else
+
+# include <openssl/ebcdic.h>
+
+/*-
+ *      Initial Port for  Apache-1.3     by <Martin.Kraemer@Mch.SNI.De>
+ *      Adapted for       OpenSSL-0.9.4  by <Martin.Kraemer@Mch.SNI.De>
+ */
+
+# ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC_TEST
+/*
+ * Here we're looking to test the EBCDIC code on an ASCII system so we don't do
+ * any translation in these tables at all.
+ */
+
+/* The ebcdic-to-ascii table: */
+const unsigned char os_toascii[256] = {
+    0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07,
+    0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f,
+    0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17,
+    0x18, 0x19, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x1c, 0x1d, 0x1e, 0x1f,
+    0x20, 0x21, 0x22, 0x23, 0x24, 0x25, 0x26, 0x27,
+    0x28, 0x29, 0x2a, 0x2b, 0x2c, 0x2d, 0x2e, 0x2f,
+    0x30, 0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0x34, 0x35, 0x36, 0x37,
+    0x38, 0x39, 0x3a, 0x3b, 0x3c, 0x3d, 0x3e, 0x3f,
+    0x40, 0x41, 0x42, 0x43, 0x44, 0x45, 0x46, 0x47,
+    0x48, 0x49, 0x4a, 0x4b, 0x4c, 0x4d, 0x4e, 0x4f,
+    0x50, 0x51, 0x52, 0x53, 0x54, 0x55, 0x56, 0x57,
+    0x58, 0x59, 0x5a, 0x5b, 0x5c, 0x5d, 0x5e, 0x5f,
+    0x60, 0x61, 0x62, 0x63, 0x64, 0x65, 0x66, 0x67,
+    0x68, 0x69, 0x6a, 0x6b, 0x6c, 0x6d, 0x6e, 0x6f,
+    0x70, 0x71, 0x72, 0x73, 0x74, 0x75, 0x76, 0x77,
+    0x78, 0x79, 0x7a, 0x7b, 0x7c, 0x7d, 0x7e, 0x7f,
+    0x80, 0x81, 0x82, 0x83, 0x84, 0x85, 0x86, 0x87,
+    0x88, 0x89, 0x8a, 0x8b, 0x8c, 0x8d, 0x8e, 0x8f,
+    0x90, 0x91, 0x92, 0x93, 0x94, 0x95, 0x96, 0x97,
+    0x98, 0x99, 0x9a, 0x9b, 0x9c, 0x9d, 0x9e, 0x9f,
+    0xa0, 0xa1, 0xa2, 0xa3, 0xa4, 0xa5, 0xa6, 0xa7,
+    0xa8, 0xa9, 0xaa, 0xab, 0xac, 0xad, 0xae, 0xaf,
+    0xb0, 0xb1, 0xb2, 0xb3, 0xb4, 0xb5, 0xb6, 0xb7,
+    0xb8, 0xb9, 0xba, 0xbb, 0xbc, 0xbd, 0xbe, 0xbf,
+    0xc0, 0xc1, 0xc2, 0xc3, 0xc4, 0xc5, 0xc6, 0xc7,
+    0xc8, 0xc9, 0xca, 0xcb, 0xcc, 0xcd, 0xce, 0xcf,
+    0xd0, 0xd1, 0xd2, 0xd3, 0xd4, 0xd5, 0xd6, 0xd7,
+    0xd8, 0xd9, 0xda, 0xdb, 0xdc, 0xdd, 0xde, 0xdf,
+    0xe0, 0xe1, 0xe2, 0xe3, 0xe4, 0xe5, 0xe6, 0xe7,
+    0xe8, 0xe9, 0xea, 0xeb, 0xec, 0xed, 0xee, 0xef,
+    0xf0, 0xf1, 0xf2, 0xf3, 0xf4, 0xf5, 0xf6, 0xf7,
+    0xf8, 0xf9, 0xfa, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0xfd, 0xfe, 0xff
+};
+
+/* The ascii-to-ebcdic table: */
+const unsigned char os_toebcdic[256] = {
+    0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07,
+    0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f,
+    0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17,
+    0x18, 0x19, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x1c, 0x1d, 0x1e, 0x1f,
+    0x20, 0x21, 0x22, 0x23, 0x24, 0x25, 0x26, 0x27,
+    0x28, 0x29, 0x2a, 0x2b, 0x2c, 0x2d, 0x2e, 0x2f,
+    0x30, 0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0x34, 0x35, 0x36, 0x37,
+    0x38, 0x39, 0x3a, 0x3b, 0x3c, 0x3d, 0x3e, 0x3f,
+    0x40, 0x41, 0x42, 0x43, 0x44, 0x45, 0x46, 0x47,
+    0x48, 0x49, 0x4a, 0x4b, 0x4c, 0x4d, 0x4e, 0x4f,
+    0x50, 0x51, 0x52, 0x53, 0x54, 0x55, 0x56, 0x57,
+    0x58, 0x59, 0x5a, 0x5b, 0x5c, 0x5d, 0x5e, 0x5f,
+    0x60, 0x61, 0x62, 0x63, 0x64, 0x65, 0x66, 0x67,
+    0x68, 0x69, 0x6a, 0x6b, 0x6c, 0x6d, 0x6e, 0x6f,
+    0x70, 0x71, 0x72, 0x73, 0x74, 0x75, 0x76, 0x77,
+    0x78, 0x79, 0x7a, 0x7b, 0x7c, 0x7d, 0x7e, 0x7f,
+    0x80, 0x81, 0x82, 0x83, 0x84, 0x85, 0x86, 0x87,
+    0x88, 0x89, 0x8a, 0x8b, 0x8c, 0x8d, 0x8e, 0x8f,
+    0x90, 0x91, 0x92, 0x93, 0x94, 0x95, 0x96, 0x97,
+    0x98, 0x99, 0x9a, 0x9b, 0x9c, 0x9d, 0x9e, 0x9f,
+    0xa0, 0xa1, 0xa2, 0xa3, 0xa4, 0xa5, 0xa6, 0xa7,
+    0xa8, 0xa9, 0xaa, 0xab, 0xac, 0xad, 0xae, 0xaf,
+    0xb0, 0xb1, 0xb2, 0xb3, 0xb4, 0xb5, 0xb6, 0xb7,
+    0xb8, 0xb9, 0xba, 0xbb, 0xbc, 0xbd, 0xbe, 0xbf,
+    0xc0, 0xc1, 0xc2, 0xc3, 0xc4, 0xc5, 0xc6, 0xc7,
+    0xc8, 0xc9, 0xca, 0xcb, 0xcc, 0xcd, 0xce, 0xcf,
+    0xd0, 0xd1, 0xd2, 0xd3, 0xd4, 0xd5, 0xd6, 0xd7,
+    0xd8, 0xd9, 0xda, 0xdb, 0xdc, 0xdd, 0xde, 0xdf,
+    0xe0, 0xe1, 0xe2, 0xe3, 0xe4, 0xe5, 0xe6, 0xe7,
+    0xe8, 0xe9, 0xea, 0xeb, 0xec, 0xed, 0xee, 0xef,
+    0xf0, 0xf1, 0xf2, 0xf3, 0xf4, 0xf5, 0xf6, 0xf7,
+    0xf8, 0xf9, 0xfa, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0xfd, 0xfe, 0xff
+};
+
+# elif defined(_OSD_POSIX)
+/*
+ * "BS2000 OSD" is a POSIX subsystem on a main frame. It is made by Siemens
+ * AG, Germany, for their BS2000 mainframe machines. Within the POSIX
+ * subsystem, the same character set was chosen as in "native BS2000", namely
+ * EBCDIC. (EDF04)
+ *
+ * The name "ASCII" in these routines is misleading: actually, conversion is
+ * not between EBCDIC and ASCII, but EBCDIC(EDF04) and ISO-8859.1; that means
+ * that (western european) national characters are preserved.
+ *
+ * This table is identical to the one used by rsh/rcp/ftp and other POSIX
+ * tools.
+ */
+
+/* Here's the bijective ebcdic-to-ascii table: */
+const unsigned char os_toascii[256] = {
+    /*
+     * 00
+     */ 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x85, 0x09, 0x86, 0x7f,
+    0x87, 0x8d, 0x8e, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, /* ................ */
+    /*
+     * 10
+     */ 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x8f, 0x0a, 0x08, 0x97,
+    0x18, 0x19, 0x9c, 0x9d, 0x1c, 0x1d, 0x1e, 0x1f, /* ................ */
+    /*
+     * 20
+     */ 0x80, 0x81, 0x82, 0x83, 0x84, 0x92, 0x17, 0x1b,
+    0x88, 0x89, 0x8a, 0x8b, 0x8c, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, /* ................ */
+    /*
+     * 30
+     */ 0x90, 0x91, 0x16, 0x93, 0x94, 0x95, 0x96, 0x04,
+    0x98, 0x99, 0x9a, 0x9b, 0x14, 0x15, 0x9e, 0x1a, /* ................ */
+    /*
+     * 40
+     */ 0x20, 0xa0, 0xe2, 0xe4, 0xe0, 0xe1, 0xe3, 0xe5,
+    0xe7, 0xf1, 0x60, 0x2e, 0x3c, 0x28, 0x2b, 0x7c, /* .........`.<(+| */
+    /*
+     * 50
+     */ 0x26, 0xe9, 0xea, 0xeb, 0xe8, 0xed, 0xee, 0xef,
+    0xec, 0xdf, 0x21, 0x24, 0x2a, 0x29, 0x3b, 0x9f, /* &.........!$*);. */
+    /*
+     * 60
+     */ 0x2d, 0x2f, 0xc2, 0xc4, 0xc0, 0xc1, 0xc3, 0xc5,
+    0xc7, 0xd1, 0x5e, 0x2c, 0x25, 0x5f, 0x3e, 0x3f,    /*-/........^,%_>?*/
+    /*
+     * 70
+     */ 0xf8, 0xc9, 0xca, 0xcb, 0xc8, 0xcd, 0xce, 0xcf,
+    0xcc, 0xa8, 0x3a, 0x23, 0x40, 0x27, 0x3d, 0x22, /* ..........:#@'=" */
+    /*
+     * 80
+     */ 0xd8, 0x61, 0x62, 0x63, 0x64, 0x65, 0x66, 0x67,
+    0x68, 0x69, 0xab, 0xbb, 0xf0, 0xfd, 0xfe, 0xb1, /* .abcdefghi...... */
+    /*
+     * 90
+     */ 0xb0, 0x6a, 0x6b, 0x6c, 0x6d, 0x6e, 0x6f, 0x70,
+    0x71, 0x72, 0xaa, 0xba, 0xe6, 0xb8, 0xc6, 0xa4, /* .jklmnopqr...... */
+    /*
+     * a0
+     */ 0xb5, 0xaf, 0x73, 0x74, 0x75, 0x76, 0x77, 0x78,
+    0x79, 0x7a, 0xa1, 0xbf, 0xd0, 0xdd, 0xde, 0xae, /* ..stuvwxyz...... */
+    /*
+     * b0
+     */ 0xa2, 0xa3, 0xa5, 0xb7, 0xa9, 0xa7, 0xb6, 0xbc,
+    0xbd, 0xbe, 0xac, 0x5b, 0x5c, 0x5d, 0xb4, 0xd7, /* ...........[\].. */
+    /*
+     * c0
+     */ 0xf9, 0x41, 0x42, 0x43, 0x44, 0x45, 0x46, 0x47,
+    0x48, 0x49, 0xad, 0xf4, 0xf6, 0xf2, 0xf3, 0xf5, /* .ABCDEFGHI...... */
+    /*
+     * d0
+     */ 0xa6, 0x4a, 0x4b, 0x4c, 0x4d, 0x4e, 0x4f, 0x50,
+    0x51, 0x52, 0xb9, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0xdb, 0xfa, 0xff, /* .JKLMNOPQR...... */
+    /*
+     * e0
+     */ 0xd9, 0xf7, 0x53, 0x54, 0x55, 0x56, 0x57, 0x58,
+    0x59, 0x5a, 0xb2, 0xd4, 0xd6, 0xd2, 0xd3, 0xd5, /* ..STUVWXYZ...... */
+    /*
+     * f0
+     */ 0x30, 0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0x34, 0x35, 0x36, 0x37,
+    0x38, 0x39, 0xb3, 0x7b, 0xdc, 0x7d, 0xda, 0x7e /* 0123456789.{.}.~ */
+};
+
+/* The ascii-to-ebcdic table: */
+const unsigned char os_toebcdic[256] = {
+    /*
+     * 00
+     */ 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x37, 0x2d, 0x2e, 0x2f,
+    0x16, 0x05, 0x15, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, /* ................ */
+    /*
+     * 10
+     */ 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x3c, 0x3d, 0x32, 0x26,
+    0x18, 0x19, 0x3f, 0x27, 0x1c, 0x1d, 0x1e, 0x1f, /* ................ */
+    /*
+     * 20
+     */ 0x40, 0x5a, 0x7f, 0x7b, 0x5b, 0x6c, 0x50, 0x7d,
+    0x4d, 0x5d, 0x5c, 0x4e, 0x6b, 0x60, 0x4b, 0x61, /* !"#$%&'()*+,-./ */
+    /*
+     * 30
+     */ 0xf0, 0xf1, 0xf2, 0xf3, 0xf4, 0xf5, 0xf6, 0xf7,
+    0xf8, 0xf9, 0x7a, 0x5e, 0x4c, 0x7e, 0x6e, 0x6f, /* 0123456789:;<=>? */
+    /*
+     * 40
+     */ 0x7c, 0xc1, 0xc2, 0xc3, 0xc4, 0xc5, 0xc6, 0xc7,
+    0xc8, 0xc9, 0xd1, 0xd2, 0xd3, 0xd4, 0xd5, 0xd6, /* @ABCDEFGHIJKLMNO */
+    /*
+     * 50
+     */ 0xd7, 0xd8, 0xd9, 0xe2, 0xe3, 0xe4, 0xe5, 0xe6,
+    0xe7, 0xe8, 0xe9, 0xbb, 0xbc, 0xbd, 0x6a, 0x6d, /* PQRSTUVWXYZ[\]^_ */
+    /*
+     * 60
+     */ 0x4a, 0x81, 0x82, 0x83, 0x84, 0x85, 0x86, 0x87,
+    0x88, 0x89, 0x91, 0x92, 0x93, 0x94, 0x95, 0x96, /* `abcdefghijklmno */
+    /*
+     * 70
+     */ 0x97, 0x98, 0x99, 0xa2, 0xa3, 0xa4, 0xa5, 0xa6,
+    0xa7, 0xa8, 0xa9, 0xfb, 0x4f, 0xfd, 0xff, 0x07, /* pqrstuvwxyz{|}~. */
+    /*
+     * 80
+     */ 0x20, 0x21, 0x22, 0x23, 0x24, 0x04, 0x06, 0x08,
+    0x28, 0x29, 0x2a, 0x2b, 0x2c, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x14, /* ................ */
+    /*
+     * 90
+     */ 0x30, 0x31, 0x25, 0x33, 0x34, 0x35, 0x36, 0x17,
+    0x38, 0x39, 0x3a, 0x3b, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x3e, 0x5f, /* ................ */
+    /*
+     * a0
+     */ 0x41, 0xaa, 0xb0, 0xb1, 0x9f, 0xb2, 0xd0, 0xb5,
+    0x79, 0xb4, 0x9a, 0x8a, 0xba, 0xca, 0xaf, 0xa1, /* ................ */
+    /*
+     * b0
+     */ 0x90, 0x8f, 0xea, 0xfa, 0xbe, 0xa0, 0xb6, 0xb3,
+    0x9d, 0xda, 0x9b, 0x8b, 0xb7, 0xb8, 0xb9, 0xab, /* ................ */
+    /*
+     * c0
+     */ 0x64, 0x65, 0x62, 0x66, 0x63, 0x67, 0x9e, 0x68,
+    0x74, 0x71, 0x72, 0x73, 0x78, 0x75, 0x76, 0x77, /* ................ */
+    /*
+     * d0
+     */ 0xac, 0x69, 0xed, 0xee, 0xeb, 0xef, 0xec, 0xbf,
+    0x80, 0xe0, 0xfe, 0xdd, 0xfc, 0xad, 0xae, 0x59, /* ................ */
+    /*
+     * e0
+     */ 0x44, 0x45, 0x42, 0x46, 0x43, 0x47, 0x9c, 0x48,
+    0x54, 0x51, 0x52, 0x53, 0x58, 0x55, 0x56, 0x57, /* ................ */
+    /*
+     * f0
+     */ 0x8c, 0x49, 0xcd, 0xce, 0xcb, 0xcf, 0xcc, 0xe1,
+    0x70, 0xc0, 0xde, 0xdb, 0xdc, 0x8d, 0x8e, 0xdf /* ................ */
+};
+
+# else /*_OSD_POSIX*/
+
+/*
+ * This code does basic character mapping for IBM's TPF and OS/390 operating
+ * systems. It is a modified version of the BS2000 table.
+ *
+ * Bijective EBCDIC (character set IBM-1047) to US-ASCII table: This table is
+ * bijective - there are no ambiguous or duplicate characters.
+ */
+const unsigned char os_toascii[256] = {
+    0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x85, 0x09, 0x86, 0x7f, /* 00-0f: */
+    0x87, 0x8d, 0x8e, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, /* ................ */
+    0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x8f, 0x0a, 0x08, 0x97, /* 10-1f: */
+    0x18, 0x19, 0x9c, 0x9d, 0x1c, 0x1d, 0x1e, 0x1f, /* ................ */
+    0x80, 0x81, 0x82, 0x83, 0x84, 0x92, 0x17, 0x1b, /* 20-2f: */
+    0x88, 0x89, 0x8a, 0x8b, 0x8c, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, /* ................ */
+    0x90, 0x91, 0x16, 0x93, 0x94, 0x95, 0x96, 0x04, /* 30-3f: */
+    0x98, 0x99, 0x9a, 0x9b, 0x14, 0x15, 0x9e, 0x1a, /* ................ */
+    0x20, 0xa0, 0xe2, 0xe4, 0xe0, 0xe1, 0xe3, 0xe5, /* 40-4f: */
+    0xe7, 0xf1, 0xa2, 0x2e, 0x3c, 0x28, 0x2b, 0x7c, /* ...........<(+| */
+    0x26, 0xe9, 0xea, 0xeb, 0xe8, 0xed, 0xee, 0xef, /* 50-5f: */
+    0xec, 0xdf, 0x21, 0x24, 0x2a, 0x29, 0x3b, 0x5e, /* &.........!$*);^ */
+    0x2d, 0x2f, 0xc2, 0xc4, 0xc0, 0xc1, 0xc3, 0xc5, /* 60-6f: */
+    0xc7, 0xd1, 0xa6, 0x2c, 0x25, 0x5f, 0x3e, 0x3f, /* -/.........,%_>? */
+    0xf8, 0xc9, 0xca, 0xcb, 0xc8, 0xcd, 0xce, 0xcf, /* 70-7f: */
+    0xcc, 0x60, 0x3a, 0x23, 0x40, 0x27, 0x3d, 0x22, /* .........`:#@'=" */
+    0xd8, 0x61, 0x62, 0x63, 0x64, 0x65, 0x66, 0x67, /* 80-8f: */
+    0x68, 0x69, 0xab, 0xbb, 0xf0, 0xfd, 0xfe, 0xb1, /* .abcdefghi...... */
+    0xb0, 0x6a, 0x6b, 0x6c, 0x6d, 0x6e, 0x6f, 0x70, /* 90-9f: */
+    0x71, 0x72, 0xaa, 0xba, 0xe6, 0xb8, 0xc6, 0xa4, /* .jklmnopqr...... */
+    0xb5, 0x7e, 0x73, 0x74, 0x75, 0x76, 0x77, 0x78, /* a0-af: */
+    0x79, 0x7a, 0xa1, 0xbf, 0xd0, 0x5b, 0xde, 0xae, /* .~stuvwxyz...[.. */
+    0xac, 0xa3, 0xa5, 0xb7, 0xa9, 0xa7, 0xb6, 0xbc, /* b0-bf: */
+    0xbd, 0xbe, 0xdd, 0xa8, 0xaf, 0x5d, 0xb4, 0xd7, /* .............].. */
+    0x7b, 0x41, 0x42, 0x43, 0x44, 0x45, 0x46, 0x47, /* c0-cf: */
+    0x48, 0x49, 0xad, 0xf4, 0xf6, 0xf2, 0xf3, 0xf5, /* {ABCDEFGHI...... */
+    0x7d, 0x4a, 0x4b, 0x4c, 0x4d, 0x4e, 0x4f, 0x50, /* d0-df: */
+    0x51, 0x52, 0xb9, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0xf9, 0xfa, 0xff, /* }JKLMNOPQR...... */
+    0x5c, 0xf7, 0x53, 0x54, 0x55, 0x56, 0x57, 0x58, /* e0-ef: */
+    0x59, 0x5a, 0xb2, 0xd4, 0xd6, 0xd2, 0xd3, 0xd5, /* \.STUVWXYZ...... */
+    0x30, 0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0x34, 0x35, 0x36, 0x37, /* f0-ff: */
+    0x38, 0x39, 0xb3, 0xdb, 0xdc, 0xd9, 0xda, 0x9f /* 0123456789...... */
+};
+
+/*
+ * The US-ASCII to EBCDIC (character set IBM-1047) table: This table is
+ * bijective (no ambiguous or duplicate characters)
+ */
+const unsigned char os_toebcdic[256] = {
+    0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x37, 0x2d, 0x2e, 0x2f, /* 00-0f: */
+    0x16, 0x05, 0x15, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, /* ................ */
+    0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x3c, 0x3d, 0x32, 0x26, /* 10-1f: */
+    0x18, 0x19, 0x3f, 0x27, 0x1c, 0x1d, 0x1e, 0x1f, /* ................ */
+    0x40, 0x5a, 0x7f, 0x7b, 0x5b, 0x6c, 0x50, 0x7d, /* 20-2f: */
+    0x4d, 0x5d, 0x5c, 0x4e, 0x6b, 0x60, 0x4b, 0x61, /* !"#$%&'()*+,-./ */
+    0xf0, 0xf1, 0xf2, 0xf3, 0xf4, 0xf5, 0xf6, 0xf7, /* 30-3f: */
+    0xf8, 0xf9, 0x7a, 0x5e, 0x4c, 0x7e, 0x6e, 0x6f, /* 0123456789:;<=>? */
+    0x7c, 0xc1, 0xc2, 0xc3, 0xc4, 0xc5, 0xc6, 0xc7, /* 40-4f: */
+    0xc8, 0xc9, 0xd1, 0xd2, 0xd3, 0xd4, 0xd5, 0xd6, /* @ABCDEFGHIJKLMNO */
+    0xd7, 0xd8, 0xd9, 0xe2, 0xe3, 0xe4, 0xe5, 0xe6, /* 50-5f: */
+    0xe7, 0xe8, 0xe9, 0xad, 0xe0, 0xbd, 0x5f, 0x6d, /* PQRSTUVWXYZ[\]^_ */
+    0x79, 0x81, 0x82, 0x83, 0x84, 0x85, 0x86, 0x87, /* 60-6f: */
+    0x88, 0x89, 0x91, 0x92, 0x93, 0x94, 0x95, 0x96, /* `abcdefghijklmno */
+    0x97, 0x98, 0x99, 0xa2, 0xa3, 0xa4, 0xa5, 0xa6, /* 70-7f: */
+    0xa7, 0xa8, 0xa9, 0xc0, 0x4f, 0xd0, 0xa1, 0x07, /* pqrstuvwxyz{|}~. */
+    0x20, 0x21, 0x22, 0x23, 0x24, 0x04, 0x06, 0x08, /* 80-8f: */
+    0x28, 0x29, 0x2a, 0x2b, 0x2c, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x14, /* ................ */
+    0x30, 0x31, 0x25, 0x33, 0x34, 0x35, 0x36, 0x17, /* 90-9f: */
+    0x38, 0x39, 0x3a, 0x3b, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x3e, 0xff, /* ................ */
+    0x41, 0xaa, 0x4a, 0xb1, 0x9f, 0xb2, 0x6a, 0xb5, /* a0-af: */
+    0xbb, 0xb4, 0x9a, 0x8a, 0xb0, 0xca, 0xaf, 0xbc, /* ................ */
+    0x90, 0x8f, 0xea, 0xfa, 0xbe, 0xa0, 0xb6, 0xb3, /* b0-bf: */
+    0x9d, 0xda, 0x9b, 0x8b, 0xb7, 0xb8, 0xb9, 0xab, /* ................ */
+    0x64, 0x65, 0x62, 0x66, 0x63, 0x67, 0x9e, 0x68, /* c0-cf: */
+    0x74, 0x71, 0x72, 0x73, 0x78, 0x75, 0x76, 0x77, /* ................ */
+    0xac, 0x69, 0xed, 0xee, 0xeb, 0xef, 0xec, 0xbf, /* d0-df: */
+    0x80, 0xfd, 0xfe, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0xba, 0xae, 0x59, /* ................ */
+    0x44, 0x45, 0x42, 0x46, 0x43, 0x47, 0x9c, 0x48, /* e0-ef: */
+    0x54, 0x51, 0x52, 0x53, 0x58, 0x55, 0x56, 0x57, /* ................ */
+    0x8c, 0x49, 0xcd, 0xce, 0xcb, 0xcf, 0xcc, 0xe1, /* f0-ff: */
+    0x70, 0xdd, 0xde, 0xdb, 0xdc, 0x8d, 0x8e, 0xdf /* ................ */
+};
+# endif/*_OSD_POSIX*/
+
+/*
+ * Translate a memory block from EBCDIC (host charset) to ASCII (net charset)
+ * dest and srce may be identical, or separate memory blocks, but should not
+ * overlap. These functions intentionally have an interface compatible to
+ * memcpy(3).
+ */
+
+void *ebcdic2ascii(void *dest, const void *srce, size_t count)
+{
+    unsigned char *udest = dest;
+    const unsigned char *usrce = srce;
+
+    while (count-- != 0) {
+        *udest++ = os_toascii[*usrce++];
+    }
+
+    return dest;
+}
+
+void *ascii2ebcdic(void *dest, const void *srce, size_t count)
+{
+    unsigned char *udest = dest;
+    const unsigned char *usrce = srce;
+
+    while (count-- != 0) {
+        *udest++ = os_toebcdic[*usrce++];
+    }
+
+    return dest;
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-armv4.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-armv4.pl
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..2314b75
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-armv4.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,1865 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# ECP_NISTZ256 module for ARMv4.
+#
+# October 2014.
+#
+# Original ECP_NISTZ256 submission targeting x86_64 is detailed in
+# http://eprint.iacr.org/2013/816. In the process of adaptation
+# original .c module was made 32-bit savvy in order to make this
+# implementation possible.
+#
+#			with/without -DECP_NISTZ256_ASM
+# Cortex-A8		+53-170%
+# Cortex-A9		+76-205%
+# Cortex-A15		+100-316%
+# Snapdragon S4		+66-187%
+#
+# Ranges denote minimum and maximum improvement coefficients depending
+# on benchmark. Lower coefficients are for ECDSA sign, server-side
+# operation. Keep in mind that +200% means 3x improvement.
+
+$flavour = shift;
+if ($flavour=~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/) { $output=$flavour; undef $flavour; }
+else { while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {} }
+
+if ($flavour && $flavour ne "void") {
+    $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+    ( $xlate="${dir}arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
+    ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
+    die "can't locate arm-xlate.pl";
+
+    open STDOUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output";
+} else {
+    open STDOUT,">$output";
+}
+
+$code.=<<___;
+#include "arm_arch.h"
+
+.text
+#if defined(__thumb2__)
+.syntax	unified
+.thumb
+#else
+.code	32
+#endif
+___
+########################################################################
+# Convert ecp_nistz256_table.c to layout expected by ecp_nistz_gather_w7
+#
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+open TABLE,"<ecp_nistz256_table.c"		or
+open TABLE,"<${dir}../ecp_nistz256_table.c"	or
+die "failed to open ecp_nistz256_table.c:",$!;
+
+use integer;
+
+foreach(<TABLE>) {
+	s/TOBN\(\s*(0x[0-9a-f]+),\s*(0x[0-9a-f]+)\s*\)/push @arr,hex($2),hex($1)/geo;
+}
+close TABLE;
+
+# See ecp_nistz256_table.c for explanation for why it's 64*16*37.
+# 64*16*37-1 is because $#arr returns last valid index or @arr, not
+# amount of elements.
+die "insane number of elements" if ($#arr != 64*16*37-1);
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_precomputed
+.type	ecp_nistz256_precomputed,%object
+.align	12
+ecp_nistz256_precomputed:
+___
+########################################################################
+# this conversion smashes P256_POINT_AFFINE by individual bytes with
+# 64 byte interval, similar to
+#	1111222233334444
+#	1234123412341234
+for(1..37) {
+	@tbl = splice(@arr,0,64*16);
+	for($i=0;$i<64;$i++) {
+		undef @line;
+		for($j=0;$j<64;$j++) {
+			push @line,(@tbl[$j*16+$i/4]>>(($i%4)*8))&0xff;
+		}
+		$code.=".byte\t";
+		$code.=join(',',map { sprintf "0x%02x",$_} @line);
+		$code.="\n";
+	}
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+.size	ecp_nistz256_precomputed,.-ecp_nistz256_precomputed
+.align	5
+.LRR:	@ 2^512 mod P precomputed for NIST P256 polynomial
+.long	0x00000003, 0x00000000, 0xffffffff, 0xfffffffb
+.long	0xfffffffe, 0xffffffff, 0xfffffffd, 0x00000004
+.Lone:
+.long	1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0
+.asciz	"ECP_NISTZ256 for ARMv4, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+.align	6
+___
+
+########################################################################
+# common register layout, note that $t2 is link register, so that if
+# internal subroutine uses $t2, then it has to offload lr...
+
+($r_ptr,$a_ptr,$b_ptr,$ff,$a0,$a1,$a2,$a3,$a4,$a5,$a6,$a7,$t1,$t2)=
+		map("r$_",(0..12,14));
+($t0,$t3)=($ff,$a_ptr);
+
+$code.=<<___;
+@ void	ecp_nistz256_to_mont(BN_ULONG r0[8],const BN_ULONG r1[8]);
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_to_mont
+.type	ecp_nistz256_to_mont,%function
+ecp_nistz256_to_mont:
+	adr	$b_ptr,.LRR
+	b	.Lecp_nistz256_mul_mont
+.size	ecp_nistz256_to_mont,.-ecp_nistz256_to_mont
+
+@ void	ecp_nistz256_from_mont(BN_ULONG r0[8],const BN_ULONG r1[8]);
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_from_mont
+.type	ecp_nistz256_from_mont,%function
+ecp_nistz256_from_mont:
+	adr	$b_ptr,.Lone
+	b	.Lecp_nistz256_mul_mont
+.size	ecp_nistz256_from_mont,.-ecp_nistz256_from_mont
+
+@ void	ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2(BN_ULONG r0[8],const BN_ULONG r1[8]);
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2
+.type	ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2,%function
+.align	4
+ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2:
+	stmdb	sp!,{r4-r12,lr}
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2
+#if __ARM_ARCH__>=5 || !defined(__thumb__)
+	ldmia	sp!,{r4-r12,pc}
+#else
+	ldmia	sp!,{r4-r12,lr}
+	bx	lr			@ interoperable with Thumb ISA:-)
+#endif
+.size	ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2,.-ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2
+
+.type	__ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2,%function
+.align	4
+__ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2:
+	ldr	$a0,[$a_ptr,#0]
+	ldr	$a1,[$a_ptr,#4]
+	ldr	$a2,[$a_ptr,#8]
+	adds	$a0,$a0,$a0		@ a[0:7]+=a[0:7], i.e. add with itself
+	ldr	$a3,[$a_ptr,#12]
+	adcs	$a1,$a1,$a1
+	ldr	$a4,[$a_ptr,#16]
+	adcs	$a2,$a2,$a2
+	ldr	$a5,[$a_ptr,#20]
+	adcs	$a3,$a3,$a3
+	ldr	$a6,[$a_ptr,#24]
+	adcs	$a4,$a4,$a4
+	ldr	$a7,[$a_ptr,#28]
+	adcs	$a5,$a5,$a5
+	adcs	$a6,$a6,$a6
+	mov	$ff,#0
+	adcs	$a7,$a7,$a7
+	adc	$ff,$ff,#0
+
+	b	.Lreduce_by_sub
+.size	__ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2,.-__ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2
+
+@ void	ecp_nistz256_add(BN_ULONG r0[8],const BN_ULONG r1[8],
+@					const BN_ULONG r2[8]);
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_add
+.type	ecp_nistz256_add,%function
+.align	4
+ecp_nistz256_add:
+	stmdb	sp!,{r4-r12,lr}
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_add
+#if __ARM_ARCH__>=5 || !defined(__thumb__)
+	ldmia	sp!,{r4-r12,pc}
+#else
+	ldmia	sp!,{r4-r12,lr}
+	bx	lr			@ interoperable with Thumb ISA:-)
+#endif
+.size	ecp_nistz256_add,.-ecp_nistz256_add
+
+.type	__ecp_nistz256_add,%function
+.align	4
+__ecp_nistz256_add:
+	str	lr,[sp,#-4]!		@ push lr
+
+	ldr	$a0,[$a_ptr,#0]
+	ldr	$a1,[$a_ptr,#4]
+	ldr	$a2,[$a_ptr,#8]
+	ldr	$a3,[$a_ptr,#12]
+	ldr	$a4,[$a_ptr,#16]
+	 ldr	$t0,[$b_ptr,#0]
+	ldr	$a5,[$a_ptr,#20]
+	 ldr	$t1,[$b_ptr,#4]
+	ldr	$a6,[$a_ptr,#24]
+	 ldr	$t2,[$b_ptr,#8]
+	ldr	$a7,[$a_ptr,#28]
+	 ldr	$t3,[$b_ptr,#12]
+	adds	$a0,$a0,$t0
+	 ldr	$t0,[$b_ptr,#16]
+	adcs	$a1,$a1,$t1
+	 ldr	$t1,[$b_ptr,#20]
+	adcs	$a2,$a2,$t2
+	 ldr	$t2,[$b_ptr,#24]
+	adcs	$a3,$a3,$t3
+	 ldr	$t3,[$b_ptr,#28]
+	adcs	$a4,$a4,$t0
+	adcs	$a5,$a5,$t1
+	adcs	$a6,$a6,$t2
+	mov	$ff,#0
+	adcs	$a7,$a7,$t3
+	adc	$ff,$ff,#0
+	ldr	lr,[sp],#4		@ pop lr
+
+.Lreduce_by_sub:
+
+	@ if a+b >= modulus, subtract modulus.
+	@
+	@ But since comparison implies subtraction, we subtract
+	@ modulus and then add it back if subraction borrowed.
+
+	subs	$a0,$a0,#-1
+	sbcs	$a1,$a1,#-1
+	sbcs	$a2,$a2,#-1
+	sbcs	$a3,$a3,#0
+	sbcs	$a4,$a4,#0
+	sbcs	$a5,$a5,#0
+	sbcs	$a6,$a6,#1
+	sbcs	$a7,$a7,#-1
+	sbc	$ff,$ff,#0
+
+	@ Note that because mod has special form, i.e. consists of
+	@ 0xffffffff, 1 and 0s, we can conditionally synthesize it by
+	@ using value of borrow as a whole or extracting single bit.
+	@ Follow $ff register...
+
+	adds	$a0,$a0,$ff		@ add synthesized modulus
+	adcs	$a1,$a1,$ff
+	str	$a0,[$r_ptr,#0]
+	adcs	$a2,$a2,$ff
+	str	$a1,[$r_ptr,#4]
+	adcs	$a3,$a3,#0
+	str	$a2,[$r_ptr,#8]
+	adcs	$a4,$a4,#0
+	str	$a3,[$r_ptr,#12]
+	adcs	$a5,$a5,#0
+	str	$a4,[$r_ptr,#16]
+	adcs	$a6,$a6,$ff,lsr#31
+	str	$a5,[$r_ptr,#20]
+	adcs	$a7,$a7,$ff
+	str	$a6,[$r_ptr,#24]
+	str	$a7,[$r_ptr,#28]
+
+	mov	pc,lr
+.size	__ecp_nistz256_add,.-__ecp_nistz256_add
+
+@ void	ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3(BN_ULONG r0[8],const BN_ULONG r1[8]);
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3
+.type	ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3,%function
+.align	4
+ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3:
+	stmdb	sp!,{r4-r12,lr}
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3
+#if __ARM_ARCH__>=5 || !defined(__thumb__)
+	ldmia	sp!,{r4-r12,pc}
+#else
+	ldmia	sp!,{r4-r12,lr}
+	bx	lr			@ interoperable with Thumb ISA:-)
+#endif
+.size	ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3,.-ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3
+
+.type	__ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3,%function
+.align	4
+__ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3:
+	str	lr,[sp,#-4]!		@ push lr
+
+	@ As multiplication by 3 is performed as 2*n+n, below are inline
+	@ copies of __ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2 and __ecp_nistz256_add, see
+	@ corresponding subroutines for details.
+
+	ldr	$a0,[$a_ptr,#0]
+	ldr	$a1,[$a_ptr,#4]
+	ldr	$a2,[$a_ptr,#8]
+	adds	$a0,$a0,$a0		@ a[0:7]+=a[0:7]
+	ldr	$a3,[$a_ptr,#12]
+	adcs	$a1,$a1,$a1
+	ldr	$a4,[$a_ptr,#16]
+	adcs	$a2,$a2,$a2
+	ldr	$a5,[$a_ptr,#20]
+	adcs	$a3,$a3,$a3
+	ldr	$a6,[$a_ptr,#24]
+	adcs	$a4,$a4,$a4
+	ldr	$a7,[$a_ptr,#28]
+	adcs	$a5,$a5,$a5
+	adcs	$a6,$a6,$a6
+	mov	$ff,#0
+	adcs	$a7,$a7,$a7
+	adc	$ff,$ff,#0
+
+	subs	$a0,$a0,#-1		@ .Lreduce_by_sub but without stores
+	sbcs	$a1,$a1,#-1
+	sbcs	$a2,$a2,#-1
+	sbcs	$a3,$a3,#0
+	sbcs	$a4,$a4,#0
+	sbcs	$a5,$a5,#0
+	sbcs	$a6,$a6,#1
+	sbcs	$a7,$a7,#-1
+	sbc	$ff,$ff,#0
+
+	adds	$a0,$a0,$ff		@ add synthesized modulus
+	adcs	$a1,$a1,$ff
+	adcs	$a2,$a2,$ff
+	adcs	$a3,$a3,#0
+	adcs	$a4,$a4,#0
+	 ldr	$b_ptr,[$a_ptr,#0]
+	adcs	$a5,$a5,#0
+	 ldr	$t1,[$a_ptr,#4]
+	adcs	$a6,$a6,$ff,lsr#31
+	 ldr	$t2,[$a_ptr,#8]
+	adc	$a7,$a7,$ff
+
+	ldr	$t0,[$a_ptr,#12]
+	adds	$a0,$a0,$b_ptr		@ 2*a[0:7]+=a[0:7]
+	ldr	$b_ptr,[$a_ptr,#16]
+	adcs	$a1,$a1,$t1
+	ldr	$t1,[$a_ptr,#20]
+	adcs	$a2,$a2,$t2
+	ldr	$t2,[$a_ptr,#24]
+	adcs	$a3,$a3,$t0
+	ldr	$t3,[$a_ptr,#28]
+	adcs	$a4,$a4,$b_ptr
+	adcs	$a5,$a5,$t1
+	adcs	$a6,$a6,$t2
+	mov	$ff,#0
+	adcs	$a7,$a7,$t3
+	adc	$ff,$ff,#0
+	ldr	lr,[sp],#4		@ pop lr
+
+	b	.Lreduce_by_sub
+.size	ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3,.-ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3
+
+@ void	ecp_nistz256_div_by_2(BN_ULONG r0[8],const BN_ULONG r1[8]);
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_div_by_2
+.type	ecp_nistz256_div_by_2,%function
+.align	4
+ecp_nistz256_div_by_2:
+	stmdb	sp!,{r4-r12,lr}
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_div_by_2
+#if __ARM_ARCH__>=5 || !defined(__thumb__)
+	ldmia	sp!,{r4-r12,pc}
+#else
+	ldmia	sp!,{r4-r12,lr}
+	bx	lr			@ interoperable with Thumb ISA:-)
+#endif
+.size	ecp_nistz256_div_by_2,.-ecp_nistz256_div_by_2
+
+.type	__ecp_nistz256_div_by_2,%function
+.align	4
+__ecp_nistz256_div_by_2:
+	@ ret = (a is odd ? a+mod : a) >> 1
+
+	ldr	$a0,[$a_ptr,#0]
+	ldr	$a1,[$a_ptr,#4]
+	ldr	$a2,[$a_ptr,#8]
+	mov	$ff,$a0,lsl#31		@ place least significant bit to most
+					@ significant position, now arithmetic
+					@ right shift by 31 will produce -1 or
+					@ 0, while logical right shift 1 or 0,
+					@ this is how modulus is conditionally
+					@ synthesized in this case...
+	ldr	$a3,[$a_ptr,#12]
+	adds	$a0,$a0,$ff,asr#31
+	ldr	$a4,[$a_ptr,#16]
+	adcs	$a1,$a1,$ff,asr#31
+	ldr	$a5,[$a_ptr,#20]
+	adcs	$a2,$a2,$ff,asr#31
+	ldr	$a6,[$a_ptr,#24]
+	adcs	$a3,$a3,#0
+	ldr	$a7,[$a_ptr,#28]
+	adcs	$a4,$a4,#0
+	 mov	$a0,$a0,lsr#1		@ a[0:7]>>=1, we can start early
+					@ because it doesn't affect flags
+	adcs	$a5,$a5,#0
+	 orr	$a0,$a0,$a1,lsl#31
+	adcs	$a6,$a6,$ff,lsr#31
+	mov	$b_ptr,#0
+	adcs	$a7,$a7,$ff,asr#31
+	 mov	$a1,$a1,lsr#1
+	adc	$b_ptr,$b_ptr,#0	@ top-most carry bit from addition
+
+	orr	$a1,$a1,$a2,lsl#31
+	mov	$a2,$a2,lsr#1
+	str	$a0,[$r_ptr,#0]
+	orr	$a2,$a2,$a3,lsl#31
+	mov	$a3,$a3,lsr#1
+	str	$a1,[$r_ptr,#4]
+	orr	$a3,$a3,$a4,lsl#31
+	mov	$a4,$a4,lsr#1
+	str	$a2,[$r_ptr,#8]
+	orr	$a4,$a4,$a5,lsl#31
+	mov	$a5,$a5,lsr#1
+	str	$a3,[$r_ptr,#12]
+	orr	$a5,$a5,$a6,lsl#31
+	mov	$a6,$a6,lsr#1
+	str	$a4,[$r_ptr,#16]
+	orr	$a6,$a6,$a7,lsl#31
+	mov	$a7,$a7,lsr#1
+	str	$a5,[$r_ptr,#20]
+	orr	$a7,$a7,$b_ptr,lsl#31	@ don't forget the top-most carry bit
+	str	$a6,[$r_ptr,#24]
+	str	$a7,[$r_ptr,#28]
+
+	mov	pc,lr
+.size	__ecp_nistz256_div_by_2,.-__ecp_nistz256_div_by_2
+
+@ void	ecp_nistz256_sub(BN_ULONG r0[8],const BN_ULONG r1[8],
+@				        const BN_ULONG r2[8]);
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_sub
+.type	ecp_nistz256_sub,%function
+.align	4
+ecp_nistz256_sub:
+	stmdb	sp!,{r4-r12,lr}
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_sub
+#if __ARM_ARCH__>=5 || !defined(__thumb__)
+	ldmia	sp!,{r4-r12,pc}
+#else
+	ldmia	sp!,{r4-r12,lr}
+	bx	lr			@ interoperable with Thumb ISA:-)
+#endif
+.size	ecp_nistz256_sub,.-ecp_nistz256_sub
+
+.type	__ecp_nistz256_sub,%function
+.align	4
+__ecp_nistz256_sub:
+	str	lr,[sp,#-4]!		@ push lr
+
+	ldr	$a0,[$a_ptr,#0]
+	ldr	$a1,[$a_ptr,#4]
+	ldr	$a2,[$a_ptr,#8]
+	ldr	$a3,[$a_ptr,#12]
+	ldr	$a4,[$a_ptr,#16]
+	 ldr	$t0,[$b_ptr,#0]
+	ldr	$a5,[$a_ptr,#20]
+	 ldr	$t1,[$b_ptr,#4]
+	ldr	$a6,[$a_ptr,#24]
+	 ldr	$t2,[$b_ptr,#8]
+	ldr	$a7,[$a_ptr,#28]
+	 ldr	$t3,[$b_ptr,#12]
+	subs	$a0,$a0,$t0
+	 ldr	$t0,[$b_ptr,#16]
+	sbcs	$a1,$a1,$t1
+	 ldr	$t1,[$b_ptr,#20]
+	sbcs	$a2,$a2,$t2
+	 ldr	$t2,[$b_ptr,#24]
+	sbcs	$a3,$a3,$t3
+	 ldr	$t3,[$b_ptr,#28]
+	sbcs	$a4,$a4,$t0
+	sbcs	$a5,$a5,$t1
+	sbcs	$a6,$a6,$t2
+	sbcs	$a7,$a7,$t3
+	sbc	$ff,$ff,$ff		@ broadcast borrow bit
+	ldr	lr,[sp],#4		@ pop lr
+
+.Lreduce_by_add:
+
+	@ if a-b borrows, add modulus.
+	@
+	@ Note that because mod has special form, i.e. consists of
+	@ 0xffffffff, 1 and 0s, we can conditionally synthesize it by
+	@ broadcasting borrow bit to a register, $ff, and using it as
+	@ a whole or extracting single bit.
+
+	adds	$a0,$a0,$ff		@ add synthesized modulus
+	adcs	$a1,$a1,$ff
+	str	$a0,[$r_ptr,#0]
+	adcs	$a2,$a2,$ff
+	str	$a1,[$r_ptr,#4]
+	adcs	$a3,$a3,#0
+	str	$a2,[$r_ptr,#8]
+	adcs	$a4,$a4,#0
+	str	$a3,[$r_ptr,#12]
+	adcs	$a5,$a5,#0
+	str	$a4,[$r_ptr,#16]
+	adcs	$a6,$a6,$ff,lsr#31
+	str	$a5,[$r_ptr,#20]
+	adcs	$a7,$a7,$ff
+	str	$a6,[$r_ptr,#24]
+	str	$a7,[$r_ptr,#28]
+
+	mov	pc,lr
+.size	__ecp_nistz256_sub,.-__ecp_nistz256_sub
+
+@ void	ecp_nistz256_neg(BN_ULONG r0[8],const BN_ULONG r1[8]);
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_neg
+.type	ecp_nistz256_neg,%function
+.align	4
+ecp_nistz256_neg:
+	stmdb	sp!,{r4-r12,lr}
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_neg
+#if __ARM_ARCH__>=5 || !defined(__thumb__)
+	ldmia	sp!,{r4-r12,pc}
+#else
+	ldmia	sp!,{r4-r12,lr}
+	bx	lr			@ interoperable with Thumb ISA:-)
+#endif
+.size	ecp_nistz256_neg,.-ecp_nistz256_neg
+
+.type	__ecp_nistz256_neg,%function
+.align	4
+__ecp_nistz256_neg:
+	ldr	$a0,[$a_ptr,#0]
+	eor	$ff,$ff,$ff
+	ldr	$a1,[$a_ptr,#4]
+	ldr	$a2,[$a_ptr,#8]
+	subs	$a0,$ff,$a0
+	ldr	$a3,[$a_ptr,#12]
+	sbcs	$a1,$ff,$a1
+	ldr	$a4,[$a_ptr,#16]
+	sbcs	$a2,$ff,$a2
+	ldr	$a5,[$a_ptr,#20]
+	sbcs	$a3,$ff,$a3
+	ldr	$a6,[$a_ptr,#24]
+	sbcs	$a4,$ff,$a4
+	ldr	$a7,[$a_ptr,#28]
+	sbcs	$a5,$ff,$a5
+	sbcs	$a6,$ff,$a6
+	sbcs	$a7,$ff,$a7
+	sbc	$ff,$ff,$ff
+
+	b	.Lreduce_by_add
+.size	__ecp_nistz256_neg,.-__ecp_nistz256_neg
+___
+{
+my @acc=map("r$_",(3..11));
+my ($t0,$t1,$bj,$t2,$t3)=map("r$_",(0,1,2,12,14));
+
+$code.=<<___;
+@ void	ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(BN_ULONG r0[8],const BN_ULONG r1[8]);
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont
+.type	ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont,%function
+.align	4
+ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont:
+	mov	$b_ptr,$a_ptr
+	b	.Lecp_nistz256_mul_mont
+.size	ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont,.-ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont
+
+@ void	ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(BN_ULONG r0[8],const BN_ULONG r1[8],
+@					     const BN_ULONG r2[8]);
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_mul_mont
+.type	ecp_nistz256_mul_mont,%function
+.align	4
+ecp_nistz256_mul_mont:
+.Lecp_nistz256_mul_mont:
+	stmdb	sp!,{r4-r12,lr}
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont
+#if __ARM_ARCH__>=5 || !defined(__thumb__)
+	ldmia	sp!,{r4-r12,pc}
+#else
+	ldmia	sp!,{r4-r12,lr}
+	bx	lr			@ interoperable with Thumb ISA:-)
+#endif
+.size	ecp_nistz256_mul_mont,.-ecp_nistz256_mul_mont
+
+.type	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont,%function
+.align	4
+__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont:
+	stmdb	sp!,{r0-r2,lr}			@ make a copy of arguments too
+
+	ldr	$bj,[$b_ptr,#0]			@ b[0]
+	ldmia	$a_ptr,{@acc[1]-@acc[8]}
+
+	umull	@acc[0],$t3,@acc[1],$bj		@ r[0]=a[0]*b[0]
+	stmdb	sp!,{$acc[1]-@acc[8]}		@ copy a[0-7] to stack, so
+						@ that it can be addressed
+						@ without spending register
+						@ on address
+	umull	@acc[1],$t0,@acc[2],$bj		@ r[1]=a[1]*b[0]
+	umull	@acc[2],$t1,@acc[3],$bj
+	adds	@acc[1],@acc[1],$t3		@ accumulate high part of mult
+	umull	@acc[3],$t2,@acc[4],$bj
+	adcs	@acc[2],@acc[2],$t0
+	umull	@acc[4],$t3,@acc[5],$bj
+	adcs	@acc[3],@acc[3],$t1
+	umull	@acc[5],$t0,@acc[6],$bj
+	adcs	@acc[4],@acc[4],$t2
+	umull	@acc[6],$t1,@acc[7],$bj
+	adcs	@acc[5],@acc[5],$t3
+	umull	@acc[7],$t2,@acc[8],$bj
+	adcs	@acc[6],@acc[6],$t0
+	adcs	@acc[7],@acc[7],$t1
+	eor	$t3,$t3,$t3			@ first overflow bit is zero
+	adc	@acc[8],$t2,#0
+___
+for(my $i=1;$i<8;$i++) {
+my $t4=@acc[0];
+
+	# Reduction iteration is normally performed by accumulating
+	# result of multiplication of modulus by "magic" digit [and
+	# omitting least significant word, which is guaranteed to
+	# be 0], but thanks to special form of modulus and "magic"
+	# digit being equal to least significant word, it can be
+	# performed with additions and subtractions alone. Indeed:
+	#
+	#        ffff.0001.0000.0000.0000.ffff.ffff.ffff
+	# *                                         abcd
+	# + xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.abcd
+	#
+	# Now observing that ff..ff*x = (2^n-1)*x = 2^n*x-x, we
+	# rewrite above as:
+	#
+	#   xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.abcd
+	# + abcd.0000.abcd.0000.0000.abcd.0000.0000.0000
+	# -      abcd.0000.0000.0000.0000.0000.0000.abcd
+	#
+	# or marking redundant operations:
+	#
+	#   xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.----
+	# + abcd.0000.abcd.0000.0000.abcd.----.----.----
+	# -      abcd.----.----.----.----.----.----.----
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	@ multiplication-less reduction $i
+	adds	@acc[3],@acc[3],@acc[0]		@ r[3]+=r[0]
+	 ldr	$bj,[sp,#40]			@ restore b_ptr
+	adcs	@acc[4],@acc[4],#0		@ r[4]+=0
+	adcs	@acc[5],@acc[5],#0		@ r[5]+=0
+	adcs	@acc[6],@acc[6],@acc[0]		@ r[6]+=r[0]
+	 ldr	$t1,[sp,#0]			@ load a[0]
+	adcs	@acc[7],@acc[7],#0		@ r[7]+=0
+	 ldr	$bj,[$bj,#4*$i]			@ load b[i]
+	adcs	@acc[8],@acc[8],@acc[0]		@ r[8]+=r[0]
+	 eor	$t0,$t0,$t0
+	adc	$t3,$t3,#0			@ overflow bit
+	subs	@acc[7],@acc[7],@acc[0]		@ r[7]-=r[0]
+	 ldr	$t2,[sp,#4]			@ a[1]
+	sbcs	@acc[8],@acc[8],#0		@ r[8]-=0
+	 umlal	@acc[1],$t0,$t1,$bj		@ "r[0]"+=a[0]*b[i]
+	 eor	$t1,$t1,$t1
+	sbc	@acc[0],$t3,#0			@ overflow bit, keep in mind
+						@ that netto result is
+						@ addition of a value which
+						@ makes underflow impossible
+
+	ldr	$t3,[sp,#8]			@ a[2]
+	umlal	@acc[2],$t1,$t2,$bj		@ "r[1]"+=a[1]*b[i]
+	 str	@acc[0],[sp,#36]		@ temporarily offload overflow
+	eor	$t2,$t2,$t2
+	ldr	$t4,[sp,#12]			@ a[3], $t4 is alias @acc[0]
+	umlal	@acc[3],$t2,$t3,$bj		@ "r[2]"+=a[2]*b[i]
+	eor	$t3,$t3,$t3
+	adds	@acc[2],@acc[2],$t0		@ accumulate high part of mult
+	ldr	$t0,[sp,#16]			@ a[4]
+	umlal	@acc[4],$t3,$t4,$bj		@ "r[3]"+=a[3]*b[i]
+	eor	$t4,$t4,$t4
+	adcs	@acc[3],@acc[3],$t1
+	ldr	$t1,[sp,#20]			@ a[5]
+	umlal	@acc[5],$t4,$t0,$bj		@ "r[4]"+=a[4]*b[i]
+	eor	$t0,$t0,$t0
+	adcs	@acc[4],@acc[4],$t2
+	ldr	$t2,[sp,#24]			@ a[6]
+	umlal	@acc[6],$t0,$t1,$bj		@ "r[5]"+=a[5]*b[i]
+	eor	$t1,$t1,$t1
+	adcs	@acc[5],@acc[5],$t3
+	ldr	$t3,[sp,#28]			@ a[7]
+	umlal	@acc[7],$t1,$t2,$bj		@ "r[6]"+=a[6]*b[i]
+	eor	$t2,$t2,$t2
+	adcs	@acc[6],@acc[6],$t4
+	 ldr	@acc[0],[sp,#36]		@ restore overflow bit
+	umlal	@acc[8],$t2,$t3,$bj		@ "r[7]"+=a[7]*b[i]
+	eor	$t3,$t3,$t3
+	adcs	@acc[7],@acc[7],$t0
+	adcs	@acc[8],@acc[8],$t1
+	adcs	@acc[0],$acc[0],$t2
+	adc	$t3,$t3,#0			@ new overflow bit
+___
+	push(@acc,shift(@acc));			# rotate registers, so that
+						# "r[i]" becomes r[i]
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	@ last multiplication-less reduction
+	adds	@acc[3],@acc[3],@acc[0]
+	ldr	$r_ptr,[sp,#32]			@ restore r_ptr
+	adcs	@acc[4],@acc[4],#0
+	adcs	@acc[5],@acc[5],#0
+	adcs	@acc[6],@acc[6],@acc[0]
+	adcs	@acc[7],@acc[7],#0
+	adcs	@acc[8],@acc[8],@acc[0]
+	adc	$t3,$t3,#0
+	subs	@acc[7],@acc[7],@acc[0]
+	sbcs	@acc[8],@acc[8],#0
+	sbc	@acc[0],$t3,#0			@ overflow bit
+
+	@ Final step is "if result > mod, subtract mod", but we do it
+	@ "other way around", namely subtract modulus from result
+	@ and if it borrowed, add modulus back.
+
+	adds	@acc[1],@acc[1],#1		@ subs	@acc[1],@acc[1],#-1
+	adcs	@acc[2],@acc[2],#0		@ sbcs	@acc[2],@acc[2],#-1
+	adcs	@acc[3],@acc[3],#0		@ sbcs	@acc[3],@acc[3],#-1
+	sbcs	@acc[4],@acc[4],#0
+	sbcs	@acc[5],@acc[5],#0
+	sbcs	@acc[6],@acc[6],#0
+	sbcs	@acc[7],@acc[7],#1
+	adcs	@acc[8],@acc[8],#0		@ sbcs	@acc[8],@acc[8],#-1
+	ldr	lr,[sp,#44]			@ restore lr
+	sbc	@acc[0],@acc[0],#0		@ broadcast borrow bit
+	add	sp,sp,#48
+
+	@ Note that because mod has special form, i.e. consists of
+	@ 0xffffffff, 1 and 0s, we can conditionally synthesize it by
+	@ broadcasting borrow bit to a register, @acc[0], and using it as
+	@ a whole or extracting single bit.
+
+	adds	@acc[1],@acc[1],@acc[0]		@ add modulus or zero
+	adcs	@acc[2],@acc[2],@acc[0]
+	str	@acc[1],[$r_ptr,#0]
+	adcs	@acc[3],@acc[3],@acc[0]
+	str	@acc[2],[$r_ptr,#4]
+	adcs	@acc[4],@acc[4],#0
+	str	@acc[3],[$r_ptr,#8]
+	adcs	@acc[5],@acc[5],#0
+	str	@acc[4],[$r_ptr,#12]
+	adcs	@acc[6],@acc[6],#0
+	str	@acc[5],[$r_ptr,#16]
+	adcs	@acc[7],@acc[7],@acc[0],lsr#31
+	str	@acc[6],[$r_ptr,#20]
+	adc	@acc[8],@acc[8],@acc[0]
+	str	@acc[7],[$r_ptr,#24]
+	str	@acc[8],[$r_ptr,#28]
+
+	mov	pc,lr
+.size	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont,.-__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont
+___
+}
+
+{
+my ($out,$inp,$index,$mask)=map("r$_",(0..3));
+$code.=<<___;
+@ void	ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5(void *r0,const P256_POINT *r1,
+@					 int r2);
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5
+.type	ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5,%function
+.align	5
+ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5:
+	stmdb	sp!,{r4-r11}
+
+	add	$out,$out,$index,lsl#2
+
+	ldmia	$inp!,{r4-r11}		@ X
+	str	r4,[$out,#64*0-4]
+	str	r5,[$out,#64*1-4]
+	str	r6,[$out,#64*2-4]
+	str	r7,[$out,#64*3-4]
+	str	r8,[$out,#64*4-4]
+	str	r9,[$out,#64*5-4]
+	str	r10,[$out,#64*6-4]
+	str	r11,[$out,#64*7-4]
+	add	$out,$out,#64*8
+
+	ldmia	$inp!,{r4-r11}		@ Y
+	str	r4,[$out,#64*0-4]
+	str	r5,[$out,#64*1-4]
+	str	r6,[$out,#64*2-4]
+	str	r7,[$out,#64*3-4]
+	str	r8,[$out,#64*4-4]
+	str	r9,[$out,#64*5-4]
+	str	r10,[$out,#64*6-4]
+	str	r11,[$out,#64*7-4]
+	add	$out,$out,#64*8
+
+	ldmia	$inp,{r4-r11}		@ Z
+	str	r4,[$out,#64*0-4]
+	str	r5,[$out,#64*1-4]
+	str	r6,[$out,#64*2-4]
+	str	r7,[$out,#64*3-4]
+	str	r8,[$out,#64*4-4]
+	str	r9,[$out,#64*5-4]
+	str	r10,[$out,#64*6-4]
+	str	r11,[$out,#64*7-4]
+
+	ldmia	sp!,{r4-r11}
+#if __ARM_ARCH__>=5 || defined(__thumb__)
+	bx	lr
+#else
+	mov	pc,lr
+#endif
+.size	ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5,.-ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5
+
+@ void	ecp_nistz256_gather_w5(P256_POINT *r0,const void *r1,
+@					      int r2);
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_gather_w5
+.type	ecp_nistz256_gather_w5,%function
+.align	5
+ecp_nistz256_gather_w5:
+	stmdb	sp!,{r4-r11}
+
+	cmp	$index,#0
+	mov	$mask,#0
+#ifdef	__thumb2__
+	itt	ne
+#endif
+	subne	$index,$index,#1
+	movne	$mask,#-1
+	add	$inp,$inp,$index,lsl#2
+
+	ldr	r4,[$inp,#64*0]
+	ldr	r5,[$inp,#64*1]
+	ldr	r6,[$inp,#64*2]
+	and	r4,r4,$mask
+	ldr	r7,[$inp,#64*3]
+	and	r5,r5,$mask
+	ldr	r8,[$inp,#64*4]
+	and	r6,r6,$mask
+	ldr	r9,[$inp,#64*5]
+	and	r7,r7,$mask
+	ldr	r10,[$inp,#64*6]
+	and	r8,r8,$mask
+	ldr	r11,[$inp,#64*7]
+	add	$inp,$inp,#64*8
+	and	r9,r9,$mask
+	and	r10,r10,$mask
+	and	r11,r11,$mask
+	stmia	$out!,{r4-r11}	@ X
+
+	ldr	r4,[$inp,#64*0]
+	ldr	r5,[$inp,#64*1]
+	ldr	r6,[$inp,#64*2]
+	and	r4,r4,$mask
+	ldr	r7,[$inp,#64*3]
+	and	r5,r5,$mask
+	ldr	r8,[$inp,#64*4]
+	and	r6,r6,$mask
+	ldr	r9,[$inp,#64*5]
+	and	r7,r7,$mask
+	ldr	r10,[$inp,#64*6]
+	and	r8,r8,$mask
+	ldr	r11,[$inp,#64*7]
+	add	$inp,$inp,#64*8
+	and	r9,r9,$mask
+	and	r10,r10,$mask
+	and	r11,r11,$mask
+	stmia	$out!,{r4-r11}	@ Y
+
+	ldr	r4,[$inp,#64*0]
+	ldr	r5,[$inp,#64*1]
+	ldr	r6,[$inp,#64*2]
+	and	r4,r4,$mask
+	ldr	r7,[$inp,#64*3]
+	and	r5,r5,$mask
+	ldr	r8,[$inp,#64*4]
+	and	r6,r6,$mask
+	ldr	r9,[$inp,#64*5]
+	and	r7,r7,$mask
+	ldr	r10,[$inp,#64*6]
+	and	r8,r8,$mask
+	ldr	r11,[$inp,#64*7]
+	and	r9,r9,$mask
+	and	r10,r10,$mask
+	and	r11,r11,$mask
+	stmia	$out,{r4-r11}		@ Z
+
+	ldmia	sp!,{r4-r11}
+#if __ARM_ARCH__>=5 || defined(__thumb__)
+	bx	lr
+#else
+	mov	pc,lr
+#endif
+.size	ecp_nistz256_gather_w5,.-ecp_nistz256_gather_w5
+
+@ void	ecp_nistz256_scatter_w7(void *r0,const P256_POINT_AFFINE *r1,
+@					 int r2);
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_scatter_w7
+.type	ecp_nistz256_scatter_w7,%function
+.align	5
+ecp_nistz256_scatter_w7:
+	add	$out,$out,$index
+	mov	$index,#64/4
+.Loop_scatter_w7:
+	ldr	$mask,[$inp],#4
+	subs	$index,$index,#1
+	strb	$mask,[$out,#64*0-1]
+	mov	$mask,$mask,lsr#8
+	strb	$mask,[$out,#64*1-1]
+	mov	$mask,$mask,lsr#8
+	strb	$mask,[$out,#64*2-1]
+	mov	$mask,$mask,lsr#8
+	strb	$mask,[$out,#64*3-1]
+	add	$out,$out,#64*4
+	bne	.Loop_scatter_w7
+
+#if __ARM_ARCH__>=5 || defined(__thumb__)
+	bx	lr
+#else
+	mov	pc,lr
+#endif
+.size	ecp_nistz256_scatter_w7,.-ecp_nistz256_scatter_w7
+
+@ void	ecp_nistz256_gather_w7(P256_POINT_AFFINE *r0,const void *r1,
+@						     int r2);
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_gather_w7
+.type	ecp_nistz256_gather_w7,%function
+.align	5
+ecp_nistz256_gather_w7:
+	stmdb	sp!,{r4-r7}
+
+	cmp	$index,#0
+	mov	$mask,#0
+#ifdef	__thumb2__
+	itt	ne
+#endif
+	subne	$index,$index,#1
+	movne	$mask,#-1
+	add	$inp,$inp,$index
+	mov	$index,#64/4
+	nop
+.Loop_gather_w7:
+	ldrb	r4,[$inp,#64*0]
+	subs	$index,$index,#1
+	ldrb	r5,[$inp,#64*1]
+	ldrb	r6,[$inp,#64*2]
+	ldrb	r7,[$inp,#64*3]
+	add	$inp,$inp,#64*4
+	orr	r4,r4,r5,lsl#8
+	orr	r4,r4,r6,lsl#16
+	orr	r4,r4,r7,lsl#24
+	and	r4,r4,$mask
+	str	r4,[$out],#4
+	bne	.Loop_gather_w7
+
+	ldmia	sp!,{r4-r7}
+#if __ARM_ARCH__>=5 || defined(__thumb__)
+	bx	lr
+#else
+	mov	pc,lr
+#endif
+.size	ecp_nistz256_gather_w7,.-ecp_nistz256_gather_w7
+___
+}
+if (0) {
+# In comparison to integer-only equivalent of below subroutine:
+#
+# Cortex-A8	+10%
+# Cortex-A9	-10%
+# Snapdragon S4	+5%
+#
+# As not all time is spent in multiplication, overall impact is deemed
+# too low to care about.
+
+my ($A0,$A1,$A2,$A3,$Bi,$zero,$temp)=map("d$_",(0..7));
+my $mask="q4";
+my $mult="q5";
+my @AxB=map("q$_",(8..15));
+
+my ($rptr,$aptr,$bptr,$toutptr)=map("r$_",(0..3));
+
+$code.=<<___;
+#if __ARM_ARCH__>=7
+.fpu	neon
+
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_mul_mont_neon
+.type	ecp_nistz256_mul_mont_neon,%function
+.align	5
+ecp_nistz256_mul_mont_neon:
+	mov	ip,sp
+	stmdb	sp!,{r4-r9}
+	vstmdb	sp!,{q4-q5}		@ ABI specification says so
+
+	sub		$toutptr,sp,#40
+	vld1.32		{${Bi}[0]},[$bptr,:32]!
+	veor		$zero,$zero,$zero
+	vld1.32		{$A0-$A3}, [$aptr]		@ can't specify :32 :-(
+	vzip.16		$Bi,$zero
+	mov		sp,$toutptr			@ alloca
+	vmov.i64	$mask,#0xffff
+
+	vmull.u32	@AxB[0],$Bi,${A0}[0]
+	vmull.u32	@AxB[1],$Bi,${A0}[1]
+	vmull.u32	@AxB[2],$Bi,${A1}[0]
+	vmull.u32	@AxB[3],$Bi,${A1}[1]
+	 vshr.u64	$temp,@AxB[0]#lo,#16
+	vmull.u32	@AxB[4],$Bi,${A2}[0]
+	 vadd.u64	@AxB[0]#hi,@AxB[0]#hi,$temp
+	vmull.u32	@AxB[5],$Bi,${A2}[1]
+	 vshr.u64	$temp,@AxB[0]#hi,#16		@ upper 32 bits of a[0]*b[0]
+	vmull.u32	@AxB[6],$Bi,${A3}[0]
+	 vand.u64	@AxB[0],@AxB[0],$mask		@ lower 32 bits of a[0]*b[0]
+	vmull.u32	@AxB[7],$Bi,${A3}[1]
+___
+for($i=1;$i<8;$i++) {
+$code.=<<___;
+	 vld1.32	{${Bi}[0]},[$bptr,:32]!
+	 veor		$zero,$zero,$zero
+	vadd.u64	@AxB[1]#lo,@AxB[1]#lo,$temp	@ reduction
+	vshl.u64	$mult,@AxB[0],#32
+	vadd.u64	@AxB[3],@AxB[3],@AxB[0]
+	vsub.u64	$mult,$mult,@AxB[0]
+	 vzip.16	$Bi,$zero
+	vadd.u64	@AxB[6],@AxB[6],@AxB[0]
+	vadd.u64	@AxB[7],@AxB[7],$mult
+___
+	push(@AxB,shift(@AxB));
+$code.=<<___;
+	vmlal.u32	@AxB[0],$Bi,${A0}[0]
+	vmlal.u32	@AxB[1],$Bi,${A0}[1]
+	vmlal.u32	@AxB[2],$Bi,${A1}[0]
+	vmlal.u32	@AxB[3],$Bi,${A1}[1]
+	 vshr.u64	$temp,@AxB[0]#lo,#16
+	vmlal.u32	@AxB[4],$Bi,${A2}[0]
+	 vadd.u64	@AxB[0]#hi,@AxB[0]#hi,$temp
+	vmlal.u32	@AxB[5],$Bi,${A2}[1]
+	 vshr.u64	$temp,@AxB[0]#hi,#16		@ upper 33 bits of a[0]*b[i]+t[0]
+	vmlal.u32	@AxB[6],$Bi,${A3}[0]
+	 vand.u64	@AxB[0],@AxB[0],$mask		@ lower 32 bits of a[0]*b[0]
+	vmull.u32	@AxB[7],$Bi,${A3}[1]
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	vadd.u64	@AxB[1]#lo,@AxB[1]#lo,$temp	@ last reduction
+	vshl.u64	$mult,@AxB[0],#32
+	vadd.u64	@AxB[3],@AxB[3],@AxB[0]
+	vsub.u64	$mult,$mult,@AxB[0]
+	vadd.u64	@AxB[6],@AxB[6],@AxB[0]
+	vadd.u64	@AxB[7],@AxB[7],$mult
+
+	vshr.u64	$temp,@AxB[1]#lo,#16		@ convert
+	vadd.u64	@AxB[1]#hi,@AxB[1]#hi,$temp
+	vshr.u64	$temp,@AxB[1]#hi,#16
+	vzip.16		@AxB[1]#lo,@AxB[1]#hi
+___
+foreach (2..7) {
+$code.=<<___;
+	vadd.u64	@AxB[$_]#lo,@AxB[$_]#lo,$temp
+	vst1.32		{@AxB[$_-1]#lo[0]},[$toutptr,:32]!
+	vshr.u64	$temp,@AxB[$_]#lo,#16
+	vadd.u64	@AxB[$_]#hi,@AxB[$_]#hi,$temp
+	vshr.u64	$temp,@AxB[$_]#hi,#16
+	vzip.16		@AxB[$_]#lo,@AxB[$_]#hi
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	vst1.32		{@AxB[7]#lo[0]},[$toutptr,:32]!
+	vst1.32		{$temp},[$toutptr]		@ upper 33 bits
+
+	ldr	r1,[sp,#0]
+	ldr	r2,[sp,#4]
+	ldr	r3,[sp,#8]
+	subs	r1,r1,#-1
+	ldr	r4,[sp,#12]
+	sbcs	r2,r2,#-1
+	ldr	r5,[sp,#16]
+	sbcs	r3,r3,#-1
+	ldr	r6,[sp,#20]
+	sbcs	r4,r4,#0
+	ldr	r7,[sp,#24]
+	sbcs	r5,r5,#0
+	ldr	r8,[sp,#28]
+	sbcs	r6,r6,#0
+	ldr	r9,[sp,#32]				@ top-most bit
+	sbcs	r7,r7,#1
+	sub	sp,ip,#40+16
+	sbcs	r8,r8,#-1
+	sbc	r9,r9,#0
+        vldmia  sp!,{q4-q5}
+
+	adds	r1,r1,r9
+	adcs	r2,r2,r9
+	str	r1,[$rptr,#0]
+	adcs	r3,r3,r9
+	str	r2,[$rptr,#4]
+	adcs	r4,r4,#0
+	str	r3,[$rptr,#8]
+	adcs	r5,r5,#0
+	str	r4,[$rptr,#12]
+	adcs	r6,r6,#0
+	str	r5,[$rptr,#16]
+	adcs	r7,r7,r9,lsr#31
+	str	r6,[$rptr,#20]
+	adcs	r8,r8,r9
+	str	r7,[$rptr,#24]
+	str	r8,[$rptr,#28]
+
+        ldmia   sp!,{r4-r9}
+	bx	lr
+.size	ecp_nistz256_mul_mont_neon,.-ecp_nistz256_mul_mont_neon
+#endif
+___
+}
+
+{{{
+########################################################################
+# Below $aN assignment matches order in which 256-bit result appears in
+# register bank at return from __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont, so that we can
+# skip over reloading it from memory. This means that below functions
+# use custom calling sequence accepting 256-bit input in registers,
+# output pointer in r0, $r_ptr, and optional pointer in r2, $b_ptr.
+#
+# See their "normal" counterparts for insights on calculations.
+
+my ($a0,$a1,$a2,$a3,$a4,$a5,$a6,$a7,
+    $t0,$t1,$t2,$t3)=map("r$_",(11,3..10,12,14,1));
+my $ff=$b_ptr;
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.type	__ecp_nistz256_sub_from,%function
+.align	5
+__ecp_nistz256_sub_from:
+	str	lr,[sp,#-4]!		@ push lr
+
+	 ldr	$t0,[$b_ptr,#0]
+	 ldr	$t1,[$b_ptr,#4]
+	 ldr	$t2,[$b_ptr,#8]
+	 ldr	$t3,[$b_ptr,#12]
+	subs	$a0,$a0,$t0
+	 ldr	$t0,[$b_ptr,#16]
+	sbcs	$a1,$a1,$t1
+	 ldr	$t1,[$b_ptr,#20]
+	sbcs	$a2,$a2,$t2
+	 ldr	$t2,[$b_ptr,#24]
+	sbcs	$a3,$a3,$t3
+	 ldr	$t3,[$b_ptr,#28]
+	sbcs	$a4,$a4,$t0
+	sbcs	$a5,$a5,$t1
+	sbcs	$a6,$a6,$t2
+	sbcs	$a7,$a7,$t3
+	sbc	$ff,$ff,$ff		@ broadcast borrow bit
+	ldr	lr,[sp],#4		@ pop lr
+
+	adds	$a0,$a0,$ff		@ add synthesized modulus
+	adcs	$a1,$a1,$ff
+	str	$a0,[$r_ptr,#0]
+	adcs	$a2,$a2,$ff
+	str	$a1,[$r_ptr,#4]
+	adcs	$a3,$a3,#0
+	str	$a2,[$r_ptr,#8]
+	adcs	$a4,$a4,#0
+	str	$a3,[$r_ptr,#12]
+	adcs	$a5,$a5,#0
+	str	$a4,[$r_ptr,#16]
+	adcs	$a6,$a6,$ff,lsr#31
+	str	$a5,[$r_ptr,#20]
+	adcs	$a7,$a7,$ff
+	str	$a6,[$r_ptr,#24]
+	str	$a7,[$r_ptr,#28]
+
+	mov	pc,lr
+.size	__ecp_nistz256_sub_from,.-__ecp_nistz256_sub_from
+
+.type	__ecp_nistz256_sub_morf,%function
+.align	5
+__ecp_nistz256_sub_morf:
+	str	lr,[sp,#-4]!		@ push lr
+
+	 ldr	$t0,[$b_ptr,#0]
+	 ldr	$t1,[$b_ptr,#4]
+	 ldr	$t2,[$b_ptr,#8]
+	 ldr	$t3,[$b_ptr,#12]
+	subs	$a0,$t0,$a0
+	 ldr	$t0,[$b_ptr,#16]
+	sbcs	$a1,$t1,$a1
+	 ldr	$t1,[$b_ptr,#20]
+	sbcs	$a2,$t2,$a2
+	 ldr	$t2,[$b_ptr,#24]
+	sbcs	$a3,$t3,$a3
+	 ldr	$t3,[$b_ptr,#28]
+	sbcs	$a4,$t0,$a4
+	sbcs	$a5,$t1,$a5
+	sbcs	$a6,$t2,$a6
+	sbcs	$a7,$t3,$a7
+	sbc	$ff,$ff,$ff		@ broadcast borrow bit
+	ldr	lr,[sp],#4		@ pop lr
+
+	adds	$a0,$a0,$ff		@ add synthesized modulus
+	adcs	$a1,$a1,$ff
+	str	$a0,[$r_ptr,#0]
+	adcs	$a2,$a2,$ff
+	str	$a1,[$r_ptr,#4]
+	adcs	$a3,$a3,#0
+	str	$a2,[$r_ptr,#8]
+	adcs	$a4,$a4,#0
+	str	$a3,[$r_ptr,#12]
+	adcs	$a5,$a5,#0
+	str	$a4,[$r_ptr,#16]
+	adcs	$a6,$a6,$ff,lsr#31
+	str	$a5,[$r_ptr,#20]
+	adcs	$a7,$a7,$ff
+	str	$a6,[$r_ptr,#24]
+	str	$a7,[$r_ptr,#28]
+
+	mov	pc,lr
+.size	__ecp_nistz256_sub_morf,.-__ecp_nistz256_sub_morf
+
+.type	__ecp_nistz256_add_self,%function
+.align	4
+__ecp_nistz256_add_self:
+	adds	$a0,$a0,$a0		@ a[0:7]+=a[0:7]
+	adcs	$a1,$a1,$a1
+	adcs	$a2,$a2,$a2
+	adcs	$a3,$a3,$a3
+	adcs	$a4,$a4,$a4
+	adcs	$a5,$a5,$a5
+	adcs	$a6,$a6,$a6
+	mov	$ff,#0
+	adcs	$a7,$a7,$a7
+	adc	$ff,$ff,#0
+
+	@ if a+b >= modulus, subtract modulus.
+	@
+	@ But since comparison implies subtraction, we subtract
+	@ modulus and then add it back if subraction borrowed.
+
+	subs	$a0,$a0,#-1
+	sbcs	$a1,$a1,#-1
+	sbcs	$a2,$a2,#-1
+	sbcs	$a3,$a3,#0
+	sbcs	$a4,$a4,#0
+	sbcs	$a5,$a5,#0
+	sbcs	$a6,$a6,#1
+	sbcs	$a7,$a7,#-1
+	sbc	$ff,$ff,#0
+
+	@ Note that because mod has special form, i.e. consists of
+	@ 0xffffffff, 1 and 0s, we can conditionally synthesize it by
+	@ using value of borrow as a whole or extracting single bit.
+	@ Follow $ff register...
+
+	adds	$a0,$a0,$ff		@ add synthesized modulus
+	adcs	$a1,$a1,$ff
+	str	$a0,[$r_ptr,#0]
+	adcs	$a2,$a2,$ff
+	str	$a1,[$r_ptr,#4]
+	adcs	$a3,$a3,#0
+	str	$a2,[$r_ptr,#8]
+	adcs	$a4,$a4,#0
+	str	$a3,[$r_ptr,#12]
+	adcs	$a5,$a5,#0
+	str	$a4,[$r_ptr,#16]
+	adcs	$a6,$a6,$ff,lsr#31
+	str	$a5,[$r_ptr,#20]
+	adcs	$a7,$a7,$ff
+	str	$a6,[$r_ptr,#24]
+	str	$a7,[$r_ptr,#28]
+
+	mov	pc,lr
+.size	__ecp_nistz256_add_self,.-__ecp_nistz256_add_self
+
+___
+
+########################################################################
+# following subroutines are "literal" implementation of those found in
+# ecp_nistz256.c
+#
+########################################################################
+# void ecp_nistz256_point_double(P256_POINT *out,const P256_POINT *inp);
+#
+{
+my ($S,$M,$Zsqr,$in_x,$tmp0)=map(32*$_,(0..4));
+# above map() describes stack layout with 5 temporary
+# 256-bit vectors on top. Then note that we push
+# starting from r0, which means that we have copy of
+# input arguments just below these temporary vectors.
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_point_double
+.type	ecp_nistz256_point_double,%function
+.align	5
+ecp_nistz256_point_double:
+	stmdb	sp!,{r0-r12,lr}		@ push from r0, unusual, but intentional
+	sub	sp,sp,#32*5
+
+.Lpoint_double_shortcut:
+	add	r3,sp,#$in_x
+	ldmia	$a_ptr!,{r4-r11}	@ copy in_x
+	stmia	r3,{r4-r11}
+
+	add	$r_ptr,sp,#$S
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2	@ p256_mul_by_2(S, in_y);
+
+	add	$b_ptr,$a_ptr,#32
+	add	$a_ptr,$a_ptr,#32
+	add	$r_ptr,sp,#$Zsqr
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	@ p256_sqr_mont(Zsqr, in_z);
+
+	add	$a_ptr,sp,#$S
+	add	$b_ptr,sp,#$S
+	add	$r_ptr,sp,#$S
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	@ p256_sqr_mont(S, S);
+
+	ldr	$b_ptr,[sp,#32*5+4]
+	add	$a_ptr,$b_ptr,#32
+	add	$b_ptr,$b_ptr,#64
+	add	$r_ptr,sp,#$tmp0
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	@ p256_mul_mont(tmp0, in_z, in_y);
+
+	ldr	$r_ptr,[sp,#32*5]
+	add	$r_ptr,$r_ptr,#64
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_add_self	@ p256_mul_by_2(res_z, tmp0);
+
+	add	$a_ptr,sp,#$in_x
+	add	$b_ptr,sp,#$Zsqr
+	add	$r_ptr,sp,#$M
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_add	@ p256_add(M, in_x, Zsqr);
+
+	add	$a_ptr,sp,#$in_x
+	add	$b_ptr,sp,#$Zsqr
+	add	$r_ptr,sp,#$Zsqr
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_sub	@ p256_sub(Zsqr, in_x, Zsqr);
+
+	add	$a_ptr,sp,#$S
+	add	$b_ptr,sp,#$S
+	add	$r_ptr,sp,#$tmp0
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	@ p256_sqr_mont(tmp0, S);
+
+	add	$a_ptr,sp,#$Zsqr
+	add	$b_ptr,sp,#$M
+	add	$r_ptr,sp,#$M
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	@ p256_mul_mont(M, M, Zsqr);
+
+	ldr	$r_ptr,[sp,#32*5]
+	add	$a_ptr,sp,#$tmp0
+	add	$r_ptr,$r_ptr,#32
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_div_by_2	@ p256_div_by_2(res_y, tmp0);
+
+	add	$a_ptr,sp,#$M
+	add	$r_ptr,sp,#$M
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3	@ p256_mul_by_3(M, M);
+
+	add	$a_ptr,sp,#$in_x
+	add	$b_ptr,sp,#$S
+	add	$r_ptr,sp,#$S
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	@ p256_mul_mont(S, S, in_x);
+
+	add	$r_ptr,sp,#$tmp0
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_add_self	@ p256_mul_by_2(tmp0, S);
+
+	ldr	$r_ptr,[sp,#32*5]
+	add	$a_ptr,sp,#$M
+	add	$b_ptr,sp,#$M
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	@ p256_sqr_mont(res_x, M);
+
+	add	$b_ptr,sp,#$tmp0
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_sub_from	@ p256_sub(res_x, res_x, tmp0);
+
+	add	$b_ptr,sp,#$S
+	add	$r_ptr,sp,#$S
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_sub_morf	@ p256_sub(S, S, res_x);
+
+	add	$a_ptr,sp,#$M
+	add	$b_ptr,sp,#$S
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	@ p256_mul_mont(S, S, M);
+
+	ldr	$r_ptr,[sp,#32*5]
+	add	$b_ptr,$r_ptr,#32
+	add	$r_ptr,$r_ptr,#32
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_sub_from	@ p256_sub(res_y, S, res_y);
+
+	add	sp,sp,#32*5+16		@ +16 means "skip even over saved r0-r3"
+#if __ARM_ARCH__>=5 || !defined(__thumb__)
+	ldmia	sp!,{r4-r12,pc}
+#else
+	ldmia	sp!,{r4-r12,lr}
+	bx	lr			@ interoperable with Thumb ISA:-)
+#endif
+.size	ecp_nistz256_point_double,.-ecp_nistz256_point_double
+___
+}
+
+########################################################################
+# void ecp_nistz256_point_add(P256_POINT *out,const P256_POINT *in1,
+#			      const P256_POINT *in2);
+{
+my ($res_x,$res_y,$res_z,
+    $in1_x,$in1_y,$in1_z,
+    $in2_x,$in2_y,$in2_z,
+    $H,$Hsqr,$R,$Rsqr,$Hcub,
+    $U1,$U2,$S1,$S2)=map(32*$_,(0..17));
+my ($Z1sqr, $Z2sqr) = ($Hsqr, $Rsqr);
+# above map() describes stack layout with 18 temporary
+# 256-bit vectors on top. Then note that we push
+# starting from r0, which means that we have copy of
+# input arguments just below these temporary vectors.
+# We use three of them for !in1infty, !in2intfy and
+# result of check for zero.
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_point_add
+.type	ecp_nistz256_point_add,%function
+.align	5
+ecp_nistz256_point_add:
+	stmdb	sp!,{r0-r12,lr}		@ push from r0, unusual, but intentional
+	sub	sp,sp,#32*18+16
+
+	ldmia	$b_ptr!,{r4-r11}	@ copy in2_x
+	add	r3,sp,#$in2_x
+	stmia	r3!,{r4-r11}
+	ldmia	$b_ptr!,{r4-r11}	@ copy in2_y
+	stmia	r3!,{r4-r11}
+	ldmia	$b_ptr,{r4-r11}		@ copy in2_z
+	orr	r12,r4,r5
+	orr	r12,r12,r6
+	orr	r12,r12,r7
+	orr	r12,r12,r8
+	orr	r12,r12,r9
+	orr	r12,r12,r10
+	orr	r12,r12,r11
+	cmp	r12,#0
+#ifdef	__thumb2__
+	it	ne
+#endif
+	movne	r12,#-1
+	stmia	r3,{r4-r11}
+	str	r12,[sp,#32*18+8]	@ !in2infty
+
+	ldmia	$a_ptr!,{r4-r11}	@ copy in1_x
+	add	r3,sp,#$in1_x
+	stmia	r3!,{r4-r11}
+	ldmia	$a_ptr!,{r4-r11}	@ copy in1_y
+	stmia	r3!,{r4-r11}
+	ldmia	$a_ptr,{r4-r11}		@ copy in1_z
+	orr	r12,r4,r5
+	orr	r12,r12,r6
+	orr	r12,r12,r7
+	orr	r12,r12,r8
+	orr	r12,r12,r9
+	orr	r12,r12,r10
+	orr	r12,r12,r11
+	cmp	r12,#0
+#ifdef	__thumb2__
+	it	ne
+#endif
+	movne	r12,#-1
+	stmia	r3,{r4-r11}
+	str	r12,[sp,#32*18+4]	@ !in1infty
+
+	add	$a_ptr,sp,#$in2_z
+	add	$b_ptr,sp,#$in2_z
+	add	$r_ptr,sp,#$Z2sqr
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	@ p256_sqr_mont(Z2sqr, in2_z);
+
+	add	$a_ptr,sp,#$in1_z
+	add	$b_ptr,sp,#$in1_z
+	add	$r_ptr,sp,#$Z1sqr
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	@ p256_sqr_mont(Z1sqr, in1_z);
+
+	add	$a_ptr,sp,#$in2_z
+	add	$b_ptr,sp,#$Z2sqr
+	add	$r_ptr,sp,#$S1
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	@ p256_mul_mont(S1, Z2sqr, in2_z);
+
+	add	$a_ptr,sp,#$in1_z
+	add	$b_ptr,sp,#$Z1sqr
+	add	$r_ptr,sp,#$S2
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	@ p256_mul_mont(S2, Z1sqr, in1_z);
+
+	add	$a_ptr,sp,#$in1_y
+	add	$b_ptr,sp,#$S1
+	add	$r_ptr,sp,#$S1
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	@ p256_mul_mont(S1, S1, in1_y);
+
+	add	$a_ptr,sp,#$in2_y
+	add	$b_ptr,sp,#$S2
+	add	$r_ptr,sp,#$S2
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	@ p256_mul_mont(S2, S2, in2_y);
+
+	add	$b_ptr,sp,#$S1
+	add	$r_ptr,sp,#$R
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_sub_from	@ p256_sub(R, S2, S1);
+
+	orr	$a0,$a0,$a1		@ see if result is zero
+	orr	$a2,$a2,$a3
+	orr	$a4,$a4,$a5
+	orr	$a0,$a0,$a2
+	orr	$a4,$a4,$a6
+	orr	$a0,$a0,$a7
+	 add	$a_ptr,sp,#$in1_x
+	orr	$a0,$a0,$a4
+	 add	$b_ptr,sp,#$Z2sqr
+	str	$a0,[sp,#32*18+12]
+
+	add	$r_ptr,sp,#$U1
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	@ p256_mul_mont(U1, in1_x, Z2sqr);
+
+	add	$a_ptr,sp,#$in2_x
+	add	$b_ptr,sp,#$Z1sqr
+	add	$r_ptr,sp,#$U2
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	@ p256_mul_mont(U2, in2_x, Z1sqr);
+
+	add	$b_ptr,sp,#$U1
+	add	$r_ptr,sp,#$H
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_sub_from	@ p256_sub(H, U2, U1);
+
+	orr	$a0,$a0,$a1		@ see if result is zero
+	orr	$a2,$a2,$a3
+	orr	$a4,$a4,$a5
+	orr	$a0,$a0,$a2
+	orr	$a4,$a4,$a6
+	orr	$a0,$a0,$a7
+	orrs	$a0,$a0,$a4
+
+	bne	.Ladd_proceed		@ is_equal(U1,U2)?
+
+	ldr	$t0,[sp,#32*18+4]
+	ldr	$t1,[sp,#32*18+8]
+	ldr	$t2,[sp,#32*18+12]
+	tst	$t0,$t1
+	beq	.Ladd_proceed		@ (in1infty || in2infty)?
+	tst	$t2,$t2
+	beq	.Ladd_double		@ is_equal(S1,S2)?
+
+	ldr	$r_ptr,[sp,#32*18+16]
+	eor	r4,r4,r4
+	eor	r5,r5,r5
+	eor	r6,r6,r6
+	eor	r7,r7,r7
+	eor	r8,r8,r8
+	eor	r9,r9,r9
+	eor	r10,r10,r10
+	eor	r11,r11,r11
+	stmia	$r_ptr!,{r4-r11}
+	stmia	$r_ptr!,{r4-r11}
+	stmia	$r_ptr!,{r4-r11}
+	b	.Ladd_done
+
+.align	4
+.Ladd_double:
+	ldr	$a_ptr,[sp,#32*18+20]
+	add	sp,sp,#32*(18-5)+16	@ difference in frame sizes
+	b	.Lpoint_double_shortcut
+
+.align	4
+.Ladd_proceed:
+	add	$a_ptr,sp,#$R
+	add	$b_ptr,sp,#$R
+	add	$r_ptr,sp,#$Rsqr
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	@ p256_sqr_mont(Rsqr, R);
+
+	add	$a_ptr,sp,#$H
+	add	$b_ptr,sp,#$in1_z
+	add	$r_ptr,sp,#$res_z
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	@ p256_mul_mont(res_z, H, in1_z);
+
+	add	$a_ptr,sp,#$H
+	add	$b_ptr,sp,#$H
+	add	$r_ptr,sp,#$Hsqr
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	@ p256_sqr_mont(Hsqr, H);
+
+	add	$a_ptr,sp,#$in2_z
+	add	$b_ptr,sp,#$res_z
+	add	$r_ptr,sp,#$res_z
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	@ p256_mul_mont(res_z, res_z, in2_z);
+
+	add	$a_ptr,sp,#$H
+	add	$b_ptr,sp,#$Hsqr
+	add	$r_ptr,sp,#$Hcub
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	@ p256_mul_mont(Hcub, Hsqr, H);
+
+	add	$a_ptr,sp,#$Hsqr
+	add	$b_ptr,sp,#$U1
+	add	$r_ptr,sp,#$U2
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	@ p256_mul_mont(U2, U1, Hsqr);
+
+	add	$r_ptr,sp,#$Hsqr
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_add_self	@ p256_mul_by_2(Hsqr, U2);
+
+	add	$b_ptr,sp,#$Rsqr
+	add	$r_ptr,sp,#$res_x
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_sub_morf	@ p256_sub(res_x, Rsqr, Hsqr);
+
+	add	$b_ptr,sp,#$Hcub
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_sub_from	@  p256_sub(res_x, res_x, Hcub);
+
+	add	$b_ptr,sp,#$U2
+	add	$r_ptr,sp,#$res_y
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_sub_morf	@ p256_sub(res_y, U2, res_x);
+
+	add	$a_ptr,sp,#$Hcub
+	add	$b_ptr,sp,#$S1
+	add	$r_ptr,sp,#$S2
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	@ p256_mul_mont(S2, S1, Hcub);
+
+	add	$a_ptr,sp,#$R
+	add	$b_ptr,sp,#$res_y
+	add	$r_ptr,sp,#$res_y
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	@ p256_mul_mont(res_y, res_y, R);
+
+	add	$b_ptr,sp,#$S2
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_sub_from	@ p256_sub(res_y, res_y, S2);
+
+	ldr	r11,[sp,#32*18+4]	@ !in1intfy
+	ldr	r12,[sp,#32*18+8]	@ !in2intfy
+	add	r1,sp,#$res_x
+	add	r2,sp,#$in2_x
+	and	r10,r11,r12
+	mvn	r11,r11
+	add	r3,sp,#$in1_x
+	and	r11,r11,r12
+	mvn	r12,r12
+	ldr	$r_ptr,[sp,#32*18+16]
+___
+for($i=0;$i<96;$i+=8) {			# conditional moves
+$code.=<<___;
+	ldmia	r1!,{r4-r5}		@ res_x
+	ldmia	r2!,{r6-r7}		@ in2_x
+	ldmia	r3!,{r8-r9}		@ in1_x
+	and	r4,r4,r10
+	and	r5,r5,r10
+	and	r6,r6,r11
+	and	r7,r7,r11
+	and	r8,r8,r12
+	and	r9,r9,r12
+	orr	r4,r4,r6
+	orr	r5,r5,r7
+	orr	r4,r4,r8
+	orr	r5,r5,r9
+	stmia	$r_ptr!,{r4-r5}
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+.Ladd_done:
+	add	sp,sp,#32*18+16+16	@ +16 means "skip even over saved r0-r3"
+#if __ARM_ARCH__>=5 || defined(__thumb__)
+	ldmia	sp!,{r4-r12,pc}
+#else
+	ldmia	sp!,{r4-r12,lr}
+	bx	lr			@ interoperable with Thumb ISA:-)
+#endif
+.size	ecp_nistz256_point_add,.-ecp_nistz256_point_add
+___
+}
+
+########################################################################
+# void ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine(P256_POINT *out,const P256_POINT *in1,
+#				     const P256_POINT_AFFINE *in2);
+{
+my ($res_x,$res_y,$res_z,
+    $in1_x,$in1_y,$in1_z,
+    $in2_x,$in2_y,
+    $U2,$S2,$H,$R,$Hsqr,$Hcub,$Rsqr)=map(32*$_,(0..14));
+my $Z1sqr = $S2;
+# above map() describes stack layout with 18 temporary
+# 256-bit vectors on top. Then note that we push
+# starting from r0, which means that we have copy of
+# input arguments just below these temporary vectors.
+# We use two of them for !in1infty, !in2intfy.
+
+my @ONE_mont=(1,0,0,-1,-1,-1,-2,0);
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine
+.type	ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine,%function
+.align	5
+ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine:
+	stmdb	sp!,{r0-r12,lr}		@ push from r0, unusual, but intentional
+	sub	sp,sp,#32*15
+
+	ldmia	$a_ptr!,{r4-r11}	@ copy in1_x
+	add	r3,sp,#$in1_x
+	stmia	r3!,{r4-r11}
+	ldmia	$a_ptr!,{r4-r11}	@ copy in1_y
+	stmia	r3!,{r4-r11}
+	ldmia	$a_ptr,{r4-r11}		@ copy in1_z
+	orr	r12,r4,r5
+	orr	r12,r12,r6
+	orr	r12,r12,r7
+	orr	r12,r12,r8
+	orr	r12,r12,r9
+	orr	r12,r12,r10
+	orr	r12,r12,r11
+	cmp	r12,#0
+#ifdef	__thumb2__
+	it	ne
+#endif
+	movne	r12,#-1
+	stmia	r3,{r4-r11}
+	str	r12,[sp,#32*15+4]	@ !in1infty
+
+	ldmia	$b_ptr!,{r4-r11}	@ copy in2_x
+	add	r3,sp,#$in2_x
+	orr	r12,r4,r5
+	orr	r12,r12,r6
+	orr	r12,r12,r7
+	orr	r12,r12,r8
+	orr	r12,r12,r9
+	orr	r12,r12,r10
+	orr	r12,r12,r11
+	stmia	r3!,{r4-r11}
+	ldmia	$b_ptr!,{r4-r11}	@ copy in2_y
+	orr	r12,r12,r4
+	orr	r12,r12,r5
+	orr	r12,r12,r6
+	orr	r12,r12,r7
+	orr	r12,r12,r8
+	orr	r12,r12,r9
+	orr	r12,r12,r10
+	orr	r12,r12,r11
+	stmia	r3!,{r4-r11}
+	cmp	r12,#0
+#ifdef	__thumb2__
+	it	ne
+#endif
+	movne	r12,#-1
+	str	r12,[sp,#32*15+8]	@ !in2infty
+
+	add	$a_ptr,sp,#$in1_z
+	add	$b_ptr,sp,#$in1_z
+	add	$r_ptr,sp,#$Z1sqr
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	@ p256_sqr_mont(Z1sqr, in1_z);
+
+	add	$a_ptr,sp,#$Z1sqr
+	add	$b_ptr,sp,#$in2_x
+	add	$r_ptr,sp,#$U2
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	@ p256_mul_mont(U2, Z1sqr, in2_x);
+
+	add	$b_ptr,sp,#$in1_x
+	add	$r_ptr,sp,#$H
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_sub_from	@ p256_sub(H, U2, in1_x);
+
+	add	$a_ptr,sp,#$Z1sqr
+	add	$b_ptr,sp,#$in1_z
+	add	$r_ptr,sp,#$S2
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	@ p256_mul_mont(S2, Z1sqr, in1_z);
+
+	add	$a_ptr,sp,#$H
+	add	$b_ptr,sp,#$in1_z
+	add	$r_ptr,sp,#$res_z
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	@ p256_mul_mont(res_z, H, in1_z);
+
+	add	$a_ptr,sp,#$in2_y
+	add	$b_ptr,sp,#$S2
+	add	$r_ptr,sp,#$S2
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	@ p256_mul_mont(S2, S2, in2_y);
+
+	add	$b_ptr,sp,#$in1_y
+	add	$r_ptr,sp,#$R
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_sub_from	@ p256_sub(R, S2, in1_y);
+
+	add	$a_ptr,sp,#$H
+	add	$b_ptr,sp,#$H
+	add	$r_ptr,sp,#$Hsqr
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	@ p256_sqr_mont(Hsqr, H);
+
+	add	$a_ptr,sp,#$R
+	add	$b_ptr,sp,#$R
+	add	$r_ptr,sp,#$Rsqr
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	@ p256_sqr_mont(Rsqr, R);
+
+	add	$a_ptr,sp,#$H
+	add	$b_ptr,sp,#$Hsqr
+	add	$r_ptr,sp,#$Hcub
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	@ p256_mul_mont(Hcub, Hsqr, H);
+
+	add	$a_ptr,sp,#$Hsqr
+	add	$b_ptr,sp,#$in1_x
+	add	$r_ptr,sp,#$U2
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	@ p256_mul_mont(U2, in1_x, Hsqr);
+
+	add	$r_ptr,sp,#$Hsqr
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_add_self	@ p256_mul_by_2(Hsqr, U2);
+
+	add	$b_ptr,sp,#$Rsqr
+	add	$r_ptr,sp,#$res_x
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_sub_morf	@ p256_sub(res_x, Rsqr, Hsqr);
+
+	add	$b_ptr,sp,#$Hcub
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_sub_from	@  p256_sub(res_x, res_x, Hcub);
+
+	add	$b_ptr,sp,#$U2
+	add	$r_ptr,sp,#$res_y
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_sub_morf	@ p256_sub(res_y, U2, res_x);
+
+	add	$a_ptr,sp,#$Hcub
+	add	$b_ptr,sp,#$in1_y
+	add	$r_ptr,sp,#$S2
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	@ p256_mul_mont(S2, in1_y, Hcub);
+
+	add	$a_ptr,sp,#$R
+	add	$b_ptr,sp,#$res_y
+	add	$r_ptr,sp,#$res_y
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	@ p256_mul_mont(res_y, res_y, R);
+
+	add	$b_ptr,sp,#$S2
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_sub_from	@ p256_sub(res_y, res_y, S2);
+
+	ldr	r11,[sp,#32*15+4]	@ !in1intfy
+	ldr	r12,[sp,#32*15+8]	@ !in2intfy
+	add	r1,sp,#$res_x
+	add	r2,sp,#$in2_x
+	and	r10,r11,r12
+	mvn	r11,r11
+	add	r3,sp,#$in1_x
+	and	r11,r11,r12
+	mvn	r12,r12
+	ldr	$r_ptr,[sp,#32*15]
+___
+for($i=0;$i<64;$i+=8) {			# conditional moves
+$code.=<<___;
+	ldmia	r1!,{r4-r5}		@ res_x
+	ldmia	r2!,{r6-r7}		@ in2_x
+	ldmia	r3!,{r8-r9}		@ in1_x
+	and	r4,r4,r10
+	and	r5,r5,r10
+	and	r6,r6,r11
+	and	r7,r7,r11
+	and	r8,r8,r12
+	and	r9,r9,r12
+	orr	r4,r4,r6
+	orr	r5,r5,r7
+	orr	r4,r4,r8
+	orr	r5,r5,r9
+	stmia	$r_ptr!,{r4-r5}
+___
+}
+for(;$i<96;$i+=8) {
+my $j=($i-64)/4;
+$code.=<<___;
+	ldmia	r1!,{r4-r5}		@ res_z
+	ldmia	r3!,{r8-r9}		@ in1_z
+	and	r4,r4,r10
+	and	r5,r5,r10
+	and	r6,r11,#@ONE_mont[$j]
+	and	r7,r11,#@ONE_mont[$j+1]
+	and	r8,r8,r12
+	and	r9,r9,r12
+	orr	r4,r4,r6
+	orr	r5,r5,r7
+	orr	r4,r4,r8
+	orr	r5,r5,r9
+	stmia	$r_ptr!,{r4-r5}
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	add	sp,sp,#32*15+16		@ +16 means "skip even over saved r0-r3"
+#if __ARM_ARCH__>=5 || !defined(__thumb__)
+	ldmia	sp!,{r4-r12,pc}
+#else
+	ldmia	sp!,{r4-r12,lr}
+	bx	lr			@ interoperable with Thumb ISA:-)
+#endif
+.size	ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine,.-ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine
+___
+}					}}}
+
+foreach (split("\n",$code)) {
+	s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/geo;
+
+	s/\bq([0-9]+)#(lo|hi)/sprintf "d%d",2*$1+($2 eq "hi")/geo;
+
+	print $_,"\n";
+}
+close STDOUT;	# enforce flush
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-armv8.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-armv8.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cdc9161
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-armv8.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,1558 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# ECP_NISTZ256 module for ARMv8.
+#
+# February 2015.
+#
+# Original ECP_NISTZ256 submission targeting x86_64 is detailed in
+# http://eprint.iacr.org/2013/816.
+#
+#			with/without -DECP_NISTZ256_ASM
+# Apple A7		+120-360%
+# Cortex-A53		+120-400%
+# Cortex-A57		+120-350%
+# X-Gene		+200-330%
+# Denver		+140-400%
+#
+# Ranges denote minimum and maximum improvement coefficients depending
+# on benchmark. Lower coefficients are for ECDSA sign, server-side
+# operation. Keep in mind that +400% means 5x improvement.
+
+$flavour = shift;
+while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {}
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+( $xlate="${dir}arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
+( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
+die "can't locate arm-xlate.pl";
+
+open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output";
+*STDOUT=*OUT;
+
+{
+my ($rp,$ap,$bp,$bi,$a0,$a1,$a2,$a3,$t0,$t1,$t2,$t3,$poly1,$poly3,
+    $acc0,$acc1,$acc2,$acc3,$acc4,$acc5) =
+    map("x$_",(0..17,19,20));
+
+my ($acc6,$acc7)=($ap,$bp);	# used in __ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont
+
+$code.=<<___;
+#include "arm_arch.h"
+
+.text
+___
+########################################################################
+# Convert ecp_nistz256_table.c to layout expected by ecp_nistz_gather_w7
+#
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+open TABLE,"<ecp_nistz256_table.c"		or
+open TABLE,"<${dir}../ecp_nistz256_table.c"	or
+die "failed to open ecp_nistz256_table.c:",$!;
+
+use integer;
+
+foreach(<TABLE>) {
+	s/TOBN\(\s*(0x[0-9a-f]+),\s*(0x[0-9a-f]+)\s*\)/push @arr,hex($2),hex($1)/geo;
+}
+close TABLE;
+
+# See ecp_nistz256_table.c for explanation for why it's 64*16*37.
+# 64*16*37-1 is because $#arr returns last valid index or @arr, not
+# amount of elements.
+die "insane number of elements" if ($#arr != 64*16*37-1);
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_precomputed
+.type	ecp_nistz256_precomputed,%object
+.align	12
+ecp_nistz256_precomputed:
+___
+########################################################################
+# this conversion smashes P256_POINT_AFFINE by individual bytes with
+# 64 byte interval, similar to
+#	1111222233334444
+#	1234123412341234
+for(1..37) {
+	@tbl = splice(@arr,0,64*16);
+	for($i=0;$i<64;$i++) {
+		undef @line;
+		for($j=0;$j<64;$j++) {
+			push @line,(@tbl[$j*16+$i/4]>>(($i%4)*8))&0xff;
+		}
+		$code.=".byte\t";
+		$code.=join(',',map { sprintf "0x%02x",$_} @line);
+		$code.="\n";
+	}
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+.size	ecp_nistz256_precomputed,.-ecp_nistz256_precomputed
+.align	5
+.Lpoly:
+.quad	0xffffffffffffffff,0x00000000ffffffff,0x0000000000000000,0xffffffff00000001
+.LRR:	// 2^512 mod P precomputed for NIST P256 polynomial
+.quad	0x0000000000000003,0xfffffffbffffffff,0xfffffffffffffffe,0x00000004fffffffd
+.Lone_mont:
+.quad	0x0000000000000001,0xffffffff00000000,0xffffffffffffffff,0x00000000fffffffe
+.Lone:
+.quad	1,0,0,0
+.asciz	"ECP_NISTZ256 for ARMv8, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+
+// void	ecp_nistz256_to_mont(BN_ULONG x0[4],const BN_ULONG x1[4]);
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_to_mont
+.type	ecp_nistz256_to_mont,%function
+.align	6
+ecp_nistz256_to_mont:
+	stp	x29,x30,[sp,#-32]!
+	add	x29,sp,#0
+	stp	x19,x20,[sp,#16]
+
+	ldr	$bi,.LRR		// bp[0]
+	ldp	$a0,$a1,[$ap]
+	ldp	$a2,$a3,[$ap,#16]
+	ldr	$poly1,.Lpoly+8
+	ldr	$poly3,.Lpoly+24
+	adr	$bp,.LRR		// &bp[0]
+
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont
+
+	ldp	x19,x20,[sp,#16]
+	ldp	x29,x30,[sp],#32
+	ret
+.size	ecp_nistz256_to_mont,.-ecp_nistz256_to_mont
+
+// void	ecp_nistz256_from_mont(BN_ULONG x0[4],const BN_ULONG x1[4]);
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_from_mont
+.type	ecp_nistz256_from_mont,%function
+.align	4
+ecp_nistz256_from_mont:
+	stp	x29,x30,[sp,#-32]!
+	add	x29,sp,#0
+	stp	x19,x20,[sp,#16]
+
+	mov	$bi,#1			// bp[0]
+	ldp	$a0,$a1,[$ap]
+	ldp	$a2,$a3,[$ap,#16]
+	ldr	$poly1,.Lpoly+8
+	ldr	$poly3,.Lpoly+24
+	adr	$bp,.Lone		// &bp[0]
+
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont
+
+	ldp	x19,x20,[sp,#16]
+	ldp	x29,x30,[sp],#32
+	ret
+.size	ecp_nistz256_from_mont,.-ecp_nistz256_from_mont
+
+// void	ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(BN_ULONG x0[4],const BN_ULONG x1[4],
+//					     const BN_ULONG x2[4]);
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_mul_mont
+.type	ecp_nistz256_mul_mont,%function
+.align	4
+ecp_nistz256_mul_mont:
+	stp	x29,x30,[sp,#-32]!
+	add	x29,sp,#0
+	stp	x19,x20,[sp,#16]
+
+	ldr	$bi,[$bp]		// bp[0]
+	ldp	$a0,$a1,[$ap]
+	ldp	$a2,$a3,[$ap,#16]
+	ldr	$poly1,.Lpoly+8
+	ldr	$poly3,.Lpoly+24
+
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont
+
+	ldp	x19,x20,[sp,#16]
+	ldp	x29,x30,[sp],#32
+	ret
+.size	ecp_nistz256_mul_mont,.-ecp_nistz256_mul_mont
+
+// void	ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(BN_ULONG x0[4],const BN_ULONG x1[4]);
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont
+.type	ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont,%function
+.align	4
+ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont:
+	stp	x29,x30,[sp,#-32]!
+	add	x29,sp,#0
+	stp	x19,x20,[sp,#16]
+
+	ldp	$a0,$a1,[$ap]
+	ldp	$a2,$a3,[$ap,#16]
+	ldr	$poly1,.Lpoly+8
+	ldr	$poly3,.Lpoly+24
+
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont
+
+	ldp	x19,x20,[sp,#16]
+	ldp	x29,x30,[sp],#32
+	ret
+.size	ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont,.-ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont
+
+// void	ecp_nistz256_add(BN_ULONG x0[4],const BN_ULONG x1[4],
+//					const BN_ULONG x2[4]);
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_add
+.type	ecp_nistz256_add,%function
+.align	4
+ecp_nistz256_add:
+	stp	x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
+	add	x29,sp,#0
+
+	ldp	$acc0,$acc1,[$ap]
+	ldp	$t0,$t1,[$bp]
+	ldp	$acc2,$acc3,[$ap,#16]
+	ldp	$t2,$t3,[$bp,#16]
+	ldr	$poly1,.Lpoly+8
+	ldr	$poly3,.Lpoly+24
+
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_add
+
+	ldp	x29,x30,[sp],#16
+	ret
+.size	ecp_nistz256_add,.-ecp_nistz256_add
+
+// void	ecp_nistz256_div_by_2(BN_ULONG x0[4],const BN_ULONG x1[4]);
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_div_by_2
+.type	ecp_nistz256_div_by_2,%function
+.align	4
+ecp_nistz256_div_by_2:
+	stp	x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
+	add	x29,sp,#0
+
+	ldp	$acc0,$acc1,[$ap]
+	ldp	$acc2,$acc3,[$ap,#16]
+	ldr	$poly1,.Lpoly+8
+	ldr	$poly3,.Lpoly+24
+
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_div_by_2
+
+	ldp	x29,x30,[sp],#16
+	ret
+.size	ecp_nistz256_div_by_2,.-ecp_nistz256_div_by_2
+
+// void	ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2(BN_ULONG x0[4],const BN_ULONG x1[4]);
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2
+.type	ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2,%function
+.align	4
+ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2:
+	stp	x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
+	add	x29,sp,#0
+
+	ldp	$acc0,$acc1,[$ap]
+	ldp	$acc2,$acc3,[$ap,#16]
+	ldr	$poly1,.Lpoly+8
+	ldr	$poly3,.Lpoly+24
+	mov	$t0,$acc0
+	mov	$t1,$acc1
+	mov	$t2,$acc2
+	mov	$t3,$acc3
+
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_add	// ret = a+a	// 2*a
+
+	ldp	x29,x30,[sp],#16
+	ret
+.size	ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2,.-ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2
+
+// void	ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3(BN_ULONG x0[4],const BN_ULONG x1[4]);
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3
+.type	ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3,%function
+.align	4
+ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3:
+	stp	x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
+	add	x29,sp,#0
+
+	ldp	$acc0,$acc1,[$ap]
+	ldp	$acc2,$acc3,[$ap,#16]
+	ldr	$poly1,.Lpoly+8
+	ldr	$poly3,.Lpoly+24
+	mov	$t0,$acc0
+	mov	$t1,$acc1
+	mov	$t2,$acc2
+	mov	$t3,$acc3
+	mov	$a0,$acc0
+	mov	$a1,$acc1
+	mov	$a2,$acc2
+	mov	$a3,$acc3
+
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_add	// ret = a+a	// 2*a
+
+	mov	$t0,$a0
+	mov	$t1,$a1
+	mov	$t2,$a2
+	mov	$t3,$a3
+
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_add	// ret += a	// 2*a+a=3*a
+
+	ldp	x29,x30,[sp],#16
+	ret
+.size	ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3,.-ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3
+
+// void	ecp_nistz256_sub(BN_ULONG x0[4],const BN_ULONG x1[4],
+//				        const BN_ULONG x2[4]);
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_sub
+.type	ecp_nistz256_sub,%function
+.align	4
+ecp_nistz256_sub:
+	stp	x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
+	add	x29,sp,#0
+
+	ldp	$acc0,$acc1,[$ap]
+	ldp	$acc2,$acc3,[$ap,#16]
+	ldr	$poly1,.Lpoly+8
+	ldr	$poly3,.Lpoly+24
+
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_sub_from
+
+	ldp	x29,x30,[sp],#16
+	ret
+.size	ecp_nistz256_sub,.-ecp_nistz256_sub
+
+// void	ecp_nistz256_neg(BN_ULONG x0[4],const BN_ULONG x1[4]);
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_neg
+.type	ecp_nistz256_neg,%function
+.align	4
+ecp_nistz256_neg:
+	stp	x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
+	add	x29,sp,#0
+
+	mov	$bp,$ap
+	mov	$acc0,xzr		// a = 0
+	mov	$acc1,xzr
+	mov	$acc2,xzr
+	mov	$acc3,xzr
+	ldr	$poly1,.Lpoly+8
+	ldr	$poly3,.Lpoly+24
+
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_sub_from
+
+	ldp	x29,x30,[sp],#16
+	ret
+.size	ecp_nistz256_neg,.-ecp_nistz256_neg
+
+// note that __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont expects a[0-3] input pre-loaded
+// to $a0-$a3 and b[0] - to $bi
+.type	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont,%function
+.align	4
+__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont:
+	mul	$acc0,$a0,$bi		// a[0]*b[0]
+	umulh	$t0,$a0,$bi
+
+	mul	$acc1,$a1,$bi		// a[1]*b[0]
+	umulh	$t1,$a1,$bi
+
+	mul	$acc2,$a2,$bi		// a[2]*b[0]
+	umulh	$t2,$a2,$bi
+
+	mul	$acc3,$a3,$bi		// a[3]*b[0]
+	umulh	$t3,$a3,$bi
+	ldr	$bi,[$bp,#8]		// b[1]
+
+	adds	$acc1,$acc1,$t0		// accumulate high parts of multiplication
+	 lsl	$t0,$acc0,#32
+	adcs	$acc2,$acc2,$t1
+	 lsr	$t1,$acc0,#32
+	adcs	$acc3,$acc3,$t2
+	adc	$acc4,xzr,$t3
+	mov	$acc5,xzr
+___
+for($i=1;$i<4;$i++) {
+        # Reduction iteration is normally performed by accumulating
+        # result of multiplication of modulus by "magic" digit [and
+        # omitting least significant word, which is guaranteed to
+        # be 0], but thanks to special form of modulus and "magic"
+        # digit being equal to least significant word, it can be
+        # performed with additions and subtractions alone. Indeed:
+        #
+        #            ffff0001.00000000.0000ffff.ffffffff
+        # *                                     abcdefgh
+        # + xxxxxxxx.xxxxxxxx.xxxxxxxx.xxxxxxxx.abcdefgh
+        #
+        # Now observing that ff..ff*x = (2^n-1)*x = 2^n*x-x, we
+        # rewrite above as:
+        #
+        #   xxxxxxxx.xxxxxxxx.xxxxxxxx.xxxxxxxx.abcdefgh
+        # + abcdefgh.abcdefgh.0000abcd.efgh0000.00000000
+        # - 0000abcd.efgh0000.00000000.00000000.abcdefgh
+        #
+        # or marking redundant operations:
+        #
+        #   xxxxxxxx.xxxxxxxx.xxxxxxxx.xxxxxxxx.--------
+        # + abcdefgh.abcdefgh.0000abcd.efgh0000.--------
+        # - 0000abcd.efgh0000.--------.--------.--------
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	subs	$t2,$acc0,$t0		// "*0xffff0001"
+	sbc	$t3,$acc0,$t1
+	adds	$acc0,$acc1,$t0		// +=acc[0]<<96 and omit acc[0]
+	 mul	$t0,$a0,$bi		// lo(a[0]*b[i])
+	adcs	$acc1,$acc2,$t1
+	 mul	$t1,$a1,$bi		// lo(a[1]*b[i])
+	adcs	$acc2,$acc3,$t2		// +=acc[0]*0xffff0001
+	 mul	$t2,$a2,$bi		// lo(a[2]*b[i])
+	adcs	$acc3,$acc4,$t3
+	 mul	$t3,$a3,$bi		// lo(a[3]*b[i])
+	adc	$acc4,$acc5,xzr
+
+	adds	$acc0,$acc0,$t0		// accumulate low parts of multiplication
+	 umulh	$t0,$a0,$bi		// hi(a[0]*b[i])
+	adcs	$acc1,$acc1,$t1
+	 umulh	$t1,$a1,$bi		// hi(a[1]*b[i])
+	adcs	$acc2,$acc2,$t2
+	 umulh	$t2,$a2,$bi		// hi(a[2]*b[i])
+	adcs	$acc3,$acc3,$t3
+	 umulh	$t3,$a3,$bi		// hi(a[3]*b[i])
+	adc	$acc4,$acc4,xzr
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($i<3);
+	ldr	$bi,[$bp,#8*($i+1)]	// b[$i+1]
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	adds	$acc1,$acc1,$t0		// accumulate high parts of multiplication
+	 lsl	$t0,$acc0,#32
+	adcs	$acc2,$acc2,$t1
+	 lsr	$t1,$acc0,#32
+	adcs	$acc3,$acc3,$t2
+	adcs	$acc4,$acc4,$t3
+	adc	$acc5,xzr,xzr
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	// last reduction
+	subs	$t2,$acc0,$t0		// "*0xffff0001"
+	sbc	$t3,$acc0,$t1
+	adds	$acc0,$acc1,$t0		// +=acc[0]<<96 and omit acc[0]
+	adcs	$acc1,$acc2,$t1
+	adcs	$acc2,$acc3,$t2		// +=acc[0]*0xffff0001
+	adcs	$acc3,$acc4,$t3
+	adc	$acc4,$acc5,xzr
+
+	adds	$t0,$acc0,#1		// subs	$t0,$acc0,#-1 // tmp = ret-modulus
+	sbcs	$t1,$acc1,$poly1
+	sbcs	$t2,$acc2,xzr
+	sbcs	$t3,$acc3,$poly3
+	sbcs	xzr,$acc4,xzr		// did it borrow?
+
+	csel	$acc0,$acc0,$t0,lo	// ret = borrow ? ret : ret-modulus
+	csel	$acc1,$acc1,$t1,lo
+	csel	$acc2,$acc2,$t2,lo
+	stp	$acc0,$acc1,[$rp]
+	csel	$acc3,$acc3,$t3,lo
+	stp	$acc2,$acc3,[$rp,#16]
+
+	ret
+.size	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont,.-__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont
+
+// note that __ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont expects a[0-3] input pre-loaded
+// to $a0-$a3
+.type	__ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont,%function
+.align	4
+__ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont:
+	//  |  |  |  |  |  |a1*a0|  |
+	//  |  |  |  |  |a2*a0|  |  |
+	//  |  |a3*a2|a3*a0|  |  |  |
+	//  |  |  |  |a2*a1|  |  |  |
+	//  |  |  |a3*a1|  |  |  |  |
+	// *|  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 2|
+	// +|a3*a3|a2*a2|a1*a1|a0*a0|
+	//  |--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--|
+	//  |A7|A6|A5|A4|A3|A2|A1|A0|, where Ax is $accx, i.e. follow $accx
+	//
+	//  "can't overflow" below mark carrying into high part of
+	//  multiplication result, which can't overflow, because it
+	//  can never be all ones.
+
+	mul	$acc1,$a1,$a0		// a[1]*a[0]
+	umulh	$t1,$a1,$a0
+	mul	$acc2,$a2,$a0		// a[2]*a[0]
+	umulh	$t2,$a2,$a0
+	mul	$acc3,$a3,$a0		// a[3]*a[0]
+	umulh	$acc4,$a3,$a0
+
+	adds	$acc2,$acc2,$t1		// accumulate high parts of multiplication
+	 mul	$t0,$a2,$a1		// a[2]*a[1]
+	 umulh	$t1,$a2,$a1
+	adcs	$acc3,$acc3,$t2
+	 mul	$t2,$a3,$a1		// a[3]*a[1]
+	 umulh	$t3,$a3,$a1
+	adc	$acc4,$acc4,xzr		// can't overflow
+
+	mul	$acc5,$a3,$a2		// a[3]*a[2]
+	umulh	$acc6,$a3,$a2
+
+	adds	$t1,$t1,$t2		// accumulate high parts of multiplication
+	 mul	$acc0,$a0,$a0		// a[0]*a[0]
+	adc	$t2,$t3,xzr		// can't overflow
+
+	adds	$acc3,$acc3,$t0		// accumulate low parts of multiplication
+	 umulh	$a0,$a0,$a0
+	adcs	$acc4,$acc4,$t1
+	 mul	$t1,$a1,$a1		// a[1]*a[1]
+	adcs	$acc5,$acc5,$t2
+	 umulh	$a1,$a1,$a1
+	adc	$acc6,$acc6,xzr		// can't overflow
+
+	adds	$acc1,$acc1,$acc1	// acc[1-6]*=2
+	 mul	$t2,$a2,$a2		// a[2]*a[2]
+	adcs	$acc2,$acc2,$acc2
+	 umulh	$a2,$a2,$a2
+	adcs	$acc3,$acc3,$acc3
+	 mul	$t3,$a3,$a3		// a[3]*a[3]
+	adcs	$acc4,$acc4,$acc4
+	 umulh	$a3,$a3,$a3
+	adcs	$acc5,$acc5,$acc5
+	adcs	$acc6,$acc6,$acc6
+	adc	$acc7,xzr,xzr
+
+	adds	$acc1,$acc1,$a0		// +a[i]*a[i]
+	adcs	$acc2,$acc2,$t1
+	adcs	$acc3,$acc3,$a1
+	adcs	$acc4,$acc4,$t2
+	adcs	$acc5,$acc5,$a2
+	 lsl	$t0,$acc0,#32
+	adcs	$acc6,$acc6,$t3
+	 lsr	$t1,$acc0,#32
+	adc	$acc7,$acc7,$a3
+___
+for($i=0;$i<3;$i++) {			# reductions, see commentary in
+					# multiplication for details
+$code.=<<___;
+	subs	$t2,$acc0,$t0		// "*0xffff0001"
+	sbc	$t3,$acc0,$t1
+	adds	$acc0,$acc1,$t0		// +=acc[0]<<96 and omit acc[0]
+	adcs	$acc1,$acc2,$t1
+	 lsl	$t0,$acc0,#32
+	adcs	$acc2,$acc3,$t2		// +=acc[0]*0xffff0001
+	 lsr	$t1,$acc0,#32
+	adc	$acc3,$t3,xzr		// can't overflow
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	subs	$t2,$acc0,$t0		// "*0xffff0001"
+	sbc	$t3,$acc0,$t1
+	adds	$acc0,$acc1,$t0		// +=acc[0]<<96 and omit acc[0]
+	adcs	$acc1,$acc2,$t1
+	adcs	$acc2,$acc3,$t2		// +=acc[0]*0xffff0001
+	adc	$acc3,$t3,xzr		// can't overflow
+
+	adds	$acc0,$acc0,$acc4	// accumulate upper half
+	adcs	$acc1,$acc1,$acc5
+	adcs	$acc2,$acc2,$acc6
+	adcs	$acc3,$acc3,$acc7
+	adc	$acc4,xzr,xzr
+
+	adds	$t0,$acc0,#1		// subs	$t0,$acc0,#-1 // tmp = ret-modulus
+	sbcs	$t1,$acc1,$poly1
+	sbcs	$t2,$acc2,xzr
+	sbcs	$t3,$acc3,$poly3
+	sbcs	xzr,$acc4,xzr		// did it borrow?
+
+	csel	$acc0,$acc0,$t0,lo	// ret = borrow ? ret : ret-modulus
+	csel	$acc1,$acc1,$t1,lo
+	csel	$acc2,$acc2,$t2,lo
+	stp	$acc0,$acc1,[$rp]
+	csel	$acc3,$acc3,$t3,lo
+	stp	$acc2,$acc3,[$rp,#16]
+
+	ret
+.size	__ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont,.-__ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont
+
+// Note that __ecp_nistz256_add expects both input vectors pre-loaded to
+// $a0-$a3 and $t0-$t3. This is done because it's used in multiple
+// contexts, e.g. in multiplication by 2 and 3...
+.type	__ecp_nistz256_add,%function
+.align	4
+__ecp_nistz256_add:
+	adds	$acc0,$acc0,$t0		// ret = a+b
+	adcs	$acc1,$acc1,$t1
+	adcs	$acc2,$acc2,$t2
+	adcs	$acc3,$acc3,$t3
+	adc	$ap,xzr,xzr		// zap $ap
+
+	adds	$t0,$acc0,#1		// subs	$t0,$a0,#-1 // tmp = ret-modulus
+	sbcs	$t1,$acc1,$poly1
+	sbcs	$t2,$acc2,xzr
+	sbcs	$t3,$acc3,$poly3
+	sbcs	xzr,$ap,xzr		// did subtraction borrow?
+
+	csel	$acc0,$acc0,$t0,lo	// ret = borrow ? ret : ret-modulus
+	csel	$acc1,$acc1,$t1,lo
+	csel	$acc2,$acc2,$t2,lo
+	stp	$acc0,$acc1,[$rp]
+	csel	$acc3,$acc3,$t3,lo
+	stp	$acc2,$acc3,[$rp,#16]
+
+	ret
+.size	__ecp_nistz256_add,.-__ecp_nistz256_add
+
+.type	__ecp_nistz256_sub_from,%function
+.align	4
+__ecp_nistz256_sub_from:
+	ldp	$t0,$t1,[$bp]
+	ldp	$t2,$t3,[$bp,#16]
+	subs	$acc0,$acc0,$t0		// ret = a-b
+	sbcs	$acc1,$acc1,$t1
+	sbcs	$acc2,$acc2,$t2
+	sbcs	$acc3,$acc3,$t3
+	sbc	$ap,xzr,xzr		// zap $ap
+
+	subs	$t0,$acc0,#1		// adds	$t0,$a0,#-1 // tmp = ret+modulus
+	adcs	$t1,$acc1,$poly1
+	adcs	$t2,$acc2,xzr
+	adc	$t3,$acc3,$poly3
+	cmp	$ap,xzr			// did subtraction borrow?
+
+	csel	$acc0,$acc0,$t0,eq	// ret = borrow ? ret+modulus : ret
+	csel	$acc1,$acc1,$t1,eq
+	csel	$acc2,$acc2,$t2,eq
+	stp	$acc0,$acc1,[$rp]
+	csel	$acc3,$acc3,$t3,eq
+	stp	$acc2,$acc3,[$rp,#16]
+
+	ret
+.size	__ecp_nistz256_sub_from,.-__ecp_nistz256_sub_from
+
+.type	__ecp_nistz256_sub_morf,%function
+.align	4
+__ecp_nistz256_sub_morf:
+	ldp	$t0,$t1,[$bp]
+	ldp	$t2,$t3,[$bp,#16]
+	subs	$acc0,$t0,$acc0		// ret = b-a
+	sbcs	$acc1,$t1,$acc1
+	sbcs	$acc2,$t2,$acc2
+	sbcs	$acc3,$t3,$acc3
+	sbc	$ap,xzr,xzr		// zap $ap
+
+	subs	$t0,$acc0,#1		// adds	$t0,$a0,#-1 // tmp = ret+modulus
+	adcs	$t1,$acc1,$poly1
+	adcs	$t2,$acc2,xzr
+	adc	$t3,$acc3,$poly3
+	cmp	$ap,xzr			// did subtraction borrow?
+
+	csel	$acc0,$acc0,$t0,eq	// ret = borrow ? ret+modulus : ret
+	csel	$acc1,$acc1,$t1,eq
+	csel	$acc2,$acc2,$t2,eq
+	stp	$acc0,$acc1,[$rp]
+	csel	$acc3,$acc3,$t3,eq
+	stp	$acc2,$acc3,[$rp,#16]
+
+	ret
+.size	__ecp_nistz256_sub_morf,.-__ecp_nistz256_sub_morf
+
+.type	__ecp_nistz256_div_by_2,%function
+.align	4
+__ecp_nistz256_div_by_2:
+	subs	$t0,$acc0,#1		// adds	$t0,$a0,#-1 // tmp = a+modulus
+	adcs	$t1,$acc1,$poly1
+	adcs	$t2,$acc2,xzr
+	adcs	$t3,$acc3,$poly3
+	adc	$ap,xzr,xzr		// zap $ap
+	tst	$acc0,#1		// is a even?
+
+	csel	$acc0,$acc0,$t0,eq	// ret = even ? a : a+modulus 
+	csel	$acc1,$acc1,$t1,eq
+	csel	$acc2,$acc2,$t2,eq
+	csel	$acc3,$acc3,$t3,eq
+	csel	$ap,xzr,$ap,eq
+
+	lsr	$acc0,$acc0,#1		// ret >>= 1
+	orr	$acc0,$acc0,$acc1,lsl#63
+	lsr	$acc1,$acc1,#1
+	orr	$acc1,$acc1,$acc2,lsl#63
+	lsr	$acc2,$acc2,#1
+	orr	$acc2,$acc2,$acc3,lsl#63
+	lsr	$acc3,$acc3,#1
+	stp	$acc0,$acc1,[$rp]
+	orr	$acc3,$acc3,$ap,lsl#63
+	stp	$acc2,$acc3,[$rp,#16]
+
+	ret
+.size	__ecp_nistz256_div_by_2,.-__ecp_nistz256_div_by_2
+___
+########################################################################
+# following subroutines are "literal" implementation of those found in
+# ecp_nistz256.c
+#
+########################################################################
+# void ecp_nistz256_point_double(P256_POINT *out,const P256_POINT *inp);
+#
+{
+my ($S,$M,$Zsqr,$tmp0)=map(32*$_,(0..3));
+# above map() describes stack layout with 4 temporary
+# 256-bit vectors on top.
+my ($rp_real,$ap_real) = map("x$_",(21,22));
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_point_double
+.type	ecp_nistz256_point_double,%function
+.align	5
+ecp_nistz256_point_double:
+	stp	x29,x30,[sp,#-80]!
+	add	x29,sp,#0
+	stp	x19,x20,[sp,#16]
+	stp	x21,x22,[sp,#32]
+	sub	sp,sp,#32*4
+
+.Ldouble_shortcut:
+	ldp	$acc0,$acc1,[$ap,#32]
+	 mov	$rp_real,$rp
+	ldp	$acc2,$acc3,[$ap,#48]
+	 mov	$ap_real,$ap
+	 ldr	$poly1,.Lpoly+8
+	mov	$t0,$acc0
+	 ldr	$poly3,.Lpoly+24
+	mov	$t1,$acc1
+	 ldp	$a0,$a1,[$ap_real,#64]	// forward load for p256_sqr_mont
+	mov	$t2,$acc2
+	mov	$t3,$acc3
+	 ldp	$a2,$a3,[$ap_real,#64+16]
+	add	$rp,sp,#$S
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_add	// p256_mul_by_2(S, in_y);
+
+	add	$rp,sp,#$Zsqr
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont	// p256_sqr_mont(Zsqr, in_z);
+
+	ldp	$t0,$t1,[$ap_real]
+	ldp	$t2,$t3,[$ap_real,#16]
+	mov	$a0,$acc0		// put Zsqr aside for p256_sub
+	mov	$a1,$acc1
+	mov	$a2,$acc2
+	mov	$a3,$acc3
+	add	$rp,sp,#$M
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_add	// p256_add(M, Zsqr, in_x);
+
+	add	$bp,$ap_real,#0
+	mov	$acc0,$a0		// restore Zsqr
+	mov	$acc1,$a1
+	 ldp	$a0,$a1,[sp,#$S]	// forward load for p256_sqr_mont
+	mov	$acc2,$a2
+	mov	$acc3,$a3
+	 ldp	$a2,$a3,[sp,#$S+16]
+	add	$rp,sp,#$Zsqr
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_sub_morf	// p256_sub(Zsqr, in_x, Zsqr);
+
+	add	$rp,sp,#$S
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont	// p256_sqr_mont(S, S);
+
+	ldr	$bi,[$ap_real,#32]
+	ldp	$a0,$a1,[$ap_real,#64]
+	ldp	$a2,$a3,[$ap_real,#64+16]
+	add	$bp,$ap_real,#32
+	add	$rp,sp,#$tmp0
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	// p256_mul_mont(tmp0, in_z, in_y);
+
+	mov	$t0,$acc0
+	mov	$t1,$acc1
+	 ldp	$a0,$a1,[sp,#$S]	// forward load for p256_sqr_mont
+	mov	$t2,$acc2
+	mov	$t3,$acc3
+	 ldp	$a2,$a3,[sp,#$S+16]
+	add	$rp,$rp_real,#64
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_add	// p256_mul_by_2(res_z, tmp0);
+
+	add	$rp,sp,#$tmp0
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont	// p256_sqr_mont(tmp0, S);
+
+	 ldr	$bi,[sp,#$Zsqr]		// forward load for p256_mul_mont
+	 ldp	$a0,$a1,[sp,#$M]
+	 ldp	$a2,$a3,[sp,#$M+16]
+	add	$rp,$rp_real,#32
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_div_by_2	// p256_div_by_2(res_y, tmp0);
+
+	add	$bp,sp,#$Zsqr
+	add	$rp,sp,#$M
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	// p256_mul_mont(M, M, Zsqr);
+
+	mov	$t0,$acc0		// duplicate M
+	mov	$t1,$acc1
+	mov	$t2,$acc2
+	mov	$t3,$acc3
+	mov	$a0,$acc0		// put M aside
+	mov	$a1,$acc1
+	mov	$a2,$acc2
+	mov	$a3,$acc3
+	add	$rp,sp,#$M
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_add
+	mov	$t0,$a0			// restore M
+	mov	$t1,$a1
+	 ldr	$bi,[$ap_real]		// forward load for p256_mul_mont
+	mov	$t2,$a2
+	 ldp	$a0,$a1,[sp,#$S]
+	mov	$t3,$a3
+	 ldp	$a2,$a3,[sp,#$S+16]
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_add	// p256_mul_by_3(M, M);
+
+	add	$bp,$ap_real,#0
+	add	$rp,sp,#$S
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	// p256_mul_mont(S, S, in_x);
+
+	mov	$t0,$acc0
+	mov	$t1,$acc1
+	 ldp	$a0,$a1,[sp,#$M]	// forward load for p256_sqr_mont
+	mov	$t2,$acc2
+	mov	$t3,$acc3
+	 ldp	$a2,$a3,[sp,#$M+16]
+	add	$rp,sp,#$tmp0
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_add	// p256_mul_by_2(tmp0, S);
+
+	add	$rp,$rp_real,#0
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont	// p256_sqr_mont(res_x, M);
+
+	add	$bp,sp,#$tmp0
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_sub_from	// p256_sub(res_x, res_x, tmp0);
+
+	add	$bp,sp,#$S
+	add	$rp,sp,#$S
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_sub_morf	// p256_sub(S, S, res_x);
+
+	ldr	$bi,[sp,#$M]
+	mov	$a0,$acc0		// copy S
+	mov	$a1,$acc1
+	mov	$a2,$acc2
+	mov	$a3,$acc3
+	add	$bp,sp,#$M
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	// p256_mul_mont(S, S, M);
+
+	add	$bp,$rp_real,#32
+	add	$rp,$rp_real,#32
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_sub_from	// p256_sub(res_y, S, res_y);
+
+	add	sp,x29,#0		// destroy frame
+	ldp	x19,x20,[x29,#16]
+	ldp	x21,x22,[x29,#32]
+	ldp	x29,x30,[sp],#80
+	ret
+.size	ecp_nistz256_point_double,.-ecp_nistz256_point_double
+___
+}
+
+########################################################################
+# void ecp_nistz256_point_add(P256_POINT *out,const P256_POINT *in1,
+#			      const P256_POINT *in2);
+{
+my ($res_x,$res_y,$res_z,
+    $H,$Hsqr,$R,$Rsqr,$Hcub,
+    $U1,$U2,$S1,$S2)=map(32*$_,(0..11));
+my ($Z1sqr, $Z2sqr) = ($Hsqr, $Rsqr);
+# above map() describes stack layout with 12 temporary
+# 256-bit vectors on top.
+my ($rp_real,$ap_real,$bp_real,$in1infty,$in2infty,$temp)=map("x$_",(21..26));
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_point_add
+.type	ecp_nistz256_point_add,%function
+.align	5
+ecp_nistz256_point_add:
+	stp	x29,x30,[sp,#-80]!
+	add	x29,sp,#0
+	stp	x19,x20,[sp,#16]
+	stp	x21,x22,[sp,#32]
+	stp	x23,x24,[sp,#48]
+	stp	x25,x26,[sp,#64]
+	sub	sp,sp,#32*12
+
+	ldp	$a0,$a1,[$bp,#64]	// in2_z
+	ldp	$a2,$a3,[$bp,#64+16]
+	 mov	$rp_real,$rp
+	 mov	$ap_real,$ap
+	 mov	$bp_real,$bp
+	 ldr	$poly1,.Lpoly+8
+	 ldr	$poly3,.Lpoly+24
+	orr	$t0,$a0,$a1
+	orr	$t2,$a2,$a3
+	orr	$in2infty,$t0,$t2
+	cmp	$in2infty,#0
+	csetm	$in2infty,ne		// !in2infty
+	add	$rp,sp,#$Z2sqr
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont	// p256_sqr_mont(Z2sqr, in2_z);
+
+	ldp	$a0,$a1,[$ap_real,#64]	// in1_z
+	ldp	$a2,$a3,[$ap_real,#64+16]
+	orr	$t0,$a0,$a1
+	orr	$t2,$a2,$a3
+	orr	$in1infty,$t0,$t2
+	cmp	$in1infty,#0
+	csetm	$in1infty,ne		// !in1infty
+	add	$rp,sp,#$Z1sqr
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont	// p256_sqr_mont(Z1sqr, in1_z);
+
+	ldr	$bi,[$bp_real,#64]
+	ldp	$a0,$a1,[sp,#$Z2sqr]
+	ldp	$a2,$a3,[sp,#$Z2sqr+16]
+	add	$bp,$bp_real,#64
+	add	$rp,sp,#$S1
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	// p256_mul_mont(S1, Z2sqr, in2_z);
+
+	ldr	$bi,[$ap_real,#64]
+	ldp	$a0,$a1,[sp,#$Z1sqr]
+	ldp	$a2,$a3,[sp,#$Z1sqr+16]
+	add	$bp,$ap_real,#64
+	add	$rp,sp,#$S2
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	// p256_mul_mont(S2, Z1sqr, in1_z);
+
+	ldr	$bi,[$ap_real,#32]
+	ldp	$a0,$a1,[sp,#$S1]
+	ldp	$a2,$a3,[sp,#$S1+16]
+	add	$bp,$ap_real,#32
+	add	$rp,sp,#$S1
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	// p256_mul_mont(S1, S1, in1_y);
+
+	ldr	$bi,[$bp_real,#32]
+	ldp	$a0,$a1,[sp,#$S2]
+	ldp	$a2,$a3,[sp,#$S2+16]
+	add	$bp,$bp_real,#32
+	add	$rp,sp,#$S2
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	// p256_mul_mont(S2, S2, in2_y);
+
+	add	$bp,sp,#$S1
+	 ldr	$bi,[sp,#$Z2sqr]	// forward load for p256_mul_mont
+	 ldp	$a0,$a1,[$ap_real]
+	 ldp	$a2,$a3,[$ap_real,#16]
+	add	$rp,sp,#$R
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_sub_from	// p256_sub(R, S2, S1);
+
+	orr	$acc0,$acc0,$acc1	// see if result is zero
+	orr	$acc2,$acc2,$acc3
+	orr	$temp,$acc0,$acc2
+
+	add	$bp,sp,#$Z2sqr
+	add	$rp,sp,#$U1
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	// p256_mul_mont(U1, in1_x, Z2sqr);
+
+	ldr	$bi,[sp,#$Z1sqr]
+	ldp	$a0,$a1,[$bp_real]
+	ldp	$a2,$a3,[$bp_real,#16]
+	add	$bp,sp,#$Z1sqr
+	add	$rp,sp,#$U2
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	// p256_mul_mont(U2, in2_x, Z1sqr);
+
+	add	$bp,sp,#$U1
+	 ldp	$a0,$a1,[sp,#$R]	// forward load for p256_sqr_mont
+	 ldp	$a2,$a3,[sp,#$R+16]
+	add	$rp,sp,#$H
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_sub_from	// p256_sub(H, U2, U1);
+
+	orr	$acc0,$acc0,$acc1	// see if result is zero
+	orr	$acc2,$acc2,$acc3
+	orr	$acc0,$acc0,$acc2
+	tst	$acc0,$acc0
+	b.ne	.Ladd_proceed		// is_equal(U1,U2)?
+
+	tst	$in1infty,$in2infty
+	b.eq	.Ladd_proceed		// (in1infty || in2infty)?
+
+	tst	$temp,$temp
+	b.eq	.Ladd_double		// is_equal(S1,S2)?
+
+	eor	$a0,$a0,$a0
+	eor	$a1,$a1,$a1
+	stp	$a0,$a1,[$rp_real]
+	stp	$a0,$a1,[$rp_real,#16]
+	stp	$a0,$a1,[$rp_real,#32]
+	stp	$a0,$a1,[$rp_real,#48]
+	stp	$a0,$a1,[$rp_real,#64]
+	stp	$a0,$a1,[$rp_real,#80]
+	b	.Ladd_done
+
+.align	4
+.Ladd_double:
+	mov	$ap,$ap_real
+	mov	$rp,$rp_real
+	ldp	x23,x24,[x29,#48]
+	ldp	x25,x26,[x29,#64]
+	add	sp,sp,#32*(12-4)	// difference in stack frames
+	b	.Ldouble_shortcut
+
+.align	4
+.Ladd_proceed:
+	add	$rp,sp,#$Rsqr
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont	// p256_sqr_mont(Rsqr, R);
+
+	ldr	$bi,[$ap_real,#64]
+	ldp	$a0,$a1,[sp,#$H]
+	ldp	$a2,$a3,[sp,#$H+16]
+	add	$bp,$ap_real,#64
+	add	$rp,sp,#$res_z
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	// p256_mul_mont(res_z, H, in1_z);
+
+	ldp	$a0,$a1,[sp,#$H]
+	ldp	$a2,$a3,[sp,#$H+16]
+	add	$rp,sp,#$Hsqr
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont	// p256_sqr_mont(Hsqr, H);
+
+	ldr	$bi,[$bp_real,#64]
+	ldp	$a0,$a1,[sp,#$res_z]
+	ldp	$a2,$a3,[sp,#$res_z+16]
+	add	$bp,$bp_real,#64
+	add	$rp,sp,#$res_z
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	// p256_mul_mont(res_z, res_z, in2_z);
+
+	ldr	$bi,[sp,#$H]
+	ldp	$a0,$a1,[sp,#$Hsqr]
+	ldp	$a2,$a3,[sp,#$Hsqr+16]
+	add	$bp,sp,#$H
+	add	$rp,sp,#$Hcub
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	// p256_mul_mont(Hcub, Hsqr, H);
+
+	ldr	$bi,[sp,#$Hsqr]
+	ldp	$a0,$a1,[sp,#$U1]
+	ldp	$a2,$a3,[sp,#$U1+16]
+	add	$bp,sp,#$Hsqr
+	add	$rp,sp,#$U2
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	// p256_mul_mont(U2, U1, Hsqr);
+
+	mov	$t0,$acc0
+	mov	$t1,$acc1
+	mov	$t2,$acc2
+	mov	$t3,$acc3
+	add	$rp,sp,#$Hsqr
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_add	// p256_mul_by_2(Hsqr, U2);
+
+	add	$bp,sp,#$Rsqr
+	add	$rp,sp,#$res_x
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_sub_morf	// p256_sub(res_x, Rsqr, Hsqr);
+
+	add	$bp,sp,#$Hcub
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_sub_from	//  p256_sub(res_x, res_x, Hcub);
+
+	add	$bp,sp,#$U2
+	 ldr	$bi,[sp,#$Hcub]		// forward load for p256_mul_mont
+	 ldp	$a0,$a1,[sp,#$S1]
+	 ldp	$a2,$a3,[sp,#$S1+16]
+	add	$rp,sp,#$res_y
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_sub_morf	// p256_sub(res_y, U2, res_x);
+
+	add	$bp,sp,#$Hcub
+	add	$rp,sp,#$S2
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	// p256_mul_mont(S2, S1, Hcub);
+
+	ldr	$bi,[sp,#$R]
+	ldp	$a0,$a1,[sp,#$res_y]
+	ldp	$a2,$a3,[sp,#$res_y+16]
+	add	$bp,sp,#$R
+	add	$rp,sp,#$res_y
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	// p256_mul_mont(res_y, res_y, R);
+
+	add	$bp,sp,#$S2
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_sub_from	// p256_sub(res_y, res_y, S2);
+
+	ldp	$a0,$a1,[sp,#$res_x]		// res
+	ldp	$a2,$a3,[sp,#$res_x+16]
+	ldp	$t0,$t1,[$bp_real]		// in2
+	ldp	$t2,$t3,[$bp_real,#16]
+___
+for($i=0;$i<64;$i+=32) {		# conditional moves
+$code.=<<___;
+	ldp	$acc0,$acc1,[$ap_real,#$i]	// in1
+	cmp	$in1infty,#0			// !$in1intfy, remember?
+	ldp	$acc2,$acc3,[$ap_real,#$i+16]
+	csel	$t0,$a0,$t0,ne
+	csel	$t1,$a1,$t1,ne
+	ldp	$a0,$a1,[sp,#$res_x+$i+32]	// res
+	csel	$t2,$a2,$t2,ne
+	csel	$t3,$a3,$t3,ne
+	cmp	$in2infty,#0			// !$in2intfy, remember?
+	ldp	$a2,$a3,[sp,#$res_x+$i+48]
+	csel	$acc0,$t0,$acc0,ne
+	csel	$acc1,$t1,$acc1,ne
+	ldp	$t0,$t1,[$bp_real,#$i+32]	// in2
+	csel	$acc2,$t2,$acc2,ne
+	csel	$acc3,$t3,$acc3,ne
+	ldp	$t2,$t3,[$bp_real,#$i+48]
+	stp	$acc0,$acc1,[$rp_real,#$i]
+	stp	$acc2,$acc3,[$rp_real,#$i+16]
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	ldp	$acc0,$acc1,[$ap_real,#$i]	// in1
+	cmp	$in1infty,#0			// !$in1intfy, remember?
+	ldp	$acc2,$acc3,[$ap_real,#$i+16]
+	csel	$t0,$a0,$t0,ne
+	csel	$t1,$a1,$t1,ne
+	csel	$t2,$a2,$t2,ne
+	csel	$t3,$a3,$t3,ne
+	cmp	$in2infty,#0			// !$in2intfy, remember?
+	csel	$acc0,$t0,$acc0,ne
+	csel	$acc1,$t1,$acc1,ne
+	csel	$acc2,$t2,$acc2,ne
+	csel	$acc3,$t3,$acc3,ne
+	stp	$acc0,$acc1,[$rp_real,#$i]
+	stp	$acc2,$acc3,[$rp_real,#$i+16]
+
+.Ladd_done:
+	add	sp,x29,#0	// destroy frame
+	ldp	x19,x20,[x29,#16]
+	ldp	x21,x22,[x29,#32]
+	ldp	x23,x24,[x29,#48]
+	ldp	x25,x26,[x29,#64]
+	ldp	x29,x30,[sp],#80
+	ret
+.size	ecp_nistz256_point_add,.-ecp_nistz256_point_add
+___
+}
+
+########################################################################
+# void ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine(P256_POINT *out,const P256_POINT *in1,
+#				     const P256_POINT_AFFINE *in2);
+{
+my ($res_x,$res_y,$res_z,
+    $U2,$S2,$H,$R,$Hsqr,$Hcub,$Rsqr)=map(32*$_,(0..9));
+my $Z1sqr = $S2;
+# above map() describes stack layout with 10 temporary
+# 256-bit vectors on top.
+my ($rp_real,$ap_real,$bp_real,$in1infty,$in2infty,$temp)=map("x$_",(21..26));
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine
+.type	ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine,%function
+.align	5
+ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine:
+	stp	x29,x30,[sp,#-80]!
+	add	x29,sp,#0
+	stp	x19,x20,[sp,#16]
+	stp	x21,x22,[sp,#32]
+	stp	x23,x24,[sp,#48]
+	stp	x25,x26,[sp,#64]
+	sub	sp,sp,#32*10
+
+	mov	$rp_real,$rp
+	mov	$ap_real,$ap
+	mov	$bp_real,$bp
+	ldr	$poly1,.Lpoly+8
+	ldr	$poly3,.Lpoly+24
+
+	ldp	$a0,$a1,[$ap,#64]	// in1_z
+	ldp	$a2,$a3,[$ap,#64+16]
+	orr	$t0,$a0,$a1
+	orr	$t2,$a2,$a3
+	orr	$in1infty,$t0,$t2
+	cmp	$in1infty,#0
+	csetm	$in1infty,ne		// !in1infty
+
+	ldp	$acc0,$acc1,[$bp]	// in2_x
+	ldp	$acc2,$acc3,[$bp,#16]
+	ldp	$t0,$t1,[$bp,#32]	// in2_y
+	ldp	$t2,$t3,[$bp,#48]
+	orr	$acc0,$acc0,$acc1
+	orr	$acc2,$acc2,$acc3
+	orr	$t0,$t0,$t1
+	orr	$t2,$t2,$t3
+	orr	$acc0,$acc0,$acc2
+	orr	$t0,$t0,$t2
+	orr	$in2infty,$acc0,$t0
+	cmp	$in2infty,#0
+	csetm	$in2infty,ne		// !in2infty
+
+	add	$rp,sp,#$Z1sqr
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont	// p256_sqr_mont(Z1sqr, in1_z);
+
+	mov	$a0,$acc0
+	mov	$a1,$acc1
+	mov	$a2,$acc2
+	mov	$a3,$acc3
+	ldr	$bi,[$bp_real]
+	add	$bp,$bp_real,#0
+	add	$rp,sp,#$U2
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	// p256_mul_mont(U2, Z1sqr, in2_x);
+
+	add	$bp,$ap_real,#0
+	 ldr	$bi,[$ap_real,#64]	// forward load for p256_mul_mont
+	 ldp	$a0,$a1,[sp,#$Z1sqr]
+	 ldp	$a2,$a3,[sp,#$Z1sqr+16]
+	add	$rp,sp,#$H
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_sub_from	// p256_sub(H, U2, in1_x);
+
+	add	$bp,$ap_real,#64
+	add	$rp,sp,#$S2
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	// p256_mul_mont(S2, Z1sqr, in1_z);
+
+	ldr	$bi,[$ap_real,#64]
+	ldp	$a0,$a1,[sp,#$H]
+	ldp	$a2,$a3,[sp,#$H+16]
+	add	$bp,$ap_real,#64
+	add	$rp,sp,#$res_z
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	// p256_mul_mont(res_z, H, in1_z);
+
+	ldr	$bi,[$bp_real,#32]
+	ldp	$a0,$a1,[sp,#$S2]
+	ldp	$a2,$a3,[sp,#$S2+16]
+	add	$bp,$bp_real,#32
+	add	$rp,sp,#$S2
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	// p256_mul_mont(S2, S2, in2_y);
+
+	add	$bp,$ap_real,#32
+	 ldp	$a0,$a1,[sp,#$H]	// forward load for p256_sqr_mont
+	 ldp	$a2,$a3,[sp,#$H+16]
+	add	$rp,sp,#$R
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_sub_from	// p256_sub(R, S2, in1_y);
+
+	add	$rp,sp,#$Hsqr
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont	// p256_sqr_mont(Hsqr, H);
+
+	ldp	$a0,$a1,[sp,#$R]
+	ldp	$a2,$a3,[sp,#$R+16]
+	add	$rp,sp,#$Rsqr
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont	// p256_sqr_mont(Rsqr, R);
+
+	ldr	$bi,[sp,#$H]
+	ldp	$a0,$a1,[sp,#$Hsqr]
+	ldp	$a2,$a3,[sp,#$Hsqr+16]
+	add	$bp,sp,#$H
+	add	$rp,sp,#$Hcub
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	// p256_mul_mont(Hcub, Hsqr, H);
+
+	ldr	$bi,[$ap_real]
+	ldp	$a0,$a1,[sp,#$Hsqr]
+	ldp	$a2,$a3,[sp,#$Hsqr+16]
+	add	$bp,$ap_real,#0
+	add	$rp,sp,#$U2
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	// p256_mul_mont(U2, in1_x, Hsqr);
+
+	mov	$t0,$acc0
+	mov	$t1,$acc1
+	mov	$t2,$acc2
+	mov	$t3,$acc3
+	add	$rp,sp,#$Hsqr
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_add	// p256_mul_by_2(Hsqr, U2);
+
+	add	$bp,sp,#$Rsqr
+	add	$rp,sp,#$res_x
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_sub_morf	// p256_sub(res_x, Rsqr, Hsqr);
+
+	add	$bp,sp,#$Hcub
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_sub_from	//  p256_sub(res_x, res_x, Hcub);
+
+	add	$bp,sp,#$U2
+	 ldr	$bi,[$ap_real,#32]	// forward load for p256_mul_mont
+	 ldp	$a0,$a1,[sp,#$Hcub]
+	 ldp	$a2,$a3,[sp,#$Hcub+16]
+	add	$rp,sp,#$res_y
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_sub_morf	// p256_sub(res_y, U2, res_x);
+
+	add	$bp,$ap_real,#32
+	add	$rp,sp,#$S2
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	// p256_mul_mont(S2, in1_y, Hcub);
+
+	ldr	$bi,[sp,#$R]
+	ldp	$a0,$a1,[sp,#$res_y]
+	ldp	$a2,$a3,[sp,#$res_y+16]
+	add	$bp,sp,#$R
+	add	$rp,sp,#$res_y
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	// p256_mul_mont(res_y, res_y, R);
+
+	add	$bp,sp,#$S2
+	bl	__ecp_nistz256_sub_from	// p256_sub(res_y, res_y, S2);
+
+	ldp	$a0,$a1,[sp,#$res_x]		// res
+	ldp	$a2,$a3,[sp,#$res_x+16]
+	ldp	$t0,$t1,[$bp_real]		// in2
+	ldp	$t2,$t3,[$bp_real,#16]
+___
+for($i=0;$i<64;$i+=32) {		# conditional moves
+$code.=<<___;
+	ldp	$acc0,$acc1,[$ap_real,#$i]	// in1
+	cmp	$in1infty,#0			// !$in1intfy, remember?
+	ldp	$acc2,$acc3,[$ap_real,#$i+16]
+	csel	$t0,$a0,$t0,ne
+	csel	$t1,$a1,$t1,ne
+	ldp	$a0,$a1,[sp,#$res_x+$i+32]	// res
+	csel	$t2,$a2,$t2,ne
+	csel	$t3,$a3,$t3,ne
+	cmp	$in2infty,#0			// !$in2intfy, remember?
+	ldp	$a2,$a3,[sp,#$res_x+$i+48]
+	csel	$acc0,$t0,$acc0,ne
+	csel	$acc1,$t1,$acc1,ne
+	ldp	$t0,$t1,[$bp_real,#$i+32]	// in2
+	csel	$acc2,$t2,$acc2,ne
+	csel	$acc3,$t3,$acc3,ne
+	ldp	$t2,$t3,[$bp_real,#$i+48]
+	stp	$acc0,$acc1,[$rp_real,#$i]
+	stp	$acc2,$acc3,[$rp_real,#$i+16]
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($i == 0);
+	adr	$bp_real,.Lone_mont-64
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	ldp	$acc0,$acc1,[$ap_real,#$i]	// in1
+	cmp	$in1infty,#0			// !$in1intfy, remember?
+	ldp	$acc2,$acc3,[$ap_real,#$i+16]
+	csel	$t0,$a0,$t0,ne
+	csel	$t1,$a1,$t1,ne
+	csel	$t2,$a2,$t2,ne
+	csel	$t3,$a3,$t3,ne
+	cmp	$in2infty,#0			// !$in2intfy, remember?
+	csel	$acc0,$t0,$acc0,ne
+	csel	$acc1,$t1,$acc1,ne
+	csel	$acc2,$t2,$acc2,ne
+	csel	$acc3,$t3,$acc3,ne
+	stp	$acc0,$acc1,[$rp_real,#$i]
+	stp	$acc2,$acc3,[$rp_real,#$i+16]
+
+	add	sp,x29,#0		// destroy frame
+	ldp	x19,x20,[x29,#16]
+	ldp	x21,x22,[x29,#32]
+	ldp	x23,x24,[x29,#48]
+	ldp	x25,x26,[x29,#64]
+	ldp	x29,x30,[sp],#80
+	ret
+.size	ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine,.-ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine
+___
+}	}
+
+########################################################################
+# scatter-gather subroutines
+{
+my ($out,$inp,$index,$mask)=map("x$_",(0..3));
+$code.=<<___;
+// void	ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5(void *x0,const P256_POINT *x1,
+//					 int x2);
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5
+.type	ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5,%function
+.align	4
+ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5:
+	stp	x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
+	add	x29,sp,#0
+
+	add	$out,$out,$index,lsl#2
+
+	ldp	x4,x5,[$inp]		// X
+	ldp	x6,x7,[$inp,#16]
+	str	w4,[$out,#64*0-4]
+	lsr	x4,x4,#32
+	str	w5,[$out,#64*1-4]
+	lsr	x5,x5,#32
+	str	w6,[$out,#64*2-4]
+	lsr	x6,x6,#32
+	str	w7,[$out,#64*3-4]
+	lsr	x7,x7,#32
+	str	w4,[$out,#64*4-4]
+	str	w5,[$out,#64*5-4]
+	str	w6,[$out,#64*6-4]
+	str	w7,[$out,#64*7-4]
+	add	$out,$out,#64*8
+
+	ldp	x4,x5,[$inp,#32]	// Y
+	ldp	x6,x7,[$inp,#48]
+	str	w4,[$out,#64*0-4]
+	lsr	x4,x4,#32
+	str	w5,[$out,#64*1-4]
+	lsr	x5,x5,#32
+	str	w6,[$out,#64*2-4]
+	lsr	x6,x6,#32
+	str	w7,[$out,#64*3-4]
+	lsr	x7,x7,#32
+	str	w4,[$out,#64*4-4]
+	str	w5,[$out,#64*5-4]
+	str	w6,[$out,#64*6-4]
+	str	w7,[$out,#64*7-4]
+	add	$out,$out,#64*8
+
+	ldp	x4,x5,[$inp,#64]	// Z
+	ldp	x6,x7,[$inp,#80]
+	str	w4,[$out,#64*0-4]
+	lsr	x4,x4,#32
+	str	w5,[$out,#64*1-4]
+	lsr	x5,x5,#32
+	str	w6,[$out,#64*2-4]
+	lsr	x6,x6,#32
+	str	w7,[$out,#64*3-4]
+	lsr	x7,x7,#32
+	str	w4,[$out,#64*4-4]
+	str	w5,[$out,#64*5-4]
+	str	w6,[$out,#64*6-4]
+	str	w7,[$out,#64*7-4]
+
+	ldr	x29,[sp],#16
+	ret
+.size	ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5,.-ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5
+
+// void	ecp_nistz256_gather_w5(P256_POINT *x0,const void *x1,
+//					      int x2);
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_gather_w5
+.type	ecp_nistz256_gather_w5,%function
+.align	4
+ecp_nistz256_gather_w5:
+	stp	x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
+	add	x29,sp,#0
+
+	cmp	$index,xzr
+	csetm	x3,ne
+	add	$index,$index,x3
+	add	$inp,$inp,$index,lsl#2
+
+	ldr	w4,[$inp,#64*0]
+	ldr	w5,[$inp,#64*1]
+	ldr	w6,[$inp,#64*2]
+	ldr	w7,[$inp,#64*3]
+	ldr	w8,[$inp,#64*4]
+	ldr	w9,[$inp,#64*5]
+	ldr	w10,[$inp,#64*6]
+	ldr	w11,[$inp,#64*7]
+	add	$inp,$inp,#64*8
+	orr	x4,x4,x8,lsl#32
+	orr	x5,x5,x9,lsl#32
+	orr	x6,x6,x10,lsl#32
+	orr	x7,x7,x11,lsl#32
+	csel	x4,x4,xzr,ne
+	csel	x5,x5,xzr,ne
+	csel	x6,x6,xzr,ne
+	csel	x7,x7,xzr,ne
+	stp	x4,x5,[$out]		// X
+	stp	x6,x7,[$out,#16]
+
+	ldr	w4,[$inp,#64*0]
+	ldr	w5,[$inp,#64*1]
+	ldr	w6,[$inp,#64*2]
+	ldr	w7,[$inp,#64*3]
+	ldr	w8,[$inp,#64*4]
+	ldr	w9,[$inp,#64*5]
+	ldr	w10,[$inp,#64*6]
+	ldr	w11,[$inp,#64*7]
+	add	$inp,$inp,#64*8
+	orr	x4,x4,x8,lsl#32
+	orr	x5,x5,x9,lsl#32
+	orr	x6,x6,x10,lsl#32
+	orr	x7,x7,x11,lsl#32
+	csel	x4,x4,xzr,ne
+	csel	x5,x5,xzr,ne
+	csel	x6,x6,xzr,ne
+	csel	x7,x7,xzr,ne
+	stp	x4,x5,[$out,#32]	// Y
+	stp	x6,x7,[$out,#48]
+
+	ldr	w4,[$inp,#64*0]
+	ldr	w5,[$inp,#64*1]
+	ldr	w6,[$inp,#64*2]
+	ldr	w7,[$inp,#64*3]
+	ldr	w8,[$inp,#64*4]
+	ldr	w9,[$inp,#64*5]
+	ldr	w10,[$inp,#64*6]
+	ldr	w11,[$inp,#64*7]
+	orr	x4,x4,x8,lsl#32
+	orr	x5,x5,x9,lsl#32
+	orr	x6,x6,x10,lsl#32
+	orr	x7,x7,x11,lsl#32
+	csel	x4,x4,xzr,ne
+	csel	x5,x5,xzr,ne
+	csel	x6,x6,xzr,ne
+	csel	x7,x7,xzr,ne
+	stp	x4,x5,[$out,#64]	// Z
+	stp	x6,x7,[$out,#80]
+
+	ldr	x29,[sp],#16
+	ret
+.size	ecp_nistz256_gather_w5,.-ecp_nistz256_gather_w5
+
+// void	ecp_nistz256_scatter_w7(void *x0,const P256_POINT_AFFINE *x1,
+//					 int x2);
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_scatter_w7
+.type	ecp_nistz256_scatter_w7,%function
+.align	4
+ecp_nistz256_scatter_w7:
+	stp	x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
+	add	x29,sp,#0
+
+	add	$out,$out,$index
+	mov	$index,#64/8
+.Loop_scatter_w7:
+	ldr	x3,[$inp],#8
+	subs	$index,$index,#1
+	prfm	pstl1strm,[$out,#4096+64*0]
+	prfm	pstl1strm,[$out,#4096+64*1]
+	prfm	pstl1strm,[$out,#4096+64*2]
+	prfm	pstl1strm,[$out,#4096+64*3]
+	prfm	pstl1strm,[$out,#4096+64*4]
+	prfm	pstl1strm,[$out,#4096+64*5]
+	prfm	pstl1strm,[$out,#4096+64*6]
+	prfm	pstl1strm,[$out,#4096+64*7]
+	strb	w3,[$out,#64*0-1]
+	lsr	x3,x3,#8
+	strb	w3,[$out,#64*1-1]
+	lsr	x3,x3,#8
+	strb	w3,[$out,#64*2-1]
+	lsr	x3,x3,#8
+	strb	w3,[$out,#64*3-1]
+	lsr	x3,x3,#8
+	strb	w3,[$out,#64*4-1]
+	lsr	x3,x3,#8
+	strb	w3,[$out,#64*5-1]
+	lsr	x3,x3,#8
+	strb	w3,[$out,#64*6-1]
+	lsr	x3,x3,#8
+	strb	w3,[$out,#64*7-1]
+	add	$out,$out,#64*8
+	b.ne	.Loop_scatter_w7
+
+	ldr	x29,[sp],#16
+	ret
+.size	ecp_nistz256_scatter_w7,.-ecp_nistz256_scatter_w7
+
+// void	ecp_nistz256_gather_w7(P256_POINT_AFFINE *x0,const void *x1,
+//						     int x2);
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_gather_w7
+.type	ecp_nistz256_gather_w7,%function
+.align	4
+ecp_nistz256_gather_w7:
+	stp	x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
+	add	x29,sp,#0
+
+	cmp	$index,xzr
+	csetm	x3,ne
+	add	$index,$index,x3
+	add	$inp,$inp,$index
+	mov	$index,#64/8
+	nop
+.Loop_gather_w7:
+	ldrb	w4,[$inp,#64*0]
+	prfm	pldl1strm,[$inp,#4096+64*0]
+	subs	$index,$index,#1
+	ldrb	w5,[$inp,#64*1]
+	prfm	pldl1strm,[$inp,#4096+64*1]
+	ldrb	w6,[$inp,#64*2]
+	prfm	pldl1strm,[$inp,#4096+64*2]
+	ldrb	w7,[$inp,#64*3]
+	prfm	pldl1strm,[$inp,#4096+64*3]
+	ldrb	w8,[$inp,#64*4]
+	prfm	pldl1strm,[$inp,#4096+64*4]
+	ldrb	w9,[$inp,#64*5]
+	prfm	pldl1strm,[$inp,#4096+64*5]
+	ldrb	w10,[$inp,#64*6]
+	prfm	pldl1strm,[$inp,#4096+64*6]
+	ldrb	w11,[$inp,#64*7]
+	prfm	pldl1strm,[$inp,#4096+64*7]
+	add	$inp,$inp,#64*8
+	orr	x4,x4,x5,lsl#8
+	orr	x6,x6,x7,lsl#8
+	orr	x8,x8,x9,lsl#8
+	orr	x4,x4,x6,lsl#16
+	orr	x10,x10,x11,lsl#8
+	orr	x4,x4,x8,lsl#32
+	orr	x4,x4,x10,lsl#48
+	and	x4,x4,x3
+	str	x4,[$out],#8
+	b.ne	.Loop_gather_w7
+
+	ldr	x29,[sp],#16
+	ret
+.size	ecp_nistz256_gather_w7,.-ecp_nistz256_gather_w7
+___
+}
+
+foreach (split("\n",$code)) {
+	s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/ge;
+
+	print $_,"\n";
+}
+close STDOUT;	# enforce flush
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-avx2.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-avx2.pl
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..3bdd2cf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-avx2.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,2100 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2014-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+##############################################################################
+#                                                                            #
+# Copyright 2014 Intel Corporation                                           #
+#                                                                            #
+# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");            #
+# you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.           #
+# You may obtain a copy of the License at                                    #
+#                                                                            #
+#    http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0                              #
+#                                                                            #
+# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software        #
+# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,          #
+# WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.   #
+# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and        #
+# limitations under the License.                                             #
+#                                                                            #
+##############################################################################
+#                                                                            #
+#  Developers and authors:                                                   #
+#  Shay Gueron (1, 2), and Vlad Krasnov (1)                                  #
+#  (1) Intel Corporation, Israel Development Center                          #
+#  (2) University of Haifa                                                   #
+#  Reference:                                                                #
+#  S.Gueron and V.Krasnov, "Fast Prime Field Elliptic Curve Cryptography with#
+#                           256 Bit Primes"                                  #
+#                                                                            #
+##############################################################################
+
+$flavour = shift;
+$output  = shift;
+if ($flavour =~ /\./) { $output = $flavour; undef $flavour; }
+
+$win64=0; $win64=1 if ($flavour =~ /[nm]asm|mingw64/ || $output =~ /\.asm$/);
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+( $xlate="${dir}x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
+( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
+die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl";
+
+open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output";
+*STDOUT=*OUT;
+
+if (`$ENV{CC} -Wa,-v -c -o /dev/null -x assembler /dev/null 2>&1`
+		=~ /GNU assembler version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
+	$avx = ($1>=2.19) + ($1>=2.22);
+	$addx = ($1>=2.23);
+}
+
+if (!$addx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /nasm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /nasm/) &&
+	    `nasm -v 2>&1` =~ /NASM version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
+	$avx = ($1>=2.09) + ($1>=2.10);
+	$addx = ($1>=2.10);
+}
+
+if (!$addx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
+	    `ml64 2>&1` =~ /Version ([0-9]+)\./) {
+	$avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=11);
+	$addx = ($1>=12);
+}
+
+if (!$addx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /(^clang version|based on LLVM) ([3-9])\.([0-9]+)/) {
+	my $ver = $2 + $3/100.0;	# 3.1->3.01, 3.10->3.10
+	$avx = ($ver>=3.0) + ($ver>=3.01);
+	$addx = ($ver>=3.03);
+}
+
+if ($avx>=2) {{
+$digit_size = "\$29";
+$n_digits = "\$9";
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.text
+
+.align 64
+.LAVX2_AND_MASK:
+.LAVX2_POLY:
+.quad 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff
+.quad 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff
+.quad 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff
+.quad 0x000001ff, 0x000001ff, 0x000001ff, 0x000001ff
+.quad 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000
+.quad 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000
+.quad 0x00040000, 0x00040000, 0x00040000, 0x00040000
+.quad 0x1fe00000, 0x1fe00000, 0x1fe00000, 0x1fe00000
+.quad 0x00ffffff, 0x00ffffff, 0x00ffffff, 0x00ffffff
+
+.LAVX2_POLY_x2:
+.quad 0x7FFFFFFC, 0x7FFFFFFC, 0x7FFFFFFC, 0x7FFFFFFC
+.quad 0x7FFFFFFC, 0x7FFFFFFC, 0x7FFFFFFC, 0x7FFFFFFC
+.quad 0x7FFFFFFC, 0x7FFFFFFC, 0x7FFFFFFC, 0x7FFFFFFC
+.quad 0x400007FC, 0x400007FC, 0x400007FC, 0x400007FC
+.quad 0x3FFFFFFE, 0x3FFFFFFE, 0x3FFFFFFE, 0x3FFFFFFE
+.quad 0x3FFFFFFE, 0x3FFFFFFE, 0x3FFFFFFE, 0x3FFFFFFE
+.quad 0x400FFFFE, 0x400FFFFE, 0x400FFFFE, 0x400FFFFE
+.quad 0x7F7FFFFE, 0x7F7FFFFE, 0x7F7FFFFE, 0x7F7FFFFE
+.quad 0x03FFFFFC, 0x03FFFFFC, 0x03FFFFFC, 0x03FFFFFC
+
+.LAVX2_POLY_x8:
+.quad 0xFFFFFFF8, 0xFFFFFFF8, 0xFFFFFFF8, 0xFFFFFFF8
+.quad 0xFFFFFFF8, 0xFFFFFFF8, 0xFFFFFFF8, 0xFFFFFFF8
+.quad 0xFFFFFFF8, 0xFFFFFFF8, 0xFFFFFFF8, 0xFFFFFFF8
+.quad 0x80000FF8, 0x80000FF8, 0x80000FF8, 0x80000FF8
+.quad 0x7FFFFFFC, 0x7FFFFFFC, 0x7FFFFFFC, 0x7FFFFFFC
+.quad 0x7FFFFFFC, 0x7FFFFFFC, 0x7FFFFFFC, 0x7FFFFFFC
+.quad 0x801FFFFC, 0x801FFFFC, 0x801FFFFC, 0x801FFFFC
+.quad 0xFEFFFFFC, 0xFEFFFFFC, 0xFEFFFFFC, 0xFEFFFFFC
+.quad 0x07FFFFF8, 0x07FFFFF8, 0x07FFFFF8, 0x07FFFFF8
+
+.LONE:
+.quad 0x00000020, 0x00000020, 0x00000020, 0x00000020
+.quad 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000
+.quad 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000
+.quad 0x1fffc000, 0x1fffc000, 0x1fffc000, 0x1fffc000
+.quad 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff
+.quad 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff
+.quad 0x1f7fffff, 0x1f7fffff, 0x1f7fffff, 0x1f7fffff
+.quad 0x03ffffff, 0x03ffffff, 0x03ffffff, 0x03ffffff
+.quad 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000
+
+# RR = 2^266 mod p in AVX2 format, to transform from the native OpenSSL
+# Montgomery form (*2^256) to our format (*2^261)
+
+.LTO_MONT_AVX2:
+.quad 0x00000400, 0x00000400, 0x00000400, 0x00000400
+.quad 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000
+.quad 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000
+.quad 0x1ff80000, 0x1ff80000, 0x1ff80000, 0x1ff80000
+.quad 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff
+.quad 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff
+.quad 0x0fffffff, 0x0fffffff, 0x0fffffff, 0x0fffffff
+.quad 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff
+.quad 0x00000003, 0x00000003, 0x00000003, 0x00000003
+
+.LFROM_MONT_AVX2:
+.quad 0x00000001, 0x00000001, 0x00000001, 0x00000001
+.quad 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000
+.quad 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000
+.quad 0x1ffffe00, 0x1ffffe00, 0x1ffffe00, 0x1ffffe00
+.quad 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff
+.quad 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff
+.quad 0x1ffbffff, 0x1ffbffff, 0x1ffbffff, 0x1ffbffff
+.quad 0x001fffff, 0x001fffff, 0x001fffff, 0x001fffff
+.quad 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000
+
+.LIntOne:
+.long 1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1
+___
+
+{
+# This function receives a pointer to an array of four affine points
+# (X, Y, <1>) and rearanges the data for AVX2 execution, while
+# converting it to 2^29 radix redundant form
+
+my ($X0,$X1,$X2,$X3, $Y0,$Y1,$Y2,$Y3,
+    $T0,$T1,$T2,$T3, $T4,$T5,$T6,$T7)=map("%ymm$_",(0..15));
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_avx2_transpose_convert
+.type	ecp_nistz256_avx2_transpose_convert,\@function,2
+.align 64
+ecp_nistz256_avx2_transpose_convert:
+	vzeroupper
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($win64);
+	lea	-8-16*10(%rsp), %rsp
+	vmovaps	%xmm6, -8-16*10(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm7, -8-16*9(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm8, -8-16*8(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm9, -8-16*7(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm10, -8-16*6(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm11, -8-16*5(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm12, -8-16*4(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm13, -8-16*3(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm14, -8-16*2(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm15, -8-16*1(%rax)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	# Load the data
+	vmovdqa		32*0(%rsi), $X0
+	lea		112(%rsi), %rax		# size optimization
+	vmovdqa		32*1(%rsi), $Y0
+	lea		.LAVX2_AND_MASK(%rip), %rdx
+	vmovdqa		32*2(%rsi), $X1
+	vmovdqa		32*3(%rsi), $Y1
+	vmovdqa		32*4-112(%rax), $X2
+	vmovdqa		32*5-112(%rax), $Y2
+	vmovdqa		32*6-112(%rax), $X3
+	vmovdqa		32*7-112(%rax), $Y3
+
+	# Transpose X and Y independently
+	vpunpcklqdq	$X1, $X0, $T0		# T0 = [B2 A2 B0 A0]
+	vpunpcklqdq	$X3, $X2, $T1		# T1 = [D2 C2 D0 C0]
+	vpunpckhqdq	$X1, $X0, $T2		# T2 = [B3 A3 B1 A1]
+	vpunpckhqdq	$X3, $X2, $T3		# T3 = [D3 C3 D1 C1]
+
+	vpunpcklqdq	$Y1, $Y0, $T4
+	vpunpcklqdq	$Y3, $Y2, $T5
+	vpunpckhqdq	$Y1, $Y0, $T6
+	vpunpckhqdq	$Y3, $Y2, $T7
+
+	vperm2i128	\$0x20, $T1, $T0, $X0	# X0 = [D0 C0 B0 A0]
+	vperm2i128	\$0x20, $T3, $T2, $X1	# X1 = [D1 C1 B1 A1]
+	vperm2i128	\$0x31, $T1, $T0, $X2	# X2 = [D2 C2 B2 A2]
+	vperm2i128	\$0x31, $T3, $T2, $X3	# X3 = [D3 C3 B3 A3]
+
+	vperm2i128	\$0x20, $T5, $T4, $Y0
+	vperm2i128	\$0x20, $T7, $T6, $Y1
+	vperm2i128	\$0x31, $T5, $T4, $Y2
+	vperm2i128	\$0x31, $T7, $T6, $Y3
+	vmovdqa		(%rdx), $T7
+
+	vpand		(%rdx), $X0, $T0	# out[0] = in[0] & mask;
+	vpsrlq		\$29, $X0, $X0
+	vpand		$T7, $X0, $T1		# out[1] = (in[0] >> shift) & mask;
+	vpsrlq		\$29, $X0, $X0
+	vpsllq		\$6, $X1, $T2
+	vpxor		$X0, $T2, $T2
+	vpand		$T7, $T2, $T2		# out[2] = ((in[0] >> (shift*2)) ^ (in[1] << (64-shift*2))) & mask;
+	vpsrlq		\$23, $X1, $X1
+	vpand		$T7, $X1, $T3		# out[3] = (in[1] >> ((shift*3)%64)) & mask;
+	vpsrlq		\$29, $X1, $X1
+	vpsllq		\$12, $X2, $T4
+	vpxor		$X1, $T4, $T4
+	vpand		$T7, $T4, $T4		# out[4] = ((in[1] >> ((shift*4)%64)) ^ (in[2] << (64*2-shift*4))) & mask;
+	vpsrlq		\$17, $X2, $X2
+	vpand		$T7, $X2, $T5		# out[5] = (in[2] >> ((shift*5)%64)) & mask;
+	vpsrlq		\$29, $X2, $X2
+	vpsllq		\$18, $X3, $T6
+	vpxor		$X2, $T6, $T6
+	vpand		$T7, $T6, $T6		# out[6] = ((in[2] >> ((shift*6)%64)) ^ (in[3] << (64*3-shift*6))) & mask;
+	vpsrlq		\$11, $X3, $X3
+	 vmovdqa	$T0, 32*0(%rdi)
+	 lea		112(%rdi), %rax		# size optimization
+	vpand		$T7, $X3, $T0		# out[7] = (in[3] >> ((shift*7)%64)) & mask;
+	vpsrlq		\$29, $X3, $X3		# out[8] = (in[3] >> ((shift*8)%64)) & mask;
+
+	vmovdqa		$T1, 32*1(%rdi)
+	vmovdqa		$T2, 32*2(%rdi)
+	vmovdqa		$T3, 32*3(%rdi)
+	vmovdqa		$T4, 32*4-112(%rax)
+	vmovdqa		$T5, 32*5-112(%rax)
+	vmovdqa		$T6, 32*6-112(%rax)
+	vmovdqa		$T0, 32*7-112(%rax)
+	vmovdqa		$X3, 32*8-112(%rax)
+	lea		448(%rdi), %rax		# size optimization
+
+	vpand		$T7, $Y0, $T0		# out[0] = in[0] & mask;
+	vpsrlq		\$29, $Y0, $Y0
+	vpand		$T7, $Y0, $T1		# out[1] = (in[0] >> shift) & mask;
+	vpsrlq		\$29, $Y0, $Y0
+	vpsllq		\$6, $Y1, $T2
+	vpxor		$Y0, $T2, $T2
+	vpand		$T7, $T2, $T2		# out[2] = ((in[0] >> (shift*2)) ^ (in[1] << (64-shift*2))) & mask;
+	vpsrlq		\$23, $Y1, $Y1
+	vpand		$T7, $Y1, $T3		# out[3] = (in[1] >> ((shift*3)%64)) & mask;
+	vpsrlq		\$29, $Y1, $Y1
+	vpsllq		\$12, $Y2, $T4
+	vpxor		$Y1, $T4, $T4
+	vpand		$T7, $T4, $T4		# out[4] = ((in[1] >> ((shift*4)%64)) ^ (in[2] << (64*2-shift*4))) & mask;
+	vpsrlq		\$17, $Y2, $Y2
+	vpand		$T7, $Y2, $T5		# out[5] = (in[2] >> ((shift*5)%64)) & mask;
+	vpsrlq		\$29, $Y2, $Y2
+	vpsllq		\$18, $Y3, $T6
+	vpxor		$Y2, $T6, $T6
+	vpand		$T7, $T6, $T6		# out[6] = ((in[2] >> ((shift*6)%64)) ^ (in[3] << (64*3-shift*6))) & mask;
+	vpsrlq		\$11, $Y3, $Y3
+	 vmovdqa	$T0, 32*9-448(%rax)
+	vpand		$T7, $Y3, $T0		# out[7] = (in[3] >> ((shift*7)%64)) & mask;
+	vpsrlq		\$29, $Y3, $Y3		# out[8] = (in[3] >> ((shift*8)%64)) & mask;
+
+	vmovdqa		$T1, 32*10-448(%rax)
+	vmovdqa		$T2, 32*11-448(%rax)
+	vmovdqa		$T3, 32*12-448(%rax)
+	vmovdqa		$T4, 32*13-448(%rax)
+	vmovdqa		$T5, 32*14-448(%rax)
+	vmovdqa		$T6, 32*15-448(%rax)
+	vmovdqa		$T0, 32*16-448(%rax)
+	vmovdqa		$Y3, 32*17-448(%rax)
+
+	vzeroupper
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($win64);
+	movaps	16*0(%rsp), %xmm6
+	movaps	16*1(%rsp), %xmm7
+	movaps	16*2(%rsp), %xmm8
+	movaps	16*3(%rsp), %xmm9
+	movaps	16*4(%rsp), %xmm10
+	movaps	16*5(%rsp), %xmm11
+	movaps	16*6(%rsp), %xmm12
+	movaps	16*7(%rsp), %xmm13
+	movaps	16*8(%rsp), %xmm14
+	movaps	16*9(%rsp), %xmm15
+	lea	8+16*10(%rsp), %rsp
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	ret
+.size	ecp_nistz256_avx2_transpose_convert,.-ecp_nistz256_avx2_transpose_convert
+___
+}
+{
+################################################################################
+# This function receives a pointer to an array of four AVX2 formatted points
+# (X, Y, Z) convert the data to normal representation, and rearanges the data
+
+my ($D0,$D1,$D2,$D3, $D4,$D5,$D6,$D7, $D8)=map("%ymm$_",(0..8));
+my ($T0,$T1,$T2,$T3, $T4,$T5,$T6)=map("%ymm$_",(9..15));
+
+$code.=<<___;
+
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_avx2_convert_transpose_back
+.type	ecp_nistz256_avx2_convert_transpose_back,\@function,2
+.align	32
+ecp_nistz256_avx2_convert_transpose_back:
+	vzeroupper
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($win64);
+	lea	-8-16*10(%rsp), %rsp
+	vmovaps	%xmm6, -8-16*10(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm7, -8-16*9(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm8, -8-16*8(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm9, -8-16*7(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm10, -8-16*6(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm11, -8-16*5(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm12, -8-16*4(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm13, -8-16*3(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm14, -8-16*2(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm15, -8-16*1(%rax)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	\$3, %ecx
+
+.Lconv_loop:
+	vmovdqa		32*0(%rsi), $D0
+	lea		160(%rsi), %rax		# size optimization
+	vmovdqa		32*1(%rsi), $D1
+	vmovdqa		32*2(%rsi), $D2
+	vmovdqa		32*3(%rsi), $D3
+	vmovdqa		32*4-160(%rax), $D4
+	vmovdqa		32*5-160(%rax), $D5
+	vmovdqa		32*6-160(%rax), $D6
+	vmovdqa		32*7-160(%rax), $D7
+	vmovdqa		32*8-160(%rax), $D8
+
+	vpsllq		\$29, $D1, $D1
+	vpsllq		\$58, $D2, $T0
+	vpaddq		$D1, $D0, $D0
+	vpaddq		$T0, $D0, $D0		# out[0] = (in[0]) ^ (in[1] << shift*1) ^ (in[2] << shift*2);
+
+	vpsrlq		\$6, $D2, $D2
+	vpsllq		\$23, $D3, $D3
+	vpsllq		\$52, $D4, $T1
+	vpaddq		$D2, $D3, $D3
+	vpaddq		$D3, $T1, $D1		# out[1] = (in[2] >> (64*1-shift*2)) ^ (in[3] << shift*3%64) ^ (in[4] << shift*4%64);
+
+	vpsrlq		\$12, $D4, $D4
+	vpsllq		\$17, $D5, $D5
+	vpsllq		\$46, $D6, $T2
+	vpaddq		$D4, $D5, $D5
+	vpaddq		$D5, $T2, $D2		# out[2] = (in[4] >> (64*2-shift*4)) ^ (in[5] << shift*5%64) ^ (in[6] << shift*6%64);
+
+	vpsrlq		\$18, $D6, $D6
+	vpsllq		\$11, $D7, $D7
+	vpsllq		\$40, $D8, $T3
+	vpaddq		$D6, $D7, $D7
+	vpaddq		$D7, $T3, $D3		# out[3] = (in[6] >> (64*3-shift*6)) ^ (in[7] << shift*7%64) ^ (in[8] << shift*8%64);
+
+	vpunpcklqdq	$D1, $D0, $T0		# T0 = [B2 A2 B0 A0]
+	vpunpcklqdq	$D3, $D2, $T1		# T1 = [D2 C2 D0 C0]
+	vpunpckhqdq	$D1, $D0, $T2		# T2 = [B3 A3 B1 A1]
+	vpunpckhqdq	$D3, $D2, $T3		# T3 = [D3 C3 D1 C1]
+
+	vperm2i128	\$0x20, $T1, $T0, $D0	# X0 = [D0 C0 B0 A0]
+	vperm2i128	\$0x20, $T3, $T2, $D1	# X1 = [D1 C1 B1 A1]
+	vperm2i128	\$0x31, $T1, $T0, $D2	# X2 = [D2 C2 B2 A2]
+	vperm2i128	\$0x31, $T3, $T2, $D3	# X3 = [D3 C3 B3 A3]
+
+	vmovdqa		$D0, 32*0(%rdi)
+	vmovdqa		$D1, 32*3(%rdi)
+	vmovdqa		$D2, 32*6(%rdi)
+	vmovdqa		$D3, 32*9(%rdi)
+
+	lea		32*9(%rsi), %rsi
+	lea		32*1(%rdi), %rdi
+
+	dec	%ecx
+	jnz	.Lconv_loop
+
+	vzeroupper
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($win64);
+	movaps	16*0(%rsp), %xmm6
+	movaps	16*1(%rsp), %xmm7
+	movaps	16*2(%rsp), %xmm8
+	movaps	16*3(%rsp), %xmm9
+	movaps	16*4(%rsp), %xmm10
+	movaps	16*5(%rsp), %xmm11
+	movaps	16*6(%rsp), %xmm12
+	movaps	16*7(%rsp), %xmm13
+	movaps	16*8(%rsp), %xmm14
+	movaps	16*9(%rsp), %xmm15
+	lea	8+16*10(%rsp), %rsp
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	ret
+.size	ecp_nistz256_avx2_convert_transpose_back,.-ecp_nistz256_avx2_convert_transpose_back
+___
+}
+{
+my ($r_ptr,$a_ptr,$b_ptr,$itr)=("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx","%ecx");
+my ($ACC0,$ACC1,$ACC2,$ACC3,$ACC4,$ACC5,$ACC6,$ACC7,$ACC8)=map("%ymm$_",(0..8));
+my ($B,$Y,$T0,$AND_MASK,$OVERFLOW)=map("%ymm$_",(9..13));
+
+sub NORMALIZE {
+my $ret=<<___;
+	vpsrlq		$digit_size, $ACC0, $T0
+	vpand		$AND_MASK, $ACC0, $ACC0
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC1, $ACC1
+
+	vpsrlq		$digit_size, $ACC1, $T0
+	vpand		$AND_MASK, $ACC1, $ACC1
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC2, $ACC2
+
+	vpsrlq		$digit_size, $ACC2, $T0
+	vpand		$AND_MASK, $ACC2, $ACC2
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC3, $ACC3
+
+	vpsrlq		$digit_size, $ACC3, $T0
+	vpand		$AND_MASK, $ACC3, $ACC3
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC4, $ACC4
+
+	vpsrlq		$digit_size, $ACC4, $T0
+	vpand		$AND_MASK, $ACC4, $ACC4
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC5, $ACC5
+
+	vpsrlq		$digit_size, $ACC5, $T0
+	vpand		$AND_MASK, $ACC5, $ACC5
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC6, $ACC6
+
+	vpsrlq		$digit_size, $ACC6, $T0
+	vpand		$AND_MASK, $ACC6, $ACC6
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC7, $ACC7
+
+	vpsrlq		$digit_size, $ACC7, $T0
+	vpand		$AND_MASK, $ACC7, $ACC7
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC8, $ACC8
+	#vpand		$AND_MASK, $ACC8, $ACC8
+___
+    $ret;
+}
+
+sub STORE {
+my $ret=<<___;
+	vmovdqa		$ACC0, 32*0(%rdi)
+	lea		160(%rdi), %rax		# size optimization
+	vmovdqa		$ACC1, 32*1(%rdi)
+	vmovdqa		$ACC2, 32*2(%rdi)
+	vmovdqa		$ACC3, 32*3(%rdi)
+	vmovdqa		$ACC4, 32*4-160(%rax)
+	vmovdqa		$ACC5, 32*5-160(%rax)
+	vmovdqa		$ACC6, 32*6-160(%rax)
+	vmovdqa		$ACC7, 32*7-160(%rax)
+	vmovdqa		$ACC8, 32*8-160(%rax)
+___
+    $ret;
+}
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.type	avx2_normalize,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	32
+avx2_normalize:
+	vpsrlq		$digit_size, $ACC0, $T0
+	vpand		$AND_MASK, $ACC0, $ACC0
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC1, $ACC1
+
+	vpsrlq		$digit_size, $ACC1, $T0
+	vpand		$AND_MASK, $ACC1, $ACC1
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC2, $ACC2
+
+	vpsrlq		$digit_size, $ACC2, $T0
+	vpand		$AND_MASK, $ACC2, $ACC2
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC3, $ACC3
+
+	vpsrlq		$digit_size, $ACC3, $T0
+	vpand		$AND_MASK, $ACC3, $ACC3
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC4, $ACC4
+
+	vpsrlq		$digit_size, $ACC4, $T0
+	vpand		$AND_MASK, $ACC4, $ACC4
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC5, $ACC5
+
+	vpsrlq		$digit_size, $ACC5, $T0
+	vpand		$AND_MASK, $ACC5, $ACC5
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC6, $ACC6
+
+	vpsrlq		$digit_size, $ACC6, $T0
+	vpand		$AND_MASK, $ACC6, $ACC6
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC7, $ACC7
+
+	vpsrlq		$digit_size, $ACC7, $T0
+	vpand		$AND_MASK, $ACC7, $ACC7
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC8, $ACC8
+	#vpand		$AND_MASK, $ACC8, $ACC8
+
+	ret
+.size	avx2_normalize,.-avx2_normalize
+
+.type	avx2_normalize_n_store,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	32
+avx2_normalize_n_store:
+	vpsrlq		$digit_size, $ACC0, $T0
+	vpand		$AND_MASK, $ACC0, $ACC0
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC1, $ACC1
+
+	vpsrlq		$digit_size, $ACC1, $T0
+	vpand		$AND_MASK, $ACC1, $ACC1
+	 vmovdqa	$ACC0, 32*0(%rdi)
+	 lea		160(%rdi), %rax		# size optimization
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC2, $ACC2
+
+	vpsrlq		$digit_size, $ACC2, $T0
+	vpand		$AND_MASK, $ACC2, $ACC2
+	 vmovdqa	$ACC1, 32*1(%rdi)
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC3, $ACC3
+
+	vpsrlq		$digit_size, $ACC3, $T0
+	vpand		$AND_MASK, $ACC3, $ACC3
+	 vmovdqa	$ACC2, 32*2(%rdi)
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC4, $ACC4
+
+	vpsrlq		$digit_size, $ACC4, $T0
+	vpand		$AND_MASK, $ACC4, $ACC4
+	 vmovdqa	$ACC3, 32*3(%rdi)
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC5, $ACC5
+
+	vpsrlq		$digit_size, $ACC5, $T0
+	vpand		$AND_MASK, $ACC5, $ACC5
+	 vmovdqa	$ACC4, 32*4-160(%rax)
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC6, $ACC6
+
+	vpsrlq		$digit_size, $ACC6, $T0
+	vpand		$AND_MASK, $ACC6, $ACC6
+	 vmovdqa	$ACC5, 32*5-160(%rax)
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC7, $ACC7
+
+	vpsrlq		$digit_size, $ACC7, $T0
+	vpand		$AND_MASK, $ACC7, $ACC7
+	 vmovdqa	$ACC6, 32*6-160(%rax)
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC8, $ACC8
+	#vpand		$AND_MASK, $ACC8, $ACC8
+	 vmovdqa	$ACC7, 32*7-160(%rax)
+	 vmovdqa	$ACC8, 32*8-160(%rax)
+
+	ret
+.size	avx2_normalize_n_store,.-avx2_normalize_n_store
+
+################################################################################
+# void avx2_mul_x4(void* RESULTx4, void *Ax4, void *Bx4);
+.type	avx2_mul_x4,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	32
+avx2_mul_x4:
+	lea	.LAVX2_POLY(%rip), %rax
+
+	vpxor	$ACC0, $ACC0, $ACC0
+	vpxor	$ACC1, $ACC1, $ACC1
+	vpxor	$ACC2, $ACC2, $ACC2
+	vpxor	$ACC3, $ACC3, $ACC3
+	vpxor	$ACC4, $ACC4, $ACC4
+	vpxor	$ACC5, $ACC5, $ACC5
+	vpxor	$ACC6, $ACC6, $ACC6
+	vpxor	$ACC7, $ACC7, $ACC7
+
+	vmovdqa	32*7(%rax), %ymm14
+	vmovdqa	32*8(%rax), %ymm15
+
+	mov	$n_digits, $itr
+	lea	-512($a_ptr), $a_ptr	# strategic bias to control u-op density
+	jmp	.Lavx2_mul_x4_loop
+
+.align	32
+.Lavx2_mul_x4_loop:
+	vmovdqa		32*0($b_ptr), $B
+	lea		32*1($b_ptr), $b_ptr
+
+	vpmuludq	32*0+512($a_ptr), $B, $T0
+	vpmuludq	32*1+512($a_ptr), $B, $OVERFLOW	# borrow $OVERFLOW
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC0, $ACC0
+	vpmuludq	32*2+512($a_ptr), $B, $T0
+	vpaddq		$OVERFLOW, $ACC1, $ACC1
+	 vpand		$AND_MASK, $ACC0, $Y
+	vpmuludq	32*3+512($a_ptr), $B, $OVERFLOW
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC2, $ACC2
+	vpmuludq	32*4+512($a_ptr), $B, $T0
+	vpaddq		$OVERFLOW, $ACC3, $ACC3
+	vpmuludq	32*5+512($a_ptr), $B, $OVERFLOW
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC4, $ACC4
+	vpmuludq	32*6+512($a_ptr), $B, $T0
+	vpaddq		$OVERFLOW, $ACC5, $ACC5
+	vpmuludq	32*7+512($a_ptr), $B, $OVERFLOW
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC6, $ACC6
+
+	# Skip some multiplications, optimizing for the constant poly
+	vpmuludq	$AND_MASK, $Y, $T0
+	 vpaddq		$OVERFLOW, $ACC7, $ACC7
+	 vpmuludq	32*8+512($a_ptr), $B, $ACC8
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC0, $OVERFLOW
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC1, $ACC0
+	vpsrlq		$digit_size, $OVERFLOW, $OVERFLOW
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC2, $ACC1
+	vpmuludq	32*3(%rax), $Y, $T0
+	vpaddq		$OVERFLOW, $ACC0, $ACC0
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC3, $ACC2
+	.byte		0x67
+	vmovdqa		$ACC4, $ACC3
+	vpsllq		\$18, $Y, $OVERFLOW
+	.byte		0x67
+	vmovdqa		$ACC5, $ACC4
+	vpmuludq	%ymm14, $Y, $T0
+	vpaddq		$OVERFLOW, $ACC6, $ACC5
+	vpmuludq	%ymm15, $Y, $OVERFLOW
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC7, $ACC6
+	vpaddq		$OVERFLOW, $ACC8, $ACC7
+
+	dec	$itr
+	jnz	.Lavx2_mul_x4_loop
+
+	vpxor	$ACC8, $ACC8, $ACC8
+
+	ret
+.size	avx2_mul_x4,.-avx2_mul_x4
+
+# Function optimized for the constant 1
+################################################################################
+# void avx2_mul_by1_x4(void* RESULTx4, void *Ax4);
+.type	avx2_mul_by1_x4,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	32
+avx2_mul_by1_x4:
+	lea	.LAVX2_POLY(%rip), %rax
+
+	vpxor	$ACC0, $ACC0, $ACC0
+	vpxor	$ACC1, $ACC1, $ACC1
+	vpxor	$ACC2, $ACC2, $ACC2
+	vpxor	$ACC3, $ACC3, $ACC3
+	vpxor	$ACC4, $ACC4, $ACC4
+	vpxor	$ACC5, $ACC5, $ACC5
+	vpxor	$ACC6, $ACC6, $ACC6
+	vpxor	$ACC7, $ACC7, $ACC7
+	vpxor	$ACC8, $ACC8, $ACC8
+
+	vmovdqa	32*3+.LONE(%rip), %ymm14
+	vmovdqa	32*7+.LONE(%rip), %ymm15
+
+	mov	$n_digits, $itr
+	jmp	.Lavx2_mul_by1_x4_loop
+
+.align	32
+.Lavx2_mul_by1_x4_loop:
+	vmovdqa		32*0($a_ptr), $B
+	.byte		0x48,0x8d,0xb6,0x20,0,0,0	# lea	32*1($a_ptr), $a_ptr
+
+	vpsllq		\$5, $B, $OVERFLOW
+	vpmuludq	%ymm14, $B, $T0
+	vpaddq		$OVERFLOW, $ACC0, $ACC0
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC3, $ACC3
+	.byte		0x67
+	vpmuludq	$AND_MASK, $B, $T0
+	vpand		$AND_MASK, $ACC0, $Y
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC4, $ACC4
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC5, $ACC5
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC6, $ACC6
+	vpsllq		\$23, $B, $T0
+
+	.byte		0x67,0x67
+	vpmuludq	%ymm15, $B, $OVERFLOW
+	vpsubq		$T0, $ACC6, $ACC6
+
+	vpmuludq	$AND_MASK, $Y, $T0
+	vpaddq		$OVERFLOW, $ACC7, $ACC7
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC0, $OVERFLOW
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC1, $ACC0
+	.byte		0x67,0x67
+	vpsrlq		$digit_size, $OVERFLOW, $OVERFLOW
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC2, $ACC1
+	vpmuludq	32*3(%rax), $Y, $T0
+	vpaddq		$OVERFLOW, $ACC0, $ACC0
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC3, $ACC2
+	vmovdqa		$ACC4, $ACC3
+	vpsllq		\$18, $Y, $OVERFLOW
+	vmovdqa		$ACC5, $ACC4
+	vpmuludq	32*7(%rax), $Y, $T0
+	vpaddq		$OVERFLOW, $ACC6, $ACC5
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC7, $ACC6
+	vpmuludq	32*8(%rax), $Y, $ACC7
+
+	dec	$itr
+	jnz	.Lavx2_mul_by1_x4_loop
+
+	ret
+.size	avx2_mul_by1_x4,.-avx2_mul_by1_x4
+
+################################################################################
+# void avx2_sqr_x4(void* RESULTx4, void *Ax4, void *Bx4);
+.type	avx2_sqr_x4,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	32
+avx2_sqr_x4:
+	lea		.LAVX2_POLY(%rip), %rax
+
+	vmovdqa		32*7(%rax), %ymm14
+	vmovdqa		32*8(%rax), %ymm15
+
+	vmovdqa		32*0($a_ptr), $B
+	vmovdqa		32*1($a_ptr), $ACC1
+	vmovdqa		32*2($a_ptr), $ACC2
+	vmovdqa		32*3($a_ptr), $ACC3
+	vmovdqa		32*4($a_ptr), $ACC4
+	vmovdqa		32*5($a_ptr), $ACC5
+	vmovdqa		32*6($a_ptr), $ACC6
+	vmovdqa		32*7($a_ptr), $ACC7
+	vpaddq		$ACC1, $ACC1, $ACC1	# 2*$ACC0..7
+	vmovdqa		32*8($a_ptr), $ACC8
+	vpaddq		$ACC2, $ACC2, $ACC2
+	vmovdqa		$ACC1, 32*0(%rcx)
+	vpaddq		$ACC3, $ACC3, $ACC3
+	vmovdqa		$ACC2, 32*1(%rcx)
+	vpaddq		$ACC4, $ACC4, $ACC4
+	vmovdqa		$ACC3, 32*2(%rcx)
+	vpaddq		$ACC5, $ACC5, $ACC5
+	vmovdqa		$ACC4, 32*3(%rcx)
+	vpaddq		$ACC6, $ACC6, $ACC6
+	vmovdqa		$ACC5, 32*4(%rcx)
+	vpaddq		$ACC7, $ACC7, $ACC7
+	vmovdqa		$ACC6, 32*5(%rcx)
+	vpaddq		$ACC8, $ACC8, $ACC8
+	vmovdqa		$ACC7, 32*6(%rcx)
+	vmovdqa		$ACC8, 32*7(%rcx)
+
+	#itr		1
+	vpmuludq	$B, $B, $ACC0
+	vpmuludq	$B, $ACC1, $ACC1
+	 vpand		$AND_MASK, $ACC0, $Y
+	vpmuludq	$B, $ACC2, $ACC2
+	vpmuludq	$B, $ACC3, $ACC3
+	vpmuludq	$B, $ACC4, $ACC4
+	vpmuludq	$B, $ACC5, $ACC5
+	vpmuludq	$B, $ACC6, $ACC6
+	 vpmuludq	$AND_MASK, $Y, $T0
+	vpmuludq	$B, $ACC7, $ACC7
+	vpmuludq	$B, $ACC8, $ACC8
+	 vmovdqa	32*1($a_ptr), $B
+
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC0, $OVERFLOW
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC1, $ACC0
+	vpsrlq		$digit_size, $OVERFLOW, $OVERFLOW
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC2, $ACC1
+	vpmuludq	32*3(%rax), $Y, $T0
+	vpaddq		$OVERFLOW, $ACC0, $ACC0
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC3, $ACC2
+	vmovdqa		$ACC4, $ACC3
+	vpsllq		\$18, $Y, $T0
+	vmovdqa		$ACC5, $ACC4
+	vpmuludq	%ymm14, $Y, $OVERFLOW
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC6, $ACC5
+	vpmuludq	%ymm15, $Y, $T0
+	vpaddq		$OVERFLOW, $ACC7, $ACC6
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC8, $ACC7
+
+	#itr		2
+	vpmuludq	$B, $B, $OVERFLOW
+	 vpand		$AND_MASK, $ACC0, $Y
+	vpmuludq	32*1(%rcx), $B, $T0
+	vpaddq		$OVERFLOW, $ACC1, $ACC1
+	vpmuludq	32*2(%rcx), $B, $OVERFLOW
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC2, $ACC2
+	vpmuludq	32*3(%rcx), $B, $T0
+	vpaddq		$OVERFLOW, $ACC3, $ACC3
+	vpmuludq	32*4(%rcx), $B, $OVERFLOW
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC4, $ACC4
+	vpmuludq	32*5(%rcx), $B, $T0
+	vpaddq		$OVERFLOW, $ACC5, $ACC5
+	vpmuludq	32*6(%rcx), $B, $OVERFLOW
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC6, $ACC6
+
+	vpmuludq	$AND_MASK, $Y, $T0
+	 vpaddq		$OVERFLOW, $ACC7, $ACC7
+	 vpmuludq	32*7(%rcx), $B, $ACC8
+	 vmovdqa	32*2($a_ptr), $B
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC0, $OVERFLOW
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC1, $ACC0
+	vpsrlq		$digit_size, $OVERFLOW, $OVERFLOW
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC2, $ACC1
+	vpmuludq	32*3(%rax), $Y, $T0
+	vpaddq		$OVERFLOW, $ACC0, $ACC0
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC3, $ACC2
+	vmovdqa		$ACC4, $ACC3
+	vpsllq		\$18, $Y, $T0
+	vmovdqa		$ACC5, $ACC4
+	vpmuludq	%ymm14, $Y, $OVERFLOW
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC6, $ACC5
+	vpmuludq	%ymm15, $Y, $T0
+	vpaddq		$OVERFLOW, $ACC7, $ACC6
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC8, $ACC7
+
+	#itr		3
+	vpmuludq	$B, $B, $T0
+	 vpand		$AND_MASK, $ACC0, $Y
+	vpmuludq	32*2(%rcx), $B, $OVERFLOW
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC2, $ACC2
+	vpmuludq	32*3(%rcx), $B, $T0
+	vpaddq		$OVERFLOW, $ACC3, $ACC3
+	vpmuludq	32*4(%rcx), $B, $OVERFLOW
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC4, $ACC4
+	vpmuludq	32*5(%rcx), $B, $T0
+	vpaddq		$OVERFLOW, $ACC5, $ACC5
+	vpmuludq	32*6(%rcx), $B, $OVERFLOW
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC6, $ACC6
+
+	vpmuludq	$AND_MASK, $Y, $T0
+	 vpaddq		$OVERFLOW, $ACC7, $ACC7
+	 vpmuludq	32*7(%rcx), $B, $ACC8
+	 vmovdqa	32*3($a_ptr), $B
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC0, $OVERFLOW
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC1, $ACC0
+	vpsrlq		$digit_size, $OVERFLOW, $OVERFLOW
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC2, $ACC1
+	vpmuludq	32*3(%rax), $Y, $T0
+	vpaddq		$OVERFLOW, $ACC0, $ACC0
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC3, $ACC2
+	vmovdqa		$ACC4, $ACC3
+	vpsllq		\$18, $Y, $T0
+	vmovdqa		$ACC5, $ACC4
+	vpmuludq	%ymm14, $Y, $OVERFLOW
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC6, $ACC5
+	vpmuludq	%ymm15, $Y, $T0
+	 vpand		$AND_MASK, $ACC0, $Y
+	vpaddq		$OVERFLOW, $ACC7, $ACC6
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC8, $ACC7
+
+	#itr		4
+	vpmuludq	$B, $B, $OVERFLOW
+	vpmuludq	32*3(%rcx), $B, $T0
+	vpaddq		$OVERFLOW, $ACC3, $ACC3
+	vpmuludq	32*4(%rcx), $B, $OVERFLOW
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC4, $ACC4
+	vpmuludq	32*5(%rcx), $B, $T0
+	vpaddq		$OVERFLOW, $ACC5, $ACC5
+	vpmuludq	32*6(%rcx), $B, $OVERFLOW
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC6, $ACC6
+
+	vpmuludq	$AND_MASK, $Y, $T0
+	 vpaddq		$OVERFLOW, $ACC7, $ACC7
+	 vpmuludq	32*7(%rcx), $B, $ACC8
+	 vmovdqa	32*4($a_ptr), $B
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC0, $OVERFLOW
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC1, $ACC0
+	vpsrlq		$digit_size, $OVERFLOW, $OVERFLOW
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC2, $ACC1
+	vpmuludq	32*3(%rax), $Y, $T0
+	vpaddq		$OVERFLOW, $ACC0, $ACC0
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC3, $ACC2
+	vmovdqa		$ACC4, $ACC3
+	vpsllq		\$18, $Y, $T0
+	vmovdqa		$ACC5, $ACC4
+	vpmuludq	%ymm14, $Y, $OVERFLOW
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC6, $ACC5
+	vpmuludq	%ymm15, $Y, $T0
+	 vpand		$AND_MASK, $ACC0, $Y
+	vpaddq		$OVERFLOW, $ACC7, $ACC6
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC8, $ACC7
+
+	#itr		5
+	vpmuludq	$B, $B, $T0
+	vpmuludq	32*4(%rcx), $B, $OVERFLOW
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC4, $ACC4
+	vpmuludq	32*5(%rcx), $B, $T0
+	vpaddq		$OVERFLOW, $ACC5, $ACC5
+	vpmuludq	32*6(%rcx), $B, $OVERFLOW
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC6, $ACC6
+
+	vpmuludq	$AND_MASK, $Y, $T0
+	 vpaddq		$OVERFLOW, $ACC7, $ACC7
+	 vpmuludq	32*7(%rcx), $B, $ACC8
+	 vmovdqa	32*5($a_ptr), $B
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC0, $OVERFLOW
+	vpsrlq		$digit_size, $OVERFLOW, $OVERFLOW
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC1, $ACC0
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC2, $ACC1
+	vpmuludq	32*3+.LAVX2_POLY(%rip), $Y, $T0
+	vpaddq		$OVERFLOW, $ACC0, $ACC0
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC3, $ACC2
+	vmovdqa		$ACC4, $ACC3
+	vpsllq		\$18, $Y, $T0
+	vmovdqa		$ACC5, $ACC4
+	vpmuludq	%ymm14, $Y, $OVERFLOW
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC6, $ACC5
+	vpmuludq	%ymm15, $Y, $T0
+	 vpand		$AND_MASK, $ACC0, $Y
+	vpaddq		$OVERFLOW, $ACC7, $ACC6
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC8, $ACC7
+
+	#itr		6
+	vpmuludq	$B, $B, $OVERFLOW
+	vpmuludq	32*5(%rcx), $B, $T0
+	vpaddq		$OVERFLOW, $ACC5, $ACC5
+	vpmuludq	32*6(%rcx), $B, $OVERFLOW
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC6, $ACC6
+
+	vpmuludq	$AND_MASK, $Y, $T0
+	 vpaddq		$OVERFLOW, $ACC7, $ACC7
+	 vpmuludq	32*7(%rcx), $B, $ACC8
+	 vmovdqa	32*6($a_ptr), $B
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC0, $OVERFLOW
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC1, $ACC0
+	vpsrlq		$digit_size, $OVERFLOW, $OVERFLOW
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC2, $ACC1
+	vpmuludq	32*3(%rax), $Y, $T0
+	vpaddq		$OVERFLOW, $ACC0, $ACC0
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC3, $ACC2
+	vmovdqa		$ACC4, $ACC3
+	vpsllq		\$18, $Y, $T0
+	vmovdqa		$ACC5, $ACC4
+	vpmuludq	%ymm14, $Y, $OVERFLOW
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC6, $ACC5
+	vpmuludq	%ymm15, $Y, $T0
+	 vpand		$AND_MASK, $ACC0, $Y
+	vpaddq		$OVERFLOW, $ACC7, $ACC6
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC8, $ACC7
+
+	#itr		7
+	vpmuludq	$B, $B, $T0
+	vpmuludq	32*6(%rcx), $B, $OVERFLOW
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC6, $ACC6
+
+	vpmuludq	$AND_MASK, $Y, $T0
+	 vpaddq		$OVERFLOW, $ACC7, $ACC7
+	 vpmuludq	32*7(%rcx), $B, $ACC8
+	 vmovdqa	32*7($a_ptr), $B
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC0, $OVERFLOW
+	vpsrlq		$digit_size, $OVERFLOW, $OVERFLOW
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC1, $ACC0
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC2, $ACC1
+	vpmuludq	32*3(%rax), $Y, $T0
+	vpaddq		$OVERFLOW, $ACC0, $ACC0
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC3, $ACC2
+	vmovdqa		$ACC4, $ACC3
+	vpsllq		\$18, $Y, $T0
+	vmovdqa		$ACC5, $ACC4
+	vpmuludq	%ymm14, $Y, $OVERFLOW
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC6, $ACC5
+	vpmuludq	%ymm15, $Y, $T0
+	 vpand		$AND_MASK, $ACC0, $Y
+	vpaddq		$OVERFLOW, $ACC7, $ACC6
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC8, $ACC7
+
+	#itr		8
+	vpmuludq	$B, $B, $OVERFLOW
+
+	vpmuludq	$AND_MASK, $Y, $T0
+	 vpaddq		$OVERFLOW, $ACC7, $ACC7
+	 vpmuludq	32*7(%rcx), $B, $ACC8
+	 vmovdqa	32*8($a_ptr), $B
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC0, $OVERFLOW
+	vpsrlq		$digit_size, $OVERFLOW, $OVERFLOW
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC1, $ACC0
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC2, $ACC1
+	vpmuludq	32*3(%rax), $Y, $T0
+	vpaddq		$OVERFLOW, $ACC0, $ACC0
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC3, $ACC2
+	vmovdqa		$ACC4, $ACC3
+	vpsllq		\$18, $Y, $T0
+	vmovdqa		$ACC5, $ACC4
+	vpmuludq	%ymm14, $Y, $OVERFLOW
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC6, $ACC5
+	vpmuludq	%ymm15, $Y, $T0
+	 vpand		$AND_MASK, $ACC0, $Y
+	vpaddq		$OVERFLOW, $ACC7, $ACC6
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC8, $ACC7
+
+	#itr		9
+	vpmuludq	$B, $B, $ACC8
+
+	vpmuludq	$AND_MASK, $Y, $T0
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC0, $OVERFLOW
+	vpsrlq		$digit_size, $OVERFLOW, $OVERFLOW
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC1, $ACC0
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC2, $ACC1
+	vpmuludq	32*3(%rax), $Y, $T0
+	vpaddq		$OVERFLOW, $ACC0, $ACC0
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC3, $ACC2
+	vmovdqa		$ACC4, $ACC3
+	vpsllq		\$18, $Y, $T0
+	vmovdqa		$ACC5, $ACC4
+	vpmuludq	%ymm14, $Y, $OVERFLOW
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC6, $ACC5
+	vpmuludq	%ymm15, $Y, $T0
+	vpaddq		$OVERFLOW, $ACC7, $ACC6
+	vpaddq		$T0, $ACC8, $ACC7
+
+	vpxor		$ACC8, $ACC8, $ACC8
+
+	ret
+.size	avx2_sqr_x4,.-avx2_sqr_x4
+
+################################################################################
+# void avx2_sub_x4(void* RESULTx4, void *Ax4, void *Bx4);
+.type	avx2_sub_x4,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	32
+avx2_sub_x4:
+	vmovdqa	32*0($a_ptr), $ACC0
+	lea	160($a_ptr), $a_ptr
+	lea	.LAVX2_POLY_x8+128(%rip), %rax
+	lea	128($b_ptr), $b_ptr
+	vmovdqa	32*1-160($a_ptr), $ACC1
+	vmovdqa	32*2-160($a_ptr), $ACC2
+	vmovdqa	32*3-160($a_ptr), $ACC3
+	vmovdqa	32*4-160($a_ptr), $ACC4
+	vmovdqa	32*5-160($a_ptr), $ACC5
+	vmovdqa	32*6-160($a_ptr), $ACC6
+	vmovdqa	32*7-160($a_ptr), $ACC7
+	vmovdqa	32*8-160($a_ptr), $ACC8
+
+	vpaddq	32*0-128(%rax), $ACC0, $ACC0
+	vpaddq	32*1-128(%rax), $ACC1, $ACC1
+	vpaddq	32*2-128(%rax), $ACC2, $ACC2
+	vpaddq	32*3-128(%rax), $ACC3, $ACC3
+	vpaddq	32*4-128(%rax), $ACC4, $ACC4
+	vpaddq	32*5-128(%rax), $ACC5, $ACC5
+	vpaddq	32*6-128(%rax), $ACC6, $ACC6
+	vpaddq	32*7-128(%rax), $ACC7, $ACC7
+	vpaddq	32*8-128(%rax), $ACC8, $ACC8
+
+	vpsubq	32*0-128($b_ptr), $ACC0, $ACC0
+	vpsubq	32*1-128($b_ptr), $ACC1, $ACC1
+	vpsubq	32*2-128($b_ptr), $ACC2, $ACC2
+	vpsubq	32*3-128($b_ptr), $ACC3, $ACC3
+	vpsubq	32*4-128($b_ptr), $ACC4, $ACC4
+	vpsubq	32*5-128($b_ptr), $ACC5, $ACC5
+	vpsubq	32*6-128($b_ptr), $ACC6, $ACC6
+	vpsubq	32*7-128($b_ptr), $ACC7, $ACC7
+	vpsubq	32*8-128($b_ptr), $ACC8, $ACC8
+
+	ret
+.size	avx2_sub_x4,.-avx2_sub_x4
+
+.type	avx2_select_n_store,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	32
+avx2_select_n_store:
+	vmovdqa	`8+32*9*8`(%rsp), $Y
+	vpor	`8+32*9*8+32`(%rsp), $Y, $Y
+
+	vpandn	$ACC0, $Y, $ACC0
+	vpandn	$ACC1, $Y, $ACC1
+	vpandn	$ACC2, $Y, $ACC2
+	vpandn	$ACC3, $Y, $ACC3
+	vpandn	$ACC4, $Y, $ACC4
+	vpandn	$ACC5, $Y, $ACC5
+	vpandn	$ACC6, $Y, $ACC6
+	vmovdqa	`8+32*9*8+32`(%rsp), $B
+	vpandn	$ACC7, $Y, $ACC7
+	vpandn	`8+32*9*8`(%rsp), $B, $B
+	vpandn	$ACC8, $Y, $ACC8
+
+	vpand	32*0(%rsi), $B, $T0
+	lea	160(%rsi), %rax
+	vpand	32*1(%rsi), $B, $Y
+	vpxor	$T0, $ACC0, $ACC0
+	vpand	32*2(%rsi), $B, $T0
+	vpxor	$Y, $ACC1, $ACC1
+	vpand	32*3(%rsi), $B, $Y
+	vpxor	$T0, $ACC2, $ACC2
+	vpand	32*4-160(%rax), $B, $T0
+	vpxor	$Y, $ACC3, $ACC3
+	vpand	32*5-160(%rax), $B, $Y
+	vpxor	$T0, $ACC4, $ACC4
+	vpand	32*6-160(%rax), $B, $T0
+	vpxor	$Y, $ACC5, $ACC5
+	vpand	32*7-160(%rax), $B, $Y
+	vpxor	$T0, $ACC6, $ACC6
+	vpand	32*8-160(%rax), $B, $T0
+	vmovdqa	`8+32*9*8+32`(%rsp), $B
+	vpxor	$Y, $ACC7, $ACC7
+
+	vpand	32*0(%rdx), $B, $Y
+	lea	160(%rdx), %rax
+	vpxor	$T0, $ACC8, $ACC8
+	vpand	32*1(%rdx), $B, $T0
+	vpxor	$Y, $ACC0, $ACC0
+	vpand	32*2(%rdx), $B, $Y
+	vpxor	$T0, $ACC1, $ACC1
+	vpand	32*3(%rdx), $B, $T0
+	vpxor	$Y, $ACC2, $ACC2
+	vpand	32*4-160(%rax), $B, $Y
+	vpxor	$T0, $ACC3, $ACC3
+	vpand	32*5-160(%rax), $B, $T0
+	vpxor	$Y, $ACC4, $ACC4
+	vpand	32*6-160(%rax), $B, $Y
+	vpxor	$T0, $ACC5, $ACC5
+	vpand	32*7-160(%rax), $B, $T0
+	vpxor	$Y, $ACC6, $ACC6
+	vpand	32*8-160(%rax), $B, $Y
+	vpxor	$T0, $ACC7, $ACC7
+	vpxor	$Y, $ACC8, $ACC8
+	`&STORE`
+
+	ret
+.size	avx2_select_n_store,.-avx2_select_n_store
+___
+$code.=<<___	if (0);				# inlined
+################################################################################
+# void avx2_mul_by2_x4(void* RESULTx4, void *Ax4);
+.type	avx2_mul_by2_x4,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	32
+avx2_mul_by2_x4:
+	vmovdqa	32*0($a_ptr), $ACC0
+	lea	160($a_ptr), %rax
+	vmovdqa	32*1($a_ptr), $ACC1
+	vmovdqa	32*2($a_ptr), $ACC2
+	vmovdqa	32*3($a_ptr), $ACC3
+	vmovdqa	32*4-160(%rax), $ACC4
+	vmovdqa	32*5-160(%rax), $ACC5
+	vmovdqa	32*6-160(%rax), $ACC6
+	vmovdqa	32*7-160(%rax), $ACC7
+	vmovdqa	32*8-160(%rax), $ACC8
+
+	vpaddq	$ACC0, $ACC0, $ACC0
+	vpaddq	$ACC1, $ACC1, $ACC1
+	vpaddq	$ACC2, $ACC2, $ACC2
+	vpaddq	$ACC3, $ACC3, $ACC3
+	vpaddq	$ACC4, $ACC4, $ACC4
+	vpaddq	$ACC5, $ACC5, $ACC5
+	vpaddq	$ACC6, $ACC6, $ACC6
+	vpaddq	$ACC7, $ACC7, $ACC7
+	vpaddq	$ACC8, $ACC8, $ACC8
+
+	ret
+.size	avx2_mul_by2_x4,.-avx2_mul_by2_x4
+___
+my ($r_ptr_in,$a_ptr_in,$b_ptr_in)=("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx");
+my ($r_ptr,$a_ptr,$b_ptr)=("%r8","%r9","%r10");
+
+$code.=<<___;
+################################################################################
+# void ecp_nistz256_avx2_point_add_affine_x4(void* RESULTx4, void *Ax4, void *Bx4);
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_avx2_point_add_affine_x4
+.type	ecp_nistz256_avx2_point_add_affine_x4,\@function,3
+.align	32
+ecp_nistz256_avx2_point_add_affine_x4:
+	mov	%rsp, %rax
+	push    %rbp
+	vzeroupper
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($win64);
+	lea	-16*10(%rsp), %rsp
+	vmovaps	%xmm6, -8-16*10(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm7, -8-16*9(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm8, -8-16*8(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm9, -8-16*7(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm10, -8-16*6(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm11, -8-16*5(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm12, -8-16*4(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm13, -8-16*3(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm14, -8-16*2(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm15, -8-16*1(%rax)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	lea	-8(%rax), %rbp
+
+# Result + 32*0 = Result.X
+# Result + 32*9 = Result.Y
+# Result + 32*18 = Result.Z
+
+# A + 32*0 = A.X
+# A + 32*9 = A.Y
+# A + 32*18 = A.Z
+
+# B + 32*0 = B.X
+# B + 32*9 = B.Y
+
+	sub	\$`32*9*8+32*2+32*8`, %rsp
+	and	\$-64, %rsp
+
+	mov	$r_ptr_in, $r_ptr
+	mov	$a_ptr_in, $a_ptr
+	mov	$b_ptr_in, $b_ptr
+
+	vmovdqa	32*0($a_ptr_in), %ymm0
+	vmovdqa	.LAVX2_AND_MASK(%rip), $AND_MASK
+	vpxor	%ymm1, %ymm1, %ymm1
+	lea	256($a_ptr_in), %rax		# size optimization
+	vpor	32*1($a_ptr_in), %ymm0, %ymm0
+	vpor	32*2($a_ptr_in), %ymm0, %ymm0
+	vpor	32*3($a_ptr_in), %ymm0, %ymm0
+	vpor	32*4-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0
+	lea	256(%rax), %rcx			# size optimization
+	vpor	32*5-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0
+	vpor	32*6-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0
+	vpor	32*7-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0
+	vpor	32*8-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0
+	vpor	32*9-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0
+	vpor	32*10-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0
+	vpor	32*11-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0
+	vpor	32*12-512(%rcx), %ymm0, %ymm0
+	vpor	32*13-512(%rcx), %ymm0, %ymm0
+	vpor	32*14-512(%rcx), %ymm0, %ymm0
+	vpor	32*15-512(%rcx), %ymm0, %ymm0
+	vpor	32*16-512(%rcx), %ymm0, %ymm0
+	vpor	32*17-512(%rcx), %ymm0, %ymm0
+	vpcmpeqq %ymm1, %ymm0, %ymm0
+	vmovdqa	%ymm0, `32*9*8`(%rsp)
+
+	vpxor	%ymm1, %ymm1, %ymm1
+	vmovdqa	32*0($b_ptr), %ymm0
+	lea	256($b_ptr), %rax		# size optimization
+	vpor	32*1($b_ptr), %ymm0, %ymm0
+	vpor	32*2($b_ptr), %ymm0, %ymm0
+	vpor	32*3($b_ptr), %ymm0, %ymm0
+	vpor	32*4-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0
+	lea	256(%rax), %rcx			# size optimization
+	vpor	32*5-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0
+	vpor	32*6-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0
+	vpor	32*7-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0
+	vpor	32*8-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0
+	vpor	32*9-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0
+	vpor	32*10-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0
+	vpor	32*11-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0
+	vpor	32*12-512(%rcx), %ymm0, %ymm0
+	vpor	32*13-512(%rcx), %ymm0, %ymm0
+	vpor	32*14-512(%rcx), %ymm0, %ymm0
+	vpor	32*15-512(%rcx), %ymm0, %ymm0
+	vpor	32*16-512(%rcx), %ymm0, %ymm0
+	vpor	32*17-512(%rcx), %ymm0, %ymm0
+	vpcmpeqq %ymm1, %ymm0, %ymm0
+	vmovdqa	%ymm0, `32*9*8+32`(%rsp)
+
+	#	Z1^2 = Z1*Z1
+	lea	`32*9*2`($a_ptr), %rsi
+	lea	`32*9*2`(%rsp), %rdi
+	lea	`32*9*8+32*2`(%rsp), %rcx	# temporary vector
+	call	avx2_sqr_x4
+	call	avx2_normalize_n_store
+
+	#	U2 = X2*Z1^2
+	lea	`32*9*0`($b_ptr), %rsi
+	lea	`32*9*2`(%rsp), %rdx
+	lea	`32*9*0`(%rsp), %rdi
+	call	avx2_mul_x4
+	#call	avx2_normalize
+	`&STORE`
+
+	#	S2 = Z1*Z1^2 = Z1^3
+	lea	`32*9*2`($a_ptr), %rsi
+	lea	`32*9*2`(%rsp), %rdx
+	lea	`32*9*1`(%rsp), %rdi
+	call	avx2_mul_x4
+	call	avx2_normalize_n_store
+
+	#	S2 = S2*Y2 = Y2*Z1^3
+	lea	`32*9*1`($b_ptr), %rsi
+	lea	`32*9*1`(%rsp), %rdx
+	lea	`32*9*1`(%rsp), %rdi
+	call	avx2_mul_x4
+	call	avx2_normalize_n_store
+
+	#	H = U2 - U1 = U2 - X1
+	lea	`32*9*0`(%rsp), %rsi
+	lea	`32*9*0`($a_ptr), %rdx
+	lea	`32*9*3`(%rsp), %rdi
+	call	avx2_sub_x4
+	call	avx2_normalize_n_store
+
+	#	R = S2 - S1 = S2 - Y1
+	lea	`32*9*1`(%rsp), %rsi
+	lea	`32*9*1`($a_ptr), %rdx
+	lea	`32*9*4`(%rsp), %rdi
+	call	avx2_sub_x4
+	call	avx2_normalize_n_store
+
+	#	Z3 = H*Z1*Z2
+	lea	`32*9*3`(%rsp), %rsi
+	lea	`32*9*2`($a_ptr), %rdx
+	lea	`32*9*2`($r_ptr), %rdi
+	call	avx2_mul_x4
+	call	avx2_normalize
+
+	lea	.LONE(%rip), %rsi
+	lea	`32*9*2`($a_ptr), %rdx
+	call	avx2_select_n_store
+
+	#	R^2 = R^2
+	lea	`32*9*4`(%rsp), %rsi
+	lea	`32*9*6`(%rsp), %rdi
+	lea	`32*9*8+32*2`(%rsp), %rcx	# temporary vector
+	call	avx2_sqr_x4
+	call	avx2_normalize_n_store
+
+	#	H^2 = H^2
+	lea	`32*9*3`(%rsp), %rsi
+	lea	`32*9*5`(%rsp), %rdi
+	call	avx2_sqr_x4
+	call	avx2_normalize_n_store
+
+	#	H^3 = H^2*H
+	lea	`32*9*3`(%rsp), %rsi
+	lea	`32*9*5`(%rsp), %rdx
+	lea	`32*9*7`(%rsp), %rdi
+	call	avx2_mul_x4
+	call	avx2_normalize_n_store
+
+	#	U2 = U1*H^2
+	lea	`32*9*0`($a_ptr), %rsi
+	lea	`32*9*5`(%rsp), %rdx
+	lea	`32*9*0`(%rsp), %rdi
+	call	avx2_mul_x4
+	#call	avx2_normalize
+	`&STORE`
+
+	#	Hsqr = U2*2
+	#lea	32*9*0(%rsp), %rsi
+	#lea	32*9*5(%rsp), %rdi
+	#call	avx2_mul_by2_x4
+
+	vpaddq	$ACC0, $ACC0, $ACC0	# inlined avx2_mul_by2_x4
+	lea	`32*9*5`(%rsp), %rdi
+	vpaddq	$ACC1, $ACC1, $ACC1
+	vpaddq	$ACC2, $ACC2, $ACC2
+	vpaddq	$ACC3, $ACC3, $ACC3
+	vpaddq	$ACC4, $ACC4, $ACC4
+	vpaddq	$ACC5, $ACC5, $ACC5
+	vpaddq	$ACC6, $ACC6, $ACC6
+	vpaddq	$ACC7, $ACC7, $ACC7
+	vpaddq	$ACC8, $ACC8, $ACC8
+	call	avx2_normalize_n_store
+
+	#	X3 = R^2 - H^3
+	#lea	32*9*6(%rsp), %rsi
+	#lea	32*9*7(%rsp), %rdx
+	#lea	32*9*5(%rsp), %rcx
+	#lea	32*9*0($r_ptr), %rdi
+	#call	avx2_sub_x4
+	#NORMALIZE
+	#STORE
+
+	#	X3 = X3 - U2*2
+	#lea	32*9*0($r_ptr), %rsi
+	#lea	32*9*0($r_ptr), %rdi
+	#call	avx2_sub_x4
+	#NORMALIZE
+	#STORE
+
+	lea	`32*9*6+128`(%rsp), %rsi
+	lea	.LAVX2_POLY_x2+128(%rip), %rax
+	lea	`32*9*7+128`(%rsp), %rdx
+	lea	`32*9*5+128`(%rsp), %rcx
+	lea	`32*9*0`($r_ptr), %rdi
+
+	vmovdqa	32*0-128(%rsi), $ACC0
+	vmovdqa	32*1-128(%rsi), $ACC1
+	vmovdqa	32*2-128(%rsi), $ACC2
+	vmovdqa	32*3-128(%rsi), $ACC3
+	vmovdqa	32*4-128(%rsi), $ACC4
+	vmovdqa	32*5-128(%rsi), $ACC5
+	vmovdqa	32*6-128(%rsi), $ACC6
+	vmovdqa	32*7-128(%rsi), $ACC7
+	vmovdqa	32*8-128(%rsi), $ACC8
+
+	vpaddq	32*0-128(%rax), $ACC0, $ACC0
+	vpaddq	32*1-128(%rax), $ACC1, $ACC1
+	vpaddq	32*2-128(%rax), $ACC2, $ACC2
+	vpaddq	32*3-128(%rax), $ACC3, $ACC3
+	vpaddq	32*4-128(%rax), $ACC4, $ACC4
+	vpaddq	32*5-128(%rax), $ACC5, $ACC5
+	vpaddq	32*6-128(%rax), $ACC6, $ACC6
+	vpaddq	32*7-128(%rax), $ACC7, $ACC7
+	vpaddq	32*8-128(%rax), $ACC8, $ACC8
+
+	vpsubq	32*0-128(%rdx), $ACC0, $ACC0
+	vpsubq	32*1-128(%rdx), $ACC1, $ACC1
+	vpsubq	32*2-128(%rdx), $ACC2, $ACC2
+	vpsubq	32*3-128(%rdx), $ACC3, $ACC3
+	vpsubq	32*4-128(%rdx), $ACC4, $ACC4
+	vpsubq	32*5-128(%rdx), $ACC5, $ACC5
+	vpsubq	32*6-128(%rdx), $ACC6, $ACC6
+	vpsubq	32*7-128(%rdx), $ACC7, $ACC7
+	vpsubq	32*8-128(%rdx), $ACC8, $ACC8
+
+	vpsubq	32*0-128(%rcx), $ACC0, $ACC0
+	vpsubq	32*1-128(%rcx), $ACC1, $ACC1
+	vpsubq	32*2-128(%rcx), $ACC2, $ACC2
+	vpsubq	32*3-128(%rcx), $ACC3, $ACC3
+	vpsubq	32*4-128(%rcx), $ACC4, $ACC4
+	vpsubq	32*5-128(%rcx), $ACC5, $ACC5
+	vpsubq	32*6-128(%rcx), $ACC6, $ACC6
+	vpsubq	32*7-128(%rcx), $ACC7, $ACC7
+	vpsubq	32*8-128(%rcx), $ACC8, $ACC8
+	call	avx2_normalize
+
+	lea	32*0($b_ptr), %rsi
+	lea	32*0($a_ptr), %rdx
+	call	avx2_select_n_store
+
+	#	H = U2 - X3
+	lea	`32*9*0`(%rsp), %rsi
+	lea	`32*9*0`($r_ptr), %rdx
+	lea	`32*9*3`(%rsp), %rdi
+	call	avx2_sub_x4
+	call	avx2_normalize_n_store
+
+	#
+	lea	`32*9*3`(%rsp), %rsi
+	lea	`32*9*4`(%rsp), %rdx
+	lea	`32*9*3`(%rsp), %rdi
+	call	avx2_mul_x4
+	call	avx2_normalize_n_store
+
+	#
+	lea	`32*9*7`(%rsp), %rsi
+	lea	`32*9*1`($a_ptr), %rdx
+	lea	`32*9*1`(%rsp), %rdi
+	call	avx2_mul_x4
+	call	avx2_normalize_n_store
+
+	#
+	lea	`32*9*3`(%rsp), %rsi
+	lea	`32*9*1`(%rsp), %rdx
+	lea	`32*9*1`($r_ptr), %rdi
+	call	avx2_sub_x4
+	call	avx2_normalize
+
+	lea	32*9($b_ptr), %rsi
+	lea	32*9($a_ptr), %rdx
+	call	avx2_select_n_store
+
+	#lea	32*9*0($r_ptr), %rsi
+	#lea	32*9*0($r_ptr), %rdi
+	#call	avx2_mul_by1_x4
+	#NORMALIZE
+	#STORE
+
+	lea	`32*9*1`($r_ptr), %rsi
+	lea	`32*9*1`($r_ptr), %rdi
+	call	avx2_mul_by1_x4
+	call	avx2_normalize_n_store
+
+	vzeroupper
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($win64);
+	movaps	%xmm6, -16*10(%rbp)
+	movaps	%xmm7, -16*9(%rbp)
+	movaps	%xmm8, -16*8(%rbp)
+	movaps	%xmm9, -16*7(%rbp)
+	movaps	%xmm10, -16*6(%rbp)
+	movaps	%xmm11, -16*5(%rbp)
+	movaps	%xmm12, -16*4(%rbp)
+	movaps	%xmm13, -16*3(%rbp)
+	movaps	%xmm14, -16*2(%rbp)
+	movaps	%xmm15, -16*1(%rbp)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	%rbp, %rsp
+	pop	%rbp
+	ret
+.size	ecp_nistz256_avx2_point_add_affine_x4,.-ecp_nistz256_avx2_point_add_affine_x4
+
+################################################################################
+# void ecp_nistz256_avx2_point_add_affines_x4(void* RESULTx4, void *Ax4, void *Bx4);
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_avx2_point_add_affines_x4
+.type	ecp_nistz256_avx2_point_add_affines_x4,\@function,3
+.align	32
+ecp_nistz256_avx2_point_add_affines_x4:
+	mov	%rsp, %rax
+	push    %rbp
+	vzeroupper
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($win64);
+	lea	-16*10(%rsp), %rsp
+	vmovaps	%xmm6, -8-16*10(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm7, -8-16*9(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm8, -8-16*8(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm9, -8-16*7(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm10, -8-16*6(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm11, -8-16*5(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm12, -8-16*4(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm13, -8-16*3(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm14, -8-16*2(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm15, -8-16*1(%rax)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	lea	-8(%rax), %rbp
+
+# Result + 32*0 = Result.X
+# Result + 32*9 = Result.Y
+# Result + 32*18 = Result.Z
+
+# A + 32*0 = A.X
+# A + 32*9 = A.Y
+
+# B + 32*0 = B.X
+# B + 32*9 = B.Y
+
+	sub	\$`32*9*8+32*2+32*8`, %rsp
+	and	\$-64, %rsp
+
+	mov	$r_ptr_in, $r_ptr
+	mov	$a_ptr_in, $a_ptr
+	mov	$b_ptr_in, $b_ptr
+
+	vmovdqa	32*0($a_ptr_in), %ymm0
+	vmovdqa	.LAVX2_AND_MASK(%rip), $AND_MASK
+	vpxor	%ymm1, %ymm1, %ymm1
+	lea	256($a_ptr_in), %rax		# size optimization
+	vpor	32*1($a_ptr_in), %ymm0, %ymm0
+	vpor	32*2($a_ptr_in), %ymm0, %ymm0
+	vpor	32*3($a_ptr_in), %ymm0, %ymm0
+	vpor	32*4-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0
+	lea	256(%rax), %rcx			# size optimization
+	vpor	32*5-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0
+	vpor	32*6-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0
+	vpor	32*7-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0
+	vpor	32*8-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0
+	vpor	32*9-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0
+	vpor	32*10-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0
+	vpor	32*11-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0
+	vpor	32*12-512(%rcx), %ymm0, %ymm0
+	vpor	32*13-512(%rcx), %ymm0, %ymm0
+	vpor	32*14-512(%rcx), %ymm0, %ymm0
+	vpor	32*15-512(%rcx), %ymm0, %ymm0
+	vpor	32*16-512(%rcx), %ymm0, %ymm0
+	vpor	32*17-512(%rcx), %ymm0, %ymm0
+	vpcmpeqq %ymm1, %ymm0, %ymm0
+	vmovdqa	%ymm0, `32*9*8`(%rsp)
+
+	vpxor	%ymm1, %ymm1, %ymm1
+	vmovdqa	32*0($b_ptr), %ymm0
+	lea	256($b_ptr), %rax		# size optimization
+	vpor	32*1($b_ptr), %ymm0, %ymm0
+	vpor	32*2($b_ptr), %ymm0, %ymm0
+	vpor	32*3($b_ptr), %ymm0, %ymm0
+	vpor	32*4-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0
+	lea	256(%rax), %rcx			# size optimization
+	vpor	32*5-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0
+	vpor	32*6-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0
+	vpor	32*7-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0
+	vpor	32*8-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0
+	vpor	32*9-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0
+	vpor	32*10-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0
+	vpor	32*11-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0
+	vpor	32*12-512(%rcx), %ymm0, %ymm0
+	vpor	32*13-512(%rcx), %ymm0, %ymm0
+	vpor	32*14-512(%rcx), %ymm0, %ymm0
+	vpor	32*15-512(%rcx), %ymm0, %ymm0
+	vpor	32*16-512(%rcx), %ymm0, %ymm0
+	vpor	32*17-512(%rcx), %ymm0, %ymm0
+	vpcmpeqq %ymm1, %ymm0, %ymm0
+	vmovdqa	%ymm0, `32*9*8+32`(%rsp)
+
+	#	H = U2 - U1 = X2 - X1
+	lea	`32*9*0`($b_ptr), %rsi
+	lea	`32*9*0`($a_ptr), %rdx
+	lea	`32*9*3`(%rsp), %rdi
+	call	avx2_sub_x4
+	call	avx2_normalize_n_store
+
+	#	R = S2 - S1 = Y2 - Y1
+	lea	`32*9*1`($b_ptr), %rsi
+	lea	`32*9*1`($a_ptr), %rdx
+	lea	`32*9*4`(%rsp), %rdi
+	call	avx2_sub_x4
+	call	avx2_normalize_n_store
+
+	#	Z3 = H*Z1*Z2 = H
+	lea	`32*9*3`(%rsp), %rsi
+	lea	`32*9*2`($r_ptr), %rdi
+	call	avx2_mul_by1_x4
+	call	avx2_normalize
+
+	vmovdqa	`32*9*8`(%rsp), $B
+	vpor	`32*9*8+32`(%rsp), $B, $B
+
+	vpandn	$ACC0, $B, $ACC0
+	lea	.LONE+128(%rip), %rax
+	vpandn	$ACC1, $B, $ACC1
+	vpandn	$ACC2, $B, $ACC2
+	vpandn	$ACC3, $B, $ACC3
+	vpandn	$ACC4, $B, $ACC4
+	vpandn	$ACC5, $B, $ACC5
+	vpandn	$ACC6, $B, $ACC6
+	vpandn	$ACC7, $B, $ACC7
+
+	vpand	32*0-128(%rax), $B, $T0
+	 vpandn	$ACC8, $B, $ACC8
+	vpand	32*1-128(%rax), $B, $Y
+	vpxor	$T0, $ACC0, $ACC0
+	vpand	32*2-128(%rax), $B, $T0
+	vpxor	$Y, $ACC1, $ACC1
+	vpand	32*3-128(%rax), $B, $Y
+	vpxor	$T0, $ACC2, $ACC2
+	vpand	32*4-128(%rax), $B, $T0
+	vpxor	$Y, $ACC3, $ACC3
+	vpand	32*5-128(%rax), $B, $Y
+	vpxor	$T0, $ACC4, $ACC4
+	vpand	32*6-128(%rax), $B, $T0
+	vpxor	$Y, $ACC5, $ACC5
+	vpand	32*7-128(%rax), $B, $Y
+	vpxor	$T0, $ACC6, $ACC6
+	vpand	32*8-128(%rax), $B, $T0
+	vpxor	$Y, $ACC7, $ACC7
+	vpxor	$T0, $ACC8, $ACC8
+	`&STORE`
+
+	#	R^2 = R^2
+	lea	`32*9*4`(%rsp), %rsi
+	lea	`32*9*6`(%rsp), %rdi
+	lea	`32*9*8+32*2`(%rsp), %rcx	# temporary vector
+	call	avx2_sqr_x4
+	call	avx2_normalize_n_store
+
+	#	H^2 = H^2
+	lea	`32*9*3`(%rsp), %rsi
+	lea	`32*9*5`(%rsp), %rdi
+	call	avx2_sqr_x4
+	call	avx2_normalize_n_store
+
+	#	H^3 = H^2*H
+	lea	`32*9*3`(%rsp), %rsi
+	lea	`32*9*5`(%rsp), %rdx
+	lea	`32*9*7`(%rsp), %rdi
+	call	avx2_mul_x4
+	call	avx2_normalize_n_store
+
+	#	U2 = U1*H^2
+	lea	`32*9*0`($a_ptr), %rsi
+	lea	`32*9*5`(%rsp), %rdx
+	lea	`32*9*0`(%rsp), %rdi
+	call	avx2_mul_x4
+	#call	avx2_normalize
+	`&STORE`
+
+	#	Hsqr = U2*2
+	#lea	32*9*0(%rsp), %rsi
+	#lea	32*9*5(%rsp), %rdi
+	#call	avx2_mul_by2_x4
+
+	vpaddq	$ACC0, $ACC0, $ACC0	# inlined avx2_mul_by2_x4
+	lea	`32*9*5`(%rsp), %rdi
+	vpaddq	$ACC1, $ACC1, $ACC1
+	vpaddq	$ACC2, $ACC2, $ACC2
+	vpaddq	$ACC3, $ACC3, $ACC3
+	vpaddq	$ACC4, $ACC4, $ACC4
+	vpaddq	$ACC5, $ACC5, $ACC5
+	vpaddq	$ACC6, $ACC6, $ACC6
+	vpaddq	$ACC7, $ACC7, $ACC7
+	vpaddq	$ACC8, $ACC8, $ACC8
+	call	avx2_normalize_n_store
+
+	#	X3 = R^2 - H^3
+	#lea	32*9*6(%rsp), %rsi
+	#lea	32*9*7(%rsp), %rdx
+	#lea	32*9*5(%rsp), %rcx
+	#lea	32*9*0($r_ptr), %rdi
+	#call	avx2_sub_x4
+	#NORMALIZE
+	#STORE
+
+	#	X3 = X3 - U2*2
+	#lea	32*9*0($r_ptr), %rsi
+	#lea	32*9*0($r_ptr), %rdi
+	#call	avx2_sub_x4
+	#NORMALIZE
+	#STORE
+
+	lea	`32*9*6+128`(%rsp), %rsi
+	lea	.LAVX2_POLY_x2+128(%rip), %rax
+	lea	`32*9*7+128`(%rsp), %rdx
+	lea	`32*9*5+128`(%rsp), %rcx
+	lea	`32*9*0`($r_ptr), %rdi
+
+	vmovdqa	32*0-128(%rsi), $ACC0
+	vmovdqa	32*1-128(%rsi), $ACC1
+	vmovdqa	32*2-128(%rsi), $ACC2
+	vmovdqa	32*3-128(%rsi), $ACC3
+	vmovdqa	32*4-128(%rsi), $ACC4
+	vmovdqa	32*5-128(%rsi), $ACC5
+	vmovdqa	32*6-128(%rsi), $ACC6
+	vmovdqa	32*7-128(%rsi), $ACC7
+	vmovdqa	32*8-128(%rsi), $ACC8
+
+	vpaddq	32*0-128(%rax), $ACC0, $ACC0
+	vpaddq	32*1-128(%rax), $ACC1, $ACC1
+	vpaddq	32*2-128(%rax), $ACC2, $ACC2
+	vpaddq	32*3-128(%rax), $ACC3, $ACC3
+	vpaddq	32*4-128(%rax), $ACC4, $ACC4
+	vpaddq	32*5-128(%rax), $ACC5, $ACC5
+	vpaddq	32*6-128(%rax), $ACC6, $ACC6
+	vpaddq	32*7-128(%rax), $ACC7, $ACC7
+	vpaddq	32*8-128(%rax), $ACC8, $ACC8
+
+	vpsubq	32*0-128(%rdx), $ACC0, $ACC0
+	vpsubq	32*1-128(%rdx), $ACC1, $ACC1
+	vpsubq	32*2-128(%rdx), $ACC2, $ACC2
+	vpsubq	32*3-128(%rdx), $ACC3, $ACC3
+	vpsubq	32*4-128(%rdx), $ACC4, $ACC4
+	vpsubq	32*5-128(%rdx), $ACC5, $ACC5
+	vpsubq	32*6-128(%rdx), $ACC6, $ACC6
+	vpsubq	32*7-128(%rdx), $ACC7, $ACC7
+	vpsubq	32*8-128(%rdx), $ACC8, $ACC8
+
+	vpsubq	32*0-128(%rcx), $ACC0, $ACC0
+	vpsubq	32*1-128(%rcx), $ACC1, $ACC1
+	vpsubq	32*2-128(%rcx), $ACC2, $ACC2
+	vpsubq	32*3-128(%rcx), $ACC3, $ACC3
+	vpsubq	32*4-128(%rcx), $ACC4, $ACC4
+	vpsubq	32*5-128(%rcx), $ACC5, $ACC5
+	vpsubq	32*6-128(%rcx), $ACC6, $ACC6
+	vpsubq	32*7-128(%rcx), $ACC7, $ACC7
+	vpsubq	32*8-128(%rcx), $ACC8, $ACC8
+	call	avx2_normalize
+
+	lea	32*0($b_ptr), %rsi
+	lea	32*0($a_ptr), %rdx
+	call	avx2_select_n_store
+
+	#	H = U2 - X3
+	lea	`32*9*0`(%rsp), %rsi
+	lea	`32*9*0`($r_ptr), %rdx
+	lea	`32*9*3`(%rsp), %rdi
+	call	avx2_sub_x4
+	call	avx2_normalize_n_store
+
+	#	H = H*R
+	lea	`32*9*3`(%rsp), %rsi
+	lea	`32*9*4`(%rsp), %rdx
+	lea	`32*9*3`(%rsp), %rdi
+	call	avx2_mul_x4
+	call	avx2_normalize_n_store
+
+	#	S2 = S1 * H^3
+	lea	`32*9*7`(%rsp), %rsi
+	lea	`32*9*1`($a_ptr), %rdx
+	lea	`32*9*1`(%rsp), %rdi
+	call	avx2_mul_x4
+	call	avx2_normalize_n_store
+
+	#
+	lea	`32*9*3`(%rsp), %rsi
+	lea	`32*9*1`(%rsp), %rdx
+	lea	`32*9*1`($r_ptr), %rdi
+	call	avx2_sub_x4
+	call	avx2_normalize
+
+	lea	32*9($b_ptr), %rsi
+	lea	32*9($a_ptr), %rdx
+	call	avx2_select_n_store
+
+	#lea	32*9*0($r_ptr), %rsi
+	#lea	32*9*0($r_ptr), %rdi
+	#call	avx2_mul_by1_x4
+	#NORMALIZE
+	#STORE
+
+	lea	`32*9*1`($r_ptr), %rsi
+	lea	`32*9*1`($r_ptr), %rdi
+	call	avx2_mul_by1_x4
+	call	avx2_normalize_n_store
+
+	vzeroupper
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($win64);
+	movaps	%xmm6, -16*10(%rbp)
+	movaps	%xmm7, -16*9(%rbp)
+	movaps	%xmm8, -16*8(%rbp)
+	movaps	%xmm9, -16*7(%rbp)
+	movaps	%xmm10, -16*6(%rbp)
+	movaps	%xmm11, -16*5(%rbp)
+	movaps	%xmm12, -16*4(%rbp)
+	movaps	%xmm13, -16*3(%rbp)
+	movaps	%xmm14, -16*2(%rbp)
+	movaps	%xmm15, -16*1(%rbp)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	%rbp, %rsp
+	pop	%rbp
+	ret
+.size	ecp_nistz256_avx2_point_add_affines_x4,.-ecp_nistz256_avx2_point_add_affines_x4
+
+################################################################################
+# void ecp_nistz256_avx2_to_mont(void* RESULTx4, void *Ax4);
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_avx2_to_mont
+.type	ecp_nistz256_avx2_to_mont,\@function,2
+.align	32
+ecp_nistz256_avx2_to_mont:
+	vzeroupper
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($win64);
+	lea	-8-16*10(%rsp), %rsp
+	vmovaps	%xmm6, -8-16*10(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm7, -8-16*9(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm8, -8-16*8(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm9, -8-16*7(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm10, -8-16*6(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm11, -8-16*5(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm12, -8-16*4(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm13, -8-16*3(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm14, -8-16*2(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm15, -8-16*1(%rax)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	vmovdqa	.LAVX2_AND_MASK(%rip), $AND_MASK
+	lea	.LTO_MONT_AVX2(%rip), %rdx
+	call	avx2_mul_x4
+	call	avx2_normalize_n_store
+
+	vzeroupper
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($win64);
+	movaps	16*0(%rsp), %xmm6
+	movaps	16*1(%rsp), %xmm7
+	movaps	16*2(%rsp), %xmm8
+	movaps	16*3(%rsp), %xmm9
+	movaps	16*4(%rsp), %xmm10
+	movaps	16*5(%rsp), %xmm11
+	movaps	16*6(%rsp), %xmm12
+	movaps	16*7(%rsp), %xmm13
+	movaps	16*8(%rsp), %xmm14
+	movaps	16*9(%rsp), %xmm15
+	lea	8+16*10(%rsp), %rsp
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	ret
+.size	ecp_nistz256_avx2_to_mont,.-ecp_nistz256_avx2_to_mont
+
+################################################################################
+# void ecp_nistz256_avx2_from_mont(void* RESULTx4, void *Ax4);
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_avx2_from_mont
+.type	ecp_nistz256_avx2_from_mont,\@function,2
+.align	32
+ecp_nistz256_avx2_from_mont:
+	vzeroupper
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($win64);
+	lea	-8-16*10(%rsp), %rsp
+	vmovaps	%xmm6, -8-16*10(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm7, -8-16*9(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm8, -8-16*8(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm9, -8-16*7(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm10, -8-16*6(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm11, -8-16*5(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm12, -8-16*4(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm13, -8-16*3(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm14, -8-16*2(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm15, -8-16*1(%rax)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	vmovdqa	.LAVX2_AND_MASK(%rip), $AND_MASK
+	lea	.LFROM_MONT_AVX2(%rip), %rdx
+	call	avx2_mul_x4
+	call	avx2_normalize_n_store
+
+	vzeroupper
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($win64);
+	movaps	16*0(%rsp), %xmm6
+	movaps	16*1(%rsp), %xmm7
+	movaps	16*2(%rsp), %xmm8
+	movaps	16*3(%rsp), %xmm9
+	movaps	16*4(%rsp), %xmm10
+	movaps	16*5(%rsp), %xmm11
+	movaps	16*6(%rsp), %xmm12
+	movaps	16*7(%rsp), %xmm13
+	movaps	16*8(%rsp), %xmm14
+	movaps	16*9(%rsp), %xmm15
+	lea	8+16*10(%rsp), %rsp
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	ret
+.size	ecp_nistz256_avx2_from_mont,.-ecp_nistz256_avx2_from_mont
+
+################################################################################
+# void ecp_nistz256_avx2_set1(void* RESULTx4);
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_avx2_set1
+.type	ecp_nistz256_avx2_set1,\@function,1
+.align	32
+ecp_nistz256_avx2_set1:
+	lea	.LONE+128(%rip), %rax
+	lea	128(%rdi), %rdi
+	vzeroupper
+	vmovdqa	32*0-128(%rax), %ymm0
+	vmovdqa	32*1-128(%rax), %ymm1
+	vmovdqa	32*2-128(%rax), %ymm2
+	vmovdqa	32*3-128(%rax), %ymm3
+	vmovdqa	32*4-128(%rax), %ymm4
+	vmovdqa	32*5-128(%rax), %ymm5
+	vmovdqa	%ymm0, 32*0-128(%rdi)
+	vmovdqa	32*6-128(%rax), %ymm0
+	vmovdqa	%ymm1, 32*1-128(%rdi)
+	vmovdqa	32*7-128(%rax), %ymm1
+	vmovdqa	%ymm2, 32*2-128(%rdi)
+	vmovdqa	32*8-128(%rax), %ymm2
+	vmovdqa	%ymm3, 32*3-128(%rdi)
+	vmovdqa	%ymm4, 32*4-128(%rdi)
+	vmovdqa	%ymm5, 32*5-128(%rdi)
+	vmovdqa	%ymm0, 32*6-128(%rdi)
+	vmovdqa	%ymm1, 32*7-128(%rdi)
+	vmovdqa	%ymm2, 32*8-128(%rdi)
+
+	vzeroupper
+	ret
+.size	ecp_nistz256_avx2_set1,.-ecp_nistz256_avx2_set1
+___
+}
+{
+################################################################################
+# void ecp_nistz256_avx2_multi_gather_w7(void* RESULT, void *in,
+#			    int index0, int index1, int index2, int index3);
+################################################################################
+
+my ($val,$in_t,$index0,$index1,$index2,$index3)=("%rdi","%rsi","%edx","%ecx","%r8d","%r9d");
+my ($INDEX0,$INDEX1,$INDEX2,$INDEX3)=map("%ymm$_",(0..3));
+my ($R0a,$R0b,$R1a,$R1b,$R2a,$R2b,$R3a,$R3b)=map("%ymm$_",(4..11));
+my ($M0,$T0,$T1,$TMP0)=map("%ymm$_",(12..15));
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_avx2_multi_gather_w7
+.type	ecp_nistz256_avx2_multi_gather_w7,\@function,6
+.align	32
+ecp_nistz256_avx2_multi_gather_w7:
+	vzeroupper
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($win64);
+	lea	-8-16*10(%rsp), %rsp
+	vmovaps	%xmm6, -8-16*10(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm7, -8-16*9(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm8, -8-16*8(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm9, -8-16*7(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm10, -8-16*6(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm11, -8-16*5(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm12, -8-16*4(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm13, -8-16*3(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm14, -8-16*2(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm15, -8-16*1(%rax)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	lea	.LIntOne(%rip), %rax
+
+	vmovd	$index0, %xmm0
+	vmovd	$index1, %xmm1
+	vmovd	$index2, %xmm2
+	vmovd	$index3, %xmm3
+
+	vpxor	$R0a, $R0a, $R0a
+	vpxor	$R0b, $R0b, $R0b
+	vpxor	$R1a, $R1a, $R1a
+	vpxor	$R1b, $R1b, $R1b
+	vpxor	$R2a, $R2a, $R2a
+	vpxor	$R2b, $R2b, $R2b
+	vpxor	$R3a, $R3a, $R3a
+	vpxor	$R3b, $R3b, $R3b
+	vmovdqa	(%rax), $M0
+
+	vpermd	$INDEX0, $R0a, $INDEX0
+	vpermd	$INDEX1, $R0a, $INDEX1
+	vpermd	$INDEX2, $R0a, $INDEX2
+	vpermd	$INDEX3, $R0a, $INDEX3
+
+	mov	\$64, %ecx
+	lea	112($val), $val		# size optimization
+	jmp	.Lmulti_select_loop_avx2
+
+# INDEX=0, corresponds to the point at infty (0,0)
+.align	32
+.Lmulti_select_loop_avx2:
+	vpcmpeqd	$INDEX0, $M0, $TMP0
+
+	vmovdqa		`32*0+32*64*2*0`($in_t), $T0
+	vmovdqa		`32*1+32*64*2*0`($in_t), $T1
+	vpand		$TMP0, $T0, $T0
+	vpand		$TMP0, $T1, $T1
+	vpxor		$T0, $R0a, $R0a
+	vpxor		$T1, $R0b, $R0b
+
+	vpcmpeqd	$INDEX1, $M0, $TMP0
+
+	vmovdqa		`32*0+32*64*2*1`($in_t), $T0
+	vmovdqa		`32*1+32*64*2*1`($in_t), $T1
+	vpand		$TMP0, $T0, $T0
+	vpand		$TMP0, $T1, $T1
+	vpxor		$T0, $R1a, $R1a
+	vpxor		$T1, $R1b, $R1b
+
+	vpcmpeqd	$INDEX2, $M0, $TMP0
+
+	vmovdqa		`32*0+32*64*2*2`($in_t), $T0
+	vmovdqa		`32*1+32*64*2*2`($in_t), $T1
+	vpand		$TMP0, $T0, $T0
+	vpand		$TMP0, $T1, $T1
+	vpxor		$T0, $R2a, $R2a
+	vpxor		$T1, $R2b, $R2b
+
+	vpcmpeqd	$INDEX3, $M0, $TMP0
+
+	vmovdqa		`32*0+32*64*2*3`($in_t), $T0
+	vmovdqa		`32*1+32*64*2*3`($in_t), $T1
+	vpand		$TMP0, $T0, $T0
+	vpand		$TMP0, $T1, $T1
+	vpxor		$T0, $R3a, $R3a
+	vpxor		$T1, $R3b, $R3b
+
+	vpaddd		(%rax), $M0, $M0	# increment
+	lea		32*2($in_t), $in_t
+
+        dec	%ecx
+	jnz	.Lmulti_select_loop_avx2
+
+	vmovdqu	$R0a, 32*0-112($val)
+	vmovdqu	$R0b, 32*1-112($val)
+	vmovdqu	$R1a, 32*2-112($val)
+	vmovdqu	$R1b, 32*3-112($val)
+	vmovdqu	$R2a, 32*4-112($val)
+	vmovdqu	$R2b, 32*5-112($val)
+	vmovdqu	$R3a, 32*6-112($val)
+	vmovdqu	$R3b, 32*7-112($val)
+
+	vzeroupper
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($win64);
+	movaps	16*0(%rsp), %xmm6
+	movaps	16*1(%rsp), %xmm7
+	movaps	16*2(%rsp), %xmm8
+	movaps	16*3(%rsp), %xmm9
+	movaps	16*4(%rsp), %xmm10
+	movaps	16*5(%rsp), %xmm11
+	movaps	16*6(%rsp), %xmm12
+	movaps	16*7(%rsp), %xmm13
+	movaps	16*8(%rsp), %xmm14
+	movaps	16*9(%rsp), %xmm15
+	lea	8+16*10(%rsp), %rsp
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	ret
+.size	ecp_nistz256_avx2_multi_gather_w7,.-ecp_nistz256_avx2_multi_gather_w7
+
+.extern	OPENSSL_ia32cap_P
+.globl	ecp_nistz_avx2_eligible
+.type	ecp_nistz_avx2_eligible,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	32
+ecp_nistz_avx2_eligible:
+	mov	OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+8(%rip),%eax
+	shr	\$5,%eax
+	and	\$1,%eax
+	ret
+.size	ecp_nistz_avx2_eligible,.-ecp_nistz_avx2_eligible
+___
+}
+}} else {{	# assembler is too old
+$code.=<<___;
+.text
+
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_avx2_transpose_convert
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_avx2_convert_transpose_back
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_avx2_point_add_affine_x4
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_avx2_point_add_affines_x4
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_avx2_to_mont
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_avx2_from_mont
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_avx2_set1
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_avx2_multi_gather_w7
+.type	ecp_nistz256_avx2_multi_gather_w7,\@abi-omnipotent
+ecp_nistz256_avx2_transpose_convert:
+ecp_nistz256_avx2_convert_transpose_back:
+ecp_nistz256_avx2_point_add_affine_x4:
+ecp_nistz256_avx2_point_add_affines_x4:
+ecp_nistz256_avx2_to_mont:
+ecp_nistz256_avx2_from_mont:
+ecp_nistz256_avx2_set1:
+ecp_nistz256_avx2_multi_gather_w7:
+	.byte	0x0f,0x0b	# ud2
+	ret
+.size	ecp_nistz256_avx2_multi_gather_w7,.-ecp_nistz256_avx2_multi_gather_w7
+
+.globl	ecp_nistz_avx2_eligible
+.type	ecp_nistz_avx2_eligible,\@abi-omnipotent
+ecp_nistz_avx2_eligible:
+	xor	%eax,%eax
+	ret
+.size	ecp_nistz_avx2_eligible,.-ecp_nistz_avx2_eligible
+___
+}}
+
+foreach (split("\n",$code)) {
+	s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval($1)/geo;
+
+	print $_,"\n";
+}
+
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-sparcv9.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-sparcv9.pl
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..97201cb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-sparcv9.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,3061 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# ECP_NISTZ256 module for SPARCv9.
+#
+# February 2015.
+#
+# Original ECP_NISTZ256 submission targeting x86_64 is detailed in
+# http://eprint.iacr.org/2013/816. In the process of adaptation
+# original .c module was made 32-bit savvy in order to make this
+# implementation possible.
+#
+#			with/without -DECP_NISTZ256_ASM
+# UltraSPARC III	+12-18%
+# SPARC T4		+99-550% (+66-150% on 32-bit Solaris)
+#
+# Ranges denote minimum and maximum improvement coefficients depending
+# on benchmark. Lower coefficients are for ECDSA sign, server-side
+# operation. Keep in mind that +200% means 3x improvement.
+
+$output = pop;
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+$code.=<<___;
+#include "sparc_arch.h"
+
+#define LOCALS	(STACK_BIAS+STACK_FRAME)
+#ifdef	__arch64__
+.register	%g2,#scratch
+.register	%g3,#scratch
+# define STACK64_FRAME	STACK_FRAME
+# define LOCALS64	LOCALS
+#else
+# define STACK64_FRAME	(2047+192)
+# define LOCALS64	STACK64_FRAME
+#endif
+
+.section	".text",#alloc,#execinstr
+___
+########################################################################
+# Convert ecp_nistz256_table.c to layout expected by ecp_nistz_gather_w7
+#
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+open TABLE,"<ecp_nistz256_table.c"		or
+open TABLE,"<${dir}../ecp_nistz256_table.c"	or
+die "failed to open ecp_nistz256_table.c:",$!;
+
+use integer;
+
+foreach(<TABLE>) {
+	s/TOBN\(\s*(0x[0-9a-f]+),\s*(0x[0-9a-f]+)\s*\)/push @arr,hex($2),hex($1)/geo;
+}
+close TABLE;
+
+# See ecp_nistz256_table.c for explanation for why it's 64*16*37.
+# 64*16*37-1 is because $#arr returns last valid index or @arr, not
+# amount of elements.
+die "insane number of elements" if ($#arr != 64*16*37-1);
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_precomputed
+.align	4096
+ecp_nistz256_precomputed:
+___
+########################################################################
+# this conversion smashes P256_POINT_AFFINE by individual bytes with
+# 64 byte interval, similar to
+#	1111222233334444
+#	1234123412341234
+for(1..37) {
+	@tbl = splice(@arr,0,64*16);
+	for($i=0;$i<64;$i++) {
+		undef @line;
+		for($j=0;$j<64;$j++) {
+			push @line,(@tbl[$j*16+$i/4]>>(($i%4)*8))&0xff;
+		}
+		$code.=".byte\t";
+		$code.=join(',',map { sprintf "0x%02x",$_} @line);
+		$code.="\n";
+	}
+}
+
+{{{
+my ($rp,$ap,$bp)=map("%i$_",(0..2));
+my @acc=map("%l$_",(0..7));
+my ($t0,$t1,$t2,$t3,$t4,$t5,$t6,$t7)=(map("%o$_",(0..5)),"%g4","%g5");
+my ($bi,$a0,$mask,$carry)=(map("%i$_",(3..5)),"%g1");
+my ($rp_real,$ap_real)=("%g2","%g3");
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.type	ecp_nistz256_precomputed,#object
+.size	ecp_nistz256_precomputed,.-ecp_nistz256_precomputed
+.align	64
+.LRR:	! 2^512 mod P precomputed for NIST P256 polynomial
+.long	0x00000003, 0x00000000, 0xffffffff, 0xfffffffb
+.long	0xfffffffe, 0xffffffff, 0xfffffffd, 0x00000004
+.Lone:
+.long	1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0
+.asciz	"ECP_NISTZ256 for SPARCv9, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+
+! void	ecp_nistz256_to_mont(BN_ULONG %i0[8],const BN_ULONG %i1[8]);
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_to_mont
+.align	64
+ecp_nistz256_to_mont:
+	save	%sp,-STACK_FRAME,%sp
+	nop
+1:	call	.+8
+	add	%o7,.LRR-1b,$bp
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont
+	nop
+	ret
+	restore
+.type	ecp_nistz256_to_mont,#function
+.size	ecp_nistz256_to_mont,.-ecp_nistz256_to_mont
+
+! void	ecp_nistz256_from_mont(BN_ULONG %i0[8],const BN_ULONG %i1[8]);
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_from_mont
+.align	32
+ecp_nistz256_from_mont:
+	save	%sp,-STACK_FRAME,%sp
+	nop
+1:	call	.+8
+	add	%o7,.Lone-1b,$bp
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont
+	nop
+	ret
+	restore
+.type	ecp_nistz256_from_mont,#function
+.size	ecp_nistz256_from_mont,.-ecp_nistz256_from_mont
+
+! void	ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(BN_ULONG %i0[8],const BN_ULONG %i1[8],
+!					      const BN_ULONG %i2[8]);
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_mul_mont
+.align	32
+ecp_nistz256_mul_mont:
+	save	%sp,-STACK_FRAME,%sp
+	nop
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont
+	nop
+	ret
+	restore
+.type	ecp_nistz256_mul_mont,#function
+.size	ecp_nistz256_mul_mont,.-ecp_nistz256_mul_mont
+
+! void	ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(BN_ULONG %i0[8],const BN_ULONG %i2[8]);
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont
+.align	32
+ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont:
+	save	%sp,-STACK_FRAME,%sp
+	mov	$ap,$bp
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont
+	nop
+	ret
+	restore
+.type	ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont,#function
+.size	ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont,.-ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont
+___
+
+########################################################################
+# Special thing to keep in mind is that $t0-$t7 hold 64-bit values,
+# while all others are meant to keep 32. "Meant to" means that additions
+# to @acc[0-7] do "contaminate" upper bits, but they are cleared before
+# they can affect outcome (follow 'and' with $mask). Also keep in mind
+# that addition with carry is addition with 32-bit carry, even though
+# CPU is 64-bit. [Addition with 64-bit carry was introduced in T3, see
+# below for VIS3 code paths.]
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.align	32
+__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont:
+	ld	[$bp+0],$bi		! b[0]
+	mov	-1,$mask
+	ld	[$ap+0],$a0
+	srl	$mask,0,$mask		! 0xffffffff
+	ld	[$ap+4],$t1
+	ld	[$ap+8],$t2
+	ld	[$ap+12],$t3
+	ld	[$ap+16],$t4
+	ld	[$ap+20],$t5
+	ld	[$ap+24],$t6
+	ld	[$ap+28],$t7
+	mulx	$a0,$bi,$t0		! a[0-7]*b[0], 64-bit results
+	mulx	$t1,$bi,$t1
+	mulx	$t2,$bi,$t2
+	mulx	$t3,$bi,$t3
+	mulx	$t4,$bi,$t4
+	mulx	$t5,$bi,$t5
+	mulx	$t6,$bi,$t6
+	mulx	$t7,$bi,$t7
+	srlx	$t0,32,@acc[1]		! extract high parts
+	srlx	$t1,32,@acc[2]
+	srlx	$t2,32,@acc[3]
+	srlx	$t3,32,@acc[4]
+	srlx	$t4,32,@acc[5]
+	srlx	$t5,32,@acc[6]
+	srlx	$t6,32,@acc[7]
+	srlx	$t7,32,@acc[0]		! "@acc[8]"
+	mov	0,$carry
+___
+for($i=1;$i<8;$i++) {
+$code.=<<___;
+	addcc	@acc[1],$t1,@acc[1]	! accumulate high parts
+	ld	[$bp+4*$i],$bi		! b[$i]
+	ld	[$ap+4],$t1		! re-load a[1-7]
+	addccc	@acc[2],$t2,@acc[2]
+	addccc	@acc[3],$t3,@acc[3]
+	ld	[$ap+8],$t2
+	ld	[$ap+12],$t3
+	addccc	@acc[4],$t4,@acc[4]
+	addccc	@acc[5],$t5,@acc[5]
+	ld	[$ap+16],$t4
+	ld	[$ap+20],$t5
+	addccc	@acc[6],$t6,@acc[6]
+	addccc	@acc[7],$t7,@acc[7]
+	ld	[$ap+24],$t6
+	ld	[$ap+28],$t7
+	addccc	@acc[0],$carry,@acc[0]	! "@acc[8]"
+	addc	%g0,%g0,$carry
+___
+	# Reduction iteration is normally performed by accumulating
+	# result of multiplication of modulus by "magic" digit [and
+	# omitting least significant word, which is guaranteed to
+	# be 0], but thanks to special form of modulus and "magic"
+	# digit being equal to least significant word, it can be
+	# performed with additions and subtractions alone. Indeed:
+	#
+	#        ffff.0001.0000.0000.0000.ffff.ffff.ffff
+	# *                                         abcd
+	# + xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.abcd
+	#
+	# Now observing that ff..ff*x = (2^n-1)*x = 2^n*x-x, we
+	# rewrite above as:
+	#
+	#   xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.abcd
+	# + abcd.0000.abcd.0000.0000.abcd.0000.0000.0000
+	# -      abcd.0000.0000.0000.0000.0000.0000.abcd
+	#
+	# or marking redundant operations:
+	#
+	#   xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.----
+	# + abcd.0000.abcd.0000.0000.abcd.----.----.----
+	# -      abcd.----.----.----.----.----.----.----
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	! multiplication-less reduction
+	addcc	@acc[3],$t0,@acc[3]	! r[3]+=r[0]
+	addccc	@acc[4],%g0,@acc[4]	! r[4]+=0
+	 and	@acc[1],$mask,@acc[1]
+	 and	@acc[2],$mask,@acc[2]
+	addccc	@acc[5],%g0,@acc[5]	! r[5]+=0
+	addccc	@acc[6],$t0,@acc[6]	! r[6]+=r[0]
+	 and	@acc[3],$mask,@acc[3]
+	 and	@acc[4],$mask,@acc[4]
+	addccc	@acc[7],%g0,@acc[7]	! r[7]+=0
+	addccc	@acc[0],$t0,@acc[0]	! r[8]+=r[0]	"@acc[8]"
+	 and	@acc[5],$mask,@acc[5]
+	 and	@acc[6],$mask,@acc[6]
+	addc	$carry,%g0,$carry	! top-most carry
+	subcc	@acc[7],$t0,@acc[7]	! r[7]-=r[0]
+	subccc	@acc[0],%g0,@acc[0]	! r[8]-=0	"@acc[8]"
+	subc	$carry,%g0,$carry	! top-most carry
+	 and	@acc[7],$mask,@acc[7]
+	 and	@acc[0],$mask,@acc[0]	! "@acc[8]"
+___
+	push(@acc,shift(@acc));		# rotate registers to "omit" acc[0]
+$code.=<<___;
+	mulx	$a0,$bi,$t0		! a[0-7]*b[$i], 64-bit results
+	mulx	$t1,$bi,$t1
+	mulx	$t2,$bi,$t2
+	mulx	$t3,$bi,$t3
+	mulx	$t4,$bi,$t4
+	mulx	$t5,$bi,$t5
+	mulx	$t6,$bi,$t6
+	mulx	$t7,$bi,$t7
+	add	@acc[0],$t0,$t0		! accumulate low parts, can't overflow
+	add	@acc[1],$t1,$t1
+	srlx	$t0,32,@acc[1]		! extract high parts
+	add	@acc[2],$t2,$t2
+	srlx	$t1,32,@acc[2]
+	add	@acc[3],$t3,$t3
+	srlx	$t2,32,@acc[3]
+	add	@acc[4],$t4,$t4
+	srlx	$t3,32,@acc[4]
+	add	@acc[5],$t5,$t5
+	srlx	$t4,32,@acc[5]
+	add	@acc[6],$t6,$t6
+	srlx	$t5,32,@acc[6]
+	add	@acc[7],$t7,$t7
+	srlx	$t6,32,@acc[7]
+	srlx	$t7,32,@acc[0]		! "@acc[8]"
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	addcc	@acc[1],$t1,@acc[1]	! accumulate high parts
+	addccc	@acc[2],$t2,@acc[2]
+	addccc	@acc[3],$t3,@acc[3]
+	addccc	@acc[4],$t4,@acc[4]
+	addccc	@acc[5],$t5,@acc[5]
+	addccc	@acc[6],$t6,@acc[6]
+	addccc	@acc[7],$t7,@acc[7]
+	addccc	@acc[0],$carry,@acc[0]	! "@acc[8]"
+	addc	%g0,%g0,$carry
+
+	addcc	@acc[3],$t0,@acc[3]	! multiplication-less reduction
+	addccc	@acc[4],%g0,@acc[4]
+	addccc	@acc[5],%g0,@acc[5]
+	addccc	@acc[6],$t0,@acc[6]
+	addccc	@acc[7],%g0,@acc[7]
+	addccc	@acc[0],$t0,@acc[0]	! "@acc[8]"
+	addc	$carry,%g0,$carry
+	subcc	@acc[7],$t0,@acc[7]
+	subccc	@acc[0],%g0,@acc[0]	! "@acc[8]"
+	subc	$carry,%g0,$carry	! top-most carry
+___
+	push(@acc,shift(@acc));		# rotate registers to omit acc[0]
+$code.=<<___;
+	! Final step is "if result > mod, subtract mod", but we do it
+	! "other way around", namely subtract modulus from result
+	! and if it borrowed, add modulus back.
+
+	subcc	@acc[0],-1,@acc[0]	! subtract modulus
+	subccc	@acc[1],-1,@acc[1]
+	subccc	@acc[2],-1,@acc[2]
+	subccc	@acc[3],0,@acc[3]
+	subccc	@acc[4],0,@acc[4]
+	subccc	@acc[5],0,@acc[5]
+	subccc	@acc[6],1,@acc[6]
+	subccc	@acc[7],-1,@acc[7]
+	subc	$carry,0,$carry		! broadcast borrow bit
+
+	! Note that because mod has special form, i.e. consists of
+	! 0xffffffff, 1 and 0s, we can conditionally synthesize it by
+	! using value of broadcasted borrow and the borrow bit itself.
+	! To minimize dependency chain we first broadcast and then
+	! extract the bit by negating (follow $bi).
+
+	addcc	@acc[0],$carry,@acc[0]	! add modulus or zero
+	addccc	@acc[1],$carry,@acc[1]
+	neg	$carry,$bi
+	st	@acc[0],[$rp]
+	addccc	@acc[2],$carry,@acc[2]
+	st	@acc[1],[$rp+4]
+	addccc	@acc[3],0,@acc[3]
+	st	@acc[2],[$rp+8]
+	addccc	@acc[4],0,@acc[4]
+	st	@acc[3],[$rp+12]
+	addccc	@acc[5],0,@acc[5]
+	st	@acc[4],[$rp+16]
+	addccc	@acc[6],$bi,@acc[6]
+	st	@acc[5],[$rp+20]
+	addc	@acc[7],$carry,@acc[7]
+	st	@acc[6],[$rp+24]
+	retl
+	st	@acc[7],[$rp+28]
+.type	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont,#function
+.size	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont,.-__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont
+
+! void	ecp_nistz256_add(BN_ULONG %i0[8],const BN_ULONG %i1[8],
+!					 const BN_ULONG %i2[8]);
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_add
+.align	32
+ecp_nistz256_add:
+	save	%sp,-STACK_FRAME,%sp
+	ld	[$ap],@acc[0]
+	ld	[$ap+4],@acc[1]
+	ld	[$ap+8],@acc[2]
+	ld	[$ap+12],@acc[3]
+	ld	[$ap+16],@acc[4]
+	ld	[$ap+20],@acc[5]
+	ld	[$ap+24],@acc[6]
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_add
+	ld	[$ap+28],@acc[7]
+	ret
+	restore
+.type	ecp_nistz256_add,#function
+.size	ecp_nistz256_add,.-ecp_nistz256_add
+
+.align	32
+__ecp_nistz256_add:
+	ld	[$bp+0],$t0		! b[0]
+	ld	[$bp+4],$t1
+	ld	[$bp+8],$t2
+	ld	[$bp+12],$t3
+	addcc	@acc[0],$t0,@acc[0]
+	ld	[$bp+16],$t4
+	ld	[$bp+20],$t5
+	addccc	@acc[1],$t1,@acc[1]
+	ld	[$bp+24],$t6
+	ld	[$bp+28],$t7
+	addccc	@acc[2],$t2,@acc[2]
+	addccc	@acc[3],$t3,@acc[3]
+	addccc	@acc[4],$t4,@acc[4]
+	addccc	@acc[5],$t5,@acc[5]
+	addccc	@acc[6],$t6,@acc[6]
+	addccc	@acc[7],$t7,@acc[7]
+	addc	%g0,%g0,$carry
+
+.Lreduce_by_sub:
+
+	! if a+b >= modulus, subtract modulus.
+	!
+	! But since comparison implies subtraction, we subtract
+	! modulus and then add it back if subraction borrowed.
+
+	subcc	@acc[0],-1,@acc[0]
+	subccc	@acc[1],-1,@acc[1]
+	subccc	@acc[2],-1,@acc[2]
+	subccc	@acc[3], 0,@acc[3]
+	subccc	@acc[4], 0,@acc[4]
+	subccc	@acc[5], 0,@acc[5]
+	subccc	@acc[6], 1,@acc[6]
+	subccc	@acc[7],-1,@acc[7]
+	subc	$carry,0,$carry
+
+	! Note that because mod has special form, i.e. consists of
+	! 0xffffffff, 1 and 0s, we can conditionally synthesize it by
+	! using value of borrow and its negative.
+
+	addcc	@acc[0],$carry,@acc[0]	! add synthesized modulus
+	addccc	@acc[1],$carry,@acc[1]
+	neg	$carry,$bi
+	st	@acc[0],[$rp]
+	addccc	@acc[2],$carry,@acc[2]
+	st	@acc[1],[$rp+4]
+	addccc	@acc[3],0,@acc[3]
+	st	@acc[2],[$rp+8]
+	addccc	@acc[4],0,@acc[4]
+	st	@acc[3],[$rp+12]
+	addccc	@acc[5],0,@acc[5]
+	st	@acc[4],[$rp+16]
+	addccc	@acc[6],$bi,@acc[6]
+	st	@acc[5],[$rp+20]
+	addc	@acc[7],$carry,@acc[7]
+	st	@acc[6],[$rp+24]
+	retl
+	st	@acc[7],[$rp+28]
+.type	__ecp_nistz256_add,#function
+.size	__ecp_nistz256_add,.-__ecp_nistz256_add
+
+! void	ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2(BN_ULONG %i0[8],const BN_ULONG %i1[8]);
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2
+.align	32
+ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2:
+	save	%sp,-STACK_FRAME,%sp
+	ld	[$ap],@acc[0]
+	ld	[$ap+4],@acc[1]
+	ld	[$ap+8],@acc[2]
+	ld	[$ap+12],@acc[3]
+	ld	[$ap+16],@acc[4]
+	ld	[$ap+20],@acc[5]
+	ld	[$ap+24],@acc[6]
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2
+	ld	[$ap+28],@acc[7]
+	ret
+	restore
+.type	ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2,#function
+.size	ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2,.-ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2
+
+.align	32
+__ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2:
+	addcc	@acc[0],@acc[0],@acc[0]	! a+a=2*a
+	addccc	@acc[1],@acc[1],@acc[1]
+	addccc	@acc[2],@acc[2],@acc[2]
+	addccc	@acc[3],@acc[3],@acc[3]
+	addccc	@acc[4],@acc[4],@acc[4]
+	addccc	@acc[5],@acc[5],@acc[5]
+	addccc	@acc[6],@acc[6],@acc[6]
+	addccc	@acc[7],@acc[7],@acc[7]
+	b	.Lreduce_by_sub
+	addc	%g0,%g0,$carry
+.type	__ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2,#function
+.size	__ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2,.-__ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2
+
+! void	ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3(BN_ULONG %i0[8],const BN_ULONG %i1[8]);
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3
+.align	32
+ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3:
+	save	%sp,-STACK_FRAME,%sp
+	ld	[$ap],@acc[0]
+	ld	[$ap+4],@acc[1]
+	ld	[$ap+8],@acc[2]
+	ld	[$ap+12],@acc[3]
+	ld	[$ap+16],@acc[4]
+	ld	[$ap+20],@acc[5]
+	ld	[$ap+24],@acc[6]
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3
+	ld	[$ap+28],@acc[7]
+	ret
+	restore
+.type	ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3,#function
+.size	ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3,.-ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3
+
+.align	32
+__ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3:
+	addcc	@acc[0],@acc[0],$t0	! a+a=2*a
+	addccc	@acc[1],@acc[1],$t1
+	addccc	@acc[2],@acc[2],$t2
+	addccc	@acc[3],@acc[3],$t3
+	addccc	@acc[4],@acc[4],$t4
+	addccc	@acc[5],@acc[5],$t5
+	addccc	@acc[6],@acc[6],$t6
+	addccc	@acc[7],@acc[7],$t7
+	addc	%g0,%g0,$carry
+
+	subcc	$t0,-1,$t0		! .Lreduce_by_sub but without stores
+	subccc	$t1,-1,$t1
+	subccc	$t2,-1,$t2
+	subccc	$t3, 0,$t3
+	subccc	$t4, 0,$t4
+	subccc	$t5, 0,$t5
+	subccc	$t6, 1,$t6
+	subccc	$t7,-1,$t7
+	subc	$carry,0,$carry
+
+	addcc	$t0,$carry,$t0		! add synthesized modulus
+	addccc	$t1,$carry,$t1
+	neg	$carry,$bi
+	addccc	$t2,$carry,$t2
+	addccc	$t3,0,$t3
+	addccc	$t4,0,$t4
+	addccc	$t5,0,$t5
+	addccc	$t6,$bi,$t6
+	addc	$t7,$carry,$t7
+
+	addcc	$t0,@acc[0],@acc[0]	! 2*a+a=3*a
+	addccc	$t1,@acc[1],@acc[1]
+	addccc	$t2,@acc[2],@acc[2]
+	addccc	$t3,@acc[3],@acc[3]
+	addccc	$t4,@acc[4],@acc[4]
+	addccc	$t5,@acc[5],@acc[5]
+	addccc	$t6,@acc[6],@acc[6]
+	addccc	$t7,@acc[7],@acc[7]
+	b	.Lreduce_by_sub
+	addc	%g0,%g0,$carry
+.type	__ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3,#function
+.size	__ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3,.-__ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3
+
+! void	ecp_nistz256_sub(BN_ULONG %i0[8],const BN_ULONG %i1[8],
+!				         const BN_ULONG %i2[8]);
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_sub
+.align	32
+ecp_nistz256_sub:
+	save	%sp,-STACK_FRAME,%sp
+	ld	[$ap],@acc[0]
+	ld	[$ap+4],@acc[1]
+	ld	[$ap+8],@acc[2]
+	ld	[$ap+12],@acc[3]
+	ld	[$ap+16],@acc[4]
+	ld	[$ap+20],@acc[5]
+	ld	[$ap+24],@acc[6]
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_sub_from
+	ld	[$ap+28],@acc[7]
+	ret
+	restore
+.type	ecp_nistz256_sub,#function
+.size	ecp_nistz256_sub,.-ecp_nistz256_sub
+
+! void	ecp_nistz256_neg(BN_ULONG %i0[8],const BN_ULONG %i1[8]);
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_neg
+.align	32
+ecp_nistz256_neg:
+	save	%sp,-STACK_FRAME,%sp
+	mov	$ap,$bp
+	mov	0,@acc[0]
+	mov	0,@acc[1]
+	mov	0,@acc[2]
+	mov	0,@acc[3]
+	mov	0,@acc[4]
+	mov	0,@acc[5]
+	mov	0,@acc[6]
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_sub_from
+	mov	0,@acc[7]
+	ret
+	restore
+.type	ecp_nistz256_neg,#function
+.size	ecp_nistz256_neg,.-ecp_nistz256_neg
+
+.align	32
+__ecp_nistz256_sub_from:
+	ld	[$bp+0],$t0		! b[0]
+	ld	[$bp+4],$t1
+	ld	[$bp+8],$t2
+	ld	[$bp+12],$t3
+	subcc	@acc[0],$t0,@acc[0]
+	ld	[$bp+16],$t4
+	ld	[$bp+20],$t5
+	subccc	@acc[1],$t1,@acc[1]
+	subccc	@acc[2],$t2,@acc[2]
+	ld	[$bp+24],$t6
+	ld	[$bp+28],$t7
+	subccc	@acc[3],$t3,@acc[3]
+	subccc	@acc[4],$t4,@acc[4]
+	subccc	@acc[5],$t5,@acc[5]
+	subccc	@acc[6],$t6,@acc[6]
+	subccc	@acc[7],$t7,@acc[7]
+	subc	%g0,%g0,$carry		! broadcast borrow bit
+
+.Lreduce_by_add:
+
+	! if a-b borrows, add modulus.
+	!
+	! Note that because mod has special form, i.e. consists of
+	! 0xffffffff, 1 and 0s, we can conditionally synthesize it by
+	! using value of broadcasted borrow and the borrow bit itself.
+	! To minimize dependency chain we first broadcast and then
+	! extract the bit by negating (follow $bi).
+
+	addcc	@acc[0],$carry,@acc[0]	! add synthesized modulus
+	addccc	@acc[1],$carry,@acc[1]
+	neg	$carry,$bi
+	st	@acc[0],[$rp]
+	addccc	@acc[2],$carry,@acc[2]
+	st	@acc[1],[$rp+4]
+	addccc	@acc[3],0,@acc[3]
+	st	@acc[2],[$rp+8]
+	addccc	@acc[4],0,@acc[4]
+	st	@acc[3],[$rp+12]
+	addccc	@acc[5],0,@acc[5]
+	st	@acc[4],[$rp+16]
+	addccc	@acc[6],$bi,@acc[6]
+	st	@acc[5],[$rp+20]
+	addc	@acc[7],$carry,@acc[7]
+	st	@acc[6],[$rp+24]
+	retl
+	st	@acc[7],[$rp+28]
+.type	__ecp_nistz256_sub_from,#function
+.size	__ecp_nistz256_sub_from,.-__ecp_nistz256_sub_from
+
+.align	32
+__ecp_nistz256_sub_morf:
+	ld	[$bp+0],$t0		! b[0]
+	ld	[$bp+4],$t1
+	ld	[$bp+8],$t2
+	ld	[$bp+12],$t3
+	subcc	$t0,@acc[0],@acc[0]
+	ld	[$bp+16],$t4
+	ld	[$bp+20],$t5
+	subccc	$t1,@acc[1],@acc[1]
+	subccc	$t2,@acc[2],@acc[2]
+	ld	[$bp+24],$t6
+	ld	[$bp+28],$t7
+	subccc	$t3,@acc[3],@acc[3]
+	subccc	$t4,@acc[4],@acc[4]
+	subccc	$t5,@acc[5],@acc[5]
+	subccc	$t6,@acc[6],@acc[6]
+	subccc	$t7,@acc[7],@acc[7]
+	b	.Lreduce_by_add
+	subc	%g0,%g0,$carry		! broadcast borrow bit
+.type	__ecp_nistz256_sub_morf,#function
+.size	__ecp_nistz256_sub_morf,.-__ecp_nistz256_sub_morf
+
+! void	ecp_nistz256_div_by_2(BN_ULONG %i0[8],const BN_ULONG %i1[8]);
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_div_by_2
+.align	32
+ecp_nistz256_div_by_2:
+	save	%sp,-STACK_FRAME,%sp
+	ld	[$ap],@acc[0]
+	ld	[$ap+4],@acc[1]
+	ld	[$ap+8],@acc[2]
+	ld	[$ap+12],@acc[3]
+	ld	[$ap+16],@acc[4]
+	ld	[$ap+20],@acc[5]
+	ld	[$ap+24],@acc[6]
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_div_by_2
+	ld	[$ap+28],@acc[7]
+	ret
+	restore
+.type	ecp_nistz256_div_by_2,#function
+.size	ecp_nistz256_div_by_2,.-ecp_nistz256_div_by_2
+
+.align	32
+__ecp_nistz256_div_by_2:
+	! ret = (a is odd ? a+mod : a) >> 1
+
+	and	@acc[0],1,$bi
+	neg	$bi,$carry
+	addcc	@acc[0],$carry,@acc[0]
+	addccc	@acc[1],$carry,@acc[1]
+	addccc	@acc[2],$carry,@acc[2]
+	addccc	@acc[3],0,@acc[3]
+	addccc	@acc[4],0,@acc[4]
+	addccc	@acc[5],0,@acc[5]
+	addccc	@acc[6],$bi,@acc[6]
+	addccc	@acc[7],$carry,@acc[7]
+	addc	%g0,%g0,$carry
+
+	! ret >>= 1
+
+	srl	@acc[0],1,@acc[0]
+	sll	@acc[1],31,$t0
+	srl	@acc[1],1,@acc[1]
+	or	@acc[0],$t0,@acc[0]
+	sll	@acc[2],31,$t1
+	srl	@acc[2],1,@acc[2]
+	or	@acc[1],$t1,@acc[1]
+	sll	@acc[3],31,$t2
+	st	@acc[0],[$rp]
+	srl	@acc[3],1,@acc[3]
+	or	@acc[2],$t2,@acc[2]
+	sll	@acc[4],31,$t3
+	st	@acc[1],[$rp+4]
+	srl	@acc[4],1,@acc[4]
+	or	@acc[3],$t3,@acc[3]
+	sll	@acc[5],31,$t4
+	st	@acc[2],[$rp+8]
+	srl	@acc[5],1,@acc[5]
+	or	@acc[4],$t4,@acc[4]
+	sll	@acc[6],31,$t5
+	st	@acc[3],[$rp+12]
+	srl	@acc[6],1,@acc[6]
+	or	@acc[5],$t5,@acc[5]
+	sll	@acc[7],31,$t6
+	st	@acc[4],[$rp+16]
+	srl	@acc[7],1,@acc[7]
+	or	@acc[6],$t6,@acc[6]
+	sll	$carry,31,$t7
+	st	@acc[5],[$rp+20]
+	or	@acc[7],$t7,@acc[7]
+	st	@acc[6],[$rp+24]
+	retl
+	st	@acc[7],[$rp+28]
+.type	__ecp_nistz256_div_by_2,#function
+.size	__ecp_nistz256_div_by_2,.-__ecp_nistz256_div_by_2
+___
+
+########################################################################
+# following subroutines are "literal" implementation of those found in
+# ecp_nistz256.c
+#
+########################################################################
+# void ecp_nistz256_point_double(P256_POINT *out,const P256_POINT *inp);
+#
+{
+my ($S,$M,$Zsqr,$tmp0)=map(32*$_,(0..3));
+# above map() describes stack layout with 4 temporary
+# 256-bit vectors on top.
+
+$code.=<<___;
+#ifdef __PIC__
+SPARC_PIC_THUNK(%g1)
+#endif
+
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_point_double
+.align	32
+ecp_nistz256_point_double:
+	SPARC_LOAD_ADDRESS_LEAF(OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P,%g1,%g5)
+	ld	[%g1],%g1		! OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0]
+	and	%g1,(SPARCV9_VIS3|SPARCV9_64BIT_STACK),%g1
+	cmp	%g1,(SPARCV9_VIS3|SPARCV9_64BIT_STACK)
+	be	ecp_nistz256_point_double_vis3
+	nop
+
+	save	%sp,-STACK_FRAME-32*4,%sp
+
+	mov	$rp,$rp_real
+	mov	$ap,$ap_real
+
+.Lpoint_double_shortcut:
+	ld	[$ap+32],@acc[0]
+	ld	[$ap+32+4],@acc[1]
+	ld	[$ap+32+8],@acc[2]
+	ld	[$ap+32+12],@acc[3]
+	ld	[$ap+32+16],@acc[4]
+	ld	[$ap+32+20],@acc[5]
+	ld	[$ap+32+24],@acc[6]
+	ld	[$ap+32+28],@acc[7]
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2	! p256_mul_by_2(S, in_y);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$S,$rp
+
+	add	$ap_real,64,$bp
+	add	$ap_real,64,$ap
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	! p256_sqr_mont(Zsqr, in_z);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$Zsqr,$rp
+
+	add	$ap_real,0,$bp
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_add	! p256_add(M, Zsqr, in_x);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$M,$rp
+
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$S,$bp
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$S,$ap
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	! p256_sqr_mont(S, S);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$S,$rp
+
+	ld	[$ap_real],@acc[0]
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$Zsqr,$bp
+	ld	[$ap_real+4],@acc[1]
+	ld	[$ap_real+8],@acc[2]
+	ld	[$ap_real+12],@acc[3]
+	ld	[$ap_real+16],@acc[4]
+	ld	[$ap_real+20],@acc[5]
+	ld	[$ap_real+24],@acc[6]
+	ld	[$ap_real+28],@acc[7]
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_sub_from	! p256_sub(Zsqr, in_x, Zsqr);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$Zsqr,$rp
+
+	add	$ap_real,32,$bp
+	add	$ap_real,64,$ap
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	! p256_mul_mont(tmp0, in_z, in_y);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$tmp0,$rp
+
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2	! p256_mul_by_2(res_z, tmp0);
+	add	$rp_real,64,$rp
+
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$Zsqr,$bp
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$M,$ap
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	! p256_mul_mont(M, M, Zsqr);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$M,$rp
+
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3	! p256_mul_by_3(M, M);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$M,$rp
+
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$S,$bp
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$S,$ap
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	! p256_sqr_mont(tmp0, S);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$tmp0,$rp
+
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_div_by_2	! p256_div_by_2(res_y, tmp0);
+	add	$rp_real,32,$rp
+
+	add	$ap_real,0,$bp
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$S,$ap
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	! p256_mul_mont(S, S, in_x);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$S,$rp
+
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2	! p256_mul_by_2(tmp0, S);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$tmp0,$rp
+
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$M,$bp
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$M,$ap
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	! p256_sqr_mont(res_x, M);
+	add	$rp_real,0,$rp
+
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$tmp0,$bp
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_sub_from	! p256_sub(res_x, res_x, tmp0);
+	add	$rp_real,0,$rp
+
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$S,$bp
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_sub_morf	! p256_sub(S, S, res_x);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$S,$rp
+
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$M,$bp
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$S,$ap
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	! p256_mul_mont(S, S, M);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$S,$rp
+
+	add	$rp_real,32,$bp
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_sub_from	! p256_sub(res_y, S, res_y);
+	add	$rp_real,32,$rp
+
+	ret
+	restore
+.type	ecp_nistz256_point_double,#function
+.size	ecp_nistz256_point_double,.-ecp_nistz256_point_double
+___
+}
+
+########################################################################
+# void ecp_nistz256_point_add(P256_POINT *out,const P256_POINT *in1,
+#			      const P256_POINT *in2);
+{
+my ($res_x,$res_y,$res_z,
+    $H,$Hsqr,$R,$Rsqr,$Hcub,
+    $U1,$U2,$S1,$S2)=map(32*$_,(0..11));
+my ($Z1sqr, $Z2sqr) = ($Hsqr, $Rsqr);
+
+# above map() describes stack layout with 12 temporary
+# 256-bit vectors on top. Then we reserve some space for
+# !in1infty, !in2infty, result of check for zero and return pointer.
+
+my $bp_real=$rp_real;
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_point_add
+.align	32
+ecp_nistz256_point_add:
+	SPARC_LOAD_ADDRESS_LEAF(OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P,%g1,%g5)
+	ld	[%g1],%g1		! OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0]
+	and	%g1,(SPARCV9_VIS3|SPARCV9_64BIT_STACK),%g1
+	cmp	%g1,(SPARCV9_VIS3|SPARCV9_64BIT_STACK)
+	be	ecp_nistz256_point_add_vis3
+	nop
+
+	save	%sp,-STACK_FRAME-32*12-32,%sp
+
+	stx	$rp,[%fp+STACK_BIAS-8]	! off-load $rp
+	mov	$ap,$ap_real
+	mov	$bp,$bp_real
+
+	ld	[$bp+64],$t0		! in2_z
+	ld	[$bp+64+4],$t1
+	ld	[$bp+64+8],$t2
+	ld	[$bp+64+12],$t3
+	ld	[$bp+64+16],$t4
+	ld	[$bp+64+20],$t5
+	ld	[$bp+64+24],$t6
+	ld	[$bp+64+28],$t7
+	or	$t1,$t0,$t0
+	or	$t3,$t2,$t2
+	or	$t5,$t4,$t4
+	or	$t7,$t6,$t6
+	or	$t2,$t0,$t0
+	or	$t6,$t4,$t4
+	or	$t4,$t0,$t0		! !in2infty
+	movrnz	$t0,-1,$t0
+	st	$t0,[%fp+STACK_BIAS-12]
+
+	ld	[$ap+64],$t0		! in1_z
+	ld	[$ap+64+4],$t1
+	ld	[$ap+64+8],$t2
+	ld	[$ap+64+12],$t3
+	ld	[$ap+64+16],$t4
+	ld	[$ap+64+20],$t5
+	ld	[$ap+64+24],$t6
+	ld	[$ap+64+28],$t7
+	or	$t1,$t0,$t0
+	or	$t3,$t2,$t2
+	or	$t5,$t4,$t4
+	or	$t7,$t6,$t6
+	or	$t2,$t0,$t0
+	or	$t6,$t4,$t4
+	or	$t4,$t0,$t0		! !in1infty
+	movrnz	$t0,-1,$t0
+	st	$t0,[%fp+STACK_BIAS-16]
+
+	add	$bp_real,64,$bp
+	add	$bp_real,64,$ap
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	! p256_sqr_mont(Z2sqr, in2_z);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$Z2sqr,$rp
+
+	add	$ap_real,64,$bp
+	add	$ap_real,64,$ap
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	! p256_sqr_mont(Z1sqr, in1_z);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$Z1sqr,$rp
+
+	add	$bp_real,64,$bp
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$Z2sqr,$ap
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	! p256_mul_mont(S1, Z2sqr, in2_z);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$S1,$rp
+
+	add	$ap_real,64,$bp
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$Z1sqr,$ap
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	! p256_mul_mont(S2, Z1sqr, in1_z);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$S2,$rp
+
+	add	$ap_real,32,$bp
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$S1,$ap
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	! p256_mul_mont(S1, S1, in1_y);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$S1,$rp
+
+	add	$bp_real,32,$bp
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$S2,$ap
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	! p256_mul_mont(S2, S2, in2_y);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$S2,$rp
+
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$S1,$bp
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_sub_from	! p256_sub(R, S2, S1);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$R,$rp
+
+	or	@acc[1],@acc[0],@acc[0]	! see if result is zero
+	or	@acc[3],@acc[2],@acc[2]
+	or	@acc[5],@acc[4],@acc[4]
+	or	@acc[7],@acc[6],@acc[6]
+	or	@acc[2],@acc[0],@acc[0]
+	or	@acc[6],@acc[4],@acc[4]
+	or	@acc[4],@acc[0],@acc[0]
+	st	@acc[0],[%fp+STACK_BIAS-20]
+
+	add	$ap_real,0,$bp
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$Z2sqr,$ap
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	! p256_mul_mont(U1, in1_x, Z2sqr);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$U1,$rp
+
+	add	$bp_real,0,$bp
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$Z1sqr,$ap
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	! p256_mul_mont(U2, in2_x, Z1sqr);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$U2,$rp
+
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$U1,$bp
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_sub_from	! p256_sub(H, U2, U1);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$H,$rp
+
+	or	@acc[1],@acc[0],@acc[0]	! see if result is zero
+	or	@acc[3],@acc[2],@acc[2]
+	or	@acc[5],@acc[4],@acc[4]
+	or	@acc[7],@acc[6],@acc[6]
+	or	@acc[2],@acc[0],@acc[0]
+	or	@acc[6],@acc[4],@acc[4]
+	orcc	@acc[4],@acc[0],@acc[0]
+
+	bne,pt	%icc,.Ladd_proceed	! is_equal(U1,U2)?
+	nop
+
+	ld	[%fp+STACK_BIAS-12],$t0
+	ld	[%fp+STACK_BIAS-16],$t1
+	ld	[%fp+STACK_BIAS-20],$t2
+	andcc	$t0,$t1,%g0
+	be,pt	%icc,.Ladd_proceed	! (in1infty || in2infty)?
+	nop
+	andcc	$t2,$t2,%g0
+	be,pt	%icc,.Ladd_double	! is_equal(S1,S2)?
+	nop
+
+	ldx	[%fp+STACK_BIAS-8],$rp
+	st	%g0,[$rp]
+	st	%g0,[$rp+4]
+	st	%g0,[$rp+8]
+	st	%g0,[$rp+12]
+	st	%g0,[$rp+16]
+	st	%g0,[$rp+20]
+	st	%g0,[$rp+24]
+	st	%g0,[$rp+28]
+	st	%g0,[$rp+32]
+	st	%g0,[$rp+32+4]
+	st	%g0,[$rp+32+8]
+	st	%g0,[$rp+32+12]
+	st	%g0,[$rp+32+16]
+	st	%g0,[$rp+32+20]
+	st	%g0,[$rp+32+24]
+	st	%g0,[$rp+32+28]
+	st	%g0,[$rp+64]
+	st	%g0,[$rp+64+4]
+	st	%g0,[$rp+64+8]
+	st	%g0,[$rp+64+12]
+	st	%g0,[$rp+64+16]
+	st	%g0,[$rp+64+20]
+	st	%g0,[$rp+64+24]
+	st	%g0,[$rp+64+28]
+	b	.Ladd_done
+	nop
+
+.align	16
+.Ladd_double:
+	ldx	[%fp+STACK_BIAS-8],$rp_real
+	mov	$ap_real,$ap
+	b	.Lpoint_double_shortcut
+	add	%sp,32*(12-4)+32,%sp	! difference in frame sizes
+
+.align	16
+.Ladd_proceed:
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$R,$bp
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$R,$ap
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	! p256_sqr_mont(Rsqr, R);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$Rsqr,$rp
+
+	add	$ap_real,64,$bp
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$H,$ap
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	! p256_mul_mont(res_z, H, in1_z);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$res_z,$rp
+
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$H,$bp
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$H,$ap
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	! p256_sqr_mont(Hsqr, H);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$Hsqr,$rp
+
+	add	$bp_real,64,$bp
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$res_z,$ap
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	! p256_mul_mont(res_z, res_z, in2_z);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$res_z,$rp
+
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$H,$bp
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$Hsqr,$ap
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	! p256_mul_mont(Hcub, Hsqr, H);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$Hcub,$rp
+
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$U1,$bp
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$Hsqr,$ap
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	! p256_mul_mont(U2, U1, Hsqr);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$U2,$rp
+
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2	! p256_mul_by_2(Hsqr, U2);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$Hsqr,$rp
+
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$Rsqr,$bp
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_sub_morf	! p256_sub(res_x, Rsqr, Hsqr);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$res_x,$rp
+
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$Hcub,$bp
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_sub_from	!  p256_sub(res_x, res_x, Hcub);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$res_x,$rp
+
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$U2,$bp
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_sub_morf	! p256_sub(res_y, U2, res_x);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$res_y,$rp
+
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$Hcub,$bp
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$S1,$ap
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	! p256_mul_mont(S2, S1, Hcub);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$S2,$rp
+
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$R,$bp
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$res_y,$ap
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	! p256_mul_mont(res_y, res_y, R);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$res_y,$rp
+
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$S2,$bp
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_sub_from	! p256_sub(res_y, res_y, S2);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$res_y,$rp
+
+	ld	[%fp+STACK_BIAS-16],$t1	! !in1infty
+	ld	[%fp+STACK_BIAS-12],$t2	! !in2infty
+	ldx	[%fp+STACK_BIAS-8],$rp
+___
+for($i=0;$i<96;$i+=8) {			# conditional moves
+$code.=<<___;
+	ld	[%sp+LOCALS+$i],@acc[0]		! res
+	ld	[%sp+LOCALS+$i+4],@acc[1]
+	ld	[$bp_real+$i],@acc[2]		! in2
+	ld	[$bp_real+$i+4],@acc[3]
+	ld	[$ap_real+$i],@acc[4]		! in1
+	ld	[$ap_real+$i+4],@acc[5]
+	movrz	$t1,@acc[2],@acc[0]
+	movrz	$t1,@acc[3],@acc[1]
+	movrz	$t2,@acc[4],@acc[0]
+	movrz	$t2,@acc[5],@acc[1]
+	st	@acc[0],[$rp+$i]
+	st	@acc[1],[$rp+$i+4]
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+.Ladd_done:
+	ret
+	restore
+.type	ecp_nistz256_point_add,#function
+.size	ecp_nistz256_point_add,.-ecp_nistz256_point_add
+___
+}
+
+########################################################################
+# void ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine(P256_POINT *out,const P256_POINT *in1,
+#				     const P256_POINT_AFFINE *in2);
+{
+my ($res_x,$res_y,$res_z,
+    $U2,$S2,$H,$R,$Hsqr,$Hcub,$Rsqr)=map(32*$_,(0..9));
+my $Z1sqr = $S2;
+# above map() describes stack layout with 10 temporary
+# 256-bit vectors on top. Then we reserve some space for
+# !in1infty, !in2infty, result of check for zero and return pointer.
+
+my @ONE_mont=(1,0,0,-1,-1,-1,-2,0);
+my $bp_real=$rp_real;
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine
+.align	32
+ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine:
+	SPARC_LOAD_ADDRESS_LEAF(OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P,%g1,%g5)
+	ld	[%g1],%g1		! OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0]
+	and	%g1,(SPARCV9_VIS3|SPARCV9_64BIT_STACK),%g1
+	cmp	%g1,(SPARCV9_VIS3|SPARCV9_64BIT_STACK)
+	be	ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine_vis3
+	nop
+
+	save	%sp,-STACK_FRAME-32*10-32,%sp
+
+	stx	$rp,[%fp+STACK_BIAS-8]	! off-load $rp
+	mov	$ap,$ap_real
+	mov	$bp,$bp_real
+
+	ld	[$ap+64],$t0		! in1_z
+	ld	[$ap+64+4],$t1
+	ld	[$ap+64+8],$t2
+	ld	[$ap+64+12],$t3
+	ld	[$ap+64+16],$t4
+	ld	[$ap+64+20],$t5
+	ld	[$ap+64+24],$t6
+	ld	[$ap+64+28],$t7
+	or	$t1,$t0,$t0
+	or	$t3,$t2,$t2
+	or	$t5,$t4,$t4
+	or	$t7,$t6,$t6
+	or	$t2,$t0,$t0
+	or	$t6,$t4,$t4
+	or	$t4,$t0,$t0		! !in1infty
+	movrnz	$t0,-1,$t0
+	st	$t0,[%fp+STACK_BIAS-16]
+
+	ld	[$bp],@acc[0]		! in2_x
+	ld	[$bp+4],@acc[1]
+	ld	[$bp+8],@acc[2]
+	ld	[$bp+12],@acc[3]
+	ld	[$bp+16],@acc[4]
+	ld	[$bp+20],@acc[5]
+	ld	[$bp+24],@acc[6]
+	ld	[$bp+28],@acc[7]
+	ld	[$bp+32],$t0		! in2_y
+	ld	[$bp+32+4],$t1
+	ld	[$bp+32+8],$t2
+	ld	[$bp+32+12],$t3
+	ld	[$bp+32+16],$t4
+	ld	[$bp+32+20],$t5
+	ld	[$bp+32+24],$t6
+	ld	[$bp+32+28],$t7
+	or	@acc[1],@acc[0],@acc[0]
+	or	@acc[3],@acc[2],@acc[2]
+	or	@acc[5],@acc[4],@acc[4]
+	or	@acc[7],@acc[6],@acc[6]
+	or	@acc[2],@acc[0],@acc[0]
+	or	@acc[6],@acc[4],@acc[4]
+	or	@acc[4],@acc[0],@acc[0]
+	or	$t1,$t0,$t0
+	or	$t3,$t2,$t2
+	or	$t5,$t4,$t4
+	or	$t7,$t6,$t6
+	or	$t2,$t0,$t0
+	or	$t6,$t4,$t4
+	or	$t4,$t0,$t0
+	or	@acc[0],$t0,$t0		! !in2infty
+	movrnz	$t0,-1,$t0
+	st	$t0,[%fp+STACK_BIAS-12]
+
+	add	$ap_real,64,$bp
+	add	$ap_real,64,$ap
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	! p256_sqr_mont(Z1sqr, in1_z);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$Z1sqr,$rp
+
+	add	$bp_real,0,$bp
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$Z1sqr,$ap
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	! p256_mul_mont(U2, Z1sqr, in2_x);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$U2,$rp
+
+	add	$ap_real,0,$bp
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_sub_from	! p256_sub(H, U2, in1_x);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$H,$rp
+
+	add	$ap_real,64,$bp
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$Z1sqr,$ap
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	! p256_mul_mont(S2, Z1sqr, in1_z);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$S2,$rp
+
+	add	$ap_real,64,$bp
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$H,$ap
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	! p256_mul_mont(res_z, H, in1_z);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$res_z,$rp
+
+	add	$bp_real,32,$bp
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$S2,$ap
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	! p256_mul_mont(S2, S2, in2_y);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$S2,$rp
+
+	add	$ap_real,32,$bp
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_sub_from	! p256_sub(R, S2, in1_y);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$R,$rp
+
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$H,$bp
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$H,$ap
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	! p256_sqr_mont(Hsqr, H);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$Hsqr,$rp
+
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$R,$bp
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$R,$ap
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	! p256_sqr_mont(Rsqr, R);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$Rsqr,$rp
+
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$H,$bp
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$Hsqr,$ap
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	! p256_mul_mont(Hcub, Hsqr, H);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$Hcub,$rp
+
+	add	$ap_real,0,$bp
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$Hsqr,$ap
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	! p256_mul_mont(U2, in1_x, Hsqr);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$U2,$rp
+
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2	! p256_mul_by_2(Hsqr, U2);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$Hsqr,$rp
+
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$Rsqr,$bp
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_sub_morf	! p256_sub(res_x, Rsqr, Hsqr);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$res_x,$rp
+
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$Hcub,$bp
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_sub_from	!  p256_sub(res_x, res_x, Hcub);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$res_x,$rp
+
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$U2,$bp
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_sub_morf	! p256_sub(res_y, U2, res_x);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$res_y,$rp
+
+	add	$ap_real,32,$bp
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$Hcub,$ap
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	! p256_mul_mont(S2, in1_y, Hcub);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$S2,$rp
+
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$R,$bp
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$res_y,$ap
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont	! p256_mul_mont(res_y, res_y, R);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$res_y,$rp
+
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$S2,$bp
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_sub_from	! p256_sub(res_y, res_y, S2);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS+$res_y,$rp
+
+	ld	[%fp+STACK_BIAS-16],$t1	! !in1infty
+	ld	[%fp+STACK_BIAS-12],$t2	! !in2infty
+	ldx	[%fp+STACK_BIAS-8],$rp
+___
+for($i=0;$i<64;$i+=8) {			# conditional moves
+$code.=<<___;
+	ld	[%sp+LOCALS+$i],@acc[0]		! res
+	ld	[%sp+LOCALS+$i+4],@acc[1]
+	ld	[$bp_real+$i],@acc[2]		! in2
+	ld	[$bp_real+$i+4],@acc[3]
+	ld	[$ap_real+$i],@acc[4]		! in1
+	ld	[$ap_real+$i+4],@acc[5]
+	movrz	$t1,@acc[2],@acc[0]
+	movrz	$t1,@acc[3],@acc[1]
+	movrz	$t2,@acc[4],@acc[0]
+	movrz	$t2,@acc[5],@acc[1]
+	st	@acc[0],[$rp+$i]
+	st	@acc[1],[$rp+$i+4]
+___
+}
+for(;$i<96;$i+=8) {
+my $j=($i-64)/4;
+$code.=<<___;
+	ld	[%sp+LOCALS+$i],@acc[0]		! res
+	ld	[%sp+LOCALS+$i+4],@acc[1]
+	ld	[$ap_real+$i],@acc[4]		! in1
+	ld	[$ap_real+$i+4],@acc[5]
+	movrz	$t1,@ONE_mont[$j],@acc[0]
+	movrz	$t1,@ONE_mont[$j+1],@acc[1]
+	movrz	$t2,@acc[4],@acc[0]
+	movrz	$t2,@acc[5],@acc[1]
+	st	@acc[0],[$rp+$i]
+	st	@acc[1],[$rp+$i+4]
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	ret
+	restore
+.type	ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine,#function
+.size	ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine,.-ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine
+___
+}								}}}
+{{{
+my ($out,$inp,$index)=map("%i$_",(0..2));
+my $mask="%o0";
+
+$code.=<<___;
+! void	ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5(void *%i0,const P256_POINT *%i1,
+!					  int %i2);
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5
+.align	32
+ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5:
+	save	%sp,-STACK_FRAME,%sp
+
+	sll	$index,2,$index
+	add	$out,$index,$out
+
+	ld	[$inp],%l0		! X
+	ld	[$inp+4],%l1
+	ld	[$inp+8],%l2
+	ld	[$inp+12],%l3
+	ld	[$inp+16],%l4
+	ld	[$inp+20],%l5
+	ld	[$inp+24],%l6
+	ld	[$inp+28],%l7
+	add	$inp,32,$inp
+	st	%l0,[$out+64*0-4]
+	st	%l1,[$out+64*1-4]
+	st	%l2,[$out+64*2-4]
+	st	%l3,[$out+64*3-4]
+	st	%l4,[$out+64*4-4]
+	st	%l5,[$out+64*5-4]
+	st	%l6,[$out+64*6-4]
+	st	%l7,[$out+64*7-4]
+	add	$out,64*8,$out
+
+	ld	[$inp],%l0		! Y
+	ld	[$inp+4],%l1
+	ld	[$inp+8],%l2
+	ld	[$inp+12],%l3
+	ld	[$inp+16],%l4
+	ld	[$inp+20],%l5
+	ld	[$inp+24],%l6
+	ld	[$inp+28],%l7
+	add	$inp,32,$inp
+	st	%l0,[$out+64*0-4]
+	st	%l1,[$out+64*1-4]
+	st	%l2,[$out+64*2-4]
+	st	%l3,[$out+64*3-4]
+	st	%l4,[$out+64*4-4]
+	st	%l5,[$out+64*5-4]
+	st	%l6,[$out+64*6-4]
+	st	%l7,[$out+64*7-4]
+	add	$out,64*8,$out
+
+	ld	[$inp],%l0		! Z
+	ld	[$inp+4],%l1
+	ld	[$inp+8],%l2
+	ld	[$inp+12],%l3
+	ld	[$inp+16],%l4
+	ld	[$inp+20],%l5
+	ld	[$inp+24],%l6
+	ld	[$inp+28],%l7
+	st	%l0,[$out+64*0-4]
+	st	%l1,[$out+64*1-4]
+	st	%l2,[$out+64*2-4]
+	st	%l3,[$out+64*3-4]
+	st	%l4,[$out+64*4-4]
+	st	%l5,[$out+64*5-4]
+	st	%l6,[$out+64*6-4]
+	st	%l7,[$out+64*7-4]
+
+	ret
+	restore
+.type	ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5,#function
+.size	ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5,.-ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5
+
+! void	ecp_nistz256_gather_w5(P256_POINT *%i0,const void *%i1,
+!					       int %i2);
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_gather_w5
+.align	32
+ecp_nistz256_gather_w5:
+	save	%sp,-STACK_FRAME,%sp
+
+	neg	$index,$mask
+	srax	$mask,63,$mask
+
+	add	$index,$mask,$index
+	sll	$index,2,$index
+	add	$inp,$index,$inp
+
+	ld	[$inp+64*0],%l0
+	ld	[$inp+64*1],%l1
+	ld	[$inp+64*2],%l2
+	ld	[$inp+64*3],%l3
+	ld	[$inp+64*4],%l4
+	ld	[$inp+64*5],%l5
+	ld	[$inp+64*6],%l6
+	ld	[$inp+64*7],%l7
+	add	$inp,64*8,$inp
+	and	%l0,$mask,%l0
+	and	%l1,$mask,%l1
+	st	%l0,[$out]		! X
+	and	%l2,$mask,%l2
+	st	%l1,[$out+4]
+	and	%l3,$mask,%l3
+	st	%l2,[$out+8]
+	and	%l4,$mask,%l4
+	st	%l3,[$out+12]
+	and	%l5,$mask,%l5
+	st	%l4,[$out+16]
+	and	%l6,$mask,%l6
+	st	%l5,[$out+20]
+	and	%l7,$mask,%l7
+	st	%l6,[$out+24]
+	st	%l7,[$out+28]
+	add	$out,32,$out
+
+	ld	[$inp+64*0],%l0
+	ld	[$inp+64*1],%l1
+	ld	[$inp+64*2],%l2
+	ld	[$inp+64*3],%l3
+	ld	[$inp+64*4],%l4
+	ld	[$inp+64*5],%l5
+	ld	[$inp+64*6],%l6
+	ld	[$inp+64*7],%l7
+	add	$inp,64*8,$inp
+	and	%l0,$mask,%l0
+	and	%l1,$mask,%l1
+	st	%l0,[$out]		! Y
+	and	%l2,$mask,%l2
+	st	%l1,[$out+4]
+	and	%l3,$mask,%l3
+	st	%l2,[$out+8]
+	and	%l4,$mask,%l4
+	st	%l3,[$out+12]
+	and	%l5,$mask,%l5
+	st	%l4,[$out+16]
+	and	%l6,$mask,%l6
+	st	%l5,[$out+20]
+	and	%l7,$mask,%l7
+	st	%l6,[$out+24]
+	st	%l7,[$out+28]
+	add	$out,32,$out
+
+	ld	[$inp+64*0],%l0
+	ld	[$inp+64*1],%l1
+	ld	[$inp+64*2],%l2
+	ld	[$inp+64*3],%l3
+	ld	[$inp+64*4],%l4
+	ld	[$inp+64*5],%l5
+	ld	[$inp+64*6],%l6
+	ld	[$inp+64*7],%l7
+	and	%l0,$mask,%l0
+	and	%l1,$mask,%l1
+	st	%l0,[$out]		! Z
+	and	%l2,$mask,%l2
+	st	%l1,[$out+4]
+	and	%l3,$mask,%l3
+	st	%l2,[$out+8]
+	and	%l4,$mask,%l4
+	st	%l3,[$out+12]
+	and	%l5,$mask,%l5
+	st	%l4,[$out+16]
+	and	%l6,$mask,%l6
+	st	%l5,[$out+20]
+	and	%l7,$mask,%l7
+	st	%l6,[$out+24]
+	st	%l7,[$out+28]
+
+	ret
+	restore
+.type	ecp_nistz256_gather_w5,#function
+.size	ecp_nistz256_gather_w5,.-ecp_nistz256_gather_w5
+
+! void	ecp_nistz256_scatter_w7(void *%i0,const P256_POINT_AFFINE *%i1,
+!					  int %i2);
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_scatter_w7
+.align	32
+ecp_nistz256_scatter_w7:
+	save	%sp,-STACK_FRAME,%sp
+	nop
+	add	$out,$index,$out
+	mov	64/4,$index
+.Loop_scatter_w7:
+	ld	[$inp],%l0
+	add	$inp,4,$inp
+	subcc	$index,1,$index
+	stb	%l0,[$out+64*0-1]
+	srl	%l0,8,%l1
+	stb	%l1,[$out+64*1-1]
+	srl	%l0,16,%l2
+	stb	%l2,[$out+64*2-1]
+	srl	%l0,24,%l3
+	stb	%l3,[$out+64*3-1]
+	bne	.Loop_scatter_w7
+	add	$out,64*4,$out
+
+	ret
+	restore
+.type	ecp_nistz256_scatter_w7,#function
+.size	ecp_nistz256_scatter_w7,.-ecp_nistz256_scatter_w7
+
+! void	ecp_nistz256_gather_w7(P256_POINT_AFFINE *%i0,const void *%i1,
+!						      int %i2);
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_gather_w7
+.align	32
+ecp_nistz256_gather_w7:
+	save	%sp,-STACK_FRAME,%sp
+
+	neg	$index,$mask
+	srax	$mask,63,$mask
+
+	add	$index,$mask,$index
+	add	$inp,$index,$inp
+	mov	64/4,$index
+
+.Loop_gather_w7:
+	ldub	[$inp+64*0],%l0
+	prefetch [$inp+3840+64*0],1
+	subcc	$index,1,$index
+	ldub	[$inp+64*1],%l1
+	prefetch [$inp+3840+64*1],1
+	ldub	[$inp+64*2],%l2
+	prefetch [$inp+3840+64*2],1
+	ldub	[$inp+64*3],%l3
+	prefetch [$inp+3840+64*3],1
+	add	$inp,64*4,$inp
+	sll	%l1,8,%l1
+	sll	%l2,16,%l2
+	or	%l0,%l1,%l0
+	sll	%l3,24,%l3
+	or	%l0,%l2,%l0
+	or	%l0,%l3,%l0
+	and	%l0,$mask,%l0
+	st	%l0,[$out]
+	bne	.Loop_gather_w7
+	add	$out,4,$out
+
+	ret
+	restore
+.type	ecp_nistz256_gather_w7,#function
+.size	ecp_nistz256_gather_w7,.-ecp_nistz256_gather_w7
+___
+}}}
+{{{
+########################################################################
+# Following subroutines are VIS3 counterparts of those above that
+# implement ones found in ecp_nistz256.c. Key difference is that they
+# use 128-bit muliplication and addition with 64-bit carry, and in order
+# to do that they perform conversion from uin32_t[8] to uint64_t[4] upon
+# entry and vice versa on return.
+#
+my ($rp,$ap,$bp)=map("%i$_",(0..2));
+my ($t0,$t1,$t2,$t3,$a0,$a1,$a2,$a3)=map("%l$_",(0..7));
+my ($acc0,$acc1,$acc2,$acc3,$acc4,$acc5)=map("%o$_",(0..5));
+my ($bi,$poly1,$poly3,$minus1)=(map("%i$_",(3..5)),"%g1");
+my ($rp_real,$ap_real)=("%g2","%g3");
+my ($acc6,$acc7)=($bp,$bi);	# used in squaring
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.align	32
+__ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2_vis3:
+	addcc	$acc0,$acc0,$acc0
+	addxccc	$acc1,$acc1,$acc1
+	addxccc	$acc2,$acc2,$acc2
+	addxccc	$acc3,$acc3,$acc3
+	b	.Lreduce_by_sub_vis3
+	addxc	%g0,%g0,$acc4		! did it carry?
+.type	__ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2_vis3,#function
+.size	__ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2_vis3,.-__ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2_vis3
+
+.align	32
+__ecp_nistz256_add_vis3:
+	ldx	[$bp+0],$t0
+	ldx	[$bp+8],$t1
+	ldx	[$bp+16],$t2
+	ldx	[$bp+24],$t3
+
+__ecp_nistz256_add_noload_vis3:
+
+	addcc	$t0,$acc0,$acc0
+	addxccc	$t1,$acc1,$acc1
+	addxccc	$t2,$acc2,$acc2
+	addxccc	$t3,$acc3,$acc3
+	addxc	%g0,%g0,$acc4		! did it carry?
+
+.Lreduce_by_sub_vis3:
+
+	addcc	$acc0,1,$t0		! add -modulus, i.e. subtract
+	addxccc	$acc1,$poly1,$t1
+	addxccc	$acc2,$minus1,$t2
+	addxccc	$acc3,$poly3,$t3
+	addxc	$acc4,$minus1,$acc4
+
+	movrz	$acc4,$t0,$acc0		! ret = borrow ? ret : ret-modulus
+	movrz	$acc4,$t1,$acc1
+	stx	$acc0,[$rp]
+	movrz	$acc4,$t2,$acc2
+	stx	$acc1,[$rp+8]
+	movrz	$acc4,$t3,$acc3
+	stx	$acc2,[$rp+16]
+	retl
+	stx	$acc3,[$rp+24]
+.type	__ecp_nistz256_add_vis3,#function
+.size	__ecp_nistz256_add_vis3,.-__ecp_nistz256_add_vis3
+
+! Trouble with subtraction is that there is no subtraction with 64-bit
+! borrow, only with 32-bit one. For this reason we "decompose" 64-bit
+! $acc0-$acc3 to 32-bit values and pick b[4] in 32-bit pieces. But
+! recall that SPARC is big-endian, which is why you'll observe that
+! b[4] is accessed as 4-0-12-8-20-16-28-24. And prior reduction we
+! "collect" result back to 64-bit $acc0-$acc3.
+.align	32
+__ecp_nistz256_sub_from_vis3:
+	ld	[$bp+4],$t0
+	ld	[$bp+0],$t1
+	ld	[$bp+12],$t2
+	ld	[$bp+8],$t3
+
+	srlx	$acc0,32,$acc4
+	not	$poly1,$poly1
+	srlx	$acc1,32,$acc5
+	subcc	$acc0,$t0,$acc0
+	ld	[$bp+20],$t0
+	subccc	$acc4,$t1,$acc4
+	ld	[$bp+16],$t1
+	subccc	$acc1,$t2,$acc1
+	ld	[$bp+28],$t2
+	and	$acc0,$poly1,$acc0
+	subccc	$acc5,$t3,$acc5
+	ld	[$bp+24],$t3
+	sllx	$acc4,32,$acc4
+	and	$acc1,$poly1,$acc1
+	sllx	$acc5,32,$acc5
+	or	$acc0,$acc4,$acc0
+	srlx	$acc2,32,$acc4
+	or	$acc1,$acc5,$acc1
+	srlx	$acc3,32,$acc5
+	subccc	$acc2,$t0,$acc2
+	subccc	$acc4,$t1,$acc4
+	subccc	$acc3,$t2,$acc3
+	and	$acc2,$poly1,$acc2
+	subccc	$acc5,$t3,$acc5
+	sllx	$acc4,32,$acc4
+	and	$acc3,$poly1,$acc3
+	sllx	$acc5,32,$acc5
+	or	$acc2,$acc4,$acc2
+	subc	%g0,%g0,$acc4		! did it borrow?
+	b	.Lreduce_by_add_vis3
+	or	$acc3,$acc5,$acc3
+.type	__ecp_nistz256_sub_from_vis3,#function
+.size	__ecp_nistz256_sub_from_vis3,.-__ecp_nistz256_sub_from_vis3
+
+.align	32
+__ecp_nistz256_sub_morf_vis3:
+	ld	[$bp+4],$t0
+	ld	[$bp+0],$t1
+	ld	[$bp+12],$t2
+	ld	[$bp+8],$t3
+
+	srlx	$acc0,32,$acc4
+	not	$poly1,$poly1
+	srlx	$acc1,32,$acc5
+	subcc	$t0,$acc0,$acc0
+	ld	[$bp+20],$t0
+	subccc	$t1,$acc4,$acc4
+	ld	[$bp+16],$t1
+	subccc	$t2,$acc1,$acc1
+	ld	[$bp+28],$t2
+	and	$acc0,$poly1,$acc0
+	subccc	$t3,$acc5,$acc5
+	ld	[$bp+24],$t3
+	sllx	$acc4,32,$acc4
+	and	$acc1,$poly1,$acc1
+	sllx	$acc5,32,$acc5
+	or	$acc0,$acc4,$acc0
+	srlx	$acc2,32,$acc4
+	or	$acc1,$acc5,$acc1
+	srlx	$acc3,32,$acc5
+	subccc	$t0,$acc2,$acc2
+	subccc	$t1,$acc4,$acc4
+	subccc	$t2,$acc3,$acc3
+	and	$acc2,$poly1,$acc2
+	subccc	$t3,$acc5,$acc5
+	sllx	$acc4,32,$acc4
+	and	$acc3,$poly1,$acc3
+	sllx	$acc5,32,$acc5
+	or	$acc2,$acc4,$acc2
+	subc	%g0,%g0,$acc4		! did it borrow?
+	or	$acc3,$acc5,$acc3
+
+.Lreduce_by_add_vis3:
+
+	addcc	$acc0,-1,$t0		! add modulus
+	not	$poly3,$t3
+	addxccc	$acc1,$poly1,$t1
+	not	$poly1,$poly1		! restore $poly1
+	addxccc	$acc2,%g0,$t2
+	addxc	$acc3,$t3,$t3
+
+	movrnz	$acc4,$t0,$acc0		! if a-b borrowed, ret = ret+mod
+	movrnz	$acc4,$t1,$acc1
+	stx	$acc0,[$rp]
+	movrnz	$acc4,$t2,$acc2
+	stx	$acc1,[$rp+8]
+	movrnz	$acc4,$t3,$acc3
+	stx	$acc2,[$rp+16]
+	retl
+	stx	$acc3,[$rp+24]
+.type	__ecp_nistz256_sub_morf_vis3,#function
+.size	__ecp_nistz256_sub_morf_vis3,.-__ecp_nistz256_sub_morf_vis3
+
+.align	32
+__ecp_nistz256_div_by_2_vis3:
+	! ret = (a is odd ? a+mod : a) >> 1
+
+	not	$poly1,$t1
+	not	$poly3,$t3
+	and	$acc0,1,$acc5
+	addcc	$acc0,-1,$t0		! add modulus
+	addxccc	$acc1,$t1,$t1
+	addxccc	$acc2,%g0,$t2
+	addxccc	$acc3,$t3,$t3
+	addxc	%g0,%g0,$acc4		! carry bit
+
+	movrnz	$acc5,$t0,$acc0
+	movrnz	$acc5,$t1,$acc1
+	movrnz	$acc5,$t2,$acc2
+	movrnz	$acc5,$t3,$acc3
+	movrz	$acc5,%g0,$acc4
+
+	! ret >>= 1
+
+	srlx	$acc0,1,$acc0
+	sllx	$acc1,63,$t0
+	srlx	$acc1,1,$acc1
+	or	$acc0,$t0,$acc0
+	sllx	$acc2,63,$t1
+	srlx	$acc2,1,$acc2
+	or	$acc1,$t1,$acc1
+	sllx	$acc3,63,$t2
+	stx	$acc0,[$rp]
+	srlx	$acc3,1,$acc3
+	or	$acc2,$t2,$acc2
+	sllx	$acc4,63,$t3		! don't forget carry bit
+	stx	$acc1,[$rp+8]
+	or	$acc3,$t3,$acc3
+	stx	$acc2,[$rp+16]
+	retl
+	stx	$acc3,[$rp+24]
+.type	__ecp_nistz256_div_by_2_vis3,#function
+.size	__ecp_nistz256_div_by_2_vis3,.-__ecp_nistz256_div_by_2_vis3
+
+! compared to __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont it's almost 4x smaller and
+! 4x faster [on T4]...
+.align	32
+__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont_vis3:
+	mulx	$a0,$bi,$acc0
+	not	$poly3,$poly3		! 0xFFFFFFFF00000001
+	umulxhi	$a0,$bi,$t0
+	mulx	$a1,$bi,$acc1
+	umulxhi	$a1,$bi,$t1
+	mulx	$a2,$bi,$acc2
+	umulxhi	$a2,$bi,$t2
+	mulx	$a3,$bi,$acc3
+	umulxhi	$a3,$bi,$t3
+	ldx	[$bp+8],$bi		! b[1]
+
+	addcc	$acc1,$t0,$acc1		! accumulate high parts of multiplication
+	 sllx	$acc0,32,$t0
+	addxccc	$acc2,$t1,$acc2
+	 srlx	$acc0,32,$t1
+	addxccc	$acc3,$t2,$acc3
+	addxc	%g0,$t3,$acc4
+	mov	0,$acc5
+___
+for($i=1;$i<4;$i++) {
+	# Reduction iteration is normally performed by accumulating
+	# result of multiplication of modulus by "magic" digit [and
+	# omitting least significant word, which is guaranteed to
+	# be 0], but thanks to special form of modulus and "magic"
+	# digit being equal to least significant word, it can be
+	# performed with additions and subtractions alone. Indeed:
+	#
+	#            ffff0001.00000000.0000ffff.ffffffff
+	# *                                     abcdefgh
+	# + xxxxxxxx.xxxxxxxx.xxxxxxxx.xxxxxxxx.abcdefgh
+	#
+	# Now observing that ff..ff*x = (2^n-1)*x = 2^n*x-x, we
+	# rewrite above as:
+	#
+	#   xxxxxxxx.xxxxxxxx.xxxxxxxx.xxxxxxxx.abcdefgh
+	# + abcdefgh.abcdefgh.0000abcd.efgh0000.00000000
+	# - 0000abcd.efgh0000.00000000.00000000.abcdefgh
+	#
+	# or marking redundant operations:
+	#
+	#   xxxxxxxx.xxxxxxxx.xxxxxxxx.xxxxxxxx.--------
+	# + abcdefgh.abcdefgh.0000abcd.efgh0000.--------
+	# - 0000abcd.efgh0000.--------.--------.--------
+	#   ^^^^^^^^ but this word is calculated with umulxhi, because
+	#            there is no subtract with 64-bit borrow:-(
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	sub	$acc0,$t0,$t2		! acc0*0xFFFFFFFF00000001, low part
+	umulxhi	$acc0,$poly3,$t3	! acc0*0xFFFFFFFF00000001, high part
+	addcc	$acc1,$t0,$acc0		! +=acc[0]<<96 and omit acc[0]
+	mulx	$a0,$bi,$t0
+	addxccc	$acc2,$t1,$acc1
+	mulx	$a1,$bi,$t1
+	addxccc	$acc3,$t2,$acc2		! +=acc[0]*0xFFFFFFFF00000001
+	mulx	$a2,$bi,$t2
+	addxccc	$acc4,$t3,$acc3
+	mulx	$a3,$bi,$t3
+	addxc	$acc5,%g0,$acc4
+
+	addcc	$acc0,$t0,$acc0		! accumulate low parts of multiplication
+	umulxhi	$a0,$bi,$t0
+	addxccc	$acc1,$t1,$acc1
+	umulxhi	$a1,$bi,$t1
+	addxccc	$acc2,$t2,$acc2
+	umulxhi	$a2,$bi,$t2
+	addxccc	$acc3,$t3,$acc3
+	umulxhi	$a3,$bi,$t3
+	addxc	$acc4,%g0,$acc4
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($i<3);
+	ldx	[$bp+8*($i+1)],$bi	! bp[$i+1]
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	addcc	$acc1,$t0,$acc1		! accumulate high parts of multiplication 
+	 sllx	$acc0,32,$t0
+	addxccc	$acc2,$t1,$acc2
+	 srlx	$acc0,32,$t1
+	addxccc	$acc3,$t2,$acc3
+	addxccc	$acc4,$t3,$acc4
+	addxc	%g0,%g0,$acc5
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	sub	$acc0,$t0,$t2		! acc0*0xFFFFFFFF00000001, low part
+	umulxhi	$acc0,$poly3,$t3	! acc0*0xFFFFFFFF00000001, high part
+	addcc	$acc1,$t0,$acc0		! +=acc[0]<<96 and omit acc[0]
+	addxccc	$acc2,$t1,$acc1
+	addxccc	$acc3,$t2,$acc2		! +=acc[0]*0xFFFFFFFF00000001
+	addxccc	$acc4,$t3,$acc3
+	b	.Lmul_final_vis3	! see below
+	addxc	$acc5,%g0,$acc4
+.type	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont_vis3,#function
+.size	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont_vis3,.-__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont_vis3
+
+! compared to above __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont_vis3 it's 21% less
+! instructions, but only 14% faster [on T4]...
+.align	32
+__ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont_vis3:
+	!  |  |  |  |  |  |a1*a0|  |
+	!  |  |  |  |  |a2*a0|  |  |
+	!  |  |a3*a2|a3*a0|  |  |  |
+	!  |  |  |  |a2*a1|  |  |  |
+	!  |  |  |a3*a1|  |  |  |  |
+	! *|  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 2|
+	! +|a3*a3|a2*a2|a1*a1|a0*a0|
+	!  |--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--|
+	!  |A7|A6|A5|A4|A3|A2|A1|A0|, where Ax is $accx, i.e. follow $accx
+	!
+	!  "can't overflow" below mark carrying into high part of
+	!  multiplication result, which can't overflow, because it
+	!  can never be all ones.
+
+	mulx	$a1,$a0,$acc1		! a[1]*a[0]
+	umulxhi	$a1,$a0,$t1
+	mulx	$a2,$a0,$acc2		! a[2]*a[0]
+	umulxhi	$a2,$a0,$t2
+	mulx	$a3,$a0,$acc3		! a[3]*a[0]
+	umulxhi	$a3,$a0,$acc4
+
+	addcc	$acc2,$t1,$acc2		! accumulate high parts of multiplication
+	mulx	$a2,$a1,$t0		! a[2]*a[1]
+	umulxhi	$a2,$a1,$t1
+	addxccc	$acc3,$t2,$acc3
+	mulx	$a3,$a1,$t2		! a[3]*a[1]
+	umulxhi	$a3,$a1,$t3
+	addxc	$acc4,%g0,$acc4		! can't overflow
+
+	mulx	$a3,$a2,$acc5		! a[3]*a[2]
+	not	$poly3,$poly3		! 0xFFFFFFFF00000001
+	umulxhi	$a3,$a2,$acc6
+
+	addcc	$t2,$t1,$t1		! accumulate high parts of multiplication
+	mulx	$a0,$a0,$acc0		! a[0]*a[0]
+	addxc	$t3,%g0,$t2		! can't overflow
+
+	addcc	$acc3,$t0,$acc3		! accumulate low parts of multiplication
+	umulxhi	$a0,$a0,$a0
+	addxccc	$acc4,$t1,$acc4
+	mulx	$a1,$a1,$t1		! a[1]*a[1]
+	addxccc	$acc5,$t2,$acc5
+	umulxhi	$a1,$a1,$a1
+	addxc	$acc6,%g0,$acc6		! can't overflow
+
+	addcc	$acc1,$acc1,$acc1	! acc[1-6]*=2
+	mulx	$a2,$a2,$t2		! a[2]*a[2]
+	addxccc	$acc2,$acc2,$acc2
+	umulxhi	$a2,$a2,$a2
+	addxccc	$acc3,$acc3,$acc3
+	mulx	$a3,$a3,$t3		! a[3]*a[3]
+	addxccc	$acc4,$acc4,$acc4
+	umulxhi	$a3,$a3,$a3
+	addxccc	$acc5,$acc5,$acc5
+	addxccc	$acc6,$acc6,$acc6
+	addxc	%g0,%g0,$acc7
+
+	addcc	$acc1,$a0,$acc1		! +a[i]*a[i]
+	addxccc	$acc2,$t1,$acc2
+	addxccc	$acc3,$a1,$acc3
+	addxccc	$acc4,$t2,$acc4
+	 sllx	$acc0,32,$t0
+	addxccc	$acc5,$a2,$acc5
+	 srlx	$acc0,32,$t1
+	addxccc	$acc6,$t3,$acc6
+	 sub	$acc0,$t0,$t2		! acc0*0xFFFFFFFF00000001, low part
+	addxc	$acc7,$a3,$acc7
+___
+for($i=0;$i<3;$i++) {			# reductions, see commentary
+					# in multiplication for details
+$code.=<<___;
+	umulxhi	$acc0,$poly3,$t3	! acc0*0xFFFFFFFF00000001, high part
+	addcc	$acc1,$t0,$acc0		! +=acc[0]<<96 and omit acc[0]
+	 sllx	$acc0,32,$t0
+	addxccc	$acc2,$t1,$acc1
+	 srlx	$acc0,32,$t1
+	addxccc	$acc3,$t2,$acc2		! +=acc[0]*0xFFFFFFFF00000001
+	 sub	$acc0,$t0,$t2		! acc0*0xFFFFFFFF00000001, low part
+	addxc	%g0,$t3,$acc3		! cant't overflow
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	umulxhi	$acc0,$poly3,$t3	! acc0*0xFFFFFFFF00000001, high part
+	addcc	$acc1,$t0,$acc0		! +=acc[0]<<96 and omit acc[0]
+	addxccc	$acc2,$t1,$acc1
+	addxccc	$acc3,$t2,$acc2		! +=acc[0]*0xFFFFFFFF00000001
+	addxc	%g0,$t3,$acc3		! can't overflow
+
+	addcc	$acc0,$acc4,$acc0	! accumulate upper half
+	addxccc	$acc1,$acc5,$acc1
+	addxccc	$acc2,$acc6,$acc2
+	addxccc	$acc3,$acc7,$acc3
+	addxc	%g0,%g0,$acc4
+
+.Lmul_final_vis3:
+
+	! Final step is "if result > mod, subtract mod", but as comparison
+	! means subtraction, we do the subtraction and then copy outcome
+	! if it didn't borrow. But note that as we [have to] replace
+	! subtraction with addition with negative, carry/borrow logic is
+	! inverse.
+
+	addcc	$acc0,1,$t0		! add -modulus, i.e. subtract
+	not	$poly3,$poly3		! restore 0x00000000FFFFFFFE
+	addxccc	$acc1,$poly1,$t1
+	addxccc	$acc2,$minus1,$t2
+	addxccc	$acc3,$poly3,$t3
+	addxccc	$acc4,$minus1,%g0	! did it carry?
+
+	movcs	%xcc,$t0,$acc0
+	movcs	%xcc,$t1,$acc1
+	stx	$acc0,[$rp]
+	movcs	%xcc,$t2,$acc2
+	stx	$acc1,[$rp+8]
+	movcs	%xcc,$t3,$acc3
+	stx	$acc2,[$rp+16]
+	retl
+	stx	$acc3,[$rp+24]
+.type	__ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont_vis3,#function
+.size	__ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont_vis3,.-__ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont_vis3
+___
+
+########################################################################
+# void ecp_nistz256_point_double(P256_POINT *out,const P256_POINT *inp);
+#
+{
+my ($res_x,$res_y,$res_z,
+    $in_x,$in_y,$in_z,
+    $S,$M,$Zsqr,$tmp0)=map(32*$_,(0..9));
+# above map() describes stack layout with 10 temporary
+# 256-bit vectors on top.
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.align	32
+ecp_nistz256_point_double_vis3:
+	save	%sp,-STACK64_FRAME-32*10,%sp
+
+	mov	$rp,$rp_real
+.Ldouble_shortcut_vis3:
+	mov	-1,$minus1
+	mov	-2,$poly3
+	sllx	$minus1,32,$poly1		! 0xFFFFFFFF00000000
+	srl	$poly3,0,$poly3			! 0x00000000FFFFFFFE
+
+	! convert input to uint64_t[4]
+	ld	[$ap],$a0			! in_x
+	ld	[$ap+4],$t0
+	ld	[$ap+8],$a1
+	ld	[$ap+12],$t1
+	ld	[$ap+16],$a2
+	ld	[$ap+20],$t2
+	ld	[$ap+24],$a3
+	ld	[$ap+28],$t3
+	sllx	$t0,32,$t0
+	sllx	$t1,32,$t1
+	ld	[$ap+32],$acc0			! in_y
+	or	$a0,$t0,$a0
+	ld	[$ap+32+4],$t0
+	sllx	$t2,32,$t2
+	ld	[$ap+32+8],$acc1
+	or	$a1,$t1,$a1
+	ld	[$ap+32+12],$t1
+	sllx	$t3,32,$t3
+	ld	[$ap+32+16],$acc2
+	or	$a2,$t2,$a2
+	ld	[$ap+32+20],$t2
+	or	$a3,$t3,$a3
+	ld	[$ap+32+24],$acc3
+	sllx	$t0,32,$t0
+	ld	[$ap+32+28],$t3
+	sllx	$t1,32,$t1
+	stx	$a0,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in_x]
+	sllx	$t2,32,$t2
+	stx	$a1,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in_x+8]
+	sllx	$t3,32,$t3
+	stx	$a2,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in_x+16]
+	or	$acc0,$t0,$acc0
+	stx	$a3,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in_x+24]
+	or	$acc1,$t1,$acc1
+	stx	$acc0,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in_y]
+	or	$acc2,$t2,$acc2
+	stx	$acc1,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in_y+8]
+	or	$acc3,$t3,$acc3
+	stx	$acc2,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in_y+16]
+	stx	$acc3,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in_y+24]
+
+	ld	[$ap+64],$a0			! in_z
+	ld	[$ap+64+4],$t0
+	ld	[$ap+64+8],$a1
+	ld	[$ap+64+12],$t1
+	ld	[$ap+64+16],$a2
+	ld	[$ap+64+20],$t2
+	ld	[$ap+64+24],$a3
+	ld	[$ap+64+28],$t3
+	sllx	$t0,32,$t0
+	sllx	$t1,32,$t1
+	or	$a0,$t0,$a0
+	sllx	$t2,32,$t2
+	or	$a1,$t1,$a1
+	sllx	$t3,32,$t3
+	or	$a2,$t2,$a2
+	or	$a3,$t3,$a3
+	sllx	$t0,32,$t0
+	sllx	$t1,32,$t1
+	stx	$a0,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in_z]
+	sllx	$t2,32,$t2
+	stx	$a1,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in_z+8]
+	sllx	$t3,32,$t3
+	stx	$a2,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in_z+16]
+	stx	$a3,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in_z+24]
+
+	! in_y is still in $acc0-$acc3
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2_vis3	! p256_mul_by_2(S, in_y);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$S,$rp
+
+	! in_z is still in $a0-$a3
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont_vis3	! p256_sqr_mont(Zsqr, in_z);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$Zsqr,$rp
+
+	mov	$acc0,$a0			! put Zsqr aside
+	mov	$acc1,$a1
+	mov	$acc2,$a2
+	mov	$acc3,$a3
+
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$in_x,$bp
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_add_vis3		! p256_add(M, Zsqr, in_x);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$M,$rp
+
+	mov	$a0,$acc0			! restore Zsqr
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$S],$a0		! forward load
+	mov	$a1,$acc1
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$S+8],$a1
+	mov	$a2,$acc2
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$S+16],$a2
+	mov	$a3,$acc3
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$S+24],$a3
+
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$in_x,$bp
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_sub_morf_vis3	! p256_sub(Zsqr, in_x, Zsqr);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$Zsqr,$rp
+
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont_vis3	! p256_sqr_mont(S, S);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$S,$rp
+
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in_z],$bi
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in_y],$a0
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in_y+8],$a1
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in_y+16],$a2
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in_y+24],$a3
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$in_z,$bp
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont_vis3	! p256_mul_mont(tmp0, in_z, in_y);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$tmp0,$rp
+
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$M],$bi		! forward load
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$Zsqr],$a0
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$Zsqr+8],$a1
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$Zsqr+16],$a2
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$Zsqr+24],$a3
+
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2_vis3	! p256_mul_by_2(res_z, tmp0);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$res_z,$rp
+
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$M,$bp
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont_vis3	! p256_mul_mont(M, M, Zsqr);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$M,$rp
+
+	mov	$acc0,$a0			! put aside M
+	mov	$acc1,$a1
+	mov	$acc2,$a2
+	mov	$acc3,$a3
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2_vis3
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$M,$rp
+	mov	$a0,$t0				! copy M
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$S],$a0		! forward load
+	mov	$a1,$t1
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$S+8],$a1
+	mov	$a2,$t2
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$S+16],$a2
+	mov	$a3,$t3
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$S+24],$a3
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_add_noload_vis3	! p256_mul_by_3(M, M);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$M,$rp
+
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont_vis3	! p256_sqr_mont(tmp0, S);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$tmp0,$rp
+
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$S],$bi		! forward load
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in_x],$a0
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in_x+8],$a1
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in_x+16],$a2
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in_x+24],$a3
+
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_div_by_2_vis3	! p256_div_by_2(res_y, tmp0);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$res_y,$rp
+
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$S,$bp
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont_vis3	! p256_mul_mont(S, S, in_x);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$S,$rp
+
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$M],$a0		! forward load
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$M+8],$a1
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$M+16],$a2
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$M+24],$a3
+
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2_vis3	! p256_mul_by_2(tmp0, S);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$tmp0,$rp
+
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont_vis3	! p256_sqr_mont(res_x, M);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$res_x,$rp
+
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$tmp0,$bp
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_sub_from_vis3	! p256_sub(res_x, res_x, tmp0);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$res_x,$rp
+
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$M],$a0		! forward load
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$M+8],$a1
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$M+16],$a2
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$M+24],$a3
+
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$S,$bp
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_sub_morf_vis3	! p256_sub(S, S, res_x);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$S,$rp
+
+	mov	$acc0,$bi
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont_vis3	! p256_mul_mont(S, S, M);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$S,$rp
+
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$res_x],$a0	! forward load
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$res_x+8],$a1
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$res_x+16],$a2
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$res_x+24],$a3
+
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$res_y,$bp
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_sub_from_vis3	! p256_sub(res_y, S, res_y);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$res_y,$bp
+
+	! convert output to uint_32[8]
+	srlx	$a0,32,$t0
+	srlx	$a1,32,$t1
+	st	$a0,[$rp_real]			! res_x
+	srlx	$a2,32,$t2
+	st	$t0,[$rp_real+4]
+	srlx	$a3,32,$t3
+	st	$a1,[$rp_real+8]
+	st	$t1,[$rp_real+12]
+	st	$a2,[$rp_real+16]
+	st	$t2,[$rp_real+20]
+	st	$a3,[$rp_real+24]
+	st	$t3,[$rp_real+28]
+
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$res_z],$a0	! forward load
+	srlx	$acc0,32,$t0
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$res_z+8],$a1
+	srlx	$acc1,32,$t1
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$res_z+16],$a2
+	srlx	$acc2,32,$t2
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$res_z+24],$a3
+	srlx	$acc3,32,$t3
+	st	$acc0,[$rp_real+32]		! res_y
+	st	$t0,  [$rp_real+32+4]
+	st	$acc1,[$rp_real+32+8]
+	st	$t1,  [$rp_real+32+12]
+	st	$acc2,[$rp_real+32+16]
+	st	$t2,  [$rp_real+32+20]
+	st	$acc3,[$rp_real+32+24]
+	st	$t3,  [$rp_real+32+28]
+
+	srlx	$a0,32,$t0
+	srlx	$a1,32,$t1
+	st	$a0,[$rp_real+64]		! res_z
+	srlx	$a2,32,$t2
+	st	$t0,[$rp_real+64+4]
+	srlx	$a3,32,$t3
+	st	$a1,[$rp_real+64+8]
+	st	$t1,[$rp_real+64+12]
+	st	$a2,[$rp_real+64+16]
+	st	$t2,[$rp_real+64+20]
+	st	$a3,[$rp_real+64+24]
+	st	$t3,[$rp_real+64+28]
+
+	ret
+	restore
+.type	ecp_nistz256_point_double_vis3,#function
+.size	ecp_nistz256_point_double_vis3,.-ecp_nistz256_point_double_vis3
+___
+}
+########################################################################
+# void ecp_nistz256_point_add(P256_POINT *out,const P256_POINT *in1,
+#			      const P256_POINT *in2);
+{
+my ($res_x,$res_y,$res_z,
+    $in1_x,$in1_y,$in1_z,
+    $in2_x,$in2_y,$in2_z,
+    $H,$Hsqr,$R,$Rsqr,$Hcub,
+    $U1,$U2,$S1,$S2)=map(32*$_,(0..17));
+my ($Z1sqr, $Z2sqr) = ($Hsqr, $Rsqr);
+
+# above map() describes stack layout with 18 temporary
+# 256-bit vectors on top. Then we reserve some space for
+# !in1infty, !in2infty and result of check for zero.
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_point_add_vis3
+.align	32
+ecp_nistz256_point_add_vis3:
+	save	%sp,-STACK64_FRAME-32*18-32,%sp
+
+	mov	$rp,$rp_real
+	mov	-1,$minus1
+	mov	-2,$poly3
+	sllx	$minus1,32,$poly1		! 0xFFFFFFFF00000000
+	srl	$poly3,0,$poly3			! 0x00000000FFFFFFFE
+
+	! convert input to uint64_t[4]
+	ld	[$bp],$a0			! in2_x
+	ld	[$bp+4],$t0
+	ld	[$bp+8],$a1
+	ld	[$bp+12],$t1
+	ld	[$bp+16],$a2
+	ld	[$bp+20],$t2
+	ld	[$bp+24],$a3
+	ld	[$bp+28],$t3
+	sllx	$t0,32,$t0
+	sllx	$t1,32,$t1
+	ld	[$bp+32],$acc0			! in2_y
+	or	$a0,$t0,$a0
+	ld	[$bp+32+4],$t0
+	sllx	$t2,32,$t2
+	ld	[$bp+32+8],$acc1
+	or	$a1,$t1,$a1
+	ld	[$bp+32+12],$t1
+	sllx	$t3,32,$t3
+	ld	[$bp+32+16],$acc2
+	or	$a2,$t2,$a2
+	ld	[$bp+32+20],$t2
+	or	$a3,$t3,$a3
+	ld	[$bp+32+24],$acc3
+	sllx	$t0,32,$t0
+	ld	[$bp+32+28],$t3
+	sllx	$t1,32,$t1
+	stx	$a0,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_x]
+	sllx	$t2,32,$t2
+	stx	$a1,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_x+8]
+	sllx	$t3,32,$t3
+	stx	$a2,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_x+16]
+	or	$acc0,$t0,$acc0
+	stx	$a3,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_x+24]
+	or	$acc1,$t1,$acc1
+	stx	$acc0,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_y]
+	or	$acc2,$t2,$acc2
+	stx	$acc1,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_y+8]
+	or	$acc3,$t3,$acc3
+	stx	$acc2,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_y+16]
+	stx	$acc3,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_y+24]
+
+	ld	[$bp+64],$acc0			! in2_z
+	ld	[$bp+64+4],$t0
+	ld	[$bp+64+8],$acc1
+	ld	[$bp+64+12],$t1
+	ld	[$bp+64+16],$acc2
+	ld	[$bp+64+20],$t2
+	ld	[$bp+64+24],$acc3
+	ld	[$bp+64+28],$t3
+	sllx	$t0,32,$t0
+	sllx	$t1,32,$t1
+	ld	[$ap],$a0			! in1_x
+	or	$acc0,$t0,$acc0
+	ld	[$ap+4],$t0
+	sllx	$t2,32,$t2
+	ld	[$ap+8],$a1
+	or	$acc1,$t1,$acc1
+	ld	[$ap+12],$t1
+	sllx	$t3,32,$t3
+	ld	[$ap+16],$a2
+	or	$acc2,$t2,$acc2
+	ld	[$ap+20],$t2
+	or	$acc3,$t3,$acc3
+	ld	[$ap+24],$a3
+	sllx	$t0,32,$t0
+	ld	[$ap+28],$t3
+	sllx	$t1,32,$t1
+	stx	$acc0,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_z]
+	sllx	$t2,32,$t2
+	stx	$acc1,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_z+8]
+	sllx	$t3,32,$t3
+	stx	$acc2,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_z+16]
+	stx	$acc3,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_z+24]
+
+	or	$acc1,$acc0,$acc0
+	or	$acc3,$acc2,$acc2
+	or	$acc2,$acc0,$acc0
+	movrnz	$acc0,-1,$acc0			! !in2infty
+	stx	$acc0,[%fp+STACK_BIAS-8]
+
+	or	$a0,$t0,$a0
+	ld	[$ap+32],$acc0			! in1_y
+	or	$a1,$t1,$a1
+	ld	[$ap+32+4],$t0
+	or	$a2,$t2,$a2
+	ld	[$ap+32+8],$acc1
+	or	$a3,$t3,$a3
+	ld	[$ap+32+12],$t1
+	ld	[$ap+32+16],$acc2
+	ld	[$ap+32+20],$t2
+	ld	[$ap+32+24],$acc3
+	sllx	$t0,32,$t0
+	ld	[$ap+32+28],$t3
+	sllx	$t1,32,$t1
+	stx	$a0,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_x]
+	sllx	$t2,32,$t2
+	stx	$a1,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_x+8]
+	sllx	$t3,32,$t3
+	stx	$a2,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_x+16]
+	or	$acc0,$t0,$acc0
+	stx	$a3,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_x+24]
+	or	$acc1,$t1,$acc1
+	stx	$acc0,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_y]
+	or	$acc2,$t2,$acc2
+	stx	$acc1,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_y+8]
+	or	$acc3,$t3,$acc3
+	stx	$acc2,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_y+16]
+	stx	$acc3,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_y+24]
+
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_z],$a0	! forward load
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_z+8],$a1
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_z+16],$a2
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_z+24],$a3
+
+	ld	[$ap+64],$acc0			! in1_z
+	ld	[$ap+64+4],$t0
+	ld	[$ap+64+8],$acc1
+	ld	[$ap+64+12],$t1
+	ld	[$ap+64+16],$acc2
+	ld	[$ap+64+20],$t2
+	ld	[$ap+64+24],$acc3
+	ld	[$ap+64+28],$t3
+	sllx	$t0,32,$t0
+	sllx	$t1,32,$t1
+	or	$acc0,$t0,$acc0
+	sllx	$t2,32,$t2
+	or	$acc1,$t1,$acc1
+	sllx	$t3,32,$t3
+	stx	$acc0,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_z]
+	or	$acc2,$t2,$acc2
+	stx	$acc1,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_z+8]
+	or	$acc3,$t3,$acc3
+	stx	$acc2,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_z+16]
+	stx	$acc3,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_z+24]
+
+	or	$acc1,$acc0,$acc0
+	or	$acc3,$acc2,$acc2
+	or	$acc2,$acc0,$acc0
+	movrnz	$acc0,-1,$acc0			! !in1infty
+	stx	$acc0,[%fp+STACK_BIAS-16]
+
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont_vis3	! p256_sqr_mont(Z2sqr, in2_z);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$Z2sqr,$rp
+
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_z],$a0
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_z+8],$a1
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_z+16],$a2
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_z+24],$a3
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont_vis3	! p256_sqr_mont(Z1sqr, in1_z);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$Z1sqr,$rp
+
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$Z2sqr],$bi
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_z],$a0
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_z+8],$a1
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_z+16],$a2
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_z+24],$a3
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$Z2sqr,$bp
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont_vis3	! p256_mul_mont(S1, Z2sqr, in2_z);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$S1,$rp
+
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$Z1sqr],$bi
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_z],$a0
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_z+8],$a1
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_z+16],$a2
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_z+24],$a3
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$Z1sqr,$bp
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont_vis3	! p256_mul_mont(S2, Z1sqr, in1_z);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$S2,$rp
+
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$S1],$bi
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_y],$a0
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_y+8],$a1
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_y+16],$a2
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_y+24],$a3
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$S1,$bp
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont_vis3	! p256_mul_mont(S1, S1, in1_y);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$S1,$rp
+
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$S2],$bi
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_y],$a0
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_y+8],$a1
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_y+16],$a2
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_y+24],$a3
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$S2,$bp
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont_vis3	! p256_mul_mont(S2, S2, in2_y);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$S2,$rp
+
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$Z2sqr],$bi	! forward load
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_x],$a0
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_x+8],$a1
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_x+16],$a2
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_x+24],$a3
+
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$S1,$bp
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_sub_from_vis3	! p256_sub(R, S2, S1);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$R,$rp
+
+	or	$acc1,$acc0,$acc0		! see if result is zero
+	or	$acc3,$acc2,$acc2
+	or	$acc2,$acc0,$acc0
+	stx	$acc0,[%fp+STACK_BIAS-24]
+
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$Z2sqr,$bp
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont_vis3	! p256_mul_mont(U1, in1_x, Z2sqr);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$U1,$rp
+
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$Z1sqr],$bi
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_x],$a0
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_x+8],$a1
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_x+16],$a2
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_x+24],$a3
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$Z1sqr,$bp
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont_vis3	! p256_mul_mont(U2, in2_x, Z1sqr);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$U2,$rp
+
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$R],$a0		! forward load
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$R+8],$a1
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$R+16],$a2
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$R+24],$a3
+
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$U1,$bp
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_sub_from_vis3	! p256_sub(H, U2, U1);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$H,$rp
+
+	or	$acc1,$acc0,$acc0		! see if result is zero
+	or	$acc3,$acc2,$acc2
+	orcc	$acc2,$acc0,$acc0
+
+	bne,pt	%xcc,.Ladd_proceed_vis3		! is_equal(U1,U2)?
+	nop
+
+	ldx	[%fp+STACK_BIAS-8],$t0
+	ldx	[%fp+STACK_BIAS-16],$t1
+	ldx	[%fp+STACK_BIAS-24],$t2
+	andcc	$t0,$t1,%g0
+	be,pt	%xcc,.Ladd_proceed_vis3		! (in1infty || in2infty)?
+	nop
+	andcc	$t2,$t2,%g0
+	be,a,pt	%xcc,.Ldouble_shortcut_vis3	! is_equal(S1,S2)?
+	add	%sp,32*(12-10)+32,%sp		! difference in frame sizes
+
+	st	%g0,[$rp_real]
+	st	%g0,[$rp_real+4]
+	st	%g0,[$rp_real+8]
+	st	%g0,[$rp_real+12]
+	st	%g0,[$rp_real+16]
+	st	%g0,[$rp_real+20]
+	st	%g0,[$rp_real+24]
+	st	%g0,[$rp_real+28]
+	st	%g0,[$rp_real+32]
+	st	%g0,[$rp_real+32+4]
+	st	%g0,[$rp_real+32+8]
+	st	%g0,[$rp_real+32+12]
+	st	%g0,[$rp_real+32+16]
+	st	%g0,[$rp_real+32+20]
+	st	%g0,[$rp_real+32+24]
+	st	%g0,[$rp_real+32+28]
+	st	%g0,[$rp_real+64]
+	st	%g0,[$rp_real+64+4]
+	st	%g0,[$rp_real+64+8]
+	st	%g0,[$rp_real+64+12]
+	st	%g0,[$rp_real+64+16]
+	st	%g0,[$rp_real+64+20]
+	st	%g0,[$rp_real+64+24]
+	st	%g0,[$rp_real+64+28]
+	b	.Ladd_done_vis3
+	nop
+
+.align	16
+.Ladd_proceed_vis3:
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont_vis3	! p256_sqr_mont(Rsqr, R);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$Rsqr,$rp
+
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$H],$bi
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_z],$a0
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_z+8],$a1
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_z+16],$a2
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_z+24],$a3
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$H,$bp
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont_vis3	! p256_mul_mont(res_z, H, in1_z);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$res_z,$rp
+
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$H],$a0
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$H+8],$a1
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$H+16],$a2
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$H+24],$a3
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont_vis3	! p256_sqr_mont(Hsqr, H);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$Hsqr,$rp
+
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$res_z],$bi
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_z],$a0
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_z+8],$a1
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_z+16],$a2
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_z+24],$a3
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$res_z,$bp
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont_vis3	! p256_mul_mont(res_z, res_z, in2_z);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$res_z,$rp
+
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$H],$bi
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$Hsqr],$a0
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$Hsqr+8],$a1
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$Hsqr+16],$a2
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$Hsqr+24],$a3
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$H,$bp
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont_vis3	! p256_mul_mont(Hcub, Hsqr, H);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$Hcub,$rp
+
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$U1],$bi
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$Hsqr],$a0
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$Hsqr+8],$a1
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$Hsqr+16],$a2
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$Hsqr+24],$a3
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$U1,$bp
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont_vis3	! p256_mul_mont(U2, U1, Hsqr);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$U2,$rp
+
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2_vis3	! p256_mul_by_2(Hsqr, U2);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$Hsqr,$rp
+
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$Rsqr,$bp
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_sub_morf_vis3	! p256_sub(res_x, Rsqr, Hsqr);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$res_x,$rp
+
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$Hcub,$bp
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_sub_from_vis3	!  p256_sub(res_x, res_x, Hcub);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$res_x,$rp
+
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$S1],$bi		! forward load
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$Hcub],$a0
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$Hcub+8],$a1
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$Hcub+16],$a2
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$Hcub+24],$a3
+
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$U2,$bp
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_sub_morf_vis3	! p256_sub(res_y, U2, res_x);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$res_y,$rp
+
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$S1,$bp
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont_vis3	! p256_mul_mont(S2, S1, Hcub);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$S2,$rp
+
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$R],$bi
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$res_y],$a0
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$res_y+8],$a1
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$res_y+16],$a2
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$res_y+24],$a3
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$R,$bp
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont_vis3	! p256_mul_mont(res_y, res_y, R);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$res_y,$rp
+
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$S2,$bp
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_sub_from_vis3	! p256_sub(res_y, res_y, S2);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$res_y,$rp
+
+	ldx	[%fp+STACK_BIAS-16],$t1		! !in1infty
+	ldx	[%fp+STACK_BIAS-8],$t2		! !in2infty
+___
+for($i=0;$i<96;$i+=16) {			# conditional moves
+$code.=<<___;
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$res_x+$i],$acc0	! res
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$res_x+$i+8],$acc1
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_x+$i],$acc2	! in2
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_x+$i+8],$acc3
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_x+$i],$acc4	! in1
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_x+$i+8],$acc5
+	movrz	$t1,$acc2,$acc0
+	movrz	$t1,$acc3,$acc1
+	movrz	$t2,$acc4,$acc0
+	movrz	$t2,$acc5,$acc1
+	srlx	$acc0,32,$acc2
+	srlx	$acc1,32,$acc3
+	st	$acc0,[$rp_real+$i]
+	st	$acc2,[$rp_real+$i+4]
+	st	$acc1,[$rp_real+$i+8]
+	st	$acc3,[$rp_real+$i+12]
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+.Ladd_done_vis3:
+	ret
+	restore
+.type	ecp_nistz256_point_add_vis3,#function
+.size	ecp_nistz256_point_add_vis3,.-ecp_nistz256_point_add_vis3
+___
+}
+########################################################################
+# void ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine(P256_POINT *out,const P256_POINT *in1,
+#				     const P256_POINT_AFFINE *in2);
+{
+my ($res_x,$res_y,$res_z,
+    $in1_x,$in1_y,$in1_z,
+    $in2_x,$in2_y,
+    $U2,$S2,$H,$R,$Hsqr,$Hcub,$Rsqr)=map(32*$_,(0..14));
+my $Z1sqr = $S2;
+# above map() describes stack layout with 15 temporary
+# 256-bit vectors on top. Then we reserve some space for
+# !in1infty and !in2infty.
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.align	32
+ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine_vis3:
+	save	%sp,-STACK64_FRAME-32*15-32,%sp
+
+	mov	$rp,$rp_real
+	mov	-1,$minus1
+	mov	-2,$poly3
+	sllx	$minus1,32,$poly1		! 0xFFFFFFFF00000000
+	srl	$poly3,0,$poly3			! 0x00000000FFFFFFFE
+
+	! convert input to uint64_t[4]
+	ld	[$bp],$a0			! in2_x
+	ld	[$bp+4],$t0
+	ld	[$bp+8],$a1
+	ld	[$bp+12],$t1
+	ld	[$bp+16],$a2
+	ld	[$bp+20],$t2
+	ld	[$bp+24],$a3
+	ld	[$bp+28],$t3
+	sllx	$t0,32,$t0
+	sllx	$t1,32,$t1
+	ld	[$bp+32],$acc0			! in2_y
+	or	$a0,$t0,$a0
+	ld	[$bp+32+4],$t0
+	sllx	$t2,32,$t2
+	ld	[$bp+32+8],$acc1
+	or	$a1,$t1,$a1
+	ld	[$bp+32+12],$t1
+	sllx	$t3,32,$t3
+	ld	[$bp+32+16],$acc2
+	or	$a2,$t2,$a2
+	ld	[$bp+32+20],$t2
+	or	$a3,$t3,$a3
+	ld	[$bp+32+24],$acc3
+	sllx	$t0,32,$t0
+	ld	[$bp+32+28],$t3
+	sllx	$t1,32,$t1
+	stx	$a0,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_x]
+	sllx	$t2,32,$t2
+	stx	$a1,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_x+8]
+	sllx	$t3,32,$t3
+	stx	$a2,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_x+16]
+	or	$acc0,$t0,$acc0
+	stx	$a3,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_x+24]
+	or	$acc1,$t1,$acc1
+	stx	$acc0,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_y]
+	or	$acc2,$t2,$acc2
+	stx	$acc1,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_y+8]
+	or	$acc3,$t3,$acc3
+	stx	$acc2,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_y+16]
+	stx	$acc3,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_y+24]
+
+	or	$a1,$a0,$a0
+	or	$a3,$a2,$a2
+	or	$acc1,$acc0,$acc0
+	or	$acc3,$acc2,$acc2
+	or	$a2,$a0,$a0
+	or	$acc2,$acc0,$acc0
+	or	$acc0,$a0,$a0
+	movrnz	$a0,-1,$a0			! !in2infty
+	stx	$a0,[%fp+STACK_BIAS-8]
+
+	ld	[$ap],$a0			! in1_x
+	ld	[$ap+4],$t0
+	ld	[$ap+8],$a1
+	ld	[$ap+12],$t1
+	ld	[$ap+16],$a2
+	ld	[$ap+20],$t2
+	ld	[$ap+24],$a3
+	ld	[$ap+28],$t3
+	sllx	$t0,32,$t0
+	sllx	$t1,32,$t1
+	ld	[$ap+32],$acc0			! in1_y
+	or	$a0,$t0,$a0
+	ld	[$ap+32+4],$t0
+	sllx	$t2,32,$t2
+	ld	[$ap+32+8],$acc1
+	or	$a1,$t1,$a1
+	ld	[$ap+32+12],$t1
+	sllx	$t3,32,$t3
+	ld	[$ap+32+16],$acc2
+	or	$a2,$t2,$a2
+	ld	[$ap+32+20],$t2
+	or	$a3,$t3,$a3
+	ld	[$ap+32+24],$acc3
+	sllx	$t0,32,$t0
+	ld	[$ap+32+28],$t3
+	sllx	$t1,32,$t1
+	stx	$a0,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_x]
+	sllx	$t2,32,$t2
+	stx	$a1,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_x+8]
+	sllx	$t3,32,$t3
+	stx	$a2,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_x+16]
+	or	$acc0,$t0,$acc0
+	stx	$a3,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_x+24]
+	or	$acc1,$t1,$acc1
+	stx	$acc0,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_y]
+	or	$acc2,$t2,$acc2
+	stx	$acc1,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_y+8]
+	or	$acc3,$t3,$acc3
+	stx	$acc2,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_y+16]
+	stx	$acc3,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_y+24]
+
+	ld	[$ap+64],$a0			! in1_z
+	ld	[$ap+64+4],$t0
+	ld	[$ap+64+8],$a1
+	ld	[$ap+64+12],$t1
+	ld	[$ap+64+16],$a2
+	ld	[$ap+64+20],$t2
+	ld	[$ap+64+24],$a3
+	ld	[$ap+64+28],$t3
+	sllx	$t0,32,$t0
+	sllx	$t1,32,$t1
+	or	$a0,$t0,$a0
+	sllx	$t2,32,$t2
+	or	$a1,$t1,$a1
+	sllx	$t3,32,$t3
+	stx	$a0,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_z]
+	or	$a2,$t2,$a2
+	stx	$a1,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_z+8]
+	or	$a3,$t3,$a3
+	stx	$a2,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_z+16]
+	stx	$a3,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_z+24]
+
+	or	$a1,$a0,$t0
+	or	$a3,$a2,$t2
+	or	$t2,$t0,$t0
+	movrnz	$t0,-1,$t0			! !in1infty
+	stx	$t0,[%fp+STACK_BIAS-16]
+
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont_vis3	! p256_sqr_mont(Z1sqr, in1_z);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$Z1sqr,$rp
+
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_x],$bi
+	mov	$acc0,$a0
+	mov	$acc1,$a1
+	mov	$acc2,$a2
+	mov	$acc3,$a3
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$in2_x,$bp
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont_vis3	! p256_mul_mont(U2, Z1sqr, in2_x);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$U2,$rp
+
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$Z1sqr],$bi	! forward load
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_z],$a0
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_z+8],$a1
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_z+16],$a2
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_z+24],$a3
+
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$in1_x,$bp
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_sub_from_vis3	! p256_sub(H, U2, in1_x);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$H,$rp
+
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$Z1sqr,$bp
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont_vis3	! p256_mul_mont(S2, Z1sqr, in1_z);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$S2,$rp
+
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$H],$bi
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_z],$a0
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_z+8],$a1
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_z+16],$a2
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_z+24],$a3
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$H,$bp
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont_vis3	! p256_mul_mont(res_z, H, in1_z);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$res_z,$rp
+
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$S2],$bi
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_y],$a0
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_y+8],$a1
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_y+16],$a2
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_y+24],$a3
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$S2,$bp
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont_vis3	! p256_mul_mont(S2, S2, in2_y);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$S2,$rp
+
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$H],$a0		! forward load
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$H+8],$a1
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$H+16],$a2
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$H+24],$a3
+
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$in1_y,$bp
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_sub_from_vis3	! p256_sub(R, S2, in1_y);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$R,$rp
+
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont_vis3	! p256_sqr_mont(Hsqr, H);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$Hsqr,$rp
+
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$R],$a0
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$R+8],$a1
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$R+16],$a2
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$R+24],$a3
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont_vis3	! p256_sqr_mont(Rsqr, R);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$Rsqr,$rp
+
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$H],$bi
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$Hsqr],$a0
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$Hsqr+8],$a1
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$Hsqr+16],$a2
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$Hsqr+24],$a3
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$H,$bp
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont_vis3	! p256_mul_mont(Hcub, Hsqr, H);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$Hcub,$rp
+
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$Hsqr],$bi
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_x],$a0
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_x+8],$a1
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_x+16],$a2
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_x+24],$a3
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$Hsqr,$bp
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont_vis3	! p256_mul_mont(U2, in1_x, Hsqr);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$U2,$rp
+
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2_vis3	! p256_mul_by_2(Hsqr, U2);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$Hsqr,$rp
+
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$Rsqr,$bp
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_sub_morf_vis3	! p256_sub(res_x, Rsqr, Hsqr);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$res_x,$rp
+
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$Hcub,$bp
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_sub_from_vis3	!  p256_sub(res_x, res_x, Hcub);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$res_x,$rp
+
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$Hcub],$bi	! forward load
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_y],$a0
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_y+8],$a1
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_y+16],$a2
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_y+24],$a3
+
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$U2,$bp
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_sub_morf_vis3	! p256_sub(res_y, U2, res_x);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$res_y,$rp
+
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$Hcub,$bp
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont_vis3	! p256_mul_mont(S2, in1_y, Hcub);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$S2,$rp
+
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$R],$bi
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$res_y],$a0
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$res_y+8],$a1
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$res_y+16],$a2
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$res_y+24],$a3
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$R,$bp
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont_vis3	! p256_mul_mont(res_y, res_y, R);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$res_y,$rp
+
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$S2,$bp
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_sub_from_vis3	! p256_sub(res_y, res_y, S2);
+	add	%sp,LOCALS64+$res_y,$rp
+
+	ldx	[%fp+STACK_BIAS-16],$t1		! !in1infty
+	ldx	[%fp+STACK_BIAS-8],$t2		! !in2infty
+1:	call	.+8
+	add	%o7,.Lone_mont_vis3-1b,$bp
+___
+for($i=0;$i<64;$i+=16) {			# conditional moves
+$code.=<<___;
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$res_x+$i],$acc0	! res
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$res_x+$i+8],$acc1
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_x+$i],$acc2	! in2
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_x+$i+8],$acc3
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_x+$i],$acc4	! in1
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_x+$i+8],$acc5
+	movrz	$t1,$acc2,$acc0
+	movrz	$t1,$acc3,$acc1
+	movrz	$t2,$acc4,$acc0
+	movrz	$t2,$acc5,$acc1
+	srlx	$acc0,32,$acc2
+	srlx	$acc1,32,$acc3
+	st	$acc0,[$rp_real+$i]
+	st	$acc2,[$rp_real+$i+4]
+	st	$acc1,[$rp_real+$i+8]
+	st	$acc3,[$rp_real+$i+12]
+___
+}
+for(;$i<96;$i+=16) {
+$code.=<<___;
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$res_x+$i],$acc0	! res
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$res_x+$i+8],$acc1
+	ldx	[$bp+$i-64],$acc2		! "in2"
+	ldx	[$bp+$i-64+8],$acc3
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_x+$i],$acc4	! in1
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_x+$i+8],$acc5
+	movrz	$t1,$acc2,$acc0
+	movrz	$t1,$acc3,$acc1
+	movrz	$t2,$acc4,$acc0
+	movrz	$t2,$acc5,$acc1
+	srlx	$acc0,32,$acc2
+	srlx	$acc1,32,$acc3
+	st	$acc0,[$rp_real+$i]
+	st	$acc2,[$rp_real+$i+4]
+	st	$acc1,[$rp_real+$i+8]
+	st	$acc3,[$rp_real+$i+12]
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	ret
+	restore
+.type	ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine_vis3,#function
+.size	ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine_vis3,.-ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine_vis3
+.align	64
+.Lone_mont_vis3:
+.long	0x00000000,0x00000001, 0xffffffff,0x00000000
+.long	0xffffffff,0xffffffff, 0x00000000,0xfffffffe
+.align	64
+___
+}								}}}
+
+# Purpose of these subroutines is to explicitly encode VIS instructions,
+# so that one can compile the module without having to specify VIS
+# extensions on compiler command line, e.g. -xarch=v9 vs. -xarch=v9a.
+# Idea is to reserve for option to produce "universal" binary and let
+# programmer detect if current CPU is VIS capable at run-time.
+sub unvis3 {
+my ($mnemonic,$rs1,$rs2,$rd)=@_;
+my %bias = ( "g" => 0, "o" => 8, "l" => 16, "i" => 24 );
+my ($ref,$opf);
+my %visopf = (	"addxc"		=> 0x011,
+		"addxccc"	=> 0x013,
+		"umulxhi"	=> 0x016	);
+
+    $ref = "$mnemonic\t$rs1,$rs2,$rd";
+
+    if ($opf=$visopf{$mnemonic}) {
+	foreach ($rs1,$rs2,$rd) {
+	    return $ref if (!/%([goli])([0-9])/);
+	    $_=$bias{$1}+$2;
+	}
+
+	return	sprintf ".word\t0x%08x !%s",
+			0x81b00000|$rd<<25|$rs1<<14|$opf<<5|$rs2,
+			$ref;
+    } else {
+	return $ref;
+    }
+}
+
+foreach (split("\n",$code)) {
+	s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/ge;
+
+	s/\b(umulxhi|addxc[c]{0,2})\s+(%[goli][0-7]),\s*(%[goli][0-7]),\s*(%[goli][0-7])/
+		&unvis3($1,$2,$3,$4)
+	 /ge;
+
+	print $_,"\n";
+}
+
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-x86.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-x86.pl
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..1d9e006
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-x86.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,1866 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# ECP_NISTZ256 module for x86/SSE2.
+#
+# October 2014.
+#
+# Original ECP_NISTZ256 submission targeting x86_64 is detailed in
+# http://eprint.iacr.org/2013/816. In the process of adaptation
+# original .c module was made 32-bit savvy in order to make this
+# implementation possible.
+#
+#		with/without -DECP_NISTZ256_ASM
+# Pentium	+66-163%
+# PIII		+72-172%
+# P4		+65-132%
+# Core2		+90-215%
+# Sandy Bridge	+105-265% (contemporary i[57]-* are all close to this)
+# Atom		+65-155%
+# Opteron	+54-110%
+# Bulldozer	+99-240%
+# VIA Nano	+93-290%
+#
+# Ranges denote minimum and maximum improvement coefficients depending
+# on benchmark. Lower coefficients are for ECDSA sign, server-side
+# operation. Keep in mind that +200% means 3x improvement.
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm");
+require "x86asm.pl";
+
+$output=pop;
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+&asm_init($ARGV[0],"ecp_nistz256-x86.pl",$ARGV[$#ARGV] eq "386");
+
+$sse2=0;
+for (@ARGV) { $sse2=1 if (/-DOPENSSL_IA32_SSE2/); }
+
+&external_label("OPENSSL_ia32cap_P") if ($sse2);
+
+
+########################################################################
+# Convert ecp_nistz256_table.c to layout expected by ecp_nistz_gather_w7
+#
+open TABLE,"<ecp_nistz256_table.c"		or
+open TABLE,"<${dir}../ecp_nistz256_table.c"	or
+die "failed to open ecp_nistz256_table.c:",$!;
+
+use integer;
+
+foreach(<TABLE>) {
+	s/TOBN\(\s*(0x[0-9a-f]+),\s*(0x[0-9a-f]+)\s*\)/push @arr,hex($2),hex($1)/geo;
+}
+close TABLE;
+
+# See ecp_nistz256_table.c for explanation for why it's 64*16*37.
+# 64*16*37-1 is because $#arr returns last valid index or @arr, not
+# amount of elements.
+die "insane number of elements" if ($#arr != 64*16*37-1);
+
+&public_label("ecp_nistz256_precomputed");
+&align(4096);
+&set_label("ecp_nistz256_precomputed");
+
+########################################################################
+# this conversion smashes P256_POINT_AFFINE by individual bytes with
+# 64 byte interval, similar to
+#	1111222233334444
+#	1234123412341234
+for(1..37) {
+	@tbl = splice(@arr,0,64*16);
+	for($i=0;$i<64;$i++) {
+		undef @line;
+		for($j=0;$j<64;$j++) {
+			push @line,(@tbl[$j*16+$i/4]>>(($i%4)*8))&0xff;
+		}
+		&data_byte(join(',',map { sprintf "0x%02x",$_} @line));
+	}
+}
+
+########################################################################
+# Keep in mind that constants are stored least to most significant word
+&static_label("RR");
+&set_label("RR",64);
+&data_word(3,0,-1,-5,-2,-1,-3,4);	# 2^512 mod P-256
+
+&static_label("ONE_mont");
+&set_label("ONE_mont");
+&data_word(1,0,0,-1,-1,-1,-2,0);
+
+&static_label("ONE");
+&set_label("ONE");
+&data_word(1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0);
+&asciz("ECP_NISZ256 for x86/SSE2, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>");
+&align(64);
+
+########################################################################
+# void ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2(BN_ULONG edi[8],const BN_ULONG esi[8]);
+&function_begin("ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2");
+	&mov	("esi",&wparam(1));
+	&mov	("edi",&wparam(0));
+	&mov	("ebp","esi");
+########################################################################
+# common pattern for internal functions is that %edi is result pointer,
+# %esi and %ebp are input ones, %ebp being optional. %edi is preserved.
+	&call	("_ecp_nistz256_add");
+&function_end("ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2");
+
+########################################################################
+# void ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3(BN_ULONG edi[8],const BN_ULONG esi[8]);
+&function_begin("ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3");
+	&mov	("esi",&wparam(1));
+					# multiplication by 3 is performed
+					# as 2*n+n, but we can't use output
+					# to store 2*n, because if output
+					# pointer equals to input, then
+					# we'll get 2*n+2*n.
+	&stack_push(8);			# therefore we need to allocate
+					# 256-bit intermediate buffer.
+	&mov	("edi","esp");
+	&mov	("ebp","esi");
+	&call	("_ecp_nistz256_add");
+	&lea	("esi",&DWP(0,"edi"));
+	&mov	("ebp",&wparam(1));
+	&mov	("edi",&wparam(0));
+	&call	("_ecp_nistz256_add");
+	&stack_pop(8);
+&function_end("ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3");
+
+########################################################################
+# void ecp_nistz256_div_by_2(BN_ULONG edi[8],const BN_ULONG esi[8]);
+&function_begin("ecp_nistz256_div_by_2");
+	&mov	("esi",&wparam(1));
+	&mov	("edi",&wparam(0));
+	&call	("_ecp_nistz256_div_by_2");
+&function_end("ecp_nistz256_div_by_2");
+
+&function_begin_B("_ecp_nistz256_div_by_2");
+	# tmp = a is odd ? a+mod : a
+	#
+	# note that because mod has special form, i.e. consists of
+	# 0xffffffff, 1 and 0s, we can conditionally synthesize it by
+	# assigning least significant bit of input to one register,
+	# %ebp, and its negative to another, %edx.
+
+	&mov	("ebp",&DWP(0,"esi"));
+	&xor	("edx","edx");
+	&mov	("ebx",&DWP(4,"esi"));
+	&mov	("eax","ebp");
+	&and	("ebp",1);
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(8,"esi"));
+	&sub	("edx","ebp");
+
+	&add	("eax","edx");
+	&adc	("ebx","edx");
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,"edi"),"eax");
+	&adc	("ecx","edx");
+	&mov	(&DWP(4,"edi"),"ebx");
+	&mov	(&DWP(8,"edi"),"ecx");
+
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(12,"esi"));
+	&mov	("ebx",&DWP(16,"esi"));
+	&adc	("eax",0);
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(20,"esi"));
+	&adc	("ebx",0);
+	&mov	(&DWP(12,"edi"),"eax");
+	&adc	("ecx",0);
+	&mov	(&DWP(16,"edi"),"ebx");
+	&mov	(&DWP(20,"edi"),"ecx");
+
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(24,"esi"));
+	&mov	("ebx",&DWP(28,"esi"));
+	&adc	("eax","ebp");
+	&adc	("ebx","edx");
+	&mov	(&DWP(24,"edi"),"eax");
+	&sbb	("esi","esi");			# broadcast carry bit
+	&mov	(&DWP(28,"edi"),"ebx");
+
+	# ret = tmp >> 1
+
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(0,"edi"));
+	&mov	("ebx",&DWP(4,"edi"));
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(8,"edi"));
+	&mov	("edx",&DWP(12,"edi"));
+
+	&shr	("eax",1);
+	&mov	("ebp","ebx");
+	&shl	("ebx",31);
+	&or	("eax","ebx");
+
+	&shr	("ebp",1);
+	&mov	("ebx","ecx");
+	&shl	("ecx",31);
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,"edi"),"eax");
+	&or	("ebp","ecx");
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(16,"edi"));
+
+	&shr	("ebx",1);
+	&mov	("ecx","edx");
+	&shl	("edx",31);
+	&mov	(&DWP(4,"edi"),"ebp");
+	&or	("ebx","edx");
+	&mov	("ebp",&DWP(20,"edi"));
+
+	&shr	("ecx",1);
+	&mov	("edx","eax");
+	&shl	("eax",31);
+	&mov	(&DWP(8,"edi"),"ebx");
+	&or	("ecx","eax");
+	&mov	("ebx",&DWP(24,"edi"));
+
+	&shr	("edx",1);
+	&mov	("eax","ebp");
+	&shl	("ebp",31);
+	&mov	(&DWP(12,"edi"),"ecx");
+	&or	("edx","ebp");
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(28,"edi"));
+
+	&shr	("eax",1);
+	&mov	("ebp","ebx");
+	&shl	("ebx",31);
+	&mov	(&DWP(16,"edi"),"edx");
+	&or	("eax","ebx");
+
+	&shr	("ebp",1);
+	&mov	("ebx","ecx");
+	&shl	("ecx",31);
+	&mov	(&DWP(20,"edi"),"eax");
+	&or	("ebp","ecx");
+
+	&shr	("ebx",1);
+	&shl	("esi",31);
+	&mov	(&DWP(24,"edi"),"ebp");
+	&or	("ebx","esi");			# handle top-most carry bit
+	&mov	(&DWP(28,"edi"),"ebx");
+
+	&ret	();
+&function_end_B("_ecp_nistz256_div_by_2");
+
+########################################################################
+# void ecp_nistz256_add(BN_ULONG edi[8],const BN_ULONG esi[8],
+#					const BN_ULONG ebp[8]);
+&function_begin("ecp_nistz256_add");
+	&mov	("esi",&wparam(1));
+	&mov	("ebp",&wparam(2));
+	&mov	("edi",&wparam(0));
+	&call	("_ecp_nistz256_add");
+&function_end("ecp_nistz256_add");
+
+&function_begin_B("_ecp_nistz256_add");
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(0,"esi"));
+	&mov	("ebx",&DWP(4,"esi"));
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(8,"esi"));
+	&add	("eax",&DWP(0,"ebp"));
+	&mov	("edx",&DWP(12,"esi"));
+	&adc	("ebx",&DWP(4,"ebp"));
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,"edi"),"eax");
+	&adc	("ecx",&DWP(8,"ebp"));
+	&mov	(&DWP(4,"edi"),"ebx");
+	&adc	("edx",&DWP(12,"ebp"));
+	&mov	(&DWP(8,"edi"),"ecx");
+	&mov	(&DWP(12,"edi"),"edx");
+
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(16,"esi"));
+	&mov	("ebx",&DWP(20,"esi"));
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(24,"esi"));
+	&adc	("eax",&DWP(16,"ebp"));
+	&mov	("edx",&DWP(28,"esi"));
+	&adc	("ebx",&DWP(20,"ebp"));
+	&mov	(&DWP(16,"edi"),"eax");
+	&adc	("ecx",&DWP(24,"ebp"));
+	&mov	(&DWP(20,"edi"),"ebx");
+	&mov	("esi",0);
+	&adc	("edx",&DWP(28,"ebp"));
+	&mov	(&DWP(24,"edi"),"ecx");
+	&adc	("esi",0);
+	&mov	(&DWP(28,"edi"),"edx");
+
+	# if a+b >= modulus, subtract modulus.
+	#
+	# But since comparison implies subtraction, we subtract modulus
+	# to see if it borrows, and then subtract it for real if
+	# subtraction didn't borrow.
+
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(0,"edi"));
+	&mov	("ebx",&DWP(4,"edi"));
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(8,"edi"));
+	&sub	("eax",-1);
+	&mov	("edx",&DWP(12,"edi"));
+	&sbb	("ebx",-1);
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(16,"edi"));
+	&sbb	("ecx",-1);
+	&mov	("ebx",&DWP(20,"edi"));
+	&sbb	("edx",0);
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(24,"edi"));
+	&sbb	("eax",0);
+	&mov	("edx",&DWP(28,"edi"));
+	&sbb	("ebx",0);
+	&sbb	("ecx",1);
+	&sbb	("edx",-1);
+	&sbb	("esi",0);
+
+	# Note that because mod has special form, i.e. consists of
+	# 0xffffffff, 1 and 0s, we can conditionally synthesize it by
+	# by using borrow.
+
+	&not	("esi");
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(0,"edi"));
+	&mov	("ebp","esi");
+	&mov	("ebx",&DWP(4,"edi"));
+	&shr	("ebp",31);
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(8,"edi"));
+	&sub	("eax","esi");
+	&mov	("edx",&DWP(12,"edi"));
+	&sbb	("ebx","esi");
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,"edi"),"eax");
+	&sbb	("ecx","esi");
+	&mov	(&DWP(4,"edi"),"ebx");
+	&sbb	("edx",0);
+	&mov	(&DWP(8,"edi"),"ecx");
+	&mov	(&DWP(12,"edi"),"edx");
+
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(16,"edi"));
+	&mov	("ebx",&DWP(20,"edi"));
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(24,"edi"));
+	&sbb	("eax",0);
+	&mov	("edx",&DWP(28,"edi"));
+	&sbb	("ebx",0);
+	&mov	(&DWP(16,"edi"),"eax");
+	&sbb	("ecx","ebp");
+	&mov	(&DWP(20,"edi"),"ebx");
+	&sbb	("edx","esi");
+	&mov	(&DWP(24,"edi"),"ecx");
+	&mov	(&DWP(28,"edi"),"edx");
+
+	&ret	();
+&function_end_B("_ecp_nistz256_add");
+
+########################################################################
+# void ecp_nistz256_sub(BN_ULONG edi[8],const BN_ULONG esi[8],
+#					const BN_ULONG ebp[8]);
+&function_begin("ecp_nistz256_sub");
+	&mov	("esi",&wparam(1));
+	&mov	("ebp",&wparam(2));
+	&mov	("edi",&wparam(0));
+	&call	("_ecp_nistz256_sub");
+&function_end("ecp_nistz256_sub");
+
+&function_begin_B("_ecp_nistz256_sub");
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(0,"esi"));
+	&mov	("ebx",&DWP(4,"esi"));
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(8,"esi"));
+	&sub	("eax",&DWP(0,"ebp"));
+	&mov	("edx",&DWP(12,"esi"));
+	&sbb	("ebx",&DWP(4,"ebp"));
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,"edi"),"eax");
+	&sbb	("ecx",&DWP(8,"ebp"));
+	&mov	(&DWP(4,"edi"),"ebx");
+	&sbb	("edx",&DWP(12,"ebp"));
+	&mov	(&DWP(8,"edi"),"ecx");
+	&mov	(&DWP(12,"edi"),"edx");
+
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(16,"esi"));
+	&mov	("ebx",&DWP(20,"esi"));
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(24,"esi"));
+	&sbb	("eax",&DWP(16,"ebp"));
+	&mov	("edx",&DWP(28,"esi"));
+	&sbb	("ebx",&DWP(20,"ebp"));
+	&sbb	("ecx",&DWP(24,"ebp"));
+	&mov	(&DWP(16,"edi"),"eax");
+	&sbb	("edx",&DWP(28,"ebp"));
+	&mov	(&DWP(20,"edi"),"ebx");
+	&sbb	("esi","esi");			# broadcast borrow bit
+	&mov	(&DWP(24,"edi"),"ecx");
+	&mov	(&DWP(28,"edi"),"edx");
+
+	# if a-b borrows, add modulus.
+	#
+	# Note that because mod has special form, i.e. consists of
+	# 0xffffffff, 1 and 0s, we can conditionally synthesize it by
+	# assigning borrow bit to one register, %ebp, and its negative
+	# to another, %esi. But we started by calculating %esi...
+
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(0,"edi"));
+	&mov	("ebp","esi");
+	&mov	("ebx",&DWP(4,"edi"));
+	&shr	("ebp",31);
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(8,"edi"));
+	&add	("eax","esi");
+	&mov	("edx",&DWP(12,"edi"));
+	&adc	("ebx","esi");
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,"edi"),"eax");
+	&adc	("ecx","esi");
+	&mov	(&DWP(4,"edi"),"ebx");
+	&adc	("edx",0);
+	&mov	(&DWP(8,"edi"),"ecx");
+	&mov	(&DWP(12,"edi"),"edx");
+
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(16,"edi"));
+	&mov	("ebx",&DWP(20,"edi"));
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(24,"edi"));
+	&adc	("eax",0);
+	&mov	("edx",&DWP(28,"edi"));
+	&adc	("ebx",0);
+	&mov	(&DWP(16,"edi"),"eax");
+	&adc	("ecx","ebp");
+	&mov	(&DWP(20,"edi"),"ebx");
+	&adc	("edx","esi");
+	&mov	(&DWP(24,"edi"),"ecx");
+	&mov	(&DWP(28,"edi"),"edx");
+
+	&ret	();
+&function_end_B("_ecp_nistz256_sub");
+
+########################################################################
+# void ecp_nistz256_neg(BN_ULONG edi[8],const BN_ULONG esi[8]);
+&function_begin("ecp_nistz256_neg");
+	&mov	("ebp",&wparam(1));
+	&mov	("edi",&wparam(0));
+
+	&xor	("eax","eax");
+	&stack_push(8);
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,"esp"),"eax");
+	&mov	("esi","esp");
+	&mov	(&DWP(4,"esp"),"eax");
+	&mov	(&DWP(8,"esp"),"eax");
+	&mov	(&DWP(12,"esp"),"eax");
+	&mov	(&DWP(16,"esp"),"eax");
+	&mov	(&DWP(20,"esp"),"eax");
+	&mov	(&DWP(24,"esp"),"eax");
+	&mov	(&DWP(28,"esp"),"eax");
+	
+	&call	("_ecp_nistz256_sub");
+
+	&stack_pop(8);
+&function_end("ecp_nistz256_neg");
+
+&function_begin_B("_picup_eax");
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(0,"esp"));
+	&ret	();
+&function_end_B("_picup_eax");
+
+########################################################################
+# void ecp_nistz256_to_mont(BN_ULONG edi[8],const BN_ULONG esi[8]);
+&function_begin("ecp_nistz256_to_mont");
+	&mov	("esi",&wparam(1));
+	&call	("_picup_eax");
+    &set_label("pic");
+	&lea	("ebp",&DWP(&label("RR")."-".&label("pic"),"eax"));
+						if ($sse2) {
+	&picmeup("eax","OPENSSL_ia32cap_P","eax",&label("pic"));
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(0,"eax"));		}
+	&mov	("edi",&wparam(0));
+	&call	("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont");
+&function_end("ecp_nistz256_to_mont");
+
+########################################################################
+# void ecp_nistz256_from_mont(BN_ULONG edi[8],const BN_ULONG esi[8]);
+&function_begin("ecp_nistz256_from_mont");
+	&mov	("esi",&wparam(1));
+	&call	("_picup_eax");
+    &set_label("pic");
+	&lea	("ebp",&DWP(&label("ONE")."-".&label("pic"),"eax"));
+						if ($sse2) {
+	&picmeup("eax","OPENSSL_ia32cap_P","eax",&label("pic"));
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(0,"eax"));		}
+	&mov	("edi",&wparam(0));
+	&call	("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont");
+&function_end("ecp_nistz256_from_mont");
+
+########################################################################
+# void ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(BN_ULONG edi[8],const BN_ULONG esi[8],
+#					     const BN_ULONG ebp[8]);
+&function_begin("ecp_nistz256_mul_mont");
+	&mov	("esi",&wparam(1));
+	&mov	("ebp",&wparam(2));
+						if ($sse2) {
+	&call	("_picup_eax");
+    &set_label("pic");
+	&picmeup("eax","OPENSSL_ia32cap_P","eax",&label("pic"));
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(0,"eax"));		}
+	&mov	("edi",&wparam(0));
+	&call	("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont");
+&function_end("ecp_nistz256_mul_mont");
+
+########################################################################
+# void ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(BN_ULONG edi[8],const BN_ULONG esi[8]);
+&function_begin("ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont");
+	&mov	("esi",&wparam(1));
+						if ($sse2) {
+	&call	("_picup_eax");
+    &set_label("pic");
+	&picmeup("eax","OPENSSL_ia32cap_P","eax",&label("pic"));
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(0,"eax"));		}
+	&mov	("edi",&wparam(0));
+	&mov	("ebp","esi");
+	&call	("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont");
+&function_end("ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont");
+
+&function_begin_B("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont");
+						if ($sse2) {
+	&and	("eax",1<<24|1<<26);
+	&cmp	("eax",1<<24|1<<26);		# see if XMM+SSE2 is on
+	&jne	(&label("mul_mont_ialu"));
+
+	########################################
+	# SSE2 code path featuring 32x16-bit
+	# multiplications is ~2x faster than
+	# IALU counterpart (except on Atom)...
+	########################################
+	# stack layout:
+	# +------------------------------------+< %esp
+	# | 7 16-byte temporary XMM words,     |
+	# | "sliding" toward lower address     |
+	# .                                    .
+	# +------------------------------------+
+	# | unused XMM word                    |
+	# +------------------------------------+< +128,%ebx
+	# | 8 16-byte XMM words holding copies |
+	# | of a[i]<<64|a[i]                   |
+	# .                                    .
+	# .                                    .
+	# +------------------------------------+< +256
+	&mov	("edx","esp");
+	&sub	("esp",0x100);
+
+	&movd	("xmm7",&DWP(0,"ebp"));		# b[0] -> 0000.00xy
+	&lea	("ebp",&DWP(4,"ebp"));
+	&pcmpeqd("xmm6","xmm6");
+	&psrlq	("xmm6",48);			# compose 0xffff<<64|0xffff
+
+	&pshuflw("xmm7","xmm7",0b11011100);	# 0000.00xy -> 0000.0x0y
+	&and	("esp",-64);
+	&pshufd	("xmm7","xmm7",0b11011100);	# 0000.0x0y -> 000x.000y
+	&lea	("ebx",&DWP(0x80,"esp"));
+
+	&movd	("xmm0",&DWP(4*0,"esi"));	# a[0] -> 0000.00xy
+	&pshufd	("xmm0","xmm0",0b11001100);	# 0000.00xy -> 00xy.00xy
+	&movd	("xmm1",&DWP(4*1,"esi"));	# a[1] -> ...
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(0x00,"ebx"),"xmm0");	# offload converted a[0]
+	&pmuludq("xmm0","xmm7");		# a[0]*b[0]
+
+	&movd	("xmm2",&DWP(4*2,"esi"));
+	&pshufd	("xmm1","xmm1",0b11001100);
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(0x10,"ebx"),"xmm1");
+	&pmuludq("xmm1","xmm7");		# a[1]*b[0]
+
+	 &movq	("xmm4","xmm0");		# clear upper 64 bits
+	 &pslldq("xmm4",6);
+	 &paddq	("xmm4","xmm0");
+	 &movdqa("xmm5","xmm4");
+	 &psrldq("xmm4",10);			# upper 32 bits of a[0]*b[0]
+	 &pand	("xmm5","xmm6");		# lower 32 bits of a[0]*b[0]
+
+	# Upper half of a[0]*b[i] is carried into next multiplication
+	# iteration, while lower one "participates" in actual reduction.
+	# Normally latter is done by accumulating result of multiplication
+	# of modulus by "magic" digit, but thanks to special form of modulus
+	# and "magic" digit it can be performed only with additions and
+	# subtractions (see note in IALU section below). Note that we are
+	# not bothered with carry bits, they are accumulated in "flatten"
+	# phase after all multiplications and reductions.
+
+	&movd	("xmm3",&DWP(4*3,"esi"));
+	&pshufd	("xmm2","xmm2",0b11001100);
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(0x20,"ebx"),"xmm2");
+	&pmuludq("xmm2","xmm7");		# a[2]*b[0]
+	 &paddq	("xmm1","xmm4");		# a[1]*b[0]+hw(a[0]*b[0]), carry
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(0x00,"esp"),"xmm1");	# t[0]
+
+	&movd	("xmm0",&DWP(4*4,"esi"));
+	&pshufd	("xmm3","xmm3",0b11001100);
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(0x30,"ebx"),"xmm3");
+	&pmuludq("xmm3","xmm7");		# a[3]*b[0]
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(0x10,"esp"),"xmm2");
+
+	&movd	("xmm1",&DWP(4*5,"esi"));
+	&pshufd	("xmm0","xmm0",0b11001100);
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(0x40,"ebx"),"xmm0");
+	&pmuludq("xmm0","xmm7");		# a[4]*b[0]
+	 &paddq	("xmm3","xmm5");		# a[3]*b[0]+lw(a[0]*b[0]), reduction step
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(0x20,"esp"),"xmm3");
+
+	&movd	("xmm2",&DWP(4*6,"esi"));
+	&pshufd	("xmm1","xmm1",0b11001100);
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(0x50,"ebx"),"xmm1");
+	&pmuludq("xmm1","xmm7");		# a[5]*b[0]
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(0x30,"esp"),"xmm0");
+	 &pshufd("xmm4","xmm5",0b10110001);	# xmm4 = xmm5<<32, reduction step
+
+	&movd	("xmm3",&DWP(4*7,"esi"));
+	&pshufd	("xmm2","xmm2",0b11001100);
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(0x60,"ebx"),"xmm2");
+	&pmuludq("xmm2","xmm7");		# a[6]*b[0]
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(0x40,"esp"),"xmm1");
+	 &psubq	("xmm4","xmm5");		# xmm4 = xmm5*0xffffffff, reduction step
+
+	&movd	("xmm0",&DWP(0,"ebp"));		# b[1] -> 0000.00xy
+	&pshufd	("xmm3","xmm3",0b11001100);
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(0x70,"ebx"),"xmm3");
+	&pmuludq("xmm3","xmm7");		# a[7]*b[0]
+
+	&pshuflw("xmm7","xmm0",0b11011100);	# 0000.00xy -> 0000.0x0y
+	&movdqa	("xmm0",&QWP(0x00,"ebx"));	# pre-load converted a[0]
+	&pshufd	("xmm7","xmm7",0b11011100);	# 0000.0x0y -> 000x.000y
+
+	&mov	("ecx",6);
+	&lea	("ebp",&DWP(4,"ebp"));
+	&jmp	(&label("madd_sse2"));
+
+&set_label("madd_sse2",16);
+	 &paddq	("xmm2","xmm5");		# a[6]*b[i-1]+lw(a[0]*b[i-1]), reduction step [modulo-scheduled]
+	 &paddq	("xmm3","xmm4");		# a[7]*b[i-1]+lw(a[0]*b[i-1])*0xffffffff, reduction step [modulo-scheduled]
+	&movdqa	("xmm1",&QWP(0x10,"ebx"));
+	&pmuludq("xmm0","xmm7");		# a[0]*b[i]
+	 &movdqa(&QWP(0x50,"esp"),"xmm2");
+
+	&movdqa	("xmm2",&QWP(0x20,"ebx"));
+	&pmuludq("xmm1","xmm7");		# a[1]*b[i]
+	 &movdqa(&QWP(0x60,"esp"),"xmm3");
+	&paddq	("xmm0",&QWP(0x00,"esp"));
+
+	&movdqa	("xmm3",&QWP(0x30,"ebx"));
+	&pmuludq("xmm2","xmm7");		# a[2]*b[i]
+	 &movq	("xmm4","xmm0");		# clear upper 64 bits
+	 &pslldq("xmm4",6);
+	&paddq	("xmm1",&QWP(0x10,"esp"));
+	 &paddq	("xmm4","xmm0");
+	 &movdqa("xmm5","xmm4");
+	 &psrldq("xmm4",10);			# upper 33 bits of a[0]*b[i]+t[0]
+
+	&movdqa	("xmm0",&QWP(0x40,"ebx"));
+	&pmuludq("xmm3","xmm7");		# a[3]*b[i]
+	 &paddq	("xmm1","xmm4");		# a[1]*b[i]+hw(a[0]*b[i]), carry
+	&paddq	("xmm2",&QWP(0x20,"esp"));
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(0x00,"esp"),"xmm1");
+
+	&movdqa	("xmm1",&QWP(0x50,"ebx"));
+	&pmuludq("xmm0","xmm7");		# a[4]*b[i]
+	&paddq	("xmm3",&QWP(0x30,"esp"));
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(0x10,"esp"),"xmm2");
+	 &pand	("xmm5","xmm6");		# lower 32 bits of a[0]*b[i]
+
+	&movdqa	("xmm2",&QWP(0x60,"ebx"));
+	&pmuludq("xmm1","xmm7");		# a[5]*b[i]
+	 &paddq	("xmm3","xmm5");		# a[3]*b[i]+lw(a[0]*b[i]), reduction step
+	&paddq	("xmm0",&QWP(0x40,"esp"));
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(0x20,"esp"),"xmm3");
+	 &pshufd("xmm4","xmm5",0b10110001);	# xmm4 = xmm5<<32, reduction step
+
+	&movdqa	("xmm3","xmm7");
+	&pmuludq("xmm2","xmm7");		# a[6]*b[i]
+	 &movd	("xmm7",&DWP(0,"ebp"));		# b[i++] -> 0000.00xy
+	 &lea	("ebp",&DWP(4,"ebp"));
+	&paddq	("xmm1",&QWP(0x50,"esp"));
+	 &psubq	("xmm4","xmm5");		# xmm4 = xmm5*0xffffffff, reduction step
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(0x30,"esp"),"xmm0");
+	 &pshuflw("xmm7","xmm7",0b11011100);	# 0000.00xy -> 0000.0x0y
+
+	&pmuludq("xmm3",&QWP(0x70,"ebx"));	# a[7]*b[i]
+	 &pshufd("xmm7","xmm7",0b11011100);	# 0000.0x0y -> 000x.000y
+	 &movdqa("xmm0",&QWP(0x00,"ebx"));	# pre-load converted a[0]
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(0x40,"esp"),"xmm1");
+	&paddq	("xmm2",&QWP(0x60,"esp"));
+
+	&dec	("ecx");
+	&jnz	(&label("madd_sse2"));
+
+	 &paddq	("xmm2","xmm5");		# a[6]*b[6]+lw(a[0]*b[6]), reduction step [modulo-scheduled]
+	 &paddq	("xmm3","xmm4");		# a[7]*b[6]+lw(a[0]*b[6])*0xffffffff, reduction step [modulo-scheduled]
+	&movdqa	("xmm1",&QWP(0x10,"ebx"));
+	&pmuludq("xmm0","xmm7");		# a[0]*b[7]
+	 &movdqa(&QWP(0x50,"esp"),"xmm2");
+
+	&movdqa	("xmm2",&QWP(0x20,"ebx"));
+	&pmuludq("xmm1","xmm7");		# a[1]*b[7]
+	 &movdqa(&QWP(0x60,"esp"),"xmm3");
+	&paddq	("xmm0",&QWP(0x00,"esp"));
+
+	&movdqa	("xmm3",&QWP(0x30,"ebx"));
+	&pmuludq("xmm2","xmm7");		# a[2]*b[7]
+	 &movq	("xmm4","xmm0");		# clear upper 64 bits
+	 &pslldq("xmm4",6);
+	&paddq	("xmm1",&QWP(0x10,"esp"));
+	 &paddq	("xmm4","xmm0");
+	 &movdqa("xmm5","xmm4");
+	 &psrldq("xmm4",10);			# upper 33 bits of a[0]*b[i]+t[0]
+
+	&movdqa	("xmm0",&QWP(0x40,"ebx"));
+	&pmuludq("xmm3","xmm7");		# a[3]*b[7]
+	 &paddq	("xmm1","xmm4");		# a[1]*b[7]+hw(a[0]*b[7]), carry
+	&paddq	("xmm2",&QWP(0x20,"esp"));
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(0x00,"esp"),"xmm1");
+
+	&movdqa	("xmm1",&QWP(0x50,"ebx"));
+	&pmuludq("xmm0","xmm7");		# a[4]*b[7]
+	&paddq	("xmm3",&QWP(0x30,"esp"));
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(0x10,"esp"),"xmm2");
+	 &pand	("xmm5","xmm6");		# lower 32 bits of a[0]*b[i]
+
+	&movdqa	("xmm2",&QWP(0x60,"ebx"));
+	&pmuludq("xmm1","xmm7");		# a[5]*b[7]
+	 &paddq	("xmm3","xmm5");		# reduction step
+	&paddq	("xmm0",&QWP(0x40,"esp"));
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(0x20,"esp"),"xmm3");
+	 &pshufd("xmm4","xmm5",0b10110001);	# xmm4 = xmm5<<32, reduction step
+
+	&movdqa	("xmm3",&QWP(0x70,"ebx"));
+	&pmuludq("xmm2","xmm7");		# a[6]*b[7]
+	&paddq	("xmm1",&QWP(0x50,"esp"));
+	 &psubq	("xmm4","xmm5");		# xmm4 = xmm5*0xffffffff, reduction step
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(0x30,"esp"),"xmm0");
+
+	&pmuludq("xmm3","xmm7");		# a[7]*b[7]
+	&pcmpeqd("xmm7","xmm7");
+	&movdqa	("xmm0",&QWP(0x00,"esp"));
+	&pslldq	("xmm7",8);
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(0x40,"esp"),"xmm1");
+	&paddq	("xmm2",&QWP(0x60,"esp"));
+
+	 &paddq	("xmm2","xmm5");		# a[6]*b[7]+lw(a[0]*b[7]), reduction step
+	 &paddq	("xmm3","xmm4");		# a[6]*b[7]+lw(a[0]*b[7])*0xffffffff, reduction step
+	 &movdqa(&QWP(0x50,"esp"),"xmm2");
+	 &movdqa(&QWP(0x60,"esp"),"xmm3");
+
+	&movdqa	("xmm1",&QWP(0x10,"esp"));
+	&movdqa	("xmm2",&QWP(0x20,"esp"));
+	&movdqa	("xmm3",&QWP(0x30,"esp"));
+
+	&movq	("xmm4","xmm0");		# "flatten"
+	&pand	("xmm0","xmm7");
+	&xor	("ebp","ebp");
+	&pslldq	("xmm4",6);
+	 &movq	("xmm5","xmm1");
+	&paddq	("xmm0","xmm4");
+	 &pand	("xmm1","xmm7");
+	&psrldq	("xmm0",6);
+	&movd	("eax","xmm0");
+	&psrldq	("xmm0",4);
+
+	&paddq	("xmm5","xmm0");
+	&movdqa	("xmm0",&QWP(0x40,"esp"));
+	&sub	("eax",-1);			# start subtracting modulus,
+						# this is used to determine
+						# if result is larger/smaller
+						# than modulus (see below)
+	&pslldq	("xmm5",6);
+	 &movq	("xmm4","xmm2");
+	&paddq	("xmm1","xmm5");
+	 &pand	("xmm2","xmm7");
+	&psrldq	("xmm1",6);
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*0,"edi"),"eax");
+	&movd	("eax","xmm1");
+	&psrldq	("xmm1",4);
+
+	&paddq	("xmm4","xmm1");
+	&movdqa	("xmm1",&QWP(0x50,"esp"));
+	&sbb	("eax",-1);
+	&pslldq	("xmm4",6);
+	 &movq	("xmm5","xmm3");
+	&paddq	("xmm2","xmm4");
+	 &pand	("xmm3","xmm7");
+	&psrldq	("xmm2",6);
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*1,"edi"),"eax");
+	&movd	("eax","xmm2");
+	&psrldq	("xmm2",4);
+
+	&paddq	("xmm5","xmm2");
+	&movdqa	("xmm2",&QWP(0x60,"esp"));
+	&sbb	("eax",-1);
+	&pslldq	("xmm5",6);
+	 &movq	("xmm4","xmm0");
+	&paddq	("xmm3","xmm5");
+	 &pand	("xmm0","xmm7");
+	&psrldq	("xmm3",6);
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*2,"edi"),"eax");
+	&movd	("eax","xmm3");
+	&psrldq	("xmm3",4);
+
+	&paddq	("xmm4","xmm3");
+	&sbb	("eax",0);
+	&pslldq	("xmm4",6);
+	 &movq	("xmm5","xmm1");
+	&paddq	("xmm0","xmm4");
+	 &pand	("xmm1","xmm7");
+	&psrldq	("xmm0",6);
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*3,"edi"),"eax");
+	&movd	("eax","xmm0");
+	&psrldq	("xmm0",4);
+
+	&paddq	("xmm5","xmm0");
+	&sbb	("eax",0);
+	&pslldq	("xmm5",6);
+	 &movq	("xmm4","xmm2");
+	&paddq	("xmm1","xmm5");
+	 &pand	("xmm2","xmm7");
+	&psrldq	("xmm1",6);
+	&movd	("ebx","xmm1");
+	&psrldq	("xmm1",4);
+	&mov	("esp","edx");
+
+	&paddq	("xmm4","xmm1");
+	&pslldq	("xmm4",6);
+	&paddq	("xmm2","xmm4");
+	&psrldq	("xmm2",6);
+	&movd	("ecx","xmm2");
+	&psrldq	("xmm2",4);
+	&sbb	("ebx",0);
+	&movd	("edx","xmm2");
+	&pextrw	("esi","xmm2",2);		# top-most overflow bit
+	&sbb	("ecx",1);
+	&sbb	("edx",-1);
+	&sbb	("esi",0);			# borrow from subtraction
+
+	# Final step is "if result > mod, subtract mod", and at this point
+	# we have result - mod written to output buffer, as well as borrow
+	# bit from this subtraction, and if borrow bit is set, we add
+	# modulus back.
+	#
+	# Note that because mod has special form, i.e. consists of
+	# 0xffffffff, 1 and 0s, we can conditionally synthesize it by
+	# assigning borrow bit to one register, %ebp, and its negative
+	# to another, %esi. But we started by calculating %esi...
+
+	&sub	("ebp","esi");
+	&add	(&DWP(4*0,"edi"),"esi");	# add modulus or zero
+	&adc	(&DWP(4*1,"edi"),"esi");
+	&adc	(&DWP(4*2,"edi"),"esi");
+	&adc	(&DWP(4*3,"edi"),0);
+	&adc	("eax",0);
+	&adc	("ebx",0);
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*4,"edi"),"eax");
+	&adc	("ecx","ebp");
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*5,"edi"),"ebx");
+	&adc	("edx","esi");
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*6,"edi"),"ecx");
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*7,"edi"),"edx");
+
+	&ret	();
+
+&set_label("mul_mont_ialu",16);			}
+
+	########################################
+	# IALU code path suitable for all CPUs.
+	########################################
+	# stack layout:
+	# +------------------------------------+< %esp
+	# | 8 32-bit temporary words, accessed |
+	# | as circular buffer                 |
+	# .                                    .
+	# .                                    .
+	# +------------------------------------+< +32
+	# | offloaded destination pointer      |
+	# +------------------------------------+
+	# | unused                             |
+	# +------------------------------------+< +40
+	&sub	("esp",10*4);
+
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(0*4,"esi"));		# a[0]
+	&mov	("ebx",&DWP(0*4,"ebp"));		# b[0]
+	&mov	(&DWP(8*4,"esp"),"edi");		# off-load dst ptr
+
+	&mul	("ebx");				# a[0]*b[0]
+	&mov	(&DWP(0*4,"esp"),"eax");		# t[0]
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(1*4,"esi"));
+	&mov	("ecx","edx")
+
+	&mul	("ebx");				# a[1]*b[0]
+	&add	("ecx","eax");
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(2*4,"esi"));
+	&adc	("edx",0);
+	&mov	(&DWP(1*4,"esp"),"ecx");		# t[1]
+	&mov	("ecx","edx");
+
+	&mul	("ebx");				# a[2]*b[0]
+	&add	("ecx","eax");
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(3*4,"esi"));
+	&adc	("edx",0);
+	&mov	(&DWP(2*4,"esp"),"ecx");		# t[2]
+	&mov	("ecx","edx");
+
+	&mul	("ebx");				# a[3]*b[0]
+	&add	("ecx","eax");
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(4*4,"esi"));
+	&adc	("edx",0);
+	&mov	(&DWP(3*4,"esp"),"ecx");		# t[3]
+	&mov	("ecx","edx");
+
+	&mul	("ebx");				# a[4]*b[0]
+	&add	("ecx","eax");
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(5*4,"esi"));
+	&adc	("edx",0);
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*4,"esp"),"ecx");		# t[4]
+	&mov	("ecx","edx");
+
+	&mul	("ebx");				# a[5]*b[0]
+	&add	("ecx","eax");
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(6*4,"esi"));
+	&adc	("edx",0);
+	&mov	(&DWP(5*4,"esp"),"ecx");		# t[5]
+	&mov	("ecx","edx");
+
+	&mul	("ebx");				# a[6]*b[0]
+	&add	("ecx","eax");
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(7*4,"esi"));
+	&adc	("edx",0);
+	&mov	(&DWP(6*4,"esp"),"ecx");		# t[6]
+	&mov	("ecx","edx");
+
+	&xor	("edi","edi");				# initial top-most carry
+	&mul	("ebx");				# a[7]*b[0]
+	&add	("ecx","eax");				# t[7]
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(0*4,"esp"));		# t[0]
+	&adc	("edx",0);				# t[8]
+
+for ($i=0;$i<7;$i++) {
+	my $j=$i+1;
+
+	# Reduction iteration is normally performed by accumulating
+	# result of multiplication of modulus by "magic" digit [and
+	# omitting least significant word, which is guaranteed to
+	# be 0], but thanks to special form of modulus and "magic"
+	# digit being equal to least significant word, it can be
+	# performed with additions and subtractions alone. Indeed:
+	#
+	#        ffff.0001.0000.0000.0000.ffff.ffff.ffff
+	# *                                         abcd
+	# + xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.abcd
+	#
+	# Now observing that ff..ff*x = (2^n-1)*x = 2^n*x-x, we
+	# rewrite above as:
+	#
+	#   xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.abcd
+	# + abcd.0000.abcd.0000.0000.abcd.0000.0000.0000
+	# -      abcd.0000.0000.0000.0000.0000.0000.abcd
+	#
+	# or marking redundant operations:
+	#
+	#   xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.----
+	# + abcd.0000.abcd.0000.0000.abcd.----.----.----
+	# -      abcd.----.----.----.----.----.----.----
+
+	&add	(&DWP((($i+3)%8)*4,"esp"),"eax");	# t[3]+=t[0]
+	&adc	(&DWP((($i+4)%8)*4,"esp"),0);		# t[4]+=0
+	&adc	(&DWP((($i+5)%8)*4,"esp"),0);		# t[5]+=0
+	&adc	(&DWP((($i+6)%8)*4,"esp"),"eax");	# t[6]+=t[0]
+	&adc	("ecx",0);				# t[7]+=0
+	&adc	("edx","eax");				# t[8]+=t[0]
+	&adc	("edi",0);				# top-most carry
+	 &mov	("ebx",&DWP($j*4,"ebp"));		# b[i]
+	&sub	("ecx","eax");				# t[7]-=t[0]
+	 &mov	("eax",&DWP(0*4,"esi"));		# a[0]
+	&sbb	("edx",0);				# t[8]-=0
+	&mov	(&DWP((($i+7)%8)*4,"esp"),"ecx");
+	&sbb	("edi",0);				# top-most carry,
+							# keep in mind that
+							# netto result is
+							# *addition* of value
+							# with (abcd<<32)-abcd
+							# on top, so that
+							# underflow is
+							# impossible, because
+							# (abcd<<32)-abcd
+							# doesn't underflow
+	&mov	(&DWP((($i+8)%8)*4,"esp"),"edx");
+
+	&mul	("ebx");				# a[0]*b[i]
+	&add	("eax",&DWP((($j+0)%8)*4,"esp"));
+	&adc	("edx",0);
+	&mov	(&DWP((($j+0)%8)*4,"esp"),"eax");
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(1*4,"esi"));
+	&mov	("ecx","edx")
+
+	&mul	("ebx");				# a[1]*b[i]
+	&add	("ecx",&DWP((($j+1)%8)*4,"esp"));
+	&adc	("edx",0);
+	&add	("ecx","eax");
+	&adc	("edx",0);
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(2*4,"esi"));
+	&mov	(&DWP((($j+1)%8)*4,"esp"),"ecx");
+	&mov	("ecx","edx");
+
+	&mul	("ebx");				# a[2]*b[i]
+	&add	("ecx",&DWP((($j+2)%8)*4,"esp"));
+	&adc	("edx",0);
+	&add	("ecx","eax");
+	&adc	("edx",0);
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(3*4,"esi"));
+	&mov	(&DWP((($j+2)%8)*4,"esp"),"ecx");
+	&mov	("ecx","edx");
+
+	&mul	("ebx");				# a[3]*b[i]
+	&add	("ecx",&DWP((($j+3)%8)*4,"esp"));
+	&adc	("edx",0);
+	&add	("ecx","eax");
+	&adc	("edx",0);
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(4*4,"esi"));
+	&mov	(&DWP((($j+3)%8)*4,"esp"),"ecx");
+	&mov	("ecx","edx");
+
+	&mul	("ebx");				# a[4]*b[i]
+	&add	("ecx",&DWP((($j+4)%8)*4,"esp"));
+	&adc	("edx",0);
+	&add	("ecx","eax");
+	&adc	("edx",0);
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(5*4,"esi"));
+	&mov	(&DWP((($j+4)%8)*4,"esp"),"ecx");
+	&mov	("ecx","edx");
+
+	&mul	("ebx");				# a[5]*b[i]
+	&add	("ecx",&DWP((($j+5)%8)*4,"esp"));
+	&adc	("edx",0);
+	&add	("ecx","eax");
+	&adc	("edx",0);
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(6*4,"esi"));
+	&mov	(&DWP((($j+5)%8)*4,"esp"),"ecx");
+	&mov	("ecx","edx");
+
+	&mul	("ebx");				# a[6]*b[i]
+	&add	("ecx",&DWP((($j+6)%8)*4,"esp"));
+	&adc	("edx",0);
+	&add	("ecx","eax");
+	&adc	("edx",0);
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(7*4,"esi"));
+	&mov	(&DWP((($j+6)%8)*4,"esp"),"ecx");
+	&mov	("ecx","edx");
+
+	&mul	("ebx");				# a[7]*b[i]
+	&add	("ecx",&DWP((($j+7)%8)*4,"esp"));
+	&adc	("edx",0);
+	&add	("ecx","eax");				# t[7]
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP((($j+0)%8)*4,"esp"));	# t[0]
+	&adc	("edx","edi");				# t[8]
+	&mov	("edi",0);
+	&adc	("edi",0);				# top-most carry
+}
+	&mov	("ebp",&DWP(8*4,"esp"));		# restore dst ptr
+	&xor	("esi","esi");
+	my $j=$i+1;
+
+	# last multiplication-less reduction
+	&add	(&DWP((($i+3)%8)*4,"esp"),"eax");	# t[3]+=t[0]
+	&adc	(&DWP((($i+4)%8)*4,"esp"),0);		# t[4]+=0
+	&adc	(&DWP((($i+5)%8)*4,"esp"),0);		# t[5]+=0
+	&adc	(&DWP((($i+6)%8)*4,"esp"),"eax");	# t[6]+=t[0]
+	&adc	("ecx",0);				# t[7]+=0
+	&adc	("edx","eax");				# t[8]+=t[0]
+	&adc	("edi",0);				# top-most carry
+	 &mov	("ebx",&DWP((($j+1)%8)*4,"esp"));
+	&sub	("ecx","eax");				# t[7]-=t[0]
+	 &mov	("eax",&DWP((($j+0)%8)*4,"esp"));
+	&sbb	("edx",0);				# t[8]-=0
+	&mov	(&DWP((($i+7)%8)*4,"esp"),"ecx");
+	&sbb	("edi",0);				# top-most carry
+	&mov	(&DWP((($i+8)%8)*4,"esp"),"edx");
+
+	# Final step is "if result > mod, subtract mod", but we do it
+	# "other way around", namely write result - mod to output buffer
+	# and if subtraction borrowed, add modulus back.
+
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP((($j+2)%8)*4,"esp"));
+	&sub	("eax",-1);
+	&mov	("edx",&DWP((($j+3)%8)*4,"esp"));
+	&sbb	("ebx",-1);
+	&mov	(&DWP(0*4,"ebp"),"eax");
+	&sbb	("ecx",-1);
+	&mov	(&DWP(1*4,"ebp"),"ebx");
+	&sbb	("edx",0);
+	&mov	(&DWP(2*4,"ebp"),"ecx");
+	&mov	(&DWP(3*4,"ebp"),"edx");
+
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP((($j+4)%8)*4,"esp"));
+	&mov	("ebx",&DWP((($j+5)%8)*4,"esp"));
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP((($j+6)%8)*4,"esp"));
+	&sbb	("eax",0);
+	&mov	("edx",&DWP((($j+7)%8)*4,"esp"));
+	&sbb	("ebx",0);
+	&sbb	("ecx",1);
+	&sbb	("edx",-1);
+	&sbb	("edi",0);
+
+	# Note that because mod has special form, i.e. consists of
+	# 0xffffffff, 1 and 0s, we can conditionally synthesize it by
+	# assigning borrow bit to one register, %ebp, and its negative
+	# to another, %esi. But we started by calculating %esi...
+
+	&sub	("esi","edi");
+	&add	(&DWP(0*4,"ebp"),"edi");		# add modulus or zero
+	&adc	(&DWP(1*4,"ebp"),"edi");
+	&adc	(&DWP(2*4,"ebp"),"edi");
+	&adc	(&DWP(3*4,"ebp"),0);
+	&adc	("eax",0);
+	&adc	("ebx",0);
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*4,"ebp"),"eax");
+	&adc	("ecx","esi");
+	&mov	(&DWP(5*4,"ebp"),"ebx");
+	&adc	("edx","edi");
+	&mov	(&DWP(6*4,"ebp"),"ecx");
+	&mov	("edi","ebp");				# fulfill contract
+	&mov	(&DWP(7*4,"ebp"),"edx");
+
+	&add	("esp",10*4);
+	&ret	();
+&function_end_B("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont");
+
+########################################################################
+# void ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5(void *edi,const P256_POINT *esi,
+#					 int ebp);
+&function_begin("ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5");
+	&mov	("edi",&wparam(0));
+	&mov	("esi",&wparam(1));
+	&mov	("ebp",&wparam(2));
+
+	&lea	("edi",&DWP(128-4,"edi","ebp",4));
+	&mov	("ebp",96/16);
+&set_label("scatter_w5_loop");
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(0,"esi"));
+	&mov	("ebx",&DWP(4,"esi"));
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(8,"esi"));
+	&mov	("edx",&DWP(12,"esi"));
+	&lea	("esi",&DWP(16,"esi"));
+	&mov	(&DWP(64*0-128,"edi"),"eax");
+	&mov	(&DWP(64*1-128,"edi"),"ebx");
+	&mov	(&DWP(64*2-128,"edi"),"ecx");
+	&mov	(&DWP(64*3-128,"edi"),"edx");
+	&lea	("edi",&DWP(64*4,"edi"));
+	&dec	("ebp");
+	&jnz	(&label("scatter_w5_loop"));
+&function_end("ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5");
+
+########################################################################
+# void ecp_nistz256_gather_w5(P256_POINT *edi,const void *esi,
+#					      int ebp);
+&function_begin("ecp_nistz256_gather_w5");
+	&mov	("esi",&wparam(1));
+	&mov	("ebp",&wparam(2));
+
+	&lea	("esi",&DWP(0,"esi","ebp",4));
+	&neg	("ebp");
+	&sar	("ebp",31);
+	&mov	("edi",&wparam(0));
+	&lea	("esi",&DWP(0,"esi","ebp",4));
+
+    for($i=0;$i<24;$i+=4) {
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(64*($i+0),"esi"));
+	&mov	("ebx",&DWP(64*($i+1),"esi"));
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(64*($i+2),"esi"));
+	&mov	("edx",&DWP(64*($i+3),"esi"));
+	&and	("eax","ebp");
+	&and	("ebx","ebp");
+	&and	("ecx","ebp");
+	&and	("edx","ebp");
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*($i+0),"edi"),"eax");
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*($i+1),"edi"),"ebx");
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*($i+2),"edi"),"ecx");
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*($i+3),"edi"),"edx");
+    }
+&function_end("ecp_nistz256_gather_w5");
+
+########################################################################
+# void ecp_nistz256_scatter_w7(void *edi,const P256_POINT_AFFINE *esi,
+#					 int ebp);
+&function_begin("ecp_nistz256_scatter_w7");
+	&mov	("edi",&wparam(0));
+	&mov	("esi",&wparam(1));
+	&mov	("ebp",&wparam(2));
+
+	&lea	("edi",&DWP(-1,"edi","ebp"));
+	&mov	("ebp",64/4);
+&set_label("scatter_w7_loop");
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(0,"esi"));
+	&lea	("esi",&DWP(4,"esi"));
+	&mov	(&BP(64*0,"edi"),"al");
+	&mov	(&BP(64*1,"edi"),"ah");
+	&shr	("eax",16);
+	&mov	(&BP(64*2,"edi"),"al");
+	&mov	(&BP(64*3,"edi"),"ah");
+	&lea	("edi",&DWP(64*4,"edi"));
+	&dec	("ebp");
+	&jnz	(&label("scatter_w7_loop"));
+&function_end("ecp_nistz256_scatter_w7");
+
+########################################################################
+# void ecp_nistz256_gather_w7(P256_POINT_AFFINE *edi,const void *esi,
+#						     int ebp);
+&function_begin("ecp_nistz256_gather_w7");
+	&mov	("esi",&wparam(1));
+	&mov	("ebp",&wparam(2));
+
+	&add	("esi","ebp");
+	&neg	("ebp"),
+	&sar	("ebp",31);
+	&mov	("edi",&wparam(0));
+	&lea	("esi",&DWP(0,"esi","ebp"));
+
+    for($i=0;$i<64;$i+=4) {
+	&movz	("eax",&BP(64*($i+0),"esi"));
+	&movz	("ebx",&BP(64*($i+1),"esi"));
+	&movz	("ecx",&BP(64*($i+2),"esi"));
+	&and	("eax","ebp");
+	&movz	("edx",&BP(64*($i+3),"esi"));
+	&and	("ebx","ebp");
+	&mov	(&BP($i+0,"edi"),"al");
+	&and	("ecx","ebp");
+	&mov	(&BP($i+1,"edi"),"bl");
+	&and	("edx","ebp");
+	&mov	(&BP($i+2,"edi"),"cl");
+	&mov	(&BP($i+3,"edi"),"dl");
+    }
+&function_end("ecp_nistz256_gather_w7");
+
+########################################################################
+# following subroutines are "literal" implementation of those found in
+# ecp_nistz256.c
+#
+########################################################################
+# void ecp_nistz256_point_double(P256_POINT *out,const P256_POINT *inp);
+#
+&static_label("point_double_shortcut");
+&function_begin("ecp_nistz256_point_double");
+{   my ($S,$M,$Zsqr,$in_x,$tmp0)=map(32*$_,(0..4));
+
+	&mov	("esi",&wparam(1));
+
+	# above map() describes stack layout with 5 temporary
+	# 256-bit vectors on top, then we take extra word for
+	# OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy.
+	&stack_push(8*5+1);
+						if ($sse2) {
+	&call	("_picup_eax");
+    &set_label("pic");
+	&picmeup("edx","OPENSSL_ia32cap_P","eax",&label("pic"));
+	&mov	("ebp",&DWP(0,"edx"));		}
+
+&set_label("point_double_shortcut");
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(0,"esi"));		# copy in_x
+	&mov	("ebx",&DWP(4,"esi"));
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(8,"esi"));
+	&mov	("edx",&DWP(12,"esi"));
+	&mov	(&DWP($in_x+0,"esp"),"eax");
+	&mov	(&DWP($in_x+4,"esp"),"ebx");
+	&mov	(&DWP($in_x+8,"esp"),"ecx");
+	&mov	(&DWP($in_x+12,"esp"),"edx");
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(16,"esi"));
+	&mov	("ebx",&DWP(20,"esi"));
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(24,"esi"));
+	&mov	("edx",&DWP(28,"esi"));
+	&mov	(&DWP($in_x+16,"esp"),"eax");
+	&mov	(&DWP($in_x+20,"esp"),"ebx");
+	&mov	(&DWP($in_x+24,"esp"),"ecx");
+	&mov	(&DWP($in_x+28,"esp"),"edx");
+	&mov	(&DWP(32*5,"esp"),"ebp");	# OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy
+
+	&lea	("ebp",&DWP(32,"esi"));
+	&lea	("esi",&DWP(32,"esi"));
+	&lea	("edi",&DWP($S,"esp"));
+	&call	("_ecp_nistz256_add");		# p256_mul_by_2(S, in_y);
+
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(32*5,"esp"));	# OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy
+	&mov	("esi",64);
+	&add	("esi",&wparam(1));
+	&lea	("edi",&DWP($Zsqr,"esp"));
+	&mov	("ebp","esi");
+	&call	("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont");	# p256_sqr_mont(Zsqr, in_z);
+
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(32*5,"esp"));	# OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy
+	&lea	("esi",&DWP($S,"esp"));
+	&lea	("ebp",&DWP($S,"esp"));
+	&lea	("edi",&DWP($S,"esp"));
+	&call	("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont");	# p256_sqr_mont(S, S);
+
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(32*5,"esp"));	# OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy
+	&mov	("ebp",&wparam(1));
+	&lea	("esi",&DWP(32,"ebp"));
+	&lea	("ebp",&DWP(64,"ebp"));
+	&lea	("edi",&DWP($tmp0,"esp"));
+	&call	("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont");	# p256_mul_mont(tmp0, in_z, in_y);
+
+	&lea	("esi",&DWP($in_x,"esp"));
+	&lea	("ebp",&DWP($Zsqr,"esp"));
+	&lea	("edi",&DWP($M,"esp"));
+	&call	("_ecp_nistz256_add");		# p256_add(M, in_x, Zsqr);
+
+	&mov	("edi",64);
+	&lea	("esi",&DWP($tmp0,"esp"));
+	&lea	("ebp",&DWP($tmp0,"esp"));
+	&add	("edi",&wparam(0));
+	&call	("_ecp_nistz256_add");		# p256_mul_by_2(res_z, tmp0);
+
+	&lea	("esi",&DWP($in_x,"esp"));
+	&lea	("ebp",&DWP($Zsqr,"esp"));
+	&lea	("edi",&DWP($Zsqr,"esp"));
+	&call	("_ecp_nistz256_sub");		# p256_sub(Zsqr, in_x, Zsqr);
+
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(32*5,"esp"));	# OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy
+	&lea	("esi",&DWP($S,"esp"));
+	&lea	("ebp",&DWP($S,"esp"));
+	&lea	("edi",&DWP($tmp0,"esp"));
+	&call	("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont");	# p256_sqr_mont(tmp0, S);
+
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(32*5,"esp"));	# OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy
+	&lea	("esi",&DWP($M,"esp"));
+	&lea	("ebp",&DWP($Zsqr,"esp"));
+	&lea	("edi",&DWP($M,"esp"));
+	&call	("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont");	# p256_mul_mont(M, M, Zsqr);
+
+	&mov	("edi",32);
+	&lea	("esi",&DWP($tmp0,"esp"));
+	&add	("edi",&wparam(0));
+	&call	("_ecp_nistz256_div_by_2");	# p256_div_by_2(res_y, tmp0);
+
+	&lea	("esi",&DWP($M,"esp"));
+	&lea	("ebp",&DWP($M,"esp"));
+	&lea	("edi",&DWP($tmp0,"esp"));
+	&call	("_ecp_nistz256_add");		# 1/2 p256_mul_by_3(M, M);
+
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(32*5,"esp"));	# OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy
+	&lea	("esi",&DWP($in_x,"esp"));
+	&lea	("ebp",&DWP($S,"esp"));
+	&lea	("edi",&DWP($S,"esp"));
+	&call	("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont");	# p256_mul_mont(S, S, in_x);
+
+	&lea	("esi",&DWP($tmp0,"esp"));
+	&lea	("ebp",&DWP($M,"esp"));
+	&lea	("edi",&DWP($M,"esp"));
+	&call	("_ecp_nistz256_add");		# 2/2 p256_mul_by_3(M, M);
+
+	&lea	("esi",&DWP($S,"esp"));
+	&lea	("ebp",&DWP($S,"esp"));
+	&lea	("edi",&DWP($tmp0,"esp"));
+	&call	("_ecp_nistz256_add");		# p256_mul_by_2(tmp0, S);
+
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(32*5,"esp"));	# OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy
+	&lea	("esi",&DWP($M,"esp"));
+	&lea	("ebp",&DWP($M,"esp"));
+	&mov	("edi",&wparam(0));
+	&call	("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont");	# p256_sqr_mont(res_x, M);
+
+	&mov	("esi","edi");			# %edi is still res_x here
+	&lea	("ebp",&DWP($tmp0,"esp"));
+	&call	("_ecp_nistz256_sub");		# p256_sub(res_x, res_x, tmp0);
+
+	&lea	("esi",&DWP($S,"esp"));
+	&mov	("ebp","edi");			# %edi is still res_x
+	&lea	("edi",&DWP($S,"esp"));
+	&call	("_ecp_nistz256_sub");		# p256_sub(S, S, res_x);
+
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(32*5,"esp"));	# OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy
+	&mov	("esi","edi");			# %edi is still &S
+	&lea	("ebp",&DWP($M,"esp"));
+	&call	("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont");	# p256_mul_mont(S, S, M);
+
+	&mov	("ebp",32);
+	&lea	("esi",&DWP($S,"esp"));
+	&add	("ebp",&wparam(0));
+	&mov	("edi","ebp");
+	&call	("_ecp_nistz256_sub");		# p256_sub(res_y, S, res_y);
+
+	&stack_pop(8*5+1);
+} &function_end("ecp_nistz256_point_double");
+
+########################################################################
+# void ecp_nistz256_point_add(P256_POINT *out,const P256_POINT *in1,
+#					      const P256_POINT *in2);
+&function_begin("ecp_nistz256_point_add");
+{   my ($res_x,$res_y,$res_z,
+	$in1_x,$in1_y,$in1_z,
+	$in2_x,$in2_y,$in2_z,
+	$H,$Hsqr,$R,$Rsqr,$Hcub,
+	$U1,$U2,$S1,$S2)=map(32*$_,(0..17));
+    my ($Z1sqr, $Z2sqr) = ($Hsqr, $Rsqr);
+
+	&mov	("esi",&wparam(2));
+
+	# above map() describes stack layout with 18 temporary
+	# 256-bit vectors on top, then we take extra words for
+	# !in1infty, !in2infty, result of check for zero and
+	# OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy. [one unused word for padding]
+	&stack_push(8*18+5);
+						if ($sse2) {
+	&call	("_picup_eax");
+    &set_label("pic");
+	&picmeup("edx","OPENSSL_ia32cap_P","eax",&label("pic"));
+	&mov	("ebp",&DWP(0,"edx"));		}
+
+	&lea	("edi",&DWP($in2_x,"esp"));
+    for($i=0;$i<96;$i+=16) {
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP($i+0,"esi"));	# copy in2
+	&mov	("ebx",&DWP($i+4,"esi"));
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP($i+8,"esi"));
+	&mov	("edx",&DWP($i+12,"esi"));
+	&mov	(&DWP($i+0,"edi"),"eax");
+	&mov	(&DWP(32*18+12,"esp"),"ebp")	if ($i==0);
+	&mov	("ebp","eax")			if ($i==64);
+	&or	("ebp","eax")			if ($i>64);
+	&mov	(&DWP($i+4,"edi"),"ebx");
+	&or	("ebp","ebx")			if ($i>=64);
+	&mov	(&DWP($i+8,"edi"),"ecx");
+	&or	("ebp","ecx")			if ($i>=64);
+	&mov	(&DWP($i+12,"edi"),"edx");
+	&or	("ebp","edx")			if ($i>=64);
+    }
+	&xor	("eax","eax");
+	&mov	("esi",&wparam(1));
+	&sub	("eax","ebp");
+	&or	("ebp","eax");
+	&sar	("ebp",31);
+	&mov	(&DWP(32*18+4,"esp"),"ebp");	# !in2infty
+
+	&lea	("edi",&DWP($in1_x,"esp"));
+    for($i=0;$i<96;$i+=16) {
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP($i+0,"esi"));	# copy in1
+	&mov	("ebx",&DWP($i+4,"esi"));
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP($i+8,"esi"));
+	&mov	("edx",&DWP($i+12,"esi"));
+	&mov	(&DWP($i+0,"edi"),"eax");
+	&mov	("ebp","eax")			if ($i==64);
+	&or	("ebp","eax")			if ($i>64);
+	&mov	(&DWP($i+4,"edi"),"ebx");
+	&or	("ebp","ebx")			if ($i>=64);
+	&mov	(&DWP($i+8,"edi"),"ecx");
+	&or	("ebp","ecx")			if ($i>=64);
+	&mov	(&DWP($i+12,"edi"),"edx");
+	&or	("ebp","edx")			if ($i>=64);
+    }
+	&xor	("eax","eax");
+	&sub	("eax","ebp");
+	&or	("ebp","eax");
+	&sar	("ebp",31);
+	&mov	(&DWP(32*18+0,"esp"),"ebp");	# !in1infty
+
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(32*18+12,"esp"));	# OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy
+	&lea	("esi",&DWP($in2_z,"esp"));
+	&lea	("ebp",&DWP($in2_z,"esp"));
+	&lea	("edi",&DWP($Z2sqr,"esp"));
+	&call	("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont");	# p256_sqr_mont(Z2sqr, in2_z);
+
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(32*18+12,"esp"));	# OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy
+	&lea	("esi",&DWP($in1_z,"esp"));
+	&lea	("ebp",&DWP($in1_z,"esp"));
+	&lea	("edi",&DWP($Z1sqr,"esp"));
+	&call	("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont");	# p256_sqr_mont(Z1sqr, in1_z);
+
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(32*18+12,"esp"));	# OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy
+	&lea	("esi",&DWP($Z2sqr,"esp"));
+	&lea	("ebp",&DWP($in2_z,"esp"));
+	&lea	("edi",&DWP($S1,"esp"));
+	&call	("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont");	# p256_mul_mont(S1, Z2sqr, in2_z);
+
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(32*18+12,"esp"));	# OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy
+	&lea	("esi",&DWP($Z1sqr,"esp"));
+	&lea	("ebp",&DWP($in1_z,"esp"));
+	&lea	("edi",&DWP($S2,"esp"));
+	&call	("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont");	# p256_mul_mont(S2, Z1sqr, in1_z);
+
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(32*18+12,"esp"));	# OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy
+	&lea	("esi",&DWP($in1_y,"esp"));
+	&lea	("ebp",&DWP($S1,"esp"));
+	&lea	("edi",&DWP($S1,"esp"));
+	&call	("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont");	# p256_mul_mont(S1, S1, in1_y);
+
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(32*18+12,"esp"));	# OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy
+	&lea	("esi",&DWP($in2_y,"esp"));
+	&lea	("ebp",&DWP($S2,"esp"));
+	&lea	("edi",&DWP($S2,"esp"));
+	&call	("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont");	# p256_mul_mont(S2, S2, in2_y);
+
+	&lea	("esi",&DWP($S2,"esp"));
+	&lea	("ebp",&DWP($S1,"esp"));
+	&lea	("edi",&DWP($R,"esp"));
+	&call	("_ecp_nistz256_sub");		# p256_sub(R, S2, S1);
+
+	&or	("ebx","eax");			# see if result is zero
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(32*18+12,"esp"));	# OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy
+	&or	("ebx","ecx");
+	&or	("ebx","edx");
+	&or	("ebx",&DWP(0,"edi"));
+	&or	("ebx",&DWP(4,"edi"));
+	 &lea	("esi",&DWP($in1_x,"esp"));
+	&or	("ebx",&DWP(8,"edi"));
+	 &lea	("ebp",&DWP($Z2sqr,"esp"));
+	&or	("ebx",&DWP(12,"edi"));
+	 &lea	("edi",&DWP($U1,"esp"));
+	&mov	(&DWP(32*18+8,"esp"),"ebx");
+
+	&call	("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont");	# p256_mul_mont(U1, in1_x, Z2sqr);
+
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(32*18+12,"esp"));	# OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy
+	&lea	("esi",&DWP($in2_x,"esp"));
+	&lea	("ebp",&DWP($Z1sqr,"esp"));
+	&lea	("edi",&DWP($U2,"esp"));
+	&call	("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont");	# p256_mul_mont(U2, in2_x, Z1sqr);
+
+	&lea	("esi",&DWP($U2,"esp"));
+	&lea	("ebp",&DWP($U1,"esp"));
+	&lea	("edi",&DWP($H,"esp"));
+	&call	("_ecp_nistz256_sub");		# p256_sub(H, U2, U1);
+
+	&or	("eax","ebx");			# see if result is zero
+	&or	("eax","ecx");
+	&or	("eax","edx");
+	&or	("eax",&DWP(0,"edi"));
+	&or	("eax",&DWP(4,"edi"));
+	&or	("eax",&DWP(8,"edi"));
+	&or	("eax",&DWP(12,"edi"));
+
+	&data_byte(0x3e);			# predict taken
+	&jnz	(&label("add_proceed"));	# is_equal(U1,U2)?
+
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(32*18+0,"esp"));
+	&and	("eax",&DWP(32*18+4,"esp"));
+	&mov	("ebx",&DWP(32*18+8,"esp"));
+	&jz	(&label("add_proceed"));	# (in1infty || in2infty)?
+	&test	("ebx","ebx");
+	&jz	(&label("add_double"));		# is_equal(S1,S2)?
+
+	&mov	("edi",&wparam(0));
+	&xor	("eax","eax");
+	&mov	("ecx",96/4);
+	&data_byte(0xfc,0xf3,0xab);		# cld; stosd
+	&jmp	(&label("add_done"));
+
+&set_label("add_double",16);
+	&mov	("esi",&wparam(1));
+	&mov	("ebp",&DWP(32*18+12,"esp"));	# OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy
+	&add	("esp",4*((8*18+5)-(8*5+1)));	# difference in frame sizes
+	&jmp	(&label("point_double_shortcut"));
+
+&set_label("add_proceed",16);
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(32*18+12,"esp"));	# OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy
+	&lea	("esi",&DWP($R,"esp"));
+	&lea	("ebp",&DWP($R,"esp"));
+	&lea	("edi",&DWP($Rsqr,"esp"));
+	&call	("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont");	# p256_sqr_mont(Rsqr, R);
+
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(32*18+12,"esp"));	# OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy
+	&lea	("esi",&DWP($H,"esp"));
+	&lea	("ebp",&DWP($in1_z,"esp"));
+	&lea	("edi",&DWP($res_z,"esp"));
+	&call	("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont");	# p256_mul_mont(res_z, H, in1_z);
+
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(32*18+12,"esp"));	# OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy
+	&lea	("esi",&DWP($H,"esp"));
+	&lea	("ebp",&DWP($H,"esp"));
+	&lea	("edi",&DWP($Hsqr,"esp"));
+	&call	("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont");	# p256_sqr_mont(Hsqr, H);
+
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(32*18+12,"esp"));	# OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy
+	&lea	("esi",&DWP($in2_z,"esp"));
+	&lea	("ebp",&DWP($res_z,"esp"));
+	&lea	("edi",&DWP($res_z,"esp"));
+	&call	("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont");	# p256_mul_mont(res_z, res_z, in2_z);
+
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(32*18+12,"esp"));	# OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy
+	&lea	("esi",&DWP($Hsqr,"esp"));
+	&lea	("ebp",&DWP($U1,"esp"));
+	&lea	("edi",&DWP($U2,"esp"));
+	&call	("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont");	# p256_mul_mont(U2, U1, Hsqr);
+
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(32*18+12,"esp"));	# OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy
+	&lea	("esi",&DWP($H,"esp"));
+	&lea	("ebp",&DWP($Hsqr,"esp"));
+	&lea	("edi",&DWP($Hcub,"esp"));
+	&call	("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont");	# p256_mul_mont(Hcub, Hsqr, H);
+
+	&lea	("esi",&DWP($U2,"esp"));
+	&lea	("ebp",&DWP($U2,"esp"));
+	&lea	("edi",&DWP($Hsqr,"esp"));
+	&call	("_ecp_nistz256_add");		# p256_mul_by_2(Hsqr, U2);
+
+	&lea	("esi",&DWP($Rsqr,"esp"));
+	&lea	("ebp",&DWP($Hsqr,"esp"));
+	&lea	("edi",&DWP($res_x,"esp"));
+	&call	("_ecp_nistz256_sub");		# p256_sub(res_x, Rsqr, Hsqr);
+
+	&lea	("esi",&DWP($res_x,"esp"));
+	&lea	("ebp",&DWP($Hcub,"esp"));
+	&lea	("edi",&DWP($res_x,"esp"));
+	&call	("_ecp_nistz256_sub");		# p256_sub(res_x, res_x, Hcub);
+
+	&lea	("esi",&DWP($U2,"esp"));
+	&lea	("ebp",&DWP($res_x,"esp"));
+	&lea	("edi",&DWP($res_y,"esp"));
+	&call	("_ecp_nistz256_sub");		# p256_sub(res_y, U2, res_x);
+
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(32*18+12,"esp"));	# OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy
+	&lea	("esi",&DWP($Hcub,"esp"));
+	&lea	("ebp",&DWP($S1,"esp"));
+	&lea	("edi",&DWP($S2,"esp"));
+	&call	("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont");	# p256_mul_mont(S2, S1, Hcub);
+
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(32*18+12,"esp"));	# OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy
+	&lea	("esi",&DWP($R,"esp"));
+	&lea	("ebp",&DWP($res_y,"esp"));
+	&lea	("edi",&DWP($res_y,"esp"));
+	&call	("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont");	# p256_mul_mont(res_y, R, res_y);
+
+	&lea	("esi",&DWP($res_y,"esp"));
+	&lea	("ebp",&DWP($S2,"esp"));
+	&lea	("edi",&DWP($res_y,"esp"));
+	&call	("_ecp_nistz256_sub");		# p256_sub(res_y, res_y, S2);
+
+	&mov	("ebp",&DWP(32*18+0,"esp"));	# !in1infty
+	&mov	("esi",&DWP(32*18+4,"esp"));	# !in2infty
+	&mov	("edi",&wparam(0));
+	&mov	("edx","ebp");
+	&not	("ebp");
+	&and	("edx","esi");
+	&and	("ebp","esi");
+	&not	("esi");
+
+	########################################
+	# conditional moves
+    for($i=64;$i<96;$i+=4) {
+	&mov	("eax","edx");
+	&and	("eax",&DWP($res_x+$i,"esp"));
+	&mov	("ebx","ebp");
+	&and	("ebx",&DWP($in2_x+$i,"esp"));
+	&mov	("ecx","esi");
+	&and	("ecx",&DWP($in1_x+$i,"esp"));
+	&or	("eax","ebx");
+	&or	("eax","ecx");
+	&mov	(&DWP($i,"edi"),"eax");
+    }
+    for($i=0;$i<64;$i+=4) {
+	&mov	("eax","edx");
+	&and	("eax",&DWP($res_x+$i,"esp"));
+	&mov	("ebx","ebp");
+	&and	("ebx",&DWP($in2_x+$i,"esp"));
+	&mov	("ecx","esi");
+	&and	("ecx",&DWP($in1_x+$i,"esp"));
+	&or	("eax","ebx");
+	&or	("eax","ecx");
+	&mov	(&DWP($i,"edi"),"eax");
+    }
+    &set_label("add_done");
+	&stack_pop(8*18+5);
+} &function_end("ecp_nistz256_point_add");
+
+########################################################################
+# void ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine(P256_POINT *out,
+#				     const P256_POINT *in1,
+#				     const P256_POINT_AFFINE *in2);
+&function_begin("ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine");
+{
+    my ($res_x,$res_y,$res_z,
+	$in1_x,$in1_y,$in1_z,
+	$in2_x,$in2_y,
+	$U2,$S2,$H,$R,$Hsqr,$Hcub,$Rsqr)=map(32*$_,(0..14));
+    my $Z1sqr = $S2;
+    my @ONE_mont=(1,0,0,-1,-1,-1,-2,0);
+
+	&mov	("esi",&wparam(1));
+
+	# above map() describes stack layout with 15 temporary
+	# 256-bit vectors on top, then we take extra words for
+	# !in1infty, !in2infty, and OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy.
+	&stack_push(8*15+3);
+						if ($sse2) {
+	&call	("_picup_eax");
+    &set_label("pic");
+	&picmeup("edx","OPENSSL_ia32cap_P","eax",&label("pic"));
+	&mov	("ebp",&DWP(0,"edx"));		}
+
+	&lea	("edi",&DWP($in1_x,"esp"));
+    for($i=0;$i<96;$i+=16) {
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP($i+0,"esi"));	# copy in1
+	&mov	("ebx",&DWP($i+4,"esi"));
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP($i+8,"esi"));
+	&mov	("edx",&DWP($i+12,"esi"));
+	&mov	(&DWP($i+0,"edi"),"eax");
+	&mov	(&DWP(32*15+8,"esp"),"ebp")	if ($i==0);
+	&mov	("ebp","eax")			if ($i==64);
+	&or	("ebp","eax")			if ($i>64);
+	&mov	(&DWP($i+4,"edi"),"ebx");
+	&or	("ebp","ebx")			if ($i>=64);
+	&mov	(&DWP($i+8,"edi"),"ecx");
+	&or	("ebp","ecx")			if ($i>=64);
+	&mov	(&DWP($i+12,"edi"),"edx");
+	&or	("ebp","edx")			if ($i>=64);
+    }
+	&xor	("eax","eax");
+	&mov	("esi",&wparam(2));
+	&sub	("eax","ebp");
+	&or	("ebp","eax");
+	&sar	("ebp",31);
+	&mov	(&DWP(32*15+0,"esp"),"ebp");	# !in1infty
+
+	&lea	("edi",&DWP($in2_x,"esp"));
+    for($i=0;$i<64;$i+=16) {
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP($i+0,"esi"));	# copy in2
+	&mov	("ebx",&DWP($i+4,"esi"));
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP($i+8,"esi"));
+	&mov	("edx",&DWP($i+12,"esi"));
+	&mov	(&DWP($i+0,"edi"),"eax");
+	&mov	("ebp","eax")			if ($i==0);
+	&or	("ebp","eax")			if ($i!=0);
+	&mov	(&DWP($i+4,"edi"),"ebx");
+	&or	("ebp","ebx");
+	&mov	(&DWP($i+8,"edi"),"ecx");
+	&or	("ebp","ecx");
+	&mov	(&DWP($i+12,"edi"),"edx");
+	&or	("ebp","edx");
+    }
+	&xor	("ebx","ebx");
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(32*15+8,"esp"));	# OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy
+	&sub	("ebx","ebp");
+	 &lea	("esi",&DWP($in1_z,"esp"));
+	&or	("ebx","ebp");
+	 &lea	("ebp",&DWP($in1_z,"esp"));
+	&sar	("ebx",31);
+	 &lea	("edi",&DWP($Z1sqr,"esp"));
+	&mov	(&DWP(32*15+4,"esp"),"ebx");	# !in2infty
+
+	&call	("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont");	# p256_sqr_mont(Z1sqr, in1_z);
+
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(32*15+8,"esp"));	# OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy
+	&lea	("esi",&DWP($in2_x,"esp"));
+	&mov	("ebp","edi");			# %esi is stull &Z1sqr
+	&lea	("edi",&DWP($U2,"esp"));
+	&call	("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont");	# p256_mul_mont(U2, Z1sqr, in2_x);
+
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(32*15+8,"esp"));	# OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy
+	&lea	("esi",&DWP($in1_z,"esp"));
+	&lea	("ebp",&DWP($Z1sqr,"esp"));
+	&lea	("edi",&DWP($S2,"esp"));
+	&call	("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont");	# p256_mul_mont(S2, Z1sqr, in1_z);
+
+	&lea	("esi",&DWP($U2,"esp"));
+	&lea	("ebp",&DWP($in1_x,"esp"));
+	&lea	("edi",&DWP($H,"esp"));
+	&call	("_ecp_nistz256_sub");		# p256_sub(H, U2, in1_x);
+
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(32*15+8,"esp"));	# OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy
+	&lea	("esi",&DWP($in2_y,"esp"));
+	&lea	("ebp",&DWP($S2,"esp"));
+	&lea	("edi",&DWP($S2,"esp"));
+	&call	("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont");	# p256_mul_mont(S2, S2, in2_y);
+
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(32*15+8,"esp"));	# OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy
+	&lea	("esi",&DWP($in1_z,"esp"));
+	&lea	("ebp",&DWP($H,"esp"));
+	&lea	("edi",&DWP($res_z,"esp"));
+	&call	("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont");	# p256_mul_mont(res_z, H, in1_z);
+
+	&lea	("esi",&DWP($S2,"esp"));
+	&lea	("ebp",&DWP($in1_y,"esp"));
+	&lea	("edi",&DWP($R,"esp"));
+	&call	("_ecp_nistz256_sub");		# p256_sub(R, S2, in1_y);
+
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(32*15+8,"esp"));	# OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy
+	&lea	("esi",&DWP($H,"esp"));
+	&lea	("ebp",&DWP($H,"esp"));
+	&lea	("edi",&DWP($Hsqr,"esp"));
+	&call	("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont");	# p256_sqr_mont(Hsqr, H);
+
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(32*15+8,"esp"));	# OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy
+	&lea	("esi",&DWP($R,"esp"));
+	&lea	("ebp",&DWP($R,"esp"));
+	&lea	("edi",&DWP($Rsqr,"esp"));
+	&call	("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont");	# p256_sqr_mont(Rsqr, R);
+
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(32*15+8,"esp"));	# OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy
+	&lea	("esi",&DWP($in1_x,"esp"));
+	&lea	("ebp",&DWP($Hsqr,"esp"));
+	&lea	("edi",&DWP($U2,"esp"));
+	&call	("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont");	# p256_mul_mont(U2, in1_x, Hsqr);
+
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(32*15+8,"esp"));	# OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy
+	&lea	("esi",&DWP($H,"esp"));
+	&lea	("ebp",&DWP($Hsqr,"esp"));
+	&lea	("edi",&DWP($Hcub,"esp"));
+	&call	("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont");	# p256_mul_mont(Hcub, Hsqr, H);
+
+	&lea	("esi",&DWP($U2,"esp"));
+	&lea	("ebp",&DWP($U2,"esp"));
+	&lea	("edi",&DWP($Hsqr,"esp"));
+	&call	("_ecp_nistz256_add");		# p256_mul_by_2(Hsqr, U2);
+
+	&lea	("esi",&DWP($Rsqr,"esp"));
+	&lea	("ebp",&DWP($Hsqr,"esp"));
+	&lea	("edi",&DWP($res_x,"esp"));
+	&call	("_ecp_nistz256_sub");		# p256_sub(res_x, Rsqr, Hsqr);
+
+	&lea	("esi",&DWP($res_x,"esp"));
+	&lea	("ebp",&DWP($Hcub,"esp"));
+	&lea	("edi",&DWP($res_x,"esp"));
+	&call	("_ecp_nistz256_sub");		# p256_sub(res_x, res_x, Hcub);
+
+	&lea	("esi",&DWP($U2,"esp"));
+	&lea	("ebp",&DWP($res_x,"esp"));
+	&lea	("edi",&DWP($res_y,"esp"));
+	&call	("_ecp_nistz256_sub");		# p256_sub(res_y, U2, res_x);
+
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(32*15+8,"esp"));	# OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy
+	&lea	("esi",&DWP($Hcub,"esp"));
+	&lea	("ebp",&DWP($in1_y,"esp"));
+	&lea	("edi",&DWP($S2,"esp"));
+	&call	("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont");	# p256_mul_mont(S2, Hcub, in1_y);
+
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(32*15+8,"esp"));	# OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy
+	&lea	("esi",&DWP($R,"esp"));
+	&lea	("ebp",&DWP($res_y,"esp"));
+	&lea	("edi",&DWP($res_y,"esp"));
+	&call	("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont");	# p256_mul_mont(res_y, res_y, R);
+
+	&lea	("esi",&DWP($res_y,"esp"));
+	&lea	("ebp",&DWP($S2,"esp"));
+	&lea	("edi",&DWP($res_y,"esp"));
+	&call	("_ecp_nistz256_sub");		# p256_sub(res_y, res_y, S2);
+
+	&mov	("ebp",&DWP(32*15+0,"esp"));	# !in1infty
+	&mov	("esi",&DWP(32*15+4,"esp"));	# !in2infty
+	&mov	("edi",&wparam(0));
+	&mov	("edx","ebp");
+	&not	("ebp");
+	&and	("edx","esi");
+	&and	("ebp","esi");
+	&not	("esi");
+
+	########################################
+	# conditional moves
+    for($i=64;$i<96;$i+=4) {
+	my $one=@ONE_mont[($i-64)/4];
+
+	&mov	("eax","edx");
+	&and	("eax",&DWP($res_x+$i,"esp"));
+	&mov	("ebx","ebp")			if ($one && $one!=-1);
+	&and	("ebx",$one)			if ($one && $one!=-1);
+	&mov	("ecx","esi");
+	&and	("ecx",&DWP($in1_x+$i,"esp"));
+	&or	("eax",$one==-1?"ebp":"ebx")	if ($one);
+	&or	("eax","ecx");
+	&mov	(&DWP($i,"edi"),"eax");
+    }
+    for($i=0;$i<64;$i+=4) {
+	&mov	("eax","edx");
+	&and	("eax",&DWP($res_x+$i,"esp"));
+	&mov	("ebx","ebp");
+	&and	("ebx",&DWP($in2_x+$i,"esp"));
+	&mov	("ecx","esi");
+	&and	("ecx",&DWP($in1_x+$i,"esp"));
+	&or	("eax","ebx");
+	&or	("eax","ecx");
+	&mov	(&DWP($i,"edi"),"eax");
+    }
+	&stack_pop(8*15+3);
+} &function_end("ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine");
+
+&asm_finish();
+
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.pl
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..714e852
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,3083 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2014-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+##############################################################################
+#                                                                            #
+# Copyright 2014 Intel Corporation                                           #
+#                                                                            #
+# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");            #
+# you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.           #
+# You may obtain a copy of the License at                                    #
+#                                                                            #
+#    http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0                              #
+#                                                                            #
+# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software        #
+# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,          #
+# WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.   #
+# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and        #
+# limitations under the License.                                             #
+#                                                                            #
+##############################################################################
+#                                                                            #
+#  Developers and authors:                                                   #
+#  Shay Gueron (1, 2), and Vlad Krasnov (1)                                  #
+#  (1) Intel Corporation, Israel Development Center                          #
+#  (2) University of Haifa                                                   #
+#  Reference:                                                                #
+#  S.Gueron and V.Krasnov, "Fast Prime Field Elliptic Curve Cryptography with#
+#                           256 Bit Primes"                                  #
+#                                                                            #
+##############################################################################
+
+# Further optimization by <appro@openssl.org>:
+#
+#		this/original	with/without -DECP_NISTZ256_ASM(*)
+# Opteron	+12-49%		+110-150%
+# Bulldozer	+14-45%		+175-210%
+# P4		+18-46%		n/a :-(
+# Westmere	+12-34%		+80-87%
+# Sandy Bridge	+9-35%		+110-120%
+# Ivy Bridge	+9-35%		+110-125%
+# Haswell	+8-37%		+140-160%
+# Broadwell	+18-58%		+145-210%
+# Atom		+15-50%		+130-180%
+# VIA Nano	+43-160%	+300-480%
+#
+# (*)	"without -DECP_NISTZ256_ASM" refers to build with
+#	"enable-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128";
+#
+# Ranges denote minimum and maximum improvement coefficients depending
+# on benchmark. Lower coefficients are for ECDSA sign, relatively fastest
+# server-side operation. Keep in mind that +100% means 2x improvement.
+
+$flavour = shift;
+$output  = shift;
+if ($flavour =~ /\./) { $output = $flavour; undef $flavour; }
+
+$win64=0; $win64=1 if ($flavour =~ /[nm]asm|mingw64/ || $output =~ /\.asm$/);
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+( $xlate="${dir}x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
+( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
+die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl";
+
+open OUT,"| \"$^X\" \"$xlate\" $flavour \"$output\"";
+*STDOUT=*OUT;
+
+if (`$ENV{CC} -Wa,-v -c -o /dev/null -x assembler /dev/null 2>&1`
+		=~ /GNU assembler version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
+	$avx = ($1>=2.19) + ($1>=2.22);
+	$addx = ($1>=2.23);
+}
+
+if (!$addx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /nasm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /nasm/) &&
+	    `nasm -v 2>&1` =~ /NASM version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
+	$avx = ($1>=2.09) + ($1>=2.10);
+	$addx = ($1>=2.10);
+}
+
+if (!$addx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
+	    `ml64 2>&1` =~ /Version ([0-9]+)\./) {
+	$avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=11);
+	$addx = ($1>=12);
+}
+
+if (!$addx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([3-9])\.([0-9]+)/) {
+	my $ver = $2 + $3/100.0;	# 3.1->3.01, 3.10->3.10
+	$avx = ($ver>=3.0) + ($ver>=3.01);
+	$addx = ($ver>=3.03);
+}
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.text
+.extern	OPENSSL_ia32cap_P
+
+# The polynomial
+.align 64
+.Lpoly:
+.quad 0xffffffffffffffff, 0x00000000ffffffff, 0x0000000000000000, 0xffffffff00000001
+
+# 2^512 mod P precomputed for NIST P256 polynomial
+.LRR:
+.quad 0x0000000000000003, 0xfffffffbffffffff, 0xfffffffffffffffe, 0x00000004fffffffd
+
+.LOne:
+.long 1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1
+.LTwo:
+.long 2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2
+.LThree:
+.long 3,3,3,3,3,3,3,3
+.LONE_mont:
+.quad 0x0000000000000001, 0xffffffff00000000, 0xffffffffffffffff, 0x00000000fffffffe
+___
+
+{
+################################################################################
+# void ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2(uint64_t res[4], uint64_t a[4]);
+
+my ($a0,$a1,$a2,$a3)=map("%r$_",(8..11));
+my ($t0,$t1,$t2,$t3,$t4)=("%rax","%rdx","%rcx","%r12","%r13");
+my ($r_ptr,$a_ptr,$b_ptr)=("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx");
+
+$code.=<<___;
+
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2
+.type	ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2,\@function,2
+.align	64
+ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2:
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+
+	mov	8*0($a_ptr), $a0
+	xor	$t4,$t4
+	mov	8*1($a_ptr), $a1
+	add	$a0, $a0		# a0:a3+a0:a3
+	mov	8*2($a_ptr), $a2
+	adc	$a1, $a1
+	mov	8*3($a_ptr), $a3
+	lea	.Lpoly(%rip), $a_ptr
+	 mov	$a0, $t0
+	adc	$a2, $a2
+	adc	$a3, $a3
+	 mov	$a1, $t1
+	adc	\$0, $t4
+
+	sub	8*0($a_ptr), $a0
+	 mov	$a2, $t2
+	sbb	8*1($a_ptr), $a1
+	sbb	8*2($a_ptr), $a2
+	 mov	$a3, $t3
+	sbb	8*3($a_ptr), $a3
+	sbb	\$0, $t4
+
+	cmovc	$t0, $a0
+	cmovc	$t1, $a1
+	mov	$a0, 8*0($r_ptr)
+	cmovc	$t2, $a2
+	mov	$a1, 8*1($r_ptr)
+	cmovc	$t3, $a3
+	mov	$a2, 8*2($r_ptr)
+	mov	$a3, 8*3($r_ptr)
+
+	pop	%r13
+	pop	%r12
+	ret
+.size	ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2,.-ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2
+
+################################################################################
+# void ecp_nistz256_div_by_2(uint64_t res[4], uint64_t a[4]);
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_div_by_2
+.type	ecp_nistz256_div_by_2,\@function,2
+.align	32
+ecp_nistz256_div_by_2:
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+
+	mov	8*0($a_ptr), $a0
+	mov	8*1($a_ptr), $a1
+	mov	8*2($a_ptr), $a2
+	 mov	$a0, $t0
+	mov	8*3($a_ptr), $a3
+	lea	.Lpoly(%rip), $a_ptr
+
+	 mov	$a1, $t1
+	xor	$t4, $t4
+	add	8*0($a_ptr), $a0
+	 mov	$a2, $t2
+	adc	8*1($a_ptr), $a1
+	adc	8*2($a_ptr), $a2
+	 mov	$a3, $t3
+	adc	8*3($a_ptr), $a3
+	adc	\$0, $t4
+	xor	$a_ptr, $a_ptr		# borrow $a_ptr
+	test	\$1, $t0
+
+	cmovz	$t0, $a0
+	cmovz	$t1, $a1
+	cmovz	$t2, $a2
+	cmovz	$t3, $a3
+	cmovz	$a_ptr, $t4
+
+	mov	$a1, $t0		# a0:a3>>1
+	shr	\$1, $a0
+	shl	\$63, $t0
+	mov	$a2, $t1
+	shr	\$1, $a1
+	or	$t0, $a0
+	shl	\$63, $t1
+	mov	$a3, $t2
+	shr	\$1, $a2
+	or	$t1, $a1
+	shl	\$63, $t2
+	shr	\$1, $a3
+	shl	\$63, $t4
+	or	$t2, $a2
+	or	$t4, $a3
+
+	mov	$a0, 8*0($r_ptr)
+	mov	$a1, 8*1($r_ptr)
+	mov	$a2, 8*2($r_ptr)
+	mov	$a3, 8*3($r_ptr)
+
+	pop	%r13
+	pop	%r12
+	ret
+.size	ecp_nistz256_div_by_2,.-ecp_nistz256_div_by_2
+
+################################################################################
+# void ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3(uint64_t res[4], uint64_t a[4]);
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3
+.type	ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3,\@function,2
+.align	32
+ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3:
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+
+	mov	8*0($a_ptr), $a0
+	xor	$t4, $t4
+	mov	8*1($a_ptr), $a1
+	add	$a0, $a0		# a0:a3+a0:a3
+	mov	8*2($a_ptr), $a2
+	adc	$a1, $a1
+	mov	8*3($a_ptr), $a3
+	 mov	$a0, $t0
+	adc	$a2, $a2
+	adc	$a3, $a3
+	 mov	$a1, $t1
+	adc	\$0, $t4
+
+	sub	\$-1, $a0
+	 mov	$a2, $t2
+	sbb	.Lpoly+8*1(%rip), $a1
+	sbb	\$0, $a2
+	 mov	$a3, $t3
+	sbb	.Lpoly+8*3(%rip), $a3
+	sbb	\$0, $t4
+
+	cmovc	$t0, $a0
+	cmovc	$t1, $a1
+	cmovc	$t2, $a2
+	cmovc	$t3, $a3
+
+	xor	$t4, $t4
+	add	8*0($a_ptr), $a0	# a0:a3+=a_ptr[0:3]
+	adc	8*1($a_ptr), $a1
+	 mov	$a0, $t0
+	adc	8*2($a_ptr), $a2
+	adc	8*3($a_ptr), $a3
+	 mov	$a1, $t1
+	adc	\$0, $t4
+
+	sub	\$-1, $a0
+	 mov	$a2, $t2
+	sbb	.Lpoly+8*1(%rip), $a1
+	sbb	\$0, $a2
+	 mov	$a3, $t3
+	sbb	.Lpoly+8*3(%rip), $a3
+	sbb	\$0, $t4
+
+	cmovc	$t0, $a0
+	cmovc	$t1, $a1
+	mov	$a0, 8*0($r_ptr)
+	cmovc	$t2, $a2
+	mov	$a1, 8*1($r_ptr)
+	cmovc	$t3, $a3
+	mov	$a2, 8*2($r_ptr)
+	mov	$a3, 8*3($r_ptr)
+
+	pop %r13
+	pop %r12
+	ret
+.size	ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3,.-ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3
+
+################################################################################
+# void ecp_nistz256_add(uint64_t res[4], uint64_t a[4], uint64_t b[4]);
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_add
+.type	ecp_nistz256_add,\@function,3
+.align	32
+ecp_nistz256_add:
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+
+	mov	8*0($a_ptr), $a0
+	xor	$t4, $t4
+	mov	8*1($a_ptr), $a1
+	mov	8*2($a_ptr), $a2
+	mov	8*3($a_ptr), $a3
+	lea	.Lpoly(%rip), $a_ptr
+
+	add	8*0($b_ptr), $a0
+	adc	8*1($b_ptr), $a1
+	 mov	$a0, $t0
+	adc	8*2($b_ptr), $a2
+	adc	8*3($b_ptr), $a3
+	 mov	$a1, $t1
+	adc	\$0, $t4
+
+	sub	8*0($a_ptr), $a0
+	 mov	$a2, $t2
+	sbb	8*1($a_ptr), $a1
+	sbb	8*2($a_ptr), $a2
+	 mov	$a3, $t3
+	sbb	8*3($a_ptr), $a3
+	sbb	\$0, $t4
+
+	cmovc	$t0, $a0
+	cmovc	$t1, $a1
+	mov	$a0, 8*0($r_ptr)
+	cmovc	$t2, $a2
+	mov	$a1, 8*1($r_ptr)
+	cmovc	$t3, $a3
+	mov	$a2, 8*2($r_ptr)
+	mov	$a3, 8*3($r_ptr)
+
+	pop %r13
+	pop %r12
+	ret
+.size	ecp_nistz256_add,.-ecp_nistz256_add
+
+################################################################################
+# void ecp_nistz256_sub(uint64_t res[4], uint64_t a[4], uint64_t b[4]);
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_sub
+.type	ecp_nistz256_sub,\@function,3
+.align	32
+ecp_nistz256_sub:
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+
+	mov	8*0($a_ptr), $a0
+	xor	$t4, $t4
+	mov	8*1($a_ptr), $a1
+	mov	8*2($a_ptr), $a2
+	mov	8*3($a_ptr), $a3
+	lea	.Lpoly(%rip), $a_ptr
+
+	sub	8*0($b_ptr), $a0
+	sbb	8*1($b_ptr), $a1
+	 mov	$a0, $t0
+	sbb	8*2($b_ptr), $a2
+	sbb	8*3($b_ptr), $a3
+	 mov	$a1, $t1
+	sbb	\$0, $t4
+
+	add	8*0($a_ptr), $a0
+	 mov	$a2, $t2
+	adc	8*1($a_ptr), $a1
+	adc	8*2($a_ptr), $a2
+	 mov	$a3, $t3
+	adc	8*3($a_ptr), $a3
+	test	$t4, $t4
+
+	cmovz	$t0, $a0
+	cmovz	$t1, $a1
+	mov	$a0, 8*0($r_ptr)
+	cmovz	$t2, $a2
+	mov	$a1, 8*1($r_ptr)
+	cmovz	$t3, $a3
+	mov	$a2, 8*2($r_ptr)
+	mov	$a3, 8*3($r_ptr)
+
+	pop %r13
+	pop %r12
+	ret
+.size	ecp_nistz256_sub,.-ecp_nistz256_sub
+
+################################################################################
+# void ecp_nistz256_neg(uint64_t res[4], uint64_t a[4]);
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_neg
+.type	ecp_nistz256_neg,\@function,2
+.align	32
+ecp_nistz256_neg:
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+
+	xor	$a0, $a0
+	xor	$a1, $a1
+	xor	$a2, $a2
+	xor	$a3, $a3
+	xor	$t4, $t4
+
+	sub	8*0($a_ptr), $a0
+	sbb	8*1($a_ptr), $a1
+	sbb	8*2($a_ptr), $a2
+	 mov	$a0, $t0
+	sbb	8*3($a_ptr), $a3
+	lea	.Lpoly(%rip), $a_ptr
+	 mov	$a1, $t1
+	sbb	\$0, $t4
+
+	add	8*0($a_ptr), $a0
+	 mov	$a2, $t2
+	adc	8*1($a_ptr), $a1
+	adc	8*2($a_ptr), $a2
+	 mov	$a3, $t3
+	adc	8*3($a_ptr), $a3
+	test	$t4, $t4
+
+	cmovz	$t0, $a0
+	cmovz	$t1, $a1
+	mov	$a0, 8*0($r_ptr)
+	cmovz	$t2, $a2
+	mov	$a1, 8*1($r_ptr)
+	cmovz	$t3, $a3
+	mov	$a2, 8*2($r_ptr)
+	mov	$a3, 8*3($r_ptr)
+
+	pop %r13
+	pop %r12
+	ret
+.size	ecp_nistz256_neg,.-ecp_nistz256_neg
+___
+}
+{
+my ($r_ptr,$a_ptr,$b_org,$b_ptr)=("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx","%rbx");
+my ($acc0,$acc1,$acc2,$acc3,$acc4,$acc5,$acc6,$acc7)=map("%r$_",(8..15));
+my ($t0,$t1,$t2,$t3,$t4)=("%rcx","%rbp","%rbx","%rdx","%rax");
+my ($poly1,$poly3)=($acc6,$acc7);
+
+$code.=<<___;
+################################################################################
+# void ecp_nistz256_to_mont(
+#   uint64_t res[4],
+#   uint64_t in[4]);
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_to_mont
+.type	ecp_nistz256_to_mont,\@function,2
+.align	32
+ecp_nistz256_to_mont:
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($addx);
+	mov	\$0x80100, %ecx
+	and	OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+8(%rip), %ecx
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	lea	.LRR(%rip), $b_org
+	jmp	.Lmul_mont
+.size	ecp_nistz256_to_mont,.-ecp_nistz256_to_mont
+
+################################################################################
+# void ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(
+#   uint64_t res[4],
+#   uint64_t a[4],
+#   uint64_t b[4]);
+
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_mul_mont
+.type	ecp_nistz256_mul_mont,\@function,3
+.align	32
+ecp_nistz256_mul_mont:
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($addx);
+	mov	\$0x80100, %ecx
+	and	OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+8(%rip), %ecx
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+.Lmul_mont:
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($addx);
+	cmp	\$0x80100, %ecx
+	je	.Lmul_montx
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	$b_org, $b_ptr
+	mov	8*0($b_org), %rax
+	mov	8*0($a_ptr), $acc1
+	mov	8*1($a_ptr), $acc2
+	mov	8*2($a_ptr), $acc3
+	mov	8*3($a_ptr), $acc4
+
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_montq
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($addx);
+	jmp	.Lmul_mont_done
+
+.align	32
+.Lmul_montx:
+	mov	$b_org, $b_ptr
+	mov	8*0($b_org), %rdx
+	mov	8*0($a_ptr), $acc1
+	mov	8*1($a_ptr), $acc2
+	mov	8*2($a_ptr), $acc3
+	mov	8*3($a_ptr), $acc4
+	lea	-128($a_ptr), $a_ptr	# control u-op density
+
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_montx
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+.Lmul_mont_done:
+	pop	%r15
+	pop	%r14
+	pop	%r13
+	pop	%r12
+	pop	%rbx
+	pop	%rbp
+	ret
+.size	ecp_nistz256_mul_mont,.-ecp_nistz256_mul_mont
+
+.type	__ecp_nistz256_mul_montq,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	32
+__ecp_nistz256_mul_montq:
+	########################################################################
+	# Multiply a by b[0]
+	mov	%rax, $t1
+	mulq	$acc1
+	mov	.Lpoly+8*1(%rip),$poly1
+	mov	%rax, $acc0
+	mov	$t1, %rax
+	mov	%rdx, $acc1
+
+	mulq	$acc2
+	mov	.Lpoly+8*3(%rip),$poly3
+	add	%rax, $acc1
+	mov	$t1, %rax
+	adc	\$0, %rdx
+	mov	%rdx, $acc2
+
+	mulq	$acc3
+	add	%rax, $acc2
+	mov	$t1, %rax
+	adc	\$0, %rdx
+	mov	%rdx, $acc3
+
+	mulq	$acc4
+	add	%rax, $acc3
+	 mov	$acc0, %rax
+	adc	\$0, %rdx
+	xor	$acc5, $acc5
+	mov	%rdx, $acc4
+
+	########################################################################
+	# First reduction step
+	# Basically now we want to multiply acc[0] by p256,
+	# and add the result to the acc.
+	# Due to the special form of p256 we do some optimizations
+	#
+	# acc[0] x p256[0..1] = acc[0] x 2^96 - acc[0]
+	# then we add acc[0] and get acc[0] x 2^96
+
+	mov	$acc0, $t1
+	shl	\$32, $acc0
+	mulq	$poly3
+	shr	\$32, $t1
+	add	$acc0, $acc1		# +=acc[0]<<96
+	adc	$t1, $acc2
+	adc	%rax, $acc3
+	 mov	8*1($b_ptr), %rax
+	adc	%rdx, $acc4
+	adc	\$0, $acc5
+	xor	$acc0, $acc0
+
+	########################################################################
+	# Multiply by b[1]
+	mov	%rax, $t1
+	mulq	8*0($a_ptr)
+	add	%rax, $acc1
+	mov	$t1, %rax
+	adc	\$0, %rdx
+	mov	%rdx, $t0
+
+	mulq	8*1($a_ptr)
+	add	$t0, $acc2
+	adc	\$0, %rdx
+	add	%rax, $acc2
+	mov	$t1, %rax
+	adc	\$0, %rdx
+	mov	%rdx, $t0
+
+	mulq	8*2($a_ptr)
+	add	$t0, $acc3
+	adc	\$0, %rdx
+	add	%rax, $acc3
+	mov	$t1, %rax
+	adc	\$0, %rdx
+	mov	%rdx, $t0
+
+	mulq	8*3($a_ptr)
+	add	$t0, $acc4
+	adc	\$0, %rdx
+	add	%rax, $acc4
+	 mov	$acc1, %rax
+	adc	%rdx, $acc5
+	adc	\$0, $acc0
+
+	########################################################################
+	# Second reduction step	
+	mov	$acc1, $t1
+	shl	\$32, $acc1
+	mulq	$poly3
+	shr	\$32, $t1
+	add	$acc1, $acc2
+	adc	$t1, $acc3
+	adc	%rax, $acc4
+	 mov	8*2($b_ptr), %rax
+	adc	%rdx, $acc5
+	adc	\$0, $acc0
+	xor	$acc1, $acc1
+
+	########################################################################
+	# Multiply by b[2]
+	mov	%rax, $t1
+	mulq	8*0($a_ptr)
+	add	%rax, $acc2
+	mov	$t1, %rax
+	adc	\$0, %rdx
+	mov	%rdx, $t0
+
+	mulq	8*1($a_ptr)
+	add	$t0, $acc3
+	adc	\$0, %rdx
+	add	%rax, $acc3
+	mov	$t1, %rax
+	adc	\$0, %rdx
+	mov	%rdx, $t0
+
+	mulq	8*2($a_ptr)
+	add	$t0, $acc4
+	adc	\$0, %rdx
+	add	%rax, $acc4
+	mov	$t1, %rax
+	adc	\$0, %rdx
+	mov	%rdx, $t0
+
+	mulq	8*3($a_ptr)
+	add	$t0, $acc5
+	adc	\$0, %rdx
+	add	%rax, $acc5
+	 mov	$acc2, %rax
+	adc	%rdx, $acc0
+	adc	\$0, $acc1
+
+	########################################################################
+	# Third reduction step	
+	mov	$acc2, $t1
+	shl	\$32, $acc2
+	mulq	$poly3
+	shr	\$32, $t1
+	add	$acc2, $acc3
+	adc	$t1, $acc4
+	adc	%rax, $acc5
+	 mov	8*3($b_ptr), %rax
+	adc	%rdx, $acc0
+	adc	\$0, $acc1
+	xor	$acc2, $acc2
+
+	########################################################################
+	# Multiply by b[3]
+	mov	%rax, $t1
+	mulq	8*0($a_ptr)
+	add	%rax, $acc3
+	mov	$t1, %rax
+	adc	\$0, %rdx
+	mov	%rdx, $t0
+
+	mulq	8*1($a_ptr)
+	add	$t0, $acc4
+	adc	\$0, %rdx
+	add	%rax, $acc4
+	mov	$t1, %rax
+	adc	\$0, %rdx
+	mov	%rdx, $t0
+
+	mulq	8*2($a_ptr)
+	add	$t0, $acc5
+	adc	\$0, %rdx
+	add	%rax, $acc5
+	mov	$t1, %rax
+	adc	\$0, %rdx
+	mov	%rdx, $t0
+
+	mulq	8*3($a_ptr)
+	add	$t0, $acc0
+	adc	\$0, %rdx
+	add	%rax, $acc0
+	 mov	$acc3, %rax
+	adc	%rdx, $acc1
+	adc	\$0, $acc2
+
+	########################################################################
+	# Final reduction step	
+	mov	$acc3, $t1
+	shl	\$32, $acc3
+	mulq	$poly3
+	shr	\$32, $t1
+	add	$acc3, $acc4
+	adc	$t1, $acc5
+	 mov	$acc4, $t0
+	adc	%rax, $acc0
+	adc	%rdx, $acc1
+	 mov	$acc5, $t1
+	adc	\$0, $acc2
+
+	########################################################################	
+	# Branch-less conditional subtraction of P
+	sub	\$-1, $acc4		# .Lpoly[0]
+	 mov	$acc0, $t2
+	sbb	$poly1, $acc5		# .Lpoly[1]
+	sbb	\$0, $acc0		# .Lpoly[2]
+	 mov	$acc1, $t3
+	sbb	$poly3, $acc1		# .Lpoly[3]
+	sbb	\$0, $acc2
+
+	cmovc	$t0, $acc4
+	cmovc	$t1, $acc5
+	mov	$acc4, 8*0($r_ptr)
+	cmovc	$t2, $acc0
+	mov	$acc5, 8*1($r_ptr)
+	cmovc	$t3, $acc1
+	mov	$acc0, 8*2($r_ptr)
+	mov	$acc1, 8*3($r_ptr)
+
+	ret
+.size	__ecp_nistz256_mul_montq,.-__ecp_nistz256_mul_montq
+
+################################################################################
+# void ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(
+#   uint64_t res[4],
+#   uint64_t a[4]);
+
+# we optimize the square according to S.Gueron and V.Krasnov,
+# "Speeding up Big-Number Squaring"
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont
+.type	ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont,\@function,2
+.align	32
+ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont:
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($addx);
+	mov	\$0x80100, %ecx
+	and	OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+8(%rip), %ecx
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($addx);
+	cmp	\$0x80100, %ecx
+	je	.Lsqr_montx
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	8*0($a_ptr), %rax
+	mov	8*1($a_ptr), $acc6
+	mov	8*2($a_ptr), $acc7
+	mov	8*3($a_ptr), $acc0
+
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_sqr_montq
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($addx);
+	jmp	.Lsqr_mont_done
+
+.align	32
+.Lsqr_montx:
+	mov	8*0($a_ptr), %rdx
+	mov	8*1($a_ptr), $acc6
+	mov	8*2($a_ptr), $acc7
+	mov	8*3($a_ptr), $acc0
+	lea	-128($a_ptr), $a_ptr	# control u-op density
+
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_sqr_montx
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+.Lsqr_mont_done:
+	pop	%r15
+	pop	%r14
+	pop	%r13
+	pop	%r12
+	pop	%rbx
+	pop	%rbp
+	ret
+.size	ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont,.-ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont
+
+.type	__ecp_nistz256_sqr_montq,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	32
+__ecp_nistz256_sqr_montq:
+	mov	%rax, $acc5
+	mulq	$acc6			# a[1]*a[0]
+	mov	%rax, $acc1
+	mov	$acc7, %rax
+	mov	%rdx, $acc2
+
+	mulq	$acc5			# a[0]*a[2]
+	add	%rax, $acc2
+	mov	$acc0, %rax
+	adc	\$0, %rdx
+	mov	%rdx, $acc3
+
+	mulq	$acc5			# a[0]*a[3]
+	add	%rax, $acc3
+	 mov	$acc7, %rax
+	adc	\$0, %rdx
+	mov	%rdx, $acc4
+
+	#################################
+	mulq	$acc6			# a[1]*a[2]
+	add	%rax, $acc3
+	mov	$acc0, %rax
+	adc	\$0, %rdx
+	mov	%rdx, $t1
+
+	mulq	$acc6			# a[1]*a[3]
+	add	%rax, $acc4
+	 mov	$acc0, %rax
+	adc	\$0, %rdx
+	add	$t1, $acc4
+	mov	%rdx, $acc5
+	adc	\$0, $acc5
+
+	#################################
+	mulq	$acc7			# a[2]*a[3]
+	xor	$acc7, $acc7
+	add	%rax, $acc5
+	 mov	8*0($a_ptr), %rax
+	mov	%rdx, $acc6
+	adc	\$0, $acc6
+
+	add	$acc1, $acc1		# acc1:6<<1
+	adc	$acc2, $acc2
+	adc	$acc3, $acc3
+	adc	$acc4, $acc4
+	adc	$acc5, $acc5
+	adc	$acc6, $acc6
+	adc	\$0, $acc7
+
+	mulq	%rax
+	mov	%rax, $acc0
+	mov	8*1($a_ptr), %rax
+	mov	%rdx, $t0
+
+	mulq	%rax
+	add	$t0, $acc1
+	adc	%rax, $acc2
+	mov	8*2($a_ptr), %rax
+	adc	\$0, %rdx
+	mov	%rdx, $t0
+
+	mulq	%rax
+	add	$t0, $acc3
+	adc	%rax, $acc4
+	mov	8*3($a_ptr), %rax
+	adc	\$0, %rdx
+	mov	%rdx, $t0
+
+	mulq	%rax
+	add	$t0, $acc5
+	adc	%rax, $acc6
+	 mov	$acc0, %rax
+	adc	%rdx, $acc7
+
+	mov	.Lpoly+8*1(%rip), $a_ptr
+	mov	.Lpoly+8*3(%rip), $t1
+
+	##########################################
+	# Now the reduction
+	# First iteration
+	mov	$acc0, $t0
+	shl	\$32, $acc0
+	mulq	$t1
+	shr	\$32, $t0
+	add	$acc0, $acc1		# +=acc[0]<<96
+	adc	$t0, $acc2
+	adc	%rax, $acc3
+	 mov	$acc1, %rax
+	adc	\$0, %rdx
+
+	##########################################
+	# Second iteration
+	mov	$acc1, $t0
+	shl	\$32, $acc1
+	mov	%rdx, $acc0
+	mulq	$t1
+	shr	\$32, $t0
+	add	$acc1, $acc2
+	adc	$t0, $acc3
+	adc	%rax, $acc0
+	 mov	$acc2, %rax
+	adc	\$0, %rdx
+
+	##########################################
+	# Third iteration
+	mov	$acc2, $t0
+	shl	\$32, $acc2
+	mov	%rdx, $acc1
+	mulq	$t1
+	shr	\$32, $t0
+	add	$acc2, $acc3
+	adc	$t0, $acc0
+	adc	%rax, $acc1
+	 mov	$acc3, %rax
+	adc	\$0, %rdx
+
+	###########################################
+	# Last iteration
+	mov	$acc3, $t0
+	shl	\$32, $acc3
+	mov	%rdx, $acc2
+	mulq	$t1
+	shr	\$32, $t0
+	add	$acc3, $acc0
+	adc	$t0, $acc1
+	adc	%rax, $acc2
+	adc	\$0, %rdx
+	xor	$acc3, $acc3
+
+	############################################
+	# Add the rest of the acc
+	add	$acc0, $acc4
+	adc	$acc1, $acc5
+	 mov	$acc4, $acc0
+	adc	$acc2, $acc6
+	adc	%rdx, $acc7
+	 mov	$acc5, $acc1
+	adc	\$0, $acc3
+
+	sub	\$-1, $acc4		# .Lpoly[0]
+	 mov	$acc6, $acc2
+	sbb	$a_ptr, $acc5		# .Lpoly[1]
+	sbb	\$0, $acc6		# .Lpoly[2]
+	 mov	$acc7, $t0
+	sbb	$t1, $acc7		# .Lpoly[3]
+	sbb	\$0, $acc3
+
+	cmovc	$acc0, $acc4
+	cmovc	$acc1, $acc5
+	mov	$acc4, 8*0($r_ptr)
+	cmovc	$acc2, $acc6
+	mov	$acc5, 8*1($r_ptr)
+	cmovc	$t0, $acc7
+	mov	$acc6, 8*2($r_ptr)
+	mov	$acc7, 8*3($r_ptr)
+
+	ret
+.size	__ecp_nistz256_sqr_montq,.-__ecp_nistz256_sqr_montq
+___
+
+if ($addx) {
+$code.=<<___;
+.type	__ecp_nistz256_mul_montx,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	32
+__ecp_nistz256_mul_montx:
+	########################################################################
+	# Multiply by b[0]
+	mulx	$acc1, $acc0, $acc1
+	mulx	$acc2, $t0, $acc2
+	mov	\$32, $poly1
+	xor	$acc5, $acc5		# cf=0
+	mulx	$acc3, $t1, $acc3
+	mov	.Lpoly+8*3(%rip), $poly3
+	adc	$t0, $acc1
+	mulx	$acc4, $t0, $acc4
+	 mov	$acc0, %rdx
+	adc	$t1, $acc2
+	 shlx	$poly1,$acc0,$t1
+	adc	$t0, $acc3
+	 shrx	$poly1,$acc0,$t0
+	adc	\$0, $acc4
+
+	########################################################################
+	# First reduction step
+	add	$t1, $acc1
+	adc	$t0, $acc2
+
+	mulx	$poly3, $t0, $t1
+	 mov	8*1($b_ptr), %rdx
+	adc	$t0, $acc3
+	adc	$t1, $acc4
+	adc	\$0, $acc5
+	xor	$acc0, $acc0		# $acc0=0,cf=0,of=0
+
+	########################################################################
+	# Multiply by b[1]
+	mulx	8*0+128($a_ptr), $t0, $t1
+	adcx	$t0, $acc1
+	adox	$t1, $acc2
+
+	mulx	8*1+128($a_ptr), $t0, $t1
+	adcx	$t0, $acc2
+	adox	$t1, $acc3
+
+	mulx	8*2+128($a_ptr), $t0, $t1
+	adcx	$t0, $acc3
+	adox	$t1, $acc4
+
+	mulx	8*3+128($a_ptr), $t0, $t1
+	 mov	$acc1, %rdx
+	adcx	$t0, $acc4
+	 shlx	$poly1, $acc1, $t0
+	adox	$t1, $acc5
+	 shrx	$poly1, $acc1, $t1
+
+	adcx	$acc0, $acc5
+	adox	$acc0, $acc0
+	adc	\$0, $acc0
+
+	########################################################################
+	# Second reduction step
+	add	$t0, $acc2
+	adc	$t1, $acc3
+
+	mulx	$poly3, $t0, $t1
+	 mov	8*2($b_ptr), %rdx
+	adc	$t0, $acc4
+	adc	$t1, $acc5
+	adc	\$0, $acc0
+	xor	$acc1 ,$acc1		# $acc1=0,cf=0,of=0
+
+	########################################################################
+	# Multiply by b[2]
+	mulx	8*0+128($a_ptr), $t0, $t1
+	adcx	$t0, $acc2
+	adox	$t1, $acc3
+
+	mulx	8*1+128($a_ptr), $t0, $t1
+	adcx	$t0, $acc3
+	adox	$t1, $acc4
+
+	mulx	8*2+128($a_ptr), $t0, $t1
+	adcx	$t0, $acc4
+	adox	$t1, $acc5
+
+	mulx	8*3+128($a_ptr), $t0, $t1
+	 mov	$acc2, %rdx
+	adcx	$t0, $acc5
+	 shlx	$poly1, $acc2, $t0
+	adox	$t1, $acc0
+	 shrx	$poly1, $acc2, $t1
+
+	adcx	$acc1, $acc0
+	adox	$acc1, $acc1
+	adc	\$0, $acc1
+
+	########################################################################
+	# Third reduction step
+	add	$t0, $acc3
+	adc	$t1, $acc4
+
+	mulx	$poly3, $t0, $t1
+	 mov	8*3($b_ptr), %rdx
+	adc	$t0, $acc5
+	adc	$t1, $acc0
+	adc	\$0, $acc1
+	xor	$acc2, $acc2		# $acc2=0,cf=0,of=0
+
+	########################################################################
+	# Multiply by b[3]
+	mulx	8*0+128($a_ptr), $t0, $t1
+	adcx	$t0, $acc3
+	adox	$t1, $acc4
+
+	mulx	8*1+128($a_ptr), $t0, $t1
+	adcx	$t0, $acc4
+	adox	$t1, $acc5
+
+	mulx	8*2+128($a_ptr), $t0, $t1
+	adcx	$t0, $acc5
+	adox	$t1, $acc0
+
+	mulx	8*3+128($a_ptr), $t0, $t1
+	 mov	$acc3, %rdx
+	adcx	$t0, $acc0
+	 shlx	$poly1, $acc3, $t0
+	adox	$t1, $acc1
+	 shrx	$poly1, $acc3, $t1
+
+	adcx	$acc2, $acc1
+	adox	$acc2, $acc2
+	adc	\$0, $acc2
+
+	########################################################################
+	# Fourth reduction step
+	add	$t0, $acc4
+	adc	$t1, $acc5
+
+	mulx	$poly3, $t0, $t1
+	 mov	$acc4, $t2
+	mov	.Lpoly+8*1(%rip), $poly1
+	adc	$t0, $acc0
+	 mov	$acc5, $t3
+	adc	$t1, $acc1
+	adc	\$0, $acc2
+
+	########################################################################
+	# Branch-less conditional subtraction of P
+	xor	%eax, %eax
+	 mov	$acc0, $t0
+	sbb	\$-1, $acc4		# .Lpoly[0]
+	sbb	$poly1, $acc5		# .Lpoly[1]
+	sbb	\$0, $acc0		# .Lpoly[2]
+	 mov	$acc1, $t1
+	sbb	$poly3, $acc1		# .Lpoly[3]
+	sbb	\$0, $acc2
+
+	cmovc	$t2, $acc4
+	cmovc	$t3, $acc5
+	mov	$acc4, 8*0($r_ptr)
+	cmovc	$t0, $acc0
+	mov	$acc5, 8*1($r_ptr)
+	cmovc	$t1, $acc1
+	mov	$acc0, 8*2($r_ptr)
+	mov	$acc1, 8*3($r_ptr)
+
+	ret
+.size	__ecp_nistz256_mul_montx,.-__ecp_nistz256_mul_montx
+
+.type	__ecp_nistz256_sqr_montx,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	32
+__ecp_nistz256_sqr_montx:
+	mulx	$acc6, $acc1, $acc2	# a[0]*a[1]
+	mulx	$acc7, $t0, $acc3	# a[0]*a[2]
+	xor	%eax, %eax
+	adc	$t0, $acc2
+	mulx	$acc0, $t1, $acc4	# a[0]*a[3]
+	 mov	$acc6, %rdx
+	adc	$t1, $acc3
+	adc	\$0, $acc4
+	xor	$acc5, $acc5		# $acc5=0,cf=0,of=0
+
+	#################################
+	mulx	$acc7, $t0, $t1		# a[1]*a[2]
+	adcx	$t0, $acc3
+	adox	$t1, $acc4
+
+	mulx	$acc0, $t0, $t1		# a[1]*a[3]
+	 mov	$acc7, %rdx
+	adcx	$t0, $acc4
+	adox	$t1, $acc5
+	adc	\$0, $acc5
+
+	#################################
+	mulx	$acc0, $t0, $acc6	# a[2]*a[3]
+	 mov	8*0+128($a_ptr), %rdx
+	xor	$acc7, $acc7		# $acc7=0,cf=0,of=0
+	 adcx	$acc1, $acc1		# acc1:6<<1
+	adox	$t0, $acc5
+	 adcx	$acc2, $acc2
+	adox	$acc7, $acc6		# of=0
+
+	mulx	%rdx, $acc0, $t1
+	mov	8*1+128($a_ptr), %rdx
+	 adcx	$acc3, $acc3
+	adox	$t1, $acc1
+	 adcx	$acc4, $acc4
+	mulx	%rdx, $t0, $t4
+	mov	8*2+128($a_ptr), %rdx
+	 adcx	$acc5, $acc5
+	adox	$t0, $acc2
+	 adcx	$acc6, $acc6
+	.byte	0x67
+	mulx	%rdx, $t0, $t1
+	mov	8*3+128($a_ptr), %rdx
+	adox	$t4, $acc3
+	 adcx	$acc7, $acc7
+	adox	$t0, $acc4
+	 mov	\$32, $a_ptr
+	adox	$t1, $acc5
+	.byte	0x67,0x67
+	mulx	%rdx, $t0, $t4
+	 mov	.Lpoly+8*3(%rip), %rdx
+	adox	$t0, $acc6
+	 shlx	$a_ptr, $acc0, $t0
+	adox	$t4, $acc7
+	 shrx	$a_ptr, $acc0, $t4
+	mov	%rdx,$t1
+
+	# reduction step 1
+	add	$t0, $acc1
+	adc	$t4, $acc2
+
+	mulx	$acc0, $t0, $acc0
+	adc	$t0, $acc3
+	 shlx	$a_ptr, $acc1, $t0
+	adc	\$0, $acc0
+	 shrx	$a_ptr, $acc1, $t4
+
+	# reduction step 2
+	add	$t0, $acc2
+	adc	$t4, $acc3
+
+	mulx	$acc1, $t0, $acc1
+	adc	$t0, $acc0
+	 shlx	$a_ptr, $acc2, $t0
+	adc	\$0, $acc1
+	 shrx	$a_ptr, $acc2, $t4
+
+	# reduction step 3
+	add	$t0, $acc3
+	adc	$t4, $acc0
+
+	mulx	$acc2, $t0, $acc2
+	adc	$t0, $acc1
+	 shlx	$a_ptr, $acc3, $t0
+	adc	\$0, $acc2
+	 shrx	$a_ptr, $acc3, $t4
+
+	# reduction step 4
+	add	$t0, $acc0
+	adc	$t4, $acc1
+
+	mulx	$acc3, $t0, $acc3
+	adc	$t0, $acc2
+	adc	\$0, $acc3
+
+	xor	$t3, $t3
+	add	$acc0, $acc4		# accumulate upper half
+	 mov	.Lpoly+8*1(%rip), $a_ptr
+	adc	$acc1, $acc5
+	 mov	$acc4, $acc0
+	adc	$acc2, $acc6
+	adc	$acc3, $acc7
+	 mov	$acc5, $acc1
+	adc	\$0, $t3
+
+	sub	\$-1, $acc4		# .Lpoly[0]
+	 mov	$acc6, $acc2
+	sbb	$a_ptr, $acc5		# .Lpoly[1]
+	sbb	\$0, $acc6		# .Lpoly[2]
+	 mov	$acc7, $acc3
+	sbb	$t1, $acc7		# .Lpoly[3]
+	sbb	\$0, $t3
+
+	cmovc	$acc0, $acc4
+	cmovc	$acc1, $acc5
+	mov	$acc4, 8*0($r_ptr)
+	cmovc	$acc2, $acc6
+	mov	$acc5, 8*1($r_ptr)
+	cmovc	$acc3, $acc7
+	mov	$acc6, 8*2($r_ptr)
+	mov	$acc7, 8*3($r_ptr)
+
+	ret
+.size	__ecp_nistz256_sqr_montx,.-__ecp_nistz256_sqr_montx
+___
+}
+}
+{
+my ($r_ptr,$in_ptr)=("%rdi","%rsi");
+my ($acc0,$acc1,$acc2,$acc3)=map("%r$_",(8..11));
+my ($t0,$t1,$t2)=("%rcx","%r12","%r13");
+
+$code.=<<___;
+################################################################################
+# void ecp_nistz256_from_mont(
+#   uint64_t res[4],
+#   uint64_t in[4]);
+# This one performs Montgomery multiplication by 1, so we only need the reduction
+
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_from_mont
+.type	ecp_nistz256_from_mont,\@function,2
+.align	32
+ecp_nistz256_from_mont:
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+
+	mov	8*0($in_ptr), %rax
+	mov	.Lpoly+8*3(%rip), $t2
+	mov	8*1($in_ptr), $acc1
+	mov	8*2($in_ptr), $acc2
+	mov	8*3($in_ptr), $acc3
+	mov	%rax, $acc0
+	mov	.Lpoly+8*1(%rip), $t1
+
+	#########################################
+	# First iteration
+	mov	%rax, $t0
+	shl	\$32, $acc0
+	mulq	$t2
+	shr	\$32, $t0
+	add	$acc0, $acc1
+	adc	$t0, $acc2
+	adc	%rax, $acc3
+	 mov	$acc1, %rax
+	adc	\$0, %rdx
+
+	#########################################
+	# Second iteration
+	mov	$acc1, $t0
+	shl	\$32, $acc1
+	mov	%rdx, $acc0
+	mulq	$t2
+	shr	\$32, $t0
+	add	$acc1, $acc2
+	adc	$t0, $acc3
+	adc	%rax, $acc0
+	 mov	$acc2, %rax
+	adc	\$0, %rdx
+
+	##########################################
+	# Third iteration
+	mov	$acc2, $t0
+	shl	\$32, $acc2
+	mov	%rdx, $acc1
+	mulq	$t2
+	shr	\$32, $t0
+	add	$acc2, $acc3
+	adc	$t0, $acc0
+	adc	%rax, $acc1
+	 mov	$acc3, %rax
+	adc	\$0, %rdx
+
+	###########################################
+	# Last iteration
+	mov	$acc3, $t0
+	shl	\$32, $acc3
+	mov	%rdx, $acc2
+	mulq	$t2
+	shr	\$32, $t0
+	add	$acc3, $acc0
+	adc	$t0, $acc1
+	 mov	$acc0, $t0
+	adc	%rax, $acc2
+	 mov	$acc1, $in_ptr
+	adc	\$0, %rdx
+
+	###########################################
+	# Branch-less conditional subtraction
+	sub	\$-1, $acc0
+	 mov	$acc2, %rax
+	sbb	$t1, $acc1
+	sbb	\$0, $acc2
+	 mov	%rdx, $acc3
+	sbb	$t2, %rdx
+	sbb	$t2, $t2
+
+	cmovnz	$t0, $acc0
+	cmovnz	$in_ptr, $acc1
+	mov	$acc0, 8*0($r_ptr)
+	cmovnz	%rax, $acc2
+	mov	$acc1, 8*1($r_ptr)
+	cmovz	%rdx, $acc3
+	mov	$acc2, 8*2($r_ptr)
+	mov	$acc3, 8*3($r_ptr)
+
+	pop	%r13
+	pop	%r12
+	ret
+.size	ecp_nistz256_from_mont,.-ecp_nistz256_from_mont
+___
+}
+{
+my ($val,$in_t,$index)=$win64?("%rcx","%rdx","%r8d"):("%rdi","%rsi","%edx");
+my ($ONE,$INDEX,$Ra,$Rb,$Rc,$Rd,$Re,$Rf)=map("%xmm$_",(0..7));
+my ($M0,$T0a,$T0b,$T0c,$T0d,$T0e,$T0f,$TMP0)=map("%xmm$_",(8..15));
+my ($M1,$T2a,$T2b,$TMP2,$M2,$T2a,$T2b,$TMP2)=map("%xmm$_",(8..15));
+
+$code.=<<___;
+################################################################################
+# void ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5(uint64_t *val, uint64_t *in_t, int index);
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5
+.type	ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	32
+ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5:
+	lea	-3($index,$index,2), $index
+	movdqa	0x00($in_t), %xmm0
+	shl	\$5, $index
+	movdqa	0x10($in_t), %xmm1
+	movdqa	0x20($in_t), %xmm2
+	movdqa	0x30($in_t), %xmm3
+	movdqa	0x40($in_t), %xmm4
+	movdqa	0x50($in_t), %xmm5
+	movdqa	%xmm0, 0x00($val,$index)
+	movdqa	%xmm1, 0x10($val,$index)
+	movdqa	%xmm2, 0x20($val,$index)
+	movdqa	%xmm3, 0x30($val,$index)
+	movdqa	%xmm4, 0x40($val,$index)
+	movdqa	%xmm5, 0x50($val,$index)
+
+	ret
+.size	ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5,.-ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5
+
+################################################################################
+# void ecp_nistz256_gather_w5(uint64_t *val, uint64_t *in_t, int index);
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_gather_w5
+.type	ecp_nistz256_gather_w5,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	32
+ecp_nistz256_gather_w5:
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($avx>1);
+	mov	OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+8(%rip), %eax
+	test	\$`1<<5`, %eax
+	jnz	.Lavx2_gather_w5
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($win64);
+	lea	-0x88(%rsp), %rax
+.LSEH_begin_ecp_nistz256_gather_w5:
+	.byte	0x48,0x8d,0x60,0xe0		#lea	-0x20(%rax), %rsp
+	.byte	0x0f,0x29,0x70,0xe0		#movaps	%xmm6, -0x20(%rax)
+	.byte	0x0f,0x29,0x78,0xf0		#movaps	%xmm7, -0x10(%rax)
+	.byte	0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x00		#movaps	%xmm8, 0(%rax)
+	.byte	0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x48,0x10	#movaps	%xmm9, 0x10(%rax)
+	.byte	0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x50,0x20	#movaps	%xmm10, 0x20(%rax)
+	.byte	0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x58,0x30	#movaps	%xmm11, 0x30(%rax)
+	.byte	0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x60,0x40	#movaps	%xmm12, 0x40(%rax)
+	.byte	0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x68,0x50	#movaps	%xmm13, 0x50(%rax)
+	.byte	0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x70,0x60	#movaps	%xmm14, 0x60(%rax)
+	.byte	0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x78,0x70	#movaps	%xmm15, 0x70(%rax)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	movdqa	.LOne(%rip), $ONE
+	movd	$index, $INDEX
+
+	pxor	$Ra, $Ra
+	pxor	$Rb, $Rb
+	pxor	$Rc, $Rc
+	pxor	$Rd, $Rd
+	pxor	$Re, $Re
+	pxor	$Rf, $Rf
+
+	movdqa	$ONE, $M0
+	pshufd	\$0, $INDEX, $INDEX
+
+	mov	\$16, %rax
+.Lselect_loop_sse_w5:
+
+	movdqa	$M0, $TMP0
+	paddd	$ONE, $M0
+	pcmpeqd $INDEX, $TMP0
+
+	movdqa	16*0($in_t), $T0a
+	movdqa	16*1($in_t), $T0b
+	movdqa	16*2($in_t), $T0c
+	movdqa	16*3($in_t), $T0d
+	movdqa	16*4($in_t), $T0e
+	movdqa	16*5($in_t), $T0f
+	lea 16*6($in_t), $in_t
+
+	pand	$TMP0, $T0a
+	pand	$TMP0, $T0b
+	por	$T0a, $Ra
+	pand	$TMP0, $T0c
+	por	$T0b, $Rb
+	pand	$TMP0, $T0d
+	por	$T0c, $Rc
+	pand	$TMP0, $T0e
+	por	$T0d, $Rd
+	pand	$TMP0, $T0f
+	por	$T0e, $Re
+	por	$T0f, $Rf
+
+	dec	%rax
+	jnz	.Lselect_loop_sse_w5
+
+	movdqu	$Ra, 16*0($val)
+	movdqu	$Rb, 16*1($val)
+	movdqu	$Rc, 16*2($val)
+	movdqu	$Rd, 16*3($val)
+	movdqu	$Re, 16*4($val)
+	movdqu	$Rf, 16*5($val)
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($win64);
+	movaps	(%rsp), %xmm6
+	movaps	0x10(%rsp), %xmm7
+	movaps	0x20(%rsp), %xmm8
+	movaps	0x30(%rsp), %xmm9
+	movaps	0x40(%rsp), %xmm10
+	movaps	0x50(%rsp), %xmm11
+	movaps	0x60(%rsp), %xmm12
+	movaps	0x70(%rsp), %xmm13
+	movaps	0x80(%rsp), %xmm14
+	movaps	0x90(%rsp), %xmm15
+	lea	0xa8(%rsp), %rsp
+.LSEH_end_ecp_nistz256_gather_w5:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	ret
+.size	ecp_nistz256_gather_w5,.-ecp_nistz256_gather_w5
+
+################################################################################
+# void ecp_nistz256_scatter_w7(uint64_t *val, uint64_t *in_t, int index);
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_scatter_w7
+.type	ecp_nistz256_scatter_w7,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	32
+ecp_nistz256_scatter_w7:
+	movdqu	0x00($in_t), %xmm0
+	shl	\$6, $index
+	movdqu	0x10($in_t), %xmm1
+	movdqu	0x20($in_t), %xmm2
+	movdqu	0x30($in_t), %xmm3
+	movdqa	%xmm0, 0x00($val,$index)
+	movdqa	%xmm1, 0x10($val,$index)
+	movdqa	%xmm2, 0x20($val,$index)
+	movdqa	%xmm3, 0x30($val,$index)
+
+	ret
+.size	ecp_nistz256_scatter_w7,.-ecp_nistz256_scatter_w7
+
+################################################################################
+# void ecp_nistz256_gather_w7(uint64_t *val, uint64_t *in_t, int index);
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_gather_w7
+.type	ecp_nistz256_gather_w7,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	32
+ecp_nistz256_gather_w7:
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($avx>1);
+	mov	OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+8(%rip), %eax
+	test	\$`1<<5`, %eax
+	jnz	.Lavx2_gather_w7
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($win64);
+	lea	-0x88(%rsp), %rax
+.LSEH_begin_ecp_nistz256_gather_w7:
+	.byte	0x48,0x8d,0x60,0xe0		#lea	-0x20(%rax), %rsp
+	.byte	0x0f,0x29,0x70,0xe0		#movaps	%xmm6, -0x20(%rax)
+	.byte	0x0f,0x29,0x78,0xf0		#movaps	%xmm7, -0x10(%rax)
+	.byte	0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x00		#movaps	%xmm8, 0(%rax)
+	.byte	0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x48,0x10	#movaps	%xmm9, 0x10(%rax)
+	.byte	0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x50,0x20	#movaps	%xmm10, 0x20(%rax)
+	.byte	0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x58,0x30	#movaps	%xmm11, 0x30(%rax)
+	.byte	0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x60,0x40	#movaps	%xmm12, 0x40(%rax)
+	.byte	0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x68,0x50	#movaps	%xmm13, 0x50(%rax)
+	.byte	0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x70,0x60	#movaps	%xmm14, 0x60(%rax)
+	.byte	0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x78,0x70	#movaps	%xmm15, 0x70(%rax)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	movdqa	.LOne(%rip), $M0
+	movd	$index, $INDEX
+
+	pxor	$Ra, $Ra
+	pxor	$Rb, $Rb
+	pxor	$Rc, $Rc
+	pxor	$Rd, $Rd
+
+	movdqa	$M0, $ONE
+	pshufd	\$0, $INDEX, $INDEX
+	mov	\$64, %rax
+
+.Lselect_loop_sse_w7:
+	movdqa	$M0, $TMP0
+	paddd	$ONE, $M0
+	movdqa	16*0($in_t), $T0a
+	movdqa	16*1($in_t), $T0b
+	pcmpeqd	$INDEX, $TMP0
+	movdqa	16*2($in_t), $T0c
+	movdqa	16*3($in_t), $T0d
+	lea	16*4($in_t), $in_t
+
+	pand	$TMP0, $T0a
+	pand	$TMP0, $T0b
+	por	$T0a, $Ra
+	pand	$TMP0, $T0c
+	por	$T0b, $Rb
+	pand	$TMP0, $T0d
+	por	$T0c, $Rc
+	prefetcht0	255($in_t)
+	por	$T0d, $Rd
+
+	dec	%rax
+	jnz	.Lselect_loop_sse_w7
+
+	movdqu	$Ra, 16*0($val)
+	movdqu	$Rb, 16*1($val)
+	movdqu	$Rc, 16*2($val)
+	movdqu	$Rd, 16*3($val)
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($win64);
+	movaps	(%rsp), %xmm6
+	movaps	0x10(%rsp), %xmm7
+	movaps	0x20(%rsp), %xmm8
+	movaps	0x30(%rsp), %xmm9
+	movaps	0x40(%rsp), %xmm10
+	movaps	0x50(%rsp), %xmm11
+	movaps	0x60(%rsp), %xmm12
+	movaps	0x70(%rsp), %xmm13
+	movaps	0x80(%rsp), %xmm14
+	movaps	0x90(%rsp), %xmm15
+	lea	0xa8(%rsp), %rsp
+.LSEH_end_ecp_nistz256_gather_w7:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	ret
+.size	ecp_nistz256_gather_w7,.-ecp_nistz256_gather_w7
+___
+}
+if ($avx>1) {
+my ($val,$in_t,$index)=$win64?("%rcx","%rdx","%r8d"):("%rdi","%rsi","%edx");
+my ($TWO,$INDEX,$Ra,$Rb,$Rc)=map("%ymm$_",(0..4));
+my ($M0,$T0a,$T0b,$T0c,$TMP0)=map("%ymm$_",(5..9));
+my ($M1,$T1a,$T1b,$T1c,$TMP1)=map("%ymm$_",(10..14));
+
+$code.=<<___;
+################################################################################
+# void ecp_nistz256_avx2_gather_w5(uint64_t *val, uint64_t *in_t, int index);
+.type	ecp_nistz256_avx2_gather_w5,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	32
+ecp_nistz256_avx2_gather_w5:
+.Lavx2_gather_w5:
+	vzeroupper
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($win64);
+	lea	-0x88(%rsp), %rax
+.LSEH_begin_ecp_nistz256_avx2_gather_w5:
+	.byte	0x48,0x8d,0x60,0xe0		#lea	-0x20(%rax), %rsp
+	.byte	0xc5,0xf8,0x29,0x70,0xe0	#vmovaps %xmm6, -0x20(%rax)
+	.byte	0xc5,0xf8,0x29,0x78,0xf0	#vmovaps %xmm7, -0x10(%rax)
+	.byte	0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x40,0x00	#vmovaps %xmm8, 8(%rax)
+	.byte	0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x48,0x10	#vmovaps %xmm9, 0x10(%rax)
+	.byte	0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x50,0x20	#vmovaps %xmm10, 0x20(%rax)
+	.byte	0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x58,0x30	#vmovaps %xmm11, 0x30(%rax)
+	.byte	0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x60,0x40	#vmovaps %xmm12, 0x40(%rax)
+	.byte	0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x68,0x50	#vmovaps %xmm13, 0x50(%rax)
+	.byte	0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x70,0x60	#vmovaps %xmm14, 0x60(%rax)
+	.byte	0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x78,0x70	#vmovaps %xmm15, 0x70(%rax)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	vmovdqa	.LTwo(%rip), $TWO
+
+	vpxor	$Ra, $Ra, $Ra
+	vpxor	$Rb, $Rb, $Rb
+	vpxor	$Rc, $Rc, $Rc
+
+	vmovdqa .LOne(%rip), $M0
+	vmovdqa .LTwo(%rip), $M1
+
+	vmovd	$index, %xmm1
+	vpermd	$INDEX, $Ra, $INDEX
+
+	mov	\$8, %rax
+.Lselect_loop_avx2_w5:
+
+	vmovdqa	32*0($in_t), $T0a
+	vmovdqa	32*1($in_t), $T0b
+	vmovdqa	32*2($in_t), $T0c
+
+	vmovdqa	32*3($in_t), $T1a
+	vmovdqa	32*4($in_t), $T1b
+	vmovdqa	32*5($in_t), $T1c
+
+	vpcmpeqd	$INDEX, $M0, $TMP0
+	vpcmpeqd	$INDEX, $M1, $TMP1
+
+	vpaddd	$TWO, $M0, $M0
+	vpaddd	$TWO, $M1, $M1
+	lea	32*6($in_t), $in_t
+
+	vpand	$TMP0, $T0a, $T0a
+	vpand	$TMP0, $T0b, $T0b
+	vpand	$TMP0, $T0c, $T0c
+	vpand	$TMP1, $T1a, $T1a
+	vpand	$TMP1, $T1b, $T1b
+	vpand	$TMP1, $T1c, $T1c
+
+	vpxor	$T0a, $Ra, $Ra
+	vpxor	$T0b, $Rb, $Rb
+	vpxor	$T0c, $Rc, $Rc
+	vpxor	$T1a, $Ra, $Ra
+	vpxor	$T1b, $Rb, $Rb
+	vpxor	$T1c, $Rc, $Rc
+
+	dec %rax
+	jnz .Lselect_loop_avx2_w5
+
+	vmovdqu $Ra, 32*0($val)
+	vmovdqu $Rb, 32*1($val)
+	vmovdqu $Rc, 32*2($val)
+	vzeroupper
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($win64);
+	movaps	(%rsp), %xmm6
+	movaps	0x10(%rsp), %xmm7
+	movaps	0x20(%rsp), %xmm8
+	movaps	0x30(%rsp), %xmm9
+	movaps	0x40(%rsp), %xmm10
+	movaps	0x50(%rsp), %xmm11
+	movaps	0x60(%rsp), %xmm12
+	movaps	0x70(%rsp), %xmm13
+	movaps	0x80(%rsp), %xmm14
+	movaps	0x90(%rsp), %xmm15
+	lea	0xa8(%rsp), %rsp
+.LSEH_end_ecp_nistz256_avx2_gather_w5:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	ret
+.size	ecp_nistz256_avx2_gather_w5,.-ecp_nistz256_avx2_gather_w5
+___
+}
+if ($avx>1) {
+my ($val,$in_t,$index)=$win64?("%rcx","%rdx","%r8d"):("%rdi","%rsi","%edx");
+my ($THREE,$INDEX,$Ra,$Rb)=map("%ymm$_",(0..3));
+my ($M0,$T0a,$T0b,$TMP0)=map("%ymm$_",(4..7));
+my ($M1,$T1a,$T1b,$TMP1)=map("%ymm$_",(8..11));
+my ($M2,$T2a,$T2b,$TMP2)=map("%ymm$_",(12..15));
+
+$code.=<<___;
+
+################################################################################
+# void ecp_nistz256_avx2_gather_w7(uint64_t *val, uint64_t *in_t, int index);
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_avx2_gather_w7
+.type	ecp_nistz256_avx2_gather_w7,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	32
+ecp_nistz256_avx2_gather_w7:
+.Lavx2_gather_w7:
+	vzeroupper
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($win64);
+	lea	-0x88(%rsp), %rax
+.LSEH_begin_ecp_nistz256_avx2_gather_w7:
+	.byte	0x48,0x8d,0x60,0xe0		#lea	-0x20(%rax), %rsp
+	.byte	0xc5,0xf8,0x29,0x70,0xe0	#vmovaps %xmm6, -0x20(%rax)
+	.byte	0xc5,0xf8,0x29,0x78,0xf0	#vmovaps %xmm7, -0x10(%rax)
+	.byte	0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x40,0x00	#vmovaps %xmm8, 8(%rax)
+	.byte	0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x48,0x10	#vmovaps %xmm9, 0x10(%rax)
+	.byte	0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x50,0x20	#vmovaps %xmm10, 0x20(%rax)
+	.byte	0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x58,0x30	#vmovaps %xmm11, 0x30(%rax)
+	.byte	0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x60,0x40	#vmovaps %xmm12, 0x40(%rax)
+	.byte	0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x68,0x50	#vmovaps %xmm13, 0x50(%rax)
+	.byte	0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x70,0x60	#vmovaps %xmm14, 0x60(%rax)
+	.byte	0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x78,0x70	#vmovaps %xmm15, 0x70(%rax)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	vmovdqa	.LThree(%rip), $THREE
+
+	vpxor	$Ra, $Ra, $Ra
+	vpxor	$Rb, $Rb, $Rb
+
+	vmovdqa .LOne(%rip), $M0
+	vmovdqa .LTwo(%rip), $M1
+	vmovdqa .LThree(%rip), $M2
+
+	vmovd	$index, %xmm1
+	vpermd	$INDEX, $Ra, $INDEX
+	# Skip index = 0, because it is implicitly the point at infinity
+
+	mov	\$21, %rax
+.Lselect_loop_avx2_w7:
+
+	vmovdqa	32*0($in_t), $T0a
+	vmovdqa	32*1($in_t), $T0b
+
+	vmovdqa	32*2($in_t), $T1a
+	vmovdqa	32*3($in_t), $T1b
+
+	vmovdqa	32*4($in_t), $T2a
+	vmovdqa	32*5($in_t), $T2b
+
+	vpcmpeqd	$INDEX, $M0, $TMP0
+	vpcmpeqd	$INDEX, $M1, $TMP1
+	vpcmpeqd	$INDEX, $M2, $TMP2
+
+	vpaddd	$THREE, $M0, $M0
+	vpaddd	$THREE, $M1, $M1
+	vpaddd	$THREE, $M2, $M2
+	lea	32*6($in_t), $in_t
+
+	vpand	$TMP0, $T0a, $T0a
+	vpand	$TMP0, $T0b, $T0b
+	vpand	$TMP1, $T1a, $T1a
+	vpand	$TMP1, $T1b, $T1b
+	vpand	$TMP2, $T2a, $T2a
+	vpand	$TMP2, $T2b, $T2b
+
+	vpxor	$T0a, $Ra, $Ra
+	vpxor	$T0b, $Rb, $Rb
+	vpxor	$T1a, $Ra, $Ra
+	vpxor	$T1b, $Rb, $Rb
+	vpxor	$T2a, $Ra, $Ra
+	vpxor	$T2b, $Rb, $Rb
+
+	dec %rax
+	jnz .Lselect_loop_avx2_w7
+
+
+	vmovdqa	32*0($in_t), $T0a
+	vmovdqa	32*1($in_t), $T0b
+
+	vpcmpeqd	$INDEX, $M0, $TMP0
+
+	vpand	$TMP0, $T0a, $T0a
+	vpand	$TMP0, $T0b, $T0b
+
+	vpxor	$T0a, $Ra, $Ra
+	vpxor	$T0b, $Rb, $Rb
+
+	vmovdqu $Ra, 32*0($val)
+	vmovdqu $Rb, 32*1($val)
+	vzeroupper
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($win64);
+	movaps	(%rsp), %xmm6
+	movaps	0x10(%rsp), %xmm7
+	movaps	0x20(%rsp), %xmm8
+	movaps	0x30(%rsp), %xmm9
+	movaps	0x40(%rsp), %xmm10
+	movaps	0x50(%rsp), %xmm11
+	movaps	0x60(%rsp), %xmm12
+	movaps	0x70(%rsp), %xmm13
+	movaps	0x80(%rsp), %xmm14
+	movaps	0x90(%rsp), %xmm15
+	lea	0xa8(%rsp), %rsp
+.LSEH_end_ecp_nistz256_avx2_gather_w7:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	ret
+.size	ecp_nistz256_avx2_gather_w7,.-ecp_nistz256_avx2_gather_w7
+___
+} else {
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_avx2_gather_w7
+.type	ecp_nistz256_avx2_gather_w7,\@function,3
+.align	32
+ecp_nistz256_avx2_gather_w7:
+	.byte	0x0f,0x0b	# ud2
+	ret
+.size	ecp_nistz256_avx2_gather_w7,.-ecp_nistz256_avx2_gather_w7
+___
+}
+{{{
+########################################################################
+# This block implements higher level point_double, point_add and
+# point_add_affine. The key to performance in this case is to allow
+# out-of-order execution logic to overlap computations from next step
+# with tail processing from current step. By using tailored calling
+# sequence we minimize inter-step overhead to give processor better
+# shot at overlapping operations...
+#
+# You will notice that input data is copied to stack. Trouble is that
+# there are no registers to spare for holding original pointers and
+# reloading them, pointers, would create undesired dependencies on
+# effective addresses calculation paths. In other words it's too done
+# to favour out-of-order execution logic.
+#						<appro@openssl.org>
+
+my ($r_ptr,$a_ptr,$b_org,$b_ptr)=("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx","%rbx");
+my ($acc0,$acc1,$acc2,$acc3,$acc4,$acc5,$acc6,$acc7)=map("%r$_",(8..15));
+my ($t0,$t1,$t2,$t3,$t4)=("%rax","%rbp","%rcx",$acc4,$acc4);
+my ($poly1,$poly3)=($acc6,$acc7);
+
+sub load_for_mul () {
+my ($a,$b,$src0) = @_;
+my $bias = $src0 eq "%rax" ? 0 : -128;
+
+"	mov	$b, $src0
+	lea	$b, $b_ptr
+	mov	8*0+$a, $acc1
+	mov	8*1+$a, $acc2
+	lea	$bias+$a, $a_ptr
+	mov	8*2+$a, $acc3
+	mov	8*3+$a, $acc4"
+}
+
+sub load_for_sqr () {
+my ($a,$src0) = @_;
+my $bias = $src0 eq "%rax" ? 0 : -128;
+
+"	mov	8*0+$a, $src0
+	mov	8*1+$a, $acc6
+	lea	$bias+$a, $a_ptr
+	mov	8*2+$a, $acc7
+	mov	8*3+$a, $acc0"
+}
+
+									{
+########################################################################
+# operate in 4-5-0-1 "name space" that matches multiplication output
+#
+my ($a0,$a1,$a2,$a3,$t3,$t4)=($acc4,$acc5,$acc0,$acc1,$acc2,$acc3);
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.type	__ecp_nistz256_add_toq,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	32
+__ecp_nistz256_add_toq:
+	xor	$t4,$t4
+	add	8*0($b_ptr), $a0
+	adc	8*1($b_ptr), $a1
+	 mov	$a0, $t0
+	adc	8*2($b_ptr), $a2
+	adc	8*3($b_ptr), $a3
+	 mov	$a1, $t1
+	adc	\$0, $t4
+
+	sub	\$-1, $a0
+	 mov	$a2, $t2
+	sbb	$poly1, $a1
+	sbb	\$0, $a2
+	 mov	$a3, $t3
+	sbb	$poly3, $a3
+	sbb	\$0, $t4
+
+	cmovc	$t0, $a0
+	cmovc	$t1, $a1
+	mov	$a0, 8*0($r_ptr)
+	cmovc	$t2, $a2
+	mov	$a1, 8*1($r_ptr)
+	cmovc	$t3, $a3
+	mov	$a2, 8*2($r_ptr)
+	mov	$a3, 8*3($r_ptr)
+
+	ret
+.size	__ecp_nistz256_add_toq,.-__ecp_nistz256_add_toq
+
+.type	__ecp_nistz256_sub_fromq,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	32
+__ecp_nistz256_sub_fromq:
+	sub	8*0($b_ptr), $a0
+	sbb	8*1($b_ptr), $a1
+	 mov	$a0, $t0
+	sbb	8*2($b_ptr), $a2
+	sbb	8*3($b_ptr), $a3
+	 mov	$a1, $t1
+	sbb	$t4, $t4
+
+	add	\$-1, $a0
+	 mov	$a2, $t2
+	adc	$poly1, $a1
+	adc	\$0, $a2
+	 mov	$a3, $t3
+	adc	$poly3, $a3
+	test	$t4, $t4
+
+	cmovz	$t0, $a0
+	cmovz	$t1, $a1
+	mov	$a0, 8*0($r_ptr)
+	cmovz	$t2, $a2
+	mov	$a1, 8*1($r_ptr)
+	cmovz	$t3, $a3
+	mov	$a2, 8*2($r_ptr)
+	mov	$a3, 8*3($r_ptr)
+
+	ret
+.size	__ecp_nistz256_sub_fromq,.-__ecp_nistz256_sub_fromq
+
+.type	__ecp_nistz256_subq,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	32
+__ecp_nistz256_subq:
+	sub	$a0, $t0
+	sbb	$a1, $t1
+	 mov	$t0, $a0
+	sbb	$a2, $t2
+	sbb	$a3, $t3
+	 mov	$t1, $a1
+	sbb	$t4, $t4
+
+	add	\$-1, $t0
+	 mov	$t2, $a2
+	adc	$poly1, $t1
+	adc	\$0, $t2
+	 mov	$t3, $a3
+	adc	$poly3, $t3
+	test	$t4, $t4
+
+	cmovnz	$t0, $a0
+	cmovnz	$t1, $a1
+	cmovnz	$t2, $a2
+	cmovnz	$t3, $a3
+
+	ret
+.size	__ecp_nistz256_subq,.-__ecp_nistz256_subq
+
+.type	__ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2q,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	32
+__ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2q:
+	xor	$t4, $t4
+	add	$a0, $a0		# a0:a3+a0:a3
+	adc	$a1, $a1
+	 mov	$a0, $t0
+	adc	$a2, $a2
+	adc	$a3, $a3
+	 mov	$a1, $t1
+	adc	\$0, $t4
+
+	sub	\$-1, $a0
+	 mov	$a2, $t2
+	sbb	$poly1, $a1
+	sbb	\$0, $a2
+	 mov	$a3, $t3
+	sbb	$poly3, $a3
+	sbb	\$0, $t4
+
+	cmovc	$t0, $a0
+	cmovc	$t1, $a1
+	mov	$a0, 8*0($r_ptr)
+	cmovc	$t2, $a2
+	mov	$a1, 8*1($r_ptr)
+	cmovc	$t3, $a3
+	mov	$a2, 8*2($r_ptr)
+	mov	$a3, 8*3($r_ptr)
+
+	ret
+.size	__ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2q,.-__ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2q
+___
+									}
+sub gen_double () {
+    my $x = shift;
+    my ($src0,$sfx,$bias);
+    my ($S,$M,$Zsqr,$in_x,$tmp0)=map(32*$_,(0..4));
+
+    if ($x ne "x") {
+	$src0 = "%rax";
+	$sfx  = "";
+	$bias = 0;
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_point_double
+.type	ecp_nistz256_point_double,\@function,2
+.align	32
+ecp_nistz256_point_double:
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($addx);
+	mov	\$0x80100, %ecx
+	and	OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+8(%rip), %ecx
+	cmp	\$0x80100, %ecx
+	je	.Lpoint_doublex
+___
+    } else {
+	$src0 = "%rdx";
+	$sfx  = "x";
+	$bias = 128;
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.type	ecp_nistz256_point_doublex,\@function,2
+.align	32
+ecp_nistz256_point_doublex:
+.Lpoint_doublex:
+___
+    }
+$code.=<<___;
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+	sub	\$32*5+8, %rsp
+
+.Lpoint_double_shortcut$x:
+	movdqu	0x00($a_ptr), %xmm0		# copy	*(P256_POINT *)$a_ptr.x
+	mov	$a_ptr, $b_ptr			# backup copy
+	movdqu	0x10($a_ptr), %xmm1
+	 mov	0x20+8*0($a_ptr), $acc4		# load in_y in "5-4-0-1" order
+	 mov	0x20+8*1($a_ptr), $acc5
+	 mov	0x20+8*2($a_ptr), $acc0
+	 mov	0x20+8*3($a_ptr), $acc1
+	 mov	.Lpoly+8*1(%rip), $poly1
+	 mov	.Lpoly+8*3(%rip), $poly3
+	movdqa	%xmm0, $in_x(%rsp)
+	movdqa	%xmm1, $in_x+0x10(%rsp)
+	lea	0x20($r_ptr), $acc2
+	lea	0x40($r_ptr), $acc3
+	movq	$r_ptr, %xmm0
+	movq	$acc2, %xmm1
+	movq	$acc3, %xmm2
+
+	lea	$S(%rsp), $r_ptr
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2$x	# p256_mul_by_2(S, in_y);
+
+	mov	0x40+8*0($a_ptr), $src0
+	mov	0x40+8*1($a_ptr), $acc6
+	mov	0x40+8*2($a_ptr), $acc7
+	mov	0x40+8*3($a_ptr), $acc0
+	lea	0x40-$bias($a_ptr), $a_ptr
+	lea	$Zsqr(%rsp), $r_ptr
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont$x	# p256_sqr_mont(Zsqr, in_z);
+
+	`&load_for_sqr("$S(%rsp)", "$src0")`
+	lea	$S(%rsp), $r_ptr
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont$x	# p256_sqr_mont(S, S);
+
+	mov	0x20($b_ptr), $src0		# $b_ptr is still valid
+	mov	0x40+8*0($b_ptr), $acc1
+	mov	0x40+8*1($b_ptr), $acc2
+	mov	0x40+8*2($b_ptr), $acc3
+	mov	0x40+8*3($b_ptr), $acc4
+	lea	0x40-$bias($b_ptr), $a_ptr
+	lea	0x20($b_ptr), $b_ptr
+	movq	%xmm2, $r_ptr
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont$x	# p256_mul_mont(res_z, in_z, in_y);
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2$x	# p256_mul_by_2(res_z, res_z);
+
+	mov	$in_x+8*0(%rsp), $acc4		# "5-4-0-1" order
+	mov	$in_x+8*1(%rsp), $acc5
+	lea	$Zsqr(%rsp), $b_ptr
+	mov	$in_x+8*2(%rsp), $acc0
+	mov	$in_x+8*3(%rsp), $acc1
+	lea	$M(%rsp), $r_ptr
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_add_to$x		# p256_add(M, in_x, Zsqr);
+
+	mov	$in_x+8*0(%rsp), $acc4		# "5-4-0-1" order
+	mov	$in_x+8*1(%rsp), $acc5
+	lea	$Zsqr(%rsp), $b_ptr
+	mov	$in_x+8*2(%rsp), $acc0
+	mov	$in_x+8*3(%rsp), $acc1
+	lea	$Zsqr(%rsp), $r_ptr
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_sub_from$x	# p256_sub(Zsqr, in_x, Zsqr);
+
+	`&load_for_sqr("$S(%rsp)", "$src0")`
+	movq	%xmm1, $r_ptr
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont$x	# p256_sqr_mont(res_y, S);
+___
+{	
+######## ecp_nistz256_div_by_2(res_y, res_y); ##########################
+# operate in 4-5-6-7 "name space" that matches squaring output
+#
+my ($poly1,$poly3)=($a_ptr,$t1);
+my ($a0,$a1,$a2,$a3,$t3,$t4,$t1)=($acc4,$acc5,$acc6,$acc7,$acc0,$acc1,$acc2);
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	xor	$t4, $t4
+	mov	$a0, $t0
+	add	\$-1, $a0
+	mov	$a1, $t1
+	adc	$poly1, $a1
+	mov	$a2, $t2
+	adc	\$0, $a2
+	mov	$a3, $t3
+	adc	$poly3, $a3
+	adc	\$0, $t4
+	xor	$a_ptr, $a_ptr		# borrow $a_ptr
+	test	\$1, $t0
+
+	cmovz	$t0, $a0
+	cmovz	$t1, $a1
+	cmovz	$t2, $a2
+	cmovz	$t3, $a3
+	cmovz	$a_ptr, $t4
+
+	mov	$a1, $t0		# a0:a3>>1
+	shr	\$1, $a0
+	shl	\$63, $t0
+	mov	$a2, $t1
+	shr	\$1, $a1
+	or	$t0, $a0
+	shl	\$63, $t1
+	mov	$a3, $t2
+	shr	\$1, $a2
+	or	$t1, $a1
+	shl	\$63, $t2
+	mov	$a0, 8*0($r_ptr)
+	shr	\$1, $a3
+	mov	$a1, 8*1($r_ptr)
+	shl	\$63, $t4
+	or	$t2, $a2
+	or	$t4, $a3
+	mov	$a2, 8*2($r_ptr)
+	mov	$a3, 8*3($r_ptr)
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	`&load_for_mul("$M(%rsp)", "$Zsqr(%rsp)", "$src0")`
+	lea	$M(%rsp), $r_ptr
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont$x	# p256_mul_mont(M, M, Zsqr);
+
+	lea	$tmp0(%rsp), $r_ptr
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2$x
+
+	lea	$M(%rsp), $b_ptr
+	lea	$M(%rsp), $r_ptr
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_add_to$x		# p256_mul_by_3(M, M);
+
+	`&load_for_mul("$S(%rsp)", "$in_x(%rsp)", "$src0")`
+	lea	$S(%rsp), $r_ptr
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont$x	# p256_mul_mont(S, S, in_x);
+
+	lea	$tmp0(%rsp), $r_ptr
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2$x	# p256_mul_by_2(tmp0, S);
+
+	`&load_for_sqr("$M(%rsp)", "$src0")`
+	movq	%xmm0, $r_ptr
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont$x	# p256_sqr_mont(res_x, M);
+
+	lea	$tmp0(%rsp), $b_ptr
+	mov	$acc6, $acc0			# harmonize sqr output and sub input
+	mov	$acc7, $acc1
+	mov	$a_ptr, $poly1
+	mov	$t1, $poly3
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_sub_from$x	# p256_sub(res_x, res_x, tmp0);
+
+	mov	$S+8*0(%rsp), $t0
+	mov	$S+8*1(%rsp), $t1
+	mov	$S+8*2(%rsp), $t2
+	mov	$S+8*3(%rsp), $acc2		# "4-5-0-1" order
+	lea	$S(%rsp), $r_ptr
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_sub$x		# p256_sub(S, S, res_x);
+
+	mov	$M(%rsp), $src0
+	lea	$M(%rsp), $b_ptr
+	mov	$acc4, $acc6			# harmonize sub output and mul input
+	xor	%ecx, %ecx
+	mov	$acc4, $S+8*0(%rsp)		# have to save:-(	
+	mov	$acc5, $acc2
+	mov	$acc5, $S+8*1(%rsp)
+	cmovz	$acc0, $acc3
+	mov	$acc0, $S+8*2(%rsp)
+	lea	$S-$bias(%rsp), $a_ptr
+	cmovz	$acc1, $acc4
+	mov	$acc1, $S+8*3(%rsp)
+	mov	$acc6, $acc1
+	lea	$S(%rsp), $r_ptr
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont$x	# p256_mul_mont(S, S, M);
+
+	movq	%xmm1, $b_ptr
+	movq	%xmm1, $r_ptr
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_sub_from$x	# p256_sub(res_y, S, res_y);
+
+	add	\$32*5+8, %rsp
+	pop	%r15
+	pop	%r14
+	pop	%r13
+	pop	%r12
+	pop	%rbx
+	pop	%rbp
+	ret
+.size	ecp_nistz256_point_double$sfx,.-ecp_nistz256_point_double$sfx
+___
+}
+&gen_double("q");
+
+sub gen_add () {
+    my $x = shift;
+    my ($src0,$sfx,$bias);
+    my ($H,$Hsqr,$R,$Rsqr,$Hcub,
+	$U1,$U2,$S1,$S2,
+	$res_x,$res_y,$res_z,
+	$in1_x,$in1_y,$in1_z,
+	$in2_x,$in2_y,$in2_z)=map(32*$_,(0..17));
+    my ($Z1sqr, $Z2sqr) = ($Hsqr, $Rsqr);
+
+    if ($x ne "x") {
+	$src0 = "%rax";
+	$sfx  = "";
+	$bias = 0;
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_point_add
+.type	ecp_nistz256_point_add,\@function,3
+.align	32
+ecp_nistz256_point_add:
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($addx);
+	mov	\$0x80100, %ecx
+	and	OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+8(%rip), %ecx
+	cmp	\$0x80100, %ecx
+	je	.Lpoint_addx
+___
+    } else {
+	$src0 = "%rdx";
+	$sfx  = "x";
+	$bias = 128;
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.type	ecp_nistz256_point_addx,\@function,3
+.align	32
+ecp_nistz256_point_addx:
+.Lpoint_addx:
+___
+    }
+$code.=<<___;
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+	sub	\$32*18+8, %rsp
+
+	movdqu	0x00($a_ptr), %xmm0		# copy	*(P256_POINT *)$a_ptr
+	movdqu	0x10($a_ptr), %xmm1
+	movdqu	0x20($a_ptr), %xmm2
+	movdqu	0x30($a_ptr), %xmm3
+	movdqu	0x40($a_ptr), %xmm4
+	movdqu	0x50($a_ptr), %xmm5
+	mov	$a_ptr, $b_ptr			# reassign
+	mov	$b_org, $a_ptr			# reassign
+	movdqa	%xmm0, $in1_x(%rsp)
+	movdqa	%xmm1, $in1_x+0x10(%rsp)
+	movdqa	%xmm2, $in1_y(%rsp)
+	movdqa	%xmm3, $in1_y+0x10(%rsp)
+	movdqa	%xmm4, $in1_z(%rsp)
+	movdqa	%xmm5, $in1_z+0x10(%rsp)
+	por	%xmm4, %xmm5
+
+	movdqu	0x00($a_ptr), %xmm0		# copy	*(P256_POINT *)$b_ptr
+	 pshufd	\$0xb1, %xmm5, %xmm3
+	movdqu	0x10($a_ptr), %xmm1
+	movdqu	0x20($a_ptr), %xmm2
+	 por	%xmm3, %xmm5
+	movdqu	0x30($a_ptr), %xmm3
+	 mov	0x40+8*0($a_ptr), $src0		# load original in2_z
+	 mov	0x40+8*1($a_ptr), $acc6
+	 mov	0x40+8*2($a_ptr), $acc7
+	 mov	0x40+8*3($a_ptr), $acc0
+	movdqa	%xmm0, $in2_x(%rsp)
+	 pshufd	\$0x1e, %xmm5, %xmm4
+	movdqa	%xmm1, $in2_x+0x10(%rsp)
+	movdqu	0x40($a_ptr),%xmm0		# in2_z again
+	movdqu	0x50($a_ptr),%xmm1
+	movdqa	%xmm2, $in2_y(%rsp)
+	movdqa	%xmm3, $in2_y+0x10(%rsp)
+	 por	%xmm4, %xmm5
+	 pxor	%xmm4, %xmm4
+	por	%xmm0, %xmm1
+	 movq	$r_ptr, %xmm0			# save $r_ptr
+
+	lea	0x40-$bias($a_ptr), $a_ptr	# $a_ptr is still valid
+	 mov	$src0, $in2_z+8*0(%rsp)		# make in2_z copy
+	 mov	$acc6, $in2_z+8*1(%rsp)
+	 mov	$acc7, $in2_z+8*2(%rsp)
+	 mov	$acc0, $in2_z+8*3(%rsp)
+	lea	$Z2sqr(%rsp), $r_ptr		# Z2^2
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont$x	# p256_sqr_mont(Z2sqr, in2_z);
+
+	pcmpeqd	%xmm4, %xmm5
+	pshufd	\$0xb1, %xmm1, %xmm4
+	por	%xmm1, %xmm4
+	pshufd	\$0, %xmm5, %xmm5		# in1infty
+	pshufd	\$0x1e, %xmm4, %xmm3
+	por	%xmm3, %xmm4
+	pxor	%xmm3, %xmm3
+	pcmpeqd	%xmm3, %xmm4
+	pshufd	\$0, %xmm4, %xmm4		# in2infty
+	 mov	0x40+8*0($b_ptr), $src0		# load original in1_z
+	 mov	0x40+8*1($b_ptr), $acc6
+	 mov	0x40+8*2($b_ptr), $acc7
+	 mov	0x40+8*3($b_ptr), $acc0
+	movq	$b_ptr, %xmm1
+
+	lea	0x40-$bias($b_ptr), $a_ptr
+	lea	$Z1sqr(%rsp), $r_ptr		# Z1^2
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont$x	# p256_sqr_mont(Z1sqr, in1_z);
+
+	`&load_for_mul("$Z2sqr(%rsp)", "$in2_z(%rsp)", "$src0")`
+	lea	$S1(%rsp), $r_ptr		# S1 = Z2^3
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont$x	# p256_mul_mont(S1, Z2sqr, in2_z);
+
+	`&load_for_mul("$Z1sqr(%rsp)", "$in1_z(%rsp)", "$src0")`
+	lea	$S2(%rsp), $r_ptr		# S2 = Z1^3
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont$x	# p256_mul_mont(S2, Z1sqr, in1_z);
+
+	`&load_for_mul("$S1(%rsp)", "$in1_y(%rsp)", "$src0")`
+	lea	$S1(%rsp), $r_ptr		# S1 = Y1*Z2^3
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont$x	# p256_mul_mont(S1, S1, in1_y);
+
+	`&load_for_mul("$S2(%rsp)", "$in2_y(%rsp)", "$src0")`
+	lea	$S2(%rsp), $r_ptr		# S2 = Y2*Z1^3
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont$x	# p256_mul_mont(S2, S2, in2_y);
+
+	lea	$S1(%rsp), $b_ptr
+	lea	$R(%rsp), $r_ptr		# R = S2 - S1
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_sub_from$x	# p256_sub(R, S2, S1);
+
+	or	$acc5, $acc4			# see if result is zero
+	movdqa	%xmm4, %xmm2
+	or	$acc0, $acc4
+	or	$acc1, $acc4
+	por	%xmm5, %xmm2			# in1infty || in2infty
+	movq	$acc4, %xmm3
+
+	`&load_for_mul("$Z2sqr(%rsp)", "$in1_x(%rsp)", "$src0")`
+	lea	$U1(%rsp), $r_ptr		# U1 = X1*Z2^2
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont$x	# p256_mul_mont(U1, in1_x, Z2sqr);
+
+	`&load_for_mul("$Z1sqr(%rsp)", "$in2_x(%rsp)", "$src0")`
+	lea	$U2(%rsp), $r_ptr		# U2 = X2*Z1^2
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont$x	# p256_mul_mont(U2, in2_x, Z1sqr);
+
+	lea	$U1(%rsp), $b_ptr
+	lea	$H(%rsp), $r_ptr		# H = U2 - U1
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_sub_from$x	# p256_sub(H, U2, U1);
+
+	or	$acc5, $acc4			# see if result is zero
+	or	$acc0, $acc4
+	or	$acc1, $acc4
+
+	.byte	0x3e				# predict taken
+	jnz	.Ladd_proceed$x			# is_equal(U1,U2)?
+	movq	%xmm2, $acc0
+	movq	%xmm3, $acc1
+	test	$acc0, $acc0
+	jnz	.Ladd_proceed$x			# (in1infty || in2infty)?
+	test	$acc1, $acc1
+	jz	.Ladd_double$x			# is_equal(S1,S2)?
+
+	movq	%xmm0, $r_ptr			# restore $r_ptr
+	pxor	%xmm0, %xmm0
+	movdqu	%xmm0, 0x00($r_ptr)
+	movdqu	%xmm0, 0x10($r_ptr)
+	movdqu	%xmm0, 0x20($r_ptr)
+	movdqu	%xmm0, 0x30($r_ptr)
+	movdqu	%xmm0, 0x40($r_ptr)
+	movdqu	%xmm0, 0x50($r_ptr)
+	jmp	.Ladd_done$x
+
+.align	32
+.Ladd_double$x:
+	movq	%xmm1, $a_ptr			# restore $a_ptr
+	movq	%xmm0, $r_ptr			# restore $r_ptr
+	add	\$`32*(18-5)`, %rsp		# difference in frame sizes
+	jmp	.Lpoint_double_shortcut$x
+
+.align	32
+.Ladd_proceed$x:
+	`&load_for_sqr("$R(%rsp)", "$src0")`
+	lea	$Rsqr(%rsp), $r_ptr		# R^2
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont$x	# p256_sqr_mont(Rsqr, R);
+
+	`&load_for_mul("$H(%rsp)", "$in1_z(%rsp)", "$src0")`
+	lea	$res_z(%rsp), $r_ptr		# Z3 = H*Z1*Z2
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont$x	# p256_mul_mont(res_z, H, in1_z);
+
+	`&load_for_sqr("$H(%rsp)", "$src0")`
+	lea	$Hsqr(%rsp), $r_ptr		# H^2
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont$x	# p256_sqr_mont(Hsqr, H);
+
+	`&load_for_mul("$res_z(%rsp)", "$in2_z(%rsp)", "$src0")`
+	lea	$res_z(%rsp), $r_ptr		# Z3 = H*Z1*Z2
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont$x	# p256_mul_mont(res_z, res_z, in2_z);
+
+	`&load_for_mul("$Hsqr(%rsp)", "$H(%rsp)", "$src0")`
+	lea	$Hcub(%rsp), $r_ptr		# H^3
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont$x	# p256_mul_mont(Hcub, Hsqr, H);
+
+	`&load_for_mul("$Hsqr(%rsp)", "$U1(%rsp)", "$src0")`
+	lea	$U2(%rsp), $r_ptr		# U1*H^2
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont$x	# p256_mul_mont(U2, U1, Hsqr);
+___
+{
+#######################################################################
+# operate in 4-5-0-1 "name space" that matches multiplication output
+#
+my ($acc0,$acc1,$acc2,$acc3,$t3,$t4)=($acc4,$acc5,$acc0,$acc1,$acc2,$acc3);
+my ($poly1, $poly3)=($acc6,$acc7);
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	#lea	$U2(%rsp), $a_ptr
+	#lea	$Hsqr(%rsp), $r_ptr	# 2*U1*H^2
+	#call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2	# ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2(Hsqr, U2);
+
+	xor	$t4, $t4
+	add	$acc0, $acc0		# a0:a3+a0:a3
+	lea	$Rsqr(%rsp), $a_ptr
+	adc	$acc1, $acc1
+	 mov	$acc0, $t0
+	adc	$acc2, $acc2
+	adc	$acc3, $acc3
+	 mov	$acc1, $t1
+	adc	\$0, $t4
+
+	sub	\$-1, $acc0
+	 mov	$acc2, $t2
+	sbb	$poly1, $acc1
+	sbb	\$0, $acc2
+	 mov	$acc3, $t3
+	sbb	$poly3, $acc3
+	sbb	\$0, $t4
+
+	cmovc	$t0, $acc0
+	mov	8*0($a_ptr), $t0
+	cmovc	$t1, $acc1
+	mov	8*1($a_ptr), $t1
+	cmovc	$t2, $acc2
+	mov	8*2($a_ptr), $t2
+	cmovc	$t3, $acc3
+	mov	8*3($a_ptr), $t3
+
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_sub$x		# p256_sub(res_x, Rsqr, Hsqr);
+
+	lea	$Hcub(%rsp), $b_ptr
+	lea	$res_x(%rsp), $r_ptr
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_sub_from$x	# p256_sub(res_x, res_x, Hcub);
+
+	mov	$U2+8*0(%rsp), $t0
+	mov	$U2+8*1(%rsp), $t1
+	mov	$U2+8*2(%rsp), $t2
+	mov	$U2+8*3(%rsp), $t3
+	lea	$res_y(%rsp), $r_ptr
+
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_sub$x		# p256_sub(res_y, U2, res_x);
+
+	mov	$acc0, 8*0($r_ptr)		# save the result, as
+	mov	$acc1, 8*1($r_ptr)		# __ecp_nistz256_sub doesn't
+	mov	$acc2, 8*2($r_ptr)
+	mov	$acc3, 8*3($r_ptr)
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	`&load_for_mul("$S1(%rsp)", "$Hcub(%rsp)", "$src0")`
+	lea	$S2(%rsp), $r_ptr
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont$x	# p256_mul_mont(S2, S1, Hcub);
+
+	`&load_for_mul("$R(%rsp)", "$res_y(%rsp)", "$src0")`
+	lea	$res_y(%rsp), $r_ptr
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont$x	# p256_mul_mont(res_y, R, res_y);
+
+	lea	$S2(%rsp), $b_ptr
+	lea	$res_y(%rsp), $r_ptr
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_sub_from$x	# p256_sub(res_y, res_y, S2);
+
+	movq	%xmm0, $r_ptr		# restore $r_ptr
+
+	movdqa	%xmm5, %xmm0		# copy_conditional(res_z, in2_z, in1infty);
+	movdqa	%xmm5, %xmm1
+	pandn	$res_z(%rsp), %xmm0
+	movdqa	%xmm5, %xmm2
+	pandn	$res_z+0x10(%rsp), %xmm1
+	movdqa	%xmm5, %xmm3
+	pand	$in2_z(%rsp), %xmm2
+	pand	$in2_z+0x10(%rsp), %xmm3
+	por	%xmm0, %xmm2
+	por	%xmm1, %xmm3
+
+	movdqa	%xmm4, %xmm0		# copy_conditional(res_z, in1_z, in2infty);
+	movdqa	%xmm4, %xmm1
+	pandn	%xmm2, %xmm0
+	movdqa	%xmm4, %xmm2
+	pandn	%xmm3, %xmm1
+	movdqa	%xmm4, %xmm3
+	pand	$in1_z(%rsp), %xmm2
+	pand	$in1_z+0x10(%rsp), %xmm3
+	por	%xmm0, %xmm2
+	por	%xmm1, %xmm3
+	movdqu	%xmm2, 0x40($r_ptr)
+	movdqu	%xmm3, 0x50($r_ptr)
+
+	movdqa	%xmm5, %xmm0		# copy_conditional(res_x, in2_x, in1infty);
+	movdqa	%xmm5, %xmm1
+	pandn	$res_x(%rsp), %xmm0
+	movdqa	%xmm5, %xmm2
+	pandn	$res_x+0x10(%rsp), %xmm1
+	movdqa	%xmm5, %xmm3
+	pand	$in2_x(%rsp), %xmm2
+	pand	$in2_x+0x10(%rsp), %xmm3
+	por	%xmm0, %xmm2
+	por	%xmm1, %xmm3
+
+	movdqa	%xmm4, %xmm0		# copy_conditional(res_x, in1_x, in2infty);
+	movdqa	%xmm4, %xmm1
+	pandn	%xmm2, %xmm0
+	movdqa	%xmm4, %xmm2
+	pandn	%xmm3, %xmm1
+	movdqa	%xmm4, %xmm3
+	pand	$in1_x(%rsp), %xmm2
+	pand	$in1_x+0x10(%rsp), %xmm3
+	por	%xmm0, %xmm2
+	por	%xmm1, %xmm3
+	movdqu	%xmm2, 0x00($r_ptr)
+	movdqu	%xmm3, 0x10($r_ptr)
+
+	movdqa	%xmm5, %xmm0		# copy_conditional(res_y, in2_y, in1infty);
+	movdqa	%xmm5, %xmm1
+	pandn	$res_y(%rsp), %xmm0
+	movdqa	%xmm5, %xmm2
+	pandn	$res_y+0x10(%rsp), %xmm1
+	movdqa	%xmm5, %xmm3
+	pand	$in2_y(%rsp), %xmm2
+	pand	$in2_y+0x10(%rsp), %xmm3
+	por	%xmm0, %xmm2
+	por	%xmm1, %xmm3
+
+	movdqa	%xmm4, %xmm0		# copy_conditional(res_y, in1_y, in2infty);
+	movdqa	%xmm4, %xmm1
+	pandn	%xmm2, %xmm0
+	movdqa	%xmm4, %xmm2
+	pandn	%xmm3, %xmm1
+	movdqa	%xmm4, %xmm3
+	pand	$in1_y(%rsp), %xmm2
+	pand	$in1_y+0x10(%rsp), %xmm3
+	por	%xmm0, %xmm2
+	por	%xmm1, %xmm3
+	movdqu	%xmm2, 0x20($r_ptr)
+	movdqu	%xmm3, 0x30($r_ptr)
+
+.Ladd_done$x:
+	add	\$32*18+8, %rsp
+	pop	%r15
+	pop	%r14
+	pop	%r13
+	pop	%r12
+	pop	%rbx
+	pop	%rbp
+	ret
+.size	ecp_nistz256_point_add$sfx,.-ecp_nistz256_point_add$sfx
+___
+}
+&gen_add("q");
+
+sub gen_add_affine () {
+    my $x = shift;
+    my ($src0,$sfx,$bias);
+    my ($U2,$S2,$H,$R,$Hsqr,$Hcub,$Rsqr,
+	$res_x,$res_y,$res_z,
+	$in1_x,$in1_y,$in1_z,
+	$in2_x,$in2_y)=map(32*$_,(0..14));
+    my $Z1sqr = $S2;
+
+    if ($x ne "x") {
+	$src0 = "%rax";
+	$sfx  = "";
+	$bias = 0;
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine
+.type	ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine,\@function,3
+.align	32
+ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine:
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($addx);
+	mov	\$0x80100, %ecx
+	and	OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+8(%rip), %ecx
+	cmp	\$0x80100, %ecx
+	je	.Lpoint_add_affinex
+___
+    } else {
+	$src0 = "%rdx";
+	$sfx  = "x";
+	$bias = 128;
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.type	ecp_nistz256_point_add_affinex,\@function,3
+.align	32
+ecp_nistz256_point_add_affinex:
+.Lpoint_add_affinex:
+___
+    }
+$code.=<<___;
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+	sub	\$32*15+8, %rsp
+
+	movdqu	0x00($a_ptr), %xmm0	# copy	*(P256_POINT *)$a_ptr
+	mov	$b_org, $b_ptr		# reassign
+	movdqu	0x10($a_ptr), %xmm1
+	movdqu	0x20($a_ptr), %xmm2
+	movdqu	0x30($a_ptr), %xmm3
+	movdqu	0x40($a_ptr), %xmm4
+	movdqu	0x50($a_ptr), %xmm5
+	 mov	0x40+8*0($a_ptr), $src0	# load original in1_z
+	 mov	0x40+8*1($a_ptr), $acc6
+	 mov	0x40+8*2($a_ptr), $acc7
+	 mov	0x40+8*3($a_ptr), $acc0
+	movdqa	%xmm0, $in1_x(%rsp)
+	movdqa	%xmm1, $in1_x+0x10(%rsp)
+	movdqa	%xmm2, $in1_y(%rsp)
+	movdqa	%xmm3, $in1_y+0x10(%rsp)
+	movdqa	%xmm4, $in1_z(%rsp)
+	movdqa	%xmm5, $in1_z+0x10(%rsp)
+	por	%xmm4, %xmm5
+
+	movdqu	0x00($b_ptr), %xmm0	# copy	*(P256_POINT_AFFINE *)$b_ptr
+	 pshufd	\$0xb1, %xmm5, %xmm3
+	movdqu	0x10($b_ptr), %xmm1
+	movdqu	0x20($b_ptr), %xmm2
+	 por	%xmm3, %xmm5
+	movdqu	0x30($b_ptr), %xmm3
+	movdqa	%xmm0, $in2_x(%rsp)
+	 pshufd	\$0x1e, %xmm5, %xmm4
+	movdqa	%xmm1, $in2_x+0x10(%rsp)
+	por	%xmm0, %xmm1
+	 movq	$r_ptr, %xmm0		# save $r_ptr
+	movdqa	%xmm2, $in2_y(%rsp)
+	movdqa	%xmm3, $in2_y+0x10(%rsp)
+	por	%xmm2, %xmm3
+	 por	%xmm4, %xmm5
+	 pxor	%xmm4, %xmm4
+	por	%xmm1, %xmm3
+
+	lea	0x40-$bias($a_ptr), $a_ptr	# $a_ptr is still valid
+	lea	$Z1sqr(%rsp), $r_ptr		# Z1^2
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont$x	# p256_sqr_mont(Z1sqr, in1_z);
+
+	pcmpeqd	%xmm4, %xmm5
+	pshufd	\$0xb1, %xmm3, %xmm4
+	 mov	0x00($b_ptr), $src0		# $b_ptr is still valid
+	 #lea	0x00($b_ptr), $b_ptr
+	 mov	$acc4, $acc1			# harmonize sqr output and mul input
+	por	%xmm3, %xmm4
+	pshufd	\$0, %xmm5, %xmm5		# in1infty
+	pshufd	\$0x1e, %xmm4, %xmm3
+	 mov	$acc5, $acc2
+	por	%xmm3, %xmm4
+	pxor	%xmm3, %xmm3
+	 mov	$acc6, $acc3
+	pcmpeqd	%xmm3, %xmm4
+	pshufd	\$0, %xmm4, %xmm4		# in2infty
+
+	lea	$Z1sqr-$bias(%rsp), $a_ptr
+	mov	$acc7, $acc4
+	lea	$U2(%rsp), $r_ptr		# U2 = X2*Z1^2
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont$x	# p256_mul_mont(U2, Z1sqr, in2_x);
+
+	lea	$in1_x(%rsp), $b_ptr
+	lea	$H(%rsp), $r_ptr		# H = U2 - U1
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_sub_from$x	# p256_sub(H, U2, in1_x);
+
+	`&load_for_mul("$Z1sqr(%rsp)", "$in1_z(%rsp)", "$src0")`
+	lea	$S2(%rsp), $r_ptr		# S2 = Z1^3
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont$x	# p256_mul_mont(S2, Z1sqr, in1_z);
+
+	`&load_for_mul("$H(%rsp)", "$in1_z(%rsp)", "$src0")`
+	lea	$res_z(%rsp), $r_ptr		# Z3 = H*Z1*Z2
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont$x	# p256_mul_mont(res_z, H, in1_z);
+
+	`&load_for_mul("$S2(%rsp)", "$in2_y(%rsp)", "$src0")`
+	lea	$S2(%rsp), $r_ptr		# S2 = Y2*Z1^3
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont$x	# p256_mul_mont(S2, S2, in2_y);
+
+	lea	$in1_y(%rsp), $b_ptr
+	lea	$R(%rsp), $r_ptr		# R = S2 - S1
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_sub_from$x	# p256_sub(R, S2, in1_y);
+
+	`&load_for_sqr("$H(%rsp)", "$src0")`
+	lea	$Hsqr(%rsp), $r_ptr		# H^2
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont$x	# p256_sqr_mont(Hsqr, H);
+
+	`&load_for_sqr("$R(%rsp)", "$src0")`
+	lea	$Rsqr(%rsp), $r_ptr		# R^2
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont$x	# p256_sqr_mont(Rsqr, R);
+
+	`&load_for_mul("$H(%rsp)", "$Hsqr(%rsp)", "$src0")`
+	lea	$Hcub(%rsp), $r_ptr		# H^3
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont$x	# p256_mul_mont(Hcub, Hsqr, H);
+
+	`&load_for_mul("$Hsqr(%rsp)", "$in1_x(%rsp)", "$src0")`
+	lea	$U2(%rsp), $r_ptr		# U1*H^2
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont$x	# p256_mul_mont(U2, in1_x, Hsqr);
+___
+{
+#######################################################################
+# operate in 4-5-0-1 "name space" that matches multiplication output
+#
+my ($acc0,$acc1,$acc2,$acc3,$t3,$t4)=($acc4,$acc5,$acc0,$acc1,$acc2,$acc3);
+my ($poly1, $poly3)=($acc6,$acc7);
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	#lea	$U2(%rsp), $a_ptr
+	#lea	$Hsqr(%rsp), $r_ptr	# 2*U1*H^2
+	#call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2	# ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2(Hsqr, U2);
+
+	xor	$t4, $t4
+	add	$acc0, $acc0		# a0:a3+a0:a3
+	lea	$Rsqr(%rsp), $a_ptr
+	adc	$acc1, $acc1
+	 mov	$acc0, $t0
+	adc	$acc2, $acc2
+	adc	$acc3, $acc3
+	 mov	$acc1, $t1
+	adc	\$0, $t4
+
+	sub	\$-1, $acc0
+	 mov	$acc2, $t2
+	sbb	$poly1, $acc1
+	sbb	\$0, $acc2
+	 mov	$acc3, $t3
+	sbb	$poly3, $acc3
+	sbb	\$0, $t4
+
+	cmovc	$t0, $acc0
+	mov	8*0($a_ptr), $t0
+	cmovc	$t1, $acc1
+	mov	8*1($a_ptr), $t1
+	cmovc	$t2, $acc2
+	mov	8*2($a_ptr), $t2
+	cmovc	$t3, $acc3
+	mov	8*3($a_ptr), $t3
+
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_sub$x		# p256_sub(res_x, Rsqr, Hsqr);
+
+	lea	$Hcub(%rsp), $b_ptr
+	lea	$res_x(%rsp), $r_ptr
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_sub_from$x	# p256_sub(res_x, res_x, Hcub);
+
+	mov	$U2+8*0(%rsp), $t0
+	mov	$U2+8*1(%rsp), $t1
+	mov	$U2+8*2(%rsp), $t2
+	mov	$U2+8*3(%rsp), $t3
+	lea	$H(%rsp), $r_ptr
+
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_sub$x		# p256_sub(H, U2, res_x);
+
+	mov	$acc0, 8*0($r_ptr)		# save the result, as
+	mov	$acc1, 8*1($r_ptr)		# __ecp_nistz256_sub doesn't
+	mov	$acc2, 8*2($r_ptr)
+	mov	$acc3, 8*3($r_ptr)
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	`&load_for_mul("$Hcub(%rsp)", "$in1_y(%rsp)", "$src0")`
+	lea	$S2(%rsp), $r_ptr
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont$x	# p256_mul_mont(S2, Hcub, in1_y);
+
+	`&load_for_mul("$H(%rsp)", "$R(%rsp)", "$src0")`
+	lea	$H(%rsp), $r_ptr
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont$x	# p256_mul_mont(H, H, R);
+
+	lea	$S2(%rsp), $b_ptr
+	lea	$res_y(%rsp), $r_ptr
+	call	__ecp_nistz256_sub_from$x	# p256_sub(res_y, H, S2);
+
+	movq	%xmm0, $r_ptr		# restore $r_ptr
+
+	movdqa	%xmm5, %xmm0		# copy_conditional(res_z, ONE, in1infty);
+	movdqa	%xmm5, %xmm1
+	pandn	$res_z(%rsp), %xmm0
+	movdqa	%xmm5, %xmm2
+	pandn	$res_z+0x10(%rsp), %xmm1
+	movdqa	%xmm5, %xmm3
+	pand	.LONE_mont(%rip), %xmm2
+	pand	.LONE_mont+0x10(%rip), %xmm3
+	por	%xmm0, %xmm2
+	por	%xmm1, %xmm3
+
+	movdqa	%xmm4, %xmm0		# copy_conditional(res_z, in1_z, in2infty);
+	movdqa	%xmm4, %xmm1
+	pandn	%xmm2, %xmm0
+	movdqa	%xmm4, %xmm2
+	pandn	%xmm3, %xmm1
+	movdqa	%xmm4, %xmm3
+	pand	$in1_z(%rsp), %xmm2
+	pand	$in1_z+0x10(%rsp), %xmm3
+	por	%xmm0, %xmm2
+	por	%xmm1, %xmm3
+	movdqu	%xmm2, 0x40($r_ptr)
+	movdqu	%xmm3, 0x50($r_ptr)
+
+	movdqa	%xmm5, %xmm0		# copy_conditional(res_x, in2_x, in1infty);
+	movdqa	%xmm5, %xmm1
+	pandn	$res_x(%rsp), %xmm0
+	movdqa	%xmm5, %xmm2
+	pandn	$res_x+0x10(%rsp), %xmm1
+	movdqa	%xmm5, %xmm3
+	pand	$in2_x(%rsp), %xmm2
+	pand	$in2_x+0x10(%rsp), %xmm3
+	por	%xmm0, %xmm2
+	por	%xmm1, %xmm3
+
+	movdqa	%xmm4, %xmm0		# copy_conditional(res_x, in1_x, in2infty);
+	movdqa	%xmm4, %xmm1
+	pandn	%xmm2, %xmm0
+	movdqa	%xmm4, %xmm2
+	pandn	%xmm3, %xmm1
+	movdqa	%xmm4, %xmm3
+	pand	$in1_x(%rsp), %xmm2
+	pand	$in1_x+0x10(%rsp), %xmm3
+	por	%xmm0, %xmm2
+	por	%xmm1, %xmm3
+	movdqu	%xmm2, 0x00($r_ptr)
+	movdqu	%xmm3, 0x10($r_ptr)
+
+	movdqa	%xmm5, %xmm0		# copy_conditional(res_y, in2_y, in1infty);
+	movdqa	%xmm5, %xmm1
+	pandn	$res_y(%rsp), %xmm0
+	movdqa	%xmm5, %xmm2
+	pandn	$res_y+0x10(%rsp), %xmm1
+	movdqa	%xmm5, %xmm3
+	pand	$in2_y(%rsp), %xmm2
+	pand	$in2_y+0x10(%rsp), %xmm3
+	por	%xmm0, %xmm2
+	por	%xmm1, %xmm3
+
+	movdqa	%xmm4, %xmm0		# copy_conditional(res_y, in1_y, in2infty);
+	movdqa	%xmm4, %xmm1
+	pandn	%xmm2, %xmm0
+	movdqa	%xmm4, %xmm2
+	pandn	%xmm3, %xmm1
+	movdqa	%xmm4, %xmm3
+	pand	$in1_y(%rsp), %xmm2
+	pand	$in1_y+0x10(%rsp), %xmm3
+	por	%xmm0, %xmm2
+	por	%xmm1, %xmm3
+	movdqu	%xmm2, 0x20($r_ptr)
+	movdqu	%xmm3, 0x30($r_ptr)
+
+	add	\$32*15+8, %rsp
+	pop	%r15
+	pop	%r14
+	pop	%r13
+	pop	%r12
+	pop	%rbx
+	pop	%rbp
+	ret
+.size	ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine$sfx,.-ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine$sfx
+___
+}
+&gen_add_affine("q");
+
+########################################################################
+# AD*X magic
+#
+if ($addx) {								{
+########################################################################
+# operate in 4-5-0-1 "name space" that matches multiplication output
+#
+my ($a0,$a1,$a2,$a3,$t3,$t4)=($acc4,$acc5,$acc0,$acc1,$acc2,$acc3);
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.type	__ecp_nistz256_add_tox,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	32
+__ecp_nistz256_add_tox:
+	xor	$t4, $t4
+	adc	8*0($b_ptr), $a0
+	adc	8*1($b_ptr), $a1
+	 mov	$a0, $t0
+	adc	8*2($b_ptr), $a2
+	adc	8*3($b_ptr), $a3
+	 mov	$a1, $t1
+	adc	\$0, $t4
+
+	xor	$t3, $t3
+	sbb	\$-1, $a0
+	 mov	$a2, $t2
+	sbb	$poly1, $a1
+	sbb	\$0, $a2
+	 mov	$a3, $t3
+	sbb	$poly3, $a3
+	sbb	\$0, $t4
+
+	cmovc	$t0, $a0
+	cmovc	$t1, $a1
+	mov	$a0, 8*0($r_ptr)
+	cmovc	$t2, $a2
+	mov	$a1, 8*1($r_ptr)
+	cmovc	$t3, $a3
+	mov	$a2, 8*2($r_ptr)
+	mov	$a3, 8*3($r_ptr)
+
+	ret
+.size	__ecp_nistz256_add_tox,.-__ecp_nistz256_add_tox
+
+.type	__ecp_nistz256_sub_fromx,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	32
+__ecp_nistz256_sub_fromx:
+	xor	$t4, $t4
+	sbb	8*0($b_ptr), $a0
+	sbb	8*1($b_ptr), $a1
+	 mov	$a0, $t0
+	sbb	8*2($b_ptr), $a2
+	sbb	8*3($b_ptr), $a3
+	 mov	$a1, $t1
+	sbb	\$0, $t4
+
+	xor	$t3, $t3
+	adc	\$-1, $a0
+	 mov	$a2, $t2
+	adc	$poly1, $a1
+	adc	\$0, $a2
+	 mov	$a3, $t3
+	adc	$poly3, $a3
+
+	bt	\$0, $t4
+	cmovnc	$t0, $a0
+	cmovnc	$t1, $a1
+	mov	$a0, 8*0($r_ptr)
+	cmovnc	$t2, $a2
+	mov	$a1, 8*1($r_ptr)
+	cmovnc	$t3, $a3
+	mov	$a2, 8*2($r_ptr)
+	mov	$a3, 8*3($r_ptr)
+
+	ret
+.size	__ecp_nistz256_sub_fromx,.-__ecp_nistz256_sub_fromx
+
+.type	__ecp_nistz256_subx,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	32
+__ecp_nistz256_subx:
+	xor	$t4, $t4
+	sbb	$a0, $t0
+	sbb	$a1, $t1
+	 mov	$t0, $a0
+	sbb	$a2, $t2
+	sbb	$a3, $t3
+	 mov	$t1, $a1
+	sbb	\$0, $t4
+
+	xor	$a3 ,$a3
+	adc	\$-1, $t0
+	 mov	$t2, $a2
+	adc	$poly1, $t1
+	adc	\$0, $t2
+	 mov	$t3, $a3
+	adc	$poly3, $t3
+
+	bt	\$0, $t4
+	cmovc	$t0, $a0
+	cmovc	$t1, $a1
+	cmovc	$t2, $a2
+	cmovc	$t3, $a3
+
+	ret
+.size	__ecp_nistz256_subx,.-__ecp_nistz256_subx
+
+.type	__ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2x,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	32
+__ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2x:
+	xor	$t4, $t4
+	adc	$a0, $a0		# a0:a3+a0:a3
+	adc	$a1, $a1
+	 mov	$a0, $t0
+	adc	$a2, $a2
+	adc	$a3, $a3
+	 mov	$a1, $t1
+	adc	\$0, $t4
+
+	xor	$t3, $t3
+	sbb	\$-1, $a0
+	 mov	$a2, $t2
+	sbb	$poly1, $a1
+	sbb	\$0, $a2
+	 mov	$a3, $t3
+	sbb	$poly3, $a3
+	sbb	\$0, $t4
+
+	cmovc	$t0, $a0
+	cmovc	$t1, $a1
+	mov	$a0, 8*0($r_ptr)
+	cmovc	$t2, $a2
+	mov	$a1, 8*1($r_ptr)
+	cmovc	$t3, $a3
+	mov	$a2, 8*2($r_ptr)
+	mov	$a3, 8*3($r_ptr)
+
+	ret
+.size	__ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2x,.-__ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2x
+___
+									}
+&gen_double("x");
+&gen_add("x");
+&gen_add_affine("x");
+}
+}}}
+
+########################################################################
+# Convert ecp_nistz256_table.c to layout expected by ecp_nistz_gather_w7
+#
+open TABLE,"<ecp_nistz256_table.c"		or 
+open TABLE,"<${dir}../ecp_nistz256_table.c"	or 
+die "failed to open ecp_nistz256_table.c:",$!;
+
+use integer;
+
+foreach(<TABLE>) {
+	s/TOBN\(\s*(0x[0-9a-f]+),\s*(0x[0-9a-f]+)\s*\)/push @arr,hex($2),hex($1)/geo;
+}
+close TABLE;
+
+die "insane number of elements" if ($#arr != 64*16*37-1);
+
+print <<___;
+.text
+.globl	ecp_nistz256_precomputed
+.type	ecp_nistz256_precomputed,\@object
+.align	4096
+ecp_nistz256_precomputed:
+___
+while (@line=splice(@arr,0,16)) {
+	print ".long\t",join(',',map { sprintf "0x%08x",$_} @line),"\n";
+}
+print <<___;
+.size	ecp_nistz256_precomputed,.-ecp_nistz256_precomputed
+___
+
+$code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem;
+print $code;
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/build.info b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/build.info
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..970c292
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/build.info
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+LIBS=../../libcrypto
+SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
+        ec_lib.c ecp_smpl.c ecp_mont.c ecp_nist.c ec_cvt.c ec_mult.c \
+        ec_err.c ec_curve.c ec_check.c ec_print.c ec_asn1.c ec_key.c \
+        ec2_smpl.c ec2_mult.c ec_ameth.c ec_pmeth.c eck_prn.c \
+        ecp_nistp224.c ecp_nistp256.c ecp_nistp521.c ecp_nistputil.c \
+        ecp_oct.c ec2_oct.c ec_oct.c ec_kmeth.c ecdh_ossl.c ecdh_kdf.c \
+        ecdsa_ossl.c ecdsa_sign.c ecdsa_vrf.c curve25519.c ecx_meth.c \
+        {- $target{ec_asm_src} -}
+
+GENERATE[ecp_nistz256-x86.s]=asm/ecp_nistz256-x86.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $(CFLAGS) $(LIB_CFLAGS) $(PROCESSOR)
+
+GENERATE[ecp_nistz256-x86_64.s]=asm/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+
+GENERATE[ecp_nistz256-avx2.s]=asm/ecp_nistz256-avx2.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+
+GENERATE[ecp_nistz256-sparcv9.S]=asm/ecp_nistz256-sparcv9.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+INCLUDE[ecp_nistz256-sparcv9.o]=..
+
+GENERATE[ecp_nistz256-armv4.S]=asm/ecp_nistz256-armv4.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+INCLUDE[ecp_nistz256-armv4.o]=..
+GENERATE[ecp_nistz256-armv8.S]=asm/ecp_nistz256-armv8.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+INCLUDE[ecp_nistz256-armv8.o]=..
+
+BEGINRAW[Makefile]
+{- $builddir -}/ecp_nistz256-%.S:	{- $sourcedir -}/asm/ecp_nistz256-%.pl
+	CC="$(CC)" $(PERL) $< $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $@
+ENDRAW[Makefile]
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/curve25519.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/curve25519.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c8aa9aa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/curve25519.c
@@ -0,0 +1,3400 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* This code is mostly taken from the ref10 version of Ed25519 in SUPERCOP
+ * 20141124 (http://bench.cr.yp.to/supercop.html).
+ *
+ * The field functions are shared by Ed25519 and X25519 where possible. */
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include "ec_lcl.h"
+
+
+/* fe means field element. Here the field is \Z/(2^255-19). An element t,
+ * entries t[0]...t[9], represents the integer t[0]+2^26 t[1]+2^51 t[2]+2^77
+ * t[3]+2^102 t[4]+...+2^230 t[9]. Bounds on each t[i] vary depending on
+ * context.  */
+typedef int32_t fe[10];
+
+static const int64_t kBottom25Bits = 0x1ffffffLL;
+static const int64_t kBottom26Bits = 0x3ffffffLL;
+static const int64_t kTop39Bits = 0xfffffffffe000000LL;
+static const int64_t kTop38Bits = 0xfffffffffc000000LL;
+
+static uint64_t load_3(const uint8_t *in) {
+  uint64_t result;
+  result = (uint64_t)in[0];
+  result |= ((uint64_t)in[1]) << 8;
+  result |= ((uint64_t)in[2]) << 16;
+  return result;
+}
+
+static uint64_t load_4(const uint8_t *in) {
+  uint64_t result;
+  result = (uint64_t)in[0];
+  result |= ((uint64_t)in[1]) << 8;
+  result |= ((uint64_t)in[2]) << 16;
+  result |= ((uint64_t)in[3]) << 24;
+  return result;
+}
+
+static void fe_frombytes(fe h, const uint8_t *s) {
+  /* Ignores top bit of h. */
+  int64_t h0 = load_4(s);
+  int64_t h1 = load_3(s + 4) << 6;
+  int64_t h2 = load_3(s + 7) << 5;
+  int64_t h3 = load_3(s + 10) << 3;
+  int64_t h4 = load_3(s + 13) << 2;
+  int64_t h5 = load_4(s + 16);
+  int64_t h6 = load_3(s + 20) << 7;
+  int64_t h7 = load_3(s + 23) << 5;
+  int64_t h8 = load_3(s + 26) << 4;
+  int64_t h9 = (load_3(s + 29) & 8388607) << 2;
+  int64_t carry0;
+  int64_t carry1;
+  int64_t carry2;
+  int64_t carry3;
+  int64_t carry4;
+  int64_t carry5;
+  int64_t carry6;
+  int64_t carry7;
+  int64_t carry8;
+  int64_t carry9;
+
+  carry9 = h9 + (1 << 24); h0 += (carry9 >> 25) * 19; h9 -= carry9 & kTop39Bits;
+  carry1 = h1 + (1 << 24); h2 += carry1 >> 25; h1 -= carry1 & kTop39Bits;
+  carry3 = h3 + (1 << 24); h4 += carry3 >> 25; h3 -= carry3 & kTop39Bits;
+  carry5 = h5 + (1 << 24); h6 += carry5 >> 25; h5 -= carry5 & kTop39Bits;
+  carry7 = h7 + (1 << 24); h8 += carry7 >> 25; h7 -= carry7 & kTop39Bits;
+
+  carry0 = h0 + (1 << 25); h1 += carry0 >> 26; h0 -= carry0 & kTop38Bits;
+  carry2 = h2 + (1 << 25); h3 += carry2 >> 26; h2 -= carry2 & kTop38Bits;
+  carry4 = h4 + (1 << 25); h5 += carry4 >> 26; h4 -= carry4 & kTop38Bits;
+  carry6 = h6 + (1 << 25); h7 += carry6 >> 26; h6 -= carry6 & kTop38Bits;
+  carry8 = h8 + (1 << 25); h9 += carry8 >> 26; h8 -= carry8 & kTop38Bits;
+
+  h[0] = h0;
+  h[1] = h1;
+  h[2] = h2;
+  h[3] = h3;
+  h[4] = h4;
+  h[5] = h5;
+  h[6] = h6;
+  h[7] = h7;
+  h[8] = h8;
+  h[9] = h9;
+}
+
+/* Preconditions:
+ *  |h| bounded by 1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,etc.
+ *
+ * Write p=2^255-19; q=floor(h/p).
+ * Basic claim: q = floor(2^(-255)(h + 19 2^(-25)h9 + 2^(-1))).
+ *
+ * Proof:
+ *   Have |h|<=p so |q|<=1 so |19^2 2^(-255) q|<1/4.
+ *   Also have |h-2^230 h9|<2^231 so |19 2^(-255)(h-2^230 h9)|<1/4.
+ *
+ *   Write y=2^(-1)-19^2 2^(-255)q-19 2^(-255)(h-2^230 h9).
+ *   Then 0<y<1.
+ *
+ *   Write r=h-pq.
+ *   Have 0<=r<=p-1=2^255-20.
+ *   Thus 0<=r+19(2^-255)r<r+19(2^-255)2^255<=2^255-1.
+ *
+ *   Write x=r+19(2^-255)r+y.
+ *   Then 0<x<2^255 so floor(2^(-255)x) = 0 so floor(q+2^(-255)x) = q.
+ *
+ *   Have q+2^(-255)x = 2^(-255)(h + 19 2^(-25) h9 + 2^(-1))
+ *   so floor(2^(-255)(h + 19 2^(-25) h9 + 2^(-1))) = q. */
+static void fe_tobytes(uint8_t *s, const fe h) {
+  int32_t h0 = h[0];
+  int32_t h1 = h[1];
+  int32_t h2 = h[2];
+  int32_t h3 = h[3];
+  int32_t h4 = h[4];
+  int32_t h5 = h[5];
+  int32_t h6 = h[6];
+  int32_t h7 = h[7];
+  int32_t h8 = h[8];
+  int32_t h9 = h[9];
+  int32_t q;
+
+  q = (19 * h9 + (((int32_t) 1) << 24)) >> 25;
+  q = (h0 + q) >> 26;
+  q = (h1 + q) >> 25;
+  q = (h2 + q) >> 26;
+  q = (h3 + q) >> 25;
+  q = (h4 + q) >> 26;
+  q = (h5 + q) >> 25;
+  q = (h6 + q) >> 26;
+  q = (h7 + q) >> 25;
+  q = (h8 + q) >> 26;
+  q = (h9 + q) >> 25;
+
+  /* Goal: Output h-(2^255-19)q, which is between 0 and 2^255-20. */
+  h0 += 19 * q;
+  /* Goal: Output h-2^255 q, which is between 0 and 2^255-20. */
+
+  h1 += h0 >> 26; h0 &= kBottom26Bits;
+  h2 += h1 >> 25; h1 &= kBottom25Bits;
+  h3 += h2 >> 26; h2 &= kBottom26Bits;
+  h4 += h3 >> 25; h3 &= kBottom25Bits;
+  h5 += h4 >> 26; h4 &= kBottom26Bits;
+  h6 += h5 >> 25; h5 &= kBottom25Bits;
+  h7 += h6 >> 26; h6 &= kBottom26Bits;
+  h8 += h7 >> 25; h7 &= kBottom25Bits;
+  h9 += h8 >> 26; h8 &= kBottom26Bits;
+                  h9 &= kBottom25Bits;
+                  /* h10 = carry9 */
+
+  /* Goal: Output h0+...+2^255 h10-2^255 q, which is between 0 and 2^255-20.
+   * Have h0+...+2^230 h9 between 0 and 2^255-1;
+   * evidently 2^255 h10-2^255 q = 0.
+   * Goal: Output h0+...+2^230 h9.  */
+
+  s[0] = h0 >> 0;
+  s[1] = h0 >> 8;
+  s[2] = h0 >> 16;
+  s[3] = (h0 >> 24) | ((uint32_t)(h1) << 2);
+  s[4] = h1 >> 6;
+  s[5] = h1 >> 14;
+  s[6] = (h1 >> 22) | ((uint32_t)(h2) << 3);
+  s[7] = h2 >> 5;
+  s[8] = h2 >> 13;
+  s[9] = (h2 >> 21) | ((uint32_t)(h3) << 5);
+  s[10] = h3 >> 3;
+  s[11] = h3 >> 11;
+  s[12] = (h3 >> 19) | ((uint32_t)(h4) << 6);
+  s[13] = h4 >> 2;
+  s[14] = h4 >> 10;
+  s[15] = h4 >> 18;
+  s[16] = h5 >> 0;
+  s[17] = h5 >> 8;
+  s[18] = h5 >> 16;
+  s[19] = (h5 >> 24) | ((uint32_t)(h6) << 1);
+  s[20] = h6 >> 7;
+  s[21] = h6 >> 15;
+  s[22] = (h6 >> 23) | ((uint32_t)(h7) << 3);
+  s[23] = h7 >> 5;
+  s[24] = h7 >> 13;
+  s[25] = (h7 >> 21) | ((uint32_t)(h8) << 4);
+  s[26] = h8 >> 4;
+  s[27] = h8 >> 12;
+  s[28] = (h8 >> 20) | ((uint32_t)(h9) << 6);
+  s[29] = h9 >> 2;
+  s[30] = h9 >> 10;
+  s[31] = h9 >> 18;
+}
+
+/* h = f */
+static void fe_copy(fe h, const fe f) {
+  memmove(h, f, sizeof(int32_t) * 10);
+}
+
+/* h = 0 */
+static void fe_0(fe h) { memset(h, 0, sizeof(int32_t) * 10); }
+
+/* h = 1 */
+static void fe_1(fe h) {
+  memset(h, 0, sizeof(int32_t) * 10);
+  h[0] = 1;
+}
+
+/* h = f + g
+ * Can overlap h with f or g.
+ *
+ * Preconditions:
+ *    |f| bounded by 1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,etc.
+ *    |g| bounded by 1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,etc.
+ *
+ * Postconditions:
+ *    |h| bounded by 1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,etc. */
+static void fe_add(fe h, const fe f, const fe g) {
+  unsigned i;
+  for (i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
+    h[i] = f[i] + g[i];
+  }
+}
+
+/* h = f - g
+ * Can overlap h with f or g.
+ *
+ * Preconditions:
+ *    |f| bounded by 1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,etc.
+ *    |g| bounded by 1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,etc.
+ *
+ * Postconditions:
+ *    |h| bounded by 1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,etc. */
+static void fe_sub(fe h, const fe f, const fe g) {
+  unsigned i;
+  for (i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
+    h[i] = f[i] - g[i];
+  }
+}
+
+/* h = f * g
+ * Can overlap h with f or g.
+ *
+ * Preconditions:
+ *    |f| bounded by 1.65*2^26,1.65*2^25,1.65*2^26,1.65*2^25,etc.
+ *    |g| bounded by 1.65*2^26,1.65*2^25,1.65*2^26,1.65*2^25,etc.
+ *
+ * Postconditions:
+ *    |h| bounded by 1.01*2^25,1.01*2^24,1.01*2^25,1.01*2^24,etc.
+ *
+ * Notes on implementation strategy:
+ *
+ * Using schoolbook multiplication.
+ * Karatsuba would save a little in some cost models.
+ *
+ * Most multiplications by 2 and 19 are 32-bit precomputations;
+ * cheaper than 64-bit postcomputations.
+ *
+ * There is one remaining multiplication by 19 in the carry chain;
+ * one *19 precomputation can be merged into this,
+ * but the resulting data flow is considerably less clean.
+ *
+ * There are 12 carries below.
+ * 10 of them are 2-way parallelizable and vectorizable.
+ * Can get away with 11 carries, but then data flow is much deeper.
+ *
+ * With tighter constraints on inputs can squeeze carries into int32. */
+static void fe_mul(fe h, const fe f, const fe g) {
+  int32_t f0 = f[0];
+  int32_t f1 = f[1];
+  int32_t f2 = f[2];
+  int32_t f3 = f[3];
+  int32_t f4 = f[4];
+  int32_t f5 = f[5];
+  int32_t f6 = f[6];
+  int32_t f7 = f[7];
+  int32_t f8 = f[8];
+  int32_t f9 = f[9];
+  int32_t g0 = g[0];
+  int32_t g1 = g[1];
+  int32_t g2 = g[2];
+  int32_t g3 = g[3];
+  int32_t g4 = g[4];
+  int32_t g5 = g[5];
+  int32_t g6 = g[6];
+  int32_t g7 = g[7];
+  int32_t g8 = g[8];
+  int32_t g9 = g[9];
+  int32_t g1_19 = 19 * g1; /* 1.959375*2^29 */
+  int32_t g2_19 = 19 * g2; /* 1.959375*2^30; still ok */
+  int32_t g3_19 = 19 * g3;
+  int32_t g4_19 = 19 * g4;
+  int32_t g5_19 = 19 * g5;
+  int32_t g6_19 = 19 * g6;
+  int32_t g7_19 = 19 * g7;
+  int32_t g8_19 = 19 * g8;
+  int32_t g9_19 = 19 * g9;
+  int32_t f1_2 = 2 * f1;
+  int32_t f3_2 = 2 * f3;
+  int32_t f5_2 = 2 * f5;
+  int32_t f7_2 = 2 * f7;
+  int32_t f9_2 = 2 * f9;
+  int64_t f0g0    = f0   * (int64_t) g0;
+  int64_t f0g1    = f0   * (int64_t) g1;
+  int64_t f0g2    = f0   * (int64_t) g2;
+  int64_t f0g3    = f0   * (int64_t) g3;
+  int64_t f0g4    = f0   * (int64_t) g4;
+  int64_t f0g5    = f0   * (int64_t) g5;
+  int64_t f0g6    = f0   * (int64_t) g6;
+  int64_t f0g7    = f0   * (int64_t) g7;
+  int64_t f0g8    = f0   * (int64_t) g8;
+  int64_t f0g9    = f0   * (int64_t) g9;
+  int64_t f1g0    = f1   * (int64_t) g0;
+  int64_t f1g1_2  = f1_2 * (int64_t) g1;
+  int64_t f1g2    = f1   * (int64_t) g2;
+  int64_t f1g3_2  = f1_2 * (int64_t) g3;
+  int64_t f1g4    = f1   * (int64_t) g4;
+  int64_t f1g5_2  = f1_2 * (int64_t) g5;
+  int64_t f1g6    = f1   * (int64_t) g6;
+  int64_t f1g7_2  = f1_2 * (int64_t) g7;
+  int64_t f1g8    = f1   * (int64_t) g8;
+  int64_t f1g9_38 = f1_2 * (int64_t) g9_19;
+  int64_t f2g0    = f2   * (int64_t) g0;
+  int64_t f2g1    = f2   * (int64_t) g1;
+  int64_t f2g2    = f2   * (int64_t) g2;
+  int64_t f2g3    = f2   * (int64_t) g3;
+  int64_t f2g4    = f2   * (int64_t) g4;
+  int64_t f2g5    = f2   * (int64_t) g5;
+  int64_t f2g6    = f2   * (int64_t) g6;
+  int64_t f2g7    = f2   * (int64_t) g7;
+  int64_t f2g8_19 = f2   * (int64_t) g8_19;
+  int64_t f2g9_19 = f2   * (int64_t) g9_19;
+  int64_t f3g0    = f3   * (int64_t) g0;
+  int64_t f3g1_2  = f3_2 * (int64_t) g1;
+  int64_t f3g2    = f3   * (int64_t) g2;
+  int64_t f3g3_2  = f3_2 * (int64_t) g3;
+  int64_t f3g4    = f3   * (int64_t) g4;
+  int64_t f3g5_2  = f3_2 * (int64_t) g5;
+  int64_t f3g6    = f3   * (int64_t) g6;
+  int64_t f3g7_38 = f3_2 * (int64_t) g7_19;
+  int64_t f3g8_19 = f3   * (int64_t) g8_19;
+  int64_t f3g9_38 = f3_2 * (int64_t) g9_19;
+  int64_t f4g0    = f4   * (int64_t) g0;
+  int64_t f4g1    = f4   * (int64_t) g1;
+  int64_t f4g2    = f4   * (int64_t) g2;
+  int64_t f4g3    = f4   * (int64_t) g3;
+  int64_t f4g4    = f4   * (int64_t) g4;
+  int64_t f4g5    = f4   * (int64_t) g5;
+  int64_t f4g6_19 = f4   * (int64_t) g6_19;
+  int64_t f4g7_19 = f4   * (int64_t) g7_19;
+  int64_t f4g8_19 = f4   * (int64_t) g8_19;
+  int64_t f4g9_19 = f4   * (int64_t) g9_19;
+  int64_t f5g0    = f5   * (int64_t) g0;
+  int64_t f5g1_2  = f5_2 * (int64_t) g1;
+  int64_t f5g2    = f5   * (int64_t) g2;
+  int64_t f5g3_2  = f5_2 * (int64_t) g3;
+  int64_t f5g4    = f5   * (int64_t) g4;
+  int64_t f5g5_38 = f5_2 * (int64_t) g5_19;
+  int64_t f5g6_19 = f5   * (int64_t) g6_19;
+  int64_t f5g7_38 = f5_2 * (int64_t) g7_19;
+  int64_t f5g8_19 = f5   * (int64_t) g8_19;
+  int64_t f5g9_38 = f5_2 * (int64_t) g9_19;
+  int64_t f6g0    = f6   * (int64_t) g0;
+  int64_t f6g1    = f6   * (int64_t) g1;
+  int64_t f6g2    = f6   * (int64_t) g2;
+  int64_t f6g3    = f6   * (int64_t) g3;
+  int64_t f6g4_19 = f6   * (int64_t) g4_19;
+  int64_t f6g5_19 = f6   * (int64_t) g5_19;
+  int64_t f6g6_19 = f6   * (int64_t) g6_19;
+  int64_t f6g7_19 = f6   * (int64_t) g7_19;
+  int64_t f6g8_19 = f6   * (int64_t) g8_19;
+  int64_t f6g9_19 = f6   * (int64_t) g9_19;
+  int64_t f7g0    = f7   * (int64_t) g0;
+  int64_t f7g1_2  = f7_2 * (int64_t) g1;
+  int64_t f7g2    = f7   * (int64_t) g2;
+  int64_t f7g3_38 = f7_2 * (int64_t) g3_19;
+  int64_t f7g4_19 = f7   * (int64_t) g4_19;
+  int64_t f7g5_38 = f7_2 * (int64_t) g5_19;
+  int64_t f7g6_19 = f7   * (int64_t) g6_19;
+  int64_t f7g7_38 = f7_2 * (int64_t) g7_19;
+  int64_t f7g8_19 = f7   * (int64_t) g8_19;
+  int64_t f7g9_38 = f7_2 * (int64_t) g9_19;
+  int64_t f8g0    = f8   * (int64_t) g0;
+  int64_t f8g1    = f8   * (int64_t) g1;
+  int64_t f8g2_19 = f8   * (int64_t) g2_19;
+  int64_t f8g3_19 = f8   * (int64_t) g3_19;
+  int64_t f8g4_19 = f8   * (int64_t) g4_19;
+  int64_t f8g5_19 = f8   * (int64_t) g5_19;
+  int64_t f8g6_19 = f8   * (int64_t) g6_19;
+  int64_t f8g7_19 = f8   * (int64_t) g7_19;
+  int64_t f8g8_19 = f8   * (int64_t) g8_19;
+  int64_t f8g9_19 = f8   * (int64_t) g9_19;
+  int64_t f9g0    = f9   * (int64_t) g0;
+  int64_t f9g1_38 = f9_2 * (int64_t) g1_19;
+  int64_t f9g2_19 = f9   * (int64_t) g2_19;
+  int64_t f9g3_38 = f9_2 * (int64_t) g3_19;
+  int64_t f9g4_19 = f9   * (int64_t) g4_19;
+  int64_t f9g5_38 = f9_2 * (int64_t) g5_19;
+  int64_t f9g6_19 = f9   * (int64_t) g6_19;
+  int64_t f9g7_38 = f9_2 * (int64_t) g7_19;
+  int64_t f9g8_19 = f9   * (int64_t) g8_19;
+  int64_t f9g9_38 = f9_2 * (int64_t) g9_19;
+  int64_t h0 = f0g0+f1g9_38+f2g8_19+f3g7_38+f4g6_19+f5g5_38+f6g4_19+f7g3_38+f8g2_19+f9g1_38;
+  int64_t h1 = f0g1+f1g0   +f2g9_19+f3g8_19+f4g7_19+f5g6_19+f6g5_19+f7g4_19+f8g3_19+f9g2_19;
+  int64_t h2 = f0g2+f1g1_2 +f2g0   +f3g9_38+f4g8_19+f5g7_38+f6g6_19+f7g5_38+f8g4_19+f9g3_38;
+  int64_t h3 = f0g3+f1g2   +f2g1   +f3g0   +f4g9_19+f5g8_19+f6g7_19+f7g6_19+f8g5_19+f9g4_19;
+  int64_t h4 = f0g4+f1g3_2 +f2g2   +f3g1_2 +f4g0   +f5g9_38+f6g8_19+f7g7_38+f8g6_19+f9g5_38;
+  int64_t h5 = f0g5+f1g4   +f2g3   +f3g2   +f4g1   +f5g0   +f6g9_19+f7g8_19+f8g7_19+f9g6_19;
+  int64_t h6 = f0g6+f1g5_2 +f2g4   +f3g3_2 +f4g2   +f5g1_2 +f6g0   +f7g9_38+f8g8_19+f9g7_38;
+  int64_t h7 = f0g7+f1g6   +f2g5   +f3g4   +f4g3   +f5g2   +f6g1   +f7g0   +f8g9_19+f9g8_19;
+  int64_t h8 = f0g8+f1g7_2 +f2g6   +f3g5_2 +f4g4   +f5g3_2 +f6g2   +f7g1_2 +f8g0   +f9g9_38;
+  int64_t h9 = f0g9+f1g8   +f2g7   +f3g6   +f4g5   +f5g4   +f6g3   +f7g2   +f8g1   +f9g0   ;
+  int64_t carry0;
+  int64_t carry1;
+  int64_t carry2;
+  int64_t carry3;
+  int64_t carry4;
+  int64_t carry5;
+  int64_t carry6;
+  int64_t carry7;
+  int64_t carry8;
+  int64_t carry9;
+
+  /* |h0| <= (1.65*1.65*2^52*(1+19+19+19+19)+1.65*1.65*2^50*(38+38+38+38+38))
+   *   i.e. |h0| <= 1.4*2^60; narrower ranges for h2, h4, h6, h8
+   * |h1| <= (1.65*1.65*2^51*(1+1+19+19+19+19+19+19+19+19))
+   *   i.e. |h1| <= 1.7*2^59; narrower ranges for h3, h5, h7, h9 */
+
+  carry0 = h0 + (1 << 25); h1 += carry0 >> 26; h0 -= carry0 & kTop38Bits;
+  carry4 = h4 + (1 << 25); h5 += carry4 >> 26; h4 -= carry4 & kTop38Bits;
+  /* |h0| <= 2^25 */
+  /* |h4| <= 2^25 */
+  /* |h1| <= 1.71*2^59 */
+  /* |h5| <= 1.71*2^59 */
+
+  carry1 = h1 + (1 << 24); h2 += carry1 >> 25; h1 -= carry1 & kTop39Bits;
+  carry5 = h5 + (1 << 24); h6 += carry5 >> 25; h5 -= carry5 & kTop39Bits;
+  /* |h1| <= 2^24; from now on fits into int32 */
+  /* |h5| <= 2^24; from now on fits into int32 */
+  /* |h2| <= 1.41*2^60 */
+  /* |h6| <= 1.41*2^60 */
+
+  carry2 = h2 + (1 << 25); h3 += carry2 >> 26; h2 -= carry2 & kTop38Bits;
+  carry6 = h6 + (1 << 25); h7 += carry6 >> 26; h6 -= carry6 & kTop38Bits;
+  /* |h2| <= 2^25; from now on fits into int32 unchanged */
+  /* |h6| <= 2^25; from now on fits into int32 unchanged */
+  /* |h3| <= 1.71*2^59 */
+  /* |h7| <= 1.71*2^59 */
+
+  carry3 = h3 + (1 << 24); h4 += carry3 >> 25; h3 -= carry3 & kTop39Bits;
+  carry7 = h7 + (1 << 24); h8 += carry7 >> 25; h7 -= carry7 & kTop39Bits;
+  /* |h3| <= 2^24; from now on fits into int32 unchanged */
+  /* |h7| <= 2^24; from now on fits into int32 unchanged */
+  /* |h4| <= 1.72*2^34 */
+  /* |h8| <= 1.41*2^60 */
+
+  carry4 = h4 + (1 << 25); h5 += carry4 >> 26; h4 -= carry4 & kTop38Bits;
+  carry8 = h8 + (1 << 25); h9 += carry8 >> 26; h8 -= carry8 & kTop38Bits;
+  /* |h4| <= 2^25; from now on fits into int32 unchanged */
+  /* |h8| <= 2^25; from now on fits into int32 unchanged */
+  /* |h5| <= 1.01*2^24 */
+  /* |h9| <= 1.71*2^59 */
+
+  carry9 = h9 + (1 << 24); h0 += (carry9 >> 25) * 19; h9 -= carry9 & kTop39Bits;
+  /* |h9| <= 2^24; from now on fits into int32 unchanged */
+  /* |h0| <= 1.1*2^39 */
+
+  carry0 = h0 + (1 << 25); h1 += carry0 >> 26; h0 -= carry0 & kTop38Bits;
+  /* |h0| <= 2^25; from now on fits into int32 unchanged */
+  /* |h1| <= 1.01*2^24 */
+
+  h[0] = h0;
+  h[1] = h1;
+  h[2] = h2;
+  h[3] = h3;
+  h[4] = h4;
+  h[5] = h5;
+  h[6] = h6;
+  h[7] = h7;
+  h[8] = h8;
+  h[9] = h9;
+}
+
+/* h = f * f
+ * Can overlap h with f.
+ *
+ * Preconditions:
+ *    |f| bounded by 1.65*2^26,1.65*2^25,1.65*2^26,1.65*2^25,etc.
+ *
+ * Postconditions:
+ *    |h| bounded by 1.01*2^25,1.01*2^24,1.01*2^25,1.01*2^24,etc.
+ *
+ * See fe_mul.c for discussion of implementation strategy. */
+static void fe_sq(fe h, const fe f) {
+  int32_t f0 = f[0];
+  int32_t f1 = f[1];
+  int32_t f2 = f[2];
+  int32_t f3 = f[3];
+  int32_t f4 = f[4];
+  int32_t f5 = f[5];
+  int32_t f6 = f[6];
+  int32_t f7 = f[7];
+  int32_t f8 = f[8];
+  int32_t f9 = f[9];
+  int32_t f0_2 = 2 * f0;
+  int32_t f1_2 = 2 * f1;
+  int32_t f2_2 = 2 * f2;
+  int32_t f3_2 = 2 * f3;
+  int32_t f4_2 = 2 * f4;
+  int32_t f5_2 = 2 * f5;
+  int32_t f6_2 = 2 * f6;
+  int32_t f7_2 = 2 * f7;
+  int32_t f5_38 = 38 * f5; /* 1.959375*2^30 */
+  int32_t f6_19 = 19 * f6; /* 1.959375*2^30 */
+  int32_t f7_38 = 38 * f7; /* 1.959375*2^30 */
+  int32_t f8_19 = 19 * f8; /* 1.959375*2^30 */
+  int32_t f9_38 = 38 * f9; /* 1.959375*2^30 */
+  int64_t f0f0    = f0   * (int64_t) f0;
+  int64_t f0f1_2  = f0_2 * (int64_t) f1;
+  int64_t f0f2_2  = f0_2 * (int64_t) f2;
+  int64_t f0f3_2  = f0_2 * (int64_t) f3;
+  int64_t f0f4_2  = f0_2 * (int64_t) f4;
+  int64_t f0f5_2  = f0_2 * (int64_t) f5;
+  int64_t f0f6_2  = f0_2 * (int64_t) f6;
+  int64_t f0f7_2  = f0_2 * (int64_t) f7;
+  int64_t f0f8_2  = f0_2 * (int64_t) f8;
+  int64_t f0f9_2  = f0_2 * (int64_t) f9;
+  int64_t f1f1_2  = f1_2 * (int64_t) f1;
+  int64_t f1f2_2  = f1_2 * (int64_t) f2;
+  int64_t f1f3_4  = f1_2 * (int64_t) f3_2;
+  int64_t f1f4_2  = f1_2 * (int64_t) f4;
+  int64_t f1f5_4  = f1_2 * (int64_t) f5_2;
+  int64_t f1f6_2  = f1_2 * (int64_t) f6;
+  int64_t f1f7_4  = f1_2 * (int64_t) f7_2;
+  int64_t f1f8_2  = f1_2 * (int64_t) f8;
+  int64_t f1f9_76 = f1_2 * (int64_t) f9_38;
+  int64_t f2f2    = f2   * (int64_t) f2;
+  int64_t f2f3_2  = f2_2 * (int64_t) f3;
+  int64_t f2f4_2  = f2_2 * (int64_t) f4;
+  int64_t f2f5_2  = f2_2 * (int64_t) f5;
+  int64_t f2f6_2  = f2_2 * (int64_t) f6;
+  int64_t f2f7_2  = f2_2 * (int64_t) f7;
+  int64_t f2f8_38 = f2_2 * (int64_t) f8_19;
+  int64_t f2f9_38 = f2   * (int64_t) f9_38;
+  int64_t f3f3_2  = f3_2 * (int64_t) f3;
+  int64_t f3f4_2  = f3_2 * (int64_t) f4;
+  int64_t f3f5_4  = f3_2 * (int64_t) f5_2;
+  int64_t f3f6_2  = f3_2 * (int64_t) f6;
+  int64_t f3f7_76 = f3_2 * (int64_t) f7_38;
+  int64_t f3f8_38 = f3_2 * (int64_t) f8_19;
+  int64_t f3f9_76 = f3_2 * (int64_t) f9_38;
+  int64_t f4f4    = f4   * (int64_t) f4;
+  int64_t f4f5_2  = f4_2 * (int64_t) f5;
+  int64_t f4f6_38 = f4_2 * (int64_t) f6_19;
+  int64_t f4f7_38 = f4   * (int64_t) f7_38;
+  int64_t f4f8_38 = f4_2 * (int64_t) f8_19;
+  int64_t f4f9_38 = f4   * (int64_t) f9_38;
+  int64_t f5f5_38 = f5   * (int64_t) f5_38;
+  int64_t f5f6_38 = f5_2 * (int64_t) f6_19;
+  int64_t f5f7_76 = f5_2 * (int64_t) f7_38;
+  int64_t f5f8_38 = f5_2 * (int64_t) f8_19;
+  int64_t f5f9_76 = f5_2 * (int64_t) f9_38;
+  int64_t f6f6_19 = f6   * (int64_t) f6_19;
+  int64_t f6f7_38 = f6   * (int64_t) f7_38;
+  int64_t f6f8_38 = f6_2 * (int64_t) f8_19;
+  int64_t f6f9_38 = f6   * (int64_t) f9_38;
+  int64_t f7f7_38 = f7   * (int64_t) f7_38;
+  int64_t f7f8_38 = f7_2 * (int64_t) f8_19;
+  int64_t f7f9_76 = f7_2 * (int64_t) f9_38;
+  int64_t f8f8_19 = f8   * (int64_t) f8_19;
+  int64_t f8f9_38 = f8   * (int64_t) f9_38;
+  int64_t f9f9_38 = f9   * (int64_t) f9_38;
+  int64_t h0 = f0f0  +f1f9_76+f2f8_38+f3f7_76+f4f6_38+f5f5_38;
+  int64_t h1 = f0f1_2+f2f9_38+f3f8_38+f4f7_38+f5f6_38;
+  int64_t h2 = f0f2_2+f1f1_2 +f3f9_76+f4f8_38+f5f7_76+f6f6_19;
+  int64_t h3 = f0f3_2+f1f2_2 +f4f9_38+f5f8_38+f6f7_38;
+  int64_t h4 = f0f4_2+f1f3_4 +f2f2   +f5f9_76+f6f8_38+f7f7_38;
+  int64_t h5 = f0f5_2+f1f4_2 +f2f3_2 +f6f9_38+f7f8_38;
+  int64_t h6 = f0f6_2+f1f5_4 +f2f4_2 +f3f3_2 +f7f9_76+f8f8_19;
+  int64_t h7 = f0f7_2+f1f6_2 +f2f5_2 +f3f4_2 +f8f9_38;
+  int64_t h8 = f0f8_2+f1f7_4 +f2f6_2 +f3f5_4 +f4f4   +f9f9_38;
+  int64_t h9 = f0f9_2+f1f8_2 +f2f7_2 +f3f6_2 +f4f5_2;
+  int64_t carry0;
+  int64_t carry1;
+  int64_t carry2;
+  int64_t carry3;
+  int64_t carry4;
+  int64_t carry5;
+  int64_t carry6;
+  int64_t carry7;
+  int64_t carry8;
+  int64_t carry9;
+
+  carry0 = h0 + (1 << 25); h1 += carry0 >> 26; h0 -= carry0 & kTop38Bits;
+  carry4 = h4 + (1 << 25); h5 += carry4 >> 26; h4 -= carry4 & kTop38Bits;
+
+  carry1 = h1 + (1 << 24); h2 += carry1 >> 25; h1 -= carry1 & kTop39Bits;
+  carry5 = h5 + (1 << 24); h6 += carry5 >> 25; h5 -= carry5 & kTop39Bits;
+
+  carry2 = h2 + (1 << 25); h3 += carry2 >> 26; h2 -= carry2 & kTop38Bits;
+  carry6 = h6 + (1 << 25); h7 += carry6 >> 26; h6 -= carry6 & kTop38Bits;
+
+  carry3 = h3 + (1 << 24); h4 += carry3 >> 25; h3 -= carry3 & kTop39Bits;
+  carry7 = h7 + (1 << 24); h8 += carry7 >> 25; h7 -= carry7 & kTop39Bits;
+
+  carry4 = h4 + (1 << 25); h5 += carry4 >> 26; h4 -= carry4 & kTop38Bits;
+  carry8 = h8 + (1 << 25); h9 += carry8 >> 26; h8 -= carry8 & kTop38Bits;
+
+  carry9 = h9 + (1 << 24); h0 += (carry9 >> 25) * 19; h9 -= carry9 & kTop39Bits;
+
+  carry0 = h0 + (1 << 25); h1 += carry0 >> 26; h0 -= carry0 & kTop38Bits;
+
+  h[0] = h0;
+  h[1] = h1;
+  h[2] = h2;
+  h[3] = h3;
+  h[4] = h4;
+  h[5] = h5;
+  h[6] = h6;
+  h[7] = h7;
+  h[8] = h8;
+  h[9] = h9;
+}
+
+static void fe_invert(fe out, const fe z) {
+  fe t0;
+  fe t1;
+  fe t2;
+  fe t3;
+  int i;
+
+  /*
+   * Compute z ** -1 = z ** (2 ** 255 - 19 - 2) with the exponent as
+   * 2 ** 255 - 21 = (2 ** 5) * (2 ** 250 - 1) + 11.
+   */
+
+  /* t0 = z ** 2 */
+  fe_sq(t0, z);
+
+  /* t1 = t0 ** (2 ** 2) = z ** 8 */
+  fe_sq(t1, t0);
+  fe_sq(t1, t1);
+
+  /* t1 = z * t1 = z ** 9 */
+  fe_mul(t1, z, t1);
+  /* t0 = t0 * t1 = z ** 11 -- stash t0 away for the end. */
+  fe_mul(t0, t0, t1);
+
+  /* t2 = t0 ** 2 = z ** 22 */
+  fe_sq(t2, t0);
+
+  /* t1 = t1 * t2 = z ** (2 ** 5 - 1) */
+  fe_mul(t1, t1, t2);
+
+  /* t2 = t1 ** (2 ** 5) = z ** ((2 ** 5) * (2 ** 5 - 1)) */
+  fe_sq(t2, t1);
+  for (i = 1; i < 5; ++i) {
+    fe_sq(t2, t2);
+  }
+
+  /* t1 = t1 * t2 = z ** ((2 ** 5 + 1) * (2 ** 5 - 1)) = z ** (2 ** 10 - 1) */
+  fe_mul(t1, t2, t1);
+
+  /* Continuing similarly... */
+
+  /* t2 = z ** (2 ** 20 - 1) */
+  fe_sq(t2, t1);
+  for (i = 1; i < 10; ++i) {
+    fe_sq(t2, t2);
+  }
+  fe_mul(t2, t2, t1);
+
+  /* t2 = z ** (2 ** 40 - 1) */
+  fe_sq(t3, t2);
+  for (i = 1; i < 20; ++i) {
+    fe_sq(t3, t3);
+  }
+  fe_mul(t2, t3, t2);
+
+  /* t2 = z ** (2 ** 10) * (2 ** 40 - 1) */
+  for (i = 0; i < 10; ++i) {
+    fe_sq(t2, t2);
+  }
+  /* t1 = z ** (2 ** 50 - 1) */
+  fe_mul(t1, t2, t1);
+
+  /* t2 = z ** (2 ** 100 - 1) */
+  fe_sq(t2, t1);
+  for (i = 1; i < 50; ++i) {
+    fe_sq(t2, t2);
+  }
+  fe_mul(t2, t2, t1);
+
+  /* t2 = z ** (2 ** 200 - 1) */
+  fe_sq(t3, t2);
+  for (i = 1; i < 100; ++i) {
+    fe_sq(t3, t3);
+  }
+  fe_mul(t2, t3, t2);
+
+  /* t2 = z ** ((2 ** 50) * (2 ** 200 - 1) */
+  fe_sq(t2, t2);
+  for (i = 1; i < 50; ++i) {
+    fe_sq(t2, t2);
+  }
+
+  /* t1 = z ** (2 ** 250 - 1) */
+  fe_mul(t1, t2, t1);
+
+  /* t1 = z ** ((2 ** 5) * (2 ** 250 - 1)) */
+  fe_sq(t1, t1);
+  for (i = 1; i < 5; ++i) {
+    fe_sq(t1, t1);
+  }
+
+  /* Recall t0 = z ** 11; out = z ** (2 ** 255 - 21) */
+  fe_mul(out, t1, t0);
+}
+
+/* h = -f
+ *
+ * Preconditions:
+ *    |f| bounded by 1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,etc.
+ *
+ * Postconditions:
+ *    |h| bounded by 1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,etc. */
+static void fe_neg(fe h, const fe f) {
+  unsigned i;
+  for (i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
+    h[i] = -f[i];
+  }
+}
+
+/* Replace (f,g) with (g,g) if b == 1;
+ * replace (f,g) with (f,g) if b == 0.
+ *
+ * Preconditions: b in {0,1}. */
+static void fe_cmov(fe f, const fe g, unsigned b) {
+  size_t i;
+  b = 0-b;
+  for (i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
+    int32_t x = f[i] ^ g[i];
+    x &= b;
+    f[i] ^= x;
+  }
+}
+
+/* h = 2 * f * f
+ * Can overlap h with f.
+ *
+ * Preconditions:
+ *    |f| bounded by 1.65*2^26,1.65*2^25,1.65*2^26,1.65*2^25,etc.
+ *
+ * Postconditions:
+ *    |h| bounded by 1.01*2^25,1.01*2^24,1.01*2^25,1.01*2^24,etc.
+ *
+ * See fe_mul.c for discussion of implementation strategy. */
+static void fe_sq2(fe h, const fe f) {
+  int32_t f0 = f[0];
+  int32_t f1 = f[1];
+  int32_t f2 = f[2];
+  int32_t f3 = f[3];
+  int32_t f4 = f[4];
+  int32_t f5 = f[5];
+  int32_t f6 = f[6];
+  int32_t f7 = f[7];
+  int32_t f8 = f[8];
+  int32_t f9 = f[9];
+  int32_t f0_2 = 2 * f0;
+  int32_t f1_2 = 2 * f1;
+  int32_t f2_2 = 2 * f2;
+  int32_t f3_2 = 2 * f3;
+  int32_t f4_2 = 2 * f4;
+  int32_t f5_2 = 2 * f5;
+  int32_t f6_2 = 2 * f6;
+  int32_t f7_2 = 2 * f7;
+  int32_t f5_38 = 38 * f5; /* 1.959375*2^30 */
+  int32_t f6_19 = 19 * f6; /* 1.959375*2^30 */
+  int32_t f7_38 = 38 * f7; /* 1.959375*2^30 */
+  int32_t f8_19 = 19 * f8; /* 1.959375*2^30 */
+  int32_t f9_38 = 38 * f9; /* 1.959375*2^30 */
+  int64_t f0f0    = f0   * (int64_t) f0;
+  int64_t f0f1_2  = f0_2 * (int64_t) f1;
+  int64_t f0f2_2  = f0_2 * (int64_t) f2;
+  int64_t f0f3_2  = f0_2 * (int64_t) f3;
+  int64_t f0f4_2  = f0_2 * (int64_t) f4;
+  int64_t f0f5_2  = f0_2 * (int64_t) f5;
+  int64_t f0f6_2  = f0_2 * (int64_t) f6;
+  int64_t f0f7_2  = f0_2 * (int64_t) f7;
+  int64_t f0f8_2  = f0_2 * (int64_t) f8;
+  int64_t f0f9_2  = f0_2 * (int64_t) f9;
+  int64_t f1f1_2  = f1_2 * (int64_t) f1;
+  int64_t f1f2_2  = f1_2 * (int64_t) f2;
+  int64_t f1f3_4  = f1_2 * (int64_t) f3_2;
+  int64_t f1f4_2  = f1_2 * (int64_t) f4;
+  int64_t f1f5_4  = f1_2 * (int64_t) f5_2;
+  int64_t f1f6_2  = f1_2 * (int64_t) f6;
+  int64_t f1f7_4  = f1_2 * (int64_t) f7_2;
+  int64_t f1f8_2  = f1_2 * (int64_t) f8;
+  int64_t f1f9_76 = f1_2 * (int64_t) f9_38;
+  int64_t f2f2    = f2   * (int64_t) f2;
+  int64_t f2f3_2  = f2_2 * (int64_t) f3;
+  int64_t f2f4_2  = f2_2 * (int64_t) f4;
+  int64_t f2f5_2  = f2_2 * (int64_t) f5;
+  int64_t f2f6_2  = f2_2 * (int64_t) f6;
+  int64_t f2f7_2  = f2_2 * (int64_t) f7;
+  int64_t f2f8_38 = f2_2 * (int64_t) f8_19;
+  int64_t f2f9_38 = f2   * (int64_t) f9_38;
+  int64_t f3f3_2  = f3_2 * (int64_t) f3;
+  int64_t f3f4_2  = f3_2 * (int64_t) f4;
+  int64_t f3f5_4  = f3_2 * (int64_t) f5_2;
+  int64_t f3f6_2  = f3_2 * (int64_t) f6;
+  int64_t f3f7_76 = f3_2 * (int64_t) f7_38;
+  int64_t f3f8_38 = f3_2 * (int64_t) f8_19;
+  int64_t f3f9_76 = f3_2 * (int64_t) f9_38;
+  int64_t f4f4    = f4   * (int64_t) f4;
+  int64_t f4f5_2  = f4_2 * (int64_t) f5;
+  int64_t f4f6_38 = f4_2 * (int64_t) f6_19;
+  int64_t f4f7_38 = f4   * (int64_t) f7_38;
+  int64_t f4f8_38 = f4_2 * (int64_t) f8_19;
+  int64_t f4f9_38 = f4   * (int64_t) f9_38;
+  int64_t f5f5_38 = f5   * (int64_t) f5_38;
+  int64_t f5f6_38 = f5_2 * (int64_t) f6_19;
+  int64_t f5f7_76 = f5_2 * (int64_t) f7_38;
+  int64_t f5f8_38 = f5_2 * (int64_t) f8_19;
+  int64_t f5f9_76 = f5_2 * (int64_t) f9_38;
+  int64_t f6f6_19 = f6   * (int64_t) f6_19;
+  int64_t f6f7_38 = f6   * (int64_t) f7_38;
+  int64_t f6f8_38 = f6_2 * (int64_t) f8_19;
+  int64_t f6f9_38 = f6   * (int64_t) f9_38;
+  int64_t f7f7_38 = f7   * (int64_t) f7_38;
+  int64_t f7f8_38 = f7_2 * (int64_t) f8_19;
+  int64_t f7f9_76 = f7_2 * (int64_t) f9_38;
+  int64_t f8f8_19 = f8   * (int64_t) f8_19;
+  int64_t f8f9_38 = f8   * (int64_t) f9_38;
+  int64_t f9f9_38 = f9   * (int64_t) f9_38;
+  int64_t h0 = f0f0  +f1f9_76+f2f8_38+f3f7_76+f4f6_38+f5f5_38;
+  int64_t h1 = f0f1_2+f2f9_38+f3f8_38+f4f7_38+f5f6_38;
+  int64_t h2 = f0f2_2+f1f1_2 +f3f9_76+f4f8_38+f5f7_76+f6f6_19;
+  int64_t h3 = f0f3_2+f1f2_2 +f4f9_38+f5f8_38+f6f7_38;
+  int64_t h4 = f0f4_2+f1f3_4 +f2f2   +f5f9_76+f6f8_38+f7f7_38;
+  int64_t h5 = f0f5_2+f1f4_2 +f2f3_2 +f6f9_38+f7f8_38;
+  int64_t h6 = f0f6_2+f1f5_4 +f2f4_2 +f3f3_2 +f7f9_76+f8f8_19;
+  int64_t h7 = f0f7_2+f1f6_2 +f2f5_2 +f3f4_2 +f8f9_38;
+  int64_t h8 = f0f8_2+f1f7_4 +f2f6_2 +f3f5_4 +f4f4   +f9f9_38;
+  int64_t h9 = f0f9_2+f1f8_2 +f2f7_2 +f3f6_2 +f4f5_2;
+  int64_t carry0;
+  int64_t carry1;
+  int64_t carry2;
+  int64_t carry3;
+  int64_t carry4;
+  int64_t carry5;
+  int64_t carry6;
+  int64_t carry7;
+  int64_t carry8;
+  int64_t carry9;
+
+  h0 += h0;
+  h1 += h1;
+  h2 += h2;
+  h3 += h3;
+  h4 += h4;
+  h5 += h5;
+  h6 += h6;
+  h7 += h7;
+  h8 += h8;
+  h9 += h9;
+
+  carry0 = h0 + (1 << 25); h1 += carry0 >> 26; h0 -= carry0 & kTop38Bits;
+  carry4 = h4 + (1 << 25); h5 += carry4 >> 26; h4 -= carry4 & kTop38Bits;
+
+  carry1 = h1 + (1 << 24); h2 += carry1 >> 25; h1 -= carry1 & kTop39Bits;
+  carry5 = h5 + (1 << 24); h6 += carry5 >> 25; h5 -= carry5 & kTop39Bits;
+
+  carry2 = h2 + (1 << 25); h3 += carry2 >> 26; h2 -= carry2 & kTop38Bits;
+  carry6 = h6 + (1 << 25); h7 += carry6 >> 26; h6 -= carry6 & kTop38Bits;
+
+  carry3 = h3 + (1 << 24); h4 += carry3 >> 25; h3 -= carry3 & kTop39Bits;
+  carry7 = h7 + (1 << 24); h8 += carry7 >> 25; h7 -= carry7 & kTop39Bits;
+
+  carry4 = h4 + (1 << 25); h5 += carry4 >> 26; h4 -= carry4 & kTop38Bits;
+  carry8 = h8 + (1 << 25); h9 += carry8 >> 26; h8 -= carry8 & kTop38Bits;
+
+  carry9 = h9 + (1 << 24); h0 += (carry9 >> 25) * 19; h9 -= carry9 & kTop39Bits;
+
+  carry0 = h0 + (1 << 25); h1 += carry0 >> 26; h0 -= carry0 & kTop38Bits;
+
+  h[0] = h0;
+  h[1] = h1;
+  h[2] = h2;
+  h[3] = h3;
+  h[4] = h4;
+  h[5] = h5;
+  h[6] = h6;
+  h[7] = h7;
+  h[8] = h8;
+  h[9] = h9;
+}
+
+/* ge means group element.
+
+ * Here the group is the set of pairs (x,y) of field elements (see fe.h)
+ * satisfying -x^2 + y^2 = 1 + d x^2y^2
+ * where d = -121665/121666.
+ *
+ * Representations:
+ *   ge_p2 (projective): (X:Y:Z) satisfying x=X/Z, y=Y/Z
+ *   ge_p3 (extended): (X:Y:Z:T) satisfying x=X/Z, y=Y/Z, XY=ZT
+ *   ge_p1p1 (completed): ((X:Z),(Y:T)) satisfying x=X/Z, y=Y/T
+ *   ge_precomp (Duif): (y+x,y-x,2dxy) */
+
+typedef struct {
+  fe X;
+  fe Y;
+  fe Z;
+} ge_p2;
+
+typedef struct {
+  fe X;
+  fe Y;
+  fe Z;
+  fe T;
+} ge_p3;
+
+typedef struct {
+  fe X;
+  fe Y;
+  fe Z;
+  fe T;
+} ge_p1p1;
+
+typedef struct {
+  fe yplusx;
+  fe yminusx;
+  fe xy2d;
+} ge_precomp;
+
+typedef struct {
+  fe YplusX;
+  fe YminusX;
+  fe Z;
+  fe T2d;
+} ge_cached;
+
+static void ge_p3_0(ge_p3 *h) {
+  fe_0(h->X);
+  fe_1(h->Y);
+  fe_1(h->Z);
+  fe_0(h->T);
+}
+
+static void ge_precomp_0(ge_precomp *h) {
+  fe_1(h->yplusx);
+  fe_1(h->yminusx);
+  fe_0(h->xy2d);
+}
+
+/* r = p */
+static void ge_p3_to_p2(ge_p2 *r, const ge_p3 *p) {
+  fe_copy(r->X, p->X);
+  fe_copy(r->Y, p->Y);
+  fe_copy(r->Z, p->Z);
+}
+
+/* r = p */
+static void ge_p1p1_to_p2(ge_p2 *r, const ge_p1p1 *p) {
+  fe_mul(r->X, p->X, p->T);
+  fe_mul(r->Y, p->Y, p->Z);
+  fe_mul(r->Z, p->Z, p->T);
+}
+
+/* r = p */
+static void ge_p1p1_to_p3(ge_p3 *r, const ge_p1p1 *p) {
+  fe_mul(r->X, p->X, p->T);
+  fe_mul(r->Y, p->Y, p->Z);
+  fe_mul(r->Z, p->Z, p->T);
+  fe_mul(r->T, p->X, p->Y);
+}
+
+/* r = 2 * p */
+static void ge_p2_dbl(ge_p1p1 *r, const ge_p2 *p) {
+  fe t0;
+
+  fe_sq(r->X, p->X);
+  fe_sq(r->Z, p->Y);
+  fe_sq2(r->T, p->Z);
+  fe_add(r->Y, p->X, p->Y);
+  fe_sq(t0, r->Y);
+  fe_add(r->Y, r->Z, r->X);
+  fe_sub(r->Z, r->Z, r->X);
+  fe_sub(r->X, t0, r->Y);
+  fe_sub(r->T, r->T, r->Z);
+}
+
+/* r = 2 * p */
+static void ge_p3_dbl(ge_p1p1 *r, const ge_p3 *p) {
+  ge_p2 q;
+  ge_p3_to_p2(&q, p);
+  ge_p2_dbl(r, &q);
+}
+
+/* r = p + q */
+static void ge_madd(ge_p1p1 *r, const ge_p3 *p, const ge_precomp *q) {
+  fe t0;
+
+  fe_add(r->X, p->Y, p->X);
+  fe_sub(r->Y, p->Y, p->X);
+  fe_mul(r->Z, r->X, q->yplusx);
+  fe_mul(r->Y, r->Y, q->yminusx);
+  fe_mul(r->T, q->xy2d, p->T);
+  fe_add(t0, p->Z, p->Z);
+  fe_sub(r->X, r->Z, r->Y);
+  fe_add(r->Y, r->Z, r->Y);
+  fe_add(r->Z, t0, r->T);
+  fe_sub(r->T, t0, r->T);
+}
+
+static uint8_t equal(signed char b, signed char c) {
+  uint8_t ub = b;
+  uint8_t uc = c;
+  uint8_t x = ub ^ uc; /* 0: yes; 1..255: no */
+  uint32_t y = x;      /* 0: yes; 1..255: no */
+  y -= 1;              /* 4294967295: yes; 0..254: no */
+  y >>= 31;            /* 1: yes; 0: no */
+  return y;
+}
+
+static void cmov(ge_precomp *t, const ge_precomp *u, uint8_t b) {
+  fe_cmov(t->yplusx, u->yplusx, b);
+  fe_cmov(t->yminusx, u->yminusx, b);
+  fe_cmov(t->xy2d, u->xy2d, b);
+}
+
+/* k25519Precomp[i][j] = (j+1)*256^i*B */
+static const ge_precomp k25519Precomp[32][8] = {
+    {
+        {
+            {25967493, -14356035, 29566456, 3660896, -12694345, 4014787,
+             27544626, -11754271, -6079156, 2047605},
+            {-12545711, 934262, -2722910, 3049990, -727428, 9406986, 12720692,
+             5043384, 19500929, -15469378},
+            {-8738181, 4489570, 9688441, -14785194, 10184609, -12363380,
+             29287919, 11864899, -24514362, -4438546},
+        },
+        {
+            {-12815894, -12976347, -21581243, 11784320, -25355658, -2750717,
+             -11717903, -3814571, -358445, -10211303},
+            {-21703237, 6903825, 27185491, 6451973, -29577724, -9554005,
+             -15616551, 11189268, -26829678, -5319081},
+            {26966642, 11152617, 32442495, 15396054, 14353839, -12752335,
+             -3128826, -9541118, -15472047, -4166697},
+        },
+        {
+            {15636291, -9688557, 24204773, -7912398, 616977, -16685262,
+             27787600, -14772189, 28944400, -1550024},
+            {16568933, 4717097, -11556148, -1102322, 15682896, -11807043,
+             16354577, -11775962, 7689662, 11199574},
+            {30464156, -5976125, -11779434, -15670865, 23220365, 15915852,
+             7512774, 10017326, -17749093, -9920357},
+        },
+        {
+            {-17036878, 13921892, 10945806, -6033431, 27105052, -16084379,
+             -28926210, 15006023, 3284568, -6276540},
+            {23599295, -8306047, -11193664, -7687416, 13236774, 10506355,
+             7464579, 9656445, 13059162, 10374397},
+            {7798556, 16710257, 3033922, 2874086, 28997861, 2835604, 32406664,
+             -3839045, -641708, -101325},
+        },
+        {
+            {10861363, 11473154, 27284546, 1981175, -30064349, 12577861,
+             32867885, 14515107, -15438304, 10819380},
+            {4708026, 6336745, 20377586, 9066809, -11272109, 6594696, -25653668,
+             12483688, -12668491, 5581306},
+            {19563160, 16186464, -29386857, 4097519, 10237984, -4348115,
+             28542350, 13850243, -23678021, -15815942},
+        },
+        {
+            {-15371964, -12862754, 32573250, 4720197, -26436522, 5875511,
+             -19188627, -15224819, -9818940, -12085777},
+            {-8549212, 109983, 15149363, 2178705, 22900618, 4543417, 3044240,
+             -15689887, 1762328, 14866737},
+            {-18199695, -15951423, -10473290, 1707278, -17185920, 3916101,
+             -28236412, 3959421, 27914454, 4383652},
+        },
+        {
+            {5153746, 9909285, 1723747, -2777874, 30523605, 5516873, 19480852,
+             5230134, -23952439, -15175766},
+            {-30269007, -3463509, 7665486, 10083793, 28475525, 1649722,
+             20654025, 16520125, 30598449, 7715701},
+            {28881845, 14381568, 9657904, 3680757, -20181635, 7843316,
+             -31400660, 1370708, 29794553, -1409300},
+        },
+        {
+            {14499471, -2729599, -33191113, -4254652, 28494862, 14271267,
+             30290735, 10876454, -33154098, 2381726},
+            {-7195431, -2655363, -14730155, 462251, -27724326, 3941372,
+             -6236617, 3696005, -32300832, 15351955},
+            {27431194, 8222322, 16448760, -3907995, -18707002, 11938355,
+             -32961401, -2970515, 29551813, 10109425},
+        },
+    },
+    {
+        {
+            {-13657040, -13155431, -31283750, 11777098, 21447386, 6519384,
+             -2378284, -1627556, 10092783, -4764171},
+            {27939166, 14210322, 4677035, 16277044, -22964462, -12398139,
+             -32508754, 12005538, -17810127, 12803510},
+            {17228999, -15661624, -1233527, 300140, -1224870, -11714777,
+             30364213, -9038194, 18016357, 4397660},
+        },
+        {
+            {-10958843, -7690207, 4776341, -14954238, 27850028, -15602212,
+             -26619106, 14544525, -17477504, 982639},
+            {29253598, 15796703, -2863982, -9908884, 10057023, 3163536, 7332899,
+             -4120128, -21047696, 9934963},
+            {5793303, 16271923, -24131614, -10116404, 29188560, 1206517,
+             -14747930, 4559895, -30123922, -10897950},
+        },
+        {
+            {-27643952, -11493006, 16282657, -11036493, 28414021, -15012264,
+             24191034, 4541697, -13338309, 5500568},
+            {12650548, -1497113, 9052871, 11355358, -17680037, -8400164,
+             -17430592, 12264343, 10874051, 13524335},
+            {25556948, -3045990, 714651, 2510400, 23394682, -10415330, 33119038,
+             5080568, -22528059, 5376628},
+        },
+        {
+            {-26088264, -4011052, -17013699, -3537628, -6726793, 1920897,
+             -22321305, -9447443, 4535768, 1569007},
+            {-2255422, 14606630, -21692440, -8039818, 28430649, 8775819,
+             -30494562, 3044290, 31848280, 12543772},
+            {-22028579, 2943893, -31857513, 6777306, 13784462, -4292203,
+             -27377195, -2062731, 7718482, 14474653},
+        },
+        {
+            {2385315, 2454213, -22631320, 46603, -4437935, -15680415, 656965,
+             -7236665, 24316168, -5253567},
+            {13741529, 10911568, -33233417, -8603737, -20177830, -1033297,
+             33040651, -13424532, -20729456, 8321686},
+            {21060490, -2212744, 15712757, -4336099, 1639040, 10656336,
+             23845965, -11874838, -9984458, 608372},
+        },
+        {
+            {-13672732, -15087586, -10889693, -7557059, -6036909, 11305547,
+             1123968, -6780577, 27229399, 23887},
+            {-23244140, -294205, -11744728, 14712571, -29465699, -2029617,
+             12797024, -6440308, -1633405, 16678954},
+            {-29500620, 4770662, -16054387, 14001338, 7830047, 9564805,
+             -1508144, -4795045, -17169265, 4904953},
+        },
+        {
+            {24059557, 14617003, 19037157, -15039908, 19766093, -14906429,
+             5169211, 16191880, 2128236, -4326833},
+            {-16981152, 4124966, -8540610, -10653797, 30336522, -14105247,
+             -29806336, 916033, -6882542, -2986532},
+            {-22630907, 12419372, -7134229, -7473371, -16478904, 16739175,
+             285431, 2763829, 15736322, 4143876},
+        },
+        {
+            {2379352, 11839345, -4110402, -5988665, 11274298, 794957, 212801,
+             -14594663, 23527084, -16458268},
+            {33431127, -11130478, -17838966, -15626900, 8909499, 8376530,
+             -32625340, 4087881, -15188911, -14416214},
+            {1767683, 7197987, -13205226, -2022635, -13091350, 448826, 5799055,
+             4357868, -4774191, -16323038},
+        },
+    },
+    {
+        {
+            {6721966, 13833823, -23523388, -1551314, 26354293, -11863321,
+             23365147, -3949732, 7390890, 2759800},
+            {4409041, 2052381, 23373853, 10530217, 7676779, -12885954, 21302353,
+             -4264057, 1244380, -12919645},
+            {-4421239, 7169619, 4982368, -2957590, 30256825, -2777540, 14086413,
+             9208236, 15886429, 16489664},
+        },
+        {
+            {1996075, 10375649, 14346367, 13311202, -6874135, -16438411,
+             -13693198, 398369, -30606455, -712933},
+            {-25307465, 9795880, -2777414, 14878809, -33531835, 14780363,
+             13348553, 12076947, -30836462, 5113182},
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+        {
+            {-20045281, 5454097, -14346548, 6447146, 28862071, 1883651,
+             -2469266, -4141880, 7770569, 9620597},
+            {23208068, 7979712, 33071466, 8149229, 1758231, -10834995, 30945528,
+             -1694323, -33502340, -14767970},
+            {1439958, -16270480, -1079989, -793782, 4625402, 10647766, -5043801,
+             1220118, 30494170, -11440799},
+        },
+        {
+            {-5037580, -13028295, -2970559, -3061767, 15640974, -6701666,
+             -26739026, 926050, -1684339, -13333647},
+            {13908495, -3549272, 30919928, -6273825, -21521863, 7989039,
+             9021034, 9078865, 3353509, 4033511},
+            {-29663431, -15113610, 32259991, -344482, 24295849, -12912123,
+             23161163, 8839127, 27485041, 7356032},
+        },
+    },
+    {
+        {
+            {9661027, 705443, 11980065, -5370154, -1628543, 14661173, -6346142,
+             2625015, 28431036, -16771834},
+            {-23839233, -8311415, -25945511, 7480958, -17681669, -8354183,
+             -22545972, 14150565, 15970762, 4099461},
+            {29262576, 16756590, 26350592, -8793563, 8529671, -11208050,
+             13617293, -9937143, 11465739, 8317062},
+        },
+        {
+            {-25493081, -6962928, 32500200, -9419051, -23038724, -2302222,
+             14898637, 3848455, 20969334, -5157516},
+            {-20384450, -14347713, -18336405, 13884722, -33039454, 2842114,
+             -21610826, -3649888, 11177095, 14989547},
+            {-24496721, -11716016, 16959896, 2278463, 12066309, 10137771,
+             13515641, 2581286, -28487508, 9930240},
+        },
+        {
+            {-17751622, -2097826, 16544300, -13009300, -15914807, -14949081,
+             18345767, -13403753, 16291481, -5314038},
+            {-33229194, 2553288, 32678213, 9875984, 8534129, 6889387, -9676774,
+             6957617, 4368891, 9788741},
+            {16660756, 7281060, -10830758, 12911820, 20108584, -8101676,
+             -21722536, -8613148, 16250552, -11111103},
+        },
+        {
+            {-19765507, 2390526, -16551031, 14161980, 1905286, 6414907, 4689584,
+             10604807, -30190403, 4782747},
+            {-1354539, 14736941, -7367442, -13292886, 7710542, -14155590,
+             -9981571, 4383045, 22546403, 437323},
+            {31665577, -12180464, -16186830, 1491339, -18368625, 3294682,
+             27343084, 2786261, -30633590, -14097016},
+        },
+        {
+            {-14467279, -683715, -33374107, 7448552, 19294360, 14334329,
+             -19690631, 2355319, -19284671, -6114373},
+            {15121312, -15796162, 6377020, -6031361, -10798111, -12957845,
+             18952177, 15496498, -29380133, 11754228},
+            {-2637277, -13483075, 8488727, -14303896, 12728761, -1622493,
+             7141596, 11724556, 22761615, -10134141},
+        },
+        {
+            {16918416, 11729663, -18083579, 3022987, -31015732, -13339659,
+             -28741185, -12227393, 32851222, 11717399},
+            {11166634, 7338049, -6722523, 4531520, -29468672, -7302055,
+             31474879, 3483633, -1193175, -4030831},
+            {-185635, 9921305, 31456609, -13536438, -12013818, 13348923,
+             33142652, 6546660, -19985279, -3948376},
+        },
+        {
+            {-32460596, 11266712, -11197107, -7899103, 31703694, 3855903,
+             -8537131, -12833048, -30772034, -15486313},
+            {-18006477, 12709068, 3991746, -6479188, -21491523, -10550425,
+             -31135347, -16049879, 10928917, 3011958},
+            {-6957757, -15594337, 31696059, 334240, 29576716, 14796075,
+             -30831056, -12805180, 18008031, 10258577},
+        },
+        {
+            {-22448644, 15655569, 7018479, -4410003, -30314266, -1201591,
+             -1853465, 1367120, 25127874, 6671743},
+            {29701166, -14373934, -10878120, 9279288, -17568, 13127210,
+             21382910, 11042292, 25838796, 4642684},
+            {-20430234, 14955537, -24126347, 8124619, -5369288, -5990470,
+             30468147, -13900640, 18423289, 4177476},
+        },
+    },
+};
+
+static uint8_t negative(signed char b) {
+  uint32_t x = b;
+  x >>= 31; /* 1: yes; 0: no */
+  return x;
+}
+
+static void table_select(ge_precomp *t, int pos, signed char b) {
+  ge_precomp minust;
+  uint8_t bnegative = negative(b);
+  uint8_t babs = b - ((uint8_t)((-bnegative) & b) << 1);
+
+  ge_precomp_0(t);
+  cmov(t, &k25519Precomp[pos][0], equal(babs, 1));
+  cmov(t, &k25519Precomp[pos][1], equal(babs, 2));
+  cmov(t, &k25519Precomp[pos][2], equal(babs, 3));
+  cmov(t, &k25519Precomp[pos][3], equal(babs, 4));
+  cmov(t, &k25519Precomp[pos][4], equal(babs, 5));
+  cmov(t, &k25519Precomp[pos][5], equal(babs, 6));
+  cmov(t, &k25519Precomp[pos][6], equal(babs, 7));
+  cmov(t, &k25519Precomp[pos][7], equal(babs, 8));
+  fe_copy(minust.yplusx, t->yminusx);
+  fe_copy(minust.yminusx, t->yplusx);
+  fe_neg(minust.xy2d, t->xy2d);
+  cmov(t, &minust, bnegative);
+}
+
+/* h = a * B
+ * where a = a[0]+256*a[1]+...+256^31 a[31]
+ * B is the Ed25519 base point (x,4/5) with x positive.
+ *
+ * Preconditions:
+ *   a[31] <= 127 */
+static void ge_scalarmult_base(ge_p3 *h, const uint8_t *a) {
+  signed char e[64];
+  signed char carry;
+  ge_p1p1 r;
+  ge_p2 s;
+  ge_precomp t;
+  int i;
+
+  for (i = 0; i < 32; ++i) {
+    e[2 * i + 0] = (a[i] >> 0) & 15;
+    e[2 * i + 1] = (a[i] >> 4) & 15;
+  }
+  /* each e[i] is between 0 and 15 */
+  /* e[63] is between 0 and 7 */
+
+  carry = 0;
+  for (i = 0; i < 63; ++i) {
+    e[i] += carry;
+    carry = e[i] + 8;
+    carry >>= 4;
+    e[i] -= carry << 4;
+  }
+  e[63] += carry;
+  /* each e[i] is between -8 and 8 */
+
+  ge_p3_0(h);
+  for (i = 1; i < 64; i += 2) {
+    table_select(&t, i / 2, e[i]);
+    ge_madd(&r, h, &t);
+    ge_p1p1_to_p3(h, &r);
+  }
+
+  ge_p3_dbl(&r, h);
+  ge_p1p1_to_p2(&s, &r);
+  ge_p2_dbl(&r, &s);
+  ge_p1p1_to_p2(&s, &r);
+  ge_p2_dbl(&r, &s);
+  ge_p1p1_to_p2(&s, &r);
+  ge_p2_dbl(&r, &s);
+  ge_p1p1_to_p3(h, &r);
+
+  for (i = 0; i < 64; i += 2) {
+    table_select(&t, i / 2, e[i]);
+    ge_madd(&r, h, &t);
+    ge_p1p1_to_p3(h, &r);
+  }
+
+  OPENSSL_cleanse(e, sizeof(e));
+}
+
+/* Replace (f,g) with (g,f) if b == 1;
+ * replace (f,g) with (f,g) if b == 0.
+ *
+ * Preconditions: b in {0,1}. */
+static void fe_cswap(fe f, fe g, unsigned int b) {
+  size_t i;
+  b = 0-b;
+  for (i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
+    int32_t x = f[i] ^ g[i];
+    x &= b;
+    f[i] ^= x;
+    g[i] ^= x;
+  }
+}
+
+/* h = f * 121666
+ * Can overlap h with f.
+ *
+ * Preconditions:
+ *    |f| bounded by 1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,etc.
+ *
+ * Postconditions:
+ *    |h| bounded by 1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,etc. */
+static void fe_mul121666(fe h, fe f) {
+  int32_t f0 = f[0];
+  int32_t f1 = f[1];
+  int32_t f2 = f[2];
+  int32_t f3 = f[3];
+  int32_t f4 = f[4];
+  int32_t f5 = f[5];
+  int32_t f6 = f[6];
+  int32_t f7 = f[7];
+  int32_t f8 = f[8];
+  int32_t f9 = f[9];
+  int64_t h0 = f0 * (int64_t) 121666;
+  int64_t h1 = f1 * (int64_t) 121666;
+  int64_t h2 = f2 * (int64_t) 121666;
+  int64_t h3 = f3 * (int64_t) 121666;
+  int64_t h4 = f4 * (int64_t) 121666;
+  int64_t h5 = f5 * (int64_t) 121666;
+  int64_t h6 = f6 * (int64_t) 121666;
+  int64_t h7 = f7 * (int64_t) 121666;
+  int64_t h8 = f8 * (int64_t) 121666;
+  int64_t h9 = f9 * (int64_t) 121666;
+  int64_t carry0;
+  int64_t carry1;
+  int64_t carry2;
+  int64_t carry3;
+  int64_t carry4;
+  int64_t carry5;
+  int64_t carry6;
+  int64_t carry7;
+  int64_t carry8;
+  int64_t carry9;
+
+  carry9 = h9 + (1 << 24); h0 += (carry9 >> 25) * 19; h9 -= carry9 & kTop39Bits;
+  carry1 = h1 + (1 << 24); h2 += carry1 >> 25; h1 -= carry1 & kTop39Bits;
+  carry3 = h3 + (1 << 24); h4 += carry3 >> 25; h3 -= carry3 & kTop39Bits;
+  carry5 = h5 + (1 << 24); h6 += carry5 >> 25; h5 -= carry5 & kTop39Bits;
+  carry7 = h7 + (1 << 24); h8 += carry7 >> 25; h7 -= carry7 & kTop39Bits;
+
+  carry0 = h0 + (1 << 25); h1 += carry0 >> 26; h0 -= carry0 & kTop38Bits;
+  carry2 = h2 + (1 << 25); h3 += carry2 >> 26; h2 -= carry2 & kTop38Bits;
+  carry4 = h4 + (1 << 25); h5 += carry4 >> 26; h4 -= carry4 & kTop38Bits;
+  carry6 = h6 + (1 << 25); h7 += carry6 >> 26; h6 -= carry6 & kTop38Bits;
+  carry8 = h8 + (1 << 25); h9 += carry8 >> 26; h8 -= carry8 & kTop38Bits;
+
+  h[0] = h0;
+  h[1] = h1;
+  h[2] = h2;
+  h[3] = h3;
+  h[4] = h4;
+  h[5] = h5;
+  h[6] = h6;
+  h[7] = h7;
+  h[8] = h8;
+  h[9] = h9;
+}
+
+static void x25519_scalar_mult_generic(uint8_t out[32],
+                                       const uint8_t scalar[32],
+                                       const uint8_t point[32]) {
+  fe x1, x2, z2, x3, z3, tmp0, tmp1;
+  uint8_t e[32];
+  unsigned swap = 0;
+  int pos;
+
+  memcpy(e, scalar, 32);
+  e[0] &= 248;
+  e[31] &= 127;
+  e[31] |= 64;
+  fe_frombytes(x1, point);
+  fe_1(x2);
+  fe_0(z2);
+  fe_copy(x3, x1);
+  fe_1(z3);
+
+  for (pos = 254; pos >= 0; --pos) {
+    unsigned b = 1 & (e[pos / 8] >> (pos & 7));
+    swap ^= b;
+    fe_cswap(x2, x3, swap);
+    fe_cswap(z2, z3, swap);
+    swap = b;
+    fe_sub(tmp0, x3, z3);
+    fe_sub(tmp1, x2, z2);
+    fe_add(x2, x2, z2);
+    fe_add(z2, x3, z3);
+    fe_mul(z3, tmp0, x2);
+    fe_mul(z2, z2, tmp1);
+    fe_sq(tmp0, tmp1);
+    fe_sq(tmp1, x2);
+    fe_add(x3, z3, z2);
+    fe_sub(z2, z3, z2);
+    fe_mul(x2, tmp1, tmp0);
+    fe_sub(tmp1, tmp1, tmp0);
+    fe_sq(z2, z2);
+    fe_mul121666(z3, tmp1);
+    fe_sq(x3, x3);
+    fe_add(tmp0, tmp0, z3);
+    fe_mul(z3, x1, z2);
+    fe_mul(z2, tmp1, tmp0);
+  }
+  fe_cswap(x2, x3, swap);
+  fe_cswap(z2, z3, swap);
+
+  fe_invert(z2, z2);
+  fe_mul(x2, x2, z2);
+  fe_tobytes(out, x2);
+
+  OPENSSL_cleanse(e, sizeof(e));
+}
+
+static void x25519_scalar_mult(uint8_t out[32], const uint8_t scalar[32],
+                               const uint8_t point[32]) {
+  x25519_scalar_mult_generic(out, scalar, point);
+}
+
+int X25519(uint8_t out_shared_key[32], const uint8_t private_key[32],
+           const uint8_t peer_public_value[32]) {
+  static const uint8_t kZeros[32] = {0};
+  x25519_scalar_mult(out_shared_key, private_key, peer_public_value);
+  /* The all-zero output results when the input is a point of small order. */
+  return CRYPTO_memcmp(kZeros, out_shared_key, 32) != 0;
+}
+
+void X25519_public_from_private(uint8_t out_public_value[32],
+                                const uint8_t private_key[32]) {
+  uint8_t e[32];
+  ge_p3 A;
+  fe zplusy, zminusy, zminusy_inv;
+
+  memcpy(e, private_key, 32);
+  e[0] &= 248;
+  e[31] &= 127;
+  e[31] |= 64;
+
+  ge_scalarmult_base(&A, e);
+
+  /* We only need the u-coordinate of the curve25519 point. The map is
+   * u=(y+1)/(1-y). Since y=Y/Z, this gives u=(Z+Y)/(Z-Y). */
+  fe_add(zplusy, A.Z, A.Y);
+  fe_sub(zminusy, A.Z, A.Y);
+  fe_invert(zminusy_inv, zminusy);
+  fe_mul(zplusy, zplusy, zminusy_inv);
+  fe_tobytes(out_public_value, zplusy);
+
+  OPENSSL_cleanse(e, sizeof(e));
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ec2_mult.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ec2_mult.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e4a1ec5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ec2_mult.c
@@ -0,0 +1,418 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ *
+ * The Elliptic Curve Public-Key Crypto Library (ECC Code) included
+ * herein is developed by SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and is contributed
+ * to the OpenSSL project.
+ *
+ * The ECC Code is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license provided below.
+ *
+ * The software is originally written by Sheueling Chang Shantz and
+ * Douglas Stebila of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+#include "internal/bn_int.h"
+#include "ec_lcl.h"
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+
+/*-
+ * Compute the x-coordinate x/z for the point 2*(x/z) in Montgomery projective
+ * coordinates.
+ * Uses algorithm Mdouble in appendix of
+ *     Lopez, J. and Dahab, R.  "Fast multiplication on elliptic curves over
+ *     GF(2^m) without precomputation" (CHES '99, LNCS 1717).
+ * modified to not require precomputation of c=b^{2^{m-1}}.
+ */
+static int gf2m_Mdouble(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *x, BIGNUM *z,
+                        BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    BIGNUM *t1;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    /* Since Mdouble is static we can guarantee that ctx != NULL. */
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    t1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (t1 == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!group->meth->field_sqr(group, x, x, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    if (!group->meth->field_sqr(group, t1, z, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, z, x, t1, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    if (!group->meth->field_sqr(group, x, x, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    if (!group->meth->field_sqr(group, t1, t1, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, t1, group->b, t1, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    if (!BN_GF2m_add(x, x, t1))
+        goto err;
+
+    ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Compute the x-coordinate x1/z1 for the point (x1/z1)+(x2/x2) in Montgomery
+ * projective coordinates.
+ * Uses algorithm Madd in appendix of
+ *     Lopez, J. and Dahab, R.  "Fast multiplication on elliptic curves over
+ *     GF(2^m) without precomputation" (CHES '99, LNCS 1717).
+ */
+static int gf2m_Madd(const EC_GROUP *group, const BIGNUM *x, BIGNUM *x1,
+                     BIGNUM *z1, const BIGNUM *x2, const BIGNUM *z2,
+                     BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    BIGNUM *t1, *t2;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    /* Since Madd is static we can guarantee that ctx != NULL. */
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    t1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    t2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (t2 == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!BN_copy(t1, x))
+        goto err;
+    if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, x1, x1, z2, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, z1, z1, x2, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, t2, x1, z1, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    if (!BN_GF2m_add(z1, z1, x1))
+        goto err;
+    if (!group->meth->field_sqr(group, z1, z1, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, x1, z1, t1, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    if (!BN_GF2m_add(x1, x1, t2))
+        goto err;
+
+    ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Compute the x, y affine coordinates from the point (x1, z1) (x2, z2)
+ * using Montgomery point multiplication algorithm Mxy() in appendix of
+ *     Lopez, J. and Dahab, R.  "Fast multiplication on elliptic curves over
+ *     GF(2^m) without precomputation" (CHES '99, LNCS 1717).
+ * Returns:
+ *     0 on error
+ *     1 if return value should be the point at infinity
+ *     2 otherwise
+ */
+static int gf2m_Mxy(const EC_GROUP *group, const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y,
+                    BIGNUM *x1, BIGNUM *z1, BIGNUM *x2, BIGNUM *z2,
+                    BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    BIGNUM *t3, *t4, *t5;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    if (BN_is_zero(z1)) {
+        BN_zero(x2);
+        BN_zero(z2);
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    if (BN_is_zero(z2)) {
+        if (!BN_copy(x2, x))
+            return 0;
+        if (!BN_GF2m_add(z2, x, y))
+            return 0;
+        return 2;
+    }
+
+    /* Since Mxy is static we can guarantee that ctx != NULL. */
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    t3 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    t4 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    t5 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (t5 == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!BN_one(t5))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, t3, z1, z2, ctx))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, z1, z1, x, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    if (!BN_GF2m_add(z1, z1, x1))
+        goto err;
+    if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, z2, z2, x, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, x1, z2, x1, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    if (!BN_GF2m_add(z2, z2, x2))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, z2, z2, z1, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    if (!group->meth->field_sqr(group, t4, x, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    if (!BN_GF2m_add(t4, t4, y))
+        goto err;
+    if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, t4, t4, t3, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    if (!BN_GF2m_add(t4, t4, z2))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, t3, t3, x, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    if (!group->meth->field_div(group, t3, t5, t3, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, t4, t3, t4, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, x2, x1, t3, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    if (!BN_GF2m_add(z2, x2, x))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, z2, z2, t4, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    if (!BN_GF2m_add(z2, z2, y))
+        goto err;
+
+    ret = 2;
+
+ err:
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Computes scalar*point and stores the result in r.
+ * point can not equal r.
+ * Uses a modified algorithm 2P of
+ *     Lopez, J. and Dahab, R.  "Fast multiplication on elliptic curves over
+ *     GF(2^m) without precomputation" (CHES '99, LNCS 1717).
+ *
+ * To protect against side-channel attack the function uses constant time swap,
+ * avoiding conditional branches.
+ */
+static int ec_GF2m_montgomery_point_multiply(const EC_GROUP *group,
+                                             EC_POINT *r,
+                                             const BIGNUM *scalar,
+                                             const EC_POINT *point,
+                                             BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    BIGNUM *x1, *x2, *z1, *z2;
+    int ret = 0, i, group_top;
+    BN_ULONG mask, word;
+
+    if (r == point) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GF2M_MONTGOMERY_POINT_MULTIPLY, EC_R_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* if result should be point at infinity */
+    if ((scalar == NULL) || BN_is_zero(scalar) || (point == NULL) ||
+        EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, point)) {
+        return EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(group, r);
+    }
+
+    /* only support affine coordinates */
+    if (!point->Z_is_one)
+        return 0;
+
+    /*
+     * Since point_multiply is static we can guarantee that ctx != NULL.
+     */
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    x1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    z1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (z1 == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    x2 = r->X;
+    z2 = r->Y;
+
+    group_top = bn_get_top(group->field);
+    if (bn_wexpand(x1, group_top) == NULL
+        || bn_wexpand(z1, group_top) == NULL
+        || bn_wexpand(x2, group_top) == NULL
+        || bn_wexpand(z2, group_top) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!BN_GF2m_mod_arr(x1, point->X, group->poly))
+        goto err;               /* x1 = x */
+    if (!BN_one(z1))
+        goto err;               /* z1 = 1 */
+    if (!group->meth->field_sqr(group, z2, x1, ctx))
+        goto err;               /* z2 = x1^2 = x^2 */
+    if (!group->meth->field_sqr(group, x2, z2, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    if (!BN_GF2m_add(x2, x2, group->b))
+        goto err;               /* x2 = x^4 + b */
+
+    /* find top most bit and go one past it */
+    i = bn_get_top(scalar) - 1;
+    mask = BN_TBIT;
+    word = bn_get_words(scalar)[i];
+    while (!(word & mask))
+        mask >>= 1;
+    mask >>= 1;
+    /* if top most bit was at word break, go to next word */
+    if (!mask) {
+        i--;
+        mask = BN_TBIT;
+    }
+
+    for (; i >= 0; i--) {
+        word = bn_get_words(scalar)[i];
+        while (mask) {
+            BN_consttime_swap(word & mask, x1, x2, group_top);
+            BN_consttime_swap(word & mask, z1, z2, group_top);
+            if (!gf2m_Madd(group, point->X, x2, z2, x1, z1, ctx))
+                goto err;
+            if (!gf2m_Mdouble(group, x1, z1, ctx))
+                goto err;
+            BN_consttime_swap(word & mask, x1, x2, group_top);
+            BN_consttime_swap(word & mask, z1, z2, group_top);
+            mask >>= 1;
+        }
+        mask = BN_TBIT;
+    }
+
+    /* convert out of "projective" coordinates */
+    i = gf2m_Mxy(group, point->X, point->Y, x1, z1, x2, z2, ctx);
+    if (i == 0)
+        goto err;
+    else if (i == 1) {
+        if (!EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(group, r))
+            goto err;
+    } else {
+        if (!BN_one(r->Z))
+            goto err;
+        r->Z_is_one = 1;
+    }
+
+    /* GF(2^m) field elements should always have BIGNUM::neg = 0 */
+    BN_set_negative(r->X, 0);
+    BN_set_negative(r->Y, 0);
+
+    ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Computes the sum
+ *     scalar*group->generator + scalars[0]*points[0] + ... + scalars[num-1]*points[num-1]
+ * gracefully ignoring NULL scalar values.
+ */
+int ec_GF2m_simple_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
+                       const BIGNUM *scalar, size_t num,
+                       const EC_POINT *points[], const BIGNUM *scalars[],
+                       BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
+    int ret = 0;
+    size_t i;
+    EC_POINT *p = NULL;
+    EC_POINT *acc = NULL;
+
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+        ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+        if (ctx == NULL)
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * This implementation is more efficient than the wNAF implementation for
+     * 2 or fewer points.  Use the ec_wNAF_mul implementation for 3 or more
+     * points, or if we can perform a fast multiplication based on
+     * precomputation.
+     */
+    if ((scalar && (num > 1)) || (num > 2)
+        || (num == 0 && EC_GROUP_have_precompute_mult(group))) {
+        ret = ec_wNAF_mul(group, r, scalar, num, points, scalars, ctx);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if ((p = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if ((acc = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(group, acc))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (scalar) {
+        if (!ec_GF2m_montgomery_point_multiply
+            (group, p, scalar, group->generator, ctx))
+            goto err;
+        if (BN_is_negative(scalar))
+            if (!group->meth->invert(group, p, ctx))
+                goto err;
+        if (!group->meth->add(group, acc, acc, p, ctx))
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
+        if (!ec_GF2m_montgomery_point_multiply
+            (group, p, scalars[i], points[i], ctx))
+            goto err;
+        if (BN_is_negative(scalars[i]))
+            if (!group->meth->invert(group, p, ctx))
+                goto err;
+        if (!group->meth->add(group, acc, acc, p, ctx))
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!EC_POINT_copy(r, acc))
+        goto err;
+
+    ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+    EC_POINT_free(p);
+    EC_POINT_free(acc);
+    BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Precomputation for point multiplication: fall back to wNAF methods because
+ * ec_GF2m_simple_mul() uses ec_wNAF_mul() if appropriate
+ */
+
+int ec_GF2m_precompute_mult(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ec_wNAF_precompute_mult(group, ctx);
+}
+
+int ec_GF2m_have_precompute_mult(const EC_GROUP *group)
+{
+    return ec_wNAF_have_precompute_mult(group);
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ec2_oct.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ec2_oct.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ea88ce8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ec2_oct.c
@@ -0,0 +1,352 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ *
+ * The Elliptic Curve Public-Key Crypto Library (ECC Code) included
+ * herein is developed by SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and is contributed
+ * to the OpenSSL project.
+ *
+ * The ECC Code is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license provided below.
+ *
+ * The software is originally written by Sheueling Chang Shantz and
+ * Douglas Stebila of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+#include "ec_lcl.h"
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+
+/*-
+ * Calculates and sets the affine coordinates of an EC_POINT from the given
+ * compressed coordinates.  Uses algorithm 2.3.4 of SEC 1.
+ * Note that the simple implementation only uses affine coordinates.
+ *
+ * The method is from the following publication:
+ *
+ *     Harper, Menezes, Vanstone:
+ *     "Public-Key Cryptosystems with Very Small Key Lengths",
+ *     EUROCRYPT '92, Springer-Verlag LNCS 658,
+ *     published February 1993
+ *
+ * US Patents 6,141,420 and 6,618,483 (Vanstone, Mullin, Agnew) describe
+ * the same method, but claim no priority date earlier than July 29, 1994
+ * (and additionally fail to cite the EUROCRYPT '92 publication as prior art).
+ */
+int ec_GF2m_simple_set_compressed_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *group,
+                                              EC_POINT *point,
+                                              const BIGNUM *x_, int y_bit,
+                                              BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *tmp, *x, *y, *z;
+    int ret = 0, z0;
+
+    /* clear error queue */
+    ERR_clear_error();
+
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+        ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+        if (ctx == NULL)
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    y_bit = (y_bit != 0) ? 1 : 0;
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    x = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    y = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    z = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (z == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!BN_GF2m_mod_arr(x, x_, group->poly))
+        goto err;
+    if (BN_is_zero(x)) {
+        if (!BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt_arr(y, group->b, group->poly, ctx))
+            goto err;
+    } else {
+        if (!group->meth->field_sqr(group, tmp, x, ctx))
+            goto err;
+        if (!group->meth->field_div(group, tmp, group->b, tmp, ctx))
+            goto err;
+        if (!BN_GF2m_add(tmp, group->a, tmp))
+            goto err;
+        if (!BN_GF2m_add(tmp, x, tmp))
+            goto err;
+        if (!BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad_arr(z, tmp, group->poly, ctx)) {
+            unsigned long err = ERR_peek_last_error();
+
+            if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_BN
+                && ERR_GET_REASON(err) == BN_R_NO_SOLUTION) {
+                ERR_clear_error();
+                ECerr(EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_SET_COMPRESSED_COORDINATES,
+                      EC_R_INVALID_COMPRESSED_POINT);
+            } else
+                ECerr(EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_SET_COMPRESSED_COORDINATES,
+                      ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        z0 = (BN_is_odd(z)) ? 1 : 0;
+        if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, y, x, z, ctx))
+            goto err;
+        if (z0 != y_bit) {
+            if (!BN_GF2m_add(y, y, x))
+                goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group, point, x, y, ctx))
+        goto err;
+
+    ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Converts an EC_POINT to an octet string. If buf is NULL, the encoded
+ * length will be returned. If the length len of buf is smaller than required
+ * an error will be returned.
+ */
+size_t ec_GF2m_simple_point2oct(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point,
+                                point_conversion_form_t form,
+                                unsigned char *buf, size_t len, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    size_t ret;
+    BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
+    int used_ctx = 0;
+    BIGNUM *x, *y, *yxi;
+    size_t field_len, i, skip;
+
+    if ((form != POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
+        && (form != POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED)
+        && (form != POINT_CONVERSION_HYBRID)) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_POINT2OCT, EC_R_INVALID_FORM);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, point)) {
+        /* encodes to a single 0 octet */
+        if (buf != NULL) {
+            if (len < 1) {
+                ECerr(EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_POINT2OCT, EC_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+                return 0;
+            }
+            buf[0] = 0;
+        }
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    /* ret := required output buffer length */
+    field_len = (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) + 7) / 8;
+    ret =
+        (form ==
+         POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) ? 1 + field_len : 1 + 2 * field_len;
+
+    /* if 'buf' is NULL, just return required length */
+    if (buf != NULL) {
+        if (len < ret) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_POINT2OCT, EC_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        if (ctx == NULL) {
+            ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+            if (ctx == NULL)
+                return 0;
+        }
+
+        BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+        used_ctx = 1;
+        x = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+        y = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+        yxi = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+        if (yxi == NULL)
+            goto err;
+
+        if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group, point, x, y, ctx))
+            goto err;
+
+        buf[0] = form;
+        if ((form != POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) && !BN_is_zero(x)) {
+            if (!group->meth->field_div(group, yxi, y, x, ctx))
+                goto err;
+            if (BN_is_odd(yxi))
+                buf[0]++;
+        }
+
+        i = 1;
+
+        skip = field_len - BN_num_bytes(x);
+        if (skip > field_len) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_POINT2OCT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        while (skip > 0) {
+            buf[i++] = 0;
+            skip--;
+        }
+        skip = BN_bn2bin(x, buf + i);
+        i += skip;
+        if (i != 1 + field_len) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_POINT2OCT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        if (form == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
+            || form == POINT_CONVERSION_HYBRID) {
+            skip = field_len - BN_num_bytes(y);
+            if (skip > field_len) {
+                ECerr(EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_POINT2OCT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            while (skip > 0) {
+                buf[i++] = 0;
+                skip--;
+            }
+            skip = BN_bn2bin(y, buf + i);
+            i += skip;
+        }
+
+        if (i != ret) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_POINT2OCT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (used_ctx)
+        BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
+    return ret;
+
+ err:
+    if (used_ctx)
+        BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Converts an octet string representation to an EC_POINT. Note that the
+ * simple implementation only uses affine coordinates.
+ */
+int ec_GF2m_simple_oct2point(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point,
+                             const unsigned char *buf, size_t len,
+                             BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    point_conversion_form_t form;
+    int y_bit;
+    BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *x, *y, *yxi;
+    size_t field_len, enc_len;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    if (len == 0) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_OCT2POINT, EC_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    form = buf[0];
+    y_bit = form & 1;
+    form = form & ~1U;
+    if ((form != 0) && (form != POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
+        && (form != POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED)
+        && (form != POINT_CONVERSION_HYBRID)) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_OCT2POINT, EC_R_INVALID_ENCODING);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if ((form == 0 || form == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) && y_bit) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_OCT2POINT, EC_R_INVALID_ENCODING);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (form == 0) {
+        if (len != 1) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_OCT2POINT, EC_R_INVALID_ENCODING);
+            return 0;
+        }
+
+        return EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(group, point);
+    }
+
+    field_len = (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) + 7) / 8;
+    enc_len =
+        (form ==
+         POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) ? 1 + field_len : 1 + 2 * field_len;
+
+    if (len != enc_len) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_OCT2POINT, EC_R_INVALID_ENCODING);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+        ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+        if (ctx == NULL)
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    x = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    y = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    yxi = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (yxi == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!BN_bin2bn(buf + 1, field_len, x))
+        goto err;
+    if (BN_ucmp(x, group->field) >= 0) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_OCT2POINT, EC_R_INVALID_ENCODING);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (form == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) {
+        if (!EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GF2m
+            (group, point, x, y_bit, ctx))
+            goto err;
+    } else {
+        if (!BN_bin2bn(buf + 1 + field_len, field_len, y))
+            goto err;
+        if (BN_ucmp(y, group->field) >= 0) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_OCT2POINT, EC_R_INVALID_ENCODING);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (form == POINT_CONVERSION_HYBRID) {
+            if (!group->meth->field_div(group, yxi, y, x, ctx))
+                goto err;
+            if (y_bit != BN_is_odd(yxi)) {
+                ECerr(EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_OCT2POINT, EC_R_INVALID_ENCODING);
+                goto err;
+            }
+        }
+
+        /*
+         * EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m is responsible for checking that
+         * the point is on the curve.
+         */
+        if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group, point, x, y, ctx))
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
+    return ret;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ec2_smpl.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ec2_smpl.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cfeef5f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ec2_smpl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,758 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ *
+ * The Elliptic Curve Public-Key Crypto Library (ECC Code) included
+ * herein is developed by SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and is contributed
+ * to the OpenSSL project.
+ *
+ * The ECC Code is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license provided below.
+ *
+ * The software is originally written by Sheueling Chang Shantz and
+ * Douglas Stebila of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+#include "internal/bn_int.h"
+#include "ec_lcl.h"
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+
+const EC_METHOD *EC_GF2m_simple_method(void)
+{
+    static const EC_METHOD ret = {
+        EC_FLAGS_DEFAULT_OCT,
+        NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field,
+        ec_GF2m_simple_group_init,
+        ec_GF2m_simple_group_finish,
+        ec_GF2m_simple_group_clear_finish,
+        ec_GF2m_simple_group_copy,
+        ec_GF2m_simple_group_set_curve,
+        ec_GF2m_simple_group_get_curve,
+        ec_GF2m_simple_group_get_degree,
+        ec_group_simple_order_bits,
+        ec_GF2m_simple_group_check_discriminant,
+        ec_GF2m_simple_point_init,
+        ec_GF2m_simple_point_finish,
+        ec_GF2m_simple_point_clear_finish,
+        ec_GF2m_simple_point_copy,
+        ec_GF2m_simple_point_set_to_infinity,
+        0 /* set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp */ ,
+        0 /* get_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp */ ,
+        ec_GF2m_simple_point_set_affine_coordinates,
+        ec_GF2m_simple_point_get_affine_coordinates,
+        0, 0, 0,
+        ec_GF2m_simple_add,
+        ec_GF2m_simple_dbl,
+        ec_GF2m_simple_invert,
+        ec_GF2m_simple_is_at_infinity,
+        ec_GF2m_simple_is_on_curve,
+        ec_GF2m_simple_cmp,
+        ec_GF2m_simple_make_affine,
+        ec_GF2m_simple_points_make_affine,
+
+        /*
+         * the following three method functions are defined in ec2_mult.c
+         */
+        ec_GF2m_simple_mul,
+        ec_GF2m_precompute_mult,
+        ec_GF2m_have_precompute_mult,
+
+        ec_GF2m_simple_field_mul,
+        ec_GF2m_simple_field_sqr,
+        ec_GF2m_simple_field_div,
+        0 /* field_encode */ ,
+        0 /* field_decode */ ,
+        0,                      /* field_set_to_one */
+        ec_key_simple_priv2oct,
+        ec_key_simple_oct2priv,
+        0, /* set private */
+        ec_key_simple_generate_key,
+        ec_key_simple_check_key,
+        ec_key_simple_generate_public_key,
+        0, /* keycopy */
+        0, /* keyfinish */
+        ecdh_simple_compute_key
+    };
+
+    return &ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initialize a GF(2^m)-based EC_GROUP structure. Note that all other members
+ * are handled by EC_GROUP_new.
+ */
+int ec_GF2m_simple_group_init(EC_GROUP *group)
+{
+    group->field = BN_new();
+    group->a = BN_new();
+    group->b = BN_new();
+
+    if (group->field == NULL || group->a == NULL || group->b == NULL) {
+        BN_free(group->field);
+        BN_free(group->a);
+        BN_free(group->b);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Free a GF(2^m)-based EC_GROUP structure. Note that all other members are
+ * handled by EC_GROUP_free.
+ */
+void ec_GF2m_simple_group_finish(EC_GROUP *group)
+{
+    BN_free(group->field);
+    BN_free(group->a);
+    BN_free(group->b);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Clear and free a GF(2^m)-based EC_GROUP structure. Note that all other
+ * members are handled by EC_GROUP_clear_free.
+ */
+void ec_GF2m_simple_group_clear_finish(EC_GROUP *group)
+{
+    BN_clear_free(group->field);
+    BN_clear_free(group->a);
+    BN_clear_free(group->b);
+    group->poly[0] = 0;
+    group->poly[1] = 0;
+    group->poly[2] = 0;
+    group->poly[3] = 0;
+    group->poly[4] = 0;
+    group->poly[5] = -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Copy a GF(2^m)-based EC_GROUP structure. Note that all other members are
+ * handled by EC_GROUP_copy.
+ */
+int ec_GF2m_simple_group_copy(EC_GROUP *dest, const EC_GROUP *src)
+{
+    if (!BN_copy(dest->field, src->field))
+        return 0;
+    if (!BN_copy(dest->a, src->a))
+        return 0;
+    if (!BN_copy(dest->b, src->b))
+        return 0;
+    dest->poly[0] = src->poly[0];
+    dest->poly[1] = src->poly[1];
+    dest->poly[2] = src->poly[2];
+    dest->poly[3] = src->poly[3];
+    dest->poly[4] = src->poly[4];
+    dest->poly[5] = src->poly[5];
+    if (bn_wexpand(dest->a, (int)(dest->poly[0] + BN_BITS2 - 1) / BN_BITS2) ==
+        NULL)
+        return 0;
+    if (bn_wexpand(dest->b, (int)(dest->poly[0] + BN_BITS2 - 1) / BN_BITS2) ==
+        NULL)
+        return 0;
+    bn_set_all_zero(dest->a);
+    bn_set_all_zero(dest->b);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Set the curve parameters of an EC_GROUP structure. */
+int ec_GF2m_simple_group_set_curve(EC_GROUP *group,
+                                   const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a,
+                                   const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int ret = 0, i;
+
+    /* group->field */
+    if (!BN_copy(group->field, p))
+        goto err;
+    i = BN_GF2m_poly2arr(group->field, group->poly, 6) - 1;
+    if ((i != 5) && (i != 3)) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_GROUP_SET_CURVE, EC_R_UNSUPPORTED_FIELD);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* group->a */
+    if (!BN_GF2m_mod_arr(group->a, a, group->poly))
+        goto err;
+    if (bn_wexpand(group->a, (int)(group->poly[0] + BN_BITS2 - 1) / BN_BITS2)
+        == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    bn_set_all_zero(group->a);
+
+    /* group->b */
+    if (!BN_GF2m_mod_arr(group->b, b, group->poly))
+        goto err;
+    if (bn_wexpand(group->b, (int)(group->poly[0] + BN_BITS2 - 1) / BN_BITS2)
+        == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    bn_set_all_zero(group->b);
+
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get the curve parameters of an EC_GROUP structure. If p, a, or b are NULL
+ * then there values will not be set but the method will return with success.
+ */
+int ec_GF2m_simple_group_get_curve(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *p,
+                                   BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    if (p != NULL) {
+        if (!BN_copy(p, group->field))
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (a != NULL) {
+        if (!BN_copy(a, group->a))
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (b != NULL) {
+        if (!BN_copy(b, group->b))
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Gets the degree of the field.  For a curve over GF(2^m) this is the value
+ * m.
+ */
+int ec_GF2m_simple_group_get_degree(const EC_GROUP *group)
+{
+    return BN_num_bits(group->field) - 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Checks the discriminant of the curve. y^2 + x*y = x^3 + a*x^2 + b is an
+ * elliptic curve <=> b != 0 (mod p)
+ */
+int ec_GF2m_simple_group_check_discriminant(const EC_GROUP *group,
+                                            BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    BIGNUM *b;
+    BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
+
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+        ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+        if (ctx == NULL) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_GROUP_CHECK_DISCRIMINANT,
+                  ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    b = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (b == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!BN_GF2m_mod_arr(b, group->b, group->poly))
+        goto err;
+
+    /*
+     * check the discriminant: y^2 + x*y = x^3 + a*x^2 + b is an elliptic
+     * curve <=> b != 0 (mod p)
+     */
+    if (BN_is_zero(b))
+        goto err;
+
+    ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+    if (ctx != NULL)
+        BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/* Initializes an EC_POINT. */
+int ec_GF2m_simple_point_init(EC_POINT *point)
+{
+    point->X = BN_new();
+    point->Y = BN_new();
+    point->Z = BN_new();
+
+    if (point->X == NULL || point->Y == NULL || point->Z == NULL) {
+        BN_free(point->X);
+        BN_free(point->Y);
+        BN_free(point->Z);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Frees an EC_POINT. */
+void ec_GF2m_simple_point_finish(EC_POINT *point)
+{
+    BN_free(point->X);
+    BN_free(point->Y);
+    BN_free(point->Z);
+}
+
+/* Clears and frees an EC_POINT. */
+void ec_GF2m_simple_point_clear_finish(EC_POINT *point)
+{
+    BN_clear_free(point->X);
+    BN_clear_free(point->Y);
+    BN_clear_free(point->Z);
+    point->Z_is_one = 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Copy the contents of one EC_POINT into another.  Assumes dest is
+ * initialized.
+ */
+int ec_GF2m_simple_point_copy(EC_POINT *dest, const EC_POINT *src)
+{
+    if (!BN_copy(dest->X, src->X))
+        return 0;
+    if (!BN_copy(dest->Y, src->Y))
+        return 0;
+    if (!BN_copy(dest->Z, src->Z))
+        return 0;
+    dest->Z_is_one = src->Z_is_one;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set an EC_POINT to the point at infinity. A point at infinity is
+ * represented by having Z=0.
+ */
+int ec_GF2m_simple_point_set_to_infinity(const EC_GROUP *group,
+                                         EC_POINT *point)
+{
+    point->Z_is_one = 0;
+    BN_zero(point->Z);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set the coordinates of an EC_POINT using affine coordinates. Note that
+ * the simple implementation only uses affine coordinates.
+ */
+int ec_GF2m_simple_point_set_affine_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *group,
+                                                EC_POINT *point,
+                                                const BIGNUM *x,
+                                                const BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    if (x == NULL || y == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_POINT_SET_AFFINE_COORDINATES,
+              ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (!BN_copy(point->X, x))
+        goto err;
+    BN_set_negative(point->X, 0);
+    if (!BN_copy(point->Y, y))
+        goto err;
+    BN_set_negative(point->Y, 0);
+    if (!BN_copy(point->Z, BN_value_one()))
+        goto err;
+    BN_set_negative(point->Z, 0);
+    point->Z_is_one = 1;
+    ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Gets the affine coordinates of an EC_POINT. Note that the simple
+ * implementation only uses affine coordinates.
+ */
+int ec_GF2m_simple_point_get_affine_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *group,
+                                                const EC_POINT *point,
+                                                BIGNUM *x, BIGNUM *y,
+                                                BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, point)) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES,
+              EC_R_POINT_AT_INFINITY);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (BN_cmp(point->Z, BN_value_one())) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES,
+              ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (x != NULL) {
+        if (!BN_copy(x, point->X))
+            goto err;
+        BN_set_negative(x, 0);
+    }
+    if (y != NULL) {
+        if (!BN_copy(y, point->Y))
+            goto err;
+        BN_set_negative(y, 0);
+    }
+    ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Computes a + b and stores the result in r.  r could be a or b, a could be
+ * b. Uses algorithm A.10.2 of IEEE P1363.
+ */
+int ec_GF2m_simple_add(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const EC_POINT *a,
+                       const EC_POINT *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *x0, *y0, *x1, *y1, *x2, *y2, *s, *t;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, a)) {
+        if (!EC_POINT_copy(r, b))
+            return 0;
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, b)) {
+        if (!EC_POINT_copy(r, a))
+            return 0;
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+        ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+        if (ctx == NULL)
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    x0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    y0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    x1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    y1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    x2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    y2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    s = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    t = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (t == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (a->Z_is_one) {
+        if (!BN_copy(x0, a->X))
+            goto err;
+        if (!BN_copy(y0, a->Y))
+            goto err;
+    } else {
+        if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group, a, x0, y0, ctx))
+            goto err;
+    }
+    if (b->Z_is_one) {
+        if (!BN_copy(x1, b->X))
+            goto err;
+        if (!BN_copy(y1, b->Y))
+            goto err;
+    } else {
+        if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group, b, x1, y1, ctx))
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (BN_GF2m_cmp(x0, x1)) {
+        if (!BN_GF2m_add(t, x0, x1))
+            goto err;
+        if (!BN_GF2m_add(s, y0, y1))
+            goto err;
+        if (!group->meth->field_div(group, s, s, t, ctx))
+            goto err;
+        if (!group->meth->field_sqr(group, x2, s, ctx))
+            goto err;
+        if (!BN_GF2m_add(x2, x2, group->a))
+            goto err;
+        if (!BN_GF2m_add(x2, x2, s))
+            goto err;
+        if (!BN_GF2m_add(x2, x2, t))
+            goto err;
+    } else {
+        if (BN_GF2m_cmp(y0, y1) || BN_is_zero(x1)) {
+            if (!EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(group, r))
+                goto err;
+            ret = 1;
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (!group->meth->field_div(group, s, y1, x1, ctx))
+            goto err;
+        if (!BN_GF2m_add(s, s, x1))
+            goto err;
+
+        if (!group->meth->field_sqr(group, x2, s, ctx))
+            goto err;
+        if (!BN_GF2m_add(x2, x2, s))
+            goto err;
+        if (!BN_GF2m_add(x2, x2, group->a))
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!BN_GF2m_add(y2, x1, x2))
+        goto err;
+    if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, y2, y2, s, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    if (!BN_GF2m_add(y2, y2, x2))
+        goto err;
+    if (!BN_GF2m_add(y2, y2, y1))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group, r, x2, y2, ctx))
+        goto err;
+
+    ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Computes 2 * a and stores the result in r.  r could be a. Uses algorithm
+ * A.10.2 of IEEE P1363.
+ */
+int ec_GF2m_simple_dbl(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const EC_POINT *a,
+                       BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ec_GF2m_simple_add(group, r, a, a, ctx);
+}
+
+int ec_GF2m_simple_invert(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, point) || BN_is_zero(point->Y))
+        /* point is its own inverse */
+        return 1;
+
+    if (!EC_POINT_make_affine(group, point, ctx))
+        return 0;
+    return BN_GF2m_add(point->Y, point->X, point->Y);
+}
+
+/* Indicates whether the given point is the point at infinity. */
+int ec_GF2m_simple_is_at_infinity(const EC_GROUP *group,
+                                  const EC_POINT *point)
+{
+    return BN_is_zero(point->Z);
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Determines whether the given EC_POINT is an actual point on the curve defined
+ * in the EC_GROUP.  A point is valid if it satisfies the Weierstrass equation:
+ *      y^2 + x*y = x^3 + a*x^2 + b.
+ */
+int ec_GF2m_simple_is_on_curve(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point,
+                               BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int ret = -1;
+    BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *lh, *y2;
+    int (*field_mul) (const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *,
+                      const BIGNUM *, BN_CTX *);
+    int (*field_sqr) (const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, BN_CTX *);
+
+    if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, point))
+        return 1;
+
+    field_mul = group->meth->field_mul;
+    field_sqr = group->meth->field_sqr;
+
+    /* only support affine coordinates */
+    if (!point->Z_is_one)
+        return -1;
+
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+        ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+        if (ctx == NULL)
+            return -1;
+    }
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    y2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    lh = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (lh == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    /*-
+     * We have a curve defined by a Weierstrass equation
+     *      y^2 + x*y = x^3 + a*x^2 + b.
+     *  <=> x^3 + a*x^2 + x*y + b + y^2 = 0
+     *  <=> ((x + a) * x + y ) * x + b + y^2 = 0
+     */
+    if (!BN_GF2m_add(lh, point->X, group->a))
+        goto err;
+    if (!field_mul(group, lh, lh, point->X, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    if (!BN_GF2m_add(lh, lh, point->Y))
+        goto err;
+    if (!field_mul(group, lh, lh, point->X, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    if (!BN_GF2m_add(lh, lh, group->b))
+        goto err;
+    if (!field_sqr(group, y2, point->Y, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    if (!BN_GF2m_add(lh, lh, y2))
+        goto err;
+    ret = BN_is_zero(lh);
+ err:
+    if (ctx)
+        BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Indicates whether two points are equal.
+ * Return values:
+ *  -1   error
+ *   0   equal (in affine coordinates)
+ *   1   not equal
+ */
+int ec_GF2m_simple_cmp(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *a,
+                       const EC_POINT *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    BIGNUM *aX, *aY, *bX, *bY;
+    BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
+    int ret = -1;
+
+    if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, a)) {
+        return EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, b) ? 0 : 1;
+    }
+
+    if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, b))
+        return 1;
+
+    if (a->Z_is_one && b->Z_is_one) {
+        return ((BN_cmp(a->X, b->X) == 0) && BN_cmp(a->Y, b->Y) == 0) ? 0 : 1;
+    }
+
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+        ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+        if (ctx == NULL)
+            return -1;
+    }
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    aX = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    aY = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    bX = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    bY = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (bY == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group, a, aX, aY, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group, b, bX, bY, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    ret = ((BN_cmp(aX, bX) == 0) && BN_cmp(aY, bY) == 0) ? 0 : 1;
+
+ err:
+    if (ctx)
+        BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/* Forces the given EC_POINT to internally use affine coordinates. */
+int ec_GF2m_simple_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point,
+                               BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *x, *y;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    if (point->Z_is_one || EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, point))
+        return 1;
+
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+        ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+        if (ctx == NULL)
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    x = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    y = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (y == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group, point, x, y, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    if (!BN_copy(point->X, x))
+        goto err;
+    if (!BN_copy(point->Y, y))
+        goto err;
+    if (!BN_one(point->Z))
+        goto err;
+    point->Z_is_one = 1;
+
+    ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+    if (ctx)
+        BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Forces each of the EC_POINTs in the given array to use affine coordinates.
+ */
+int ec_GF2m_simple_points_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *group, size_t num,
+                                      EC_POINT *points[], BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    size_t i;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
+        if (!group->meth->make_affine(group, points[i], ctx))
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Wrapper to simple binary polynomial field multiplication implementation. */
+int ec_GF2m_simple_field_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *r,
+                             const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return BN_GF2m_mod_mul_arr(r, a, b, group->poly, ctx);
+}
+
+/* Wrapper to simple binary polynomial field squaring implementation. */
+int ec_GF2m_simple_field_sqr(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *r,
+                             const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr(r, a, group->poly, ctx);
+}
+
+/* Wrapper to simple binary polynomial field division implementation. */
+int ec_GF2m_simple_field_div(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *r,
+                             const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return BN_GF2m_mod_div(r, a, b, group->field, ctx);
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ec_ameth.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ec_ameth.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b66adf2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ec_ameth.c
@@ -0,0 +1,885 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/ec.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/cms.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include "internal/asn1_int.h"
+#include "internal/evp_int.h"
+#include "ec_lcl.h"
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
+static int ecdh_cms_decrypt(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri);
+static int ecdh_cms_encrypt(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri);
+#endif
+
+static int eckey_param2type(int *pptype, void **ppval, EC_KEY *ec_key)
+{
+    const EC_GROUP *group;
+    int nid;
+    if (ec_key == NULL || (group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec_key)) == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_ECKEY_PARAM2TYPE, EC_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (EC_GROUP_get_asn1_flag(group)
+        && (nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
+        /* we have a 'named curve' => just set the OID */
+    {
+        *ppval = OBJ_nid2obj(nid);
+        *pptype = V_ASN1_OBJECT;
+    } else {                    /* explicit parameters */
+
+        ASN1_STRING *pstr = NULL;
+        pstr = ASN1_STRING_new();
+        if (pstr == NULL)
+            return 0;
+        pstr->length = i2d_ECParameters(ec_key, &pstr->data);
+        if (pstr->length <= 0) {
+            ASN1_STRING_free(pstr);
+            ECerr(EC_F_ECKEY_PARAM2TYPE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        *ppval = pstr;
+        *pptype = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int eckey_pub_encode(X509_PUBKEY *pk, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    EC_KEY *ec_key = pkey->pkey.ec;
+    void *pval = NULL;
+    int ptype;
+    unsigned char *penc = NULL, *p;
+    int penclen;
+
+    if (!eckey_param2type(&ptype, &pval, ec_key)) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_ECKEY_PUB_ENCODE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    penclen = i2o_ECPublicKey(ec_key, NULL);
+    if (penclen <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    penc = OPENSSL_malloc(penclen);
+    if (penc == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    p = penc;
+    penclen = i2o_ECPublicKey(ec_key, &p);
+    if (penclen <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    if (X509_PUBKEY_set0_param(pk, OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_PKEY_EC),
+                               ptype, pval, penc, penclen))
+        return 1;
+ err:
+    if (ptype == V_ASN1_OBJECT)
+        ASN1_OBJECT_free(pval);
+    else
+        ASN1_STRING_free(pval);
+    OPENSSL_free(penc);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static EC_KEY *eckey_type2param(int ptype, const void *pval)
+{
+    EC_KEY *eckey = NULL;
+    if (ptype == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) {
+        const ASN1_STRING *pstr = pval;
+        const unsigned char *pm = NULL;
+        int pmlen;
+        pm = pstr->data;
+        pmlen = pstr->length;
+        if ((eckey = d2i_ECParameters(NULL, &pm, pmlen)) == NULL) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_ECKEY_TYPE2PARAM, EC_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+            goto ecerr;
+        }
+    } else if (ptype == V_ASN1_OBJECT) {
+        const ASN1_OBJECT *poid = pval;
+        EC_GROUP *group;
+
+        /*
+         * type == V_ASN1_OBJECT => the parameters are given by an asn1 OID
+         */
+        if ((eckey = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_ECKEY_TYPE2PARAM, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto ecerr;
+        }
+        group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(OBJ_obj2nid(poid));
+        if (group == NULL)
+            goto ecerr;
+        EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(group, OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE);
+        if (EC_KEY_set_group(eckey, group) == 0)
+            goto ecerr;
+        EC_GROUP_free(group);
+    } else {
+        ECerr(EC_F_ECKEY_TYPE2PARAM, EC_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+        goto ecerr;
+    }
+
+    return eckey;
+
+ ecerr:
+    EC_KEY_free(eckey);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+static int eckey_pub_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509_PUBKEY *pubkey)
+{
+    const unsigned char *p = NULL;
+    const void *pval;
+    int ptype, pklen;
+    EC_KEY *eckey = NULL;
+    X509_ALGOR *palg;
+
+    if (!X509_PUBKEY_get0_param(NULL, &p, &pklen, &palg, pubkey))
+        return 0;
+    X509_ALGOR_get0(NULL, &ptype, &pval, palg);
+
+    eckey = eckey_type2param(ptype, pval);
+
+    if (!eckey) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_ECKEY_PUB_DECODE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* We have parameters now set public key */
+    if (!o2i_ECPublicKey(&eckey, &p, pklen)) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_ECKEY_PUB_DECODE, EC_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+        goto ecerr;
+    }
+
+    EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY(pkey, eckey);
+    return 1;
+
+ ecerr:
+    EC_KEY_free(eckey);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int eckey_pub_cmp(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b)
+{
+    int r;
+    const EC_GROUP *group = EC_KEY_get0_group(b->pkey.ec);
+    const EC_POINT *pa = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(a->pkey.ec),
+        *pb = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(b->pkey.ec);
+    if (group == NULL || pa == NULL || pb == NULL)
+        return -2;
+    r = EC_POINT_cmp(group, pa, pb, NULL);
+    if (r == 0)
+        return 1;
+    if (r == 1)
+        return 0;
+    return -2;
+}
+
+static int eckey_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, const PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8)
+{
+    const unsigned char *p = NULL;
+    const void *pval;
+    int ptype, pklen;
+    EC_KEY *eckey = NULL;
+    const X509_ALGOR *palg;
+
+    if (!PKCS8_pkey_get0(NULL, &p, &pklen, &palg, p8))
+        return 0;
+    X509_ALGOR_get0(NULL, &ptype, &pval, palg);
+
+    eckey = eckey_type2param(ptype, pval);
+
+    if (!eckey)
+        goto ecliberr;
+
+    /* We have parameters now set private key */
+    if (!d2i_ECPrivateKey(&eckey, &p, pklen)) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_ECKEY_PRIV_DECODE, EC_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+        goto ecerr;
+    }
+
+    EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY(pkey, eckey);
+    return 1;
+
+ ecliberr:
+    ECerr(EC_F_ECKEY_PRIV_DECODE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ ecerr:
+    EC_KEY_free(eckey);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int eckey_priv_encode(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    EC_KEY ec_key = *(pkey->pkey.ec);
+    unsigned char *ep, *p;
+    int eplen, ptype;
+    void *pval;
+    unsigned int old_flags;
+
+    if (!eckey_param2type(&ptype, &pval, &ec_key)) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_ECKEY_PRIV_ENCODE, EC_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* set the private key */
+
+    /*
+     * do not include the parameters in the SEC1 private key see PKCS#11
+     * 12.11
+     */
+    old_flags = EC_KEY_get_enc_flags(&ec_key);
+    EC_KEY_set_enc_flags(&ec_key, old_flags | EC_PKEY_NO_PARAMETERS);
+
+    eplen = i2d_ECPrivateKey(&ec_key, NULL);
+    if (!eplen) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_ECKEY_PRIV_ENCODE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    ep = OPENSSL_malloc(eplen);
+    if (ep == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_ECKEY_PRIV_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    p = ep;
+    if (!i2d_ECPrivateKey(&ec_key, &p)) {
+        OPENSSL_free(ep);
+        ECerr(EC_F_ECKEY_PRIV_ENCODE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (!PKCS8_pkey_set0(p8, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey), 0,
+                         ptype, pval, ep, eplen)) {
+        OPENSSL_free(ep);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int int_ec_size(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    return ECDSA_size(pkey->pkey.ec);
+}
+
+static int ec_bits(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    return EC_GROUP_order_bits(EC_KEY_get0_group(pkey->pkey.ec));
+}
+
+static int ec_security_bits(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    int ecbits = ec_bits(pkey);
+    if (ecbits >= 512)
+        return 256;
+    if (ecbits >= 384)
+        return 192;
+    if (ecbits >= 256)
+        return 128;
+    if (ecbits >= 224)
+        return 112;
+    if (ecbits >= 160)
+        return 80;
+    return ecbits / 2;
+}
+
+static int ec_missing_parameters(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    if (pkey->pkey.ec == NULL || EC_KEY_get0_group(pkey->pkey.ec) == NULL)
+        return 1;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int ec_copy_parameters(EVP_PKEY *to, const EVP_PKEY *from)
+{
+    EC_GROUP *group = EC_GROUP_dup(EC_KEY_get0_group(from->pkey.ec));
+
+    if (group == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    if (to->pkey.ec == NULL) {
+        to->pkey.ec = EC_KEY_new();
+        if (to->pkey.ec == NULL)
+            goto err;
+    }
+    if (EC_KEY_set_group(to->pkey.ec, group) == 0)
+        goto err;
+    EC_GROUP_free(group);
+    return 1;
+ err:
+    EC_GROUP_free(group);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int ec_cmp_parameters(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b)
+{
+    const EC_GROUP *group_a = EC_KEY_get0_group(a->pkey.ec),
+        *group_b = EC_KEY_get0_group(b->pkey.ec);
+    if (group_a == NULL || group_b == NULL)
+        return -2;
+    if (EC_GROUP_cmp(group_a, group_b, NULL))
+        return 0;
+    else
+        return 1;
+}
+
+static void int_ec_free(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    EC_KEY_free(pkey->pkey.ec);
+}
+
+typedef enum {
+    EC_KEY_PRINT_PRIVATE,
+    EC_KEY_PRINT_PUBLIC,
+    EC_KEY_PRINT_PARAM
+} ec_print_t;
+
+static int do_EC_KEY_print(BIO *bp, const EC_KEY *x, int off, ec_print_t ktype)
+{
+    const char *ecstr;
+    unsigned char *priv = NULL, *pub = NULL;
+    size_t privlen = 0, publen = 0;
+    int ret = 0;
+    const EC_GROUP *group;
+
+    if (x == NULL || (group = EC_KEY_get0_group(x)) == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_DO_EC_KEY_PRINT, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (ktype != EC_KEY_PRINT_PARAM && EC_KEY_get0_public_key(x) != NULL) {
+        publen = EC_KEY_key2buf(x, EC_KEY_get_conv_form(x), &pub, NULL);
+        if (publen == 0)
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (ktype == EC_KEY_PRINT_PRIVATE && EC_KEY_get0_private_key(x) != NULL) {
+        privlen = EC_KEY_priv2buf(x, &priv);
+        if (privlen == 0)
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (ktype == EC_KEY_PRINT_PRIVATE)
+        ecstr = "Private-Key";
+    else if (ktype == EC_KEY_PRINT_PUBLIC)
+        ecstr = "Public-Key";
+    else
+        ecstr = "ECDSA-Parameters";
+
+    if (!BIO_indent(bp, off, 128))
+        goto err;
+    if (BIO_printf(bp, "%s: (%d bit)\n", ecstr,
+                   EC_GROUP_order_bits(group)) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (privlen != 0) {
+        if (BIO_printf(bp, "%*spriv:\n", off, "") <= 0)
+            goto err;
+        if (ASN1_buf_print(bp, priv, privlen, off + 4) == 0)
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (publen != 0) {
+        if (BIO_printf(bp, "%*spub:\n", off, "") <= 0)
+            goto err;
+        if (ASN1_buf_print(bp, pub, publen, off + 4) == 0)
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!ECPKParameters_print(bp, group, off))
+        goto err;
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    if (!ret)
+        ECerr(EC_F_DO_EC_KEY_PRINT, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(priv, privlen);
+    OPENSSL_free(pub);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int eckey_param_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+                              const unsigned char **pder, int derlen)
+{
+    EC_KEY *eckey;
+
+    if ((eckey = d2i_ECParameters(NULL, pder, derlen)) == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_ECKEY_PARAM_DECODE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY(pkey, eckey);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int eckey_param_encode(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, unsigned char **pder)
+{
+    return i2d_ECParameters(pkey->pkey.ec, pder);
+}
+
+static int eckey_param_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent,
+                             ASN1_PCTX *ctx)
+{
+    return do_EC_KEY_print(bp, pkey->pkey.ec, indent, EC_KEY_PRINT_PARAM);
+}
+
+static int eckey_pub_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent,
+                           ASN1_PCTX *ctx)
+{
+    return do_EC_KEY_print(bp, pkey->pkey.ec, indent, EC_KEY_PRINT_PUBLIC);
+}
+
+static int eckey_priv_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent,
+                            ASN1_PCTX *ctx)
+{
+    return do_EC_KEY_print(bp, pkey->pkey.ec, indent, EC_KEY_PRINT_PRIVATE);
+}
+
+static int old_ec_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+                              const unsigned char **pder, int derlen)
+{
+    EC_KEY *ec;
+
+    if ((ec = d2i_ECPrivateKey(NULL, pder, derlen)) == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_OLD_EC_PRIV_DECODE, EC_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY(pkey, ec);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int old_ec_priv_encode(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, unsigned char **pder)
+{
+    return i2d_ECPrivateKey(pkey->pkey.ec, pder);
+}
+
+static int ec_pkey_ctrl(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int op, long arg1, void *arg2)
+{
+    switch (op) {
+    case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN:
+        if (arg1 == 0) {
+            int snid, hnid;
+            X509_ALGOR *alg1, *alg2;
+            PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_get0_algs(arg2, NULL, &alg1, &alg2);
+            if (alg1 == NULL || alg1->algorithm == NULL)
+                return -1;
+            hnid = OBJ_obj2nid(alg1->algorithm);
+            if (hnid == NID_undef)
+                return -1;
+            if (!OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(&snid, hnid, EVP_PKEY_id(pkey)))
+                return -1;
+            X509_ALGOR_set0(alg2, OBJ_nid2obj(snid), V_ASN1_UNDEF, 0);
+        }
+        return 1;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
+    case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_SIGN:
+        if (arg1 == 0) {
+            int snid, hnid;
+            X509_ALGOR *alg1, *alg2;
+            CMS_SignerInfo_get0_algs(arg2, NULL, NULL, &alg1, &alg2);
+            if (alg1 == NULL || alg1->algorithm == NULL)
+                return -1;
+            hnid = OBJ_obj2nid(alg1->algorithm);
+            if (hnid == NID_undef)
+                return -1;
+            if (!OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(&snid, hnid, EVP_PKEY_id(pkey)))
+                return -1;
+            X509_ALGOR_set0(alg2, OBJ_nid2obj(snid), V_ASN1_UNDEF, 0);
+        }
+        return 1;
+
+    case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_ENVELOPE:
+        if (arg1 == 1)
+            return ecdh_cms_decrypt(arg2);
+        else if (arg1 == 0)
+            return ecdh_cms_encrypt(arg2);
+        return -2;
+
+    case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_RI_TYPE:
+        *(int *)arg2 = CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE;
+        return 1;
+#endif
+
+    case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_DEFAULT_MD_NID:
+        *(int *)arg2 = NID_sha256;
+        return 2;
+
+    case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_SET1_TLS_ENCPT:
+        return EC_KEY_oct2key(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey), arg2, arg1, NULL);
+
+    case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_GET1_TLS_ENCPT:
+        return EC_KEY_key2buf(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey),
+                              POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, arg2, NULL);
+
+    default:
+        return -2;
+
+    }
+
+}
+
+const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD eckey_asn1_meth = {
+    EVP_PKEY_EC,
+    EVP_PKEY_EC,
+    0,
+    "EC",
+    "OpenSSL EC algorithm",
+
+    eckey_pub_decode,
+    eckey_pub_encode,
+    eckey_pub_cmp,
+    eckey_pub_print,
+
+    eckey_priv_decode,
+    eckey_priv_encode,
+    eckey_priv_print,
+
+    int_ec_size,
+    ec_bits,
+    ec_security_bits,
+
+    eckey_param_decode,
+    eckey_param_encode,
+    ec_missing_parameters,
+    ec_copy_parameters,
+    ec_cmp_parameters,
+    eckey_param_print,
+    0,
+
+    int_ec_free,
+    ec_pkey_ctrl,
+    old_ec_priv_decode,
+    old_ec_priv_encode
+};
+
+int EC_KEY_print(BIO *bp, const EC_KEY *x, int off)
+{
+    int private = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(x) != NULL;
+
+    return do_EC_KEY_print(bp, x, off,
+                private ? EC_KEY_PRINT_PRIVATE : EC_KEY_PRINT_PUBLIC);
+}
+
+int ECParameters_print(BIO *bp, const EC_KEY *x)
+{
+    return do_EC_KEY_print(bp, x, 4, EC_KEY_PRINT_PARAM);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
+
+static int ecdh_cms_set_peerkey(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx,
+                                X509_ALGOR *alg, ASN1_BIT_STRING *pubkey)
+{
+    const ASN1_OBJECT *aoid;
+    int atype;
+    const void *aval;
+    int rv = 0;
+    EVP_PKEY *pkpeer = NULL;
+    EC_KEY *ecpeer = NULL;
+    const unsigned char *p;
+    int plen;
+    X509_ALGOR_get0(&aoid, &atype, &aval, alg);
+    if (OBJ_obj2nid(aoid) != NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey)
+        goto err;
+    /* If absent parameters get group from main key */
+    if (atype == V_ASN1_UNDEF || atype == V_ASN1_NULL) {
+        const EC_GROUP *grp;
+        EVP_PKEY *pk;
+        pk = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(pctx);
+        if (!pk)
+            goto err;
+        grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(pk->pkey.ec);
+        ecpeer = EC_KEY_new();
+        if (ecpeer == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        if (!EC_KEY_set_group(ecpeer, grp))
+            goto err;
+    } else {
+        ecpeer = eckey_type2param(atype, aval);
+        if (!ecpeer)
+            goto err;
+    }
+    /* We have parameters now set public key */
+    plen = ASN1_STRING_length(pubkey);
+    p = ASN1_STRING_get0_data(pubkey);
+    if (!p || !plen)
+        goto err;
+    if (!o2i_ECPublicKey(&ecpeer, &p, plen))
+        goto err;
+    pkpeer = EVP_PKEY_new();
+    if (pkpeer == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(pkpeer, ecpeer);
+    if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pctx, pkpeer) > 0)
+        rv = 1;
+ err:
+    EC_KEY_free(ecpeer);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(pkpeer);
+    return rv;
+}
+
+/* Set KDF parameters based on KDF NID */
+static int ecdh_cms_set_kdf_param(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx, int eckdf_nid)
+{
+    int kdf_nid, kdfmd_nid, cofactor;
+    const EVP_MD *kdf_md;
+    if (eckdf_nid == NID_undef)
+        return 0;
+
+    /* Lookup KDF type, cofactor mode and digest */
+    if (!OBJ_find_sigid_algs(eckdf_nid, &kdfmd_nid, &kdf_nid))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (kdf_nid == NID_dh_std_kdf)
+        cofactor = 0;
+    else if (kdf_nid == NID_dh_cofactor_kdf)
+        cofactor = 1;
+    else
+        return 0;
+
+    if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ecdh_cofactor_mode(pctx, cofactor) <= 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ecdh_kdf_type(pctx, EVP_PKEY_ECDH_KDF_X9_62) <= 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    kdf_md = EVP_get_digestbynid(kdfmd_nid);
+    if (!kdf_md)
+        return 0;
+
+    if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ecdh_kdf_md(pctx, kdf_md) <= 0)
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int ecdh_cms_set_shared_info(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx, CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
+{
+    int rv = 0;
+
+    X509_ALGOR *alg, *kekalg = NULL;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ukm;
+    const unsigned char *p;
+    unsigned char *der = NULL;
+    int plen, keylen;
+    const EVP_CIPHER *kekcipher;
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *kekctx;
+
+    if (!CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_alg(ri, &alg, &ukm))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (!ecdh_cms_set_kdf_param(pctx, OBJ_obj2nid(alg->algorithm))) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_ECDH_CMS_SET_SHARED_INFO, EC_R_KDF_PARAMETER_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (alg->parameter->type != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
+        return 0;
+
+    p = alg->parameter->value.sequence->data;
+    plen = alg->parameter->value.sequence->length;
+    kekalg = d2i_X509_ALGOR(NULL, &p, plen);
+    if (!kekalg)
+        goto err;
+    kekctx = CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_ctx(ri);
+    if (!kekctx)
+        goto err;
+    kekcipher = EVP_get_cipherbyobj(kekalg->algorithm);
+    if (!kekcipher || EVP_CIPHER_mode(kekcipher) != EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE)
+        goto err;
+    if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(kekctx, kekcipher, NULL, NULL, NULL))
+        goto err;
+    if (EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param(kekctx, kekalg->parameter) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(kekctx);
+    if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ecdh_kdf_outlen(pctx, keylen) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    plen = CMS_SharedInfo_encode(&der, kekalg, ukm, keylen);
+
+    if (!plen)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_ecdh_kdf_ukm(pctx, der, plen) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    der = NULL;
+
+    rv = 1;
+ err:
+    X509_ALGOR_free(kekalg);
+    OPENSSL_free(der);
+    return rv;
+}
+
+static int ecdh_cms_decrypt(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx;
+    pctx = CMS_RecipientInfo_get0_pkey_ctx(ri);
+    if (!pctx)
+        return 0;
+    /* See if we need to set peer key */
+    if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_peerkey(pctx)) {
+        X509_ALGOR *alg;
+        ASN1_BIT_STRING *pubkey;
+        if (!CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_orig_id(ri, &alg, &pubkey,
+                                                 NULL, NULL, NULL))
+            return 0;
+        if (!alg || !pubkey)
+            return 0;
+        if (!ecdh_cms_set_peerkey(pctx, alg, pubkey)) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_ECDH_CMS_DECRYPT, EC_R_PEER_KEY_ERROR);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+    /* Set ECDH derivation parameters and initialise unwrap context */
+    if (!ecdh_cms_set_shared_info(pctx, ri)) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_ECDH_CMS_DECRYPT, EC_R_SHARED_INFO_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int ecdh_cms_encrypt(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx;
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
+    int keylen;
+    X509_ALGOR *talg, *wrap_alg = NULL;
+    const ASN1_OBJECT *aoid;
+    ASN1_BIT_STRING *pubkey;
+    ASN1_STRING *wrap_str;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ukm;
+    unsigned char *penc = NULL;
+    int penclen;
+    int rv = 0;
+    int ecdh_nid, kdf_type, kdf_nid, wrap_nid;
+    const EVP_MD *kdf_md;
+    pctx = CMS_RecipientInfo_get0_pkey_ctx(ri);
+    if (!pctx)
+        return 0;
+    /* Get ephemeral key */
+    pkey = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(pctx);
+    if (!CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_orig_id(ri, &talg, &pubkey,
+                                             NULL, NULL, NULL))
+        goto err;
+    X509_ALGOR_get0(&aoid, NULL, NULL, talg);
+    /* Is everything uninitialised? */
+    if (aoid == OBJ_nid2obj(NID_undef)) {
+
+        EC_KEY *eckey = pkey->pkey.ec;
+        /* Set the key */
+        unsigned char *p;
+
+        penclen = i2o_ECPublicKey(eckey, NULL);
+        if (penclen <= 0)
+            goto err;
+        penc = OPENSSL_malloc(penclen);
+        if (penc == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        p = penc;
+        penclen = i2o_ECPublicKey(eckey, &p);
+        if (penclen <= 0)
+            goto err;
+        ASN1_STRING_set0(pubkey, penc, penclen);
+        pubkey->flags &= ~(ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT | 0x07);
+        pubkey->flags |= ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT;
+
+        penc = NULL;
+        X509_ALGOR_set0(talg, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey),
+                        V_ASN1_UNDEF, NULL);
+    }
+
+    /* See if custom parameters set */
+    kdf_type = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_ecdh_kdf_type(pctx);
+    if (kdf_type <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_ecdh_kdf_md(pctx, &kdf_md))
+        goto err;
+    ecdh_nid = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_ecdh_cofactor_mode(pctx);
+    if (ecdh_nid < 0)
+        goto err;
+    else if (ecdh_nid == 0)
+        ecdh_nid = NID_dh_std_kdf;
+    else if (ecdh_nid == 1)
+        ecdh_nid = NID_dh_cofactor_kdf;
+
+    if (kdf_type == EVP_PKEY_ECDH_KDF_NONE) {
+        kdf_type = EVP_PKEY_ECDH_KDF_X9_62;
+        if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ecdh_kdf_type(pctx, kdf_type) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+    } else
+        /* Unknown KDF */
+        goto err;
+    if (kdf_md == NULL) {
+        /* Fixme later for better MD */
+        kdf_md = EVP_sha1();
+        if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ecdh_kdf_md(pctx, kdf_md) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_alg(ri, &talg, &ukm))
+        goto err;
+
+    /* Lookup NID for KDF+cofactor+digest */
+
+    if (!OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(&kdf_nid, EVP_MD_type(kdf_md), ecdh_nid))
+        goto err;
+    /* Get wrap NID */
+    ctx = CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_ctx(ri);
+    wrap_nid = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_type(ctx);
+    keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
+
+    /* Package wrap algorithm in an AlgorithmIdentifier */
+
+    wrap_alg = X509_ALGOR_new();
+    if (wrap_alg == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    wrap_alg->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(wrap_nid);
+    wrap_alg->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new();
+    if (wrap_alg->parameter == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (EVP_CIPHER_param_to_asn1(ctx, wrap_alg->parameter) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    if (ASN1_TYPE_get(wrap_alg->parameter) == NID_undef) {
+        ASN1_TYPE_free(wrap_alg->parameter);
+        wrap_alg->parameter = NULL;
+    }
+
+    if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ecdh_kdf_outlen(pctx, keylen) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    penclen = CMS_SharedInfo_encode(&penc, wrap_alg, ukm, keylen);
+
+    if (!penclen)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_ecdh_kdf_ukm(pctx, penc, penclen) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    penc = NULL;
+
+    /*
+     * Now need to wrap encoding of wrap AlgorithmIdentifier into parameter
+     * of another AlgorithmIdentifier.
+     */
+    penclen = i2d_X509_ALGOR(wrap_alg, &penc);
+    if (!penc || !penclen)
+        goto err;
+    wrap_str = ASN1_STRING_new();
+    if (wrap_str == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    ASN1_STRING_set0(wrap_str, penc, penclen);
+    penc = NULL;
+    X509_ALGOR_set0(talg, OBJ_nid2obj(kdf_nid), V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, wrap_str);
+
+    rv = 1;
+
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_free(penc);
+    X509_ALGOR_free(wrap_alg);
+    return rv;
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..271178f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1237 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include "ec_lcl.h"
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+
+int EC_GROUP_get_basis_type(const EC_GROUP *group)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)) !=
+        NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field)
+        /* everything else is currently not supported */
+        return 0;
+
+    /* Find the last non-zero element of group->poly[] */
+    for (i = 0;
+         i < (int)OSSL_NELEM(group->poly) && group->poly[i] != 0;
+         i++)
+        continue;
+
+    if (i == 4)
+        return NID_X9_62_ppBasis;
+    else if (i == 2)
+        return NID_X9_62_tpBasis;
+    else
+        /* everything else is currently not supported */
+        return 0;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+int EC_GROUP_get_trinomial_basis(const EC_GROUP *group, unsigned int *k)
+{
+    if (group == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)) !=
+        NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field
+        || !((group->poly[0] != 0) && (group->poly[1] != 0)
+             && (group->poly[2] == 0))) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_TRINOMIAL_BASIS,
+              ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (k)
+        *k = group->poly[1];
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int EC_GROUP_get_pentanomial_basis(const EC_GROUP *group, unsigned int *k1,
+                                   unsigned int *k2, unsigned int *k3)
+{
+    if (group == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)) !=
+        NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field
+        || !((group->poly[0] != 0) && (group->poly[1] != 0)
+             && (group->poly[2] != 0) && (group->poly[3] != 0)
+             && (group->poly[4] == 0))) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_PENTANOMIAL_BASIS,
+              ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (k1)
+        *k1 = group->poly[3];
+    if (k2)
+        *k2 = group->poly[2];
+    if (k3)
+        *k3 = group->poly[1];
+
+    return 1;
+}
+#endif
+
+/* some structures needed for the asn1 encoding */
+typedef struct x9_62_pentanomial_st {
+    long k1;
+    long k2;
+    long k3;
+} X9_62_PENTANOMIAL;
+
+typedef struct x9_62_characteristic_two_st {
+    long m;
+    ASN1_OBJECT *type;
+    union {
+        char *ptr;
+        /* NID_X9_62_onBasis */
+        ASN1_NULL *onBasis;
+        /* NID_X9_62_tpBasis */
+        ASN1_INTEGER *tpBasis;
+        /* NID_X9_62_ppBasis */
+        X9_62_PENTANOMIAL *ppBasis;
+        /* anything else */
+        ASN1_TYPE *other;
+    } p;
+} X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO;
+
+typedef struct x9_62_fieldid_st {
+    ASN1_OBJECT *fieldType;
+    union {
+        char *ptr;
+        /* NID_X9_62_prime_field */
+        ASN1_INTEGER *prime;
+        /* NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field */
+        X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO *char_two;
+        /* anything else */
+        ASN1_TYPE *other;
+    } p;
+} X9_62_FIELDID;
+
+typedef struct x9_62_curve_st {
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *a;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *b;
+    ASN1_BIT_STRING *seed;
+} X9_62_CURVE;
+
+struct ec_parameters_st {
+    long version;
+    X9_62_FIELDID *fieldID;
+    X9_62_CURVE *curve;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *base;
+    ASN1_INTEGER *order;
+    ASN1_INTEGER *cofactor;
+} /* ECPARAMETERS */ ;
+
+struct ecpk_parameters_st {
+    int type;
+    union {
+        ASN1_OBJECT *named_curve;
+        ECPARAMETERS *parameters;
+        ASN1_NULL *implicitlyCA;
+    } value;
+} /* ECPKPARAMETERS */ ;
+
+/* SEC1 ECPrivateKey */
+typedef struct ec_privatekey_st {
+    long version;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *privateKey;
+    ECPKPARAMETERS *parameters;
+    ASN1_BIT_STRING *publicKey;
+} EC_PRIVATEKEY;
+
+/* the OpenSSL ASN.1 definitions */
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(X9_62_PENTANOMIAL) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_PENTANOMIAL, k1, LONG),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_PENTANOMIAL, k2, LONG),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_PENTANOMIAL, k3, LONG)
+} static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(X9_62_PENTANOMIAL)
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(X9_62_PENTANOMIAL)
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(X9_62_PENTANOMIAL)
+
+ASN1_ADB_TEMPLATE(char_two_def) = ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO, p.other, ASN1_ANY);
+
+ASN1_ADB(X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO) = {
+        ADB_ENTRY(NID_X9_62_onBasis, ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO, p.onBasis, ASN1_NULL)),
+        ADB_ENTRY(NID_X9_62_tpBasis, ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO, p.tpBasis, ASN1_INTEGER)),
+        ADB_ENTRY(NID_X9_62_ppBasis, ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO, p.ppBasis, X9_62_PENTANOMIAL))
+} ASN1_ADB_END(X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO, 0, type, 0, &char_two_def_tt, NULL);
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO, m, LONG),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO, type, ASN1_OBJECT),
+        ASN1_ADB_OBJECT(X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO)
+} static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO)
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO)
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO)
+
+ASN1_ADB_TEMPLATE(fieldID_def) = ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_FIELDID, p.other, ASN1_ANY);
+
+ASN1_ADB(X9_62_FIELDID) = {
+        ADB_ENTRY(NID_X9_62_prime_field, ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_FIELDID, p.prime, ASN1_INTEGER)),
+        ADB_ENTRY(NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_FIELDID, p.char_two, X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO))
+} ASN1_ADB_END(X9_62_FIELDID, 0, fieldType, 0, &fieldID_def_tt, NULL);
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(X9_62_FIELDID) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_FIELDID, fieldType, ASN1_OBJECT),
+        ASN1_ADB_OBJECT(X9_62_FIELDID)
+} static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(X9_62_FIELDID)
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(X9_62_CURVE) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_CURVE, a, ASN1_OCTET_STRING),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_CURVE, b, ASN1_OCTET_STRING),
+        ASN1_OPT(X9_62_CURVE, seed, ASN1_BIT_STRING)
+} static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(X9_62_CURVE)
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(ECPARAMETERS) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(ECPARAMETERS, version, LONG),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(ECPARAMETERS, fieldID, X9_62_FIELDID),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(ECPARAMETERS, curve, X9_62_CURVE),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(ECPARAMETERS, base, ASN1_OCTET_STRING),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(ECPARAMETERS, order, ASN1_INTEGER),
+        ASN1_OPT(ECPARAMETERS, cofactor, ASN1_INTEGER)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(ECPARAMETERS)
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(ECPARAMETERS)
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(ECPARAMETERS)
+
+ASN1_CHOICE(ECPKPARAMETERS) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(ECPKPARAMETERS, value.named_curve, ASN1_OBJECT),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(ECPKPARAMETERS, value.parameters, ECPARAMETERS),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(ECPKPARAMETERS, value.implicitlyCA, ASN1_NULL)
+} ASN1_CHOICE_END(ECPKPARAMETERS)
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const(ECPKPARAMETERS)
+DECLARE_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const(ECPKPARAMETERS, ECPKPARAMETERS)
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const(ECPKPARAMETERS)
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(EC_PRIVATEKEY) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(EC_PRIVATEKEY, version, LONG),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(EC_PRIVATEKEY, privateKey, ASN1_OCTET_STRING),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(EC_PRIVATEKEY, parameters, ECPKPARAMETERS, 0),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(EC_PRIVATEKEY, publicKey, ASN1_BIT_STRING, 1)
+} static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(EC_PRIVATEKEY)
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const(EC_PRIVATEKEY)
+DECLARE_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const(EC_PRIVATEKEY, EC_PRIVATEKEY)
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const(EC_PRIVATEKEY)
+
+/* some declarations of internal function */
+
+/* ec_asn1_group2field() sets the values in a X9_62_FIELDID object */
+static int ec_asn1_group2fieldid(const EC_GROUP *, X9_62_FIELDID *);
+/* ec_asn1_group2curve() sets the values in a X9_62_CURVE object */
+static int ec_asn1_group2curve(const EC_GROUP *, X9_62_CURVE *);
+
+/* the function definitions */
+
+static int ec_asn1_group2fieldid(const EC_GROUP *group, X9_62_FIELDID *field)
+{
+    int ok = 0, nid;
+    BIGNUM *tmp = NULL;
+
+    if (group == NULL || field == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    /* clear the old values (if necessary) */
+    ASN1_OBJECT_free(field->fieldType);
+    ASN1_TYPE_free(field->p.other);
+
+    nid = EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group));
+    /* set OID for the field */
+    if ((field->fieldType = OBJ_nid2obj(nid)) == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID, ERR_R_OBJ_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (nid == NID_X9_62_prime_field) {
+        if ((tmp = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        /* the parameters are specified by the prime number p */
+        if (!EC_GROUP_get_curve_GFp(group, tmp, NULL, NULL, NULL)) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        /* set the prime number */
+        field->p.prime = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(tmp, NULL);
+        if (field->p.prime == NULL) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    } else if (nid == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field)
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+    {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID, EC_R_GF2M_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+        goto err;
+    }
+#else
+    {
+        int field_type;
+        X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO *char_two;
+
+        field->p.char_two = X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO_new();
+        char_two = field->p.char_two;
+
+        if (char_two == NULL) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        char_two->m = (long)EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
+
+        field_type = EC_GROUP_get_basis_type(group);
+
+        if (field_type == 0) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        /* set base type OID */
+        if ((char_two->type = OBJ_nid2obj(field_type)) == NULL) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID, ERR_R_OBJ_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        if (field_type == NID_X9_62_tpBasis) {
+            unsigned int k;
+
+            if (!EC_GROUP_get_trinomial_basis(group, &k))
+                goto err;
+
+            char_two->p.tpBasis = ASN1_INTEGER_new();
+            if (char_two->p.tpBasis == NULL) {
+                ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(char_two->p.tpBasis, (long)k)) {
+                ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+                goto err;
+            }
+        } else if (field_type == NID_X9_62_ppBasis) {
+            unsigned int k1, k2, k3;
+
+            if (!EC_GROUP_get_pentanomial_basis(group, &k1, &k2, &k3))
+                goto err;
+
+            char_two->p.ppBasis = X9_62_PENTANOMIAL_new();
+            if (char_two->p.ppBasis == NULL) {
+                ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                goto err;
+            }
+
+            /* set k? values */
+            char_two->p.ppBasis->k1 = (long)k1;
+            char_two->p.ppBasis->k2 = (long)k2;
+            char_two->p.ppBasis->k3 = (long)k3;
+        } else {                /* field_type == NID_X9_62_onBasis */
+
+            /* for ONB the parameters are (asn1) NULL */
+            char_two->p.onBasis = ASN1_NULL_new();
+            if (char_two->p.onBasis == NULL) {
+                ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                goto err;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+#endif
+    else {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID, EC_R_UNSUPPORTED_FIELD);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    ok = 1;
+
+ err:
+    BN_free(tmp);
+    return (ok);
+}
+
+static int ec_asn1_group2curve(const EC_GROUP *group, X9_62_CURVE *curve)
+{
+    int ok = 0, nid;
+    BIGNUM *tmp_1 = NULL, *tmp_2 = NULL;
+    unsigned char *buffer_1 = NULL, *buffer_2 = NULL,
+        *a_buf = NULL, *b_buf = NULL;
+    size_t len_1, len_2;
+    unsigned char char_zero = 0;
+
+    if (!group || !curve || !curve->a || !curve->b)
+        return 0;
+
+    if ((tmp_1 = BN_new()) == NULL || (tmp_2 = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2CURVE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    nid = EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group));
+
+    /* get a and b */
+    if (nid == NID_X9_62_prime_field) {
+        if (!EC_GROUP_get_curve_GFp(group, NULL, tmp_1, tmp_2, NULL)) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2CURVE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+    else {                      /* nid == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field */
+
+        if (!EC_GROUP_get_curve_GF2m(group, NULL, tmp_1, tmp_2, NULL)) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2CURVE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+#endif
+    len_1 = (size_t)BN_num_bytes(tmp_1);
+    len_2 = (size_t)BN_num_bytes(tmp_2);
+
+    if (len_1 == 0) {
+        /* len_1 == 0 => a == 0 */
+        a_buf = &char_zero;
+        len_1 = 1;
+    } else {
+        if ((buffer_1 = OPENSSL_malloc(len_1)) == NULL) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2CURVE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if ((len_1 = BN_bn2bin(tmp_1, buffer_1)) == 0) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2CURVE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        a_buf = buffer_1;
+    }
+
+    if (len_2 == 0) {
+        /* len_2 == 0 => b == 0 */
+        b_buf = &char_zero;
+        len_2 = 1;
+    } else {
+        if ((buffer_2 = OPENSSL_malloc(len_2)) == NULL) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2CURVE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if ((len_2 = BN_bn2bin(tmp_2, buffer_2)) == 0) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2CURVE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        b_buf = buffer_2;
+    }
+
+    /* set a and b */
+    if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(curve->a, a_buf, len_1) ||
+        !ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(curve->b, b_buf, len_2)) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2CURVE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* set the seed (optional) */
+    if (group->seed) {
+        if (!curve->seed)
+            if ((curve->seed = ASN1_BIT_STRING_new()) == NULL) {
+                ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2CURVE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                goto err;
+            }
+        curve->seed->flags &= ~(ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT | 0x07);
+        curve->seed->flags |= ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT;
+        if (!ASN1_BIT_STRING_set(curve->seed, group->seed,
+                                 (int)group->seed_len)) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2CURVE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    } else {
+        ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(curve->seed);
+        curve->seed = NULL;
+    }
+
+    ok = 1;
+
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_free(buffer_1);
+    OPENSSL_free(buffer_2);
+    BN_free(tmp_1);
+    BN_free(tmp_2);
+    return (ok);
+}
+
+ECPARAMETERS *EC_GROUP_get_ecparameters(const EC_GROUP *group,
+                                               ECPARAMETERS *params)
+{
+    size_t len = 0;
+    ECPARAMETERS *ret = NULL;
+    const BIGNUM *tmp;
+    unsigned char *buffer = NULL;
+    const EC_POINT *point = NULL;
+    point_conversion_form_t form;
+
+    if (params == NULL) {
+        if ((ret = ECPARAMETERS_new()) == NULL) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    } else
+        ret = params;
+
+    /* set the version (always one) */
+    ret->version = (long)0x1;
+
+    /* set the fieldID */
+    if (!ec_asn1_group2fieldid(group, ret->fieldID)) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* set the curve */
+    if (!ec_asn1_group2curve(group, ret->curve)) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* set the base point */
+    if ((point = EC_GROUP_get0_generator(group)) == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_UNDEFINED_GENERATOR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    form = EC_GROUP_get_point_conversion_form(group);
+
+    len = EC_POINT_point2buf(group, point, form, &buffer, NULL);
+    if (len == 0) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (ret->base == NULL && (ret->base = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new()) == NULL) {
+        OPENSSL_free(buffer);
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    ASN1_STRING_set0(ret->base, buffer, len);
+
+    /* set the order */
+    tmp = EC_GROUP_get0_order(group);
+    if (tmp == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    ret->order = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(tmp, ret->order);
+    if (ret->order == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* set the cofactor (optional) */
+    tmp = EC_GROUP_get0_cofactor(group);
+    if (tmp != NULL) {
+        ret->cofactor = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(tmp, ret->cofactor);
+        if (ret->cofactor == NULL) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    return ret;
+
+ err:
+    if (params == NULL)
+        ECPARAMETERS_free(ret);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+ECPKPARAMETERS *EC_GROUP_get_ecpkparameters(const EC_GROUP *group,
+                                            ECPKPARAMETERS *params)
+{
+    int ok = 1, tmp;
+    ECPKPARAMETERS *ret = params;
+
+    if (ret == NULL) {
+        if ((ret = ECPKPARAMETERS_new()) == NULL) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_ECPKPARAMETERS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+    } else {
+        if (ret->type == 0)
+            ASN1_OBJECT_free(ret->value.named_curve);
+        else if (ret->type == 1 && ret->value.parameters)
+            ECPARAMETERS_free(ret->value.parameters);
+    }
+
+    if (EC_GROUP_get_asn1_flag(group)) {
+        /*
+         * use the asn1 OID to describe the the elliptic curve parameters
+         */
+        tmp = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group);
+        if (tmp) {
+            ret->type = 0;
+            if ((ret->value.named_curve = OBJ_nid2obj(tmp)) == NULL)
+                ok = 0;
+        } else
+            /* we don't know the nid => ERROR */
+            ok = 0;
+    } else {
+        /* use the ECPARAMETERS structure */
+        ret->type = 1;
+        if ((ret->value.parameters =
+             EC_GROUP_get_ecparameters(group, NULL)) == NULL)
+            ok = 0;
+    }
+
+    if (!ok) {
+        ECPKPARAMETERS_free(ret);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters(const ECPARAMETERS *params)
+{
+    int ok = 0, tmp;
+    EC_GROUP *ret = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *p = NULL, *a = NULL, *b = NULL;
+    EC_POINT *point = NULL;
+    long field_bits;
+
+    if (!params->fieldID || !params->fieldID->fieldType ||
+        !params->fieldID->p.ptr) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_ASN1_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* now extract the curve parameters a and b */
+    if (!params->curve || !params->curve->a ||
+        !params->curve->a->data || !params->curve->b ||
+        !params->curve->b->data) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_ASN1_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    a = BN_bin2bn(params->curve->a->data, params->curve->a->length, NULL);
+    if (a == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    b = BN_bin2bn(params->curve->b->data, params->curve->b->length, NULL);
+    if (b == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* get the field parameters */
+    tmp = OBJ_obj2nid(params->fieldID->fieldType);
+    if (tmp == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field)
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+    {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_GF2M_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+        goto err;
+    }
+#else
+    {
+        X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO *char_two;
+
+        char_two = params->fieldID->p.char_two;
+
+        field_bits = char_two->m;
+        if (field_bits > OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_FIELD_TOO_LARGE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        /* get the base type */
+        tmp = OBJ_obj2nid(char_two->type);
+
+        if (tmp == NID_X9_62_tpBasis) {
+            long tmp_long;
+
+            if (!char_two->p.tpBasis) {
+                ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_ASN1_ERROR);
+                goto err;
+            }
+
+            tmp_long = ASN1_INTEGER_get(char_two->p.tpBasis);
+
+            if (!(char_two->m > tmp_long && tmp_long > 0)) {
+                ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS,
+                      EC_R_INVALID_TRINOMIAL_BASIS);
+                goto err;
+            }
+
+            /* create the polynomial */
+            if (!BN_set_bit(p, (int)char_two->m))
+                goto err;
+            if (!BN_set_bit(p, (int)tmp_long))
+                goto err;
+            if (!BN_set_bit(p, 0))
+                goto err;
+        } else if (tmp == NID_X9_62_ppBasis) {
+            X9_62_PENTANOMIAL *penta;
+
+            penta = char_two->p.ppBasis;
+            if (!penta) {
+                ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_ASN1_ERROR);
+                goto err;
+            }
+
+            if (!
+                (char_two->m > penta->k3 && penta->k3 > penta->k2
+                 && penta->k2 > penta->k1 && penta->k1 > 0)) {
+                ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS,
+                      EC_R_INVALID_PENTANOMIAL_BASIS);
+                goto err;
+            }
+
+            /* create the polynomial */
+            if (!BN_set_bit(p, (int)char_two->m))
+                goto err;
+            if (!BN_set_bit(p, (int)penta->k1))
+                goto err;
+            if (!BN_set_bit(p, (int)penta->k2))
+                goto err;
+            if (!BN_set_bit(p, (int)penta->k3))
+                goto err;
+            if (!BN_set_bit(p, 0))
+                goto err;
+        } else if (tmp == NID_X9_62_onBasis) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
+            goto err;
+        } else {                /* error */
+
+            ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_ASN1_ERROR);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        /* create the EC_GROUP structure */
+        ret = EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m(p, a, b, NULL);
+    }
+#endif
+    else if (tmp == NID_X9_62_prime_field) {
+        /* we have a curve over a prime field */
+        /* extract the prime number */
+        if (!params->fieldID->p.prime) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_ASN1_ERROR);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        p = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(params->fieldID->p.prime, NULL);
+        if (p == NULL) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        if (BN_is_negative(p) || BN_is_zero(p)) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_INVALID_FIELD);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        field_bits = BN_num_bits(p);
+        if (field_bits > OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_FIELD_TOO_LARGE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        /* create the EC_GROUP structure */
+        ret = EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp(p, a, b, NULL);
+    } else {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_INVALID_FIELD);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (ret == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* extract seed (optional) */
+    if (params->curve->seed != NULL) {
+        OPENSSL_free(ret->seed);
+        if ((ret->seed = OPENSSL_malloc(params->curve->seed->length)) == NULL) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        memcpy(ret->seed, params->curve->seed->data,
+               params->curve->seed->length);
+        ret->seed_len = params->curve->seed->length;
+    }
+
+    if (!params->order || !params->base || !params->base->data) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_ASN1_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if ((point = EC_POINT_new(ret)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* set the point conversion form */
+    EC_GROUP_set_point_conversion_form(ret, (point_conversion_form_t)
+                                       (params->base->data[0] & ~0x01));
+
+    /* extract the ec point */
+    if (!EC_POINT_oct2point(ret, point, params->base->data,
+                            params->base->length, NULL)) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* extract the order */
+    if ((a = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(params->order, a)) == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (BN_is_negative(a) || BN_is_zero(a)) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_INVALID_GROUP_ORDER);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (BN_num_bits(a) > (int)field_bits + 1) { /* Hasse bound */
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_INVALID_GROUP_ORDER);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* extract the cofactor (optional) */
+    if (params->cofactor == NULL) {
+        BN_free(b);
+        b = NULL;
+    } else if ((b = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(params->cofactor, b)) == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    /* set the generator, order and cofactor (if present) */
+    if (!EC_GROUP_set_generator(ret, point, a, b)) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    ok = 1;
+
+ err:
+    if (!ok) {
+        EC_GROUP_clear_free(ret);
+        ret = NULL;
+    }
+
+    BN_free(p);
+    BN_free(a);
+    BN_free(b);
+    EC_POINT_free(point);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters(const ECPKPARAMETERS *params)
+{
+    EC_GROUP *ret = NULL;
+    int tmp = 0;
+
+    if (params == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPKPARAMETERS, EC_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    if (params->type == 0) {    /* the curve is given by an OID */
+        tmp = OBJ_obj2nid(params->value.named_curve);
+        if ((ret = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(tmp)) == NULL) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPKPARAMETERS,
+                  EC_R_EC_GROUP_NEW_BY_NAME_FAILURE);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+        EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(ret, OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE);
+    } else if (params->type == 1) { /* the parameters are given by a
+                                     * ECPARAMETERS structure */
+        ret = EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters(params->value.parameters);
+        if (!ret) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPKPARAMETERS, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+        EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(ret, 0x0);
+    } else if (params->type == 2) { /* implicitlyCA */
+        return NULL;
+    } else {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPKPARAMETERS, EC_R_ASN1_ERROR);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/* EC_GROUP <-> DER encoding of ECPKPARAMETERS */
+
+EC_GROUP *d2i_ECPKParameters(EC_GROUP **a, const unsigned char **in, long len)
+{
+    EC_GROUP *group = NULL;
+    ECPKPARAMETERS *params = NULL;
+    const unsigned char *p = *in;
+
+    if ((params = d2i_ECPKPARAMETERS(NULL, &p, len)) == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPKPARAMETERS, EC_R_D2I_ECPKPARAMETERS_FAILURE);
+        ECPKPARAMETERS_free(params);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    if ((group = EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters(params)) == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPKPARAMETERS, EC_R_PKPARAMETERS2GROUP_FAILURE);
+        ECPKPARAMETERS_free(params);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    if (a) {
+        EC_GROUP_clear_free(*a);
+        *a = group;
+    }
+
+    ECPKPARAMETERS_free(params);
+    *in = p;
+    return (group);
+}
+
+int i2d_ECPKParameters(const EC_GROUP *a, unsigned char **out)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    ECPKPARAMETERS *tmp = EC_GROUP_get_ecpkparameters(a, NULL);
+    if (tmp == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPKPARAMETERS, EC_R_GROUP2PKPARAMETERS_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if ((ret = i2d_ECPKPARAMETERS(tmp, out)) == 0) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPKPARAMETERS, EC_R_I2D_ECPKPARAMETERS_FAILURE);
+        ECPKPARAMETERS_free(tmp);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    ECPKPARAMETERS_free(tmp);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+/* some EC_KEY functions */
+
+EC_KEY *d2i_ECPrivateKey(EC_KEY **a, const unsigned char **in, long len)
+{
+    EC_KEY *ret = NULL;
+    EC_PRIVATEKEY *priv_key = NULL;
+    const unsigned char *p = *in;
+
+    if ((priv_key = d2i_EC_PRIVATEKEY(NULL, &p, len)) == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    if (a == NULL || *a == NULL) {
+        if ((ret = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    } else
+        ret = *a;
+
+    if (priv_key->parameters) {
+        EC_GROUP_clear_free(ret->group);
+        ret->group = EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters(priv_key->parameters);
+    }
+
+    if (ret->group == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    ret->version = priv_key->version;
+
+    if (priv_key->privateKey) {
+        ASN1_OCTET_STRING *pkey = priv_key->privateKey;
+        if (EC_KEY_oct2priv(ret, ASN1_STRING_get0_data(pkey),
+                            ASN1_STRING_length(pkey)) == 0)
+            goto err;
+    } else {
+        ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, EC_R_MISSING_PRIVATE_KEY);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    EC_POINT_clear_free(ret->pub_key);
+    ret->pub_key = EC_POINT_new(ret->group);
+    if (ret->pub_key == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (priv_key->publicKey) {
+        const unsigned char *pub_oct;
+        int pub_oct_len;
+
+        pub_oct = ASN1_STRING_get0_data(priv_key->publicKey);
+        pub_oct_len = ASN1_STRING_length(priv_key->publicKey);
+        if (!EC_KEY_oct2key(ret, pub_oct, pub_oct_len, NULL)) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    } else {
+        if (ret->group->meth->keygenpub == NULL
+            || ret->group->meth->keygenpub(ret) == 0)
+                goto err;
+        /* Remember the original private-key-only encoding. */
+        ret->enc_flag |= EC_PKEY_NO_PUBKEY;
+    }
+
+    if (a)
+        *a = ret;
+    EC_PRIVATEKEY_free(priv_key);
+    *in = p;
+    return (ret);
+
+ err:
+    if (a == NULL || *a != ret)
+        EC_KEY_free(ret);
+    EC_PRIVATEKEY_free(priv_key);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+int i2d_ECPrivateKey(EC_KEY *a, unsigned char **out)
+{
+    int ret = 0, ok = 0;
+    unsigned char *priv= NULL, *pub= NULL;
+    size_t privlen = 0, publen = 0;
+
+    EC_PRIVATEKEY *priv_key = NULL;
+
+    if (a == NULL || a->group == NULL ||
+        (!(a->enc_flag & EC_PKEY_NO_PUBKEY) && a->pub_key == NULL)) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if ((priv_key = EC_PRIVATEKEY_new()) == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    priv_key->version = a->version;
+
+    privlen = EC_KEY_priv2buf(a, &priv);
+
+    if (privlen == 0) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    ASN1_STRING_set0(priv_key->privateKey, priv, privlen);
+    priv = NULL;
+
+    if (!(a->enc_flag & EC_PKEY_NO_PARAMETERS)) {
+        if ((priv_key->parameters =
+             EC_GROUP_get_ecpkparameters(a->group,
+                                        priv_key->parameters)) == NULL) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (!(a->enc_flag & EC_PKEY_NO_PUBKEY)) {
+        priv_key->publicKey = ASN1_BIT_STRING_new();
+        if (priv_key->publicKey == NULL) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        publen = EC_KEY_key2buf(a, a->conv_form, &pub, NULL);
+
+        if (publen == 0) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        priv_key->publicKey->flags &= ~(ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT | 0x07);
+        priv_key->publicKey->flags |= ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT;
+        ASN1_STRING_set0(priv_key->publicKey, pub, publen);
+        pub = NULL;
+    }
+
+    if ((ret = i2d_EC_PRIVATEKEY(priv_key, out)) == 0) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    ok = 1;
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(priv, privlen);
+    OPENSSL_free(pub);
+    EC_PRIVATEKEY_free(priv_key);
+    return (ok ? ret : 0);
+}
+
+int i2d_ECParameters(EC_KEY *a, unsigned char **out)
+{
+    if (a == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return i2d_ECPKParameters(a->group, out);
+}
+
+EC_KEY *d2i_ECParameters(EC_KEY **a, const unsigned char **in, long len)
+{
+    EC_KEY *ret;
+
+    if (in == NULL || *in == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    if (a == NULL || *a == NULL) {
+        if ((ret = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+    } else
+        ret = *a;
+
+    if (!d2i_ECPKParameters(&ret->group, in, len)) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+        if (a == NULL || *a != ret)
+             EC_KEY_free(ret);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    if (a)
+        *a = ret;
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+EC_KEY *o2i_ECPublicKey(EC_KEY **a, const unsigned char **in, long len)
+{
+    EC_KEY *ret = NULL;
+
+    if (a == NULL || (*a) == NULL || (*a)->group == NULL) {
+        /*
+         * sorry, but a EC_GROUP-structure is necessary to set the public key
+         */
+        ECerr(EC_F_O2I_ECPUBLICKEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    ret = *a;
+    if (!EC_KEY_oct2key(ret, *in, len, NULL)) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_O2I_ECPUBLICKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    *in += len;
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int i2o_ECPublicKey(const EC_KEY *a, unsigned char **out)
+{
+    size_t buf_len = 0;
+    int new_buffer = 0;
+
+    if (a == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_I2O_ECPUBLICKEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    buf_len = EC_POINT_point2oct(a->group, a->pub_key,
+                                 a->conv_form, NULL, 0, NULL);
+
+    if (out == NULL || buf_len == 0)
+        /* out == NULL => just return the length of the octet string */
+        return buf_len;
+
+    if (*out == NULL) {
+        if ((*out = OPENSSL_malloc(buf_len)) == NULL) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_I2O_ECPUBLICKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        new_buffer = 1;
+    }
+    if (!EC_POINT_point2oct(a->group, a->pub_key, a->conv_form,
+                            *out, buf_len, NULL)) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_I2O_ECPUBLICKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+        if (new_buffer) {
+            OPENSSL_free(*out);
+            *out = NULL;
+        }
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (!new_buffer)
+        *out += buf_len;
+    return buf_len;
+}
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(ECDSA_SIG) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(ECDSA_SIG, r, CBIGNUM),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(ECDSA_SIG, s, CBIGNUM)
+} static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(ECDSA_SIG)
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const(ECDSA_SIG)
+DECLARE_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const(ECDSA_SIG, ECDSA_SIG)
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const_fname(ECDSA_SIG, ECDSA_SIG, ECDSA_SIG)
+
+ECDSA_SIG *ECDSA_SIG_new(void)
+{
+    ECDSA_SIG *sig = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*sig));
+    if (sig == NULL)
+        ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIG_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return sig;
+}
+
+void ECDSA_SIG_free(ECDSA_SIG *sig)
+{
+    if (sig == NULL)
+        return;
+    BN_clear_free(sig->r);
+    BN_clear_free(sig->s);
+    OPENSSL_free(sig);
+}
+
+void ECDSA_SIG_get0(const ECDSA_SIG *sig, const BIGNUM **pr, const BIGNUM **ps)
+{
+    if (pr != NULL)
+        *pr = sig->r;
+    if (ps != NULL)
+        *ps = sig->s;
+}
+
+int ECDSA_SIG_set0(ECDSA_SIG *sig, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *s)
+{
+    if (r == NULL || s == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    BN_clear_free(sig->r);
+    BN_clear_free(sig->s);
+    sig->r = r;
+    sig->s = s;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int ECDSA_size(const EC_KEY *r)
+{
+    int ret, i;
+    ASN1_INTEGER bs;
+    unsigned char buf[4];
+    const EC_GROUP *group;
+
+    if (r == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    group = EC_KEY_get0_group(r);
+    if (group == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    i = EC_GROUP_order_bits(group);
+    if (i == 0)
+        return 0;
+    bs.length = (i + 7) / 8;
+    bs.data = buf;
+    bs.type = V_ASN1_INTEGER;
+    /* If the top bit is set the asn1 encoding is 1 larger. */
+    buf[0] = 0xff;
+
+    i = i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(&bs, NULL);
+    i += i;                     /* r and s */
+    ret = ASN1_object_size(1, i, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE);
+    return (ret);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ec_check.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ec_check.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..eeb06ec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ec_check.c
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "ec_lcl.h"
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+int EC_GROUP_check(const EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    const BIGNUM *order;
+    BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
+    EC_POINT *point = NULL;
+
+    /* Custom curves assumed to be correct */
+    if ((group->meth->flags & EC_FLAGS_CUSTOM_CURVE) != 0)
+        return 1;
+
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+        ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+        if (ctx == NULL) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_CHECK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* check the discriminant */
+    if (!EC_GROUP_check_discriminant(group, ctx)) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_CHECK, EC_R_DISCRIMINANT_IS_ZERO);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* check the generator */
+    if (group->generator == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_CHECK, EC_R_UNDEFINED_GENERATOR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, group->generator, ctx) <= 0) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_CHECK, EC_R_POINT_IS_NOT_ON_CURVE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* check the order of the generator */
+    if ((point = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(group);
+    if (order == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (BN_is_zero(order)) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_CHECK, EC_R_UNDEFINED_ORDER);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, point, order, NULL, NULL, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    if (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, point)) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_CHECK, EC_R_INVALID_GROUP_ORDER);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+    BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
+    EC_POINT_free(point);
+    return ret;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ec_curve.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ec_curve.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f8a3846
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ec_curve.c
@@ -0,0 +1,3169 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ *
+ * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ *
+ * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license provided above.
+ *
+ * The elliptic curve binary polynomial software is originally written by
+ * Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include "ec_lcl.h"
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/obj_mac.h>
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+#include "e_os.h"
+
+typedef struct {
+    int field_type,             /* either NID_X9_62_prime_field or
+                                 * NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field */
+     seed_len, param_len;
+    unsigned int cofactor;      /* promoted to BN_ULONG */
+} EC_CURVE_DATA;
+
+/* the nist prime curves */
+static const struct {
+    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
+    unsigned char data[20 + 24 * 6];
+} _EC_NIST_PRIME_192 = {
+    {
+        NID_X9_62_prime_field, 20, 24, 1
+    },
+    {
+        /* seed */
+        0x30, 0x45, 0xAE, 0x6F, 0xC8, 0x42, 0x2F, 0x64, 0xED, 0x57, 0x95, 0x28,
+        0xD3, 0x81, 0x20, 0xEA, 0xE1, 0x21, 0x96, 0xD5,
+        /* p */
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        /* a */
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFC,
+        /* b */
+        0x64, 0x21, 0x05, 0x19, 0xE5, 0x9C, 0x80, 0xE7, 0x0F, 0xA7, 0xE9, 0xAB,
+        0x72, 0x24, 0x30, 0x49, 0xFE, 0xB8, 0xDE, 0xEC, 0xC1, 0x46, 0xB9, 0xB1,
+        /* x */
+        0x18, 0x8D, 0xA8, 0x0E, 0xB0, 0x30, 0x90, 0xF6, 0x7C, 0xBF, 0x20, 0xEB,
+        0x43, 0xA1, 0x88, 0x00, 0xF4, 0xFF, 0x0A, 0xFD, 0x82, 0xFF, 0x10, 0x12,
+        /* y */
+        0x07, 0x19, 0x2b, 0x95, 0xff, 0xc8, 0xda, 0x78, 0x63, 0x10, 0x11, 0xed,
+        0x6b, 0x24, 0xcd, 0xd5, 0x73, 0xf9, 0x77, 0xa1, 0x1e, 0x79, 0x48, 0x11,
+        /* order */
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0x99, 0xDE, 0xF8, 0x36, 0x14, 0x6B, 0xC9, 0xB1, 0xB4, 0xD2, 0x28, 0x31
+    }
+};
+
+static const struct {
+    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
+    unsigned char data[20 + 28 * 6];
+} _EC_NIST_PRIME_224 = {
+    {
+        NID_X9_62_prime_field, 20, 28, 1
+    },
+    {
+        /* seed */
+        0xBD, 0x71, 0x34, 0x47, 0x99, 0xD5, 0xC7, 0xFC, 0xDC, 0x45, 0xB5, 0x9F,
+        0xA3, 0xB9, 0xAB, 0x8F, 0x6A, 0x94, 0x8B, 0xC5,
+        /* p */
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+        /* a */
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE,
+        /* b */
+        0xB4, 0x05, 0x0A, 0x85, 0x0C, 0x04, 0xB3, 0xAB, 0xF5, 0x41, 0x32, 0x56,
+        0x50, 0x44, 0xB0, 0xB7, 0xD7, 0xBF, 0xD8, 0xBA, 0x27, 0x0B, 0x39, 0x43,
+        0x23, 0x55, 0xFF, 0xB4,
+        /* x */
+        0xB7, 0x0E, 0x0C, 0xBD, 0x6B, 0xB4, 0xBF, 0x7F, 0x32, 0x13, 0x90, 0xB9,
+        0x4A, 0x03, 0xC1, 0xD3, 0x56, 0xC2, 0x11, 0x22, 0x34, 0x32, 0x80, 0xD6,
+        0x11, 0x5C, 0x1D, 0x21,
+        /* y */
+        0xbd, 0x37, 0x63, 0x88, 0xb5, 0xf7, 0x23, 0xfb, 0x4c, 0x22, 0xdf, 0xe6,
+        0xcd, 0x43, 0x75, 0xa0, 0x5a, 0x07, 0x47, 0x64, 0x44, 0xd5, 0x81, 0x99,
+        0x85, 0x00, 0x7e, 0x34,
+        /* order */
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0x16, 0xA2, 0xE0, 0xB8, 0xF0, 0x3E, 0x13, 0xDD, 0x29, 0x45,
+        0x5C, 0x5C, 0x2A, 0x3D
+    }
+};
+
+static const struct {
+    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
+    unsigned char data[20 + 48 * 6];
+} _EC_NIST_PRIME_384 = {
+    {
+        NID_X9_62_prime_field, 20, 48, 1
+    },
+    {
+        /* seed */
+        0xA3, 0x35, 0x92, 0x6A, 0xA3, 0x19, 0xA2, 0x7A, 0x1D, 0x00, 0x89, 0x6A,
+        0x67, 0x73, 0xA4, 0x82, 0x7A, 0xCD, 0xAC, 0x73,
+        /* p */
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        /* a */
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFC,
+        /* b */
+        0xB3, 0x31, 0x2F, 0xA7, 0xE2, 0x3E, 0xE7, 0xE4, 0x98, 0x8E, 0x05, 0x6B,
+        0xE3, 0xF8, 0x2D, 0x19, 0x18, 0x1D, 0x9C, 0x6E, 0xFE, 0x81, 0x41, 0x12,
+        0x03, 0x14, 0x08, 0x8F, 0x50, 0x13, 0x87, 0x5A, 0xC6, 0x56, 0x39, 0x8D,
+        0x8A, 0x2E, 0xD1, 0x9D, 0x2A, 0x85, 0xC8, 0xED, 0xD3, 0xEC, 0x2A, 0xEF,
+        /* x */
+        0xAA, 0x87, 0xCA, 0x22, 0xBE, 0x8B, 0x05, 0x37, 0x8E, 0xB1, 0xC7, 0x1E,
+        0xF3, 0x20, 0xAD, 0x74, 0x6E, 0x1D, 0x3B, 0x62, 0x8B, 0xA7, 0x9B, 0x98,
+        0x59, 0xF7, 0x41, 0xE0, 0x82, 0x54, 0x2A, 0x38, 0x55, 0x02, 0xF2, 0x5D,
+        0xBF, 0x55, 0x29, 0x6C, 0x3A, 0x54, 0x5E, 0x38, 0x72, 0x76, 0x0A, 0xB7,
+        /* y */
+        0x36, 0x17, 0xde, 0x4a, 0x96, 0x26, 0x2c, 0x6f, 0x5d, 0x9e, 0x98, 0xbf,
+        0x92, 0x92, 0xdc, 0x29, 0xf8, 0xf4, 0x1d, 0xbd, 0x28, 0x9a, 0x14, 0x7c,
+        0xe9, 0xda, 0x31, 0x13, 0xb5, 0xf0, 0xb8, 0xc0, 0x0a, 0x60, 0xb1, 0xce,
+        0x1d, 0x7e, 0x81, 0x9d, 0x7a, 0x43, 0x1d, 0x7c, 0x90, 0xea, 0x0e, 0x5f,
+        /* order */
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0xC7, 0x63, 0x4D, 0x81, 0xF4, 0x37, 0x2D, 0xDF, 0x58, 0x1A, 0x0D, 0xB2,
+        0x48, 0xB0, 0xA7, 0x7A, 0xEC, 0xEC, 0x19, 0x6A, 0xCC, 0xC5, 0x29, 0x73
+    }
+};
+
+static const struct {
+    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
+    unsigned char data[20 + 66 * 6];
+} _EC_NIST_PRIME_521 = {
+    {
+        NID_X9_62_prime_field, 20, 66, 1
+    },
+    {
+        /* seed */
+        0xD0, 0x9E, 0x88, 0x00, 0x29, 0x1C, 0xB8, 0x53, 0x96, 0xCC, 0x67, 0x17,
+        0x39, 0x32, 0x84, 0xAA, 0xA0, 0xDA, 0x64, 0xBA,
+        /* p */
+        0x01, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        /* a */
+        0x01, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFC,
+        /* b */
+        0x00, 0x51, 0x95, 0x3E, 0xB9, 0x61, 0x8E, 0x1C, 0x9A, 0x1F, 0x92, 0x9A,
+        0x21, 0xA0, 0xB6, 0x85, 0x40, 0xEE, 0xA2, 0xDA, 0x72, 0x5B, 0x99, 0xB3,
+        0x15, 0xF3, 0xB8, 0xB4, 0x89, 0x91, 0x8E, 0xF1, 0x09, 0xE1, 0x56, 0x19,
+        0x39, 0x51, 0xEC, 0x7E, 0x93, 0x7B, 0x16, 0x52, 0xC0, 0xBD, 0x3B, 0xB1,
+        0xBF, 0x07, 0x35, 0x73, 0xDF, 0x88, 0x3D, 0x2C, 0x34, 0xF1, 0xEF, 0x45,
+        0x1F, 0xD4, 0x6B, 0x50, 0x3F, 0x00,
+        /* x */
+        0x00, 0xC6, 0x85, 0x8E, 0x06, 0xB7, 0x04, 0x04, 0xE9, 0xCD, 0x9E, 0x3E,
+        0xCB, 0x66, 0x23, 0x95, 0xB4, 0x42, 0x9C, 0x64, 0x81, 0x39, 0x05, 0x3F,
+        0xB5, 0x21, 0xF8, 0x28, 0xAF, 0x60, 0x6B, 0x4D, 0x3D, 0xBA, 0xA1, 0x4B,
+        0x5E, 0x77, 0xEF, 0xE7, 0x59, 0x28, 0xFE, 0x1D, 0xC1, 0x27, 0xA2, 0xFF,
+        0xA8, 0xDE, 0x33, 0x48, 0xB3, 0xC1, 0x85, 0x6A, 0x42, 0x9B, 0xF9, 0x7E,
+        0x7E, 0x31, 0xC2, 0xE5, 0xBD, 0x66,
+        /* y */
+        0x01, 0x18, 0x39, 0x29, 0x6a, 0x78, 0x9a, 0x3b, 0xc0, 0x04, 0x5c, 0x8a,
+        0x5f, 0xb4, 0x2c, 0x7d, 0x1b, 0xd9, 0x98, 0xf5, 0x44, 0x49, 0x57, 0x9b,
+        0x44, 0x68, 0x17, 0xaf, 0xbd, 0x17, 0x27, 0x3e, 0x66, 0x2c, 0x97, 0xee,
+        0x72, 0x99, 0x5e, 0xf4, 0x26, 0x40, 0xc5, 0x50, 0xb9, 0x01, 0x3f, 0xad,
+        0x07, 0x61, 0x35, 0x3c, 0x70, 0x86, 0xa2, 0x72, 0xc2, 0x40, 0x88, 0xbe,
+        0x94, 0x76, 0x9f, 0xd1, 0x66, 0x50,
+        /* order */
+        0x01, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFA, 0x51, 0x86,
+        0x87, 0x83, 0xBF, 0x2F, 0x96, 0x6B, 0x7F, 0xCC, 0x01, 0x48, 0xF7, 0x09,
+        0xA5, 0xD0, 0x3B, 0xB5, 0xC9, 0xB8, 0x89, 0x9C, 0x47, 0xAE, 0xBB, 0x6F,
+        0xB7, 0x1E, 0x91, 0x38, 0x64, 0x09
+    }
+};
+
+/* the x9.62 prime curves (minus the nist prime curves) */
+static const struct {
+    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
+    unsigned char data[20 + 24 * 6];
+} _EC_X9_62_PRIME_192V2 = {
+    {
+        NID_X9_62_prime_field, 20, 24, 1
+    },
+    {
+        /* seed */
+        0x31, 0xA9, 0x2E, 0xE2, 0x02, 0x9F, 0xD1, 0x0D, 0x90, 0x1B, 0x11, 0x3E,
+        0x99, 0x07, 0x10, 0xF0, 0xD2, 0x1A, 0xC6, 0xB6,
+        /* p */
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        /* a */
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFC,
+        /* b */
+        0xCC, 0x22, 0xD6, 0xDF, 0xB9, 0x5C, 0x6B, 0x25, 0xE4, 0x9C, 0x0D, 0x63,
+        0x64, 0xA4, 0xE5, 0x98, 0x0C, 0x39, 0x3A, 0xA2, 0x16, 0x68, 0xD9, 0x53,
+        /* x */
+        0xEE, 0xA2, 0xBA, 0xE7, 0xE1, 0x49, 0x78, 0x42, 0xF2, 0xDE, 0x77, 0x69,
+        0xCF, 0xE9, 0xC9, 0x89, 0xC0, 0x72, 0xAD, 0x69, 0x6F, 0x48, 0x03, 0x4A,
+        /* y */
+        0x65, 0x74, 0xd1, 0x1d, 0x69, 0xb6, 0xec, 0x7a, 0x67, 0x2b, 0xb8, 0x2a,
+        0x08, 0x3d, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xb0, 0x84, 0x7d, 0xe9, 0x70, 0xb2, 0xde, 0x15,
+        /* order */
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE,
+        0x5F, 0xB1, 0xA7, 0x24, 0xDC, 0x80, 0x41, 0x86, 0x48, 0xD8, 0xDD, 0x31
+    }
+};
+
+static const struct {
+    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
+    unsigned char data[20 + 24 * 6];
+} _EC_X9_62_PRIME_192V3 = {
+    {
+        NID_X9_62_prime_field, 20, 24, 1
+    },
+    {
+        /* seed */
+        0xC4, 0x69, 0x68, 0x44, 0x35, 0xDE, 0xB3, 0x78, 0xC4, 0xB6, 0x5C, 0xA9,
+        0x59, 0x1E, 0x2A, 0x57, 0x63, 0x05, 0x9A, 0x2E,
+        /* p */
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        /* a */
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFC,
+        /* b */
+        0x22, 0x12, 0x3D, 0xC2, 0x39, 0x5A, 0x05, 0xCA, 0xA7, 0x42, 0x3D, 0xAE,
+        0xCC, 0xC9, 0x47, 0x60, 0xA7, 0xD4, 0x62, 0x25, 0x6B, 0xD5, 0x69, 0x16,
+        /* x */
+        0x7D, 0x29, 0x77, 0x81, 0x00, 0xC6, 0x5A, 0x1D, 0xA1, 0x78, 0x37, 0x16,
+        0x58, 0x8D, 0xCE, 0x2B, 0x8B, 0x4A, 0xEE, 0x8E, 0x22, 0x8F, 0x18, 0x96,
+        /* y */
+        0x38, 0xa9, 0x0f, 0x22, 0x63, 0x73, 0x37, 0x33, 0x4b, 0x49, 0xdc, 0xb6,
+        0x6a, 0x6d, 0xc8, 0xf9, 0x97, 0x8a, 0xca, 0x76, 0x48, 0xa9, 0x43, 0xb0,
+        /* order */
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0x7A, 0x62, 0xD0, 0x31, 0xC8, 0x3F, 0x42, 0x94, 0xF6, 0x40, 0xEC, 0x13
+    }
+};
+
+static const struct {
+    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
+    unsigned char data[20 + 30 * 6];
+} _EC_X9_62_PRIME_239V1 = {
+    {
+        NID_X9_62_prime_field, 20, 30, 1
+    },
+    {
+        /* seed */
+        0xE4, 0x3B, 0xB4, 0x60, 0xF0, 0xB8, 0x0C, 0xC0, 0xC0, 0xB0, 0x75, 0x79,
+        0x8E, 0x94, 0x80, 0x60, 0xF8, 0x32, 0x1B, 0x7D,
+        /* p */
+        0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        /* a */
+        0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFC,
+        /* b */
+        0x6B, 0x01, 0x6C, 0x3B, 0xDC, 0xF1, 0x89, 0x41, 0xD0, 0xD6, 0x54, 0x92,
+        0x14, 0x75, 0xCA, 0x71, 0xA9, 0xDB, 0x2F, 0xB2, 0x7D, 0x1D, 0x37, 0x79,
+        0x61, 0x85, 0xC2, 0x94, 0x2C, 0x0A,
+        /* x */
+        0x0F, 0xFA, 0x96, 0x3C, 0xDC, 0xA8, 0x81, 0x6C, 0xCC, 0x33, 0xB8, 0x64,
+        0x2B, 0xED, 0xF9, 0x05, 0xC3, 0xD3, 0x58, 0x57, 0x3D, 0x3F, 0x27, 0xFB,
+        0xBD, 0x3B, 0x3C, 0xB9, 0xAA, 0xAF,
+        /* y */
+        0x7d, 0xeb, 0xe8, 0xe4, 0xe9, 0x0a, 0x5d, 0xae, 0x6e, 0x40, 0x54, 0xca,
+        0x53, 0x0b, 0xa0, 0x46, 0x54, 0xb3, 0x68, 0x18, 0xce, 0x22, 0x6b, 0x39,
+        0xfc, 0xcb, 0x7b, 0x02, 0xf1, 0xae,
+        /* order */
+        0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x9E, 0x5E, 0x9A, 0x9F, 0x5D, 0x90, 0x71, 0xFB, 0xD1,
+        0x52, 0x26, 0x88, 0x90, 0x9D, 0x0B
+    }
+};
+
+static const struct {
+    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
+    unsigned char data[20 + 30 * 6];
+} _EC_X9_62_PRIME_239V2 = {
+    {
+        NID_X9_62_prime_field, 20, 30, 1
+    },
+    {
+        /* seed */
+        0xE8, 0xB4, 0x01, 0x16, 0x04, 0x09, 0x53, 0x03, 0xCA, 0x3B, 0x80, 0x99,
+        0x98, 0x2B, 0xE0, 0x9F, 0xCB, 0x9A, 0xE6, 0x16,
+        /* p */
+        0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        /* a */
+        0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFC,
+        /* b */
+        0x61, 0x7F, 0xAB, 0x68, 0x32, 0x57, 0x6C, 0xBB, 0xFE, 0xD5, 0x0D, 0x99,
+        0xF0, 0x24, 0x9C, 0x3F, 0xEE, 0x58, 0xB9, 0x4B, 0xA0, 0x03, 0x8C, 0x7A,
+        0xE8, 0x4C, 0x8C, 0x83, 0x2F, 0x2C,
+        /* x */
+        0x38, 0xAF, 0x09, 0xD9, 0x87, 0x27, 0x70, 0x51, 0x20, 0xC9, 0x21, 0xBB,
+        0x5E, 0x9E, 0x26, 0x29, 0x6A, 0x3C, 0xDC, 0xF2, 0xF3, 0x57, 0x57, 0xA0,
+        0xEA, 0xFD, 0x87, 0xB8, 0x30, 0xE7,
+        /* y */
+        0x5b, 0x01, 0x25, 0xe4, 0xdb, 0xea, 0x0e, 0xc7, 0x20, 0x6d, 0xa0, 0xfc,
+        0x01, 0xd9, 0xb0, 0x81, 0x32, 0x9f, 0xb5, 0x55, 0xde, 0x6e, 0xf4, 0x60,
+        0x23, 0x7d, 0xff, 0x8b, 0xe4, 0xba,
+        /* order */
+        0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0xCF, 0xA7, 0xE8, 0x59, 0x43, 0x77, 0xD4, 0x14, 0xC0,
+        0x38, 0x21, 0xBC, 0x58, 0x20, 0x63
+    }
+};
+
+static const struct {
+    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
+    unsigned char data[20 + 30 * 6];
+} _EC_X9_62_PRIME_239V3 = {
+    {
+        NID_X9_62_prime_field, 20, 30, 1
+    },
+    {
+        /* seed */
+        0x7D, 0x73, 0x74, 0x16, 0x8F, 0xFE, 0x34, 0x71, 0xB6, 0x0A, 0x85, 0x76,
+        0x86, 0xA1, 0x94, 0x75, 0xD3, 0xBF, 0xA2, 0xFF,
+        /* p */
+        0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        /* a */
+        0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFC,
+        /* b */
+        0x25, 0x57, 0x05, 0xFA, 0x2A, 0x30, 0x66, 0x54, 0xB1, 0xF4, 0xCB, 0x03,
+        0xD6, 0xA7, 0x50, 0xA3, 0x0C, 0x25, 0x01, 0x02, 0xD4, 0x98, 0x87, 0x17,
+        0xD9, 0xBA, 0x15, 0xAB, 0x6D, 0x3E,
+        /* x */
+        0x67, 0x68, 0xAE, 0x8E, 0x18, 0xBB, 0x92, 0xCF, 0xCF, 0x00, 0x5C, 0x94,
+        0x9A, 0xA2, 0xC6, 0xD9, 0x48, 0x53, 0xD0, 0xE6, 0x60, 0xBB, 0xF8, 0x54,
+        0xB1, 0xC9, 0x50, 0x5F, 0xE9, 0x5A,
+        /* y */
+        0x16, 0x07, 0xe6, 0x89, 0x8f, 0x39, 0x0c, 0x06, 0xbc, 0x1d, 0x55, 0x2b,
+        0xad, 0x22, 0x6f, 0x3b, 0x6f, 0xcf, 0xe4, 0x8b, 0x6e, 0x81, 0x84, 0x99,
+        0xaf, 0x18, 0xe3, 0xed, 0x6c, 0xf3,
+        /* order */
+        0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x97, 0x5D, 0xEB, 0x41, 0xB3, 0xA6, 0x05, 0x7C, 0x3C,
+        0x43, 0x21, 0x46, 0x52, 0x65, 0x51
+    }
+};
+
+static const struct {
+    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
+    unsigned char data[20 + 32 * 6];
+} _EC_X9_62_PRIME_256V1 = {
+    {
+        NID_X9_62_prime_field, 20, 32, 1
+    },
+    {
+        /* seed */
+        0xC4, 0x9D, 0x36, 0x08, 0x86, 0xE7, 0x04, 0x93, 0x6A, 0x66, 0x78, 0xE1,
+        0x13, 0x9D, 0x26, 0xB7, 0x81, 0x9F, 0x7E, 0x90,
+        /* p */
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        /* a */
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFC,
+        /* b */
+        0x5A, 0xC6, 0x35, 0xD8, 0xAA, 0x3A, 0x93, 0xE7, 0xB3, 0xEB, 0xBD, 0x55,
+        0x76, 0x98, 0x86, 0xBC, 0x65, 0x1D, 0x06, 0xB0, 0xCC, 0x53, 0xB0, 0xF6,
+        0x3B, 0xCE, 0x3C, 0x3E, 0x27, 0xD2, 0x60, 0x4B,
+        /* x */
+        0x6B, 0x17, 0xD1, 0xF2, 0xE1, 0x2C, 0x42, 0x47, 0xF8, 0xBC, 0xE6, 0xE5,
+        0x63, 0xA4, 0x40, 0xF2, 0x77, 0x03, 0x7D, 0x81, 0x2D, 0xEB, 0x33, 0xA0,
+        0xF4, 0xA1, 0x39, 0x45, 0xD8, 0x98, 0xC2, 0x96,
+        /* y */
+        0x4f, 0xe3, 0x42, 0xe2, 0xfe, 0x1a, 0x7f, 0x9b, 0x8e, 0xe7, 0xeb, 0x4a,
+        0x7c, 0x0f, 0x9e, 0x16, 0x2b, 0xce, 0x33, 0x57, 0x6b, 0x31, 0x5e, 0xce,
+        0xcb, 0xb6, 0x40, 0x68, 0x37, 0xbf, 0x51, 0xf5,
+        /* order */
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xBC, 0xE6, 0xFA, 0xAD, 0xA7, 0x17, 0x9E, 0x84,
+        0xF3, 0xB9, 0xCA, 0xC2, 0xFC, 0x63, 0x25, 0x51
+    }
+};
+
+/* the secg prime curves (minus the nist and x9.62 prime curves) */
+static const struct {
+    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
+    unsigned char data[20 + 14 * 6];
+} _EC_SECG_PRIME_112R1 = {
+    {
+        NID_X9_62_prime_field, 20, 14, 1
+    },
+    {
+        /* seed */
+        0x00, 0xF5, 0x0B, 0x02, 0x8E, 0x4D, 0x69, 0x6E, 0x67, 0x68, 0x75, 0x61,
+        0x51, 0x75, 0x29, 0x04, 0x72, 0x78, 0x3F, 0xB1,
+        /* p */
+        0xDB, 0x7C, 0x2A, 0xBF, 0x62, 0xE3, 0x5E, 0x66, 0x80, 0x76, 0xBE, 0xAD,
+        0x20, 0x8B,
+        /* a */
+        0xDB, 0x7C, 0x2A, 0xBF, 0x62, 0xE3, 0x5E, 0x66, 0x80, 0x76, 0xBE, 0xAD,
+        0x20, 0x88,
+        /* b */
+        0x65, 0x9E, 0xF8, 0xBA, 0x04, 0x39, 0x16, 0xEE, 0xDE, 0x89, 0x11, 0x70,
+        0x2B, 0x22,
+        /* x */
+        0x09, 0x48, 0x72, 0x39, 0x99, 0x5A, 0x5E, 0xE7, 0x6B, 0x55, 0xF9, 0xC2,
+        0xF0, 0x98,
+        /* y */
+        0xa8, 0x9c, 0xe5, 0xaf, 0x87, 0x24, 0xc0, 0xa2, 0x3e, 0x0e, 0x0f, 0xf7,
+        0x75, 0x00,
+        /* order */
+        0xDB, 0x7C, 0x2A, 0xBF, 0x62, 0xE3, 0x5E, 0x76, 0x28, 0xDF, 0xAC, 0x65,
+        0x61, 0xC5
+    }
+};
+
+static const struct {
+    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
+    unsigned char data[20 + 14 * 6];
+} _EC_SECG_PRIME_112R2 = {
+    {
+        NID_X9_62_prime_field, 20, 14, 4
+    },
+    {
+        /* seed */
+        0x00, 0x27, 0x57, 0xA1, 0x11, 0x4D, 0x69, 0x6E, 0x67, 0x68, 0x75, 0x61,
+        0x51, 0x75, 0x53, 0x16, 0xC0, 0x5E, 0x0B, 0xD4,
+        /* p */
+        0xDB, 0x7C, 0x2A, 0xBF, 0x62, 0xE3, 0x5E, 0x66, 0x80, 0x76, 0xBE, 0xAD,
+        0x20, 0x8B,
+        /* a */
+        0x61, 0x27, 0xC2, 0x4C, 0x05, 0xF3, 0x8A, 0x0A, 0xAA, 0xF6, 0x5C, 0x0E,
+        0xF0, 0x2C,
+        /* b */
+        0x51, 0xDE, 0xF1, 0x81, 0x5D, 0xB5, 0xED, 0x74, 0xFC, 0xC3, 0x4C, 0x85,
+        0xD7, 0x09,
+        /* x */
+        0x4B, 0xA3, 0x0A, 0xB5, 0xE8, 0x92, 0xB4, 0xE1, 0x64, 0x9D, 0xD0, 0x92,
+        0x86, 0x43,
+        /* y */
+        0xad, 0xcd, 0x46, 0xf5, 0x88, 0x2e, 0x37, 0x47, 0xde, 0xf3, 0x6e, 0x95,
+        0x6e, 0x97,
+        /* order */
+        0x36, 0xDF, 0x0A, 0xAF, 0xD8, 0xB8, 0xD7, 0x59, 0x7C, 0xA1, 0x05, 0x20,
+        0xD0, 0x4B
+    }
+};
+
+static const struct {
+    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
+    unsigned char data[20 + 16 * 6];
+} _EC_SECG_PRIME_128R1 = {
+    {
+        NID_X9_62_prime_field, 20, 16, 1
+    },
+    {
+        /* seed */
+        0x00, 0x0E, 0x0D, 0x4D, 0x69, 0x6E, 0x67, 0x68, 0x75, 0x61, 0x51, 0x75,
+        0x0C, 0xC0, 0x3A, 0x44, 0x73, 0xD0, 0x36, 0x79,
+        /* p */
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFD, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        /* a */
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFD, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFC,
+        /* b */
+        0xE8, 0x75, 0x79, 0xC1, 0x10, 0x79, 0xF4, 0x3D, 0xD8, 0x24, 0x99, 0x3C,
+        0x2C, 0xEE, 0x5E, 0xD3,
+        /* x */
+        0x16, 0x1F, 0xF7, 0x52, 0x8B, 0x89, 0x9B, 0x2D, 0x0C, 0x28, 0x60, 0x7C,
+        0xA5, 0x2C, 0x5B, 0x86,
+        /* y */
+        0xcf, 0x5a, 0xc8, 0x39, 0x5b, 0xaf, 0xeb, 0x13, 0xc0, 0x2d, 0xa2, 0x92,
+        0xdd, 0xed, 0x7a, 0x83,
+        /* order */
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x75, 0xA3, 0x0D, 0x1B,
+        0x90, 0x38, 0xA1, 0x15
+    }
+};
+
+static const struct {
+    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
+    unsigned char data[20 + 16 * 6];
+} _EC_SECG_PRIME_128R2 = {
+    {
+        NID_X9_62_prime_field, 20, 16, 4
+    },
+    {
+        /* seed */
+        0x00, 0x4D, 0x69, 0x6E, 0x67, 0x68, 0x75, 0x61, 0x51, 0x75, 0x12, 0xD8,
+        0xF0, 0x34, 0x31, 0xFC, 0xE6, 0x3B, 0x88, 0xF4,
+        /* p */
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFD, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        /* a */
+        0xD6, 0x03, 0x19, 0x98, 0xD1, 0xB3, 0xBB, 0xFE, 0xBF, 0x59, 0xCC, 0x9B,
+        0xBF, 0xF9, 0xAE, 0xE1,
+        /* b */
+        0x5E, 0xEE, 0xFC, 0xA3, 0x80, 0xD0, 0x29, 0x19, 0xDC, 0x2C, 0x65, 0x58,
+        0xBB, 0x6D, 0x8A, 0x5D,
+        /* x */
+        0x7B, 0x6A, 0xA5, 0xD8, 0x5E, 0x57, 0x29, 0x83, 0xE6, 0xFB, 0x32, 0xA7,
+        0xCD, 0xEB, 0xC1, 0x40,
+        /* y */
+        0x27, 0xb6, 0x91, 0x6a, 0x89, 0x4d, 0x3a, 0xee, 0x71, 0x06, 0xfe, 0x80,
+        0x5f, 0xc3, 0x4b, 0x44,
+        /* order */
+        0x3F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xBE, 0x00, 0x24, 0x72,
+        0x06, 0x13, 0xB5, 0xA3
+    }
+};
+
+static const struct {
+    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
+    unsigned char data[0 + 21 * 6];
+} _EC_SECG_PRIME_160K1 = {
+    {
+        NID_X9_62_prime_field, 0, 21, 1
+    },
+    {
+        /* no seed */
+        /* p */
+        0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xAC, 0x73,
+        /* a */
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        /* b */
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x07,
+        /* x */
+        0x00, 0x3B, 0x4C, 0x38, 0x2C, 0xE3, 0x7A, 0xA1, 0x92, 0xA4, 0x01, 0x9E,
+        0x76, 0x30, 0x36, 0xF4, 0xF5, 0xDD, 0x4D, 0x7E, 0xBB,
+        /* y */
+        0x00, 0x93, 0x8c, 0xf9, 0x35, 0x31, 0x8f, 0xdc, 0xed, 0x6b, 0xc2, 0x82,
+        0x86, 0x53, 0x17, 0x33, 0xc3, 0xf0, 0x3c, 0x4f, 0xee,
+        /* order */
+        0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0xB8,
+        0xFA, 0x16, 0xDF, 0xAB, 0x9A, 0xCA, 0x16, 0xB6, 0xB3
+    }
+};
+
+static const struct {
+    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
+    unsigned char data[20 + 21 * 6];
+} _EC_SECG_PRIME_160R1 = {
+    {
+        NID_X9_62_prime_field, 20, 21, 1
+    },
+    {
+        /* seed */
+        0x10, 0x53, 0xCD, 0xE4, 0x2C, 0x14, 0xD6, 0x96, 0xE6, 0x76, 0x87, 0x56,
+        0x15, 0x17, 0x53, 0x3B, 0xF3, 0xF8, 0x33, 0x45,
+        /* p */
+        0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        /* a */
+        0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFC,
+        /* b */
+        0x00, 0x1C, 0x97, 0xBE, 0xFC, 0x54, 0xBD, 0x7A, 0x8B, 0x65, 0xAC, 0xF8,
+        0x9F, 0x81, 0xD4, 0xD4, 0xAD, 0xC5, 0x65, 0xFA, 0x45,
+        /* x */
+        0x00, 0x4A, 0x96, 0xB5, 0x68, 0x8E, 0xF5, 0x73, 0x28, 0x46, 0x64, 0x69,
+        0x89, 0x68, 0xC3, 0x8B, 0xB9, 0x13, 0xCB, 0xFC, 0x82,
+        /* y */
+        0x00, 0x23, 0xa6, 0x28, 0x55, 0x31, 0x68, 0x94, 0x7d, 0x59, 0xdc, 0xc9,
+        0x12, 0x04, 0x23, 0x51, 0x37, 0x7a, 0xc5, 0xfb, 0x32,
+        /* order */
+        0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0xF4,
+        0xC8, 0xF9, 0x27, 0xAE, 0xD3, 0xCA, 0x75, 0x22, 0x57
+    }
+};
+
+static const struct {
+    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
+    unsigned char data[20 + 21 * 6];
+} _EC_SECG_PRIME_160R2 = {
+    {
+        NID_X9_62_prime_field, 20, 21, 1
+    },
+    {
+        /* seed */
+        0xB9, 0x9B, 0x99, 0xB0, 0x99, 0xB3, 0x23, 0xE0, 0x27, 0x09, 0xA4, 0xD6,
+        0x96, 0xE6, 0x76, 0x87, 0x56, 0x15, 0x17, 0x51,
+        /* p */
+        0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xAC, 0x73,
+        /* a */
+        0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xAC, 0x70,
+        /* b */
+        0x00, 0xB4, 0xE1, 0x34, 0xD3, 0xFB, 0x59, 0xEB, 0x8B, 0xAB, 0x57, 0x27,
+        0x49, 0x04, 0x66, 0x4D, 0x5A, 0xF5, 0x03, 0x88, 0xBA,
+        /* x */
+        0x00, 0x52, 0xDC, 0xB0, 0x34, 0x29, 0x3A, 0x11, 0x7E, 0x1F, 0x4F, 0xF1,
+        0x1B, 0x30, 0xF7, 0x19, 0x9D, 0x31, 0x44, 0xCE, 0x6D,
+        /* y */
+        0x00, 0xfe, 0xaf, 0xfe, 0xf2, 0xe3, 0x31, 0xf2, 0x96, 0xe0, 0x71, 0xfa,
+        0x0d, 0xf9, 0x98, 0x2c, 0xfe, 0xa7, 0xd4, 0x3f, 0x2e,
+        /* order */
+        0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x35,
+        0x1E, 0xE7, 0x86, 0xA8, 0x18, 0xF3, 0xA1, 0xA1, 0x6B
+    }
+};
+
+static const struct {
+    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
+    unsigned char data[0 + 24 * 6];
+} _EC_SECG_PRIME_192K1 = {
+    {
+        NID_X9_62_prime_field, 0, 24, 1
+    },
+    {
+        /* no seed */
+        /* p */
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xEE, 0x37,
+        /* a */
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        /* b */
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x03,
+        /* x */
+        0xDB, 0x4F, 0xF1, 0x0E, 0xC0, 0x57, 0xE9, 0xAE, 0x26, 0xB0, 0x7D, 0x02,
+        0x80, 0xB7, 0xF4, 0x34, 0x1D, 0xA5, 0xD1, 0xB1, 0xEA, 0xE0, 0x6C, 0x7D,
+        /* y */
+        0x9b, 0x2f, 0x2f, 0x6d, 0x9c, 0x56, 0x28, 0xa7, 0x84, 0x41, 0x63, 0xd0,
+        0x15, 0xbe, 0x86, 0x34, 0x40, 0x82, 0xaa, 0x88, 0xd9, 0x5e, 0x2f, 0x9d,
+        /* order */
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE,
+        0x26, 0xF2, 0xFC, 0x17, 0x0F, 0x69, 0x46, 0x6A, 0x74, 0xDE, 0xFD, 0x8D
+    }
+};
+
+static const struct {
+    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
+    unsigned char data[0 + 29 * 6];
+} _EC_SECG_PRIME_224K1 = {
+    {
+        NID_X9_62_prime_field, 0, 29, 1
+    },
+    {
+        /* no seed */
+        /* p */
+        0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xE5, 0x6D,
+        /* a */
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        /* b */
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x05,
+        /* x */
+        0x00, 0xA1, 0x45, 0x5B, 0x33, 0x4D, 0xF0, 0x99, 0xDF, 0x30, 0xFC, 0x28,
+        0xA1, 0x69, 0xA4, 0x67, 0xE9, 0xE4, 0x70, 0x75, 0xA9, 0x0F, 0x7E, 0x65,
+        0x0E, 0xB6, 0xB7, 0xA4, 0x5C,
+        /* y */
+        0x00, 0x7e, 0x08, 0x9f, 0xed, 0x7f, 0xba, 0x34, 0x42, 0x82, 0xca, 0xfb,
+        0xd6, 0xf7, 0xe3, 0x19, 0xf7, 0xc0, 0xb0, 0xbd, 0x59, 0xe2, 0xca, 0x4b,
+        0xdb, 0x55, 0x6d, 0x61, 0xa5,
+        /* order */
+        0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0xDC, 0xE8, 0xD2, 0xEC, 0x61, 0x84, 0xCA, 0xF0, 0xA9,
+        0x71, 0x76, 0x9F, 0xB1, 0xF7
+    }
+};
+
+static const struct {
+    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
+    unsigned char data[0 + 32 * 6];
+} _EC_SECG_PRIME_256K1 = {
+    {
+        NID_X9_62_prime_field, 0, 32, 1
+    },
+    {
+        /* no seed */
+        /* p */
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFC, 0x2F,
+        /* a */
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        /* b */
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x07,
+        /* x */
+        0x79, 0xBE, 0x66, 0x7E, 0xF9, 0xDC, 0xBB, 0xAC, 0x55, 0xA0, 0x62, 0x95,
+        0xCE, 0x87, 0x0B, 0x07, 0x02, 0x9B, 0xFC, 0xDB, 0x2D, 0xCE, 0x28, 0xD9,
+        0x59, 0xF2, 0x81, 0x5B, 0x16, 0xF8, 0x17, 0x98,
+        /* y */
+        0x48, 0x3a, 0xda, 0x77, 0x26, 0xa3, 0xc4, 0x65, 0x5d, 0xa4, 0xfb, 0xfc,
+        0x0e, 0x11, 0x08, 0xa8, 0xfd, 0x17, 0xb4, 0x48, 0xa6, 0x85, 0x54, 0x19,
+        0x9c, 0x47, 0xd0, 0x8f, 0xfb, 0x10, 0xd4, 0xb8,
+        /* order */
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xBA, 0xAE, 0xDC, 0xE6, 0xAF, 0x48, 0xA0, 0x3B,
+        0xBF, 0xD2, 0x5E, 0x8C, 0xD0, 0x36, 0x41, 0x41
+    }
+};
+
+/* some wap/wtls curves */
+static const struct {
+    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
+    unsigned char data[0 + 15 * 6];
+} _EC_WTLS_8 = {
+    {
+        NID_X9_62_prime_field, 0, 15, 1
+    },
+    {
+        /* no seed */
+        /* p */
+        0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0xFF, 0xFD, 0xE7,
+        /* a */
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        /* b */
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x03,
+        /* x */
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+        /* y */
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x02,
+        /* order */
+        0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0xEC, 0xEA, 0x55, 0x1A,
+        0xD8, 0x37, 0xE9
+    }
+};
+
+static const struct {
+    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
+    unsigned char data[0 + 21 * 6];
+} _EC_WTLS_9 = {
+    {
+        NID_X9_62_prime_field, 0, 21, 1
+    },
+    {
+        /* no seed */
+        /* p */
+        0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFC, 0x80, 0x8F,
+        /* a */
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        /* b */
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x03,
+        /* x */
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+        /* y */
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02,
+        /* order */
+        0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0xCD,
+        0xC9, 0x8A, 0xE0, 0xE2, 0xDE, 0x57, 0x4A, 0xBF, 0x33
+    }
+};
+
+static const struct {
+    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
+    unsigned char data[0 + 28 * 6];
+} _EC_WTLS_12 = {
+    {
+        NID_X9_62_prime_field, 0, 28, 1
+    },
+    {
+        /* no seed */
+        /* p */
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+        /* a */
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE,
+        /* b */
+        0xB4, 0x05, 0x0A, 0x85, 0x0C, 0x04, 0xB3, 0xAB, 0xF5, 0x41, 0x32, 0x56,
+        0x50, 0x44, 0xB0, 0xB7, 0xD7, 0xBF, 0xD8, 0xBA, 0x27, 0x0B, 0x39, 0x43,
+        0x23, 0x55, 0xFF, 0xB4,
+        /* x */
+        0xB7, 0x0E, 0x0C, 0xBD, 0x6B, 0xB4, 0xBF, 0x7F, 0x32, 0x13, 0x90, 0xB9,
+        0x4A, 0x03, 0xC1, 0xD3, 0x56, 0xC2, 0x11, 0x22, 0x34, 0x32, 0x80, 0xD6,
+        0x11, 0x5C, 0x1D, 0x21,
+        /* y */
+        0xbd, 0x37, 0x63, 0x88, 0xb5, 0xf7, 0x23, 0xfb, 0x4c, 0x22, 0xdf, 0xe6,
+        0xcd, 0x43, 0x75, 0xa0, 0x5a, 0x07, 0x47, 0x64, 0x44, 0xd5, 0x81, 0x99,
+        0x85, 0x00, 0x7e, 0x34,
+        /* order */
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0x16, 0xA2, 0xE0, 0xB8, 0xF0, 0x3E, 0x13, 0xDD, 0x29, 0x45,
+        0x5C, 0x5C, 0x2A, 0x3D
+    }
+};
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+
+/* characteristic two curves */
+static const struct {
+    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
+    unsigned char data[20 + 15 * 6];
+} _EC_SECG_CHAR2_113R1 = {
+    {
+        NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 20, 15, 2
+    },
+    {
+        /* seed */
+        0x10, 0xE7, 0x23, 0xAB, 0x14, 0xD6, 0x96, 0xE6, 0x76, 0x87, 0x56, 0x15,
+        0x17, 0x56, 0xFE, 0xBF, 0x8F, 0xCB, 0x49, 0xA9,
+        /* p */
+        0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x02, 0x01,
+        /* a */
+        0x00, 0x30, 0x88, 0x25, 0x0C, 0xA6, 0xE7, 0xC7, 0xFE, 0x64, 0x9C, 0xE8,
+        0x58, 0x20, 0xF7,
+        /* b */
+        0x00, 0xE8, 0xBE, 0xE4, 0xD3, 0xE2, 0x26, 0x07, 0x44, 0x18, 0x8B, 0xE0,
+        0xE9, 0xC7, 0x23,
+        /* x */
+        0x00, 0x9D, 0x73, 0x61, 0x6F, 0x35, 0xF4, 0xAB, 0x14, 0x07, 0xD7, 0x35,
+        0x62, 0xC1, 0x0F,
+        /* y */
+        0x00, 0xA5, 0x28, 0x30, 0x27, 0x79, 0x58, 0xEE, 0x84, 0xD1, 0x31, 0x5E,
+        0xD3, 0x18, 0x86,
+        /* order */
+        0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xD9, 0xCC, 0xEC, 0x8A,
+        0x39, 0xE5, 0x6F
+    }
+};
+
+static const struct {
+    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
+    unsigned char data[20 + 15 * 6];
+} _EC_SECG_CHAR2_113R2 = {
+    {
+        NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 20, 15, 2
+    },
+    {
+        /* seed */
+        0x10, 0xC0, 0xFB, 0x15, 0x76, 0x08, 0x60, 0xDE, 0xF1, 0xEE, 0xF4, 0xD6,
+        0x96, 0xE6, 0x76, 0x87, 0x56, 0x15, 0x17, 0x5D,
+        /* p */
+        0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x02, 0x01,
+        /* a */
+        0x00, 0x68, 0x99, 0x18, 0xDB, 0xEC, 0x7E, 0x5A, 0x0D, 0xD6, 0xDF, 0xC0,
+        0xAA, 0x55, 0xC7,
+        /* b */
+        0x00, 0x95, 0xE9, 0xA9, 0xEC, 0x9B, 0x29, 0x7B, 0xD4, 0xBF, 0x36, 0xE0,
+        0x59, 0x18, 0x4F,
+        /* x */
+        0x01, 0xA5, 0x7A, 0x6A, 0x7B, 0x26, 0xCA, 0x5E, 0xF5, 0x2F, 0xCD, 0xB8,
+        0x16, 0x47, 0x97,
+        /* y */
+        0x00, 0xB3, 0xAD, 0xC9, 0x4E, 0xD1, 0xFE, 0x67, 0x4C, 0x06, 0xE6, 0x95,
+        0xBA, 0xBA, 0x1D,
+        /* order */
+        0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x08, 0x78, 0x9B, 0x24,
+        0x96, 0xAF, 0x93
+    }
+};
+
+static const struct {
+    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
+    unsigned char data[20 + 17 * 6];
+} _EC_SECG_CHAR2_131R1 = {
+    {
+        NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 20, 17, 2
+    },
+    {
+        /* seed */
+        0x4D, 0x69, 0x6E, 0x67, 0x68, 0x75, 0x61, 0x51, 0x75, 0x98, 0x5B, 0xD3,
+        0xAD, 0xBA, 0xDA, 0x21, 0xB4, 0x3A, 0x97, 0xE2,
+        /* p */
+        0x08, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x0D,
+        /* a */
+        0x07, 0xA1, 0x1B, 0x09, 0xA7, 0x6B, 0x56, 0x21, 0x44, 0x41, 0x8F, 0xF3,
+        0xFF, 0x8C, 0x25, 0x70, 0xB8,
+        /* b */
+        0x02, 0x17, 0xC0, 0x56, 0x10, 0x88, 0x4B, 0x63, 0xB9, 0xC6, 0xC7, 0x29,
+        0x16, 0x78, 0xF9, 0xD3, 0x41,
+        /* x */
+        0x00, 0x81, 0xBA, 0xF9, 0x1F, 0xDF, 0x98, 0x33, 0xC4, 0x0F, 0x9C, 0x18,
+        0x13, 0x43, 0x63, 0x83, 0x99,
+        /* y */
+        0x07, 0x8C, 0x6E, 0x7E, 0xA3, 0x8C, 0x00, 0x1F, 0x73, 0xC8, 0x13, 0x4B,
+        0x1B, 0x4E, 0xF9, 0xE1, 0x50,
+        /* order */
+        0x04, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x31, 0x23, 0x95,
+        0x3A, 0x94, 0x64, 0xB5, 0x4D
+    }
+};
+
+static const struct {
+    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
+    unsigned char data[20 + 17 * 6];
+} _EC_SECG_CHAR2_131R2 = {
+    {
+        NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 20, 17, 2
+    },
+    {
+        /* seed */
+        0x98, 0x5B, 0xD3, 0xAD, 0xBA, 0xD4, 0xD6, 0x96, 0xE6, 0x76, 0x87, 0x56,
+        0x15, 0x17, 0x5A, 0x21, 0xB4, 0x3A, 0x97, 0xE3,
+        /* p */
+        0x08, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x0D,
+        /* a */
+        0x03, 0xE5, 0xA8, 0x89, 0x19, 0xD7, 0xCA, 0xFC, 0xBF, 0x41, 0x5F, 0x07,
+        0xC2, 0x17, 0x65, 0x73, 0xB2,
+        /* b */
+        0x04, 0xB8, 0x26, 0x6A, 0x46, 0xC5, 0x56, 0x57, 0xAC, 0x73, 0x4C, 0xE3,
+        0x8F, 0x01, 0x8F, 0x21, 0x92,
+        /* x */
+        0x03, 0x56, 0xDC, 0xD8, 0xF2, 0xF9, 0x50, 0x31, 0xAD, 0x65, 0x2D, 0x23,
+        0x95, 0x1B, 0xB3, 0x66, 0xA8,
+        /* y */
+        0x06, 0x48, 0xF0, 0x6D, 0x86, 0x79, 0x40, 0xA5, 0x36, 0x6D, 0x9E, 0x26,
+        0x5D, 0xE9, 0xEB, 0x24, 0x0F,
+        /* order */
+        0x04, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x69, 0x54, 0xA2,
+        0x33, 0x04, 0x9B, 0xA9, 0x8F
+    }
+};
+
+static const struct {
+    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
+    unsigned char data[0 + 21 * 6];
+} _EC_NIST_CHAR2_163K = {
+    {
+        NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 0, 21, 2
+    },
+    {
+        /* no seed */
+        /* p */
+        0x08, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xC9,
+        /* a */
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+        /* b */
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+        /* x */
+        0x02, 0xFE, 0x13, 0xC0, 0x53, 0x7B, 0xBC, 0x11, 0xAC, 0xAA, 0x07, 0xD7,
+        0x93, 0xDE, 0x4E, 0x6D, 0x5E, 0x5C, 0x94, 0xEE, 0xE8,
+        /* y */
+        0x02, 0x89, 0x07, 0x0F, 0xB0, 0x5D, 0x38, 0xFF, 0x58, 0x32, 0x1F, 0x2E,
+        0x80, 0x05, 0x36, 0xD5, 0x38, 0xCC, 0xDA, 0xA3, 0xD9,
+        /* order */
+        0x04, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x01,
+        0x08, 0xA2, 0xE0, 0xCC, 0x0D, 0x99, 0xF8, 0xA5, 0xEF
+    }
+};
+
+static const struct {
+    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
+    unsigned char data[0 + 21 * 6];
+} _EC_SECG_CHAR2_163R1 = {
+    {
+        NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 0, 21, 2
+    },
+    {
+        /* p */
+        0x08, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xC9,
+        /* a */
+        0x07, 0xB6, 0x88, 0x2C, 0xAA, 0xEF, 0xA8, 0x4F, 0x95, 0x54, 0xFF, 0x84,
+        0x28, 0xBD, 0x88, 0xE2, 0x46, 0xD2, 0x78, 0x2A, 0xE2,
+        /* b */
+        0x07, 0x13, 0x61, 0x2D, 0xCD, 0xDC, 0xB4, 0x0A, 0xAB, 0x94, 0x6B, 0xDA,
+        0x29, 0xCA, 0x91, 0xF7, 0x3A, 0xF9, 0x58, 0xAF, 0xD9,
+        /* x */
+        0x03, 0x69, 0x97, 0x96, 0x97, 0xAB, 0x43, 0x89, 0x77, 0x89, 0x56, 0x67,
+        0x89, 0x56, 0x7F, 0x78, 0x7A, 0x78, 0x76, 0xA6, 0x54,
+        /* y */
+        0x00, 0x43, 0x5E, 0xDB, 0x42, 0xEF, 0xAF, 0xB2, 0x98, 0x9D, 0x51, 0xFE,
+        0xFC, 0xE3, 0xC8, 0x09, 0x88, 0xF4, 0x1F, 0xF8, 0x83,
+        /* order */
+        0x03, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x48,
+        0xAA, 0xB6, 0x89, 0xC2, 0x9C, 0xA7, 0x10, 0x27, 0x9B
+    }
+};
+
+static const struct {
+    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
+    unsigned char data[0 + 21 * 6];
+} _EC_NIST_CHAR2_163B = {
+    {
+        NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 0, 21, 2
+    },
+    {
+        /* p */
+        0x08, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xC9,
+        /* a */
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+        /* b */
+        0x02, 0x0A, 0x60, 0x19, 0x07, 0xB8, 0xC9, 0x53, 0xCA, 0x14, 0x81, 0xEB,
+        0x10, 0x51, 0x2F, 0x78, 0x74, 0x4A, 0x32, 0x05, 0xFD,
+        /* x */
+        0x03, 0xF0, 0xEB, 0xA1, 0x62, 0x86, 0xA2, 0xD5, 0x7E, 0xA0, 0x99, 0x11,
+        0x68, 0xD4, 0x99, 0x46, 0x37, 0xE8, 0x34, 0x3E, 0x36,
+        /* y */
+        0x00, 0xD5, 0x1F, 0xBC, 0x6C, 0x71, 0xA0, 0x09, 0x4F, 0xA2, 0xCD, 0xD5,
+        0x45, 0xB1, 0x1C, 0x5C, 0x0C, 0x79, 0x73, 0x24, 0xF1,
+        /* order */
+        0x04, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x92,
+        0xFE, 0x77, 0xE7, 0x0C, 0x12, 0xA4, 0x23, 0x4C, 0x33
+    }
+};
+
+static const struct {
+    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
+    unsigned char data[20 + 25 * 6];
+} _EC_SECG_CHAR2_193R1 = {
+    {
+        NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 20, 25, 2
+    },
+    {
+        /* seed */
+        0x10, 0x3F, 0xAE, 0xC7, 0x4D, 0x69, 0x6E, 0x67, 0x68, 0x75, 0x61, 0x51,
+        0x75, 0x77, 0x7F, 0xC5, 0xB1, 0x91, 0xEF, 0x30,
+        /* p */
+        0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80,
+        0x01,
+        /* a */
+        0x00, 0x17, 0x85, 0x8F, 0xEB, 0x7A, 0x98, 0x97, 0x51, 0x69, 0xE1, 0x71,
+        0xF7, 0x7B, 0x40, 0x87, 0xDE, 0x09, 0x8A, 0xC8, 0xA9, 0x11, 0xDF, 0x7B,
+        0x01,
+        /* b */
+        0x00, 0xFD, 0xFB, 0x49, 0xBF, 0xE6, 0xC3, 0xA8, 0x9F, 0xAC, 0xAD, 0xAA,
+        0x7A, 0x1E, 0x5B, 0xBC, 0x7C, 0xC1, 0xC2, 0xE5, 0xD8, 0x31, 0x47, 0x88,
+        0x14,
+        /* x */
+        0x01, 0xF4, 0x81, 0xBC, 0x5F, 0x0F, 0xF8, 0x4A, 0x74, 0xAD, 0x6C, 0xDF,
+        0x6F, 0xDE, 0xF4, 0xBF, 0x61, 0x79, 0x62, 0x53, 0x72, 0xD8, 0xC0, 0xC5,
+        0xE1,
+        /* y */
+        0x00, 0x25, 0xE3, 0x99, 0xF2, 0x90, 0x37, 0x12, 0xCC, 0xF3, 0xEA, 0x9E,
+        0x3A, 0x1A, 0xD1, 0x7F, 0xB0, 0xB3, 0x20, 0x1B, 0x6A, 0xF7, 0xCE, 0x1B,
+        0x05,
+        /* order */
+        0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0xC7, 0xF3, 0x4A, 0x77, 0x8F, 0x44, 0x3A, 0xCC, 0x92, 0x0E, 0xBA,
+        0x49
+    }
+};
+
+static const struct {
+    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
+    unsigned char data[20 + 25 * 6];
+} _EC_SECG_CHAR2_193R2 = {
+    {
+        NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 20, 25, 2
+    },
+    {
+        /* seed */
+        0x10, 0xB7, 0xB4, 0xD6, 0x96, 0xE6, 0x76, 0x87, 0x56, 0x15, 0x17, 0x51,
+        0x37, 0xC8, 0xA1, 0x6F, 0xD0, 0xDA, 0x22, 0x11,
+        /* p */
+        0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80,
+        0x01,
+        /* a */
+        0x01, 0x63, 0xF3, 0x5A, 0x51, 0x37, 0xC2, 0xCE, 0x3E, 0xA6, 0xED, 0x86,
+        0x67, 0x19, 0x0B, 0x0B, 0xC4, 0x3E, 0xCD, 0x69, 0x97, 0x77, 0x02, 0x70,
+        0x9B,
+        /* b */
+        0x00, 0xC9, 0xBB, 0x9E, 0x89, 0x27, 0xD4, 0xD6, 0x4C, 0x37, 0x7E, 0x2A,
+        0xB2, 0x85, 0x6A, 0x5B, 0x16, 0xE3, 0xEF, 0xB7, 0xF6, 0x1D, 0x43, 0x16,
+        0xAE,
+        /* x */
+        0x00, 0xD9, 0xB6, 0x7D, 0x19, 0x2E, 0x03, 0x67, 0xC8, 0x03, 0xF3, 0x9E,
+        0x1A, 0x7E, 0x82, 0xCA, 0x14, 0xA6, 0x51, 0x35, 0x0A, 0xAE, 0x61, 0x7E,
+        0x8F,
+        /* y */
+        0x01, 0xCE, 0x94, 0x33, 0x56, 0x07, 0xC3, 0x04, 0xAC, 0x29, 0xE7, 0xDE,
+        0xFB, 0xD9, 0xCA, 0x01, 0xF5, 0x96, 0xF9, 0x27, 0x22, 0x4C, 0xDE, 0xCF,
+        0x6C,
+        /* order */
+        0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x01, 0x5A, 0xAB, 0x56, 0x1B, 0x00, 0x54, 0x13, 0xCC, 0xD4, 0xEE, 0x99,
+        0xD5
+    }
+};
+
+static const struct {
+    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
+    unsigned char data[0 + 30 * 6];
+} _EC_NIST_CHAR2_233K = {
+    {
+        NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 0, 30, 4
+    },
+    {
+        /* no seed */
+        0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+        /* a */
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        /* b */
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+        /* x */
+        0x01, 0x72, 0x32, 0xBA, 0x85, 0x3A, 0x7E, 0x73, 0x1A, 0xF1, 0x29, 0xF2,
+        0x2F, 0xF4, 0x14, 0x95, 0x63, 0xA4, 0x19, 0xC2, 0x6B, 0xF5, 0x0A, 0x4C,
+        0x9D, 0x6E, 0xEF, 0xAD, 0x61, 0x26,
+        /* y */
+        0x01, 0xDB, 0x53, 0x7D, 0xEC, 0xE8, 0x19, 0xB7, 0xF7, 0x0F, 0x55, 0x5A,
+        0x67, 0xC4, 0x27, 0xA8, 0xCD, 0x9B, 0xF1, 0x8A, 0xEB, 0x9B, 0x56, 0xE0,
+        0xC1, 0x10, 0x56, 0xFA, 0xE6, 0xA3,
+        /* order */
+        0x00, 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x06, 0x9D, 0x5B, 0xB9, 0x15, 0xBC, 0xD4, 0x6E, 0xFB,
+        0x1A, 0xD5, 0xF1, 0x73, 0xAB, 0xDF
+    }
+};
+
+static const struct {
+    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
+    unsigned char data[20 + 30 * 6];
+} _EC_NIST_CHAR2_233B = {
+    {
+        NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 20, 30, 2
+    },
+    {
+        /* seed */
+        0x74, 0xD5, 0x9F, 0xF0, 0x7F, 0x6B, 0x41, 0x3D, 0x0E, 0xA1, 0x4B, 0x34,
+        0x4B, 0x20, 0xA2, 0xDB, 0x04, 0x9B, 0x50, 0xC3,
+        /* p */
+        0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+        /* a */
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+        /* b */
+        0x00, 0x66, 0x64, 0x7E, 0xDE, 0x6C, 0x33, 0x2C, 0x7F, 0x8C, 0x09, 0x23,
+        0xBB, 0x58, 0x21, 0x3B, 0x33, 0x3B, 0x20, 0xE9, 0xCE, 0x42, 0x81, 0xFE,
+        0x11, 0x5F, 0x7D, 0x8F, 0x90, 0xAD,
+        /* x */
+        0x00, 0xFA, 0xC9, 0xDF, 0xCB, 0xAC, 0x83, 0x13, 0xBB, 0x21, 0x39, 0xF1,
+        0xBB, 0x75, 0x5F, 0xEF, 0x65, 0xBC, 0x39, 0x1F, 0x8B, 0x36, 0xF8, 0xF8,
+        0xEB, 0x73, 0x71, 0xFD, 0x55, 0x8B,
+        /* y */
+        0x01, 0x00, 0x6A, 0x08, 0xA4, 0x19, 0x03, 0x35, 0x06, 0x78, 0xE5, 0x85,
+        0x28, 0xBE, 0xBF, 0x8A, 0x0B, 0xEF, 0xF8, 0x67, 0xA7, 0xCA, 0x36, 0x71,
+        0x6F, 0x7E, 0x01, 0xF8, 0x10, 0x52,
+        /* order */
+        0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x13, 0xE9, 0x74, 0xE7, 0x2F, 0x8A, 0x69, 0x22, 0x03,
+        0x1D, 0x26, 0x03, 0xCF, 0xE0, 0xD7
+    }
+};
+
+static const struct {
+    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
+    unsigned char data[0 + 30 * 6];
+} _EC_SECG_CHAR2_239K1 = {
+    {
+        NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 0, 30, 4
+    },
+    {
+        /* no seed */
+        0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x40, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+        /* a */
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        /* b */
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+        /* x */
+        0x29, 0xA0, 0xB6, 0xA8, 0x87, 0xA9, 0x83, 0xE9, 0x73, 0x09, 0x88, 0xA6,
+        0x87, 0x27, 0xA8, 0xB2, 0xD1, 0x26, 0xC4, 0x4C, 0xC2, 0xCC, 0x7B, 0x2A,
+        0x65, 0x55, 0x19, 0x30, 0x35, 0xDC,
+        /* y */
+        0x76, 0x31, 0x08, 0x04, 0xF1, 0x2E, 0x54, 0x9B, 0xDB, 0x01, 0x1C, 0x10,
+        0x30, 0x89, 0xE7, 0x35, 0x10, 0xAC, 0xB2, 0x75, 0xFC, 0x31, 0x2A, 0x5D,
+        0xC6, 0xB7, 0x65, 0x53, 0xF0, 0xCA,
+        /* order */
+        0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x5A, 0x79, 0xFE, 0xC6, 0x7C, 0xB6, 0xE9, 0x1F, 0x1C,
+        0x1D, 0xA8, 0x00, 0xE4, 0x78, 0xA5
+    }
+};
+
+static const struct {
+    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
+    unsigned char data[0 + 36 * 6];
+} _EC_NIST_CHAR2_283K = {
+    {
+        NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 0, 36, 4
+    },
+    {
+        /* no seed */
+        0x08, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x10, 0xA1,
+        /* a */
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        /* b */
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+        /* x */
+        0x05, 0x03, 0x21, 0x3F, 0x78, 0xCA, 0x44, 0x88, 0x3F, 0x1A, 0x3B, 0x81,
+        0x62, 0xF1, 0x88, 0xE5, 0x53, 0xCD, 0x26, 0x5F, 0x23, 0xC1, 0x56, 0x7A,
+        0x16, 0x87, 0x69, 0x13, 0xB0, 0xC2, 0xAC, 0x24, 0x58, 0x49, 0x28, 0x36,
+        /* y */
+        0x01, 0xCC, 0xDA, 0x38, 0x0F, 0x1C, 0x9E, 0x31, 0x8D, 0x90, 0xF9, 0x5D,
+        0x07, 0xE5, 0x42, 0x6F, 0xE8, 0x7E, 0x45, 0xC0, 0xE8, 0x18, 0x46, 0x98,
+        0xE4, 0x59, 0x62, 0x36, 0x4E, 0x34, 0x11, 0x61, 0x77, 0xDD, 0x22, 0x59,
+        /* order */
+        0x01, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xE9, 0xAE, 0x2E, 0xD0, 0x75, 0x77,
+        0x26, 0x5D, 0xFF, 0x7F, 0x94, 0x45, 0x1E, 0x06, 0x1E, 0x16, 0x3C, 0x61
+    }
+};
+
+static const struct {
+    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
+    unsigned char data[20 + 36 * 6];
+} _EC_NIST_CHAR2_283B = {
+    {
+        NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 20, 36, 2
+    },
+    {
+        /* no seed */
+        0x77, 0xE2, 0xB0, 0x73, 0x70, 0xEB, 0x0F, 0x83, 0x2A, 0x6D, 0xD5, 0xB6,
+        0x2D, 0xFC, 0x88, 0xCD, 0x06, 0xBB, 0x84, 0xBE,
+        /* p */
+        0x08, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x10, 0xA1,
+        /* a */
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+        /* b */
+        0x02, 0x7B, 0x68, 0x0A, 0xC8, 0xB8, 0x59, 0x6D, 0xA5, 0xA4, 0xAF, 0x8A,
+        0x19, 0xA0, 0x30, 0x3F, 0xCA, 0x97, 0xFD, 0x76, 0x45, 0x30, 0x9F, 0xA2,
+        0xA5, 0x81, 0x48, 0x5A, 0xF6, 0x26, 0x3E, 0x31, 0x3B, 0x79, 0xA2, 0xF5,
+        /* x */
+        0x05, 0xF9, 0x39, 0x25, 0x8D, 0xB7, 0xDD, 0x90, 0xE1, 0x93, 0x4F, 0x8C,
+        0x70, 0xB0, 0xDF, 0xEC, 0x2E, 0xED, 0x25, 0xB8, 0x55, 0x7E, 0xAC, 0x9C,
+        0x80, 0xE2, 0xE1, 0x98, 0xF8, 0xCD, 0xBE, 0xCD, 0x86, 0xB1, 0x20, 0x53,
+        /* y */
+        0x03, 0x67, 0x68, 0x54, 0xFE, 0x24, 0x14, 0x1C, 0xB9, 0x8F, 0xE6, 0xD4,
+        0xB2, 0x0D, 0x02, 0xB4, 0x51, 0x6F, 0xF7, 0x02, 0x35, 0x0E, 0xDD, 0xB0,
+        0x82, 0x67, 0x79, 0xC8, 0x13, 0xF0, 0xDF, 0x45, 0xBE, 0x81, 0x12, 0xF4,
+        /* order */
+        0x03, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xEF, 0x90, 0x39, 0x96, 0x60, 0xFC,
+        0x93, 0x8A, 0x90, 0x16, 0x5B, 0x04, 0x2A, 0x7C, 0xEF, 0xAD, 0xB3, 0x07
+    }
+};
+
+static const struct {
+    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
+    unsigned char data[0 + 52 * 6];
+} _EC_NIST_CHAR2_409K = {
+    {
+        NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 0, 52, 4
+    },
+    {
+        /* no seed */
+        /* p */
+        0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+        /* a */
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        /* b */
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+        /* x */
+        0x00, 0x60, 0xF0, 0x5F, 0x65, 0x8F, 0x49, 0xC1, 0xAD, 0x3A, 0xB1, 0x89,
+        0x0F, 0x71, 0x84, 0x21, 0x0E, 0xFD, 0x09, 0x87, 0xE3, 0x07, 0xC8, 0x4C,
+        0x27, 0xAC, 0xCF, 0xB8, 0xF9, 0xF6, 0x7C, 0xC2, 0xC4, 0x60, 0x18, 0x9E,
+        0xB5, 0xAA, 0xAA, 0x62, 0xEE, 0x22, 0x2E, 0xB1, 0xB3, 0x55, 0x40, 0xCF,
+        0xE9, 0x02, 0x37, 0x46,
+        /* y */
+        0x01, 0xE3, 0x69, 0x05, 0x0B, 0x7C, 0x4E, 0x42, 0xAC, 0xBA, 0x1D, 0xAC,
+        0xBF, 0x04, 0x29, 0x9C, 0x34, 0x60, 0x78, 0x2F, 0x91, 0x8E, 0xA4, 0x27,
+        0xE6, 0x32, 0x51, 0x65, 0xE9, 0xEA, 0x10, 0xE3, 0xDA, 0x5F, 0x6C, 0x42,
+        0xE9, 0xC5, 0x52, 0x15, 0xAA, 0x9C, 0xA2, 0x7A, 0x58, 0x63, 0xEC, 0x48,
+        0xD8, 0xE0, 0x28, 0x6B,
+        /* order */
+        0x00, 0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0x5F, 0x83, 0xB2, 0xD4, 0xEA, 0x20, 0x40, 0x0E, 0xC4,
+        0x55, 0x7D, 0x5E, 0xD3, 0xE3, 0xE7, 0xCA, 0x5B, 0x4B, 0x5C, 0x83, 0xB8,
+        0xE0, 0x1E, 0x5F, 0xCF
+    }
+};
+
+static const struct {
+    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
+    unsigned char data[20 + 52 * 6];
+} _EC_NIST_CHAR2_409B = {
+    {
+        NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 20, 52, 2
+    },
+    {
+        /* seed */
+        0x40, 0x99, 0xB5, 0xA4, 0x57, 0xF9, 0xD6, 0x9F, 0x79, 0x21, 0x3D, 0x09,
+        0x4C, 0x4B, 0xCD, 0x4D, 0x42, 0x62, 0x21, 0x0B,
+        /* p */
+        0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+        /* a */
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+        /* b */
+        0x00, 0x21, 0xA5, 0xC2, 0xC8, 0xEE, 0x9F, 0xEB, 0x5C, 0x4B, 0x9A, 0x75,
+        0x3B, 0x7B, 0x47, 0x6B, 0x7F, 0xD6, 0x42, 0x2E, 0xF1, 0xF3, 0xDD, 0x67,
+        0x47, 0x61, 0xFA, 0x99, 0xD6, 0xAC, 0x27, 0xC8, 0xA9, 0xA1, 0x97, 0xB2,
+        0x72, 0x82, 0x2F, 0x6C, 0xD5, 0x7A, 0x55, 0xAA, 0x4F, 0x50, 0xAE, 0x31,
+        0x7B, 0x13, 0x54, 0x5F,
+        /* x */
+        0x01, 0x5D, 0x48, 0x60, 0xD0, 0x88, 0xDD, 0xB3, 0x49, 0x6B, 0x0C, 0x60,
+        0x64, 0x75, 0x62, 0x60, 0x44, 0x1C, 0xDE, 0x4A, 0xF1, 0x77, 0x1D, 0x4D,
+        0xB0, 0x1F, 0xFE, 0x5B, 0x34, 0xE5, 0x97, 0x03, 0xDC, 0x25, 0x5A, 0x86,
+        0x8A, 0x11, 0x80, 0x51, 0x56, 0x03, 0xAE, 0xAB, 0x60, 0x79, 0x4E, 0x54,
+        0xBB, 0x79, 0x96, 0xA7,
+        /* y */
+        0x00, 0x61, 0xB1, 0xCF, 0xAB, 0x6B, 0xE5, 0xF3, 0x2B, 0xBF, 0xA7, 0x83,
+        0x24, 0xED, 0x10, 0x6A, 0x76, 0x36, 0xB9, 0xC5, 0xA7, 0xBD, 0x19, 0x8D,
+        0x01, 0x58, 0xAA, 0x4F, 0x54, 0x88, 0xD0, 0x8F, 0x38, 0x51, 0x4F, 0x1F,
+        0xDF, 0x4B, 0x4F, 0x40, 0xD2, 0x18, 0x1B, 0x36, 0x81, 0xC3, 0x64, 0xBA,
+        0x02, 0x73, 0xC7, 0x06,
+        /* order */
+        0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0xE2, 0xAA, 0xD6, 0xA6, 0x12, 0xF3, 0x33, 0x07, 0xBE,
+        0x5F, 0xA4, 0x7C, 0x3C, 0x9E, 0x05, 0x2F, 0x83, 0x81, 0x64, 0xCD, 0x37,
+        0xD9, 0xA2, 0x11, 0x73
+    }
+};
+
+static const struct {
+    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
+    unsigned char data[0 + 72 * 6];
+} _EC_NIST_CHAR2_571K = {
+    {
+        NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 0, 72, 4
+    },
+    {
+        /* no seed */
+        /* p */
+        0x08, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0x25,
+        /* a */
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        /* b */
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+        /* x */
+        0x02, 0x6E, 0xB7, 0xA8, 0x59, 0x92, 0x3F, 0xBC, 0x82, 0x18, 0x96, 0x31,
+        0xF8, 0x10, 0x3F, 0xE4, 0xAC, 0x9C, 0xA2, 0x97, 0x00, 0x12, 0xD5, 0xD4,
+        0x60, 0x24, 0x80, 0x48, 0x01, 0x84, 0x1C, 0xA4, 0x43, 0x70, 0x95, 0x84,
+        0x93, 0xB2, 0x05, 0xE6, 0x47, 0xDA, 0x30, 0x4D, 0xB4, 0xCE, 0xB0, 0x8C,
+        0xBB, 0xD1, 0xBA, 0x39, 0x49, 0x47, 0x76, 0xFB, 0x98, 0x8B, 0x47, 0x17,
+        0x4D, 0xCA, 0x88, 0xC7, 0xE2, 0x94, 0x52, 0x83, 0xA0, 0x1C, 0x89, 0x72,
+        /* y */
+        0x03, 0x49, 0xDC, 0x80, 0x7F, 0x4F, 0xBF, 0x37, 0x4F, 0x4A, 0xEA, 0xDE,
+        0x3B, 0xCA, 0x95, 0x31, 0x4D, 0xD5, 0x8C, 0xEC, 0x9F, 0x30, 0x7A, 0x54,
+        0xFF, 0xC6, 0x1E, 0xFC, 0x00, 0x6D, 0x8A, 0x2C, 0x9D, 0x49, 0x79, 0xC0,
+        0xAC, 0x44, 0xAE, 0xA7, 0x4F, 0xBE, 0xBB, 0xB9, 0xF7, 0x72, 0xAE, 0xDC,
+        0xB6, 0x20, 0xB0, 0x1A, 0x7B, 0xA7, 0xAF, 0x1B, 0x32, 0x04, 0x30, 0xC8,
+        0x59, 0x19, 0x84, 0xF6, 0x01, 0xCD, 0x4C, 0x14, 0x3E, 0xF1, 0xC7, 0xA3,
+        /* order */
+        0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x13, 0x18, 0x50, 0xE1, 0xF1, 0x9A, 0x63, 0xE4, 0xB3, 0x91, 0xA8, 0xDB,
+        0x91, 0x7F, 0x41, 0x38, 0xB6, 0x30, 0xD8, 0x4B, 0xE5, 0xD6, 0x39, 0x38,
+        0x1E, 0x91, 0xDE, 0xB4, 0x5C, 0xFE, 0x77, 0x8F, 0x63, 0x7C, 0x10, 0x01
+    }
+};
+
+static const struct {
+    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
+    unsigned char data[20 + 72 * 6];
+} _EC_NIST_CHAR2_571B = {
+    {
+        NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 20, 72, 2
+    },
+    {
+        /* seed */
+        0x2A, 0xA0, 0x58, 0xF7, 0x3A, 0x0E, 0x33, 0xAB, 0x48, 0x6B, 0x0F, 0x61,
+        0x04, 0x10, 0xC5, 0x3A, 0x7F, 0x13, 0x23, 0x10,
+        /* p */
+        0x08, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0x25,
+        /* a */
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+        /* b */
+        0x02, 0xF4, 0x0E, 0x7E, 0x22, 0x21, 0xF2, 0x95, 0xDE, 0x29, 0x71, 0x17,
+        0xB7, 0xF3, 0xD6, 0x2F, 0x5C, 0x6A, 0x97, 0xFF, 0xCB, 0x8C, 0xEF, 0xF1,
+        0xCD, 0x6B, 0xA8, 0xCE, 0x4A, 0x9A, 0x18, 0xAD, 0x84, 0xFF, 0xAB, 0xBD,
+        0x8E, 0xFA, 0x59, 0x33, 0x2B, 0xE7, 0xAD, 0x67, 0x56, 0xA6, 0x6E, 0x29,
+        0x4A, 0xFD, 0x18, 0x5A, 0x78, 0xFF, 0x12, 0xAA, 0x52, 0x0E, 0x4D, 0xE7,
+        0x39, 0xBA, 0xCA, 0x0C, 0x7F, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0x7F, 0x29, 0x55, 0x72, 0x7A,
+        /* x */
+        0x03, 0x03, 0x00, 0x1D, 0x34, 0xB8, 0x56, 0x29, 0x6C, 0x16, 0xC0, 0xD4,
+        0x0D, 0x3C, 0xD7, 0x75, 0x0A, 0x93, 0xD1, 0xD2, 0x95, 0x5F, 0xA8, 0x0A,
+        0xA5, 0xF4, 0x0F, 0xC8, 0xDB, 0x7B, 0x2A, 0xBD, 0xBD, 0xE5, 0x39, 0x50,
+        0xF4, 0xC0, 0xD2, 0x93, 0xCD, 0xD7, 0x11, 0xA3, 0x5B, 0x67, 0xFB, 0x14,
+        0x99, 0xAE, 0x60, 0x03, 0x86, 0x14, 0xF1, 0x39, 0x4A, 0xBF, 0xA3, 0xB4,
+        0xC8, 0x50, 0xD9, 0x27, 0xE1, 0xE7, 0x76, 0x9C, 0x8E, 0xEC, 0x2D, 0x19,
+        /* y */
+        0x03, 0x7B, 0xF2, 0x73, 0x42, 0xDA, 0x63, 0x9B, 0x6D, 0xCC, 0xFF, 0xFE,
+        0xB7, 0x3D, 0x69, 0xD7, 0x8C, 0x6C, 0x27, 0xA6, 0x00, 0x9C, 0xBB, 0xCA,
+        0x19, 0x80, 0xF8, 0x53, 0x39, 0x21, 0xE8, 0xA6, 0x84, 0x42, 0x3E, 0x43,
+        0xBA, 0xB0, 0x8A, 0x57, 0x62, 0x91, 0xAF, 0x8F, 0x46, 0x1B, 0xB2, 0xA8,
+        0xB3, 0x53, 0x1D, 0x2F, 0x04, 0x85, 0xC1, 0x9B, 0x16, 0xE2, 0xF1, 0x51,
+        0x6E, 0x23, 0xDD, 0x3C, 0x1A, 0x48, 0x27, 0xAF, 0x1B, 0x8A, 0xC1, 0x5B,
+        /* order */
+        0x03, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0xE6, 0x61, 0xCE, 0x18, 0xFF, 0x55, 0x98, 0x73, 0x08, 0x05, 0x9B, 0x18,
+        0x68, 0x23, 0x85, 0x1E, 0xC7, 0xDD, 0x9C, 0xA1, 0x16, 0x1D, 0xE9, 0x3D,
+        0x51, 0x74, 0xD6, 0x6E, 0x83, 0x82, 0xE9, 0xBB, 0x2F, 0xE8, 0x4E, 0x47
+    }
+};
+
+static const struct {
+    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
+    unsigned char data[20 + 21 * 6];
+} _EC_X9_62_CHAR2_163V1 = {
+    {
+        NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 20, 21, 2
+    },
+    {
+        /* seed */
+        0xD2, 0xC0, 0xFB, 0x15, 0x76, 0x08, 0x60, 0xDE, 0xF1, 0xEE, 0xF4, 0xD6,
+        0x96, 0xE6, 0x76, 0x87, 0x56, 0x15, 0x17, 0x54,
+        /* p */
+        0x08, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x07,
+        /* a */
+        0x07, 0x25, 0x46, 0xB5, 0x43, 0x52, 0x34, 0xA4, 0x22, 0xE0, 0x78, 0x96,
+        0x75, 0xF4, 0x32, 0xC8, 0x94, 0x35, 0xDE, 0x52, 0x42,
+        /* b */
+        0x00, 0xC9, 0x51, 0x7D, 0x06, 0xD5, 0x24, 0x0D, 0x3C, 0xFF, 0x38, 0xC7,
+        0x4B, 0x20, 0xB6, 0xCD, 0x4D, 0x6F, 0x9D, 0xD4, 0xD9,
+        /* x */
+        0x07, 0xAF, 0x69, 0x98, 0x95, 0x46, 0x10, 0x3D, 0x79, 0x32, 0x9F, 0xCC,
+        0x3D, 0x74, 0x88, 0x0F, 0x33, 0xBB, 0xE8, 0x03, 0xCB,
+        /* y */
+        0x01, 0xEC, 0x23, 0x21, 0x1B, 0x59, 0x66, 0xAD, 0xEA, 0x1D, 0x3F, 0x87,
+        0xF7, 0xEA, 0x58, 0x48, 0xAE, 0xF0, 0xB7, 0xCA, 0x9F,
+        /* order */
+        0x04, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0xE6,
+        0x0F, 0xC8, 0x82, 0x1C, 0xC7, 0x4D, 0xAE, 0xAF, 0xC1
+    }
+};
+
+static const struct {
+    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
+    unsigned char data[20 + 21 * 6];
+} _EC_X9_62_CHAR2_163V2 = {
+    {
+        NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 20, 21, 2
+    },
+    {
+        /* seed */
+        0x53, 0x81, 0x4C, 0x05, 0x0D, 0x44, 0xD6, 0x96, 0xE6, 0x76, 0x87, 0x56,
+        0x15, 0x17, 0x58, 0x0C, 0xA4, 0xE2, 0x9F, 0xFD,
+        /* p */
+        0x08, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x07,
+        /* a */
+        0x01, 0x08, 0xB3, 0x9E, 0x77, 0xC4, 0xB1, 0x08, 0xBE, 0xD9, 0x81, 0xED,
+        0x0E, 0x89, 0x0E, 0x11, 0x7C, 0x51, 0x1C, 0xF0, 0x72,
+        /* b */
+        0x06, 0x67, 0xAC, 0xEB, 0x38, 0xAF, 0x4E, 0x48, 0x8C, 0x40, 0x74, 0x33,
+        0xFF, 0xAE, 0x4F, 0x1C, 0x81, 0x16, 0x38, 0xDF, 0x20,
+        /* x */
+        0x00, 0x24, 0x26, 0x6E, 0x4E, 0xB5, 0x10, 0x6D, 0x0A, 0x96, 0x4D, 0x92,
+        0xC4, 0x86, 0x0E, 0x26, 0x71, 0xDB, 0x9B, 0x6C, 0xC5,
+        /* y */
+        0x07, 0x9F, 0x68, 0x4D, 0xDF, 0x66, 0x84, 0xC5, 0xCD, 0x25, 0x8B, 0x38,
+        0x90, 0x02, 0x1B, 0x23, 0x86, 0xDF, 0xD1, 0x9F, 0xC5,
+        /* order */
+        0x03, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFD, 0xF6,
+        0x4D, 0xE1, 0x15, 0x1A, 0xDB, 0xB7, 0x8F, 0x10, 0xA7
+    }
+};
+
+static const struct {
+    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
+    unsigned char data[20 + 21 * 6];
+} _EC_X9_62_CHAR2_163V3 = {
+    {
+        NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 20, 21, 2
+    },
+    {
+        /* seed */
+        0x50, 0xCB, 0xF1, 0xD9, 0x5C, 0xA9, 0x4D, 0x69, 0x6E, 0x67, 0x68, 0x75,
+        0x61, 0x51, 0x75, 0xF1, 0x6A, 0x36, 0xA3, 0xB8,
+        /* p */
+        0x08, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x07,
+        /* a */
+        0x07, 0xA5, 0x26, 0xC6, 0x3D, 0x3E, 0x25, 0xA2, 0x56, 0xA0, 0x07, 0x69,
+        0x9F, 0x54, 0x47, 0xE3, 0x2A, 0xE4, 0x56, 0xB5, 0x0E,
+        /* b */
+        0x03, 0xF7, 0x06, 0x17, 0x98, 0xEB, 0x99, 0xE2, 0x38, 0xFD, 0x6F, 0x1B,
+        0xF9, 0x5B, 0x48, 0xFE, 0xEB, 0x48, 0x54, 0x25, 0x2B,
+        /* x */
+        0x02, 0xF9, 0xF8, 0x7B, 0x7C, 0x57, 0x4D, 0x0B, 0xDE, 0xCF, 0x8A, 0x22,
+        0xE6, 0x52, 0x47, 0x75, 0xF9, 0x8C, 0xDE, 0xBD, 0xCB,
+        /* y */
+        0x05, 0xB9, 0x35, 0x59, 0x0C, 0x15, 0x5E, 0x17, 0xEA, 0x48, 0xEB, 0x3F,
+        0xF3, 0x71, 0x8B, 0x89, 0x3D, 0xF5, 0x9A, 0x05, 0xD0,
+        /* order */
+        0x03, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0x1A,
+        0xEE, 0x14, 0x0F, 0x11, 0x0A, 0xFF, 0x96, 0x13, 0x09
+    }
+};
+
+static const struct {
+    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
+    unsigned char data[0 + 23 * 6];
+} _EC_X9_62_CHAR2_176V1 = {
+    {
+        NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 0, 23, 0xFF6E
+    },
+    {
+        /* no seed */
+        /* p */
+        0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x08, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x07,
+        /* a */
+        0x00, 0xE4, 0xE6, 0xDB, 0x29, 0x95, 0x06, 0x5C, 0x40, 0x7D, 0x9D, 0x39,
+        0xB8, 0xD0, 0x96, 0x7B, 0x96, 0x70, 0x4B, 0xA8, 0xE9, 0xC9, 0x0B,
+        /* b */
+        0x00, 0x5D, 0xDA, 0x47, 0x0A, 0xBE, 0x64, 0x14, 0xDE, 0x8E, 0xC1, 0x33,
+        0xAE, 0x28, 0xE9, 0xBB, 0xD7, 0xFC, 0xEC, 0x0A, 0xE0, 0xFF, 0xF2,
+        /* x */
+        0x00, 0x8D, 0x16, 0xC2, 0x86, 0x67, 0x98, 0xB6, 0x00, 0xF9, 0xF0, 0x8B,
+        0xB4, 0xA8, 0xE8, 0x60, 0xF3, 0x29, 0x8C, 0xE0, 0x4A, 0x57, 0x98,
+        /* y */
+        0x00, 0x6F, 0xA4, 0x53, 0x9C, 0x2D, 0xAD, 0xDD, 0xD6, 0xBA, 0xB5, 0x16,
+        0x7D, 0x61, 0xB4, 0x36, 0xE1, 0xD9, 0x2B, 0xB1, 0x6A, 0x56, 0x2C,
+        /* order */
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x92, 0x53, 0x73, 0x97, 0xEC, 0xA4, 0xF6, 0x14,
+        0x57, 0x99, 0xD6, 0x2B, 0x0A, 0x19, 0xCE, 0x06, 0xFE, 0x26, 0xAD
+    }
+};
+
+static const struct {
+    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
+    unsigned char data[20 + 24 * 6];
+} _EC_X9_62_CHAR2_191V1 = {
+    {
+        NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 20, 24, 2
+    },
+    {
+        /* seed */
+        0x4E, 0x13, 0xCA, 0x54, 0x27, 0x44, 0xD6, 0x96, 0xE6, 0x76, 0x87, 0x56,
+        0x15, 0x17, 0x55, 0x2F, 0x27, 0x9A, 0x8C, 0x84,
+        /* p */
+        0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x01,
+        /* a */
+        0x28, 0x66, 0x53, 0x7B, 0x67, 0x67, 0x52, 0x63, 0x6A, 0x68, 0xF5, 0x65,
+        0x54, 0xE1, 0x26, 0x40, 0x27, 0x6B, 0x64, 0x9E, 0xF7, 0x52, 0x62, 0x67,
+        /* b */
+        0x2E, 0x45, 0xEF, 0x57, 0x1F, 0x00, 0x78, 0x6F, 0x67, 0xB0, 0x08, 0x1B,
+        0x94, 0x95, 0xA3, 0xD9, 0x54, 0x62, 0xF5, 0xDE, 0x0A, 0xA1, 0x85, 0xEC,
+        /* x */
+        0x36, 0xB3, 0xDA, 0xF8, 0xA2, 0x32, 0x06, 0xF9, 0xC4, 0xF2, 0x99, 0xD7,
+        0xB2, 0x1A, 0x9C, 0x36, 0x91, 0x37, 0xF2, 0xC8, 0x4A, 0xE1, 0xAA, 0x0D,
+        /* y */
+        0x76, 0x5B, 0xE7, 0x34, 0x33, 0xB3, 0xF9, 0x5E, 0x33, 0x29, 0x32, 0xE7,
+        0x0E, 0xA2, 0x45, 0xCA, 0x24, 0x18, 0xEA, 0x0E, 0xF9, 0x80, 0x18, 0xFB,
+        /* order */
+        0x40, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x04, 0xA2, 0x0E, 0x90, 0xC3, 0x90, 0x67, 0xC8, 0x93, 0xBB, 0xB9, 0xA5
+    }
+};
+
+static const struct {
+    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
+    unsigned char data[20 + 24 * 6];
+} _EC_X9_62_CHAR2_191V2 = {
+    {
+        NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 20, 24, 4
+    },
+    {
+        /* seed */
+        0x08, 0x71, 0xEF, 0x2F, 0xEF, 0x24, 0xD6, 0x96, 0xE6, 0x76, 0x87, 0x56,
+        0x15, 0x17, 0x58, 0xBE, 0xE0, 0xD9, 0x5C, 0x15,
+        /* p */
+        0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x01,
+        /* a */
+        0x40, 0x10, 0x28, 0x77, 0x4D, 0x77, 0x77, 0xC7, 0xB7, 0x66, 0x6D, 0x13,
+        0x66, 0xEA, 0x43, 0x20, 0x71, 0x27, 0x4F, 0x89, 0xFF, 0x01, 0xE7, 0x18,
+        /* b */
+        0x06, 0x20, 0x04, 0x8D, 0x28, 0xBC, 0xBD, 0x03, 0xB6, 0x24, 0x9C, 0x99,
+        0x18, 0x2B, 0x7C, 0x8C, 0xD1, 0x97, 0x00, 0xC3, 0x62, 0xC4, 0x6A, 0x01,
+        /* x */
+        0x38, 0x09, 0xB2, 0xB7, 0xCC, 0x1B, 0x28, 0xCC, 0x5A, 0x87, 0x92, 0x6A,
+        0xAD, 0x83, 0xFD, 0x28, 0x78, 0x9E, 0x81, 0xE2, 0xC9, 0xE3, 0xBF, 0x10,
+        /* y */
+        0x17, 0x43, 0x43, 0x86, 0x62, 0x6D, 0x14, 0xF3, 0xDB, 0xF0, 0x17, 0x60,
+        0xD9, 0x21, 0x3A, 0x3E, 0x1C, 0xF3, 0x7A, 0xEC, 0x43, 0x7D, 0x66, 0x8A,
+        /* order */
+        0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x50, 0x50, 0x8C, 0xB8, 0x9F, 0x65, 0x28, 0x24, 0xE0, 0x6B, 0x81, 0x73
+    }
+};
+
+static const struct {
+    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
+    unsigned char data[20 + 24 * 6];
+} _EC_X9_62_CHAR2_191V3 = {
+    {
+        NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 20, 24, 6
+    },
+    {
+        /* seed */
+        0xE0, 0x53, 0x51, 0x2D, 0xC6, 0x84, 0xD6, 0x96, 0xE6, 0x76, 0x87, 0x56,
+        0x15, 0x17, 0x50, 0x67, 0xAE, 0x78, 0x6D, 0x1F,
+        /* p */
+        0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x01,
+        /* a */
+        0x6C, 0x01, 0x07, 0x47, 0x56, 0x09, 0x91, 0x22, 0x22, 0x10, 0x56, 0x91,
+        0x1C, 0x77, 0xD7, 0x7E, 0x77, 0xA7, 0x77, 0xE7, 0xE7, 0xE7, 0x7F, 0xCB,
+        /* b */
+        0x71, 0xFE, 0x1A, 0xF9, 0x26, 0xCF, 0x84, 0x79, 0x89, 0xEF, 0xEF, 0x8D,
+        0xB4, 0x59, 0xF6, 0x63, 0x94, 0xD9, 0x0F, 0x32, 0xAD, 0x3F, 0x15, 0xE8,
+        /* x */
+        0x37, 0x5D, 0x4C, 0xE2, 0x4F, 0xDE, 0x43, 0x44, 0x89, 0xDE, 0x87, 0x46,
+        0xE7, 0x17, 0x86, 0x01, 0x50, 0x09, 0xE6, 0x6E, 0x38, 0xA9, 0x26, 0xDD,
+        /* y */
+        0x54, 0x5A, 0x39, 0x17, 0x61, 0x96, 0x57, 0x5D, 0x98, 0x59, 0x99, 0x36,
+        0x6E, 0x6A, 0xD3, 0x4C, 0xE0, 0xA7, 0x7C, 0xD7, 0x12, 0x7B, 0x06, 0xBE,
+        /* order */
+        0x15, 0x55, 0x55, 0x55, 0x55, 0x55, 0x55, 0x55, 0x55, 0x55, 0x55, 0x55,
+        0x61, 0x0C, 0x0B, 0x19, 0x68, 0x12, 0xBF, 0xB6, 0x28, 0x8A, 0x3E, 0xA3
+    }
+};
+
+static const struct {
+    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
+    unsigned char data[0 + 27 * 6];
+} _EC_X9_62_CHAR2_208W1 = {
+    {
+        NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 0, 27, 0xFE48
+    },
+    {
+        /* no seed */
+        /* p */
+        0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x08, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x07,
+        /* a */
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        /* b */
+        0x00, 0xC8, 0x61, 0x9E, 0xD4, 0x5A, 0x62, 0xE6, 0x21, 0x2E, 0x11, 0x60,
+        0x34, 0x9E, 0x2B, 0xFA, 0x84, 0x44, 0x39, 0xFA, 0xFC, 0x2A, 0x3F, 0xD1,
+        0x63, 0x8F, 0x9E,
+        /* x */
+        0x00, 0x89, 0xFD, 0xFB, 0xE4, 0xAB, 0xE1, 0x93, 0xDF, 0x95, 0x59, 0xEC,
+        0xF0, 0x7A, 0xC0, 0xCE, 0x78, 0x55, 0x4E, 0x27, 0x84, 0xEB, 0x8C, 0x1E,
+        0xD1, 0xA5, 0x7A,
+        /* y */
+        0x00, 0x0F, 0x55, 0xB5, 0x1A, 0x06, 0xE7, 0x8E, 0x9A, 0xC3, 0x8A, 0x03,
+        0x5F, 0xF5, 0x20, 0xD8, 0xB0, 0x17, 0x81, 0xBE, 0xB1, 0xA6, 0xBB, 0x08,
+        0x61, 0x7D, 0xE3,
+        /* order */
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x01, 0xBA, 0xF9, 0x5C, 0x97, 0x23, 0xC5, 0x7B, 0x6C,
+        0x21, 0xDA, 0x2E, 0xFF, 0x2D, 0x5E, 0xD5, 0x88, 0xBD, 0xD5, 0x71, 0x7E,
+        0x21, 0x2F, 0x9D
+    }
+};
+
+static const struct {
+    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
+    unsigned char data[20 + 30 * 6];
+} _EC_X9_62_CHAR2_239V1 = {
+    {
+        NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 20, 30, 4
+    },
+    {
+        /* seed */
+        0xD3, 0x4B, 0x9A, 0x4D, 0x69, 0x6E, 0x67, 0x68, 0x75, 0x61, 0x51, 0x75,
+        0xCA, 0x71, 0xB9, 0x20, 0xBF, 0xEF, 0xB0, 0x5D,
+        /* p */
+        0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x10, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+        /* a */
+        0x32, 0x01, 0x08, 0x57, 0x07, 0x7C, 0x54, 0x31, 0x12, 0x3A, 0x46, 0xB8,
+        0x08, 0x90, 0x67, 0x56, 0xF5, 0x43, 0x42, 0x3E, 0x8D, 0x27, 0x87, 0x75,
+        0x78, 0x12, 0x57, 0x78, 0xAC, 0x76,
+        /* b */
+        0x79, 0x04, 0x08, 0xF2, 0xEE, 0xDA, 0xF3, 0x92, 0xB0, 0x12, 0xED, 0xEF,
+        0xB3, 0x39, 0x2F, 0x30, 0xF4, 0x32, 0x7C, 0x0C, 0xA3, 0xF3, 0x1F, 0xC3,
+        0x83, 0xC4, 0x22, 0xAA, 0x8C, 0x16,
+        /* x */
+        0x57, 0x92, 0x70, 0x98, 0xFA, 0x93, 0x2E, 0x7C, 0x0A, 0x96, 0xD3, 0xFD,
+        0x5B, 0x70, 0x6E, 0xF7, 0xE5, 0xF5, 0xC1, 0x56, 0xE1, 0x6B, 0x7E, 0x7C,
+        0x86, 0x03, 0x85, 0x52, 0xE9, 0x1D,
+        /* y */
+        0x61, 0xD8, 0xEE, 0x50, 0x77, 0xC3, 0x3F, 0xEC, 0xF6, 0xF1, 0xA1, 0x6B,
+        0x26, 0x8D, 0xE4, 0x69, 0xC3, 0xC7, 0x74, 0x4E, 0xA9, 0xA9, 0x71, 0x64,
+        0x9F, 0xC7, 0xA9, 0x61, 0x63, 0x05,
+        /* order */
+        0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0F, 0x4D, 0x42, 0xFF, 0xE1, 0x49, 0x2A, 0x49, 0x93,
+        0xF1, 0xCA, 0xD6, 0x66, 0xE4, 0x47
+    }
+};
+
+static const struct {
+    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
+    unsigned char data[20 + 30 * 6];
+} _EC_X9_62_CHAR2_239V2 = {
+    {
+        NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 20, 30, 6
+    },
+    {
+        /* seed */
+        0x2A, 0xA6, 0x98, 0x2F, 0xDF, 0xA4, 0xD6, 0x96, 0xE6, 0x76, 0x87, 0x56,
+        0x15, 0x17, 0x5D, 0x26, 0x67, 0x27, 0x27, 0x7D,
+        /* p */
+        0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x10, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+        /* a */
+        0x42, 0x30, 0x01, 0x77, 0x57, 0xA7, 0x67, 0xFA, 0xE4, 0x23, 0x98, 0x56,
+        0x9B, 0x74, 0x63, 0x25, 0xD4, 0x53, 0x13, 0xAF, 0x07, 0x66, 0x26, 0x64,
+        0x79, 0xB7, 0x56, 0x54, 0xE6, 0x5F,
+        /* b */
+        0x50, 0x37, 0xEA, 0x65, 0x41, 0x96, 0xCF, 0xF0, 0xCD, 0x82, 0xB2, 0xC1,
+        0x4A, 0x2F, 0xCF, 0x2E, 0x3F, 0xF8, 0x77, 0x52, 0x85, 0xB5, 0x45, 0x72,
+        0x2F, 0x03, 0xEA, 0xCD, 0xB7, 0x4B,
+        /* x */
+        0x28, 0xF9, 0xD0, 0x4E, 0x90, 0x00, 0x69, 0xC8, 0xDC, 0x47, 0xA0, 0x85,
+        0x34, 0xFE, 0x76, 0xD2, 0xB9, 0x00, 0xB7, 0xD7, 0xEF, 0x31, 0xF5, 0x70,
+        0x9F, 0x20, 0x0C, 0x4C, 0xA2, 0x05,
+        /* y */
+        0x56, 0x67, 0x33, 0x4C, 0x45, 0xAF, 0xF3, 0xB5, 0xA0, 0x3B, 0xAD, 0x9D,
+        0xD7, 0x5E, 0x2C, 0x71, 0xA9, 0x93, 0x62, 0x56, 0x7D, 0x54, 0x53, 0xF7,
+        0xFA, 0x6E, 0x22, 0x7E, 0xC8, 0x33,
+        /* order */
+        0x15, 0x55, 0x55, 0x55, 0x55, 0x55, 0x55, 0x55, 0x55, 0x55, 0x55, 0x55,
+        0x55, 0x55, 0x55, 0x3C, 0x6F, 0x28, 0x85, 0x25, 0x9C, 0x31, 0xE3, 0xFC,
+        0xDF, 0x15, 0x46, 0x24, 0x52, 0x2D
+    }
+};
+
+static const struct {
+    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
+    unsigned char data[20 + 30 * 6];
+} _EC_X9_62_CHAR2_239V3 = {
+    {
+        NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 20, 30, 0xA
+    },
+    {
+        /* seed */
+        0x9E, 0x07, 0x6F, 0x4D, 0x69, 0x6E, 0x67, 0x68, 0x75, 0x61, 0x51, 0x75,
+        0xE1, 0x1E, 0x9F, 0xDD, 0x77, 0xF9, 0x20, 0x41,
+        /* p */
+        0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x10, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+        /* a */
+        0x01, 0x23, 0x87, 0x74, 0x66, 0x6A, 0x67, 0x76, 0x6D, 0x66, 0x76, 0xF7,
+        0x78, 0xE6, 0x76, 0xB6, 0x69, 0x99, 0x17, 0x66, 0x66, 0xE6, 0x87, 0x66,
+        0x6D, 0x87, 0x66, 0xC6, 0x6A, 0x9F,
+        /* b */
+        0x6A, 0x94, 0x19, 0x77, 0xBA, 0x9F, 0x6A, 0x43, 0x51, 0x99, 0xAC, 0xFC,
+        0x51, 0x06, 0x7E, 0xD5, 0x87, 0xF5, 0x19, 0xC5, 0xEC, 0xB5, 0x41, 0xB8,
+        0xE4, 0x41, 0x11, 0xDE, 0x1D, 0x40,
+        /* x */
+        0x70, 0xF6, 0xE9, 0xD0, 0x4D, 0x28, 0x9C, 0x4E, 0x89, 0x91, 0x3C, 0xE3,
+        0x53, 0x0B, 0xFD, 0xE9, 0x03, 0x97, 0x7D, 0x42, 0xB1, 0x46, 0xD5, 0x39,
+        0xBF, 0x1B, 0xDE, 0x4E, 0x9C, 0x92,
+        /* y */
+        0x2E, 0x5A, 0x0E, 0xAF, 0x6E, 0x5E, 0x13, 0x05, 0xB9, 0x00, 0x4D, 0xCE,
+        0x5C, 0x0E, 0xD7, 0xFE, 0x59, 0xA3, 0x56, 0x08, 0xF3, 0x38, 0x37, 0xC8,
+        0x16, 0xD8, 0x0B, 0x79, 0xF4, 0x61,
+        /* order */
+        0x0C, 0xCC, 0xCC, 0xCC, 0xCC, 0xCC, 0xCC, 0xCC, 0xCC, 0xCC, 0xCC, 0xCC,
+        0xCC, 0xCC, 0xCC, 0xAC, 0x49, 0x12, 0xD2, 0xD9, 0xDF, 0x90, 0x3E, 0xF9,
+        0x88, 0x8B, 0x8A, 0x0E, 0x4C, 0xFF
+    }
+};
+
+static const struct {
+    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
+    unsigned char data[0 + 35 * 6];
+} _EC_X9_62_CHAR2_272W1 = {
+    {
+        NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 0, 35, 0xFF06
+    },
+    {
+        /* no seed */
+        /* p */
+        0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0B,
+        /* a */
+        0x00, 0x91, 0xA0, 0x91, 0xF0, 0x3B, 0x5F, 0xBA, 0x4A, 0xB2, 0xCC, 0xF4,
+        0x9C, 0x4E, 0xDD, 0x22, 0x0F, 0xB0, 0x28, 0x71, 0x2D, 0x42, 0xBE, 0x75,
+        0x2B, 0x2C, 0x40, 0x09, 0x4D, 0xBA, 0xCD, 0xB5, 0x86, 0xFB, 0x20,
+        /* b */
+        0x00, 0x71, 0x67, 0xEF, 0xC9, 0x2B, 0xB2, 0xE3, 0xCE, 0x7C, 0x8A, 0xAA,
+        0xFF, 0x34, 0xE1, 0x2A, 0x9C, 0x55, 0x70, 0x03, 0xD7, 0xC7, 0x3A, 0x6F,
+        0xAF, 0x00, 0x3F, 0x99, 0xF6, 0xCC, 0x84, 0x82, 0xE5, 0x40, 0xF7,
+        /* x */
+        0x00, 0x61, 0x08, 0xBA, 0xBB, 0x2C, 0xEE, 0xBC, 0xF7, 0x87, 0x05, 0x8A,
+        0x05, 0x6C, 0xBE, 0x0C, 0xFE, 0x62, 0x2D, 0x77, 0x23, 0xA2, 0x89, 0xE0,
+        0x8A, 0x07, 0xAE, 0x13, 0xEF, 0x0D, 0x10, 0xD1, 0x71, 0xDD, 0x8D,
+        /* y */
+        0x00, 0x10, 0xC7, 0x69, 0x57, 0x16, 0x85, 0x1E, 0xEF, 0x6B, 0xA7, 0xF6,
+        0x87, 0x2E, 0x61, 0x42, 0xFB, 0xD2, 0x41, 0xB8, 0x30, 0xFF, 0x5E, 0xFC,
+        0xAC, 0xEC, 0xCA, 0xB0, 0x5E, 0x02, 0x00, 0x5D, 0xDE, 0x9D, 0x23,
+        /* order */
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0xFA, 0xF5, 0x13, 0x54, 0xE0, 0xE3, 0x9E, 0x48,
+        0x92, 0xDF, 0x6E, 0x31, 0x9C, 0x72, 0xC8, 0x16, 0x16, 0x03, 0xFA, 0x45,
+        0xAA, 0x7B, 0x99, 0x8A, 0x16, 0x7B, 0x8F, 0x1E, 0x62, 0x95, 0x21
+    }
+};
+
+static const struct {
+    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
+    unsigned char data[0 + 39 * 6];
+} _EC_X9_62_CHAR2_304W1 = {
+    {
+        NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 0, 39, 0xFE2E
+    },
+    {
+        /* no seed */
+        /* p */
+        0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x08, 0x07,
+        /* a */
+        0x00, 0xFD, 0x0D, 0x69, 0x31, 0x49, 0xA1, 0x18, 0xF6, 0x51, 0xE6, 0xDC,
+        0xE6, 0x80, 0x20, 0x85, 0x37, 0x7E, 0x5F, 0x88, 0x2D, 0x1B, 0x51, 0x0B,
+        0x44, 0x16, 0x00, 0x74, 0xC1, 0x28, 0x80, 0x78, 0x36, 0x5A, 0x03, 0x96,
+        0xC8, 0xE6, 0x81,
+        /* b */
+        0x00, 0xBD, 0xDB, 0x97, 0xE5, 0x55, 0xA5, 0x0A, 0x90, 0x8E, 0x43, 0xB0,
+        0x1C, 0x79, 0x8E, 0xA5, 0xDA, 0xA6, 0x78, 0x8F, 0x1E, 0xA2, 0x79, 0x4E,
+        0xFC, 0xF5, 0x71, 0x66, 0xB8, 0xC1, 0x40, 0x39, 0x60, 0x1E, 0x55, 0x82,
+        0x73, 0x40, 0xBE,
+        /* x */
+        0x00, 0x19, 0x7B, 0x07, 0x84, 0x5E, 0x9B, 0xE2, 0xD9, 0x6A, 0xDB, 0x0F,
+        0x5F, 0x3C, 0x7F, 0x2C, 0xFF, 0xBD, 0x7A, 0x3E, 0xB8, 0xB6, 0xFE, 0xC3,
+        0x5C, 0x7F, 0xD6, 0x7F, 0x26, 0xDD, 0xF6, 0x28, 0x5A, 0x64, 0x4F, 0x74,
+        0x0A, 0x26, 0x14,
+        /* y */
+        0x00, 0xE1, 0x9F, 0xBE, 0xB7, 0x6E, 0x0D, 0xA1, 0x71, 0x51, 0x7E, 0xCF,
+        0x40, 0x1B, 0x50, 0x28, 0x9B, 0xF0, 0x14, 0x10, 0x32, 0x88, 0x52, 0x7A,
+        0x9B, 0x41, 0x6A, 0x10, 0x5E, 0x80, 0x26, 0x0B, 0x54, 0x9F, 0xDC, 0x1B,
+        0x92, 0xC0, 0x3B,
+        /* order */
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x01, 0xD5, 0x56, 0x57, 0x2A, 0xAB, 0xAC, 0x80, 0x01,
+        0x01, 0xD5, 0x56, 0x57, 0x2A, 0xAB, 0xAC, 0x80, 0x01, 0x02, 0x2D, 0x5C,
+        0x91, 0xDD, 0x17, 0x3F, 0x8F, 0xB5, 0x61, 0xDA, 0x68, 0x99, 0x16, 0x44,
+        0x43, 0x05, 0x1D
+    }
+};
+
+static const struct {
+    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
+    unsigned char data[20 + 45 * 6];
+} _EC_X9_62_CHAR2_359V1 = {
+    {
+        NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 20, 45, 0x4C
+    },
+    {
+        /* seed */
+        0x2B, 0x35, 0x49, 0x20, 0xB7, 0x24, 0xD6, 0x96, 0xE6, 0x76, 0x87, 0x56,
+        0x15, 0x17, 0x58, 0x5B, 0xA1, 0x33, 0x2D, 0xC6,
+        /* p */
+        0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x10, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+        /* a */
+        0x56, 0x67, 0x67, 0x6A, 0x65, 0x4B, 0x20, 0x75, 0x4F, 0x35, 0x6E, 0xA9,
+        0x20, 0x17, 0xD9, 0x46, 0x56, 0x7C, 0x46, 0x67, 0x55, 0x56, 0xF1, 0x95,
+        0x56, 0xA0, 0x46, 0x16, 0xB5, 0x67, 0xD2, 0x23, 0xA5, 0xE0, 0x56, 0x56,
+        0xFB, 0x54, 0x90, 0x16, 0xA9, 0x66, 0x56, 0xA5, 0x57,
+        /* b */
+        0x24, 0x72, 0xE2, 0xD0, 0x19, 0x7C, 0x49, 0x36, 0x3F, 0x1F, 0xE7, 0xF5,
+        0xB6, 0xDB, 0x07, 0x5D, 0x52, 0xB6, 0x94, 0x7D, 0x13, 0x5D, 0x8C, 0xA4,
+        0x45, 0x80, 0x5D, 0x39, 0xBC, 0x34, 0x56, 0x26, 0x08, 0x96, 0x87, 0x74,
+        0x2B, 0x63, 0x29, 0xE7, 0x06, 0x80, 0x23, 0x19, 0x88,
+        /* x */
+        0x3C, 0x25, 0x8E, 0xF3, 0x04, 0x77, 0x67, 0xE7, 0xED, 0xE0, 0xF1, 0xFD,
+        0xAA, 0x79, 0xDA, 0xEE, 0x38, 0x41, 0x36, 0x6A, 0x13, 0x2E, 0x16, 0x3A,
+        0xCE, 0xD4, 0xED, 0x24, 0x01, 0xDF, 0x9C, 0x6B, 0xDC, 0xDE, 0x98, 0xE8,
+        0xE7, 0x07, 0xC0, 0x7A, 0x22, 0x39, 0xB1, 0xB0, 0x97,
+        /* y */
+        0x53, 0xD7, 0xE0, 0x85, 0x29, 0x54, 0x70, 0x48, 0x12, 0x1E, 0x9C, 0x95,
+        0xF3, 0x79, 0x1D, 0xD8, 0x04, 0x96, 0x39, 0x48, 0xF3, 0x4F, 0xAE, 0x7B,
+        0xF4, 0x4E, 0xA8, 0x23, 0x65, 0xDC, 0x78, 0x68, 0xFE, 0x57, 0xE4, 0xAE,
+        0x2D, 0xE2, 0x11, 0x30, 0x5A, 0x40, 0x71, 0x04, 0xBD,
+        /* order */
+        0x01, 0xAF, 0x28, 0x6B, 0xCA, 0x1A, 0xF2, 0x86, 0xBC, 0xA1, 0xAF, 0x28,
+        0x6B, 0xCA, 0x1A, 0xF2, 0x86, 0xBC, 0xA1, 0xAF, 0x28, 0x6B, 0xC9, 0xFB,
+        0x8F, 0x6B, 0x85, 0xC5, 0x56, 0x89, 0x2C, 0x20, 0xA7, 0xEB, 0x96, 0x4F,
+        0xE7, 0x71, 0x9E, 0x74, 0xF4, 0x90, 0x75, 0x8D, 0x3B
+    }
+};
+
+static const struct {
+    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
+    unsigned char data[0 + 47 * 6];
+} _EC_X9_62_CHAR2_368W1 = {
+    {
+        NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 0, 47, 0xFF70
+    },
+    {
+        /* no seed */
+        /* p */
+        0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x07,
+        /* a */
+        0x00, 0xE0, 0xD2, 0xEE, 0x25, 0x09, 0x52, 0x06, 0xF5, 0xE2, 0xA4, 0xF9,
+        0xED, 0x22, 0x9F, 0x1F, 0x25, 0x6E, 0x79, 0xA0, 0xE2, 0xB4, 0x55, 0x97,
+        0x0D, 0x8D, 0x0D, 0x86, 0x5B, 0xD9, 0x47, 0x78, 0xC5, 0x76, 0xD6, 0x2F,
+        0x0A, 0xB7, 0x51, 0x9C, 0xCD, 0x2A, 0x1A, 0x90, 0x6A, 0xE3, 0x0D,
+        /* b */
+        0x00, 0xFC, 0x12, 0x17, 0xD4, 0x32, 0x0A, 0x90, 0x45, 0x2C, 0x76, 0x0A,
+        0x58, 0xED, 0xCD, 0x30, 0xC8, 0xDD, 0x06, 0x9B, 0x3C, 0x34, 0x45, 0x38,
+        0x37, 0xA3, 0x4E, 0xD5, 0x0C, 0xB5, 0x49, 0x17, 0xE1, 0xC2, 0x11, 0x2D,
+        0x84, 0xD1, 0x64, 0xF4, 0x44, 0xF8, 0xF7, 0x47, 0x86, 0x04, 0x6A,
+        /* x */
+        0x00, 0x10, 0x85, 0xE2, 0x75, 0x53, 0x81, 0xDC, 0xCC, 0xE3, 0xC1, 0x55,
+        0x7A, 0xFA, 0x10, 0xC2, 0xF0, 0xC0, 0xC2, 0x82, 0x56, 0x46, 0xC5, 0xB3,
+        0x4A, 0x39, 0x4C, 0xBC, 0xFA, 0x8B, 0xC1, 0x6B, 0x22, 0xE7, 0xE7, 0x89,
+        0xE9, 0x27, 0xBE, 0x21, 0x6F, 0x02, 0xE1, 0xFB, 0x13, 0x6A, 0x5F,
+        /* y */
+        0x00, 0x7B, 0x3E, 0xB1, 0xBD, 0xDC, 0xBA, 0x62, 0xD5, 0xD8, 0xB2, 0x05,
+        0x9B, 0x52, 0x57, 0x97, 0xFC, 0x73, 0x82, 0x2C, 0x59, 0x05, 0x9C, 0x62,
+        0x3A, 0x45, 0xFF, 0x38, 0x43, 0xCE, 0xE8, 0xF8, 0x7C, 0xD1, 0x85, 0x5A,
+        0xDA, 0xA8, 0x1E, 0x2A, 0x07, 0x50, 0xB8, 0x0F, 0xDA, 0x23, 0x10,
+        /* order */
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x90, 0x51, 0x2D, 0xA9, 0xAF, 0x72, 0xB0, 0x83,
+        0x49, 0xD9, 0x8A, 0x5D, 0xD4, 0xC7, 0xB0, 0x53, 0x2E, 0xCA, 0x51, 0xCE,
+        0x03, 0xE2, 0xD1, 0x0F, 0x3B, 0x7A, 0xC5, 0x79, 0xBD, 0x87, 0xE9, 0x09,
+        0xAE, 0x40, 0xA6, 0xF1, 0x31, 0xE9, 0xCF, 0xCE, 0x5B, 0xD9, 0x67
+    }
+};
+
+static const struct {
+    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
+    unsigned char data[0 + 54 * 6];
+} _EC_X9_62_CHAR2_431R1 = {
+    {
+        NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 0, 54, 0x2760
+    },
+    {
+        /* no seed */
+        /* p */
+        0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+        /* a */
+        0x1A, 0x82, 0x7E, 0xF0, 0x0D, 0xD6, 0xFC, 0x0E, 0x23, 0x4C, 0xAF, 0x04,
+        0x6C, 0x6A, 0x5D, 0x8A, 0x85, 0x39, 0x5B, 0x23, 0x6C, 0xC4, 0xAD, 0x2C,
+        0xF3, 0x2A, 0x0C, 0xAD, 0xBD, 0xC9, 0xDD, 0xF6, 0x20, 0xB0, 0xEB, 0x99,
+        0x06, 0xD0, 0x95, 0x7F, 0x6C, 0x6F, 0xEA, 0xCD, 0x61, 0x54, 0x68, 0xDF,
+        0x10, 0x4D, 0xE2, 0x96, 0xCD, 0x8F,
+        /* b */
+        0x10, 0xD9, 0xB4, 0xA3, 0xD9, 0x04, 0x7D, 0x8B, 0x15, 0x43, 0x59, 0xAB,
+        0xFB, 0x1B, 0x7F, 0x54, 0x85, 0xB0, 0x4C, 0xEB, 0x86, 0x82, 0x37, 0xDD,
+        0xC9, 0xDE, 0xDA, 0x98, 0x2A, 0x67, 0x9A, 0x5A, 0x91, 0x9B, 0x62, 0x6D,
+        0x4E, 0x50, 0xA8, 0xDD, 0x73, 0x1B, 0x10, 0x7A, 0x99, 0x62, 0x38, 0x1F,
+        0xB5, 0xD8, 0x07, 0xBF, 0x26, 0x18,
+        /* x */
+        0x12, 0x0F, 0xC0, 0x5D, 0x3C, 0x67, 0xA9, 0x9D, 0xE1, 0x61, 0xD2, 0xF4,
+        0x09, 0x26, 0x22, 0xFE, 0xCA, 0x70, 0x1B, 0xE4, 0xF5, 0x0F, 0x47, 0x58,
+        0x71, 0x4E, 0x8A, 0x87, 0xBB, 0xF2, 0xA6, 0x58, 0xEF, 0x8C, 0x21, 0xE7,
+        0xC5, 0xEF, 0xE9, 0x65, 0x36, 0x1F, 0x6C, 0x29, 0x99, 0xC0, 0xC2, 0x47,
+        0xB0, 0xDB, 0xD7, 0x0C, 0xE6, 0xB7,
+        /* y */
+        0x20, 0xD0, 0xAF, 0x89, 0x03, 0xA9, 0x6F, 0x8D, 0x5F, 0xA2, 0xC2, 0x55,
+        0x74, 0x5D, 0x3C, 0x45, 0x1B, 0x30, 0x2C, 0x93, 0x46, 0xD9, 0xB7, 0xE4,
+        0x85, 0xE7, 0xBC, 0xE4, 0x1F, 0x6B, 0x59, 0x1F, 0x3E, 0x8F, 0x6A, 0xDD,
+        0xCB, 0xB0, 0xBC, 0x4C, 0x2F, 0x94, 0x7A, 0x7D, 0xE1, 0xA8, 0x9B, 0x62,
+        0x5D, 0x6A, 0x59, 0x8B, 0x37, 0x60,
+        /* order */
+        0x00, 0x03, 0x40, 0x34, 0x03, 0x40, 0x34, 0x03, 0x40, 0x34, 0x03, 0x40,
+        0x34, 0x03, 0x40, 0x34, 0x03, 0x40, 0x34, 0x03, 0x40, 0x34, 0x03, 0x40,
+        0x34, 0x03, 0x40, 0x34, 0x03, 0x23, 0xC3, 0x13, 0xFA, 0xB5, 0x05, 0x89,
+        0x70, 0x3B, 0x5E, 0xC6, 0x8D, 0x35, 0x87, 0xFE, 0xC6, 0x0D, 0x16, 0x1C,
+        0xC1, 0x49, 0xC1, 0xAD, 0x4A, 0x91
+    }
+};
+
+static const struct {
+    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
+    unsigned char data[0 + 15 * 6];
+} _EC_WTLS_1 = {
+    {
+        NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 0, 15, 2
+    },
+    {
+        /* no seed */
+        /* p */
+        0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x02, 0x01,
+        /* a */
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+        /* b */
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+        /* x */
+        0x01, 0x66, 0x79, 0x79, 0xA4, 0x0B, 0xA4, 0x97, 0xE5, 0xD5, 0xC2, 0x70,
+        0x78, 0x06, 0x17,
+        /* y */
+        0x00, 0xF4, 0x4B, 0x4A, 0xF1, 0xEC, 0xC2, 0x63, 0x0E, 0x08, 0x78, 0x5C,
+        0xEB, 0xCC, 0x15,
+        /* order */
+        0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFD, 0xBF, 0x91, 0xAF,
+        0x6D, 0xEA, 0x73
+    }
+};
+
+/* IPSec curves */
+/*
+ * NOTE: The of curves over a extension field of non prime degree is not
+ * recommended (Weil-descent). As the group order is not a prime this curve
+ * is not suitable for ECDSA.
+ */
+static const struct {
+    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
+    unsigned char data[0 + 20 * 6];
+} _EC_IPSEC_155_ID3 = {
+    {
+        NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 0, 20, 3
+    },
+    {
+        /* no seed */
+        /* p */
+        0x08, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x40, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+        /* a */
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        /* b */
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x07, 0x33, 0x8f,
+        /* x */
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x7b,
+        /* y */
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0xc8,
+        /* order */
+        0x02, 0xAA, 0xAA, 0xAA, 0xAA, 0xAA, 0xAA, 0xAA, 0xAA, 0xAA, 0xC7, 0xF3,
+        0xC7, 0x88, 0x1B, 0xD0, 0x86, 0x8F, 0xA8, 0x6C
+    }
+};
+
+/*
+ * NOTE: The of curves over a extension field of non prime degree is not
+ * recommended (Weil-descent). As the group order is not a prime this curve
+ * is not suitable for ECDSA.
+ */
+static const struct {
+    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
+    unsigned char data[0 + 24 * 6];
+} _EC_IPSEC_185_ID4 = {
+    {
+        NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 0, 24, 2
+    },
+    {
+        /* no seed */
+        /* p */
+        0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+        /* a */
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        /* b */
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x1e, 0xe9,
+        /* x */
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x18,
+        /* y */
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0d,
+        /* order */
+        0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        0xED, 0xF9, 0x7C, 0x44, 0xDB, 0x9F, 0x24, 0x20, 0xBA, 0xFC, 0xA7, 0x5E
+    }
+};
+
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * These curves were added by Annie Yousar <a.yousar@informatik.hu-berlin.de>
+ * For the definition of RFC 5639 curves see
+ * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5639.txt These curves are generated verifiable
+ * at random, nevertheless the seed is omitted as parameter because the
+ * generation mechanism is different from those defined in ANSI X9.62.
+ */
+
+static const struct {
+    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
+    unsigned char data[0 + 20 * 6];
+} _EC_brainpoolP160r1 = {
+    {
+        NID_X9_62_prime_field, 0, 20, 1
+    },
+    {
+        /* no seed */
+        /* p */
+        0xE9, 0x5E, 0x4A, 0x5F, 0x73, 0x70, 0x59, 0xDC, 0x60, 0xDF, 0xC7, 0xAD,
+        0x95, 0xB3, 0xD8, 0x13, 0x95, 0x15, 0x62, 0x0F,
+        /* a */
+        0x34, 0x0E, 0x7B, 0xE2, 0xA2, 0x80, 0xEB, 0x74, 0xE2, 0xBE, 0x61, 0xBA,
+        0xDA, 0x74, 0x5D, 0x97, 0xE8, 0xF7, 0xC3, 0x00,
+        /* b */
+        0x1E, 0x58, 0x9A, 0x85, 0x95, 0x42, 0x34, 0x12, 0x13, 0x4F, 0xAA, 0x2D,
+        0xBD, 0xEC, 0x95, 0xC8, 0xD8, 0x67, 0x5E, 0x58,
+        /* x */
+        0xBE, 0xD5, 0xAF, 0x16, 0xEA, 0x3F, 0x6A, 0x4F, 0x62, 0x93, 0x8C, 0x46,
+        0x31, 0xEB, 0x5A, 0xF7, 0xBD, 0xBC, 0xDB, 0xC3,
+        /* y */
+        0x16, 0x67, 0xCB, 0x47, 0x7A, 0x1A, 0x8E, 0xC3, 0x38, 0xF9, 0x47, 0x41,
+        0x66, 0x9C, 0x97, 0x63, 0x16, 0xDA, 0x63, 0x21,
+        /* order */
+        0xE9, 0x5E, 0x4A, 0x5F, 0x73, 0x70, 0x59, 0xDC, 0x60, 0xDF, 0x59, 0x91,
+        0xD4, 0x50, 0x29, 0x40, 0x9E, 0x60, 0xFC, 0x09
+    }
+};
+
+static const struct {
+    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
+    unsigned char data[0 + 20 * 6];
+} _EC_brainpoolP160t1 = {
+    {
+        NID_X9_62_prime_field, 0, 20, 1
+    },
+    {
+        /* no seed */
+        /* p */
+        0xE9, 0x5E, 0x4A, 0x5F, 0x73, 0x70, 0x59, 0xDC, 0x60, 0xDF, 0xC7, 0xAD,
+        0x95, 0xB3, 0xD8, 0x13, 0x95, 0x15, 0x62, 0x0F,
+        /* a */
+        0xE9, 0x5E, 0x4A, 0x5F, 0x73, 0x70, 0x59, 0xDC, 0x60, 0xDF, 0xC7, 0xAD,
+        0x95, 0xB3, 0xD8, 0x13, 0x95, 0x15, 0x62, 0x0C,
+        /* b */
+        0x7A, 0x55, 0x6B, 0x6D, 0xAE, 0x53, 0x5B, 0x7B, 0x51, 0xED, 0x2C, 0x4D,
+        0x7D, 0xAA, 0x7A, 0x0B, 0x5C, 0x55, 0xF3, 0x80,
+        /* x */
+        0xB1, 0x99, 0xB1, 0x3B, 0x9B, 0x34, 0xEF, 0xC1, 0x39, 0x7E, 0x64, 0xBA,
+        0xEB, 0x05, 0xAC, 0xC2, 0x65, 0xFF, 0x23, 0x78,
+        /* y */
+        0xAD, 0xD6, 0x71, 0x8B, 0x7C, 0x7C, 0x19, 0x61, 0xF0, 0x99, 0x1B, 0x84,
+        0x24, 0x43, 0x77, 0x21, 0x52, 0xC9, 0xE0, 0xAD,
+        /* order */
+        0xE9, 0x5E, 0x4A, 0x5F, 0x73, 0x70, 0x59, 0xDC, 0x60, 0xDF, 0x59, 0x91,
+        0xD4, 0x50, 0x29, 0x40, 0x9E, 0x60, 0xFC, 0x09
+    }
+};
+
+static const struct {
+    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
+    unsigned char data[0 + 24 * 6];
+} _EC_brainpoolP192r1 = {
+    {
+        NID_X9_62_prime_field, 0, 24, 1
+    },
+    {
+        /* no seed */
+        /* p */
+        0xC3, 0x02, 0xF4, 0x1D, 0x93, 0x2A, 0x36, 0xCD, 0xA7, 0xA3, 0x46, 0x30,
+        0x93, 0xD1, 0x8D, 0xB7, 0x8F, 0xCE, 0x47, 0x6D, 0xE1, 0xA8, 0x62, 0x97,
+        /* a */
+        0x6A, 0x91, 0x17, 0x40, 0x76, 0xB1, 0xE0, 0xE1, 0x9C, 0x39, 0xC0, 0x31,
+        0xFE, 0x86, 0x85, 0xC1, 0xCA, 0xE0, 0x40, 0xE5, 0xC6, 0x9A, 0x28, 0xEF,
+        /* b */
+        0x46, 0x9A, 0x28, 0xEF, 0x7C, 0x28, 0xCC, 0xA3, 0xDC, 0x72, 0x1D, 0x04,
+        0x4F, 0x44, 0x96, 0xBC, 0xCA, 0x7E, 0xF4, 0x14, 0x6F, 0xBF, 0x25, 0xC9,
+        /* x */
+        0xC0, 0xA0, 0x64, 0x7E, 0xAA, 0xB6, 0xA4, 0x87, 0x53, 0xB0, 0x33, 0xC5,
+        0x6C, 0xB0, 0xF0, 0x90, 0x0A, 0x2F, 0x5C, 0x48, 0x53, 0x37, 0x5F, 0xD6,
+        /* y */
+        0x14, 0xB6, 0x90, 0x86, 0x6A, 0xBD, 0x5B, 0xB8, 0x8B, 0x5F, 0x48, 0x28,
+        0xC1, 0x49, 0x00, 0x02, 0xE6, 0x77, 0x3F, 0xA2, 0xFA, 0x29, 0x9B, 0x8F,
+        /* order */
+        0xC3, 0x02, 0xF4, 0x1D, 0x93, 0x2A, 0x36, 0xCD, 0xA7, 0xA3, 0x46, 0x2F,
+        0x9E, 0x9E, 0x91, 0x6B, 0x5B, 0xE8, 0xF1, 0x02, 0x9A, 0xC4, 0xAC, 0xC1
+    }
+};
+
+static const struct {
+    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
+    unsigned char data[0 + 24 * 6];
+} _EC_brainpoolP192t1 = {
+    {
+        NID_X9_62_prime_field, 0, 24, 1
+    },
+    {
+        /* no seed */
+        /* p */
+        0xC3, 0x02, 0xF4, 0x1D, 0x93, 0x2A, 0x36, 0xCD, 0xA7, 0xA3, 0x46, 0x30,
+        0x93, 0xD1, 0x8D, 0xB7, 0x8F, 0xCE, 0x47, 0x6D, 0xE1, 0xA8, 0x62, 0x97,
+        /* a */
+        0xC3, 0x02, 0xF4, 0x1D, 0x93, 0x2A, 0x36, 0xCD, 0xA7, 0xA3, 0x46, 0x30,
+        0x93, 0xD1, 0x8D, 0xB7, 0x8F, 0xCE, 0x47, 0x6D, 0xE1, 0xA8, 0x62, 0x94,
+        /* b */
+        0x13, 0xD5, 0x6F, 0xFA, 0xEC, 0x78, 0x68, 0x1E, 0x68, 0xF9, 0xDE, 0xB4,
+        0x3B, 0x35, 0xBE, 0xC2, 0xFB, 0x68, 0x54, 0x2E, 0x27, 0x89, 0x7B, 0x79,
+        /* x */
+        0x3A, 0xE9, 0xE5, 0x8C, 0x82, 0xF6, 0x3C, 0x30, 0x28, 0x2E, 0x1F, 0xE7,
+        0xBB, 0xF4, 0x3F, 0xA7, 0x2C, 0x44, 0x6A, 0xF6, 0xF4, 0x61, 0x81, 0x29,
+        /* y */
+        0x09, 0x7E, 0x2C, 0x56, 0x67, 0xC2, 0x22, 0x3A, 0x90, 0x2A, 0xB5, 0xCA,
+        0x44, 0x9D, 0x00, 0x84, 0xB7, 0xE5, 0xB3, 0xDE, 0x7C, 0xCC, 0x01, 0xC9,
+        /* order */
+        0xC3, 0x02, 0xF4, 0x1D, 0x93, 0x2A, 0x36, 0xCD, 0xA7, 0xA3, 0x46, 0x2F,
+        0x9E, 0x9E, 0x91, 0x6B, 0x5B, 0xE8, 0xF1, 0x02, 0x9A, 0xC4, 0xAC, 0xC1
+    }
+};
+
+static const struct {
+    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
+    unsigned char data[0 + 28 * 6];
+} _EC_brainpoolP224r1 = {
+    {
+        NID_X9_62_prime_field, 0, 28, 1
+    },
+    {
+        /* no seed */
+        /* p */
+        0xD7, 0xC1, 0x34, 0xAA, 0x26, 0x43, 0x66, 0x86, 0x2A, 0x18, 0x30, 0x25,
+        0x75, 0xD1, 0xD7, 0x87, 0xB0, 0x9F, 0x07, 0x57, 0x97, 0xDA, 0x89, 0xF5,
+        0x7E, 0xC8, 0xC0, 0xFF,
+        /* a */
+        0x68, 0xA5, 0xE6, 0x2C, 0xA9, 0xCE, 0x6C, 0x1C, 0x29, 0x98, 0x03, 0xA6,
+        0xC1, 0x53, 0x0B, 0x51, 0x4E, 0x18, 0x2A, 0xD8, 0xB0, 0x04, 0x2A, 0x59,
+        0xCA, 0xD2, 0x9F, 0x43,
+        /* b */
+        0x25, 0x80, 0xF6, 0x3C, 0xCF, 0xE4, 0x41, 0x38, 0x87, 0x07, 0x13, 0xB1,
+        0xA9, 0x23, 0x69, 0xE3, 0x3E, 0x21, 0x35, 0xD2, 0x66, 0xDB, 0xB3, 0x72,
+        0x38, 0x6C, 0x40, 0x0B,
+        /* x */
+        0x0D, 0x90, 0x29, 0xAD, 0x2C, 0x7E, 0x5C, 0xF4, 0x34, 0x08, 0x23, 0xB2,
+        0xA8, 0x7D, 0xC6, 0x8C, 0x9E, 0x4C, 0xE3, 0x17, 0x4C, 0x1E, 0x6E, 0xFD,
+        0xEE, 0x12, 0xC0, 0x7D,
+        /* y */
+        0x58, 0xAA, 0x56, 0xF7, 0x72, 0xC0, 0x72, 0x6F, 0x24, 0xC6, 0xB8, 0x9E,
+        0x4E, 0xCD, 0xAC, 0x24, 0x35, 0x4B, 0x9E, 0x99, 0xCA, 0xA3, 0xF6, 0xD3,
+        0x76, 0x14, 0x02, 0xCD,
+        /* order */
+        0xD7, 0xC1, 0x34, 0xAA, 0x26, 0x43, 0x66, 0x86, 0x2A, 0x18, 0x30, 0x25,
+        0x75, 0xD0, 0xFB, 0x98, 0xD1, 0x16, 0xBC, 0x4B, 0x6D, 0xDE, 0xBC, 0xA3,
+        0xA5, 0xA7, 0x93, 0x9F
+    }
+};
+
+static const struct {
+    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
+    unsigned char data[0 + 28 * 6];
+} _EC_brainpoolP224t1 = {
+    {
+        NID_X9_62_prime_field, 0, 28, 1
+    },
+    {
+        /* no seed */
+        /* p */
+        0xD7, 0xC1, 0x34, 0xAA, 0x26, 0x43, 0x66, 0x86, 0x2A, 0x18, 0x30, 0x25,
+        0x75, 0xD1, 0xD7, 0x87, 0xB0, 0x9F, 0x07, 0x57, 0x97, 0xDA, 0x89, 0xF5,
+        0x7E, 0xC8, 0xC0, 0xFF,
+        /* a */
+        0xD7, 0xC1, 0x34, 0xAA, 0x26, 0x43, 0x66, 0x86, 0x2A, 0x18, 0x30, 0x25,
+        0x75, 0xD1, 0xD7, 0x87, 0xB0, 0x9F, 0x07, 0x57, 0x97, 0xDA, 0x89, 0xF5,
+        0x7E, 0xC8, 0xC0, 0xFC,
+        /* b */
+        0x4B, 0x33, 0x7D, 0x93, 0x41, 0x04, 0xCD, 0x7B, 0xEF, 0x27, 0x1B, 0xF6,
+        0x0C, 0xED, 0x1E, 0xD2, 0x0D, 0xA1, 0x4C, 0x08, 0xB3, 0xBB, 0x64, 0xF1,
+        0x8A, 0x60, 0x88, 0x8D,
+        /* x */
+        0x6A, 0xB1, 0xE3, 0x44, 0xCE, 0x25, 0xFF, 0x38, 0x96, 0x42, 0x4E, 0x7F,
+        0xFE, 0x14, 0x76, 0x2E, 0xCB, 0x49, 0xF8, 0x92, 0x8A, 0xC0, 0xC7, 0x60,
+        0x29, 0xB4, 0xD5, 0x80,
+        /* y */
+        0x03, 0x74, 0xE9, 0xF5, 0x14, 0x3E, 0x56, 0x8C, 0xD2, 0x3F, 0x3F, 0x4D,
+        0x7C, 0x0D, 0x4B, 0x1E, 0x41, 0xC8, 0xCC, 0x0D, 0x1C, 0x6A, 0xBD, 0x5F,
+        0x1A, 0x46, 0xDB, 0x4C,
+        /* order */
+        0xD7, 0xC1, 0x34, 0xAA, 0x26, 0x43, 0x66, 0x86, 0x2A, 0x18, 0x30, 0x25,
+        0x75, 0xD0, 0xFB, 0x98, 0xD1, 0x16, 0xBC, 0x4B, 0x6D, 0xDE, 0xBC, 0xA3,
+        0xA5, 0xA7, 0x93, 0x9F
+    }
+};
+
+static const struct {
+    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
+    unsigned char data[0 + 32 * 6];
+} _EC_brainpoolP256r1 = {
+    {
+        NID_X9_62_prime_field, 0, 32, 1
+    },
+    {
+        /* no seed */
+        /* p */
+        0xA9, 0xFB, 0x57, 0xDB, 0xA1, 0xEE, 0xA9, 0xBC, 0x3E, 0x66, 0x0A, 0x90,
+        0x9D, 0x83, 0x8D, 0x72, 0x6E, 0x3B, 0xF6, 0x23, 0xD5, 0x26, 0x20, 0x28,
+        0x20, 0x13, 0x48, 0x1D, 0x1F, 0x6E, 0x53, 0x77,
+        /* a */
+        0x7D, 0x5A, 0x09, 0x75, 0xFC, 0x2C, 0x30, 0x57, 0xEE, 0xF6, 0x75, 0x30,
+        0x41, 0x7A, 0xFF, 0xE7, 0xFB, 0x80, 0x55, 0xC1, 0x26, 0xDC, 0x5C, 0x6C,
+        0xE9, 0x4A, 0x4B, 0x44, 0xF3, 0x30, 0xB5, 0xD9,
+        /* b */
+        0x26, 0xDC, 0x5C, 0x6C, 0xE9, 0x4A, 0x4B, 0x44, 0xF3, 0x30, 0xB5, 0xD9,
+        0xBB, 0xD7, 0x7C, 0xBF, 0x95, 0x84, 0x16, 0x29, 0x5C, 0xF7, 0xE1, 0xCE,
+        0x6B, 0xCC, 0xDC, 0x18, 0xFF, 0x8C, 0x07, 0xB6,
+        /* x */
+        0x8B, 0xD2, 0xAE, 0xB9, 0xCB, 0x7E, 0x57, 0xCB, 0x2C, 0x4B, 0x48, 0x2F,
+        0xFC, 0x81, 0xB7, 0xAF, 0xB9, 0xDE, 0x27, 0xE1, 0xE3, 0xBD, 0x23, 0xC2,
+        0x3A, 0x44, 0x53, 0xBD, 0x9A, 0xCE, 0x32, 0x62,
+        /* y */
+        0x54, 0x7E, 0xF8, 0x35, 0xC3, 0xDA, 0xC4, 0xFD, 0x97, 0xF8, 0x46, 0x1A,
+        0x14, 0x61, 0x1D, 0xC9, 0xC2, 0x77, 0x45, 0x13, 0x2D, 0xED, 0x8E, 0x54,
+        0x5C, 0x1D, 0x54, 0xC7, 0x2F, 0x04, 0x69, 0x97,
+        /* order */
+        0xA9, 0xFB, 0x57, 0xDB, 0xA1, 0xEE, 0xA9, 0xBC, 0x3E, 0x66, 0x0A, 0x90,
+        0x9D, 0x83, 0x8D, 0x71, 0x8C, 0x39, 0x7A, 0xA3, 0xB5, 0x61, 0xA6, 0xF7,
+        0x90, 0x1E, 0x0E, 0x82, 0x97, 0x48, 0x56, 0xA7
+    }
+};
+
+static const struct {
+    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
+    unsigned char data[0 + 32 * 6];
+} _EC_brainpoolP256t1 = {
+    {
+        NID_X9_62_prime_field, 0, 32, 1
+    },
+    {
+        /* no seed */
+        /* p */
+        0xA9, 0xFB, 0x57, 0xDB, 0xA1, 0xEE, 0xA9, 0xBC, 0x3E, 0x66, 0x0A, 0x90,
+        0x9D, 0x83, 0x8D, 0x72, 0x6E, 0x3B, 0xF6, 0x23, 0xD5, 0x26, 0x20, 0x28,
+        0x20, 0x13, 0x48, 0x1D, 0x1F, 0x6E, 0x53, 0x77,
+        /* a */
+        0xA9, 0xFB, 0x57, 0xDB, 0xA1, 0xEE, 0xA9, 0xBC, 0x3E, 0x66, 0x0A, 0x90,
+        0x9D, 0x83, 0x8D, 0x72, 0x6E, 0x3B, 0xF6, 0x23, 0xD5, 0x26, 0x20, 0x28,
+        0x20, 0x13, 0x48, 0x1D, 0x1F, 0x6E, 0x53, 0x74,
+        /* b */
+        0x66, 0x2C, 0x61, 0xC4, 0x30, 0xD8, 0x4E, 0xA4, 0xFE, 0x66, 0xA7, 0x73,
+        0x3D, 0x0B, 0x76, 0xB7, 0xBF, 0x93, 0xEB, 0xC4, 0xAF, 0x2F, 0x49, 0x25,
+        0x6A, 0xE5, 0x81, 0x01, 0xFE, 0xE9, 0x2B, 0x04,
+        /* x */
+        0xA3, 0xE8, 0xEB, 0x3C, 0xC1, 0xCF, 0xE7, 0xB7, 0x73, 0x22, 0x13, 0xB2,
+        0x3A, 0x65, 0x61, 0x49, 0xAF, 0xA1, 0x42, 0xC4, 0x7A, 0xAF, 0xBC, 0x2B,
+        0x79, 0xA1, 0x91, 0x56, 0x2E, 0x13, 0x05, 0xF4,
+        /* y */
+        0x2D, 0x99, 0x6C, 0x82, 0x34, 0x39, 0xC5, 0x6D, 0x7F, 0x7B, 0x22, 0xE1,
+        0x46, 0x44, 0x41, 0x7E, 0x69, 0xBC, 0xB6, 0xDE, 0x39, 0xD0, 0x27, 0x00,
+        0x1D, 0xAB, 0xE8, 0xF3, 0x5B, 0x25, 0xC9, 0xBE,
+        /* order */
+        0xA9, 0xFB, 0x57, 0xDB, 0xA1, 0xEE, 0xA9, 0xBC, 0x3E, 0x66, 0x0A, 0x90,
+        0x9D, 0x83, 0x8D, 0x71, 0x8C, 0x39, 0x7A, 0xA3, 0xB5, 0x61, 0xA6, 0xF7,
+        0x90, 0x1E, 0x0E, 0x82, 0x97, 0x48, 0x56, 0xA7
+    }
+};
+
+static const struct {
+    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
+    unsigned char data[0 + 40 * 6];
+} _EC_brainpoolP320r1 = {
+    {
+        NID_X9_62_prime_field, 0, 40, 1
+    },
+    {
+        /* no seed */
+        /* p */
+        0xD3, 0x5E, 0x47, 0x20, 0x36, 0xBC, 0x4F, 0xB7, 0xE1, 0x3C, 0x78, 0x5E,
+        0xD2, 0x01, 0xE0, 0x65, 0xF9, 0x8F, 0xCF, 0xA6, 0xF6, 0xF4, 0x0D, 0xEF,
+        0x4F, 0x92, 0xB9, 0xEC, 0x78, 0x93, 0xEC, 0x28, 0xFC, 0xD4, 0x12, 0xB1,
+        0xF1, 0xB3, 0x2E, 0x27,
+        /* a */
+        0x3E, 0xE3, 0x0B, 0x56, 0x8F, 0xBA, 0xB0, 0xF8, 0x83, 0xCC, 0xEB, 0xD4,
+        0x6D, 0x3F, 0x3B, 0xB8, 0xA2, 0xA7, 0x35, 0x13, 0xF5, 0xEB, 0x79, 0xDA,
+        0x66, 0x19, 0x0E, 0xB0, 0x85, 0xFF, 0xA9, 0xF4, 0x92, 0xF3, 0x75, 0xA9,
+        0x7D, 0x86, 0x0E, 0xB4,
+        /* b */
+        0x52, 0x08, 0x83, 0x94, 0x9D, 0xFD, 0xBC, 0x42, 0xD3, 0xAD, 0x19, 0x86,
+        0x40, 0x68, 0x8A, 0x6F, 0xE1, 0x3F, 0x41, 0x34, 0x95, 0x54, 0xB4, 0x9A,
+        0xCC, 0x31, 0xDC, 0xCD, 0x88, 0x45, 0x39, 0x81, 0x6F, 0x5E, 0xB4, 0xAC,
+        0x8F, 0xB1, 0xF1, 0xA6,
+        /* x */
+        0x43, 0xBD, 0x7E, 0x9A, 0xFB, 0x53, 0xD8, 0xB8, 0x52, 0x89, 0xBC, 0xC4,
+        0x8E, 0xE5, 0xBF, 0xE6, 0xF2, 0x01, 0x37, 0xD1, 0x0A, 0x08, 0x7E, 0xB6,
+        0xE7, 0x87, 0x1E, 0x2A, 0x10, 0xA5, 0x99, 0xC7, 0x10, 0xAF, 0x8D, 0x0D,
+        0x39, 0xE2, 0x06, 0x11,
+        /* y */
+        0x14, 0xFD, 0xD0, 0x55, 0x45, 0xEC, 0x1C, 0xC8, 0xAB, 0x40, 0x93, 0x24,
+        0x7F, 0x77, 0x27, 0x5E, 0x07, 0x43, 0xFF, 0xED, 0x11, 0x71, 0x82, 0xEA,
+        0xA9, 0xC7, 0x78, 0x77, 0xAA, 0xAC, 0x6A, 0xC7, 0xD3, 0x52, 0x45, 0xD1,
+        0x69, 0x2E, 0x8E, 0xE1,
+        /* order */
+        0xD3, 0x5E, 0x47, 0x20, 0x36, 0xBC, 0x4F, 0xB7, 0xE1, 0x3C, 0x78, 0x5E,
+        0xD2, 0x01, 0xE0, 0x65, 0xF9, 0x8F, 0xCF, 0xA5, 0xB6, 0x8F, 0x12, 0xA3,
+        0x2D, 0x48, 0x2E, 0xC7, 0xEE, 0x86, 0x58, 0xE9, 0x86, 0x91, 0x55, 0x5B,
+        0x44, 0xC5, 0x93, 0x11
+    }
+};
+
+static const struct {
+    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
+    unsigned char data[0 + 40 * 6];
+} _EC_brainpoolP320t1 = {
+    {
+        NID_X9_62_prime_field, 0, 40, 1
+    },
+    {
+        /* no seed */
+        /* p */
+        0xD3, 0x5E, 0x47, 0x20, 0x36, 0xBC, 0x4F, 0xB7, 0xE1, 0x3C, 0x78, 0x5E,
+        0xD2, 0x01, 0xE0, 0x65, 0xF9, 0x8F, 0xCF, 0xA6, 0xF6, 0xF4, 0x0D, 0xEF,
+        0x4F, 0x92, 0xB9, 0xEC, 0x78, 0x93, 0xEC, 0x28, 0xFC, 0xD4, 0x12, 0xB1,
+        0xF1, 0xB3, 0x2E, 0x27,
+        /* a */
+        0xD3, 0x5E, 0x47, 0x20, 0x36, 0xBC, 0x4F, 0xB7, 0xE1, 0x3C, 0x78, 0x5E,
+        0xD2, 0x01, 0xE0, 0x65, 0xF9, 0x8F, 0xCF, 0xA6, 0xF6, 0xF4, 0x0D, 0xEF,
+        0x4F, 0x92, 0xB9, 0xEC, 0x78, 0x93, 0xEC, 0x28, 0xFC, 0xD4, 0x12, 0xB1,
+        0xF1, 0xB3, 0x2E, 0x24,
+        /* b */
+        0xA7, 0xF5, 0x61, 0xE0, 0x38, 0xEB, 0x1E, 0xD5, 0x60, 0xB3, 0xD1, 0x47,
+        0xDB, 0x78, 0x20, 0x13, 0x06, 0x4C, 0x19, 0xF2, 0x7E, 0xD2, 0x7C, 0x67,
+        0x80, 0xAA, 0xF7, 0x7F, 0xB8, 0xA5, 0x47, 0xCE, 0xB5, 0xB4, 0xFE, 0xF4,
+        0x22, 0x34, 0x03, 0x53,
+        /* x */
+        0x92, 0x5B, 0xE9, 0xFB, 0x01, 0xAF, 0xC6, 0xFB, 0x4D, 0x3E, 0x7D, 0x49,
+        0x90, 0x01, 0x0F, 0x81, 0x34, 0x08, 0xAB, 0x10, 0x6C, 0x4F, 0x09, 0xCB,
+        0x7E, 0xE0, 0x78, 0x68, 0xCC, 0x13, 0x6F, 0xFF, 0x33, 0x57, 0xF6, 0x24,
+        0xA2, 0x1B, 0xED, 0x52,
+        /* y */
+        0x63, 0xBA, 0x3A, 0x7A, 0x27, 0x48, 0x3E, 0xBF, 0x66, 0x71, 0xDB, 0xEF,
+        0x7A, 0xBB, 0x30, 0xEB, 0xEE, 0x08, 0x4E, 0x58, 0xA0, 0xB0, 0x77, 0xAD,
+        0x42, 0xA5, 0xA0, 0x98, 0x9D, 0x1E, 0xE7, 0x1B, 0x1B, 0x9B, 0xC0, 0x45,
+        0x5F, 0xB0, 0xD2, 0xC3,
+        /* order */
+        0xD3, 0x5E, 0x47, 0x20, 0x36, 0xBC, 0x4F, 0xB7, 0xE1, 0x3C, 0x78, 0x5E,
+        0xD2, 0x01, 0xE0, 0x65, 0xF9, 0x8F, 0xCF, 0xA5, 0xB6, 0x8F, 0x12, 0xA3,
+        0x2D, 0x48, 0x2E, 0xC7, 0xEE, 0x86, 0x58, 0xE9, 0x86, 0x91, 0x55, 0x5B,
+        0x44, 0xC5, 0x93, 0x11
+    }
+};
+
+static const struct {
+    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
+    unsigned char data[0 + 48 * 6];
+} _EC_brainpoolP384r1 = {
+    {
+        NID_X9_62_prime_field, 0, 48, 1
+    },
+    {
+        /* no seed */
+        /* p */
+        0x8C, 0xB9, 0x1E, 0x82, 0xA3, 0x38, 0x6D, 0x28, 0x0F, 0x5D, 0x6F, 0x7E,
+        0x50, 0xE6, 0x41, 0xDF, 0x15, 0x2F, 0x71, 0x09, 0xED, 0x54, 0x56, 0xB4,
+        0x12, 0xB1, 0xDA, 0x19, 0x7F, 0xB7, 0x11, 0x23, 0xAC, 0xD3, 0xA7, 0x29,
+        0x90, 0x1D, 0x1A, 0x71, 0x87, 0x47, 0x00, 0x13, 0x31, 0x07, 0xEC, 0x53,
+        /* a */
+        0x7B, 0xC3, 0x82, 0xC6, 0x3D, 0x8C, 0x15, 0x0C, 0x3C, 0x72, 0x08, 0x0A,
+        0xCE, 0x05, 0xAF, 0xA0, 0xC2, 0xBE, 0xA2, 0x8E, 0x4F, 0xB2, 0x27, 0x87,
+        0x13, 0x91, 0x65, 0xEF, 0xBA, 0x91, 0xF9, 0x0F, 0x8A, 0xA5, 0x81, 0x4A,
+        0x50, 0x3A, 0xD4, 0xEB, 0x04, 0xA8, 0xC7, 0xDD, 0x22, 0xCE, 0x28, 0x26,
+        /* b */
+        0x04, 0xA8, 0xC7, 0xDD, 0x22, 0xCE, 0x28, 0x26, 0x8B, 0x39, 0xB5, 0x54,
+        0x16, 0xF0, 0x44, 0x7C, 0x2F, 0xB7, 0x7D, 0xE1, 0x07, 0xDC, 0xD2, 0xA6,
+        0x2E, 0x88, 0x0E, 0xA5, 0x3E, 0xEB, 0x62, 0xD5, 0x7C, 0xB4, 0x39, 0x02,
+        0x95, 0xDB, 0xC9, 0x94, 0x3A, 0xB7, 0x86, 0x96, 0xFA, 0x50, 0x4C, 0x11,
+        /* x */
+        0x1D, 0x1C, 0x64, 0xF0, 0x68, 0xCF, 0x45, 0xFF, 0xA2, 0xA6, 0x3A, 0x81,
+        0xB7, 0xC1, 0x3F, 0x6B, 0x88, 0x47, 0xA3, 0xE7, 0x7E, 0xF1, 0x4F, 0xE3,
+        0xDB, 0x7F, 0xCA, 0xFE, 0x0C, 0xBD, 0x10, 0xE8, 0xE8, 0x26, 0xE0, 0x34,
+        0x36, 0xD6, 0x46, 0xAA, 0xEF, 0x87, 0xB2, 0xE2, 0x47, 0xD4, 0xAF, 0x1E,
+        /* y */
+        0x8A, 0xBE, 0x1D, 0x75, 0x20, 0xF9, 0xC2, 0xA4, 0x5C, 0xB1, 0xEB, 0x8E,
+        0x95, 0xCF, 0xD5, 0x52, 0x62, 0xB7, 0x0B, 0x29, 0xFE, 0xEC, 0x58, 0x64,
+        0xE1, 0x9C, 0x05, 0x4F, 0xF9, 0x91, 0x29, 0x28, 0x0E, 0x46, 0x46, 0x21,
+        0x77, 0x91, 0x81, 0x11, 0x42, 0x82, 0x03, 0x41, 0x26, 0x3C, 0x53, 0x15,
+        /* order */
+        0x8C, 0xB9, 0x1E, 0x82, 0xA3, 0x38, 0x6D, 0x28, 0x0F, 0x5D, 0x6F, 0x7E,
+        0x50, 0xE6, 0x41, 0xDF, 0x15, 0x2F, 0x71, 0x09, 0xED, 0x54, 0x56, 0xB3,
+        0x1F, 0x16, 0x6E, 0x6C, 0xAC, 0x04, 0x25, 0xA7, 0xCF, 0x3A, 0xB6, 0xAF,
+        0x6B, 0x7F, 0xC3, 0x10, 0x3B, 0x88, 0x32, 0x02, 0xE9, 0x04, 0x65, 0x65
+    }
+};
+
+static const struct {
+    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
+    unsigned char data[0 + 48 * 6];
+} _EC_brainpoolP384t1 = {
+    {
+        NID_X9_62_prime_field, 0, 48, 1
+    },
+    {
+        /* no seed */
+        /* p */
+        0x8C, 0xB9, 0x1E, 0x82, 0xA3, 0x38, 0x6D, 0x28, 0x0F, 0x5D, 0x6F, 0x7E,
+        0x50, 0xE6, 0x41, 0xDF, 0x15, 0x2F, 0x71, 0x09, 0xED, 0x54, 0x56, 0xB4,
+        0x12, 0xB1, 0xDA, 0x19, 0x7F, 0xB7, 0x11, 0x23, 0xAC, 0xD3, 0xA7, 0x29,
+        0x90, 0x1D, 0x1A, 0x71, 0x87, 0x47, 0x00, 0x13, 0x31, 0x07, 0xEC, 0x53,
+        /* a */
+        0x8C, 0xB9, 0x1E, 0x82, 0xA3, 0x38, 0x6D, 0x28, 0x0F, 0x5D, 0x6F, 0x7E,
+        0x50, 0xE6, 0x41, 0xDF, 0x15, 0x2F, 0x71, 0x09, 0xED, 0x54, 0x56, 0xB4,
+        0x12, 0xB1, 0xDA, 0x19, 0x7F, 0xB7, 0x11, 0x23, 0xAC, 0xD3, 0xA7, 0x29,
+        0x90, 0x1D, 0x1A, 0x71, 0x87, 0x47, 0x00, 0x13, 0x31, 0x07, 0xEC, 0x50,
+        /* b */
+        0x7F, 0x51, 0x9E, 0xAD, 0xA7, 0xBD, 0xA8, 0x1B, 0xD8, 0x26, 0xDB, 0xA6,
+        0x47, 0x91, 0x0F, 0x8C, 0x4B, 0x93, 0x46, 0xED, 0x8C, 0xCD, 0xC6, 0x4E,
+        0x4B, 0x1A, 0xBD, 0x11, 0x75, 0x6D, 0xCE, 0x1D, 0x20, 0x74, 0xAA, 0x26,
+        0x3B, 0x88, 0x80, 0x5C, 0xED, 0x70, 0x35, 0x5A, 0x33, 0xB4, 0x71, 0xEE,
+        /* x */
+        0x18, 0xDE, 0x98, 0xB0, 0x2D, 0xB9, 0xA3, 0x06, 0xF2, 0xAF, 0xCD, 0x72,
+        0x35, 0xF7, 0x2A, 0x81, 0x9B, 0x80, 0xAB, 0x12, 0xEB, 0xD6, 0x53, 0x17,
+        0x24, 0x76, 0xFE, 0xCD, 0x46, 0x2A, 0xAB, 0xFF, 0xC4, 0xFF, 0x19, 0x1B,
+        0x94, 0x6A, 0x5F, 0x54, 0xD8, 0xD0, 0xAA, 0x2F, 0x41, 0x88, 0x08, 0xCC,
+        /* y */
+        0x25, 0xAB, 0x05, 0x69, 0x62, 0xD3, 0x06, 0x51, 0xA1, 0x14, 0xAF, 0xD2,
+        0x75, 0x5A, 0xD3, 0x36, 0x74, 0x7F, 0x93, 0x47, 0x5B, 0x7A, 0x1F, 0xCA,
+        0x3B, 0x88, 0xF2, 0xB6, 0xA2, 0x08, 0xCC, 0xFE, 0x46, 0x94, 0x08, 0x58,
+        0x4D, 0xC2, 0xB2, 0x91, 0x26, 0x75, 0xBF, 0x5B, 0x9E, 0x58, 0x29, 0x28,
+        /* order */
+        0x8C, 0xB9, 0x1E, 0x82, 0xA3, 0x38, 0x6D, 0x28, 0x0F, 0x5D, 0x6F, 0x7E,
+        0x50, 0xE6, 0x41, 0xDF, 0x15, 0x2F, 0x71, 0x09, 0xED, 0x54, 0x56, 0xB3,
+        0x1F, 0x16, 0x6E, 0x6C, 0xAC, 0x04, 0x25, 0xA7, 0xCF, 0x3A, 0xB6, 0xAF,
+        0x6B, 0x7F, 0xC3, 0x10, 0x3B, 0x88, 0x32, 0x02, 0xE9, 0x04, 0x65, 0x65
+    }
+};
+
+static const struct {
+    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
+    unsigned char data[0 + 64 * 6];
+} _EC_brainpoolP512r1 = {
+    {
+        NID_X9_62_prime_field, 0, 64, 1
+    },
+    {
+        /* no seed */
+        /* p */
+        0xAA, 0xDD, 0x9D, 0xB8, 0xDB, 0xE9, 0xC4, 0x8B, 0x3F, 0xD4, 0xE6, 0xAE,
+        0x33, 0xC9, 0xFC, 0x07, 0xCB, 0x30, 0x8D, 0xB3, 0xB3, 0xC9, 0xD2, 0x0E,
+        0xD6, 0x63, 0x9C, 0xCA, 0x70, 0x33, 0x08, 0x71, 0x7D, 0x4D, 0x9B, 0x00,
+        0x9B, 0xC6, 0x68, 0x42, 0xAE, 0xCD, 0xA1, 0x2A, 0xE6, 0xA3, 0x80, 0xE6,
+        0x28, 0x81, 0xFF, 0x2F, 0x2D, 0x82, 0xC6, 0x85, 0x28, 0xAA, 0x60, 0x56,
+        0x58, 0x3A, 0x48, 0xF3,
+        /* a */
+        0x78, 0x30, 0xA3, 0x31, 0x8B, 0x60, 0x3B, 0x89, 0xE2, 0x32, 0x71, 0x45,
+        0xAC, 0x23, 0x4C, 0xC5, 0x94, 0xCB, 0xDD, 0x8D, 0x3D, 0xF9, 0x16, 0x10,
+        0xA8, 0x34, 0x41, 0xCA, 0xEA, 0x98, 0x63, 0xBC, 0x2D, 0xED, 0x5D, 0x5A,
+        0xA8, 0x25, 0x3A, 0xA1, 0x0A, 0x2E, 0xF1, 0xC9, 0x8B, 0x9A, 0xC8, 0xB5,
+        0x7F, 0x11, 0x17, 0xA7, 0x2B, 0xF2, 0xC7, 0xB9, 0xE7, 0xC1, 0xAC, 0x4D,
+        0x77, 0xFC, 0x94, 0xCA,
+        /* b */
+        0x3D, 0xF9, 0x16, 0x10, 0xA8, 0x34, 0x41, 0xCA, 0xEA, 0x98, 0x63, 0xBC,
+        0x2D, 0xED, 0x5D, 0x5A, 0xA8, 0x25, 0x3A, 0xA1, 0x0A, 0x2E, 0xF1, 0xC9,
+        0x8B, 0x9A, 0xC8, 0xB5, 0x7F, 0x11, 0x17, 0xA7, 0x2B, 0xF2, 0xC7, 0xB9,
+        0xE7, 0xC1, 0xAC, 0x4D, 0x77, 0xFC, 0x94, 0xCA, 0xDC, 0x08, 0x3E, 0x67,
+        0x98, 0x40, 0x50, 0xB7, 0x5E, 0xBA, 0xE5, 0xDD, 0x28, 0x09, 0xBD, 0x63,
+        0x80, 0x16, 0xF7, 0x23,
+        /* x */
+        0x81, 0xAE, 0xE4, 0xBD, 0xD8, 0x2E, 0xD9, 0x64, 0x5A, 0x21, 0x32, 0x2E,
+        0x9C, 0x4C, 0x6A, 0x93, 0x85, 0xED, 0x9F, 0x70, 0xB5, 0xD9, 0x16, 0xC1,
+        0xB4, 0x3B, 0x62, 0xEE, 0xF4, 0xD0, 0x09, 0x8E, 0xFF, 0x3B, 0x1F, 0x78,
+        0xE2, 0xD0, 0xD4, 0x8D, 0x50, 0xD1, 0x68, 0x7B, 0x93, 0xB9, 0x7D, 0x5F,
+        0x7C, 0x6D, 0x50, 0x47, 0x40, 0x6A, 0x5E, 0x68, 0x8B, 0x35, 0x22, 0x09,
+        0xBC, 0xB9, 0xF8, 0x22,
+        /* y */
+        0x7D, 0xDE, 0x38, 0x5D, 0x56, 0x63, 0x32, 0xEC, 0xC0, 0xEA, 0xBF, 0xA9,
+        0xCF, 0x78, 0x22, 0xFD, 0xF2, 0x09, 0xF7, 0x00, 0x24, 0xA5, 0x7B, 0x1A,
+        0xA0, 0x00, 0xC5, 0x5B, 0x88, 0x1F, 0x81, 0x11, 0xB2, 0xDC, 0xDE, 0x49,
+        0x4A, 0x5F, 0x48, 0x5E, 0x5B, 0xCA, 0x4B, 0xD8, 0x8A, 0x27, 0x63, 0xAE,
+        0xD1, 0xCA, 0x2B, 0x2F, 0xA8, 0xF0, 0x54, 0x06, 0x78, 0xCD, 0x1E, 0x0F,
+        0x3A, 0xD8, 0x08, 0x92,
+        /* order */
+        0xAA, 0xDD, 0x9D, 0xB8, 0xDB, 0xE9, 0xC4, 0x8B, 0x3F, 0xD4, 0xE6, 0xAE,
+        0x33, 0xC9, 0xFC, 0x07, 0xCB, 0x30, 0x8D, 0xB3, 0xB3, 0xC9, 0xD2, 0x0E,
+        0xD6, 0x63, 0x9C, 0xCA, 0x70, 0x33, 0x08, 0x70, 0x55, 0x3E, 0x5C, 0x41,
+        0x4C, 0xA9, 0x26, 0x19, 0x41, 0x86, 0x61, 0x19, 0x7F, 0xAC, 0x10, 0x47,
+        0x1D, 0xB1, 0xD3, 0x81, 0x08, 0x5D, 0xDA, 0xDD, 0xB5, 0x87, 0x96, 0x82,
+        0x9C, 0xA9, 0x00, 0x69
+    }
+};
+
+static const struct {
+    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
+    unsigned char data[0 + 64 * 6];
+} _EC_brainpoolP512t1 = {
+    {
+        NID_X9_62_prime_field, 0, 64, 1
+    },
+    {
+        /* no seed */
+        /* p */
+        0xAA, 0xDD, 0x9D, 0xB8, 0xDB, 0xE9, 0xC4, 0x8B, 0x3F, 0xD4, 0xE6, 0xAE,
+        0x33, 0xC9, 0xFC, 0x07, 0xCB, 0x30, 0x8D, 0xB3, 0xB3, 0xC9, 0xD2, 0x0E,
+        0xD6, 0x63, 0x9C, 0xCA, 0x70, 0x33, 0x08, 0x71, 0x7D, 0x4D, 0x9B, 0x00,
+        0x9B, 0xC6, 0x68, 0x42, 0xAE, 0xCD, 0xA1, 0x2A, 0xE6, 0xA3, 0x80, 0xE6,
+        0x28, 0x81, 0xFF, 0x2F, 0x2D, 0x82, 0xC6, 0x85, 0x28, 0xAA, 0x60, 0x56,
+        0x58, 0x3A, 0x48, 0xF3,
+        /* a */
+        0xAA, 0xDD, 0x9D, 0xB8, 0xDB, 0xE9, 0xC4, 0x8B, 0x3F, 0xD4, 0xE6, 0xAE,
+        0x33, 0xC9, 0xFC, 0x07, 0xCB, 0x30, 0x8D, 0xB3, 0xB3, 0xC9, 0xD2, 0x0E,
+        0xD6, 0x63, 0x9C, 0xCA, 0x70, 0x33, 0x08, 0x71, 0x7D, 0x4D, 0x9B, 0x00,
+        0x9B, 0xC6, 0x68, 0x42, 0xAE, 0xCD, 0xA1, 0x2A, 0xE6, 0xA3, 0x80, 0xE6,
+        0x28, 0x81, 0xFF, 0x2F, 0x2D, 0x82, 0xC6, 0x85, 0x28, 0xAA, 0x60, 0x56,
+        0x58, 0x3A, 0x48, 0xF0,
+        /* b */
+        0x7C, 0xBB, 0xBC, 0xF9, 0x44, 0x1C, 0xFA, 0xB7, 0x6E, 0x18, 0x90, 0xE4,
+        0x68, 0x84, 0xEA, 0xE3, 0x21, 0xF7, 0x0C, 0x0B, 0xCB, 0x49, 0x81, 0x52,
+        0x78, 0x97, 0x50, 0x4B, 0xEC, 0x3E, 0x36, 0xA6, 0x2B, 0xCD, 0xFA, 0x23,
+        0x04, 0x97, 0x65, 0x40, 0xF6, 0x45, 0x00, 0x85, 0xF2, 0xDA, 0xE1, 0x45,
+        0xC2, 0x25, 0x53, 0xB4, 0x65, 0x76, 0x36, 0x89, 0x18, 0x0E, 0xA2, 0x57,
+        0x18, 0x67, 0x42, 0x3E,
+        /* x */
+        0x64, 0x0E, 0xCE, 0x5C, 0x12, 0x78, 0x87, 0x17, 0xB9, 0xC1, 0xBA, 0x06,
+        0xCB, 0xC2, 0xA6, 0xFE, 0xBA, 0x85, 0x84, 0x24, 0x58, 0xC5, 0x6D, 0xDE,
+        0x9D, 0xB1, 0x75, 0x8D, 0x39, 0xC0, 0x31, 0x3D, 0x82, 0xBA, 0x51, 0x73,
+        0x5C, 0xDB, 0x3E, 0xA4, 0x99, 0xAA, 0x77, 0xA7, 0xD6, 0x94, 0x3A, 0x64,
+        0xF7, 0xA3, 0xF2, 0x5F, 0xE2, 0x6F, 0x06, 0xB5, 0x1B, 0xAA, 0x26, 0x96,
+        0xFA, 0x90, 0x35, 0xDA,
+        /* y */
+        0x5B, 0x53, 0x4B, 0xD5, 0x95, 0xF5, 0xAF, 0x0F, 0xA2, 0xC8, 0x92, 0x37,
+        0x6C, 0x84, 0xAC, 0xE1, 0xBB, 0x4E, 0x30, 0x19, 0xB7, 0x16, 0x34, 0xC0,
+        0x11, 0x31, 0x15, 0x9C, 0xAE, 0x03, 0xCE, 0xE9, 0xD9, 0x93, 0x21, 0x84,
+        0xBE, 0xEF, 0x21, 0x6B, 0xD7, 0x1D, 0xF2, 0xDA, 0xDF, 0x86, 0xA6, 0x27,
+        0x30, 0x6E, 0xCF, 0xF9, 0x6D, 0xBB, 0x8B, 0xAC, 0xE1, 0x98, 0xB6, 0x1E,
+        0x00, 0xF8, 0xB3, 0x32,
+        /* order */
+        0xAA, 0xDD, 0x9D, 0xB8, 0xDB, 0xE9, 0xC4, 0x8B, 0x3F, 0xD4, 0xE6, 0xAE,
+        0x33, 0xC9, 0xFC, 0x07, 0xCB, 0x30, 0x8D, 0xB3, 0xB3, 0xC9, 0xD2, 0x0E,
+        0xD6, 0x63, 0x9C, 0xCA, 0x70, 0x33, 0x08, 0x70, 0x55, 0x3E, 0x5C, 0x41,
+        0x4C, 0xA9, 0x26, 0x19, 0x41, 0x86, 0x61, 0x19, 0x7F, 0xAC, 0x10, 0x47,
+        0x1D, 0xB1, 0xD3, 0x81, 0x08, 0x5D, 0xDA, 0xDD, 0xB5, 0x87, 0x96, 0x82,
+        0x9C, 0xA9, 0x00, 0x69
+    }
+};
+
+typedef struct _ec_list_element_st {
+    int nid;
+    const EC_CURVE_DATA *data;
+    const EC_METHOD *(*meth) (void);
+    const char *comment;
+} ec_list_element;
+
+static const ec_list_element curve_list[] = {
+    /* prime field curves */
+    /* secg curves */
+    {NID_secp112r1, &_EC_SECG_PRIME_112R1.h, 0,
+     "SECG/WTLS curve over a 112 bit prime field"},
+    {NID_secp112r2, &_EC_SECG_PRIME_112R2.h, 0,
+     "SECG curve over a 112 bit prime field"},
+    {NID_secp128r1, &_EC_SECG_PRIME_128R1.h, 0,
+     "SECG curve over a 128 bit prime field"},
+    {NID_secp128r2, &_EC_SECG_PRIME_128R2.h, 0,
+     "SECG curve over a 128 bit prime field"},
+    {NID_secp160k1, &_EC_SECG_PRIME_160K1.h, 0,
+     "SECG curve over a 160 bit prime field"},
+    {NID_secp160r1, &_EC_SECG_PRIME_160R1.h, 0,
+     "SECG curve over a 160 bit prime field"},
+    {NID_secp160r2, &_EC_SECG_PRIME_160R2.h, 0,
+     "SECG/WTLS curve over a 160 bit prime field"},
+    /* SECG secp192r1 is the same as X9.62 prime192v1 and hence omitted */
+    {NID_secp192k1, &_EC_SECG_PRIME_192K1.h, 0,
+     "SECG curve over a 192 bit prime field"},
+    {NID_secp224k1, &_EC_SECG_PRIME_224K1.h, 0,
+     "SECG curve over a 224 bit prime field"},
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128
+    {NID_secp224r1, &_EC_NIST_PRIME_224.h, EC_GFp_nistp224_method,
+     "NIST/SECG curve over a 224 bit prime field"},
+#else
+    {NID_secp224r1, &_EC_NIST_PRIME_224.h, 0,
+     "NIST/SECG curve over a 224 bit prime field"},
+#endif
+    {NID_secp256k1, &_EC_SECG_PRIME_256K1.h, 0,
+     "SECG curve over a 256 bit prime field"},
+    /* SECG secp256r1 is the same as X9.62 prime256v1 and hence omitted */
+    {NID_secp384r1, &_EC_NIST_PRIME_384.h, 0,
+     "NIST/SECG curve over a 384 bit prime field"},
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128
+    {NID_secp521r1, &_EC_NIST_PRIME_521.h, EC_GFp_nistp521_method,
+     "NIST/SECG curve over a 521 bit prime field"},
+#else
+    {NID_secp521r1, &_EC_NIST_PRIME_521.h, 0,
+     "NIST/SECG curve over a 521 bit prime field"},
+#endif
+    /* X9.62 curves */
+    {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, &_EC_NIST_PRIME_192.h, 0,
+     "NIST/X9.62/SECG curve over a 192 bit prime field"},
+    {NID_X9_62_prime192v2, &_EC_X9_62_PRIME_192V2.h, 0,
+     "X9.62 curve over a 192 bit prime field"},
+    {NID_X9_62_prime192v3, &_EC_X9_62_PRIME_192V3.h, 0,
+     "X9.62 curve over a 192 bit prime field"},
+    {NID_X9_62_prime239v1, &_EC_X9_62_PRIME_239V1.h, 0,
+     "X9.62 curve over a 239 bit prime field"},
+    {NID_X9_62_prime239v2, &_EC_X9_62_PRIME_239V2.h, 0,
+     "X9.62 curve over a 239 bit prime field"},
+    {NID_X9_62_prime239v3, &_EC_X9_62_PRIME_239V3.h, 0,
+     "X9.62 curve over a 239 bit prime field"},
+    {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, &_EC_X9_62_PRIME_256V1.h,
+#if defined(ECP_NISTZ256_ASM)
+     EC_GFp_nistz256_method,
+#elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128)
+     EC_GFp_nistp256_method,
+#else
+     0,
+#endif
+     "X9.62/SECG curve over a 256 bit prime field"},
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+    /* characteristic two field curves */
+    /* NIST/SECG curves */
+    {NID_sect113r1, &_EC_SECG_CHAR2_113R1.h, 0,
+     "SECG curve over a 113 bit binary field"},
+    {NID_sect113r2, &_EC_SECG_CHAR2_113R2.h, 0,
+     "SECG curve over a 113 bit binary field"},
+    {NID_sect131r1, &_EC_SECG_CHAR2_131R1.h, 0,
+     "SECG/WTLS curve over a 131 bit binary field"},
+    {NID_sect131r2, &_EC_SECG_CHAR2_131R2.h, 0,
+     "SECG curve over a 131 bit binary field"},
+    {NID_sect163k1, &_EC_NIST_CHAR2_163K.h, 0,
+     "NIST/SECG/WTLS curve over a 163 bit binary field"},
+    {NID_sect163r1, &_EC_SECG_CHAR2_163R1.h, 0,
+     "SECG curve over a 163 bit binary field"},
+    {NID_sect163r2, &_EC_NIST_CHAR2_163B.h, 0,
+     "NIST/SECG curve over a 163 bit binary field"},
+    {NID_sect193r1, &_EC_SECG_CHAR2_193R1.h, 0,
+     "SECG curve over a 193 bit binary field"},
+    {NID_sect193r2, &_EC_SECG_CHAR2_193R2.h, 0,
+     "SECG curve over a 193 bit binary field"},
+    {NID_sect233k1, &_EC_NIST_CHAR2_233K.h, 0,
+     "NIST/SECG/WTLS curve over a 233 bit binary field"},
+    {NID_sect233r1, &_EC_NIST_CHAR2_233B.h, 0,
+     "NIST/SECG/WTLS curve over a 233 bit binary field"},
+    {NID_sect239k1, &_EC_SECG_CHAR2_239K1.h, 0,
+     "SECG curve over a 239 bit binary field"},
+    {NID_sect283k1, &_EC_NIST_CHAR2_283K.h, 0,
+     "NIST/SECG curve over a 283 bit binary field"},
+    {NID_sect283r1, &_EC_NIST_CHAR2_283B.h, 0,
+     "NIST/SECG curve over a 283 bit binary field"},
+    {NID_sect409k1, &_EC_NIST_CHAR2_409K.h, 0,
+     "NIST/SECG curve over a 409 bit binary field"},
+    {NID_sect409r1, &_EC_NIST_CHAR2_409B.h, 0,
+     "NIST/SECG curve over a 409 bit binary field"},
+    {NID_sect571k1, &_EC_NIST_CHAR2_571K.h, 0,
+     "NIST/SECG curve over a 571 bit binary field"},
+    {NID_sect571r1, &_EC_NIST_CHAR2_571B.h, 0,
+     "NIST/SECG curve over a 571 bit binary field"},
+    /* X9.62 curves */
+    {NID_X9_62_c2pnb163v1, &_EC_X9_62_CHAR2_163V1.h, 0,
+     "X9.62 curve over a 163 bit binary field"},
+    {NID_X9_62_c2pnb163v2, &_EC_X9_62_CHAR2_163V2.h, 0,
+     "X9.62 curve over a 163 bit binary field"},
+    {NID_X9_62_c2pnb163v3, &_EC_X9_62_CHAR2_163V3.h, 0,
+     "X9.62 curve over a 163 bit binary field"},
+    {NID_X9_62_c2pnb176v1, &_EC_X9_62_CHAR2_176V1.h, 0,
+     "X9.62 curve over a 176 bit binary field"},
+    {NID_X9_62_c2tnb191v1, &_EC_X9_62_CHAR2_191V1.h, 0,
+     "X9.62 curve over a 191 bit binary field"},
+    {NID_X9_62_c2tnb191v2, &_EC_X9_62_CHAR2_191V2.h, 0,
+     "X9.62 curve over a 191 bit binary field"},
+    {NID_X9_62_c2tnb191v3, &_EC_X9_62_CHAR2_191V3.h, 0,
+     "X9.62 curve over a 191 bit binary field"},
+    {NID_X9_62_c2pnb208w1, &_EC_X9_62_CHAR2_208W1.h, 0,
+     "X9.62 curve over a 208 bit binary field"},
+    {NID_X9_62_c2tnb239v1, &_EC_X9_62_CHAR2_239V1.h, 0,
+     "X9.62 curve over a 239 bit binary field"},
+    {NID_X9_62_c2tnb239v2, &_EC_X9_62_CHAR2_239V2.h, 0,
+     "X9.62 curve over a 239 bit binary field"},
+    {NID_X9_62_c2tnb239v3, &_EC_X9_62_CHAR2_239V3.h, 0,
+     "X9.62 curve over a 239 bit binary field"},
+    {NID_X9_62_c2pnb272w1, &_EC_X9_62_CHAR2_272W1.h, 0,
+     "X9.62 curve over a 272 bit binary field"},
+    {NID_X9_62_c2pnb304w1, &_EC_X9_62_CHAR2_304W1.h, 0,
+     "X9.62 curve over a 304 bit binary field"},
+    {NID_X9_62_c2tnb359v1, &_EC_X9_62_CHAR2_359V1.h, 0,
+     "X9.62 curve over a 359 bit binary field"},
+    {NID_X9_62_c2pnb368w1, &_EC_X9_62_CHAR2_368W1.h, 0,
+     "X9.62 curve over a 368 bit binary field"},
+    {NID_X9_62_c2tnb431r1, &_EC_X9_62_CHAR2_431R1.h, 0,
+     "X9.62 curve over a 431 bit binary field"},
+    /*
+     * the WAP/WTLS curves [unlike SECG, spec has its own OIDs for curves
+     * from X9.62]
+     */
+    {NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls1, &_EC_WTLS_1.h, 0,
+     "WTLS curve over a 113 bit binary field"},
+    {NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls3, &_EC_NIST_CHAR2_163K.h, 0,
+     "NIST/SECG/WTLS curve over a 163 bit binary field"},
+    {NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls4, &_EC_SECG_CHAR2_113R1.h, 0,
+     "SECG curve over a 113 bit binary field"},
+    {NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls5, &_EC_X9_62_CHAR2_163V1.h, 0,
+     "X9.62 curve over a 163 bit binary field"},
+#endif
+    {NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls6, &_EC_SECG_PRIME_112R1.h, 0,
+     "SECG/WTLS curve over a 112 bit prime field"},
+    {NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls7, &_EC_SECG_PRIME_160R2.h, 0,
+     "SECG/WTLS curve over a 160 bit prime field"},
+    {NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls8, &_EC_WTLS_8.h, 0,
+     "WTLS curve over a 112 bit prime field"},
+    {NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls9, &_EC_WTLS_9.h, 0,
+     "WTLS curve over a 160 bit prime field"},
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+    {NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls10, &_EC_NIST_CHAR2_233K.h, 0,
+     "NIST/SECG/WTLS curve over a 233 bit binary field"},
+    {NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls11, &_EC_NIST_CHAR2_233B.h, 0,
+     "NIST/SECG/WTLS curve over a 233 bit binary field"},
+#endif
+    {NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls12, &_EC_WTLS_12.h, 0,
+     "WTLS curve over a 224 bit prime field"},
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+    /* IPSec curves */
+    {NID_ipsec3, &_EC_IPSEC_155_ID3.h, 0,
+     "\n\tIPSec/IKE/Oakley curve #3 over a 155 bit binary field.\n"
+     "\tNot suitable for ECDSA.\n\tQuestionable extension field!"},
+    {NID_ipsec4, &_EC_IPSEC_185_ID4.h, 0,
+     "\n\tIPSec/IKE/Oakley curve #4 over a 185 bit binary field.\n"
+     "\tNot suitable for ECDSA.\n\tQuestionable extension field!"},
+#endif
+    /* brainpool curves */
+    {NID_brainpoolP160r1, &_EC_brainpoolP160r1.h, 0,
+     "RFC 5639 curve over a 160 bit prime field"},
+    {NID_brainpoolP160t1, &_EC_brainpoolP160t1.h, 0,
+     "RFC 5639 curve over a 160 bit prime field"},
+    {NID_brainpoolP192r1, &_EC_brainpoolP192r1.h, 0,
+     "RFC 5639 curve over a 192 bit prime field"},
+    {NID_brainpoolP192t1, &_EC_brainpoolP192t1.h, 0,
+     "RFC 5639 curve over a 192 bit prime field"},
+    {NID_brainpoolP224r1, &_EC_brainpoolP224r1.h, 0,
+     "RFC 5639 curve over a 224 bit prime field"},
+    {NID_brainpoolP224t1, &_EC_brainpoolP224t1.h, 0,
+     "RFC 5639 curve over a 224 bit prime field"},
+    {NID_brainpoolP256r1, &_EC_brainpoolP256r1.h, 0,
+     "RFC 5639 curve over a 256 bit prime field"},
+    {NID_brainpoolP256t1, &_EC_brainpoolP256t1.h, 0,
+     "RFC 5639 curve over a 256 bit prime field"},
+    {NID_brainpoolP320r1, &_EC_brainpoolP320r1.h, 0,
+     "RFC 5639 curve over a 320 bit prime field"},
+    {NID_brainpoolP320t1, &_EC_brainpoolP320t1.h, 0,
+     "RFC 5639 curve over a 320 bit prime field"},
+    {NID_brainpoolP384r1, &_EC_brainpoolP384r1.h, 0,
+     "RFC 5639 curve over a 384 bit prime field"},
+    {NID_brainpoolP384t1, &_EC_brainpoolP384t1.h, 0,
+     "RFC 5639 curve over a 384 bit prime field"},
+    {NID_brainpoolP512r1, &_EC_brainpoolP512r1.h, 0,
+     "RFC 5639 curve over a 512 bit prime field"},
+    {NID_brainpoolP512t1, &_EC_brainpoolP512t1.h, 0,
+     "RFC 5639 curve over a 512 bit prime field"},
+};
+
+#define curve_list_length OSSL_NELEM(curve_list)
+
+static EC_GROUP *ec_group_new_from_data(const ec_list_element curve)
+{
+    EC_GROUP *group = NULL;
+    EC_POINT *P = NULL;
+    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *p = NULL, *a = NULL, *b = NULL, *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *order =
+        NULL;
+    int ok = 0;
+    int seed_len, param_len;
+    const EC_METHOD *meth;
+    const EC_CURVE_DATA *data;
+    const unsigned char *params;
+
+    /* If no curve data curve method must handle everything */
+    if (curve.data == NULL)
+        return EC_GROUP_new(curve.meth != NULL ? curve.meth() : NULL);
+
+    if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    data = curve.data;
+    seed_len = data->seed_len;
+    param_len = data->param_len;
+    params = (const unsigned char *)(data + 1); /* skip header */
+    params += seed_len;         /* skip seed */
+
+    if ((p = BN_bin2bn(params + 0 * param_len, param_len, NULL)) == NULL
+        || (a = BN_bin2bn(params + 1 * param_len, param_len, NULL)) == NULL
+        || (b = BN_bin2bn(params + 2 * param_len, param_len, NULL)) == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (curve.meth != 0) {
+        meth = curve.meth();
+        if (((group = EC_GROUP_new(meth)) == NULL) ||
+            (!(group->meth->group_set_curve(group, p, a, b, ctx)))) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    } else if (data->field_type == NID_X9_62_prime_field) {
+        if ((group = EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp(p, a, b, ctx)) == NULL) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+    else {                      /* field_type ==
+                                 * NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field */
+
+        if ((group = EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m(p, a, b, ctx)) == NULL) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+#endif
+
+    if ((P = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if ((x = BN_bin2bn(params + 3 * param_len, param_len, NULL)) == NULL
+        || (y = BN_bin2bn(params + 4 * param_len, param_len, NULL)) == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, y, ctx)) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if ((order = BN_bin2bn(params + 5 * param_len, param_len, NULL)) == NULL
+        || !BN_set_word(x, (BN_ULONG)data->cofactor)) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (!EC_GROUP_set_generator(group, P, order, x)) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (seed_len) {
+        if (!EC_GROUP_set_seed(group, params - seed_len, seed_len)) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+    ok = 1;
+ err:
+    if (!ok) {
+        EC_GROUP_free(group);
+        group = NULL;
+    }
+    EC_POINT_free(P);
+    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+    BN_free(p);
+    BN_free(a);
+    BN_free(b);
+    BN_free(order);
+    BN_free(x);
+    BN_free(y);
+    return group;
+}
+
+EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(int nid)
+{
+    size_t i;
+    EC_GROUP *ret = NULL;
+
+    if (nid <= 0)
+        return NULL;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < curve_list_length; i++)
+        if (curve_list[i].nid == nid) {
+            ret = ec_group_new_from_data(curve_list[i]);
+            break;
+        }
+
+    if (ret == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_BY_CURVE_NAME, EC_R_UNKNOWN_GROUP);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    EC_GROUP_set_curve_name(ret, nid);
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+size_t EC_get_builtin_curves(EC_builtin_curve *r, size_t nitems)
+{
+    size_t i, min;
+
+    if (r == NULL || nitems == 0)
+        return curve_list_length;
+
+    min = nitems < curve_list_length ? nitems : curve_list_length;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < min; i++) {
+        r[i].nid = curve_list[i].nid;
+        r[i].comment = curve_list[i].comment;
+    }
+
+    return curve_list_length;
+}
+
+/* Functions to translate between common NIST curve names and NIDs */
+
+typedef struct {
+    const char *name;           /* NIST Name of curve */
+    int nid;                    /* Curve NID */
+} EC_NIST_NAME;
+
+static EC_NIST_NAME nist_curves[] = {
+    {"B-163", NID_sect163r2},
+    {"B-233", NID_sect233r1},
+    {"B-283", NID_sect283r1},
+    {"B-409", NID_sect409r1},
+    {"B-571", NID_sect571r1},
+    {"K-163", NID_sect163k1},
+    {"K-233", NID_sect233k1},
+    {"K-283", NID_sect283k1},
+    {"K-409", NID_sect409k1},
+    {"K-571", NID_sect571k1},
+    {"P-192", NID_X9_62_prime192v1},
+    {"P-224", NID_secp224r1},
+    {"P-256", NID_X9_62_prime256v1},
+    {"P-384", NID_secp384r1},
+    {"P-521", NID_secp521r1}
+};
+
+const char *EC_curve_nid2nist(int nid)
+{
+    size_t i;
+    for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nist_curves); i++) {
+        if (nist_curves[i].nid == nid)
+            return nist_curves[i].name;
+    }
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+int EC_curve_nist2nid(const char *name)
+{
+    size_t i;
+    for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nist_curves); i++) {
+        if (strcmp(nist_curves[i].name, name) == 0)
+            return nist_curves[i].nid;
+    }
+    return NID_undef;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ec_cvt.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ec_cvt.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bfff6d6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ec_cvt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ *
+ * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ *
+ * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license provided above.
+ *
+ * The elliptic curve binary polynomial software is originally written by
+ * Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include "ec_lcl.h"
+
+EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp(const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a,
+                                 const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    const EC_METHOD *meth;
+    EC_GROUP *ret;
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT)
+    /*
+     * This might appear controversial, but the fact is that generic
+     * prime method was observed to deliver better performance even
+     * for NIST primes on a range of platforms, e.g.: 60%-15%
+     * improvement on IA-64, ~25% on ARM, 30%-90% on P4, 20%-25%
+     * in 32-bit build and 35%--12% in 64-bit build on Core2...
+     * Coefficients are relative to optimized bn_nist.c for most
+     * intensive ECDSA verify and ECDH operations for 192- and 521-
+     * bit keys respectively. Choice of these boundary values is
+     * arguable, because the dependency of improvement coefficient
+     * from key length is not a "monotone" curve. For example while
+     * 571-bit result is 23% on ARM, 384-bit one is -1%. But it's
+     * generally faster, sometimes "respectfully" faster, sometimes
+     * "tolerably" slower... What effectively happens is that loop
+     * with bn_mul_add_words is put against bn_mul_mont, and the
+     * latter "wins" on short vectors. Correct solution should be
+     * implementing dedicated NxN multiplication subroutines for
+     * small N. But till it materializes, let's stick to generic
+     * prime method...
+     *                                              <appro>
+     */
+    meth = EC_GFp_mont_method();
+#else
+    if (BN_nist_mod_func(p))
+        meth = EC_GFp_nist_method();
+    else
+        meth = EC_GFp_mont_method();
+#endif
+
+    ret = EC_GROUP_new(meth);
+    if (ret == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+
+    if (!EC_GROUP_set_curve_GFp(ret, p, a, b, ctx)) {
+        EC_GROUP_clear_free(ret);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m(const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a,
+                                  const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    const EC_METHOD *meth;
+    EC_GROUP *ret;
+
+    meth = EC_GF2m_simple_method();
+
+    ret = EC_GROUP_new(meth);
+    if (ret == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+
+    if (!EC_GROUP_set_curve_GF2m(ret, p, a, b, ctx)) {
+        EC_GROUP_clear_free(ret);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    return ret;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ec_err.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ec_err.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e4c2c1c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ec_err.c
@@ -0,0 +1,290 @@
+/*
+ * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/ec.h>
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+
+# define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EC,func,0)
+# define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EC,0,reason)
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA EC_str_functs[] = {
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_BN_TO_FELEM), "BN_to_felem"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_D2I_ECPARAMETERS), "d2i_ECParameters"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_D2I_ECPKPARAMETERS), "d2i_ECPKParameters"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY), "d2i_ECPrivateKey"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_DO_EC_KEY_PRINT), "do_EC_KEY_print"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECDH_CMS_DECRYPT), "ecdh_cms_decrypt"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECDH_CMS_SET_SHARED_INFO), "ecdh_cms_set_shared_info"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECDH_COMPUTE_KEY), "ECDH_compute_key"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECDH_SIMPLE_COMPUTE_KEY), "ecdh_simple_compute_key"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN_EX), "ECDSA_do_sign_ex"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECDSA_DO_VERIFY), "ECDSA_do_verify"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_EX), "ECDSA_sign_ex"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP), "ECDSA_sign_setup"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECDSA_SIG_NEW), "ECDSA_SIG_new"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECDSA_VERIFY), "ECDSA_verify"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECKEY_PARAM2TYPE), "eckey_param2type"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECKEY_PARAM_DECODE), "eckey_param_decode"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECKEY_PRIV_DECODE), "eckey_priv_decode"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECKEY_PRIV_ENCODE), "eckey_priv_encode"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECKEY_PUB_DECODE), "eckey_pub_decode"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECKEY_PUB_ENCODE), "eckey_pub_encode"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECKEY_TYPE2PARAM), "eckey_type2param"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECPARAMETERS_PRINT), "ECParameters_print"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECPARAMETERS_PRINT_FP), "ECParameters_print_fp"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECPKPARAMETERS_PRINT), "ECPKParameters_print"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECPKPARAMETERS_PRINT_FP), "ECPKParameters_print_fp"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_GET_AFFINE), "ecp_nistz256_get_affine"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_MULT_PRECOMPUTE),
+     "ecp_nistz256_mult_precompute"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_POINTS_MUL), "ecp_nistz256_points_mul"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_PRE_COMP_NEW), "ecp_nistz256_pre_comp_new"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_WINDOWED_MUL), "ecp_nistz256_windowed_mul"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECX_KEY_OP), "ecx_key_op"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECX_PRIV_ENCODE), "ecx_priv_encode"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECX_PUB_ENCODE), "ecx_pub_encode"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2CURVE), "ec_asn1_group2curve"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID), "ec_asn1_group2fieldid"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GF2M_MONTGOMERY_POINT_MULTIPLY),
+     "ec_GF2m_montgomery_point_multiply"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_GROUP_CHECK_DISCRIMINANT),
+     "ec_GF2m_simple_group_check_discriminant"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_GROUP_SET_CURVE),
+     "ec_GF2m_simple_group_set_curve"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_OCT2POINT), "ec_GF2m_simple_oct2point"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_POINT2OCT), "ec_GF2m_simple_point2oct"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES),
+     "ec_GF2m_simple_point_get_affine_coordinates"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_POINT_SET_AFFINE_COORDINATES),
+     "ec_GF2m_simple_point_set_affine_coordinates"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_SET_COMPRESSED_COORDINATES),
+     "ec_GF2m_simple_set_compressed_coordinates"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GFP_MONT_FIELD_DECODE), "ec_GFp_mont_field_decode"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GFP_MONT_FIELD_ENCODE), "ec_GFp_mont_field_encode"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GFP_MONT_FIELD_MUL), "ec_GFp_mont_field_mul"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GFP_MONT_FIELD_SET_TO_ONE),
+     "ec_GFp_mont_field_set_to_one"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GFP_MONT_FIELD_SQR), "ec_GFp_mont_field_sqr"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GFP_MONT_GROUP_SET_CURVE),
+     "ec_GFp_mont_group_set_curve"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP224_GROUP_SET_CURVE),
+     "ec_GFp_nistp224_group_set_curve"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP224_POINTS_MUL), "ec_GFp_nistp224_points_mul"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP224_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES),
+     "ec_GFp_nistp224_point_get_affine_coordinates"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP256_GROUP_SET_CURVE),
+     "ec_GFp_nistp256_group_set_curve"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP256_POINTS_MUL), "ec_GFp_nistp256_points_mul"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP256_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES),
+     "ec_GFp_nistp256_point_get_affine_coordinates"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP521_GROUP_SET_CURVE),
+     "ec_GFp_nistp521_group_set_curve"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP521_POINTS_MUL), "ec_GFp_nistp521_points_mul"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP521_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES),
+     "ec_GFp_nistp521_point_get_affine_coordinates"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GFP_NIST_FIELD_MUL), "ec_GFp_nist_field_mul"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GFP_NIST_FIELD_SQR), "ec_GFp_nist_field_sqr"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GFP_NIST_GROUP_SET_CURVE),
+     "ec_GFp_nist_group_set_curve"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_GROUP_CHECK_DISCRIMINANT),
+     "ec_GFp_simple_group_check_discriminant"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_GROUP_SET_CURVE),
+     "ec_GFp_simple_group_set_curve"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_MAKE_AFFINE), "ec_GFp_simple_make_affine"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_OCT2POINT), "ec_GFp_simple_oct2point"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_POINT2OCT), "ec_GFp_simple_point2oct"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_POINTS_MAKE_AFFINE),
+     "ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES),
+     "ec_GFp_simple_point_get_affine_coordinates"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_POINT_SET_AFFINE_COORDINATES),
+     "ec_GFp_simple_point_set_affine_coordinates"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_SET_COMPRESSED_COORDINATES),
+     "ec_GFp_simple_set_compressed_coordinates"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GROUP_CHECK), "EC_GROUP_check"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GROUP_CHECK_DISCRIMINANT),
+     "EC_GROUP_check_discriminant"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GROUP_COPY), "EC_GROUP_copy"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_CURVE_GF2M), "EC_GROUP_get_curve_GF2m"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_CURVE_GFP), "EC_GROUP_get_curve_GFp"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_DEGREE), "EC_GROUP_get_degree"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_ECPARAMETERS), "EC_GROUP_get_ecparameters"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_ECPKPARAMETERS),
+     "EC_GROUP_get_ecpkparameters"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_PENTANOMIAL_BASIS),
+     "EC_GROUP_get_pentanomial_basis"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_TRINOMIAL_BASIS),
+     "EC_GROUP_get_trinomial_basis"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW), "EC_GROUP_new"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_BY_CURVE_NAME), "EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA), "ec_group_new_from_data"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS),
+     "EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPKPARAMETERS),
+     "EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GROUP_SET_CURVE_GF2M), "EC_GROUP_set_curve_GF2m"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GROUP_SET_CURVE_GFP), "EC_GROUP_set_curve_GFp"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GROUP_SET_GENERATOR), "EC_GROUP_set_generator"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY), "EC_KEY_check_key"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_KEY_COPY), "EC_KEY_copy"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_KEY_GENERATE_KEY), "EC_KEY_generate_key"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_KEY_NEW), "EC_KEY_new"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_KEY_NEW_METHOD), "EC_KEY_new_method"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_KEY_OCT2PRIV), "EC_KEY_oct2priv"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_KEY_PRINT), "EC_KEY_print"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_KEY_PRINT_FP), "EC_KEY_print_fp"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_KEY_PRIV2OCT), "EC_KEY_priv2oct"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_KEY_SET_PUBLIC_KEY_AFFINE_COORDINATES),
+     "EC_KEY_set_public_key_affine_coordinates"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY), "ec_key_simple_check_key"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_OCT2PRIV), "ec_key_simple_oct2priv"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_PRIV2OCT), "ec_key_simple_priv2oct"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_POINTS_MAKE_AFFINE), "EC_POINTs_make_affine"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_POINT_ADD), "EC_POINT_add"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_POINT_CMP), "EC_POINT_cmp"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_POINT_COPY), "EC_POINT_copy"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_POINT_DBL), "EC_POINT_dbl"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GF2M),
+     "EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GFP),
+     "EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_POINT_GET_JPROJECTIVE_COORDINATES_GFP),
+     "EC_POINT_get_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_POINT_INVERT), "EC_POINT_invert"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_POINT_IS_AT_INFINITY), "EC_POINT_is_at_infinity"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_POINT_IS_ON_CURVE), "EC_POINT_is_on_curve"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_POINT_MAKE_AFFINE), "EC_POINT_make_affine"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_POINT_NEW), "EC_POINT_new"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_POINT_OCT2POINT), "EC_POINT_oct2point"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_POINT_POINT2OCT), "EC_POINT_point2oct"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GF2M),
+     "EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GFP),
+     "EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_COMPRESSED_COORDINATES_GF2M),
+     "EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GF2m"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_COMPRESSED_COORDINATES_GFP),
+     "EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_JPROJECTIVE_COORDINATES_GFP),
+     "EC_POINT_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_TO_INFINITY), "EC_POINT_set_to_infinity"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_PRE_COMP_NEW), "ec_pre_comp_new"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_WNAF_MUL), "ec_wNAF_mul"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_WNAF_PRECOMPUTE_MULT), "ec_wNAF_precompute_mult"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_I2D_ECPARAMETERS), "i2d_ECParameters"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_I2D_ECPKPARAMETERS), "i2d_ECPKParameters"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_I2D_ECPRIVATEKEY), "i2d_ECPrivateKey"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_I2O_ECPUBLICKEY), "i2o_ECPublicKey"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_NISTP224_PRE_COMP_NEW), "nistp224_pre_comp_new"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_NISTP256_PRE_COMP_NEW), "nistp256_pre_comp_new"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_NISTP521_PRE_COMP_NEW), "nistp521_pre_comp_new"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_O2I_ECPUBLICKEY), "o2i_ECPublicKey"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_OLD_EC_PRIV_DECODE), "old_ec_priv_decode"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_OSSL_ECDH_COMPUTE_KEY), "ossl_ecdh_compute_key"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG), "ossl_ecdsa_sign_sig"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG), "ossl_ecdsa_verify_sig"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_PKEY_ECX_DERIVE), "pkey_ecx_derive"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_PKEY_EC_CTRL), "pkey_ec_ctrl"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_PKEY_EC_CTRL_STR), "pkey_ec_ctrl_str"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_PKEY_EC_DERIVE), "pkey_ec_derive"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_PKEY_EC_KEYGEN), "pkey_ec_keygen"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_PKEY_EC_PARAMGEN), "pkey_ec_paramgen"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_PKEY_EC_SIGN), "pkey_ec_sign"},
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA EC_str_reasons[] = {
+    {ERR_REASON(EC_R_ASN1_ERROR), "asn1 error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EC_R_BAD_SIGNATURE), "bad signature"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EC_R_BIGNUM_OUT_OF_RANGE), "bignum out of range"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EC_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL), "buffer too small"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EC_R_COORDINATES_OUT_OF_RANGE), "coordinates out of range"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EC_R_CURVE_DOES_NOT_SUPPORT_ECDH),
+     "curve does not support ecdh"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EC_R_CURVE_DOES_NOT_SUPPORT_SIGNING),
+     "curve does not support signing"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EC_R_D2I_ECPKPARAMETERS_FAILURE),
+     "d2i ecpkparameters failure"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EC_R_DECODE_ERROR), "decode error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EC_R_DISCRIMINANT_IS_ZERO), "discriminant is zero"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EC_R_EC_GROUP_NEW_BY_NAME_FAILURE),
+     "ec group new by name failure"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EC_R_FIELD_TOO_LARGE), "field too large"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EC_R_GF2M_NOT_SUPPORTED), "gf2m not supported"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EC_R_GROUP2PKPARAMETERS_FAILURE),
+     "group2pkparameters failure"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EC_R_I2D_ECPKPARAMETERS_FAILURE),
+     "i2d ecpkparameters failure"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS), "incompatible objects"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EC_R_INVALID_ARGUMENT), "invalid argument"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EC_R_INVALID_COMPRESSED_POINT), "invalid compressed point"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EC_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_BIT), "invalid compression bit"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EC_R_INVALID_CURVE), "invalid curve"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EC_R_INVALID_DIGEST), "invalid digest"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EC_R_INVALID_DIGEST_TYPE), "invalid digest type"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EC_R_INVALID_ENCODING), "invalid encoding"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EC_R_INVALID_FIELD), "invalid field"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EC_R_INVALID_FORM), "invalid form"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EC_R_INVALID_GROUP_ORDER), "invalid group order"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EC_R_INVALID_KEY), "invalid key"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EC_R_INVALID_OUTPUT_LENGTH), "invalid output length"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EC_R_INVALID_PEER_KEY), "invalid peer key"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EC_R_INVALID_PENTANOMIAL_BASIS), "invalid pentanomial basis"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EC_R_INVALID_PRIVATE_KEY), "invalid private key"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EC_R_INVALID_TRINOMIAL_BASIS), "invalid trinomial basis"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EC_R_KDF_PARAMETER_ERROR), "kdf parameter error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EC_R_KEYS_NOT_SET), "keys not set"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EC_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS), "missing parameters"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EC_R_MISSING_PRIVATE_KEY), "missing private key"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EC_R_NEED_NEW_SETUP_VALUES), "need new setup values"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EC_R_NOT_A_NIST_PRIME), "not a NIST prime"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EC_R_NOT_IMPLEMENTED), "not implemented"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EC_R_NOT_INITIALIZED), "not initialized"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EC_R_NO_PARAMETERS_SET), "no parameters set"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EC_R_NO_PRIVATE_VALUE), "no private value"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EC_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED), "operation not supported"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EC_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER), "passed null parameter"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EC_R_PEER_KEY_ERROR), "peer key error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EC_R_PKPARAMETERS2GROUP_FAILURE),
+     "pkparameters2group failure"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EC_R_POINT_ARITHMETIC_FAILURE), "point arithmetic failure"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EC_R_POINT_AT_INFINITY), "point at infinity"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EC_R_POINT_IS_NOT_ON_CURVE), "point is not on curve"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EC_R_RANDOM_NUMBER_GENERATION_FAILED),
+     "random number generation failed"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EC_R_SHARED_INFO_ERROR), "shared info error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EC_R_SLOT_FULL), "slot full"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EC_R_UNDEFINED_GENERATOR), "undefined generator"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EC_R_UNDEFINED_ORDER), "undefined order"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EC_R_UNKNOWN_GROUP), "unknown group"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EC_R_UNKNOWN_ORDER), "unknown order"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EC_R_UNSUPPORTED_FIELD), "unsupported field"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EC_R_WRONG_CURVE_PARAMETERS), "wrong curve parameters"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EC_R_WRONG_ORDER), "wrong order"},
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+
+#endif
+
+int ERR_load_EC_strings(void)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+
+    if (ERR_func_error_string(EC_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) {
+        ERR_load_strings(0, EC_str_functs);
+        ERR_load_strings(0, EC_str_reasons);
+    }
+#endif
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ec_key.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ec_key.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f1f0afb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ec_key.c
@@ -0,0 +1,637 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ * Portions originally developed by SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and
+ * contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ */
+
+#include <internal/cryptlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include "ec_lcl.h"
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+
+EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new(void)
+{
+    return EC_KEY_new_method(NULL);
+}
+
+EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(int nid)
+{
+    EC_KEY *ret = EC_KEY_new();
+    if (ret == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    ret->group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(nid);
+    if (ret->group == NULL) {
+        EC_KEY_free(ret);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    if (ret->meth->set_group != NULL
+        && ret->meth->set_group(ret, ret->group) == 0) {
+        EC_KEY_free(ret);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+void EC_KEY_free(EC_KEY *r)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    if (r == NULL)
+        return;
+
+    CRYPTO_atomic_add(&r->references, -1, &i, r->lock);
+    REF_PRINT_COUNT("EC_KEY", r);
+    if (i > 0)
+        return;
+    REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0);
+
+    if (r->meth->finish != NULL)
+        r->meth->finish(r);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    ENGINE_finish(r->engine);
+#endif
+
+    if (r->group && r->group->meth->keyfinish)
+        r->group->meth->keyfinish(r);
+
+    CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_EC_KEY, r, &r->ex_data);
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(r->lock);
+    EC_GROUP_free(r->group);
+    EC_POINT_free(r->pub_key);
+    BN_clear_free(r->priv_key);
+
+    OPENSSL_clear_free((void *)r, sizeof(EC_KEY));
+}
+
+EC_KEY *EC_KEY_copy(EC_KEY *dest, const EC_KEY *src)
+{
+    if (dest == NULL || src == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_COPY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    if (src->meth != dest->meth) {
+        if (dest->meth->finish != NULL)
+            dest->meth->finish(dest);
+        if (dest->group && dest->group->meth->keyfinish)
+            dest->group->meth->keyfinish(dest);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+        if (ENGINE_finish(dest->engine) == 0)
+            return 0;
+        dest->engine = NULL;
+#endif
+    }
+    /* copy the parameters */
+    if (src->group != NULL) {
+        const EC_METHOD *meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(src->group);
+        /* clear the old group */
+        EC_GROUP_free(dest->group);
+        dest->group = EC_GROUP_new(meth);
+        if (dest->group == NULL)
+            return NULL;
+        if (!EC_GROUP_copy(dest->group, src->group))
+            return NULL;
+
+        /*  copy the public key */
+        if (src->pub_key != NULL) {
+            EC_POINT_free(dest->pub_key);
+            dest->pub_key = EC_POINT_new(src->group);
+            if (dest->pub_key == NULL)
+                return NULL;
+            if (!EC_POINT_copy(dest->pub_key, src->pub_key))
+                return NULL;
+        }
+        /* copy the private key */
+        if (src->priv_key != NULL) {
+            if (dest->priv_key == NULL) {
+                dest->priv_key = BN_new();
+                if (dest->priv_key == NULL)
+                    return NULL;
+            }
+            if (!BN_copy(dest->priv_key, src->priv_key))
+                return NULL;
+            if (src->group->meth->keycopy
+                && src->group->meth->keycopy(dest, src) == 0)
+                return NULL;
+        }
+    }
+
+
+    /* copy the rest */
+    dest->enc_flag = src->enc_flag;
+    dest->conv_form = src->conv_form;
+    dest->version = src->version;
+    dest->flags = src->flags;
+    if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_EC_KEY,
+                            &dest->ex_data, &src->ex_data))
+        return NULL;
+
+    if (src->meth != dest->meth) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+        if (src->engine != NULL && ENGINE_init(src->engine) == 0)
+            return NULL;
+        dest->engine = src->engine;
+#endif
+        dest->meth = src->meth;
+    }
+
+    if (src->meth->copy != NULL && src->meth->copy(dest, src) == 0)
+        return NULL;
+
+    return dest;
+}
+
+EC_KEY *EC_KEY_dup(const EC_KEY *ec_key)
+{
+    EC_KEY *ret = EC_KEY_new_method(ec_key->engine);
+
+    if (ret == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+
+    if (EC_KEY_copy(ret, ec_key) == NULL) {
+        EC_KEY_free(ret);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int EC_KEY_up_ref(EC_KEY *r)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    if (CRYPTO_atomic_add(&r->references, 1, &i, r->lock) <= 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    REF_PRINT_COUNT("EC_KEY", r);
+    REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 2);
+    return ((i > 1) ? 1 : 0);
+}
+
+int EC_KEY_generate_key(EC_KEY *eckey)
+{
+    if (eckey == NULL || eckey->group == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_GENERATE_KEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (eckey->meth->keygen != NULL)
+        return eckey->meth->keygen(eckey);
+    ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_GENERATE_KEY, EC_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int ossl_ec_key_gen(EC_KEY *eckey)
+{
+    OPENSSL_assert(eckey->group->meth->keygen != NULL);
+    return eckey->group->meth->keygen(eckey);
+}
+
+int ec_key_simple_generate_key(EC_KEY *eckey)
+{
+    int ok = 0;
+    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *priv_key = NULL;
+    const BIGNUM *order = NULL;
+    EC_POINT *pub_key = NULL;
+
+    if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (eckey->priv_key == NULL) {
+        priv_key = BN_new();
+        if (priv_key == NULL)
+            goto err;
+    } else
+        priv_key = eckey->priv_key;
+
+    order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(eckey->group);
+    if (order == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    do
+        if (!BN_rand_range(priv_key, order))
+            goto err;
+    while (BN_is_zero(priv_key)) ;
+
+    if (eckey->pub_key == NULL) {
+        pub_key = EC_POINT_new(eckey->group);
+        if (pub_key == NULL)
+            goto err;
+    } else
+        pub_key = eckey->pub_key;
+
+    if (!EC_POINT_mul(eckey->group, pub_key, priv_key, NULL, NULL, ctx))
+        goto err;
+
+    eckey->priv_key = priv_key;
+    eckey->pub_key = pub_key;
+
+    ok = 1;
+
+ err:
+    if (eckey->pub_key == NULL)
+        EC_POINT_free(pub_key);
+    if (eckey->priv_key != priv_key)
+        BN_free(priv_key);
+    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+    return ok;
+}
+
+int ec_key_simple_generate_public_key(EC_KEY *eckey)
+{
+    return EC_POINT_mul(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key, eckey->priv_key, NULL,
+                        NULL, NULL);
+}
+
+int EC_KEY_check_key(const EC_KEY *eckey)
+{
+    if (eckey == NULL || eckey->group == NULL || eckey->pub_key == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (eckey->group->meth->keycheck == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return eckey->group->meth->keycheck(eckey);
+}
+
+int ec_key_simple_check_key(const EC_KEY *eckey)
+{
+    int ok = 0;
+    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+    const BIGNUM *order = NULL;
+    EC_POINT *point = NULL;
+
+    if (eckey == NULL || eckey->group == NULL || eckey->pub_key == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key)) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_POINT_AT_INFINITY);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if ((point = EC_POINT_new(eckey->group)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* testing whether the pub_key is on the elliptic curve */
+    if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key, ctx) <= 0) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_POINT_IS_NOT_ON_CURVE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    /* testing whether pub_key * order is the point at infinity */
+    order = eckey->group->order;
+    if (BN_is_zero(order)) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_INVALID_GROUP_ORDER);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (!EC_POINT_mul(eckey->group, point, NULL, eckey->pub_key, order, ctx)) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(eckey->group, point)) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_WRONG_ORDER);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    /*
+     * in case the priv_key is present : check if generator * priv_key ==
+     * pub_key
+     */
+    if (eckey->priv_key != NULL) {
+        if (BN_cmp(eckey->priv_key, order) >= 0) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_WRONG_ORDER);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (!EC_POINT_mul(eckey->group, point, eckey->priv_key,
+                          NULL, NULL, ctx)) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (EC_POINT_cmp(eckey->group, point, eckey->pub_key, ctx) != 0) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_INVALID_PRIVATE_KEY);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+    ok = 1;
+ err:
+    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+    EC_POINT_free(point);
+    return ok;
+}
+
+int EC_KEY_set_public_key_affine_coordinates(EC_KEY *key, BIGNUM *x,
+                                             BIGNUM *y)
+{
+    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *tx, *ty;
+    EC_POINT *point = NULL;
+    int ok = 0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+    int tmp_nid, is_char_two = 0;
+#endif
+
+    if (key == NULL || key->group == NULL || x == NULL || y == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SET_PUBLIC_KEY_AFFINE_COORDINATES,
+              ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    point = EC_POINT_new(key->group);
+
+    if (point == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    tx = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    ty = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (ty == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+    tmp_nid = EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(key->group));
+
+    if (tmp_nid == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field)
+        is_char_two = 1;
+
+    if (is_char_two) {
+        if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m(key->group, point,
+                                                  x, y, ctx))
+            goto err;
+        if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m(key->group, point,
+                                                  tx, ty, ctx))
+            goto err;
+    } else
+#endif
+    {
+        if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(key->group, point,
+                                                 x, y, ctx))
+            goto err;
+        if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(key->group, point,
+                                                 tx, ty, ctx))
+            goto err;
+    }
+    /*
+     * Check if retrieved coordinates match originals and are less than field
+     * order: if not values are out of range.
+     */
+    if (BN_cmp(x, tx) || BN_cmp(y, ty)
+        || (BN_cmp(x, key->group->field) >= 0)
+        || (BN_cmp(y, key->group->field) >= 0)) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SET_PUBLIC_KEY_AFFINE_COORDINATES,
+              EC_R_COORDINATES_OUT_OF_RANGE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!EC_KEY_set_public_key(key, point))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (EC_KEY_check_key(key) == 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    ok = 1;
+
+ err:
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+    EC_POINT_free(point);
+    return ok;
+
+}
+
+const EC_GROUP *EC_KEY_get0_group(const EC_KEY *key)
+{
+    return key->group;
+}
+
+int EC_KEY_set_group(EC_KEY *key, const EC_GROUP *group)
+{
+    if (key->meth->set_group != NULL && key->meth->set_group(key, group) == 0)
+        return 0;
+    EC_GROUP_free(key->group);
+    key->group = EC_GROUP_dup(group);
+    return (key->group == NULL) ? 0 : 1;
+}
+
+const BIGNUM *EC_KEY_get0_private_key(const EC_KEY *key)
+{
+    return key->priv_key;
+}
+
+int EC_KEY_set_private_key(EC_KEY *key, const BIGNUM *priv_key)
+{
+    if (key->group == NULL || key->group->meth == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    if (key->group->meth->set_private != NULL
+        && key->group->meth->set_private(key, priv_key) == 0)
+        return 0;
+    if (key->meth->set_private != NULL
+        && key->meth->set_private(key, priv_key) == 0)
+        return 0;
+    BN_clear_free(key->priv_key);
+    key->priv_key = BN_dup(priv_key);
+    return (key->priv_key == NULL) ? 0 : 1;
+}
+
+const EC_POINT *EC_KEY_get0_public_key(const EC_KEY *key)
+{
+    return key->pub_key;
+}
+
+int EC_KEY_set_public_key(EC_KEY *key, const EC_POINT *pub_key)
+{
+    if (key->meth->set_public != NULL
+        && key->meth->set_public(key, pub_key) == 0)
+        return 0;
+    EC_POINT_free(key->pub_key);
+    key->pub_key = EC_POINT_dup(pub_key, key->group);
+    return (key->pub_key == NULL) ? 0 : 1;
+}
+
+unsigned int EC_KEY_get_enc_flags(const EC_KEY *key)
+{
+    return key->enc_flag;
+}
+
+void EC_KEY_set_enc_flags(EC_KEY *key, unsigned int flags)
+{
+    key->enc_flag = flags;
+}
+
+point_conversion_form_t EC_KEY_get_conv_form(const EC_KEY *key)
+{
+    return key->conv_form;
+}
+
+void EC_KEY_set_conv_form(EC_KEY *key, point_conversion_form_t cform)
+{
+    key->conv_form = cform;
+    if (key->group != NULL)
+        EC_GROUP_set_point_conversion_form(key->group, cform);
+}
+
+void EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag(EC_KEY *key, int flag)
+{
+    if (key->group != NULL)
+        EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(key->group, flag);
+}
+
+int EC_KEY_precompute_mult(EC_KEY *key, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    if (key->group == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    return EC_GROUP_precompute_mult(key->group, ctx);
+}
+
+int EC_KEY_get_flags(const EC_KEY *key)
+{
+    return key->flags;
+}
+
+void EC_KEY_set_flags(EC_KEY *key, int flags)
+{
+    key->flags |= flags;
+}
+
+void EC_KEY_clear_flags(EC_KEY *key, int flags)
+{
+    key->flags &= ~flags;
+}
+
+size_t EC_KEY_key2buf(const EC_KEY *key, point_conversion_form_t form,
+                        unsigned char **pbuf, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    if (key == NULL || key->pub_key == NULL || key->group == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    return EC_POINT_point2buf(key->group, key->pub_key, form, pbuf, ctx);
+}
+
+int EC_KEY_oct2key(EC_KEY *key, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len,
+                   BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    if (key == NULL || key->group == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    if (key->pub_key == NULL)
+        key->pub_key = EC_POINT_new(key->group);
+    if (key->pub_key == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    if (EC_POINT_oct2point(key->group, key->pub_key, buf, len, ctx) == 0)
+        return 0;
+    /*
+     * Save the point conversion form.
+     * For non-custom curves the first octet of the buffer (excluding
+     * the last significant bit) contains the point conversion form.
+     * EC_POINT_oct2point() has already performed sanity checking of
+     * the buffer so we know it is valid.
+     */
+    if ((key->group->meth->flags & EC_FLAGS_CUSTOM_CURVE) == 0)
+        key->conv_form = (point_conversion_form_t)(buf[0] & ~0x01);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+size_t EC_KEY_priv2oct(const EC_KEY *eckey,
+                       unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
+{
+    if (eckey->group == NULL || eckey->group->meth == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    if (eckey->group->meth->priv2oct == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_PRIV2OCT, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return eckey->group->meth->priv2oct(eckey, buf, len);
+}
+
+size_t ec_key_simple_priv2oct(const EC_KEY *eckey,
+                              unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
+{
+    size_t buf_len;
+
+    buf_len = (EC_GROUP_order_bits(eckey->group) + 7) / 8;
+    if (eckey->priv_key == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    if (buf == NULL)
+        return buf_len;
+    else if (len < buf_len)
+        return 0;
+
+    /* Octetstring may need leading zeros if BN is to short */
+
+    if (BN_bn2binpad(eckey->priv_key, buf, buf_len) == -1) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_PRIV2OCT, EC_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return buf_len;
+}
+
+int EC_KEY_oct2priv(EC_KEY *eckey, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
+{
+    if (eckey->group == NULL || eckey->group->meth == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    if (eckey->group->meth->oct2priv == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_OCT2PRIV, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return eckey->group->meth->oct2priv(eckey, buf, len);
+}
+
+int ec_key_simple_oct2priv(EC_KEY *eckey, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
+{
+    if (eckey->priv_key == NULL)
+        eckey->priv_key = BN_secure_new();
+    if (eckey->priv_key == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_OCT2PRIV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    eckey->priv_key = BN_bin2bn(buf, len, eckey->priv_key);
+    if (eckey->priv_key == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_OCT2PRIV, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+size_t EC_KEY_priv2buf(const EC_KEY *eckey, unsigned char **pbuf)
+{
+    size_t len;
+    unsigned char *buf;
+    len = EC_KEY_priv2oct(eckey, NULL, 0);
+    if (len == 0)
+        return 0;
+    buf = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
+    if (buf == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    len = EC_KEY_priv2oct(eckey, buf, len);
+    if (len == 0) {
+        OPENSSL_free(buf);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    *pbuf = buf;
+    return len;
+}
+
+int EC_KEY_can_sign(const EC_KEY *eckey)
+{
+    if (eckey->group == NULL || eckey->group->meth == NULL
+        || (eckey->group->meth->flags & EC_FLAGS_NO_SIGN))
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ec_kmeth.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ec_kmeth.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5e5d1ae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ec_kmeth.c
@@ -0,0 +1,317 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/ec.h>
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include "ec_lcl.h"
+
+
+static const EC_KEY_METHOD openssl_ec_key_method = {
+    "OpenSSL EC_KEY method",
+    0,
+    0,0,0,0,0,0,
+    ossl_ec_key_gen,
+    ossl_ecdh_compute_key,
+    ossl_ecdsa_sign,
+    ossl_ecdsa_sign_setup,
+    ossl_ecdsa_sign_sig,
+    ossl_ecdsa_verify,
+    ossl_ecdsa_verify_sig
+};
+
+static const EC_KEY_METHOD *default_ec_key_meth = &openssl_ec_key_method;
+
+const EC_KEY_METHOD *EC_KEY_OpenSSL(void)
+{
+    return &openssl_ec_key_method;
+}
+
+const EC_KEY_METHOD *EC_KEY_get_default_method(void)
+{
+    return default_ec_key_meth;
+}
+
+void EC_KEY_set_default_method(const EC_KEY_METHOD *meth)
+{
+    if (meth == NULL)
+        default_ec_key_meth = &openssl_ec_key_method;
+    else
+        default_ec_key_meth = meth;
+}
+
+const EC_KEY_METHOD *EC_KEY_get_method(const EC_KEY *key)
+{
+    return key->meth;
+}
+
+int EC_KEY_set_method(EC_KEY *key, const EC_KEY_METHOD *meth)
+{
+    void (*finish)(EC_KEY *key) = key->meth->finish;
+
+    if (finish != NULL)
+        finish(key);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    ENGINE_finish(key->engine);
+    key->engine = NULL;
+#endif
+
+    key->meth = meth;
+    if (meth->init != NULL)
+        return meth->init(key);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new_method(ENGINE *engine)
+{
+    EC_KEY *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
+
+    if (ret == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    ret->references = 1;
+    ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
+    if (ret->lock == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        OPENSSL_free(ret);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    ret->meth = EC_KEY_get_default_method();
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    if (engine != NULL) {
+        if (!ENGINE_init(engine)) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        ret->engine = engine;
+    } else
+        ret->engine = ENGINE_get_default_EC();
+    if (ret->engine != NULL) {
+        ret->meth = ENGINE_get_EC(ret->engine);
+        if (ret->meth == NULL) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+#endif
+
+    ret->version = 1;
+    ret->conv_form = POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED;
+
+    if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_EC_KEY, ret, &ret->ex_data)) {
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (ret->meth->init != NULL && ret->meth->init(ret) == 0) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_INIT_FAIL);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    return ret;
+
+err:
+    EC_KEY_free(ret);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+int ECDH_compute_key(void *out, size_t outlen, const EC_POINT *pub_key,
+                     const EC_KEY *eckey,
+                     void *(*KDF) (const void *in, size_t inlen, void *out,
+                                   size_t *outlen))
+{
+    unsigned char *sec = NULL;
+    size_t seclen;
+    if (eckey->meth->compute_key == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_ECDH_COMPUTE_KEY, EC_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (outlen > INT_MAX) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_ECDH_COMPUTE_KEY, EC_R_INVALID_OUTPUT_LENGTH);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (!eckey->meth->compute_key(&sec, &seclen, pub_key, eckey))
+        return 0;
+    if (KDF != NULL) {
+        KDF(sec, seclen, out, &outlen);
+    } else {
+        if (outlen > seclen)
+            outlen = seclen;
+        memcpy(out, sec, outlen);
+    }
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(sec, seclen);
+    return outlen;
+}
+
+EC_KEY_METHOD *EC_KEY_METHOD_new(const EC_KEY_METHOD *meth)
+{
+    EC_KEY_METHOD *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*meth));
+
+    if (ret == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    if (meth != NULL)
+        *ret = *meth;
+    ret->flags |= EC_KEY_METHOD_DYNAMIC;
+    return ret;
+}
+
+void EC_KEY_METHOD_free(EC_KEY_METHOD *meth)
+{
+    if (meth->flags & EC_KEY_METHOD_DYNAMIC)
+        OPENSSL_free(meth);
+}
+
+void EC_KEY_METHOD_set_init(EC_KEY_METHOD *meth,
+                            int (*init)(EC_KEY *key),
+                            void (*finish)(EC_KEY *key),
+                            int (*copy)(EC_KEY *dest, const EC_KEY *src),
+                            int (*set_group)(EC_KEY *key, const EC_GROUP *grp),
+                            int (*set_private)(EC_KEY *key,
+                                               const BIGNUM *priv_key),
+                            int (*set_public)(EC_KEY *key,
+                                              const EC_POINT *pub_key))
+{
+    meth->init = init;
+    meth->finish = finish;
+    meth->copy = copy;
+    meth->set_group = set_group;
+    meth->set_private = set_private;
+    meth->set_public = set_public;
+}
+
+void EC_KEY_METHOD_set_keygen(EC_KEY_METHOD *meth,
+                              int (*keygen)(EC_KEY *key))
+{
+    meth->keygen = keygen;
+}
+
+void EC_KEY_METHOD_set_compute_key(EC_KEY_METHOD *meth,
+                                   int (*ckey)(unsigned char **psec,
+                                               size_t *pseclen,
+                                               const EC_POINT *pub_key,
+                                               const EC_KEY *ecdh))
+{
+    meth->compute_key = ckey;
+}
+
+void EC_KEY_METHOD_set_sign(EC_KEY_METHOD *meth,
+                            int (*sign)(int type, const unsigned char *dgst,
+                                        int dlen, unsigned char *sig,
+                                        unsigned int *siglen,
+                                        const BIGNUM *kinv, const BIGNUM *r,
+                                        EC_KEY *eckey),
+                            int (*sign_setup)(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in,
+                                              BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp),
+                            ECDSA_SIG *(*sign_sig)(const unsigned char *dgst,
+                                                   int dgst_len,
+                                                   const BIGNUM *in_kinv,
+                                                   const BIGNUM *in_r,
+                                                   EC_KEY *eckey))
+{
+    meth->sign = sign;
+    meth->sign_setup = sign_setup;
+    meth->sign_sig = sign_sig;
+}
+
+void EC_KEY_METHOD_set_verify(EC_KEY_METHOD *meth,
+                              int (*verify)(int type, const unsigned
+                                            char *dgst, int dgst_len,
+                                            const unsigned char *sigbuf,
+                                            int sig_len, EC_KEY *eckey),
+                              int (*verify_sig)(const unsigned char *dgst,
+                                                int dgst_len,
+                                                const ECDSA_SIG *sig,
+                                                EC_KEY *eckey))
+{
+    meth->verify = verify;
+    meth->verify_sig = verify_sig;
+}
+
+void EC_KEY_METHOD_get_init(const EC_KEY_METHOD *meth,
+                            int (**pinit)(EC_KEY *key),
+                            void (**pfinish)(EC_KEY *key),
+                            int (**pcopy)(EC_KEY *dest, const EC_KEY *src),
+                            int (**pset_group)(EC_KEY *key,
+                                               const EC_GROUP *grp),
+                            int (**pset_private)(EC_KEY *key,
+                                                 const BIGNUM *priv_key),
+                            int (**pset_public)(EC_KEY *key,
+                                                const EC_POINT *pub_key))
+{
+    if (pinit != NULL)
+        *pinit = meth->init;
+    if (pfinish != NULL)
+        *pfinish = meth->finish;
+    if (pcopy != NULL)
+        *pcopy = meth->copy;
+    if (pset_group != NULL)
+        *pset_group = meth->set_group;
+    if (pset_private != NULL)
+        *pset_private = meth->set_private;
+    if (pset_public != NULL)
+        *pset_public = meth->set_public;
+}
+
+void EC_KEY_METHOD_get_keygen(const EC_KEY_METHOD *meth,
+                              int (**pkeygen)(EC_KEY *key))
+{
+    if (pkeygen != NULL)
+        *pkeygen = meth->keygen;
+}
+
+void EC_KEY_METHOD_get_compute_key(const EC_KEY_METHOD *meth,
+                                   int (**pck)(unsigned char **pout,
+                                               size_t *poutlen,
+                                               const EC_POINT *pub_key,
+                                               const EC_KEY *ecdh))
+{
+    if (pck != NULL)
+        *pck = meth->compute_key;
+}
+
+void EC_KEY_METHOD_get_sign(const EC_KEY_METHOD *meth,
+                            int (**psign)(int type, const unsigned char *dgst,
+                                          int dlen, unsigned char *sig,
+                                          unsigned int *siglen,
+                                          const BIGNUM *kinv, const BIGNUM *r,
+                                          EC_KEY *eckey),
+                            int (**psign_setup)(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in,
+                                                BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp),
+                            ECDSA_SIG *(**psign_sig)(const unsigned char *dgst,
+                                                     int dgst_len,
+                                                     const BIGNUM *in_kinv,
+                                                     const BIGNUM *in_r,
+                                                     EC_KEY *eckey))
+{
+    if (psign != NULL)
+        *psign = meth->sign;
+    if (psign_setup != NULL)
+        *psign_setup = meth->sign_setup;
+    if (psign_sig != NULL)
+        *psign_sig = meth->sign_sig;
+}
+
+void EC_KEY_METHOD_get_verify(const EC_KEY_METHOD *meth,
+                              int (**pverify)(int type, const unsigned
+                                              char *dgst, int dgst_len,
+                                              const unsigned char *sigbuf,
+                                              int sig_len, EC_KEY *eckey),
+                              int (**pverify_sig)(const unsigned char *dgst,
+                                                  int dgst_len,
+                                                  const ECDSA_SIG *sig,
+                                                  EC_KEY *eckey))
+{
+    if (pverify != NULL)
+        *pverify = meth->verify;
+    if (pverify_sig != NULL)
+        *pverify_sig = meth->verify_sig;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ded35a7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h
@@ -0,0 +1,613 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ *
+ * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ *
+ * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license provided above.
+ *
+ * The elliptic curve binary polynomial software is originally written by
+ * Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+#include <openssl/obj_mac.h>
+#include <openssl/ec.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+#include "e_os.h"
+
+#if defined(__SUNPRO_C)
+# if __SUNPRO_C >= 0x520
+#  pragma error_messages (off,E_ARRAY_OF_INCOMPLETE_NONAME,E_ARRAY_OF_INCOMPLETE)
+# endif
+#endif
+
+/* Use default functions for poin2oct, oct2point and compressed coordinates */
+#define EC_FLAGS_DEFAULT_OCT    0x1
+
+/* Use custom formats for EC_GROUP, EC_POINT and EC_KEY */
+#define EC_FLAGS_CUSTOM_CURVE   0x2
+
+/* Curve does not support signing operations */
+#define EC_FLAGS_NO_SIGN        0x4
+
+/*
+ * Structure details are not part of the exported interface, so all this may
+ * change in future versions.
+ */
+
+struct ec_method_st {
+    /* Various method flags */
+    int flags;
+    /* used by EC_METHOD_get_field_type: */
+    int field_type;             /* a NID */
+    /*
+     * used by EC_GROUP_new, EC_GROUP_free, EC_GROUP_clear_free,
+     * EC_GROUP_copy:
+     */
+    int (*group_init) (EC_GROUP *);
+    void (*group_finish) (EC_GROUP *);
+    void (*group_clear_finish) (EC_GROUP *);
+    int (*group_copy) (EC_GROUP *, const EC_GROUP *);
+    /* used by EC_GROUP_set_curve_GFp, EC_GROUP_get_curve_GFp, */
+    /* EC_GROUP_set_curve_GF2m, and EC_GROUP_get_curve_GF2m: */
+    int (*group_set_curve) (EC_GROUP *, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a,
+                            const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *);
+    int (*group_get_curve) (const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b,
+                            BN_CTX *);
+    /* used by EC_GROUP_get_degree: */
+    int (*group_get_degree) (const EC_GROUP *);
+    int (*group_order_bits) (const EC_GROUP *);
+    /* used by EC_GROUP_check: */
+    int (*group_check_discriminant) (const EC_GROUP *, BN_CTX *);
+    /*
+     * used by EC_POINT_new, EC_POINT_free, EC_POINT_clear_free,
+     * EC_POINT_copy:
+     */
+    int (*point_init) (EC_POINT *);
+    void (*point_finish) (EC_POINT *);
+    void (*point_clear_finish) (EC_POINT *);
+    int (*point_copy) (EC_POINT *, const EC_POINT *);
+    /*-
+     * used by EC_POINT_set_to_infinity,
+     * EC_POINT_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp,
+     * EC_POINT_get_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp,
+     * EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp,     ..._GF2m,
+     * EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp,     ..._GF2m,
+     * EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp, ..._GF2m:
+     */
+    int (*point_set_to_infinity) (const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *);
+    int (*point_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp) (const EC_GROUP *,
+                                                  EC_POINT *, const BIGNUM *x,
+                                                  const BIGNUM *y,
+                                                  const BIGNUM *z, BN_CTX *);
+    int (*point_get_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp) (const EC_GROUP *,
+                                                  const EC_POINT *, BIGNUM *x,
+                                                  BIGNUM *y, BIGNUM *z,
+                                                  BN_CTX *);
+    int (*point_set_affine_coordinates) (const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *,
+                                         const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y,
+                                         BN_CTX *);
+    int (*point_get_affine_coordinates) (const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *,
+                                         BIGNUM *x, BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *);
+    int (*point_set_compressed_coordinates) (const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *,
+                                             const BIGNUM *x, int y_bit,
+                                             BN_CTX *);
+    /* used by EC_POINT_point2oct, EC_POINT_oct2point: */
+    size_t (*point2oct) (const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *,
+                         point_conversion_form_t form, unsigned char *buf,
+                         size_t len, BN_CTX *);
+    int (*oct2point) (const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *, const unsigned char *buf,
+                      size_t len, BN_CTX *);
+    /* used by EC_POINT_add, EC_POINT_dbl, ECP_POINT_invert: */
+    int (*add) (const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *r, const EC_POINT *a,
+                const EC_POINT *b, BN_CTX *);
+    int (*dbl) (const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *r, const EC_POINT *a, BN_CTX *);
+    int (*invert) (const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *, BN_CTX *);
+    /*
+     * used by EC_POINT_is_at_infinity, EC_POINT_is_on_curve, EC_POINT_cmp:
+     */
+    int (*is_at_infinity) (const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *);
+    int (*is_on_curve) (const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *, BN_CTX *);
+    int (*point_cmp) (const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *a, const EC_POINT *b,
+                      BN_CTX *);
+    /* used by EC_POINT_make_affine, EC_POINTs_make_affine: */
+    int (*make_affine) (const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *, BN_CTX *);
+    int (*points_make_affine) (const EC_GROUP *, size_t num, EC_POINT *[],
+                               BN_CTX *);
+    /*
+     * used by EC_POINTs_mul, EC_POINT_mul, EC_POINT_precompute_mult,
+     * EC_POINT_have_precompute_mult (default implementations are used if the
+     * 'mul' pointer is 0):
+     */
+    int (*mul) (const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar,
+                size_t num, const EC_POINT *points[], const BIGNUM *scalars[],
+                BN_CTX *);
+    int (*precompute_mult) (EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *);
+    int (*have_precompute_mult) (const EC_GROUP *group);
+    /* internal functions */
+    /*
+     * 'field_mul', 'field_sqr', and 'field_div' can be used by 'add' and
+     * 'dbl' so that the same implementations of point operations can be used
+     * with different optimized implementations of expensive field
+     * operations:
+     */
+    int (*field_mul) (const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
+                      const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *);
+    int (*field_sqr) (const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *);
+    int (*field_div) (const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
+                      const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *);
+    /* e.g. to Montgomery */
+    int (*field_encode) (const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
+                         BN_CTX *);
+    /* e.g. from Montgomery */
+    int (*field_decode) (const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
+                         BN_CTX *);
+    int (*field_set_to_one) (const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, BN_CTX *);
+    /* private key operations */
+    size_t (*priv2oct)(const EC_KEY *eckey, unsigned char *buf, size_t len);
+    int (*oct2priv)(EC_KEY *eckey, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len);
+    int (*set_private)(EC_KEY *eckey, const BIGNUM *priv_key);
+    int (*keygen)(EC_KEY *eckey);
+    int (*keycheck)(const EC_KEY *eckey);
+    int (*keygenpub)(EC_KEY *eckey);
+    int (*keycopy)(EC_KEY *dst, const EC_KEY *src);
+    void (*keyfinish)(EC_KEY *eckey);
+    /* custom ECDH operation */
+    int (*ecdh_compute_key)(unsigned char **pout, size_t *poutlen,
+                            const EC_POINT *pub_key, const EC_KEY *ecdh);
+};
+
+/*
+ * Types and functions to manipulate pre-computed values.
+ */
+typedef struct nistp224_pre_comp_st NISTP224_PRE_COMP;
+typedef struct nistp256_pre_comp_st NISTP256_PRE_COMP;
+typedef struct nistp521_pre_comp_st NISTP521_PRE_COMP;
+typedef struct nistz256_pre_comp_st NISTZ256_PRE_COMP;
+typedef struct ec_pre_comp_st EC_PRE_COMP;
+
+struct ec_group_st {
+    const EC_METHOD *meth;
+    EC_POINT *generator;        /* optional */
+    BIGNUM *order, *cofactor;
+    int curve_name;             /* optional NID for named curve */
+    int asn1_flag;              /* flag to control the asn1 encoding */
+    point_conversion_form_t asn1_form;
+    unsigned char *seed;        /* optional seed for parameters (appears in
+                                 * ASN1) */
+    size_t seed_len;
+    /*
+     * The following members are handled by the method functions, even if
+     * they appear generic
+     */
+    /*
+     * Field specification. For curves over GF(p), this is the modulus; for
+     * curves over GF(2^m), this is the irreducible polynomial defining the
+     * field.
+     */
+    BIGNUM *field;
+    /*
+     * Field specification for curves over GF(2^m). The irreducible f(t) is
+     * then of the form: t^poly[0] + t^poly[1] + ... + t^poly[k] where m =
+     * poly[0] > poly[1] > ... > poly[k] = 0. The array is terminated with
+     * poly[k+1]=-1. All elliptic curve irreducibles have at most 5 non-zero
+     * terms.
+     */
+    int poly[6];
+    /*
+     * Curve coefficients. (Here the assumption is that BIGNUMs can be used
+     * or abused for all kinds of fields, not just GF(p).) For characteristic
+     * > 3, the curve is defined by a Weierstrass equation of the form y^2 =
+     * x^3 + a*x + b. For characteristic 2, the curve is defined by an
+     * equation of the form y^2 + x*y = x^3 + a*x^2 + b.
+     */
+    BIGNUM *a, *b;
+    /* enable optimized point arithmetics for special case */
+    int a_is_minus3;
+    /* method-specific (e.g., Montgomery structure) */
+    void *field_data1;
+    /* method-specific */
+    void *field_data2;
+    /* method-specific */
+    int (*field_mod_func) (BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *,
+                           BN_CTX *);
+    /* data for ECDSA inverse */
+    BN_MONT_CTX *mont_data;
+
+    /*
+     * Precomputed values for speed. The PCT_xxx names match the
+     * pre_comp.xxx union names; see the SETPRECOMP and HAVEPRECOMP
+     * macros, below.
+     */
+    enum {
+        PCT_none,
+        PCT_nistp224, PCT_nistp256, PCT_nistp521, PCT_nistz256,
+        PCT_ec
+    } pre_comp_type;
+    union {
+        NISTP224_PRE_COMP *nistp224;
+        NISTP256_PRE_COMP *nistp256;
+        NISTP521_PRE_COMP *nistp521;
+        NISTZ256_PRE_COMP *nistz256;
+        EC_PRE_COMP *ec;
+    } pre_comp;
+};
+
+#define SETPRECOMP(g, type, pre) \
+    g->pre_comp_type = PCT_##type, g->pre_comp.type = pre
+#define HAVEPRECOMP(g, type) \
+    g->pre_comp_type == PCT_##type && g->pre_comp.type != NULL
+
+struct ec_key_st {
+    const EC_KEY_METHOD *meth;
+    ENGINE *engine;
+    int version;
+    EC_GROUP *group;
+    EC_POINT *pub_key;
+    BIGNUM *priv_key;
+    unsigned int enc_flag;
+    point_conversion_form_t conv_form;
+    int references;
+    int flags;
+    CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data;
+    CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock;
+};
+
+struct ec_point_st {
+    const EC_METHOD *meth;
+    /*
+     * All members except 'meth' are handled by the method functions, even if
+     * they appear generic
+     */
+    BIGNUM *X;
+    BIGNUM *Y;
+    BIGNUM *Z;                  /* Jacobian projective coordinates: * (X, Y,
+                                 * Z) represents (X/Z^2, Y/Z^3) if Z != 0 */
+    int Z_is_one;               /* enable optimized point arithmetics for
+                                 * special case */
+};
+
+NISTP224_PRE_COMP *EC_nistp224_pre_comp_dup(NISTP224_PRE_COMP *);
+NISTP256_PRE_COMP *EC_nistp256_pre_comp_dup(NISTP256_PRE_COMP *);
+NISTP521_PRE_COMP *EC_nistp521_pre_comp_dup(NISTP521_PRE_COMP *);
+NISTZ256_PRE_COMP *EC_nistz256_pre_comp_dup(NISTZ256_PRE_COMP *);
+NISTP256_PRE_COMP *EC_nistp256_pre_comp_dup(NISTP256_PRE_COMP *);
+EC_PRE_COMP *EC_ec_pre_comp_dup(EC_PRE_COMP *);
+
+void EC_pre_comp_free(EC_GROUP *group);
+void EC_nistp224_pre_comp_free(NISTP224_PRE_COMP *);
+void EC_nistp256_pre_comp_free(NISTP256_PRE_COMP *);
+void EC_nistp521_pre_comp_free(NISTP521_PRE_COMP *);
+void EC_nistz256_pre_comp_free(NISTZ256_PRE_COMP *);
+void EC_ec_pre_comp_free(EC_PRE_COMP *);
+
+/*
+ * method functions in ec_mult.c (ec_lib.c uses these as defaults if
+ * group->method->mul is 0)
+ */
+int ec_wNAF_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar,
+                size_t num, const EC_POINT *points[], const BIGNUM *scalars[],
+                BN_CTX *);
+int ec_wNAF_precompute_mult(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *);
+int ec_wNAF_have_precompute_mult(const EC_GROUP *group);
+
+/* method functions in ecp_smpl.c */
+int ec_GFp_simple_group_init(EC_GROUP *);
+void ec_GFp_simple_group_finish(EC_GROUP *);
+void ec_GFp_simple_group_clear_finish(EC_GROUP *);
+int ec_GFp_simple_group_copy(EC_GROUP *, const EC_GROUP *);
+int ec_GFp_simple_group_set_curve(EC_GROUP *, const BIGNUM *p,
+                                  const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *);
+int ec_GFp_simple_group_get_curve(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *a,
+                                  BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *);
+int ec_GFp_simple_group_get_degree(const EC_GROUP *);
+int ec_GFp_simple_group_check_discriminant(const EC_GROUP *, BN_CTX *);
+int ec_GFp_simple_point_init(EC_POINT *);
+void ec_GFp_simple_point_finish(EC_POINT *);
+void ec_GFp_simple_point_clear_finish(EC_POINT *);
+int ec_GFp_simple_point_copy(EC_POINT *, const EC_POINT *);
+int ec_GFp_simple_point_set_to_infinity(const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *);
+int ec_GFp_simple_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *,
+                                                  EC_POINT *, const BIGNUM *x,
+                                                  const BIGNUM *y,
+                                                  const BIGNUM *z, BN_CTX *);
+int ec_GFp_simple_get_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *,
+                                                  const EC_POINT *, BIGNUM *x,
+                                                  BIGNUM *y, BIGNUM *z,
+                                                  BN_CTX *);
+int ec_GFp_simple_point_set_affine_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *,
+                                               const BIGNUM *x,
+                                               const BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *);
+int ec_GFp_simple_point_get_affine_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *,
+                                               const EC_POINT *, BIGNUM *x,
+                                               BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *);
+int ec_GFp_simple_set_compressed_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *,
+                                             const BIGNUM *x, int y_bit,
+                                             BN_CTX *);
+size_t ec_GFp_simple_point2oct(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *,
+                               point_conversion_form_t form,
+                               unsigned char *buf, size_t len, BN_CTX *);
+int ec_GFp_simple_oct2point(const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *,
+                            const unsigned char *buf, size_t len, BN_CTX *);
+int ec_GFp_simple_add(const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *r, const EC_POINT *a,
+                      const EC_POINT *b, BN_CTX *);
+int ec_GFp_simple_dbl(const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *r, const EC_POINT *a,
+                      BN_CTX *);
+int ec_GFp_simple_invert(const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *, BN_CTX *);
+int ec_GFp_simple_is_at_infinity(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *);
+int ec_GFp_simple_is_on_curve(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *, BN_CTX *);
+int ec_GFp_simple_cmp(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *a, const EC_POINT *b,
+                      BN_CTX *);
+int ec_GFp_simple_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *, BN_CTX *);
+int ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *, size_t num,
+                                     EC_POINT *[], BN_CTX *);
+int ec_GFp_simple_field_mul(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
+                            const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *);
+int ec_GFp_simple_field_sqr(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
+                            BN_CTX *);
+
+/* method functions in ecp_mont.c */
+int ec_GFp_mont_group_init(EC_GROUP *);
+int ec_GFp_mont_group_set_curve(EC_GROUP *, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a,
+                                const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *);
+void ec_GFp_mont_group_finish(EC_GROUP *);
+void ec_GFp_mont_group_clear_finish(EC_GROUP *);
+int ec_GFp_mont_group_copy(EC_GROUP *, const EC_GROUP *);
+int ec_GFp_mont_field_mul(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
+                          const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *);
+int ec_GFp_mont_field_sqr(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
+                          BN_CTX *);
+int ec_GFp_mont_field_encode(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
+                             BN_CTX *);
+int ec_GFp_mont_field_decode(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
+                             BN_CTX *);
+int ec_GFp_mont_field_set_to_one(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, BN_CTX *);
+
+/* method functions in ecp_nist.c */
+int ec_GFp_nist_group_copy(EC_GROUP *dest, const EC_GROUP *src);
+int ec_GFp_nist_group_set_curve(EC_GROUP *, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a,
+                                const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *);
+int ec_GFp_nist_field_mul(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
+                          const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *);
+int ec_GFp_nist_field_sqr(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
+                          BN_CTX *);
+
+/* method functions in ec2_smpl.c */
+int ec_GF2m_simple_group_init(EC_GROUP *);
+void ec_GF2m_simple_group_finish(EC_GROUP *);
+void ec_GF2m_simple_group_clear_finish(EC_GROUP *);
+int ec_GF2m_simple_group_copy(EC_GROUP *, const EC_GROUP *);
+int ec_GF2m_simple_group_set_curve(EC_GROUP *, const BIGNUM *p,
+                                   const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
+                                   BN_CTX *);
+int ec_GF2m_simple_group_get_curve(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *a,
+                                   BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *);
+int ec_GF2m_simple_group_get_degree(const EC_GROUP *);
+int ec_GF2m_simple_group_check_discriminant(const EC_GROUP *, BN_CTX *);
+int ec_GF2m_simple_point_init(EC_POINT *);
+void ec_GF2m_simple_point_finish(EC_POINT *);
+void ec_GF2m_simple_point_clear_finish(EC_POINT *);
+int ec_GF2m_simple_point_copy(EC_POINT *, const EC_POINT *);
+int ec_GF2m_simple_point_set_to_infinity(const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *);
+int ec_GF2m_simple_point_set_affine_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *,
+                                                const BIGNUM *x,
+                                                const BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *);
+int ec_GF2m_simple_point_get_affine_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *,
+                                                const EC_POINT *, BIGNUM *x,
+                                                BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *);
+int ec_GF2m_simple_set_compressed_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *,
+                                              const BIGNUM *x, int y_bit,
+                                              BN_CTX *);
+size_t ec_GF2m_simple_point2oct(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *,
+                                point_conversion_form_t form,
+                                unsigned char *buf, size_t len, BN_CTX *);
+int ec_GF2m_simple_oct2point(const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *,
+                             const unsigned char *buf, size_t len, BN_CTX *);
+int ec_GF2m_simple_add(const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *r, const EC_POINT *a,
+                       const EC_POINT *b, BN_CTX *);
+int ec_GF2m_simple_dbl(const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *r, const EC_POINT *a,
+                       BN_CTX *);
+int ec_GF2m_simple_invert(const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *, BN_CTX *);
+int ec_GF2m_simple_is_at_infinity(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *);
+int ec_GF2m_simple_is_on_curve(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *, BN_CTX *);
+int ec_GF2m_simple_cmp(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *a, const EC_POINT *b,
+                       BN_CTX *);
+int ec_GF2m_simple_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *, BN_CTX *);
+int ec_GF2m_simple_points_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *, size_t num,
+                                      EC_POINT *[], BN_CTX *);
+int ec_GF2m_simple_field_mul(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
+                             const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *);
+int ec_GF2m_simple_field_sqr(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
+                             BN_CTX *);
+int ec_GF2m_simple_field_div(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
+                             const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *);
+
+/* method functions in ec2_mult.c */
+int ec_GF2m_simple_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
+                       const BIGNUM *scalar, size_t num,
+                       const EC_POINT *points[], const BIGNUM *scalars[],
+                       BN_CTX *);
+int ec_GF2m_precompute_mult(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int ec_GF2m_have_precompute_mult(const EC_GROUP *group);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128
+/* method functions in ecp_nistp224.c */
+int ec_GFp_nistp224_group_init(EC_GROUP *group);
+int ec_GFp_nistp224_group_set_curve(EC_GROUP *group, const BIGNUM *p,
+                                    const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n,
+                                    BN_CTX *);
+int ec_GFp_nistp224_point_get_affine_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *group,
+                                                 const EC_POINT *point,
+                                                 BIGNUM *x, BIGNUM *y,
+                                                 BN_CTX *ctx);
+int ec_GFp_nistp224_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
+                        const BIGNUM *scalar, size_t num,
+                        const EC_POINT *points[], const BIGNUM *scalars[],
+                        BN_CTX *);
+int ec_GFp_nistp224_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
+                               const BIGNUM *scalar, size_t num,
+                               const EC_POINT *points[],
+                               const BIGNUM *scalars[], BN_CTX *ctx);
+int ec_GFp_nistp224_precompute_mult(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int ec_GFp_nistp224_have_precompute_mult(const EC_GROUP *group);
+
+/* method functions in ecp_nistp256.c */
+int ec_GFp_nistp256_group_init(EC_GROUP *group);
+int ec_GFp_nistp256_group_set_curve(EC_GROUP *group, const BIGNUM *p,
+                                    const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n,
+                                    BN_CTX *);
+int ec_GFp_nistp256_point_get_affine_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *group,
+                                                 const EC_POINT *point,
+                                                 BIGNUM *x, BIGNUM *y,
+                                                 BN_CTX *ctx);
+int ec_GFp_nistp256_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
+                        const BIGNUM *scalar, size_t num,
+                        const EC_POINT *points[], const BIGNUM *scalars[],
+                        BN_CTX *);
+int ec_GFp_nistp256_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
+                               const BIGNUM *scalar, size_t num,
+                               const EC_POINT *points[],
+                               const BIGNUM *scalars[], BN_CTX *ctx);
+int ec_GFp_nistp256_precompute_mult(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int ec_GFp_nistp256_have_precompute_mult(const EC_GROUP *group);
+
+/* method functions in ecp_nistp521.c */
+int ec_GFp_nistp521_group_init(EC_GROUP *group);
+int ec_GFp_nistp521_group_set_curve(EC_GROUP *group, const BIGNUM *p,
+                                    const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n,
+                                    BN_CTX *);
+int ec_GFp_nistp521_point_get_affine_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *group,
+                                                 const EC_POINT *point,
+                                                 BIGNUM *x, BIGNUM *y,
+                                                 BN_CTX *ctx);
+int ec_GFp_nistp521_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
+                        const BIGNUM *scalar, size_t num,
+                        const EC_POINT *points[], const BIGNUM *scalars[],
+                        BN_CTX *);
+int ec_GFp_nistp521_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
+                               const BIGNUM *scalar, size_t num,
+                               const EC_POINT *points[],
+                               const BIGNUM *scalars[], BN_CTX *ctx);
+int ec_GFp_nistp521_precompute_mult(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int ec_GFp_nistp521_have_precompute_mult(const EC_GROUP *group);
+
+/* utility functions in ecp_nistputil.c */
+void ec_GFp_nistp_points_make_affine_internal(size_t num, void *point_array,
+                                              size_t felem_size,
+                                              void *tmp_felems,
+                                              void (*felem_one) (void *out),
+                                              int (*felem_is_zero) (const void
+                                                                    *in),
+                                              void (*felem_assign) (void *out,
+                                                                    const void
+                                                                    *in),
+                                              void (*felem_square) (void *out,
+                                                                    const void
+                                                                    *in),
+                                              void (*felem_mul) (void *out,
+                                                                 const void
+                                                                 *in1,
+                                                                 const void
+                                                                 *in2),
+                                              void (*felem_inv) (void *out,
+                                                                 const void
+                                                                 *in),
+                                              void (*felem_contract) (void
+                                                                      *out,
+                                                                      const
+                                                                      void
+                                                                      *in));
+void ec_GFp_nistp_recode_scalar_bits(unsigned char *sign,
+                                     unsigned char *digit, unsigned char in);
+#endif
+int ec_precompute_mont_data(EC_GROUP *);
+int ec_group_simple_order_bits(const EC_GROUP *group);
+
+#ifdef ECP_NISTZ256_ASM
+/** Returns GFp methods using montgomery multiplication, with x86-64 optimized
+ * P256. See http://eprint.iacr.org/2013/816.
+ *  \return  EC_METHOD object
+ */
+const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_nistz256_method(void);
+#endif
+
+size_t ec_key_simple_priv2oct(const EC_KEY *eckey,
+                              unsigned char *buf, size_t len);
+int ec_key_simple_oct2priv(EC_KEY *eckey, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len);
+int ec_key_simple_generate_key(EC_KEY *eckey);
+int ec_key_simple_generate_public_key(EC_KEY *eckey);
+int ec_key_simple_check_key(const EC_KEY *eckey);
+
+/* EC_METHOD definitions */
+
+struct ec_key_method_st {
+    const char *name;
+    int32_t flags;
+    int (*init)(EC_KEY *key);
+    void (*finish)(EC_KEY *key);
+    int (*copy)(EC_KEY *dest, const EC_KEY *src);
+    int (*set_group)(EC_KEY *key, const EC_GROUP *grp);
+    int (*set_private)(EC_KEY *key, const BIGNUM *priv_key);
+    int (*set_public)(EC_KEY *key, const EC_POINT *pub_key);
+    int (*keygen)(EC_KEY *key);
+    int (*compute_key)(unsigned char **pout, size_t *poutlen,
+                       const EC_POINT *pub_key, const EC_KEY *ecdh);
+    int (*sign)(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, unsigned char
+                *sig, unsigned int *siglen, const BIGNUM *kinv,
+                const BIGNUM *r, EC_KEY *eckey);
+    int (*sign_setup)(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
+                      BIGNUM **rp);
+    ECDSA_SIG *(*sign_sig)(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
+                           const BIGNUM *in_kinv, const BIGNUM *in_r,
+                           EC_KEY *eckey);
+
+    int (*verify)(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
+                  const unsigned char *sigbuf, int sig_len, EC_KEY *eckey);
+    int (*verify_sig)(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
+                      const ECDSA_SIG *sig, EC_KEY *eckey);
+};
+
+#define EC_KEY_METHOD_DYNAMIC   1
+
+int ossl_ec_key_gen(EC_KEY *eckey);
+int ossl_ecdh_compute_key(unsigned char **pout, size_t *poutlen,
+                          const EC_POINT *pub_key, const EC_KEY *ecdh);
+int ecdh_simple_compute_key(unsigned char **pout, size_t *poutlen,
+                            const EC_POINT *pub_key, const EC_KEY *ecdh);
+
+struct ECDSA_SIG_st {
+    BIGNUM *r;
+    BIGNUM *s;
+};
+
+int ossl_ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
+                          BIGNUM **rp);
+int ossl_ecdsa_sign(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen,
+                    unsigned char *sig, unsigned int *siglen,
+                    const BIGNUM *kinv, const BIGNUM *r, EC_KEY *eckey);
+ECDSA_SIG *ossl_ecdsa_sign_sig(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
+                               const BIGNUM *in_kinv, const BIGNUM *in_r,
+                               EC_KEY *eckey);
+int ossl_ecdsa_verify(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
+                      const unsigned char *sigbuf, int sig_len, EC_KEY *eckey);
+int ossl_ecdsa_verify_sig(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
+                          const ECDSA_SIG *sig, EC_KEY *eckey);
+
+int X25519(uint8_t out_shared_key[32], const uint8_t private_key[32],
+           const uint8_t peer_public_value[32]);
+void X25519_public_from_private(uint8_t out_public_value[32],
+                                const uint8_t private_key[32]);
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7cb4bfe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1004 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ * Binary polynomial ECC support in OpenSSL originally developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ */
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+
+#include "ec_lcl.h"
+
+/* functions for EC_GROUP objects */
+
+EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new(const EC_METHOD *meth)
+{
+    EC_GROUP *ret;
+
+    if (meth == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW, EC_R_SLOT_FULL);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    if (meth->group_init == 0) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
+    if (ret == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    ret->meth = meth;
+    if ((ret->meth->flags & EC_FLAGS_CUSTOM_CURVE) == 0) {
+        ret->order = BN_new();
+        if (ret->order == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        ret->cofactor = BN_new();
+        if (ret->cofactor == NULL)
+            goto err;
+    }
+    ret->asn1_flag = OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE;
+    ret->asn1_form = POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED;
+    if (!meth->group_init(ret))
+        goto err;
+    return ret;
+
+ err:
+    BN_free(ret->order);
+    BN_free(ret->cofactor);
+    OPENSSL_free(ret);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+void EC_pre_comp_free(EC_GROUP *group)
+{
+    switch (group->pre_comp_type) {
+    default:
+        break;
+#ifdef ECP_NISTZ256_REFERENCE_IMPLEMENTATION
+    case PCT_nistz256:
+        EC_nistz256_pre_comp_free(group->pre_comp.nistz256);
+        break;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128
+    case PCT_nistp224:
+        EC_nistp224_pre_comp_free(group->pre_comp.nistp224);
+        break;
+    case PCT_nistp256:
+        EC_nistp256_pre_comp_free(group->pre_comp.nistp256);
+        break;
+    case PCT_nistp521:
+        EC_nistp521_pre_comp_free(group->pre_comp.nistp521);
+        break;
+#endif
+    case PCT_ec:
+        EC_ec_pre_comp_free(group->pre_comp.ec);
+        break;
+    }
+    group->pre_comp.ec = NULL;
+}
+
+void EC_GROUP_free(EC_GROUP *group)
+{
+    if (!group)
+        return;
+
+    if (group->meth->group_finish != 0)
+        group->meth->group_finish(group);
+
+    EC_pre_comp_free(group);
+    BN_MONT_CTX_free(group->mont_data);
+    EC_POINT_free(group->generator);
+    BN_free(group->order);
+    BN_free(group->cofactor);
+    OPENSSL_free(group->seed);
+    OPENSSL_free(group);
+}
+
+void EC_GROUP_clear_free(EC_GROUP *group)
+{
+    if (!group)
+        return;
+
+    if (group->meth->group_clear_finish != 0)
+        group->meth->group_clear_finish(group);
+    else if (group->meth->group_finish != 0)
+        group->meth->group_finish(group);
+
+    EC_pre_comp_free(group);
+    BN_MONT_CTX_free(group->mont_data);
+    EC_POINT_clear_free(group->generator);
+    BN_clear_free(group->order);
+    BN_clear_free(group->cofactor);
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(group->seed, group->seed_len);
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(group, sizeof(*group));
+}
+
+int EC_GROUP_copy(EC_GROUP *dest, const EC_GROUP *src)
+{
+    if (dest->meth->group_copy == 0) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_COPY, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (dest->meth != src->meth) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_COPY, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (dest == src)
+        return 1;
+
+    /* Copy precomputed */
+    dest->pre_comp_type = src->pre_comp_type;
+    switch (src->pre_comp_type) {
+    default:
+        dest->pre_comp.ec = NULL;
+        break;
+#ifdef ECP_NISTZ256_REFERENCE_IMPLEMENTATION
+    case PCT_nistz256:
+        dest->pre_comp.nistz256 = EC_nistz256_pre_comp_dup(src->pre_comp.nistz256);
+        break;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128
+    case PCT_nistp224:
+        dest->pre_comp.nistp224 = EC_nistp224_pre_comp_dup(src->pre_comp.nistp224);
+        break;
+    case PCT_nistp256:
+        dest->pre_comp.nistp256 = EC_nistp256_pre_comp_dup(src->pre_comp.nistp256);
+        break;
+    case PCT_nistp521:
+        dest->pre_comp.nistp521 = EC_nistp521_pre_comp_dup(src->pre_comp.nistp521);
+        break;
+#endif
+    case PCT_ec:
+        dest->pre_comp.ec = EC_ec_pre_comp_dup(src->pre_comp.ec);
+        break;
+    }
+
+    if (src->mont_data != NULL) {
+        if (dest->mont_data == NULL) {
+            dest->mont_data = BN_MONT_CTX_new();
+            if (dest->mont_data == NULL)
+                return 0;
+        }
+        if (!BN_MONT_CTX_copy(dest->mont_data, src->mont_data))
+            return 0;
+    } else {
+        /* src->generator == NULL */
+        BN_MONT_CTX_free(dest->mont_data);
+        dest->mont_data = NULL;
+    }
+
+    if (src->generator != NULL) {
+        if (dest->generator == NULL) {
+            dest->generator = EC_POINT_new(dest);
+            if (dest->generator == NULL)
+                return 0;
+        }
+        if (!EC_POINT_copy(dest->generator, src->generator))
+            return 0;
+    } else {
+        /* src->generator == NULL */
+        EC_POINT_clear_free(dest->generator);
+        dest->generator = NULL;
+    }
+
+    if ((src->meth->flags & EC_FLAGS_CUSTOM_CURVE) == 0) {
+        if (!BN_copy(dest->order, src->order))
+            return 0;
+        if (!BN_copy(dest->cofactor, src->cofactor))
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    dest->curve_name = src->curve_name;
+    dest->asn1_flag = src->asn1_flag;
+    dest->asn1_form = src->asn1_form;
+
+    if (src->seed) {
+        OPENSSL_free(dest->seed);
+        dest->seed = OPENSSL_malloc(src->seed_len);
+        if (dest->seed == NULL)
+            return 0;
+        if (!memcpy(dest->seed, src->seed, src->seed_len))
+            return 0;
+        dest->seed_len = src->seed_len;
+    } else {
+        OPENSSL_free(dest->seed);
+        dest->seed = NULL;
+        dest->seed_len = 0;
+    }
+
+    return dest->meth->group_copy(dest, src);
+}
+
+EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_dup(const EC_GROUP *a)
+{
+    EC_GROUP *t = NULL;
+    int ok = 0;
+
+    if (a == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+
+    if ((t = EC_GROUP_new(a->meth)) == NULL)
+        return (NULL);
+    if (!EC_GROUP_copy(t, a))
+        goto err;
+
+    ok = 1;
+
+ err:
+    if (!ok) {
+        EC_GROUP_free(t);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+        return t;
+}
+
+const EC_METHOD *EC_GROUP_method_of(const EC_GROUP *group)
+{
+    return group->meth;
+}
+
+int EC_METHOD_get_field_type(const EC_METHOD *meth)
+{
+    return meth->field_type;
+}
+
+int EC_GROUP_set_generator(EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *generator,
+                           const BIGNUM *order, const BIGNUM *cofactor)
+{
+    if (generator == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_SET_GENERATOR, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (group->generator == NULL) {
+        group->generator = EC_POINT_new(group);
+        if (group->generator == NULL)
+            return 0;
+    }
+    if (!EC_POINT_copy(group->generator, generator))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (order != NULL) {
+        if (!BN_copy(group->order, order))
+            return 0;
+    } else
+        BN_zero(group->order);
+
+    if (cofactor != NULL) {
+        if (!BN_copy(group->cofactor, cofactor))
+            return 0;
+    } else
+        BN_zero(group->cofactor);
+
+    /*
+     * Some groups have an order with
+     * factors of two, which makes the Montgomery setup fail.
+     * |group->mont_data| will be NULL in this case.
+     */
+    if (BN_is_odd(group->order)) {
+        return ec_precompute_mont_data(group);
+    }
+
+    BN_MONT_CTX_free(group->mont_data);
+    group->mont_data = NULL;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+const EC_POINT *EC_GROUP_get0_generator(const EC_GROUP *group)
+{
+    return group->generator;
+}
+
+BN_MONT_CTX *EC_GROUP_get_mont_data(const EC_GROUP *group)
+{
+    return group->mont_data;
+}
+
+int EC_GROUP_get_order(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *order, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    if (group->order == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    if (!BN_copy(order, group->order))
+        return 0;
+
+    return !BN_is_zero(order);
+}
+
+const BIGNUM *EC_GROUP_get0_order(const EC_GROUP *group)
+{
+    return group->order;
+}
+
+int EC_GROUP_order_bits(const EC_GROUP *group)
+{
+    OPENSSL_assert(group->meth->group_order_bits != NULL);
+    return group->meth->group_order_bits(group);
+}
+
+int EC_GROUP_get_cofactor(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *cofactor,
+                          BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+
+    if (group->cofactor == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    if (!BN_copy(cofactor, group->cofactor))
+        return 0;
+
+    return !BN_is_zero(group->cofactor);
+}
+
+const BIGNUM *EC_GROUP_get0_cofactor(const EC_GROUP *group)
+{
+    return group->cofactor;
+}
+
+void EC_GROUP_set_curve_name(EC_GROUP *group, int nid)
+{
+    group->curve_name = nid;
+}
+
+int EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(const EC_GROUP *group)
+{
+    return group->curve_name;
+}
+
+void EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(EC_GROUP *group, int flag)
+{
+    group->asn1_flag = flag;
+}
+
+int EC_GROUP_get_asn1_flag(const EC_GROUP *group)
+{
+    return group->asn1_flag;
+}
+
+void EC_GROUP_set_point_conversion_form(EC_GROUP *group,
+                                        point_conversion_form_t form)
+{
+    group->asn1_form = form;
+}
+
+point_conversion_form_t EC_GROUP_get_point_conversion_form(const EC_GROUP
+                                                           *group)
+{
+    return group->asn1_form;
+}
+
+size_t EC_GROUP_set_seed(EC_GROUP *group, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
+{
+    OPENSSL_free(group->seed);
+    group->seed = NULL;
+    group->seed_len = 0;
+
+    if (!len || !p)
+        return 1;
+
+    if ((group->seed = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    memcpy(group->seed, p, len);
+    group->seed_len = len;
+
+    return len;
+}
+
+unsigned char *EC_GROUP_get0_seed(const EC_GROUP *group)
+{
+    return group->seed;
+}
+
+size_t EC_GROUP_get_seed_len(const EC_GROUP *group)
+{
+    return group->seed_len;
+}
+
+int EC_GROUP_set_curve_GFp(EC_GROUP *group, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a,
+                           const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    if (group->meth->group_set_curve == 0) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_SET_CURVE_GFP, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return group->meth->group_set_curve(group, p, a, b, ctx);
+}
+
+int EC_GROUP_get_curve_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *a,
+                           BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    if (group->meth->group_get_curve == 0) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_CURVE_GFP, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return group->meth->group_get_curve(group, p, a, b, ctx);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+int EC_GROUP_set_curve_GF2m(EC_GROUP *group, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a,
+                            const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    if (group->meth->group_set_curve == 0) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_SET_CURVE_GF2M,
+              ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return group->meth->group_set_curve(group, p, a, b, ctx);
+}
+
+int EC_GROUP_get_curve_GF2m(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *a,
+                            BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    if (group->meth->group_get_curve == 0) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_CURVE_GF2M,
+              ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return group->meth->group_get_curve(group, p, a, b, ctx);
+}
+#endif
+
+int EC_GROUP_get_degree(const EC_GROUP *group)
+{
+    if (group->meth->group_get_degree == 0) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_DEGREE, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return group->meth->group_get_degree(group);
+}
+
+int EC_GROUP_check_discriminant(const EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    if (group->meth->group_check_discriminant == 0) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_CHECK_DISCRIMINANT,
+              ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return group->meth->group_check_discriminant(group, ctx);
+}
+
+int EC_GROUP_cmp(const EC_GROUP *a, const EC_GROUP *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int r = 0;
+    BIGNUM *a1, *a2, *a3, *b1, *b2, *b3;
+    BN_CTX *ctx_new = NULL;
+
+    /* compare the field types */
+    if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(a)) !=
+        EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(b)))
+        return 1;
+    /* compare the curve name (if present in both) */
+    if (EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(a) && EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(b) &&
+        EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(a) != EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(b))
+        return 1;
+    if (a->meth->flags & EC_FLAGS_CUSTOM_CURVE)
+        return 0;
+
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        ctx_new = ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        return -1;
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    a1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    a2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    a3 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    b1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    b2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    b3 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (b3 == NULL) {
+        BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+        BN_CTX_free(ctx_new);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * XXX This approach assumes that the external representation of curves
+     * over the same field type is the same.
+     */
+    if (!a->meth->group_get_curve(a, a1, a2, a3, ctx) ||
+        !b->meth->group_get_curve(b, b1, b2, b3, ctx))
+        r = 1;
+
+    if (r || BN_cmp(a1, b1) || BN_cmp(a2, b2) || BN_cmp(a3, b3))
+        r = 1;
+
+    /* XXX EC_POINT_cmp() assumes that the methods are equal */
+    if (r || EC_POINT_cmp(a, EC_GROUP_get0_generator(a),
+                          EC_GROUP_get0_generator(b), ctx))
+        r = 1;
+
+    if (!r) {
+        const BIGNUM *ao, *bo, *ac, *bc;
+        /* compare the order and cofactor */
+        ao = EC_GROUP_get0_order(a);
+        bo = EC_GROUP_get0_order(b);
+        ac = EC_GROUP_get0_cofactor(a);
+        bc = EC_GROUP_get0_cofactor(b);
+        if (ao == NULL || bo == NULL) {
+            BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+            BN_CTX_free(ctx_new);
+            return -1;
+        }
+        if (BN_cmp(ao, bo) || BN_cmp(ac, bc))
+            r = 1;
+    }
+
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    BN_CTX_free(ctx_new);
+
+    return r;
+}
+
+/* functions for EC_POINT objects */
+
+EC_POINT *EC_POINT_new(const EC_GROUP *group)
+{
+    EC_POINT *ret;
+
+    if (group == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_NEW, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    if (group->meth->point_init == 0) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_NEW, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
+    if (ret == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    ret->meth = group->meth;
+
+    if (!ret->meth->point_init(ret)) {
+        OPENSSL_free(ret);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+void EC_POINT_free(EC_POINT *point)
+{
+    if (!point)
+        return;
+
+    if (point->meth->point_finish != 0)
+        point->meth->point_finish(point);
+    OPENSSL_free(point);
+}
+
+void EC_POINT_clear_free(EC_POINT *point)
+{
+    if (!point)
+        return;
+
+    if (point->meth->point_clear_finish != 0)
+        point->meth->point_clear_finish(point);
+    else if (point->meth->point_finish != 0)
+        point->meth->point_finish(point);
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(point, sizeof(*point));
+}
+
+int EC_POINT_copy(EC_POINT *dest, const EC_POINT *src)
+{
+    if (dest->meth->point_copy == 0) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_COPY, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (dest->meth != src->meth) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_COPY, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (dest == src)
+        return 1;
+    return dest->meth->point_copy(dest, src);
+}
+
+EC_POINT *EC_POINT_dup(const EC_POINT *a, const EC_GROUP *group)
+{
+    EC_POINT *t;
+    int r;
+
+    if (a == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+
+    t = EC_POINT_new(group);
+    if (t == NULL)
+        return (NULL);
+    r = EC_POINT_copy(t, a);
+    if (!r) {
+        EC_POINT_free(t);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    return t;
+}
+
+const EC_METHOD *EC_POINT_method_of(const EC_POINT *point)
+{
+    return point->meth;
+}
+
+int EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point)
+{
+    if (group->meth->point_set_to_infinity == 0) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_TO_INFINITY,
+              ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (group->meth != point->meth) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_TO_INFINITY, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return group->meth->point_set_to_infinity(group, point);
+}
+
+int EC_POINT_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group,
+                                             EC_POINT *point, const BIGNUM *x,
+                                             const BIGNUM *y, const BIGNUM *z,
+                                             BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    if (group->meth->point_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp == 0) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_JPROJECTIVE_COORDINATES_GFP,
+              ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (group->meth != point->meth) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_JPROJECTIVE_COORDINATES_GFP,
+              EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return group->meth->point_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(group, point, x,
+                                                              y, z, ctx);
+}
+
+int EC_POINT_get_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group,
+                                             const EC_POINT *point, BIGNUM *x,
+                                             BIGNUM *y, BIGNUM *z,
+                                             BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    if (group->meth->point_get_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp == 0) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_GET_JPROJECTIVE_COORDINATES_GFP,
+              ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (group->meth != point->meth) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_GET_JPROJECTIVE_COORDINATES_GFP,
+              EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return group->meth->point_get_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(group, point, x,
+                                                              y, z, ctx);
+}
+
+int EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group,
+                                        EC_POINT *point, const BIGNUM *x,
+                                        const BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    if (group->meth->point_set_affine_coordinates == 0) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GFP,
+              ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (group->meth != point->meth) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GFP,
+              EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (!group->meth->point_set_affine_coordinates(group, point, x, y, ctx))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, point, ctx) <= 0) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GFP,
+              EC_R_POINT_IS_NOT_ON_CURVE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+int EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m(const EC_GROUP *group,
+                                         EC_POINT *point, const BIGNUM *x,
+                                         const BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    if (group->meth->point_set_affine_coordinates == 0) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GF2M,
+              ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (group->meth != point->meth) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GF2M,
+              EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (!group->meth->point_set_affine_coordinates(group, point, x, y, ctx))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, point, ctx) <= 0) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GF2M,
+              EC_R_POINT_IS_NOT_ON_CURVE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+#endif
+
+int EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group,
+                                        const EC_POINT *point, BIGNUM *x,
+                                        BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    if (group->meth->point_get_affine_coordinates == 0) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GFP,
+              ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (group->meth != point->meth) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GFP,
+              EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return group->meth->point_get_affine_coordinates(group, point, x, y, ctx);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+int EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m(const EC_GROUP *group,
+                                         const EC_POINT *point, BIGNUM *x,
+                                         BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    if (group->meth->point_get_affine_coordinates == 0) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GF2M,
+              ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (group->meth != point->meth) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GF2M,
+              EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return group->meth->point_get_affine_coordinates(group, point, x, y, ctx);
+}
+#endif
+
+int EC_POINT_add(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const EC_POINT *a,
+                 const EC_POINT *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    if (group->meth->add == 0) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_ADD, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if ((group->meth != r->meth) || (r->meth != a->meth)
+        || (a->meth != b->meth)) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_ADD, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return group->meth->add(group, r, a, b, ctx);
+}
+
+int EC_POINT_dbl(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const EC_POINT *a,
+                 BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    if (group->meth->dbl == 0) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_DBL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if ((group->meth != r->meth) || (r->meth != a->meth)) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_DBL, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return group->meth->dbl(group, r, a, ctx);
+}
+
+int EC_POINT_invert(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *a, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    if (group->meth->invert == 0) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_INVERT, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (group->meth != a->meth) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_INVERT, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return group->meth->invert(group, a, ctx);
+}
+
+int EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point)
+{
+    if (group->meth->is_at_infinity == 0) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_IS_AT_INFINITY,
+              ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (group->meth != point->meth) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_IS_AT_INFINITY, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return group->meth->is_at_infinity(group, point);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check whether an EC_POINT is on the curve or not. Note that the return
+ * value for this function should NOT be treated as a boolean. Return values:
+ *  1: The point is on the curve
+ *  0: The point is not on the curve
+ * -1: An error occurred
+ */
+int EC_POINT_is_on_curve(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point,
+                         BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    if (group->meth->is_on_curve == 0) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_IS_ON_CURVE, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (group->meth != point->meth) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_IS_ON_CURVE, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return group->meth->is_on_curve(group, point, ctx);
+}
+
+int EC_POINT_cmp(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *a, const EC_POINT *b,
+                 BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    if (group->meth->point_cmp == 0) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_CMP, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+        return -1;
+    }
+    if ((group->meth != a->meth) || (a->meth != b->meth)) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_CMP, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
+        return -1;
+    }
+    return group->meth->point_cmp(group, a, b, ctx);
+}
+
+int EC_POINT_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    if (group->meth->make_affine == 0) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_MAKE_AFFINE, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (group->meth != point->meth) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_MAKE_AFFINE, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return group->meth->make_affine(group, point, ctx);
+}
+
+int EC_POINTs_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *group, size_t num,
+                          EC_POINT *points[], BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    size_t i;
+
+    if (group->meth->points_make_affine == 0) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINTS_MAKE_AFFINE, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
+        if (group->meth != points[i]->meth) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINTS_MAKE_AFFINE, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+    return group->meth->points_make_affine(group, num, points, ctx);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Functions for point multiplication. If group->meth->mul is 0, we use the
+ * wNAF-based implementations in ec_mult.c; otherwise we dispatch through
+ * methods.
+ */
+
+int EC_POINTs_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar,
+                  size_t num, const EC_POINT *points[],
+                  const BIGNUM *scalars[], BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    if (group->meth->mul == 0)
+        /* use default */
+        return ec_wNAF_mul(group, r, scalar, num, points, scalars, ctx);
+
+    return group->meth->mul(group, r, scalar, num, points, scalars, ctx);
+}
+
+int EC_POINT_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *g_scalar,
+                 const EC_POINT *point, const BIGNUM *p_scalar, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    /* just a convenient interface to EC_POINTs_mul() */
+
+    const EC_POINT *points[1];
+    const BIGNUM *scalars[1];
+
+    points[0] = point;
+    scalars[0] = p_scalar;
+
+    return EC_POINTs_mul(group, r, g_scalar,
+                         (point != NULL
+                          && p_scalar != NULL), points, scalars, ctx);
+}
+
+int EC_GROUP_precompute_mult(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    if (group->meth->mul == 0)
+        /* use default */
+        return ec_wNAF_precompute_mult(group, ctx);
+
+    if (group->meth->precompute_mult != 0)
+        return group->meth->precompute_mult(group, ctx);
+    else
+        return 1;               /* nothing to do, so report success */
+}
+
+int EC_GROUP_have_precompute_mult(const EC_GROUP *group)
+{
+    if (group->meth->mul == 0)
+        /* use default */
+        return ec_wNAF_have_precompute_mult(group);
+
+    if (group->meth->have_precompute_mult != 0)
+        return group->meth->have_precompute_mult(group);
+    else
+        return 0;               /* cannot tell whether precomputation has
+                                 * been performed */
+}
+
+/*
+ * ec_precompute_mont_data sets |group->mont_data| from |group->order| and
+ * returns one on success. On error it returns zero.
+ */
+int ec_precompute_mont_data(EC_GROUP *group)
+{
+    BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    BN_MONT_CTX_free(group->mont_data);
+    group->mont_data = NULL;
+
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    group->mont_data = BN_MONT_CTX_new();
+    if (group->mont_data == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(group->mont_data, group->order, ctx)) {
+        BN_MONT_CTX_free(group->mont_data);
+        group->mont_data = NULL;
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+
+    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int EC_KEY_set_ex_data(EC_KEY *key, int idx, void *arg)
+{
+    return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&key->ex_data, idx, arg);
+}
+
+void *EC_KEY_get_ex_data(const EC_KEY *key, int idx)
+{
+    return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&key->ex_data, idx);
+}
+
+int ec_group_simple_order_bits(const EC_GROUP *group)
+{
+    if (group->order == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    return BN_num_bits(group->order);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ec_mult.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ec_mult.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b39777f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ec_mult.c
@@ -0,0 +1,684 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ * Portions of this software developed by SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC.,
+ * and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ */
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "internal/bn_int.h"
+#include "ec_lcl.h"
+
+/*
+ * This file implements the wNAF-based interleaving multi-exponentiation method
+ * Formerly at:
+ *   http://www.informatik.tu-darmstadt.de/TI/Mitarbeiter/moeller.html#multiexp
+ * You might now find it here:
+ *   http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F3-540-45537-X_13
+ *   http://www.bmoeller.de/pdf/TI-01-08.multiexp.pdf
+ * For multiplication with precomputation, we use wNAF splitting, formerly at:
+ *   http://www.informatik.tu-darmstadt.de/TI/Mitarbeiter/moeller.html#fastexp
+ */
+
+/* structure for precomputed multiples of the generator */
+struct ec_pre_comp_st {
+    const EC_GROUP *group;      /* parent EC_GROUP object */
+    size_t blocksize;           /* block size for wNAF splitting */
+    size_t numblocks;           /* max. number of blocks for which we have
+                                 * precomputation */
+    size_t w;                   /* window size */
+    EC_POINT **points;          /* array with pre-calculated multiples of
+                                 * generator: 'num' pointers to EC_POINT
+                                 * objects followed by a NULL */
+    size_t num;                 /* numblocks * 2^(w-1) */
+    int references;
+    CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock;
+};
+
+static EC_PRE_COMP *ec_pre_comp_new(const EC_GROUP *group)
+{
+    EC_PRE_COMP *ret = NULL;
+
+    if (!group)
+        return NULL;
+
+    ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
+    if (ret == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_PRE_COMP_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    ret->group = group;
+    ret->blocksize = 8;         /* default */
+    ret->w = 4;                 /* default */
+    ret->references = 1;
+
+    ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
+    if (ret->lock == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_PRE_COMP_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        OPENSSL_free(ret);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+EC_PRE_COMP *EC_ec_pre_comp_dup(EC_PRE_COMP *pre)
+{
+    int i;
+    if (pre != NULL)
+        CRYPTO_atomic_add(&pre->references, 1, &i, pre->lock);
+    return pre;
+}
+
+void EC_ec_pre_comp_free(EC_PRE_COMP *pre)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    if (pre == NULL)
+        return;
+
+    CRYPTO_atomic_add(&pre->references, -1, &i, pre->lock);
+    REF_PRINT_COUNT("EC_ec", pre);
+    if (i > 0)
+        return;
+    REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0);
+
+    if (pre->points != NULL) {
+        EC_POINT **pts;
+
+        for (pts = pre->points; *pts != NULL; pts++)
+            EC_POINT_free(*pts);
+        OPENSSL_free(pre->points);
+    }
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(pre->lock);
+    OPENSSL_free(pre);
+}
+
+/*
+ * TODO: table should be optimised for the wNAF-based implementation,
+ * sometimes smaller windows will give better performance (thus the
+ * boundaries should be increased)
+ */
+#define EC_window_bits_for_scalar_size(b) \
+                ((size_t) \
+                 ((b) >= 2000 ? 6 : \
+                  (b) >=  800 ? 5 : \
+                  (b) >=  300 ? 4 : \
+                  (b) >=   70 ? 3 : \
+                  (b) >=   20 ? 2 : \
+                  1))
+
+/*-
+ * Compute
+ *      \sum scalars[i]*points[i],
+ * also including
+ *      scalar*generator
+ * in the addition if scalar != NULL
+ */
+int ec_wNAF_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar,
+                size_t num, const EC_POINT *points[], const BIGNUM *scalars[],
+                BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
+    const EC_POINT *generator = NULL;
+    EC_POINT *tmp = NULL;
+    size_t totalnum;
+    size_t blocksize = 0, numblocks = 0; /* for wNAF splitting */
+    size_t pre_points_per_block = 0;
+    size_t i, j;
+    int k;
+    int r_is_inverted = 0;
+    int r_is_at_infinity = 1;
+    size_t *wsize = NULL;       /* individual window sizes */
+    signed char **wNAF = NULL;  /* individual wNAFs */
+    size_t *wNAF_len = NULL;
+    size_t max_len = 0;
+    size_t num_val;
+    EC_POINT **val = NULL;      /* precomputation */
+    EC_POINT **v;
+    EC_POINT ***val_sub = NULL; /* pointers to sub-arrays of 'val' or
+                                 * 'pre_comp->points' */
+    const EC_PRE_COMP *pre_comp = NULL;
+    int num_scalar = 0;         /* flag: will be set to 1 if 'scalar' must be
+                                 * treated like other scalars, i.e.
+                                 * precomputation is not available */
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    if (group->meth != r->meth) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_MUL, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if ((scalar == NULL) && (num == 0)) {
+        return EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(group, r);
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
+        if (group->meth != points[i]->meth) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_MUL, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+        ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+        if (ctx == NULL)
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (scalar != NULL) {
+        generator = EC_GROUP_get0_generator(group);
+        if (generator == NULL) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_MUL, EC_R_UNDEFINED_GENERATOR);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        /* look if we can use precomputed multiples of generator */
+
+        pre_comp = group->pre_comp.ec;
+        if (pre_comp && pre_comp->numblocks
+            && (EC_POINT_cmp(group, generator, pre_comp->points[0], ctx) ==
+                0)) {
+            blocksize = pre_comp->blocksize;
+
+            /*
+             * determine maximum number of blocks that wNAF splitting may
+             * yield (NB: maximum wNAF length is bit length plus one)
+             */
+            numblocks = (BN_num_bits(scalar) / blocksize) + 1;
+
+            /*
+             * we cannot use more blocks than we have precomputation for
+             */
+            if (numblocks > pre_comp->numblocks)
+                numblocks = pre_comp->numblocks;
+
+            pre_points_per_block = (size_t)1 << (pre_comp->w - 1);
+
+            /* check that pre_comp looks sane */
+            if (pre_comp->num != (pre_comp->numblocks * pre_points_per_block)) {
+                ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_MUL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                goto err;
+            }
+        } else {
+            /* can't use precomputation */
+            pre_comp = NULL;
+            numblocks = 1;
+            num_scalar = 1;     /* treat 'scalar' like 'num'-th element of
+                                 * 'scalars' */
+        }
+    }
+
+    totalnum = num + numblocks;
+
+    wsize = OPENSSL_malloc(totalnum * sizeof(wsize[0]));
+    wNAF_len = OPENSSL_malloc(totalnum * sizeof(wNAF_len[0]));
+    /* include space for pivot */
+    wNAF = OPENSSL_malloc((totalnum + 1) * sizeof(wNAF[0]));
+    val_sub = OPENSSL_malloc(totalnum * sizeof(val_sub[0]));
+
+    /* Ensure wNAF is initialised in case we end up going to err */
+    if (wNAF != NULL)
+        wNAF[0] = NULL;         /* preliminary pivot */
+
+    if (wsize == NULL || wNAF_len == NULL || wNAF == NULL || val_sub == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_MUL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * num_val will be the total number of temporarily precomputed points
+     */
+    num_val = 0;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < num + num_scalar; i++) {
+        size_t bits;
+
+        bits = i < num ? BN_num_bits(scalars[i]) : BN_num_bits(scalar);
+        wsize[i] = EC_window_bits_for_scalar_size(bits);
+        num_val += (size_t)1 << (wsize[i] - 1);
+        wNAF[i + 1] = NULL;     /* make sure we always have a pivot */
+        wNAF[i] =
+            bn_compute_wNAF((i < num ? scalars[i] : scalar), wsize[i],
+                            &wNAF_len[i]);
+        if (wNAF[i] == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        if (wNAF_len[i] > max_len)
+            max_len = wNAF_len[i];
+    }
+
+    if (numblocks) {
+        /* we go here iff scalar != NULL */
+
+        if (pre_comp == NULL) {
+            if (num_scalar != 1) {
+                ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_MUL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            /* we have already generated a wNAF for 'scalar' */
+        } else {
+            signed char *tmp_wNAF = NULL;
+            size_t tmp_len = 0;
+
+            if (num_scalar != 0) {
+                ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_MUL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                goto err;
+            }
+
+            /*
+             * use the window size for which we have precomputation
+             */
+            wsize[num] = pre_comp->w;
+            tmp_wNAF = bn_compute_wNAF(scalar, wsize[num], &tmp_len);
+            if (!tmp_wNAF)
+                goto err;
+
+            if (tmp_len <= max_len) {
+                /*
+                 * One of the other wNAFs is at least as long as the wNAF
+                 * belonging to the generator, so wNAF splitting will not buy
+                 * us anything.
+                 */
+
+                numblocks = 1;
+                totalnum = num + 1; /* don't use wNAF splitting */
+                wNAF[num] = tmp_wNAF;
+                wNAF[num + 1] = NULL;
+                wNAF_len[num] = tmp_len;
+                /*
+                 * pre_comp->points starts with the points that we need here:
+                 */
+                val_sub[num] = pre_comp->points;
+            } else {
+                /*
+                 * don't include tmp_wNAF directly into wNAF array - use wNAF
+                 * splitting and include the blocks
+                 */
+
+                signed char *pp;
+                EC_POINT **tmp_points;
+
+                if (tmp_len < numblocks * blocksize) {
+                    /*
+                     * possibly we can do with fewer blocks than estimated
+                     */
+                    numblocks = (tmp_len + blocksize - 1) / blocksize;
+                    if (numblocks > pre_comp->numblocks) {
+                        ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_MUL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                        OPENSSL_free(tmp_wNAF);
+                        goto err;
+                    }
+                    totalnum = num + numblocks;
+                }
+
+                /* split wNAF in 'numblocks' parts */
+                pp = tmp_wNAF;
+                tmp_points = pre_comp->points;
+
+                for (i = num; i < totalnum; i++) {
+                    if (i < totalnum - 1) {
+                        wNAF_len[i] = blocksize;
+                        if (tmp_len < blocksize) {
+                            ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_MUL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                            OPENSSL_free(tmp_wNAF);
+                            goto err;
+                        }
+                        tmp_len -= blocksize;
+                    } else
+                        /*
+                         * last block gets whatever is left (this could be
+                         * more or less than 'blocksize'!)
+                         */
+                        wNAF_len[i] = tmp_len;
+
+                    wNAF[i + 1] = NULL;
+                    wNAF[i] = OPENSSL_malloc(wNAF_len[i]);
+                    if (wNAF[i] == NULL) {
+                        ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_MUL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                        OPENSSL_free(tmp_wNAF);
+                        goto err;
+                    }
+                    memcpy(wNAF[i], pp, wNAF_len[i]);
+                    if (wNAF_len[i] > max_len)
+                        max_len = wNAF_len[i];
+
+                    if (*tmp_points == NULL) {
+                        ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_MUL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                        OPENSSL_free(tmp_wNAF);
+                        goto err;
+                    }
+                    val_sub[i] = tmp_points;
+                    tmp_points += pre_points_per_block;
+                    pp += blocksize;
+                }
+                OPENSSL_free(tmp_wNAF);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * All points we precompute now go into a single array 'val'.
+     * 'val_sub[i]' is a pointer to the subarray for the i-th point, or to a
+     * subarray of 'pre_comp->points' if we already have precomputation.
+     */
+    val = OPENSSL_malloc((num_val + 1) * sizeof(val[0]));
+    if (val == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_MUL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    val[num_val] = NULL;        /* pivot element */
+
+    /* allocate points for precomputation */
+    v = val;
+    for (i = 0; i < num + num_scalar; i++) {
+        val_sub[i] = v;
+        for (j = 0; j < ((size_t)1 << (wsize[i] - 1)); j++) {
+            *v = EC_POINT_new(group);
+            if (*v == NULL)
+                goto err;
+            v++;
+        }
+    }
+    if (!(v == val + num_val)) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_MUL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if ((tmp = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    /*-
+     * prepare precomputed values:
+     *    val_sub[i][0] :=     points[i]
+     *    val_sub[i][1] := 3 * points[i]
+     *    val_sub[i][2] := 5 * points[i]
+     *    ...
+     */
+    for (i = 0; i < num + num_scalar; i++) {
+        if (i < num) {
+            if (!EC_POINT_copy(val_sub[i][0], points[i]))
+                goto err;
+        } else {
+            if (!EC_POINT_copy(val_sub[i][0], generator))
+                goto err;
+        }
+
+        if (wsize[i] > 1) {
+            if (!EC_POINT_dbl(group, tmp, val_sub[i][0], ctx))
+                goto err;
+            for (j = 1; j < ((size_t)1 << (wsize[i] - 1)); j++) {
+                if (!EC_POINT_add
+                    (group, val_sub[i][j], val_sub[i][j - 1], tmp, ctx))
+                    goto err;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (!EC_POINTs_make_affine(group, num_val, val, ctx))
+        goto err;
+
+    r_is_at_infinity = 1;
+
+    for (k = max_len - 1; k >= 0; k--) {
+        if (!r_is_at_infinity) {
+            if (!EC_POINT_dbl(group, r, r, ctx))
+                goto err;
+        }
+
+        for (i = 0; i < totalnum; i++) {
+            if (wNAF_len[i] > (size_t)k) {
+                int digit = wNAF[i][k];
+                int is_neg;
+
+                if (digit) {
+                    is_neg = digit < 0;
+
+                    if (is_neg)
+                        digit = -digit;
+
+                    if (is_neg != r_is_inverted) {
+                        if (!r_is_at_infinity) {
+                            if (!EC_POINT_invert(group, r, ctx))
+                                goto err;
+                        }
+                        r_is_inverted = !r_is_inverted;
+                    }
+
+                    /* digit > 0 */
+
+                    if (r_is_at_infinity) {
+                        if (!EC_POINT_copy(r, val_sub[i][digit >> 1]))
+                            goto err;
+                        r_is_at_infinity = 0;
+                    } else {
+                        if (!EC_POINT_add
+                            (group, r, r, val_sub[i][digit >> 1], ctx))
+                            goto err;
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (r_is_at_infinity) {
+        if (!EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(group, r))
+            goto err;
+    } else {
+        if (r_is_inverted)
+            if (!EC_POINT_invert(group, r, ctx))
+                goto err;
+    }
+
+    ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+    BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
+    EC_POINT_free(tmp);
+    OPENSSL_free(wsize);
+    OPENSSL_free(wNAF_len);
+    if (wNAF != NULL) {
+        signed char **w;
+
+        for (w = wNAF; *w != NULL; w++)
+            OPENSSL_free(*w);
+
+        OPENSSL_free(wNAF);
+    }
+    if (val != NULL) {
+        for (v = val; *v != NULL; v++)
+            EC_POINT_clear_free(*v);
+
+        OPENSSL_free(val);
+    }
+    OPENSSL_free(val_sub);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * ec_wNAF_precompute_mult()
+ * creates an EC_PRE_COMP object with preprecomputed multiples of the generator
+ * for use with wNAF splitting as implemented in ec_wNAF_mul().
+ *
+ * 'pre_comp->points' is an array of multiples of the generator
+ * of the following form:
+ * points[0] =     generator;
+ * points[1] = 3 * generator;
+ * ...
+ * points[2^(w-1)-1] =     (2^(w-1)-1) * generator;
+ * points[2^(w-1)]   =     2^blocksize * generator;
+ * points[2^(w-1)+1] = 3 * 2^blocksize * generator;
+ * ...
+ * points[2^(w-1)*(numblocks-1)-1] = (2^(w-1)) *  2^(blocksize*(numblocks-2)) * generator
+ * points[2^(w-1)*(numblocks-1)]   =              2^(blocksize*(numblocks-1)) * generator
+ * ...
+ * points[2^(w-1)*numblocks-1]     = (2^(w-1)) *  2^(blocksize*(numblocks-1)) * generator
+ * points[2^(w-1)*numblocks]       = NULL
+ */
+int ec_wNAF_precompute_mult(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    const EC_POINT *generator;
+    EC_POINT *tmp_point = NULL, *base = NULL, **var;
+    BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
+    const BIGNUM *order;
+    size_t i, bits, w, pre_points_per_block, blocksize, numblocks, num;
+    EC_POINT **points = NULL;
+    EC_PRE_COMP *pre_comp;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    /* if there is an old EC_PRE_COMP object, throw it away */
+    EC_pre_comp_free(group);
+    if ((pre_comp = ec_pre_comp_new(group)) == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    generator = EC_GROUP_get0_generator(group);
+    if (generator == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_PRECOMPUTE_MULT, EC_R_UNDEFINED_GENERATOR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+        ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+        if (ctx == NULL)
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+
+    order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(group);
+    if (order == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (BN_is_zero(order)) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_PRECOMPUTE_MULT, EC_R_UNKNOWN_ORDER);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    bits = BN_num_bits(order);
+    /*
+     * The following parameters mean we precompute (approximately) one point
+     * per bit. TBD: The combination 8, 4 is perfect for 160 bits; for other
+     * bit lengths, other parameter combinations might provide better
+     * efficiency.
+     */
+    blocksize = 8;
+    w = 4;
+    if (EC_window_bits_for_scalar_size(bits) > w) {
+        /* let's not make the window too small ... */
+        w = EC_window_bits_for_scalar_size(bits);
+    }
+
+    numblocks = (bits + blocksize - 1) / blocksize; /* max. number of blocks
+                                                     * to use for wNAF
+                                                     * splitting */
+
+    pre_points_per_block = (size_t)1 << (w - 1);
+    num = pre_points_per_block * numblocks; /* number of points to compute
+                                             * and store */
+
+    points = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*points) * (num + 1));
+    if (points == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_PRECOMPUTE_MULT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    var = points;
+    var[num] = NULL;            /* pivot */
+    for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
+        if ((var[i] = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_PRECOMPUTE_MULT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if ((tmp_point = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL
+        || (base = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_PRECOMPUTE_MULT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!EC_POINT_copy(base, generator))
+        goto err;
+
+    /* do the precomputation */
+    for (i = 0; i < numblocks; i++) {
+        size_t j;
+
+        if (!EC_POINT_dbl(group, tmp_point, base, ctx))
+            goto err;
+
+        if (!EC_POINT_copy(*var++, base))
+            goto err;
+
+        for (j = 1; j < pre_points_per_block; j++, var++) {
+            /*
+             * calculate odd multiples of the current base point
+             */
+            if (!EC_POINT_add(group, *var, tmp_point, *(var - 1), ctx))
+                goto err;
+        }
+
+        if (i < numblocks - 1) {
+            /*
+             * get the next base (multiply current one by 2^blocksize)
+             */
+            size_t k;
+
+            if (blocksize <= 2) {
+                ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_PRECOMPUTE_MULT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                goto err;
+            }
+
+            if (!EC_POINT_dbl(group, base, tmp_point, ctx))
+                goto err;
+            for (k = 2; k < blocksize; k++) {
+                if (!EC_POINT_dbl(group, base, base, ctx))
+                    goto err;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (!EC_POINTs_make_affine(group, num, points, ctx))
+        goto err;
+
+    pre_comp->group = group;
+    pre_comp->blocksize = blocksize;
+    pre_comp->numblocks = numblocks;
+    pre_comp->w = w;
+    pre_comp->points = points;
+    points = NULL;
+    pre_comp->num = num;
+    SETPRECOMP(group, ec, pre_comp);
+    pre_comp = NULL;
+    ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+    if (ctx != NULL)
+        BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
+    EC_ec_pre_comp_free(pre_comp);
+    if (points) {
+        EC_POINT **p;
+
+        for (p = points; *p != NULL; p++)
+            EC_POINT_free(*p);
+        OPENSSL_free(points);
+    }
+    EC_POINT_free(tmp_point);
+    EC_POINT_free(base);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int ec_wNAF_have_precompute_mult(const EC_GROUP *group)
+{
+    return HAVEPRECOMP(group, ec);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ec_oct.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ec_oct.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..effc42a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ec_oct.c
@@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ * Binary polynomial ECC support in OpenSSL originally developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ */
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+
+#include "ec_lcl.h"
+
+int EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group,
+                                            EC_POINT *point, const BIGNUM *x,
+                                            int y_bit, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    if (group->meth->point_set_compressed_coordinates == 0
+        && !(group->meth->flags & EC_FLAGS_DEFAULT_OCT)) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_COMPRESSED_COORDINATES_GFP,
+              ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (group->meth != point->meth) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_COMPRESSED_COORDINATES_GFP,
+              EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (group->meth->flags & EC_FLAGS_DEFAULT_OCT) {
+        if (group->meth->field_type == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
+            return ec_GFp_simple_set_compressed_coordinates(group, point, x,
+                                                            y_bit, ctx);
+        else
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+        {
+            ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_COMPRESSED_COORDINATES_GFP,
+                  EC_R_GF2M_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+            return 0;
+        }
+#else
+            return ec_GF2m_simple_set_compressed_coordinates(group, point, x,
+                                                             y_bit, ctx);
+#endif
+    }
+    return group->meth->point_set_compressed_coordinates(group, point, x,
+                                                         y_bit, ctx);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+int EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GF2m(const EC_GROUP *group,
+                                             EC_POINT *point, const BIGNUM *x,
+                                             int y_bit, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    if (group->meth->point_set_compressed_coordinates == 0
+        && !(group->meth->flags & EC_FLAGS_DEFAULT_OCT)) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_COMPRESSED_COORDINATES_GF2M,
+              ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (group->meth != point->meth) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_COMPRESSED_COORDINATES_GF2M,
+              EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (group->meth->flags & EC_FLAGS_DEFAULT_OCT) {
+        if (group->meth->field_type == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
+            return ec_GFp_simple_set_compressed_coordinates(group, point, x,
+                                                            y_bit, ctx);
+        else
+            return ec_GF2m_simple_set_compressed_coordinates(group, point, x,
+                                                             y_bit, ctx);
+    }
+    return group->meth->point_set_compressed_coordinates(group, point, x,
+                                                         y_bit, ctx);
+}
+#endif
+
+size_t EC_POINT_point2oct(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point,
+                          point_conversion_form_t form, unsigned char *buf,
+                          size_t len, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    if (group->meth->point2oct == 0
+        && !(group->meth->flags & EC_FLAGS_DEFAULT_OCT)) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_POINT2OCT, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (group->meth != point->meth) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_POINT2OCT, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (group->meth->flags & EC_FLAGS_DEFAULT_OCT) {
+        if (group->meth->field_type == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
+            return ec_GFp_simple_point2oct(group, point, form, buf, len, ctx);
+        else
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+        {
+            ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_POINT2OCT, EC_R_GF2M_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+            return 0;
+        }
+#else
+            return ec_GF2m_simple_point2oct(group, point,
+                                            form, buf, len, ctx);
+#endif
+    }
+
+    return group->meth->point2oct(group, point, form, buf, len, ctx);
+}
+
+int EC_POINT_oct2point(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point,
+                       const unsigned char *buf, size_t len, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    if (group->meth->oct2point == 0
+        && !(group->meth->flags & EC_FLAGS_DEFAULT_OCT)) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_OCT2POINT, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (group->meth != point->meth) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_OCT2POINT, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (group->meth->flags & EC_FLAGS_DEFAULT_OCT) {
+        if (group->meth->field_type == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
+            return ec_GFp_simple_oct2point(group, point, buf, len, ctx);
+        else
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+        {
+            ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_OCT2POINT, EC_R_GF2M_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+            return 0;
+        }
+#else
+            return ec_GF2m_simple_oct2point(group, point, buf, len, ctx);
+#endif
+    }
+    return group->meth->oct2point(group, point, buf, len, ctx);
+}
+
+size_t EC_POINT_point2buf(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point,
+                          point_conversion_form_t form,
+                          unsigned char **pbuf, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    size_t len;
+    unsigned char *buf;
+    len = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, point, form, NULL, 0, NULL);
+    if (len == 0)
+        return 0;
+    buf = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
+    if (buf == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    len = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, point, form, buf, len, ctx);
+    if (len == 0) {
+        OPENSSL_free(buf);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    *pbuf = buf;
+    return len;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ec_pmeth.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ec_pmeth.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..68ff2bb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ec_pmeth.c
@@ -0,0 +1,463 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/ec.h>
+#include "ec_lcl.h"
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include "internal/evp_int.h"
+
+/* EC pkey context structure */
+
+typedef struct {
+    /* Key and paramgen group */
+    EC_GROUP *gen_group;
+    /* message digest */
+    const EVP_MD *md;
+    /* Duplicate key if custom cofactor needed */
+    EC_KEY *co_key;
+    /* Cofactor mode */
+    signed char cofactor_mode;
+    /* KDF (if any) to use for ECDH */
+    char kdf_type;
+    /* Message digest to use for key derivation */
+    const EVP_MD *kdf_md;
+    /* User key material */
+    unsigned char *kdf_ukm;
+    size_t kdf_ukmlen;
+    /* KDF output length */
+    size_t kdf_outlen;
+} EC_PKEY_CTX;
+
+static int pkey_ec_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    EC_PKEY_CTX *dctx;
+
+    dctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*dctx));
+    if (dctx == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    dctx->cofactor_mode = -1;
+    dctx->kdf_type = EVP_PKEY_ECDH_KDF_NONE;
+    ctx->data = dctx;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int pkey_ec_copy(EVP_PKEY_CTX *dst, EVP_PKEY_CTX *src)
+{
+    EC_PKEY_CTX *dctx, *sctx;
+    if (!pkey_ec_init(dst))
+        return 0;
+    sctx = src->data;
+    dctx = dst->data;
+    if (sctx->gen_group) {
+        dctx->gen_group = EC_GROUP_dup(sctx->gen_group);
+        if (!dctx->gen_group)
+            return 0;
+    }
+    dctx->md = sctx->md;
+
+    if (sctx->co_key) {
+        dctx->co_key = EC_KEY_dup(sctx->co_key);
+        if (!dctx->co_key)
+            return 0;
+    }
+    dctx->kdf_type = sctx->kdf_type;
+    dctx->kdf_md = sctx->kdf_md;
+    dctx->kdf_outlen = sctx->kdf_outlen;
+    if (sctx->kdf_ukm) {
+        dctx->kdf_ukm = OPENSSL_memdup(sctx->kdf_ukm, sctx->kdf_ukmlen);
+        if (!dctx->kdf_ukm)
+            return 0;
+    } else
+        dctx->kdf_ukm = NULL;
+    dctx->kdf_ukmlen = sctx->kdf_ukmlen;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static void pkey_ec_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    EC_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data;
+    if (dctx) {
+        EC_GROUP_free(dctx->gen_group);
+        EC_KEY_free(dctx->co_key);
+        OPENSSL_free(dctx->kdf_ukm);
+        OPENSSL_free(dctx);
+    }
+}
+
+static int pkey_ec_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen,
+                        const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)
+{
+    int ret, type;
+    unsigned int sltmp;
+    EC_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data;
+    EC_KEY *ec = ctx->pkey->pkey.ec;
+
+    if (!sig) {
+        *siglen = ECDSA_size(ec);
+        return 1;
+    } else if (*siglen < (size_t)ECDSA_size(ec)) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_PKEY_EC_SIGN, EC_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (dctx->md)
+        type = EVP_MD_type(dctx->md);
+    else
+        type = NID_sha1;
+
+    ret = ECDSA_sign(type, tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp, ec);
+
+    if (ret <= 0)
+        return ret;
+    *siglen = (size_t)sltmp;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int pkey_ec_verify(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                          const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen,
+                          const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)
+{
+    int ret, type;
+    EC_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data;
+    EC_KEY *ec = ctx->pkey->pkey.ec;
+
+    if (dctx->md)
+        type = EVP_MD_type(dctx->md);
+    else
+        type = NID_sha1;
+
+    ret = ECDSA_verify(type, tbs, tbslen, sig, siglen, ec);
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+static int pkey_ec_derive(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key,
+                          size_t *keylen)
+{
+    int ret;
+    size_t outlen;
+    const EC_POINT *pubkey = NULL;
+    EC_KEY *eckey;
+    EC_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data;
+    if (!ctx->pkey || !ctx->peerkey) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_PKEY_EC_DERIVE, EC_R_KEYS_NOT_SET);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    eckey = dctx->co_key ? dctx->co_key : ctx->pkey->pkey.ec;
+
+    if (!key) {
+        const EC_GROUP *group;
+        group = EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey);
+        *keylen = (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) + 7) / 8;
+        return 1;
+    }
+    pubkey = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ctx->peerkey->pkey.ec);
+
+    /*
+     * NB: unlike PKCS#3 DH, if *outlen is less than maximum size this is not
+     * an error, the result is truncated.
+     */
+
+    outlen = *keylen;
+
+    ret = ECDH_compute_key(key, outlen, pubkey, eckey, 0);
+    if (ret <= 0)
+        return 0;
+    *keylen = ret;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int pkey_ec_kdf_derive(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                              unsigned char *key, size_t *keylen)
+{
+    EC_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data;
+    unsigned char *ktmp = NULL;
+    size_t ktmplen;
+    int rv = 0;
+    if (dctx->kdf_type == EVP_PKEY_ECDH_KDF_NONE)
+        return pkey_ec_derive(ctx, key, keylen);
+    if (!key) {
+        *keylen = dctx->kdf_outlen;
+        return 1;
+    }
+    if (*keylen != dctx->kdf_outlen)
+        return 0;
+    if (!pkey_ec_derive(ctx, NULL, &ktmplen))
+        return 0;
+    ktmp = OPENSSL_malloc(ktmplen);
+    if (ktmp == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    if (!pkey_ec_derive(ctx, ktmp, &ktmplen))
+        goto err;
+    /* Do KDF stuff */
+    if (!ECDH_KDF_X9_62(key, *keylen, ktmp, ktmplen,
+                        dctx->kdf_ukm, dctx->kdf_ukmlen, dctx->kdf_md))
+        goto err;
+    rv = 1;
+
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(ktmp, ktmplen);
+    return rv;
+}
+#endif
+
+static int pkey_ec_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2)
+{
+    EC_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data;
+    EC_GROUP *group;
+    switch (type) {
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_PARAMGEN_CURVE_NID:
+        group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(p1);
+        if (group == NULL) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_PKEY_EC_CTRL, EC_R_INVALID_CURVE);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        EC_GROUP_free(dctx->gen_group);
+        dctx->gen_group = group;
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_PARAM_ENC:
+        if (!dctx->gen_group) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_PKEY_EC_CTRL, EC_R_NO_PARAMETERS_SET);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(dctx->gen_group, p1);
+        return 1;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_ECDH_COFACTOR:
+        if (p1 == -2) {
+            if (dctx->cofactor_mode != -1)
+                return dctx->cofactor_mode;
+            else {
+                EC_KEY *ec_key = ctx->pkey->pkey.ec;
+                return EC_KEY_get_flags(ec_key) & EC_FLAG_COFACTOR_ECDH ? 1 :
+                    0;
+            }
+        } else if (p1 < -1 || p1 > 1)
+            return -2;
+        dctx->cofactor_mode = p1;
+        if (p1 != -1) {
+            EC_KEY *ec_key = ctx->pkey->pkey.ec;
+            if (!ec_key->group)
+                return -2;
+            /* If cofactor is 1 cofactor mode does nothing */
+            if (BN_is_one(ec_key->group->cofactor))
+                return 1;
+            if (!dctx->co_key) {
+                dctx->co_key = EC_KEY_dup(ec_key);
+                if (!dctx->co_key)
+                    return 0;
+            }
+            if (p1)
+                EC_KEY_set_flags(dctx->co_key, EC_FLAG_COFACTOR_ECDH);
+            else
+                EC_KEY_clear_flags(dctx->co_key, EC_FLAG_COFACTOR_ECDH);
+        } else {
+            EC_KEY_free(dctx->co_key);
+            dctx->co_key = NULL;
+        }
+        return 1;
+#endif
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_KDF_TYPE:
+        if (p1 == -2)
+            return dctx->kdf_type;
+        if (p1 != EVP_PKEY_ECDH_KDF_NONE && p1 != EVP_PKEY_ECDH_KDF_X9_62)
+            return -2;
+        dctx->kdf_type = p1;
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_KDF_MD:
+        dctx->kdf_md = p2;
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_EC_KDF_MD:
+        *(const EVP_MD **)p2 = dctx->kdf_md;
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_KDF_OUTLEN:
+        if (p1 <= 0)
+            return -2;
+        dctx->kdf_outlen = (size_t)p1;
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_EC_KDF_OUTLEN:
+        *(int *)p2 = dctx->kdf_outlen;
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_KDF_UKM:
+        OPENSSL_free(dctx->kdf_ukm);
+        dctx->kdf_ukm = p2;
+        if (p2)
+            dctx->kdf_ukmlen = p1;
+        else
+            dctx->kdf_ukmlen = 0;
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_EC_KDF_UKM:
+        *(unsigned char **)p2 = dctx->kdf_ukm;
+        return dctx->kdf_ukmlen;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_MD:
+        if (EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_sha1 &&
+            EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1 &&
+            EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_sha224 &&
+            EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_sha256 &&
+            EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_sha384 &&
+            EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_sha512) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_PKEY_EC_CTRL, EC_R_INVALID_DIGEST_TYPE);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        dctx->md = p2;
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_MD:
+        *(const EVP_MD **)p2 = dctx->md;
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY:
+        /* Default behaviour is OK */
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DIGESTINIT:
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN:
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_SIGN:
+        return 1;
+
+    default:
+        return -2;
+
+    }
+}
+
+static int pkey_ec_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                            const char *type, const char *value)
+{
+    if (strcmp(type, "ec_paramgen_curve") == 0) {
+        int nid;
+        nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(value);
+        if (nid == NID_undef)
+            nid = OBJ_sn2nid(value);
+        if (nid == NID_undef)
+            nid = OBJ_ln2nid(value);
+        if (nid == NID_undef) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_PKEY_EC_CTRL_STR, EC_R_INVALID_CURVE);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(ctx, nid);
+    } else if (strcmp(type, "ec_param_enc") == 0) {
+        int param_enc;
+        if (strcmp(value, "explicit") == 0)
+            param_enc = 0;
+        else if (strcmp(value, "named_curve") == 0)
+            param_enc = OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE;
+        else
+            return -2;
+        return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_param_enc(ctx, param_enc);
+    } else if (strcmp(type, "ecdh_kdf_md") == 0) {
+        const EVP_MD *md;
+        if ((md = EVP_get_digestbyname(value)) == NULL) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_PKEY_EC_CTRL_STR, EC_R_INVALID_DIGEST);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ecdh_kdf_md(ctx, md);
+    } else if (strcmp(type, "ecdh_cofactor_mode") == 0) {
+        int co_mode;
+        co_mode = atoi(value);
+        return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ecdh_cofactor_mode(ctx, co_mode);
+    }
+
+    return -2;
+}
+
+static int pkey_ec_paramgen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    EC_KEY *ec = NULL;
+    EC_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data;
+    int ret = 0;
+    if (dctx->gen_group == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_PKEY_EC_PARAMGEN, EC_R_NO_PARAMETERS_SET);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    ec = EC_KEY_new();
+    if (ec == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    ret = EC_KEY_set_group(ec, dctx->gen_group);
+    if (ret)
+        EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY(pkey, ec);
+    else
+        EC_KEY_free(ec);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int pkey_ec_keygen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    EC_KEY *ec = NULL;
+    EC_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data;
+    if (ctx->pkey == NULL && dctx->gen_group == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_PKEY_EC_KEYGEN, EC_R_NO_PARAMETERS_SET);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    ec = EC_KEY_new();
+    if (!ec)
+        return 0;
+    EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY(pkey, ec);
+    if (ctx->pkey) {
+        /* Note: if error return, pkey is freed by parent routine */
+        if (!EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, ctx->pkey))
+            return 0;
+    } else {
+        if (!EC_KEY_set_group(ec, dctx->gen_group))
+            return 0;
+    }
+    return EC_KEY_generate_key(pkey->pkey.ec);
+}
+
+const EVP_PKEY_METHOD ec_pkey_meth = {
+    EVP_PKEY_EC,
+    0,
+    pkey_ec_init,
+    pkey_ec_copy,
+    pkey_ec_cleanup,
+
+    0,
+    pkey_ec_paramgen,
+
+    0,
+    pkey_ec_keygen,
+
+    0,
+    pkey_ec_sign,
+
+    0,
+    pkey_ec_verify,
+
+    0, 0,
+
+    0, 0, 0, 0,
+
+    0, 0,
+
+    0, 0,
+
+    0,
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    pkey_ec_kdf_derive,
+#else
+    0,
+#endif
+    pkey_ec_ctrl,
+    pkey_ec_ctrl_str
+};
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ec_print.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ec_print.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1afa2ce
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ec_print.c
@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include "ec_lcl.h"
+
+BIGNUM *EC_POINT_point2bn(const EC_GROUP *group,
+                          const EC_POINT *point,
+                          point_conversion_form_t form,
+                          BIGNUM *ret, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    size_t buf_len = 0;
+    unsigned char *buf;
+
+    buf_len = EC_POINT_point2buf(group, point, form, &buf, ctx);
+
+    if (buf_len == 0)
+        return NULL;
+
+    ret = BN_bin2bn(buf, buf_len, ret);
+
+    OPENSSL_free(buf);
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+EC_POINT *EC_POINT_bn2point(const EC_GROUP *group,
+                            const BIGNUM *bn, EC_POINT *point, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    size_t buf_len = 0;
+    unsigned char *buf;
+    EC_POINT *ret;
+
+    if ((buf_len = BN_num_bytes(bn)) == 0)
+        return NULL;
+    buf = OPENSSL_malloc(buf_len);
+    if (buf == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+
+    if (!BN_bn2bin(bn, buf)) {
+        OPENSSL_free(buf);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    if (point == NULL) {
+        if ((ret = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
+            OPENSSL_free(buf);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+    } else
+        ret = point;
+
+    if (!EC_POINT_oct2point(group, ret, buf, buf_len, ctx)) {
+        if (ret != point)
+            EC_POINT_clear_free(ret);
+        OPENSSL_free(buf);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    OPENSSL_free(buf);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static const char *HEX_DIGITS = "0123456789ABCDEF";
+
+/* the return value must be freed (using OPENSSL_free()) */
+char *EC_POINT_point2hex(const EC_GROUP *group,
+                         const EC_POINT *point,
+                         point_conversion_form_t form, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    char *ret, *p;
+    size_t buf_len = 0, i;
+    unsigned char *buf = NULL, *pbuf;
+
+    buf_len = EC_POINT_point2buf(group, point, form, &buf, ctx);
+
+    if (buf_len == 0)
+        return NULL;
+
+    ret = OPENSSL_malloc(buf_len * 2 + 2);
+    if (ret == NULL) {
+        OPENSSL_free(buf);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    p = ret;
+    pbuf = buf;
+    for (i = buf_len; i > 0; i--) {
+        int v = (int)*(pbuf++);
+        *(p++) = HEX_DIGITS[v >> 4];
+        *(p++) = HEX_DIGITS[v & 0x0F];
+    }
+    *p = '\0';
+
+    OPENSSL_free(buf);
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+EC_POINT *EC_POINT_hex2point(const EC_GROUP *group,
+                             const char *buf, EC_POINT *point, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    EC_POINT *ret = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *tmp_bn = NULL;
+
+    if (!BN_hex2bn(&tmp_bn, buf))
+        return NULL;
+
+    ret = EC_POINT_bn2point(group, tmp_bn, point, ctx);
+
+    BN_clear_free(tmp_bn);
+
+    return ret;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ecdh_kdf.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ecdh_kdf.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d47486e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ecdh_kdf.c
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/ec.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+/* Key derivation function from X9.62/SECG */
+/* Way more than we will ever need */
+#define ECDH_KDF_MAX    (1 << 30)
+
+int ECDH_KDF_X9_62(unsigned char *out, size_t outlen,
+                   const unsigned char *Z, size_t Zlen,
+                   const unsigned char *sinfo, size_t sinfolen,
+                   const EVP_MD *md)
+{
+    EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL;
+    int rv = 0;
+    unsigned int i;
+    size_t mdlen;
+    unsigned char ctr[4];
+    if (sinfolen > ECDH_KDF_MAX || outlen > ECDH_KDF_MAX
+        || Zlen > ECDH_KDF_MAX)
+        return 0;
+    mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+    if (mctx == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    mdlen = EVP_MD_size(md);
+    for (i = 1;; i++) {
+        unsigned char mtmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+        if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL))
+            goto err;
+        ctr[3] = i & 0xFF;
+        ctr[2] = (i >> 8) & 0xFF;
+        ctr[1] = (i >> 16) & 0xFF;
+        ctr[0] = (i >> 24) & 0xFF;
+        if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(mctx, Z, Zlen))
+            goto err;
+        if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(mctx, ctr, sizeof(ctr)))
+            goto err;
+        if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(mctx, sinfo, sinfolen))
+            goto err;
+        if (outlen >= mdlen) {
+            if (!EVP_DigestFinal(mctx, out, NULL))
+                goto err;
+            outlen -= mdlen;
+            if (outlen == 0)
+                break;
+            out += mdlen;
+        } else {
+            if (!EVP_DigestFinal(mctx, mtmp, NULL))
+                goto err;
+            memcpy(out, mtmp, outlen);
+            OPENSSL_cleanse(mtmp, mdlen);
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    rv = 1;
+ err:
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
+    return rv;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ecdh_ossl.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ecdh_ossl.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a865145
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ecdh_ossl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ *
+ * The Elliptic Curve Public-Key Crypto Library (ECC Code) included
+ * herein is developed by SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and is contributed
+ * to the OpenSSL project.
+ *
+ * The ECC Code is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license provided below.
+ *
+ * The ECDH software is originally written by Douglas Stebila of
+ * Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/ec.h>
+#include "ec_lcl.h"
+
+int ossl_ecdh_compute_key(unsigned char **psec, size_t *pseclen,
+                          const EC_POINT *pub_key, const EC_KEY *ecdh)
+{
+    if (ecdh->group->meth->ecdh_compute_key == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDH_COMPUTE_KEY, EC_R_CURVE_DOES_NOT_SUPPORT_ECDH);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return ecdh->group->meth->ecdh_compute_key(psec, pseclen, pub_key, ecdh);
+}
+
+/*-
+ * This implementation is based on the following primitives in the IEEE 1363 standard:
+ *  - ECKAS-DH1
+ *  - ECSVDP-DH
+ */
+int ecdh_simple_compute_key(unsigned char **pout, size_t *poutlen,
+                            const EC_POINT *pub_key, const EC_KEY *ecdh)
+{
+    BN_CTX *ctx;
+    EC_POINT *tmp = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *x = NULL, *y = NULL;
+    const BIGNUM *priv_key;
+    const EC_GROUP *group;
+    int ret = 0;
+    size_t buflen, len;
+    unsigned char *buf = NULL;
+
+    if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    x = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    y = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (y == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_ECDH_SIMPLE_COMPUTE_KEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh);
+    if (priv_key == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_ECDH_SIMPLE_COMPUTE_KEY, EC_R_NO_PRIVATE_VALUE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh);
+
+    if (EC_KEY_get_flags(ecdh) & EC_FLAG_COFACTOR_ECDH) {
+        if (!EC_GROUP_get_cofactor(group, x, NULL) ||
+            !BN_mul(x, x, priv_key, ctx)) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_ECDH_SIMPLE_COMPUTE_KEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        priv_key = x;
+    }
+
+    if ((tmp = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_ECDH_SIMPLE_COMPUTE_KEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, tmp, NULL, pub_key, priv_key, ctx)) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_ECDH_SIMPLE_COMPUTE_KEY, EC_R_POINT_ARITHMETIC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)) ==
+        NID_X9_62_prime_field) {
+        if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, tmp, x, y, ctx)) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_ECDH_SIMPLE_COMPUTE_KEY, EC_R_POINT_ARITHMETIC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+    else {
+        if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group, tmp, x, y, ctx)) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_ECDH_SIMPLE_COMPUTE_KEY, EC_R_POINT_ARITHMETIC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+#endif
+
+    buflen = (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) + 7) / 8;
+    len = BN_num_bytes(x);
+    if (len > buflen) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_ECDH_SIMPLE_COMPUTE_KEY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if ((buf = OPENSSL_malloc(buflen)) == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_ECDH_SIMPLE_COMPUTE_KEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    memset(buf, 0, buflen - len);
+    if (len != (size_t)BN_bn2bin(x, buf + buflen - len)) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_ECDH_SIMPLE_COMPUTE_KEY, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    *pout = buf;
+    *poutlen = buflen;
+    buf = NULL;
+
+    ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+    EC_POINT_free(tmp);
+    if (ctx)
+        BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+    OPENSSL_free(buf);
+    return ret;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ecdsa_ossl.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ecdsa_ossl.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..72e2f0f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ecdsa_ossl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,476 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/obj_mac.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/ec.h>
+#include "ec_lcl.h"
+
+int ossl_ecdsa_sign(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen,
+                    unsigned char *sig, unsigned int *siglen,
+                    const BIGNUM *kinv, const BIGNUM *r, EC_KEY *eckey)
+{
+    ECDSA_SIG *s;
+    RAND_seed(dgst, dlen);
+    s = ECDSA_do_sign_ex(dgst, dlen, kinv, r, eckey);
+    if (s == NULL) {
+        *siglen = 0;
+        return 0;
+    }
+    *siglen = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(s, &sig);
+    ECDSA_SIG_free(s);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in,
+                            BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp,
+                            const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen)
+{
+    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *k = NULL, *r = NULL, *X = NULL;
+    const BIGNUM *order;
+    EC_POINT *tmp_point = NULL;
+    const EC_GROUP *group;
+    int ret = 0;
+    int order_bits;
+
+    if (eckey == NULL || (group = EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey)) == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (!EC_KEY_can_sign(eckey)) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, EC_R_CURVE_DOES_NOT_SUPPORT_SIGNING);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (ctx_in == NULL) {
+        if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    } else
+        ctx = ctx_in;
+
+    k = BN_new();               /* this value is later returned in *kinvp */
+    r = BN_new();               /* this value is later returned in *rp */
+    X = BN_new();
+    if (k == NULL || r == NULL || X == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if ((tmp_point = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(group);
+    if (order == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* Preallocate space */
+    order_bits = BN_num_bits(order);
+    if (!BN_set_bit(k, order_bits)
+        || !BN_set_bit(r, order_bits)
+        || !BN_set_bit(X, order_bits))
+        goto err;
+
+    do {
+        /* get random k */
+        do
+            if (dgst != NULL) {
+                if (!BN_generate_dsa_nonce
+                    (k, order, EC_KEY_get0_private_key(eckey), dgst, dlen,
+                     ctx)) {
+                    ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP,
+                             EC_R_RANDOM_NUMBER_GENERATION_FAILED);
+                    goto err;
+                }
+            } else {
+                if (!BN_rand_range(k, order)) {
+                    ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP,
+                             EC_R_RANDOM_NUMBER_GENERATION_FAILED);
+                    goto err;
+                }
+            }
+        while (BN_is_zero(k));
+
+        /*
+         * We do not want timing information to leak the length of k, so we
+         * compute G*k using an equivalent scalar of fixed bit-length.
+         *
+         * We unconditionally perform both of these additions to prevent a
+         * small timing information leakage.  We then choose the sum that is
+         * one bit longer than the order.  This guarantees the code
+         * path used in the constant time implementations elsewhere.
+         *
+         * TODO: revisit the BN_copy aiming for a memory access agnostic
+         * conditional copy.
+         */
+        if (!BN_add(r, k, order)
+            || !BN_add(X, r, order)
+            || !BN_copy(k, BN_num_bits(r) > order_bits ? r : X))
+            goto err;
+
+        /* compute r the x-coordinate of generator * k */
+        if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, tmp_point, k, NULL, NULL, ctx)) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)) ==
+            NID_X9_62_prime_field) {
+            if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp
+                (group, tmp_point, X, NULL, ctx)) {
+                ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+                goto err;
+            }
+        }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+        else {                  /* NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field */
+
+            if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group,
+                                                      tmp_point, X, NULL,
+                                                      ctx)) {
+                ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+                goto err;
+            }
+        }
+#endif
+        if (!BN_nnmod(r, X, order, ctx)) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+    while (BN_is_zero(r));
+
+    /* compute the inverse of k */
+    if (EC_GROUP_get_mont_data(group) != NULL) {
+        /*
+         * We want inverse in constant time, therefore we utilize the fact
+         * order must be prime and use Fermats Little Theorem instead.
+         */
+        if (!BN_set_word(X, 2)) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (!BN_mod_sub(X, order, X, order, ctx)) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        BN_set_flags(X, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+        if (!BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime
+            (k, k, X, order, ctx, EC_GROUP_get_mont_data(group))) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    } else {
+        if (!BN_mod_inverse(k, k, order, ctx)) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* clear old values if necessary */
+    BN_clear_free(*rp);
+    BN_clear_free(*kinvp);
+    /* save the pre-computed values  */
+    *rp = r;
+    *kinvp = k;
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    if (!ret) {
+        BN_clear_free(k);
+        BN_clear_free(r);
+    }
+    if (ctx != ctx_in)
+        BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+    EC_POINT_free(tmp_point);
+    BN_clear_free(X);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+int ossl_ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
+                          BIGNUM **rp)
+{
+    return ecdsa_sign_setup(eckey, ctx_in, kinvp, rp, NULL, 0);
+}
+
+ECDSA_SIG *ossl_ecdsa_sign_sig(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
+                               const BIGNUM *in_kinv, const BIGNUM *in_r,
+                               EC_KEY *eckey)
+{
+    int ok = 0, i;
+    BIGNUM *kinv = NULL, *s, *m = NULL, *tmp = NULL;
+    const BIGNUM *order, *ckinv;
+    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+    const EC_GROUP *group;
+    ECDSA_SIG *ret;
+    const BIGNUM *priv_key;
+
+    group = EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey);
+    priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(eckey);
+
+    if (group == NULL || priv_key == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    if (!EC_KEY_can_sign(eckey)) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, EC_R_CURVE_DOES_NOT_SUPPORT_SIGNING);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    ret = ECDSA_SIG_new();
+    if (ret == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    ret->r = BN_new();
+    ret->s = BN_new();
+    if (ret->r == NULL || ret->s == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    s = ret->s;
+
+    if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL ||
+        (tmp = BN_new()) == NULL || (m = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(group);
+    if (order == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    i = BN_num_bits(order);
+    /*
+     * Need to truncate digest if it is too long: first truncate whole bytes.
+     */
+    if (8 * dgst_len > i)
+        dgst_len = (i + 7) / 8;
+    if (!BN_bin2bn(dgst, dgst_len, m)) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    /* If still too long truncate remaining bits with a shift */
+    if ((8 * dgst_len > i) && !BN_rshift(m, m, 8 - (i & 0x7))) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    do {
+        if (in_kinv == NULL || in_r == NULL) {
+            if (!ecdsa_sign_setup(eckey, ctx, &kinv, &ret->r, dgst, dgst_len)) {
+                ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            ckinv = kinv;
+        } else {
+            ckinv = in_kinv;
+            if (BN_copy(ret->r, in_r) == NULL) {
+                ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                goto err;
+            }
+        }
+
+        if (!BN_mod_mul(tmp, priv_key, ret->r, order, ctx)) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (!BN_mod_add_quick(s, tmp, m, order)) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (!BN_mod_mul(s, s, ckinv, order, ctx)) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (BN_is_zero(s)) {
+            /*
+             * if kinv and r have been supplied by the caller don't to
+             * generate new kinv and r values
+             */
+            if (in_kinv != NULL && in_r != NULL) {
+                ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, EC_R_NEED_NEW_SETUP_VALUES);
+                goto err;
+            }
+        } else
+            /* s != 0 => we have a valid signature */
+            break;
+    }
+    while (1);
+
+    ok = 1;
+ err:
+    if (!ok) {
+        ECDSA_SIG_free(ret);
+        ret = NULL;
+    }
+    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+    BN_clear_free(m);
+    BN_clear_free(tmp);
+    BN_clear_free(kinv);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * returns
+ *      1: correct signature
+ *      0: incorrect signature
+ *     -1: error
+ */
+int ossl_ecdsa_verify(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
+                      const unsigned char *sigbuf, int sig_len, EC_KEY *eckey)
+{
+    ECDSA_SIG *s;
+    const unsigned char *p = sigbuf;
+    unsigned char *der = NULL;
+    int derlen = -1;
+    int ret = -1;
+
+    s = ECDSA_SIG_new();
+    if (s == NULL)
+        return (ret);
+    if (d2i_ECDSA_SIG(&s, &p, sig_len) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    /* Ensure signature uses DER and doesn't have trailing garbage */
+    derlen = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(s, &der);
+    if (derlen != sig_len || memcmp(sigbuf, der, derlen) != 0)
+        goto err;
+    ret = ECDSA_do_verify(dgst, dgst_len, s, eckey);
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(der, derlen);
+    ECDSA_SIG_free(s);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+int ossl_ecdsa_verify_sig(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
+                          const ECDSA_SIG *sig, EC_KEY *eckey)
+{
+    int ret = -1, i;
+    BN_CTX *ctx;
+    const BIGNUM *order;
+    BIGNUM *u1, *u2, *m, *X;
+    EC_POINT *point = NULL;
+    const EC_GROUP *group;
+    const EC_POINT *pub_key;
+
+    /* check input values */
+    if (eckey == NULL || (group = EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey)) == NULL ||
+        (pub_key = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(eckey)) == NULL || sig == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, EC_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (!EC_KEY_can_sign(eckey)) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, EC_R_CURVE_DOES_NOT_SUPPORT_SIGNING);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return -1;
+    }
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    u1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    u2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    m = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    X = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (X == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(group);
+    if (order == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (BN_is_zero(sig->r) || BN_is_negative(sig->r) ||
+        BN_ucmp(sig->r, order) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(sig->s) ||
+        BN_is_negative(sig->s) || BN_ucmp(sig->s, order) >= 0) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, EC_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+        ret = 0;                /* signature is invalid */
+        goto err;
+    }
+    /* calculate tmp1 = inv(S) mod order */
+    if (!BN_mod_inverse(u2, sig->s, order, ctx)) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    /* digest -> m */
+    i = BN_num_bits(order);
+    /*
+     * Need to truncate digest if it is too long: first truncate whole bytes.
+     */
+    if (8 * dgst_len > i)
+        dgst_len = (i + 7) / 8;
+    if (!BN_bin2bn(dgst, dgst_len, m)) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    /* If still too long truncate remaining bits with a shift */
+    if ((8 * dgst_len > i) && !BN_rshift(m, m, 8 - (i & 0x7))) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    /* u1 = m * tmp mod order */
+    if (!BN_mod_mul(u1, m, u2, order, ctx)) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    /* u2 = r * w mod q */
+    if (!BN_mod_mul(u2, sig->r, u2, order, ctx)) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if ((point = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, point, u1, pub_key, u2, ctx)) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)) ==
+        NID_X9_62_prime_field) {
+        if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, point, X, NULL, ctx)) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+    else {                      /* NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field */
+
+        if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group, point, X, NULL, ctx)) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+#endif
+    if (!BN_nnmod(u1, X, order, ctx)) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    /*  if the signature is correct u1 is equal to sig->r */
+    ret = (BN_ucmp(u1, sig->r) == 0);
+ err:
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+    EC_POINT_free(point);
+    return ret;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ecdsa_sign.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ecdsa_sign.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..aee06e9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ecdsa_sign.c
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/ec.h>
+#include "ec_lcl.h"
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+ECDSA_SIG *ECDSA_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, EC_KEY *eckey)
+{
+    return ECDSA_do_sign_ex(dgst, dlen, NULL, NULL, eckey);
+}
+
+ECDSA_SIG *ECDSA_do_sign_ex(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen,
+                            const BIGNUM *kinv, const BIGNUM *rp,
+                            EC_KEY *eckey)
+{
+    if (eckey->meth->sign_sig != NULL)
+        return eckey->meth->sign_sig(dgst, dlen, kinv, rp, eckey);
+    ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN_EX, EC_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+int ECDSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, unsigned char
+               *sig, unsigned int *siglen, EC_KEY *eckey)
+{
+    return ECDSA_sign_ex(type, dgst, dlen, sig, siglen, NULL, NULL, eckey);
+}
+
+int ECDSA_sign_ex(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen,
+                  unsigned char *sig, unsigned int *siglen, const BIGNUM *kinv,
+                  const BIGNUM *r, EC_KEY *eckey)
+{
+    if (eckey->meth->sign != NULL)
+        return eckey->meth->sign(type, dgst, dlen, sig, siglen, kinv, r, eckey);
+    ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_EX, EC_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int ECDSA_sign_setup(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
+                     BIGNUM **rp)
+{
+    if (eckey->meth->sign_setup != NULL)
+        return eckey->meth->sign_setup(eckey, ctx_in, kinvp, rp);
+    ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, EC_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+    return 0;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ecdsa_vrf.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ecdsa_vrf.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f61a200
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ecdsa_vrf.c
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/ec.h>
+#include "ec_lcl.h"
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+/*-
+ * returns
+ *      1: correct signature
+ *      0: incorrect signature
+ *     -1: error
+ */
+int ECDSA_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
+                    const ECDSA_SIG *sig, EC_KEY *eckey)
+{
+    if (eckey->meth->verify_sig != NULL)
+        return eckey->meth->verify_sig(dgst, dgst_len, sig, eckey);
+    ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_DO_VERIFY, EC_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * returns
+ *      1: correct signature
+ *      0: incorrect signature
+ *     -1: error
+ */
+int ECDSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
+                 const unsigned char *sigbuf, int sig_len, EC_KEY *eckey)
+{
+    if (eckey->meth->verify != NULL)
+        return eckey->meth->verify(type, dgst, dgst_len, sigbuf, sig_len,
+                                   eckey);
+    ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_VERIFY, EC_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+    return 0;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/eck_prn.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/eck_prn.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3e826cb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/eck_prn.c
@@ -0,0 +1,273 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ * Portions originally developed by SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and
+ * contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/ec.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+int ECPKParameters_print_fp(FILE *fp, const EC_GROUP *x, int off)
+{
+    BIO *b;
+    int ret;
+
+    if ((b = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_ECPKPARAMETERS_PRINT_FP, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+        return (0);
+    }
+    BIO_set_fp(b, fp, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+    ret = ECPKParameters_print(b, x, off);
+    BIO_free(b);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+int EC_KEY_print_fp(FILE *fp, const EC_KEY *x, int off)
+{
+    BIO *b;
+    int ret;
+
+    if ((b = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_PRINT_FP, ERR_R_BIO_LIB);
+        return (0);
+    }
+    BIO_set_fp(b, fp, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+    ret = EC_KEY_print(b, x, off);
+    BIO_free(b);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+int ECParameters_print_fp(FILE *fp, const EC_KEY *x)
+{
+    BIO *b;
+    int ret;
+
+    if ((b = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_ECPARAMETERS_PRINT_FP, ERR_R_BIO_LIB);
+        return (0);
+    }
+    BIO_set_fp(b, fp, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+    ret = ECParameters_print(b, x);
+    BIO_free(b);
+    return (ret);
+}
+#endif
+
+static int print_bin(BIO *fp, const char *str, const unsigned char *num,
+                     size_t len, int off);
+
+int ECPKParameters_print(BIO *bp, const EC_GROUP *x, int off)
+{
+    int ret = 0, reason = ERR_R_BIO_LIB;
+    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+    const EC_POINT *point = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *p = NULL, *a = NULL, *b = NULL, *gen = NULL;
+    const BIGNUM *order = NULL, *cofactor = NULL;
+    const unsigned char *seed;
+    size_t seed_len = 0;
+
+    static const char *gen_compressed = "Generator (compressed):";
+    static const char *gen_uncompressed = "Generator (uncompressed):";
+    static const char *gen_hybrid = "Generator (hybrid):";
+
+    if (!x) {
+        reason = ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER;
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+        reason = ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE;
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (EC_GROUP_get_asn1_flag(x)) {
+        /* the curve parameter are given by an asn1 OID */
+        int nid;
+        const char *nname;
+
+        if (!BIO_indent(bp, off, 128))
+            goto err;
+
+        nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(x);
+        if (nid == 0)
+            goto err;
+        if (BIO_printf(bp, "ASN1 OID: %s", OBJ_nid2sn(nid)) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+        if (BIO_printf(bp, "\n") <= 0)
+            goto err;
+        nname = EC_curve_nid2nist(nid);
+        if (nname) {
+            if (!BIO_indent(bp, off, 128))
+                goto err;
+            if (BIO_printf(bp, "NIST CURVE: %s\n", nname) <= 0)
+                goto err;
+        }
+    } else {
+        /* explicit parameters */
+        int is_char_two = 0;
+        point_conversion_form_t form;
+        int tmp_nid = EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(x));
+
+        if (tmp_nid == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field)
+            is_char_two = 1;
+
+        if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL || (a = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+            (b = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+            reason = ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE;
+            goto err;
+        }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+        if (is_char_two) {
+            if (!EC_GROUP_get_curve_GF2m(x, p, a, b, ctx)) {
+                reason = ERR_R_EC_LIB;
+                goto err;
+            }
+        } else                  /* prime field */
+#endif
+        {
+            if (!EC_GROUP_get_curve_GFp(x, p, a, b, ctx)) {
+                reason = ERR_R_EC_LIB;
+                goto err;
+            }
+        }
+
+        if ((point = EC_GROUP_get0_generator(x)) == NULL) {
+            reason = ERR_R_EC_LIB;
+            goto err;
+        }
+        order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(x);
+        cofactor = EC_GROUP_get0_cofactor(x);
+        if (order == NULL) {
+            reason = ERR_R_EC_LIB;
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        form = EC_GROUP_get_point_conversion_form(x);
+
+        if ((gen = EC_POINT_point2bn(x, point, form, NULL, ctx)) == NULL) {
+            reason = ERR_R_EC_LIB;
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        if ((seed = EC_GROUP_get0_seed(x)) != NULL)
+            seed_len = EC_GROUP_get_seed_len(x);
+
+        if (!BIO_indent(bp, off, 128))
+            goto err;
+
+        /* print the 'short name' of the field type */
+        if (BIO_printf(bp, "Field Type: %s\n", OBJ_nid2sn(tmp_nid))
+            <= 0)
+            goto err;
+
+        if (is_char_two) {
+            /* print the 'short name' of the base type OID */
+            int basis_type = EC_GROUP_get_basis_type(x);
+            if (basis_type == 0)
+                goto err;
+
+            if (!BIO_indent(bp, off, 128))
+                goto err;
+
+            if (BIO_printf(bp, "Basis Type: %s\n",
+                           OBJ_nid2sn(basis_type)) <= 0)
+                goto err;
+
+            /* print the polynomial */
+            if ((p != NULL) && !ASN1_bn_print(bp, "Polynomial:", p, NULL,
+                                              off))
+                goto err;
+        } else {
+            if ((p != NULL) && !ASN1_bn_print(bp, "Prime:", p, NULL, off))
+                goto err;
+        }
+        if ((a != NULL) && !ASN1_bn_print(bp, "A:   ", a, NULL, off))
+            goto err;
+        if ((b != NULL) && !ASN1_bn_print(bp, "B:   ", b, NULL, off))
+            goto err;
+        if (form == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) {
+            if ((gen != NULL) && !ASN1_bn_print(bp, gen_compressed, gen,
+                                                NULL, off))
+                goto err;
+        } else if (form == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
+            if ((gen != NULL) && !ASN1_bn_print(bp, gen_uncompressed, gen,
+                                                NULL, off))
+                goto err;
+        } else {                /* form == POINT_CONVERSION_HYBRID */
+
+            if ((gen != NULL) && !ASN1_bn_print(bp, gen_hybrid, gen,
+                                                NULL, off))
+                goto err;
+        }
+        if ((order != NULL) && !ASN1_bn_print(bp, "Order: ", order,
+                                              NULL, off))
+            goto err;
+        if ((cofactor != NULL) && !ASN1_bn_print(bp, "Cofactor: ", cofactor,
+                                                 NULL, off))
+            goto err;
+        if (seed && !print_bin(bp, "Seed:", seed, seed_len, off))
+            goto err;
+    }
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    if (!ret)
+        ECerr(EC_F_ECPKPARAMETERS_PRINT, reason);
+    BN_free(p);
+    BN_free(a);
+    BN_free(b);
+    BN_free(gen);
+    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static int print_bin(BIO *fp, const char *name, const unsigned char *buf,
+                     size_t len, int off)
+{
+    size_t i;
+    char str[128 + 1 + 4];
+
+    if (buf == NULL)
+        return 1;
+    if (off > 0) {
+        if (off > 128)
+            off = 128;
+        memset(str, ' ', off);
+        if (BIO_write(fp, str, off) <= 0)
+            return 0;
+    } else {
+        off = 0;
+    }
+
+    if (BIO_printf(fp, "%s", name) <= 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+        if ((i % 15) == 0) {
+            str[0] = '\n';
+            memset(&(str[1]), ' ', off + 4);
+            if (BIO_write(fp, str, off + 1 + 4) <= 0)
+                return 0;
+        }
+        if (BIO_printf(fp, "%02x%s", buf[i], ((i + 1) == len) ? "" : ":") <=
+            0)
+            return 0;
+    }
+    if (BIO_write(fp, "\n", 1) <= 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ecp_mont.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ecp_mont.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..994cc1d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ecp_mont.c
@@ -0,0 +1,242 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ * Portions of this software developed by SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC.,
+ * and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+#include "ec_lcl.h"
+
+const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_mont_method(void)
+{
+    static const EC_METHOD ret = {
+        EC_FLAGS_DEFAULT_OCT,
+        NID_X9_62_prime_field,
+        ec_GFp_mont_group_init,
+        ec_GFp_mont_group_finish,
+        ec_GFp_mont_group_clear_finish,
+        ec_GFp_mont_group_copy,
+        ec_GFp_mont_group_set_curve,
+        ec_GFp_simple_group_get_curve,
+        ec_GFp_simple_group_get_degree,
+        ec_group_simple_order_bits,
+        ec_GFp_simple_group_check_discriminant,
+        ec_GFp_simple_point_init,
+        ec_GFp_simple_point_finish,
+        ec_GFp_simple_point_clear_finish,
+        ec_GFp_simple_point_copy,
+        ec_GFp_simple_point_set_to_infinity,
+        ec_GFp_simple_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp,
+        ec_GFp_simple_get_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp,
+        ec_GFp_simple_point_set_affine_coordinates,
+        ec_GFp_simple_point_get_affine_coordinates,
+        0, 0, 0,
+        ec_GFp_simple_add,
+        ec_GFp_simple_dbl,
+        ec_GFp_simple_invert,
+        ec_GFp_simple_is_at_infinity,
+        ec_GFp_simple_is_on_curve,
+        ec_GFp_simple_cmp,
+        ec_GFp_simple_make_affine,
+        ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine,
+        0 /* mul */ ,
+        0 /* precompute_mult */ ,
+        0 /* have_precompute_mult */ ,
+        ec_GFp_mont_field_mul,
+        ec_GFp_mont_field_sqr,
+        0 /* field_div */ ,
+        ec_GFp_mont_field_encode,
+        ec_GFp_mont_field_decode,
+        ec_GFp_mont_field_set_to_one,
+        ec_key_simple_priv2oct,
+        ec_key_simple_oct2priv,
+        0, /* set private */
+        ec_key_simple_generate_key,
+        ec_key_simple_check_key,
+        ec_key_simple_generate_public_key,
+        0, /* keycopy */
+        0, /* keyfinish */
+        ecdh_simple_compute_key
+    };
+
+    return &ret;
+}
+
+int ec_GFp_mont_group_init(EC_GROUP *group)
+{
+    int ok;
+
+    ok = ec_GFp_simple_group_init(group);
+    group->field_data1 = NULL;
+    group->field_data2 = NULL;
+    return ok;
+}
+
+void ec_GFp_mont_group_finish(EC_GROUP *group)
+{
+    BN_MONT_CTX_free(group->field_data1);
+    group->field_data1 = NULL;
+    BN_free(group->field_data2);
+    group->field_data2 = NULL;
+    ec_GFp_simple_group_finish(group);
+}
+
+void ec_GFp_mont_group_clear_finish(EC_GROUP *group)
+{
+    BN_MONT_CTX_free(group->field_data1);
+    group->field_data1 = NULL;
+    BN_clear_free(group->field_data2);
+    group->field_data2 = NULL;
+    ec_GFp_simple_group_clear_finish(group);
+}
+
+int ec_GFp_mont_group_copy(EC_GROUP *dest, const EC_GROUP *src)
+{
+    BN_MONT_CTX_free(dest->field_data1);
+    dest->field_data1 = NULL;
+    BN_clear_free(dest->field_data2);
+    dest->field_data2 = NULL;
+
+    if (!ec_GFp_simple_group_copy(dest, src))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (src->field_data1 != NULL) {
+        dest->field_data1 = BN_MONT_CTX_new();
+        if (dest->field_data1 == NULL)
+            return 0;
+        if (!BN_MONT_CTX_copy(dest->field_data1, src->field_data1))
+            goto err;
+    }
+    if (src->field_data2 != NULL) {
+        dest->field_data2 = BN_dup(src->field_data2);
+        if (dest->field_data2 == NULL)
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+
+ err:
+    BN_MONT_CTX_free(dest->field_data1);
+    dest->field_data1 = NULL;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int ec_GFp_mont_group_set_curve(EC_GROUP *group, const BIGNUM *p,
+                                const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
+    BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *one = NULL;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    BN_MONT_CTX_free(group->field_data1);
+    group->field_data1 = NULL;
+    BN_free(group->field_data2);
+    group->field_data2 = NULL;
+
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+        ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+        if (ctx == NULL)
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new();
+    if (mont == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont, p, ctx)) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_MONT_GROUP_SET_CURVE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    one = BN_new();
+    if (one == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (!BN_to_montgomery(one, BN_value_one(), mont, ctx))
+        goto err;
+
+    group->field_data1 = mont;
+    mont = NULL;
+    group->field_data2 = one;
+    one = NULL;
+
+    ret = ec_GFp_simple_group_set_curve(group, p, a, b, ctx);
+
+    if (!ret) {
+        BN_MONT_CTX_free(group->field_data1);
+        group->field_data1 = NULL;
+        BN_free(group->field_data2);
+        group->field_data2 = NULL;
+    }
+
+ err:
+    BN_free(one);
+    BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
+    BN_MONT_CTX_free(mont);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int ec_GFp_mont_field_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
+                          const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    if (group->field_data1 == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_MONT_FIELD_MUL, EC_R_NOT_INITIALIZED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return BN_mod_mul_montgomery(r, a, b, group->field_data1, ctx);
+}
+
+int ec_GFp_mont_field_sqr(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
+                          BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    if (group->field_data1 == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_MONT_FIELD_SQR, EC_R_NOT_INITIALIZED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return BN_mod_mul_montgomery(r, a, a, group->field_data1, ctx);
+}
+
+int ec_GFp_mont_field_encode(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *r,
+                             const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    if (group->field_data1 == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_MONT_FIELD_ENCODE, EC_R_NOT_INITIALIZED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return BN_to_montgomery(r, a, (BN_MONT_CTX *)group->field_data1, ctx);
+}
+
+int ec_GFp_mont_field_decode(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *r,
+                             const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    if (group->field_data1 == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_MONT_FIELD_DECODE, EC_R_NOT_INITIALIZED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return BN_from_montgomery(r, a, group->field_data1, ctx);
+}
+
+int ec_GFp_mont_field_set_to_one(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *r,
+                                 BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    if (group->field_data2 == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_MONT_FIELD_SET_TO_ONE, EC_R_NOT_INITIALIZED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (!BN_copy(r, group->field_data2))
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ecp_nist.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ecp_nist.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..615563b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ecp_nist.c
@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ * Portions of this software developed by SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC.,
+ * and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ */
+
+#include <limits.h>
+
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/obj_mac.h>
+#include "ec_lcl.h"
+
+const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_nist_method(void)
+{
+    static const EC_METHOD ret = {
+        EC_FLAGS_DEFAULT_OCT,
+        NID_X9_62_prime_field,
+        ec_GFp_simple_group_init,
+        ec_GFp_simple_group_finish,
+        ec_GFp_simple_group_clear_finish,
+        ec_GFp_nist_group_copy,
+        ec_GFp_nist_group_set_curve,
+        ec_GFp_simple_group_get_curve,
+        ec_GFp_simple_group_get_degree,
+        ec_group_simple_order_bits,
+        ec_GFp_simple_group_check_discriminant,
+        ec_GFp_simple_point_init,
+        ec_GFp_simple_point_finish,
+        ec_GFp_simple_point_clear_finish,
+        ec_GFp_simple_point_copy,
+        ec_GFp_simple_point_set_to_infinity,
+        ec_GFp_simple_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp,
+        ec_GFp_simple_get_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp,
+        ec_GFp_simple_point_set_affine_coordinates,
+        ec_GFp_simple_point_get_affine_coordinates,
+        0, 0, 0,
+        ec_GFp_simple_add,
+        ec_GFp_simple_dbl,
+        ec_GFp_simple_invert,
+        ec_GFp_simple_is_at_infinity,
+        ec_GFp_simple_is_on_curve,
+        ec_GFp_simple_cmp,
+        ec_GFp_simple_make_affine,
+        ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine,
+        0 /* mul */ ,
+        0 /* precompute_mult */ ,
+        0 /* have_precompute_mult */ ,
+        ec_GFp_nist_field_mul,
+        ec_GFp_nist_field_sqr,
+        0 /* field_div */ ,
+        0 /* field_encode */ ,
+        0 /* field_decode */ ,
+        0,                      /* field_set_to_one */
+        ec_key_simple_priv2oct,
+        ec_key_simple_oct2priv,
+        0, /* set private */
+        ec_key_simple_generate_key,
+        ec_key_simple_check_key,
+        ec_key_simple_generate_public_key,
+        0, /* keycopy */
+        0, /* keyfinish */
+        ecdh_simple_compute_key
+    };
+
+    return &ret;
+}
+
+int ec_GFp_nist_group_copy(EC_GROUP *dest, const EC_GROUP *src)
+{
+    dest->field_mod_func = src->field_mod_func;
+
+    return ec_GFp_simple_group_copy(dest, src);
+}
+
+int ec_GFp_nist_group_set_curve(EC_GROUP *group, const BIGNUM *p,
+                                const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
+
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        if ((ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+            return 0;
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+
+    if (BN_ucmp(BN_get0_nist_prime_192(), p) == 0)
+        group->field_mod_func = BN_nist_mod_192;
+    else if (BN_ucmp(BN_get0_nist_prime_224(), p) == 0)
+        group->field_mod_func = BN_nist_mod_224;
+    else if (BN_ucmp(BN_get0_nist_prime_256(), p) == 0)
+        group->field_mod_func = BN_nist_mod_256;
+    else if (BN_ucmp(BN_get0_nist_prime_384(), p) == 0)
+        group->field_mod_func = BN_nist_mod_384;
+    else if (BN_ucmp(BN_get0_nist_prime_521(), p) == 0)
+        group->field_mod_func = BN_nist_mod_521;
+    else {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NIST_GROUP_SET_CURVE, EC_R_NOT_A_NIST_PRIME);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    ret = ec_GFp_simple_group_set_curve(group, p, a, b, ctx);
+
+ err:
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int ec_GFp_nist_field_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
+                          const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    BN_CTX *ctx_new = NULL;
+
+    if (!group || !r || !a || !b) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NIST_FIELD_MUL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (!ctx)
+        if ((ctx_new = ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+
+    if (!BN_mul(r, a, b, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    if (!group->field_mod_func(r, r, group->field, ctx))
+        goto err;
+
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    BN_CTX_free(ctx_new);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int ec_GFp_nist_field_sqr(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
+                          BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    BN_CTX *ctx_new = NULL;
+
+    if (!group || !r || !a) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NIST_FIELD_SQR, EC_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (!ctx)
+        if ((ctx_new = ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+
+    if (!BN_sqr(r, a, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    if (!group->field_mod_func(r, r, group->field, ctx))
+        goto err;
+
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    BN_CTX_free(ctx_new);
+    return ret;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp224.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp224.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0cd994f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp224.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1715 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2010-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* Copyright 2011 Google Inc.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ *
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ *  Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ *  distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ *  WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ *  See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ *  limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * A 64-bit implementation of the NIST P-224 elliptic curve point multiplication
+ *
+ * Inspired by Daniel J. Bernstein's public domain nistp224 implementation
+ * and Adam Langley's public domain 64-bit C implementation of curve25519
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128
+NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT
+#else
+
+# include <stdint.h>
+# include <string.h>
+# include <openssl/err.h>
+# include "ec_lcl.h"
+
+# if defined(__GNUC__) && (__GNUC__ > 3 || (__GNUC__ == 3 && __GNUC_MINOR__ >= 1))
+  /* even with gcc, the typedef won't work for 32-bit platforms */
+typedef __uint128_t uint128_t;  /* nonstandard; implemented by gcc on 64-bit
+                                 * platforms */
+# else
+#  error "Need GCC 3.1 or later to define type uint128_t"
+# endif
+
+typedef uint8_t u8;
+typedef uint64_t u64;
+
+/******************************************************************************/
+/*-
+ * INTERNAL REPRESENTATION OF FIELD ELEMENTS
+ *
+ * Field elements are represented as a_0 + 2^56*a_1 + 2^112*a_2 + 2^168*a_3
+ * using 64-bit coefficients called 'limbs',
+ * and sometimes (for multiplication results) as
+ * b_0 + 2^56*b_1 + 2^112*b_2 + 2^168*b_3 + 2^224*b_4 + 2^280*b_5 + 2^336*b_6
+ * using 128-bit coefficients called 'widelimbs'.
+ * A 4-limb representation is an 'felem';
+ * a 7-widelimb representation is a 'widefelem'.
+ * Even within felems, bits of adjacent limbs overlap, and we don't always
+ * reduce the representations: we ensure that inputs to each felem
+ * multiplication satisfy a_i < 2^60, so outputs satisfy b_i < 4*2^60*2^60,
+ * and fit into a 128-bit word without overflow. The coefficients are then
+ * again partially reduced to obtain an felem satisfying a_i < 2^57.
+ * We only reduce to the unique minimal representation at the end of the
+ * computation.
+ */
+
+typedef uint64_t limb;
+typedef uint128_t widelimb;
+
+typedef limb felem[4];
+typedef widelimb widefelem[7];
+
+/*
+ * Field element represented as a byte arrary. 28*8 = 224 bits is also the
+ * group order size for the elliptic curve, and we also use this type for
+ * scalars for point multiplication.
+ */
+typedef u8 felem_bytearray[28];
+
+static const felem_bytearray nistp224_curve_params[5] = {
+    {0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, /* p */
+     0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+     0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01},
+    {0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, /* a */
+     0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+     0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE},
+    {0xB4, 0x05, 0x0A, 0x85, 0x0C, 0x04, 0xB3, 0xAB, 0xF5, 0x41, /* b */
+     0x32, 0x56, 0x50, 0x44, 0xB0, 0xB7, 0xD7, 0xBF, 0xD8, 0xBA,
+     0x27, 0x0B, 0x39, 0x43, 0x23, 0x55, 0xFF, 0xB4},
+    {0xB7, 0x0E, 0x0C, 0xBD, 0x6B, 0xB4, 0xBF, 0x7F, 0x32, 0x13, /* x */
+     0x90, 0xB9, 0x4A, 0x03, 0xC1, 0xD3, 0x56, 0xC2, 0x11, 0x22,
+     0x34, 0x32, 0x80, 0xD6, 0x11, 0x5C, 0x1D, 0x21},
+    {0xbd, 0x37, 0x63, 0x88, 0xb5, 0xf7, 0x23, 0xfb, 0x4c, 0x22, /* y */
+     0xdf, 0xe6, 0xcd, 0x43, 0x75, 0xa0, 0x5a, 0x07, 0x47, 0x64,
+     0x44, 0xd5, 0x81, 0x99, 0x85, 0x00, 0x7e, 0x34}
+};
+
+/*-
+ * Precomputed multiples of the standard generator
+ * Points are given in coordinates (X, Y, Z) where Z normally is 1
+ * (0 for the point at infinity).
+ * For each field element, slice a_0 is word 0, etc.
+ *
+ * The table has 2 * 16 elements, starting with the following:
+ * index | bits    | point
+ * ------+---------+------------------------------
+ *     0 | 0 0 0 0 | 0G
+ *     1 | 0 0 0 1 | 1G
+ *     2 | 0 0 1 0 | 2^56G
+ *     3 | 0 0 1 1 | (2^56 + 1)G
+ *     4 | 0 1 0 0 | 2^112G
+ *     5 | 0 1 0 1 | (2^112 + 1)G
+ *     6 | 0 1 1 0 | (2^112 + 2^56)G
+ *     7 | 0 1 1 1 | (2^112 + 2^56 + 1)G
+ *     8 | 1 0 0 0 | 2^168G
+ *     9 | 1 0 0 1 | (2^168 + 1)G
+ *    10 | 1 0 1 0 | (2^168 + 2^56)G
+ *    11 | 1 0 1 1 | (2^168 + 2^56 + 1)G
+ *    12 | 1 1 0 0 | (2^168 + 2^112)G
+ *    13 | 1 1 0 1 | (2^168 + 2^112 + 1)G
+ *    14 | 1 1 1 0 | (2^168 + 2^112 + 2^56)G
+ *    15 | 1 1 1 1 | (2^168 + 2^112 + 2^56 + 1)G
+ * followed by a copy of this with each element multiplied by 2^28.
+ *
+ * The reason for this is so that we can clock bits into four different
+ * locations when doing simple scalar multiplies against the base point,
+ * and then another four locations using the second 16 elements.
+ */
+static const felem gmul[2][16][3] = {
+{{{0, 0, 0, 0},
+  {0, 0, 0, 0},
+  {0, 0, 0, 0}},
+ {{0x3280d6115c1d21, 0xc1d356c2112234, 0x7f321390b94a03, 0xb70e0cbd6bb4bf},
+  {0xd5819985007e34, 0x75a05a07476444, 0xfb4c22dfe6cd43, 0xbd376388b5f723},
+  {1, 0, 0, 0}},
+ {{0xfd9675666ebbe9, 0xbca7664d40ce5e, 0x2242df8d8a2a43, 0x1f49bbb0f99bc5},
+  {0x29e0b892dc9c43, 0xece8608436e662, 0xdc858f185310d0, 0x9812dd4eb8d321},
+  {1, 0, 0, 0}},
+ {{0x6d3e678d5d8eb8, 0x559eed1cb362f1, 0x16e9a3bbce8a3f, 0xeedcccd8c2a748},
+  {0xf19f90ed50266d, 0xabf2b4bf65f9df, 0x313865468fafec, 0x5cb379ba910a17},
+  {1, 0, 0, 0}},
+ {{0x0641966cab26e3, 0x91fb2991fab0a0, 0xefec27a4e13a0b, 0x0499aa8a5f8ebe},
+  {0x7510407766af5d, 0x84d929610d5450, 0x81d77aae82f706, 0x6916f6d4338c5b},
+  {1, 0, 0, 0}},
+ {{0xea95ac3b1f15c6, 0x086000905e82d4, 0xdd323ae4d1c8b1, 0x932b56be7685a3},
+  {0x9ef93dea25dbbf, 0x41665960f390f0, 0xfdec76dbe2a8a7, 0x523e80f019062a},
+  {1, 0, 0, 0}},
+ {{0x822fdd26732c73, 0xa01c83531b5d0f, 0x363f37347c1ba4, 0xc391b45c84725c},
+  {0xbbd5e1b2d6ad24, 0xddfbcde19dfaec, 0xc393da7e222a7f, 0x1efb7890ede244},
+  {1, 0, 0, 0}},
+ {{0x4c9e90ca217da1, 0xd11beca79159bb, 0xff8d33c2c98b7c, 0x2610b39409f849},
+  {0x44d1352ac64da0, 0xcdbb7b2c46b4fb, 0x966c079b753c89, 0xfe67e4e820b112},
+  {1, 0, 0, 0}},
+ {{0xe28cae2df5312d, 0xc71b61d16f5c6e, 0x79b7619a3e7c4c, 0x05c73240899b47},
+  {0x9f7f6382c73e3a, 0x18615165c56bda, 0x641fab2116fd56, 0x72855882b08394},
+  {1, 0, 0, 0}},
+ {{0x0469182f161c09, 0x74a98ca8d00fb5, 0xb89da93489a3e0, 0x41c98768fb0c1d},
+  {0xe5ea05fb32da81, 0x3dce9ffbca6855, 0x1cfe2d3fbf59e6, 0x0e5e03408738a7},
+  {1, 0, 0, 0}},
+ {{0xdab22b2333e87f, 0x4430137a5dd2f6, 0xe03ab9f738beb8, 0xcb0c5d0dc34f24},
+  {0x764a7df0c8fda5, 0x185ba5c3fa2044, 0x9281d688bcbe50, 0xc40331df893881},
+  {1, 0, 0, 0}},
+ {{0xb89530796f0f60, 0xade92bd26909a3, 0x1a0c83fb4884da, 0x1765bf22a5a984},
+  {0x772a9ee75db09e, 0x23bc6c67cec16f, 0x4c1edba8b14e2f, 0xe2a215d9611369},
+  {1, 0, 0, 0}},
+ {{0x571e509fb5efb3, 0xade88696410552, 0xc8ae85fada74fe, 0x6c7e4be83bbde3},
+  {0xff9f51160f4652, 0xb47ce2495a6539, 0xa2946c53b582f4, 0x286d2db3ee9a60},
+  {1, 0, 0, 0}},
+ {{0x40bbd5081a44af, 0x0995183b13926c, 0xbcefba6f47f6d0, 0x215619e9cc0057},
+  {0x8bc94d3b0df45e, 0xf11c54a3694f6f, 0x8631b93cdfe8b5, 0xe7e3f4b0982db9},
+  {1, 0, 0, 0}},
+ {{0xb17048ab3e1c7b, 0xac38f36ff8a1d8, 0x1c29819435d2c6, 0xc813132f4c07e9},
+  {0x2891425503b11f, 0x08781030579fea, 0xf5426ba5cc9674, 0x1e28ebf18562bc},
+  {1, 0, 0, 0}},
+ {{0x9f31997cc864eb, 0x06cd91d28b5e4c, 0xff17036691a973, 0xf1aef351497c58},
+  {0xdd1f2d600564ff, 0xdead073b1402db, 0x74a684435bd693, 0xeea7471f962558},
+  {1, 0, 0, 0}}},
+{{{0, 0, 0, 0},
+  {0, 0, 0, 0},
+  {0, 0, 0, 0}},
+ {{0x9665266dddf554, 0x9613d78b60ef2d, 0xce27a34cdba417, 0xd35ab74d6afc31},
+  {0x85ccdd22deb15e, 0x2137e5783a6aab, 0xa141cffd8c93c6, 0x355a1830e90f2d},
+  {1, 0, 0, 0}},
+ {{0x1a494eadaade65, 0xd6da4da77fe53c, 0xe7992996abec86, 0x65c3553c6090e3},
+  {0xfa610b1fb09346, 0xf1c6540b8a4aaf, 0xc51a13ccd3cbab, 0x02995b1b18c28a},
+  {1, 0, 0, 0}},
+ {{0x7874568e7295ef, 0x86b419fbe38d04, 0xdc0690a7550d9a, 0xd3966a44beac33},
+  {0x2b7280ec29132f, 0xbeaa3b6a032df3, 0xdc7dd88ae41200, 0xd25e2513e3a100},
+  {1, 0, 0, 0}},
+ {{0x924857eb2efafd, 0xac2bce41223190, 0x8edaa1445553fc, 0x825800fd3562d5},
+  {0x8d79148ea96621, 0x23a01c3dd9ed8d, 0xaf8b219f9416b5, 0xd8db0cc277daea},
+  {1, 0, 0, 0}},
+ {{0x76a9c3b1a700f0, 0xe9acd29bc7e691, 0x69212d1a6b0327, 0x6322e97fe154be},
+  {0x469fc5465d62aa, 0x8d41ed18883b05, 0x1f8eae66c52b88, 0xe4fcbe9325be51},
+  {1, 0, 0, 0}},
+ {{0x825fdf583cac16, 0x020b857c7b023a, 0x683c17744b0165, 0x14ffd0a2daf2f1},
+  {0x323b36184218f9, 0x4944ec4e3b47d4, 0xc15b3080841acf, 0x0bced4b01a28bb},
+  {1, 0, 0, 0}},
+ {{0x92ac22230df5c4, 0x52f33b4063eda8, 0xcb3f19870c0c93, 0x40064f2ba65233},
+  {0xfe16f0924f8992, 0x012da25af5b517, 0x1a57bb24f723a6, 0x06f8bc76760def},
+  {1, 0, 0, 0}},
+ {{0x4a7084f7817cb9, 0xbcab0738ee9a78, 0x3ec11e11d9c326, 0xdc0fe90e0f1aae},
+  {0xcf639ea5f98390, 0x5c350aa22ffb74, 0x9afae98a4047b7, 0x956ec2d617fc45},
+  {1, 0, 0, 0}},
+ {{0x4306d648c1be6a, 0x9247cd8bc9a462, 0xf5595e377d2f2e, 0xbd1c3caff1a52e},
+  {0x045e14472409d0, 0x29f3e17078f773, 0x745a602b2d4f7d, 0x191837685cdfbb},
+  {1, 0, 0, 0}},
+ {{0x5b6ee254a8cb79, 0x4953433f5e7026, 0xe21faeb1d1def4, 0xc4c225785c09de},
+  {0x307ce7bba1e518, 0x31b125b1036db8, 0x47e91868839e8f, 0xc765866e33b9f3},
+  {1, 0, 0, 0}},
+ {{0x3bfece24f96906, 0x4794da641e5093, 0xde5df64f95db26, 0x297ecd89714b05},
+  {0x701bd3ebb2c3aa, 0x7073b4f53cb1d5, 0x13c5665658af16, 0x9895089d66fe58},
+  {1, 0, 0, 0}},
+ {{0x0fef05f78c4790, 0x2d773633b05d2e, 0x94229c3a951c94, 0xbbbd70df4911bb},
+  {0xb2c6963d2c1168, 0x105f47a72b0d73, 0x9fdf6111614080, 0x7b7e94b39e67b0},
+  {1, 0, 0, 0}},
+ {{0xad1a7d6efbe2b3, 0xf012482c0da69d, 0x6b3bdf12438345, 0x40d7558d7aa4d9},
+  {0x8a09fffb5c6d3d, 0x9a356e5d9ffd38, 0x5973f15f4f9b1c, 0xdcd5f59f63c3ea},
+  {1, 0, 0, 0}},
+ {{0xacf39f4c5ca7ab, 0x4c8071cc5fd737, 0xc64e3602cd1184, 0x0acd4644c9abba},
+  {0x6c011a36d8bf6e, 0xfecd87ba24e32a, 0x19f6f56574fad8, 0x050b204ced9405},
+  {1, 0, 0, 0}},
+ {{0xed4f1cae7d9a96, 0x5ceef7ad94c40a, 0x778e4a3bf3ef9b, 0x7405783dc3b55e},
+  {0x32477c61b6e8c6, 0xb46a97570f018b, 0x91176d0a7e95d1, 0x3df90fbc4c7d0e},
+  {1, 0, 0, 0}}}
+};
+
+/* Precomputation for the group generator. */
+struct nistp224_pre_comp_st {
+    felem g_pre_comp[2][16][3];
+    int references;
+    CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock;
+};
+
+const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_nistp224_method(void)
+{
+    static const EC_METHOD ret = {
+        EC_FLAGS_DEFAULT_OCT,
+        NID_X9_62_prime_field,
+        ec_GFp_nistp224_group_init,
+        ec_GFp_simple_group_finish,
+        ec_GFp_simple_group_clear_finish,
+        ec_GFp_nist_group_copy,
+        ec_GFp_nistp224_group_set_curve,
+        ec_GFp_simple_group_get_curve,
+        ec_GFp_simple_group_get_degree,
+        ec_group_simple_order_bits,
+        ec_GFp_simple_group_check_discriminant,
+        ec_GFp_simple_point_init,
+        ec_GFp_simple_point_finish,
+        ec_GFp_simple_point_clear_finish,
+        ec_GFp_simple_point_copy,
+        ec_GFp_simple_point_set_to_infinity,
+        ec_GFp_simple_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp,
+        ec_GFp_simple_get_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp,
+        ec_GFp_simple_point_set_affine_coordinates,
+        ec_GFp_nistp224_point_get_affine_coordinates,
+        0 /* point_set_compressed_coordinates */ ,
+        0 /* point2oct */ ,
+        0 /* oct2point */ ,
+        ec_GFp_simple_add,
+        ec_GFp_simple_dbl,
+        ec_GFp_simple_invert,
+        ec_GFp_simple_is_at_infinity,
+        ec_GFp_simple_is_on_curve,
+        ec_GFp_simple_cmp,
+        ec_GFp_simple_make_affine,
+        ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine,
+        ec_GFp_nistp224_points_mul,
+        ec_GFp_nistp224_precompute_mult,
+        ec_GFp_nistp224_have_precompute_mult,
+        ec_GFp_nist_field_mul,
+        ec_GFp_nist_field_sqr,
+        0 /* field_div */ ,
+        0 /* field_encode */ ,
+        0 /* field_decode */ ,
+        0,                      /* field_set_to_one */
+        ec_key_simple_priv2oct,
+        ec_key_simple_oct2priv,
+        0, /* set private */
+        ec_key_simple_generate_key,
+        ec_key_simple_check_key,
+        ec_key_simple_generate_public_key,
+        0, /* keycopy */
+        0, /* keyfinish */
+        ecdh_simple_compute_key
+    };
+
+    return &ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Helper functions to convert field elements to/from internal representation
+ */
+static void bin28_to_felem(felem out, const u8 in[28])
+{
+    out[0] = *((const uint64_t *)(in)) & 0x00ffffffffffffff;
+    out[1] = (*((const uint64_t *)(in + 7))) & 0x00ffffffffffffff;
+    out[2] = (*((const uint64_t *)(in + 14))) & 0x00ffffffffffffff;
+    out[3] = (*((const uint64_t *)(in+20))) >> 8;
+}
+
+static void felem_to_bin28(u8 out[28], const felem in)
+{
+    unsigned i;
+    for (i = 0; i < 7; ++i) {
+        out[i] = in[0] >> (8 * i);
+        out[i + 7] = in[1] >> (8 * i);
+        out[i + 14] = in[2] >> (8 * i);
+        out[i + 21] = in[3] >> (8 * i);
+    }
+}
+
+/* To preserve endianness when using BN_bn2bin and BN_bin2bn */
+static void flip_endian(u8 *out, const u8 *in, unsigned len)
+{
+    unsigned i;
+    for (i = 0; i < len; ++i)
+        out[i] = in[len - 1 - i];
+}
+
+/* From OpenSSL BIGNUM to internal representation */
+static int BN_to_felem(felem out, const BIGNUM *bn)
+{
+    felem_bytearray b_in;
+    felem_bytearray b_out;
+    unsigned num_bytes;
+
+    /* BN_bn2bin eats leading zeroes */
+    memset(b_out, 0, sizeof(b_out));
+    num_bytes = BN_num_bytes(bn);
+    if (num_bytes > sizeof(b_out)) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_BN_TO_FELEM, EC_R_BIGNUM_OUT_OF_RANGE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (BN_is_negative(bn)) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_BN_TO_FELEM, EC_R_BIGNUM_OUT_OF_RANGE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    num_bytes = BN_bn2bin(bn, b_in);
+    flip_endian(b_out, b_in, num_bytes);
+    bin28_to_felem(out, b_out);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* From internal representation to OpenSSL BIGNUM */
+static BIGNUM *felem_to_BN(BIGNUM *out, const felem in)
+{
+    felem_bytearray b_in, b_out;
+    felem_to_bin28(b_in, in);
+    flip_endian(b_out, b_in, sizeof(b_out));
+    return BN_bin2bn(b_out, sizeof(b_out), out);
+}
+
+/******************************************************************************/
+/*-
+ *                              FIELD OPERATIONS
+ *
+ * Field operations, using the internal representation of field elements.
+ * NB! These operations are specific to our point multiplication and cannot be
+ * expected to be correct in general - e.g., multiplication with a large scalar
+ * will cause an overflow.
+ *
+ */
+
+static void felem_one(felem out)
+{
+    out[0] = 1;
+    out[1] = 0;
+    out[2] = 0;
+    out[3] = 0;
+}
+
+static void felem_assign(felem out, const felem in)
+{
+    out[0] = in[0];
+    out[1] = in[1];
+    out[2] = in[2];
+    out[3] = in[3];
+}
+
+/* Sum two field elements: out += in */
+static void felem_sum(felem out, const felem in)
+{
+    out[0] += in[0];
+    out[1] += in[1];
+    out[2] += in[2];
+    out[3] += in[3];
+}
+
+/* Get negative value: out = -in */
+/* Assumes in[i] < 2^57 */
+static void felem_neg(felem out, const felem in)
+{
+    static const limb two58p2 = (((limb) 1) << 58) + (((limb) 1) << 2);
+    static const limb two58m2 = (((limb) 1) << 58) - (((limb) 1) << 2);
+    static const limb two58m42m2 = (((limb) 1) << 58) -
+        (((limb) 1) << 42) - (((limb) 1) << 2);
+
+    /* Set to 0 mod 2^224-2^96+1 to ensure out > in */
+    out[0] = two58p2 - in[0];
+    out[1] = two58m42m2 - in[1];
+    out[2] = two58m2 - in[2];
+    out[3] = two58m2 - in[3];
+}
+
+/* Subtract field elements: out -= in */
+/* Assumes in[i] < 2^57 */
+static void felem_diff(felem out, const felem in)
+{
+    static const limb two58p2 = (((limb) 1) << 58) + (((limb) 1) << 2);
+    static const limb two58m2 = (((limb) 1) << 58) - (((limb) 1) << 2);
+    static const limb two58m42m2 = (((limb) 1) << 58) -
+        (((limb) 1) << 42) - (((limb) 1) << 2);
+
+    /* Add 0 mod 2^224-2^96+1 to ensure out > in */
+    out[0] += two58p2;
+    out[1] += two58m42m2;
+    out[2] += two58m2;
+    out[3] += two58m2;
+
+    out[0] -= in[0];
+    out[1] -= in[1];
+    out[2] -= in[2];
+    out[3] -= in[3];
+}
+
+/* Subtract in unreduced 128-bit mode: out -= in */
+/* Assumes in[i] < 2^119 */
+static void widefelem_diff(widefelem out, const widefelem in)
+{
+    static const widelimb two120 = ((widelimb) 1) << 120;
+    static const widelimb two120m64 = (((widelimb) 1) << 120) -
+        (((widelimb) 1) << 64);
+    static const widelimb two120m104m64 = (((widelimb) 1) << 120) -
+        (((widelimb) 1) << 104) - (((widelimb) 1) << 64);
+
+    /* Add 0 mod 2^224-2^96+1 to ensure out > in */
+    out[0] += two120;
+    out[1] += two120m64;
+    out[2] += two120m64;
+    out[3] += two120;
+    out[4] += two120m104m64;
+    out[5] += two120m64;
+    out[6] += two120m64;
+
+    out[0] -= in[0];
+    out[1] -= in[1];
+    out[2] -= in[2];
+    out[3] -= in[3];
+    out[4] -= in[4];
+    out[5] -= in[5];
+    out[6] -= in[6];
+}
+
+/* Subtract in mixed mode: out128 -= in64 */
+/* in[i] < 2^63 */
+static void felem_diff_128_64(widefelem out, const felem in)
+{
+    static const widelimb two64p8 = (((widelimb) 1) << 64) +
+        (((widelimb) 1) << 8);
+    static const widelimb two64m8 = (((widelimb) 1) << 64) -
+        (((widelimb) 1) << 8);
+    static const widelimb two64m48m8 = (((widelimb) 1) << 64) -
+        (((widelimb) 1) << 48) - (((widelimb) 1) << 8);
+
+    /* Add 0 mod 2^224-2^96+1 to ensure out > in */
+    out[0] += two64p8;
+    out[1] += two64m48m8;
+    out[2] += two64m8;
+    out[3] += two64m8;
+
+    out[0] -= in[0];
+    out[1] -= in[1];
+    out[2] -= in[2];
+    out[3] -= in[3];
+}
+
+/*
+ * Multiply a field element by a scalar: out = out * scalar The scalars we
+ * actually use are small, so results fit without overflow
+ */
+static void felem_scalar(felem out, const limb scalar)
+{
+    out[0] *= scalar;
+    out[1] *= scalar;
+    out[2] *= scalar;
+    out[3] *= scalar;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Multiply an unreduced field element by a scalar: out = out * scalar The
+ * scalars we actually use are small, so results fit without overflow
+ */
+static void widefelem_scalar(widefelem out, const widelimb scalar)
+{
+    out[0] *= scalar;
+    out[1] *= scalar;
+    out[2] *= scalar;
+    out[3] *= scalar;
+    out[4] *= scalar;
+    out[5] *= scalar;
+    out[6] *= scalar;
+}
+
+/* Square a field element: out = in^2 */
+static void felem_square(widefelem out, const felem in)
+{
+    limb tmp0, tmp1, tmp2;
+    tmp0 = 2 * in[0];
+    tmp1 = 2 * in[1];
+    tmp2 = 2 * in[2];
+    out[0] = ((widelimb) in[0]) * in[0];
+    out[1] = ((widelimb) in[0]) * tmp1;
+    out[2] = ((widelimb) in[0]) * tmp2 + ((widelimb) in[1]) * in[1];
+    out[3] = ((widelimb) in[3]) * tmp0 + ((widelimb) in[1]) * tmp2;
+    out[4] = ((widelimb) in[3]) * tmp1 + ((widelimb) in[2]) * in[2];
+    out[5] = ((widelimb) in[3]) * tmp2;
+    out[6] = ((widelimb) in[3]) * in[3];
+}
+
+/* Multiply two field elements: out = in1 * in2 */
+static void felem_mul(widefelem out, const felem in1, const felem in2)
+{
+    out[0] = ((widelimb) in1[0]) * in2[0];
+    out[1] = ((widelimb) in1[0]) * in2[1] + ((widelimb) in1[1]) * in2[0];
+    out[2] = ((widelimb) in1[0]) * in2[2] + ((widelimb) in1[1]) * in2[1] +
+             ((widelimb) in1[2]) * in2[0];
+    out[3] = ((widelimb) in1[0]) * in2[3] + ((widelimb) in1[1]) * in2[2] +
+             ((widelimb) in1[2]) * in2[1] + ((widelimb) in1[3]) * in2[0];
+    out[4] = ((widelimb) in1[1]) * in2[3] + ((widelimb) in1[2]) * in2[2] +
+             ((widelimb) in1[3]) * in2[1];
+    out[5] = ((widelimb) in1[2]) * in2[3] + ((widelimb) in1[3]) * in2[2];
+    out[6] = ((widelimb) in1[3]) * in2[3];
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Reduce seven 128-bit coefficients to four 64-bit coefficients.
+ * Requires in[i] < 2^126,
+ * ensures out[0] < 2^56, out[1] < 2^56, out[2] < 2^56, out[3] <= 2^56 + 2^16 */
+static void felem_reduce(felem out, const widefelem in)
+{
+    static const widelimb two127p15 = (((widelimb) 1) << 127) +
+        (((widelimb) 1) << 15);
+    static const widelimb two127m71 = (((widelimb) 1) << 127) -
+        (((widelimb) 1) << 71);
+    static const widelimb two127m71m55 = (((widelimb) 1) << 127) -
+        (((widelimb) 1) << 71) - (((widelimb) 1) << 55);
+    widelimb output[5];
+
+    /* Add 0 mod 2^224-2^96+1 to ensure all differences are positive */
+    output[0] = in[0] + two127p15;
+    output[1] = in[1] + two127m71m55;
+    output[2] = in[2] + two127m71;
+    output[3] = in[3];
+    output[4] = in[4];
+
+    /* Eliminate in[4], in[5], in[6] */
+    output[4] += in[6] >> 16;
+    output[3] += (in[6] & 0xffff) << 40;
+    output[2] -= in[6];
+
+    output[3] += in[5] >> 16;
+    output[2] += (in[5] & 0xffff) << 40;
+    output[1] -= in[5];
+
+    output[2] += output[4] >> 16;
+    output[1] += (output[4] & 0xffff) << 40;
+    output[0] -= output[4];
+
+    /* Carry 2 -> 3 -> 4 */
+    output[3] += output[2] >> 56;
+    output[2] &= 0x00ffffffffffffff;
+
+    output[4] = output[3] >> 56;
+    output[3] &= 0x00ffffffffffffff;
+
+    /* Now output[2] < 2^56, output[3] < 2^56, output[4] < 2^72 */
+
+    /* Eliminate output[4] */
+    output[2] += output[4] >> 16;
+    /* output[2] < 2^56 + 2^56 = 2^57 */
+    output[1] += (output[4] & 0xffff) << 40;
+    output[0] -= output[4];
+
+    /* Carry 0 -> 1 -> 2 -> 3 */
+    output[1] += output[0] >> 56;
+    out[0] = output[0] & 0x00ffffffffffffff;
+
+    output[2] += output[1] >> 56;
+    /* output[2] < 2^57 + 2^72 */
+    out[1] = output[1] & 0x00ffffffffffffff;
+    output[3] += output[2] >> 56;
+    /* output[3] <= 2^56 + 2^16 */
+    out[2] = output[2] & 0x00ffffffffffffff;
+
+    /*-
+     * out[0] < 2^56, out[1] < 2^56, out[2] < 2^56,
+     * out[3] <= 2^56 + 2^16 (due to final carry),
+     * so out < 2*p
+     */
+    out[3] = output[3];
+}
+
+static void felem_square_reduce(felem out, const felem in)
+{
+    widefelem tmp;
+    felem_square(tmp, in);
+    felem_reduce(out, tmp);
+}
+
+static void felem_mul_reduce(felem out, const felem in1, const felem in2)
+{
+    widefelem tmp;
+    felem_mul(tmp, in1, in2);
+    felem_reduce(out, tmp);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Reduce to unique minimal representation. Requires 0 <= in < 2*p (always
+ * call felem_reduce first)
+ */
+static void felem_contract(felem out, const felem in)
+{
+    static const int64_t two56 = ((limb) 1) << 56;
+    /* 0 <= in < 2*p, p = 2^224 - 2^96 + 1 */
+    /* if in > p , reduce in = in - 2^224 + 2^96 - 1 */
+    int64_t tmp[4], a;
+    tmp[0] = in[0];
+    tmp[1] = in[1];
+    tmp[2] = in[2];
+    tmp[3] = in[3];
+    /* Case 1: a = 1 iff in >= 2^224 */
+    a = (in[3] >> 56);
+    tmp[0] -= a;
+    tmp[1] += a << 40;
+    tmp[3] &= 0x00ffffffffffffff;
+    /*
+     * Case 2: a = 0 iff p <= in < 2^224, i.e., the high 128 bits are all 1
+     * and the lower part is non-zero
+     */
+    a = ((in[3] & in[2] & (in[1] | 0x000000ffffffffff)) + 1) |
+        (((int64_t) (in[0] + (in[1] & 0x000000ffffffffff)) - 1) >> 63);
+    a &= 0x00ffffffffffffff;
+    /* turn a into an all-one mask (if a = 0) or an all-zero mask */
+    a = (a - 1) >> 63;
+    /* subtract 2^224 - 2^96 + 1 if a is all-one */
+    tmp[3] &= a ^ 0xffffffffffffffff;
+    tmp[2] &= a ^ 0xffffffffffffffff;
+    tmp[1] &= (a ^ 0xffffffffffffffff) | 0x000000ffffffffff;
+    tmp[0] -= 1 & a;
+
+    /*
+     * eliminate negative coefficients: if tmp[0] is negative, tmp[1] must be
+     * non-zero, so we only need one step
+     */
+    a = tmp[0] >> 63;
+    tmp[0] += two56 & a;
+    tmp[1] -= 1 & a;
+
+    /* carry 1 -> 2 -> 3 */
+    tmp[2] += tmp[1] >> 56;
+    tmp[1] &= 0x00ffffffffffffff;
+
+    tmp[3] += tmp[2] >> 56;
+    tmp[2] &= 0x00ffffffffffffff;
+
+    /* Now 0 <= out < p */
+    out[0] = tmp[0];
+    out[1] = tmp[1];
+    out[2] = tmp[2];
+    out[3] = tmp[3];
+}
+
+/*
+ * Zero-check: returns 1 if input is 0, and 0 otherwise. We know that field
+ * elements are reduced to in < 2^225, so we only need to check three cases:
+ * 0, 2^224 - 2^96 + 1, and 2^225 - 2^97 + 2
+ */
+static limb felem_is_zero(const felem in)
+{
+    limb zero, two224m96p1, two225m97p2;
+
+    zero = in[0] | in[1] | in[2] | in[3];
+    zero = (((int64_t) (zero) - 1) >> 63) & 1;
+    two224m96p1 = (in[0] ^ 1) | (in[1] ^ 0x00ffff0000000000)
+        | (in[2] ^ 0x00ffffffffffffff) | (in[3] ^ 0x00ffffffffffffff);
+    two224m96p1 = (((int64_t) (two224m96p1) - 1) >> 63) & 1;
+    two225m97p2 = (in[0] ^ 2) | (in[1] ^ 0x00fffe0000000000)
+        | (in[2] ^ 0x00ffffffffffffff) | (in[3] ^ 0x01ffffffffffffff);
+    two225m97p2 = (((int64_t) (two225m97p2) - 1) >> 63) & 1;
+    return (zero | two224m96p1 | two225m97p2);
+}
+
+static int felem_is_zero_int(const void *in)
+{
+    return (int)(felem_is_zero(in) & ((limb) 1));
+}
+
+/* Invert a field element */
+/* Computation chain copied from djb's code */
+static void felem_inv(felem out, const felem in)
+{
+    felem ftmp, ftmp2, ftmp3, ftmp4;
+    widefelem tmp;
+    unsigned i;
+
+    felem_square(tmp, in);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp);    /* 2 */
+    felem_mul(tmp, in, ftmp);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp);    /* 2^2 - 1 */
+    felem_square(tmp, ftmp);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp);    /* 2^3 - 2 */
+    felem_mul(tmp, in, ftmp);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp);    /* 2^3 - 1 */
+    felem_square(tmp, ftmp);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp2, tmp);   /* 2^4 - 2 */
+    felem_square(tmp, ftmp2);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp2, tmp);   /* 2^5 - 4 */
+    felem_square(tmp, ftmp2);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp2, tmp);   /* 2^6 - 8 */
+    felem_mul(tmp, ftmp2, ftmp);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp);    /* 2^6 - 1 */
+    felem_square(tmp, ftmp);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp2, tmp);   /* 2^7 - 2 */
+    for (i = 0; i < 5; ++i) {   /* 2^12 - 2^6 */
+        felem_square(tmp, ftmp2);
+        felem_reduce(ftmp2, tmp);
+    }
+    felem_mul(tmp, ftmp2, ftmp);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp2, tmp);   /* 2^12 - 1 */
+    felem_square(tmp, ftmp2);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp3, tmp);   /* 2^13 - 2 */
+    for (i = 0; i < 11; ++i) {  /* 2^24 - 2^12 */
+        felem_square(tmp, ftmp3);
+        felem_reduce(ftmp3, tmp);
+    }
+    felem_mul(tmp, ftmp3, ftmp2);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp2, tmp);   /* 2^24 - 1 */
+    felem_square(tmp, ftmp2);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp3, tmp);   /* 2^25 - 2 */
+    for (i = 0; i < 23; ++i) {  /* 2^48 - 2^24 */
+        felem_square(tmp, ftmp3);
+        felem_reduce(ftmp3, tmp);
+    }
+    felem_mul(tmp, ftmp3, ftmp2);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp3, tmp);   /* 2^48 - 1 */
+    felem_square(tmp, ftmp3);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp4, tmp);   /* 2^49 - 2 */
+    for (i = 0; i < 47; ++i) {  /* 2^96 - 2^48 */
+        felem_square(tmp, ftmp4);
+        felem_reduce(ftmp4, tmp);
+    }
+    felem_mul(tmp, ftmp3, ftmp4);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp3, tmp);   /* 2^96 - 1 */
+    felem_square(tmp, ftmp3);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp4, tmp);   /* 2^97 - 2 */
+    for (i = 0; i < 23; ++i) {  /* 2^120 - 2^24 */
+        felem_square(tmp, ftmp4);
+        felem_reduce(ftmp4, tmp);
+    }
+    felem_mul(tmp, ftmp2, ftmp4);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp2, tmp);   /* 2^120 - 1 */
+    for (i = 0; i < 6; ++i) {   /* 2^126 - 2^6 */
+        felem_square(tmp, ftmp2);
+        felem_reduce(ftmp2, tmp);
+    }
+    felem_mul(tmp, ftmp2, ftmp);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp);    /* 2^126 - 1 */
+    felem_square(tmp, ftmp);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp);    /* 2^127 - 2 */
+    felem_mul(tmp, ftmp, in);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp);    /* 2^127 - 1 */
+    for (i = 0; i < 97; ++i) {  /* 2^224 - 2^97 */
+        felem_square(tmp, ftmp);
+        felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp);
+    }
+    felem_mul(tmp, ftmp, ftmp3);
+    felem_reduce(out, tmp);     /* 2^224 - 2^96 - 1 */
+}
+
+/*
+ * Copy in constant time: if icopy == 1, copy in to out, if icopy == 0, copy
+ * out to itself.
+ */
+static void copy_conditional(felem out, const felem in, limb icopy)
+{
+    unsigned i;
+    /*
+     * icopy is a (64-bit) 0 or 1, so copy is either all-zero or all-one
+     */
+    const limb copy = -icopy;
+    for (i = 0; i < 4; ++i) {
+        const limb tmp = copy & (in[i] ^ out[i]);
+        out[i] ^= tmp;
+    }
+}
+
+/******************************************************************************/
+/*-
+ *                       ELLIPTIC CURVE POINT OPERATIONS
+ *
+ * Points are represented in Jacobian projective coordinates:
+ * (X, Y, Z) corresponds to the affine point (X/Z^2, Y/Z^3),
+ * or to the point at infinity if Z == 0.
+ *
+ */
+
+/*-
+ * Double an elliptic curve point:
+ * (X', Y', Z') = 2 * (X, Y, Z), where
+ * X' = (3 * (X - Z^2) * (X + Z^2))^2 - 8 * X * Y^2
+ * Y' = 3 * (X - Z^2) * (X + Z^2) * (4 * X * Y^2 - X') - 8 * Y^2
+ * Z' = (Y + Z)^2 - Y^2 - Z^2 = 2 * Y * Z
+ * Outputs can equal corresponding inputs, i.e., x_out == x_in is allowed,
+ * while x_out == y_in is not (maybe this works, but it's not tested).
+ */
+static void
+point_double(felem x_out, felem y_out, felem z_out,
+             const felem x_in, const felem y_in, const felem z_in)
+{
+    widefelem tmp, tmp2;
+    felem delta, gamma, beta, alpha, ftmp, ftmp2;
+
+    felem_assign(ftmp, x_in);
+    felem_assign(ftmp2, x_in);
+
+    /* delta = z^2 */
+    felem_square(tmp, z_in);
+    felem_reduce(delta, tmp);
+
+    /* gamma = y^2 */
+    felem_square(tmp, y_in);
+    felem_reduce(gamma, tmp);
+
+    /* beta = x*gamma */
+    felem_mul(tmp, x_in, gamma);
+    felem_reduce(beta, tmp);
+
+    /* alpha = 3*(x-delta)*(x+delta) */
+    felem_diff(ftmp, delta);
+    /* ftmp[i] < 2^57 + 2^58 + 2 < 2^59 */
+    felem_sum(ftmp2, delta);
+    /* ftmp2[i] < 2^57 + 2^57 = 2^58 */
+    felem_scalar(ftmp2, 3);
+    /* ftmp2[i] < 3 * 2^58 < 2^60 */
+    felem_mul(tmp, ftmp, ftmp2);
+    /* tmp[i] < 2^60 * 2^59 * 4 = 2^121 */
+    felem_reduce(alpha, tmp);
+
+    /* x' = alpha^2 - 8*beta */
+    felem_square(tmp, alpha);
+    /* tmp[i] < 4 * 2^57 * 2^57 = 2^116 */
+    felem_assign(ftmp, beta);
+    felem_scalar(ftmp, 8);
+    /* ftmp[i] < 8 * 2^57 = 2^60 */
+    felem_diff_128_64(tmp, ftmp);
+    /* tmp[i] < 2^116 + 2^64 + 8 < 2^117 */
+    felem_reduce(x_out, tmp);
+
+    /* z' = (y + z)^2 - gamma - delta */
+    felem_sum(delta, gamma);
+    /* delta[i] < 2^57 + 2^57 = 2^58 */
+    felem_assign(ftmp, y_in);
+    felem_sum(ftmp, z_in);
+    /* ftmp[i] < 2^57 + 2^57 = 2^58 */
+    felem_square(tmp, ftmp);
+    /* tmp[i] < 4 * 2^58 * 2^58 = 2^118 */
+    felem_diff_128_64(tmp, delta);
+    /* tmp[i] < 2^118 + 2^64 + 8 < 2^119 */
+    felem_reduce(z_out, tmp);
+
+    /* y' = alpha*(4*beta - x') - 8*gamma^2 */
+    felem_scalar(beta, 4);
+    /* beta[i] < 4 * 2^57 = 2^59 */
+    felem_diff(beta, x_out);
+    /* beta[i] < 2^59 + 2^58 + 2 < 2^60 */
+    felem_mul(tmp, alpha, beta);
+    /* tmp[i] < 4 * 2^57 * 2^60 = 2^119 */
+    felem_square(tmp2, gamma);
+    /* tmp2[i] < 4 * 2^57 * 2^57 = 2^116 */
+    widefelem_scalar(tmp2, 8);
+    /* tmp2[i] < 8 * 2^116 = 2^119 */
+    widefelem_diff(tmp, tmp2);
+    /* tmp[i] < 2^119 + 2^120 < 2^121 */
+    felem_reduce(y_out, tmp);
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Add two elliptic curve points:
+ * (X_1, Y_1, Z_1) + (X_2, Y_2, Z_2) = (X_3, Y_3, Z_3), where
+ * X_3 = (Z_1^3 * Y_2 - Z_2^3 * Y_1)^2 - (Z_1^2 * X_2 - Z_2^2 * X_1)^3 -
+ * 2 * Z_2^2 * X_1 * (Z_1^2 * X_2 - Z_2^2 * X_1)^2
+ * Y_3 = (Z_1^3 * Y_2 - Z_2^3 * Y_1) * (Z_2^2 * X_1 * (Z_1^2 * X_2 - Z_2^2 * X_1)^2 - X_3) -
+ *        Z_2^3 * Y_1 * (Z_1^2 * X_2 - Z_2^2 * X_1)^3
+ * Z_3 = (Z_1^2 * X_2 - Z_2^2 * X_1) * (Z_1 * Z_2)
+ *
+ * This runs faster if 'mixed' is set, which requires Z_2 = 1 or Z_2 = 0.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * This function is not entirely constant-time: it includes a branch for
+ * checking whether the two input points are equal, (while not equal to the
+ * point at infinity). This case never happens during single point
+ * multiplication, so there is no timing leak for ECDH or ECDSA signing.
+ */
+static void point_add(felem x3, felem y3, felem z3,
+                      const felem x1, const felem y1, const felem z1,
+                      const int mixed, const felem x2, const felem y2,
+                      const felem z2)
+{
+    felem ftmp, ftmp2, ftmp3, ftmp4, ftmp5, x_out, y_out, z_out;
+    widefelem tmp, tmp2;
+    limb z1_is_zero, z2_is_zero, x_equal, y_equal;
+
+    if (!mixed) {
+        /* ftmp2 = z2^2 */
+        felem_square(tmp, z2);
+        felem_reduce(ftmp2, tmp);
+
+        /* ftmp4 = z2^3 */
+        felem_mul(tmp, ftmp2, z2);
+        felem_reduce(ftmp4, tmp);
+
+        /* ftmp4 = z2^3*y1 */
+        felem_mul(tmp2, ftmp4, y1);
+        felem_reduce(ftmp4, tmp2);
+
+        /* ftmp2 = z2^2*x1 */
+        felem_mul(tmp2, ftmp2, x1);
+        felem_reduce(ftmp2, tmp2);
+    } else {
+        /*
+         * We'll assume z2 = 1 (special case z2 = 0 is handled later)
+         */
+
+        /* ftmp4 = z2^3*y1 */
+        felem_assign(ftmp4, y1);
+
+        /* ftmp2 = z2^2*x1 */
+        felem_assign(ftmp2, x1);
+    }
+
+    /* ftmp = z1^2 */
+    felem_square(tmp, z1);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp);
+
+    /* ftmp3 = z1^3 */
+    felem_mul(tmp, ftmp, z1);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp3, tmp);
+
+    /* tmp = z1^3*y2 */
+    felem_mul(tmp, ftmp3, y2);
+    /* tmp[i] < 4 * 2^57 * 2^57 = 2^116 */
+
+    /* ftmp3 = z1^3*y2 - z2^3*y1 */
+    felem_diff_128_64(tmp, ftmp4);
+    /* tmp[i] < 2^116 + 2^64 + 8 < 2^117 */
+    felem_reduce(ftmp3, tmp);
+
+    /* tmp = z1^2*x2 */
+    felem_mul(tmp, ftmp, x2);
+    /* tmp[i] < 4 * 2^57 * 2^57 = 2^116 */
+
+    /* ftmp = z1^2*x2 - z2^2*x1 */
+    felem_diff_128_64(tmp, ftmp2);
+    /* tmp[i] < 2^116 + 2^64 + 8 < 2^117 */
+    felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp);
+
+    /*
+     * the formulae are incorrect if the points are equal so we check for
+     * this and do doubling if this happens
+     */
+    x_equal = felem_is_zero(ftmp);
+    y_equal = felem_is_zero(ftmp3);
+    z1_is_zero = felem_is_zero(z1);
+    z2_is_zero = felem_is_zero(z2);
+    /* In affine coordinates, (X_1, Y_1) == (X_2, Y_2) */
+    if (x_equal && y_equal && !z1_is_zero && !z2_is_zero) {
+        point_double(x3, y3, z3, x1, y1, z1);
+        return;
+    }
+
+    /* ftmp5 = z1*z2 */
+    if (!mixed) {
+        felem_mul(tmp, z1, z2);
+        felem_reduce(ftmp5, tmp);
+    } else {
+        /* special case z2 = 0 is handled later */
+        felem_assign(ftmp5, z1);
+    }
+
+    /* z_out = (z1^2*x2 - z2^2*x1)*(z1*z2) */
+    felem_mul(tmp, ftmp, ftmp5);
+    felem_reduce(z_out, tmp);
+
+    /* ftmp = (z1^2*x2 - z2^2*x1)^2 */
+    felem_assign(ftmp5, ftmp);
+    felem_square(tmp, ftmp);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp);
+
+    /* ftmp5 = (z1^2*x2 - z2^2*x1)^3 */
+    felem_mul(tmp, ftmp, ftmp5);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp5, tmp);
+
+    /* ftmp2 = z2^2*x1*(z1^2*x2 - z2^2*x1)^2 */
+    felem_mul(tmp, ftmp2, ftmp);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp2, tmp);
+
+    /* tmp = z2^3*y1*(z1^2*x2 - z2^2*x1)^3 */
+    felem_mul(tmp, ftmp4, ftmp5);
+    /* tmp[i] < 4 * 2^57 * 2^57 = 2^116 */
+
+    /* tmp2 = (z1^3*y2 - z2^3*y1)^2 */
+    felem_square(tmp2, ftmp3);
+    /* tmp2[i] < 4 * 2^57 * 2^57 < 2^116 */
+
+    /* tmp2 = (z1^3*y2 - z2^3*y1)^2 - (z1^2*x2 - z2^2*x1)^3 */
+    felem_diff_128_64(tmp2, ftmp5);
+    /* tmp2[i] < 2^116 + 2^64 + 8 < 2^117 */
+
+    /* ftmp5 = 2*z2^2*x1*(z1^2*x2 - z2^2*x1)^2 */
+    felem_assign(ftmp5, ftmp2);
+    felem_scalar(ftmp5, 2);
+    /* ftmp5[i] < 2 * 2^57 = 2^58 */
+
+    /*-
+     * x_out = (z1^3*y2 - z2^3*y1)^2 - (z1^2*x2 - z2^2*x1)^3 -
+     *  2*z2^2*x1*(z1^2*x2 - z2^2*x1)^2
+     */
+    felem_diff_128_64(tmp2, ftmp5);
+    /* tmp2[i] < 2^117 + 2^64 + 8 < 2^118 */
+    felem_reduce(x_out, tmp2);
+
+    /* ftmp2 = z2^2*x1*(z1^2*x2 - z2^2*x1)^2 - x_out */
+    felem_diff(ftmp2, x_out);
+    /* ftmp2[i] < 2^57 + 2^58 + 2 < 2^59 */
+
+    /*
+     * tmp2 = (z1^3*y2 - z2^3*y1)*(z2^2*x1*(z1^2*x2 - z2^2*x1)^2 - x_out)
+     */
+    felem_mul(tmp2, ftmp3, ftmp2);
+    /* tmp2[i] < 4 * 2^57 * 2^59 = 2^118 */
+
+    /*-
+     * y_out = (z1^3*y2 - z2^3*y1)*(z2^2*x1*(z1^2*x2 - z2^2*x1)^2 - x_out) -
+     *  z2^3*y1*(z1^2*x2 - z2^2*x1)^3
+     */
+    widefelem_diff(tmp2, tmp);
+    /* tmp2[i] < 2^118 + 2^120 < 2^121 */
+    felem_reduce(y_out, tmp2);
+
+    /*
+     * the result (x_out, y_out, z_out) is incorrect if one of the inputs is
+     * the point at infinity, so we need to check for this separately
+     */
+
+    /*
+     * if point 1 is at infinity, copy point 2 to output, and vice versa
+     */
+    copy_conditional(x_out, x2, z1_is_zero);
+    copy_conditional(x_out, x1, z2_is_zero);
+    copy_conditional(y_out, y2, z1_is_zero);
+    copy_conditional(y_out, y1, z2_is_zero);
+    copy_conditional(z_out, z2, z1_is_zero);
+    copy_conditional(z_out, z1, z2_is_zero);
+    felem_assign(x3, x_out);
+    felem_assign(y3, y_out);
+    felem_assign(z3, z_out);
+}
+
+/*
+ * select_point selects the |idx|th point from a precomputation table and
+ * copies it to out.
+ * The pre_comp array argument should be size of |size| argument
+ */
+static void select_point(const u64 idx, unsigned int size,
+                         const felem pre_comp[][3], felem out[3])
+{
+    unsigned i, j;
+    limb *outlimbs = &out[0][0];
+
+    memset(out, 0, sizeof(*out) * 3);
+    for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
+        const limb *inlimbs = &pre_comp[i][0][0];
+        u64 mask = i ^ idx;
+        mask |= mask >> 4;
+        mask |= mask >> 2;
+        mask |= mask >> 1;
+        mask &= 1;
+        mask--;
+        for (j = 0; j < 4 * 3; j++)
+            outlimbs[j] |= inlimbs[j] & mask;
+    }
+}
+
+/* get_bit returns the |i|th bit in |in| */
+static char get_bit(const felem_bytearray in, unsigned i)
+{
+    if (i >= 224)
+        return 0;
+    return (in[i >> 3] >> (i & 7)) & 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Interleaved point multiplication using precomputed point multiples: The
+ * small point multiples 0*P, 1*P, ..., 16*P are in pre_comp[], the scalars
+ * in scalars[]. If g_scalar is non-NULL, we also add this multiple of the
+ * generator, using certain (large) precomputed multiples in g_pre_comp.
+ * Output point (X, Y, Z) is stored in x_out, y_out, z_out
+ */
+static void batch_mul(felem x_out, felem y_out, felem z_out,
+                      const felem_bytearray scalars[],
+                      const unsigned num_points, const u8 *g_scalar,
+                      const int mixed, const felem pre_comp[][17][3],
+                      const felem g_pre_comp[2][16][3])
+{
+    int i, skip;
+    unsigned num;
+    unsigned gen_mul = (g_scalar != NULL);
+    felem nq[3], tmp[4];
+    u64 bits;
+    u8 sign, digit;
+
+    /* set nq to the point at infinity */
+    memset(nq, 0, sizeof(nq));
+
+    /*
+     * Loop over all scalars msb-to-lsb, interleaving additions of multiples
+     * of the generator (two in each of the last 28 rounds) and additions of
+     * other points multiples (every 5th round).
+     */
+    skip = 1;                   /* save two point operations in the first
+                                 * round */
+    for (i = (num_points ? 220 : 27); i >= 0; --i) {
+        /* double */
+        if (!skip)
+            point_double(nq[0], nq[1], nq[2], nq[0], nq[1], nq[2]);
+
+        /* add multiples of the generator */
+        if (gen_mul && (i <= 27)) {
+            /* first, look 28 bits upwards */
+            bits = get_bit(g_scalar, i + 196) << 3;
+            bits |= get_bit(g_scalar, i + 140) << 2;
+            bits |= get_bit(g_scalar, i + 84) << 1;
+            bits |= get_bit(g_scalar, i + 28);
+            /* select the point to add, in constant time */
+            select_point(bits, 16, g_pre_comp[1], tmp);
+
+            if (!skip) {
+                /* value 1 below is argument for "mixed" */
+                point_add(nq[0], nq[1], nq[2],
+                          nq[0], nq[1], nq[2], 1, tmp[0], tmp[1], tmp[2]);
+            } else {
+                memcpy(nq, tmp, 3 * sizeof(felem));
+                skip = 0;
+            }
+
+            /* second, look at the current position */
+            bits = get_bit(g_scalar, i + 168) << 3;
+            bits |= get_bit(g_scalar, i + 112) << 2;
+            bits |= get_bit(g_scalar, i + 56) << 1;
+            bits |= get_bit(g_scalar, i);
+            /* select the point to add, in constant time */
+            select_point(bits, 16, g_pre_comp[0], tmp);
+            point_add(nq[0], nq[1], nq[2],
+                      nq[0], nq[1], nq[2],
+                      1 /* mixed */ , tmp[0], tmp[1], tmp[2]);
+        }
+
+        /* do other additions every 5 doublings */
+        if (num_points && (i % 5 == 0)) {
+            /* loop over all scalars */
+            for (num = 0; num < num_points; ++num) {
+                bits = get_bit(scalars[num], i + 4) << 5;
+                bits |= get_bit(scalars[num], i + 3) << 4;
+                bits |= get_bit(scalars[num], i + 2) << 3;
+                bits |= get_bit(scalars[num], i + 1) << 2;
+                bits |= get_bit(scalars[num], i) << 1;
+                bits |= get_bit(scalars[num], i - 1);
+                ec_GFp_nistp_recode_scalar_bits(&sign, &digit, bits);
+
+                /* select the point to add or subtract */
+                select_point(digit, 17, pre_comp[num], tmp);
+                felem_neg(tmp[3], tmp[1]); /* (X, -Y, Z) is the negative
+                                            * point */
+                copy_conditional(tmp[1], tmp[3], sign);
+
+                if (!skip) {
+                    point_add(nq[0], nq[1], nq[2],
+                              nq[0], nq[1], nq[2],
+                              mixed, tmp[0], tmp[1], tmp[2]);
+                } else {
+                    memcpy(nq, tmp, 3 * sizeof(felem));
+                    skip = 0;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    felem_assign(x_out, nq[0]);
+    felem_assign(y_out, nq[1]);
+    felem_assign(z_out, nq[2]);
+}
+
+/******************************************************************************/
+/*
+ * FUNCTIONS TO MANAGE PRECOMPUTATION
+ */
+
+static NISTP224_PRE_COMP *nistp224_pre_comp_new()
+{
+    NISTP224_PRE_COMP *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
+
+    if (!ret) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_NISTP224_PRE_COMP_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    ret->references = 1;
+
+    ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
+    if (ret->lock == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_NISTP224_PRE_COMP_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        OPENSSL_free(ret);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+NISTP224_PRE_COMP *EC_nistp224_pre_comp_dup(NISTP224_PRE_COMP *p)
+{
+    int i;
+    if (p != NULL)
+        CRYPTO_atomic_add(&p->references, 1, &i, p->lock);
+    return p;
+}
+
+void EC_nistp224_pre_comp_free(NISTP224_PRE_COMP *p)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    if (p == NULL)
+        return;
+
+    CRYPTO_atomic_add(&p->references, -1, &i, p->lock);
+    REF_PRINT_COUNT("EC_nistp224", x);
+    if (i > 0)
+        return;
+    REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0);
+
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(p->lock);
+    OPENSSL_free(p);
+}
+
+/******************************************************************************/
+/*
+ * OPENSSL EC_METHOD FUNCTIONS
+ */
+
+int ec_GFp_nistp224_group_init(EC_GROUP *group)
+{
+    int ret;
+    ret = ec_GFp_simple_group_init(group);
+    group->a_is_minus3 = 1;
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int ec_GFp_nistp224_group_set_curve(EC_GROUP *group, const BIGNUM *p,
+                                    const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
+                                    BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *curve_p, *curve_a, *curve_b;
+
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        if ((ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+            return 0;
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    if (((curve_p = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) ||
+        ((curve_a = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) ||
+        ((curve_b = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL))
+        goto err;
+    BN_bin2bn(nistp224_curve_params[0], sizeof(felem_bytearray), curve_p);
+    BN_bin2bn(nistp224_curve_params[1], sizeof(felem_bytearray), curve_a);
+    BN_bin2bn(nistp224_curve_params[2], sizeof(felem_bytearray), curve_b);
+    if ((BN_cmp(curve_p, p)) || (BN_cmp(curve_a, a)) || (BN_cmp(curve_b, b))) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP224_GROUP_SET_CURVE,
+              EC_R_WRONG_CURVE_PARAMETERS);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    group->field_mod_func = BN_nist_mod_224;
+    ret = ec_GFp_simple_group_set_curve(group, p, a, b, ctx);
+ err:
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Takes the Jacobian coordinates (X, Y, Z) of a point and returns (X', Y') =
+ * (X/Z^2, Y/Z^3)
+ */
+int ec_GFp_nistp224_point_get_affine_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *group,
+                                                 const EC_POINT *point,
+                                                 BIGNUM *x, BIGNUM *y,
+                                                 BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    felem z1, z2, x_in, y_in, x_out, y_out;
+    widefelem tmp;
+
+    if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, point)) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP224_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES,
+              EC_R_POINT_AT_INFINITY);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if ((!BN_to_felem(x_in, point->X)) || (!BN_to_felem(y_in, point->Y)) ||
+        (!BN_to_felem(z1, point->Z)))
+        return 0;
+    felem_inv(z2, z1);
+    felem_square(tmp, z2);
+    felem_reduce(z1, tmp);
+    felem_mul(tmp, x_in, z1);
+    felem_reduce(x_in, tmp);
+    felem_contract(x_out, x_in);
+    if (x != NULL) {
+        if (!felem_to_BN(x, x_out)) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP224_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES,
+                  ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+    felem_mul(tmp, z1, z2);
+    felem_reduce(z1, tmp);
+    felem_mul(tmp, y_in, z1);
+    felem_reduce(y_in, tmp);
+    felem_contract(y_out, y_in);
+    if (y != NULL) {
+        if (!felem_to_BN(y, y_out)) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP224_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES,
+                  ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static void make_points_affine(size_t num, felem points[ /* num */ ][3],
+                               felem tmp_felems[ /* num+1 */ ])
+{
+    /*
+     * Runs in constant time, unless an input is the point at infinity (which
+     * normally shouldn't happen).
+     */
+    ec_GFp_nistp_points_make_affine_internal(num,
+                                             points,
+                                             sizeof(felem),
+                                             tmp_felems,
+                                             (void (*)(void *))felem_one,
+                                             felem_is_zero_int,
+                                             (void (*)(void *, const void *))
+                                             felem_assign,
+                                             (void (*)(void *, const void *))
+                                             felem_square_reduce, (void (*)
+                                                                   (void *,
+                                                                    const void
+                                                                    *,
+                                                                    const void
+                                                                    *))
+                                             felem_mul_reduce,
+                                             (void (*)(void *, const void *))
+                                             felem_inv,
+                                             (void (*)(void *, const void *))
+                                             felem_contract);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Computes scalar*generator + \sum scalars[i]*points[i], ignoring NULL
+ * values Result is stored in r (r can equal one of the inputs).
+ */
+int ec_GFp_nistp224_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
+                               const BIGNUM *scalar, size_t num,
+                               const EC_POINT *points[],
+                               const BIGNUM *scalars[], BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    int j;
+    unsigned i;
+    int mixed = 0;
+    BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *x, *y, *z, *tmp_scalar;
+    felem_bytearray g_secret;
+    felem_bytearray *secrets = NULL;
+    felem (*pre_comp)[17][3] = NULL;
+    felem *tmp_felems = NULL;
+    felem_bytearray tmp;
+    unsigned num_bytes;
+    int have_pre_comp = 0;
+    size_t num_points = num;
+    felem x_in, y_in, z_in, x_out, y_out, z_out;
+    NISTP224_PRE_COMP *pre = NULL;
+    const felem(*g_pre_comp)[16][3] = NULL;
+    EC_POINT *generator = NULL;
+    const EC_POINT *p = NULL;
+    const BIGNUM *p_scalar = NULL;
+
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        if ((ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+            return 0;
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    if (((x = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) ||
+        ((y = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) ||
+        ((z = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) ||
+        ((tmp_scalar = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (scalar != NULL) {
+        pre = group->pre_comp.nistp224;
+        if (pre)
+            /* we have precomputation, try to use it */
+            g_pre_comp = (const felem(*)[16][3])pre->g_pre_comp;
+        else
+            /* try to use the standard precomputation */
+            g_pre_comp = &gmul[0];
+        generator = EC_POINT_new(group);
+        if (generator == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        /* get the generator from precomputation */
+        if (!felem_to_BN(x, g_pre_comp[0][1][0]) ||
+            !felem_to_BN(y, g_pre_comp[0][1][1]) ||
+            !felem_to_BN(z, g_pre_comp[0][1][2])) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP224_POINTS_MUL, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (!EC_POINT_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(group,
+                                                      generator, x, y, z,
+                                                      ctx))
+            goto err;
+        if (0 == EC_POINT_cmp(group, generator, group->generator, ctx))
+            /* precomputation matches generator */
+            have_pre_comp = 1;
+        else
+            /*
+             * we don't have valid precomputation: treat the generator as a
+             * random point
+             */
+            num_points = num_points + 1;
+    }
+
+    if (num_points > 0) {
+        if (num_points >= 3) {
+            /*
+             * unless we precompute multiples for just one or two points,
+             * converting those into affine form is time well spent
+             */
+            mixed = 1;
+        }
+        secrets = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*secrets) * num_points);
+        pre_comp = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*pre_comp) * num_points);
+        if (mixed)
+            tmp_felems =
+                OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(felem) * (num_points * 17 + 1));
+        if ((secrets == NULL) || (pre_comp == NULL)
+            || (mixed && (tmp_felems == NULL))) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP224_POINTS_MUL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        /*
+         * we treat NULL scalars as 0, and NULL points as points at infinity,
+         * i.e., they contribute nothing to the linear combination
+         */
+        for (i = 0; i < num_points; ++i) {
+            if (i == num)
+                /* the generator */
+            {
+                p = EC_GROUP_get0_generator(group);
+                p_scalar = scalar;
+            } else
+                /* the i^th point */
+            {
+                p = points[i];
+                p_scalar = scalars[i];
+            }
+            if ((p_scalar != NULL) && (p != NULL)) {
+                /* reduce scalar to 0 <= scalar < 2^224 */
+                if ((BN_num_bits(p_scalar) > 224)
+                    || (BN_is_negative(p_scalar))) {
+                    /*
+                     * this is an unusual input, and we don't guarantee
+                     * constant-timeness
+                     */
+                    if (!BN_nnmod(tmp_scalar, p_scalar, group->order, ctx)) {
+                        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP224_POINTS_MUL, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+                        goto err;
+                    }
+                    num_bytes = BN_bn2bin(tmp_scalar, tmp);
+                } else
+                    num_bytes = BN_bn2bin(p_scalar, tmp);
+                flip_endian(secrets[i], tmp, num_bytes);
+                /* precompute multiples */
+                if ((!BN_to_felem(x_out, p->X)) ||
+                    (!BN_to_felem(y_out, p->Y)) ||
+                    (!BN_to_felem(z_out, p->Z)))
+                    goto err;
+                felem_assign(pre_comp[i][1][0], x_out);
+                felem_assign(pre_comp[i][1][1], y_out);
+                felem_assign(pre_comp[i][1][2], z_out);
+                for (j = 2; j <= 16; ++j) {
+                    if (j & 1) {
+                        point_add(pre_comp[i][j][0], pre_comp[i][j][1],
+                                  pre_comp[i][j][2], pre_comp[i][1][0],
+                                  pre_comp[i][1][1], pre_comp[i][1][2], 0,
+                                  pre_comp[i][j - 1][0],
+                                  pre_comp[i][j - 1][1],
+                                  pre_comp[i][j - 1][2]);
+                    } else {
+                        point_double(pre_comp[i][j][0], pre_comp[i][j][1],
+                                     pre_comp[i][j][2], pre_comp[i][j / 2][0],
+                                     pre_comp[i][j / 2][1],
+                                     pre_comp[i][j / 2][2]);
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        if (mixed)
+            make_points_affine(num_points * 17, pre_comp[0], tmp_felems);
+    }
+
+    /* the scalar for the generator */
+    if ((scalar != NULL) && (have_pre_comp)) {
+        memset(g_secret, 0, sizeof(g_secret));
+        /* reduce scalar to 0 <= scalar < 2^224 */
+        if ((BN_num_bits(scalar) > 224) || (BN_is_negative(scalar))) {
+            /*
+             * this is an unusual input, and we don't guarantee
+             * constant-timeness
+             */
+            if (!BN_nnmod(tmp_scalar, scalar, group->order, ctx)) {
+                ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP224_POINTS_MUL, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            num_bytes = BN_bn2bin(tmp_scalar, tmp);
+        } else
+            num_bytes = BN_bn2bin(scalar, tmp);
+        flip_endian(g_secret, tmp, num_bytes);
+        /* do the multiplication with generator precomputation */
+        batch_mul(x_out, y_out, z_out,
+                  (const felem_bytearray(*))secrets, num_points,
+                  g_secret,
+                  mixed, (const felem(*)[17][3])pre_comp, g_pre_comp);
+    } else
+        /* do the multiplication without generator precomputation */
+        batch_mul(x_out, y_out, z_out,
+                  (const felem_bytearray(*))secrets, num_points,
+                  NULL, mixed, (const felem(*)[17][3])pre_comp, NULL);
+    /* reduce the output to its unique minimal representation */
+    felem_contract(x_in, x_out);
+    felem_contract(y_in, y_out);
+    felem_contract(z_in, z_out);
+    if ((!felem_to_BN(x, x_in)) || (!felem_to_BN(y, y_in)) ||
+        (!felem_to_BN(z, z_in))) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP224_POINTS_MUL, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    ret = EC_POINT_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(group, r, x, y, z, ctx);
+
+ err:
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    EC_POINT_free(generator);
+    BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
+    OPENSSL_free(secrets);
+    OPENSSL_free(pre_comp);
+    OPENSSL_free(tmp_felems);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int ec_GFp_nistp224_precompute_mult(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    NISTP224_PRE_COMP *pre = NULL;
+    int i, j;
+    BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *x, *y;
+    EC_POINT *generator = NULL;
+    felem tmp_felems[32];
+
+    /* throw away old precomputation */
+    EC_pre_comp_free(group);
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        if ((ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+            return 0;
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    if (((x = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) || ((y = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL))
+        goto err;
+    /* get the generator */
+    if (group->generator == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    generator = EC_POINT_new(group);
+    if (generator == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    BN_bin2bn(nistp224_curve_params[3], sizeof(felem_bytearray), x);
+    BN_bin2bn(nistp224_curve_params[4], sizeof(felem_bytearray), y);
+    if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, generator, x, y, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    if ((pre = nistp224_pre_comp_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    /*
+     * if the generator is the standard one, use built-in precomputation
+     */
+    if (0 == EC_POINT_cmp(group, generator, group->generator, ctx)) {
+        memcpy(pre->g_pre_comp, gmul, sizeof(pre->g_pre_comp));
+        goto done;
+    }
+    if ((!BN_to_felem(pre->g_pre_comp[0][1][0], group->generator->X)) ||
+        (!BN_to_felem(pre->g_pre_comp[0][1][1], group->generator->Y)) ||
+        (!BN_to_felem(pre->g_pre_comp[0][1][2], group->generator->Z)))
+        goto err;
+    /*
+     * compute 2^56*G, 2^112*G, 2^168*G for the first table, 2^28*G, 2^84*G,
+     * 2^140*G, 2^196*G for the second one
+     */
+    for (i = 1; i <= 8; i <<= 1) {
+        point_double(pre->g_pre_comp[1][i][0], pre->g_pre_comp[1][i][1],
+                     pre->g_pre_comp[1][i][2], pre->g_pre_comp[0][i][0],
+                     pre->g_pre_comp[0][i][1], pre->g_pre_comp[0][i][2]);
+        for (j = 0; j < 27; ++j) {
+            point_double(pre->g_pre_comp[1][i][0], pre->g_pre_comp[1][i][1],
+                         pre->g_pre_comp[1][i][2], pre->g_pre_comp[1][i][0],
+                         pre->g_pre_comp[1][i][1], pre->g_pre_comp[1][i][2]);
+        }
+        if (i == 8)
+            break;
+        point_double(pre->g_pre_comp[0][2 * i][0],
+                     pre->g_pre_comp[0][2 * i][1],
+                     pre->g_pre_comp[0][2 * i][2], pre->g_pre_comp[1][i][0],
+                     pre->g_pre_comp[1][i][1], pre->g_pre_comp[1][i][2]);
+        for (j = 0; j < 27; ++j) {
+            point_double(pre->g_pre_comp[0][2 * i][0],
+                         pre->g_pre_comp[0][2 * i][1],
+                         pre->g_pre_comp[0][2 * i][2],
+                         pre->g_pre_comp[0][2 * i][0],
+                         pre->g_pre_comp[0][2 * i][1],
+                         pre->g_pre_comp[0][2 * i][2]);
+        }
+    }
+    for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
+        /* g_pre_comp[i][0] is the point at infinity */
+        memset(pre->g_pre_comp[i][0], 0, sizeof(pre->g_pre_comp[i][0]));
+        /* the remaining multiples */
+        /* 2^56*G + 2^112*G resp. 2^84*G + 2^140*G */
+        point_add(pre->g_pre_comp[i][6][0], pre->g_pre_comp[i][6][1],
+                  pre->g_pre_comp[i][6][2], pre->g_pre_comp[i][4][0],
+                  pre->g_pre_comp[i][4][1], pre->g_pre_comp[i][4][2],
+                  0, pre->g_pre_comp[i][2][0], pre->g_pre_comp[i][2][1],
+                  pre->g_pre_comp[i][2][2]);
+        /* 2^56*G + 2^168*G resp. 2^84*G + 2^196*G */
+        point_add(pre->g_pre_comp[i][10][0], pre->g_pre_comp[i][10][1],
+                  pre->g_pre_comp[i][10][2], pre->g_pre_comp[i][8][0],
+                  pre->g_pre_comp[i][8][1], pre->g_pre_comp[i][8][2],
+                  0, pre->g_pre_comp[i][2][0], pre->g_pre_comp[i][2][1],
+                  pre->g_pre_comp[i][2][2]);
+        /* 2^112*G + 2^168*G resp. 2^140*G + 2^196*G */
+        point_add(pre->g_pre_comp[i][12][0], pre->g_pre_comp[i][12][1],
+                  pre->g_pre_comp[i][12][2], pre->g_pre_comp[i][8][0],
+                  pre->g_pre_comp[i][8][1], pre->g_pre_comp[i][8][2],
+                  0, pre->g_pre_comp[i][4][0], pre->g_pre_comp[i][4][1],
+                  pre->g_pre_comp[i][4][2]);
+        /*
+         * 2^56*G + 2^112*G + 2^168*G resp. 2^84*G + 2^140*G + 2^196*G
+         */
+        point_add(pre->g_pre_comp[i][14][0], pre->g_pre_comp[i][14][1],
+                  pre->g_pre_comp[i][14][2], pre->g_pre_comp[i][12][0],
+                  pre->g_pre_comp[i][12][1], pre->g_pre_comp[i][12][2],
+                  0, pre->g_pre_comp[i][2][0], pre->g_pre_comp[i][2][1],
+                  pre->g_pre_comp[i][2][2]);
+        for (j = 1; j < 8; ++j) {
+            /* odd multiples: add G resp. 2^28*G */
+            point_add(pre->g_pre_comp[i][2 * j + 1][0],
+                      pre->g_pre_comp[i][2 * j + 1][1],
+                      pre->g_pre_comp[i][2 * j + 1][2],
+                      pre->g_pre_comp[i][2 * j][0],
+                      pre->g_pre_comp[i][2 * j][1],
+                      pre->g_pre_comp[i][2 * j][2], 0,
+                      pre->g_pre_comp[i][1][0], pre->g_pre_comp[i][1][1],
+                      pre->g_pre_comp[i][1][2]);
+        }
+    }
+    make_points_affine(31, &(pre->g_pre_comp[0][1]), tmp_felems);
+
+ done:
+    SETPRECOMP(group, nistp224, pre);
+    pre = NULL;
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    EC_POINT_free(generator);
+    BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
+    EC_nistp224_pre_comp_free(pre);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int ec_GFp_nistp224_have_precompute_mult(const EC_GROUP *group)
+{
+    return HAVEPRECOMP(group, nistp224);
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp256.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp256.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ffd2a7d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp256.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2350 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* Copyright 2011 Google Inc.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ *
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ *  Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ *  distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ *  WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ *  See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ *  limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * A 64-bit implementation of the NIST P-256 elliptic curve point multiplication
+ *
+ * OpenSSL integration was taken from Emilia Kasper's work in ecp_nistp224.c.
+ * Otherwise based on Emilia's P224 work, which was inspired by my curve25519
+ * work which got its smarts from Daniel J. Bernstein's work on the same.
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128
+NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT
+#else
+
+# include <stdint.h>
+# include <string.h>
+# include <openssl/err.h>
+# include "ec_lcl.h"
+
+# if defined(__GNUC__) && (__GNUC__ > 3 || (__GNUC__ == 3 && __GNUC_MINOR__ >= 1))
+  /* even with gcc, the typedef won't work for 32-bit platforms */
+typedef __uint128_t uint128_t;  /* nonstandard; implemented by gcc on 64-bit
+                                 * platforms */
+typedef __int128_t int128_t;
+# else
+#  error "Need GCC 3.1 or later to define type uint128_t"
+# endif
+
+typedef uint8_t u8;
+typedef uint32_t u32;
+typedef uint64_t u64;
+
+/*
+ * The underlying field. P256 operates over GF(2^256-2^224+2^192+2^96-1). We
+ * can serialise an element of this field into 32 bytes. We call this an
+ * felem_bytearray.
+ */
+
+typedef u8 felem_bytearray[32];
+
+/*
+ * These are the parameters of P256, taken from FIPS 186-3, page 86. These
+ * values are big-endian.
+ */
+static const felem_bytearray nistp256_curve_params[5] = {
+    {0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, /* p */
+     0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+     0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
+     0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff},
+    {0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, /* a = -3 */
+     0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+     0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
+     0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfc}, /* b */
+    {0x5a, 0xc6, 0x35, 0xd8, 0xaa, 0x3a, 0x93, 0xe7,
+     0xb3, 0xeb, 0xbd, 0x55, 0x76, 0x98, 0x86, 0xbc,
+     0x65, 0x1d, 0x06, 0xb0, 0xcc, 0x53, 0xb0, 0xf6,
+     0x3b, 0xce, 0x3c, 0x3e, 0x27, 0xd2, 0x60, 0x4b},
+    {0x6b, 0x17, 0xd1, 0xf2, 0xe1, 0x2c, 0x42, 0x47, /* x */
+     0xf8, 0xbc, 0xe6, 0xe5, 0x63, 0xa4, 0x40, 0xf2,
+     0x77, 0x03, 0x7d, 0x81, 0x2d, 0xeb, 0x33, 0xa0,
+     0xf4, 0xa1, 0x39, 0x45, 0xd8, 0x98, 0xc2, 0x96},
+    {0x4f, 0xe3, 0x42, 0xe2, 0xfe, 0x1a, 0x7f, 0x9b, /* y */
+     0x8e, 0xe7, 0xeb, 0x4a, 0x7c, 0x0f, 0x9e, 0x16,
+     0x2b, 0xce, 0x33, 0x57, 0x6b, 0x31, 0x5e, 0xce,
+     0xcb, 0xb6, 0x40, 0x68, 0x37, 0xbf, 0x51, 0xf5}
+};
+
+/*-
+ * The representation of field elements.
+ * ------------------------------------
+ *
+ * We represent field elements with either four 128-bit values, eight 128-bit
+ * values, or four 64-bit values. The field element represented is:
+ *   v[0]*2^0 + v[1]*2^64 + v[2]*2^128 + v[3]*2^192  (mod p)
+ * or:
+ *   v[0]*2^0 + v[1]*2^64 + v[2]*2^128 + ... + v[8]*2^512  (mod p)
+ *
+ * 128-bit values are called 'limbs'. Since the limbs are spaced only 64 bits
+ * apart, but are 128-bits wide, the most significant bits of each limb overlap
+ * with the least significant bits of the next.
+ *
+ * A field element with four limbs is an 'felem'. One with eight limbs is a
+ * 'longfelem'
+ *
+ * A field element with four, 64-bit values is called a 'smallfelem'. Small
+ * values are used as intermediate values before multiplication.
+ */
+
+# define NLIMBS 4
+
+typedef uint128_t limb;
+typedef limb felem[NLIMBS];
+typedef limb longfelem[NLIMBS * 2];
+typedef u64 smallfelem[NLIMBS];
+
+/* This is the value of the prime as four 64-bit words, little-endian. */
+static const u64 kPrime[4] =
+    { 0xfffffffffffffffful, 0xffffffff, 0, 0xffffffff00000001ul };
+static const u64 bottom63bits = 0x7ffffffffffffffful;
+
+/*
+ * bin32_to_felem takes a little-endian byte array and converts it into felem
+ * form. This assumes that the CPU is little-endian.
+ */
+static void bin32_to_felem(felem out, const u8 in[32])
+{
+    out[0] = *((u64 *)&in[0]);
+    out[1] = *((u64 *)&in[8]);
+    out[2] = *((u64 *)&in[16]);
+    out[3] = *((u64 *)&in[24]);
+}
+
+/*
+ * smallfelem_to_bin32 takes a smallfelem and serialises into a little
+ * endian, 32 byte array. This assumes that the CPU is little-endian.
+ */
+static void smallfelem_to_bin32(u8 out[32], const smallfelem in)
+{
+    *((u64 *)&out[0]) = in[0];
+    *((u64 *)&out[8]) = in[1];
+    *((u64 *)&out[16]) = in[2];
+    *((u64 *)&out[24]) = in[3];
+}
+
+/* To preserve endianness when using BN_bn2bin and BN_bin2bn */
+static void flip_endian(u8 *out, const u8 *in, unsigned len)
+{
+    unsigned i;
+    for (i = 0; i < len; ++i)
+        out[i] = in[len - 1 - i];
+}
+
+/* BN_to_felem converts an OpenSSL BIGNUM into an felem */
+static int BN_to_felem(felem out, const BIGNUM *bn)
+{
+    felem_bytearray b_in;
+    felem_bytearray b_out;
+    unsigned num_bytes;
+
+    /* BN_bn2bin eats leading zeroes */
+    memset(b_out, 0, sizeof(b_out));
+    num_bytes = BN_num_bytes(bn);
+    if (num_bytes > sizeof(b_out)) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_BN_TO_FELEM, EC_R_BIGNUM_OUT_OF_RANGE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (BN_is_negative(bn)) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_BN_TO_FELEM, EC_R_BIGNUM_OUT_OF_RANGE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    num_bytes = BN_bn2bin(bn, b_in);
+    flip_endian(b_out, b_in, num_bytes);
+    bin32_to_felem(out, b_out);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* felem_to_BN converts an felem into an OpenSSL BIGNUM */
+static BIGNUM *smallfelem_to_BN(BIGNUM *out, const smallfelem in)
+{
+    felem_bytearray b_in, b_out;
+    smallfelem_to_bin32(b_in, in);
+    flip_endian(b_out, b_in, sizeof(b_out));
+    return BN_bin2bn(b_out, sizeof(b_out), out);
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Field operations
+ * ----------------
+ */
+
+static void smallfelem_one(smallfelem out)
+{
+    out[0] = 1;
+    out[1] = 0;
+    out[2] = 0;
+    out[3] = 0;
+}
+
+static void smallfelem_assign(smallfelem out, const smallfelem in)
+{
+    out[0] = in[0];
+    out[1] = in[1];
+    out[2] = in[2];
+    out[3] = in[3];
+}
+
+static void felem_assign(felem out, const felem in)
+{
+    out[0] = in[0];
+    out[1] = in[1];
+    out[2] = in[2];
+    out[3] = in[3];
+}
+
+/* felem_sum sets out = out + in. */
+static void felem_sum(felem out, const felem in)
+{
+    out[0] += in[0];
+    out[1] += in[1];
+    out[2] += in[2];
+    out[3] += in[3];
+}
+
+/* felem_small_sum sets out = out + in. */
+static void felem_small_sum(felem out, const smallfelem in)
+{
+    out[0] += in[0];
+    out[1] += in[1];
+    out[2] += in[2];
+    out[3] += in[3];
+}
+
+/* felem_scalar sets out = out * scalar */
+static void felem_scalar(felem out, const u64 scalar)
+{
+    out[0] *= scalar;
+    out[1] *= scalar;
+    out[2] *= scalar;
+    out[3] *= scalar;
+}
+
+/* longfelem_scalar sets out = out * scalar */
+static void longfelem_scalar(longfelem out, const u64 scalar)
+{
+    out[0] *= scalar;
+    out[1] *= scalar;
+    out[2] *= scalar;
+    out[3] *= scalar;
+    out[4] *= scalar;
+    out[5] *= scalar;
+    out[6] *= scalar;
+    out[7] *= scalar;
+}
+
+# define two105m41m9 (((limb)1) << 105) - (((limb)1) << 41) - (((limb)1) << 9)
+# define two105 (((limb)1) << 105)
+# define two105m41p9 (((limb)1) << 105) - (((limb)1) << 41) + (((limb)1) << 9)
+
+/* zero105 is 0 mod p */
+static const felem zero105 =
+    { two105m41m9, two105, two105m41p9, two105m41p9 };
+
+/*-
+ * smallfelem_neg sets |out| to |-small|
+ * On exit:
+ *   out[i] < out[i] + 2^105
+ */
+static void smallfelem_neg(felem out, const smallfelem small)
+{
+    /* In order to prevent underflow, we subtract from 0 mod p. */
+    out[0] = zero105[0] - small[0];
+    out[1] = zero105[1] - small[1];
+    out[2] = zero105[2] - small[2];
+    out[3] = zero105[3] - small[3];
+}
+
+/*-
+ * felem_diff subtracts |in| from |out|
+ * On entry:
+ *   in[i] < 2^104
+ * On exit:
+ *   out[i] < out[i] + 2^105
+ */
+static void felem_diff(felem out, const felem in)
+{
+    /*
+     * In order to prevent underflow, we add 0 mod p before subtracting.
+     */
+    out[0] += zero105[0];
+    out[1] += zero105[1];
+    out[2] += zero105[2];
+    out[3] += zero105[3];
+
+    out[0] -= in[0];
+    out[1] -= in[1];
+    out[2] -= in[2];
+    out[3] -= in[3];
+}
+
+# define two107m43m11 (((limb)1) << 107) - (((limb)1) << 43) - (((limb)1) << 11)
+# define two107 (((limb)1) << 107)
+# define two107m43p11 (((limb)1) << 107) - (((limb)1) << 43) + (((limb)1) << 11)
+
+/* zero107 is 0 mod p */
+static const felem zero107 =
+    { two107m43m11, two107, two107m43p11, two107m43p11 };
+
+/*-
+ * An alternative felem_diff for larger inputs |in|
+ * felem_diff_zero107 subtracts |in| from |out|
+ * On entry:
+ *   in[i] < 2^106
+ * On exit:
+ *   out[i] < out[i] + 2^107
+ */
+static void felem_diff_zero107(felem out, const felem in)
+{
+    /*
+     * In order to prevent underflow, we add 0 mod p before subtracting.
+     */
+    out[0] += zero107[0];
+    out[1] += zero107[1];
+    out[2] += zero107[2];
+    out[3] += zero107[3];
+
+    out[0] -= in[0];
+    out[1] -= in[1];
+    out[2] -= in[2];
+    out[3] -= in[3];
+}
+
+/*-
+ * longfelem_diff subtracts |in| from |out|
+ * On entry:
+ *   in[i] < 7*2^67
+ * On exit:
+ *   out[i] < out[i] + 2^70 + 2^40
+ */
+static void longfelem_diff(longfelem out, const longfelem in)
+{
+    static const limb two70m8p6 =
+        (((limb) 1) << 70) - (((limb) 1) << 8) + (((limb) 1) << 6);
+    static const limb two70p40 = (((limb) 1) << 70) + (((limb) 1) << 40);
+    static const limb two70 = (((limb) 1) << 70);
+    static const limb two70m40m38p6 =
+        (((limb) 1) << 70) - (((limb) 1) << 40) - (((limb) 1) << 38) +
+        (((limb) 1) << 6);
+    static const limb two70m6 = (((limb) 1) << 70) - (((limb) 1) << 6);
+
+    /* add 0 mod p to avoid underflow */
+    out[0] += two70m8p6;
+    out[1] += two70p40;
+    out[2] += two70;
+    out[3] += two70m40m38p6;
+    out[4] += two70m6;
+    out[5] += two70m6;
+    out[6] += two70m6;
+    out[7] += two70m6;
+
+    /* in[i] < 7*2^67 < 2^70 - 2^40 - 2^38 + 2^6 */
+    out[0] -= in[0];
+    out[1] -= in[1];
+    out[2] -= in[2];
+    out[3] -= in[3];
+    out[4] -= in[4];
+    out[5] -= in[5];
+    out[6] -= in[6];
+    out[7] -= in[7];
+}
+
+# define two64m0 (((limb)1) << 64) - 1
+# define two110p32m0 (((limb)1) << 110) + (((limb)1) << 32) - 1
+# define two64m46 (((limb)1) << 64) - (((limb)1) << 46)
+# define two64m32 (((limb)1) << 64) - (((limb)1) << 32)
+
+/* zero110 is 0 mod p */
+static const felem zero110 = { two64m0, two110p32m0, two64m46, two64m32 };
+
+/*-
+ * felem_shrink converts an felem into a smallfelem. The result isn't quite
+ * minimal as the value may be greater than p.
+ *
+ * On entry:
+ *   in[i] < 2^109
+ * On exit:
+ *   out[i] < 2^64
+ */
+static void felem_shrink(smallfelem out, const felem in)
+{
+    felem tmp;
+    u64 a, b, mask;
+    u64 high, low;
+    static const u64 kPrime3Test = 0x7fffffff00000001ul; /* 2^63 - 2^32 + 1 */
+
+    /* Carry 2->3 */
+    tmp[3] = zero110[3] + in[3] + ((u64)(in[2] >> 64));
+    /* tmp[3] < 2^110 */
+
+    tmp[2] = zero110[2] + (u64)in[2];
+    tmp[0] = zero110[0] + in[0];
+    tmp[1] = zero110[1] + in[1];
+    /* tmp[0] < 2**110, tmp[1] < 2^111, tmp[2] < 2**65 */
+
+    /*
+     * We perform two partial reductions where we eliminate the high-word of
+     * tmp[3]. We don't update the other words till the end.
+     */
+    a = tmp[3] >> 64;           /* a < 2^46 */
+    tmp[3] = (u64)tmp[3];
+    tmp[3] -= a;
+    tmp[3] += ((limb) a) << 32;
+    /* tmp[3] < 2^79 */
+
+    b = a;
+    a = tmp[3] >> 64;           /* a < 2^15 */
+    b += a;                     /* b < 2^46 + 2^15 < 2^47 */
+    tmp[3] = (u64)tmp[3];
+    tmp[3] -= a;
+    tmp[3] += ((limb) a) << 32;
+    /* tmp[3] < 2^64 + 2^47 */
+
+    /*
+     * This adjusts the other two words to complete the two partial
+     * reductions.
+     */
+    tmp[0] += b;
+    tmp[1] -= (((limb) b) << 32);
+
+    /*
+     * In order to make space in tmp[3] for the carry from 2 -> 3, we
+     * conditionally subtract kPrime if tmp[3] is large enough.
+     */
+    high = (u64)(tmp[3] >> 64);
+    /* As tmp[3] < 2^65, high is either 1 or 0 */
+    high = 0 - high;
+    /*-
+     * high is:
+     *   all ones   if the high word of tmp[3] is 1
+     *   all zeros  if the high word of tmp[3] if 0
+     */
+    low = (u64)tmp[3];
+    mask = 0 - (low >> 63);
+    /*-
+     * mask is:
+     *   all ones   if the MSB of low is 1
+     *   all zeros  if the MSB of low if 0
+     */
+    low &= bottom63bits;
+    low -= kPrime3Test;
+    /* if low was greater than kPrime3Test then the MSB is zero */
+    low = ~low;
+    low = 0 - (low >> 63);
+    /*-
+     * low is:
+     *   all ones   if low was > kPrime3Test
+     *   all zeros  if low was <= kPrime3Test
+     */
+    mask = (mask & low) | high;
+    tmp[0] -= mask & kPrime[0];
+    tmp[1] -= mask & kPrime[1];
+    /* kPrime[2] is zero, so omitted */
+    tmp[3] -= mask & kPrime[3];
+    /* tmp[3] < 2**64 - 2**32 + 1 */
+
+    tmp[1] += ((u64)(tmp[0] >> 64));
+    tmp[0] = (u64)tmp[0];
+    tmp[2] += ((u64)(tmp[1] >> 64));
+    tmp[1] = (u64)tmp[1];
+    tmp[3] += ((u64)(tmp[2] >> 64));
+    tmp[2] = (u64)tmp[2];
+    /* tmp[i] < 2^64 */
+
+    out[0] = tmp[0];
+    out[1] = tmp[1];
+    out[2] = tmp[2];
+    out[3] = tmp[3];
+}
+
+/* smallfelem_expand converts a smallfelem to an felem */
+static void smallfelem_expand(felem out, const smallfelem in)
+{
+    out[0] = in[0];
+    out[1] = in[1];
+    out[2] = in[2];
+    out[3] = in[3];
+}
+
+/*-
+ * smallfelem_square sets |out| = |small|^2
+ * On entry:
+ *   small[i] < 2^64
+ * On exit:
+ *   out[i] < 7 * 2^64 < 2^67
+ */
+static void smallfelem_square(longfelem out, const smallfelem small)
+{
+    limb a;
+    u64 high, low;
+
+    a = ((uint128_t) small[0]) * small[0];
+    low = a;
+    high = a >> 64;
+    out[0] = low;
+    out[1] = high;
+
+    a = ((uint128_t) small[0]) * small[1];
+    low = a;
+    high = a >> 64;
+    out[1] += low;
+    out[1] += low;
+    out[2] = high;
+
+    a = ((uint128_t) small[0]) * small[2];
+    low = a;
+    high = a >> 64;
+    out[2] += low;
+    out[2] *= 2;
+    out[3] = high;
+
+    a = ((uint128_t) small[0]) * small[3];
+    low = a;
+    high = a >> 64;
+    out[3] += low;
+    out[4] = high;
+
+    a = ((uint128_t) small[1]) * small[2];
+    low = a;
+    high = a >> 64;
+    out[3] += low;
+    out[3] *= 2;
+    out[4] += high;
+
+    a = ((uint128_t) small[1]) * small[1];
+    low = a;
+    high = a >> 64;
+    out[2] += low;
+    out[3] += high;
+
+    a = ((uint128_t) small[1]) * small[3];
+    low = a;
+    high = a >> 64;
+    out[4] += low;
+    out[4] *= 2;
+    out[5] = high;
+
+    a = ((uint128_t) small[2]) * small[3];
+    low = a;
+    high = a >> 64;
+    out[5] += low;
+    out[5] *= 2;
+    out[6] = high;
+    out[6] += high;
+
+    a = ((uint128_t) small[2]) * small[2];
+    low = a;
+    high = a >> 64;
+    out[4] += low;
+    out[5] += high;
+
+    a = ((uint128_t) small[3]) * small[3];
+    low = a;
+    high = a >> 64;
+    out[6] += low;
+    out[7] = high;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * felem_square sets |out| = |in|^2
+ * On entry:
+ *   in[i] < 2^109
+ * On exit:
+ *   out[i] < 7 * 2^64 < 2^67
+ */
+static void felem_square(longfelem out, const felem in)
+{
+    u64 small[4];
+    felem_shrink(small, in);
+    smallfelem_square(out, small);
+}
+
+/*-
+ * smallfelem_mul sets |out| = |small1| * |small2|
+ * On entry:
+ *   small1[i] < 2^64
+ *   small2[i] < 2^64
+ * On exit:
+ *   out[i] < 7 * 2^64 < 2^67
+ */
+static void smallfelem_mul(longfelem out, const smallfelem small1,
+                           const smallfelem small2)
+{
+    limb a;
+    u64 high, low;
+
+    a = ((uint128_t) small1[0]) * small2[0];
+    low = a;
+    high = a >> 64;
+    out[0] = low;
+    out[1] = high;
+
+    a = ((uint128_t) small1[0]) * small2[1];
+    low = a;
+    high = a >> 64;
+    out[1] += low;
+    out[2] = high;
+
+    a = ((uint128_t) small1[1]) * small2[0];
+    low = a;
+    high = a >> 64;
+    out[1] += low;
+    out[2] += high;
+
+    a = ((uint128_t) small1[0]) * small2[2];
+    low = a;
+    high = a >> 64;
+    out[2] += low;
+    out[3] = high;
+
+    a = ((uint128_t) small1[1]) * small2[1];
+    low = a;
+    high = a >> 64;
+    out[2] += low;
+    out[3] += high;
+
+    a = ((uint128_t) small1[2]) * small2[0];
+    low = a;
+    high = a >> 64;
+    out[2] += low;
+    out[3] += high;
+
+    a = ((uint128_t) small1[0]) * small2[3];
+    low = a;
+    high = a >> 64;
+    out[3] += low;
+    out[4] = high;
+
+    a = ((uint128_t) small1[1]) * small2[2];
+    low = a;
+    high = a >> 64;
+    out[3] += low;
+    out[4] += high;
+
+    a = ((uint128_t) small1[2]) * small2[1];
+    low = a;
+    high = a >> 64;
+    out[3] += low;
+    out[4] += high;
+
+    a = ((uint128_t) small1[3]) * small2[0];
+    low = a;
+    high = a >> 64;
+    out[3] += low;
+    out[4] += high;
+
+    a = ((uint128_t) small1[1]) * small2[3];
+    low = a;
+    high = a >> 64;
+    out[4] += low;
+    out[5] = high;
+
+    a = ((uint128_t) small1[2]) * small2[2];
+    low = a;
+    high = a >> 64;
+    out[4] += low;
+    out[5] += high;
+
+    a = ((uint128_t) small1[3]) * small2[1];
+    low = a;
+    high = a >> 64;
+    out[4] += low;
+    out[5] += high;
+
+    a = ((uint128_t) small1[2]) * small2[3];
+    low = a;
+    high = a >> 64;
+    out[5] += low;
+    out[6] = high;
+
+    a = ((uint128_t) small1[3]) * small2[2];
+    low = a;
+    high = a >> 64;
+    out[5] += low;
+    out[6] += high;
+
+    a = ((uint128_t) small1[3]) * small2[3];
+    low = a;
+    high = a >> 64;
+    out[6] += low;
+    out[7] = high;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * felem_mul sets |out| = |in1| * |in2|
+ * On entry:
+ *   in1[i] < 2^109
+ *   in2[i] < 2^109
+ * On exit:
+ *   out[i] < 7 * 2^64 < 2^67
+ */
+static void felem_mul(longfelem out, const felem in1, const felem in2)
+{
+    smallfelem small1, small2;
+    felem_shrink(small1, in1);
+    felem_shrink(small2, in2);
+    smallfelem_mul(out, small1, small2);
+}
+
+/*-
+ * felem_small_mul sets |out| = |small1| * |in2|
+ * On entry:
+ *   small1[i] < 2^64
+ *   in2[i] < 2^109
+ * On exit:
+ *   out[i] < 7 * 2^64 < 2^67
+ */
+static void felem_small_mul(longfelem out, const smallfelem small1,
+                            const felem in2)
+{
+    smallfelem small2;
+    felem_shrink(small2, in2);
+    smallfelem_mul(out, small1, small2);
+}
+
+# define two100m36m4 (((limb)1) << 100) - (((limb)1) << 36) - (((limb)1) << 4)
+# define two100 (((limb)1) << 100)
+# define two100m36p4 (((limb)1) << 100) - (((limb)1) << 36) + (((limb)1) << 4)
+/* zero100 is 0 mod p */
+static const felem zero100 =
+    { two100m36m4, two100, two100m36p4, two100m36p4 };
+
+/*-
+ * Internal function for the different flavours of felem_reduce.
+ * felem_reduce_ reduces the higher coefficients in[4]-in[7].
+ * On entry:
+ *   out[0] >= in[6] + 2^32*in[6] + in[7] + 2^32*in[7]
+ *   out[1] >= in[7] + 2^32*in[4]
+ *   out[2] >= in[5] + 2^32*in[5]
+ *   out[3] >= in[4] + 2^32*in[5] + 2^32*in[6]
+ * On exit:
+ *   out[0] <= out[0] + in[4] + 2^32*in[5]
+ *   out[1] <= out[1] + in[5] + 2^33*in[6]
+ *   out[2] <= out[2] + in[7] + 2*in[6] + 2^33*in[7]
+ *   out[3] <= out[3] + 2^32*in[4] + 3*in[7]
+ */
+static void felem_reduce_(felem out, const longfelem in)
+{
+    int128_t c;
+    /* combine common terms from below */
+    c = in[4] + (in[5] << 32);
+    out[0] += c;
+    out[3] -= c;
+
+    c = in[5] - in[7];
+    out[1] += c;
+    out[2] -= c;
+
+    /* the remaining terms */
+    /* 256: [(0,1),(96,-1),(192,-1),(224,1)] */
+    out[1] -= (in[4] << 32);
+    out[3] += (in[4] << 32);
+
+    /* 320: [(32,1),(64,1),(128,-1),(160,-1),(224,-1)] */
+    out[2] -= (in[5] << 32);
+
+    /* 384: [(0,-1),(32,-1),(96,2),(128,2),(224,-1)] */
+    out[0] -= in[6];
+    out[0] -= (in[6] << 32);
+    out[1] += (in[6] << 33);
+    out[2] += (in[6] * 2);
+    out[3] -= (in[6] << 32);
+
+    /* 448: [(0,-1),(32,-1),(64,-1),(128,1),(160,2),(192,3)] */
+    out[0] -= in[7];
+    out[0] -= (in[7] << 32);
+    out[2] += (in[7] << 33);
+    out[3] += (in[7] * 3);
+}
+
+/*-
+ * felem_reduce converts a longfelem into an felem.
+ * To be called directly after felem_square or felem_mul.
+ * On entry:
+ *   in[0] < 2^64, in[1] < 3*2^64, in[2] < 5*2^64, in[3] < 7*2^64
+ *   in[4] < 7*2^64, in[5] < 5*2^64, in[6] < 3*2^64, in[7] < 2*64
+ * On exit:
+ *   out[i] < 2^101
+ */
+static void felem_reduce(felem out, const longfelem in)
+{
+    out[0] = zero100[0] + in[0];
+    out[1] = zero100[1] + in[1];
+    out[2] = zero100[2] + in[2];
+    out[3] = zero100[3] + in[3];
+
+    felem_reduce_(out, in);
+
+    /*-
+     * out[0] > 2^100 - 2^36 - 2^4 - 3*2^64 - 3*2^96 - 2^64 - 2^96 > 0
+     * out[1] > 2^100 - 2^64 - 7*2^96 > 0
+     * out[2] > 2^100 - 2^36 + 2^4 - 5*2^64 - 5*2^96 > 0
+     * out[3] > 2^100 - 2^36 + 2^4 - 7*2^64 - 5*2^96 - 3*2^96 > 0
+     *
+     * out[0] < 2^100 + 2^64 + 7*2^64 + 5*2^96 < 2^101
+     * out[1] < 2^100 + 3*2^64 + 5*2^64 + 3*2^97 < 2^101
+     * out[2] < 2^100 + 5*2^64 + 2^64 + 3*2^65 + 2^97 < 2^101
+     * out[3] < 2^100 + 7*2^64 + 7*2^96 + 3*2^64 < 2^101
+     */
+}
+
+/*-
+ * felem_reduce_zero105 converts a larger longfelem into an felem.
+ * On entry:
+ *   in[0] < 2^71
+ * On exit:
+ *   out[i] < 2^106
+ */
+static void felem_reduce_zero105(felem out, const longfelem in)
+{
+    out[0] = zero105[0] + in[0];
+    out[1] = zero105[1] + in[1];
+    out[2] = zero105[2] + in[2];
+    out[3] = zero105[3] + in[3];
+
+    felem_reduce_(out, in);
+
+    /*-
+     * out[0] > 2^105 - 2^41 - 2^9 - 2^71 - 2^103 - 2^71 - 2^103 > 0
+     * out[1] > 2^105 - 2^71 - 2^103 > 0
+     * out[2] > 2^105 - 2^41 + 2^9 - 2^71 - 2^103 > 0
+     * out[3] > 2^105 - 2^41 + 2^9 - 2^71 - 2^103 - 2^103 > 0
+     *
+     * out[0] < 2^105 + 2^71 + 2^71 + 2^103 < 2^106
+     * out[1] < 2^105 + 2^71 + 2^71 + 2^103 < 2^106
+     * out[2] < 2^105 + 2^71 + 2^71 + 2^71 + 2^103 < 2^106
+     * out[3] < 2^105 + 2^71 + 2^103 + 2^71 < 2^106
+     */
+}
+
+/*
+ * subtract_u64 sets *result = *result - v and *carry to one if the
+ * subtraction underflowed.
+ */
+static void subtract_u64(u64 *result, u64 *carry, u64 v)
+{
+    uint128_t r = *result;
+    r -= v;
+    *carry = (r >> 64) & 1;
+    *result = (u64)r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * felem_contract converts |in| to its unique, minimal representation. On
+ * entry: in[i] < 2^109
+ */
+static void felem_contract(smallfelem out, const felem in)
+{
+    unsigned i;
+    u64 all_equal_so_far = 0, result = 0, carry;
+
+    felem_shrink(out, in);
+    /* small is minimal except that the value might be > p */
+
+    all_equal_so_far--;
+    /*
+     * We are doing a constant time test if out >= kPrime. We need to compare
+     * each u64, from most-significant to least significant. For each one, if
+     * all words so far have been equal (m is all ones) then a non-equal
+     * result is the answer. Otherwise we continue.
+     */
+    for (i = 3; i < 4; i--) {
+        u64 equal;
+        uint128_t a = ((uint128_t) kPrime[i]) - out[i];
+        /*
+         * if out[i] > kPrime[i] then a will underflow and the high 64-bits
+         * will all be set.
+         */
+        result |= all_equal_so_far & ((u64)(a >> 64));
+
+        /*
+         * if kPrime[i] == out[i] then |equal| will be all zeros and the
+         * decrement will make it all ones.
+         */
+        equal = kPrime[i] ^ out[i];
+        equal--;
+        equal &= equal << 32;
+        equal &= equal << 16;
+        equal &= equal << 8;
+        equal &= equal << 4;
+        equal &= equal << 2;
+        equal &= equal << 1;
+        equal = 0 - (equal >> 63);
+
+        all_equal_so_far &= equal;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * if all_equal_so_far is still all ones then the two values are equal
+     * and so out >= kPrime is true.
+     */
+    result |= all_equal_so_far;
+
+    /* if out >= kPrime then we subtract kPrime. */
+    subtract_u64(&out[0], &carry, result & kPrime[0]);
+    subtract_u64(&out[1], &carry, carry);
+    subtract_u64(&out[2], &carry, carry);
+    subtract_u64(&out[3], &carry, carry);
+
+    subtract_u64(&out[1], &carry, result & kPrime[1]);
+    subtract_u64(&out[2], &carry, carry);
+    subtract_u64(&out[3], &carry, carry);
+
+    subtract_u64(&out[2], &carry, result & kPrime[2]);
+    subtract_u64(&out[3], &carry, carry);
+
+    subtract_u64(&out[3], &carry, result & kPrime[3]);
+}
+
+static void smallfelem_square_contract(smallfelem out, const smallfelem in)
+{
+    longfelem longtmp;
+    felem tmp;
+
+    smallfelem_square(longtmp, in);
+    felem_reduce(tmp, longtmp);
+    felem_contract(out, tmp);
+}
+
+static void smallfelem_mul_contract(smallfelem out, const smallfelem in1,
+                                    const smallfelem in2)
+{
+    longfelem longtmp;
+    felem tmp;
+
+    smallfelem_mul(longtmp, in1, in2);
+    felem_reduce(tmp, longtmp);
+    felem_contract(out, tmp);
+}
+
+/*-
+ * felem_is_zero returns a limb with all bits set if |in| == 0 (mod p) and 0
+ * otherwise.
+ * On entry:
+ *   small[i] < 2^64
+ */
+static limb smallfelem_is_zero(const smallfelem small)
+{
+    limb result;
+    u64 is_p;
+
+    u64 is_zero = small[0] | small[1] | small[2] | small[3];
+    is_zero--;
+    is_zero &= is_zero << 32;
+    is_zero &= is_zero << 16;
+    is_zero &= is_zero << 8;
+    is_zero &= is_zero << 4;
+    is_zero &= is_zero << 2;
+    is_zero &= is_zero << 1;
+    is_zero = 0 - (is_zero >> 63);
+
+    is_p = (small[0] ^ kPrime[0]) |
+        (small[1] ^ kPrime[1]) |
+        (small[2] ^ kPrime[2]) | (small[3] ^ kPrime[3]);
+    is_p--;
+    is_p &= is_p << 32;
+    is_p &= is_p << 16;
+    is_p &= is_p << 8;
+    is_p &= is_p << 4;
+    is_p &= is_p << 2;
+    is_p &= is_p << 1;
+    is_p = 0 - (is_p >> 63);
+
+    is_zero |= is_p;
+
+    result = is_zero;
+    result |= ((limb) is_zero) << 64;
+    return result;
+}
+
+static int smallfelem_is_zero_int(const void *small)
+{
+    return (int)(smallfelem_is_zero(small) & ((limb) 1));
+}
+
+/*-
+ * felem_inv calculates |out| = |in|^{-1}
+ *
+ * Based on Fermat's Little Theorem:
+ *   a^p = a (mod p)
+ *   a^{p-1} = 1 (mod p)
+ *   a^{p-2} = a^{-1} (mod p)
+ */
+static void felem_inv(felem out, const felem in)
+{
+    felem ftmp, ftmp2;
+    /* each e_I will hold |in|^{2^I - 1} */
+    felem e2, e4, e8, e16, e32, e64;
+    longfelem tmp;
+    unsigned i;
+
+    felem_square(tmp, in);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp);    /* 2^1 */
+    felem_mul(tmp, in, ftmp);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp);    /* 2^2 - 2^0 */
+    felem_assign(e2, ftmp);
+    felem_square(tmp, ftmp);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp);    /* 2^3 - 2^1 */
+    felem_square(tmp, ftmp);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp);    /* 2^4 - 2^2 */
+    felem_mul(tmp, ftmp, e2);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp);    /* 2^4 - 2^0 */
+    felem_assign(e4, ftmp);
+    felem_square(tmp, ftmp);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp);    /* 2^5 - 2^1 */
+    felem_square(tmp, ftmp);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp);    /* 2^6 - 2^2 */
+    felem_square(tmp, ftmp);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp);    /* 2^7 - 2^3 */
+    felem_square(tmp, ftmp);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp);    /* 2^8 - 2^4 */
+    felem_mul(tmp, ftmp, e4);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp);    /* 2^8 - 2^0 */
+    felem_assign(e8, ftmp);
+    for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+        felem_square(tmp, ftmp);
+        felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp);
+    }                           /* 2^16 - 2^8 */
+    felem_mul(tmp, ftmp, e8);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp);    /* 2^16 - 2^0 */
+    felem_assign(e16, ftmp);
+    for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
+        felem_square(tmp, ftmp);
+        felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp);
+    }                           /* 2^32 - 2^16 */
+    felem_mul(tmp, ftmp, e16);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp);    /* 2^32 - 2^0 */
+    felem_assign(e32, ftmp);
+    for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
+        felem_square(tmp, ftmp);
+        felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp);
+    }                           /* 2^64 - 2^32 */
+    felem_assign(e64, ftmp);
+    felem_mul(tmp, ftmp, in);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp);    /* 2^64 - 2^32 + 2^0 */
+    for (i = 0; i < 192; i++) {
+        felem_square(tmp, ftmp);
+        felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp);
+    }                           /* 2^256 - 2^224 + 2^192 */
+
+    felem_mul(tmp, e64, e32);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp2, tmp);   /* 2^64 - 2^0 */
+    for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
+        felem_square(tmp, ftmp2);
+        felem_reduce(ftmp2, tmp);
+    }                           /* 2^80 - 2^16 */
+    felem_mul(tmp, ftmp2, e16);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp2, tmp);   /* 2^80 - 2^0 */
+    for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+        felem_square(tmp, ftmp2);
+        felem_reduce(ftmp2, tmp);
+    }                           /* 2^88 - 2^8 */
+    felem_mul(tmp, ftmp2, e8);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp2, tmp);   /* 2^88 - 2^0 */
+    for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
+        felem_square(tmp, ftmp2);
+        felem_reduce(ftmp2, tmp);
+    }                           /* 2^92 - 2^4 */
+    felem_mul(tmp, ftmp2, e4);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp2, tmp);   /* 2^92 - 2^0 */
+    felem_square(tmp, ftmp2);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp2, tmp);   /* 2^93 - 2^1 */
+    felem_square(tmp, ftmp2);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp2, tmp);   /* 2^94 - 2^2 */
+    felem_mul(tmp, ftmp2, e2);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp2, tmp);   /* 2^94 - 2^0 */
+    felem_square(tmp, ftmp2);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp2, tmp);   /* 2^95 - 2^1 */
+    felem_square(tmp, ftmp2);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp2, tmp);   /* 2^96 - 2^2 */
+    felem_mul(tmp, ftmp2, in);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp2, tmp);   /* 2^96 - 3 */
+
+    felem_mul(tmp, ftmp2, ftmp);
+    felem_reduce(out, tmp);     /* 2^256 - 2^224 + 2^192 + 2^96 - 3 */
+}
+
+static void smallfelem_inv_contract(smallfelem out, const smallfelem in)
+{
+    felem tmp;
+
+    smallfelem_expand(tmp, in);
+    felem_inv(tmp, tmp);
+    felem_contract(out, tmp);
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Group operations
+ * ----------------
+ *
+ * Building on top of the field operations we have the operations on the
+ * elliptic curve group itself. Points on the curve are represented in Jacobian
+ * coordinates
+ */
+
+/*-
+ * point_double calculates 2*(x_in, y_in, z_in)
+ *
+ * The method is taken from:
+ *   http://hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-shortw-jacobian-3.html#doubling-dbl-2001-b
+ *
+ * Outputs can equal corresponding inputs, i.e., x_out == x_in is allowed.
+ * while x_out == y_in is not (maybe this works, but it's not tested).
+ */
+static void
+point_double(felem x_out, felem y_out, felem z_out,
+             const felem x_in, const felem y_in, const felem z_in)
+{
+    longfelem tmp, tmp2;
+    felem delta, gamma, beta, alpha, ftmp, ftmp2;
+    smallfelem small1, small2;
+
+    felem_assign(ftmp, x_in);
+    /* ftmp[i] < 2^106 */
+    felem_assign(ftmp2, x_in);
+    /* ftmp2[i] < 2^106 */
+
+    /* delta = z^2 */
+    felem_square(tmp, z_in);
+    felem_reduce(delta, tmp);
+    /* delta[i] < 2^101 */
+
+    /* gamma = y^2 */
+    felem_square(tmp, y_in);
+    felem_reduce(gamma, tmp);
+    /* gamma[i] < 2^101 */
+    felem_shrink(small1, gamma);
+
+    /* beta = x*gamma */
+    felem_small_mul(tmp, small1, x_in);
+    felem_reduce(beta, tmp);
+    /* beta[i] < 2^101 */
+
+    /* alpha = 3*(x-delta)*(x+delta) */
+    felem_diff(ftmp, delta);
+    /* ftmp[i] < 2^105 + 2^106 < 2^107 */
+    felem_sum(ftmp2, delta);
+    /* ftmp2[i] < 2^105 + 2^106 < 2^107 */
+    felem_scalar(ftmp2, 3);
+    /* ftmp2[i] < 3 * 2^107 < 2^109 */
+    felem_mul(tmp, ftmp, ftmp2);
+    felem_reduce(alpha, tmp);
+    /* alpha[i] < 2^101 */
+    felem_shrink(small2, alpha);
+
+    /* x' = alpha^2 - 8*beta */
+    smallfelem_square(tmp, small2);
+    felem_reduce(x_out, tmp);
+    felem_assign(ftmp, beta);
+    felem_scalar(ftmp, 8);
+    /* ftmp[i] < 8 * 2^101 = 2^104 */
+    felem_diff(x_out, ftmp);
+    /* x_out[i] < 2^105 + 2^101 < 2^106 */
+
+    /* z' = (y + z)^2 - gamma - delta */
+    felem_sum(delta, gamma);
+    /* delta[i] < 2^101 + 2^101 = 2^102 */
+    felem_assign(ftmp, y_in);
+    felem_sum(ftmp, z_in);
+    /* ftmp[i] < 2^106 + 2^106 = 2^107 */
+    felem_square(tmp, ftmp);
+    felem_reduce(z_out, tmp);
+    felem_diff(z_out, delta);
+    /* z_out[i] < 2^105 + 2^101 < 2^106 */
+
+    /* y' = alpha*(4*beta - x') - 8*gamma^2 */
+    felem_scalar(beta, 4);
+    /* beta[i] < 4 * 2^101 = 2^103 */
+    felem_diff_zero107(beta, x_out);
+    /* beta[i] < 2^107 + 2^103 < 2^108 */
+    felem_small_mul(tmp, small2, beta);
+    /* tmp[i] < 7 * 2^64 < 2^67 */
+    smallfelem_square(tmp2, small1);
+    /* tmp2[i] < 7 * 2^64 */
+    longfelem_scalar(tmp2, 8);
+    /* tmp2[i] < 8 * 7 * 2^64 = 7 * 2^67 */
+    longfelem_diff(tmp, tmp2);
+    /* tmp[i] < 2^67 + 2^70 + 2^40 < 2^71 */
+    felem_reduce_zero105(y_out, tmp);
+    /* y_out[i] < 2^106 */
+}
+
+/*
+ * point_double_small is the same as point_double, except that it operates on
+ * smallfelems
+ */
+static void
+point_double_small(smallfelem x_out, smallfelem y_out, smallfelem z_out,
+                   const smallfelem x_in, const smallfelem y_in,
+                   const smallfelem z_in)
+{
+    felem felem_x_out, felem_y_out, felem_z_out;
+    felem felem_x_in, felem_y_in, felem_z_in;
+
+    smallfelem_expand(felem_x_in, x_in);
+    smallfelem_expand(felem_y_in, y_in);
+    smallfelem_expand(felem_z_in, z_in);
+    point_double(felem_x_out, felem_y_out, felem_z_out,
+                 felem_x_in, felem_y_in, felem_z_in);
+    felem_shrink(x_out, felem_x_out);
+    felem_shrink(y_out, felem_y_out);
+    felem_shrink(z_out, felem_z_out);
+}
+
+/* copy_conditional copies in to out iff mask is all ones. */
+static void copy_conditional(felem out, const felem in, limb mask)
+{
+    unsigned i;
+    for (i = 0; i < NLIMBS; ++i) {
+        const limb tmp = mask & (in[i] ^ out[i]);
+        out[i] ^= tmp;
+    }
+}
+
+/* copy_small_conditional copies in to out iff mask is all ones. */
+static void copy_small_conditional(felem out, const smallfelem in, limb mask)
+{
+    unsigned i;
+    const u64 mask64 = mask;
+    for (i = 0; i < NLIMBS; ++i) {
+        out[i] = ((limb) (in[i] & mask64)) | (out[i] & ~mask);
+    }
+}
+
+/*-
+ * point_add calculates (x1, y1, z1) + (x2, y2, z2)
+ *
+ * The method is taken from:
+ *   http://hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-shortw-jacobian-3.html#addition-add-2007-bl,
+ * adapted for mixed addition (z2 = 1, or z2 = 0 for the point at infinity).
+ *
+ * This function includes a branch for checking whether the two input points
+ * are equal, (while not equal to the point at infinity). This case never
+ * happens during single point multiplication, so there is no timing leak for
+ * ECDH or ECDSA signing.
+ */
+static void point_add(felem x3, felem y3, felem z3,
+                      const felem x1, const felem y1, const felem z1,
+                      const int mixed, const smallfelem x2,
+                      const smallfelem y2, const smallfelem z2)
+{
+    felem ftmp, ftmp2, ftmp3, ftmp4, ftmp5, ftmp6, x_out, y_out, z_out;
+    longfelem tmp, tmp2;
+    smallfelem small1, small2, small3, small4, small5;
+    limb x_equal, y_equal, z1_is_zero, z2_is_zero;
+
+    felem_shrink(small3, z1);
+
+    z1_is_zero = smallfelem_is_zero(small3);
+    z2_is_zero = smallfelem_is_zero(z2);
+
+    /* ftmp = z1z1 = z1**2 */
+    smallfelem_square(tmp, small3);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp);
+    /* ftmp[i] < 2^101 */
+    felem_shrink(small1, ftmp);
+
+    if (!mixed) {
+        /* ftmp2 = z2z2 = z2**2 */
+        smallfelem_square(tmp, z2);
+        felem_reduce(ftmp2, tmp);
+        /* ftmp2[i] < 2^101 */
+        felem_shrink(small2, ftmp2);
+
+        felem_shrink(small5, x1);
+
+        /* u1 = ftmp3 = x1*z2z2 */
+        smallfelem_mul(tmp, small5, small2);
+        felem_reduce(ftmp3, tmp);
+        /* ftmp3[i] < 2^101 */
+
+        /* ftmp5 = z1 + z2 */
+        felem_assign(ftmp5, z1);
+        felem_small_sum(ftmp5, z2);
+        /* ftmp5[i] < 2^107 */
+
+        /* ftmp5 = (z1 + z2)**2 - (z1z1 + z2z2) = 2z1z2 */
+        felem_square(tmp, ftmp5);
+        felem_reduce(ftmp5, tmp);
+        /* ftmp2 = z2z2 + z1z1 */
+        felem_sum(ftmp2, ftmp);
+        /* ftmp2[i] < 2^101 + 2^101 = 2^102 */
+        felem_diff(ftmp5, ftmp2);
+        /* ftmp5[i] < 2^105 + 2^101 < 2^106 */
+
+        /* ftmp2 = z2 * z2z2 */
+        smallfelem_mul(tmp, small2, z2);
+        felem_reduce(ftmp2, tmp);
+
+        /* s1 = ftmp2 = y1 * z2**3 */
+        felem_mul(tmp, y1, ftmp2);
+        felem_reduce(ftmp6, tmp);
+        /* ftmp6[i] < 2^101 */
+    } else {
+        /*
+         * We'll assume z2 = 1 (special case z2 = 0 is handled later)
+         */
+
+        /* u1 = ftmp3 = x1*z2z2 */
+        felem_assign(ftmp3, x1);
+        /* ftmp3[i] < 2^106 */
+
+        /* ftmp5 = 2z1z2 */
+        felem_assign(ftmp5, z1);
+        felem_scalar(ftmp5, 2);
+        /* ftmp5[i] < 2*2^106 = 2^107 */
+
+        /* s1 = ftmp2 = y1 * z2**3 */
+        felem_assign(ftmp6, y1);
+        /* ftmp6[i] < 2^106 */
+    }
+
+    /* u2 = x2*z1z1 */
+    smallfelem_mul(tmp, x2, small1);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp4, tmp);
+
+    /* h = ftmp4 = u2 - u1 */
+    felem_diff_zero107(ftmp4, ftmp3);
+    /* ftmp4[i] < 2^107 + 2^101 < 2^108 */
+    felem_shrink(small4, ftmp4);
+
+    x_equal = smallfelem_is_zero(small4);
+
+    /* z_out = ftmp5 * h */
+    felem_small_mul(tmp, small4, ftmp5);
+    felem_reduce(z_out, tmp);
+    /* z_out[i] < 2^101 */
+
+    /* ftmp = z1 * z1z1 */
+    smallfelem_mul(tmp, small1, small3);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp);
+
+    /* s2 = tmp = y2 * z1**3 */
+    felem_small_mul(tmp, y2, ftmp);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp5, tmp);
+
+    /* r = ftmp5 = (s2 - s1)*2 */
+    felem_diff_zero107(ftmp5, ftmp6);
+    /* ftmp5[i] < 2^107 + 2^107 = 2^108 */
+    felem_scalar(ftmp5, 2);
+    /* ftmp5[i] < 2^109 */
+    felem_shrink(small1, ftmp5);
+    y_equal = smallfelem_is_zero(small1);
+
+    if (x_equal && y_equal && !z1_is_zero && !z2_is_zero) {
+        point_double(x3, y3, z3, x1, y1, z1);
+        return;
+    }
+
+    /* I = ftmp = (2h)**2 */
+    felem_assign(ftmp, ftmp4);
+    felem_scalar(ftmp, 2);
+    /* ftmp[i] < 2*2^108 = 2^109 */
+    felem_square(tmp, ftmp);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp);
+
+    /* J = ftmp2 = h * I */
+    felem_mul(tmp, ftmp4, ftmp);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp2, tmp);
+
+    /* V = ftmp4 = U1 * I */
+    felem_mul(tmp, ftmp3, ftmp);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp4, tmp);
+
+    /* x_out = r**2 - J - 2V */
+    smallfelem_square(tmp, small1);
+    felem_reduce(x_out, tmp);
+    felem_assign(ftmp3, ftmp4);
+    felem_scalar(ftmp4, 2);
+    felem_sum(ftmp4, ftmp2);
+    /* ftmp4[i] < 2*2^101 + 2^101 < 2^103 */
+    felem_diff(x_out, ftmp4);
+    /* x_out[i] < 2^105 + 2^101 */
+
+    /* y_out = r(V-x_out) - 2 * s1 * J */
+    felem_diff_zero107(ftmp3, x_out);
+    /* ftmp3[i] < 2^107 + 2^101 < 2^108 */
+    felem_small_mul(tmp, small1, ftmp3);
+    felem_mul(tmp2, ftmp6, ftmp2);
+    longfelem_scalar(tmp2, 2);
+    /* tmp2[i] < 2*2^67 = 2^68 */
+    longfelem_diff(tmp, tmp2);
+    /* tmp[i] < 2^67 + 2^70 + 2^40 < 2^71 */
+    felem_reduce_zero105(y_out, tmp);
+    /* y_out[i] < 2^106 */
+
+    copy_small_conditional(x_out, x2, z1_is_zero);
+    copy_conditional(x_out, x1, z2_is_zero);
+    copy_small_conditional(y_out, y2, z1_is_zero);
+    copy_conditional(y_out, y1, z2_is_zero);
+    copy_small_conditional(z_out, z2, z1_is_zero);
+    copy_conditional(z_out, z1, z2_is_zero);
+    felem_assign(x3, x_out);
+    felem_assign(y3, y_out);
+    felem_assign(z3, z_out);
+}
+
+/*
+ * point_add_small is the same as point_add, except that it operates on
+ * smallfelems
+ */
+static void point_add_small(smallfelem x3, smallfelem y3, smallfelem z3,
+                            smallfelem x1, smallfelem y1, smallfelem z1,
+                            smallfelem x2, smallfelem y2, smallfelem z2)
+{
+    felem felem_x3, felem_y3, felem_z3;
+    felem felem_x1, felem_y1, felem_z1;
+    smallfelem_expand(felem_x1, x1);
+    smallfelem_expand(felem_y1, y1);
+    smallfelem_expand(felem_z1, z1);
+    point_add(felem_x3, felem_y3, felem_z3, felem_x1, felem_y1, felem_z1, 0,
+              x2, y2, z2);
+    felem_shrink(x3, felem_x3);
+    felem_shrink(y3, felem_y3);
+    felem_shrink(z3, felem_z3);
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Base point pre computation
+ * --------------------------
+ *
+ * Two different sorts of precomputed tables are used in the following code.
+ * Each contain various points on the curve, where each point is three field
+ * elements (x, y, z).
+ *
+ * For the base point table, z is usually 1 (0 for the point at infinity).
+ * This table has 2 * 16 elements, starting with the following:
+ * index | bits    | point
+ * ------+---------+------------------------------
+ *     0 | 0 0 0 0 | 0G
+ *     1 | 0 0 0 1 | 1G
+ *     2 | 0 0 1 0 | 2^64G
+ *     3 | 0 0 1 1 | (2^64 + 1)G
+ *     4 | 0 1 0 0 | 2^128G
+ *     5 | 0 1 0 1 | (2^128 + 1)G
+ *     6 | 0 1 1 0 | (2^128 + 2^64)G
+ *     7 | 0 1 1 1 | (2^128 + 2^64 + 1)G
+ *     8 | 1 0 0 0 | 2^192G
+ *     9 | 1 0 0 1 | (2^192 + 1)G
+ *    10 | 1 0 1 0 | (2^192 + 2^64)G
+ *    11 | 1 0 1 1 | (2^192 + 2^64 + 1)G
+ *    12 | 1 1 0 0 | (2^192 + 2^128)G
+ *    13 | 1 1 0 1 | (2^192 + 2^128 + 1)G
+ *    14 | 1 1 1 0 | (2^192 + 2^128 + 2^64)G
+ *    15 | 1 1 1 1 | (2^192 + 2^128 + 2^64 + 1)G
+ * followed by a copy of this with each element multiplied by 2^32.
+ *
+ * The reason for this is so that we can clock bits into four different
+ * locations when doing simple scalar multiplies against the base point,
+ * and then another four locations using the second 16 elements.
+ *
+ * Tables for other points have table[i] = iG for i in 0 .. 16. */
+
+/* gmul is the table of precomputed base points */
+static const smallfelem gmul[2][16][3] = {
+    {{{0, 0, 0, 0},
+      {0, 0, 0, 0},
+      {0, 0, 0, 0}},
+     {{0xf4a13945d898c296, 0x77037d812deb33a0, 0xf8bce6e563a440f2,
+       0x6b17d1f2e12c4247},
+      {0xcbb6406837bf51f5, 0x2bce33576b315ece, 0x8ee7eb4a7c0f9e16,
+       0x4fe342e2fe1a7f9b},
+      {1, 0, 0, 0}},
+     {{0x90e75cb48e14db63, 0x29493baaad651f7e, 0x8492592e326e25de,
+       0x0fa822bc2811aaa5},
+      {0xe41124545f462ee7, 0x34b1a65050fe82f5, 0x6f4ad4bcb3df188b,
+       0xbff44ae8f5dba80d},
+      {1, 0, 0, 0}},
+     {{0x93391ce2097992af, 0xe96c98fd0d35f1fa, 0xb257c0de95e02789,
+       0x300a4bbc89d6726f},
+      {0xaa54a291c08127a0, 0x5bb1eeada9d806a5, 0x7f1ddb25ff1e3c6f,
+       0x72aac7e0d09b4644},
+      {1, 0, 0, 0}},
+     {{0x57c84fc9d789bd85, 0xfc35ff7dc297eac3, 0xfb982fd588c6766e,
+       0x447d739beedb5e67},
+      {0x0c7e33c972e25b32, 0x3d349b95a7fae500, 0xe12e9d953a4aaff7,
+       0x2d4825ab834131ee},
+      {1, 0, 0, 0}},
+     {{0x13949c932a1d367f, 0xef7fbd2b1a0a11b7, 0xddc6068bb91dfc60,
+       0xef9519328a9c72ff},
+      {0x196035a77376d8a8, 0x23183b0895ca1740, 0xc1ee9807022c219c,
+       0x611e9fc37dbb2c9b},
+      {1, 0, 0, 0}},
+     {{0xcae2b1920b57f4bc, 0x2936df5ec6c9bc36, 0x7dea6482e11238bf,
+       0x550663797b51f5d8},
+      {0x44ffe216348a964c, 0x9fb3d576dbdefbe1, 0x0afa40018d9d50e5,
+       0x157164848aecb851},
+      {1, 0, 0, 0}},
+     {{0xe48ecafffc5cde01, 0x7ccd84e70d715f26, 0xa2e8f483f43e4391,
+       0xeb5d7745b21141ea},
+      {0xcac917e2731a3479, 0x85f22cfe2844b645, 0x0990e6a158006cee,
+       0xeafd72ebdbecc17b},
+      {1, 0, 0, 0}},
+     {{0x6cf20ffb313728be, 0x96439591a3c6b94a, 0x2736ff8344315fc5,
+       0xa6d39677a7849276},
+      {0xf2bab833c357f5f4, 0x824a920c2284059b, 0x66b8babd2d27ecdf,
+       0x674f84749b0b8816},
+      {1, 0, 0, 0}},
+     {{0x2df48c04677c8a3e, 0x74e02f080203a56b, 0x31855f7db8c7fedb,
+       0x4e769e7672c9ddad},
+      {0xa4c36165b824bbb0, 0xfb9ae16f3b9122a5, 0x1ec0057206947281,
+       0x42b99082de830663},
+      {1, 0, 0, 0}},
+     {{0x6ef95150dda868b9, 0xd1f89e799c0ce131, 0x7fdc1ca008a1c478,
+       0x78878ef61c6ce04d},
+      {0x9c62b9121fe0d976, 0x6ace570ebde08d4f, 0xde53142c12309def,
+       0xb6cb3f5d7b72c321},
+      {1, 0, 0, 0}},
+     {{0x7f991ed2c31a3573, 0x5b82dd5bd54fb496, 0x595c5220812ffcae,
+       0x0c88bc4d716b1287},
+      {0x3a57bf635f48aca8, 0x7c8181f4df2564f3, 0x18d1b5b39c04e6aa,
+       0xdd5ddea3f3901dc6},
+      {1, 0, 0, 0}},
+     {{0xe96a79fb3e72ad0c, 0x43a0a28c42ba792f, 0xefe0a423083e49f3,
+       0x68f344af6b317466},
+      {0xcdfe17db3fb24d4a, 0x668bfc2271f5c626, 0x604ed93c24d67ff3,
+       0x31b9c405f8540a20},
+      {1, 0, 0, 0}},
+     {{0xd36b4789a2582e7f, 0x0d1a10144ec39c28, 0x663c62c3edbad7a0,
+       0x4052bf4b6f461db9},
+      {0x235a27c3188d25eb, 0xe724f33999bfcc5b, 0x862be6bd71d70cc8,
+       0xfecf4d5190b0fc61},
+      {1, 0, 0, 0}},
+     {{0x74346c10a1d4cfac, 0xafdf5cc08526a7a4, 0x123202a8f62bff7a,
+       0x1eddbae2c802e41a},
+      {0x8fa0af2dd603f844, 0x36e06b7e4c701917, 0x0c45f45273db33a0,
+       0x43104d86560ebcfc},
+      {1, 0, 0, 0}},
+     {{0x9615b5110d1d78e5, 0x66b0de3225c4744b, 0x0a4a46fb6aaf363a,
+       0xb48e26b484f7a21c},
+      {0x06ebb0f621a01b2d, 0xc004e4048b7b0f98, 0x64131bcdfed6f668,
+       0xfac015404d4d3dab},
+      {1, 0, 0, 0}}},
+    {{{0, 0, 0, 0},
+      {0, 0, 0, 0},
+      {0, 0, 0, 0}},
+     {{0x3a5a9e22185a5943, 0x1ab919365c65dfb6, 0x21656b32262c71da,
+       0x7fe36b40af22af89},
+      {0xd50d152c699ca101, 0x74b3d5867b8af212, 0x9f09f40407dca6f1,
+       0xe697d45825b63624},
+      {1, 0, 0, 0}},
+     {{0xa84aa9397512218e, 0xe9a521b074ca0141, 0x57880b3a18a2e902,
+       0x4a5b506612a677a6},
+      {0x0beada7a4c4f3840, 0x626db15419e26d9d, 0xc42604fbe1627d40,
+       0xeb13461ceac089f1},
+      {1, 0, 0, 0}},
+     {{0xf9faed0927a43281, 0x5e52c4144103ecbc, 0xc342967aa815c857,
+       0x0781b8291c6a220a},
+      {0x5a8343ceeac55f80, 0x88f80eeee54a05e3, 0x97b2a14f12916434,
+       0x690cde8df0151593},
+      {1, 0, 0, 0}},
+     {{0xaee9c75df7f82f2a, 0x9e4c35874afdf43a, 0xf5622df437371326,
+       0x8a535f566ec73617},
+      {0xc5f9a0ac223094b7, 0xcde533864c8c7669, 0x37e02819085a92bf,
+       0x0455c08468b08bd7},
+      {1, 0, 0, 0}},
+     {{0x0c0a6e2c9477b5d9, 0xf9a4bf62876dc444, 0x5050a949b6cdc279,
+       0x06bada7ab77f8276},
+      {0xc8b4aed1ea48dac9, 0xdebd8a4b7ea1070f, 0x427d49101366eb70,
+       0x5b476dfd0e6cb18a},
+      {1, 0, 0, 0}},
+     {{0x7c5c3e44278c340a, 0x4d54606812d66f3b, 0x29a751b1ae23c5d8,
+       0x3e29864e8a2ec908},
+      {0x142d2a6626dbb850, 0xad1744c4765bd780, 0x1f150e68e322d1ed,
+       0x239b90ea3dc31e7e},
+      {1, 0, 0, 0}},
+     {{0x78c416527a53322a, 0x305dde6709776f8e, 0xdbcab759f8862ed4,
+       0x820f4dd949f72ff7},
+      {0x6cc544a62b5debd4, 0x75be5d937b4e8cc4, 0x1b481b1b215c14d3,
+       0x140406ec783a05ec},
+      {1, 0, 0, 0}},
+     {{0x6a703f10e895df07, 0xfd75f3fa01876bd8, 0xeb5b06e70ce08ffe,
+       0x68f6b8542783dfee},
+      {0x90c76f8a78712655, 0xcf5293d2f310bf7f, 0xfbc8044dfda45028,
+       0xcbe1feba92e40ce6},
+      {1, 0, 0, 0}},
+     {{0xe998ceea4396e4c1, 0xfc82ef0b6acea274, 0x230f729f2250e927,
+       0xd0b2f94d2f420109},
+      {0x4305adddb38d4966, 0x10b838f8624c3b45, 0x7db2636658954e7a,
+       0x971459828b0719e5},
+      {1, 0, 0, 0}},
+     {{0x4bd6b72623369fc9, 0x57f2929e53d0b876, 0xc2d5cba4f2340687,
+       0x961610004a866aba},
+      {0x49997bcd2e407a5e, 0x69ab197d92ddcb24, 0x2cf1f2438fe5131c,
+       0x7acb9fadcee75e44},
+      {1, 0, 0, 0}},
+     {{0x254e839423d2d4c0, 0xf57f0c917aea685b, 0xa60d880f6f75aaea,
+       0x24eb9acca333bf5b},
+      {0xe3de4ccb1cda5dea, 0xfeef9341c51a6b4f, 0x743125f88bac4c4d,
+       0x69f891c5acd079cc},
+      {1, 0, 0, 0}},
+     {{0xeee44b35702476b5, 0x7ed031a0e45c2258, 0xb422d1e7bd6f8514,
+       0xe51f547c5972a107},
+      {0xa25bcd6fc9cf343d, 0x8ca922ee097c184e, 0xa62f98b3a9fe9a06,
+       0x1c309a2b25bb1387},
+      {1, 0, 0, 0}},
+     {{0x9295dbeb1967c459, 0xb00148833472c98e, 0xc504977708011828,
+       0x20b87b8aa2c4e503},
+      {0x3063175de057c277, 0x1bd539338fe582dd, 0x0d11adef5f69a044,
+       0xf5c6fa49919776be},
+      {1, 0, 0, 0}},
+     {{0x8c944e760fd59e11, 0x3876cba1102fad5f, 0xa454c3fad83faa56,
+       0x1ed7d1b9332010b9},
+      {0xa1011a270024b889, 0x05e4d0dcac0cd344, 0x52b520f0eb6a2a24,
+       0x3a2b03f03217257a},
+      {1, 0, 0, 0}},
+     {{0xf20fc2afdf1d043d, 0xf330240db58d5a62, 0xfc7d229ca0058c3b,
+       0x15fee545c78dd9f6},
+      {0x501e82885bc98cda, 0x41ef80e5d046ac04, 0x557d9f49461210fb,
+       0x4ab5b6b2b8753f81},
+      {1, 0, 0, 0}}}
+};
+
+/*
+ * select_point selects the |idx|th point from a precomputation table and
+ * copies it to out.
+ */
+static void select_point(const u64 idx, unsigned int size,
+                         const smallfelem pre_comp[16][3], smallfelem out[3])
+{
+    unsigned i, j;
+    u64 *outlimbs = &out[0][0];
+
+    memset(out, 0, sizeof(*out) * 3);
+
+    for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
+        const u64 *inlimbs = (u64 *)&pre_comp[i][0][0];
+        u64 mask = i ^ idx;
+        mask |= mask >> 4;
+        mask |= mask >> 2;
+        mask |= mask >> 1;
+        mask &= 1;
+        mask--;
+        for (j = 0; j < NLIMBS * 3; j++)
+            outlimbs[j] |= inlimbs[j] & mask;
+    }
+}
+
+/* get_bit returns the |i|th bit in |in| */
+static char get_bit(const felem_bytearray in, int i)
+{
+    if ((i < 0) || (i >= 256))
+        return 0;
+    return (in[i >> 3] >> (i & 7)) & 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Interleaved point multiplication using precomputed point multiples: The
+ * small point multiples 0*P, 1*P, ..., 17*P are in pre_comp[], the scalars
+ * in scalars[]. If g_scalar is non-NULL, we also add this multiple of the
+ * generator, using certain (large) precomputed multiples in g_pre_comp.
+ * Output point (X, Y, Z) is stored in x_out, y_out, z_out
+ */
+static void batch_mul(felem x_out, felem y_out, felem z_out,
+                      const felem_bytearray scalars[],
+                      const unsigned num_points, const u8 *g_scalar,
+                      const int mixed, const smallfelem pre_comp[][17][3],
+                      const smallfelem g_pre_comp[2][16][3])
+{
+    int i, skip;
+    unsigned num, gen_mul = (g_scalar != NULL);
+    felem nq[3], ftmp;
+    smallfelem tmp[3];
+    u64 bits;
+    u8 sign, digit;
+
+    /* set nq to the point at infinity */
+    memset(nq, 0, sizeof(nq));
+
+    /*
+     * Loop over all scalars msb-to-lsb, interleaving additions of multiples
+     * of the generator (two in each of the last 32 rounds) and additions of
+     * other points multiples (every 5th round).
+     */
+    skip = 1;                   /* save two point operations in the first
+                                 * round */
+    for (i = (num_points ? 255 : 31); i >= 0; --i) {
+        /* double */
+        if (!skip)
+            point_double(nq[0], nq[1], nq[2], nq[0], nq[1], nq[2]);
+
+        /* add multiples of the generator */
+        if (gen_mul && (i <= 31)) {
+            /* first, look 32 bits upwards */
+            bits = get_bit(g_scalar, i + 224) << 3;
+            bits |= get_bit(g_scalar, i + 160) << 2;
+            bits |= get_bit(g_scalar, i + 96) << 1;
+            bits |= get_bit(g_scalar, i + 32);
+            /* select the point to add, in constant time */
+            select_point(bits, 16, g_pre_comp[1], tmp);
+
+            if (!skip) {
+                /* Arg 1 below is for "mixed" */
+                point_add(nq[0], nq[1], nq[2],
+                          nq[0], nq[1], nq[2], 1, tmp[0], tmp[1], tmp[2]);
+            } else {
+                smallfelem_expand(nq[0], tmp[0]);
+                smallfelem_expand(nq[1], tmp[1]);
+                smallfelem_expand(nq[2], tmp[2]);
+                skip = 0;
+            }
+
+            /* second, look at the current position */
+            bits = get_bit(g_scalar, i + 192) << 3;
+            bits |= get_bit(g_scalar, i + 128) << 2;
+            bits |= get_bit(g_scalar, i + 64) << 1;
+            bits |= get_bit(g_scalar, i);
+            /* select the point to add, in constant time */
+            select_point(bits, 16, g_pre_comp[0], tmp);
+            /* Arg 1 below is for "mixed" */
+            point_add(nq[0], nq[1], nq[2],
+                      nq[0], nq[1], nq[2], 1, tmp[0], tmp[1], tmp[2]);
+        }
+
+        /* do other additions every 5 doublings */
+        if (num_points && (i % 5 == 0)) {
+            /* loop over all scalars */
+            for (num = 0; num < num_points; ++num) {
+                bits = get_bit(scalars[num], i + 4) << 5;
+                bits |= get_bit(scalars[num], i + 3) << 4;
+                bits |= get_bit(scalars[num], i + 2) << 3;
+                bits |= get_bit(scalars[num], i + 1) << 2;
+                bits |= get_bit(scalars[num], i) << 1;
+                bits |= get_bit(scalars[num], i - 1);
+                ec_GFp_nistp_recode_scalar_bits(&sign, &digit, bits);
+
+                /*
+                 * select the point to add or subtract, in constant time
+                 */
+                select_point(digit, 17, pre_comp[num], tmp);
+                smallfelem_neg(ftmp, tmp[1]); /* (X, -Y, Z) is the negative
+                                               * point */
+                copy_small_conditional(ftmp, tmp[1], (((limb) sign) - 1));
+                felem_contract(tmp[1], ftmp);
+
+                if (!skip) {
+                    point_add(nq[0], nq[1], nq[2],
+                              nq[0], nq[1], nq[2],
+                              mixed, tmp[0], tmp[1], tmp[2]);
+                } else {
+                    smallfelem_expand(nq[0], tmp[0]);
+                    smallfelem_expand(nq[1], tmp[1]);
+                    smallfelem_expand(nq[2], tmp[2]);
+                    skip = 0;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    felem_assign(x_out, nq[0]);
+    felem_assign(y_out, nq[1]);
+    felem_assign(z_out, nq[2]);
+}
+
+/* Precomputation for the group generator. */
+struct nistp256_pre_comp_st {
+    smallfelem g_pre_comp[2][16][3];
+    int references;
+    CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock;
+};
+
+const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_nistp256_method(void)
+{
+    static const EC_METHOD ret = {
+        EC_FLAGS_DEFAULT_OCT,
+        NID_X9_62_prime_field,
+        ec_GFp_nistp256_group_init,
+        ec_GFp_simple_group_finish,
+        ec_GFp_simple_group_clear_finish,
+        ec_GFp_nist_group_copy,
+        ec_GFp_nistp256_group_set_curve,
+        ec_GFp_simple_group_get_curve,
+        ec_GFp_simple_group_get_degree,
+        ec_group_simple_order_bits,
+        ec_GFp_simple_group_check_discriminant,
+        ec_GFp_simple_point_init,
+        ec_GFp_simple_point_finish,
+        ec_GFp_simple_point_clear_finish,
+        ec_GFp_simple_point_copy,
+        ec_GFp_simple_point_set_to_infinity,
+        ec_GFp_simple_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp,
+        ec_GFp_simple_get_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp,
+        ec_GFp_simple_point_set_affine_coordinates,
+        ec_GFp_nistp256_point_get_affine_coordinates,
+        0 /* point_set_compressed_coordinates */ ,
+        0 /* point2oct */ ,
+        0 /* oct2point */ ,
+        ec_GFp_simple_add,
+        ec_GFp_simple_dbl,
+        ec_GFp_simple_invert,
+        ec_GFp_simple_is_at_infinity,
+        ec_GFp_simple_is_on_curve,
+        ec_GFp_simple_cmp,
+        ec_GFp_simple_make_affine,
+        ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine,
+        ec_GFp_nistp256_points_mul,
+        ec_GFp_nistp256_precompute_mult,
+        ec_GFp_nistp256_have_precompute_mult,
+        ec_GFp_nist_field_mul,
+        ec_GFp_nist_field_sqr,
+        0 /* field_div */ ,
+        0 /* field_encode */ ,
+        0 /* field_decode */ ,
+        0,                      /* field_set_to_one */
+        ec_key_simple_priv2oct,
+        ec_key_simple_oct2priv,
+        0, /* set private */
+        ec_key_simple_generate_key,
+        ec_key_simple_check_key,
+        ec_key_simple_generate_public_key,
+        0, /* keycopy */
+        0, /* keyfinish */
+        ecdh_simple_compute_key
+    };
+
+    return &ret;
+}
+
+/******************************************************************************/
+/*
+ * FUNCTIONS TO MANAGE PRECOMPUTATION
+ */
+
+static NISTP256_PRE_COMP *nistp256_pre_comp_new()
+{
+    NISTP256_PRE_COMP *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
+
+    if (ret == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_NISTP256_PRE_COMP_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    ret->references = 1;
+
+    ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
+    if (ret->lock == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_NISTP256_PRE_COMP_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        OPENSSL_free(ret);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+NISTP256_PRE_COMP *EC_nistp256_pre_comp_dup(NISTP256_PRE_COMP *p)
+{
+    int i;
+    if (p != NULL)
+        CRYPTO_atomic_add(&p->references, 1, &i, p->lock);
+    return p;
+}
+
+void EC_nistp256_pre_comp_free(NISTP256_PRE_COMP *pre)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    if (pre == NULL)
+        return;
+
+    CRYPTO_atomic_add(&pre->references, -1, &i, pre->lock);
+    REF_PRINT_COUNT("EC_nistp256", x);
+    if (i > 0)
+        return;
+    REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0);
+
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(pre->lock);
+    OPENSSL_free(pre);
+}
+
+/******************************************************************************/
+/*
+ * OPENSSL EC_METHOD FUNCTIONS
+ */
+
+int ec_GFp_nistp256_group_init(EC_GROUP *group)
+{
+    int ret;
+    ret = ec_GFp_simple_group_init(group);
+    group->a_is_minus3 = 1;
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int ec_GFp_nistp256_group_set_curve(EC_GROUP *group, const BIGNUM *p,
+                                    const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
+                                    BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *curve_p, *curve_a, *curve_b;
+
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        if ((ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+            return 0;
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    if (((curve_p = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) ||
+        ((curve_a = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) ||
+        ((curve_b = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL))
+        goto err;
+    BN_bin2bn(nistp256_curve_params[0], sizeof(felem_bytearray), curve_p);
+    BN_bin2bn(nistp256_curve_params[1], sizeof(felem_bytearray), curve_a);
+    BN_bin2bn(nistp256_curve_params[2], sizeof(felem_bytearray), curve_b);
+    if ((BN_cmp(curve_p, p)) || (BN_cmp(curve_a, a)) || (BN_cmp(curve_b, b))) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP256_GROUP_SET_CURVE,
+              EC_R_WRONG_CURVE_PARAMETERS);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    group->field_mod_func = BN_nist_mod_256;
+    ret = ec_GFp_simple_group_set_curve(group, p, a, b, ctx);
+ err:
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Takes the Jacobian coordinates (X, Y, Z) of a point and returns (X', Y') =
+ * (X/Z^2, Y/Z^3)
+ */
+int ec_GFp_nistp256_point_get_affine_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *group,
+                                                 const EC_POINT *point,
+                                                 BIGNUM *x, BIGNUM *y,
+                                                 BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    felem z1, z2, x_in, y_in;
+    smallfelem x_out, y_out;
+    longfelem tmp;
+
+    if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, point)) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP256_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES,
+              EC_R_POINT_AT_INFINITY);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if ((!BN_to_felem(x_in, point->X)) || (!BN_to_felem(y_in, point->Y)) ||
+        (!BN_to_felem(z1, point->Z)))
+        return 0;
+    felem_inv(z2, z1);
+    felem_square(tmp, z2);
+    felem_reduce(z1, tmp);
+    felem_mul(tmp, x_in, z1);
+    felem_reduce(x_in, tmp);
+    felem_contract(x_out, x_in);
+    if (x != NULL) {
+        if (!smallfelem_to_BN(x, x_out)) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP256_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES,
+                  ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+    felem_mul(tmp, z1, z2);
+    felem_reduce(z1, tmp);
+    felem_mul(tmp, y_in, z1);
+    felem_reduce(y_in, tmp);
+    felem_contract(y_out, y_in);
+    if (y != NULL) {
+        if (!smallfelem_to_BN(y, y_out)) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP256_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES,
+                  ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* points below is of size |num|, and tmp_smallfelems is of size |num+1| */
+static void make_points_affine(size_t num, smallfelem points[][3],
+                               smallfelem tmp_smallfelems[])
+{
+    /*
+     * Runs in constant time, unless an input is the point at infinity (which
+     * normally shouldn't happen).
+     */
+    ec_GFp_nistp_points_make_affine_internal(num,
+                                             points,
+                                             sizeof(smallfelem),
+                                             tmp_smallfelems,
+                                             (void (*)(void *))smallfelem_one,
+                                             smallfelem_is_zero_int,
+                                             (void (*)(void *, const void *))
+                                             smallfelem_assign,
+                                             (void (*)(void *, const void *))
+                                             smallfelem_square_contract,
+                                             (void (*)
+                                              (void *, const void *,
+                                               const void *))
+                                             smallfelem_mul_contract,
+                                             (void (*)(void *, const void *))
+                                             smallfelem_inv_contract,
+                                             /* nothing to contract */
+                                             (void (*)(void *, const void *))
+                                             smallfelem_assign);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Computes scalar*generator + \sum scalars[i]*points[i], ignoring NULL
+ * values Result is stored in r (r can equal one of the inputs).
+ */
+int ec_GFp_nistp256_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
+                               const BIGNUM *scalar, size_t num,
+                               const EC_POINT *points[],
+                               const BIGNUM *scalars[], BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    int j;
+    int mixed = 0;
+    BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *x, *y, *z, *tmp_scalar;
+    felem_bytearray g_secret;
+    felem_bytearray *secrets = NULL;
+    smallfelem (*pre_comp)[17][3] = NULL;
+    smallfelem *tmp_smallfelems = NULL;
+    felem_bytearray tmp;
+    unsigned i, num_bytes;
+    int have_pre_comp = 0;
+    size_t num_points = num;
+    smallfelem x_in, y_in, z_in;
+    felem x_out, y_out, z_out;
+    NISTP256_PRE_COMP *pre = NULL;
+    const smallfelem(*g_pre_comp)[16][3] = NULL;
+    EC_POINT *generator = NULL;
+    const EC_POINT *p = NULL;
+    const BIGNUM *p_scalar = NULL;
+
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        if ((ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+            return 0;
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    if (((x = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) ||
+        ((y = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) ||
+        ((z = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) ||
+        ((tmp_scalar = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (scalar != NULL) {
+        pre = group->pre_comp.nistp256;
+        if (pre)
+            /* we have precomputation, try to use it */
+            g_pre_comp = (const smallfelem(*)[16][3])pre->g_pre_comp;
+        else
+            /* try to use the standard precomputation */
+            g_pre_comp = &gmul[0];
+        generator = EC_POINT_new(group);
+        if (generator == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        /* get the generator from precomputation */
+        if (!smallfelem_to_BN(x, g_pre_comp[0][1][0]) ||
+            !smallfelem_to_BN(y, g_pre_comp[0][1][1]) ||
+            !smallfelem_to_BN(z, g_pre_comp[0][1][2])) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP256_POINTS_MUL, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (!EC_POINT_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(group,
+                                                      generator, x, y, z,
+                                                      ctx))
+            goto err;
+        if (0 == EC_POINT_cmp(group, generator, group->generator, ctx))
+            /* precomputation matches generator */
+            have_pre_comp = 1;
+        else
+            /*
+             * we don't have valid precomputation: treat the generator as a
+             * random point
+             */
+            num_points++;
+    }
+    if (num_points > 0) {
+        if (num_points >= 3) {
+            /*
+             * unless we precompute multiples for just one or two points,
+             * converting those into affine form is time well spent
+             */
+            mixed = 1;
+        }
+        secrets = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*secrets) * num_points);
+        pre_comp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*pre_comp) * num_points);
+        if (mixed)
+            tmp_smallfelems =
+              OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*tmp_smallfelems) * (num_points * 17 + 1));
+        if ((secrets == NULL) || (pre_comp == NULL)
+            || (mixed && (tmp_smallfelems == NULL))) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP256_POINTS_MUL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        /*
+         * we treat NULL scalars as 0, and NULL points as points at infinity,
+         * i.e., they contribute nothing to the linear combination
+         */
+        memset(secrets, 0, sizeof(*secrets) * num_points);
+        memset(pre_comp, 0, sizeof(*pre_comp) * num_points);
+        for (i = 0; i < num_points; ++i) {
+            if (i == num)
+                /*
+                 * we didn't have a valid precomputation, so we pick the
+                 * generator
+                 */
+            {
+                p = EC_GROUP_get0_generator(group);
+                p_scalar = scalar;
+            } else
+                /* the i^th point */
+            {
+                p = points[i];
+                p_scalar = scalars[i];
+            }
+            if ((p_scalar != NULL) && (p != NULL)) {
+                /* reduce scalar to 0 <= scalar < 2^256 */
+                if ((BN_num_bits(p_scalar) > 256)
+                    || (BN_is_negative(p_scalar))) {
+                    /*
+                     * this is an unusual input, and we don't guarantee
+                     * constant-timeness
+                     */
+                    if (!BN_nnmod(tmp_scalar, p_scalar, group->order, ctx)) {
+                        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP256_POINTS_MUL, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+                        goto err;
+                    }
+                    num_bytes = BN_bn2bin(tmp_scalar, tmp);
+                } else
+                    num_bytes = BN_bn2bin(p_scalar, tmp);
+                flip_endian(secrets[i], tmp, num_bytes);
+                /* precompute multiples */
+                if ((!BN_to_felem(x_out, p->X)) ||
+                    (!BN_to_felem(y_out, p->Y)) ||
+                    (!BN_to_felem(z_out, p->Z)))
+                    goto err;
+                felem_shrink(pre_comp[i][1][0], x_out);
+                felem_shrink(pre_comp[i][1][1], y_out);
+                felem_shrink(pre_comp[i][1][2], z_out);
+                for (j = 2; j <= 16; ++j) {
+                    if (j & 1) {
+                        point_add_small(pre_comp[i][j][0], pre_comp[i][j][1],
+                                        pre_comp[i][j][2], pre_comp[i][1][0],
+                                        pre_comp[i][1][1], pre_comp[i][1][2],
+                                        pre_comp[i][j - 1][0],
+                                        pre_comp[i][j - 1][1],
+                                        pre_comp[i][j - 1][2]);
+                    } else {
+                        point_double_small(pre_comp[i][j][0],
+                                           pre_comp[i][j][1],
+                                           pre_comp[i][j][2],
+                                           pre_comp[i][j / 2][0],
+                                           pre_comp[i][j / 2][1],
+                                           pre_comp[i][j / 2][2]);
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        if (mixed)
+            make_points_affine(num_points * 17, pre_comp[0], tmp_smallfelems);
+    }
+
+    /* the scalar for the generator */
+    if ((scalar != NULL) && (have_pre_comp)) {
+        memset(g_secret, 0, sizeof(g_secret));
+        /* reduce scalar to 0 <= scalar < 2^256 */
+        if ((BN_num_bits(scalar) > 256) || (BN_is_negative(scalar))) {
+            /*
+             * this is an unusual input, and we don't guarantee
+             * constant-timeness
+             */
+            if (!BN_nnmod(tmp_scalar, scalar, group->order, ctx)) {
+                ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP256_POINTS_MUL, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            num_bytes = BN_bn2bin(tmp_scalar, tmp);
+        } else
+            num_bytes = BN_bn2bin(scalar, tmp);
+        flip_endian(g_secret, tmp, num_bytes);
+        /* do the multiplication with generator precomputation */
+        batch_mul(x_out, y_out, z_out,
+                  (const felem_bytearray(*))secrets, num_points,
+                  g_secret,
+                  mixed, (const smallfelem(*)[17][3])pre_comp, g_pre_comp);
+    } else
+        /* do the multiplication without generator precomputation */
+        batch_mul(x_out, y_out, z_out,
+                  (const felem_bytearray(*))secrets, num_points,
+                  NULL, mixed, (const smallfelem(*)[17][3])pre_comp, NULL);
+    /* reduce the output to its unique minimal representation */
+    felem_contract(x_in, x_out);
+    felem_contract(y_in, y_out);
+    felem_contract(z_in, z_out);
+    if ((!smallfelem_to_BN(x, x_in)) || (!smallfelem_to_BN(y, y_in)) ||
+        (!smallfelem_to_BN(z, z_in))) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP256_POINTS_MUL, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    ret = EC_POINT_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(group, r, x, y, z, ctx);
+
+ err:
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    EC_POINT_free(generator);
+    BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
+    OPENSSL_free(secrets);
+    OPENSSL_free(pre_comp);
+    OPENSSL_free(tmp_smallfelems);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int ec_GFp_nistp256_precompute_mult(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    NISTP256_PRE_COMP *pre = NULL;
+    int i, j;
+    BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *x, *y;
+    EC_POINT *generator = NULL;
+    smallfelem tmp_smallfelems[32];
+    felem x_tmp, y_tmp, z_tmp;
+
+    /* throw away old precomputation */
+    EC_pre_comp_free(group);
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        if ((ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+            return 0;
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    if (((x = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) || ((y = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL))
+        goto err;
+    /* get the generator */
+    if (group->generator == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    generator = EC_POINT_new(group);
+    if (generator == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    BN_bin2bn(nistp256_curve_params[3], sizeof(felem_bytearray), x);
+    BN_bin2bn(nistp256_curve_params[4], sizeof(felem_bytearray), y);
+    if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, generator, x, y, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    if ((pre = nistp256_pre_comp_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    /*
+     * if the generator is the standard one, use built-in precomputation
+     */
+    if (0 == EC_POINT_cmp(group, generator, group->generator, ctx)) {
+        memcpy(pre->g_pre_comp, gmul, sizeof(pre->g_pre_comp));
+        goto done;
+    }
+    if ((!BN_to_felem(x_tmp, group->generator->X)) ||
+        (!BN_to_felem(y_tmp, group->generator->Y)) ||
+        (!BN_to_felem(z_tmp, group->generator->Z)))
+        goto err;
+    felem_shrink(pre->g_pre_comp[0][1][0], x_tmp);
+    felem_shrink(pre->g_pre_comp[0][1][1], y_tmp);
+    felem_shrink(pre->g_pre_comp[0][1][2], z_tmp);
+    /*
+     * compute 2^64*G, 2^128*G, 2^192*G for the first table, 2^32*G, 2^96*G,
+     * 2^160*G, 2^224*G for the second one
+     */
+    for (i = 1; i <= 8; i <<= 1) {
+        point_double_small(pre->g_pre_comp[1][i][0], pre->g_pre_comp[1][i][1],
+                           pre->g_pre_comp[1][i][2], pre->g_pre_comp[0][i][0],
+                           pre->g_pre_comp[0][i][1],
+                           pre->g_pre_comp[0][i][2]);
+        for (j = 0; j < 31; ++j) {
+            point_double_small(pre->g_pre_comp[1][i][0],
+                               pre->g_pre_comp[1][i][1],
+                               pre->g_pre_comp[1][i][2],
+                               pre->g_pre_comp[1][i][0],
+                               pre->g_pre_comp[1][i][1],
+                               pre->g_pre_comp[1][i][2]);
+        }
+        if (i == 8)
+            break;
+        point_double_small(pre->g_pre_comp[0][2 * i][0],
+                           pre->g_pre_comp[0][2 * i][1],
+                           pre->g_pre_comp[0][2 * i][2],
+                           pre->g_pre_comp[1][i][0], pre->g_pre_comp[1][i][1],
+                           pre->g_pre_comp[1][i][2]);
+        for (j = 0; j < 31; ++j) {
+            point_double_small(pre->g_pre_comp[0][2 * i][0],
+                               pre->g_pre_comp[0][2 * i][1],
+                               pre->g_pre_comp[0][2 * i][2],
+                               pre->g_pre_comp[0][2 * i][0],
+                               pre->g_pre_comp[0][2 * i][1],
+                               pre->g_pre_comp[0][2 * i][2]);
+        }
+    }
+    for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
+        /* g_pre_comp[i][0] is the point at infinity */
+        memset(pre->g_pre_comp[i][0], 0, sizeof(pre->g_pre_comp[i][0]));
+        /* the remaining multiples */
+        /* 2^64*G + 2^128*G resp. 2^96*G + 2^160*G */
+        point_add_small(pre->g_pre_comp[i][6][0], pre->g_pre_comp[i][6][1],
+                        pre->g_pre_comp[i][6][2], pre->g_pre_comp[i][4][0],
+                        pre->g_pre_comp[i][4][1], pre->g_pre_comp[i][4][2],
+                        pre->g_pre_comp[i][2][0], pre->g_pre_comp[i][2][1],
+                        pre->g_pre_comp[i][2][2]);
+        /* 2^64*G + 2^192*G resp. 2^96*G + 2^224*G */
+        point_add_small(pre->g_pre_comp[i][10][0], pre->g_pre_comp[i][10][1],
+                        pre->g_pre_comp[i][10][2], pre->g_pre_comp[i][8][0],
+                        pre->g_pre_comp[i][8][1], pre->g_pre_comp[i][8][2],
+                        pre->g_pre_comp[i][2][0], pre->g_pre_comp[i][2][1],
+                        pre->g_pre_comp[i][2][2]);
+        /* 2^128*G + 2^192*G resp. 2^160*G + 2^224*G */
+        point_add_small(pre->g_pre_comp[i][12][0], pre->g_pre_comp[i][12][1],
+                        pre->g_pre_comp[i][12][2], pre->g_pre_comp[i][8][0],
+                        pre->g_pre_comp[i][8][1], pre->g_pre_comp[i][8][2],
+                        pre->g_pre_comp[i][4][0], pre->g_pre_comp[i][4][1],
+                        pre->g_pre_comp[i][4][2]);
+        /*
+         * 2^64*G + 2^128*G + 2^192*G resp. 2^96*G + 2^160*G + 2^224*G
+         */
+        point_add_small(pre->g_pre_comp[i][14][0], pre->g_pre_comp[i][14][1],
+                        pre->g_pre_comp[i][14][2], pre->g_pre_comp[i][12][0],
+                        pre->g_pre_comp[i][12][1], pre->g_pre_comp[i][12][2],
+                        pre->g_pre_comp[i][2][0], pre->g_pre_comp[i][2][1],
+                        pre->g_pre_comp[i][2][2]);
+        for (j = 1; j < 8; ++j) {
+            /* odd multiples: add G resp. 2^32*G */
+            point_add_small(pre->g_pre_comp[i][2 * j + 1][0],
+                            pre->g_pre_comp[i][2 * j + 1][1],
+                            pre->g_pre_comp[i][2 * j + 1][2],
+                            pre->g_pre_comp[i][2 * j][0],
+                            pre->g_pre_comp[i][2 * j][1],
+                            pre->g_pre_comp[i][2 * j][2],
+                            pre->g_pre_comp[i][1][0],
+                            pre->g_pre_comp[i][1][1],
+                            pre->g_pre_comp[i][1][2]);
+        }
+    }
+    make_points_affine(31, &(pre->g_pre_comp[0][1]), tmp_smallfelems);
+
+ done:
+    SETPRECOMP(group, nistp256, pre);
+    pre = NULL;
+    ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    EC_POINT_free(generator);
+    BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
+    EC_nistp256_pre_comp_free(pre);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int ec_GFp_nistp256_have_precompute_mult(const EC_GROUP *group)
+{
+    return HAVEPRECOMP(group, nistp256);
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..133f089
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2138 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* Copyright 2011 Google Inc.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ *
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ *  Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ *  distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ *  WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ *  See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ *  limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * A 64-bit implementation of the NIST P-521 elliptic curve point multiplication
+ *
+ * OpenSSL integration was taken from Emilia Kasper's work in ecp_nistp224.c.
+ * Otherwise based on Emilia's P224 work, which was inspired by my curve25519
+ * work which got its smarts from Daniel J. Bernstein's work on the same.
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/e_os2.h>
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128
+NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT
+#else
+
+# include <string.h>
+# include <openssl/err.h>
+# include "ec_lcl.h"
+
+# if defined(__GNUC__) && (__GNUC__ > 3 || (__GNUC__ == 3 && __GNUC_MINOR__ >= 1))
+  /* even with gcc, the typedef won't work for 32-bit platforms */
+typedef __uint128_t uint128_t;  /* nonstandard; implemented by gcc on 64-bit
+                                 * platforms */
+# else
+#  error "Need GCC 3.1 or later to define type uint128_t"
+# endif
+
+typedef uint8_t u8;
+typedef uint64_t u64;
+
+/*
+ * The underlying field. P521 operates over GF(2^521-1). We can serialise an
+ * element of this field into 66 bytes where the most significant byte
+ * contains only a single bit. We call this an felem_bytearray.
+ */
+
+typedef u8 felem_bytearray[66];
+
+/*
+ * These are the parameters of P521, taken from FIPS 186-3, section D.1.2.5.
+ * These values are big-endian.
+ */
+static const felem_bytearray nistp521_curve_params[5] = {
+    {0x01, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, /* p */
+     0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
+     0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
+     0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
+     0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
+     0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
+     0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
+     0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
+     0xff, 0xff},
+    {0x01, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, /* a = -3 */
+     0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
+     0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
+     0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
+     0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
+     0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
+     0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
+     0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
+     0xff, 0xfc},
+    {0x00, 0x51, 0x95, 0x3e, 0xb9, 0x61, 0x8e, 0x1c, /* b */
+     0x9a, 0x1f, 0x92, 0x9a, 0x21, 0xa0, 0xb6, 0x85,
+     0x40, 0xee, 0xa2, 0xda, 0x72, 0x5b, 0x99, 0xb3,
+     0x15, 0xf3, 0xb8, 0xb4, 0x89, 0x91, 0x8e, 0xf1,
+     0x09, 0xe1, 0x56, 0x19, 0x39, 0x51, 0xec, 0x7e,
+     0x93, 0x7b, 0x16, 0x52, 0xc0, 0xbd, 0x3b, 0xb1,
+     0xbf, 0x07, 0x35, 0x73, 0xdf, 0x88, 0x3d, 0x2c,
+     0x34, 0xf1, 0xef, 0x45, 0x1f, 0xd4, 0x6b, 0x50,
+     0x3f, 0x00},
+    {0x00, 0xc6, 0x85, 0x8e, 0x06, 0xb7, 0x04, 0x04, /* x */
+     0xe9, 0xcd, 0x9e, 0x3e, 0xcb, 0x66, 0x23, 0x95,
+     0xb4, 0x42, 0x9c, 0x64, 0x81, 0x39, 0x05, 0x3f,
+     0xb5, 0x21, 0xf8, 0x28, 0xaf, 0x60, 0x6b, 0x4d,
+     0x3d, 0xba, 0xa1, 0x4b, 0x5e, 0x77, 0xef, 0xe7,
+     0x59, 0x28, 0xfe, 0x1d, 0xc1, 0x27, 0xa2, 0xff,
+     0xa8, 0xde, 0x33, 0x48, 0xb3, 0xc1, 0x85, 0x6a,
+     0x42, 0x9b, 0xf9, 0x7e, 0x7e, 0x31, 0xc2, 0xe5,
+     0xbd, 0x66},
+    {0x01, 0x18, 0x39, 0x29, 0x6a, 0x78, 0x9a, 0x3b, /* y */
+     0xc0, 0x04, 0x5c, 0x8a, 0x5f, 0xb4, 0x2c, 0x7d,
+     0x1b, 0xd9, 0x98, 0xf5, 0x44, 0x49, 0x57, 0x9b,
+     0x44, 0x68, 0x17, 0xaf, 0xbd, 0x17, 0x27, 0x3e,
+     0x66, 0x2c, 0x97, 0xee, 0x72, 0x99, 0x5e, 0xf4,
+     0x26, 0x40, 0xc5, 0x50, 0xb9, 0x01, 0x3f, 0xad,
+     0x07, 0x61, 0x35, 0x3c, 0x70, 0x86, 0xa2, 0x72,
+     0xc2, 0x40, 0x88, 0xbe, 0x94, 0x76, 0x9f, 0xd1,
+     0x66, 0x50}
+};
+
+/*-
+ * The representation of field elements.
+ * ------------------------------------
+ *
+ * We represent field elements with nine values. These values are either 64 or
+ * 128 bits and the field element represented is:
+ *   v[0]*2^0 + v[1]*2^58 + v[2]*2^116 + ... + v[8]*2^464  (mod p)
+ * Each of the nine values is called a 'limb'. Since the limbs are spaced only
+ * 58 bits apart, but are greater than 58 bits in length, the most significant
+ * bits of each limb overlap with the least significant bits of the next.
+ *
+ * A field element with 64-bit limbs is an 'felem'. One with 128-bit limbs is a
+ * 'largefelem' */
+
+# define NLIMBS 9
+
+typedef uint64_t limb;
+typedef limb felem[NLIMBS];
+typedef uint128_t largefelem[NLIMBS];
+
+static const limb bottom57bits = 0x1ffffffffffffff;
+static const limb bottom58bits = 0x3ffffffffffffff;
+
+/*
+ * bin66_to_felem takes a little-endian byte array and converts it into felem
+ * form. This assumes that the CPU is little-endian.
+ */
+static void bin66_to_felem(felem out, const u8 in[66])
+{
+    out[0] = (*((limb *) & in[0])) & bottom58bits;
+    out[1] = (*((limb *) & in[7]) >> 2) & bottom58bits;
+    out[2] = (*((limb *) & in[14]) >> 4) & bottom58bits;
+    out[3] = (*((limb *) & in[21]) >> 6) & bottom58bits;
+    out[4] = (*((limb *) & in[29])) & bottom58bits;
+    out[5] = (*((limb *) & in[36]) >> 2) & bottom58bits;
+    out[6] = (*((limb *) & in[43]) >> 4) & bottom58bits;
+    out[7] = (*((limb *) & in[50]) >> 6) & bottom58bits;
+    out[8] = (*((limb *) & in[58])) & bottom57bits;
+}
+
+/*
+ * felem_to_bin66 takes an felem and serialises into a little endian, 66 byte
+ * array. This assumes that the CPU is little-endian.
+ */
+static void felem_to_bin66(u8 out[66], const felem in)
+{
+    memset(out, 0, 66);
+    (*((limb *) & out[0])) = in[0];
+    (*((limb *) & out[7])) |= in[1] << 2;
+    (*((limb *) & out[14])) |= in[2] << 4;
+    (*((limb *) & out[21])) |= in[3] << 6;
+    (*((limb *) & out[29])) = in[4];
+    (*((limb *) & out[36])) |= in[5] << 2;
+    (*((limb *) & out[43])) |= in[6] << 4;
+    (*((limb *) & out[50])) |= in[7] << 6;
+    (*((limb *) & out[58])) = in[8];
+}
+
+/* To preserve endianness when using BN_bn2bin and BN_bin2bn */
+static void flip_endian(u8 *out, const u8 *in, unsigned len)
+{
+    unsigned i;
+    for (i = 0; i < len; ++i)
+        out[i] = in[len - 1 - i];
+}
+
+/* BN_to_felem converts an OpenSSL BIGNUM into an felem */
+static int BN_to_felem(felem out, const BIGNUM *bn)
+{
+    felem_bytearray b_in;
+    felem_bytearray b_out;
+    unsigned num_bytes;
+
+    /* BN_bn2bin eats leading zeroes */
+    memset(b_out, 0, sizeof(b_out));
+    num_bytes = BN_num_bytes(bn);
+    if (num_bytes > sizeof(b_out)) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_BN_TO_FELEM, EC_R_BIGNUM_OUT_OF_RANGE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (BN_is_negative(bn)) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_BN_TO_FELEM, EC_R_BIGNUM_OUT_OF_RANGE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    num_bytes = BN_bn2bin(bn, b_in);
+    flip_endian(b_out, b_in, num_bytes);
+    bin66_to_felem(out, b_out);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* felem_to_BN converts an felem into an OpenSSL BIGNUM */
+static BIGNUM *felem_to_BN(BIGNUM *out, const felem in)
+{
+    felem_bytearray b_in, b_out;
+    felem_to_bin66(b_in, in);
+    flip_endian(b_out, b_in, sizeof(b_out));
+    return BN_bin2bn(b_out, sizeof(b_out), out);
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Field operations
+ * ----------------
+ */
+
+static void felem_one(felem out)
+{
+    out[0] = 1;
+    out[1] = 0;
+    out[2] = 0;
+    out[3] = 0;
+    out[4] = 0;
+    out[5] = 0;
+    out[6] = 0;
+    out[7] = 0;
+    out[8] = 0;
+}
+
+static void felem_assign(felem out, const felem in)
+{
+    out[0] = in[0];
+    out[1] = in[1];
+    out[2] = in[2];
+    out[3] = in[3];
+    out[4] = in[4];
+    out[5] = in[5];
+    out[6] = in[6];
+    out[7] = in[7];
+    out[8] = in[8];
+}
+
+/* felem_sum64 sets out = out + in. */
+static void felem_sum64(felem out, const felem in)
+{
+    out[0] += in[0];
+    out[1] += in[1];
+    out[2] += in[2];
+    out[3] += in[3];
+    out[4] += in[4];
+    out[5] += in[5];
+    out[6] += in[6];
+    out[7] += in[7];
+    out[8] += in[8];
+}
+
+/* felem_scalar sets out = in * scalar */
+static void felem_scalar(felem out, const felem in, limb scalar)
+{
+    out[0] = in[0] * scalar;
+    out[1] = in[1] * scalar;
+    out[2] = in[2] * scalar;
+    out[3] = in[3] * scalar;
+    out[4] = in[4] * scalar;
+    out[5] = in[5] * scalar;
+    out[6] = in[6] * scalar;
+    out[7] = in[7] * scalar;
+    out[8] = in[8] * scalar;
+}
+
+/* felem_scalar64 sets out = out * scalar */
+static void felem_scalar64(felem out, limb scalar)
+{
+    out[0] *= scalar;
+    out[1] *= scalar;
+    out[2] *= scalar;
+    out[3] *= scalar;
+    out[4] *= scalar;
+    out[5] *= scalar;
+    out[6] *= scalar;
+    out[7] *= scalar;
+    out[8] *= scalar;
+}
+
+/* felem_scalar128 sets out = out * scalar */
+static void felem_scalar128(largefelem out, limb scalar)
+{
+    out[0] *= scalar;
+    out[1] *= scalar;
+    out[2] *= scalar;
+    out[3] *= scalar;
+    out[4] *= scalar;
+    out[5] *= scalar;
+    out[6] *= scalar;
+    out[7] *= scalar;
+    out[8] *= scalar;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * felem_neg sets |out| to |-in|
+ * On entry:
+ *   in[i] < 2^59 + 2^14
+ * On exit:
+ *   out[i] < 2^62
+ */
+static void felem_neg(felem out, const felem in)
+{
+    /* In order to prevent underflow, we subtract from 0 mod p. */
+    static const limb two62m3 = (((limb) 1) << 62) - (((limb) 1) << 5);
+    static const limb two62m2 = (((limb) 1) << 62) - (((limb) 1) << 4);
+
+    out[0] = two62m3 - in[0];
+    out[1] = two62m2 - in[1];
+    out[2] = two62m2 - in[2];
+    out[3] = two62m2 - in[3];
+    out[4] = two62m2 - in[4];
+    out[5] = two62m2 - in[5];
+    out[6] = two62m2 - in[6];
+    out[7] = two62m2 - in[7];
+    out[8] = two62m2 - in[8];
+}
+
+/*-
+ * felem_diff64 subtracts |in| from |out|
+ * On entry:
+ *   in[i] < 2^59 + 2^14
+ * On exit:
+ *   out[i] < out[i] + 2^62
+ */
+static void felem_diff64(felem out, const felem in)
+{
+    /*
+     * In order to prevent underflow, we add 0 mod p before subtracting.
+     */
+    static const limb two62m3 = (((limb) 1) << 62) - (((limb) 1) << 5);
+    static const limb two62m2 = (((limb) 1) << 62) - (((limb) 1) << 4);
+
+    out[0] += two62m3 - in[0];
+    out[1] += two62m2 - in[1];
+    out[2] += two62m2 - in[2];
+    out[3] += two62m2 - in[3];
+    out[4] += two62m2 - in[4];
+    out[5] += two62m2 - in[5];
+    out[6] += two62m2 - in[6];
+    out[7] += two62m2 - in[7];
+    out[8] += two62m2 - in[8];
+}
+
+/*-
+ * felem_diff_128_64 subtracts |in| from |out|
+ * On entry:
+ *   in[i] < 2^62 + 2^17
+ * On exit:
+ *   out[i] < out[i] + 2^63
+ */
+static void felem_diff_128_64(largefelem out, const felem in)
+{
+    /*
+     * In order to prevent underflow, we add 0 mod p before subtracting.
+     */
+    static const limb two63m6 = (((limb) 1) << 62) - (((limb) 1) << 5);
+    static const limb two63m5 = (((limb) 1) << 62) - (((limb) 1) << 4);
+
+    out[0] += two63m6 - in[0];
+    out[1] += two63m5 - in[1];
+    out[2] += two63m5 - in[2];
+    out[3] += two63m5 - in[3];
+    out[4] += two63m5 - in[4];
+    out[5] += two63m5 - in[5];
+    out[6] += two63m5 - in[6];
+    out[7] += two63m5 - in[7];
+    out[8] += two63m5 - in[8];
+}
+
+/*-
+ * felem_diff_128_64 subtracts |in| from |out|
+ * On entry:
+ *   in[i] < 2^126
+ * On exit:
+ *   out[i] < out[i] + 2^127 - 2^69
+ */
+static void felem_diff128(largefelem out, const largefelem in)
+{
+    /*
+     * In order to prevent underflow, we add 0 mod p before subtracting.
+     */
+    static const uint128_t two127m70 =
+        (((uint128_t) 1) << 127) - (((uint128_t) 1) << 70);
+    static const uint128_t two127m69 =
+        (((uint128_t) 1) << 127) - (((uint128_t) 1) << 69);
+
+    out[0] += (two127m70 - in[0]);
+    out[1] += (two127m69 - in[1]);
+    out[2] += (two127m69 - in[2]);
+    out[3] += (two127m69 - in[3]);
+    out[4] += (two127m69 - in[4]);
+    out[5] += (two127m69 - in[5]);
+    out[6] += (two127m69 - in[6]);
+    out[7] += (two127m69 - in[7]);
+    out[8] += (two127m69 - in[8]);
+}
+
+/*-
+ * felem_square sets |out| = |in|^2
+ * On entry:
+ *   in[i] < 2^62
+ * On exit:
+ *   out[i] < 17 * max(in[i]) * max(in[i])
+ */
+static void felem_square(largefelem out, const felem in)
+{
+    felem inx2, inx4;
+    felem_scalar(inx2, in, 2);
+    felem_scalar(inx4, in, 4);
+
+    /*-
+     * We have many cases were we want to do
+     *   in[x] * in[y] +
+     *   in[y] * in[x]
+     * This is obviously just
+     *   2 * in[x] * in[y]
+     * However, rather than do the doubling on the 128 bit result, we
+     * double one of the inputs to the multiplication by reading from
+     * |inx2|
+     */
+
+    out[0] = ((uint128_t) in[0]) * in[0];
+    out[1] = ((uint128_t) in[0]) * inx2[1];
+    out[2] = ((uint128_t) in[0]) * inx2[2] + ((uint128_t) in[1]) * in[1];
+    out[3] = ((uint128_t) in[0]) * inx2[3] + ((uint128_t) in[1]) * inx2[2];
+    out[4] = ((uint128_t) in[0]) * inx2[4] +
+             ((uint128_t) in[1]) * inx2[3] + ((uint128_t) in[2]) * in[2];
+    out[5] = ((uint128_t) in[0]) * inx2[5] +
+             ((uint128_t) in[1]) * inx2[4] + ((uint128_t) in[2]) * inx2[3];
+    out[6] = ((uint128_t) in[0]) * inx2[6] +
+             ((uint128_t) in[1]) * inx2[5] +
+             ((uint128_t) in[2]) * inx2[4] + ((uint128_t) in[3]) * in[3];
+    out[7] = ((uint128_t) in[0]) * inx2[7] +
+             ((uint128_t) in[1]) * inx2[6] +
+             ((uint128_t) in[2]) * inx2[5] + ((uint128_t) in[3]) * inx2[4];
+    out[8] = ((uint128_t) in[0]) * inx2[8] +
+             ((uint128_t) in[1]) * inx2[7] +
+             ((uint128_t) in[2]) * inx2[6] +
+             ((uint128_t) in[3]) * inx2[5] + ((uint128_t) in[4]) * in[4];
+
+    /*
+     * The remaining limbs fall above 2^521, with the first falling at 2^522.
+     * They correspond to locations one bit up from the limbs produced above
+     * so we would have to multiply by two to align them. Again, rather than
+     * operate on the 128-bit result, we double one of the inputs to the
+     * multiplication. If we want to double for both this reason, and the
+     * reason above, then we end up multiplying by four.
+     */
+
+    /* 9 */
+    out[0] += ((uint128_t) in[1]) * inx4[8] +
+              ((uint128_t) in[2]) * inx4[7] +
+              ((uint128_t) in[3]) * inx4[6] + ((uint128_t) in[4]) * inx4[5];
+
+    /* 10 */
+    out[1] += ((uint128_t) in[2]) * inx4[8] +
+              ((uint128_t) in[3]) * inx4[7] +
+              ((uint128_t) in[4]) * inx4[6] + ((uint128_t) in[5]) * inx2[5];
+
+    /* 11 */
+    out[2] += ((uint128_t) in[3]) * inx4[8] +
+              ((uint128_t) in[4]) * inx4[7] + ((uint128_t) in[5]) * inx4[6];
+
+    /* 12 */
+    out[3] += ((uint128_t) in[4]) * inx4[8] +
+              ((uint128_t) in[5]) * inx4[7] + ((uint128_t) in[6]) * inx2[6];
+
+    /* 13 */
+    out[4] += ((uint128_t) in[5]) * inx4[8] + ((uint128_t) in[6]) * inx4[7];
+
+    /* 14 */
+    out[5] += ((uint128_t) in[6]) * inx4[8] + ((uint128_t) in[7]) * inx2[7];
+
+    /* 15 */
+    out[6] += ((uint128_t) in[7]) * inx4[8];
+
+    /* 16 */
+    out[7] += ((uint128_t) in[8]) * inx2[8];
+}
+
+/*-
+ * felem_mul sets |out| = |in1| * |in2|
+ * On entry:
+ *   in1[i] < 2^64
+ *   in2[i] < 2^63
+ * On exit:
+ *   out[i] < 17 * max(in1[i]) * max(in2[i])
+ */
+static void felem_mul(largefelem out, const felem in1, const felem in2)
+{
+    felem in2x2;
+    felem_scalar(in2x2, in2, 2);
+
+    out[0] = ((uint128_t) in1[0]) * in2[0];
+
+    out[1] = ((uint128_t) in1[0]) * in2[1] +
+             ((uint128_t) in1[1]) * in2[0];
+
+    out[2] = ((uint128_t) in1[0]) * in2[2] +
+             ((uint128_t) in1[1]) * in2[1] +
+             ((uint128_t) in1[2]) * in2[0];
+
+    out[3] = ((uint128_t) in1[0]) * in2[3] +
+             ((uint128_t) in1[1]) * in2[2] +
+             ((uint128_t) in1[2]) * in2[1] +
+             ((uint128_t) in1[3]) * in2[0];
+
+    out[4] = ((uint128_t) in1[0]) * in2[4] +
+             ((uint128_t) in1[1]) * in2[3] +
+             ((uint128_t) in1[2]) * in2[2] +
+             ((uint128_t) in1[3]) * in2[1] +
+             ((uint128_t) in1[4]) * in2[0];
+
+    out[5] = ((uint128_t) in1[0]) * in2[5] +
+             ((uint128_t) in1[1]) * in2[4] +
+             ((uint128_t) in1[2]) * in2[3] +
+             ((uint128_t) in1[3]) * in2[2] +
+             ((uint128_t) in1[4]) * in2[1] +
+             ((uint128_t) in1[5]) * in2[0];
+
+    out[6] = ((uint128_t) in1[0]) * in2[6] +
+             ((uint128_t) in1[1]) * in2[5] +
+             ((uint128_t) in1[2]) * in2[4] +
+             ((uint128_t) in1[3]) * in2[3] +
+             ((uint128_t) in1[4]) * in2[2] +
+             ((uint128_t) in1[5]) * in2[1] +
+             ((uint128_t) in1[6]) * in2[0];
+
+    out[7] = ((uint128_t) in1[0]) * in2[7] +
+             ((uint128_t) in1[1]) * in2[6] +
+             ((uint128_t) in1[2]) * in2[5] +
+             ((uint128_t) in1[3]) * in2[4] +
+             ((uint128_t) in1[4]) * in2[3] +
+             ((uint128_t) in1[5]) * in2[2] +
+             ((uint128_t) in1[6]) * in2[1] +
+             ((uint128_t) in1[7]) * in2[0];
+
+    out[8] = ((uint128_t) in1[0]) * in2[8] +
+             ((uint128_t) in1[1]) * in2[7] +
+             ((uint128_t) in1[2]) * in2[6] +
+             ((uint128_t) in1[3]) * in2[5] +
+             ((uint128_t) in1[4]) * in2[4] +
+             ((uint128_t) in1[5]) * in2[3] +
+             ((uint128_t) in1[6]) * in2[2] +
+             ((uint128_t) in1[7]) * in2[1] +
+             ((uint128_t) in1[8]) * in2[0];
+
+    /* See comment in felem_square about the use of in2x2 here */
+
+    out[0] += ((uint128_t) in1[1]) * in2x2[8] +
+              ((uint128_t) in1[2]) * in2x2[7] +
+              ((uint128_t) in1[3]) * in2x2[6] +
+              ((uint128_t) in1[4]) * in2x2[5] +
+              ((uint128_t) in1[5]) * in2x2[4] +
+              ((uint128_t) in1[6]) * in2x2[3] +
+              ((uint128_t) in1[7]) * in2x2[2] +
+              ((uint128_t) in1[8]) * in2x2[1];
+
+    out[1] += ((uint128_t) in1[2]) * in2x2[8] +
+              ((uint128_t) in1[3]) * in2x2[7] +
+              ((uint128_t) in1[4]) * in2x2[6] +
+              ((uint128_t) in1[5]) * in2x2[5] +
+              ((uint128_t) in1[6]) * in2x2[4] +
+              ((uint128_t) in1[7]) * in2x2[3] +
+              ((uint128_t) in1[8]) * in2x2[2];
+
+    out[2] += ((uint128_t) in1[3]) * in2x2[8] +
+              ((uint128_t) in1[4]) * in2x2[7] +
+              ((uint128_t) in1[5]) * in2x2[6] +
+              ((uint128_t) in1[6]) * in2x2[5] +
+              ((uint128_t) in1[7]) * in2x2[4] +
+              ((uint128_t) in1[8]) * in2x2[3];
+
+    out[3] += ((uint128_t) in1[4]) * in2x2[8] +
+              ((uint128_t) in1[5]) * in2x2[7] +
+              ((uint128_t) in1[6]) * in2x2[6] +
+              ((uint128_t) in1[7]) * in2x2[5] +
+              ((uint128_t) in1[8]) * in2x2[4];
+
+    out[4] += ((uint128_t) in1[5]) * in2x2[8] +
+              ((uint128_t) in1[6]) * in2x2[7] +
+              ((uint128_t) in1[7]) * in2x2[6] +
+              ((uint128_t) in1[8]) * in2x2[5];
+
+    out[5] += ((uint128_t) in1[6]) * in2x2[8] +
+              ((uint128_t) in1[7]) * in2x2[7] +
+              ((uint128_t) in1[8]) * in2x2[6];
+
+    out[6] += ((uint128_t) in1[7]) * in2x2[8] +
+              ((uint128_t) in1[8]) * in2x2[7];
+
+    out[7] += ((uint128_t) in1[8]) * in2x2[8];
+}
+
+static const limb bottom52bits = 0xfffffffffffff;
+
+/*-
+ * felem_reduce converts a largefelem to an felem.
+ * On entry:
+ *   in[i] < 2^128
+ * On exit:
+ *   out[i] < 2^59 + 2^14
+ */
+static void felem_reduce(felem out, const largefelem in)
+{
+    u64 overflow1, overflow2;
+
+    out[0] = ((limb) in[0]) & bottom58bits;
+    out[1] = ((limb) in[1]) & bottom58bits;
+    out[2] = ((limb) in[2]) & bottom58bits;
+    out[3] = ((limb) in[3]) & bottom58bits;
+    out[4] = ((limb) in[4]) & bottom58bits;
+    out[5] = ((limb) in[5]) & bottom58bits;
+    out[6] = ((limb) in[6]) & bottom58bits;
+    out[7] = ((limb) in[7]) & bottom58bits;
+    out[8] = ((limb) in[8]) & bottom58bits;
+
+    /* out[i] < 2^58 */
+
+    out[1] += ((limb) in[0]) >> 58;
+    out[1] += (((limb) (in[0] >> 64)) & bottom52bits) << 6;
+    /*-
+     * out[1] < 2^58 + 2^6 + 2^58
+     *        = 2^59 + 2^6
+     */
+    out[2] += ((limb) (in[0] >> 64)) >> 52;
+
+    out[2] += ((limb) in[1]) >> 58;
+    out[2] += (((limb) (in[1] >> 64)) & bottom52bits) << 6;
+    out[3] += ((limb) (in[1] >> 64)) >> 52;
+
+    out[3] += ((limb) in[2]) >> 58;
+    out[3] += (((limb) (in[2] >> 64)) & bottom52bits) << 6;
+    out[4] += ((limb) (in[2] >> 64)) >> 52;
+
+    out[4] += ((limb) in[3]) >> 58;
+    out[4] += (((limb) (in[3] >> 64)) & bottom52bits) << 6;
+    out[5] += ((limb) (in[3] >> 64)) >> 52;
+
+    out[5] += ((limb) in[4]) >> 58;
+    out[5] += (((limb) (in[4] >> 64)) & bottom52bits) << 6;
+    out[6] += ((limb) (in[4] >> 64)) >> 52;
+
+    out[6] += ((limb) in[5]) >> 58;
+    out[6] += (((limb) (in[5] >> 64)) & bottom52bits) << 6;
+    out[7] += ((limb) (in[5] >> 64)) >> 52;
+
+    out[7] += ((limb) in[6]) >> 58;
+    out[7] += (((limb) (in[6] >> 64)) & bottom52bits) << 6;
+    out[8] += ((limb) (in[6] >> 64)) >> 52;
+
+    out[8] += ((limb) in[7]) >> 58;
+    out[8] += (((limb) (in[7] >> 64)) & bottom52bits) << 6;
+    /*-
+     * out[x > 1] < 2^58 + 2^6 + 2^58 + 2^12
+     *            < 2^59 + 2^13
+     */
+    overflow1 = ((limb) (in[7] >> 64)) >> 52;
+
+    overflow1 += ((limb) in[8]) >> 58;
+    overflow1 += (((limb) (in[8] >> 64)) & bottom52bits) << 6;
+    overflow2 = ((limb) (in[8] >> 64)) >> 52;
+
+    overflow1 <<= 1;            /* overflow1 < 2^13 + 2^7 + 2^59 */
+    overflow2 <<= 1;            /* overflow2 < 2^13 */
+
+    out[0] += overflow1;        /* out[0] < 2^60 */
+    out[1] += overflow2;        /* out[1] < 2^59 + 2^6 + 2^13 */
+
+    out[1] += out[0] >> 58;
+    out[0] &= bottom58bits;
+    /*-
+     * out[0] < 2^58
+     * out[1] < 2^59 + 2^6 + 2^13 + 2^2
+     *        < 2^59 + 2^14
+     */
+}
+
+static void felem_square_reduce(felem out, const felem in)
+{
+    largefelem tmp;
+    felem_square(tmp, in);
+    felem_reduce(out, tmp);
+}
+
+static void felem_mul_reduce(felem out, const felem in1, const felem in2)
+{
+    largefelem tmp;
+    felem_mul(tmp, in1, in2);
+    felem_reduce(out, tmp);
+}
+
+/*-
+ * felem_inv calculates |out| = |in|^{-1}
+ *
+ * Based on Fermat's Little Theorem:
+ *   a^p = a (mod p)
+ *   a^{p-1} = 1 (mod p)
+ *   a^{p-2} = a^{-1} (mod p)
+ */
+static void felem_inv(felem out, const felem in)
+{
+    felem ftmp, ftmp2, ftmp3, ftmp4;
+    largefelem tmp;
+    unsigned i;
+
+    felem_square(tmp, in);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp);    /* 2^1 */
+    felem_mul(tmp, in, ftmp);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp);    /* 2^2 - 2^0 */
+    felem_assign(ftmp2, ftmp);
+    felem_square(tmp, ftmp);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp);    /* 2^3 - 2^1 */
+    felem_mul(tmp, in, ftmp);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp);    /* 2^3 - 2^0 */
+    felem_square(tmp, ftmp);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp);    /* 2^4 - 2^1 */
+
+    felem_square(tmp, ftmp2);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp3, tmp);   /* 2^3 - 2^1 */
+    felem_square(tmp, ftmp3);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp3, tmp);   /* 2^4 - 2^2 */
+    felem_mul(tmp, ftmp3, ftmp2);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp3, tmp);   /* 2^4 - 2^0 */
+
+    felem_assign(ftmp2, ftmp3);
+    felem_square(tmp, ftmp3);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp3, tmp);   /* 2^5 - 2^1 */
+    felem_square(tmp, ftmp3);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp3, tmp);   /* 2^6 - 2^2 */
+    felem_square(tmp, ftmp3);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp3, tmp);   /* 2^7 - 2^3 */
+    felem_square(tmp, ftmp3);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp3, tmp);   /* 2^8 - 2^4 */
+    felem_assign(ftmp4, ftmp3);
+    felem_mul(tmp, ftmp3, ftmp);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp4, tmp);   /* 2^8 - 2^1 */
+    felem_square(tmp, ftmp4);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp4, tmp);   /* 2^9 - 2^2 */
+    felem_mul(tmp, ftmp3, ftmp2);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp3, tmp);   /* 2^8 - 2^0 */
+    felem_assign(ftmp2, ftmp3);
+
+    for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+        felem_square(tmp, ftmp3);
+        felem_reduce(ftmp3, tmp); /* 2^16 - 2^8 */
+    }
+    felem_mul(tmp, ftmp3, ftmp2);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp3, tmp);   /* 2^16 - 2^0 */
+    felem_assign(ftmp2, ftmp3);
+
+    for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
+        felem_square(tmp, ftmp3);
+        felem_reduce(ftmp3, tmp); /* 2^32 - 2^16 */
+    }
+    felem_mul(tmp, ftmp3, ftmp2);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp3, tmp);   /* 2^32 - 2^0 */
+    felem_assign(ftmp2, ftmp3);
+
+    for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
+        felem_square(tmp, ftmp3);
+        felem_reduce(ftmp3, tmp); /* 2^64 - 2^32 */
+    }
+    felem_mul(tmp, ftmp3, ftmp2);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp3, tmp);   /* 2^64 - 2^0 */
+    felem_assign(ftmp2, ftmp3);
+
+    for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
+        felem_square(tmp, ftmp3);
+        felem_reduce(ftmp3, tmp); /* 2^128 - 2^64 */
+    }
+    felem_mul(tmp, ftmp3, ftmp2);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp3, tmp);   /* 2^128 - 2^0 */
+    felem_assign(ftmp2, ftmp3);
+
+    for (i = 0; i < 128; i++) {
+        felem_square(tmp, ftmp3);
+        felem_reduce(ftmp3, tmp); /* 2^256 - 2^128 */
+    }
+    felem_mul(tmp, ftmp3, ftmp2);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp3, tmp);   /* 2^256 - 2^0 */
+    felem_assign(ftmp2, ftmp3);
+
+    for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
+        felem_square(tmp, ftmp3);
+        felem_reduce(ftmp3, tmp); /* 2^512 - 2^256 */
+    }
+    felem_mul(tmp, ftmp3, ftmp2);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp3, tmp);   /* 2^512 - 2^0 */
+
+    for (i = 0; i < 9; i++) {
+        felem_square(tmp, ftmp3);
+        felem_reduce(ftmp3, tmp); /* 2^521 - 2^9 */
+    }
+    felem_mul(tmp, ftmp3, ftmp4);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp3, tmp);   /* 2^512 - 2^2 */
+    felem_mul(tmp, ftmp3, in);
+    felem_reduce(out, tmp);     /* 2^512 - 3 */
+}
+
+/* This is 2^521-1, expressed as an felem */
+static const felem kPrime = {
+    0x03ffffffffffffff, 0x03ffffffffffffff, 0x03ffffffffffffff,
+    0x03ffffffffffffff, 0x03ffffffffffffff, 0x03ffffffffffffff,
+    0x03ffffffffffffff, 0x03ffffffffffffff, 0x01ffffffffffffff
+};
+
+/*-
+ * felem_is_zero returns a limb with all bits set if |in| == 0 (mod p) and 0
+ * otherwise.
+ * On entry:
+ *   in[i] < 2^59 + 2^14
+ */
+static limb felem_is_zero(const felem in)
+{
+    felem ftmp;
+    limb is_zero, is_p;
+    felem_assign(ftmp, in);
+
+    ftmp[0] += ftmp[8] >> 57;
+    ftmp[8] &= bottom57bits;
+    /* ftmp[8] < 2^57 */
+    ftmp[1] += ftmp[0] >> 58;
+    ftmp[0] &= bottom58bits;
+    ftmp[2] += ftmp[1] >> 58;
+    ftmp[1] &= bottom58bits;
+    ftmp[3] += ftmp[2] >> 58;
+    ftmp[2] &= bottom58bits;
+    ftmp[4] += ftmp[3] >> 58;
+    ftmp[3] &= bottom58bits;
+    ftmp[5] += ftmp[4] >> 58;
+    ftmp[4] &= bottom58bits;
+    ftmp[6] += ftmp[5] >> 58;
+    ftmp[5] &= bottom58bits;
+    ftmp[7] += ftmp[6] >> 58;
+    ftmp[6] &= bottom58bits;
+    ftmp[8] += ftmp[7] >> 58;
+    ftmp[7] &= bottom58bits;
+    /* ftmp[8] < 2^57 + 4 */
+
+    /*
+     * The ninth limb of 2*(2^521-1) is 0x03ffffffffffffff, which is greater
+     * than our bound for ftmp[8]. Therefore we only have to check if the
+     * zero is zero or 2^521-1.
+     */
+
+    is_zero = 0;
+    is_zero |= ftmp[0];
+    is_zero |= ftmp[1];
+    is_zero |= ftmp[2];
+    is_zero |= ftmp[3];
+    is_zero |= ftmp[4];
+    is_zero |= ftmp[5];
+    is_zero |= ftmp[6];
+    is_zero |= ftmp[7];
+    is_zero |= ftmp[8];
+
+    is_zero--;
+    /*
+     * We know that ftmp[i] < 2^63, therefore the only way that the top bit
+     * can be set is if is_zero was 0 before the decrement.
+     */
+    is_zero = 0 - (is_zero >> 63);
+
+    is_p = ftmp[0] ^ kPrime[0];
+    is_p |= ftmp[1] ^ kPrime[1];
+    is_p |= ftmp[2] ^ kPrime[2];
+    is_p |= ftmp[3] ^ kPrime[3];
+    is_p |= ftmp[4] ^ kPrime[4];
+    is_p |= ftmp[5] ^ kPrime[5];
+    is_p |= ftmp[6] ^ kPrime[6];
+    is_p |= ftmp[7] ^ kPrime[7];
+    is_p |= ftmp[8] ^ kPrime[8];
+
+    is_p--;
+    is_p = 0 - (is_p >> 63);
+
+    is_zero |= is_p;
+    return is_zero;
+}
+
+static int felem_is_zero_int(const void *in)
+{
+    return (int)(felem_is_zero(in) & ((limb) 1));
+}
+
+/*-
+ * felem_contract converts |in| to its unique, minimal representation.
+ * On entry:
+ *   in[i] < 2^59 + 2^14
+ */
+static void felem_contract(felem out, const felem in)
+{
+    limb is_p, is_greater, sign;
+    static const limb two58 = ((limb) 1) << 58;
+
+    felem_assign(out, in);
+
+    out[0] += out[8] >> 57;
+    out[8] &= bottom57bits;
+    /* out[8] < 2^57 */
+    out[1] += out[0] >> 58;
+    out[0] &= bottom58bits;
+    out[2] += out[1] >> 58;
+    out[1] &= bottom58bits;
+    out[3] += out[2] >> 58;
+    out[2] &= bottom58bits;
+    out[4] += out[3] >> 58;
+    out[3] &= bottom58bits;
+    out[5] += out[4] >> 58;
+    out[4] &= bottom58bits;
+    out[6] += out[5] >> 58;
+    out[5] &= bottom58bits;
+    out[7] += out[6] >> 58;
+    out[6] &= bottom58bits;
+    out[8] += out[7] >> 58;
+    out[7] &= bottom58bits;
+    /* out[8] < 2^57 + 4 */
+
+    /*
+     * If the value is greater than 2^521-1 then we have to subtract 2^521-1
+     * out. See the comments in felem_is_zero regarding why we don't test for
+     * other multiples of the prime.
+     */
+
+    /*
+     * First, if |out| is equal to 2^521-1, we subtract it out to get zero.
+     */
+
+    is_p = out[0] ^ kPrime[0];
+    is_p |= out[1] ^ kPrime[1];
+    is_p |= out[2] ^ kPrime[2];
+    is_p |= out[3] ^ kPrime[3];
+    is_p |= out[4] ^ kPrime[4];
+    is_p |= out[5] ^ kPrime[5];
+    is_p |= out[6] ^ kPrime[6];
+    is_p |= out[7] ^ kPrime[7];
+    is_p |= out[8] ^ kPrime[8];
+
+    is_p--;
+    is_p &= is_p << 32;
+    is_p &= is_p << 16;
+    is_p &= is_p << 8;
+    is_p &= is_p << 4;
+    is_p &= is_p << 2;
+    is_p &= is_p << 1;
+    is_p = 0 - (is_p >> 63);
+    is_p = ~is_p;
+
+    /* is_p is 0 iff |out| == 2^521-1 and all ones otherwise */
+
+    out[0] &= is_p;
+    out[1] &= is_p;
+    out[2] &= is_p;
+    out[3] &= is_p;
+    out[4] &= is_p;
+    out[5] &= is_p;
+    out[6] &= is_p;
+    out[7] &= is_p;
+    out[8] &= is_p;
+
+    /*
+     * In order to test that |out| >= 2^521-1 we need only test if out[8] >>
+     * 57 is greater than zero as (2^521-1) + x >= 2^522
+     */
+    is_greater = out[8] >> 57;
+    is_greater |= is_greater << 32;
+    is_greater |= is_greater << 16;
+    is_greater |= is_greater << 8;
+    is_greater |= is_greater << 4;
+    is_greater |= is_greater << 2;
+    is_greater |= is_greater << 1;
+    is_greater = 0 - (is_greater >> 63);
+
+    out[0] -= kPrime[0] & is_greater;
+    out[1] -= kPrime[1] & is_greater;
+    out[2] -= kPrime[2] & is_greater;
+    out[3] -= kPrime[3] & is_greater;
+    out[4] -= kPrime[4] & is_greater;
+    out[5] -= kPrime[5] & is_greater;
+    out[6] -= kPrime[6] & is_greater;
+    out[7] -= kPrime[7] & is_greater;
+    out[8] -= kPrime[8] & is_greater;
+
+    /* Eliminate negative coefficients */
+    sign = -(out[0] >> 63);
+    out[0] += (two58 & sign);
+    out[1] -= (1 & sign);
+    sign = -(out[1] >> 63);
+    out[1] += (two58 & sign);
+    out[2] -= (1 & sign);
+    sign = -(out[2] >> 63);
+    out[2] += (two58 & sign);
+    out[3] -= (1 & sign);
+    sign = -(out[3] >> 63);
+    out[3] += (two58 & sign);
+    out[4] -= (1 & sign);
+    sign = -(out[4] >> 63);
+    out[4] += (two58 & sign);
+    out[5] -= (1 & sign);
+    sign = -(out[0] >> 63);
+    out[5] += (two58 & sign);
+    out[6] -= (1 & sign);
+    sign = -(out[6] >> 63);
+    out[6] += (two58 & sign);
+    out[7] -= (1 & sign);
+    sign = -(out[7] >> 63);
+    out[7] += (two58 & sign);
+    out[8] -= (1 & sign);
+    sign = -(out[5] >> 63);
+    out[5] += (two58 & sign);
+    out[6] -= (1 & sign);
+    sign = -(out[6] >> 63);
+    out[6] += (two58 & sign);
+    out[7] -= (1 & sign);
+    sign = -(out[7] >> 63);
+    out[7] += (two58 & sign);
+    out[8] -= (1 & sign);
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Group operations
+ * ----------------
+ *
+ * Building on top of the field operations we have the operations on the
+ * elliptic curve group itself. Points on the curve are represented in Jacobian
+ * coordinates */
+
+/*-
+ * point_double calculates 2*(x_in, y_in, z_in)
+ *
+ * The method is taken from:
+ *   http://hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-shortw-jacobian-3.html#doubling-dbl-2001-b
+ *
+ * Outputs can equal corresponding inputs, i.e., x_out == x_in is allowed.
+ * while x_out == y_in is not (maybe this works, but it's not tested). */
+static void
+point_double(felem x_out, felem y_out, felem z_out,
+             const felem x_in, const felem y_in, const felem z_in)
+{
+    largefelem tmp, tmp2;
+    felem delta, gamma, beta, alpha, ftmp, ftmp2;
+
+    felem_assign(ftmp, x_in);
+    felem_assign(ftmp2, x_in);
+
+    /* delta = z^2 */
+    felem_square(tmp, z_in);
+    felem_reduce(delta, tmp);   /* delta[i] < 2^59 + 2^14 */
+
+    /* gamma = y^2 */
+    felem_square(tmp, y_in);
+    felem_reduce(gamma, tmp);   /* gamma[i] < 2^59 + 2^14 */
+
+    /* beta = x*gamma */
+    felem_mul(tmp, x_in, gamma);
+    felem_reduce(beta, tmp);    /* beta[i] < 2^59 + 2^14 */
+
+    /* alpha = 3*(x-delta)*(x+delta) */
+    felem_diff64(ftmp, delta);
+    /* ftmp[i] < 2^61 */
+    felem_sum64(ftmp2, delta);
+    /* ftmp2[i] < 2^60 + 2^15 */
+    felem_scalar64(ftmp2, 3);
+    /* ftmp2[i] < 3*2^60 + 3*2^15 */
+    felem_mul(tmp, ftmp, ftmp2);
+    /*-
+     * tmp[i] < 17(3*2^121 + 3*2^76)
+     *        = 61*2^121 + 61*2^76
+     *        < 64*2^121 + 64*2^76
+     *        = 2^127 + 2^82
+     *        < 2^128
+     */
+    felem_reduce(alpha, tmp);
+
+    /* x' = alpha^2 - 8*beta */
+    felem_square(tmp, alpha);
+    /*
+     * tmp[i] < 17*2^120 < 2^125
+     */
+    felem_assign(ftmp, beta);
+    felem_scalar64(ftmp, 8);
+    /* ftmp[i] < 2^62 + 2^17 */
+    felem_diff_128_64(tmp, ftmp);
+    /* tmp[i] < 2^125 + 2^63 + 2^62 + 2^17 */
+    felem_reduce(x_out, tmp);
+
+    /* z' = (y + z)^2 - gamma - delta */
+    felem_sum64(delta, gamma);
+    /* delta[i] < 2^60 + 2^15 */
+    felem_assign(ftmp, y_in);
+    felem_sum64(ftmp, z_in);
+    /* ftmp[i] < 2^60 + 2^15 */
+    felem_square(tmp, ftmp);
+    /*
+     * tmp[i] < 17(2^122) < 2^127
+     */
+    felem_diff_128_64(tmp, delta);
+    /* tmp[i] < 2^127 + 2^63 */
+    felem_reduce(z_out, tmp);
+
+    /* y' = alpha*(4*beta - x') - 8*gamma^2 */
+    felem_scalar64(beta, 4);
+    /* beta[i] < 2^61 + 2^16 */
+    felem_diff64(beta, x_out);
+    /* beta[i] < 2^61 + 2^60 + 2^16 */
+    felem_mul(tmp, alpha, beta);
+    /*-
+     * tmp[i] < 17*((2^59 + 2^14)(2^61 + 2^60 + 2^16))
+     *        = 17*(2^120 + 2^75 + 2^119 + 2^74 + 2^75 + 2^30)
+     *        = 17*(2^120 + 2^119 + 2^76 + 2^74 + 2^30)
+     *        < 2^128
+     */
+    felem_square(tmp2, gamma);
+    /*-
+     * tmp2[i] < 17*(2^59 + 2^14)^2
+     *         = 17*(2^118 + 2^74 + 2^28)
+     */
+    felem_scalar128(tmp2, 8);
+    /*-
+     * tmp2[i] < 8*17*(2^118 + 2^74 + 2^28)
+     *         = 2^125 + 2^121 + 2^81 + 2^77 + 2^35 + 2^31
+     *         < 2^126
+     */
+    felem_diff128(tmp, tmp2);
+    /*-
+     * tmp[i] < 2^127 - 2^69 + 17(2^120 + 2^119 + 2^76 + 2^74 + 2^30)
+     *        = 2^127 + 2^124 + 2^122 + 2^120 + 2^118 + 2^80 + 2^78 + 2^76 +
+     *          2^74 + 2^69 + 2^34 + 2^30
+     *        < 2^128
+     */
+    felem_reduce(y_out, tmp);
+}
+
+/* copy_conditional copies in to out iff mask is all ones. */
+static void copy_conditional(felem out, const felem in, limb mask)
+{
+    unsigned i;
+    for (i = 0; i < NLIMBS; ++i) {
+        const limb tmp = mask & (in[i] ^ out[i]);
+        out[i] ^= tmp;
+    }
+}
+
+/*-
+ * point_add calculates (x1, y1, z1) + (x2, y2, z2)
+ *
+ * The method is taken from
+ *   http://hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-shortw-jacobian-3.html#addition-add-2007-bl,
+ * adapted for mixed addition (z2 = 1, or z2 = 0 for the point at infinity).
+ *
+ * This function includes a branch for checking whether the two input points
+ * are equal (while not equal to the point at infinity). This case never
+ * happens during single point multiplication, so there is no timing leak for
+ * ECDH or ECDSA signing. */
+static void point_add(felem x3, felem y3, felem z3,
+                      const felem x1, const felem y1, const felem z1,
+                      const int mixed, const felem x2, const felem y2,
+                      const felem z2)
+{
+    felem ftmp, ftmp2, ftmp3, ftmp4, ftmp5, ftmp6, x_out, y_out, z_out;
+    largefelem tmp, tmp2;
+    limb x_equal, y_equal, z1_is_zero, z2_is_zero;
+
+    z1_is_zero = felem_is_zero(z1);
+    z2_is_zero = felem_is_zero(z2);
+
+    /* ftmp = z1z1 = z1**2 */
+    felem_square(tmp, z1);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp);
+
+    if (!mixed) {
+        /* ftmp2 = z2z2 = z2**2 */
+        felem_square(tmp, z2);
+        felem_reduce(ftmp2, tmp);
+
+        /* u1 = ftmp3 = x1*z2z2 */
+        felem_mul(tmp, x1, ftmp2);
+        felem_reduce(ftmp3, tmp);
+
+        /* ftmp5 = z1 + z2 */
+        felem_assign(ftmp5, z1);
+        felem_sum64(ftmp5, z2);
+        /* ftmp5[i] < 2^61 */
+
+        /* ftmp5 = (z1 + z2)**2 - z1z1 - z2z2 = 2*z1z2 */
+        felem_square(tmp, ftmp5);
+        /* tmp[i] < 17*2^122 */
+        felem_diff_128_64(tmp, ftmp);
+        /* tmp[i] < 17*2^122 + 2^63 */
+        felem_diff_128_64(tmp, ftmp2);
+        /* tmp[i] < 17*2^122 + 2^64 */
+        felem_reduce(ftmp5, tmp);
+
+        /* ftmp2 = z2 * z2z2 */
+        felem_mul(tmp, ftmp2, z2);
+        felem_reduce(ftmp2, tmp);
+
+        /* s1 = ftmp6 = y1 * z2**3 */
+        felem_mul(tmp, y1, ftmp2);
+        felem_reduce(ftmp6, tmp);
+    } else {
+        /*
+         * We'll assume z2 = 1 (special case z2 = 0 is handled later)
+         */
+
+        /* u1 = ftmp3 = x1*z2z2 */
+        felem_assign(ftmp3, x1);
+
+        /* ftmp5 = 2*z1z2 */
+        felem_scalar(ftmp5, z1, 2);
+
+        /* s1 = ftmp6 = y1 * z2**3 */
+        felem_assign(ftmp6, y1);
+    }
+
+    /* u2 = x2*z1z1 */
+    felem_mul(tmp, x2, ftmp);
+    /* tmp[i] < 17*2^120 */
+
+    /* h = ftmp4 = u2 - u1 */
+    felem_diff_128_64(tmp, ftmp3);
+    /* tmp[i] < 17*2^120 + 2^63 */
+    felem_reduce(ftmp4, tmp);
+
+    x_equal = felem_is_zero(ftmp4);
+
+    /* z_out = ftmp5 * h */
+    felem_mul(tmp, ftmp5, ftmp4);
+    felem_reduce(z_out, tmp);
+
+    /* ftmp = z1 * z1z1 */
+    felem_mul(tmp, ftmp, z1);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp);
+
+    /* s2 = tmp = y2 * z1**3 */
+    felem_mul(tmp, y2, ftmp);
+    /* tmp[i] < 17*2^120 */
+
+    /* r = ftmp5 = (s2 - s1)*2 */
+    felem_diff_128_64(tmp, ftmp6);
+    /* tmp[i] < 17*2^120 + 2^63 */
+    felem_reduce(ftmp5, tmp);
+    y_equal = felem_is_zero(ftmp5);
+    felem_scalar64(ftmp5, 2);
+    /* ftmp5[i] < 2^61 */
+
+    if (x_equal && y_equal && !z1_is_zero && !z2_is_zero) {
+        point_double(x3, y3, z3, x1, y1, z1);
+        return;
+    }
+
+    /* I = ftmp = (2h)**2 */
+    felem_assign(ftmp, ftmp4);
+    felem_scalar64(ftmp, 2);
+    /* ftmp[i] < 2^61 */
+    felem_square(tmp, ftmp);
+    /* tmp[i] < 17*2^122 */
+    felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp);
+
+    /* J = ftmp2 = h * I */
+    felem_mul(tmp, ftmp4, ftmp);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp2, tmp);
+
+    /* V = ftmp4 = U1 * I */
+    felem_mul(tmp, ftmp3, ftmp);
+    felem_reduce(ftmp4, tmp);
+
+    /* x_out = r**2 - J - 2V */
+    felem_square(tmp, ftmp5);
+    /* tmp[i] < 17*2^122 */
+    felem_diff_128_64(tmp, ftmp2);
+    /* tmp[i] < 17*2^122 + 2^63 */
+    felem_assign(ftmp3, ftmp4);
+    felem_scalar64(ftmp4, 2);
+    /* ftmp4[i] < 2^61 */
+    felem_diff_128_64(tmp, ftmp4);
+    /* tmp[i] < 17*2^122 + 2^64 */
+    felem_reduce(x_out, tmp);
+
+    /* y_out = r(V-x_out) - 2 * s1 * J */
+    felem_diff64(ftmp3, x_out);
+    /*
+     * ftmp3[i] < 2^60 + 2^60 = 2^61
+     */
+    felem_mul(tmp, ftmp5, ftmp3);
+    /* tmp[i] < 17*2^122 */
+    felem_mul(tmp2, ftmp6, ftmp2);
+    /* tmp2[i] < 17*2^120 */
+    felem_scalar128(tmp2, 2);
+    /* tmp2[i] < 17*2^121 */
+    felem_diff128(tmp, tmp2);
+        /*-
+         * tmp[i] < 2^127 - 2^69 + 17*2^122
+         *        = 2^126 - 2^122 - 2^6 - 2^2 - 1
+         *        < 2^127
+         */
+    felem_reduce(y_out, tmp);
+
+    copy_conditional(x_out, x2, z1_is_zero);
+    copy_conditional(x_out, x1, z2_is_zero);
+    copy_conditional(y_out, y2, z1_is_zero);
+    copy_conditional(y_out, y1, z2_is_zero);
+    copy_conditional(z_out, z2, z1_is_zero);
+    copy_conditional(z_out, z1, z2_is_zero);
+    felem_assign(x3, x_out);
+    felem_assign(y3, y_out);
+    felem_assign(z3, z_out);
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Base point pre computation
+ * --------------------------
+ *
+ * Two different sorts of precomputed tables are used in the following code.
+ * Each contain various points on the curve, where each point is three field
+ * elements (x, y, z).
+ *
+ * For the base point table, z is usually 1 (0 for the point at infinity).
+ * This table has 16 elements:
+ * index | bits    | point
+ * ------+---------+------------------------------
+ *     0 | 0 0 0 0 | 0G
+ *     1 | 0 0 0 1 | 1G
+ *     2 | 0 0 1 0 | 2^130G
+ *     3 | 0 0 1 1 | (2^130 + 1)G
+ *     4 | 0 1 0 0 | 2^260G
+ *     5 | 0 1 0 1 | (2^260 + 1)G
+ *     6 | 0 1 1 0 | (2^260 + 2^130)G
+ *     7 | 0 1 1 1 | (2^260 + 2^130 + 1)G
+ *     8 | 1 0 0 0 | 2^390G
+ *     9 | 1 0 0 1 | (2^390 + 1)G
+ *    10 | 1 0 1 0 | (2^390 + 2^130)G
+ *    11 | 1 0 1 1 | (2^390 + 2^130 + 1)G
+ *    12 | 1 1 0 0 | (2^390 + 2^260)G
+ *    13 | 1 1 0 1 | (2^390 + 2^260 + 1)G
+ *    14 | 1 1 1 0 | (2^390 + 2^260 + 2^130)G
+ *    15 | 1 1 1 1 | (2^390 + 2^260 + 2^130 + 1)G
+ *
+ * The reason for this is so that we can clock bits into four different
+ * locations when doing simple scalar multiplies against the base point.
+ *
+ * Tables for other points have table[i] = iG for i in 0 .. 16. */
+
+/* gmul is the table of precomputed base points */
+static const felem gmul[16][3] = {
+{{0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
+ {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
+ {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}},
+{{0x017e7e31c2e5bd66, 0x022cf0615a90a6fe, 0x00127a2ffa8de334,
+  0x01dfbf9d64a3f877, 0x006b4d3dbaa14b5e, 0x014fed487e0a2bd8,
+  0x015b4429c6481390, 0x03a73678fb2d988e, 0x00c6858e06b70404},
+ {0x00be94769fd16650, 0x031c21a89cb09022, 0x039013fad0761353,
+  0x02657bd099031542, 0x03273e662c97ee72, 0x01e6d11a05ebef45,
+  0x03d1bd998f544495, 0x03001172297ed0b1, 0x011839296a789a3b},
+ {1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}},
+{{0x0373faacbc875bae, 0x00f325023721c671, 0x00f666fd3dbde5ad,
+  0x01a6932363f88ea7, 0x01fc6d9e13f9c47b, 0x03bcbffc2bbf734e,
+  0x013ee3c3647f3a92, 0x029409fefe75d07d, 0x00ef9199963d85e5},
+ {0x011173743ad5b178, 0x02499c7c21bf7d46, 0x035beaeabb8b1a58,
+  0x00f989c4752ea0a3, 0x0101e1de48a9c1a3, 0x01a20076be28ba6c,
+  0x02f8052e5eb2de95, 0x01bfe8f82dea117c, 0x0160074d3c36ddb7},
+ {1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}},
+{{0x012f3fc373393b3b, 0x03d3d6172f1419fa, 0x02adc943c0b86873,
+  0x00d475584177952b, 0x012a4d1673750ee2, 0x00512517a0f13b0c,
+  0x02b184671a7b1734, 0x0315b84236f1a50a, 0x00a4afc472edbdb9},
+ {0x00152a7077f385c4, 0x03044007d8d1c2ee, 0x0065829d61d52b52,
+  0x00494ff6b6631d0d, 0x00a11d94d5f06bcf, 0x02d2f89474d9282e,
+  0x0241c5727c06eeb9, 0x0386928710fbdb9d, 0x01f883f727b0dfbe},
+ {1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}},
+{{0x019b0c3c9185544d, 0x006243a37c9d97db, 0x02ee3cbe030a2ad2,
+  0x00cfdd946bb51e0d, 0x0271c00932606b91, 0x03f817d1ec68c561,
+  0x03f37009806a369c, 0x03c1f30baf184fd5, 0x01091022d6d2f065},
+ {0x0292c583514c45ed, 0x0316fca51f9a286c, 0x00300af507c1489a,
+  0x0295f69008298cf1, 0x02c0ed8274943d7b, 0x016509b9b47a431e,
+  0x02bc9de9634868ce, 0x005b34929bffcb09, 0x000c1a0121681524},
+ {1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}},
+{{0x0286abc0292fb9f2, 0x02665eee9805b3f7, 0x01ed7455f17f26d6,
+  0x0346355b83175d13, 0x006284944cd0a097, 0x0191895bcdec5e51,
+  0x02e288370afda7d9, 0x03b22312bfefa67a, 0x01d104d3fc0613fe},
+ {0x0092421a12f7e47f, 0x0077a83fa373c501, 0x03bd25c5f696bd0d,
+  0x035c41e4d5459761, 0x01ca0d1742b24f53, 0x00aaab27863a509c,
+  0x018b6de47df73917, 0x025c0b771705cd01, 0x01fd51d566d760a7},
+ {1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}},
+{{0x01dd92ff6b0d1dbd, 0x039c5e2e8f8afa69, 0x0261ed13242c3b27,
+  0x0382c6e67026e6a0, 0x01d60b10be2089f9, 0x03c15f3dce86723f,
+  0x03c764a32d2a062d, 0x017307eac0fad056, 0x018207c0b96c5256},
+ {0x0196a16d60e13154, 0x03e6ce74c0267030, 0x00ddbf2b4e52a5aa,
+  0x012738241bbf31c8, 0x00ebe8dc04685a28, 0x024c2ad6d380d4a2,
+  0x035ee062a6e62d0e, 0x0029ed74af7d3a0f, 0x00eef32aec142ebd},
+ {1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}},
+{{0x00c31ec398993b39, 0x03a9f45bcda68253, 0x00ac733c24c70890,
+  0x00872b111401ff01, 0x01d178c23195eafb, 0x03bca2c816b87f74,
+  0x0261a9af46fbad7a, 0x0324b2a8dd3d28f9, 0x00918121d8f24e23},
+ {0x032bc8c1ca983cd7, 0x00d869dfb08fc8c6, 0x01693cb61fce1516,
+  0x012a5ea68f4e88a8, 0x010869cab88d7ae3, 0x009081ad277ceee1,
+  0x033a77166d064cdc, 0x03955235a1fb3a95, 0x01251a4a9b25b65e},
+ {1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}},
+{{0x00148a3a1b27f40b, 0x0123186df1b31fdc, 0x00026e7beaad34ce,
+  0x01db446ac1d3dbba, 0x0299c1a33437eaec, 0x024540610183cbb7,
+  0x0173bb0e9ce92e46, 0x02b937e43921214b, 0x01ab0436a9bf01b5},
+ {0x0383381640d46948, 0x008dacbf0e7f330f, 0x03602122bcc3f318,
+  0x01ee596b200620d6, 0x03bd0585fda430b3, 0x014aed77fd123a83,
+  0x005ace749e52f742, 0x0390fe041da2b842, 0x0189a8ceb3299242},
+ {1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}},
+{{0x012a19d6b3282473, 0x00c0915918b423ce, 0x023a954eb94405ae,
+  0x00529f692be26158, 0x0289fa1b6fa4b2aa, 0x0198ae4ceea346ef,
+  0x0047d8cdfbdedd49, 0x00cc8c8953f0f6b8, 0x001424abbff49203},
+ {0x0256732a1115a03a, 0x0351bc38665c6733, 0x03f7b950fb4a6447,
+  0x000afffa94c22155, 0x025763d0a4dab540, 0x000511e92d4fc283,
+  0x030a7e9eda0ee96c, 0x004c3cd93a28bf0a, 0x017edb3a8719217f},
+ {1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}},
+{{0x011de5675a88e673, 0x031d7d0f5e567fbe, 0x0016b2062c970ae5,
+  0x03f4a2be49d90aa7, 0x03cef0bd13822866, 0x03f0923dcf774a6c,
+  0x0284bebc4f322f72, 0x016ab2645302bb2c, 0x01793f95dace0e2a},
+ {0x010646e13527a28f, 0x01ca1babd59dc5e7, 0x01afedfd9a5595df,
+  0x01f15785212ea6b1, 0x0324e5d64f6ae3f4, 0x02d680f526d00645,
+  0x0127920fadf627a7, 0x03b383f75df4f684, 0x0089e0057e783b0a},
+ {1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}},
+{{0x00f334b9eb3c26c6, 0x0298fdaa98568dce, 0x01c2d24843a82292,
+  0x020bcb24fa1b0711, 0x02cbdb3d2b1875e6, 0x0014907598f89422,
+  0x03abe3aa43b26664, 0x02cbf47f720bc168, 0x0133b5e73014b79b},
+ {0x034aab5dab05779d, 0x00cdc5d71fee9abb, 0x0399f16bd4bd9d30,
+  0x03582fa592d82647, 0x02be1cdfb775b0e9, 0x0034f7cea32e94cb,
+  0x0335a7f08f56f286, 0x03b707e9565d1c8b, 0x0015c946ea5b614f},
+ {1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}},
+{{0x024676f6cff72255, 0x00d14625cac96378, 0x00532b6008bc3767,
+  0x01fc16721b985322, 0x023355ea1b091668, 0x029de7afdc0317c3,
+  0x02fc8a7ca2da037c, 0x02de1217d74a6f30, 0x013f7173175b73bf},
+ {0x0344913f441490b5, 0x0200f9e272b61eca, 0x0258a246b1dd55d2,
+  0x03753db9ea496f36, 0x025e02937a09c5ef, 0x030cbd3d14012692,
+  0x01793a67e70dc72a, 0x03ec1d37048a662e, 0x006550f700c32a8d},
+ {1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}},
+{{0x00d3f48a347eba27, 0x008e636649b61bd8, 0x00d3b93716778fb3,
+  0x004d1915757bd209, 0x019d5311a3da44e0, 0x016d1afcbbe6aade,
+  0x0241bf5f73265616, 0x0384672e5d50d39b, 0x005009fee522b684},
+ {0x029b4fab064435fe, 0x018868ee095bbb07, 0x01ea3d6936cc92b8,
+  0x000608b00f78a2f3, 0x02db911073d1c20f, 0x018205938470100a,
+  0x01f1e4964cbe6ff2, 0x021a19a29eed4663, 0x01414485f42afa81},
+ {1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}},
+{{0x01612b3a17f63e34, 0x03813992885428e6, 0x022b3c215b5a9608,
+  0x029b4057e19f2fcb, 0x0384059a587af7e6, 0x02d6400ace6fe610,
+  0x029354d896e8e331, 0x00c047ee6dfba65e, 0x0037720542e9d49d},
+ {0x02ce9eed7c5e9278, 0x0374ed703e79643b, 0x01316c54c4072006,
+  0x005aaa09054b2ee8, 0x002824000c840d57, 0x03d4eba24771ed86,
+  0x0189c50aabc3bdae, 0x0338c01541e15510, 0x00466d56e38eed42},
+ {1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}},
+{{0x007efd8330ad8bd6, 0x02465ed48047710b, 0x0034c6606b215e0c,
+  0x016ae30c53cbf839, 0x01fa17bd37161216, 0x018ead4e61ce8ab9,
+  0x005482ed5f5dee46, 0x037543755bba1d7f, 0x005e5ac7e70a9d0f},
+ {0x0117e1bb2fdcb2a2, 0x03deea36249f40c4, 0x028d09b4a6246cb7,
+  0x03524b8855bcf756, 0x023d7d109d5ceb58, 0x0178e43e3223ef9c,
+  0x0154536a0c6e966a, 0x037964d1286ee9fe, 0x0199bcd90e125055},
+ {1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}}
+};
+
+/*
+ * select_point selects the |idx|th point from a precomputation table and
+ * copies it to out.
+ */
+ /* pre_comp below is of the size provided in |size| */
+static void select_point(const limb idx, unsigned int size,
+                         const felem pre_comp[][3], felem out[3])
+{
+    unsigned i, j;
+    limb *outlimbs = &out[0][0];
+
+    memset(out, 0, sizeof(*out) * 3);
+
+    for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
+        const limb *inlimbs = &pre_comp[i][0][0];
+        limb mask = i ^ idx;
+        mask |= mask >> 4;
+        mask |= mask >> 2;
+        mask |= mask >> 1;
+        mask &= 1;
+        mask--;
+        for (j = 0; j < NLIMBS * 3; j++)
+            outlimbs[j] |= inlimbs[j] & mask;
+    }
+}
+
+/* get_bit returns the |i|th bit in |in| */
+static char get_bit(const felem_bytearray in, int i)
+{
+    if (i < 0)
+        return 0;
+    return (in[i >> 3] >> (i & 7)) & 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Interleaved point multiplication using precomputed point multiples: The
+ * small point multiples 0*P, 1*P, ..., 16*P are in pre_comp[], the scalars
+ * in scalars[]. If g_scalar is non-NULL, we also add this multiple of the
+ * generator, using certain (large) precomputed multiples in g_pre_comp.
+ * Output point (X, Y, Z) is stored in x_out, y_out, z_out
+ */
+static void batch_mul(felem x_out, felem y_out, felem z_out,
+                      const felem_bytearray scalars[],
+                      const unsigned num_points, const u8 *g_scalar,
+                      const int mixed, const felem pre_comp[][17][3],
+                      const felem g_pre_comp[16][3])
+{
+    int i, skip;
+    unsigned num, gen_mul = (g_scalar != NULL);
+    felem nq[3], tmp[4];
+    limb bits;
+    u8 sign, digit;
+
+    /* set nq to the point at infinity */
+    memset(nq, 0, sizeof(nq));
+
+    /*
+     * Loop over all scalars msb-to-lsb, interleaving additions of multiples
+     * of the generator (last quarter of rounds) and additions of other
+     * points multiples (every 5th round).
+     */
+    skip = 1;                   /* save two point operations in the first
+                                 * round */
+    for (i = (num_points ? 520 : 130); i >= 0; --i) {
+        /* double */
+        if (!skip)
+            point_double(nq[0], nq[1], nq[2], nq[0], nq[1], nq[2]);
+
+        /* add multiples of the generator */
+        if (gen_mul && (i <= 130)) {
+            bits = get_bit(g_scalar, i + 390) << 3;
+            if (i < 130) {
+                bits |= get_bit(g_scalar, i + 260) << 2;
+                bits |= get_bit(g_scalar, i + 130) << 1;
+                bits |= get_bit(g_scalar, i);
+            }
+            /* select the point to add, in constant time */
+            select_point(bits, 16, g_pre_comp, tmp);
+            if (!skip) {
+                /* The 1 argument below is for "mixed" */
+                point_add(nq[0], nq[1], nq[2],
+                          nq[0], nq[1], nq[2], 1, tmp[0], tmp[1], tmp[2]);
+            } else {
+                memcpy(nq, tmp, 3 * sizeof(felem));
+                skip = 0;
+            }
+        }
+
+        /* do other additions every 5 doublings */
+        if (num_points && (i % 5 == 0)) {
+            /* loop over all scalars */
+            for (num = 0; num < num_points; ++num) {
+                bits = get_bit(scalars[num], i + 4) << 5;
+                bits |= get_bit(scalars[num], i + 3) << 4;
+                bits |= get_bit(scalars[num], i + 2) << 3;
+                bits |= get_bit(scalars[num], i + 1) << 2;
+                bits |= get_bit(scalars[num], i) << 1;
+                bits |= get_bit(scalars[num], i - 1);
+                ec_GFp_nistp_recode_scalar_bits(&sign, &digit, bits);
+
+                /*
+                 * select the point to add or subtract, in constant time
+                 */
+                select_point(digit, 17, pre_comp[num], tmp);
+                felem_neg(tmp[3], tmp[1]); /* (X, -Y, Z) is the negative
+                                            * point */
+                copy_conditional(tmp[1], tmp[3], (-(limb) sign));
+
+                if (!skip) {
+                    point_add(nq[0], nq[1], nq[2],
+                              nq[0], nq[1], nq[2],
+                              mixed, tmp[0], tmp[1], tmp[2]);
+                } else {
+                    memcpy(nq, tmp, 3 * sizeof(felem));
+                    skip = 0;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    felem_assign(x_out, nq[0]);
+    felem_assign(y_out, nq[1]);
+    felem_assign(z_out, nq[2]);
+}
+
+/* Precomputation for the group generator. */
+struct nistp521_pre_comp_st {
+    felem g_pre_comp[16][3];
+    int references;
+    CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock;
+};
+
+const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_nistp521_method(void)
+{
+    static const EC_METHOD ret = {
+        EC_FLAGS_DEFAULT_OCT,
+        NID_X9_62_prime_field,
+        ec_GFp_nistp521_group_init,
+        ec_GFp_simple_group_finish,
+        ec_GFp_simple_group_clear_finish,
+        ec_GFp_nist_group_copy,
+        ec_GFp_nistp521_group_set_curve,
+        ec_GFp_simple_group_get_curve,
+        ec_GFp_simple_group_get_degree,
+        ec_group_simple_order_bits,
+        ec_GFp_simple_group_check_discriminant,
+        ec_GFp_simple_point_init,
+        ec_GFp_simple_point_finish,
+        ec_GFp_simple_point_clear_finish,
+        ec_GFp_simple_point_copy,
+        ec_GFp_simple_point_set_to_infinity,
+        ec_GFp_simple_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp,
+        ec_GFp_simple_get_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp,
+        ec_GFp_simple_point_set_affine_coordinates,
+        ec_GFp_nistp521_point_get_affine_coordinates,
+        0 /* point_set_compressed_coordinates */ ,
+        0 /* point2oct */ ,
+        0 /* oct2point */ ,
+        ec_GFp_simple_add,
+        ec_GFp_simple_dbl,
+        ec_GFp_simple_invert,
+        ec_GFp_simple_is_at_infinity,
+        ec_GFp_simple_is_on_curve,
+        ec_GFp_simple_cmp,
+        ec_GFp_simple_make_affine,
+        ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine,
+        ec_GFp_nistp521_points_mul,
+        ec_GFp_nistp521_precompute_mult,
+        ec_GFp_nistp521_have_precompute_mult,
+        ec_GFp_nist_field_mul,
+        ec_GFp_nist_field_sqr,
+        0 /* field_div */ ,
+        0 /* field_encode */ ,
+        0 /* field_decode */ ,
+        0,                      /* field_set_to_one */
+        ec_key_simple_priv2oct,
+        ec_key_simple_oct2priv,
+        0, /* set private */
+        ec_key_simple_generate_key,
+        ec_key_simple_check_key,
+        ec_key_simple_generate_public_key,
+        0, /* keycopy */
+        0, /* keyfinish */
+        ecdh_simple_compute_key
+    };
+
+    return &ret;
+}
+
+/******************************************************************************/
+/*
+ * FUNCTIONS TO MANAGE PRECOMPUTATION
+ */
+
+static NISTP521_PRE_COMP *nistp521_pre_comp_new()
+{
+    NISTP521_PRE_COMP *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
+
+    if (ret == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_NISTP521_PRE_COMP_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    ret->references = 1;
+
+    ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
+    if (ret->lock == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_NISTP521_PRE_COMP_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        OPENSSL_free(ret);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+NISTP521_PRE_COMP *EC_nistp521_pre_comp_dup(NISTP521_PRE_COMP *p)
+{
+    int i;
+    if (p != NULL)
+        CRYPTO_atomic_add(&p->references, 1, &i, p->lock);
+    return p;
+}
+
+void EC_nistp521_pre_comp_free(NISTP521_PRE_COMP *p)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    if (p == NULL)
+        return;
+
+    CRYPTO_atomic_add(&p->references, -1, &i, p->lock);
+    REF_PRINT_COUNT("EC_nistp521", x);
+    if (i > 0)
+        return;
+    REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0);
+
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(p->lock);
+    OPENSSL_free(p);
+}
+
+/******************************************************************************/
+/*
+ * OPENSSL EC_METHOD FUNCTIONS
+ */
+
+int ec_GFp_nistp521_group_init(EC_GROUP *group)
+{
+    int ret;
+    ret = ec_GFp_simple_group_init(group);
+    group->a_is_minus3 = 1;
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int ec_GFp_nistp521_group_set_curve(EC_GROUP *group, const BIGNUM *p,
+                                    const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
+                                    BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *curve_p, *curve_a, *curve_b;
+
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        if ((ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+            return 0;
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    if (((curve_p = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) ||
+        ((curve_a = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) ||
+        ((curve_b = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL))
+        goto err;
+    BN_bin2bn(nistp521_curve_params[0], sizeof(felem_bytearray), curve_p);
+    BN_bin2bn(nistp521_curve_params[1], sizeof(felem_bytearray), curve_a);
+    BN_bin2bn(nistp521_curve_params[2], sizeof(felem_bytearray), curve_b);
+    if ((BN_cmp(curve_p, p)) || (BN_cmp(curve_a, a)) || (BN_cmp(curve_b, b))) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP521_GROUP_SET_CURVE,
+              EC_R_WRONG_CURVE_PARAMETERS);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    group->field_mod_func = BN_nist_mod_521;
+    ret = ec_GFp_simple_group_set_curve(group, p, a, b, ctx);
+ err:
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Takes the Jacobian coordinates (X, Y, Z) of a point and returns (X', Y') =
+ * (X/Z^2, Y/Z^3)
+ */
+int ec_GFp_nistp521_point_get_affine_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *group,
+                                                 const EC_POINT *point,
+                                                 BIGNUM *x, BIGNUM *y,
+                                                 BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    felem z1, z2, x_in, y_in, x_out, y_out;
+    largefelem tmp;
+
+    if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, point)) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP521_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES,
+              EC_R_POINT_AT_INFINITY);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if ((!BN_to_felem(x_in, point->X)) || (!BN_to_felem(y_in, point->Y)) ||
+        (!BN_to_felem(z1, point->Z)))
+        return 0;
+    felem_inv(z2, z1);
+    felem_square(tmp, z2);
+    felem_reduce(z1, tmp);
+    felem_mul(tmp, x_in, z1);
+    felem_reduce(x_in, tmp);
+    felem_contract(x_out, x_in);
+    if (x != NULL) {
+        if (!felem_to_BN(x, x_out)) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP521_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES,
+                  ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+    felem_mul(tmp, z1, z2);
+    felem_reduce(z1, tmp);
+    felem_mul(tmp, y_in, z1);
+    felem_reduce(y_in, tmp);
+    felem_contract(y_out, y_in);
+    if (y != NULL) {
+        if (!felem_to_BN(y, y_out)) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP521_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES,
+                  ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* points below is of size |num|, and tmp_felems is of size |num+1/ */
+static void make_points_affine(size_t num, felem points[][3],
+                               felem tmp_felems[])
+{
+    /*
+     * Runs in constant time, unless an input is the point at infinity (which
+     * normally shouldn't happen).
+     */
+    ec_GFp_nistp_points_make_affine_internal(num,
+                                             points,
+                                             sizeof(felem),
+                                             tmp_felems,
+                                             (void (*)(void *))felem_one,
+                                             felem_is_zero_int,
+                                             (void (*)(void *, const void *))
+                                             felem_assign,
+                                             (void (*)(void *, const void *))
+                                             felem_square_reduce, (void (*)
+                                                                   (void *,
+                                                                    const void
+                                                                    *,
+                                                                    const void
+                                                                    *))
+                                             felem_mul_reduce,
+                                             (void (*)(void *, const void *))
+                                             felem_inv,
+                                             (void (*)(void *, const void *))
+                                             felem_contract);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Computes scalar*generator + \sum scalars[i]*points[i], ignoring NULL
+ * values Result is stored in r (r can equal one of the inputs).
+ */
+int ec_GFp_nistp521_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
+                               const BIGNUM *scalar, size_t num,
+                               const EC_POINT *points[],
+                               const BIGNUM *scalars[], BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    int j;
+    int mixed = 0;
+    BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *x, *y, *z, *tmp_scalar;
+    felem_bytearray g_secret;
+    felem_bytearray *secrets = NULL;
+    felem (*pre_comp)[17][3] = NULL;
+    felem *tmp_felems = NULL;
+    felem_bytearray tmp;
+    unsigned i, num_bytes;
+    int have_pre_comp = 0;
+    size_t num_points = num;
+    felem x_in, y_in, z_in, x_out, y_out, z_out;
+    NISTP521_PRE_COMP *pre = NULL;
+    felem(*g_pre_comp)[3] = NULL;
+    EC_POINT *generator = NULL;
+    const EC_POINT *p = NULL;
+    const BIGNUM *p_scalar = NULL;
+
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        if ((ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+            return 0;
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    if (((x = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) ||
+        ((y = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) ||
+        ((z = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) ||
+        ((tmp_scalar = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (scalar != NULL) {
+        pre = group->pre_comp.nistp521;
+        if (pre)
+            /* we have precomputation, try to use it */
+            g_pre_comp = &pre->g_pre_comp[0];
+        else
+            /* try to use the standard precomputation */
+            g_pre_comp = (felem(*)[3]) gmul;
+        generator = EC_POINT_new(group);
+        if (generator == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        /* get the generator from precomputation */
+        if (!felem_to_BN(x, g_pre_comp[1][0]) ||
+            !felem_to_BN(y, g_pre_comp[1][1]) ||
+            !felem_to_BN(z, g_pre_comp[1][2])) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP521_POINTS_MUL, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (!EC_POINT_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(group,
+                                                      generator, x, y, z,
+                                                      ctx))
+            goto err;
+        if (0 == EC_POINT_cmp(group, generator, group->generator, ctx))
+            /* precomputation matches generator */
+            have_pre_comp = 1;
+        else
+            /*
+             * we don't have valid precomputation: treat the generator as a
+             * random point
+             */
+            num_points++;
+    }
+
+    if (num_points > 0) {
+        if (num_points >= 2) {
+            /*
+             * unless we precompute multiples for just one point, converting
+             * those into affine form is time well spent
+             */
+            mixed = 1;
+        }
+        secrets = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*secrets) * num_points);
+        pre_comp = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*pre_comp) * num_points);
+        if (mixed)
+            tmp_felems =
+                OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*tmp_felems) * (num_points * 17 + 1));
+        if ((secrets == NULL) || (pre_comp == NULL)
+            || (mixed && (tmp_felems == NULL))) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP521_POINTS_MUL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        /*
+         * we treat NULL scalars as 0, and NULL points as points at infinity,
+         * i.e., they contribute nothing to the linear combination
+         */
+        for (i = 0; i < num_points; ++i) {
+            if (i == num)
+                /*
+                 * we didn't have a valid precomputation, so we pick the
+                 * generator
+                 */
+            {
+                p = EC_GROUP_get0_generator(group);
+                p_scalar = scalar;
+            } else
+                /* the i^th point */
+            {
+                p = points[i];
+                p_scalar = scalars[i];
+            }
+            if ((p_scalar != NULL) && (p != NULL)) {
+                /* reduce scalar to 0 <= scalar < 2^521 */
+                if ((BN_num_bits(p_scalar) > 521)
+                    || (BN_is_negative(p_scalar))) {
+                    /*
+                     * this is an unusual input, and we don't guarantee
+                     * constant-timeness
+                     */
+                    if (!BN_nnmod(tmp_scalar, p_scalar, group->order, ctx)) {
+                        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP521_POINTS_MUL, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+                        goto err;
+                    }
+                    num_bytes = BN_bn2bin(tmp_scalar, tmp);
+                } else
+                    num_bytes = BN_bn2bin(p_scalar, tmp);
+                flip_endian(secrets[i], tmp, num_bytes);
+                /* precompute multiples */
+                if ((!BN_to_felem(x_out, p->X)) ||
+                    (!BN_to_felem(y_out, p->Y)) ||
+                    (!BN_to_felem(z_out, p->Z)))
+                    goto err;
+                memcpy(pre_comp[i][1][0], x_out, sizeof(felem));
+                memcpy(pre_comp[i][1][1], y_out, sizeof(felem));
+                memcpy(pre_comp[i][1][2], z_out, sizeof(felem));
+                for (j = 2; j <= 16; ++j) {
+                    if (j & 1) {
+                        point_add(pre_comp[i][j][0], pre_comp[i][j][1],
+                                  pre_comp[i][j][2], pre_comp[i][1][0],
+                                  pre_comp[i][1][1], pre_comp[i][1][2], 0,
+                                  pre_comp[i][j - 1][0],
+                                  pre_comp[i][j - 1][1],
+                                  pre_comp[i][j - 1][2]);
+                    } else {
+                        point_double(pre_comp[i][j][0], pre_comp[i][j][1],
+                                     pre_comp[i][j][2], pre_comp[i][j / 2][0],
+                                     pre_comp[i][j / 2][1],
+                                     pre_comp[i][j / 2][2]);
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        if (mixed)
+            make_points_affine(num_points * 17, pre_comp[0], tmp_felems);
+    }
+
+    /* the scalar for the generator */
+    if ((scalar != NULL) && (have_pre_comp)) {
+        memset(g_secret, 0, sizeof(g_secret));
+        /* reduce scalar to 0 <= scalar < 2^521 */
+        if ((BN_num_bits(scalar) > 521) || (BN_is_negative(scalar))) {
+            /*
+             * this is an unusual input, and we don't guarantee
+             * constant-timeness
+             */
+            if (!BN_nnmod(tmp_scalar, scalar, group->order, ctx)) {
+                ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP521_POINTS_MUL, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            num_bytes = BN_bn2bin(tmp_scalar, tmp);
+        } else
+            num_bytes = BN_bn2bin(scalar, tmp);
+        flip_endian(g_secret, tmp, num_bytes);
+        /* do the multiplication with generator precomputation */
+        batch_mul(x_out, y_out, z_out,
+                  (const felem_bytearray(*))secrets, num_points,
+                  g_secret,
+                  mixed, (const felem(*)[17][3])pre_comp,
+                  (const felem(*)[3])g_pre_comp);
+    } else
+        /* do the multiplication without generator precomputation */
+        batch_mul(x_out, y_out, z_out,
+                  (const felem_bytearray(*))secrets, num_points,
+                  NULL, mixed, (const felem(*)[17][3])pre_comp, NULL);
+    /* reduce the output to its unique minimal representation */
+    felem_contract(x_in, x_out);
+    felem_contract(y_in, y_out);
+    felem_contract(z_in, z_out);
+    if ((!felem_to_BN(x, x_in)) || (!felem_to_BN(y, y_in)) ||
+        (!felem_to_BN(z, z_in))) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP521_POINTS_MUL, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    ret = EC_POINT_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(group, r, x, y, z, ctx);
+
+ err:
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    EC_POINT_free(generator);
+    BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
+    OPENSSL_free(secrets);
+    OPENSSL_free(pre_comp);
+    OPENSSL_free(tmp_felems);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int ec_GFp_nistp521_precompute_mult(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    NISTP521_PRE_COMP *pre = NULL;
+    int i, j;
+    BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *x, *y;
+    EC_POINT *generator = NULL;
+    felem tmp_felems[16];
+
+    /* throw away old precomputation */
+    EC_pre_comp_free(group);
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        if ((ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+            return 0;
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    if (((x = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) || ((y = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL))
+        goto err;
+    /* get the generator */
+    if (group->generator == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    generator = EC_POINT_new(group);
+    if (generator == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    BN_bin2bn(nistp521_curve_params[3], sizeof(felem_bytearray), x);
+    BN_bin2bn(nistp521_curve_params[4], sizeof(felem_bytearray), y);
+    if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, generator, x, y, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    if ((pre = nistp521_pre_comp_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    /*
+     * if the generator is the standard one, use built-in precomputation
+     */
+    if (0 == EC_POINT_cmp(group, generator, group->generator, ctx)) {
+        memcpy(pre->g_pre_comp, gmul, sizeof(pre->g_pre_comp));
+        goto done;
+    }
+    if ((!BN_to_felem(pre->g_pre_comp[1][0], group->generator->X)) ||
+        (!BN_to_felem(pre->g_pre_comp[1][1], group->generator->Y)) ||
+        (!BN_to_felem(pre->g_pre_comp[1][2], group->generator->Z)))
+        goto err;
+    /* compute 2^130*G, 2^260*G, 2^390*G */
+    for (i = 1; i <= 4; i <<= 1) {
+        point_double(pre->g_pre_comp[2 * i][0], pre->g_pre_comp[2 * i][1],
+                     pre->g_pre_comp[2 * i][2], pre->g_pre_comp[i][0],
+                     pre->g_pre_comp[i][1], pre->g_pre_comp[i][2]);
+        for (j = 0; j < 129; ++j) {
+            point_double(pre->g_pre_comp[2 * i][0],
+                         pre->g_pre_comp[2 * i][1],
+                         pre->g_pre_comp[2 * i][2],
+                         pre->g_pre_comp[2 * i][0],
+                         pre->g_pre_comp[2 * i][1],
+                         pre->g_pre_comp[2 * i][2]);
+        }
+    }
+    /* g_pre_comp[0] is the point at infinity */
+    memset(pre->g_pre_comp[0], 0, sizeof(pre->g_pre_comp[0]));
+    /* the remaining multiples */
+    /* 2^130*G + 2^260*G */
+    point_add(pre->g_pre_comp[6][0], pre->g_pre_comp[6][1],
+              pre->g_pre_comp[6][2], pre->g_pre_comp[4][0],
+              pre->g_pre_comp[4][1], pre->g_pre_comp[4][2],
+              0, pre->g_pre_comp[2][0], pre->g_pre_comp[2][1],
+              pre->g_pre_comp[2][2]);
+    /* 2^130*G + 2^390*G */
+    point_add(pre->g_pre_comp[10][0], pre->g_pre_comp[10][1],
+              pre->g_pre_comp[10][2], pre->g_pre_comp[8][0],
+              pre->g_pre_comp[8][1], pre->g_pre_comp[8][2],
+              0, pre->g_pre_comp[2][0], pre->g_pre_comp[2][1],
+              pre->g_pre_comp[2][2]);
+    /* 2^260*G + 2^390*G */
+    point_add(pre->g_pre_comp[12][0], pre->g_pre_comp[12][1],
+              pre->g_pre_comp[12][2], pre->g_pre_comp[8][0],
+              pre->g_pre_comp[8][1], pre->g_pre_comp[8][2],
+              0, pre->g_pre_comp[4][0], pre->g_pre_comp[4][1],
+              pre->g_pre_comp[4][2]);
+    /* 2^130*G + 2^260*G + 2^390*G */
+    point_add(pre->g_pre_comp[14][0], pre->g_pre_comp[14][1],
+              pre->g_pre_comp[14][2], pre->g_pre_comp[12][0],
+              pre->g_pre_comp[12][1], pre->g_pre_comp[12][2],
+              0, pre->g_pre_comp[2][0], pre->g_pre_comp[2][1],
+              pre->g_pre_comp[2][2]);
+    for (i = 1; i < 8; ++i) {
+        /* odd multiples: add G */
+        point_add(pre->g_pre_comp[2 * i + 1][0],
+                  pre->g_pre_comp[2 * i + 1][1],
+                  pre->g_pre_comp[2 * i + 1][2], pre->g_pre_comp[2 * i][0],
+                  pre->g_pre_comp[2 * i][1], pre->g_pre_comp[2 * i][2], 0,
+                  pre->g_pre_comp[1][0], pre->g_pre_comp[1][1],
+                  pre->g_pre_comp[1][2]);
+    }
+    make_points_affine(15, &(pre->g_pre_comp[1]), tmp_felems);
+
+ done:
+    SETPRECOMP(group, nistp521, pre);
+    ret = 1;
+    pre = NULL;
+ err:
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    EC_POINT_free(generator);
+    BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
+    EC_nistp521_pre_comp_free(pre);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int ec_GFp_nistp521_have_precompute_mult(const EC_GROUP *group)
+{
+    return HAVEPRECOMP(group, nistp521);
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ecp_nistputil.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ecp_nistputil.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..97fb631
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ecp_nistputil.c
@@ -0,0 +1,223 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* Copyright 2011 Google Inc.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ *
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ *  Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ *  distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ *  WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ *  See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ *  limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128
+NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT
+#else
+
+/*
+ * Common utility functions for ecp_nistp224.c, ecp_nistp256.c, ecp_nistp521.c.
+ */
+
+# include <stddef.h>
+# include "ec_lcl.h"
+
+/*
+ * Convert an array of points into affine coordinates. (If the point at
+ * infinity is found (Z = 0), it remains unchanged.) This function is
+ * essentially an equivalent to EC_POINTs_make_affine(), but works with the
+ * internal representation of points as used by ecp_nistp###.c rather than
+ * with (BIGNUM-based) EC_POINT data structures. point_array is the
+ * input/output buffer ('num' points in projective form, i.e. three
+ * coordinates each), based on an internal representation of field elements
+ * of size 'felem_size'. tmp_felems needs to point to a temporary array of
+ * 'num'+1 field elements for storage of intermediate values.
+ */
+void ec_GFp_nistp_points_make_affine_internal(size_t num, void *point_array,
+                                              size_t felem_size,
+                                              void *tmp_felems,
+                                              void (*felem_one) (void *out),
+                                              int (*felem_is_zero) (const void
+                                                                    *in),
+                                              void (*felem_assign) (void *out,
+                                                                    const void
+                                                                    *in),
+                                              void (*felem_square) (void *out,
+                                                                    const void
+                                                                    *in),
+                                              void (*felem_mul) (void *out,
+                                                                 const void
+                                                                 *in1,
+                                                                 const void
+                                                                 *in2),
+                                              void (*felem_inv) (void *out,
+                                                                 const void
+                                                                 *in),
+                                              void (*felem_contract) (void
+                                                                      *out,
+                                                                      const
+                                                                      void
+                                                                      *in))
+{
+    int i = 0;
+
+# define tmp_felem(I) (&((char *)tmp_felems)[(I) * felem_size])
+# define X(I) (&((char *)point_array)[3*(I) * felem_size])
+# define Y(I) (&((char *)point_array)[(3*(I) + 1) * felem_size])
+# define Z(I) (&((char *)point_array)[(3*(I) + 2) * felem_size])
+
+    if (!felem_is_zero(Z(0)))
+        felem_assign(tmp_felem(0), Z(0));
+    else
+        felem_one(tmp_felem(0));
+    for (i = 1; i < (int)num; i++) {
+        if (!felem_is_zero(Z(i)))
+            felem_mul(tmp_felem(i), tmp_felem(i - 1), Z(i));
+        else
+            felem_assign(tmp_felem(i), tmp_felem(i - 1));
+    }
+    /*
+     * Now each tmp_felem(i) is the product of Z(0) .. Z(i), skipping any
+     * zero-valued factors: if Z(i) = 0, we essentially pretend that Z(i) = 1
+     */
+
+    felem_inv(tmp_felem(num - 1), tmp_felem(num - 1));
+    for (i = num - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+        if (i > 0)
+            /*
+             * tmp_felem(i-1) is the product of Z(0) .. Z(i-1), tmp_felem(i)
+             * is the inverse of the product of Z(0) .. Z(i)
+             */
+            /* 1/Z(i) */
+            felem_mul(tmp_felem(num), tmp_felem(i - 1), tmp_felem(i));
+        else
+            felem_assign(tmp_felem(num), tmp_felem(0)); /* 1/Z(0) */
+
+        if (!felem_is_zero(Z(i))) {
+            if (i > 0)
+                /*
+                 * For next iteration, replace tmp_felem(i-1) by its inverse
+                 */
+                felem_mul(tmp_felem(i - 1), tmp_felem(i), Z(i));
+
+            /*
+             * Convert point (X, Y, Z) into affine form (X/(Z^2), Y/(Z^3), 1)
+             */
+            felem_square(Z(i), tmp_felem(num)); /* 1/(Z^2) */
+            felem_mul(X(i), X(i), Z(i)); /* X/(Z^2) */
+            felem_mul(Z(i), Z(i), tmp_felem(num)); /* 1/(Z^3) */
+            felem_mul(Y(i), Y(i), Z(i)); /* Y/(Z^3) */
+            felem_contract(X(i), X(i));
+            felem_contract(Y(i), Y(i));
+            felem_one(Z(i));
+        } else {
+            if (i > 0)
+                /*
+                 * For next iteration, replace tmp_felem(i-1) by its inverse
+                 */
+                felem_assign(tmp_felem(i - 1), tmp_felem(i));
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/*-
+ * This function looks at 5+1 scalar bits (5 current, 1 adjacent less
+ * significant bit), and recodes them into a signed digit for use in fast point
+ * multiplication: the use of signed rather than unsigned digits means that
+ * fewer points need to be precomputed, given that point inversion is easy
+ * (a precomputed point dP makes -dP available as well).
+ *
+ * BACKGROUND:
+ *
+ * Signed digits for multiplication were introduced by Booth ("A signed binary
+ * multiplication technique", Quart. Journ. Mech. and Applied Math., vol. IV,
+ * pt. 2 (1951), pp. 236-240), in that case for multiplication of integers.
+ * Booth's original encoding did not generally improve the density of nonzero
+ * digits over the binary representation, and was merely meant to simplify the
+ * handling of signed factors given in two's complement; but it has since been
+ * shown to be the basis of various signed-digit representations that do have
+ * further advantages, including the wNAF, using the following general approach:
+ *
+ * (1) Given a binary representation
+ *
+ *       b_k  ...  b_2  b_1  b_0,
+ *
+ *     of a nonnegative integer (b_k in {0, 1}), rewrite it in digits 0, 1, -1
+ *     by using bit-wise subtraction as follows:
+ *
+ *        b_k b_(k-1)  ...  b_2  b_1  b_0
+ *      -     b_k      ...  b_3  b_2  b_1  b_0
+ *       -------------------------------------
+ *        s_k b_(k-1)  ...  s_3  s_2  s_1  s_0
+ *
+ *     A left-shift followed by subtraction of the original value yields a new
+ *     representation of the same value, using signed bits s_i = b_(i+1) - b_i.
+ *     This representation from Booth's paper has since appeared in the
+ *     literature under a variety of different names including "reversed binary
+ *     form", "alternating greedy expansion", "mutual opposite form", and
+ *     "sign-alternating {+-1}-representation".
+ *
+ *     An interesting property is that among the nonzero bits, values 1 and -1
+ *     strictly alternate.
+ *
+ * (2) Various window schemes can be applied to the Booth representation of
+ *     integers: for example, right-to-left sliding windows yield the wNAF
+ *     (a signed-digit encoding independently discovered by various researchers
+ *     in the 1990s), and left-to-right sliding windows yield a left-to-right
+ *     equivalent of the wNAF (independently discovered by various researchers
+ *     around 2004).
+ *
+ * To prevent leaking information through side channels in point multiplication,
+ * we need to recode the given integer into a regular pattern: sliding windows
+ * as in wNAFs won't do, we need their fixed-window equivalent -- which is a few
+ * decades older: we'll be using the so-called "modified Booth encoding" due to
+ * MacSorley ("High-speed arithmetic in binary computers", Proc. IRE, vol. 49
+ * (1961), pp. 67-91), in a radix-2^5 setting.  That is, we always combine five
+ * signed bits into a signed digit:
+ *
+ *       s_(4j + 4) s_(4j + 3) s_(4j + 2) s_(4j + 1) s_(4j)
+ *
+ * The sign-alternating property implies that the resulting digit values are
+ * integers from -16 to 16.
+ *
+ * Of course, we don't actually need to compute the signed digits s_i as an
+ * intermediate step (that's just a nice way to see how this scheme relates
+ * to the wNAF): a direct computation obtains the recoded digit from the
+ * six bits b_(4j + 4) ... b_(4j - 1).
+ *
+ * This function takes those five bits as an integer (0 .. 63), writing the
+ * recoded digit to *sign (0 for positive, 1 for negative) and *digit (absolute
+ * value, in the range 0 .. 8).  Note that this integer essentially provides the
+ * input bits "shifted to the left" by one position: for example, the input to
+ * compute the least significant recoded digit, given that there's no bit b_-1,
+ * has to be b_4 b_3 b_2 b_1 b_0 0.
+ *
+ */
+void ec_GFp_nistp_recode_scalar_bits(unsigned char *sign,
+                                     unsigned char *digit, unsigned char in)
+{
+    unsigned char s, d;
+
+    s = ~((in >> 5) - 1);       /* sets all bits to MSB(in), 'in' seen as
+                                 * 6-bit value */
+    d = (1 << 6) - in - 1;
+    d = (d & s) | (in & ~s);
+    d = (d >> 1) + (d & 1);
+
+    *sign = s & 1;
+    *digit = d;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ecp_nistz256.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ecp_nistz256.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2461898
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ecp_nistz256.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1559 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2014-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/******************************************************************************
+ *                                                                            *
+ * Copyright 2014 Intel Corporation                                           *
+ *                                                                            *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");            *
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.           *
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at                                    *
+ *                                                                            *
+ *    http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0                              *
+ *                                                                            *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software        *
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,          *
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.   *
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and        *
+ * limitations under the License.                                             *
+ *                                                                            *
+ ******************************************************************************
+ *                                                                            *
+ * Developers and authors:                                                    *
+ * Shay Gueron (1, 2), and Vlad Krasnov (1)                                   *
+ * (1) Intel Corporation, Israel Development Center                           *
+ * (2) University of Haifa                                                    *
+ * Reference:                                                                 *
+ * S.Gueron and V.Krasnov, "Fast Prime Field Elliptic Curve Cryptography with *
+ *                          256 Bit Primes"                                   *
+ *                                                                            *
+ ******************************************************************************/
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "internal/bn_int.h"
+#include "ec_lcl.h"
+
+#if BN_BITS2 != 64
+# define TOBN(hi,lo)    lo,hi
+#else
+# define TOBN(hi,lo)    ((BN_ULONG)hi<<32|lo)
+#endif
+
+#if defined(__GNUC__)
+# define ALIGN32        __attribute((aligned(32)))
+#elif defined(_MSC_VER)
+# define ALIGN32        __declspec(align(32))
+#else
+# define ALIGN32
+#endif
+
+#define ALIGNPTR(p,N)   ((unsigned char *)p+N-(size_t)p%N)
+#define P256_LIMBS      (256/BN_BITS2)
+
+typedef unsigned short u16;
+
+typedef struct {
+    BN_ULONG X[P256_LIMBS];
+    BN_ULONG Y[P256_LIMBS];
+    BN_ULONG Z[P256_LIMBS];
+} P256_POINT;
+
+typedef struct {
+    BN_ULONG X[P256_LIMBS];
+    BN_ULONG Y[P256_LIMBS];
+} P256_POINT_AFFINE;
+
+typedef P256_POINT_AFFINE PRECOMP256_ROW[64];
+
+/* structure for precomputed multiples of the generator */
+struct nistz256_pre_comp_st {
+    const EC_GROUP *group;      /* Parent EC_GROUP object */
+    size_t w;                   /* Window size */
+    /*
+     * Constant time access to the X and Y coordinates of the pre-computed,
+     * generator multiplies, in the Montgomery domain. Pre-calculated
+     * multiplies are stored in affine form.
+     */
+    PRECOMP256_ROW *precomp;
+    void *precomp_storage;
+    int references;
+    CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock;
+};
+
+/* Functions implemented in assembly */
+/*
+ * Most of below mentioned functions *preserve* the property of inputs
+ * being fully reduced, i.e. being in [0, modulus) range. Simply put if
+ * inputs are fully reduced, then output is too. Note that reverse is
+ * not true, in sense that given partially reduced inputs output can be
+ * either, not unlikely reduced. And "most" in first sentence refers to
+ * the fact that given the calculations flow one can tolerate that
+ * addition, 1st function below, produces partially reduced result *if*
+ * multiplications by 2 and 3, which customarily use addition, fully
+ * reduce it. This effectively gives two options: a) addition produces
+ * fully reduced result [as long as inputs are, just like remaining
+ * functions]; b) addition is allowed to produce partially reduced
+ * result, but multiplications by 2 and 3 perform additional reduction
+ * step. Choice between the two can be platform-specific, but it was a)
+ * in all cases so far...
+ */
+/* Modular add: res = a+b mod P   */
+void ecp_nistz256_add(BN_ULONG res[P256_LIMBS],
+                      const BN_ULONG a[P256_LIMBS],
+                      const BN_ULONG b[P256_LIMBS]);
+/* Modular mul by 2: res = 2*a mod P */
+void ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2(BN_ULONG res[P256_LIMBS],
+                           const BN_ULONG a[P256_LIMBS]);
+/* Modular mul by 3: res = 3*a mod P */
+void ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3(BN_ULONG res[P256_LIMBS],
+                           const BN_ULONG a[P256_LIMBS]);
+
+/* Modular div by 2: res = a/2 mod P */
+void ecp_nistz256_div_by_2(BN_ULONG res[P256_LIMBS],
+                           const BN_ULONG a[P256_LIMBS]);
+/* Modular sub: res = a-b mod P   */
+void ecp_nistz256_sub(BN_ULONG res[P256_LIMBS],
+                      const BN_ULONG a[P256_LIMBS],
+                      const BN_ULONG b[P256_LIMBS]);
+/* Modular neg: res = -a mod P    */
+void ecp_nistz256_neg(BN_ULONG res[P256_LIMBS], const BN_ULONG a[P256_LIMBS]);
+/* Montgomery mul: res = a*b*2^-256 mod P */
+void ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(BN_ULONG res[P256_LIMBS],
+                           const BN_ULONG a[P256_LIMBS],
+                           const BN_ULONG b[P256_LIMBS]);
+/* Montgomery sqr: res = a*a*2^-256 mod P */
+void ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(BN_ULONG res[P256_LIMBS],
+                           const BN_ULONG a[P256_LIMBS]);
+/* Convert a number from Montgomery domain, by multiplying with 1 */
+void ecp_nistz256_from_mont(BN_ULONG res[P256_LIMBS],
+                            const BN_ULONG in[P256_LIMBS]);
+/* Convert a number to Montgomery domain, by multiplying with 2^512 mod P*/
+void ecp_nistz256_to_mont(BN_ULONG res[P256_LIMBS],
+                          const BN_ULONG in[P256_LIMBS]);
+/* Functions that perform constant time access to the precomputed tables */
+void ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5(P256_POINT *val,
+                             const P256_POINT *in_t, int idx);
+void ecp_nistz256_gather_w5(P256_POINT *val,
+                            const P256_POINT *in_t, int idx);
+void ecp_nistz256_scatter_w7(P256_POINT_AFFINE *val,
+                             const P256_POINT_AFFINE *in_t, int idx);
+void ecp_nistz256_gather_w7(P256_POINT_AFFINE *val,
+                            const P256_POINT_AFFINE *in_t, int idx);
+
+/* One converted into the Montgomery domain */
+static const BN_ULONG ONE[P256_LIMBS] = {
+    TOBN(0x00000000, 0x00000001), TOBN(0xffffffff, 0x00000000),
+    TOBN(0xffffffff, 0xffffffff), TOBN(0x00000000, 0xfffffffe)
+};
+
+static NISTZ256_PRE_COMP *ecp_nistz256_pre_comp_new(const EC_GROUP *group);
+
+/* Precomputed tables for the default generator */
+extern const PRECOMP256_ROW ecp_nistz256_precomputed[37];
+
+/* Recode window to a signed digit, see ecp_nistputil.c for details */
+static unsigned int _booth_recode_w5(unsigned int in)
+{
+    unsigned int s, d;
+
+    s = ~((in >> 5) - 1);
+    d = (1 << 6) - in - 1;
+    d = (d & s) | (in & ~s);
+    d = (d >> 1) + (d & 1);
+
+    return (d << 1) + (s & 1);
+}
+
+static unsigned int _booth_recode_w7(unsigned int in)
+{
+    unsigned int s, d;
+
+    s = ~((in >> 7) - 1);
+    d = (1 << 8) - in - 1;
+    d = (d & s) | (in & ~s);
+    d = (d >> 1) + (d & 1);
+
+    return (d << 1) + (s & 1);
+}
+
+static void copy_conditional(BN_ULONG dst[P256_LIMBS],
+                             const BN_ULONG src[P256_LIMBS], BN_ULONG move)
+{
+    BN_ULONG mask1 = 0-move;
+    BN_ULONG mask2 = ~mask1;
+
+    dst[0] = (src[0] & mask1) ^ (dst[0] & mask2);
+    dst[1] = (src[1] & mask1) ^ (dst[1] & mask2);
+    dst[2] = (src[2] & mask1) ^ (dst[2] & mask2);
+    dst[3] = (src[3] & mask1) ^ (dst[3] & mask2);
+    if (P256_LIMBS == 8) {
+        dst[4] = (src[4] & mask1) ^ (dst[4] & mask2);
+        dst[5] = (src[5] & mask1) ^ (dst[5] & mask2);
+        dst[6] = (src[6] & mask1) ^ (dst[6] & mask2);
+        dst[7] = (src[7] & mask1) ^ (dst[7] & mask2);
+    }
+}
+
+static BN_ULONG is_zero(BN_ULONG in)
+{
+    in |= (0 - in);
+    in = ~in;
+    in >>= BN_BITS2 - 1;
+    return in;
+}
+
+static BN_ULONG is_equal(const BN_ULONG a[P256_LIMBS],
+                         const BN_ULONG b[P256_LIMBS])
+{
+    BN_ULONG res;
+
+    res = a[0] ^ b[0];
+    res |= a[1] ^ b[1];
+    res |= a[2] ^ b[2];
+    res |= a[3] ^ b[3];
+    if (P256_LIMBS == 8) {
+        res |= a[4] ^ b[4];
+        res |= a[5] ^ b[5];
+        res |= a[6] ^ b[6];
+        res |= a[7] ^ b[7];
+    }
+
+    return is_zero(res);
+}
+
+static BN_ULONG is_one(const BIGNUM *z)
+{
+    BN_ULONG res = 0;
+    BN_ULONG *a = bn_get_words(z);
+
+    if (bn_get_top(z) == (P256_LIMBS - P256_LIMBS / 8)) {
+        res = a[0] ^ ONE[0];
+        res |= a[1] ^ ONE[1];
+        res |= a[2] ^ ONE[2];
+        res |= a[3] ^ ONE[3];
+        if (P256_LIMBS == 8) {
+            res |= a[4] ^ ONE[4];
+            res |= a[5] ^ ONE[5];
+            res |= a[6] ^ ONE[6];
+            /*
+             * no check for a[7] (being zero) on 32-bit platforms,
+             * because value of "one" takes only 7 limbs.
+             */
+        }
+        res = is_zero(res);
+    }
+
+    return res;
+}
+
+#ifndef ECP_NISTZ256_REFERENCE_IMPLEMENTATION
+void ecp_nistz256_point_double(P256_POINT *r, const P256_POINT *a);
+void ecp_nistz256_point_add(P256_POINT *r,
+                            const P256_POINT *a, const P256_POINT *b);
+void ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine(P256_POINT *r,
+                                   const P256_POINT *a,
+                                   const P256_POINT_AFFINE *b);
+#else
+/* Point double: r = 2*a */
+static void ecp_nistz256_point_double(P256_POINT *r, const P256_POINT *a)
+{
+    BN_ULONG S[P256_LIMBS];
+    BN_ULONG M[P256_LIMBS];
+    BN_ULONG Zsqr[P256_LIMBS];
+    BN_ULONG tmp0[P256_LIMBS];
+
+    const BN_ULONG *in_x = a->X;
+    const BN_ULONG *in_y = a->Y;
+    const BN_ULONG *in_z = a->Z;
+
+    BN_ULONG *res_x = r->X;
+    BN_ULONG *res_y = r->Y;
+    BN_ULONG *res_z = r->Z;
+
+    ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2(S, in_y);
+
+    ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(Zsqr, in_z);
+
+    ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(S, S);
+
+    ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(res_z, in_z, in_y);
+    ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2(res_z, res_z);
+
+    ecp_nistz256_add(M, in_x, Zsqr);
+    ecp_nistz256_sub(Zsqr, in_x, Zsqr);
+
+    ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res_y, S);
+    ecp_nistz256_div_by_2(res_y, res_y);
+
+    ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(M, M, Zsqr);
+    ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3(M, M);
+
+    ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(S, S, in_x);
+    ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2(tmp0, S);
+
+    ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res_x, M);
+
+    ecp_nistz256_sub(res_x, res_x, tmp0);
+    ecp_nistz256_sub(S, S, res_x);
+
+    ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(S, S, M);
+    ecp_nistz256_sub(res_y, S, res_y);
+}
+
+/* Point addition: r = a+b */
+static void ecp_nistz256_point_add(P256_POINT *r,
+                                   const P256_POINT *a, const P256_POINT *b)
+{
+    BN_ULONG U2[P256_LIMBS], S2[P256_LIMBS];
+    BN_ULONG U1[P256_LIMBS], S1[P256_LIMBS];
+    BN_ULONG Z1sqr[P256_LIMBS];
+    BN_ULONG Z2sqr[P256_LIMBS];
+    BN_ULONG H[P256_LIMBS], R[P256_LIMBS];
+    BN_ULONG Hsqr[P256_LIMBS];
+    BN_ULONG Rsqr[P256_LIMBS];
+    BN_ULONG Hcub[P256_LIMBS];
+
+    BN_ULONG res_x[P256_LIMBS];
+    BN_ULONG res_y[P256_LIMBS];
+    BN_ULONG res_z[P256_LIMBS];
+
+    BN_ULONG in1infty, in2infty;
+
+    const BN_ULONG *in1_x = a->X;
+    const BN_ULONG *in1_y = a->Y;
+    const BN_ULONG *in1_z = a->Z;
+
+    const BN_ULONG *in2_x = b->X;
+    const BN_ULONG *in2_y = b->Y;
+    const BN_ULONG *in2_z = b->Z;
+
+    /*
+     * Infinity in encoded as (,,0)
+     */
+    in1infty = (in1_z[0] | in1_z[1] | in1_z[2] | in1_z[3]);
+    if (P256_LIMBS == 8)
+        in1infty |= (in1_z[4] | in1_z[5] | in1_z[6] | in1_z[7]);
+
+    in2infty = (in2_z[0] | in2_z[1] | in2_z[2] | in2_z[3]);
+    if (P256_LIMBS == 8)
+        in2infty |= (in2_z[4] | in2_z[5] | in2_z[6] | in2_z[7]);
+
+    in1infty = is_zero(in1infty);
+    in2infty = is_zero(in2infty);
+
+    ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(Z2sqr, in2_z);        /* Z2^2 */
+    ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(Z1sqr, in1_z);        /* Z1^2 */
+
+    ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(S1, Z2sqr, in2_z);    /* S1 = Z2^3 */
+    ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(S2, Z1sqr, in1_z);    /* S2 = Z1^3 */
+
+    ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(S1, S1, in1_y);       /* S1 = Y1*Z2^3 */
+    ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(S2, S2, in2_y);       /* S2 = Y2*Z1^3 */
+    ecp_nistz256_sub(R, S2, S1);                /* R = S2 - S1 */
+
+    ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(U1, in1_x, Z2sqr);    /* U1 = X1*Z2^2 */
+    ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(U2, in2_x, Z1sqr);    /* U2 = X2*Z1^2 */
+    ecp_nistz256_sub(H, U2, U1);                /* H = U2 - U1 */
+
+    /*
+     * This should not happen during sign/ecdh, so no constant time violation
+     */
+    if (is_equal(U1, U2) && !in1infty && !in2infty) {
+        if (is_equal(S1, S2)) {
+            ecp_nistz256_point_double(r, a);
+            return;
+        } else {
+            memset(r, 0, sizeof(*r));
+            return;
+        }
+    }
+
+    ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(Rsqr, R);             /* R^2 */
+    ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(res_z, H, in1_z);     /* Z3 = H*Z1*Z2 */
+    ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(Hsqr, H);             /* H^2 */
+    ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(res_z, res_z, in2_z); /* Z3 = H*Z1*Z2 */
+    ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(Hcub, Hsqr, H);       /* H^3 */
+
+    ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(U2, U1, Hsqr);        /* U1*H^2 */
+    ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2(Hsqr, U2);            /* 2*U1*H^2 */
+
+    ecp_nistz256_sub(res_x, Rsqr, Hsqr);
+    ecp_nistz256_sub(res_x, res_x, Hcub);
+
+    ecp_nistz256_sub(res_y, U2, res_x);
+
+    ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(S2, S1, Hcub);
+    ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(res_y, R, res_y);
+    ecp_nistz256_sub(res_y, res_y, S2);
+
+    copy_conditional(res_x, in2_x, in1infty);
+    copy_conditional(res_y, in2_y, in1infty);
+    copy_conditional(res_z, in2_z, in1infty);
+
+    copy_conditional(res_x, in1_x, in2infty);
+    copy_conditional(res_y, in1_y, in2infty);
+    copy_conditional(res_z, in1_z, in2infty);
+
+    memcpy(r->X, res_x, sizeof(res_x));
+    memcpy(r->Y, res_y, sizeof(res_y));
+    memcpy(r->Z, res_z, sizeof(res_z));
+}
+
+/* Point addition when b is known to be affine: r = a+b */
+static void ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine(P256_POINT *r,
+                                          const P256_POINT *a,
+                                          const P256_POINT_AFFINE *b)
+{
+    BN_ULONG U2[P256_LIMBS], S2[P256_LIMBS];
+    BN_ULONG Z1sqr[P256_LIMBS];
+    BN_ULONG H[P256_LIMBS], R[P256_LIMBS];
+    BN_ULONG Hsqr[P256_LIMBS];
+    BN_ULONG Rsqr[P256_LIMBS];
+    BN_ULONG Hcub[P256_LIMBS];
+
+    BN_ULONG res_x[P256_LIMBS];
+    BN_ULONG res_y[P256_LIMBS];
+    BN_ULONG res_z[P256_LIMBS];
+
+    BN_ULONG in1infty, in2infty;
+
+    const BN_ULONG *in1_x = a->X;
+    const BN_ULONG *in1_y = a->Y;
+    const BN_ULONG *in1_z = a->Z;
+
+    const BN_ULONG *in2_x = b->X;
+    const BN_ULONG *in2_y = b->Y;
+
+    /*
+     * Infinity in encoded as (,,0)
+     */
+    in1infty = (in1_z[0] | in1_z[1] | in1_z[2] | in1_z[3]);
+    if (P256_LIMBS == 8)
+        in1infty |= (in1_z[4] | in1_z[5] | in1_z[6] | in1_z[7]);
+
+    /*
+     * In affine representation we encode infinity as (0,0), which is
+     * not on the curve, so it is OK
+     */
+    in2infty = (in2_x[0] | in2_x[1] | in2_x[2] | in2_x[3] |
+                in2_y[0] | in2_y[1] | in2_y[2] | in2_y[3]);
+    if (P256_LIMBS == 8)
+        in2infty |= (in2_x[4] | in2_x[5] | in2_x[6] | in2_x[7] |
+                     in2_y[4] | in2_y[5] | in2_y[6] | in2_y[7]);
+
+    in1infty = is_zero(in1infty);
+    in2infty = is_zero(in2infty);
+
+    ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(Z1sqr, in1_z);        /* Z1^2 */
+
+    ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(U2, in2_x, Z1sqr);    /* U2 = X2*Z1^2 */
+    ecp_nistz256_sub(H, U2, in1_x);             /* H = U2 - U1 */
+
+    ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(S2, Z1sqr, in1_z);    /* S2 = Z1^3 */
+
+    ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(res_z, H, in1_z);     /* Z3 = H*Z1*Z2 */
+
+    ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(S2, S2, in2_y);       /* S2 = Y2*Z1^3 */
+    ecp_nistz256_sub(R, S2, in1_y);             /* R = S2 - S1 */
+
+    ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(Hsqr, H);             /* H^2 */
+    ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(Rsqr, R);             /* R^2 */
+    ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(Hcub, Hsqr, H);       /* H^3 */
+
+    ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(U2, in1_x, Hsqr);     /* U1*H^2 */
+    ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2(Hsqr, U2);            /* 2*U1*H^2 */
+
+    ecp_nistz256_sub(res_x, Rsqr, Hsqr);
+    ecp_nistz256_sub(res_x, res_x, Hcub);
+    ecp_nistz256_sub(H, U2, res_x);
+
+    ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(S2, in1_y, Hcub);
+    ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(H, H, R);
+    ecp_nistz256_sub(res_y, H, S2);
+
+    copy_conditional(res_x, in2_x, in1infty);
+    copy_conditional(res_x, in1_x, in2infty);
+
+    copy_conditional(res_y, in2_y, in1infty);
+    copy_conditional(res_y, in1_y, in2infty);
+
+    copy_conditional(res_z, ONE, in1infty);
+    copy_conditional(res_z, in1_z, in2infty);
+
+    memcpy(r->X, res_x, sizeof(res_x));
+    memcpy(r->Y, res_y, sizeof(res_y));
+    memcpy(r->Z, res_z, sizeof(res_z));
+}
+#endif
+
+/* r = in^-1 mod p */
+static void ecp_nistz256_mod_inverse(BN_ULONG r[P256_LIMBS],
+                                     const BN_ULONG in[P256_LIMBS])
+{
+    /*
+     * The poly is ffffffff 00000001 00000000 00000000 00000000 ffffffff
+     * ffffffff ffffffff We use FLT and used poly-2 as exponent
+     */
+    BN_ULONG p2[P256_LIMBS];
+    BN_ULONG p4[P256_LIMBS];
+    BN_ULONG p8[P256_LIMBS];
+    BN_ULONG p16[P256_LIMBS];
+    BN_ULONG p32[P256_LIMBS];
+    BN_ULONG res[P256_LIMBS];
+    int i;
+
+    ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, in);
+    ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(p2, res, in);         /* 3*p */
+
+    ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, p2);
+    ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, res);
+    ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(p4, res, p2);         /* f*p */
+
+    ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, p4);
+    ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, res);
+    ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, res);
+    ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, res);
+    ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(p8, res, p4);         /* ff*p */
+
+    ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, p8);
+    for (i = 0; i < 7; i++)
+        ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, res);
+    ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(p16, res, p8);        /* ffff*p */
+
+    ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, p16);
+    for (i = 0; i < 15; i++)
+        ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, res);
+    ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(p32, res, p16);       /* ffffffff*p */
+
+    ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, p32);
+    for (i = 0; i < 31; i++)
+        ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, res);
+    ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(res, res, in);
+
+    for (i = 0; i < 32 * 4; i++)
+        ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, res);
+    ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(res, res, p32);
+
+    for (i = 0; i < 32; i++)
+        ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, res);
+    ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(res, res, p32);
+
+    for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+        ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, res);
+    ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(res, res, p16);
+
+    for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
+        ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, res);
+    ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(res, res, p8);
+
+    ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, res);
+    ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, res);
+    ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, res);
+    ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, res);
+    ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(res, res, p4);
+
+    ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, res);
+    ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, res);
+    ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(res, res, p2);
+
+    ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, res);
+    ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, res);
+    ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(res, res, in);
+
+    memcpy(r, res, sizeof(res));
+}
+
+/*
+ * ecp_nistz256_bignum_to_field_elem copies the contents of |in| to |out| and
+ * returns one if it fits. Otherwise it returns zero.
+ */
+__owur static int ecp_nistz256_bignum_to_field_elem(BN_ULONG out[P256_LIMBS],
+                                                    const BIGNUM *in)
+{
+    return bn_copy_words(out, in, P256_LIMBS);
+}
+
+/* r = sum(scalar[i]*point[i]) */
+__owur static int ecp_nistz256_windowed_mul(const EC_GROUP *group,
+                                            P256_POINT *r,
+                                            const BIGNUM **scalar,
+                                            const EC_POINT **point,
+                                            size_t num, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    size_t i;
+    int j, ret = 0;
+    unsigned int idx;
+    unsigned char (*p_str)[33] = NULL;
+    const unsigned int window_size = 5;
+    const unsigned int mask = (1 << (window_size + 1)) - 1;
+    unsigned int wvalue;
+    P256_POINT *temp;           /* place for 5 temporary points */
+    const BIGNUM **scalars = NULL;
+    P256_POINT (*table)[16] = NULL;
+    void *table_storage = NULL;
+
+    if ((num * 16 + 6) > OPENSSL_MALLOC_MAX_NELEMS(P256_POINT)
+        || (table_storage =
+            OPENSSL_malloc((num * 16 + 5) * sizeof(P256_POINT) + 64)) == NULL
+        || (p_str =
+            OPENSSL_malloc(num * 33 * sizeof(unsigned char))) == NULL
+        || (scalars = OPENSSL_malloc(num * sizeof(BIGNUM *))) == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_WINDOWED_MUL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    table = (void *)ALIGNPTR(table_storage, 64);
+    temp = (P256_POINT *)(table + num);
+
+    for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
+        P256_POINT *row = table[i];
+
+        /* This is an unusual input, we don't guarantee constant-timeness. */
+        if ((BN_num_bits(scalar[i]) > 256) || BN_is_negative(scalar[i])) {
+            BIGNUM *mod;
+
+            if ((mod = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
+                goto err;
+            if (!BN_nnmod(mod, scalar[i], group->order, ctx)) {
+                ECerr(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_WINDOWED_MUL, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            scalars[i] = mod;
+        } else
+            scalars[i] = scalar[i];
+
+        for (j = 0; j < bn_get_top(scalars[i]) * BN_BYTES; j += BN_BYTES) {
+            BN_ULONG d = bn_get_words(scalars[i])[j / BN_BYTES];
+
+            p_str[i][j + 0] = (unsigned char)d;
+            p_str[i][j + 1] = (unsigned char)(d >> 8);
+            p_str[i][j + 2] = (unsigned char)(d >> 16);
+            p_str[i][j + 3] = (unsigned char)(d >>= 24);
+            if (BN_BYTES == 8) {
+                d >>= 8;
+                p_str[i][j + 4] = (unsigned char)d;
+                p_str[i][j + 5] = (unsigned char)(d >> 8);
+                p_str[i][j + 6] = (unsigned char)(d >> 16);
+                p_str[i][j + 7] = (unsigned char)(d >> 24);
+            }
+        }
+        for (; j < 33; j++)
+            p_str[i][j] = 0;
+
+        if (!ecp_nistz256_bignum_to_field_elem(temp[0].X, point[i]->X)
+            || !ecp_nistz256_bignum_to_field_elem(temp[0].Y, point[i]->Y)
+            || !ecp_nistz256_bignum_to_field_elem(temp[0].Z, point[i]->Z)) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_WINDOWED_MUL,
+                  EC_R_COORDINATES_OUT_OF_RANGE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        /*
+         * row[0] is implicitly (0,0,0) (the point at infinity), therefore it
+         * is not stored. All other values are actually stored with an offset
+         * of -1 in table.
+         */
+
+        ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5  (row, &temp[0], 1);
+        ecp_nistz256_point_double(&temp[1], &temp[0]);              /*1+1=2  */
+        ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5  (row, &temp[1], 2);
+        ecp_nistz256_point_add   (&temp[2], &temp[1], &temp[0]);    /*2+1=3  */
+        ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5  (row, &temp[2], 3);
+        ecp_nistz256_point_double(&temp[1], &temp[1]);              /*2*2=4  */
+        ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5  (row, &temp[1], 4);
+        ecp_nistz256_point_double(&temp[2], &temp[2]);              /*2*3=6  */
+        ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5  (row, &temp[2], 6);
+        ecp_nistz256_point_add   (&temp[3], &temp[1], &temp[0]);    /*4+1=5  */
+        ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5  (row, &temp[3], 5);
+        ecp_nistz256_point_add   (&temp[4], &temp[2], &temp[0]);    /*6+1=7  */
+        ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5  (row, &temp[4], 7);
+        ecp_nistz256_point_double(&temp[1], &temp[1]);              /*2*4=8  */
+        ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5  (row, &temp[1], 8);
+        ecp_nistz256_point_double(&temp[2], &temp[2]);              /*2*6=12 */
+        ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5  (row, &temp[2], 12);
+        ecp_nistz256_point_double(&temp[3], &temp[3]);              /*2*5=10 */
+        ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5  (row, &temp[3], 10);
+        ecp_nistz256_point_double(&temp[4], &temp[4]);              /*2*7=14 */
+        ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5  (row, &temp[4], 14);
+        ecp_nistz256_point_add   (&temp[2], &temp[2], &temp[0]);    /*12+1=13*/
+        ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5  (row, &temp[2], 13);
+        ecp_nistz256_point_add   (&temp[3], &temp[3], &temp[0]);    /*10+1=11*/
+        ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5  (row, &temp[3], 11);
+        ecp_nistz256_point_add   (&temp[4], &temp[4], &temp[0]);    /*14+1=15*/
+        ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5  (row, &temp[4], 15);
+        ecp_nistz256_point_add   (&temp[2], &temp[1], &temp[0]);    /*8+1=9  */
+        ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5  (row, &temp[2], 9);
+        ecp_nistz256_point_double(&temp[1], &temp[1]);              /*2*8=16 */
+        ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5  (row, &temp[1], 16);
+    }
+
+    idx = 255;
+
+    wvalue = p_str[0][(idx - 1) / 8];
+    wvalue = (wvalue >> ((idx - 1) % 8)) & mask;
+
+    /*
+     * We gather to temp[0], because we know it's position relative
+     * to table
+     */
+    ecp_nistz256_gather_w5(&temp[0], table[0], _booth_recode_w5(wvalue) >> 1);
+    memcpy(r, &temp[0], sizeof(temp[0]));
+
+    while (idx >= 5) {
+        for (i = (idx == 255 ? 1 : 0); i < num; i++) {
+            unsigned int off = (idx - 1) / 8;
+
+            wvalue = p_str[i][off] | p_str[i][off + 1] << 8;
+            wvalue = (wvalue >> ((idx - 1) % 8)) & mask;
+
+            wvalue = _booth_recode_w5(wvalue);
+
+            ecp_nistz256_gather_w5(&temp[0], table[i], wvalue >> 1);
+
+            ecp_nistz256_neg(temp[1].Y, temp[0].Y);
+            copy_conditional(temp[0].Y, temp[1].Y, (wvalue & 1));
+
+            ecp_nistz256_point_add(r, r, &temp[0]);
+        }
+
+        idx -= window_size;
+
+        ecp_nistz256_point_double(r, r);
+        ecp_nistz256_point_double(r, r);
+        ecp_nistz256_point_double(r, r);
+        ecp_nistz256_point_double(r, r);
+        ecp_nistz256_point_double(r, r);
+    }
+
+    /* Final window */
+    for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
+        wvalue = p_str[i][0];
+        wvalue = (wvalue << 1) & mask;
+
+        wvalue = _booth_recode_w5(wvalue);
+
+        ecp_nistz256_gather_w5(&temp[0], table[i], wvalue >> 1);
+
+        ecp_nistz256_neg(temp[1].Y, temp[0].Y);
+        copy_conditional(temp[0].Y, temp[1].Y, wvalue & 1);
+
+        ecp_nistz256_point_add(r, r, &temp[0]);
+    }
+
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_free(table_storage);
+    OPENSSL_free(p_str);
+    OPENSSL_free(scalars);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/* Coordinates of G, for which we have precomputed tables */
+static const BN_ULONG def_xG[P256_LIMBS] = {
+    TOBN(0x79e730d4, 0x18a9143c), TOBN(0x75ba95fc, 0x5fedb601),
+    TOBN(0x79fb732b, 0x77622510), TOBN(0x18905f76, 0xa53755c6)
+};
+
+static const BN_ULONG def_yG[P256_LIMBS] = {
+    TOBN(0xddf25357, 0xce95560a), TOBN(0x8b4ab8e4, 0xba19e45c),
+    TOBN(0xd2e88688, 0xdd21f325), TOBN(0x8571ff18, 0x25885d85)
+};
+
+/*
+ * ecp_nistz256_is_affine_G returns one if |generator| is the standard, P-256
+ * generator.
+ */
+static int ecp_nistz256_is_affine_G(const EC_POINT *generator)
+{
+    return (bn_get_top(generator->X) == P256_LIMBS) &&
+        (bn_get_top(generator->Y) == P256_LIMBS) &&
+        is_equal(bn_get_words(generator->X), def_xG) &&
+        is_equal(bn_get_words(generator->Y), def_yG) &&
+        is_one(generator->Z);
+}
+
+__owur static int ecp_nistz256_mult_precompute(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    /*
+     * We precompute a table for a Booth encoded exponent (wNAF) based
+     * computation. Each table holds 64 values for safe access, with an
+     * implicit value of infinity at index zero. We use window of size 7, and
+     * therefore require ceil(256/7) = 37 tables.
+     */
+    const BIGNUM *order;
+    EC_POINT *P = NULL, *T = NULL;
+    const EC_POINT *generator;
+    NISTZ256_PRE_COMP *pre_comp;
+    BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
+    int i, j, k, ret = 0;
+    size_t w;
+
+    PRECOMP256_ROW *preComputedTable = NULL;
+    unsigned char *precomp_storage = NULL;
+
+    /* if there is an old NISTZ256_PRE_COMP object, throw it away */
+    EC_pre_comp_free(group);
+    generator = EC_GROUP_get0_generator(group);
+    if (generator == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_MULT_PRECOMPUTE, EC_R_UNDEFINED_GENERATOR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (ecp_nistz256_is_affine_G(generator)) {
+        /*
+         * No need to calculate tables for the standard generator because we
+         * have them statically.
+         */
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    if ((pre_comp = ecp_nistz256_pre_comp_new(group)) == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+        ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+        if (ctx == NULL)
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+
+    order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(group);
+    if (order == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (BN_is_zero(order)) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_MULT_PRECOMPUTE, EC_R_UNKNOWN_ORDER);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    w = 7;
+
+    if ((precomp_storage =
+         OPENSSL_malloc(37 * 64 * sizeof(P256_POINT_AFFINE) + 64)) == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_MULT_PRECOMPUTE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    preComputedTable = (void *)ALIGNPTR(precomp_storage, 64);
+
+    P = EC_POINT_new(group);
+    T = EC_POINT_new(group);
+    if (P == NULL || T == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    /*
+     * The zero entry is implicitly infinity, and we skip it, storing other
+     * values with -1 offset.
+     */
+    if (!EC_POINT_copy(T, generator))
+        goto err;
+
+    for (k = 0; k < 64; k++) {
+        if (!EC_POINT_copy(P, T))
+            goto err;
+        for (j = 0; j < 37; j++) {
+            P256_POINT_AFFINE temp;
+            /*
+             * It would be faster to use EC_POINTs_make_affine and
+             * make multiple points affine at the same time.
+             */
+            if (!EC_POINT_make_affine(group, P, ctx))
+                goto err;
+            if (!ecp_nistz256_bignum_to_field_elem(temp.X, P->X) ||
+                !ecp_nistz256_bignum_to_field_elem(temp.Y, P->Y)) {
+                ECerr(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_MULT_PRECOMPUTE,
+                      EC_R_COORDINATES_OUT_OF_RANGE);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            ecp_nistz256_scatter_w7(preComputedTable[j], &temp, k);
+            for (i = 0; i < 7; i++) {
+                if (!EC_POINT_dbl(group, P, P, ctx))
+                    goto err;
+            }
+        }
+        if (!EC_POINT_add(group, T, T, generator, ctx))
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    pre_comp->group = group;
+    pre_comp->w = w;
+    pre_comp->precomp = preComputedTable;
+    pre_comp->precomp_storage = precomp_storage;
+    precomp_storage = NULL;
+    SETPRECOMP(group, nistz256, pre_comp);
+    pre_comp = NULL;
+    ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+    if (ctx != NULL)
+        BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
+
+    EC_nistz256_pre_comp_free(pre_comp);
+    OPENSSL_free(precomp_storage);
+    EC_POINT_free(P);
+    EC_POINT_free(T);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note that by default ECP_NISTZ256_AVX2 is undefined. While it's great
+ * code processing 4 points in parallel, corresponding serial operation
+ * is several times slower, because it uses 29x29=58-bit multiplication
+ * as opposite to 64x64=128-bit in integer-only scalar case. As result
+ * it doesn't provide *significant* performance improvement. Note that
+ * just defining ECP_NISTZ256_AVX2 is not sufficient to make it work,
+ * you'd need to compile even asm/ecp_nistz256-avx.pl module.
+ */
+#if defined(ECP_NISTZ256_AVX2)
+# if !(defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
+       defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_MX64)) || \
+     !(defined(__GNUC__) || defined(_MSC_VER)) /* this is for ALIGN32 */
+#  undef ECP_NISTZ256_AVX2
+# else
+/* Constant time access, loading four values, from four consecutive tables */
+void ecp_nistz256_avx2_multi_gather_w7(void *result, const void *in,
+                                       int index0, int index1, int index2,
+                                       int index3);
+void ecp_nistz256_avx2_transpose_convert(void *RESULTx4, const void *in);
+void ecp_nistz256_avx2_convert_transpose_back(void *result, const void *Ax4);
+void ecp_nistz256_avx2_point_add_affine_x4(void *RESULTx4, const void *Ax4,
+                                           const void *Bx4);
+void ecp_nistz256_avx2_point_add_affines_x4(void *RESULTx4, const void *Ax4,
+                                            const void *Bx4);
+void ecp_nistz256_avx2_to_mont(void *RESULTx4, const void *Ax4);
+void ecp_nistz256_avx2_from_mont(void *RESULTx4, const void *Ax4);
+void ecp_nistz256_avx2_set1(void *RESULTx4);
+int ecp_nistz_avx2_eligible(void);
+
+static void booth_recode_w7(unsigned char *sign,
+                            unsigned char *digit, unsigned char in)
+{
+    unsigned char s, d;
+
+    s = ~((in >> 7) - 1);
+    d = (1 << 8) - in - 1;
+    d = (d & s) | (in & ~s);
+    d = (d >> 1) + (d & 1);
+
+    *sign = s & 1;
+    *digit = d;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ecp_nistz256_avx2_mul_g performs multiplication by G, using only the
+ * precomputed table. It does 4 affine point additions in parallel,
+ * significantly speeding up point multiplication for a fixed value.
+ */
+static void ecp_nistz256_avx2_mul_g(P256_POINT *r,
+                                    unsigned char p_str[33],
+                                    const P256_POINT_AFFINE(*preComputedTable)[64])
+{
+    const unsigned int window_size = 7;
+    const unsigned int mask = (1 << (window_size + 1)) - 1;
+    unsigned int wvalue;
+    /* Using 4 windows at a time */
+    unsigned char sign0, digit0;
+    unsigned char sign1, digit1;
+    unsigned char sign2, digit2;
+    unsigned char sign3, digit3;
+    unsigned int idx = 0;
+    BN_ULONG tmp[P256_LIMBS];
+    int i;
+
+    ALIGN32 BN_ULONG aX4[4 * 9 * 3] = { 0 };
+    ALIGN32 BN_ULONG bX4[4 * 9 * 2] = { 0 };
+    ALIGN32 P256_POINT_AFFINE point_arr[4];
+    ALIGN32 P256_POINT res_point_arr[4];
+
+    /* Initial four windows */
+    wvalue = *((u16 *) & p_str[0]);
+    wvalue = (wvalue << 1) & mask;
+    idx += window_size;
+    booth_recode_w7(&sign0, &digit0, wvalue);
+    wvalue = *((u16 *) & p_str[(idx - 1) / 8]);
+    wvalue = (wvalue >> ((idx - 1) % 8)) & mask;
+    idx += window_size;
+    booth_recode_w7(&sign1, &digit1, wvalue);
+    wvalue = *((u16 *) & p_str[(idx - 1) / 8]);
+    wvalue = (wvalue >> ((idx - 1) % 8)) & mask;
+    idx += window_size;
+    booth_recode_w7(&sign2, &digit2, wvalue);
+    wvalue = *((u16 *) & p_str[(idx - 1) / 8]);
+    wvalue = (wvalue >> ((idx - 1) % 8)) & mask;
+    idx += window_size;
+    booth_recode_w7(&sign3, &digit3, wvalue);
+
+    ecp_nistz256_avx2_multi_gather_w7(point_arr, preComputedTable[0],
+                                      digit0, digit1, digit2, digit3);
+
+    ecp_nistz256_neg(tmp, point_arr[0].Y);
+    copy_conditional(point_arr[0].Y, tmp, sign0);
+    ecp_nistz256_neg(tmp, point_arr[1].Y);
+    copy_conditional(point_arr[1].Y, tmp, sign1);
+    ecp_nistz256_neg(tmp, point_arr[2].Y);
+    copy_conditional(point_arr[2].Y, tmp, sign2);
+    ecp_nistz256_neg(tmp, point_arr[3].Y);
+    copy_conditional(point_arr[3].Y, tmp, sign3);
+
+    ecp_nistz256_avx2_transpose_convert(aX4, point_arr);
+    ecp_nistz256_avx2_to_mont(aX4, aX4);
+    ecp_nistz256_avx2_to_mont(&aX4[4 * 9], &aX4[4 * 9]);
+    ecp_nistz256_avx2_set1(&aX4[4 * 9 * 2]);
+
+    wvalue = *((u16 *) & p_str[(idx - 1) / 8]);
+    wvalue = (wvalue >> ((idx - 1) % 8)) & mask;
+    idx += window_size;
+    booth_recode_w7(&sign0, &digit0, wvalue);
+    wvalue = *((u16 *) & p_str[(idx - 1) / 8]);
+    wvalue = (wvalue >> ((idx - 1) % 8)) & mask;
+    idx += window_size;
+    booth_recode_w7(&sign1, &digit1, wvalue);
+    wvalue = *((u16 *) & p_str[(idx - 1) / 8]);
+    wvalue = (wvalue >> ((idx - 1) % 8)) & mask;
+    idx += window_size;
+    booth_recode_w7(&sign2, &digit2, wvalue);
+    wvalue = *((u16 *) & p_str[(idx - 1) / 8]);
+    wvalue = (wvalue >> ((idx - 1) % 8)) & mask;
+    idx += window_size;
+    booth_recode_w7(&sign3, &digit3, wvalue);
+
+    ecp_nistz256_avx2_multi_gather_w7(point_arr, preComputedTable[4 * 1],
+                                      digit0, digit1, digit2, digit3);
+
+    ecp_nistz256_neg(tmp, point_arr[0].Y);
+    copy_conditional(point_arr[0].Y, tmp, sign0);
+    ecp_nistz256_neg(tmp, point_arr[1].Y);
+    copy_conditional(point_arr[1].Y, tmp, sign1);
+    ecp_nistz256_neg(tmp, point_arr[2].Y);
+    copy_conditional(point_arr[2].Y, tmp, sign2);
+    ecp_nistz256_neg(tmp, point_arr[3].Y);
+    copy_conditional(point_arr[3].Y, tmp, sign3);
+
+    ecp_nistz256_avx2_transpose_convert(bX4, point_arr);
+    ecp_nistz256_avx2_to_mont(bX4, bX4);
+    ecp_nistz256_avx2_to_mont(&bX4[4 * 9], &bX4[4 * 9]);
+    /* Optimized when both inputs are affine */
+    ecp_nistz256_avx2_point_add_affines_x4(aX4, aX4, bX4);
+
+    for (i = 2; i < 9; i++) {
+        wvalue = *((u16 *) & p_str[(idx - 1) / 8]);
+        wvalue = (wvalue >> ((idx - 1) % 8)) & mask;
+        idx += window_size;
+        booth_recode_w7(&sign0, &digit0, wvalue);
+        wvalue = *((u16 *) & p_str[(idx - 1) / 8]);
+        wvalue = (wvalue >> ((idx - 1) % 8)) & mask;
+        idx += window_size;
+        booth_recode_w7(&sign1, &digit1, wvalue);
+        wvalue = *((u16 *) & p_str[(idx - 1) / 8]);
+        wvalue = (wvalue >> ((idx - 1) % 8)) & mask;
+        idx += window_size;
+        booth_recode_w7(&sign2, &digit2, wvalue);
+        wvalue = *((u16 *) & p_str[(idx - 1) / 8]);
+        wvalue = (wvalue >> ((idx - 1) % 8)) & mask;
+        idx += window_size;
+        booth_recode_w7(&sign3, &digit3, wvalue);
+
+        ecp_nistz256_avx2_multi_gather_w7(point_arr,
+                                          preComputedTable[4 * i],
+                                          digit0, digit1, digit2, digit3);
+
+        ecp_nistz256_neg(tmp, point_arr[0].Y);
+        copy_conditional(point_arr[0].Y, tmp, sign0);
+        ecp_nistz256_neg(tmp, point_arr[1].Y);
+        copy_conditional(point_arr[1].Y, tmp, sign1);
+        ecp_nistz256_neg(tmp, point_arr[2].Y);
+        copy_conditional(point_arr[2].Y, tmp, sign2);
+        ecp_nistz256_neg(tmp, point_arr[3].Y);
+        copy_conditional(point_arr[3].Y, tmp, sign3);
+
+        ecp_nistz256_avx2_transpose_convert(bX4, point_arr);
+        ecp_nistz256_avx2_to_mont(bX4, bX4);
+        ecp_nistz256_avx2_to_mont(&bX4[4 * 9], &bX4[4 * 9]);
+
+        ecp_nistz256_avx2_point_add_affine_x4(aX4, aX4, bX4);
+    }
+
+    ecp_nistz256_avx2_from_mont(&aX4[4 * 9 * 0], &aX4[4 * 9 * 0]);
+    ecp_nistz256_avx2_from_mont(&aX4[4 * 9 * 1], &aX4[4 * 9 * 1]);
+    ecp_nistz256_avx2_from_mont(&aX4[4 * 9 * 2], &aX4[4 * 9 * 2]);
+
+    ecp_nistz256_avx2_convert_transpose_back(res_point_arr, aX4);
+    /* Last window is performed serially */
+    wvalue = *((u16 *) & p_str[(idx - 1) / 8]);
+    wvalue = (wvalue >> ((idx - 1) % 8)) & mask;
+    booth_recode_w7(&sign0, &digit0, wvalue);
+    ecp_nistz256_gather_w7((P256_POINT_AFFINE *)r,
+                           preComputedTable[36], digit0);
+    ecp_nistz256_neg(tmp, r->Y);
+    copy_conditional(r->Y, tmp, sign0);
+    memcpy(r->Z, ONE, sizeof(ONE));
+    /* Sum the four windows */
+    ecp_nistz256_point_add(r, r, &res_point_arr[0]);
+    ecp_nistz256_point_add(r, r, &res_point_arr[1]);
+    ecp_nistz256_point_add(r, r, &res_point_arr[2]);
+    ecp_nistz256_point_add(r, r, &res_point_arr[3]);
+}
+# endif
+#endif
+
+__owur static int ecp_nistz256_set_from_affine(EC_POINT *out, const EC_GROUP *group,
+                                               const P256_POINT_AFFINE *in,
+                                               BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    BIGNUM *x, *y;
+    BN_ULONG d_x[P256_LIMBS], d_y[P256_LIMBS];
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    x = BN_new();
+    if (x == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    y = BN_new();
+    if (y == NULL) {
+        BN_free(x);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    memcpy(d_x, in->X, sizeof(d_x));
+    bn_set_static_words(x, d_x, P256_LIMBS);
+
+    memcpy(d_y, in->Y, sizeof(d_y));
+    bn_set_static_words(y, d_y, P256_LIMBS);
+
+    ret = EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, out, x, y, ctx);
+
+    BN_free(x);
+    BN_free(y);
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/* r = scalar*G + sum(scalars[i]*points[i]) */
+__owur static int ecp_nistz256_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group,
+                                          EC_POINT *r,
+                                          const BIGNUM *scalar,
+                                          size_t num,
+                                          const EC_POINT *points[],
+                                          const BIGNUM *scalars[], BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int i = 0, ret = 0, no_precomp_for_generator = 0, p_is_infinity = 0;
+    size_t j;
+    unsigned char p_str[33] = { 0 };
+    const PRECOMP256_ROW *preComputedTable = NULL;
+    const NISTZ256_PRE_COMP *pre_comp = NULL;
+    const EC_POINT *generator = NULL;
+    BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
+    const BIGNUM **new_scalars = NULL;
+    const EC_POINT **new_points = NULL;
+    unsigned int idx = 0;
+    const unsigned int window_size = 7;
+    const unsigned int mask = (1 << (window_size + 1)) - 1;
+    unsigned int wvalue;
+    ALIGN32 union {
+        P256_POINT p;
+        P256_POINT_AFFINE a;
+    } t, p;
+    BIGNUM *tmp_scalar;
+
+    if ((num + 1) == 0 || (num + 1) > OPENSSL_MALLOC_MAX_NELEMS(void *)) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_POINTS_MUL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (group->meth != r->meth) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_POINTS_MUL, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if ((scalar == NULL) && (num == 0))
+        return EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(group, r);
+
+    for (j = 0; j < num; j++) {
+        if (group->meth != points[j]->meth) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_POINTS_MUL, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+        ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+        if (ctx == NULL)
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+
+    if (scalar) {
+        generator = EC_GROUP_get0_generator(group);
+        if (generator == NULL) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_POINTS_MUL, EC_R_UNDEFINED_GENERATOR);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        /* look if we can use precomputed multiples of generator */
+        pre_comp = group->pre_comp.nistz256;
+
+        if (pre_comp) {
+            /*
+             * If there is a precomputed table for the generator, check that
+             * it was generated with the same generator.
+             */
+            EC_POINT *pre_comp_generator = EC_POINT_new(group);
+            if (pre_comp_generator == NULL)
+                goto err;
+
+            if (!ecp_nistz256_set_from_affine(pre_comp_generator,
+                                              group, pre_comp->precomp[0],
+                                              ctx)) {
+                EC_POINT_free(pre_comp_generator);
+                goto err;
+            }
+
+            if (0 == EC_POINT_cmp(group, generator, pre_comp_generator, ctx))
+                preComputedTable = (const PRECOMP256_ROW *)pre_comp->precomp;
+
+            EC_POINT_free(pre_comp_generator);
+        }
+
+        if (preComputedTable == NULL && ecp_nistz256_is_affine_G(generator)) {
+            /*
+             * If there is no precomputed data, but the generator is the
+             * default, a hardcoded table of precomputed data is used. This
+             * is because applications, such as Apache, do not use
+             * EC_KEY_precompute_mult.
+             */
+            preComputedTable = ecp_nistz256_precomputed;
+        }
+
+        if (preComputedTable) {
+            if ((BN_num_bits(scalar) > 256)
+                || BN_is_negative(scalar)) {
+                if ((tmp_scalar = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
+                    goto err;
+
+                if (!BN_nnmod(tmp_scalar, scalar, group->order, ctx)) {
+                    ECerr(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_POINTS_MUL, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+                    goto err;
+                }
+                scalar = tmp_scalar;
+            }
+
+            for (i = 0; i < bn_get_top(scalar) * BN_BYTES; i += BN_BYTES) {
+                BN_ULONG d = bn_get_words(scalar)[i / BN_BYTES];
+
+                p_str[i + 0] = (unsigned char)d;
+                p_str[i + 1] = (unsigned char)(d >> 8);
+                p_str[i + 2] = (unsigned char)(d >> 16);
+                p_str[i + 3] = (unsigned char)(d >>= 24);
+                if (BN_BYTES == 8) {
+                    d >>= 8;
+                    p_str[i + 4] = (unsigned char)d;
+                    p_str[i + 5] = (unsigned char)(d >> 8);
+                    p_str[i + 6] = (unsigned char)(d >> 16);
+                    p_str[i + 7] = (unsigned char)(d >> 24);
+                }
+            }
+
+            for (; i < 33; i++)
+                p_str[i] = 0;
+
+#if defined(ECP_NISTZ256_AVX2)
+            if (ecp_nistz_avx2_eligible()) {
+                ecp_nistz256_avx2_mul_g(&p.p, p_str, preComputedTable);
+            } else
+#endif
+            {
+                BN_ULONG infty;
+
+                /* First window */
+                wvalue = (p_str[0] << 1) & mask;
+                idx += window_size;
+
+                wvalue = _booth_recode_w7(wvalue);
+
+                ecp_nistz256_gather_w7(&p.a, preComputedTable[0],
+                                       wvalue >> 1);
+
+                ecp_nistz256_neg(p.p.Z, p.p.Y);
+                copy_conditional(p.p.Y, p.p.Z, wvalue & 1);
+
+                /*
+                 * Since affine infinity is encoded as (0,0) and
+                 * Jacobian ias (,,0), we need to harmonize them
+                 * by assigning "one" or zero to Z.
+                 */
+                infty = (p.p.X[0] | p.p.X[1] | p.p.X[2] | p.p.X[3] |
+                         p.p.Y[0] | p.p.Y[1] | p.p.Y[2] | p.p.Y[3]);
+                if (P256_LIMBS == 8)
+                    infty |= (p.p.X[4] | p.p.X[5] | p.p.X[6] | p.p.X[7] |
+                              p.p.Y[4] | p.p.Y[5] | p.p.Y[6] | p.p.Y[7]);
+
+                infty = 0 - is_zero(infty);
+                infty = ~infty;
+
+                p.p.Z[0] = ONE[0] & infty;
+                p.p.Z[1] = ONE[1] & infty;
+                p.p.Z[2] = ONE[2] & infty;
+                p.p.Z[3] = ONE[3] & infty;
+                if (P256_LIMBS == 8) {
+                    p.p.Z[4] = ONE[4] & infty;
+                    p.p.Z[5] = ONE[5] & infty;
+                    p.p.Z[6] = ONE[6] & infty;
+                    p.p.Z[7] = ONE[7] & infty;
+                }
+
+                for (i = 1; i < 37; i++) {
+                    unsigned int off = (idx - 1) / 8;
+                    wvalue = p_str[off] | p_str[off + 1] << 8;
+                    wvalue = (wvalue >> ((idx - 1) % 8)) & mask;
+                    idx += window_size;
+
+                    wvalue = _booth_recode_w7(wvalue);
+
+                    ecp_nistz256_gather_w7(&t.a,
+                                           preComputedTable[i], wvalue >> 1);
+
+                    ecp_nistz256_neg(t.p.Z, t.a.Y);
+                    copy_conditional(t.a.Y, t.p.Z, wvalue & 1);
+
+                    ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine(&p.p, &p.p, &t.a);
+                }
+            }
+        } else {
+            p_is_infinity = 1;
+            no_precomp_for_generator = 1;
+        }
+    } else
+        p_is_infinity = 1;
+
+    if (no_precomp_for_generator) {
+        /*
+         * Without a precomputed table for the generator, it has to be
+         * handled like a normal point.
+         */
+        new_scalars = OPENSSL_malloc((num + 1) * sizeof(BIGNUM *));
+        if (new_scalars == NULL) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_POINTS_MUL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        new_points = OPENSSL_malloc((num + 1) * sizeof(EC_POINT *));
+        if (new_points == NULL) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_POINTS_MUL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        memcpy(new_scalars, scalars, num * sizeof(BIGNUM *));
+        new_scalars[num] = scalar;
+        memcpy(new_points, points, num * sizeof(EC_POINT *));
+        new_points[num] = generator;
+
+        scalars = new_scalars;
+        points = new_points;
+        num++;
+    }
+
+    if (num) {
+        P256_POINT *out = &t.p;
+        if (p_is_infinity)
+            out = &p.p;
+
+        if (!ecp_nistz256_windowed_mul(group, out, scalars, points, num, ctx))
+            goto err;
+
+        if (!p_is_infinity)
+            ecp_nistz256_point_add(&p.p, &p.p, out);
+    }
+
+    /* Not constant-time, but we're only operating on the public output. */
+    if (!bn_set_words(r->X, p.p.X, P256_LIMBS) ||
+        !bn_set_words(r->Y, p.p.Y, P256_LIMBS) ||
+        !bn_set_words(r->Z, p.p.Z, P256_LIMBS)) {
+        goto err;
+    }
+    r->Z_is_one = is_one(r->Z) & 1;
+
+    ret = 1;
+
+err:
+    if (ctx)
+        BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
+    OPENSSL_free(new_points);
+    OPENSSL_free(new_scalars);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+__owur static int ecp_nistz256_get_affine(const EC_GROUP *group,
+                                          const EC_POINT *point,
+                                          BIGNUM *x, BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    BN_ULONG z_inv2[P256_LIMBS];
+    BN_ULONG z_inv3[P256_LIMBS];
+    BN_ULONG x_aff[P256_LIMBS];
+    BN_ULONG y_aff[P256_LIMBS];
+    BN_ULONG point_x[P256_LIMBS], point_y[P256_LIMBS], point_z[P256_LIMBS];
+    BN_ULONG x_ret[P256_LIMBS], y_ret[P256_LIMBS];
+
+    if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, point)) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_GET_AFFINE, EC_R_POINT_AT_INFINITY);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (!ecp_nistz256_bignum_to_field_elem(point_x, point->X) ||
+        !ecp_nistz256_bignum_to_field_elem(point_y, point->Y) ||
+        !ecp_nistz256_bignum_to_field_elem(point_z, point->Z)) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_GET_AFFINE, EC_R_COORDINATES_OUT_OF_RANGE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    ecp_nistz256_mod_inverse(z_inv3, point_z);
+    ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(z_inv2, z_inv3);
+    ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(x_aff, z_inv2, point_x);
+
+    if (x != NULL) {
+        ecp_nistz256_from_mont(x_ret, x_aff);
+        if (!bn_set_words(x, x_ret, P256_LIMBS))
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (y != NULL) {
+        ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(z_inv3, z_inv3, z_inv2);
+        ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(y_aff, z_inv3, point_y);
+        ecp_nistz256_from_mont(y_ret, y_aff);
+        if (!bn_set_words(y, y_ret, P256_LIMBS))
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static NISTZ256_PRE_COMP *ecp_nistz256_pre_comp_new(const EC_GROUP *group)
+{
+    NISTZ256_PRE_COMP *ret = NULL;
+
+    if (!group)
+        return NULL;
+
+    ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
+
+    if (ret == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_PRE_COMP_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    ret->group = group;
+    ret->w = 6;                 /* default */
+    ret->references = 1;
+
+    ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
+    if (ret->lock == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_PRE_COMP_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        OPENSSL_free(ret);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+NISTZ256_PRE_COMP *EC_nistz256_pre_comp_dup(NISTZ256_PRE_COMP *p)
+{
+    int i;
+    if (p != NULL)
+        CRYPTO_atomic_add(&p->references, 1, &i, p->lock);
+    return p;
+}
+
+void EC_nistz256_pre_comp_free(NISTZ256_PRE_COMP *pre)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    if (pre == NULL)
+        return;
+
+    CRYPTO_atomic_add(&pre->references, -1, &i, pre->lock);
+    REF_PRINT_COUNT("EC_nistz256", x);
+    if (i > 0)
+        return;
+    REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0);
+
+    OPENSSL_free(pre->precomp_storage);
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(pre->lock);
+    OPENSSL_free(pre);
+}
+
+
+static int ecp_nistz256_window_have_precompute_mult(const EC_GROUP *group)
+{
+    /* There is a hard-coded table for the default generator. */
+    const EC_POINT *generator = EC_GROUP_get0_generator(group);
+
+    if (generator != NULL && ecp_nistz256_is_affine_G(generator)) {
+        /* There is a hard-coded table for the default generator. */
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    return HAVEPRECOMP(group, nistz256);
+}
+
+const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_nistz256_method(void)
+{
+    static const EC_METHOD ret = {
+        EC_FLAGS_DEFAULT_OCT,
+        NID_X9_62_prime_field,
+        ec_GFp_mont_group_init,
+        ec_GFp_mont_group_finish,
+        ec_GFp_mont_group_clear_finish,
+        ec_GFp_mont_group_copy,
+        ec_GFp_mont_group_set_curve,
+        ec_GFp_simple_group_get_curve,
+        ec_GFp_simple_group_get_degree,
+        ec_group_simple_order_bits,
+        ec_GFp_simple_group_check_discriminant,
+        ec_GFp_simple_point_init,
+        ec_GFp_simple_point_finish,
+        ec_GFp_simple_point_clear_finish,
+        ec_GFp_simple_point_copy,
+        ec_GFp_simple_point_set_to_infinity,
+        ec_GFp_simple_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp,
+        ec_GFp_simple_get_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp,
+        ec_GFp_simple_point_set_affine_coordinates,
+        ecp_nistz256_get_affine,
+        0, 0, 0,
+        ec_GFp_simple_add,
+        ec_GFp_simple_dbl,
+        ec_GFp_simple_invert,
+        ec_GFp_simple_is_at_infinity,
+        ec_GFp_simple_is_on_curve,
+        ec_GFp_simple_cmp,
+        ec_GFp_simple_make_affine,
+        ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine,
+        ecp_nistz256_points_mul,                    /* mul */
+        ecp_nistz256_mult_precompute,               /* precompute_mult */
+        ecp_nistz256_window_have_precompute_mult,   /* have_precompute_mult */
+        ec_GFp_mont_field_mul,
+        ec_GFp_mont_field_sqr,
+        0,                                          /* field_div */
+        ec_GFp_mont_field_encode,
+        ec_GFp_mont_field_decode,
+        ec_GFp_mont_field_set_to_one,
+        ec_key_simple_priv2oct,
+        ec_key_simple_oct2priv,
+        0, /* set private */
+        ec_key_simple_generate_key,
+        ec_key_simple_check_key,
+        ec_key_simple_generate_public_key,
+        0, /* keycopy */
+        0, /* keyfinish */
+        ecdh_simple_compute_key
+    };
+
+    return &ret;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ecp_nistz256_table.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ecp_nistz256_table.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3f5625c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ecp_nistz256_table.c
@@ -0,0 +1,9542 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2014-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * This is the precomputed constant time access table for the code in
+ * ecp_montp256.c, for the default generator. The table consists of 37
+ * subtables, each subtable contains 64 affine points. The affine points are
+ * encoded as eight uint64's, four for the x coordinate and four for the y.
+ * Both values are in little-endian order. There are 37 tables because a
+ * signed, 6-bit wNAF form of the scalar is used and ceil(256/(6 + 1)) = 37.
+ * Within each table there are 64 values because the 6-bit wNAF value can
+ * take 64 values, ignoring the sign bit, which is implemented by performing
+ * a negation of the affine point when required. We would like to align it
+ * to 2MB in order to increase the chances of using a large page but that
+ * appears to lead to invalid ELF files being produced.
+ */
+
+#if defined(__GNUC__)
+__attribute((aligned(4096)))
+#elif defined(_MSC_VER)
+__declspec(align(4096))
+#elif defined(__SUNPRO_C)
+# pragma align 4096(ecp_nistz256_precomputed)
+#endif
+static const BN_ULONG ecp_nistz256_precomputed[37][64 *
+                                                   sizeof(P256_POINT_AFFINE) /
+                                                   sizeof(BN_ULONG)] = {
+    {TOBN(0x79e730d4, 0x18a9143c), TOBN(0x75ba95fc, 0x5fedb601),
+     TOBN(0x79fb732b, 0x77622510), TOBN(0x18905f76, 0xa53755c6),
+     TOBN(0xddf25357, 0xce95560a), TOBN(0x8b4ab8e4, 0xba19e45c),
+     TOBN(0xd2e88688, 0xdd21f325), TOBN(0x8571ff18, 0x25885d85),
+     TOBN(0x850046d4, 0x10ddd64d), TOBN(0xaa6ae3c1, 0xa433827d),
+     TOBN(0x73220503, 0x8d1490d9), TOBN(0xf6bb32e4, 0x3dcf3a3b),
+     TOBN(0x2f3648d3, 0x61bee1a5), TOBN(0x152cd7cb, 0xeb236ff8),
+     TOBN(0x19a8fb0e, 0x92042dbe), TOBN(0x78c57751, 0x0a5b8a3b),
+     TOBN(0xffac3f90, 0x4eebc127), TOBN(0xb027f84a, 0x087d81fb),
+     TOBN(0x66ad77dd, 0x87cbbc98), TOBN(0x26936a3f, 0xb6ff747e),
+     TOBN(0xb04c5c1f, 0xc983a7eb), TOBN(0x583e47ad, 0x0861fe1a),
+     TOBN(0x78820831, 0x1a2ee98e), TOBN(0xd5f06a29, 0xe587cc07),
+     TOBN(0x74b0b50d, 0x46918dcc), TOBN(0x4650a6ed, 0xc623c173),
+     TOBN(0x0cdaacac, 0xe8100af2), TOBN(0x577362f5, 0x41b0176b),
+     TOBN(0x2d96f24c, 0xe4cbaba6), TOBN(0x17628471, 0xfad6f447),
+     TOBN(0x6b6c36de, 0xe5ddd22e), TOBN(0x84b14c39, 0x4c5ab863),
+     TOBN(0xbe1b8aae, 0xc45c61f5), TOBN(0x90ec649a, 0x94b9537d),
+     TOBN(0x941cb5aa, 0xd076c20c), TOBN(0xc9079605, 0x890523c8),
+     TOBN(0xeb309b4a, 0xe7ba4f10), TOBN(0x73c568ef, 0xe5eb882b),
+     TOBN(0x3540a987, 0x7e7a1f68), TOBN(0x73a076bb, 0x2dd1e916),
+     TOBN(0x40394737, 0x3e77664a), TOBN(0x55ae744f, 0x346cee3e),
+     TOBN(0xd50a961a, 0x5b17a3ad), TOBN(0x13074b59, 0x54213673),
+     TOBN(0x93d36220, 0xd377e44b), TOBN(0x299c2b53, 0xadff14b5),
+     TOBN(0xf424d44c, 0xef639f11), TOBN(0xa4c9916d, 0x4a07f75f),
+     TOBN(0x0746354e, 0xa0173b4f), TOBN(0x2bd20213, 0xd23c00f7),
+     TOBN(0xf43eaab5, 0x0c23bb08), TOBN(0x13ba5119, 0xc3123e03),
+     TOBN(0x2847d030, 0x3f5b9d4d), TOBN(0x6742f2f2, 0x5da67bdd),
+     TOBN(0xef933bdc, 0x77c94195), TOBN(0xeaedd915, 0x6e240867),
+     TOBN(0x27f14cd1, 0x9499a78f), TOBN(0x462ab5c5, 0x6f9b3455),
+     TOBN(0x8f90f02a, 0xf02cfc6b), TOBN(0xb763891e, 0xb265230d),
+     TOBN(0xf59da3a9, 0x532d4977), TOBN(0x21e3327d, 0xcf9eba15),
+     TOBN(0x123c7b84, 0xbe60bbf0), TOBN(0x56ec12f2, 0x7706df76),
+     TOBN(0x75c96e8f, 0x264e20e8), TOBN(0xabe6bfed, 0x59a7a841),
+     TOBN(0x2cc09c04, 0x44c8eb00), TOBN(0xe05b3080, 0xf0c4e16b),
+     TOBN(0x1eb7777a, 0xa45f3314), TOBN(0x56af7bed, 0xce5d45e3),
+     TOBN(0x2b6e019a, 0x88b12f1a), TOBN(0x086659cd, 0xfd835f9b),
+     TOBN(0x2c18dbd1, 0x9dc21ec8), TOBN(0x98f9868a, 0x0fcf8139),
+     TOBN(0x737d2cd6, 0x48250b49), TOBN(0xcc61c947, 0x24b3428f),
+     TOBN(0x0c2b4078, 0x80dd9e76), TOBN(0xc43a8991, 0x383fbe08),
+     TOBN(0x5f7d2d65, 0x779be5d2), TOBN(0x78719a54, 0xeb3b4ab5),
+     TOBN(0xea7d260a, 0x6245e404), TOBN(0x9de40795, 0x6e7fdfe0),
+     TOBN(0x1ff3a415, 0x8dac1ab5), TOBN(0x3e7090f1, 0x649c9073),
+     TOBN(0x1a768561, 0x2b944e88), TOBN(0x250f939e, 0xe57f61c8),
+     TOBN(0x0c0daa89, 0x1ead643d), TOBN(0x68930023, 0xe125b88e),
+     TOBN(0x04b71aa7, 0xd2697768), TOBN(0xabdedef5, 0xca345a33),
+     TOBN(0x2409d29d, 0xee37385e), TOBN(0x4ee1df77, 0xcb83e156),
+     TOBN(0x0cac12d9, 0x1cbb5b43), TOBN(0x170ed2f6, 0xca895637),
+     TOBN(0x28228cfa, 0x8ade6d66), TOBN(0x7ff57c95, 0x53238aca),
+     TOBN(0xccc42563, 0x4b2ed709), TOBN(0x0e356769, 0x856fd30d),
+     TOBN(0xbcbcd43f, 0x559e9811), TOBN(0x738477ac, 0x5395b759),
+     TOBN(0x35752b90, 0xc00ee17f), TOBN(0x68748390, 0x742ed2e3),
+     TOBN(0x7cd06422, 0xbd1f5bc1), TOBN(0xfbc08769, 0xc9e7b797),
+     TOBN(0xa242a35b, 0xb0cf664a), TOBN(0x126e48f7, 0x7f9707e3),
+     TOBN(0x1717bf54, 0xc6832660), TOBN(0xfaae7332, 0xfd12c72e),
+     TOBN(0x27b52db7, 0x995d586b), TOBN(0xbe29569e, 0x832237c2),
+     TOBN(0xe8e4193e, 0x2a65e7db), TOBN(0x152706dc, 0x2eaa1bbb),
+     TOBN(0x72bcd8b7, 0xbc60055b), TOBN(0x03cc23ee, 0x56e27e4b),
+     TOBN(0xee337424, 0xe4819370), TOBN(0xe2aa0e43, 0x0ad3da09),
+     TOBN(0x40b8524f, 0x6383c45d), TOBN(0xd7663554, 0x42a41b25),
+     TOBN(0x64efa6de, 0x778a4797), TOBN(0x2042170a, 0x7079adf4),
+     TOBN(0x808b0b65, 0x0bc6fb80), TOBN(0x5882e075, 0x3ffe2e6b),
+     TOBN(0xd5ef2f7c, 0x2c83f549), TOBN(0x54d63c80, 0x9103b723),
+     TOBN(0xf2f11bd6, 0x52a23f9b), TOBN(0x3670c319, 0x4b0b6587),
+     TOBN(0x55c4623b, 0xb1580e9e), TOBN(0x64edf7b2, 0x01efe220),
+     TOBN(0x97091dcb, 0xd53c5c9d), TOBN(0xf17624b6, 0xac0a177b),
+     TOBN(0xb0f13975, 0x2cfe2dff), TOBN(0xc1a35c0a, 0x6c7a574e),
+     TOBN(0x227d3146, 0x93e79987), TOBN(0x0575bf30, 0xe89cb80e),
+     TOBN(0x2f4e247f, 0x0d1883bb), TOBN(0xebd51226, 0x3274c3d0),
+     TOBN(0x5f3e51c8, 0x56ada97a), TOBN(0x4afc964d, 0x8f8b403e),
+     TOBN(0xa6f247ab, 0x412e2979), TOBN(0x675abd1b, 0x6f80ebda),
+     TOBN(0x66a2bd72, 0x5e485a1d), TOBN(0x4b2a5caf, 0x8f4f0b3c),
+     TOBN(0x2626927f, 0x1b847bba), TOBN(0x6c6fc7d9, 0x0502394d),
+     TOBN(0xfea912ba, 0xa5659ae8), TOBN(0x68363aba, 0x25e1a16e),
+     TOBN(0xb8842277, 0x752c41ac), TOBN(0xfe545c28, 0x2897c3fc),
+     TOBN(0x2d36e9e7, 0xdc4c696b), TOBN(0x5806244a, 0xfba977c5),
+     TOBN(0x85665e9b, 0xe39508c1), TOBN(0xf720ee25, 0x6d12597b),
+     TOBN(0x8a979129, 0xd2337a31), TOBN(0x5916868f, 0x0f862bdc),
+     TOBN(0x048099d9, 0x5dd283ba), TOBN(0xe2d1eeb6, 0xfe5bfb4e),
+     TOBN(0x82ef1c41, 0x7884005d), TOBN(0xa2d4ec17, 0xffffcbae),
+     TOBN(0x9161c53f, 0x8aa95e66), TOBN(0x5ee104e1, 0xc5fee0d0),
+     TOBN(0x562e4cec, 0xc135b208), TOBN(0x74e1b265, 0x4783f47d),
+     TOBN(0x6d2a506c, 0x5a3f3b30), TOBN(0xecead9f4, 0xc16762fc),
+     TOBN(0xf29dd4b2, 0xe286e5b9), TOBN(0x1b0fadc0, 0x83bb3c61),
+     TOBN(0x7a75023e, 0x7fac29a4), TOBN(0xc086d5f1, 0xc9477fa3),
+     TOBN(0x0fc61135, 0x2f6f3076), TOBN(0xc99ffa23, 0xe3912a9a),
+     TOBN(0x6a0b0685, 0xd2f8ba3d), TOBN(0xfdc777e8, 0xe93358a4),
+     TOBN(0x94a787bb, 0x35415f04), TOBN(0x640c2d6a, 0x4d23fea4),
+     TOBN(0x9de917da, 0x153a35b5), TOBN(0x793e8d07, 0x5d5cd074),
+     TOBN(0xf4f87653, 0x2de45068), TOBN(0x37c7a7e8, 0x9e2e1f6e),
+     TOBN(0xd0825fa2, 0xa3584069), TOBN(0xaf2cea7c, 0x1727bf42),
+     TOBN(0x0360a4fb, 0x9e4785a9), TOBN(0xe5fda49c, 0x27299f4a),
+     TOBN(0x48068e13, 0x71ac2f71), TOBN(0x83d0687b, 0x9077666f),
+     TOBN(0x6d3883b2, 0x15d02819), TOBN(0x6d0d7550, 0x40dd9a35),
+     TOBN(0x61d7cbf9, 0x1d2b469f), TOBN(0xf97b232f, 0x2efc3115),
+     TOBN(0xa551d750, 0xb24bcbc7), TOBN(0x11ea4949, 0x88a1e356),
+     TOBN(0x7669f031, 0x93cb7501), TOBN(0x595dc55e, 0xca737b8a),
+     TOBN(0xa4a319ac, 0xd837879f), TOBN(0x6fc1b49e, 0xed6b67b0),
+     TOBN(0xe3959933, 0x32f1f3af), TOBN(0x966742eb, 0x65432a2e),
+     TOBN(0x4b8dc9fe, 0xb4966228), TOBN(0x96cc6312, 0x43f43950),
+     TOBN(0x12068859, 0xc9b731ee), TOBN(0x7b948dc3, 0x56f79968),
+     TOBN(0x61e4ad32, 0xed1f8008), TOBN(0xe6c9267a, 0xd8b17538),
+     TOBN(0x1ac7c5eb, 0x857ff6fb), TOBN(0x994baaa8, 0x55f2fb10),
+     TOBN(0x84cf14e1, 0x1d248018), TOBN(0x5a39898b, 0x628ac508),
+     TOBN(0x14fde97b, 0x5fa944f5), TOBN(0xed178030, 0xd12e5ac7),
+     TOBN(0x042c2af4, 0x97e2feb4), TOBN(0xd36a42d7, 0xaebf7313),
+     TOBN(0x49d2c9eb, 0x084ffdd7), TOBN(0x9f8aa54b, 0x2ef7c76a),
+     TOBN(0x9200b7ba, 0x09895e70), TOBN(0x3bd0c66f, 0xddb7fb58),
+     TOBN(0x2d97d108, 0x78eb4cbb), TOBN(0x2d431068, 0xd84bde31),
+     TOBN(0x4b523eb7, 0x172ccd1f), TOBN(0x7323cb28, 0x30a6a892),
+     TOBN(0x97082ec0, 0xcfe153eb), TOBN(0xe97f6b6a, 0xf2aadb97),
+     TOBN(0x1d3d393e, 0xd1a83da1), TOBN(0xa6a7f9c7, 0x804b2a68),
+     TOBN(0x4a688b48, 0x2d0cb71e), TOBN(0xa9b4cc5f, 0x40585278),
+     TOBN(0x5e5db46a, 0xcb66e132), TOBN(0xf1be963a, 0x0d925880),
+     TOBN(0x944a7027, 0x0317b9e2), TOBN(0xe266f959, 0x48603d48),
+     TOBN(0x98db6673, 0x5c208899), TOBN(0x90472447, 0xa2fb18a3),
+     TOBN(0x8a966939, 0x777c619f), TOBN(0x3798142a, 0x2a3be21b),
+     TOBN(0xb4241cb1, 0x3298b343), TOBN(0xa3a14e49, 0xb44f65a1),
+     TOBN(0xc5f4d6cd, 0x3ac77acd), TOBN(0xd0288cb5, 0x52b6fc3c),
+     TOBN(0xd5cc8c2f, 0x1c040abc), TOBN(0xb675511e, 0x06bf9b4a),
+     TOBN(0xd667da37, 0x9b3aa441), TOBN(0x460d45ce, 0x51601f72),
+     TOBN(0xe2f73c69, 0x6755ff89), TOBN(0xdd3cf7e7, 0x473017e6),
+     TOBN(0x8ef5689d, 0x3cf7600d), TOBN(0x948dc4f8, 0xb1fc87b4),
+     TOBN(0xd9e9fe81, 0x4ea53299), TOBN(0x2d921ca2, 0x98eb6028),
+     TOBN(0xfaecedfd, 0x0c9803fc), TOBN(0xf38ae891, 0x4d7b4745),
+     TOBN(0xd8c5fccf, 0xc5e3a3d8), TOBN(0xbefd904c, 0x4079dfbf),
+     TOBN(0xbc6d6a58, 0xfead0197), TOBN(0x39227077, 0x695532a4),
+     TOBN(0x09e23e6d, 0xdbef42f5), TOBN(0x7e449b64, 0x480a9908),
+     TOBN(0x7b969c1a, 0xad9a2e40), TOBN(0x6231d792, 0x9591c2a4),
+     TOBN(0x87151456, 0x0f664534), TOBN(0x85ceae7c, 0x4b68f103),
+     TOBN(0xac09c4ae, 0x65578ab9), TOBN(0x33ec6868, 0xf044b10c),
+     TOBN(0x6ac4832b, 0x3a8ec1f1), TOBN(0x5509d128, 0x5847d5ef),
+     TOBN(0xf909604f, 0x763f1574), TOBN(0xb16c4303, 0xc32f63c4),
+     TOBN(0xb6ab2014, 0x7ca23cd3), TOBN(0xcaa7a5c6, 0xa391849d),
+     TOBN(0x5b0673a3, 0x75678d94), TOBN(0xc982ddd4, 0xdd303e64),
+     TOBN(0xfd7b000b, 0x5db6f971), TOBN(0xbba2cb1f, 0x6f876f92),
+     TOBN(0xc77332a3, 0x3c569426), TOBN(0xa159100c, 0x570d74f8),
+     TOBN(0xfd16847f, 0xdec67ef5), TOBN(0x742ee464, 0x233e76b7),
+     TOBN(0x0b8e4134, 0xefc2b4c8), TOBN(0xca640b86, 0x42a3e521),
+     TOBN(0x653a0190, 0x8ceb6aa9), TOBN(0x313c300c, 0x547852d5),
+     TOBN(0x24e4ab12, 0x6b237af7), TOBN(0x2ba90162, 0x8bb47af8),
+     TOBN(0x3d5e58d6, 0xa8219bb7), TOBN(0xc691d0bd, 0x1b06c57f),
+     TOBN(0x0ae4cb10, 0xd257576e), TOBN(0x3569656c, 0xd54a3dc3),
+     TOBN(0xe5ebaebd, 0x94cda03a), TOBN(0x934e82d3, 0x162bfe13),
+     TOBN(0x450ac0ba, 0xe251a0c6), TOBN(0x480b9e11, 0xdd6da526),
+     TOBN(0x00467bc5, 0x8cce08b5), TOBN(0xb636458c, 0x7f178d55),
+     TOBN(0xc5748bae, 0xa677d806), TOBN(0x2763a387, 0xdfa394eb),
+     TOBN(0xa12b448a, 0x7d3cebb6), TOBN(0xe7adda3e, 0x6f20d850),
+     TOBN(0xf63ebce5, 0x1558462c), TOBN(0x58b36143, 0x620088a8),
+     TOBN(0x8a2cc3ca, 0x4d63c0ee), TOBN(0x51233117, 0x0fe948ce),
+     TOBN(0x7463fd85, 0x222ef33b), TOBN(0xadf0c7dc, 0x7c603d6c),
+     TOBN(0x0ec32d3b, 0xfe7765e5), TOBN(0xccaab359, 0xbf380409),
+     TOBN(0xbdaa84d6, 0x8e59319c), TOBN(0xd9a4c280, 0x9c80c34d),
+     TOBN(0xa9d89488, 0xa059c142), TOBN(0x6f5ae714, 0xff0b9346),
+     TOBN(0x068f237d, 0x16fb3664), TOBN(0x5853e4c4, 0x363186ac),
+     TOBN(0xe2d87d23, 0x63c52f98), TOBN(0x2ec4a766, 0x81828876),
+     TOBN(0x47b864fa, 0xe14e7b1c), TOBN(0x0c0bc0e5, 0x69192408),
+     TOBN(0xe4d7681d, 0xb82e9f3e), TOBN(0x83200f0b, 0xdf25e13c),
+     TOBN(0x8909984c, 0x66f27280), TOBN(0x462d7b00, 0x75f73227),
+     TOBN(0xd90ba188, 0xf2651798), TOBN(0x74c6e18c, 0x36ab1c34),
+     TOBN(0xab256ea3, 0x5ef54359), TOBN(0x03466612, 0xd1aa702f),
+     TOBN(0x624d6049, 0x2ed22e91), TOBN(0x6fdfe0b5, 0x6f072822),
+     TOBN(0xeeca1115, 0x39ce2271), TOBN(0x98100a4f, 0xdb01614f),
+     TOBN(0xb6b0daa2, 0xa35c628f), TOBN(0xb6f94d2e, 0xc87e9a47),
+     TOBN(0xc6773259, 0x1d57d9ce), TOBN(0xf70bfeec, 0x03884a7b),
+     TOBN(0x5fb35ccf, 0xed2bad01), TOBN(0xa155cbe3, 0x1da6a5c7),
+     TOBN(0xc2e2594c, 0x30a92f8f), TOBN(0x649c89ce, 0x5bfafe43),
+     TOBN(0xd158667d, 0xe9ff257a), TOBN(0x9b359611, 0xf32c50ae),
+     TOBN(0x4b00b20b, 0x906014cf), TOBN(0xf3a8cfe3, 0x89bc7d3d),
+     TOBN(0x4ff23ffd, 0x248a7d06), TOBN(0x80c5bfb4, 0x878873fa),
+     TOBN(0xb7d9ad90, 0x05745981), TOBN(0x179c85db, 0x3db01994),
+     TOBN(0xba41b062, 0x61a6966c), TOBN(0x4d82d052, 0xeadce5a8),
+     TOBN(0x9e91cd3b, 0xa5e6a318), TOBN(0x47795f4f, 0x95b2dda0),
+     TOBN(0xecfd7c1f, 0xd55a897c), TOBN(0x009194ab, 0xb29110fb),
+     TOBN(0x5f0e2046, 0xe381d3b0), TOBN(0x5f3425f6, 0xa98dd291),
+     TOBN(0xbfa06687, 0x730d50da), TOBN(0x0423446c, 0x4b083b7f),
+     TOBN(0x397a247d, 0xd69d3417), TOBN(0xeb629f90, 0x387ba42a),
+     TOBN(0x1ee426cc, 0xd5cd79bf), TOBN(0x0032940b, 0x946c6e18),
+     TOBN(0x1b1e8ae0, 0x57477f58), TOBN(0xe94f7d34, 0x6d823278),
+     TOBN(0xc747cb96, 0x782ba21a), TOBN(0xc5254469, 0xf72b33a5),
+     TOBN(0x772ef6de, 0xc7f80c81), TOBN(0xd73acbfe, 0x2cd9e6b5),
+     TOBN(0x4075b5b1, 0x49ee90d9), TOBN(0x785c339a, 0xa06e9eba),
+     TOBN(0xa1030d5b, 0xabf825e0), TOBN(0xcec684c3, 0xa42931dc),
+     TOBN(0x42ab62c9, 0xc1586e63), TOBN(0x45431d66, 0x5ab43f2b),
+     TOBN(0x57c8b2c0, 0x55f7835d), TOBN(0x033da338, 0xc1b7f865),
+     TOBN(0x283c7513, 0xcaa76097), TOBN(0x0a624fa9, 0x36c83906),
+     TOBN(0x6b20afec, 0x715af2c7), TOBN(0x4b969974, 0xeba78bfd),
+     TOBN(0x220755cc, 0xd921d60e), TOBN(0x9b944e10, 0x7baeca13),
+     TOBN(0x04819d51, 0x5ded93d4), TOBN(0x9bbff86e, 0x6dddfd27),
+     TOBN(0x6b344130, 0x77adc612), TOBN(0xa7496529, 0xbbd803a0),
+     TOBN(0x1a1baaa7, 0x6d8805bd), TOBN(0xc8403902, 0x470343ad),
+     TOBN(0x39f59f66, 0x175adff1), TOBN(0x0b26d7fb, 0xb7d8c5b7),
+     TOBN(0xa875f5ce, 0x529d75e3), TOBN(0x85efc7e9, 0x41325cc2),
+     TOBN(0x21950b42, 0x1ff6acd3), TOBN(0xffe70484, 0x53dc6909),
+     TOBN(0xff4cd0b2, 0x28766127), TOBN(0xabdbe608, 0x4fb7db2b),
+     TOBN(0x837c9228, 0x5e1109e8), TOBN(0x26147d27, 0xf4645b5a),
+     TOBN(0x4d78f592, 0xf7818ed8), TOBN(0xd394077e, 0xf247fa36),
+     TOBN(0x0fb9c2d0, 0x488c171a), TOBN(0xa78bfbaa, 0x13685278),
+     TOBN(0xedfbe268, 0xd5b1fa6a), TOBN(0x0dceb8db, 0x2b7eaba7),
+     TOBN(0xbf9e8089, 0x9ae2b710), TOBN(0xefde7ae6, 0xa4449c96),
+     TOBN(0x43b7716b, 0xcc143a46), TOBN(0xd7d34194, 0xc3628c13),
+     TOBN(0x508cec1c, 0x3b3f64c9), TOBN(0xe20bc0ba, 0x1e5edf3f),
+     TOBN(0xda1deb85, 0x2f4318d4), TOBN(0xd20ebe0d, 0x5c3fa443),
+     TOBN(0x370b4ea7, 0x73241ea3), TOBN(0x61f1511c, 0x5e1a5f65),
+     TOBN(0x99a5e23d, 0x82681c62), TOBN(0xd731e383, 0xa2f54c2d),
+     TOBN(0x2692f36e, 0x83445904), TOBN(0x2e0ec469, 0xaf45f9c0),
+     TOBN(0x905a3201, 0xc67528b7), TOBN(0x88f77f34, 0xd0e5e542),
+     TOBN(0xf67a8d29, 0x5864687c), TOBN(0x23b92eae, 0x22df3562),
+     TOBN(0x5c27014b, 0x9bbec39e), TOBN(0x7ef2f226, 0x9c0f0f8d),
+     TOBN(0x97359638, 0x546c4d8d), TOBN(0x5f9c3fc4, 0x92f24679),
+     TOBN(0x912e8bed, 0xa8c8acd9), TOBN(0xec3a318d, 0x306634b0),
+     TOBN(0x80167f41, 0xc31cb264), TOBN(0x3db82f6f, 0x522113f2),
+     TOBN(0xb155bcd2, 0xdcafe197), TOBN(0xfba1da59, 0x43465283),
+     TOBN(0xa0425b8e, 0xb212cf53), TOBN(0x4f2e512e, 0xf8557c5f),
+     TOBN(0xc1286ff9, 0x25c4d56c), TOBN(0xbb8a0fea, 0xee26c851),
+     TOBN(0xc28f70d2, 0xe7d6107e), TOBN(0x7ee0c444, 0xe76265aa),
+     TOBN(0x3df277a4, 0x1d1936b1), TOBN(0x1a556e3f, 0xea9595eb),
+     TOBN(0x258bbbf9, 0xe7305683), TOBN(0x31eea5bf, 0x07ef5be6),
+     TOBN(0x0deb0e4a, 0x46c814c1), TOBN(0x5cee8449, 0xa7b730dd),
+     TOBN(0xeab495c5, 0xa0182bde), TOBN(0xee759f87, 0x9e27a6b4),
+     TOBN(0xc2cf6a68, 0x80e518ca), TOBN(0x25e8013f, 0xf14cf3f4),
+     TOBN(0x8fc44140, 0x7e8d7a14), TOBN(0xbb1ff3ca, 0x9556f36a),
+     TOBN(0x6a844385, 0x14600044), TOBN(0xba3f0c4a, 0x7451ae63),
+     TOBN(0xdfcac25b, 0x1f9af32a), TOBN(0x01e0db86, 0xb1f2214b),
+     TOBN(0x4e9a5bc2, 0xa4b596ac), TOBN(0x83927681, 0x026c2c08),
+     TOBN(0x3ec832e7, 0x7acaca28), TOBN(0x1bfeea57, 0xc7385b29),
+     TOBN(0x068212e3, 0xfd1eaf38), TOBN(0xc1329830, 0x6acf8ccc),
+     TOBN(0xb909f2db, 0x2aac9e59), TOBN(0x5748060d, 0xb661782a),
+     TOBN(0xc5ab2632, 0xc79b7a01), TOBN(0xda44c6c6, 0x00017626),
+     TOBN(0xf26c00e8, 0xa7ea82f0), TOBN(0x99cac80d, 0xe4299aaf),
+     TOBN(0xd66fe3b6, 0x7ed78be1), TOBN(0x305f725f, 0x648d02cd),
+     TOBN(0x33ed1bc4, 0x623fb21b), TOBN(0xfa70533e, 0x7a6319ad),
+     TOBN(0x17ab562d, 0xbe5ffb3e), TOBN(0x06374994, 0x56674741),
+     TOBN(0x69d44ed6, 0x5c46aa8e), TOBN(0x2100d5d3, 0xa8d063d1),
+     TOBN(0xcb9727ea, 0xa2d17c36), TOBN(0x4c2bab1b, 0x8add53b7),
+     TOBN(0xa084e90c, 0x15426704), TOBN(0x778afcd3, 0xa837ebea),
+     TOBN(0x6651f701, 0x7ce477f8), TOBN(0xa0624998, 0x46fb7a8b),
+     TOBN(0xdc1e6828, 0xed8a6e19), TOBN(0x33fc2336, 0x4189d9c7),
+     TOBN(0x026f8fe2, 0x671c39bc), TOBN(0xd40c4ccd, 0xbc6f9915),
+     TOBN(0xafa135bb, 0xf80e75ca), TOBN(0x12c651a0, 0x22adff2c),
+     TOBN(0xc40a04bd, 0x4f51ad96), TOBN(0x04820109, 0xbbe4e832),
+     TOBN(0x3667eb1a, 0x7f4c04cc), TOBN(0x59556621, 0xa9404f84),
+     TOBN(0x71cdf653, 0x7eceb50a), TOBN(0x994a44a6, 0x9b8335fa),
+     TOBN(0xd7faf819, 0xdbeb9b69), TOBN(0x473c5680, 0xeed4350d),
+     TOBN(0xb6658466, 0xda44bba2), TOBN(0x0d1bc780, 0x872bdbf3),
+     TOBN(0xe535f175, 0xa1962f91), TOBN(0x6ed7e061, 0xed58f5a7),
+     TOBN(0x177aa4c0, 0x2089a233), TOBN(0x0dbcb03a, 0xe539b413),
+     TOBN(0xe3dc424e, 0xbb32e38e), TOBN(0x6472e5ef, 0x6806701e),
+     TOBN(0xdd47ff98, 0x814be9ee), TOBN(0x6b60cfff, 0x35ace009),
+     TOBN(0xb8d3d931, 0x9ff91fe5), TOBN(0x039c4800, 0xf0518eed),
+     TOBN(0x95c37632, 0x9182cb26), TOBN(0x0763a434, 0x82fc568d),
+     TOBN(0x707c04d5, 0x383e76ba), TOBN(0xac98b930, 0x824e8197),
+     TOBN(0x92bf7c8f, 0x91230de0), TOBN(0x90876a01, 0x40959b70),
+     TOBN(0xdb6d96f3, 0x05968b80), TOBN(0x380a0913, 0x089f73b9),
+     TOBN(0x7da70b83, 0xc2c61e01), TOBN(0x95fb8394, 0x569b38c7),
+     TOBN(0x9a3c6512, 0x80edfe2f), TOBN(0x8f726bb9, 0x8faeaf82),
+     TOBN(0x8010a4a0, 0x78424bf8), TOBN(0x29672044, 0x0e844970)}
+    ,
+    {TOBN(0x63c5cb81, 0x7a2ad62a), TOBN(0x7ef2b6b9, 0xac62ff54),
+     TOBN(0x3749bba4, 0xb3ad9db5), TOBN(0xad311f2c, 0x46d5a617),
+     TOBN(0xb77a8087, 0xc2ff3b6d), TOBN(0xb46feaf3, 0x367834ff),
+     TOBN(0xf8aa266d, 0x75d6b138), TOBN(0xfa38d320, 0xec008188),
+     TOBN(0x486d8ffa, 0x696946fc), TOBN(0x50fbc6d8, 0xb9cba56d),
+     TOBN(0x7e3d423e, 0x90f35a15), TOBN(0x7c3da195, 0xc0dd962c),
+     TOBN(0xe673fdb0, 0x3cfd5d8b), TOBN(0x0704b7c2, 0x889dfca5),
+     TOBN(0xf6ce581f, 0xf52305aa), TOBN(0x399d49eb, 0x914d5e53),
+     TOBN(0x380a496d, 0x6ec293cd), TOBN(0x733dbda7, 0x8e7051f5),
+     TOBN(0x037e388d, 0xb849140a), TOBN(0xee4b32b0, 0x5946dbf6),
+     TOBN(0xb1c4fda9, 0xcae368d1), TOBN(0x5001a7b0, 0xfdb0b2f3),
+     TOBN(0x6df59374, 0x2e3ac46e), TOBN(0x4af675f2, 0x39b3e656),
+     TOBN(0x44e38110, 0x39949296), TOBN(0x5b63827b, 0x361db1b5),
+     TOBN(0x3e5323ed, 0x206eaff5), TOBN(0x942370d2, 0xc21f4290),
+     TOBN(0xf2caaf2e, 0xe0d985a1), TOBN(0x192cc64b, 0x7239846d),
+     TOBN(0x7c0b8f47, 0xae6312f8), TOBN(0x7dc61f91, 0x96620108),
+     TOBN(0xb830fb5b, 0xc2da7de9), TOBN(0xd0e643df, 0x0ff8d3be),
+     TOBN(0x31ee77ba, 0x188a9641), TOBN(0x4e8aa3aa, 0xbcf6d502),
+     TOBN(0xf9fb6532, 0x9a49110f), TOBN(0xd18317f6, 0x2dd6b220),
+     TOBN(0x7e3ced41, 0x52c3ea5a), TOBN(0x0d296a14, 0x7d579c4a),
+     TOBN(0x35d6a53e, 0xed4c3717), TOBN(0x9f8240cf, 0x3d0ed2a3),
+     TOBN(0x8c0d4d05, 0xe5543aa5), TOBN(0x45d5bbfb, 0xdd33b4b4),
+     TOBN(0xfa04cc73, 0x137fd28e), TOBN(0x862ac6ef, 0xc73b3ffd),
+     TOBN(0x403ff9f5, 0x31f51ef2), TOBN(0x34d5e0fc, 0xbc73f5a2),
+     TOBN(0xf2526820, 0x08913f4f), TOBN(0xea20ed61, 0xeac93d95),
+     TOBN(0x51ed38b4, 0x6ca6b26c), TOBN(0x8662dcbc, 0xea4327b0),
+     TOBN(0x6daf295c, 0x725d2aaa), TOBN(0xbad2752f, 0x8e52dcda),
+     TOBN(0x2210e721, 0x0b17dacc), TOBN(0xa37f7912, 0xd51e8232),
+     TOBN(0x4f7081e1, 0x44cc3add), TOBN(0xd5ffa1d6, 0x87be82cf),
+     TOBN(0x89890b6c, 0x0edd6472), TOBN(0xada26e1a, 0x3ed17863),
+     TOBN(0x276f2715, 0x63483caa), TOBN(0xe6924cd9, 0x2f6077fd),
+     TOBN(0x05a7fe98, 0x0a466e3c), TOBN(0xf1c794b0, 0xb1902d1f),
+     TOBN(0xe5213688, 0x82a8042c), TOBN(0xd931cfaf, 0xcd278298),
+     TOBN(0x069a0ae0, 0xf597a740), TOBN(0x0adbb3f3, 0xeb59107c),
+     TOBN(0x983e951e, 0x5eaa8eb8), TOBN(0xe663a8b5, 0x11b48e78),
+     TOBN(0x1631cc0d, 0x8a03f2c5), TOBN(0x7577c11e, 0x11e271e2),
+     TOBN(0x33b2385c, 0x08369a90), TOBN(0x2990c59b, 0x190eb4f8),
+     TOBN(0x819a6145, 0xc68eac80), TOBN(0x7a786d62, 0x2ec4a014),
+     TOBN(0x33faadbe, 0x20ac3a8d), TOBN(0x31a21781, 0x5aba2d30),
+     TOBN(0x209d2742, 0xdba4f565), TOBN(0xdb2ce9e3, 0x55aa0fbb),
+     TOBN(0x8cef334b, 0x168984df), TOBN(0xe81dce17, 0x33879638),
+     TOBN(0xf6e6949c, 0x263720f0), TOBN(0x5c56feaf, 0xf593cbec),
+     TOBN(0x8bff5601, 0xfde58c84), TOBN(0x74e24117, 0x2eccb314),
+     TOBN(0xbcf01b61, 0x4c9a8a78), TOBN(0xa233e35e, 0x544c9868),
+     TOBN(0xb3156bf3, 0x8bd7aff1), TOBN(0x1b5ee4cb, 0x1d81b146),
+     TOBN(0x7ba1ac41, 0xd628a915), TOBN(0x8f3a8f9c, 0xfd89699e),
+     TOBN(0x7329b9c9, 0xa0748be7), TOBN(0x1d391c95, 0xa92e621f),
+     TOBN(0xe51e6b21, 0x4d10a837), TOBN(0xd255f53a, 0x4947b435),
+     TOBN(0x07669e04, 0xf1788ee3), TOBN(0xc14f27af, 0xa86938a2),
+     TOBN(0x8b47a334, 0xe93a01c0), TOBN(0xff627438, 0xd9366808),
+     TOBN(0x7a0985d8, 0xca2a5965), TOBN(0x3d9a5542, 0xd6e9b9b3),
+     TOBN(0xc23eb80b, 0x4cf972e8), TOBN(0x5c1c33bb, 0x4fdf72fd),
+     TOBN(0x0c4a58d4, 0x74a86108), TOBN(0xf8048a8f, 0xee4c5d90),
+     TOBN(0xe3c7c924, 0xe86d4c80), TOBN(0x28c889de, 0x056a1e60),
+     TOBN(0x57e2662e, 0xb214a040), TOBN(0xe8c48e98, 0x37e10347),
+     TOBN(0x87742862, 0x80ac748a), TOBN(0xf1c24022, 0x186b06f2),
+     TOBN(0xac2dd4c3, 0x5f74040a), TOBN(0x409aeb71, 0xfceac957),
+     TOBN(0x4fbad782, 0x55c4ec23), TOBN(0xb359ed61, 0x8a7b76ec),
+     TOBN(0x12744926, 0xed6f4a60), TOBN(0xe21e8d7f, 0x4b912de3),
+     TOBN(0xe2575a59, 0xfc705a59), TOBN(0x72f1d4de, 0xed2dbc0e),
+     TOBN(0x3d2b24b9, 0xeb7926b8), TOBN(0xbff88cb3, 0xcdbe5509),
+     TOBN(0xd0f399af, 0xe4dd640b), TOBN(0x3c5fe130, 0x2f76ed45),
+     TOBN(0x6f3562f4, 0x3764fb3d), TOBN(0x7b5af318, 0x3151b62d),
+     TOBN(0xd5bd0bc7, 0xd79ce5f3), TOBN(0xfdaf6b20, 0xec66890f),
+     TOBN(0x735c67ec, 0x6063540c), TOBN(0x50b259c2, 0xe5f9cb8f),
+     TOBN(0xb8734f9a, 0x3f99c6ab), TOBN(0xf8cc13d5, 0xa3a7bc85),
+     TOBN(0x80c1b305, 0xc5217659), TOBN(0xfe5364d4, 0x4ec12a54),
+     TOBN(0xbd87045e, 0x681345fe), TOBN(0x7f8efeb1, 0x582f897f),
+     TOBN(0xe8cbf1e5, 0xd5923359), TOBN(0xdb0cea9d, 0x539b9fb0),
+     TOBN(0x0c5b34cf, 0x49859b98), TOBN(0x5e583c56, 0xa4403cc6),
+     TOBN(0x11fc1a2d, 0xd48185b7), TOBN(0xc93fbc7e, 0x6e521787),
+     TOBN(0x47e7a058, 0x05105b8b), TOBN(0x7b4d4d58, 0xdb8260c8),
+     TOBN(0xe33930b0, 0x46eb842a), TOBN(0x8e844a9a, 0x7bdae56d),
+     TOBN(0x34ef3a9e, 0x13f7fdfc), TOBN(0xb3768f82, 0x636ca176),
+     TOBN(0x2821f4e0, 0x4e09e61c), TOBN(0x414dc3a1, 0xa0c7cddc),
+     TOBN(0xd5379437, 0x54945fcd), TOBN(0x151b6eef, 0xb3555ff1),
+     TOBN(0xb31bd613, 0x6339c083), TOBN(0x39ff8155, 0xdfb64701),
+     TOBN(0x7c3388d2, 0xe29604ab), TOBN(0x1e19084b, 0xa6b10442),
+     TOBN(0x17cf54c0, 0xeccd47ef), TOBN(0x89693385, 0x4a5dfb30),
+     TOBN(0x69d023fb, 0x47daf9f6), TOBN(0x9222840b, 0x7d91d959),
+     TOBN(0x439108f5, 0x803bac62), TOBN(0x0b7dd91d, 0x379bd45f),
+     TOBN(0xd651e827, 0xca63c581), TOBN(0x5c5d75f6, 0x509c104f),
+     TOBN(0x7d5fc738, 0x1f2dc308), TOBN(0x20faa7bf, 0xd98454be),
+     TOBN(0x95374bee, 0xa517b031), TOBN(0xf036b9b1, 0x642692ac),
+     TOBN(0xc5106109, 0x39842194), TOBN(0xb7e2353e, 0x49d05295),
+     TOBN(0xfc8c1d5c, 0xefb42ee0), TOBN(0xe04884eb, 0x08ce811c),
+     TOBN(0xf1f75d81, 0x7419f40e), TOBN(0x5b0ac162, 0xa995c241),
+     TOBN(0x120921bb, 0xc4c55646), TOBN(0x713520c2, 0x8d33cf97),
+     TOBN(0xb4a65a5c, 0xe98c5100), TOBN(0x6cec871d, 0x2ddd0f5a),
+     TOBN(0x251f0b7f, 0x9ba2e78b), TOBN(0x224a8434, 0xce3a2a5f),
+     TOBN(0x26827f61, 0x25f5c46f), TOBN(0x6a22bedc, 0x48545ec0),
+     TOBN(0x25ae5fa0, 0xb1bb5cdc), TOBN(0xd693682f, 0xfcb9b98f),
+     TOBN(0x32027fe8, 0x91e5d7d3), TOBN(0xf14b7d17, 0x73a07678),
+     TOBN(0xf88497b3, 0xc0dfdd61), TOBN(0xf7c2eec0, 0x2a8c4f48),
+     TOBN(0xaa5573f4, 0x3756e621), TOBN(0xc013a240, 0x1825b948),
+     TOBN(0x1c03b345, 0x63878572), TOBN(0xa0472bea, 0x653a4184),
+     TOBN(0xf4222e27, 0x0ac69a80), TOBN(0x34096d25, 0xf51e54f6),
+     TOBN(0x00a648cb, 0x8fffa591), TOBN(0x4e87acdc, 0x69b6527f),
+     TOBN(0x0575e037, 0xe285ccb4), TOBN(0x188089e4, 0x50ddcf52),
+     TOBN(0xaa96c9a8, 0x870ff719), TOBN(0x74a56cd8, 0x1fc7e369),
+     TOBN(0x41d04ee2, 0x1726931a), TOBN(0x0bbbb2c8, 0x3660ecfd),
+     TOBN(0xa6ef6de5, 0x24818e18), TOBN(0xe421cc51, 0xe7d57887),
+     TOBN(0xf127d208, 0xbea87be6), TOBN(0x16a475d3, 0xb1cdd682),
+     TOBN(0x9db1b684, 0x439b63f7), TOBN(0x5359b3db, 0xf0f113b6),
+     TOBN(0xdfccf1de, 0x8bf06e31), TOBN(0x1fdf8f44, 0xdd383901),
+     TOBN(0x10775cad, 0x5017e7d2), TOBN(0xdfc3a597, 0x58d11eef),
+     TOBN(0x6ec9c8a0, 0xb1ecff10), TOBN(0xee6ed6cc, 0x28400549),
+     TOBN(0xb5ad7bae, 0x1b4f8d73), TOBN(0x61b4f11d, 0xe00aaab9),
+     TOBN(0x7b32d69b, 0xd4eff2d7), TOBN(0x88ae6771, 0x4288b60f),
+     TOBN(0x159461b4, 0x37a1e723), TOBN(0x1f3d4789, 0x570aae8c),
+     TOBN(0x869118c0, 0x7f9871da), TOBN(0x35fbda78, 0xf635e278),
+     TOBN(0x738f3641, 0xe1541dac), TOBN(0x6794b13a, 0xc0dae45f),
+     TOBN(0x065064ac, 0x09cc0917), TOBN(0x27c53729, 0xc68540fd),
+     TOBN(0x0d2d4c8e, 0xef227671), TOBN(0xd23a9f80, 0xa1785a04),
+     TOBN(0x98c59528, 0x52650359), TOBN(0xfa09ad01, 0x74a1acad),
+     TOBN(0x082d5a29, 0x0b55bf5c), TOBN(0xa40f1c67, 0x419b8084),
+     TOBN(0x3a5c752e, 0xdcc18770), TOBN(0x4baf1f2f, 0x8825c3a5),
+     TOBN(0xebd63f74, 0x21b153ed), TOBN(0xa2383e47, 0xb2f64723),
+     TOBN(0xe7bf620a, 0x2646d19a), TOBN(0x56cb44ec, 0x03c83ffd),
+     TOBN(0xaf7267c9, 0x4f6be9f1), TOBN(0x8b2dfd7b, 0xc06bb5e9),
+     TOBN(0xb87072f2, 0xa672c5c7), TOBN(0xeacb11c8, 0x0d53c5e2),
+     TOBN(0x22dac29d, 0xff435932), TOBN(0x37bdb99d, 0x4408693c),
+     TOBN(0xf6e62fb6, 0x2899c20f), TOBN(0x3535d512, 0x447ece24),
+     TOBN(0xfbdc6b88, 0xff577ce3), TOBN(0x726693bd, 0x190575f2),
+     TOBN(0x6772b0e5, 0xab4b35a2), TOBN(0x1d8b6001, 0xf5eeaacf),
+     TOBN(0x728f7ce4, 0x795b9580), TOBN(0x4a20ed2a, 0x41fb81da),
+     TOBN(0x9f685cd4, 0x4fec01e6), TOBN(0x3ed7ddcc, 0xa7ff50ad),
+     TOBN(0x460fd264, 0x0c2d97fd), TOBN(0x3a241426, 0xeb82f4f9),
+     TOBN(0x17d1df2c, 0x6a8ea820), TOBN(0xb2b50d3b, 0xf22cc254),
+     TOBN(0x03856cba, 0xb7291426), TOBN(0x87fd26ae, 0x04f5ee39),
+     TOBN(0x9cb696cc, 0x02bee4ba), TOBN(0x53121804, 0x06820fd6),
+     TOBN(0xa5dfc269, 0x0212e985), TOBN(0x666f7ffa, 0x160f9a09),
+     TOBN(0xc503cd33, 0xbccd9617), TOBN(0x365dede4, 0xba7730a3),
+     TOBN(0x798c6355, 0x5ddb0786), TOBN(0xa6c3200e, 0xfc9cd3bc),
+     TOBN(0x060ffb2c, 0xe5e35efd), TOBN(0x99a4e25b, 0x5555a1c1),
+     TOBN(0x11d95375, 0xf70b3751), TOBN(0x0a57354a, 0x160e1bf6),
+     TOBN(0xecb3ae4b, 0xf8e4b065), TOBN(0x07a834c4, 0x2e53022b),
+     TOBN(0x1cd300b3, 0x8692ed96), TOBN(0x16a6f792, 0x61ee14ec),
+     TOBN(0x8f1063c6, 0x6a8649ed), TOBN(0xfbcdfcfe, 0x869f3e14),
+     TOBN(0x2cfb97c1, 0x00a7b3ec), TOBN(0xcea49b3c, 0x7130c2f1),
+     TOBN(0x462d044f, 0xe9d96488), TOBN(0x4b53d52e, 0x8182a0c1),
+     TOBN(0x84b6ddd3, 0x0391e9e9), TOBN(0x80ab7b48, 0xb1741a09),
+     TOBN(0xec0e15d4, 0x27d3317f), TOBN(0x8dfc1ddb, 0x1a64671e),
+     TOBN(0x93cc5d5f, 0xd49c5b92), TOBN(0xc995d53d, 0x3674a331),
+     TOBN(0x302e41ec, 0x090090ae), TOBN(0x2278a0cc, 0xedb06830),
+     TOBN(0x1d025932, 0xfbc99690), TOBN(0x0c32fbd2, 0xb80d68da),
+     TOBN(0xd79146da, 0xf341a6c1), TOBN(0xae0ba139, 0x1bef68a0),
+     TOBN(0xc6b8a563, 0x8d774b3a), TOBN(0x1cf307bd, 0x880ba4d7),
+     TOBN(0xc033bdc7, 0x19803511), TOBN(0xa9f97b3b, 0x8888c3be),
+     TOBN(0x3d68aebc, 0x85c6d05e), TOBN(0xc3b88a9d, 0x193919eb),
+     TOBN(0x2d300748, 0xc48b0ee3), TOBN(0x7506bc7c, 0x07a746c1),
+     TOBN(0xfc48437c, 0x6e6d57f3), TOBN(0x5bd71587, 0xcfeaa91a),
+     TOBN(0xa4ed0408, 0xc1bc5225), TOBN(0xd0b946db, 0x2719226d),
+     TOBN(0x109ecd62, 0x758d2d43), TOBN(0x75c8485a, 0x2751759b),
+     TOBN(0xb0b75f49, 0x9ce4177a), TOBN(0x4fa61a1e, 0x79c10c3d),
+     TOBN(0xc062d300, 0xa167fcd7), TOBN(0x4df3874c, 0x750f0fa8),
+     TOBN(0x29ae2cf9, 0x83dfedc9), TOBN(0xf8437134, 0x8d87631a),
+     TOBN(0xaf571711, 0x7429c8d2), TOBN(0x18d15867, 0x146d9272),
+     TOBN(0x83053ecf, 0x69769bb7), TOBN(0xc55eb856, 0xc479ab82),
+     TOBN(0x5ef7791c, 0x21b0f4b2), TOBN(0xaa5956ba, 0x3d491525),
+     TOBN(0x407a96c2, 0x9fe20eba), TOBN(0xf27168bb, 0xe52a5ad3),
+     TOBN(0x43b60ab3, 0xbf1d9d89), TOBN(0xe45c51ef, 0x710e727a),
+     TOBN(0xdfca5276, 0x099b4221), TOBN(0x8dc6407c, 0x2557a159),
+     TOBN(0x0ead8335, 0x91035895), TOBN(0x0a9db957, 0x9c55dc32),
+     TOBN(0xe40736d3, 0xdf61bc76), TOBN(0x13a619c0, 0x3f778cdb),
+     TOBN(0x6dd921a4, 0xc56ea28f), TOBN(0x76a52433, 0x2fa647b4),
+     TOBN(0x23591891, 0xac5bdc5d), TOBN(0xff4a1a72, 0xbac7dc01),
+     TOBN(0x9905e261, 0x62df8453), TOBN(0x3ac045df, 0xe63b265f),
+     TOBN(0x8a3f341b, 0xad53dba7), TOBN(0x8ec269cc, 0x837b625a),
+     TOBN(0xd71a2782, 0x3ae31189), TOBN(0x8fb4f9a3, 0x55e96120),
+     TOBN(0x804af823, 0xff9875cf), TOBN(0x23224f57, 0x5d442a9b),
+     TOBN(0x1c4d3b9e, 0xecc62679), TOBN(0x91da22fb, 0xa0e7ddb1),
+     TOBN(0xa370324d, 0x6c04a661), TOBN(0x9710d3b6, 0x5e376d17),
+     TOBN(0xed8c98f0, 0x3044e357), TOBN(0xc364ebbe, 0x6422701c),
+     TOBN(0x347f5d51, 0x7733d61c), TOBN(0xd55644b9, 0xcea826c3),
+     TOBN(0x80c6e0ad, 0x55a25548), TOBN(0x0aa7641d, 0x844220a7),
+     TOBN(0x1438ec81, 0x31810660), TOBN(0x9dfa6507, 0xde4b4043),
+     TOBN(0x10b515d8, 0xcc3e0273), TOBN(0x1b6066dd, 0x28d8cfb2),
+     TOBN(0xd3b04591, 0x9c9efebd), TOBN(0x425d4bdf, 0xa21c1ff4),
+     TOBN(0x5fe5af19, 0xd57607d3), TOBN(0xbbf773f7, 0x54481084),
+     TOBN(0x8435bd69, 0x94b03ed1), TOBN(0xd9ad1de3, 0x634cc546),
+     TOBN(0x2cf423fc, 0x00e420ca), TOBN(0xeed26d80, 0xa03096dd),
+     TOBN(0xd7f60be7, 0xa4db09d2), TOBN(0xf47f569d, 0x960622f7),
+     TOBN(0xe5925fd7, 0x7296c729), TOBN(0xeff2db26, 0x26ca2715),
+     TOBN(0xa6fcd014, 0xb913e759), TOBN(0x53da4786, 0x8ff4de93),
+     TOBN(0x14616d79, 0xc32068e1), TOBN(0xb187d664, 0xccdf352e),
+     TOBN(0xf7afb650, 0x1dc90b59), TOBN(0x8170e943, 0x7daa1b26),
+     TOBN(0xc8e3bdd8, 0x700c0a84), TOBN(0x6e8d345f, 0x6482bdfa),
+     TOBN(0x84cfbfa1, 0xc5c5ea50), TOBN(0xd3baf14c, 0x67960681),
+     TOBN(0x26398403, 0x0dd50942), TOBN(0xe4b7839c, 0x4716a663),
+     TOBN(0xd5f1f794, 0xe7de6dc0), TOBN(0x5cd0f4d4, 0x622aa7ce),
+     TOBN(0x5295f3f1, 0x59acfeec), TOBN(0x8d933552, 0x953e0607),
+     TOBN(0xc7db8ec5, 0x776c5722), TOBN(0xdc467e62, 0x2b5f290c),
+     TOBN(0xd4297e70, 0x4ff425a9), TOBN(0x4be924c1, 0x0cf7bb72),
+     TOBN(0x0d5dc5ae, 0xa1892131), TOBN(0x8bf8a8e3, 0xa705c992),
+     TOBN(0x73a0b064, 0x7a305ac5), TOBN(0x00c9ca4e, 0x9a8c77a8),
+     TOBN(0x5dfee80f, 0x83774bdd), TOBN(0x63131602, 0x85734485),
+     TOBN(0xa1b524ae, 0x914a69a9), TOBN(0xebc2ffaf, 0xd4e300d7),
+     TOBN(0x52c93db7, 0x7cfa46a5), TOBN(0x71e6161f, 0x21653b50),
+     TOBN(0x3574fc57, 0xa4bc580a), TOBN(0xc09015dd, 0xe1bc1253),
+     TOBN(0x4b7b47b2, 0xd174d7aa), TOBN(0x4072d8e8, 0xf3a15d04),
+     TOBN(0xeeb7d47f, 0xd6fa07ed), TOBN(0x6f2b9ff9, 0xedbdafb1),
+     TOBN(0x18c51615, 0x3760fe8a), TOBN(0x7a96e6bf, 0xf06c6c13),
+     TOBN(0x4d7a0410, 0x0ea2d071), TOBN(0xa1914e9b, 0x0be2a5ce),
+     TOBN(0x5726e357, 0xd8a3c5cf), TOBN(0x1197ecc3, 0x2abb2b13),
+     TOBN(0x6c0d7f7f, 0x31ae88dd), TOBN(0x15b20d1a, 0xfdbb3efe),
+     TOBN(0xcd06aa26, 0x70584039), TOBN(0x2277c969, 0xa7dc9747),
+     TOBN(0xbca69587, 0x7855d815), TOBN(0x899ea238, 0x5188b32a),
+     TOBN(0x37d9228b, 0x760c1c9d), TOBN(0xc7efbb11, 0x9b5c18da),
+     TOBN(0x7f0d1bc8, 0x19f6dbc5), TOBN(0x4875384b, 0x07e6905b),
+     TOBN(0xc7c50baa, 0x3ba8cd86), TOBN(0xb0ce40fb, 0xc2905de0),
+     TOBN(0x70840673, 0x7a231952), TOBN(0xa912a262, 0xcf43de26),
+     TOBN(0x9c38ddcc, 0xeb5b76c1), TOBN(0x746f5285, 0x26fc0ab4),
+     TOBN(0x52a63a50, 0xd62c269f), TOBN(0x60049c55, 0x99458621),
+     TOBN(0xe7f48f82, 0x3c2f7c9e), TOBN(0x6bd99043, 0x917d5cf3),
+     TOBN(0xeb1317a8, 0x8701f469), TOBN(0xbd3fe2ed, 0x9a449fe0),
+     TOBN(0x421e79ca, 0x12ef3d36), TOBN(0x9ee3c36c, 0x3e7ea5de),
+     TOBN(0xe48198b5, 0xcdff36f7), TOBN(0xaff4f967, 0xc6b82228),
+     TOBN(0x15e19dd0, 0xc47adb7e), TOBN(0x45699b23, 0x032e7dfa),
+     TOBN(0x40680c8b, 0x1fae026a), TOBN(0x5a347a48, 0x550dbf4d),
+     TOBN(0xe652533b, 0x3cef0d7d), TOBN(0xd94f7b18, 0x2bbb4381),
+     TOBN(0x838752be, 0x0e80f500), TOBN(0x8e6e2488, 0x9e9c9bfb),
+     TOBN(0xc9751697, 0x16caca6a), TOBN(0x866c49d8, 0x38531ad9),
+     TOBN(0xc917e239, 0x7151ade1), TOBN(0x2d016ec1, 0x6037c407),
+     TOBN(0xa407ccc9, 0x00eac3f9), TOBN(0x835f6280, 0xe2ed4748),
+     TOBN(0xcc54c347, 0x1cc98e0d), TOBN(0x0e969937, 0xdcb572eb),
+     TOBN(0x1b16c8e8, 0x8f30c9cb), TOBN(0xa606ae75, 0x373c4661),
+     TOBN(0x47aa689b, 0x35502cab), TOBN(0xf89014ae, 0x4d9bb64f),
+     TOBN(0x202f6a9c, 0x31c71f7b), TOBN(0x01f95aa3, 0x296ffe5c),
+     TOBN(0x5fc06014, 0x53cec3a3), TOBN(0xeb991237, 0x5f498a45),
+     TOBN(0xae9a935e, 0x5d91ba87), TOBN(0xc6ac6281, 0x0b564a19),
+     TOBN(0x8a8fe81c, 0x3bd44e69), TOBN(0x7c8b467f, 0x9dd11d45),
+     TOBN(0xf772251f, 0xea5b8e69), TOBN(0xaeecb3bd, 0xc5b75fbc),
+     TOBN(0x1aca3331, 0x887ff0e5), TOBN(0xbe5d49ff, 0x19f0a131),
+     TOBN(0x582c13aa, 0xe5c8646f), TOBN(0xdbaa12e8, 0x20e19980),
+     TOBN(0x8f40f31a, 0xf7abbd94), TOBN(0x1f13f5a8, 0x1dfc7663),
+     TOBN(0x5d81f1ee, 0xaceb4fc0), TOBN(0x36256002, 0x5e6f0f42),
+     TOBN(0x4b67d6d7, 0x751370c8), TOBN(0x2608b698, 0x03e80589),
+     TOBN(0xcfc0d2fc, 0x05268301), TOBN(0xa6943d39, 0x40309212),
+     TOBN(0x192a90c2, 0x1fd0e1c2), TOBN(0xb209f113, 0x37f1dc76),
+     TOBN(0xefcc5e06, 0x97bf1298), TOBN(0xcbdb6730, 0x219d639e),
+     TOBN(0xd009c116, 0xb81e8c6f), TOBN(0xa3ffdde3, 0x1a7ce2e5),
+     TOBN(0xc53fbaaa, 0xa914d3ba), TOBN(0x836d500f, 0x88df85ee),
+     TOBN(0xd98dc71b, 0x66ee0751), TOBN(0x5a3d7005, 0x714516fd),
+     TOBN(0x21d3634d, 0x39eedbba), TOBN(0x35cd2e68, 0x0455a46d),
+     TOBN(0xc8cafe65, 0xf9d7eb0c), TOBN(0xbda3ce9e, 0x00cefb3e),
+     TOBN(0xddc17a60, 0x2c9cf7a4), TOBN(0x01572ee4, 0x7bcb8773),
+     TOBN(0xa92b2b01, 0x8c7548df), TOBN(0x732fd309, 0xa84600e3),
+     TOBN(0xe22109c7, 0x16543a40), TOBN(0x9acafd36, 0xfede3c6c),
+     TOBN(0xfb206852, 0x6824e614), TOBN(0x2a4544a9, 0xda25dca0),
+     TOBN(0x25985262, 0x91d60b06), TOBN(0x281b7be9, 0x28753545),
+     TOBN(0xec667b1a, 0x90f13b27), TOBN(0x33a83aff, 0x940e2eb4),
+     TOBN(0x80009862, 0xd5d721d5), TOBN(0x0c3357a3, 0x5bd3a182),
+     TOBN(0x27f3a83b, 0x7aa2cda4), TOBN(0xb58ae74e, 0xf6f83085),
+     TOBN(0x2a911a81, 0x2e6dad6b), TOBN(0xde286051, 0xf43d6c5b),
+     TOBN(0x4bdccc41, 0xf996c4d8), TOBN(0xe7312ec0, 0x0ae1e24e)}
+    ,
+    {TOBN(0xf8d112e7, 0x6e6485b3), TOBN(0x4d3e24db, 0x771c52f8),
+     TOBN(0x48e3ee41, 0x684a2f6d), TOBN(0x7161957d, 0x21d95551),
+     TOBN(0x19631283, 0xcdb12a6c), TOBN(0xbf3fa882, 0x2e50e164),
+     TOBN(0xf6254b63, 0x3166cc73), TOBN(0x3aefa7ae, 0xaee8cc38),
+     TOBN(0x79b0fe62, 0x3b36f9fd), TOBN(0x26543b23, 0xfde19fc0),
+     TOBN(0x136e64a0, 0x958482ef), TOBN(0x23f63771, 0x9b095825),
+     TOBN(0x14cfd596, 0xb6a1142e), TOBN(0x5ea6aac6, 0x335aac0b),
+     TOBN(0x86a0e8bd, 0xf3081dd5), TOBN(0x5fb89d79, 0x003dc12a),
+     TOBN(0xf615c33a, 0xf72e34d4), TOBN(0x0bd9ea40, 0x110eec35),
+     TOBN(0x1c12bc5b, 0xc1dea34e), TOBN(0x686584c9, 0x49ae4699),
+     TOBN(0x13ad95d3, 0x8c97b942), TOBN(0x4609561a, 0x4e5c7562),
+     TOBN(0x9e94a4ae, 0xf2737f89), TOBN(0xf57594c6, 0x371c78b6),
+     TOBN(0x0f0165fc, 0xe3779ee3), TOBN(0xe00e7f9d, 0xbd495d9e),
+     TOBN(0x1fa4efa2, 0x20284e7a), TOBN(0x4564bade, 0x47ac6219),
+     TOBN(0x90e6312a, 0xc4708e8e), TOBN(0x4f5725fb, 0xa71e9adf),
+     TOBN(0xe95f55ae, 0x3d684b9f), TOBN(0x47f7ccb1, 0x1e94b415),
+     TOBN(0x7322851b, 0x8d946581), TOBN(0xf0d13133, 0xbdf4a012),
+     TOBN(0xa3510f69, 0x6584dae0), TOBN(0x03a7c171, 0x3c9f6c6d),
+     TOBN(0x5be97f38, 0xe475381a), TOBN(0xca1ba422, 0x85823334),
+     TOBN(0xf83cc5c7, 0x0be17dda), TOBN(0x158b1494, 0x0b918c0f),
+     TOBN(0xda3a77e5, 0x522e6b69), TOBN(0x69c908c3, 0xbbcd6c18),
+     TOBN(0x1f1b9e48, 0xd924fd56), TOBN(0x37c64e36, 0xaa4bb3f7),
+     TOBN(0x5a4fdbdf, 0xee478d7d), TOBN(0xba75c8bc, 0x0193f7a0),
+     TOBN(0x84bc1e84, 0x56cd16df), TOBN(0x1fb08f08, 0x46fad151),
+     TOBN(0x8a7cabf9, 0x842e9f30), TOBN(0xa331d4bf, 0x5eab83af),
+     TOBN(0xd272cfba, 0x017f2a6a), TOBN(0x27560abc, 0x83aba0e3),
+     TOBN(0x94b83387, 0x0e3a6b75), TOBN(0x25c6aea2, 0x6b9f50f5),
+     TOBN(0x803d691d, 0xb5fdf6d0), TOBN(0x03b77509, 0xe6333514),
+     TOBN(0x36178903, 0x61a341c1), TOBN(0x3604dc60, 0x0cfd6142),
+     TOBN(0x022295eb, 0x8533316c), TOBN(0x3dbde4ac, 0x44af2922),
+     TOBN(0x898afc5d, 0x1c7eef69), TOBN(0x58896805, 0xd14f4fa1),
+     TOBN(0x05002160, 0x203c21ca), TOBN(0x6f0d1f30, 0x40ef730b),
+     TOBN(0x8e8c44d4, 0x196224f8), TOBN(0x75a4ab95, 0x374d079d),
+     TOBN(0x79085ecc, 0x7d48f123), TOBN(0x56f04d31, 0x1bf65ad8),
+     TOBN(0xe220bf1c, 0xbda602b2), TOBN(0x73ee1742, 0xf9612c69),
+     TOBN(0x76008fc8, 0x084fd06b), TOBN(0x4000ef9f, 0xf11380d1),
+     TOBN(0x48201b4b, 0x12cfe297), TOBN(0x3eee129c, 0x292f74e5),
+     TOBN(0xe1fe114e, 0xc9e874e8), TOBN(0x899b055c, 0x92c5fc41),
+     TOBN(0x4e477a64, 0x3a39c8cf), TOBN(0x82f09efe, 0x78963cc9),
+     TOBN(0x6fd3fd8f, 0xd333f863), TOBN(0x85132b2a, 0xdc949c63),
+     TOBN(0x7e06a3ab, 0x516eb17b), TOBN(0x73bec06f, 0xd2c7372b),
+     TOBN(0xe4f74f55, 0xba896da6), TOBN(0xbb4afef8, 0x8e9eb40f),
+     TOBN(0x2d75bec8, 0xe61d66b0), TOBN(0x02bda4b4, 0xef29300b),
+     TOBN(0x8bbaa8de, 0x026baa5a), TOBN(0xff54befd, 0xa07f4440),
+     TOBN(0xbd9b8b1d, 0xbe7a2af3), TOBN(0xec51caa9, 0x4fb74a72),
+     TOBN(0xb9937a4b, 0x63879697), TOBN(0x7c9a9d20, 0xec2687d5),
+     TOBN(0x1773e44f, 0x6ef5f014), TOBN(0x8abcf412, 0xe90c6900),
+     TOBN(0x387bd022, 0x8142161e), TOBN(0x50393755, 0xfcb6ff2a),
+     TOBN(0x9813fd56, 0xed6def63), TOBN(0x53cf6482, 0x7d53106c),
+     TOBN(0x991a35bd, 0x431f7ac1), TOBN(0xf1e274dd, 0x63e65faf),
+     TOBN(0xf63ffa3c, 0x44cc7880), TOBN(0x411a426b, 0x7c256981),
+     TOBN(0xb698b9fd, 0x93a420e0), TOBN(0x89fdddc0, 0xae53f8fe),
+     TOBN(0x766e0722, 0x32398baa), TOBN(0x205fee42, 0x5cfca031),
+     TOBN(0xa49f5341, 0x7a029cf2), TOBN(0xa88c68b8, 0x4023890d),
+     TOBN(0xbc275041, 0x7337aaa8), TOBN(0x9ed364ad, 0x0eb384f4),
+     TOBN(0xe0816f85, 0x29aba92f), TOBN(0x2e9e1941, 0x04e38a88),
+     TOBN(0x57eef44a, 0x3dafd2d5), TOBN(0x35d1fae5, 0x97ed98d8),
+     TOBN(0x50628c09, 0x2307f9b1), TOBN(0x09d84aae, 0xd6cba5c6),
+     TOBN(0x67071bc7, 0x88aaa691), TOBN(0x2dea57a9, 0xafe6cb03),
+     TOBN(0xdfe11bb4, 0x3d78ac01), TOBN(0x7286418c, 0x7fd7aa51),
+     TOBN(0xfabf7709, 0x77f7195a), TOBN(0x8ec86167, 0xadeb838f),
+     TOBN(0xea1285a8, 0xbb4f012d), TOBN(0xd6883503, 0x9a3eab3f),
+     TOBN(0xee5d24f8, 0x309004c2), TOBN(0xa96e4b76, 0x13ffe95e),
+     TOBN(0x0cdffe12, 0xbd223ea4), TOBN(0x8f5c2ee5, 0xb6739a53),
+     TOBN(0x5cb4aaa5, 0xdd968198), TOBN(0xfa131c52, 0x72413a6c),
+     TOBN(0x53d46a90, 0x9536d903), TOBN(0xb270f0d3, 0x48606d8e),
+     TOBN(0x518c7564, 0xa053a3bc), TOBN(0x088254b7, 0x1a86caef),
+     TOBN(0xb3ba8cb4, 0x0ab5efd0), TOBN(0x5c59900e, 0x4605945d),
+     TOBN(0xecace1dd, 0xa1887395), TOBN(0x40960f36, 0x932a65de),
+     TOBN(0x9611ff5c, 0x3aa95529), TOBN(0xc58215b0, 0x7c1e5a36),
+     TOBN(0xd48c9b58, 0xf0e1a524), TOBN(0xb406856b, 0xf590dfb8),
+     TOBN(0xc7605e04, 0x9cd95662), TOBN(0x0dd036ee, 0xa33ecf82),
+     TOBN(0xa50171ac, 0xc33156b3), TOBN(0xf09d24ea, 0x4a80172e),
+     TOBN(0x4e1f72c6, 0x76dc8eef), TOBN(0xe60caadc, 0x5e3d44ee),
+     TOBN(0x006ef8a6, 0x979b1d8f), TOBN(0x60908a1c, 0x97788d26),
+     TOBN(0x6e08f95b, 0x266feec0), TOBN(0x618427c2, 0x22e8c94e),
+     TOBN(0x3d613339, 0x59145a65), TOBN(0xcd9bc368, 0xfa406337),
+     TOBN(0x82d11be3, 0x2d8a52a0), TOBN(0xf6877b27, 0x97a1c590),
+     TOBN(0x837a819b, 0xf5cbdb25), TOBN(0x2a4fd1d8, 0xde090249),
+     TOBN(0x622a7de7, 0x74990e5f), TOBN(0x840fa5a0, 0x7945511b),
+     TOBN(0x30b974be, 0x6558842d), TOBN(0x70df8c64, 0x17f3d0a6),
+     TOBN(0x7c803520, 0x7542e46d), TOBN(0x7251fe7f, 0xe4ecc823),
+     TOBN(0xe59134cb, 0x5e9aac9a), TOBN(0x11bb0934, 0xf0045d71),
+     TOBN(0x53e5d9b5, 0xdbcb1d4e), TOBN(0x8d97a905, 0x92defc91),
+     TOBN(0xfe289327, 0x7946d3f9), TOBN(0xe132bd24, 0x07472273),
+     TOBN(0xeeeb510c, 0x1eb6ae86), TOBN(0x777708c5, 0xf0595067),
+     TOBN(0x18e2c8cd, 0x1297029e), TOBN(0x2c61095c, 0xbbf9305e),
+     TOBN(0xe466c258, 0x6b85d6d9), TOBN(0x8ac06c36, 0xda1ea530),
+     TOBN(0xa365dc39, 0xa1304668), TOBN(0xe4a9c885, 0x07f89606),
+     TOBN(0x65a4898f, 0xacc7228d), TOBN(0x3e2347ff, 0x84ca8303),
+     TOBN(0xa5f6fb77, 0xea7d23a3), TOBN(0x2fac257d, 0x672a71cd),
+     TOBN(0x6908bef8, 0x7e6a44d3), TOBN(0x8ff87566, 0x891d3d7a),
+     TOBN(0xe58e90b3, 0x6b0cf82e), TOBN(0x6438d246, 0x2615b5e7),
+     TOBN(0x07b1f8fc, 0x669c145a), TOBN(0xb0d8b2da, 0x36f1e1cb),
+     TOBN(0x54d5dadb, 0xd9184c4d), TOBN(0x3dbb18d5, 0xf93d9976),
+     TOBN(0x0a3e0f56, 0xd1147d47), TOBN(0x2afa8c8d, 0xa0a48609),
+     TOBN(0x275353e8, 0xbc36742c), TOBN(0x898f427e, 0xeea0ed90),
+     TOBN(0x26f4947e, 0x3e477b00), TOBN(0x8ad8848a, 0x308741e3),
+     TOBN(0x6c703c38, 0xd74a2a46), TOBN(0x5e3e05a9, 0x9ba17ba2),
+     TOBN(0xc1fa6f66, 0x4ab9a9e4), TOBN(0x474a2d9a, 0x3841d6ec),
+     TOBN(0x871239ad, 0x653ae326), TOBN(0x14bcf72a, 0xa74cbb43),
+     TOBN(0x8737650e, 0x20d4c083), TOBN(0x3df86536, 0x110ed4af),
+     TOBN(0xd2d86fe7, 0xb53ca555), TOBN(0x688cb00d, 0xabd5d538),
+     TOBN(0xcf81bda3, 0x1ad38468), TOBN(0x7ccfe3cc, 0xf01167b6),
+     TOBN(0xcf4f47e0, 0x6c4c1fe6), TOBN(0x557e1f1a, 0x298bbb79),
+     TOBN(0xf93b974f, 0x30d45a14), TOBN(0x174a1d2d, 0x0baf97c4),
+     TOBN(0x7a003b30, 0xc51fbf53), TOBN(0xd8940991, 0xee68b225),
+     TOBN(0x5b0aa7b7, 0x1c0f4173), TOBN(0x975797c9, 0xa20a7153),
+     TOBN(0x26e08c07, 0xe3533d77), TOBN(0xd7222e6a, 0x2e341c99),
+     TOBN(0x9d60ec3d, 0x8d2dc4ed), TOBN(0xbdfe0d8f, 0x7c476cf8),
+     TOBN(0x1fe59ab6, 0x1d056605), TOBN(0xa9ea9df6, 0x86a8551f),
+     TOBN(0x8489941e, 0x47fb8d8c), TOBN(0xfeb874eb, 0x4a7f1b10),
+     TOBN(0xfe5fea86, 0x7ee0d98f), TOBN(0x201ad34b, 0xdbf61864),
+     TOBN(0x45d8fe47, 0x37c031d4), TOBN(0xd5f49fae, 0x795f0822),
+     TOBN(0xdb0fb291, 0xc7f4a40c), TOBN(0x2e69d9c1, 0x730ddd92),
+     TOBN(0x754e1054, 0x49d76987), TOBN(0x8a24911d, 0x7662db87),
+     TOBN(0x61fc1810, 0x60a71676), TOBN(0xe852d1a8, 0xf66a8ad1),
+     TOBN(0x172bbd65, 0x6417231e), TOBN(0x0d6de7bd, 0x3babb11f),
+     TOBN(0x6fde6f88, 0xc8e347f8), TOBN(0x1c587547, 0x9bd99cc3),
+     TOBN(0x78e54ed0, 0x34076950), TOBN(0x97f0f334, 0x796e83ba),
+     TOBN(0xe4dbe1ce, 0x4924867a), TOBN(0xbd5f51b0, 0x60b84917),
+     TOBN(0x37530040, 0x3cb09a79), TOBN(0xdb3fe0f8, 0xff1743d8),
+     TOBN(0xed7894d8, 0x556fa9db), TOBN(0xfa262169, 0x23412fbf),
+     TOBN(0x563be0db, 0xba7b9291), TOBN(0x6ca8b8c0, 0x0c9fb234),
+     TOBN(0xed406aa9, 0xbd763802), TOBN(0xc21486a0, 0x65303da1),
+     TOBN(0x61ae291e, 0xc7e62ec4), TOBN(0x622a0492, 0xdf99333e),
+     TOBN(0x7fd80c9d, 0xbb7a8ee0), TOBN(0xdc2ed3bc, 0x6c01aedb),
+     TOBN(0x35c35a12, 0x08be74ec), TOBN(0xd540cb1a, 0x469f671f),
+     TOBN(0xd16ced4e, 0xcf84f6c7), TOBN(0x8561fb9c, 0x2d090f43),
+     TOBN(0x7e693d79, 0x6f239db4), TOBN(0xa736f928, 0x77bd0d94),
+     TOBN(0x07b4d929, 0x2c1950ee), TOBN(0xda177543, 0x56dc11b3),
+     TOBN(0xa5dfbbaa, 0x7a6a878e), TOBN(0x1c70cb29, 0x4decb08a),
+     TOBN(0xfba28c8b, 0x6f0f7c50), TOBN(0xa8eba2b8, 0x854dcc6d),
+     TOBN(0x5ff8e89a, 0x36b78642), TOBN(0x070c1c8e, 0xf6873adf),
+     TOBN(0xbbd3c371, 0x6484d2e4), TOBN(0xfb78318f, 0x0d414129),
+     TOBN(0x2621a39c, 0x6ad93b0b), TOBN(0x979d74c2, 0xa9e917f7),
+     TOBN(0xfc195647, 0x61fb0428), TOBN(0x4d78954a, 0xbee624d4),
+     TOBN(0xb94896e0, 0xb8ae86fd), TOBN(0x6667ac0c, 0xc91c8b13),
+     TOBN(0x9f180512, 0x43bcf832), TOBN(0xfbadf8b7, 0xa0010137),
+     TOBN(0xc69b4089, 0xb3ba8aa7), TOBN(0xfac4bacd, 0xe687ce85),
+     TOBN(0x9164088d, 0x977eab40), TOBN(0x51f4c5b6, 0x2760b390),
+     TOBN(0xd238238f, 0x340dd553), TOBN(0x358566c3, 0xdb1d31c9),
+     TOBN(0x3a5ad69e, 0x5068f5ff), TOBN(0xf31435fc, 0xdaff6b06),
+     TOBN(0xae549a5b, 0xd6debff0), TOBN(0x59e5f0b7, 0x75e01331),
+     TOBN(0x5d492fb8, 0x98559acf), TOBN(0x96018c2e, 0x4db79b50),
+     TOBN(0x55f4a48f, 0x609f66aa), TOBN(0x1943b3af, 0x4900a14f),
+     TOBN(0xc22496df, 0x15a40d39), TOBN(0xb2a44684, 0x4c20f7c5),
+     TOBN(0x76a35afa, 0x3b98404c), TOBN(0xbec75725, 0xff5d1b77),
+     TOBN(0xb67aa163, 0xbea06444), TOBN(0x27e95bb2, 0xf724b6f2),
+     TOBN(0x3c20e3e9, 0xd238c8ab), TOBN(0x1213754e, 0xddd6ae17),
+     TOBN(0x8c431020, 0x716e0f74), TOBN(0x6679c82e, 0xffc095c2),
+     TOBN(0x2eb3adf4, 0xd0ac2932), TOBN(0x2cc970d3, 0x01bb7a76),
+     TOBN(0x70c71f2f, 0x740f0e66), TOBN(0x545c616b, 0x2b6b23cc),
+     TOBN(0x4528cfcb, 0xb40a8bd7), TOBN(0xff839633, 0x2ab27722),
+     TOBN(0x049127d9, 0x025ac99a), TOBN(0xd314d4a0, 0x2b63e33b),
+     TOBN(0xc8c310e7, 0x28d84519), TOBN(0x0fcb8983, 0xb3bc84ba),
+     TOBN(0x2cc52261, 0x38634818), TOBN(0x501814f4, 0xb44c2e0b),
+     TOBN(0xf7e181aa, 0x54dfdba3), TOBN(0xcfd58ff0, 0xe759718c),
+     TOBN(0xf90cdb14, 0xd3b507a8), TOBN(0x57bd478e, 0xc50bdad8),
+     TOBN(0x29c197e2, 0x50e5f9aa), TOBN(0x4db6eef8, 0xe40bc855),
+     TOBN(0x2cc8f21a, 0xd1fc0654), TOBN(0xc71cc963, 0x81269d73),
+     TOBN(0xecfbb204, 0x077f49f9), TOBN(0xdde92571, 0xca56b793),
+     TOBN(0x9abed6a3, 0xf97ad8f7), TOBN(0xe6c19d3f, 0x924de3bd),
+     TOBN(0x8dce92f4, 0xa140a800), TOBN(0x85f44d1e, 0x1337af07),
+     TOBN(0x5953c08b, 0x09d64c52), TOBN(0xa1b5e49f, 0xf5df9749),
+     TOBN(0x336a8fb8, 0x52735f7d), TOBN(0xb332b6db, 0x9add676b),
+     TOBN(0x558b88a0, 0xb4511aa4), TOBN(0x09788752, 0xdbd5cc55),
+     TOBN(0x16b43b9c, 0xd8cd52bd), TOBN(0x7f0bc5a0, 0xc2a2696b),
+     TOBN(0x146e12d4, 0xc11f61ef), TOBN(0x9ce10754, 0x3a83e79e),
+     TOBN(0x08ec73d9, 0x6cbfca15), TOBN(0x09ff29ad, 0x5b49653f),
+     TOBN(0xe31b72bd, 0xe7da946e), TOBN(0xebf9eb3b, 0xee80a4f2),
+     TOBN(0xd1aabd08, 0x17598ce4), TOBN(0x18b5fef4, 0x53f37e80),
+     TOBN(0xd5d5cdd3, 0x5958cd79), TOBN(0x3580a1b5, 0x1d373114),
+     TOBN(0xa36e4c91, 0xfa935726), TOBN(0xa38c534d, 0xef20d760),
+     TOBN(0x7088e40a, 0x2ff5845b), TOBN(0xe5bb40bd, 0xbd78177f),
+     TOBN(0x4f06a7a8, 0x857f9920), TOBN(0xe3cc3e50, 0xe968f05d),
+     TOBN(0x1d68b7fe, 0xe5682d26), TOBN(0x5206f76f, 0xaec7f87c),
+     TOBN(0x41110530, 0x041951ab), TOBN(0x58ec52c1, 0xd4b5a71a),
+     TOBN(0xf3488f99, 0x0f75cf9a), TOBN(0xf411951f, 0xba82d0d5),
+     TOBN(0x27ee75be, 0x618895ab), TOBN(0xeae060d4, 0x6d8aab14),
+     TOBN(0x9ae1df73, 0x7fb54dc2), TOBN(0x1f3e391b, 0x25963649),
+     TOBN(0x242ec32a, 0xfe055081), TOBN(0x5bd450ef, 0x8491c9bd),
+     TOBN(0x367efc67, 0x981eb389), TOBN(0xed7e1928, 0x3a0550d5),
+     TOBN(0x362e776b, 0xab3ce75c), TOBN(0xe890e308, 0x1f24c523),
+     TOBN(0xb961b682, 0xfeccef76), TOBN(0x8b8e11f5, 0x8bba6d92),
+     TOBN(0x8f2ccc4c, 0x2b2375c4), TOBN(0x0d7f7a52, 0xe2f86cfa),
+     TOBN(0xfd94d30a, 0x9efe5633), TOBN(0x2d8d246b, 0x5451f934),
+     TOBN(0x2234c6e3, 0x244e6a00), TOBN(0xde2b5b0d, 0xddec8c50),
+     TOBN(0x2ce53c5a, 0xbf776f5b), TOBN(0x6f724071, 0x60357b05),
+     TOBN(0xb2593717, 0x71bf3f7a), TOBN(0x87d2501c, 0x440c4a9f),
+     TOBN(0x440552e1, 0x87b05340), TOBN(0xb7bf7cc8, 0x21624c32),
+     TOBN(0x4155a6ce, 0x22facddb), TOBN(0x5a4228cb, 0x889837ef),
+     TOBN(0xef87d6d6, 0xfd4fd671), TOBN(0xa233687e, 0xc2daa10e),
+     TOBN(0x75622244, 0x03c0eb96), TOBN(0x7632d184, 0x8bf19be6),
+     TOBN(0x05d0f8e9, 0x40735ff4), TOBN(0x3a3e6e13, 0xc00931f1),
+     TOBN(0x31ccde6a, 0xdafe3f18), TOBN(0xf381366a, 0xcfe51207),
+     TOBN(0x24c222a9, 0x60167d92), TOBN(0x62f9d6f8, 0x7529f18c),
+     TOBN(0x412397c0, 0x0353b114), TOBN(0x334d89dc, 0xef808043),
+     TOBN(0xd9ec63ba, 0x2a4383ce), TOBN(0xcec8e937, 0x5cf92ba0),
+     TOBN(0xfb8b4288, 0xc8be74c0), TOBN(0x67d6912f, 0x105d4391),
+     TOBN(0x7b996c46, 0x1b913149), TOBN(0x36aae2ef, 0x3a4e02da),
+     TOBN(0xb68aa003, 0x972de594), TOBN(0x284ec70d, 0x4ec6d545),
+     TOBN(0xf3d2b2d0, 0x61391d54), TOBN(0x69c5d5d6, 0xfe114e92),
+     TOBN(0xbe0f00b5, 0xb4482dff), TOBN(0xe1596fa5, 0xf5bf33c5),
+     TOBN(0x10595b56, 0x96a71cba), TOBN(0x944938b2, 0xfdcadeb7),
+     TOBN(0xa282da4c, 0xfccd8471), TOBN(0x98ec05f3, 0x0d37bfe1),
+     TOBN(0xe171ce1b, 0x0698304a), TOBN(0x2d691444, 0x21bdf79b),
+     TOBN(0xd0cd3b74, 0x1b21dec1), TOBN(0x712ecd8b, 0x16a15f71),
+     TOBN(0x8d4c00a7, 0x00fd56e1), TOBN(0x02ec9692, 0xf9527c18),
+     TOBN(0x21c44937, 0x4a3e42e1), TOBN(0x9176fbab, 0x1392ae0a),
+     TOBN(0x8726f1ba, 0x44b7b618), TOBN(0xb4d7aae9, 0xf1de491c),
+     TOBN(0xf91df7b9, 0x07b582c0), TOBN(0x7e116c30, 0xef60aa3a),
+     TOBN(0x99270f81, 0x466265d7), TOBN(0xb15b6fe2, 0x4df7adf0),
+     TOBN(0xfe33b2d3, 0xf9738f7f), TOBN(0x48553ab9, 0xd6d70f95),
+     TOBN(0x2cc72ac8, 0xc21e94db), TOBN(0x795ac38d, 0xbdc0bbee),
+     TOBN(0x0a1be449, 0x2e40478f), TOBN(0x81bd3394, 0x052bde55),
+     TOBN(0x63c8dbe9, 0x56b3c4f2), TOBN(0x017a99cf, 0x904177cc),
+     TOBN(0x947bbddb, 0x4d010fc1), TOBN(0xacf9b00b, 0xbb2c9b21),
+     TOBN(0x2970bc8d, 0x47173611), TOBN(0x1a4cbe08, 0xac7d756f),
+     TOBN(0x06d9f4aa, 0x67d541a2), TOBN(0xa3e8b689, 0x59c2cf44),
+     TOBN(0xaad066da, 0x4d88f1dd), TOBN(0xc604f165, 0x7ad35dea),
+     TOBN(0x7edc0720, 0x4478ca67), TOBN(0xa10dfae0, 0xba02ce06),
+     TOBN(0xeceb1c76, 0xaf36f4e4), TOBN(0x994b2292, 0xaf3f8f48),
+     TOBN(0xbf9ed77b, 0x77c8a68c), TOBN(0x74f544ea, 0x51744c9d),
+     TOBN(0x82d05bb9, 0x8113a757), TOBN(0x4ef2d2b4, 0x8a9885e4),
+     TOBN(0x1e332be5, 0x1aa7865f), TOBN(0x22b76b18, 0x290d1a52),
+     TOBN(0x308a2310, 0x44351683), TOBN(0x9d861896, 0xa3f22840),
+     TOBN(0x5959ddcd, 0x841ed947), TOBN(0x0def0c94, 0x154b73bf),
+     TOBN(0xf0105417, 0x4c7c15e0), TOBN(0x539bfb02, 0x3a277c32),
+     TOBN(0xe699268e, 0xf9dccf5f), TOBN(0x9f5796a5, 0x0247a3bd),
+     TOBN(0x8b839de8, 0x4f157269), TOBN(0xc825c1e5, 0x7a30196b),
+     TOBN(0x6ef0aabc, 0xdc8a5a91), TOBN(0xf4a8ce6c, 0x498b7fe6),
+     TOBN(0x1cce35a7, 0x70cbac78), TOBN(0x83488e9b, 0xf6b23958),
+     TOBN(0x0341a070, 0xd76cb011), TOBN(0xda6c9d06, 0xae1b2658),
+     TOBN(0xb701fb30, 0xdd648c52), TOBN(0x994ca02c, 0x52fb9fd1),
+     TOBN(0x06933117, 0x6f563086), TOBN(0x3d2b8100, 0x17856bab),
+     TOBN(0xe89f48c8, 0x5963a46e), TOBN(0x658ab875, 0xa99e61c7),
+     TOBN(0x6e296f87, 0x4b8517b4), TOBN(0x36c4fcdc, 0xfc1bc656),
+     TOBN(0xde5227a1, 0xa3906def), TOBN(0x9fe95f57, 0x62418945),
+     TOBN(0x20c91e81, 0xfdd96cde), TOBN(0x5adbe47e, 0xda4480de),
+     TOBN(0xa009370f, 0x396de2b6), TOBN(0x98583d4b, 0xf0ecc7bd),
+     TOBN(0xf44f6b57, 0xe51d0672), TOBN(0x03d6b078, 0x556b1984),
+     TOBN(0x27dbdd93, 0xb0b64912), TOBN(0x9b3a3434, 0x15687b09),
+     TOBN(0x0dba6461, 0x51ec20a9), TOBN(0xec93db7f, 0xff28187c),
+     TOBN(0x00ff8c24, 0x66e48bdd), TOBN(0x2514f2f9, 0x11ccd78e),
+     TOBN(0xeba11f4f, 0xe1250603), TOBN(0x8a22cd41, 0x243fa156),
+     TOBN(0xa4e58df4, 0xb283e4c6), TOBN(0x78c29859, 0x8b39783f),
+     TOBN(0x5235aee2, 0xa5259809), TOBN(0xc16284b5, 0x0e0227dd),
+     TOBN(0xa5f57916, 0x1338830d), TOBN(0x6d4b8a6b, 0xd2123fca),
+     TOBN(0x236ea68a, 0xf9c546f8), TOBN(0xc1d36873, 0xfa608d36),
+     TOBN(0xcd76e495, 0x8d436d13), TOBN(0xd4d9c221, 0x8fb080af),
+     TOBN(0x665c1728, 0xe8ad3fb5), TOBN(0xcf1ebe4d, 0xb3d572e0),
+     TOBN(0xa7a8746a, 0x584c5e20), TOBN(0x267e4ea1, 0xb9dc7035),
+     TOBN(0x593a15cf, 0xb9548c9b), TOBN(0x5e6e2135, 0x4bd012f3),
+     TOBN(0xdf31cc6a, 0x8c8f936e), TOBN(0x8af84d04, 0xb5c241dc),
+     TOBN(0x63990a6f, 0x345efb86), TOBN(0x6fef4e61, 0xb9b962cb)}
+    ,
+    {TOBN(0xf6368f09, 0x25722608), TOBN(0x131260db, 0x131cf5c6),
+     TOBN(0x40eb353b, 0xfab4f7ac), TOBN(0x85c78880, 0x37eee829),
+     TOBN(0x4c1581ff, 0xc3bdf24e), TOBN(0x5bff75cb, 0xf5c3c5a8),
+     TOBN(0x35e8c83f, 0xa14e6f40), TOBN(0xb81d1c0f, 0x0295e0ca),
+     TOBN(0xfcde7cc8, 0xf43a730f), TOBN(0xe89b6f3c, 0x33ab590e),
+     TOBN(0xc823f529, 0xad03240b), TOBN(0x82b79afe, 0x98bea5db),
+     TOBN(0x568f2856, 0x962fe5de), TOBN(0x0c590adb, 0x60c591f3),
+     TOBN(0x1fc74a14, 0x4a28a858), TOBN(0x3b662498, 0xb3203f4c),
+     TOBN(0x91e3cf0d, 0x6c39765a), TOBN(0xa2db3acd, 0xac3cca0b),
+     TOBN(0x288f2f08, 0xcb953b50), TOBN(0x2414582c, 0xcf43cf1a),
+     TOBN(0x8dec8bbc, 0x60eee9a8), TOBN(0x54c79f02, 0x729aa042),
+     TOBN(0xd81cd5ec, 0x6532f5d5), TOBN(0xa672303a, 0xcf82e15f),
+     TOBN(0x376aafa8, 0x719c0563), TOBN(0xcd8ad2dc, 0xbc5fc79f),
+     TOBN(0x303fdb9f, 0xcb750cd3), TOBN(0x14ff052f, 0x4418b08e),
+     TOBN(0xf75084cf, 0x3e2d6520), TOBN(0x7ebdf0f8, 0x144ed509),
+     TOBN(0xf43bf0f2, 0xd3f25b98), TOBN(0x86ad71cf, 0xa354d837),
+     TOBN(0xb827fe92, 0x26f43572), TOBN(0xdfd3ab5b, 0x5d824758),
+     TOBN(0x315dd23a, 0x539094c1), TOBN(0x85c0e37a, 0x66623d68),
+     TOBN(0x575c7972, 0x7be19ae0), TOBN(0x616a3396, 0xdf0d36b5),
+     TOBN(0xa1ebb3c8, 0x26b1ff7e), TOBN(0x635b9485, 0x140ad453),
+     TOBN(0x92bf3cda, 0xda430c0b), TOBN(0x4702850e, 0x3a96dac6),
+     TOBN(0xc91cf0a5, 0x15ac326a), TOBN(0x95de4f49, 0xab8c25e4),
+     TOBN(0xb01bad09, 0xe265c17c), TOBN(0x24e45464, 0x087b3881),
+     TOBN(0xd43e583c, 0xe1fac5ca), TOBN(0xe17cb318, 0x6ead97a6),
+     TOBN(0x6cc39243, 0x74dcec46), TOBN(0x33cfc02d, 0x54c2b73f),
+     TOBN(0x82917844, 0xf26cd99c), TOBN(0x8819dd95, 0xd1773f89),
+     TOBN(0x09572aa6, 0x0871f427), TOBN(0x8e0cf365, 0xf6f01c34),
+     TOBN(0x7fa52988, 0xbff1f5af), TOBN(0x4eb357ea, 0xe75e8e50),
+     TOBN(0xd9d0c8c4, 0x868af75d), TOBN(0xd7325cff, 0x45c8c7ea),
+     TOBN(0xab471996, 0xcc81ecb0), TOBN(0xff5d55f3, 0x611824ed),
+     TOBN(0xbe314541, 0x1977a0ee), TOBN(0x5085c4c5, 0x722038c6),
+     TOBN(0x2d5335bf, 0xf94bb495), TOBN(0x894ad8a6, 0xc8e2a082),
+     TOBN(0x5c3e2341, 0xada35438), TOBN(0xf4a9fc89, 0x049b8c4e),
+     TOBN(0xbeeb355a, 0x9f17cf34), TOBN(0x3f311e0e, 0x6c91fe10),
+     TOBN(0xc2d20038, 0x92ab9891), TOBN(0x257bdcc1, 0x3e8ce9a9),
+     TOBN(0x1b2d9789, 0x88c53bee), TOBN(0x927ce89a, 0xcdba143a),
+     TOBN(0xb0a32cca, 0x523db280), TOBN(0x5c889f8a, 0x50d43783),
+     TOBN(0x503e04b3, 0x4897d16f), TOBN(0x8cdb6e78, 0x08f5f2e8),
+     TOBN(0x6ab91cf0, 0x179c8e74), TOBN(0xd8874e52, 0x48211d60),
+     TOBN(0xf948d4d5, 0xea851200), TOBN(0x4076d41e, 0xe6f9840a),
+     TOBN(0xc20e263c, 0x47b517ea), TOBN(0x79a448fd, 0x30685e5e),
+     TOBN(0xe55f6f78, 0xf90631a0), TOBN(0x88a790b1, 0xa79e6346),
+     TOBN(0x62160c7d, 0x80969fe8), TOBN(0x54f92fd4, 0x41491bb9),
+     TOBN(0xa6645c23, 0x5c957526), TOBN(0xf44cc5ae, 0xbea3ce7b),
+     TOBN(0xf7628327, 0x8b1e68b7), TOBN(0xc731ad7a, 0x303f29d3),
+     TOBN(0xfe5a9ca9, 0x57d03ecb), TOBN(0x96c0d50c, 0x41bc97a7),
+     TOBN(0xc4669fe7, 0x9b4f7f24), TOBN(0xfdd781d8, 0x3d9967ef),
+     TOBN(0x7892c7c3, 0x5d2c208d), TOBN(0x8bf64f7c, 0xae545cb3),
+     TOBN(0xc01f862c, 0x467be912), TOBN(0xf4c85ee9, 0xc73d30cc),
+     TOBN(0x1fa6f4be, 0x6ab83ec7), TOBN(0xa07a3c1c, 0x4e3e3cf9),
+     TOBN(0x87f8ef45, 0x0c00beb3), TOBN(0x30e2c2b3, 0x000d4c3e),
+     TOBN(0x1aa00b94, 0xfe08bf5b), TOBN(0x32c133aa, 0x9224ef52),
+     TOBN(0x38df16bb, 0x32e5685d), TOBN(0x68a9e069, 0x58e6f544),
+     TOBN(0x495aaff7, 0xcdc5ebc6), TOBN(0xf894a645, 0x378b135f),
+     TOBN(0xf316350a, 0x09e27ecf), TOBN(0xeced201e, 0x58f7179d),
+     TOBN(0x2eec273c, 0xe97861ba), TOBN(0x47ec2cae, 0xd693be2e),
+     TOBN(0xfa4c97c4, 0xf68367ce), TOBN(0xe4f47d0b, 0xbe5a5755),
+     TOBN(0x17de815d, 0xb298a979), TOBN(0xd7eca659, 0xc177dc7d),
+     TOBN(0x20fdbb71, 0x49ded0a3), TOBN(0x4cb2aad4, 0xfb34d3c5),
+     TOBN(0x2cf31d28, 0x60858a33), TOBN(0x3b6873ef, 0xa24aa40f),
+     TOBN(0x540234b2, 0x2c11bb37), TOBN(0x2d0366dd, 0xed4c74a3),
+     TOBN(0xf9a968da, 0xeec5f25d), TOBN(0x36601068, 0x67b63142),
+     TOBN(0x07cd6d2c, 0x68d7b6d4), TOBN(0xa8f74f09, 0x0c842942),
+     TOBN(0xe2751404, 0x7768b1ee), TOBN(0x4b5f7e89, 0xfe62aee4),
+     TOBN(0xc6a77177, 0x89070d26), TOBN(0xa1f28e4e, 0xdd1c8bc7),
+     TOBN(0xea5f4f06, 0x469e1f17), TOBN(0x78fc242a, 0xfbdb78e0),
+     TOBN(0xc9c7c592, 0x8b0588f1), TOBN(0xb6b7a0fd, 0x1535921e),
+     TOBN(0xcc5bdb91, 0xbde5ae35), TOBN(0xb42c485e, 0x12ff1864),
+     TOBN(0xa1113e13, 0xdbab98aa), TOBN(0xde9d469b, 0xa17b1024),
+     TOBN(0x23f48b37, 0xc0462d3a), TOBN(0x3752e537, 0x7c5c078d),
+     TOBN(0xe3a86add, 0x15544eb9), TOBN(0xf013aea7, 0x80fba279),
+     TOBN(0x8b5bb76c, 0xf22001b5), TOBN(0xe617ba14, 0xf02891ab),
+     TOBN(0xd39182a6, 0x936219d3), TOBN(0x5ce1f194, 0xae51cb19),
+     TOBN(0xc78f8598, 0xbf07a74c), TOBN(0x6d7158f2, 0x22cbf1bc),
+     TOBN(0x3b846b21, 0xe300ce18), TOBN(0x35fba630, 0x2d11275d),
+     TOBN(0x5fe25c36, 0xa0239b9b), TOBN(0xd8beb35d, 0xdf05d940),
+     TOBN(0x4db02bb0, 0x1f7e320d), TOBN(0x0641c364, 0x6da320ea),
+     TOBN(0x6d95fa5d, 0x821389a3), TOBN(0x92699748, 0x8fcd8e3d),
+     TOBN(0x316fef17, 0xceb6c143), TOBN(0x67fcb841, 0xd933762b),
+     TOBN(0xbb837e35, 0x118b17f8), TOBN(0x4b92552f, 0x9fd24821),
+     TOBN(0xae6bc70e, 0x46aca793), TOBN(0x1cf0b0e4, 0xe579311b),
+     TOBN(0x8dc631be, 0x5802f716), TOBN(0x099bdc6f, 0xbddbee4d),
+     TOBN(0xcc352bb2, 0x0caf8b05), TOBN(0xf74d505a, 0x72d63df2),
+     TOBN(0xb9876d4b, 0x91c4f408), TOBN(0x1ce18473, 0x9e229b2d),
+     TOBN(0x49507597, 0x83abdb4a), TOBN(0x850fbcb6, 0xdee84b18),
+     TOBN(0x6325236e, 0x609e67dc), TOBN(0x04d831d9, 0x9336c6d8),
+     TOBN(0x8deaae3b, 0xfa12d45d), TOBN(0xe425f8ce, 0x4746e246),
+     TOBN(0x8004c175, 0x24f5f31e), TOBN(0xaca16d8f, 0xad62c3b7),
+     TOBN(0x0dc15a6a, 0x9152f934), TOBN(0xf1235e5d, 0xed0e12c1),
+     TOBN(0xc33c06ec, 0xda477dac), TOBN(0x76be8732, 0xb2ea0006),
+     TOBN(0xcf3f7831, 0x0c0cd313), TOBN(0x3c524553, 0xa614260d),
+     TOBN(0x31a756f8, 0xcab22d15), TOBN(0x03ee10d1, 0x77827a20),
+     TOBN(0xd1e059b2, 0x1994ef20), TOBN(0x2a653b69, 0x638ae318),
+     TOBN(0x70d5eb58, 0x2f699010), TOBN(0x279739f7, 0x09f5f84a),
+     TOBN(0x5da4663c, 0x8b799336), TOBN(0xfdfdf14d, 0x203c37eb),
+     TOBN(0x32d8a9dc, 0xa1dbfb2d), TOBN(0xab40cff0, 0x77d48f9b),
+     TOBN(0xc018b383, 0xd20b42d5), TOBN(0xf9a810ef, 0x9f78845f),
+     TOBN(0x40af3753, 0xbdba9df0), TOBN(0xb90bdcfc, 0x131dfdf9),
+     TOBN(0x18720591, 0xf01ab782), TOBN(0xc823f211, 0x6af12a88),
+     TOBN(0xa51b80f3, 0x0dc14401), TOBN(0xde248f77, 0xfb2dfbe3),
+     TOBN(0xef5a44e5, 0x0cafe751), TOBN(0x73997c9c, 0xd4dcd221),
+     TOBN(0x32fd86d1, 0xde854024), TOBN(0xd5b53adc, 0xa09b84bb),
+     TOBN(0x008d7a11, 0xdcedd8d1), TOBN(0x406bd1c8, 0x74b32c84),
+     TOBN(0x5d4472ff, 0x05dde8b1), TOBN(0x2e25f2cd, 0xfce2b32f),
+     TOBN(0xbec0dd5e, 0x29dfc254), TOBN(0x4455fcf6, 0x2b98b267),
+     TOBN(0x0b4d43a5, 0xc72df2ad), TOBN(0xea70e6be, 0x48a75397),
+     TOBN(0x2aad6169, 0x5820f3bf), TOBN(0xf410d2dd, 0x9e37f68f),
+     TOBN(0x70fb7dba, 0x7be5ac83), TOBN(0x636bb645, 0x36ec3eec),
+     TOBN(0x27104ea3, 0x9754e21c), TOBN(0xbc87a3e6, 0x8d63c373),
+     TOBN(0x483351d7, 0x4109db9a), TOBN(0x0fa724e3, 0x60134da7),
+     TOBN(0x9ff44c29, 0xb0720b16), TOBN(0x2dd0cf13, 0x06aceead),
+     TOBN(0x5942758c, 0xe26929a6), TOBN(0x96c5db92, 0xb766a92b),
+     TOBN(0xcec7d4c0, 0x5f18395e), TOBN(0xd3f22744, 0x1f80d032),
+     TOBN(0x7a68b37a, 0xcb86075b), TOBN(0x074764dd, 0xafef92db),
+     TOBN(0xded1e950, 0x7bc7f389), TOBN(0xc580c850, 0xb9756460),
+     TOBN(0xaeeec2a4, 0x7da48157), TOBN(0x3f0b4e7f, 0x82c587b3),
+     TOBN(0x231c6de8, 0xa9f19c53), TOBN(0x5717bd73, 0x6974e34e),
+     TOBN(0xd9e1d216, 0xf1508fa9), TOBN(0x9f112361, 0xdadaa124),
+     TOBN(0x80145e31, 0x823b7348), TOBN(0x4dd8f0d5, 0xac634069),
+     TOBN(0xe3d82fc7, 0x2297c258), TOBN(0x276fcfee, 0x9cee7431),
+     TOBN(0x8eb61b5e, 0x2bc0aea9), TOBN(0x4f668fd5, 0xde329431),
+     TOBN(0x03a32ab1, 0x38e4b87e), TOBN(0xe1374517, 0x73d0ef0b),
+     TOBN(0x1a46f7e6, 0x853ac983), TOBN(0xc3bdf42e, 0x68e78a57),
+     TOBN(0xacf20785, 0x2ea96dd1), TOBN(0xa10649b9, 0xf1638460),
+     TOBN(0xf2369f0b, 0x879fbbed), TOBN(0x0ff0ae86, 0xda9d1869),
+     TOBN(0x5251d759, 0x56766f45), TOBN(0x4984d8c0, 0x2be8d0fc),
+     TOBN(0x7ecc95a6, 0xd21008f0), TOBN(0x29bd54a0, 0x3a1a1c49),
+     TOBN(0xab9828c5, 0xd26c50f3), TOBN(0x32c0087c, 0x51d0d251),
+     TOBN(0x9bac3ce6, 0x0c1cdb26), TOBN(0xcd94d947, 0x557ca205),
+     TOBN(0x1b1bd598, 0x9db1fdcd), TOBN(0x0eda0108, 0xa3d8b149),
+     TOBN(0x95066610, 0x56152fcc), TOBN(0xc2f037e6, 0xe7192b33),
+     TOBN(0xdeffb41a, 0xc92e05a4), TOBN(0x1105f6c2, 0xc2f6c62e),
+     TOBN(0x68e73500, 0x8733913c), TOBN(0xcce86163, 0x3f3adc40),
+     TOBN(0xf407a942, 0x38a278e9), TOBN(0xd13c1b9d, 0x2ab21292),
+     TOBN(0x93ed7ec7, 0x1c74cf5c), TOBN(0x8887dc48, 0xf1a4c1b4),
+     TOBN(0x3830ff30, 0x4b3a11f1), TOBN(0x358c5a3c, 0x58937cb6),
+     TOBN(0x027dc404, 0x89022829), TOBN(0x40e93977, 0x3b798f79),
+     TOBN(0x90ad3337, 0x38be6ead), TOBN(0x9c23f6bc, 0xf34c0a5d),
+     TOBN(0xd1711a35, 0xfbffd8bb), TOBN(0x60fcfb49, 0x1949d3dd),
+     TOBN(0x09c8ef4b, 0x7825d93a), TOBN(0x24233cff, 0xa0a8c968),
+     TOBN(0x67ade46c, 0xe6d982af), TOBN(0xebb6bf3e, 0xe7544d7c),
+     TOBN(0xd6b9ba76, 0x3d8bd087), TOBN(0x46fe382d, 0x4dc61280),
+     TOBN(0xbd39a7e8, 0xb5bdbd75), TOBN(0xab381331, 0xb8f228fe),
+     TOBN(0x0709a77c, 0xce1c4300), TOBN(0x6a247e56, 0xf337ceac),
+     TOBN(0x8f34f21b, 0x636288be), TOBN(0x9dfdca74, 0xc8a7c305),
+     TOBN(0x6decfd1b, 0xea919e04), TOBN(0xcdf2688d, 0x8e1991f8),
+     TOBN(0xe607df44, 0xd0f8a67e), TOBN(0xd985df4b, 0x0b58d010),
+     TOBN(0x57f834c5, 0x0c24f8f4), TOBN(0xe976ef56, 0xa0bf01ae),
+     TOBN(0x536395ac, 0xa1c32373), TOBN(0x351027aa, 0x734c0a13),
+     TOBN(0xd2f1b5d6, 0x5e6bd5bc), TOBN(0x2b539e24, 0x223debed),
+     TOBN(0xd4994cec, 0x0eaa1d71), TOBN(0x2a83381d, 0x661dcf65),
+     TOBN(0x5f1aed2f, 0x7b54c740), TOBN(0x0bea3fa5, 0xd6dda5ee),
+     TOBN(0x9d4fb684, 0x36cc6134), TOBN(0x8eb9bbf3, 0xc0a443dd),
+     TOBN(0xfc500e2e, 0x383b7d2a), TOBN(0x7aad621c, 0x5b775257),
+     TOBN(0x69284d74, 0x0a8f7cc0), TOBN(0xe820c2ce, 0x07562d65),
+     TOBN(0xbf9531b9, 0x499758ee), TOBN(0x73e95ca5, 0x6ee0cc2d),
+     TOBN(0xf61790ab, 0xfbaf50a5), TOBN(0xdf55e76b, 0x684e0750),
+     TOBN(0xec516da7, 0xf176b005), TOBN(0x575553bb, 0x7a2dddc7),
+     TOBN(0x37c87ca3, 0x553afa73), TOBN(0x315f3ffc, 0x4d55c251),
+     TOBN(0xe846442a, 0xaf3e5d35), TOBN(0x61b91149, 0x6495ff28),
+     TOBN(0x23cc95d3, 0xfa326dc3), TOBN(0x1df4da1f, 0x18fc2cea),
+     TOBN(0x24bf9adc, 0xd0a37d59), TOBN(0xb6710053, 0x320d6e1e),
+     TOBN(0x96f9667e, 0x618344d1), TOBN(0xcc7ce042, 0xa06445af),
+     TOBN(0xa02d8514, 0xd68dbc3a), TOBN(0x4ea109e4, 0x280b5a5b),
+     TOBN(0x5741a7ac, 0xb40961bf), TOBN(0x4ada5937, 0x6aa56bfa),
+     TOBN(0x7feb9145, 0x02b765d1), TOBN(0x561e97be, 0xe6ad1582),
+     TOBN(0xbbc4a5b6, 0xda3982f5), TOBN(0x0c2659ed, 0xb546f468),
+     TOBN(0xb8e7e6aa, 0x59612d20), TOBN(0xd83dfe20, 0xac19e8e0),
+     TOBN(0x8530c45f, 0xb835398c), TOBN(0x6106a8bf, 0xb38a41c2),
+     TOBN(0x21e8f9a6, 0x35f5dcdb), TOBN(0x39707137, 0xcae498ed),
+     TOBN(0x70c23834, 0xd8249f00), TOBN(0x9f14b58f, 0xab2537a0),
+     TOBN(0xd043c365, 0x5f61c0c2), TOBN(0xdc5926d6, 0x09a194a7),
+     TOBN(0xddec0339, 0x8e77738a), TOBN(0xd07a63ef, 0xfba46426),
+     TOBN(0x2e58e79c, 0xee7f6e86), TOBN(0xe59b0459, 0xff32d241),
+     TOBN(0xc5ec84e5, 0x20fa0338), TOBN(0x97939ac8, 0xeaff5ace),
+     TOBN(0x0310a4e3, 0xb4a38313), TOBN(0x9115fba2, 0x8f9d9885),
+     TOBN(0x8dd710c2, 0x5fadf8c3), TOBN(0x66be38a2, 0xce19c0e2),
+     TOBN(0xd42a279c, 0x4cfe5022), TOBN(0x597bb530, 0x0e24e1b8),
+     TOBN(0x3cde86b7, 0xc153ca7f), TOBN(0xa8d30fb3, 0x707d63bd),
+     TOBN(0xac905f92, 0xbd60d21e), TOBN(0x98e7ffb6, 0x7b9a54ab),
+     TOBN(0xd7147df8, 0xe9726a30), TOBN(0xb5e216ff, 0xafce3533),
+     TOBN(0xb550b799, 0x2ff1ec40), TOBN(0x6b613b87, 0xa1e953fd),
+     TOBN(0x87b88dba, 0x792d5610), TOBN(0x2ee1270a, 0xa190fbe1),
+     TOBN(0x02f4e2dc, 0x2ef581da), TOBN(0x016530e4, 0xeff82a95),
+     TOBN(0xcbb93dfd, 0x8fd6ee89), TOBN(0x16d3d986, 0x46848fff),
+     TOBN(0x600eff24, 0x1da47adf), TOBN(0x1b9754a0, 0x0ad47a71),
+     TOBN(0x8f9266df, 0x70c33b98), TOBN(0xaadc87ae, 0xdf34186e),
+     TOBN(0x0d2ce8e1, 0x4ad24132), TOBN(0x8a47cbfc, 0x19946eba),
+     TOBN(0x47feeb66, 0x62b5f3af), TOBN(0xcefab561, 0x0abb3734),
+     TOBN(0x449de60e, 0x19f35cb1), TOBN(0x39f8db14, 0x157f0eb9),
+     TOBN(0xffaecc5b, 0x3c61bfd6), TOBN(0xa5a4d41d, 0x41216703),
+     TOBN(0x7f8fabed, 0x224e1cc2), TOBN(0x0d5a8186, 0x871ad953),
+     TOBN(0xf10774f7, 0xd22da9a9), TOBN(0x45b8a678, 0xcc8a9b0d),
+     TOBN(0xd9c2e722, 0xbdc32cff), TOBN(0xbf71b5f5, 0x337202a5),
+     TOBN(0x95c57f2f, 0x69fc4db9), TOBN(0xb6dad34c, 0x765d01e1),
+     TOBN(0x7e0bd13f, 0xcb904635), TOBN(0x61751253, 0x763a588c),
+     TOBN(0xd85c2997, 0x81af2c2d), TOBN(0xc0f7d9c4, 0x81b9d7da),
+     TOBN(0x838a34ae, 0x08533e8d), TOBN(0x15c4cb08, 0x311d8311),
+     TOBN(0x97f83285, 0x8e121e14), TOBN(0xeea7dc1e, 0x85000a5f),
+     TOBN(0x0c6059b6, 0x5d256274), TOBN(0xec9beace, 0xb95075c0),
+     TOBN(0x173daad7, 0x1df97828), TOBN(0xbf851cb5, 0xa8937877),
+     TOBN(0xb083c594, 0x01646f3c), TOBN(0x3bad30cf, 0x50c6d352),
+     TOBN(0xfeb2b202, 0x496bbcea), TOBN(0x3cf9fd4f, 0x18a1e8ba),
+     TOBN(0xd26de7ff, 0x1c066029), TOBN(0x39c81e9e, 0x4e9ed4f8),
+     TOBN(0xd8be0cb9, 0x7b390d35), TOBN(0x01df2bbd, 0x964aab27),
+     TOBN(0x3e8c1a65, 0xc3ef64f8), TOBN(0x567291d1, 0x716ed1dd),
+     TOBN(0x95499c6c, 0x5f5406d3), TOBN(0x71fdda39, 0x5ba8e23f),
+     TOBN(0xcfeb320e, 0xd5096ece), TOBN(0xbe7ba92b, 0xca66dd16),
+     TOBN(0x4608d36b, 0xc6fb5a7d), TOBN(0xe3eea15a, 0x6d2dd0e0),
+     TOBN(0x75b0a3eb, 0x8f97a36a), TOBN(0xf59814cc, 0x1c83de1e),
+     TOBN(0x56c9c5b0, 0x1c33c23f), TOBN(0xa96c1da4, 0x6faa4136),
+     TOBN(0x46bf2074, 0xde316551), TOBN(0x3b866e7b, 0x1f756c8f),
+     TOBN(0x727727d8, 0x1495ed6b), TOBN(0xb2394243, 0xb682dce7),
+     TOBN(0x8ab8454e, 0x758610f3), TOBN(0xc243ce84, 0x857d72a4),
+     TOBN(0x7b320d71, 0xdbbf370f), TOBN(0xff9afa37, 0x78e0f7ca),
+     TOBN(0x0119d1e0, 0xea7b523f), TOBN(0xb997f8cb, 0x058c7d42),
+     TOBN(0x285bcd2a, 0x37bbb184), TOBN(0x51dcec49, 0xa45d1fa6),
+     TOBN(0x6ade3b64, 0xe29634cb), TOBN(0x080c94a7, 0x26b86ef1),
+     TOBN(0xba583db1, 0x2283fbe3), TOBN(0x902bddc8, 0x5a9315ed),
+     TOBN(0x07c1ccb3, 0x86964bec), TOBN(0x78f4eacf, 0xb6258301),
+     TOBN(0x4bdf3a49, 0x56f90823), TOBN(0xba0f5080, 0x741d777b),
+     TOBN(0x091d71c3, 0xf38bf760), TOBN(0x9633d50f, 0x9b625b02),
+     TOBN(0x03ecb743, 0xb8c9de61), TOBN(0xb4751254, 0x5de74720),
+     TOBN(0x9f9defc9, 0x74ce1cb2), TOBN(0x774a4f6a, 0x00bd32ef),
+     TOBN(0xaca385f7, 0x73848f22), TOBN(0x53dad716, 0xf3f8558e),
+     TOBN(0xab7b34b0, 0x93c471f9), TOBN(0xf530e069, 0x19644bc7),
+     TOBN(0x3d9fb1ff, 0xdd59d31a), TOBN(0x4382e0df, 0x08daa795),
+     TOBN(0x165c6f4b, 0xd5cc88d7), TOBN(0xeaa392d5, 0x4a18c900),
+     TOBN(0x94203c67, 0x648024ee), TOBN(0x188763f2, 0x8c2fabcd),
+     TOBN(0xa80f87ac, 0xbbaec835), TOBN(0x632c96e0, 0xf29d8d54),
+     TOBN(0x29b0a60e, 0x4c00a95e), TOBN(0x2ef17f40, 0xe011e9fa),
+     TOBN(0xf6c0e1d1, 0x15b77223), TOBN(0xaaec2c62, 0x14b04e32),
+     TOBN(0xd35688d8, 0x3d84e58c), TOBN(0x2af5094c, 0x958571db),
+     TOBN(0x4fff7e19, 0x760682a6), TOBN(0x4cb27077, 0xe39a407c),
+     TOBN(0x0f59c547, 0x4ff0e321), TOBN(0x169f34a6, 0x1b34c8ff),
+     TOBN(0x2bff1096, 0x52bc1ba7), TOBN(0xa25423b7, 0x83583544),
+     TOBN(0x5d55d5d5, 0x0ac8b782), TOBN(0xff6622ec, 0x2db3c892),
+     TOBN(0x48fce741, 0x6b8bb642), TOBN(0x31d6998c, 0x69d7e3dc),
+     TOBN(0xdbaf8004, 0xcadcaed0), TOBN(0x801b0142, 0xd81d053c),
+     TOBN(0x94b189fc, 0x59630ec6), TOBN(0x120e9934, 0xaf762c8e),
+     TOBN(0x53a29aa4, 0xfdc6a404), TOBN(0x19d8e01e, 0xa1909948),
+     TOBN(0x3cfcabf1, 0xd7e89681), TOBN(0x3321a50d, 0x4e132d37),
+     TOBN(0xd0496863, 0xe9a86111), TOBN(0x8c0cde61, 0x06a3bc65),
+     TOBN(0xaf866c49, 0xfc9f8eef), TOBN(0x2066350e, 0xff7f5141),
+     TOBN(0x4f8a4689, 0xe56ddfbd), TOBN(0xea1b0c07, 0xfe32983a),
+     TOBN(0x2b317462, 0x873cb8cb), TOBN(0x658deddc, 0x2d93229f),
+     TOBN(0x65efaf4d, 0x0f64ef58), TOBN(0xfe43287d, 0x730cc7a8),
+     TOBN(0xaebc0c72, 0x3d047d70), TOBN(0x92efa539, 0xd92d26c9),
+     TOBN(0x06e78457, 0x94b56526), TOBN(0x415cb80f, 0x0961002d),
+     TOBN(0x89e5c565, 0x76dcb10f), TOBN(0x8bbb6982, 0xff9259fe),
+     TOBN(0x4fe8795b, 0x9abc2668), TOBN(0xb5d4f534, 0x1e678fb1),
+     TOBN(0x6601f3be, 0x7b7da2b9), TOBN(0x98da59e2, 0xa13d6805),
+     TOBN(0x190d8ea6, 0x01799a52), TOBN(0xa20cec41, 0xb86d2952),
+     TOBN(0x3062ffb2, 0x7fff2a7c), TOBN(0x741b32e5, 0x79f19d37),
+     TOBN(0xf80d8181, 0x4eb57d47), TOBN(0x7a2d0ed4, 0x16aef06b),
+     TOBN(0x09735fb0, 0x1cecb588), TOBN(0x1641caaa, 0xc6061f5b)}
+    ,
+    {TOBN(0x7f99824f, 0x20151427), TOBN(0x206828b6, 0x92430206),
+     TOBN(0xaa9097d7, 0xe1112357), TOBN(0xacf9a2f2, 0x09e414ec),
+     TOBN(0xdbdac9da, 0x27915356), TOBN(0x7e0734b7, 0x001efee3),
+     TOBN(0x54fab5bb, 0xd2b288e2), TOBN(0x4c630fc4, 0xf62dd09c),
+     TOBN(0x8537107a, 0x1ac2703b), TOBN(0xb49258d8, 0x6bc857b5),
+     TOBN(0x57df14de, 0xbcdaccd1), TOBN(0x24ab68d7, 0xc4ae8529),
+     TOBN(0x7ed8b5d4, 0x734e59d0), TOBN(0x5f8740c8, 0xc495cc80),
+     TOBN(0x84aedd5a, 0x291db9b3), TOBN(0x80b360f8, 0x4fb995be),
+     TOBN(0xae915f5d, 0x5fa067d1), TOBN(0x4134b57f, 0x9668960c),
+     TOBN(0xbd3656d6, 0xa48edaac), TOBN(0xdac1e3e4, 0xfc1d7436),
+     TOBN(0x674ff869, 0xd81fbb26), TOBN(0x449ed3ec, 0xb26c33d4),
+     TOBN(0x85138705, 0xd94203e8), TOBN(0xccde538b, 0xbeeb6f4a),
+     TOBN(0x55d5c68d, 0xa61a76fa), TOBN(0x598b441d, 0xca1554dc),
+     TOBN(0xd39923b9, 0x773b279c), TOBN(0x33331d3c, 0x36bf9efc),
+     TOBN(0x2d4c848e, 0x298de399), TOBN(0xcfdb8e77, 0xa1a27f56),
+     TOBN(0x94c855ea, 0x57b8ab70), TOBN(0xdcdb9dae, 0x6f7879ba),
+     TOBN(0x7bdff8c2, 0x019f2a59), TOBN(0xb3ce5bb3, 0xcb4fbc74),
+     TOBN(0xea907f68, 0x8a9173dd), TOBN(0x6cd3d0d3, 0x95a75439),
+     TOBN(0x92ecc4d6, 0xefed021c), TOBN(0x09a9f9b0, 0x6a77339a),
+     TOBN(0x87ca6b15, 0x7188c64a), TOBN(0x10c29968, 0x44899158),
+     TOBN(0x5859a229, 0xed6e82ef), TOBN(0x16f338e3, 0x65ebaf4e),
+     TOBN(0x0cd31387, 0x5ead67ae), TOBN(0x1c73d228, 0x54ef0bb4),
+     TOBN(0x4cb55131, 0x74a5c8c7), TOBN(0x01cd2970, 0x7f69ad6a),
+     TOBN(0xa04d00dd, 0xe966f87e), TOBN(0xd96fe447, 0x0b7b0321),
+     TOBN(0x342ac06e, 0x88fbd381), TOBN(0x02cd4a84, 0x5c35a493),
+     TOBN(0xe8fa89de, 0x54f1bbcd), TOBN(0x341d6367, 0x2575ed4c),
+     TOBN(0xebe357fb, 0xd238202b), TOBN(0x600b4d1a, 0xa984ead9),
+     TOBN(0xc35c9f44, 0x52436ea0), TOBN(0x96fe0a39, 0xa370751b),
+     TOBN(0x4c4f0736, 0x7f636a38), TOBN(0x9f943fb7, 0x0e76d5cb),
+     TOBN(0xb03510ba, 0xa8b68b8b), TOBN(0xc246780a, 0x9ed07a1f),
+     TOBN(0x3c051415, 0x6d549fc2), TOBN(0xc2953f31, 0x607781ca),
+     TOBN(0x955e2c69, 0xd8d95413), TOBN(0xb300fadc, 0x7bd282e3),
+     TOBN(0x81fe7b50, 0x87e9189f), TOBN(0xdb17375c, 0xf42dda27),
+     TOBN(0x22f7d896, 0xcf0a5904), TOBN(0xa0e57c5a, 0xebe348e6),
+     TOBN(0xa61011d3, 0xf40e3c80), TOBN(0xb1189321, 0x8db705c5),
+     TOBN(0x4ed9309e, 0x50fedec3), TOBN(0xdcf14a10, 0x4d6d5c1d),
+     TOBN(0x056c265b, 0x55691342), TOBN(0xe8e08504, 0x91049dc7),
+     TOBN(0x131329f5, 0xc9bae20a), TOBN(0x96c8b3e8, 0xd9dccdb4),
+     TOBN(0x8c5ff838, 0xfb4ee6b4), TOBN(0xfc5a9aeb, 0x41e8ccf0),
+     TOBN(0x7417b764, 0xfae050c6), TOBN(0x0953c3d7, 0x00452080),
+     TOBN(0x21372682, 0x38dfe7e8), TOBN(0xea417e15, 0x2bb79d4b),
+     TOBN(0x59641f1c, 0x76e7cf2d), TOBN(0x271e3059, 0xea0bcfcc),
+     TOBN(0x624c7dfd, 0x7253ecbd), TOBN(0x2f552e25, 0x4fca6186),
+     TOBN(0xcbf84ecd, 0x4d866e9c), TOBN(0x73967709, 0xf68d4610),
+     TOBN(0xa14b1163, 0xc27901b4), TOBN(0xfd9236e0, 0x899b8bf3),
+     TOBN(0x42b091ec, 0xcbc6da0a), TOBN(0xbb1dac6f, 0x5ad1d297),
+     TOBN(0x80e61d53, 0xa91cf76e), TOBN(0x4110a412, 0xd31f1ee7),
+     TOBN(0x2d87c3ba, 0x13efcf77), TOBN(0x1f374bb4, 0xdf450d76),
+     TOBN(0x5e78e2f2, 0x0d188dab), TOBN(0xe3968ed0, 0xf4b885ef),
+     TOBN(0x46c0568e, 0x7314570f), TOBN(0x31616338, 0x01170521),
+     TOBN(0x18e1e7e2, 0x4f0c8afe), TOBN(0x4caa75ff, 0xdeea78da),
+     TOBN(0x82db67f2, 0x7c5d8a51), TOBN(0x36a44d86, 0x6f505370),
+     TOBN(0xd72c5bda, 0x0333974f), TOBN(0x5db516ae, 0x27a70146),
+     TOBN(0x34705281, 0x210ef921), TOBN(0xbff17a8f, 0x0c9c38e5),
+     TOBN(0x78f4814e, 0x12476da1), TOBN(0xc1e16613, 0x33c16980),
+     TOBN(0x9e5b386f, 0x424d4bca), TOBN(0x4c274e87, 0xc85740de),
+     TOBN(0xb6a9b88d, 0x6c2f5226), TOBN(0x14d1b944, 0x550d7ca8),
+     TOBN(0x580c85fc, 0x1fc41709), TOBN(0xc1da368b, 0x54c6d519),
+     TOBN(0x2b0785ce, 0xd5113cf7), TOBN(0x0670f633, 0x5a34708f),
+     TOBN(0x46e23767, 0x15cc3f88), TOBN(0x1b480cfa, 0x50c72c8f),
+     TOBN(0x20288602, 0x4147519a), TOBN(0xd0981eac, 0x26b372f0),
+     TOBN(0xa9d4a7ca, 0xa785ebc8), TOBN(0xd953c50d, 0xdbdf58e9),
+     TOBN(0x9d6361cc, 0xfd590f8f), TOBN(0x72e9626b, 0x44e6c917),
+     TOBN(0x7fd96110, 0x22eb64cf), TOBN(0x863ebb7e, 0x9eb288f3),
+     TOBN(0x6e6ab761, 0x6aca8ee7), TOBN(0x97d10b39, 0xd7b40358),
+     TOBN(0x1687d377, 0x1e5feb0d), TOBN(0xc83e50e4, 0x8265a27a),
+     TOBN(0x8f75a9fe, 0xc954b313), TOBN(0xcc2e8f47, 0x310d1f61),
+     TOBN(0xf5ba81c5, 0x6557d0e0), TOBN(0x25f9680c, 0x3eaf6207),
+     TOBN(0xf95c6609, 0x4354080b), TOBN(0x5225bfa5, 0x7bf2fe1c),
+     TOBN(0xc5c004e2, 0x5c7d98fa), TOBN(0x3561bf1c, 0x019aaf60),
+     TOBN(0x5e6f9f17, 0xba151474), TOBN(0xdec2f934, 0xb04f6eca),
+     TOBN(0x64e368a1, 0x269acb1e), TOBN(0x1332d9e4, 0x0cdda493),
+     TOBN(0x60d6cf69, 0xdf23de05), TOBN(0x66d17da2, 0x009339a0),
+     TOBN(0x9fcac985, 0x0a693923), TOBN(0xbcf057fc, 0xed7c6a6d),
+     TOBN(0xc3c5c8c5, 0xf0b5662c), TOBN(0x25318dd8, 0xdcba4f24),
+     TOBN(0x60e8cb75, 0x082b69ff), TOBN(0x7c23b3ee, 0x1e728c01),
+     TOBN(0x15e10a0a, 0x097e4403), TOBN(0xcb3d0a86, 0x19854665),
+     TOBN(0x88d8e211, 0xd67d4826), TOBN(0xb39af66e, 0x0b9d2839),
+     TOBN(0xa5f94588, 0xbd475ca8), TOBN(0xe06b7966, 0xc077b80b),
+     TOBN(0xfedb1485, 0xda27c26c), TOBN(0xd290d33a, 0xfe0fd5e0),
+     TOBN(0xa40bcc47, 0xf34fb0fa), TOBN(0xb4760cc8, 0x1fb1ab09),
+     TOBN(0x8fca0993, 0xa273bfe3), TOBN(0x13e4fe07, 0xf70b213c),
+     TOBN(0x3bcdb992, 0xfdb05163), TOBN(0x8c484b11, 0x0c2b19b6),
+     TOBN(0x1acb815f, 0xaaf2e3e2), TOBN(0xc6905935, 0xb89ff1b4),
+     TOBN(0xb2ad6f9d, 0x586e74e1), TOBN(0x488883ad, 0x67b80484),
+     TOBN(0x758aa2c7, 0x369c3ddb), TOBN(0x8ab74e69, 0x9f9afd31),
+     TOBN(0x10fc2d28, 0x5e21beb1), TOBN(0x3484518a, 0x318c42f9),
+     TOBN(0x377427dc, 0x53cf40c3), TOBN(0x9de0781a, 0x391bc1d9),
+     TOBN(0x8faee858, 0x693807e1), TOBN(0xa3865327, 0x4e81ccc7),
+     TOBN(0x02c30ff2, 0x6f835b84), TOBN(0xb604437b, 0x0d3d38d4),
+     TOBN(0xb3fc8a98, 0x5ca1823d), TOBN(0xb82f7ec9, 0x03be0324),
+     TOBN(0xee36d761, 0xcf684a33), TOBN(0x5a01df0e, 0x9f29bf7d),
+     TOBN(0x686202f3, 0x1306583d), TOBN(0x05b10da0, 0x437c622e),
+     TOBN(0xbf9aaa0f, 0x076a7bc8), TOBN(0x25e94efb, 0x8f8f4e43),
+     TOBN(0x8a35c9b7, 0xfa3dc26d), TOBN(0xe0e5fb93, 0x96ff03c5),
+     TOBN(0xa77e3843, 0xebc394ce), TOBN(0xcede6595, 0x8361de60),
+     TOBN(0xd27c22f6, 0xa1993545), TOBN(0xab01cc36, 0x24d671ba),
+     TOBN(0x63fa2877, 0xa169c28e), TOBN(0x925ef904, 0x2eb08376),
+     TOBN(0x3b2fa3cf, 0x53aa0b32), TOBN(0xb27beb5b, 0x71c49d7a),
+     TOBN(0xb60e1834, 0xd105e27f), TOBN(0xd6089788, 0x4f68570d),
+     TOBN(0x23094ce0, 0xd6fbc2ac), TOBN(0x738037a1, 0x815ff551),
+     TOBN(0xda73b1bb, 0x6bef119c), TOBN(0xdcf6c430, 0xeef506ba),
+     TOBN(0x00e4fe7b, 0xe3ef104a), TOBN(0xebdd9a2c, 0x0a065628),
+     TOBN(0x853a81c3, 0x8792043e), TOBN(0x22ad6ece, 0xb3b59108),
+     TOBN(0x9fb813c0, 0x39cd297d), TOBN(0x8ec7e16e, 0x05bda5d9),
+     TOBN(0x2834797c, 0x0d104b96), TOBN(0xcc11a2e7, 0x7c511510),
+     TOBN(0x96ca5a53, 0x96ee6380), TOBN(0x054c8655, 0xcea38742),
+     TOBN(0xb5946852, 0xd54dfa7d), TOBN(0x97c422e7, 0x1f4ab207),
+     TOBN(0xbf907509, 0x0c22b540), TOBN(0x2cde42aa, 0xb7c267d4),
+     TOBN(0xba18f9ed, 0x5ab0d693), TOBN(0x3ba62aa6, 0x6e4660d9),
+     TOBN(0xb24bf97b, 0xab9ea96a), TOBN(0x5d039642, 0xe3b60e32),
+     TOBN(0x4e6a4506, 0x7c4d9bd5), TOBN(0x666c5b9e, 0x7ed4a6a4),
+     TOBN(0xfa3fdcd9, 0x8edbd7cc), TOBN(0x4660bb87, 0xc6ccd753),
+     TOBN(0x9ae90820, 0x21e6b64f), TOBN(0x8a56a713, 0xb36bfb3f),
+     TOBN(0xabfce096, 0x5726d47f), TOBN(0x9eed01b2, 0x0b1a9a7f),
+     TOBN(0x30e9cad4, 0x4eb74a37), TOBN(0x7b2524cc, 0x53e9666d),
+     TOBN(0x6a29683b, 0x8f4b002f), TOBN(0xc2200d7a, 0x41f4fc20),
+     TOBN(0xcf3af47a, 0x3a338acc), TOBN(0x6539a4fb, 0xe7128975),
+     TOBN(0xcec31c14, 0xc33c7fcf), TOBN(0x7eb6799b, 0xc7be322b),
+     TOBN(0x119ef4e9, 0x6646f623), TOBN(0x7b7a26a5, 0x54d7299b),
+     TOBN(0xcb37f08d, 0x403f46f2), TOBN(0x94b8fc43, 0x1a0ec0c7),
+     TOBN(0xbb8514e3, 0xc332142f), TOBN(0xf3ed2c33, 0xe80d2a7a),
+     TOBN(0x8d2080af, 0xb639126c), TOBN(0xf7b6be60, 0xe3553ade),
+     TOBN(0x3950aa9f, 0x1c7e2b09), TOBN(0x847ff958, 0x6410f02b),
+     TOBN(0x877b7cf5, 0x678a31b0), TOBN(0xd50301ae, 0x3998b620),
+     TOBN(0x734257c5, 0xc00fb396), TOBN(0xf9fb18a0, 0x04e672a6),
+     TOBN(0xff8bd8eb, 0xe8758851), TOBN(0x1e64e4c6, 0x5d99ba44),
+     TOBN(0x4b8eaedf, 0x7dfd93b7), TOBN(0xba2f2a98, 0x04e76b8c),
+     TOBN(0x7d790cba, 0xe8053433), TOBN(0xc8e725a0, 0x3d2c9585),
+     TOBN(0x58c5c476, 0xcdd8f5ed), TOBN(0xd106b952, 0xefa9fe1d),
+     TOBN(0x3c5c775b, 0x0eff13a9), TOBN(0x242442ba, 0xe057b930),
+     TOBN(0xe9f458d4, 0xc9b70cbd), TOBN(0x69b71448, 0xa3cdb89a),
+     TOBN(0x41ee46f6, 0x0e2ed742), TOBN(0x573f1045, 0x40067493),
+     TOBN(0xb1e154ff, 0x9d54c304), TOBN(0x2ad0436a, 0x8d3a7502),
+     TOBN(0xee4aaa2d, 0x431a8121), TOBN(0xcd38b3ab, 0x886f11ed),
+     TOBN(0x57d49ea6, 0x034a0eb7), TOBN(0xd2b773bd, 0xf7e85e58),
+     TOBN(0x4a559ac4, 0x9b5c1f14), TOBN(0xc444be1a, 0x3e54df2b),
+     TOBN(0x13aad704, 0xeda41891), TOBN(0xcd927bec, 0x5eb5c788),
+     TOBN(0xeb3c8516, 0xe48c8a34), TOBN(0x1b7ac812, 0x4b546669),
+     TOBN(0x1815f896, 0x594df8ec), TOBN(0x87c6a79c, 0x79227865),
+     TOBN(0xae02a2f0, 0x9b56ddbd), TOBN(0x1339b5ac, 0x8a2f1cf3),
+     TOBN(0xf2b569c7, 0x839dff0d), TOBN(0xb0b9e864, 0xfee9a43d),
+     TOBN(0x4ff8ca41, 0x77bb064e), TOBN(0x145a2812, 0xfd249f63),
+     TOBN(0x3ab7beac, 0xf86f689a), TOBN(0x9bafec27, 0x01d35f5e),
+     TOBN(0x28054c65, 0x4265aa91), TOBN(0xa4b18304, 0x035efe42),
+     TOBN(0x6887b0e6, 0x9639dec7), TOBN(0xf4b8f6ad, 0x3d52aea5),
+     TOBN(0xfb9293cc, 0x971a8a13), TOBN(0x3f159e5d, 0x4c934d07),
+     TOBN(0x2c50e9b1, 0x09acbc29), TOBN(0x08eb65e6, 0x7154d129),
+     TOBN(0x4feff589, 0x30b75c3e), TOBN(0x0bb82fe2, 0x94491c93),
+     TOBN(0xd8ac377a, 0x89af62bb), TOBN(0xd7b51490, 0x9685e49f),
+     TOBN(0xabca9a7b, 0x04497f19), TOBN(0x1b35ed0a, 0x1a7ad13f),
+     TOBN(0x6b601e21, 0x3ec86ed6), TOBN(0xda91fcb9, 0xce0c76f1),
+     TOBN(0x9e28507b, 0xd7ab27e1), TOBN(0x7c19a555, 0x63945b7b),
+     TOBN(0x6b43f0a1, 0xaafc9827), TOBN(0x443b4fbd, 0x3aa55b91),
+     TOBN(0x962b2e65, 0x6962c88f), TOBN(0x139da8d4, 0xce0db0ca),
+     TOBN(0xb93f05dd, 0x1b8d6c4f), TOBN(0x779cdff7, 0x180b9824),
+     TOBN(0xbba23fdd, 0xae57c7b7), TOBN(0x345342f2, 0x1b932522),
+     TOBN(0xfd9c80fe, 0x556d4aa3), TOBN(0xa03907ba, 0x6525bb61),
+     TOBN(0x38b010e1, 0xff218933), TOBN(0xc066b654, 0xaa52117b),
+     TOBN(0x8e141920, 0x94f2e6ea), TOBN(0x66a27dca, 0x0d32f2b2),
+     TOBN(0x69c7f993, 0x048b3717), TOBN(0xbf5a989a, 0xb178ae1c),
+     TOBN(0x49fa9058, 0x564f1d6b), TOBN(0x27ec6e15, 0xd31fde4e),
+     TOBN(0x4cce0373, 0x7276e7fc), TOBN(0x64086d79, 0x89d6bf02),
+     TOBN(0x5a72f046, 0x4ccdd979), TOBN(0x909c3566, 0x47775631),
+     TOBN(0x1c07bc6b, 0x75dd7125), TOBN(0xb4c6bc97, 0x87a0428d),
+     TOBN(0x507ece52, 0xfdeb6b9d), TOBN(0xfca56512, 0xb2c95432),
+     TOBN(0x15d97181, 0xd0e8bd06), TOBN(0x384dd317, 0xc6bb46ea),
+     TOBN(0x5441ea20, 0x3952b624), TOBN(0xbcf70dee, 0x4e7dc2fb),
+     TOBN(0x372b016e, 0x6628e8c3), TOBN(0x07a0d667, 0xb60a7522),
+     TOBN(0xcf05751b, 0x0a344ee2), TOBN(0x0ec09a48, 0x118bdeec),
+     TOBN(0x6e4b3d4e, 0xd83dce46), TOBN(0x43a6316d, 0x99d2fc6e),
+     TOBN(0xa99d8989, 0x56cf044c), TOBN(0x7c7f4454, 0xae3e5fb7),
+     TOBN(0xb2e6b121, 0xfbabbe92), TOBN(0x281850fb, 0xe1330076),
+     TOBN(0x093581ec, 0x97890015), TOBN(0x69b1dded, 0x75ff77f5),
+     TOBN(0x7cf0b18f, 0xab105105), TOBN(0x953ced31, 0xa89ccfef),
+     TOBN(0x3151f85f, 0xeb914009), TOBN(0x3c9f1b87, 0x88ed48ad),
+     TOBN(0xc9aba1a1, 0x4a7eadcb), TOBN(0x928e7501, 0x522e71cf),
+     TOBN(0xeaede727, 0x3a2e4f83), TOBN(0x467e10d1, 0x1ce3bbd3),
+     TOBN(0xf3442ac3, 0xb955dcf0), TOBN(0xba96307d, 0xd3d5e527),
+     TOBN(0xf763a10e, 0xfd77f474), TOBN(0x5d744bd0, 0x6a6e1ff0),
+     TOBN(0xd287282a, 0xa777899e), TOBN(0xe20eda8f, 0xd03f3cde),
+     TOBN(0x6a7e75bb, 0x50b07d31), TOBN(0x0b7e2a94, 0x6f379de4),
+     TOBN(0x31cb64ad, 0x19f593cf), TOBN(0x7b1a9e4f, 0x1e76ef1d),
+     TOBN(0xe18c9c9d, 0xb62d609c), TOBN(0x439bad6d, 0xe779a650),
+     TOBN(0x219d9066, 0xe032f144), TOBN(0x1db632b8, 0xe8b2ec6a),
+     TOBN(0xff0d0fd4, 0xfda12f78), TOBN(0x56fb4c2d, 0x2a25d265),
+     TOBN(0x5f4e2ee1, 0x255a03f1), TOBN(0x61cd6af2, 0xe96af176),
+     TOBN(0xe0317ba8, 0xd068bc97), TOBN(0x927d6bab, 0x264b988e),
+     TOBN(0xa18f07e0, 0xe90fb21e), TOBN(0x00fd2b80, 0xbba7fca1),
+     TOBN(0x20387f27, 0x95cd67b5), TOBN(0x5b89a4e7, 0xd39707f7),
+     TOBN(0x8f83ad3f, 0x894407ce), TOBN(0xa0025b94, 0x6c226132),
+     TOBN(0xc79563c7, 0xf906c13b), TOBN(0x5f548f31, 0x4e7bb025),
+     TOBN(0x2b4c6b8f, 0xeac6d113), TOBN(0xa67e3f9c, 0x0e813c76),
+     TOBN(0x3982717c, 0x3fe1f4b9), TOBN(0x58865819, 0x26d8050e),
+     TOBN(0x99f3640c, 0xf7f06f20), TOBN(0xdc610216, 0x2a66ebc2),
+     TOBN(0x52f2c175, 0x767a1e08), TOBN(0x05660e1a, 0x5999871b),
+     TOBN(0x6b0f1762, 0x6d3c4693), TOBN(0xf0e7d627, 0x37ed7bea),
+     TOBN(0xc51758c7, 0xb75b226d), TOBN(0x40a88628, 0x1f91613b),
+     TOBN(0x889dbaa7, 0xbbb38ce0), TOBN(0xe0404b65, 0xbddcad81),
+     TOBN(0xfebccd3a, 0x8bc9671f), TOBN(0xfbf9a357, 0xee1f5375),
+     TOBN(0x5dc169b0, 0x28f33398), TOBN(0xb07ec11d, 0x72e90f65),
+     TOBN(0xae7f3b4a, 0xfaab1eb1), TOBN(0xd970195e, 0x5f17538a),
+     TOBN(0x52b05cbe, 0x0181e640), TOBN(0xf5debd62, 0x2643313d),
+     TOBN(0x76148154, 0x5df31f82), TOBN(0x23e03b33, 0x3a9e13c5),
+     TOBN(0xff758949, 0x4fde0c1f), TOBN(0xbf8a1abe, 0xe5b6ec20),
+     TOBN(0x702278fb, 0x87e1db6c), TOBN(0xc447ad7a, 0x35ed658f),
+     TOBN(0x48d4aa38, 0x03d0ccf2), TOBN(0x80acb338, 0x819a7c03),
+     TOBN(0x9bc7c89e, 0x6e17cecc), TOBN(0x46736b8b, 0x03be1d82),
+     TOBN(0xd65d7b60, 0xc0432f96), TOBN(0xddebe7a3, 0xdeb5442f),
+     TOBN(0x79a25307, 0x7dff69a2), TOBN(0x37a56d94, 0x02cf3122),
+     TOBN(0x8bab8aed, 0xf2350d0a), TOBN(0x13c3f276, 0x037b0d9a),
+     TOBN(0xc664957c, 0x44c65cae), TOBN(0x88b44089, 0xc2e71a88),
+     TOBN(0xdb88e5a3, 0x5cb02664), TOBN(0x5d4c0bf1, 0x8686c72e),
+     TOBN(0xea3d9b62, 0xa682d53e), TOBN(0x9b605ef4, 0x0b2ad431),
+     TOBN(0x71bac202, 0xc69645d0), TOBN(0xa115f03a, 0x6a1b66e7),
+     TOBN(0xfe2c563a, 0x158f4dc4), TOBN(0xf715b3a0, 0x4d12a78c),
+     TOBN(0x8f7f0a48, 0xd413213a), TOBN(0x2035806d, 0xc04becdb),
+     TOBN(0xecd34a99, 0x5d8587f5), TOBN(0x4d8c3079, 0x9f6d3a71),
+     TOBN(0x1b2a2a67, 0x8d95a8f6), TOBN(0xc58c9d7d, 0xf2110d0d),
+     TOBN(0xdeee81d5, 0xcf8fba3f), TOBN(0xa42be3c0, 0x0c7cdf68),
+     TOBN(0x2126f742, 0xd43b5eaa), TOBN(0x054a0766, 0xdfa59b85),
+     TOBN(0x9d0d5e36, 0x126bfd45), TOBN(0xa1f8fbd7, 0x384f8a8f),
+     TOBN(0x317680f5, 0xd563fccc), TOBN(0x48ca5055, 0xf280a928),
+     TOBN(0xe00b81b2, 0x27b578cf), TOBN(0x10aad918, 0x2994a514),
+     TOBN(0xd9e07b62, 0xb7bdc953), TOBN(0x9f0f6ff2, 0x5bc086dd),
+     TOBN(0x09d1ccff, 0x655eee77), TOBN(0x45475f79, 0x5bef7df1),
+     TOBN(0x3faa28fa, 0x86f702cc), TOBN(0x92e60905, 0x0f021f07),
+     TOBN(0xe9e62968, 0x7f8fa8c6), TOBN(0xbd71419a, 0xf036ea2c),
+     TOBN(0x171ee1cc, 0x6028da9a), TOBN(0x5352fe1a, 0xc251f573),
+     TOBN(0xf8ff236e, 0x3fa997f4), TOBN(0xd831b6c9, 0xa5749d5f),
+     TOBN(0x7c872e1d, 0xe350e2c2), TOBN(0xc56240d9, 0x1e0ce403),
+     TOBN(0xf9deb077, 0x6974f5cb), TOBN(0x7d50ba87, 0x961c3728),
+     TOBN(0xd6f89426, 0x5a3a2518), TOBN(0xcf817799, 0xc6303d43),
+     TOBN(0x510a0471, 0x619e5696), TOBN(0xab049ff6, 0x3a5e307b),
+     TOBN(0xe4cdf9b0, 0xfeb13ec7), TOBN(0xd5e97117, 0x9d8ff90c),
+     TOBN(0xf6f64d06, 0x9afa96af), TOBN(0x00d0bf5e, 0x9d2012a2),
+     TOBN(0xe63f301f, 0x358bcdc0), TOBN(0x07689e99, 0x0a9d47f8),
+     TOBN(0x1f689e2f, 0x4f43d43a), TOBN(0x4d542a16, 0x90920904),
+     TOBN(0xaea293d5, 0x9ca0a707), TOBN(0xd061fe45, 0x8ac68065),
+     TOBN(0x1033bf1b, 0x0090008c), TOBN(0x29749558, 0xc08a6db6),
+     TOBN(0x74b5fc59, 0xc1d5d034), TOBN(0xf712e9f6, 0x67e215e0),
+     TOBN(0xfd520cbd, 0x860200e6), TOBN(0x0229acb4, 0x3ea22588),
+     TOBN(0x9cd1e14c, 0xfff0c82e), TOBN(0x87684b62, 0x59c69e73),
+     TOBN(0xda85e61c, 0x96ccb989), TOBN(0x2d5dbb02, 0xa3d06493),
+     TOBN(0xf22ad33a, 0xe86b173c), TOBN(0xe8e41ea5, 0xa79ff0e3),
+     TOBN(0x01d2d725, 0xdd0d0c10), TOBN(0x31f39088, 0x032d28f9),
+     TOBN(0x7b3f71e1, 0x7829839e), TOBN(0x0cf691b4, 0x4502ae58),
+     TOBN(0xef658dbd, 0xbefc6115), TOBN(0xa5cd6ee5, 0xb3ab5314),
+     TOBN(0x206c8d7b, 0x5f1d2347), TOBN(0x794645ba, 0x4cc2253a),
+     TOBN(0xd517d8ff, 0x58389e08), TOBN(0x4fa20dee, 0x9f847288),
+     TOBN(0xeba072d8, 0xd797770a), TOBN(0x7360c91d, 0xbf429e26),
+     TOBN(0x7200a3b3, 0x80af8279), TOBN(0x6a1c9150, 0x82dadce3),
+     TOBN(0x0ee6d3a7, 0xc35d8794), TOBN(0x042e6558, 0x0356bae5),
+     TOBN(0x9f59698d, 0x643322fd), TOBN(0x9379ae15, 0x50a61967),
+     TOBN(0x64b9ae62, 0xfcc9981e), TOBN(0xaed3d631, 0x6d2934c6),
+     TOBN(0x2454b302, 0x5e4e65eb), TOBN(0xab09f647, 0xf9950428)}
+    ,
+    {TOBN(0xb2083a12, 0x22248acc), TOBN(0x1f6ec0ef, 0x3264e366),
+     TOBN(0x5659b704, 0x5afdee28), TOBN(0x7a823a40, 0xe6430bb5),
+     TOBN(0x24592a04, 0xe1900a79), TOBN(0xcde09d4a, 0xc9ee6576),
+     TOBN(0x52b6463f, 0x4b5ea54a), TOBN(0x1efe9ed3, 0xd3ca65a7),
+     TOBN(0xe27a6dbe, 0x305406dd), TOBN(0x8eb7dc7f, 0xdd5d1957),
+     TOBN(0xf54a6876, 0x387d4d8f), TOBN(0x9c479409, 0xc7762de4),
+     TOBN(0xbe4d5b5d, 0x99b30778), TOBN(0x25380c56, 0x6e793682),
+     TOBN(0x602d37f3, 0xdac740e3), TOBN(0x140deabe, 0x1566e4ae),
+     TOBN(0x4481d067, 0xafd32acf), TOBN(0xd8f0fcca, 0xe1f71ccf),
+     TOBN(0xd208dd0c, 0xb596f2da), TOBN(0xd049d730, 0x9aad93f9),
+     TOBN(0xc79f263d, 0x42ab580e), TOBN(0x09411bb1, 0x23f707b4),
+     TOBN(0x8cfde1ff, 0x835e0eda), TOBN(0x72707490, 0x90f03402),
+     TOBN(0xeaee6126, 0xc49a861e), TOBN(0x024f3b65, 0xe14f0d06),
+     TOBN(0x51a3f1e8, 0xc69bfc17), TOBN(0xc3c3a8e9, 0xa7686381),
+     TOBN(0x3400752c, 0xb103d4c8), TOBN(0x02bc4613, 0x9218b36b),
+     TOBN(0xc67f75eb, 0x7651504a), TOBN(0xd6848b56, 0xd02aebfa),
+     TOBN(0xbd9802e6, 0xc30fa92b), TOBN(0x5a70d96d, 0x9a552784),
+     TOBN(0x9085c4ea, 0x3f83169b), TOBN(0xfa9423bb, 0x06908228),
+     TOBN(0x2ffebe12, 0xfe97a5b9), TOBN(0x85da6049, 0x71b99118),
+     TOBN(0x9cbc2f7f, 0x63178846), TOBN(0xfd96bc70, 0x9153218e),
+     TOBN(0x958381db, 0x1782269b), TOBN(0xae34bf79, 0x2597e550),
+     TOBN(0xbb5c6064, 0x5f385153), TOBN(0x6f0e96af, 0xe3088048),
+     TOBN(0xbf6a0215, 0x77884456), TOBN(0xb3b5688c, 0x69310ea7),
+     TOBN(0x17c94295, 0x04fad2de), TOBN(0xe020f0e5, 0x17896d4d),
+     TOBN(0x730ba0ab, 0x0976505f), TOBN(0x567f6813, 0x095e2ec5),
+     TOBN(0x47062010, 0x6331ab71), TOBN(0x72cfa977, 0x41d22b9f),
+     TOBN(0x33e55ead, 0x8a2373da), TOBN(0xa8d0d5f4, 0x7ba45a68),
+     TOBN(0xba1d8f9c, 0x03029d15), TOBN(0x8f34f1cc, 0xfc55b9f3),
+     TOBN(0xcca4428d, 0xbbe5a1a9), TOBN(0x8187fd5f, 0x3126bd67),
+     TOBN(0x0036973a, 0x48105826), TOBN(0xa39b6663, 0xb8bd61a0),
+     TOBN(0x6d42deef, 0x2d65a808), TOBN(0x4969044f, 0x94636b19),
+     TOBN(0xf611ee47, 0xdd5d564c), TOBN(0x7b2f3a49, 0xd2873077),
+     TOBN(0x94157d45, 0x300eb294), TOBN(0x2b2a656e, 0x169c1494),
+     TOBN(0xc000dd76, 0xd3a47aa9), TOBN(0xa2864e4f, 0xa6243ea4),
+     TOBN(0x82716c47, 0xdb89842e), TOBN(0x12dfd7d7, 0x61479fb7),
+     TOBN(0x3b9a2c56, 0xe0b2f6dc), TOBN(0x46be862a, 0xd7f85d67),
+     TOBN(0x03b0d8dd, 0x0f82b214), TOBN(0x460c34f9, 0xf103cbc6),
+     TOBN(0xf32e5c03, 0x18d79e19), TOBN(0x8b8888ba, 0xa84117f8),
+     TOBN(0x8f3c37dc, 0xc0722677), TOBN(0x10d21be9, 0x1c1c0f27),
+     TOBN(0xd47c8468, 0xe0f7a0c6), TOBN(0x9bf02213, 0xadecc0e0),
+     TOBN(0x0baa7d12, 0x42b48b99), TOBN(0x1bcb665d, 0x48424096),
+     TOBN(0x8b847cd6, 0xebfb5cfb), TOBN(0x87c2ae56, 0x9ad4d10d),
+     TOBN(0xf1cbb122, 0x0de36726), TOBN(0xe7043c68, 0x3fdfbd21),
+     TOBN(0x4bd0826a, 0x4e79d460), TOBN(0x11f5e598, 0x4bd1a2cb),
+     TOBN(0x97554160, 0xb7fe7b6e), TOBN(0x7d16189a, 0x400a3fb2),
+     TOBN(0xd73e9bea, 0xe328ca1e), TOBN(0x0dd04b97, 0xe793d8cc),
+     TOBN(0xa9c83c9b, 0x506db8cc), TOBN(0x5cd47aae, 0xcf38814c),
+     TOBN(0x26fc430d, 0xb64b45e6), TOBN(0x079b5499, 0xd818ea84),
+     TOBN(0xebb01102, 0xc1c24a3b), TOBN(0xca24e568, 0x1c161c1a),
+     TOBN(0x103eea69, 0x36f00a4a), TOBN(0x9ad76ee8, 0x76176c7b),
+     TOBN(0x97451fc2, 0x538e0ff7), TOBN(0x94f89809, 0x6604b3b0),
+     TOBN(0x6311436e, 0x3249cfd7), TOBN(0x27b4a7bd, 0x41224f69),
+     TOBN(0x03b5d21a, 0xe0ac2941), TOBN(0x279b0254, 0xc2d31937),
+     TOBN(0x3307c052, 0xcac992d0), TOBN(0x6aa7cb92, 0xefa8b1f3),
+     TOBN(0x5a182580, 0x0d37c7a5), TOBN(0x13380c37, 0x342d5422),
+     TOBN(0x92ac2d66, 0xd5d2ef92), TOBN(0x035a70c9, 0x030c63c6),
+     TOBN(0xc16025dd, 0x4ce4f152), TOBN(0x1f419a71, 0xf9df7c06),
+     TOBN(0x6d5b2214, 0x91e4bb14), TOBN(0xfc43c6cc, 0x839fb4ce),
+     TOBN(0x49f06591, 0x925d6b2d), TOBN(0x4b37d9d3, 0x62186598),
+     TOBN(0x8c54a971, 0xd01b1629), TOBN(0xe1a9c29f, 0x51d50e05),
+     TOBN(0x5109b785, 0x71ba1861), TOBN(0x48b22d5c, 0xd0c8f93d),
+     TOBN(0xe8fa84a7, 0x8633bb93), TOBN(0x53fba6ba, 0x5aebbd08),
+     TOBN(0x7ff27df3, 0xe5eea7d8), TOBN(0x521c8796, 0x68ca7158),
+     TOBN(0xb9d5133b, 0xce6f1a05), TOBN(0x2d50cd53, 0xfd0ebee4),
+     TOBN(0xc82115d6, 0xc5a3ef16), TOBN(0x993eff9d, 0xba079221),
+     TOBN(0xe4da2c5e, 0x4b5da81c), TOBN(0x9a89dbdb, 0x8033fd85),
+     TOBN(0x60819ebf, 0x2b892891), TOBN(0x53902b21, 0x5d14a4d5),
+     TOBN(0x6ac35051, 0xd7fda421), TOBN(0xcc6ab885, 0x61c83284),
+     TOBN(0x14eba133, 0xf74cff17), TOBN(0x240aaa03, 0xecb813f2),
+     TOBN(0xcfbb6540, 0x6f665bee), TOBN(0x084b1fe4, 0xa425ad73),
+     TOBN(0x009d5d16, 0xd081f6a6), TOBN(0x35304fe8, 0xeef82c90),
+     TOBN(0xf20346d5, 0xaa9eaa22), TOBN(0x0ada9f07, 0xac1c91e3),
+     TOBN(0xa6e21678, 0x968a6144), TOBN(0x54c1f77c, 0x07b31a1e),
+     TOBN(0xd6bb787e, 0x5781fbe1), TOBN(0x61bd2ee0, 0xe31f1c4a),
+     TOBN(0xf25aa1e9, 0x781105fc), TOBN(0x9cf2971f, 0x7b2f8e80),
+     TOBN(0x26d15412, 0xcdff919b), TOBN(0x01db4ebe, 0x34bc896e),
+     TOBN(0x7d9b3e23, 0xb40df1cf), TOBN(0x59337373, 0x94e971b4),
+     TOBN(0xbf57bd14, 0x669cf921), TOBN(0x865daedf, 0x0c1a1064),
+     TOBN(0x3eb70bd3, 0x83279125), TOBN(0xbc3d5b9f, 0x34ecdaab),
+     TOBN(0x91e3ed7e, 0x5f755caf), TOBN(0x49699f54, 0xd41e6f02),
+     TOBN(0x185770e1, 0xd4a7a15b), TOBN(0x08f3587a, 0xeaac87e7),
+     TOBN(0x352018db, 0x473133ea), TOBN(0x674ce719, 0x04fd30fc),
+     TOBN(0x7b8d9835, 0x088b3e0e), TOBN(0x7a0356a9, 0x5d0d47a1),
+     TOBN(0x9d9e7659, 0x6474a3c4), TOBN(0x61ea48a7, 0xff66966c),
+     TOBN(0x30417758, 0x0f3e4834), TOBN(0xfdbb21c2, 0x17a9afcb),
+     TOBN(0x756fa17f, 0x2f9a67b3), TOBN(0x2a6b2421, 0xa245c1a8),
+     TOBN(0x64be2794, 0x4af02291), TOBN(0xade465c6, 0x2a5804fe),
+     TOBN(0x8dffbd39, 0xa6f08fd7), TOBN(0xc4efa84c, 0xaa14403b),
+     TOBN(0xa1b91b2a, 0x442b0f5c), TOBN(0xb748e317, 0xcf997736),
+     TOBN(0x8d1b62bf, 0xcee90e16), TOBN(0x907ae271, 0x0b2078c0),
+     TOBN(0xdf31534b, 0x0c9bcddd), TOBN(0x043fb054, 0x39adce83),
+     TOBN(0x99031043, 0xd826846a), TOBN(0x61a9c0d6, 0xb144f393),
+     TOBN(0xdab48046, 0x47718427), TOBN(0xdf17ff9b, 0x6e830f8b),
+     TOBN(0x408d7ee8, 0xe49a1347), TOBN(0x6ac71e23, 0x91c1d4ae),
+     TOBN(0xc8cbb9fd, 0x1defd73c), TOBN(0x19840657, 0xbbbbfec5),
+     TOBN(0x39db1cb5, 0x9e7ef8ea), TOBN(0x78aa8296, 0x64105f30),
+     TOBN(0xa3d9b7f0, 0xa3738c29), TOBN(0x0a2f235a, 0xbc3250a3),
+     TOBN(0x55e506f6, 0x445e4caf), TOBN(0x0974f73d, 0x33475f7a),
+     TOBN(0xd37dbba3, 0x5ba2f5a8), TOBN(0x542c6e63, 0x6af40066),
+     TOBN(0x26d99b53, 0xc5d73e2c), TOBN(0x06060d7d, 0x6c3ca33e),
+     TOBN(0xcdbef1c2, 0x065fef4a), TOBN(0x77e60f7d, 0xfd5b92e3),
+     TOBN(0xd7c549f0, 0x26708350), TOBN(0x201b3ad0, 0x34f121bf),
+     TOBN(0x5fcac2a1, 0x0334fc14), TOBN(0x8a9a9e09, 0x344552f6),
+     TOBN(0x7dd8a1d3, 0x97653082), TOBN(0x5fc0738f, 0x79d4f289),
+     TOBN(0x787d244d, 0x17d2d8c3), TOBN(0xeffc6345, 0x70830684),
+     TOBN(0x5ddb96dd, 0xe4f73ae5), TOBN(0x8efb14b1, 0x172549a5),
+     TOBN(0x6eb73eee, 0x2245ae7a), TOBN(0xbca4061e, 0xea11f13e),
+     TOBN(0xb577421d, 0x30b01f5d), TOBN(0xaa688b24, 0x782e152c),
+     TOBN(0x67608e71, 0xbd3502ba), TOBN(0x4ef41f24, 0xb4de75a0),
+     TOBN(0xb08dde5e, 0xfd6125e5), TOBN(0xde484825, 0xa409543f),
+     TOBN(0x1f198d98, 0x65cc2295), TOBN(0x428a3771, 0x6e0edfa2),
+     TOBN(0x4f9697a2, 0xadf35fc7), TOBN(0x01a43c79, 0xf7cac3c7),
+     TOBN(0xb05d7059, 0x0fd3659a), TOBN(0x8927f30c, 0xbb7f2d9a),
+     TOBN(0x4023d1ac, 0x8cf984d3), TOBN(0x32125ed3, 0x02897a45),
+     TOBN(0xfb572dad, 0x3d414205), TOBN(0x73000ef2, 0xe3fa82a9),
+     TOBN(0x4c0868e9, 0xf10a5581), TOBN(0x5b61fc67, 0x6b0b3ca5),
+     TOBN(0xc1258d5b, 0x7cae440c), TOBN(0x21c08b41, 0x402b7531),
+     TOBN(0xf61a8955, 0xde932321), TOBN(0x3568faf8, 0x2d1408af),
+     TOBN(0x71b15e99, 0x9ecf965b), TOBN(0xf14ed248, 0xe917276f),
+     TOBN(0xc6f4caa1, 0x820cf9e2), TOBN(0x681b20b2, 0x18d83c7e),
+     TOBN(0x6cde738d, 0xc6c01120), TOBN(0x71db0813, 0xae70e0db),
+     TOBN(0x95fc0644, 0x74afe18c), TOBN(0x34619053, 0x129e2be7),
+     TOBN(0x80615cea, 0xdb2a3b15), TOBN(0x0a49a19e, 0xdb4c7073),
+     TOBN(0x0e1b84c8, 0x8fd2d367), TOBN(0xd74bf462, 0x033fb8aa),
+     TOBN(0x889f6d65, 0x533ef217), TOBN(0x7158c7e4, 0xc3ca2e87),
+     TOBN(0xfb670dfb, 0xdc2b4167), TOBN(0x75910a01, 0x844c257f),
+     TOBN(0xf336bf07, 0xcf88577d), TOBN(0x22245250, 0xe45e2ace),
+     TOBN(0x2ed92e8d, 0x7ca23d85), TOBN(0x29f8be4c, 0x2b812f58),
+     TOBN(0xdd9ebaa7, 0x076fe12b), TOBN(0x3f2400cb, 0xae1537f9),
+     TOBN(0x1aa93528, 0x17bdfb46), TOBN(0xc0f98430, 0x67883b41),
+     TOBN(0x5590ede1, 0x0170911d), TOBN(0x7562f5bb, 0x34d4b17f),
+     TOBN(0xe1fa1df2, 0x1826b8d2), TOBN(0xb40b796a, 0x6bd80d59),
+     TOBN(0xd65bf197, 0x3467ba92), TOBN(0x8c9b46db, 0xf70954b0),
+     TOBN(0x97c8a0f3, 0x0e78f15d), TOBN(0xa8f3a69a, 0x85a4c961),
+     TOBN(0x4242660f, 0x61e4ce9b), TOBN(0xbf06aab3, 0x6ea6790c),
+     TOBN(0xc6706f8e, 0xec986416), TOBN(0x9e56dec1, 0x9a9fc225),
+     TOBN(0x527c46f4, 0x9a9898d9), TOBN(0xd799e77b, 0x5633cdef),
+     TOBN(0x24eacc16, 0x7d9e4297), TOBN(0xabb61cea, 0x6b1cb734),
+     TOBN(0xbee2e8a7, 0xf778443c), TOBN(0x3bb42bf1, 0x29de2fe6),
+     TOBN(0xcbed86a1, 0x3003bb6f), TOBN(0xd3918e6c, 0xd781cdf6),
+     TOBN(0x4bee3271, 0x9a5103f1), TOBN(0x5243efc6, 0xf50eac06),
+     TOBN(0xb8e122cb, 0x6adcc119), TOBN(0x1b7faa84, 0xc0b80a08),
+     TOBN(0x32c3d1bd, 0x6dfcd08c), TOBN(0x129dec4e, 0x0be427de),
+     TOBN(0x98ab679c, 0x1d263c83), TOBN(0xafc83cb7, 0xcef64eff),
+     TOBN(0x85eb6088, 0x2fa6be76), TOBN(0x892585fb, 0x1328cbfe),
+     TOBN(0xc154d3ed, 0xcf618dda), TOBN(0xc44f601b, 0x3abaf26e),
+     TOBN(0x7bf57d0b, 0x2be1fdfd), TOBN(0xa833bd2d, 0x21137fee),
+     TOBN(0x9353af36, 0x2db591a8), TOBN(0xc76f26dc, 0x5562a056),
+     TOBN(0x1d87e47d, 0x3fdf5a51), TOBN(0x7afb5f93, 0x55c9cab0),
+     TOBN(0x91bbf58f, 0x89e0586e), TOBN(0x7c72c018, 0x0d843709),
+     TOBN(0xa9a5aafb, 0x99b5c3dc), TOBN(0xa48a0f1d, 0x3844aeb0),
+     TOBN(0x7178b7dd, 0xb667e482), TOBN(0x453985e9, 0x6e23a59a),
+     TOBN(0x4a54c860, 0x01b25dd8), TOBN(0x0dd37f48, 0xfb897c8a),
+     TOBN(0x5f8aa610, 0x0ea90cd9), TOBN(0xc8892c68, 0x16d5830d),
+     TOBN(0xeb4befc0, 0xef514ca5), TOBN(0x478eb679, 0xe72c9ee6),
+     TOBN(0x9bca20da, 0xdbc40d5f), TOBN(0xf015de21, 0xdde4f64a),
+     TOBN(0xaa6a4de0, 0xeaf4b8a5), TOBN(0x68cfd9ca, 0x4bc60e32),
+     TOBN(0x668a4b01, 0x7fd15e70), TOBN(0xd9f0694a, 0xf27dc09d),
+     TOBN(0xf6c3cad5, 0xba708bcd), TOBN(0x5cd2ba69, 0x5bb95c2a),
+     TOBN(0xaa28c1d3, 0x33c0a58f), TOBN(0x23e274e3, 0xabc77870),
+     TOBN(0x44c3692d, 0xdfd20a4a), TOBN(0x091c5fd3, 0x81a66653),
+     TOBN(0x6c0bb691, 0x09a0757d), TOBN(0x9072e8b9, 0x667343ea),
+     TOBN(0x31d40eb0, 0x80848bec), TOBN(0x95bd480a, 0x79fd36cc),
+     TOBN(0x01a77c61, 0x65ed43f5), TOBN(0xafccd127, 0x2e0d40bf),
+     TOBN(0xeccfc82d, 0x1cc1884b), TOBN(0xc85ac201, 0x5d4753b4),
+     TOBN(0xc7a6caac, 0x658e099f), TOBN(0xcf46369e, 0x04b27390),
+     TOBN(0xe2e7d049, 0x506467ea), TOBN(0x481b63a2, 0x37cdeccc),
+     TOBN(0x4029abd8, 0xed80143a), TOBN(0x28bfe3c7, 0xbcb00b88),
+     TOBN(0x3bec1009, 0x0643d84a), TOBN(0x885f3668, 0xabd11041),
+     TOBN(0xdb02432c, 0xf83a34d6), TOBN(0x32f7b360, 0x719ceebe),
+     TOBN(0xf06c7837, 0xdad1fe7a), TOBN(0x60a157a9, 0x5441a0b0),
+     TOBN(0x704970e9, 0xe2d47550), TOBN(0xcd2bd553, 0x271b9020),
+     TOBN(0xff57f82f, 0x33e24a0b), TOBN(0x9cbee23f, 0xf2565079),
+     TOBN(0x16353427, 0xeb5f5825), TOBN(0x276feec4, 0xe948d662),
+     TOBN(0xd1b62bc6, 0xda10032b), TOBN(0x718351dd, 0xf0e72a53),
+     TOBN(0x93452076, 0x2420e7ba), TOBN(0x96368fff, 0x3a00118d),
+     TOBN(0x00ce2d26, 0x150a49e4), TOBN(0x0c28b636, 0x3f04706b),
+     TOBN(0xbad65a46, 0x58b196d0), TOBN(0x6c8455fc, 0xec9f8b7c),
+     TOBN(0xe90c895f, 0x2d71867e), TOBN(0x5c0be31b, 0xedf9f38c),
+     TOBN(0x2a37a15e, 0xd8f6ec04), TOBN(0x239639e7, 0x8cd85251),
+     TOBN(0xd8975315, 0x9c7c4c6b), TOBN(0x603aa3c0, 0xd7409af7),
+     TOBN(0xb8d53d0c, 0x007132fb), TOBN(0x68d12af7, 0xa6849238),
+     TOBN(0xbe0607e7, 0xbf5d9279), TOBN(0x9aa50055, 0xaada74ce),
+     TOBN(0xe81079cb, 0xba7e8ccb), TOBN(0x610c71d1, 0xa5f4ff5e),
+     TOBN(0x9e2ee1a7, 0x5aa07093), TOBN(0xca84004b, 0xa75da47c),
+     TOBN(0x074d3951, 0x3de75401), TOBN(0xf938f756, 0xbb311592),
+     TOBN(0x96197618, 0x00a43421), TOBN(0x39a25362, 0x07bc78c8),
+     TOBN(0x278f710a, 0x0a171276), TOBN(0xb28446ea, 0x8d1a8f08),
+     TOBN(0x184781bf, 0xe3b6a661), TOBN(0x7751cb1d, 0xe6d279f7),
+     TOBN(0xf8ff95d6, 0xc59eb662), TOBN(0x186d90b7, 0x58d3dea7),
+     TOBN(0x0e4bb6c1, 0xdfb4f754), TOBN(0x5c5cf56b, 0x2b2801dc),
+     TOBN(0xc561e452, 0x1f54564d), TOBN(0xb4fb8c60, 0xf0dd7f13),
+     TOBN(0xf8849630, 0x33ff98c7), TOBN(0x9619fffa, 0xcf17769c),
+     TOBN(0xf8090bf6, 0x1bfdd80a), TOBN(0x14d9a149, 0x422cfe63),
+     TOBN(0xb354c360, 0x6f6df9ea), TOBN(0xdbcf770d, 0x218f17ea),
+     TOBN(0x207db7c8, 0x79eb3480), TOBN(0x213dbda8, 0x559b6a26),
+     TOBN(0xac4c200b, 0x29fc81b3), TOBN(0xebc3e09f, 0x171d87c1),
+     TOBN(0x91799530, 0x1481aa9e), TOBN(0x051b92e1, 0x92e114fa),
+     TOBN(0xdf8f92e9, 0xecb5537f), TOBN(0x44b1b2cc, 0x290c7483),
+     TOBN(0xa711455a, 0x2adeb016), TOBN(0x964b6856, 0x81a10c2c),
+     TOBN(0x4f159d99, 0xcec03623), TOBN(0x05532225, 0xef3271ea),
+     TOBN(0xb231bea3, 0xc5ee4849), TOBN(0x57a54f50, 0x7094f103),
+     TOBN(0x3e2d421d, 0x9598b352), TOBN(0xe865a49c, 0x67412ab4),
+     TOBN(0xd2998a25, 0x1cc3a912), TOBN(0x5d092808, 0x0c74d65d),
+     TOBN(0x73f45908, 0x4088567a), TOBN(0xeb6b280e, 0x1f214a61),
+     TOBN(0x8c9adc34, 0xcaf0c13d), TOBN(0x39d12938, 0xf561fb80),
+     TOBN(0xb2dc3a5e, 0xbc6edfb4), TOBN(0x7485b1b1, 0xfe4d210e),
+     TOBN(0x062e0400, 0xe186ae72), TOBN(0x91e32d5c, 0x6eeb3b88),
+     TOBN(0x6df574d7, 0x4be59224), TOBN(0xebc88ccc, 0x716d55f3),
+     TOBN(0x26c2e6d0, 0xcad6ed33), TOBN(0xc6e21e7d, 0x0d3e8b10),
+     TOBN(0x2cc5840e, 0x5bcc36bb), TOBN(0x9292445e, 0x7da74f69),
+     TOBN(0x8be8d321, 0x4e5193a8), TOBN(0x3ec23629, 0x8df06413),
+     TOBN(0xc7e9ae85, 0xb134defa), TOBN(0x6073b1d0, 0x1bb2d475),
+     TOBN(0xb9ad615e, 0x2863c00d), TOBN(0x9e29493d, 0x525f4ac4),
+     TOBN(0xc32b1dea, 0x4e9acf4f), TOBN(0x3e1f01c8, 0xa50db88d),
+     TOBN(0xb05d70ea, 0x04da916c), TOBN(0x714b0d0a, 0xd865803e),
+     TOBN(0x4bd493fc, 0x9920cb5e), TOBN(0x5b44b1f7, 0x92c7a3ac),
+     TOBN(0xa2a77293, 0xbcec9235), TOBN(0x5ee06e87, 0xcd378553),
+     TOBN(0xceff8173, 0xda621607), TOBN(0x2bb03e4c, 0x99f5d290),
+     TOBN(0x2945106a, 0xa6f734ac), TOBN(0xb5056604, 0xd25c4732),
+     TOBN(0x5945920c, 0xe079afee), TOBN(0x686e17a0, 0x6789831f),
+     TOBN(0x5966bee8, 0xb74a5ae5), TOBN(0x38a673a2, 0x1e258d46),
+     TOBN(0xbd1cc1f2, 0x83141c95), TOBN(0x3b2ecf4f, 0x0e96e486),
+     TOBN(0xcd3aa896, 0x74e5fc78), TOBN(0x415ec10c, 0x2482fa7a),
+     TOBN(0x15234419, 0x80503380), TOBN(0x513d917a, 0xd314b392),
+     TOBN(0xb0b52f4e, 0x63caecae), TOBN(0x07bf22ad, 0x2dc7780b),
+     TOBN(0xe761e8a1, 0xe4306839), TOBN(0x1b3be962, 0x5dd7feaa),
+     TOBN(0x4fe728de, 0x74c778f1), TOBN(0xf1fa0bda, 0x5e0070f6),
+     TOBN(0x85205a31, 0x6ec3f510), TOBN(0x2c7e4a14, 0xd2980475),
+     TOBN(0xde3c19c0, 0x6f30ebfd), TOBN(0xdb1c1f38, 0xd4b7e644),
+     TOBN(0xfe291a75, 0x5dce364a), TOBN(0xb7b22a3c, 0x058f5be3),
+     TOBN(0x2cd2c302, 0x37fea38c), TOBN(0x2930967a, 0x2e17be17),
+     TOBN(0x87f009de, 0x0c061c65), TOBN(0xcb014aac, 0xedc6ed44),
+     TOBN(0x49bd1cb4, 0x3bafb1eb), TOBN(0x81bd8b5c, 0x282d3688),
+     TOBN(0x1cdab87e, 0xf01a17af), TOBN(0x21f37ac4, 0xe710063b),
+     TOBN(0x5a6c5676, 0x42fc8193), TOBN(0xf4753e70, 0x56a6015c),
+     TOBN(0x020f795e, 0xa15b0a44), TOBN(0x8f37c8d7, 0x8958a958),
+     TOBN(0x63b7e89b, 0xa4b675b5), TOBN(0xb4fb0c0c, 0x0fc31aea),
+     TOBN(0xed95e639, 0xa7ff1f2e), TOBN(0x9880f5a3, 0x619614fb),
+     TOBN(0xdeb6ff02, 0x947151ab), TOBN(0x5bc5118c, 0xa868dcdb),
+     TOBN(0xd8da2055, 0x4c20cea5), TOBN(0xcac2776e, 0x14c4d69a),
+     TOBN(0xcccb22c1, 0x622d599b), TOBN(0xa4ddb653, 0x68a9bb50),
+     TOBN(0x2c4ff151, 0x1b4941b4), TOBN(0xe1ff19b4, 0x6efba588),
+     TOBN(0x35034363, 0xc48345e0), TOBN(0x45542e3d, 0x1e29dfc4),
+     TOBN(0xf197cb91, 0x349f7aed), TOBN(0x3b2b5a00, 0x8fca8420),
+     TOBN(0x7c175ee8, 0x23aaf6d8), TOBN(0x54dcf421, 0x35af32b6),
+     TOBN(0x0ba14307, 0x27d6561e), TOBN(0x879d5ee4, 0xd175b1e2),
+     TOBN(0xc7c43673, 0x99807db5), TOBN(0x77a54455, 0x9cd55bcd),
+     TOBN(0xe6c2ff13, 0x0105c072), TOBN(0x18f7a99f, 0x8dda7da4),
+     TOBN(0x4c301820, 0x0e2d35c1), TOBN(0x06a53ca0, 0xd9cc6c82),
+     TOBN(0xaa21cc1e, 0xf1aa1d9e), TOBN(0x32414334, 0x4a75b1e8),
+     TOBN(0x2a6d1328, 0x0ebe9fdc), TOBN(0x16bd173f, 0x98a4755a),
+     TOBN(0xfbb9b245, 0x2133ffd9), TOBN(0x39a8b2f1, 0x830f1a20),
+     TOBN(0x484bc97d, 0xd5a1f52a), TOBN(0xd6aebf56, 0xa40eddf8),
+     TOBN(0x32257acb, 0x76ccdac6), TOBN(0xaf4d36ec, 0x1586ff27),
+     TOBN(0x8eaa8863, 0xf8de7dd1), TOBN(0x0045d5cf, 0x88647c16)}
+    ,
+    {TOBN(0xa6f3d574, 0xc005979d), TOBN(0xc2072b42, 0x6a40e350),
+     TOBN(0xfca5c156, 0x8de2ecf9), TOBN(0xa8c8bf5b, 0xa515344e),
+     TOBN(0x97aee555, 0x114df14a), TOBN(0xd4374a4d, 0xfdc5ec6b),
+     TOBN(0x754cc28f, 0x2ca85418), TOBN(0x71cb9e27, 0xd3c41f78),
+     TOBN(0x89105079, 0x03605c39), TOBN(0xf0843d9e, 0xa142c96c),
+     TOBN(0xf3744934, 0x16923684), TOBN(0x732caa2f, 0xfa0a2893),
+     TOBN(0xb2e8c270, 0x61160170), TOBN(0xc32788cc, 0x437fbaa3),
+     TOBN(0x39cd818e, 0xa6eda3ac), TOBN(0xe2e94239, 0x9e2b2e07),
+     TOBN(0x6967d39b, 0x0260e52a), TOBN(0xd42585cc, 0x90653325),
+     TOBN(0x0d9bd605, 0x21ca7954), TOBN(0x4fa20877, 0x81ed57b3),
+     TOBN(0x60c1eff8, 0xe34a0bbe), TOBN(0x56b0040c, 0x84f6ef64),
+     TOBN(0x28be2b24, 0xb1af8483), TOBN(0xb2278163, 0xf5531614),
+     TOBN(0x8df27545, 0x5922ac1c), TOBN(0xa7b3ef5c, 0xa52b3f63),
+     TOBN(0x8e77b214, 0x71de57c4), TOBN(0x31682c10, 0x834c008b),
+     TOBN(0xc76824f0, 0x4bd55d31), TOBN(0xb6d1c086, 0x17b61c71),
+     TOBN(0x31db0903, 0xc2a5089d), TOBN(0x9c092172, 0x184e5d3f),
+     TOBN(0xdd7ced5b, 0xc00cc638), TOBN(0x1a2015eb, 0x61278fc2),
+     TOBN(0x2e8e5288, 0x6a37f8d6), TOBN(0xc457786f, 0xe79933ad),
+     TOBN(0xb3fe4cce, 0x2c51211a), TOBN(0xad9b10b2, 0x24c20498),
+     TOBN(0x90d87a4f, 0xd28db5e5), TOBN(0x698cd105, 0x3aca2fc3),
+     TOBN(0x4f112d07, 0xe91b536d), TOBN(0xceb982f2, 0x9eba09d6),
+     TOBN(0x3c157b2c, 0x197c396f), TOBN(0xe23c2d41, 0x7b66eb24),
+     TOBN(0x480c57d9, 0x3f330d37), TOBN(0xb3a4c8a1, 0x79108deb),
+     TOBN(0x702388de, 0xcb199ce5), TOBN(0x0b019211, 0xb944a8d4),
+     TOBN(0x24f2a692, 0x840bb336), TOBN(0x7c353bdc, 0xa669fa7b),
+     TOBN(0xda20d6fc, 0xdec9c300), TOBN(0x625fbe2f, 0xa13a4f17),
+     TOBN(0xa2b1b61a, 0xdbc17328), TOBN(0x008965bf, 0xa9515621),
+     TOBN(0x49690939, 0xc620ff46), TOBN(0x182dd27d, 0x8717e91c),
+     TOBN(0x5ace5035, 0xea6c3997), TOBN(0x54259aaa, 0xc2610bef),
+     TOBN(0xef18bb3f, 0x3c80dd39), TOBN(0x6910b95b, 0x5fc3fa39),
+     TOBN(0xfce2f510, 0x43e09aee), TOBN(0xced56c9f, 0xa7675665),
+     TOBN(0x10e265ac, 0xd872db61), TOBN(0x6982812e, 0xae9fce69),
+     TOBN(0x29be11c6, 0xce800998), TOBN(0x72bb1752, 0xb90360d9),
+     TOBN(0x2c193197, 0x5a4ad590), TOBN(0x2ba2f548, 0x9fc1dbc0),
+     TOBN(0x7fe4eebb, 0xe490ebe0), TOBN(0x12a0a4cd, 0x7fae11c0),
+     TOBN(0x7197cf81, 0xe903ba37), TOBN(0xcf7d4aa8, 0xde1c6dd8),
+     TOBN(0x92af6bf4, 0x3fd5684c), TOBN(0x2b26eecf, 0x80360aa1),
+     TOBN(0xbd960f30, 0x00546a82), TOBN(0x407b3c43, 0xf59ad8fe),
+     TOBN(0x86cae5fe, 0x249c82ba), TOBN(0x9e0faec7, 0x2463744c),
+     TOBN(0x87f551e8, 0x94916272), TOBN(0x033f9344, 0x6ceb0615),
+     TOBN(0x1e5eb0d1, 0x8be82e84), TOBN(0x89967f0e, 0x7a582fef),
+     TOBN(0xbcf687d5, 0xa6e921fa), TOBN(0xdfee4cf3, 0xd37a09ba),
+     TOBN(0x94f06965, 0xb493c465), TOBN(0x638b9a1c, 0x7635c030),
+     TOBN(0x76667864, 0x66f05e9f), TOBN(0xccaf6808, 0xc04da725),
+     TOBN(0xca2eb690, 0x768fccfc), TOBN(0xf402d37d, 0xb835b362),
+     TOBN(0x0efac0d0, 0xe2fdfcce), TOBN(0xefc9cdef, 0xb638d990),
+     TOBN(0x2af12b72, 0xd1669a8b), TOBN(0x33c536bc, 0x5774ccbd),
+     TOBN(0x30b21909, 0xfb34870e), TOBN(0xc38fa2f7, 0x7df25aca),
+     TOBN(0x74c5f02b, 0xbf81f3f5), TOBN(0x0525a5ae, 0xaf7e4581),
+     TOBN(0x88d2aaba, 0x433c54ae), TOBN(0xed9775db, 0x806a56c5),
+     TOBN(0xd320738a, 0xc0edb37d), TOBN(0x25fdb6ee, 0x66cc1f51),
+     TOBN(0xac661d17, 0x10600d76), TOBN(0x931ec1f3, 0xbdd1ed76),
+     TOBN(0x65c11d62, 0x19ee43f1), TOBN(0x5cd57c3e, 0x60829d97),
+     TOBN(0xd26c91a3, 0x984be6e8), TOBN(0xf08d9309, 0x8b0c53bd),
+     TOBN(0x94bc9e5b, 0xc016e4ea), TOBN(0xd3916839, 0x11d43d2b),
+     TOBN(0x886c5ad7, 0x73701155), TOBN(0xe0377626, 0x20b00715),
+     TOBN(0x7f01c9ec, 0xaa80ba59), TOBN(0x3083411a, 0x68538e51),
+     TOBN(0x970370f1, 0xe88128af), TOBN(0x625cc3db, 0x91dec14b),
+     TOBN(0xfef9666c, 0x01ac3107), TOBN(0xb2a8d577, 0xd5057ac3),
+     TOBN(0xb0f26299, 0x92be5df7), TOBN(0xf579c8e5, 0x00353924),
+     TOBN(0xb8fa3d93, 0x1341ed7a), TOBN(0x4223272c, 0xa7b59d49),
+     TOBN(0x3dcb1947, 0x83b8c4a4), TOBN(0x4e413c01, 0xed1302e4),
+     TOBN(0x6d999127, 0xe17e44ce), TOBN(0xee86bf75, 0x33b3adfb),
+     TOBN(0xf6902fe6, 0x25aa96ca), TOBN(0xb73540e4, 0xe5aae47d),
+     TOBN(0x32801d7b, 0x1b4a158c), TOBN(0xe571c99e, 0x27e2a369),
+     TOBN(0x40cb76c0, 0x10d9f197), TOBN(0xc308c289, 0x3167c0ae),
+     TOBN(0xa6ef9dd3, 0xeb7958f2), TOBN(0xa7226dfc, 0x300879b1),
+     TOBN(0x6cd0b362, 0x7edf0636), TOBN(0x4efbce6c, 0x7bc37eed),
+     TOBN(0x75f92a05, 0x8d699021), TOBN(0x586d4c79, 0x772566e3),
+     TOBN(0x378ca5f1, 0x761ad23a), TOBN(0x650d86fc, 0x1465a8ac),
+     TOBN(0x7a4ed457, 0x842ba251), TOBN(0x6b65e3e6, 0x42234933),
+     TOBN(0xaf1543b7, 0x31aad657), TOBN(0xa4cefe98, 0xcbfec369),
+     TOBN(0xb587da90, 0x9f47befb), TOBN(0x6562e9fb, 0x41312d13),
+     TOBN(0xa691ea59, 0xeff1cefe), TOBN(0xcc30477a, 0x05fc4cf6),
+     TOBN(0xa1632461, 0x0b0ffd3d), TOBN(0xa1f16f3b, 0x5b355956),
+     TOBN(0x5b148d53, 0x4224ec24), TOBN(0xdc834e7b, 0xf977012a),
+     TOBN(0x7bfc5e75, 0xb2c69dbc), TOBN(0x3aa77a29, 0x03c3da6c),
+     TOBN(0xde0df03c, 0xca910271), TOBN(0xcbd5ca4a, 0x7806dc55),
+     TOBN(0xe1ca5807, 0x6db476cb), TOBN(0xfde15d62, 0x5f37a31e),
+     TOBN(0xf49af520, 0xf41af416), TOBN(0x96c5c5b1, 0x7d342db5),
+     TOBN(0x155c43b7, 0xeb4ceb9b), TOBN(0x2e993010, 0x4e77371a),
+     TOBN(0x1d2987da, 0x675d43af), TOBN(0xef2bc1c0, 0x8599fd72),
+     TOBN(0x96894b7b, 0x9342f6b2), TOBN(0x201eadf2, 0x7c8e71f0),
+     TOBN(0xf3479d9f, 0x4a1f3efc), TOBN(0xe0f8a742, 0x702a9704),
+     TOBN(0xeafd44b6, 0xb3eba40c), TOBN(0xf9739f29, 0xc1c1e0d0),
+     TOBN(0x0091471a, 0x619d505e), TOBN(0xc15f9c96, 0x9d7c263e),
+     TOBN(0x5be47285, 0x83afbe33), TOBN(0xa3b6d6af, 0x04f1e092),
+     TOBN(0xe76526b9, 0x751a9d11), TOBN(0x2ec5b26d, 0x9a4ae4d2),
+     TOBN(0xeb66f4d9, 0x02f6fb8d), TOBN(0x4063c561, 0x96912164),
+     TOBN(0xeb7050c1, 0x80ef3000), TOBN(0x288d1c33, 0xeaa5b3f0),
+     TOBN(0xe87c68d6, 0x07806fd8), TOBN(0xb2f7f9d5, 0x4bbbf50f),
+     TOBN(0x25972f3a, 0xac8d6627), TOBN(0xf8547774, 0x10e8c13b),
+     TOBN(0xcc50ef6c, 0x872b4a60), TOBN(0xab2a34a4, 0x4613521b),
+     TOBN(0x39c5c190, 0x983e15d1), TOBN(0x61dde5df, 0x59905512),
+     TOBN(0xe417f621, 0x9f2275f3), TOBN(0x0750c8b6, 0x451d894b),
+     TOBN(0x75b04ab9, 0x78b0bdaa), TOBN(0x3bfd9fd4, 0x458589bd),
+     TOBN(0xf1013e30, 0xee9120b6), TOBN(0x2b51af93, 0x23a4743e),
+     TOBN(0xea96ffae, 0x48d14d9e), TOBN(0x71dc0dbe, 0x698a1d32),
+     TOBN(0x914962d2, 0x0180cca4), TOBN(0x1ae60677, 0xc3568963),
+     TOBN(0x8cf227b1, 0x437bc444), TOBN(0xc650c83b, 0xc9962c7a),
+     TOBN(0x23c2c7dd, 0xfe7ccfc4), TOBN(0xf925c89d, 0x1b929d48),
+     TOBN(0x4460f74b, 0x06783c33), TOBN(0xac2c8d49, 0xa590475a),
+     TOBN(0xfb40b407, 0xb807bba0), TOBN(0x9d1e362d, 0x69ff8f3a),
+     TOBN(0xa33e9681, 0xcbef64a4), TOBN(0x67ece5fa, 0x332fb4b2),
+     TOBN(0x6900a99b, 0x739f10e3), TOBN(0xc3341ca9, 0xff525925),
+     TOBN(0xee18a626, 0xa9e2d041), TOBN(0xa5a83685, 0x29580ddd),
+     TOBN(0xf3470c81, 0x9d7de3cd), TOBN(0xedf02586, 0x2062cf9c),
+     TOBN(0xf43522fa, 0xc010edb0), TOBN(0x30314135, 0x13a4b1ae),
+     TOBN(0xc792e02a, 0xdb22b94b), TOBN(0x993d8ae9, 0xa1eaa45b),
+     TOBN(0x8aad6cd3, 0xcd1e1c63), TOBN(0x89529ca7, 0xc5ce688a),
+     TOBN(0x2ccee3aa, 0xe572a253), TOBN(0xe02b6438, 0x02a21efb),
+     TOBN(0xa7091b6e, 0xc9430358), TOBN(0x06d1b1fa, 0x9d7db504),
+     TOBN(0x58846d32, 0xc4744733), TOBN(0x40517c71, 0x379f9e34),
+     TOBN(0x2f65655f, 0x130ef6ca), TOBN(0x526e4488, 0xf1f3503f),
+     TOBN(0x8467bd17, 0x7ee4a976), TOBN(0x1d9dc913, 0x921363d1),
+     TOBN(0xd8d24c33, 0xb069e041), TOBN(0x5eb5da0a, 0x2cdf7f51),
+     TOBN(0x1c0f3cb1, 0x197b994f), TOBN(0x3c95a6c5, 0x2843eae9),
+     TOBN(0x7766ffc9, 0xa6097ea5), TOBN(0x7bea4093, 0xd723b867),
+     TOBN(0xb48e1f73, 0x4db378f9), TOBN(0x70025b00, 0xe37b77ac),
+     TOBN(0x943dc8e7, 0xaf24ad46), TOBN(0xb98a15ac, 0x16d00a85),
+     TOBN(0x3adc38ba, 0x2743b004), TOBN(0xb1c7f4f7, 0x334415ee),
+     TOBN(0xea43df8f, 0x1e62d05a), TOBN(0x32618905, 0x9d76a3b6),
+     TOBN(0x2fbd0bb5, 0xa23a0f46), TOBN(0x5bc971db, 0x6a01918c),
+     TOBN(0x7801d94a, 0xb4743f94), TOBN(0xb94df65e, 0x676ae22b),
+     TOBN(0xaafcbfab, 0xaf95894c), TOBN(0x7b9bdc07, 0x276b2241),
+     TOBN(0xeaf98362, 0x5bdda48b), TOBN(0x5977faf2, 0xa3fcb4df),
+     TOBN(0xbed042ef, 0x052c4b5b), TOBN(0x9fe87f71, 0x067591f0),
+     TOBN(0xc89c73ca, 0x22f24ec7), TOBN(0x7d37fa9e, 0xe64a9f1b),
+     TOBN(0x2710841a, 0x15562627), TOBN(0x2c01a613, 0xc243b034),
+     TOBN(0x1d135c56, 0x2bc68609), TOBN(0xc2ca1715, 0x8b03f1f6),
+     TOBN(0xc9966c2d, 0x3eb81d82), TOBN(0xc02abf4a, 0x8f6df13e),
+     TOBN(0x77b34bd7, 0x8f72b43b), TOBN(0xaff6218f, 0x360c82b0),
+     TOBN(0x0aa5726c, 0x8d55b9d2), TOBN(0xdc0adbe9, 0x99e9bffb),
+     TOBN(0x9097549c, 0xefb9e72a), TOBN(0x16755712, 0x9dfb3111),
+     TOBN(0xdd8bf984, 0xf26847f9), TOBN(0xbcb8e387, 0xdfb30cb7),
+     TOBN(0xc1fd32a7, 0x5171ef9c), TOBN(0x977f3fc7, 0x389b363f),
+     TOBN(0x116eaf2b, 0xf4babda0), TOBN(0xfeab68bd, 0xf7113c8e),
+     TOBN(0xd1e3f064, 0xb7def526), TOBN(0x1ac30885, 0xe0b3fa02),
+     TOBN(0x1c5a6e7b, 0x40142d9d), TOBN(0x839b5603, 0x30921c0b),
+     TOBN(0x48f301fa, 0x36a116a3), TOBN(0x380e1107, 0xcfd9ee6d),
+     TOBN(0x7945ead8, 0x58854be1), TOBN(0x4111c12e, 0xcbd4d49d),
+     TOBN(0xece3b1ec, 0x3a29c2ef), TOBN(0x6356d404, 0x8d3616f5),
+     TOBN(0x9f0d6a8f, 0x594d320e), TOBN(0x0989316d, 0xf651ccd2),
+     TOBN(0x6c32117a, 0x0f8fdde4), TOBN(0x9abe5cc5, 0xa26a9bbc),
+     TOBN(0xcff560fb, 0x9723f671), TOBN(0x21b2a12d, 0x7f3d593c),
+     TOBN(0xe4cb18da, 0x24ba0696), TOBN(0x186e2220, 0xc3543384),
+     TOBN(0x722f64e0, 0x88312c29), TOBN(0x94282a99, 0x17dc7752),
+     TOBN(0x62467bbf, 0x5a85ee89), TOBN(0xf435c650, 0xf10076a0),
+     TOBN(0xc9ff1539, 0x43b3a50b), TOBN(0x7132130c, 0x1a53efbc),
+     TOBN(0x31bfe063, 0xf7b0c5b7), TOBN(0xb0179a7d, 0x4ea994cc),
+     TOBN(0x12d064b3, 0xc85f455b), TOBN(0x47259328, 0x8f6e0062),
+     TOBN(0xf64e590b, 0xb875d6d9), TOBN(0x22dd6225, 0xad92bcc7),
+     TOBN(0xb658038e, 0xb9c3bd6d), TOBN(0x00cdb0d6, 0xfbba27c8),
+     TOBN(0x0c681337, 0x1062c45d), TOBN(0xd8515b8c, 0x2d33407d),
+     TOBN(0xcb8f699e, 0x8cbb5ecf), TOBN(0x8c4347f8, 0xc608d7d8),
+     TOBN(0x2c11850a, 0xbb3e00db), TOBN(0x20a8dafd, 0xecb49d19),
+     TOBN(0xbd781480, 0x45ee2f40), TOBN(0x75e354af, 0x416b60cf),
+     TOBN(0xde0b58a1, 0x8d49a8c4), TOBN(0xe40e94e2, 0xfa359536),
+     TOBN(0xbd4fa59f, 0x62accd76), TOBN(0x05cf466a, 0x8c762837),
+     TOBN(0xb5abda99, 0x448c277b), TOBN(0x5a9e01bf, 0x48b13740),
+     TOBN(0x9d457798, 0x326aad8d), TOBN(0xbdef4954, 0xc396f7e7),
+     TOBN(0x6fb274a2, 0xc253e292), TOBN(0x2800bf0a, 0x1cfe53e7),
+     TOBN(0x22426d31, 0x44438fd4), TOBN(0xef233923, 0x5e259f9a),
+     TOBN(0x4188503c, 0x03f66264), TOBN(0x9e5e7f13, 0x7f9fdfab),
+     TOBN(0x565eb76c, 0x5fcc1aba), TOBN(0xea632548, 0x59b5bff8),
+     TOBN(0x5587c087, 0xaab6d3fa), TOBN(0x92b639ea, 0x6ce39c1b),
+     TOBN(0x0706e782, 0x953b135c), TOBN(0x7308912e, 0x425268ef),
+     TOBN(0x599e92c7, 0x090e7469), TOBN(0x83b90f52, 0x9bc35e75),
+     TOBN(0x4750b3d0, 0x244975b3), TOBN(0xf3a44358, 0x11965d72),
+     TOBN(0x179c6774, 0x9c8dc751), TOBN(0xff18cdfe, 0xd23d9ff0),
+     TOBN(0xc4013833, 0x2028e247), TOBN(0x96e280e2, 0xf3bfbc79),
+     TOBN(0xf60417bd, 0xd0880a84), TOBN(0x263c9f3d, 0x2a568151),
+     TOBN(0x36be15b3, 0x2d2ce811), TOBN(0x846dc0c2, 0xf8291d21),
+     TOBN(0x5cfa0ecb, 0x789fcfdb), TOBN(0x45a0beed, 0xd7535b9a),
+     TOBN(0xec8e9f07, 0x96d69af1), TOBN(0x31a7c5b8, 0x599ab6dc),
+     TOBN(0xd36d45ef, 0xf9e2e09f), TOBN(0x3cf49ef1, 0xdcee954b),
+     TOBN(0x6be34cf3, 0x086cff9b), TOBN(0x88dbd491, 0x39a3360f),
+     TOBN(0x1e96b8cc, 0x0dbfbd1d), TOBN(0xc1e5f7bf, 0xcb7e2552),
+     TOBN(0x0547b214, 0x28819d98), TOBN(0xc770dd9c, 0x7aea9dcb),
+     TOBN(0xaef0d4c7, 0x041d68c8), TOBN(0xcc2b9818, 0x13cb9ba8),
+     TOBN(0x7fc7bc76, 0xfe86c607), TOBN(0x6b7b9337, 0x502a9a95),
+     TOBN(0x1948dc27, 0xd14dab63), TOBN(0x249dd198, 0xdae047be),
+     TOBN(0xe8356584, 0xa981a202), TOBN(0x3531dd18, 0x3a893387),
+     TOBN(0x1be11f90, 0xc85c7209), TOBN(0x93d2fe1e, 0xe2a52b5a),
+     TOBN(0x8225bfe2, 0xec6d6b97), TOBN(0x9cf6d6f4, 0xbd0aa5de),
+     TOBN(0x911459cb, 0x54779f5f), TOBN(0x5649cddb, 0x86aeb1f3),
+     TOBN(0x32133579, 0x3f26ce5a), TOBN(0xc289a102, 0x550f431e),
+     TOBN(0x559dcfda, 0x73b84c6f), TOBN(0x84973819, 0xee3ac4d7),
+     TOBN(0xb51e55e6, 0xf2606a82), TOBN(0xe25f7061, 0x90f2fb57),
+     TOBN(0xacef6c2a, 0xb1a4e37c), TOBN(0x864e359d, 0x5dcf2706),
+     TOBN(0x479e6b18, 0x7ce57316), TOBN(0x2cab2500, 0x3a96b23d),
+     TOBN(0xed489862, 0x8ef16df7), TOBN(0x2056538c, 0xef3758b5),
+     TOBN(0xa7df865e, 0xf15d3101), TOBN(0x80c5533a, 0x61b553d7),
+     TOBN(0x366e1997, 0x4ed14294), TOBN(0x6620741f, 0xb3c0bcd6),
+     TOBN(0x21d1d9c4, 0xedc45418), TOBN(0x005b859e, 0xc1cc4a9d),
+     TOBN(0xdf01f630, 0xa1c462f0), TOBN(0x15d06cf3, 0xf26820c7),
+     TOBN(0x9f7f24ee, 0x3484be47), TOBN(0x2ff33e96, 0x4a0c902f),
+     TOBN(0x00bdf457, 0x5a0bc453), TOBN(0x2378dfaf, 0x1aa238db),
+     TOBN(0x272420ec, 0x856720f2), TOBN(0x2ad9d95b, 0x96797291),
+     TOBN(0xd1242cc6, 0x768a1558), TOBN(0x2e287f8b, 0x5cc86aa8),
+     TOBN(0x796873d0, 0x990cecaa), TOBN(0xade55f81, 0x675d4080),
+     TOBN(0x2645eea3, 0x21f0cd84), TOBN(0x7a1efa0f, 0xb4e17d02),
+     TOBN(0xf6858420, 0x037cc061), TOBN(0x682e05f0, 0xd5d43e12),
+     TOBN(0x59c36994, 0x27218710), TOBN(0x85cbba4d, 0x3f7cd2fc),
+     TOBN(0x726f9729, 0x7a3cd22a), TOBN(0x9f8cd5dc, 0x4a628397),
+     TOBN(0x17b93ab9, 0xc23165ed), TOBN(0xff5f5dbf, 0x122823d4),
+     TOBN(0xc1e4e4b5, 0x654a446d), TOBN(0xd1a9496f, 0x677257ba),
+     TOBN(0x6387ba94, 0xde766a56), TOBN(0x23608bc8, 0x521ec74a),
+     TOBN(0x16a522d7, 0x6688c4d4), TOBN(0x9d6b4282, 0x07373abd),
+     TOBN(0xa62f07ac, 0xb42efaa3), TOBN(0xf73e00f7, 0xe3b90180),
+     TOBN(0x36175fec, 0x49421c3e), TOBN(0xc4e44f9b, 0x3dcf2678),
+     TOBN(0x76df436b, 0x7220f09f), TOBN(0x172755fb, 0x3aa8b6cf),
+     TOBN(0xbab89d57, 0x446139cc), TOBN(0x0a0a6e02, 0x5fe0208f),
+     TOBN(0xcdbb63e2, 0x11e5d399), TOBN(0x33ecaa12, 0xa8977f0b),
+     TOBN(0x59598b21, 0xf7c42664), TOBN(0xb3e91b32, 0xab65d08a),
+     TOBN(0x035822ee, 0xf4502526), TOBN(0x1dcf0176, 0x720a82a9),
+     TOBN(0x50f8598f, 0x3d589e02), TOBN(0xdf0478ff, 0xb1d63d2c),
+     TOBN(0x8b8068bd, 0x1571cd07), TOBN(0x30c3aa4f, 0xd79670cd),
+     TOBN(0x25e8fd4b, 0x941ade7f), TOBN(0x3d1debdc, 0x32790011),
+     TOBN(0x65b6dcbd, 0x3a3f9ff0), TOBN(0x282736a4, 0x793de69c),
+     TOBN(0xef69a0c3, 0xd41d3bd3), TOBN(0xb533b8c9, 0x07a26bde),
+     TOBN(0xe2801d97, 0xdb2edf9f), TOBN(0xdc4a8269, 0xe1877af0),
+     TOBN(0x6c1c5851, 0x3d590dbe), TOBN(0x84632f6b, 0xee4e9357),
+     TOBN(0xd36d36b7, 0x79b33374), TOBN(0xb46833e3, 0x9bbca2e6),
+     TOBN(0x37893913, 0xf7fc0586), TOBN(0x385315f7, 0x66bf4719),
+     TOBN(0x72c56293, 0xb31855dc), TOBN(0xd1416d4e, 0x849061fe),
+     TOBN(0xbeb3ab78, 0x51047213), TOBN(0x447f6e61, 0xf040c996),
+     TOBN(0xd06d310d, 0x638b1d0c), TOBN(0xe28a413f, 0xbad1522e),
+     TOBN(0x685a76cb, 0x82003f86), TOBN(0x610d07f7, 0x0bcdbca3),
+     TOBN(0x6ff66021, 0x9ca4c455), TOBN(0x7df39b87, 0xcea10eec),
+     TOBN(0xb9255f96, 0xe22db218), TOBN(0x8cc6d9eb, 0x08a34c44),
+     TOBN(0xcd4ffb86, 0x859f9276), TOBN(0x8fa15eb2, 0x50d07335),
+     TOBN(0xdf553845, 0xcf2c24b5), TOBN(0x89f66a9f, 0x52f9c3ba),
+     TOBN(0x8f22b5b9, 0xe4a7ceb3), TOBN(0xaffef809, 0x0e134686),
+     TOBN(0x3e53e1c6, 0x8eb8fac2), TOBN(0x93c1e4eb, 0x28aec98e),
+     TOBN(0xb6b91ec5, 0x32a43bcb), TOBN(0x2dbfa947, 0xb2d74a51),
+     TOBN(0xe065d190, 0xca84bad7), TOBN(0xfb13919f, 0xad58e65c),
+     TOBN(0x3c41718b, 0xf1cb6e31), TOBN(0x688969f0, 0x06d05c3f),
+     TOBN(0xd4f94ce7, 0x21264d45), TOBN(0xfdfb65e9, 0x7367532b),
+     TOBN(0x5b1be8b1, 0x0945a39d), TOBN(0x229f789c, 0x2b8baf3b),
+     TOBN(0xd8f41f3e, 0x6f49f15d), TOBN(0x678ce828, 0x907f0792),
+     TOBN(0xc69ace82, 0xfca6e867), TOBN(0x106451ae, 0xd01dcc89),
+     TOBN(0x1bb4f7f0, 0x19fc32d2), TOBN(0x64633dfc, 0xb00c52d2),
+     TOBN(0x8f13549a, 0xad9ea445), TOBN(0x99a3bf50, 0xfb323705),
+     TOBN(0x0c9625a2, 0x534d4dbc), TOBN(0x45b8f1d1, 0xc2a2fea3),
+     TOBN(0x76ec21a1, 0xa530fc1a), TOBN(0x4bac9c2a, 0x9e5bd734),
+     TOBN(0x5996d76a, 0x7b4e3587), TOBN(0x0045cdee, 0x1182d9e3),
+     TOBN(0x1aee24b9, 0x1207f13d), TOBN(0x66452e97, 0x97345a41),
+     TOBN(0x16e5b054, 0x9f950cd0), TOBN(0x9cc72fb1, 0xd7fdd075),
+     TOBN(0x6edd61e7, 0x66249663), TOBN(0xde4caa4d, 0xf043cccb),
+     TOBN(0x11b1f57a, 0x55c7ac17), TOBN(0x779cbd44, 0x1a85e24d),
+     TOBN(0x78030f86, 0xe46081e7), TOBN(0xfd4a6032, 0x8e20f643),
+     TOBN(0xcc7a6488, 0x0a750c0f), TOBN(0x39bacfe3, 0x4e548e83),
+     TOBN(0x3d418c76, 0x0c110f05), TOBN(0x3e4daa4c, 0xb1f11588),
+     TOBN(0x2733e7b5, 0x5ffc69ff), TOBN(0x46f147bc, 0x92053127),
+     TOBN(0x885b2434, 0xd722df94), TOBN(0x6a444f65, 0xe6fc6b7c)}
+    ,
+    {TOBN(0x7a1a465a, 0xc3f16ea8), TOBN(0x115a461d, 0xb2f1d11c),
+     TOBN(0x4767dd95, 0x6c68a172), TOBN(0x3392f2eb, 0xd13a4698),
+     TOBN(0xc7a99ccd, 0xe526cdc7), TOBN(0x8e537fdc, 0x22292b81),
+     TOBN(0x76d8cf69, 0xa6d39198), TOBN(0xffc5ff43, 0x2446852d),
+     TOBN(0x97b14f7e, 0xa90567e6), TOBN(0x513257b7, 0xb6ae5cb7),
+     TOBN(0x85454a3c, 0x9f10903d), TOBN(0xd8d2c9ad, 0x69bc3724),
+     TOBN(0x38da9324, 0x6b29cb44), TOBN(0xb540a21d, 0x77c8cbac),
+     TOBN(0x9bbfe435, 0x01918e42), TOBN(0xfffa707a, 0x56c3614e),
+     TOBN(0x0ce4e3f1, 0xd4e353b7), TOBN(0x062d8a14, 0xef46b0a0),
+     TOBN(0x6408d5ab, 0x574b73fd), TOBN(0xbc41d1c9, 0xd3273ffd),
+     TOBN(0x3538e1e7, 0x6be77800), TOBN(0x71fe8b37, 0xc5655031),
+     TOBN(0x1cd91621, 0x6b9b331a), TOBN(0xad825d0b, 0xbb388f73),
+     TOBN(0x56c2e05b, 0x1cb76219), TOBN(0x0ec0bf91, 0x71567e7e),
+     TOBN(0xe7076f86, 0x61c4c910), TOBN(0xd67b085b, 0xbabc04d9),
+     TOBN(0x9fb90459, 0x5e93a96a), TOBN(0x7526c1ea, 0xfbdc249a),
+     TOBN(0x0d44d367, 0xecdd0bb7), TOBN(0x95399917, 0x9dc0d695),
+     TOBN(0x61360ee9, 0x9e240d18), TOBN(0x057cdcac, 0xb4b94466),
+     TOBN(0xe7667cd1, 0x2fe5325c), TOBN(0x1fa297b5, 0x21974e3b),
+     TOBN(0xfa4081e7, 0xdb083d76), TOBN(0x31993be6, 0xf206bd15),
+     TOBN(0x8949269b, 0x14c19f8c), TOBN(0x21468d72, 0xa9d92357),
+     TOBN(0x2ccbc583, 0xa4c506ec), TOBN(0x957ed188, 0xd1acfe97),
+     TOBN(0x8baed833, 0x12f1aea2), TOBN(0xef2a6cb4, 0x8325362d),
+     TOBN(0x130dde42, 0x8e195c43), TOBN(0xc842025a, 0x0e6050c6),
+     TOBN(0x2da972a7, 0x08686a5d), TOBN(0xb52999a1, 0xe508b4a8),
+     TOBN(0xd9f090b9, 0x10a5a8bd), TOBN(0xca91d249, 0x096864da),
+     TOBN(0x8e6a93be, 0x3f67dbc1), TOBN(0xacae6fba, 0xf5f4764c),
+     TOBN(0x1563c6e0, 0xd21411a0), TOBN(0x28fa787f, 0xda0a4ad8),
+     TOBN(0xd524491c, 0x908c8030), TOBN(0x1257ba0e, 0x4c795f07),
+     TOBN(0x83f49167, 0xceca9754), TOBN(0x426d2cf6, 0x4b7939a0),
+     TOBN(0x2555e355, 0x723fd0bf), TOBN(0xa96e6d06, 0xc4f144e2),
+     TOBN(0x4768a8dd, 0x87880e61), TOBN(0x15543815, 0xe508e4d5),
+     TOBN(0x09d7e772, 0xb1b65e15), TOBN(0x63439dd6, 0xac302fa0),
+     TOBN(0xb93f802f, 0xc14e35c2), TOBN(0x71735b7c, 0x4341333c),
+     TOBN(0x03a25104, 0x16d4f362), TOBN(0x3f4d069b, 0xbf433c8e),
+     TOBN(0x0d83ae01, 0xf78f5a7c), TOBN(0x50a8ffbe, 0x7c4eed07),
+     TOBN(0xc74f8906, 0x76e10f83), TOBN(0x7d080966, 0x9ddaf8e1),
+     TOBN(0xb11df8e1, 0x698e04cc), TOBN(0x877be203, 0x169005c8),
+     TOBN(0x32749e8c, 0x4f3c6179), TOBN(0x2dbc9d0a, 0x7853fc05),
+     TOBN(0x187d4f93, 0x9454d937), TOBN(0xe682ce9d, 0xb4800e1b),
+     TOBN(0xa9129ad8, 0x165e68e8), TOBN(0x0fe29735, 0xbe7f785b),
+     TOBN(0x5303f40c, 0x5b9e02b7), TOBN(0xa37c9692, 0x35ee04e8),
+     TOBN(0x5f46cc20, 0x34d6632b), TOBN(0x55ef72b2, 0x96ac545b),
+     TOBN(0xabec5c1f, 0x7b91b062), TOBN(0x0a79e1c7, 0xbb33e821),
+     TOBN(0xbb04b428, 0x3a9f4117), TOBN(0x0de1f28f, 0xfd2a475a),
+     TOBN(0x31019ccf, 0x3a4434b4), TOBN(0xa3458111, 0x1a7954dc),
+     TOBN(0xa9dac80d, 0xe34972a7), TOBN(0xb043d054, 0x74f6b8dd),
+     TOBN(0x021c319e, 0x11137b1a), TOBN(0x00a754ce, 0xed5cc03f),
+     TOBN(0x0aa2c794, 0xcbea5ad4), TOBN(0x093e67f4, 0x70c015b6),
+     TOBN(0x72cdfee9, 0xc97e3f6b), TOBN(0xc10bcab4, 0xb6da7461),
+     TOBN(0x3b02d2fc, 0xb59806b9), TOBN(0x85185e89, 0xa1de6f47),
+     TOBN(0x39e6931f, 0x0eb6c4d4), TOBN(0x4d4440bd, 0xd4fa5b04),
+     TOBN(0x5418786e, 0x34be7eb8), TOBN(0x6380e521, 0x9d7259bc),
+     TOBN(0x20ac0351, 0xd598d710), TOBN(0x272c4166, 0xcb3a4da4),
+     TOBN(0xdb82fe1a, 0xca71de1f), TOBN(0x746e79f2, 0xd8f54b0f),
+     TOBN(0x6e7fc736, 0x4b573e9b), TOBN(0x75d03f46, 0xfd4b5040),
+     TOBN(0x5c1cc36d, 0x0b98d87b), TOBN(0x513ba3f1, 0x1f472da1),
+     TOBN(0x79d0af26, 0xabb177dd), TOBN(0xf82ab568, 0x7891d564),
+     TOBN(0x2b6768a9, 0x72232173), TOBN(0xefbb3bb0, 0x8c1f6619),
+     TOBN(0xb29c11db, 0xa6d18358), TOBN(0x519e2797, 0xb0916d3a),
+     TOBN(0xd4dc18f0, 0x9188e290), TOBN(0x648e86e3, 0x98b0ca7f),
+     TOBN(0x859d3145, 0x983c38b5), TOBN(0xb14f176c, 0x637abc8b),
+     TOBN(0x2793fb9d, 0xcaff7be6), TOBN(0xebe5a55f, 0x35a66a5a),
+     TOBN(0x7cec1dcd, 0x9f87dc59), TOBN(0x7c595cd3, 0xfbdbf560),
+     TOBN(0x5b543b22, 0x26eb3257), TOBN(0x69080646, 0xc4c935fd),
+     TOBN(0x7f2e4403, 0x81e9ede3), TOBN(0x243c3894, 0xcaf6df0a),
+     TOBN(0x7c605bb1, 0x1c073b11), TOBN(0xcd06a541, 0xba6a4a62),
+     TOBN(0x29168949, 0x49d4e2e5), TOBN(0x33649d07, 0x4af66880),
+     TOBN(0xbfc0c885, 0xe9a85035), TOBN(0xb4e52113, 0xfc410f4b),
+     TOBN(0xdca3b706, 0x78a6513b), TOBN(0x92ea4a2a, 0x9edb1943),
+     TOBN(0x02642216, 0xdb6e2dd8), TOBN(0x9b45d0b4, 0x9fd57894),
+     TOBN(0x114e70db, 0xc69d11ae), TOBN(0x1477dd19, 0x4c57595f),
+     TOBN(0xbc2208b4, 0xec77c272), TOBN(0x95c5b4d7, 0xdb68f59c),
+     TOBN(0xb8c4fc63, 0x42e532b7), TOBN(0x386ba422, 0x9ae35290),
+     TOBN(0xfb5dda42, 0xd201ecbc), TOBN(0x2353dc8b, 0xa0e38fd6),
+     TOBN(0x9a0b85ea, 0x68f7e978), TOBN(0x96ec5682, 0x2ad6d11f),
+     TOBN(0x5e279d6c, 0xe5f6886d), TOBN(0xd3fe03cd, 0x3cb1914d),
+     TOBN(0xfe541fa4, 0x7ea67c77), TOBN(0x952bd2af, 0xe3ea810c),
+     TOBN(0x791fef56, 0x8d01d374), TOBN(0xa3a1c621, 0x0f11336e),
+     TOBN(0x5ad0d5a9, 0xc7ec6d79), TOBN(0xff7038af, 0x3225c342),
+     TOBN(0x003c6689, 0xbc69601b), TOBN(0x25059bc7, 0x45e8747d),
+     TOBN(0xfa4965b2, 0xf2086fbf), TOBN(0xf6840ea6, 0x86916078),
+     TOBN(0xd7ac7620, 0x70081d6c), TOBN(0xe600da31, 0xb5328645),
+     TOBN(0x01916f63, 0x529b8a80), TOBN(0xe80e4858, 0x2d7d6f3e),
+     TOBN(0x29eb0fe8, 0xd664ca7c), TOBN(0xf017637b, 0xe7b43b0c),
+     TOBN(0x9a75c806, 0x76cb2566), TOBN(0x8f76acb1, 0xb24892d9),
+     TOBN(0x7ae7b9cc, 0x1f08fe45), TOBN(0x19ef7329, 0x6a4907d8),
+     TOBN(0x2db4ab71, 0x5f228bf0), TOBN(0xf3cdea39, 0x817032d7),
+     TOBN(0x0b1f482e, 0xdcabe3c0), TOBN(0x3baf76b4, 0xbb86325c),
+     TOBN(0xd49065e0, 0x10089465), TOBN(0x3bab5d29, 0x8e77c596),
+     TOBN(0x7636c3a6, 0x193dbd95), TOBN(0xdef5d294, 0xb246e499),
+     TOBN(0xb22c58b9, 0x286b2475), TOBN(0xa0b93939, 0xcd80862b),
+     TOBN(0x3002c83a, 0xf0992388), TOBN(0x6de01f9b, 0xeacbe14c),
+     TOBN(0x6aac688e, 0xadd70482), TOBN(0x708de92a, 0x7b4a4e8a),
+     TOBN(0x75b6dd73, 0x758a6eef), TOBN(0xea4bf352, 0x725b3c43),
+     TOBN(0x10041f2c, 0x87912868), TOBN(0xb1b1be95, 0xef09297a),
+     TOBN(0x19ae23c5, 0xa9f3860a), TOBN(0xc4f0f839, 0x515dcf4b),
+     TOBN(0x3c7ecca3, 0x97f6306a), TOBN(0x744c44ae, 0x68a3a4b0),
+     TOBN(0x69cd13a0, 0xb3a1d8a2), TOBN(0x7cad0a1e, 0x5256b578),
+     TOBN(0xea653fcd, 0x33791d9e), TOBN(0x9cc2a05d, 0x74b2e05f),
+     TOBN(0x73b391dc, 0xfd7affa2), TOBN(0xddb7091e, 0xb6b05442),
+     TOBN(0xc71e27bf, 0x8538a5c6), TOBN(0x195c63dd, 0x89abff17),
+     TOBN(0xfd315285, 0x1b71e3da), TOBN(0x9cbdfda7, 0xfa680fa0),
+     TOBN(0x9db876ca, 0x849d7eab), TOBN(0xebe2764b, 0x3c273271),
+     TOBN(0x663357e3, 0xf208dcea), TOBN(0x8c5bd833, 0x565b1b70),
+     TOBN(0xccc3b4f5, 0x9837fc0d), TOBN(0x9b641ba8, 0xa79cf00f),
+     TOBN(0x7428243d, 0xdfdf3990), TOBN(0x83a594c4, 0x020786b1),
+     TOBN(0xb712451a, 0x526c4502), TOBN(0x9d39438e, 0x6adb3f93),
+     TOBN(0xfdb261e3, 0xe9ff0ccd), TOBN(0x80344e3c, 0xe07af4c3),
+     TOBN(0x75900d7c, 0x2fa4f126), TOBN(0x08a3b865, 0x5c99a232),
+     TOBN(0x2478b6bf, 0xdb25e0c3), TOBN(0x482cc2c2, 0x71db2edf),
+     TOBN(0x37df7e64, 0x5f321bb8), TOBN(0x8a93821b, 0x9a8005b4),
+     TOBN(0x3fa2f10c, 0xcc8c1958), TOBN(0x0d332218, 0x2c269d0a),
+     TOBN(0x20ab8119, 0xe246b0e6), TOBN(0xb39781e4, 0xd349fd17),
+     TOBN(0xd293231e, 0xb31aa100), TOBN(0x4b779c97, 0xbb032168),
+     TOBN(0x4b3f19e1, 0xc8470500), TOBN(0x45b7efe9, 0x0c4c869d),
+     TOBN(0xdb84f38a, 0xa1a6bbcc), TOBN(0x3b59cb15, 0xb2fddbc1),
+     TOBN(0xba5514df, 0x3fd165e8), TOBN(0x499fd6a9, 0x061f8811),
+     TOBN(0x72cd1fe0, 0xbfef9f00), TOBN(0x120a4bb9, 0x79ad7e8a),
+     TOBN(0xf2ffd095, 0x5f4a5ac5), TOBN(0xcfd174f1, 0x95a7a2f0),
+     TOBN(0xd42301ba, 0x9d17baf1), TOBN(0xd2fa487a, 0x77f22089),
+     TOBN(0x9cb09efe, 0xb1dc77e1), TOBN(0xe9566939, 0x21c99682),
+     TOBN(0x8c546901, 0x6c6067bb), TOBN(0xfd378574, 0x61c24456),
+     TOBN(0x2b6a6cbe, 0x81796b33), TOBN(0x62d550f6, 0x58e87f8b),
+     TOBN(0x1b763e1c, 0x7f1b01b4), TOBN(0x4b93cfea, 0x1b1b5e12),
+     TOBN(0xb9345238, 0x1d531696), TOBN(0x57201c00, 0x88cdde69),
+     TOBN(0xdde92251, 0x9a86afc7), TOBN(0xe3043895, 0xbd35cea8),
+     TOBN(0x7608c1e1, 0x8555970d), TOBN(0x8267dfa9, 0x2535935e),
+     TOBN(0xd4c60a57, 0x322ea38b), TOBN(0xe0bf7977, 0x804ef8b5),
+     TOBN(0x1a0dab28, 0xc06fece4), TOBN(0xd405991e, 0x94e7b49d),
+     TOBN(0xc542b6d2, 0x706dab28), TOBN(0xcb228da3, 0xa91618fb),
+     TOBN(0x224e4164, 0x107d1cea), TOBN(0xeb9fdab3, 0xd0f5d8f1),
+     TOBN(0xc02ba386, 0x0d6e41cd), TOBN(0x676a72c5, 0x9b1f7146),
+     TOBN(0xffd6dd98, 0x4d6cb00b), TOBN(0xcef9c5ca, 0xde2e8d7c),
+     TOBN(0xa1bbf5d7, 0x641c7936), TOBN(0x1b95b230, 0xee8f772e),
+     TOBN(0xf765a92e, 0xe8ac25b1), TOBN(0xceb04cfc, 0x3a18b7c6),
+     TOBN(0x27944cef, 0x0acc8966), TOBN(0xcbb3c957, 0x434c1004),
+     TOBN(0x9c9971a1, 0xa43ff93c), TOBN(0x5bc2db17, 0xa1e358a9),
+     TOBN(0x45b4862e, 0xa8d9bc82), TOBN(0x70ebfbfb, 0x2201e052),
+     TOBN(0xafdf64c7, 0x92871591), TOBN(0xea5bcae6, 0xb42d0219),
+     TOBN(0xde536c55, 0x2ad8f03c), TOBN(0xcd6c3f4d, 0xa76aa33c),
+     TOBN(0xbeb5f623, 0x0bca6de3), TOBN(0xdd20dd99, 0xb1e706fd),
+     TOBN(0x90b3ff9d, 0xac9059d4), TOBN(0x2d7b2902, 0x7ccccc4e),
+     TOBN(0x8a090a59, 0xce98840f), TOBN(0xa5d947e0, 0x8410680a),
+     TOBN(0x49ae346a, 0x923379a5), TOBN(0x7dbc84f9, 0xb28a3156),
+     TOBN(0xfd40d916, 0x54a1aff2), TOBN(0xabf318ba, 0x3a78fb9b),
+     TOBN(0x50152ed8, 0x3029f95e), TOBN(0x9fc1dd77, 0xc58ad7fa),
+     TOBN(0x5fa57915, 0x13595c17), TOBN(0xb9504668, 0x8f62b3a9),
+     TOBN(0x907b5b24, 0xff3055b0), TOBN(0x2e995e35, 0x9a84f125),
+     TOBN(0x87dacf69, 0x7e9bbcfb), TOBN(0x95d0c1d6, 0xe86d96e3),
+     TOBN(0x65726e3c, 0x2d95a75c), TOBN(0x2c3c9001, 0xacd27f21),
+     TOBN(0x1deab561, 0x6c973f57), TOBN(0x108b7e2c, 0xa5221643),
+     TOBN(0x5fee9859, 0xc4ef79d4), TOBN(0xbd62b88a, 0x40d4b8c6),
+     TOBN(0xb4dd29c4, 0x197c75d6), TOBN(0x266a6df2, 0xb7076feb),
+     TOBN(0x9512d0ea, 0x4bf2df11), TOBN(0x1320c24f, 0x6b0cc9ec),
+     TOBN(0x6bb1e0e1, 0x01a59596), TOBN(0x8317c5bb, 0xeff9aaac),
+     TOBN(0x65bb405e, 0x385aa6c9), TOBN(0x613439c1, 0x8f07988f),
+     TOBN(0xd730049f, 0x16a66e91), TOBN(0xe97f2820, 0xfa1b0e0d),
+     TOBN(0x4131e003, 0x304c28ea), TOBN(0x820ab732, 0x526bac62),
+     TOBN(0xb2ac9ef9, 0x28714423), TOBN(0x54ecfffa, 0xadb10cb2),
+     TOBN(0x8781476e, 0xf886a4cc), TOBN(0x4b2c87b5, 0xdb2f8d49),
+     TOBN(0xe857cd20, 0x0a44295d), TOBN(0x707d7d21, 0x58c6b044),
+     TOBN(0xae8521f9, 0xf596757c), TOBN(0x87448f03, 0x67b2b714),
+     TOBN(0x13a9bc45, 0x5ebcd58d), TOBN(0x79bcced9, 0x9122d3c1),
+     TOBN(0x3c644247, 0x9e076642), TOBN(0x0cf22778, 0x2df4767d),
+     TOBN(0x5e61aee4, 0x71d444b6), TOBN(0x211236bf, 0xc5084a1d),
+     TOBN(0x7e15bc9a, 0x4fd3eaf6), TOBN(0x68df2c34, 0xab622bf5),
+     TOBN(0x9e674f0f, 0x59bf4f36), TOBN(0xf883669b, 0xd7f34d73),
+     TOBN(0xc48ac1b8, 0x31497b1d), TOBN(0x323b925d, 0x5106703b),
+     TOBN(0x22156f42, 0x74082008), TOBN(0xeffc521a, 0xc8482bcb),
+     TOBN(0x5c6831bf, 0x12173479), TOBN(0xcaa2528f, 0xc4739490),
+     TOBN(0x84d2102a, 0x8f1b3c4d), TOBN(0xcf64dfc1, 0x2d9bec0d),
+     TOBN(0x433febad, 0x78a546ef), TOBN(0x1f621ec3, 0x7b73cef1),
+     TOBN(0x6aecd627, 0x37338615), TOBN(0x162082ab, 0x01d8edf6),
+     TOBN(0x833a8119, 0x19e86b66), TOBN(0x6023a251, 0xd299b5db),
+     TOBN(0xf5bb0c3a, 0xbbf04b89), TOBN(0x6735eb69, 0xae749a44),
+     TOBN(0xd0e058c5, 0x4713de3b), TOBN(0xfdf2593e, 0x2c3d4ccd),
+     TOBN(0x1b8f414e, 0xfdd23667), TOBN(0xdd52aaca, 0xfa2015ee),
+     TOBN(0x3e31b517, 0xbd9625ff), TOBN(0x5ec9322d, 0x8db5918c),
+     TOBN(0xbc73ac85, 0xa96f5294), TOBN(0x82aa5bf3, 0x61a0666a),
+     TOBN(0x49755810, 0xbf08ac42), TOBN(0xd21cdfd5, 0x891cedfc),
+     TOBN(0x918cb57b, 0x67f8be10), TOBN(0x365d1a7c, 0x56ffa726),
+     TOBN(0x2435c504, 0x6532de93), TOBN(0xc0fc5e10, 0x2674cd02),
+     TOBN(0x6e51fcf8, 0x9cbbb142), TOBN(0x1d436e5a, 0xafc50692),
+     TOBN(0x766bffff, 0x3fbcae22), TOBN(0x3148c2fd, 0xfd55d3b8),
+     TOBN(0x52c7fdc9, 0x233222fa), TOBN(0x89ff1092, 0xe419fb6b),
+     TOBN(0x3cd6db99, 0x25254977), TOBN(0x2e85a161, 0x1cf12ca7),
+     TOBN(0xadd2547c, 0xdc810bc9), TOBN(0xea3f458f, 0x9d257c22),
+     TOBN(0x642c1fbe, 0x27d6b19b), TOBN(0xed07e6b5, 0x140481a6),
+     TOBN(0x6ada1d42, 0x86d2e0f8), TOBN(0xe5920122, 0x0e8a9fd5),
+     TOBN(0x02c936af, 0x708c1b49), TOBN(0x60f30fee, 0x2b4bfaff),
+     TOBN(0x6637ad06, 0x858e6a61), TOBN(0xce4c7767, 0x3fd374d0),
+     TOBN(0x39d54b2d, 0x7188defb), TOBN(0xa8c9d250, 0xf56a6b66),
+     TOBN(0x58fc0f5e, 0xb24fe1dc), TOBN(0x9eaf9dee, 0x6b73f24c),
+     TOBN(0xa90d588b, 0x33650705), TOBN(0xde5b62c5, 0xaf2ec729),
+     TOBN(0x5c72cfae, 0xd3c2b36e), TOBN(0x868c19d5, 0x034435da),
+     TOBN(0x88605f93, 0xe17ee145), TOBN(0xaa60c4ee, 0x77a5d5b1),
+     TOBN(0xbcf5bfd2, 0x3b60c472), TOBN(0xaf4ef13c, 0xeb1d3049),
+     TOBN(0x373f44fc, 0xe13895c9), TOBN(0xf29b382f, 0x0cbc9822),
+     TOBN(0x1bfcb853, 0x73efaef6), TOBN(0xcf56ac9c, 0xa8c96f40),
+     TOBN(0xd7adf109, 0x7a191e24), TOBN(0x98035f44, 0xbf8a8dc2),
+     TOBN(0xf40a71b9, 0x1e750c84), TOBN(0xc57f7b0c, 0x5dc6c469),
+     TOBN(0x49a0e79c, 0x6fbc19c1), TOBN(0x6b0f5889, 0xa48ebdb8),
+     TOBN(0x5d3fd084, 0xa07c4e9f), TOBN(0xc3830111, 0xab27de14),
+     TOBN(0x0e4929fe, 0x33e08dcc), TOBN(0xf4a5ad24, 0x40bb73a3),
+     TOBN(0xde86c2bf, 0x490f97ca), TOBN(0x288f09c6, 0x67a1ce18),
+     TOBN(0x364bb886, 0x1844478d), TOBN(0x7840fa42, 0xceedb040),
+     TOBN(0x1269fdd2, 0x5a631b37), TOBN(0x94761f1e, 0xa47c8b7d),
+     TOBN(0xfc0c2e17, 0x481c6266), TOBN(0x85e16ea2, 0x3daa5fa7),
+     TOBN(0xccd86033, 0x92491048), TOBN(0x0c2f6963, 0xf4d402d7),
+     TOBN(0x6336f7df, 0xdf6a865c), TOBN(0x0a2a463c, 0xb5c02a87),
+     TOBN(0xb0e29be7, 0xbf2f12ee), TOBN(0xf0a22002, 0x66bad988),
+     TOBN(0x27f87e03, 0x9123c1d7), TOBN(0x21669c55, 0x328a8c98),
+     TOBN(0x186b9803, 0x92f14529), TOBN(0xd3d056cc, 0x63954df3),
+     TOBN(0x2f03fd58, 0x175a46f6), TOBN(0x63e34ebe, 0x11558558),
+     TOBN(0xe13fedee, 0x5b80cfa5), TOBN(0xe872a120, 0xd401dbd1),
+     TOBN(0x52657616, 0xe8a9d667), TOBN(0xbc8da4b6, 0xe08d6693),
+     TOBN(0x370fb9bb, 0x1b703e75), TOBN(0x6773b186, 0xd4338363),
+     TOBN(0x18dad378, 0xecef7bff), TOBN(0xaac787ed, 0x995677da),
+     TOBN(0x4801ea8b, 0x0437164b), TOBN(0xf430ad20, 0x73fe795e),
+     TOBN(0xb164154d, 0x8ee5eb73), TOBN(0x0884ecd8, 0x108f7c0e),
+     TOBN(0x0e6ec096, 0x5f520698), TOBN(0x640631fe, 0x44f7b8d9),
+     TOBN(0x92fd34fc, 0xa35a68b9), TOBN(0x9c5a4b66, 0x4d40cf4e),
+     TOBN(0x949454bf, 0x80b6783d), TOBN(0x80e701fe, 0x3a320a10),
+     TOBN(0x8d1a564a, 0x1a0a39b2), TOBN(0x1436d53d, 0x320587db),
+     TOBN(0xf5096e6d, 0x6556c362), TOBN(0xbc23a3c0, 0xe2455d7e),
+     TOBN(0x3a7aee54, 0x807230f9), TOBN(0x9ba1cfa6, 0x22ae82fd),
+     TOBN(0x833a057a, 0x99c5d706), TOBN(0x8be85f4b, 0x842315c9),
+     TOBN(0xd083179a, 0x66a72f12), TOBN(0x2fc77d5d, 0xcdcc73cd),
+     TOBN(0x22b88a80, 0x5616ee30), TOBN(0xfb09548f, 0xe7ab1083),
+     TOBN(0x8ad6ab0d, 0x511270cd), TOBN(0x61f6c57a, 0x6924d9ab),
+     TOBN(0xa0f7bf72, 0x90aecb08), TOBN(0x849f87c9, 0x0df784a4),
+     TOBN(0x27c79c15, 0xcfaf1d03), TOBN(0xbbf9f675, 0xc463face),
+     TOBN(0x91502c65, 0x765ba543), TOBN(0x18ce3cac, 0x42ea60dd),
+     TOBN(0xe5cee6ac, 0x6e43ecb3), TOBN(0x63e4e910, 0x68f2aeeb),
+     TOBN(0x26234fa3, 0xc85932ee), TOBN(0x96883e8b, 0x4c90c44d),
+     TOBN(0x29b9e738, 0xa18a50f6), TOBN(0xbfc62b2a, 0x3f0420df),
+     TOBN(0xd22a7d90, 0x6d3e1fa9), TOBN(0x17115618, 0xfe05b8a3),
+     TOBN(0x2a0c9926, 0xbb2b9c01), TOBN(0xc739fcc6, 0xe07e76a2),
+     TOBN(0x540e9157, 0x165e439a), TOBN(0x06353a62, 0x6a9063d8),
+     TOBN(0x84d95594, 0x61e927a3), TOBN(0x013b9b26, 0xe2e0be7f),
+     TOBN(0x4feaec3b, 0x973497f1), TOBN(0x15c0f94e, 0x093ebc2d),
+     TOBN(0x6af5f227, 0x33af0583), TOBN(0x0c2af206, 0xc61f3340),
+     TOBN(0xd25dbdf1, 0x4457397c), TOBN(0x2e8ed017, 0xcabcbae0),
+     TOBN(0xe3010938, 0xc2815306), TOBN(0xbaa99337, 0xe8c6cd68),
+     TOBN(0x08513182, 0x3b0ec7de), TOBN(0x1e1b822b, 0x58df05df),
+     TOBN(0x5c14842f, 0xa5c3b683), TOBN(0x98fe977e, 0x3eba34ce),
+     TOBN(0xfd2316c2, 0x0d5e8873), TOBN(0xe48d839a, 0xbd0d427d),
+     TOBN(0x495b2218, 0x623fc961), TOBN(0x24ee56e7, 0xb46fba5e),
+     TOBN(0x9184a55b, 0x91e4de58), TOBN(0xa7488ca5, 0xdfdea288),
+     TOBN(0xa723862e, 0xa8dcc943), TOBN(0x92d762b2, 0x849dc0fc),
+     TOBN(0x3c444a12, 0x091ff4a9), TOBN(0x581113fa, 0x0cada274),
+     TOBN(0xb9de0a45, 0x30d8eae2), TOBN(0x5e0fcd85, 0xdf6b41ea),
+     TOBN(0x6233ea68, 0xc094dbb5), TOBN(0xb77d062e, 0xd968d410),
+     TOBN(0x3e719bbc, 0x58b3002d), TOBN(0x68e7dd3d, 0x3dc49d58),
+     TOBN(0x8d825740, 0x013a5e58), TOBN(0x21311747, 0x3c9e3c1b),
+     TOBN(0x0cb0a2a7, 0x7c99b6ab), TOBN(0x5c48a3b3, 0xc2f888f2)}
+    ,
+    {TOBN(0xc7913e91, 0x991724f3), TOBN(0x5eda799c, 0x39cbd686),
+     TOBN(0xddb595c7, 0x63d4fc1e), TOBN(0x6b63b80b, 0xac4fed54),
+     TOBN(0x6ea0fc69, 0x7e5fb516), TOBN(0x737708ba, 0xd0f1c964),
+     TOBN(0x9628745f, 0x11a92ca5), TOBN(0x61f37958, 0x9a86967a),
+     TOBN(0x9af39b2c, 0xaa665072), TOBN(0x78322fa4, 0xefd324ef),
+     TOBN(0x3d153394, 0xc327bd31), TOBN(0x81d5f271, 0x3129dab0),
+     TOBN(0xc72e0c42, 0xf48027f5), TOBN(0xaa40cdbc, 0x8536e717),
+     TOBN(0xf45a657a, 0x2d369d0f), TOBN(0xb03bbfc4, 0xea7f74e6),
+     TOBN(0x46a8c418, 0x0d738ded), TOBN(0x6f1a5bb0, 0xe0de5729),
+     TOBN(0xf10230b9, 0x8ba81675), TOBN(0x32c6f30c, 0x112b33d4),
+     TOBN(0x7559129d, 0xd8fffb62), TOBN(0x6a281b47, 0xb459bf05),
+     TOBN(0x77c1bd3a, 0xfa3b6776), TOBN(0x0709b380, 0x7829973a),
+     TOBN(0x8c26b232, 0xa3326505), TOBN(0x38d69272, 0xee1d41bf),
+     TOBN(0x0459453e, 0xffe32afa), TOBN(0xce8143ad, 0x7cb3ea87),
+     TOBN(0x932ec1fa, 0x7e6ab666), TOBN(0x6cd2d230, 0x22286264),
+     TOBN(0x459a46fe, 0x6736f8ed), TOBN(0x50bf0d00, 0x9eca85bb),
+     TOBN(0x0b825852, 0x877a21ec), TOBN(0x300414a7, 0x0f537a94),
+     TOBN(0x3f1cba40, 0x21a9a6a2), TOBN(0x50824eee, 0x76943c00),
+     TOBN(0xa0dbfcec, 0xf83cba5d), TOBN(0xf9538148, 0x93b4f3c0),
+     TOBN(0x61744162, 0x48f24dd7), TOBN(0x5322d64d, 0xe4fb09dd),
+     TOBN(0x57447384, 0x3d9325f3), TOBN(0xa9bef2d0, 0xf371cb84),
+     TOBN(0x77d2188b, 0xa61e36c5), TOBN(0xbbd6a7d7, 0xc602df72),
+     TOBN(0xba3aa902, 0x8f61bc0b), TOBN(0xf49085ed, 0x6ed0b6a1),
+     TOBN(0x8bc625d6, 0xae6e8298), TOBN(0x832b0b1d, 0xa2e9c01d),
+     TOBN(0xa337c447, 0xf1f0ced1), TOBN(0x800cc793, 0x9492dd2b),
+     TOBN(0x4b93151d, 0xbea08efa), TOBN(0x820cf3f8, 0xde0a741e),
+     TOBN(0xff1982dc, 0x1c0f7d13), TOBN(0xef921960, 0x84dde6ca),
+     TOBN(0x1ad7d972, 0x45f96ee3), TOBN(0x319c8dbe, 0x29dea0c7),
+     TOBN(0xd3ea3871, 0x7b82b99b), TOBN(0x75922d4d, 0x470eb624),
+     TOBN(0x8f66ec54, 0x3b95d466), TOBN(0x66e673cc, 0xbee1e346),
+     TOBN(0x6afe67c4, 0xb5f2b89a), TOBN(0x3de9c1e6, 0x290e5cd3),
+     TOBN(0x8c278bb6, 0x310a2ada), TOBN(0x420fa384, 0x0bdb323b),
+     TOBN(0x0ae1d63b, 0x0eb919b0), TOBN(0xd74ee51d, 0xa74b9620),
+     TOBN(0x395458d0, 0xa674290c), TOBN(0x324c930f, 0x4620a510),
+     TOBN(0x2d1f4d19, 0xfbac27d4), TOBN(0x4086e8ca, 0x9bedeeac),
+     TOBN(0x0cdd211b, 0x9b679ab8), TOBN(0x5970167d, 0x7090fec4),
+     TOBN(0x3420f2c9, 0xfaf1fc63), TOBN(0x616d333a, 0x328c8bb4),
+     TOBN(0x7d65364c, 0x57f1fe4a), TOBN(0x9343e877, 0x55e5c73a),
+     TOBN(0x5795176b, 0xe970e78c), TOBN(0xa36ccebf, 0x60533627),
+     TOBN(0xfc7c7380, 0x09cdfc1b), TOBN(0xb39a2afe, 0xb3fec326),
+     TOBN(0xb7ff1ba1, 0x6224408a), TOBN(0xcc856e92, 0x247cfc5e),
+     TOBN(0x01f102e7, 0xc18bc493), TOBN(0x4613ab74, 0x2091c727),
+     TOBN(0xaa25e89c, 0xc420bf2b), TOBN(0x00a53176, 0x90337ec2),
+     TOBN(0xd2be9f43, 0x7d025fc7), TOBN(0x3316fb85, 0x6e6fe3dc),
+     TOBN(0x27520af5, 0x9ac50814), TOBN(0xfdf95e78, 0x9a8e4223),
+     TOBN(0xb7e7df2a, 0x56bec5a0), TOBN(0xf7022f7d, 0xdf159e5d),
+     TOBN(0x93eeeab1, 0xcac1fe8f), TOBN(0x8040188c, 0x37451168),
+     TOBN(0x7ee8aa8a, 0xd967dce6), TOBN(0xfa0e79e7, 0x3abc9299),
+     TOBN(0x67332cfc, 0x2064cfd1), TOBN(0x339c31de, 0xb0651934),
+     TOBN(0x719b28d5, 0x2a3bcbea), TOBN(0xee74c82b, 0x9d6ae5c6),
+     TOBN(0x0927d05e, 0xbaf28ee6), TOBN(0x82cecf2c, 0x9d719028),
+     TOBN(0x0b0d353e, 0xddb30289), TOBN(0xfe4bb977, 0xfddb2e29),
+     TOBN(0xbb5bb990, 0x640bfd9e), TOBN(0xd226e277, 0x82f62108),
+     TOBN(0x4bf00985, 0x02ffdd56), TOBN(0x7756758a, 0x2ca1b1b5),
+     TOBN(0xc32b62a3, 0x5285fe91), TOBN(0xedbc546a, 0x8c9cd140),
+     TOBN(0x1e47a013, 0xaf5cb008), TOBN(0xbca7e720, 0x073ce8f2),
+     TOBN(0xe10b2ab8, 0x17a91cae), TOBN(0xb89aab65, 0x08e27f63),
+     TOBN(0x7b3074a7, 0xdba3ddf9), TOBN(0x1c20ce09, 0x330c2972),
+     TOBN(0x6b9917b4, 0x5fcf7e33), TOBN(0xe6793743, 0x945ceb42),
+     TOBN(0x18fc2215, 0x5c633d19), TOBN(0xad1adb3c, 0xc7485474),
+     TOBN(0x646f9679, 0x6424c49b), TOBN(0xf888dfe8, 0x67c241c9),
+     TOBN(0xe12d4b93, 0x24f68b49), TOBN(0x9a6b62d8, 0xa571df20),
+     TOBN(0x81b4b26d, 0x179483cb), TOBN(0x666f9632, 0x9511fae2),
+     TOBN(0xd281b3e4, 0xd53aa51f), TOBN(0x7f96a765, 0x7f3dbd16),
+     TOBN(0xa7f8b5bf, 0x074a30ce), TOBN(0xd7f52107, 0x005a32e6),
+     TOBN(0x6f9e0907, 0x50237ed4), TOBN(0x2f21da47, 0x8096fa2b),
+     TOBN(0xf3e19cb4, 0xeec863a0), TOBN(0xd18f77fd, 0x9527620a),
+     TOBN(0x9505c81c, 0x407c1cf8), TOBN(0x9998db4e, 0x1b6ec284),
+     TOBN(0x7e3389e5, 0xc247d44d), TOBN(0x12507141, 0x3f4f3d80),
+     TOBN(0xd4ba0110, 0x4a78a6c7), TOBN(0x312874a0, 0x767720be),
+     TOBN(0xded059a6, 0x75944370), TOBN(0xd6123d90, 0x3b2c0bdd),
+     TOBN(0xa56b717b, 0x51c108e3), TOBN(0x9bb7940e, 0x070623e9),
+     TOBN(0x794e2d59, 0x84ac066c), TOBN(0xf5954a92, 0xe68c69a0),
+     TOBN(0x28c52458, 0x4fd99dcc), TOBN(0x60e639fc, 0xb1012517),
+     TOBN(0xc2e60125, 0x7de79248), TOBN(0xe9ef6404, 0xf12fc6d7),
+     TOBN(0x4c4f2808, 0x2a3b5d32), TOBN(0x865ad32e, 0xc768eb8a),
+     TOBN(0xac02331b, 0x13fb70b6), TOBN(0x037b44c1, 0x95599b27),
+     TOBN(0x1a860fc4, 0x60bd082c), TOBN(0xa2e25745, 0xc980cd01),
+     TOBN(0xee3387a8, 0x1da0263e), TOBN(0x931bfb95, 0x2d10f3d6),
+     TOBN(0x5b687270, 0xa1f24a32), TOBN(0xf140e65d, 0xca494b86),
+     TOBN(0x4f4ddf91, 0xb2f1ac7a), TOBN(0xf99eaabb, 0x760fee27),
+     TOBN(0x57f4008a, 0x49c228e5), TOBN(0x090be440, 0x1cf713bb),
+     TOBN(0xac91fbe4, 0x5004f022), TOBN(0xd838c2c2, 0x569e1af6),
+     TOBN(0xd6c7d20b, 0x0f1daaa5), TOBN(0xaa063ac1, 0x1bbb02c0),
+     TOBN(0x0938a422, 0x59558a78), TOBN(0x5343c669, 0x8435da2f),
+     TOBN(0x96f67b18, 0x034410dc), TOBN(0x7cc1e424, 0x84510804),
+     TOBN(0x86a1543f, 0x16dfbb7d), TOBN(0x921fa942, 0x5b5bd592),
+     TOBN(0x9dcccb6e, 0xb33dd03c), TOBN(0x8581ddd9, 0xb843f51e),
+     TOBN(0x54935fcb, 0x81d73c9e), TOBN(0x6d07e979, 0x0a5e97ab),
+     TOBN(0x4dc7b30a, 0xcf3a6bab), TOBN(0x147ab1f3, 0x170bee11),
+     TOBN(0x0aaf8e3d, 0x9fafdee4), TOBN(0xfab3dbcb, 0x538a8b95),
+     TOBN(0x405df4b3, 0x6ef13871), TOBN(0xf1f4e9cb, 0x088d5a49),
+     TOBN(0x9bcd24d3, 0x66b33f1d), TOBN(0x3b97b820, 0x5ce445c0),
+     TOBN(0xe2926549, 0xba93ff61), TOBN(0xd9c341ce, 0x4dafe616),
+     TOBN(0xfb30a76e, 0x16efb6f3), TOBN(0xdf24b8ca, 0x605b953c),
+     TOBN(0x8bd52afe, 0xc2fffb9f), TOBN(0xbbac5ff7, 0xe19d0b96),
+     TOBN(0x43c01b87, 0x459afccd), TOBN(0x6bd45143, 0xb7432652),
+     TOBN(0x84734530, 0x55b5d78e), TOBN(0x81088fdb, 0x1554ba7d),
+     TOBN(0xada0a52c, 0x1e269375), TOBN(0xf9f037c4, 0x2dc5ec10),
+     TOBN(0xc0660607, 0x94bfbc11), TOBN(0xc0a630bb, 0xc9c40d2f),
+     TOBN(0x5efc797e, 0xab64c31e), TOBN(0xffdb1dab, 0x74507144),
+     TOBN(0xf6124287, 0x1ca6790c), TOBN(0xe9609d81, 0xe69bf1bf),
+     TOBN(0xdb898595, 0x00d24fc9), TOBN(0x9c750333, 0xe51fb417),
+     TOBN(0x51830a91, 0xfef7bbde), TOBN(0x0ce67dc8, 0x945f585c),
+     TOBN(0x9a730ed4, 0x4763eb50), TOBN(0x24a0e221, 0xc1ab0d66),
+     TOBN(0x643b6393, 0x648748f3), TOBN(0x1982daa1, 0x6d3c6291),
+     TOBN(0x6f00a9f7, 0x8bbc5549), TOBN(0x7a1783e1, 0x7f36384e),
+     TOBN(0xe8346323, 0xde977f50), TOBN(0x91ab688d, 0xb245502a),
+     TOBN(0x331ab6b5, 0x6d0bdd66), TOBN(0x0a6ef32e, 0x64b71229),
+     TOBN(0x1028150e, 0xfe7c352f), TOBN(0x27e04350, 0xce7b39d3),
+     TOBN(0x2a3c8acd, 0xc1070c82), TOBN(0xfb2034d3, 0x80c9feef),
+     TOBN(0x2d729621, 0x709f3729), TOBN(0x8df290bf, 0x62cb4549),
+     TOBN(0x02f99f33, 0xfc2e4326), TOBN(0x3b30076d, 0x5eddf032),
+     TOBN(0xbb21f8cf, 0x0c652fb5), TOBN(0x314fb49e, 0xed91cf7b),
+     TOBN(0xa013eca5, 0x2f700750), TOBN(0x2b9e3c23, 0x712a4575),
+     TOBN(0xe5355557, 0xaf30fbb0), TOBN(0x1ada3516, 0x7c77e771),
+     TOBN(0x45f6ecb2, 0x7b135670), TOBN(0xe85d19df, 0x7cfc202e),
+     TOBN(0x0f1b50c7, 0x58d1be9f), TOBN(0x5ebf2c0a, 0xead2e344),
+     TOBN(0x1531fe4e, 0xabc199c9), TOBN(0xc7032592, 0x56bab0ae),
+     TOBN(0x16ab2e48, 0x6c1fec54), TOBN(0x0f87fda8, 0x04280188),
+     TOBN(0xdc9f46fc, 0x609e4a74), TOBN(0x2a44a143, 0xba667f91),
+     TOBN(0xbc3d8b95, 0xb4d83436), TOBN(0xa01e4bd0, 0xc7bd2958),
+     TOBN(0x7b182932, 0x73483c90), TOBN(0xa79c6aa1, 0xa7c7b598),
+     TOBN(0xbf3983c6, 0xeaaac07e), TOBN(0x8f18181e, 0x96e0d4e6),
+     TOBN(0x8553d37c, 0x051af62b), TOBN(0xe9a998eb, 0x0bf94496),
+     TOBN(0xe0844f9f, 0xb0d59aa1), TOBN(0x983fd558, 0xe6afb813),
+     TOBN(0x9670c0ca, 0x65d69804), TOBN(0x732b22de, 0x6ea5ff2d),
+     TOBN(0xd7640ba9, 0x5fd8623b), TOBN(0x9f619163, 0xa6351782),
+     TOBN(0x0bfc27ee, 0xacee5043), TOBN(0xae419e73, 0x2eb10f02),
+     TOBN(0x19c028d1, 0x8943fb05), TOBN(0x71f01cf7, 0xff13aa2a),
+     TOBN(0x7790737e, 0x8887a132), TOBN(0x67513309, 0x66318410),
+     TOBN(0x9819e8a3, 0x7ddb795e), TOBN(0xfecb8ef5, 0xdad100b2),
+     TOBN(0x59f74a22, 0x3021926a), TOBN(0xb7c28a49, 0x6f9b4c1c),
+     TOBN(0xed1a733f, 0x912ad0ab), TOBN(0x42a910af, 0x01a5659c),
+     TOBN(0x3842c6e0, 0x7bd68cab), TOBN(0x2b57fa38, 0x76d70ac8),
+     TOBN(0x8a6707a8, 0x3c53aaeb), TOBN(0x62c1c510, 0x65b4db18),
+     TOBN(0x8de2c1fb, 0xb2d09dc7), TOBN(0xc3dfed12, 0x266bd23b),
+     TOBN(0x927d039b, 0xd5b27db6), TOBN(0x2fb2f0f1, 0x103243da),
+     TOBN(0xf855a07b, 0x80be7399), TOBN(0xed9327ce, 0x1f9f27a8),
+     TOBN(0xa0bd99c7, 0x729bdef7), TOBN(0x2b67125e, 0x28250d88),
+     TOBN(0x784b26e8, 0x8670ced7), TOBN(0xe3dfe41f, 0xc31bd3b4),
+     TOBN(0x9e353a06, 0xbcc85cbc), TOBN(0x302e2909, 0x60178a9d),
+     TOBN(0x860abf11, 0xa6eac16e), TOBN(0x76447000, 0xaa2b3aac),
+     TOBN(0x46ff9d19, 0x850afdab), TOBN(0x35bdd6a5, 0xfdb2d4c1),
+     TOBN(0xe82594b0, 0x7e5c9ce9), TOBN(0x0f379e53, 0x20af346e),
+     TOBN(0x608b31e3, 0xbc65ad4a), TOBN(0x710c6b12, 0x267c4826),
+     TOBN(0x51c966f9, 0x71954cf1), TOBN(0xb1cec793, 0x0d0aa215),
+     TOBN(0x1f155989, 0x86bd23a8), TOBN(0xae2ff99c, 0xf9452e86),
+     TOBN(0xd8dd953c, 0x340ceaa2), TOBN(0x26355275, 0x2e2e9333),
+     TOBN(0x15d4e5f9, 0x8586f06d), TOBN(0xd6bf94a8, 0xf7cab546),
+     TOBN(0x33c59a0a, 0xb76a9af0), TOBN(0x52740ab3, 0xba095af7),
+     TOBN(0xc444de8a, 0x24389ca0), TOBN(0xcc6f9863, 0x706da0cb),
+     TOBN(0xb5a741a7, 0x6b2515cf), TOBN(0x71c41601, 0x9585c749),
+     TOBN(0x78350d4f, 0xe683de97), TOBN(0x31d61524, 0x63d0b5f5),
+     TOBN(0x7a0cc5e1, 0xfbce090b), TOBN(0xaac927ed, 0xfbcb2a5b),
+     TOBN(0xe920de49, 0x20d84c35), TOBN(0x8c06a0b6, 0x22b4de26),
+     TOBN(0xd34dd58b, 0xafe7ddf3), TOBN(0x55851fed, 0xc1e6e55b),
+     TOBN(0xd1395616, 0x960696e7), TOBN(0x940304b2, 0x5f22705f),
+     TOBN(0x6f43f861, 0xb0a2a860), TOBN(0xcf121282, 0x0e7cc981),
+     TOBN(0x12186212, 0x0ab64a96), TOBN(0x09215b9a, 0xb789383c),
+     TOBN(0x311eb305, 0x37387c09), TOBN(0xc5832fce, 0xf03ee760),
+     TOBN(0x30358f58, 0x32f7ea19), TOBN(0xe01d3c34, 0x91d53551),
+     TOBN(0x1ca5ee41, 0xda48ea80), TOBN(0x34e71e8e, 0xcf4fa4c1),
+     TOBN(0x312abd25, 0x7af1e1c7), TOBN(0xe3afcdeb, 0x2153f4a5),
+     TOBN(0x9d5c84d7, 0x00235e9a), TOBN(0x0308d3f4, 0x8c4c836f),
+     TOBN(0xc0a66b04, 0x89332de5), TOBN(0x610dd399, 0x89e566ef),
+     TOBN(0xf8eea460, 0xd1ac1635), TOBN(0x84cbb3fb, 0x20a2c0df),
+     TOBN(0x40afb488, 0xe74a48c5), TOBN(0x29738198, 0xd326b150),
+     TOBN(0x2a17747f, 0xa6d74081), TOBN(0x60ea4c05, 0x55a26214),
+     TOBN(0x53514bb4, 0x1f88c5fe), TOBN(0xedd64567, 0x7e83426c),
+     TOBN(0xd5d6cbec, 0x96460b25), TOBN(0xa12fd0ce, 0x68dc115e),
+     TOBN(0xc5bc3ed2, 0x697840ea), TOBN(0x969876a8, 0xa6331e31),
+     TOBN(0x60c36217, 0x472ff580), TOBN(0xf4229705, 0x4ad41393),
+     TOBN(0x4bd99ef0, 0xa03b8b92), TOBN(0x501c7317, 0xc144f4f6),
+     TOBN(0x159009b3, 0x18464945), TOBN(0x6d5e594c, 0x74c5c6be),
+     TOBN(0x2d587011, 0x321a3660), TOBN(0xd1e184b1, 0x3898d022),
+     TOBN(0x5ba04752, 0x4c6a7e04), TOBN(0x47fa1e2b, 0x45550b65),
+     TOBN(0x9419daf0, 0x48c0a9a5), TOBN(0x66362953, 0x7c243236),
+     TOBN(0xcd0744b1, 0x5cb12a88), TOBN(0x561b6f9a, 0x2b646188),
+     TOBN(0x599415a5, 0x66c2c0c0), TOBN(0xbe3f0859, 0x0f83f09a),
+     TOBN(0x9141c5be, 0xb92041b8), TOBN(0x01ae38c7, 0x26477d0d),
+     TOBN(0xca8b71f3, 0xd12c7a94), TOBN(0xfab5b31f, 0x765c70db),
+     TOBN(0x76ae7492, 0x487443e9), TOBN(0x8595a310, 0x990d1349),
+     TOBN(0xf8dbeda8, 0x7d460a37), TOBN(0x7f7ad082, 0x1e45a38f),
+     TOBN(0xed1d4db6, 0x1059705a), TOBN(0xa3dd492a, 0xe6b9c697),
+     TOBN(0x4b92ee3a, 0x6eb38bd5), TOBN(0xbab2609d, 0x67cc0bb7),
+     TOBN(0x7fc4fe89, 0x6e70ee82), TOBN(0xeff2c56e, 0x13e6b7e3),
+     TOBN(0x9b18959e, 0x34d26fca), TOBN(0x2517ab66, 0x889d6b45),
+     TOBN(0xf167b4e0, 0xbdefdd4f), TOBN(0x69958465, 0xf366e401),
+     TOBN(0x5aa368ab, 0xa73bbec0), TOBN(0x12148709, 0x7b240c21),
+     TOBN(0x378c3233, 0x18969006), TOBN(0xcb4d73ce, 0xe1fe53d1),
+     TOBN(0x5f50a80e, 0x130c4361), TOBN(0xd67f5951, 0x7ef5212b),
+     TOBN(0xf145e21e, 0x9e70c72e), TOBN(0xb2e52e29, 0x5566d2fb),
+     TOBN(0x44eaba4a, 0x032397f5), TOBN(0x5e56937b, 0x7e31a7de),
+     TOBN(0x68dcf517, 0x456c61e1), TOBN(0xbc2e954a, 0xa8b0a388),
+     TOBN(0xe3552fa7, 0x60a8b755), TOBN(0x03442dae, 0x73ad0cde),
+     TOBN(0x37ffe747, 0xceb26210), TOBN(0x983545e8, 0x787baef9),
+     TOBN(0x8b8c8535, 0x86a3de31), TOBN(0xc621dbcb, 0xfacd46db),
+     TOBN(0x82e442e9, 0x59266fbb), TOBN(0xa3514c37, 0x339d471c),
+     TOBN(0x3a11b771, 0x62cdad96), TOBN(0xf0cb3b3c, 0xecf9bdf0),
+     TOBN(0x3fcbdbce, 0x478e2135), TOBN(0x7547b5cf, 0xbda35342),
+     TOBN(0xa97e81f1, 0x8a677af6), TOBN(0xc8c2bf83, 0x28817987),
+     TOBN(0xdf07eaaf, 0x45580985), TOBN(0xc68d1f05, 0xc93b45cb),
+     TOBN(0x106aa2fe, 0xc77b4cac), TOBN(0x4c1d8afc, 0x04a7ae86),
+     TOBN(0xdb41c3fd, 0x9eb45ab2), TOBN(0x5b234b5b, 0xd4b22e74),
+     TOBN(0xda253dec, 0xf215958a), TOBN(0x67e0606e, 0xa04edfa0),
+     TOBN(0xabbbf070, 0xef751b11), TOBN(0xf352f175, 0xf6f06dce),
+     TOBN(0xdfc4b6af, 0x6839f6b4), TOBN(0x53ddf9a8, 0x9959848e),
+     TOBN(0xda49c379, 0xc21520b0), TOBN(0x90864ff0, 0xdbd5d1b6),
+     TOBN(0x2f055d23, 0x5f49c7f7), TOBN(0xe51e4e6a, 0xa796b2d8),
+     TOBN(0xc361a67f, 0x5c9dc340), TOBN(0x5ad53c37, 0xbca7c620),
+     TOBN(0xda1d6588, 0x32c756d0), TOBN(0xad60d911, 0x8bb67e13),
+     TOBN(0xd6c47bdf, 0x0eeec8c6), TOBN(0x4a27fec1, 0x078a1821),
+     TOBN(0x081f7415, 0xc3099524), TOBN(0x8effdf0b, 0x82cd8060),
+     TOBN(0xdb70ec1c, 0x65842df8), TOBN(0x8821b358, 0xd319a901),
+     TOBN(0x72ee56ee, 0xde42b529), TOBN(0x5bb39592, 0x236e4286),
+     TOBN(0xd1183316, 0xfd6f7140), TOBN(0xf9fadb5b, 0xbd8e81f7),
+     TOBN(0x701d5e0c, 0x5a02d962), TOBN(0xfdee4dbf, 0x1b601324),
+     TOBN(0xbed17407, 0x35d7620e), TOBN(0x04e3c2c3, 0xf48c0012),
+     TOBN(0x9ee29da7, 0x3455449a), TOBN(0x562cdef4, 0x91a836c4),
+     TOBN(0x8f682a5f, 0x47701097), TOBN(0x617125d8, 0xff88d0c2),
+     TOBN(0x948fda24, 0x57bb86dd), TOBN(0x348abb8f, 0x289f7286),
+     TOBN(0xeb10eab5, 0x99d94bbd), TOBN(0xd51ba28e, 0x4684d160),
+     TOBN(0xabe0e51c, 0x30c8f41a), TOBN(0x66588b45, 0x13254f4a),
+     TOBN(0x147ebf01, 0xfad097a5), TOBN(0x49883ea8, 0x610e815d),
+     TOBN(0xe44d60ba, 0x8a11de56), TOBN(0xa970de6e, 0x827a7a6d),
+     TOBN(0x2be41424, 0x5e17fc19), TOBN(0xd833c657, 0x01214057),
+     TOBN(0x1375813b, 0x363e723f), TOBN(0x6820bb88, 0xe6a52e9b),
+     TOBN(0x7e7f6970, 0xd875d56a), TOBN(0xd6a0a9ac, 0x51fbf6bf),
+     TOBN(0x54ba8790, 0xa3083c12), TOBN(0xebaeb23d, 0x6ae7eb64),
+     TOBN(0xa8685c3a, 0xb99a907a), TOBN(0xf1e74550, 0x026bf40b),
+     TOBN(0x7b73a027, 0xc802cd9e), TOBN(0x9a8a927c, 0x4fef4635),
+     TOBN(0xe1b6f60c, 0x08191224), TOBN(0xc4126ebb, 0xde4ec091),
+     TOBN(0xe1dff4dc, 0x4ae38d84), TOBN(0xde3f57db, 0x4f2ef985),
+     TOBN(0x34964337, 0xd446a1dd), TOBN(0x7bf217a0, 0x859e77f6),
+     TOBN(0x8ff10527, 0x8e1d13f5), TOBN(0xa304ef03, 0x74eeae27),
+     TOBN(0xfc6f5e47, 0xd19dfa5a), TOBN(0xdb007de3, 0x7fad982b),
+     TOBN(0x28205ad1, 0x613715f5), TOBN(0x251e6729, 0x7889529e),
+     TOBN(0x72705184, 0x1ae98e78), TOBN(0xf818537d, 0x271cac32),
+     TOBN(0xc8a15b7e, 0xb7f410f5), TOBN(0xc474356f, 0x81f62393),
+     TOBN(0x92dbdc5a, 0xc242316b), TOBN(0xabe060ac, 0xdbf4aff5),
+     TOBN(0x6e8c38fe, 0x909a8ec6), TOBN(0x43e514e5, 0x6116cb94),
+     TOBN(0x2078fa38, 0x07d784f9), TOBN(0x1161a880, 0xf4b5b357),
+     TOBN(0x5283ce79, 0x13adea3d), TOBN(0x0756c3e6, 0xcc6a910b),
+     TOBN(0x60bcfe01, 0xaaa79697), TOBN(0x04a73b29, 0x56391db1),
+     TOBN(0xdd8dad47, 0x189b45a0), TOBN(0xbfac0dd0, 0x48d5b8d9),
+     TOBN(0x34ab3af5, 0x7d3d2ec2), TOBN(0x6fa2fc2d, 0x207bd3af),
+     TOBN(0x9ff40092, 0x66550ded), TOBN(0x719b3e87, 0x1fd5b913),
+     TOBN(0xa573a496, 0x6d17fbc7), TOBN(0x0cd1a70a, 0x73d2b24e),
+     TOBN(0x34e2c5ca, 0xb2676937), TOBN(0xe7050b06, 0xbf669f21),
+     TOBN(0xfbe948b6, 0x1ede9046), TOBN(0xa0530051, 0x97662659),
+     TOBN(0x58cbd4ed, 0xf10124c5), TOBN(0xde2646e4, 0xdd6c06c8),
+     TOBN(0x332f8108, 0x8cad38c0), TOBN(0x471b7e90, 0x6bd68ae2),
+     TOBN(0x56ac3fb2, 0x0d8e27a3), TOBN(0xb54660db, 0x136b4b0d),
+     TOBN(0x123a1e11, 0xa6fd8de4), TOBN(0x44dbffea, 0xa37799ef),
+     TOBN(0x4540b977, 0xce6ac17c), TOBN(0x495173a8, 0xaf60acef)}
+    ,
+    {TOBN(0x9ebb284d, 0x391c2a82), TOBN(0xbcdd4863, 0x158308e8),
+     TOBN(0x006f16ec, 0x83f1edca), TOBN(0xa13e2c37, 0x695dc6c8),
+     TOBN(0x2ab756f0, 0x4a057a87), TOBN(0xa8765500, 0xa6b48f98),
+     TOBN(0x4252face, 0x68651c44), TOBN(0xa52b540b, 0xe1765e02),
+     TOBN(0x4f922fc5, 0x16a0d2bb), TOBN(0x0d5cc16c, 0x1a623499),
+     TOBN(0x9241cf3a, 0x57c62c8b), TOBN(0x2f5e6961, 0xfd1b667f),
+     TOBN(0x5c15c70b, 0xf5a01797), TOBN(0x3d20b44d, 0x60956192),
+     TOBN(0x04911b37, 0x071fdb52), TOBN(0xf648f916, 0x8d6f0f7b),
+     TOBN(0x6dc1acaf, 0xe60b7cf7), TOBN(0x25860a50, 0x84a9d869),
+     TOBN(0x56fc6f09, 0xe7ba8ac4), TOBN(0x828c5bd0, 0x6148d29e),
+     TOBN(0xac6b435e, 0xdc55ae5f), TOBN(0xa527f56c, 0xc0117411),
+     TOBN(0x94d5045e, 0xfd24342c), TOBN(0x2c4c0a35, 0x70b67c0d),
+     TOBN(0x027cc8b8, 0xfac61d9a), TOBN(0x7d25e062, 0xe3c6fe8a),
+     TOBN(0xe08805bf, 0xe5bff503), TOBN(0x13271e6c, 0x6ff632f7),
+     TOBN(0x55dca6c0, 0x232f76a5), TOBN(0x8957c32d, 0x701ef426),
+     TOBN(0xee728bcb, 0xa10a5178), TOBN(0x5ea60411, 0xb62c5173),
+     TOBN(0xfc4e964e, 0xd0b8892b), TOBN(0x9ea17683, 0x9301bb74),
+     TOBN(0x6265c5ae, 0xfcc48626), TOBN(0xe60cf82e, 0xbb3e9102),
+     TOBN(0x57adf797, 0xd4df5531), TOBN(0x235b59a1, 0x8deeefe2),
+     TOBN(0x60adcf58, 0x3f306eb1), TOBN(0x105c2753, 0x3d09492d),
+     TOBN(0x4090914b, 0xb5def996), TOBN(0x1cb69c83, 0x233dd1e7),
+     TOBN(0xc1e9c1d3, 0x9b3d5e76), TOBN(0x1f3338ed, 0xfccf6012),
+     TOBN(0xb1e95d0d, 0x2f5378a8), TOBN(0xacf4c2c7, 0x2f00cd21),
+     TOBN(0x6e984240, 0xeb5fe290), TOBN(0xd66c038d, 0x248088ae),
+     TOBN(0x804d264a, 0xf94d70cf), TOBN(0xbdb802ef, 0x7314bf7e),
+     TOBN(0x8fb54de2, 0x4333ed02), TOBN(0x740461e0, 0x285635d9),
+     TOBN(0x4113b2c8, 0x365e9383), TOBN(0xea762c83, 0x3fdef652),
+     TOBN(0x4eec6e2e, 0x47b956c1), TOBN(0xa3d814be, 0x65620fa4),
+     TOBN(0x9ad5462b, 0xb4d8bc50), TOBN(0x181c0b16, 0xa9195770),
+     TOBN(0xebd4fe1c, 0x78412a68), TOBN(0xae0341bc, 0xc0dff48c),
+     TOBN(0xb6bc45cf, 0x7003e866), TOBN(0xf11a6dea, 0x8a24a41b),
+     TOBN(0x5407151a, 0xd04c24c2), TOBN(0x62c9d27d, 0xda5b7b68),
+     TOBN(0x2e964235, 0x88cceff6), TOBN(0x8594c54f, 0x8b07ed69),
+     TOBN(0x1578e73c, 0xc84d0d0d), TOBN(0x7b4e1055, 0xff532868),
+     TOBN(0xa348c0d5, 0xb5ec995a), TOBN(0xbf4b9d55, 0x14289a54),
+     TOBN(0x9ba155a6, 0x58fbd777), TOBN(0x186ed7a8, 0x1a84491d),
+     TOBN(0xd4992b30, 0x614c0900), TOBN(0xda98d121, 0xbd00c24b),
+     TOBN(0x7f534dc8, 0x7ec4bfa1), TOBN(0x4a5ff674, 0x37dc34bc),
+     TOBN(0x68c196b8, 0x1d7ea1d7), TOBN(0x38cf2893, 0x80a6d208),
+     TOBN(0xfd56cd09, 0xe3cbbd6e), TOBN(0xec72e27e, 0x4205a5b6),
+     TOBN(0x15ea68f5, 0xa44f77f7), TOBN(0x7aa5f9fd, 0xb43c52bc),
+     TOBN(0x86ff676f, 0x94f0e609), TOBN(0xa4cde963, 0x2e2d432b),
+     TOBN(0x8cafa0c0, 0xeee470af), TOBN(0x84137d0e, 0x8a3f5ec8),
+     TOBN(0xebb40411, 0xfaa31231), TOBN(0xa239c13f, 0x6f7f7ccf),
+     TOBN(0x32865719, 0xa8afd30b), TOBN(0x86798328, 0x8a826dce),
+     TOBN(0xdf04e891, 0xc4a8fbe0), TOBN(0xbb6b6e1b, 0xebf56ad3),
+     TOBN(0x0a695b11, 0x471f1ff0), TOBN(0xd76c3389, 0xbe15baf0),
+     TOBN(0x018edb95, 0xbe96c43e), TOBN(0xf2beaaf4, 0x90794158),
+     TOBN(0x152db09e, 0xc3076a27), TOBN(0x5e82908e, 0xe416545d),
+     TOBN(0xa2c41272, 0x356d6f2e), TOBN(0xdc9c9642, 0x31fd74e1),
+     TOBN(0x66ceb88d, 0x519bf615), TOBN(0xe29ecd76, 0x05a2274e),
+     TOBN(0x3a0473c4, 0xbf5e2fa0), TOBN(0x6b6eb671, 0x64284e67),
+     TOBN(0xe8b97932, 0xb88756dd), TOBN(0xed4e8652, 0xf17e3e61),
+     TOBN(0xc2dd1499, 0x3ee1c4a4), TOBN(0xc0aaee17, 0x597f8c0e),
+     TOBN(0x15c4edb9, 0x6c168af3), TOBN(0x6563c7bf, 0xb39ae875),
+     TOBN(0xadfadb6f, 0x20adb436), TOBN(0xad55e8c9, 0x9a042ac0),
+     TOBN(0x975a1ed8, 0xb76da1f5), TOBN(0x10dfa466, 0xa58acb94),
+     TOBN(0x8dd7f7e3, 0xac060282), TOBN(0x6813e66a, 0x572a051e),
+     TOBN(0xb4ccae1e, 0x350cb901), TOBN(0xb653d656, 0x50cb7822),
+     TOBN(0x42484710, 0xdfab3b87), TOBN(0xcd7ee537, 0x9b670fd0),
+     TOBN(0x0a50b12e, 0x523b8bf6), TOBN(0x8009eb5b, 0x8f910c1b),
+     TOBN(0xf535af82, 0x4a167588), TOBN(0x0f835f9c, 0xfb2a2abd),
+     TOBN(0xf59b2931, 0x2afceb62), TOBN(0xc797df2a, 0x169d383f),
+     TOBN(0xeb3f5fb0, 0x66ac02b0), TOBN(0x029d4c6f, 0xdaa2d0ca),
+     TOBN(0xd4059bc1, 0xafab4bc5), TOBN(0x833f5c6f, 0x56783247),
+     TOBN(0xb5346630, 0x8d2d3605), TOBN(0x83387891, 0xd34d8433),
+     TOBN(0xd973b30f, 0xadd9419a), TOBN(0xbcca1099, 0xafe3fce8),
+     TOBN(0x08178315, 0x0809aac6), TOBN(0x01b7f21a, 0x540f0f11),
+     TOBN(0x65c29219, 0x909523c8), TOBN(0xa62f648f, 0xa3a1c741),
+     TOBN(0x88598d4f, 0x60c9e55a), TOBN(0xbce9141b, 0x0e4f347a),
+     TOBN(0x9af97d84, 0x35f9b988), TOBN(0x0210da62, 0x320475b6),
+     TOBN(0x3c076e22, 0x9191476c), TOBN(0x7520dbd9, 0x44fc7834),
+     TOBN(0x6a6b2cfe, 0xc1ab1bbd), TOBN(0xef8a65be, 0xdc650938),
+     TOBN(0x72855540, 0x805d7bc4), TOBN(0xda389396, 0xed11fdfd),
+     TOBN(0xa9d5bd36, 0x74660876), TOBN(0x11d67c54, 0xb45dff35),
+     TOBN(0x6af7d148, 0xa4f5da94), TOBN(0xbb8d4c3f, 0xc0bbeb31),
+     TOBN(0x87a7ebd1, 0xe0a1b12a), TOBN(0x1e4ef88d, 0x770ba95f),
+     TOBN(0x8c33345c, 0xdc2ae9cb), TOBN(0xcecf1276, 0x01cc8403),
+     TOBN(0x687c012e, 0x1b39b80f), TOBN(0xfd90d0ad, 0x35c33ba4),
+     TOBN(0xa3ef5a67, 0x5c9661c2), TOBN(0x368fc88e, 0xe017429e),
+     TOBN(0xd30c6761, 0x196a2fa2), TOBN(0x931b9817, 0xbd5b312e),
+     TOBN(0xba01000c, 0x72f54a31), TOBN(0xa203d2c8, 0x66eaa541),
+     TOBN(0xf2abdee0, 0x98939db3), TOBN(0xe37d6c2c, 0x3e606c02),
+     TOBN(0xf2921574, 0x521ff643), TOBN(0x2781b3c4, 0xd7e2fca3),
+     TOBN(0x664300b0, 0x7850ec06), TOBN(0xac5a38b9, 0x7d3a10cf),
+     TOBN(0x9233188d, 0xe34ab39d), TOBN(0xe77057e4, 0x5072cbb9),
+     TOBN(0xbcf0c042, 0xb59e78df), TOBN(0x4cfc91e8, 0x1d97de52),
+     TOBN(0x4661a26c, 0x3ee0ca4a), TOBN(0x5620a4c1, 0xfb8507bc),
+     TOBN(0x4b44d4aa, 0x049f842c), TOBN(0xceabc5d5, 0x1540e82b),
+     TOBN(0x306710fd, 0x15c6f156), TOBN(0xbe5ae52b, 0x63db1d72),
+     TOBN(0x06f1e7e6, 0x334957f1), TOBN(0x57e388f0, 0x31144a70),
+     TOBN(0xfb69bb2f, 0xdf96447b), TOBN(0x0f78ebd3, 0x73e38a12),
+     TOBN(0xb8222605, 0x2b7ce542), TOBN(0xe6d4ce99, 0x7472bde1),
+     TOBN(0x53e16ebe, 0x09d2f4da), TOBN(0x180ff42e, 0x53b92b2e),
+     TOBN(0xc59bcc02, 0x2c34a1c6), TOBN(0x3803d6f9, 0x422c46c2),
+     TOBN(0x18aff74f, 0x5c14a8a2), TOBN(0x55aebf80, 0x10a08b28),
+     TOBN(0x66097d58, 0x7135593f), TOBN(0x32e6eff7, 0x2be570cd),
+     TOBN(0x584e6a10, 0x2a8c860d), TOBN(0xcd185890, 0xa2eb4163),
+     TOBN(0x7ceae99d, 0x6d97e134), TOBN(0xd42c6b70, 0xdd8447ce),
+     TOBN(0x59ddbb4a, 0xb8c50273), TOBN(0x03c612df, 0x3cf34e1e),
+     TOBN(0x84b9ca15, 0x04b6c5a0), TOBN(0x35216f39, 0x18f0e3a3),
+     TOBN(0x3ec2d2bc, 0xbd986c00), TOBN(0x8bf546d9, 0xd19228fe),
+     TOBN(0xd1c655a4, 0x4cd623c3), TOBN(0x366ce718, 0x502b8e5a),
+     TOBN(0x2cfc84b4, 0xeea0bfe7), TOBN(0xe01d5cee, 0xcf443e8e),
+     TOBN(0x8ec045d9, 0x036520f8), TOBN(0xdfb3c3d1, 0x92d40e98),
+     TOBN(0x0bac4cce, 0xcc559a04), TOBN(0x35eccae5, 0x240ea6b1),
+     TOBN(0x180b32db, 0xf8a5a0ac), TOBN(0x547972a5, 0xeb699700),
+     TOBN(0xa3765801, 0xca26bca0), TOBN(0x57e09d0e, 0xa647f25a),
+     TOBN(0xb956970e, 0x2fdd23cc), TOBN(0xb80288bc, 0x5682e971),
+     TOBN(0xe6e6d91e, 0x9ae86ebc), TOBN(0x0564c83f, 0x8c9f1939),
+     TOBN(0x551932a2, 0x39560368), TOBN(0xe893752b, 0x049c28e2),
+     TOBN(0x0b03cee5, 0xa6a158c3), TOBN(0xe12d656b, 0x04964263),
+     TOBN(0x4b47554e, 0x63e3bc1d), TOBN(0xc719b6a2, 0x45044ff7),
+     TOBN(0x4f24d30a, 0xe48daa07), TOBN(0xa3f37556, 0xc8c1edc3),
+     TOBN(0x9a47bf76, 0x0700d360), TOBN(0xbb1a1824, 0x822ae4e2),
+     TOBN(0x22e275a3, 0x89f1fb4c), TOBN(0x72b1aa23, 0x9968c5f5),
+     TOBN(0xa75feaca, 0xbe063f64), TOBN(0x9b392f43, 0xbce47a09),
+     TOBN(0xd4241509, 0x1ad07aca), TOBN(0x4b0c591b, 0x8d26cd0f),
+     TOBN(0x2d42ddfd, 0x92f1169a), TOBN(0x63aeb1ac, 0x4cbf2392),
+     TOBN(0x1de9e877, 0x0691a2af), TOBN(0xebe79af7, 0xd98021da),
+     TOBN(0xcfdf2a4e, 0x40e50acf), TOBN(0xf0a98ad7, 0xaf01d665),
+     TOBN(0xefb640bf, 0x1831be1f), TOBN(0x6fe8bd2f, 0x80e9ada0),
+     TOBN(0x94c103a1, 0x6cafbc91), TOBN(0x170f8759, 0x8308e08c),
+     TOBN(0x5de2d2ab, 0x9780ff4f), TOBN(0x666466bc, 0x45b201f2),
+     TOBN(0x58af2010, 0xf5b343bc), TOBN(0x0f2e400a, 0xf2f142fe),
+     TOBN(0x3483bfde, 0xa85f4bdf), TOBN(0xf0b1d093, 0x03bfeaa9),
+     TOBN(0x2ea01b95, 0xc7081603), TOBN(0xe943e4c9, 0x3dba1097),
+     TOBN(0x47be92ad, 0xb438f3a6), TOBN(0x00bb7742, 0xe5bf6636),
+     TOBN(0x136b7083, 0x824297b4), TOBN(0x9d0e5580, 0x5584455f),
+     TOBN(0xab48cedc, 0xf1c7d69e), TOBN(0x53a9e481, 0x2a256e76),
+     TOBN(0x0402b0e0, 0x65eb2413), TOBN(0xdadbbb84, 0x8fc407a7),
+     TOBN(0xa65cd5a4, 0x8d7f5492), TOBN(0x21d44293, 0x74bae294),
+     TOBN(0x66917ce6, 0x3b5f1cc4), TOBN(0x37ae52ea, 0xce872e62),
+     TOBN(0xbb087b72, 0x2905f244), TOBN(0x12077086, 0x1e6af74f),
+     TOBN(0x4b644e49, 0x1058edea), TOBN(0x827510e3, 0xb638ca1d),
+     TOBN(0x8cf2b704, 0x6038591c), TOBN(0xffc8b47a, 0xfe635063),
+     TOBN(0x3ae220e6, 0x1b4d5e63), TOBN(0xbd864742, 0x9d961b4b),
+     TOBN(0x610c107e, 0x9bd16bed), TOBN(0x4270352a, 0x1127147b),
+     TOBN(0x7d17ffe6, 0x64cfc50e), TOBN(0x50dee01a, 0x1e36cb42),
+     TOBN(0x068a7622, 0x35dc5f9a), TOBN(0x9a08d536, 0xdf53f62c),
+     TOBN(0x4ed71457, 0x6be5f7de), TOBN(0xd93006f8, 0xc2263c9e),
+     TOBN(0xe073694c, 0xcacacb36), TOBN(0x2ff7a5b4, 0x3ae118ab),
+     TOBN(0x3cce53f1, 0xcd871236), TOBN(0xf156a39d, 0xc2aa6d52),
+     TOBN(0x9cc5f271, 0xb198d76d), TOBN(0xbc615b6f, 0x81383d39),
+     TOBN(0xa54538e8, 0xde3eee6b), TOBN(0x58c77538, 0xab910d91),
+     TOBN(0x31e5bdbc, 0x58d278bd), TOBN(0x3cde4adf, 0xb963acae),
+     TOBN(0xb1881fd2, 0x5302169c), TOBN(0x8ca60fa0, 0xa989ed8b),
+     TOBN(0xa1999458, 0xff96a0ee), TOBN(0xc1141f03, 0xac6c283d),
+     TOBN(0x7677408d, 0x6dfafed3), TOBN(0x33a01653, 0x39661588),
+     TOBN(0x3c9c15ec, 0x0b726fa0), TOBN(0x090cfd93, 0x6c9b56da),
+     TOBN(0xe34f4bae, 0xa3c40af5), TOBN(0x3469eadb, 0xd21129f1),
+     TOBN(0xcc51674a, 0x1e207ce8), TOBN(0x1e293b24, 0xc83b1ef9),
+     TOBN(0x17173d13, 0x1e6c0bb4), TOBN(0x19004695, 0x90776d35),
+     TOBN(0xe7980e34, 0x6de6f922), TOBN(0x873554cb, 0xf4dd9a22),
+     TOBN(0x0316c627, 0xcbf18a51), TOBN(0x4d93651b, 0x3032c081),
+     TOBN(0x207f2771, 0x3946834d), TOBN(0x2c08d7b4, 0x30cdbf80),
+     TOBN(0x137a4fb4, 0x86df2a61), TOBN(0xa1ed9c07, 0xecf7b4a2),
+     TOBN(0xb2e460e2, 0x7bd042ff), TOBN(0xb7f5e2fa, 0x5f62f5ec),
+     TOBN(0x7aa6ec6b, 0xcc2423b7), TOBN(0x75ce0a7f, 0xba63eea7),
+     TOBN(0x67a45fb1, 0xf250a6e1), TOBN(0x93bc919c, 0xe53cdc9f),
+     TOBN(0x9271f56f, 0x871942df), TOBN(0x2372ff6f, 0x7859ad66),
+     TOBN(0x5f4c2b96, 0x33cb1a78), TOBN(0xe3e29101, 0x5838aa83),
+     TOBN(0xa7ed1611, 0xe4e8110c), TOBN(0x2a2d70d5, 0x330198ce),
+     TOBN(0xbdf132e8, 0x6720efe0), TOBN(0xe61a8962, 0x66a471bf),
+     TOBN(0x796d3a85, 0x825808bd), TOBN(0x51dc3cb7, 0x3fd6e902),
+     TOBN(0x643c768a, 0x916219d1), TOBN(0x36cd7685, 0xa2ad7d32),
+     TOBN(0xe3db9d05, 0xb22922a4), TOBN(0x6494c87e, 0xdba29660),
+     TOBN(0xf0ac91df, 0xbcd2ebc7), TOBN(0x4deb57a0, 0x45107f8d),
+     TOBN(0x42271f59, 0xc3d12a73), TOBN(0x5f71687c, 0xa5c2c51d),
+     TOBN(0xcb1f50c6, 0x05797bcb), TOBN(0x29ed0ed9, 0xd6d34eb0),
+     TOBN(0xe5fe5b47, 0x4683c2eb), TOBN(0x4956eeb5, 0x97447c46),
+     TOBN(0x5b163a43, 0x71207167), TOBN(0x93fa2fed, 0x0248c5ef),
+     TOBN(0x67930af2, 0x31f63950), TOBN(0xa77797c1, 0x14caa2c9),
+     TOBN(0x526e80ee, 0x27ac7e62), TOBN(0xe1e6e626, 0x58b28aec),
+     TOBN(0x636178b0, 0xb3c9fef0), TOBN(0xaf7752e0, 0x6d5f90be),
+     TOBN(0x94ecaf18, 0xeece51cf), TOBN(0x2864d0ed, 0xca806e1f),
+     TOBN(0x6de2e383, 0x97c69134), TOBN(0x5a42c316, 0xeb291293),
+     TOBN(0xc7779219, 0x6a60bae0), TOBN(0xa24de346, 0x6b7599d1),
+     TOBN(0x49d374aa, 0xb75d4941), TOBN(0x98900586, 0x2d501ff0),
+     TOBN(0x9f16d40e, 0xeb7974cf), TOBN(0x1033860b, 0xcdd8c115),
+     TOBN(0xb6c69ac8, 0x2094cec3), TOBN(0x9976fb88, 0x403b770c),
+     TOBN(0x1dea026c, 0x4859590d), TOBN(0xb6acbb46, 0x8562d1fd),
+     TOBN(0x7cd6c461, 0x44569d85), TOBN(0xc3190a36, 0x97f0891d),
+     TOBN(0xc6f53195, 0x48d5a17d), TOBN(0x7d919966, 0xd749abc8),
+     TOBN(0x65104837, 0xdd1c8a20), TOBN(0x7e5410c8, 0x2f683419),
+     TOBN(0x958c3ca8, 0xbe94022e), TOBN(0x605c3197, 0x6145dac2),
+     TOBN(0x3fc07501, 0x01683d54), TOBN(0x1d7127c5, 0x595b1234),
+     TOBN(0x10b8f87c, 0x9481277f), TOBN(0x677db2a8, 0xe65a1adb),
+     TOBN(0xec2fccaa, 0xddce3345), TOBN(0x2a6811b7, 0x012a4350),
+     TOBN(0x96760ff1, 0xac598bdc), TOBN(0x054d652a, 0xd1bf4128),
+     TOBN(0x0a1151d4, 0x92a21005), TOBN(0xad7f3971, 0x33110fdf),
+     TOBN(0x8c95928c, 0x1960100f), TOBN(0x6c91c825, 0x7bf03362),
+     TOBN(0xc8c8b2a2, 0xce309f06), TOBN(0xfdb27b59, 0xca27204b),
+     TOBN(0xd223eaa5, 0x0848e32e), TOBN(0xb93e4b2e, 0xe7bfaf1e),
+     TOBN(0xc5308ae6, 0x44aa3ded), TOBN(0x317a666a, 0xc015d573),
+     TOBN(0xc888ce23, 0x1a979707), TOBN(0xf141c1e6, 0x0d5c4958),
+     TOBN(0xb53b7de5, 0x61906373), TOBN(0x858dbade, 0xeb999595),
+     TOBN(0x8cbb47b2, 0xa59e5c36), TOBN(0x660318b3, 0xdcf4e842),
+     TOBN(0xbd161ccd, 0x12ba4b7a), TOBN(0xf399daab, 0xf8c8282a),
+     TOBN(0x1587633a, 0xeeb2130d), TOBN(0xa465311a, 0xda38dd7d),
+     TOBN(0x5f75eec8, 0x64d3779b), TOBN(0x3c5d0476, 0xad64c171),
+     TOBN(0x87410371, 0x2a914428), TOBN(0x8096a891, 0x90e2fc29),
+     TOBN(0xd3d2ae9d, 0x23b3ebc2), TOBN(0x90bdd6db, 0xa580cfd6),
+     TOBN(0x52dbb7f3, 0xc5b01f6c), TOBN(0xe68eded4, 0xe102a2dc),
+     TOBN(0x17785b77, 0x99eb6df0), TOBN(0x26c3cc51, 0x7386b779),
+     TOBN(0x345ed988, 0x6417a48e), TOBN(0xe990b4e4, 0x07d6ef31),
+     TOBN(0x0f456b7e, 0x2586abba), TOBN(0x239ca6a5, 0x59c96e9a),
+     TOBN(0xe327459c, 0xe2eb4206), TOBN(0x3a4c3313, 0xa002b90a),
+     TOBN(0x2a114806, 0xf6a3f6fb), TOBN(0xad5cad2f, 0x85c251dd),
+     TOBN(0x92c1f613, 0xf5a784d3), TOBN(0xec7bfacf, 0x349766d5),
+     TOBN(0x04b3cd33, 0x3e23cb3b), TOBN(0x3979fe84, 0xc5a64b2d),
+     TOBN(0x192e2720, 0x7e589106), TOBN(0xa60c43d1, 0xa15b527f),
+     TOBN(0x2dae9082, 0xbe7cf3a6), TOBN(0xcc86ba92, 0xbc967274),
+     TOBN(0xf28a2ce8, 0xaea0a8a9), TOBN(0x404ca6d9, 0x6ee988b3),
+     TOBN(0xfd7e9c5d, 0x005921b8), TOBN(0xf56297f1, 0x44e79bf9),
+     TOBN(0xa163b460, 0x0d75ddc2), TOBN(0x30b23616, 0xa1f2be87),
+     TOBN(0x4b070d21, 0xbfe50e2b), TOBN(0x7ef8cfd0, 0xe1bfede1),
+     TOBN(0xadba0011, 0x2aac4ae0), TOBN(0x2a3e7d01, 0xb9ebd033),
+     TOBN(0x995277ec, 0xe38d9d1c), TOBN(0xb500249e, 0x9c5d2de3),
+     TOBN(0x8912b820, 0xf13ca8c9), TOBN(0xc8798114, 0x877793af),
+     TOBN(0x19e6125d, 0xec3f1dec), TOBN(0x07b1f040, 0x911178da),
+     TOBN(0xd93ededa, 0x904a6738), TOBN(0x55187a5a, 0x0bebedcd),
+     TOBN(0xf7d04722, 0xeb329d41), TOBN(0xf449099e, 0xf170b391),
+     TOBN(0xfd317a69, 0xca99f828), TOBN(0x50c3db2b, 0x34a4976d),
+     TOBN(0xe9ba7784, 0x3757b392), TOBN(0x326caefd, 0xaa3ca05a),
+     TOBN(0x78e5293b, 0xf1e593d4), TOBN(0x7842a937, 0x0d98fd13),
+     TOBN(0xe694bf96, 0x5f96b10d), TOBN(0x373a9df6, 0x06a8cd05),
+     TOBN(0x997d1e51, 0xe8f0c7fc), TOBN(0x1d019790, 0x63fd972e),
+     TOBN(0x0064d858, 0x5499fb32), TOBN(0x7b67bad9, 0x77a8aeb7),
+     TOBN(0x1d3eb977, 0x2d08eec5), TOBN(0x5fc047a6, 0xcbabae1d),
+     TOBN(0x0577d159, 0xe54a64bb), TOBN(0x8862201b, 0xc43497e4),
+     TOBN(0xad6b4e28, 0x2ce0608d), TOBN(0x8b687b7d, 0x0b167aac),
+     TOBN(0x6ed4d367, 0x8b2ecfa9), TOBN(0x24dfe62d, 0xa90c3c38),
+     TOBN(0xa1862e10, 0x3fe5c42b), TOBN(0x1ca73dca, 0xd5732a9f),
+     TOBN(0x35f038b7, 0x76bb87ad), TOBN(0x674976ab, 0xf242b81f),
+     TOBN(0x4f2bde7e, 0xb0fd90cd), TOBN(0x6efc172e, 0xa7fdf092),
+     TOBN(0x3806b69b, 0x92222f1f), TOBN(0x5a2459ca, 0x6cf7ae70),
+     TOBN(0x6789f69c, 0xa85217ee), TOBN(0x5f232b5e, 0xe3dc85ac),
+     TOBN(0x660e3ec5, 0x48e9e516), TOBN(0x124b4e47, 0x3197eb31),
+     TOBN(0x10a0cb13, 0xaafcca23), TOBN(0x7bd63ba4, 0x8213224f),
+     TOBN(0xaffad7cc, 0x290a7f4f), TOBN(0x6b409c9e, 0x0286b461),
+     TOBN(0x58ab809f, 0xffa407af), TOBN(0xc3122eed, 0xc68ac073),
+     TOBN(0x17bf9e50, 0x4ef24d7e), TOBN(0x5d929794, 0x3e2a5811),
+     TOBN(0x519bc867, 0x02902e01), TOBN(0x76bba5da, 0x39c8a851),
+     TOBN(0xe9f9669c, 0xda94951e), TOBN(0x4b6af58d, 0x66b8d418),
+     TOBN(0xfa321074, 0x17d426a4), TOBN(0xc78e66a9, 0x9dde6027),
+     TOBN(0x0516c083, 0x4a53b964), TOBN(0xfc659d38, 0xff602330),
+     TOBN(0x0ab55e5c, 0x58c5c897), TOBN(0x985099b2, 0x838bc5df),
+     TOBN(0x061d9efc, 0xc52fc238), TOBN(0x712b2728, 0x6ac1da3f),
+     TOBN(0xfb658149, 0x9283fe08), TOBN(0x4954ac94, 0xb8aaa2f7),
+     TOBN(0x85c0ada4, 0x7fb2e74f), TOBN(0xee8ba98e, 0xb89926b0),
+     TOBN(0xe4f9d37d, 0x23d1af5b), TOBN(0x14ccdbf9, 0xba9b015e),
+     TOBN(0xb674481b, 0x7bfe7178), TOBN(0x4e1debae, 0x65405868),
+     TOBN(0x061b2821, 0xc48c867d), TOBN(0x69c15b35, 0x513b30ea),
+     TOBN(0x3b4a1666, 0x36871088), TOBN(0xe5e29f5d, 0x1220b1ff),
+     TOBN(0x4b82bb35, 0x233d9f4d), TOBN(0x4e076333, 0x18cdc675)}
+    ,
+    {TOBN(0x0d53f5c7, 0xa3e6fced), TOBN(0xe8cbbdd5, 0xf45fbdeb),
+     TOBN(0xf85c01df, 0x13339a70), TOBN(0x0ff71880, 0x142ceb81),
+     TOBN(0x4c4e8774, 0xbd70437a), TOBN(0x5fb32891, 0xba0bda6a),
+     TOBN(0x1cdbebd2, 0xf18bd26e), TOBN(0x2f9526f1, 0x03a9d522),
+     TOBN(0x40ce3051, 0x92c4d684), TOBN(0x8b04d725, 0x7612efcd),
+     TOBN(0xb9dcda36, 0x6f9cae20), TOBN(0x0edc4d24, 0xf058856c),
+     TOBN(0x64f2e6bf, 0x85427900), TOBN(0x3de81295, 0xdc09dfea),
+     TOBN(0xd41b4487, 0x379bf26c), TOBN(0x50b62c6d, 0x6df135a9),
+     TOBN(0xd4f8e3b4, 0xc72dfe67), TOBN(0xc416b0f6, 0x90e19fdf),
+     TOBN(0x18b9098d, 0x4c13bd35), TOBN(0xac11118a, 0x15b8cb9e),
+     TOBN(0xf598a318, 0xf0062841), TOBN(0xbfe0602f, 0x89f356f4),
+     TOBN(0x7ae3637e, 0x30177a0c), TOBN(0x34097747, 0x61136537),
+     TOBN(0x0db2fb5e, 0xd005832a), TOBN(0x5f5efd3b, 0x91042e4f),
+     TOBN(0x8c4ffdc6, 0xed70f8ca), TOBN(0xe4645d0b, 0xb52da9cc),
+     TOBN(0x9596f58b, 0xc9001d1f), TOBN(0x52c8f0bc, 0x4e117205),
+     TOBN(0xfd4aa0d2, 0xe398a084), TOBN(0x815bfe3a, 0x104f49de),
+     TOBN(0x97e5443f, 0x23885e5f), TOBN(0xf72f8f99, 0xe8433aab),
+     TOBN(0xbd00b154, 0xe4d4e604), TOBN(0xd0b35e6a, 0xe5e173ff),
+     TOBN(0x57b2a048, 0x9164722d), TOBN(0x3e3c665b, 0x88761ec8),
+     TOBN(0x6bdd1397, 0x3da83832), TOBN(0x3c8b1a1e, 0x73dafe3b),
+     TOBN(0x4497ace6, 0x54317cac), TOBN(0xbe600ab9, 0x521771b3),
+     TOBN(0xb42e409e, 0xb0dfe8b8), TOBN(0x386a67d7, 0x3942310f),
+     TOBN(0x25548d8d, 0x4431cc28), TOBN(0xa7cff142, 0x985dc524),
+     TOBN(0x4d60f5a1, 0x93c4be32), TOBN(0x83ebd5c8, 0xd071c6e1),
+     TOBN(0xba3a80a7, 0xb1fd2b0b), TOBN(0x9b3ad396, 0x5bec33e8),
+     TOBN(0xb3868d61, 0x79743fb3), TOBN(0xcfd169fc, 0xfdb462fa),
+     TOBN(0xd3b499d7, 0x9ce0a6af), TOBN(0x55dc1cf1, 0xe42d3ff8),
+     TOBN(0x04fb9e6c, 0xc6c3e1b2), TOBN(0x47e6961d, 0x6f69a474),
+     TOBN(0x54eb3acc, 0xe548b37b), TOBN(0xb38e7542, 0x84d40549),
+     TOBN(0x8c3daa51, 0x7b341b4f), TOBN(0x2f6928ec, 0x690bf7fa),
+     TOBN(0x0496b323, 0x86ce6c41), TOBN(0x01be1c55, 0x10adadcd),
+     TOBN(0xc04e67e7, 0x4bb5faf9), TOBN(0x3cbaf678, 0xe15c9985),
+     TOBN(0x8cd12145, 0x50ca4247), TOBN(0xba1aa47a, 0xe7dd30aa),
+     TOBN(0x2f81ddf1, 0xe58fee24), TOBN(0x03452936, 0xeec9b0e8),
+     TOBN(0x8bdc3b81, 0x243aea96), TOBN(0x9a2919af, 0x15c3d0e5),
+     TOBN(0x9ea640ec, 0x10948361), TOBN(0x5ac86d5b, 0x6e0bcccf),
+     TOBN(0xf892d918, 0xc36cf440), TOBN(0xaed3e837, 0xc939719c),
+     TOBN(0xb07b08d2, 0xc0218b64), TOBN(0x6f1bcbba, 0xce9790dd),
+     TOBN(0x4a84d6ed, 0x60919b8e), TOBN(0xd8900791, 0x8ac1f9eb),
+     TOBN(0xf84941aa, 0x0dd5daef), TOBN(0xb22fe40a, 0x67fd62c5),
+     TOBN(0x97e15ba2, 0x157f2db3), TOBN(0xbda2fc8f, 0x8e28ca9c),
+     TOBN(0x5d050da4, 0x37b9f454), TOBN(0x3d57eb57, 0x2379d72e),
+     TOBN(0xe9b5eba2, 0xfb5ee997), TOBN(0x01648ca2, 0xe11538ca),
+     TOBN(0x32bb76f6, 0xf6327974), TOBN(0x338f14b8, 0xff3f4bb7),
+     TOBN(0x524d226a, 0xd7ab9a2d), TOBN(0x9c00090d, 0x7dfae958),
+     TOBN(0x0ba5f539, 0x8751d8c2), TOBN(0x8afcbcdd, 0x3ab8262d),
+     TOBN(0x57392729, 0xe99d043b), TOBN(0xef51263b, 0xaebc943a),
+     TOBN(0x9feace93, 0x20862935), TOBN(0x639efc03, 0xb06c817b),
+     TOBN(0x1fe054b3, 0x66b4be7a), TOBN(0x3f25a9de, 0x84a37a1e),
+     TOBN(0xf39ef1ad, 0x78d75cd9), TOBN(0xd7b58f49, 0x5062c1b5),
+     TOBN(0x6f74f9a9, 0xff563436), TOBN(0xf718ff29, 0xe8af51e7),
+     TOBN(0x5234d313, 0x15e97fec), TOBN(0xb6a8e2b1, 0x292f1c0a),
+     TOBN(0xa7f53aa8, 0x327720c1), TOBN(0x956ca322, 0xba092cc8),
+     TOBN(0x8f03d64a, 0x28746c4d), TOBN(0x51fe1782, 0x66d0d392),
+     TOBN(0xd19b34db, 0x3c832c80), TOBN(0x60dccc5c, 0x6da2e3b4),
+     TOBN(0x245dd62e, 0x0a104ccc), TOBN(0xa7ab1de1, 0x620b21fd),
+     TOBN(0xb293ae0b, 0x3893d123), TOBN(0xf7b75783, 0xb15ee71c),
+     TOBN(0x5aa3c614, 0x42a9468b), TOBN(0xd686123c, 0xdb15d744),
+     TOBN(0x8c616891, 0xa7ab4116), TOBN(0x6fcd72c8, 0xa4e6a459),
+     TOBN(0xac219110, 0x77e5fad7), TOBN(0xfb6a20e7, 0x704fa46b),
+     TOBN(0xe839be7d, 0x341d81dc), TOBN(0xcddb6889, 0x32148379),
+     TOBN(0xda6211a1, 0xf7026ead), TOBN(0xf3b2575f, 0xf4d1cc5e),
+     TOBN(0x40cfc8f6, 0xa7a73ae6), TOBN(0x83879a5e, 0x61d5b483),
+     TOBN(0xc5acb1ed, 0x41a50ebc), TOBN(0x59a60cc8, 0x3c07d8fa),
+     TOBN(0x1b73bdce, 0xb1876262), TOBN(0x2b0d79f0, 0x12af4ee9),
+     TOBN(0x8bcf3b0b, 0xd46e1d07), TOBN(0x17d6af9d, 0xe45d152f),
+     TOBN(0x73520461, 0x6d736451), TOBN(0x43cbbd97, 0x56b0bf5a),
+     TOBN(0xb0833a5b, 0xd5999b9d), TOBN(0x702614f0, 0xeb72e398),
+     TOBN(0x0aadf01a, 0x59c3e9f8), TOBN(0x40200e77, 0xce6b3d16),
+     TOBN(0xda22bdd3, 0xdeddafad), TOBN(0x76dedaf4, 0x310d72e1),
+     TOBN(0x49ef807c, 0x4bc2e88f), TOBN(0x6ba81291, 0x146dd5a5),
+     TOBN(0xa1a4077a, 0x7d8d59e9), TOBN(0x87b6a2e7, 0x802db349),
+     TOBN(0xd5679997, 0x1b4e598e), TOBN(0xf499ef1f, 0x06fe4b1d),
+     TOBN(0x3978d3ae, 0xfcb267c5), TOBN(0xb582b557, 0x235786d0),
+     TOBN(0x32b3b2ca, 0x1715cb07), TOBN(0x4c3de6a2, 0x8480241d),
+     TOBN(0x63b5ffed, 0xcb571ecd), TOBN(0xeaf53900, 0xed2fe9a9),
+     TOBN(0xdec98d4a, 0xc3b81990), TOBN(0x1cb83722, 0x9e0cc8fe),
+     TOBN(0xfe0b0491, 0xd2b427b9), TOBN(0x0f2386ac, 0xe983a66c),
+     TOBN(0x930c4d1e, 0xb3291213), TOBN(0xa2f82b2e, 0x59a62ae4),
+     TOBN(0x77233853, 0xf93e89e3), TOBN(0x7f8063ac, 0x11777c7f),
+     TOBN(0xff0eb567, 0x59ad2877), TOBN(0x6f454642, 0x9865c754),
+     TOBN(0xe6fe701a, 0x236e9a84), TOBN(0xc586ef16, 0x06e40fc3),
+     TOBN(0x3f62b6e0, 0x24bafad9), TOBN(0xc8b42bd2, 0x64da906a),
+     TOBN(0xc98e1eb4, 0xda3276a0), TOBN(0x30d0e5fc, 0x06cbf852),
+     TOBN(0x1b6b2ae1, 0xe8b4dfd4), TOBN(0xd754d5c7, 0x8301cbac),
+     TOBN(0x66097629, 0x112a39ac), TOBN(0xf86b5999, 0x93ba4ab9),
+     TOBN(0x26c9dea7, 0x99f9d581), TOBN(0x0473b1a8, 0xc2fafeaa),
+     TOBN(0x1469af55, 0x3b2505a5), TOBN(0x227d16d7, 0xd6a43323),
+     TOBN(0x3316f73c, 0xad3d97f9), TOBN(0x52bf3bb5, 0x1f137455),
+     TOBN(0x953eafeb, 0x09954e7c), TOBN(0xa721dfed, 0xdd732411),
+     TOBN(0xb4929821, 0x141d4579), TOBN(0x3411321c, 0xaa3bd435),
+     TOBN(0xafb355aa, 0x17fa6015), TOBN(0xb4e7ef4a, 0x18e42f0e),
+     TOBN(0x604ac97c, 0x59371000), TOBN(0xe1c48c70, 0x7f759c18),
+     TOBN(0x3f62ecc5, 0xa5db6b65), TOBN(0x0a78b173, 0x38a21495),
+     TOBN(0x6be1819d, 0xbcc8ad94), TOBN(0x70dc04f6, 0xd89c3400),
+     TOBN(0x462557b4, 0xa6b4840a), TOBN(0x544c6ade, 0x60bd21c0),
+     TOBN(0x6a00f24e, 0x907a544b), TOBN(0xa7520dcb, 0x313da210),
+     TOBN(0xfe939b75, 0x11e4994b), TOBN(0x918b6ba6, 0xbc275d70),
+     TOBN(0xd3e5e0fc, 0x644be892), TOBN(0x707a9816, 0xfdaf6c42),
+     TOBN(0x60145567, 0xf15c13fe), TOBN(0x4818ebaa, 0xe130a54a),
+     TOBN(0x28aad3ad, 0x58d2f767), TOBN(0xdc5267fd, 0xd7e7c773),
+     TOBN(0x4919cc88, 0xc3afcc98), TOBN(0xaa2e6ab0, 0x2db8cd4b),
+     TOBN(0xd46fec04, 0xd0c63eaa), TOBN(0xa1cb92c5, 0x19ffa832),
+     TOBN(0x678dd178, 0xe43a631f), TOBN(0xfb5ae1cd, 0x3dc788b3),
+     TOBN(0x68b4fb90, 0x6e77de04), TOBN(0x7992bcf0, 0xf06dbb97),
+     TOBN(0x896e6a13, 0xc417c01d), TOBN(0x8d96332c, 0xb956be01),
+     TOBN(0x902fc93a, 0x413aa2b9), TOBN(0x99a4d915, 0xfc98c8a5),
+     TOBN(0x52c29407, 0x565f1137), TOBN(0x4072690f, 0x21e4f281),
+     TOBN(0x36e607cf, 0x02ff6072), TOBN(0xa47d2ca9, 0x8ad98cdc),
+     TOBN(0xbf471d1e, 0xf5f56609), TOBN(0xbcf86623, 0xf264ada0),
+     TOBN(0xb70c0687, 0xaa9e5cb6), TOBN(0xc98124f2, 0x17401c6c),
+     TOBN(0x8189635f, 0xd4a61435), TOBN(0xd28fb8af, 0xa9d98ea6),
+     TOBN(0xb9a67c2a, 0x40c251f8), TOBN(0x88cd5d87, 0xa2da44be),
+     TOBN(0x437deb96, 0xe09b5423), TOBN(0x150467db, 0x64287dc1),
+     TOBN(0xe161debb, 0xcdabb839), TOBN(0xa79e9742, 0xf1839a3e),
+     TOBN(0xbb8dd3c2, 0x652d202b), TOBN(0x7b3e67f7, 0xe9f97d96),
+     TOBN(0x5aa5d78f, 0xb1cb6ac9), TOBN(0xffa13e8e, 0xca1d0d45),
+     TOBN(0x369295dd, 0x2ba5bf95), TOBN(0xd68bd1f8, 0x39aff05e),
+     TOBN(0xaf0d86f9, 0x26d783f2), TOBN(0x543a59b3, 0xfc3aafc1),
+     TOBN(0x3fcf81d2, 0x7b7da97c), TOBN(0xc990a056, 0xd25dee46),
+     TOBN(0x3e6775b8, 0x519cce2c), TOBN(0xfc9af71f, 0xae13d863),
+     TOBN(0x774a4a6f, 0x47c1605c), TOBN(0x46ba4245, 0x2fd205e8),
+     TOBN(0xa06feea4, 0xd3fd524d), TOBN(0x1e724641, 0x6de1acc2),
+     TOBN(0xf53816f1, 0x334e2b42), TOBN(0x49e5918e, 0x922f0024),
+     TOBN(0x439530b6, 0x65c7322d), TOBN(0xcf12cc01, 0xb3c1b3fb),
+     TOBN(0xc70b0186, 0x0172f685), TOBN(0xb915ee22, 0x1b58391d),
+     TOBN(0x9afdf03b, 0xa317db24), TOBN(0x87dec659, 0x17b8ffc4),
+     TOBN(0x7f46597b, 0xe4d3d050), TOBN(0x80a1c1ed, 0x006500e7),
+     TOBN(0x84902a96, 0x78bf030e), TOBN(0xfb5e9c9a, 0x50560148),
+     TOBN(0x6dae0a92, 0x63362426), TOBN(0xdcaeecf4, 0xa9e30c40),
+     TOBN(0xc0d887bb, 0x518d0c6b), TOBN(0x99181152, 0xcb985b9d),
+     TOBN(0xad186898, 0xef7bc381), TOBN(0x18168ffb, 0x9ee46201),
+     TOBN(0x9a04cdaa, 0x2502753c), TOBN(0xbb279e26, 0x51407c41),
+     TOBN(0xeacb03aa, 0xf23564e5), TOBN(0x18336582, 0x71e61016),
+     TOBN(0x8684b8c4, 0xeb809877), TOBN(0xb336e18d, 0xea0e672e),
+     TOBN(0xefb601f0, 0x34ee5867), TOBN(0x2733edbe, 0x1341cfd1),
+     TOBN(0xb15e809a, 0x26025c3c), TOBN(0xe6e981a6, 0x9350df88),
+     TOBN(0x92376237, 0x8502fd8e), TOBN(0x4791f216, 0x0c12be9b),
+     TOBN(0xb7256789, 0x25f02425), TOBN(0xec863194, 0x7a974443),
+     TOBN(0x7c0ce882, 0xfb41cc52), TOBN(0xc266ff7e, 0xf25c07f2),
+     TOBN(0x3d4da8c3, 0x017025f3), TOBN(0xefcf628c, 0xfb9579b4),
+     TOBN(0x5c4d0016, 0x1f3716ec), TOBN(0x9c27ebc4, 0x6801116e),
+     TOBN(0x5eba0ea1, 0x1da1767e), TOBN(0xfe151452, 0x47004c57),
+     TOBN(0x3ace6df6, 0x8c2373b7), TOBN(0x75c3dffe, 0x5dbc37ac),
+     TOBN(0x3dc32a73, 0xddc925fc), TOBN(0xb679c841, 0x2f65ee0b),
+     TOBN(0x715a3295, 0x451cbfeb), TOBN(0xd9889768, 0xf76e9a29),
+     TOBN(0xec20ce7f, 0xb28ad247), TOBN(0xe99146c4, 0x00894d79),
+     TOBN(0x71457d7c, 0x9f5e3ea7), TOBN(0x097b2662, 0x38030031),
+     TOBN(0xdb7f6ae6, 0xcf9f82a8), TOBN(0x319decb9, 0x438f473a),
+     TOBN(0xa63ab386, 0x283856c3), TOBN(0x13e3172f, 0xb06a361b),
+     TOBN(0x2959f8dc, 0x7d5a006c), TOBN(0x2dbc27c6, 0x75fba752),
+     TOBN(0xc1227ab2, 0x87c22c9e), TOBN(0x06f61f75, 0x71a268b2),
+     TOBN(0x1b6bb971, 0x04779ce2), TOBN(0xaca83812, 0x0aadcb1d),
+     TOBN(0x297ae0bc, 0xaeaab2d5), TOBN(0xa5c14ee7, 0x5bfb9f13),
+     TOBN(0xaa00c583, 0xf17a62c7), TOBN(0x39eb962c, 0x173759f6),
+     TOBN(0x1eeba1d4, 0x86c9a88f), TOBN(0x0ab6c37a, 0xdf016c5e),
+     TOBN(0xa2a147db, 0xa28a0749), TOBN(0x246c20d6, 0xee519165),
+     TOBN(0x5068d1b1, 0xd3810715), TOBN(0xb1e7018c, 0x748160b9),
+     TOBN(0x03f5b1fa, 0xf380ff62), TOBN(0xef7fb1dd, 0xf3cb2c1e),
+     TOBN(0xeab539a8, 0xfc91a7da), TOBN(0x83ddb707, 0xf3f9b561),
+     TOBN(0xc550e211, 0xfe7df7a4), TOBN(0xa7cd07f2, 0x063f6f40),
+     TOBN(0xb0de3635, 0x2976879c), TOBN(0xb5f83f85, 0xe55741da),
+     TOBN(0x4ea9d25e, 0xf3d8ac3d), TOBN(0x6fe2066f, 0x62819f02),
+     TOBN(0x4ab2b9c2, 0xcef4a564), TOBN(0x1e155d96, 0x5ffa2de3),
+     TOBN(0x0eb0a19b, 0xc3a72d00), TOBN(0x4037665b, 0x8513c31b),
+     TOBN(0x2fb2b6bf, 0x04c64637), TOBN(0x45c34d6e, 0x08cdc639),
+     TOBN(0x56f1e10f, 0xf01fd796), TOBN(0x4dfb8101, 0xfe3667b8),
+     TOBN(0xe0eda253, 0x9021d0c0), TOBN(0x7a94e9ff, 0x8a06c6ab),
+     TOBN(0x2d3bb0d9, 0xbb9aa882), TOBN(0xea20e4e5, 0xec05fd10),
+     TOBN(0xed7eeb5f, 0x1a1ca64e), TOBN(0x2fa6b43c, 0xc6327cbd),
+     TOBN(0xb577e3cf, 0x3aa91121), TOBN(0x8c6bd5ea, 0x3a34079b),
+     TOBN(0xd7e5ba39, 0x60e02fc0), TOBN(0xf16dd2c3, 0x90141bf8),
+     TOBN(0xb57276d9, 0x80101b98), TOBN(0x760883fd, 0xb82f0f66),
+     TOBN(0x89d7de75, 0x4bc3eff3), TOBN(0x03b60643, 0x5dc2ab40),
+     TOBN(0xcd6e53df, 0xe05beeac), TOBN(0xf2f1e862, 0xbc3325cd),
+     TOBN(0xdd0f7921, 0x774f03c3), TOBN(0x97ca7221, 0x4552cc1b),
+     TOBN(0x5a0d6afe, 0x1cd19f72), TOBN(0xa20915dc, 0xf183fbeb),
+     TOBN(0x9fda4b40, 0x832c403c), TOBN(0x32738edd, 0xbe425442),
+     TOBN(0x469a1df6, 0xb5eccf1a), TOBN(0x4b5aff42, 0x28bbe1f0),
+     TOBN(0x31359d7f, 0x570dfc93), TOBN(0xa18be235, 0xf0088628),
+     TOBN(0xa5b30fba, 0xb00ed3a9), TOBN(0x34c61374, 0x73cdf8be),
+     TOBN(0x2c5c5f46, 0xabc56797), TOBN(0x5cecf93d, 0xb82a8ae2),
+     TOBN(0x7d3dbe41, 0xa968fbf0), TOBN(0xd23d4583, 0x1a5c7f3d),
+     TOBN(0xf28f69a0, 0xc087a9c7), TOBN(0xc2d75471, 0x474471ca),
+     TOBN(0x36ec9f4a, 0x4eb732ec), TOBN(0x6c943bbd, 0xb1ca6bed),
+     TOBN(0xd64535e1, 0xf2457892), TOBN(0x8b84a8ea, 0xf7e2ac06),
+     TOBN(0xe0936cd3, 0x2499dd5f), TOBN(0x12053d7e, 0x0ed04e57),
+     TOBN(0x4bdd0076, 0xe4305d9d), TOBN(0x34a527b9, 0x1f67f0a2),
+     TOBN(0xe79a4af0, 0x9cec46ea), TOBN(0xb15347a1, 0x658b9bc7),
+     TOBN(0x6bd2796f, 0x35af2f75), TOBN(0xac957990, 0x4051c435),
+     TOBN(0x2669dda3, 0xc33a655d), TOBN(0x5d503c2e, 0x88514aa3),
+     TOBN(0xdfa11337, 0x3753dd41), TOBN(0x3f054673, 0x0b754f78),
+     TOBN(0xbf185677, 0x496125bd), TOBN(0xfb0023c8, 0x3775006c),
+     TOBN(0xfa0f072f, 0x3a037899), TOBN(0x4222b6eb, 0x0e4aea57),
+     TOBN(0x3dde5e76, 0x7866d25a), TOBN(0xb6eb04f8, 0x4837aa6f),
+     TOBN(0x5315591a, 0x2cf1cdb8), TOBN(0x6dfb4f41, 0x2d4e683c),
+     TOBN(0x7e923ea4, 0x48ee1f3a), TOBN(0x9604d9f7, 0x05a2afd5),
+     TOBN(0xbe1d4a33, 0x40ea4948), TOBN(0x5b45f1f4, 0xb44cbd2f),
+     TOBN(0x5faf8376, 0x4acc757e), TOBN(0xa7cf9ab8, 0x63d68ff7),
+     TOBN(0x8ad62f69, 0xdf0e404b), TOBN(0xd65f33c2, 0x12bdafdf),
+     TOBN(0xc365de15, 0xa377b14e), TOBN(0x6bf5463b, 0x8e39f60c),
+     TOBN(0x62030d2d, 0x2ce68148), TOBN(0xd95867ef, 0xe6f843a8),
+     TOBN(0xd39a0244, 0xef5ab017), TOBN(0x0bd2d8c1, 0x4ab55d12),
+     TOBN(0xc9503db3, 0x41639169), TOBN(0x2d4e25b0, 0xf7660c8a),
+     TOBN(0x760cb3b5, 0xe224c5d7), TOBN(0xfa3baf8c, 0x68616919),
+     TOBN(0x9fbca113, 0x8d142552), TOBN(0x1ab18bf1, 0x7669ebf5),
+     TOBN(0x55e6f53e, 0x9bdf25dd), TOBN(0x04cc0bf3, 0xcb6cd154),
+     TOBN(0x595bef49, 0x95e89080), TOBN(0xfe9459a8, 0x104a9ac1),
+     TOBN(0xad2d89ca, 0xcce9bb32), TOBN(0xddea65e1, 0xf7de8285),
+     TOBN(0x62ed8c35, 0xb351bd4b), TOBN(0x4150ff36, 0x0c0e19a7),
+     TOBN(0x86e3c801, 0x345f4e47), TOBN(0x3bf21f71, 0x203a266c),
+     TOBN(0x7ae110d4, 0x855b1f13), TOBN(0x5d6aaf6a, 0x07262517),
+     TOBN(0x1e0f12e1, 0x813d28f1), TOBN(0x6000e11d, 0x7ad7a523),
+     TOBN(0xc7d8deef, 0xc744a17b), TOBN(0x1e990b48, 0x14c05a00),
+     TOBN(0x68fddaee, 0x93e976d5), TOBN(0x696241d1, 0x46610d63),
+     TOBN(0xb204e7c3, 0x893dda88), TOBN(0x8bccfa65, 0x6a3a6946),
+     TOBN(0xb59425b4, 0xc5cd1411), TOBN(0x701b4042, 0xff3658b1),
+     TOBN(0xe3e56bca, 0x4784cf93), TOBN(0x27de5f15, 0x8fe68d60),
+     TOBN(0x4ab9cfce, 0xf8d53f19), TOBN(0xddb10311, 0xa40a730d),
+     TOBN(0x6fa73cd1, 0x4eee0a8a), TOBN(0xfd548748, 0x5249719d),
+     TOBN(0x49d66316, 0xa8123ef0), TOBN(0x73c32db4, 0xe7f95438),
+     TOBN(0x2e2ed209, 0x0d9e7854), TOBN(0xf98a9329, 0x9d9f0507),
+     TOBN(0xc5d33cf6, 0x0c6aa20a), TOBN(0x9a32ba14, 0x75279bb2),
+     TOBN(0x7e3202cb, 0x774a7307), TOBN(0x64ed4bc4, 0xe8c42dbd),
+     TOBN(0xc20f1a06, 0xd4caed0d), TOBN(0xb8021407, 0x171d22b3),
+     TOBN(0xd426ca04, 0xd13268d7), TOBN(0x92377007, 0x25f4d126),
+     TOBN(0x4204cbc3, 0x71f21a85), TOBN(0x18461b7a, 0xf82369ba),
+     TOBN(0xc0c07d31, 0x3fc858f9), TOBN(0x5deb5a50, 0xe2bab569),
+     TOBN(0xd5959d46, 0xd5eea89e), TOBN(0xfdff8424, 0x08437f4b),
+     TOBN(0xf21071e4, 0x3cfe254f), TOBN(0x72417696, 0x95468321),
+     TOBN(0x5d8288b9, 0x102cae3e), TOBN(0x2d143e3d, 0xf1965dff),
+     TOBN(0x00c9a376, 0xa078d847), TOBN(0x6fc0da31, 0x26028731),
+     TOBN(0xa2baeadf, 0xe45083a2), TOBN(0x66bc7218, 0x5e5b4bcd),
+     TOBN(0x2c826442, 0xd04b8e7f), TOBN(0xc19f5451, 0x6c4b586b),
+     TOBN(0x60182c49, 0x5b7eeed5), TOBN(0xd9954ecd, 0x7aa9dfa1),
+     TOBN(0xa403a8ec, 0xc73884ad), TOBN(0x7fb17de2, 0x9bb39041),
+     TOBN(0x694b64c5, 0xabb020e8), TOBN(0x3d18c184, 0x19c4eec7),
+     TOBN(0x9c4673ef, 0x1c4793e5), TOBN(0xc7b8aeb5, 0x056092e6),
+     TOBN(0x3aa1ca43, 0xf0f8c16b), TOBN(0x224ed5ec, 0xd679b2f6),
+     TOBN(0x0d56eeaf, 0x55a205c9), TOBN(0xbfe115ba, 0x4b8e028b),
+     TOBN(0x97e60849, 0x3927f4fe), TOBN(0xf91fbf94, 0x759aa7c5),
+     TOBN(0x985af769, 0x6be90a51), TOBN(0xc1277b78, 0x78ccb823),
+     TOBN(0x395b656e, 0xe7a75952), TOBN(0x00df7de0, 0x928da5f5),
+     TOBN(0x09c23175, 0x4ca4454f), TOBN(0x4ec971f4, 0x7aa2d3c1),
+     TOBN(0x45c3c507, 0xe75d9ccc), TOBN(0x63b7be8a, 0x3dc90306),
+     TOBN(0x37e09c66, 0x5db44bdc), TOBN(0x50d60da1, 0x6841c6a2),
+     TOBN(0x6f9b65ee, 0x08df1b12), TOBN(0x38734879, 0x7ff089df),
+     TOBN(0x9c331a66, 0x3fe8013d), TOBN(0x017f5de9, 0x5f42fcc8),
+     TOBN(0x43077866, 0xe8e57567), TOBN(0xc9f781ce, 0xf9fcdb18),
+     TOBN(0x38131dda, 0x9b12e174), TOBN(0x25d84aa3, 0x8a03752a),
+     TOBN(0x45e09e09, 0x4d0c0ce2), TOBN(0x1564008b, 0x92bebba5),
+     TOBN(0xf7e8ad31, 0xa87284c7), TOBN(0xb7c4b46c, 0x97e7bbaa),
+     TOBN(0x3e22a7b3, 0x97acf4ec), TOBN(0x0426c400, 0x5ea8b640),
+     TOBN(0x5e3295a6, 0x4e969285), TOBN(0x22aabc59, 0xa6a45670),
+     TOBN(0xb929714c, 0x5f5942bc), TOBN(0x9a6168bd, 0xfa3182ed),
+     TOBN(0x2216a665, 0x104152ba), TOBN(0x46908d03, 0xb6926368)}
+    ,
+    {TOBN(0xa9f5d874, 0x5a1251fb), TOBN(0x967747a8, 0xc72725c7),
+     TOBN(0x195c33e5, 0x31ffe89e), TOBN(0x609d210f, 0xe964935e),
+     TOBN(0xcafd6ca8, 0x2fe12227), TOBN(0xaf9b5b96, 0x0426469d),
+     TOBN(0x2e9ee04c, 0x5693183c), TOBN(0x1084a333, 0xc8146fef),
+     TOBN(0x96649933, 0xaed1d1f7), TOBN(0x566eaff3, 0x50563090),
+     TOBN(0x345057f0, 0xad2e39cf), TOBN(0x148ff65b, 0x1f832124),
+     TOBN(0x042e89d4, 0xcf94cf0d), TOBN(0x319bec84, 0x520c58b3),
+     TOBN(0x2a267626, 0x5361aa0d), TOBN(0xc86fa302, 0x8fbc87ad),
+     TOBN(0xfc83d2ab, 0x5c8b06d5), TOBN(0xb1a785a2, 0xfe4eac46),
+     TOBN(0xb99315bc, 0x846f7779), TOBN(0xcf31d816, 0xef9ea505),
+     TOBN(0x2391fe6a, 0x15d7dc85), TOBN(0x2f132b04, 0xb4016b33),
+     TOBN(0x29547fe3, 0x181cb4c7), TOBN(0xdb66d8a6, 0x650155a1),
+     TOBN(0x6b66d7e1, 0xadc1696f), TOBN(0x98ebe593, 0x0acd72d0),
+     TOBN(0x65f24550, 0xcc1b7435), TOBN(0xce231393, 0xb4b9a5ec),
+     TOBN(0x234a22d4, 0xdb067df9), TOBN(0x98dda095, 0xcaff9b00),
+     TOBN(0x1bbc75a0, 0x6100c9c1), TOBN(0x1560a9c8, 0x939cf695),
+     TOBN(0xcf006d3e, 0x99e0925f), TOBN(0x2dd74a96, 0x6322375a),
+     TOBN(0xc58b446a, 0xb56af5ba), TOBN(0x50292683, 0xe0b9b4f1),
+     TOBN(0xe2c34cb4, 0x1aeaffa3), TOBN(0x8b17203f, 0x9b9587c1),
+     TOBN(0x6d559207, 0xead1350c), TOBN(0x2b66a215, 0xfb7f9604),
+     TOBN(0x0850325e, 0xfe51bf74), TOBN(0x9c4f579e, 0x5e460094),
+     TOBN(0x5c87b92a, 0x76da2f25), TOBN(0x889de4e0, 0x6febef33),
+     TOBN(0x6900ec06, 0x646083ce), TOBN(0xbe2a0335, 0xbfe12773),
+     TOBN(0xadd1da35, 0xc5344110), TOBN(0x757568b7, 0xb802cd20),
+     TOBN(0x75559779, 0x00f7e6c8), TOBN(0x38e8b94f, 0x0facd2f0),
+     TOBN(0xfea1f3af, 0x03fde375), TOBN(0x5e11a1d8, 0x75881dfc),
+     TOBN(0xb3a6b02e, 0xc1e2f2ef), TOBN(0x193d2bbb, 0xc605a6c5),
+     TOBN(0x325ffeee, 0x339a0b2d), TOBN(0x27b6a724, 0x9e0c8846),
+     TOBN(0xe4050f1c, 0xf1c367ca), TOBN(0x9bc85a9b, 0xc90fbc7d),
+     TOBN(0xa373c4a2, 0xe1a11032), TOBN(0xb64232b7, 0xad0393a9),
+     TOBN(0xf5577eb0, 0x167dad29), TOBN(0x1604f301, 0x94b78ab2),
+     TOBN(0x0baa94af, 0xe829348b), TOBN(0x77fbd8dd, 0x41654342),
+     TOBN(0xdab50ea5, 0xb964e39a), TOBN(0xd4c29e3c, 0xd0d3c76e),
+     TOBN(0x80dae67c, 0x56d11964), TOBN(0x7307a8bf, 0xe5ffcc2f),
+     TOBN(0x65bbc1aa, 0x91708c3b), TOBN(0xa151e62c, 0x28bf0eeb),
+     TOBN(0x6cb53381, 0x6fa34db7), TOBN(0x5139e05c, 0xa29403a8),
+     TOBN(0x6ff651b4, 0x94a7cd2e), TOBN(0x5671ffd1, 0x0699336c),
+     TOBN(0x6f5fd2cc, 0x979a896a), TOBN(0x11e893a8, 0xd8148cef),
+     TOBN(0x988906a1, 0x65cf7b10), TOBN(0x81b67178, 0xc50d8485),
+     TOBN(0x7c0deb35, 0x8a35b3de), TOBN(0x423ac855, 0xc1d29799),
+     TOBN(0xaf580d87, 0xdac50b74), TOBN(0x28b2b89f, 0x5869734c),
+     TOBN(0x99a3b936, 0x874e28fb), TOBN(0xbb2c9190, 0x25f3f73a),
+     TOBN(0x199f6918, 0x84a9d5b7), TOBN(0x7ebe2325, 0x7e770374),
+     TOBN(0xf442e107, 0x0738efe2), TOBN(0xcf9f3f56, 0xcf9082d2),
+     TOBN(0x719f69e1, 0x09618708), TOBN(0xcc9e8364, 0xc183f9b1),
+     TOBN(0xec203a95, 0x366a21af), TOBN(0x6aec5d6d, 0x068b141f),
+     TOBN(0xee2df78a, 0x994f04e9), TOBN(0xb39ccae8, 0x271245b0),
+     TOBN(0xb875a4a9, 0x97e43f4f), TOBN(0x507dfe11, 0xdb2cea98),
+     TOBN(0x4fbf81cb, 0x489b03e9), TOBN(0xdb86ec5b, 0x6ec414fa),
+     TOBN(0xfad444f9, 0xf51b3ae5), TOBN(0xca7d33d6, 0x1914e3fe),
+     TOBN(0xa9c32f5c, 0x0ae6c4d0), TOBN(0xa9ca1d1e, 0x73969568),
+     TOBN(0x98043c31, 0x1aa7467e), TOBN(0xe832e75c, 0xe21b5ac6),
+     TOBN(0x314b7aea, 0x5232123d), TOBN(0x08307c8c, 0x65ae86db),
+     TOBN(0x06e7165c, 0xaa4668ed), TOBN(0xb170458b, 0xb4d3ec39),
+     TOBN(0x4d2e3ec6, 0xc19bb986), TOBN(0xc5f34846, 0xae0304ed),
+     TOBN(0x917695a0, 0x6c9f9722), TOBN(0x6c7f7317, 0x4cab1c0a),
+     TOBN(0x6295940e, 0x9d6d2e8b), TOBN(0xd318b8c1, 0x549f7c97),
+     TOBN(0x22453204, 0x97713885), TOBN(0x468d834b, 0xa8a440fe),
+     TOBN(0xd81fe5b2, 0xbfba796e), TOBN(0x152364db, 0x6d71f116),
+     TOBN(0xbb8c7c59, 0xb5b66e53), TOBN(0x0b12c61b, 0x2641a192),
+     TOBN(0x31f14802, 0xfcf0a7fd), TOBN(0x42fd0789, 0x5488b01e),
+     TOBN(0x71d78d6d, 0x9952b498), TOBN(0x8eb572d9, 0x07ac5201),
+     TOBN(0xe0a2a44c, 0x4d194a88), TOBN(0xd2b63fd9, 0xba017e66),
+     TOBN(0x78efc6c8, 0xf888aefc), TOBN(0xb76f6bda, 0x4a881a11),
+     TOBN(0x187f314b, 0xb46c2397), TOBN(0x004cf566, 0x5ded2819),
+     TOBN(0xa9ea5704, 0x38764d34), TOBN(0xbba45217, 0x78084709),
+     TOBN(0x06474571, 0x1171121e), TOBN(0xad7b7eb1, 0xe7c9b671),
+     TOBN(0xdacfbc40, 0x730f7507), TOBN(0x178cd8c6, 0xc7ad7bd1),
+     TOBN(0xbf0be101, 0xb2a67238), TOBN(0x3556d367, 0xaf9c14f2),
+     TOBN(0x104b7831, 0xa5662075), TOBN(0x58ca59bb, 0x79d9e60a),
+     TOBN(0x4bc45392, 0xa569a73b), TOBN(0x517a52e8, 0x5698f6c9),
+     TOBN(0x85643da5, 0xaeadd755), TOBN(0x1aed0cd5, 0x2a581b84),
+     TOBN(0xb9b4ff84, 0x80af1372), TOBN(0x244c3113, 0xf1ba5d1f),
+     TOBN(0x2a5dacbe, 0xf5f98d31), TOBN(0x2c3323e8, 0x4375bc2a),
+     TOBN(0x17a3ab4a, 0x5594b1dd), TOBN(0xa1928bfb, 0xceb4797e),
+     TOBN(0xe83af245, 0xe4886a19), TOBN(0x8979d546, 0x72b5a74a),
+     TOBN(0xa0f726bc, 0x19f9e967), TOBN(0xd9d03152, 0xe8fbbf4e),
+     TOBN(0xcfd6f51d, 0xb7707d40), TOBN(0x633084d9, 0x63f6e6e0),
+     TOBN(0xedcd9cdc, 0x55667eaf), TOBN(0x73b7f92b, 0x2e44d56f),
+     TOBN(0xfb2e39b6, 0x4e962b14), TOBN(0x7d408f6e, 0xf671fcbf),
+     TOBN(0xcc634ddc, 0x164a89bb), TOBN(0x74a42bb2, 0x3ef3bd05),
+     TOBN(0x1280dbb2, 0x428decbb), TOBN(0x6103f6bb, 0x402c8596),
+     TOBN(0xfa2bf581, 0x355a5752), TOBN(0x562f96a8, 0x00946674),
+     TOBN(0x4e4ca16d, 0x6da0223b), TOBN(0xfe47819f, 0x28d3aa25),
+     TOBN(0x9eea3075, 0xf8dfcf8a), TOBN(0xa284f0aa, 0x95669825),
+     TOBN(0xb3fca250, 0x867d3fd8), TOBN(0x20757b5f, 0x269d691e),
+     TOBN(0xf2c24020, 0x93b8a5de), TOBN(0xd3f93359, 0xebc06da6),
+     TOBN(0x1178293e, 0xb2739c33), TOBN(0xd2a3e770, 0xbcd686e5),
+     TOBN(0xa76f49f4, 0xcd941534), TOBN(0x0d37406b, 0xe3c71c0e),
+     TOBN(0x172d9397, 0x3b97f7e3), TOBN(0xec17e239, 0xbd7fd0de),
+     TOBN(0xe3290551, 0x6f496ba2), TOBN(0x6a693172, 0x36ad50e7),
+     TOBN(0xc4e539a2, 0x83e7eff5), TOBN(0x752737e7, 0x18e1b4cf),
+     TOBN(0xa2f7932c, 0x68af43ee), TOBN(0x5502468e, 0x703d00bd),
+     TOBN(0xe5dc978f, 0x2fb061f5), TOBN(0xc9a1904a, 0x28c815ad),
+     TOBN(0xd3af538d, 0x470c56a4), TOBN(0x159abc5f, 0x193d8ced),
+     TOBN(0x2a37245f, 0x20108ef3), TOBN(0xfa17081e, 0x223f7178),
+     TOBN(0x27b0fb2b, 0x10c8c0f5), TOBN(0x2102c3ea, 0x40650547),
+     TOBN(0x594564df, 0x8ac3bfa7), TOBN(0x98102033, 0x509dad96),
+     TOBN(0x6989643f, 0xf1d18a13), TOBN(0x35eebd91, 0xd7fc5af0),
+     TOBN(0x078d096a, 0xfaeaafd8), TOBN(0xb7a89341, 0xdef3de98),
+     TOBN(0x2a206e8d, 0xecf2a73a), TOBN(0x066a6397, 0x8e551994),
+     TOBN(0x3a6a088a, 0xb98d53a2), TOBN(0x0ce7c67c, 0x2d1124aa),
+     TOBN(0x48cec671, 0x759a113c), TOBN(0xe3b373d3, 0x4f6f67fa),
+     TOBN(0x5455d479, 0xfd36727b), TOBN(0xe5a428ee, 0xa13c0d81),
+     TOBN(0xb853dbc8, 0x1c86682b), TOBN(0xb78d2727, 0xb8d02b2a),
+     TOBN(0xaaf69bed, 0x8ebc329a), TOBN(0xdb6b40b3, 0x293b2148),
+     TOBN(0xe42ea77d, 0xb8c4961f), TOBN(0xb1a12f7c, 0x20e5e0ab),
+     TOBN(0xa0ec5274, 0x79e8b05e), TOBN(0x68027391, 0xfab60a80),
+     TOBN(0x6bfeea5f, 0x16b1bd5e), TOBN(0xf957e420, 0x4de30ad3),
+     TOBN(0xcbaf664e, 0x6a353b9e), TOBN(0x5c873312, 0x26d14feb),
+     TOBN(0x4e87f98c, 0xb65f57cb), TOBN(0xdb60a621, 0x5e0cdd41),
+     TOBN(0x67c16865, 0xa6881440), TOBN(0x1093ef1a, 0x46ab52aa),
+     TOBN(0xc095afb5, 0x3f4ece64), TOBN(0x6a6bb02e, 0x7604551a),
+     TOBN(0x55d44b4e, 0x0b26b8cd), TOBN(0xe5f9a999, 0xf971268a),
+     TOBN(0xc08ec425, 0x11a7de84), TOBN(0x83568095, 0xfda469dd),
+     TOBN(0x737bfba1, 0x6c6c90a2), TOBN(0x1cb9c4a0, 0xbe229831),
+     TOBN(0x93bccbba, 0xbb2eec64), TOBN(0xa0c23b64, 0xda03adbe),
+     TOBN(0x5f7aa00a, 0xe0e86ac4), TOBN(0x470b941e, 0xfc1401e6),
+     TOBN(0x5ad8d679, 0x9df43574), TOBN(0x4ccfb8a9, 0x0f65d810),
+     TOBN(0x1bce80e3, 0xaa7fbd81), TOBN(0x273291ad, 0x9508d20a),
+     TOBN(0xf5c4b46b, 0x42a92806), TOBN(0x810684ec, 0xa86ab44a),
+     TOBN(0x4591640b, 0xca0bc9f8), TOBN(0xb5efcdfc, 0x5c4b6054),
+     TOBN(0x16fc8907, 0x6e9edd12), TOBN(0xe29d0b50, 0xd4d792f9),
+     TOBN(0xa45fd01c, 0x9b03116d), TOBN(0x85035235, 0xc81765a4),
+     TOBN(0x1fe2a9b2, 0xb4b4b67c), TOBN(0xc1d10df0, 0xe8020604),
+     TOBN(0x9d64abfc, 0xbc8058d8), TOBN(0x8943b9b2, 0x712a0fbb),
+     TOBN(0x90eed914, 0x3b3def04), TOBN(0x85ab3aa2, 0x4ce775ff),
+     TOBN(0x605fd4ca, 0x7bbc9040), TOBN(0x8b34a564, 0xe2c75dfb),
+     TOBN(0x41ffc94a, 0x10358560), TOBN(0x2d8a5072, 0x9e5c28aa),
+     TOBN(0xe915a0fc, 0x4cc7eb15), TOBN(0xe9efab05, 0x8f6d0f5d),
+     TOBN(0xdbab47a9, 0xd19e9b91), TOBN(0x8cfed745, 0x0276154c),
+     TOBN(0x154357ae, 0x2cfede0d), TOBN(0x520630df, 0x19f5a4ef),
+     TOBN(0x25759f7c, 0xe382360f), TOBN(0xb6db05c9, 0x88bf5857),
+     TOBN(0x2917d61d, 0x6c58d46c), TOBN(0x14f8e491, 0xfd20cb7a),
+     TOBN(0xb68a727a, 0x11c20340), TOBN(0x0386f86f, 0xaf7ccbb6),
+     TOBN(0x5c8bc6cc, 0xfee09a20), TOBN(0x7d76ff4a, 0xbb7eea35),
+     TOBN(0xa7bdebe7, 0xdb15be7a), TOBN(0x67a08054, 0xd89f0302),
+     TOBN(0x56bf0ea9, 0xc1193364), TOBN(0xc8244467, 0x62837ebe),
+     TOBN(0x32bd8e8b, 0x20d841b8), TOBN(0x127a0548, 0xdbb8a54f),
+     TOBN(0x83dd4ca6, 0x63b20236), TOBN(0x87714718, 0x203491fa),
+     TOBN(0x4dabcaaa, 0xaa8a5288), TOBN(0x91cc0c8a, 0xaf23a1c9),
+     TOBN(0x34c72c6a, 0x3f220e0c), TOBN(0xbcc20bdf, 0x1232144a),
+     TOBN(0x6e2f42da, 0xa20ede1b), TOBN(0xc441f00c, 0x74a00515),
+     TOBN(0xbf46a5b6, 0x734b8c4b), TOBN(0x57409503, 0x7b56c9a4),
+     TOBN(0x9f735261, 0xe4585d45), TOBN(0x9231faed, 0x6734e642),
+     TOBN(0x1158a176, 0xbe70ee6c), TOBN(0x35f1068d, 0x7c3501bf),
+     TOBN(0x6beef900, 0xa2d26115), TOBN(0x649406f2, 0xef0afee3),
+     TOBN(0x3f43a60a, 0xbc2420a1), TOBN(0x509002a7, 0xd5aee4ac),
+     TOBN(0xb46836a5, 0x3ff3571b), TOBN(0x24f98b78, 0x837927c1),
+     TOBN(0x6254256a, 0x4533c716), TOBN(0xf27abb0b, 0xd07ee196),
+     TOBN(0xd7cf64fc, 0x5c6d5bfd), TOBN(0x6915c751, 0xf0cd7a77),
+     TOBN(0xd9f59012, 0x8798f534), TOBN(0x772b0da8, 0xf81d8b5f),
+     TOBN(0x1244260c, 0x2e03fa69), TOBN(0x36cf0e3a, 0x3be1a374),
+     TOBN(0x6e7c1633, 0xef06b960), TOBN(0xa71a4c55, 0x671f90f6),
+     TOBN(0x7a941251, 0x33c673db), TOBN(0xc0bea510, 0x73e8c131),
+     TOBN(0x61a8a699, 0xd4f6c734), TOBN(0x25e78c88, 0x341ed001),
+     TOBN(0x5c18acf8, 0x8e2f7d90), TOBN(0xfdbf33d7, 0x77be32cd),
+     TOBN(0x0a085cd7, 0xd2eb5ee9), TOBN(0x2d702cfb, 0xb3201115),
+     TOBN(0xb6e0ebdb, 0x85c88ce8), TOBN(0x23a3ce3c, 0x1e01d617),
+     TOBN(0x3041618e, 0x567333ac), TOBN(0x9dd0fd8f, 0x157edb6b),
+     TOBN(0x27f74702, 0xb57872b8), TOBN(0x2ef26b4f, 0x657d5fe1),
+     TOBN(0x95426f0a, 0x57cf3d40), TOBN(0x847e2ad1, 0x65a6067a),
+     TOBN(0xd474d9a0, 0x09996a74), TOBN(0x16a56acd, 0x2a26115c),
+     TOBN(0x02a615c3, 0xd16f4d43), TOBN(0xcc3fc965, 0xaadb85b7),
+     TOBN(0x386bda73, 0xce07d1b0), TOBN(0xd82910c2, 0x58ad4178),
+     TOBN(0x124f82cf, 0xcd2617f4), TOBN(0xcc2f5e8d, 0xef691770),
+     TOBN(0x82702550, 0xb8c30ccc), TOBN(0x7b856aea, 0x1a8e575a),
+     TOBN(0xbb822fef, 0xb1ab9459), TOBN(0x085928bc, 0xec24e38e),
+     TOBN(0x5d0402ec, 0xba8f4b4d), TOBN(0xc07cd4ba, 0x00b4d58b),
+     TOBN(0x5d8dffd5, 0x29227e7a), TOBN(0x61d44d0c, 0x31bf386f),
+     TOBN(0xe486dc2b, 0x135e6f4d), TOBN(0x680962eb, 0xe79410ef),
+     TOBN(0xa61bd343, 0xf10088b5), TOBN(0x6aa76076, 0xe2e28686),
+     TOBN(0x80463d11, 0x8fb98871), TOBN(0xcb26f5c3, 0xbbc76aff),
+     TOBN(0xd4ab8edd, 0xfbe03614), TOBN(0xc8eb579b, 0xc0cf2dee),
+     TOBN(0xcc004c15, 0xc93bae41), TOBN(0x46fbae5d, 0x3aeca3b2),
+     TOBN(0x671235cf, 0x0f1e9ab1), TOBN(0xadfba934, 0x9ec285c1),
+     TOBN(0x88ded013, 0xf216c980), TOBN(0xc8ac4fb8, 0xf79e0bc1),
+     TOBN(0xa29b89c6, 0xfb97a237), TOBN(0xb697b780, 0x9922d8e7),
+     TOBN(0x3142c639, 0xddb945b5), TOBN(0x447b06c7, 0xe094c3a9),
+     TOBN(0xcdcb3642, 0x72266c90), TOBN(0x633aad08, 0xa9385046),
+     TOBN(0xa36c936b, 0xb57c6477), TOBN(0x871f8b64, 0xe94dbcc6),
+     TOBN(0x28d0fb62, 0xa591a67b), TOBN(0x9d40e081, 0xc1d926f5),
+     TOBN(0x3111eaf6, 0xf2d84b5a), TOBN(0x228993f9, 0xa565b644),
+     TOBN(0x0ccbf592, 0x2c83188b), TOBN(0xf87b30ab, 0x3df3e197),
+     TOBN(0xb8658b31, 0x7642bca8), TOBN(0x1a032d7f, 0x52800f17),
+     TOBN(0x051dcae5, 0x79bf9445), TOBN(0xeba6b8ee, 0x54a2e253),
+     TOBN(0x5c8b9cad, 0xd4485692), TOBN(0x84bda40e, 0x8986e9be),
+     TOBN(0xd16d16a4, 0x2f0db448), TOBN(0x8ec80050, 0xa14d4188),
+     TOBN(0xb2b26107, 0x98fa7aaa), TOBN(0x41209ee4, 0xf073aa4e),
+     TOBN(0xf1570359, 0xf2d6b19b), TOBN(0xcbe6868c, 0xfc577caf),
+     TOBN(0x186c4bdc, 0x32c04dd3), TOBN(0xa6c35fae, 0xcfeee397),
+     TOBN(0xb4a1b312, 0xf086c0cf), TOBN(0xe0a5ccc6, 0xd9461fe2),
+     TOBN(0xc32278aa, 0x1536189f), TOBN(0x1126c55f, 0xba6df571),
+     TOBN(0x0f71a602, 0xb194560e), TOBN(0x8b2d7405, 0x324bd6e1),
+     TOBN(0x8481939e, 0x3738be71), TOBN(0xb5090b1a, 0x1a4d97a9),
+     TOBN(0x116c65a3, 0xf05ba915), TOBN(0x21863ad3, 0xaae448aa),
+     TOBN(0xd24e2679, 0xa7aae5d3), TOBN(0x7076013d, 0x0de5c1c4),
+     TOBN(0x2d50f8ba, 0xbb05b629), TOBN(0x73c1abe2, 0x6e66efbb),
+     TOBN(0xefd4b422, 0xf2488af7), TOBN(0xe4105d02, 0x663ba575),
+     TOBN(0x7eb60a8b, 0x53a69457), TOBN(0x62210008, 0xc945973b),
+     TOBN(0xfb255478, 0x77a50ec6), TOBN(0xbf0392f7, 0x0a37a72c),
+     TOBN(0xa0a7a19c, 0x4be18e7a), TOBN(0x90d8ea16, 0x25b1e0af),
+     TOBN(0x7582a293, 0xef953f57), TOBN(0x90a64d05, 0xbdc5465a),
+     TOBN(0xca79c497, 0xe2510717), TOBN(0x560dbb7c, 0x18cb641f),
+     TOBN(0x1d8e3286, 0x4b66abfb), TOBN(0xd26f52e5, 0x59030900),
+     TOBN(0x1ee3f643, 0x5584941a), TOBN(0x6d3b3730, 0x569f5958),
+     TOBN(0x9ff2a62f, 0x4789dba5), TOBN(0x91fcb815, 0x72b5c9b7),
+     TOBN(0xf446cb7d, 0x6c8f9a0e), TOBN(0x48f625c1, 0x39b7ecb5),
+     TOBN(0xbabae801, 0x1c6219b8), TOBN(0xe7a562d9, 0x28ac2f23),
+     TOBN(0xe1b48732, 0x26e20588), TOBN(0x06ee1cad, 0x775af051),
+     TOBN(0xda29ae43, 0xfaff79f7), TOBN(0xc141a412, 0x652ee9e0),
+     TOBN(0x1e127f6f, 0x195f4bd0), TOBN(0x29c6ab4f, 0x072f34f8),
+     TOBN(0x7b7c1477, 0x30448112), TOBN(0x82b51af1, 0xe4a38656),
+     TOBN(0x2bf2028a, 0x2f315010), TOBN(0xc9a4a01f, 0x6ea88cd4),
+     TOBN(0xf63e95d8, 0x257e5818), TOBN(0xdd8efa10, 0xb4519b16),
+     TOBN(0xed8973e0, 0x0da910bf), TOBN(0xed49d077, 0x5c0fe4a9),
+     TOBN(0xac3aac5e, 0xb7caee1e), TOBN(0x1033898d, 0xa7f4da57),
+     TOBN(0x42145c0e, 0x5c6669b9), TOBN(0x42daa688, 0xc1aa2aa0),
+     TOBN(0x629cc15c, 0x1a1d885a), TOBN(0x25572ec0, 0xf4b76817),
+     TOBN(0x8312e435, 0x9c8f8f28), TOBN(0x8107f8cd, 0x81965490),
+     TOBN(0x516ff3a3, 0x6fa6110c), TOBN(0x74fb1eb1, 0xfb93561f),
+     TOBN(0x6c0c9047, 0x8457522b), TOBN(0xcfd32104, 0x6bb8bdc6),
+     TOBN(0x2d6884a2, 0xcc80ad57), TOBN(0x7c27fc35, 0x86a9b637),
+     TOBN(0x3461baed, 0xadf4e8cd), TOBN(0x1d56251a, 0x617242f0),
+     TOBN(0x0b80d209, 0xc955bef4), TOBN(0xdf02cad2, 0x06adb047),
+     TOBN(0xf0d7cb91, 0x5ec74fee), TOBN(0xd2503375, 0x1111ba44),
+     TOBN(0x9671755e, 0xdf53cb36), TOBN(0x54dcb612, 0x3368551b),
+     TOBN(0x66d69aac, 0xc8a025a4), TOBN(0x6be946c6, 0xe77ef445),
+     TOBN(0x719946d1, 0xa995e094), TOBN(0x65e848f6, 0xe51e04d8),
+     TOBN(0xe62f3300, 0x6a1e3113), TOBN(0x1541c7c1, 0x501de503),
+     TOBN(0x4daac9fa, 0xf4acfade), TOBN(0x0e585897, 0x44cd0b71),
+     TOBN(0x544fd869, 0x0a51cd77), TOBN(0x60fc20ed, 0x0031016d),
+     TOBN(0x58b404ec, 0xa4276867), TOBN(0x46f6c3cc, 0x34f34993),
+     TOBN(0x477ca007, 0xc636e5bd), TOBN(0x8018f5e5, 0x7c458b47),
+     TOBN(0xa1202270, 0xe47b668f), TOBN(0xcef48ccd, 0xee14f203),
+     TOBN(0x23f98bae, 0x62ff9b4d), TOBN(0x55acc035, 0xc589eddd),
+     TOBN(0x3fe712af, 0x64db4444), TOBN(0x19e9d634, 0xbecdd480),
+     TOBN(0xe08bc047, 0xa930978a), TOBN(0x2dbf24ec, 0xa1280733),
+     TOBN(0x3c0ae38c, 0x2cd706b2), TOBN(0x5b012a5b, 0x359017b9),
+     TOBN(0x3943c38c, 0x72e0f5ae), TOBN(0x786167ea, 0x57176fa3),
+     TOBN(0xe5f9897d, 0x594881dc), TOBN(0x6b5efad8, 0xcfb820c1),
+     TOBN(0xb2179093, 0xd55018de), TOBN(0x39ad7d32, 0x0bac56ce),
+     TOBN(0xb55122e0, 0x2cfc0e81), TOBN(0x117c4661, 0xf6d89daa),
+     TOBN(0x362d01e1, 0xcb64fa09), TOBN(0x6a309b4e, 0x3e9c4ddd),
+     TOBN(0xfa979fb7, 0xabea49b1), TOBN(0xb4b1d27d, 0x10e2c6c5),
+     TOBN(0xbd61c2c4, 0x23afde7a), TOBN(0xeb6614f8, 0x9786d358),
+     TOBN(0x4a5d816b, 0x7f6f7459), TOBN(0xe431a44f, 0x09360e7b),
+     TOBN(0x8c27a032, 0xc309914c), TOBN(0xcea5d68a, 0xcaede3d8),
+     TOBN(0x3668f665, 0x3a0a3f95), TOBN(0x89369416, 0x7ceba27b),
+     TOBN(0x89981fad, 0xe4728fe9), TOBN(0x7102c8a0, 0x8a093562),
+     TOBN(0xbb80310e, 0x235d21c8), TOBN(0x505e55d1, 0xbefb7f7b),
+     TOBN(0xa0a90811, 0x12958a67), TOBN(0xd67e106a, 0x4d851fef),
+     TOBN(0xb84011a9, 0x431dd80e), TOBN(0xeb7c7cca, 0x73306cd9),
+     TOBN(0x20fadd29, 0xd1b3b730), TOBN(0x83858b5b, 0xfe37b3d3),
+     TOBN(0xbf4cd193, 0xb6251d5c), TOBN(0x1cca1fd3, 0x1352d952),
+     TOBN(0xc66157a4, 0x90fbc051), TOBN(0x7990a638, 0x89b98636),}
+    ,
+    {TOBN(0xe5aa692a, 0x87dec0e1), TOBN(0x010ded8d, 0xf7b39d00),
+     TOBN(0x7b1b80c8, 0x54cfa0b5), TOBN(0x66beb876, 0xa0f8ea28),
+     TOBN(0x50d7f531, 0x3476cd0e), TOBN(0xa63d0e65, 0xb08d3949),
+     TOBN(0x1a09eea9, 0x53479fc6), TOBN(0x82ae9891, 0xf499e742),
+     TOBN(0xab58b910, 0x5ca7d866), TOBN(0x582967e2, 0x3adb3b34),
+     TOBN(0x89ae4447, 0xcceac0bc), TOBN(0x919c667c, 0x7bf56af5),
+     TOBN(0x9aec17b1, 0x60f5dcd7), TOBN(0xec697b9f, 0xddcaadbc),
+     TOBN(0x0b98f341, 0x463467f5), TOBN(0xb187f1f7, 0xa967132f),
+     TOBN(0x90fe7a1d, 0x214aeb18), TOBN(0x1506af3c, 0x741432f7),
+     TOBN(0xbb5565f9, 0xe591a0c4), TOBN(0x10d41a77, 0xb44f1bc3),
+     TOBN(0xa09d65e4, 0xa84bde96), TOBN(0x42f060d8, 0xf20a6a1c),
+     TOBN(0x652a3bfd, 0xf27f9ce7), TOBN(0xb6bdb65c, 0x3b3d739f),
+     TOBN(0xeb5ddcb6, 0xec7fae9f), TOBN(0x995f2714, 0xefb66e5a),
+     TOBN(0xdee95d8e, 0x69445d52), TOBN(0x1b6c2d46, 0x09e27620),
+     TOBN(0x32621c31, 0x8129d716), TOBN(0xb03909f1, 0x0958c1aa),
+     TOBN(0x8c468ef9, 0x1af4af63), TOBN(0x162c429f, 0xfba5cdf6),
+     TOBN(0x2f682343, 0x753b9371), TOBN(0x29cab45a, 0x5f1f9cd7),
+     TOBN(0x571623ab, 0xb245db96), TOBN(0xc507db09, 0x3fd79999),
+     TOBN(0x4e2ef652, 0xaf036c32), TOBN(0x86f0cc78, 0x05018e5c),
+     TOBN(0xc10a73d4, 0xab8be350), TOBN(0x6519b397, 0x7e826327),
+     TOBN(0xe8cb5eef, 0x9c053df7), TOBN(0x8de25b37, 0xb300ea6f),
+     TOBN(0xdb03fa92, 0xc849cffb), TOBN(0x242e43a7, 0xe84169bb),
+     TOBN(0xe4fa51f4, 0xdd6f958e), TOBN(0x6925a77f, 0xf4445a8d),
+     TOBN(0xe6e72a50, 0xe90d8949), TOBN(0xc66648e3, 0x2b1f6390),
+     TOBN(0xb2ab1957, 0x173e460c), TOBN(0x1bbbce75, 0x30704590),
+     TOBN(0xc0a90dbd, 0xdb1c7162), TOBN(0x505e399e, 0x15cdd65d),
+     TOBN(0x68434dcb, 0x57797ab7), TOBN(0x60ad35ba, 0x6a2ca8e8),
+     TOBN(0x4bfdb1e0, 0xde3336c1), TOBN(0xbbef99eb, 0xd8b39015),
+     TOBN(0x6c3b96f3, 0x1711ebec), TOBN(0x2da40f1f, 0xce98fdc4),
+     TOBN(0xb99774d3, 0x57b4411f), TOBN(0x87c8bdf4, 0x15b65bb6),
+     TOBN(0xda3a89e3, 0xc2eef12d), TOBN(0xde95bb9b, 0x3c7471f3),
+     TOBN(0x600f225b, 0xd812c594), TOBN(0x54907c5d, 0x2b75a56b),
+     TOBN(0xa93cc5f0, 0x8db60e35), TOBN(0x743e3cd6, 0xfa833319),
+     TOBN(0x7dad5c41, 0xf81683c9), TOBN(0x70c1e7d9, 0x9c34107e),
+     TOBN(0x0edc4a39, 0xa6be0907), TOBN(0x36d47035, 0x86d0b7d3),
+     TOBN(0x8c76da03, 0x272bfa60), TOBN(0x0b4a07ea, 0x0f08a414),
+     TOBN(0x699e4d29, 0x45c1dd53), TOBN(0xcadc5898, 0x231debb5),
+     TOBN(0xdf49fcc7, 0xa77f00e0), TOBN(0x93057bbf, 0xa73e5a0e),
+     TOBN(0x2f8b7ecd, 0x027a4cd1), TOBN(0x114734b3, 0xc614011a),
+     TOBN(0xe7a01db7, 0x67677c68), TOBN(0x89d9be5e, 0x7e273f4f),
+     TOBN(0xd225cb2e, 0x089808ef), TOBN(0xf1f7a27d, 0xd59e4107),
+     TOBN(0x53afc761, 0x8211b9c9), TOBN(0x0361bc67, 0xe6819159),
+     TOBN(0x2a865d0b, 0x7f071426), TOBN(0x6a3c1810, 0xe7072567),
+     TOBN(0x3e3bca1e, 0x0d6bcabd), TOBN(0xa1b02bc1, 0x408591bc),
+     TOBN(0xe0deee59, 0x31fba239), TOBN(0xf47424d3, 0x98bd91d1),
+     TOBN(0x0f8886f4, 0x071a3c1d), TOBN(0x3f7d41e8, 0xa819233b),
+     TOBN(0x708623c2, 0xcf6eb998), TOBN(0x86bb49af, 0x609a287f),
+     TOBN(0x942bb249, 0x63c90762), TOBN(0x0ef6eea5, 0x55a9654b),
+     TOBN(0x5f6d2d72, 0x36f5defe), TOBN(0xfa9922dc, 0x56f99176),
+     TOBN(0x6c8c5ece, 0xf78ce0c7), TOBN(0x7b44589d, 0xbe09b55e),
+     TOBN(0xe11b3bca, 0x9ea83770), TOBN(0xd7fa2c7f, 0x2ab71547),
+     TOBN(0x2a3dd6fa, 0x2a1ddcc0), TOBN(0x09acb430, 0x5a7b7707),
+     TOBN(0x4add4a2e, 0x649d4e57), TOBN(0xcd53a2b0, 0x1917526e),
+     TOBN(0xc5262330, 0x20b44ac4), TOBN(0x4028746a, 0xbaa2c31d),
+     TOBN(0x51318390, 0x64291d4c), TOBN(0xbf48f151, 0xee5ad909),
+     TOBN(0xcce57f59, 0x7b185681), TOBN(0x7c3ac1b0, 0x4854d442),
+     TOBN(0x65587dc3, 0xc093c171), TOBN(0xae7acb24, 0x24f42b65),
+     TOBN(0x5a338adb, 0x955996cb), TOBN(0xc8e65675, 0x6051f91b),
+     TOBN(0x66711fba, 0x28b8d0b1), TOBN(0x15d74137, 0xb6c10a90),
+     TOBN(0x70cdd7eb, 0x3a232a80), TOBN(0xc9e2f07f, 0x6191ed24),
+     TOBN(0xa80d1db6, 0xf79588c0), TOBN(0xfa52fc69, 0xb55768cc),
+     TOBN(0x0b4df1ae, 0x7f54438a), TOBN(0x0cadd1a7, 0xf9b46a4f),
+     TOBN(0xb40ea6b3, 0x1803dd6f), TOBN(0x488e4fa5, 0x55eaae35),
+     TOBN(0x9f047d55, 0x382e4e16), TOBN(0xc9b5b7e0, 0x2f6e0c98),
+     TOBN(0x6b1bd2d3, 0x95762649), TOBN(0xa9604ee7, 0xc7aea3f6),
+     TOBN(0x3646ff27, 0x6dc6f896), TOBN(0x9bf0e7f5, 0x2860bad1),
+     TOBN(0x2d92c821, 0x7cb44b92), TOBN(0xa2f5ce63, 0xaea9c182),
+     TOBN(0xd0a2afb1, 0x9154a5fd), TOBN(0x482e474c, 0x95801da6),
+     TOBN(0xc19972d0, 0xb611c24b), TOBN(0x1d468e65, 0x60a8f351),
+     TOBN(0xeb758069, 0x7bcf6421), TOBN(0xec9dd0ee, 0x88fbc491),
+     TOBN(0x5b59d2bf, 0x956c2e32), TOBN(0x73dc6864, 0xdcddf94e),
+     TOBN(0xfd5e2321, 0xbcee7665), TOBN(0xa7b4f8ef, 0x5e9a06c4),
+     TOBN(0xfba918dd, 0x7280f855), TOBN(0xbbaac260, 0x8baec688),
+     TOBN(0xa3b3f00f, 0x33400f42), TOBN(0x3d2dba29, 0x66f2e6e4),
+     TOBN(0xb6f71a94, 0x98509375), TOBN(0x8f33031f, 0xcea423cc),
+     TOBN(0x009b8dd0, 0x4807e6fb), TOBN(0x5163cfe5, 0x5cdb954c),
+     TOBN(0x03cc8f17, 0xcf41c6e8), TOBN(0xf1f03c2a, 0x037b925c),
+     TOBN(0xc39c19cc, 0x66d2427c), TOBN(0x823d24ba, 0x7b6c18e4),
+     TOBN(0x32ef9013, 0x901f0b4f), TOBN(0x684360f1, 0xf8941c2e),
+     TOBN(0x0ebaff52, 0x2c28092e), TOBN(0x7891e4e3, 0x256c932f),
+     TOBN(0x51264319, 0xac445e3d), TOBN(0x553432e7, 0x8ea74381),
+     TOBN(0xe6eeaa69, 0x67e9c50a), TOBN(0x27ced284, 0x62e628c7),
+     TOBN(0x3f96d375, 0x7a4afa57), TOBN(0xde0a14c3, 0xe484c150),
+     TOBN(0x364a24eb, 0x38bd9923), TOBN(0x1df18da0, 0xe5177422),
+     TOBN(0x174e8f82, 0xd8d38a9b), TOBN(0x2e97c600, 0xe7de1391),
+     TOBN(0xc5709850, 0xa1c175dd), TOBN(0x969041a0, 0x32ae5035),
+     TOBN(0xcbfd533b, 0x76a2086b), TOBN(0xd6bba71b, 0xd7c2e8fe),
+     TOBN(0xb2d58ee6, 0x099dfb67), TOBN(0x3a8b342d, 0x064a85d9),
+     TOBN(0x3bc07649, 0x522f9be3), TOBN(0x690c075b, 0xdf1f49a8),
+     TOBN(0x80e1aee8, 0x3854ec42), TOBN(0x2a7dbf44, 0x17689dc7),
+     TOBN(0xc004fc0e, 0x3faf4078), TOBN(0xb2f02e9e, 0xdf11862c),
+     TOBN(0xf10a5e0f, 0xa0a1b7b3), TOBN(0x30aca623, 0x8936ec80),
+     TOBN(0xf83cbf05, 0x02f40d9a), TOBN(0x4681c468, 0x2c318a4d),
+     TOBN(0x98575618, 0x0e9c2674), TOBN(0xbe79d046, 0x1847092e),
+     TOBN(0xaf1e480a, 0x78bd01e0), TOBN(0x6dd359e4, 0x72a51db9),
+     TOBN(0x62ce3821, 0xe3afbab6), TOBN(0xc5cee5b6, 0x17733199),
+     TOBN(0xe08b30d4, 0x6ffd9fbb), TOBN(0x6e5bc699, 0x36c610b7),
+     TOBN(0xf343cff2, 0x9ce262cf), TOBN(0xca2e4e35, 0x68b914c1),
+     TOBN(0x011d64c0, 0x16de36c5), TOBN(0xe0b10fdd, 0x42e2b829),
+     TOBN(0x78942981, 0x6685aaf8), TOBN(0xe7511708, 0x230ede97),
+     TOBN(0x671ed8fc, 0x3b922bf8), TOBN(0xe4d8c0a0, 0x4c29b133),
+     TOBN(0x87eb1239, 0x3b6e99c4), TOBN(0xaff3974c, 0x8793beba),
+     TOBN(0x03749405, 0x2c18df9b), TOBN(0xc5c3a293, 0x91007139),
+     TOBN(0x6a77234f, 0xe37a0b95), TOBN(0x02c29a21, 0xb661c96b),
+     TOBN(0xc3aaf1d6, 0x141ecf61), TOBN(0x9195509e, 0x3bb22f53),
+     TOBN(0x29597404, 0x22d51357), TOBN(0x1b083822, 0x537bed60),
+     TOBN(0xcd7d6e35, 0xe07289f0), TOBN(0x1f94c48c, 0x6dd86eff),
+     TOBN(0xc8bb1f82, 0xeb0f9cfa), TOBN(0x9ee0b7e6, 0x1b2eb97d),
+     TOBN(0x5a52fe2e, 0x34d74e31), TOBN(0xa352c310, 0x3bf79ab6),
+     TOBN(0x97ff6c5a, 0xabfeeb8f), TOBN(0xbfbe8fef, 0xf5c97305),
+     TOBN(0xd6081ce6, 0xa7904608), TOBN(0x1f812f3a, 0xc4fca249),
+     TOBN(0x9b24bc9a, 0xb9e5e200), TOBN(0x91022c67, 0x38012ee8),
+     TOBN(0xe83d9c5d, 0x30a713a1), TOBN(0x4876e3f0, 0x84ef0f93),
+     TOBN(0xc9777029, 0xc1fbf928), TOBN(0xef7a6bb3, 0xbce7d2a4),
+     TOBN(0xb8067228, 0xdfa2a659), TOBN(0xd5cd3398, 0xd877a48f),
+     TOBN(0xbea4fd8f, 0x025d0f3f), TOBN(0xd67d2e35, 0x2eae7c2b),
+     TOBN(0x184de7d7, 0xcc5f4394), TOBN(0xb5551b5c, 0x4536e142),
+     TOBN(0x2e89b212, 0xd34aa60a), TOBN(0x14a96fea, 0xf50051d5),
+     TOBN(0x4e21ef74, 0x0d12bb0b), TOBN(0xc522f020, 0x60b9677e),
+     TOBN(0x8b12e467, 0x2df7731d), TOBN(0x39f80382, 0x7b326d31),
+     TOBN(0xdfb8630c, 0x39024a94), TOBN(0xaacb96a8, 0x97319452),
+     TOBN(0xd68a3961, 0xeda3867c), TOBN(0x0c58e2b0, 0x77c4ffca),
+     TOBN(0x3d545d63, 0x4da919fa), TOBN(0xef79b69a, 0xf15e2289),
+     TOBN(0x54bc3d3d, 0x808bab10), TOBN(0xc8ab3007, 0x45f82c37),
+     TOBN(0xc12738b6, 0x7c4a658a), TOBN(0xb3c47639, 0x40e72182),
+     TOBN(0x3b77be46, 0x8798e44f), TOBN(0xdc047df2, 0x17a7f85f),
+     TOBN(0x2439d4c5, 0x5e59d92d), TOBN(0xcedca475, 0xe8e64d8d),
+     TOBN(0xa724cd0d, 0x87ca9b16), TOBN(0x35e4fd59, 0xa5540dfe),
+     TOBN(0xf8c1ff18, 0xe4bcf6b1), TOBN(0x856d6285, 0x295018fa),
+     TOBN(0x433f665c, 0x3263c949), TOBN(0xa6a76dd6, 0xa1f21409),
+     TOBN(0x17d32334, 0xcc7b4f79), TOBN(0xa1d03122, 0x06720e4a),
+     TOBN(0xadb6661d, 0x81d9bed5), TOBN(0xf0d6fb02, 0x11db15d1),
+     TOBN(0x7fd11ad5, 0x1fb747d2), TOBN(0xab50f959, 0x3033762b),
+     TOBN(0x2a7e711b, 0xfbefaf5a), TOBN(0xc7393278, 0x3fef2bbf),
+     TOBN(0xe29fa244, 0x0df6f9be), TOBN(0x9092757b, 0x71efd215),
+     TOBN(0xee60e311, 0x4f3d6fd9), TOBN(0x338542d4, 0x0acfb78b),
+     TOBN(0x44a23f08, 0x38961a0f), TOBN(0x1426eade, 0x986987ca),
+     TOBN(0x36e6ee2e, 0x4a863cc6), TOBN(0x48059420, 0x628b8b79),
+     TOBN(0x30303ad8, 0x7396e1de), TOBN(0x5c8bdc48, 0x38c5aad1),
+     TOBN(0x3e40e11f, 0x5c8f5066), TOBN(0xabd6e768, 0x8d246bbd),
+     TOBN(0x68aa40bb, 0x23330a01), TOBN(0xd23f5ee4, 0xc34eafa0),
+     TOBN(0x3bbee315, 0x5de02c21), TOBN(0x18dd4397, 0xd1d8dd06),
+     TOBN(0x3ba1939a, 0x122d7b44), TOBN(0xe6d3b40a, 0xa33870d6),
+     TOBN(0x8e620f70, 0x1c4fe3f8), TOBN(0xf6bba1a5, 0xd3a50cbf),
+     TOBN(0x4a78bde5, 0xcfc0aee0), TOBN(0x847edc46, 0xc08c50bd),
+     TOBN(0xbaa2439c, 0xad63c9b2), TOBN(0xceb4a728, 0x10fc2acb),
+     TOBN(0xa419e40e, 0x26da033d), TOBN(0x6cc3889d, 0x03e02683),
+     TOBN(0x1cd28559, 0xfdccf725), TOBN(0x0fd7e0f1, 0x8d13d208),
+     TOBN(0x01b9733b, 0x1f0df9d4), TOBN(0x8cc2c5f3, 0xa2b5e4f3),
+     TOBN(0x43053bfa, 0x3a304fd4), TOBN(0x8e87665c, 0x0a9f1aa7),
+     TOBN(0x087f29ec, 0xd73dc965), TOBN(0x15ace455, 0x3e9023db),
+     TOBN(0x2370e309, 0x2bce28b4), TOBN(0xf9723442, 0xb6b1e84a),
+     TOBN(0xbeee662e, 0xb72d9f26), TOBN(0xb19396de, 0xf0e47109),
+     TOBN(0x85b1fa73, 0xe13289d0), TOBN(0x436cf77e, 0x54e58e32),
+     TOBN(0x0ec833b3, 0xe990ef77), TOBN(0x7373e3ed, 0x1b11fc25),
+     TOBN(0xbe0eda87, 0x0fc332ce), TOBN(0xced04970, 0x8d7ea856),
+     TOBN(0xf85ff785, 0x7e977ca0), TOBN(0xb66ee8da, 0xdfdd5d2b),
+     TOBN(0xf5e37950, 0x905af461), TOBN(0x587b9090, 0x966d487c),
+     TOBN(0x6a198a1b, 0x32ba0127), TOBN(0xa7720e07, 0x141615ac),
+     TOBN(0xa23f3499, 0x996ef2f2), TOBN(0xef5f64b4, 0x470bcb3d),
+     TOBN(0xa526a962, 0x92b8c559), TOBN(0x0c14aac0, 0x69740a0f),
+     TOBN(0x0d41a9e3, 0xa6bdc0a5), TOBN(0x97d52106, 0x9c48aef4),
+     TOBN(0xcf16bd30, 0x3e7c253b), TOBN(0xcc834b1a, 0x47fdedc1),
+     TOBN(0x7362c6e5, 0x373aab2e), TOBN(0x264ed85e, 0xc5f590ff),
+     TOBN(0x7a46d9c0, 0x66d41870), TOBN(0xa50c20b1, 0x4787ba09),
+     TOBN(0x185e7e51, 0xe3d44635), TOBN(0xb3b3e080, 0x31e2d8dc),
+     TOBN(0xbed1e558, 0xa179e9d9), TOBN(0x2daa3f79, 0x74a76781),
+     TOBN(0x4372baf2, 0x3a40864f), TOBN(0x46900c54, 0x4fe75cb5),
+     TOBN(0xb95f171e, 0xf76765d0), TOBN(0x4ad726d2, 0x95c87502),
+     TOBN(0x2ec769da, 0x4d7c99bd), TOBN(0x5e2ddd19, 0xc36cdfa8),
+     TOBN(0xc22117fc, 0xa93e6dea), TOBN(0xe8a2583b, 0x93771123),
+     TOBN(0xbe2f6089, 0xfa08a3a2), TOBN(0x4809d5ed, 0x8f0e1112),
+     TOBN(0x3b414aa3, 0xda7a095e), TOBN(0x9049acf1, 0x26f5aadd),
+     TOBN(0x78d46a4d, 0x6be8b84a), TOBN(0xd66b1963, 0xb732b9b3),
+     TOBN(0x5c2ac2a0, 0xde6e9555), TOBN(0xcf52d098, 0xb5bd8770),
+     TOBN(0x15a15fa6, 0x0fd28921), TOBN(0x56ccb81e, 0x8b27536d),
+     TOBN(0x0f0d8ab8, 0x9f4ccbb8), TOBN(0xed5f44d2, 0xdb221729),
+     TOBN(0x43141988, 0x00bed10c), TOBN(0xc94348a4, 0x1d735b8b),
+     TOBN(0x79f3e9c4, 0x29ef8479), TOBN(0x4c13a4e3, 0x614c693f),
+     TOBN(0x32c9af56, 0x8e143a14), TOBN(0xbc517799, 0xe29ac5c4),
+     TOBN(0x05e17992, 0x2774856f), TOBN(0x6e52fb05, 0x6c1bf55f),
+     TOBN(0xaeda4225, 0xe4f19e16), TOBN(0x70f4728a, 0xaf5ccb26),
+     TOBN(0x5d2118d1, 0xb2947f22), TOBN(0xc827ea16, 0x281d6fb9),
+     TOBN(0x8412328d, 0x8cf0eabd), TOBN(0x45ee9fb2, 0x03ef9dcf),
+     TOBN(0x8e700421, 0xbb937d63), TOBN(0xdf8ff2d5, 0xcc4b37a6),
+     TOBN(0xa4c0d5b2, 0x5ced7b68), TOBN(0x6537c1ef, 0xc7308f59),
+     TOBN(0x25ce6a26, 0x3b37f8e8), TOBN(0x170e9a9b, 0xdeebc6ce),
+     TOBN(0xdd037952, 0x8728d72c), TOBN(0x445b0e55, 0x850154bc),
+     TOBN(0x4b7d0e06, 0x83a7337b), TOBN(0x1e3416d4, 0xffecf249),
+     TOBN(0x24840eff, 0x66a2b71f), TOBN(0xd0d9a50a, 0xb37cc26d),
+     TOBN(0xe2198150, 0x6fe28ef7), TOBN(0x3cc5ef16, 0x23324c7f),
+     TOBN(0x220f3455, 0x769b5263), TOBN(0xe2ade2f1, 0xa10bf475),
+     TOBN(0x28cd20fa, 0x458d3671), TOBN(0x1549722c, 0x2dc4847b),
+     TOBN(0x6dd01e55, 0x591941e3), TOBN(0x0e6fbcea, 0x27128ccb),
+     TOBN(0xae1a1e6b, 0x3bef0262), TOBN(0xfa8c472c, 0x8f54e103),
+     TOBN(0x7539c0a8, 0x72c052ec), TOBN(0xd7b27369, 0x5a3490e9),
+     TOBN(0x143fe1f1, 0x71684349), TOBN(0x36b4722e, 0x32e19b97),
+     TOBN(0xdc059227, 0x90980aff), TOBN(0x175c9c88, 0x9e13d674),
+     TOBN(0xa7de5b22, 0x6e6bfdb1), TOBN(0x5ea5b7b2, 0xbedb4b46),
+     TOBN(0xd5570191, 0xd34a6e44), TOBN(0xfcf60d2e, 0xa24ff7e6),
+     TOBN(0x614a392d, 0x677819e1), TOBN(0x7be74c7e, 0xaa5a29e8),
+     TOBN(0xab50fece, 0x63c85f3f), TOBN(0xaca2e2a9, 0x46cab337),
+     TOBN(0x7f700388, 0x122a6fe3), TOBN(0xdb69f703, 0x882a04a8),
+     TOBN(0x9a77935d, 0xcf7aed57), TOBN(0xdf16207c, 0x8d91c86f),
+     TOBN(0x2fca49ab, 0x63ed9998), TOBN(0xa3125c44, 0xa77ddf96),
+     TOBN(0x05dd8a86, 0x24344072), TOBN(0xa023dda2, 0xfec3fb56),
+     TOBN(0x421b41fc, 0x0c743032), TOBN(0x4f2120c1, 0x5e438639),
+     TOBN(0xfb7cae51, 0xc83c1b07), TOBN(0xb2370caa, 0xcac2171a),
+     TOBN(0x2eb2d962, 0x6cc820fb), TOBN(0x59feee5c, 0xb85a44bf),
+     TOBN(0x94620fca, 0x5b6598f0), TOBN(0x6b922cae, 0x7e314051),
+     TOBN(0xff8745ad, 0x106bed4e), TOBN(0x546e71f5, 0xdfa1e9ab),
+     TOBN(0x935c1e48, 0x1ec29487), TOBN(0x9509216c, 0x4d936530),
+     TOBN(0xc7ca3067, 0x85c9a2db), TOBN(0xd6ae5152, 0x6be8606f),
+     TOBN(0x09dbcae6, 0xe14c651d), TOBN(0xc9536e23, 0x9bc32f96),
+     TOBN(0xa90535a9, 0x34521b03), TOBN(0xf39c526c, 0x878756ff),
+     TOBN(0x383172ec, 0x8aedf03c), TOBN(0x20a8075e, 0xefe0c034),
+     TOBN(0xf22f9c62, 0x64026422), TOBN(0x8dd10780, 0x24b9d076),
+     TOBN(0x944c742a, 0x3bef2950), TOBN(0x55b9502e, 0x88a2b00b),
+     TOBN(0xa59e14b4, 0x86a09817), TOBN(0xa39dd3ac, 0x47bb4071),
+     TOBN(0x55137f66, 0x3be0592f), TOBN(0x07fcafd4, 0xc9e63f5b),
+     TOBN(0x963652ee, 0x346eb226), TOBN(0x7dfab085, 0xec2facb7),
+     TOBN(0x273bf2b8, 0x691add26), TOBN(0x30d74540, 0xf2b46c44),
+     TOBN(0x05e8e73e, 0xf2c2d065), TOBN(0xff9b8a00, 0xd42eeac9),
+     TOBN(0x2fcbd205, 0x97209d22), TOBN(0xeb740ffa, 0xde14ea2c),
+     TOBN(0xc71ff913, 0xa8aef518), TOBN(0x7bfc74bb, 0xfff4cfa2),
+     TOBN(0x1716680c, 0xb6b36048), TOBN(0x121b2cce, 0x9ef79af1),
+     TOBN(0xbff3c836, 0xa01eb3d3), TOBN(0x50eb1c6a, 0x5f79077b),
+     TOBN(0xa48c32d6, 0xa004bbcf), TOBN(0x47a59316, 0x7d64f61d),
+     TOBN(0x6068147f, 0x93102016), TOBN(0x12c5f654, 0x94d12576),
+     TOBN(0xefb071a7, 0xc9bc6b91), TOBN(0x7c2da0c5, 0x6e23ea95),
+     TOBN(0xf4fd45b6, 0xd4a1dd5d), TOBN(0x3e7ad9b6, 0x9122b13c),
+     TOBN(0x342ca118, 0xe6f57a48), TOBN(0x1c2e94a7, 0x06f8288f),
+     TOBN(0x99e68f07, 0x5a97d231), TOBN(0x7c80de97, 0x4d838758),
+     TOBN(0xbce0f5d0, 0x05872727), TOBN(0xbe5d95c2, 0x19c4d016),
+     TOBN(0x921d5cb1, 0x9c2492ee), TOBN(0x42192dc1, 0x404d6fb3),
+     TOBN(0x4c84dcd1, 0x32f988d3), TOBN(0xde26d61f, 0xa17b8e85),
+     TOBN(0xc466dcb6, 0x137c7408), TOBN(0x9a38d7b6, 0x36a266da),
+     TOBN(0x7ef5cb06, 0x83bebf1b), TOBN(0xe5cdcbbf, 0x0fd014e3),
+     TOBN(0x30aa376d, 0xf65965a0), TOBN(0x60fe88c2, 0xebb3e95e),
+     TOBN(0x33fd0b61, 0x66ee6f20), TOBN(0x8827dcdb, 0x3f41f0a0),
+     TOBN(0xbf8a9d24, 0x0c56c690), TOBN(0x40265dad, 0xddb7641d),
+     TOBN(0x522b05bf, 0x3a6b662b), TOBN(0x466d1dfe, 0xb1478c9b),
+     TOBN(0xaa616962, 0x1484469b), TOBN(0x0db60549, 0x02df8f9f),
+     TOBN(0xc37bca02, 0x3cb8bf51), TOBN(0x5effe346, 0x21371ce8),
+     TOBN(0xe8f65264, 0xff112c32), TOBN(0x8a9c736d, 0x7b971fb2),
+     TOBN(0xa4f19470, 0x7b75080d), TOBN(0xfc3f2c5a, 0x8839c59b),
+     TOBN(0x1d6c777e, 0x5aeb49c2), TOBN(0xf3db034d, 0xda1addfe),
+     TOBN(0xd76fee5a, 0x5535affc), TOBN(0x0853ac70, 0xb92251fd),
+     TOBN(0x37e3d594, 0x8b2a29d5), TOBN(0x28f1f457, 0x4de00ddb),
+     TOBN(0x8083c1b5, 0xf42c328b), TOBN(0xd8ef1d8f, 0xe493c73b),
+     TOBN(0x96fb6260, 0x41dc61bd), TOBN(0xf74e8a9d, 0x27ee2f8a),
+     TOBN(0x7c605a80, 0x2c946a5d), TOBN(0xeed48d65, 0x3839ccfd),
+     TOBN(0x9894344f, 0x3a29467a), TOBN(0xde81e949, 0xc51eba6d),
+     TOBN(0xdaea066b, 0xa5e5c2f2), TOBN(0x3fc8a614, 0x08c8c7b3),
+     TOBN(0x7adff88f, 0x06d0de9f), TOBN(0xbbc11cf5, 0x3b75ce0a),
+     TOBN(0x9fbb7acc, 0xfbbc87d5), TOBN(0xa1458e26, 0x7badfde2)}
+    ,
+    {TOBN(0x1cb43668, 0xe039c256), TOBN(0x5f26fb8b, 0x7c17fd5d),
+     TOBN(0xeee426af, 0x79aa062b), TOBN(0x072002d0, 0xd78fbf04),
+     TOBN(0x4c9ca237, 0xe84fb7e3), TOBN(0xb401d8a1, 0x0c82133d),
+     TOBN(0xaaa52592, 0x6d7e4181), TOBN(0xe9430833, 0x73dbb152),
+     TOBN(0xf92dda31, 0xbe24319a), TOBN(0x03f7d28b, 0xe095a8e7),
+     TOBN(0xa52fe840, 0x98782185), TOBN(0x276ddafe, 0x29c24dbc),
+     TOBN(0x80cd5496, 0x1d7a64eb), TOBN(0xe4360889, 0x7f1dbe42),
+     TOBN(0x2f81a877, 0x8438d2d5), TOBN(0x7e4d52a8, 0x85169036),
+     TOBN(0x19e3d5b1, 0x1d59715d), TOBN(0xc7eaa762, 0xd788983e),
+     TOBN(0xe5a730b0, 0xabf1f248), TOBN(0xfbab8084, 0xfae3fd83),
+     TOBN(0x65e50d21, 0x53765b2f), TOBN(0xbdd4e083, 0xfa127f3d),
+     TOBN(0x9cf3c074, 0x397b1b10), TOBN(0x59f8090c, 0xb1b59fd3),
+     TOBN(0x7b15fd9d, 0x615faa8f), TOBN(0x8fa1eb40, 0x968554ed),
+     TOBN(0x7bb4447e, 0x7aa44882), TOBN(0x2bb2d0d1, 0x029fff32),
+     TOBN(0x075e2a64, 0x6caa6d2f), TOBN(0x8eb879de, 0x22e7351b),
+     TOBN(0xbcd5624e, 0x9a506c62), TOBN(0x218eaef0, 0xa87e24dc),
+     TOBN(0x37e56847, 0x44ddfa35), TOBN(0x9ccfc5c5, 0xdab3f747),
+     TOBN(0x9ac1df3f, 0x1ee96cf4), TOBN(0x0c0571a1, 0x3b480b8f),
+     TOBN(0x2fbeb3d5, 0x4b3a7b3c), TOBN(0x35c03669, 0x5dcdbb99),
+     TOBN(0x52a0f5dc, 0xb2415b3a), TOBN(0xd57759b4, 0x4413ed9a),
+     TOBN(0x1fe647d8, 0x3d30a2c5), TOBN(0x0857f77e, 0xf78a81dc),
+     TOBN(0x11d5a334, 0x131a4a9b), TOBN(0xc0a94af9, 0x29d393f5),
+     TOBN(0xbc3a5c0b, 0xdaa6ec1a), TOBN(0xba9fe493, 0x88d2d7ed),
+     TOBN(0xbb4335b4, 0xbb614797), TOBN(0x991c4d68, 0x72f83533),
+     TOBN(0x53258c28, 0xd2f01cb3), TOBN(0x93d6eaa3, 0xd75db0b1),
+     TOBN(0x419a2b0d, 0xe87d0db4), TOBN(0xa1e48f03, 0xd8fe8493),
+     TOBN(0xf747faf6, 0xc508b23a), TOBN(0xf137571a, 0x35d53549),
+     TOBN(0x9f5e58e2, 0xfcf9b838), TOBN(0xc7186cee, 0xa7fd3cf5),
+     TOBN(0x77b868ce, 0xe978a1d3), TOBN(0xe3a68b33, 0x7ab92d04),
+     TOBN(0x51029794, 0x87a5b862), TOBN(0x5f0606c3, 0x3a61d41d),
+     TOBN(0x2814be27, 0x6f9326f1), TOBN(0x2f521c14, 0xc6fe3c2e),
+     TOBN(0x17464d7d, 0xacdf7351), TOBN(0x10f5f9d3, 0x777f7e44),
+     TOBN(0xce8e616b, 0x269fb37d), TOBN(0xaaf73804, 0x7de62de5),
+     TOBN(0xaba11175, 0x4fdd4153), TOBN(0x515759ba, 0x3770b49b),
+     TOBN(0x8b09ebf8, 0xaa423a61), TOBN(0x592245a1, 0xcd41fb92),
+     TOBN(0x1cba8ec1, 0x9b4c8936), TOBN(0xa87e91e3, 0xaf36710e),
+     TOBN(0x1fd84ce4, 0x3d34a2e3), TOBN(0xee3759ce, 0xb43b5d61),
+     TOBN(0x895bc78c, 0x619186c7), TOBN(0xf19c3809, 0xcbb9725a),
+     TOBN(0xc0be21aa, 0xde744b1f), TOBN(0xa7d222b0, 0x60f8056b),
+     TOBN(0x74be6157, 0xb23efe11), TOBN(0x6fab2b4f, 0x0cd68253),
+     TOBN(0xad33ea5f, 0x4bf1d725), TOBN(0x9c1d8ee2, 0x4f6c950f),
+     TOBN(0x544ee78a, 0xa377af06), TOBN(0x54f489bb, 0x94a113e1),
+     TOBN(0x8f11d634, 0x992fb7e8), TOBN(0x0169a7aa, 0xa2a44347),
+     TOBN(0x1d49d4af, 0x95020e00), TOBN(0x95945722, 0xe08e120b),
+     TOBN(0xb6e33878, 0xa4d32282), TOBN(0xe36e029d, 0x48020ae7),
+     TOBN(0xe05847fb, 0x37a9b750), TOBN(0xf876812c, 0xb29e3819),
+     TOBN(0x84ad138e, 0xd23a17f0), TOBN(0x6d7b4480, 0xf0b3950e),
+     TOBN(0xdfa8aef4, 0x2fd67ae0), TOBN(0x8d3eea24, 0x52333af6),
+     TOBN(0x0d052075, 0xb15d5acc), TOBN(0xc6d9c79f, 0xbd815bc4),
+     TOBN(0x8dcafd88, 0xdfa36cf2), TOBN(0x908ccbe2, 0x38aa9070),
+     TOBN(0x638722c4, 0xba35afce), TOBN(0x5a3da8b0, 0xfd6abf0b),
+     TOBN(0x2dce252c, 0xc9c335c1), TOBN(0x84e7f0de, 0x65aa799b),
+     TOBN(0x2101a522, 0xb99a72cb), TOBN(0x06de6e67, 0x87618016),
+     TOBN(0x5ff8c7cd, 0xe6f3653e), TOBN(0x0a821ab5, 0xc7a6754a),
+     TOBN(0x7e3fa52b, 0x7cb0b5a2), TOBN(0xa7fb121c, 0xc9048790),
+     TOBN(0x1a725020, 0x06ce053a), TOBN(0xb490a31f, 0x04e929b0),
+     TOBN(0xe17be47d, 0x62dd61ad), TOBN(0x781a961c, 0x6be01371),
+     TOBN(0x1063bfd3, 0xdae3cbba), TOBN(0x35647406, 0x7f73c9ba),
+     TOBN(0xf50e957b, 0x2736a129), TOBN(0xa6313702, 0xed13f256),
+     TOBN(0x9436ee65, 0x3a19fcc5), TOBN(0xcf2bdb29, 0xe7a4c8b6),
+     TOBN(0xb06b1244, 0xc5f95cd8), TOBN(0xda8c8af0, 0xf4ab95f4),
+     TOBN(0x1bae59c2, 0xb9e5836d), TOBN(0x07d51e7e, 0x3acffffc),
+     TOBN(0x01e15e6a, 0xc2ccbcda), TOBN(0x3bc1923f, 0x8528c3e0),
+     TOBN(0x43324577, 0xa49fead4), TOBN(0x61a1b884, 0x2aa7a711),
+     TOBN(0xf9a86e08, 0x700230ef), TOBN(0x0af585a1, 0xbd19adf8),
+     TOBN(0x7645f361, 0xf55ad8f2), TOBN(0x6e676223, 0x46c3614c),
+     TOBN(0x23cb257c, 0x4e774d3f), TOBN(0x82a38513, 0xac102d1b),
+     TOBN(0x9bcddd88, 0x7b126aa5), TOBN(0xe716998b, 0xeefd3ee4),
+     TOBN(0x4239d571, 0xfb167583), TOBN(0xdd011c78, 0xd16c8f8a),
+     TOBN(0x271c2895, 0x69a27519), TOBN(0x9ce0a3b7, 0xd2d64b6a),
+     TOBN(0x8c977289, 0xd5ec6738), TOBN(0xa3b49f9a, 0x8840ef6b),
+     TOBN(0x808c14c9, 0x9a453419), TOBN(0x5c00295b, 0x0cf0a2d5),
+     TOBN(0x524414fb, 0x1d4bcc76), TOBN(0xb07691d2, 0x459a88f1),
+     TOBN(0x77f43263, 0xf70d110f), TOBN(0x64ada5e0, 0xb7abf9f3),
+     TOBN(0xafd0f94e, 0x5b544cf5), TOBN(0xb4a13a15, 0xfd2713fe),
+     TOBN(0xb99b7d6e, 0x250c74f4), TOBN(0x097f2f73, 0x20324e45),
+     TOBN(0x994b37d8, 0xaffa8208), TOBN(0xc3c31b0b, 0xdc29aafc),
+     TOBN(0x3da74651, 0x7a3a607f), TOBN(0xd8e1b8c1, 0xfe6955d6),
+     TOBN(0x716e1815, 0xc8418682), TOBN(0x541d487f, 0x7dc91d97),
+     TOBN(0x48a04669, 0xc6996982), TOBN(0xf39cab15, 0x83a6502e),
+     TOBN(0x025801a0, 0xe68db055), TOBN(0xf3569758, 0xba3338d5),
+     TOBN(0xb0c8c0aa, 0xee2afa84), TOBN(0x4f6985d3, 0xfb6562d1),
+     TOBN(0x351f1f15, 0x132ed17a), TOBN(0x510ed0b4, 0xc04365fe),
+     TOBN(0xa3f98138, 0xe5b1f066), TOBN(0xbc9d95d6, 0x32df03dc),
+     TOBN(0xa83ccf6e, 0x19abd09e), TOBN(0x0b4097c1, 0x4ff17edb),
+     TOBN(0x58a5c478, 0xd64a06ce), TOBN(0x2ddcc3fd, 0x544a58fd),
+     TOBN(0xd449503d, 0x9e8153b8), TOBN(0x3324fd02, 0x7774179b),
+     TOBN(0xaf5d47c8, 0xdbd9120c), TOBN(0xeb860162, 0x34fa94db),
+     TOBN(0x5817bdd1, 0x972f07f4), TOBN(0xe5579e2e, 0xd27bbceb),
+     TOBN(0x86847a1f, 0x5f11e5a6), TOBN(0xb39ed255, 0x7c3cf048),
+     TOBN(0xe1076417, 0xa2f62e55), TOBN(0x6b9ab38f, 0x1bcf82a2),
+     TOBN(0x4bb7c319, 0x7aeb29f9), TOBN(0xf6d17da3, 0x17227a46),
+     TOBN(0xab53ddbd, 0x0f968c00), TOBN(0xa03da7ec, 0x000c880b),
+     TOBN(0x7b239624, 0x6a9ad24d), TOBN(0x612c0401, 0x01ec60d0),
+     TOBN(0x70d10493, 0x109f5df1), TOBN(0xfbda4030, 0x80af7550),
+     TOBN(0x30b93f95, 0xc6b9a9b3), TOBN(0x0c74ec71, 0x007d9418),
+     TOBN(0x94175564, 0x6edb951f), TOBN(0x5f4a9d78, 0x7f22c282),
+     TOBN(0xb7870895, 0xb38d1196), TOBN(0xbc593df3, 0xa228ce7c),
+     TOBN(0xc78c5bd4, 0x6af3641a), TOBN(0x7802200b, 0x3d9b3dcc),
+     TOBN(0x0dc73f32, 0x8be33304), TOBN(0x847ed87d, 0x61ffb79a),
+     TOBN(0xf85c974e, 0x6d671192), TOBN(0x1e14100a, 0xde16f60f),
+     TOBN(0x45cb0d5a, 0x95c38797), TOBN(0x18923bba, 0x9b022da4),
+     TOBN(0xef2be899, 0xbbe7e86e), TOBN(0x4a1510ee, 0x216067bf),
+     TOBN(0xd98c8154, 0x84d5ce3e), TOBN(0x1af777f0, 0xf92a2b90),
+     TOBN(0x9fbcb400, 0x4ef65724), TOBN(0x3e04a4c9, 0x3c0ca6fe),
+     TOBN(0xfb3e2cb5, 0x55002994), TOBN(0x1f3a93c5, 0x5363ecab),
+     TOBN(0x1fe00efe, 0x3923555b), TOBN(0x744bedd9, 0x1e1751ea),
+     TOBN(0x3fb2db59, 0x6ab69357), TOBN(0x8dbd7365, 0xf5e6618b),
+     TOBN(0x99d53099, 0xdf1ea40e), TOBN(0xb3f24a0b, 0x57d61e64),
+     TOBN(0xd088a198, 0x596eb812), TOBN(0x22c8361b, 0x5762940b),
+     TOBN(0x66f01f97, 0xf9c0d95c), TOBN(0x88461172, 0x8e43cdae),
+     TOBN(0x11599a7f, 0xb72b15c3), TOBN(0x135a7536, 0x420d95cc),
+     TOBN(0x2dcdf0f7, 0x5f7ae2f6), TOBN(0x15fc6e1d, 0xd7fa6da2),
+     TOBN(0x81ca829a, 0xd1d441b6), TOBN(0x84c10cf8, 0x04a106b6),
+     TOBN(0xa9b26c95, 0xa73fbbd0), TOBN(0x7f24e0cb, 0x4d8f6ee8),
+     TOBN(0x48b45937, 0x1e25a043), TOBN(0xf8a74fca, 0x036f3dfe),
+     TOBN(0x1ed46585, 0xc9f84296), TOBN(0x7fbaa8fb, 0x3bc278b0),
+     TOBN(0xa8e96cd4, 0x6c4fcbd0), TOBN(0x940a1202, 0x73b60a5f),
+     TOBN(0x34aae120, 0x55a4aec8), TOBN(0x550e9a74, 0xdbd742f0),
+     TOBN(0x794456d7, 0x228c68ab), TOBN(0x492f8868, 0xa4e25ec6),
+     TOBN(0x682915ad, 0xb2d8f398), TOBN(0xf13b51cc, 0x5b84c953),
+     TOBN(0xcda90ab8, 0x5bb917d6), TOBN(0x4b615560, 0x4ea3dee1),
+     TOBN(0x578b4e85, 0x0a52c1c8), TOBN(0xeab1a695, 0x20b75fc4),
+     TOBN(0x60c14f3c, 0xaa0bb3c6), TOBN(0x220f448a, 0xb8216094),
+     TOBN(0x4fe7ee31, 0xb0e63d34), TOBN(0xf4600572, 0xa9e54fab),
+     TOBN(0xc0493334, 0xd5e7b5a4), TOBN(0x8589fb92, 0x06d54831),
+     TOBN(0xaa70f5cc, 0x6583553a), TOBN(0x0879094a, 0xe25649e5),
+     TOBN(0xcc904507, 0x10044652), TOBN(0xebb0696d, 0x02541c4f),
+     TOBN(0x5a171fde, 0xb9718710), TOBN(0x38f1bed8, 0xf374a9f5),
+     TOBN(0xc8c582e1, 0xba39bdc1), TOBN(0xfc457b0a, 0x908cc0ce),
+     TOBN(0x9a187fd4, 0x883841e2), TOBN(0x8ec25b39, 0x38725381),
+     TOBN(0x2553ed05, 0x96f84395), TOBN(0x095c7661, 0x6f6c6897),
+     TOBN(0x917ac85c, 0x4bdc5610), TOBN(0xb2885fe4, 0x179eb301),
+     TOBN(0x5fc65547, 0x8b78bdcc), TOBN(0x4a9fc893, 0xe59e4699),
+     TOBN(0xbb7ff0cd, 0x3ce299af), TOBN(0x195be9b3, 0xadf38b20),
+     TOBN(0x6a929c87, 0xd38ddb8f), TOBN(0x55fcc99c, 0xb21a51b9),
+     TOBN(0x2b695b4c, 0x721a4593), TOBN(0xed1e9a15, 0x768eaac2),
+     TOBN(0xfb63d71c, 0x7489f914), TOBN(0xf98ba31c, 0x78118910),
+     TOBN(0x80291373, 0x9b128eb4), TOBN(0x7801214e, 0xd448af4a),
+     TOBN(0xdbd2e22b, 0x55418dd3), TOBN(0xeffb3c0d, 0xd3998242),
+     TOBN(0xdfa6077c, 0xc7bf3827), TOBN(0xf2165bcb, 0x47f8238f),
+     TOBN(0xfe37cf68, 0x8564d554), TOBN(0xe5f825c4, 0x0a81fb98),
+     TOBN(0x43cc4f67, 0xffed4d6f), TOBN(0xbc609578, 0xb50a34b0),
+     TOBN(0x8aa8fcf9, 0x5041faf1), TOBN(0x5659f053, 0x651773b6),
+     TOBN(0xe87582c3, 0x6044d63b), TOBN(0xa6089409, 0x0cdb0ca0),
+     TOBN(0x8c993e0f, 0xbfb2bcf6), TOBN(0xfc64a719, 0x45985cfc),
+     TOBN(0x15c4da80, 0x83dbedba), TOBN(0x804ae112, 0x2be67df7),
+     TOBN(0xda4c9658, 0xa23defde), TOBN(0x12002ddd, 0x5156e0d3),
+     TOBN(0xe68eae89, 0x5dd21b96), TOBN(0x8b99f28b, 0xcf44624d),
+     TOBN(0x0ae00808, 0x1ec8897a), TOBN(0xdd0a9303, 0x6712f76e),
+     TOBN(0x96237522, 0x4e233de4), TOBN(0x192445b1, 0x2b36a8a5),
+     TOBN(0xabf9ff74, 0x023993d9), TOBN(0x21f37bf4, 0x2aad4a8f),
+     TOBN(0x340a4349, 0xf8bd2bbd), TOBN(0x1d902cd9, 0x4868195d),
+     TOBN(0x3d27bbf1, 0xe5fdb6f1), TOBN(0x7a5ab088, 0x124f9f1c),
+     TOBN(0xc466ab06, 0xf7a09e03), TOBN(0x2f8a1977, 0x31f2c123),
+     TOBN(0xda355dc7, 0x041b6657), TOBN(0xcb840d12, 0x8ece2a7c),
+     TOBN(0xb600ad9f, 0x7db32675), TOBN(0x78fea133, 0x07a06f1b),
+     TOBN(0x5d032269, 0xb31f6094), TOBN(0x07753ef5, 0x83ec37aa),
+     TOBN(0x03485aed, 0x9c0bea78), TOBN(0x41bb3989, 0xbc3f4524),
+     TOBN(0x09403761, 0x697f726d), TOBN(0x6109beb3, 0xdf394820),
+     TOBN(0x804111ea, 0x3b6d1145), TOBN(0xb6271ea9, 0xa8582654),
+     TOBN(0x619615e6, 0x24e66562), TOBN(0xa2554945, 0xd7b6ad9c),
+     TOBN(0xd9c4985e, 0x99bfe35f), TOBN(0x9770ccc0, 0x7b51cdf6),
+     TOBN(0x7c327013, 0x92881832), TOBN(0x8777d45f, 0x286b26d1),
+     TOBN(0x9bbeda22, 0xd847999d), TOBN(0x03aa33b6, 0xc3525d32),
+     TOBN(0x4b7b96d4, 0x28a959a1), TOBN(0xbb3786e5, 0x31e5d234),
+     TOBN(0xaeb5d3ce, 0x6961f247), TOBN(0x20aa85af, 0x02f93d3f),
+     TOBN(0x9cd1ad3d, 0xd7a7ae4f), TOBN(0xbf6688f0, 0x781adaa8),
+     TOBN(0xb1b40e86, 0x7469cead), TOBN(0x1904c524, 0x309fca48),
+     TOBN(0x9b7312af, 0x4b54bbc7), TOBN(0xbe24bf8f, 0x593affa2),
+     TOBN(0xbe5e0790, 0xbd98764b), TOBN(0xa0f45f17, 0xa26e299e),
+     TOBN(0x4af0d2c2, 0x6b8fe4c7), TOBN(0xef170db1, 0x8ae8a3e6),
+     TOBN(0x0e8d61a0, 0x29e0ccc1), TOBN(0xcd53e87e, 0x60ad36ca),
+     TOBN(0x328c6623, 0xc8173822), TOBN(0x7ee1767d, 0xa496be55),
+     TOBN(0x89f13259, 0x648945af), TOBN(0x9e45a5fd, 0x25c8009c),
+     TOBN(0xaf2febd9, 0x1f61ab8c), TOBN(0x43f6bc86, 0x8a275385),
+     TOBN(0x87792348, 0xf2142e79), TOBN(0x17d89259, 0xc6e6238a),
+     TOBN(0x7536d2f6, 0x4a839d9b), TOBN(0x1f428fce, 0x76a1fbdc),
+     TOBN(0x1c109601, 0x0db06dfe), TOBN(0xbfc16bc1, 0x50a3a3cc),
+     TOBN(0xf9cbd9ec, 0x9b30f41b), TOBN(0x5b5da0d6, 0x00138cce),
+     TOBN(0xec1d0a48, 0x56ef96a7), TOBN(0xb47eb848, 0x982bf842),
+     TOBN(0x66deae32, 0xec3f700d), TOBN(0x4e43c42c, 0xaa1181e0),
+     TOBN(0xa1d72a31, 0xd1a4aa2a), TOBN(0x440d4668, 0xc004f3ce),
+     TOBN(0x0d6a2d3b, 0x45fe8a7a), TOBN(0x820e52e2, 0xfb128365),
+     TOBN(0x29ac5fcf, 0x25e51b09), TOBN(0x180cd2bf, 0x2023d159),
+     TOBN(0xa9892171, 0xa1ebf90e), TOBN(0xf97c4c87, 0x7c132181),
+     TOBN(0x9f1dc724, 0xc03dbb7e), TOBN(0xae043765, 0x018cbbe4),
+     TOBN(0xfb0b2a36, 0x0767d153), TOBN(0xa8e2f4d6, 0x249cbaeb),
+     TOBN(0x172a5247, 0xd95ea168), TOBN(0x1758fada, 0x2970764a),
+     TOBN(0xac803a51, 0x1d978169), TOBN(0x299cfe2e, 0xde77e01b),
+     TOBN(0x652a1e17, 0xb0a98927), TOBN(0x2e26e1d1, 0x20014495),
+     TOBN(0x7ae0af9f, 0x7175b56a), TOBN(0xc2e22a80, 0xd64b9f95),
+     TOBN(0x4d0ff9fb, 0xd90a060a), TOBN(0x496a27db, 0xbaf38085),
+     TOBN(0x32305401, 0xda776bcf), TOBN(0xb8cdcef6, 0x725f209e),
+     TOBN(0x61ba0f37, 0x436a0bba), TOBN(0x263fa108, 0x76860049),
+     TOBN(0x92beb98e, 0xda3542cf), TOBN(0xa2d4d14a, 0xd5849538),
+     TOBN(0x989b9d68, 0x12e9a1bc), TOBN(0x61d9075c, 0x5f6e3268),
+     TOBN(0x352c6aa9, 0x99ace638), TOBN(0xde4e4a55, 0x920f43ff),
+     TOBN(0xe5e4144a, 0xd673c017), TOBN(0x667417ae, 0x6f6e05ea),
+     TOBN(0x613416ae, 0xdcd1bd56), TOBN(0x5eb36201, 0x86693711),
+     TOBN(0x2d7bc504, 0x3a1aa914), TOBN(0x175a1299, 0x76dc5975),
+     TOBN(0xe900e0f2, 0x3fc8125c), TOBN(0x569ef68c, 0x11198875),
+     TOBN(0x9012db63, 0x63a113b4), TOBN(0xe3bd3f56, 0x98835766),
+     TOBN(0xa5c94a52, 0x76412dea), TOBN(0xad9e2a09, 0xaa735e5c),
+     TOBN(0x405a984c, 0x508b65e9), TOBN(0xbde4a1d1, 0x6df1a0d1),
+     TOBN(0x1a9433a1, 0xdfba80da), TOBN(0xe9192ff9, 0x9440ad2e),
+     TOBN(0x9f649696, 0x5099fe92), TOBN(0x25ddb65c, 0x0b27a54a),
+     TOBN(0x178279dd, 0xc590da61), TOBN(0x5479a999, 0xfbde681a),
+     TOBN(0xd0e84e05, 0x013fe162), TOBN(0xbe11dc92, 0x632d471b),
+     TOBN(0xdf0b0c45, 0xfc0e089f), TOBN(0x04fb15b0, 0x4c144025),
+     TOBN(0xa61d5fc2, 0x13c99927), TOBN(0xa033e9e0, 0x3de2eb35),
+     TOBN(0xf8185d5c, 0xb8dacbb4), TOBN(0x9a88e265, 0x8644549d),
+     TOBN(0xf717af62, 0x54671ff6), TOBN(0x4bd4241b, 0x5fa58603),
+     TOBN(0x06fba40b, 0xe67773c0), TOBN(0xc1d933d2, 0x6a2847e9),
+     TOBN(0xf4f5acf3, 0x689e2c70), TOBN(0x92aab0e7, 0x46bafd31),
+     TOBN(0x798d76aa, 0x3473f6e5), TOBN(0xcc6641db, 0x93141934),
+     TOBN(0xcae27757, 0xd31e535e), TOBN(0x04cc43b6, 0x87c2ee11),
+     TOBN(0x8d1f9675, 0x2e029ffa), TOBN(0xc2150672, 0xe4cc7a2c),
+     TOBN(0x3b03c1e0, 0x8d68b013), TOBN(0xa9d6816f, 0xedf298f3),
+     TOBN(0x1bfbb529, 0xa2804464), TOBN(0x95a52fae, 0x5db22125),
+     TOBN(0x55b32160, 0x0e1cb64e), TOBN(0x004828f6, 0x7e7fc9fe),
+     TOBN(0x13394b82, 0x1bb0fb93), TOBN(0xb6293a2d, 0x35f1a920),
+     TOBN(0xde35ef21, 0xd145d2d9), TOBN(0xbe6225b3, 0xbb8fa603),
+     TOBN(0x00fc8f6b, 0x32cf252d), TOBN(0xa28e52e6, 0x117cf8c2),
+     TOBN(0x9d1dc89b, 0x4c371e6d), TOBN(0xcebe0675, 0x36ef0f28),
+     TOBN(0x5de05d09, 0xa4292f81), TOBN(0xa8303593, 0x353e3083),
+     TOBN(0xa1715b0a, 0x7e37a9bb), TOBN(0x8c56f61e, 0x2b8faec3),
+     TOBN(0x52507431, 0x33c9b102), TOBN(0x0130cefc, 0xa44431f0),
+     TOBN(0x56039fa0, 0xbd865cfb), TOBN(0x4b03e578, 0xbc5f1dd7),
+     TOBN(0x40edf2e4, 0xbabe7224), TOBN(0xc752496d, 0x3a1988f6),
+     TOBN(0xd1572d3b, 0x564beb6b), TOBN(0x0db1d110, 0x39a1c608),
+     TOBN(0x568d1934, 0x16f60126), TOBN(0x05ae9668, 0xf354af33),
+     TOBN(0x19de6d37, 0xc92544f2), TOBN(0xcc084353, 0xa35837d5),
+     TOBN(0xcbb6869c, 0x1a514ece), TOBN(0xb633e728, 0x2e1d1066),
+     TOBN(0xf15dd69f, 0x936c581c), TOBN(0x96e7b8ce, 0x7439c4f9),
+     TOBN(0x5e676f48, 0x2e448a5b), TOBN(0xb2ca7d5b, 0xfd916bbb),
+     TOBN(0xd55a2541, 0xf5024025), TOBN(0x47bc5769, 0xe4c2d937),
+     TOBN(0x7d31b92a, 0x0362189f), TOBN(0x83f3086e, 0xef7816f9),
+     TOBN(0xf9f46d94, 0xb587579a), TOBN(0xec2d22d8, 0x30e76c5f),
+     TOBN(0x27d57461, 0xb000ffcf), TOBN(0xbb7e65f9, 0x364ffc2c),
+     TOBN(0x7c7c9477, 0x6652a220), TOBN(0x61618f89, 0xd696c981),
+     TOBN(0x5021701d, 0x89effff3), TOBN(0xf2c8ff8e, 0x7c314163),
+     TOBN(0x2da413ad, 0x8efb4d3e), TOBN(0x937b5adf, 0xce176d95),
+     TOBN(0x22867d34, 0x2a67d51c), TOBN(0x262b9b10, 0x18eb3ac9),
+     TOBN(0x4e314fe4, 0xc43ff28b), TOBN(0x76476627, 0x6a664e7a),
+     TOBN(0x3e90e40b, 0xb7a565c2), TOBN(0x8588993a, 0xc1acf831),
+     TOBN(0xd7b501d6, 0x8f938829), TOBN(0x996627ee, 0x3edd7d4c),
+     TOBN(0x37d44a62, 0x90cd34c7), TOBN(0xa8327499, 0xf3833e8d),
+     TOBN(0x2e18917d, 0x4bf50353), TOBN(0x85dd726b, 0x556765fb),
+     TOBN(0x54fe65d6, 0x93d5ab66), TOBN(0x3ddbaced, 0x915c25fe),
+     TOBN(0xa799d9a4, 0x12f22e85), TOBN(0xe2a24867, 0x6d06f6bc),
+     TOBN(0xf4f1ee56, 0x43ca1637), TOBN(0xfda2828b, 0x61ece30a),
+     TOBN(0x758c1a3e, 0xa2dee7a6), TOBN(0xdcde2f3c, 0x734b2284),
+     TOBN(0xaba445d2, 0x4eaba6ad), TOBN(0x35aaf668, 0x76cee0a7),
+     TOBN(0x7e0b04a9, 0xe5aa049a), TOBN(0xe74083ad, 0x91103e84),
+     TOBN(0xbeb183ce, 0x40afecc3), TOBN(0x6b89de9f, 0xea043f7a),}
+    ,
+    {TOBN(0x0e299d23, 0xfe67ba66), TOBN(0x91450760, 0x93cf2f34),
+     TOBN(0xf45b5ea9, 0x97fcf913), TOBN(0x5be00843, 0x8bd7ddda),
+     TOBN(0x358c3e05, 0xd53ff04d), TOBN(0xbf7ccdc3, 0x5de91ef7),
+     TOBN(0xad684dbf, 0xb69ec1a0), TOBN(0x367e7cf2, 0x801fd997),
+     TOBN(0x0ca1f3b7, 0xb0dc8595), TOBN(0x27de4608, 0x9f1d9f2e),
+     TOBN(0x1af3bf39, 0xbadd82a7), TOBN(0x79356a79, 0x65862448),
+     TOBN(0xc0602345, 0xf5f9a052), TOBN(0x1a8b0f89, 0x139a42f9),
+     TOBN(0xb53eee42, 0x844d40fc), TOBN(0x93b0bfe5, 0x4e5b6368),
+     TOBN(0x5434dd02, 0xc024789c), TOBN(0x90dca9ea, 0x41b57bfc),
+     TOBN(0x8aa898e2, 0x243398df), TOBN(0xf607c834, 0x894a94bb),
+     TOBN(0xbb07be97, 0xc2c99b76), TOBN(0x6576ba67, 0x18c29302),
+     TOBN(0x3d79efcc, 0xe703a88c), TOBN(0xf259ced7, 0xb6a0d106),
+     TOBN(0x0f893a5d, 0xc8de610b), TOBN(0xe8c515fb, 0x67e223ce),
+     TOBN(0x7774bfa6, 0x4ead6dc5), TOBN(0x89d20f95, 0x925c728f),
+     TOBN(0x7a1e0966, 0x098583ce), TOBN(0xa2eedb94, 0x93f2a7d7),
+     TOBN(0x1b282097, 0x4c304d4a), TOBN(0x0842e3da, 0xc077282d),
+     TOBN(0xe4d972a3, 0x3b9e2d7b), TOBN(0x7cc60b27, 0xc48218ff),
+     TOBN(0x8fc70838, 0x84149d91), TOBN(0x5c04346f, 0x2f461ecc),
+     TOBN(0xebe9fdf2, 0x614650a9), TOBN(0x5e35b537, 0xc1f666ac),
+     TOBN(0x645613d1, 0x88babc83), TOBN(0x88cace3a, 0xc5e1c93e),
+     TOBN(0x209ca375, 0x3de92e23), TOBN(0xccb03cc8, 0x5fbbb6e3),
+     TOBN(0xccb90f03, 0xd7b1487e), TOBN(0xfa9c2a38, 0xc710941f),
+     TOBN(0x756c3823, 0x6724ceed), TOBN(0x3a902258, 0x192d0323),
+     TOBN(0xb150e519, 0xea5e038e), TOBN(0xdcba2865, 0xc7427591),
+     TOBN(0xe549237f, 0x78890732), TOBN(0xc443bef9, 0x53fcb4d9),
+     TOBN(0x9884d8a6, 0xeb3480d6), TOBN(0x8a35b6a1, 0x3048b186),
+     TOBN(0xb4e44716, 0x65e9a90a), TOBN(0x45bf380d, 0x653006c0),
+     TOBN(0x8f3f820d, 0x4fe9ae3b), TOBN(0x244a35a0, 0x979a3b71),
+     TOBN(0xa1010e9d, 0x74cd06ff), TOBN(0x9c17c7df, 0xaca3eeac),
+     TOBN(0x74c86cd3, 0x8063aa2b), TOBN(0x8595c4b3, 0x734614ff),
+     TOBN(0xa3de00ca, 0x990f62cc), TOBN(0xd9bed213, 0xca0c3be5),
+     TOBN(0x7886078a, 0xdf8ce9f5), TOBN(0xddb27ce3, 0x5cd44444),
+     TOBN(0xed374a66, 0x58926ddd), TOBN(0x138b2d49, 0x908015b8),
+     TOBN(0x886c6579, 0xde1f7ab8), TOBN(0x888b9aa0, 0xc3020b7a),
+     TOBN(0xd3ec034e, 0x3a96e355), TOBN(0xba65b0b8, 0xf30fbe9a),
+     TOBN(0x064c8e50, 0xff21367a), TOBN(0x1f508ea4, 0x0b04b46e),
+     TOBN(0x98561a49, 0x747c866c), TOBN(0xbbb1e5fe, 0x0518a062),
+     TOBN(0x20ff4e8b, 0xecdc3608), TOBN(0x7f55cded, 0x20184027),
+     TOBN(0x8d73ec95, 0xf38c85f0), TOBN(0x5b589fdf, 0x8bc3b8c3),
+     TOBN(0xbe95dd98, 0x0f12b66f), TOBN(0xf5bd1a09, 0x0e338e01),
+     TOBN(0x65163ae5, 0x5e915918), TOBN(0x6158d6d9, 0x86f8a46b),
+     TOBN(0x8466b538, 0xeeebf99c), TOBN(0xca8761f6, 0xbca477ef),
+     TOBN(0xaf3449c2, 0x9ebbc601), TOBN(0xef3b0f41, 0xe0c3ae2f),
+     TOBN(0xaa6c577d, 0x5de63752), TOBN(0xe9166601, 0x64682a51),
+     TOBN(0x5a3097be, 0xfc15aa1e), TOBN(0x40d12548, 0xb54b0745),
+     TOBN(0x5bad4706, 0x519a5f12), TOBN(0xed03f717, 0xa439dee6),
+     TOBN(0x0794bb6c, 0x4a02c499), TOBN(0xf725083d, 0xcffe71d2),
+     TOBN(0x2cad7519, 0x0f3adcaf), TOBN(0x7f68ea1c, 0x43729310),
+     TOBN(0xe747c8c7, 0xb7ffd977), TOBN(0xec104c35, 0x80761a22),
+     TOBN(0x8395ebaf, 0x5a3ffb83), TOBN(0xfb3261f4, 0xe4b63db7),
+     TOBN(0x53544960, 0xd883e544), TOBN(0x13520d70, 0x8cc2eeb8),
+     TOBN(0x08f6337b, 0xd3d65f99), TOBN(0x83997db2, 0x781cf95b),
+     TOBN(0xce6ff106, 0x0dbd2c01), TOBN(0x4f8eea6b, 0x1f9ce934),
+     TOBN(0x546f7c4b, 0x0e993921), TOBN(0x6236a324, 0x5e753fc7),
+     TOBN(0x65a41f84, 0xa16022e9), TOBN(0x0c18d878, 0x43d1dbb2),
+     TOBN(0x73c55640, 0x2d4cef9c), TOBN(0xa0428108, 0x70444c74),
+     TOBN(0x68e4f15e, 0x9afdfb3c), TOBN(0x49a56143, 0x5bdfb6df),
+     TOBN(0xa9bc1bd4, 0x5f823d97), TOBN(0xbceb5970, 0xea111c2a),
+     TOBN(0x366b455f, 0xb269bbc4), TOBN(0x7cd85e1e, 0xe9bc5d62),
+     TOBN(0xc743c41c, 0x4f18b086), TOBN(0xa4b40990, 0x95294fb9),
+     TOBN(0x9c7c581d, 0x26ee8382), TOBN(0xcf17dcc5, 0x359d638e),
+     TOBN(0xee8273ab, 0xb728ae3d), TOBN(0x1d112926, 0xf821f047),
+     TOBN(0x11498477, 0x50491a74), TOBN(0x687fa761, 0xfde0dfb9),
+     TOBN(0x2c258022, 0x7ea435ab), TOBN(0x6b8bdb94, 0x91ce7e3f),
+     TOBN(0x4c5b5dc9, 0x3bf834aa), TOBN(0x04371819, 0x4f6c7e4b),
+     TOBN(0xc284e00a, 0x3736bcad), TOBN(0x0d881118, 0x21ae8f8d),
+     TOBN(0xf9cf0f82, 0xf48c8e33), TOBN(0xa11fd075, 0xa1bf40db),
+     TOBN(0xdceab0de, 0xdc2733e5), TOBN(0xc560a8b5, 0x8e986bd7),
+     TOBN(0x48dd1fe2, 0x3929d097), TOBN(0x3885b290, 0x92f188f1),
+     TOBN(0x0f2ae613, 0xda6fcdac), TOBN(0x9054303e, 0xb662a46c),
+     TOBN(0xb6871e44, 0x0738042a), TOBN(0x98e6a977, 0xbdaf6449),
+     TOBN(0xd8bc0650, 0xd1c9df1b), TOBN(0xef3d6451, 0x36e098f9),
+     TOBN(0x03fbae82, 0xb6d72d28), TOBN(0x77ca9db1, 0xf5d84080),
+     TOBN(0x8a112cff, 0xa58efc1c), TOBN(0x518d761c, 0xc564cb4a),
+     TOBN(0x69b5740e, 0xf0d1b5ce), TOBN(0x717039cc, 0xe9eb1785),
+     TOBN(0x3fe29f90, 0x22f53382), TOBN(0x8e54ba56, 0x6bc7c95c),
+     TOBN(0x9c806d8a, 0xf7f91d0f), TOBN(0x3b61b0f1, 0xa82a5728),
+     TOBN(0x4640032d, 0x94d76754), TOBN(0x273eb5de, 0x47d834c6),
+     TOBN(0x2988abf7, 0x7b4e4d53), TOBN(0xb7ce66bf, 0xde401777),
+     TOBN(0x9fba6b32, 0x715071b3), TOBN(0x82413c24, 0xad3a1a98),
+     TOBN(0x5b7fc8c4, 0xe0e8ad93), TOBN(0xb5679aee, 0x5fab868d),
+     TOBN(0xb1f9d2fa, 0x2b3946f3), TOBN(0x458897dc, 0x5685b50a),
+     TOBN(0x1e98c930, 0x89d0caf3), TOBN(0x39564c5f, 0x78642e92),
+     TOBN(0x1b77729a, 0x0dbdaf18), TOBN(0xf9170722, 0x579e82e6),
+     TOBN(0x680c0317, 0xe4515fa5), TOBN(0xf85cff84, 0xfb0c790f),
+     TOBN(0xc7a82aab, 0x6d2e0765), TOBN(0x7446bca9, 0x35c82b32),
+     TOBN(0x5de607aa, 0x6d63184f), TOBN(0x7c1a46a8, 0x262803a6),
+     TOBN(0xd218313d, 0xaebe8035), TOBN(0x92113ffd, 0xc73c51f8),
+     TOBN(0x4b38e083, 0x12e7e46c), TOBN(0x69d0a37a, 0x56126bd5),
+     TOBN(0xfb3f324b, 0x73c07e04), TOBN(0xa0c22f67, 0x8fda7267),
+     TOBN(0x8f2c0051, 0x4d2c7d8f), TOBN(0xbc45ced3, 0xcbe2cae5),
+     TOBN(0xe1c6cf07, 0xa8f0f277), TOBN(0xbc392312, 0x1eb99a98),
+     TOBN(0x75537b7e, 0x3cc8ac85), TOBN(0x8d725f57, 0xdd02753b),
+     TOBN(0xfd05ff64, 0xb737df2f), TOBN(0x55fe8712, 0xf6d2531d),
+     TOBN(0x57ce04a9, 0x6ab6b01c), TOBN(0x69a02a89, 0x7cd93724),
+     TOBN(0x4f82ac35, 0xcf86699b), TOBN(0x8242d3ad, 0x9cb4b232),
+     TOBN(0x713d0f65, 0xd62105e5), TOBN(0xbb222bfa, 0x2d29be61),
+     TOBN(0xf2f9a79e, 0x6cfbef09), TOBN(0xfc24d8d3, 0xd5d6782f),
+     TOBN(0x5db77085, 0xd4129967), TOBN(0xdb81c3cc, 0xdc3c2a43),
+     TOBN(0x9d655fc0, 0x05d8d9a3), TOBN(0x3f5d057a, 0x54298026),
+     TOBN(0x1157f56d, 0x88c54694), TOBN(0xb26baba5, 0x9b09573e),
+     TOBN(0x2cab03b0, 0x22adffd1), TOBN(0x60a412c8, 0xdd69f383),
+     TOBN(0xed76e98b, 0x54b25039), TOBN(0xd4ee67d3, 0x687e714d),
+     TOBN(0x87739648, 0x7b00b594), TOBN(0xce419775, 0xc9ef709b),
+     TOBN(0x40f76f85, 0x1c203a40), TOBN(0x30d352d6, 0xeafd8f91),
+     TOBN(0xaf196d3d, 0x95578dd2), TOBN(0xea4bb3d7, 0x77cc3f3d),
+     TOBN(0x42a5bd03, 0xb98e782b), TOBN(0xac958c40, 0x0624920d),
+     TOBN(0xb838134c, 0xfc56fcc8), TOBN(0x86ec4ccf, 0x89572e5e),
+     TOBN(0x69c43526, 0x9be47be0), TOBN(0x323b7dd8, 0xcb28fea1),
+     TOBN(0xfa5538ba, 0x3a6c67e5), TOBN(0xef921d70, 0x1d378e46),
+     TOBN(0xf92961fc, 0x3c4b880e), TOBN(0x3f6f914e, 0x98940a67),
+     TOBN(0xa990eb0a, 0xfef0ff39), TOBN(0xa6c2920f, 0xf0eeff9c),
+     TOBN(0xca804166, 0x51b8d9a3), TOBN(0x42531bc9, 0x0ffb0db1),
+     TOBN(0x72ce4718, 0xaa82e7ce), TOBN(0x6e199913, 0xdf574741),
+     TOBN(0xd5f1b13d, 0xd5d36946), TOBN(0x8255dc65, 0xf68f0194),
+     TOBN(0xdc9df4cd, 0x8710d230), TOBN(0x3453c20f, 0x138c1988),
+     TOBN(0x9af98dc0, 0x89a6ef01), TOBN(0x4dbcc3f0, 0x9857df85),
+     TOBN(0x34805601, 0x5c1ad924), TOBN(0x40448da5, 0xd0493046),
+     TOBN(0xf629926d, 0x4ee343e2), TOBN(0x6343f1bd, 0x90e8a301),
+     TOBN(0xefc93491, 0x40815b3f), TOBN(0xf882a423, 0xde8f66fb),
+     TOBN(0x3a12d5f4, 0xe7db9f57), TOBN(0x7dfba38a, 0x3c384c27),
+     TOBN(0x7a904bfd, 0x6fc660b1), TOBN(0xeb6c5db3, 0x2773b21c),
+     TOBN(0xc350ee66, 0x1cdfe049), TOBN(0x9baac0ce, 0x44540f29),
+     TOBN(0xbc57b6ab, 0xa5ec6aad), TOBN(0x167ce8c3, 0x0a7c1baa),
+     TOBN(0xb23a03a5, 0x53fb2b56), TOBN(0x6ce141e7, 0x4e057f78),
+     TOBN(0x796525c3, 0x89e490d9), TOBN(0x0bc95725, 0xa31a7e75),
+     TOBN(0x1ec56791, 0x1220fd06), TOBN(0x716e3a3c, 0x408b0bd6),
+     TOBN(0x31cd6bf7, 0xe8ebeba9), TOBN(0xa7326ca6, 0xbee6b670),
+     TOBN(0x3d9f851c, 0xcd090c43), TOBN(0x561e8f13, 0xf12c3988),
+     TOBN(0x50490b6a, 0x904b7be4), TOBN(0x61690ce1, 0x0410737b),
+     TOBN(0x299e9a37, 0x0f009052), TOBN(0x258758f0, 0xf026092e),
+     TOBN(0x9fa255f3, 0xfdfcdc0f), TOBN(0xdbc9fb1f, 0xc0e1bcd2),
+     TOBN(0x35f9dd6e, 0x24651840), TOBN(0xdca45a84, 0xa5c59abc),
+     TOBN(0x103d396f, 0xecca4938), TOBN(0x4532da0a, 0xb97b3f29),
+     TOBN(0xc4135ea5, 0x1999a6bf), TOBN(0x3aa9505a, 0x5e6bf2ee),
+     TOBN(0xf77cef06, 0x3f5be093), TOBN(0x97d1a0f8, 0xa943152e),
+     TOBN(0x2cb0ebba, 0x2e1c21dd), TOBN(0xf41b29fc, 0x2c6797c4),
+     TOBN(0xc6e17321, 0xb300101f), TOBN(0x4422b0e9, 0xd0d79a89),
+     TOBN(0x49e4901c, 0x92f1bfc4), TOBN(0x06ab1f8f, 0xe1e10ed9),
+     TOBN(0x84d35577, 0xdb2926b8), TOBN(0xca349d39, 0x356e8ec2),
+     TOBN(0x70b63d32, 0x343bf1a9), TOBN(0x8fd3bd28, 0x37d1a6b1),
+     TOBN(0x0454879c, 0x316865b4), TOBN(0xee959ff6, 0xc458efa2),
+     TOBN(0x0461dcf8, 0x9706dc3f), TOBN(0x737db0e2, 0x164e4b2e),
+     TOBN(0x09262680, 0x2f8843c8), TOBN(0x54498bbc, 0x7745e6f6),
+     TOBN(0x359473fa, 0xa29e24af), TOBN(0xfcc3c454, 0x70aa87a1),
+     TOBN(0xfd2c4bf5, 0x00573ace), TOBN(0xb65b514e, 0x28dd1965),
+     TOBN(0xe46ae7cf, 0x2193e393), TOBN(0x60e9a4e1, 0xf5444d97),
+     TOBN(0xe7594e96, 0x00ff38ed), TOBN(0x43d84d2f, 0x0a0e0f02),
+     TOBN(0x8b6db141, 0xee398a21), TOBN(0xb88a56ae, 0xe3bcc5be),
+     TOBN(0x0a1aa52f, 0x373460ea), TOBN(0x20da1a56, 0x160bb19b),
+     TOBN(0xfb54999d, 0x65bf0384), TOBN(0x71a14d24, 0x5d5a180e),
+     TOBN(0xbc44db7b, 0x21737b04), TOBN(0xd84fcb18, 0x01dd8e92),
+     TOBN(0x80de937b, 0xfa44b479), TOBN(0x53505499, 0x5c98fd4f),
+     TOBN(0x1edb12ab, 0x28f08727), TOBN(0x4c58b582, 0xa5f3ef53),
+     TOBN(0xbfb236d8, 0x8327f246), TOBN(0xc3a3bfaa, 0x4d7df320),
+     TOBN(0xecd96c59, 0xb96024f2), TOBN(0xfc293a53, 0x7f4e0433),
+     TOBN(0x5341352b, 0x5acf6e10), TOBN(0xc50343fd, 0xafe652c3),
+     TOBN(0x4af3792d, 0x18577a7f), TOBN(0xe1a4c617, 0xaf16823d),
+     TOBN(0x9b26d0cd, 0x33425d0a), TOBN(0x306399ed, 0x9b7bc47f),
+     TOBN(0x2a792f33, 0x706bb20b), TOBN(0x31219614, 0x98111055),
+     TOBN(0x864ec064, 0x87f5d28b), TOBN(0x11392d91, 0x962277fd),
+     TOBN(0xb5aa7942, 0xbb6aed5f), TOBN(0x080094dc, 0x47e799d9),
+     TOBN(0x4afa588c, 0x208ba19b), TOBN(0xd3e7570f, 0x8512f284),
+     TOBN(0xcbae64e6, 0x02f5799a), TOBN(0xdeebe7ef, 0x514b9492),
+     TOBN(0x30300f98, 0xe5c298ff), TOBN(0x17f561be, 0x3678361f),
+     TOBN(0xf52ff312, 0x98cb9a16), TOBN(0x6233c3bc, 0x5562d490),
+     TOBN(0x7bfa15a1, 0x92e3a2cb), TOBN(0x961bcfd1, 0xe6365119),
+     TOBN(0x3bdd29bf, 0x2c8c53b1), TOBN(0x739704df, 0x822844ba),
+     TOBN(0x7dacfb58, 0x7e7b754b), TOBN(0x23360791, 0xa806c9b9),
+     TOBN(0xe7eb88c9, 0x23504452), TOBN(0x2983e996, 0x852c1783),
+     TOBN(0xdd4ae529, 0x958d881d), TOBN(0x026bae03, 0x262c7b3c),
+     TOBN(0x3a6f9193, 0x960b52d1), TOBN(0xd0980f90, 0x92696cfb),
+     TOBN(0x4c1f428c, 0xd5f30851), TOBN(0x94dfed27, 0x2a4f6630),
+     TOBN(0x4df53772, 0xfc5d48a4), TOBN(0xdd2d5a2f, 0x933260ce),
+     TOBN(0x574115bd, 0xd44cc7a5), TOBN(0x4ba6b20d, 0xbd12533a),
+     TOBN(0x30e93cb8, 0x243057c9), TOBN(0x794c486a, 0x14de320e),
+     TOBN(0xe925d4ce, 0xf21496e4), TOBN(0xf951d198, 0xec696331),
+     TOBN(0x9810e2de, 0x3e8d812f), TOBN(0xd0a47259, 0x389294ab),
+     TOBN(0x513ba2b5, 0x0e3bab66), TOBN(0x462caff5, 0xabad306f),
+     TOBN(0xe2dc6d59, 0xaf04c49e), TOBN(0x1aeb8750, 0xe0b84b0b),
+     TOBN(0xc034f12f, 0x2f7d0ca2), TOBN(0x6d2e8128, 0xe06acf2f),
+     TOBN(0x801f4f83, 0x21facc2f), TOBN(0xa1170c03, 0xf40ef607),
+     TOBN(0xfe0a1d4f, 0x7805a99c), TOBN(0xbde56a36, 0xcc26aba5),
+     TOBN(0x5b1629d0, 0x35531f40), TOBN(0xac212c2b, 0x9afa6108),
+     TOBN(0x30a06bf3, 0x15697be5), TOBN(0x6f0545dc, 0x2c63c7c1),
+     TOBN(0x5d8cb842, 0x7ccdadaf), TOBN(0xd52e379b, 0xac7015bb),
+     TOBN(0xc4f56147, 0xf462c23e), TOBN(0xd44a4298, 0x46bc24b0),
+     TOBN(0xbc73d23a, 0xe2856d4f), TOBN(0x61cedd8c, 0x0832bcdf),
+     TOBN(0x60953556, 0x99f241d7), TOBN(0xee4adbd7, 0x001a349d),
+     TOBN(0x0b35bf6a, 0xaa89e491), TOBN(0x7f0076f4, 0x136f7546),
+     TOBN(0xd19a18ba, 0x9264da3d), TOBN(0x6eb2d2cd, 0x62a7a28b),
+     TOBN(0xcdba941f, 0x8761c971), TOBN(0x1550518b, 0xa3be4a5d),
+     TOBN(0xd0e8e2f0, 0x57d0b70c), TOBN(0xeea8612e, 0xcd133ba3),
+     TOBN(0x814670f0, 0x44416aec), TOBN(0x424db6c3, 0x30775061),
+     TOBN(0xd96039d1, 0x16213fd1), TOBN(0xc61e7fa5, 0x18a3478f),
+     TOBN(0xa805bdcc, 0xcb0c5021), TOBN(0xbdd6f3a8, 0x0cc616dd),
+     TOBN(0x06009667, 0x5d97f7e2), TOBN(0x31db0fc1, 0xaf0bf4b6),
+     TOBN(0x23680ed4, 0x5491627a), TOBN(0xb99a3c66, 0x7d741fb1),
+     TOBN(0xe9bb5f55, 0x36b1ff92), TOBN(0x29738577, 0x512b388d),
+     TOBN(0xdb8a2ce7, 0x50fcf263), TOBN(0x385346d4, 0x6c4f7b47),
+     TOBN(0xbe86c5ef, 0x31631f9e), TOBN(0xbf91da21, 0x03a57a29),
+     TOBN(0xc3b1f796, 0x7b23f821), TOBN(0x0f7d00d2, 0x770db354),
+     TOBN(0x8ffc6c3b, 0xd8fe79da), TOBN(0xcc5e8c40, 0xd525c996),
+     TOBN(0x4640991d, 0xcfff632a), TOBN(0x64d97e8c, 0x67112528),
+     TOBN(0xc232d973, 0x02f1cd1e), TOBN(0xce87eacb, 0x1dd212a4),
+     TOBN(0x6e4c8c73, 0xe69802f7), TOBN(0x12ef0290, 0x1fffddbd),
+     TOBN(0x941ec74e, 0x1bcea6e2), TOBN(0xd0b54024, 0x3cb92cbb),
+     TOBN(0x809fb9d4, 0x7e8f9d05), TOBN(0x3bf16159, 0xf2992aae),
+     TOBN(0xad40f279, 0xf8a7a838), TOBN(0x11aea631, 0x05615660),
+     TOBN(0xbf52e6f1, 0xa01f6fa1), TOBN(0xef046995, 0x3dc2aec9),
+     TOBN(0x785dbec9, 0xd8080711), TOBN(0xe1aec60a, 0x9fdedf76),
+     TOBN(0xece797b5, 0xfa21c126), TOBN(0xc66e898f, 0x05e52732),
+     TOBN(0x39bb69c4, 0x08811fdb), TOBN(0x8bfe1ef8, 0x2fc7f082),
+     TOBN(0xc8e7a393, 0x174f4138), TOBN(0xfba8ad1d, 0xd58d1f98),
+     TOBN(0xbc21d0ce, 0xbfd2fd5b), TOBN(0x0b839a82, 0x6ee60d61),
+     TOBN(0xaacf7658, 0xafd22253), TOBN(0xb526bed8, 0xaae396b3),
+     TOBN(0xccc1bbc2, 0x38564464), TOBN(0x9e3ff947, 0x8c45bc73),
+     TOBN(0xcde9bca3, 0x58188a78), TOBN(0x138b8ee0, 0xd73bf8f7),
+     TOBN(0x5c7e234c, 0x4123c489), TOBN(0x66e69368, 0xfa643297),
+     TOBN(0x0629eeee, 0x39a15fa3), TOBN(0x95fab881, 0xa9e2a927),
+     TOBN(0xb2497007, 0xeafbb1e1), TOBN(0xd75c9ce6, 0xe75b7a93),
+     TOBN(0x3558352d, 0xefb68d78), TOBN(0xa2f26699, 0x223f6396),
+     TOBN(0xeb911ecf, 0xe469b17a), TOBN(0x62545779, 0xe72d3ec2),
+     TOBN(0x8ea47de7, 0x82cb113f), TOBN(0xebe4b086, 0x4e1fa98d),
+     TOBN(0xec2d5ed7, 0x8cdfedb1), TOBN(0xa535c077, 0xfe211a74),
+     TOBN(0x9678109b, 0x11d244c5), TOBN(0xf17c8bfb, 0xbe299a76),
+     TOBN(0xb651412e, 0xfb11fbc4), TOBN(0xea0b5482, 0x94ab3f65),
+     TOBN(0xd8dffd95, 0x0cf78243), TOBN(0x2e719e57, 0xce0361d4),
+     TOBN(0x9007f085, 0x304ddc5b), TOBN(0x095e8c6d, 0x4daba2ea),
+     TOBN(0x5a33cdb4, 0x3f9d28a9), TOBN(0x85b95cd8, 0xe2283003),
+     TOBN(0xbcd6c819, 0xb9744733), TOBN(0x29c5f538, 0xfc7f5783),
+     TOBN(0x6c49b2fa, 0xd59038e4), TOBN(0x68349cc1, 0x3bbe1018),
+     TOBN(0xcc490c1d, 0x21830ee5), TOBN(0x36f9c4ee, 0xe9bfa297),
+     TOBN(0x58fd7294, 0x48de1a94), TOBN(0xaadb13a8, 0x4e8f2cdc),
+     TOBN(0x515eaaa0, 0x81313dba), TOBN(0xc76bb468, 0xc2152dd8),
+     TOBN(0x357f8d75, 0xa653dbf8), TOBN(0xe4d8c4d1, 0xb14ac143),
+     TOBN(0xbdb8e675, 0xb055cb40), TOBN(0x898f8e7b, 0x977b5167),
+     TOBN(0xecc65651, 0xb82fb863), TOBN(0x56544814, 0x6d88f01f),
+     TOBN(0xb0928e95, 0x263a75a9), TOBN(0xcfb6836f, 0x1a22fcda),
+     TOBN(0x651d14db, 0x3f3bd37c), TOBN(0x1d3837fb, 0xb6ad4664),
+     TOBN(0x7c5fb538, 0xff4f94ab), TOBN(0x7243c712, 0x6d7fb8f2),
+     TOBN(0xef13d60c, 0xa85c5287), TOBN(0x18cfb7c7, 0x4bb8dd1b),
+     TOBN(0x82f9bfe6, 0x72908219), TOBN(0x35c4592b, 0x9d5144ab),
+     TOBN(0x52734f37, 0x9cf4b42f), TOBN(0x6bac55e7, 0x8c60ddc4),
+     TOBN(0xb5cd811e, 0x94dea0f6), TOBN(0x259ecae4, 0xe18cc1a3),
+     TOBN(0x6a0e836e, 0x15e660f8), TOBN(0x6c639ea6, 0x0e02bff2),
+     TOBN(0x8721b8cb, 0x7e1026fd), TOBN(0x9e73b50b, 0x63261942),
+     TOBN(0xb8c70974, 0x77f01da3), TOBN(0x1839e6a6, 0x8268f57f),
+     TOBN(0x571b9415, 0x5150b805), TOBN(0x1892389e, 0xf92c7097),
+     TOBN(0x8d69c18e, 0x4a084b95), TOBN(0x7014c512, 0xbe5b495c),
+     TOBN(0x4780db36, 0x1b07523c), TOBN(0x2f6219ce, 0x2c1c64fa),
+     TOBN(0xc38b81b0, 0x602c105a), TOBN(0xab4f4f20, 0x5dc8e360),
+     TOBN(0x20d3c982, 0xcf7d62d2), TOBN(0x1f36e29d, 0x23ba8150),
+     TOBN(0x48ae0bf0, 0x92763f9e), TOBN(0x7a527e6b, 0x1d3a7007),
+     TOBN(0xb4a89097, 0x581a85e3), TOBN(0x1f1a520f, 0xdc158be5),
+     TOBN(0xf98db37d, 0x167d726e), TOBN(0x8802786e, 0x1113e862)}
+    ,
+    {TOBN(0xefb2149e, 0x36f09ab0), TOBN(0x03f163ca, 0x4a10bb5b),
+     TOBN(0xd0297045, 0x06e20998), TOBN(0x56f0af00, 0x1b5a3bab),
+     TOBN(0x7af4cfec, 0x70880e0d), TOBN(0x7332a66f, 0xbe3d913f),
+     TOBN(0x32e6c84a, 0x7eceb4bd), TOBN(0xedc4a79a, 0x9c228f55),
+     TOBN(0xc37c7dd0, 0xc55c4496), TOBN(0xa6a96357, 0x25bbabd2),
+     TOBN(0x5b7e63f2, 0xadd7f363), TOBN(0x9dce3782, 0x2e73f1df),
+     TOBN(0xe1e5a16a, 0xb2b91f71), TOBN(0xe4489823, 0x5ba0163c),
+     TOBN(0xf2759c32, 0xf6e515ad), TOBN(0xa5e2f1f8, 0x8615eecf),
+     TOBN(0x74519be7, 0xabded551), TOBN(0x03d358b8, 0xc8b74410),
+     TOBN(0x4d00b10b, 0x0e10d9a9), TOBN(0x6392b0b1, 0x28da52b7),
+     TOBN(0x6744a298, 0x0b75c904), TOBN(0xc305b0ae, 0xa8f7f96c),
+     TOBN(0x042e421d, 0x182cf932), TOBN(0xf6fc5d50, 0x9e4636ca),
+     TOBN(0x795847c9, 0xd64cc78c), TOBN(0x6c50621b, 0x9b6cb27b),
+     TOBN(0x07099bf8, 0xdf8022ab), TOBN(0x48f862eb, 0xc04eda1d),
+     TOBN(0xd12732ed, 0xe1603c16), TOBN(0x19a80e0f, 0x5c9a9450),
+     TOBN(0xe2257f54, 0xb429b4fc), TOBN(0x66d3b2c6, 0x45460515),
+     TOBN(0x6ca4f87e, 0x822e37be), TOBN(0x73f237b4, 0x253bda4e),
+     TOBN(0xf747f3a2, 0x41190aeb), TOBN(0xf06fa36f, 0x804cf284),
+     TOBN(0x0a6bbb6e, 0xfc621c12), TOBN(0x5d624b64, 0x40b80ec6),
+     TOBN(0x4b072425, 0x7ba556f3), TOBN(0x7fa0c354, 0x3e2d20a8),
+     TOBN(0xe921fa31, 0xe3229d41), TOBN(0xa929c652, 0x94531bd4),
+     TOBN(0x84156027, 0xa6d38209), TOBN(0xf3d69f73, 0x6bdb97bd),
+     TOBN(0x8906d19a, 0x16833631), TOBN(0x68a34c2e, 0x03d51be3),
+     TOBN(0xcb59583b, 0x0e511cd8), TOBN(0x99ce6bfd, 0xfdc132a8),
+     TOBN(0x3facdaaa, 0xffcdb463), TOBN(0x658bbc1a, 0x34a38b08),
+     TOBN(0x12a801f8, 0xf1a9078d), TOBN(0x1567bcf9, 0x6ab855de),
+     TOBN(0xe08498e0, 0x3572359b), TOBN(0xcf0353e5, 0x8659e68b),
+     TOBN(0xbb86e9c8, 0x7d23807c), TOBN(0xbc08728d, 0x2198e8a2),
+     TOBN(0x8de2b7bc, 0x453cadd6), TOBN(0x203900a7, 0xbc0bc1f8),
+     TOBN(0xbcd86e47, 0xa6abd3af), TOBN(0x911cac12, 0x8502effb),
+     TOBN(0x2d550242, 0xec965469), TOBN(0x0e9f7692, 0x29e0017e),
+     TOBN(0x633f078f, 0x65979885), TOBN(0xfb87d449, 0x4cf751ef),
+     TOBN(0xe1790e4b, 0xfc25419a), TOBN(0x36467203, 0x4bff3cfd),
+     TOBN(0xc8db6386, 0x25b6e83f), TOBN(0x6cc69f23, 0x6cad6fd2),
+     TOBN(0x0219e45a, 0x6bc68bb9), TOBN(0xe43d79b6, 0x297f7334),
+     TOBN(0x7d445368, 0x465dc97c), TOBN(0x4b9eea32, 0x2a0b949a),
+     TOBN(0x1b96c6ba, 0x6102d021), TOBN(0xeaafac78, 0x2f4461ea),
+     TOBN(0xd4b85c41, 0xc49f19a8), TOBN(0x275c28e4, 0xcf538875),
+     TOBN(0x35451a9d, 0xdd2e54e0), TOBN(0x6991adb5, 0x0605618b),
+     TOBN(0x5b8b4bcd, 0x7b36cd24), TOBN(0x372a4f8c, 0x56f37216),
+     TOBN(0xc890bd73, 0xa6a5da60), TOBN(0x6f083da0, 0xdc4c9ff0),
+     TOBN(0xf4e14d94, 0xf0536e57), TOBN(0xf9ee1eda, 0xaaec8243),
+     TOBN(0x571241ec, 0x8bdcf8e7), TOBN(0xa5db8271, 0x0b041e26),
+     TOBN(0x9a0b9a99, 0xe3fff040), TOBN(0xcaaf21dd, 0x7c271202),
+     TOBN(0xb4e2b2e1, 0x4f0dd2e8), TOBN(0xe77e7c4f, 0x0a377ac7),
+     TOBN(0x69202c3f, 0x0d7a2198), TOBN(0xf759b7ff, 0x28200eb8),
+     TOBN(0xc87526ed, 0xdcfe314e), TOBN(0xeb84c524, 0x53d5cf99),
+     TOBN(0xb1b52ace, 0x515138b6), TOBN(0x5aa7ff8c, 0x23fca3f4),
+     TOBN(0xff0b13c3, 0xb9791a26), TOBN(0x960022da, 0xcdd58b16),
+     TOBN(0xdbd55c92, 0x57aad2de), TOBN(0x3baaaaa3, 0xf30fe619),
+     TOBN(0x9a4b2346, 0x0d881efd), TOBN(0x506416c0, 0x46325e2a),
+     TOBN(0x91381e76, 0x035c18d4), TOBN(0xb3bb68be, 0xf27817b0),
+     TOBN(0x15bfb8bf, 0x5116f937), TOBN(0x7c64a586, 0xc1268943),
+     TOBN(0x71e25cc3, 0x8419a2c8), TOBN(0x9fd6b0c4, 0x8335f463),
+     TOBN(0x4bf0ba3c, 0xe8ee0e0e), TOBN(0x6f6fba60, 0x298c21fa),
+     TOBN(0x57d57b39, 0xae66bee0), TOBN(0x292d5130, 0x22672544),
+     TOBN(0xf451105d, 0xbab093b3), TOBN(0x012f59b9, 0x02839986),
+     TOBN(0x8a915802, 0x3474a89c), TOBN(0x048c919c, 0x2de03e97),
+     TOBN(0xc476a2b5, 0x91071cd5), TOBN(0x791ed89a, 0x034970a5),
+     TOBN(0x89bd9042, 0xe1b7994b), TOBN(0x8eaf5179, 0xa1057ffd),
+     TOBN(0x6066e2a2, 0xd551ee10), TOBN(0x87a8f1d8, 0x727e09a6),
+     TOBN(0x00d08bab, 0x2c01148d), TOBN(0x6da8e4f1, 0x424f33fe),
+     TOBN(0x466d17f0, 0xcf9a4e71), TOBN(0xff502010, 0x3bf5cb19),
+     TOBN(0xdccf97d8, 0xd062ecc0), TOBN(0x80c0d9af, 0x81d80ac4),
+     TOBN(0xe87771d8, 0x033f2876), TOBN(0xb0186ec6, 0x7d5cc3db),
+     TOBN(0x58e8bb80, 0x3bc9bc1d), TOBN(0x4d1395cc, 0x6f6ef60e),
+     TOBN(0xa73c62d6, 0x186244a0), TOBN(0x918e5f23, 0x110a5b53),
+     TOBN(0xed4878ca, 0x741b7eab), TOBN(0x3038d71a, 0xdbe03e51),
+     TOBN(0x840204b7, 0xa93c3246), TOBN(0x21ab6069, 0xa0b9b4cd),
+     TOBN(0xf5fa6e2b, 0xb1d64218), TOBN(0x1de6ad0e, 0xf3d56191),
+     TOBN(0x570aaa88, 0xff1929c7), TOBN(0xc6df4c6b, 0x640e87b5),
+     TOBN(0xde8a74f2, 0xc65f0ccc), TOBN(0x8b972fd5, 0xe6f6cc01),
+     TOBN(0x3fff36b6, 0x0b846531), TOBN(0xba7e45e6, 0x10a5e475),
+     TOBN(0x84a1d10e, 0x4145b6c5), TOBN(0xf1f7f91a, 0x5e046d9d),
+     TOBN(0x0317a692, 0x44de90d7), TOBN(0x951a1d4a, 0xf199c15e),
+     TOBN(0x91f78046, 0xc9d73deb), TOBN(0x74c82828, 0xfab8224f),
+     TOBN(0xaa6778fc, 0xe7560b90), TOBN(0xb4073e61, 0xa7e824ce),
+     TOBN(0xff0d693c, 0xd642eba8), TOBN(0x7ce2e57a, 0x5dccef38),
+     TOBN(0x89c2c789, 0x1df1ad46), TOBN(0x83a06922, 0x098346fd),
+     TOBN(0x2d715d72, 0xda2fc177), TOBN(0x7b6dd71d, 0x85b6cf1d),
+     TOBN(0xc60a6d0a, 0x73fa9cb0), TOBN(0xedd3992e, 0x328bf5a9),
+     TOBN(0xc380ddd0, 0x832c8c82), TOBN(0xd182d410, 0xa2a0bf50),
+     TOBN(0x7d9d7438, 0xd9a528db), TOBN(0xe8b1a0e9, 0xcaf53994),
+     TOBN(0xddd6e5fe, 0x0e19987c), TOBN(0xacb8df03, 0x190b059d),
+     TOBN(0x53703a32, 0x8300129f), TOBN(0x1f637662, 0x68c43bfd),
+     TOBN(0xbcbd1913, 0x00e54051), TOBN(0x812fcc62, 0x7bf5a8c5),
+     TOBN(0x3f969d5f, 0x29fb85da), TOBN(0x72f4e00a, 0x694759e8),
+     TOBN(0x426b6e52, 0x790726b7), TOBN(0x617bbc87, 0x3bdbb209),
+     TOBN(0x511f8bb9, 0x97aee317), TOBN(0x812a4096, 0xe81536a8),
+     TOBN(0x137dfe59, 0x3ac09b9b), TOBN(0x0682238f, 0xba8c9a7a),
+     TOBN(0x7072ead6, 0xaeccb4bd), TOBN(0x6a34e9aa, 0x692ba633),
+     TOBN(0xc82eaec2, 0x6fff9d33), TOBN(0xfb753512, 0x1d4d2b62),
+     TOBN(0x1a0445ff, 0x1d7aadab), TOBN(0x65d38260, 0xd5f6a67c),
+     TOBN(0x6e62fb08, 0x91cfb26f), TOBN(0xef1e0fa5, 0x5c7d91d6),
+     TOBN(0x47e7c7ba, 0x33db72cd), TOBN(0x017cbc09, 0xfa7c74b2),
+     TOBN(0x3c931590, 0xf50a503c), TOBN(0xcac54f60, 0x616baa42),
+     TOBN(0x9b6cd380, 0xb2369f0f), TOBN(0x97d3a70d, 0x23c76151),
+     TOBN(0x5f9dd6fc, 0x9862a9c6), TOBN(0x044c4ab2, 0x12312f51),
+     TOBN(0x035ea0fd, 0x834a2ddc), TOBN(0x49e6b862, 0xcc7b826d),
+     TOBN(0xb03d6883, 0x62fce490), TOBN(0x62f2497a, 0xb37e36e9),
+     TOBN(0x04b005b6, 0xc6458293), TOBN(0x36bb5276, 0xe8d10af7),
+     TOBN(0xacf2dc13, 0x8ee617b8), TOBN(0x470d2d35, 0xb004b3d4),
+     TOBN(0x06790832, 0xfeeb1b77), TOBN(0x2bb75c39, 0x85657f9c),
+     TOBN(0xd70bd4ed, 0xc0f60004), TOBN(0xfe797ecc, 0x219b018b),
+     TOBN(0x9b5bec2a, 0x753aebcc), TOBN(0xdaf9f3dc, 0xc939eca5),
+     TOBN(0xd6bc6833, 0xd095ad09), TOBN(0x98abdd51, 0xdaa4d2fc),
+     TOBN(0xd9840a31, 0x8d168be5), TOBN(0xcf7c10e0, 0x2325a23c),
+     TOBN(0xa5c02aa0, 0x7e6ecfaf), TOBN(0x2462e7e6, 0xb5bfdf18),
+     TOBN(0xab2d8a8b, 0xa0cc3f12), TOBN(0x68dd485d, 0xbc672a29),
+     TOBN(0x72039752, 0x596f2cd3), TOBN(0x5d3eea67, 0xa0cf3d8d),
+     TOBN(0x810a1a81, 0xe6602671), TOBN(0x8f144a40, 0x14026c0c),
+     TOBN(0xbc753a6d, 0x76b50f85), TOBN(0xc4dc21e8, 0x645cd4a4),
+     TOBN(0xc5262dea, 0x521d0378), TOBN(0x802b8e0e, 0x05011c6f),
+     TOBN(0x1ba19cbb, 0x0b4c19ea), TOBN(0x21db64b5, 0xebf0aaec),
+     TOBN(0x1f394ee9, 0x70342f9d), TOBN(0x93a10aee, 0x1bc44a14),
+     TOBN(0xa7eed31b, 0x3efd0baa), TOBN(0x6e7c824e, 0x1d154e65),
+     TOBN(0xee23fa81, 0x9966e7ee), TOBN(0x64ec4aa8, 0x05b7920d),
+     TOBN(0x2d44462d, 0x2d90aad4), TOBN(0xf44dd195, 0xdf277ad5),
+     TOBN(0x8d6471f1, 0xbb46b6a1), TOBN(0x1e65d313, 0xfd885090),
+     TOBN(0x33a800f5, 0x13a977b4), TOBN(0xaca9d721, 0x0797e1ef),
+     TOBN(0x9a5a85a0, 0xfcff6a17), TOBN(0x9970a3f3, 0x1eca7cee),
+     TOBN(0xbb9f0d6b, 0xc9504be3), TOBN(0xe0c504be, 0xadd24ee2),
+     TOBN(0x7e09d956, 0x77fcc2f4), TOBN(0xef1a5227, 0x65bb5fc4),
+     TOBN(0x145d4fb1, 0x8b9286aa), TOBN(0x66fd0c5d, 0x6649028b),
+     TOBN(0x98857ceb, 0x1bf4581c), TOBN(0xe635e186, 0xaca7b166),
+     TOBN(0x278ddd22, 0x659722ac), TOBN(0xa0903c4c, 0x1db68007),
+     TOBN(0x366e4589, 0x48f21402), TOBN(0x31b49c14, 0xb96abda2),
+     TOBN(0x329c4b09, 0xe0403190), TOBN(0x97197ca3, 0xd29f43fe),
+     TOBN(0x8073dd1e, 0x274983d8), TOBN(0xda1a3bde, 0x55717c8f),
+     TOBN(0xfd3d4da2, 0x0361f9d1), TOBN(0x1332d081, 0x4c7de1ce),
+     TOBN(0x9b7ef7a3, 0xaa6d0e10), TOBN(0x17db2e73, 0xf54f1c4a),
+     TOBN(0xaf3dffae, 0x4cd35567), TOBN(0xaaa2f406, 0xe56f4e71),
+     TOBN(0x8966759e, 0x7ace3fc7), TOBN(0x9594eacf, 0x45a8d8c6),
+     TOBN(0x8de3bd8b, 0x91834e0e), TOBN(0xafe4ca53, 0x548c0421),
+     TOBN(0xfdd7e856, 0xe6ee81c6), TOBN(0x8f671beb, 0x6b891a3a),
+     TOBN(0xf7a58f2b, 0xfae63829), TOBN(0x9ab186fb, 0x9c11ac9f),
+     TOBN(0x8d6eb369, 0x10b5be76), TOBN(0x046b7739, 0xfb040bcd),
+     TOBN(0xccb4529f, 0xcb73de88), TOBN(0x1df0fefc, 0xcf26be03),
+     TOBN(0xad7757a6, 0xbcfcd027), TOBN(0xa8786c75, 0xbb3165ca),
+     TOBN(0xe9db1e34, 0x7e99a4d9), TOBN(0x99ee86df, 0xb06c504b),
+     TOBN(0x5b7c2ddd, 0xc15c9f0a), TOBN(0xdf87a734, 0x4295989e),
+     TOBN(0x59ece47c, 0x03d08fda), TOBN(0xb074d3dd, 0xad5fc702),
+     TOBN(0x20407903, 0x51a03776), TOBN(0x2bb1f77b, 0x2a608007),
+     TOBN(0x25c58f4f, 0xe1153185), TOBN(0xe6df62f6, 0x766e6447),
+     TOBN(0xefb3d1be, 0xed51275a), TOBN(0x5de47dc7, 0x2f0f483f),
+     TOBN(0x7932d98e, 0x97c2bedf), TOBN(0xd5c11927, 0x0219f8a1),
+     TOBN(0x9d751200, 0xa73a294e), TOBN(0x5f88434a, 0x9dc20172),
+     TOBN(0xd28d9fd3, 0xa26f506a), TOBN(0xa890cd31, 0x9d1dcd48),
+     TOBN(0x0aebaec1, 0x70f4d3b4), TOBN(0xfd1a1369, 0x0ffc8d00),
+     TOBN(0xb9d9c240, 0x57d57838), TOBN(0x45929d26, 0x68bac361),
+     TOBN(0x5a2cd060, 0x25b15ca6), TOBN(0x4b3c83e1, 0x6e474446),
+     TOBN(0x1aac7578, 0xee1e5134), TOBN(0xa418f5d6, 0xc91e2f41),
+     TOBN(0x6936fc8a, 0x213ed68b), TOBN(0x860ae7ed, 0x510a5224),
+     TOBN(0x63660335, 0xdef09b53), TOBN(0x641b2897, 0xcd79c98d),
+     TOBN(0x29bd38e1, 0x01110f35), TOBN(0x79c26f42, 0x648b1937),
+     TOBN(0x64dae519, 0x9d9164f4), TOBN(0xd85a2310, 0x0265c273),
+     TOBN(0x7173dd5d, 0x4b07e2b1), TOBN(0xd144c4cb, 0x8d9ea221),
+     TOBN(0xe8b04ea4, 0x1105ab14), TOBN(0x92dda542, 0xfe80d8f1),
+     TOBN(0xe9982fa8, 0xcf03dce6), TOBN(0x8b5ea965, 0x1a22cffc),
+     TOBN(0xf7f4ea7f, 0x3fad88c4), TOBN(0x62db773e, 0x6a5ba95c),
+     TOBN(0xd20f02fb, 0x93f24567), TOBN(0xfd46c69a, 0x315257ca),
+     TOBN(0x0ac74cc7, 0x8bcab987), TOBN(0x46f31c01, 0x5ceca2f5),
+     TOBN(0x40aedb59, 0x888b219e), TOBN(0xe50ecc37, 0xe1fccd02),
+     TOBN(0x1bcd9dad, 0x911f816c), TOBN(0x583cc1ec, 0x8db9b00c),
+     TOBN(0xf3cd2e66, 0xa483bf11), TOBN(0xfa08a6f5, 0xb1b2c169),
+     TOBN(0xf375e245, 0x4be9fa28), TOBN(0x99a7ffec, 0x5b6d011f),
+     TOBN(0x6a3ebddb, 0xc4ae62da), TOBN(0x6cea00ae, 0x374aef5d),
+     TOBN(0xab5fb98d, 0x9d4d05bc), TOBN(0x7cba1423, 0xd560f252),
+     TOBN(0x49b2cc21, 0x208490de), TOBN(0x1ca66ec3, 0xbcfb2879),
+     TOBN(0x7f1166b7, 0x1b6fb16f), TOBN(0xfff63e08, 0x65fe5db3),
+     TOBN(0xb8345abe, 0x8b2610be), TOBN(0xb732ed80, 0x39de3df4),
+     TOBN(0x0e24ed50, 0x211c32b4), TOBN(0xd10d8a69, 0x848ff27d),
+     TOBN(0xc1074398, 0xed4de248), TOBN(0xd7cedace, 0x10488927),
+     TOBN(0xa4aa6bf8, 0x85673e13), TOBN(0xb46bae91, 0x6daf30af),
+     TOBN(0x07088472, 0xfcef7ad8), TOBN(0x61151608, 0xd4b35e97),
+     TOBN(0xbcfe8f26, 0xdde29986), TOBN(0xeb84c4c7, 0xd5a34c79),
+     TOBN(0xc1eec55c, 0x164e1214), TOBN(0x891be86d, 0xa147bb03),
+     TOBN(0x9fab4d10, 0x0ba96835), TOBN(0xbf01e9b8, 0xa5c1ae9f),
+     TOBN(0x6b4de139, 0xb186ebc0), TOBN(0xd5c74c26, 0x85b91bca),
+     TOBN(0x5086a99c, 0xc2d93854), TOBN(0xeed62a7b, 0xa7a9dfbc),
+     TOBN(0x8778ed6f, 0x76b7618a), TOBN(0xbff750a5, 0x03b66062),
+     TOBN(0x4cb7be22, 0xb65186db), TOBN(0x369dfbf0, 0xcc3a6d13),
+     TOBN(0xc7dab26c, 0x7191a321), TOBN(0x9edac3f9, 0x40ed718e),
+     TOBN(0xbc142b36, 0xd0cfd183), TOBN(0xc8af82f6, 0x7c991693),
+     TOBN(0xb3d1e4d8, 0x97ce0b2a), TOBN(0xe6d7c87f, 0xc3a55cdf),
+     TOBN(0x35846b95, 0x68b81afe), TOBN(0x018d12af, 0xd3c239d8),
+     TOBN(0x2b2c6208, 0x01206e15), TOBN(0xe0e42453, 0xa3b882c6),
+     TOBN(0x854470a3, 0xa50162d5), TOBN(0x08157478, 0x7017a62a),
+     TOBN(0x18bd3fb4, 0x820357c7), TOBN(0x992039ae, 0x6f1458ad),
+     TOBN(0x9a1df3c5, 0x25b44aa1), TOBN(0x2d780357, 0xed3d5281),
+     TOBN(0x58cf7e4d, 0xc77ad4d4), TOBN(0xd49a7998, 0xf9df4fc4),
+     TOBN(0x4465a8b5, 0x1d71205e), TOBN(0xa0ee0ea6, 0x649254aa),
+     TOBN(0x4b5eeecf, 0xab7bd771), TOBN(0x6c873073, 0x35c262b9),
+     TOBN(0xdc5bd648, 0x3c9d61e7), TOBN(0x233d6d54, 0x321460d2),
+     TOBN(0xd20c5626, 0xfc195bcc), TOBN(0x25445958, 0x04d78b63),
+     TOBN(0xe03fcb3d, 0x17ec8ef3), TOBN(0x54b690d1, 0x46b8f781),
+     TOBN(0x82fa2c8a, 0x21230646), TOBN(0xf51aabb9, 0x084f418c),
+     TOBN(0xff4fbec1, 0x1a30ba43), TOBN(0x6a5acf73, 0x743c9df7),
+     TOBN(0x1da2b357, 0xd635b4d5), TOBN(0xc3de68dd, 0xecd5c1da),
+     TOBN(0xa689080b, 0xd61af0dd), TOBN(0xdea5938a, 0xd665bf99),
+     TOBN(0x0231d71a, 0xfe637294), TOBN(0x01968aa6, 0xa5a81cd8),
+     TOBN(0x11252d50, 0x048e63b5), TOBN(0xc446bc52, 0x6ca007e9),
+     TOBN(0xef8c50a6, 0x96d6134b), TOBN(0x9361fbf5, 0x9e09a05c),
+     TOBN(0xf17f85a6, 0xdca3291a), TOBN(0xb178d548, 0xff251a21),
+     TOBN(0x87f6374b, 0xa4df3915), TOBN(0x566ce1bf, 0x2fd5d608),
+     TOBN(0x425cba4d, 0x7de35102), TOBN(0x6b745f8f, 0x58c5d5e2),
+     TOBN(0x88402af6, 0x63122edf), TOBN(0x3190f9ed, 0x3b989a89),
+     TOBN(0x4ad3d387, 0xebba3156), TOBN(0xef385ad9, 0xc7c469a5),
+     TOBN(0xb08281de, 0x3f642c29), TOBN(0x20be0888, 0x910ffb88),
+     TOBN(0xf353dd4a, 0xd5292546), TOBN(0x3f1627de, 0x8377a262),
+     TOBN(0xa5faa013, 0xeefcd638), TOBN(0x8f3bf626, 0x74cc77c3),
+     TOBN(0x32618f65, 0xa348f55e), TOBN(0x5787c0dc, 0x9fefeb9e),
+     TOBN(0xf1673aa2, 0xd9a23e44), TOBN(0x88dfa993, 0x4e10690d),
+     TOBN(0x1ced1b36, 0x2bf91108), TOBN(0x9193ceca, 0x3af48649),
+     TOBN(0xfb34327d, 0x2d738fc5), TOBN(0x6697b037, 0x975fee6c),
+     TOBN(0x2f485da0, 0xc04079a5), TOBN(0x2cdf5735, 0x2feaa1ac),
+     TOBN(0x76944420, 0xbd55659e), TOBN(0x7973e32b, 0x4376090c),
+     TOBN(0x86bb4fe1, 0x163b591a), TOBN(0x10441aed, 0xc196f0ca),
+     TOBN(0x3b431f4a, 0x045ad915), TOBN(0x6c11b437, 0xa4afacb1),
+     TOBN(0x30b0c7db, 0x71fdbbd8), TOBN(0xb642931f, 0xeda65acd),
+     TOBN(0x4baae6e8, 0x9c92b235), TOBN(0xa73bbd0e, 0x6b3993a1),
+     TOBN(0xd06d60ec, 0x693dd031), TOBN(0x03cab91b, 0x7156881c),
+     TOBN(0xd615862f, 0x1db3574b), TOBN(0x485b0185, 0x64bb061a),
+     TOBN(0x27434988, 0xa0181e06), TOBN(0x2cd61ad4, 0xc1c0c757),
+     TOBN(0x3effed5a, 0x2ff9f403), TOBN(0x8dc98d8b, 0x62239029),
+     TOBN(0x2206021e, 0x1f17b70d), TOBN(0xafbec0ca, 0xbf510015),
+     TOBN(0x9fed7164, 0x80130dfa), TOBN(0x306dc2b5, 0x8a02dcf5),
+     TOBN(0x48f06620, 0xfeb10fc0), TOBN(0x78d1e1d5, 0x5a57cf51),
+     TOBN(0xadef8c5a, 0x192ef710), TOBN(0x88afbd4b, 0x3b7431f9),
+     TOBN(0x7e1f7407, 0x64250c9e), TOBN(0x6e31318d, 0xb58bec07),
+     TOBN(0xfd4fc4b8, 0x24f89b4e), TOBN(0x65a5dd88, 0x48c36a2a),
+     TOBN(0x4f1eccff, 0xf024baa7), TOBN(0x22a21cf2, 0xcba94650),
+     TOBN(0x95d29dee, 0x42a554f7), TOBN(0x828983a5, 0x002ec4ba),
+     TOBN(0x8112a1f7, 0x8badb73d), TOBN(0x79ea8897, 0xa27c1839),
+     TOBN(0x8969a5a7, 0xd065fd83), TOBN(0xf49af791, 0xb262a0bc),
+     TOBN(0xfcdea8b6, 0xaf2b5127), TOBN(0x10e913e1, 0x564c2dbc),
+     TOBN(0x51239d14, 0xbc21ef51), TOBN(0xe51c3ceb, 0x4ce57292),
+     TOBN(0x795ff068, 0x47bbcc3b), TOBN(0x86b46e1e, 0xbd7e11e6),
+     TOBN(0x0ea6ba23, 0x80041ef4), TOBN(0xd72fe505, 0x6262342e),
+     TOBN(0x8abc6dfd, 0x31d294d4), TOBN(0xbbe017a2, 0x1278c2c9),
+     TOBN(0xb1fcfa09, 0xb389328a), TOBN(0x322fbc62, 0xd01771b5),
+     TOBN(0x04c0d063, 0x60b045bf), TOBN(0xdb652edc, 0x10e52d01),
+     TOBN(0x50ef932c, 0x03ec6627), TOBN(0xde1b3b2d, 0xc1ee50e3),
+     TOBN(0x5ab7bdc5, 0xdc37a90d), TOBN(0xfea67213, 0x31e33a96),
+     TOBN(0x6482b5cb, 0x4f2999aa), TOBN(0x38476cc6, 0xb8cbf0dd),
+     TOBN(0x93ebfacb, 0x173405bb), TOBN(0x15cdafe7, 0xe52369ec),
+     TOBN(0xd42d5ba4, 0xd935b7db), TOBN(0x648b6004, 0x1c99a4cd),
+     TOBN(0x785101bd, 0xa3b5545b), TOBN(0x4bf2c38a, 0x9dd67faf),
+     TOBN(0xb1aadc63, 0x4442449c), TOBN(0xe0e9921a, 0x33ad4fb8),
+     TOBN(0x5c552313, 0xaa686d82), TOBN(0xdee635fa, 0x465d866c),
+     TOBN(0xbc3c224a, 0x18ee6e8a), TOBN(0xeed748a6, 0xed42e02f),
+     TOBN(0xe70f930a, 0xd474cd08), TOBN(0x774ea6ec, 0xfff24adf),
+     TOBN(0x03e2de1c, 0xf3480d4a), TOBN(0xf0d8edc7, 0xbc8acf1a),
+     TOBN(0xf23e3303, 0x68295a9c), TOBN(0xfadd5f68, 0xc546a97d),
+     TOBN(0x895597ad, 0x96f8acb1), TOBN(0xbddd49d5, 0x671bdae2),
+     TOBN(0x16fcd528, 0x21dd43f4), TOBN(0xa5a45412, 0x6619141a)}
+    ,
+    {TOBN(0x8ce9b6bf, 0xc360e25a), TOBN(0xe6425195, 0x075a1a78),
+     TOBN(0x9dc756a8, 0x481732f4), TOBN(0x83c0440f, 0x5432b57a),
+     TOBN(0xc670b3f1, 0xd720281f), TOBN(0x2205910e, 0xd135e051),
+     TOBN(0xded14b0e, 0xdb052be7), TOBN(0x697b3d27, 0xc568ea39),
+     TOBN(0x2e599b9a, 0xfb3ff9ed), TOBN(0x28c2e0ab, 0x17f6515c),
+     TOBN(0x1cbee4fd, 0x474da449), TOBN(0x071279a4, 0x4f364452),
+     TOBN(0x97abff66, 0x01fbe855), TOBN(0x3ee394e8, 0x5fda51c4),
+     TOBN(0x190385f6, 0x67597c0b), TOBN(0x6e9fccc6, 0xa27ee34b),
+     TOBN(0x0b89de93, 0x14092ebb), TOBN(0xf17256bd, 0x428e240c),
+     TOBN(0xcf89a7f3, 0x93d2f064), TOBN(0x4f57841e, 0xe1ed3b14),
+     TOBN(0x4ee14405, 0xe708d855), TOBN(0x856aae72, 0x03f1c3d0),
+     TOBN(0xc8e5424f, 0xbdd7eed5), TOBN(0x3333e4ef, 0x73ab4270),
+     TOBN(0x3bc77ade, 0xdda492f8), TOBN(0xc11a3aea, 0x78297205),
+     TOBN(0x5e89a3e7, 0x34931b4c), TOBN(0x17512e2e, 0x9f5694bb),
+     TOBN(0x5dc349f3, 0x177bf8b6), TOBN(0x232ea4ba, 0x08c7ff3e),
+     TOBN(0x9c4f9d16, 0xf511145d), TOBN(0xccf109a3, 0x33b379c3),
+     TOBN(0xe75e7a88, 0xa1f25897), TOBN(0x7ac6961f, 0xa1b5d4d8),
+     TOBN(0xe3e10773, 0x08f3ed5c), TOBN(0x208a54ec, 0x0a892dfb),
+     TOBN(0xbe826e19, 0x78660710), TOBN(0x0cf70a97, 0x237df2c8),
+     TOBN(0x418a7340, 0xed704da5), TOBN(0xa3eeb9a9, 0x08ca33fd),
+     TOBN(0x49d96233, 0x169bca96), TOBN(0x04d286d4, 0x2da6aafb),
+     TOBN(0xc09606ec, 0xa0c2fa94), TOBN(0x8869d0d5, 0x23ff0fb3),
+     TOBN(0xa99937e5, 0xd0150d65), TOBN(0xa92e2503, 0x240c14c9),
+     TOBN(0x656bf945, 0x108e2d49), TOBN(0x152a733a, 0xa2f59e2b),
+     TOBN(0xb4323d58, 0x8434a920), TOBN(0xc0af8e93, 0x622103c5),
+     TOBN(0x667518ef, 0x938dbf9a), TOBN(0xa1843073, 0x83a9cdf2),
+     TOBN(0x350a94aa, 0x5447ab80), TOBN(0xe5e5a325, 0xc75a3d61),
+     TOBN(0x74ba507f, 0x68411a9e), TOBN(0x10581fc1, 0x594f70c5),
+     TOBN(0x60e28570, 0x80eb24a9), TOBN(0x7bedfb4d, 0x488e0cfd),
+     TOBN(0x721ebbd7, 0xc259cdb8), TOBN(0x0b0da855, 0xbc6390a9),
+     TOBN(0x2b4d04db, 0xde314c70), TOBN(0xcdbf1fbc, 0x6c32e846),
+     TOBN(0x33833eab, 0xb162fc9e), TOBN(0x9939b48b, 0xb0dd3ab7),
+     TOBN(0x5aaa98a7, 0xcb0c9c8c), TOBN(0x75105f30, 0x81c4375c),
+     TOBN(0xceee5057, 0x5ef1c90f), TOBN(0xb31e065f, 0xc23a17bf),
+     TOBN(0x5364d275, 0xd4b6d45a), TOBN(0xd363f3ad, 0x62ec8996),
+     TOBN(0xb5d21239, 0x4391c65b), TOBN(0x84564765, 0xebb41b47),
+     TOBN(0x20d18ecc, 0x37107c78), TOBN(0xacff3b6b, 0x570c2a66),
+     TOBN(0x22f975d9, 0x9bd0d845), TOBN(0xef0a0c46, 0xba178fa0),
+     TOBN(0x1a419651, 0x76b6028e), TOBN(0xc49ec674, 0x248612d4),
+     TOBN(0x5b6ac4f2, 0x7338af55), TOBN(0x06145e62, 0x7bee5a36),
+     TOBN(0x33e95d07, 0xe75746b5), TOBN(0x1c1e1f6d, 0xc40c78be),
+     TOBN(0x967833ef, 0x222ff8e2), TOBN(0x4bedcf6a, 0xb49180ad),
+     TOBN(0x6b37e9c1, 0x3d7a4c8a), TOBN(0x2748887c, 0x6ddfe760),
+     TOBN(0xf7055123, 0xaa3a5bbc), TOBN(0x954ff225, 0x7bbb8e74),
+     TOBN(0xc42b8ab1, 0x97c3dfb9), TOBN(0x55a549b0, 0xcf168154),
+     TOBN(0xad6748e7, 0xc1b50692), TOBN(0x2775780f, 0x6fc5cbcb),
+     TOBN(0x4eab80b8, 0xe1c9d7c8), TOBN(0x8c69dae1, 0x3fdbcd56),
+     TOBN(0x47e6b4fb, 0x9969eace), TOBN(0x002f1085, 0xa705cb5a),
+     TOBN(0x4e23ca44, 0x6d3fea55), TOBN(0xb4ae9c86, 0xf4810568),
+     TOBN(0x47bfb91b, 0x2a62f27d), TOBN(0x60deb4c9, 0xd9bac28c),
+     TOBN(0xa892d894, 0x7de6c34c), TOBN(0x4ee68259, 0x4494587d),
+     TOBN(0x914ee14e, 0x1a3f8a5b), TOBN(0xbb113eaa, 0x28700385),
+     TOBN(0x81ca03b9, 0x2115b4c9), TOBN(0x7c163d38, 0x8908cad1),
+     TOBN(0xc912a118, 0xaa18179a), TOBN(0xe09ed750, 0x886e3081),
+     TOBN(0xa676e3fa, 0x26f516ca), TOBN(0x753cacf7, 0x8e732f91),
+     TOBN(0x51592aea, 0x833da8b4), TOBN(0xc626f42f, 0x4cbea8aa),
+     TOBN(0xef9dc899, 0xa7b56eaf), TOBN(0x00c0e52c, 0x34ef7316),
+     TOBN(0x5b1e4e24, 0xfe818a86), TOBN(0x9d31e20d, 0xc538be47),
+     TOBN(0x22eb932d, 0x3ed68974), TOBN(0xe44bbc08, 0x7c4e87c4),
+     TOBN(0x4121086e, 0x0dde9aef), TOBN(0x8e6b9cff, 0x134f4345),
+     TOBN(0x96892c1f, 0x711b0eb9), TOBN(0xb905f2c8, 0x780ab954),
+     TOBN(0xace26309, 0xa20792db), TOBN(0xec8ac9b3, 0x0684e126),
+     TOBN(0x486ad8b6, 0xb40a2447), TOBN(0x60121fc1, 0x9fe3fb24),
+     TOBN(0x5626fccf, 0x1a8e3b3f), TOBN(0x4e568622, 0x6ad1f394),
+     TOBN(0xda7aae0d, 0x196aa5a1), TOBN(0xe0df8c77, 0x1041b5fb),
+     TOBN(0x451465d9, 0x26b318b7), TOBN(0xc29b6e55, 0x7ab136e9),
+     TOBN(0x2c2ab48b, 0x71148463), TOBN(0xb5738de3, 0x64454a76),
+     TOBN(0x54ccf9a0, 0x5a03abe4), TOBN(0x377c0296, 0x0427d58e),
+     TOBN(0x73f5f0b9, 0x2bb39c1f), TOBN(0x14373f2c, 0xe608d8c5),
+     TOBN(0xdcbfd314, 0x00fbb805), TOBN(0xdf18fb20, 0x83afdcfb),
+     TOBN(0x81a57f42, 0x42b3523f), TOBN(0xe958532d, 0x87f650fb),
+     TOBN(0xaa8dc8b6, 0x8b0a7d7c), TOBN(0x1b75dfb7, 0x150166be),
+     TOBN(0x90e4f7c9, 0x2d7d1413), TOBN(0x67e2d6b5, 0x9834f597),
+     TOBN(0x4fd4f4f9, 0xa808c3e8), TOBN(0xaf8237e0, 0xd5281ec1),
+     TOBN(0x25ab5fdc, 0x84687cee), TOBN(0xc5ded6b1, 0xa5b26c09),
+     TOBN(0x8e4a5aec, 0xc8ea7650), TOBN(0x23b73e5c, 0x14cc417f),
+     TOBN(0x2bfb4318, 0x3037bf52), TOBN(0xb61e6db5, 0x78c725d7),
+     TOBN(0x8efd4060, 0xbbb3e5d7), TOBN(0x2e014701, 0xdbac488e),
+     TOBN(0xac75cf9a, 0x360aa449), TOBN(0xb70cfd05, 0x79634d08),
+     TOBN(0xa591536d, 0xfffb15ef), TOBN(0xb2c37582, 0xd07c106c),
+     TOBN(0xb4293fdc, 0xf50225f9), TOBN(0xc52e175c, 0xb0e12b03),
+     TOBN(0xf649c3ba, 0xd0a8bf64), TOBN(0x745a8fef, 0xeb8ae3c6),
+     TOBN(0x30d7e5a3, 0x58321bc3), TOBN(0xb1732be7, 0x0bc4df48),
+     TOBN(0x1f217993, 0xe9ea5058), TOBN(0xf7a71cde, 0x3e4fd745),
+     TOBN(0x86cc533e, 0x894c5bbb), TOBN(0x6915c7d9, 0x69d83082),
+     TOBN(0xa6aa2d05, 0x5815c244), TOBN(0xaeeee592, 0x49b22ce5),
+     TOBN(0x89e39d13, 0x78135486), TOBN(0x3a275c1f, 0x16b76f2f),
+     TOBN(0xdb6bcc1b, 0xe036e8f5), TOBN(0x4df69b21, 0x5e4709f5),
+     TOBN(0xa188b250, 0x2d0f39aa), TOBN(0x622118bb, 0x15a85947),
+     TOBN(0x2ebf520f, 0xfde0f4fa), TOBN(0xa40e9f29, 0x4860e539),
+     TOBN(0x7b6a51eb, 0x22b57f0f), TOBN(0x849a33b9, 0x7e80644a),
+     TOBN(0x50e5d16f, 0x1cf095fe), TOBN(0xd754b54e, 0xec55f002),
+     TOBN(0x5cfbbb22, 0x236f4a98), TOBN(0x0b0c59e9, 0x066800bb),
+     TOBN(0x4ac69a8f, 0x5a9a7774), TOBN(0x2b33f804, 0xd6bec948),
+     TOBN(0xb3729295, 0x32e6c466), TOBN(0x68956d0f, 0x4e599c73),
+     TOBN(0xa47a249f, 0x155c31cc), TOBN(0x24d80f0d, 0xe1ce284e),
+     TOBN(0xcd821dfb, 0x988baf01), TOBN(0xe6331a7d, 0xdbb16647),
+     TOBN(0x1eb8ad33, 0x094cb960), TOBN(0x593cca38, 0xc91bbca5),
+     TOBN(0x384aac8d, 0x26567456), TOBN(0x40fa0309, 0xc04b6490),
+     TOBN(0x97834cd6, 0xdab6c8f6), TOBN(0x68a7318d, 0x3f91e55f),
+     TOBN(0xa00fd04e, 0xfc4d3157), TOBN(0xb56f8ab2, 0x2bf3bdea),
+     TOBN(0x014f5648, 0x4fa57172), TOBN(0x948c5860, 0x450abdb3),
+     TOBN(0x342b5df0, 0x0ebd4f08), TOBN(0x3e5168cd, 0x0e82938e),
+     TOBN(0x7aedc1ce, 0xb0df5dd0), TOBN(0x6bbbc6d9, 0xe5732516),
+     TOBN(0xc7bfd486, 0x605daaa6), TOBN(0x46fd72b7, 0xbb9a6c9e),
+     TOBN(0xe4847fb1, 0xa124fb89), TOBN(0x75959cbd, 0xa2d8ffbc),
+     TOBN(0x42579f65, 0xc8a588ee), TOBN(0x368c92e6, 0xb80b499d),
+     TOBN(0xea4ef6cd, 0x999a5df1), TOBN(0xaa73bb7f, 0x936fe604),
+     TOBN(0xf347a70d, 0x6457d188), TOBN(0x86eda86b, 0x8b7a388b),
+     TOBN(0xb7cdff06, 0x0ccd6013), TOBN(0xbeb1b6c7, 0xd0053fb2),
+     TOBN(0x0b022387, 0x99240a9f), TOBN(0x1bbb384f, 0x776189b2),
+     TOBN(0x8695e71e, 0x9066193a), TOBN(0x2eb50097, 0x06ffac7e),
+     TOBN(0x0654a9c0, 0x4a7d2caa), TOBN(0x6f3fb3d1, 0xa5aaa290),
+     TOBN(0x835db041, 0xff476e8f), TOBN(0x540b8b0b, 0xc42295e4),
+     TOBN(0xa5c73ac9, 0x05e214f5), TOBN(0x9a74075a, 0x56a0b638),
+     TOBN(0x2e4b1090, 0xce9e680b), TOBN(0x57a5b479, 0x6b8d9afa),
+     TOBN(0x0dca48e7, 0x26bfe65c), TOBN(0x097e391c, 0x7290c307),
+     TOBN(0x683c462e, 0x6669e72e), TOBN(0xf505be1e, 0x062559ac),
+     TOBN(0x5fbe3ea1, 0xe3a3035a), TOBN(0x6431ebf6, 0x9cd50da8),
+     TOBN(0xfd169d5c, 0x1f6407f2), TOBN(0x8d838a95, 0x60fce6b8),
+     TOBN(0x2a2bfa7f, 0x650006f0), TOBN(0xdfd7dad3, 0x50c0fbb2),
+     TOBN(0x92452495, 0xccf9ad96), TOBN(0x183bf494, 0xd95635f9),
+     TOBN(0x02d5df43, 0x4a7bd989), TOBN(0x505385cc, 0xa5431095),
+     TOBN(0xdd98e67d, 0xfd43f53e), TOBN(0xd61e1a6c, 0x500c34a9),
+     TOBN(0x5a4b46c6, 0x4a8a3d62), TOBN(0x8469c4d0, 0x247743d2),
+     TOBN(0x2bb3a13d, 0x88f7e433), TOBN(0x62b23a10, 0x01be5849),
+     TOBN(0xe83596b4, 0xa63d1a4c), TOBN(0x454e7fea, 0x7d183f3e),
+     TOBN(0x643fce61, 0x17afb01c), TOBN(0x4e65e5e6, 0x1c4c3638),
+     TOBN(0x41d85ea1, 0xef74c45b), TOBN(0x2cfbfa66, 0xae328506),
+     TOBN(0x98b078f5, 0x3ada7da9), TOBN(0xd985fe37, 0xec752fbb),
+     TOBN(0xeece68fe, 0x5a0148b4), TOBN(0x6f9a55c7, 0x2d78136d),
+     TOBN(0x232dccc4, 0xd2b729ce), TOBN(0xa27e0dfd, 0x90aafbc4),
+     TOBN(0x96474452, 0x12b4603e), TOBN(0xa876c551, 0x6b706d14),
+     TOBN(0xdf145fcf, 0x69a9d412), TOBN(0xe2ab75b7, 0x2d479c34),
+     TOBN(0x12df9a76, 0x1a23ff97), TOBN(0xc6138992, 0x5d359d10),
+     TOBN(0x6e51c7ae, 0xfa835f22), TOBN(0x69a79cb1, 0xc0fcc4d9),
+     TOBN(0xf57f350d, 0x594cc7e1), TOBN(0x3079ca63, 0x3350ab79),
+     TOBN(0x226fb614, 0x9aff594a), TOBN(0x35afec02, 0x6d59a62b),
+     TOBN(0x9bee46f4, 0x06ed2c6e), TOBN(0x58da1735, 0x7d939a57),
+     TOBN(0x44c50402, 0x8fd1797e), TOBN(0xd8853e7c, 0x5ccea6ca),
+     TOBN(0x4065508d, 0xa35fcd5f), TOBN(0x8965df8c, 0x495ccaeb),
+     TOBN(0x0f2da850, 0x12e1a962), TOBN(0xee471b94, 0xc1cf1cc4),
+     TOBN(0xcef19bc8, 0x0a08fb75), TOBN(0x704958f5, 0x81de3591),
+     TOBN(0x2867f8b2, 0x3aef4f88), TOBN(0x8d749384, 0xea9f9a5f),
+     TOBN(0x1b385537, 0x8c9049f4), TOBN(0x5be948f3, 0x7b92d8b6),
+     TOBN(0xd96f725d, 0xb6e2bd6b), TOBN(0x37a222bc, 0x958c454d),
+     TOBN(0xe7c61abb, 0x8809bf61), TOBN(0x46f07fbc, 0x1346f18d),
+     TOBN(0xfb567a7a, 0xe87c0d1c), TOBN(0x84a461c8, 0x7ef3d07a),
+     TOBN(0x0a5adce6, 0xd9278d98), TOBN(0x24d94813, 0x9dfc73e1),
+     TOBN(0x4f3528b6, 0x054321c3), TOBN(0x2e03fdde, 0x692ea706),
+     TOBN(0x10e60619, 0x47b533c0), TOBN(0x1a8bc73f, 0x2ca3c055),
+     TOBN(0xae58d4b2, 0x1bb62b8f), TOBN(0xb2045a73, 0x584a24e3),
+     TOBN(0x3ab3d5af, 0xbd76e195), TOBN(0x478dd1ad, 0x6938a810),
+     TOBN(0x6ffab393, 0x6ee3d5cb), TOBN(0xdfb693db, 0x22b361e4),
+     TOBN(0xf9694496, 0x51dbf1a7), TOBN(0xcab4b4ef, 0x08a2e762),
+     TOBN(0xe8c92f25, 0xd39bba9a), TOBN(0x850e61bc, 0xf1464d96),
+     TOBN(0xb7e830e3, 0xdc09508b), TOBN(0xfaf6d2cf, 0x74317655),
+     TOBN(0x72606ceb, 0xdf690355), TOBN(0x48bb92b3, 0xd0c3ded6),
+     TOBN(0x65b75484, 0x5c7cf892), TOBN(0xf6cd7ac9, 0xd5d5f01f),
+     TOBN(0xc2c30a59, 0x96401d69), TOBN(0x91268650, 0xed921878),
+     TOBN(0x380bf913, 0xb78c558f), TOBN(0x43c0baeb, 0xc8afdaa9),
+     TOBN(0x377f61d5, 0x54f169d3), TOBN(0xf8da07e3, 0xae5ff20b),
+     TOBN(0xb676c49d, 0xa8a90ea8), TOBN(0x81c1ff2b, 0x83a29b21),
+     TOBN(0x383297ac, 0x2ad8d276), TOBN(0x3001122f, 0xba89f982),
+     TOBN(0xe1d794be, 0x6718e448), TOBN(0x246c1482, 0x7c3e6e13),
+     TOBN(0x56646ef8, 0x5d26b5ef), TOBN(0x80f5091e, 0x88069cdd),
+     TOBN(0xc5992e2f, 0x724bdd38), TOBN(0x02e915b4, 0x8471e8c7),
+     TOBN(0x96ff320a, 0x0d0ff2a9), TOBN(0xbf886487, 0x4384d1a0),
+     TOBN(0xbbe1e6a6, 0xc93f72d6), TOBN(0xd5f75d12, 0xcad800ea),
+     TOBN(0xfa40a09f, 0xe7acf117), TOBN(0x32c8cdd5, 0x7581a355),
+     TOBN(0x74221992, 0x7023c499), TOBN(0xa8afe5d7, 0x38ec3901),
+     TOBN(0x5691afcb, 0xa90e83f0), TOBN(0x41bcaa03, 0x0b8f8eac),
+     TOBN(0xe38b5ff9, 0x8d2668d5), TOBN(0x0715281a, 0x7ad81965),
+     TOBN(0x1bc8fc7c, 0x03c6ce11), TOBN(0xcbbee6e2, 0x8b650436),
+     TOBN(0x06b00fe8, 0x0cdb9808), TOBN(0x17d6e066, 0xfe3ed315),
+     TOBN(0x2e9d38c6, 0x4d0b5018), TOBN(0xab8bfd56, 0x844dcaef),
+     TOBN(0x42894a59, 0x513aed8b), TOBN(0xf77f3b6d, 0x314bd07a),
+     TOBN(0xbbdecb8f, 0x8e42b582), TOBN(0xf10e2fa8, 0xd2390fe6),
+     TOBN(0xefb95022, 0x62a2f201), TOBN(0x4d59ea50, 0x50ee32b0),
+     TOBN(0xd87f7728, 0x6da789a8), TOBN(0xcf98a2cf, 0xf79492c4),
+     TOBN(0xf9577239, 0x720943c2), TOBN(0xba044cf5, 0x3990b9d0),
+     TOBN(0x5aa8e823, 0x95f2884a), TOBN(0x834de6ed, 0x0278a0af),
+     TOBN(0xc8e1ee9a, 0x5f25bd12), TOBN(0x9259ceaa, 0x6f7ab271),
+     TOBN(0x7e6d97a2, 0x77d00b76), TOBN(0x5c0c6eea, 0xa437832a),
+     TOBN(0x5232c20f, 0x5606b81d), TOBN(0xabd7b375, 0x0d991ee5),
+     TOBN(0x4d2bfe35, 0x8632d951), TOBN(0x78f85146, 0x98ed9364),
+     TOBN(0x951873f0, 0xf30c3282), TOBN(0x0da8ac80, 0xa789230b),
+     TOBN(0x3ac7789c, 0x5398967f), TOBN(0xa69b8f7f, 0xbdda0fb5),
+     TOBN(0xe5db7717, 0x6add8545), TOBN(0x1b71cb66, 0x72c49b66),
+     TOBN(0xd8560739, 0x68421d77), TOBN(0x03840fe8, 0x83e3afea),
+     TOBN(0xb391dad5, 0x1ec69977), TOBN(0xae243fb9, 0x307f6726),
+     TOBN(0xc88ac87b, 0xe8ca160c), TOBN(0x5174cced, 0x4ce355f4),
+     TOBN(0x98a35966, 0xe58ba37d), TOBN(0xfdcc8da2, 0x7817335d),
+     TOBN(0x5b752830, 0x83fbc7bf), TOBN(0x68e419d4, 0xd9c96984),
+     TOBN(0x409a39f4, 0x02a40380), TOBN(0x88940faf, 0x1fe977bc),
+     TOBN(0xc640a94b, 0x8f8edea6), TOBN(0x1e22cd17, 0xed11547d),
+     TOBN(0xe28568ce, 0x59ffc3e2), TOBN(0x60aa1b55, 0xc1dee4e7),
+     TOBN(0xc67497c8, 0x837cb363), TOBN(0x06fb438a, 0x105a2bf2),
+     TOBN(0x30357ec4, 0x500d8e20), TOBN(0x1ad9095d, 0x0670db10),
+     TOBN(0x7f589a05, 0xc73b7cfd), TOBN(0xf544607d, 0x880d6d28),
+     TOBN(0x17ba93b1, 0xa20ef103), TOBN(0xad859130, 0x6ba6577b),
+     TOBN(0x65c91cf6, 0x6fa214a0), TOBN(0xd7d49c6c, 0x27990da5),
+     TOBN(0xecd9ec8d, 0x20bb569d), TOBN(0xbd4b2502, 0xeeffbc33),
+     TOBN(0x2056ca5a, 0x6bed0467), TOBN(0x7916a1f7, 0x5b63728c),
+     TOBN(0xd4f9497d, 0x53a4f566), TOBN(0x89734664, 0x97b56810),
+     TOBN(0xf8e1da74, 0x0494a621), TOBN(0x82546a93, 0x8d011c68),
+     TOBN(0x1f3acb19, 0xc61ac162), TOBN(0x52f8fa9c, 0xabad0d3e),
+     TOBN(0x15356523, 0xb4b7ea43), TOBN(0x5a16ad61, 0xae608125),
+     TOBN(0xb0bcb87f, 0x4faed184), TOBN(0x5f236b1d, 0x5029f45f),
+     TOBN(0xd42c7607, 0x0bc6b1fc), TOBN(0xc644324e, 0x68aefce3),
+     TOBN(0x8e191d59, 0x5c5d8446), TOBN(0xc0208077, 0x13ae1979),
+     TOBN(0xadcaee55, 0x3ba59cc7), TOBN(0x20ed6d6b, 0xa2cb81ba),
+     TOBN(0x0952ba19, 0xb6efcffc), TOBN(0x60f12d68, 0x97c0b87c),
+     TOBN(0x4ee2c7c4, 0x9caa30bc), TOBN(0x767238b7, 0x97fbff4e),
+     TOBN(0xebc73921, 0x501b5d92), TOBN(0x3279e3df, 0xc2a37737),
+     TOBN(0x9fc12bc8, 0x6d197543), TOBN(0xfa94dc6f, 0x0a40db4e),
+     TOBN(0x7392b41a, 0x530ccbbd), TOBN(0x87c82146, 0xea823525),
+     TOBN(0xa52f984c, 0x05d98d0c), TOBN(0x2ae57d73, 0x5ef6974c),
+     TOBN(0x9377f7bf, 0x3042a6dd), TOBN(0xb1a007c0, 0x19647a64),
+     TOBN(0xfaa9079a, 0x0cca9767), TOBN(0x3d81a25b, 0xf68f72d5),
+     TOBN(0x752067f8, 0xff81578e), TOBN(0x78622150, 0x9045447d),
+     TOBN(0xc0c22fcf, 0x0505aa6f), TOBN(0x1030f0a6, 0x6bed1c77),
+     TOBN(0x31f29f15, 0x1f0bd739), TOBN(0x2d7989c7, 0xe6debe85),
+     TOBN(0x5c070e72, 0x8e677e98), TOBN(0x0a817bd3, 0x06e81fd5),
+     TOBN(0xc110d830, 0xb0f2ac95), TOBN(0x48d0995a, 0xab20e64e),
+     TOBN(0x0f3e00e1, 0x7729cd9a), TOBN(0x2a570c20, 0xdd556946),
+     TOBN(0x912dbcfd, 0x4e86214d), TOBN(0x2d014ee2, 0xcf615498),
+     TOBN(0x55e2b1e6, 0x3530d76e), TOBN(0xc5135ae4, 0xfd0fd6d1),
+     TOBN(0x0066273a, 0xd4f3049f), TOBN(0xbb8e9893, 0xe7087477),
+     TOBN(0x2dba1ddb, 0x14c6e5fd), TOBN(0xdba37886, 0x51f57e6c),
+     TOBN(0x5aaee0a6, 0x5a72f2cf), TOBN(0x1208bfbf, 0x7bea5642),
+     TOBN(0xf5c6aa3b, 0x67872c37), TOBN(0xd726e083, 0x43f93224),
+     TOBN(0x1854daa5, 0x061f1658), TOBN(0xc0016df1, 0xdf0cd2b3),
+     TOBN(0xc2a3f23e, 0x833d50de), TOBN(0x73b681d2, 0xbbbd3017),
+     TOBN(0x2f046dc4, 0x3ac343c0), TOBN(0x9c847e7d, 0x85716421),
+     TOBN(0xe1e13c91, 0x0917eed4), TOBN(0x3fc9eebd, 0x63a1b9c6),
+     TOBN(0x0f816a72, 0x7fe02299), TOBN(0x6335ccc2, 0x294f3319),
+     TOBN(0x3820179f, 0x4745c5be), TOBN(0xe647b782, 0x922f066e),
+     TOBN(0xc22e49de, 0x02cafb8a), TOBN(0x299bc2ff, 0xfcc2eccc),
+     TOBN(0x9a8feea2, 0x6e0e8282), TOBN(0xa627278b, 0xfe893205),
+     TOBN(0xa7e19733, 0x7933e47b), TOBN(0xf4ff6b13, 0x2e766402),
+     TOBN(0xa4d8be0a, 0x98440d9f), TOBN(0x658f5c2f, 0x38938808),
+     TOBN(0x90b75677, 0xc95b3b3e), TOBN(0xfa044269, 0x3137b6ff),
+     TOBN(0x077b039b, 0x43c47c29), TOBN(0xcca95dd3, 0x8a6445b2),
+     TOBN(0x0b498ba4, 0x2333fc4c), TOBN(0x274f8e68, 0xf736a1b1),
+     TOBN(0x6ca348fd, 0x5f1d4b2e), TOBN(0x24d3be78, 0xa8f10199),
+     TOBN(0x8535f858, 0xca14f530), TOBN(0xa6e7f163, 0x5b982e51),
+     TOBN(0x847c8512, 0x36e1bf62), TOBN(0xf6a7c58e, 0x03448418),
+     TOBN(0x583f3703, 0xf9374ab6), TOBN(0x864f9195, 0x6e564145),
+     TOBN(0x33bc3f48, 0x22526d50), TOBN(0x9f323c80, 0x1262a496),
+     TOBN(0xaa97a7ae, 0x3f046a9a), TOBN(0x70da183e, 0xdf8a039a),
+     TOBN(0x5b68f71c, 0x52aa0ba6), TOBN(0x9be0fe51, 0x21459c2d),
+     TOBN(0xc1e17eb6, 0xcbc613e5), TOBN(0x33131d55, 0x497ea61c),
+     TOBN(0x2f69d39e, 0xaf7eded5), TOBN(0x73c2f434, 0xde6af11b),
+     TOBN(0x4ca52493, 0xa4a375fa), TOBN(0x5f06787c, 0xb833c5c2),
+     TOBN(0x814e091f, 0x3e6e71cf), TOBN(0x76451f57, 0x8b746666)}
+    ,
+    {TOBN(0x80f9bdef, 0x694db7e0), TOBN(0xedca8787, 0xb9fcddc6),
+     TOBN(0x51981c34, 0x03b8dce1), TOBN(0x4274dcf1, 0x70e10ba1),
+     TOBN(0xf72743b8, 0x6def6d1a), TOBN(0xd25b1670, 0xebdb1866),
+     TOBN(0xc4491e8c, 0x050c6f58), TOBN(0x2be2b2ab, 0x87fbd7f5),
+     TOBN(0x3e0e5c9d, 0xd111f8ec), TOBN(0xbcc33f8d, 0xb7c4e760),
+     TOBN(0x702f9a91, 0xbd392a51), TOBN(0x7da4a795, 0xc132e92d),
+     TOBN(0x1a0b0ae3, 0x0bb1151b), TOBN(0x54febac8, 0x02e32251),
+     TOBN(0xea3a5082, 0x694e9e78), TOBN(0xe58ffec1, 0xe4fe40b8),
+     TOBN(0xf85592fc, 0xd1e0cf9e), TOBN(0xdea75f0d, 0xc0e7b2e8),
+     TOBN(0xc04215cf, 0xc135584e), TOBN(0x174fc727, 0x2f57092a),
+     TOBN(0xe7277877, 0xeb930bea), TOBN(0x504caccb, 0x5eb02a5a),
+     TOBN(0xf9fe08f7, 0xf5241b9b), TOBN(0xe7fb62f4, 0x8d5ca954),
+     TOBN(0xfbb8349d, 0x29c4120b), TOBN(0x9f94391f, 0xc0d0d915),
+     TOBN(0xc4074fa7, 0x5410ba51), TOBN(0xa66adbf6, 0x150a5911),
+     TOBN(0xc164543c, 0x34bfca38), TOBN(0xe0f27560, 0xb9e1ccfc),
+     TOBN(0x99da0f53, 0xe820219c), TOBN(0xe8234498, 0xc6b4997a),
+     TOBN(0xcfb88b76, 0x9d4c5423), TOBN(0x9e56eb10, 0xb0521c49),
+     TOBN(0x418e0b5e, 0xbe8700a1), TOBN(0x00cbaad6, 0xf93cb58a),
+     TOBN(0xe923fbde, 0xd92a5e67), TOBN(0xca4979ac, 0x1f347f11),
+     TOBN(0x89162d85, 0x6bc0585b), TOBN(0xdd6254af, 0xac3c70e3),
+     TOBN(0x7b23c513, 0x516e19e4), TOBN(0x56e2e847, 0xc5c4d593),
+     TOBN(0x9f727d73, 0x5ce71ef6), TOBN(0x5b6304a6, 0xf79a44c5),
+     TOBN(0x6638a736, 0x3ab7e433), TOBN(0x1adea470, 0xfe742f83),
+     TOBN(0xe054b854, 0x5b7fc19f), TOBN(0xf935381a, 0xba1d0698),
+     TOBN(0x546eab2d, 0x799e9a74), TOBN(0x96239e0e, 0xa949f729),
+     TOBN(0xca274c6b, 0x7090055a), TOBN(0x835142c3, 0x9020c9b0),
+     TOBN(0xa405667a, 0xa2e8807f), TOBN(0x29f2c085, 0x1aa3d39e),
+     TOBN(0xcc555d64, 0x42fc72f5), TOBN(0xe856e0e7, 0xfbeacb3c),
+     TOBN(0xb5504f9d, 0x918e4936), TOBN(0x65035ef6, 0xb2513982),
+     TOBN(0x0553a0c2, 0x6f4d9cb9), TOBN(0x6cb10d56, 0xbea85509),
+     TOBN(0x48d957b7, 0xa242da11), TOBN(0x16a4d3dd, 0x672b7268),
+     TOBN(0x3d7e637c, 0x8502a96b), TOBN(0x27c7032b, 0x730d463b),
+     TOBN(0xbdc02b18, 0xe4136a14), TOBN(0xbacf969d, 0x678e32bf),
+     TOBN(0xc98d89a3, 0xdd9c3c03), TOBN(0x7b92420a, 0x23becc4f),
+     TOBN(0xd4b41f78, 0xc64d565c), TOBN(0x9f969d00, 0x10f28295),
+     TOBN(0xec7f7f76, 0xb13d051a), TOBN(0x08945e1e, 0xa92da585),
+     TOBN(0x55366b7d, 0x5846426f), TOBN(0xe7d09e89, 0x247d441d),
+     TOBN(0x510b404d, 0x736fbf48), TOBN(0x7fa003d0, 0xe784bd7d),
+     TOBN(0x25f7614f, 0x17fd9596), TOBN(0x49e0e0a1, 0x35cb98db),
+     TOBN(0x2c65957b, 0x2e83a76a), TOBN(0x5d40da8d, 0xcddbe0f8),
+     TOBN(0xf2b8c405, 0x050bad24), TOBN(0x8918426d, 0xc2aa4823),
+     TOBN(0x2aeab3dd, 0xa38365a7), TOBN(0x72031717, 0x7c91b690),
+     TOBN(0x8b00d699, 0x60a94120), TOBN(0x478a255d, 0xe99eaeec),
+     TOBN(0xbf656a5f, 0x6f60aafd), TOBN(0xdfd7cb75, 0x5dee77b3),
+     TOBN(0x37f68bb4, 0xa595939d), TOBN(0x03556479, 0x28740217),
+     TOBN(0x8e740e7c, 0x84ad7612), TOBN(0xd89bc843, 0x9044695f),
+     TOBN(0xf7f3da5d, 0x85a9184d), TOBN(0x562563bb, 0x9fc0b074),
+     TOBN(0x06d2e6aa, 0xf88a888e), TOBN(0x612d8643, 0x161fbe7c),
+     TOBN(0x465edba7, 0xf64085e7), TOBN(0xb230f304, 0x29aa8511),
+     TOBN(0x53388426, 0xcda2d188), TOBN(0x90885735, 0x4b666649),
+     TOBN(0x6f02ff9a, 0x652f54f6), TOBN(0x65c82294, 0x5fae2bf0),
+     TOBN(0x7816ade0, 0x62f5eee3), TOBN(0xdcdbdf43, 0xfcc56d70),
+     TOBN(0x9fb3bba3, 0x54530bb2), TOBN(0xbde3ef77, 0xcb0869ea),
+     TOBN(0x89bc9046, 0x0b431163), TOBN(0x4d03d7d2, 0xe4819a35),
+     TOBN(0x33ae4f9e, 0x43b6a782), TOBN(0x216db307, 0x9c88a686),
+     TOBN(0x91dd88e0, 0x00ffedd9), TOBN(0xb280da9f, 0x12bd4840),
+     TOBN(0x32a7cb8a, 0x1635e741), TOBN(0xfe14008a, 0x78be02a7),
+     TOBN(0x3fafb334, 0x1b7ae030), TOBN(0x7fd508e7, 0x5add0ce9),
+     TOBN(0x72c83219, 0xd607ad51), TOBN(0x0f229c0a, 0x8d40964a),
+     TOBN(0x1be2c336, 0x1c878da2), TOBN(0xe0c96742, 0xeab2ab86),
+     TOBN(0x458f8691, 0x3e538cd7), TOBN(0xa7001f6c, 0x8e08ad53),
+     TOBN(0x52b8c6e6, 0xbf5d15ff), TOBN(0x548234a4, 0x011215dd),
+     TOBN(0xff5a9d2d, 0x3d5b4045), TOBN(0xb0ffeeb6, 0x4a904190),
+     TOBN(0x55a3aca4, 0x48607f8b), TOBN(0x8cbd665c, 0x30a0672a),
+     TOBN(0x87f834e0, 0x42583068), TOBN(0x02da2aeb, 0xf3f6e683),
+     TOBN(0x6b763e5d, 0x05c12248), TOBN(0x7230378f, 0x65a8aefc),
+     TOBN(0x93bd80b5, 0x71e8e5ca), TOBN(0x53ab041c, 0xb3b62524),
+     TOBN(0x1b860513, 0x6c9c552e), TOBN(0xe84d402c, 0xd5524e66),
+     TOBN(0xa37f3573, 0xf37f5937), TOBN(0xeb0f6c7d, 0xd1e4fca5),
+     TOBN(0x2965a554, 0xac8ab0fc), TOBN(0x17fbf56c, 0x274676ac),
+     TOBN(0x2e2f6bd9, 0xacf7d720), TOBN(0x41fc8f88, 0x10224766),
+     TOBN(0x517a14b3, 0x85d53bef), TOBN(0xdae327a5, 0x7d76a7d1),
+     TOBN(0x6ad0a065, 0xc4818267), TOBN(0x33aa189b, 0x37c1bbc1),
+     TOBN(0x64970b52, 0x27392a92), TOBN(0x21699a1c, 0x2d1535ea),
+     TOBN(0xcd20779c, 0xc2d7a7fd), TOBN(0xe3186059, 0x99c83cf2),
+     TOBN(0x9b69440b, 0x72c0b8c7), TOBN(0xa81497d7, 0x7b9e0e4d),
+     TOBN(0x515d5c89, 0x1f5f82dc), TOBN(0x9a7f67d7, 0x6361079e),
+     TOBN(0xa8da81e3, 0x11a35330), TOBN(0xe44990c4, 0x4b18be1b),
+     TOBN(0xc7d5ed95, 0xaf103e59), TOBN(0xece8aba7, 0x8dac9261),
+     TOBN(0xbe82b099, 0x9394b8d3), TOBN(0x6830f09a, 0x16adfe83),
+     TOBN(0x250a29b4, 0x88172d01), TOBN(0x8b20bd65, 0xcaff9e02),
+     TOBN(0xb8a7661e, 0xe8a6329a), TOBN(0x4520304d, 0xd3fce920),
+     TOBN(0xae45da1f, 0x2b47f7ef), TOBN(0xe07f5288, 0x5bffc540),
+     TOBN(0xf7997009, 0x3464f874), TOBN(0x2244c2cd, 0xa6fa1f38),
+     TOBN(0x43c41ac1, 0x94d7d9b1), TOBN(0x5bafdd82, 0xc82e7f17),
+     TOBN(0xdf0614c1, 0x5fda0fca), TOBN(0x74b043a7, 0xa8ae37ad),
+     TOBN(0x3ba6afa1, 0x9e71734c), TOBN(0x15d5437e, 0x9c450f2e),
+     TOBN(0x4a5883fe, 0x67e242b1), TOBN(0x5143bdc2, 0x2c1953c2),
+     TOBN(0x542b8b53, 0xfc5e8920), TOBN(0x363bf9a8, 0x9a9cee08),
+     TOBN(0x02375f10, 0xc3486e08), TOBN(0x2037543b, 0x8c5e70d2),
+     TOBN(0x7109bccc, 0x625640b4), TOBN(0xcbc1051e, 0x8bc62c3b),
+     TOBN(0xf8455fed, 0x803f26ea), TOBN(0x6badceab, 0xeb372424),
+     TOBN(0xa2a9ce7c, 0x6b53f5f9), TOBN(0x64246595, 0x1b176d99),
+     TOBN(0xb1298d36, 0xb95c081b), TOBN(0x53505bb8, 0x1d9a9ee6),
+     TOBN(0x3f6f9e61, 0xf2ba70b0), TOBN(0xd07e16c9, 0x8afad453),
+     TOBN(0x9f1694bb, 0xe7eb4a6a), TOBN(0xdfebced9, 0x3cb0bc8e),
+     TOBN(0x92d3dcdc, 0x53868c8b), TOBN(0x174311a2, 0x386107a6),
+     TOBN(0x4109e07c, 0x689b4e64), TOBN(0x30e4587f, 0x2df3dcb6),
+     TOBN(0x841aea31, 0x0811b3b2), TOBN(0x6144d41d, 0x0cce43ea),
+     TOBN(0x464c4581, 0x2a9a7803), TOBN(0xd03d371f, 0x3e158930),
+     TOBN(0xc676d7f2, 0xb1f3390b), TOBN(0x9f7a1b8c, 0xa5b61272),
+     TOBN(0x4ebebfc9, 0xc2e127a9), TOBN(0x4602500c, 0x5dd997bf),
+     TOBN(0x7f09771c, 0x4711230f), TOBN(0x058eb37c, 0x020f09c1),
+     TOBN(0xab693d4b, 0xfee5e38b), TOBN(0x9289eb1f, 0x4653cbc0),
+     TOBN(0xbecf46ab, 0xd51b9cf5), TOBN(0xd2aa9c02, 0x9f0121af),
+     TOBN(0x36aaf7d2, 0xe90dc274), TOBN(0x909e4ea0, 0x48b95a3c),
+     TOBN(0xe6b70496, 0x6f32dbdb), TOBN(0x672188a0, 0x8b030b3e),
+     TOBN(0xeeffe5b3, 0xcfb617e2), TOBN(0x87e947de, 0x7c82709e),
+     TOBN(0xa44d2b39, 0x1770f5a7), TOBN(0xe4d4d791, 0x0e44eb82),
+     TOBN(0x42e69d1e, 0x3f69712a), TOBN(0xbf11c4d6, 0xac6a820e),
+     TOBN(0xb5e7f3e5, 0x42c4224c), TOBN(0xd6b4e81c, 0x449d941c),
+     TOBN(0x5d72bd16, 0x5450e878), TOBN(0x6a61e28a, 0xee25ac54),
+     TOBN(0x33272094, 0xe6f1cd95), TOBN(0x7512f30d, 0x0d18673f),
+     TOBN(0x32f7a4ca, 0x5afc1464), TOBN(0x2f095656, 0x6bbb977b),
+     TOBN(0x586f47ca, 0xa8226200), TOBN(0x02c868ad, 0x1ac07369),
+     TOBN(0x4ef2b845, 0xc613acbe), TOBN(0x43d7563e, 0x0386054c),
+     TOBN(0x54da9dc7, 0xab952578), TOBN(0xb5423df2, 0x26e84d0b),
+     TOBN(0xa8b64eeb, 0x9b872042), TOBN(0xac205782, 0x5990f6df),
+     TOBN(0x4ff696eb, 0x21f4c77a), TOBN(0x1a79c3e4, 0xaab273af),
+     TOBN(0x29bc922e, 0x9436b3f1), TOBN(0xff807ef8, 0xd6d9a27a),
+     TOBN(0x82acea3d, 0x778f22a0), TOBN(0xfb10b2e8, 0x5b5e7469),
+     TOBN(0xc0b16980, 0x2818ee7d), TOBN(0x011afff4, 0xc91c1a2f),
+     TOBN(0x95a6d126, 0xad124418), TOBN(0x31c081a5, 0xe72e295f),
+     TOBN(0x36bb283a, 0xf2f4db75), TOBN(0xd115540f, 0x7acef462),
+     TOBN(0xc7f3a8f8, 0x33f6746c), TOBN(0x21e46f65, 0xfea990ca),
+     TOBN(0x915fd5c5, 0xcaddb0a9), TOBN(0xbd41f016, 0x78614555),
+     TOBN(0x346f4434, 0x426ffb58), TOBN(0x80559436, 0x14dbc204),
+     TOBN(0xf3dd20fe, 0x5a969b7f), TOBN(0x9d59e956, 0xe899a39a),
+     TOBN(0xf1b0971c, 0x8ad4cf4b), TOBN(0x03448860, 0x2ffb8fb8),
+     TOBN(0xf071ac3c, 0x65340ba4), TOBN(0x408d0596, 0xb27fd758),
+     TOBN(0xe7c78ea4, 0x98c364b0), TOBN(0xa4aac4a5, 0x051e8ab5),
+     TOBN(0xb9e1d560, 0x485d9002), TOBN(0x9acd518a, 0x88844455),
+     TOBN(0xe4ca688f, 0xd06f56c0), TOBN(0xa48af70d, 0xdf027972),
+     TOBN(0x691f0f04, 0x5e9a609d), TOBN(0xa9dd82cd, 0xee61270e),
+     TOBN(0x8903ca63, 0xa0ef18d3), TOBN(0x9fb7ee35, 0x3d6ca3bd),
+     TOBN(0xa7b4a09c, 0xabf47d03), TOBN(0x4cdada01, 0x1c67de8e),
+     TOBN(0x52003749, 0x9355a244), TOBN(0xe77fd2b6, 0x4f2151a9),
+     TOBN(0x695d6cf6, 0x66b4efcb), TOBN(0xc5a0cacf, 0xda2cfe25),
+     TOBN(0x104efe5c, 0xef811865), TOBN(0xf52813e8, 0x9ea5cc3d),
+     TOBN(0x855683dc, 0x40b58dbc), TOBN(0x0338ecde, 0x175fcb11),
+     TOBN(0xf9a05637, 0x74921592), TOBN(0xb4f1261d, 0xb9bb9d31),
+     TOBN(0x551429b7, 0x4e9c5459), TOBN(0xbe182e6f, 0x6ea71f53),
+     TOBN(0xd3a3b07c, 0xdfc50573), TOBN(0x9ba1afda, 0x62be8d44),
+     TOBN(0x9bcfd2cb, 0x52ab65d3), TOBN(0xdf11d547, 0xa9571802),
+     TOBN(0x099403ee, 0x02a2404a), TOBN(0x497406f4, 0x21088a71),
+     TOBN(0x99479409, 0x5004ae71), TOBN(0xbdb42078, 0xa812c362),
+     TOBN(0x2b72a30f, 0xd8828442), TOBN(0x283add27, 0xfcb5ed1c),
+     TOBN(0xf7c0e200, 0x66a40015), TOBN(0x3e3be641, 0x08b295ef),
+     TOBN(0xac127dc1, 0xe038a675), TOBN(0x729deff3, 0x8c5c6320),
+     TOBN(0xb7df8fd4, 0xa90d2c53), TOBN(0x9b74b0ec, 0x681e7cd3),
+     TOBN(0x5cb5a623, 0xdab407e5), TOBN(0xcdbd3615, 0x76b340c6),
+     TOBN(0xa184415a, 0x7d28392c), TOBN(0xc184c1d8, 0xe96f7830),
+     TOBN(0xc3204f19, 0x81d3a80f), TOBN(0xfde0c841, 0xc8e02432),
+     TOBN(0x78203b3e, 0x8149e0c1), TOBN(0x5904bdbb, 0x08053a73),
+     TOBN(0x30fc1dd1, 0x101b6805), TOBN(0x43c223bc, 0x49aa6d49),
+     TOBN(0x9ed67141, 0x7a174087), TOBN(0x311469a0, 0xd5997008),
+     TOBN(0xb189b684, 0x5e43fc61), TOBN(0xf3282375, 0xe0d3ab57),
+     TOBN(0x4fa34b67, 0xb1181da8), TOBN(0x621ed0b2, 0x99ee52b8),
+     TOBN(0x9b178de1, 0xad990676), TOBN(0xd51de67b, 0x56d54065),
+     TOBN(0x2a2c27c4, 0x7538c201), TOBN(0x33856ec8, 0x38a40f5c),
+     TOBN(0x2522fc15, 0xbe6cdcde), TOBN(0x1e603f33, 0x9f0c6f89),
+     TOBN(0x7994edc3, 0x103e30a6), TOBN(0x033a00db, 0x220c853e),
+     TOBN(0xd3cfa409, 0xf7bb7fd7), TOBN(0x70f8781e, 0x462d18f6),
+     TOBN(0xbbd82980, 0x687fe295), TOBN(0x6eef4c32, 0x595669f3),
+     TOBN(0x86a9303b, 0x2f7e85c3), TOBN(0x5fce4621, 0x71988f9b),
+     TOBN(0x5b935bf6, 0xc138acb5), TOBN(0x30ea7d67, 0x25661212),
+     TOBN(0xef1eb5f4, 0xe51ab9a2), TOBN(0x0587c98a, 0xae067c78),
+     TOBN(0xb3ce1b3c, 0x77ca9ca6), TOBN(0x2a553d4d, 0x54b5f057),
+     TOBN(0xc7898236, 0x4da29ec2), TOBN(0xdbdd5d13, 0xb9c57316),
+     TOBN(0xc57d6e6b, 0x2cd80d47), TOBN(0x80b460cf, 0xfe9e7391),
+     TOBN(0x98648cab, 0xf963c31e), TOBN(0x67f9f633, 0xcc4d32fd),
+     TOBN(0x0af42a9d, 0xfdf7c687), TOBN(0x55f292a3, 0x0b015ea7),
+     TOBN(0x89e468b2, 0xcd21ab3d), TOBN(0xe504f022, 0xc393d392),
+     TOBN(0xab21e1d4, 0xa5013af9), TOBN(0xe3283f78, 0xc2c28acb),
+     TOBN(0xf38b35f6, 0x226bf99f), TOBN(0xe8354274, 0x0e291e69),
+     TOBN(0x61673a15, 0xb20c162d), TOBN(0xc101dc75, 0xb04fbdbe),
+     TOBN(0x8323b4c2, 0x255bd617), TOBN(0x6c969693, 0x6c2a9154),
+     TOBN(0xc6e65860, 0x62679387), TOBN(0x8e01db0c, 0xb8c88e23),
+     TOBN(0x33c42873, 0x893a5559), TOBN(0x7630f04b, 0x47a3e149),
+     TOBN(0xb5d80805, 0xddcf35f8), TOBN(0x582ca080, 0x77dfe732),
+     TOBN(0x2c7156e1, 0x0b1894a0), TOBN(0x92034001, 0xd81c68c0),
+     TOBN(0xed225d00, 0xc8b115b5), TOBN(0x237f9c22, 0x83b907f2),
+     TOBN(0x0ea2f32f, 0x4470e2c0), TOBN(0xb725f7c1, 0x58be4e95),
+     TOBN(0x0f1dcafa, 0xb1ae5463), TOBN(0x59ed5187, 0x1ba2fc04),
+     TOBN(0xf6e0f316, 0xd0115d4d), TOBN(0x5180b12f, 0xd3691599),
+     TOBN(0x157e32c9, 0x527f0a41), TOBN(0x7b0b081d, 0xa8e0ecc0),
+     TOBN(0x6dbaaa8a, 0xbf4f0dd0), TOBN(0x99b289c7, 0x4d252696),
+     TOBN(0x79b7755e, 0xdbf864fe), TOBN(0x6974e2b1, 0x76cad3ab),
+     TOBN(0x35dbbee2, 0x06ddd657), TOBN(0xe7cbdd11, 0x2ff3a96d),
+     TOBN(0x88381968, 0x076be758), TOBN(0x2d737e72, 0x08c91f5d),
+     TOBN(0x5f83ab62, 0x86ec3776), TOBN(0x98aa649d, 0x945fa7a1),
+     TOBN(0xf477ec37, 0x72ef0933), TOBN(0x66f52b1e, 0x098c17b1),
+     TOBN(0x9eec58fb, 0xd803738b), TOBN(0x91aaade7, 0xe4e86aa4),
+     TOBN(0x6b1ae617, 0xa5b51492), TOBN(0x63272121, 0xbbc45974),
+     TOBN(0x7e0e28f0, 0x862c5129), TOBN(0x0a8f79a9, 0x3321a4a0),
+     TOBN(0xe26d1664, 0x5041c88f), TOBN(0x0571b805, 0x53233e3a),
+     TOBN(0xd1b0ccde, 0xc9520711), TOBN(0x55a9e4ed, 0x3c8b84bf),
+     TOBN(0x9426bd39, 0xa1fef314), TOBN(0x4f5f638e, 0x6eb93f2b),
+     TOBN(0xba2a1ed3, 0x2bf9341b), TOBN(0xd63c1321, 0x4d42d5a9),
+     TOBN(0xd2964a89, 0x316dc7c5), TOBN(0xd1759606, 0xca511851),
+     TOBN(0xd8a9201f, 0xf9e6ed35), TOBN(0xb7b5ee45, 0x6736925a),
+     TOBN(0x0a83fbbc, 0x99581af7), TOBN(0x3076bc40, 0x64eeb051),
+     TOBN(0x5511c98c, 0x02dec312), TOBN(0x270de898, 0x238dcb78),
+     TOBN(0x2cf4cf9c, 0x539c08c9), TOBN(0xa70cb65e, 0x38d3b06e),
+     TOBN(0xb12ec10e, 0xcfe57bbd), TOBN(0x82c7b656, 0x35a0c2b5),
+     TOBN(0xddc7d5cd, 0x161c67bd), TOBN(0xe32e8985, 0xae3a32cc),
+     TOBN(0x7aba9444, 0xd11a5529), TOBN(0xe964ed02, 0x2427fa1a),
+     TOBN(0x1528392d, 0x24a1770a), TOBN(0xa152ce2c, 0x12c72fcd),
+     TOBN(0x714553a4, 0x8ec07649), TOBN(0x18b4c290, 0x459dd453),
+     TOBN(0xea32b714, 0x7b64b110), TOBN(0xb871bfa5, 0x2e6f07a2),
+     TOBN(0xb67112e5, 0x9e2e3c9b), TOBN(0xfbf250e5, 0x44aa90f6),
+     TOBN(0xf77aedb8, 0xbd539006), TOBN(0x3b0cdf9a, 0xd172a66f),
+     TOBN(0xedf69fea, 0xf8c51187), TOBN(0x05bb67ec, 0x741e4da7),
+     TOBN(0x47df0f32, 0x08114345), TOBN(0x56facb07, 0xbb9792b1),
+     TOBN(0xf3e007e9, 0x8f6229e4), TOBN(0x62d103f4, 0x526fba0f),
+     TOBN(0x4f33bef7, 0xb0339d79), TOBN(0x9841357b, 0xb59bfec1),
+     TOBN(0xfa8dbb59, 0xc34e6705), TOBN(0xc3c7180b, 0x7fdaa84c),
+     TOBN(0xf95872fc, 0xa4108537), TOBN(0x8750cc3b, 0x932a3e5a),
+     TOBN(0xb61cc69d, 0xb7275d7d), TOBN(0xffa0168b, 0x2e59b2e9),
+     TOBN(0xca032abc, 0x6ecbb493), TOBN(0x1d86dbd3, 0x2c9082d8),
+     TOBN(0xae1e0b67, 0xe28ef5ba), TOBN(0x2c9a4699, 0xcb18e169),
+     TOBN(0x0ecd0e33, 0x1e6bbd20), TOBN(0x571b360e, 0xaf5e81d2),
+     TOBN(0xcd9fea58, 0x101c1d45), TOBN(0x6651788e, 0x18880452),
+     TOBN(0xa9972635, 0x1f8dd446), TOBN(0x44bed022, 0xe37281d0),
+     TOBN(0x094b2b2d, 0x33da525d), TOBN(0xf193678e, 0x13144fd8),
+     TOBN(0xb8ab5ba4, 0xf4c1061d), TOBN(0x4343b5fa, 0xdccbe0f4),
+     TOBN(0xa8702371, 0x63812713), TOBN(0x47bf6d2d, 0xf7611d93),
+     TOBN(0x46729b8c, 0xbd21e1d7), TOBN(0x7484d4e0, 0xd629e77d),
+     TOBN(0x830e6eea, 0x60dbac1f), TOBN(0x23d8c484, 0xda06a2f7),
+     TOBN(0x896714b0, 0x50ca535b), TOBN(0xdc8d3644, 0xebd97a9b),
+     TOBN(0x106ef9fa, 0xb12177b4), TOBN(0xf79bf464, 0x534d5d9c),
+     TOBN(0x2537a349, 0xa6ab360b), TOBN(0xc7c54253, 0xa00c744f),
+     TOBN(0xb3c7a047, 0xe5911a76), TOBN(0x61ffa5c8, 0x647f1ee7),
+     TOBN(0x15aed36f, 0x8f56ab42), TOBN(0x6a0d41b0, 0xa3ff9ac9),
+     TOBN(0x68f469f5, 0xcc30d357), TOBN(0xbe9adf81, 0x6b72be96),
+     TOBN(0x1cd926fe, 0x903ad461), TOBN(0x7e89e38f, 0xcaca441b),
+     TOBN(0xf0f82de5, 0xfacf69d4), TOBN(0x363b7e76, 0x4775344c),
+     TOBN(0x6894f312, 0xb2e36d04), TOBN(0x3c6cb4fe, 0x11d1c9a5),
+     TOBN(0x85d9c339, 0x4008e1f2), TOBN(0x5e9a85ea, 0x249f326c),
+     TOBN(0xdc35c60a, 0x678c5e06), TOBN(0xc08b944f, 0x9f86fba9),
+     TOBN(0xde40c02c, 0x89f71f0f), TOBN(0xad8f3e31, 0xff3da3c0),
+     TOBN(0x3ea5096b, 0x42125ded), TOBN(0x13879cbf, 0xa7379183),
+     TOBN(0x6f4714a5, 0x6b306a0b), TOBN(0x359c2ea6, 0x67646c5e),
+     TOBN(0xfacf8943, 0x07726368), TOBN(0x07a58935, 0x65ff431e),
+     TOBN(0x24d661d1, 0x68754ab0), TOBN(0x801fce1d, 0x6f429a76),
+     TOBN(0xc068a85f, 0xa58ce769), TOBN(0xedc35c54, 0x5d5eca2b),
+     TOBN(0xea31276f, 0xa3f660d1), TOBN(0xa0184ebe, 0xb8fc7167),
+     TOBN(0x0f20f21a, 0x1d8db0ae), TOBN(0xd96d095f, 0x56c35e12),
+     TOBN(0xedf402b5, 0xf8c2a25b), TOBN(0x1bb772b9, 0x059204b6),
+     TOBN(0x50cbeae2, 0x19b4e34c), TOBN(0x93109d80, 0x3fa0845a),
+     TOBN(0x54f7ccf7, 0x8ef59fb5), TOBN(0x3b438fe2, 0x88070963),
+     TOBN(0x9e28c659, 0x31f3ba9b), TOBN(0x9cc31b46, 0xead9da92),
+     TOBN(0x3c2f0ba9, 0xb733aa5f), TOBN(0xdece47cb, 0xf05af235),
+     TOBN(0xf8e3f715, 0xa2ac82a5), TOBN(0xc97ba641, 0x2203f18a),
+     TOBN(0xc3af5504, 0x09c11060), TOBN(0x56ea2c05, 0x46af512d),
+     TOBN(0xfac28daf, 0xf3f28146), TOBN(0x87fab43a, 0x959ef494),}
+    ,
+    {TOBN(0x09891641, 0xd4c5105f), TOBN(0x1ae80f8e, 0x6d7fbd65),
+     TOBN(0x9d67225f, 0xbee6bdb0), TOBN(0x3b433b59, 0x7fc4d860),
+     TOBN(0x44e66db6, 0x93e85638), TOBN(0xf7b59252, 0xe3e9862f),
+     TOBN(0xdb785157, 0x665c32ec), TOBN(0x702fefd7, 0xae362f50),
+     TOBN(0x3754475d, 0x0fefb0c3), TOBN(0xd48fb56b, 0x46d7c35d),
+     TOBN(0xa070b633, 0x363798a4), TOBN(0xae89f3d2, 0x8fdb98e6),
+     TOBN(0x970b89c8, 0x6363d14c), TOBN(0x89817521, 0x67abd27d),
+     TOBN(0x9bf7d474, 0x44d5a021), TOBN(0xb3083baf, 0xcac72aee),
+     TOBN(0x389741de, 0xbe949a44), TOBN(0x638e9388, 0x546a4fa5),
+     TOBN(0x3fe6419c, 0xa0047bdc), TOBN(0x7047f648, 0xaaea57ca),
+     TOBN(0x54e48a90, 0x41fbab17), TOBN(0xda8e0b28, 0x576bdba2),
+     TOBN(0xe807eebc, 0xc72afddc), TOBN(0x07d3336d, 0xf42577bf),
+     TOBN(0x62a8c244, 0xbfe20925), TOBN(0x91c19ac3, 0x8fdce867),
+     TOBN(0x5a96a5d5, 0xdd387063), TOBN(0x61d587d4, 0x21d324f6),
+     TOBN(0xe87673a2, 0xa37173ea), TOBN(0x23848008, 0x53778b65),
+     TOBN(0x10f8441e, 0x05bab43e), TOBN(0xfa11fe12, 0x4621efbe),
+     TOBN(0x047b772e, 0x81685d7b), TOBN(0x23f27d81, 0xbf34a976),
+     TOBN(0xc27608e2, 0x915f48ef), TOBN(0x3b0b43fa, 0xa521d5c3),
+     TOBN(0x7613fb26, 0x63ca7284), TOBN(0x7f5729b4, 0x1d4db837),
+     TOBN(0x87b14898, 0x583b526b), TOBN(0x00b732a6, 0xbbadd3d1),
+     TOBN(0x8e02f426, 0x2048e396), TOBN(0x436b50b6, 0x383d9de4),
+     TOBN(0xf78d3481, 0x471e85ad), TOBN(0x8b01ea6a, 0xd005c8d6),
+     TOBN(0xd3c7afee, 0x97015c07), TOBN(0x46cdf1a9, 0x4e3ba2ae),
+     TOBN(0x7a42e501, 0x83d3a1d2), TOBN(0xd54b5268, 0xb541dff4),
+     TOBN(0x3f24cf30, 0x4e23e9bc), TOBN(0x4387f816, 0x126e3624),
+     TOBN(0x26a46a03, 0x3b0b6d61), TOBN(0xaf1bc845, 0x8b2d777c),
+     TOBN(0x25c401ba, 0x527de79c), TOBN(0x0e1346d4, 0x4261bbb6),
+     TOBN(0x4b96c44b, 0x287b4bc7), TOBN(0x658493c7, 0x5254562f),
+     TOBN(0x23f949fe, 0xb8a24a20), TOBN(0x17ebfed1, 0xf52ca53f),
+     TOBN(0x9b691bbe, 0xbcfb4853), TOBN(0x5617ff6b, 0x6278a05d),
+     TOBN(0x241b34c5, 0xe3c99ebd), TOBN(0xfc64242e, 0x1784156a),
+     TOBN(0x4206482f, 0x695d67df), TOBN(0xb967ce0e, 0xee27c011),
+     TOBN(0x65db3751, 0x21c80b5d), TOBN(0x2e7a563c, 0xa31ecca0),
+     TOBN(0xe56ffc4e, 0x5238a07e), TOBN(0x3d6c2966, 0x32ced854),
+     TOBN(0xe99d7d1a, 0xaf70b885), TOBN(0xafc3bad9, 0x2d686459),
+     TOBN(0x9c78bf46, 0x0cc8ba5b), TOBN(0x5a439519, 0x18955aa3),
+     TOBN(0xf8b517a8, 0x5fe4e314), TOBN(0xe60234d0, 0xfcb8906f),
+     TOBN(0xffe542ac, 0xf2061b23), TOBN(0x287e191f, 0x6b4cb59c),
+     TOBN(0x21857ddc, 0x09d877d8), TOBN(0x1c23478c, 0x14678941),
+     TOBN(0xbbf0c056, 0xb6e05ea4), TOBN(0x82da4b53, 0xb01594fe),
+     TOBN(0xf7526791, 0xfadb8608), TOBN(0x049e832d, 0x7b74cdf6),
+     TOBN(0xa43581cc, 0xc2b90a34), TOBN(0x73639eb8, 0x9360b10c),
+     TOBN(0x4fba331f, 0xe1e4a71b), TOBN(0x6ffd6b93, 0x8072f919),
+     TOBN(0x6e53271c, 0x65679032), TOBN(0x67206444, 0xf14272ce),
+     TOBN(0xc0f734a3, 0xb2335834), TOBN(0x9526205a, 0x90ef6860),
+     TOBN(0xcb8be717, 0x04e2bb0d), TOBN(0x2418871e, 0x02f383fa),
+     TOBN(0xd7177681, 0x4082c157), TOBN(0xcc914ad0, 0x29c20073),
+     TOBN(0xf186c1eb, 0xe587e728), TOBN(0x6fdb3c22, 0x61bcd5fd),
+     TOBN(0x30d014a6, 0xf2f9f8e9), TOBN(0x963ece23, 0x4fec49d2),
+     TOBN(0x862025c5, 0x9605a8d9), TOBN(0x39874445, 0x19f8929a),
+     TOBN(0x01b6ff65, 0x12bf476a), TOBN(0x598a64d8, 0x09cf7d91),
+     TOBN(0xd7ec7749, 0x93be56ca), TOBN(0x10899785, 0xcbb33615),
+     TOBN(0xb8a092fd, 0x02eee3ad), TOBN(0xa86b3d35, 0x30145270),
+     TOBN(0x323d98c6, 0x8512b675), TOBN(0x4b8bc785, 0x62ebb40f),
+     TOBN(0x7d301f54, 0x413f9cde), TOBN(0xa5e4fb4f, 0x2bab5664),
+     TOBN(0x1d2b252d, 0x1cbfec23), TOBN(0xfcd576bb, 0xe177120d),
+     TOBN(0x04427d3e, 0x83731a34), TOBN(0x2bb9028e, 0xed836e8e),
+     TOBN(0xb36acff8, 0xb612ca7c), TOBN(0xb88fe5ef, 0xd3d9c73a),
+     TOBN(0xbe2a6bc6, 0xedea4eb3), TOBN(0x43b93133, 0x488eec77),
+     TOBN(0xf41ff566, 0xb17106e1), TOBN(0x469e9172, 0x654efa32),
+     TOBN(0xb4480f04, 0x41c23fa3), TOBN(0xb4712eb0, 0xc1989a2e),
+     TOBN(0x3ccbba0f, 0x93a29ca7), TOBN(0x6e205c14, 0xd619428c),
+     TOBN(0x90db7957, 0xb3641686), TOBN(0x0432691d, 0x45ac8b4e),
+     TOBN(0x07a759ac, 0xf64e0350), TOBN(0x0514d89c, 0x9c972517),
+     TOBN(0x1701147f, 0xa8e67fc3), TOBN(0x9e2e0b8b, 0xab2085be),
+     TOBN(0xd5651824, 0xac284e57), TOBN(0x890d4325, 0x74893664),
+     TOBN(0x8a7c5e6e, 0xc55e68a3), TOBN(0xbf12e90b, 0x4339c85a),
+     TOBN(0x31846b85, 0xf922b655), TOBN(0x9a54ce4d, 0x0bf4d700),
+     TOBN(0xd7f4e83a, 0xf1a14295), TOBN(0x916f955c, 0xb285d4f9),
+     TOBN(0xe57bb0e0, 0x99ffdaba), TOBN(0x28a43034, 0xeab0d152),
+     TOBN(0x0a36ffa2, 0xb8a9cef8), TOBN(0x5517407e, 0xb9ec051a),
+     TOBN(0x9c796096, 0xea68e672), TOBN(0x853db5fb, 0xfb3c77fb),
+     TOBN(0x21474ba9, 0xe864a51a), TOBN(0x6c267699, 0x6e8a1b8b),
+     TOBN(0x7c823626, 0x94120a28), TOBN(0xe61e9a48, 0x8383a5db),
+     TOBN(0x7dd75003, 0x9f84216d), TOBN(0xab020d07, 0xad43cd85),
+     TOBN(0x9437ae48, 0xda12c659), TOBN(0x6449c2eb, 0xe65452ad),
+     TOBN(0xcc7c4c1c, 0x2cf9d7c1), TOBN(0x1320886a, 0xee95e5ab),
+     TOBN(0xbb7b9056, 0xbeae170c), TOBN(0xc8a5b250, 0xdbc0d662),
+     TOBN(0x4ed81432, 0xc11d2303), TOBN(0x7da66912, 0x1f03769f),
+     TOBN(0x3ac7a5fd, 0x84539828), TOBN(0x14dada94, 0x3bccdd02),
+     TOBN(0x8b84c321, 0x7ef6b0d1), TOBN(0x52a9477a, 0x7c933f22),
+     TOBN(0x5ef6728a, 0xfd440b82), TOBN(0x5c3bd859, 0x6ce4bd5e),
+     TOBN(0x918b80f5, 0xf22c2d3e), TOBN(0x368d5040, 0xb7bb6cc5),
+     TOBN(0xb66142a1, 0x2695a11c), TOBN(0x60ac583a, 0xeb19ea70),
+     TOBN(0x317cbb98, 0x0eab2437), TOBN(0x8cc08c55, 0x5e2654c8),
+     TOBN(0xfe2d6520, 0xe6d8307f), TOBN(0xe9f147f3, 0x57428993),
+     TOBN(0x5f9c7d14, 0xd2fd6cf1), TOBN(0xa3ecd064, 0x2d4fcbb0),
+     TOBN(0xad83fef0, 0x8e7341f7), TOBN(0x643f23a0, 0x3a63115c),
+     TOBN(0xd38a78ab, 0xe65ab743), TOBN(0xbf7c75b1, 0x35edc89c),
+     TOBN(0x3dd8752e, 0x530df568), TOBN(0xf85c4a76, 0xe308c682),
+     TOBN(0x4c9955b2, 0xe68acf37), TOBN(0xa544df3d, 0xab32af85),
+     TOBN(0x4b8ec3f5, 0xa25cf493), TOBN(0x4d8f2764, 0x1a622feb),
+     TOBN(0x7bb4f7aa, 0xf0dcbc49), TOBN(0x7de551f9, 0x70bbb45b),
+     TOBN(0xcfd0f3e4, 0x9f2ca2e5), TOBN(0xece58709, 0x1f5c76ef),
+     TOBN(0x32920edd, 0x167d79ae), TOBN(0x039df8a2, 0xfa7d7ec1),
+     TOBN(0xf46206c0, 0xbb30af91), TOBN(0x1ff5e2f5, 0x22676b59),
+     TOBN(0x11f4a039, 0x6ea51d66), TOBN(0x506c1445, 0x807d7a26),
+     TOBN(0x60da5705, 0x755a9b24), TOBN(0x8fc8cc32, 0x1f1a319e),
+     TOBN(0x83642d4d, 0x9433d67d), TOBN(0x7fa5cb8f, 0x6a7dd296),
+     TOBN(0x576591db, 0x9b7bde07), TOBN(0x13173d25, 0x419716fb),
+     TOBN(0xea30599d, 0xd5b340ff), TOBN(0xfc6b5297, 0xb0fe76c5),
+     TOBN(0x1c6968c8, 0xab8f5adc), TOBN(0xf723c7f5, 0x901c928d),
+     TOBN(0x4203c321, 0x9773d402), TOBN(0xdf7c6aa3, 0x1b51dd47),
+     TOBN(0x3d49e37a, 0x552be23c), TOBN(0x57febee8, 0x0b5a6e87),
+     TOBN(0xc5ecbee4, 0x7bd8e739), TOBN(0x79d44994, 0xae63bf75),
+     TOBN(0x168bd00f, 0x38fb8923), TOBN(0x75d48ee4, 0xd0533130),
+     TOBN(0x554f77aa, 0xdb5cdf33), TOBN(0x3396e896, 0x3c696769),
+     TOBN(0x2fdddbf2, 0xd3fd674e), TOBN(0xbbb8f6ee, 0x99d0e3e5),
+     TOBN(0x51b90651, 0xcbae2f70), TOBN(0xefc4bc05, 0x93aaa8eb),
+     TOBN(0x8ecd8689, 0xdd1df499), TOBN(0x1aee99a8, 0x22f367a5),
+     TOBN(0x95d485b9, 0xae8274c5), TOBN(0x6c14d445, 0x7d30b39c),
+     TOBN(0xbafea90b, 0xbcc1ef81), TOBN(0x7c5f317a, 0xa459a2ed),
+     TOBN(0x01211075, 0x4ef44227), TOBN(0xa17bed6e, 0xdc20f496),
+     TOBN(0x0cdfe424, 0x819853cd), TOBN(0x13793298, 0xf71e2ce7),
+     TOBN(0x3c1f3078, 0xdbbe307b), TOBN(0x6dd1c20e, 0x76ee9936),
+     TOBN(0x23ee4b57, 0x423caa20), TOBN(0x4ac3793b, 0x8efb840e),
+     TOBN(0x934438eb, 0xed1f8ca0), TOBN(0x3e546658, 0x4ebb25a2),
+     TOBN(0xc415af0e, 0xc069896f), TOBN(0xc13eddb0, 0x9a5aa43d),
+     TOBN(0x7a04204f, 0xd49eb8f6), TOBN(0xd0d5bdfc, 0xd74f1670),
+     TOBN(0x3697e286, 0x56fc0558), TOBN(0x10207371, 0x01cebade),
+     TOBN(0x5f87e690, 0x0647a82b), TOBN(0x908e0ed4, 0x8f40054f),
+     TOBN(0xa9f633d4, 0x79853803), TOBN(0x8ed13c9a, 0x4a28b252),
+     TOBN(0x3e2ef676, 0x1f460f64), TOBN(0x53930b9b, 0x36d06336),
+     TOBN(0x347073ac, 0x8fc4979b), TOBN(0x84380e0e, 0x5ecd5597),
+     TOBN(0xe3b22c6b, 0xc4fe3c39), TOBN(0xba4a8153, 0x6c7bebdf),
+     TOBN(0xf23ab6b7, 0x25693459), TOBN(0x53bc3770, 0x14922b11),
+     TOBN(0x4645c8ab, 0x5afc60db), TOBN(0xaa022355, 0x20b9f2a3),
+     TOBN(0x52a2954c, 0xce0fc507), TOBN(0x8c2731bb, 0x7ce1c2e7),
+     TOBN(0xf39608ab, 0x18a0339d), TOBN(0xac7a658d, 0x3735436c),
+     TOBN(0xb22c2b07, 0xcd992b4f), TOBN(0x4e83daec, 0xf40dcfd4),
+     TOBN(0x8a34c7be, 0x2f39ea3e), TOBN(0xef0c005f, 0xb0a56d2e),
+     TOBN(0x62731f6a, 0x6edd8038), TOBN(0x5721d740, 0x4e3cb075),
+     TOBN(0x1ea41511, 0xfbeeee1b), TOBN(0xd1ef5e73, 0xef1d0c05),
+     TOBN(0x42feefd1, 0x73c07d35), TOBN(0xe530a00a, 0x8a329493),
+     TOBN(0x5d55b7fe, 0xf15ebfb0), TOBN(0x549de03c, 0xd322491a),
+     TOBN(0xf7b5f602, 0x745b3237), TOBN(0x3632a3a2, 0x1ab6e2b6),
+     TOBN(0x0d3bba89, 0x0ef59f78), TOBN(0x0dfc6443, 0xc9e52b9a),
+     TOBN(0x1dc79699, 0x72631447), TOBN(0xef033917, 0xb3be20b1),
+     TOBN(0x0c92735d, 0xb1383948), TOBN(0xc1fc29a2, 0xc0dd7d7d),
+     TOBN(0x6485b697, 0x403ed068), TOBN(0x13bfaab3, 0xaac93bdc),
+     TOBN(0x410dc6a9, 0x0deeaf52), TOBN(0xb003fb02, 0x4c641c15),
+     TOBN(0x1384978c, 0x5bc504c4), TOBN(0x37640487, 0x864a6a77),
+     TOBN(0x05991bc6, 0x222a77da), TOBN(0x62260a57, 0x5e47eb11),
+     TOBN(0xc7af6613, 0xf21b432c), TOBN(0x22f3acc9, 0xab4953e9),
+     TOBN(0x52934922, 0x8e41d155), TOBN(0x4d024568, 0x3ac059ef),
+     TOBN(0xb0201755, 0x4d884411), TOBN(0xce8055cf, 0xa59a178f),
+     TOBN(0xcd77d1af, 0xf6204549), TOBN(0xa0a00a3e, 0xc7066759),
+     TOBN(0x471071ef, 0x0272c229), TOBN(0x009bcf6b, 0xd3c4b6b0),
+     TOBN(0x2a2638a8, 0x22305177), TOBN(0xd51d59df, 0x41645bbf),
+     TOBN(0xa81142fd, 0xc0a7a3c0), TOBN(0xa17eca6d, 0x4c7063ee),
+     TOBN(0x0bb887ed, 0x60d9dcec), TOBN(0xd6d28e51, 0x20ad2455),
+     TOBN(0xebed6308, 0xa67102ba), TOBN(0x042c3114, 0x8bffa408),
+     TOBN(0xfd099ac5, 0x8aa68e30), TOBN(0x7a6a3d7c, 0x1483513e),
+     TOBN(0xffcc6b75, 0xba2d8f0c), TOBN(0x54dacf96, 0x1e78b954),
+     TOBN(0xf645696f, 0xa4a9af89), TOBN(0x3a411940, 0x06ac98ec),
+     TOBN(0x41b8b3f6, 0x22a67a20), TOBN(0x2d0b1e0f, 0x99dec626),
+     TOBN(0x27c89192, 0x40be34e8), TOBN(0xc7162b37, 0x91907f35),
+     TOBN(0x90188ec1, 0xa956702b), TOBN(0xca132f7d, 0xdf93769c),
+     TOBN(0x3ece44f9, 0x0e2025b4), TOBN(0x67aaec69, 0x0c62f14c),
+     TOBN(0xad741418, 0x22e3cc11), TOBN(0xcf9b75c3, 0x7ff9a50e),
+     TOBN(0x02fa2b16, 0x4d348272), TOBN(0xbd99d61a, 0x9959d56d),
+     TOBN(0xbc4f19db, 0x18762916), TOBN(0xcc7cce50, 0x49c1ac80),
+     TOBN(0x4d59ebaa, 0xd846bd83), TOBN(0x8775a9dc, 0xa9202849),
+     TOBN(0x07ec4ae1, 0x6e1f4ca9), TOBN(0x27eb5875, 0xba893f11),
+     TOBN(0x00284d51, 0x662cc565), TOBN(0x82353a6b, 0x0db4138d),
+     TOBN(0xd9c7aaaa, 0xaa32a594), TOBN(0xf5528b5e, 0xa5669c47),
+     TOBN(0xf3220231, 0x2f23c5ff), TOBN(0xe3e8147a, 0x6affa3a1),
+     TOBN(0xfb423d5c, 0x202ddda0), TOBN(0x3d6414ac, 0x6b871bd4),
+     TOBN(0x586f82e1, 0xa51a168a), TOBN(0xb712c671, 0x48ae5448),
+     TOBN(0x9a2e4bd1, 0x76233eb8), TOBN(0x0188223a, 0x78811ca9),
+     TOBN(0x553c5e21, 0xf7c18de1), TOBN(0x7682e451, 0xb27bb286),
+     TOBN(0x3ed036b3, 0x0e51e929), TOBN(0xf487211b, 0xec9cb34f),
+     TOBN(0x0d094277, 0x0c24efc8), TOBN(0x0349fd04, 0xbef737a4),
+     TOBN(0x6d1c9dd2, 0x514cdd28), TOBN(0x29c135ff, 0x30da9521),
+     TOBN(0xea6e4508, 0xf78b0b6f), TOBN(0x176f5dd2, 0x678c143c),
+     TOBN(0x08148418, 0x4be21e65), TOBN(0x27f7525c, 0xe7df38c4),
+     TOBN(0x1fb70e09, 0x748ab1a4), TOBN(0x9cba50a0, 0x5efe4433),
+     TOBN(0x7846c7a6, 0x15f75af2), TOBN(0x2a7c2c57, 0x5ee73ea8),
+     TOBN(0x42e566a4, 0x3f0a449a), TOBN(0x45474c3b, 0xad90fc3d),
+     TOBN(0x7447be3d, 0x8b61d057), TOBN(0x3e9d1cf1, 0x3a4ec092),
+     TOBN(0x1603e453, 0xf380a6e6), TOBN(0x0b86e431, 0x9b1437c2),
+     TOBN(0x7a4173f2, 0xef29610a), TOBN(0x8fa729a7, 0xf03d57f7),
+     TOBN(0x3e186f6e, 0x6c9c217e), TOBN(0xbe1d3079, 0x91919524),
+     TOBN(0x92a62a70, 0x153d4fb1), TOBN(0x32ed3e34, 0xd68c2f71),
+     TOBN(0xd785027f, 0x9eb1a8b7), TOBN(0xbc37eb77, 0xc5b22fe8),
+     TOBN(0x466b34f0, 0xb9d6a191), TOBN(0x008a89af, 0x9a05f816),
+     TOBN(0x19b028fb, 0x7d42c10a), TOBN(0x7fe8c92f, 0x49b3f6b8),
+     TOBN(0x58907cc0, 0xa5a0ade3), TOBN(0xb3154f51, 0x559d1a7c),
+     TOBN(0x5066efb6, 0xd9790ed6), TOBN(0xa77a0cbc, 0xa6aa793b),
+     TOBN(0x1a915f3c, 0x223e042e), TOBN(0x1c5def04, 0x69c5874b),
+     TOBN(0x0e830078, 0x73b6c1da), TOBN(0x55cf85d2, 0xfcd8557a),
+     TOBN(0x0f7c7c76, 0x0460f3b1), TOBN(0x87052acb, 0x46e58063),
+     TOBN(0x09212b80, 0x907eae66), TOBN(0x3cb068e0, 0x4d721c89),
+     TOBN(0xa87941ae, 0xdd45ac1c), TOBN(0xde8d5c0d, 0x0daa0dbb),
+     TOBN(0xda421fdc, 0xe3502e6e), TOBN(0xc8944201, 0x4d89a084),
+     TOBN(0x7307ba5e, 0xf0c24bfb), TOBN(0xda212beb, 0x20bde0ef),
+     TOBN(0xea2da24b, 0xf82ce682), TOBN(0x058d3816, 0x07f71fe4),
+     TOBN(0x35a02462, 0x5ffad8de), TOBN(0xcd7b05dc, 0xaadcefab),
+     TOBN(0xd442f8ed, 0x1d9f54ec), TOBN(0x8be3d618, 0xb2d3b5ca),
+     TOBN(0xe2220ed0, 0xe06b2ce2), TOBN(0x82699a5f, 0x1b0da4c0),
+     TOBN(0x3ff106f5, 0x71c0c3a7), TOBN(0x8f580f5a, 0x0d34180c),
+     TOBN(0x4ebb120e, 0x22d7d375), TOBN(0x5e5782cc, 0xe9513675),
+     TOBN(0x2275580c, 0x99c82a70), TOBN(0xe8359fbf, 0x15ea8c4c),
+     TOBN(0x53b48db8, 0x7b415e70), TOBN(0xaacf2240, 0x100c6014),
+     TOBN(0x9faaccf5, 0xe4652f1d), TOBN(0xbd6fdd2a, 0xd56157b2),
+     TOBN(0xa4f4fb1f, 0x6261ec50), TOBN(0x244e55ad, 0x476bcd52),
+     TOBN(0x881c9305, 0x047d320b), TOBN(0x1ca983d5, 0x6181263f),
+     TOBN(0x354e9a44, 0x278fb8ee), TOBN(0xad2dbc0f, 0x396e4964),
+     TOBN(0x723f3aa2, 0x9268b3de), TOBN(0x0d1ca29a, 0xe6e0609a),
+     TOBN(0x794866aa, 0x6cf44252), TOBN(0x0b59f3e3, 0x01af87ed),
+     TOBN(0xe234e5ff, 0x7f4a6c51), TOBN(0xa8768fd2, 0x61dc2f7e),
+     TOBN(0xdafc7332, 0x0a94d81f), TOBN(0xd7f84282, 0x06938ce1),
+     TOBN(0xae0b3c0e, 0x0546063e), TOBN(0x7fbadcb2, 0x5d61abc6),
+     TOBN(0xd5d7a2c9, 0x369ac400), TOBN(0xa5978d09, 0xae67d10c),
+     TOBN(0x290f211e, 0x4f85eaac), TOBN(0xe61e2ad1, 0xfacac681),
+     TOBN(0xae125225, 0x388384cd), TOBN(0xa7fb68e9, 0xccfde30f),
+     TOBN(0x7a59b936, 0x3daed4c2), TOBN(0x80a9aa40, 0x2606f789),
+     TOBN(0xb40c1ea5, 0xf6a6d90a), TOBN(0x948364d3, 0x514d5885),
+     TOBN(0x062ebc60, 0x70985182), TOBN(0xa6db5b0e, 0x33310895),
+     TOBN(0x64a12175, 0xe329c2f5), TOBN(0xc5f25bd2, 0x90ea237e),
+     TOBN(0x7915c524, 0x2d0a4c23), TOBN(0xeb5d26e4, 0x6bb3cc52),
+     TOBN(0x369a9116, 0xc09e2c92), TOBN(0x0c527f92, 0xcf182cf8),
+     TOBN(0x9e591938, 0x2aede0ac), TOBN(0xb2922208, 0x6cc34939),
+     TOBN(0x3c9d8962, 0x99a34361), TOBN(0x3c81836d, 0xc1905fe6),
+     TOBN(0x4bfeb57f, 0xa001ec5a), TOBN(0xe993f5bb, 0xa0dc5dba),
+     TOBN(0x47884109, 0x724a1380), TOBN(0x8a0369ab, 0x32fe9a04),
+     TOBN(0xea068d60, 0x8c927db8), TOBN(0xbf5f37cf, 0x94655741),
+     TOBN(0x47d402a2, 0x04b6c7ea), TOBN(0x4551c295, 0x6af259cb),
+     TOBN(0x698b71e7, 0xed77ee8b), TOBN(0xbddf7bd0, 0xf309d5c7),
+     TOBN(0x6201c22c, 0x34e780ca), TOBN(0xab04f7d8, 0x4c295ef4),
+     TOBN(0x1c947294, 0x4313a8ce), TOBN(0xe532e4ac, 0x92ca4cfe),
+     TOBN(0x89738f80, 0xd0a7a97a), TOBN(0xec088c88, 0xa580fd5b),
+     TOBN(0x612b1ecc, 0x42ce9e51), TOBN(0x8f9840fd, 0xb25fdd2a),
+     TOBN(0x3cda78c0, 0x01e7f839), TOBN(0x546b3d3a, 0xece05480),
+     TOBN(0x271719a9, 0x80d30916), TOBN(0x45497107, 0x584c20c4),
+     TOBN(0xaf8f9478, 0x5bc78608), TOBN(0x28c7d484, 0x277e2a4c),
+     TOBN(0xfce01767, 0x88a2ffe4), TOBN(0xdc506a35, 0x28e169a5),
+     TOBN(0x0ea10861, 0x7af9c93a), TOBN(0x1ed24361, 0x03fa0e08),
+     TOBN(0x96eaaa92, 0xa3d694e7), TOBN(0xc0f43b4d, 0xef50bc74),
+     TOBN(0xce6aa58c, 0x64114db4), TOBN(0x8218e8ea, 0x7c000fd4),
+     TOBN(0xac815dfb, 0x185f8844), TOBN(0xcd7e90cb, 0x1557abfb),
+     TOBN(0x23d16655, 0xafbfecdf), TOBN(0x80f3271f, 0x085cac4a),
+     TOBN(0x7fc39aa7, 0xd0e62f47), TOBN(0x88d519d1, 0x460a48e5),
+     TOBN(0x59559ac4, 0xd28f101e), TOBN(0x7981d9e9, 0xca9ae816),
+     TOBN(0x5c38652c, 0x9ac38203), TOBN(0x86eaf87f, 0x57657fe5),
+     TOBN(0x568fc472, 0xe21f5416), TOBN(0x2afff39c, 0xe7e597b5),
+     TOBN(0x3adbbb07, 0x256d4eab), TOBN(0x22598692, 0x8285ab89),
+     TOBN(0x35f8112a, 0x041caefe), TOBN(0x95df02e3, 0xa5064c8b),
+     TOBN(0x4d63356e, 0xc7004bf3), TOBN(0x230a08f4, 0xdb83c7de),
+     TOBN(0xca27b270, 0x8709a7b7), TOBN(0x0d1c4cc4, 0xcb9abd2d),
+     TOBN(0x8a0bc66e, 0x7550fee8), TOBN(0x369cd4c7, 0x9cf7247e),
+     TOBN(0x75562e84, 0x92b5b7e7), TOBN(0x8fed0da0, 0x5802af7b),
+     TOBN(0x6a7091c2, 0xe48fb889), TOBN(0x26882c13, 0x7b8a9d06),
+     TOBN(0xa2498663, 0x1b82a0e2), TOBN(0x844ed736, 0x3518152d),
+     TOBN(0x282f476f, 0xd86e27c7), TOBN(0xa04edaca, 0x04afefdc),
+     TOBN(0x8b256ebc, 0x6119e34d), TOBN(0x56a413e9, 0x0787d78b),}
+    ,
+    {TOBN(0x82ee061d, 0x5a74be50), TOBN(0xe41781c4, 0xdea16ff5),
+     TOBN(0xe0b0c81e, 0x99bfc8a2), TOBN(0x624f4d69, 0x0b547e2d),
+     TOBN(0x3a83545d, 0xbdcc9ae4), TOBN(0x2573dbb6, 0x409b1e8e),
+     TOBN(0x482960c4, 0xa6c93539), TOBN(0xf01059ad, 0x5ae18798),
+     TOBN(0x715c9f97, 0x3112795f), TOBN(0xe8244437, 0x984e6ee1),
+     TOBN(0x55cb4858, 0xecb66bcd), TOBN(0x7c136735, 0xabaffbee),
+     TOBN(0x54661595, 0x5dbec38e), TOBN(0x51c0782c, 0x388ad153),
+     TOBN(0x9ba4c53a, 0xc6e0952f), TOBN(0x27e6782a, 0x1b21dfa8),
+     TOBN(0x682f903d, 0x4ed2dbc2), TOBN(0x0eba59c8, 0x7c3b2d83),
+     TOBN(0x8e9dc84d, 0x9c7e9335), TOBN(0x5f9b21b0, 0x0eb226d7),
+     TOBN(0xe33bd394, 0xaf267bae), TOBN(0xaa86cc25, 0xbe2e15ae),
+     TOBN(0x4f0bf67d, 0x6a8ec500), TOBN(0x5846aa44, 0xf9630658),
+     TOBN(0xfeb09740, 0xe2c2bf15), TOBN(0x627a2205, 0xa9e99704),
+     TOBN(0xec8d73d0, 0xc2fbc565), TOBN(0x223eed8f, 0xc20c8de8),
+     TOBN(0x1ee32583, 0xa8363b49), TOBN(0x1a0b6cb9, 0xc9c2b0a6),
+     TOBN(0x49f7c3d2, 0x90dbc85c), TOBN(0xa8dfbb97, 0x1ef4c1ac),
+     TOBN(0xafb34d4c, 0x65c7c2ab), TOBN(0x1d4610e7, 0xe2c5ea84),
+     TOBN(0x893f6d1b, 0x973c4ab5), TOBN(0xa3cdd7e9, 0x945ba5c4),
+     TOBN(0x60514983, 0x064417ee), TOBN(0x1459b23c, 0xad6bdf2b),
+     TOBN(0x23b2c341, 0x5cf726c3), TOBN(0x3a829635, 0x32d6354a),
+     TOBN(0x294f901f, 0xab192c18), TOBN(0xec5fcbfe, 0x7030164f),
+     TOBN(0xe2e2fcb7, 0xe2246ba6), TOBN(0x1e7c88b3, 0x221a1a0c),
+     TOBN(0x72c7dd93, 0xc92d88c5), TOBN(0x41c2148e, 0x1106fb59),
+     TOBN(0x547dd4f5, 0xa0f60f14), TOBN(0xed9b52b2, 0x63960f31),
+     TOBN(0x6c8349eb, 0xb0a5b358), TOBN(0xb154c5c2, 0x9e7e2ed6),
+     TOBN(0xcad5eccf, 0xeda462db), TOBN(0xf2d6dbe4, 0x2de66b69),
+     TOBN(0x426aedf3, 0x8665e5b2), TOBN(0x488a8513, 0x7b7f5723),
+     TOBN(0x15cc43b3, 0x8bcbb386), TOBN(0x27ad0af3, 0xd791d879),
+     TOBN(0xc16c236e, 0x846e364f), TOBN(0x7f33527c, 0xdea50ca0),
+     TOBN(0xc4810775, 0x0926b86d), TOBN(0x6c2a3609, 0x0598e70c),
+     TOBN(0xa6755e52, 0xf024e924), TOBN(0xe0fa07a4, 0x9db4afca),
+     TOBN(0x15c3ce7d, 0x66831790), TOBN(0x5b4ef350, 0xa6cbb0d6),
+     TOBN(0x2c4aafc4, 0xb6205969), TOBN(0x42563f02, 0xf6c7854f),
+     TOBN(0x016aced5, 0x1d983b48), TOBN(0xfeb356d8, 0x99949755),
+     TOBN(0x8c2a2c81, 0xd1a39bd7), TOBN(0x8f44340f, 0xe6934ae9),
+     TOBN(0x148cf91c, 0x447904da), TOBN(0x7340185f, 0x0f51a926),
+     TOBN(0x2f8f00fb, 0x7409ab46), TOBN(0x057e78e6, 0x80e289b2),
+     TOBN(0x03e5022c, 0xa888e5d1), TOBN(0x3c87111a, 0x9dede4e2),
+     TOBN(0x5b9b0e1c, 0x7809460b), TOBN(0xe751c852, 0x71c9abc7),
+     TOBN(0x8b944e28, 0xc7cc1dc9), TOBN(0x4f201ffa, 0x1d3cfa08),
+     TOBN(0x02fc905c, 0x3e6721ce), TOBN(0xd52d70da, 0xd0b3674c),
+     TOBN(0x5dc2e5ca, 0x18810da4), TOBN(0xa984b273, 0x5c69dd99),
+     TOBN(0x63b92527, 0x84de5ca4), TOBN(0x2f1c9872, 0xc852dec4),
+     TOBN(0x18b03593, 0xc2e3de09), TOBN(0x19d70b01, 0x9813dc2f),
+     TOBN(0x42806b2d, 0xa6dc1d29), TOBN(0xd3030009, 0xf871e144),
+     TOBN(0xa1feb333, 0xaaf49276), TOBN(0xb5583b9e, 0xc70bc04b),
+     TOBN(0x1db0be78, 0x95695f20), TOBN(0xfc841811, 0x89d012b5),
+     TOBN(0x6409f272, 0x05f61643), TOBN(0x40d34174, 0xd5883128),
+     TOBN(0xd79196f5, 0x67419833), TOBN(0x6059e252, 0x863b7b08),
+     TOBN(0x84da1817, 0x1c56700c), TOBN(0x5758ee56, 0xb28d3ec4),
+     TOBN(0x7da2771d, 0x013b0ea6), TOBN(0xfddf524b, 0x54c5e9b9),
+     TOBN(0x7df4faf8, 0x24305d80), TOBN(0x58f5c1bf, 0x3a97763f),
+     TOBN(0xa5af37f1, 0x7c696042), TOBN(0xd4cba22c, 0x4a2538de),
+     TOBN(0x211cb995, 0x9ea42600), TOBN(0xcd105f41, 0x7b069889),
+     TOBN(0xb1e1cf19, 0xddb81e74), TOBN(0x472f2d89, 0x5157b8ca),
+     TOBN(0x086fb008, 0xee9db885), TOBN(0x365cd570, 0x0f26d131),
+     TOBN(0x284b02bb, 0xa2be7053), TOBN(0xdcbbf7c6, 0x7ab9a6d6),
+     TOBN(0x4425559c, 0x20f7a530), TOBN(0x961f2dfa, 0x188767c8),
+     TOBN(0xe2fd9435, 0x70dc80c4), TOBN(0x104d6b63, 0xf0784120),
+     TOBN(0x7f592bc1, 0x53567122), TOBN(0xf6bc1246, 0xf688ad77),
+     TOBN(0x05214c05, 0x0f15dde9), TOBN(0xa47a76a8, 0x0d5f2b82),
+     TOBN(0xbb254d30, 0x62e82b62), TOBN(0x11a05fe0, 0x3ec955ee),
+     TOBN(0x7eaff46e, 0x9d529b36), TOBN(0x55ab1301, 0x8f9e3df6),
+     TOBN(0xc463e371, 0x99317698), TOBN(0xfd251438, 0xccda47ad),
+     TOBN(0xca9c3547, 0x23d695ea), TOBN(0x48ce626e, 0x16e589b5),
+     TOBN(0x6b5b64c7, 0xb187d086), TOBN(0xd02e1794, 0xb2207948),
+     TOBN(0x8b58e98f, 0x7198111d), TOBN(0x90ca6305, 0xdcf9c3cc),
+     TOBN(0x5691fe72, 0xf34089b0), TOBN(0x60941af1, 0xfc7c80ff),
+     TOBN(0xa09bc0a2, 0x22eb51e5), TOBN(0xc0bb7244, 0xaa9cf09a),
+     TOBN(0x36a8077f, 0x80159f06), TOBN(0x8b5c989e, 0xdddc560e),
+     TOBN(0x19d2f316, 0x512e1f43), TOBN(0x02eac554, 0xad08ff62),
+     TOBN(0x012ab84c, 0x07d20b4e), TOBN(0x37d1e115, 0xd6d4e4e1),
+     TOBN(0xb6443e1a, 0xab7b19a8), TOBN(0xf08d067e, 0xdef8cd45),
+     TOBN(0x63adf3e9, 0x685e03da), TOBN(0xcf15a10e, 0x4792b916),
+     TOBN(0xf44bcce5, 0xb738a425), TOBN(0xebe131d5, 0x9636b2fd),
+     TOBN(0x94068841, 0x7850d605), TOBN(0x09684eaa, 0xb40d749d),
+     TOBN(0x8c3c669c, 0x72ba075b), TOBN(0x89f78b55, 0xba469015),
+     TOBN(0x5706aade, 0x3e9f8ba8), TOBN(0x6d8bd565, 0xb32d7ed7),
+     TOBN(0x25f4e63b, 0x805f08d6), TOBN(0x7f48200d, 0xc3bcc1b5),
+     TOBN(0x4e801968, 0xb025d847), TOBN(0x74afac04, 0x87cbe0a8),
+     TOBN(0x43ed2c2b, 0x7e63d690), TOBN(0xefb6bbf0, 0x0223cdb8),
+     TOBN(0x4fec3cae, 0x2884d3fe), TOBN(0x065ecce6, 0xd75e25a4),
+     TOBN(0x6c2294ce, 0x69f79071), TOBN(0x0d9a8e5f, 0x044b8666),
+     TOBN(0x5009f238, 0x17b69d8f), TOBN(0x3c29f8fe, 0xc5dfdaf7),
+     TOBN(0x9067528f, 0xebae68c4), TOBN(0x5b385632, 0x30c5ba21),
+     TOBN(0x540df119, 0x1fdd1aec), TOBN(0xcf37825b, 0xcfba4c78),
+     TOBN(0x77eff980, 0xbeb11454), TOBN(0x40a1a991, 0x60c1b066),
+     TOBN(0xe8018980, 0xf889a1c7), TOBN(0xb9c52ae9, 0x76c24be0),
+     TOBN(0x05fbbcce, 0x45650ef4), TOBN(0xae000f10, 0x8aa29ac7),
+     TOBN(0x884b7172, 0x4f04c470), TOBN(0x7cd4fde2, 0x19bb5c25),
+     TOBN(0x6477b22a, 0xe8840869), TOBN(0xa8868859, 0x5fbd0686),
+     TOBN(0xf23cc02e, 0x1116dfba), TOBN(0x76cd563f, 0xd87d7776),
+     TOBN(0xe2a37598, 0xa9d82abf), TOBN(0x5f188ccb, 0xe6c170f5),
+     TOBN(0x81682200, 0x5066b087), TOBN(0xda22c212, 0xc7155ada),
+     TOBN(0x151e5d3a, 0xfbddb479), TOBN(0x4b606b84, 0x6d715b99),
+     TOBN(0x4a73b54b, 0xf997cb2e), TOBN(0x9a1bfe43, 0x3ecd8b66),
+     TOBN(0x1c312809, 0x2a67d48a), TOBN(0xcd6a671e, 0x031fa9e2),
+     TOBN(0xbec3312a, 0x0e43a34a), TOBN(0x1d935639, 0x55ef47d3),
+     TOBN(0x5ea02489, 0x8fea73ea), TOBN(0x8247b364, 0xa035afb2),
+     TOBN(0xb58300a6, 0x5265b54c), TOBN(0x3286662f, 0x722c7148),
+     TOBN(0xb77fd76b, 0xb4ec4c20), TOBN(0xf0a12fa7, 0x0f3fe3fd),
+     TOBN(0xf845bbf5, 0x41d8c7e8), TOBN(0xe4d969ca, 0x5ec10aa8),
+     TOBN(0x4c0053b7, 0x43e232a3), TOBN(0xdc7a3fac, 0x37f8a45a),
+     TOBN(0x3c4261c5, 0x20d81c8f), TOBN(0xfd4b3453, 0xb00eab00),
+     TOBN(0x76d48f86, 0xd36e3062), TOBN(0x626c5277, 0xa143ff02),
+     TOBN(0x538174de, 0xaf76f42e), TOBN(0x2267aa86, 0x6407ceac),
+     TOBN(0xfad76351, 0x72e572d5), TOBN(0xab861af7, 0xba7330eb),
+     TOBN(0xa0a1c8c7, 0x418d8657), TOBN(0x988821cb, 0x20289a52),
+     TOBN(0x79732522, 0xcccc18ad), TOBN(0xaadf3f8d, 0xf1a6e027),
+     TOBN(0xf7382c93, 0x17c2354d), TOBN(0x5ce1680c, 0xd818b689),
+     TOBN(0x359ebbfc, 0xd9ecbee9), TOBN(0x4330689c, 0x1cae62ac),
+     TOBN(0xb55ce5b4, 0xc51ac38a), TOBN(0x7921dfea, 0xfe238ee8),
+     TOBN(0x3972bef8, 0x271d1ca5), TOBN(0x3e423bc7, 0xe8aabd18),
+     TOBN(0x57b09f3f, 0x44a3e5e3), TOBN(0x5da886ae, 0x7b444d66),
+     TOBN(0x68206634, 0xa9964375), TOBN(0x356a2fa3, 0x699cd0ff),
+     TOBN(0xaf0faa24, 0xdba515e9), TOBN(0x536e1f5c, 0xb321d79a),
+     TOBN(0xd3b9913a, 0x5c04e4ea), TOBN(0xd549dcfe, 0xd6f11513),
+     TOBN(0xee227bf5, 0x79fd1d94), TOBN(0x9f35afee, 0xb43f2c67),
+     TOBN(0xd2638d24, 0xf1314f53), TOBN(0x62baf948, 0xcabcd822),
+     TOBN(0x5542de29, 0x4ef48db0), TOBN(0xb3eb6a04, 0xfc5f6bb2),
+     TOBN(0x23c110ae, 0x1208e16a), TOBN(0x1a4d15b5, 0xf8363e24),
+     TOBN(0x30716844, 0x164be00b), TOBN(0xa8e24824, 0xf6f4690d),
+     TOBN(0x548773a2, 0x90b170cf), TOBN(0xa1bef331, 0x42f191f4),
+     TOBN(0x70f418d0, 0x9247aa97), TOBN(0xea06028e, 0x48be9147),
+     TOBN(0xe13122f3, 0xdbfb894e), TOBN(0xbe9b79f6, 0xce274b18),
+     TOBN(0x85a49de5, 0xca58aadf), TOBN(0x24957758, 0x11487351),
+     TOBN(0x111def61, 0xbb939099), TOBN(0x1d6a974a, 0x26d13694),
+     TOBN(0x4474b4ce, 0xd3fc253b), TOBN(0x3a1485e6, 0x4c5db15e),
+     TOBN(0xe79667b4, 0x147c15b4), TOBN(0xe34f553b, 0x7bc61301),
+     TOBN(0x032b80f8, 0x17094381), TOBN(0x55d8bafd, 0x723eaa21),
+     TOBN(0x5a987995, 0xf1c0e74e), TOBN(0x5a9b292e, 0xebba289c),
+     TOBN(0x413cd4b2, 0xeb4c8251), TOBN(0x98b5d243, 0xd162db0a),
+     TOBN(0xbb47bf66, 0x68342520), TOBN(0x08d68949, 0xbaa862d1),
+     TOBN(0x11f349c7, 0xe906abcd), TOBN(0x454ce985, 0xed7bf00e),
+     TOBN(0xacab5c9e, 0xb55b803b), TOBN(0xb03468ea, 0x31e3c16d),
+     TOBN(0x5c24213d, 0xd273bf12), TOBN(0x211538eb, 0x71587887),
+     TOBN(0x198e4a2f, 0x731dea2d), TOBN(0xd5856cf2, 0x74ed7b2a),
+     TOBN(0x86a632eb, 0x13a664fe), TOBN(0x932cd909, 0xbda41291),
+     TOBN(0x850e95d4, 0xc0c4ddc0), TOBN(0xc0f422f8, 0x347fc2c9),
+     TOBN(0xe68cbec4, 0x86076bcb), TOBN(0xf9e7c0c0, 0xcd6cd286),
+     TOBN(0x65994ddb, 0x0f5f27ca), TOBN(0xe85461fb, 0xa80d59ff),
+     TOBN(0xff05481a, 0x66601023), TOBN(0xc665427a, 0xfc9ebbfb),
+     TOBN(0xb0571a69, 0x7587fd52), TOBN(0x935289f8, 0x8d49efce),
+     TOBN(0x61becc60, 0xea420688), TOBN(0xb22639d9, 0x13a786af),
+     TOBN(0x1a8e6220, 0x361ecf90), TOBN(0x001f23e0, 0x25506463),
+     TOBN(0xe4ae9b5d, 0x0a5c2b79), TOBN(0xebc9cdad, 0xd8149db5),
+     TOBN(0xb33164a1, 0x934aa728), TOBN(0x750eb00e, 0xae9b60f3),
+     TOBN(0x5a91615b, 0x9b9cfbfd), TOBN(0x97015cbf, 0xef45f7f6),
+     TOBN(0xb462c4a5, 0xbf5151df), TOBN(0x21adcc41, 0xb07118f2),
+     TOBN(0xd60c545b, 0x043fa42c), TOBN(0xfc21aa54, 0xe96be1ab),
+     TOBN(0xe84bc32f, 0x4e51ea80), TOBN(0x3dae45f0, 0x259b5d8d),
+     TOBN(0xbb73c7eb, 0xc38f1b5e), TOBN(0xe405a74a, 0xe8ae617d),
+     TOBN(0xbb1ae9c6, 0x9f1c56bd), TOBN(0x8c176b98, 0x49f196a4),
+     TOBN(0xc448f311, 0x6875092b), TOBN(0xb5afe3de, 0x9f976033),
+     TOBN(0xa8dafd49, 0x145813e5), TOBN(0x687fc4d9, 0xe2b34226),
+     TOBN(0xf2dfc92d, 0x4c7ff57f), TOBN(0x004e3fc1, 0x401f1b46),
+     TOBN(0x5afddab6, 0x1430c9ab), TOBN(0x0bdd41d3, 0x2238e997),
+     TOBN(0xf0947430, 0x418042ae), TOBN(0x71f9adda, 0xcdddc4cb),
+     TOBN(0x7090c016, 0xc52dd907), TOBN(0xd9bdf44d, 0x29e2047f),
+     TOBN(0xe6f1fe80, 0x1b1011a6), TOBN(0xb63accbc, 0xd9acdc78),
+     TOBN(0xcfc7e235, 0x1272a95b), TOBN(0x0c667717, 0xa6276ac8),
+     TOBN(0x3c0d3709, 0xe2d7eef7), TOBN(0x5add2b06, 0x9a685b3e),
+     TOBN(0x363ad32d, 0x14ea5d65), TOBN(0xf8e01f06, 0x8d7dd506),
+     TOBN(0xc9ea2213, 0x75b4aac6), TOBN(0xed2a2bf9, 0x0d353466),
+     TOBN(0x439d79b5, 0xe9d3a7c3), TOBN(0x8e0ee5a6, 0x81b7f34b),
+     TOBN(0xcf3dacf5, 0x1dc4ba75), TOBN(0x1d3d1773, 0xeb3310c7),
+     TOBN(0xa8e67112, 0x7747ae83), TOBN(0x31f43160, 0x197d6b40),
+     TOBN(0x0521ccee, 0xcd961400), TOBN(0x67246f11, 0xf6535768),
+     TOBN(0x702fcc5a, 0xef0c3133), TOBN(0x247cc45d, 0x7e16693b),
+     TOBN(0xfd484e49, 0xc729b749), TOBN(0x522cef7d, 0xb218320f),
+     TOBN(0xe56ef405, 0x59ab93b3), TOBN(0x225fba11, 0x9f181071),
+     TOBN(0x33bd6595, 0x15330ed0), TOBN(0xc4be69d5, 0x1ddb32f7),
+     TOBN(0x264c7668, 0x0448087c), TOBN(0xac30903f, 0x71432dae),
+     TOBN(0x3851b266, 0x00f9bf47), TOBN(0x400ed311, 0x6cdd6d03),
+     TOBN(0x045e79fe, 0xf8fd2424), TOBN(0xfdfd974a, 0xfa6da98b),
+     TOBN(0x45c9f641, 0x0c1e673a), TOBN(0x76f2e733, 0x5b2c5168),
+     TOBN(0x1adaebb5, 0x2a601753), TOBN(0xb286514c, 0xc57c2d49),
+     TOBN(0xd8769670, 0x1e0bfd24), TOBN(0x950c547e, 0x04478922),
+     TOBN(0xd1d41969, 0xe5d32bfe), TOBN(0x30bc1472, 0x750d6c3e),
+     TOBN(0x8f3679fe, 0xe0e27f3a), TOBN(0x8f64a7dc, 0xa4a6ee0c),
+     TOBN(0x2fe59937, 0x633dfb1f), TOBN(0xea82c395, 0x977f2547),
+     TOBN(0xcbdfdf1a, 0x661ea646), TOBN(0xc7ccc591, 0xb9085451),
+     TOBN(0x82177962, 0x81761e13), TOBN(0xda57596f, 0x9196885c),
+     TOBN(0xbc17e849, 0x28ffbd70), TOBN(0x1e6e0a41, 0x2671d36f),
+     TOBN(0x61ae872c, 0x4152fcf5), TOBN(0x441c87b0, 0x9e77e754),
+     TOBN(0xd0799dd5, 0xa34dff09), TOBN(0x766b4e44, 0x88a6b171),
+     TOBN(0xdc06a512, 0x11f1c792), TOBN(0xea02ae93, 0x4be35c3e),
+     TOBN(0xe5ca4d6d, 0xe90c469e), TOBN(0x4df4368e, 0x56e4ff5c),
+     TOBN(0x7817acab, 0x4baef62e), TOBN(0x9f5a2202, 0xa85b91e8),
+     TOBN(0x9666ebe6, 0x6ce57610), TOBN(0x32ad31f3, 0xf73bfe03),
+     TOBN(0x628330a4, 0x25bcf4d6), TOBN(0xea950593, 0x515056e6),
+     TOBN(0x59811c89, 0xe1332156), TOBN(0xc89cf1fe, 0x8c11b2d7),
+     TOBN(0x75b63913, 0x04e60cc0), TOBN(0xce811e8d, 0x4625d375),
+     TOBN(0x030e43fc, 0x2d26e562), TOBN(0xfbb30b4b, 0x608d36a0),
+     TOBN(0x634ff82c, 0x48528118), TOBN(0x7c6fe085, 0xcd285911),
+     TOBN(0x7f2830c0, 0x99358f28), TOBN(0x2e60a95e, 0x665e6c09),
+     TOBN(0x08407d3d, 0x9b785dbf), TOBN(0x530889ab, 0xa759bce7),
+     TOBN(0xf228e0e6, 0x52f61239), TOBN(0x2b6d1461, 0x6879be3c),
+     TOBN(0xe6902c04, 0x51a7bbf7), TOBN(0x30ad99f0, 0x76f24a64),
+     TOBN(0x66d9317a, 0x98bc6da0), TOBN(0xf4f877f3, 0xcb596ac0),
+     TOBN(0xb05ff62d, 0x4c44f119), TOBN(0x4555f536, 0xe9b77416),
+     TOBN(0xc7c0d059, 0x8caed63b), TOBN(0x0cd2b7ce, 0xc358b2a9),
+     TOBN(0x3f33287b, 0x46945fa3), TOBN(0xf8785b20, 0xd67c8791),
+     TOBN(0xc54a7a61, 0x9637bd08), TOBN(0x54d4598c, 0x18be79d7),
+     TOBN(0x889e5acb, 0xc46d7ce1), TOBN(0x9a515bb7, 0x8b085877),
+     TOBN(0xfac1a03d, 0x0b7a5050), TOBN(0x7d3e738a, 0xf2926035),
+     TOBN(0x861cc2ce, 0x2a6cb0eb), TOBN(0x6f2e2955, 0x8f7adc79),
+     TOBN(0x61c4d451, 0x33016376), TOBN(0xd9fd2c80, 0x5ad59090),
+     TOBN(0xe5a83738, 0xb2b836a1), TOBN(0x855b41a0, 0x7c0d6622),
+     TOBN(0x186fe317, 0x7cc19af1), TOBN(0x6465c1ff, 0xfdd99acb),
+     TOBN(0x46e5c23f, 0x6974b99e), TOBN(0x75a7cf8b, 0xa2717cbe),
+     TOBN(0x4d2ebc3f, 0x062be658), TOBN(0x094b4447, 0x5f209c98),
+     TOBN(0x4af285ed, 0xb940cb5a), TOBN(0x6706d792, 0x7cc82f10),
+     TOBN(0xc8c8776c, 0x030526fa), TOBN(0xfa8e6f76, 0xa0da9140),
+     TOBN(0x77ea9d34, 0x591ee4f0), TOBN(0x5f46e337, 0x40274166),
+     TOBN(0x1bdf98bb, 0xea671457), TOBN(0xd7c08b46, 0x862a1fe2),
+     TOBN(0x46cc303c, 0x1c08ad63), TOBN(0x99543440, 0x4c845e7b),
+     TOBN(0x1b8fbdb5, 0x48f36bf7), TOBN(0x5b82c392, 0x8c8273a7),
+     TOBN(0x08f712c4, 0x928435d5), TOBN(0x071cf0f1, 0x79330380),
+     TOBN(0xc74c2d24, 0xa8da054a), TOBN(0xcb0e7201, 0x43c46b5c),
+     TOBN(0x0ad7337a, 0xc0b7eff3), TOBN(0x8552225e, 0xc5e48b3c),
+     TOBN(0xe6f78b0c, 0x73f13a5f), TOBN(0x5e70062e, 0x82349cbe),
+     TOBN(0x6b8d5048, 0xe7073969), TOBN(0x392d2a29, 0xc33cb3d2),
+     TOBN(0xee4f727c, 0x4ecaa20f), TOBN(0xa068c99e, 0x2ccde707),
+     TOBN(0xfcd5651f, 0xb87a2913), TOBN(0xea3e3c15, 0x3cc252f0),
+     TOBN(0x777d92df, 0x3b6cd3e4), TOBN(0x7a414143, 0xc5a732e7),
+     TOBN(0xa895951a, 0xa71ff493), TOBN(0xfe980c92, 0xbbd37cf6),
+     TOBN(0x45bd5e64, 0xdecfeeff), TOBN(0x910dc2a9, 0xa44c43e9),
+     TOBN(0xcb403f26, 0xcca9f54d), TOBN(0x928bbdfb, 0x9303f6db),
+     TOBN(0x3c37951e, 0xa9eee67c), TOBN(0x3bd61a52, 0xf79961c3),
+     TOBN(0x09a238e6, 0x395c9a79), TOBN(0x6940ca2d, 0x61eb352d),
+     TOBN(0x7d1e5c5e, 0xc1875631), TOBN(0x1e19742c, 0x1e1b20d1),
+     TOBN(0x4633d908, 0x23fc2e6e), TOBN(0xa76e29a9, 0x08959149),
+     TOBN(0x61069d9c, 0x84ed7da5), TOBN(0x0baa11cf, 0x5dbcad51),
+     TOBN(0xd01eec64, 0x961849da), TOBN(0x93b75f1f, 0xaf3d8c28),
+     TOBN(0x57bc4f9f, 0x1ca2ee44), TOBN(0x5a26322d, 0x00e00558),
+     TOBN(0x1888d658, 0x61a023ef), TOBN(0x1d72aab4, 0xb9e5246e),
+     TOBN(0xa9a26348, 0xe5563ec0), TOBN(0xa0971963, 0xc3439a43),
+     TOBN(0x567dd54b, 0xadb9b5b7), TOBN(0x73fac1a1, 0xc45a524b),
+     TOBN(0x8fe97ef7, 0xfe38e608), TOBN(0x608748d2, 0x3f384f48),
+     TOBN(0xb0571794, 0xc486094f), TOBN(0x869254a3, 0x8bf3a8d6),
+     TOBN(0x148a8dd1, 0x310b0e25), TOBN(0x99ab9f3f, 0x9aa3f7d8),
+     TOBN(0x0927c68a, 0x6706c02e), TOBN(0x22b5e76c, 0x69790e6c),
+     TOBN(0x6c325260, 0x6c71376c), TOBN(0x53a57690, 0x09ef6657),
+     TOBN(0x8d63f852, 0xedffcf3a), TOBN(0xb4d2ed04, 0x3c0a6f55),
+     TOBN(0xdb3aa8de, 0x12519b9e), TOBN(0x5d38e9c4, 0x1e0a569a),
+     TOBN(0x871528bf, 0x303747e2), TOBN(0xa208e77c, 0xf5b5c18d),
+     TOBN(0x9d129c88, 0xca6bf923), TOBN(0xbcbf197f, 0xbf02839f),
+     TOBN(0x9b9bf030, 0x27323194), TOBN(0x3b055a8b, 0x339ca59d),
+     TOBN(0xb46b2312, 0x0f669520), TOBN(0x19789f1f, 0x497e5f24),
+     TOBN(0x9c499468, 0xaaf01801), TOBN(0x72ee1190, 0x8b69d59c),
+     TOBN(0x8bd39595, 0xacf4c079), TOBN(0x3ee11ece, 0x8e0cd048),
+     TOBN(0xebde86ec, 0x1ed66f18), TOBN(0x225d906b, 0xd61fce43),
+     TOBN(0x5cab07d6, 0xe8bed74d), TOBN(0x16e4617f, 0x27855ab7),
+     TOBN(0x6568aadd, 0xb2fbc3dd), TOBN(0xedb5484f, 0x8aeddf5b),
+     TOBN(0x878f20e8, 0x6dcf2fad), TOBN(0x3516497c, 0x615f5699),}
+    ,
+    {TOBN(0xef0a3fec, 0xfa181e69), TOBN(0x9ea02f81, 0x30d69a98),
+     TOBN(0xb2e9cf8e, 0x66eab95d), TOBN(0x520f2beb, 0x24720021),
+     TOBN(0x621c540a, 0x1df84361), TOBN(0x12037721, 0x71fa6d5d),
+     TOBN(0x6e3c7b51, 0x0ff5f6ff), TOBN(0x817a069b, 0xabb2bef3),
+     TOBN(0x83572fb6, 0xb294cda6), TOBN(0x6ce9bf75, 0xb9039f34),
+     TOBN(0x20e012f0, 0x095cbb21), TOBN(0xa0aecc1b, 0xd063f0da),
+     TOBN(0x57c21c3a, 0xf02909e5), TOBN(0xc7d59ecf, 0x48ce9cdc),
+     TOBN(0x2732b844, 0x8ae336f8), TOBN(0x056e3723, 0x3f4f85f4),
+     TOBN(0x8a10b531, 0x89e800ca), TOBN(0x50fe0c17, 0x145208fd),
+     TOBN(0x9e43c0d3, 0xb714ba37), TOBN(0x427d200e, 0x34189acc),
+     TOBN(0x05dee24f, 0xe616e2c0), TOBN(0x9c25f4c8, 0xee1854c1),
+     TOBN(0x4d3222a5, 0x8f342a73), TOBN(0x0807804f, 0xa027c952),
+     TOBN(0xc222653a, 0x4f0d56f3), TOBN(0x961e4047, 0xca28b805),
+     TOBN(0x2c03f8b0, 0x4a73434b), TOBN(0x4c966787, 0xab712a19),
+     TOBN(0xcc196c42, 0x864fee42), TOBN(0xc1be93da, 0x5b0ece5c),
+     TOBN(0xa87d9f22, 0xc131c159), TOBN(0x2bb6d593, 0xdce45655),
+     TOBN(0x22c49ec9, 0xb809b7ce), TOBN(0x8a41486b, 0xe2c72c2c),
+     TOBN(0x813b9420, 0xfea0bf36), TOBN(0xb3d36ee9, 0xa66dac69),
+     TOBN(0x6fddc08a, 0x328cc987), TOBN(0x0a3bcd2c, 0x3a326461),
+     TOBN(0x7103c49d, 0xd810dbba), TOBN(0xf9d81a28, 0x4b78a4c4),
+     TOBN(0x3de865ad, 0xe4d55941), TOBN(0xdedafa5e, 0x30384087),
+     TOBN(0x6f414abb, 0x4ef18b9b), TOBN(0x9ee9ea42, 0xfaee5268),
+     TOBN(0x260faa16, 0x37a55a4a), TOBN(0xeb19a514, 0x015f93b9),
+     TOBN(0x51d7ebd2, 0x9e9c3598), TOBN(0x523fc56d, 0x1932178e),
+     TOBN(0x501d070c, 0xb98fe684), TOBN(0xd60fbe9a, 0x124a1458),
+     TOBN(0xa45761c8, 0x92bc6b3f), TOBN(0xf5384858, 0xfe6f27cb),
+     TOBN(0x4b0271f7, 0xb59e763b), TOBN(0x3d4606a9, 0x5b5a8e5e),
+     TOBN(0x1eda5d9b, 0x05a48292), TOBN(0xda7731d0, 0xe6fec446),
+     TOBN(0xa3e33693, 0x90d45871), TOBN(0xe9764040, 0x06166d8d),
+     TOBN(0xb5c33682, 0x89a90403), TOBN(0x4bd17983, 0x72f1d637),
+     TOBN(0xa616679e, 0xd5d2c53a), TOBN(0x5ec4bcd8, 0xfdcf3b87),
+     TOBN(0xae6d7613, 0xb66a694e), TOBN(0x7460fc76, 0xe3fc27e5),
+     TOBN(0x70469b82, 0x95caabee), TOBN(0xde024ca5, 0x889501e3),
+     TOBN(0x6bdadc06, 0x076ed265), TOBN(0x0cb1236b, 0x5a0ef8b2),
+     TOBN(0x4065ddbf, 0x0972ebf9), TOBN(0xf1dd3875, 0x22aca432),
+     TOBN(0xa88b97cf, 0x744aff76), TOBN(0xd1359afd, 0xfe8e3d24),
+     TOBN(0x52a3ba2b, 0x91502cf3), TOBN(0x2c3832a8, 0x084db75d),
+     TOBN(0x04a12ddd, 0xde30b1c9), TOBN(0x7802eabc, 0xe31fd60c),
+     TOBN(0x33707327, 0xa37fddab), TOBN(0x65d6f2ab, 0xfaafa973),
+     TOBN(0x3525c5b8, 0x11e6f91a), TOBN(0x76aeb0c9, 0x5f46530b),
+     TOBN(0xe8815ff6, 0x2f93a675), TOBN(0xa6ec9684, 0x05f48679),
+     TOBN(0x6dcbb556, 0x358ae884), TOBN(0x0af61472, 0xe19e3873),
+     TOBN(0x72334372, 0xa5f696be), TOBN(0xc65e57ea, 0x6f22fb70),
+     TOBN(0x268da30c, 0x946cea90), TOBN(0x136a8a87, 0x65681b2a),
+     TOBN(0xad5e81dc, 0x0f9f44d4), TOBN(0xf09a6960, 0x2c46585a),
+     TOBN(0xd1649164, 0xc447d1b1), TOBN(0x3b4b36c8, 0x879dc8b1),
+     TOBN(0x20d4177b, 0x3b6b234c), TOBN(0x096a2505, 0x1730d9d0),
+     TOBN(0x0611b9b8, 0xef80531d), TOBN(0xba904b3b, 0x64bb495d),
+     TOBN(0x1192d9d4, 0x93a3147a), TOBN(0x9f30a5dc, 0x9a565545),
+     TOBN(0x90b1f9cb, 0x6ef07212), TOBN(0x29958546, 0x0d87fc13),
+     TOBN(0xd3323eff, 0xc17db9ba), TOBN(0xcb18548c, 0xcb1644a8),
+     TOBN(0x18a306d4, 0x4f49ffbc), TOBN(0x28d658f1, 0x4c2e8684),
+     TOBN(0x44ba60cd, 0xa99f8c71), TOBN(0x67b7abdb, 0x4bf742ff),
+     TOBN(0x66310f9c, 0x914b3f99), TOBN(0xae430a32, 0xf412c161),
+     TOBN(0x1e6776d3, 0x88ace52f), TOBN(0x4bc0fa24, 0x52d7067d),
+     TOBN(0x03c286aa, 0x8f07cd1b), TOBN(0x4cb8f38c, 0xa985b2c1),
+     TOBN(0x83ccbe80, 0x8c3bff36), TOBN(0x005a0bd2, 0x5263e575),
+     TOBN(0x460d7dda, 0x259bdcd1), TOBN(0x4a1c5642, 0xfa5cab6b),
+     TOBN(0x2b7bdbb9, 0x9fe4fc88), TOBN(0x09418e28, 0xcc97bbb5),
+     TOBN(0xd8274fb4, 0xa12321ae), TOBN(0xb137007d, 0x5c87b64e),
+     TOBN(0x80531fe1, 0xc63c4962), TOBN(0x50541e89, 0x981fdb25),
+     TOBN(0xdc1291a1, 0xfd4c2b6b), TOBN(0xc0693a17, 0xa6df4fca),
+     TOBN(0xb2c4604e, 0x0117f203), TOBN(0x245f1963, 0x0a99b8d0),
+     TOBN(0xaedc20aa, 0xc6212c44), TOBN(0xb1ed4e56, 0x520f52a8),
+     TOBN(0xfe48f575, 0xf8547be3), TOBN(0x0a7033cd, 0xa9e45f98),
+     TOBN(0x4b45d3a9, 0x18c50100), TOBN(0xb2a6cd6a, 0xa61d41da),
+     TOBN(0x60bbb4f5, 0x57933c6b), TOBN(0xa7538ebd, 0x2b0d7ffc),
+     TOBN(0x9ea3ab8d, 0x8cd626b6), TOBN(0x8273a484, 0x3601625a),
+     TOBN(0x88859845, 0x0168e508), TOBN(0x8cbc9bb2, 0x99a94abd),
+     TOBN(0x713ac792, 0xfab0a671), TOBN(0xa3995b19, 0x6c9ebffc),
+     TOBN(0xe711668e, 0x1239e152), TOBN(0x56892558, 0xbbb8dff4),
+     TOBN(0x8bfc7dab, 0xdbf17963), TOBN(0x5b59fe5a, 0xb3de1253),
+     TOBN(0x7e3320eb, 0x34a9f7ae), TOBN(0xe5e8cf72, 0xd751efe4),
+     TOBN(0x7ea003bc, 0xd9be2f37), TOBN(0xc0f551a0, 0xb6c08ef7),
+     TOBN(0x56606268, 0x038f6725), TOBN(0x1dd38e35, 0x6d92d3b6),
+     TOBN(0x07dfce7c, 0xc3cbd686), TOBN(0x4e549e04, 0x651c5da8),
+     TOBN(0x4058f93b, 0x08b19340), TOBN(0xc2fae6f4, 0xcac6d89d),
+     TOBN(0x4bad8a8c, 0x8f159cc7), TOBN(0x0ddba4b3, 0xcb0b601c),
+     TOBN(0xda4fc7b5, 0x1dd95f8c), TOBN(0x1d163cd7, 0xcea5c255),
+     TOBN(0x30707d06, 0x274a8c4c), TOBN(0x79d9e008, 0x2802e9ce),
+     TOBN(0x02a29ebf, 0xe6ddd505), TOBN(0x37064e74, 0xb50bed1a),
+     TOBN(0x3f6bae65, 0xa7327d57), TOBN(0x3846f5f1, 0xf83920bc),
+     TOBN(0x87c37491, 0x60df1b9b), TOBN(0x4cfb2895, 0x2d1da29f),
+     TOBN(0x10a478ca, 0x4ed1743c), TOBN(0x390c6030, 0x3edd47c6),
+     TOBN(0x8f3e5312, 0x8c0a78de), TOBN(0xccd02bda, 0x1e85df70),
+     TOBN(0xd6c75c03, 0xa61b6582), TOBN(0x0762921c, 0xfc0eebd1),
+     TOBN(0xd34d0823, 0xd85010c0), TOBN(0xd73aaacb, 0x0044cf1f),
+     TOBN(0xfb4159bb, 0xa3b5e78a), TOBN(0x2287c7f7, 0xe5826f3f),
+     TOBN(0x4aeaf742, 0x580b1a01), TOBN(0xf080415d, 0x60423b79),
+     TOBN(0xe12622cd, 0xa7dea144), TOBN(0x49ea4996, 0x59d62472),
+     TOBN(0xb42991ef, 0x571f3913), TOBN(0x0610f214, 0xf5b25a8a),
+     TOBN(0x47adc585, 0x30b79e8f), TOBN(0xf90e3df6, 0x07a065a2),
+     TOBN(0x5d0a5deb, 0x43e2e034), TOBN(0x53fb5a34, 0x444024aa),
+     TOBN(0xa8628c68, 0x6b0c9f7f), TOBN(0x9c69c29c, 0xac563656),
+     TOBN(0x5a231feb, 0xbace47b6), TOBN(0xbdce0289, 0x9ea5a2ec),
+     TOBN(0x05da1fac, 0x9463853e), TOBN(0x96812c52, 0x509e78aa),
+     TOBN(0xd3fb5771, 0x57151692), TOBN(0xeb2721f8, 0xd98e1c44),
+     TOBN(0xc0506087, 0x32399be1), TOBN(0xda5a5511, 0xd979d8b8),
+     TOBN(0x737ed55d, 0xc6f56780), TOBN(0xe20d3004, 0x0dc7a7f4),
+     TOBN(0x02ce7301, 0xf5941a03), TOBN(0x91ef5215, 0xed30f83a),
+     TOBN(0x28727fc1, 0x4092d85f), TOBN(0x72d223c6, 0x5c49e41a),
+     TOBN(0xa7cf30a2, 0xba6a4d81), TOBN(0x7c086209, 0xb030d87d),
+     TOBN(0x04844c7d, 0xfc588b09), TOBN(0x728cd499, 0x5874bbb0),
+     TOBN(0xcc1281ee, 0xe84c0495), TOBN(0x0769b5ba, 0xec31958f),
+     TOBN(0x665c228b, 0xf99c2471), TOBN(0xf2d8a11b, 0x191eb110),
+     TOBN(0x4594f494, 0xd36d7024), TOBN(0x482ded8b, 0xcdcb25a1),
+     TOBN(0xc958a9d8, 0xdadd4885), TOBN(0x7004477e, 0xf1d2b547),
+     TOBN(0x0a45f6ef, 0x2a0af550), TOBN(0x4fc739d6, 0x2f8d6351),
+     TOBN(0x75cdaf27, 0x786f08a9), TOBN(0x8700bb26, 0x42c2737f),
+     TOBN(0x855a7141, 0x1c4e2670), TOBN(0x810188c1, 0x15076fef),
+     TOBN(0xc251d0c9, 0xabcd3297), TOBN(0xae4c8967, 0xf48108eb),
+     TOBN(0xbd146de7, 0x18ceed30), TOBN(0xf9d4f07a, 0xc986bced),
+     TOBN(0x5ad98ed5, 0x83fa1e08), TOBN(0x7780d33e, 0xbeabd1fb),
+     TOBN(0xe330513c, 0x903b1196), TOBN(0xba11de9e, 0xa47bc8c4),
+     TOBN(0x684334da, 0x02c2d064), TOBN(0x7ecf360d, 0xa48de23b),
+     TOBN(0x57a1b474, 0x0a9089d8), TOBN(0xf28fa439, 0xff36734c),
+     TOBN(0xf2a482cb, 0xea4570b3), TOBN(0xee65d68b, 0xa5ebcee9),
+     TOBN(0x988d0036, 0xb9694cd5), TOBN(0x53edd0e9, 0x37885d32),
+     TOBN(0xe37e3307, 0xbeb9bc6d), TOBN(0xe9abb907, 0x9f5c6768),
+     TOBN(0x4396ccd5, 0x51f2160f), TOBN(0x2500888c, 0x47336da6),
+     TOBN(0x383f9ed9, 0x926fce43), TOBN(0x809dd1c7, 0x04da2930),
+     TOBN(0x30f6f596, 0x8a4cb227), TOBN(0x0d700c7f, 0x73a56b38),
+     TOBN(0x1825ea33, 0xab64a065), TOBN(0xaab9b735, 0x1338df80),
+     TOBN(0x1516100d, 0x9b63f57f), TOBN(0x2574395a, 0x27a6a634),
+     TOBN(0xb5560fb6, 0x700a1acd), TOBN(0xe823fd73, 0xfd999681),
+     TOBN(0xda915d1f, 0x6cb4e1ba), TOBN(0x0d030118, 0x6ebe00a3),
+     TOBN(0x744fb0c9, 0x89fca8cd), TOBN(0x970d01db, 0xf9da0e0b),
+     TOBN(0x0ad8c564, 0x7931d76f), TOBN(0xb15737bf, 0xf659b96a),
+     TOBN(0xdc9933e8, 0xa8b484e7), TOBN(0xb2fdbdf9, 0x7a26dec7),
+     TOBN(0x2349e9a4, 0x9f1f0136), TOBN(0x7860368e, 0x70fddddb),
+     TOBN(0xd93d2c1c, 0xf9ad3e18), TOBN(0x6d6c5f17, 0x689f4e79),
+     TOBN(0x7a544d91, 0xb24ff1b6), TOBN(0x3e12a5eb, 0xfe16cd8c),
+     TOBN(0x543574e9, 0xa56b872f), TOBN(0xa1ad550c, 0xfcf68ea2),
+     TOBN(0x689e37d2, 0x3f560ef7), TOBN(0x8c54b9ca, 0xc9d47a8b),
+     TOBN(0x46d40a4a, 0x088ac342), TOBN(0xec450c7c, 0x1576c6d0),
+     TOBN(0xb589e31c, 0x1f9689e9), TOBN(0xdacf2602, 0xb8781718),
+     TOBN(0xa89237c6, 0xc8cb6b42), TOBN(0x1326fc93, 0xb96ef381),
+     TOBN(0x55d56c6d, 0xb5f07825), TOBN(0xacba2eea, 0x7449e22d),
+     TOBN(0x74e0887a, 0x633c3000), TOBN(0xcb6cd172, 0xd7cbcf71),
+     TOBN(0x309e81de, 0xc36cf1be), TOBN(0x07a18a6d, 0x60ae399b),
+     TOBN(0xb36c2679, 0x9edce57e), TOBN(0x52b892f4, 0xdf001d41),
+     TOBN(0xd884ae5d, 0x16a1f2c6), TOBN(0x9b329424, 0xefcc370a),
+     TOBN(0x3120daf2, 0xbd2e21df), TOBN(0x55298d2d, 0x02470a99),
+     TOBN(0x0b78af6c, 0xa05db32e), TOBN(0x5c76a331, 0x601f5636),
+     TOBN(0xaae861ff, 0xf8a4f29c), TOBN(0x70dc9240, 0xd68f8d49),
+     TOBN(0x960e649f, 0x81b1321c), TOBN(0x3d2c801b, 0x8792e4ce),
+     TOBN(0xf479f772, 0x42521876), TOBN(0x0bed93bc, 0x416c79b1),
+     TOBN(0xa67fbc05, 0x263e5bc9), TOBN(0x01e8e630, 0x521db049),
+     TOBN(0x76f26738, 0xc6f3431e), TOBN(0xe609cb02, 0xe3267541),
+     TOBN(0xb10cff2d, 0x818c877c), TOBN(0x1f0e75ce, 0x786a13cb),
+     TOBN(0xf4fdca64, 0x1158544d), TOBN(0x5d777e89, 0x6cb71ed0),
+     TOBN(0x3c233737, 0xa9aa4755), TOBN(0x7b453192, 0xe527ab40),
+     TOBN(0xdb59f688, 0x39f05ffe), TOBN(0x8f4f4be0, 0x6d82574e),
+     TOBN(0xcce3450c, 0xee292d1b), TOBN(0xaa448a12, 0x61ccd086),
+     TOBN(0xabce91b3, 0xf7914967), TOBN(0x4537f09b, 0x1908a5ed),
+     TOBN(0xa812421e, 0xf51042e7), TOBN(0xfaf5cebc, 0xec0b3a34),
+     TOBN(0x730ffd87, 0x4ca6b39a), TOBN(0x70fb72ed, 0x02efd342),
+     TOBN(0xeb4735f9, 0xd75c8edb), TOBN(0xc11f2157, 0xc278aa51),
+     TOBN(0xc459f635, 0xbf3bfebf), TOBN(0x3a1ff0b4, 0x6bd9601f),
+     TOBN(0xc9d12823, 0xc420cb73), TOBN(0x3e9af3e2, 0x3c2915a3),
+     TOBN(0xe0c82c72, 0xb41c3440), TOBN(0x175239e5, 0xe3039a5f),
+     TOBN(0xe1084b8a, 0x558795a3), TOBN(0x328d0a1d, 0xd01e5c60),
+     TOBN(0x0a495f2e, 0xd3788a04), TOBN(0x25d8ff16, 0x66c11a9f),
+     TOBN(0xf5155f05, 0x9ed692d6), TOBN(0x954fa107, 0x4f425fe4),
+     TOBN(0xd16aabf2, 0xe98aaa99), TOBN(0x90cd8ba0, 0x96b0f88a),
+     TOBN(0x957f4782, 0xc154026a), TOBN(0x54ee0734, 0x52af56d2),
+     TOBN(0xbcf89e54, 0x45b4147a), TOBN(0x3d102f21, 0x9a52816c),
+     TOBN(0x6808517e, 0x39b62e77), TOBN(0x92e25421, 0x69169ad8),
+     TOBN(0xd721d871, 0xbb608558), TOBN(0x60e4ebae, 0xf6d4ff9b),
+     TOBN(0x0ba10819, 0x41f2763e), TOBN(0xca2e45be, 0x51ee3247),
+     TOBN(0x66d172ec, 0x2bfd7a5f), TOBN(0x528a8f2f, 0x74d0b12d),
+     TOBN(0xe17f1e38, 0xdabe70dc), TOBN(0x1d5d7316, 0x9f93983c),
+     TOBN(0x51b2184a, 0xdf423e31), TOBN(0xcb417291, 0xaedb1a10),
+     TOBN(0x2054ca93, 0x625bcab9), TOBN(0x54396860, 0xa98998f0),
+     TOBN(0x4e53f6c4, 0xa54ae57e), TOBN(0x0ffeb590, 0xee648e9d),
+     TOBN(0xfbbdaadc, 0x6afaf6bc), TOBN(0xf88ae796, 0xaa3bfb8a),
+     TOBN(0x209f1d44, 0xd2359ed9), TOBN(0xac68dd03, 0xf3544ce2),
+     TOBN(0xf378da47, 0xfd51e569), TOBN(0xe1abd860, 0x2cc80097),
+     TOBN(0x23ca18d9, 0x343b6e3a), TOBN(0x480797e8, 0xb40a1bae),
+     TOBN(0xd1f0c717, 0x533f3e67), TOBN(0x44896970, 0x06e6cdfc),
+     TOBN(0x8ca21055, 0x52a82e8d), TOBN(0xb2caf785, 0x78460cdc),
+     TOBN(0x4c1b7b62, 0xe9037178), TOBN(0xefc09d2c, 0xdb514b58),
+     TOBN(0x5f2df9ee, 0x9113be5c), TOBN(0x2fbda78f, 0xb3f9271c),
+     TOBN(0xe09a81af, 0x8f83fc54), TOBN(0x06b13866, 0x8afb5141),
+     TOBN(0x38f6480f, 0x43e3865d), TOBN(0x72dd77a8, 0x1ddf47d9),
+     TOBN(0xf2a8e971, 0x4c205ff7), TOBN(0x46d449d8, 0x9d088ad8),
+     TOBN(0x926619ea, 0x185d706f), TOBN(0xe47e02eb, 0xc7dd7f62),
+     TOBN(0xe7f120a7, 0x8cbc2031), TOBN(0xc18bef00, 0x998d4ac9),
+     TOBN(0x18f37a9c, 0x6bdf22da), TOBN(0xefbc432f, 0x90dc82df),
+     TOBN(0xc52cef8e, 0x5d703651), TOBN(0x82887ba0, 0xd99881a5),
+     TOBN(0x7cec9dda, 0xb920ec1d), TOBN(0xd0d7e8c3, 0xec3e8d3b),
+     TOBN(0x445bc395, 0x4ca88747), TOBN(0xedeaa2e0, 0x9fd53535),
+     TOBN(0x461b1d93, 0x6cc87475), TOBN(0xd92a52e2, 0x6d2383bd),
+     TOBN(0xfabccb59, 0xd7903546), TOBN(0x6111a761, 0x3d14b112),
+     TOBN(0x0ae584fe, 0xb3d5f612), TOBN(0x5ea69b8d, 0x60e828ec),
+     TOBN(0x6c078985, 0x54087030), TOBN(0x649cab04, 0xac4821fe),
+     TOBN(0x25ecedcf, 0x8bdce214), TOBN(0xb5622f72, 0x86af7361),
+     TOBN(0x0e1227aa, 0x7038b9e2), TOBN(0xd0efb273, 0xac20fa77),
+     TOBN(0x817ff88b, 0x79df975b), TOBN(0x856bf286, 0x1999503e),
+     TOBN(0xb4d5351f, 0x5038ec46), TOBN(0x740a52c5, 0xfc42af6e),
+     TOBN(0x2e38bb15, 0x2cbb1a3f), TOBN(0xc3eb99fe, 0x17a83429),
+     TOBN(0xca4fcbf1, 0xdd66bb74), TOBN(0x880784d6, 0xcde5e8fc),
+     TOBN(0xddc84c1c, 0xb4e7a0be), TOBN(0x8780510d, 0xbd15a72f),
+     TOBN(0x44bcf1af, 0x81ec30e1), TOBN(0x141e50a8, 0x0a61073e),
+     TOBN(0x0d955718, 0x47be87ae), TOBN(0x68a61417, 0xf76a4372),
+     TOBN(0xf57e7e87, 0xc607c3d3), TOBN(0x043afaf8, 0x5252f332),
+     TOBN(0xcc14e121, 0x1552a4d2), TOBN(0xb6dee692, 0xbb4d4ab4),
+     TOBN(0xb6ab74c8, 0xa03816a4), TOBN(0x84001ae4, 0x6f394a29),
+     TOBN(0x5bed8344, 0xd795fb45), TOBN(0x57326e7d, 0xb79f55a5),
+     TOBN(0xc9533ce0, 0x4accdffc), TOBN(0x53473caf, 0x3993fa04),
+     TOBN(0x7906eb93, 0xa13df4c8), TOBN(0xa73e51f6, 0x97cbe46f),
+     TOBN(0xd1ab3ae1, 0x0ae4ccf8), TOBN(0x25614508, 0x8a5b3dbc),
+     TOBN(0x61eff962, 0x11a71b27), TOBN(0xdf71412b, 0x6bb7fa39),
+     TOBN(0xb31ba6b8, 0x2bd7f3ef), TOBN(0xb0b9c415, 0x69180d29),
+     TOBN(0xeec14552, 0x014cdde5), TOBN(0x702c624b, 0x227b4bbb),
+     TOBN(0x2b15e8c2, 0xd3e988f3), TOBN(0xee3bcc6d, 0xa4f7fd04),
+     TOBN(0x9d00822a, 0x42ac6c85), TOBN(0x2db0cea6, 0x1df9f2b7),
+     TOBN(0xd7cad2ab, 0x42de1e58), TOBN(0x346ed526, 0x2d6fbb61),
+     TOBN(0xb3962995, 0x1a2faf09), TOBN(0x2fa8a580, 0x7c25612e),
+     TOBN(0x30ae04da, 0x7cf56490), TOBN(0x75662908, 0x0eea3961),
+     TOBN(0x3609f5c5, 0x3d080847), TOBN(0xcb081d39, 0x5241d4f6),
+     TOBN(0xb4fb3810, 0x77961a63), TOBN(0xc20c5984, 0x2abb66fc),
+     TOBN(0x3d40aa7c, 0xf902f245), TOBN(0x9cb12736, 0x4e536b1e),
+     TOBN(0x5eda24da, 0x99b3134f), TOBN(0xafbd9c69, 0x5cd011af),
+     TOBN(0x9a16e30a, 0xc7088c7d), TOBN(0x5ab65710, 0x3207389f),
+     TOBN(0x1b09547f, 0xe7407a53), TOBN(0x2322f9d7, 0x4fdc6eab),
+     TOBN(0xc0f2f22d, 0x7430de4d), TOBN(0x19382696, 0xe68ca9a9),
+     TOBN(0x17f1eff1, 0x918e5868), TOBN(0xe3b5b635, 0x586f4204),
+     TOBN(0x146ef980, 0x3fbc4341), TOBN(0x359f2c80, 0x5b5eed4e),
+     TOBN(0x9f35744e, 0x7482e41d), TOBN(0x9a9ac3ec, 0xf3b224c2),
+     TOBN(0x9161a6fe, 0x91fc50ae), TOBN(0x89ccc66b, 0xc613fa7c),
+     TOBN(0x89268b14, 0xc732f15a), TOBN(0x7cd6f4e2, 0xb467ed03),
+     TOBN(0xfbf79869, 0xce56b40e), TOBN(0xf93e094c, 0xc02dde98),
+     TOBN(0xefe0c3a8, 0xedee2cd7), TOBN(0x90f3ffc0, 0xb268fd42),
+     TOBN(0x81a7fd56, 0x08241aed), TOBN(0x95ab7ad8, 0x00b1afe8),
+     TOBN(0x40127056, 0x3e310d52), TOBN(0xd3ffdeb1, 0x09d9fc43),
+     TOBN(0xc8f85c91, 0xd11a8594), TOBN(0x2e74d258, 0x31cf6db8),
+     TOBN(0x829c7ca3, 0x02b5dfd0), TOBN(0xe389cfbe, 0x69143c86),
+     TOBN(0xd01b6405, 0x941768d8), TOBN(0x45103995, 0x03bf825d),
+     TOBN(0xcc4ee166, 0x56cd17e2), TOBN(0xbea3c283, 0xba037e79),
+     TOBN(0x4e1ac06e, 0xd9a47520), TOBN(0xfbfe18aa, 0xaf852404),
+     TOBN(0x5615f8e2, 0x8087648a), TOBN(0x7301e47e, 0xb9d150d9),
+     TOBN(0x79f9f9dd, 0xb299b977), TOBN(0x76697a7b, 0xa5b78314),
+     TOBN(0x10d67468, 0x7d7c90e7), TOBN(0x7afffe03, 0x937210b5),
+     TOBN(0x5aef3e4b, 0x28c22cee), TOBN(0xefb0ecd8, 0x09fd55ae),
+     TOBN(0x4cea7132, 0x0d2a5d6a), TOBN(0x9cfb5fa1, 0x01db6357),
+     TOBN(0x395e0b57, 0xf36e1ac5), TOBN(0x008fa9ad, 0x36cafb7d),
+     TOBN(0x8f6cdf70, 0x5308c4db), TOBN(0x51527a37, 0x95ed2477),
+     TOBN(0xba0dee30, 0x5bd21311), TOBN(0x6ed41b22, 0x909c90d7),
+     TOBN(0xc5f6b758, 0x7c8696d3), TOBN(0x0db8eaa8, 0x3ce83a80),
+     TOBN(0xd297fe37, 0xb24b4b6f), TOBN(0xfe58afe8, 0x522d1f0d),
+     TOBN(0x97358736, 0x8c98dbd9), TOBN(0x6bc226ca, 0x9454a527),
+     TOBN(0xa12b384e, 0xce53c2d0), TOBN(0x779d897d, 0x5e4606da),
+     TOBN(0xa53e47b0, 0x73ec12b0), TOBN(0x462dbbba, 0x5756f1ad),
+     TOBN(0x69fe09f2, 0xcafe37b6), TOBN(0x273d1ebf, 0xecce2e17),
+     TOBN(0x8ac1d538, 0x3cf607fd), TOBN(0x8035f7ff, 0x12e10c25),}
+    ,
+    {TOBN(0x854d34c7, 0x7e6c5520), TOBN(0xc27df9ef, 0xdcb9ea58),
+     TOBN(0x405f2369, 0xd686666d), TOBN(0x29d1febf, 0x0417aa85),
+     TOBN(0x9846819e, 0x93470afe), TOBN(0x3e6a9669, 0xe2a27f9e),
+     TOBN(0x24d008a2, 0xe31e6504), TOBN(0xdba7cecf, 0x9cb7680a),
+     TOBN(0xecaff541, 0x338d6e43), TOBN(0x56f7dd73, 0x4541d5cc),
+     TOBN(0xb5d426de, 0x96bc88ca), TOBN(0x48d94f6b, 0x9ed3a2c3),
+     TOBN(0x6354a3bb, 0x2ef8279c), TOBN(0xd575465b, 0x0b1867f2),
+     TOBN(0xef99b0ff, 0x95225151), TOBN(0xf3e19d88, 0xf94500d8),
+     TOBN(0x92a83268, 0xe32dd620), TOBN(0x913ec99f, 0x627849a2),
+     TOBN(0xedd8fdfa, 0x2c378882), TOBN(0xaf96f33e, 0xee6f8cfe),
+     TOBN(0xc06737e5, 0xdc3fa8a5), TOBN(0x236bb531, 0xb0b03a1d),
+     TOBN(0x33e59f29, 0x89f037b0), TOBN(0x13f9b5a7, 0xd9a12a53),
+     TOBN(0x0d0df6ce, 0x51efb310), TOBN(0xcb5b2eb4, 0x958df5be),
+     TOBN(0xd6459e29, 0x36158e59), TOBN(0x82aae2b9, 0x1466e336),
+     TOBN(0xfb658a39, 0x411aa636), TOBN(0x7152ecc5, 0xd4c0a933),
+     TOBN(0xf10c758a, 0x49f026b7), TOBN(0xf4837f97, 0xcb09311f),
+     TOBN(0xddfb02c4, 0xc753c45f), TOBN(0x18ca81b6, 0xf9c840fe),
+     TOBN(0x846fd09a, 0xb0f8a3e6), TOBN(0xb1162add, 0xe7733dbc),
+     TOBN(0x7070ad20, 0x236e3ab6), TOBN(0xf88cdaf5, 0xb2a56326),
+     TOBN(0x05fc8719, 0x997cbc7a), TOBN(0x442cd452, 0x4b665272),
+     TOBN(0x7807f364, 0xb71698f5), TOBN(0x6ba418d2, 0x9f7b605e),
+     TOBN(0xfd20b00f, 0xa03b2cbb), TOBN(0x883eca37, 0xda54386f),
+     TOBN(0xff0be43f, 0xf3437f24), TOBN(0xe910b432, 0xa48bb33c),
+     TOBN(0x4963a128, 0x329df765), TOBN(0xac1dd556, 0xbe2fe6f7),
+     TOBN(0x557610f9, 0x24a0a3fc), TOBN(0x38e17bf4, 0xe881c3f9),
+     TOBN(0x6ba84faf, 0xed0dac99), TOBN(0xd4a222c3, 0x59eeb918),
+     TOBN(0xc79c1dbe, 0x13f542b6), TOBN(0x1fc65e0d, 0xe425d457),
+     TOBN(0xeffb754f, 0x1debb779), TOBN(0x638d8fd0, 0x9e08af60),
+     TOBN(0x994f523a, 0x626332d5), TOBN(0x7bc38833, 0x5561bb44),
+     TOBN(0x005ed4b0, 0x3d845ea2), TOBN(0xd39d3ee1, 0xc2a1f08a),
+     TOBN(0x6561fdd3, 0xe7676b0d), TOBN(0x620e35ff, 0xfb706017),
+     TOBN(0x36ce424f, 0xf264f9a8), TOBN(0xc4c3419f, 0xda2681f7),
+     TOBN(0xfb6afd2f, 0x69beb6e8), TOBN(0x3a50b993, 0x6d700d03),
+     TOBN(0xc840b2ad, 0x0c83a14f), TOBN(0x573207be, 0x54085bef),
+     TOBN(0x5af882e3, 0x09fe7e5b), TOBN(0x957678a4, 0x3b40a7e1),
+     TOBN(0x172d4bdd, 0x543056e2), TOBN(0x9c1b26b4, 0x0df13c0a),
+     TOBN(0x1c30861c, 0xf405ff06), TOBN(0xebac86bd, 0x486e828b),
+     TOBN(0xe791a971, 0x636933fc), TOBN(0x50e7c2be, 0x7aeee947),
+     TOBN(0xc3d4a095, 0xfa90d767), TOBN(0xae60eb7b, 0xe670ab7b),
+     TOBN(0x17633a64, 0x397b056d), TOBN(0x93a21f33, 0x105012aa),
+     TOBN(0x663c370b, 0xabb88643), TOBN(0x91df36d7, 0x22e21599),
+     TOBN(0x183ba835, 0x8b761671), TOBN(0x381eea1d, 0x728f3bf1),
+     TOBN(0xb9b2f1ba, 0x39966e6c), TOBN(0x7c464a28, 0xe7295492),
+     TOBN(0x0fd5f70a, 0x09b26b7f), TOBN(0xa9aba1f9, 0xfbe009df),
+     TOBN(0x857c1f22, 0x369b87ad), TOBN(0x3c00e5d9, 0x32fca556),
+     TOBN(0x1ad74cab, 0x90b06466), TOBN(0xa7112386, 0x550faaf2),
+     TOBN(0x7435e198, 0x6d9bd5f5), TOBN(0x2dcc7e38, 0x59c3463f),
+     TOBN(0xdc7df748, 0xca7bd4b2), TOBN(0x13cd4c08, 0x9dec2f31),
+     TOBN(0x0d3b5df8, 0xe3237710), TOBN(0x0dadb26e, 0xcbd2f7b0),
+     TOBN(0x9f5966ab, 0xe4aa082b), TOBN(0x666ec8de, 0x350e966e),
+     TOBN(0x1bfd1ed5, 0xee524216), TOBN(0xcd93c59b, 0x41dab0b6),
+     TOBN(0x658a8435, 0xd186d6ba), TOBN(0x1b7d34d2, 0x159d1195),
+     TOBN(0x5936e460, 0x22caf46b), TOBN(0x6a45dd8f, 0x9a96fe4f),
+     TOBN(0xf7925434, 0xb98f474e), TOBN(0x41410412, 0x0053ef15),
+     TOBN(0x71cf8d12, 0x41de97bf), TOBN(0xb8547b61, 0xbd80bef4),
+     TOBN(0xb47d3970, 0xc4db0037), TOBN(0xf1bcd328, 0xfef20dff),
+     TOBN(0x31a92e09, 0x10caad67), TOBN(0x1f591960, 0x5531a1e1),
+     TOBN(0x3bb852e0, 0x5f4fc840), TOBN(0x63e297ca, 0x93a72c6c),
+     TOBN(0x3c2b0b2e, 0x49abad67), TOBN(0x6ec405fc, 0xed3db0d9),
+     TOBN(0xdc14a530, 0x7fef1d40), TOBN(0xccd19846, 0x280896fc),
+     TOBN(0x00f83176, 0x9bb81648), TOBN(0xd69eb485, 0x653120d0),
+     TOBN(0xd17d75f4, 0x4ccabc62), TOBN(0x34a07f82, 0xb749fcb1),
+     TOBN(0x2c3af787, 0xbbfb5554), TOBN(0xb06ed4d0, 0x62e283f8),
+     TOBN(0x5722889f, 0xa19213a0), TOBN(0x162b085e, 0xdcf3c7b4),
+     TOBN(0xbcaecb31, 0xe0dd3eca), TOBN(0xc6237fbc, 0xe52f13a5),
+     TOBN(0xcc2b6b03, 0x27bac297), TOBN(0x2ae1cac5, 0xb917f54a),
+     TOBN(0x474807d4, 0x7845ae4f), TOBN(0xfec7dd92, 0xce5972e0),
+     TOBN(0xc3bd2541, 0x1d7915bb), TOBN(0x66f85dc4, 0xd94907ca),
+     TOBN(0xd981b888, 0xbdbcf0ca), TOBN(0xd75f5da6, 0xdf279e9f),
+     TOBN(0x128bbf24, 0x7054e934), TOBN(0x3c6ff6e5, 0x81db134b),
+     TOBN(0x795b7cf4, 0x047d26e4), TOBN(0xf370f7b8, 0x5049ec37),
+     TOBN(0xc6712d4d, 0xced945af), TOBN(0xdf30b5ec, 0x095642bc),
+     TOBN(0x9b034c62, 0x4896246e), TOBN(0x5652c016, 0xee90bbd1),
+     TOBN(0xeb38636f, 0x87fedb73), TOBN(0x5e32f847, 0x0135a613),
+     TOBN(0x0703b312, 0xcf933c83), TOBN(0xd05bb76e, 0x1a7f47e6),
+     TOBN(0x825e4f0c, 0x949c2415), TOBN(0x569e5622, 0x7250d6f8),
+     TOBN(0xbbe9eb3a, 0x6568013e), TOBN(0x8dbd203f, 0x22f243fc),
+     TOBN(0x9dbd7694, 0xb342734a), TOBN(0x8f6d12f8, 0x46afa984),
+     TOBN(0xb98610a2, 0xc9eade29), TOBN(0xbab4f323, 0x47dd0f18),
+     TOBN(0x5779737b, 0x671c0d46), TOBN(0x10b6a7c6, 0xd3e0a42a),
+     TOBN(0xfb19ddf3, 0x3035b41c), TOBN(0xd336343f, 0x99c45895),
+     TOBN(0x61fe4938, 0x54c857e5), TOBN(0xc4d506be, 0xae4e57d5),
+     TOBN(0x3cd8c8cb, 0xbbc33f75), TOBN(0x7281f08a, 0x9262c77d),
+     TOBN(0x083f4ea6, 0xf11a2823), TOBN(0x8895041e, 0x9fba2e33),
+     TOBN(0xfcdfea49, 0x9c438edf), TOBN(0x7678dcc3, 0x91edba44),
+     TOBN(0xf07b3b87, 0xe2ba50f0), TOBN(0xc13888ef, 0x43948c1b),
+     TOBN(0xc2135ad4, 0x1140af42), TOBN(0x8e5104f3, 0x926ed1a7),
+     TOBN(0xf24430cb, 0x88f6695f), TOBN(0x0ce0637b, 0x6d73c120),
+     TOBN(0xb2db01e6, 0xfe631e8f), TOBN(0x1c5563d7, 0xd7bdd24b),
+     TOBN(0x8daea3ba, 0x369ad44f), TOBN(0x000c81b6, 0x8187a9f9),
+     TOBN(0x5f48a951, 0xaae1fd9a), TOBN(0xe35626c7, 0x8d5aed8a),
+     TOBN(0x20952763, 0x0498c622), TOBN(0x76d17634, 0x773aa504),
+     TOBN(0x36d90dda, 0xeb300f7a), TOBN(0x9dcf7dfc, 0xedb5e801),
+     TOBN(0x645cb268, 0x74d5244c), TOBN(0xa127ee79, 0x348e3aa2),
+     TOBN(0x488acc53, 0x575f1dbb), TOBN(0x95037e85, 0x80e6161e),
+     TOBN(0x57e59283, 0x292650d0), TOBN(0xabe67d99, 0x14938216),
+     TOBN(0x3c7f944b, 0x3f8e1065), TOBN(0xed908cb6, 0x330e8924),
+     TOBN(0x08ee8fd5, 0x6f530136), TOBN(0x2227b7d5, 0xd7ffc169),
+     TOBN(0x4f55c893, 0xb5cd6dd5), TOBN(0x82225e11, 0xa62796e8),
+     TOBN(0x5c6cead1, 0xcb18e12c), TOBN(0x4381ae0c, 0x84f5a51a),
+     TOBN(0x345913d3, 0x7fafa4c8), TOBN(0x3d918082, 0x0491aac0),
+     TOBN(0x9347871f, 0x3e69264c), TOBN(0xbea9dd3c, 0xb4f4f0cd),
+     TOBN(0xbda5d067, 0x3eadd3e7), TOBN(0x0033c1b8, 0x0573bcd8),
+     TOBN(0x25589379, 0x5da2486c), TOBN(0xcb89ee5b, 0x86abbee7),
+     TOBN(0x8fe0a8f3, 0x22532e5d), TOBN(0xb6410ff0, 0x727dfc4c),
+     TOBN(0x619b9d58, 0x226726db), TOBN(0x5ec25669, 0x7a2b2dc7),
+     TOBN(0xaf4d2e06, 0x4c3beb01), TOBN(0x852123d0, 0x7acea556),
+     TOBN(0x0e9470fa, 0xf783487a), TOBN(0x75a7ea04, 0x5664b3eb),
+     TOBN(0x4ad78f35, 0x6798e4ba), TOBN(0x9214e6e5, 0xc7d0e091),
+     TOBN(0xc420b488, 0xb1290403), TOBN(0x64049e0a, 0xfc295749),
+     TOBN(0x03ef5af1, 0x3ae9841f), TOBN(0xdbe4ca19, 0xb0b662a6),
+     TOBN(0x46845c5f, 0xfa453458), TOBN(0xf8dabf19, 0x10b66722),
+     TOBN(0xb650f0aa, 0xcce2793b), TOBN(0x71db851e, 0xc5ec47c1),
+     TOBN(0x3eb78f3e, 0x3b234fa9), TOBN(0xb0c60f35, 0xfc0106ce),
+     TOBN(0x05427121, 0x774eadbd), TOBN(0x25367faf, 0xce323863),
+     TOBN(0x7541b5c9, 0xcd086976), TOBN(0x4ff069e2, 0xdc507ad1),
+     TOBN(0x74145256, 0x8776e667), TOBN(0x6e76142c, 0xb23c6bb5),
+     TOBN(0xdbf30712, 0x1b3a8a87), TOBN(0x60e7363e, 0x98450836),
+     TOBN(0x5741450e, 0xb7366d80), TOBN(0xe4ee14ca, 0x4837dbdf),
+     TOBN(0xa765eb9b, 0x69d4316f), TOBN(0x04548dca, 0x8ef43825),
+     TOBN(0x9c9f4e4c, 0x5ae888eb), TOBN(0x733abb51, 0x56e9ac99),
+     TOBN(0xdaad3c20, 0xba6ac029), TOBN(0x9b8dd3d3, 0x2ba3e38e),
+     TOBN(0xa9bb4c92, 0x0bc5d11a), TOBN(0xf20127a7, 0x9c5f88a3),
+     TOBN(0x4f52b06e, 0x161d3cb8), TOBN(0x26c1ff09, 0x6afaf0a6),
+     TOBN(0x32670d2f, 0x7189e71f), TOBN(0xc6438748, 0x5ecf91e7),
+     TOBN(0x15758e57, 0xdb757a21), TOBN(0x427d09f8, 0x290a9ce5),
+     TOBN(0x846a308f, 0x38384a7a), TOBN(0xaac3acb4, 0xb0732b99),
+     TOBN(0x9e941009, 0x17845819), TOBN(0x95cba111, 0xa7ce5e03),
+     TOBN(0x6f3d4f7f, 0xb00009c4), TOBN(0xb8396c27, 0x8ff28b5f),
+     TOBN(0xb1a9ae43, 0x1c97975d), TOBN(0x9d7ba8af, 0xe5d9fed5),
+     TOBN(0x338cf09f, 0x34f485b6), TOBN(0xbc0ddacc, 0x64122516),
+     TOBN(0xa450da12, 0x05d471fe), TOBN(0x4c3a6250, 0x628dd8c9),
+     TOBN(0x69c7d103, 0xd1295837), TOBN(0xa2893e50, 0x3807eb2f),
+     TOBN(0xd6e1e1de, 0xbdb41491), TOBN(0xc630745b, 0x5e138235),
+     TOBN(0xc892109e, 0x48661ae1), TOBN(0x8d17e7eb, 0xea2b2674),
+     TOBN(0x00ec0f87, 0xc328d6b5), TOBN(0x6d858645, 0xf079ff9e),
+     TOBN(0x6cdf243e, 0x19115ead), TOBN(0x1ce1393e, 0x4bac4fcf),
+     TOBN(0x2c960ed0, 0x9c29f25b), TOBN(0x59be4d8e, 0x9d388a05),
+     TOBN(0x0d46e06c, 0xd0def72b), TOBN(0xb923db5d, 0xe0342748),
+     TOBN(0xf7d3aacd, 0x936d4a3d), TOBN(0x558519cc, 0x0b0b099e),
+     TOBN(0x3ea8ebf8, 0x827097ef), TOBN(0x259353db, 0xd054f55d),
+     TOBN(0x84c89abc, 0x6d2ed089), TOBN(0x5c548b69, 0x8e096a7c),
+     TOBN(0xd587f616, 0x994b995d), TOBN(0x4d1531f6, 0xa5845601),
+     TOBN(0x792ab31e, 0x451fd9f0), TOBN(0xc8b57bb2, 0x65adf6ca),
+     TOBN(0x68440fcb, 0x1cd5ad73), TOBN(0xb9c860e6, 0x6144da4f),
+     TOBN(0x2ab286aa, 0x8462beb8), TOBN(0xcc6b8fff, 0xef46797f),
+     TOBN(0xac820da4, 0x20c8a471), TOBN(0x69ae05a1, 0x77ff7faf),
+     TOBN(0xb9163f39, 0xbfb5da77), TOBN(0xbd03e590, 0x2c73ab7a),
+     TOBN(0x7e862b5e, 0xb2940d9e), TOBN(0x3c663d86, 0x4b9af564),
+     TOBN(0xd8309031, 0xbde3033d), TOBN(0x298231b2, 0xd42c5bc6),
+     TOBN(0x42090d2c, 0x552ad093), TOBN(0xa4799d1c, 0xff854695),
+     TOBN(0x0a88b5d6, 0xd31f0d00), TOBN(0xf8b40825, 0xa2f26b46),
+     TOBN(0xec29b1ed, 0xf1bd7218), TOBN(0xd491c53b, 0x4b24c86e),
+     TOBN(0xd2fe588f, 0x3395ea65), TOBN(0x6f3764f7, 0x4456ef15),
+     TOBN(0xdb43116d, 0xcdc34800), TOBN(0xcdbcd456, 0xc1e33955),
+     TOBN(0xefdb5540, 0x74ab286b), TOBN(0x948c7a51, 0xd18c5d7c),
+     TOBN(0xeb81aa37, 0x7378058e), TOBN(0x41c746a1, 0x04411154),
+     TOBN(0xa10c73bc, 0xfb828ac7), TOBN(0x6439be91, 0x9d972b29),
+     TOBN(0x4bf3b4b0, 0x43a2fbad), TOBN(0x39e6dadf, 0x82b5e840),
+     TOBN(0x4f716408, 0x6397bd4c), TOBN(0x0f7de568, 0x7f1eeccb),
+     TOBN(0x5865c5a1, 0xd2ffbfc1), TOBN(0xf74211fa, 0x4ccb6451),
+     TOBN(0x66368a88, 0xc0b32558), TOBN(0x5b539dc2, 0x9ad7812e),
+     TOBN(0x579483d0, 0x2f3af6f6), TOBN(0x52132078, 0x99934ece),
+     TOBN(0x50b9650f, 0xdcc9e983), TOBN(0xca989ec9, 0xaee42b8a),
+     TOBN(0x6a44c829, 0xd6f62f99), TOBN(0x8f06a309, 0x4c2a7c0c),
+     TOBN(0x4ea2b3a0, 0x98a0cb0a), TOBN(0x5c547b70, 0xbeee8364),
+     TOBN(0x461d40e1, 0x682afe11), TOBN(0x9e0fc77a, 0x7b41c0a8),
+     TOBN(0x79e4aefd, 0xe20d5d36), TOBN(0x2916e520, 0x32dd9f63),
+     TOBN(0xf59e52e8, 0x3f883faf), TOBN(0x396f9639, 0x2b868d35),
+     TOBN(0xc902a9df, 0x4ca19881), TOBN(0x0fc96822, 0xdb2401a6),
+     TOBN(0x41237587, 0x66f1c68d), TOBN(0x10fc6de3, 0xfb476c0d),
+     TOBN(0xf8b6b579, 0x841f5d90), TOBN(0x2ba8446c, 0xfa24f44a),
+     TOBN(0xa237b920, 0xef4a9975), TOBN(0x60bb6004, 0x2330435f),
+     TOBN(0xd6f4ab5a, 0xcfb7e7b5), TOBN(0xb2ac5097, 0x83435391),
+     TOBN(0xf036ee2f, 0xb0d1ea67), TOBN(0xae779a6a, 0x74c56230),
+     TOBN(0x59bff8c8, 0xab838ae6), TOBN(0xcd83ca99, 0x9b38e6f0),
+     TOBN(0xbb27bef5, 0xe33deed3), TOBN(0xe6356f6f, 0x001892a8),
+     TOBN(0xbf3be6cc, 0x7adfbd3e), TOBN(0xaecbc81c, 0x33d1ac9d),
+     TOBN(0xe4feb909, 0xe6e861dc), TOBN(0x90a247a4, 0x53f5f801),
+     TOBN(0x01c50acb, 0x27346e57), TOBN(0xce29242e, 0x461acc1b),
+     TOBN(0x04dd214a, 0x2f998a91), TOBN(0x271ee9b1, 0xd4baf27b),
+     TOBN(0x7e3027d1, 0xe8c26722), TOBN(0x21d1645c, 0x1820dce5),
+     TOBN(0x086f242c, 0x7501779c), TOBN(0xf0061407, 0xfa0e8009),
+     TOBN(0xf23ce477, 0x60187129), TOBN(0x05bbdedb, 0x0fde9bd0),
+     TOBN(0x682f4832, 0x25d98473), TOBN(0xf207fe85, 0x5c658427),
+     TOBN(0xb6fdd7ba, 0x4166ffa1), TOBN(0x0c314056, 0x9eed799d),
+     TOBN(0x0db8048f, 0x4107e28f), TOBN(0x74ed3871, 0x41216840),
+     TOBN(0x74489f8f, 0x56a3c06e), TOBN(0x1e1c005b, 0x12777134),
+     TOBN(0xdb332a73, 0xf37ec3c3), TOBN(0xc65259bd, 0xdd59eba0),
+     TOBN(0x2291709c, 0xdb4d3257), TOBN(0x9a793b25, 0xbd389390),
+     TOBN(0xf39fe34b, 0xe43756f0), TOBN(0x2f76bdce, 0x9afb56c9),
+     TOBN(0x9f37867a, 0x61208b27), TOBN(0xea1d4307, 0x089972c3),
+     TOBN(0x8c595330, 0x8bdf623a), TOBN(0x5f5accda, 0x8441fb7d),
+     TOBN(0xfafa9418, 0x32ddfd95), TOBN(0x6ad40c5a, 0x0fde9be7),
+     TOBN(0x43faba89, 0xaeca8709), TOBN(0xc64a7cf1, 0x2c248a9d),
+     TOBN(0x16620252, 0x72637a76), TOBN(0xaee1c791, 0x22b8d1bb),
+     TOBN(0xf0f798fd, 0x21a843b2), TOBN(0x56e4ed4d, 0x8d005cb1),
+     TOBN(0x355f7780, 0x1f0d8abe), TOBN(0x197b04cf, 0x34522326),
+     TOBN(0x41f9b31f, 0xfd42c13f), TOBN(0x5ef7feb2, 0xb40f933d),
+     TOBN(0x27326f42, 0x5d60bad4), TOBN(0x027ecdb2, 0x8c92cf89),
+     TOBN(0x04aae4d1, 0x4e3352fe), TOBN(0x08414d2f, 0x73591b90),
+     TOBN(0x5ed6124e, 0xb7da7d60), TOBN(0xb985b931, 0x4d13d4ec),
+     TOBN(0xa592d3ab, 0x96bf36f9), TOBN(0x012dbed5, 0xbbdf51df),
+     TOBN(0xa57963c0, 0xdf6c177d), TOBN(0x010ec869, 0x87ca29cf),
+     TOBN(0xba1700f6, 0xbf926dff), TOBN(0x7c9fdbd1, 0xf4bf6bc2),
+     TOBN(0xdc18dc8f, 0x64da11f5), TOBN(0xa6074b7a, 0xd938ae75),
+     TOBN(0x14270066, 0xe84f44a4), TOBN(0x99998d38, 0xd27b954e),
+     TOBN(0xc1be8ab2, 0xb4f38e9a), TOBN(0x8bb55bbf, 0x15c01016),
+     TOBN(0xf73472b4, 0x0ea2ab30), TOBN(0xd365a340, 0xf73d68dd),
+     TOBN(0xc01a7168, 0x19c2e1eb), TOBN(0x32f49e37, 0x34061719),
+     TOBN(0xb73c57f1, 0x01d8b4d6), TOBN(0x03c8423c, 0x26b47700),
+     TOBN(0x321d0bc8, 0xa4d8826a), TOBN(0x6004213c, 0x4bc0e638),
+     TOBN(0xf78c64a1, 0xc1c06681), TOBN(0x16e0a16f, 0xef018e50),
+     TOBN(0x31cbdf91, 0xdb42b2b3), TOBN(0xf8f4ffce, 0xe0d36f58),
+     TOBN(0xcdcc71cd, 0x4cc5e3e0), TOBN(0xd55c7cfa, 0xa129e3e0),
+     TOBN(0xccdb6ba0, 0x0fb2cbf1), TOBN(0x6aba0005, 0xc4bce3cb),
+     TOBN(0x501cdb30, 0xd232cfc4), TOBN(0x9ddcf12e, 0xd58a3cef),
+     TOBN(0x02d2cf9c, 0x87e09149), TOBN(0xdc5d7ec7, 0x2c976257),
+     TOBN(0x6447986e, 0x0b50d7dd), TOBN(0x88fdbaf7, 0x807f112a),
+     TOBN(0x58c9822a, 0xb00ae9f6), TOBN(0x6abfb950, 0x6d3d27e0),
+     TOBN(0xd0a74487, 0x8a429f4f), TOBN(0x0649712b, 0xdb516609),
+     TOBN(0xb826ba57, 0xe769b5df), TOBN(0x82335df2, 0x1fc7aaf2),
+     TOBN(0x2389f067, 0x5c93d995), TOBN(0x59ac367a, 0x68677be6),
+     TOBN(0xa77985ff, 0x21d9951b), TOBN(0x038956fb, 0x85011cce),
+     TOBN(0x608e48cb, 0xbb734e37), TOBN(0xc08c0bf2, 0x2be5b26f),
+     TOBN(0x17bbdd3b, 0xf9b1a0d9), TOBN(0xeac7d898, 0x10483319),
+     TOBN(0xc95c4baf, 0xbc1a6dea), TOBN(0xfdd0e2bf, 0x172aafdb),
+     TOBN(0x40373cbc, 0x8235c41a), TOBN(0x14303f21, 0xfb6f41d5),
+     TOBN(0xba063621, 0x0408f237), TOBN(0xcad3b09a, 0xecd2d1ed),
+     TOBN(0x4667855a, 0x52abb6a2), TOBN(0xba9157dc, 0xaa8b417b),
+     TOBN(0xfe7f3507, 0x4f013efb), TOBN(0x1b112c4b, 0xaa38c4a2),
+     TOBN(0xa1406a60, 0x9ba64345), TOBN(0xe53cba33, 0x6993c80b),
+     TOBN(0x45466063, 0xded40d23), TOBN(0x3d5f1f4d, 0x54908e25),
+     TOBN(0x9ebefe62, 0x403c3c31), TOBN(0x274ea0b5, 0x0672a624),
+     TOBN(0xff818d99, 0x451d1b71), TOBN(0x80e82643, 0x8f79cf79),
+     TOBN(0xa165df13, 0x73ce37f5), TOBN(0xa744ef4f, 0xfe3a21fd),
+     TOBN(0x73f1e7f5, 0xcf551396), TOBN(0xc616898e, 0x868c676b),
+     TOBN(0x671c28c7, 0x8c442c36), TOBN(0xcfe5e558, 0x5e0a317d),
+     TOBN(0x1242d818, 0x7051f476), TOBN(0x56fad2a6, 0x14f03442),
+     TOBN(0x262068bc, 0x0a44d0f6), TOBN(0xdfa2cd6e, 0xce6edf4e),
+     TOBN(0x0f43813a, 0xd15d1517), TOBN(0x61214cb2, 0x377d44f5),
+     TOBN(0xd399aa29, 0xc639b35f), TOBN(0x42136d71, 0x54c51c19),
+     TOBN(0x9774711b, 0x08417221), TOBN(0x0a5546b3, 0x52545a57),
+     TOBN(0x80624c41, 0x1150582d), TOBN(0x9ec5c418, 0xfbc555bc),
+     TOBN(0x2c87dcad, 0x771849f1), TOBN(0xb0c932c5, 0x01d7bf6f),
+     TOBN(0x6aa5cd3e, 0x89116eb2), TOBN(0xd378c25a, 0x51ca7bd3),
+     TOBN(0xc612a0da, 0x9e6e3e31), TOBN(0x0417a54d, 0xb68ad5d0),
+     TOBN(0x00451e4a, 0x22c6edb8), TOBN(0x9fbfe019, 0xb42827ce),
+     TOBN(0x2fa92505, 0xba9384a2), TOBN(0x21b8596e, 0x64ad69c1),
+     TOBN(0x8f4fcc49, 0x983b35a6), TOBN(0xde093760, 0x72754672),
+     TOBN(0x2f14ccc8, 0xf7bffe6d), TOBN(0x27566bff, 0x5d94263d),
+     TOBN(0xb5b4e9c6, 0x2df3ec30), TOBN(0x94f1d7d5, 0x3e6ea6ba),
+     TOBN(0x97b7851a, 0xaaca5e9b), TOBN(0x518aa521, 0x56713b97),
+     TOBN(0x3357e8c7, 0x150a61f6), TOBN(0x7842e7e2, 0xec2c2b69),
+     TOBN(0x8dffaf65, 0x6868a548), TOBN(0xd963bd82, 0xe068fc81),
+     TOBN(0x64da5c8b, 0x65917733), TOBN(0x927090ff, 0x7b247328),}
+    ,
+    {TOBN(0x214bc9a7, 0xd298c241), TOBN(0xe3b697ba, 0x56807cfd),
+     TOBN(0xef1c7802, 0x4564eadb), TOBN(0xdde8cdcf, 0xb48149c5),
+     TOBN(0x946bf0a7, 0x5a4d2604), TOBN(0x27154d7f, 0x6c1538af),
+     TOBN(0x95cc9230, 0xde5b1fcc), TOBN(0xd88519e9, 0x66864f82),
+     TOBN(0xb828dd1a, 0x7cb1282c), TOBN(0xa08d7626, 0xbe46973a),
+     TOBN(0x6baf8d40, 0xe708d6b2), TOBN(0x72571fa1, 0x4daeb3f3),
+     TOBN(0x85b1732f, 0xf22dfd98), TOBN(0x87ab01a7, 0x0087108d),
+     TOBN(0xaaaafea8, 0x5988207a), TOBN(0xccc832f8, 0x69f00755),
+     TOBN(0x964d950e, 0x36ff3bf0), TOBN(0x8ad20f6f, 0xf0b34638),
+     TOBN(0x4d9177b3, 0xb5d7585f), TOBN(0xcf839760, 0xef3f019f),
+     TOBN(0x582fc5b3, 0x8288c545), TOBN(0x2f8e4e9b, 0x13116bd1),
+     TOBN(0xf91e1b2f, 0x332120ef), TOBN(0xcf568724, 0x2a17dd23),
+     TOBN(0x488f1185, 0xca8d9d1a), TOBN(0xadf2c77d, 0xd987ded2),
+     TOBN(0x5f3039f0, 0x60c46124), TOBN(0xe5d70b75, 0x71e095f4),
+     TOBN(0x82d58650, 0x6260e70f), TOBN(0x39d75ea7, 0xf750d105),
+     TOBN(0x8cf3d0b1, 0x75bac364), TOBN(0xf3a7564d, 0x21d01329),
+     TOBN(0x182f04cd, 0x2f52d2a7), TOBN(0x4fde149a, 0xe2df565a),
+     TOBN(0xb80c5eec, 0xa79fb2f7), TOBN(0xab491d7b, 0x22ddc897),
+     TOBN(0x99d76c18, 0xc6312c7f), TOBN(0xca0d5f3d, 0x6aa41a57),
+     TOBN(0x71207325, 0xd15363a0), TOBN(0xe82aa265, 0xbeb252c2),
+     TOBN(0x94ab4700, 0xec3128c2), TOBN(0x6c76d862, 0x8e383f49),
+     TOBN(0xdc36b150, 0xc03024eb), TOBN(0xfb439477, 0x53daac69),
+     TOBN(0xfc68764a, 0x8dc79623), TOBN(0x5b86995d, 0xb440fbb2),
+     TOBN(0xd66879bf, 0xccc5ee0d), TOBN(0x05228942, 0x95aa8bd3),
+     TOBN(0xb51a40a5, 0x1e6a75c1), TOBN(0x24327c76, 0x0ea7d817),
+     TOBN(0x06630182, 0x07774597), TOBN(0xd6fdbec3, 0x97fa7164),
+     TOBN(0x20c99dfb, 0x13c90f48), TOBN(0xd6ac5273, 0x686ef263),
+     TOBN(0xc6a50bdc, 0xfef64eeb), TOBN(0xcd87b281, 0x86fdfc32),
+     TOBN(0xb24aa43e, 0x3fcd3efc), TOBN(0xdd26c034, 0xb8088e9a),
+     TOBN(0xa5ef4dc9, 0xbd3d46ea), TOBN(0xa2f99d58, 0x8a4c6a6f),
+     TOBN(0xddabd355, 0x2f1da46c), TOBN(0x72c3f8ce, 0x1afacdd1),
+     TOBN(0xd90c4eee, 0x92d40578), TOBN(0xd28bb41f, 0xca623b94),
+     TOBN(0x50fc0711, 0x745edc11), TOBN(0x9dd9ad7d, 0x3dc87558),
+     TOBN(0xce6931fb, 0xb49d1e64), TOBN(0x6c77a0a2, 0xc98bd0f9),
+     TOBN(0x62b9a629, 0x6baf7cb1), TOBN(0xcf065f91, 0xccf72d22),
+     TOBN(0x7203cce9, 0x79639071), TOBN(0x09ae4885, 0xf9cb732f),
+     TOBN(0x5e7c3bec, 0xee8314f3), TOBN(0x1c068aed, 0xdbea298f),
+     TOBN(0x08d381f1, 0x7c80acec), TOBN(0x03b56be8, 0xe330495b),
+     TOBN(0xaeffb8f2, 0x9222882d), TOBN(0x95ff38f6, 0xc4af8bf7),
+     TOBN(0x50e32d35, 0x1fc57d8c), TOBN(0x6635be52, 0x17b444f0),
+     TOBN(0x04d15276, 0xa5177900), TOBN(0x4e1dbb47, 0xf6858752),
+     TOBN(0x5b475622, 0xc615796c), TOBN(0xa6fa0387, 0x691867bf),
+     TOBN(0xed7f5d56, 0x2844c6d0), TOBN(0xc633cf9b, 0x03a2477d),
+     TOBN(0xf6be5c40, 0x2d3721d6), TOBN(0xaf312eb7, 0xe9fd68e6),
+     TOBN(0x242792d2, 0xe7417ce1), TOBN(0xff42bc71, 0x970ee7f5),
+     TOBN(0x1ff4dc6d, 0x5c67a41e), TOBN(0x77709b7b, 0x20882a58),
+     TOBN(0x3554731d, 0xbe217f2c), TOBN(0x2af2a8cd, 0x5bb72177),
+     TOBN(0x58eee769, 0x591dd059), TOBN(0xbb2930c9, 0x4bba6477),
+     TOBN(0x863ee047, 0x7d930cfc), TOBN(0x4c262ad1, 0x396fd1f4),
+     TOBN(0xf4765bc8, 0x039af7e1), TOBN(0x2519834b, 0x5ba104f6),
+     TOBN(0x7cd61b4c, 0xd105f961), TOBN(0xa5415da5, 0xd63bca54),
+     TOBN(0x778280a0, 0x88a1f17c), TOBN(0xc4968949, 0x2329512c),
+     TOBN(0x174a9126, 0xcecdaa7a), TOBN(0xfc8c7e0e, 0x0b13247b),
+     TOBN(0x29c110d2, 0x3484c1c4), TOBN(0xf8eb8757, 0x831dfc3b),
+     TOBN(0x022f0212, 0xc0067452), TOBN(0x3f6f69ee, 0x7b9b926c),
+     TOBN(0x09032da0, 0xef42daf4), TOBN(0x79f00ade, 0x83f80de4),
+     TOBN(0x6210db71, 0x81236c97), TOBN(0x74f7685b, 0x3ee0781f),
+     TOBN(0x4df7da7b, 0xa3e41372), TOBN(0x2aae38b1, 0xb1a1553e),
+     TOBN(0x1688e222, 0xf6dd9d1b), TOBN(0x57695448, 0x5b8b6487),
+     TOBN(0x478d2127, 0x4b2edeaa), TOBN(0xb2818fa5, 0x1e85956a),
+     TOBN(0x1e6addda, 0xf176f2c0), TOBN(0x01ca4604, 0xe2572658),
+     TOBN(0x0a404ded, 0x85342ffb), TOBN(0x8cf60f96, 0x441838d6),
+     TOBN(0x9bbc691c, 0xc9071c4a), TOBN(0xfd588744, 0x34442803),
+     TOBN(0x97101c85, 0x809c0d81), TOBN(0xa7fb754c, 0x8c456f7f),
+     TOBN(0xc95f3c5c, 0xd51805e1), TOBN(0xab4ccd39, 0xb299dca8),
+     TOBN(0x3e03d20b, 0x47eaf500), TOBN(0xfa3165c1, 0xd7b80893),
+     TOBN(0x005e8b54, 0xe160e552), TOBN(0xdc4972ba, 0x9019d11f),
+     TOBN(0x21a6972e, 0x0c9a4a7a), TOBN(0xa52c258f, 0x37840fd7),
+     TOBN(0xf8559ff4, 0xc1e99d81), TOBN(0x08e1a7d6, 0xa3c617c0),
+     TOBN(0xb398fd43, 0x248c6ba7), TOBN(0x6ffedd91, 0xd1283794),
+     TOBN(0x8a6a59d2, 0xd629d208), TOBN(0xa9d141d5, 0x3490530e),
+     TOBN(0x42f6fc18, 0x38505989), TOBN(0x09bf250d, 0x479d94ee),
+     TOBN(0x223ad3b1, 0xb3822790), TOBN(0x6c5926c0, 0x93b8971c),
+     TOBN(0x609efc7e, 0x75f7fa62), TOBN(0x45d66a6d, 0x1ec2d989),
+     TOBN(0x4422d663, 0x987d2792), TOBN(0x4a73caad, 0x3eb31d2b),
+     TOBN(0xf06c2ac1, 0xa32cb9e6), TOBN(0xd9445c5f, 0x91aeba84),
+     TOBN(0x6af7a1d5, 0xaf71013f), TOBN(0xe68216e5, 0x0bedc946),
+     TOBN(0xf4cba30b, 0xd27370a0), TOBN(0x7981afbf, 0x870421cc),
+     TOBN(0x02496a67, 0x9449f0e1), TOBN(0x86cfc4be, 0x0a47edae),
+     TOBN(0x3073c936, 0xb1feca22), TOBN(0xf5694612, 0x03f8f8fb),
+     TOBN(0xd063b723, 0x901515ea), TOBN(0x4c6c77a5, 0x749cf038),
+     TOBN(0x6361e360, 0xab9e5059), TOBN(0x596cf171, 0xa76a37c0),
+     TOBN(0x800f53fa, 0x6530ae7a), TOBN(0x0f5e631e, 0x0792a7a6),
+     TOBN(0x5cc29c24, 0xefdb81c9), TOBN(0xa269e868, 0x3f9c40ba),
+     TOBN(0xec14f9e1, 0x2cb7191e), TOBN(0x78ea1bd8, 0xe5b08ea6),
+     TOBN(0x3c65aa9b, 0x46332bb9), TOBN(0x84cc22b3, 0xbf80ce25),
+     TOBN(0x0098e9e9, 0xd49d5bf1), TOBN(0xcd4ec1c6, 0x19087da4),
+     TOBN(0x3c9d07c5, 0xaef6e357), TOBN(0x839a0268, 0x9f8f64b8),
+     TOBN(0xc5e9eb62, 0xc6d8607f), TOBN(0x759689f5, 0x6aa995e4),
+     TOBN(0x70464669, 0xbbb48317), TOBN(0x921474bf, 0xe402417d),
+     TOBN(0xcabe135b, 0x2a354c8c), TOBN(0xd51e52d2, 0x812fa4b5),
+     TOBN(0xec741096, 0x53311fe8), TOBN(0x4f774535, 0xb864514b),
+     TOBN(0xbcadd671, 0x5bde48f8), TOBN(0xc9703873, 0x2189bc7d),
+     TOBN(0x5d45299e, 0xc709ee8a), TOBN(0xd1287ee2, 0x845aaff8),
+     TOBN(0x7d1f8874, 0xdb1dbf1f), TOBN(0xea46588b, 0x990c88d6),
+     TOBN(0x60ba649a, 0x84368313), TOBN(0xd5fdcbce, 0x60d543ae),
+     TOBN(0x90b46d43, 0x810d5ab0), TOBN(0x6739d8f9, 0x04d7e5cc),
+     TOBN(0x021c1a58, 0x0d337c33), TOBN(0x00a61162, 0x68e67c40),
+     TOBN(0x95ef413b, 0x379f0a1f), TOBN(0xfe126605, 0xe9e2ab95),
+     TOBN(0x67578b85, 0x2f5f199c), TOBN(0xf5c00329, 0x2cb84913),
+     TOBN(0xf7956430, 0x37577dd8), TOBN(0x83b82af4, 0x29c5fe88),
+     TOBN(0x9c1bea26, 0xcdbdc132), TOBN(0x589fa086, 0x9c04339e),
+     TOBN(0x033e9538, 0xb13799df), TOBN(0x85fa8b21, 0xd295d034),
+     TOBN(0xdf17f73f, 0xbd9ddcca), TOBN(0xf32bd122, 0xddb66334),
+     TOBN(0x55ef88a7, 0x858b044c), TOBN(0x1f0d69c2, 0x5aa9e397),
+     TOBN(0x55fd9cc3, 0x40d85559), TOBN(0xc774df72, 0x7785ddb2),
+     TOBN(0x5dcce9f6, 0xd3bd2e1c), TOBN(0xeb30da20, 0xa85dfed0),
+     TOBN(0x5ed7f5bb, 0xd3ed09c4), TOBN(0x7d42a35c, 0x82a9c1bd),
+     TOBN(0xcf3de995, 0x9890272d), TOBN(0x75f3432a, 0x3e713a10),
+     TOBN(0x5e13479f, 0xe28227b8), TOBN(0xb8561ea9, 0xfefacdc8),
+     TOBN(0xa6a297a0, 0x8332aafd), TOBN(0x9b0d8bb5, 0x73809b62),
+     TOBN(0xd2fa1cfd, 0x0c63036f), TOBN(0x7a16eb55, 0xbd64bda8),
+     TOBN(0x3f5cf5f6, 0x78e62ddc), TOBN(0x2267c454, 0x07fd752b),
+     TOBN(0x5e361b6b, 0x5e437bbe), TOBN(0x95c59501, 0x8354e075),
+     TOBN(0xec725f85, 0xf2b254d9), TOBN(0x844b617d, 0x2cb52b4e),
+     TOBN(0xed8554f5, 0xcf425fb5), TOBN(0xab67703e, 0x2af9f312),
+     TOBN(0x4cc34ec1, 0x3cf48283), TOBN(0xb09daa25, 0x9c8a705e),
+     TOBN(0xd1e9d0d0, 0x5b7d4f84), TOBN(0x4df6ef64, 0xdb38929d),
+     TOBN(0xe16b0763, 0xaa21ba46), TOBN(0xc6b1d178, 0xa293f8fb),
+     TOBN(0x0ff5b602, 0xd520aabf), TOBN(0x94d671bd, 0xc339397a),
+     TOBN(0x7c7d98cf, 0x4f5792fa), TOBN(0x7c5e0d67, 0x11215261),
+     TOBN(0x9b19a631, 0xa7c5a6d4), TOBN(0xc8511a62, 0x7a45274d),
+     TOBN(0x0c16621c, 0xa5a60d99), TOBN(0xf7fbab88, 0xcf5e48cb),
+     TOBN(0xab1e6ca2, 0xf7ddee08), TOBN(0x83bd08ce, 0xe7867f3c),
+     TOBN(0xf7e48e8a, 0x2ac13e27), TOBN(0x4494f6df, 0x4eb1a9f5),
+     TOBN(0xedbf84eb, 0x981f0a62), TOBN(0x49badc32, 0x536438f0),
+     TOBN(0x50bea541, 0x004f7571), TOBN(0xbac67d10, 0xdf1c94ee),
+     TOBN(0x253d73a1, 0xb727bc31), TOBN(0xb3d01cf2, 0x30686e28),
+     TOBN(0x51b77b1b, 0x55fd0b8b), TOBN(0xa099d183, 0xfeec3173),
+     TOBN(0x202b1fb7, 0x670e72b7), TOBN(0xadc88b33, 0xa8e1635f),
+     TOBN(0x34e8216a, 0xf989d905), TOBN(0xc2e68d20, 0x29b58d01),
+     TOBN(0x11f81c92, 0x6fe55a93), TOBN(0x15f1462a, 0x8f296f40),
+     TOBN(0x1915d375, 0xea3d62f2), TOBN(0xa17765a3, 0x01c8977d),
+     TOBN(0x7559710a, 0xe47b26f6), TOBN(0xe0bd29c8, 0x535077a5),
+     TOBN(0x615f976d, 0x08d84858), TOBN(0x370dfe85, 0x69ced5c1),
+     TOBN(0xbbc7503c, 0xa734fa56), TOBN(0xfbb9f1ec, 0x91ac4574),
+     TOBN(0x95d7ec53, 0x060dd7ef), TOBN(0xeef2dacd, 0x6e657979),
+     TOBN(0x54511af3, 0xe2a08235), TOBN(0x1e324aa4, 0x1f4aea3d),
+     TOBN(0x550e7e71, 0xe6e67671), TOBN(0xbccd5190, 0xbf52faf7),
+     TOBN(0xf880d316, 0x223cc62a), TOBN(0x0d402c7e, 0x2b32eb5d),
+     TOBN(0xa40bc039, 0x306a5a3b), TOBN(0x4e0a41fd, 0x96783a1b),
+     TOBN(0xa1e8d39a, 0x0253cdd4), TOBN(0x6480be26, 0xc7388638),
+     TOBN(0xee365e1d, 0x2285f382), TOBN(0x188d8d8f, 0xec0b5c36),
+     TOBN(0x34ef1a48, 0x1f0f4d82), TOBN(0x1a8f43e1, 0xa487d29a),
+     TOBN(0x8168226d, 0x77aefb3a), TOBN(0xf69a751e, 0x1e72c253),
+     TOBN(0x8e04359a, 0xe9594df1), TOBN(0x475ffd7d, 0xd14c0467),
+     TOBN(0xb5a2c2b1, 0x3844e95c), TOBN(0x85caf647, 0xdd12ef94),
+     TOBN(0x1ecd2a9f, 0xf1063d00), TOBN(0x1dd2e229, 0x23843311),
+     TOBN(0x38f0e09d, 0x73d17244), TOBN(0x3ede7746, 0x8fc653f1),
+     TOBN(0xae4459f5, 0xdc20e21c), TOBN(0x00db2ffa, 0x6a8599ea),
+     TOBN(0x11682c39, 0x30cfd905), TOBN(0x4934d074, 0xa5c112a6),
+     TOBN(0xbdf063c5, 0x568bfe95), TOBN(0x779a440a, 0x016c441a),
+     TOBN(0x0c23f218, 0x97d6fbdc), TOBN(0xd3a5cd87, 0xe0776aac),
+     TOBN(0xcee37f72, 0xd712e8db), TOBN(0xfb28c70d, 0x26f74e8d),
+     TOBN(0xffe0c728, 0xb61301a0), TOBN(0xa6282168, 0xd3724354),
+     TOBN(0x7ff4cb00, 0x768ffedc), TOBN(0xc51b3088, 0x03b02de9),
+     TOBN(0xa5a8147c, 0x3902dda5), TOBN(0x35d2f706, 0xfe6973b4),
+     TOBN(0x5ac2efcf, 0xc257457e), TOBN(0x933f48d4, 0x8700611b),
+     TOBN(0xc365af88, 0x4912beb2), TOBN(0x7f5a4de6, 0x162edf94),
+     TOBN(0xc646ba7c, 0x0c32f34b), TOBN(0x632c6af3, 0xb2091074),
+     TOBN(0x58d4f2e3, 0x753e43a9), TOBN(0x70e1d217, 0x24d4e23f),
+     TOBN(0xb24bf729, 0xafede6a6), TOBN(0x7f4a94d8, 0x710c8b60),
+     TOBN(0xaad90a96, 0x8d4faa6a), TOBN(0xd9ed0b32, 0xb066b690),
+     TOBN(0x52fcd37b, 0x78b6dbfd), TOBN(0x0b64615e, 0x8bd2b431),
+     TOBN(0x228e2048, 0xcfb9fad5), TOBN(0xbeaa386d, 0x240b76bd),
+     TOBN(0x2d6681c8, 0x90dad7bc), TOBN(0x3e553fc3, 0x06d38f5e),
+     TOBN(0xf27cdb9b, 0x9d5f9750), TOBN(0x3e85c52a, 0xd28c5b0e),
+     TOBN(0x190795af, 0x5247c39b), TOBN(0x547831eb, 0xbddd6828),
+     TOBN(0xf327a227, 0x4a82f424), TOBN(0x36919c78, 0x7e47f89d),
+     TOBN(0xe4783919, 0x43c7392c), TOBN(0xf101b9aa, 0x2316fefe),
+     TOBN(0xbcdc9e9c, 0x1c5009d2), TOBN(0xfb55ea13, 0x9cd18345),
+     TOBN(0xf5b5e231, 0xa3ce77c7), TOBN(0xde6b4527, 0xd2f2cb3d),
+     TOBN(0x10f6a333, 0x9bb26f5f), TOBN(0x1e85db8e, 0x044d85b6),
+     TOBN(0xc3697a08, 0x94197e54), TOBN(0x65e18cc0, 0xa7cb4ea8),
+     TOBN(0xa38c4f50, 0xa471fe6e), TOBN(0xf031747a, 0x2f13439c),
+     TOBN(0x53c4a6ba, 0xc007318b), TOBN(0xa8da3ee5, 0x1deccb3d),
+     TOBN(0x0555b31c, 0x558216b1), TOBN(0x90c7810c, 0x2f79e6c2),
+     TOBN(0x9b669f4d, 0xfe8eed3c), TOBN(0x70398ec8, 0xe0fac126),
+     TOBN(0xa96a449e, 0xf701b235), TOBN(0x0ceecdb3, 0xeb94f395),
+     TOBN(0x285fc368, 0xd0cb7431), TOBN(0x0d37bb52, 0x16a18c64),
+     TOBN(0x05110d38, 0xb880d2dd), TOBN(0xa60f177b, 0x65930d57),
+     TOBN(0x7da34a67, 0xf36235f5), TOBN(0x47f5e17c, 0x183816b9),
+     TOBN(0xc7664b57, 0xdb394af4), TOBN(0x39ba215d, 0x7036f789),
+     TOBN(0x46d2ca0e, 0x2f27b472), TOBN(0xc42647ee, 0xf73a84b7),
+     TOBN(0x44bc7545, 0x64488f1d), TOBN(0xaa922708, 0xf4cf85d5),
+     TOBN(0x721a01d5, 0x53e4df63), TOBN(0x649c0c51, 0x5db46ced),
+     TOBN(0x6bf0d64e, 0x3cffcb6c), TOBN(0xe3bf93fe, 0x50f71d96),
+     TOBN(0x75044558, 0xbcc194a0), TOBN(0x16ae3372, 0x6afdc554),
+     TOBN(0xbfc01adf, 0x5ca48f3f), TOBN(0x64352f06, 0xe22a9b84),
+     TOBN(0xcee54da1, 0xc1099e4a), TOBN(0xbbda54e8, 0xfa1b89c0),
+     TOBN(0x166a3df5, 0x6f6e55fb), TOBN(0x1ca44a24, 0x20176f88),
+     TOBN(0x936afd88, 0xdfb7b5ff), TOBN(0xe34c2437, 0x8611d4a0),
+     TOBN(0x7effbb75, 0x86142103), TOBN(0x6704ba1b, 0x1f34fc4d),
+     TOBN(0x7c2a468f, 0x10c1b122), TOBN(0x36b3a610, 0x8c6aace9),
+     TOBN(0xabfcc0a7, 0x75a0d050), TOBN(0x066f9197, 0x3ce33e32),
+     TOBN(0xce905ef4, 0x29fe09be), TOBN(0x89ee25ba, 0xa8376351),
+     TOBN(0x2a3ede22, 0xfd29dc76), TOBN(0x7fd32ed9, 0x36f17260),
+     TOBN(0x0cadcf68, 0x284b4126), TOBN(0x63422f08, 0xa7951fc8),
+     TOBN(0x562b24f4, 0x0807e199), TOBN(0xfe9ce5d1, 0x22ad4490),
+     TOBN(0xc2f51b10, 0x0db2b1b4), TOBN(0xeb3613ff, 0xe4541d0d),
+     TOBN(0xbd2c4a05, 0x2680813b), TOBN(0x527aa55d, 0x561b08d6),
+     TOBN(0xa9f8a40e, 0xa7205558), TOBN(0xe3eea56f, 0x243d0bec),
+     TOBN(0x7b853817, 0xa0ff58b3), TOBN(0xb67d3f65, 0x1a69e627),
+     TOBN(0x0b76bbb9, 0xa869b5d6), TOBN(0xa3afeb82, 0x546723ed),
+     TOBN(0x5f24416d, 0x3e554892), TOBN(0x8413b53d, 0x430e2a45),
+     TOBN(0x99c56aee, 0x9032a2a0), TOBN(0x09432bf6, 0xeec367b1),
+     TOBN(0x552850c6, 0xdaf0ecc1), TOBN(0x49ebce55, 0x5bc92048),
+     TOBN(0xdfb66ba6, 0x54811307), TOBN(0x1b84f797, 0x6f298597),
+     TOBN(0x79590481, 0x8d1d7a0d), TOBN(0xd9fabe03, 0x3a6fa556),
+     TOBN(0xa40f9c59, 0xba9e5d35), TOBN(0xcb1771c1, 0xf6247577),
+     TOBN(0x542a47ca, 0xe9a6312b), TOBN(0xa34b3560, 0x552dd8c5),
+     TOBN(0xfdf94de0, 0x0d794716), TOBN(0xd46124a9, 0x9c623094),
+     TOBN(0x56b7435d, 0x68afe8b4), TOBN(0x27f20540, 0x6c0d8ea1),
+     TOBN(0x12b77e14, 0x73186898), TOBN(0xdbc3dd46, 0x7479490f),
+     TOBN(0x951a9842, 0xc03b0c05), TOBN(0x8b1b3bb3, 0x7921bc96),
+     TOBN(0xa573b346, 0x2b202e0a), TOBN(0x77e4665d, 0x47254d56),
+     TOBN(0x08b70dfc, 0xd23e3984), TOBN(0xab86e8bc, 0xebd14236),
+     TOBN(0xaa3e07f8, 0x57114ba7), TOBN(0x5ac71689, 0xab0ef4f2),
+     TOBN(0x88fca384, 0x0139d9af), TOBN(0x72733f88, 0x76644af0),
+     TOBN(0xf122f72a, 0x65d74f4a), TOBN(0x13931577, 0xa5626c7a),
+     TOBN(0xd5b5d9eb, 0x70f8d5a4), TOBN(0x375adde7, 0xd7bbb228),
+     TOBN(0x31e88b86, 0x0c1c0b32), TOBN(0xd1f568c4, 0x173edbaa),
+     TOBN(0x1592fc83, 0x5459df02), TOBN(0x2beac0fb, 0x0fcd9a7e),
+     TOBN(0xb0a6fdb8, 0x1b473b0a), TOBN(0xe3224c6f, 0x0fe8fc48),
+     TOBN(0x680bd00e, 0xe87edf5b), TOBN(0x30385f02, 0x20e77cf5),
+     TOBN(0xe9ab98c0, 0x4d42d1b2), TOBN(0x72d191d2, 0xd3816d77),
+     TOBN(0x1564daca, 0x0917d9e5), TOBN(0x394eab59, 0x1f8fed7f),
+     TOBN(0xa209aa8d, 0x7fbb3896), TOBN(0x5564f3b9, 0xbe6ac98e),
+     TOBN(0xead21d05, 0xd73654ef), TOBN(0x68d1a9c4, 0x13d78d74),
+     TOBN(0x61e01708, 0x6d4973a0), TOBN(0x83da3500, 0x46e6d32a),
+     TOBN(0x6a3dfca4, 0x68ae0118), TOBN(0xa1b9a4c9, 0xd02da069),
+     TOBN(0x0b2ff9c7, 0xebab8302), TOBN(0x98af07c3, 0x944ba436),
+     TOBN(0x85997326, 0x995f0f9f), TOBN(0x467fade0, 0x71b58bc6),
+     TOBN(0x47e4495a, 0xbd625a2b), TOBN(0xfdd2d01d, 0x33c3b8cd),
+     TOBN(0x2c38ae28, 0xc693f9fa), TOBN(0x48622329, 0x348f7999),
+     TOBN(0x97bf738e, 0x2161f583), TOBN(0x15ee2fa7, 0x565e8cc9),
+     TOBN(0xa1a5c845, 0x5777e189), TOBN(0xcc10bee0, 0x456f2829),
+     TOBN(0x8ad95c56, 0xda762bd5), TOBN(0x152e2214, 0xe9d91da8),
+     TOBN(0x975b0e72, 0x7cb23c74), TOBN(0xfd5d7670, 0xa90c66df),
+     TOBN(0xb5b5b8ad, 0x225ffc53), TOBN(0xab6dff73, 0xfaded2ae),
+     TOBN(0xebd56781, 0x6f4cbe9d), TOBN(0x0ed8b249, 0x6a574bd7),
+     TOBN(0x41c246fe, 0x81a881fa), TOBN(0x91564805, 0xc3db9c70),
+     TOBN(0xd7c12b08, 0x5b862809), TOBN(0x1facd1f1, 0x55858d7b),
+     TOBN(0x7693747c, 0xaf09e92a), TOBN(0x3b69dcba, 0x189a425f),
+     TOBN(0x0be28e9f, 0x967365ef), TOBN(0x57300eb2, 0xe801f5c9),
+     TOBN(0x93b8ac6a, 0xd583352f), TOBN(0xa2cf1f89, 0xcd05b2b7),
+     TOBN(0x7c0c9b74, 0x4dcc40cc), TOBN(0xfee38c45, 0xada523fb),
+     TOBN(0xb49a4dec, 0x1099cc4d), TOBN(0x325c377f, 0x69f069c6),
+     TOBN(0xe12458ce, 0x476cc9ff), TOBN(0x580e0b6c, 0xc6d4cb63),
+     TOBN(0xd561c8b7, 0x9072289b), TOBN(0x0377f264, 0xa619e6da),
+     TOBN(0x26685362, 0x88e591a5), TOBN(0xa453a7bd, 0x7523ca2b),
+     TOBN(0x8a9536d2, 0xc1df4533), TOBN(0xc8e50f2f, 0xbe972f79),
+     TOBN(0xd433e50f, 0x6d3549cf), TOBN(0x6f33696f, 0xfacd665e),
+     TOBN(0x695bfdac, 0xce11fcb4), TOBN(0x810ee252, 0xaf7c9860),
+     TOBN(0x65450fe1, 0x7159bb2c), TOBN(0xf7dfbebe, 0x758b357b),
+     TOBN(0x2b057e74, 0xd69fea72), TOBN(0xd485717a, 0x92731745),}
+    ,
+    {TOBN(0x896c42e8, 0xee36860c), TOBN(0xdaf04dfd, 0x4113c22d),
+     TOBN(0x1adbb7b7, 0x44104213), TOBN(0xe5fd5fa1, 0x1fd394ea),
+     TOBN(0x68235d94, 0x1a4e0551), TOBN(0x6772cfbe, 0x18d10151),
+     TOBN(0x276071e3, 0x09984523), TOBN(0xe4e879de, 0x5a56ba98),
+     TOBN(0xaaafafb0, 0x285b9491), TOBN(0x01a0be88, 0x1e4c705e),
+     TOBN(0xff1d4f5d, 0x2ad9caab), TOBN(0x6e349a4a, 0xc37a233f),
+     TOBN(0xcf1c1246, 0x4a1c6a16), TOBN(0xd99e6b66, 0x29383260),
+     TOBN(0xea3d4366, 0x5f6d5471), TOBN(0x36974d04, 0xff8cc89b),
+     TOBN(0xc26c49a1, 0xcfe89d80), TOBN(0xb42c026d, 0xda9c8371),
+     TOBN(0xca6c013a, 0xdad066d2), TOBN(0xfb8f7228, 0x56a4f3ee),
+     TOBN(0x08b579ec, 0xd850935b), TOBN(0x34c1a74c, 0xd631e1b3),
+     TOBN(0xcb5fe596, 0xac198534), TOBN(0x39ff21f6, 0xe1f24f25),
+     TOBN(0x27f29e14, 0x8f929057), TOBN(0x7a64ae06, 0xc0c853df),
+     TOBN(0x256cd183, 0x58e9c5ce), TOBN(0x9d9cce82, 0xded092a5),
+     TOBN(0xcc6e5979, 0x6e93b7c7), TOBN(0xe1e47092, 0x31bb9e27),
+     TOBN(0xb70b3083, 0xaa9e29a0), TOBN(0xbf181a75, 0x3785e644),
+     TOBN(0xf53f2c65, 0x8ead09f7), TOBN(0x1335e1d5, 0x9780d14d),
+     TOBN(0x69cc20e0, 0xcd1b66bc), TOBN(0x9b670a37, 0xbbe0bfc8),
+     TOBN(0xce53dc81, 0x28efbeed), TOBN(0x0c74e77c, 0x8326a6e5),
+     TOBN(0x3604e0d2, 0xb88e9a63), TOBN(0xbab38fca, 0x13dc2248),
+     TOBN(0x8ed6e8c8, 0x5c0a3f1e), TOBN(0xbcad2492, 0x7c87c37f),
+     TOBN(0xfdfb62bb, 0x9ee3b78d), TOBN(0xeba8e477, 0xcbceba46),
+     TOBN(0x37d38cb0, 0xeeaede4b), TOBN(0x0bc498e8, 0x7976deb6),
+     TOBN(0xb2944c04, 0x6b6147fb), TOBN(0x8b123f35, 0xf71f9609),
+     TOBN(0xa155dcc7, 0xde79dc24), TOBN(0xf1168a32, 0x558f69cd),
+     TOBN(0xbac21595, 0x0d1850df), TOBN(0x15c8295b, 0xb204c848),
+     TOBN(0xf661aa36, 0x7d8184ff), TOBN(0xc396228e, 0x30447bdb),
+     TOBN(0x11cd5143, 0xbde4a59e), TOBN(0xe3a26e3b, 0x6beab5e6),
+     TOBN(0xd3b3a13f, 0x1402b9d0), TOBN(0x573441c3, 0x2c7bc863),
+     TOBN(0x4b301ec4, 0x578c3e6e), TOBN(0xc26fc9c4, 0x0adaf57e),
+     TOBN(0x96e71bfd, 0x7493cea3), TOBN(0xd05d4b3f, 0x1af81456),
+     TOBN(0xdaca2a8a, 0x6a8c608f), TOBN(0x53ef07f6, 0x0725b276),
+     TOBN(0x07a5fbd2, 0x7824fc56), TOBN(0x34675218, 0x13289077),
+     TOBN(0x5bf69fd5, 0xe0c48349), TOBN(0xa613ddd3, 0xb6aa7875),
+     TOBN(0x7f78c19c, 0x5450d866), TOBN(0x46f4409c, 0x8f84a481),
+     TOBN(0x9f1d1928, 0x90fce239), TOBN(0x016c4168, 0xb2ce44b9),
+     TOBN(0xbae023f0, 0xc7435978), TOBN(0xb152c888, 0x20e30e19),
+     TOBN(0x9c241645, 0xe3fa6faf), TOBN(0x735d95c1, 0x84823e60),
+     TOBN(0x03197573, 0x03955317), TOBN(0x0b4b02a9, 0xf03b4995),
+     TOBN(0x076bf559, 0x70274600), TOBN(0x32c5cc53, 0xaaf57508),
+     TOBN(0xe8af6d1f, 0x60624129), TOBN(0xb7bc5d64, 0x9a5e2b5e),
+     TOBN(0x3814b048, 0x5f082d72), TOBN(0x76f267f2, 0xce19677a),
+     TOBN(0x626c630f, 0xb36eed93), TOBN(0x55230cd7, 0x3bf56803),
+     TOBN(0x78837949, 0xce2736a0), TOBN(0x0d792d60, 0xaa6c55f1),
+     TOBN(0x0318dbfd, 0xd5c7c5d2), TOBN(0xb38f8da7, 0x072b342d),
+     TOBN(0x3569bddc, 0x7b8de38a), TOBN(0xf25b5887, 0xa1c94842),
+     TOBN(0xb2d5b284, 0x2946ad60), TOBN(0x854f29ad, 0xe9d1707e),
+     TOBN(0xaa5159dc, 0x2c6a4509), TOBN(0x899f94c0, 0x57189837),
+     TOBN(0xcf6adc51, 0xf4a55b03), TOBN(0x261762de, 0x35e3b2d5),
+     TOBN(0x4cc43012, 0x04827b51), TOBN(0xcd22a113, 0xc6021442),
+     TOBN(0xce2fd61a, 0x247c9569), TOBN(0x59a50973, 0xd152beca),
+     TOBN(0x6c835a11, 0x63a716d4), TOBN(0xc26455ed, 0x187dedcf),
+     TOBN(0x27f536e0, 0x49ce89e7), TOBN(0x18908539, 0xcc890cb5),
+     TOBN(0x308909ab, 0xd83c2aa1), TOBN(0xecd3142b, 0x1ab73bd3),
+     TOBN(0x6a85bf59, 0xb3f5ab84), TOBN(0x3c320a68, 0xf2bea4c6),
+     TOBN(0xad8dc538, 0x6da4541f), TOBN(0xeaf34eb0, 0xb7c41186),
+     TOBN(0x1c780129, 0x977c97c4), TOBN(0x5ff9beeb, 0xc57eb9fa),
+     TOBN(0xa24d0524, 0xc822c478), TOBN(0xfd8eec2a, 0x461cd415),
+     TOBN(0xfbde194e, 0xf027458c), TOBN(0xb4ff5319, 0x1d1be115),
+     TOBN(0x63f874d9, 0x4866d6f4), TOBN(0x35c75015, 0xb21ad0c9),
+     TOBN(0xa6b5c9d6, 0x46ac49d2), TOBN(0x42c77c0b, 0x83137aa9),
+     TOBN(0x24d000fc, 0x68225a38), TOBN(0x0f63cfc8, 0x2fe1e907),
+     TOBN(0x22d1b01b, 0xc6441f95), TOBN(0x7d38f719, 0xec8e448f),
+     TOBN(0x9b33fa5f, 0x787fb1ba), TOBN(0x94dcfda1, 0x190158df),
+     TOBN(0xc47cb339, 0x5f6d4a09), TOBN(0x6b4f355c, 0xee52b826),
+     TOBN(0x3d100f5d, 0xf51b930a), TOBN(0xf4512fac, 0x9f668f69),
+     TOBN(0x546781d5, 0x206c4c74), TOBN(0xd021d4d4, 0xcb4d2e48),
+     TOBN(0x494a54c2, 0xca085c2d), TOBN(0xf1dbaca4, 0x520850a8),
+     TOBN(0x63c79326, 0x490a1aca), TOBN(0xcb64dd9c, 0x41526b02),
+     TOBN(0xbb772591, 0xa2979258), TOBN(0x3f582970, 0x48d97846),
+     TOBN(0xd66b70d1, 0x7c213ba7), TOBN(0xc28febb5, 0xe8a0ced4),
+     TOBN(0x6b911831, 0xc10338c1), TOBN(0x0d54e389, 0xbf0126f3),
+     TOBN(0x7048d460, 0x4af206ee), TOBN(0x786c88f6, 0x77e97cb9),
+     TOBN(0xd4375ae1, 0xac64802e), TOBN(0x469bcfe1, 0xd53ec11c),
+     TOBN(0xfc9b340d, 0x47062230), TOBN(0xe743bb57, 0xc5b4a3ac),
+     TOBN(0xfe00b4aa, 0x59ef45ac), TOBN(0x29a4ef23, 0x59edf188),
+     TOBN(0x40242efe, 0xb483689b), TOBN(0x2575d3f6, 0x513ac262),
+     TOBN(0xf30037c8, 0x0ca6db72), TOBN(0xc9fcce82, 0x98864be2),
+     TOBN(0x84a112ff, 0x0149362d), TOBN(0x95e57582, 0x1c4ae971),
+     TOBN(0x1fa4b1a8, 0x945cf86c), TOBN(0x4525a734, 0x0b024a2f),
+     TOBN(0xe76c8b62, 0x8f338360), TOBN(0x483ff593, 0x28edf32b),
+     TOBN(0x67e8e90a, 0x298b1aec), TOBN(0x9caab338, 0x736d9a21),
+     TOBN(0x5c09d2fd, 0x66892709), TOBN(0x2496b4dc, 0xb55a1d41),
+     TOBN(0x93f5fb1a, 0xe24a4394), TOBN(0x08c75049, 0x6fa8f6c1),
+     TOBN(0xcaead1c2, 0xc905d85f), TOBN(0xe9d7f790, 0x0733ae57),
+     TOBN(0x24c9a65c, 0xf07cdd94), TOBN(0x7389359c, 0xa4b55931),
+     TOBN(0xf58709b7, 0x367e45f7), TOBN(0x1f203067, 0xcb7e7adc),
+     TOBN(0x82444bff, 0xc7b72818), TOBN(0x07303b35, 0xbaac8033),
+     TOBN(0x1e1ee4e4, 0xd13b7ea1), TOBN(0xe6489b24, 0xe0e74180),
+     TOBN(0xa5f2c610, 0x7e70ef70), TOBN(0xa1655412, 0xbdd10894),
+     TOBN(0x555ebefb, 0x7af4194e), TOBN(0x533c1c3c, 0x8e89bd9c),
+     TOBN(0x735b9b57, 0x89895856), TOBN(0x15fb3cd2, 0x567f5c15),
+     TOBN(0x057fed45, 0x526f09fd), TOBN(0xe8a4f10c, 0x8128240a),
+     TOBN(0x9332efc4, 0xff2bfd8d), TOBN(0x214e77a0, 0xbd35aa31),
+     TOBN(0x32896d73, 0x14faa40e), TOBN(0x767867ec, 0x01e5f186),
+     TOBN(0xc9adf8f1, 0x17a1813e), TOBN(0xcb6cda78, 0x54741795),
+     TOBN(0xb7521b6d, 0x349d51aa), TOBN(0xf56b5a9e, 0xe3c7b8e9),
+     TOBN(0xc6f1e5c9, 0x32a096df), TOBN(0x083667c4, 0xa3635024),
+     TOBN(0x365ea135, 0x18087f2f), TOBN(0xf1b8eaac, 0xd136e45d),
+     TOBN(0xc8a0e484, 0x73aec989), TOBN(0xd75a324b, 0x142c9259),
+     TOBN(0xb7b4d001, 0x01dae185), TOBN(0x45434e0b, 0x9b7a94bc),
+     TOBN(0xf54339af, 0xfbd8cb0b), TOBN(0xdcc4569e, 0xe98ef49e),
+     TOBN(0x7789318a, 0x09a51299), TOBN(0x81b4d206, 0xb2b025d8),
+     TOBN(0xf64aa418, 0xfae85792), TOBN(0x3e50258f, 0xacd7baf7),
+     TOBN(0xdce84cdb, 0x2996864b), TOBN(0xa2e67089, 0x1f485fa4),
+     TOBN(0xb28b2bb6, 0x534c6a5a), TOBN(0x31a7ec6b, 0xc94b9d39),
+     TOBN(0x1d217766, 0xd6bc20da), TOBN(0x4acdb5ec, 0x86761190),
+     TOBN(0x68726328, 0x73701063), TOBN(0x4d24ee7c, 0x2128c29b),
+     TOBN(0xc072ebd3, 0xa19fd868), TOBN(0x612e481c, 0xdb8ddd3b),
+     TOBN(0xb4e1d754, 0x1a64d852), TOBN(0x00ef95ac, 0xc4c6c4ab),
+     TOBN(0x1536d2ed, 0xaa0a6c46), TOBN(0x61294086, 0x43774790),
+     TOBN(0x54af25e8, 0x343fda10), TOBN(0x9ff9d98d, 0xfd25d6f2),
+     TOBN(0x0746af7c, 0x468b8835), TOBN(0x977a31cb, 0x730ecea7),
+     TOBN(0xa5096b80, 0xc2cf4a81), TOBN(0xaa986833, 0x6458c37a),
+     TOBN(0x6af29bf3, 0xa6bd9d34), TOBN(0x6a62fe9b, 0x33c5d854),
+     TOBN(0x50e6c304, 0xb7133b5e), TOBN(0x04b60159, 0x7d6e6848),
+     TOBN(0x4cd296df, 0x5579bea4), TOBN(0x10e35ac8, 0x5ceedaf1),
+     TOBN(0x04c4c5fd, 0xe3bcc5b1), TOBN(0x95f9ee8a, 0x89412cf9),
+     TOBN(0x2c9459ee, 0x82b6eb0f), TOBN(0x2e845765, 0x95c2aadd),
+     TOBN(0x774a84ae, 0xd327fcfe), TOBN(0xd8c93722, 0x0368d476),
+     TOBN(0x0dbd5748, 0xf83e8a3b), TOBN(0xa579aa96, 0x8d2495f3),
+     TOBN(0x535996a0, 0xae496e9b), TOBN(0x07afbfe9, 0xb7f9bcc2),
+     TOBN(0x3ac1dc6d, 0x5b7bd293), TOBN(0x3b592cff, 0x7022323d),
+     TOBN(0xba0deb98, 0x9c0a3e76), TOBN(0x18e78e9f, 0x4b197acb),
+     TOBN(0x211cde10, 0x296c36ef), TOBN(0x7ee89672, 0x82c4da77),
+     TOBN(0xb617d270, 0xa57836da), TOBN(0xf0cd9c31, 0x9cb7560b),
+     TOBN(0x01fdcbf7, 0xe455fe90), TOBN(0x3fb53cbb, 0x7e7334f3),
+     TOBN(0x781e2ea4, 0x4e7de4ec), TOBN(0x8adab3ad, 0x0b384fd0),
+     TOBN(0x129eee2f, 0x53d64829), TOBN(0x7a471e17, 0xa261492b),
+     TOBN(0xe4f9adb9, 0xe4cb4a2c), TOBN(0x3d359f6f, 0x97ba2c2d),
+     TOBN(0x346c6786, 0x0aacd697), TOBN(0x92b444c3, 0x75c2f8a8),
+     TOBN(0xc79fa117, 0xd85df44e), TOBN(0x56782372, 0x398ddf31),
+     TOBN(0x60e690f2, 0xbbbab3b8), TOBN(0x4851f8ae, 0x8b04816b),
+     TOBN(0xc72046ab, 0x9c92e4d2), TOBN(0x518c74a1, 0x7cf3136b),
+     TOBN(0xff4eb50a, 0xf9877d4c), TOBN(0x14578d90, 0xa919cabb),
+     TOBN(0x8218f8c4, 0xac5eb2b6), TOBN(0xa3ccc547, 0x542016e4),
+     TOBN(0x025bf48e, 0x327f8349), TOBN(0xf3e97346, 0xf43cb641),
+     TOBN(0xdc2bafdf, 0x500f1085), TOBN(0x57167876, 0x2f063055),
+     TOBN(0x5bd914b9, 0x411925a6), TOBN(0x7c078d48, 0xa1123de5),
+     TOBN(0xee6bf835, 0x182b165d), TOBN(0xb11b5e5b, 0xba519727),
+     TOBN(0xe33ea76c, 0x1eea7b85), TOBN(0x2352b461, 0x92d4f85e),
+     TOBN(0xf101d334, 0xafe115bb), TOBN(0xfabc1294, 0x889175a3),
+     TOBN(0x7f6bcdc0, 0x5233f925), TOBN(0xe0a802db, 0xe77fec55),
+     TOBN(0xbdb47b75, 0x8069b659), TOBN(0x1c5e12de, 0xf98fbd74),
+     TOBN(0x869c58c6, 0x4b8457ee), TOBN(0xa5360f69, 0x4f7ea9f7),
+     TOBN(0xe576c09f, 0xf460b38f), TOBN(0x6b70d548, 0x22b7fb36),
+     TOBN(0x3fd237f1, 0x3bfae315), TOBN(0x33797852, 0xcbdff369),
+     TOBN(0x97df25f5, 0x25b516f9), TOBN(0x46f388f2, 0xba38ad2d),
+     TOBN(0x656c4658, 0x89d8ddbb), TOBN(0x8830b26e, 0x70f38ee8),
+     TOBN(0x4320fd5c, 0xde1212b0), TOBN(0xc34f30cf, 0xe4a2edb2),
+     TOBN(0xabb131a3, 0x56ab64b8), TOBN(0x7f77f0cc, 0xd99c5d26),
+     TOBN(0x66856a37, 0xbf981d94), TOBN(0x19e76d09, 0x738bd76e),
+     TOBN(0xe76c8ac3, 0x96238f39), TOBN(0xc0a482be, 0xa830b366),
+     TOBN(0xb7b8eaff, 0x0b4eb499), TOBN(0x8ecd83bc, 0x4bfb4865),
+     TOBN(0x971b2cb7, 0xa2f3776f), TOBN(0xb42176a4, 0xf4b88adf),
+     TOBN(0xb9617df5, 0xbe1fa446), TOBN(0x8b32d508, 0xcd031bd2),
+     TOBN(0x1c6bd47d, 0x53b618c0), TOBN(0xc424f46c, 0x6a227923),
+     TOBN(0x7303ffde, 0xdd92d964), TOBN(0xe9712878, 0x71b5abf2),
+     TOBN(0x8f48a632, 0xf815561d), TOBN(0x85f48ff5, 0xd3c055d1),
+     TOBN(0x222a1427, 0x7525684f), TOBN(0xd0d841a0, 0x67360cc3),
+     TOBN(0x4245a926, 0x0b9267c6), TOBN(0xc78913f1, 0xcf07f863),
+     TOBN(0xaa844c8e, 0x4d0d9e24), TOBN(0xa42ad522, 0x3d5f9017),
+     TOBN(0xbd371749, 0xa2c989d5), TOBN(0x928292df, 0xe1f5e78e),
+     TOBN(0x493b383e, 0x0a1ea6da), TOBN(0x5136fd8d, 0x13aee529),
+     TOBN(0x860c44b1, 0xf2c34a99), TOBN(0x3b00aca4, 0xbf5855ac),
+     TOBN(0xabf6aaa0, 0xfaaf37be), TOBN(0x65f43682, 0x2a53ec08),
+     TOBN(0x1d9a5801, 0xa11b12e1), TOBN(0x78a7ab2c, 0xe20ed475),
+     TOBN(0x0de1067e, 0x9a41e0d5), TOBN(0x30473f5f, 0x305023ea),
+     TOBN(0xdd3ae09d, 0x169c7d97), TOBN(0x5cd5baa4, 0xcfaef9cd),
+     TOBN(0x5cd7440b, 0x65a44803), TOBN(0xdc13966a, 0x47f364de),
+     TOBN(0x077b2be8, 0x2b8357c1), TOBN(0x0cb1b4c5, 0xe9d57c2a),
+     TOBN(0x7a4ceb32, 0x05ff363e), TOBN(0xf310fa4d, 0xca35a9ef),
+     TOBN(0xdbb7b352, 0xf97f68c6), TOBN(0x0c773b50, 0x0b02cf58),
+     TOBN(0xea2e4821, 0x3c1f96d9), TOBN(0xffb357b0, 0xeee01815),
+     TOBN(0xb9c924cd, 0xe0f28039), TOBN(0x0b36c95a, 0x46a3fbe4),
+     TOBN(0x1faaaea4, 0x5e46db6c), TOBN(0xcae575c3, 0x1928aaff),
+     TOBN(0x7f671302, 0xa70dab86), TOBN(0xfcbd12a9, 0x71c58cfc),
+     TOBN(0xcbef9acf, 0xbee0cb92), TOBN(0x573da0b9, 0xf8c1b583),
+     TOBN(0x4752fcfe, 0x0d41d550), TOBN(0xe7eec0e3, 0x2155cffe),
+     TOBN(0x0fc39fcb, 0x545ae248), TOBN(0x522cb8d1, 0x8065f44e),
+     TOBN(0x263c962a, 0x70cbb96c), TOBN(0xe034362a, 0xbcd124a9),
+     TOBN(0xf120db28, 0x3c2ae58d), TOBN(0xb9a38d49, 0xfef6d507),
+     TOBN(0xb1fd2a82, 0x1ff140fd), TOBN(0xbd162f30, 0x20aee7e0),
+     TOBN(0x4e17a5d4, 0xcb251949), TOBN(0x2aebcb83, 0x4f7e1c3d),
+     TOBN(0x608eb25f, 0x937b0527), TOBN(0xf42e1e47, 0xeb7d9997),
+     TOBN(0xeba699c4, 0xb8a53a29), TOBN(0x1f921c71, 0xe091b536),
+     TOBN(0xcce29e7b, 0x5b26bbd5), TOBN(0x7a8ef5ed, 0x3b61a680),
+     TOBN(0xe5ef8043, 0xba1f1c7e), TOBN(0x16ea8217, 0x18158dda),
+     TOBN(0x01778a2b, 0x599ff0f9), TOBN(0x68a923d7, 0x8104fc6b),
+     TOBN(0x5bfa44df, 0xda694ff3), TOBN(0x4f7199db, 0xf7667f12),
+     TOBN(0xc06d8ff6, 0xe46f2a79), TOBN(0x08b5dead, 0xe9f8131d),
+     TOBN(0x02519a59, 0xabb4ce7c), TOBN(0xc4f710bc, 0xb42aec3e),
+     TOBN(0x3d77b057, 0x78bde41a), TOBN(0x6474bf80, 0xb4186b5a),
+     TOBN(0x048b3f67, 0x88c65741), TOBN(0xc64519de, 0x03c7c154),
+     TOBN(0xdf073846, 0x0edfcc4f), TOBN(0x319aa737, 0x48f1aa6b),
+     TOBN(0x8b9f8a02, 0xca909f77), TOBN(0x90258139, 0x7580bfef),
+     TOBN(0xd8bfd3ca, 0xc0c22719), TOBN(0xc60209e4, 0xc9ca151e),
+     TOBN(0x7a744ab5, 0xd9a1a69c), TOBN(0x6de5048b, 0x14937f8f),
+     TOBN(0x171938d8, 0xe115ac04), TOBN(0x7df70940, 0x1c6b16d2),
+     TOBN(0xa6aeb663, 0x7f8e94e7), TOBN(0xc130388e, 0x2a2cf094),
+     TOBN(0x1850be84, 0x77f54e6e), TOBN(0x9f258a72, 0x65d60fe5),
+     TOBN(0xff7ff0c0, 0x6c9146d6), TOBN(0x039aaf90, 0xe63a830b),
+     TOBN(0x38f27a73, 0x9460342f), TOBN(0x4703148c, 0x3f795f8a),
+     TOBN(0x1bb5467b, 0x9681a97e), TOBN(0x00931ba5, 0xecaeb594),
+     TOBN(0xcdb6719d, 0x786f337c), TOBN(0xd9c01cd2, 0xe704397d),
+     TOBN(0x0f4a3f20, 0x555c2fef), TOBN(0x00452509, 0x7c0af223),
+     TOBN(0x54a58047, 0x84db8e76), TOBN(0x3bacf1aa, 0x93c8aa06),
+     TOBN(0x11ca957c, 0xf7919422), TOBN(0x50641053, 0x78cdaa40),
+     TOBN(0x7a303874, 0x9f7144ae), TOBN(0x170c963f, 0x43d4acfd),
+     TOBN(0x5e148149, 0x58ddd3ef), TOBN(0xa7bde582, 0x9e72dba8),
+     TOBN(0x0769da8b, 0x6fa68750), TOBN(0xfa64e532, 0x572e0249),
+     TOBN(0xfcaadf9d, 0x2619ad31), TOBN(0x87882daa, 0xa7b349cd),
+     TOBN(0x9f6eb731, 0x6c67a775), TOBN(0xcb10471a, 0xefc5d0b1),
+     TOBN(0xb433750c, 0xe1b806b2), TOBN(0x19c5714d, 0x57b1ae7e),
+     TOBN(0xc0dc8b7b, 0xed03fd3f), TOBN(0xdd03344f, 0x31bc194e),
+     TOBN(0xa66c52a7, 0x8c6320b5), TOBN(0x8bc82ce3, 0xd0b6fd93),
+     TOBN(0xf8e13501, 0xb35f1341), TOBN(0xe53156dd, 0x25a43e42),
+     TOBN(0xd3adf27e, 0x4daeb85c), TOBN(0xb81d8379, 0xbbeddeb5),
+     TOBN(0x1b0b546e, 0x2e435867), TOBN(0x9020eb94, 0xeba5dd60),
+     TOBN(0x37d91161, 0x8210cb9d), TOBN(0x4c596b31, 0x5c91f1cf),
+     TOBN(0xb228a90f, 0x0e0b040d), TOBN(0xbaf02d82, 0x45ff897f),
+     TOBN(0x2aac79e6, 0x00fa6122), TOBN(0x24828817, 0x8e36f557),
+     TOBN(0xb9521d31, 0x113ec356), TOBN(0x9e48861e, 0x15eff1f8),
+     TOBN(0x2aa1d412, 0xe0d41715), TOBN(0x71f86203, 0x53f131b8),
+     TOBN(0xf60da8da, 0x3fd19408), TOBN(0x4aa716dc, 0x278d9d99),
+     TOBN(0x394531f7, 0xa8c51c90), TOBN(0xb560b0e8, 0xf59db51c),
+     TOBN(0xa28fc992, 0xfa34bdad), TOBN(0xf024fa14, 0x9cd4f8bd),
+     TOBN(0x5cf530f7, 0x23a9d0d3), TOBN(0x615ca193, 0xe28c9b56),
+     TOBN(0x6d2a483d, 0x6f73c51e), TOBN(0xa4cb2412, 0xea0dc2dd),
+     TOBN(0x50663c41, 0x1eb917ff), TOBN(0x3d3a74cf, 0xeade299e),
+     TOBN(0x29b3990f, 0x4a7a9202), TOBN(0xa9bccf59, 0xa7b15c3d),
+     TOBN(0x66a3ccdc, 0xa5df9208), TOBN(0x48027c14, 0x43f2f929),
+     TOBN(0xd385377c, 0x40b557f0), TOBN(0xe001c366, 0xcd684660),
+     TOBN(0x1b18ed6b, 0xe2183a27), TOBN(0x879738d8, 0x63210329),
+     TOBN(0xa687c74b, 0xbda94882), TOBN(0xd1bbcc48, 0xa684b299),
+     TOBN(0xaf6f1112, 0x863b3724), TOBN(0x6943d1b4, 0x2c8ce9f8),
+     TOBN(0xe044a3bb, 0x098cafb4), TOBN(0x27ed2310, 0x60d48caf),
+     TOBN(0x542b5675, 0x3a31b84d), TOBN(0xcbf3dd50, 0xfcddbed7),
+     TOBN(0x25031f16, 0x41b1d830), TOBN(0xa7ec851d, 0xcb0c1e27),
+     TOBN(0xac1c8fe0, 0xb5ae75db), TOBN(0xb24c7557, 0x08c52120),
+     TOBN(0x57f811dc, 0x1d4636c3), TOBN(0xf8436526, 0x681a9939),
+     TOBN(0x1f6bc6d9, 0x9c81adb3), TOBN(0x840f8ac3, 0x5b7d80d4),
+     TOBN(0x731a9811, 0xf4387f1a), TOBN(0x7c501cd3, 0xb5156880),
+     TOBN(0xa5ca4a07, 0xdfe68867), TOBN(0xf123d8f0, 0x5fcea120),
+     TOBN(0x1fbb0e71, 0xd607039e), TOBN(0x2b70e215, 0xcd3a4546),
+     TOBN(0x32d2f01d, 0x53324091), TOBN(0xb796ff08, 0x180ab19b),
+     TOBN(0x32d87a86, 0x3c57c4aa), TOBN(0x2aed9caf, 0xb7c49a27),
+     TOBN(0x9fb35eac, 0x31630d98), TOBN(0x338e8cdf, 0x5c3e20a3),
+     TOBN(0x80f16182, 0x66cde8db), TOBN(0x4e159980, 0x2d72fd36),
+     TOBN(0xd7b8f13b, 0x9b6e5072), TOBN(0xf5213907, 0x3b7b5dc1),
+     TOBN(0x4d431f1d, 0x8ce4396e), TOBN(0x37a1a680, 0xa7ed2142),
+     TOBN(0xbf375696, 0xd01aaf6b), TOBN(0xaa1c0c54, 0xe63aab66),
+     TOBN(0x3014368b, 0x4ed80940), TOBN(0x67e6d056, 0x7a6fcedd),
+     TOBN(0x7c208c49, 0xca97579f), TOBN(0xfe3d7a81, 0xa23597f6),
+     TOBN(0x5e203202, 0x7e096ae2), TOBN(0xb1f3e1e7, 0x24b39366),
+     TOBN(0x26da26f3, 0x2fdcdffc), TOBN(0x79422f1d, 0x6097be83),}
+    ,
+    {TOBN(0x263a2cfb, 0x9db3b381), TOBN(0x9c3a2dee, 0xd4df0a4b),
+     TOBN(0x728d06e9, 0x7d04e61f), TOBN(0x8b1adfbc, 0x42449325),
+     TOBN(0x6ec1d939, 0x7e053a1b), TOBN(0xee2be5c7, 0x66daf707),
+     TOBN(0x80ba1e14, 0x810ac7ab), TOBN(0xdd2ae778, 0xf530f174),
+     TOBN(0x0435d97a, 0x205b9d8b), TOBN(0x6eb8f064, 0x056756d4),
+     TOBN(0xd5e88a8b, 0xb6f8210e), TOBN(0x070ef12d, 0xec9fd9ea),
+     TOBN(0x4d849505, 0x3bcc876a), TOBN(0x12a75338, 0xa7404ce3),
+     TOBN(0xd22b49e1, 0xb8a1db5e), TOBN(0xec1f2051, 0x14bfa5ad),
+     TOBN(0xadbaeb79, 0xb6828f36), TOBN(0x9d7a0258, 0x01bd5b9e),
+     TOBN(0xeda01e0d, 0x1e844b0c), TOBN(0x4b625175, 0x887edfc9),
+     TOBN(0x14109fdd, 0x9669b621), TOBN(0x88a2ca56, 0xf6f87b98),
+     TOBN(0xfe2eb788, 0x170df6bc), TOBN(0x0cea06f4, 0xffa473f9),
+     TOBN(0x43ed81b5, 0xc4e83d33), TOBN(0xd9f35879, 0x5efd488b),
+     TOBN(0x164a620f, 0x9deb4d0f), TOBN(0xc6927bdb, 0xac6a7394),
+     TOBN(0x45c28df7, 0x9f9e0f03), TOBN(0x2868661e, 0xfcd7e1a9),
+     TOBN(0x7cf4e8d0, 0xffa348f1), TOBN(0x6bd4c284, 0x398538e0),
+     TOBN(0x2618a091, 0x289a8619), TOBN(0xef796e60, 0x6671b173),
+     TOBN(0x664e46e5, 0x9090c632), TOBN(0xa38062d4, 0x1e66f8fb),
+     TOBN(0x6c744a20, 0x0573274e), TOBN(0xd07b67e4, 0xa9271394),
+     TOBN(0x391223b2, 0x6bdc0e20), TOBN(0xbe2d93f1, 0xeb0a05a7),
+     TOBN(0xf23e2e53, 0x3f36d141), TOBN(0xe84bb3d4, 0x4dfca442),
+     TOBN(0xb804a48d, 0x6b7c023a), TOBN(0x1e16a8fa, 0x76431c3b),
+     TOBN(0x1b5452ad, 0xddd472e0), TOBN(0x7d405ee7, 0x0d1ee127),
+     TOBN(0x50fc6f1d, 0xffa27599), TOBN(0x351ac53c, 0xbf391b35),
+     TOBN(0x7efa14b8, 0x4444896b), TOBN(0x64974d2f, 0xf94027fb),
+     TOBN(0xefdcd0e8, 0xde84487d), TOBN(0x8c45b260, 0x2b48989b),
+     TOBN(0xa8fcbbc2, 0xd8463487), TOBN(0xd1b2b3f7, 0x3fbc476c),
+     TOBN(0x21d005b7, 0xc8f443c0), TOBN(0x518f2e67, 0x40c0139c),
+     TOBN(0x56036e8c, 0x06d75fc1), TOBN(0x2dcf7bb7, 0x3249a89f),
+     TOBN(0x81dd1d3d, 0xe245e7dd), TOBN(0xf578dc4b, 0xebd6e2a7),
+     TOBN(0x4c028903, 0xdf2ce7a0), TOBN(0xaee36288, 0x9c39afac),
+     TOBN(0xdc847c31, 0x146404ab), TOBN(0x6304c0d8, 0xa4e97818),
+     TOBN(0xae51dca2, 0xa91f6791), TOBN(0x2abe4190, 0x9baa9efc),
+     TOBN(0xd9d2e2f4, 0x559c7ac1), TOBN(0xe82f4b51, 0xfc9f773a),
+     TOBN(0xa7713027, 0x4073e81c), TOBN(0xc0276fac, 0xfbb596fc),
+     TOBN(0x1d819fc9, 0xa684f70c), TOBN(0x29b47fdd, 0xc9f7b1e0),
+     TOBN(0x358de103, 0x459b1940), TOBN(0xec881c59, 0x5b013e93),
+     TOBN(0x51574c93, 0x49532ad3), TOBN(0x2db1d445, 0xb37b46de),
+     TOBN(0xc6445b87, 0xdf239fd8), TOBN(0xc718af75, 0x151d24ee),
+     TOBN(0xaea1c4a4, 0xf43c6259), TOBN(0x40c0e5d7, 0x70be02f7),
+     TOBN(0x6a4590f4, 0x721b33f2), TOBN(0x2124f1fb, 0xfedf04ea),
+     TOBN(0xf8e53cde, 0x9745efe7), TOBN(0xe7e10432, 0x65f046d9),
+     TOBN(0xc3fca28e, 0xe4d0c7e6), TOBN(0x847e339a, 0x87253b1b),
+     TOBN(0x9b595348, 0x3743e643), TOBN(0xcb6a0a0b, 0x4fd12fc5),
+     TOBN(0xfb6836c3, 0x27d02dcc), TOBN(0x5ad00982, 0x7a68bcc2),
+     TOBN(0x1b24b44c, 0x005e912d), TOBN(0xcc83d20f, 0x811fdcfe),
+     TOBN(0x36527ec1, 0x666fba0c), TOBN(0x69948197, 0x14754635),
+     TOBN(0xfcdcb1a8, 0x556da9c2), TOBN(0xa5934267, 0x81a732b2),
+     TOBN(0xec1214ed, 0xa714181d), TOBN(0x609ac13b, 0x6067b341),
+     TOBN(0xff4b4c97, 0xa545df1f), TOBN(0xa1240501, 0x34d2076b),
+     TOBN(0x6efa0c23, 0x1409ca97), TOBN(0x254cc1a8, 0x20638c43),
+     TOBN(0xd4e363af, 0xdcfb46cd), TOBN(0x62c2adc3, 0x03942a27),
+     TOBN(0xc67b9df0, 0x56e46483), TOBN(0xa55abb20, 0x63736356),
+     TOBN(0xab93c098, 0xc551bc52), TOBN(0x382b49f9, 0xb15fe64b),
+     TOBN(0x9ec221ad, 0x4dff8d47), TOBN(0x79caf615, 0x437df4d6),
+     TOBN(0x5f13dc64, 0xbb456509), TOBN(0xe4c589d9, 0x191f0714),
+     TOBN(0x27b6a8ab, 0x3fd40e09), TOBN(0xe455842e, 0x77313ea9),
+     TOBN(0x8b51d1e2, 0x1f55988b), TOBN(0x5716dd73, 0x062bbbfc),
+     TOBN(0x633c11e5, 0x4e8bf3de), TOBN(0x9a0e77b6, 0x1b85be3b),
+     TOBN(0x56510729, 0x0911cca6), TOBN(0x27e76495, 0xefa6590f),
+     TOBN(0xe4ac8b33, 0x070d3aab), TOBN(0x2643672b, 0x9a2cd5e5),
+     TOBN(0x52eff79b, 0x1cfc9173), TOBN(0x665ca49b, 0x90a7c13f),
+     TOBN(0x5a8dda59, 0xb3efb998), TOBN(0x8a5b922d, 0x052f1341),
+     TOBN(0xae9ebbab, 0x3cf9a530), TOBN(0x35986e7b, 0xf56da4d7),
+     TOBN(0x3a636b5c, 0xff3513cc), TOBN(0xbb0cf8ba, 0x3198f7dd),
+     TOBN(0xb8d40522, 0x41f16f86), TOBN(0x760575d8, 0xde13a7bf),
+     TOBN(0x36f74e16, 0x9f7aa181), TOBN(0x163a3ecf, 0xf509ed1c),
+     TOBN(0x6aead61f, 0x3c40a491), TOBN(0x158c95fc, 0xdfe8fcaa),
+     TOBN(0xa3991b6e, 0x13cda46f), TOBN(0x79482415, 0x342faed0),
+     TOBN(0xf3ba5bde, 0x666b5970), TOBN(0x1d52e6bc, 0xb26ab6dd),
+     TOBN(0x768ba1e7, 0x8608dd3d), TOBN(0x4930db2a, 0xea076586),
+     TOBN(0xd9575714, 0xe7dc1afa), TOBN(0x1fc7bf7d, 0xf7c58817),
+     TOBN(0x6b47accd, 0xd9eee96c), TOBN(0x0ca277fb, 0xe58cec37),
+     TOBN(0x113fe413, 0xe702c42a), TOBN(0xdd1764ee, 0xc47cbe51),
+     TOBN(0x041e7cde, 0x7b3ed739), TOBN(0x50cb7459, 0x5ce9e1c0),
+     TOBN(0x35568513, 0x2925b212), TOBN(0x7cff95c4, 0x001b081c),
+     TOBN(0x63ee4cbd, 0x8088b454), TOBN(0xdb7f32f7, 0x9a9e0c8a),
+     TOBN(0xb377d418, 0x6b2447cb), TOBN(0xe3e982aa, 0xd370219b),
+     TOBN(0x06ccc1e4, 0xc2a2a593), TOBN(0x72c36865, 0x0773f24f),
+     TOBN(0xa13b4da7, 0x95859423), TOBN(0x8bbf1d33, 0x75040c8f),
+     TOBN(0x726f0973, 0xda50c991), TOBN(0x48afcd5b, 0x822d6ee2),
+     TOBN(0xe5fc718b, 0x20fd7771), TOBN(0xb9e8e77d, 0xfd0807a1),
+     TOBN(0x7f5e0f44, 0x99a7703d), TOBN(0x6972930e, 0x618e36f3),
+     TOBN(0x2b7c77b8, 0x23807bbe), TOBN(0xe5b82405, 0xcb27ff50),
+     TOBN(0xba8b8be3, 0xbd379062), TOBN(0xd64b7a1d, 0x2dce4a92),
+     TOBN(0x040a73c5, 0xb2952e37), TOBN(0x0a9e252e, 0xd438aeca),
+     TOBN(0xdd43956b, 0xc39d3bcb), TOBN(0x1a31ca00, 0xb32b2d63),
+     TOBN(0xd67133b8, 0x5c417a18), TOBN(0xd08e4790, 0x2ef442c8),
+     TOBN(0x98cb1ae9, 0x255c0980), TOBN(0x4bd86381, 0x2b4a739f),
+     TOBN(0x5a5c31e1, 0x1e4a45a1), TOBN(0x1e5d55fe, 0x9cb0db2f),
+     TOBN(0x74661b06, 0x8ff5cc29), TOBN(0x026b389f, 0x0eb8a4f4),
+     TOBN(0x536b21a4, 0x58848c24), TOBN(0x2e5bf8ec, 0x81dc72b0),
+     TOBN(0x03c187d0, 0xad886aac), TOBN(0x5c16878a, 0xb771b645),
+     TOBN(0xb07dfc6f, 0xc74045ab), TOBN(0x2c6360bf, 0x7800caed),
+     TOBN(0x24295bb5, 0xb9c972a3), TOBN(0xc9e6f88e, 0x7c9a6dba),
+     TOBN(0x90ffbf24, 0x92a79aa6), TOBN(0xde29d50a, 0x41c26ac2),
+     TOBN(0x9f0af483, 0xd309cbe6), TOBN(0x5b020d8a, 0xe0bced4f),
+     TOBN(0x606e986d, 0xb38023e3), TOBN(0xad8f2c9d, 0x1abc6933),
+     TOBN(0x19292e1d, 0xe7400e93), TOBN(0xfe3e18a9, 0x52be5e4d),
+     TOBN(0xe8e9771d, 0x2e0680bf), TOBN(0x8c5bec98, 0xc54db063),
+     TOBN(0x2af9662a, 0x74a55d1f), TOBN(0xe3fbf28f, 0x046f66d8),
+     TOBN(0xa3a72ab4, 0xd4dc4794), TOBN(0x09779f45, 0x5c7c2dd8),
+     TOBN(0xd893bdaf, 0xc3d19d8d), TOBN(0xd5a75094, 0x57d6a6df),
+     TOBN(0x8cf8fef9, 0x952e6255), TOBN(0x3da67cfb, 0xda9a8aff),
+     TOBN(0x4c23f62a, 0x2c160dcd), TOBN(0x34e6c5e3, 0x8f90eaef),
+     TOBN(0x35865519, 0xa9a65d5a), TOBN(0x07c48aae, 0x8fd38a3d),
+     TOBN(0xb7e7aeda, 0x50068527), TOBN(0x2c09ef23, 0x1c90936a),
+     TOBN(0x31ecfeb6, 0xe879324c), TOBN(0xa0871f6b, 0xfb0ec938),
+     TOBN(0xb1f0fb68, 0xd84d835d), TOBN(0xc90caf39, 0x861dc1e6),
+     TOBN(0x12e5b046, 0x7594f8d7), TOBN(0x26897ae2, 0x65012b92),
+     TOBN(0xbcf68a08, 0xa4d6755d), TOBN(0x403ee41c, 0x0991fbda),
+     TOBN(0x733e343e, 0x3bbf17e8), TOBN(0xd2c7980d, 0x679b3d65),
+     TOBN(0x33056232, 0xd2e11305), TOBN(0x966be492, 0xf3c07a6f),
+     TOBN(0x6a8878ff, 0xbb15509d), TOBN(0xff221101, 0x0a9b59a4),
+     TOBN(0x6c9f564a, 0xabe30129), TOBN(0xc6f2c940, 0x336e64cf),
+     TOBN(0x0fe75262, 0x8b0c8022), TOBN(0xbe0267e9, 0x6ae8db87),
+     TOBN(0x22e192f1, 0x93bc042b), TOBN(0xf085b534, 0xb237c458),
+     TOBN(0xa0d192bd, 0x832c4168), TOBN(0x7a76e9e3, 0xbdf6271d),
+     TOBN(0x52a882fa, 0xb88911b5), TOBN(0xc85345e4, 0xb4db0eb5),
+     TOBN(0xa3be02a6, 0x81a7c3ff), TOBN(0x51889c8c, 0xf0ec0469),
+     TOBN(0x9d031369, 0xa5e829e5), TOBN(0xcbb4c6fc, 0x1607aa41),
+     TOBN(0x75ac59a6, 0x241d84c1), TOBN(0xc043f2bf, 0x8829e0ee),
+     TOBN(0x82a38f75, 0x8ea5e185), TOBN(0x8bda40b9, 0xd87cbd9f),
+     TOBN(0x9e65e75e, 0x2d8fc601), TOBN(0x3d515f74, 0xa35690b3),
+     TOBN(0x534acf4f, 0xda79e5ac), TOBN(0x68b83b3a, 0x8630215f),
+     TOBN(0x5c748b2e, 0xd085756e), TOBN(0xb0317258, 0xe5d37cb2),
+     TOBN(0x6735841a, 0xc5ccc2c4), TOBN(0x7d7dc96b, 0x3d9d5069),
+     TOBN(0xa147e410, 0xfd1754bd), TOBN(0x65296e94, 0xd399ddd5),
+     TOBN(0xf6b5b2d0, 0xbc8fa5bc), TOBN(0x8a5ead67, 0x500c277b),
+     TOBN(0x214625e6, 0xdfa08a5d), TOBN(0x51fdfedc, 0x959cf047),
+     TOBN(0x6bc9430b, 0x289fca32), TOBN(0xe36ff0cf, 0x9d9bdc3f),
+     TOBN(0x2fe187cb, 0x58ea0ede), TOBN(0xed66af20, 0x5a900b3f),
+     TOBN(0x00e0968b, 0x5fa9f4d6), TOBN(0x2d4066ce, 0x37a362e7),
+     TOBN(0xa99a9748, 0xbd07e772), TOBN(0x710989c0, 0x06a4f1d0),
+     TOBN(0xd5dedf35, 0xce40cbd8), TOBN(0xab55c5f0, 0x1743293d),
+     TOBN(0x766f1144, 0x8aa24e2c), TOBN(0x94d874f8, 0x605fbcb4),
+     TOBN(0xa365f0e8, 0xa518001b), TOBN(0xee605eb6, 0x9d04ef0f),
+     TOBN(0x5a3915cd, 0xba8d4d25), TOBN(0x44c0e1b8, 0xb5113472),
+     TOBN(0xcbb024e8, 0x8b6740dc), TOBN(0x89087a53, 0xee1d4f0c),
+     TOBN(0xa88fa05c, 0x1fc4e372), TOBN(0x8bf395cb, 0xaf8b3af2),
+     TOBN(0x1e71c9a1, 0xdeb8568b), TOBN(0xa35daea0, 0x80fb3d32),
+     TOBN(0xe8b6f266, 0x2cf8fb81), TOBN(0x6d51afe8, 0x9490696a),
+     TOBN(0x81beac6e, 0x51803a19), TOBN(0xe3d24b7f, 0x86219080),
+     TOBN(0x727cfd9d, 0xdf6f463c), TOBN(0x8c6865ca, 0x72284ee8),
+     TOBN(0x32c88b7d, 0xb743f4ef), TOBN(0x3793909b, 0xe7d11dce),
+     TOBN(0xd398f922, 0x2ff2ebe8), TOBN(0x2c70ca44, 0xe5e49796),
+     TOBN(0xdf4d9929, 0xcb1131b1), TOBN(0x7826f298, 0x25888e79),
+     TOBN(0x4d3a112c, 0xf1d8740a), TOBN(0x00384cb6, 0x270afa8b),
+     TOBN(0xcb64125b, 0x3ab48095), TOBN(0x3451c256, 0x62d05106),
+     TOBN(0xd73d577d, 0xa4955845), TOBN(0x39570c16, 0xbf9f4433),
+     TOBN(0xd7dfaad3, 0xadecf263), TOBN(0xf1c3d8d1, 0xdc76e102),
+     TOBN(0x5e774a58, 0x54c6a836), TOBN(0xdad4b672, 0x3e92d47b),
+     TOBN(0xbe7e990f, 0xf0d796a0), TOBN(0x5fc62478, 0xdf0e8b02),
+     TOBN(0x8aae8bf4, 0x030c00ad), TOBN(0x3d2db93b, 0x9004ba0f),
+     TOBN(0xe48c8a79, 0xd85d5ddc), TOBN(0xe907caa7, 0x6bb07f34),
+     TOBN(0x58db343a, 0xa39eaed5), TOBN(0x0ea6e007, 0xadaf5724),
+     TOBN(0xe00df169, 0xd23233f3), TOBN(0x3e322796, 0x77cb637f),
+     TOBN(0x1f897c0e, 0x1da0cf6c), TOBN(0xa651f5d8, 0x31d6bbdd),
+     TOBN(0xdd61af19, 0x1a230c76), TOBN(0xbd527272, 0xcdaa5e4a),
+     TOBN(0xca753636, 0xd0abcd7e), TOBN(0x78bdd37c, 0x370bd8dc),
+     TOBN(0xc23916c2, 0x17cd93fe), TOBN(0x65b97a4d, 0xdadce6e2),
+     TOBN(0xe04ed4eb, 0x174e42f8), TOBN(0x1491ccaa, 0xbb21480a),
+     TOBN(0x145a8280, 0x23196332), TOBN(0x3c3862d7, 0x587b479a),
+     TOBN(0x9f4a88a3, 0x01dcd0ed), TOBN(0x4da2b7ef, 0x3ea12f1f),
+     TOBN(0xf8e7ae33, 0xb126e48e), TOBN(0x404a0b32, 0xf494e237),
+     TOBN(0x9beac474, 0xc55acadb), TOBN(0x4ee5cf3b, 0xcbec9fd9),
+     TOBN(0x336b33b9, 0x7df3c8c3), TOBN(0xbd905fe3, 0xb76808fd),
+     TOBN(0x8f436981, 0xaa45c16a), TOBN(0x255c5bfa, 0x3dd27b62),
+     TOBN(0x71965cbf, 0xc3dd9b4d), TOBN(0xce23edbf, 0xfc068a87),
+     TOBN(0xb78d4725, 0x745b029b), TOBN(0x74610713, 0xcefdd9bd),
+     TOBN(0x7116f75f, 0x1266bf52), TOBN(0x02046722, 0x18e49bb6),
+     TOBN(0xdf43df9f, 0x3d6f19e3), TOBN(0xef1bc7d0, 0xe685cb2f),
+     TOBN(0xcddb27c1, 0x7078c432), TOBN(0xe1961b9c, 0xb77fedb7),
+     TOBN(0x1edc2f5c, 0xc2290570), TOBN(0x2c3fefca, 0x19cbd886),
+     TOBN(0xcf880a36, 0xc2af389a), TOBN(0x96c610fd, 0xbda71cea),
+     TOBN(0xf03977a9, 0x32aa8463), TOBN(0x8eb7763f, 0x8586d90a),
+     TOBN(0x3f342454, 0x2a296e77), TOBN(0xc8718683, 0x42837a35),
+     TOBN(0x7dc71090, 0x6a09c731), TOBN(0x54778ffb, 0x51b816db),
+     TOBN(0x6b33bfec, 0xaf06defd), TOBN(0xfe3c105f, 0x8592b70b),
+     TOBN(0xf937fda4, 0x61da6114), TOBN(0x3c13e651, 0x4c266ad7),
+     TOBN(0xe363a829, 0x855938e8), TOBN(0x2eeb5d9e, 0x9de54b72),
+     TOBN(0xbeb93b0e, 0x20ccfab9), TOBN(0x3dffbb5f, 0x25e61a25),
+     TOBN(0x7f655e43, 0x1acc093d), TOBN(0x0cb6cc3d, 0x3964ce61),
+     TOBN(0x6ab283a1, 0xe5e9b460), TOBN(0x55d787c5, 0xa1c7e72d),
+     TOBN(0x4d2efd47, 0xdeadbf02), TOBN(0x11e80219, 0xac459068),
+     TOBN(0x810c7626, 0x71f311f0), TOBN(0xfa17ef8d, 0x4ab6ef53),
+     TOBN(0xaf47fd25, 0x93e43bff), TOBN(0x5cb5ff3f, 0x0be40632),
+     TOBN(0x54687106, 0x8ee61da3), TOBN(0x7764196e, 0xb08afd0f),
+     TOBN(0x831ab3ed, 0xf0290a8f), TOBN(0xcae81966, 0xcb47c387),
+     TOBN(0xaad7dece, 0x184efb4f), TOBN(0xdcfc53b3, 0x4749110e),
+     TOBN(0x6698f23c, 0x4cb632f9), TOBN(0xc42a1ad6, 0xb91f8067),
+     TOBN(0xb116a81d, 0x6284180a), TOBN(0xebedf5f8, 0xe901326f),
+     TOBN(0xf2274c9f, 0x97e3e044), TOBN(0x42018520, 0x11d09fc9),
+     TOBN(0x56a65f17, 0xd18e6e23), TOBN(0x2ea61e2a, 0x352b683c),
+     TOBN(0x27d291bc, 0x575eaa94), TOBN(0x9e7bc721, 0xb8ff522d),
+     TOBN(0x5f7268bf, 0xa7f04d6f), TOBN(0x5868c73f, 0xaba41748),
+     TOBN(0x9f85c2db, 0x7be0eead), TOBN(0x511e7842, 0xff719135),
+     TOBN(0x5a06b1e9, 0xc5ea90d7), TOBN(0x0c19e283, 0x26fab631),
+     TOBN(0x8af8f0cf, 0xe9206c55), TOBN(0x89389cb4, 0x3553c06a),
+     TOBN(0x39dbed97, 0xf65f8004), TOBN(0x0621b037, 0xc508991d),
+     TOBN(0x1c52e635, 0x96e78cc4), TOBN(0x5385c8b2, 0x0c06b4a8),
+     TOBN(0xd84ddfdb, 0xb0e87d03), TOBN(0xc49dfb66, 0x934bafad),
+     TOBN(0x7071e170, 0x59f70772), TOBN(0x3a073a84, 0x3a1db56b),
+     TOBN(0x03494903, 0x3b8af190), TOBN(0x7d882de3, 0xd32920f0),
+     TOBN(0x91633f0a, 0xb2cf8940), TOBN(0x72b0b178, 0x6f948f51),
+     TOBN(0x2d28dc30, 0x782653c8), TOBN(0x88829849, 0xdb903a05),
+     TOBN(0xb8095d0c, 0x6a19d2bb), TOBN(0x4b9e7f0c, 0x86f782cb),
+     TOBN(0x7af73988, 0x2d907064), TOBN(0xd12be0fe, 0x8b32643c),
+     TOBN(0x358ed23d, 0x0e165dc3), TOBN(0x3d47ce62, 0x4e2378ce),
+     TOBN(0x7e2bb0b9, 0xfeb8a087), TOBN(0x3246e8ae, 0xe29e10b9),
+     TOBN(0x459f4ec7, 0x03ce2b4d), TOBN(0xe9b4ca1b, 0xbbc077cf),
+     TOBN(0x2613b4f2, 0x0e9940c1), TOBN(0xfc598bb9, 0x047d1eb1),
+     TOBN(0x9744c62b, 0x45036099), TOBN(0xa9dee742, 0x167c65d8),
+     TOBN(0x0c511525, 0xdabe1943), TOBN(0xda110554, 0x93c6c624),
+     TOBN(0xae00a52c, 0x651a3be2), TOBN(0xcda5111d, 0x884449a6),
+     TOBN(0x063c06f4, 0xff33bed1), TOBN(0x73baaf9a, 0x0d3d76b4),
+     TOBN(0x52fb0c9d, 0x7fc63668), TOBN(0x6886c9dd, 0x0c039cde),
+     TOBN(0x602bd599, 0x55b22351), TOBN(0xb00cab02, 0x360c7c13),
+     TOBN(0x8cb616bc, 0x81b69442), TOBN(0x41486700, 0xb55c3cee),
+     TOBN(0x71093281, 0xf49ba278), TOBN(0xad956d9c, 0x64a50710),
+     TOBN(0x9561f28b, 0x638a7e81), TOBN(0x54155cdf, 0x5980ddc3),
+     TOBN(0xb2db4a96, 0xd26f247a), TOBN(0x9d774e4e, 0x4787d100),
+     TOBN(0x1a9e6e2e, 0x078637d2), TOBN(0x1c363e2d, 0x5e0ae06a),
+     TOBN(0x7493483e, 0xe9cfa354), TOBN(0x76843cb3, 0x7f74b98d),
+     TOBN(0xbaca6591, 0xd4b66947), TOBN(0xb452ce98, 0x04460a8c),
+     TOBN(0x6830d246, 0x43768f55), TOBN(0xf4197ed8, 0x7dff12df),
+     TOBN(0x6521b472, 0x400dd0f7), TOBN(0x59f5ca8f, 0x4b1e7093),
+     TOBN(0x6feff11b, 0x080338ae), TOBN(0x0ada31f6, 0xa29ca3c6),
+     TOBN(0x24794eb6, 0x94a2c215), TOBN(0xd83a43ab, 0x05a57ab4),
+     TOBN(0x264a543a, 0x2a6f89fe), TOBN(0x2c2a3868, 0xdd5ec7c2),
+     TOBN(0xd3373940, 0x8439d9b2), TOBN(0x715ea672, 0x0acd1f11),
+     TOBN(0x42c1d235, 0xe7e6cc19), TOBN(0x81ce6e96, 0xb990585c),
+     TOBN(0x04e5dfe0, 0xd809c7bd), TOBN(0xd7b2580c, 0x8f1050ab),
+     TOBN(0x6d91ad78, 0xd8a4176f), TOBN(0x0af556ee, 0x4e2e897c),
+     TOBN(0x162a8b73, 0x921de0ac), TOBN(0x52ac9c22, 0x7ea78400),
+     TOBN(0xee2a4eea, 0xefce2174), TOBN(0xbe61844e, 0x6d637f79),
+     TOBN(0x0491f1bc, 0x789a283b), TOBN(0x72d3ac3d, 0x880836f4),
+     TOBN(0xaa1c5ea3, 0x88e5402d), TOBN(0x1b192421, 0xd5cc473d),
+     TOBN(0x5c0b9998, 0x9dc84cac), TOBN(0xb0a8482d, 0x9c6e75b8),
+     TOBN(0x639961d0, 0x3a191ce2), TOBN(0xda3bc865, 0x6d837930),
+     TOBN(0xca990653, 0x056e6f8f), TOBN(0x84861c41, 0x64d133a7),
+     TOBN(0x8b403276, 0x746abe40), TOBN(0xb7b4d51a, 0xebf8e303),
+     TOBN(0x05b43211, 0x220a255d), TOBN(0xc997152c, 0x02419e6e),
+     TOBN(0x76ff47b6, 0x630c2fea), TOBN(0x50518677, 0x281fdade),
+     TOBN(0x3283b8ba, 0xcf902b0b), TOBN(0x8d4b4eb5, 0x37db303b),
+     TOBN(0xcc89f42d, 0x755011bc), TOBN(0xb43d74bb, 0xdd09d19b),
+     TOBN(0x65746bc9, 0x8adba350), TOBN(0x364eaf8c, 0xb51c1927),
+     TOBN(0x13c76596, 0x10ad72ec), TOBN(0x30045121, 0xf8d40c20),
+     TOBN(0x6d2d99b7, 0xea7b979b), TOBN(0xcd78cd74, 0xe6fb3bcd),
+     TOBN(0x11e45a9e, 0x86cffbfe), TOBN(0x78a61cf4, 0x637024f6),
+     TOBN(0xd06bc872, 0x3d502295), TOBN(0xf1376854, 0x458cb288),
+     TOBN(0xb9db26a1, 0x342f8586), TOBN(0xf33effcf, 0x4beee09e),
+     TOBN(0xd7e0c4cd, 0xb30cfb3a), TOBN(0x6d09b8c1, 0x6c9db4c8),
+     TOBN(0x40ba1a42, 0x07c8d9df), TOBN(0x6fd495f7, 0x1c52c66d),
+     TOBN(0xfb0e169f, 0x275264da), TOBN(0x80c2b746, 0xe57d8362),
+     TOBN(0xedd987f7, 0x49ad7222), TOBN(0xfdc229af, 0x4398ec7b),}
+    ,
+    {TOBN(0xb0d1ed84, 0x52666a58), TOBN(0x4bcb6e00, 0xe6a9c3c2),
+     TOBN(0x3c57411c, 0x26906408), TOBN(0xcfc20755, 0x13556400),
+     TOBN(0xa08b1c50, 0x5294dba3), TOBN(0xa30ba286, 0x8b7dd31e),
+     TOBN(0xd70ba90e, 0x991eca74), TOBN(0x094e142c, 0xe762c2b9),
+     TOBN(0xb81d783e, 0x979f3925), TOBN(0x1efd130a, 0xaf4c89a7),
+     TOBN(0x525c2144, 0xfd1bf7fa), TOBN(0x4b296904, 0x1b265a9e),
+     TOBN(0xed8e9634, 0xb9db65b6), TOBN(0x35c82e32, 0x03599d8a),
+     TOBN(0xdaa7a54f, 0x403563f3), TOBN(0x9df088ad, 0x022c38ab),
+     TOBN(0xe5cfb066, 0xbb3fd30a), TOBN(0x429169da, 0xeff0354e),
+     TOBN(0x809cf852, 0x3524e36c), TOBN(0x136f4fb3, 0x0155be1d),
+     TOBN(0x4826af01, 0x1fbba712), TOBN(0x6ef0f0b4, 0x506ba1a1),
+     TOBN(0xd9928b31, 0x77aea73e), TOBN(0xe2bf6af2, 0x5eaa244e),
+     TOBN(0x8d084f12, 0x4237b64b), TOBN(0x688ebe99, 0xe3ecfd07),
+     TOBN(0x57b8a70c, 0xf6845dd8), TOBN(0x808fc59c, 0x5da4a325),
+     TOBN(0xa9032b2b, 0xa3585862), TOBN(0xb66825d5, 0xedf29386),
+     TOBN(0xb5a5a8db, 0x431ec29b), TOBN(0xbb143a98, 0x3a1e8dc8),
+     TOBN(0x35ee94ce, 0x12ae381b), TOBN(0x3a7f176c, 0x86ccda90),
+     TOBN(0xc63a657e, 0x4606eaca), TOBN(0x9ae5a380, 0x43cd04df),
+     TOBN(0x9bec8d15, 0xed251b46), TOBN(0x1f5d6d30, 0xcaca5e64),
+     TOBN(0x347b3b35, 0x9ff20f07), TOBN(0x4d65f034, 0xf7e4b286),
+     TOBN(0x9e93ba24, 0xf111661e), TOBN(0xedced484, 0xb105eb04),
+     TOBN(0x96dc9ba1, 0xf424b578), TOBN(0xbf8f66b7, 0xe83e9069),
+     TOBN(0x872d4df4, 0xd7ed8216), TOBN(0xbf07f377, 0x8e2cbecf),
+     TOBN(0x4281d899, 0x98e73754), TOBN(0xfec85fbb, 0x8aab8708),
+     TOBN(0x9a3c0dee, 0xa5ba5b0b), TOBN(0xe6a116ce, 0x42d05299),
+     TOBN(0xae9775fe, 0xe9b02d42), TOBN(0x72b05200, 0xa1545cb6),
+     TOBN(0xbc506f7d, 0x31a3b4ea), TOBN(0xe5893078, 0x8bbd9b32),
+     TOBN(0xc8bc5f37, 0xe4b12a97), TOBN(0x6b000c06, 0x4a73b671),
+     TOBN(0x13b5bf22, 0x765fa7d0), TOBN(0x59805bf0, 0x1d6a5370),
+     TOBN(0x67a5e29d, 0x4280db98), TOBN(0x4f53916f, 0x776b1ce3),
+     TOBN(0x714ff61f, 0x33ddf626), TOBN(0x4206238e, 0xa085d103),
+     TOBN(0x1c50d4b7, 0xe5809ee3), TOBN(0x999f450d, 0x85f8eb1d),
+     TOBN(0x658a6051, 0xe4c79e9b), TOBN(0x1394cb73, 0xc66a9fea),
+     TOBN(0x27f31ed5, 0xc6be7b23), TOBN(0xf4c88f36, 0x5aa6f8fe),
+     TOBN(0x0fb0721f, 0x4aaa499e), TOBN(0x68b3a7d5, 0xe3fb2a6b),
+     TOBN(0xa788097d, 0x3a92851d), TOBN(0x060e7f8a, 0xe96f4913),
+     TOBN(0x82eebe73, 0x1a3a93bc), TOBN(0x42bbf465, 0xa21adc1a),
+     TOBN(0xc10b6fa4, 0xef030efd), TOBN(0x247aa4c7, 0x87b097bb),
+     TOBN(0x8b8dc632, 0xf60c77da), TOBN(0x6ffbc26a, 0xc223523e),
+     TOBN(0xa4f6ff11, 0x344579cf), TOBN(0x5825653c, 0x980250f6),
+     TOBN(0xb2dd097e, 0xbc1aa2b9), TOBN(0x07889393, 0x37a0333a),
+     TOBN(0x1cf55e71, 0x37a0db38), TOBN(0x2648487f, 0x792c1613),
+     TOBN(0xdad01336, 0x3fcef261), TOBN(0x6239c81d, 0x0eabf129),
+     TOBN(0x8ee761de, 0x9d276be2), TOBN(0x406a7a34, 0x1eda6ad3),
+     TOBN(0x4bf367ba, 0x4a493b31), TOBN(0x54f20a52, 0x9bf7f026),
+     TOBN(0xb696e062, 0x9795914b), TOBN(0xcddab96d, 0x8bf236ac),
+     TOBN(0x4ff2c70a, 0xed25ea13), TOBN(0xfa1d09eb, 0x81cbbbe7),
+     TOBN(0x88fc8c87, 0x468544c5), TOBN(0x847a670d, 0x696b3317),
+     TOBN(0xf133421e, 0x64bcb626), TOBN(0xaea638c8, 0x26dee0b5),
+     TOBN(0xd6e7680b, 0xb310346c), TOBN(0xe06f4097, 0xd5d4ced3),
+     TOBN(0x09961452, 0x7512a30b), TOBN(0xf3d867fd, 0xe589a59a),
+     TOBN(0x2e73254f, 0x52d0c180), TOBN(0x9063d8a3, 0x333c74ac),
+     TOBN(0xeda6c595, 0xd314e7bc), TOBN(0x2ee7464b, 0x467899ed),
+     TOBN(0x1cef423c, 0x0a1ed5d3), TOBN(0x217e76ea, 0x69cc7613),
+     TOBN(0x27ccce1f, 0xe7cda917), TOBN(0x12d8016b, 0x8a893f16),
+     TOBN(0xbcd6de84, 0x9fc74f6b), TOBN(0xfa5817e2, 0xf3144e61),
+     TOBN(0x1f354164, 0x0821ee4c), TOBN(0x1583eab4, 0x0bc61992),
+     TOBN(0x7490caf6, 0x1d72879f), TOBN(0x998ad9f3, 0xf76ae7b2),
+     TOBN(0x1e181950, 0xa41157f7), TOBN(0xa9d7e1e6, 0xe8da3a7e),
+     TOBN(0x963784eb, 0x8426b95f), TOBN(0x0ee4ed6e, 0x542e2a10),
+     TOBN(0xb79d4cc5, 0xac751e7b), TOBN(0x93f96472, 0xfd4211bd),
+     TOBN(0x8c72d3d2, 0xc8de4fc6), TOBN(0x7b69cbf5, 0xdf44f064),
+     TOBN(0x3da90ca2, 0xf4bf94e1), TOBN(0x1a5325f8, 0xf12894e2),
+     TOBN(0x0a437f6c, 0x7917d60b), TOBN(0x9be70486, 0x96c9cb5d),
+     TOBN(0xb4d880bf, 0xe1dc5c05), TOBN(0xd738adda, 0xeebeeb57),
+     TOBN(0x6f0119d3, 0xdf0fe6a3), TOBN(0x5c686e55, 0x66eaaf5a),
+     TOBN(0x9cb10b50, 0xdfd0b7ec), TOBN(0xbdd0264b, 0x6a497c21),
+     TOBN(0xfc093514, 0x8c546c96), TOBN(0x58a947fa, 0x79dbf42a),
+     TOBN(0xc0b48d4e, 0x49ccd6d7), TOBN(0xff8fb02c, 0x88bd5580),
+     TOBN(0xc75235e9, 0x07d473b2), TOBN(0x4fab1ac5, 0xa2188af3),
+     TOBN(0x030fa3bc, 0x97576ec0), TOBN(0xe8c946e8, 0x0b7e7d2f),
+     TOBN(0x40a5c9cc, 0x70305600), TOBN(0x6d8260a9, 0xc8b013b4),
+     TOBN(0x0368304f, 0x70bba85c), TOBN(0xad090da1, 0xa4a0d311),
+     TOBN(0x7170e870, 0x2415eec1), TOBN(0xbfba35fe, 0x8461ea47),
+     TOBN(0x6279019a, 0xc1e91938), TOBN(0xa47638f3, 0x1afc415f),
+     TOBN(0x36c65cbb, 0xbcba0e0f), TOBN(0x02160efb, 0x034e2c48),
+     TOBN(0xe6c51073, 0x615cd9e4), TOBN(0x498ec047, 0xf1243c06),
+     TOBN(0x3e5a8809, 0xb17b3d8c), TOBN(0x5cd99e61, 0x0cc565f1),
+     TOBN(0x81e312df, 0x7851dafe), TOBN(0xf156f5ba, 0xa79061e2),
+     TOBN(0x80d62b71, 0x880c590e), TOBN(0xbec9746f, 0x0a39faa1),
+     TOBN(0x1d98a9c1, 0xc8ed1f7a), TOBN(0x09e43bb5, 0xa81d5ff2),
+     TOBN(0xd5f00f68, 0x0da0794a), TOBN(0x412050d9, 0x661aa836),
+     TOBN(0xa89f7c4e, 0x90747e40), TOBN(0x6dc05ebb, 0xb62a3686),
+     TOBN(0xdf4de847, 0x308e3353), TOBN(0x53868fbb, 0x9fb53bb9),
+     TOBN(0x2b09d2c3, 0xcfdcf7dd), TOBN(0x41a9fce3, 0x723fcab4),
+     TOBN(0x73d905f7, 0x07f57ca3), TOBN(0x080f9fb1, 0xac8e1555),
+     TOBN(0x7c088e84, 0x9ba7a531), TOBN(0x07d35586, 0xed9a147f),
+     TOBN(0x602846ab, 0xaf48c336), TOBN(0x7320fd32, 0x0ccf0e79),
+     TOBN(0xaa780798, 0xb18bd1ff), TOBN(0x52c2e300, 0xafdd2905),
+     TOBN(0xf27ea3d6, 0x434267cd), TOBN(0x8b96d16d, 0x15605b5f),
+     TOBN(0x7bb31049, 0x4b45706b), TOBN(0xe7f58b8e, 0x743d25f8),
+     TOBN(0xe9b5e45b, 0x87f30076), TOBN(0xd19448d6, 0x5d053d5a),
+     TOBN(0x1ecc8cb9, 0xd3210a04), TOBN(0x6bc7d463, 0xdafb5269),
+     TOBN(0x3e59b10a, 0x67c3489f), TOBN(0x1769788c, 0x65641e1b),
+     TOBN(0x8a53b82d, 0xbd6cb838), TOBN(0x7066d6e6, 0x236d5f22),
+     TOBN(0x03aa1c61, 0x6908536e), TOBN(0xc971da0d, 0x66ae9809),
+     TOBN(0x01b3a86b, 0xc49a2fac), TOBN(0x3b8420c0, 0x3092e77a),
+     TOBN(0x02057300, 0x7d6fb556), TOBN(0x6941b2a1, 0xbff40a87),
+     TOBN(0x140b6308, 0x0658ff2a), TOBN(0x87804363, 0x3424ab36),
+     TOBN(0x0253bd51, 0x5751e299), TOBN(0xc75bcd76, 0x449c3e3a),
+     TOBN(0x92eb4090, 0x7f8f875d), TOBN(0x9c9d754e, 0x56c26bbf),
+     TOBN(0x158cea61, 0x8110bbe7), TOBN(0x62a6b802, 0x745f91ea),
+     TOBN(0xa79c41aa, 0xc6e7394b), TOBN(0x445b6a83, 0xad57ef10),
+     TOBN(0x0c5277eb, 0x6ea6f40c), TOBN(0x319fe96b, 0x88633365),
+     TOBN(0x0b0fc61f, 0x385f63cb), TOBN(0x41250c84, 0x22bdd127),
+     TOBN(0x67d153f1, 0x09e942c2), TOBN(0x60920d08, 0xc021ad5d),
+     TOBN(0x229f5746, 0x724d81a5), TOBN(0xb7ffb892, 0x5bba3299),
+     TOBN(0x518c51a1, 0xde413032), TOBN(0x2a9bfe77, 0x3c2fd94c),
+     TOBN(0xcbcde239, 0x3191f4fd), TOBN(0x43093e16, 0xd3d6ada1),
+     TOBN(0x184579f3, 0x58769606), TOBN(0x2c94a8b3, 0xd236625c),
+     TOBN(0x6922b9c0, 0x5c437d8e), TOBN(0x3d4ae423, 0xd8d9f3c8),
+     TOBN(0xf72c31c1, 0x2e7090a2), TOBN(0x4ac3f5f3, 0xd76a55bd),
+     TOBN(0x342508fc, 0x6b6af991), TOBN(0x0d527100, 0x1b5cebbd),
+     TOBN(0xb84740d0, 0xdd440dd7), TOBN(0x748ef841, 0x780162fd),
+     TOBN(0xa8dbfe0e, 0xdfc6fafb), TOBN(0xeadfdf05, 0xf7300f27),
+     TOBN(0x7d06555f, 0xfeba4ec9), TOBN(0x12c56f83, 0x9e25fa97),
+     TOBN(0x77f84203, 0xd39b8c34), TOBN(0xed8b1be6, 0x3125eddb),
+     TOBN(0x5bbf2441, 0xf6e39dc5), TOBN(0xb00f6ee6, 0x6a5d678a),
+     TOBN(0xba456ecf, 0x57d0ea99), TOBN(0xdcae0f58, 0x17e06c43),
+     TOBN(0x01643de4, 0x0f5b4baa), TOBN(0x2c324341, 0xd161b9be),
+     TOBN(0x80177f55, 0xe126d468), TOBN(0xed325f1f, 0x76748e09),
+     TOBN(0x6116004a, 0xcfa9bdc2), TOBN(0x2d8607e6, 0x3a9fb468),
+     TOBN(0x0e573e27, 0x6009d660), TOBN(0x3a525d2e, 0x8d10c5a1),
+     TOBN(0xd26cb45c, 0x3b9009a0), TOBN(0xb6b0cdc0, 0xde9d7448),
+     TOBN(0x949c9976, 0xe1337c26), TOBN(0x6faadebd, 0xd73d68e5),
+     TOBN(0x9e158614, 0xf1b768d9), TOBN(0x22dfa557, 0x9cc4f069),
+     TOBN(0xccd6da17, 0xbe93c6d6), TOBN(0x24866c61, 0xa504f5b9),
+     TOBN(0x2121353c, 0x8d694da1), TOBN(0x1c6ca580, 0x0140b8c6),
+     TOBN(0xc245ad8c, 0xe964021e), TOBN(0xb83bffba, 0x032b82b3),
+     TOBN(0xfaa220c6, 0x47ef9898), TOBN(0x7e8d3ac6, 0x982c948a),
+     TOBN(0x1faa2091, 0xbc2d124a), TOBN(0xbd54c3dd, 0x05b15ff4),
+     TOBN(0x386bf3ab, 0xc87c6fb7), TOBN(0xfb2b0563, 0xfdeb6f66),
+     TOBN(0x4e77c557, 0x5b45afb4), TOBN(0xe9ded649, 0xefb8912d),
+     TOBN(0x7ec9bbf5, 0x42f6e557), TOBN(0x2570dfff, 0x62671f00),
+     TOBN(0x2b3bfb78, 0x88e084bd), TOBN(0xa024b238, 0xf37fe5b4),
+     TOBN(0x44e7dc04, 0x95649aee), TOBN(0x498ca255, 0x5e7ec1d8),
+     TOBN(0x3bc766ea, 0xaaa07e86), TOBN(0x0db6facb, 0xf3608586),
+     TOBN(0xbadd2549, 0xbdc259c8), TOBN(0x95af3c6e, 0x041c649f),
+     TOBN(0xb36a928c, 0x02e30afb), TOBN(0x9b5356ad, 0x008a88b8),
+     TOBN(0x4b67a5f1, 0xcf1d9e9d), TOBN(0xc6542e47, 0xa5d8d8ce),
+     TOBN(0x73061fe8, 0x7adfb6cc), TOBN(0xcc826fd3, 0x98678141),
+     TOBN(0x00e758b1, 0x3c80515a), TOBN(0x6afe3247, 0x41485083),
+     TOBN(0x0fcb08b9, 0xb6ae8a75), TOBN(0xb8cf388d, 0x4acf51e1),
+     TOBN(0x344a5560, 0x6961b9d6), TOBN(0x1a6778b8, 0x6a97fd0c),
+     TOBN(0xd840fdc1, 0xecc4c7e3), TOBN(0xde9fe47d, 0x16db68cc),
+     TOBN(0xe95f89de, 0xa3e216aa), TOBN(0x84f1a6a4, 0x9594a8be),
+     TOBN(0x7ddc7d72, 0x5a7b162b), TOBN(0xc5cfda19, 0xadc817a3),
+     TOBN(0x80a5d350, 0x78b58d46), TOBN(0x93365b13, 0x82978f19),
+     TOBN(0x2e44d225, 0x26a1fc90), TOBN(0x0d6d10d2, 0x4d70705d),
+     TOBN(0xd94b6b10, 0xd70c45f4), TOBN(0x0f201022, 0xb216c079),
+     TOBN(0xcec966c5, 0x658fde41), TOBN(0xa8d2bc7d, 0x7e27601d),
+     TOBN(0xbfcce3e1, 0xff230be7), TOBN(0x3394ff6b, 0x0033ffb5),
+     TOBN(0xd890c509, 0x8132c9af), TOBN(0xaac4b0eb, 0x361e7868),
+     TOBN(0x5194ded3, 0xe82d15aa), TOBN(0x4550bd2e, 0x23ae6b7d),
+     TOBN(0x3fda318e, 0xea5399d4), TOBN(0xd989bffa, 0x91638b80),
+     TOBN(0x5ea124d0, 0xa14aa12d), TOBN(0x1fb1b899, 0x3667b944),
+     TOBN(0x95ec7969, 0x44c44d6a), TOBN(0x91df144a, 0x57e86137),
+     TOBN(0x915fd620, 0x73adac44), TOBN(0x8f01732d, 0x59a83801),
+     TOBN(0xec579d25, 0x3aa0a633), TOBN(0x06de5e7c, 0xc9d6d59c),
+     TOBN(0xc132f958, 0xb1ef8010), TOBN(0x29476f96, 0xe65c1a02),
+     TOBN(0x336a77c0, 0xd34c3565), TOBN(0xef1105b2, 0x1b9f1e9e),
+     TOBN(0x63e6d08b, 0xf9e08002), TOBN(0x9aff2f21, 0xc613809e),
+     TOBN(0xb5754f85, 0x3a80e75d), TOBN(0xde71853e, 0x6bbda681),
+     TOBN(0x86f041df, 0x8197fd7a), TOBN(0x8b332e08, 0x127817fa),
+     TOBN(0x05d99be8, 0xb9c20cda), TOBN(0x89f7aad5, 0xd5cd0c98),
+     TOBN(0x7ef936fe, 0x5bb94183), TOBN(0x92ca0753, 0xb05cd7f2),
+     TOBN(0x9d65db11, 0x74a1e035), TOBN(0x02628cc8, 0x13eaea92),
+     TOBN(0xf2d9e242, 0x49e4fbf2), TOBN(0x94fdfd9b, 0xe384f8b7),
+     TOBN(0x65f56054, 0x63428c6b), TOBN(0x2f7205b2, 0x90b409a5),
+     TOBN(0xf778bb78, 0xff45ae11), TOBN(0xa13045be, 0xc5ee53b2),
+     TOBN(0xe00a14ff, 0x03ef77fe), TOBN(0x689cd59f, 0xffef8bef),
+     TOBN(0x3578f0ed, 0x1e9ade22), TOBN(0xe99f3ec0, 0x6268b6a8),
+     TOBN(0xa2057d91, 0xea1b3c3e), TOBN(0x2d1a7053, 0xb8823a4a),
+     TOBN(0xabbb336a, 0x2cca451e), TOBN(0xcd2466e3, 0x2218bb5d),
+     TOBN(0x3ac1f42f, 0xc8cb762d), TOBN(0x7e312aae, 0x7690211f),
+     TOBN(0xebb9bd73, 0x45d07450), TOBN(0x207c4b82, 0x46c2213f),
+     TOBN(0x99d425c1, 0x375913ec), TOBN(0x94e45e96, 0x67908220),
+     TOBN(0xc08f3087, 0xcd67dbf6), TOBN(0xa5670fbe, 0xc0887056),
+     TOBN(0x6717b64a, 0x66f5b8fc), TOBN(0xd5a56aea, 0x786fec28),
+     TOBN(0xa8c3f55f, 0xc0ff4952), TOBN(0xa77fefae, 0x457ac49b),
+     TOBN(0x29882d7c, 0x98379d44), TOBN(0xd000bdfb, 0x509edc8a),
+     TOBN(0xc6f95979, 0xe66fe464), TOBN(0x504a6115, 0xfa61bde0),
+     TOBN(0x56b3b871, 0xeffea31a), TOBN(0x2d3de26d, 0xf0c21a54),
+     TOBN(0x21dbff31, 0x834753bf), TOBN(0xe67ecf49, 0x69269d86),
+     TOBN(0x7a176952, 0x151fe690), TOBN(0x03515804, 0x7f2adb5f),
+     TOBN(0xee794b15, 0xd1b62a8d), TOBN(0xf004ceec, 0xaae454e6),
+     TOBN(0x0897ea7c, 0xf0386fac), TOBN(0x3b62ff12, 0xd1fca751),
+     TOBN(0x154181df, 0x1b7a04ec), TOBN(0x2008e04a, 0xfb5847ec),
+     TOBN(0xd147148e, 0x41dbd772), TOBN(0x2b419f73, 0x22942654),
+     TOBN(0x669f30d3, 0xe9c544f7), TOBN(0x52a2c223, 0xc8540149),
+     TOBN(0x5da9ee14, 0x634dfb02), TOBN(0x5f074ff0, 0xf47869f3),
+     TOBN(0x74ee878d, 0xa3933acc), TOBN(0xe6510651, 0x4fe35ed1),
+     TOBN(0xb3eb9482, 0xf1012e7a), TOBN(0x51013cc0, 0xa8a566ae),
+     TOBN(0xdd5e9243, 0x47c00d3b), TOBN(0x7fde089d, 0x946bb0e5),
+     TOBN(0x030754fe, 0xc731b4b3), TOBN(0x12a136a4, 0x99fda062),
+     TOBN(0x7c1064b8, 0x5a1a35bc), TOBN(0xbf1f5763, 0x446c84ef),
+     TOBN(0xed29a56d, 0xa16d4b34), TOBN(0x7fba9d09, 0xdca21c4f),
+     TOBN(0x66d7ac00, 0x6d8de486), TOBN(0x60061987, 0x73a2a5e1),
+     TOBN(0x8b400f86, 0x9da28ff0), TOBN(0x3133f708, 0x43c4599c),
+     TOBN(0x9911c9b8, 0xee28cb0d), TOBN(0xcd7e2874, 0x8e0af61d),
+     TOBN(0x5a85f0f2, 0x72ed91fc), TOBN(0x85214f31, 0x9cd4a373),
+     TOBN(0x881fe5be, 0x1925253c), TOBN(0xd8dc98e0, 0x91e8bc76),
+     TOBN(0x7120affe, 0x585cc3a2), TOBN(0x724952ed, 0x735bf97a),
+     TOBN(0x5581e7dc, 0x3eb34581), TOBN(0x5cbff4f2, 0xe52ee57d),
+     TOBN(0x8d320a0e, 0x87d8cc7b), TOBN(0x9beaa7f3, 0xf1d280d0),
+     TOBN(0x7a0b9571, 0x9beec704), TOBN(0x9126332e, 0x5b7f0057),
+     TOBN(0x01fbc1b4, 0x8ed3bd6d), TOBN(0x35bb2c12, 0xd945eb24),
+     TOBN(0x6404694e, 0x9a8ae255), TOBN(0xb6092eec, 0x8d6abfb3),
+     TOBN(0x4d76143f, 0xcc058865), TOBN(0x7b0a5af2, 0x6e249922),
+     TOBN(0x8aef9440, 0x6a50d353), TOBN(0xe11e4bcc, 0x64f0e07a),
+     TOBN(0x4472993a, 0xa14a90fa), TOBN(0x7706e20c, 0xba0c51d4),
+     TOBN(0xf403292f, 0x1532672d), TOBN(0x52573bfa, 0x21829382),
+     TOBN(0x6a7bb6a9, 0x3b5bdb83), TOBN(0x08da65c0, 0xa4a72318),
+     TOBN(0xc58d22aa, 0x63eb065f), TOBN(0x1717596c, 0x1b15d685),
+     TOBN(0x112df0d0, 0xb266d88b), TOBN(0xf688ae97, 0x5941945a),
+     TOBN(0x487386e3, 0x7c292cac), TOBN(0x42f3b50d, 0x57d6985c),
+     TOBN(0x6da4f998, 0x6a90fc34), TOBN(0xc8f257d3, 0x65ca8a8d),
+     TOBN(0xc2feabca, 0x6951f762), TOBN(0xe1bc81d0, 0x74c323ac),
+     TOBN(0x1bc68f67, 0x251a2a12), TOBN(0x10d86587, 0xbe8a70dc),
+     TOBN(0xd648af7f, 0xf0f84d2e), TOBN(0xf0aa9ebc, 0x6a43ac92),
+     TOBN(0x69e3be04, 0x27596893), TOBN(0xb6bb02a6, 0x45bf452b),
+     TOBN(0x0875c11a, 0xf4c698c8), TOBN(0x6652b5c7, 0xbece3794),
+     TOBN(0x7b3755fd, 0x4f5c0499), TOBN(0x6ea16558, 0xb5532b38),
+     TOBN(0xd1c69889, 0xa2e96ef7), TOBN(0x9c773c3a, 0x61ed8f48),
+     TOBN(0x2b653a40, 0x9b323abc), TOBN(0xe26605e1, 0xf0e1d791),
+     TOBN(0x45d41064, 0x4a87157a), TOBN(0x8f9a78b7, 0xcbbce616),
+     TOBN(0xcf1e44aa, 0xc407eddd), TOBN(0x81ddd1d8, 0xa35b964f),
+     TOBN(0x473e339e, 0xfd083999), TOBN(0x6c94bdde, 0x8e796802),
+     TOBN(0x5a304ada, 0x8545d185), TOBN(0x82ae44ea, 0x738bb8cb),
+     TOBN(0x628a35e3, 0xdf87e10e), TOBN(0xd3624f3d, 0xa15b9fe3),
+     TOBN(0xcc44209b, 0x14be4254), TOBN(0x7d0efcbc, 0xbdbc2ea5),
+     TOBN(0x1f603362, 0x04c37bbe), TOBN(0x21f363f5, 0x56a5852c),
+     TOBN(0xa1503d1c, 0xa8501550), TOBN(0x2251e0e1, 0xd8ab10bb),
+     TOBN(0xde129c96, 0x6961c51c), TOBN(0x1f7246a4, 0x81910f68),
+     TOBN(0x2eb744ee, 0x5f2591f2), TOBN(0x3c47d33f, 0x5e627157),
+     TOBN(0x4d6d62c9, 0x22f3bd68), TOBN(0x6120a64b, 0xcb8df856),
+     TOBN(0x3a9ac6c0, 0x7b5d07df), TOBN(0xa92b9558, 0x7ef39783),
+     TOBN(0xe128a134, 0xab3a9b4f), TOBN(0x41c18807, 0xb1252f05),
+     TOBN(0xfc7ed089, 0x80ba9b1c), TOBN(0xac8dc6de, 0xc532a9dd),
+     TOBN(0xbf829cef, 0x55246809), TOBN(0x101b784f, 0x5b4ee80f),
+     TOBN(0xc09945bb, 0xb6f11603), TOBN(0x57b09dbe, 0x41d2801e),
+     TOBN(0xfba5202f, 0xa97534a8), TOBN(0x7fd8ae5f, 0xc17b9614),
+     TOBN(0xa50ba666, 0x78308435), TOBN(0x9572f77c, 0xd3868c4d),
+     TOBN(0x0cef7bfd, 0x2dd7aab0), TOBN(0xe7958e08, 0x2c7c79ff),
+     TOBN(0x81262e42, 0x25346689), TOBN(0x716da290, 0xb07c7004),
+     TOBN(0x35f911ea, 0xb7950ee3), TOBN(0x6fd72969, 0x261d21b5),
+     TOBN(0x52389803, 0x08b640d3), TOBN(0x5b0026ee, 0x887f12a1),
+     TOBN(0x20e21660, 0x742e9311), TOBN(0x0ef6d541, 0x5ff77ff7),
+     TOBN(0x969127f0, 0xf9c41135), TOBN(0xf21d60c9, 0x68a64993),
+     TOBN(0x656e5d0c, 0xe541875c), TOBN(0xf1e0f84e, 0xa1d3c233),
+     TOBN(0x9bcca359, 0x06002d60), TOBN(0xbe2da60c, 0x06191552),
+     TOBN(0x5da8bbae, 0x61181ec3), TOBN(0x9f04b823, 0x65806f19),
+     TOBN(0xf1604a7d, 0xd4b79bb8), TOBN(0xaee806fb, 0x52c878c8),
+     TOBN(0x34144f11, 0x8d47b8e8), TOBN(0x72edf52b, 0x949f9054),
+     TOBN(0xebfca84e, 0x2127015a), TOBN(0x9051d0c0, 0x9cb7cef3),
+     TOBN(0x86e8fe58, 0x296deec8), TOBN(0x33b28188, 0x41010d74),}
+    ,
+    {TOBN(0x01079383, 0x171b445f), TOBN(0x9bcf21e3, 0x8131ad4c),
+     TOBN(0x8cdfe205, 0xc93987e8), TOBN(0xe63f4152, 0xc92e8c8f),
+     TOBN(0x729462a9, 0x30add43d), TOBN(0x62ebb143, 0xc980f05a),
+     TOBN(0x4f3954e5, 0x3b06e968), TOBN(0xfe1d75ad, 0x242cf6b1),
+     TOBN(0x5f95c6c7, 0xaf8685c8), TOBN(0xd4c1c8ce, 0x2f8f01aa),
+     TOBN(0xc44bbe32, 0x2574692a), TOBN(0xb8003478, 0xd4a4a068),
+     TOBN(0x7c8fc6e5, 0x2eca3cdb), TOBN(0xea1db16b, 0xec04d399),
+     TOBN(0xb05bc82e, 0x8f2bc5cf), TOBN(0x763d517f, 0xf44793d2),
+     TOBN(0x4451c1b8, 0x08bd98d0), TOBN(0x644b1cd4, 0x6575f240),
+     TOBN(0x6907eb33, 0x7375d270), TOBN(0x56c8bebd, 0xfa2286bd),
+     TOBN(0xc713d2ac, 0xc4632b46), TOBN(0x17da427a, 0xafd60242),
+     TOBN(0x313065b7, 0xc95c7546), TOBN(0xf8239898, 0xbf17a3de),
+     TOBN(0xf3b7963f, 0x4c830320), TOBN(0x842c7aa0, 0x903203e3),
+     TOBN(0xaf22ca0a, 0xe7327afb), TOBN(0x38e13092, 0x967609b6),
+     TOBN(0x73b8fb62, 0x757558f1), TOBN(0x3cc3e831, 0xf7eca8c1),
+     TOBN(0xe4174474, 0xf6331627), TOBN(0xa77989ca, 0xc3c40234),
+     TOBN(0xe5fd17a1, 0x44a081e0), TOBN(0xd797fb7d, 0xb70e296a),
+     TOBN(0x2b472b30, 0x481f719c), TOBN(0x0e632a98, 0xfe6f8c52),
+     TOBN(0x89ccd116, 0xc5f0c284), TOBN(0xf51088af, 0x2d987c62),
+     TOBN(0x2a2bccda, 0x4c2de6cf), TOBN(0x810f9efe, 0xf679f0f9),
+     TOBN(0xb0f394b9, 0x7ffe4b3e), TOBN(0x0b691d21, 0xe5fa5d21),
+     TOBN(0xb0bd7747, 0x9dfbbc75), TOBN(0xd2830fda, 0xfaf78b00),
+     TOBN(0xf78c249c, 0x52434f57), TOBN(0x4b1f7545, 0x98096dab),
+     TOBN(0x73bf6f94, 0x8ff8c0b3), TOBN(0x34aef03d, 0x454e134c),
+     TOBN(0xf8d151f4, 0xb7ac7ec5), TOBN(0xd6ceb95a, 0xe50da7d5),
+     TOBN(0xa1b492b0, 0xdc3a0eb8), TOBN(0x75157b69, 0xb3dd2863),
+     TOBN(0xe2c4c74e, 0xc5413d62), TOBN(0xbe329ff7, 0xbc5fc4c7),
+     TOBN(0x835a2aea, 0x60fa9dda), TOBN(0xf117f5ad, 0x7445cb87),
+     TOBN(0xae8317f4, 0xb0166f7a), TOBN(0xfbd3e3f7, 0xceec74e6),
+     TOBN(0xfdb516ac, 0xe0874bfd), TOBN(0x3d846019, 0xc681f3a3),
+     TOBN(0x0b12ee5c, 0x7c1620b0), TOBN(0xba68b4dd, 0x2b63c501),
+     TOBN(0xac03cd32, 0x6668c51e), TOBN(0x2a6279f7, 0x4e0bcb5b),
+     TOBN(0x17bd69b0, 0x6ae85c10), TOBN(0x72946979, 0x1dfdd3a6),
+     TOBN(0xd9a03268, 0x2c078bec), TOBN(0x41c6a658, 0xbfd68a52),
+     TOBN(0xcdea1024, 0x0e023900), TOBN(0xbaeec121, 0xb10d144d),
+     TOBN(0x5a600e74, 0x058ab8dc), TOBN(0x1333af21, 0xbb89ccdd),
+     TOBN(0xdf25eae0, 0x3aaba1f1), TOBN(0x2cada16e, 0x3b7144cf),
+     TOBN(0x657ee27d, 0x71ab98bc), TOBN(0x99088b4c, 0x7a6fc96e),
+     TOBN(0x05d5c0a0, 0x3549dbd4), TOBN(0x42cbdf8f, 0xf158c3ac),
+     TOBN(0x3fb6b3b0, 0x87edd685), TOBN(0x22071cf6, 0x86f064d0),
+     TOBN(0xd2d6721f, 0xff2811e5), TOBN(0xdb81b703, 0xfe7fae8c),
+     TOBN(0x3cfb74ef, 0xd3f1f7bb), TOBN(0x0cdbcd76, 0x16cdeb5d),
+     TOBN(0x4f39642a, 0x566a808c), TOBN(0x02b74454, 0x340064d6),
+     TOBN(0xfabbadca, 0x0528fa6f), TOBN(0xe4c3074c, 0xd3fc0bb6),
+     TOBN(0xb32cb8b0, 0xb796d219), TOBN(0xc3e95f4f, 0x34741dd9),
+     TOBN(0x87212125, 0x68edf6f5), TOBN(0x7a03aee4, 0xa2b9cb8e),
+     TOBN(0x0cd3c376, 0xf53a89aa), TOBN(0x0d8af9b1, 0x948a28dc),
+     TOBN(0xcf86a3f4, 0x902ab04f), TOBN(0x8aacb62a, 0x7f42002d),
+     TOBN(0x106985eb, 0xf62ffd52), TOBN(0xe670b54e, 0x5797bf10),
+     TOBN(0x4b405209, 0xc5e30aef), TOBN(0x12c97a20, 0x4365b5e9),
+     TOBN(0x104646ce, 0x1fe32093), TOBN(0x13cb4ff6, 0x3907a8c9),
+     TOBN(0x8b9f30d1, 0xd46e726b), TOBN(0xe1985e21, 0xaba0f499),
+     TOBN(0xc573dea9, 0x10a230cd), TOBN(0x24f46a93, 0xcd30f947),
+     TOBN(0xf2623fcf, 0xabe2010a), TOBN(0x3f278cb2, 0x73f00e4f),
+     TOBN(0xed55c67d, 0x50b920eb), TOBN(0xf1cb9a2d, 0x8e760571),
+     TOBN(0x7c50d109, 0x0895b709), TOBN(0x4207cf07, 0x190d4369),
+     TOBN(0x3b027e81, 0xc4127fe1), TOBN(0xa9f8b9ad, 0x3ae9c566),
+     TOBN(0x5ab10851, 0xacbfbba5), TOBN(0xa747d648, 0x569556f5),
+     TOBN(0xcc172b5c, 0x2ba97bf7), TOBN(0x15e0f77d, 0xbcfa3324),
+     TOBN(0xa345b797, 0x7686279d), TOBN(0x5a723480, 0xe38003d3),
+     TOBN(0xfd8e139f, 0x8f5fcda8), TOBN(0xf3e558c4, 0xbdee5bfd),
+     TOBN(0xd76cbaf4, 0xe33f9f77), TOBN(0x3a4c97a4, 0x71771969),
+     TOBN(0xda27e84b, 0xf6dce6a7), TOBN(0xff373d96, 0x13e6c2d1),
+     TOBN(0xf115193c, 0xd759a6e9), TOBN(0x3f9b7025, 0x63d2262c),
+     TOBN(0xd9764a31, 0x317cd062), TOBN(0x30779d8e, 0x199f8332),
+     TOBN(0xd8074106, 0x16b11b0b), TOBN(0x7917ab9f, 0x78aeaed8),
+     TOBN(0xb67a9cbe, 0x28fb1d8e), TOBN(0x2e313563, 0x136eda33),
+     TOBN(0x010b7069, 0xa371a86c), TOBN(0x44d90fa2, 0x6744e6b7),
+     TOBN(0x68190867, 0xd6b3e243), TOBN(0x9fe6cd9d, 0x59048c48),
+     TOBN(0xb900b028, 0x95731538), TOBN(0xa012062f, 0x32cae04f),
+     TOBN(0x8107c8bc, 0x9399d082), TOBN(0x47e8c54a, 0x41df12e2),
+     TOBN(0x14ba5117, 0xb6ef3f73), TOBN(0x22260bea, 0x81362f0b),
+     TOBN(0x90ea261e, 0x1a18cc20), TOBN(0x2192999f, 0x2321d636),
+     TOBN(0xef64d314, 0xe311b6a0), TOBN(0xd7401e4c, 0x3b54a1f5),
+     TOBN(0x19019983, 0x6fbca2ba), TOBN(0x46ad3293, 0x8fbffc4b),
+     TOBN(0xa142d3f6, 0x3786bf40), TOBN(0xeb5cbc26, 0xb67039fc),
+     TOBN(0x9cb0ae6c, 0x252bd479), TOBN(0x05e0f88a, 0x12b5848f),
+     TOBN(0x78f6d2b2, 0xa5c97663), TOBN(0x6f6e149b, 0xc162225c),
+     TOBN(0xe602235c, 0xde601a89), TOBN(0xd17bbe98, 0xf373be1f),
+     TOBN(0xcaf49a5b, 0xa8471827), TOBN(0x7e1a0a85, 0x18aaa116),
+     TOBN(0x6c833196, 0x270580c3), TOBN(0x1e233839, 0xf1c98a14),
+     TOBN(0x67b2f7b4, 0xae34e0a5), TOBN(0x47ac8745, 0xd8ce7289),
+     TOBN(0x2b74779a, 0x100dd467), TOBN(0x274a4337, 0x4ee50d09),
+     TOBN(0x603dcf13, 0x83608bc9), TOBN(0xcd9da6c3, 0xc89e8388),
+     TOBN(0x2660199f, 0x355116ac), TOBN(0xcc38bb59, 0xb6d18eed),
+     TOBN(0x3075f31f, 0x2f4bc071), TOBN(0x9774457f, 0x265dc57e),
+     TOBN(0x06a6a9c8, 0xc6db88bb), TOBN(0x6429d07f, 0x4ec98e04),
+     TOBN(0x8d05e57b, 0x05ecaa8b), TOBN(0x20f140b1, 0x7872ea7b),
+     TOBN(0xdf8c0f09, 0xca494693), TOBN(0x48d3a020, 0xf252e909),
+     TOBN(0x4c5c29af, 0x57b14b12), TOBN(0x7e6fa37d, 0xbf47ad1c),
+     TOBN(0x66e7b506, 0x49a0c938), TOBN(0xb72c0d48, 0x6be5f41f),
+     TOBN(0x6a6242b8, 0xb2359412), TOBN(0xcd35c774, 0x8e859480),
+     TOBN(0x12536fea, 0x87baa627), TOBN(0x58c1fec1, 0xf72aa680),
+     TOBN(0x6c29b637, 0x601e5dc9), TOBN(0x9e3c3c1c, 0xde9e01b9),
+     TOBN(0xefc8127b, 0x2bcfe0b0), TOBN(0x35107102, 0x2a12f50d),
+     TOBN(0x6ccd6cb1, 0x4879b397), TOBN(0xf792f804, 0xf8a82f21),
+     TOBN(0x509d4804, 0xa9b46402), TOBN(0xedddf85d, 0xc10f0850),
+     TOBN(0x928410dc, 0x4b6208aa), TOBN(0xf6229c46, 0x391012dc),
+     TOBN(0xc5a7c41e, 0x7727b9b6), TOBN(0x289e4e4b, 0xaa444842),
+     TOBN(0x049ba1d9, 0xe9a947ea), TOBN(0x44f9e47f, 0x83c8debc),
+     TOBN(0xfa77a1fe, 0x611f8b8e), TOBN(0xfd2e416a, 0xf518f427),
+     TOBN(0xc5fffa70, 0x114ebac3), TOBN(0xfe57c4e9, 0x5d89697b),
+     TOBN(0xfdd053ac, 0xb1aaf613), TOBN(0x31df210f, 0xea585a45),
+     TOBN(0x318cc10e, 0x24985034), TOBN(0x1a38efd1, 0x5f1d6130),
+     TOBN(0xbf86f237, 0x0b1e9e21), TOBN(0xb258514d, 0x1dbe88aa),
+     TOBN(0x1e38a588, 0x90c1baf9), TOBN(0x2936a01e, 0xbdb9b692),
+     TOBN(0xd576de98, 0x6dd5b20c), TOBN(0xb586bf71, 0x70f98ecf),
+     TOBN(0xcccf0f12, 0xc42d2fd7), TOBN(0x8717e61c, 0xfb35bd7b),
+     TOBN(0x8b1e5722, 0x35e6fc06), TOBN(0x3477728f, 0x0b3e13d5),
+     TOBN(0x150c294d, 0xaa8a7372), TOBN(0xc0291d43, 0x3bfa528a),
+     TOBN(0xc6c8bc67, 0xcec5a196), TOBN(0xdeeb31e4, 0x5c2e8a7c),
+     TOBN(0xba93e244, 0xfb6e1c51), TOBN(0xb9f8b71b, 0x2e28e156),
+     TOBN(0xce65a287, 0x968a2ab9), TOBN(0xe3c5ce69, 0x46bbcb1f),
+     TOBN(0xf8c835b9, 0xe7ae3f30), TOBN(0x16bbee26, 0xff72b82b),
+     TOBN(0x665e2017, 0xfd42cd22), TOBN(0x1e139970, 0xf8b1d2a0),
+     TOBN(0x125cda29, 0x79204932), TOBN(0x7aee94a5, 0x49c3bee5),
+     TOBN(0x68c70160, 0x89821a66), TOBN(0xf7c37678, 0x8f981669),
+     TOBN(0xd90829fc, 0x48cc3645), TOBN(0x346af049, 0xd70addfc),
+     TOBN(0x2057b232, 0x370bf29c), TOBN(0xf90c73ce, 0x42e650ee),
+     TOBN(0xe03386ea, 0xa126ab90), TOBN(0x0e266e7e, 0x975a087b),
+     TOBN(0x80578eb9, 0x0fca65d9), TOBN(0x7e2989ea, 0x16af45b8),
+     TOBN(0x7438212d, 0xcac75a4e), TOBN(0x38c7ca39, 0x4fef36b8),
+     TOBN(0x8650c494, 0xd402676a), TOBN(0x26ab5a66, 0xf72c7c48),
+     TOBN(0x4e6cb426, 0xce3a464e), TOBN(0xf8f99896, 0x2b72f841),
+     TOBN(0x8c318491, 0x1a335cc8), TOBN(0x563459ba, 0x6a5913e4),
+     TOBN(0x1b920d61, 0xc7b32919), TOBN(0x805ab8b6, 0xa02425ad),
+     TOBN(0x2ac512da, 0x8d006086), TOBN(0x6ca4846a, 0xbcf5c0fd),
+     TOBN(0xafea51d8, 0xac2138d7), TOBN(0xcb647545, 0x344cd443),
+     TOBN(0x0429ee8f, 0xbd7d9040), TOBN(0xee66a2de, 0x819b9c96),
+     TOBN(0x54f9ec25, 0xdea7d744), TOBN(0x2ffea642, 0x671721bb),
+     TOBN(0x4f19dbd1, 0x114344ea), TOBN(0x04304536, 0xfd0dbc8b),
+     TOBN(0x014b50aa, 0x29ec7f91), TOBN(0xb5fc22fe, 0xbb06014d),
+     TOBN(0x60d963a9, 0x1ee682e0), TOBN(0xdf48abc0, 0xfe85c727),
+     TOBN(0x0cadba13, 0x2e707c2d), TOBN(0xde608d3a, 0xa645aeff),
+     TOBN(0x05f1c28b, 0xedafd883), TOBN(0x3c362ede, 0xbd94de1f),
+     TOBN(0x8dd0629d, 0x13593e41), TOBN(0x0a5e736f, 0x766d6eaf),
+     TOBN(0xbfa92311, 0xf68cf9d1), TOBN(0xa4f9ef87, 0xc1797556),
+     TOBN(0x10d75a1f, 0x5601c209), TOBN(0x651c374c, 0x09b07361),
+     TOBN(0x49950b58, 0x88b5cead), TOBN(0x0ef00058, 0x6fa9dbaa),
+     TOBN(0xf51ddc26, 0x4e15f33a), TOBN(0x1f8b5ca6, 0x2ef46140),
+     TOBN(0x343ac0a3, 0xee9523f0), TOBN(0xbb75eab2, 0x975ea978),
+     TOBN(0x1bccf332, 0x107387f4), TOBN(0x790f9259, 0x9ab0062e),
+     TOBN(0xf1a363ad, 0x1e4f6a5f), TOBN(0x06e08b84, 0x62519a50),
+     TOBN(0x60915187, 0x7265f1ee), TOBN(0x6a80ca34, 0x93ae985e),
+     TOBN(0x81b29768, 0xaaba4864), TOBN(0xb13cabf2, 0x8d52a7d6),
+     TOBN(0xb5c36348, 0x8ead03f1), TOBN(0xc932ad95, 0x81c7c1c0),
+     TOBN(0x5452708e, 0xcae1e27b), TOBN(0x9dac4269, 0x1b0df648),
+     TOBN(0x233e3f0c, 0xdfcdb8bc), TOBN(0xe6ceccdf, 0xec540174),
+     TOBN(0xbd0d845e, 0x95081181), TOBN(0xcc8a7920, 0x699355d5),
+     TOBN(0x111c0f6d, 0xc3b375a8), TOBN(0xfd95bc6b, 0xfd51e0dc),
+     TOBN(0x4a106a26, 0x6888523a), TOBN(0x4d142bd6, 0xcb01a06d),
+     TOBN(0x79bfd289, 0xadb9b397), TOBN(0x0bdbfb94, 0xe9863914),
+     TOBN(0x29d8a229, 0x1660f6a6), TOBN(0x7f6abcd6, 0x551c042d),
+     TOBN(0x13039deb, 0x0ac3ffe8), TOBN(0xa01be628, 0xec8523fb),
+     TOBN(0x6ea34103, 0x0ca1c328), TOBN(0xc74114bd, 0xb903928e),
+     TOBN(0x8aa4ff4e, 0x9e9144b0), TOBN(0x7064091f, 0x7f9a4b17),
+     TOBN(0xa3f4f521, 0xe447f2c4), TOBN(0x81b8da7a, 0x604291f0),
+     TOBN(0xd680bc46, 0x7d5926de), TOBN(0x84f21fd5, 0x34a1202f),
+     TOBN(0x1d1e3181, 0x4e9df3d8), TOBN(0x1ca4861a, 0x39ab8d34),
+     TOBN(0x809ddeec, 0x5b19aa4a), TOBN(0x59f72f7e, 0x4d329366),
+     TOBN(0xa2f93f41, 0x386d5087), TOBN(0x40bf739c, 0xdd67d64f),
+     TOBN(0xb4494205, 0x66702158), TOBN(0xc33c65be, 0x73b1e178),
+     TOBN(0xcdcd657c, 0x38ca6153), TOBN(0x97f4519a, 0xdc791976),
+     TOBN(0xcc7c7f29, 0xcd6e1f39), TOBN(0x38de9cfb, 0x7e3c3932),
+     TOBN(0xe448eba3, 0x7b793f85), TOBN(0xe9f8dbf9, 0xf067e914),
+     TOBN(0xc0390266, 0xf114ae87), TOBN(0x39ed75a7, 0xcd6a8e2a),
+     TOBN(0xadb14848, 0x7ffba390), TOBN(0x67f8cb8b, 0x6af9bc09),
+     TOBN(0x322c3848, 0x9c7476db), TOBN(0xa320fecf, 0x52a538d6),
+     TOBN(0xe0493002, 0xb2aced2b), TOBN(0xdfba1809, 0x616bd430),
+     TOBN(0x531c4644, 0xc331be70), TOBN(0xbc04d32e, 0x90d2e450),
+     TOBN(0x1805a0d1, 0x0f9f142d), TOBN(0x2c44a0c5, 0x47ee5a23),
+     TOBN(0x31875a43, 0x3989b4e3), TOBN(0x6b1949fd, 0x0c063481),
+     TOBN(0x2dfb9e08, 0xbe0f4492), TOBN(0x3ff0da03, 0xe9d5e517),
+     TOBN(0x03dbe9a1, 0xf79466a8), TOBN(0x0b87bcd0, 0x15ea9932),
+     TOBN(0xeb64fc83, 0xab1f58ab), TOBN(0x6d9598da, 0x817edc8a),
+     TOBN(0x699cff66, 0x1d3b67e5), TOBN(0x645c0f29, 0x92635853),
+     TOBN(0x253cdd82, 0xeabaf21c), TOBN(0x82b9602a, 0x2241659e),
+     TOBN(0x2cae07ec, 0x2d9f7091), TOBN(0xbe4c720c, 0x8b48cd9b),
+     TOBN(0x6ce5bc03, 0x6f08d6c9), TOBN(0x36e8a997, 0xaf10bf40),
+     TOBN(0x83422d21, 0x3e10ff12), TOBN(0x7b26d3eb, 0xbcc12494),
+     TOBN(0xb240d2d0, 0xc9469ad6), TOBN(0xc4a11b4d, 0x30afa05b),
+     TOBN(0x4b604ace, 0xdd6ba286), TOBN(0x18486600, 0x3ee2864c),
+     TOBN(0x5869d6ba, 0x8d9ce5be), TOBN(0x0d8f68c5, 0xff4bfb0d),
+     TOBN(0xb69f210b, 0x5700cf73), TOBN(0x61f6653a, 0x6d37c135),
+     TOBN(0xff3d432b, 0x5aff5a48), TOBN(0x0d81c4b9, 0x72ba3a69),
+     TOBN(0xee879ae9, 0xfa1899ef), TOBN(0xbac7e2a0, 0x2d6acafd),
+     TOBN(0xd6d93f6c, 0x1c664399), TOBN(0x4c288de1, 0x5bcb135d),
+     TOBN(0x83031dab, 0x9dab7cbf), TOBN(0xfe23feb0, 0x3abbf5f0),
+     TOBN(0x9f1b2466, 0xcdedca85), TOBN(0x140bb710, 0x1a09538c),
+     TOBN(0xac8ae851, 0x5e11115d), TOBN(0x0d63ff67, 0x6f03f59e),
+     TOBN(0x755e5551, 0x7d234afb), TOBN(0x61c2db4e, 0x7e208fc1),
+     TOBN(0xaa9859ce, 0xf28a4b5d), TOBN(0xbdd6d4fc, 0x34af030f),
+     TOBN(0xd1c4a26d, 0x3be01cb1), TOBN(0x9ba14ffc, 0x243aa07c),
+     TOBN(0xf95cd3a9, 0xb2503502), TOBN(0xe379bc06, 0x7d2a93ab),
+     TOBN(0x3efc18e9, 0xd4ca8d68), TOBN(0x083558ec, 0x80bb412a),
+     TOBN(0xd903b940, 0x9645a968), TOBN(0xa499f0b6, 0x9ba6054f),
+     TOBN(0x208b573c, 0xb8349abe), TOBN(0x3baab3e5, 0x30b4fc1c),
+     TOBN(0x87e978ba, 0xcb524990), TOBN(0x3524194e, 0xccdf0e80),
+     TOBN(0x62711725, 0x7d4bcc42), TOBN(0xe90a3d9b, 0xb90109ba),
+     TOBN(0x3b1bdd57, 0x1323e1e0), TOBN(0xb78e9bd5, 0x5eae1599),
+     TOBN(0x0794b746, 0x9e03d278), TOBN(0x80178605, 0xd70e6297),
+     TOBN(0x171792f8, 0x99c97855), TOBN(0x11b393ee, 0xf5a86b5c),
+     TOBN(0x48ef6582, 0xd8884f27), TOBN(0xbd44737a, 0xbf19ba5f),
+     TOBN(0x8698de4c, 0xa42062c6), TOBN(0x8975eb80, 0x61ce9c54),
+     TOBN(0xd50e57c7, 0xd7fe71f3), TOBN(0x15342190, 0xbc97ce38),
+     TOBN(0x51bda2de, 0x4df07b63), TOBN(0xba12aeae, 0x200eb87d),
+     TOBN(0xabe135d2, 0xa9b4f8f6), TOBN(0x04619d65, 0xfad6d99c),
+     TOBN(0x4a6683a7, 0x7994937c), TOBN(0x7a778c8b, 0x6f94f09a),
+     TOBN(0x8c508623, 0x20a71b89), TOBN(0x241a2aed, 0x1c229165),
+     TOBN(0x352be595, 0xaaf83a99), TOBN(0x9fbfee7f, 0x1562bac8),
+     TOBN(0xeaf658b9, 0x5c4017e3), TOBN(0x1dc7f9e0, 0x15120b86),
+     TOBN(0xd84f13dd, 0x4c034d6f), TOBN(0x283dd737, 0xeaea3038),
+     TOBN(0x197f2609, 0xcd85d6a2), TOBN(0x6ebbc345, 0xfae60177),
+     TOBN(0xb80f031b, 0x4e12fede), TOBN(0xde55d0c2, 0x07a2186b),
+     TOBN(0x1fb3e37f, 0x24dcdd5a), TOBN(0x8d602da5, 0x7ed191fb),
+     TOBN(0x108fb056, 0x76023e0d), TOBN(0x70178c71, 0x459c20c0),
+     TOBN(0xfad5a386, 0x3fe54cf0), TOBN(0xa4a3ec4f, 0x02bbb475),
+     TOBN(0x1aa5ec20, 0x919d94d7), TOBN(0x5d3b63b5, 0xa81e4ab3),
+     TOBN(0x7fa733d8, 0x5ad3d2af), TOBN(0xfbc586dd, 0xd1ac7a37),
+     TOBN(0x282925de, 0x40779614), TOBN(0xfe0ffffb, 0xe74a242a),
+     TOBN(0x3f39e67f, 0x906151e5), TOBN(0xcea27f5f, 0x55e10649),
+     TOBN(0xdca1d4e1, 0xc17cf7b7), TOBN(0x0c326d12, 0x2fe2362d),
+     TOBN(0x05f7ac33, 0x7dd35df3), TOBN(0x0c3b7639, 0xc396dbdf),
+     TOBN(0x0912f5ac, 0x03b7db1c), TOBN(0x9dea4b70, 0x5c9ed4a9),
+     TOBN(0x475e6e53, 0xaae3f639), TOBN(0xfaba0e7c, 0xfc278bac),
+     TOBN(0x16f9e221, 0x9490375f), TOBN(0xaebf9746, 0xa5a7ed0a),
+     TOBN(0x45f9af3f, 0xf41ad5d6), TOBN(0x03c4623c, 0xb2e99224),
+     TOBN(0x82c5bb5c, 0xb3cf56aa), TOBN(0x64311819, 0x34567ed3),
+     TOBN(0xec57f211, 0x8be489ac), TOBN(0x2821895d, 0xb9a1104b),
+     TOBN(0x610dc875, 0x6064e007), TOBN(0x8e526f3f, 0x5b20d0fe),
+     TOBN(0x6e71ca77, 0x5b645aee), TOBN(0x3d1dcb9f, 0x800e10ff),
+     TOBN(0x36b51162, 0x189cf6de), TOBN(0x2c5a3e30, 0x6bb17353),
+     TOBN(0xc186cd3e, 0x2a6c6fbf), TOBN(0xa74516fa, 0x4bf97906),
+     TOBN(0x5b4b8f4b, 0x279d6901), TOBN(0x0c4e57b4, 0x2b573743),
+     TOBN(0x75fdb229, 0xb6e386b6), TOBN(0xb46793fd, 0x99deac27),
+     TOBN(0xeeec47ea, 0xcf712629), TOBN(0xe965f3c4, 0xcbc3b2dd),
+     TOBN(0x8dd1fb83, 0x425c6559), TOBN(0x7fc00ee6, 0x0af06fda),
+     TOBN(0xe98c9225, 0x33d956df), TOBN(0x0f1ef335, 0x4fbdc8a2),
+     TOBN(0x2abb5145, 0xb79b8ea2), TOBN(0x40fd2945, 0xbdbff288),
+     TOBN(0x6a814ac4, 0xd7185db7), TOBN(0xc4329d6f, 0xc084609a),
+     TOBN(0xc9ba7b52, 0xed1be45d), TOBN(0x891dd20d, 0xe4cd2c74),
+     TOBN(0x5a4d4a7f, 0x824139b1), TOBN(0x66c17716, 0xb873c710),
+     TOBN(0x5e5bc141, 0x2843c4e0), TOBN(0xd5ac4817, 0xb97eb5bf),
+     TOBN(0xc0f8af54, 0x450c95c7), TOBN(0xc91b3fa0, 0x318406c5),
+     TOBN(0x360c340a, 0xab9d97f8), TOBN(0xfb57bd07, 0x90a2d611),
+     TOBN(0x4339ae3c, 0xa6a6f7e5), TOBN(0x9c1fcd2a, 0x2feb8a10),
+     TOBN(0x972bcca9, 0xc7ea7432), TOBN(0x1b0b924c, 0x308076f6),
+     TOBN(0x80b2814a, 0x2a5b4ca5), TOBN(0x2f78f55b, 0x61ef3b29),
+     TOBN(0xf838744a, 0xc18a414f), TOBN(0xc611eaae, 0x903d0a86),
+     TOBN(0x94dabc16, 0x2a453f55), TOBN(0xe6f2e3da, 0x14efb279),
+     TOBN(0x5b7a6017, 0x9320dc3c), TOBN(0x692e382f, 0x8df6b5a4),
+     TOBN(0x3f5e15e0, 0x2d40fa90), TOBN(0xc87883ae, 0x643dd318),
+     TOBN(0x511053e4, 0x53544774), TOBN(0x834d0ecc, 0x3adba2bc),
+     TOBN(0x4215d7f7, 0xbae371f5), TOBN(0xfcfd57bf, 0x6c8663bc),
+     TOBN(0xded2383d, 0xd6901b1d), TOBN(0x3b49fbb4, 0xb5587dc3),
+     TOBN(0xfd44a08d, 0x07625f62), TOBN(0x3ee4d65b, 0x9de9b762),}
+    ,
+    {TOBN(0x64e5137d, 0x0d63d1fa), TOBN(0x658fc052, 0x02a9d89f),
+     TOBN(0x48894874, 0x50436309), TOBN(0xe9ae30f8, 0xd598da61),
+     TOBN(0x2ed710d1, 0x818baf91), TOBN(0xe27e9e06, 0x8b6a0c20),
+     TOBN(0x1e28dcfb, 0x1c1a6b44), TOBN(0x883acb64, 0xd6ac57dc),
+     TOBN(0x8735728d, 0xc2c6ff70), TOBN(0x79d6122f, 0xc5dc2235),
+     TOBN(0x23f5d003, 0x19e277f9), TOBN(0x7ee84e25, 0xdded8cc7),
+     TOBN(0x91a8afb0, 0x63cd880a), TOBN(0x3f3ea7c6, 0x3574af60),
+     TOBN(0x0cfcdc84, 0x02de7f42), TOBN(0x62d0792f, 0xb31aa152),
+     TOBN(0x8e1b4e43, 0x8a5807ce), TOBN(0xad283893, 0xe4109a7e),
+     TOBN(0xc30cc9cb, 0xafd59dda), TOBN(0xf65f36c6, 0x3d8d8093),
+     TOBN(0xdf31469e, 0xa60d32b2), TOBN(0xee93df4b, 0x3e8191c8),
+     TOBN(0x9c1017c5, 0x355bdeb5), TOBN(0xd2623185, 0x8616aa28),
+     TOBN(0xb02c83f9, 0xdec31a21), TOBN(0x988c8b23, 0x6ad9d573),
+     TOBN(0x53e983ae, 0xa57be365), TOBN(0xe968734d, 0x646f834e),
+     TOBN(0x9137ea8f, 0x5da6309b), TOBN(0x10f3a624, 0xc1f1ce16),
+     TOBN(0x782a9ea2, 0xca440921), TOBN(0xdf94739e, 0x5b46f1b5),
+     TOBN(0x9f9be006, 0xcce85c9b), TOBN(0x360e70d6, 0xa4c7c2d3),
+     TOBN(0x2cd5beea, 0xaefa1e60), TOBN(0x64cf63c0, 0x8c3d2b6d),
+     TOBN(0xfb107fa3, 0xe1cf6f90), TOBN(0xb7e937c6, 0xd5e044e6),
+     TOBN(0x74e8ca78, 0xce34db9f), TOBN(0x4f8b36c1, 0x3e210bd0),
+     TOBN(0x1df165a4, 0x34a35ea8), TOBN(0x3418e0f7, 0x4d4412f6),
+     TOBN(0x5af1f8af, 0x518836c3), TOBN(0x42ceef4d, 0x130e1965),
+     TOBN(0x5560ca0b, 0x543a1957), TOBN(0xc33761e5, 0x886cb123),
+     TOBN(0x66624b1f, 0xfe98ed30), TOBN(0xf772f4bf, 0x1090997d),
+     TOBN(0xf4e540bb, 0x4885d410), TOBN(0x7287f810, 0x9ba5f8d7),
+     TOBN(0x22d0d865, 0xde98dfb1), TOBN(0x49ff51a1, 0xbcfbb8a3),
+     TOBN(0xb6b6fa53, 0x6bc3012e), TOBN(0x3d31fd72, 0x170d541d),
+     TOBN(0x8018724f, 0x4b0f4966), TOBN(0x79e7399f, 0x87dbde07),
+     TOBN(0x56f8410e, 0xf4f8b16a), TOBN(0x97241afe, 0xc47b266a),
+     TOBN(0x0a406b8e, 0x6d9c87c1), TOBN(0x803f3e02, 0xcd42ab1b),
+     TOBN(0x7f0309a8, 0x04dbec69), TOBN(0xa83b85f7, 0x3bbad05f),
+     TOBN(0xc6097273, 0xad8e197f), TOBN(0xc097440e, 0x5067adc1),
+     TOBN(0x730eafb6, 0x3524ff16), TOBN(0xd7f9b51e, 0x823fc6ce),
+     TOBN(0x27bd0d32, 0x443e4ac0), TOBN(0x40c59ad9, 0x4d66f217),
+     TOBN(0x6c33136f, 0x17c387a4), TOBN(0x5043b8d5, 0xeb86804d),
+     TOBN(0x74970312, 0x675a73c9), TOBN(0x838fdb31, 0xf16669b6),
+     TOBN(0xc507b6dd, 0x418e7ddd), TOBN(0x39888d93, 0x472f19d6),
+     TOBN(0x7eae26be, 0x0c27eb4d), TOBN(0x17b53ed3, 0xfbabb884),
+     TOBN(0xfc27021b, 0x2b01ae4f), TOBN(0x88462e87, 0xcf488682),
+     TOBN(0xbee096ec, 0x215e2d87), TOBN(0xeb2fea9a, 0xd242e29b),
+     TOBN(0x5d985b5f, 0xb821fc28), TOBN(0x89d2e197, 0xdc1e2ad2),
+     TOBN(0x55b566b8, 0x9030ba62), TOBN(0xe3fd41b5, 0x4f41b1c6),
+     TOBN(0xb738ac2e, 0xb9a96d61), TOBN(0x7f8567ca, 0x369443f4),
+     TOBN(0x8698622d, 0xf803a440), TOBN(0x2b586236, 0x8fe2f4dc),
+     TOBN(0xbbcc00c7, 0x56b95bce), TOBN(0x5ec03906, 0x616da680),
+     TOBN(0x79162ee6, 0x72214252), TOBN(0x43132b63, 0x86a892d2),
+     TOBN(0x4bdd3ff2, 0x2f3263bf), TOBN(0xd5b3733c, 0x9cd0a142),
+     TOBN(0x592eaa82, 0x44415ccb), TOBN(0x663e8924, 0x8d5474ea),
+     TOBN(0x8058a25e, 0x5236344e), TOBN(0x82e8df9d, 0xbda76ee6),
+     TOBN(0xdcf6efd8, 0x11cc3d22), TOBN(0x00089cda, 0x3b4ab529),
+     TOBN(0x91d3a071, 0xbd38a3db), TOBN(0x4ea97fc0, 0xef72b925),
+     TOBN(0x0c9fc15b, 0xea3edf75), TOBN(0x5a6297cd, 0xa4348ed3),
+     TOBN(0x0d38ab35, 0xce7c42d4), TOBN(0x9fd493ef, 0x82feab10),
+     TOBN(0x46056b6d, 0x82111b45), TOBN(0xda11dae1, 0x73efc5c3),
+     TOBN(0xdc740278, 0x5545a7fb), TOBN(0xbdb2601c, 0x40d507e6),
+     TOBN(0x121dfeeb, 0x7066fa58), TOBN(0x214369a8, 0x39ae8c2a),
+     TOBN(0x195709cb, 0x06e0956c), TOBN(0x4c9d254f, 0x010cd34b),
+     TOBN(0xf51e13f7, 0x0471a532), TOBN(0xe19d6791, 0x1e73054d),
+     TOBN(0xf702a628, 0xdb5c7be3), TOBN(0xc7141218, 0xb24dde05),
+     TOBN(0xdc18233c, 0xf29b2e2e), TOBN(0x3a6bd1e8, 0x85342dba),
+     TOBN(0x3f747fa0, 0xb311898c), TOBN(0xe2a272e4, 0xcd0eac65),
+     TOBN(0x4bba5851, 0xf914d0bc), TOBN(0x7a1a9660, 0xc4a43ee3),
+     TOBN(0xe5a367ce, 0xa1c8cde9), TOBN(0x9d958ba9, 0x7271abe3),
+     TOBN(0xf3ff7eb6, 0x3d1615cd), TOBN(0xa2280dce, 0xf5ae20b0),
+     TOBN(0x56dba5c1, 0xcf640147), TOBN(0xea5a2e3d, 0x5e83d118),
+     TOBN(0x04cd6b6d, 0xda24c511), TOBN(0x1c0f4671, 0xe854d214),
+     TOBN(0x91a6b7a9, 0x69565381), TOBN(0xdc966240, 0xdecf1f5b),
+     TOBN(0x1b22d21c, 0xfcf5d009), TOBN(0x2a05f641, 0x9021dbd5),
+     TOBN(0x8c0ed566, 0xd4312483), TOBN(0x5179a95d, 0x643e216f),
+     TOBN(0xcc185fec, 0x17044493), TOBN(0xb3063339, 0x54991a21),
+     TOBN(0xd801ecdb, 0x0081a726), TOBN(0x0149b0c6, 0x4fa89bbb),
+     TOBN(0xafe9065a, 0x4391b6b9), TOBN(0xedc92786, 0xd633f3a3),
+     TOBN(0xe408c24a, 0xae6a8e13), TOBN(0x85833fde, 0x9f3897ab),
+     TOBN(0x43800e7e, 0xd81a0715), TOBN(0xde08e346, 0xb44ffc5f),
+     TOBN(0x7094184c, 0xcdeff2e0), TOBN(0x49f9387b, 0x165eaed1),
+     TOBN(0x635d6129, 0x777c468a), TOBN(0x8c0dcfd1, 0x538c2dd8),
+     TOBN(0xd6d9d9e3, 0x7a6a308b), TOBN(0x62375830, 0x4c2767d3),
+     TOBN(0x874a8bc6, 0xf38cbeb6), TOBN(0xd94d3f1a, 0xccb6fd9e),
+     TOBN(0x92a9735b, 0xba21f248), TOBN(0x272ad0e5, 0x6cd1efb0),
+     TOBN(0x7437b69c, 0x05b03284), TOBN(0xe7f04702, 0x6948c225),
+     TOBN(0x8a56c04a, 0xcba2ecec), TOBN(0x0c181270, 0xe3a73e41),
+     TOBN(0x6cb34e9d, 0x03e93725), TOBN(0xf77c8713, 0x496521a9),
+     TOBN(0x94569183, 0xfa7f9f90), TOBN(0xf2e7aa4c, 0x8c9707ad),
+     TOBN(0xced2c9ba, 0x26c1c9a3), TOBN(0x9109fe96, 0x40197507),
+     TOBN(0x9ae868a9, 0xe9adfe1c), TOBN(0x3984403d, 0x314e39bb),
+     TOBN(0xb5875720, 0xf2fe378f), TOBN(0x33f901e0, 0xba44a628),
+     TOBN(0xea1125fe, 0x3652438c), TOBN(0xae9ec4e6, 0x9dd1f20b),
+     TOBN(0x1e740d9e, 0xbebf7fbd), TOBN(0x6dbd3ddc, 0x42dbe79c),
+     TOBN(0x62082aec, 0xedd36776), TOBN(0xf612c478, 0xe9859039),
+     TOBN(0xa493b201, 0x032f7065), TOBN(0xebd4d8f2, 0x4ff9b211),
+     TOBN(0x3f23a0aa, 0xaac4cb32), TOBN(0xea3aadb7, 0x15ed4005),
+     TOBN(0xacf17ea4, 0xafa27e63), TOBN(0x56125c1a, 0xc11fd66c),
+     TOBN(0x266344a4, 0x3794f8dc), TOBN(0xdcca923a, 0x483c5c36),
+     TOBN(0x2d6b6bbf, 0x3f9d10a0), TOBN(0xb320c5ca, 0x81d9bdf3),
+     TOBN(0x620e28ff, 0x47b50a95), TOBN(0x933e3b01, 0xcef03371),
+     TOBN(0xf081bf85, 0x99100153), TOBN(0x183be9a0, 0xc3a8c8d6),
+     TOBN(0x4e3ddc5a, 0xd6bbe24d), TOBN(0xc6c74630, 0x53843795),
+     TOBN(0x78193dd7, 0x65ec2d4c), TOBN(0xb8df26cc, 0xcd3c89b2),
+     TOBN(0x98dbe399, 0x5a483f8d), TOBN(0x72d8a957, 0x7dd3313a),
+     TOBN(0x65087294, 0xab0bd375), TOBN(0xfcd89248, 0x7c259d16),
+     TOBN(0x8a9443d7, 0x7613aa81), TOBN(0x80100800, 0x85fe6584),
+     TOBN(0x70fc4dbc, 0x7fb10288), TOBN(0xf58280d3, 0xe86beee8),
+     TOBN(0x14fdd82f, 0x7c978c38), TOBN(0xdf1204c1, 0x0de44d7b),
+     TOBN(0xa08a1c84, 0x4160252f), TOBN(0x591554ca, 0xc17646a5),
+     TOBN(0x214a37d6, 0xa05bd525), TOBN(0x48d5f09b, 0x07957b3c),
+     TOBN(0x0247cdcb, 0xd7109bc9), TOBN(0x40f9e4bb, 0x30599ce7),
+     TOBN(0xc325fa03, 0xf46ad2ec), TOBN(0x00f766cf, 0xc3e3f9ee),
+     TOBN(0xab556668, 0xd43a4577), TOBN(0x68d30a61, 0x3ee03b93),
+     TOBN(0x7ddc81ea, 0x77b46a08), TOBN(0xcf5a6477, 0xc7480699),
+     TOBN(0x43a8cb34, 0x6633f683), TOBN(0x1b867e6b, 0x92363c60),
+     TOBN(0x43921114, 0x1f60558e), TOBN(0xcdbcdd63, 0x2f41450e),
+     TOBN(0x7fc04601, 0xcc630e8b), TOBN(0xea7c66d5, 0x97038b43),
+     TOBN(0x7259b8a5, 0x04e99fd8), TOBN(0x98a8dd12, 0x4785549a),
+     TOBN(0x0e459a7c, 0x840552e1), TOBN(0xcdfcf4d0, 0x4bb0909e),
+     TOBN(0x34a86db2, 0x53758da7), TOBN(0xe643bb83, 0xeac997e1),
+     TOBN(0x96400bd7, 0x530c5b7e), TOBN(0x9f97af87, 0xb41c8b52),
+     TOBN(0x34fc8820, 0xfbeee3f9), TOBN(0x93e53490, 0x49091afd),
+     TOBN(0x764b9be5, 0x9a31f35c), TOBN(0x71f37864, 0x57e3d924),
+     TOBN(0x02fb34e0, 0x943aa75e), TOBN(0xa18c9c58, 0xab8ff6e4),
+     TOBN(0x080f31b1, 0x33cf0d19), TOBN(0x5c9682db, 0x083518a7),
+     TOBN(0x873d4ca6, 0xb709c3de), TOBN(0x64a84262, 0x3575b8f0),
+     TOBN(0x6275da1f, 0x020154bb), TOBN(0x97678caa, 0xd17cf1ab),
+     TOBN(0x8779795f, 0x951a95c3), TOBN(0xdd35b163, 0x50fccc08),
+     TOBN(0x32709627, 0x33d8f031), TOBN(0x3c5ab10a, 0x498dd85c),
+     TOBN(0xb6c185c3, 0x41dca566), TOBN(0x7de7feda, 0xd8622aa3),
+     TOBN(0x99e84d92, 0x901b6dfb), TOBN(0x30a02b0e, 0x7c4ad288),
+     TOBN(0xc7c81daa, 0x2fd3cf36), TOBN(0xd1319547, 0xdf89e59f),
+     TOBN(0xb2be8184, 0xcd496733), TOBN(0xd5f449eb, 0x93d3412b),
+     TOBN(0x7ea41b1b, 0x25fe531d), TOBN(0xf9797432, 0x6a1d5646),
+     TOBN(0x86067f72, 0x2bde501a), TOBN(0xf91481c0, 0x0c85e89c),
+     TOBN(0xca8ee465, 0xf8b05bc6), TOBN(0x1844e1cf, 0x02e83cda),
+     TOBN(0xca82114a, 0xb4dbe33b), TOBN(0x0f9f8769, 0x4eabfde2),
+     TOBN(0x4936b1c0, 0x38b27fe2), TOBN(0x63b6359b, 0xaba402df),
+     TOBN(0x40c0ea2f, 0x656bdbab), TOBN(0x9c992a89, 0x6580c39c),
+     TOBN(0x600e8f15, 0x2a60aed1), TOBN(0xeb089ca4, 0xe0bf49df),
+     TOBN(0x9c233d7d, 0x2d42d99a), TOBN(0x648d3f95, 0x4c6bc2fa),
+     TOBN(0xdcc383a8, 0xe1add3f3), TOBN(0xf42c0c6a, 0x4f64a348),
+     TOBN(0x2abd176f, 0x0030dbdb), TOBN(0x4de501a3, 0x7d6c215e),
+     TOBN(0x4a107c1f, 0x4b9a64bc), TOBN(0xa77f0ad3, 0x2496cd59),
+     TOBN(0xfb78ac62, 0x7688dffb), TOBN(0x7025a2ca, 0x67937d8e),
+     TOBN(0xfde8b2d1, 0xd1a8f4e7), TOBN(0xf5b3da47, 0x7354927c),
+     TOBN(0xe48606a3, 0xd9205735), TOBN(0xac477cc6, 0xe177b917),
+     TOBN(0xfb1f73d2, 0xa883239a), TOBN(0xe12572f6, 0xcc8b8357),
+     TOBN(0x9d355e9c, 0xfb1f4f86), TOBN(0x89b795f8, 0xd9f3ec6e),
+     TOBN(0x27be56f1, 0xb54398dc), TOBN(0x1890efd7, 0x3fedeed5),
+     TOBN(0x62f77f1f, 0x9c6d0140), TOBN(0x7ef0e314, 0x596f0ee4),
+     TOBN(0x50ca6631, 0xcc61dab3), TOBN(0x4a39801d, 0xf4866e4f),
+     TOBN(0x66c8d032, 0xae363b39), TOBN(0x22c591e5, 0x2ead66aa),
+     TOBN(0x954ba308, 0xde02a53e), TOBN(0x2a6c060f, 0xd389f357),
+     TOBN(0xe6cfcde8, 0xfbf40b66), TOBN(0x8e02fc56, 0xc6340ce1),
+     TOBN(0xe4957795, 0x73adb4ba), TOBN(0x7b86122c, 0xa7b03805),
+     TOBN(0x63f83512, 0x0c8e6fa6), TOBN(0x83660ea0, 0x057d7804),
+     TOBN(0xbad79105, 0x21ba473c), TOBN(0xb6c50bee, 0xded5389d),
+     TOBN(0xee2caf4d, 0xaa7c9bc0), TOBN(0xd97b8de4, 0x8c4e98a7),
+     TOBN(0xa9f63e70, 0xab3bbddb), TOBN(0x3898aabf, 0x2597815a),
+     TOBN(0x7659af89, 0xac15b3d9), TOBN(0xedf7725b, 0x703ce784),
+     TOBN(0x25470fab, 0xe085116b), TOBN(0x04a43375, 0x87285310),
+     TOBN(0x4e39187e, 0xe2bfd52f), TOBN(0x36166b44, 0x7d9ebc74),
+     TOBN(0x92ad433c, 0xfd4b322c), TOBN(0x726aa817, 0xba79ab51),
+     TOBN(0xf96eacd8, 0xc1db15eb), TOBN(0xfaf71e91, 0x0476be63),
+     TOBN(0xdd69a640, 0x641fad98), TOBN(0xb7995918, 0x29622559),
+     TOBN(0x03c6daa5, 0xde4199dc), TOBN(0x92cadc97, 0xad545eb4),
+     TOBN(0x1028238b, 0x256534e4), TOBN(0x73e80ce6, 0x8595409a),
+     TOBN(0x690d4c66, 0xd05dc59b), TOBN(0xc95f7b8f, 0x981dee80),
+     TOBN(0xf4337014, 0xd856ac25), TOBN(0x441bd9dd, 0xac524dca),
+     TOBN(0x640b3d85, 0x5f0499f5), TOBN(0x39cf84a9, 0xd5fda182),
+     TOBN(0x04e7b055, 0xb2aa95a0), TOBN(0x29e33f0a, 0x0ddf1860),
+     TOBN(0x082e74b5, 0x423f6b43), TOBN(0x217edeb9, 0x0aaa2b0f),
+     TOBN(0x58b83f35, 0x83cbea55), TOBN(0xc485ee4d, 0xbc185d70),
+     TOBN(0x833ff03b, 0x1e5f6992), TOBN(0xb5b9b9cc, 0xcf0c0dd5),
+     TOBN(0x7caaee8e, 0x4e9e8a50), TOBN(0x462e907b, 0x6269dafd),
+     TOBN(0x6ed5cee9, 0xfbe791c6), TOBN(0x68ca3259, 0xed430790),
+     TOBN(0x2b72bdf2, 0x13b5ba88), TOBN(0x60294c8a, 0x35ef0ac4),
+     TOBN(0x9c3230ed, 0x19b99b08), TOBN(0x560fff17, 0x6c2589aa),
+     TOBN(0x552b8487, 0xd6770374), TOBN(0xa373202d, 0x9a56f685),
+     TOBN(0xd3e7f907, 0x45f175d9), TOBN(0x3c2f315f, 0xd080d810),
+     TOBN(0x1130e9dd, 0x7b9520e8), TOBN(0xc078f9e2, 0x0af037b5),
+     TOBN(0x38cd2ec7, 0x1e9c104c), TOBN(0x0f684368, 0xc472fe92),
+     TOBN(0xd3f1b5ed, 0x6247e7ef), TOBN(0xb32d33a9, 0x396dfe21),
+     TOBN(0x46f59cf4, 0x4a9aa2c2), TOBN(0x69cd5168, 0xff0f7e41),
+     TOBN(0x3f59da0f, 0x4b3234da), TOBN(0xcf0b0235, 0xb4579ebe),
+     TOBN(0x6d1cbb25, 0x6d2476c7), TOBN(0x4f0837e6, 0x9dc30f08),
+     TOBN(0x9a4075bb, 0x906f6e98), TOBN(0x253bb434, 0xc761e7d1),
+     TOBN(0xde2e645f, 0x6e73af10), TOBN(0xb89a4060, 0x0c5f131c),
+     TOBN(0xd12840c5, 0xb8cc037f), TOBN(0x3d093a5b, 0x7405bb47),
+     TOBN(0x6202c253, 0x206348b8), TOBN(0xbf5d57fc, 0xc55a3ca7),
+     TOBN(0x89f6c90c, 0x8c3bef48), TOBN(0x23ac7623, 0x5a0a960a),
+     TOBN(0xdfbd3d6b, 0x552b42ab), TOBN(0x3ef22458, 0x132061f6),
+     TOBN(0xd74e9bda, 0xc97e6516), TOBN(0x88779360, 0xc230f49e),
+     TOBN(0xa6ec1de3, 0x1e74ea49), TOBN(0x581dcee5, 0x3fb645a2),
+     TOBN(0xbaef2391, 0x8f483f14), TOBN(0x6d2dddfc, 0xd137d13b),
+     TOBN(0x54cde50e, 0xd2743a42), TOBN(0x89a34fc5, 0xe4d97e67),
+     TOBN(0x13f1f5b3, 0x12e08ce5), TOBN(0xa80540b8, 0xa7f0b2ca),
+     TOBN(0x854bcf77, 0x01982805), TOBN(0xb8653ffd, 0x233bea04),
+     TOBN(0x8e7b8787, 0x02b0b4c9), TOBN(0x2675261f, 0x9acb170a),
+     TOBN(0x061a9d90, 0x930c14e5), TOBN(0xb59b30e0, 0xdef0abea),
+     TOBN(0x1dc19ea6, 0x0200ec7d), TOBN(0xb6f4a3f9, 0x0bce132b),
+     TOBN(0xb8d5de90, 0xf13e27e0), TOBN(0xbaee5ef0, 0x1fade16f),
+     TOBN(0x6f406aaa, 0xe4c6cf38), TOBN(0xab4cfe06, 0xd1369815),
+     TOBN(0x0dcffe87, 0xefd550c6), TOBN(0x9d4f59c7, 0x75ff7d39),
+     TOBN(0xb02553b1, 0x51deb6ad), TOBN(0x812399a4, 0xb1877749),
+     TOBN(0xce90f71f, 0xca6006e1), TOBN(0xc32363a6, 0xb02b6e77),
+     TOBN(0x02284fbe, 0xdc36c64d), TOBN(0x86c81e31, 0xa7e1ae61),
+     TOBN(0x2576c7e5, 0xb909d94a), TOBN(0x8b6f7d02, 0x818b2bb0),
+     TOBN(0xeca3ed07, 0x56faa38a), TOBN(0xa3790e6c, 0x9305bb54),
+     TOBN(0xd784eeda, 0x7bc73061), TOBN(0xbd56d369, 0x6dd50614),
+     TOBN(0xd6575949, 0x229a8aa9), TOBN(0xdcca8f47, 0x4595ec28),
+     TOBN(0x814305c1, 0x06ab4fe6), TOBN(0xc8c39768, 0x24f43f16),
+     TOBN(0xe2a45f36, 0x523f2b36), TOBN(0x995c6493, 0x920d93bb),
+     TOBN(0xf8afdab7, 0x90f1632b), TOBN(0x79ebbecd, 0x1c295954),
+     TOBN(0xc7bb3ddb, 0x79592f48), TOBN(0x67216a7b, 0x5f88e998),
+     TOBN(0xd91f098b, 0xbc01193e), TOBN(0xf7d928a5, 0xb1db83fc),
+     TOBN(0x55e38417, 0xe991f600), TOBN(0x2a91113e, 0x2981a934),
+     TOBN(0xcbc9d648, 0x06b13bde), TOBN(0xb011b6ac, 0x0755ff44),
+     TOBN(0x6f4cb518, 0x045ec613), TOBN(0x522d2d31, 0xc2f5930a),
+     TOBN(0x5acae1af, 0x382e65de), TOBN(0x57643067, 0x27bc966f),
+     TOBN(0x5e12705d, 0x1c7193f0), TOBN(0xf0f32f47, 0x3be8858e),
+     TOBN(0x785c3d7d, 0x96c6dfc7), TOBN(0xd75b4a20, 0xbf31795d),
+     TOBN(0x91acf17b, 0x342659d4), TOBN(0xe596ea34, 0x44f0378f),
+     TOBN(0x4515708f, 0xce52129d), TOBN(0x17387e1e, 0x79f2f585),
+     TOBN(0x72cfd2e9, 0x49dee168), TOBN(0x1ae05223, 0x3e2af239),
+     TOBN(0x009e75be, 0x1d94066a), TOBN(0x6cca31c7, 0x38abf413),
+     TOBN(0xb50bd61d, 0x9bc49908), TOBN(0x4a9b4a8c, 0xf5e2bc1e),
+     TOBN(0xeb6cc5f7, 0x946f83ac), TOBN(0x27da93fc, 0xebffab28),
+     TOBN(0xea314c96, 0x4821c8c5), TOBN(0x8de49ded, 0xa83c15f4),
+     TOBN(0x7a64cf20, 0x7af33004), TOBN(0x45f1bfeb, 0xc9627e10),
+     TOBN(0x878b0626, 0x54b9df60), TOBN(0x5e4fdc3c, 0xa95c0b33),
+     TOBN(0xe54a37ca, 0xc2035d8e), TOBN(0x9087cda9, 0x80f20b8c),
+     TOBN(0x36f61c23, 0x8319ade4), TOBN(0x766f287a, 0xde8cfdf8),
+     TOBN(0x48821948, 0x346f3705), TOBN(0x49a7b853, 0x16e4f4a2),
+     TOBN(0xb9b3f8a7, 0x5cedadfd), TOBN(0x8f562815, 0x8db2a815),
+     TOBN(0xc0b7d554, 0x01f68f95), TOBN(0x12971e27, 0x688a208e),
+     TOBN(0xc9f8b696, 0xd0ff34fc), TOBN(0x20824de2, 0x1222718c),
+     TOBN(0x7213cf9f, 0x0c95284d), TOBN(0xe2ad741b, 0xdc158240),
+     TOBN(0x0ee3a6df, 0x54043ccf), TOBN(0x16ff479b, 0xd84412b3),
+     TOBN(0xf6c74ee0, 0xdfc98af0), TOBN(0xa78a169f, 0x52fcd2fb),
+     TOBN(0xd8ae8746, 0x99c930e9), TOBN(0x1d33e858, 0x49e117a5),
+     TOBN(0x7581fcb4, 0x6624759f), TOBN(0xde50644f, 0x5bedc01d),
+     TOBN(0xbeec5d00, 0xcaf3155e), TOBN(0x672d66ac, 0xbc73e75f),
+     TOBN(0x86b9d8c6, 0x270b01db), TOBN(0xd249ef83, 0x50f55b79),
+     TOBN(0x6131d6d4, 0x73978fe3), TOBN(0xcc4e4542, 0x754b00a1),
+     TOBN(0x4e05df05, 0x57dfcfe9), TOBN(0x94b29cdd, 0x51ef6bf0),
+     TOBN(0xe4530cff, 0x9bc7edf2), TOBN(0x8ac236fd, 0xd3da65f3),
+     TOBN(0x0faf7d5f, 0xc8eb0b48), TOBN(0x4d2de14c, 0x660eb039),
+     TOBN(0xc006bba7, 0x60430e54), TOBN(0x10a2d0d6, 0xda3289ab),
+     TOBN(0x9c037a5d, 0xd7979c59), TOBN(0x04d1f3d3, 0xa116d944),
+     TOBN(0x9ff22473, 0x8a0983cd), TOBN(0x28e25b38, 0xc883cabb),
+     TOBN(0xe968dba5, 0x47a58995), TOBN(0x2c80b505, 0x774eebdf),
+     TOBN(0xee763b71, 0x4a953beb), TOBN(0x502e223f, 0x1642e7f6),
+     TOBN(0x6fe4b641, 0x61d5e722), TOBN(0x9d37c5b0, 0xdbef5316),
+     TOBN(0x0115ed70, 0xf8330bc7), TOBN(0x139850e6, 0x75a72789),
+     TOBN(0x27d7faec, 0xffceccc2), TOBN(0x3016a860, 0x4fd9f7f6),
+     TOBN(0xc492ec64, 0x4cd8f64c), TOBN(0x58a2d790, 0x279d7b51),
+     TOBN(0x0ced1fc5, 0x1fc75256), TOBN(0x3e658aed, 0x8f433017),
+     TOBN(0x0b61942e, 0x05da59eb), TOBN(0xba3d60a3, 0x0ddc3722),
+     TOBN(0x7c311cd1, 0x742e7f87), TOBN(0x6473ffee, 0xf6b01b6e),}
+    ,
+    {TOBN(0x8303604f, 0x692ac542), TOBN(0xf079ffe1, 0x227b91d3),
+     TOBN(0x19f63e63, 0x15aaf9bd), TOBN(0xf99ee565, 0xf1f344fb),
+     TOBN(0x8a1d661f, 0xd6219199), TOBN(0x8c883bc6, 0xd48ce41c),
+     TOBN(0x1065118f, 0x3c74d904), TOBN(0x713889ee, 0x0faf8b1b),
+     TOBN(0x972b3f8f, 0x81a1b3be), TOBN(0x4f3ce145, 0xce2764a0),
+     TOBN(0xe2d0f1cc, 0x28c4f5f7), TOBN(0xdeee0c0d, 0xc7f3985b),
+     TOBN(0x7df4adc0, 0xd39e25c3), TOBN(0x40619820, 0xc467a080),
+     TOBN(0x440ebc93, 0x61cf5a58), TOBN(0x527729a6, 0x422ad600),
+     TOBN(0xca6c0937, 0xb1b76ba6), TOBN(0x1a2eab85, 0x4d2026dc),
+     TOBN(0xb1715e15, 0x19d9ae0a), TOBN(0xf1ad9199, 0xbac4a026),
+     TOBN(0x35b3dfb8, 0x07ea7b0e), TOBN(0xedf5496f, 0x3ed9eb89),
+     TOBN(0x8932e5ff, 0x2d6d08ab), TOBN(0xf314874e, 0x25bd2731),
+     TOBN(0xefb26a75, 0x3f73f449), TOBN(0x1d1c94f8, 0x8d44fc79),
+     TOBN(0x49f0fbc5, 0x3bc0dc4d), TOBN(0xb747ea0b, 0x3698a0d0),
+     TOBN(0x5218c3fe, 0x228d291e), TOBN(0x35b804b5, 0x43c129d6),
+     TOBN(0xfac859b8, 0xd1acc516), TOBN(0x6c10697d, 0x95d6e668),
+     TOBN(0xc38e438f, 0x0876fd4e), TOBN(0x45f0c307, 0x83d2f383),
+     TOBN(0x203cc2ec, 0xb10934cb), TOBN(0x6a8f2439, 0x2c9d46ee),
+     TOBN(0xf16b431b, 0x65ccde7b), TOBN(0x41e2cd18, 0x27e76a6f),
+     TOBN(0xb9c8cf8f, 0x4e3484d7), TOBN(0x64426efd, 0x8315244a),
+     TOBN(0x1c0a8e44, 0xfc94dea3), TOBN(0x34c8cdbf, 0xdad6a0b0),
+     TOBN(0x919c3840, 0x04113cef), TOBN(0xfd32fba4, 0x15490ffa),
+     TOBN(0x58d190f6, 0x795dcfb7), TOBN(0xfef01b03, 0x83588baf),
+     TOBN(0x9e6d1d63, 0xca1fc1c0), TOBN(0x53173f96, 0xf0a41ac9),
+     TOBN(0x2b1d402a, 0xba16f73b), TOBN(0x2fb31014, 0x8cf9b9fc),
+     TOBN(0x2d51e60e, 0x446ef7bf), TOBN(0xc731021b, 0xb91e1745),
+     TOBN(0x9d3b4724, 0x4fee99d4), TOBN(0x4bca48b6, 0xfac5c1ea),
+     TOBN(0x70f5f514, 0xbbea9af7), TOBN(0x751f55a5, 0x974c283a),
+     TOBN(0x6e30251a, 0xcb452fdb), TOBN(0x31ee6965, 0x50f30650),
+     TOBN(0xb0b3e508, 0x933548d9), TOBN(0xb8949a4f, 0xf4b0ef5b),
+     TOBN(0x208b8326, 0x3c88f3bd), TOBN(0xab147c30, 0xdb1d9989),
+     TOBN(0xed6515fd, 0x44d4df03), TOBN(0x17a12f75, 0xe72eb0c5),
+     TOBN(0x3b59796d, 0x36cf69db), TOBN(0x1219eee9, 0x56670c18),
+     TOBN(0xfe3341f7, 0x7a070d8e), TOBN(0x9b70130b, 0xa327f90c),
+     TOBN(0x36a32462, 0x0ae18e0e), TOBN(0x2021a623, 0x46c0a638),
+     TOBN(0x251b5817, 0xc62eb0d4), TOBN(0x87bfbcdf, 0x4c762293),
+     TOBN(0xf78ab505, 0xcdd61d64), TOBN(0x8c7a53fc, 0xc8c18857),
+     TOBN(0xa653ce6f, 0x16147515), TOBN(0x9c923aa5, 0xea7d52d5),
+     TOBN(0xc24709cb, 0x5c18871f), TOBN(0x7d53bec8, 0x73b3cc74),
+     TOBN(0x59264aff, 0xfdd1d4c4), TOBN(0x5555917e, 0x240da582),
+     TOBN(0xcae8bbda, 0x548f5a0e), TOBN(0x1910eaba, 0x3bbfbbe1),
+     TOBN(0xae579685, 0x7677afc3), TOBN(0x49ea61f1, 0x73ff0b5c),
+     TOBN(0x78655478, 0x4f7c3922), TOBN(0x95d337cd, 0x20c68eef),
+     TOBN(0x68f1e1e5, 0xdf779ab9), TOBN(0x14b491b0, 0xb5cf69a8),
+     TOBN(0x7a6cbbe0, 0x28e3fe89), TOBN(0xe7e1fee4, 0xc5aac0eb),
+     TOBN(0x7f47eda5, 0x697e5140), TOBN(0x4f450137, 0xb454921f),
+     TOBN(0xdb625f84, 0x95cd8185), TOBN(0x74be0ba1, 0xcdb2e583),
+     TOBN(0xaee4fd7c, 0xdd5e6de4), TOBN(0x4251437d, 0xe8101739),
+     TOBN(0x686d72a0, 0xac620366), TOBN(0x4be3fb9c, 0xb6d59344),
+     TOBN(0x6e8b44e7, 0xa1eb75b9), TOBN(0x84e39da3, 0x91a5c10c),
+     TOBN(0x37cc1490, 0xb38f0409), TOBN(0x02951943, 0x2c2ade82),
+     TOBN(0x9b688783, 0x1190a2d8), TOBN(0x25627d14, 0x231182ba),
+     TOBN(0x6eb550aa, 0x658a6d87), TOBN(0x1405aaa7, 0xcf9c7325),
+     TOBN(0xd147142e, 0x5c8748c9), TOBN(0x7f637e4f, 0x53ede0e0),
+     TOBN(0xf8ca2776, 0x14ffad2c), TOBN(0xe58fb1bd, 0xbafb6791),
+     TOBN(0x17158c23, 0xbf8f93fc), TOBN(0x7f15b373, 0x0a4a4655),
+     TOBN(0x39d4add2, 0xd842ca72), TOBN(0xa71e4391, 0x3ed96305),
+     TOBN(0x5bb09cbe, 0x6700be14), TOBN(0x68d69d54, 0xd8befcf6),
+     TOBN(0xa45f5367, 0x37183bcf), TOBN(0x7152b7bb, 0x3370dff7),
+     TOBN(0xcf887baa, 0xbf12525b), TOBN(0xe7ac7bdd, 0xd6d1e3cd),
+     TOBN(0x25914f78, 0x81fdad90), TOBN(0xcf638f56, 0x0d2cf6ab),
+     TOBN(0xb90bc03f, 0xcc054de5), TOBN(0x932811a7, 0x18b06350),
+     TOBN(0x2f00b330, 0x9bbd11ff), TOBN(0x76108a6f, 0xb4044974),
+     TOBN(0x801bb9e0, 0xa851d266), TOBN(0x0dd099be, 0xbf8990c1),
+     TOBN(0x58c5aaaa, 0xabe32986), TOBN(0x0fe9dd2a, 0x50d59c27),
+     TOBN(0x84951ff4, 0x8d307305), TOBN(0x6c23f829, 0x86529b78),
+     TOBN(0x50bb2218, 0x0b136a79), TOBN(0x7e2174de, 0x77a20996),
+     TOBN(0x6f00a4b9, 0xc0bb4da6), TOBN(0x89a25a17, 0xefdde8da),
+     TOBN(0xf728a27e, 0xc11ee01d), TOBN(0xf900553a, 0xe5f10dfb),
+     TOBN(0x189a83c8, 0x02ec893c), TOBN(0x3ca5bdc1, 0x23f66d77),
+     TOBN(0x98781537, 0x97eada9f), TOBN(0x59c50ab3, 0x10256230),
+     TOBN(0x346042d9, 0x323c69b3), TOBN(0x1b715a6d, 0x2c460449),
+     TOBN(0xa41dd476, 0x6ae06e0b), TOBN(0xcdd7888e, 0x9d42e25f),
+     TOBN(0x0f395f74, 0x56b25a20), TOBN(0xeadfe0ae, 0x8700e27e),
+     TOBN(0xb09d52a9, 0x69950093), TOBN(0x3525d9cb, 0x327f8d40),
+     TOBN(0xb8235a94, 0x67df886a), TOBN(0x77e4b0dd, 0x035faec2),
+     TOBN(0x115eb20a, 0x517d7061), TOBN(0x77fe3433, 0x6c2df683),
+     TOBN(0x6870ddc7, 0xcdc6fc67), TOBN(0xb1610588, 0x0b87de83),
+     TOBN(0x343584ca, 0xd9c4ddbe), TOBN(0xb3164f1c, 0x3d754be2),
+     TOBN(0x0731ed3a, 0xc1e6c894), TOBN(0x26327dec, 0x4f6b904c),
+     TOBN(0x9d49c6de, 0x97b5cd32), TOBN(0x40835dae, 0xb5eceecd),
+     TOBN(0xc66350ed, 0xd9ded7fe), TOBN(0x8aeebb5c, 0x7a678804),
+     TOBN(0x51d42fb7, 0x5b8ee9ec), TOBN(0xd7a17bdd, 0x8e3ca118),
+     TOBN(0x40d7511a, 0x2ef4400e), TOBN(0xc48990ac, 0x875a66f4),
+     TOBN(0x8de07d2a, 0x2199e347), TOBN(0xbee75556, 0x2a39e051),
+     TOBN(0x56918786, 0x916e51dc), TOBN(0xeb191313, 0x4a2d89ec),
+     TOBN(0x6679610d, 0x37d341ed), TOBN(0x434fbb41, 0x56d51c2b),
+     TOBN(0xe54b7ee7, 0xd7492dba), TOBN(0xaa33a79a, 0x59021493),
+     TOBN(0x49fc5054, 0xe4bd6d3d), TOBN(0x09540f04, 0x5ab551d0),
+     TOBN(0x8acc9085, 0x4942d3a6), TOBN(0x231af02f, 0x2d28323b),
+     TOBN(0x93458cac, 0x0992c163), TOBN(0x1fef8e71, 0x888e3bb4),
+     TOBN(0x27578da5, 0xbe8c268c), TOBN(0xcc8be792, 0xe805ec00),
+     TOBN(0x29267bae, 0xc61c3855), TOBN(0xebff429d, 0x58c1fd3b),
+     TOBN(0x22d886c0, 0x8c0b93b8), TOBN(0xca5e00b2, 0x2ddb8953),
+     TOBN(0xcf330117, 0xc3fed8b7), TOBN(0xd49ac6fa, 0x819c01f6),
+     TOBN(0x6ddaa6bd, 0x3c0fbd54), TOBN(0x91743068, 0x8049a2cf),
+     TOBN(0xd67f981e, 0xaff2ef81), TOBN(0xc3654d35, 0x2818ae80),
+     TOBN(0x81d05044, 0x1b2aa892), TOBN(0x2db067bf, 0x3d099328),
+     TOBN(0xe7c79e86, 0x703dcc97), TOBN(0xe66f9b37, 0xe133e215),
+     TOBN(0xcdf119a6, 0xe39a7a5c), TOBN(0x47c60de3, 0x876f1b61),
+     TOBN(0x6e405939, 0xd860f1b2), TOBN(0x3e9a1dbc, 0xf5ed4d4a),
+     TOBN(0x3f23619e, 0xc9b6bcbd), TOBN(0x5ee790cf, 0x734e4497),
+     TOBN(0xf0a834b1, 0x5bdaf9bb), TOBN(0x02cedda7, 0x4ca295f0),
+     TOBN(0x4619aa2b, 0xcb8e378c), TOBN(0xe5613244, 0xcc987ea4),
+     TOBN(0x0bc022cc, 0x76b23a50), TOBN(0x4a2793ad, 0x0a6c21ce),
+     TOBN(0x38328780, 0x89cac3f5), TOBN(0x29176f1b, 0xcba26d56),
+     TOBN(0x06296187, 0x4f6f59eb), TOBN(0x86e9bca9, 0x8bdc658e),
+     TOBN(0x2ca9c4d3, 0x57e30402), TOBN(0x5438b216, 0x516a09bb),
+     TOBN(0x0a6a063c, 0x7672765a), TOBN(0x37a3ce64, 0x0547b9bf),
+     TOBN(0x42c099c8, 0x98b1a633), TOBN(0xb5ab800d, 0x05ee6961),
+     TOBN(0xf1963f59, 0x11a5acd6), TOBN(0xbaee6157, 0x46201063),
+     TOBN(0x36d9a649, 0xa596210a), TOBN(0xaed04363, 0x1ba7138c),
+     TOBN(0xcf817d1c, 0xa4a82b76), TOBN(0x5586960e, 0xf3806be9),
+     TOBN(0x7ab67c89, 0x09dc6bb5), TOBN(0x52ace7a0, 0x114fe7eb),
+     TOBN(0xcd987618, 0xcbbc9b70), TOBN(0x4f06fd5a, 0x604ca5e1),
+     TOBN(0x90af14ca, 0x6dbde133), TOBN(0x1afe4322, 0x948a3264),
+     TOBN(0xa70d2ca6, 0xc44b2c6c), TOBN(0xab726799, 0x0ef87dfe),
+     TOBN(0x310f64dc, 0x2e696377), TOBN(0x49b42e68, 0x4c8126a0),
+     TOBN(0x0ea444c3, 0xcea0b176), TOBN(0x53a8ddf7, 0xcb269182),
+     TOBN(0xf3e674eb, 0xbbba9dcb), TOBN(0x0d2878a8, 0xd8669d33),
+     TOBN(0x04b935d5, 0xd019b6a3), TOBN(0xbb5cf88e, 0x406f1e46),
+     TOBN(0xa1912d16, 0x5b57c111), TOBN(0x9803fc21, 0x19ebfd78),
+     TOBN(0x4f231c9e, 0xc07764a9), TOBN(0xd93286ee, 0xb75bd055),
+     TOBN(0x83a9457d, 0x8ee6c9de), TOBN(0x04695915, 0x6087ec90),
+     TOBN(0x14c6dd8a, 0x58d6cd46), TOBN(0x9cb633b5, 0x8e6634d2),
+     TOBN(0xc1305047, 0xf81bc328), TOBN(0x12ede0e2, 0x26a177e5),
+     TOBN(0x332cca62, 0x065a6f4f), TOBN(0xc3a47ecd, 0x67be487b),
+     TOBN(0x741eb187, 0x0f47ed1c), TOBN(0x99e66e58, 0xe7598b14),
+     TOBN(0x6f0544ca, 0x63d0ff12), TOBN(0xe5efc784, 0xb610a05f),
+     TOBN(0xf72917b1, 0x7cad7b47), TOBN(0x3ff6ea20, 0xf2cac0c0),
+     TOBN(0xcc23791b, 0xf21db8b7), TOBN(0x7dac70b1, 0xd7d93565),
+     TOBN(0x682cda1d, 0x694bdaad), TOBN(0xeb88bb8c, 0x1023516d),
+     TOBN(0xc4c634b4, 0xdfdbeb1b), TOBN(0x22f5ca72, 0xb4ee4dea),
+     TOBN(0x1045a368, 0xe6524821), TOBN(0xed9e8a3f, 0x052b18b2),
+     TOBN(0x9b7f2cb1, 0xb961f49a), TOBN(0x7fee2ec1, 0x7b009670),
+     TOBN(0x350d8754, 0x22507a6d), TOBN(0x561bd711, 0x4db55f1d),
+     TOBN(0x4c189ccc, 0x320bbcaf), TOBN(0x568434cf, 0xdf1de48c),
+     TOBN(0x6af1b00e, 0x0fa8f128), TOBN(0xf0ba9d02, 0x8907583c),
+     TOBN(0x735a4004, 0x32ff9f60), TOBN(0x3dd8e4b6, 0xc25dcf33),
+     TOBN(0xf2230f16, 0x42c74cef), TOBN(0xd8117623, 0x013fa8ad),
+     TOBN(0x36822876, 0xf51fe76e), TOBN(0x8a6811cc, 0x11d62589),
+     TOBN(0xc3fc7e65, 0x46225718), TOBN(0xb7df2c9f, 0xc82fdbcd),
+     TOBN(0x3b1d4e52, 0xdd7b205b), TOBN(0xb6959478, 0x47a2e414),
+     TOBN(0x05e4d793, 0xefa91148), TOBN(0xb47ed446, 0xfd2e9675),
+     TOBN(0x1a7098b9, 0x04c9d9bf), TOBN(0x661e2881, 0x1b793048),
+     TOBN(0xb1a16966, 0xb01ee461), TOBN(0xbc521308, 0x2954746f),
+     TOBN(0xc909a0fc, 0x2477de50), TOBN(0xd80bb41c, 0x7dbd51ef),
+     TOBN(0xa85be7ec, 0x53294905), TOBN(0x6d465b18, 0x83958f97),
+     TOBN(0x16f6f330, 0xfb6840fd), TOBN(0xfaaeb214, 0x3401e6c8),
+     TOBN(0xaf83d30f, 0xccb5b4f8), TOBN(0x22885739, 0x266dec4b),
+     TOBN(0x51b4367c, 0x7bc467df), TOBN(0x926562e3, 0xd842d27a),
+     TOBN(0xdfcb6614, 0x0fea14a6), TOBN(0xeb394dae, 0xf2734cd9),
+     TOBN(0x3eeae5d2, 0x11c0be98), TOBN(0xb1e6ed11, 0x814e8165),
+     TOBN(0x191086bc, 0xe52bce1c), TOBN(0x14b74cc6, 0xa75a04da),
+     TOBN(0x63cf1186, 0x8c060985), TOBN(0x071047de, 0x2dbd7f7c),
+     TOBN(0x4e433b8b, 0xce0942ca), TOBN(0xecbac447, 0xd8fec61d),
+     TOBN(0x8f0ed0e2, 0xebf3232f), TOBN(0xfff80f9e, 0xc52a2edd),
+     TOBN(0xad9ab433, 0x75b55fdb), TOBN(0x73ca7820, 0xe42e0c11),
+     TOBN(0x6dace0a0, 0xe6251b46), TOBN(0x89bc6b5c, 0x4c0d932d),
+     TOBN(0x3438cd77, 0x095da19a), TOBN(0x2f24a939, 0x8d48bdfb),
+     TOBN(0x99b47e46, 0x766561b7), TOBN(0x736600e6, 0x0ed0322a),
+     TOBN(0x06a47cb1, 0x638e1865), TOBN(0x927c1c2d, 0xcb136000),
+     TOBN(0x29542337, 0x0cc5df69), TOBN(0x99b37c02, 0x09d649a9),
+     TOBN(0xc5f0043c, 0x6aefdb27), TOBN(0x6cdd9987, 0x1be95c27),
+     TOBN(0x69850931, 0x390420d2), TOBN(0x299c40ac, 0x0983efa4),
+     TOBN(0x3a05e778, 0xaf39aead), TOBN(0x84274408, 0x43a45193),
+     TOBN(0x6bcd0fb9, 0x91a711a0), TOBN(0x461592c8, 0x9f52ab17),
+     TOBN(0xb49302b4, 0xda3c6ed6), TOBN(0xc51fddc7, 0x330d7067),
+     TOBN(0x94babeb6, 0xda50d531), TOBN(0x521b840d, 0xa6a7b9da),
+     TOBN(0x5305151e, 0x404bdc89), TOBN(0x1bcde201, 0xd0d07449),
+     TOBN(0xf427a78b, 0x3b76a59a), TOBN(0xf84841ce, 0x07791a1b),
+     TOBN(0xebd314be, 0xbf91ed1c), TOBN(0x8e61d34c, 0xbf172943),
+     TOBN(0x1d5dc451, 0x5541b892), TOBN(0xb186ee41, 0xfc9d9e54),
+     TOBN(0x9d9f345e, 0xd5bf610d), TOBN(0x3e7ba65d, 0xf6acca9f),
+     TOBN(0x9dda787a, 0xa8369486), TOBN(0x09f9dab7, 0x8eb5ba53),
+     TOBN(0x5afb2033, 0xd6481bc3), TOBN(0x76f4ce30, 0xafa62104),
+     TOBN(0xa8fa00cf, 0xf4f066b5), TOBN(0x89ab5143, 0x461dafc2),
+     TOBN(0x44339ed7, 0xa3389998), TOBN(0x2ff862f1, 0xbc214903),
+     TOBN(0x2c88f985, 0xb05556e3), TOBN(0xcd96058e, 0x3467081e),
+     TOBN(0x7d6a4176, 0xedc637ea), TOBN(0xe1743d09, 0x36a5acdc),
+     TOBN(0x66fd72e2, 0x7eb37726), TOBN(0xf7fa264e, 0x1481a037),
+     TOBN(0x9fbd3bde, 0x45f4aa79), TOBN(0xed1e0147, 0x767c3e22),
+     TOBN(0x7621f979, 0x82e7abe2), TOBN(0x19eedc72, 0x45f633f8),
+     TOBN(0xe69b155e, 0x6137bf3a), TOBN(0xa0ad13ce, 0x414ee94e),
+     TOBN(0x93e3d524, 0x1c0e651a), TOBN(0xab1a6e2a, 0x02ce227e),
+     TOBN(0xe7af1797, 0x4ab27eca), TOBN(0x245446de, 0xbd444f39),
+     TOBN(0x59e22a21, 0x56c07613), TOBN(0x43deafce, 0xf4275498),
+     TOBN(0x10834ccb, 0x67fd0946), TOBN(0xa75841e5, 0x47406edf),
+     TOBN(0xebd6a677, 0x7b0ac93d), TOBN(0xa6e37b0d, 0x78f5e0d7),
+     TOBN(0x2516c096, 0x76f5492b), TOBN(0x1e4bf888, 0x9ac05f3a),
+     TOBN(0xcdb42ce0, 0x4df0ba2b), TOBN(0x935d5cfd, 0x5062341b),
+     TOBN(0x8a303333, 0x82acac20), TOBN(0x429438c4, 0x5198b00e),
+     TOBN(0x1d083bc9, 0x049d33fa), TOBN(0x58b82dda, 0x946f67ff),
+     TOBN(0xac3e2db8, 0x67a1d6a3), TOBN(0x62e6bead, 0x1798aac8),
+     TOBN(0xfc85980f, 0xde46c58c), TOBN(0xa7f69379, 0x69c8d7be),
+     TOBN(0x23557927, 0x837b35ec), TOBN(0x06a933d8, 0xe0790c0c),
+     TOBN(0x827c0e9b, 0x077ff55d), TOBN(0x53977798, 0xbb26e680),
+     TOBN(0x59530874, 0x1d9cb54f), TOBN(0xcca3f449, 0x4aac53ef),
+     TOBN(0x11dc5c87, 0xa07eda0f), TOBN(0xc138bccf, 0xfd6400c8),
+     TOBN(0x549680d3, 0x13e5da72), TOBN(0xc93eed82, 0x4540617e),
+     TOBN(0xfd3db157, 0x4d0b75c0), TOBN(0x9716eb42, 0x6386075b),
+     TOBN(0x0639605c, 0x817b2c16), TOBN(0x09915109, 0xf1e4f201),
+     TOBN(0x35c9a928, 0x5cca6c3b), TOBN(0xb25f7d1a, 0x3505c900),
+     TOBN(0xeb9f7d20, 0x630480c4), TOBN(0xc3c7b8c6, 0x2a1a501c),
+     TOBN(0x3f99183c, 0x5a1f8e24), TOBN(0xfdb118fa, 0x9dd255f0),
+     TOBN(0xb9b18b90, 0xc27f62a6), TOBN(0xe8f732f7, 0x396ec191),
+     TOBN(0x524a2d91, 0x0be786ab), TOBN(0x5d32adef, 0x0ac5a0f5),
+     TOBN(0x9b53d4d6, 0x9725f694), TOBN(0x032a76c6, 0x0510ba89),
+     TOBN(0x840391a3, 0xebeb1544), TOBN(0x44b7b88c, 0x3ed73ac3),
+     TOBN(0xd24bae7a, 0x256cb8b3), TOBN(0x7ceb151a, 0xe394cb12),
+     TOBN(0xbd6b66d0, 0x5bc1e6a8), TOBN(0xec70cecb, 0x090f07bf),
+     TOBN(0x270644ed, 0x7d937589), TOBN(0xee9e1a3d, 0x5f1dccfe),
+     TOBN(0xb0d40a84, 0x745b98d2), TOBN(0xda429a21, 0x2556ed40),
+     TOBN(0xf676eced, 0x85148cb9), TOBN(0x5a22d40c, 0xded18936),
+     TOBN(0x3bc4b9e5, 0x70e8a4ce), TOBN(0xbfd1445b, 0x9eae0379),
+     TOBN(0xf23f2c0c, 0x1a0bd47e), TOBN(0xa9c0bb31, 0xe1845531),
+     TOBN(0x9ddc4d60, 0x0a4c3f6b), TOBN(0xbdfaad79, 0x2c15ef44),
+     TOBN(0xce55a236, 0x7f484acc), TOBN(0x08653ca7, 0x055b1f15),
+     TOBN(0x2efa8724, 0x538873a3), TOBN(0x09299e5d, 0xace1c7e7),
+     TOBN(0x07afab66, 0xade332ba), TOBN(0x9be1fdf6, 0x92dd71b7),
+     TOBN(0xa49b5d59, 0x5758b11c), TOBN(0x0b852893, 0xc8654f40),
+     TOBN(0xb63ef6f4, 0x52379447), TOBN(0xd4957d29, 0x105e690c),
+     TOBN(0x7d484363, 0x646559b0), TOBN(0xf4a8273c, 0x49788a8e),
+     TOBN(0xee406cb8, 0x34ce54a9), TOBN(0x1e1c260f, 0xf86fda9b),
+     TOBN(0xe150e228, 0xcf6a4a81), TOBN(0x1fa3b6a3, 0x1b488772),
+     TOBN(0x1e6ff110, 0xc5a9c15b), TOBN(0xc6133b91, 0x8ad6aa47),
+     TOBN(0x8ac5d55c, 0x9dffa978), TOBN(0xba1d1c1d, 0x5f3965f2),
+     TOBN(0xf969f4e0, 0x7732b52f), TOBN(0xfceecdb5, 0xa5172a07),
+     TOBN(0xb0120a5f, 0x10f2b8f5), TOBN(0xc83a6cdf, 0x5c4c2f63),
+     TOBN(0x4d47a491, 0xf8f9c213), TOBN(0xd9e1cce5, 0xd3f1bbd5),
+     TOBN(0x0d91bc7c, 0xaba7e372), TOBN(0xfcdc74c8, 0xdfd1a2db),
+     TOBN(0x05efa800, 0x374618e5), TOBN(0x11216969, 0x15a7925e),
+     TOBN(0xd4c89823, 0xf6021c5d), TOBN(0x880d5e84, 0xeff14423),
+     TOBN(0x6523bc5a, 0x6dcd1396), TOBN(0xd1acfdfc, 0x113c978b),
+     TOBN(0xb0c164e8, 0xbbb66840), TOBN(0xf7f4301e, 0x72b58459),
+     TOBN(0xc29ad4a6, 0xa638e8ec), TOBN(0xf5ab8961, 0x46b78699),
+     TOBN(0x9dbd7974, 0x0e954750), TOBN(0x0121de88, 0x64f9d2c6),
+     TOBN(0x2e597b42, 0xd985232e), TOBN(0x55b6c3c5, 0x53451777),
+     TOBN(0xbb53e547, 0x519cb9fb), TOBN(0xf134019f, 0x8428600d),
+     TOBN(0x5a473176, 0xe081791a), TOBN(0x2f3e2263, 0x35fb0c08),
+     TOBN(0xb28c3017, 0x73d273b0), TOBN(0xccd21076, 0x7721ef9a),
+     TOBN(0x054cc292, 0xb650dc39), TOBN(0x662246de, 0x6188045e),
+     TOBN(0x904b52fa, 0x6b83c0d1), TOBN(0xa72df267, 0x97e9cd46),
+     TOBN(0x886b43cd, 0x899725e4), TOBN(0x2b651688, 0xd849ff22),
+     TOBN(0x60479b79, 0x02f34533), TOBN(0x5e354c14, 0x0c77c148),
+     TOBN(0xb4bb7581, 0xa8537c78), TOBN(0x188043d7, 0xefe1495f),
+     TOBN(0x9ba12f42, 0x8c1d5026), TOBN(0x2e0c8a26, 0x93d4aaab),
+     TOBN(0xbdba7b8b, 0xaa57c450), TOBN(0x140c9ad6, 0x9bbdafef),
+     TOBN(0x2067aa42, 0x25ac0f18), TOBN(0xf7b1295b, 0x04d1fbf3),
+     TOBN(0x14829111, 0xa4b04824), TOBN(0x2ce3f192, 0x33bd5e91),
+     TOBN(0x9c7a1d55, 0x8f2e1b72), TOBN(0xfe932286, 0x302aa243),
+     TOBN(0x497ca7b4, 0xd4be9554), TOBN(0xb8e821b8, 0xe0547a6e),
+     TOBN(0xfb2838be, 0x67e573e0), TOBN(0x05891db9, 0x4084c44b),
+     TOBN(0x91311373, 0x96c1c2c5), TOBN(0x6aebfa3f, 0xd958444b),
+     TOBN(0xac9cdce9, 0xe56e55c1), TOBN(0x7148ced3, 0x2caa46d0),
+     TOBN(0x2e10c7ef, 0xb61fe8eb), TOBN(0x9fd835da, 0xff97cf4d),}
+    ,
+    {TOBN(0xa36da109, 0x081e9387), TOBN(0xfb9780d7, 0x8c935828),
+     TOBN(0xd5940332, 0xe540b015), TOBN(0xc9d7b51b, 0xe0f466fa),
+     TOBN(0xfaadcd41, 0xd6d9f671), TOBN(0xba6c1e28, 0xb1a2ac17),
+     TOBN(0x066a7833, 0xed201e5f), TOBN(0x19d99719, 0xf90f462b),
+     TOBN(0xf431f462, 0x060b5f61), TOBN(0xa56f46b4, 0x7bd057c2),
+     TOBN(0x348dca6c, 0x47e1bf65), TOBN(0x9a38783e, 0x41bcf1ff),
+     TOBN(0x7a5d33a9, 0xda710718), TOBN(0x5a779987, 0x2e0aeaf6),
+     TOBN(0xca87314d, 0x2d29d187), TOBN(0xfa0edc3e, 0xc687d733),
+     TOBN(0x9df33621, 0x6a31e09b), TOBN(0xde89e44d, 0xc1350e35),
+     TOBN(0x29214871, 0x4ca0cf52), TOBN(0xdf379672, 0x0b88a538),
+     TOBN(0xc92a510a, 0x2591d61b), TOBN(0x79aa87d7, 0x585b447b),
+     TOBN(0xf67db604, 0xe5287f77), TOBN(0x1697c8bf, 0x5efe7a80),
+     TOBN(0x1c894849, 0xcb198ac7), TOBN(0xa884a93d, 0x0f264665),
+     TOBN(0x2da964ef, 0x9b200678), TOBN(0x3c351b87, 0x009834e6),
+     TOBN(0xafb2ef9f, 0xe2c4b44b), TOBN(0x580f6c47, 0x3326790c),
+     TOBN(0xb8480521, 0x0b02264a), TOBN(0x8ba6f9e2, 0x42a194e2),
+     TOBN(0xfc87975f, 0x8fb54738), TOBN(0x35160788, 0x27c3ead3),
+     TOBN(0x834116d2, 0xb74a085a), TOBN(0x53c99a73, 0xa62fe996),
+     TOBN(0x87585be0, 0x5b81c51b), TOBN(0x925bafa8, 0xbe0852b7),
+     TOBN(0x76a4fafd, 0xa84d19a7), TOBN(0x39a45982, 0x585206d4),
+     TOBN(0x499b6ab6, 0x5eb03c0e), TOBN(0xf19b7954, 0x72bc3fde),
+     TOBN(0xa86b5b9c, 0x6e3a80d2), TOBN(0xe4377508, 0x6d42819f),
+     TOBN(0xc1663650, 0xbb3ee8a3), TOBN(0x75eb14fc, 0xb132075f),
+     TOBN(0xa8ccc906, 0x7ad834f6), TOBN(0xea6a2474, 0xe6e92ffd),
+     TOBN(0x9d72fd95, 0x0f8d6758), TOBN(0xcb84e101, 0x408c07dd),
+     TOBN(0xb9114bfd, 0xa5e23221), TOBN(0x358b5fe2, 0xe94e742c),
+     TOBN(0x1c0577ec, 0x95f40e75), TOBN(0xf0155451, 0x3d73f3d6),
+     TOBN(0x9d55cd67, 0xbd1b9b66), TOBN(0x63e86e78, 0xaf8d63c7),
+     TOBN(0x39d934ab, 0xd3c095f1), TOBN(0x04b261be, 0xe4b76d71),
+     TOBN(0x1d2e6970, 0xe73e6984), TOBN(0x879fb23b, 0x5e5fcb11),
+     TOBN(0x11506c72, 0xdfd75490), TOBN(0x3a97d085, 0x61bcf1c1),
+     TOBN(0x43201d82, 0xbf5e7007), TOBN(0x7f0ac52f, 0x798232a7),
+     TOBN(0x2715cbc4, 0x6eb564d4), TOBN(0x8d6c752c, 0x9e570e29),
+     TOBN(0xf80247c8, 0x9ef5fd5d), TOBN(0xc3c66b46, 0xd53eb514),
+     TOBN(0x9666b401, 0x0f87de56), TOBN(0xce62c06f, 0xc6c603b5),
+     TOBN(0xae7b4c60, 0x7e4fc942), TOBN(0x38ac0b77, 0x663a9c19),
+     TOBN(0xcb4d20ee, 0x4b049136), TOBN(0x8b63bf12, 0x356a4613),
+     TOBN(0x1221aef6, 0x70e08128), TOBN(0xe62d8c51, 0x4acb6b16),
+     TOBN(0x71f64a67, 0x379e7896), TOBN(0xb25237a2, 0xcafd7fa5),
+     TOBN(0xf077bd98, 0x3841ba6a), TOBN(0xc4ac0244, 0x3cd16e7e),
+     TOBN(0x548ba869, 0x21fea4ca), TOBN(0xd36d0817, 0xf3dfdac1),
+     TOBN(0x09d8d71f, 0xf4685faf), TOBN(0x8eff66be, 0xc52c459a),
+     TOBN(0x182faee7, 0x0b57235e), TOBN(0xee3c39b1, 0x0106712b),
+     TOBN(0x5107331f, 0xc0fcdcb0), TOBN(0x669fb9dc, 0xa51054ba),
+     TOBN(0xb25101fb, 0x319d7682), TOBN(0xb0293129, 0x0a982fee),
+     TOBN(0x51c1c9b9, 0x0261b344), TOBN(0x0e008c5b, 0xbfd371fa),
+     TOBN(0xd866dd1c, 0x0278ca33), TOBN(0x666f76a6, 0xe5aa53b1),
+     TOBN(0xe5cfb779, 0x6013a2cf), TOBN(0x1d3a1aad, 0xa3521836),
+     TOBN(0xcedd2531, 0x73faa485), TOBN(0xc8ee6c4f, 0xc0a76878),
+     TOBN(0xddbccfc9, 0x2a11667d), TOBN(0x1a418ea9, 0x1c2f695a),
+     TOBN(0xdb11bd92, 0x51f73971), TOBN(0x3e4b3c82, 0xda2ed89f),
+     TOBN(0x9a44f3f4, 0xe73e0319), TOBN(0xd1e3de0f, 0x303431af),
+     TOBN(0x3c5604ff, 0x50f75f9c), TOBN(0x1d8eddf3, 0x7e752b22),
+     TOBN(0x0ef074dd, 0x3c9a1118), TOBN(0xd0ffc172, 0xccb86d7b),
+     TOBN(0xabd1ece3, 0x037d90f2), TOBN(0xe3f307d6, 0x6055856c),
+     TOBN(0x422f9328, 0x7e4c6daf), TOBN(0x902aac66, 0x334879a0),
+     TOBN(0xb6a1e7bf, 0x94cdfade), TOBN(0x6c97e1ed, 0x7fc6d634),
+     TOBN(0x662ad24d, 0xa2fb63f8), TOBN(0xf81be1b9, 0xa5928405),
+     TOBN(0x86d765e4, 0xd14b4206), TOBN(0xbecc2e0e, 0x8fa0db65),
+     TOBN(0xa28838e0, 0xb17fc76c), TOBN(0xe49a602a, 0xe37cf24e),
+     TOBN(0x76b4131a, 0x567193ec), TOBN(0xaf3c305a, 0xe5f6e70b),
+     TOBN(0x9587bd39, 0x031eebdd), TOBN(0x5709def8, 0x71bbe831),
+     TOBN(0x57059983, 0x0eb2b669), TOBN(0x4d80ce1b, 0x875b7029),
+     TOBN(0x838a7da8, 0x0364ac16), TOBN(0x2f431d23, 0xbe1c83ab),
+     TOBN(0xe56812a6, 0xf9294dd3), TOBN(0xb448d01f, 0x9b4b0d77),
+     TOBN(0xf3ae6061, 0x04e8305c), TOBN(0x2bead645, 0x94d8c63e),
+     TOBN(0x0a85434d, 0x84fd8b07), TOBN(0x537b983f, 0xf7a9dee5),
+     TOBN(0xedcc5f18, 0xef55bd85), TOBN(0x2041af62, 0x21c6cf8b),
+     TOBN(0x8e52874c, 0xb940c71e), TOBN(0x211935a9, 0xdb5f4b3a),
+     TOBN(0x94350492, 0x301b1dc3), TOBN(0x33d2646d, 0x29958620),
+     TOBN(0x16b0d64b, 0xef911404), TOBN(0x9d1f25ea, 0x9a3c5ef4),
+     TOBN(0x20f200eb, 0x4a352c78), TOBN(0x43929f2c, 0x4bd0b428),
+     TOBN(0xa5656667, 0xc7196e29), TOBN(0x7992c2f0, 0x9391be48),
+     TOBN(0xaaa97cbd, 0x9ee0cd6e), TOBN(0x51b0310c, 0x3dc8c9bf),
+     TOBN(0x237f8acf, 0xdd9f22cb), TOBN(0xbb1d81a1, 0xb585d584),
+     TOBN(0x8d5d85f5, 0x8c416388), TOBN(0x0d6e5a5a, 0x42fe474f),
+     TOBN(0xe7812766, 0x38235d4e), TOBN(0x1c62bd67, 0x496e3298),
+     TOBN(0x8378660c, 0x3f175bc8), TOBN(0x4d04e189, 0x17afdd4d),
+     TOBN(0x32a81601, 0x85a8068c), TOBN(0xdb58e4e1, 0x92b29a85),
+     TOBN(0xe8a65b86, 0xc70d8a3b), TOBN(0x5f0e6f4e, 0x98a0403b),
+     TOBN(0x08129684, 0x69ed2370), TOBN(0x34dc30bd, 0x0871ee26),
+     TOBN(0x3a5ce948, 0x7c9c5b05), TOBN(0x7d487b80, 0x43a90c87),
+     TOBN(0x4089ba37, 0xdd0e7179), TOBN(0x45f80191, 0xb4041811),
+     TOBN(0x1c3e1058, 0x98747ba5), TOBN(0x98c4e13a, 0x6e1ae592),
+     TOBN(0xd44636e6, 0xe82c9f9e), TOBN(0x711db87c, 0xc33a1043),
+     TOBN(0x6f431263, 0xaa8aec05), TOBN(0x43ff120d, 0x2744a4aa),
+     TOBN(0xd3bd892f, 0xae77779b), TOBN(0xf0fe0cc9, 0x8cdc9f82),
+     TOBN(0xca5f7fe6, 0xf1c5b1bc), TOBN(0xcc63a682, 0x44929a72),
+     TOBN(0xc7eaba0c, 0x09dbe19a), TOBN(0x2f3585ad, 0x6b5c73c2),
+     TOBN(0x8ab8924b, 0x0ae50c30), TOBN(0x17fcd27a, 0x638b30ba),
+     TOBN(0xaf414d34, 0x10b3d5a5), TOBN(0x09c107d2, 0x2a9accf1),
+     TOBN(0x15dac49f, 0x946a6242), TOBN(0xaec3df2a, 0xd707d642),
+     TOBN(0x2c2492b7, 0x3f894ae0), TOBN(0xf59df3e5, 0xb75f18ce),
+     TOBN(0x7cb740d2, 0x8f53cad0), TOBN(0x3eb585fb, 0xc4f01294),
+     TOBN(0x17da0c86, 0x32c7f717), TOBN(0xeb8c795b, 0xaf943f4c),
+     TOBN(0x4ee23fb5, 0xf67c51d2), TOBN(0xef187575, 0x68889949),
+     TOBN(0xa6b4bdb2, 0x0389168b), TOBN(0xc4ecd258, 0xea577d03),
+     TOBN(0x3a63782b, 0x55743082), TOBN(0x6f678f4c, 0xc72f08cd),
+     TOBN(0x553511cf, 0x65e58dd8), TOBN(0xd53b4e3e, 0xd402c0cd),
+     TOBN(0x37de3e29, 0xa037c14c), TOBN(0x86b6c516, 0xc05712aa),
+     TOBN(0x2834da3e, 0xb38dff6f), TOBN(0xbe012c52, 0xea636be8),
+     TOBN(0x292d238c, 0x61dd37f8), TOBN(0x0e54523f, 0x8f8142db),
+     TOBN(0xe31eb436, 0x036a05d8), TOBN(0x83e3cdff, 0x1e93c0ff),
+     TOBN(0x3fd2fe0f, 0x50821ddf), TOBN(0xc8e19b0d, 0xff9eb33b),
+     TOBN(0xc8cc943f, 0xb569a5fe), TOBN(0xad0090d4, 0xd4342d75),
+     TOBN(0x82090b4b, 0xcaeca000), TOBN(0xca39687f, 0x1bd410eb),
+     TOBN(0xe7bb0df7, 0x65959d77), TOBN(0x39d78218, 0x9c964999),
+     TOBN(0xd87f62e8, 0xb2415451), TOBN(0xe5efb774, 0xbed76108),
+     TOBN(0x3ea011a4, 0xe822f0d0), TOBN(0xbc647ad1, 0x5a8704f8),
+     TOBN(0xbb315b35, 0x50c6820f), TOBN(0x863dec3d, 0xb7e76bec),
+     TOBN(0x01ff5d3a, 0xf017bfc7), TOBN(0x20054439, 0x976b8229),
+     TOBN(0x067fca37, 0x0bbd0d3b), TOBN(0xf63dde64, 0x7f5e3d0f),
+     TOBN(0x22dbefb3, 0x2a4c94e9), TOBN(0xafbff0fe, 0x96f8278a),
+     TOBN(0x80aea0b1, 0x3503793d), TOBN(0xb2238029, 0x5f06cd29),
+     TOBN(0x65703e57, 0x8ec3feca), TOBN(0x06c38314, 0x393e7053),
+     TOBN(0xa0b751eb, 0x7c6734c4), TOBN(0xd2e8a435, 0xc59f0f1e),
+     TOBN(0x147d9052, 0x5e9ca895), TOBN(0x2f4dd31e, 0x972072df),
+     TOBN(0xa16fda8e, 0xe6c6755c), TOBN(0xc66826ff, 0xcf196558),
+     TOBN(0x1f1a76a3, 0x0cf43895), TOBN(0xa9d604e0, 0x83c3097b),
+     TOBN(0xe1908309, 0x66390e0e), TOBN(0xa50bf753, 0xb3c85eff),
+     TOBN(0x0696bdde, 0xf6a70251), TOBN(0x548b801b, 0x3c6ab16a),
+     TOBN(0x37fcf704, 0xa4d08762), TOBN(0x090b3def, 0xdff76c4e),
+     TOBN(0x87e8cb89, 0x69cb9158), TOBN(0x44a90744, 0x995ece43),
+     TOBN(0xf85395f4, 0x0ad9fbf5), TOBN(0x49b0f6c5, 0x4fb0c82d),
+     TOBN(0x75d9bc15, 0xadf7cccf), TOBN(0x81a3e5d6, 0xdfa1e1b0),
+     TOBN(0x8c39e444, 0x249bc17e), TOBN(0xf37dccb2, 0x8ea7fd43),
+     TOBN(0xda654873, 0x907fba12), TOBN(0x35daa6da, 0x4a372904),
+     TOBN(0x0564cfc6, 0x6283a6c5), TOBN(0xd09fa4f6, 0x4a9395bf),
+     TOBN(0x688e9ec9, 0xaeb19a36), TOBN(0xd913f1ce, 0xc7bfbfb4),
+     TOBN(0x797b9a3c, 0x61c2faa6), TOBN(0x2f979bec, 0x6a0a9c12),
+     TOBN(0xb5969d0f, 0x359679ec), TOBN(0xebcf523d, 0x079b0460),
+     TOBN(0xfd6b0008, 0x10fab870), TOBN(0x3f2edcda, 0x9373a39c),
+     TOBN(0x0d64f9a7, 0x6f568431), TOBN(0xf848c27c, 0x02f8898c),
+     TOBN(0xf418ade1, 0x260b5bd5), TOBN(0xc1f3e323, 0x6973dee8),
+     TOBN(0x46e9319c, 0x26c185dd), TOBN(0x6d85b7d8, 0x546f0ac4),
+     TOBN(0x427965f2, 0x247f9d57), TOBN(0xb519b636, 0xb0035f48),
+     TOBN(0x6b6163a9, 0xab87d59c), TOBN(0xff9f58c3, 0x39caaa11),
+     TOBN(0x4ac39cde, 0x3177387b), TOBN(0x5f6557c2, 0x873e77f9),
+     TOBN(0x67504006, 0x36a83041), TOBN(0x9b1c96ca, 0x75ef196c),
+     TOBN(0xf34283de, 0xb08c7940), TOBN(0x7ea09644, 0x1128c316),
+     TOBN(0xb510b3b5, 0x6aa39dff), TOBN(0x59b43da2, 0x9f8e4d8c),
+     TOBN(0xa8ce31fd, 0x9e4c4b9f), TOBN(0x0e20be26, 0xc1303c01),
+     TOBN(0x18187182, 0xe8ee47c9), TOBN(0xd9687cdb, 0x7db98101),
+     TOBN(0x7a520e4d, 0xa1e14ff6), TOBN(0x429808ba, 0x8836d572),
+     TOBN(0xa37ca60d, 0x4944b663), TOBN(0xf901f7a9, 0xa3f91ae5),
+     TOBN(0xe4e3e76e, 0x9e36e3b1), TOBN(0x9aa219cf, 0x29d93250),
+     TOBN(0x347fe275, 0x056a2512), TOBN(0xa4d643d9, 0xde65d95c),
+     TOBN(0x9669d396, 0x699fc3ed), TOBN(0xb598dee2, 0xcf8c6bbe),
+     TOBN(0x682ac1e5, 0xdda9e5c6), TOBN(0x4e0d3c72, 0xcaa9fc95),
+     TOBN(0x17faaade, 0x772bea44), TOBN(0x5ef8428c, 0xab0009c8),
+     TOBN(0xcc4ce47a, 0x460ff016), TOBN(0xda6d12bf, 0x725281cb),
+     TOBN(0x44c67848, 0x0223aad2), TOBN(0x6e342afa, 0x36256e28),
+     TOBN(0x1400bb0b, 0x93a37c04), TOBN(0x62b1bc9b, 0xdd10bd96),
+     TOBN(0x7251adeb, 0x0dac46b7), TOBN(0x7d33b92e, 0x7be4ef51),
+     TOBN(0x28b2a94b, 0xe61fa29a), TOBN(0x4b2be13f, 0x06422233),
+     TOBN(0x36d6d062, 0x330d8d37), TOBN(0x5ef80e1e, 0xb28ca005),
+     TOBN(0x174d4699, 0x6d16768e), TOBN(0x9fc4ff6a, 0x628bf217),
+     TOBN(0x77705a94, 0x154e490d), TOBN(0x9d96dd28, 0x8d2d997a),
+     TOBN(0x77e2d9d8, 0xce5d72c4), TOBN(0x9d06c5a4, 0xc11c714f),
+     TOBN(0x02aa5136, 0x79e4a03e), TOBN(0x1386b3c2, 0x030ff28b),
+     TOBN(0xfe82e8a6, 0xfb283f61), TOBN(0x7df203e5, 0xf3abc3fb),
+     TOBN(0xeec7c351, 0x3a4d3622), TOBN(0xf7d17dbf, 0xdf762761),
+     TOBN(0xc3956e44, 0x522055f0), TOBN(0xde3012db, 0x8fa748db),
+     TOBN(0xca9fcb63, 0xbf1dcc14), TOBN(0xa56d9dcf, 0xbe4e2f3a),
+     TOBN(0xb86186b6, 0x8bcec9c2), TOBN(0x7cf24df9, 0x680b9f06),
+     TOBN(0xc46b45ea, 0xc0d29281), TOBN(0xfff42bc5, 0x07b10e12),
+     TOBN(0x12263c40, 0x4d289427), TOBN(0x3d5f1899, 0xb4848ec4),
+     TOBN(0x11f97010, 0xd040800c), TOBN(0xb4c5f529, 0x300feb20),
+     TOBN(0xcc543f8f, 0xde94fdcb), TOBN(0xe96af739, 0xc7c2f05e),
+     TOBN(0xaa5e0036, 0x882692e1), TOBN(0x09c75b68, 0x950d4ae9),
+     TOBN(0x62f63df2, 0xb5932a7a), TOBN(0x2658252e, 0xde0979ad),
+     TOBN(0x2a19343f, 0xb5e69631), TOBN(0x718c7501, 0x525b666b),
+     TOBN(0x26a42d69, 0xea40dc3a), TOBN(0xdc84ad22, 0xaecc018f),
+     TOBN(0x25c36c7b, 0x3270f04a), TOBN(0x46ba6d47, 0x50fa72ed),
+     TOBN(0x6c37d1c5, 0x93e58a8e), TOBN(0xa2394731, 0x120c088c),
+     TOBN(0xc3be4263, 0xcb6e86da), TOBN(0x2c417d36, 0x7126d038),
+     TOBN(0x5b70f9c5, 0x8b6f8efa), TOBN(0x671a2faa, 0x37718536),
+     TOBN(0xd3ced3c6, 0xb539c92b), TOBN(0xe56f1bd9, 0xa31203c2),
+     TOBN(0x8b096ec4, 0x9ff3c8eb), TOBN(0x2deae432, 0x43491cea),
+     TOBN(0x2465c6eb, 0x17943794), TOBN(0x5d267e66, 0x20586843),
+     TOBN(0x9d3d116d, 0xb07159d0), TOBN(0xae07a67f, 0xc1896210),
+     TOBN(0x8fc84d87, 0xbb961579), TOBN(0x30009e49, 0x1c1f8dd6),
+     TOBN(0x8a8caf22, 0xe3132819), TOBN(0xcffa197c, 0xf23ab4ff),
+     TOBN(0x58103a44, 0x205dd687), TOBN(0x57b796c3, 0x0ded67a2),
+     TOBN(0x0b9c3a6c, 0xa1779ad7), TOBN(0xa33cfe2e, 0x357c09c5),
+     TOBN(0x2ea29315, 0x3db4a57e), TOBN(0x91959695, 0x8ebeb52e),
+     TOBN(0x118db9a6, 0xe546c879), TOBN(0x8e996df4, 0x6295c8d6),
+     TOBN(0xdd990484, 0x55ec806b), TOBN(0x24f291ca, 0x165c1035),
+     TOBN(0xcca523bb, 0x440e2229), TOBN(0x324673a2, 0x73ef4d04),
+     TOBN(0xaf3adf34, 0x3e11ec39), TOBN(0x6136d7f1, 0xdc5968d3),
+     TOBN(0x7a7b2899, 0xb053a927), TOBN(0x3eaa2661, 0xae067ecd),
+     TOBN(0x8549b9c8, 0x02779cd9), TOBN(0x061d7940, 0xc53385ea),
+     TOBN(0x3e0ba883, 0xf06d18bd), TOBN(0x4ba6de53, 0xb2700843),
+     TOBN(0xb966b668, 0x591a9e4d), TOBN(0x93f67567, 0x7f4fa0ed),
+     TOBN(0x5a02711b, 0x4347237b), TOBN(0xbc041e2f, 0xe794608e),
+     TOBN(0x55af10f5, 0x70f73d8c), TOBN(0xd2d4d4f7, 0xbb7564f7),
+     TOBN(0xd7d27a89, 0xb3e93ce7), TOBN(0xf7b5a875, 0x5d3a2c1b),
+     TOBN(0xb29e68a0, 0x255b218a), TOBN(0xb533837e, 0x8af76754),
+     TOBN(0xd1b05a73, 0x579fab2e), TOBN(0xb41055a1, 0xecd74385),
+     TOBN(0xb2369274, 0x445e9115), TOBN(0x2972a7c4, 0xf520274e),
+     TOBN(0x6c08334e, 0xf678e68a), TOBN(0x4e4160f0, 0x99b057ed),
+     TOBN(0x3cfe11b8, 0x52ccb69a), TOBN(0x2fd1823a, 0x21c8f772),
+     TOBN(0xdf7f072f, 0x3298f055), TOBN(0x8c0566f9, 0xfec74a6e),
+     TOBN(0xe549e019, 0x5bb4d041), TOBN(0x7c3930ba, 0x9208d850),
+     TOBN(0xe07141fc, 0xaaa2902b), TOBN(0x539ad799, 0xe4f69ad3),
+     TOBN(0xa6453f94, 0x813f9ffd), TOBN(0xc58d3c48, 0x375bc2f7),
+     TOBN(0xb3326fad, 0x5dc64e96), TOBN(0x3aafcaa9, 0xb240e354),
+     TOBN(0x1d1b0903, 0xaca1e7a9), TOBN(0x4ceb9767, 0x1211b8a0),
+     TOBN(0xeca83e49, 0xe32a858e), TOBN(0x4c32892e, 0xae907bad),
+     TOBN(0xd5b42ab6, 0x2eb9b494), TOBN(0x7fde3ee2, 0x1eabae1b),
+     TOBN(0x13b5ab09, 0xcaf54957), TOBN(0xbfb028be, 0xe5f5d5d5),
+     TOBN(0x928a0650, 0x2003e2c0), TOBN(0x90793aac, 0x67476843),
+     TOBN(0x5e942e79, 0xc81710a0), TOBN(0x557e4a36, 0x27ccadd4),
+     TOBN(0x72a2bc56, 0x4bcf6d0c), TOBN(0x09ee5f43, 0x26d7b80c),
+     TOBN(0x6b70dbe9, 0xd4292f19), TOBN(0x56f74c26, 0x63f16b18),
+     TOBN(0xc23db0f7, 0x35fbb42a), TOBN(0xb606bdf6, 0x6ae10040),
+     TOBN(0x1eb15d4d, 0x044573ac), TOBN(0x7dc3cf86, 0x556b0ba4),
+     TOBN(0x97af9a33, 0xc60df6f7), TOBN(0x0b1ef85c, 0xa716ce8c),
+     TOBN(0x2922f884, 0xc96958be), TOBN(0x7c32fa94, 0x35690963),
+     TOBN(0x2d7f667c, 0xeaa00061), TOBN(0xeaaf7c17, 0x3547365c),
+     TOBN(0x1eb4de46, 0x87032d58), TOBN(0xc54f3d83, 0x5e2c79e0),
+     TOBN(0x07818df4, 0x5d04ef23), TOBN(0x55faa9c8, 0x673d41b4),
+     TOBN(0xced64f6f, 0x89b95355), TOBN(0x4860d2ea, 0xb7415c84),
+     TOBN(0x5fdb9bd2, 0x050ebad3), TOBN(0xdb53e0cc, 0x6685a5bf),
+     TOBN(0xb830c031, 0x9feb6593), TOBN(0xdd87f310, 0x6accff17),
+     TOBN(0x2303ebab, 0x9f555c10), TOBN(0x94603695, 0x287e7065),
+     TOBN(0xf88311c3, 0x2e83358c), TOBN(0x508dd9b4, 0xeefb0178),
+     TOBN(0x7ca23706, 0x2dba8652), TOBN(0x62aac5a3, 0x0047abe5),
+     TOBN(0x9a61d2a0, 0x8b1ea7b3), TOBN(0xd495ab63, 0xae8b1485),
+     TOBN(0x38740f84, 0x87052f99), TOBN(0x178ebe5b, 0xb2974eea),
+     TOBN(0x030bbcca, 0x5b36d17f), TOBN(0xb5e4cce3, 0xaaf86eea),
+     TOBN(0xb51a0220, 0x68f8e9e0), TOBN(0xa4348796, 0x09eb3e75),
+     TOBN(0xbe592309, 0xeef1a752), TOBN(0x5d7162d7, 0x6f2aa1ed),
+     TOBN(0xaebfb5ed, 0x0f007dd2), TOBN(0x255e14b2, 0xc89edd22),
+     TOBN(0xba85e072, 0x0303b697), TOBN(0xc5d17e25, 0xf05720ff),
+     TOBN(0x02b58d6e, 0x5128ebb6), TOBN(0x2c80242d, 0xd754e113),
+     TOBN(0x919fca5f, 0xabfae1ca), TOBN(0x937afaac, 0x1a21459b),
+     TOBN(0x9e0ca91c, 0x1f66a4d2), TOBN(0x194cc7f3, 0x23ec1331),
+     TOBN(0xad25143a, 0x8aa11690), TOBN(0xbe40ad8d, 0x09b59e08),
+     TOBN(0x37d60d9b, 0xe750860a), TOBN(0x6c53b008, 0xc6bf434c),
+     TOBN(0xb572415d, 0x1356eb80), TOBN(0xb8bf9da3, 0x9578ded8),
+     TOBN(0x22658e36, 0x5e8fb38b), TOBN(0x9b70ce22, 0x5af8cb22),
+     TOBN(0x7c00018a, 0x829a8180), TOBN(0x84329f93, 0xb81ed295),
+     TOBN(0x7c343ea2, 0x5f3cea83), TOBN(0x38f8655f, 0x67586536),
+     TOBN(0xa661a0d0, 0x1d3ec517), TOBN(0x98744652, 0x512321ae),
+     TOBN(0x084ca591, 0xeca92598), TOBN(0xa9bb9dc9, 0x1dcb3feb),
+     TOBN(0x14c54355, 0x78b4c240), TOBN(0x5ed62a3b, 0x610cafdc),
+     TOBN(0x07512f37, 0x1b38846b), TOBN(0x571bb70a, 0xb0e38161),
+     TOBN(0xb556b95b, 0x2da705d2), TOBN(0x3ef8ada6, 0xb1a08f98),
+     TOBN(0x85302ca7, 0xddecfbe5), TOBN(0x0e530573, 0x943105cd),
+     TOBN(0x60554d55, 0x21a9255d), TOBN(0x63a32fa1, 0xf2f3802a),
+     TOBN(0x35c8c5b0, 0xcd477875), TOBN(0x97f458ea, 0x6ad42da1),
+     TOBN(0x832d7080, 0xeb6b242d), TOBN(0xd30bd023, 0x3b71e246),
+     TOBN(0x7027991b, 0xbe31139d), TOBN(0x68797e91, 0x462e4e53),
+     TOBN(0x423fe20a, 0x6b4e185a), TOBN(0x82f2c67e, 0x42d9b707),
+     TOBN(0x25c81768, 0x4cf7811b), TOBN(0xbd53005e, 0x045bb95d),}
+    ,
+    {TOBN(0xe5f649be, 0x9d8e68fd), TOBN(0xdb0f0533, 0x1b044320),
+     TOBN(0xf6fde9b3, 0xe0c33398), TOBN(0x92f4209b, 0x66c8cfae),
+     TOBN(0xe9d1afcc, 0x1a739d4b), TOBN(0x09aea75f, 0xa28ab8de),
+     TOBN(0x14375fb5, 0xeac6f1d0), TOBN(0x6420b560, 0x708f7aa5),
+     TOBN(0x9eae499c, 0x6254dc41), TOBN(0x7e293924, 0x7a837e7e),
+     TOBN(0x74aec08c, 0x090524a7), TOBN(0xf82b9219, 0x8d6f55f2),
+     TOBN(0x493c962e, 0x1402cec5), TOBN(0x9f17ca17, 0xfa2f30e7),
+     TOBN(0xbcd783e8, 0xe9b879cb), TOBN(0xea3d8c14, 0x5a6f145f),
+     TOBN(0xdede15e7, 0x5e0dee6e), TOBN(0x74f24872, 0xdc628aa2),
+     TOBN(0xd3e9c4fe, 0x7861bb93), TOBN(0x56d4822a, 0x6187b2e0),
+     TOBN(0xb66417cf, 0xc59826f9), TOBN(0xca260969, 0x2408169e),
+     TOBN(0xedf69d06, 0xc79ef885), TOBN(0x00031f8a, 0xdc7d138f),
+     TOBN(0x103c46e6, 0x0ebcf726), TOBN(0x4482b831, 0x6231470e),
+     TOBN(0x6f6dfaca, 0x487c2109), TOBN(0x2e0ace97, 0x62e666ef),
+     TOBN(0x3246a9d3, 0x1f8d1f42), TOBN(0x1b1e83f1, 0x574944d2),
+     TOBN(0x13dfa63a, 0xa57f334b), TOBN(0x0cf8daed, 0x9f025d81),
+     TOBN(0x30d78ea8, 0x00ee11c1), TOBN(0xeb053cd4, 0xb5e3dd75),
+     TOBN(0x9b65b13e, 0xd58c43c5), TOBN(0xc3ad49bd, 0xbd151663),
+     TOBN(0x99fd8e41, 0xb6427990), TOBN(0x12cf15bd, 0x707eae1e),
+     TOBN(0x29ad4f1b, 0x1aabb71e), TOBN(0x5143e74d, 0x07545d0e),
+     TOBN(0x30266336, 0xc88bdee1), TOBN(0x25f29306, 0x5876767c),
+     TOBN(0x9c078571, 0xc6731996), TOBN(0xc88690b2, 0xed552951),
+     TOBN(0x274f2c2d, 0x852705b4), TOBN(0xb0bf8d44, 0x4e09552d),
+     TOBN(0x7628beeb, 0x986575d1), TOBN(0x407be238, 0x7f864651),
+     TOBN(0x0e5e3049, 0xa639fc6b), TOBN(0xe75c35d9, 0x86003625),
+     TOBN(0x0cf35bd8, 0x5dcc1646), TOBN(0x8bcaced2, 0x6c26273a),
+     TOBN(0xe22ecf1d, 0xb5536742), TOBN(0x013dd897, 0x1a9e068b),
+     TOBN(0x17f411cb, 0x8a7909c5), TOBN(0x5757ac98, 0x861dd506),
+     TOBN(0x85de1f0d, 0x1e935abb), TOBN(0xdefd10b4, 0x154de37a),
+     TOBN(0xb8d9e392, 0x369cebb5), TOBN(0x54d5ef9b, 0x761324be),
+     TOBN(0x4d6341ba, 0x74f17e26), TOBN(0xc0a0e3c8, 0x78c1dde4),
+     TOBN(0xa6d77581, 0x87d918fd), TOBN(0x66876015, 0x02ca3a13),
+     TOBN(0xc7313e9c, 0xf36658f0), TOBN(0xc433ef1c, 0x71f8057e),
+     TOBN(0x85326246, 0x1b6a835a), TOBN(0xc8f05398, 0x7c86394c),
+     TOBN(0xff398cdf, 0xe983c4a1), TOBN(0xbf5e8162, 0x03b7b931),
+     TOBN(0x93193c46, 0xb7b9045b), TOBN(0x1e4ebf5d, 0xa4a6e46b),
+     TOBN(0xf9942a60, 0x43a24fe7), TOBN(0x29c1191e, 0xffb3492b),
+     TOBN(0x9f662449, 0x902fde05), TOBN(0xc792a7ac, 0x6713c32d),
+     TOBN(0x2fd88ad8, 0xb737982c), TOBN(0x7e3a0319, 0xa21e60e3),
+     TOBN(0x09b0de44, 0x7383591a), TOBN(0x6df141ee, 0x8310a456),
+     TOBN(0xaec1a039, 0xe6d6f471), TOBN(0x14b2ba0f, 0x1198d12e),
+     TOBN(0xebc1a160, 0x3aeee5ac), TOBN(0x401f4836, 0xe0b964ce),
+     TOBN(0x2ee43796, 0x4fd03f66), TOBN(0x3fdb4e49, 0xdd8f3f12),
+     TOBN(0x6ef267f6, 0x29380f18), TOBN(0x3e8e9670, 0x8da64d16),
+     TOBN(0xbc19180c, 0x207674f1), TOBN(0x112e09a7, 0x33ae8fdb),
+     TOBN(0x99667554, 0x6aaeb71e), TOBN(0x79432af1, 0xe101b1c7),
+     TOBN(0xd5eb558f, 0xde2ddec6), TOBN(0x81392d1f, 0x5357753f),
+     TOBN(0xa7a76b97, 0x3ae1158a), TOBN(0x416fbbff, 0x4a899991),
+     TOBN(0x9e65fdfd, 0x0d4a9dcf), TOBN(0x7bc29e48, 0x944ddf12),
+     TOBN(0xbc1a92d9, 0x3c856866), TOBN(0x273c6905, 0x6e98dfe2),
+     TOBN(0x69fce418, 0xcdfaa6b8), TOBN(0x606bd823, 0x5061c69f),
+     TOBN(0x42d495a0, 0x6af75e27), TOBN(0x8ed3d505, 0x6d873a1f),
+     TOBN(0xaf552841, 0x6ab25b6a), TOBN(0xc6c0ffc7, 0x2b1a4523),
+     TOBN(0xab18827b, 0x21c99e03), TOBN(0x060e8648, 0x9034691b),
+     TOBN(0x5207f90f, 0x93c7f398), TOBN(0x9f4a96cb, 0x82f8d10b),
+     TOBN(0xdd71cd79, 0x3ad0f9e3), TOBN(0x84f435d2, 0xfc3a54f5),
+     TOBN(0x4b03c55b, 0x8e33787f), TOBN(0xef42f975, 0xa6384673),
+     TOBN(0xff7304f7, 0x5051b9f0), TOBN(0x18aca1dc, 0x741c87c2),
+     TOBN(0x56f120a7, 0x2d4bfe80), TOBN(0xfd823b3d, 0x053e732c),
+     TOBN(0x11bccfe4, 0x7537ca16), TOBN(0xdf6c9c74, 0x1b5a996b),
+     TOBN(0xee7332c7, 0x904fc3fa), TOBN(0x14a23f45, 0xc7e3636a),
+     TOBN(0xc38659c3, 0xf091d9aa), TOBN(0x4a995e5d, 0xb12d8540),
+     TOBN(0x20a53bec, 0xf3a5598a), TOBN(0x56534b17, 0xb1eaa995),
+     TOBN(0x9ed3dca4, 0xbf04e03c), TOBN(0x716c563a, 0xd8d56268),
+     TOBN(0x27ba77a4, 0x1d6178e7), TOBN(0xe4c80c40, 0x68a1ff8e),
+     TOBN(0x75011099, 0x0a13f63d), TOBN(0x7bf33521, 0xa61d46f3),
+     TOBN(0x0aff218e, 0x10b365bb), TOBN(0x81021804, 0x0fd7ea75),
+     TOBN(0x05a3fd8a, 0xa4b3a925), TOBN(0xb829e75f, 0x9b3db4e6),
+     TOBN(0x6bdc75a5, 0x4d53e5fb), TOBN(0x04a5dc02, 0xd52717e3),
+     TOBN(0x86af502f, 0xe9a42ec2), TOBN(0x8867e8fb, 0x2630e382),
+     TOBN(0xbf845c6e, 0xbec9889b), TOBN(0x54f491f2, 0xcb47c98d),
+     TOBN(0xa3091fba, 0x790c2a12), TOBN(0xd7f6fd78, 0xc20f708b),
+     TOBN(0xa569ac30, 0xacde5e17), TOBN(0xd0f996d0, 0x6852b4d7),
+     TOBN(0xe51d4bb5, 0x4609ae54), TOBN(0x3fa37d17, 0x0daed061),
+     TOBN(0x62a88684, 0x34b8fb41), TOBN(0x99a2acbd, 0x9efb64f1),
+     TOBN(0xb75c1a5e, 0x6448e1f2), TOBN(0xfa99951a, 0x42b5a069),
+     TOBN(0x6d956e89, 0x2f3b26e7), TOBN(0xf4709860, 0xda875247),
+     TOBN(0x3ad15179, 0x2482dda3), TOBN(0xd64110e3, 0x017d82f0),
+     TOBN(0x14928d2c, 0xfad414e4), TOBN(0x2b155f58, 0x2ed02b24),
+     TOBN(0x481a141b, 0xcb821bf1), TOBN(0x12e3c770, 0x4f81f5da),
+     TOBN(0xe49c5de5, 0x9fff8381), TOBN(0x11053232, 0x5bbec894),
+     TOBN(0xa0d051cc, 0x454d88c4), TOBN(0x4f6db89c, 0x1f8e531b),
+     TOBN(0x34fe3fd6, 0xca563a44), TOBN(0x7f5c2215, 0x58da8ab9),
+     TOBN(0x8445016d, 0x9474f0a1), TOBN(0x17d34d61, 0xcb7d8a0a),
+     TOBN(0x8e9d3910, 0x1c474019), TOBN(0xcaff2629, 0xd52ceefb),
+     TOBN(0xf9cf3e32, 0xc1622c2b), TOBN(0xd4b95e3c, 0xe9071a05),
+     TOBN(0xfbbca61f, 0x1594438c), TOBN(0x1eb6e6a6, 0x04aadedf),
+     TOBN(0x853027f4, 0x68e14940), TOBN(0x221d322a, 0xdfabda9c),
+     TOBN(0xed8ea9f6, 0xb7cb179a), TOBN(0xdc7b764d, 0xb7934dcc),
+     TOBN(0xfcb13940, 0x5e09180d), TOBN(0x6629a6bf, 0xb47dc2dd),
+     TOBN(0xbfc55e4e, 0x9f5a915e), TOBN(0xb1db9d37, 0x6204441e),
+     TOBN(0xf82d68cf, 0x930c5f53), TOBN(0x17d3a142, 0xcbb605b1),
+     TOBN(0xdd5944ea, 0x308780f2), TOBN(0xdc8de761, 0x3845f5e4),
+     TOBN(0x6beaba7d, 0x7624d7a3), TOBN(0x1e709afd, 0x304df11e),
+     TOBN(0x95364376, 0x02170456), TOBN(0xbf204b3a, 0xc8f94b64),
+     TOBN(0x4e53af7c, 0x5680ca68), TOBN(0x0526074a, 0xe0c67574),
+     TOBN(0x95d8cef8, 0xecd92af6), TOBN(0xe6b9fa7a, 0x6cd1745a),
+     TOBN(0x3d546d3d, 0xa325c3e4), TOBN(0x1f57691d, 0x9ae93aae),
+     TOBN(0xe891f3fe, 0x9d2e1a33), TOBN(0xd430093f, 0xac063d35),
+     TOBN(0xeda59b12, 0x5513a327), TOBN(0xdc2134f3, 0x5536f18f),
+     TOBN(0xaa51fe2c, 0x5c210286), TOBN(0x3f68aaee, 0x1cab658c),
+     TOBN(0x5a23a00b, 0xf9357292), TOBN(0x9a626f39, 0x7efdabed),
+     TOBN(0xfe2b3bf3, 0x199d78e3), TOBN(0xb7a2af77, 0x71bbc345),
+     TOBN(0x3d19827a, 0x1e59802c), TOBN(0x823bbc15, 0xb487a51c),
+     TOBN(0x856139f2, 0x99d0a422), TOBN(0x9ac3df65, 0xf456c6fb),
+     TOBN(0xaddf65c6, 0x701f8bd6), TOBN(0x149f321e, 0x3758df87),
+     TOBN(0xb1ecf714, 0x721b7eba), TOBN(0xe17df098, 0x31a3312a),
+     TOBN(0xdb2fd6ec, 0xd5c4d581), TOBN(0xfd02996f, 0x8fcea1b3),
+     TOBN(0xe29fa63e, 0x7882f14f), TOBN(0xc9f6dc35, 0x07c6cadc),
+     TOBN(0x46f22d6f, 0xb882bed0), TOBN(0x1a45755b, 0xd118e52c),
+     TOBN(0x9f2c7c27, 0x7c4608cf), TOBN(0x7ccbdf32, 0x568012c2),
+     TOBN(0xfcb0aedd, 0x61729b0e), TOBN(0x7ca2ca9e, 0xf7d75dbf),
+     TOBN(0xf58fecb1, 0x6f640f62), TOBN(0xe274b92b, 0x39f51946),
+     TOBN(0x7f4dfc04, 0x6288af44), TOBN(0x0a91f32a, 0xeac329e5),
+     TOBN(0x43ad274b, 0xd6aaba31), TOBN(0x719a1640, 0x0f6884f9),
+     TOBN(0x685d29f6, 0xdaf91e20), TOBN(0x5ec1cc33, 0x27e49d52),
+     TOBN(0x38f4de96, 0x3b54a059), TOBN(0x0e0015e5, 0xefbcfdb3),
+     TOBN(0x177d23d9, 0x4dbb8da6), TOBN(0x98724aa2, 0x97a617ad),
+     TOBN(0x30f0885b, 0xfdb6558e), TOBN(0xf9f7a28a, 0xc7899a96),
+     TOBN(0xd2ae8ac8, 0x872dc112), TOBN(0xfa0642ca, 0x73c3c459),
+     TOBN(0x15296981, 0xe7dfc8d6), TOBN(0x67cd4450, 0x1fb5b94a),
+     TOBN(0x0ec71cf1, 0x0eddfd37), TOBN(0xc7e5eeb3, 0x9a8eddc7),
+     TOBN(0x02ac8e3d, 0x81d95028), TOBN(0x0088f172, 0x70b0e35d),
+     TOBN(0xec041fab, 0xe1881fe3), TOBN(0x62cf71b8, 0xd99e7faa),
+     TOBN(0x5043dea7, 0xe0f222c2), TOBN(0x309d42ac, 0x72e65142),
+     TOBN(0x94fe9ddd, 0x9216cd30), TOBN(0xd6539c7d, 0x0f87feec),
+     TOBN(0x03c5a57c, 0x432ac7d7), TOBN(0x72692cf0, 0x327fda10),
+     TOBN(0xec28c85f, 0x280698de), TOBN(0x2331fb46, 0x7ec283b1),
+     TOBN(0xd34bfa32, 0x2867e633), TOBN(0x78709a82, 0x0a9cc815),
+     TOBN(0xb7fe6964, 0x875e2fa5), TOBN(0x25cc064f, 0x9e98bfb5),
+     TOBN(0x9eb0151c, 0x493a65c5), TOBN(0x5fb5d941, 0x53182464),
+     TOBN(0x69e6f130, 0xf04618e2), TOBN(0xa8ecec22, 0xf89c8ab6),
+     TOBN(0xcd6ac88b, 0xb96209bd), TOBN(0x65fa8cdb, 0xb3e1c9e0),
+     TOBN(0xa47d22f5, 0x4a8d8eac), TOBN(0x83895cdf, 0x8d33f963),
+     TOBN(0xa8adca59, 0xb56cd3d1), TOBN(0x10c8350b, 0xdaf38232),
+     TOBN(0x2b161fb3, 0xa5080a9f), TOBN(0xbe7f5c64, 0x3af65b3a),
+     TOBN(0x2c754039, 0x97403a11), TOBN(0x94626cf7, 0x121b96af),
+     TOBN(0x431de7c4, 0x6a983ec2), TOBN(0x3780dd3a, 0x52cc3df7),
+     TOBN(0xe28a0e46, 0x2baf8e3b), TOBN(0xabe68aad, 0x51d299ae),
+     TOBN(0x603eb8f9, 0x647a2408), TOBN(0x14c61ed6, 0x5c750981),
+     TOBN(0x88b34414, 0xc53352e7), TOBN(0x5a34889c, 0x1337d46e),
+     TOBN(0x612c1560, 0xf95f2bc8), TOBN(0x8a3f8441, 0xd4807a3a),
+     TOBN(0x680d9e97, 0x5224da68), TOBN(0x60cd6e88, 0xc3eb00e9),
+     TOBN(0x3875a98e, 0x9a6bc375), TOBN(0xdc80f924, 0x4fd554c2),
+     TOBN(0x6c4b3415, 0x6ac77407), TOBN(0xa1e5ea8f, 0x25420681),
+     TOBN(0x541bfa14, 0x4607a458), TOBN(0x5dbc7e7a, 0x96d7fbf9),
+     TOBN(0x646a851b, 0x31590a47), TOBN(0x039e85ba, 0x15ee6df8),
+     TOBN(0xd19fa231, 0xd7b43fc0), TOBN(0x84bc8be8, 0x299a0e04),
+     TOBN(0x2b9d2936, 0xf20df03a), TOBN(0x24054382, 0x8608d472),
+     TOBN(0x76b6ba04, 0x9149202a), TOBN(0xb21c3831, 0x3670e7b7),
+     TOBN(0xddd93059, 0xd6fdee10), TOBN(0x9da47ad3, 0x78488e71),
+     TOBN(0x99cc1dfd, 0xa0fcfb25), TOBN(0x42abde10, 0x64696954),
+     TOBN(0x14cc15fc, 0x17eab9fe), TOBN(0xd6e863e4, 0xd3e70972),
+     TOBN(0x29a7765c, 0x6432112c), TOBN(0x88660001, 0x5b0774d8),
+     TOBN(0x3729175a, 0x2c088eae), TOBN(0x13afbcae, 0x8230b8d4),
+     TOBN(0x44768151, 0x915f4379), TOBN(0xf086431a, 0xd8d22812),
+     TOBN(0x37461955, 0xc298b974), TOBN(0x905fb5f0, 0xf8711e04),
+     TOBN(0x787abf3a, 0xfe969d18), TOBN(0x392167c2, 0x6f6a494e),
+     TOBN(0xfc7a0d2d, 0x28c511da), TOBN(0xf127c7dc, 0xb66a262d),
+     TOBN(0xf9c4bb95, 0xfd63fdf0), TOBN(0x90016589, 0x3913ef46),
+     TOBN(0x74d2a73c, 0x11aa600d), TOBN(0x2f5379bd, 0x9fb5ab52),
+     TOBN(0xe49e53a4, 0x7fb70068), TOBN(0x68dd39e5, 0x404aa9a7),
+     TOBN(0xb9b0cf57, 0x2ecaa9c3), TOBN(0xba0e103b, 0xe824826b),
+     TOBN(0x60c2198b, 0x4631a3c4), TOBN(0xc5ff84ab, 0xfa8966a2),
+     TOBN(0x2d6ebe22, 0xac95aff8), TOBN(0x1c9bb6db, 0xb5a46d09),
+     TOBN(0x419062da, 0x53ee4f8d), TOBN(0x7b9042d0, 0xbb97efef),
+     TOBN(0x0f87f080, 0x830cf6bd), TOBN(0x4861d19a, 0x6ec8a6c6),
+     TOBN(0xd3a0daa1, 0x202f01aa), TOBN(0xb0111674, 0xf25afbd5),
+     TOBN(0x6d00d6cf, 0x1afb20d9), TOBN(0x13695000, 0x40671bc5),
+     TOBN(0x913ab0dc, 0x2485ea9b), TOBN(0x1f2bed06, 0x9eef61ac),
+     TOBN(0x850c8217, 0x6d799e20), TOBN(0x93415f37, 0x3271c2de),
+     TOBN(0x5afb06e9, 0x6c4f5910), TOBN(0x688a52df, 0xc4e9e421),
+     TOBN(0x30495ba3, 0xe2a9a6db), TOBN(0x4601303d, 0x58f9268b),
+     TOBN(0xbe3b0dad, 0x7eb0f04f), TOBN(0x4ea47250, 0x4456936d),
+     TOBN(0x8caf8798, 0xd33fd3e7), TOBN(0x1ccd8a89, 0xeb433708),
+     TOBN(0x9effe3e8, 0x87fd50ad), TOBN(0xbe240a56, 0x6b29c4df),
+     TOBN(0xec4ffd98, 0xca0e7ebd), TOBN(0xf586783a, 0xe748616e),
+     TOBN(0xa5b00d8f, 0xc77baa99), TOBN(0x0acada29, 0xb4f34c9c),
+     TOBN(0x36dad67d, 0x0fe723ac), TOBN(0x1d8e53a5, 0x39c36c1e),
+     TOBN(0xe4dd342d, 0x1f4bea41), TOBN(0x64fd5e35, 0xebc9e4e0),
+     TOBN(0x96f01f90, 0x57908805), TOBN(0xb5b9ea3d, 0x5ed480dd),
+     TOBN(0x366c5dc2, 0x3efd2dd0), TOBN(0xed2fe305, 0x6e9dfa27),
+     TOBN(0x4575e892, 0x6e9197e2), TOBN(0x11719c09, 0xab502a5d),
+     TOBN(0x264c7bec, 0xe81f213f), TOBN(0x741b9241, 0x55f5c457),
+     TOBN(0x78ac7b68, 0x49a5f4f4), TOBN(0xf91d70a2, 0x9fc45b7d),
+     TOBN(0x39b05544, 0xb0f5f355), TOBN(0x11f06bce, 0xeef930d9),
+     TOBN(0xdb84d25d, 0x038d05e1), TOBN(0x04838ee5, 0xbacc1d51),
+     TOBN(0x9da3ce86, 0x9e8ee00b), TOBN(0xc3412057, 0xc36eda1f),
+     TOBN(0xae80b913, 0x64d9c2f4), TOBN(0x7468bac3, 0xa010a8ff),
+     TOBN(0xdfd20037, 0x37359d41), TOBN(0x1a0f5ab8, 0x15efeacc),
+     TOBN(0x7c25ad2f, 0x659d0ce0), TOBN(0x4011bcbb, 0x6785cff1),
+     TOBN(0x128b9912, 0x7e2192c7), TOBN(0xa549d8e1, 0x13ccb0e8),
+     TOBN(0x805588d8, 0xc85438b1), TOBN(0x5680332d, 0xbc25cb27),
+     TOBN(0xdcd1bc96, 0x1a4bfdf4), TOBN(0x779ff428, 0x706f6566),
+     TOBN(0x8bbee998, 0xf059987a), TOBN(0xf6ce8cf2, 0xcc686de7),
+     TOBN(0xf8ad3c4a, 0x953cfdb2), TOBN(0xd1d426d9, 0x2205da36),
+     TOBN(0xb3c0f13f, 0xc781a241), TOBN(0x3e89360e, 0xd75362a8),
+     TOBN(0xccd05863, 0xc8a91184), TOBN(0x9bd0c9b7, 0xefa8a7f4),
+     TOBN(0x97ee4d53, 0x8a912a4b), TOBN(0xde5e15f8, 0xbcf518fd),
+     TOBN(0x6a055bf8, 0xc467e1e0), TOBN(0x10be4b4b, 0x1587e256),
+     TOBN(0xd90c14f2, 0x668621c9), TOBN(0xd5518f51, 0xab9c92c1),
+     TOBN(0x8e6a0100, 0xd6d47b3c), TOBN(0xcbe980dd, 0x66716175),
+     TOBN(0x500d3f10, 0xddd83683), TOBN(0x3b6cb35d, 0x99cac73c),
+     TOBN(0x53730c8b, 0x6083d550), TOBN(0xcf159767, 0xdf0a1987),
+     TOBN(0x84bfcf53, 0x43ad73b3), TOBN(0x1b528c20, 0x4f035a94),
+     TOBN(0x4294edf7, 0x33eeac69), TOBN(0xb6283e83, 0x817f3240),
+     TOBN(0xc3fdc959, 0x0a5f25b1), TOBN(0xefaf8aa5, 0x5844ee22),
+     TOBN(0xde269ba5, 0xdbdde4de), TOBN(0xe3347160, 0xc56133bf),
+     TOBN(0xc1184219, 0x8d9ea9f8), TOBN(0x090de5db, 0xf3fc1ab5),
+     TOBN(0x404c37b1, 0x0bf22cda), TOBN(0x7de20ec8, 0xf5618894),
+     TOBN(0x754c588e, 0xecdaecab), TOBN(0x6ca4b0ed, 0x88342743),
+     TOBN(0x76f08bdd, 0xf4a938ec), TOBN(0xd182de89, 0x91493ccb),
+     TOBN(0xd652c53e, 0xc8a4186a), TOBN(0xb3e878db, 0x946d8e33),
+     TOBN(0x088453c0, 0x5f37663c), TOBN(0x5cd9daaa, 0xb407748b),
+     TOBN(0xa1f5197f, 0x586d5e72), TOBN(0x47500be8, 0xc443ca59),
+     TOBN(0x78ef35b2, 0xe2652424), TOBN(0x09c5d26f, 0x6dd7767d),
+     TOBN(0x7175a79a, 0xa74d3f7b), TOBN(0x0428fd8d, 0xcf5ea459),
+     TOBN(0x511cb97c, 0xa5d1746d), TOBN(0x36363939, 0xe71d1278),
+     TOBN(0xcf2df955, 0x10350bf4), TOBN(0xb3817439, 0x60aae782),
+     TOBN(0xa748c0e4, 0x3e688809), TOBN(0x98021fbf, 0xd7a5a006),
+     TOBN(0x9076a70c, 0x0e367a98), TOBN(0xbea1bc15, 0x0f62b7c2),
+     TOBN(0x2645a68c, 0x30fe0343), TOBN(0xacaffa78, 0x699dc14f),
+     TOBN(0xf4469964, 0x457bf9c4), TOBN(0x0db6407b, 0x0d2ead83),
+     TOBN(0x68d56cad, 0xb2c6f3eb), TOBN(0x3b512e73, 0xf376356c),
+     TOBN(0xe43b0e1f, 0xfce10408), TOBN(0x89ddc003, 0x5a5e257d),
+     TOBN(0xb0ae0d12, 0x0362e5b3), TOBN(0x07f983c7, 0xb0519161),
+     TOBN(0xc2e94d15, 0x5d5231e7), TOBN(0xcff22aed, 0x0b4f9513),
+     TOBN(0xb02588dd, 0x6ad0b0b5), TOBN(0xb967d1ac, 0x11d0dcd5),
+     TOBN(0x8dac6bc6, 0xcf777b6c), TOBN(0x0062bdbd, 0x4c6d1959),
+     TOBN(0x53da71b5, 0x0ef5cc85), TOBN(0x07012c7d, 0x4006f14f),
+     TOBN(0x4617f962, 0xac47800d), TOBN(0x53365f2b, 0xc102ed75),
+     TOBN(0xb422efcb, 0x4ab8c9d3), TOBN(0x195cb26b, 0x34af31c9),
+     TOBN(0x3a926e29, 0x05f2c4ce), TOBN(0xbd2bdecb, 0x9856966c),
+     TOBN(0x5d16ab3a, 0x85527015), TOBN(0x9f81609e, 0x4486c231),
+     TOBN(0xd8b96b2c, 0xda350002), TOBN(0xbd054690, 0xfa1b7d36),
+     TOBN(0xdc90ebf5, 0xe71d79bc), TOBN(0xf241b6f9, 0x08964e4e),
+     TOBN(0x7c838643, 0x2fe3cd4c), TOBN(0xe0f33acb, 0xb4bc633c),
+     TOBN(0xb4a9ecec, 0x3d139f1f), TOBN(0x05ce69cd, 0xdc4a1f49),
+     TOBN(0xa19d1b16, 0xf5f98aaf), TOBN(0x45bb71d6, 0x6f23e0ef),
+     TOBN(0x33789fcd, 0x46cdfdd3), TOBN(0x9b8e2978, 0xcee040ca),
+     TOBN(0x9c69b246, 0xae0a6828), TOBN(0xba533d24, 0x7078d5aa),
+     TOBN(0x7a2e42c0, 0x7bb4fbdb), TOBN(0xcfb4879a, 0x7035385c),
+     TOBN(0x8c3dd30b, 0x3281705b), TOBN(0x7e361c6c, 0x404fe081),
+     TOBN(0x7b21649c, 0x3f604edf), TOBN(0x5dbf6a3f, 0xe52ffe47),
+     TOBN(0xc41b7c23, 0x4b54d9bf), TOBN(0x1374e681, 0x3511c3d9),
+     TOBN(0x1863bf16, 0xc1b2b758), TOBN(0x90e78507, 0x1e9e6a96),
+     TOBN(0xab4bf98d, 0x5d86f174), TOBN(0xd74e0bd3, 0x85e96fe4),
+     TOBN(0x8afde39f, 0xcac5d344), TOBN(0x90946dbc, 0xbd91b847),
+     TOBN(0xf5b42358, 0xfe1a838c), TOBN(0x05aae6c5, 0x620ac9d8),
+     TOBN(0x8e193bd8, 0xa1ce5a0b), TOBN(0x8f710571, 0x4dabfd72),
+     TOBN(0x8d8fdd48, 0x182caaac), TOBN(0x8c4aeefa, 0x040745cf),
+     TOBN(0x73c6c30a, 0xf3b93e6d), TOBN(0x991241f3, 0x16f42011),
+     TOBN(0xa0158eea, 0xe457a477), TOBN(0xd19857db, 0xee6ddc05),
+     TOBN(0xb3265224, 0x18c41671), TOBN(0x3ffdfc7e, 0x3c2c0d58),
+     TOBN(0x3a3a5254, 0x26ee7cda), TOBN(0x341b0869, 0xdf02c3a8),
+     TOBN(0xa023bf42, 0x723bbfc8), TOBN(0x3d15002a, 0x14452691),}
+    ,
+    {TOBN(0x5ef7324c, 0x85edfa30), TOBN(0x25976554, 0x87d4f3da),
+     TOBN(0x352f5bc0, 0xdcb50c86), TOBN(0x8f6927b0, 0x4832a96c),
+     TOBN(0xd08ee1ba, 0x55f2f94c), TOBN(0x6a996f99, 0x344b45fa),
+     TOBN(0xe133cb8d, 0xa8aa455d), TOBN(0x5d0721ec, 0x758dc1f7),
+     TOBN(0x6ba7a920, 0x79e5fb67), TOBN(0xe1331feb, 0x70aa725e),
+     TOBN(0x5080ccf5, 0x7df5d837), TOBN(0xe4cae01d, 0x7ff72e21),
+     TOBN(0xd9243ee6, 0x0412a77d), TOBN(0x06ff7cac, 0xdf449025),
+     TOBN(0xbe75f7cd, 0x23ef5a31), TOBN(0xbc957822, 0x0ddef7a8),
+     TOBN(0x8cf7230c, 0xb0ce1c55), TOBN(0x5b534d05, 0x0bbfb607),
+     TOBN(0xee1ef113, 0x0e16363b), TOBN(0x27e0aa7a, 0xb4999e82),
+     TOBN(0xce1dac2d, 0x79362c41), TOBN(0x67920c90, 0x91bb6cb0),
+     TOBN(0x1e648d63, 0x2223df24), TOBN(0x0f7d9eef, 0xe32e8f28),
+     TOBN(0x6943f39a, 0xfa833834), TOBN(0x22951722, 0xa6328562),
+     TOBN(0x81d63dd5, 0x4170fc10), TOBN(0x9f5fa58f, 0xaecc2e6d),
+     TOBN(0xb66c8725, 0xe77d9a3b), TOBN(0x11235cea, 0x6384ebe0),
+     TOBN(0x06a8c118, 0x5845e24a), TOBN(0x0137b286, 0xebd093b1),
+     TOBN(0xc589e1ce, 0x44ace150), TOBN(0xe0f8d3d9, 0x4381e97c),
+     TOBN(0x59e99b11, 0x62c5a4b8), TOBN(0x90d262f7, 0xfd0ec9f9),
+     TOBN(0xfbc854c9, 0x283e13c9), TOBN(0x2d04fde7, 0xaedc7085),
+     TOBN(0x057d7765, 0x47dcbecb), TOBN(0x8dbdf591, 0x9a76fa5f),
+     TOBN(0xd0150695, 0x0de1e578), TOBN(0x2e1463e7, 0xe9f72bc6),
+     TOBN(0xffa68441, 0x1b39eca5), TOBN(0x673c8530, 0x7c037f2f),
+     TOBN(0xd0d6a600, 0x747f91da), TOBN(0xb08d43e1, 0xc9cb78e9),
+     TOBN(0x0fc0c644, 0x27b5cef5), TOBN(0x5c1d160a, 0xa60a2fd6),
+     TOBN(0xf98cae53, 0x28c8e13b), TOBN(0x375f10c4, 0xb2eddcd1),
+     TOBN(0xd4eb8b7f, 0x5cce06ad), TOBN(0xb4669f45, 0x80a2e1ef),
+     TOBN(0xd593f9d0, 0x5bbd8699), TOBN(0x5528a4c9, 0xe7976d13),
+     TOBN(0x3923e095, 0x1c7e28d3), TOBN(0xb9293790, 0x3f6bb577),
+     TOBN(0xdb567d6a, 0xc42bd6d2), TOBN(0x6df86468, 0xbb1f96ae),
+     TOBN(0x0efe5b1a, 0x4843b28e), TOBN(0x961bbb05, 0x6379b240),
+     TOBN(0xb6caf5f0, 0x70a6a26b), TOBN(0x70686c0d, 0x328e6e39),
+     TOBN(0x80da06cf, 0x895fc8d3), TOBN(0x804d8810, 0xb363fdc9),
+     TOBN(0xbe22877b, 0x207f1670), TOBN(0x9b0dd188, 0x4e615291),
+     TOBN(0x625ae8dc, 0x97a3c2bf), TOBN(0x08584ef7, 0x439b86e8),
+     TOBN(0xde7190a5, 0xdcd898ff), TOBN(0x26286c40, 0x2058ee3d),
+     TOBN(0x3db0b217, 0x5f87b1c1), TOBN(0xcc334771, 0x102a6db5),
+     TOBN(0xd99de954, 0x2f770fb1), TOBN(0x97c1c620, 0x4cd7535e),
+     TOBN(0xd3b6c448, 0x3f09cefc), TOBN(0xd725af15, 0x5a63b4f8),
+     TOBN(0x0c95d24f, 0xc01e20ec), TOBN(0xdfd37494, 0x9ae7121f),
+     TOBN(0x7d6ddb72, 0xec77b7ec), TOBN(0xfe079d3b, 0x0353a4ae),
+     TOBN(0x3066e70a, 0x2e6ac8d2), TOBN(0x9c6b5a43, 0x106e5c05),
+     TOBN(0x52d3c6f5, 0xede59b8c), TOBN(0x30d6a5c3, 0xfccec9ae),
+     TOBN(0xedec7c22, 0x4fc0a9ef), TOBN(0x190ff083, 0x95c16ced),
+     TOBN(0xbe12ec8f, 0x94de0fde), TOBN(0x0d131ab8, 0x852d3433),
+     TOBN(0x42ace07e, 0x85701291), TOBN(0x94793ed9, 0x194061a8),
+     TOBN(0x30e83ed6, 0xd7f4a485), TOBN(0x9eec7269, 0xf9eeff4d),
+     TOBN(0x90acba59, 0x0c9d8005), TOBN(0x5feca458, 0x1e79b9d1),
+     TOBN(0x8fbe5427, 0x1d506a1e), TOBN(0xa32b2c8e, 0x2439cfa7),
+     TOBN(0x1671c173, 0x73dd0b4e), TOBN(0x37a28214, 0x44a054c6),
+     TOBN(0x81760a1b, 0x4e8b53f1), TOBN(0xa6c04224, 0xf9f93b9e),
+     TOBN(0x18784b34, 0xcf671e3c), TOBN(0x81bbecd2, 0xcda9b994),
+     TOBN(0x38831979, 0xb2ab3848), TOBN(0xef54feb7, 0xf2e03c2d),
+     TOBN(0xcf197ca7, 0xfb8088fa), TOBN(0x01427247, 0x4ddc96c5),
+     TOBN(0xa2d2550a, 0x30777176), TOBN(0x53469898, 0x4d0cf71d),
+     TOBN(0x6ce937b8, 0x3a2aaac6), TOBN(0xe9f91dc3, 0x5af38d9b),
+     TOBN(0x2598ad83, 0xc8bf2899), TOBN(0x8e706ac9, 0xb5536c16),
+     TOBN(0x40dc7495, 0xf688dc98), TOBN(0x26490cd7, 0x124c4afc),
+     TOBN(0xe651ec84, 0x1f18775c), TOBN(0x393ea6c3, 0xb4fdaf4a),
+     TOBN(0x1e1f3343, 0x7f338e0d), TOBN(0x39fb832b, 0x6053e7b5),
+     TOBN(0x46e702da, 0x619e14d5), TOBN(0x859cacd1, 0xcdeef6e0),
+     TOBN(0x63b99ce7, 0x4462007d), TOBN(0xb8ab48a5, 0x4cb5f5b7),
+     TOBN(0x9ec673d2, 0xf55edde7), TOBN(0xd1567f74, 0x8cfaefda),
+     TOBN(0x46381b6b, 0x0887bcec), TOBN(0x694497ce, 0xe178f3c2),
+     TOBN(0x5e6525e3, 0x1e6266cb), TOBN(0x5931de26, 0x697d6413),
+     TOBN(0x87f8df7c, 0x0e58d493), TOBN(0xb1ae5ed0, 0x58b73f12),
+     TOBN(0xc368f784, 0xdea0c34d), TOBN(0x9bd0a120, 0x859a91a0),
+     TOBN(0xb00d88b7, 0xcc863c68), TOBN(0x3a1cc11e, 0x3d1f4d65),
+     TOBN(0xea38e0e7, 0x0aa85593), TOBN(0x37f13e98, 0x7dc4aee8),
+     TOBN(0x10d38667, 0xbc947bad), TOBN(0x738e07ce, 0x2a36ee2e),
+     TOBN(0xc93470cd, 0xc577fcac), TOBN(0xdee1b616, 0x2782470d),
+     TOBN(0x36a25e67, 0x2e793d12), TOBN(0xd6aa6cae, 0xe0f186da),
+     TOBN(0x474d0fd9, 0x80e07af7), TOBN(0xf7cdc47d, 0xba8a5cd4),
+     TOBN(0x28af6d9d, 0xab15247f), TOBN(0x7c789c10, 0x493a537f),
+     TOBN(0x7ac9b110, 0x23a334e7), TOBN(0x0236ac09, 0x12c9c277),
+     TOBN(0xa7e5bd25, 0x1d7a5144), TOBN(0x098b9c2a, 0xf13ec4ec),
+     TOBN(0x3639daca, 0xd3f0abca), TOBN(0x642da81a, 0xa23960f9),
+     TOBN(0x7d2e5c05, 0x4f7269b1), TOBN(0xfcf30777, 0xe287c385),
+     TOBN(0x10edc84f, 0xf2a46f21), TOBN(0x35441757, 0x4f43fa36),
+     TOBN(0xf1327899, 0xfd703431), TOBN(0xa438d7a6, 0x16dd587a),
+     TOBN(0x65c34c57, 0xe9c8352d), TOBN(0xa728edab, 0x5cc5a24e),
+     TOBN(0xaed78abc, 0x42531689), TOBN(0x0a51a0e8, 0x010963ef),
+     TOBN(0x5776fa0a, 0xd717d9b3), TOBN(0xf356c239, 0x7dd3428b),
+     TOBN(0x29903fff, 0x8d3a3dac), TOBN(0x409597fa, 0x3d94491f),
+     TOBN(0x4cd7a5ff, 0xbf4a56a4), TOBN(0xe5096474, 0x8adab462),
+     TOBN(0xa97b5126, 0x5c3427b0), TOBN(0x6401405c, 0xd282c9bd),
+     TOBN(0x3629f8d7, 0x222c5c45), TOBN(0xb1c02c16, 0xe8d50aed),
+     TOBN(0xbea2ed75, 0xd9635bc9), TOBN(0x226790c7, 0x6e24552f),
+     TOBN(0x3c33f2a3, 0x65f1d066), TOBN(0x2a43463e, 0x6dfccc2e),
+     TOBN(0x8cc3453a, 0xdb483761), TOBN(0xe7cc6085, 0x65d5672b),
+     TOBN(0x277ed6cb, 0xde3efc87), TOBN(0x19f2f368, 0x69234eaf),
+     TOBN(0x9aaf4317, 0x5c0b800b), TOBN(0x1f1e7c89, 0x8b6da6e2),
+     TOBN(0x6cfb4715, 0xb94ec75e), TOBN(0xd590dd5f, 0x453118c2),
+     TOBN(0x14e49da1, 0x1f17a34c), TOBN(0x5420ab39, 0x235a1456),
+     TOBN(0xb7637241, 0x2f50363b), TOBN(0x7b15d623, 0xc3fabb6e),
+     TOBN(0xa0ef40b1, 0xe274e49c), TOBN(0x5cf50744, 0x96b1860a),
+     TOBN(0xd6583fbf, 0x66afe5a4), TOBN(0x44240510, 0xf47e3e9a),
+     TOBN(0x99254343, 0x11b2d595), TOBN(0xf1367499, 0xeec8df57),
+     TOBN(0x3cb12c61, 0x3e73dd05), TOBN(0xd248c033, 0x7dac102a),
+     TOBN(0xcf154f13, 0xa77739f5), TOBN(0xbf4288cb, 0x23d2af42),
+     TOBN(0xaa64c9b6, 0x32e4a1cf), TOBN(0xee8c07a8, 0xc8a208f3),
+     TOBN(0xe10d4999, 0x6fe8393f), TOBN(0x0f809a3f, 0xe91f3a32),
+     TOBN(0x61096d1c, 0x802f63c8), TOBN(0x289e1462, 0x57750d3d),
+     TOBN(0xed06167e, 0x9889feea), TOBN(0xd5c9c0e2, 0xe0993909),
+     TOBN(0x46fca0d8, 0x56508ac6), TOBN(0x91826047, 0x4f1b8e83),
+     TOBN(0x4f2c877a, 0x9a4a2751), TOBN(0x71bd0072, 0xcae6fead),
+     TOBN(0x38df8dcc, 0x06aa1941), TOBN(0x5a074b4c, 0x63beeaa8),
+     TOBN(0xd6d65934, 0xc1cec8ed), TOBN(0xa6ecb49e, 0xaabc03bd),
+     TOBN(0xaade91c2, 0xde8a8415), TOBN(0xcfb0efdf, 0x691136e0),
+     TOBN(0x11af45ee, 0x23ab3495), TOBN(0xa132df88, 0x0b77463d),
+     TOBN(0x8923c15c, 0x815d06f4), TOBN(0xc3ceb3f5, 0x0d61a436),
+     TOBN(0xaf52291d, 0xe88fb1da), TOBN(0xea057974, 0x1da12179),
+     TOBN(0xb0d7218c, 0xd2fef720), TOBN(0x6c0899c9, 0x8e1d8845),
+     TOBN(0x98157504, 0x752ddad7), TOBN(0xd60bd74f, 0xa1a68a97),
+     TOBN(0x7047a3a9, 0xf658fb99), TOBN(0x1f5d86d6, 0x5f8511e4),
+     TOBN(0xb8a4bc42, 0x4b5a6d88), TOBN(0x69eb2c33, 0x1abefa7d),
+     TOBN(0x95bf39e8, 0x13c9c510), TOBN(0xf571960a, 0xd48aab43),
+     TOBN(0x7e8cfbcf, 0x704e23c6), TOBN(0xc71b7d22, 0x28aaa65b),
+     TOBN(0xa041b2bd, 0x245e3c83), TOBN(0x69b98834, 0xd21854ff),
+     TOBN(0x89d227a3, 0x963bfeec), TOBN(0x99947aaa, 0xde7da7cb),
+     TOBN(0x1d9ee9db, 0xee68a9b1), TOBN(0x0a08f003, 0x698ec368),
+     TOBN(0xe9ea4094, 0x78ef2487), TOBN(0xc8d2d415, 0x02cfec26),
+     TOBN(0xc52f9a6e, 0xb7dcf328), TOBN(0x0ed489e3, 0x85b6a937),
+     TOBN(0x9b94986b, 0xbef3366e), TOBN(0x0de59c70, 0xedddddb8),
+     TOBN(0xffdb748c, 0xeadddbe2), TOBN(0x9b9784bb, 0x8266ea40),
+     TOBN(0x142b5502, 0x1a93507a), TOBN(0xb4cd1187, 0x8d3c06cf),
+     TOBN(0xdf70e76a, 0x91ec3f40), TOBN(0x484e81ad, 0x4e7553c2),
+     TOBN(0x830f87b5, 0x272e9d6e), TOBN(0xea1c93e5, 0xc6ff514a),
+     TOBN(0x67cc2adc, 0xc4192a8e), TOBN(0xc77e27e2, 0x42f4535a),
+     TOBN(0x9cdbab36, 0xd2b713c5), TOBN(0x86274ea0, 0xcf7b0cd3),
+     TOBN(0x784680f3, 0x09af826b), TOBN(0xbfcc837a, 0x0c72dea3),
+     TOBN(0xa8bdfe9d, 0xd6529b73), TOBN(0x708aa228, 0x63a88002),
+     TOBN(0x6c7a9a54, 0xc91d45b9), TOBN(0xdf1a38bb, 0xfd004f56),
+     TOBN(0x2e8c9a26, 0xb8bad853), TOBN(0x2d52cea3, 0x3723eae7),
+     TOBN(0x054d6d81, 0x56ca2830), TOBN(0xa3317d14, 0x9a8dc411),
+     TOBN(0xa08662fe, 0xfd4ddeda), TOBN(0xed2a153a, 0xb55d792b),
+     TOBN(0x7035c16a, 0xbfc6e944), TOBN(0xb6bc5834, 0x00171cf3),
+     TOBN(0xe27152b3, 0x83d102b6), TOBN(0xfe695a47, 0x0646b848),
+     TOBN(0xa5bb09d8, 0x916e6d37), TOBN(0xb4269d64, 0x0d17015e),
+     TOBN(0x8d8156a1, 0x0a1d2285), TOBN(0xfeef6c51, 0x46d26d72),
+     TOBN(0x9dac57c8, 0x4c5434a7), TOBN(0x0282e5be, 0x59d39e31),
+     TOBN(0xedfff181, 0x721c486d), TOBN(0x301baf10, 0xbc58824e),
+     TOBN(0x8136a6aa, 0x00570031), TOBN(0x55aaf78c, 0x1cddde68),
+     TOBN(0x26829371, 0x59c63952), TOBN(0x3a3bd274, 0x8bc25baf),
+     TOBN(0xecdf8657, 0xb7e52dc3), TOBN(0x2dd8c087, 0xfd78e6c8),
+     TOBN(0x20553274, 0xf5531461), TOBN(0x8b4a1281, 0x5d95499b),
+     TOBN(0xe2c8763a, 0x1a80f9d2), TOBN(0xd1dbe32b, 0x4ddec758),
+     TOBN(0xaf12210d, 0x30c34169), TOBN(0xba74a953, 0x78baa533),
+     TOBN(0x3d133c6e, 0xa438f254), TOBN(0xa431531a, 0x201bef5b),
+     TOBN(0x15295e22, 0xf669d7ec), TOBN(0xca374f64, 0x357fb515),
+     TOBN(0x8a8406ff, 0xeaa3fdb3), TOBN(0x106ae448, 0xdf3f2da8),
+     TOBN(0x8f9b0a90, 0x33c8e9a1), TOBN(0x234645e2, 0x71ad5885),
+     TOBN(0x3d083224, 0x1c0aed14), TOBN(0xf10a7d3e, 0x7a942d46),
+     TOBN(0x7c11deee, 0x40d5c9be), TOBN(0xb2bae7ff, 0xba84ed98),
+     TOBN(0x93e97139, 0xaad58ddd), TOBN(0x3d872796, 0x3f6d1fa3),
+     TOBN(0x483aca81, 0x8569ff13), TOBN(0x8b89a5fb, 0x9a600f72),
+     TOBN(0x4cbc27c3, 0xc06f2b86), TOBN(0x22130713, 0x63ad9c0b),
+     TOBN(0xb5358b1e, 0x48ac2840), TOBN(0x18311294, 0xecba9477),
+     TOBN(0xda58f990, 0xa6946b43), TOBN(0x3098baf9, 0x9ab41819),
+     TOBN(0x66c4c158, 0x4198da52), TOBN(0xab4fc17c, 0x146bfd1b),
+     TOBN(0x2f0a4c3c, 0xbf36a908), TOBN(0x2ae9e34b, 0x58cf7838),
+     TOBN(0xf411529e, 0x3fa11b1f), TOBN(0x21e43677, 0x974af2b4),
+     TOBN(0x7c20958e, 0xc230793b), TOBN(0x710ea885, 0x16e840f3),
+     TOBN(0xfc0b21fc, 0xc5dc67cf), TOBN(0x08d51647, 0x88405718),
+     TOBN(0xd955c21f, 0xcfe49eb7), TOBN(0x9722a5d5, 0x56dd4a1f),
+     TOBN(0xc9ef50e2, 0xc861baa5), TOBN(0xc0c21a5d, 0x9505ac3e),
+     TOBN(0xaf6b9a33, 0x8b7c063f), TOBN(0xc6370339, 0x2f4779c1),
+     TOBN(0x22df99c7, 0x638167c3), TOBN(0xfe6ffe76, 0x795db30c),
+     TOBN(0x2b822d33, 0xa4854989), TOBN(0xfef031dd, 0x30563aa5),
+     TOBN(0x16b09f82, 0xd57c667f), TOBN(0xc70312ce, 0xcc0b76f1),
+     TOBN(0xbf04a9e6, 0xc9118aec), TOBN(0x82fcb419, 0x3409d133),
+     TOBN(0x1a8ab385, 0xab45d44d), TOBN(0xfba07222, 0x617b83a3),
+     TOBN(0xb05f50dd, 0x58e81b52), TOBN(0x1d8db553, 0x21ce5aff),
+     TOBN(0x3097b8d4, 0xe344a873), TOBN(0x7d8d116d, 0xfe36d53e),
+     TOBN(0x6db22f58, 0x7875e750), TOBN(0x2dc5e373, 0x43e144ea),
+     TOBN(0xc05f32e6, 0xe799eb95), TOBN(0xe9e5f4df, 0x6899e6ec),
+     TOBN(0xbdc3bd68, 0x1fab23d5), TOBN(0xb72b8ab7, 0x73af60e6),
+     TOBN(0x8db27ae0, 0x2cecc84a), TOBN(0x600016d8, 0x7bdb871c),
+     TOBN(0x42a44b13, 0xd7c46f58), TOBN(0xb8919727, 0xc3a77d39),
+     TOBN(0xcfc6bbbd, 0xdafd6088), TOBN(0x1a740146, 0x6bd20d39),
+     TOBN(0x8c747abd, 0x98c41072), TOBN(0x4c91e765, 0xbdf68ea1),
+     TOBN(0x7c95e5ca, 0x08819a78), TOBN(0xcf48b729, 0xc9587921),
+     TOBN(0x091c7c5f, 0xdebbcc7d), TOBN(0x6f287404, 0xf0e05149),
+     TOBN(0xf83b5ac2, 0x26cd44ec), TOBN(0x88ae32a6, 0xcfea250e),
+     TOBN(0x6ac5047a, 0x1d06ebc5), TOBN(0xc7e550b4, 0xd434f781),
+     TOBN(0x61ab1cf2, 0x5c727bd2), TOBN(0x2e4badb1, 0x1cf915b0),
+     TOBN(0x1b4dadec, 0xf69d3920), TOBN(0xe61b1ca6, 0xf14c1dfe),
+     TOBN(0x90b479cc, 0xbd6bd51f), TOBN(0x8024e401, 0x8045ec30),
+     TOBN(0xcab29ca3, 0x25ef0e62), TOBN(0x4f2e9416, 0x49e4ebc0),
+     TOBN(0x45eb40ec, 0x0ccced58), TOBN(0x25cd4b9c, 0x0da44f98),
+     TOBN(0x43e06458, 0x871812c6), TOBN(0x99f80d55, 0x16cef651),
+     TOBN(0x571340c9, 0xce6dc153), TOBN(0x138d5117, 0xd8665521),
+     TOBN(0xacdb45bc, 0x4e07014d), TOBN(0x2f34bb38, 0x84b60b91),
+     TOBN(0xf44a4fd2, 0x2ae8921e), TOBN(0xb039288e, 0x892ba1e2),
+     TOBN(0x9da50174, 0xb1c180b2), TOBN(0x6b70ab66, 0x1693dc87),
+     TOBN(0x7e9babc9, 0xe7057481), TOBN(0x4581ddef, 0x9c80dc41),
+     TOBN(0x0c890da9, 0x51294682), TOBN(0x0b5629d3, 0x3f4736e5),
+     TOBN(0x2340c79e, 0xb06f5b41), TOBN(0xa42e84ce, 0x4e243469),
+     TOBN(0xf9a20135, 0x045a71a9), TOBN(0xefbfb415, 0xd27b6fb6),
+     TOBN(0x25ebea23, 0x9d33cd6f), TOBN(0x9caedb88, 0xaa6c0af8),
+     TOBN(0x53dc7e9a, 0xd9ce6f96), TOBN(0x3897f9fd, 0x51e0b15a),
+     TOBN(0xf51cb1f8, 0x8e5d788e), TOBN(0x1aec7ba8, 0xe1d490ee),
+     TOBN(0x265991e0, 0xcc58cb3c), TOBN(0x9f306e8c, 0x9fc3ad31),
+     TOBN(0x5fed006e, 0x5040a0ac), TOBN(0xca9d5043, 0xfb476f2e),
+     TOBN(0xa19c06e8, 0xbeea7a23), TOBN(0xd2865801, 0x0edabb63),
+     TOBN(0xdb92293f, 0x6967469a), TOBN(0x2894d839, 0x8d8a8ed8),
+     TOBN(0x87c9e406, 0xbbc77122), TOBN(0x8671c6f1, 0x2ea3a26a),
+     TOBN(0xe42df8d6, 0xd7de9853), TOBN(0x2e3ce346, 0xb1f2bcc7),
+     TOBN(0xda601dfc, 0x899d50cf), TOBN(0xbfc913de, 0xfb1b598f),
+     TOBN(0x81c4909f, 0xe61f7908), TOBN(0x192e304f, 0x9bbc7b29),
+     TOBN(0xc3ed8738, 0xc104b338), TOBN(0xedbe9e47, 0x783f5d61),
+     TOBN(0x0c06e9be, 0x2db30660), TOBN(0xda3e613f, 0xc0eb7d8e),
+     TOBN(0xd8fa3e97, 0x322e096e), TOBN(0xfebd91e8, 0xd336e247),
+     TOBN(0x8f13ccc4, 0xdf655a49), TOBN(0xa9e00dfc, 0x5eb20210),
+     TOBN(0x84631d0f, 0xc656b6ea), TOBN(0x93a058cd, 0xd8c0d947),
+     TOBN(0x6846904a, 0x67bd3448), TOBN(0x4a3d4e1a, 0xf394fd5c),
+     TOBN(0xc102c1a5, 0xdb225f52), TOBN(0xe3455bba, 0xfc4f5e9a),
+     TOBN(0x6b36985b, 0x4b9ad1ce), TOBN(0xa9818536, 0x5bb7f793),
+     TOBN(0x6c25e1d0, 0x48b1a416), TOBN(0x1381dd53, 0x3c81bee7),
+     TOBN(0xd2a30d61, 0x7a4a7620), TOBN(0xc8412926, 0x39b8944c),
+     TOBN(0x3c1c6fbe, 0x7a97c33a), TOBN(0x941e541d, 0x938664e7),
+     TOBN(0x417499e8, 0x4a34f239), TOBN(0x15fdb83c, 0xb90402d5),
+     TOBN(0xb75f46bf, 0x433aa832), TOBN(0xb61e15af, 0x63215db1),
+     TOBN(0xaabe59d4, 0xa127f89a), TOBN(0x5d541e0c, 0x07e816da),
+     TOBN(0xaaba0659, 0xa618b692), TOBN(0x55327733, 0x17266026),
+     TOBN(0xaf53a0fc, 0x95f57552), TOBN(0x32947650, 0x6cacb0c9),
+     TOBN(0x253ff58d, 0xc821be01), TOBN(0xb0309531, 0xa06f1146),
+     TOBN(0x59bbbdf5, 0x05c2e54d), TOBN(0x158f27ad, 0x26e8dd22),
+     TOBN(0xcc5b7ffb, 0x397e1e53), TOBN(0xae03f65b, 0x7fc1e50d),
+     TOBN(0xa9784ebd, 0x9c95f0f9), TOBN(0x5ed9deb2, 0x24640771),
+     TOBN(0x31244af7, 0x035561c4), TOBN(0x87332f3a, 0x7ee857de),
+     TOBN(0x09e16e9e, 0x2b9e0d88), TOBN(0x52d910f4, 0x56a06049),
+     TOBN(0x507ed477, 0xa9592f48), TOBN(0x85cb917b, 0x2365d678),
+     TOBN(0xf8511c93, 0x4c8998d1), TOBN(0x2186a3f1, 0x730ea58f),
+     TOBN(0x50189626, 0xb2029db0), TOBN(0x9137a6d9, 0x02ceb75a),
+     TOBN(0x2fe17f37, 0x748bc82c), TOBN(0x87c2e931, 0x80469f8c),
+     TOBN(0x850f71cd, 0xbf891aa2), TOBN(0x0ca1b89b, 0x75ec3d8d),
+     TOBN(0x516c43aa, 0x5e1cd3cd), TOBN(0x89397808, 0x9a887c28),
+     TOBN(0x0059c699, 0xddea1f9f), TOBN(0x7737d6fa, 0x8e6868f7),
+     TOBN(0x6d93746a, 0x60f1524b), TOBN(0x36985e55, 0xba052aa7),
+     TOBN(0x41b1d322, 0xed923ea5), TOBN(0x3429759f, 0x25852a11),
+     TOBN(0xbeca6ec3, 0x092e9f41), TOBN(0x3a238c66, 0x62256bbd),
+     TOBN(0xd82958ea, 0x70ad487d), TOBN(0x4ac8aaf9, 0x65610d93),
+     TOBN(0x3fa101b1, 0x5e4ccab0), TOBN(0x9bf430f2, 0x9de14bfb),
+     TOBN(0xa10f5cc6, 0x6531899d), TOBN(0x590005fb, 0xea8ce17d),
+     TOBN(0xc437912f, 0x24544cb6), TOBN(0x9987b71a, 0xd79ac2e3),
+     TOBN(0x13e3d9dd, 0xc058a212), TOBN(0x00075aac, 0xd2de9606),
+     TOBN(0x80ab508b, 0x6cac8369), TOBN(0x87842be7, 0xf54f6c89),
+     TOBN(0xa7ad663d, 0x6bc532a4), TOBN(0x67813de7, 0x78a91bc8),
+     TOBN(0x5dcb61ce, 0xc3427239), TOBN(0x5f3c7cf0, 0xc56934d9),
+     TOBN(0xc079e0fb, 0xe3191591), TOBN(0xe40896bd, 0xb01aada7),
+     TOBN(0x8d466791, 0x0492d25f), TOBN(0x8aeb30c9, 0xe7408276),
+     TOBN(0xe9437495, 0x9287aacc), TOBN(0x23d4708d, 0x79fe03d4),
+     TOBN(0x8cda9cf2, 0xd0c05199), TOBN(0x502fbc22, 0xfae78454),
+     TOBN(0xc0bda9df, 0xf572a182), TOBN(0x5f9b71b8, 0x6158b372),
+     TOBN(0xe0f33a59, 0x2b82dd07), TOBN(0x76302735, 0x9523032e),
+     TOBN(0x7fe1a721, 0xc4505a32), TOBN(0x7b6e3e82, 0xf796409f),}
+    ,
+    {TOBN(0xe3417bc0, 0x35d0b34a), TOBN(0x440b386b, 0x8327c0a7),
+     TOBN(0x8fb7262d, 0xac0362d1), TOBN(0x2c41114c, 0xe0cdf943),
+     TOBN(0x2ba5cef1, 0xad95a0b1), TOBN(0xc09b37a8, 0x67d54362),
+     TOBN(0x26d6cdd2, 0x01e486c9), TOBN(0x20477abf, 0x42ff9297),
+     TOBN(0xa004dcb3, 0x292a9287), TOBN(0xddc15cf6, 0x77b092c7),
+     TOBN(0x083a8464, 0x806c0605), TOBN(0x4a68df70, 0x3db997b0),
+     TOBN(0x9c134e45, 0x05bf7dd0), TOBN(0xa4e63d39, 0x8ccf7f8c),
+     TOBN(0xa6e6517f, 0x41b5f8af), TOBN(0xaa8b9342, 0xad7bc1cc),
+     TOBN(0x126f35b5, 0x1e706ad9), TOBN(0xb99cebb4, 0xc3a9ebdf),
+     TOBN(0xa75389af, 0xbf608d90), TOBN(0x76113c4f, 0xc6c89858),
+     TOBN(0x80de8eb0, 0x97e2b5aa), TOBN(0x7e1022cc, 0x63b91304),
+     TOBN(0x3bdab605, 0x6ccc066c), TOBN(0x33cbb144, 0xb2edf900),
+     TOBN(0xc4176471, 0x7af715d2), TOBN(0xe2f7f594, 0xd0134a96),
+     TOBN(0x2c1873ef, 0xa41ec956), TOBN(0xe4e7b4f6, 0x77821304),
+     TOBN(0xe5c8ff97, 0x88d5374a), TOBN(0x2b915e63, 0x80823d5b),
+     TOBN(0xea6bc755, 0xb2ee8fe2), TOBN(0x6657624c, 0xe7112651),
+     TOBN(0x157af101, 0xdace5aca), TOBN(0xc4fdbcf2, 0x11a6a267),
+     TOBN(0xdaddf340, 0xc49c8609), TOBN(0x97e49f52, 0xe9604a65),
+     TOBN(0x9be8e790, 0x937e2ad5), TOBN(0x846e2508, 0x326e17f1),
+     TOBN(0x3f38007a, 0x0bbbc0dc), TOBN(0xcf03603f, 0xb11e16d6),
+     TOBN(0xd6f800e0, 0x7442f1d5), TOBN(0x475607d1, 0x66e0e3ab),
+     TOBN(0x82807f16, 0xb7c64047), TOBN(0x8858e1e3, 0xa749883d),
+     TOBN(0x5859120b, 0x8231ee10), TOBN(0x1b80e7eb, 0x638a1ece),
+     TOBN(0xcb72525a, 0xc6aa73a4), TOBN(0xa7cdea3d, 0x844423ac),
+     TOBN(0x5ed0c007, 0xf8ae7c38), TOBN(0x6db07a5c, 0x3d740192),
+     TOBN(0xbe5e9c2a, 0x5fe36db3), TOBN(0xd5b9d57a, 0x76e95046),
+     TOBN(0x54ac32e7, 0x8eba20f2), TOBN(0xef11ca8f, 0x71b9a352),
+     TOBN(0x305e373e, 0xff98a658), TOBN(0xffe5a100, 0x823eb667),
+     TOBN(0x57477b11, 0xe51732d2), TOBN(0xdfd6eb28, 0x2538fc0e),
+     TOBN(0x5c43b0cc, 0x3b39eec5), TOBN(0x6af12778, 0xcb36cc57),
+     TOBN(0x70b0852d, 0x06c425ae), TOBN(0x6df92f8c, 0x5c221b9b),
+     TOBN(0x6c8d4f9e, 0xce826d9c), TOBN(0xf59aba7b, 0xb49359c3),
+     TOBN(0x5c8ed8d5, 0xda64309d), TOBN(0x61a6de56, 0x91b30704),
+     TOBN(0xd6b52f6a, 0x2f9b5808), TOBN(0x0eee4194, 0x98c958a7),
+     TOBN(0xcddd9aab, 0x771e4caa), TOBN(0x83965dfd, 0x78bc21be),
+     TOBN(0x02affce3, 0xb3b504f5), TOBN(0x30847a21, 0x561c8291),
+     TOBN(0xd2eb2cf1, 0x52bfda05), TOBN(0xe0e4c4e9, 0x6197b98c),
+     TOBN(0x1d35076c, 0xf8a1726f), TOBN(0x6c06085b, 0x2db11e3d),
+     TOBN(0x15c0c4d7, 0x4463ba14), TOBN(0x9d292f83, 0x0030238c),
+     TOBN(0x1311ee8b, 0x3727536d), TOBN(0xfeea86ef, 0xbeaedc1e),
+     TOBN(0xb9d18cd3, 0x66131e2e), TOBN(0xf31d974f, 0x80fe2682),
+     TOBN(0xb6e49e0f, 0xe4160289), TOBN(0x7c48ec0b, 0x08e92799),
+     TOBN(0x818111d8, 0xd1989aa7), TOBN(0xb34fa0aa, 0xebf926f9),
+     TOBN(0xdb5fe2f5, 0xa245474a), TOBN(0xf80a6ebb, 0x3c7ca756),
+     TOBN(0xa7f96054, 0xafa05dd8), TOBN(0x26dfcf21, 0xfcaf119e),
+     TOBN(0xe20ef2e3, 0x0564bb59), TOBN(0xef4dca50, 0x61cb02b8),
+     TOBN(0xcda7838a, 0x65d30672), TOBN(0x8b08d534, 0xfd657e86),
+     TOBN(0x4c5b4395, 0x46d595c8), TOBN(0x39b58725, 0x425cb836),
+     TOBN(0x8ea61059, 0x3de9abe3), TOBN(0x40434881, 0x9cdc03be),
+     TOBN(0x9b261245, 0xcfedce8c), TOBN(0x78c318b4, 0xcf5234a1),
+     TOBN(0x510bcf16, 0xfde24c99), TOBN(0x2a77cb75, 0xa2c2ff5d),
+     TOBN(0x9c895c2b, 0x27960fb4), TOBN(0xd30ce975, 0xb0eda42b),
+     TOBN(0xfda85393, 0x1a62cc26), TOBN(0x23c69b96, 0x50c0e052),
+     TOBN(0xa227df15, 0xbfc633f3), TOBN(0x2ac78848, 0x1bae7d48),
+     TOBN(0x487878f9, 0x187d073d), TOBN(0x6c2be919, 0x967f807d),
+     TOBN(0x765861d8, 0x336e6d8f), TOBN(0x88b8974c, 0xce528a43),
+     TOBN(0x09521177, 0xff57d051), TOBN(0x2ff38037, 0xfb6a1961),
+     TOBN(0xfc0aba74, 0xa3d76ad4), TOBN(0x7c764803, 0x25a7ec17),
+     TOBN(0x7532d75f, 0x48879bc8), TOBN(0xea7eacc0, 0x58ce6bc1),
+     TOBN(0xc82176b4, 0x8e896c16), TOBN(0x9a30e0b2, 0x2c750fed),
+     TOBN(0xc37e2c2e, 0x421d3aa4), TOBN(0xf926407c, 0xe84fa840),
+     TOBN(0x18abc03d, 0x1454e41c), TOBN(0x26605ecd, 0x3f7af644),
+     TOBN(0x242341a6, 0xd6a5eabf), TOBN(0x1edb84f4, 0x216b668e),
+     TOBN(0xd836edb8, 0x04010102), TOBN(0x5b337ce7, 0x945e1d8c),
+     TOBN(0xd2075c77, 0xc055dc14), TOBN(0x2a0ffa25, 0x81d89cdf),
+     TOBN(0x8ce815ea, 0x6ffdcbaf), TOBN(0xa3428878, 0xfb648867),
+     TOBN(0x277699cf, 0x884655fb), TOBN(0xfa5b5bd6, 0x364d3e41),
+     TOBN(0x01f680c6, 0x441e1cb7), TOBN(0x3fd61e66, 0xb70a7d67),
+     TOBN(0x666ba2dc, 0xcc78cf66), TOBN(0xb3018174, 0x6fdbff77),
+     TOBN(0x8d4dd0db, 0x168d4668), TOBN(0x259455d0, 0x1dab3a2a),
+     TOBN(0xf58564c5, 0xcde3acec), TOBN(0x77141925, 0x13adb276),
+     TOBN(0x527d725d, 0x8a303f65), TOBN(0x55deb6c9, 0xe6f38f7b),
+     TOBN(0xfd5bb657, 0xb1fa70fb), TOBN(0xfa07f50f, 0xd8073a00),
+     TOBN(0xf72e3aa7, 0xbca02500), TOBN(0xf68f895d, 0x9975740d),
+     TOBN(0x30112060, 0x5cae2a6a), TOBN(0x01bd7218, 0x02874842),
+     TOBN(0x3d423891, 0x7ce47bd3), TOBN(0xa66663c1, 0x789544f6),
+     TOBN(0x864d05d7, 0x3272d838), TOBN(0xe22924f9, 0xfa6295c5),
+     TOBN(0x8189593f, 0x6c2fda32), TOBN(0x330d7189, 0xb184b544),
+     TOBN(0x79efa62c, 0xbde1f714), TOBN(0x35771c94, 0xe5cb1a63),
+     TOBN(0x2f4826b8, 0x641c8332), TOBN(0x00a894fb, 0xc8cee854),
+     TOBN(0xb4b9a39b, 0x36194d40), TOBN(0xe857a7c5, 0x77612601),
+     TOBN(0xf4209dd2, 0x4ecf2f58), TOBN(0x82b9e66d, 0x5a033487),
+     TOBN(0xc1e36934, 0xe4e8b9dd), TOBN(0xd2372c9d, 0xa42377d7),
+     TOBN(0x51dc94c7, 0x0e3ae43b), TOBN(0x4c57761e, 0x04474f6f),
+     TOBN(0xdcdacd0a, 0x1058a318), TOBN(0x369cf3f5, 0x78053a9a),
+     TOBN(0xc6c3de50, 0x31c68de2), TOBN(0x4653a576, 0x3c4b6d9f),
+     TOBN(0x1688dd5a, 0xaa4e5c97), TOBN(0x5be80aa1, 0xb7ab3c74),
+     TOBN(0x70cefe7c, 0xbc65c283), TOBN(0x57f95f13, 0x06867091),
+     TOBN(0xa39114e2, 0x4415503b), TOBN(0xc08ff7c6, 0x4cbb17e9),
+     TOBN(0x1eff674d, 0xd7dec966), TOBN(0x6d4690af, 0x53376f63),
+     TOBN(0xff6fe32e, 0xea74237b), TOBN(0xc436d17e, 0xcd57508e),
+     TOBN(0x15aa28e1, 0xedcc40fe), TOBN(0x0d769c04, 0x581bbb44),
+     TOBN(0xc240b6de, 0x34eaacda), TOBN(0xd9e116e8, 0x2ba0f1de),
+     TOBN(0xcbe45ec7, 0x79438e55), TOBN(0x91787c9d, 0x96f752d7),
+     TOBN(0x897f532b, 0xf129ac2f), TOBN(0xd307b7c8, 0x5a36e22c),
+     TOBN(0x91940675, 0x749fb8f3), TOBN(0xd14f95d0, 0x157fdb28),
+     TOBN(0xfe51d029, 0x6ae55043), TOBN(0x8931e98f, 0x44a87de1),
+     TOBN(0xe57f1cc6, 0x09e4fee2), TOBN(0x0d063b67, 0x4e072d92),
+     TOBN(0x70a998b9, 0xed0e4316), TOBN(0xe74a736b, 0x306aca46),
+     TOBN(0xecf0fbf2, 0x4fda97c7), TOBN(0xa40f65cb, 0x3e178d93),
+     TOBN(0x16253604, 0x16df4285), TOBN(0xb0c9babb, 0xd0c56ae2),
+     TOBN(0x73032b19, 0xcfc5cfc3), TOBN(0xe497e5c3, 0x09752056),
+     TOBN(0x12096bb4, 0x164bda96), TOBN(0x1ee42419, 0xa0b74da1),
+     TOBN(0x8fc36243, 0x403826ba), TOBN(0x0c8f0069, 0xdc09e660),
+     TOBN(0x8667e981, 0xc27253c9), TOBN(0x05a6aefb, 0x92b36a45),
+     TOBN(0xa62c4b36, 0x9cb7bb46), TOBN(0x8394f375, 0x11f7027b),
+     TOBN(0x747bc79c, 0x5f109d0f), TOBN(0xcad88a76, 0x5b8cc60a),
+     TOBN(0x80c5a66b, 0x58f09e68), TOBN(0xe753d451, 0xf6127eac),
+     TOBN(0xc44b74a1, 0x5b0ec6f5), TOBN(0x47989fe4, 0x5289b2b8),
+     TOBN(0x745f8484, 0x58d6fc73), TOBN(0xec362a6f, 0xf61c70ab),
+     TOBN(0x070c98a7, 0xb3a8ad41), TOBN(0x73a20fc0, 0x7b63db51),
+     TOBN(0xed2c2173, 0xf44c35f4), TOBN(0x8a56149d, 0x9acc9dca),
+     TOBN(0x98f17881, 0x9ac6e0f4), TOBN(0x360fdeaf, 0xa413b5ed),
+     TOBN(0x0625b8f4, 0xa300b0fd), TOBN(0xf1f4d76a, 0x5b3222d3),
+     TOBN(0x9d6f5109, 0x587f76b8), TOBN(0x8b4ee08d, 0x2317fdb5),
+     TOBN(0x88089bb7, 0x8c68b095), TOBN(0x95570e9a, 0x5808d9b9),
+     TOBN(0xa395c36f, 0x35d33ae7), TOBN(0x200ea123, 0x50bb5a94),
+     TOBN(0x20c789bd, 0x0bafe84b), TOBN(0x243ef52d, 0x0919276a),
+     TOBN(0x3934c577, 0xe23ae233), TOBN(0xb93807af, 0xa460d1ec),
+     TOBN(0xb72a53b1, 0xf8fa76a4), TOBN(0xd8914cb0, 0xc3ca4491),
+     TOBN(0x2e128494, 0x3fb42622), TOBN(0x3b2700ac, 0x500907d5),
+     TOBN(0xf370fb09, 0x1a95ec63), TOBN(0xf8f30be2, 0x31b6dfbd),
+     TOBN(0xf2b2f8d2, 0x69e55f15), TOBN(0x1fead851, 0xcc1323e9),
+     TOBN(0xfa366010, 0xd9e5eef6), TOBN(0x64d487b0, 0xe316107e),
+     TOBN(0x4c076b86, 0xd23ddc82), TOBN(0x03fd344c, 0x7e0143f0),
+     TOBN(0xa95362ff, 0x317af2c5), TOBN(0x0add3db7, 0xe18b7a4f),
+     TOBN(0x9c673e3f, 0x8260e01b), TOBN(0xfbeb49e5, 0x54a1cc91),
+     TOBN(0x91351bf2, 0x92f2e433), TOBN(0xc755e7ec, 0x851141eb),
+     TOBN(0xc9a95139, 0x29607745), TOBN(0x0ca07420, 0xa26f2b28),
+     TOBN(0xcb2790e7, 0x4bc6f9dd), TOBN(0x345bbb58, 0xadcaffc0),
+     TOBN(0xc65ea38c, 0xbe0f27a2), TOBN(0x67c24d7c, 0x641fcb56),
+     TOBN(0x2c25f0a7, 0xa9e2c757), TOBN(0x93f5cdb0, 0x16f16c49),
+     TOBN(0x2ca5a9d7, 0xc5ee30a1), TOBN(0xd1593635, 0xb909b729),
+     TOBN(0x804ce9f3, 0xdadeff48), TOBN(0xec464751, 0xb07c30c3),
+     TOBN(0x89d65ff3, 0x9e49af6a), TOBN(0xf2d6238a, 0x6f3d01bc),
+     TOBN(0x1095561e, 0x0bced843), TOBN(0x51789e12, 0xc8a13fd8),
+     TOBN(0xd633f929, 0x763231df), TOBN(0x46df9f7d, 0xe7cbddef),
+     TOBN(0x01c889c0, 0xcb265da8), TOBN(0xfce1ad10, 0xaf4336d2),
+     TOBN(0x8d110df6, 0xfc6a0a7e), TOBN(0xdd431b98, 0x6da425dc),
+     TOBN(0xcdc4aeab, 0x1834aabe), TOBN(0x84deb124, 0x8439b7fc),
+     TOBN(0x8796f169, 0x3c2a5998), TOBN(0x9b9247b4, 0x7947190d),
+     TOBN(0x55b9d9a5, 0x11597014), TOBN(0x7e9dd70d, 0x7b1566ee),
+     TOBN(0x94ad78f7, 0xcbcd5e64), TOBN(0x0359ac17, 0x9bd4c032),
+     TOBN(0x3b11baaf, 0x7cc222ae), TOBN(0xa6a6e284, 0xba78e812),
+     TOBN(0x8392053f, 0x24cea1a0), TOBN(0xc97bce4a, 0x33621491),
+     TOBN(0x7eb1db34, 0x35399ee9), TOBN(0x473f78ef, 0xece81ad1),
+     TOBN(0x41d72fe0, 0xf63d3d0d), TOBN(0xe620b880, 0xafab62fc),
+     TOBN(0x92096bc9, 0x93158383), TOBN(0x41a21357, 0x8f896f6c),
+     TOBN(0x1b5ee2fa, 0xc7dcfcab), TOBN(0x650acfde, 0x9546e007),
+     TOBN(0xc081b749, 0xb1b02e07), TOBN(0xda9e41a0, 0xf9eca03d),
+     TOBN(0x013ba727, 0x175a54ab), TOBN(0xca0cd190, 0xea5d8d10),
+     TOBN(0x85ea52c0, 0x95fd96a9), TOBN(0x2c591b9f, 0xbc5c3940),
+     TOBN(0x6fb4d4e4, 0x2bad4d5f), TOBN(0xfa4c3590, 0xfef0059b),
+     TOBN(0x6a10218a, 0xf5122294), TOBN(0x9a78a81a, 0xa85751d1),
+     TOBN(0x04f20579, 0xa98e84e7), TOBN(0xfe1242c0, 0x4997e5b5),
+     TOBN(0xe77a273b, 0xca21e1e4), TOBN(0xfcc8b1ef, 0x9411939d),
+     TOBN(0xe20ea302, 0x92d0487a), TOBN(0x1442dbec, 0x294b91fe),
+     TOBN(0x1f7a4afe, 0xbb6b0e8f), TOBN(0x1700ef74, 0x6889c318),
+     TOBN(0xf5bbffc3, 0x70f1fc62), TOBN(0x3b31d4b6, 0x69c79cca),
+     TOBN(0xe8bc2aab, 0xa7f6340d), TOBN(0xb0b08ab4, 0xa725e10a),
+     TOBN(0x44f05701, 0xae340050), TOBN(0xba4b3016, 0x1cf0c569),
+     TOBN(0x5aa29f83, 0xfbe19a51), TOBN(0x1b9ed428, 0xb71d752e),
+     TOBN(0x1666e54e, 0xeb4819f5), TOBN(0x616cdfed, 0x9e18b75b),
+     TOBN(0x112ed5be, 0x3ee27b0b), TOBN(0xfbf28319, 0x44c7de4d),
+     TOBN(0xd685ec85, 0xe0e60d84), TOBN(0x68037e30, 0x1db7ee78),
+     TOBN(0x5b65bdcd, 0x003c4d6e), TOBN(0x33e7363a, 0x93e29a6a),
+     TOBN(0x995b3a61, 0x08d0756c), TOBN(0xd727f85c, 0x2faf134b),
+     TOBN(0xfac6edf7, 0x1d337823), TOBN(0x99b9aa50, 0x0439b8b4),
+     TOBN(0x722eb104, 0xe2b4e075), TOBN(0x49987295, 0x437c4926),
+     TOBN(0xb1e4c0e4, 0x46a9b82d), TOBN(0xd0cb3197, 0x57a006f5),
+     TOBN(0xf3de0f7d, 0xd7808c56), TOBN(0xb5c54d8f, 0x51f89772),
+     TOBN(0x500a114a, 0xadbd31aa), TOBN(0x9afaaaa6, 0x295f6cab),
+     TOBN(0x94705e21, 0x04cf667a), TOBN(0xfc2a811b, 0x9d3935d7),
+     TOBN(0x560b0280, 0x6d09267c), TOBN(0xf19ed119, 0xf780e53b),
+     TOBN(0xf0227c09, 0x067b6269), TOBN(0x967b8533, 0x5caef599),
+     TOBN(0x155b9243, 0x68efeebc), TOBN(0xcd6d34f5, 0xc497bae6),
+     TOBN(0x1dd8d5d3, 0x6cceb370), TOBN(0x2aeac579, 0xa78d7bf9),
+     TOBN(0x5d65017d, 0x70b67a62), TOBN(0x70c8e44f, 0x17c53f67),
+     TOBN(0xd1fc0950, 0x86a34d09), TOBN(0xe0fca256, 0xe7134907),
+     TOBN(0xe24fa29c, 0x80fdd315), TOBN(0x2c4acd03, 0xd87499ad),
+     TOBN(0xbaaf7517, 0x3b5a9ba6), TOBN(0xb9cbe1f6, 0x12e51a51),
+     TOBN(0xd88edae3, 0x5e154897), TOBN(0xe4309c3c, 0x77b66ca0),
+     TOBN(0xf5555805, 0xf67f3746), TOBN(0x85fc37ba, 0xa36401ff),
+     TOBN(0xdf86e2ca, 0xd9499a53), TOBN(0x6270b2a3, 0xecbc955b),
+     TOBN(0xafae64f5, 0x974ad33b), TOBN(0x04d85977, 0xfe7b2df1),
+     TOBN(0x2a3db3ff, 0x4ab03f73), TOBN(0x0b87878a, 0x8702740a),
+     TOBN(0x6d263f01, 0x5a061732), TOBN(0xc25430ce, 0xa32a1901),
+     TOBN(0xf7ebab3d, 0xdb155018), TOBN(0x3a86f693, 0x63a9b78e),
+     TOBN(0x349ae368, 0xda9f3804), TOBN(0x470f07fe, 0xa164349c),
+     TOBN(0xd52f4cc9, 0x8562baa5), TOBN(0xc74a9e86, 0x2b290df3),
+     TOBN(0xd3a1aa35, 0x43471a24), TOBN(0x239446be, 0xb8194511),
+     TOBN(0xbec2dd00, 0x81dcd44d), TOBN(0xca3d7f0f, 0xc42ac82d),
+     TOBN(0x1f3db085, 0xfdaf4520), TOBN(0xbb6d3e80, 0x4549daf2),
+     TOBN(0xf5969d8a, 0x19ad5c42), TOBN(0x7052b13d, 0xdbfd1511),
+     TOBN(0x11890d1b, 0x682b9060), TOBN(0xa71d3883, 0xac34452c),
+     TOBN(0xa438055b, 0x783805b4), TOBN(0x43241277, 0x4725b23e),
+     TOBN(0xf20cf96e, 0x4901bbed), TOBN(0x6419c710, 0xf432a2bb),
+     TOBN(0x57a0fbb9, 0xdfa9cd7d), TOBN(0x589111e4, 0x00daa249),
+     TOBN(0x19809a33, 0x7b60554e), TOBN(0xea5f8887, 0xede283a4),
+     TOBN(0x2d713802, 0x503bfd35), TOBN(0x151bb0af, 0x585d2a53),
+     TOBN(0x40b08f74, 0x43b30ca8), TOBN(0xe10b5bba, 0xd9934583),
+     TOBN(0xe8a546d6, 0xb51110ad), TOBN(0x1dd50e66, 0x28e0b6c5),
+     TOBN(0x292e9d54, 0xcff2b821), TOBN(0x3882555d, 0x47281760),
+     TOBN(0x134838f8, 0x3724d6e3), TOBN(0xf2c679e0, 0x22ddcda1),
+     TOBN(0x40ee8815, 0x6d2a5768), TOBN(0x7f227bd2, 0x1c1e7e2d),
+     TOBN(0x487ba134, 0xd04ff443), TOBN(0x76e2ff3d, 0xc614e54b),
+     TOBN(0x36b88d6f, 0xa3177ec7), TOBN(0xbf731d51, 0x2328fff5),
+     TOBN(0x758caea2, 0x49ba158e), TOBN(0x5ab8ff4c, 0x02938188),
+     TOBN(0x33e16056, 0x35edc56d), TOBN(0x5a69d349, 0x7e940d79),
+     TOBN(0x6c4fd001, 0x03866dcb), TOBN(0x20a38f57, 0x4893cdef),
+     TOBN(0xfbf3e790, 0xfac3a15b), TOBN(0x6ed7ea2e, 0x7a4f8e6b),
+     TOBN(0xa663eb4f, 0xbc3aca86), TOBN(0x22061ea5, 0x080d53f7),
+     TOBN(0x2480dfe6, 0xf546783f), TOBN(0xd38bc6da, 0x5a0a641e),
+     TOBN(0xfb093cd1, 0x2ede8965), TOBN(0x89654db4, 0xacb455cf),
+     TOBN(0x413cbf9a, 0x26e1adee), TOBN(0x291f3764, 0x373294d4),
+     TOBN(0x00797257, 0x648083fe), TOBN(0x25f504d3, 0x208cc341),
+     TOBN(0x635a8e5e, 0xc3a0ee43), TOBN(0x70aaebca, 0x679898ff),
+     TOBN(0x9ee9f547, 0x5dc63d56), TOBN(0xce987966, 0xffb34d00),
+     TOBN(0xf9f86b19, 0x5e26310a), TOBN(0x9e435484, 0x382a8ca8),
+     TOBN(0x253bcb81, 0xc2352fe4), TOBN(0xa4eac8b0, 0x4474b571),
+     TOBN(0xc1b97512, 0xc1ad8cf8), TOBN(0x193b4e9e, 0x99e0b697),
+     TOBN(0x939d2716, 0x01e85df0), TOBN(0x4fb265b3, 0xcd44eafd),
+     TOBN(0x321e7dcd, 0xe51e1ae2), TOBN(0x8e3a8ca6, 0xe3d8b096),
+     TOBN(0x8de46cb0, 0x52604998), TOBN(0x91099ad8, 0x39072aa7),
+     TOBN(0x2617f91c, 0x93aa96b8), TOBN(0x0fc8716b, 0x7fca2e13),
+     TOBN(0xa7106f5e, 0x95328723), TOBN(0xd1c9c40b, 0x262e6522),
+     TOBN(0xb9bafe86, 0x42b7c094), TOBN(0x1873439d, 0x1543c021),
+     TOBN(0xe1baa5de, 0x5cbefd5d), TOBN(0xa363fc5e, 0x521e8aff),
+     TOBN(0xefe6320d, 0xf862eaac), TOBN(0x14419c63, 0x22c647dc),
+     TOBN(0x0e06707c, 0x4e46d428), TOBN(0xcb6c834f, 0x4a178f8f),
+     TOBN(0x0f993a45, 0xd30f917c), TOBN(0xd4c4b049, 0x9879afee),
+     TOBN(0xb6142a1e, 0x70500063), TOBN(0x7c9b41c3, 0xa5d9d605),
+     TOBN(0xbc00fc2f, 0x2f8ba2c7), TOBN(0x0966eb2f, 0x7c67aa28),
+     TOBN(0x13f7b516, 0x5a786972), TOBN(0x3bfb7557, 0x8a2fbba0),
+     TOBN(0x131c4f23, 0x5a2b9620), TOBN(0xbff3ed27, 0x6faf46be),
+     TOBN(0x9b4473d1, 0x7e172323), TOBN(0x421e8878, 0x339f6246),
+     TOBN(0x0fa8587a, 0x25a41632), TOBN(0xc0814124, 0xa35b6c93),
+     TOBN(0x2b18a9f5, 0x59ebb8db), TOBN(0x264e3357, 0x76edb29c),
+     TOBN(0xaf245ccd, 0xc87c51e2), TOBN(0x16b3015b, 0x501e6214),
+     TOBN(0xbb31c560, 0x0a3882ce), TOBN(0x6961bb94, 0xfec11e04),
+     TOBN(0x3b825b8d, 0xeff7a3a0), TOBN(0xbec33738, 0xb1df7326),
+     TOBN(0x68ad747c, 0x99604a1f), TOBN(0xd154c934, 0x9a3bd499),
+     TOBN(0xac33506f, 0x1cc7a906), TOBN(0x73bb5392, 0x6c560e8f),
+     TOBN(0x6428fcbe, 0x263e3944), TOBN(0xc11828d5, 0x1c387434),
+     TOBN(0x3cd04be1, 0x3e4b12ff), TOBN(0xc3aad9f9, 0x2d88667c),
+     TOBN(0xc52ddcf8, 0x248120cf), TOBN(0x985a892e, 0x2a389532),
+     TOBN(0xfbb4b21b, 0x3bb85fa0), TOBN(0xf95375e0, 0x8dfc6269),
+     TOBN(0xfb4fb06c, 0x7ee2acea), TOBN(0x6785426e, 0x309c4d1f),
+     TOBN(0x659b17c8, 0xd8ceb147), TOBN(0x9b649eee, 0xb70a5554),
+     TOBN(0x6b7fa0b5, 0xac6bc634), TOBN(0xd99fe2c7, 0x1d6e732f),
+     TOBN(0x30e6e762, 0x8d3abba2), TOBN(0x18fee6e7, 0xa797b799),
+     TOBN(0x5c9d360d, 0xc696464d), TOBN(0xe3baeb48, 0x27bfde12),
+     TOBN(0x2bf5db47, 0xf23206d5), TOBN(0x2f6d3420, 0x1d260152),
+     TOBN(0x17b87653, 0x3f8ff89a), TOBN(0x5157c30c, 0x378fa458),
+     TOBN(0x7517c5c5, 0x2d4fb936), TOBN(0xef22f7ac, 0xe6518cdc),
+     TOBN(0xdeb483e6, 0xbf847a64), TOBN(0xf5084558, 0x92e0fa89),}
+    ,
+    {TOBN(0xab9659d8, 0xdf7304d4), TOBN(0xb71bcf1b, 0xff210e8e),
+     TOBN(0xa9a2438b, 0xd73fbd60), TOBN(0x4595cd1f, 0x5d11b4de),
+     TOBN(0x9c0d329a, 0x4835859d), TOBN(0x4a0f0d2d, 0x7dbb6e56),
+     TOBN(0xc6038e5e, 0xdf928a4e), TOBN(0xc9429621, 0x8f5ad154),
+     TOBN(0x91213462, 0xf23f2d92), TOBN(0x6cab71bd, 0x60b94078),
+     TOBN(0x6bdd0a63, 0x176cde20), TOBN(0x54c9b20c, 0xee4d54bc),
+     TOBN(0x3cd2d8aa, 0x9f2ac02f), TOBN(0x03f8e617, 0x206eedb0),
+     TOBN(0xc7f68e16, 0x93086434), TOBN(0x831469c5, 0x92dd3db9),
+     TOBN(0x8521df24, 0x8f981354), TOBN(0x587e23ec, 0x3588a259),
+     TOBN(0xcbedf281, 0xd7a0992c), TOBN(0x06930a55, 0x38961407),
+     TOBN(0x09320deb, 0xbe5bbe21), TOBN(0xa7ffa5b5, 0x2491817f),
+     TOBN(0xe6c8b4d9, 0x09065160), TOBN(0xac4f3992, 0xfff6d2a9),
+     TOBN(0x7aa7a158, 0x3ae9c1bd), TOBN(0xe0af6d98, 0xe37ce240),
+     TOBN(0xe54342d9, 0x28ab38b4), TOBN(0xe8b75007, 0x0a1c98ca),
+     TOBN(0xefce86af, 0xe02358f2), TOBN(0x31b8b856, 0xea921228),
+     TOBN(0x052a1912, 0x0a1c67fc), TOBN(0xb4069ea4, 0xe3aead59),
+     TOBN(0x3232d6e2, 0x7fa03cb3), TOBN(0xdb938e5b, 0x0fdd7d88),
+     TOBN(0x04c1d2cd, 0x2ccbfc5d), TOBN(0xd2f45c12, 0xaf3a580f),
+     TOBN(0x592620b5, 0x7883e614), TOBN(0x5fd27e68, 0xbe7c5f26),
+     TOBN(0x139e45a9, 0x1567e1e3), TOBN(0x2cc71d2d, 0x44d8aaaf),
+     TOBN(0x4a9090cd, 0xe36d0757), TOBN(0xf722d7b1, 0xd9a29382),
+     TOBN(0xfb7fb04c, 0x04b48ddf), TOBN(0x628ad2a7, 0xebe16f43),
+     TOBN(0xcd3fbfb5, 0x20226040), TOBN(0x6c34ecb1, 0x5104b6c4),
+     TOBN(0x30c0754e, 0xc903c188), TOBN(0xec336b08, 0x2d23cab0),
+     TOBN(0x473d62a2, 0x1e206ee5), TOBN(0xf1e27480, 0x8c49a633),
+     TOBN(0x87ab956c, 0xe9f6b2c3), TOBN(0x61830b48, 0x62b606ea),
+     TOBN(0x67cd6846, 0xe78e815f), TOBN(0xfe40139f, 0x4c02082a),
+     TOBN(0x52bbbfcb, 0x952ec365), TOBN(0x74c11642, 0x6b9836ab),
+     TOBN(0x9f51439e, 0x558df019), TOBN(0x230da4ba, 0xac712b27),
+     TOBN(0x518919e3, 0x55185a24), TOBN(0x4dcefcdd, 0x84b78f50),
+     TOBN(0xa7d90fb2, 0xa47d4c5a), TOBN(0x55ac9abf, 0xb30e009e),
+     TOBN(0xfd2fc359, 0x74eed273), TOBN(0xb72d824c, 0xdbea8faf),
+     TOBN(0xce721a74, 0x4513e2ca), TOBN(0x0b418612, 0x38240b2c),
+     TOBN(0x05199968, 0xd5baa450), TOBN(0xeb1757ed, 0x2b0e8c25),
+     TOBN(0x6ebc3e28, 0x3dfac6d5), TOBN(0xb2431e2e, 0x48a237f5),
+     TOBN(0x2acb5e23, 0x52f61499), TOBN(0x5558a2a7, 0xe06c936b),
+     TOBN(0xd213f923, 0xcbb13d1b), TOBN(0x98799f42, 0x5bfb9bfe),
+     TOBN(0x1ae8ddc9, 0x701144a9), TOBN(0x0b8b3bb6, 0x4c5595ee),
+     TOBN(0x0ea9ef2e, 0x3ecebb21), TOBN(0x17cb6c4b, 0x3671f9a7),
+     TOBN(0x47ef464f, 0x726f1d1f), TOBN(0x171b9484, 0x6943a276),
+     TOBN(0x51a4ae2d, 0x7ef0329c), TOBN(0x08509222, 0x91c4402a),
+     TOBN(0x64a61d35, 0xafd45bbc), TOBN(0x38f096fe, 0x3035a851),
+     TOBN(0xc7468b74, 0xa1dec027), TOBN(0xe8cf10e7, 0x4fc7dcba),
+     TOBN(0xea35ff40, 0xf4a06353), TOBN(0x0b4c0dfa, 0x8b77dd66),
+     TOBN(0x779b8552, 0xde7e5c19), TOBN(0xfab28609, 0xc1c0256c),
+     TOBN(0x64f58eee, 0xabd4743d), TOBN(0x4e8ef838, 0x7b6cc93b),
+     TOBN(0xee650d26, 0x4cb1bf3d), TOBN(0x4c1f9d09, 0x73dedf61),
+     TOBN(0xaef7c9d7, 0xbfb70ced), TOBN(0x1ec0507e, 0x1641de1e),
+     TOBN(0xcd7e5cc7, 0xcde45079), TOBN(0xde173c9a, 0x516ac9e4),
+     TOBN(0x517a8494, 0xc170315c), TOBN(0x438fd905, 0x91d8e8fb),
+     TOBN(0x5145c506, 0xc7d9630b), TOBN(0x6457a87b, 0xf47d4d75),
+     TOBN(0xd31646bf, 0x0d9a80e8), TOBN(0x453add2b, 0xcef3aabe),
+     TOBN(0xc9941109, 0xa607419d), TOBN(0xfaa71e62, 0xbb6bca80),
+     TOBN(0x34158c13, 0x07c431f3), TOBN(0x594abebc, 0x992bc47a),
+     TOBN(0x6dfea691, 0xeb78399f), TOBN(0x48aafb35, 0x3f42cba4),
+     TOBN(0xedcd65af, 0x077c04f0), TOBN(0x1a29a366, 0xe884491a),
+     TOBN(0x023a40e5, 0x1c21f2bf), TOBN(0xf99a513c, 0xa5057aee),
+     TOBN(0xa3fe7e25, 0xbcab072e), TOBN(0x8568d2e1, 0x40e32bcf),
+     TOBN(0x904594eb, 0xd3f69d9f), TOBN(0x181a9733, 0x07affab1),
+     TOBN(0xe4d68d76, 0xb6e330f4), TOBN(0x87a6dafb, 0xc75a7fc1),
+     TOBN(0x549db2b5, 0xef7d9289), TOBN(0x2480d4a8, 0x197f015a),
+     TOBN(0x61d5590b, 0xc40493b6), TOBN(0x3a55b52e, 0x6f780331),
+     TOBN(0x40eb8115, 0x309eadb0), TOBN(0xdea7de5a, 0x92e5c625),
+     TOBN(0x64d631f0, 0xcc6a3d5a), TOBN(0x9d5e9d7c, 0x93e8dd61),
+     TOBN(0xf297bef5, 0x206d3ffc), TOBN(0x23d5e033, 0x7d808bd4),
+     TOBN(0x4a4f6912, 0xd24cf5ba), TOBN(0xe4d8163b, 0x09cdaa8a),
+     TOBN(0x0e0de9ef, 0xd3082e8e), TOBN(0x4fe1246c, 0x0192f360),
+     TOBN(0x1f900150, 0x4b8eee0a), TOBN(0x5219da81, 0xf1da391b),
+     TOBN(0x7bf6a5c1, 0xf7ea25aa), TOBN(0xd165e6bf, 0xfbb07d5f),
+     TOBN(0xe3539361, 0x89e78671), TOBN(0xa3fcac89, 0x2bac4219),
+     TOBN(0xdfab6fd4, 0xf0baa8ab), TOBN(0x5a4adac1, 0xe2c1c2e5),
+     TOBN(0x6cd75e31, 0x40d85849), TOBN(0xce263fea, 0x19b39181),
+     TOBN(0xcb6803d3, 0x07032c72), TOBN(0x7f40d5ce, 0x790968c8),
+     TOBN(0xa6de86bd, 0xdce978f0), TOBN(0x25547c4f, 0x368f751c),
+     TOBN(0xb1e685fd, 0x65fb2a9e), TOBN(0xce69336f, 0x1eb9179c),
+     TOBN(0xb15d1c27, 0x12504442), TOBN(0xb7df465c, 0xb911a06b),
+     TOBN(0xb8d804a3, 0x315980cd), TOBN(0x693bc492, 0xfa3bebf7),
+     TOBN(0x3578aeee, 0x2253c504), TOBN(0x158de498, 0xcd2474a2),
+     TOBN(0x1331f5c7, 0xcfda8368), TOBN(0xd2d7bbb3, 0x78d7177e),
+     TOBN(0xdf61133a, 0xf3c1e46e), TOBN(0x5836ce7d, 0xd30e7be8),
+     TOBN(0x83084f19, 0x94f834cb), TOBN(0xd35653d4, 0x429ed782),
+     TOBN(0xa542f16f, 0x59e58243), TOBN(0xc2b52f65, 0x0470a22d),
+     TOBN(0xe3b6221b, 0x18f23d96), TOBN(0xcb05abac, 0x3f5252b4),
+     TOBN(0xca00938b, 0x87d61402), TOBN(0x2f186cdd, 0x411933e4),
+     TOBN(0xe042ece5, 0x9a29a5c5), TOBN(0xb19b3c07, 0x3b6c8402),
+     TOBN(0xc97667c7, 0x19d92684), TOBN(0xb5624622, 0xebc66372),
+     TOBN(0x0cb96e65, 0x3c04fa02), TOBN(0x83a7176c, 0x8eaa39aa),
+     TOBN(0x2033561d, 0xeaa1633f), TOBN(0x45a9d086, 0x4533df73),
+     TOBN(0xe0542c1d, 0x3dc090bc), TOBN(0x82c996ef, 0xaa59c167),
+     TOBN(0xe3f735e8, 0x0ee7fc4d), TOBN(0x7b179393, 0x7c35db79),
+     TOBN(0xb6419e25, 0xf8c5dbfd), TOBN(0x4d9d7a1e, 0x1f327b04),
+     TOBN(0x979f6f9b, 0x298dfca8), TOBN(0xc7c5dff1, 0x8de9366a),
+     TOBN(0x1b7a588d, 0x04c82bdd), TOBN(0x68005534, 0xf8319dfd),
+     TOBN(0xde8a55b5, 0xd8eb9580), TOBN(0x5ea886da, 0x8d5bca81),
+     TOBN(0xe8530a01, 0x252a0b4d), TOBN(0x1bffb4fe, 0x35eaa0a1),
+     TOBN(0x2ad828b1, 0xd8e99563), TOBN(0x7de96ef5, 0x95f9cd87),
+     TOBN(0x4abb2d0c, 0xd77d970c), TOBN(0x03cfb933, 0xd33ef9cb),
+     TOBN(0xb0547c01, 0x8b211fe9), TOBN(0x2fe64809, 0xa56ed1c6),
+     TOBN(0xcb7d5624, 0xc2ac98cc), TOBN(0x2a1372c0, 0x1a393e33),
+     TOBN(0xc8d1ec1c, 0x29660521), TOBN(0xf3d31b04, 0xb37ac3e9),
+     TOBN(0xa29ae9df, 0x5ece6e7c), TOBN(0x0603ac8f, 0x0facfb55),
+     TOBN(0xcfe85b7a, 0xdda233a5), TOBN(0xe618919f, 0xbd75f0b8),
+     TOBN(0xf555a3d2, 0x99bf1603), TOBN(0x1f43afc9, 0xf184255a),
+     TOBN(0xdcdaf341, 0x319a3e02), TOBN(0xd3b117ef, 0x03903a39),
+     TOBN(0xe095da13, 0x65d1d131), TOBN(0x86f16367, 0xc37ad03e),
+     TOBN(0x5f37389e, 0x462cd8dd), TOBN(0xc103fa04, 0xd67a60e6),
+     TOBN(0x57c34344, 0xf4b478f0), TOBN(0xce91edd8, 0xe117c98d),
+     TOBN(0x001777b0, 0x231fc12e), TOBN(0x11ae47f2, 0xb207bccb),
+     TOBN(0xd983cf8d, 0x20f8a242), TOBN(0x7aff5b1d, 0xf22e1ad8),
+     TOBN(0x68fd11d0, 0x7fc4feb3), TOBN(0x5d53ae90, 0xb0f1c3e1),
+     TOBN(0x50fb7905, 0xec041803), TOBN(0x85e3c977, 0x14404888),
+     TOBN(0x0e67faed, 0xac628d8f), TOBN(0x2e865150, 0x6668532c),
+     TOBN(0x15acaaa4, 0x6a67a6b0), TOBN(0xf4cdee25, 0xb25cec41),
+     TOBN(0x49ee565a, 0xe4c6701e), TOBN(0x2a04ca66, 0xfc7d63d8),
+     TOBN(0xeb105018, 0xef0543fb), TOBN(0xf709a4f5, 0xd1b0d81d),
+     TOBN(0x5b906ee6, 0x2915d333), TOBN(0xf4a87412, 0x96f1f0ab),
+     TOBN(0xb6b82fa7, 0x4d82f4c2), TOBN(0x90725a60, 0x6804efb3),
+     TOBN(0xbc82ec46, 0xadc3425e), TOBN(0xb7b80581, 0x2787843e),
+     TOBN(0xdf46d91c, 0xdd1fc74c), TOBN(0xdc1c62cb, 0xe783a6c4),
+     TOBN(0x59d1b9f3, 0x1a04cbba), TOBN(0xd87f6f72, 0x95e40764),
+     TOBN(0x02b4cfc1, 0x317f4a76), TOBN(0x8d2703eb, 0x91036bce),
+     TOBN(0x98206cc6, 0xa5e72a56), TOBN(0x57be9ed1, 0xcf53fb0f),
+     TOBN(0x09374571, 0xef0b17ac), TOBN(0x74b2655e, 0xd9181b38),
+     TOBN(0xc8f80ea8, 0x89935d0e), TOBN(0xc0d9e942, 0x91529936),
+     TOBN(0x19686041, 0x1e84e0e5), TOBN(0xa5db84d3, 0xaea34c93),
+     TOBN(0xf9d5bb19, 0x7073a732), TOBN(0xb8d2fe56, 0x6bcfd7c0),
+     TOBN(0x45775f36, 0xf3eb82fa), TOBN(0x8cb20ccc, 0xfdff8b58),
+     TOBN(0x1659b65f, 0x8374c110), TOBN(0xb8b4a422, 0x330c789a),
+     TOBN(0x75e3c3ea, 0x6fe8208b), TOBN(0xbd74b9e4, 0x286e78fe),
+     TOBN(0x0be2e81b, 0xd7d93a1a), TOBN(0x7ed06e27, 0xdd0a5aae),
+     TOBN(0x721f5a58, 0x6be8b800), TOBN(0x428299d1, 0xd846db28),
+     TOBN(0x95cb8e6b, 0x5be88ed3), TOBN(0xc3186b23, 0x1c034e11),
+     TOBN(0xa6312c9e, 0x8977d99b), TOBN(0xbe944331, 0x83f531e7),
+     TOBN(0x8232c0c2, 0x18d3b1d4), TOBN(0x617aae8b, 0xe1247b73),
+     TOBN(0x40153fc4, 0x282aec3b), TOBN(0xc6063d2f, 0xf7b8f823),
+     TOBN(0x68f10e58, 0x3304f94c), TOBN(0x31efae74, 0xee676346),
+     TOBN(0xbadb6c6d, 0x40a9b97c), TOBN(0x14702c63, 0x4f666256),
+     TOBN(0xdeb954f1, 0x5184b2e3), TOBN(0x5184a526, 0x94b6ca40),
+     TOBN(0xfff05337, 0x003c32ea), TOBN(0x5aa374dd, 0x205974c7),
+     TOBN(0x9a763854, 0x4b0dd71a), TOBN(0x459cd27f, 0xdeb947ec),
+     TOBN(0xa6e28161, 0x459c2b92), TOBN(0x2f020fa8, 0x75ee8ef5),
+     TOBN(0xb132ec2d, 0x30b06310), TOBN(0xc3e15899, 0xbc6a4530),
+     TOBN(0xdc5f53fe, 0xaa3f451a), TOBN(0x3a3c7f23, 0xc2d9acac),
+     TOBN(0x2ec2f892, 0x6b27e58b), TOBN(0x68466ee7, 0xd742799f),
+     TOBN(0x98324dd4, 0x1fa26613), TOBN(0xa2dc6dab, 0xbdc29d63),
+     TOBN(0xf9675faa, 0xd712d657), TOBN(0x813994be, 0x21fd8d15),
+     TOBN(0x5ccbb722, 0xfd4f7553), TOBN(0x5135ff8b, 0xf3a36b20),
+     TOBN(0x44be28af, 0x69559df5), TOBN(0x40b65bed, 0x9d41bf30),
+     TOBN(0xd98bf2a4, 0x3734e520), TOBN(0x5e3abbe3, 0x209bdcba),
+     TOBN(0x77c76553, 0xbc945b35), TOBN(0x5331c093, 0xc6ef14aa),
+     TOBN(0x518ffe29, 0x76b60c80), TOBN(0x2285593b, 0x7ace16f8),
+     TOBN(0xab1f64cc, 0xbe2b9784), TOBN(0xe8f2c0d9, 0xab2421b6),
+     TOBN(0x617d7174, 0xc1df065c), TOBN(0xafeeb5ab, 0x5f6578fa),
+     TOBN(0x16ff1329, 0x263b54a8), TOBN(0x45c55808, 0xc990dce3),
+     TOBN(0x42eab6c0, 0xecc8c177), TOBN(0x799ea9b5, 0x5982ecaa),
+     TOBN(0xf65da244, 0xb607ef8e), TOBN(0x8ab226ce, 0x32a3fc2c),
+     TOBN(0x745741e5, 0x7ea973dc), TOBN(0x5c00ca70, 0x20888f2e),
+     TOBN(0x7cdce3cf, 0x45fd9cf1), TOBN(0x8a741ef1, 0x5507f872),
+     TOBN(0x47c51c2f, 0x196b4cec), TOBN(0x70d08e43, 0xc97ea618),
+     TOBN(0x930da15c, 0x15b18a2b), TOBN(0x33b6c678, 0x2f610514),
+     TOBN(0xc662e4f8, 0x07ac9794), TOBN(0x1eccf050, 0xba06cb79),
+     TOBN(0x1ff08623, 0xe7d954e5), TOBN(0x6ef2c5fb, 0x24cf71c3),
+     TOBN(0xb2c063d2, 0x67978453), TOBN(0xa0cf3796, 0x1d654af8),
+     TOBN(0x7cb242ea, 0x7ebdaa37), TOBN(0x206e0b10, 0xb86747e0),
+     TOBN(0x481dae5f, 0xd5ecfefc), TOBN(0x07084fd8, 0xc2bff8fc),
+     TOBN(0x8040a01a, 0xea324596), TOBN(0x4c646980, 0xd4de4036),
+     TOBN(0x9eb8ab4e, 0xd65abfc3), TOBN(0xe01cb91f, 0x13541ec7),
+     TOBN(0x8f029adb, 0xfd695012), TOBN(0x9ae28483, 0x3c7569ec),
+     TOBN(0xa5614c9e, 0xa66d80a1), TOBN(0x680a3e44, 0x75f5f911),
+     TOBN(0x0c07b14d, 0xceba4fc1), TOBN(0x891c285b, 0xa13071c1),
+     TOBN(0xcac67ceb, 0x799ece3c), TOBN(0x29b910a9, 0x41e07e27),
+     TOBN(0x66bdb409, 0xf2e43123), TOBN(0x06f8b137, 0x7ac9ecbe),
+     TOBN(0x5981fafd, 0x38547090), TOBN(0x19ab8b9f, 0x85e3415d),
+     TOBN(0xfc28c194, 0xc7e31b27), TOBN(0x843be0aa, 0x6fbcbb42),
+     TOBN(0xf3b1ed43, 0xa6db836c), TOBN(0x2a1330e4, 0x01a45c05),
+     TOBN(0x4f19f3c5, 0x95c1a377), TOBN(0xa85f39d0, 0x44b5ee33),
+     TOBN(0x3da18e6d, 0x4ae52834), TOBN(0x5a403b39, 0x7423dcb0),
+     TOBN(0xbb555e0a, 0xf2374aef), TOBN(0x2ad599c4, 0x1e8ca111),
+     TOBN(0x1b3a2fb9, 0x014b3bf8), TOBN(0x73092684, 0xf66d5007),
+     TOBN(0x079f1426, 0xc4340102), TOBN(0x1827cf81, 0x8fddf4de),
+     TOBN(0xc83605f6, 0xf10ff927), TOBN(0xd3871451, 0x23739fc6),
+     TOBN(0x6d163450, 0xcac1c2cc), TOBN(0x6b521296, 0xa2ec1ac5),
+     TOBN(0x0606c4f9, 0x6e3cb4a5), TOBN(0xe47d3f41, 0x778abff7),
+     TOBN(0x425a8d5e, 0xbe8e3a45), TOBN(0x53ea9e97, 0xa6102160),
+     TOBN(0x477a106e, 0x39cbb688), TOBN(0x532401d2, 0xf3386d32),
+     TOBN(0x8e564f64, 0xb1b9b421), TOBN(0xca9b8388, 0x81dad33f),
+     TOBN(0xb1422b4e, 0x2093913e), TOBN(0x533d2f92, 0x69bc8112),
+     TOBN(0x3fa017be, 0xebe7b2c7), TOBN(0xb2767c4a, 0xcaf197c6),
+     TOBN(0xc925ff87, 0xaedbae9f), TOBN(0x7daf0eb9, 0x36880a54),
+     TOBN(0x9284ddf5, 0x9c4d0e71), TOBN(0x1581cf93, 0x316f8cf5),
+     TOBN(0x3eeca887, 0x3ac1f452), TOBN(0xb417fce9, 0xfb6aeffe),
+     TOBN(0xa5918046, 0xeefb8dc3), TOBN(0x73d318ac, 0x02209400),
+     TOBN(0xe800400f, 0x728693e5), TOBN(0xe87d814b, 0x339927ed),
+     TOBN(0x93e94d3b, 0x57ea9910), TOBN(0xff8a35b6, 0x2245fb69),
+     TOBN(0x043853d7, 0x7f200d34), TOBN(0x470f1e68, 0x0f653ce1),
+     TOBN(0x81ac05bd, 0x59a06379), TOBN(0xa14052c2, 0x03930c29),
+     TOBN(0x6b72fab5, 0x26bc2797), TOBN(0x13670d16, 0x99f16771),
+     TOBN(0x00170052, 0x1e3e48d1), TOBN(0x978fe401, 0xb7adf678),
+     TOBN(0x55ecfb92, 0xd41c5dd4), TOBN(0x5ff8e247, 0xc7b27da5),
+     TOBN(0xe7518272, 0x013fb606), TOBN(0x5768d7e5, 0x2f547a3c),
+     TOBN(0xbb24eaa3, 0x60017a5f), TOBN(0x6b18e6e4, 0x9c64ce9b),
+     TOBN(0xc225c655, 0x103dde07), TOBN(0xfc3672ae, 0x7592f7ea),
+     TOBN(0x9606ad77, 0xd06283a1), TOBN(0x542fc650, 0xe4d59d99),
+     TOBN(0xabb57c49, 0x2a40e7c2), TOBN(0xac948f13, 0xa8db9f55),
+     TOBN(0x6d4c9682, 0xb04465c3), TOBN(0xe3d062fa, 0x6468bd15),
+     TOBN(0xa51729ac, 0x5f318d7e), TOBN(0x1fc87df6, 0x9eb6fc95),
+     TOBN(0x63d146a8, 0x0591f652), TOBN(0xa861b8f7, 0x589621aa),
+     TOBN(0x59f5f15a, 0xce31348c), TOBN(0x8f663391, 0x440da6da),
+     TOBN(0xcfa778ac, 0xb591ffa3), TOBN(0x027ca9c5, 0x4cdfebce),
+     TOBN(0xbe8e05a5, 0x444ea6b3), TOBN(0x8aab4e69, 0xa78d8254),
+     TOBN(0x2437f04f, 0xb474d6b8), TOBN(0x6597ffd4, 0x045b3855),
+     TOBN(0xbb0aea4e, 0xca47ecaa), TOBN(0x568aae83, 0x85c7ebfc),
+     TOBN(0x0e966e64, 0xc73b2383), TOBN(0x49eb3447, 0xd17d8762),
+     TOBN(0xde107821, 0x8da05dab), TOBN(0x443d8baa, 0x016b7236),
+     TOBN(0x163b63a5, 0xea7610d6), TOBN(0xe47e4185, 0xce1ca979),
+     TOBN(0xae648b65, 0x80baa132), TOBN(0xebf53de2, 0x0e0d5b64),
+     TOBN(0x8d3bfcb4, 0xd3c8c1ca), TOBN(0x0d914ef3, 0x5d04b309),
+     TOBN(0x55ef6415, 0x3de7d395), TOBN(0xbde1666f, 0x26b850e8),
+     TOBN(0xdbe1ca6e, 0xd449ab19), TOBN(0x8902b322, 0xe89a2672),
+     TOBN(0xb1674b7e, 0xdacb7a53), TOBN(0x8e9faf6e, 0xf52523ff),
+     TOBN(0x6ba535da, 0x9a85788b), TOBN(0xd21f03ae, 0xbd0626d4),
+     TOBN(0x099f8c47, 0xe873dc64), TOBN(0xcda8564d, 0x018ec97e),
+     TOBN(0x3e8d7a5c, 0xde92c68c), TOBN(0x78e035a1, 0x73323cc4),
+     TOBN(0x3ef26275, 0xf880ff7c), TOBN(0xa4ee3dff, 0x273eedaa),
+     TOBN(0x58823507, 0xaf4e18f8), TOBN(0x967ec9b5, 0x0672f328),
+     TOBN(0x9ded19d9, 0x559d3186), TOBN(0x5e2ab3de, 0x6cdce39c),
+     TOBN(0xabad6e4d, 0x11c226df), TOBN(0xf9783f43, 0x87723014),
+     TOBN(0x9a49a0cf, 0x1a885719), TOBN(0xfc0c1a5a, 0x90da9dbf),
+     TOBN(0x8bbaec49, 0x571d92ac), TOBN(0x569e85fe, 0x4692517f),
+     TOBN(0x8333b014, 0xa14ea4af), TOBN(0x32f2a62f, 0x12e5c5ad),
+     TOBN(0x98c2ce3a, 0x06d89b85), TOBN(0xb90741aa, 0x2ff77a08),
+     TOBN(0x2530defc, 0x01f795a2), TOBN(0xd6e5ba0b, 0x84b3c199),
+     TOBN(0x7d8e8451, 0x12e4c936), TOBN(0xae419f7d, 0xbd0be17b),
+     TOBN(0xa583fc8c, 0x22262bc9), TOBN(0x6b842ac7, 0x91bfe2bd),
+     TOBN(0x33cef4e9, 0x440d6827), TOBN(0x5f69f4de, 0xef81fb14),
+     TOBN(0xf16cf6f6, 0x234fbb92), TOBN(0x76ae3fc3, 0xd9e7e158),
+     TOBN(0x4e89f6c2, 0xe9740b33), TOBN(0x677bc85d, 0x4962d6a1),
+     TOBN(0x6c6d8a7f, 0x68d10d15), TOBN(0x5f9a7224, 0x0257b1cd),
+     TOBN(0x7096b916, 0x4ad85961), TOBN(0x5f8c47f7, 0xe657ab4a),
+     TOBN(0xde57d7d0, 0xf7461d7e), TOBN(0x7eb6094d, 0x80ce5ee2),
+     TOBN(0x0b1e1dfd, 0x34190547), TOBN(0x8a394f43, 0xf05dd150),
+     TOBN(0x0a9eb24d, 0x97df44e6), TOBN(0x78ca06bf, 0x87675719),
+     TOBN(0x6f0b3462, 0x6ffeec22), TOBN(0x9d91bcea, 0x36cdd8fb),
+     TOBN(0xac83363c, 0xa105be47), TOBN(0x81ba76c1, 0x069710e3),
+     TOBN(0x3d1b24cb, 0x28c682c6), TOBN(0x27f25228, 0x8612575b),
+     TOBN(0xb587c779, 0xe8e66e98), TOBN(0x7b0c03e9, 0x405eb1fe),
+     TOBN(0xfdf0d030, 0x15b548e7), TOBN(0xa8be76e0, 0x38b36af7),
+     TOBN(0x4cdab04a, 0x4f310c40), TOBN(0x6287223e, 0xf47ecaec),
+     TOBN(0x678e6055, 0x8b399320), TOBN(0x61fe3fa6, 0xc01e4646),
+     TOBN(0xc482866b, 0x03261a5e), TOBN(0xdfcf45b8, 0x5c2f244a),
+     TOBN(0x8fab9a51, 0x2f684b43), TOBN(0xf796c654, 0xc7220a66),
+     TOBN(0x1d90707e, 0xf5afa58f), TOBN(0x2c421d97, 0x4fdbe0de),
+     TOBN(0xc4f4cda3, 0xaf2ebc2f), TOBN(0xa0af843d, 0xcb4efe24),
+     TOBN(0x53b857c1, 0x9ccd10b1), TOBN(0xddc9d1eb, 0x914d3e04),
+     TOBN(0x7bdec8bb, 0x62771deb), TOBN(0x829277aa, 0x91c5aa81),
+     TOBN(0x7af18dd6, 0x832391ae), TOBN(0x1740f316, 0xc71a84ca),}
+    ,
+    {TOBN(0x8928e99a, 0xeeaf8c49), TOBN(0xee7aa73d, 0x6e24d728),
+     TOBN(0x4c5007c2, 0xe72b156c), TOBN(0x5fcf57c5, 0xed408a1d),
+     TOBN(0x9f719e39, 0xb6057604), TOBN(0x7d343c01, 0xc2868bbf),
+     TOBN(0x2cca254b, 0x7e103e2d), TOBN(0xe6eb38a9, 0xf131bea2),
+     TOBN(0xb33e624f, 0x8be762b4), TOBN(0x2a9ee4d1, 0x058e3413),
+     TOBN(0x968e6369, 0x67d805fa), TOBN(0x9848949b, 0x7db8bfd7),
+     TOBN(0x5308d7e5, 0xd23a8417), TOBN(0x892f3b1d, 0xf3e29da5),
+     TOBN(0xc95c139e, 0x3dee471f), TOBN(0x8631594d, 0xd757e089),
+     TOBN(0xe0c82a3c, 0xde918dcc), TOBN(0x2e7b5994, 0x26fdcf4b),
+     TOBN(0x82c50249, 0x32cb1b2d), TOBN(0xea613a9d, 0x7657ae07),
+     TOBN(0xc2eb5f6c, 0xf1fdc9f7), TOBN(0xb6eae8b8, 0x879fe682),
+     TOBN(0x253dfee0, 0x591cbc7f), TOBN(0x000da713, 0x3e1290e6),
+     TOBN(0x1083e2ea, 0x1f095615), TOBN(0x0a28ad77, 0x14e68c33),
+     TOBN(0x6bfc0252, 0x3d8818be), TOBN(0xb585113a, 0xf35850cd),
+     TOBN(0x7d935f0b, 0x30df8aa1), TOBN(0xaddda07c, 0x4ab7e3ac),
+     TOBN(0x92c34299, 0x552f00cb), TOBN(0xc33ed1de, 0x2909df6c),
+     TOBN(0x22c2195d, 0x80e87766), TOBN(0x9e99e6d8, 0x9ddf4ac0),
+     TOBN(0x09642e4e, 0x65e74934), TOBN(0x2610ffa2, 0xff1ff241),
+     TOBN(0x4d1d47d4, 0x751c8159), TOBN(0x697b4985, 0xaf3a9363),
+     TOBN(0x0318ca46, 0x87477c33), TOBN(0xa90cb565, 0x9441eff3),
+     TOBN(0x58bb3848, 0x36f024cb), TOBN(0x85be1f77, 0x36016168),
+     TOBN(0x6c59587c, 0xdc7e07f1), TOBN(0x191be071, 0xaf1d8f02),
+     TOBN(0xbf169fa5, 0xcca5e55c), TOBN(0x3864ba3c, 0xf7d04eac),
+     TOBN(0x915e367f, 0x8d7d05db), TOBN(0xb48a876d, 0xa6549e5d),
+     TOBN(0xef89c656, 0x580e40a2), TOBN(0xf194ed8c, 0x728068bc),
+     TOBN(0x74528045, 0xa47990c9), TOBN(0xf53fc7d7, 0x5e1a4649),
+     TOBN(0xbec5ae9b, 0x78593e7d), TOBN(0x2cac4ee3, 0x41db65d7),
+     TOBN(0xa8c1eb24, 0x04a3d39b), TOBN(0x53b7d634, 0x03f8f3ef),
+     TOBN(0x2dc40d48, 0x3e07113c), TOBN(0x6e4a5d39, 0x7d8b63ae),
+     TOBN(0x5582a94b, 0x79684c2b), TOBN(0x932b33d4, 0x622da26c),
+     TOBN(0xf534f651, 0x0dbbf08d), TOBN(0x211d07c9, 0x64c23a52),
+     TOBN(0x0eeece0f, 0xee5bdc9b), TOBN(0xdf178168, 0xf7015558),
+     TOBN(0xd4294635, 0x0a712229), TOBN(0x93cbe448, 0x09273f8c),
+     TOBN(0x00b095ef, 0x8f13bc83), TOBN(0xbb741972, 0x8798978c),
+     TOBN(0x9d7309a2, 0x56dbe6e7), TOBN(0xe578ec56, 0x5a5d39ec),
+     TOBN(0x3961151b, 0x851f9a31), TOBN(0x2da7715d, 0xe5709eb4),
+     TOBN(0x867f3017, 0x53dfabf0), TOBN(0x728d2078, 0xb8e39259),
+     TOBN(0x5c75a0cd, 0x815d9958), TOBN(0xf84867a6, 0x16603be1),
+     TOBN(0xc865b13d, 0x70e35b1c), TOBN(0x02414468, 0x19b03e2c),
+     TOBN(0xe46041da, 0xac1f3121), TOBN(0x7c9017ad, 0x6f028a7c),
+     TOBN(0xabc96de9, 0x0a482873), TOBN(0x4265d6b1, 0xb77e54d4),
+     TOBN(0x68c38e79, 0xa57d88e7), TOBN(0xd461d766, 0x9ce82de3),
+     TOBN(0x817a9ec5, 0x64a7e489), TOBN(0xcc5675cd, 0xa0def5f2),
+     TOBN(0x9a00e785, 0x985d494e), TOBN(0xc626833f, 0x1b03514a),
+     TOBN(0xabe7905a, 0x83cdd60e), TOBN(0x50602fb5, 0xa1170184),
+     TOBN(0x689886cd, 0xb023642a), TOBN(0xd568d090, 0xa6e1fb00),
+     TOBN(0x5b1922c7, 0x0259217f), TOBN(0x93831cd9, 0xc43141e4),
+     TOBN(0xdfca3587, 0x0c95f86e), TOBN(0xdec2057a, 0x568ae828),
+     TOBN(0xc44ea599, 0xf98a759a), TOBN(0x55a0a7a2, 0xf7c23c1d),
+     TOBN(0xd5ffb6e6, 0x94c4f687), TOBN(0x3563cce2, 0x12848478),
+     TOBN(0x812b3517, 0xe7b1fbe1), TOBN(0x8a7dc979, 0x4f7338e0),
+     TOBN(0x211ecee9, 0x52d048db), TOBN(0x2eea4056, 0xc86ea3b8),
+     TOBN(0xd8cb68a7, 0xba772b34), TOBN(0xe16ed341, 0x5f4e2541),
+     TOBN(0x9b32f6a6, 0x0fec14db), TOBN(0xeee376f7, 0x391698be),
+     TOBN(0xe9a7aa17, 0x83674c02), TOBN(0x65832f97, 0x5843022a),
+     TOBN(0x29f3a8da, 0x5ba4990f), TOBN(0x79a59c3a, 0xfb8e3216),
+     TOBN(0x9cdc4d2e, 0xbd19bb16), TOBN(0xc6c7cfd0, 0xb3262d86),
+     TOBN(0xd4ce14d0, 0x969c0b47), TOBN(0x1fa352b7, 0x13e56128),
+     TOBN(0x383d55b8, 0x973db6d3), TOBN(0x71836850, 0xe8e5b7bf),
+     TOBN(0xc7714596, 0xe6bb571f), TOBN(0x259df31f, 0x2d5b2dd2),
+     TOBN(0x568f8925, 0x913cc16d), TOBN(0x18bc5b6d, 0xe1a26f5a),
+     TOBN(0xdfa413be, 0xf5f499ae), TOBN(0xf8835dec, 0xc3f0ae84),
+     TOBN(0xb6e60bd8, 0x65a40ab0), TOBN(0x65596439, 0x194b377e),
+     TOBN(0xbcd85625, 0x92084a69), TOBN(0x5ce433b9, 0x4f23ede0),
+     TOBN(0xe8e8f04f, 0x6ad65143), TOBN(0x11511827, 0xd6e14af6),
+     TOBN(0x3d390a10, 0x8295c0c7), TOBN(0x71e29ee4, 0x621eba16),
+     TOBN(0xa588fc09, 0x63717b46), TOBN(0x02be02fe, 0xe06ad4a2),
+     TOBN(0x931558c6, 0x04c22b22), TOBN(0xbb4d4bd6, 0x12f3c849),
+     TOBN(0x54a4f496, 0x20efd662), TOBN(0x92ba6d20, 0xc5952d14),
+     TOBN(0x2db8ea1e, 0xcc9784c2), TOBN(0x81cc10ca, 0x4b353644),
+     TOBN(0x40b570ad, 0x4b4d7f6c), TOBN(0x5c9f1d96, 0x84a1dcd2),
+     TOBN(0x01379f81, 0x3147e797), TOBN(0xe5c6097b, 0x2bd499f5),
+     TOBN(0x40dcafa6, 0x328e5e20), TOBN(0xf7b5244a, 0x54815550),
+     TOBN(0xb9a4f118, 0x47bfc978), TOBN(0x0ea0e79f, 0xd25825b1),
+     TOBN(0xa50f96eb, 0x646c7ecf), TOBN(0xeb811493, 0x446dea9d),
+     TOBN(0x2af04677, 0xdfabcf69), TOBN(0xbe3a068f, 0xc713f6e8),
+     TOBN(0x860d523d, 0x42e06189), TOBN(0xbf077941, 0x4e3aff13),
+     TOBN(0x0b616dca, 0xc1b20650), TOBN(0xe66dd6d1, 0x2131300d),
+     TOBN(0xd4a0fd67, 0xff99abde), TOBN(0xc9903550, 0xc7aac50d),
+     TOBN(0x022ecf8b, 0x7c46b2d7), TOBN(0x3333b1e8, 0x3abf92af),
+     TOBN(0x11cc113c, 0x6c491c14), TOBN(0x05976688, 0x80dd3f88),
+     TOBN(0xf5b4d9e7, 0x29d932ed), TOBN(0xe982aad8, 0xa2c38b6d),
+     TOBN(0x6f925347, 0x8be0dcf0), TOBN(0x700080ae, 0x65ca53f2),
+     TOBN(0xd8131156, 0x443ca77f), TOBN(0xe92d6942, 0xec51f984),
+     TOBN(0xd2a08af8, 0x85dfe9ae), TOBN(0xd825d9a5, 0x4d2a86ca),
+     TOBN(0x2c53988d, 0x39dff020), TOBN(0xf38b135a, 0x430cdc40),
+     TOBN(0x0c918ae0, 0x62a7150b), TOBN(0xf31fd8de, 0x0c340e9b),
+     TOBN(0xafa0e7ae, 0x4dbbf02e), TOBN(0x5847fb2a, 0x5eba6239),
+     TOBN(0x6b1647dc, 0xdccbac8b), TOBN(0xb642aa78, 0x06f485c8),
+     TOBN(0x873f3765, 0x7038ecdf), TOBN(0x2ce5e865, 0xfa49d3fe),
+     TOBN(0xea223788, 0xc98c4400), TOBN(0x8104a8cd, 0xf1fa5279),
+     TOBN(0xbcf7cc7a, 0x06becfd7), TOBN(0x49424316, 0xc8f974ae),
+     TOBN(0xc0da65e7, 0x84d6365d), TOBN(0xbcb7443f, 0x8f759fb8),
+     TOBN(0x35c712b1, 0x7ae81930), TOBN(0x80428dff, 0x4c6e08ab),
+     TOBN(0xf19dafef, 0xa4faf843), TOBN(0xced8538d, 0xffa9855f),
+     TOBN(0x20ac409c, 0xbe3ac7ce), TOBN(0x358c1fb6, 0x882da71e),
+     TOBN(0xafa9c0e5, 0xfd349961), TOBN(0x2b2cfa51, 0x8421c2fc),
+     TOBN(0x2a80db17, 0xf3a28d38), TOBN(0xa8aba539, 0x5d138e7e),
+     TOBN(0x52012d1d, 0x6e96eb8d), TOBN(0x65d8dea0, 0xcbaf9622),
+     TOBN(0x57735447, 0xb264f56c), TOBN(0xbeebef3f, 0x1b6c8da2),
+     TOBN(0xfc346d98, 0xce785254), TOBN(0xd50e8d72, 0xbb64a161),
+     TOBN(0xc03567c7, 0x49794add), TOBN(0x15a76065, 0x752c7ef6),
+     TOBN(0x59f3a222, 0x961f23d6), TOBN(0x378e4438, 0x73ecc0b0),
+     TOBN(0xc74be434, 0x5a82fde4), TOBN(0xae509af2, 0xd8b9cf34),
+     TOBN(0x4a61ee46, 0x577f44a1), TOBN(0xe09b748c, 0xb611deeb),
+     TOBN(0xc0481b2c, 0xf5f7b884), TOBN(0x35626678, 0x61acfa6b),
+     TOBN(0x37f4c518, 0xbf8d21e6), TOBN(0x22d96531, 0xb205a76d),
+     TOBN(0x37fb85e1, 0x954073c0), TOBN(0xbceafe4f, 0x65b3a567),
+     TOBN(0xefecdef7, 0xbe42a582), TOBN(0xd3fc6080, 0x65046be6),
+     TOBN(0xc9af13c8, 0x09e8dba9), TOBN(0x1e6c9847, 0x641491ff),
+     TOBN(0x3b574925, 0xd30c31f7), TOBN(0xb7eb72ba, 0xac2a2122),
+     TOBN(0x776a0dac, 0xef0859e7), TOBN(0x06fec314, 0x21900942),
+     TOBN(0x2464bc10, 0xf8c22049), TOBN(0x9bfbcce7, 0x875ebf69),
+     TOBN(0xd7a88e2a, 0x4336326b), TOBN(0xda05261c, 0x5bc2acfa),
+     TOBN(0xc29f5bdc, 0xeba7efc8), TOBN(0x471237ca, 0x25dbbf2e),
+     TOBN(0xa72773f2, 0x2975f127), TOBN(0xdc744e8e, 0x04d0b326),
+     TOBN(0x38a7ed16, 0xa56edb73), TOBN(0x64357e37, 0x2c007e70),
+     TOBN(0xa167d15b, 0x5080b400), TOBN(0x07b41164, 0x23de4be1),
+     TOBN(0xb2d91e32, 0x74c89883), TOBN(0x3c162821, 0x2882e7ed),
+     TOBN(0xad6b36ba, 0x7503e482), TOBN(0x48434e8e, 0x0ea34331),
+     TOBN(0x79f4f24f, 0x2c7ae0b9), TOBN(0xc46fbf81, 0x1939b44a),
+     TOBN(0x76fefae8, 0x56595eb1), TOBN(0x417b66ab, 0xcd5f29c7),
+     TOBN(0x5f2332b2, 0xc5ceec20), TOBN(0xd69661ff, 0xe1a1cae2),
+     TOBN(0x5ede7e52, 0x9b0286e6), TOBN(0x9d062529, 0xe276b993),
+     TOBN(0x324794b0, 0x7e50122b), TOBN(0xdd744f8b, 0x4af07ca5),
+     TOBN(0x30a12f08, 0xd63fc97b), TOBN(0x39650f1a, 0x76626d9d),
+     TOBN(0x101b47f7, 0x1fa38477), TOBN(0x3d815f19, 0xd4dc124f),
+     TOBN(0x1569ae95, 0xb26eb58a), TOBN(0xc3cde188, 0x95fb1887),
+     TOBN(0x54e9f37b, 0xf9539a48), TOBN(0xb0100e06, 0x7408c1a5),
+     TOBN(0x821d9811, 0xea580cbb), TOBN(0x8af52d35, 0x86e50c56),
+     TOBN(0xdfbd9d47, 0xdbbf698b), TOBN(0x2961a1ea, 0x03dc1c73),
+     TOBN(0x203d38f8, 0xe76a5df8), TOBN(0x08a53a68, 0x6def707a),
+     TOBN(0x26eefb48, 0x1bee45d4), TOBN(0xb3cee346, 0x3c688036),
+     TOBN(0x463c5315, 0xc42f2469), TOBN(0x19d84d2e, 0x81378162),
+     TOBN(0x22d7c3c5, 0x1c4d349f), TOBN(0x65965844, 0x163d59c5),
+     TOBN(0xcf198c56, 0xb8abceae), TOBN(0x6fb1fb1b, 0x628559d5),
+     TOBN(0x8bbffd06, 0x07bf8fe3), TOBN(0x46259c58, 0x3467734b),
+     TOBN(0xd8953cea, 0x35f7f0d3), TOBN(0x1f0bece2, 0xd65b0ff1),
+     TOBN(0xf7d5b4b3, 0xf3c72914), TOBN(0x29e8ea95, 0x3cb53389),
+     TOBN(0x4a365626, 0x836b6d46), TOBN(0xe849f910, 0xea174fde),
+     TOBN(0x7ec62fbb, 0xf4737f21), TOBN(0xd8dba5ab, 0x6209f5ac),
+     TOBN(0x24b5d7a9, 0xa5f9adbe), TOBN(0x707d28f7, 0xa61dc768),
+     TOBN(0x7711460b, 0xcaa999ea), TOBN(0xba7b174d, 0x1c92e4cc),
+     TOBN(0x3c4bab66, 0x18d4bf2d), TOBN(0xb8f0c980, 0xeb8bd279),
+     TOBN(0x024bea9a, 0x324b4737), TOBN(0xfba9e423, 0x32a83bca),
+     TOBN(0x6e635643, 0xa232dced), TOBN(0x99619367, 0x2571c8ba),
+     TOBN(0xe8c9f357, 0x54b7032b), TOBN(0xf936b3ba, 0x2442d54a),
+     TOBN(0x2263f0f0, 0x8290c65a), TOBN(0x48989780, 0xee2c7fdb),
+     TOBN(0xadc5d55a, 0x13d4f95e), TOBN(0x737cff85, 0xad9b8500),
+     TOBN(0x271c557b, 0x8a73f43d), TOBN(0xbed617a4, 0xe18bc476),
+     TOBN(0x66245401, 0x7dfd8ab2), TOBN(0xae7b89ae, 0x3a2870aa),
+     TOBN(0x1b555f53, 0x23a7e545), TOBN(0x6791e247, 0xbe057e4c),
+     TOBN(0x860136ad, 0x324fa34d), TOBN(0xea111447, 0x4cbeae28),
+     TOBN(0x023a4270, 0xbedd3299), TOBN(0x3d5c3a7f, 0xc1c35c34),
+     TOBN(0xb0f6db67, 0x8d0412d2), TOBN(0xd92625e2, 0xfcdc6b9a),
+     TOBN(0x92ae5ccc, 0x4e28a982), TOBN(0xea251c36, 0x47a3ce7e),
+     TOBN(0x9d658932, 0x790691bf), TOBN(0xed610589, 0x06b736ae),
+     TOBN(0x712c2f04, 0xc0d63b6e), TOBN(0x5cf06fd5, 0xc63d488f),
+     TOBN(0x97363fac, 0xd9588e41), TOBN(0x1f9bf762, 0x2b93257e),
+     TOBN(0xa9d1ffc4, 0x667acace), TOBN(0x1cf4a1aa, 0x0a061ecf),
+     TOBN(0x40e48a49, 0xdc1818d0), TOBN(0x0643ff39, 0xa3621ab0),
+     TOBN(0x5768640c, 0xe39ef639), TOBN(0x1fc099ea, 0x04d86854),
+     TOBN(0x9130b9c3, 0xeccd28fd), TOBN(0xd743cbd2, 0x7eec54ab),
+     TOBN(0x052b146f, 0xe5b475b6), TOBN(0x058d9a82, 0x900a7d1f),
+     TOBN(0x65e02292, 0x91262b72), TOBN(0x96f924f9, 0xbb0edf03),
+     TOBN(0x5cfa59c8, 0xfe206842), TOBN(0xf6037004, 0x5eafa720),
+     TOBN(0x5f30699e, 0x18d7dd96), TOBN(0x381e8782, 0xcbab2495),
+     TOBN(0x91669b46, 0xdd8be949), TOBN(0xb40606f5, 0x26aae8ef),
+     TOBN(0x2812b839, 0xfc6751a4), TOBN(0x16196214, 0xfba800ef),
+     TOBN(0x4398d5ca, 0x4c1a2875), TOBN(0x720c00ee, 0x653d8349),
+     TOBN(0xc2699eb0, 0xd820007c), TOBN(0x880ee660, 0xa39b5825),
+     TOBN(0x70694694, 0x471f6984), TOBN(0xf7d16ea8, 0xe3dda99a),
+     TOBN(0x28d675b2, 0xc0519a23), TOBN(0x9ebf94fe, 0x4f6952e3),
+     TOBN(0xf28bb767, 0xa2294a8a), TOBN(0x85512b4d, 0xfe0af3f5),
+     TOBN(0x18958ba8, 0x99b16a0d), TOBN(0x95c2430c, 0xba7548a7),
+     TOBN(0xb30d1b10, 0xa16be615), TOBN(0xe3ebbb97, 0x85bfb74c),
+     TOBN(0xa3273cfe, 0x18549fdb), TOBN(0xf6e200bf, 0x4fcdb792),
+     TOBN(0x54a76e18, 0x83aba56c), TOBN(0x73ec66f6, 0x89ef6aa2),
+     TOBN(0x8d17add7, 0xd1b9a305), TOBN(0xa959c5b9, 0xb7ae1b9d),
+     TOBN(0x88643522, 0x6bcc094a), TOBN(0xcc5616c4, 0xd7d429b9),
+     TOBN(0xa6dada01, 0xe6a33f7c), TOBN(0xc6217a07, 0x9d4e70ad),
+     TOBN(0xd619a818, 0x09c15b7c), TOBN(0xea06b329, 0x0e80c854),
+     TOBN(0x174811ce, 0xa5f5e7b9), TOBN(0x66dfc310, 0x787c65f4),
+     TOBN(0x4ea7bd69, 0x3316ab54), TOBN(0xc12c4acb, 0x1dcc0f70),
+     TOBN(0xe4308d1a, 0x1e407dd9), TOBN(0xe8a3587c, 0x91afa997),
+     TOBN(0xea296c12, 0xab77b7a5), TOBN(0xb5ad49e4, 0x673c0d52),
+     TOBN(0x40f9b2b2, 0x7006085a), TOBN(0xa88ff340, 0x87bf6ec2),
+     TOBN(0x978603b1, 0x4e3066a6), TOBN(0xb3f99fc2, 0xb5e486e2),
+     TOBN(0x07b53f5e, 0xb2e63645), TOBN(0xbe57e547, 0x84c84232),
+     TOBN(0xd779c216, 0x7214d5cf), TOBN(0x617969cd, 0x029a3aca),
+     TOBN(0xd17668cd, 0x8a7017a0), TOBN(0x77b4d19a, 0xbe9b7ee8),
+     TOBN(0x58fd0e93, 0x9c161776), TOBN(0xa8c4f4ef, 0xd5968a72),
+     TOBN(0x296071cc, 0x67b3de77), TOBN(0xae3c0b8e, 0x634f7905),
+     TOBN(0x67e440c2, 0x8a7100c9), TOBN(0xbb8c3c1b, 0xeb4b9b42),
+     TOBN(0x6d71e8ea, 0xc51b3583), TOBN(0x7591f5af, 0x9525e642),
+     TOBN(0xf73a2f7b, 0x13f509f3), TOBN(0x618487aa, 0x5619ac9b),
+     TOBN(0x3a72e5f7, 0x9d61718a), TOBN(0x00413bcc, 0x7592d28c),
+     TOBN(0x7d9b11d3, 0x963c35cf), TOBN(0x77623bcf, 0xb90a46ed),
+     TOBN(0xdeef273b, 0xdcdd2a50), TOBN(0x4a741f9b, 0x0601846e),
+     TOBN(0x33b89e51, 0x0ec6e929), TOBN(0xcb02319f, 0x8b7f22cd),
+     TOBN(0xbbe1500d, 0x084bae24), TOBN(0x2f0ae8d7, 0x343d2693),
+     TOBN(0xacffb5f2, 0x7cdef811), TOBN(0xaa0c030a, 0x263fb94f),
+     TOBN(0x6eef0d61, 0xa0f442de), TOBN(0xf92e1817, 0x27b139d3),
+     TOBN(0x1ae6deb7, 0x0ad8bc28), TOBN(0xa89e38dc, 0xc0514130),
+     TOBN(0x81eeb865, 0xd2fdca23), TOBN(0x5a15ee08, 0xcc8ef895),
+     TOBN(0x768fa10a, 0x01905614), TOBN(0xeff5b8ef, 0x880ee19b),
+     TOBN(0xf0c0cabb, 0xcb1c8a0e), TOBN(0x2e1ee9cd, 0xb8c838f9),
+     TOBN(0x0587d8b8, 0x8a4a14c0), TOBN(0xf6f27896, 0x2ff698e5),
+     TOBN(0xed38ef1c, 0x89ee6256), TOBN(0xf44ee1fe, 0x6b353b45),
+     TOBN(0x9115c0c7, 0x70e903b3), TOBN(0xc78ec0a1, 0x818f31df),
+     TOBN(0x6c003324, 0xb7dccbc6), TOBN(0xd96dd1f3, 0x163bbc25),
+     TOBN(0x33aa82dd, 0x5cedd805), TOBN(0x123aae4f, 0x7f7eb2f1),
+     TOBN(0x1723fcf5, 0xa26262cd), TOBN(0x1f7f4d5d, 0x0060ebd5),
+     TOBN(0xf19c5c01, 0xb2eaa3af), TOBN(0x2ccb9b14, 0x9790accf),
+     TOBN(0x1f9c1cad, 0x52324aa6), TOBN(0x63200526, 0x7247df54),
+     TOBN(0x5732fe42, 0xbac96f82), TOBN(0x52fe771f, 0x01a1c384),
+     TOBN(0x546ca13d, 0xb1001684), TOBN(0xb56b4eee, 0xa1709f75),
+     TOBN(0x266545a9, 0xd5db8672), TOBN(0xed971c90, 0x1e8f3cfb),
+     TOBN(0x4e7d8691, 0xe3a07b29), TOBN(0x7570d9ec, 0xe4b696b9),
+     TOBN(0xdc5fa067, 0x7bc7e9ae), TOBN(0x68b44caf, 0xc82c4844),
+     TOBN(0x519d34b3, 0xbf44da80), TOBN(0x283834f9, 0x5ab32e66),
+     TOBN(0x6e608797, 0x6278a000), TOBN(0x1e62960e, 0x627312f6),
+     TOBN(0x9b87b27b, 0xe6901c55), TOBN(0x80e78538, 0x24fdbc1f),
+     TOBN(0xbbbc0951, 0x2facc27d), TOBN(0x06394239, 0xac143b5a),
+     TOBN(0x35bb4a40, 0x376c1944), TOBN(0x7cb62694, 0x63da1511),
+     TOBN(0xafd29161, 0xb7148a3b), TOBN(0xa6f9d9ed, 0x4e2ea2ee),
+     TOBN(0x15dc2ca2, 0x880dd212), TOBN(0x903c3813, 0xa61139a9),
+     TOBN(0x2aa7b46d, 0x6c0f8785), TOBN(0x36ce2871, 0x901c60ff),
+     TOBN(0xc683b028, 0xe10d9c12), TOBN(0x7573baa2, 0x032f33d3),
+     TOBN(0x87a9b1f6, 0x67a31b58), TOBN(0xfd3ed11a, 0xf4ffae12),
+     TOBN(0x83dcaa9a, 0x0cb2748e), TOBN(0x8239f018, 0x5d6fdf16),
+     TOBN(0xba67b49c, 0x72753941), TOBN(0x2beec455, 0xc321cb36),
+     TOBN(0x88015606, 0x3f8b84ce), TOBN(0x76417083, 0x8d38c86f),
+     TOBN(0x054f1ca7, 0x598953dd), TOBN(0xc939e110, 0x4e8e7429),
+     TOBN(0x9b1ac2b3, 0x5a914f2f), TOBN(0x39e35ed3, 0xe74b8f9c),
+     TOBN(0xd0debdb2, 0x781b2fb0), TOBN(0x1585638f, 0x2d997ba2),
+     TOBN(0x9c4b646e, 0x9e2fce99), TOBN(0x68a21081, 0x1e80857f),
+     TOBN(0x06d54e44, 0x3643b52a), TOBN(0xde8d6d63, 0x0d8eb843),
+     TOBN(0x70321563, 0x42146a0a), TOBN(0x8ba826f2, 0x5eaa3622),
+     TOBN(0x227a58bd, 0x86138787), TOBN(0x43b6c03c, 0x10281d37),
+     TOBN(0x6326afbb, 0xb54dde39), TOBN(0x744e5e8a, 0xdb6f2d5f),
+     TOBN(0x48b2a99a, 0xcff158e1), TOBN(0xa93c8fa0, 0xef87918f),
+     TOBN(0x2182f956, 0xde058c5c), TOBN(0x216235d2, 0x936f9e7a),
+     TOBN(0xace0c0db, 0xd2e31e67), TOBN(0xc96449bf, 0xf23ac3e7),
+     TOBN(0x7e9a2874, 0x170693bd), TOBN(0xa28e14fd, 0xa45e6335),
+     TOBN(0x5757f6b3, 0x56427344), TOBN(0x822e4556, 0xacf8edf9),
+     TOBN(0x2b7a6ee2, 0xe6a285cd), TOBN(0x5866f211, 0xa9df3af0),
+     TOBN(0x40dde2dd, 0xf845b844), TOBN(0x986c3726, 0x110e5e49),
+     TOBN(0x73680c2a, 0xf7172277), TOBN(0x57b94f0f, 0x0cccb244),
+     TOBN(0xbdff7267, 0x2d438ca7), TOBN(0xbad1ce11, 0xcf4663fd),
+     TOBN(0x9813ed9d, 0xd8f71cae), TOBN(0xf43272a6, 0x961fdaa6),
+     TOBN(0xbeff0119, 0xbd6d1637), TOBN(0xfebc4f91, 0x30361978),
+     TOBN(0x02b37a95, 0x2f41deff), TOBN(0x0e44a59a, 0xe63b89b7),
+     TOBN(0x673257dc, 0x143ff951), TOBN(0x19c02205, 0xd752baf4),
+     TOBN(0x46c23069, 0xc4b7d692), TOBN(0x2e6392c3, 0xfd1502ac),
+     TOBN(0x6057b1a2, 0x1b220846), TOBN(0xe51ff946, 0x0c1b5b63),}
+    ,
+    {TOBN(0x6e85cb51, 0x566c5c43), TOBN(0xcff9c919, 0x3597f046),
+     TOBN(0x9354e90c, 0x4994d94a), TOBN(0xe0a39332, 0x2147927d),
+     TOBN(0x8427fac1, 0x0dc1eb2b), TOBN(0x88cfd8c2, 0x2ff319fa),
+     TOBN(0xe2d4e684, 0x01965274), TOBN(0xfa2e067d, 0x67aaa746),
+     TOBN(0xb6d92a7f, 0x3e5f9f11), TOBN(0x9afe153a, 0xd6cb3b8e),
+     TOBN(0x4d1a6dd7, 0xddf800bd), TOBN(0xf6c13cc0, 0xcaf17e19),
+     TOBN(0x15f6c58e, 0x325fc3ee), TOBN(0x71095400, 0xa31dc3b2),
+     TOBN(0x168e7c07, 0xafa3d3e7), TOBN(0x3f8417a1, 0x94c7ae2d),
+     TOBN(0xec234772, 0x813b230d), TOBN(0x634d0f5f, 0x17344427),
+     TOBN(0x11548ab1, 0xd77fc56a), TOBN(0x7fab1750, 0xce06af77),
+     TOBN(0xb62c10a7, 0x4f7c4f83), TOBN(0xa7d2edc4, 0x220a67d9),
+     TOBN(0x1c404170, 0x921209a0), TOBN(0x0b9815a0, 0xface59f0),
+     TOBN(0x2842589b, 0x319540c3), TOBN(0x18490f59, 0xa283d6f8),
+     TOBN(0xa2731f84, 0xdaae9fcb), TOBN(0x3db6d960, 0xc3683ba0),
+     TOBN(0xc85c63bb, 0x14611069), TOBN(0xb19436af, 0x0788bf05),
+     TOBN(0x905459df, 0x347460d2), TOBN(0x73f6e094, 0xe11a7db1),
+     TOBN(0xdc7f938e, 0xb6357f37), TOBN(0xc5d00f79, 0x2bd8aa62),
+     TOBN(0xc878dcb9, 0x2ca979fc), TOBN(0x37e83ed9, 0xeb023a99),
+     TOBN(0x6b23e273, 0x1560bf3d), TOBN(0x1086e459, 0x1d0fae61),
+     TOBN(0x78248316, 0x9a9414bd), TOBN(0x1b956bc0, 0xf0ea9ea1),
+     TOBN(0x7b85bb91, 0xc31b9c38), TOBN(0x0c5aa90b, 0x48ef57b5),
+     TOBN(0xdedeb169, 0xaf3bab6f), TOBN(0xe610ad73, 0x2d373685),
+     TOBN(0xf13870df, 0x02ba8e15), TOBN(0x0337edb6, 0x8ca7f771),
+     TOBN(0xe4acf747, 0xb62c036c), TOBN(0xd921d576, 0xb6b94e81),
+     TOBN(0xdbc86439, 0x2c422f7a), TOBN(0xfb635362, 0xed348898),
+     TOBN(0x83084668, 0xc45bfcd1), TOBN(0xc357c9e3, 0x2b315e11),
+     TOBN(0xb173b540, 0x5b2e5b8c), TOBN(0x7e946931, 0xe102b9a4),
+     TOBN(0x17c890eb, 0x7b0fb199), TOBN(0xec225a83, 0xd61b662b),
+     TOBN(0xf306a3c8, 0xee3c76cb), TOBN(0x3cf11623, 0xd32a1f6e),
+     TOBN(0xe6d5ab64, 0x6863e956), TOBN(0x3b8a4cbe, 0x5c005c26),
+     TOBN(0xdcd529a5, 0x9ce6bb27), TOBN(0xc4afaa52, 0x04d4b16f),
+     TOBN(0xb0624a26, 0x7923798d), TOBN(0x85e56df6, 0x6b307fab),
+     TOBN(0x0281893c, 0x2bf29698), TOBN(0x91fc19a4, 0xd7ce7603),
+     TOBN(0x75a5dca3, 0xad9a558f), TOBN(0x40ceb3fa, 0x4d50bf77),
+     TOBN(0x1baf6060, 0xbc9ba369), TOBN(0x927e1037, 0x597888c2),
+     TOBN(0xd936bf19, 0x86a34c07), TOBN(0xd4cf10c1, 0xc34ae980),
+     TOBN(0x3a3e5334, 0x859dd614), TOBN(0x9c475b5b, 0x18d0c8ee),
+     TOBN(0x63080d1f, 0x07cd51d5), TOBN(0xc9c0d0a6, 0xb88b4326),
+     TOBN(0x1ac98691, 0xc234296f), TOBN(0x2a0a83a4, 0x94887fb6),
+     TOBN(0x56511427, 0x0cea9cf2), TOBN(0x5230a6e8, 0xa24802f5),
+     TOBN(0xf7a2bf0f, 0x72e3d5c1), TOBN(0x37717446, 0x4f21439e),
+     TOBN(0xfedcbf25, 0x9ce30334), TOBN(0xe0030a78, 0x7ce202f9),
+     TOBN(0x6f2d9ebf, 0x1202e9ca), TOBN(0xe79dde6c, 0x75e6e591),
+     TOBN(0xf52072af, 0xf1dac4f8), TOBN(0x6c8d087e, 0xbb9b404d),
+     TOBN(0xad0fc73d, 0xbce913af), TOBN(0x909e587b, 0x458a07cb),
+     TOBN(0x1300da84, 0xd4f00c8a), TOBN(0x425cd048, 0xb54466ac),
+     TOBN(0xb59cb9be, 0x90e9d8bf), TOBN(0x991616db, 0x3e431b0e),
+     TOBN(0xd3aa117a, 0x531aecff), TOBN(0x91af92d3, 0x59f4dc3b),
+     TOBN(0x9b1ec292, 0xe93fda29), TOBN(0x76bb6c17, 0xe97d91bc),
+     TOBN(0x7509d95f, 0xaface1e6), TOBN(0x3653fe47, 0xbe855ae3),
+     TOBN(0x73180b28, 0x0f680e75), TOBN(0x75eefd1b, 0xeeb6c26c),
+     TOBN(0xa4cdf29f, 0xb66d4236), TOBN(0x2d70a997, 0x6b5821d8),
+     TOBN(0x7a3ee207, 0x20445c36), TOBN(0x71d1ac82, 0x59877174),
+     TOBN(0x0fc539f7, 0x949f73e9), TOBN(0xd05cf3d7, 0x982e3081),
+     TOBN(0x8758e20b, 0x7b1c7129), TOBN(0xffadcc20, 0x569e61f2),
+     TOBN(0xb05d3a2f, 0x59544c2d), TOBN(0xbe16f5c1, 0x9fff5e53),
+     TOBN(0x73cf65b8, 0xaad58135), TOBN(0x622c2119, 0x037aa5be),
+     TOBN(0x79373b3f, 0x646fd6a0), TOBN(0x0e029db5, 0x0d3978cf),
+     TOBN(0x8bdfc437, 0x94fba037), TOBN(0xaefbd687, 0x620797a6),
+     TOBN(0x3fa5382b, 0xbd30d38e), TOBN(0x7627cfbf, 0x585d7464),
+     TOBN(0xb2330fef, 0x4e4ca463), TOBN(0xbcef7287, 0x3566cc63),
+     TOBN(0xd161d2ca, 0xcf780900), TOBN(0x135dc539, 0x5b54827d),
+     TOBN(0x638f052e, 0x27bf1bc6), TOBN(0x10a224f0, 0x07dfa06c),
+     TOBN(0xe973586d, 0x6d3321da), TOBN(0x8b0c5738, 0x26152c8f),
+     TOBN(0x07ef4f2a, 0x34606074), TOBN(0x80fe7fe8, 0xa0f7047a),
+     TOBN(0x3d1a8152, 0xe1a0e306), TOBN(0x32cf43d8, 0x88da5222),
+     TOBN(0xbf89a95f, 0x5f02ffe6), TOBN(0x3d9eb9a4, 0x806ad3ea),
+     TOBN(0x012c17bb, 0x79c8e55e), TOBN(0xfdcd1a74, 0x99c81dac),
+     TOBN(0x7043178b, 0xb9556098), TOBN(0x4090a1df, 0x801c3886),
+     TOBN(0x759800ff, 0x9b67b912), TOBN(0x3e5c0304, 0x232620c8),
+     TOBN(0x4b9d3c4b, 0x70dceeca), TOBN(0xbb2d3c15, 0x181f648e),
+     TOBN(0xf981d837, 0x6e33345c), TOBN(0xb626289b, 0x0cf2297a),
+     TOBN(0x766ac659, 0x8baebdcf), TOBN(0x1a28ae09, 0x75df01e5),
+     TOBN(0xb71283da, 0x375876d8), TOBN(0x4865a96d, 0x607b9800),
+     TOBN(0x25dd1bcd, 0x237936b2), TOBN(0x332f4f4b, 0x60417494),
+     TOBN(0xd0923d68, 0x370a2147), TOBN(0x497f5dfb, 0xdc842203),
+     TOBN(0x9dc74cbd, 0x32be5e0f), TOBN(0x7475bcb7, 0x17a01375),
+     TOBN(0x438477c9, 0x50d872b1), TOBN(0xcec67879, 0xffe1d63d),
+     TOBN(0x9b006014, 0xd8578c70), TOBN(0xc9ad99a8, 0x78bb6b8b),
+     TOBN(0x6799008e, 0x11fb3806), TOBN(0xcfe81435, 0xcd44cab3),
+     TOBN(0xa2ee1582, 0x2f4fb344), TOBN(0xb8823450, 0x483fa6eb),
+     TOBN(0x622d323d, 0x652c7749), TOBN(0xd8474a98, 0xbeb0a15b),
+     TOBN(0xe43c154d, 0x5d1c00d0), TOBN(0x7fd581d9, 0x0e3e7aac),
+     TOBN(0x2b44c619, 0x2525ddf8), TOBN(0x67a033eb, 0xb8ae9739),
+     TOBN(0x113ffec1, 0x9ef2d2e4), TOBN(0x1bf6767e, 0xd5a0ea7f),
+     TOBN(0x57fff75e, 0x03714c0a), TOBN(0xa23c422e, 0x0a23e9ee),
+     TOBN(0xdd5f6b2d, 0x540f83af), TOBN(0xc2c2c27e, 0x55ea46a7),
+     TOBN(0xeb6b4246, 0x672a1208), TOBN(0xd13599f7, 0xae634f7a),
+     TOBN(0xcf914b5c, 0xd7b32c6e), TOBN(0x61a5a640, 0xeaf61814),
+     TOBN(0x8dc3df8b, 0x208a1bbb), TOBN(0xef627fd6, 0xb6d79aa5),
+     TOBN(0x44232ffc, 0xc4c86bc8), TOBN(0xe6f9231b, 0x061539fe),
+     TOBN(0x1d04f25a, 0x958b9533), TOBN(0x180cf934, 0x49e8c885),
+     TOBN(0x89689595, 0x9884aaf7), TOBN(0xb1959be3, 0x07b348a6),
+     TOBN(0x96250e57, 0x3c147c87), TOBN(0xae0efb3a, 0xdd0c61f8),
+     TOBN(0xed00745e, 0xca8c325e), TOBN(0x3c911696, 0xecff3f70),
+     TOBN(0x73acbc65, 0x319ad41d), TOBN(0x7b01a020, 0xf0b1c7ef),
+     TOBN(0xea32b293, 0x63a1483f), TOBN(0x89eabe71, 0x7a248f96),
+     TOBN(0x9c6231d3, 0x343157e5), TOBN(0x93a375e5, 0xdf3c546d),
+     TOBN(0xe76e9343, 0x6a2afe69), TOBN(0xc4f89100, 0xe166c88e),
+     TOBN(0x248efd0d, 0x4f872093), TOBN(0xae0eb3ea, 0x8fe0ea61),
+     TOBN(0xaf89790d, 0x9d79046e), TOBN(0x4d650f2d, 0x6cee0976),
+     TOBN(0xa3935d9a, 0x43071eca), TOBN(0x66fcd2c9, 0x283b0bfe),
+     TOBN(0x0e665eb5, 0x696605f1), TOBN(0xe77e5d07, 0xa54cd38d),
+     TOBN(0x90ee050a, 0x43d950cf), TOBN(0x86ddebda, 0xd32e69b5),
+     TOBN(0x6ad94a3d, 0xfddf7415), TOBN(0xf7fa1309, 0x3f6e8d5a),
+     TOBN(0xc4831d1d, 0xe9957f75), TOBN(0x7de28501, 0xd5817447),
+     TOBN(0x6f1d7078, 0x9e2aeb6b), TOBN(0xba2b9ff4, 0xf67a53c2),
+     TOBN(0x36963767, 0xdf9defc3), TOBN(0x479deed3, 0x0d38022c),
+     TOBN(0xd2edb89b, 0x3a8631e8), TOBN(0x8de855de, 0x7a213746),
+     TOBN(0xb2056cb7, 0xb00c5f11), TOBN(0xdeaefbd0, 0x2c9b85e4),
+     TOBN(0x03f39a8d, 0xd150892d), TOBN(0x37b84686, 0x218b7985),
+     TOBN(0x36296dd8, 0xb7375f1a), TOBN(0x472cd4b1, 0xb78e898e),
+     TOBN(0x15dff651, 0xe9f05de9), TOBN(0xd4045069, 0x2ce98ba9),
+     TOBN(0x8466a7ae, 0x9b38024c), TOBN(0xb910e700, 0xe5a6b5ef),
+     TOBN(0xae1c56ea, 0xb3aa8f0d), TOBN(0xbab2a507, 0x7eee74a6),
+     TOBN(0x0dca11e2, 0x4b4c4620), TOBN(0xfd896e2e, 0x4c47d1f4),
+     TOBN(0xeb45ae53, 0x308fbd93), TOBN(0x46cd5a2e, 0x02c36fda),
+     TOBN(0x6a3d4e90, 0xbaa48385), TOBN(0xdd55e62e, 0x9dbe9960),
+     TOBN(0xa1406aa0, 0x2a81ede7), TOBN(0x6860dd14, 0xf9274ea7),
+     TOBN(0xcfdcb0c2, 0x80414f86), TOBN(0xff410b10, 0x22f94327),
+     TOBN(0x5a33cc38, 0x49ad467b), TOBN(0xefb48b6c, 0x0a7335f1),
+     TOBN(0x14fb54a4, 0xb153a360), TOBN(0x604aa9d2, 0xb52469cc),
+     TOBN(0x5e9dc486, 0x754e48e9), TOBN(0x693cb455, 0x37471e8e),
+     TOBN(0xfb2fd7cd, 0x8d3b37b6), TOBN(0x63345e16, 0xcf09ff07),
+     TOBN(0x9910ba6b, 0x23a5d896), TOBN(0x1fe19e35, 0x7fe4364e),
+     TOBN(0x6e1da8c3, 0x9a33c677), TOBN(0x15b4488b, 0x29fd9fd0),
+     TOBN(0x1f439254, 0x1a1f22bf), TOBN(0x920a8a70, 0xab8163e8),
+     TOBN(0x3fd1b249, 0x07e5658e), TOBN(0xf2c4f79c, 0xb6ec839b),
+     TOBN(0x1abbc3d0, 0x4aa38d1b), TOBN(0x3b0db35c, 0xb5d9510e),
+     TOBN(0x1754ac78, 0x3e60dec0), TOBN(0x53272fd7, 0xea099b33),
+     TOBN(0x5fb0494f, 0x07a8e107), TOBN(0x4a89e137, 0x6a8191fa),
+     TOBN(0xa113b7f6, 0x3c4ad544), TOBN(0x88a2e909, 0x6cb9897b),
+     TOBN(0x17d55de3, 0xb44a3f84), TOBN(0xacb2f344, 0x17c6c690),
+     TOBN(0x32088168, 0x10232390), TOBN(0xf2e8a61f, 0x6c733bf7),
+     TOBN(0xa774aab6, 0x9c2d7652), TOBN(0xfb5307e3, 0xed95c5bc),
+     TOBN(0xa05c73c2, 0x4981f110), TOBN(0x1baae31c, 0xa39458c9),
+     TOBN(0x1def185b, 0xcbea62e7), TOBN(0xe8ac9eae, 0xeaf63059),
+     TOBN(0x098a8cfd, 0x9921851c), TOBN(0xd959c3f1, 0x3abe2f5b),
+     TOBN(0xa4f19525, 0x20e40ae5), TOBN(0x320789e3, 0x07a24aa1),
+     TOBN(0x259e6927, 0x7392b2bc), TOBN(0x58f6c667, 0x1918668b),
+     TOBN(0xce1db2bb, 0xc55d2d8b), TOBN(0x41d58bb7, 0xf4f6ca56),
+     TOBN(0x7650b680, 0x8f877614), TOBN(0x905e16ba, 0xf4c349ed),
+     TOBN(0xed415140, 0xf661acac), TOBN(0x3b8784f0, 0xcb2270af),
+     TOBN(0x3bc280ac, 0x8a402cba), TOBN(0xd53f7146, 0x0937921a),
+     TOBN(0xc03c8ee5, 0xe5681e83), TOBN(0x62126105, 0xf6ac9e4a),
+     TOBN(0x9503a53f, 0x936b1a38), TOBN(0x3d45e2d4, 0x782fecbd),
+     TOBN(0x69a5c439, 0x76e8ae98), TOBN(0xb53b2eeb, 0xbfb4b00e),
+     TOBN(0xf1674712, 0x72386c89), TOBN(0x30ca34a2, 0x4268bce4),
+     TOBN(0x7f1ed86c, 0x78341730), TOBN(0x8ef5beb8, 0xb525e248),
+     TOBN(0xbbc489fd, 0xb74fbf38), TOBN(0x38a92a0e, 0x91a0b382),
+     TOBN(0x7a77ba3f, 0x22433ccf), TOBN(0xde8362d6, 0xa29f05a9),
+     TOBN(0x7f6a30ea, 0x61189afc), TOBN(0x693b5505, 0x59ef114f),
+     TOBN(0x50266bc0, 0xcd1797a1), TOBN(0xea17b47e, 0xf4b7af2d),
+     TOBN(0xd6c4025c, 0x3df9483e), TOBN(0x8cbb9d9f, 0xa37b18c9),
+     TOBN(0x91cbfd9c, 0x4d8424cf), TOBN(0xdb7048f1, 0xab1c3506),
+     TOBN(0x9eaf641f, 0x028206a3), TOBN(0xf986f3f9, 0x25bdf6ce),
+     TOBN(0x262143b5, 0x224c08dc), TOBN(0x2bbb09b4, 0x81b50c91),
+     TOBN(0xc16ed709, 0xaca8c84f), TOBN(0xa6210d9d, 0xb2850ca8),
+     TOBN(0x6d8df67a, 0x09cb54d6), TOBN(0x91eef6e0, 0x500919a4),
+     TOBN(0x90f61381, 0x0f132857), TOBN(0x9acede47, 0xf8d5028b),
+     TOBN(0x844d1b71, 0x90b771c3), TOBN(0x563b71e4, 0xba6426be),
+     TOBN(0x2efa2e83, 0xbdb802ff), TOBN(0x3410cbab, 0xab5b4a41),
+     TOBN(0x555b2d26, 0x30da84dd), TOBN(0xd0711ae9, 0xee1cc29a),
+     TOBN(0xcf3e8c60, 0x2f547792), TOBN(0x03d7d5de, 0xdc678b35),
+     TOBN(0x071a2fa8, 0xced806b8), TOBN(0x222e6134, 0x697f1478),
+     TOBN(0xdc16fd5d, 0xabfcdbbf), TOBN(0x44912ebf, 0x121b53b8),
+     TOBN(0xac943674, 0x2496c27c), TOBN(0x8ea3176c, 0x1ffc26b0),
+     TOBN(0xb6e224ac, 0x13debf2c), TOBN(0x524cc235, 0xf372a832),
+     TOBN(0xd706e1d8, 0x9f6f1b18), TOBN(0x2552f005, 0x44cce35b),
+     TOBN(0x8c8326c2, 0xa88e31fc), TOBN(0xb5468b2c, 0xf9552047),
+     TOBN(0xce683e88, 0x3ff90f2b), TOBN(0x77947bdf, 0x2f0a5423),
+     TOBN(0xd0a1b28b, 0xed56e328), TOBN(0xaee35253, 0xc20134ac),
+     TOBN(0x7e98367d, 0x3567962f), TOBN(0x379ed61f, 0x8188bffb),
+     TOBN(0x73bba348, 0xfaf130a1), TOBN(0x6c1f75e1, 0x904ed734),
+     TOBN(0x18956642, 0x3b4a79fc), TOBN(0xf20bc83d, 0x54ef4493),
+     TOBN(0x836d425d, 0x9111eca1), TOBN(0xe5b5c318, 0x009a8dcf),
+     TOBN(0x3360b25d, 0x13221bc5), TOBN(0x707baad2, 0x6b3eeaf7),
+     TOBN(0xd7279ed8, 0x743a95a1), TOBN(0x7450a875, 0x969e809f),
+     TOBN(0x32b6bd53, 0xe5d0338f), TOBN(0x1e77f7af, 0x2b883bbc),
+     TOBN(0x90da12cc, 0x1063ecd0), TOBN(0xe2697b58, 0xc315be47),
+     TOBN(0x2771a5bd, 0xda85d534), TOBN(0x53e78c1f, 0xff980eea),
+     TOBN(0xadf1cf84, 0x900385e7), TOBN(0x7d3b14f6, 0xc9387b62),
+     TOBN(0x170e74b0, 0xcb8f2bd2), TOBN(0x2d50b486, 0x827fa993),
+     TOBN(0xcdbe8c9a, 0xf6f32bab), TOBN(0x55e906b0, 0xc3b93ab8),
+     TOBN(0x747f22fc, 0x8fe280d1), TOBN(0xcd8e0de5, 0xb2e114ab),
+     TOBN(0x5ab7dbeb, 0xe10b68b0), TOBN(0x9dc63a9c, 0xa480d4b2),
+     TOBN(0x78d4bc3b, 0x4be1495f), TOBN(0x25eb3db8, 0x9359122d),
+     TOBN(0x3f8ac05b, 0x0809cbdc), TOBN(0xbf4187bb, 0xd37c702f),
+     TOBN(0x84cea069, 0x1416a6a5), TOBN(0x8f860c79, 0x43ef881c),
+     TOBN(0x41311f8a, 0x38038a5d), TOBN(0xe78c2ec0, 0xfc612067),
+     TOBN(0x494d2e81, 0x5ad73581), TOBN(0xb4cc9e00, 0x59604097),
+     TOBN(0xff558aec, 0xf3612cba), TOBN(0x35beef7a, 0x9e36c39e),
+     TOBN(0x1845c7cf, 0xdbcf41b9), TOBN(0x5703662a, 0xaea997c0),
+     TOBN(0x8b925afe, 0xe402f6d8), TOBN(0xd0a1b1ae, 0x4dd72162),
+     TOBN(0x9f47b375, 0x03c41c4b), TOBN(0xa023829b, 0x0391d042),
+     TOBN(0x5f5045c3, 0x503b8b0a), TOBN(0x123c2688, 0x98c010e5),
+     TOBN(0x324ec0cc, 0x36ba06ee), TOBN(0xface3115, 0x3dd2cc0c),
+     TOBN(0xb364f3be, 0xf333e91f), TOBN(0xef8aff73, 0x28e832b0),
+     TOBN(0x1e9bad04, 0x2d05841b), TOBN(0x42f0e3df, 0x356a21e2),
+     TOBN(0xa3270bcb, 0x4add627e), TOBN(0xb09a8158, 0xd322e711),
+     TOBN(0x86e326a1, 0x0fee104a), TOBN(0xad7788f8, 0x3703f65d),
+     TOBN(0x7e765430, 0x47bc4833), TOBN(0x6cee582b, 0x2b9b893a),
+     TOBN(0x9cd2a167, 0xe8f55a7b), TOBN(0xefbee3c6, 0xd9e4190d),
+     TOBN(0x33ee7185, 0xd40c2e9d), TOBN(0x844cc9c5, 0xa380b548),
+     TOBN(0x323f8ecd, 0x66926e04), TOBN(0x0001e38f, 0x8110c1ba),
+     TOBN(0x8dbcac12, 0xfc6a7f07), TOBN(0xd65e1d58, 0x0cec0827),
+     TOBN(0xd2cd4141, 0xbe76ca2d), TOBN(0x7895cf5c, 0xe892f33a),
+     TOBN(0x956d230d, 0x367139d2), TOBN(0xa91abd3e, 0xd012c4c1),
+     TOBN(0x34fa4883, 0x87eb36bf), TOBN(0xc5f07102, 0x914b8fb4),
+     TOBN(0x90f0e579, 0xadb9c95f), TOBN(0xfe6ea8cb, 0x28888195),
+     TOBN(0x7b9b5065, 0xedfa9284), TOBN(0x6c510bd2, 0x2b8c8d65),
+     TOBN(0xd7b8ebef, 0xcbe8aafd), TOBN(0xedb3af98, 0x96b1da07),
+     TOBN(0x28ff779d, 0x6295d426), TOBN(0x0c4f6ac7, 0x3fa3ad7b),
+     TOBN(0xec44d054, 0x8b8e2604), TOBN(0x9b32a66d, 0x8b0050e1),
+     TOBN(0x1f943366, 0xf0476ce2), TOBN(0x7554d953, 0xa602c7b4),
+     TOBN(0xbe35aca6, 0x524f2809), TOBN(0xb6881229, 0xfd4edbea),
+     TOBN(0xe8cd0c8f, 0x508efb63), TOBN(0x9eb5b5c8, 0x6abcefc7),
+     TOBN(0xf5621f5f, 0xb441ab4f), TOBN(0x79e6c046, 0xb76a2b22),
+     TOBN(0x74a4792c, 0xe37a1f69), TOBN(0xcbd252cb, 0x03542b60),
+     TOBN(0x785f65d5, 0xb3c20bd3), TOBN(0x8dea6143, 0x4fabc60c),
+     TOBN(0x45e21446, 0xde673629), TOBN(0x57f7aa1e, 0x703c2d21),
+     TOBN(0xa0e99b7f, 0x98c868c7), TOBN(0x4e42f66d, 0x8b641676),
+     TOBN(0x602884dc, 0x91077896), TOBN(0xa0d690cf, 0xc2c9885b),
+     TOBN(0xfeb4da33, 0x3b9a5187), TOBN(0x5f789598, 0x153c87ee),
+     TOBN(0x2192dd47, 0x52b16dba), TOBN(0xdeefc0e6, 0x3524c1b1),
+     TOBN(0x465ea76e, 0xe4383693), TOBN(0x79401711, 0x361b8d98),
+     TOBN(0xa5f9ace9, 0xf21a15cb), TOBN(0x73d26163, 0xefee9aeb),
+     TOBN(0xcca844b3, 0xe677016c), TOBN(0x6c122b07, 0x57eaee06),
+     TOBN(0xb782dce7, 0x15f09690), TOBN(0x508b9b12, 0x2dfc0fc9),
+     TOBN(0x9015ab4b, 0x65d89fc6), TOBN(0x5e79dab7, 0xd6d5bb0f),
+     TOBN(0x64f021f0, 0x6c775aa2), TOBN(0xdf09d8cc, 0x37c7eca1),
+     TOBN(0x9a761367, 0xef2fa506), TOBN(0xed4ca476, 0x5b81eec6),
+     TOBN(0x262ede36, 0x10bbb8b5), TOBN(0x0737ce83, 0x0641ada3),
+     TOBN(0x4c94288a, 0xe9831ccc), TOBN(0x487fc1ce, 0x8065e635),
+     TOBN(0xb13d7ab3, 0xb8bb3659), TOBN(0xdea5df3e, 0x855e4120),
+     TOBN(0xb9a18573, 0x85eb0244), TOBN(0x1a1b8ea3, 0xa7cfe0a3),
+     TOBN(0x3b837119, 0x67b0867c), TOBN(0x8d5e0d08, 0x9d364520),
+     TOBN(0x52dccc1e, 0xd930f0e3), TOBN(0xefbbcec7, 0xbf20bbaf),
+     TOBN(0x99cffcab, 0x0263ad10), TOBN(0xd8199e6d, 0xfcd18f8a),
+     TOBN(0x64e2773f, 0xe9f10617), TOBN(0x0079e8e1, 0x08704848),
+     TOBN(0x1169989f, 0x8a342283), TOBN(0x8097799c, 0xa83012e6),
+     TOBN(0xece966cb, 0x8a6a9001), TOBN(0x93b3afef, 0x072ac7fc),
+     TOBN(0xe6893a2a, 0x2db3d5ba), TOBN(0x263dc462, 0x89bf4fdc),
+     TOBN(0x8852dfc9, 0xe0396673), TOBN(0x7ac70895, 0x3af362b6),
+     TOBN(0xbb9cce4d, 0x5c2f342b), TOBN(0xbf80907a, 0xb52d7aae),
+     TOBN(0x97f3d3cd, 0x2161bcd0), TOBN(0xb25b0834, 0x0962744d),
+     TOBN(0xc5b18ea5, 0x6c3a1dda), TOBN(0xfe4ec7eb, 0x06c92317),
+     TOBN(0xb787b890, 0xad1c4afe), TOBN(0xdccd9a92, 0x0ede801a),
+     TOBN(0x9ac6ddda, 0xdb58da1f), TOBN(0x22bbc12f, 0xb8cae6ee),
+     TOBN(0xc6f8bced, 0x815c4a43), TOBN(0x8105a92c, 0xf96480c7),
+     TOBN(0x0dc3dbf3, 0x7a859d51), TOBN(0xe3ec7ce6, 0x3041196b),
+     TOBN(0xd9f64b25, 0x0d1067c9), TOBN(0xf2321321, 0x3d1f8dd8),
+     TOBN(0x8b5c619c, 0x76497ee8), TOBN(0x5d2b0ac6, 0xc717370e),
+     TOBN(0x98204cb6, 0x4fcf68e1), TOBN(0x0bdec211, 0x62bc6792),
+     TOBN(0x6973ccef, 0xa63b1011), TOBN(0xf9e3fa97, 0xe0de1ac5),
+     TOBN(0x5efb693e, 0x3d0e0c8b), TOBN(0x037248e9, 0xd2d4fcb4),}
+    ,
+    {TOBN(0x80802dc9, 0x1ec34f9e), TOBN(0xd8772d35, 0x33810603),
+     TOBN(0x3f06d66c, 0x530cb4f3), TOBN(0x7be5ed0d, 0xc475c129),
+     TOBN(0xcb9e3c19, 0x31e82b10), TOBN(0xc63d2857, 0xc9ff6b4c),
+     TOBN(0xb92118c6, 0x92a1b45e), TOBN(0x0aec4414, 0x7285bbca),
+     TOBN(0xfc189ae7, 0x1e29a3ef), TOBN(0xcbe906f0, 0x4c93302e),
+     TOBN(0xd0107914, 0xceaae10e), TOBN(0xb7a23f34, 0xb68e19f8),
+     TOBN(0xe9d875c2, 0xefd2119d), TOBN(0x03198c6e, 0xfcadc9c8),
+     TOBN(0x65591bf6, 0x4da17113), TOBN(0x3cf0bbf8, 0x3d443038),
+     TOBN(0xae485bb7, 0x2b724759), TOBN(0x945353e1, 0xb2d4c63a),
+     TOBN(0x82159d07, 0xde7d6f2c), TOBN(0x389caef3, 0x4ec5b109),
+     TOBN(0x4a8ebb53, 0xdb65ef14), TOBN(0x2dc2cb7e, 0xdd99de43),
+     TOBN(0x816fa3ed, 0x83f2405f), TOBN(0x73429bb9, 0xc14208a3),
+     TOBN(0xb618d590, 0xb01e6e27), TOBN(0x047e2ccd, 0xe180b2dc),
+     TOBN(0xd1b299b5, 0x04aea4a9), TOBN(0x412c9e1e, 0x9fa403a4),
+     TOBN(0x88d28a36, 0x79407552), TOBN(0x49c50136, 0xf332b8e3),
+     TOBN(0x3a1b6fcc, 0xe668de19), TOBN(0x178851bc, 0x75122b97),
+     TOBN(0xb1e13752, 0xfb85fa4c), TOBN(0xd61257ce, 0x383c8ce9),
+     TOBN(0xd43da670, 0xd2f74dae), TOBN(0xa35aa23f, 0xbf846bbb),
+     TOBN(0x5e74235d, 0x4421fc83), TOBN(0xf6df8ee0, 0xc363473b),
+     TOBN(0x34d7f52a, 0x3c4aa158), TOBN(0x50d05aab, 0x9bc6d22e),
+     TOBN(0x8c56e735, 0xa64785f4), TOBN(0xbc56637b, 0x5f29cd07),
+     TOBN(0x53b2bb80, 0x3ee35067), TOBN(0x50235a0f, 0xdc919270),
+     TOBN(0x191ab6d8, 0xf2c4aa65), TOBN(0xc3475831, 0x8396023b),
+     TOBN(0x80400ba5, 0xf0f805ba), TOBN(0x8881065b, 0x5ec0f80f),
+     TOBN(0xc370e522, 0xcc1b5e83), TOBN(0xde2d4ad1, 0x860b8bfb),
+     TOBN(0xad364df0, 0x67b256df), TOBN(0x8f12502e, 0xe0138997),
+     TOBN(0x503fa0dc, 0x7783920a), TOBN(0xe80014ad, 0xc0bc866a),
+     TOBN(0x3f89b744, 0xd3064ba6), TOBN(0x03511dcd, 0xcba5dba5),
+     TOBN(0x197dd46d, 0x95a7b1a2), TOBN(0x9c4e7ad6, 0x3c6341fb),
+     TOBN(0x426eca29, 0x484c2ece), TOBN(0x9211e489, 0xde7f4f8a),
+     TOBN(0x14997f6e, 0xc78ef1f4), TOBN(0x2b2c0910, 0x06574586),
+     TOBN(0x17286a6e, 0x1c3eede8), TOBN(0x25f92e47, 0x0f60e018),
+     TOBN(0x805c5646, 0x31890a36), TOBN(0x703ef600, 0x57feea5b),
+     TOBN(0x389f747c, 0xaf3c3030), TOBN(0xe0e5daeb, 0x54dd3739),
+     TOBN(0xfe24a4c3, 0xc9c9f155), TOBN(0x7e4bf176, 0xb5393962),
+     TOBN(0x37183de2, 0xaf20bf29), TOBN(0x4a1bd7b5, 0xf95a8c3b),
+     TOBN(0xa83b9699, 0x46191d3d), TOBN(0x281fc8dd, 0x7b87f257),
+     TOBN(0xb18e2c13, 0x54107588), TOBN(0x6372def7, 0x9b2bafe8),
+     TOBN(0xdaf4bb48, 0x0d8972ca), TOBN(0x3f2dd4b7, 0x56167a3f),
+     TOBN(0x1eace32d, 0x84310cf4), TOBN(0xe3bcefaf, 0xe42700aa),
+     TOBN(0x5fe5691e, 0xd785e73d), TOBN(0xa5db5ab6, 0x2ea60467),
+     TOBN(0x02e23d41, 0xdfc6514a), TOBN(0x35e8048e, 0xe03c3665),
+     TOBN(0x3f8b118f, 0x1adaa0f8), TOBN(0x28ec3b45, 0x84ce1a5a),
+     TOBN(0xe8cacc6e, 0x2c6646b8), TOBN(0x1343d185, 0xdbd0e40f),
+     TOBN(0xe5d7f844, 0xcaaa358c), TOBN(0x1a1db7e4, 0x9924182a),
+     TOBN(0xd64cd42d, 0x9c875d9a), TOBN(0xb37b515f, 0x042eeec8),
+     TOBN(0x4d4dd409, 0x7b165fbe), TOBN(0xfc322ed9, 0xe206eff3),
+     TOBN(0x7dee4102, 0x59b7e17e), TOBN(0x55a481c0, 0x8236ca00),
+     TOBN(0x8c885312, 0xc23fc975), TOBN(0x15715806, 0x05d6297b),
+     TOBN(0xa078868e, 0xf78edd39), TOBN(0x956b31e0, 0x03c45e52),
+     TOBN(0x470275d5, 0xff7b33a6), TOBN(0xc8d5dc3a, 0x0c7e673f),
+     TOBN(0x419227b4, 0x7e2f2598), TOBN(0x8b37b634, 0x4c14a975),
+     TOBN(0xd0667ed6, 0x8b11888c), TOBN(0x5e0e8c3e, 0x803e25dc),
+     TOBN(0x34e5d0dc, 0xb987a24a), TOBN(0x9f40ac3b, 0xae920323),
+     TOBN(0x5463de95, 0x34e0f63a), TOBN(0xa128bf92, 0x6b6328f9),
+     TOBN(0x491ccd7c, 0xda64f1b7), TOBN(0x7ef1ec27, 0xc47bde35),
+     TOBN(0xa857240f, 0xa36a2737), TOBN(0x35dc1366, 0x63621bc1),
+     TOBN(0x7a3a6453, 0xd4fb6897), TOBN(0x80f1a439, 0xc929319d),
+     TOBN(0xfc18274b, 0xf8cb0ba0), TOBN(0xb0b53766, 0x8078c5eb),
+     TOBN(0xfb0d4924, 0x1e01d0ef), TOBN(0x50d7c67d, 0x372ab09c),
+     TOBN(0xb4e370af, 0x3aeac968), TOBN(0xe4f7fee9, 0xc4b63266),
+     TOBN(0xb4acd4c2, 0xe3ac5664), TOBN(0xf8910bd2, 0xceb38cbf),
+     TOBN(0x1c3ae50c, 0xc9c0726e), TOBN(0x15309569, 0xd97b40bf),
+     TOBN(0x70884b7f, 0xfd5a5a1b), TOBN(0x3890896a, 0xef8314cd),
+     TOBN(0x58e1515c, 0xa5618c93), TOBN(0xe665432b, 0x77d942d1),
+     TOBN(0xb32181bf, 0xb6f767a8), TOBN(0x753794e8, 0x3a604110),
+     TOBN(0x09afeb7c, 0xe8c0dbcc), TOBN(0x31e02613, 0x598673a3),
+     TOBN(0x5d98e557, 0x7d46db00), TOBN(0xfc21fb8c, 0x9d985b28),
+     TOBN(0xc9040116, 0xb0843e0b), TOBN(0x53b1b3a8, 0x69b04531),
+     TOBN(0xdd1649f0, 0x85d7d830), TOBN(0xbb3bcc87, 0xcb7427e8),
+     TOBN(0x77261100, 0xc93dce83), TOBN(0x7e79da61, 0xa1922a2a),
+     TOBN(0x587a2b02, 0xf3149ce8), TOBN(0x147e1384, 0xde92ec83),
+     TOBN(0x484c83d3, 0xaf077f30), TOBN(0xea78f844, 0x0658b53a),
+     TOBN(0x912076c2, 0x027aec53), TOBN(0xf34714e3, 0x93c8177d),
+     TOBN(0x37ef5d15, 0xc2376c84), TOBN(0x8315b659, 0x3d1aa783),
+     TOBN(0x3a75c484, 0xef852a90), TOBN(0x0ba0c58a, 0x16086bd4),
+     TOBN(0x29688d7a, 0x529a6d48), TOBN(0x9c7f250d, 0xc2f19203),
+     TOBN(0x123042fb, 0x682e2df9), TOBN(0x2b7587e7, 0xad8121bc),
+     TOBN(0x30fc0233, 0xe0182a65), TOBN(0xb82ecf87, 0xe3e1128a),
+     TOBN(0x71682861, 0x93fb098f), TOBN(0x043e21ae, 0x85e9e6a7),
+     TOBN(0xab5b49d6, 0x66c834ea), TOBN(0x3be43e18, 0x47414287),
+     TOBN(0xf40fb859, 0x219a2a47), TOBN(0x0e6559e9, 0xcc58df3c),
+     TOBN(0xfe1dfe8e, 0x0c6615b4), TOBN(0x14abc8fd, 0x56459d70),
+     TOBN(0x7be0fa8e, 0x05de0386), TOBN(0x8e63ef68, 0xe9035c7c),
+     TOBN(0x116401b4, 0x53b31e91), TOBN(0x0cba7ad4, 0x4436b4d8),
+     TOBN(0x9151f9a0, 0x107afd66), TOBN(0xafaca8d0, 0x1f0ee4c4),
+     TOBN(0x75fe5c1d, 0x9ee9761c), TOBN(0x3497a16b, 0xf0c0588f),
+     TOBN(0x3ee2bebd, 0x0304804c), TOBN(0xa8fb9a60, 0xc2c990b9),
+     TOBN(0xd14d32fe, 0x39251114), TOBN(0x36bf25bc, 0xcac73366),
+     TOBN(0xc9562c66, 0xdba7495c), TOBN(0x324d301b, 0x46ad348b),
+     TOBN(0x9f46620c, 0xd670407e), TOBN(0x0ea8d4f1, 0xe3733a01),
+     TOBN(0xd396d532, 0xb0c324e0), TOBN(0x5b211a0e, 0x03c317cd),
+     TOBN(0x090d7d20, 0x5ffe7b37), TOBN(0x3b7f3efb, 0x1747d2da),
+     TOBN(0xa2cb525f, 0xb54fc519), TOBN(0x6e220932, 0xf66a971e),
+     TOBN(0xddc160df, 0xb486d440), TOBN(0x7fcfec46, 0x3fe13465),
+     TOBN(0x83da7e4e, 0x76e4c151), TOBN(0xd6fa48a1, 0xd8d302b5),
+     TOBN(0xc6304f26, 0x5872cd88), TOBN(0x806c1d3c, 0x278b90a1),
+     TOBN(0x3553e725, 0xcaf0bc1c), TOBN(0xff59e603, 0xbb9d8d5c),
+     TOBN(0xa4550f32, 0x7a0b85dd), TOBN(0xdec5720a, 0x93ecc217),
+     TOBN(0x0b88b741, 0x69d62213), TOBN(0x7212f245, 0x5b365955),
+     TOBN(0x20764111, 0xb5cae787), TOBN(0x13cb7f58, 0x1dfd3124),
+     TOBN(0x2dca77da, 0x1175aefb), TOBN(0xeb75466b, 0xffaae775),
+     TOBN(0x74d76f3b, 0xdb6cff32), TOBN(0x7440f37a, 0x61fcda9a),
+     TOBN(0x1bb3ac92, 0xb525028b), TOBN(0x20fbf8f7, 0xa1975f29),
+     TOBN(0x982692e1, 0xdf83097f), TOBN(0x28738f6c, 0x554b0800),
+     TOBN(0xdc703717, 0xa2ce2f2f), TOBN(0x7913b93c, 0x40814194),
+     TOBN(0x04924593, 0x1fe89636), TOBN(0x7b98443f, 0xf78834a6),
+     TOBN(0x11c6ab01, 0x5114a5a1), TOBN(0x60deb383, 0xffba5f4c),
+     TOBN(0x4caa54c6, 0x01a982e6), TOBN(0x1dd35e11, 0x3491cd26),
+     TOBN(0x973c315f, 0x7cbd6b05), TOBN(0xcab00775, 0x52494724),
+     TOBN(0x04659b1f, 0x6565e15a), TOBN(0xbf30f529, 0x8c8fb026),
+     TOBN(0xfc21641b, 0xa8a0de37), TOBN(0xe9c7a366, 0xfa5e5114),
+     TOBN(0xdb849ca5, 0x52f03ad8), TOBN(0xc7e8dbe9, 0x024e35c0),
+     TOBN(0xa1a2bbac, 0xcfc3c789), TOBN(0xbf733e7d, 0x9c26f262),
+     TOBN(0x882ffbf5, 0xb8444823), TOBN(0xb7224e88, 0x6bf8483b),
+     TOBN(0x53023b8b, 0x65bef640), TOBN(0xaabfec91, 0xd4d5f8cd),
+     TOBN(0xa40e1510, 0x079ea1bd), TOBN(0x1ad9addc, 0xd05d5d26),
+     TOBN(0xdb3f2eab, 0x13e68d4f), TOBN(0x1cff1ae2, 0x640f803f),
+     TOBN(0xe0e7b749, 0xd4cee117), TOBN(0x8e9f275b, 0x4036d909),
+     TOBN(0xce34e31d, 0x8f4d4c38), TOBN(0x22b37f69, 0xd75130fc),
+     TOBN(0x83e0f1fd, 0xb4014604), TOBN(0xa8ce9919, 0x89415078),
+     TOBN(0x82375b75, 0x41792efe), TOBN(0x4f59bf5c, 0x97d4515b),
+     TOBN(0xac4f324f, 0x923a277d), TOBN(0xd9bc9b7d, 0x650f3406),
+     TOBN(0xc6fa87d1, 0x8a39bc51), TOBN(0x82588530, 0x5ccc108f),
+     TOBN(0x5ced3c9f, 0x82e4c634), TOBN(0x8efb8314, 0x3a4464f8),
+     TOBN(0xe706381b, 0x7a1dca25), TOBN(0x6cd15a3c, 0x5a2a412b),
+     TOBN(0x9347a8fd, 0xbfcd8fb5), TOBN(0x31db2eef, 0x6e54cd22),
+     TOBN(0xc4aeb11e, 0xf8d8932f), TOBN(0x11e7c1ed, 0x344411af),
+     TOBN(0x2653050c, 0xdc9a151e), TOBN(0x9edbfc08, 0x3bb0a859),
+     TOBN(0x926c81c7, 0xfd5691e7), TOBN(0x9c1b2342, 0x6f39019a),
+     TOBN(0x64a81c8b, 0x7f8474b9), TOBN(0x90657c07, 0x01761819),
+     TOBN(0x390b3331, 0x55e0375a), TOBN(0xc676c626, 0xb6ebc47d),
+     TOBN(0x51623247, 0xb7d6dee8), TOBN(0x0948d927, 0x79659313),
+     TOBN(0x99700161, 0xe9ab35ed), TOBN(0x06cc32b4, 0x8ddde408),
+     TOBN(0x6f2fd664, 0x061ef338), TOBN(0x1606fa02, 0xc202e9ed),
+     TOBN(0x55388bc1, 0x929ba99b), TOBN(0xc4428c5e, 0x1e81df69),
+     TOBN(0xce2028ae, 0xf91b0b2a), TOBN(0xce870a23, 0xf03dfd3f),
+     TOBN(0x66ec2c87, 0x0affe8ed), TOBN(0xb205fb46, 0x284d0c00),
+     TOBN(0xbf5dffe7, 0x44cefa48), TOBN(0xb6fc37a8, 0xa19876d7),
+     TOBN(0xbecfa84c, 0x08b72863), TOBN(0xd7205ff5, 0x2576374f),
+     TOBN(0x80330d32, 0x8887de41), TOBN(0x5de0df0c, 0x869ea534),
+     TOBN(0x13f42753, 0x3c56ea17), TOBN(0xeb1f6069, 0x452b1a78),
+     TOBN(0x50474396, 0xe30ea15c), TOBN(0x575816a1, 0xc1494125),
+     TOBN(0xbe1ce55b, 0xfe6bb38f), TOBN(0xb901a948, 0x96ae30f7),
+     TOBN(0xe5af0f08, 0xd8fc3548), TOBN(0x5010b5d0, 0xd73bfd08),
+     TOBN(0x993d2880, 0x53fe655a), TOBN(0x99f2630b, 0x1c1309fd),
+     TOBN(0xd8677baf, 0xb4e3b76f), TOBN(0x14e51ddc, 0xb840784b),
+     TOBN(0x326c750c, 0xbf0092ce), TOBN(0xc83d306b, 0xf528320f),
+     TOBN(0xc4456715, 0x77d4715c), TOBN(0xd30019f9, 0x6b703235),
+     TOBN(0x207ccb2e, 0xd669e986), TOBN(0x57c824af, 0xf6dbfc28),
+     TOBN(0xf0eb532f, 0xd8f92a23), TOBN(0x4a557fd4, 0x9bb98fd2),
+     TOBN(0xa57acea7, 0xc1e6199a), TOBN(0x0c663820, 0x8b94b1ed),
+     TOBN(0x9b42be8f, 0xf83a9266), TOBN(0xc7741c97, 0x0101bd45),
+     TOBN(0x95770c11, 0x07bd9ceb), TOBN(0x1f50250a, 0x8b2e0744),
+     TOBN(0xf762eec8, 0x1477b654), TOBN(0xc65b900e, 0x15efe59a),
+     TOBN(0x88c96148, 0x9546a897), TOBN(0x7e8025b3, 0xc30b4d7c),
+     TOBN(0xae4065ef, 0x12045cf9), TOBN(0x6fcb2caf, 0x9ccce8bd),
+     TOBN(0x1fa0ba4e, 0xf2cf6525), TOBN(0xf683125d, 0xcb72c312),
+     TOBN(0xa01da4ea, 0xe312410e), TOBN(0x67e28677, 0x6cd8e830),
+     TOBN(0xabd95752, 0x98fb3f07), TOBN(0x05f11e11, 0xeef649a5),
+     TOBN(0xba47faef, 0x9d3472c2), TOBN(0x3adff697, 0xc77d1345),
+     TOBN(0x4761fa04, 0xdd15afee), TOBN(0x64f1f61a, 0xb9e69462),
+     TOBN(0xfa691fab, 0x9bfb9093), TOBN(0x3df8ae8f, 0xa1133dfe),
+     TOBN(0xcd5f8967, 0x58cc710d), TOBN(0xfbb88d50, 0x16c7fe79),
+     TOBN(0x8e011b4c, 0xe88c50d1), TOBN(0x7532e807, 0xa8771c4f),
+     TOBN(0x64c78a48, 0xe2278ee4), TOBN(0x0b283e83, 0x3845072a),
+     TOBN(0x98a6f291, 0x49e69274), TOBN(0xb96e9668, 0x1868b21c),
+     TOBN(0x38f0adc2, 0xb1a8908e), TOBN(0x90afcff7, 0x1feb829d),
+     TOBN(0x9915a383, 0x210b0856), TOBN(0xa5a80602, 0xdef04889),
+     TOBN(0x800e9af9, 0x7c64d509), TOBN(0x81382d0b, 0xb8996f6f),
+     TOBN(0x490eba53, 0x81927e27), TOBN(0x46c63b32, 0x4af50182),
+     TOBN(0x784c5fd9, 0xd3ad62ce), TOBN(0xe4fa1870, 0xf8ae8736),
+     TOBN(0x4ec9d0bc, 0xd7466b25), TOBN(0x84ddbe1a, 0xdb235c65),
+     TOBN(0x5e2645ee, 0x163c1688), TOBN(0x570bd00e, 0x00eba747),
+     TOBN(0xfa51b629, 0x128bfa0f), TOBN(0x92fce1bd, 0x6c1d3b68),
+     TOBN(0x3e7361dc, 0xb66778b1), TOBN(0x9c7d249d, 0x5561d2bb),
+     TOBN(0xa40b28bf, 0x0bbc6229), TOBN(0x1c83c05e, 0xdfd91497),
+     TOBN(0x5f9f5154, 0xf083df05), TOBN(0xbac38b3c, 0xeee66c9d),
+     TOBN(0xf71db7e3, 0xec0dfcfd), TOBN(0xf2ecda8e, 0x8b0a8416),
+     TOBN(0x52fddd86, 0x7812aa66), TOBN(0x2896ef10, 0x4e6f4272),
+     TOBN(0xff27186a, 0x0fe9a745), TOBN(0x08249fcd, 0x49ca70db),
+     TOBN(0x7425a2e6, 0x441cac49), TOBN(0xf4a0885a, 0xece5ff57),
+     TOBN(0x6e2cb731, 0x7d7ead58), TOBN(0xf96cf7d6, 0x1898d104),
+     TOBN(0xafe67c9d, 0x4f2c9a89), TOBN(0x89895a50, 0x1c7bf5bc),
+     TOBN(0xdc7cb8e5, 0x573cecfa), TOBN(0x66497eae, 0xd15f03e6),
+     TOBN(0x6bc0de69, 0x3f084420), TOBN(0x323b9b36, 0xacd532b0),
+     TOBN(0xcfed390a, 0x0115a3c1), TOBN(0x9414c40b, 0x2d65ca0e),
+     TOBN(0x641406bd, 0x2f530c78), TOBN(0x29369a44, 0x833438f2),
+     TOBN(0x996884f5, 0x903fa271), TOBN(0xe6da0fd2, 0xb9da921e),
+     TOBN(0xa6f2f269, 0x5db01e54), TOBN(0x1ee3e9bd, 0x6876214e),
+     TOBN(0xa26e181c, 0xe27a9497), TOBN(0x36d254e4, 0x8e215e04),
+     TOBN(0x42f32a6c, 0x252cabca), TOBN(0x99481487, 0x80b57614),
+     TOBN(0x4c4dfe69, 0x40d9cae1), TOBN(0x05869580, 0x11a10f09),
+     TOBN(0xca287b57, 0x3491b64b), TOBN(0x77862d5d, 0x3fd4a53b),
+     TOBN(0xbf94856e, 0x50349126), TOBN(0x2be30bd1, 0x71c5268f),
+     TOBN(0x10393f19, 0xcbb650a6), TOBN(0x639531fe, 0x778cf9fd),
+     TOBN(0x02556a11, 0xb2935359), TOBN(0xda38aa96, 0xaf8c126e),
+     TOBN(0x47dbe6c2, 0x0960167f), TOBN(0x37bbabb6, 0x501901cd),
+     TOBN(0xb6e979e0, 0x2c947778), TOBN(0xd69a5175, 0x7a1a1dc6),
+     TOBN(0xc3ed5095, 0x9d9faf0c), TOBN(0x4dd9c096, 0x1d5fa5f0),
+     TOBN(0xa0c4304d, 0x64f16ea8), TOBN(0x8b1cac16, 0x7e718623),
+     TOBN(0x0b576546, 0x7c67f03e), TOBN(0x559cf5ad, 0xcbd88c01),
+     TOBN(0x074877bb, 0x0e2af19a), TOBN(0x1f717ec1, 0xa1228c92),
+     TOBN(0x70bcb800, 0x326e8920), TOBN(0xec6e2c5c, 0x4f312804),
+     TOBN(0x426aea7d, 0x3fca4752), TOBN(0xf12c0949, 0x2211f62a),
+     TOBN(0x24beecd8, 0x7be7b6b5), TOBN(0xb77eaf4c, 0x36d7a27d),
+     TOBN(0x154c2781, 0xfda78fd3), TOBN(0x848a83b0, 0x264eeabe),
+     TOBN(0x81287ef0, 0x4ffe2bc4), TOBN(0x7b6d88c6, 0xb6b6fc2a),
+     TOBN(0x805fb947, 0xce417d99), TOBN(0x4b93dcc3, 0x8b916cc4),
+     TOBN(0x72e65bb3, 0x21273323), TOBN(0xbcc1badd, 0x6ea9886e),
+     TOBN(0x0e223011, 0x4bc5ee85), TOBN(0xa561be74, 0xc18ee1e4),
+     TOBN(0x762fd2d4, 0xa6bcf1f1), TOBN(0x50e6a5a4, 0x95231489),
+     TOBN(0xca96001f, 0xa00b500b), TOBN(0x5c098cfc, 0x5d7dcdf5),
+     TOBN(0xa64e2d2e, 0x8c446a85), TOBN(0xbae9bcf1, 0x971f3c62),
+     TOBN(0x4ec22683, 0x8435a2c5), TOBN(0x8ceaed6c, 0x4bad4643),
+     TOBN(0xe9f8fb47, 0xccccf4e3), TOBN(0xbd4f3fa4, 0x1ce3b21e),
+     TOBN(0xd79fb110, 0xa3db3292), TOBN(0xe28a37da, 0xb536c66a),
+     TOBN(0x279ce87b, 0x8e49e6a9), TOBN(0x70ccfe8d, 0xfdcec8e3),
+     TOBN(0x2193e4e0, 0x3ba464b2), TOBN(0x0f39d60e, 0xaca9a398),
+     TOBN(0x7d7932af, 0xf82c12ab), TOBN(0xd8ff50ed, 0x91e7e0f7),
+     TOBN(0xea961058, 0xfa28a7e0), TOBN(0xc726cf25, 0x0bf5ec74),
+     TOBN(0xe74d55c8, 0xdb229666), TOBN(0x0bd9abbf, 0xa57f5799),
+     TOBN(0x7479ef07, 0x4dfc47b3), TOBN(0xd9c65fc3, 0x0c52f91d),
+     TOBN(0x8e0283fe, 0x36a8bde2), TOBN(0xa32a8b5e, 0x7d4b7280),
+     TOBN(0x6a677c61, 0x12e83233), TOBN(0x0fbb3512, 0xdcc9bf28),
+     TOBN(0x562e8ea5, 0x0d780f61), TOBN(0x0db8b22b, 0x1dc4e89c),
+     TOBN(0x0a6fd1fb, 0x89be0144), TOBN(0x8c77d246, 0xca57113b),
+     TOBN(0x4639075d, 0xff09c91c), TOBN(0x5b47b17f, 0x5060824c),
+     TOBN(0x58aea2b0, 0x16287b52), TOBN(0xa1343520, 0xd0cd8eb0),
+     TOBN(0x6148b4d0, 0xc5d58573), TOBN(0xdd2b6170, 0x291c68ae),
+     TOBN(0xa61b3929, 0x1da3b3b7), TOBN(0x5f946d79, 0x08c4ac10),
+     TOBN(0x4105d4a5, 0x7217d583), TOBN(0x5061da3d, 0x25e6de5e),
+     TOBN(0x3113940d, 0xec1b4991), TOBN(0xf12195e1, 0x36f485ae),
+     TOBN(0xa7507fb2, 0x731a2ee0), TOBN(0x95057a8e, 0x6e9e196e),
+     TOBN(0xa3c2c911, 0x2e130136), TOBN(0x97dfbb36, 0x33c60d15),
+     TOBN(0xcaf3c581, 0xb300ee2b), TOBN(0x77f25d90, 0xf4bac8b8),
+     TOBN(0xdb1c4f98, 0x6d840cd6), TOBN(0x471d62c0, 0xe634288c),
+     TOBN(0x8ec2f85e, 0xcec8a161), TOBN(0x41f37cbc, 0xfa6f4ae2),
+     TOBN(0x6793a20f, 0x4b709985), TOBN(0x7a7bd33b, 0xefa8985b),
+     TOBN(0x2c6a3fbd, 0x938e6446), TOBN(0x19042619, 0x2a8d47c1),
+     TOBN(0x16848667, 0xcc36975f), TOBN(0x02acf168, 0x9d5f1dfb),
+     TOBN(0x62d41ad4, 0x613baa94), TOBN(0xb56fbb92, 0x9f684670),
+     TOBN(0xce610d0d, 0xe9e40569), TOBN(0x7b99c65f, 0x35489fef),
+     TOBN(0x0c88ad1b, 0x3df18b97), TOBN(0x81b7d9be, 0x5d0e9edb),
+     TOBN(0xd85218c0, 0xc716cc0a), TOBN(0xf4b5ff90, 0x85691c49),
+     TOBN(0xa4fd666b, 0xce356ac6), TOBN(0x17c72895, 0x4b327a7a),
+     TOBN(0xf93d5085, 0xda6be7de), TOBN(0xff71530e, 0x3301d34e),
+     TOBN(0x4cd96442, 0xd8f448e8), TOBN(0x9283d331, 0x2ed18ffa),
+     TOBN(0x4d33dd99, 0x2a849870), TOBN(0xa716964b, 0x41576335),
+     TOBN(0xff5e3a9b, 0x179be0e5), TOBN(0x5b9d6b1b, 0x83b13632),
+     TOBN(0x3b8bd7d4, 0xa52f313b), TOBN(0xc9dd95a0, 0x637a4660),
+     TOBN(0x30035962, 0x0b3e218f), TOBN(0xce1481a3, 0xc7b28a3c),
+     TOBN(0xab41b43a, 0x43228d83), TOBN(0x24ae1c30, 0x4ad63f99),
+     TOBN(0x8e525f1a, 0x46a51229), TOBN(0x14af860f, 0xcd26d2b4),
+     TOBN(0xd6baef61, 0x3f714aa1), TOBN(0xf51865ad, 0xeb78795e),
+     TOBN(0xd3e21fce, 0xe6a9d694), TOBN(0x82ceb1dd, 0x8a37b527)}
+};
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ecp_oct.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ecp_oct.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4d142a4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ecp_oct.c
@@ -0,0 +1,372 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ * Portions of this software developed by SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC.,
+ * and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/symhacks.h>
+
+#include "ec_lcl.h"
+
+int ec_GFp_simple_set_compressed_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *group,
+                                             EC_POINT *point,
+                                             const BIGNUM *x_, int y_bit,
+                                             BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *tmp1, *tmp2, *x, *y;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    /* clear error queue */
+    ERR_clear_error();
+
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+        ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+        if (ctx == NULL)
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    y_bit = (y_bit != 0);
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    tmp1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    tmp2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    x = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    y = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (y == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    /*-
+     * Recover y.  We have a Weierstrass equation
+     *     y^2 = x^3 + a*x + b,
+     * so  y  is one of the square roots of  x^3 + a*x + b.
+     */
+
+    /* tmp1 := x^3 */
+    if (!BN_nnmod(x, x_, group->field, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    if (group->meth->field_decode == 0) {
+        /* field_{sqr,mul} work on standard representation */
+        if (!group->meth->field_sqr(group, tmp2, x_, ctx))
+            goto err;
+        if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, tmp1, tmp2, x_, ctx))
+            goto err;
+    } else {
+        if (!BN_mod_sqr(tmp2, x_, group->field, ctx))
+            goto err;
+        if (!BN_mod_mul(tmp1, tmp2, x_, group->field, ctx))
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* tmp1 := tmp1 + a*x */
+    if (group->a_is_minus3) {
+        if (!BN_mod_lshift1_quick(tmp2, x, group->field))
+            goto err;
+        if (!BN_mod_add_quick(tmp2, tmp2, x, group->field))
+            goto err;
+        if (!BN_mod_sub_quick(tmp1, tmp1, tmp2, group->field))
+            goto err;
+    } else {
+        if (group->meth->field_decode) {
+            if (!group->meth->field_decode(group, tmp2, group->a, ctx))
+                goto err;
+            if (!BN_mod_mul(tmp2, tmp2, x, group->field, ctx))
+                goto err;
+        } else {
+            /* field_mul works on standard representation */
+            if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, tmp2, group->a, x, ctx))
+                goto err;
+        }
+
+        if (!BN_mod_add_quick(tmp1, tmp1, tmp2, group->field))
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* tmp1 := tmp1 + b */
+    if (group->meth->field_decode) {
+        if (!group->meth->field_decode(group, tmp2, group->b, ctx))
+            goto err;
+        if (!BN_mod_add_quick(tmp1, tmp1, tmp2, group->field))
+            goto err;
+    } else {
+        if (!BN_mod_add_quick(tmp1, tmp1, group->b, group->field))
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!BN_mod_sqrt(y, tmp1, group->field, ctx)) {
+        unsigned long err = ERR_peek_last_error();
+
+        if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_BN
+            && ERR_GET_REASON(err) == BN_R_NOT_A_SQUARE) {
+            ERR_clear_error();
+            ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_SET_COMPRESSED_COORDINATES,
+                  EC_R_INVALID_COMPRESSED_POINT);
+        } else
+            ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_SET_COMPRESSED_COORDINATES,
+                  ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (y_bit != BN_is_odd(y)) {
+        if (BN_is_zero(y)) {
+            int kron;
+
+            kron = BN_kronecker(x, group->field, ctx);
+            if (kron == -2)
+                goto err;
+
+            if (kron == 1)
+                ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_SET_COMPRESSED_COORDINATES,
+                      EC_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_BIT);
+            else
+                /*
+                 * BN_mod_sqrt() should have cought this error (not a square)
+                 */
+                ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_SET_COMPRESSED_COORDINATES,
+                      EC_R_INVALID_COMPRESSED_POINT);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (!BN_usub(y, group->field, y))
+            goto err;
+    }
+    if (y_bit != BN_is_odd(y)) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_SET_COMPRESSED_COORDINATES,
+              ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, point, x, y, ctx))
+        goto err;
+
+    ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+size_t ec_GFp_simple_point2oct(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point,
+                               point_conversion_form_t form,
+                               unsigned char *buf, size_t len, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    size_t ret;
+    BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
+    int used_ctx = 0;
+    BIGNUM *x, *y;
+    size_t field_len, i, skip;
+
+    if ((form != POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
+        && (form != POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED)
+        && (form != POINT_CONVERSION_HYBRID)) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_POINT2OCT, EC_R_INVALID_FORM);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, point)) {
+        /* encodes to a single 0 octet */
+        if (buf != NULL) {
+            if (len < 1) {
+                ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_POINT2OCT, EC_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+                return 0;
+            }
+            buf[0] = 0;
+        }
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    /* ret := required output buffer length */
+    field_len = BN_num_bytes(group->field);
+    ret =
+        (form ==
+         POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) ? 1 + field_len : 1 + 2 * field_len;
+
+    /* if 'buf' is NULL, just return required length */
+    if (buf != NULL) {
+        if (len < ret) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_POINT2OCT, EC_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        if (ctx == NULL) {
+            ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+            if (ctx == NULL)
+                return 0;
+        }
+
+        BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+        used_ctx = 1;
+        x = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+        y = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+        if (y == NULL)
+            goto err;
+
+        if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, point, x, y, ctx))
+            goto err;
+
+        if ((form == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED
+             || form == POINT_CONVERSION_HYBRID) && BN_is_odd(y))
+            buf[0] = form + 1;
+        else
+            buf[0] = form;
+
+        i = 1;
+
+        skip = field_len - BN_num_bytes(x);
+        if (skip > field_len) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_POINT2OCT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        while (skip > 0) {
+            buf[i++] = 0;
+            skip--;
+        }
+        skip = BN_bn2bin(x, buf + i);
+        i += skip;
+        if (i != 1 + field_len) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_POINT2OCT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        if (form == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
+            || form == POINT_CONVERSION_HYBRID) {
+            skip = field_len - BN_num_bytes(y);
+            if (skip > field_len) {
+                ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_POINT2OCT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            while (skip > 0) {
+                buf[i++] = 0;
+                skip--;
+            }
+            skip = BN_bn2bin(y, buf + i);
+            i += skip;
+        }
+
+        if (i != ret) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_POINT2OCT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (used_ctx)
+        BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
+    return ret;
+
+ err:
+    if (used_ctx)
+        BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int ec_GFp_simple_oct2point(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point,
+                            const unsigned char *buf, size_t len, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    point_conversion_form_t form;
+    int y_bit;
+    BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *x, *y;
+    size_t field_len, enc_len;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    if (len == 0) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_OCT2POINT, EC_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    form = buf[0];
+    y_bit = form & 1;
+    form = form & ~1U;
+    if ((form != 0) && (form != POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
+        && (form != POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED)
+        && (form != POINT_CONVERSION_HYBRID)) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_OCT2POINT, EC_R_INVALID_ENCODING);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if ((form == 0 || form == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) && y_bit) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_OCT2POINT, EC_R_INVALID_ENCODING);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (form == 0) {
+        if (len != 1) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_OCT2POINT, EC_R_INVALID_ENCODING);
+            return 0;
+        }
+
+        return EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(group, point);
+    }
+
+    field_len = BN_num_bytes(group->field);
+    enc_len =
+        (form ==
+         POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) ? 1 + field_len : 1 + 2 * field_len;
+
+    if (len != enc_len) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_OCT2POINT, EC_R_INVALID_ENCODING);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+        ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+        if (ctx == NULL)
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    x = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    y = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (y == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!BN_bin2bn(buf + 1, field_len, x))
+        goto err;
+    if (BN_ucmp(x, group->field) >= 0) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_OCT2POINT, EC_R_INVALID_ENCODING);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (form == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) {
+        if (!EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp
+            (group, point, x, y_bit, ctx))
+            goto err;
+    } else {
+        if (!BN_bin2bn(buf + 1 + field_len, field_len, y))
+            goto err;
+        if (BN_ucmp(y, group->field) >= 0) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_OCT2POINT, EC_R_INVALID_ENCODING);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (form == POINT_CONVERSION_HYBRID) {
+            if (y_bit != BN_is_odd(y)) {
+                ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_OCT2POINT, EC_R_INVALID_ENCODING);
+                goto err;
+            }
+        }
+
+        /*
+         * EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp is responsible for checking that
+         * the point is on the curve.
+         */
+        if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, point, x, y, ctx))
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
+    return ret;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..abd3795
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1369 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ * Portions of this software developed by SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC.,
+ * and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/symhacks.h>
+
+#include "ec_lcl.h"
+
+const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_simple_method(void)
+{
+    static const EC_METHOD ret = {
+        EC_FLAGS_DEFAULT_OCT,
+        NID_X9_62_prime_field,
+        ec_GFp_simple_group_init,
+        ec_GFp_simple_group_finish,
+        ec_GFp_simple_group_clear_finish,
+        ec_GFp_simple_group_copy,
+        ec_GFp_simple_group_set_curve,
+        ec_GFp_simple_group_get_curve,
+        ec_GFp_simple_group_get_degree,
+        ec_group_simple_order_bits,
+        ec_GFp_simple_group_check_discriminant,
+        ec_GFp_simple_point_init,
+        ec_GFp_simple_point_finish,
+        ec_GFp_simple_point_clear_finish,
+        ec_GFp_simple_point_copy,
+        ec_GFp_simple_point_set_to_infinity,
+        ec_GFp_simple_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp,
+        ec_GFp_simple_get_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp,
+        ec_GFp_simple_point_set_affine_coordinates,
+        ec_GFp_simple_point_get_affine_coordinates,
+        0, 0, 0,
+        ec_GFp_simple_add,
+        ec_GFp_simple_dbl,
+        ec_GFp_simple_invert,
+        ec_GFp_simple_is_at_infinity,
+        ec_GFp_simple_is_on_curve,
+        ec_GFp_simple_cmp,
+        ec_GFp_simple_make_affine,
+        ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine,
+        0 /* mul */ ,
+        0 /* precompute_mult */ ,
+        0 /* have_precompute_mult */ ,
+        ec_GFp_simple_field_mul,
+        ec_GFp_simple_field_sqr,
+        0 /* field_div */ ,
+        0 /* field_encode */ ,
+        0 /* field_decode */ ,
+        0,                      /* field_set_to_one */
+        ec_key_simple_priv2oct,
+        ec_key_simple_oct2priv,
+        0, /* set private */
+        ec_key_simple_generate_key,
+        ec_key_simple_check_key,
+        ec_key_simple_generate_public_key,
+        0, /* keycopy */
+        0, /* keyfinish */
+        ecdh_simple_compute_key
+    };
+
+    return &ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Most method functions in this file are designed to work with
+ * non-trivial representations of field elements if necessary
+ * (see ecp_mont.c): while standard modular addition and subtraction
+ * are used, the field_mul and field_sqr methods will be used for
+ * multiplication, and field_encode and field_decode (if defined)
+ * will be used for converting between representations.
+ *
+ * Functions ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine() and
+ * ec_GFp_simple_point_get_affine_coordinates() specifically assume
+ * that if a non-trivial representation is used, it is a Montgomery
+ * representation (i.e. 'encoding' means multiplying by some factor R).
+ */
+
+int ec_GFp_simple_group_init(EC_GROUP *group)
+{
+    group->field = BN_new();
+    group->a = BN_new();
+    group->b = BN_new();
+    if (group->field == NULL || group->a == NULL || group->b == NULL) {
+        BN_free(group->field);
+        BN_free(group->a);
+        BN_free(group->b);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    group->a_is_minus3 = 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+void ec_GFp_simple_group_finish(EC_GROUP *group)
+{
+    BN_free(group->field);
+    BN_free(group->a);
+    BN_free(group->b);
+}
+
+void ec_GFp_simple_group_clear_finish(EC_GROUP *group)
+{
+    BN_clear_free(group->field);
+    BN_clear_free(group->a);
+    BN_clear_free(group->b);
+}
+
+int ec_GFp_simple_group_copy(EC_GROUP *dest, const EC_GROUP *src)
+{
+    if (!BN_copy(dest->field, src->field))
+        return 0;
+    if (!BN_copy(dest->a, src->a))
+        return 0;
+    if (!BN_copy(dest->b, src->b))
+        return 0;
+
+    dest->a_is_minus3 = src->a_is_minus3;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int ec_GFp_simple_group_set_curve(EC_GROUP *group,
+                                  const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a,
+                                  const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *tmp_a;
+
+    /* p must be a prime > 3 */
+    if (BN_num_bits(p) <= 2 || !BN_is_odd(p)) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_GROUP_SET_CURVE, EC_R_INVALID_FIELD);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+        ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+        if (ctx == NULL)
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    tmp_a = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (tmp_a == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* group->field */
+    if (!BN_copy(group->field, p))
+        goto err;
+    BN_set_negative(group->field, 0);
+
+    /* group->a */
+    if (!BN_nnmod(tmp_a, a, p, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    if (group->meth->field_encode) {
+        if (!group->meth->field_encode(group, group->a, tmp_a, ctx))
+            goto err;
+    } else if (!BN_copy(group->a, tmp_a))
+        goto err;
+
+    /* group->b */
+    if (!BN_nnmod(group->b, b, p, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    if (group->meth->field_encode)
+        if (!group->meth->field_encode(group, group->b, group->b, ctx))
+            goto err;
+
+    /* group->a_is_minus3 */
+    if (!BN_add_word(tmp_a, 3))
+        goto err;
+    group->a_is_minus3 = (0 == BN_cmp(tmp_a, group->field));
+
+    ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int ec_GFp_simple_group_get_curve(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *a,
+                                  BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
+
+    if (p != NULL) {
+        if (!BN_copy(p, group->field))
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (a != NULL || b != NULL) {
+        if (group->meth->field_decode) {
+            if (ctx == NULL) {
+                ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+                if (ctx == NULL)
+                    return 0;
+            }
+            if (a != NULL) {
+                if (!group->meth->field_decode(group, a, group->a, ctx))
+                    goto err;
+            }
+            if (b != NULL) {
+                if (!group->meth->field_decode(group, b, group->b, ctx))
+                    goto err;
+            }
+        } else {
+            if (a != NULL) {
+                if (!BN_copy(a, group->a))
+                    goto err;
+            }
+            if (b != NULL) {
+                if (!BN_copy(b, group->b))
+                    goto err;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+    BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int ec_GFp_simple_group_get_degree(const EC_GROUP *group)
+{
+    return BN_num_bits(group->field);
+}
+
+int ec_GFp_simple_group_check_discriminant(const EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    BIGNUM *a, *b, *order, *tmp_1, *tmp_2;
+    const BIGNUM *p = group->field;
+    BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
+
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+        ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+        if (ctx == NULL) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_GROUP_CHECK_DISCRIMINANT,
+                  ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    a = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    b = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    tmp_1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    tmp_2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    order = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (order == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (group->meth->field_decode) {
+        if (!group->meth->field_decode(group, a, group->a, ctx))
+            goto err;
+        if (!group->meth->field_decode(group, b, group->b, ctx))
+            goto err;
+    } else {
+        if (!BN_copy(a, group->a))
+            goto err;
+        if (!BN_copy(b, group->b))
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    /*-
+     * check the discriminant:
+     * y^2 = x^3 + a*x + b is an elliptic curve <=> 4*a^3 + 27*b^2 != 0 (mod p)
+     * 0 =< a, b < p
+     */
+    if (BN_is_zero(a)) {
+        if (BN_is_zero(b))
+            goto err;
+    } else if (!BN_is_zero(b)) {
+        if (!BN_mod_sqr(tmp_1, a, p, ctx))
+            goto err;
+        if (!BN_mod_mul(tmp_2, tmp_1, a, p, ctx))
+            goto err;
+        if (!BN_lshift(tmp_1, tmp_2, 2))
+            goto err;
+        /* tmp_1 = 4*a^3 */
+
+        if (!BN_mod_sqr(tmp_2, b, p, ctx))
+            goto err;
+        if (!BN_mul_word(tmp_2, 27))
+            goto err;
+        /* tmp_2 = 27*b^2 */
+
+        if (!BN_mod_add(a, tmp_1, tmp_2, p, ctx))
+            goto err;
+        if (BN_is_zero(a))
+            goto err;
+    }
+    ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+    if (ctx != NULL)
+        BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int ec_GFp_simple_point_init(EC_POINT *point)
+{
+    point->X = BN_new();
+    point->Y = BN_new();
+    point->Z = BN_new();
+    point->Z_is_one = 0;
+
+    if (point->X == NULL || point->Y == NULL || point->Z == NULL) {
+        BN_free(point->X);
+        BN_free(point->Y);
+        BN_free(point->Z);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+void ec_GFp_simple_point_finish(EC_POINT *point)
+{
+    BN_free(point->X);
+    BN_free(point->Y);
+    BN_free(point->Z);
+}
+
+void ec_GFp_simple_point_clear_finish(EC_POINT *point)
+{
+    BN_clear_free(point->X);
+    BN_clear_free(point->Y);
+    BN_clear_free(point->Z);
+    point->Z_is_one = 0;
+}
+
+int ec_GFp_simple_point_copy(EC_POINT *dest, const EC_POINT *src)
+{
+    if (!BN_copy(dest->X, src->X))
+        return 0;
+    if (!BN_copy(dest->Y, src->Y))
+        return 0;
+    if (!BN_copy(dest->Z, src->Z))
+        return 0;
+    dest->Z_is_one = src->Z_is_one;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int ec_GFp_simple_point_set_to_infinity(const EC_GROUP *group,
+                                        EC_POINT *point)
+{
+    point->Z_is_one = 0;
+    BN_zero(point->Z);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int ec_GFp_simple_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group,
+                                                  EC_POINT *point,
+                                                  const BIGNUM *x,
+                                                  const BIGNUM *y,
+                                                  const BIGNUM *z,
+                                                  BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+        ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+        if (ctx == NULL)
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (x != NULL) {
+        if (!BN_nnmod(point->X, x, group->field, ctx))
+            goto err;
+        if (group->meth->field_encode) {
+            if (!group->meth->field_encode(group, point->X, point->X, ctx))
+                goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (y != NULL) {
+        if (!BN_nnmod(point->Y, y, group->field, ctx))
+            goto err;
+        if (group->meth->field_encode) {
+            if (!group->meth->field_encode(group, point->Y, point->Y, ctx))
+                goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (z != NULL) {
+        int Z_is_one;
+
+        if (!BN_nnmod(point->Z, z, group->field, ctx))
+            goto err;
+        Z_is_one = BN_is_one(point->Z);
+        if (group->meth->field_encode) {
+            if (Z_is_one && (group->meth->field_set_to_one != 0)) {
+                if (!group->meth->field_set_to_one(group, point->Z, ctx))
+                    goto err;
+            } else {
+                if (!group->
+                    meth->field_encode(group, point->Z, point->Z, ctx))
+                    goto err;
+            }
+        }
+        point->Z_is_one = Z_is_one;
+    }
+
+    ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+    BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int ec_GFp_simple_get_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group,
+                                                  const EC_POINT *point,
+                                                  BIGNUM *x, BIGNUM *y,
+                                                  BIGNUM *z, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    if (group->meth->field_decode != 0) {
+        if (ctx == NULL) {
+            ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+            if (ctx == NULL)
+                return 0;
+        }
+
+        if (x != NULL) {
+            if (!group->meth->field_decode(group, x, point->X, ctx))
+                goto err;
+        }
+        if (y != NULL) {
+            if (!group->meth->field_decode(group, y, point->Y, ctx))
+                goto err;
+        }
+        if (z != NULL) {
+            if (!group->meth->field_decode(group, z, point->Z, ctx))
+                goto err;
+        }
+    } else {
+        if (x != NULL) {
+            if (!BN_copy(x, point->X))
+                goto err;
+        }
+        if (y != NULL) {
+            if (!BN_copy(y, point->Y))
+                goto err;
+        }
+        if (z != NULL) {
+            if (!BN_copy(z, point->Z))
+                goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+    BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int ec_GFp_simple_point_set_affine_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *group,
+                                               EC_POINT *point,
+                                               const BIGNUM *x,
+                                               const BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    if (x == NULL || y == NULL) {
+        /*
+         * unlike for projective coordinates, we do not tolerate this
+         */
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_POINT_SET_AFFINE_COORDINATES,
+              ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return EC_POINT_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(group, point, x, y,
+                                                    BN_value_one(), ctx);
+}
+
+int ec_GFp_simple_point_get_affine_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *group,
+                                               const EC_POINT *point,
+                                               BIGNUM *x, BIGNUM *y,
+                                               BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *Z, *Z_1, *Z_2, *Z_3;
+    const BIGNUM *Z_;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, point)) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES,
+              EC_R_POINT_AT_INFINITY);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+        ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+        if (ctx == NULL)
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    Z = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    Z_1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    Z_2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    Z_3 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (Z_3 == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* transform  (X, Y, Z)  into  (x, y) := (X/Z^2, Y/Z^3) */
+
+    if (group->meth->field_decode) {
+        if (!group->meth->field_decode(group, Z, point->Z, ctx))
+            goto err;
+        Z_ = Z;
+    } else {
+        Z_ = point->Z;
+    }
+
+    if (BN_is_one(Z_)) {
+        if (group->meth->field_decode) {
+            if (x != NULL) {
+                if (!group->meth->field_decode(group, x, point->X, ctx))
+                    goto err;
+            }
+            if (y != NULL) {
+                if (!group->meth->field_decode(group, y, point->Y, ctx))
+                    goto err;
+            }
+        } else {
+            if (x != NULL) {
+                if (!BN_copy(x, point->X))
+                    goto err;
+            }
+            if (y != NULL) {
+                if (!BN_copy(y, point->Y))
+                    goto err;
+            }
+        }
+    } else {
+        if (!BN_mod_inverse(Z_1, Z_, group->field, ctx)) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES,
+                  ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        if (group->meth->field_encode == 0) {
+            /* field_sqr works on standard representation */
+            if (!group->meth->field_sqr(group, Z_2, Z_1, ctx))
+                goto err;
+        } else {
+            if (!BN_mod_sqr(Z_2, Z_1, group->field, ctx))
+                goto err;
+        }
+
+        if (x != NULL) {
+            /*
+             * in the Montgomery case, field_mul will cancel out Montgomery
+             * factor in X:
+             */
+            if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, x, point->X, Z_2, ctx))
+                goto err;
+        }
+
+        if (y != NULL) {
+            if (group->meth->field_encode == 0) {
+                /*
+                 * field_mul works on standard representation
+                 */
+                if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, Z_3, Z_2, Z_1, ctx))
+                    goto err;
+            } else {
+                if (!BN_mod_mul(Z_3, Z_2, Z_1, group->field, ctx))
+                    goto err;
+            }
+
+            /*
+             * in the Montgomery case, field_mul will cancel out Montgomery
+             * factor in Y:
+             */
+            if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, y, point->Y, Z_3, ctx))
+                goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int ec_GFp_simple_add(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const EC_POINT *a,
+                      const EC_POINT *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int (*field_mul) (const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *,
+                      const BIGNUM *, BN_CTX *);
+    int (*field_sqr) (const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, BN_CTX *);
+    const BIGNUM *p;
+    BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *n0, *n1, *n2, *n3, *n4, *n5, *n6;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    if (a == b)
+        return EC_POINT_dbl(group, r, a, ctx);
+    if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, a))
+        return EC_POINT_copy(r, b);
+    if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, b))
+        return EC_POINT_copy(r, a);
+
+    field_mul = group->meth->field_mul;
+    field_sqr = group->meth->field_sqr;
+    p = group->field;
+
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+        ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+        if (ctx == NULL)
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    n0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    n1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    n2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    n3 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    n4 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    n5 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    n6 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (n6 == NULL)
+        goto end;
+
+    /*
+     * Note that in this function we must not read components of 'a' or 'b'
+     * once we have written the corresponding components of 'r'. ('r' might
+     * be one of 'a' or 'b'.)
+     */
+
+    /* n1, n2 */
+    if (b->Z_is_one) {
+        if (!BN_copy(n1, a->X))
+            goto end;
+        if (!BN_copy(n2, a->Y))
+            goto end;
+        /* n1 = X_a */
+        /* n2 = Y_a */
+    } else {
+        if (!field_sqr(group, n0, b->Z, ctx))
+            goto end;
+        if (!field_mul(group, n1, a->X, n0, ctx))
+            goto end;
+        /* n1 = X_a * Z_b^2 */
+
+        if (!field_mul(group, n0, n0, b->Z, ctx))
+            goto end;
+        if (!field_mul(group, n2, a->Y, n0, ctx))
+            goto end;
+        /* n2 = Y_a * Z_b^3 */
+    }
+
+    /* n3, n4 */
+    if (a->Z_is_one) {
+        if (!BN_copy(n3, b->X))
+            goto end;
+        if (!BN_copy(n4, b->Y))
+            goto end;
+        /* n3 = X_b */
+        /* n4 = Y_b */
+    } else {
+        if (!field_sqr(group, n0, a->Z, ctx))
+            goto end;
+        if (!field_mul(group, n3, b->X, n0, ctx))
+            goto end;
+        /* n3 = X_b * Z_a^2 */
+
+        if (!field_mul(group, n0, n0, a->Z, ctx))
+            goto end;
+        if (!field_mul(group, n4, b->Y, n0, ctx))
+            goto end;
+        /* n4 = Y_b * Z_a^3 */
+    }
+
+    /* n5, n6 */
+    if (!BN_mod_sub_quick(n5, n1, n3, p))
+        goto end;
+    if (!BN_mod_sub_quick(n6, n2, n4, p))
+        goto end;
+    /* n5 = n1 - n3 */
+    /* n6 = n2 - n4 */
+
+    if (BN_is_zero(n5)) {
+        if (BN_is_zero(n6)) {
+            /* a is the same point as b */
+            BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+            ret = EC_POINT_dbl(group, r, a, ctx);
+            ctx = NULL;
+            goto end;
+        } else {
+            /* a is the inverse of b */
+            BN_zero(r->Z);
+            r->Z_is_one = 0;
+            ret = 1;
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* 'n7', 'n8' */
+    if (!BN_mod_add_quick(n1, n1, n3, p))
+        goto end;
+    if (!BN_mod_add_quick(n2, n2, n4, p))
+        goto end;
+    /* 'n7' = n1 + n3 */
+    /* 'n8' = n2 + n4 */
+
+    /* Z_r */
+    if (a->Z_is_one && b->Z_is_one) {
+        if (!BN_copy(r->Z, n5))
+            goto end;
+    } else {
+        if (a->Z_is_one) {
+            if (!BN_copy(n0, b->Z))
+                goto end;
+        } else if (b->Z_is_one) {
+            if (!BN_copy(n0, a->Z))
+                goto end;
+        } else {
+            if (!field_mul(group, n0, a->Z, b->Z, ctx))
+                goto end;
+        }
+        if (!field_mul(group, r->Z, n0, n5, ctx))
+            goto end;
+    }
+    r->Z_is_one = 0;
+    /* Z_r = Z_a * Z_b * n5 */
+
+    /* X_r */
+    if (!field_sqr(group, n0, n6, ctx))
+        goto end;
+    if (!field_sqr(group, n4, n5, ctx))
+        goto end;
+    if (!field_mul(group, n3, n1, n4, ctx))
+        goto end;
+    if (!BN_mod_sub_quick(r->X, n0, n3, p))
+        goto end;
+    /* X_r = n6^2 - n5^2 * 'n7' */
+
+    /* 'n9' */
+    if (!BN_mod_lshift1_quick(n0, r->X, p))
+        goto end;
+    if (!BN_mod_sub_quick(n0, n3, n0, p))
+        goto end;
+    /* n9 = n5^2 * 'n7' - 2 * X_r */
+
+    /* Y_r */
+    if (!field_mul(group, n0, n0, n6, ctx))
+        goto end;
+    if (!field_mul(group, n5, n4, n5, ctx))
+        goto end;               /* now n5 is n5^3 */
+    if (!field_mul(group, n1, n2, n5, ctx))
+        goto end;
+    if (!BN_mod_sub_quick(n0, n0, n1, p))
+        goto end;
+    if (BN_is_odd(n0))
+        if (!BN_add(n0, n0, p))
+            goto end;
+    /* now  0 <= n0 < 2*p,  and n0 is even */
+    if (!BN_rshift1(r->Y, n0))
+        goto end;
+    /* Y_r = (n6 * 'n9' - 'n8' * 'n5^3') / 2 */
+
+    ret = 1;
+
+ end:
+    if (ctx)                    /* otherwise we already called BN_CTX_end */
+        BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int ec_GFp_simple_dbl(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const EC_POINT *a,
+                      BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int (*field_mul) (const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *,
+                      const BIGNUM *, BN_CTX *);
+    int (*field_sqr) (const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, BN_CTX *);
+    const BIGNUM *p;
+    BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *n0, *n1, *n2, *n3;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, a)) {
+        BN_zero(r->Z);
+        r->Z_is_one = 0;
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    field_mul = group->meth->field_mul;
+    field_sqr = group->meth->field_sqr;
+    p = group->field;
+
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+        ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+        if (ctx == NULL)
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    n0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    n1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    n2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    n3 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (n3 == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    /*
+     * Note that in this function we must not read components of 'a' once we
+     * have written the corresponding components of 'r'. ('r' might the same
+     * as 'a'.)
+     */
+
+    /* n1 */
+    if (a->Z_is_one) {
+        if (!field_sqr(group, n0, a->X, ctx))
+            goto err;
+        if (!BN_mod_lshift1_quick(n1, n0, p))
+            goto err;
+        if (!BN_mod_add_quick(n0, n0, n1, p))
+            goto err;
+        if (!BN_mod_add_quick(n1, n0, group->a, p))
+            goto err;
+        /* n1 = 3 * X_a^2 + a_curve */
+    } else if (group->a_is_minus3) {
+        if (!field_sqr(group, n1, a->Z, ctx))
+            goto err;
+        if (!BN_mod_add_quick(n0, a->X, n1, p))
+            goto err;
+        if (!BN_mod_sub_quick(n2, a->X, n1, p))
+            goto err;
+        if (!field_mul(group, n1, n0, n2, ctx))
+            goto err;
+        if (!BN_mod_lshift1_quick(n0, n1, p))
+            goto err;
+        if (!BN_mod_add_quick(n1, n0, n1, p))
+            goto err;
+        /*-
+         * n1 = 3 * (X_a + Z_a^2) * (X_a - Z_a^2)
+         *    = 3 * X_a^2 - 3 * Z_a^4
+         */
+    } else {
+        if (!field_sqr(group, n0, a->X, ctx))
+            goto err;
+        if (!BN_mod_lshift1_quick(n1, n0, p))
+            goto err;
+        if (!BN_mod_add_quick(n0, n0, n1, p))
+            goto err;
+        if (!field_sqr(group, n1, a->Z, ctx))
+            goto err;
+        if (!field_sqr(group, n1, n1, ctx))
+            goto err;
+        if (!field_mul(group, n1, n1, group->a, ctx))
+            goto err;
+        if (!BN_mod_add_quick(n1, n1, n0, p))
+            goto err;
+        /* n1 = 3 * X_a^2 + a_curve * Z_a^4 */
+    }
+
+    /* Z_r */
+    if (a->Z_is_one) {
+        if (!BN_copy(n0, a->Y))
+            goto err;
+    } else {
+        if (!field_mul(group, n0, a->Y, a->Z, ctx))
+            goto err;
+    }
+    if (!BN_mod_lshift1_quick(r->Z, n0, p))
+        goto err;
+    r->Z_is_one = 0;
+    /* Z_r = 2 * Y_a * Z_a */
+
+    /* n2 */
+    if (!field_sqr(group, n3, a->Y, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    if (!field_mul(group, n2, a->X, n3, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    if (!BN_mod_lshift_quick(n2, n2, 2, p))
+        goto err;
+    /* n2 = 4 * X_a * Y_a^2 */
+
+    /* X_r */
+    if (!BN_mod_lshift1_quick(n0, n2, p))
+        goto err;
+    if (!field_sqr(group, r->X, n1, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    if (!BN_mod_sub_quick(r->X, r->X, n0, p))
+        goto err;
+    /* X_r = n1^2 - 2 * n2 */
+
+    /* n3 */
+    if (!field_sqr(group, n0, n3, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    if (!BN_mod_lshift_quick(n3, n0, 3, p))
+        goto err;
+    /* n3 = 8 * Y_a^4 */
+
+    /* Y_r */
+    if (!BN_mod_sub_quick(n0, n2, r->X, p))
+        goto err;
+    if (!field_mul(group, n0, n1, n0, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    if (!BN_mod_sub_quick(r->Y, n0, n3, p))
+        goto err;
+    /* Y_r = n1 * (n2 - X_r) - n3 */
+
+    ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int ec_GFp_simple_invert(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, point) || BN_is_zero(point->Y))
+        /* point is its own inverse */
+        return 1;
+
+    return BN_usub(point->Y, group->field, point->Y);
+}
+
+int ec_GFp_simple_is_at_infinity(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point)
+{
+    return BN_is_zero(point->Z);
+}
+
+int ec_GFp_simple_is_on_curve(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point,
+                              BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int (*field_mul) (const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *,
+                      const BIGNUM *, BN_CTX *);
+    int (*field_sqr) (const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, BN_CTX *);
+    const BIGNUM *p;
+    BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *rh, *tmp, *Z4, *Z6;
+    int ret = -1;
+
+    if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, point))
+        return 1;
+
+    field_mul = group->meth->field_mul;
+    field_sqr = group->meth->field_sqr;
+    p = group->field;
+
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+        ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+        if (ctx == NULL)
+            return -1;
+    }
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    rh = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    Z4 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    Z6 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (Z6 == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    /*-
+     * We have a curve defined by a Weierstrass equation
+     *      y^2 = x^3 + a*x + b.
+     * The point to consider is given in Jacobian projective coordinates
+     * where  (X, Y, Z)  represents  (x, y) = (X/Z^2, Y/Z^3).
+     * Substituting this and multiplying by  Z^6  transforms the above equation into
+     *      Y^2 = X^3 + a*X*Z^4 + b*Z^6.
+     * To test this, we add up the right-hand side in 'rh'.
+     */
+
+    /* rh := X^2 */
+    if (!field_sqr(group, rh, point->X, ctx))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!point->Z_is_one) {
+        if (!field_sqr(group, tmp, point->Z, ctx))
+            goto err;
+        if (!field_sqr(group, Z4, tmp, ctx))
+            goto err;
+        if (!field_mul(group, Z6, Z4, tmp, ctx))
+            goto err;
+
+        /* rh := (rh + a*Z^4)*X */
+        if (group->a_is_minus3) {
+            if (!BN_mod_lshift1_quick(tmp, Z4, p))
+                goto err;
+            if (!BN_mod_add_quick(tmp, tmp, Z4, p))
+                goto err;
+            if (!BN_mod_sub_quick(rh, rh, tmp, p))
+                goto err;
+            if (!field_mul(group, rh, rh, point->X, ctx))
+                goto err;
+        } else {
+            if (!field_mul(group, tmp, Z4, group->a, ctx))
+                goto err;
+            if (!BN_mod_add_quick(rh, rh, tmp, p))
+                goto err;
+            if (!field_mul(group, rh, rh, point->X, ctx))
+                goto err;
+        }
+
+        /* rh := rh + b*Z^6 */
+        if (!field_mul(group, tmp, group->b, Z6, ctx))
+            goto err;
+        if (!BN_mod_add_quick(rh, rh, tmp, p))
+            goto err;
+    } else {
+        /* point->Z_is_one */
+
+        /* rh := (rh + a)*X */
+        if (!BN_mod_add_quick(rh, rh, group->a, p))
+            goto err;
+        if (!field_mul(group, rh, rh, point->X, ctx))
+            goto err;
+        /* rh := rh + b */
+        if (!BN_mod_add_quick(rh, rh, group->b, p))
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* 'lh' := Y^2 */
+    if (!field_sqr(group, tmp, point->Y, ctx))
+        goto err;
+
+    ret = (0 == BN_ucmp(tmp, rh));
+
+ err:
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int ec_GFp_simple_cmp(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *a,
+                      const EC_POINT *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    /*-
+     * return values:
+     *  -1   error
+     *   0   equal (in affine coordinates)
+     *   1   not equal
+     */
+
+    int (*field_mul) (const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *,
+                      const BIGNUM *, BN_CTX *);
+    int (*field_sqr) (const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, BN_CTX *);
+    BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *tmp1, *tmp2, *Za23, *Zb23;
+    const BIGNUM *tmp1_, *tmp2_;
+    int ret = -1;
+
+    if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, a)) {
+        return EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, b) ? 0 : 1;
+    }
+
+    if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, b))
+        return 1;
+
+    if (a->Z_is_one && b->Z_is_one) {
+        return ((BN_cmp(a->X, b->X) == 0) && BN_cmp(a->Y, b->Y) == 0) ? 0 : 1;
+    }
+
+    field_mul = group->meth->field_mul;
+    field_sqr = group->meth->field_sqr;
+
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+        ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+        if (ctx == NULL)
+            return -1;
+    }
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    tmp1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    tmp2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    Za23 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    Zb23 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (Zb23 == NULL)
+        goto end;
+
+    /*-
+     * We have to decide whether
+     *     (X_a/Z_a^2, Y_a/Z_a^3) = (X_b/Z_b^2, Y_b/Z_b^3),
+     * or equivalently, whether
+     *     (X_a*Z_b^2, Y_a*Z_b^3) = (X_b*Z_a^2, Y_b*Z_a^3).
+     */
+
+    if (!b->Z_is_one) {
+        if (!field_sqr(group, Zb23, b->Z, ctx))
+            goto end;
+        if (!field_mul(group, tmp1, a->X, Zb23, ctx))
+            goto end;
+        tmp1_ = tmp1;
+    } else
+        tmp1_ = a->X;
+    if (!a->Z_is_one) {
+        if (!field_sqr(group, Za23, a->Z, ctx))
+            goto end;
+        if (!field_mul(group, tmp2, b->X, Za23, ctx))
+            goto end;
+        tmp2_ = tmp2;
+    } else
+        tmp2_ = b->X;
+
+    /* compare  X_a*Z_b^2  with  X_b*Z_a^2 */
+    if (BN_cmp(tmp1_, tmp2_) != 0) {
+        ret = 1;                /* points differ */
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (!b->Z_is_one) {
+        if (!field_mul(group, Zb23, Zb23, b->Z, ctx))
+            goto end;
+        if (!field_mul(group, tmp1, a->Y, Zb23, ctx))
+            goto end;
+        /* tmp1_ = tmp1 */
+    } else
+        tmp1_ = a->Y;
+    if (!a->Z_is_one) {
+        if (!field_mul(group, Za23, Za23, a->Z, ctx))
+            goto end;
+        if (!field_mul(group, tmp2, b->Y, Za23, ctx))
+            goto end;
+        /* tmp2_ = tmp2 */
+    } else
+        tmp2_ = b->Y;
+
+    /* compare  Y_a*Z_b^3  with  Y_b*Z_a^3 */
+    if (BN_cmp(tmp1_, tmp2_) != 0) {
+        ret = 1;                /* points differ */
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    /* points are equal */
+    ret = 0;
+
+ end:
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int ec_GFp_simple_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point,
+                              BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *x, *y;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    if (point->Z_is_one || EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, point))
+        return 1;
+
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+        ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+        if (ctx == NULL)
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    x = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    y = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (y == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, point, x, y, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, point, x, y, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    if (!point->Z_is_one) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_MAKE_AFFINE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *group, size_t num,
+                                     EC_POINT *points[], BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *tmp, *tmp_Z;
+    BIGNUM **prod_Z = NULL;
+    size_t i;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    if (num == 0)
+        return 1;
+
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+        ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+        if (ctx == NULL)
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    tmp_Z = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (tmp == NULL || tmp_Z == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    prod_Z = OPENSSL_malloc(num * sizeof(prod_Z[0]));
+    if (prod_Z == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
+        prod_Z[i] = BN_new();
+        if (prod_Z[i] == NULL)
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Set each prod_Z[i] to the product of points[0]->Z .. points[i]->Z,
+     * skipping any zero-valued inputs (pretend that they're 1).
+     */
+
+    if (!BN_is_zero(points[0]->Z)) {
+        if (!BN_copy(prod_Z[0], points[0]->Z))
+            goto err;
+    } else {
+        if (group->meth->field_set_to_one != 0) {
+            if (!group->meth->field_set_to_one(group, prod_Z[0], ctx))
+                goto err;
+        } else {
+            if (!BN_one(prod_Z[0]))
+                goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    for (i = 1; i < num; i++) {
+        if (!BN_is_zero(points[i]->Z)) {
+            if (!group->
+                meth->field_mul(group, prod_Z[i], prod_Z[i - 1], points[i]->Z,
+                                ctx))
+                goto err;
+        } else {
+            if (!BN_copy(prod_Z[i], prod_Z[i - 1]))
+                goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Now use a single explicit inversion to replace every non-zero
+     * points[i]->Z by its inverse.
+     */
+
+    if (!BN_mod_inverse(tmp, prod_Z[num - 1], group->field, ctx)) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_POINTS_MAKE_AFFINE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (group->meth->field_encode != 0) {
+        /*
+         * In the Montgomery case, we just turned R*H (representing H) into
+         * 1/(R*H), but we need R*(1/H) (representing 1/H); i.e. we need to
+         * multiply by the Montgomery factor twice.
+         */
+        if (!group->meth->field_encode(group, tmp, tmp, ctx))
+            goto err;
+        if (!group->meth->field_encode(group, tmp, tmp, ctx))
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    for (i = num - 1; i > 0; --i) {
+        /*
+         * Loop invariant: tmp is the product of the inverses of points[0]->Z
+         * .. points[i]->Z (zero-valued inputs skipped).
+         */
+        if (!BN_is_zero(points[i]->Z)) {
+            /*
+             * Set tmp_Z to the inverse of points[i]->Z (as product of Z
+             * inverses 0 .. i, Z values 0 .. i - 1).
+             */
+            if (!group->
+                meth->field_mul(group, tmp_Z, prod_Z[i - 1], tmp, ctx))
+                goto err;
+            /*
+             * Update tmp to satisfy the loop invariant for i - 1.
+             */
+            if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, tmp, tmp, points[i]->Z, ctx))
+                goto err;
+            /* Replace points[i]->Z by its inverse. */
+            if (!BN_copy(points[i]->Z, tmp_Z))
+                goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (!BN_is_zero(points[0]->Z)) {
+        /* Replace points[0]->Z by its inverse. */
+        if (!BN_copy(points[0]->Z, tmp))
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* Finally, fix up the X and Y coordinates for all points. */
+
+    for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
+        EC_POINT *p = points[i];
+
+        if (!BN_is_zero(p->Z)) {
+            /* turn  (X, Y, 1/Z)  into  (X/Z^2, Y/Z^3, 1) */
+
+            if (!group->meth->field_sqr(group, tmp, p->Z, ctx))
+                goto err;
+            if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, p->X, p->X, tmp, ctx))
+                goto err;
+
+            if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, tmp, tmp, p->Z, ctx))
+                goto err;
+            if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, p->Y, p->Y, tmp, ctx))
+                goto err;
+
+            if (group->meth->field_set_to_one != 0) {
+                if (!group->meth->field_set_to_one(group, p->Z, ctx))
+                    goto err;
+            } else {
+                if (!BN_one(p->Z))
+                    goto err;
+            }
+            p->Z_is_one = 1;
+        }
+    }
+
+    ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
+    if (prod_Z != NULL) {
+        for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
+            if (prod_Z[i] == NULL)
+                break;
+            BN_clear_free(prod_Z[i]);
+        }
+        OPENSSL_free(prod_Z);
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int ec_GFp_simple_field_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
+                            const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return BN_mod_mul(r, a, b, group->field, ctx);
+}
+
+int ec_GFp_simple_field_sqr(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
+                            BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return BN_mod_sqr(r, a, group->field, ctx);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ecx_meth.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ecx_meth.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..018a941
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ecx_meth.c
@@ -0,0 +1,373 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/ec.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include "internal/asn1_int.h"
+#include "internal/evp_int.h"
+#include "ec_lcl.h"
+
+#define X25519_KEYLEN        32
+#define X25519_BITS          253
+#define X25519_SECURITY_BITS 128
+
+typedef struct {
+    unsigned char pubkey[X25519_KEYLEN];
+    unsigned char *privkey;
+} X25519_KEY;
+
+typedef enum {
+    X25519_PUBLIC,
+    X25519_PRIVATE,
+    X25519_KEYGEN
+} ecx_key_op_t;
+
+/* Setup EVP_PKEY using public, private or generation */
+static int ecx_key_op(EVP_PKEY *pkey, const X509_ALGOR *palg,
+                      const unsigned char *p, int plen, ecx_key_op_t op)
+{
+    X25519_KEY *xkey;
+
+    if (op != X25519_KEYGEN) {
+        if (palg != NULL) {
+            int ptype;
+
+            /* Algorithm parameters must be absent */
+            X509_ALGOR_get0(NULL, &ptype, NULL, palg);
+            if (ptype != V_ASN1_UNDEF) {
+                ECerr(EC_F_ECX_KEY_OP, EC_R_INVALID_ENCODING);
+                return 0;
+            }
+        }
+
+        if (p == NULL || plen != X25519_KEYLEN) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_ECX_KEY_OP, EC_R_INVALID_ENCODING);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    xkey = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*xkey));
+    if (xkey == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_ECX_KEY_OP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (op == X25519_PUBLIC) {
+        memcpy(xkey->pubkey, p, plen);
+    } else {
+        xkey->privkey = OPENSSL_secure_malloc(X25519_KEYLEN);
+        if (xkey->privkey == NULL) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_ECX_KEY_OP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            OPENSSL_free(xkey);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        if (op == X25519_KEYGEN) {
+            if (RAND_bytes(xkey->privkey, X25519_KEYLEN) <= 0) {
+                OPENSSL_secure_free(xkey->privkey);
+                OPENSSL_free(xkey);
+                return 0;
+            }
+            xkey->privkey[0] &= 248;
+            xkey->privkey[31] &= 127;
+            xkey->privkey[31] |= 64;
+        } else {
+            memcpy(xkey->privkey, p, X25519_KEYLEN);
+        }
+        X25519_public_from_private(xkey->pubkey, xkey->privkey);
+    }
+
+    EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, NID_X25519, xkey);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int ecx_pub_encode(X509_PUBKEY *pk, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    const X25519_KEY *xkey = pkey->pkey.ptr;
+    unsigned char *penc;
+
+    if (xkey == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_ECX_PUB_ENCODE, EC_R_INVALID_KEY);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    penc = OPENSSL_memdup(xkey->pubkey, X25519_KEYLEN);
+    if (penc == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_ECX_PUB_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (!X509_PUBKEY_set0_param(pk, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_X25519), V_ASN1_UNDEF,
+                                NULL, penc, X25519_KEYLEN)) {
+        OPENSSL_free(penc);
+        ECerr(EC_F_ECX_PUB_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int ecx_pub_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509_PUBKEY *pubkey)
+{
+    const unsigned char *p;
+    int pklen;
+    X509_ALGOR *palg;
+
+    if (!X509_PUBKEY_get0_param(NULL, &p, &pklen, &palg, pubkey))
+        return 0;
+    return ecx_key_op(pkey, palg, p, pklen, X25519_PUBLIC);
+}
+
+static int ecx_pub_cmp(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b)
+{
+    const X25519_KEY *akey = a->pkey.ptr;
+    const X25519_KEY *bkey = b->pkey.ptr;
+
+    if (akey == NULL || bkey == NULL)
+        return -2;
+    return !CRYPTO_memcmp(akey->pubkey, bkey->pubkey, X25519_KEYLEN);
+}
+
+static int ecx_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, const PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8)
+{
+    const unsigned char *p;
+    int plen;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *oct = NULL;
+    const X509_ALGOR *palg;
+    int rv;
+
+    if (!PKCS8_pkey_get0(NULL, &p, &plen, &palg, p8))
+        return 0;
+
+    oct = d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(NULL, &p, plen);
+    if (oct == NULL) {
+        p = NULL;
+        plen = 0;
+    } else {
+        p = ASN1_STRING_get0_data(oct);
+        plen = ASN1_STRING_length(oct);
+    }
+
+    rv = ecx_key_op(pkey, palg, p, plen, X25519_PRIVATE);
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(oct);
+    return rv;
+}
+
+static int ecx_priv_encode(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    const X25519_KEY *xkey = pkey->pkey.ptr;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING oct;
+    unsigned char *penc = NULL;
+    int penclen;
+
+    if (xkey == NULL || xkey->privkey == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_ECX_PRIV_ENCODE, EC_R_INVALID_PRIVATE_KEY);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    oct.data = xkey->privkey;
+    oct.length = X25519_KEYLEN;
+    oct.flags = 0;
+
+    penclen = i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(&oct, &penc);
+    if (penclen < 0) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_ECX_PRIV_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (!PKCS8_pkey_set0(p8, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_X25519), 0,
+                         V_ASN1_UNDEF, NULL, penc, penclen)) {
+        OPENSSL_clear_free(penc, penclen);
+        ECerr(EC_F_ECX_PRIV_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int ecx_size(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    return X25519_KEYLEN;
+}
+
+static int ecx_bits(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    return X25519_BITS;
+}
+
+static int ecx_security_bits(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    return X25519_SECURITY_BITS;
+}
+
+static void ecx_free(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    X25519_KEY *xkey = pkey->pkey.ptr;
+
+    if (xkey)
+        OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(xkey->privkey, X25519_KEYLEN);
+    OPENSSL_free(xkey);
+}
+
+/* "parameters" are always equal */
+static int ecx_cmp_parameters(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b)
+{
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int ecx_key_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent,
+                         ASN1_PCTX *ctx, ecx_key_op_t op)
+{
+    const X25519_KEY *xkey = pkey->pkey.ptr;
+
+    if (op == X25519_PRIVATE) {
+        if (xkey == NULL || xkey->privkey == NULL) {
+            if (BIO_printf(bp, "%*s<INVALID PRIVATE KEY>\n", indent, "") <= 0)
+                return 0;
+            return 1;
+        }
+        if (BIO_printf(bp, "%*sX25519 Private-Key:\n", indent, "") <= 0)
+            return 0;
+        if (BIO_printf(bp, "%*spriv:\n", indent, "") <= 0)
+            return 0;
+        if (ASN1_buf_print(bp, xkey->privkey, X25519_KEYLEN, indent + 4) == 0)
+            return 0;
+    } else {
+        if (xkey == NULL) {
+            if (BIO_printf(bp, "%*s<INVALID PUBLIC KEY>\n", indent, "") <= 0)
+                return 0;
+            return 1;
+        }
+        if (BIO_printf(bp, "%*sX25519 Public-Key:\n", indent, "") <= 0)
+            return 0;
+    }
+    if (BIO_printf(bp, "%*spub:\n", indent, "") <= 0)
+        return 0;
+    if (ASN1_buf_print(bp, xkey->pubkey, X25519_KEYLEN, indent + 4) == 0)
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int ecx_priv_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent,
+                          ASN1_PCTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ecx_key_print(bp, pkey, indent, ctx, X25519_PRIVATE);
+}
+
+static int ecx_pub_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent,
+                         ASN1_PCTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ecx_key_print(bp, pkey, indent, ctx, X25519_PUBLIC);
+}
+
+static int ecx_ctrl(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int op, long arg1, void *arg2)
+{
+    switch (op) {
+
+    case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_SET1_TLS_ENCPT:
+        return ecx_key_op(pkey, NULL, arg2, arg1, X25519_PUBLIC);
+
+    case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_GET1_TLS_ENCPT:
+        if (pkey->pkey.ptr != NULL) {
+            const X25519_KEY *xkey = pkey->pkey.ptr;
+            unsigned char **ppt = arg2;
+            *ppt = OPENSSL_memdup(xkey->pubkey, X25519_KEYLEN);
+            if (*ppt != NULL)
+                return X25519_KEYLEN;
+        }
+        return 0;
+
+    case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_DEFAULT_MD_NID:
+        *(int *)arg2 = NID_sha256;
+        return 2;
+
+    default:
+        return -2;
+
+    }
+}
+
+const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD ecx25519_asn1_meth = {
+    NID_X25519,
+    NID_X25519,
+    0,
+    "X25519",
+    "OpenSSL X25519 algorithm",
+
+    ecx_pub_decode,
+    ecx_pub_encode,
+    ecx_pub_cmp,
+    ecx_pub_print,
+
+    ecx_priv_decode,
+    ecx_priv_encode,
+    ecx_priv_print,
+
+    ecx_size,
+    ecx_bits,
+    ecx_security_bits,
+
+    0, 0, 0, 0,
+    ecx_cmp_parameters,
+    0, 0,
+
+    ecx_free,
+    ecx_ctrl,
+    NULL,
+    NULL
+};
+
+static int pkey_ecx_keygen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    return ecx_key_op(pkey, NULL, NULL, 0, X25519_KEYGEN);
+}
+
+static int pkey_ecx_derive(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key,
+                           size_t *keylen)
+{
+    const X25519_KEY *pkey, *peerkey;
+
+    if (ctx->pkey == NULL || ctx->peerkey == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_PKEY_ECX_DERIVE, EC_R_KEYS_NOT_SET);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    pkey = ctx->pkey->pkey.ptr;
+    peerkey = ctx->peerkey->pkey.ptr;
+    if (pkey == NULL || pkey->privkey == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_PKEY_ECX_DERIVE, EC_R_INVALID_PRIVATE_KEY);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (peerkey == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_PKEY_ECX_DERIVE, EC_R_INVALID_PEER_KEY);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    *keylen = X25519_KEYLEN;
+    if (key != NULL && X25519(key, pkey->privkey, peerkey->pubkey) == 0)
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int pkey_ecx_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2)
+{
+    /* Only need to handle peer key for derivation */
+    if (type == EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY)
+        return 1;
+    return -2;
+}
+
+const EVP_PKEY_METHOD ecx25519_pkey_meth = {
+    NID_X25519,
+    0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+    pkey_ecx_keygen,
+    0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+    pkey_ecx_derive,
+    pkey_ecx_ctrl,
+    0
+};
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/engine/README b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/engine/README
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..41baa18
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/engine/README
@@ -0,0 +1,211 @@
+Notes: 2001-09-24
+-----------------
+
+This "description" (if one chooses to call it that) needed some major updating
+so here goes. This update addresses a change being made at the same time to
+OpenSSL, and it pretty much completely restructures the underlying mechanics of
+the "ENGINE" code. So it serves a double purpose of being a "ENGINE internals
+for masochists" document *and* a rather extensive commit log message. (I'd get
+lynched for sticking all this in CHANGES or the commit mails :-).
+
+ENGINE_TABLE underlies this restructuring, as described in the internal header
+"eng_int.h", implemented in eng_table.c, and used in each of the "class" files;
+tb_rsa.c, tb_dsa.c, etc.
+
+However, "EVP_CIPHER" underlies the motivation and design of ENGINE_TABLE so
+I'll mention a bit about that first. EVP_CIPHER (and most of this applies
+equally to EVP_MD for digests) is both a "method" and a algorithm/mode
+identifier that, in the current API, "lingers". These cipher description +
+implementation structures can be defined or obtained directly by applications,
+or can be loaded "en masse" into EVP storage so that they can be catalogued and
+searched in various ways, ie. two ways of encrypting with the "des_cbc"
+algorithm/mode pair are;
+
+(i) directly;
+     const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_des_cbc();
+     EVP_EncryptInit(&ctx, cipher, key, iv);
+     [ ... use EVP_EncryptUpdate() and EVP_EncryptFinal() ...]
+
+(ii) indirectly; 
+     OpenSSL_add_all_ciphers();
+     cipher = EVP_get_cipherbyname("des_cbc");
+     EVP_EncryptInit(&ctx, cipher, key, iv);
+     [ ... etc ... ]
+
+The latter is more generally used because it also allows ciphers/digests to be
+looked up based on other identifiers which can be useful for automatic cipher
+selection, eg. in SSL/TLS, or by user-controllable configuration.
+
+The important point about this is that EVP_CIPHER definitions and structures are
+passed around with impunity and there is no safe way, without requiring massive
+rewrites of many applications, to assume that EVP_CIPHERs can be reference
+counted. One an EVP_CIPHER is exposed to the caller, neither it nor anything it
+comes from can "safely" be destroyed. Unless of course the way of getting to
+such ciphers is via entirely distinct API calls that didn't exist before.
+However existing API usage cannot be made to understand when an EVP_CIPHER
+pointer, that has been passed to the caller, is no longer being used.
+
+The other problem with the existing API w.r.t. to hooking EVP_CIPHER support
+into ENGINE is storage - the OBJ_NAME-based storage used by EVP to register
+ciphers simultaneously registers cipher *types* and cipher *implementations* -
+they are effectively the same thing, an "EVP_CIPHER" pointer. The problem with
+hooking in ENGINEs is that multiple ENGINEs may implement the same ciphers. The
+solution is necessarily that ENGINE-provided ciphers simply are not registered,
+stored, or exposed to the caller in the same manner as existing ciphers. This is
+especially necessary considering the fact ENGINE uses reference counts to allow
+for cleanup, modularity, and DSO support - yet EVP_CIPHERs, as exposed to
+callers in the current API, support no such controls.
+
+Another sticking point for integrating cipher support into ENGINE is linkage.
+Already there is a problem with the way ENGINE supports RSA, DSA, etc whereby
+they are available *because* they're part of a giant ENGINE called "openssl".
+Ie. all implementations *have* to come from an ENGINE, but we get round that by
+having a giant ENGINE with all the software support encapsulated. This creates
+linker hassles if nothing else - linking a 1-line application that calls 2 basic
+RSA functions (eg. "RSA_free(RSA_new());") will result in large quantities of
+ENGINE code being linked in *and* because of that DSA, DH, and RAND also. If we
+continue with this approach for EVP_CIPHER support (even if it *was* possible)
+we would lose our ability to link selectively by selectively loading certain
+implementations of certain functionality. Touching any part of any kind of
+crypto would result in massive static linkage of everything else. So the
+solution is to change the way ENGINE feeds existing "classes", ie. how the
+hooking to ENGINE works from RSA, DSA, DH, RAND, as well as adding new hooking
+for EVP_CIPHER, and EVP_MD.
+
+The way this is now being done is by mostly reverting back to how things used to
+work prior to ENGINE :-). Ie. RSA now has a "RSA_METHOD" pointer again - this
+was previously replaced by an "ENGINE" pointer and all RSA code that required
+the RSA_METHOD would call ENGINE_get_RSA() each time on its ENGINE handle to
+temporarily get and use the ENGINE's RSA implementation. Apart from being more
+efficient, switching back to each RSA having an RSA_METHOD pointer also allows
+us to conceivably operate with *no* ENGINE. As we'll see, this removes any need
+for a fallback ENGINE that encapsulates default implementations - we can simply
+have our RSA structure pointing its RSA_METHOD pointer to the software
+implementation and have its ENGINE pointer set to NULL.
+
+A look at the EVP_CIPHER hooking is most explanatory, the RSA, DSA (etc) cases
+turn out to be degenerate forms of the same thing. The EVP storage of ciphers,
+and the existing EVP API functions that return "software" implementations and
+descriptions remain untouched. However, the storage takes more meaning in terms
+of "cipher description" and less meaning in terms of "implementation". When an
+EVP_CIPHER_CTX is actually initialised with an EVP_CIPHER method and is about to
+begin en/decryption, the hooking to ENGINE comes into play. What happens is that
+cipher-specific ENGINE code is asked for an ENGINE pointer (a functional
+reference) for any ENGINE that is registered to perform the algo/mode that the
+provided EVP_CIPHER structure represents. Under normal circumstances, that
+ENGINE code will return NULL because no ENGINEs will have had any cipher
+implementations *registered*. As such, a NULL ENGINE pointer is stored in the
+EVP_CIPHER_CTX context, and the EVP_CIPHER structure is left hooked into the
+context and so is used as the implementation. Pretty much how things work now
+except we'd have a redundant ENGINE pointer set to NULL and doing nothing.
+
+Conversely, if an ENGINE *has* been registered to perform the algorithm/mode
+combination represented by the provided EVP_CIPHER, then a functional reference
+to that ENGINE will be returned to the EVP_CIPHER_CTX during initialisation.
+That functional reference will be stored in the context (and released on
+cleanup) - and having that reference provides a *safe* way to use an EVP_CIPHER
+definition that is private to the ENGINE. Ie. the EVP_CIPHER provided by the
+application will actually be replaced by an EVP_CIPHER from the registered
+ENGINE - it will support the same algorithm/mode as the original but will be a
+completely different implementation. Because this EVP_CIPHER isn't stored in the
+EVP storage, nor is it returned to applications from traditional API functions,
+there is no associated problem with it not having reference counts. And of
+course, when one of these "private" cipher implementations is hooked into
+EVP_CIPHER_CTX, it is done whilst the EVP_CIPHER_CTX holds a functional
+reference to the ENGINE that owns it, thus the use of the ENGINE's EVP_CIPHER is
+safe.
+
+The "cipher-specific ENGINE code" I mentioned is implemented in tb_cipher.c but
+in essence it is simply an instantiation of "ENGINE_TABLE" code for use by
+EVP_CIPHER code. tb_digest.c is virtually identical but, of course, it is for
+use by EVP_MD code. Ditto for tb_rsa.c, tb_dsa.c, etc. These instantiations of
+ENGINE_TABLE essentially provide linker-separation of the classes so that even
+if ENGINEs implement *all* possible algorithms, an application using only
+EVP_CIPHER code will link at most code relating to EVP_CIPHER, tb_cipher.c, core
+ENGINE code that is independent of class, and of course the ENGINE
+implementation that the application loaded. It will *not* however link any
+class-specific ENGINE code for digests, RSA, etc nor will it bleed over into
+other APIs, such as the RSA/DSA/etc library code.
+
+ENGINE_TABLE is a little more complicated than may seem necessary but this is
+mostly to avoid a lot of "init()"-thrashing on ENGINEs (that may have to load
+DSOs, and other expensive setup that shouldn't be thrashed unnecessarily) *and*
+to duplicate "default" behaviour. Basically an ENGINE_TABLE instantiation, for
+example tb_cipher.c, implements a hash-table keyed by integer "nid" values.
+These nids provide the uniquenness of an algorithm/mode - and each nid will hash
+to a potentially NULL "ENGINE_PILE". An ENGINE_PILE is essentially a list of
+pointers to ENGINEs that implement that particular 'nid'. Each "pile" uses some
+caching tricks such that requests on that 'nid' will be cached and all future
+requests will return immediately (well, at least with minimal operation) unless
+a change is made to the pile, eg. perhaps an ENGINE was unloaded. The reason is
+that an application could have support for 10 ENGINEs statically linked
+in, and the machine in question may not have any of the hardware those 10
+ENGINEs support. If each of those ENGINEs has a "des_cbc" implementation, we
+want to avoid every EVP_CIPHER_CTX setup from trying (and failing) to initialise
+each of those 10 ENGINEs. Instead, the first such request will try to do that
+and will either return (and cache) a NULL ENGINE pointer or will return a
+functional reference to the first that successfully initialised. In the latter
+case it will also cache an extra functional reference to the ENGINE as a
+"default" for that 'nid'. The caching is acknowledged by a 'uptodate' variable
+that is unset only if un/registration takes place on that pile. Ie. if
+implementations of "des_cbc" are added or removed. This behaviour can be
+tweaked; the ENGINE_TABLE_FLAG_NOINIT value can be passed to
+ENGINE_set_table_flags(), in which case the only ENGINEs that tb_cipher.c will
+try to initialise from the "pile" will be those that are already initialised
+(ie. it's simply an increment of the functional reference count, and no real
+"initialisation" will take place).
+
+RSA, DSA, DH, and RAND all have their own ENGINE_TABLE code as well, and the
+difference is that they all use an implicit 'nid' of 1. Whereas EVP_CIPHERs are
+actually qualitatively different depending on 'nid' (the "des_cbc" EVP_CIPHER is
+not an interoperable implementation of "aes_256_cbc"), RSA_METHODs are
+necessarily interoperable and don't have different flavours, only different
+implementations. In other words, the ENGINE_TABLE for RSA will either be empty,
+or will have a single ENGING_PILE hashed to by the 'nid' 1 and that pile
+represents ENGINEs that implement the single "type" of RSA there is.
+
+Cleanup - the registration and unregistration may pose questions about how
+cleanup works with the ENGINE_PILE doing all this caching nonsense (ie. when the
+application or EVP_CIPHER code releases its last reference to an ENGINE, the
+ENGINE_PILE code may still have references and thus those ENGINEs will stay
+hooked in forever). The way this is handled is via "unregistration". With these
+new ENGINE changes, an abstract ENGINE can be loaded and initialised, but that
+is an algorithm-agnostic process. Even if initialised, it will not have
+registered any of its implementations (to do so would link all class "table"
+code despite the fact the application may use only ciphers, for example). This
+is deliberately a distinct step. Moreover, registration and unregistration has
+nothing to do with whether an ENGINE is *functional* or not (ie. you can even
+register an ENGINE and its implementations without it being operational, you may
+not even have the drivers to make it operate). What actually happens with
+respect to cleanup is managed inside eng_lib.c with the "engine_cleanup_***"
+functions. These functions are internal-only and each part of ENGINE code that
+could require cleanup will, upon performing its first allocation, register a
+callback with the "engine_cleanup" code. The other part of this that makes it
+tick is that the ENGINE_TABLE instantiations (tb_***.c) use NULL as their
+initialised state. So if RSA code asks for an ENGINE and no ENGINE has
+registered an implementation, the code will simply return NULL and the tb_rsa.c
+state will be unchanged. Thus, no cleanup is required unless registration takes
+place. ENGINE_cleanup() will simply iterate across a list of registered cleanup
+callbacks calling each in turn, and will then internally delete its own storage
+(a STACK). When a cleanup callback is next registered (eg. if the cleanup() is
+part of a gracefull restart and the application wants to cleanup all state then
+start again), the internal STACK storage will be freshly allocated. This is much
+the same as the situation in the ENGINE_TABLE instantiations ... NULL is the
+initialised state, so only modification operations (not queries) will cause that
+code to have to register a cleanup.
+
+What else? The bignum callbacks and associated ENGINE functions have been
+removed for two obvious reasons; (i) there was no way to generalise them to the
+mechanism now used by RSA/DSA/..., because there's no such thing as a BIGNUM
+method, and (ii) because of (i), there was no meaningful way for library or
+application code to automatically hook and use ENGINE supplied bignum functions
+anyway. Also, ENGINE_cpy() has been removed (although an internal-only version
+exists) - the idea of providing an ENGINE_cpy() function probably wasn't a good
+one and now certainly doesn't make sense in any generalised way. Some of the
+RSA, DSA, DH, and RAND functions that were fiddled during the original ENGINE
+changes have now, as a consequence, been reverted back. This is because the
+hooking of ENGINE is now automatic (and passive, it can interally use a NULL
+ENGINE pointer to simply ignore ENGINE from then on).
+
+Hell, that should be enough for now ... comments welcome: geoff@openssl.org
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/engine/build.info b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/engine/build.info
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..161dad4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/engine/build.info
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+LIBS=../../libcrypto
+SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
+        eng_err.c eng_lib.c eng_list.c eng_init.c eng_ctrl.c \
+        eng_table.c eng_pkey.c eng_fat.c eng_all.c \
+        tb_rsa.c tb_dsa.c tb_dh.c tb_rand.c \
+        tb_cipher.c tb_digest.c tb_pkmeth.c tb_asnmth.c tb_eckey.c \
+        eng_openssl.c eng_cnf.c eng_dyn.c eng_cryptodev.c \
+        eng_rdrand.c
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/engine/eng_all.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/engine/eng_all.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ebe0277
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/engine/eng_all.c
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "eng_int.h"
+
+void ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(void)
+{
+    /* Some ENGINEs need this */
+    OPENSSL_cpuid_setup();
+
+    OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_ALL_BUILTIN, NULL);
+}
+
+#if (defined(__OpenBSD__) || defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(HAVE_CRYPTODEV)) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED)
+void ENGINE_setup_bsd_cryptodev(void)
+{
+    static int bsd_cryptodev_default_loaded = 0;
+    if (!bsd_cryptodev_default_loaded) {
+        OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_CRYPTODEV, NULL);
+        ENGINE_register_all_complete();
+    }
+    bsd_cryptodev_default_loaded = 1;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/engine/eng_cnf.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/engine/eng_cnf.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6f0a066
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/engine/eng_cnf.c
@@ -0,0 +1,192 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "eng_int.h"
+#include <openssl/conf.h>
+
+/* #define ENGINE_CONF_DEBUG */
+
+/* ENGINE config module */
+
+static const char *skip_dot(const char *name)
+{
+    const char *p = strchr(name, '.');
+
+    if (p != NULL)
+        return p + 1;
+    return name;
+}
+
+static STACK_OF(ENGINE) *initialized_engines = NULL;
+
+static int int_engine_init(ENGINE *e)
+{
+    if (!ENGINE_init(e))
+        return 0;
+    if (!initialized_engines)
+        initialized_engines = sk_ENGINE_new_null();
+    if (!initialized_engines || !sk_ENGINE_push(initialized_engines, e)) {
+        ENGINE_finish(e);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int int_engine_configure(const char *name, const char *value, const CONF *cnf)
+{
+    int i;
+    int ret = 0;
+    long do_init = -1;
+    STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *ecmds;
+    CONF_VALUE *ecmd = NULL;
+    const char *ctrlname, *ctrlvalue;
+    ENGINE *e = NULL;
+    int soft = 0;
+
+    name = skip_dot(name);
+#ifdef ENGINE_CONF_DEBUG
+    fprintf(stderr, "Configuring engine %s\n", name);
+#endif
+    /* Value is a section containing ENGINE commands */
+    ecmds = NCONF_get_section(cnf, value);
+
+    if (!ecmds) {
+        ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_INT_ENGINE_CONFIGURE,
+                  ENGINE_R_ENGINE_SECTION_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(ecmds); i++) {
+        ecmd = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(ecmds, i);
+        ctrlname = skip_dot(ecmd->name);
+        ctrlvalue = ecmd->value;
+#ifdef ENGINE_CONF_DEBUG
+        fprintf(stderr, "ENGINE conf: doing ctrl(%s,%s)\n", ctrlname,
+                ctrlvalue);
+#endif
+
+        /* First handle some special pseudo ctrls */
+
+        /* Override engine name to use */
+        if (strcmp(ctrlname, "engine_id") == 0)
+            name = ctrlvalue;
+        else if (strcmp(ctrlname, "soft_load") == 0)
+            soft = 1;
+        /* Load a dynamic ENGINE */
+        else if (strcmp(ctrlname, "dynamic_path") == 0) {
+            e = ENGINE_by_id("dynamic");
+            if (!e)
+                goto err;
+            if (!ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(e, "SO_PATH", ctrlvalue, 0))
+                goto err;
+            if (!ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(e, "LIST_ADD", "2", 0))
+                goto err;
+            if (!ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(e, "LOAD", NULL, 0))
+                goto err;
+        }
+        /* ... add other pseudos here ... */
+        else {
+            /*
+             * At this point we need an ENGINE structural reference if we
+             * don't already have one.
+             */
+            if (!e) {
+                e = ENGINE_by_id(name);
+                if (!e && soft) {
+                    ERR_clear_error();
+                    return 1;
+                }
+                if (!e)
+                    goto err;
+            }
+            /*
+             * Allow "EMPTY" to mean no value: this allows a valid "value" to
+             * be passed to ctrls of type NO_INPUT
+             */
+            if (strcmp(ctrlvalue, "EMPTY") == 0)
+                ctrlvalue = NULL;
+            if (strcmp(ctrlname, "init") == 0) {
+                if (!NCONF_get_number_e(cnf, value, "init", &do_init))
+                    goto err;
+                if (do_init == 1) {
+                    if (!int_engine_init(e))
+                        goto err;
+                } else if (do_init != 0) {
+                    ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_INT_ENGINE_CONFIGURE,
+                              ENGINE_R_INVALID_INIT_VALUE);
+                    goto err;
+                }
+            } else if (strcmp(ctrlname, "default_algorithms") == 0) {
+                if (!ENGINE_set_default_string(e, ctrlvalue))
+                    goto err;
+            } else if (!ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(e, ctrlname, ctrlvalue, 0))
+                goto err;
+        }
+
+    }
+    if (e && (do_init == -1) && !int_engine_init(e)) {
+        ecmd = NULL;
+        goto err;
+    }
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    if (ret != 1) {
+        ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_INT_ENGINE_CONFIGURE,
+                  ENGINE_R_ENGINE_CONFIGURATION_ERROR);
+        if (ecmd)
+            ERR_add_error_data(6, "section=", ecmd->section,
+                               ", name=", ecmd->name,
+                               ", value=", ecmd->value);
+    }
+    ENGINE_free(e);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int int_engine_module_init(CONF_IMODULE *md, const CONF *cnf)
+{
+    STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *elist;
+    CONF_VALUE *cval;
+    int i;
+#ifdef ENGINE_CONF_DEBUG
+    fprintf(stderr, "Called engine module: name %s, value %s\n",
+            CONF_imodule_get_name(md), CONF_imodule_get_value(md));
+#endif
+    /* Value is a section containing ENGINEs to configure */
+    elist = NCONF_get_section(cnf, CONF_imodule_get_value(md));
+
+    if (!elist) {
+        ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_INT_ENGINE_MODULE_INIT,
+                  ENGINE_R_ENGINES_SECTION_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(elist); i++) {
+        cval = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(elist, i);
+        if (!int_engine_configure(cval->name, cval->value, cnf))
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static void int_engine_module_finish(CONF_IMODULE *md)
+{
+    ENGINE *e;
+
+    while ((e = sk_ENGINE_pop(initialized_engines)))
+        ENGINE_finish(e);
+    sk_ENGINE_free(initialized_engines);
+    initialized_engines = NULL;
+}
+
+void ENGINE_add_conf_module(void)
+{
+    CONF_module_add("engines",
+                    int_engine_module_init, int_engine_module_finish);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/engine/eng_cryptodev.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/engine/eng_cryptodev.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5572735
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/engine/eng_cryptodev.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1757 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2002 Bob Beck <beck@openbsd.org>
+ * Copyright (c) 2002 Theo de Raadt
+ * Copyright (c) 2002 Markus Friedl
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
+ * DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY
+ * DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
+ * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND
+ * ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <internal/engine.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+
+#if (defined(__unix__) || defined(unix)) && !defined(USG) && \
+        (defined(OpenBSD) || defined(__FreeBSD__))
+# include <sys/param.h>
+# if (defined(OpenBSD) && (OpenBSD >= 200112)) || \
+     (defined(__FreeBSD_version) && \
+      ((__FreeBSD_version >= 470101 && __FreeBSD_version < 500000) || \
+       __FreeBSD_version >= 500041))
+#  define HAVE_CRYPTODEV
+# endif
+# if defined(OpenBSD) && (OpenBSD >= 200110)
+#  define HAVE_SYSLOG_R
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_CRYPTODEV
+# include <crypto/cryptodev.h>
+# include <sys/ioctl.h>
+# include <errno.h>
+# include <stdio.h>
+# include <unistd.h>
+# include <fcntl.h>
+# include <stdarg.h>
+# include <syslog.h>
+# include <errno.h>
+# include <string.h>
+#endif
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+
+#ifndef HAVE_CRYPTODEV
+
+void engine_load_cryptodev_int(void)
+{
+    /* This is a NOP on platforms without /dev/crypto */
+    return;
+}
+
+#else
+
+struct dev_crypto_state {
+    struct session_op d_sess;
+    int d_fd;
+# ifdef USE_CRYPTODEV_DIGESTS
+    char dummy_mac_key[HASH_MAX_LEN];
+    unsigned char digest_res[HASH_MAX_LEN];
+    char *mac_data;
+    int mac_len;
+# endif
+};
+
+static u_int32_t cryptodev_asymfeat = 0;
+
+static RSA_METHOD *cryptodev_rsa;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+static DSA_METHOD *cryptodev_dsa = NULL;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+static DH_METHOD *cryptodev_dh;
+#endif
+
+static int get_asym_dev_crypto(void);
+static int open_dev_crypto(void);
+static int get_dev_crypto(void);
+static int get_cryptodev_ciphers(const int **cnids);
+# ifdef USE_CRYPTODEV_DIGESTS
+static int get_cryptodev_digests(const int **cnids);
+# endif
+static int cryptodev_usable_ciphers(const int **nids);
+static int cryptodev_usable_digests(const int **nids);
+static int cryptodev_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                            const unsigned char *in, size_t inl);
+static int cryptodev_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+                              const unsigned char *iv, int enc);
+static int cryptodev_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx);
+static int cryptodev_engine_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher,
+                                    const int **nids, int nid);
+static int cryptodev_engine_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest,
+                                    const int **nids, int nid);
+static int bn2crparam(const BIGNUM *a, struct crparam *crp);
+static int crparam2bn(struct crparam *crp, BIGNUM *a);
+static void zapparams(struct crypt_kop *kop);
+static int cryptodev_asym(struct crypt_kop *kop, int rlen, BIGNUM *r,
+                          int slen, BIGNUM *s);
+
+static int cryptodev_bn_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
+                                const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx,
+                                BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx);
+static int cryptodev_rsa_nocrt_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa,
+                                       BN_CTX *ctx);
+static int cryptodev_rsa_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa,
+                                 BN_CTX *ctx);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+static int cryptodev_dsa_bn_mod_exp(DSA *dsa, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
+                                    const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m,
+                                    BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx);
+static int cryptodev_dsa_dsa_mod_exp(DSA *dsa, BIGNUM *t1, const BIGNUM *g,
+                                     const BIGNUM *u1, const BIGNUM *pub_key,
+                                     const BIGNUM *u2, const BIGNUM *p,
+                                     BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *mont);
+static DSA_SIG *cryptodev_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen,
+                                      DSA *dsa);
+static int cryptodev_dsa_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
+                                DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+static int cryptodev_mod_exp_dh(const DH *dh, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
+                                const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx,
+                                BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx);
+static int cryptodev_dh_compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key,
+                                    DH *dh);
+#endif
+static int cryptodev_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p,
+                          void (*f) (void));
+void engine_load_cryptodev_int(void);
+
+static const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN cryptodev_defns[] = {
+    {0, NULL, NULL, 0}
+};
+
+static struct {
+    int id;
+    int nid;
+    int ivmax;
+    int keylen;
+} ciphers[] = {
+    {
+        CRYPTO_ARC4, NID_rc4, 0, 16,
+    },
+    {
+        CRYPTO_DES_CBC, NID_des_cbc, 8, 8,
+    },
+    {
+        CRYPTO_3DES_CBC, NID_des_ede3_cbc, 8, 24,
+    },
+    {
+        CRYPTO_AES_CBC, NID_aes_128_cbc, 16, 16,
+    },
+    {
+        CRYPTO_AES_CBC, NID_aes_192_cbc, 16, 24,
+    },
+    {
+        CRYPTO_AES_CBC, NID_aes_256_cbc, 16, 32,
+    },
+# ifdef CRYPTO_AES_CTR
+    {
+        CRYPTO_AES_CTR, NID_aes_128_ctr, 14, 16,
+    },
+    {
+        CRYPTO_AES_CTR, NID_aes_192_ctr, 14, 24,
+    },
+    {
+        CRYPTO_AES_CTR, NID_aes_256_ctr, 14, 32,
+    },
+# endif
+    {
+        CRYPTO_BLF_CBC, NID_bf_cbc, 8, 16,
+    },
+    {
+        CRYPTO_CAST_CBC, NID_cast5_cbc, 8, 16,
+    },
+    {
+        CRYPTO_SKIPJACK_CBC, NID_undef, 0, 0,
+    },
+    {
+        0, NID_undef, 0, 0,
+    },
+};
+
+# ifdef USE_CRYPTODEV_DIGESTS
+static struct {
+    int id;
+    int nid;
+    int keylen;
+} digests[] = {
+    {
+        CRYPTO_MD5_HMAC, NID_hmacWithMD5, 16
+    },
+    {
+        CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC, NID_hmacWithSHA1, 20
+    },
+    {
+        CRYPTO_RIPEMD160_HMAC, NID_ripemd160, 16
+        /* ? */
+    },
+    {
+        CRYPTO_MD5_KPDK, NID_undef, 0
+    },
+    {
+        CRYPTO_SHA1_KPDK, NID_undef, 0
+    },
+    {
+        CRYPTO_MD5, NID_md5, 16
+    },
+    {
+        CRYPTO_SHA1, NID_sha1, 20
+    },
+    {
+        0, NID_undef, 0
+    },
+};
+# endif
+
+/*
+ * Return a fd if /dev/crypto seems usable, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+static int open_dev_crypto(void)
+{
+    static int fd = -1;
+
+    if (fd == -1) {
+        if ((fd = open("/dev/crypto", O_RDWR, 0)) == -1)
+            return (-1);
+        /* close on exec */
+        if (fcntl(fd, F_SETFD, 1) == -1) {
+            close(fd);
+            fd = -1;
+            return (-1);
+        }
+    }
+    return (fd);
+}
+
+static int get_dev_crypto(void)
+{
+    int fd, retfd;
+
+    if ((fd = open_dev_crypto()) == -1)
+        return (-1);
+# ifndef CRIOGET_NOT_NEEDED
+    if (ioctl(fd, CRIOGET, &retfd) == -1)
+        return (-1);
+
+    /* close on exec */
+    if (fcntl(retfd, F_SETFD, 1) == -1) {
+        close(retfd);
+        return (-1);
+    }
+# else
+    retfd = fd;
+# endif
+    return (retfd);
+}
+
+static void put_dev_crypto(int fd)
+{
+# ifndef CRIOGET_NOT_NEEDED
+    close(fd);
+# endif
+}
+
+/* Caching version for asym operations */
+static int get_asym_dev_crypto(void)
+{
+    static int fd = -1;
+
+    if (fd == -1)
+        fd = get_dev_crypto();
+    return fd;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Find out what ciphers /dev/crypto will let us have a session for.
+ * XXX note, that some of these openssl doesn't deal with yet!
+ * returning them here is harmless, as long as we return NULL
+ * when asked for a handler in the cryptodev_engine_ciphers routine
+ */
+static int get_cryptodev_ciphers(const int **cnids)
+{
+    static int nids[CRYPTO_ALGORITHM_MAX];
+    struct session_op sess;
+    int fd, i, count = 0;
+
+    if ((fd = get_dev_crypto()) < 0) {
+        *cnids = NULL;
+        return (0);
+    }
+    memset(&sess, 0, sizeof(sess));
+    sess.key = (caddr_t) "123456789abcdefghijklmno";
+
+    for (i = 0; ciphers[i].id && count < CRYPTO_ALGORITHM_MAX; i++) {
+        if (ciphers[i].nid == NID_undef)
+            continue;
+        sess.cipher = ciphers[i].id;
+        sess.keylen = ciphers[i].keylen;
+        sess.mac = 0;
+        if (ioctl(fd, CIOCGSESSION, &sess) != -1 &&
+            ioctl(fd, CIOCFSESSION, &sess.ses) != -1)
+            nids[count++] = ciphers[i].nid;
+    }
+    put_dev_crypto(fd);
+
+    if (count > 0)
+        *cnids = nids;
+    else
+        *cnids = NULL;
+    return (count);
+}
+
+# ifdef USE_CRYPTODEV_DIGESTS
+/*
+ * Find out what digests /dev/crypto will let us have a session for.
+ * XXX note, that some of these openssl doesn't deal with yet!
+ * returning them here is harmless, as long as we return NULL
+ * when asked for a handler in the cryptodev_engine_digests routine
+ */
+static int get_cryptodev_digests(const int **cnids)
+{
+    static int nids[CRYPTO_ALGORITHM_MAX];
+    struct session_op sess;
+    int fd, i, count = 0;
+
+    if ((fd = get_dev_crypto()) < 0) {
+        *cnids = NULL;
+        return (0);
+    }
+    memset(&sess, 0, sizeof(sess));
+    sess.mackey = (caddr_t) "123456789abcdefghijklmno";
+    for (i = 0; digests[i].id && count < CRYPTO_ALGORITHM_MAX; i++) {
+        if (digests[i].nid == NID_undef)
+            continue;
+        sess.mac = digests[i].id;
+        sess.mackeylen = digests[i].keylen;
+        sess.cipher = 0;
+        if (ioctl(fd, CIOCGSESSION, &sess) != -1 &&
+            ioctl(fd, CIOCFSESSION, &sess.ses) != -1)
+            nids[count++] = digests[i].nid;
+    }
+    put_dev_crypto(fd);
+
+    if (count > 0)
+        *cnids = nids;
+    else
+        *cnids = NULL;
+    return (count);
+}
+# endif                         /* 0 */
+
+/*
+ * Find the useable ciphers|digests from dev/crypto - this is the first
+ * thing called by the engine init crud which determines what it
+ * can use for ciphers from this engine. We want to return
+ * only what we can do, anything else is handled by software.
+ *
+ * If we can't initialize the device to do anything useful for
+ * any reason, we want to return a NULL array, and 0 length,
+ * which forces everything to be done is software. By putting
+ * the initialization of the device in here, we ensure we can
+ * use this engine as the default, and if for whatever reason
+ * /dev/crypto won't do what we want it will just be done in
+ * software
+ *
+ * This can (should) be greatly expanded to perhaps take into
+ * account speed of the device, and what we want to do.
+ * (although the disabling of particular alg's could be controlled
+ * by the device driver with sysctl's.) - this is where we
+ * want most of the decisions made about what we actually want
+ * to use from /dev/crypto.
+ */
+static int cryptodev_usable_ciphers(const int **nids)
+{
+    return (get_cryptodev_ciphers(nids));
+}
+
+static int cryptodev_usable_digests(const int **nids)
+{
+# ifdef USE_CRYPTODEV_DIGESTS
+    return (get_cryptodev_digests(nids));
+# else
+    /*
+     * XXXX just disable all digests for now, because it sucks.
+     * we need a better way to decide this - i.e. I may not
+     * want digests on slow cards like hifn on fast machines,
+     * but might want them on slow or loaded machines, etc.
+     * will also want them when using crypto cards that don't
+     * suck moose gonads - would be nice to be able to decide something
+     * as reasonable default without having hackery that's card dependent.
+     * of course, the default should probably be just do everything,
+     * with perhaps a sysctl to turn algorithms off (or have them off
+     * by default) on cards that generally suck like the hifn.
+     */
+    *nids = NULL;
+    return (0);
+# endif
+}
+
+static int
+cryptodev_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                 const unsigned char *in, size_t inl)
+{
+    struct crypt_op cryp;
+    struct dev_crypto_state *state = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(ctx);
+    struct session_op *sess = &state->d_sess;
+    const void *iiv;
+    unsigned char save_iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+
+    if (state->d_fd < 0)
+        return (0);
+    if (!inl)
+        return (1);
+    if ((inl % EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(ctx)) != 0)
+        return (0);
+
+    memset(&cryp, 0, sizeof(cryp));
+
+    cryp.ses = sess->ses;
+    cryp.flags = 0;
+    cryp.len = inl;
+    cryp.src = (caddr_t) in;
+    cryp.dst = (caddr_t) out;
+    cryp.mac = 0;
+
+    cryp.op = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx) ? COP_ENCRYPT : COP_DECRYPT;
+
+    if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) > 0) {
+        cryp.iv = (caddr_t) EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv(ctx);
+        if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) {
+            iiv = in + inl - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
+            memcpy(save_iv, iiv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx));
+        }
+    } else
+        cryp.iv = NULL;
+
+    if (ioctl(state->d_fd, CIOCCRYPT, &cryp) == -1) {
+        /*
+         * XXX need better error handling this can fail for a number of
+         * different reasons.
+         */
+        return (0);
+    }
+
+    if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) > 0) {
+        if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx))
+            iiv = out + inl - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
+        else
+            iiv = save_iv;
+        memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), iiv,
+               EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx));
+    }
+    return (1);
+}
+
+static int
+cryptodev_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+                   const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
+{
+    struct dev_crypto_state *state = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(ctx);
+    struct session_op *sess = &state->d_sess;
+    int cipher = -1, i;
+
+    for (i = 0; ciphers[i].id; i++)
+        if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_nid(ctx) == ciphers[i].nid &&
+            EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) <= ciphers[i].ivmax &&
+            EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) == ciphers[i].keylen) {
+            cipher = ciphers[i].id;
+            break;
+        }
+
+    if (!ciphers[i].id) {
+        state->d_fd = -1;
+        return (0);
+    }
+
+    memset(sess, 0, sizeof(*sess));
+
+    if ((state->d_fd = get_dev_crypto()) < 0)
+        return (0);
+
+    sess->key = (caddr_t) key;
+    sess->keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
+    sess->cipher = cipher;
+
+    if (ioctl(state->d_fd, CIOCGSESSION, sess) == -1) {
+        put_dev_crypto(state->d_fd);
+        state->d_fd = -1;
+        return (0);
+    }
+    return (1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * free anything we allocated earlier when initing a
+ * session, and close the session.
+ */
+static int cryptodev_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    struct dev_crypto_state *state = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(ctx);
+    struct session_op *sess = &state->d_sess;
+
+    if (state->d_fd < 0)
+        return (0);
+
+    /*
+     * XXX if this ioctl fails, something's wrong. the invoker may have called
+     * us with a bogus ctx, or we could have a device that for whatever
+     * reason just doesn't want to play ball - it's not clear what's right
+     * here - should this be an error? should it just increase a counter,
+     * hmm. For right now, we return 0 - I don't believe that to be "right".
+     * we could call the gorpy openssl lib error handlers that print messages
+     * to users of the library. hmm..
+     */
+
+    if (ioctl(state->d_fd, CIOCFSESSION, &sess->ses) == -1) {
+        ret = 0;
+    } else {
+        ret = 1;
+    }
+    put_dev_crypto(state->d_fd);
+    state->d_fd = -1;
+
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+/*
+ * libcrypto EVP stuff - this is how we get wired to EVP so the engine
+ * gets called when libcrypto requests a cipher NID.
+ */
+
+/* RC4 */
+static EVP_CIPHER *rc4_cipher = NULL;
+static const EVP_CIPHER *cryptodev_rc4(void)
+{
+    if (rc4_cipher == NULL) {
+        EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
+
+        if ((cipher = EVP_CIPHER_meth_new(NID_rc4, 1, 16)) == NULL
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_iv_length(cipher, 0)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_flags(cipher, EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_init(cipher, cryptodev_init_key)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_do_cipher(cipher, cryptodev_cipher)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_cleanup(cipher, cryptodev_cleanup)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_impl_ctx_size(cipher, sizeof(struct dev_crypto_state))) {
+            EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(cipher);
+            cipher = NULL;
+        }
+        rc4_cipher = cipher;
+    }
+    return rc4_cipher;
+}
+
+/* DES CBC EVP */
+static EVP_CIPHER *des_cbc_cipher = NULL;
+static const EVP_CIPHER *cryptodev_des_cbc(void)
+{
+    if (des_cbc_cipher == NULL) {
+        EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
+
+        if ((cipher = EVP_CIPHER_meth_new(NID_des_cbc, 8, 8)) == NULL
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_iv_length(cipher, 8)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_flags(cipher, EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_init(cipher, cryptodev_init_key)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_do_cipher(cipher, cryptodev_cipher)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_cleanup(cipher, cryptodev_cleanup)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_impl_ctx_size(cipher, sizeof(struct dev_crypto_state))
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_set_asn1_params(cipher, EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_get_asn1_params(cipher, EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv)) {
+            EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(cipher);
+            cipher = NULL;
+        }
+        des_cbc_cipher = cipher;
+    }
+    return des_cbc_cipher;
+}
+
+/* 3DES CBC EVP */
+static EVP_CIPHER *des3_cbc_cipher = NULL;
+static const EVP_CIPHER *cryptodev_3des_cbc(void)
+{
+    if (des3_cbc_cipher == NULL) {
+        EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
+
+        if ((cipher = EVP_CIPHER_meth_new(NID_des_ede3_cbc, 8, 24)) == NULL
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_iv_length(cipher, 8)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_flags(cipher, EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_init(cipher, cryptodev_init_key)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_do_cipher(cipher, cryptodev_cipher)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_cleanup(cipher, cryptodev_cleanup)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_impl_ctx_size(cipher, sizeof(struct dev_crypto_state))
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_set_asn1_params(cipher, EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_get_asn1_params(cipher, EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv)) {
+            EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(cipher);
+            cipher = NULL;
+        }
+        des3_cbc_cipher = cipher;
+    }
+    return des3_cbc_cipher;
+}
+
+static EVP_CIPHER *bf_cbc_cipher = NULL;
+static const EVP_CIPHER *cryptodev_bf_cbc(void)
+{
+    if (bf_cbc_cipher == NULL) {
+        EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
+
+        if ((cipher = EVP_CIPHER_meth_new(NID_bf_cbc, 8, 16)) == NULL
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_iv_length(cipher, 8)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_flags(cipher, EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_init(cipher, cryptodev_init_key)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_do_cipher(cipher, cryptodev_cipher)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_cleanup(cipher, cryptodev_cleanup)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_impl_ctx_size(cipher, sizeof(struct dev_crypto_state))
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_set_asn1_params(cipher, EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_get_asn1_params(cipher, EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv)) {
+            EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(cipher);
+            cipher = NULL;
+        }
+        bf_cbc_cipher = cipher;
+    }
+    return bf_cbc_cipher;
+}
+
+static EVP_CIPHER *cast_cbc_cipher = NULL;
+static const EVP_CIPHER *cryptodev_cast_cbc(void)
+{
+    if (cast_cbc_cipher == NULL) {
+        EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
+
+        if ((cipher = EVP_CIPHER_meth_new(NID_cast5_cbc, 8, 16)) == NULL
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_iv_length(cipher, 8)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_flags(cipher, EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_init(cipher, cryptodev_init_key)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_do_cipher(cipher, cryptodev_cipher)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_cleanup(cipher, cryptodev_cleanup)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_impl_ctx_size(cipher, sizeof(struct dev_crypto_state))
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_set_asn1_params(cipher, EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_get_asn1_params(cipher, EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv)) {
+            EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(cipher);
+            cipher = NULL;
+        }
+        cast_cbc_cipher = cipher;
+    }
+    return cast_cbc_cipher;
+}
+
+static EVP_CIPHER *aes_cbc_cipher = NULL;
+static const EVP_CIPHER *cryptodev_aes_cbc(void)
+{
+    if (aes_cbc_cipher == NULL) {
+        EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
+
+        if ((cipher = EVP_CIPHER_meth_new(NID_aes_128_cbc, 16, 16)) == NULL
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_iv_length(cipher, 16)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_flags(cipher, EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_init(cipher, cryptodev_init_key)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_do_cipher(cipher, cryptodev_cipher)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_cleanup(cipher, cryptodev_cleanup)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_impl_ctx_size(cipher, sizeof(struct dev_crypto_state))
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_set_asn1_params(cipher, EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_get_asn1_params(cipher, EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv)) {
+            EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(cipher);
+            cipher = NULL;
+        }
+        aes_cbc_cipher = cipher;
+    }
+    return aes_cbc_cipher;
+}
+
+static EVP_CIPHER *aes_192_cbc_cipher = NULL;
+static const EVP_CIPHER *cryptodev_aes_192_cbc(void)
+{
+    if (aes_192_cbc_cipher == NULL) {
+        EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
+
+        if ((cipher = EVP_CIPHER_meth_new(NID_aes_192_cbc, 16, 24)) == NULL
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_iv_length(cipher, 16)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_flags(cipher, EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_init(cipher, cryptodev_init_key)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_do_cipher(cipher, cryptodev_cipher)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_cleanup(cipher, cryptodev_cleanup)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_impl_ctx_size(cipher, sizeof(struct dev_crypto_state))
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_set_asn1_params(cipher, EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_get_asn1_params(cipher, EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv)) {
+            EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(cipher);
+            cipher = NULL;
+        }
+        aes_192_cbc_cipher = cipher;
+    }
+    return aes_192_cbc_cipher;
+}
+
+static EVP_CIPHER *aes_256_cbc_cipher = NULL;
+static const EVP_CIPHER *cryptodev_aes_256_cbc(void)
+{
+    if (aes_256_cbc_cipher == NULL) {
+        EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
+
+        if ((cipher = EVP_CIPHER_meth_new(NID_aes_256_cbc, 16, 32)) == NULL
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_iv_length(cipher, 16)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_flags(cipher, EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_init(cipher, cryptodev_init_key)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_do_cipher(cipher, cryptodev_cipher)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_cleanup(cipher, cryptodev_cleanup)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_impl_ctx_size(cipher, sizeof(struct dev_crypto_state))
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_set_asn1_params(cipher, EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_get_asn1_params(cipher, EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv)) {
+            EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(cipher);
+            cipher = NULL;
+        }
+        aes_256_cbc_cipher = cipher;
+    }
+    return aes_256_cbc_cipher;
+}
+
+# ifdef CRYPTO_AES_CTR
+static EVP_CIPHER *aes_ctr_cipher = NULL;
+static const EVP_CIPHER *cryptodev_aes_ctr(void)
+{
+    if (aes_ctr_cipher == NULL) {
+        EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
+
+        if ((cipher = EVP_CIPHER_meth_new(NID_aes_128_ctr, 16, 16)) == NULL
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_iv_length(cipher, 14)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_flags(cipher, EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_init(cipher, cryptodev_init_key)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_do_cipher(cipher, cryptodev_cipher)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_cleanup(cipher, cryptodev_cleanup)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_impl_ctx_size(cipher, sizeof(struct dev_crypto_state))
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_set_asn1_params(cipher, EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_get_asn1_params(cipher, EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv)) {
+            EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(cipher);
+            cipher = NULL;
+        }
+        aes_ctr_cipher = cipher;
+    }
+    return aes_ctr_cipher;
+}
+
+static EVP_CIPHER *aes_192_ctr_cipher = NULL;
+static const EVP_CIPHER *cryptodev_aes_192_ctr(void)
+{
+    if (aes_192_ctr_cipher == NULL) {
+        EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
+
+        if ((cipher = EVP_CIPHER_meth_new(NID_aes_192_ctr, 16, 24)) == NULL
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_iv_length(cipher, 14)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_flags(cipher, EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_init(cipher, cryptodev_init_key)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_do_cipher(cipher, cryptodev_cipher)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_cleanup(cipher, cryptodev_cleanup)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_impl_ctx_size(cipher, sizeof(struct dev_crypto_state))
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_set_asn1_params(cipher, EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_get_asn1_params(cipher, EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv)) {
+            EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(cipher);
+            cipher = NULL;
+        }
+        aes_192_ctr_cipher = cipher;
+    }
+    return aes_192_ctr_cipher;
+}
+
+static EVP_CIPHER *aes_256_ctr_cipher = NULL;
+static const EVP_CIPHER *cryptodev_aes_256_ctr(void)
+{
+    if (aes_256_ctr_cipher == NULL) {
+        EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
+
+        if ((cipher = EVP_CIPHER_meth_new(NID_aes_256_ctr, 16, 32)) == NULL
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_iv_length(cipher, 14)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_flags(cipher, EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_init(cipher, cryptodev_init_key)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_do_cipher(cipher, cryptodev_cipher)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_cleanup(cipher, cryptodev_cleanup)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_impl_ctx_size(cipher, sizeof(struct dev_crypto_state))
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_set_asn1_params(cipher, EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_get_asn1_params(cipher, EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv)) {
+            EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(cipher);
+            cipher = NULL;
+        }
+        aes_256_ctr_cipher = cipher;
+    }
+    return aes_256_ctr_cipher;
+}
+# endif
+/*
+ * Registered by the ENGINE when used to find out how to deal with
+ * a particular NID in the ENGINE. this says what we'll do at the
+ * top level - note, that list is restricted by what we answer with
+ */
+static int
+cryptodev_engine_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher,
+                         const int **nids, int nid)
+{
+    if (!cipher)
+        return (cryptodev_usable_ciphers(nids));
+
+    switch (nid) {
+    case NID_rc4:
+        *cipher = cryptodev_rc4();
+        break;
+    case NID_des_ede3_cbc:
+        *cipher = cryptodev_3des_cbc();
+        break;
+    case NID_des_cbc:
+        *cipher = cryptodev_des_cbc();
+        break;
+    case NID_bf_cbc:
+        *cipher = cryptodev_bf_cbc();
+        break;
+    case NID_cast5_cbc:
+        *cipher = cryptodev_cast_cbc();
+        break;
+    case NID_aes_128_cbc:
+        *cipher = cryptodev_aes_cbc();
+        break;
+    case NID_aes_192_cbc:
+        *cipher = cryptodev_aes_192_cbc();
+        break;
+    case NID_aes_256_cbc:
+        *cipher = cryptodev_aes_256_cbc();
+        break;
+# ifdef CRYPTO_AES_CTR
+    case NID_aes_128_ctr:
+        *cipher = cryptodev_aes_ctr();
+        break;
+    case NID_aes_192_ctr:
+        *cipher = cryptodev_aes_192_ctr();
+        break;
+    case NID_aes_256_ctr:
+        *cipher = cryptodev_aes_256_ctr();
+        break;
+# endif
+    default:
+        *cipher = NULL;
+        break;
+    }
+    return (*cipher != NULL);
+}
+
+# ifdef USE_CRYPTODEV_DIGESTS
+
+/* convert digest type to cryptodev */
+static int digest_nid_to_cryptodev(int nid)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    for (i = 0; digests[i].id; i++)
+        if (digests[i].nid == nid)
+            return (digests[i].id);
+    return (0);
+}
+
+static int digest_key_length(int nid)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    for (i = 0; digests[i].id; i++)
+        if (digests[i].nid == nid)
+            return digests[i].keylen;
+    return (0);
+}
+
+static int cryptodev_digest_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    struct dev_crypto_state *state = EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx);
+    struct session_op *sess = &state->d_sess;
+    int digest;
+
+    if ((digest = digest_nid_to_cryptodev(EVP_MD_CTX_type(ctx))) == NID_undef) {
+        printf("cryptodev_digest_init: Can't get digest \n");
+        return (0);
+    }
+
+    memset(state, 0, sizeof(*state));
+
+    if ((state->d_fd = get_dev_crypto()) < 0) {
+        printf("cryptodev_digest_init: Can't get Dev \n");
+        return (0);
+    }
+
+    sess->mackey = state->dummy_mac_key;
+    sess->mackeylen = digest_key_length(EVP_MD_CTX_type(ctx));
+    sess->mac = digest;
+
+    if (ioctl(state->d_fd, CIOCGSESSION, sess) < 0) {
+        put_dev_crypto(state->d_fd);
+        state->d_fd = -1;
+        printf("cryptodev_digest_init: Open session failed\n");
+        return (0);
+    }
+
+    return (1);
+}
+
+static int cryptodev_digest_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data,
+                                   size_t count)
+{
+    struct crypt_op cryp;
+    struct dev_crypto_state *state = EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx);
+    struct session_op *sess = &state->d_sess;
+    char *new_mac_data;
+
+    if (!data || state->d_fd < 0) {
+        printf("cryptodev_digest_update: illegal inputs \n");
+        return (0);
+    }
+
+    if (!count) {
+        return (0);
+    }
+
+    if (!EVP_MD_CTX_test_flags(ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_ONESHOT)) {
+        /* if application doesn't support one buffer */
+        new_mac_data =
+            OPENSSL_realloc(state->mac_data, state->mac_len + count);
+
+        if (!new_mac_data) {
+            printf("cryptodev_digest_update: realloc failed\n");
+            return (0);
+        }
+        state->mac_data = new_mac_data;
+
+        memcpy(state->mac_data + state->mac_len, data, count);
+        state->mac_len += count;
+
+        return (1);
+    }
+
+    memset(&cryp, 0, sizeof(cryp));
+
+    cryp.ses = sess->ses;
+    cryp.flags = 0;
+    cryp.len = count;
+    cryp.src = (caddr_t) data;
+    cryp.dst = NULL;
+    cryp.mac = (caddr_t) state->digest_res;
+    if (ioctl(state->d_fd, CIOCCRYPT, &cryp) < 0) {
+        printf("cryptodev_digest_update: digest failed\n");
+        return (0);
+    }
+    return (1);
+}
+
+static int cryptodev_digest_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md)
+{
+    struct crypt_op cryp;
+    struct dev_crypto_state *state = EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx);
+    struct session_op *sess = &state->d_sess;
+
+    int ret = 1;
+
+    if (!md || state->d_fd < 0) {
+        printf("cryptodev_digest_final: illegal input\n");
+        return (0);
+    }
+
+    if (!EVP_MD_CTX_test_flags(ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_ONESHOT)) {
+        /* if application doesn't support one buffer */
+        memset(&cryp, 0, sizeof(cryp));
+        cryp.ses = sess->ses;
+        cryp.flags = 0;
+        cryp.len = state->mac_len;
+        cryp.src = state->mac_data;
+        cryp.dst = NULL;
+        cryp.mac = (caddr_t) md;
+        if (ioctl(state->d_fd, CIOCCRYPT, &cryp) < 0) {
+            printf("cryptodev_digest_final: digest failed\n");
+            return (0);
+        }
+
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    memcpy(md, state->digest_res, EVP_MD_CTX_size(ctx));
+
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static int cryptodev_digest_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int ret = 1;
+    struct dev_crypto_state *state = EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx);
+    struct session_op *sess = &state->d_sess;
+
+    if (state == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    if (state->d_fd < 0) {
+        printf("cryptodev_digest_cleanup: illegal input\n");
+        return (0);
+    }
+
+    OPENSSL_free(state->mac_data);
+    state->mac_data = NULL;
+    state->mac_len = 0;
+
+    if (ioctl(state->d_fd, CIOCFSESSION, &sess->ses) < 0) {
+        printf("cryptodev_digest_cleanup: failed to close session\n");
+        ret = 0;
+    } else {
+        ret = 1;
+    }
+    put_dev_crypto(state->d_fd);
+    state->d_fd = -1;
+
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static int cryptodev_digest_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *to, const EVP_MD_CTX *from)
+{
+    struct dev_crypto_state *fstate = EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(from);
+    struct dev_crypto_state *dstate = EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(to);
+    struct session_op *sess;
+    int digest;
+
+    if (dstate == NULL || fstate == NULL)
+        return 1;
+
+    memcpy(dstate, fstate, sizeof(struct dev_crypto_state));
+
+    sess = &dstate->d_sess;
+
+    digest = digest_nid_to_cryptodev(EVP_MD_CTX_type(to));
+
+    sess->mackey = dstate->dummy_mac_key;
+    sess->mackeylen = digest_key_length(EVP_MD_CTX_type(to));
+    sess->mac = digest;
+
+    dstate->d_fd = get_dev_crypto();
+
+    if (ioctl(dstate->d_fd, CIOCGSESSION, sess) < 0) {
+        put_dev_crypto(dstate->d_fd);
+        dstate->d_fd = -1;
+        printf("cryptodev_digest_copy: Open session failed\n");
+        return (0);
+    }
+
+    if (fstate->mac_len != 0) {
+        if (fstate->mac_data != NULL) {
+            dstate->mac_data = OPENSSL_malloc(fstate->mac_len);
+            if (dstate->mac_data == NULL) {
+                printf("cryptodev_digest_copy: mac_data allocation failed\n");
+                return (0);
+            }
+            memcpy(dstate->mac_data, fstate->mac_data, fstate->mac_len);
+            dstate->mac_len = fstate->mac_len;
+        }
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static EVP_MD *sha1_md = NULL;
+static const EVP_MD *cryptodev_sha1(void)
+{
+    if (sha1_md == NULL) {
+        EVP_MD *md;
+
+        if ((md = EVP_MD_meth_new(NID_sha1, NID_undef)) == NULL
+            || !EVP_MD_meth_set_result_size(md, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH)
+            || !EVP_MD_meth_set_flags(md, EVP_MD_FLAG_ONESHOT)
+            || !EVP_MD_meth_set_input_blocksize(md, SHA_CBLOCK)
+            || !EVP_MD_meth_set_app_datasize(md,
+                                             sizeof(struct dev_crypto_state))
+            || !EVP_MD_meth_set_init(md, cryptodev_digest_init)
+            || !EVP_MD_meth_set_update(md, cryptodev_digest_update)
+            || !EVP_MD_meth_set_final(md, cryptodev_digest_final)
+            || !EVP_MD_meth_set_copy(md, cryptodev_digest_copy)
+            || !EVP_MD_meth_set_cleanup(md, cryptodev_digest_cleanup)) {
+            EVP_MD_meth_free(md);
+            md = NULL;
+        }
+        sha1_md = md;
+    }
+    return sha1_md;
+}
+
+static EVP_MD *md5_md = NULL;
+static const EVP_MD *cryptodev_md5(void)
+{
+    if (md5_md == NULL) {
+        EVP_MD *md;
+
+        if ((md = EVP_MD_meth_new(NID_md5, NID_undef)) == NULL
+            || !EVP_MD_meth_set_result_size(md, 16 /* MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH */)
+            || !EVP_MD_meth_set_flags(md, EVP_MD_FLAG_ONESHOT)
+            || !EVP_MD_meth_set_input_blocksize(md, 64 /* MD5_CBLOCK */)
+            || !EVP_MD_meth_set_app_datasize(md,
+                                             sizeof(struct dev_crypto_state))
+            || !EVP_MD_meth_set_init(md, cryptodev_digest_init)
+            || !EVP_MD_meth_set_update(md, cryptodev_digest_update)
+            || !EVP_MD_meth_set_final(md, cryptodev_digest_final)
+            || !EVP_MD_meth_set_copy(md, cryptodev_digest_copy)
+            || !EVP_MD_meth_set_cleanup(md, cryptodev_digest_cleanup)) {
+            EVP_MD_meth_free(md);
+            md = NULL;
+        }
+        md5_md = md;
+    }
+    return md5_md;
+}
+
+# endif                         /* USE_CRYPTODEV_DIGESTS */
+
+static int
+cryptodev_engine_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest,
+                         const int **nids, int nid)
+{
+    if (!digest)
+        return (cryptodev_usable_digests(nids));
+
+    switch (nid) {
+# ifdef USE_CRYPTODEV_DIGESTS
+    case NID_md5:
+        *digest = cryptodev_md5();
+        break;
+    case NID_sha1:
+        *digest = cryptodev_sha1();
+        break;
+    default:
+# endif                         /* USE_CRYPTODEV_DIGESTS */
+        *digest = NULL;
+        break;
+    }
+    return (*digest != NULL);
+}
+
+static int cryptodev_engine_destroy(ENGINE *e)
+{
+    EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(rc4_cipher);
+    rc4_cipher = NULL;
+    EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(des_cbc_cipher);
+    des_cbc_cipher = NULL;
+    EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(des3_cbc_cipher);
+    des3_cbc_cipher = NULL;
+    EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(bf_cbc_cipher);
+    bf_cbc_cipher = NULL;
+    EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(cast_cbc_cipher);
+    cast_cbc_cipher = NULL;
+    EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(aes_cbc_cipher);
+    aes_cbc_cipher = NULL;
+    EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(aes_192_cbc_cipher);
+    aes_192_cbc_cipher = NULL;
+    EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(aes_256_cbc_cipher);
+    aes_256_cbc_cipher = NULL;
+# ifdef CRYPTO_AES_CTR
+    EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(aes_ctr_cipher);
+    aes_ctr_cipher = NULL;
+    EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(aes_192_ctr_cipher);
+    aes_192_ctr_cipher = NULL;
+    EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(aes_256_ctr_cipher);
+    aes_256_ctr_cipher = NULL;
+# endif
+# ifdef USE_CRYPTODEV_DIGESTS
+    EVP_MD_meth_free(sha1_md);
+    sha1_md = NULL;
+    EVP_MD_meth_free(md5_md);
+    md5_md = NULL;
+# endif
+    RSA_meth_free(cryptodev_rsa);
+    cryptodev_rsa = NULL;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+    DSA_meth_free(cryptodev_dsa);
+    cryptodev_dsa = NULL;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+    DH_meth_free(cryptodev_dh);
+    cryptodev_dh = NULL;
+#endif
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convert a BIGNUM to the representation that /dev/crypto needs.
+ * Upon completion of use, the caller is responsible for freeing
+ * crp->crp_p.
+ */
+static int bn2crparam(const BIGNUM *a, struct crparam *crp)
+{
+    ssize_t bytes, bits;
+    u_char *b;
+
+    crp->crp_p = NULL;
+    crp->crp_nbits = 0;
+
+    bits = BN_num_bits(a);
+    bytes = BN_num_bytes(a);
+
+    b = OPENSSL_zalloc(bytes);
+    if (b == NULL)
+        return (1);
+
+    crp->crp_p = (caddr_t) b;
+    crp->crp_nbits = bits;
+
+    BN_bn2bin(a, b);
+    return (0);
+}
+
+/* Convert a /dev/crypto parameter to a BIGNUM */
+static int crparam2bn(struct crparam *crp, BIGNUM *a)
+{
+    u_int8_t *pd;
+    int i, bytes;
+
+    bytes = (crp->crp_nbits + 7) / 8;
+
+    if (bytes == 0)
+        return (-1);
+
+    if ((pd = OPENSSL_malloc(bytes)) == NULL)
+        return (-1);
+
+    for (i = 0; i < bytes; i++)
+        pd[i] = crp->crp_p[bytes - i - 1];
+
+    BN_bin2bn(pd, bytes, a);
+    free(pd);
+
+    return (0);
+}
+
+static void zapparams(struct crypt_kop *kop)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < kop->crk_iparams + kop->crk_oparams; i++) {
+        OPENSSL_free(kop->crk_param[i].crp_p);
+        kop->crk_param[i].crp_p = NULL;
+        kop->crk_param[i].crp_nbits = 0;
+    }
+}
+
+static int
+cryptodev_asym(struct crypt_kop *kop, int rlen, BIGNUM *r, int slen,
+               BIGNUM *s)
+{
+    int fd, ret = -1;
+
+    if ((fd = get_asym_dev_crypto()) < 0)
+        return ret;
+
+    if (r) {
+        kop->crk_param[kop->crk_iparams].crp_p = OPENSSL_zalloc(rlen);
+        if (kop->crk_param[kop->crk_iparams].crp_p == NULL)
+            return ret;
+        kop->crk_param[kop->crk_iparams].crp_nbits = rlen * 8;
+        kop->crk_oparams++;
+    }
+    if (s) {
+        kop->crk_param[kop->crk_iparams + 1].crp_p =
+            OPENSSL_zalloc(slen);
+        /* No need to free the kop->crk_iparams parameter if it was allocated,
+         * callers of this routine have to free allocated parameters through
+         * zapparams both in case of success and failure
+         */
+        if (kop->crk_param[kop->crk_iparams+1].crp_p == NULL)
+            return ret;
+        kop->crk_param[kop->crk_iparams + 1].crp_nbits = slen * 8;
+        kop->crk_oparams++;
+    }
+
+    if (ioctl(fd, CIOCKEY, kop) == 0) {
+        if (r)
+            crparam2bn(&kop->crk_param[kop->crk_iparams], r);
+        if (s)
+            crparam2bn(&kop->crk_param[kop->crk_iparams + 1], s);
+        ret = 0;
+    }
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+cryptodev_bn_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
+                     const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont)
+{
+    struct crypt_kop kop;
+    int ret = 1;
+
+    /*
+     * Currently, we know we can do mod exp iff we can do any asymmetric
+     * operations at all.
+     */
+    if (cryptodev_asymfeat == 0) {
+        ret = BN_mod_exp(r, a, p, m, ctx);
+        return (ret);
+    }
+
+    memset(&kop, 0, sizeof(kop));
+    kop.crk_op = CRK_MOD_EXP;
+
+    /* inputs: a^p % m */
+    if (bn2crparam(a, &kop.crk_param[0]))
+        goto err;
+    if (bn2crparam(p, &kop.crk_param[1]))
+        goto err;
+    if (bn2crparam(m, &kop.crk_param[2]))
+        goto err;
+    kop.crk_iparams = 3;
+
+    if (cryptodev_asym(&kop, BN_num_bytes(m), r, 0, NULL)) {
+        const RSA_METHOD *meth = RSA_PKCS1_OpenSSL();
+        printf("OCF asym process failed, Running in software\n");
+        ret = RSA_meth_get_bn_mod_exp(meth)(r, a, p, m, ctx, in_mont);
+
+    } else if (ECANCELED == kop.crk_status) {
+        const RSA_METHOD *meth = RSA_PKCS1_OpenSSL();
+        printf("OCF hardware operation cancelled. Running in Software\n");
+        ret = RSA_meth_get_bn_mod_exp(meth)(r, a, p, m, ctx, in_mont);
+    }
+    /* else cryptodev operation worked ok ==> ret = 1 */
+
+ err:
+    zapparams(&kop);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static int
+cryptodev_rsa_nocrt_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa,
+                            BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int r;
+    const BIGNUM *n = NULL;
+    const BIGNUM *d = NULL;
+
+    ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+    RSA_get0_key(rsa, &n, NULL, &d);
+    r = cryptodev_bn_mod_exp(r0, I, d, n, ctx, NULL);
+    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+    return (r);
+}
+
+static int
+cryptodev_rsa_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    struct crypt_kop kop;
+    int ret = 1;
+    const BIGNUM *p = NULL;
+    const BIGNUM *q = NULL;
+    const BIGNUM *dmp1 = NULL;
+    const BIGNUM *dmq1 = NULL;
+    const BIGNUM *iqmp = NULL;
+    const BIGNUM *n = NULL;
+
+    RSA_get0_factors(rsa, &p, &q);
+    RSA_get0_crt_params(rsa, &dmp1, &dmq1, &iqmp);
+    RSA_get0_key(rsa, &n, NULL, NULL);
+
+    if (!p || !q || !dmp1 || !dmq1 || !iqmp) {
+        /* XXX 0 means failure?? */
+        return (0);
+    }
+
+    memset(&kop, 0, sizeof(kop));
+    kop.crk_op = CRK_MOD_EXP_CRT;
+    /* inputs: rsa->p rsa->q I rsa->dmp1 rsa->dmq1 rsa->iqmp */
+    if (bn2crparam(p, &kop.crk_param[0]))
+        goto err;
+    if (bn2crparam(q, &kop.crk_param[1]))
+        goto err;
+    if (bn2crparam(I, &kop.crk_param[2]))
+        goto err;
+    if (bn2crparam(dmp1, &kop.crk_param[3]))
+        goto err;
+    if (bn2crparam(dmq1, &kop.crk_param[4]))
+        goto err;
+    if (bn2crparam(iqmp, &kop.crk_param[5]))
+        goto err;
+    kop.crk_iparams = 6;
+
+    if (cryptodev_asym(&kop, BN_num_bytes(n), r0, 0, NULL)) {
+        const RSA_METHOD *meth = RSA_PKCS1_OpenSSL();
+        printf("OCF asym process failed, running in Software\n");
+        ret = RSA_meth_get_mod_exp(meth)(r0, I, rsa, ctx);
+
+    } else if (ECANCELED == kop.crk_status) {
+        const RSA_METHOD *meth = RSA_PKCS1_OpenSSL();
+        printf("OCF hardware operation cancelled. Running in Software\n");
+        ret = RSA_meth_get_mod_exp(meth)(r0, I, rsa, ctx);
+    }
+    /* else cryptodev operation worked ok ==> ret = 1 */
+
+ err:
+    zapparams(&kop);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+static int
+cryptodev_dsa_bn_mod_exp(DSA *dsa, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
+                         const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx)
+{
+    return cryptodev_bn_mod_exp(r, a, p, m, ctx, m_ctx);
+}
+
+static int
+cryptodev_dsa_dsa_mod_exp(DSA *dsa, BIGNUM *t1, const BIGNUM *g,
+                          const BIGNUM *u1, const BIGNUM *pub_key,
+                          const BIGNUM *u2, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx,
+                          BN_MONT_CTX *mont)
+{
+    const BIGNUM *dsag, *dsap, *dsapub_key;
+    BIGNUM *t2;
+    int ret = 0;
+    const DSA_METHOD *meth;
+    int (*bn_mod_exp)(DSA *, BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *,
+                      BN_CTX *, BN_MONT_CTX *);
+
+    t2 = BN_new();
+    if (t2 == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* v = ( g^u1 * y^u2 mod p ) mod q */
+    /* let t1 = g ^ u1 mod p */
+    ret = 0;
+
+    DSA_get0_pqg(dsa, &dsap, NULL, &dsag);
+    DSA_get0_key(dsa, &dsapub_key, NULL);
+
+    meth = DSA_get_method(dsa);
+    if (meth == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    bn_mod_exp = DSA_meth_get_bn_mod_exp(meth);
+    if (bn_mod_exp == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!bn_mod_exp(dsa, t1, dsag, u1, dsap, ctx, mont))
+        goto err;
+
+    /* let t2 = y ^ u2 mod p */
+    if (!bn_mod_exp(dsa, t2, dsapub_key, u2, dsap, ctx, mont))
+        goto err;
+    /* let t1 = t1 * t2 mod p */
+    if (!BN_mod_mul(t1, t1, t2, dsap, ctx))
+        goto err;
+
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    BN_free(t2);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static DSA_SIG *cryptodev_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen,
+                                      DSA *dsa)
+{
+    struct crypt_kop kop;
+    BIGNUM *r, *s;
+    const BIGNUM *dsap = NULL, *dsaq = NULL, *dsag = NULL;
+    const BIGNUM *priv_key = NULL;
+    DSA_SIG *dsasig, *dsaret = NULL;
+
+    dsasig = DSA_SIG_new();
+    if (dsasig == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    memset(&kop, 0, sizeof(kop));
+    kop.crk_op = CRK_DSA_SIGN;
+
+    /* inputs: dgst dsa->p dsa->q dsa->g dsa->priv_key */
+    kop.crk_param[0].crp_p = (caddr_t) dgst;
+    kop.crk_param[0].crp_nbits = dlen * 8;
+    DSA_get0_pqg(dsa, &dsap, &dsaq, &dsag);
+    DSA_get0_key(dsa, NULL, &priv_key);
+    if (bn2crparam(dsap, &kop.crk_param[1]))
+        goto err;
+    if (bn2crparam(dsaq, &kop.crk_param[2]))
+        goto err;
+    if (bn2crparam(dsag, &kop.crk_param[3]))
+        goto err;
+    if (bn2crparam(priv_key, &kop.crk_param[4]))
+        goto err;
+    kop.crk_iparams = 5;
+
+    r = BN_new();
+    if (r == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    s = BN_new();
+    if (s == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (cryptodev_asym(&kop, BN_num_bytes(dsaq), r,
+                       BN_num_bytes(dsaq), s) == 0) {
+        DSA_SIG_set0(dsasig, r, s);
+        dsaret = dsasig;
+    } else {
+        dsaret = DSA_meth_get_sign(DSA_OpenSSL())(dgst, dlen, dsa);
+    }
+ err:
+    if (dsaret != dsasig)
+        DSA_SIG_free(dsasig);
+    kop.crk_param[0].crp_p = NULL;
+    zapparams(&kop);
+    return dsaret;
+}
+
+static int
+cryptodev_dsa_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen,
+                     DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa)
+{
+    struct crypt_kop kop;
+    int dsaret = 1;
+    const BIGNUM *pr, *ps, *p = NULL, *q = NULL, *g = NULL, *pub_key = NULL;
+
+    memset(&kop, 0, sizeof(kop));
+    kop.crk_op = CRK_DSA_VERIFY;
+
+    /* inputs: dgst dsa->p dsa->q dsa->g dsa->pub_key sig->r sig->s */
+    kop.crk_param[0].crp_p = (caddr_t) dgst;
+    kop.crk_param[0].crp_nbits = dlen * 8;
+    DSA_get0_pqg(dsa, &p, &q, &g);
+    if (bn2crparam(p, &kop.crk_param[1]))
+        goto err;
+    if (bn2crparam(q, &kop.crk_param[2]))
+        goto err;
+    if (bn2crparam(g, &kop.crk_param[3]))
+        goto err;
+    DSA_get0_key(dsa, &pub_key, NULL);
+    if (bn2crparam(pub_key, &kop.crk_param[4]))
+        goto err;
+    DSA_SIG_get0(sig, &pr, &ps);
+    if (bn2crparam(pr, &kop.crk_param[5]))
+        goto err;
+    if (bn2crparam(ps, &kop.crk_param[6]))
+        goto err;
+    kop.crk_iparams = 7;
+
+    if (cryptodev_asym(&kop, 0, NULL, 0, NULL) == 0) {
+        /*
+         * OCF success value is 0, if not zero, change dsaret to fail
+         */
+        if (0 != kop.crk_status)
+            dsaret = 0;
+    } else {
+        dsaret = DSA_meth_get_verify(DSA_OpenSSL())(dgst, dlen, sig, dsa);
+    }
+ err:
+    kop.crk_param[0].crp_p = NULL;
+    zapparams(&kop);
+    return (dsaret);
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+static int
+cryptodev_mod_exp_dh(const DH *dh, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
+                     const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx,
+                     BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx)
+{
+    return (cryptodev_bn_mod_exp(r, a, p, m, ctx, m_ctx));
+}
+
+static int
+cryptodev_dh_compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh)
+{
+    struct crypt_kop kop;
+    int dhret = 1;
+    int fd, keylen;
+    const BIGNUM *p = NULL;
+    const BIGNUM *priv_key = NULL;
+
+    if ((fd = get_asym_dev_crypto()) < 0) {
+        const DH_METHOD *meth = DH_OpenSSL();
+
+        return DH_meth_get_compute_key(meth)(key, pub_key, dh);
+    }
+
+    DH_get0_pqg(dh, &p, NULL, NULL);
+    DH_get0_key(dh, NULL, &priv_key);
+
+    keylen = BN_num_bits(p);
+
+    memset(&kop, 0, sizeof(kop));
+    kop.crk_op = CRK_DH_COMPUTE_KEY;
+
+    /* inputs: dh->priv_key pub_key dh->p key */
+    if (bn2crparam(priv_key, &kop.crk_param[0]))
+        goto err;
+    if (bn2crparam(pub_key, &kop.crk_param[1]))
+        goto err;
+    if (bn2crparam(p, &kop.crk_param[2]))
+        goto err;
+    kop.crk_iparams = 3;
+
+    kop.crk_param[3].crp_p = (caddr_t) key;
+    kop.crk_param[3].crp_nbits = keylen * 8;
+    kop.crk_oparams = 1;
+
+    if (ioctl(fd, CIOCKEY, &kop) == -1) {
+        const DH_METHOD *meth = DH_OpenSSL();
+
+        dhret = DH_meth_get_compute_key(meth)(key, pub_key, dh);
+    }
+ err:
+    kop.crk_param[3].crp_p = NULL;
+    zapparams(&kop);
+    return (dhret);
+}
+
+#endif /* ndef OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+
+/*
+ * ctrl right now is just a wrapper that doesn't do much
+ * but I expect we'll want some options soon.
+ */
+static int
+cryptodev_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f) (void))
+{
+# ifdef HAVE_SYSLOG_R
+    struct syslog_data sd = SYSLOG_DATA_INIT;
+# endif
+
+    switch (cmd) {
+    default:
+# ifdef HAVE_SYSLOG_R
+        syslog_r(LOG_ERR, &sd, "cryptodev_ctrl: unknown command %d", cmd);
+# else
+        syslog(LOG_ERR, "cryptodev_ctrl: unknown command %d", cmd);
+# endif
+        break;
+    }
+    return (1);
+}
+
+void engine_load_cryptodev_int(void)
+{
+    ENGINE *engine = ENGINE_new();
+    int fd;
+
+    if (engine == NULL)
+        return;
+    if ((fd = get_dev_crypto()) < 0) {
+        ENGINE_free(engine);
+        return;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * find out what asymmetric crypto algorithms we support
+     */
+    if (ioctl(fd, CIOCASYMFEAT, &cryptodev_asymfeat) == -1) {
+        put_dev_crypto(fd);
+        ENGINE_free(engine);
+        return;
+    }
+    put_dev_crypto(fd);
+
+    if (!ENGINE_set_id(engine, "cryptodev") ||
+        !ENGINE_set_name(engine, "BSD cryptodev engine") ||
+        !ENGINE_set_destroy_function(engine, cryptodev_engine_destroy) ||
+        !ENGINE_set_ciphers(engine, cryptodev_engine_ciphers) ||
+        !ENGINE_set_digests(engine, cryptodev_engine_digests) ||
+        !ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(engine, cryptodev_ctrl) ||
+        !ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(engine, cryptodev_defns)) {
+        ENGINE_free(engine);
+        return;
+    }
+
+    cryptodev_rsa = RSA_meth_dup(RSA_PKCS1_OpenSSL());
+    if (cryptodev_rsa != NULL) {
+        RSA_meth_set1_name(cryptodev_rsa, "cryptodev RSA method");
+        RSA_meth_set_flags(cryptodev_rsa, 0);
+        if (ENGINE_set_RSA(engine, cryptodev_rsa)) {
+            if (cryptodev_asymfeat & CRF_MOD_EXP) {
+                RSA_meth_set_bn_mod_exp(cryptodev_rsa, cryptodev_bn_mod_exp);
+                if (cryptodev_asymfeat & CRF_MOD_EXP_CRT)
+                    RSA_meth_set_mod_exp(cryptodev_rsa, cryptodev_rsa_mod_exp);
+                else
+                    RSA_meth_set_mod_exp(cryptodev_rsa,
+                                         cryptodev_rsa_nocrt_mod_exp);
+            }
+        }
+    } else {
+        ENGINE_free(engine);
+        return;
+    }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+    cryptodev_dsa = DSA_meth_dup(DSA_OpenSSL());
+    if (cryptodev_dsa != NULL) {
+        DSA_meth_set1_name(cryptodev_dsa, "cryptodev DSA method");
+        DSA_meth_set_flags(cryptodev_dsa, 0);
+        if (ENGINE_set_DSA(engine, cryptodev_dsa)) {
+            if (cryptodev_asymfeat & CRF_DSA_SIGN)
+                DSA_meth_set_sign(cryptodev_dsa, cryptodev_dsa_do_sign);
+            if (cryptodev_asymfeat & CRF_MOD_EXP) {
+                DSA_meth_set_bn_mod_exp(cryptodev_dsa,
+                                        cryptodev_dsa_bn_mod_exp);
+                DSA_meth_set_mod_exp(cryptodev_dsa, cryptodev_dsa_dsa_mod_exp);
+            }
+            if (cryptodev_asymfeat & CRF_DSA_VERIFY)
+                DSA_meth_set_verify(cryptodev_dsa, cryptodev_dsa_verify);
+        }
+    } else {
+        ENGINE_free(engine);
+        return;
+    }
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+    cryptodev_dh = DH_meth_dup(DH_OpenSSL());
+    if (cryptodev_dh != NULL) {
+        DH_meth_set1_name(cryptodev_dh, "cryptodev DH method");
+        DH_meth_set_flags(cryptodev_dh, 0);
+        if (ENGINE_set_DH(engine, cryptodev_dh)) {
+            if (cryptodev_asymfeat & CRF_MOD_EXP) {
+                DH_meth_set_bn_mod_exp(cryptodev_dh, cryptodev_mod_exp_dh);
+                if (cryptodev_asymfeat & CRF_DH_COMPUTE_KEY)
+                    DH_meth_set_compute_key(cryptodev_dh,
+                                            cryptodev_dh_compute_key);
+            }
+        }
+    } else {
+        ENGINE_free(engine);
+        return;
+    }
+#endif
+
+    ENGINE_add(engine);
+    ENGINE_free(engine);
+    ERR_clear_error();
+}
+
+#endif                          /* HAVE_CRYPTODEV */
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/engine/eng_ctrl.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/engine/eng_ctrl.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7925f4f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/engine/eng_ctrl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,338 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "eng_int.h"
+
+/*
+ * When querying a ENGINE-specific control command's 'description', this
+ * string is used if the ENGINE_CMD_DEFN has cmd_desc set to NULL.
+ */
+static const char *int_no_description = "";
+
+/*
+ * These internal functions handle 'CMD'-related control commands when the
+ * ENGINE in question has asked us to take care of it (ie. the ENGINE did not
+ * set the ENGINE_FLAGS_MANUAL_CMD_CTRL flag.
+ */
+
+static int int_ctrl_cmd_is_null(const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN *defn)
+{
+    if ((defn->cmd_num == 0) || (defn->cmd_name == NULL))
+        return 1;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int int_ctrl_cmd_by_name(const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN *defn, const char *s)
+{
+    int idx = 0;
+    while (!int_ctrl_cmd_is_null(defn) && (strcmp(defn->cmd_name, s) != 0)) {
+        idx++;
+        defn++;
+    }
+    if (int_ctrl_cmd_is_null(defn))
+        /* The given name wasn't found */
+        return -1;
+    return idx;
+}
+
+static int int_ctrl_cmd_by_num(const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN *defn, unsigned int num)
+{
+    int idx = 0;
+    /*
+     * NB: It is stipulated that 'cmd_defn' lists are ordered by cmd_num. So
+     * our searches don't need to take any longer than necessary.
+     */
+    while (!int_ctrl_cmd_is_null(defn) && (defn->cmd_num < num)) {
+        idx++;
+        defn++;
+    }
+    if (defn->cmd_num == num)
+        return idx;
+    /* The given cmd_num wasn't found */
+    return -1;
+}
+
+static int int_ctrl_helper(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p,
+                           void (*f) (void))
+{
+    int idx;
+    char *s = (char *)p;
+    /* Take care of the easy one first (eg. it requires no searches) */
+    if (cmd == ENGINE_CTRL_GET_FIRST_CMD_TYPE) {
+        if ((e->cmd_defns == NULL) || int_ctrl_cmd_is_null(e->cmd_defns))
+            return 0;
+        return e->cmd_defns->cmd_num;
+    }
+    /* One or two commands require that "p" be a valid string buffer */
+    if ((cmd == ENGINE_CTRL_GET_CMD_FROM_NAME) ||
+        (cmd == ENGINE_CTRL_GET_NAME_FROM_CMD) ||
+        (cmd == ENGINE_CTRL_GET_DESC_FROM_CMD)) {
+        if (s == NULL) {
+            ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_INT_CTRL_HELPER, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+            return -1;
+        }
+    }
+    /* Now handle cmd_name -> cmd_num conversion */
+    if (cmd == ENGINE_CTRL_GET_CMD_FROM_NAME) {
+        if ((e->cmd_defns == NULL)
+            || ((idx = int_ctrl_cmd_by_name(e->cmd_defns, s)) < 0)) {
+            ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_INT_CTRL_HELPER, ENGINE_R_INVALID_CMD_NAME);
+            return -1;
+        }
+        return e->cmd_defns[idx].cmd_num;
+    }
+    /*
+     * For the rest of the commands, the 'long' argument must specify a valid
+     * command number - so we need to conduct a search.
+     */
+    if ((e->cmd_defns == NULL) || ((idx = int_ctrl_cmd_by_num(e->cmd_defns,
+                                                              (unsigned int)
+                                                              i)) < 0)) {
+        ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_INT_CTRL_HELPER, ENGINE_R_INVALID_CMD_NUMBER);
+        return -1;
+    }
+    /* Now the logic splits depending on command type */
+    switch (cmd) {
+    case ENGINE_CTRL_GET_NEXT_CMD_TYPE:
+        idx++;
+        if (int_ctrl_cmd_is_null(e->cmd_defns + idx))
+            /* end-of-list */
+            return 0;
+        else
+            return e->cmd_defns[idx].cmd_num;
+    case ENGINE_CTRL_GET_NAME_LEN_FROM_CMD:
+        return strlen(e->cmd_defns[idx].cmd_name);
+    case ENGINE_CTRL_GET_NAME_FROM_CMD:
+        return BIO_snprintf(s, strlen(e->cmd_defns[idx].cmd_name) + 1,
+                            "%s", e->cmd_defns[idx].cmd_name);
+    case ENGINE_CTRL_GET_DESC_LEN_FROM_CMD:
+        if (e->cmd_defns[idx].cmd_desc)
+            return strlen(e->cmd_defns[idx].cmd_desc);
+        return strlen(int_no_description);
+    case ENGINE_CTRL_GET_DESC_FROM_CMD:
+        if (e->cmd_defns[idx].cmd_desc)
+            return BIO_snprintf(s,
+                                strlen(e->cmd_defns[idx].cmd_desc) + 1,
+                                "%s", e->cmd_defns[idx].cmd_desc);
+        return BIO_snprintf(s, strlen(int_no_description) + 1, "%s",
+                            int_no_description);
+    case ENGINE_CTRL_GET_CMD_FLAGS:
+        return e->cmd_defns[idx].cmd_flags;
+    }
+    /* Shouldn't really be here ... */
+    ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_INT_CTRL_HELPER, ENGINE_R_INTERNAL_LIST_ERROR);
+    return -1;
+}
+
+int ENGINE_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f) (void))
+{
+    int ctrl_exists, ref_exists;
+    if (e == NULL) {
+        ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(global_engine_lock);
+    ref_exists = ((e->struct_ref > 0) ? 1 : 0);
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(global_engine_lock);
+    ctrl_exists = ((e->ctrl == NULL) ? 0 : 1);
+    if (!ref_exists) {
+        ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_CTRL, ENGINE_R_NO_REFERENCE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    /*
+     * Intercept any "root-level" commands before trying to hand them on to
+     * ctrl() handlers.
+     */
+    switch (cmd) {
+    case ENGINE_CTRL_HAS_CTRL_FUNCTION:
+        return ctrl_exists;
+    case ENGINE_CTRL_GET_FIRST_CMD_TYPE:
+    case ENGINE_CTRL_GET_NEXT_CMD_TYPE:
+    case ENGINE_CTRL_GET_CMD_FROM_NAME:
+    case ENGINE_CTRL_GET_NAME_LEN_FROM_CMD:
+    case ENGINE_CTRL_GET_NAME_FROM_CMD:
+    case ENGINE_CTRL_GET_DESC_LEN_FROM_CMD:
+    case ENGINE_CTRL_GET_DESC_FROM_CMD:
+    case ENGINE_CTRL_GET_CMD_FLAGS:
+        if (ctrl_exists && !(e->flags & ENGINE_FLAGS_MANUAL_CMD_CTRL))
+            return int_ctrl_helper(e, cmd, i, p, f);
+        if (!ctrl_exists) {
+            ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_CTRL, ENGINE_R_NO_CONTROL_FUNCTION);
+            /*
+             * For these cmd-related functions, failure is indicated by a -1
+             * return value (because 0 is used as a valid return in some
+             * places).
+             */
+            return -1;
+        }
+    default:
+        break;
+    }
+    /* Anything else requires a ctrl() handler to exist. */
+    if (!ctrl_exists) {
+        ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_CTRL, ENGINE_R_NO_CONTROL_FUNCTION);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return e->ctrl(e, cmd, i, p, f);
+}
+
+int ENGINE_cmd_is_executable(ENGINE *e, int cmd)
+{
+    int flags;
+    if ((flags =
+         ENGINE_ctrl(e, ENGINE_CTRL_GET_CMD_FLAGS, cmd, NULL, NULL)) < 0) {
+        ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_CMD_IS_EXECUTABLE,
+                  ENGINE_R_INVALID_CMD_NUMBER);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (!(flags & ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NO_INPUT) &&
+        !(flags & ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NUMERIC) &&
+        !(flags & ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING))
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int ENGINE_ctrl_cmd(ENGINE *e, const char *cmd_name,
+                    long i, void *p, void (*f) (void), int cmd_optional)
+{
+    int num;
+
+    if (e == NULL || cmd_name == NULL) {
+        ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_CTRL_CMD, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (e->ctrl == NULL
+        || (num = ENGINE_ctrl(e, ENGINE_CTRL_GET_CMD_FROM_NAME,
+                              0, (void *)cmd_name, NULL)) <= 0) {
+        /*
+         * If the command didn't *have* to be supported, we fake success.
+         * This allows certain settings to be specified for multiple ENGINEs
+         * and only require a change of ENGINE id (without having to
+         * selectively apply settings). Eg. changing from a hardware device
+         * back to the regular software ENGINE without editing the config
+         * file, etc.
+         */
+        if (cmd_optional) {
+            ERR_clear_error();
+            return 1;
+        }
+        ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_CTRL_CMD, ENGINE_R_INVALID_CMD_NAME);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    /*
+     * Force the result of the control command to 0 or 1, for the reasons
+     * mentioned before.
+     */
+    if (ENGINE_ctrl(e, num, i, p, f) > 0)
+        return 1;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(ENGINE *e, const char *cmd_name, const char *arg,
+                           int cmd_optional)
+{
+    int num, flags;
+    long l;
+    char *ptr;
+
+    if (e == NULL || cmd_name == NULL) {
+        ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_CTRL_CMD_STRING, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (e->ctrl == NULL
+        || (num = ENGINE_ctrl(e, ENGINE_CTRL_GET_CMD_FROM_NAME,
+                              0, (void *)cmd_name, NULL)) <= 0) {
+        /*
+         * If the command didn't *have* to be supported, we fake success.
+         * This allows certain settings to be specified for multiple ENGINEs
+         * and only require a change of ENGINE id (without having to
+         * selectively apply settings). Eg. changing from a hardware device
+         * back to the regular software ENGINE without editing the config
+         * file, etc.
+         */
+        if (cmd_optional) {
+            ERR_clear_error();
+            return 1;
+        }
+        ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_CTRL_CMD_STRING, ENGINE_R_INVALID_CMD_NAME);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (!ENGINE_cmd_is_executable(e, num)) {
+        ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_CTRL_CMD_STRING,
+                  ENGINE_R_CMD_NOT_EXECUTABLE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    flags = ENGINE_ctrl(e, ENGINE_CTRL_GET_CMD_FLAGS, num, NULL, NULL);
+    if (flags < 0) {
+        /*
+         * Shouldn't happen, given that ENGINE_cmd_is_executable() returned
+         * success.
+         */
+        ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_CTRL_CMD_STRING,
+                  ENGINE_R_INTERNAL_LIST_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    /*
+     * If the command takes no input, there must be no input. And vice versa.
+     */
+    if (flags & ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NO_INPUT) {
+        if (arg != NULL) {
+            ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_CTRL_CMD_STRING,
+                      ENGINE_R_COMMAND_TAKES_NO_INPUT);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        /*
+         * We deliberately force the result of ENGINE_ctrl() to 0 or 1 rather
+         * than returning it as "return data". This is to ensure usage of
+         * these commands is consistent across applications and that certain
+         * applications don't understand it one way, and others another.
+         */
+        if (ENGINE_ctrl(e, num, 0, (void *)arg, NULL) > 0)
+            return 1;
+        return 0;
+    }
+    /* So, we require input */
+    if (arg == NULL) {
+        ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_CTRL_CMD_STRING,
+                  ENGINE_R_COMMAND_TAKES_INPUT);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    /* If it takes string input, that's easy */
+    if (flags & ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING) {
+        /* Same explanation as above */
+        if (ENGINE_ctrl(e, num, 0, (void *)arg, NULL) > 0)
+            return 1;
+        return 0;
+    }
+    /*
+     * If it doesn't take numeric either, then it is unsupported for use in a
+     * config-setting situation, which is what this function is for. This
+     * should never happen though, because ENGINE_cmd_is_executable() was
+     * used.
+     */
+    if (!(flags & ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NUMERIC)) {
+        ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_CTRL_CMD_STRING,
+                  ENGINE_R_INTERNAL_LIST_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    l = strtol(arg, &ptr, 10);
+    if ((arg == ptr) || (*ptr != '\0')) {
+        ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_CTRL_CMD_STRING,
+                  ENGINE_R_ARGUMENT_IS_NOT_A_NUMBER);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    /*
+     * Force the result of the control command to 0 or 1, for the reasons
+     * mentioned before.
+     */
+    if (ENGINE_ctrl(e, num, l, NULL, NULL) > 0)
+        return 1;
+    return 0;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/engine/eng_dyn.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/engine/eng_dyn.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..843226c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/engine/eng_dyn.c
@@ -0,0 +1,510 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "eng_int.h"
+#include "internal/dso.h"
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+
+/*
+ * Shared libraries implementing ENGINEs for use by the "dynamic" ENGINE
+ * loader should implement the hook-up functions with the following
+ * prototypes.
+ */
+
+/* Our ENGINE handlers */
+static int dynamic_init(ENGINE *e);
+static int dynamic_finish(ENGINE *e);
+static int dynamic_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p,
+                        void (*f) (void));
+/* Predeclare our context type */
+typedef struct st_dynamic_data_ctx dynamic_data_ctx;
+/* The implementation for the important control command */
+static int dynamic_load(ENGINE *e, dynamic_data_ctx *ctx);
+
+#define DYNAMIC_CMD_SO_PATH             ENGINE_CMD_BASE
+#define DYNAMIC_CMD_NO_VCHECK           (ENGINE_CMD_BASE + 1)
+#define DYNAMIC_CMD_ID                  (ENGINE_CMD_BASE + 2)
+#define DYNAMIC_CMD_LIST_ADD            (ENGINE_CMD_BASE + 3)
+#define DYNAMIC_CMD_DIR_LOAD            (ENGINE_CMD_BASE + 4)
+#define DYNAMIC_CMD_DIR_ADD             (ENGINE_CMD_BASE + 5)
+#define DYNAMIC_CMD_LOAD                (ENGINE_CMD_BASE + 6)
+
+/* The constants used when creating the ENGINE */
+static const char *engine_dynamic_id = "dynamic";
+static const char *engine_dynamic_name = "Dynamic engine loading support";
+static const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN dynamic_cmd_defns[] = {
+    {DYNAMIC_CMD_SO_PATH,
+     "SO_PATH",
+     "Specifies the path to the new ENGINE shared library",
+     ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING},
+    {DYNAMIC_CMD_NO_VCHECK,
+     "NO_VCHECK",
+     "Specifies to continue even if version checking fails (boolean)",
+     ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NUMERIC},
+    {DYNAMIC_CMD_ID,
+     "ID",
+     "Specifies an ENGINE id name for loading",
+     ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING},
+    {DYNAMIC_CMD_LIST_ADD,
+     "LIST_ADD",
+     "Whether to add a loaded ENGINE to the internal list (0=no,1=yes,2=mandatory)",
+     ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NUMERIC},
+    {DYNAMIC_CMD_DIR_LOAD,
+     "DIR_LOAD",
+     "Specifies whether to load from 'DIR_ADD' directories (0=no,1=yes,2=mandatory)",
+     ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NUMERIC},
+    {DYNAMIC_CMD_DIR_ADD,
+     "DIR_ADD",
+     "Adds a directory from which ENGINEs can be loaded",
+     ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING},
+    {DYNAMIC_CMD_LOAD,
+     "LOAD",
+     "Load up the ENGINE specified by other settings",
+     ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NO_INPUT},
+    {0, NULL, NULL, 0}
+};
+
+/*
+ * Loading code stores state inside the ENGINE structure via the "ex_data"
+ * element. We load all our state into a single structure and use that as a
+ * single context in the "ex_data" stack.
+ */
+struct st_dynamic_data_ctx {
+    /* The DSO object we load that supplies the ENGINE code */
+    DSO *dynamic_dso;
+    /*
+     * The function pointer to the version checking shared library function
+     */
+    dynamic_v_check_fn v_check;
+    /*
+     * The function pointer to the engine-binding shared library function
+     */
+    dynamic_bind_engine bind_engine;
+    /* The default name/path for loading the shared library */
+    char *DYNAMIC_LIBNAME;
+    /* Whether to continue loading on a version check failure */
+    int no_vcheck;
+    /* If non-NULL, stipulates the 'id' of the ENGINE to be loaded */
+    char *engine_id;
+    /*
+     * If non-zero, a successfully loaded ENGINE should be added to the
+     * internal ENGINE list. If 2, the add must succeed or the entire load
+     * should fail.
+     */
+    int list_add_value;
+    /* The symbol name for the version checking function */
+    const char *DYNAMIC_F1;
+    /* The symbol name for the "initialise ENGINE structure" function */
+    const char *DYNAMIC_F2;
+    /*
+     * Whether to never use 'dirs', use 'dirs' as a fallback, or only use
+     * 'dirs' for loading. Default is to use 'dirs' as a fallback.
+     */
+    int dir_load;
+    /* A stack of directories from which ENGINEs could be loaded */
+    STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *dirs;
+};
+
+/*
+ * This is the "ex_data" index we obtain and reserve for use with our context
+ * structure.
+ */
+static int dynamic_ex_data_idx = -1;
+
+static void int_free_str(char *s)
+{
+    OPENSSL_free(s);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Because our ex_data element may or may not get allocated depending on
+ * whether a "first-use" occurs before the ENGINE is freed, we have a memory
+ * leak problem to solve. We can't declare a "new" handler for the ex_data as
+ * we don't want a dynamic_data_ctx in *all* ENGINE structures of all types
+ * (this is a bug in the design of CRYPTO_EX_DATA). As such, we just declare
+ * a "free" handler and that will get called if an ENGINE is being destroyed
+ * and there was an ex_data element corresponding to our context type.
+ */
+static void dynamic_data_ctx_free_func(void *parent, void *ptr,
+                                       CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, int idx, long argl,
+                                       void *argp)
+{
+    if (ptr) {
+        dynamic_data_ctx *ctx = (dynamic_data_ctx *)ptr;
+        DSO_free(ctx->dynamic_dso);
+        OPENSSL_free(ctx->DYNAMIC_LIBNAME);
+        OPENSSL_free(ctx->engine_id);
+        sk_OPENSSL_STRING_pop_free(ctx->dirs, int_free_str);
+        OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Construct the per-ENGINE context. We create it blindly and then use a lock
+ * to check for a race - if so, all but one of the threads "racing" will have
+ * wasted their time. The alternative involves creating everything inside the
+ * lock which is far worse.
+ */
+static int dynamic_set_data_ctx(ENGINE *e, dynamic_data_ctx **ctx)
+{
+    dynamic_data_ctx *c = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*c));
+    int ret = 1;
+
+    if (c == NULL) {
+        ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_SET_DATA_CTX, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    c->dirs = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null();
+    if (c->dirs == NULL) {
+        ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_SET_DATA_CTX, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        OPENSSL_free(c);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    c->DYNAMIC_F1 = "v_check";
+    c->DYNAMIC_F2 = "bind_engine";
+    c->dir_load = 1;
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(global_engine_lock);
+    if ((*ctx = (dynamic_data_ctx *)ENGINE_get_ex_data(e,
+                                                       dynamic_ex_data_idx))
+        == NULL) {
+        /* Good, we're the first */
+        ret = ENGINE_set_ex_data(e, dynamic_ex_data_idx, c);
+        if (ret) {
+            *ctx = c;
+            c = NULL;
+        }
+    }
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(global_engine_lock);
+    /*
+     * If we lost the race to set the context, c is non-NULL and *ctx is the
+     * context of the thread that won.
+     */
+    if (c)
+        sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(c->dirs);
+    OPENSSL_free(c);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function retrieves the context structure from an ENGINE's "ex_data",
+ * or if it doesn't exist yet, sets it up.
+ */
+static dynamic_data_ctx *dynamic_get_data_ctx(ENGINE *e)
+{
+    dynamic_data_ctx *ctx;
+    if (dynamic_ex_data_idx < 0) {
+        /*
+         * Create and register the ENGINE ex_data, and associate our "free"
+         * function with it to ensure any allocated contexts get freed when
+         * an ENGINE goes underground.
+         */
+        int new_idx = ENGINE_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL,
+                                              dynamic_data_ctx_free_func);
+        if (new_idx == -1) {
+            ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_GET_DATA_CTX, ENGINE_R_NO_INDEX);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+        CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(global_engine_lock);
+        /* Avoid a race by checking again inside this lock */
+        if (dynamic_ex_data_idx < 0) {
+            /* Good, someone didn't beat us to it */
+            dynamic_ex_data_idx = new_idx;
+            new_idx = -1;
+        }
+        CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(global_engine_lock);
+        /*
+         * In theory we could "give back" the index here if (new_idx>-1), but
+         * it's not possible and wouldn't gain us much if it were.
+         */
+    }
+    ctx = (dynamic_data_ctx *)ENGINE_get_ex_data(e, dynamic_ex_data_idx);
+    /* Check if the context needs to be created */
+    if ((ctx == NULL) && !dynamic_set_data_ctx(e, &ctx))
+        /* "set_data" will set errors if necessary */
+        return NULL;
+    return ctx;
+}
+
+static ENGINE *engine_dynamic(void)
+{
+    ENGINE *ret = ENGINE_new();
+    if (ret == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    if (!ENGINE_set_id(ret, engine_dynamic_id) ||
+        !ENGINE_set_name(ret, engine_dynamic_name) ||
+        !ENGINE_set_init_function(ret, dynamic_init) ||
+        !ENGINE_set_finish_function(ret, dynamic_finish) ||
+        !ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(ret, dynamic_ctrl) ||
+        !ENGINE_set_flags(ret, ENGINE_FLAGS_BY_ID_COPY) ||
+        !ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(ret, dynamic_cmd_defns)) {
+        ENGINE_free(ret);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+void engine_load_dynamic_int(void)
+{
+    ENGINE *toadd = engine_dynamic();
+    if (!toadd)
+        return;
+    ENGINE_add(toadd);
+    /*
+     * If the "add" worked, it gets a structural reference. So either way, we
+     * release our just-created reference.
+     */
+    ENGINE_free(toadd);
+    /*
+     * If the "add" didn't work, it was probably a conflict because it was
+     * already added (eg. someone calling ENGINE_load_blah then calling
+     * ENGINE_load_builtin_engines() perhaps).
+     */
+    ERR_clear_error();
+}
+
+static int dynamic_init(ENGINE *e)
+{
+    /*
+     * We always return failure - the "dynamic" engine itself can't be used
+     * for anything.
+     */
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int dynamic_finish(ENGINE *e)
+{
+    /*
+     * This should never be called on account of "dynamic_init" always
+     * failing.
+     */
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int dynamic_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f) (void))
+{
+    dynamic_data_ctx *ctx = dynamic_get_data_ctx(e);
+    int initialised;
+
+    if (!ctx) {
+        ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_CTRL, ENGINE_R_NOT_LOADED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    initialised = ((ctx->dynamic_dso == NULL) ? 0 : 1);
+    /* All our control commands require the ENGINE to be uninitialised */
+    if (initialised) {
+        ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_CTRL, ENGINE_R_ALREADY_LOADED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    switch (cmd) {
+    case DYNAMIC_CMD_SO_PATH:
+        /* a NULL 'p' or a string of zero-length is the same thing */
+        if (p && (strlen((const char *)p) < 1))
+            p = NULL;
+        OPENSSL_free(ctx->DYNAMIC_LIBNAME);
+        if (p)
+            ctx->DYNAMIC_LIBNAME = OPENSSL_strdup(p);
+        else
+            ctx->DYNAMIC_LIBNAME = NULL;
+        return (ctx->DYNAMIC_LIBNAME ? 1 : 0);
+    case DYNAMIC_CMD_NO_VCHECK:
+        ctx->no_vcheck = ((i == 0) ? 0 : 1);
+        return 1;
+    case DYNAMIC_CMD_ID:
+        /* a NULL 'p' or a string of zero-length is the same thing */
+        if (p && (strlen((const char *)p) < 1))
+            p = NULL;
+        OPENSSL_free(ctx->engine_id);
+        if (p)
+            ctx->engine_id = OPENSSL_strdup(p);
+        else
+            ctx->engine_id = NULL;
+        return (ctx->engine_id ? 1 : 0);
+    case DYNAMIC_CMD_LIST_ADD:
+        if ((i < 0) || (i > 2)) {
+            ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_CTRL, ENGINE_R_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        ctx->list_add_value = (int)i;
+        return 1;
+    case DYNAMIC_CMD_LOAD:
+        return dynamic_load(e, ctx);
+    case DYNAMIC_CMD_DIR_LOAD:
+        if ((i < 0) || (i > 2)) {
+            ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_CTRL, ENGINE_R_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        ctx->dir_load = (int)i;
+        return 1;
+    case DYNAMIC_CMD_DIR_ADD:
+        /* a NULL 'p' or a string of zero-length is the same thing */
+        if (!p || (strlen((const char *)p) < 1)) {
+            ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_CTRL, ENGINE_R_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        {
+            char *tmp_str = OPENSSL_strdup(p);
+            if (tmp_str == NULL) {
+                ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_CTRL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                return 0;
+            }
+            if (!sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(ctx->dirs, tmp_str)) {
+                OPENSSL_free(tmp_str);
+                ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_CTRL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                return 0;
+            }
+        }
+        return 1;
+    default:
+        break;
+    }
+    ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_CTRL, ENGINE_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int int_load(dynamic_data_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    int num, loop;
+    /* Unless told not to, try a direct load */
+    if ((ctx->dir_load != 2) && (DSO_load(ctx->dynamic_dso,
+                                          ctx->DYNAMIC_LIBNAME, NULL,
+                                          0)) != NULL)
+        return 1;
+    /* If we're not allowed to use 'dirs' or we have none, fail */
+    if (!ctx->dir_load || (num = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(ctx->dirs)) < 1)
+        return 0;
+    for (loop = 0; loop < num; loop++) {
+        const char *s = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(ctx->dirs, loop);
+        char *merge = DSO_merge(ctx->dynamic_dso, ctx->DYNAMIC_LIBNAME, s);
+        if (!merge)
+            return 0;
+        if (DSO_load(ctx->dynamic_dso, merge, NULL, 0)) {
+            /* Found what we're looking for */
+            OPENSSL_free(merge);
+            return 1;
+        }
+        OPENSSL_free(merge);
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int dynamic_load(ENGINE *e, dynamic_data_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    ENGINE cpy;
+    dynamic_fns fns;
+
+    if (ctx->dynamic_dso == NULL)
+        ctx->dynamic_dso = DSO_new();
+    if (ctx->dynamic_dso == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    if (!ctx->DYNAMIC_LIBNAME) {
+        if (!ctx->engine_id)
+            return 0;
+        DSO_ctrl(ctx->dynamic_dso, DSO_CTRL_SET_FLAGS,
+                 DSO_FLAG_NAME_TRANSLATION_EXT_ONLY, NULL);
+        ctx->DYNAMIC_LIBNAME =
+            DSO_convert_filename(ctx->dynamic_dso, ctx->engine_id);
+    }
+    if (!int_load(ctx)) {
+        ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_LOAD, ENGINE_R_DSO_NOT_FOUND);
+        DSO_free(ctx->dynamic_dso);
+        ctx->dynamic_dso = NULL;
+        return 0;
+    }
+    /* We have to find a bind function otherwise it'll always end badly */
+    if (!
+        (ctx->bind_engine =
+         (dynamic_bind_engine) DSO_bind_func(ctx->dynamic_dso,
+                                             ctx->DYNAMIC_F2))) {
+        ctx->bind_engine = NULL;
+        DSO_free(ctx->dynamic_dso);
+        ctx->dynamic_dso = NULL;
+        ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_LOAD, ENGINE_R_DSO_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    /* Do we perform version checking? */
+    if (!ctx->no_vcheck) {
+        unsigned long vcheck_res = 0;
+        /*
+         * Now we try to find a version checking function and decide how to
+         * cope with failure if/when it fails.
+         */
+        ctx->v_check =
+            (dynamic_v_check_fn) DSO_bind_func(ctx->dynamic_dso,
+                                               ctx->DYNAMIC_F1);
+        if (ctx->v_check)
+            vcheck_res = ctx->v_check(OSSL_DYNAMIC_VERSION);
+        /*
+         * We fail if the version checker veto'd the load *or* if it is
+         * deferring to us (by returning its version) and we think it is too
+         * old.
+         */
+        if (vcheck_res < OSSL_DYNAMIC_OLDEST) {
+            /* Fail */
+            ctx->bind_engine = NULL;
+            ctx->v_check = NULL;
+            DSO_free(ctx->dynamic_dso);
+            ctx->dynamic_dso = NULL;
+            ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_LOAD,
+                      ENGINE_R_VERSION_INCOMPATIBILITY);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+    /*
+     * First binary copy the ENGINE structure so that we can roll back if the
+     * hand-over fails
+     */
+    memcpy(&cpy, e, sizeof(ENGINE));
+    /*
+     * Provide the ERR, "ex_data", memory, and locking callbacks so the
+     * loaded library uses our state rather than its own. FIXME: As noted in
+     * engine.h, much of this would be simplified if each area of code
+     * provided its own "summary" structure of all related callbacks. It
+     * would also increase opaqueness.
+     */
+    fns.static_state = ENGINE_get_static_state();
+    CRYPTO_get_mem_functions(&fns.mem_fns.malloc_fn, &fns.mem_fns.realloc_fn,
+                             &fns.mem_fns.free_fn);
+    /*
+     * Now that we've loaded the dynamic engine, make sure no "dynamic"
+     * ENGINE elements will show through.
+     */
+    engine_set_all_null(e);
+
+    /* Try to bind the ENGINE onto our own ENGINE structure */
+    if (!ctx->bind_engine(e, ctx->engine_id, &fns)) {
+        ctx->bind_engine = NULL;
+        ctx->v_check = NULL;
+        DSO_free(ctx->dynamic_dso);
+        ctx->dynamic_dso = NULL;
+        ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_LOAD, ENGINE_R_INIT_FAILED);
+        /* Copy the original ENGINE structure back */
+        memcpy(e, &cpy, sizeof(ENGINE));
+        return 0;
+    }
+    /* Do we try to add this ENGINE to the internal list too? */
+    if (ctx->list_add_value > 0) {
+        if (!ENGINE_add(e)) {
+            /* Do we tolerate this or fail? */
+            if (ctx->list_add_value > 1) {
+                /*
+                 * Fail - NB: By this time, it's too late to rollback, and
+                 * trying to do so allows the bind_engine() code to have
+                 * created leaks. We just have to fail where we are, after
+                 * the ENGINE has changed.
+                 */
+                ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_LOAD,
+                          ENGINE_R_CONFLICTING_ENGINE_ID);
+                return 0;
+            }
+            /* Tolerate */
+            ERR_clear_error();
+        }
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/engine/eng_err.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/engine/eng_err.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5e9d16f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/engine/eng_err.c
@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+/*
+ * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+
+# define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_ENGINE,func,0)
+# define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_ENGINE,0,reason)
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA ENGINE_str_functs[] = {
+    {ERR_FUNC(ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_CTRL), "dynamic_ctrl"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_GET_DATA_CTX), "dynamic_get_data_ctx"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_LOAD), "dynamic_load"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_SET_DATA_CTX), "dynamic_set_data_ctx"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_ADD), "ENGINE_add"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_BY_ID), "ENGINE_by_id"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_CMD_IS_EXECUTABLE), "ENGINE_cmd_is_executable"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_CTRL), "ENGINE_ctrl"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_CTRL_CMD), "ENGINE_ctrl_cmd"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_CTRL_CMD_STRING), "ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_FINISH), "ENGINE_finish"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_GET_CIPHER), "ENGINE_get_cipher"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_GET_DIGEST), "ENGINE_get_digest"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_GET_FIRST), "ENGINE_get_first"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_GET_LAST), "ENGINE_get_last"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_GET_NEXT), "ENGINE_get_next"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_GET_PKEY_ASN1_METH),
+     "ENGINE_get_pkey_asn1_meth"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_GET_PKEY_METH), "ENGINE_get_pkey_meth"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_GET_PREV), "ENGINE_get_prev"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_INIT), "ENGINE_init"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_LIST_ADD), "engine_list_add"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_LIST_REMOVE), "engine_list_remove"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_LOAD_PRIVATE_KEY), "ENGINE_load_private_key"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_LOAD_PUBLIC_KEY), "ENGINE_load_public_key"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_LOAD_SSL_CLIENT_CERT),
+     "ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_NEW), "ENGINE_new"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_PKEY_ASN1_FIND_STR),
+     "ENGINE_pkey_asn1_find_str"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_REMOVE), "ENGINE_remove"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_SET_DEFAULT_STRING),
+     "ENGINE_set_default_string"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_SET_ID), "ENGINE_set_id"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_SET_NAME), "ENGINE_set_name"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_TABLE_REGISTER), "engine_table_register"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_UNLOCKED_FINISH), "engine_unlocked_finish"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_UP_REF), "ENGINE_up_ref"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ENGINE_F_INT_CTRL_HELPER), "int_ctrl_helper"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ENGINE_F_INT_ENGINE_CONFIGURE), "int_engine_configure"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ENGINE_F_INT_ENGINE_MODULE_INIT), "int_engine_module_init"},
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA ENGINE_str_reasons[] = {
+    {ERR_REASON(ENGINE_R_ALREADY_LOADED), "already loaded"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ENGINE_R_ARGUMENT_IS_NOT_A_NUMBER),
+     "argument is not a number"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ENGINE_R_CMD_NOT_EXECUTABLE), "cmd not executable"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ENGINE_R_COMMAND_TAKES_INPUT), "command takes input"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ENGINE_R_COMMAND_TAKES_NO_INPUT), "command takes no input"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ENGINE_R_CONFLICTING_ENGINE_ID), "conflicting engine id"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ENGINE_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED),
+     "ctrl command not implemented"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ENGINE_R_DSO_FAILURE), "DSO failure"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ENGINE_R_DSO_NOT_FOUND), "dso not found"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ENGINE_R_ENGINES_SECTION_ERROR), "engines section error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ENGINE_R_ENGINE_CONFIGURATION_ERROR),
+     "engine configuration error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ENGINE_R_ENGINE_IS_NOT_IN_LIST), "engine is not in the list"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ENGINE_R_ENGINE_SECTION_ERROR), "engine section error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ENGINE_R_FAILED_LOADING_PRIVATE_KEY),
+     "failed loading private key"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ENGINE_R_FAILED_LOADING_PUBLIC_KEY),
+     "failed loading public key"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ENGINE_R_FINISH_FAILED), "finish failed"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ENGINE_R_ID_OR_NAME_MISSING), "'id' or 'name' missing"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ENGINE_R_INIT_FAILED), "init failed"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ENGINE_R_INTERNAL_LIST_ERROR), "internal list error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ENGINE_R_INVALID_ARGUMENT), "invalid argument"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ENGINE_R_INVALID_CMD_NAME), "invalid cmd name"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ENGINE_R_INVALID_CMD_NUMBER), "invalid cmd number"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ENGINE_R_INVALID_INIT_VALUE), "invalid init value"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ENGINE_R_INVALID_STRING), "invalid string"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ENGINE_R_NOT_INITIALISED), "not initialised"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ENGINE_R_NOT_LOADED), "not loaded"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ENGINE_R_NO_CONTROL_FUNCTION), "no control function"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ENGINE_R_NO_INDEX), "no index"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ENGINE_R_NO_LOAD_FUNCTION), "no load function"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ENGINE_R_NO_REFERENCE), "no reference"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ENGINE_R_NO_SUCH_ENGINE), "no such engine"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ENGINE_R_UNIMPLEMENTED_CIPHER), "unimplemented cipher"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ENGINE_R_UNIMPLEMENTED_DIGEST), "unimplemented digest"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ENGINE_R_UNIMPLEMENTED_PUBLIC_KEY_METHOD),
+     "unimplemented public key method"},
+    {ERR_REASON(ENGINE_R_VERSION_INCOMPATIBILITY), "version incompatibility"},
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+
+#endif
+
+int ERR_load_ENGINE_strings(void)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+
+    if (ERR_func_error_string(ENGINE_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) {
+        ERR_load_strings(0, ENGINE_str_functs);
+        ERR_load_strings(0, ENGINE_str_reasons);
+    }
+#endif
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/engine/eng_fat.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/engine/eng_fat.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5cb8187
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/engine/eng_fat.c
@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ * ECDH support in OpenSSL originally developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ */
+
+#include "eng_int.h"
+#include <openssl/conf.h>
+
+int ENGINE_set_default(ENGINE *e, unsigned int flags)
+{
+    if ((flags & ENGINE_METHOD_CIPHERS) && !ENGINE_set_default_ciphers(e))
+        return 0;
+    if ((flags & ENGINE_METHOD_DIGESTS) && !ENGINE_set_default_digests(e))
+        return 0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+    if ((flags & ENGINE_METHOD_RSA) && !ENGINE_set_default_RSA(e))
+        return 0;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+    if ((flags & ENGINE_METHOD_DSA) && !ENGINE_set_default_DSA(e))
+        return 0;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+    if ((flags & ENGINE_METHOD_DH) && !ENGINE_set_default_DH(e))
+        return 0;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    if ((flags & ENGINE_METHOD_EC) && !ENGINE_set_default_EC(e))
+        return 0;
+#endif
+    if ((flags & ENGINE_METHOD_RAND) && !ENGINE_set_default_RAND(e))
+        return 0;
+    if ((flags & ENGINE_METHOD_PKEY_METHS)
+        && !ENGINE_set_default_pkey_meths(e))
+        return 0;
+    if ((flags & ENGINE_METHOD_PKEY_ASN1_METHS)
+        && !ENGINE_set_default_pkey_asn1_meths(e))
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Set default algorithms using a string */
+
+static int int_def_cb(const char *alg, int len, void *arg)
+{
+    unsigned int *pflags = arg;
+    if (alg == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    if (strncmp(alg, "ALL", len) == 0)
+        *pflags |= ENGINE_METHOD_ALL;
+    else if (strncmp(alg, "RSA", len) == 0)
+        *pflags |= ENGINE_METHOD_RSA;
+    else if (strncmp(alg, "DSA", len) == 0)
+        *pflags |= ENGINE_METHOD_DSA;
+    else if (strncmp(alg, "DH", len) == 0)
+        *pflags |= ENGINE_METHOD_DH;
+    else if (strncmp(alg, "EC", len) == 0)
+        *pflags |= ENGINE_METHOD_EC;
+    else if (strncmp(alg, "RAND", len) == 0)
+        *pflags |= ENGINE_METHOD_RAND;
+    else if (strncmp(alg, "CIPHERS", len) == 0)
+        *pflags |= ENGINE_METHOD_CIPHERS;
+    else if (strncmp(alg, "DIGESTS", len) == 0)
+        *pflags |= ENGINE_METHOD_DIGESTS;
+    else if (strncmp(alg, "PKEY", len) == 0)
+        *pflags |= ENGINE_METHOD_PKEY_METHS | ENGINE_METHOD_PKEY_ASN1_METHS;
+    else if (strncmp(alg, "PKEY_CRYPTO", len) == 0)
+        *pflags |= ENGINE_METHOD_PKEY_METHS;
+    else if (strncmp(alg, "PKEY_ASN1", len) == 0)
+        *pflags |= ENGINE_METHOD_PKEY_ASN1_METHS;
+    else
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int ENGINE_set_default_string(ENGINE *e, const char *def_list)
+{
+    unsigned int flags = 0;
+    if (!CONF_parse_list(def_list, ',', 1, int_def_cb, &flags)) {
+        ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_SET_DEFAULT_STRING,
+                  ENGINE_R_INVALID_STRING);
+        ERR_add_error_data(2, "str=", def_list);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return ENGINE_set_default(e, flags);
+}
+
+int ENGINE_register_complete(ENGINE *e)
+{
+    ENGINE_register_ciphers(e);
+    ENGINE_register_digests(e);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+    ENGINE_register_RSA(e);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+    ENGINE_register_DSA(e);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+    ENGINE_register_DH(e);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    ENGINE_register_EC(e);
+#endif
+    ENGINE_register_RAND(e);
+    ENGINE_register_pkey_meths(e);
+    ENGINE_register_pkey_asn1_meths(e);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int ENGINE_register_all_complete(void)
+{
+    ENGINE *e;
+
+    for (e = ENGINE_get_first(); e; e = ENGINE_get_next(e))
+        if (!(e->flags & ENGINE_FLAGS_NO_REGISTER_ALL))
+            ENGINE_register_complete(e);
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/engine/eng_init.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/engine/eng_init.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8be7c6f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/engine/eng_init.c
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "eng_int.h"
+
+/*
+ * Initialise a engine type for use (or up its functional reference count if
+ * it's already in use). This version is only used internally.
+ */
+int engine_unlocked_init(ENGINE *e)
+{
+    int to_return = 1;
+
+    if ((e->funct_ref == 0) && e->init)
+        /*
+         * This is the first functional reference and the engine requires
+         * initialisation so we do it now.
+         */
+        to_return = e->init(e);
+    if (to_return) {
+        /*
+         * OK, we return a functional reference which is also a structural
+         * reference.
+         */
+        e->struct_ref++;
+        e->funct_ref++;
+        engine_ref_debug(e, 0, 1);
+        engine_ref_debug(e, 1, 1);
+    }
+    return to_return;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Free a functional reference to a engine type. This version is only used
+ * internally.
+ */
+int engine_unlocked_finish(ENGINE *e, int unlock_for_handlers)
+{
+    int to_return = 1;
+
+    /*
+     * Reduce the functional reference count here so if it's the terminating
+     * case, we can release the lock safely and call the finish() handler
+     * without risk of a race. We get a race if we leave the count until
+     * after and something else is calling "finish" at the same time -
+     * there's a chance that both threads will together take the count from 2
+     * to 0 without either calling finish().
+     */
+    e->funct_ref--;
+    engine_ref_debug(e, 1, -1);
+    if ((e->funct_ref == 0) && e->finish) {
+        if (unlock_for_handlers)
+            CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(global_engine_lock);
+        to_return = e->finish(e);
+        if (unlock_for_handlers)
+            CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(global_engine_lock);
+        if (!to_return)
+            return 0;
+    }
+    REF_ASSERT_ISNT(e->funct_ref < 0);
+    /* Release the structural reference too */
+    if (!engine_free_util(e, 0)) {
+        ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_UNLOCKED_FINISH, ENGINE_R_FINISH_FAILED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return to_return;
+}
+
+/* The API (locked) version of "init" */
+int ENGINE_init(ENGINE *e)
+{
+    int ret;
+    if (e == NULL) {
+        ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_INIT, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (!RUN_ONCE(&engine_lock_init, do_engine_lock_init)) {
+        ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(global_engine_lock);
+    ret = engine_unlocked_init(e);
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(global_engine_lock);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/* The API (locked) version of "finish" */
+int ENGINE_finish(ENGINE *e)
+{
+    int to_return = 1;
+
+    if (e == NULL)
+        return 1;
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(global_engine_lock);
+    to_return = engine_unlocked_finish(e, 1);
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(global_engine_lock);
+    if (!to_return) {
+        ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_FINISH, ENGINE_R_FINISH_FAILED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return to_return;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/engine/eng_int.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/engine/eng_int.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c604fad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/engine/eng_int.h
@@ -0,0 +1,183 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ * ECDH support in OpenSSL originally developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_ENGINE_INT_H
+# define HEADER_ENGINE_INT_H
+
+# include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+# include <internal/engine.h>
+# include <internal/thread_once.h>
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+extern CRYPTO_RWLOCK *global_engine_lock;
+
+/*
+ * If we compile with this symbol defined, then both reference counts in the
+ * ENGINE structure will be monitored with a line of output on stderr for
+ * each change. This prints the engine's pointer address (truncated to
+ * unsigned int), "struct" or "funct" to indicate the reference type, the
+ * before and after reference count, and the file:line-number pair. The
+ * "engine_ref_debug" statements must come *after* the change.
+ */
+# ifdef ENGINE_REF_COUNT_DEBUG
+
+#  define engine_ref_debug(e, isfunct, diff) \
+        fprintf(stderr, "engine: %08x %s from %d to %d (%s:%d)\n", \
+                (unsigned int)(e), (isfunct ? "funct" : "struct"), \
+                ((isfunct) ? ((e)->funct_ref - (diff)) : ((e)->struct_ref - (diff))), \
+                ((isfunct) ? (e)->funct_ref : (e)->struct_ref), \
+                (OPENSSL_FILE), (OPENSSL_LINE))
+
+# else
+
+#  define engine_ref_debug(e, isfunct, diff)
+
+# endif
+
+/*
+ * Any code that will need cleanup operations should use these functions to
+ * register callbacks. engine_cleanup_int() will call all registered
+ * callbacks in order. NB: both the "add" functions assume the engine lock to
+ * already be held (in "write" mode).
+ */
+typedef void (ENGINE_CLEANUP_CB) (void);
+typedef struct st_engine_cleanup_item {
+    ENGINE_CLEANUP_CB *cb;
+} ENGINE_CLEANUP_ITEM;
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(ENGINE_CLEANUP_ITEM)
+void engine_cleanup_add_first(ENGINE_CLEANUP_CB *cb);
+void engine_cleanup_add_last(ENGINE_CLEANUP_CB *cb);
+
+/* We need stacks of ENGINEs for use in eng_table.c */
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(ENGINE)
+
+/*
+ * If this symbol is defined then engine_table_select(), the function that is
+ * used by RSA, DSA (etc) code to select registered ENGINEs, cache defaults
+ * and functional references (etc), will display debugging summaries to
+ * stderr.
+ */
+/* #define ENGINE_TABLE_DEBUG */
+
+/*
+ * This represents an implementation table. Dependent code should instantiate
+ * it as a (ENGINE_TABLE *) pointer value set initially to NULL.
+ */
+typedef struct st_engine_table ENGINE_TABLE;
+int engine_table_register(ENGINE_TABLE **table, ENGINE_CLEANUP_CB *cleanup,
+                          ENGINE *e, const int *nids, int num_nids,
+                          int setdefault);
+void engine_table_unregister(ENGINE_TABLE **table, ENGINE *e);
+void engine_table_cleanup(ENGINE_TABLE **table);
+# ifndef ENGINE_TABLE_DEBUG
+ENGINE *engine_table_select(ENGINE_TABLE **table, int nid);
+# else
+ENGINE *engine_table_select_tmp(ENGINE_TABLE **table, int nid, const char *f,
+                                int l);
+#  define engine_table_select(t,n) engine_table_select_tmp(t,n,OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE)
+# endif
+typedef void (engine_table_doall_cb) (int nid, STACK_OF(ENGINE) *sk,
+                                      ENGINE *def, void *arg);
+void engine_table_doall(ENGINE_TABLE *table, engine_table_doall_cb *cb,
+                        void *arg);
+
+/*
+ * Internal versions of API functions that have control over locking. These
+ * are used between C files when functionality needs to be shared but the
+ * caller may already be controlling of the engine lock.
+ */
+int engine_unlocked_init(ENGINE *e);
+int engine_unlocked_finish(ENGINE *e, int unlock_for_handlers);
+int engine_free_util(ENGINE *e, int locked);
+
+/*
+ * This function will reset all "set"able values in an ENGINE to NULL. This
+ * won't touch reference counts or ex_data, but is equivalent to calling all
+ * the ENGINE_set_***() functions with a NULL value.
+ */
+void engine_set_all_null(ENGINE *e);
+
+/*
+ * NB: Bitwise OR-able values for the "flags" variable in ENGINE are now
+ * exposed in engine.h.
+ */
+
+/* Free up dynamically allocated public key methods associated with ENGINE */
+
+void engine_pkey_meths_free(ENGINE *e);
+void engine_pkey_asn1_meths_free(ENGINE *e);
+
+/* Once initialisation function */
+extern CRYPTO_ONCE engine_lock_init;
+DECLARE_RUN_ONCE(do_engine_lock_init)
+
+/*
+ * This is a structure for storing implementations of various crypto
+ * algorithms and functions.
+ */
+struct engine_st {
+    const char *id;
+    const char *name;
+    const RSA_METHOD *rsa_meth;
+    const DSA_METHOD *dsa_meth;
+    const DH_METHOD *dh_meth;
+    const EC_KEY_METHOD *ec_meth;
+    const RAND_METHOD *rand_meth;
+    /* Cipher handling is via this callback */
+    ENGINE_CIPHERS_PTR ciphers;
+    /* Digest handling is via this callback */
+    ENGINE_DIGESTS_PTR digests;
+    /* Public key handling via this callback */
+    ENGINE_PKEY_METHS_PTR pkey_meths;
+    /* ASN1 public key handling via this callback */
+    ENGINE_PKEY_ASN1_METHS_PTR pkey_asn1_meths;
+    ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR destroy;
+    ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR init;
+    ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR finish;
+    ENGINE_CTRL_FUNC_PTR ctrl;
+    ENGINE_LOAD_KEY_PTR load_privkey;
+    ENGINE_LOAD_KEY_PTR load_pubkey;
+    ENGINE_SSL_CLIENT_CERT_PTR load_ssl_client_cert;
+    const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN *cmd_defns;
+    int flags;
+    /* reference count on the structure itself */
+    int struct_ref;
+    /*
+     * reference count on usability of the engine type. NB: This controls the
+     * loading and initialisation of any functionality required by this
+     * engine, whereas the previous count is simply to cope with
+     * (de)allocation of this structure. Hence, running_ref <= struct_ref at
+     * all times.
+     */
+    int funct_ref;
+    /* A place to store per-ENGINE data */
+    CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data;
+    /* Used to maintain the linked-list of engines. */
+    struct engine_st *prev;
+    struct engine_st *next;
+};
+
+typedef struct st_engine_pile ENGINE_PILE;
+
+DEFINE_LHASH_OF(ENGINE_PILE);
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif                          /* HEADER_ENGINE_INT_H */
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/engine/eng_lib.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/engine/eng_lib.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cbefc7e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/engine/eng_lib.c
@@ -0,0 +1,290 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "eng_int.h"
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+CRYPTO_RWLOCK *global_engine_lock;
+
+CRYPTO_ONCE engine_lock_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
+
+/* The "new"/"free" stuff first */
+
+DEFINE_RUN_ONCE(do_engine_lock_init)
+{
+    OPENSSL_init_crypto(0, NULL);
+    global_engine_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
+    return global_engine_lock != NULL;
+}
+
+ENGINE *ENGINE_new(void)
+{
+    ENGINE *ret;
+
+    if (!RUN_ONCE(&engine_lock_init, do_engine_lock_init)
+        || (ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret))) == NULL) {
+        ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    ret->struct_ref = 1;
+    engine_ref_debug(ret, 0, 1);
+    if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_ENGINE, ret, &ret->ex_data)) {
+        OPENSSL_free(ret);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Placed here (close proximity to ENGINE_new) so that modifications to the
+ * elements of the ENGINE structure are more likely to be caught and changed
+ * here.
+ */
+void engine_set_all_null(ENGINE *e)
+{
+    e->id = NULL;
+    e->name = NULL;
+    e->rsa_meth = NULL;
+    e->dsa_meth = NULL;
+    e->dh_meth = NULL;
+    e->rand_meth = NULL;
+    e->ciphers = NULL;
+    e->digests = NULL;
+    e->destroy = NULL;
+    e->init = NULL;
+    e->finish = NULL;
+    e->ctrl = NULL;
+    e->load_privkey = NULL;
+    e->load_pubkey = NULL;
+    e->cmd_defns = NULL;
+    e->flags = 0;
+}
+
+int engine_free_util(ENGINE *e, int locked)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    if (e == NULL)
+        return 1;
+    if (locked)
+        CRYPTO_atomic_add(&e->struct_ref, -1, &i, global_engine_lock);
+    else
+        i = --e->struct_ref;
+    engine_ref_debug(e, 0, -1)
+    if (i > 0)
+        return 1;
+    REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0);
+    /* Free up any dynamically allocated public key methods */
+    engine_pkey_meths_free(e);
+    engine_pkey_asn1_meths_free(e);
+    /*
+     * Give the ENGINE a chance to do any structural cleanup corresponding to
+     * allocation it did in its constructor (eg. unload error strings)
+     */
+    if (e->destroy)
+        e->destroy(e);
+    CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_ENGINE, e, &e->ex_data);
+    OPENSSL_free(e);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int ENGINE_free(ENGINE *e)
+{
+    return engine_free_util(e, 1);
+}
+
+/* Cleanup stuff */
+
+/*
+ * engine_cleanup_int() is coded such that anything that does work that will
+ * need cleanup can register a "cleanup" callback here. That way we don't get
+ * linker bloat by referring to all *possible* cleanups, but any linker bloat
+ * into code "X" will cause X's cleanup function to end up here.
+ */
+static STACK_OF(ENGINE_CLEANUP_ITEM) *cleanup_stack = NULL;
+static int int_cleanup_check(int create)
+{
+    if (cleanup_stack)
+        return 1;
+    if (!create)
+        return 0;
+    cleanup_stack = sk_ENGINE_CLEANUP_ITEM_new_null();
+    return (cleanup_stack ? 1 : 0);
+}
+
+static ENGINE_CLEANUP_ITEM *int_cleanup_item(ENGINE_CLEANUP_CB *cb)
+{
+    ENGINE_CLEANUP_ITEM *item = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*item));
+    if (item == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    item->cb = cb;
+    return item;
+}
+
+void engine_cleanup_add_first(ENGINE_CLEANUP_CB *cb)
+{
+    ENGINE_CLEANUP_ITEM *item;
+    if (!int_cleanup_check(1))
+        return;
+    item = int_cleanup_item(cb);
+    if (item)
+        sk_ENGINE_CLEANUP_ITEM_insert(cleanup_stack, item, 0);
+}
+
+void engine_cleanup_add_last(ENGINE_CLEANUP_CB *cb)
+{
+    ENGINE_CLEANUP_ITEM *item;
+    if (!int_cleanup_check(1))
+        return;
+    item = int_cleanup_item(cb);
+    if (item)
+        sk_ENGINE_CLEANUP_ITEM_push(cleanup_stack, item);
+}
+
+/* The API function that performs all cleanup */
+static void engine_cleanup_cb_free(ENGINE_CLEANUP_ITEM *item)
+{
+    (*(item->cb)) ();
+    OPENSSL_free(item);
+}
+
+void engine_cleanup_int(void)
+{
+    if (int_cleanup_check(0)) {
+        sk_ENGINE_CLEANUP_ITEM_pop_free(cleanup_stack,
+                                        engine_cleanup_cb_free);
+        cleanup_stack = NULL;
+    }
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(global_engine_lock);
+}
+
+/* Now the "ex_data" support */
+
+int ENGINE_set_ex_data(ENGINE *e, int idx, void *arg)
+{
+    return (CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&e->ex_data, idx, arg));
+}
+
+void *ENGINE_get_ex_data(const ENGINE *e, int idx)
+{
+    return (CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&e->ex_data, idx));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Functions to get/set an ENGINE's elements - mainly to avoid exposing the
+ * ENGINE structure itself.
+ */
+
+int ENGINE_set_id(ENGINE *e, const char *id)
+{
+    if (id == NULL) {
+        ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_SET_ID, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    e->id = id;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int ENGINE_set_name(ENGINE *e, const char *name)
+{
+    if (name == NULL) {
+        ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_SET_NAME, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    e->name = name;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int ENGINE_set_destroy_function(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR destroy_f)
+{
+    e->destroy = destroy_f;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int ENGINE_set_init_function(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR init_f)
+{
+    e->init = init_f;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int ENGINE_set_finish_function(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR finish_f)
+{
+    e->finish = finish_f;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_CTRL_FUNC_PTR ctrl_f)
+{
+    e->ctrl = ctrl_f;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int ENGINE_set_flags(ENGINE *e, int flags)
+{
+    e->flags = flags;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(ENGINE *e, const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN *defns)
+{
+    e->cmd_defns = defns;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+const char *ENGINE_get_id(const ENGINE *e)
+{
+    return e->id;
+}
+
+const char *ENGINE_get_name(const ENGINE *e)
+{
+    return e->name;
+}
+
+ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR ENGINE_get_destroy_function(const ENGINE *e)
+{
+    return e->destroy;
+}
+
+ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR ENGINE_get_init_function(const ENGINE *e)
+{
+    return e->init;
+}
+
+ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR ENGINE_get_finish_function(const ENGINE *e)
+{
+    return e->finish;
+}
+
+ENGINE_CTRL_FUNC_PTR ENGINE_get_ctrl_function(const ENGINE *e)
+{
+    return e->ctrl;
+}
+
+int ENGINE_get_flags(const ENGINE *e)
+{
+    return e->flags;
+}
+
+const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN *ENGINE_get_cmd_defns(const ENGINE *e)
+{
+    return e->cmd_defns;
+}
+
+/*
+ * eng_lib.o is pretty much linked into anything that touches ENGINE already,
+ * so put the "static_state" hack here.
+ */
+
+static int internal_static_hack = 0;
+
+void *ENGINE_get_static_state(void)
+{
+    return &internal_static_hack;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/engine/eng_list.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/engine/eng_list.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..934389f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/engine/eng_list.c
@@ -0,0 +1,354 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ * ECDH support in OpenSSL originally developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ */
+
+#include "eng_int.h"
+
+/*
+ * The linked-list of pointers to engine types. engine_list_head incorporates
+ * an implicit structural reference but engine_list_tail does not - the
+ * latter is a computational niceity and only points to something that is
+ * already pointed to by its predecessor in the list (or engine_list_head
+ * itself). In the same way, the use of the "prev" pointer in each ENGINE is
+ * to save excessive list iteration, it doesn't correspond to an extra
+ * structural reference. Hence, engine_list_head, and each non-null "next"
+ * pointer account for the list itself assuming exactly 1 structural
+ * reference on each list member.
+ */
+static ENGINE *engine_list_head = NULL;
+static ENGINE *engine_list_tail = NULL;
+
+/*
+ * This cleanup function is only needed internally. If it should be called,
+ * we register it with the "engine_cleanup_int()" stack to be called during
+ * cleanup.
+ */
+
+static void engine_list_cleanup(void)
+{
+    ENGINE *iterator = engine_list_head;
+
+    while (iterator != NULL) {
+        ENGINE_remove(iterator);
+        iterator = engine_list_head;
+    }
+    return;
+}
+
+/*
+ * These static functions starting with a lower case "engine_" always take
+ * place when global_engine_lock has been locked up.
+ */
+static int engine_list_add(ENGINE *e)
+{
+    int conflict = 0;
+    ENGINE *iterator = NULL;
+
+    if (e == NULL) {
+        ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_LIST_ADD, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    iterator = engine_list_head;
+    while (iterator && !conflict) {
+        conflict = (strcmp(iterator->id, e->id) == 0);
+        iterator = iterator->next;
+    }
+    if (conflict) {
+        ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_LIST_ADD, ENGINE_R_CONFLICTING_ENGINE_ID);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (engine_list_head == NULL) {
+        /* We are adding to an empty list. */
+        if (engine_list_tail) {
+            ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_LIST_ADD, ENGINE_R_INTERNAL_LIST_ERROR);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        engine_list_head = e;
+        e->prev = NULL;
+        /*
+         * The first time the list allocates, we should register the cleanup.
+         */
+        engine_cleanup_add_last(engine_list_cleanup);
+    } else {
+        /* We are adding to the tail of an existing list. */
+        if ((engine_list_tail == NULL) || (engine_list_tail->next != NULL)) {
+            ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_LIST_ADD, ENGINE_R_INTERNAL_LIST_ERROR);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        engine_list_tail->next = e;
+        e->prev = engine_list_tail;
+    }
+    /*
+     * Having the engine in the list assumes a structural reference.
+     */
+    e->struct_ref++;
+    engine_ref_debug(e, 0, 1);
+    /* However it came to be, e is the last item in the list. */
+    engine_list_tail = e;
+    e->next = NULL;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int engine_list_remove(ENGINE *e)
+{
+    ENGINE *iterator;
+
+    if (e == NULL) {
+        ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_LIST_REMOVE, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    /* We need to check that e is in our linked list! */
+    iterator = engine_list_head;
+    while (iterator && (iterator != e))
+        iterator = iterator->next;
+    if (iterator == NULL) {
+        ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_LIST_REMOVE,
+                  ENGINE_R_ENGINE_IS_NOT_IN_LIST);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    /* un-link e from the chain. */
+    if (e->next)
+        e->next->prev = e->prev;
+    if (e->prev)
+        e->prev->next = e->next;
+    /* Correct our head/tail if necessary. */
+    if (engine_list_head == e)
+        engine_list_head = e->next;
+    if (engine_list_tail == e)
+        engine_list_tail = e->prev;
+    engine_free_util(e, 0);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Get the first/last "ENGINE" type available. */
+ENGINE *ENGINE_get_first(void)
+{
+    ENGINE *ret;
+
+    if (!RUN_ONCE(&engine_lock_init, do_engine_lock_init)) {
+        ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_GET_FIRST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(global_engine_lock);
+    ret = engine_list_head;
+    if (ret) {
+        ret->struct_ref++;
+        engine_ref_debug(ret, 0, 1);
+    }
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(global_engine_lock);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+ENGINE *ENGINE_get_last(void)
+{
+    ENGINE *ret;
+
+    if (!RUN_ONCE(&engine_lock_init, do_engine_lock_init)) {
+        ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_GET_LAST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(global_engine_lock);
+    ret = engine_list_tail;
+    if (ret) {
+        ret->struct_ref++;
+        engine_ref_debug(ret, 0, 1);
+    }
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(global_engine_lock);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/* Iterate to the next/previous "ENGINE" type (NULL = end of the list). */
+ENGINE *ENGINE_get_next(ENGINE *e)
+{
+    ENGINE *ret = NULL;
+    if (e == NULL) {
+        ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_GET_NEXT, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(global_engine_lock);
+    ret = e->next;
+    if (ret) {
+        /* Return a valid structural reference to the next ENGINE */
+        ret->struct_ref++;
+        engine_ref_debug(ret, 0, 1);
+    }
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(global_engine_lock);
+    /* Release the structural reference to the previous ENGINE */
+    ENGINE_free(e);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+ENGINE *ENGINE_get_prev(ENGINE *e)
+{
+    ENGINE *ret = NULL;
+    if (e == NULL) {
+        ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_GET_PREV, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(global_engine_lock);
+    ret = e->prev;
+    if (ret) {
+        /* Return a valid structural reference to the next ENGINE */
+        ret->struct_ref++;
+        engine_ref_debug(ret, 0, 1);
+    }
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(global_engine_lock);
+    /* Release the structural reference to the previous ENGINE */
+    ENGINE_free(e);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/* Add another "ENGINE" type into the list. */
+int ENGINE_add(ENGINE *e)
+{
+    int to_return = 1;
+    if (e == NULL) {
+        ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_ADD, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if ((e->id == NULL) || (e->name == NULL)) {
+        ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_ADD, ENGINE_R_ID_OR_NAME_MISSING);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(global_engine_lock);
+    if (!engine_list_add(e)) {
+        ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_ADD, ENGINE_R_INTERNAL_LIST_ERROR);
+        to_return = 0;
+    }
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(global_engine_lock);
+    return to_return;
+}
+
+/* Remove an existing "ENGINE" type from the array. */
+int ENGINE_remove(ENGINE *e)
+{
+    int to_return = 1;
+    if (e == NULL) {
+        ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_REMOVE, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(global_engine_lock);
+    if (!engine_list_remove(e)) {
+        ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_REMOVE, ENGINE_R_INTERNAL_LIST_ERROR);
+        to_return = 0;
+    }
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(global_engine_lock);
+    return to_return;
+}
+
+static void engine_cpy(ENGINE *dest, const ENGINE *src)
+{
+    dest->id = src->id;
+    dest->name = src->name;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+    dest->rsa_meth = src->rsa_meth;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+    dest->dsa_meth = src->dsa_meth;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+    dest->dh_meth = src->dh_meth;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    dest->ec_meth = src->ec_meth;
+#endif
+    dest->rand_meth = src->rand_meth;
+    dest->ciphers = src->ciphers;
+    dest->digests = src->digests;
+    dest->pkey_meths = src->pkey_meths;
+    dest->destroy = src->destroy;
+    dest->init = src->init;
+    dest->finish = src->finish;
+    dest->ctrl = src->ctrl;
+    dest->load_privkey = src->load_privkey;
+    dest->load_pubkey = src->load_pubkey;
+    dest->cmd_defns = src->cmd_defns;
+    dest->flags = src->flags;
+}
+
+ENGINE *ENGINE_by_id(const char *id)
+{
+    ENGINE *iterator;
+    char *load_dir = NULL;
+    if (id == NULL) {
+        ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_BY_ID, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    if (!RUN_ONCE(&engine_lock_init, do_engine_lock_init)) {
+        ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_BY_ID, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(global_engine_lock);
+    iterator = engine_list_head;
+    while (iterator && (strcmp(id, iterator->id) != 0))
+        iterator = iterator->next;
+    if (iterator != NULL) {
+        /*
+         * We need to return a structural reference. If this is an ENGINE
+         * type that returns copies, make a duplicate - otherwise increment
+         * the existing ENGINE's reference count.
+         */
+        if (iterator->flags & ENGINE_FLAGS_BY_ID_COPY) {
+            ENGINE *cp = ENGINE_new();
+            if (cp == NULL)
+                iterator = NULL;
+            else {
+                engine_cpy(cp, iterator);
+                iterator = cp;
+            }
+        } else {
+            iterator->struct_ref++;
+            engine_ref_debug(iterator, 0, 1);
+        }
+    }
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(global_engine_lock);
+    if (iterator != NULL)
+        return iterator;
+    /*
+     * Prevent infinite recursion if we're looking for the dynamic engine.
+     */
+    if (strcmp(id, "dynamic")) {
+        if ((load_dir = getenv("OPENSSL_ENGINES")) == 0)
+            load_dir = ENGINESDIR;
+        iterator = ENGINE_by_id("dynamic");
+        if (!iterator || !ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(iterator, "ID", id, 0) ||
+            !ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(iterator, "DIR_LOAD", "2", 0) ||
+            !ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(iterator, "DIR_ADD",
+                                    load_dir, 0) ||
+            !ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(iterator, "LIST_ADD", "1", 0) ||
+            !ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(iterator, "LOAD", NULL, 0))
+            goto notfound;
+        return iterator;
+    }
+ notfound:
+    ENGINE_free(iterator);
+    ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_BY_ID, ENGINE_R_NO_SUCH_ENGINE);
+    ERR_add_error_data(2, "id=", id);
+    return NULL;
+    /* EEK! Experimental code ends */
+}
+
+int ENGINE_up_ref(ENGINE *e)
+{
+    int i;
+    if (e == NULL) {
+        ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_UP_REF, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    CRYPTO_atomic_add(&e->struct_ref, 1, &i, global_engine_lock);
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/engine/eng_openssl.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/engine/eng_openssl.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9208f7e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/engine/eng_openssl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,652 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ * ECDH support in OpenSSL originally developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <internal/engine.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+
+#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+
+/*
+ * This testing gunk is implemented (and explained) lower down. It also
+ * assumes the application explicitly calls "ENGINE_load_openssl()" because
+ * this is no longer automatic in ENGINE_load_builtin_engines().
+ */
+#define TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_RC4
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+#define TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_PKEY
+#endif
+/* #define TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_HMAC */
+/* #define TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_HMAC_INIT */
+/* #define TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_RC4_OTHERS */
+#define TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_RC4_P_INIT
+/* #define TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_RC4_P_CIPHER */
+#define TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_SHA
+/* #define TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_SHA_OTHERS */
+/* #define TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_SHA_P_INIT */
+/* #define TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_SHA_P_UPDATE */
+/* #define TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_SHA_P_FINAL */
+
+/* Now check what of those algorithms are actually enabled */
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
+# undef TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_RC4
+# undef TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_RC4_OTHERS
+# undef TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_RC4_P_INIT
+# undef TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_RC4_P_CIPHER
+#endif
+
+static int openssl_destroy(ENGINE *e);
+
+#ifdef TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_RC4
+static int openssl_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher,
+                           const int **nids, int nid);
+#endif
+#ifdef TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_SHA
+static int openssl_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest,
+                           const int **nids, int nid);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_PKEY
+static EVP_PKEY *openssl_load_privkey(ENGINE *eng, const char *key_id,
+                                      UI_METHOD *ui_method,
+                                      void *callback_data);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_HMAC
+static int ossl_register_hmac_meth(void);
+static int ossl_pkey_meths(ENGINE *e, EVP_PKEY_METHOD **pmeth,
+                           const int **nids, int nid);
+#endif
+
+/* The constants used when creating the ENGINE */
+static const char *engine_openssl_id = "openssl";
+static const char *engine_openssl_name = "Software engine support";
+
+/*
+ * This internal function is used by ENGINE_openssl() and possibly by the
+ * "dynamic" ENGINE support too
+ */
+static int bind_helper(ENGINE *e)
+{
+    if (!ENGINE_set_id(e, engine_openssl_id)
+        || !ENGINE_set_name(e, engine_openssl_name)
+        || !ENGINE_set_destroy_function(e, openssl_destroy)
+#ifndef TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_NO_ALGORITHMS
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+        || !ENGINE_set_RSA(e, RSA_get_default_method())
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+        || !ENGINE_set_DSA(e, DSA_get_default_method())
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+        || !ENGINE_set_EC(e, EC_KEY_OpenSSL())
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+        || !ENGINE_set_DH(e, DH_get_default_method())
+# endif
+        || !ENGINE_set_RAND(e, RAND_OpenSSL())
+# ifdef TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_RC4
+        || !ENGINE_set_ciphers(e, openssl_ciphers)
+# endif
+# ifdef TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_SHA
+        || !ENGINE_set_digests(e, openssl_digests)
+# endif
+#endif
+#ifdef TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_PKEY
+        || !ENGINE_set_load_privkey_function(e, openssl_load_privkey)
+#endif
+#ifdef TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_HMAC
+        || !ossl_register_hmac_meth()
+        || !ENGINE_set_pkey_meths(e, ossl_pkey_meths)
+#endif
+        )
+        return 0;
+    /*
+     * If we add errors to this ENGINE, ensure the error handling is setup
+     * here
+     */
+    /* openssl_load_error_strings(); */
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static ENGINE *engine_openssl(void)
+{
+    ENGINE *ret = ENGINE_new();
+    if (ret == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    if (!bind_helper(ret)) {
+        ENGINE_free(ret);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+void engine_load_openssl_int(void)
+{
+    ENGINE *toadd = engine_openssl();
+    if (!toadd)
+        return;
+    ENGINE_add(toadd);
+    /*
+     * If the "add" worked, it gets a structural reference. So either way, we
+     * release our just-created reference.
+     */
+    ENGINE_free(toadd);
+    ERR_clear_error();
+}
+
+/*
+ * This stuff is needed if this ENGINE is being compiled into a
+ * self-contained shared-library.
+ */
+#ifdef ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT
+static int bind_fn(ENGINE *e, const char *id)
+{
+    if (id && (strcmp(id, engine_openssl_id) != 0))
+        return 0;
+    if (!bind_helper(e))
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_CHECK_FN()
+    IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN(bind_fn)
+#endif                          /* ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT */
+#ifdef TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_RC4
+/*-
+ * This section of code compiles an "alternative implementation" of two modes of
+ * RC4 into this ENGINE. The result is that EVP_CIPHER operation for "rc4"
+ * should under normal circumstances go via this support rather than the default
+ * EVP support. There are other symbols to tweak the testing;
+ *    TEST_ENC_OPENSSL_RC4_OTHERS - print a one line message to stderr each time
+ *        we're asked for a cipher we don't support (should not happen).
+ *    TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_RC4_P_INIT - print a one line message to stderr each time
+ *        the "init_key" handler is called.
+ *    TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_RC4_P_CIPHER - ditto for the "cipher" handler.
+ */
+# include <openssl/rc4.h>
+# define TEST_RC4_KEY_SIZE               16
+typedef struct {
+    unsigned char key[TEST_RC4_KEY_SIZE];
+    RC4_KEY ks;
+} TEST_RC4_KEY;
+# define test(ctx) ((TEST_RC4_KEY *)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(ctx))
+static int test_rc4_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+                             const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
+{
+# ifdef TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_RC4_P_INIT
+    fprintf(stderr, "(TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_RC4) test_init_key() called\n");
+# endif
+    memcpy(&test(ctx)->key[0], key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx));
+    RC4_set_key(&test(ctx)->ks, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx),
+                test(ctx)->key);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int test_rc4_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                           const unsigned char *in, size_t inl)
+{
+# ifdef TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_RC4_P_CIPHER
+    fprintf(stderr, "(TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_RC4) test_cipher() called\n");
+# endif
+    RC4(&test(ctx)->ks, inl, in, out);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static EVP_CIPHER *r4_cipher = NULL;
+static const EVP_CIPHER *test_r4_cipher(void)
+{
+    if (r4_cipher == NULL) {
+        EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
+
+        if ((cipher = EVP_CIPHER_meth_new(NID_rc4, 1, TEST_RC4_KEY_SIZE)) == NULL
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_iv_length(cipher, 0)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_flags(cipher, EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_init(cipher, test_rc4_init_key)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_do_cipher(cipher, test_rc4_cipher)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_impl_ctx_size(cipher, sizeof(TEST_RC4_KEY))) {
+            EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(cipher);
+            cipher = NULL;
+        }
+        r4_cipher = cipher;
+    }
+    return r4_cipher;
+}
+static void test_r4_cipher_destroy(void)
+{
+    EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(r4_cipher);
+    r4_cipher = NULL;
+}
+
+static EVP_CIPHER *r4_40_cipher = NULL;
+static const EVP_CIPHER *test_r4_40_cipher(void)
+{
+    if (r4_40_cipher == NULL) {
+        EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
+
+        if ((cipher = EVP_CIPHER_meth_new(NID_rc4, 1, 5 /* 40 bits */)) == NULL
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_iv_length(cipher, 0)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_flags(cipher, EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_init(cipher, test_rc4_init_key)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_do_cipher(cipher, test_rc4_cipher)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_impl_ctx_size(cipher, sizeof(TEST_RC4_KEY))) {
+            EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(cipher);
+            cipher = NULL;
+        }
+        r4_40_cipher = cipher;
+    }
+    return r4_40_cipher;
+}
+static void test_r4_40_cipher_destroy(void)
+{
+    EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(r4_40_cipher);
+    r4_40_cipher = NULL;
+}
+static int test_cipher_nids(const int **nids)
+{
+    static int cipher_nids[4] = { 0, 0, 0, 0 };
+    static int pos = 0;
+    static int init = 0;
+
+    if (!init) {
+        const EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
+        if ((cipher = test_r4_cipher()) != NULL)
+            cipher_nids[pos++] = EVP_CIPHER_nid(cipher);
+        if ((cipher = test_r4_40_cipher()) != NULL)
+            cipher_nids[pos++] = EVP_CIPHER_nid(cipher);
+        cipher_nids[pos] = 0;
+        init = 1;
+    }
+    *nids = cipher_nids;
+    return pos;
+}
+
+static int openssl_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher,
+                           const int **nids, int nid)
+{
+    if (!cipher) {
+        /* We are returning a list of supported nids */
+        return test_cipher_nids(nids);
+    }
+    /* We are being asked for a specific cipher */
+    if (nid == NID_rc4)
+        *cipher = test_r4_cipher();
+    else if (nid == NID_rc4_40)
+        *cipher = test_r4_40_cipher();
+    else {
+# ifdef TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_RC4_OTHERS
+        fprintf(stderr, "(TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_RC4) returning NULL for "
+                "nid %d\n", nid);
+# endif
+        *cipher = NULL;
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_SHA
+/* Much the same sort of comment as for TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_RC4 */
+# include <openssl/sha.h>
+
+static int test_sha1_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+{
+# ifdef TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_SHA_P_INIT
+    fprintf(stderr, "(TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_SHA) test_sha1_init() called\n");
+# endif
+    return SHA1_Init(EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx));
+}
+
+static int test_sha1_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count)
+{
+# ifdef TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_SHA_P_UPDATE
+    fprintf(stderr, "(TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_SHA) test_sha1_update() called\n");
+# endif
+    return SHA1_Update(EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx), data, count);
+}
+
+static int test_sha1_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md)
+{
+# ifdef TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_SHA_P_FINAL
+    fprintf(stderr, "(TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_SHA) test_sha1_final() called\n");
+# endif
+    return SHA1_Final(md, EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx));
+}
+
+static EVP_MD *sha1_md = NULL;
+static const EVP_MD *test_sha_md(void)
+{
+    if (sha1_md == NULL) {
+        EVP_MD *md;
+
+        if ((md = EVP_MD_meth_new(NID_sha1, NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption)) == NULL
+            || !EVP_MD_meth_set_result_size(md, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH)
+            || !EVP_MD_meth_set_input_blocksize(md, SHA_CBLOCK)
+            || !EVP_MD_meth_set_app_datasize(md,
+                                             sizeof(EVP_MD *) + sizeof(SHA_CTX))
+            || !EVP_MD_meth_set_flags(md, 0)
+            || !EVP_MD_meth_set_init(md, test_sha1_init)
+            || !EVP_MD_meth_set_update(md, test_sha1_update)
+            || !EVP_MD_meth_set_final(md, test_sha1_final)) {
+            EVP_MD_meth_free(md);
+            md = NULL;
+        }
+        sha1_md = md;
+    }
+    return sha1_md;
+}
+static void test_sha_md_destroy(void)
+{
+    EVP_MD_meth_free(sha1_md);
+    sha1_md = NULL;
+}
+static int test_digest_nids(const int **nids)
+{
+    static int digest_nids[2] = { 0, 0 };
+    static int pos = 0;
+    static int init = 0;
+
+    if (!init) {
+        const EVP_MD *md;
+        if ((md = test_sha_md()) != NULL)
+            digest_nids[pos++] = EVP_MD_type(md);
+        digest_nids[pos] = 0;
+        init = 1;
+    }
+    *nids = digest_nids;
+    return pos;
+}
+
+static int openssl_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest,
+                           const int **nids, int nid)
+{
+    if (!digest) {
+        /* We are returning a list of supported nids */
+        return test_digest_nids(nids);
+    }
+    /* We are being asked for a specific digest */
+    if (nid == NID_sha1)
+        *digest = test_sha_md();
+    else {
+# ifdef TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_SHA_OTHERS
+        fprintf(stderr, "(TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_SHA) returning NULL for "
+                "nid %d\n", nid);
+# endif
+        *digest = NULL;
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_PKEY
+static EVP_PKEY *openssl_load_privkey(ENGINE *eng, const char *key_id,
+                                      UI_METHOD *ui_method,
+                                      void *callback_data)
+{
+    BIO *in;
+    EVP_PKEY *key;
+    fprintf(stderr, "(TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_PKEY)Loading Private key %s\n",
+            key_id);
+    in = BIO_new_file(key_id, "r");
+    if (!in)
+        return NULL;
+    key = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(in, NULL, 0, NULL);
+    BIO_free(in);
+    return key;
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_HMAC
+
+/*
+ * Experimental HMAC redirection implementation: mainly copied from
+ * hm_pmeth.c
+ */
+
+/* HMAC pkey context structure */
+
+typedef struct {
+    const EVP_MD *md;           /* MD for HMAC use */
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING ktmp;     /* Temp storage for key */
+    HMAC_CTX *ctx;
+} OSSL_HMAC_PKEY_CTX;
+
+static int ossl_hmac_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    OSSL_HMAC_PKEY_CTX *hctx;
+
+    hctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*hctx));
+    if (hctx == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    hctx->ktmp.type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
+    hctx->ctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
+    if (hctx->ctx == NULL) {
+        OPENSSL_free(hctx);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_data(ctx, hctx);
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_keygen_info(ctx, NULL, 0);
+# ifdef TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_HMAC_INIT
+    fprintf(stderr, "(TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_HMAC) ossl_hmac_init() called\n");
+# endif
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static void ossl_hmac_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);
+
+static int ossl_hmac_copy(EVP_PKEY_CTX *dst, EVP_PKEY_CTX *src)
+{
+    OSSL_HMAC_PKEY_CTX *sctx, *dctx;
+
+    /* allocate memory for dst->data and a new HMAC_CTX in dst->data->ctx */
+    if (!ossl_hmac_init(dst))
+        return 0;
+    sctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(src);
+    dctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(dst);
+    dctx->md = sctx->md;
+    if (!HMAC_CTX_copy(dctx->ctx, sctx->ctx))
+        goto err;
+    if (sctx->ktmp.data) {
+        if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(&dctx->ktmp,
+                                   sctx->ktmp.data, sctx->ktmp.length))
+            goto err;
+    }
+    return 1;
+err:
+    /* release HMAC_CTX in dst->data->ctx and memory allocated for dst->data */
+    ossl_hmac_cleanup(dst);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static void ossl_hmac_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    OSSL_HMAC_PKEY_CTX *hctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(ctx);
+
+    if (hctx) {
+        HMAC_CTX_free(hctx->ctx);
+        OPENSSL_clear_free(hctx->ktmp.data, hctx->ktmp.length);
+        OPENSSL_free(hctx);
+        EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_data(ctx, NULL);
+    }
+}
+
+static int ossl_hmac_keygen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *hkey = NULL;
+    OSSL_HMAC_PKEY_CTX *hctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(ctx);
+    if (!hctx->ktmp.data)
+        return 0;
+    hkey = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_dup(&hctx->ktmp);
+    if (!hkey)
+        return 0;
+    EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, EVP_PKEY_HMAC, hkey);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int ossl_int_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count)
+{
+    OSSL_HMAC_PKEY_CTX *hctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(EVP_MD_CTX_pkey_ctx(ctx));
+    if (!HMAC_Update(hctx->ctx, data, count))
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int ossl_hmac_signctx_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_MD_CTX *mctx)
+{
+    EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(mctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NO_INIT);
+    EVP_MD_CTX_set_update_fn(mctx, ossl_int_update);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int ossl_hmac_signctx(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig,
+                             size_t *siglen, EVP_MD_CTX *mctx)
+{
+    unsigned int hlen;
+    OSSL_HMAC_PKEY_CTX *hctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(ctx);
+    int l = EVP_MD_CTX_size(mctx);
+
+    if (l < 0)
+        return 0;
+    *siglen = l;
+    if (!sig)
+        return 1;
+
+    if (!HMAC_Final(hctx->ctx, sig, &hlen))
+        return 0;
+    *siglen = (size_t)hlen;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int ossl_hmac_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2)
+{
+    OSSL_HMAC_PKEY_CTX *hctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(ctx);
+    EVP_PKEY *pk;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *key;
+    switch (type) {
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_MAC_KEY:
+        if ((!p2 && p1 > 0) || (p1 < -1))
+            return 0;
+        if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(&hctx->ktmp, p2, p1))
+            return 0;
+        break;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_MD:
+        hctx->md = p2;
+        break;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DIGESTINIT:
+        pk = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(ctx);
+        key = EVP_PKEY_get0(pk);
+        if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx->ctx, key->data, key->length, hctx->md, NULL))
+            return 0;
+        break;
+
+    default:
+        return -2;
+
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int ossl_hmac_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                              const char *type, const char *value)
+{
+    if (!value) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (strcmp(type, "key") == 0) {
+        void *p = (void *)value;
+        return ossl_hmac_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_MAC_KEY, -1, p);
+    }
+    if (strcmp(type, "hexkey") == 0) {
+        unsigned char *key;
+        int r;
+        long keylen;
+        key = OPENSSL_hexstr2buf(value, &keylen);
+        if (!key)
+            return 0;
+        r = ossl_hmac_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_MAC_KEY, keylen, key);
+        OPENSSL_free(key);
+        return r;
+    }
+    return -2;
+}
+
+static EVP_PKEY_METHOD *ossl_hmac_meth;
+
+static int ossl_register_hmac_meth(void)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY_METHOD *meth;
+    meth = EVP_PKEY_meth_new(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, 0);
+    if (meth == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    EVP_PKEY_meth_set_init(meth, ossl_hmac_init);
+    EVP_PKEY_meth_set_copy(meth, ossl_hmac_copy);
+    EVP_PKEY_meth_set_cleanup(meth, ossl_hmac_cleanup);
+
+    EVP_PKEY_meth_set_keygen(meth, 0, ossl_hmac_keygen);
+
+    EVP_PKEY_meth_set_signctx(meth, ossl_hmac_signctx_init,
+                              ossl_hmac_signctx);
+
+    EVP_PKEY_meth_set_ctrl(meth, ossl_hmac_ctrl, ossl_hmac_ctrl_str);
+    ossl_hmac_meth = meth;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int ossl_pkey_meths(ENGINE *e, EVP_PKEY_METHOD **pmeth,
+                           const int **nids, int nid)
+{
+    static int ossl_pkey_nids[] = {
+        EVP_PKEY_HMAC,
+        0
+    };
+    if (!pmeth) {
+        *nids = ossl_pkey_nids;
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    if (nid == EVP_PKEY_HMAC) {
+        *pmeth = ossl_hmac_meth;
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    *pmeth = NULL;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+#endif
+
+int openssl_destroy(ENGINE *e)
+{
+    test_sha_md_destroy();
+#ifdef TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_RC4
+    test_r4_cipher_destroy();
+    test_r4_40_cipher_destroy();
+#endif
+    return 1;
+}
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/engine/eng_pkey.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/engine/eng_pkey.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..305a648
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/engine/eng_pkey.c
@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "eng_int.h"
+
+/* Basic get/set stuff */
+
+int ENGINE_set_load_privkey_function(ENGINE *e,
+                                     ENGINE_LOAD_KEY_PTR loadpriv_f)
+{
+    e->load_privkey = loadpriv_f;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int ENGINE_set_load_pubkey_function(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_LOAD_KEY_PTR loadpub_f)
+{
+    e->load_pubkey = loadpub_f;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int ENGINE_set_load_ssl_client_cert_function(ENGINE *e,
+                                             ENGINE_SSL_CLIENT_CERT_PTR
+                                             loadssl_f)
+{
+    e->load_ssl_client_cert = loadssl_f;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+ENGINE_LOAD_KEY_PTR ENGINE_get_load_privkey_function(const ENGINE *e)
+{
+    return e->load_privkey;
+}
+
+ENGINE_LOAD_KEY_PTR ENGINE_get_load_pubkey_function(const ENGINE *e)
+{
+    return e->load_pubkey;
+}
+
+ENGINE_SSL_CLIENT_CERT_PTR ENGINE_get_ssl_client_cert_function(const ENGINE
+                                                               *e)
+{
+    return e->load_ssl_client_cert;
+}
+
+/* API functions to load public/private keys */
+
+EVP_PKEY *ENGINE_load_private_key(ENGINE *e, const char *key_id,
+                                  UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+
+    if (e == NULL) {
+        ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_LOAD_PRIVATE_KEY,
+                  ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(global_engine_lock);
+    if (e->funct_ref == 0) {
+        CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(global_engine_lock);
+        ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_LOAD_PRIVATE_KEY, ENGINE_R_NOT_INITIALISED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(global_engine_lock);
+    if (!e->load_privkey) {
+        ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_LOAD_PRIVATE_KEY,
+                  ENGINE_R_NO_LOAD_FUNCTION);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    pkey = e->load_privkey(e, key_id, ui_method, callback_data);
+    if (!pkey) {
+        ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_LOAD_PRIVATE_KEY,
+                  ENGINE_R_FAILED_LOADING_PRIVATE_KEY);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return pkey;
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY *ENGINE_load_public_key(ENGINE *e, const char *key_id,
+                                 UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+
+    if (e == NULL) {
+        ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_LOAD_PUBLIC_KEY,
+                  ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(global_engine_lock);
+    if (e->funct_ref == 0) {
+        CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(global_engine_lock);
+        ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_LOAD_PUBLIC_KEY, ENGINE_R_NOT_INITIALISED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(global_engine_lock);
+    if (!e->load_pubkey) {
+        ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_LOAD_PUBLIC_KEY, ENGINE_R_NO_LOAD_FUNCTION);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    pkey = e->load_pubkey(e, key_id, ui_method, callback_data);
+    if (!pkey) {
+        ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_LOAD_PUBLIC_KEY,
+                  ENGINE_R_FAILED_LOADING_PUBLIC_KEY);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return pkey;
+}
+
+int ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(ENGINE *e, SSL *s,
+                                STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn, X509 **pcert,
+                                EVP_PKEY **ppkey, STACK_OF(X509) **pother,
+                                UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data)
+{
+
+    if (e == NULL) {
+        ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_LOAD_SSL_CLIENT_CERT,
+                  ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(global_engine_lock);
+    if (e->funct_ref == 0) {
+        CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(global_engine_lock);
+        ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_LOAD_SSL_CLIENT_CERT,
+                  ENGINE_R_NOT_INITIALISED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(global_engine_lock);
+    if (!e->load_ssl_client_cert) {
+        ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_LOAD_SSL_CLIENT_CERT,
+                  ENGINE_R_NO_LOAD_FUNCTION);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return e->load_ssl_client_cert(e, s, ca_dn, pcert, ppkey, pother,
+                                   ui_method, callback_data);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/engine/eng_rdrand.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/engine/eng_rdrand.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b3defcb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/engine/eng_rdrand.c
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <internal/engine.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+
+#if (defined(__i386)   || defined(__i386__)   || defined(_M_IX86) || \
+     defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
+     defined(_M_AMD64) || defined (_M_X64)) && defined(OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ)
+
+size_t OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand(void);
+
+static int get_random_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
+{
+    size_t rnd;
+
+    while (num >= (int)sizeof(size_t)) {
+        if ((rnd = OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand()) == 0)
+            return 0;
+
+        *((size_t *)buf) = rnd;
+        buf += sizeof(size_t);
+        num -= sizeof(size_t);
+    }
+    if (num) {
+        if ((rnd = OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand()) == 0)
+            return 0;
+
+        memcpy(buf, &rnd, num);
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int random_status(void)
+{
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static RAND_METHOD rdrand_meth = {
+    NULL,                       /* seed */
+    get_random_bytes,
+    NULL,                       /* cleanup */
+    NULL,                       /* add */
+    get_random_bytes,
+    random_status,
+};
+
+static int rdrand_init(ENGINE *e)
+{
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static const char *engine_e_rdrand_id = "rdrand";
+static const char *engine_e_rdrand_name = "Intel RDRAND engine";
+
+static int bind_helper(ENGINE *e)
+{
+    if (!ENGINE_set_id(e, engine_e_rdrand_id) ||
+        !ENGINE_set_name(e, engine_e_rdrand_name) ||
+        !ENGINE_set_flags(e, ENGINE_FLAGS_NO_REGISTER_ALL) ||
+        !ENGINE_set_init_function(e, rdrand_init) ||
+        !ENGINE_set_RAND(e, &rdrand_meth))
+        return 0;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static ENGINE *ENGINE_rdrand(void)
+{
+    ENGINE *ret = ENGINE_new();
+    if (ret == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    if (!bind_helper(ret)) {
+        ENGINE_free(ret);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+void engine_load_rdrand_int(void)
+{
+    extern unsigned int OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[];
+
+    if (OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1 << (62 - 32))) {
+        ENGINE *toadd = ENGINE_rdrand();
+        if (!toadd)
+            return;
+        ENGINE_add(toadd);
+        ENGINE_free(toadd);
+        ERR_clear_error();
+    }
+}
+#else
+void engine_load_rdrand_int(void)
+{
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/engine/eng_table.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/engine/eng_table.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ac4b02f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/engine/eng_table.c
@@ -0,0 +1,308 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2001-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/lhash.h>
+#include "eng_int.h"
+
+/* The type of the items in the table */
+struct st_engine_pile {
+    /* The 'nid' of this algorithm/mode */
+    int nid;
+    /* ENGINEs that implement this algorithm/mode. */
+    STACK_OF(ENGINE) *sk;
+    /* The default ENGINE to perform this algorithm/mode. */
+    ENGINE *funct;
+    /*
+     * Zero if 'sk' is newer than the cached 'funct', non-zero otherwise
+     */
+    int uptodate;
+};
+
+/* The type exposed in eng_int.h */
+struct st_engine_table {
+    LHASH_OF(ENGINE_PILE) piles;
+};                              /* ENGINE_TABLE */
+
+typedef struct st_engine_pile_doall {
+    engine_table_doall_cb *cb;
+    void *arg;
+} ENGINE_PILE_DOALL;
+
+/* Global flags (ENGINE_TABLE_FLAG_***). */
+static unsigned int table_flags = 0;
+
+/* API function manipulating 'table_flags' */
+unsigned int ENGINE_get_table_flags(void)
+{
+    return table_flags;
+}
+
+void ENGINE_set_table_flags(unsigned int flags)
+{
+    table_flags = flags;
+}
+
+/* Internal functions for the "piles" hash table */
+static unsigned long engine_pile_hash(const ENGINE_PILE *c)
+{
+    return c->nid;
+}
+
+static int engine_pile_cmp(const ENGINE_PILE *a, const ENGINE_PILE *b)
+{
+    return a->nid - b->nid;
+}
+
+static int int_table_check(ENGINE_TABLE **t, int create)
+{
+    LHASH_OF(ENGINE_PILE) *lh;
+
+    if (*t)
+        return 1;
+    if (!create)
+        return 0;
+    if ((lh = lh_ENGINE_PILE_new(engine_pile_hash, engine_pile_cmp)) == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    *t = (ENGINE_TABLE *)lh;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Privately exposed (via eng_int.h) functions for adding and/or removing
+ * ENGINEs from the implementation table
+ */
+int engine_table_register(ENGINE_TABLE **table, ENGINE_CLEANUP_CB *cleanup,
+                          ENGINE *e, const int *nids, int num_nids,
+                          int setdefault)
+{
+    int ret = 0, added = 0;
+    ENGINE_PILE tmplate, *fnd;
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(global_engine_lock);
+    if (!(*table))
+        added = 1;
+    if (!int_table_check(table, 1))
+        goto end;
+    if (added)
+        /* The cleanup callback needs to be added */
+        engine_cleanup_add_first(cleanup);
+    while (num_nids--) {
+        tmplate.nid = *nids;
+        fnd = lh_ENGINE_PILE_retrieve(&(*table)->piles, &tmplate);
+        if (!fnd) {
+            fnd = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*fnd));
+            if (fnd == NULL)
+                goto end;
+            fnd->uptodate = 1;
+            fnd->nid = *nids;
+            fnd->sk = sk_ENGINE_new_null();
+            if (!fnd->sk) {
+                OPENSSL_free(fnd);
+                goto end;
+            }
+            fnd->funct = NULL;
+            (void)lh_ENGINE_PILE_insert(&(*table)->piles, fnd);
+            if (lh_ENGINE_PILE_retrieve(&(*table)->piles, &tmplate) != fnd) {
+                sk_ENGINE_free(fnd->sk);
+                OPENSSL_free(fnd);
+                goto end;
+            }
+        }
+        /* A registration shouldn't add duplicate entries */
+        (void)sk_ENGINE_delete_ptr(fnd->sk, e);
+        /*
+         * if 'setdefault', this ENGINE goes to the head of the list
+         */
+        if (!sk_ENGINE_push(fnd->sk, e))
+            goto end;
+        /* "touch" this ENGINE_PILE */
+        fnd->uptodate = 0;
+        if (setdefault) {
+            if (!engine_unlocked_init(e)) {
+                ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_TABLE_REGISTER,
+                          ENGINE_R_INIT_FAILED);
+                goto end;
+            }
+            if (fnd->funct)
+                engine_unlocked_finish(fnd->funct, 0);
+            fnd->funct = e;
+            fnd->uptodate = 1;
+        }
+        nids++;
+    }
+    ret = 1;
+ end:
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(global_engine_lock);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static void int_unregister_cb(ENGINE_PILE *pile, ENGINE *e)
+{
+    int n;
+    /* Iterate the 'c->sk' stack removing any occurrence of 'e' */
+    while ((n = sk_ENGINE_find(pile->sk, e)) >= 0) {
+        (void)sk_ENGINE_delete(pile->sk, n);
+        pile->uptodate = 0;
+    }
+    if (pile->funct == e) {
+        engine_unlocked_finish(e, 0);
+        pile->funct = NULL;
+    }
+}
+
+IMPLEMENT_LHASH_DOALL_ARG(ENGINE_PILE, ENGINE);
+
+void engine_table_unregister(ENGINE_TABLE **table, ENGINE *e)
+{
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(global_engine_lock);
+    if (int_table_check(table, 0))
+        lh_ENGINE_PILE_doall_ENGINE(&(*table)->piles, int_unregister_cb, e);
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(global_engine_lock);
+}
+
+static void int_cleanup_cb_doall(ENGINE_PILE *p)
+{
+    if (!p)
+        return;
+    sk_ENGINE_free(p->sk);
+    if (p->funct)
+        engine_unlocked_finish(p->funct, 0);
+    OPENSSL_free(p);
+}
+
+void engine_table_cleanup(ENGINE_TABLE **table)
+{
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(global_engine_lock);
+    if (*table) {
+        lh_ENGINE_PILE_doall(&(*table)->piles, int_cleanup_cb_doall);
+        lh_ENGINE_PILE_free(&(*table)->piles);
+        *table = NULL;
+    }
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(global_engine_lock);
+}
+
+/* return a functional reference for a given 'nid' */
+#ifndef ENGINE_TABLE_DEBUG
+ENGINE *engine_table_select(ENGINE_TABLE **table, int nid)
+#else
+ENGINE *engine_table_select_tmp(ENGINE_TABLE **table, int nid, const char *f,
+                                int l)
+#endif
+{
+    ENGINE *ret = NULL;
+    ENGINE_PILE tmplate, *fnd = NULL;
+    int initres, loop = 0;
+
+    if (!(*table)) {
+#ifdef ENGINE_TABLE_DEBUG
+        fprintf(stderr, "engine_table_dbg: %s:%d, nid=%d, nothing "
+                "registered!\n", f, l, nid);
+#endif
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    ERR_set_mark();
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(global_engine_lock);
+    /*
+     * Check again inside the lock otherwise we could race against cleanup
+     * operations. But don't worry about a fprintf(stderr).
+     */
+    if (!int_table_check(table, 0))
+        goto end;
+    tmplate.nid = nid;
+    fnd = lh_ENGINE_PILE_retrieve(&(*table)->piles, &tmplate);
+    if (!fnd)
+        goto end;
+    if (fnd->funct && engine_unlocked_init(fnd->funct)) {
+#ifdef ENGINE_TABLE_DEBUG
+        fprintf(stderr, "engine_table_dbg: %s:%d, nid=%d, using "
+                "ENGINE '%s' cached\n", f, l, nid, fnd->funct->id);
+#endif
+        ret = fnd->funct;
+        goto end;
+    }
+    if (fnd->uptodate) {
+        ret = fnd->funct;
+        goto end;
+    }
+ trynext:
+    ret = sk_ENGINE_value(fnd->sk, loop++);
+    if (!ret) {
+#ifdef ENGINE_TABLE_DEBUG
+        fprintf(stderr, "engine_table_dbg: %s:%d, nid=%d, no "
+                "registered implementations would initialise\n", f, l, nid);
+#endif
+        goto end;
+    }
+    /* Try to initialise the ENGINE? */
+    if ((ret->funct_ref > 0) || !(table_flags & ENGINE_TABLE_FLAG_NOINIT))
+        initres = engine_unlocked_init(ret);
+    else
+        initres = 0;
+    if (initres) {
+        /* Update 'funct' */
+        if ((fnd->funct != ret) && engine_unlocked_init(ret)) {
+            /* If there was a previous default we release it. */
+            if (fnd->funct)
+                engine_unlocked_finish(fnd->funct, 0);
+            fnd->funct = ret;
+#ifdef ENGINE_TABLE_DEBUG
+            fprintf(stderr, "engine_table_dbg: %s:%d, nid=%d, "
+                    "setting default to '%s'\n", f, l, nid, ret->id);
+#endif
+        }
+#ifdef ENGINE_TABLE_DEBUG
+        fprintf(stderr, "engine_table_dbg: %s:%d, nid=%d, using "
+                "newly initialised '%s'\n", f, l, nid, ret->id);
+#endif
+        goto end;
+    }
+    goto trynext;
+ end:
+    /*
+     * If it failed, it is unlikely to succeed again until some future
+     * registrations have taken place. In all cases, we cache.
+     */
+    if (fnd)
+        fnd->uptodate = 1;
+#ifdef ENGINE_TABLE_DEBUG
+    if (ret)
+        fprintf(stderr, "engine_table_dbg: %s:%d, nid=%d, caching "
+                "ENGINE '%s'\n", f, l, nid, ret->id);
+    else
+        fprintf(stderr, "engine_table_dbg: %s:%d, nid=%d, caching "
+                "'no matching ENGINE'\n", f, l, nid);
+#endif
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(global_engine_lock);
+    /*
+     * Whatever happened, any failed init()s are not failures in this
+     * context, so clear our error state.
+     */
+    ERR_pop_to_mark();
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/* Table enumeration */
+
+static void int_dall(const ENGINE_PILE *pile, ENGINE_PILE_DOALL *dall)
+{
+    dall->cb(pile->nid, pile->sk, pile->funct, dall->arg);
+}
+
+IMPLEMENT_LHASH_DOALL_ARG_CONST(ENGINE_PILE, ENGINE_PILE_DOALL);
+
+void engine_table_doall(ENGINE_TABLE *table, engine_table_doall_cb *cb,
+                        void *arg)
+{
+    ENGINE_PILE_DOALL dall;
+    dall.cb = cb;
+    dall.arg = arg;
+    if (table)
+        lh_ENGINE_PILE_doall_ENGINE_PILE_DOALL(&table->piles, int_dall, &dall);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/engine/tb_asnmth.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/engine/tb_asnmth.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..480267d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/engine/tb_asnmth.c
@@ -0,0 +1,207 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "eng_int.h"
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include "internal/asn1_int.h"
+
+/*
+ * If this symbol is defined then ENGINE_get_pkey_asn1_meth_engine(), the
+ * function that is used by EVP to hook in pkey_asn1_meth code and cache
+ * defaults (etc), will display brief debugging summaries to stderr with the
+ * 'nid'.
+ */
+/* #define ENGINE_PKEY_ASN1_METH_DEBUG */
+
+static ENGINE_TABLE *pkey_asn1_meth_table = NULL;
+
+void ENGINE_unregister_pkey_asn1_meths(ENGINE *e)
+{
+    engine_table_unregister(&pkey_asn1_meth_table, e);
+}
+
+static void engine_unregister_all_pkey_asn1_meths(void)
+{
+    engine_table_cleanup(&pkey_asn1_meth_table);
+}
+
+int ENGINE_register_pkey_asn1_meths(ENGINE *e)
+{
+    if (e->pkey_asn1_meths) {
+        const int *nids;
+        int num_nids = e->pkey_asn1_meths(e, NULL, &nids, 0);
+        if (num_nids > 0)
+            return engine_table_register(&pkey_asn1_meth_table,
+                                         engine_unregister_all_pkey_asn1_meths,
+                                         e, nids, num_nids, 0);
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+void ENGINE_register_all_pkey_asn1_meths(void)
+{
+    ENGINE *e;
+
+    for (e = ENGINE_get_first(); e; e = ENGINE_get_next(e))
+        ENGINE_register_pkey_asn1_meths(e);
+}
+
+int ENGINE_set_default_pkey_asn1_meths(ENGINE *e)
+{
+    if (e->pkey_asn1_meths) {
+        const int *nids;
+        int num_nids = e->pkey_asn1_meths(e, NULL, &nids, 0);
+        if (num_nids > 0)
+            return engine_table_register(&pkey_asn1_meth_table,
+                                         engine_unregister_all_pkey_asn1_meths,
+                                         e, nids, num_nids, 1);
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Exposed API function to get a functional reference from the implementation
+ * table (ie. try to get a functional reference from the tabled structural
+ * references) for a given pkey_asn1_meth 'nid'
+ */
+ENGINE *ENGINE_get_pkey_asn1_meth_engine(int nid)
+{
+    return engine_table_select(&pkey_asn1_meth_table, nid);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Obtains a pkey_asn1_meth implementation from an ENGINE functional
+ * reference
+ */
+const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ENGINE_get_pkey_asn1_meth(ENGINE *e, int nid)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ret;
+    ENGINE_PKEY_ASN1_METHS_PTR fn = ENGINE_get_pkey_asn1_meths(e);
+    if (!fn || !fn(e, &ret, NULL, nid)) {
+        ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_GET_PKEY_ASN1_METH,
+                  ENGINE_R_UNIMPLEMENTED_PUBLIC_KEY_METHOD);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/* Gets the pkey_asn1_meth callback from an ENGINE structure */
+ENGINE_PKEY_ASN1_METHS_PTR ENGINE_get_pkey_asn1_meths(const ENGINE *e)
+{
+    return e->pkey_asn1_meths;
+}
+
+/* Sets the pkey_asn1_meth callback in an ENGINE structure */
+int ENGINE_set_pkey_asn1_meths(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_PKEY_ASN1_METHS_PTR f)
+{
+    e->pkey_asn1_meths = f;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Internal function to free up EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD structures before an
+ * ENGINE is destroyed
+ */
+
+void engine_pkey_asn1_meths_free(ENGINE *e)
+{
+    int i;
+    EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *pkm;
+    if (e->pkey_asn1_meths) {
+        const int *pknids;
+        int npknids;
+        npknids = e->pkey_asn1_meths(e, NULL, &pknids, 0);
+        for (i = 0; i < npknids; i++) {
+            if (e->pkey_asn1_meths(e, &pkm, NULL, pknids[i])) {
+                EVP_PKEY_asn1_free(pkm);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Find a method based on a string. This does a linear search through all
+ * implemented algorithms. This is OK in practice because only a small number
+ * of algorithms are likely to be implemented in an engine and it is not used
+ * for speed critical operations.
+ */
+
+const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ENGINE_get_pkey_asn1_meth_str(ENGINE *e,
+                                                          const char *str,
+                                                          int len)
+{
+    int i, nidcount;
+    const int *nids;
+    EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth;
+    if (!e->pkey_asn1_meths)
+        return NULL;
+    if (len == -1)
+        len = strlen(str);
+    nidcount = e->pkey_asn1_meths(e, NULL, &nids, 0);
+    for (i = 0; i < nidcount; i++) {
+        e->pkey_asn1_meths(e, &ameth, NULL, nids[i]);
+        if (((int)strlen(ameth->pem_str) == len)
+            && strncasecmp(ameth->pem_str, str, len) == 0)
+            return ameth;
+    }
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+typedef struct {
+    ENGINE *e;
+    const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth;
+    const char *str;
+    int len;
+} ENGINE_FIND_STR;
+
+static void look_str_cb(int nid, STACK_OF(ENGINE) *sk, ENGINE *def, void *arg)
+{
+    ENGINE_FIND_STR *lk = arg;
+    int i;
+    if (lk->ameth)
+        return;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_ENGINE_num(sk); i++) {
+        ENGINE *e = sk_ENGINE_value(sk, i);
+        EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth;
+        e->pkey_asn1_meths(e, &ameth, NULL, nid);
+        if (((int)strlen(ameth->pem_str) == lk->len)
+                && strncasecmp(ameth->pem_str, lk->str, lk->len) == 0) {
+            lk->e = e;
+            lk->ameth = ameth;
+            return;
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ENGINE_pkey_asn1_find_str(ENGINE **pe,
+                                                      const char *str,
+                                                      int len)
+{
+    ENGINE_FIND_STR fstr;
+    fstr.e = NULL;
+    fstr.ameth = NULL;
+    fstr.str = str;
+    fstr.len = len;
+
+    if (!RUN_ONCE(&engine_lock_init, do_engine_lock_init)) {
+        ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_PKEY_ASN1_FIND_STR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(global_engine_lock);
+    engine_table_doall(pkey_asn1_meth_table, look_str_cb, &fstr);
+    /* If found obtain a structural reference to engine */
+    if (fstr.e) {
+        fstr.e->struct_ref++;
+        engine_ref_debug(fstr.e, 0, 1);
+    }
+    *pe = fstr.e;
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(global_engine_lock);
+    return fstr.ameth;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/engine/tb_cipher.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/engine/tb_cipher.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ac49141
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/engine/tb_cipher.c
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "eng_int.h"
+
+static ENGINE_TABLE *cipher_table = NULL;
+
+void ENGINE_unregister_ciphers(ENGINE *e)
+{
+    engine_table_unregister(&cipher_table, e);
+}
+
+static void engine_unregister_all_ciphers(void)
+{
+    engine_table_cleanup(&cipher_table);
+}
+
+int ENGINE_register_ciphers(ENGINE *e)
+{
+    if (e->ciphers) {
+        const int *nids;
+        int num_nids = e->ciphers(e, NULL, &nids, 0);
+        if (num_nids > 0)
+            return engine_table_register(&cipher_table,
+                                         engine_unregister_all_ciphers, e,
+                                         nids, num_nids, 0);
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+void ENGINE_register_all_ciphers()
+{
+    ENGINE *e;
+
+    for (e = ENGINE_get_first(); e; e = ENGINE_get_next(e))
+        ENGINE_register_ciphers(e);
+}
+
+int ENGINE_set_default_ciphers(ENGINE *e)
+{
+    if (e->ciphers) {
+        const int *nids;
+        int num_nids = e->ciphers(e, NULL, &nids, 0);
+        if (num_nids > 0)
+            return engine_table_register(&cipher_table,
+                                         engine_unregister_all_ciphers, e,
+                                         nids, num_nids, 1);
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Exposed API function to get a functional reference from the implementation
+ * table (ie. try to get a functional reference from the tabled structural
+ * references) for a given cipher 'nid'
+ */
+ENGINE *ENGINE_get_cipher_engine(int nid)
+{
+    return engine_table_select(&cipher_table, nid);
+}
+
+/* Obtains a cipher implementation from an ENGINE functional reference */
+const EVP_CIPHER *ENGINE_get_cipher(ENGINE *e, int nid)
+{
+    const EVP_CIPHER *ret;
+    ENGINE_CIPHERS_PTR fn = ENGINE_get_ciphers(e);
+    if (!fn || !fn(e, &ret, NULL, nid)) {
+        ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_GET_CIPHER, ENGINE_R_UNIMPLEMENTED_CIPHER);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/* Gets the cipher callback from an ENGINE structure */
+ENGINE_CIPHERS_PTR ENGINE_get_ciphers(const ENGINE *e)
+{
+    return e->ciphers;
+}
+
+/* Sets the cipher callback in an ENGINE structure */
+int ENGINE_set_ciphers(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_CIPHERS_PTR f)
+{
+    e->ciphers = f;
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/engine/tb_dh.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/engine/tb_dh.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c6440df
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/engine/tb_dh.c
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "eng_int.h"
+
+static ENGINE_TABLE *dh_table = NULL;
+static const int dummy_nid = 1;
+
+void ENGINE_unregister_DH(ENGINE *e)
+{
+    engine_table_unregister(&dh_table, e);
+}
+
+static void engine_unregister_all_DH(void)
+{
+    engine_table_cleanup(&dh_table);
+}
+
+int ENGINE_register_DH(ENGINE *e)
+{
+    if (e->dh_meth)
+        return engine_table_register(&dh_table,
+                                     engine_unregister_all_DH, e, &dummy_nid,
+                                     1, 0);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+void ENGINE_register_all_DH()
+{
+    ENGINE *e;
+
+    for (e = ENGINE_get_first(); e; e = ENGINE_get_next(e))
+        ENGINE_register_DH(e);
+}
+
+int ENGINE_set_default_DH(ENGINE *e)
+{
+    if (e->dh_meth)
+        return engine_table_register(&dh_table,
+                                     engine_unregister_all_DH, e, &dummy_nid,
+                                     1, 1);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Exposed API function to get a functional reference from the implementation
+ * table (ie. try to get a functional reference from the tabled structural
+ * references).
+ */
+ENGINE *ENGINE_get_default_DH(void)
+{
+    return engine_table_select(&dh_table, dummy_nid);
+}
+
+/* Obtains an DH implementation from an ENGINE functional reference */
+const DH_METHOD *ENGINE_get_DH(const ENGINE *e)
+{
+    return e->dh_meth;
+}
+
+/* Sets an DH implementation in an ENGINE structure */
+int ENGINE_set_DH(ENGINE *e, const DH_METHOD *dh_meth)
+{
+    e->dh_meth = dh_meth;
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/engine/tb_digest.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/engine/tb_digest.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..194b9c7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/engine/tb_digest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "eng_int.h"
+
+static ENGINE_TABLE *digest_table = NULL;
+
+void ENGINE_unregister_digests(ENGINE *e)
+{
+    engine_table_unregister(&digest_table, e);
+}
+
+static void engine_unregister_all_digests(void)
+{
+    engine_table_cleanup(&digest_table);
+}
+
+int ENGINE_register_digests(ENGINE *e)
+{
+    if (e->digests) {
+        const int *nids;
+        int num_nids = e->digests(e, NULL, &nids, 0);
+        if (num_nids > 0)
+            return engine_table_register(&digest_table,
+                                         engine_unregister_all_digests, e,
+                                         nids, num_nids, 0);
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+void ENGINE_register_all_digests()
+{
+    ENGINE *e;
+
+    for (e = ENGINE_get_first(); e; e = ENGINE_get_next(e))
+        ENGINE_register_digests(e);
+}
+
+int ENGINE_set_default_digests(ENGINE *e)
+{
+    if (e->digests) {
+        const int *nids;
+        int num_nids = e->digests(e, NULL, &nids, 0);
+        if (num_nids > 0)
+            return engine_table_register(&digest_table,
+                                         engine_unregister_all_digests, e,
+                                         nids, num_nids, 1);
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Exposed API function to get a functional reference from the implementation
+ * table (ie. try to get a functional reference from the tabled structural
+ * references) for a given digest 'nid'
+ */
+ENGINE *ENGINE_get_digest_engine(int nid)
+{
+    return engine_table_select(&digest_table, nid);
+}
+
+/* Obtains a digest implementation from an ENGINE functional reference */
+const EVP_MD *ENGINE_get_digest(ENGINE *e, int nid)
+{
+    const EVP_MD *ret;
+    ENGINE_DIGESTS_PTR fn = ENGINE_get_digests(e);
+    if (!fn || !fn(e, &ret, NULL, nid)) {
+        ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_GET_DIGEST, ENGINE_R_UNIMPLEMENTED_DIGEST);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/* Gets the digest callback from an ENGINE structure */
+ENGINE_DIGESTS_PTR ENGINE_get_digests(const ENGINE *e)
+{
+    return e->digests;
+}
+
+/* Sets the digest callback in an ENGINE structure */
+int ENGINE_set_digests(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_DIGESTS_PTR f)
+{
+    e->digests = f;
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/engine/tb_dsa.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/engine/tb_dsa.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fdb80cd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/engine/tb_dsa.c
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "eng_int.h"
+
+static ENGINE_TABLE *dsa_table = NULL;
+static const int dummy_nid = 1;
+
+void ENGINE_unregister_DSA(ENGINE *e)
+{
+    engine_table_unregister(&dsa_table, e);
+}
+
+static void engine_unregister_all_DSA(void)
+{
+    engine_table_cleanup(&dsa_table);
+}
+
+int ENGINE_register_DSA(ENGINE *e)
+{
+    if (e->dsa_meth)
+        return engine_table_register(&dsa_table,
+                                     engine_unregister_all_DSA, e, &dummy_nid,
+                                     1, 0);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+void ENGINE_register_all_DSA()
+{
+    ENGINE *e;
+
+    for (e = ENGINE_get_first(); e; e = ENGINE_get_next(e))
+        ENGINE_register_DSA(e);
+}
+
+int ENGINE_set_default_DSA(ENGINE *e)
+{
+    if (e->dsa_meth)
+        return engine_table_register(&dsa_table,
+                                     engine_unregister_all_DSA, e, &dummy_nid,
+                                     1, 1);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Exposed API function to get a functional reference from the implementation
+ * table (ie. try to get a functional reference from the tabled structural
+ * references).
+ */
+ENGINE *ENGINE_get_default_DSA(void)
+{
+    return engine_table_select(&dsa_table, dummy_nid);
+}
+
+/* Obtains an DSA implementation from an ENGINE functional reference */
+const DSA_METHOD *ENGINE_get_DSA(const ENGINE *e)
+{
+    return e->dsa_meth;
+}
+
+/* Sets an DSA implementation in an ENGINE structure */
+int ENGINE_set_DSA(ENGINE *e, const DSA_METHOD *dsa_meth)
+{
+    e->dsa_meth = dsa_meth;
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/engine/tb_eckey.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/engine/tb_eckey.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..75750b2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/engine/tb_eckey.c
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "eng_int.h"
+
+static ENGINE_TABLE *dh_table = NULL;
+static const int dummy_nid = 1;
+
+void ENGINE_unregister_EC(ENGINE *e)
+{
+    engine_table_unregister(&dh_table, e);
+}
+
+static void engine_unregister_all_EC(void)
+{
+    engine_table_cleanup(&dh_table);
+}
+
+int ENGINE_register_EC(ENGINE *e)
+{
+    if (e->ec_meth != NULL)
+        return engine_table_register(&dh_table,
+                                     engine_unregister_all_EC, e, &dummy_nid,
+                                     1, 0);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+void ENGINE_register_all_EC()
+{
+    ENGINE *e;
+
+    for (e = ENGINE_get_first(); e; e = ENGINE_get_next(e))
+        ENGINE_register_EC(e);
+}
+
+int ENGINE_set_default_EC(ENGINE *e)
+{
+    if (e->ec_meth != NULL)
+        return engine_table_register(&dh_table,
+                                     engine_unregister_all_EC, e, &dummy_nid,
+                                     1, 1);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Exposed API function to get a functional reference from the implementation
+ * table (ie. try to get a functional reference from the tabled structural
+ * references).
+ */
+ENGINE *ENGINE_get_default_EC(void)
+{
+    return engine_table_select(&dh_table, dummy_nid);
+}
+
+/* Obtains an EC_KEY implementation from an ENGINE functional reference */
+const EC_KEY_METHOD *ENGINE_get_EC(const ENGINE *e)
+{
+    return e->ec_meth;
+}
+
+/* Sets an EC_KEY implementation in an ENGINE structure */
+int ENGINE_set_EC(ENGINE *e, const EC_KEY_METHOD *ec_meth)
+{
+    e->ec_meth = ec_meth;
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/engine/tb_pkmeth.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/engine/tb_pkmeth.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2e82d85
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/engine/tb_pkmeth.c
@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "eng_int.h"
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+static ENGINE_TABLE *pkey_meth_table = NULL;
+
+void ENGINE_unregister_pkey_meths(ENGINE *e)
+{
+    engine_table_unregister(&pkey_meth_table, e);
+}
+
+static void engine_unregister_all_pkey_meths(void)
+{
+    engine_table_cleanup(&pkey_meth_table);
+}
+
+int ENGINE_register_pkey_meths(ENGINE *e)
+{
+    if (e->pkey_meths) {
+        const int *nids;
+        int num_nids = e->pkey_meths(e, NULL, &nids, 0);
+        if (num_nids > 0)
+            return engine_table_register(&pkey_meth_table,
+                                         engine_unregister_all_pkey_meths, e,
+                                         nids, num_nids, 0);
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+void ENGINE_register_all_pkey_meths()
+{
+    ENGINE *e;
+
+    for (e = ENGINE_get_first(); e; e = ENGINE_get_next(e))
+        ENGINE_register_pkey_meths(e);
+}
+
+int ENGINE_set_default_pkey_meths(ENGINE *e)
+{
+    if (e->pkey_meths) {
+        const int *nids;
+        int num_nids = e->pkey_meths(e, NULL, &nids, 0);
+        if (num_nids > 0)
+            return engine_table_register(&pkey_meth_table,
+                                         engine_unregister_all_pkey_meths, e,
+                                         nids, num_nids, 1);
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Exposed API function to get a functional reference from the implementation
+ * table (ie. try to get a functional reference from the tabled structural
+ * references) for a given pkey_meth 'nid'
+ */
+ENGINE *ENGINE_get_pkey_meth_engine(int nid)
+{
+    return engine_table_select(&pkey_meth_table, nid);
+}
+
+/* Obtains a pkey_meth implementation from an ENGINE functional reference */
+const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *ENGINE_get_pkey_meth(ENGINE *e, int nid)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY_METHOD *ret;
+    ENGINE_PKEY_METHS_PTR fn = ENGINE_get_pkey_meths(e);
+    if (!fn || !fn(e, &ret, NULL, nid)) {
+        ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_GET_PKEY_METH,
+                  ENGINE_R_UNIMPLEMENTED_PUBLIC_KEY_METHOD);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/* Gets the pkey_meth callback from an ENGINE structure */
+ENGINE_PKEY_METHS_PTR ENGINE_get_pkey_meths(const ENGINE *e)
+{
+    return e->pkey_meths;
+}
+
+/* Sets the pkey_meth callback in an ENGINE structure */
+int ENGINE_set_pkey_meths(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_PKEY_METHS_PTR f)
+{
+    e->pkey_meths = f;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Internal function to free up EVP_PKEY_METHOD structures before an ENGINE
+ * is destroyed
+ */
+
+void engine_pkey_meths_free(ENGINE *e)
+{
+    int i;
+    EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pkm;
+    if (e->pkey_meths) {
+        const int *pknids;
+        int npknids;
+        npknids = e->pkey_meths(e, NULL, &pknids, 0);
+        for (i = 0; i < npknids; i++) {
+            if (e->pkey_meths(e, &pkm, NULL, pknids[i])) {
+                EVP_PKEY_meth_free(pkm);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/engine/tb_rand.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/engine/tb_rand.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..225e7c8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/engine/tb_rand.c
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "eng_int.h"
+
+static ENGINE_TABLE *rand_table = NULL;
+static const int dummy_nid = 1;
+
+void ENGINE_unregister_RAND(ENGINE *e)
+{
+    engine_table_unregister(&rand_table, e);
+}
+
+static void engine_unregister_all_RAND(void)
+{
+    engine_table_cleanup(&rand_table);
+}
+
+int ENGINE_register_RAND(ENGINE *e)
+{
+    if (e->rand_meth)
+        return engine_table_register(&rand_table,
+                                     engine_unregister_all_RAND, e,
+                                     &dummy_nid, 1, 0);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+void ENGINE_register_all_RAND()
+{
+    ENGINE *e;
+
+    for (e = ENGINE_get_first(); e; e = ENGINE_get_next(e))
+        ENGINE_register_RAND(e);
+}
+
+int ENGINE_set_default_RAND(ENGINE *e)
+{
+    if (e->rand_meth)
+        return engine_table_register(&rand_table,
+                                     engine_unregister_all_RAND, e,
+                                     &dummy_nid, 1, 1);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Exposed API function to get a functional reference from the implementation
+ * table (ie. try to get a functional reference from the tabled structural
+ * references).
+ */
+ENGINE *ENGINE_get_default_RAND(void)
+{
+    return engine_table_select(&rand_table, dummy_nid);
+}
+
+/* Obtains an RAND implementation from an ENGINE functional reference */
+const RAND_METHOD *ENGINE_get_RAND(const ENGINE *e)
+{
+    return e->rand_meth;
+}
+
+/* Sets an RAND implementation in an ENGINE structure */
+int ENGINE_set_RAND(ENGINE *e, const RAND_METHOD *rand_meth)
+{
+    e->rand_meth = rand_meth;
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/engine/tb_rsa.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/engine/tb_rsa.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e2cc680
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/engine/tb_rsa.c
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "eng_int.h"
+
+static ENGINE_TABLE *rsa_table = NULL;
+static const int dummy_nid = 1;
+
+void ENGINE_unregister_RSA(ENGINE *e)
+{
+    engine_table_unregister(&rsa_table, e);
+}
+
+static void engine_unregister_all_RSA(void)
+{
+    engine_table_cleanup(&rsa_table);
+}
+
+int ENGINE_register_RSA(ENGINE *e)
+{
+    if (e->rsa_meth)
+        return engine_table_register(&rsa_table,
+                                     engine_unregister_all_RSA, e, &dummy_nid,
+                                     1, 0);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+void ENGINE_register_all_RSA()
+{
+    ENGINE *e;
+
+    for (e = ENGINE_get_first(); e; e = ENGINE_get_next(e))
+        ENGINE_register_RSA(e);
+}
+
+int ENGINE_set_default_RSA(ENGINE *e)
+{
+    if (e->rsa_meth)
+        return engine_table_register(&rsa_table,
+                                     engine_unregister_all_RSA, e, &dummy_nid,
+                                     1, 1);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Exposed API function to get a functional reference from the implementation
+ * table (ie. try to get a functional reference from the tabled structural
+ * references).
+ */
+ENGINE *ENGINE_get_default_RSA(void)
+{
+    return engine_table_select(&rsa_table, dummy_nid);
+}
+
+/* Obtains an RSA implementation from an ENGINE functional reference */
+const RSA_METHOD *ENGINE_get_RSA(const ENGINE *e)
+{
+    return e->rsa_meth;
+}
+
+/* Sets an RSA implementation in an ENGINE structure */
+int ENGINE_set_RSA(ENGINE *e, const RSA_METHOD *rsa_meth)
+{
+    e->rsa_meth = rsa_meth;
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/err/README b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/err/README
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6d2ce0c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/err/README
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+Adding new libraries
+--------------------
+
+When adding a new sub-library to OpenSSL, assign it a library number
+ERR_LIB_XXX, define a macro XXXerr() (both in err.h), add its
+name to ERR_str_libraries[] (in crypto/err/err.c), and add
+ERR_load_XXX_strings() to the ERR_load_crypto_strings() function
+(in crypto/err/err_all.c). Finally, add an entry:
+
+    L      XXX     xxx.h   xxx_err.c
+
+to crypto/err/openssl.ec, and add xxx_err.c to the Makefile.
+Running make errors will then generate a file xxx_err.c, and
+add all error codes used in the library to xxx.h.
+
+Additionally the library include file must have a certain form.
+Typically it will initially look like this:
+
+    #ifndef HEADER_XXX_H
+    #define HEADER_XXX_H
+
+    #ifdef __cplusplus
+    extern "C" {
+    #endif
+
+    /* Include files */
+
+    #include <openssl/bio.h>
+    #include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+    /* Macros, structures and function prototypes */
+
+
+    /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+
+The BEGIN ERROR CODES sequence is used by the error code
+generation script as the point to place new error codes, any text
+after this point will be overwritten when make errors is run.
+The closing #endif etc will be automatically added by the script.
+
+The generated C error code file xxx_err.c will load the header
+files stdio.h, openssl/err.h and openssl/xxx.h so the
+header file must load any additional header files containing any
+definitions it uses.
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/err/build.info b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/err/build.info
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6163d95
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/err/build.info
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+LIBS=../../libcrypto
+SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
+        err.c err_all.c err_prn.c
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/err/err.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/err/err.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c439928
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/err/err.c
@@ -0,0 +1,793 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <internal/cryptlib_int.h>
+#include <internal/err.h>
+#include <internal/err_int.h>
+#include <openssl/lhash.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+#include <internal/thread_once.h>
+
+static void err_load_strings(int lib, ERR_STRING_DATA *str);
+
+static void ERR_STATE_free(ERR_STATE *s);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+static ERR_STRING_DATA ERR_str_libraries[] = {
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_NONE, 0, 0), "unknown library"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SYS, 0, 0), "system library"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_BN, 0, 0), "bignum routines"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, 0), "rsa routines"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, 0, 0), "Diffie-Hellman routines"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, 0, 0), "digital envelope routines"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_BUF, 0, 0), "memory buffer routines"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_OBJ, 0, 0), "object identifier routines"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PEM, 0, 0), "PEM routines"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DSA, 0, 0), "dsa routines"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, 0, 0), "x509 certificate routines"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_ASN1, 0, 0), "asn1 encoding routines"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CONF, 0, 0), "configuration file routines"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CRYPTO, 0, 0), "common libcrypto routines"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EC, 0, 0), "elliptic curve routines"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_ECDSA, 0, 0), "ECDSA routines"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_ECDH, 0, 0), "ECDH routines"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, 0), "SSL routines"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_BIO, 0, 0), "BIO routines"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PKCS7, 0, 0), "PKCS7 routines"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509V3, 0, 0), "X509 V3 routines"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, 0, 0), "PKCS12 routines"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RAND, 0, 0), "random number generator"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DSO, 0, 0), "DSO support routines"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_TS, 0, 0), "time stamp routines"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_ENGINE, 0, 0), "engine routines"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_OCSP, 0, 0), "OCSP routines"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_UI, 0, 0), "UI routines"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_FIPS, 0, 0), "FIPS routines"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMS, 0, 0), "CMS routines"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_HMAC, 0, 0), "HMAC routines"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CT, 0, 0), "CT routines"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_ASYNC, 0, 0), "ASYNC routines"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, 0, 0), "KDF routines"},
+    {0, NULL},
+};
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA ERR_str_functs[] = {
+    {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_FOPEN, 0), "fopen"},
+    {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_CONNECT, 0), "connect"},
+    {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_GETSERVBYNAME, 0), "getservbyname"},
+    {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_SOCKET, 0), "socket"},
+    {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_IOCTLSOCKET, 0), "ioctlsocket"},
+    {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_BIND, 0), "bind"},
+    {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_LISTEN, 0), "listen"},
+    {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_ACCEPT, 0), "accept"},
+# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS
+    {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_WSASTARTUP, 0), "WSAstartup"},
+# endif
+    {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_OPENDIR, 0), "opendir"},
+    {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_FREAD, 0), "fread"},
+    {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_GETADDRINFO, 0), "getaddrinfo"},
+    {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_GETNAMEINFO, 0), "getnameinfo"},
+    {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_SETSOCKOPT, 0), "setsockopt"},
+    {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_GETSOCKOPT, 0), "getsockopt"},
+    {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_GETSOCKNAME, 0), "getsockname"},
+    {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_GETHOSTBYNAME, 0), "gethostbyname"},
+    {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_FFLUSH, 0), "fflush"},
+    {0, NULL},
+};
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA ERR_str_reasons[] = {
+    {ERR_R_SYS_LIB, "system lib"},
+    {ERR_R_BN_LIB, "BN lib"},
+    {ERR_R_RSA_LIB, "RSA lib"},
+    {ERR_R_DH_LIB, "DH lib"},
+    {ERR_R_EVP_LIB, "EVP lib"},
+    {ERR_R_BUF_LIB, "BUF lib"},
+    {ERR_R_OBJ_LIB, "OBJ lib"},
+    {ERR_R_PEM_LIB, "PEM lib"},
+    {ERR_R_DSA_LIB, "DSA lib"},
+    {ERR_R_X509_LIB, "X509 lib"},
+    {ERR_R_ASN1_LIB, "ASN1 lib"},
+    {ERR_R_EC_LIB, "EC lib"},
+    {ERR_R_BIO_LIB, "BIO lib"},
+    {ERR_R_PKCS7_LIB, "PKCS7 lib"},
+    {ERR_R_X509V3_LIB, "X509V3 lib"},
+    {ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB, "ENGINE lib"},
+    {ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB, "ECDSA lib"},
+
+    {ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR, "nested asn1 error"},
+    {ERR_R_MISSING_ASN1_EOS, "missing asn1 eos"},
+
+    {ERR_R_FATAL, "fatal"},
+    {ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE, "malloc failure"},
+    {ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED,
+     "called a function you should not call"},
+    {ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER, "passed a null parameter"},
+    {ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR, "internal error"},
+    {ERR_R_DISABLED, "called a function that was disabled at compile-time"},
+    {ERR_R_INIT_FAIL, "init fail"},
+
+    {0, NULL},
+};
+#endif
+
+static CRYPTO_ONCE err_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
+static int set_err_thread_local;
+static CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL err_thread_local;
+
+static CRYPTO_ONCE err_string_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
+static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *err_string_lock;
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA *int_err_get_item(const ERR_STRING_DATA *);
+
+/*
+ * The internal state
+ */
+
+static LHASH_OF(ERR_STRING_DATA) *int_error_hash = NULL;
+static int int_err_library_number = ERR_LIB_USER;
+
+static unsigned long get_error_values(int inc, int top, const char **file,
+                                      int *line, const char **data,
+                                      int *flags);
+
+static unsigned long err_string_data_hash(const ERR_STRING_DATA *a)
+{
+    unsigned long ret, l;
+
+    l = a->error;
+    ret = l ^ ERR_GET_LIB(l) ^ ERR_GET_FUNC(l);
+    return (ret ^ ret % 19 * 13);
+}
+
+static int err_string_data_cmp(const ERR_STRING_DATA *a,
+                               const ERR_STRING_DATA *b)
+{
+    return (int)(a->error - b->error);
+}
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA *int_err_get_item(const ERR_STRING_DATA *d)
+{
+    ERR_STRING_DATA *p = NULL;
+
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(err_string_lock);
+    if (int_error_hash != NULL)
+        p = lh_ERR_STRING_DATA_retrieve(int_error_hash, d);
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(err_string_lock);
+
+    return p;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+# define NUM_SYS_STR_REASONS 127
+# define LEN_SYS_STR_REASON 32
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA SYS_str_reasons[NUM_SYS_STR_REASONS + 1];
+/*
+ * SYS_str_reasons is filled with copies of strerror() results at
+ * initialization. 'errno' values up to 127 should cover all usual errors,
+ * others will be displayed numerically by ERR_error_string. It is crucial
+ * that we have something for each reason code that occurs in
+ * ERR_str_reasons, or bogus reason strings will be returned for SYSerr(),
+ * which always gets an errno value and never one of those 'standard' reason
+ * codes.
+ */
+
+static void build_SYS_str_reasons(void)
+{
+    /* OPENSSL_malloc cannot be used here, use static storage instead */
+    static char strerror_tab[NUM_SYS_STR_REASONS][LEN_SYS_STR_REASON];
+    static int init = 1;
+    int i;
+
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(err_string_lock);
+    if (!init) {
+        CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(err_string_lock);
+        return;
+    }
+
+    for (i = 1; i <= NUM_SYS_STR_REASONS; i++) {
+        ERR_STRING_DATA *str = &SYS_str_reasons[i - 1];
+
+        str->error = (unsigned long)i;
+        if (str->string == NULL) {
+            char (*dest)[LEN_SYS_STR_REASON] = &(strerror_tab[i - 1]);
+            if (openssl_strerror_r(i, *dest, sizeof(*dest)))
+                str->string = *dest;
+        }
+        if (str->string == NULL)
+            str->string = "unknown";
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Now we still have SYS_str_reasons[NUM_SYS_STR_REASONS] = {0, NULL}, as
+     * required by ERR_load_strings.
+     */
+
+    init = 0;
+
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(err_string_lock);
+}
+#endif
+
+#define err_clear_data(p,i) \
+        do { \
+        if ((p)->err_data_flags[i] & ERR_TXT_MALLOCED) \
+                {  \
+                OPENSSL_free((p)->err_data[i]); \
+                (p)->err_data[i]=NULL; \
+                } \
+        (p)->err_data_flags[i]=0; \
+        } while(0)
+
+#define err_clear(p,i) \
+        do { \
+        (p)->err_flags[i]=0; \
+        (p)->err_buffer[i]=0; \
+        err_clear_data(p,i); \
+        (p)->err_file[i]=NULL; \
+        (p)->err_line[i]= -1; \
+        } while(0)
+
+static void ERR_STATE_free(ERR_STATE *s)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    if (s == NULL)
+        return;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < ERR_NUM_ERRORS; i++) {
+        err_clear_data(s, i);
+    }
+    OPENSSL_free(s);
+}
+
+DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_err_strings_init)
+{
+    OPENSSL_init_crypto(0, NULL);
+    err_string_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
+    return err_string_lock != NULL;
+}
+
+void err_cleanup(void)
+{
+    if (set_err_thread_local != 0)
+        CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&err_thread_local);
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(err_string_lock);
+    err_string_lock = NULL;
+}
+
+int ERR_load_ERR_strings(void)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+    if (!RUN_ONCE(&err_string_init, do_err_strings_init))
+        return 0;
+
+    err_load_strings(0, ERR_str_libraries);
+    err_load_strings(0, ERR_str_reasons);
+    err_load_strings(ERR_LIB_SYS, ERR_str_functs);
+    build_SYS_str_reasons();
+    err_load_strings(ERR_LIB_SYS, SYS_str_reasons);
+#endif
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static void err_load_strings(int lib, ERR_STRING_DATA *str)
+{
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(err_string_lock);
+    if (int_error_hash == NULL)
+        int_error_hash = lh_ERR_STRING_DATA_new(err_string_data_hash,
+                                                err_string_data_cmp);
+    if (int_error_hash != NULL) {
+        for (; str->error; str++) {
+            if (lib)
+                str->error |= ERR_PACK(lib, 0, 0);
+            (void)lh_ERR_STRING_DATA_insert(int_error_hash, str);
+        }
+    }
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(err_string_lock);
+}
+
+int ERR_load_strings(int lib, ERR_STRING_DATA *str)
+{
+    if (ERR_load_ERR_strings() == 0)
+        return 0;
+    err_load_strings(lib, str);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int ERR_unload_strings(int lib, ERR_STRING_DATA *str)
+{
+    if (!RUN_ONCE(&err_string_init, do_err_strings_init))
+        return 0;
+
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(err_string_lock);
+    if (int_error_hash != NULL) {
+        for (; str->error; str++) {
+            if (lib)
+                str->error |= ERR_PACK(lib, 0, 0);
+            (void)lh_ERR_STRING_DATA_delete(int_error_hash, str);
+        }
+    }
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(err_string_lock);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+void err_free_strings_int(void)
+{
+    if (!RUN_ONCE(&err_string_init, do_err_strings_init))
+        return;
+
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(err_string_lock);
+    lh_ERR_STRING_DATA_free(int_error_hash);
+    int_error_hash = NULL;
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(err_string_lock);
+}
+
+/********************************************************/
+
+void ERR_put_error(int lib, int func, int reason, const char *file, int line)
+{
+    ERR_STATE *es;
+
+#ifdef _OSD_POSIX
+    /*
+     * In the BS2000-OSD POSIX subsystem, the compiler generates path names
+     * in the form "*POSIX(/etc/passwd)". This dirty hack strips them to
+     * something sensible. @@@ We shouldn't modify a const string, though.
+     */
+    if (strncmp(file, "*POSIX(", sizeof("*POSIX(") - 1) == 0) {
+        char *end;
+
+        /* Skip the "*POSIX(" prefix */
+        file += sizeof("*POSIX(") - 1;
+        end = &file[strlen(file) - 1];
+        if (*end == ')')
+            *end = '\0';
+        /* Optional: use the basename of the path only. */
+        if ((end = strrchr(file, '/')) != NULL)
+            file = &end[1];
+    }
+#endif
+    es = ERR_get_state();
+    if (es == NULL)
+        return;
+
+    es->top = (es->top + 1) % ERR_NUM_ERRORS;
+    if (es->top == es->bottom)
+        es->bottom = (es->bottom + 1) % ERR_NUM_ERRORS;
+    es->err_flags[es->top] = 0;
+    es->err_buffer[es->top] = ERR_PACK(lib, func, reason);
+    es->err_file[es->top] = file;
+    es->err_line[es->top] = line;
+    err_clear_data(es, es->top);
+}
+
+void ERR_clear_error(void)
+{
+    int i;
+    ERR_STATE *es;
+
+    es = ERR_get_state();
+    if (es == NULL)
+        return;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < ERR_NUM_ERRORS; i++) {
+        err_clear(es, i);
+    }
+    es->top = es->bottom = 0;
+}
+
+unsigned long ERR_get_error(void)
+{
+    return (get_error_values(1, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL));
+}
+
+unsigned long ERR_get_error_line(const char **file, int *line)
+{
+    return (get_error_values(1, 0, file, line, NULL, NULL));
+}
+
+unsigned long ERR_get_error_line_data(const char **file, int *line,
+                                      const char **data, int *flags)
+{
+    return (get_error_values(1, 0, file, line, data, flags));
+}
+
+unsigned long ERR_peek_error(void)
+{
+    return (get_error_values(0, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL));
+}
+
+unsigned long ERR_peek_error_line(const char **file, int *line)
+{
+    return (get_error_values(0, 0, file, line, NULL, NULL));
+}
+
+unsigned long ERR_peek_error_line_data(const char **file, int *line,
+                                       const char **data, int *flags)
+{
+    return (get_error_values(0, 0, file, line, data, flags));
+}
+
+unsigned long ERR_peek_last_error(void)
+{
+    return (get_error_values(0, 1, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL));
+}
+
+unsigned long ERR_peek_last_error_line(const char **file, int *line)
+{
+    return (get_error_values(0, 1, file, line, NULL, NULL));
+}
+
+unsigned long ERR_peek_last_error_line_data(const char **file, int *line,
+                                            const char **data, int *flags)
+{
+    return (get_error_values(0, 1, file, line, data, flags));
+}
+
+static unsigned long get_error_values(int inc, int top, const char **file,
+                                      int *line, const char **data,
+                                      int *flags)
+{
+    int i = 0;
+    ERR_STATE *es;
+    unsigned long ret;
+
+    es = ERR_get_state();
+    if (es == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    if (inc && top) {
+        if (file)
+            *file = "";
+        if (line)
+            *line = 0;
+        if (data)
+            *data = "";
+        if (flags)
+            *flags = 0;
+
+        return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    if (es->bottom == es->top)
+        return 0;
+    if (top)
+        i = es->top;            /* last error */
+    else
+        i = (es->bottom + 1) % ERR_NUM_ERRORS; /* first error */
+
+    ret = es->err_buffer[i];
+    if (inc) {
+        es->bottom = i;
+        es->err_buffer[i] = 0;
+    }
+
+    if ((file != NULL) && (line != NULL)) {
+        if (es->err_file[i] == NULL) {
+            *file = "NA";
+            if (line != NULL)
+                *line = 0;
+        } else {
+            *file = es->err_file[i];
+            if (line != NULL)
+                *line = es->err_line[i];
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (data == NULL) {
+        if (inc) {
+            err_clear_data(es, i);
+        }
+    } else {
+        if (es->err_data[i] == NULL) {
+            *data = "";
+            if (flags != NULL)
+                *flags = 0;
+        } else {
+            *data = es->err_data[i];
+            if (flags != NULL)
+                *flags = es->err_data_flags[i];
+        }
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+void ERR_error_string_n(unsigned long e, char *buf, size_t len)
+{
+    char lsbuf[64], fsbuf[64], rsbuf[64];
+    const char *ls, *fs, *rs;
+    unsigned long l, f, r;
+
+    if (len == 0)
+        return;
+
+    l = ERR_GET_LIB(e);
+    f = ERR_GET_FUNC(e);
+    r = ERR_GET_REASON(e);
+
+    ls = ERR_lib_error_string(e);
+    fs = ERR_func_error_string(e);
+    rs = ERR_reason_error_string(e);
+
+    if (ls == NULL)
+        BIO_snprintf(lsbuf, sizeof(lsbuf), "lib(%lu)", l);
+    if (fs == NULL)
+        BIO_snprintf(fsbuf, sizeof(fsbuf), "func(%lu)", f);
+    if (rs == NULL)
+        BIO_snprintf(rsbuf, sizeof(rsbuf), "reason(%lu)", r);
+
+    BIO_snprintf(buf, len, "error:%08lX:%s:%s:%s", e, ls ? ls : lsbuf,
+                 fs ? fs : fsbuf, rs ? rs : rsbuf);
+    if (strlen(buf) == len - 1) {
+        /*
+         * output may be truncated; make sure we always have 5
+         * colon-separated fields, i.e. 4 colons ...
+         */
+#define NUM_COLONS 4
+        if (len > NUM_COLONS) { /* ... if possible */
+            int i;
+            char *s = buf;
+
+            for (i = 0; i < NUM_COLONS; i++) {
+                char *colon = strchr(s, ':');
+                if (colon == NULL || colon > &buf[len - 1] - NUM_COLONS + i) {
+                    /*
+                     * set colon no. i at last possible position (buf[len-1]
+                     * is the terminating 0)
+                     */
+                    colon = &buf[len - 1] - NUM_COLONS + i;
+                    *colon = ':';
+                }
+                s = colon + 1;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * ERR_error_string_n should be used instead for ret != NULL as
+ * ERR_error_string cannot know how large the buffer is
+ */
+char *ERR_error_string(unsigned long e, char *ret)
+{
+    static char buf[256];
+
+    if (ret == NULL)
+        ret = buf;
+    ERR_error_string_n(e, ret, 256);
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+const char *ERR_lib_error_string(unsigned long e)
+{
+    ERR_STRING_DATA d, *p;
+    unsigned long l;
+
+    if (!RUN_ONCE(&err_string_init, do_err_strings_init)) {
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    l = ERR_GET_LIB(e);
+    d.error = ERR_PACK(l, 0, 0);
+    p = int_err_get_item(&d);
+    return ((p == NULL) ? NULL : p->string);
+}
+
+const char *ERR_func_error_string(unsigned long e)
+{
+    ERR_STRING_DATA d, *p;
+    unsigned long l, f;
+
+    if (!RUN_ONCE(&err_string_init, do_err_strings_init)) {
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    l = ERR_GET_LIB(e);
+    f = ERR_GET_FUNC(e);
+    d.error = ERR_PACK(l, f, 0);
+    p = int_err_get_item(&d);
+    return ((p == NULL) ? NULL : p->string);
+}
+
+const char *ERR_reason_error_string(unsigned long e)
+{
+    ERR_STRING_DATA d, *p = NULL;
+    unsigned long l, r;
+
+    if (!RUN_ONCE(&err_string_init, do_err_strings_init)) {
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    l = ERR_GET_LIB(e);
+    r = ERR_GET_REASON(e);
+    d.error = ERR_PACK(l, 0, r);
+    p = int_err_get_item(&d);
+    if (!p) {
+        d.error = ERR_PACK(0, 0, r);
+        p = int_err_get_item(&d);
+    }
+    return ((p == NULL) ? NULL : p->string);
+}
+
+void err_delete_thread_state(void)
+{
+    ERR_STATE *state = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&err_thread_local);
+    if (state == NULL)
+        return;
+
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&err_thread_local, NULL);
+    ERR_STATE_free(state);
+}
+
+#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+void ERR_remove_thread_state(void *dummy)
+{
+}
+#endif
+
+#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10000000L
+void ERR_remove_state(unsigned long pid)
+{
+}
+#endif
+
+DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(err_do_init)
+{
+    set_err_thread_local = 1;
+    return CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local(&err_thread_local, NULL);
+}
+
+ERR_STATE *ERR_get_state(void)
+{
+    ERR_STATE *state = NULL;
+
+    if (!RUN_ONCE(&err_init, err_do_init))
+        return NULL;
+
+    /*
+     * If base OPENSSL_init_crypto() hasn't been called yet, be sure to call
+     * it now to avoid state to be doubly allocated and thereby leak memory.
+     * Needed on any platform that doesn't define OPENSSL_USE_NODELETE.
+     */
+    if (!OPENSSL_init_crypto(0, NULL))
+        return NULL;
+
+    state = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&err_thread_local);
+
+    if (state == NULL) {
+        state = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*state));
+        if (state == NULL)
+            return NULL;
+
+        if (!ossl_init_thread_start(OPENSSL_INIT_THREAD_ERR_STATE)
+            || !CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&err_thread_local, state)) {
+            ERR_STATE_free(state);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+
+        /* Ignore failures from these */
+        OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_CRYPTO_STRINGS, NULL);
+    }
+
+    return state;
+}
+
+int ERR_get_next_error_library(void)
+{
+    int ret;
+
+    if (!RUN_ONCE(&err_string_init, do_err_strings_init)) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(err_string_lock);
+    ret = int_err_library_number++;
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(err_string_lock);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+void ERR_set_error_data(char *data, int flags)
+{
+    ERR_STATE *es;
+    int i;
+
+    es = ERR_get_state();
+    if (es == NULL)
+        return;
+
+    i = es->top;
+
+    err_clear_data(es, i);
+    es->err_data[i] = data;
+    es->err_data_flags[i] = flags;
+}
+
+void ERR_add_error_data(int num, ...)
+{
+    va_list args;
+    va_start(args, num);
+    ERR_add_error_vdata(num, args);
+    va_end(args);
+}
+
+void ERR_add_error_vdata(int num, va_list args)
+{
+    int i, n, s;
+    char *str, *p, *a;
+
+    s = 80;
+    str = OPENSSL_malloc(s + 1);
+    if (str == NULL)
+        return;
+    str[0] = '\0';
+
+    n = 0;
+    for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
+        a = va_arg(args, char *);
+        /* ignore NULLs, thanks to Bob Beck <beck@obtuse.com> */
+        if (a != NULL) {
+            n += strlen(a);
+            if (n > s) {
+                s = n + 20;
+                p = OPENSSL_realloc(str, s + 1);
+                if (p == NULL) {
+                    OPENSSL_free(str);
+                    return;
+                }
+                str = p;
+            }
+            OPENSSL_strlcat(str, a, (size_t)s + 1);
+        }
+    }
+    ERR_set_error_data(str, ERR_TXT_MALLOCED | ERR_TXT_STRING);
+}
+
+int ERR_set_mark(void)
+{
+    ERR_STATE *es;
+
+    es = ERR_get_state();
+    if (es == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    if (es->bottom == es->top)
+        return 0;
+    es->err_flags[es->top] |= ERR_FLAG_MARK;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int ERR_pop_to_mark(void)
+{
+    ERR_STATE *es;
+
+    es = ERR_get_state();
+    if (es == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    while (es->bottom != es->top
+           && (es->err_flags[es->top] & ERR_FLAG_MARK) == 0) {
+        err_clear(es, es->top);
+        es->top -= 1;
+        if (es->top == -1)
+            es->top = ERR_NUM_ERRORS - 1;
+    }
+
+    if (es->bottom == es->top)
+        return 0;
+    es->err_flags[es->top] &= ~ERR_FLAG_MARK;
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/err/err_all.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/err/err_all.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3b1304f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/err/err_all.c
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/err_int.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/ec.h>
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/comp.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/pem2.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/conf.h>
+#include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include "internal/dso.h"
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#include <openssl/ui.h>
+#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+# include <openssl/fips.h>
+#endif
+#include <openssl/ts.h>
+#include <openssl/cms.h>
+#include <openssl/ct.h>
+#include <openssl/async.h>
+#include <openssl/kdf.h>
+
+int err_load_crypto_strings_int(void)
+{
+    if (
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+        FIPS_set_error_callbacks(ERR_put_error, ERR_add_error_vdata) == 0 ||
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+        ERR_load_ERR_strings() == 0 ||    /* include error strings for SYSerr */
+        ERR_load_BN_strings() == 0 ||
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+        ERR_load_RSA_strings() == 0 ||
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+        ERR_load_DH_strings() == 0 ||
+# endif
+        ERR_load_EVP_strings() == 0 ||
+        ERR_load_BUF_strings() == 0 ||
+        ERR_load_OBJ_strings() == 0 ||
+        ERR_load_PEM_strings() == 0 ||
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+        ERR_load_DSA_strings() == 0 ||
+# endif
+        ERR_load_X509_strings() == 0 ||
+        ERR_load_ASN1_strings() == 0 ||
+        ERR_load_CONF_strings() == 0 ||
+        ERR_load_CRYPTO_strings() == 0 ||
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+        ERR_load_COMP_strings() == 0 ||
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+        ERR_load_EC_strings() == 0 ||
+# endif
+        /* skip ERR_load_SSL_strings() because it is not in this library */
+        ERR_load_BIO_strings() == 0 ||
+        ERR_load_PKCS7_strings() == 0 ||
+        ERR_load_X509V3_strings() == 0 ||
+        ERR_load_PKCS12_strings() == 0 ||
+        ERR_load_RAND_strings() == 0 ||
+        ERR_load_DSO_strings() == 0 ||
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TS
+        ERR_load_TS_strings() == 0 ||
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+        ERR_load_ENGINE_strings() == 0 ||
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+        ERR_load_OCSP_strings() == 0 ||
+# endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_UI
+        ERR_load_UI_strings() == 0 ||
+#endif
+# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+        ERR_load_FIPS_strings() == 0 ||
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
+        ERR_load_CMS_strings() == 0 ||
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
+        ERR_load_CT_strings() == 0 ||
+# endif
+        ERR_load_ASYNC_strings() == 0 ||
+#endif
+        ERR_load_KDF_strings() == 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/err/err_prn.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/err/err_prn.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6ae1251
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/err/err_prn.c
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/lhash.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+void ERR_print_errors_cb(int (*cb) (const char *str, size_t len, void *u),
+                         void *u)
+{
+    unsigned long l;
+    char buf[256];
+    char buf2[4096];
+    const char *file, *data;
+    int line, flags;
+    /*
+     * We don't know what kind of thing CRYPTO_THREAD_ID is. Here is our best
+     * attempt to convert it into something we can print.
+     */
+    union {
+        CRYPTO_THREAD_ID tid;
+        unsigned long ltid;
+    } tid;
+
+    tid.ltid = 0;
+    tid.tid = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id();
+
+    while ((l = ERR_get_error_line_data(&file, &line, &data, &flags)) != 0) {
+        ERR_error_string_n(l, buf, sizeof(buf));
+        BIO_snprintf(buf2, sizeof(buf2), "%lu:%s:%s:%d:%s\n", tid.ltid, buf,
+                     file, line, (flags & ERR_TXT_STRING) ? data : "");
+        if (cb(buf2, strlen(buf2), u) <= 0)
+            break;              /* abort outputting the error report */
+    }
+}
+
+static int print_bio(const char *str, size_t len, void *bp)
+{
+    return BIO_write((BIO *)bp, str, len);
+}
+
+void ERR_print_errors(BIO *bp)
+{
+    ERR_print_errors_cb(print_bio, bp);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+void ERR_print_errors_fp(FILE *fp)
+{
+    BIO *bio = BIO_new_fp(fp, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+    if (bio == NULL)
+        return;
+
+    ERR_print_errors_cb(print_bio, bio);
+    BIO_free(bio);
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/err/openssl.ec b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/err/openssl.ec
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..15d151f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/err/openssl.ec
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+# crypto/err/openssl.ec
+
+# configuration file for util/mkerr.pl
+
+# files that may have to be rewritten by util/mkerr.pl
+L ERR		NONE				NONE
+L BN		include/openssl/bn.h		crypto/bn/bn_err.c
+L RSA		include/openssl/rsa.h		crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c
+L DH		include/openssl/dh.h		crypto/dh/dh_err.c
+L EVP		include/openssl/evp.h		crypto/evp/evp_err.c
+L BUF		include/openssl/buffer.h	crypto/buffer/buf_err.c
+L OBJ		include/openssl/objects.h	crypto/objects/obj_err.c
+L PEM		include/openssl/pem.h		crypto/pem/pem_err.c
+L DSA		include/openssl/dsa.h		crypto/dsa/dsa_err.c
+L X509		include/openssl/x509.h		crypto/x509/x509_err.c
+L ASN1		include/openssl/asn1.h		crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c
+L CONF		include/openssl/conf.h		crypto/conf/conf_err.c
+L CRYPTO	include/openssl/crypto.h	crypto/cpt_err.c
+L EC		include/openssl/ec.h		crypto/ec/ec_err.c
+L SSL		include/openssl/ssl.h		ssl/ssl_err.c
+L BIO		include/openssl/bio.h		crypto/bio/bio_err.c
+L PKCS7		include/openssl/pkcs7.h		crypto/pkcs7/pkcs7err.c
+L X509V3	include/openssl/x509v3.h	crypto/x509v3/v3err.c
+L PKCS12	include/openssl/pkcs12.h	crypto/pkcs12/pk12err.c
+L RAND		include/openssl/rand.h		crypto/rand/rand_err.c
+L DSO		include/internal/dso.h		crypto/dso/dso_err.c
+L ENGINE	include/openssl/engine.h	crypto/engine/eng_err.c
+L OCSP		include/openssl/ocsp.h		crypto/ocsp/ocsp_err.c
+L UI		include/openssl/ui.h		crypto/ui/ui_err.c
+L COMP		include/openssl/comp.h		crypto/comp/comp_err.c
+L TS		include/openssl/ts.h		crypto/ts/ts_err.c
+#L HMAC		include/openssl/hmac.h		crypto/hmac/hmac_err.c
+L CMS		include/openssl/cms.h		crypto/cms/cms_err.c
+#L FIPS		include/openssl/fips.h		crypto/fips_err.h
+L CT		include/openssl/ct.h		crypto/ct/ct_err.c
+L ASYNC		include/openssl/async.h		crypto/async/async_err.c
+L KDF		include/openssl/kdf.h		crypto/kdf/kdf_err.c
+
+# additional header files to be scanned for function names
+L NONE		include/openssl/x509_vfy.h	NONE
+L NONE		crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h		NONE
+L NONE		crypto/cms/cms_lcl.h		NONE
+L NONE		crypto/ct/ct_locl.h		NONE
+#L NONE		fips/rand/fips_rand.h		NONE
+L NONE		ssl/ssl_locl.h			NONE
+
+F RSAREF_F_RSA_BN2BIN
+F RSAREF_F_RSA_PRIVATE_DECRYPT
+F RSAREF_F_RSA_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT
+F RSAREF_F_RSA_PUBLIC_DECRYPT
+F RSAREF_F_RSA_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT
+
+R SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE         1010
+R SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_BAD_RECORD_MAC             1020
+R SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPTION_FAILED          1021
+R SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_RECORD_OVERFLOW            1022
+R SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE      1030
+R SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE          1040
+R SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_NO_CERTIFICATE             1041
+R SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_BAD_CERTIFICATE            1042
+R SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE    1043
+R SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED        1044
+R SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED        1045
+R SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN        1046
+R SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER          1047
+R SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_UNKNOWN_CA                 1048
+R SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_ACCESS_DENIED              1049
+R SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECODE_ERROR               1050
+R SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPT_ERROR              1051
+R SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_EXPORT_RESTRICTION         1060
+R SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_PROTOCOL_VERSION           1070
+R SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY      1071
+R SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INTERNAL_ERROR             1080
+R SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK     1086
+R SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_USER_CANCELLED             1090
+R SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_NO_RENEGOTIATION           1100
+R SSL_R_TLSV1_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION            1110
+R SSL_R_TLSV1_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE         1111
+R SSL_R_TLSV1_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME                1112
+R SSL_R_TLSV1_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE  1113
+R SSL_R_TLSV1_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE       1114
+R TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY                 1115
+R TLS1_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL              1120
+
+R RSAREF_R_CONTENT_ENCODING			0x0400
+R RSAREF_R_DATA					0x0401
+R RSAREF_R_DIGEST_ALGORITHM			0x0402
+R RSAREF_R_ENCODING				0x0403
+R RSAREF_R_KEY					0x0404
+R RSAREF_R_KEY_ENCODING				0x0405
+R RSAREF_R_LEN					0x0406
+R RSAREF_R_MODULUS_LEN				0x0407
+R RSAREF_R_NEED_RANDOM				0x0408
+R RSAREF_R_PRIVATE_KEY				0x0409
+R RSAREF_R_PUBLIC_KEY				0x040a
+R RSAREF_R_SIGNATURE				0x040b
+R RSAREF_R_SIGNATURE_ENCODING			0x040c
+R RSAREF_R_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM			0x040d
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/bio_b64.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/bio_b64.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a86e8db
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/bio_b64.c
@@ -0,0 +1,551 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include "internal/bio.h"
+
+static int b64_write(BIO *h, const char *buf, int num);
+static int b64_read(BIO *h, char *buf, int size);
+static int b64_puts(BIO *h, const char *str);
+/*
+ * static int b64_gets(BIO *h, char *str, int size);
+ */
+static long b64_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, long arg1, void *arg2);
+static int b64_new(BIO *h);
+static int b64_free(BIO *data);
+static long b64_callback_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, BIO_info_cb *fp);
+#define B64_BLOCK_SIZE  1024
+#define B64_BLOCK_SIZE2 768
+#define B64_NONE        0
+#define B64_ENCODE      1
+#define B64_DECODE      2
+
+typedef struct b64_struct {
+    /*
+     * BIO *bio; moved to the BIO structure
+     */
+    int buf_len;
+    int buf_off;
+    int tmp_len;                /* used to find the start when decoding */
+    int tmp_nl;                 /* If true, scan until '\n' */
+    int encode;
+    int start;                  /* have we started decoding yet? */
+    int cont;                   /* <= 0 when finished */
+    EVP_ENCODE_CTX *base64;
+    char buf[EVP_ENCODE_LENGTH(B64_BLOCK_SIZE) + 10];
+    char tmp[B64_BLOCK_SIZE];
+} BIO_B64_CTX;
+
+static const BIO_METHOD methods_b64 = {
+    BIO_TYPE_BASE64,
+    "base64 encoding",
+    b64_write,
+    b64_read,
+    b64_puts,
+    NULL,                       /* b64_gets, */
+    b64_ctrl,
+    b64_new,
+    b64_free,
+    b64_callback_ctrl,
+};
+
+
+const BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_base64(void)
+{
+    return &methods_b64;
+}
+
+static int b64_new(BIO *bi)
+{
+    BIO_B64_CTX *ctx;
+
+    ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx));
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    ctx->cont = 1;
+    ctx->start = 1;
+    ctx->base64 = EVP_ENCODE_CTX_new();
+    if (ctx->base64 == NULL) {
+        OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    BIO_set_data(bi, ctx);
+    BIO_set_init(bi, 1);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int b64_free(BIO *a)
+{
+    BIO_B64_CTX *ctx;
+    if (a == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    ctx = BIO_get_data(a);
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    EVP_ENCODE_CTX_free(ctx->base64);
+    OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+    BIO_set_data(a, NULL);
+    BIO_set_init(a, 0);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int b64_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
+{
+    int ret = 0, i, ii, j, k, x, n, num, ret_code = 0;
+    BIO_B64_CTX *ctx;
+    unsigned char *p, *q;
+    BIO *next;
+
+    if (out == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    ctx = (BIO_B64_CTX *)BIO_get_data(b);
+
+    next = BIO_next(b);
+    if ((ctx == NULL) || (next == NULL))
+        return 0;
+
+    BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+
+    if (ctx->encode != B64_DECODE) {
+        ctx->encode = B64_DECODE;
+        ctx->buf_len = 0;
+        ctx->buf_off = 0;
+        ctx->tmp_len = 0;
+        EVP_DecodeInit(ctx->base64);
+    }
+
+    /* First check if there are bytes decoded/encoded */
+    if (ctx->buf_len > 0) {
+        OPENSSL_assert(ctx->buf_len >= ctx->buf_off);
+        i = ctx->buf_len - ctx->buf_off;
+        if (i > outl)
+            i = outl;
+        OPENSSL_assert(ctx->buf_off + i < (int)sizeof(ctx->buf));
+        memcpy(out, &(ctx->buf[ctx->buf_off]), i);
+        ret = i;
+        out += i;
+        outl -= i;
+        ctx->buf_off += i;
+        if (ctx->buf_len == ctx->buf_off) {
+            ctx->buf_len = 0;
+            ctx->buf_off = 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * At this point, we have room of outl bytes and an empty buffer, so we
+     * should read in some more.
+     */
+
+    ret_code = 0;
+    while (outl > 0) {
+        if (ctx->cont <= 0)
+            break;
+
+        i = BIO_read(next, &(ctx->tmp[ctx->tmp_len]),
+                     B64_BLOCK_SIZE - ctx->tmp_len);
+
+        if (i <= 0) {
+            ret_code = i;
+
+            /* Should we continue next time we are called? */
+            if (!BIO_should_retry(next)) {
+                ctx->cont = i;
+                /* If buffer empty break */
+                if (ctx->tmp_len == 0)
+                    break;
+                /* Fall through and process what we have */
+                else
+                    i = 0;
+            }
+            /* else we retry and add more data to buffer */
+            else
+                break;
+        }
+        i += ctx->tmp_len;
+        ctx->tmp_len = i;
+
+        /*
+         * We need to scan, a line at a time until we have a valid line if we
+         * are starting.
+         */
+        if (ctx->start && (BIO_get_flags(b) & BIO_FLAGS_BASE64_NO_NL)) {
+            /* ctx->start=1; */
+            ctx->tmp_len = 0;
+        } else if (ctx->start) {
+            q = p = (unsigned char *)ctx->tmp;
+            num = 0;
+            for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
+                if (*(q++) != '\n')
+                    continue;
+
+                /*
+                 * due to a previous very long line, we need to keep on
+                 * scanning for a '\n' before we even start looking for
+                 * base64 encoded stuff.
+                 */
+                if (ctx->tmp_nl) {
+                    p = q;
+                    ctx->tmp_nl = 0;
+                    continue;
+                }
+
+                k = EVP_DecodeUpdate(ctx->base64,
+                                     (unsigned char *)ctx->buf,
+                                     &num, p, q - p);
+                if ((k <= 0) && (num == 0) && (ctx->start))
+                    EVP_DecodeInit(ctx->base64);
+                else {
+                    if (p != (unsigned char *)
+                        &(ctx->tmp[0])) {
+                        i -= (p - (unsigned char *)
+                              &(ctx->tmp[0]));
+                        for (x = 0; x < i; x++)
+                            ctx->tmp[x] = p[x];
+                    }
+                    EVP_DecodeInit(ctx->base64);
+                    ctx->start = 0;
+                    break;
+                }
+                p = q;
+            }
+
+            /* we fell off the end without starting */
+            if ((j == i) && (num == 0)) {
+                /*
+                 * Is this is one long chunk?, if so, keep on reading until a
+                 * new line.
+                 */
+                if (p == (unsigned char *)&(ctx->tmp[0])) {
+                    /* Check buffer full */
+                    if (i == B64_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+                        ctx->tmp_nl = 1;
+                        ctx->tmp_len = 0;
+                    }
+                } else if (p != q) { /* finished on a '\n' */
+                    n = q - p;
+                    for (ii = 0; ii < n; ii++)
+                        ctx->tmp[ii] = p[ii];
+                    ctx->tmp_len = n;
+                }
+                /* else finished on a '\n' */
+                continue;
+            } else {
+                ctx->tmp_len = 0;
+            }
+        } else if ((i < B64_BLOCK_SIZE) && (ctx->cont > 0)) {
+            /*
+             * If buffer isn't full and we can retry then restart to read in
+             * more data.
+             */
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        if (BIO_get_flags(b) & BIO_FLAGS_BASE64_NO_NL) {
+            int z, jj;
+
+            jj = i & ~3;        /* process per 4 */
+            z = EVP_DecodeBlock((unsigned char *)ctx->buf,
+                                (unsigned char *)ctx->tmp, jj);
+            if (jj > 2) {
+                if (ctx->tmp[jj - 1] == '=') {
+                    z--;
+                    if (ctx->tmp[jj - 2] == '=')
+                        z--;
+                }
+            }
+            /*
+             * z is now number of output bytes and jj is the number consumed
+             */
+            if (jj != i) {
+                memmove(ctx->tmp, &ctx->tmp[jj], i - jj);
+                ctx->tmp_len = i - jj;
+            }
+            ctx->buf_len = 0;
+            if (z > 0) {
+                ctx->buf_len = z;
+            }
+            i = z;
+        } else {
+            i = EVP_DecodeUpdate(ctx->base64,
+                                 (unsigned char *)ctx->buf, &ctx->buf_len,
+                                 (unsigned char *)ctx->tmp, i);
+            ctx->tmp_len = 0;
+        }
+        /*
+         * If eof or an error was signalled, then the condition
+         * 'ctx->cont <= 0' will prevent b64_read() from reading
+         * more data on subsequent calls. This assignment was
+         * deleted accidentally in commit 5562cfaca4f3.
+         */
+        ctx->cont = i;
+
+        ctx->buf_off = 0;
+        if (i < 0) {
+            ret_code = 0;
+            ctx->buf_len = 0;
+            break;
+        }
+
+        if (ctx->buf_len <= outl)
+            i = ctx->buf_len;
+        else
+            i = outl;
+
+        memcpy(out, ctx->buf, i);
+        ret += i;
+        ctx->buf_off = i;
+        if (ctx->buf_off == ctx->buf_len) {
+            ctx->buf_len = 0;
+            ctx->buf_off = 0;
+        }
+        outl -= i;
+        out += i;
+    }
+    /* BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); */
+    BIO_copy_next_retry(b);
+    return ((ret == 0) ? ret_code : ret);
+}
+
+static int b64_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    int n;
+    int i;
+    BIO_B64_CTX *ctx;
+    BIO *next;
+
+    ctx = (BIO_B64_CTX *)BIO_get_data(b);
+    next = BIO_next(b);
+    if ((ctx == NULL) || (next == NULL))
+        return 0;
+
+    BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+
+    if (ctx->encode != B64_ENCODE) {
+        ctx->encode = B64_ENCODE;
+        ctx->buf_len = 0;
+        ctx->buf_off = 0;
+        ctx->tmp_len = 0;
+        EVP_EncodeInit(ctx->base64);
+    }
+
+    OPENSSL_assert(ctx->buf_off < (int)sizeof(ctx->buf));
+    OPENSSL_assert(ctx->buf_len <= (int)sizeof(ctx->buf));
+    OPENSSL_assert(ctx->buf_len >= ctx->buf_off);
+    n = ctx->buf_len - ctx->buf_off;
+    while (n > 0) {
+        i = BIO_write(next, &(ctx->buf[ctx->buf_off]), n);
+        if (i <= 0) {
+            BIO_copy_next_retry(b);
+            return (i);
+        }
+        OPENSSL_assert(i <= n);
+        ctx->buf_off += i;
+        OPENSSL_assert(ctx->buf_off <= (int)sizeof(ctx->buf));
+        OPENSSL_assert(ctx->buf_len >= ctx->buf_off);
+        n -= i;
+    }
+    /* at this point all pending data has been written */
+    ctx->buf_off = 0;
+    ctx->buf_len = 0;
+
+    if ((in == NULL) || (inl <= 0))
+        return (0);
+
+    while (inl > 0) {
+        n = (inl > B64_BLOCK_SIZE) ? B64_BLOCK_SIZE : inl;
+
+        if (BIO_get_flags(b) & BIO_FLAGS_BASE64_NO_NL) {
+            if (ctx->tmp_len > 0) {
+                OPENSSL_assert(ctx->tmp_len <= 3);
+                n = 3 - ctx->tmp_len;
+                /*
+                 * There's a theoretical possibility for this
+                 */
+                if (n > inl)
+                    n = inl;
+                memcpy(&(ctx->tmp[ctx->tmp_len]), in, n);
+                ctx->tmp_len += n;
+                ret += n;
+                if (ctx->tmp_len < 3)
+                    break;
+                ctx->buf_len =
+                    EVP_EncodeBlock((unsigned char *)ctx->buf,
+                                    (unsigned char *)ctx->tmp, ctx->tmp_len);
+                OPENSSL_assert(ctx->buf_len <= (int)sizeof(ctx->buf));
+                OPENSSL_assert(ctx->buf_len >= ctx->buf_off);
+                /*
+                 * Since we're now done using the temporary buffer, the
+                 * length should be 0'd
+                 */
+                ctx->tmp_len = 0;
+            } else {
+                if (n < 3) {
+                    memcpy(ctx->tmp, in, n);
+                    ctx->tmp_len = n;
+                    ret += n;
+                    break;
+                }
+                n -= n % 3;
+                ctx->buf_len =
+                    EVP_EncodeBlock((unsigned char *)ctx->buf,
+                                    (const unsigned char *)in, n);
+                OPENSSL_assert(ctx->buf_len <= (int)sizeof(ctx->buf));
+                OPENSSL_assert(ctx->buf_len >= ctx->buf_off);
+                ret += n;
+            }
+        } else {
+            if (!EVP_EncodeUpdate(ctx->base64,
+                                 (unsigned char *)ctx->buf, &ctx->buf_len,
+                                 (unsigned char *)in, n))
+                return ((ret == 0) ? -1 : ret);
+            OPENSSL_assert(ctx->buf_len <= (int)sizeof(ctx->buf));
+            OPENSSL_assert(ctx->buf_len >= ctx->buf_off);
+            ret += n;
+        }
+        inl -= n;
+        in += n;
+
+        ctx->buf_off = 0;
+        n = ctx->buf_len;
+        while (n > 0) {
+            i = BIO_write(next, &(ctx->buf[ctx->buf_off]), n);
+            if (i <= 0) {
+                BIO_copy_next_retry(b);
+                return ((ret == 0) ? i : ret);
+            }
+            OPENSSL_assert(i <= n);
+            n -= i;
+            ctx->buf_off += i;
+            OPENSSL_assert(ctx->buf_off <= (int)sizeof(ctx->buf));
+            OPENSSL_assert(ctx->buf_len >= ctx->buf_off);
+        }
+        ctx->buf_len = 0;
+        ctx->buf_off = 0;
+    }
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static long b64_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
+{
+    BIO_B64_CTX *ctx;
+    long ret = 1;
+    int i;
+    BIO *next;
+
+    ctx = (BIO_B64_CTX *)BIO_get_data(b);
+    next = BIO_next(b);
+    if ((ctx == NULL) || (next == NULL))
+        return 0;
+
+    switch (cmd) {
+    case BIO_CTRL_RESET:
+        ctx->cont = 1;
+        ctx->start = 1;
+        ctx->encode = B64_NONE;
+        ret = BIO_ctrl(next, cmd, num, ptr);
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_EOF:         /* More to read */
+        if (ctx->cont <= 0)
+            ret = 1;
+        else
+            ret = BIO_ctrl(next, cmd, num, ptr);
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_WPENDING:    /* More to write in buffer */
+        OPENSSL_assert(ctx->buf_len >= ctx->buf_off);
+        ret = ctx->buf_len - ctx->buf_off;
+        if ((ret == 0) && (ctx->encode != B64_NONE)
+            && (EVP_ENCODE_CTX_num(ctx->base64) != 0))
+            ret = 1;
+        else if (ret <= 0)
+            ret = BIO_ctrl(next, cmd, num, ptr);
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_PENDING:     /* More to read in buffer */
+        OPENSSL_assert(ctx->buf_len >= ctx->buf_off);
+        ret = ctx->buf_len - ctx->buf_off;
+        if (ret <= 0)
+            ret = BIO_ctrl(next, cmd, num, ptr);
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_FLUSH:
+        /* do a final write */
+ again:
+        while (ctx->buf_len != ctx->buf_off) {
+            i = b64_write(b, NULL, 0);
+            if (i < 0)
+                return i;
+        }
+        if (BIO_get_flags(b) & BIO_FLAGS_BASE64_NO_NL) {
+            if (ctx->tmp_len != 0) {
+                ctx->buf_len = EVP_EncodeBlock((unsigned char *)ctx->buf,
+                                               (unsigned char *)ctx->tmp,
+                                               ctx->tmp_len);
+                ctx->buf_off = 0;
+                ctx->tmp_len = 0;
+                goto again;
+            }
+        } else if (ctx->encode != B64_NONE
+                   && EVP_ENCODE_CTX_num(ctx->base64) != 0) {
+            ctx->buf_off = 0;
+            EVP_EncodeFinal(ctx->base64,
+                            (unsigned char *)ctx->buf, &(ctx->buf_len));
+            /* push out the bytes */
+            goto again;
+        }
+        /* Finally flush the underlying BIO */
+        ret = BIO_ctrl(next, cmd, num, ptr);
+        break;
+
+    case BIO_C_DO_STATE_MACHINE:
+        BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+        ret = BIO_ctrl(next, cmd, num, ptr);
+        BIO_copy_next_retry(b);
+        break;
+
+    case BIO_CTRL_DUP:
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_INFO:
+    case BIO_CTRL_GET:
+    case BIO_CTRL_SET:
+    default:
+        ret = BIO_ctrl(next, cmd, num, ptr);
+        break;
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static long b64_callback_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, BIO_info_cb *fp)
+{
+    long ret = 1;
+    BIO *next = BIO_next(b);
+
+    if (next == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    switch (cmd) {
+    default:
+        ret = BIO_callback_ctrl(next, cmd, fp);
+        break;
+    }
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static int b64_puts(BIO *b, const char *str)
+{
+    return b64_write(b, str, strlen(str));
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/bio_enc.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/bio_enc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e62d1df
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/bio_enc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,450 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include "internal/bio.h"
+
+static int enc_write(BIO *h, const char *buf, int num);
+static int enc_read(BIO *h, char *buf, int size);
+/*
+ * static int enc_puts(BIO *h, const char *str);
+ */
+/*
+ * static int enc_gets(BIO *h, char *str, int size);
+ */
+static long enc_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, long arg1, void *arg2);
+static int enc_new(BIO *h);
+static int enc_free(BIO *data);
+static long enc_callback_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, BIO_info_cb *fps);
+#define ENC_BLOCK_SIZE  (1024*4)
+#define ENC_MIN_CHUNK   (256)
+#define BUF_OFFSET      (ENC_MIN_CHUNK + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH)
+
+typedef struct enc_struct {
+    int buf_len;
+    int buf_off;
+    int cont;                   /* <= 0 when finished */
+    int finished;
+    int ok;                     /* bad decrypt */
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cipher;
+    unsigned char *read_start, *read_end;
+    /*
+     * buf is larger than ENC_BLOCK_SIZE because EVP_DecryptUpdate can return
+     * up to a block more data than is presented to it
+     */
+    unsigned char buf[BUF_OFFSET + ENC_BLOCK_SIZE];
+} BIO_ENC_CTX;
+
+static const BIO_METHOD methods_enc = {
+    BIO_TYPE_CIPHER,
+    "cipher",
+    enc_write,
+    enc_read,
+    NULL,                       /* enc_puts, */
+    NULL,                       /* enc_gets, */
+    enc_ctrl,
+    enc_new,
+    enc_free,
+    enc_callback_ctrl,
+};
+
+const BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_cipher(void)
+{
+    return (&methods_enc);
+}
+
+static int enc_new(BIO *bi)
+{
+    BIO_ENC_CTX *ctx;
+
+    ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx));
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    ctx->cipher = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+    if (ctx->cipher == NULL) {
+        OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    ctx->cont = 1;
+    ctx->ok = 1;
+    ctx->read_end = ctx->read_start = &(ctx->buf[BUF_OFFSET]);
+    BIO_set_data(bi, ctx);
+    BIO_set_init(bi, 1);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int enc_free(BIO *a)
+{
+    BIO_ENC_CTX *b;
+
+    if (a == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    b = BIO_get_data(a);
+    if (b == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(b->cipher);
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(b, sizeof(BIO_ENC_CTX));
+    BIO_set_data(a, NULL);
+    BIO_set_init(a, 0);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int enc_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
+{
+    int ret = 0, i, blocksize;
+    BIO_ENC_CTX *ctx;
+    BIO *next;
+
+    if (out == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    ctx = BIO_get_data(b);
+
+    next = BIO_next(b);
+    if ((ctx == NULL) || (next == NULL))
+        return 0;
+
+    /* First check if there are bytes decoded/encoded */
+    if (ctx->buf_len > 0) {
+        i = ctx->buf_len - ctx->buf_off;
+        if (i > outl)
+            i = outl;
+        memcpy(out, &(ctx->buf[ctx->buf_off]), i);
+        ret = i;
+        out += i;
+        outl -= i;
+        ctx->buf_off += i;
+        if (ctx->buf_len == ctx->buf_off) {
+            ctx->buf_len = 0;
+            ctx->buf_off = 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    blocksize = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(ctx->cipher);
+    if (blocksize == 1)
+        blocksize = 0;
+
+    /*
+     * At this point, we have room of outl bytes and an empty buffer, so we
+     * should read in some more.
+     */
+
+    while (outl > 0) {
+        if (ctx->cont <= 0)
+            break;
+
+        if (ctx->read_start == ctx->read_end) { /* time to read more data */
+            ctx->read_end = ctx->read_start = &(ctx->buf[BUF_OFFSET]);
+            i = BIO_read(next, ctx->read_start, ENC_BLOCK_SIZE);
+            if (i > 0)
+                ctx->read_end += i;
+        } else {
+            i = ctx->read_end - ctx->read_start;
+        }
+
+        if (i <= 0) {
+            /* Should be continue next time we are called? */
+            if (!BIO_should_retry(next)) {
+                ctx->cont = i;
+                i = EVP_CipherFinal_ex(ctx->cipher,
+                                       ctx->buf, &(ctx->buf_len));
+                ctx->ok = i;
+                ctx->buf_off = 0;
+            } else {
+                ret = (ret == 0) ? i : ret;
+                break;
+            }
+        } else {
+            if (outl > ENC_MIN_CHUNK) {
+                /*
+                 * Depending on flags block cipher decrypt can write
+                 * one extra block and then back off, i.e. output buffer
+                 * has to accommodate extra block...
+                 */
+                int j = outl - blocksize, buf_len;
+
+                if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx->cipher,
+                                      (unsigned char *)out, &buf_len,
+                                      ctx->read_start, i > j ? j : i)) {
+                    BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+                    return 0;
+                }
+                ret += buf_len;
+                out += buf_len;
+                outl -= buf_len;
+
+                if ((i -= j) <= 0) {
+                    ctx->read_start = ctx->read_end;
+                    continue;
+                }
+                ctx->read_start += j;
+            }
+            if (i > ENC_MIN_CHUNK)
+                i = ENC_MIN_CHUNK;
+            if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx->cipher,
+                                  ctx->buf, &ctx->buf_len,
+                                  ctx->read_start, i)) {
+                BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+                ctx->ok = 0;
+                return 0;
+            }
+            ctx->read_start += i;
+            ctx->cont = 1;
+            /*
+             * Note: it is possible for EVP_CipherUpdate to decrypt zero
+             * bytes because this is or looks like the final block: if this
+             * happens we should retry and either read more data or decrypt
+             * the final block
+             */
+            if (ctx->buf_len == 0)
+                continue;
+        }
+
+        if (ctx->buf_len <= outl)
+            i = ctx->buf_len;
+        else
+            i = outl;
+        if (i <= 0)
+            break;
+        memcpy(out, ctx->buf, i);
+        ret += i;
+        ctx->buf_off = i;
+        outl -= i;
+        out += i;
+    }
+
+    BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+    BIO_copy_next_retry(b);
+    return ((ret == 0) ? ctx->cont : ret);
+}
+
+static int enc_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl)
+{
+    int ret = 0, n, i;
+    BIO_ENC_CTX *ctx;
+    BIO *next;
+
+    ctx = BIO_get_data(b);
+    next = BIO_next(b);
+    if ((ctx == NULL) || (next == NULL))
+        return 0;
+
+    ret = inl;
+
+    BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+    n = ctx->buf_len - ctx->buf_off;
+    while (n > 0) {
+        i = BIO_write(next, &(ctx->buf[ctx->buf_off]), n);
+        if (i <= 0) {
+            BIO_copy_next_retry(b);
+            return (i);
+        }
+        ctx->buf_off += i;
+        n -= i;
+    }
+    /* at this point all pending data has been written */
+
+    if ((in == NULL) || (inl <= 0))
+        return (0);
+
+    ctx->buf_off = 0;
+    while (inl > 0) {
+        n = (inl > ENC_BLOCK_SIZE) ? ENC_BLOCK_SIZE : inl;
+        if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx->cipher,
+                              ctx->buf, &ctx->buf_len,
+                              (const unsigned char *)in, n)) {
+            BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+            ctx->ok = 0;
+            return 0;
+        }
+        inl -= n;
+        in += n;
+
+        ctx->buf_off = 0;
+        n = ctx->buf_len;
+        while (n > 0) {
+            i = BIO_write(next, &(ctx->buf[ctx->buf_off]), n);
+            if (i <= 0) {
+                BIO_copy_next_retry(b);
+                return (ret == inl) ? i : ret - inl;
+            }
+            n -= i;
+            ctx->buf_off += i;
+        }
+        ctx->buf_len = 0;
+        ctx->buf_off = 0;
+    }
+    BIO_copy_next_retry(b);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static long enc_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
+{
+    BIO *dbio;
+    BIO_ENC_CTX *ctx, *dctx;
+    long ret = 1;
+    int i;
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX **c_ctx;
+    BIO *next;
+
+    ctx = BIO_get_data(b);
+    next = BIO_next(b);
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    switch (cmd) {
+    case BIO_CTRL_RESET:
+        ctx->ok = 1;
+        ctx->finished = 0;
+        if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx->cipher, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
+                               EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx->cipher)))
+            return 0;
+        ret = BIO_ctrl(next, cmd, num, ptr);
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_EOF:         /* More to read */
+        if (ctx->cont <= 0)
+            ret = 1;
+        else
+            ret = BIO_ctrl(next, cmd, num, ptr);
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_WPENDING:
+        ret = ctx->buf_len - ctx->buf_off;
+        if (ret <= 0)
+            ret = BIO_ctrl(next, cmd, num, ptr);
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_PENDING:     /* More to read in buffer */
+        ret = ctx->buf_len - ctx->buf_off;
+        if (ret <= 0)
+            ret = BIO_ctrl(next, cmd, num, ptr);
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_FLUSH:
+        /* do a final write */
+ again:
+        while (ctx->buf_len != ctx->buf_off) {
+            i = enc_write(b, NULL, 0);
+            if (i < 0)
+                return i;
+        }
+
+        if (!ctx->finished) {
+            ctx->finished = 1;
+            ctx->buf_off = 0;
+            ret = EVP_CipherFinal_ex(ctx->cipher,
+                                     (unsigned char *)ctx->buf,
+                                     &(ctx->buf_len));
+            ctx->ok = (int)ret;
+            if (ret <= 0)
+                break;
+
+            /* push out the bytes */
+            goto again;
+        }
+
+        /* Finally flush the underlying BIO */
+        ret = BIO_ctrl(next, cmd, num, ptr);
+        break;
+    case BIO_C_GET_CIPHER_STATUS:
+        ret = (long)ctx->ok;
+        break;
+    case BIO_C_DO_STATE_MACHINE:
+        BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+        ret = BIO_ctrl(next, cmd, num, ptr);
+        BIO_copy_next_retry(b);
+        break;
+    case BIO_C_GET_CIPHER_CTX:
+        c_ctx = (EVP_CIPHER_CTX **)ptr;
+        *c_ctx = ctx->cipher;
+        BIO_set_init(b, 1);
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_DUP:
+        dbio = (BIO *)ptr;
+        dctx = BIO_get_data(dbio);
+        dctx->cipher = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+        if (dctx->cipher == NULL)
+            return 0;
+        ret = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_copy(dctx->cipher, ctx->cipher);
+        if (ret)
+            BIO_set_init(dbio, 1);
+        break;
+    default:
+        ret = BIO_ctrl(next, cmd, num, ptr);
+        break;
+    }
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static long enc_callback_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, BIO_info_cb *fp)
+{
+    long ret = 1;
+    BIO *next = BIO_next(b);
+
+    if (next == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    switch (cmd) {
+    default:
+        ret = BIO_callback_ctrl(next, cmd, fp);
+        break;
+    }
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+/*-
+void BIO_set_cipher_ctx(b,c)
+BIO *b;
+EVP_CIPHER_ctx *c;
+        {
+        if (b == NULL) return;
+
+        if ((b->callback != NULL) &&
+                (b->callback(b,BIO_CB_CTRL,(char *)c,BIO_CTRL_SET,e,0L) <= 0))
+                return;
+
+        b->init=1;
+        ctx=(BIO_ENC_CTX *)b->ptr;
+        memcpy(ctx->cipher,c,sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX));
+
+        if (b->callback != NULL)
+                b->callback(b,BIO_CB_CTRL,(char *)c,BIO_CTRL_SET,e,1L);
+        }
+*/
+
+int BIO_set_cipher(BIO *b, const EVP_CIPHER *c, const unsigned char *k,
+                   const unsigned char *i, int e)
+{
+    BIO_ENC_CTX *ctx;
+    long (*callback) (struct bio_st *, int, const char *, int, long, long);
+
+    ctx = BIO_get_data(b);
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    callback = BIO_get_callback(b);
+
+    if ((callback != NULL) &&
+            (callback(b, BIO_CB_CTRL, (const char *)c, BIO_CTRL_SET, e,
+                      0L) <= 0))
+        return 0;
+
+    BIO_set_init(b, 1);
+
+    if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx->cipher, c, NULL, k, i, e))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (callback != NULL)
+        return callback(b, BIO_CB_CTRL, (const char *)c, BIO_CTRL_SET, e, 1L);
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/bio_md.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/bio_md.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2f0f283
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/bio_md.c
@@ -0,0 +1,232 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include "internal/evp_int.h"
+#include "evp_locl.h"
+#include "internal/bio.h"
+
+/*
+ * BIO_put and BIO_get both add to the digest, BIO_gets returns the digest
+ */
+
+static int md_write(BIO *h, char const *buf, int num);
+static int md_read(BIO *h, char *buf, int size);
+/*
+ * static int md_puts(BIO *h, const char *str);
+ */
+static int md_gets(BIO *h, char *str, int size);
+static long md_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, long arg1, void *arg2);
+static int md_new(BIO *h);
+static int md_free(BIO *data);
+static long md_callback_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, BIO_info_cb *fp);
+
+static const BIO_METHOD methods_md = {
+    BIO_TYPE_MD,
+    "message digest",
+    md_write,
+    md_read,
+    NULL,                       /* md_puts, */
+    md_gets,
+    md_ctrl,
+    md_new,
+    md_free,
+    md_callback_ctrl,
+};
+
+const BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_md(void)
+{
+    return (&methods_md);
+}
+
+static int md_new(BIO *bi)
+{
+    EVP_MD_CTX *ctx;
+
+    ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        return (0);
+
+    BIO_set_init(bi, 1);
+    BIO_set_data(bi, ctx);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int md_free(BIO *a)
+{
+    if (a == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(BIO_get_data(a));
+    BIO_set_data(a, NULL);
+    BIO_set_init(a, 0);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int md_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    EVP_MD_CTX *ctx;
+    BIO *next;
+
+    if (out == NULL)
+        return (0);
+
+    ctx = BIO_get_data(b);
+    next = BIO_next(b);
+
+    if ((ctx == NULL) || (next == NULL))
+        return (0);
+
+    ret = BIO_read(next, out, outl);
+    if (BIO_get_init(b)) {
+        if (ret > 0) {
+            if (EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, (unsigned char *)out,
+                                 (unsigned int)ret) <= 0)
+                return (-1);
+        }
+    }
+    BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+    BIO_copy_next_retry(b);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static int md_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    EVP_MD_CTX *ctx;
+    BIO *next;
+
+    if ((in == NULL) || (inl <= 0))
+        return 0;
+
+    ctx = BIO_get_data(b);
+    next = BIO_next(b);
+    if ((ctx != NULL) && (next != NULL))
+        ret = BIO_write(next, in, inl);
+
+    if (BIO_get_init(b)) {
+        if (ret > 0) {
+            if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, (const unsigned char *)in,
+                                  (unsigned int)ret)) {
+                BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+                return 0;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    if (next != NULL) {
+        BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+        BIO_copy_next_retry(b);
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static long md_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
+{
+    EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, *dctx, **pctx;
+    const EVP_MD **ppmd;
+    EVP_MD *md;
+    long ret = 1;
+    BIO *dbio, *next;
+
+
+    ctx = BIO_get_data(b);
+    next = BIO_next(b);
+
+    switch (cmd) {
+    case BIO_CTRL_RESET:
+        if (BIO_get_init(b))
+            ret = EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, ctx->digest, NULL);
+        else
+            ret = 0;
+        if (ret > 0)
+            ret = BIO_ctrl(next, cmd, num, ptr);
+        break;
+    case BIO_C_GET_MD:
+        if (BIO_get_init(b)) {
+            ppmd = ptr;
+            *ppmd = ctx->digest;
+        } else
+            ret = 0;
+        break;
+    case BIO_C_GET_MD_CTX:
+        pctx = ptr;
+        *pctx = ctx;
+        BIO_set_init(b, 1);
+        break;
+    case BIO_C_SET_MD_CTX:
+        if (BIO_get_init(b))
+            BIO_set_data(b, ptr);
+        else
+            ret = 0;
+        break;
+    case BIO_C_DO_STATE_MACHINE:
+        BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+        ret = BIO_ctrl(next, cmd, num, ptr);
+        BIO_copy_next_retry(b);
+        break;
+
+    case BIO_C_SET_MD:
+        md = ptr;
+        ret = EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, md, NULL);
+        if (ret > 0)
+            BIO_set_init(b, 1);
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_DUP:
+        dbio = ptr;
+        dctx = BIO_get_data(dbio);
+        if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(dctx, ctx))
+            return 0;
+        BIO_set_init(b, 1);
+        break;
+    default:
+        ret = BIO_ctrl(next, cmd, num, ptr);
+        break;
+    }
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static long md_callback_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, BIO_info_cb *fp)
+{
+    long ret = 1;
+    BIO *next;
+
+    next = BIO_next(b);
+
+    if (next == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    switch (cmd) {
+    default:
+        ret = BIO_callback_ctrl(next, cmd, fp);
+        break;
+    }
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static int md_gets(BIO *bp, char *buf, int size)
+{
+    EVP_MD_CTX *ctx;
+    unsigned int ret;
+
+    ctx = BIO_get_data(bp);
+
+    if (size < ctx->digest->md_size)
+        return 0;
+
+    if (EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, (unsigned char *)buf, &ret) <= 0)
+        return -1;
+
+    return ((int)ret);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/bio_ok.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/bio_ok.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b156e62
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/bio_ok.c
@@ -0,0 +1,605 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*-
+        From: Arne Ansper <arne@cyber.ee>
+
+        Why BIO_f_reliable?
+
+        I wrote function which took BIO* as argument, read data from it
+        and processed it. Then I wanted to store the input file in
+        encrypted form. OK I pushed BIO_f_cipher to the BIO stack
+        and everything was OK. BUT if user types wrong password
+        BIO_f_cipher outputs only garbage and my function crashes. Yes
+        I can and I should fix my function, but BIO_f_cipher is
+        easy way to add encryption support to many existing applications
+        and it's hard to debug and fix them all.
+
+        So I wanted another BIO which would catch the incorrect passwords and
+        file damages which cause garbage on BIO_f_cipher's output.
+
+        The easy way is to push the BIO_f_md and save the checksum at
+        the end of the file. However there are several problems with this
+        approach:
+
+        1) you must somehow separate checksum from actual data.
+        2) you need lot's of memory when reading the file, because you
+        must read to the end of the file and verify the checksum before
+        letting the application to read the data.
+
+        BIO_f_reliable tries to solve both problems, so that you can
+        read and write arbitrary long streams using only fixed amount
+        of memory.
+
+        BIO_f_reliable splits data stream into blocks. Each block is prefixed
+        with it's length and suffixed with it's digest. So you need only
+        several Kbytes of memory to buffer single block before verifying
+        it's digest.
+
+        BIO_f_reliable goes further and adds several important capabilities:
+
+        1) the digest of the block is computed over the whole stream
+        -- so nobody can rearrange the blocks or remove or replace them.
+
+        2) to detect invalid passwords right at the start BIO_f_reliable
+        adds special prefix to the stream. In order to avoid known plain-text
+        attacks this prefix is generated as follows:
+
+                *) digest is initialized with random seed instead of
+                standardized one.
+                *) same seed is written to output
+                *) well-known text is then hashed and the output
+                of the digest is also written to output.
+
+        reader can now read the seed from stream, hash the same string
+        and then compare the digest output.
+
+        Bad things: BIO_f_reliable knows what's going on in EVP_Digest. I
+        initially wrote and tested this code on x86 machine and wrote the
+        digests out in machine-dependent order :( There are people using
+        this code and I cannot change this easily without making existing
+        data files unreadable.
+
+*/
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include "internal/bio.h"
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include "internal/evp_int.h"
+
+static int ok_write(BIO *h, const char *buf, int num);
+static int ok_read(BIO *h, char *buf, int size);
+static long ok_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, long arg1, void *arg2);
+static int ok_new(BIO *h);
+static int ok_free(BIO *data);
+static long ok_callback_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, BIO_info_cb *fp);
+
+static __owur int sig_out(BIO *b);
+static __owur int sig_in(BIO *b);
+static __owur int block_out(BIO *b);
+static __owur int block_in(BIO *b);
+#define OK_BLOCK_SIZE   (1024*4)
+#define OK_BLOCK_BLOCK  4
+#define IOBS            (OK_BLOCK_SIZE+ OK_BLOCK_BLOCK+ 3*EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)
+#define WELLKNOWN "The quick brown fox jumped over the lazy dog's back."
+
+typedef struct ok_struct {
+    size_t buf_len;
+    size_t buf_off;
+    size_t buf_len_save;
+    size_t buf_off_save;
+    int cont;                   /* <= 0 when finished */
+    int finished;
+    EVP_MD_CTX *md;
+    int blockout;               /* output block is ready */
+    int sigio;                  /* must process signature */
+    unsigned char buf[IOBS];
+} BIO_OK_CTX;
+
+static const BIO_METHOD methods_ok = {
+    BIO_TYPE_CIPHER,
+    "reliable",
+    ok_write,
+    ok_read,
+    NULL,                       /* ok_puts, */
+    NULL,                       /* ok_gets, */
+    ok_ctrl,
+    ok_new,
+    ok_free,
+    ok_callback_ctrl,
+};
+
+const BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_reliable(void)
+{
+    return (&methods_ok);
+}
+
+static int ok_new(BIO *bi)
+{
+    BIO_OK_CTX *ctx;
+
+    ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx));
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    ctx->cont = 1;
+    ctx->sigio = 1;
+    ctx->md = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+    if (ctx->md == NULL) {
+        OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    BIO_set_init(bi, 0);
+    BIO_set_data(bi, ctx);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int ok_free(BIO *a)
+{
+    BIO_OK_CTX *ctx;
+
+    if (a == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    ctx = BIO_get_data(a);
+
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx->md);
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx, sizeof(BIO_OK_CTX));
+    BIO_set_data(a, NULL);
+    BIO_set_init(a, 0);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int ok_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
+{
+    int ret = 0, i, n;
+    BIO_OK_CTX *ctx;
+    BIO *next;
+
+    if (out == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    ctx = BIO_get_data(b);
+    next = BIO_next(b);
+
+    if ((ctx == NULL) || (next == NULL) || (BIO_get_init(b) == 0))
+        return 0;
+
+    while (outl > 0) {
+
+        /* copy clean bytes to output buffer */
+        if (ctx->blockout) {
+            i = ctx->buf_len - ctx->buf_off;
+            if (i > outl)
+                i = outl;
+            memcpy(out, &(ctx->buf[ctx->buf_off]), i);
+            ret += i;
+            out += i;
+            outl -= i;
+            ctx->buf_off += i;
+
+            /* all clean bytes are out */
+            if (ctx->buf_len == ctx->buf_off) {
+                ctx->buf_off = 0;
+
+                /*
+                 * copy start of the next block into proper place
+                 */
+                if (ctx->buf_len_save - ctx->buf_off_save > 0) {
+                    ctx->buf_len = ctx->buf_len_save - ctx->buf_off_save;
+                    memmove(ctx->buf, &(ctx->buf[ctx->buf_off_save]),
+                            ctx->buf_len);
+                } else {
+                    ctx->buf_len = 0;
+                }
+                ctx->blockout = 0;
+            }
+        }
+
+        /* output buffer full -- cancel */
+        if (outl == 0)
+            break;
+
+        /* no clean bytes in buffer -- fill it */
+        n = IOBS - ctx->buf_len;
+        i = BIO_read(next, &(ctx->buf[ctx->buf_len]), n);
+
+        if (i <= 0)
+            break;              /* nothing new */
+
+        ctx->buf_len += i;
+
+        /* no signature yet -- check if we got one */
+        if (ctx->sigio == 1) {
+            if (!sig_in(b)) {
+                BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+                return 0;
+            }
+        }
+
+        /* signature ok -- check if we got block */
+        if (ctx->sigio == 0) {
+            if (!block_in(b)) {
+                BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+                return 0;
+            }
+        }
+
+        /* invalid block -- cancel */
+        if (ctx->cont <= 0)
+            break;
+
+    }
+
+    BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+    BIO_copy_next_retry(b);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int ok_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl)
+{
+    int ret = 0, n, i;
+    BIO_OK_CTX *ctx;
+    BIO *next;
+
+    if (inl <= 0)
+        return inl;
+
+    ctx = BIO_get_data(b);
+    next = BIO_next(b);
+    ret = inl;
+
+    if ((ctx == NULL) || (next == NULL) || (BIO_get_init(b) == 0))
+        return (0);
+
+    if (ctx->sigio && !sig_out(b))
+        return 0;
+
+    do {
+        BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+        n = ctx->buf_len - ctx->buf_off;
+        while (ctx->blockout && n > 0) {
+            i = BIO_write(next, &(ctx->buf[ctx->buf_off]), n);
+            if (i <= 0) {
+                BIO_copy_next_retry(b);
+                if (!BIO_should_retry(b))
+                    ctx->cont = 0;
+                return (i);
+            }
+            ctx->buf_off += i;
+            n -= i;
+        }
+
+        /* at this point all pending data has been written */
+        ctx->blockout = 0;
+        if (ctx->buf_len == ctx->buf_off) {
+            ctx->buf_len = OK_BLOCK_BLOCK;
+            ctx->buf_off = 0;
+        }
+
+        if ((in == NULL) || (inl <= 0))
+            return (0);
+
+        n = (inl + ctx->buf_len > OK_BLOCK_SIZE + OK_BLOCK_BLOCK) ?
+            (int)(OK_BLOCK_SIZE + OK_BLOCK_BLOCK - ctx->buf_len) : inl;
+
+        memcpy(&ctx->buf[ctx->buf_len], in, n);
+        ctx->buf_len += n;
+        inl -= n;
+        in += n;
+
+        if (ctx->buf_len >= OK_BLOCK_SIZE + OK_BLOCK_BLOCK) {
+            if (!block_out(b)) {
+                BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+                return 0;
+            }
+        }
+    } while (inl > 0);
+
+    BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+    BIO_copy_next_retry(b);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static long ok_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
+{
+    BIO_OK_CTX *ctx;
+    EVP_MD *md;
+    const EVP_MD **ppmd;
+    long ret = 1;
+    int i;
+    BIO *next;
+
+    ctx = BIO_get_data(b);
+    next = BIO_next(b);
+
+    switch (cmd) {
+    case BIO_CTRL_RESET:
+        ctx->buf_len = 0;
+        ctx->buf_off = 0;
+        ctx->buf_len_save = 0;
+        ctx->buf_off_save = 0;
+        ctx->cont = 1;
+        ctx->finished = 0;
+        ctx->blockout = 0;
+        ctx->sigio = 1;
+        ret = BIO_ctrl(next, cmd, num, ptr);
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_EOF:         /* More to read */
+        if (ctx->cont <= 0)
+            ret = 1;
+        else
+            ret = BIO_ctrl(next, cmd, num, ptr);
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_PENDING:     /* More to read in buffer */
+    case BIO_CTRL_WPENDING:    /* More to read in buffer */
+        ret = ctx->blockout ? ctx->buf_len - ctx->buf_off : 0;
+        if (ret <= 0)
+            ret = BIO_ctrl(next, cmd, num, ptr);
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_FLUSH:
+        /* do a final write */
+        if (ctx->blockout == 0)
+            if (!block_out(b))
+                return 0;
+
+        while (ctx->blockout) {
+            i = ok_write(b, NULL, 0);
+            if (i < 0) {
+                ret = i;
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+
+        ctx->finished = 1;
+        ctx->buf_off = ctx->buf_len = 0;
+        ctx->cont = (int)ret;
+
+        /* Finally flush the underlying BIO */
+        ret = BIO_ctrl(next, cmd, num, ptr);
+        break;
+    case BIO_C_DO_STATE_MACHINE:
+        BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+        ret = BIO_ctrl(next, cmd, num, ptr);
+        BIO_copy_next_retry(b);
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_INFO:
+        ret = (long)ctx->cont;
+        break;
+    case BIO_C_SET_MD:
+        md = ptr;
+        if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx->md, md, NULL))
+            return 0;
+        BIO_set_init(b, 1);
+        break;
+    case BIO_C_GET_MD:
+        if (BIO_get_init(b)) {
+            ppmd = ptr;
+            *ppmd = EVP_MD_CTX_md(ctx->md);
+        } else
+            ret = 0;
+        break;
+    default:
+        ret = BIO_ctrl(next, cmd, num, ptr);
+        break;
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static long ok_callback_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, BIO_info_cb *fp)
+{
+    long ret = 1;
+    BIO *next;
+
+    next = BIO_next(b);
+
+    if (next == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    switch (cmd) {
+    default:
+        ret = BIO_callback_ctrl(next, cmd, fp);
+        break;
+    }
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static void longswap(void *_ptr, size_t len)
+{
+    const union {
+        long one;
+        char little;
+    } is_endian = {
+        1
+    };
+
+    if (is_endian.little) {
+        size_t i;
+        unsigned char *p = _ptr, c;
+
+        for (i = 0; i < len; i += 4) {
+            c = p[0], p[0] = p[3], p[3] = c;
+            c = p[1], p[1] = p[2], p[2] = c;
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+static int sig_out(BIO *b)
+{
+    BIO_OK_CTX *ctx;
+    EVP_MD_CTX *md;
+    const EVP_MD *digest;
+    int md_size;
+    void *md_data;
+
+    ctx = BIO_get_data(b);
+    md = ctx->md;
+    digest = EVP_MD_CTX_md(md);
+    md_size = EVP_MD_size(digest);
+    md_data = EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(md);
+
+    if (ctx->buf_len + 2 * md_size > OK_BLOCK_SIZE)
+        return 1;
+
+    if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(md, digest, NULL))
+        goto berr;
+    /*
+     * FIXME: there's absolutely no guarantee this makes any sense at all,
+     * particularly now EVP_MD_CTX has been restructured.
+     */
+    if (RAND_bytes(md_data, md_size) <= 0)
+        goto berr;
+    memcpy(&(ctx->buf[ctx->buf_len]), md_data, md_size);
+    longswap(&(ctx->buf[ctx->buf_len]), md_size);
+    ctx->buf_len += md_size;
+
+    if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md, WELLKNOWN, strlen(WELLKNOWN)))
+        goto berr;
+    if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md, &(ctx->buf[ctx->buf_len]), NULL))
+        goto berr;
+    ctx->buf_len += md_size;
+    ctx->blockout = 1;
+    ctx->sigio = 0;
+    return 1;
+ berr:
+    BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int sig_in(BIO *b)
+{
+    BIO_OK_CTX *ctx;
+    EVP_MD_CTX *md;
+    unsigned char tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+    int ret = 0;
+    const EVP_MD *digest;
+    int md_size;
+    void *md_data;
+
+    ctx = BIO_get_data(b);
+    md = ctx->md;
+    digest = EVP_MD_CTX_md(md);
+    md_size = EVP_MD_size(digest);
+    md_data = EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(md);
+
+    if ((int)(ctx->buf_len - ctx->buf_off) < 2 * md_size)
+        return 1;
+
+    if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(md, digest, NULL))
+        goto berr;
+    memcpy(md_data, &(ctx->buf[ctx->buf_off]), md_size);
+    longswap(md_data, md_size);
+    ctx->buf_off += md_size;
+
+    if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md, WELLKNOWN, strlen(WELLKNOWN)))
+        goto berr;
+    if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md, tmp, NULL))
+        goto berr;
+    ret = memcmp(&(ctx->buf[ctx->buf_off]), tmp, md_size) == 0;
+    ctx->buf_off += md_size;
+    if (ret == 1) {
+        ctx->sigio = 0;
+        if (ctx->buf_len != ctx->buf_off) {
+            memmove(ctx->buf, &(ctx->buf[ctx->buf_off]),
+                    ctx->buf_len - ctx->buf_off);
+        }
+        ctx->buf_len -= ctx->buf_off;
+        ctx->buf_off = 0;
+    } else {
+        ctx->cont = 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+ berr:
+    BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int block_out(BIO *b)
+{
+    BIO_OK_CTX *ctx;
+    EVP_MD_CTX *md;
+    unsigned long tl;
+    const EVP_MD *digest;
+    int md_size;
+
+    ctx = BIO_get_data(b);
+    md = ctx->md;
+    digest = EVP_MD_CTX_md(md);
+    md_size = EVP_MD_size(digest);
+
+    tl = ctx->buf_len - OK_BLOCK_BLOCK;
+    ctx->buf[0] = (unsigned char)(tl >> 24);
+    ctx->buf[1] = (unsigned char)(tl >> 16);
+    ctx->buf[2] = (unsigned char)(tl >> 8);
+    ctx->buf[3] = (unsigned char)(tl);
+    if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md,
+                          (unsigned char *)&(ctx->buf[OK_BLOCK_BLOCK]), tl))
+        goto berr;
+    if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md, &(ctx->buf[ctx->buf_len]), NULL))
+        goto berr;
+    ctx->buf_len += md_size;
+    ctx->blockout = 1;
+    return 1;
+ berr:
+    BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int block_in(BIO *b)
+{
+    BIO_OK_CTX *ctx;
+    EVP_MD_CTX *md;
+    unsigned long tl = 0;
+    unsigned char tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+    int md_size;
+
+    ctx = BIO_get_data(b);
+    md = ctx->md;
+    md_size = EVP_MD_size(EVP_MD_CTX_md(md));
+
+    assert(sizeof(tl) >= OK_BLOCK_BLOCK); /* always true */
+    tl = ctx->buf[0];
+    tl <<= 8;
+    tl |= ctx->buf[1];
+    tl <<= 8;
+    tl |= ctx->buf[2];
+    tl <<= 8;
+    tl |= ctx->buf[3];
+
+    if (ctx->buf_len < tl + OK_BLOCK_BLOCK + md_size)
+        return 1;
+
+    if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md,
+                          (unsigned char *)&(ctx->buf[OK_BLOCK_BLOCK]), tl))
+        goto berr;
+    if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md, tmp, NULL))
+        goto berr;
+    if (memcmp(&(ctx->buf[tl + OK_BLOCK_BLOCK]), tmp, md_size) == 0) {
+        /* there might be parts from next block lurking around ! */
+        ctx->buf_off_save = tl + OK_BLOCK_BLOCK + md_size;
+        ctx->buf_len_save = ctx->buf_len;
+        ctx->buf_off = OK_BLOCK_BLOCK;
+        ctx->buf_len = tl + OK_BLOCK_BLOCK;
+        ctx->blockout = 1;
+    } else {
+        ctx->cont = 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+ berr:
+    BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+    return 0;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/build.info b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/build.info
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bf633dc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/build.info
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+LIBS=../../libcrypto
+SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
+        encode.c digest.c evp_enc.c evp_key.c evp_cnf.c \
+        e_des.c e_bf.c e_idea.c e_des3.c e_camellia.c\
+        e_rc4.c e_aes.c names.c e_seed.c \
+        e_xcbc_d.c e_rc2.c e_cast.c e_rc5.c \
+        m_null.c m_md2.c m_md4.c m_md5.c m_sha1.c m_wp.c \
+        m_md5_sha1.c m_mdc2.c m_ripemd.c \
+        p_open.c p_seal.c p_sign.c p_verify.c p_lib.c p_enc.c p_dec.c \
+        bio_md.c bio_b64.c bio_enc.c evp_err.c e_null.c \
+        c_allc.c c_alld.c evp_lib.c bio_ok.c \
+        evp_pkey.c evp_pbe.c p5_crpt.c p5_crpt2.c scrypt.c \
+        e_old.c pmeth_lib.c pmeth_fn.c pmeth_gn.c m_sigver.c \
+        e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha256.c e_rc4_hmac_md5.c \
+        e_chacha20_poly1305.c cmeth_lib.c
+
+INCLUDE[e_aes.o]=.. ../modes
+INCLUDE[e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.o]=../modes
+INCLUDE[e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha256.o]=../modes
+INCLUDE[e_camellia.o]=.. ../modes
+INCLUDE[e_des.o]=..
+INCLUDE[e_des3.o]=..
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/c_allc.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/c_allc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6ed31ed
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/c_allc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,220 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <internal/evp_int.h>
+#include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+
+void openssl_add_all_ciphers_int(void)
+{
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_des_cfb());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_des_cfb1());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_des_cfb8());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_des_ede_cfb());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_des_ede3_cfb());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_des_ede3_cfb1());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_des_ede3_cfb8());
+
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_des_ofb());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_des_ede_ofb());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_des_ede3_ofb());
+
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_desx_cbc());
+    EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_desx_cbc, "DESX");
+    EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_desx_cbc, "desx");
+
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_des_cbc());
+    EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_des_cbc, "DES");
+    EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_des_cbc, "des");
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_des_ede_cbc());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_des_ede3_cbc());
+    EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_des_ede3_cbc, "DES3");
+    EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_des_ede3_cbc, "des3");
+
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_des_ecb());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_des_ede());
+    EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_des_ede_ecb, "DES-EDE-ECB");
+    EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_des_ede_ecb, "des-ede-ecb");
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_des_ede3());
+    EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_des_ede3_ecb, "DES-EDE3-ECB");
+    EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_des_ede3_ecb, "des-ede3-ecb");
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_des_ede3_wrap());
+    EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_id_smime_alg_CMS3DESwrap, "des3-wrap");
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_rc4());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_rc4_40());
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_rc4_hmac_md5());
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_IDEA
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_idea_ecb());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_idea_cfb());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_idea_ofb());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_idea_cbc());
+    EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_idea_cbc, "IDEA");
+    EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_idea_cbc, "idea");
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SEED
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_seed_ecb());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_seed_cfb());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_seed_ofb());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_seed_cbc());
+    EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_seed_cbc, "SEED");
+    EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_seed_cbc, "seed");
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC2
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_rc2_ecb());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_rc2_cfb());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_rc2_ofb());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_rc2_cbc());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_rc2_40_cbc());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_rc2_64_cbc());
+    EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_rc2_cbc, "RC2");
+    EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_rc2_cbc, "rc2");
+    EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_rc2_cbc, "rc2-128");
+    EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_rc2_64_cbc, "rc2-64");
+    EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_rc2_40_cbc, "rc2-40");
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BF
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_bf_ecb());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_bf_cfb());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_bf_ofb());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_bf_cbc());
+    EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_bf_cbc, "BF");
+    EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_bf_cbc, "bf");
+    EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_bf_cbc, "blowfish");
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAST
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_cast5_ecb());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_cast5_cfb());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_cast5_ofb());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_cast5_cbc());
+    EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_cast5_cbc, "CAST");
+    EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_cast5_cbc, "cast");
+    EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_cast5_cbc, "CAST-cbc");
+    EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_cast5_cbc, "cast-cbc");
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC5
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_rc5_32_12_16_ecb());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_rc5_32_12_16_cfb());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_rc5_32_12_16_ofb());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_rc5_32_12_16_cbc());
+    EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_rc5_cbc, "rc5");
+    EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_rc5_cbc, "RC5");
+#endif
+
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_128_ecb());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_128_cbc());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_128_cfb());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_128_cfb1());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_128_cfb8());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_128_ofb());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_128_ctr());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_128_gcm());
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCB
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_128_ocb());
+#endif
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_128_xts());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_128_ccm());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_128_wrap());
+    EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_id_aes128_wrap, "aes128-wrap");
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_128_wrap_pad());
+    EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_aes_128_cbc, "AES128");
+    EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_aes_128_cbc, "aes128");
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_192_ecb());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_192_cbc());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_192_cfb());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_192_cfb1());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_192_cfb8());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_192_ofb());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_192_ctr());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_192_gcm());
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCB
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_192_ocb());
+#endif
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_192_ccm());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_192_wrap());
+    EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_id_aes192_wrap, "aes192-wrap");
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_192_wrap_pad());
+    EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_aes_192_cbc, "AES192");
+    EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_aes_192_cbc, "aes192");
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_256_ecb());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_256_cbc());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_256_cfb());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_256_cfb1());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_256_cfb8());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_256_ofb());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_256_ctr());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_256_gcm());
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCB
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_256_ocb());
+#endif
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_256_xts());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_256_ccm());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_256_wrap());
+    EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_id_aes256_wrap, "aes256-wrap");
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_256_wrap_pad());
+    EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_aes_256_cbc, "AES256");
+    EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_aes_256_cbc, "aes256");
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha1());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha256());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha256());
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_camellia_128_ecb());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_camellia_128_cbc());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_camellia_128_cfb());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_camellia_128_cfb1());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_camellia_128_cfb8());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_camellia_128_ofb());
+    EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_camellia_128_cbc, "CAMELLIA128");
+    EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_camellia_128_cbc, "camellia128");
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_camellia_192_ecb());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_camellia_192_cbc());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_camellia_192_cfb());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_camellia_192_cfb1());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_camellia_192_cfb8());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_camellia_192_ofb());
+    EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_camellia_192_cbc, "CAMELLIA192");
+    EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_camellia_192_cbc, "camellia192");
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_camellia_256_ecb());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_camellia_256_cbc());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_camellia_256_cfb());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_camellia_256_cfb1());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_camellia_256_cfb8());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_camellia_256_ofb());
+    EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_camellia_256_cbc, "CAMELLIA256");
+    EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_camellia_256_cbc, "camellia256");
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_camellia_128_ctr());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_camellia_192_ctr());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_camellia_256_ctr());
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CHACHA
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_chacha20());
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POLY1305
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_chacha20_poly1305());
+# endif
+#endif
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/c_alld.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/c_alld.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ec79734
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/c_alld.c
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <internal/evp_int.h>
+#include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+
+void openssl_add_all_digests_int(void)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD4
+    EVP_add_digest(EVP_md4());
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+    EVP_add_digest(EVP_md5());
+    EVP_add_digest_alias(SN_md5, "ssl3-md5");
+    EVP_add_digest(EVP_md5_sha1());
+#endif
+    EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha1());
+    EVP_add_digest_alias(SN_sha1, "ssl3-sha1");
+    EVP_add_digest_alias(SN_sha1WithRSAEncryption, SN_sha1WithRSA);
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MDC2) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DES)
+    EVP_add_digest(EVP_mdc2());
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RMD160
+    EVP_add_digest(EVP_ripemd160());
+    EVP_add_digest_alias(SN_ripemd160, "ripemd");
+    EVP_add_digest_alias(SN_ripemd160, "rmd160");
+#endif
+    EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha224());
+    EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha256());
+    EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha384());
+    EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha512());
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WHIRLPOOL
+    EVP_add_digest(EVP_whirlpool());
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BLAKE2
+    EVP_add_digest(EVP_blake2b512());
+    EVP_add_digest(EVP_blake2s256());
+#endif
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/cmeth_lib.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/cmeth_lib.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e2295c4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/cmeth_lib.c
@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include "internal/evp_int.h"
+#include "evp_locl.h"
+
+EVP_CIPHER *EVP_CIPHER_meth_new(int cipher_type, int block_size, int key_len)
+{
+    EVP_CIPHER *cipher = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER));
+
+    if (cipher != NULL) {
+        cipher->nid = cipher_type;
+        cipher->block_size = block_size;
+        cipher->key_len = key_len;
+    }
+    return cipher;
+}
+
+EVP_CIPHER *EVP_CIPHER_meth_dup(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher)
+{
+    EVP_CIPHER *to = EVP_CIPHER_meth_new(cipher->nid, cipher->block_size,
+                                         cipher->key_len);
+
+    if (to != NULL)
+        memcpy(to, cipher, sizeof(*to));
+    return to;
+}
+
+void EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(EVP_CIPHER *cipher)
+{
+    OPENSSL_free(cipher);
+}
+
+int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_iv_length(EVP_CIPHER *cipher, int iv_len)
+{
+    cipher->iv_len = iv_len;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_flags(EVP_CIPHER *cipher, unsigned long flags)
+{
+    cipher->flags = flags;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_impl_ctx_size(EVP_CIPHER *cipher, int ctx_size)
+{
+    cipher->ctx_size = ctx_size;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_init(EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
+                             int (*init) (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+                                          const unsigned char *key,
+                                          const unsigned char *iv,
+                                          int enc))
+{
+    cipher->init = init;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
+                                  int (*do_cipher) (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+                                                    unsigned char *out,
+                                                    const unsigned char *in,
+                                                    size_t inl))
+{
+    cipher->do_cipher = do_cipher;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
+                                int (*cleanup) (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *))
+{
+    cipher->cleanup = cleanup;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_set_asn1_params(EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
+                                        int (*set_asn1_parameters) (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *,
+                                                                    ASN1_TYPE *))
+{
+    cipher->set_asn1_parameters = set_asn1_parameters;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_get_asn1_params(EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
+                                        int (*get_asn1_parameters) (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *,
+                                                                    ASN1_TYPE *))
+{
+    cipher->get_asn1_parameters = get_asn1_parameters;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
+                             int (*ctrl) (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int type,
+                                          int arg, void *ptr))
+{
+    cipher->ctrl = ctrl;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+
+int (*EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_init(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher))(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+                                                          const unsigned char *key,
+                                                          const unsigned char *iv,
+                                                          int enc)
+{
+    return cipher->init;
+}
+int (*EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_do_cipher(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher))(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+                                                               unsigned char *out,
+                                                               const unsigned char *in,
+                                                               size_t inl)
+{
+    return cipher->do_cipher;
+}
+
+int (*EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_cleanup(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher))(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *)
+{
+    return cipher->cleanup;
+}
+
+int (*EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_set_asn1_params(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher))(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *,
+                                                                     ASN1_TYPE *)
+{
+    return cipher->set_asn1_parameters;
+}
+
+int (*EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_get_asn1_params(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher))(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *,
+                                                               ASN1_TYPE *)
+{
+    return cipher->get_asn1_parameters;
+}
+
+int (*EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_ctrl(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher))(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *,
+                                                          int type, int arg,
+                                                          void *ptr)
+{
+    return cipher->ctrl;
+}
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/digest.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/digest.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..65eff7c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/digest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,269 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#include "internal/evp_int.h"
+#include "evp_locl.h"
+
+/* This call frees resources associated with the context */
+int EVP_MD_CTX_reset(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        return 1;
+
+    /*
+     * Don't assume ctx->md_data was cleaned in EVP_Digest_Final, because
+     * sometimes only copies of the context are ever finalised.
+     */
+    if (ctx->digest && ctx->digest->cleanup
+        && !EVP_MD_CTX_test_flags(ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_CLEANED))
+        ctx->digest->cleanup(ctx);
+    if (ctx->digest && ctx->digest->ctx_size && ctx->md_data
+        && !EVP_MD_CTX_test_flags(ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_REUSE)) {
+        OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->md_data, ctx->digest->ctx_size);
+    }
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx->pctx);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    ENGINE_finish(ctx->engine);
+#endif
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx, sizeof(*ctx));
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+EVP_MD_CTX *EVP_MD_CTX_new(void)
+{
+    return OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(EVP_MD_CTX));
+}
+
+void EVP_MD_CTX_free(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    EVP_MD_CTX_reset(ctx);
+    OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+}
+
+int EVP_DigestInit(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *type)
+{
+    EVP_MD_CTX_reset(ctx);
+    return EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, type, NULL);
+}
+
+int EVP_DigestInit_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *type, ENGINE *impl)
+{
+    EVP_MD_CTX_clear_flags(ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_CLEANED);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    /*
+     * Whether it's nice or not, "Inits" can be used on "Final"'d contexts so
+     * this context may already have an ENGINE! Try to avoid releasing the
+     * previous handle, re-querying for an ENGINE, and having a
+     * reinitialisation, when it may all be unnecessary.
+     */
+    if (ctx->engine && ctx->digest &&
+        (type == NULL || (type->type == ctx->digest->type)))
+        goto skip_to_init;
+    if (type) {
+        /*
+         * Ensure an ENGINE left lying around from last time is cleared (the
+         * previous check attempted to avoid this if the same ENGINE and
+         * EVP_MD could be used).
+         */
+        ENGINE_finish(ctx->engine);
+        if (impl != NULL) {
+            if (!ENGINE_init(impl)) {
+                EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_DIGESTINIT_EX, EVP_R_INITIALIZATION_ERROR);
+                return 0;
+            }
+        } else {
+            /* Ask if an ENGINE is reserved for this job */
+            impl = ENGINE_get_digest_engine(type->type);
+        }
+        if (impl != NULL) {
+            /* There's an ENGINE for this job ... (apparently) */
+            const EVP_MD *d = ENGINE_get_digest(impl, type->type);
+
+            if (d == NULL) {
+                EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_DIGESTINIT_EX, EVP_R_INITIALIZATION_ERROR);
+                ENGINE_finish(impl);
+                return 0;
+            }
+            /* We'll use the ENGINE's private digest definition */
+            type = d;
+            /*
+             * Store the ENGINE functional reference so we know 'type' came
+             * from an ENGINE and we need to release it when done.
+             */
+            ctx->engine = impl;
+        } else
+            ctx->engine = NULL;
+    } else {
+        if (!ctx->digest) {
+            EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_DIGESTINIT_EX, EVP_R_NO_DIGEST_SET);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        type = ctx->digest;
+    }
+#endif
+    if (ctx->digest != type) {
+        if (ctx->digest && ctx->digest->ctx_size) {
+            OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->md_data, ctx->digest->ctx_size);
+            ctx->md_data = NULL;
+        }
+        ctx->digest = type;
+        if (!(ctx->flags & EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NO_INIT) && type->ctx_size) {
+            ctx->update = type->update;
+            ctx->md_data = OPENSSL_zalloc(type->ctx_size);
+            if (ctx->md_data == NULL) {
+                EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_DIGESTINIT_EX, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                return 0;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+ skip_to_init:
+#endif
+    if (ctx->pctx) {
+        int r;
+        r = EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx->pctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG,
+                              EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DIGESTINIT, 0, ctx);
+        if (r <= 0 && (r != -2))
+            return 0;
+    }
+    if (ctx->flags & EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NO_INIT)
+        return 1;
+    return ctx->digest->init(ctx);
+}
+
+int EVP_DigestUpdate(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count)
+{
+    return ctx->update(ctx, data, count);
+}
+
+/* The caller can assume that this removes any secret data from the context */
+int EVP_DigestFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *size)
+{
+    int ret;
+    ret = EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, md, size);
+    EVP_MD_CTX_reset(ctx);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/* The caller can assume that this removes any secret data from the context */
+int EVP_DigestFinal_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *size)
+{
+    int ret;
+
+    OPENSSL_assert(ctx->digest->md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+    ret = ctx->digest->final(ctx, md);
+    if (size != NULL)
+        *size = ctx->digest->md_size;
+    if (ctx->digest->cleanup) {
+        ctx->digest->cleanup(ctx);
+        EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_CLEANED);
+    }
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->md_data, ctx->digest->ctx_size);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int EVP_MD_CTX_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *out, const EVP_MD_CTX *in)
+{
+    EVP_MD_CTX_reset(out);
+    return EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(out, in);
+}
+
+int EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *out, const EVP_MD_CTX *in)
+{
+    unsigned char *tmp_buf;
+    if ((in == NULL) || (in->digest == NULL)) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_MD_CTX_COPY_EX, EVP_R_INPUT_NOT_INITIALIZED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    /* Make sure it's safe to copy a digest context using an ENGINE */
+    if (in->engine && !ENGINE_init(in->engine)) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_MD_CTX_COPY_EX, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB);
+        return 0;
+    }
+#endif
+
+    if (out->digest == in->digest) {
+        tmp_buf = out->md_data;
+        EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(out, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_REUSE);
+    } else
+        tmp_buf = NULL;
+    EVP_MD_CTX_reset(out);
+    memcpy(out, in, sizeof(*out));
+
+    /* Null these variables, since they are getting fixed up
+     * properly below.  Anything else may cause a memleak and/or
+     * double free if any of the memory allocations below fail
+     */
+    out->md_data = NULL;
+    out->pctx = NULL;
+
+    if (in->md_data && out->digest->ctx_size) {
+        if (tmp_buf)
+            out->md_data = tmp_buf;
+        else {
+            out->md_data = OPENSSL_malloc(out->digest->ctx_size);
+            if (out->md_data == NULL) {
+                EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_MD_CTX_COPY_EX, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                return 0;
+            }
+        }
+        memcpy(out->md_data, in->md_data, out->digest->ctx_size);
+    }
+
+    out->update = in->update;
+
+    if (in->pctx) {
+        out->pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_dup(in->pctx);
+        if (!out->pctx) {
+            EVP_MD_CTX_reset(out);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (out->digest->copy)
+        return out->digest->copy(out, in);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int EVP_Digest(const void *data, size_t count,
+               unsigned char *md, unsigned int *size, const EVP_MD *type,
+               ENGINE *impl)
+{
+    EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+    int ret;
+
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_ONESHOT);
+    ret = EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, type, impl)
+        && EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, data, count)
+        && EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, md, size);
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, int cmd, int p1, void *p2)
+{
+    if (ctx->digest && ctx->digest->md_ctrl) {
+        int ret = ctx->digest->md_ctrl(ctx, cmd, p1, p2);
+        if (ret <= 0)
+            return 0;
+        return 1;
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/e_aes.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/e_aes.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3f36d70
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/e_aes.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2705 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2001-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <openssl/aes.h>
+#include "internal/evp_int.h"
+#include "modes_lcl.h"
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include "evp_locl.h"
+
+typedef struct {
+    union {
+        double align;
+        AES_KEY ks;
+    } ks;
+    block128_f block;
+    union {
+        cbc128_f cbc;
+        ctr128_f ctr;
+    } stream;
+} EVP_AES_KEY;
+
+typedef struct {
+    union {
+        double align;
+        AES_KEY ks;
+    } ks;                       /* AES key schedule to use */
+    int key_set;                /* Set if key initialised */
+    int iv_set;                 /* Set if an iv is set */
+    GCM128_CONTEXT gcm;
+    unsigned char *iv;          /* Temporary IV store */
+    int ivlen;                  /* IV length */
+    int taglen;
+    int iv_gen;                 /* It is OK to generate IVs */
+    int tls_aad_len;            /* TLS AAD length */
+    ctr128_f ctr;
+} EVP_AES_GCM_CTX;
+
+typedef struct {
+    union {
+        double align;
+        AES_KEY ks;
+    } ks1, ks2;                 /* AES key schedules to use */
+    XTS128_CONTEXT xts;
+    void (*stream) (const unsigned char *in,
+                    unsigned char *out, size_t length,
+                    const AES_KEY *key1, const AES_KEY *key2,
+                    const unsigned char iv[16]);
+} EVP_AES_XTS_CTX;
+
+typedef struct {
+    union {
+        double align;
+        AES_KEY ks;
+    } ks;                       /* AES key schedule to use */
+    int key_set;                /* Set if key initialised */
+    int iv_set;                 /* Set if an iv is set */
+    int tag_set;                /* Set if tag is valid */
+    int len_set;                /* Set if message length set */
+    int L, M;                   /* L and M parameters from RFC3610 */
+    int tls_aad_len;            /* TLS AAD length */
+    CCM128_CONTEXT ccm;
+    ccm128_f str;
+} EVP_AES_CCM_CTX;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCB
+typedef struct {
+    union {
+        double align;
+        AES_KEY ks;
+    } ksenc;                    /* AES key schedule to use for encryption */
+    union {
+        double align;
+        AES_KEY ks;
+    } ksdec;                    /* AES key schedule to use for decryption */
+    int key_set;                /* Set if key initialised */
+    int iv_set;                 /* Set if an iv is set */
+    OCB128_CONTEXT ocb;
+    unsigned char *iv;          /* Temporary IV store */
+    unsigned char tag[16];
+    unsigned char data_buf[16]; /* Store partial data blocks */
+    unsigned char aad_buf[16];  /* Store partial AAD blocks */
+    int data_buf_len;
+    int aad_buf_len;
+    int ivlen;                  /* IV length */
+    int taglen;
+} EVP_AES_OCB_CTX;
+#endif
+
+#define MAXBITCHUNK     ((size_t)1<<(sizeof(size_t)*8-4))
+
+#ifdef VPAES_ASM
+int vpaes_set_encrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, int bits,
+                          AES_KEY *key);
+int vpaes_set_decrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, int bits,
+                          AES_KEY *key);
+
+void vpaes_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                   const AES_KEY *key);
+void vpaes_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                   const AES_KEY *key);
+
+void vpaes_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *in,
+                       unsigned char *out,
+                       size_t length,
+                       const AES_KEY *key, unsigned char *ivec, int enc);
+#endif
+#ifdef BSAES_ASM
+void bsaes_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                       size_t length, const AES_KEY *key,
+                       unsigned char ivec[16], int enc);
+void bsaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                                size_t len, const AES_KEY *key,
+                                const unsigned char ivec[16]);
+void bsaes_xts_encrypt(const unsigned char *inp, unsigned char *out,
+                       size_t len, const AES_KEY *key1,
+                       const AES_KEY *key2, const unsigned char iv[16]);
+void bsaes_xts_decrypt(const unsigned char *inp, unsigned char *out,
+                       size_t len, const AES_KEY *key1,
+                       const AES_KEY *key2, const unsigned char iv[16]);
+#endif
+#ifdef AES_CTR_ASM
+void AES_ctr32_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                       size_t blocks, const AES_KEY *key,
+                       const unsigned char ivec[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]);
+#endif
+#ifdef AES_XTS_ASM
+void AES_xts_encrypt(const char *inp, char *out, size_t len,
+                     const AES_KEY *key1, const AES_KEY *key2,
+                     const unsigned char iv[16]);
+void AES_xts_decrypt(const char *inp, char *out, size_t len,
+                     const AES_KEY *key1, const AES_KEY *key2,
+                     const unsigned char iv[16]);
+#endif
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ) && (defined(__powerpc__) || defined(__ppc__) || defined(_ARCH_PPC))
+# include "ppc_arch.h"
+# ifdef VPAES_ASM
+#  define VPAES_CAPABLE (OPENSSL_ppccap_P & PPC_ALTIVEC)
+# endif
+# define HWAES_CAPABLE  (OPENSSL_ppccap_P & PPC_CRYPTO207)
+# define HWAES_set_encrypt_key aes_p8_set_encrypt_key
+# define HWAES_set_decrypt_key aes_p8_set_decrypt_key
+# define HWAES_encrypt aes_p8_encrypt
+# define HWAES_decrypt aes_p8_decrypt
+# define HWAES_cbc_encrypt aes_p8_cbc_encrypt
+# define HWAES_ctr32_encrypt_blocks aes_p8_ctr32_encrypt_blocks
+# define HWAES_xts_encrypt aes_p8_xts_encrypt
+# define HWAES_xts_decrypt aes_p8_xts_decrypt
+#endif
+
+#if     defined(AES_ASM) && !defined(I386_ONLY) &&      (  \
+        ((defined(__i386)       || defined(__i386__)    || \
+          defined(_M_IX86)) && defined(OPENSSL_IA32_SSE2))|| \
+        defined(__x86_64)       || defined(__x86_64__)  || \
+        defined(_M_AMD64)       || defined(_M_X64)      )
+
+extern unsigned int OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[];
+
+# ifdef VPAES_ASM
+#  define VPAES_CAPABLE   (OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1]&(1<<(41-32)))
+# endif
+# ifdef BSAES_ASM
+#  define BSAES_CAPABLE   (OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1]&(1<<(41-32)))
+# endif
+/*
+ * AES-NI section
+ */
+# define AESNI_CAPABLE   (OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1]&(1<<(57-32)))
+
+int aesni_set_encrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, int bits,
+                          AES_KEY *key);
+int aesni_set_decrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, int bits,
+                          AES_KEY *key);
+
+void aesni_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                   const AES_KEY *key);
+void aesni_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                   const AES_KEY *key);
+
+void aesni_ecb_encrypt(const unsigned char *in,
+                       unsigned char *out,
+                       size_t length, const AES_KEY *key, int enc);
+void aesni_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *in,
+                       unsigned char *out,
+                       size_t length,
+                       const AES_KEY *key, unsigned char *ivec, int enc);
+
+void aesni_ctr32_encrypt_blocks(const unsigned char *in,
+                                unsigned char *out,
+                                size_t blocks,
+                                const void *key, const unsigned char *ivec);
+
+void aesni_xts_encrypt(const unsigned char *in,
+                       unsigned char *out,
+                       size_t length,
+                       const AES_KEY *key1, const AES_KEY *key2,
+                       const unsigned char iv[16]);
+
+void aesni_xts_decrypt(const unsigned char *in,
+                       unsigned char *out,
+                       size_t length,
+                       const AES_KEY *key1, const AES_KEY *key2,
+                       const unsigned char iv[16]);
+
+void aesni_ccm64_encrypt_blocks(const unsigned char *in,
+                                unsigned char *out,
+                                size_t blocks,
+                                const void *key,
+                                const unsigned char ivec[16],
+                                unsigned char cmac[16]);
+
+void aesni_ccm64_decrypt_blocks(const unsigned char *in,
+                                unsigned char *out,
+                                size_t blocks,
+                                const void *key,
+                                const unsigned char ivec[16],
+                                unsigned char cmac[16]);
+
+# if defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64)
+size_t aesni_gcm_encrypt(const unsigned char *in,
+                         unsigned char *out,
+                         size_t len,
+                         const void *key, unsigned char ivec[16], u64 *Xi);
+#  define AES_gcm_encrypt aesni_gcm_encrypt
+size_t aesni_gcm_decrypt(const unsigned char *in,
+                         unsigned char *out,
+                         size_t len,
+                         const void *key, unsigned char ivec[16], u64 *Xi);
+#  define AES_gcm_decrypt aesni_gcm_decrypt
+void gcm_ghash_avx(u64 Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16], const u8 *in,
+                   size_t len);
+#  define AES_GCM_ASM(gctx)       (gctx->ctr==aesni_ctr32_encrypt_blocks && \
+                                 gctx->gcm.ghash==gcm_ghash_avx)
+#  define AES_GCM_ASM2(gctx)      (gctx->gcm.block==(block128_f)aesni_encrypt && \
+                                 gctx->gcm.ghash==gcm_ghash_avx)
+#  undef AES_GCM_ASM2          /* minor size optimization */
+# endif
+
+static int aesni_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+                          const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
+{
+    int ret, mode;
+    EVP_AES_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY,ctx);
+
+    mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx);
+    if ((mode == EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE || mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
+        && !enc) {
+        ret = aesni_set_decrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
+                                    &dat->ks.ks);
+        dat->block = (block128_f) aesni_decrypt;
+        dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ?
+            (cbc128_f) aesni_cbc_encrypt : NULL;
+    } else {
+        ret = aesni_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
+                                    &dat->ks.ks);
+        dat->block = (block128_f) aesni_encrypt;
+        if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
+            dat->stream.cbc = (cbc128_f) aesni_cbc_encrypt;
+        else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE)
+            dat->stream.ctr = (ctr128_f) aesni_ctr32_encrypt_blocks;
+        else
+            dat->stream.cbc = NULL;
+    }
+
+    if (ret < 0) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_AESNI_INIT_KEY, EVP_R_AES_KEY_SETUP_FAILED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int aesni_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                            const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
+{
+    aesni_cbc_encrypt(in, out, len, &EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY,ctx)->ks.ks,
+                      EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx),
+                      EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx));
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int aesni_ecb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                            const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
+{
+    size_t bl = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(ctx);
+
+    if (len < bl)
+        return 1;
+
+    aesni_ecb_encrypt(in, out, len, &EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY,ctx)->ks.ks,
+                      EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx));
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+# define aesni_ofb_cipher aes_ofb_cipher
+static int aesni_ofb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                            const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
+
+# define aesni_cfb_cipher aes_cfb_cipher
+static int aesni_cfb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                            const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
+
+# define aesni_cfb8_cipher aes_cfb8_cipher
+static int aesni_cfb8_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                             const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
+
+# define aesni_cfb1_cipher aes_cfb1_cipher
+static int aesni_cfb1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                             const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
+
+# define aesni_ctr_cipher aes_ctr_cipher
+static int aesni_ctr_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                            const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
+
+static int aesni_gcm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+                              const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
+{
+    EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX,ctx);
+    if (!iv && !key)
+        return 1;
+    if (key) {
+        aesni_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
+                              &gctx->ks.ks);
+        CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks, (block128_f) aesni_encrypt);
+        gctx->ctr = (ctr128_f) aesni_ctr32_encrypt_blocks;
+        /*
+         * If we have an iv can set it directly, otherwise use saved IV.
+         */
+        if (iv == NULL && gctx->iv_set)
+            iv = gctx->iv;
+        if (iv) {
+            CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, iv, gctx->ivlen);
+            gctx->iv_set = 1;
+        }
+        gctx->key_set = 1;
+    } else {
+        /* If key set use IV, otherwise copy */
+        if (gctx->key_set)
+            CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, iv, gctx->ivlen);
+        else
+            memcpy(gctx->iv, iv, gctx->ivlen);
+        gctx->iv_set = 1;
+        gctx->iv_gen = 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+# define aesni_gcm_cipher aes_gcm_cipher
+static int aesni_gcm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                            const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
+
+static int aesni_xts_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+                              const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
+{
+    EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_XTS_CTX,ctx);
+    if (!iv && !key)
+        return 1;
+
+    if (key) {
+        /* key_len is two AES keys */
+        if (enc) {
+            aesni_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 4,
+                                  &xctx->ks1.ks);
+            xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) aesni_encrypt;
+            xctx->stream = aesni_xts_encrypt;
+        } else {
+            aesni_set_decrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 4,
+                                  &xctx->ks1.ks);
+            xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) aesni_decrypt;
+            xctx->stream = aesni_xts_decrypt;
+        }
+
+        aesni_set_encrypt_key(key + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) / 2,
+                              EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 4,
+                              &xctx->ks2.ks);
+        xctx->xts.block2 = (block128_f) aesni_encrypt;
+
+        xctx->xts.key1 = &xctx->ks1;
+    }
+
+    if (iv) {
+        xctx->xts.key2 = &xctx->ks2;
+        memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), iv, 16);
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+# define aesni_xts_cipher aes_xts_cipher
+static int aesni_xts_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                            const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
+
+static int aesni_ccm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+                              const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
+{
+    EVP_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_CCM_CTX,ctx);
+    if (!iv && !key)
+        return 1;
+    if (key) {
+        aesni_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
+                              &cctx->ks.ks);
+        CRYPTO_ccm128_init(&cctx->ccm, cctx->M, cctx->L,
+                           &cctx->ks, (block128_f) aesni_encrypt);
+        cctx->str = enc ? (ccm128_f) aesni_ccm64_encrypt_blocks :
+            (ccm128_f) aesni_ccm64_decrypt_blocks;
+        cctx->key_set = 1;
+    }
+    if (iv) {
+        memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), iv, 15 - cctx->L);
+        cctx->iv_set = 1;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+# define aesni_ccm_cipher aes_ccm_cipher
+static int aesni_ccm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                            const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCB
+void aesni_ocb_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                       size_t blocks, const void *key,
+                       size_t start_block_num,
+                       unsigned char offset_i[16],
+                       const unsigned char L_[][16],
+                       unsigned char checksum[16]);
+void aesni_ocb_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                       size_t blocks, const void *key,
+                       size_t start_block_num,
+                       unsigned char offset_i[16],
+                       const unsigned char L_[][16],
+                       unsigned char checksum[16]);
+
+static int aesni_ocb_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+                              const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
+{
+    EVP_AES_OCB_CTX *octx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_OCB_CTX,ctx);
+    if (!iv && !key)
+        return 1;
+    if (key) {
+        do {
+            /*
+             * We set both the encrypt and decrypt key here because decrypt
+             * needs both. We could possibly optimise to remove setting the
+             * decrypt for an encryption operation.
+             */
+            aesni_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
+                                  &octx->ksenc.ks);
+            aesni_set_decrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
+                                  &octx->ksdec.ks);
+            if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_init(&octx->ocb,
+                                    &octx->ksenc.ks, &octx->ksdec.ks,
+                                    (block128_f) aesni_encrypt,
+                                    (block128_f) aesni_decrypt,
+                                    enc ? aesni_ocb_encrypt
+                                        : aesni_ocb_decrypt))
+                return 0;
+        }
+        while (0);
+
+        /*
+         * If we have an iv we can set it directly, otherwise use saved IV.
+         */
+        if (iv == NULL && octx->iv_set)
+            iv = octx->iv;
+        if (iv) {
+            if (CRYPTO_ocb128_setiv(&octx->ocb, iv, octx->ivlen, octx->taglen)
+                != 1)
+                return 0;
+            octx->iv_set = 1;
+        }
+        octx->key_set = 1;
+    } else {
+        /* If key set use IV, otherwise copy */
+        if (octx->key_set)
+            CRYPTO_ocb128_setiv(&octx->ocb, iv, octx->ivlen, octx->taglen);
+        else
+            memcpy(octx->iv, iv, octx->ivlen);
+        octx->iv_set = 1;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+#  define aesni_ocb_cipher aes_ocb_cipher
+static int aesni_ocb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                            const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
+# endif                        /* OPENSSL_NO_OCB */
+
+# define BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,blocksize,ivlen,nmode,mode,MODE,flags) \
+static const EVP_CIPHER aesni_##keylen##_##mode = { \
+        nid##_##keylen##_##nmode,blocksize,keylen/8,ivlen, \
+        flags|EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE,   \
+        aesni_init_key,                 \
+        aesni_##mode##_cipher,          \
+        NULL,                           \
+        sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY),            \
+        NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL }; \
+static const EVP_CIPHER aes_##keylen##_##mode = { \
+        nid##_##keylen##_##nmode,blocksize,     \
+        keylen/8,ivlen, \
+        flags|EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE,   \
+        aes_init_key,                   \
+        aes_##mode##_cipher,            \
+        NULL,                           \
+        sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY),            \
+        NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL }; \
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_##keylen##_##mode(void) \
+{ return AESNI_CAPABLE?&aesni_##keylen##_##mode:&aes_##keylen##_##mode; }
+
+# define BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(nid,keylen,blocksize,ivlen,mode,MODE,flags) \
+static const EVP_CIPHER aesni_##keylen##_##mode = { \
+        nid##_##keylen##_##mode,blocksize, \
+        (EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE?2:1)*keylen/8, ivlen, \
+        flags|EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE,   \
+        aesni_##mode##_init_key,        \
+        aesni_##mode##_cipher,          \
+        aes_##mode##_cleanup,           \
+        sizeof(EVP_AES_##MODE##_CTX),   \
+        NULL,NULL,aes_##mode##_ctrl,NULL }; \
+static const EVP_CIPHER aes_##keylen##_##mode = { \
+        nid##_##keylen##_##mode,blocksize, \
+        (EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE?2:1)*keylen/8, ivlen, \
+        flags|EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE,   \
+        aes_##mode##_init_key,          \
+        aes_##mode##_cipher,            \
+        aes_##mode##_cleanup,           \
+        sizeof(EVP_AES_##MODE##_CTX),   \
+        NULL,NULL,aes_##mode##_ctrl,NULL }; \
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_##keylen##_##mode(void) \
+{ return AESNI_CAPABLE?&aesni_##keylen##_##mode:&aes_##keylen##_##mode; }
+
+#elif   defined(AES_ASM) && (defined(__sparc) || defined(__sparc__))
+
+# include "sparc_arch.h"
+
+extern unsigned int OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[];
+
+/*
+ * Initial Fujitsu SPARC64 X support
+ */
+# define HWAES_CAPABLE           (OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] & SPARCV9_FJAESX)
+# define HWAES_set_encrypt_key aes_fx_set_encrypt_key
+# define HWAES_set_decrypt_key aes_fx_set_decrypt_key
+# define HWAES_encrypt aes_fx_encrypt
+# define HWAES_decrypt aes_fx_decrypt
+# define HWAES_cbc_encrypt aes_fx_cbc_encrypt
+# define HWAES_ctr32_encrypt_blocks aes_fx_ctr32_encrypt_blocks
+
+# define SPARC_AES_CAPABLE       (OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[1] & CFR_AES)
+
+void aes_t4_set_encrypt_key(const unsigned char *key, int bits, AES_KEY *ks);
+void aes_t4_set_decrypt_key(const unsigned char *key, int bits, AES_KEY *ks);
+void aes_t4_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                    const AES_KEY *key);
+void aes_t4_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                    const AES_KEY *key);
+/*
+ * Key-length specific subroutines were chosen for following reason.
+ * Each SPARC T4 core can execute up to 8 threads which share core's
+ * resources. Loading as much key material to registers allows to
+ * minimize references to shared memory interface, as well as amount
+ * of instructions in inner loops [much needed on T4]. But then having
+ * non-key-length specific routines would require conditional branches
+ * either in inner loops or on subroutines' entries. Former is hardly
+ * acceptable, while latter means code size increase to size occupied
+ * by multiple key-length specific subroutines, so why fight?
+ */
+void aes128_t4_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                           size_t len, const AES_KEY *key,
+                           unsigned char *ivec);
+void aes128_t4_cbc_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                           size_t len, const AES_KEY *key,
+                           unsigned char *ivec);
+void aes192_t4_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                           size_t len, const AES_KEY *key,
+                           unsigned char *ivec);
+void aes192_t4_cbc_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                           size_t len, const AES_KEY *key,
+                           unsigned char *ivec);
+void aes256_t4_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                           size_t len, const AES_KEY *key,
+                           unsigned char *ivec);
+void aes256_t4_cbc_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                           size_t len, const AES_KEY *key,
+                           unsigned char *ivec);
+void aes128_t4_ctr32_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                             size_t blocks, const AES_KEY *key,
+                             unsigned char *ivec);
+void aes192_t4_ctr32_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                             size_t blocks, const AES_KEY *key,
+                             unsigned char *ivec);
+void aes256_t4_ctr32_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                             size_t blocks, const AES_KEY *key,
+                             unsigned char *ivec);
+void aes128_t4_xts_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                           size_t blocks, const AES_KEY *key1,
+                           const AES_KEY *key2, const unsigned char *ivec);
+void aes128_t4_xts_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                           size_t blocks, const AES_KEY *key1,
+                           const AES_KEY *key2, const unsigned char *ivec);
+void aes256_t4_xts_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                           size_t blocks, const AES_KEY *key1,
+                           const AES_KEY *key2, const unsigned char *ivec);
+void aes256_t4_xts_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                           size_t blocks, const AES_KEY *key1,
+                           const AES_KEY *key2, const unsigned char *ivec);
+
+static int aes_t4_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+                           const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
+{
+    int ret, mode, bits;
+    EVP_AES_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY,ctx);
+
+    mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx);
+    bits = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8;
+    if ((mode == EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE || mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
+        && !enc) {
+        ret = 0;
+        aes_t4_set_decrypt_key(key, bits, &dat->ks.ks);
+        dat->block = (block128_f) aes_t4_decrypt;
+        switch (bits) {
+        case 128:
+            dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ?
+                (cbc128_f) aes128_t4_cbc_decrypt : NULL;
+            break;
+        case 192:
+            dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ?
+                (cbc128_f) aes192_t4_cbc_decrypt : NULL;
+            break;
+        case 256:
+            dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ?
+                (cbc128_f) aes256_t4_cbc_decrypt : NULL;
+            break;
+        default:
+            ret = -1;
+        }
+    } else {
+        ret = 0;
+        aes_t4_set_encrypt_key(key, bits, &dat->ks.ks);
+        dat->block = (block128_f) aes_t4_encrypt;
+        switch (bits) {
+        case 128:
+            if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
+                dat->stream.cbc = (cbc128_f) aes128_t4_cbc_encrypt;
+            else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE)
+                dat->stream.ctr = (ctr128_f) aes128_t4_ctr32_encrypt;
+            else
+                dat->stream.cbc = NULL;
+            break;
+        case 192:
+            if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
+                dat->stream.cbc = (cbc128_f) aes192_t4_cbc_encrypt;
+            else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE)
+                dat->stream.ctr = (ctr128_f) aes192_t4_ctr32_encrypt;
+            else
+                dat->stream.cbc = NULL;
+            break;
+        case 256:
+            if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
+                dat->stream.cbc = (cbc128_f) aes256_t4_cbc_encrypt;
+            else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE)
+                dat->stream.ctr = (ctr128_f) aes256_t4_ctr32_encrypt;
+            else
+                dat->stream.cbc = NULL;
+            break;
+        default:
+            ret = -1;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (ret < 0) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_AES_T4_INIT_KEY, EVP_R_AES_KEY_SETUP_FAILED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+# define aes_t4_cbc_cipher aes_cbc_cipher
+static int aes_t4_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                             const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
+
+# define aes_t4_ecb_cipher aes_ecb_cipher
+static int aes_t4_ecb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                             const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
+
+# define aes_t4_ofb_cipher aes_ofb_cipher
+static int aes_t4_ofb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                             const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
+
+# define aes_t4_cfb_cipher aes_cfb_cipher
+static int aes_t4_cfb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                             const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
+
+# define aes_t4_cfb8_cipher aes_cfb8_cipher
+static int aes_t4_cfb8_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                              const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
+
+# define aes_t4_cfb1_cipher aes_cfb1_cipher
+static int aes_t4_cfb1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                              const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
+
+# define aes_t4_ctr_cipher aes_ctr_cipher
+static int aes_t4_ctr_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                             const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
+
+static int aes_t4_gcm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+                               const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
+{
+    EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX,ctx);
+    if (!iv && !key)
+        return 1;
+    if (key) {
+        int bits = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8;
+        aes_t4_set_encrypt_key(key, bits, &gctx->ks.ks);
+        CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks,
+                           (block128_f) aes_t4_encrypt);
+        switch (bits) {
+        case 128:
+            gctx->ctr = (ctr128_f) aes128_t4_ctr32_encrypt;
+            break;
+        case 192:
+            gctx->ctr = (ctr128_f) aes192_t4_ctr32_encrypt;
+            break;
+        case 256:
+            gctx->ctr = (ctr128_f) aes256_t4_ctr32_encrypt;
+            break;
+        default:
+            return 0;
+        }
+        /*
+         * If we have an iv can set it directly, otherwise use saved IV.
+         */
+        if (iv == NULL && gctx->iv_set)
+            iv = gctx->iv;
+        if (iv) {
+            CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, iv, gctx->ivlen);
+            gctx->iv_set = 1;
+        }
+        gctx->key_set = 1;
+    } else {
+        /* If key set use IV, otherwise copy */
+        if (gctx->key_set)
+            CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, iv, gctx->ivlen);
+        else
+            memcpy(gctx->iv, iv, gctx->ivlen);
+        gctx->iv_set = 1;
+        gctx->iv_gen = 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+# define aes_t4_gcm_cipher aes_gcm_cipher
+static int aes_t4_gcm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                             const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
+
+static int aes_t4_xts_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+                               const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
+{
+    EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_XTS_CTX,ctx);
+    if (!iv && !key)
+        return 1;
+
+    if (key) {
+        int bits = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 4;
+        xctx->stream = NULL;
+        /* key_len is two AES keys */
+        if (enc) {
+            aes_t4_set_encrypt_key(key, bits, &xctx->ks1.ks);
+            xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) aes_t4_encrypt;
+            switch (bits) {
+            case 128:
+                xctx->stream = aes128_t4_xts_encrypt;
+                break;
+            case 256:
+                xctx->stream = aes256_t4_xts_encrypt;
+                break;
+            default:
+                return 0;
+            }
+        } else {
+            aes_t4_set_decrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 4,
+                                   &xctx->ks1.ks);
+            xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) aes_t4_decrypt;
+            switch (bits) {
+            case 128:
+                xctx->stream = aes128_t4_xts_decrypt;
+                break;
+            case 256:
+                xctx->stream = aes256_t4_xts_decrypt;
+                break;
+            default:
+                return 0;
+            }
+        }
+
+        aes_t4_set_encrypt_key(key + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) / 2,
+                               EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 4,
+                               &xctx->ks2.ks);
+        xctx->xts.block2 = (block128_f) aes_t4_encrypt;
+
+        xctx->xts.key1 = &xctx->ks1;
+    }
+
+    if (iv) {
+        xctx->xts.key2 = &xctx->ks2;
+        memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), iv, 16);
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+# define aes_t4_xts_cipher aes_xts_cipher
+static int aes_t4_xts_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                             const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
+
+static int aes_t4_ccm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+                               const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
+{
+    EVP_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_CCM_CTX,ctx);
+    if (!iv && !key)
+        return 1;
+    if (key) {
+        int bits = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8;
+        aes_t4_set_encrypt_key(key, bits, &cctx->ks.ks);
+        CRYPTO_ccm128_init(&cctx->ccm, cctx->M, cctx->L,
+                           &cctx->ks, (block128_f) aes_t4_encrypt);
+        cctx->str = NULL;
+        cctx->key_set = 1;
+    }
+    if (iv) {
+        memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), iv, 15 - cctx->L);
+        cctx->iv_set = 1;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+# define aes_t4_ccm_cipher aes_ccm_cipher
+static int aes_t4_ccm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                             const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCB
+static int aes_t4_ocb_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+                               const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
+{
+    EVP_AES_OCB_CTX *octx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_OCB_CTX,ctx);
+    if (!iv && !key)
+        return 1;
+    if (key) {
+        do {
+            /*
+             * We set both the encrypt and decrypt key here because decrypt
+             * needs both. We could possibly optimise to remove setting the
+             * decrypt for an encryption operation.
+             */
+            aes_t4_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
+                                   &octx->ksenc.ks);
+            aes_t4_set_decrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
+                                   &octx->ksdec.ks);
+            if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_init(&octx->ocb,
+                                    &octx->ksenc.ks, &octx->ksdec.ks,
+                                    (block128_f) aes_t4_encrypt,
+                                    (block128_f) aes_t4_decrypt,
+                                    NULL))
+                return 0;
+        }
+        while (0);
+
+        /*
+         * If we have an iv we can set it directly, otherwise use saved IV.
+         */
+        if (iv == NULL && octx->iv_set)
+            iv = octx->iv;
+        if (iv) {
+            if (CRYPTO_ocb128_setiv(&octx->ocb, iv, octx->ivlen, octx->taglen)
+                != 1)
+                return 0;
+            octx->iv_set = 1;
+        }
+        octx->key_set = 1;
+    } else {
+        /* If key set use IV, otherwise copy */
+        if (octx->key_set)
+            CRYPTO_ocb128_setiv(&octx->ocb, iv, octx->ivlen, octx->taglen);
+        else
+            memcpy(octx->iv, iv, octx->ivlen);
+        octx->iv_set = 1;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+#  define aes_t4_ocb_cipher aes_ocb_cipher
+static int aes_t4_ocb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                             const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
+# endif                        /* OPENSSL_NO_OCB */
+
+# define BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,blocksize,ivlen,nmode,mode,MODE,flags) \
+static const EVP_CIPHER aes_t4_##keylen##_##mode = { \
+        nid##_##keylen##_##nmode,blocksize,keylen/8,ivlen, \
+        flags|EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE,   \
+        aes_t4_init_key,                \
+        aes_t4_##mode##_cipher,         \
+        NULL,                           \
+        sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY),            \
+        NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL }; \
+static const EVP_CIPHER aes_##keylen##_##mode = { \
+        nid##_##keylen##_##nmode,blocksize,     \
+        keylen/8,ivlen, \
+        flags|EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE,   \
+        aes_init_key,                   \
+        aes_##mode##_cipher,            \
+        NULL,                           \
+        sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY),            \
+        NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL }; \
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_##keylen##_##mode(void) \
+{ return SPARC_AES_CAPABLE?&aes_t4_##keylen##_##mode:&aes_##keylen##_##mode; }
+
+# define BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(nid,keylen,blocksize,ivlen,mode,MODE,flags) \
+static const EVP_CIPHER aes_t4_##keylen##_##mode = { \
+        nid##_##keylen##_##mode,blocksize, \
+        (EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE?2:1)*keylen/8, ivlen, \
+        flags|EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE,   \
+        aes_t4_##mode##_init_key,       \
+        aes_t4_##mode##_cipher,         \
+        aes_##mode##_cleanup,           \
+        sizeof(EVP_AES_##MODE##_CTX),   \
+        NULL,NULL,aes_##mode##_ctrl,NULL }; \
+static const EVP_CIPHER aes_##keylen##_##mode = { \
+        nid##_##keylen##_##mode,blocksize, \
+        (EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE?2:1)*keylen/8, ivlen, \
+        flags|EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE,   \
+        aes_##mode##_init_key,          \
+        aes_##mode##_cipher,            \
+        aes_##mode##_cleanup,           \
+        sizeof(EVP_AES_##MODE##_CTX),   \
+        NULL,NULL,aes_##mode##_ctrl,NULL }; \
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_##keylen##_##mode(void) \
+{ return SPARC_AES_CAPABLE?&aes_t4_##keylen##_##mode:&aes_##keylen##_##mode; }
+
+#else
+
+# define BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,blocksize,ivlen,nmode,mode,MODE,flags) \
+static const EVP_CIPHER aes_##keylen##_##mode = { \
+        nid##_##keylen##_##nmode,blocksize,keylen/8,ivlen, \
+        flags|EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE,   \
+        aes_init_key,                   \
+        aes_##mode##_cipher,            \
+        NULL,                           \
+        sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY),            \
+        NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL }; \
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_##keylen##_##mode(void) \
+{ return &aes_##keylen##_##mode; }
+
+# define BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(nid,keylen,blocksize,ivlen,mode,MODE,flags) \
+static const EVP_CIPHER aes_##keylen##_##mode = { \
+        nid##_##keylen##_##mode,blocksize, \
+        (EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE?2:1)*keylen/8, ivlen, \
+        flags|EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE,   \
+        aes_##mode##_init_key,          \
+        aes_##mode##_cipher,            \
+        aes_##mode##_cleanup,           \
+        sizeof(EVP_AES_##MODE##_CTX),   \
+        NULL,NULL,aes_##mode##_ctrl,NULL }; \
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_##keylen##_##mode(void) \
+{ return &aes_##keylen##_##mode; }
+
+#endif
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ) && (defined(__arm__) || defined(__arm) || defined(__aarch64__))
+# include "arm_arch.h"
+# if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7
+#  if defined(BSAES_ASM)
+#   define BSAES_CAPABLE (OPENSSL_armcap_P & ARMV7_NEON)
+#  endif
+#  if defined(VPAES_ASM)
+#   define VPAES_CAPABLE (OPENSSL_armcap_P & ARMV7_NEON)
+#  endif
+#  define HWAES_CAPABLE (OPENSSL_armcap_P & ARMV8_AES)
+#  define HWAES_set_encrypt_key aes_v8_set_encrypt_key
+#  define HWAES_set_decrypt_key aes_v8_set_decrypt_key
+#  define HWAES_encrypt aes_v8_encrypt
+#  define HWAES_decrypt aes_v8_decrypt
+#  define HWAES_cbc_encrypt aes_v8_cbc_encrypt
+#  define HWAES_ctr32_encrypt_blocks aes_v8_ctr32_encrypt_blocks
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HWAES_CAPABLE)
+int HWAES_set_encrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, const int bits,
+                          AES_KEY *key);
+int HWAES_set_decrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, const int bits,
+                          AES_KEY *key);
+void HWAES_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                   const AES_KEY *key);
+void HWAES_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                   const AES_KEY *key);
+void HWAES_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                       size_t length, const AES_KEY *key,
+                       unsigned char *ivec, const int enc);
+void HWAES_ctr32_encrypt_blocks(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                                size_t len, const AES_KEY *key,
+                                const unsigned char ivec[16]);
+void HWAES_xts_encrypt(const unsigned char *inp, unsigned char *out,
+                       size_t len, const AES_KEY *key1,
+                       const AES_KEY *key2, const unsigned char iv[16]);
+void HWAES_xts_decrypt(const unsigned char *inp, unsigned char *out,
+                       size_t len, const AES_KEY *key1,
+                       const AES_KEY *key2, const unsigned char iv[16]);
+#endif
+
+#define BLOCK_CIPHER_generic_pack(nid,keylen,flags)             \
+        BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,16,16,cbc,cbc,CBC,flags|EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1)     \
+        BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,16,0,ecb,ecb,ECB,flags|EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1)      \
+        BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,1,16,ofb128,ofb,OFB,flags|EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1)   \
+        BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,1,16,cfb128,cfb,CFB,flags|EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1)   \
+        BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,1,16,cfb1,cfb1,CFB,flags)       \
+        BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,1,16,cfb8,cfb8,CFB,flags)       \
+        BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,1,16,ctr,ctr,CTR,flags)
+
+static int aes_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+                        const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
+{
+    int ret, mode;
+    EVP_AES_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY,ctx);
+
+    mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx);
+    if ((mode == EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE || mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
+        && !enc) {
+#ifdef HWAES_CAPABLE
+        if (HWAES_CAPABLE) {
+            ret = HWAES_set_decrypt_key(key,
+                                        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
+                                        &dat->ks.ks);
+            dat->block = (block128_f) HWAES_decrypt;
+            dat->stream.cbc = NULL;
+# ifdef HWAES_cbc_encrypt
+            if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
+                dat->stream.cbc = (cbc128_f) HWAES_cbc_encrypt;
+# endif
+        } else
+#endif
+#ifdef BSAES_CAPABLE
+        if (BSAES_CAPABLE && mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
+            ret = AES_set_decrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
+                                      &dat->ks.ks);
+            dat->block = (block128_f) AES_decrypt;
+            dat->stream.cbc = (cbc128_f) bsaes_cbc_encrypt;
+        } else
+#endif
+#ifdef VPAES_CAPABLE
+        if (VPAES_CAPABLE) {
+            ret = vpaes_set_decrypt_key(key,
+                                        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
+                                        &dat->ks.ks);
+            dat->block = (block128_f) vpaes_decrypt;
+            dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ?
+                (cbc128_f) vpaes_cbc_encrypt : NULL;
+        } else
+#endif
+        {
+            ret = AES_set_decrypt_key(key,
+                                      EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
+                                      &dat->ks.ks);
+            dat->block = (block128_f) AES_decrypt;
+            dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ?
+                (cbc128_f) AES_cbc_encrypt : NULL;
+        }
+    } else
+#ifdef HWAES_CAPABLE
+    if (HWAES_CAPABLE) {
+        ret = HWAES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
+                                    &dat->ks.ks);
+        dat->block = (block128_f) HWAES_encrypt;
+        dat->stream.cbc = NULL;
+# ifdef HWAES_cbc_encrypt
+        if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
+            dat->stream.cbc = (cbc128_f) HWAES_cbc_encrypt;
+        else
+# endif
+# ifdef HWAES_ctr32_encrypt_blocks
+        if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE)
+            dat->stream.ctr = (ctr128_f) HWAES_ctr32_encrypt_blocks;
+        else
+# endif
+            (void)0;            /* terminate potentially open 'else' */
+    } else
+#endif
+#ifdef BSAES_CAPABLE
+    if (BSAES_CAPABLE && mode == EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE) {
+        ret = AES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
+                                  &dat->ks.ks);
+        dat->block = (block128_f) AES_encrypt;
+        dat->stream.ctr = (ctr128_f) bsaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks;
+    } else
+#endif
+#ifdef VPAES_CAPABLE
+    if (VPAES_CAPABLE) {
+        ret = vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
+                                    &dat->ks.ks);
+        dat->block = (block128_f) vpaes_encrypt;
+        dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ?
+            (cbc128_f) vpaes_cbc_encrypt : NULL;
+    } else
+#endif
+    {
+        ret = AES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
+                                  &dat->ks.ks);
+        dat->block = (block128_f) AES_encrypt;
+        dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ?
+            (cbc128_f) AES_cbc_encrypt : NULL;
+#ifdef AES_CTR_ASM
+        if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE)
+            dat->stream.ctr = (ctr128_f) AES_ctr32_encrypt;
+#endif
+    }
+
+    if (ret < 0) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_AES_INIT_KEY, EVP_R_AES_KEY_SETUP_FAILED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int aes_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                          const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
+{
+    EVP_AES_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY,ctx);
+
+    if (dat->stream.cbc)
+        (*dat->stream.cbc) (in, out, len, &dat->ks,
+                            EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx),
+                            EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx));
+    else if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx))
+        CRYPTO_cbc128_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks,
+                              EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), dat->block);
+    else
+        CRYPTO_cbc128_decrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks,
+                              EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), dat->block);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int aes_ecb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                          const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
+{
+    size_t bl = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(ctx);
+    size_t i;
+    EVP_AES_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY,ctx);
+
+    if (len < bl)
+        return 1;
+
+    for (i = 0, len -= bl; i <= len; i += bl)
+        (*dat->block) (in + i, out + i, &dat->ks);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int aes_ofb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                          const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
+{
+    EVP_AES_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY,ctx);
+
+    int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_num(ctx);
+    CRYPTO_ofb128_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks,
+                          EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), &num, dat->block);
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int aes_cfb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                          const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
+{
+    EVP_AES_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY,ctx);
+
+    int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_num(ctx);
+    CRYPTO_cfb128_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks,
+                          EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), &num,
+                          EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx), dat->block);
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int aes_cfb8_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                           const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
+{
+    EVP_AES_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY,ctx);
+
+    int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_num(ctx);
+    CRYPTO_cfb128_8_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks,
+                            EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), &num,
+                            EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx), dat->block);
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int aes_cfb1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                           const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
+{
+    EVP_AES_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY,ctx);
+
+    if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_test_flags(ctx, EVP_CIPH_FLAG_LENGTH_BITS)) {
+        int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_num(ctx);
+        CRYPTO_cfb128_1_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks,
+                                EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), &num,
+                                EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx), dat->block);
+        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num);
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    while (len >= MAXBITCHUNK) {
+        int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_num(ctx);
+        CRYPTO_cfb128_1_encrypt(in, out, MAXBITCHUNK * 8, &dat->ks,
+                                EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), &num,
+                                EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx), dat->block);
+        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num);
+        len -= MAXBITCHUNK;
+        out += MAXBITCHUNK;
+        in  += MAXBITCHUNK;
+    }
+    if (len) {
+        int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_num(ctx);
+        CRYPTO_cfb128_1_encrypt(in, out, len * 8, &dat->ks,
+                                EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), &num,
+                                EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx), dat->block);
+        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num);
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int aes_ctr_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                          const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
+{
+    unsigned int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_num(ctx);
+    EVP_AES_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY,ctx);
+
+    if (dat->stream.ctr)
+        CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt_ctr32(in, out, len, &dat->ks,
+                                    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx),
+                                    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx),
+                                    &num, dat->stream.ctr);
+    else
+        CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks,
+                              EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx),
+                              EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx), &num,
+                              dat->block);
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+BLOCK_CIPHER_generic_pack(NID_aes, 128, 0)
+    BLOCK_CIPHER_generic_pack(NID_aes, 192, 0)
+    BLOCK_CIPHER_generic_pack(NID_aes, 256, 0)
+
+static int aes_gcm_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c)
+{
+    EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX,c);
+    if (gctx == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(&gctx->gcm, sizeof(gctx->gcm));
+    if (gctx->iv != EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(c))
+        OPENSSL_free(gctx->iv);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* increment counter (64-bit int) by 1 */
+static void ctr64_inc(unsigned char *counter)
+{
+    int n = 8;
+    unsigned char c;
+
+    do {
+        --n;
+        c = counter[n];
+        ++c;
+        counter[n] = c;
+        if (c)
+            return;
+    } while (n);
+}
+
+static int aes_gcm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr)
+{
+    EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX,c);
+    switch (type) {
+    case EVP_CTRL_INIT:
+        gctx->key_set = 0;
+        gctx->iv_set = 0;
+        gctx->ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(c);
+        gctx->iv = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(c);
+        gctx->taglen = -1;
+        gctx->iv_gen = 0;
+        gctx->tls_aad_len = -1;
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN:
+        if (arg <= 0)
+            return 0;
+        /* Allocate memory for IV if needed */
+        if ((arg > EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) && (arg > gctx->ivlen)) {
+            if (gctx->iv != EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(c))
+                OPENSSL_free(gctx->iv);
+            gctx->iv = OPENSSL_malloc(arg);
+            if (gctx->iv == NULL)
+                return 0;
+        }
+        gctx->ivlen = arg;
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG:
+        if (arg <= 0 || arg > 16 || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c))
+            return 0;
+        memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c), ptr, arg);
+        gctx->taglen = arg;
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG:
+        if (arg <= 0 || arg > 16 || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c)
+            || gctx->taglen < 0)
+            return 0;
+        memcpy(ptr, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c), arg);
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED:
+        /* Special case: -1 length restores whole IV */
+        if (arg == -1) {
+            memcpy(gctx->iv, ptr, gctx->ivlen);
+            gctx->iv_gen = 1;
+            return 1;
+        }
+        /*
+         * Fixed field must be at least 4 bytes and invocation field at least
+         * 8.
+         */
+        if ((arg < 4) || (gctx->ivlen - arg) < 8)
+            return 0;
+        if (arg)
+            memcpy(gctx->iv, ptr, arg);
+        if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c)
+            && RAND_bytes(gctx->iv + arg, gctx->ivlen - arg) <= 0)
+            return 0;
+        gctx->iv_gen = 1;
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN:
+        if (gctx->iv_gen == 0 || gctx->key_set == 0)
+            return 0;
+        CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, gctx->iv, gctx->ivlen);
+        if (arg <= 0 || arg > gctx->ivlen)
+            arg = gctx->ivlen;
+        memcpy(ptr, gctx->iv + gctx->ivlen - arg, arg);
+        /*
+         * Invocation field will be at least 8 bytes in size and so no need
+         * to check wrap around or increment more than last 8 bytes.
+         */
+        ctr64_inc(gctx->iv + gctx->ivlen - 8);
+        gctx->iv_set = 1;
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_INV:
+        if (gctx->iv_gen == 0 || gctx->key_set == 0
+            || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c))
+            return 0;
+        memcpy(gctx->iv + gctx->ivlen - arg, ptr, arg);
+        CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, gctx->iv, gctx->ivlen);
+        gctx->iv_set = 1;
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD:
+        /* Save the AAD for later use */
+        if (arg != EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN)
+            return 0;
+        memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c), ptr, arg);
+        gctx->tls_aad_len = arg;
+        {
+            unsigned int len =
+                EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c)[arg - 2] << 8
+                | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c)[arg - 1];
+            /* Correct length for explicit IV */
+            if (len < EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN)
+                return 0;
+            len -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+            /* If decrypting correct for tag too */
+            if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c)) {
+                if (len < EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN)
+                    return 0;
+                len -= EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
+            }
+            EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c)[arg - 2] = len >> 8;
+            EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c)[arg - 1] = len & 0xff;
+        }
+        /* Extra padding: tag appended to record */
+        return EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
+
+    case EVP_CTRL_COPY:
+        {
+            EVP_CIPHER_CTX *out = ptr;
+            EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx_out = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX,out);
+            if (gctx->gcm.key) {
+                if (gctx->gcm.key != &gctx->ks)
+                    return 0;
+                gctx_out->gcm.key = &gctx_out->ks;
+            }
+            if (gctx->iv == EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(c))
+                gctx_out->iv = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(out);
+            else {
+                gctx_out->iv = OPENSSL_malloc(gctx->ivlen);
+                if (gctx_out->iv == NULL)
+                    return 0;
+                memcpy(gctx_out->iv, gctx->iv, gctx->ivlen);
+            }
+            return 1;
+        }
+
+    default:
+        return -1;
+
+    }
+}
+
+static int aes_gcm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+                            const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
+{
+    EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX,ctx);
+    if (!iv && !key)
+        return 1;
+    if (key) {
+        do {
+#ifdef HWAES_CAPABLE
+            if (HWAES_CAPABLE) {
+                HWAES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
+                                      &gctx->ks.ks);
+                CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks,
+                                   (block128_f) HWAES_encrypt);
+# ifdef HWAES_ctr32_encrypt_blocks
+                gctx->ctr = (ctr128_f) HWAES_ctr32_encrypt_blocks;
+# else
+                gctx->ctr = NULL;
+# endif
+                break;
+            } else
+#endif
+#ifdef BSAES_CAPABLE
+            if (BSAES_CAPABLE) {
+                AES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
+                                    &gctx->ks.ks);
+                CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks,
+                                   (block128_f) AES_encrypt);
+                gctx->ctr = (ctr128_f) bsaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks;
+                break;
+            } else
+#endif
+#ifdef VPAES_CAPABLE
+            if (VPAES_CAPABLE) {
+                vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
+                                      &gctx->ks.ks);
+                CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks,
+                                   (block128_f) vpaes_encrypt);
+                gctx->ctr = NULL;
+                break;
+            } else
+#endif
+                (void)0;        /* terminate potentially open 'else' */
+
+            AES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
+                                &gctx->ks.ks);
+            CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks,
+                               (block128_f) AES_encrypt);
+#ifdef AES_CTR_ASM
+            gctx->ctr = (ctr128_f) AES_ctr32_encrypt;
+#else
+            gctx->ctr = NULL;
+#endif
+        } while (0);
+
+        /*
+         * If we have an iv can set it directly, otherwise use saved IV.
+         */
+        if (iv == NULL && gctx->iv_set)
+            iv = gctx->iv;
+        if (iv) {
+            CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, iv, gctx->ivlen);
+            gctx->iv_set = 1;
+        }
+        gctx->key_set = 1;
+    } else {
+        /* If key set use IV, otherwise copy */
+        if (gctx->key_set)
+            CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, iv, gctx->ivlen);
+        else
+            memcpy(gctx->iv, iv, gctx->ivlen);
+        gctx->iv_set = 1;
+        gctx->iv_gen = 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Handle TLS GCM packet format. This consists of the last portion of the IV
+ * followed by the payload and finally the tag. On encrypt generate IV,
+ * encrypt payload and write the tag. On verify retrieve IV, decrypt payload
+ * and verify tag.
+ */
+
+static int aes_gcm_tls_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                              const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
+{
+    EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX,ctx);
+    int rv = -1;
+    /* Encrypt/decrypt must be performed in place */
+    if (out != in
+        || len < (EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN))
+        return -1;
+    /*
+     * Set IV from start of buffer or generate IV and write to start of
+     * buffer.
+     */
+    if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx) ?
+                            EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN : EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_INV,
+                            EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN, out) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    /* Use saved AAD */
+    if (CRYPTO_gcm128_aad(&gctx->gcm, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx),
+                          gctx->tls_aad_len))
+        goto err;
+    /* Fix buffer and length to point to payload */
+    in += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+    out += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+    len -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
+    if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) {
+        /* Encrypt payload */
+        if (gctx->ctr) {
+            size_t bulk = 0;
+#if defined(AES_GCM_ASM)
+            if (len >= 32 && AES_GCM_ASM(gctx)) {
+                if (CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(&gctx->gcm, NULL, NULL, 0))
+                    return -1;
+
+                bulk = AES_gcm_encrypt(in, out, len,
+                                       gctx->gcm.key,
+                                       gctx->gcm.Yi.c, gctx->gcm.Xi.u);
+                gctx->gcm.len.u[1] += bulk;
+            }
+#endif
+            if (CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt_ctr32(&gctx->gcm,
+                                            in + bulk,
+                                            out + bulk,
+                                            len - bulk, gctx->ctr))
+                goto err;
+        } else {
+            size_t bulk = 0;
+#if defined(AES_GCM_ASM2)
+            if (len >= 32 && AES_GCM_ASM2(gctx)) {
+                if (CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(&gctx->gcm, NULL, NULL, 0))
+                    return -1;
+
+                bulk = AES_gcm_encrypt(in, out, len,
+                                       gctx->gcm.key,
+                                       gctx->gcm.Yi.c, gctx->gcm.Xi.u);
+                gctx->gcm.len.u[1] += bulk;
+            }
+#endif
+            if (CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(&gctx->gcm,
+                                      in + bulk, out + bulk, len - bulk))
+                goto err;
+        }
+        out += len;
+        /* Finally write tag */
+        CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(&gctx->gcm, out, EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN);
+        rv = len + EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
+    } else {
+        /* Decrypt */
+        if (gctx->ctr) {
+            size_t bulk = 0;
+#if defined(AES_GCM_ASM)
+            if (len >= 16 && AES_GCM_ASM(gctx)) {
+                if (CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(&gctx->gcm, NULL, NULL, 0))
+                    return -1;
+
+                bulk = AES_gcm_decrypt(in, out, len,
+                                       gctx->gcm.key,
+                                       gctx->gcm.Yi.c, gctx->gcm.Xi.u);
+                gctx->gcm.len.u[1] += bulk;
+            }
+#endif
+            if (CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt_ctr32(&gctx->gcm,
+                                            in + bulk,
+                                            out + bulk,
+                                            len - bulk, gctx->ctr))
+                goto err;
+        } else {
+            size_t bulk = 0;
+#if defined(AES_GCM_ASM2)
+            if (len >= 16 && AES_GCM_ASM2(gctx)) {
+                if (CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(&gctx->gcm, NULL, NULL, 0))
+                    return -1;
+
+                bulk = AES_gcm_decrypt(in, out, len,
+                                       gctx->gcm.key,
+                                       gctx->gcm.Yi.c, gctx->gcm.Xi.u);
+                gctx->gcm.len.u[1] += bulk;
+            }
+#endif
+            if (CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(&gctx->gcm,
+                                      in + bulk, out + bulk, len - bulk))
+                goto err;
+        }
+        /* Retrieve tag */
+        CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(&gctx->gcm, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx),
+                          EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN);
+        /* If tag mismatch wipe buffer */
+        if (CRYPTO_memcmp(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx), in + len,
+                          EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN)) {
+            OPENSSL_cleanse(out, len);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        rv = len;
+    }
+
+ err:
+    gctx->iv_set = 0;
+    gctx->tls_aad_len = -1;
+    return rv;
+}
+
+static int aes_gcm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                          const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
+{
+    EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX,ctx);
+    /* If not set up, return error */
+    if (!gctx->key_set)
+        return -1;
+
+    if (gctx->tls_aad_len >= 0)
+        return aes_gcm_tls_cipher(ctx, out, in, len);
+
+    if (!gctx->iv_set)
+        return -1;
+    if (in) {
+        if (out == NULL) {
+            if (CRYPTO_gcm128_aad(&gctx->gcm, in, len))
+                return -1;
+        } else if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) {
+            if (gctx->ctr) {
+                size_t bulk = 0;
+#if defined(AES_GCM_ASM)
+                if (len >= 32 && AES_GCM_ASM(gctx)) {
+                    size_t res = (16 - gctx->gcm.mres) % 16;
+
+                    if (CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(&gctx->gcm, in, out, res))
+                        return -1;
+
+                    bulk = AES_gcm_encrypt(in + res,
+                                           out + res, len - res,
+                                           gctx->gcm.key, gctx->gcm.Yi.c,
+                                           gctx->gcm.Xi.u);
+                    gctx->gcm.len.u[1] += bulk;
+                    bulk += res;
+                }
+#endif
+                if (CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt_ctr32(&gctx->gcm,
+                                                in + bulk,
+                                                out + bulk,
+                                                len - bulk, gctx->ctr))
+                    return -1;
+            } else {
+                size_t bulk = 0;
+#if defined(AES_GCM_ASM2)
+                if (len >= 32 && AES_GCM_ASM2(gctx)) {
+                    size_t res = (16 - gctx->gcm.mres) % 16;
+
+                    if (CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(&gctx->gcm, in, out, res))
+                        return -1;
+
+                    bulk = AES_gcm_encrypt(in + res,
+                                           out + res, len - res,
+                                           gctx->gcm.key, gctx->gcm.Yi.c,
+                                           gctx->gcm.Xi.u);
+                    gctx->gcm.len.u[1] += bulk;
+                    bulk += res;
+                }
+#endif
+                if (CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(&gctx->gcm,
+                                          in + bulk, out + bulk, len - bulk))
+                    return -1;
+            }
+        } else {
+            if (gctx->ctr) {
+                size_t bulk = 0;
+#if defined(AES_GCM_ASM)
+                if (len >= 16 && AES_GCM_ASM(gctx)) {
+                    size_t res = (16 - gctx->gcm.mres) % 16;
+
+                    if (CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(&gctx->gcm, in, out, res))
+                        return -1;
+
+                    bulk = AES_gcm_decrypt(in + res,
+                                           out + res, len - res,
+                                           gctx->gcm.key,
+                                           gctx->gcm.Yi.c, gctx->gcm.Xi.u);
+                    gctx->gcm.len.u[1] += bulk;
+                    bulk += res;
+                }
+#endif
+                if (CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt_ctr32(&gctx->gcm,
+                                                in + bulk,
+                                                out + bulk,
+                                                len - bulk, gctx->ctr))
+                    return -1;
+            } else {
+                size_t bulk = 0;
+#if defined(AES_GCM_ASM2)
+                if (len >= 16 && AES_GCM_ASM2(gctx)) {
+                    size_t res = (16 - gctx->gcm.mres) % 16;
+
+                    if (CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(&gctx->gcm, in, out, res))
+                        return -1;
+
+                    bulk = AES_gcm_decrypt(in + res,
+                                           out + res, len - res,
+                                           gctx->gcm.key,
+                                           gctx->gcm.Yi.c, gctx->gcm.Xi.u);
+                    gctx->gcm.len.u[1] += bulk;
+                    bulk += res;
+                }
+#endif
+                if (CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(&gctx->gcm,
+                                          in + bulk, out + bulk, len - bulk))
+                    return -1;
+            }
+        }
+        return len;
+    } else {
+        if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) {
+            if (gctx->taglen < 0)
+                return -1;
+            if (CRYPTO_gcm128_finish(&gctx->gcm,
+                                     EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx),
+                                     gctx->taglen) != 0)
+                return -1;
+            gctx->iv_set = 0;
+            return 0;
+        }
+        CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(&gctx->gcm, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx), 16);
+        gctx->taglen = 16;
+        /* Don't reuse the IV */
+        gctx->iv_set = 0;
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+}
+
+#define CUSTOM_FLAGS    (EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1 \
+                | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER \
+                | EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CTRL_INIT \
+                | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_COPY)
+
+BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 128, 1, 12, gcm, GCM,
+                    EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | CUSTOM_FLAGS)
+    BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 192, 1, 12, gcm, GCM,
+                    EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | CUSTOM_FLAGS)
+    BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 256, 1, 12, gcm, GCM,
+                    EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | CUSTOM_FLAGS)
+
+static int aes_xts_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr)
+{
+    EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_XTS_CTX,c);
+    if (type == EVP_CTRL_COPY) {
+        EVP_CIPHER_CTX *out = ptr;
+        EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx_out = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_XTS_CTX,out);
+        if (xctx->xts.key1) {
+            if (xctx->xts.key1 != &xctx->ks1)
+                return 0;
+            xctx_out->xts.key1 = &xctx_out->ks1;
+        }
+        if (xctx->xts.key2) {
+            if (xctx->xts.key2 != &xctx->ks2)
+                return 0;
+            xctx_out->xts.key2 = &xctx_out->ks2;
+        }
+        return 1;
+    } else if (type != EVP_CTRL_INIT)
+        return -1;
+    /* key1 and key2 are used as an indicator both key and IV are set */
+    xctx->xts.key1 = NULL;
+    xctx->xts.key2 = NULL;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int aes_xts_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+                            const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
+{
+    EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_XTS_CTX,ctx);
+    if (!iv && !key)
+        return 1;
+
+    if (key)
+        do {
+#ifdef AES_XTS_ASM
+            xctx->stream = enc ? AES_xts_encrypt : AES_xts_decrypt;
+#else
+            xctx->stream = NULL;
+#endif
+            /* key_len is two AES keys */
+#ifdef HWAES_CAPABLE
+            if (HWAES_CAPABLE) {
+                if (enc) {
+                    HWAES_set_encrypt_key(key,
+                                          EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 4,
+                                          &xctx->ks1.ks);
+                    xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) HWAES_encrypt;
+# ifdef HWAES_xts_encrypt
+                    xctx->stream = HWAES_xts_encrypt;
+# endif
+                } else {
+                    HWAES_set_decrypt_key(key,
+                                          EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 4,
+                                          &xctx->ks1.ks);
+                    xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) HWAES_decrypt;
+# ifdef HWAES_xts_decrypt
+                    xctx->stream = HWAES_xts_decrypt;
+#endif
+                }
+
+                HWAES_set_encrypt_key(key + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) / 2,
+                                      EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 4,
+                                      &xctx->ks2.ks);
+                xctx->xts.block2 = (block128_f) HWAES_encrypt;
+
+                xctx->xts.key1 = &xctx->ks1;
+                break;
+            } else
+#endif
+#ifdef BSAES_CAPABLE
+            if (BSAES_CAPABLE)
+                xctx->stream = enc ? bsaes_xts_encrypt : bsaes_xts_decrypt;
+            else
+#endif
+#ifdef VPAES_CAPABLE
+            if (VPAES_CAPABLE) {
+                if (enc) {
+                    vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key,
+                                          EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 4,
+                                          &xctx->ks1.ks);
+                    xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) vpaes_encrypt;
+                } else {
+                    vpaes_set_decrypt_key(key,
+                                          EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 4,
+                                          &xctx->ks1.ks);
+                    xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) vpaes_decrypt;
+                }
+
+                vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) / 2,
+                                      EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 4,
+                                      &xctx->ks2.ks);
+                xctx->xts.block2 = (block128_f) vpaes_encrypt;
+
+                xctx->xts.key1 = &xctx->ks1;
+                break;
+            } else
+#endif
+                (void)0;        /* terminate potentially open 'else' */
+
+            if (enc) {
+                AES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 4,
+                                    &xctx->ks1.ks);
+                xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) AES_encrypt;
+            } else {
+                AES_set_decrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 4,
+                                    &xctx->ks1.ks);
+                xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) AES_decrypt;
+            }
+
+            AES_set_encrypt_key(key + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) / 2,
+                                EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 4,
+                                &xctx->ks2.ks);
+            xctx->xts.block2 = (block128_f) AES_encrypt;
+
+            xctx->xts.key1 = &xctx->ks1;
+        } while (0);
+
+    if (iv) {
+        xctx->xts.key2 = &xctx->ks2;
+        memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), iv, 16);
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int aes_xts_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                          const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
+{
+    EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_XTS_CTX,ctx);
+    if (!xctx->xts.key1 || !xctx->xts.key2)
+        return 0;
+    if (!out || !in || len < AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
+        return 0;
+    if (xctx->stream)
+        (*xctx->stream) (in, out, len,
+                         xctx->xts.key1, xctx->xts.key2,
+                         EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx));
+    else if (CRYPTO_xts128_encrypt(&xctx->xts, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx),
+                                   in, out, len,
+                                   EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)))
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+#define aes_xts_cleanup NULL
+
+#define XTS_FLAGS       (EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1 | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV \
+                         | EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CTRL_INIT \
+                         | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_COPY)
+
+BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 128, 1, 16, xts, XTS, XTS_FLAGS)
+    BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 256, 1, 16, xts, XTS, XTS_FLAGS)
+
+static int aes_ccm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr)
+{
+    EVP_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_CCM_CTX,c);
+    switch (type) {
+    case EVP_CTRL_INIT:
+        cctx->key_set = 0;
+        cctx->iv_set = 0;
+        cctx->L = 8;
+        cctx->M = 12;
+        cctx->tag_set = 0;
+        cctx->len_set = 0;
+        cctx->tls_aad_len = -1;
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD:
+        /* Save the AAD for later use */
+        if (arg != EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN)
+            return 0;
+        memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c), ptr, arg);
+        cctx->tls_aad_len = arg;
+        {
+            uint16_t len =
+                EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c)[arg - 2] << 8
+                | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c)[arg - 1];
+            /* Correct length for explicit IV */
+            if (len < EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN)
+                return 0;
+            len -= EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+            /* If decrypting correct for tag too */
+            if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c)) {
+                if (len < cctx->M)
+                    return 0;
+                len -= cctx->M;
+            }
+            EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c)[arg - 2] = len >> 8;
+            EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c)[arg - 1] = len & 0xff;
+        }
+        /* Extra padding: tag appended to record */
+        return cctx->M;
+
+    case EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_IV_FIXED:
+        /* Sanity check length */
+        if (arg != EVP_CCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN)
+            return 0;
+        /* Just copy to first part of IV */
+        memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(c), ptr, arg);
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN:
+        arg = 15 - arg;
+        /* fall thru */
+    case EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_L:
+        if (arg < 2 || arg > 8)
+            return 0;
+        cctx->L = arg;
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG:
+        if ((arg & 1) || arg < 4 || arg > 16)
+            return 0;
+        if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c) && ptr)
+            return 0;
+        if (ptr) {
+            cctx->tag_set = 1;
+            memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c), ptr, arg);
+        }
+        cctx->M = arg;
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG:
+        if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c) || !cctx->tag_set)
+            return 0;
+        if (!CRYPTO_ccm128_tag(&cctx->ccm, ptr, (size_t)arg))
+            return 0;
+        cctx->tag_set = 0;
+        cctx->iv_set = 0;
+        cctx->len_set = 0;
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_CTRL_COPY:
+        {
+            EVP_CIPHER_CTX *out = ptr;
+            EVP_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx_out = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_CCM_CTX,out);
+            if (cctx->ccm.key) {
+                if (cctx->ccm.key != &cctx->ks)
+                    return 0;
+                cctx_out->ccm.key = &cctx_out->ks;
+            }
+            return 1;
+        }
+
+    default:
+        return -1;
+
+    }
+}
+
+static int aes_ccm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+                            const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
+{
+    EVP_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_CCM_CTX,ctx);
+    if (!iv && !key)
+        return 1;
+    if (key)
+        do {
+#ifdef HWAES_CAPABLE
+            if (HWAES_CAPABLE) {
+                HWAES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
+                                      &cctx->ks.ks);
+
+                CRYPTO_ccm128_init(&cctx->ccm, cctx->M, cctx->L,
+                                   &cctx->ks, (block128_f) HWAES_encrypt);
+                cctx->str = NULL;
+                cctx->key_set = 1;
+                break;
+            } else
+#endif
+#ifdef VPAES_CAPABLE
+            if (VPAES_CAPABLE) {
+                vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
+                                      &cctx->ks.ks);
+                CRYPTO_ccm128_init(&cctx->ccm, cctx->M, cctx->L,
+                                   &cctx->ks, (block128_f) vpaes_encrypt);
+                cctx->str = NULL;
+                cctx->key_set = 1;
+                break;
+            }
+#endif
+            AES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
+                                &cctx->ks.ks);
+            CRYPTO_ccm128_init(&cctx->ccm, cctx->M, cctx->L,
+                               &cctx->ks, (block128_f) AES_encrypt);
+            cctx->str = NULL;
+            cctx->key_set = 1;
+        } while (0);
+    if (iv) {
+        memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), iv, 15 - cctx->L);
+        cctx->iv_set = 1;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int aes_ccm_tls_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                              const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
+{
+    EVP_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_CCM_CTX,ctx);
+    CCM128_CONTEXT *ccm = &cctx->ccm;
+    /* Encrypt/decrypt must be performed in place */
+    if (out != in || len < (EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + (size_t)cctx->M))
+        return -1;
+    /* If encrypting set explicit IV from sequence number (start of AAD) */
+    if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx))
+        memcpy(out, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx),
+               EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN);
+    /* Get rest of IV from explicit IV */
+    memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx) + EVP_CCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN, in,
+           EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN);
+    /* Correct length value */
+    len -= EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + cctx->M;
+    if (CRYPTO_ccm128_setiv(ccm, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), 15 - cctx->L,
+                            len))
+            return -1;
+    /* Use saved AAD */
+    CRYPTO_ccm128_aad(ccm, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx), cctx->tls_aad_len);
+    /* Fix buffer to point to payload */
+    in += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+    out += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+    if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) {
+        if (cctx->str ? CRYPTO_ccm128_encrypt_ccm64(ccm, in, out, len,
+                                                    cctx->str) :
+            CRYPTO_ccm128_encrypt(ccm, in, out, len))
+            return -1;
+        if (!CRYPTO_ccm128_tag(ccm, out + len, cctx->M))
+            return -1;
+        return len + EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + cctx->M;
+    } else {
+        if (cctx->str ? !CRYPTO_ccm128_decrypt_ccm64(ccm, in, out, len,
+                                                     cctx->str) :
+            !CRYPTO_ccm128_decrypt(ccm, in, out, len)) {
+            unsigned char tag[16];
+            if (CRYPTO_ccm128_tag(ccm, tag, cctx->M)) {
+                if (!CRYPTO_memcmp(tag, in + len, cctx->M))
+                    return len;
+            }
+        }
+        OPENSSL_cleanse(out, len);
+        return -1;
+    }
+}
+
+static int aes_ccm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                          const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
+{
+    EVP_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_CCM_CTX,ctx);
+    CCM128_CONTEXT *ccm = &cctx->ccm;
+    /* If not set up, return error */
+    if (!cctx->key_set)
+        return -1;
+
+    if (cctx->tls_aad_len >= 0)
+        return aes_ccm_tls_cipher(ctx, out, in, len);
+
+    if (!cctx->iv_set)
+        return -1;
+
+    if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx) && !cctx->tag_set)
+        return -1;
+    if (!out) {
+        if (!in) {
+            if (CRYPTO_ccm128_setiv(ccm, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx),
+                                    15 - cctx->L, len))
+                return -1;
+            cctx->len_set = 1;
+            return len;
+        }
+        /* If have AAD need message length */
+        if (!cctx->len_set && len)
+            return -1;
+        CRYPTO_ccm128_aad(ccm, in, len);
+        return len;
+    }
+    /* EVP_*Final() doesn't return any data */
+    if (!in)
+        return 0;
+    /* If not set length yet do it */
+    if (!cctx->len_set) {
+        if (CRYPTO_ccm128_setiv(ccm, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx),
+                                15 - cctx->L, len))
+            return -1;
+        cctx->len_set = 1;
+    }
+    if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) {
+        if (cctx->str ? CRYPTO_ccm128_encrypt_ccm64(ccm, in, out, len,
+                                                    cctx->str) :
+            CRYPTO_ccm128_encrypt(ccm, in, out, len))
+            return -1;
+        cctx->tag_set = 1;
+        return len;
+    } else {
+        int rv = -1;
+        if (cctx->str ? !CRYPTO_ccm128_decrypt_ccm64(ccm, in, out, len,
+                                                     cctx->str) :
+            !CRYPTO_ccm128_decrypt(ccm, in, out, len)) {
+            unsigned char tag[16];
+            if (CRYPTO_ccm128_tag(ccm, tag, cctx->M)) {
+                if (!CRYPTO_memcmp(tag, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx),
+                                   cctx->M))
+                    rv = len;
+            }
+        }
+        if (rv == -1)
+            OPENSSL_cleanse(out, len);
+        cctx->iv_set = 0;
+        cctx->tag_set = 0;
+        cctx->len_set = 0;
+        return rv;
+    }
+}
+
+#define aes_ccm_cleanup NULL
+
+BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 128, 1, 12, ccm, CCM,
+                    EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | CUSTOM_FLAGS)
+    BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 192, 1, 12, ccm, CCM,
+                        EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | CUSTOM_FLAGS)
+    BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 256, 1, 12, ccm, CCM,
+                        EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | CUSTOM_FLAGS)
+
+typedef struct {
+    union {
+        double align;
+        AES_KEY ks;
+    } ks;
+    /* Indicates if IV has been set */
+    unsigned char *iv;
+} EVP_AES_WRAP_CTX;
+
+static int aes_wrap_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+                             const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
+{
+    EVP_AES_WRAP_CTX *wctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_WRAP_CTX,ctx);
+    if (!iv && !key)
+        return 1;
+    if (key) {
+        if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx))
+            AES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
+                                &wctx->ks.ks);
+        else
+            AES_set_decrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
+                                &wctx->ks.ks);
+        if (!iv)
+            wctx->iv = NULL;
+    }
+    if (iv) {
+        memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx));
+        wctx->iv = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx);
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int aes_wrap_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                           const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen)
+{
+    EVP_AES_WRAP_CTX *wctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_WRAP_CTX,ctx);
+    size_t rv;
+    /* AES wrap with padding has IV length of 4, without padding 8 */
+    int pad = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) == 4;
+    /* No final operation so always return zero length */
+    if (!in)
+        return 0;
+    /* Input length must always be non-zero */
+    if (!inlen)
+        return -1;
+    /* If decrypting need at least 16 bytes and multiple of 8 */
+    if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx) && (inlen < 16 || inlen & 0x7))
+        return -1;
+    /* If not padding input must be multiple of 8 */
+    if (!pad && inlen & 0x7)
+        return -1;
+    if (is_partially_overlapping(out, in, inlen)) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_AES_WRAP_CIPHER, EVP_R_PARTIALLY_OVERLAPPING);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (!out) {
+        if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) {
+            /* If padding round up to multiple of 8 */
+            if (pad)
+                inlen = (inlen + 7) / 8 * 8;
+            /* 8 byte prefix */
+            return inlen + 8;
+        } else {
+            /*
+             * If not padding output will be exactly 8 bytes smaller than
+             * input. If padding it will be at least 8 bytes smaller but we
+             * don't know how much.
+             */
+            return inlen - 8;
+        }
+    }
+    if (pad) {
+        if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx))
+            rv = CRYPTO_128_wrap_pad(&wctx->ks.ks, wctx->iv,
+                                     out, in, inlen,
+                                     (block128_f) AES_encrypt);
+        else
+            rv = CRYPTO_128_unwrap_pad(&wctx->ks.ks, wctx->iv,
+                                       out, in, inlen,
+                                       (block128_f) AES_decrypt);
+    } else {
+        if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx))
+            rv = CRYPTO_128_wrap(&wctx->ks.ks, wctx->iv,
+                                 out, in, inlen, (block128_f) AES_encrypt);
+        else
+            rv = CRYPTO_128_unwrap(&wctx->ks.ks, wctx->iv,
+                                   out, in, inlen, (block128_f) AES_decrypt);
+    }
+    return rv ? (int)rv : -1;
+}
+
+#define WRAP_FLAGS      (EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE \
+                | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER \
+                | EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1)
+
+static const EVP_CIPHER aes_128_wrap = {
+    NID_id_aes128_wrap,
+    8, 16, 8, WRAP_FLAGS,
+    aes_wrap_init_key, aes_wrap_cipher,
+    NULL,
+    sizeof(EVP_AES_WRAP_CTX),
+    NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL
+};
+
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_128_wrap(void)
+{
+    return &aes_128_wrap;
+}
+
+static const EVP_CIPHER aes_192_wrap = {
+    NID_id_aes192_wrap,
+    8, 24, 8, WRAP_FLAGS,
+    aes_wrap_init_key, aes_wrap_cipher,
+    NULL,
+    sizeof(EVP_AES_WRAP_CTX),
+    NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL
+};
+
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_192_wrap(void)
+{
+    return &aes_192_wrap;
+}
+
+static const EVP_CIPHER aes_256_wrap = {
+    NID_id_aes256_wrap,
+    8, 32, 8, WRAP_FLAGS,
+    aes_wrap_init_key, aes_wrap_cipher,
+    NULL,
+    sizeof(EVP_AES_WRAP_CTX),
+    NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL
+};
+
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_256_wrap(void)
+{
+    return &aes_256_wrap;
+}
+
+static const EVP_CIPHER aes_128_wrap_pad = {
+    NID_id_aes128_wrap_pad,
+    8, 16, 4, WRAP_FLAGS,
+    aes_wrap_init_key, aes_wrap_cipher,
+    NULL,
+    sizeof(EVP_AES_WRAP_CTX),
+    NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL
+};
+
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_128_wrap_pad(void)
+{
+    return &aes_128_wrap_pad;
+}
+
+static const EVP_CIPHER aes_192_wrap_pad = {
+    NID_id_aes192_wrap_pad,
+    8, 24, 4, WRAP_FLAGS,
+    aes_wrap_init_key, aes_wrap_cipher,
+    NULL,
+    sizeof(EVP_AES_WRAP_CTX),
+    NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL
+};
+
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_192_wrap_pad(void)
+{
+    return &aes_192_wrap_pad;
+}
+
+static const EVP_CIPHER aes_256_wrap_pad = {
+    NID_id_aes256_wrap_pad,
+    8, 32, 4, WRAP_FLAGS,
+    aes_wrap_init_key, aes_wrap_cipher,
+    NULL,
+    sizeof(EVP_AES_WRAP_CTX),
+    NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL
+};
+
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_256_wrap_pad(void)
+{
+    return &aes_256_wrap_pad;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCB
+static int aes_ocb_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr)
+{
+    EVP_AES_OCB_CTX *octx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_OCB_CTX,c);
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *newc;
+    EVP_AES_OCB_CTX *new_octx;
+
+    switch (type) {
+    case EVP_CTRL_INIT:
+        octx->key_set = 0;
+        octx->iv_set = 0;
+        octx->ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(c);
+        octx->iv = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(c);
+        octx->taglen = 16;
+        octx->data_buf_len = 0;
+        octx->aad_buf_len = 0;
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN:
+        /* IV len must be 1 to 15 */
+        if (arg <= 0 || arg > 15)
+            return 0;
+
+        octx->ivlen = arg;
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG:
+        if (!ptr) {
+            /* Tag len must be 0 to 16 */
+            if (arg < 0 || arg > 16)
+                return 0;
+
+            octx->taglen = arg;
+            return 1;
+        }
+        if (arg != octx->taglen || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c))
+            return 0;
+        memcpy(octx->tag, ptr, arg);
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG:
+        if (arg != octx->taglen || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c))
+            return 0;
+
+        memcpy(ptr, octx->tag, arg);
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_CTRL_COPY:
+        newc = (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *)ptr;
+        new_octx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_OCB_CTX,newc);
+        return CRYPTO_ocb128_copy_ctx(&new_octx->ocb, &octx->ocb,
+                                      &new_octx->ksenc.ks,
+                                      &new_octx->ksdec.ks);
+
+    default:
+        return -1;
+
+    }
+}
+
+# ifdef HWAES_CAPABLE
+#  ifdef HWAES_ocb_encrypt
+void HWAES_ocb_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                       size_t blocks, const void *key,
+                       size_t start_block_num,
+                       unsigned char offset_i[16],
+                       const unsigned char L_[][16],
+                       unsigned char checksum[16]);
+#  else
+#    define HWAES_ocb_encrypt ((ocb128_f)NULL)
+#  endif
+#  ifdef HWAES_ocb_decrypt
+void HWAES_ocb_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                       size_t blocks, const void *key,
+                       size_t start_block_num,
+                       unsigned char offset_i[16],
+                       const unsigned char L_[][16],
+                       unsigned char checksum[16]);
+#  else
+#    define HWAES_ocb_decrypt ((ocb128_f)NULL)
+#  endif
+# endif
+
+static int aes_ocb_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+                            const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
+{
+    EVP_AES_OCB_CTX *octx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_OCB_CTX,ctx);
+    if (!iv && !key)
+        return 1;
+    if (key) {
+        do {
+            /*
+             * We set both the encrypt and decrypt key here because decrypt
+             * needs both. We could possibly optimise to remove setting the
+             * decrypt for an encryption operation.
+             */
+# ifdef HWAES_CAPABLE
+            if (HWAES_CAPABLE) {
+                HWAES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
+                                      &octx->ksenc.ks);
+                HWAES_set_decrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
+                                      &octx->ksdec.ks);
+                if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_init(&octx->ocb,
+                                        &octx->ksenc.ks, &octx->ksdec.ks,
+                                        (block128_f) HWAES_encrypt,
+                                        (block128_f) HWAES_decrypt,
+                                        enc ? HWAES_ocb_encrypt
+                                            : HWAES_ocb_decrypt))
+                    return 0;
+                break;
+            }
+# endif
+# ifdef VPAES_CAPABLE
+            if (VPAES_CAPABLE) {
+                vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
+                                      &octx->ksenc.ks);
+                vpaes_set_decrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
+                                      &octx->ksdec.ks);
+                if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_init(&octx->ocb,
+                                        &octx->ksenc.ks, &octx->ksdec.ks,
+                                        (block128_f) vpaes_encrypt,
+                                        (block128_f) vpaes_decrypt,
+                                        NULL))
+                    return 0;
+                break;
+            }
+# endif
+            AES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
+                                &octx->ksenc.ks);
+            AES_set_decrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
+                                &octx->ksdec.ks);
+            if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_init(&octx->ocb,
+                                    &octx->ksenc.ks, &octx->ksdec.ks,
+                                    (block128_f) AES_encrypt,
+                                    (block128_f) AES_decrypt,
+                                    NULL))
+                return 0;
+        }
+        while (0);
+
+        /*
+         * If we have an iv we can set it directly, otherwise use saved IV.
+         */
+        if (iv == NULL && octx->iv_set)
+            iv = octx->iv;
+        if (iv) {
+            if (CRYPTO_ocb128_setiv(&octx->ocb, iv, octx->ivlen, octx->taglen)
+                != 1)
+                return 0;
+            octx->iv_set = 1;
+        }
+        octx->key_set = 1;
+    } else {
+        /* If key set use IV, otherwise copy */
+        if (octx->key_set)
+            CRYPTO_ocb128_setiv(&octx->ocb, iv, octx->ivlen, octx->taglen);
+        else
+            memcpy(octx->iv, iv, octx->ivlen);
+        octx->iv_set = 1;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int aes_ocb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                          const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
+{
+    unsigned char *buf;
+    int *buf_len;
+    int written_len = 0;
+    size_t trailing_len;
+    EVP_AES_OCB_CTX *octx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_OCB_CTX,ctx);
+
+    /* If IV or Key not set then return error */
+    if (!octx->iv_set)
+        return -1;
+
+    if (!octx->key_set)
+        return -1;
+
+    if (in != NULL) {
+        /*
+         * Need to ensure we are only passing full blocks to low level OCB
+         * routines. We do it here rather than in EVP_EncryptUpdate/
+         * EVP_DecryptUpdate because we need to pass full blocks of AAD too
+         * and those routines don't support that
+         */
+
+        /* Are we dealing with AAD or normal data here? */
+        if (out == NULL) {
+            buf = octx->aad_buf;
+            buf_len = &(octx->aad_buf_len);
+        } else {
+            buf = octx->data_buf;
+            buf_len = &(octx->data_buf_len);
+
+            if (is_partially_overlapping(out + *buf_len, in, len)) {
+                EVPerr(EVP_F_AES_OCB_CIPHER, EVP_R_PARTIALLY_OVERLAPPING);
+                return 0;
+            }
+        }
+
+        /*
+         * If we've got a partially filled buffer from a previous call then
+         * use that data first
+         */
+        if (*buf_len > 0) {
+            unsigned int remaining;
+
+            remaining = AES_BLOCK_SIZE - (*buf_len);
+            if (remaining > len) {
+                memcpy(buf + (*buf_len), in, len);
+                *(buf_len) += len;
+                return 0;
+            }
+            memcpy(buf + (*buf_len), in, remaining);
+
+            /*
+             * If we get here we've filled the buffer, so process it
+             */
+            len -= remaining;
+            in += remaining;
+            if (out == NULL) {
+                if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_aad(&octx->ocb, buf, AES_BLOCK_SIZE))
+                    return -1;
+            } else if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) {
+                if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_encrypt(&octx->ocb, buf, out,
+                                           AES_BLOCK_SIZE))
+                    return -1;
+            } else {
+                if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_decrypt(&octx->ocb, buf, out,
+                                           AES_BLOCK_SIZE))
+                    return -1;
+            }
+            written_len = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+            *buf_len = 0;
+            if (out != NULL)
+                out += AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+        }
+
+        /* Do we have a partial block to handle at the end? */
+        trailing_len = len % AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+
+        /*
+         * If we've got some full blocks to handle, then process these first
+         */
+        if (len != trailing_len) {
+            if (out == NULL) {
+                if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_aad(&octx->ocb, in, len - trailing_len))
+                    return -1;
+            } else if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) {
+                if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_encrypt
+                    (&octx->ocb, in, out, len - trailing_len))
+                    return -1;
+            } else {
+                if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_decrypt
+                    (&octx->ocb, in, out, len - trailing_len))
+                    return -1;
+            }
+            written_len += len - trailing_len;
+            in += len - trailing_len;
+        }
+
+        /* Handle any trailing partial block */
+        if (trailing_len > 0) {
+            memcpy(buf, in, trailing_len);
+            *buf_len = trailing_len;
+        }
+
+        return written_len;
+    } else {
+        /*
+         * First of all empty the buffer of any partial block that we might
+         * have been provided - both for data and AAD
+         */
+        if (octx->data_buf_len > 0) {
+            if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) {
+                if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_encrypt(&octx->ocb, octx->data_buf, out,
+                                           octx->data_buf_len))
+                    return -1;
+            } else {
+                if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_decrypt(&octx->ocb, octx->data_buf, out,
+                                           octx->data_buf_len))
+                    return -1;
+            }
+            written_len = octx->data_buf_len;
+            octx->data_buf_len = 0;
+        }
+        if (octx->aad_buf_len > 0) {
+            if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_aad
+                (&octx->ocb, octx->aad_buf, octx->aad_buf_len))
+                return -1;
+            octx->aad_buf_len = 0;
+        }
+        /* If decrypting then verify */
+        if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) {
+            if (octx->taglen < 0)
+                return -1;
+            if (CRYPTO_ocb128_finish(&octx->ocb,
+                                     octx->tag, octx->taglen) != 0)
+                return -1;
+            octx->iv_set = 0;
+            return written_len;
+        }
+        /* If encrypting then just get the tag */
+        if (CRYPTO_ocb128_tag(&octx->ocb, octx->tag, 16) != 1)
+            return -1;
+        /* Don't reuse the IV */
+        octx->iv_set = 0;
+        return written_len;
+    }
+}
+
+static int aes_ocb_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c)
+{
+    EVP_AES_OCB_CTX *octx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_OCB_CTX,c);
+    CRYPTO_ocb128_cleanup(&octx->ocb);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 128, 16, 12, ocb, OCB,
+                    EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | CUSTOM_FLAGS)
+BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 192, 16, 12, ocb, OCB,
+                    EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | CUSTOM_FLAGS)
+BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 256, 16, 12, ocb, OCB,
+                    EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | CUSTOM_FLAGS)
+#endif                         /* OPENSSL_NO_OCB */
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f30f722
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c
@@ -0,0 +1,964 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/aes.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include "modes_lcl.h"
+#include "internal/evp_int.h"
+#include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
+
+typedef struct {
+    AES_KEY ks;
+    SHA_CTX head, tail, md;
+    size_t payload_length;      /* AAD length in decrypt case */
+    union {
+        unsigned int tls_ver;
+        unsigned char tls_aad[16]; /* 13 used */
+    } aux;
+} EVP_AES_HMAC_SHA1;
+
+#define NO_PAYLOAD_LENGTH       ((size_t)-1)
+
+#if     defined(AES_ASM) &&     ( \
+        defined(__x86_64)       || defined(__x86_64__)  || \
+        defined(_M_AMD64)       || defined(_M_X64)      )
+
+extern unsigned int OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[];
+# define AESNI_CAPABLE   (1<<(57-32))
+
+int aesni_set_encrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, int bits,
+                          AES_KEY *key);
+int aesni_set_decrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, int bits,
+                          AES_KEY *key);
+
+void aesni_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *in,
+                       unsigned char *out,
+                       size_t length,
+                       const AES_KEY *key, unsigned char *ivec, int enc);
+
+void aesni_cbc_sha1_enc(const void *inp, void *out, size_t blocks,
+                        const AES_KEY *key, unsigned char iv[16],
+                        SHA_CTX *ctx, const void *in0);
+
+void aesni256_cbc_sha1_dec(const void *inp, void *out, size_t blocks,
+                           const AES_KEY *key, unsigned char iv[16],
+                           SHA_CTX *ctx, const void *in0);
+
+# define data(ctx) ((EVP_AES_HMAC_SHA1 *)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(ctx))
+
+static int aesni_cbc_hmac_sha1_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+                                        const unsigned char *inkey,
+                                        const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
+{
+    EVP_AES_HMAC_SHA1 *key = data(ctx);
+    int ret;
+
+    if (enc)
+        ret = aesni_set_encrypt_key(inkey,
+                                    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
+                                    &key->ks);
+    else
+        ret = aesni_set_decrypt_key(inkey,
+                                    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
+                                    &key->ks);
+
+    SHA1_Init(&key->head);      /* handy when benchmarking */
+    key->tail = key->head;
+    key->md = key->head;
+
+    key->payload_length = NO_PAYLOAD_LENGTH;
+
+    return ret < 0 ? 0 : 1;
+}
+
+# define STITCHED_CALL
+# undef  STITCHED_DECRYPT_CALL
+
+# if !defined(STITCHED_CALL)
+#  define aes_off 0
+# endif
+
+void sha1_block_data_order(void *c, const void *p, size_t len);
+
+static void sha1_update(SHA_CTX *c, const void *data, size_t len)
+{
+    const unsigned char *ptr = data;
+    size_t res;
+
+    if ((res = c->num)) {
+        res = SHA_CBLOCK - res;
+        if (len < res)
+            res = len;
+        SHA1_Update(c, ptr, res);
+        ptr += res;
+        len -= res;
+    }
+
+    res = len % SHA_CBLOCK;
+    len -= res;
+
+    if (len) {
+        sha1_block_data_order(c, ptr, len / SHA_CBLOCK);
+
+        ptr += len;
+        c->Nh += len >> 29;
+        c->Nl += len <<= 3;
+        if (c->Nl < (unsigned int)len)
+            c->Nh++;
+    }
+
+    if (res)
+        SHA1_Update(c, ptr, res);
+}
+
+# ifdef SHA1_Update
+#  undef SHA1_Update
+# endif
+# define SHA1_Update sha1_update
+
+# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK)
+
+typedef struct {
+    unsigned int A[8], B[8], C[8], D[8], E[8];
+} SHA1_MB_CTX;
+typedef struct {
+    const unsigned char *ptr;
+    int blocks;
+} HASH_DESC;
+
+void sha1_multi_block(SHA1_MB_CTX *, const HASH_DESC *, int);
+
+typedef struct {
+    const unsigned char *inp;
+    unsigned char *out;
+    int blocks;
+    u64 iv[2];
+} CIPH_DESC;
+
+void aesni_multi_cbc_encrypt(CIPH_DESC *, void *, int);
+
+static size_t tls1_1_multi_block_encrypt(EVP_AES_HMAC_SHA1 *key,
+                                         unsigned char *out,
+                                         const unsigned char *inp,
+                                         size_t inp_len, int n4x)
+{                               /* n4x is 1 or 2 */
+    HASH_DESC hash_d[8], edges[8];
+    CIPH_DESC ciph_d[8];
+    unsigned char storage[sizeof(SHA1_MB_CTX) + 32];
+    union {
+        u64 q[16];
+        u32 d[32];
+        u8 c[128];
+    } blocks[8];
+    SHA1_MB_CTX *ctx;
+    unsigned int frag, last, packlen, i, x4 = 4 * n4x, minblocks, processed =
+        0;
+    size_t ret = 0;
+    u8 *IVs;
+#  if defined(BSWAP8)
+    u64 seqnum;
+#  endif
+
+    /* ask for IVs in bulk */
+    if (RAND_bytes((IVs = blocks[0].c), 16 * x4) <= 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    ctx = (SHA1_MB_CTX *) (storage + 32 - ((size_t)storage % 32)); /* align */
+
+    frag = (unsigned int)inp_len >> (1 + n4x);
+    last = (unsigned int)inp_len + frag - (frag << (1 + n4x));
+    if (last > frag && ((last + 13 + 9) % 64) < (x4 - 1)) {
+        frag++;
+        last -= x4 - 1;
+    }
+
+    packlen = 5 + 16 + ((frag + 20 + 16) & -16);
+
+    /* populate descriptors with pointers and IVs */
+    hash_d[0].ptr = inp;
+    ciph_d[0].inp = inp;
+    /* 5+16 is place for header and explicit IV */
+    ciph_d[0].out = out + 5 + 16;
+    memcpy(ciph_d[0].out - 16, IVs, 16);
+    memcpy(ciph_d[0].iv, IVs, 16);
+    IVs += 16;
+
+    for (i = 1; i < x4; i++) {
+        ciph_d[i].inp = hash_d[i].ptr = hash_d[i - 1].ptr + frag;
+        ciph_d[i].out = ciph_d[i - 1].out + packlen;
+        memcpy(ciph_d[i].out - 16, IVs, 16);
+        memcpy(ciph_d[i].iv, IVs, 16);
+        IVs += 16;
+    }
+
+#  if defined(BSWAP8)
+    memcpy(blocks[0].c, key->md.data, 8);
+    seqnum = BSWAP8(blocks[0].q[0]);
+#  endif
+    for (i = 0; i < x4; i++) {
+        unsigned int len = (i == (x4 - 1) ? last : frag);
+#  if !defined(BSWAP8)
+        unsigned int carry, j;
+#  endif
+
+        ctx->A[i] = key->md.h0;
+        ctx->B[i] = key->md.h1;
+        ctx->C[i] = key->md.h2;
+        ctx->D[i] = key->md.h3;
+        ctx->E[i] = key->md.h4;
+
+        /* fix seqnum */
+#  if defined(BSWAP8)
+        blocks[i].q[0] = BSWAP8(seqnum + i);
+#  else
+        for (carry = i, j = 8; j--;) {
+            blocks[i].c[j] = ((u8 *)key->md.data)[j] + carry;
+            carry = (blocks[i].c[j] - carry) >> (sizeof(carry) * 8 - 1);
+        }
+#  endif
+        blocks[i].c[8] = ((u8 *)key->md.data)[8];
+        blocks[i].c[9] = ((u8 *)key->md.data)[9];
+        blocks[i].c[10] = ((u8 *)key->md.data)[10];
+        /* fix length */
+        blocks[i].c[11] = (u8)(len >> 8);
+        blocks[i].c[12] = (u8)(len);
+
+        memcpy(blocks[i].c + 13, hash_d[i].ptr, 64 - 13);
+        hash_d[i].ptr += 64 - 13;
+        hash_d[i].blocks = (len - (64 - 13)) / 64;
+
+        edges[i].ptr = blocks[i].c;
+        edges[i].blocks = 1;
+    }
+
+    /* hash 13-byte headers and first 64-13 bytes of inputs */
+    sha1_multi_block(ctx, edges, n4x);
+    /* hash bulk inputs */
+#  define MAXCHUNKSIZE    2048
+#  if     MAXCHUNKSIZE%64
+#   error  "MAXCHUNKSIZE is not divisible by 64"
+#  elif   MAXCHUNKSIZE
+    /*
+     * goal is to minimize pressure on L1 cache by moving in shorter steps,
+     * so that hashed data is still in the cache by the time we encrypt it
+     */
+    minblocks = ((frag <= last ? frag : last) - (64 - 13)) / 64;
+    if (minblocks > MAXCHUNKSIZE / 64) {
+        for (i = 0; i < x4; i++) {
+            edges[i].ptr = hash_d[i].ptr;
+            edges[i].blocks = MAXCHUNKSIZE / 64;
+            ciph_d[i].blocks = MAXCHUNKSIZE / 16;
+        }
+        do {
+            sha1_multi_block(ctx, edges, n4x);
+            aesni_multi_cbc_encrypt(ciph_d, &key->ks, n4x);
+
+            for (i = 0; i < x4; i++) {
+                edges[i].ptr = hash_d[i].ptr += MAXCHUNKSIZE;
+                hash_d[i].blocks -= MAXCHUNKSIZE / 64;
+                edges[i].blocks = MAXCHUNKSIZE / 64;
+                ciph_d[i].inp += MAXCHUNKSIZE;
+                ciph_d[i].out += MAXCHUNKSIZE;
+                ciph_d[i].blocks = MAXCHUNKSIZE / 16;
+                memcpy(ciph_d[i].iv, ciph_d[i].out - 16, 16);
+            }
+            processed += MAXCHUNKSIZE;
+            minblocks -= MAXCHUNKSIZE / 64;
+        } while (minblocks > MAXCHUNKSIZE / 64);
+    }
+#  endif
+#  undef  MAXCHUNKSIZE
+    sha1_multi_block(ctx, hash_d, n4x);
+
+    memset(blocks, 0, sizeof(blocks));
+    for (i = 0; i < x4; i++) {
+        unsigned int len = (i == (x4 - 1) ? last : frag),
+            off = hash_d[i].blocks * 64;
+        const unsigned char *ptr = hash_d[i].ptr + off;
+
+        off = (len - processed) - (64 - 13) - off; /* remainder actually */
+        memcpy(blocks[i].c, ptr, off);
+        blocks[i].c[off] = 0x80;
+        len += 64 + 13;         /* 64 is HMAC header */
+        len *= 8;               /* convert to bits */
+        if (off < (64 - 8)) {
+#  ifdef BSWAP4
+            blocks[i].d[15] = BSWAP4(len);
+#  else
+            PUTU32(blocks[i].c + 60, len);
+#  endif
+            edges[i].blocks = 1;
+        } else {
+#  ifdef BSWAP4
+            blocks[i].d[31] = BSWAP4(len);
+#  else
+            PUTU32(blocks[i].c + 124, len);
+#  endif
+            edges[i].blocks = 2;
+        }
+        edges[i].ptr = blocks[i].c;
+    }
+
+    /* hash input tails and finalize */
+    sha1_multi_block(ctx, edges, n4x);
+
+    memset(blocks, 0, sizeof(blocks));
+    for (i = 0; i < x4; i++) {
+#  ifdef BSWAP4
+        blocks[i].d[0] = BSWAP4(ctx->A[i]);
+        ctx->A[i] = key->tail.h0;
+        blocks[i].d[1] = BSWAP4(ctx->B[i]);
+        ctx->B[i] = key->tail.h1;
+        blocks[i].d[2] = BSWAP4(ctx->C[i]);
+        ctx->C[i] = key->tail.h2;
+        blocks[i].d[3] = BSWAP4(ctx->D[i]);
+        ctx->D[i] = key->tail.h3;
+        blocks[i].d[4] = BSWAP4(ctx->E[i]);
+        ctx->E[i] = key->tail.h4;
+        blocks[i].c[20] = 0x80;
+        blocks[i].d[15] = BSWAP4((64 + 20) * 8);
+#  else
+        PUTU32(blocks[i].c + 0, ctx->A[i]);
+        ctx->A[i] = key->tail.h0;
+        PUTU32(blocks[i].c + 4, ctx->B[i]);
+        ctx->B[i] = key->tail.h1;
+        PUTU32(blocks[i].c + 8, ctx->C[i]);
+        ctx->C[i] = key->tail.h2;
+        PUTU32(blocks[i].c + 12, ctx->D[i]);
+        ctx->D[i] = key->tail.h3;
+        PUTU32(blocks[i].c + 16, ctx->E[i]);
+        ctx->E[i] = key->tail.h4;
+        blocks[i].c[20] = 0x80;
+        PUTU32(blocks[i].c + 60, (64 + 20) * 8);
+#  endif
+        edges[i].ptr = blocks[i].c;
+        edges[i].blocks = 1;
+    }
+
+    /* finalize MACs */
+    sha1_multi_block(ctx, edges, n4x);
+
+    for (i = 0; i < x4; i++) {
+        unsigned int len = (i == (x4 - 1) ? last : frag), pad, j;
+        unsigned char *out0 = out;
+
+        memcpy(ciph_d[i].out, ciph_d[i].inp, len - processed);
+        ciph_d[i].inp = ciph_d[i].out;
+
+        out += 5 + 16 + len;
+
+        /* write MAC */
+        PUTU32(out + 0, ctx->A[i]);
+        PUTU32(out + 4, ctx->B[i]);
+        PUTU32(out + 8, ctx->C[i]);
+        PUTU32(out + 12, ctx->D[i]);
+        PUTU32(out + 16, ctx->E[i]);
+        out += 20;
+        len += 20;
+
+        /* pad */
+        pad = 15 - len % 16;
+        for (j = 0; j <= pad; j++)
+            *(out++) = pad;
+        len += pad + 1;
+
+        ciph_d[i].blocks = (len - processed) / 16;
+        len += 16;              /* account for explicit iv */
+
+        /* arrange header */
+        out0[0] = ((u8 *)key->md.data)[8];
+        out0[1] = ((u8 *)key->md.data)[9];
+        out0[2] = ((u8 *)key->md.data)[10];
+        out0[3] = (u8)(len >> 8);
+        out0[4] = (u8)(len);
+
+        ret += len + 5;
+        inp += frag;
+    }
+
+    aesni_multi_cbc_encrypt(ciph_d, &key->ks, n4x);
+
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(blocks, sizeof(blocks));
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx, sizeof(*ctx));
+
+    return ret;
+}
+# endif
+
+static int aesni_cbc_hmac_sha1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                                      const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
+{
+    EVP_AES_HMAC_SHA1 *key = data(ctx);
+    unsigned int l;
+    size_t plen = key->payload_length, iv = 0, /* explicit IV in TLS 1.1 and
+                                                * later */
+        sha_off = 0;
+# if defined(STITCHED_CALL)
+    size_t aes_off = 0, blocks;
+
+    sha_off = SHA_CBLOCK - key->md.num;
+# endif
+
+    key->payload_length = NO_PAYLOAD_LENGTH;
+
+    if (len % AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
+        return 0;
+
+    if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) {
+        if (plen == NO_PAYLOAD_LENGTH)
+            plen = len;
+        else if (len !=
+                 ((plen + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH +
+                   AES_BLOCK_SIZE) & -AES_BLOCK_SIZE))
+            return 0;
+        else if (key->aux.tls_ver >= TLS1_1_VERSION)
+            iv = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+
+# if defined(STITCHED_CALL)
+        if (plen > (sha_off + iv)
+            && (blocks = (plen - (sha_off + iv)) / SHA_CBLOCK)) {
+            SHA1_Update(&key->md, in + iv, sha_off);
+
+            aesni_cbc_sha1_enc(in, out, blocks, &key->ks,
+                               EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx),
+                               &key->md, in + iv + sha_off);
+            blocks *= SHA_CBLOCK;
+            aes_off += blocks;
+            sha_off += blocks;
+            key->md.Nh += blocks >> 29;
+            key->md.Nl += blocks <<= 3;
+            if (key->md.Nl < (unsigned int)blocks)
+                key->md.Nh++;
+        } else {
+            sha_off = 0;
+        }
+# endif
+        sha_off += iv;
+        SHA1_Update(&key->md, in + sha_off, plen - sha_off);
+
+        if (plen != len) {      /* "TLS" mode of operation */
+            if (in != out)
+                memcpy(out + aes_off, in + aes_off, plen - aes_off);
+
+            /* calculate HMAC and append it to payload */
+            SHA1_Final(out + plen, &key->md);
+            key->md = key->tail;
+            SHA1_Update(&key->md, out + plen, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+            SHA1_Final(out + plen, &key->md);
+
+            /* pad the payload|hmac */
+            plen += SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+            for (l = len - plen - 1; plen < len; plen++)
+                out[plen] = l;
+            /* encrypt HMAC|padding at once */
+            aesni_cbc_encrypt(out + aes_off, out + aes_off, len - aes_off,
+                              &key->ks, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), 1);
+        } else {
+            aesni_cbc_encrypt(in + aes_off, out + aes_off, len - aes_off,
+                              &key->ks, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), 1);
+        }
+    } else {
+        union {
+            unsigned int u[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH / sizeof(unsigned int)];
+            unsigned char c[32 + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+        } mac, *pmac;
+
+        /* arrange cache line alignment */
+        pmac = (void *)(((size_t)mac.c + 31) & ((size_t)0 - 32));
+
+        if (plen != NO_PAYLOAD_LENGTH) { /* "TLS" mode of operation */
+            size_t inp_len, mask, j, i;
+            unsigned int res, maxpad, pad, bitlen;
+            int ret = 1;
+            union {
+                unsigned int u[SHA_LBLOCK];
+                unsigned char c[SHA_CBLOCK];
+            } *data = (void *)key->md.data;
+# if defined(STITCHED_DECRYPT_CALL)
+            unsigned char tail_iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+            int stitch = 0;
+# endif
+
+            if ((key->aux.tls_aad[plen - 4] << 8 | key->aux.tls_aad[plen - 3])
+                >= TLS1_1_VERSION) {
+                if (len < (AES_BLOCK_SIZE + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 1))
+                    return 0;
+
+                /* omit explicit iv */
+                memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), in, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+
+                in += AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+                out += AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+                len -= AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+            } else if (len < (SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 1))
+                return 0;
+
+# if defined(STITCHED_DECRYPT_CALL)
+            if (len >= 1024 && ctx->key_len == 32) {
+                /* decrypt last block */
+                memcpy(tail_iv, in + len - 2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+                       AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+                aesni_cbc_encrypt(in + len - AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+                                  out + len - AES_BLOCK_SIZE, AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+                                  &key->ks, tail_iv, 0);
+                stitch = 1;
+            } else
+# endif
+                /* decrypt HMAC|padding at once */
+                aesni_cbc_encrypt(in, out, len, &key->ks,
+                                  EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), 0);
+
+            /* figure out payload length */
+            pad = out[len - 1];
+            maxpad = len - (SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 1);
+            maxpad |= (255 - maxpad) >> (sizeof(maxpad) * 8 - 8);
+            maxpad &= 255;
+
+            mask = constant_time_ge(maxpad, pad);
+            ret &= mask;
+            /*
+             * If pad is invalid then we will fail the above test but we must
+             * continue anyway because we are in constant time code. However,
+             * we'll use the maxpad value instead of the supplied pad to make
+             * sure we perform well defined pointer arithmetic.
+             */
+            pad = constant_time_select(mask, pad, maxpad);
+
+            inp_len = len - (SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + pad + 1);
+
+            key->aux.tls_aad[plen - 2] = inp_len >> 8;
+            key->aux.tls_aad[plen - 1] = inp_len;
+
+            /* calculate HMAC */
+            key->md = key->head;
+            SHA1_Update(&key->md, key->aux.tls_aad, plen);
+
+# if defined(STITCHED_DECRYPT_CALL)
+            if (stitch) {
+                blocks = (len - (256 + 32 + SHA_CBLOCK)) / SHA_CBLOCK;
+                aes_off = len - AES_BLOCK_SIZE - blocks * SHA_CBLOCK;
+                sha_off = SHA_CBLOCK - plen;
+
+                aesni_cbc_encrypt(in, out, aes_off, &key->ks, ctx->iv, 0);
+
+                SHA1_Update(&key->md, out, sha_off);
+                aesni256_cbc_sha1_dec(in + aes_off,
+                                      out + aes_off, blocks, &key->ks,
+                                      ctx->iv, &key->md, out + sha_off);
+
+                sha_off += blocks *= SHA_CBLOCK;
+                out += sha_off;
+                len -= sha_off;
+                inp_len -= sha_off;
+
+                key->md.Nl += (blocks << 3); /* at most 18 bits */
+                memcpy(ctx->iv, tail_iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+            }
+# endif
+
+# if 1
+            len -= SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; /* amend mac */
+            if (len >= (256 + SHA_CBLOCK)) {
+                j = (len - (256 + SHA_CBLOCK)) & (0 - SHA_CBLOCK);
+                j += SHA_CBLOCK - key->md.num;
+                SHA1_Update(&key->md, out, j);
+                out += j;
+                len -= j;
+                inp_len -= j;
+            }
+
+            /* but pretend as if we hashed padded payload */
+            bitlen = key->md.Nl + (inp_len << 3); /* at most 18 bits */
+#  ifdef BSWAP4
+            bitlen = BSWAP4(bitlen);
+#  else
+            mac.c[0] = 0;
+            mac.c[1] = (unsigned char)(bitlen >> 16);
+            mac.c[2] = (unsigned char)(bitlen >> 8);
+            mac.c[3] = (unsigned char)bitlen;
+            bitlen = mac.u[0];
+#  endif
+
+            pmac->u[0] = 0;
+            pmac->u[1] = 0;
+            pmac->u[2] = 0;
+            pmac->u[3] = 0;
+            pmac->u[4] = 0;
+
+            for (res = key->md.num, j = 0; j < len; j++) {
+                size_t c = out[j];
+                mask = (j - inp_len) >> (sizeof(j) * 8 - 8);
+                c &= mask;
+                c |= 0x80 & ~mask & ~((inp_len - j) >> (sizeof(j) * 8 - 8));
+                data->c[res++] = (unsigned char)c;
+
+                if (res != SHA_CBLOCK)
+                    continue;
+
+                /* j is not incremented yet */
+                mask = 0 - ((inp_len + 7 - j) >> (sizeof(j) * 8 - 1));
+                data->u[SHA_LBLOCK - 1] |= bitlen & mask;
+                sha1_block_data_order(&key->md, data, 1);
+                mask &= 0 - ((j - inp_len - 72) >> (sizeof(j) * 8 - 1));
+                pmac->u[0] |= key->md.h0 & mask;
+                pmac->u[1] |= key->md.h1 & mask;
+                pmac->u[2] |= key->md.h2 & mask;
+                pmac->u[3] |= key->md.h3 & mask;
+                pmac->u[4] |= key->md.h4 & mask;
+                res = 0;
+            }
+
+            for (i = res; i < SHA_CBLOCK; i++, j++)
+                data->c[i] = 0;
+
+            if (res > SHA_CBLOCK - 8) {
+                mask = 0 - ((inp_len + 8 - j) >> (sizeof(j) * 8 - 1));
+                data->u[SHA_LBLOCK - 1] |= bitlen & mask;
+                sha1_block_data_order(&key->md, data, 1);
+                mask &= 0 - ((j - inp_len - 73) >> (sizeof(j) * 8 - 1));
+                pmac->u[0] |= key->md.h0 & mask;
+                pmac->u[1] |= key->md.h1 & mask;
+                pmac->u[2] |= key->md.h2 & mask;
+                pmac->u[3] |= key->md.h3 & mask;
+                pmac->u[4] |= key->md.h4 & mask;
+
+                memset(data, 0, SHA_CBLOCK);
+                j += 64;
+            }
+            data->u[SHA_LBLOCK - 1] = bitlen;
+            sha1_block_data_order(&key->md, data, 1);
+            mask = 0 - ((j - inp_len - 73) >> (sizeof(j) * 8 - 1));
+            pmac->u[0] |= key->md.h0 & mask;
+            pmac->u[1] |= key->md.h1 & mask;
+            pmac->u[2] |= key->md.h2 & mask;
+            pmac->u[3] |= key->md.h3 & mask;
+            pmac->u[4] |= key->md.h4 & mask;
+
+#  ifdef BSWAP4
+            pmac->u[0] = BSWAP4(pmac->u[0]);
+            pmac->u[1] = BSWAP4(pmac->u[1]);
+            pmac->u[2] = BSWAP4(pmac->u[2]);
+            pmac->u[3] = BSWAP4(pmac->u[3]);
+            pmac->u[4] = BSWAP4(pmac->u[4]);
+#  else
+            for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
+                res = pmac->u[i];
+                pmac->c[4 * i + 0] = (unsigned char)(res >> 24);
+                pmac->c[4 * i + 1] = (unsigned char)(res >> 16);
+                pmac->c[4 * i + 2] = (unsigned char)(res >> 8);
+                pmac->c[4 * i + 3] = (unsigned char)res;
+            }
+#  endif
+            len += SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+# else
+            SHA1_Update(&key->md, out, inp_len);
+            res = key->md.num;
+            SHA1_Final(pmac->c, &key->md);
+
+            {
+                unsigned int inp_blocks, pad_blocks;
+
+                /* but pretend as if we hashed padded payload */
+                inp_blocks =
+                    1 + ((SHA_CBLOCK - 9 - res) >> (sizeof(res) * 8 - 1));
+                res += (unsigned int)(len - inp_len);
+                pad_blocks = res / SHA_CBLOCK;
+                res %= SHA_CBLOCK;
+                pad_blocks +=
+                    1 + ((SHA_CBLOCK - 9 - res) >> (sizeof(res) * 8 - 1));
+                for (; inp_blocks < pad_blocks; inp_blocks++)
+                    sha1_block_data_order(&key->md, data, 1);
+            }
+# endif
+            key->md = key->tail;
+            SHA1_Update(&key->md, pmac->c, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+            SHA1_Final(pmac->c, &key->md);
+
+            /* verify HMAC */
+            out += inp_len;
+            len -= inp_len;
+# if 1
+            {
+                unsigned char *p = out + len - 1 - maxpad - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+                size_t off = out - p;
+                unsigned int c, cmask;
+
+                maxpad += SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+                for (res = 0, i = 0, j = 0; j < maxpad; j++) {
+                    c = p[j];
+                    cmask =
+                        ((int)(j - off - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH)) >> (sizeof(int) *
+                                                                 8 - 1);
+                    res |= (c ^ pad) & ~cmask; /* ... and padding */
+                    cmask &= ((int)(off - 1 - j)) >> (sizeof(int) * 8 - 1);
+                    res |= (c ^ pmac->c[i]) & cmask;
+                    i += 1 & cmask;
+                }
+                maxpad -= SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+
+                res = 0 - ((0 - res) >> (sizeof(res) * 8 - 1));
+                ret &= (int)~res;
+            }
+# else
+            for (res = 0, i = 0; i < SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++)
+                res |= out[i] ^ pmac->c[i];
+            res = 0 - ((0 - res) >> (sizeof(res) * 8 - 1));
+            ret &= (int)~res;
+
+            /* verify padding */
+            pad = (pad & ~res) | (maxpad & res);
+            out = out + len - 1 - pad;
+            for (res = 0, i = 0; i < pad; i++)
+                res |= out[i] ^ pad;
+
+            res = (0 - res) >> (sizeof(res) * 8 - 1);
+            ret &= (int)~res;
+# endif
+            return ret;
+        } else {
+# if defined(STITCHED_DECRYPT_CALL)
+            if (len >= 1024 && ctx->key_len == 32) {
+                if (sha_off %= SHA_CBLOCK)
+                    blocks = (len - 3 * SHA_CBLOCK) / SHA_CBLOCK;
+                else
+                    blocks = (len - 2 * SHA_CBLOCK) / SHA_CBLOCK;
+                aes_off = len - blocks * SHA_CBLOCK;
+
+                aesni_cbc_encrypt(in, out, aes_off, &key->ks, ctx->iv, 0);
+                SHA1_Update(&key->md, out, sha_off);
+                aesni256_cbc_sha1_dec(in + aes_off,
+                                      out + aes_off, blocks, &key->ks,
+                                      ctx->iv, &key->md, out + sha_off);
+
+                sha_off += blocks *= SHA_CBLOCK;
+                out += sha_off;
+                len -= sha_off;
+
+                key->md.Nh += blocks >> 29;
+                key->md.Nl += blocks <<= 3;
+                if (key->md.Nl < (unsigned int)blocks)
+                    key->md.Nh++;
+            } else
+# endif
+                /* decrypt HMAC|padding at once */
+                aesni_cbc_encrypt(in, out, len, &key->ks,
+                                  EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), 0);
+
+            SHA1_Update(&key->md, out, len);
+        }
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int aesni_cbc_hmac_sha1_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type, int arg,
+                                    void *ptr)
+{
+    EVP_AES_HMAC_SHA1 *key = data(ctx);
+
+    switch (type) {
+    case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY:
+        {
+            unsigned int i;
+            unsigned char hmac_key[64];
+
+            memset(hmac_key, 0, sizeof(hmac_key));
+
+            if (arg > (int)sizeof(hmac_key)) {
+                SHA1_Init(&key->head);
+                SHA1_Update(&key->head, ptr, arg);
+                SHA1_Final(hmac_key, &key->head);
+            } else {
+                memcpy(hmac_key, ptr, arg);
+            }
+
+            for (i = 0; i < sizeof(hmac_key); i++)
+                hmac_key[i] ^= 0x36; /* ipad */
+            SHA1_Init(&key->head);
+            SHA1_Update(&key->head, hmac_key, sizeof(hmac_key));
+
+            for (i = 0; i < sizeof(hmac_key); i++)
+                hmac_key[i] ^= 0x36 ^ 0x5c; /* opad */
+            SHA1_Init(&key->tail);
+            SHA1_Update(&key->tail, hmac_key, sizeof(hmac_key));
+
+            OPENSSL_cleanse(hmac_key, sizeof(hmac_key));
+
+            return 1;
+        }
+    case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD:
+        {
+            unsigned char *p = ptr;
+            unsigned int len;
+
+            if (arg != EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN)
+                return -1;
+
+            len = p[arg - 2] << 8 | p[arg - 1];
+
+            if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) {
+                key->payload_length = len;
+                if ((key->aux.tls_ver =
+                     p[arg - 4] << 8 | p[arg - 3]) >= TLS1_1_VERSION) {
+                    if (len < AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
+                        return 0;
+                    len -= AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+                    p[arg - 2] = len >> 8;
+                    p[arg - 1] = len;
+                }
+                key->md = key->head;
+                SHA1_Update(&key->md, p, arg);
+
+                return (int)(((len + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH +
+                               AES_BLOCK_SIZE) & -AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
+                             - len);
+            } else {
+                memcpy(key->aux.tls_aad, ptr, arg);
+                key->payload_length = arg;
+
+                return SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+            }
+        }
+# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK)
+    case EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE:
+        return (int)(5 + 16 + ((arg + 20 + 16) & -16));
+    case EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD:
+        {
+            EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM *param =
+                (EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM *) ptr;
+            unsigned int n4x = 1, x4;
+            unsigned int frag, last, packlen, inp_len;
+
+            if (arg < (int)sizeof(EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM))
+                return -1;
+
+            inp_len = param->inp[11] << 8 | param->inp[12];
+
+            if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) {
+                if ((param->inp[9] << 8 | param->inp[10]) < TLS1_1_VERSION)
+                    return -1;
+
+                if (inp_len) {
+                    if (inp_len < 4096)
+                        return 0; /* too short */
+
+                    if (inp_len >= 8192 && OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[2] & (1 << 5))
+                        n4x = 2; /* AVX2 */
+                } else if ((n4x = param->interleave / 4) && n4x <= 2)
+                    inp_len = param->len;
+                else
+                    return -1;
+
+                key->md = key->head;
+                SHA1_Update(&key->md, param->inp, 13);
+
+                x4 = 4 * n4x;
+                n4x += 1;
+
+                frag = inp_len >> n4x;
+                last = inp_len + frag - (frag << n4x);
+                if (last > frag && ((last + 13 + 9) % 64 < (x4 - 1))) {
+                    frag++;
+                    last -= x4 - 1;
+                }
+
+                packlen = 5 + 16 + ((frag + 20 + 16) & -16);
+                packlen = (packlen << n4x) - packlen;
+                packlen += 5 + 16 + ((last + 20 + 16) & -16);
+
+                param->interleave = x4;
+
+                return (int)packlen;
+            } else
+                return -1;      /* not yet */
+        }
+    case EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT:
+        {
+            EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM *param =
+                (EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM *) ptr;
+
+            return (int)tls1_1_multi_block_encrypt(key, param->out,
+                                                   param->inp, param->len,
+                                                   param->interleave / 4);
+        }
+    case EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_DECRYPT:
+# endif
+    default:
+        return -1;
+    }
+}
+
+static EVP_CIPHER aesni_128_cbc_hmac_sha1_cipher = {
+# ifdef NID_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1
+    NID_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1,
+# else
+    NID_undef,
+# endif
+    AES_BLOCK_SIZE, 16, AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+    EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1 |
+        EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK,
+    aesni_cbc_hmac_sha1_init_key,
+    aesni_cbc_hmac_sha1_cipher,
+    NULL,
+    sizeof(EVP_AES_HMAC_SHA1),
+    EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1 ? NULL : EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
+    EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1 ? NULL : EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
+    aesni_cbc_hmac_sha1_ctrl,
+    NULL
+};
+
+static EVP_CIPHER aesni_256_cbc_hmac_sha1_cipher = {
+# ifdef NID_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha1
+    NID_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha1,
+# else
+    NID_undef,
+# endif
+    AES_BLOCK_SIZE, 32, AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+    EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1 |
+        EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK,
+    aesni_cbc_hmac_sha1_init_key,
+    aesni_cbc_hmac_sha1_cipher,
+    NULL,
+    sizeof(EVP_AES_HMAC_SHA1),
+    EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1 ? NULL : EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
+    EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1 ? NULL : EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
+    aesni_cbc_hmac_sha1_ctrl,
+    NULL
+};
+
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1(void)
+{
+    return (OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & AESNI_CAPABLE ?
+            &aesni_128_cbc_hmac_sha1_cipher : NULL);
+}
+
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha1(void)
+{
+    return (OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & AESNI_CAPABLE ?
+            &aesni_256_cbc_hmac_sha1_cipher : NULL);
+}
+#else
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1(void)
+{
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha1(void)
+{
+    return NULL;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha256.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha256.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..13973f1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha256.c
@@ -0,0 +1,950 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2013-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/aes.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include "modes_lcl.h"
+#include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
+#include "internal/evp_int.h"
+
+typedef struct {
+    AES_KEY ks;
+    SHA256_CTX head, tail, md;
+    size_t payload_length;      /* AAD length in decrypt case */
+    union {
+        unsigned int tls_ver;
+        unsigned char tls_aad[16]; /* 13 used */
+    } aux;
+} EVP_AES_HMAC_SHA256;
+
+# define NO_PAYLOAD_LENGTH       ((size_t)-1)
+
+#if     defined(AES_ASM) &&     ( \
+        defined(__x86_64)       || defined(__x86_64__)  || \
+        defined(_M_AMD64)       || defined(_M_X64)      )
+
+extern unsigned int OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[];
+# define AESNI_CAPABLE   (1<<(57-32))
+
+int aesni_set_encrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, int bits,
+                          AES_KEY *key);
+int aesni_set_decrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, int bits,
+                          AES_KEY *key);
+
+void aesni_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *in,
+                       unsigned char *out,
+                       size_t length,
+                       const AES_KEY *key, unsigned char *ivec, int enc);
+
+int aesni_cbc_sha256_enc(const void *inp, void *out, size_t blocks,
+                         const AES_KEY *key, unsigned char iv[16],
+                         SHA256_CTX *ctx, const void *in0);
+
+# define data(ctx) ((EVP_AES_HMAC_SHA256 *)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(ctx))
+
+static int aesni_cbc_hmac_sha256_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+                                          const unsigned char *inkey,
+                                          const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
+{
+    EVP_AES_HMAC_SHA256 *key = data(ctx);
+    int ret;
+
+    if (enc)
+        ret = aesni_set_encrypt_key(inkey,
+                                    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
+                                    &key->ks);
+    else
+        ret = aesni_set_decrypt_key(inkey,
+                                    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
+                                    &key->ks);
+
+    SHA256_Init(&key->head);    /* handy when benchmarking */
+    key->tail = key->head;
+    key->md = key->head;
+
+    key->payload_length = NO_PAYLOAD_LENGTH;
+
+    return ret < 0 ? 0 : 1;
+}
+
+# define STITCHED_CALL
+
+# if !defined(STITCHED_CALL)
+#  define aes_off 0
+# endif
+
+void sha256_block_data_order(void *c, const void *p, size_t len);
+
+static void sha256_update(SHA256_CTX *c, const void *data, size_t len)
+{
+    const unsigned char *ptr = data;
+    size_t res;
+
+    if ((res = c->num)) {
+        res = SHA256_CBLOCK - res;
+        if (len < res)
+            res = len;
+        SHA256_Update(c, ptr, res);
+        ptr += res;
+        len -= res;
+    }
+
+    res = len % SHA256_CBLOCK;
+    len -= res;
+
+    if (len) {
+        sha256_block_data_order(c, ptr, len / SHA256_CBLOCK);
+
+        ptr += len;
+        c->Nh += len >> 29;
+        c->Nl += len <<= 3;
+        if (c->Nl < (unsigned int)len)
+            c->Nh++;
+    }
+
+    if (res)
+        SHA256_Update(c, ptr, res);
+}
+
+# ifdef SHA256_Update
+#  undef SHA256_Update
+# endif
+# define SHA256_Update sha256_update
+
+# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK)
+
+typedef struct {
+    unsigned int A[8], B[8], C[8], D[8], E[8], F[8], G[8], H[8];
+} SHA256_MB_CTX;
+typedef struct {
+    const unsigned char *ptr;
+    int blocks;
+} HASH_DESC;
+
+void sha256_multi_block(SHA256_MB_CTX *, const HASH_DESC *, int);
+
+typedef struct {
+    const unsigned char *inp;
+    unsigned char *out;
+    int blocks;
+    u64 iv[2];
+} CIPH_DESC;
+
+void aesni_multi_cbc_encrypt(CIPH_DESC *, void *, int);
+
+static size_t tls1_1_multi_block_encrypt(EVP_AES_HMAC_SHA256 *key,
+                                         unsigned char *out,
+                                         const unsigned char *inp,
+                                         size_t inp_len, int n4x)
+{                               /* n4x is 1 or 2 */
+    HASH_DESC hash_d[8], edges[8];
+    CIPH_DESC ciph_d[8];
+    unsigned char storage[sizeof(SHA256_MB_CTX) + 32];
+    union {
+        u64 q[16];
+        u32 d[32];
+        u8 c[128];
+    } blocks[8];
+    SHA256_MB_CTX *ctx;
+    unsigned int frag, last, packlen, i, x4 = 4 * n4x, minblocks, processed =
+        0;
+    size_t ret = 0;
+    u8 *IVs;
+#  if defined(BSWAP8)
+    u64 seqnum;
+#  endif
+
+    /* ask for IVs in bulk */
+    if (RAND_bytes((IVs = blocks[0].c), 16 * x4) <= 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    /* align */
+    ctx = (SHA256_MB_CTX *) (storage + 32 - ((size_t)storage % 32));
+
+    frag = (unsigned int)inp_len >> (1 + n4x);
+    last = (unsigned int)inp_len + frag - (frag << (1 + n4x));
+    if (last > frag && ((last + 13 + 9) % 64) < (x4 - 1)) {
+        frag++;
+        last -= x4 - 1;
+    }
+
+    packlen = 5 + 16 + ((frag + 32 + 16) & -16);
+
+    /* populate descriptors with pointers and IVs */
+    hash_d[0].ptr = inp;
+    ciph_d[0].inp = inp;
+    /* 5+16 is place for header and explicit IV */
+    ciph_d[0].out = out + 5 + 16;
+    memcpy(ciph_d[0].out - 16, IVs, 16);
+    memcpy(ciph_d[0].iv, IVs, 16);
+    IVs += 16;
+
+    for (i = 1; i < x4; i++) {
+        ciph_d[i].inp = hash_d[i].ptr = hash_d[i - 1].ptr + frag;
+        ciph_d[i].out = ciph_d[i - 1].out + packlen;
+        memcpy(ciph_d[i].out - 16, IVs, 16);
+        memcpy(ciph_d[i].iv, IVs, 16);
+        IVs += 16;
+    }
+
+#  if defined(BSWAP8)
+    memcpy(blocks[0].c, key->md.data, 8);
+    seqnum = BSWAP8(blocks[0].q[0]);
+#  endif
+    for (i = 0; i < x4; i++) {
+        unsigned int len = (i == (x4 - 1) ? last : frag);
+#  if !defined(BSWAP8)
+        unsigned int carry, j;
+#  endif
+
+        ctx->A[i] = key->md.h[0];
+        ctx->B[i] = key->md.h[1];
+        ctx->C[i] = key->md.h[2];
+        ctx->D[i] = key->md.h[3];
+        ctx->E[i] = key->md.h[4];
+        ctx->F[i] = key->md.h[5];
+        ctx->G[i] = key->md.h[6];
+        ctx->H[i] = key->md.h[7];
+
+        /* fix seqnum */
+#  if defined(BSWAP8)
+        blocks[i].q[0] = BSWAP8(seqnum + i);
+#  else
+        for (carry = i, j = 8; j--;) {
+            blocks[i].c[j] = ((u8 *)key->md.data)[j] + carry;
+            carry = (blocks[i].c[j] - carry) >> (sizeof(carry) * 8 - 1);
+        }
+#  endif
+        blocks[i].c[8] = ((u8 *)key->md.data)[8];
+        blocks[i].c[9] = ((u8 *)key->md.data)[9];
+        blocks[i].c[10] = ((u8 *)key->md.data)[10];
+        /* fix length */
+        blocks[i].c[11] = (u8)(len >> 8);
+        blocks[i].c[12] = (u8)(len);
+
+        memcpy(blocks[i].c + 13, hash_d[i].ptr, 64 - 13);
+        hash_d[i].ptr += 64 - 13;
+        hash_d[i].blocks = (len - (64 - 13)) / 64;
+
+        edges[i].ptr = blocks[i].c;
+        edges[i].blocks = 1;
+    }
+
+    /* hash 13-byte headers and first 64-13 bytes of inputs */
+    sha256_multi_block(ctx, edges, n4x);
+    /* hash bulk inputs */
+#  define MAXCHUNKSIZE    2048
+#  if     MAXCHUNKSIZE%64
+#   error  "MAXCHUNKSIZE is not divisible by 64"
+#  elif   MAXCHUNKSIZE
+    /*
+     * goal is to minimize pressure on L1 cache by moving in shorter steps,
+     * so that hashed data is still in the cache by the time we encrypt it
+     */
+    minblocks = ((frag <= last ? frag : last) - (64 - 13)) / 64;
+    if (minblocks > MAXCHUNKSIZE / 64) {
+        for (i = 0; i < x4; i++) {
+            edges[i].ptr = hash_d[i].ptr;
+            edges[i].blocks = MAXCHUNKSIZE / 64;
+            ciph_d[i].blocks = MAXCHUNKSIZE / 16;
+        }
+        do {
+            sha256_multi_block(ctx, edges, n4x);
+            aesni_multi_cbc_encrypt(ciph_d, &key->ks, n4x);
+
+            for (i = 0; i < x4; i++) {
+                edges[i].ptr = hash_d[i].ptr += MAXCHUNKSIZE;
+                hash_d[i].blocks -= MAXCHUNKSIZE / 64;
+                edges[i].blocks = MAXCHUNKSIZE / 64;
+                ciph_d[i].inp += MAXCHUNKSIZE;
+                ciph_d[i].out += MAXCHUNKSIZE;
+                ciph_d[i].blocks = MAXCHUNKSIZE / 16;
+                memcpy(ciph_d[i].iv, ciph_d[i].out - 16, 16);
+            }
+            processed += MAXCHUNKSIZE;
+            minblocks -= MAXCHUNKSIZE / 64;
+        } while (minblocks > MAXCHUNKSIZE / 64);
+    }
+#  endif
+#  undef  MAXCHUNKSIZE
+    sha256_multi_block(ctx, hash_d, n4x);
+
+    memset(blocks, 0, sizeof(blocks));
+    for (i = 0; i < x4; i++) {
+        unsigned int len = (i == (x4 - 1) ? last : frag),
+            off = hash_d[i].blocks * 64;
+        const unsigned char *ptr = hash_d[i].ptr + off;
+
+        off = (len - processed) - (64 - 13) - off; /* remainder actually */
+        memcpy(blocks[i].c, ptr, off);
+        blocks[i].c[off] = 0x80;
+        len += 64 + 13;         /* 64 is HMAC header */
+        len *= 8;               /* convert to bits */
+        if (off < (64 - 8)) {
+#  ifdef BSWAP4
+            blocks[i].d[15] = BSWAP4(len);
+#  else
+            PUTU32(blocks[i].c + 60, len);
+#  endif
+            edges[i].blocks = 1;
+        } else {
+#  ifdef BSWAP4
+            blocks[i].d[31] = BSWAP4(len);
+#  else
+            PUTU32(blocks[i].c + 124, len);
+#  endif
+            edges[i].blocks = 2;
+        }
+        edges[i].ptr = blocks[i].c;
+    }
+
+    /* hash input tails and finalize */
+    sha256_multi_block(ctx, edges, n4x);
+
+    memset(blocks, 0, sizeof(blocks));
+    for (i = 0; i < x4; i++) {
+#  ifdef BSWAP4
+        blocks[i].d[0] = BSWAP4(ctx->A[i]);
+        ctx->A[i] = key->tail.h[0];
+        blocks[i].d[1] = BSWAP4(ctx->B[i]);
+        ctx->B[i] = key->tail.h[1];
+        blocks[i].d[2] = BSWAP4(ctx->C[i]);
+        ctx->C[i] = key->tail.h[2];
+        blocks[i].d[3] = BSWAP4(ctx->D[i]);
+        ctx->D[i] = key->tail.h[3];
+        blocks[i].d[4] = BSWAP4(ctx->E[i]);
+        ctx->E[i] = key->tail.h[4];
+        blocks[i].d[5] = BSWAP4(ctx->F[i]);
+        ctx->F[i] = key->tail.h[5];
+        blocks[i].d[6] = BSWAP4(ctx->G[i]);
+        ctx->G[i] = key->tail.h[6];
+        blocks[i].d[7] = BSWAP4(ctx->H[i]);
+        ctx->H[i] = key->tail.h[7];
+        blocks[i].c[32] = 0x80;
+        blocks[i].d[15] = BSWAP4((64 + 32) * 8);
+#  else
+        PUTU32(blocks[i].c + 0, ctx->A[i]);
+        ctx->A[i] = key->tail.h[0];
+        PUTU32(blocks[i].c + 4, ctx->B[i]);
+        ctx->B[i] = key->tail.h[1];
+        PUTU32(blocks[i].c + 8, ctx->C[i]);
+        ctx->C[i] = key->tail.h[2];
+        PUTU32(blocks[i].c + 12, ctx->D[i]);
+        ctx->D[i] = key->tail.h[3];
+        PUTU32(blocks[i].c + 16, ctx->E[i]);
+        ctx->E[i] = key->tail.h[4];
+        PUTU32(blocks[i].c + 20, ctx->F[i]);
+        ctx->F[i] = key->tail.h[5];
+        PUTU32(blocks[i].c + 24, ctx->G[i]);
+        ctx->G[i] = key->tail.h[6];
+        PUTU32(blocks[i].c + 28, ctx->H[i]);
+        ctx->H[i] = key->tail.h[7];
+        blocks[i].c[32] = 0x80;
+        PUTU32(blocks[i].c + 60, (64 + 32) * 8);
+#  endif
+        edges[i].ptr = blocks[i].c;
+        edges[i].blocks = 1;
+    }
+
+    /* finalize MACs */
+    sha256_multi_block(ctx, edges, n4x);
+
+    for (i = 0; i < x4; i++) {
+        unsigned int len = (i == (x4 - 1) ? last : frag), pad, j;
+        unsigned char *out0 = out;
+
+        memcpy(ciph_d[i].out, ciph_d[i].inp, len - processed);
+        ciph_d[i].inp = ciph_d[i].out;
+
+        out += 5 + 16 + len;
+
+        /* write MAC */
+        PUTU32(out + 0, ctx->A[i]);
+        PUTU32(out + 4, ctx->B[i]);
+        PUTU32(out + 8, ctx->C[i]);
+        PUTU32(out + 12, ctx->D[i]);
+        PUTU32(out + 16, ctx->E[i]);
+        PUTU32(out + 20, ctx->F[i]);
+        PUTU32(out + 24, ctx->G[i]);
+        PUTU32(out + 28, ctx->H[i]);
+        out += 32;
+        len += 32;
+
+        /* pad */
+        pad = 15 - len % 16;
+        for (j = 0; j <= pad; j++)
+            *(out++) = pad;
+        len += pad + 1;
+
+        ciph_d[i].blocks = (len - processed) / 16;
+        len += 16;              /* account for explicit iv */
+
+        /* arrange header */
+        out0[0] = ((u8 *)key->md.data)[8];
+        out0[1] = ((u8 *)key->md.data)[9];
+        out0[2] = ((u8 *)key->md.data)[10];
+        out0[3] = (u8)(len >> 8);
+        out0[4] = (u8)(len);
+
+        ret += len + 5;
+        inp += frag;
+    }
+
+    aesni_multi_cbc_encrypt(ciph_d, &key->ks, n4x);
+
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(blocks, sizeof(blocks));
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx, sizeof(*ctx));
+
+    return ret;
+}
+# endif
+
+static int aesni_cbc_hmac_sha256_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+                                        unsigned char *out,
+                                        const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
+{
+    EVP_AES_HMAC_SHA256 *key = data(ctx);
+    unsigned int l;
+    size_t plen = key->payload_length, iv = 0, /* explicit IV in TLS 1.1 and
+                                                * later */
+        sha_off = 0;
+# if defined(STITCHED_CALL)
+    size_t aes_off = 0, blocks;
+
+    sha_off = SHA256_CBLOCK - key->md.num;
+# endif
+
+    key->payload_length = NO_PAYLOAD_LENGTH;
+
+    if (len % AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
+        return 0;
+
+    if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) {
+        if (plen == NO_PAYLOAD_LENGTH)
+            plen = len;
+        else if (len !=
+                 ((plen + SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH +
+                   AES_BLOCK_SIZE) & -AES_BLOCK_SIZE))
+            return 0;
+        else if (key->aux.tls_ver >= TLS1_1_VERSION)
+            iv = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+
+# if defined(STITCHED_CALL)
+        /*
+         * Assembly stitch handles AVX-capable processors, but its
+         * performance is not optimal on AMD Jaguar, ~40% worse, for
+         * unknown reasons. Incidentally processor in question supports
+         * AVX, but not AMD-specific XOP extension, which can be used
+         * to identify it and avoid stitch invocation. So that after we
+         * establish that current CPU supports AVX, we even see if it's
+         * either even XOP-capable Bulldozer-based or GenuineIntel one.
+         * But SHAEXT-capable go ahead...
+         */
+        if (((OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[2] & (1 << 29)) ||         /* SHAEXT? */
+             ((OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1 << (60 - 32))) && /* AVX? */
+              ((OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1 << (43 - 32)))   /* XOP? */
+               | (OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[0] & (1 << 30))))) &&  /* "Intel CPU"? */
+            plen > (sha_off + iv) &&
+            (blocks = (plen - (sha_off + iv)) / SHA256_CBLOCK)) {
+            SHA256_Update(&key->md, in + iv, sha_off);
+
+            (void)aesni_cbc_sha256_enc(in, out, blocks, &key->ks,
+                                       EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx),
+                                       &key->md, in + iv + sha_off);
+            blocks *= SHA256_CBLOCK;
+            aes_off += blocks;
+            sha_off += blocks;
+            key->md.Nh += blocks >> 29;
+            key->md.Nl += blocks <<= 3;
+            if (key->md.Nl < (unsigned int)blocks)
+                key->md.Nh++;
+        } else {
+            sha_off = 0;
+        }
+# endif
+        sha_off += iv;
+        SHA256_Update(&key->md, in + sha_off, plen - sha_off);
+
+        if (plen != len) {      /* "TLS" mode of operation */
+            if (in != out)
+                memcpy(out + aes_off, in + aes_off, plen - aes_off);
+
+            /* calculate HMAC and append it to payload */
+            SHA256_Final(out + plen, &key->md);
+            key->md = key->tail;
+            SHA256_Update(&key->md, out + plen, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+            SHA256_Final(out + plen, &key->md);
+
+            /* pad the payload|hmac */
+            plen += SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+            for (l = len - plen - 1; plen < len; plen++)
+                out[plen] = l;
+            /* encrypt HMAC|padding at once */
+            aesni_cbc_encrypt(out + aes_off, out + aes_off, len - aes_off,
+                              &key->ks, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), 1);
+        } else {
+            aesni_cbc_encrypt(in + aes_off, out + aes_off, len - aes_off,
+                              &key->ks, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), 1);
+        }
+    } else {
+        union {
+            unsigned int u[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH / sizeof(unsigned int)];
+            unsigned char c[64 + SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+        } mac, *pmac;
+
+        /* arrange cache line alignment */
+        pmac = (void *)(((size_t)mac.c + 63) & ((size_t)0 - 64));
+
+        /* decrypt HMAC|padding at once */
+        aesni_cbc_encrypt(in, out, len, &key->ks,
+                          EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), 0);
+
+        if (plen != NO_PAYLOAD_LENGTH) { /* "TLS" mode of operation */
+            size_t inp_len, mask, j, i;
+            unsigned int res, maxpad, pad, bitlen;
+            int ret = 1;
+            union {
+                unsigned int u[SHA_LBLOCK];
+                unsigned char c[SHA256_CBLOCK];
+            } *data = (void *)key->md.data;
+
+            if ((key->aux.tls_aad[plen - 4] << 8 | key->aux.tls_aad[plen - 3])
+                >= TLS1_1_VERSION)
+                iv = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+
+            if (len < (iv + SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH + 1))
+                return 0;
+
+            /* omit explicit iv */
+            out += iv;
+            len -= iv;
+
+            /* figure out payload length */
+            pad = out[len - 1];
+            maxpad = len - (SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH + 1);
+            maxpad |= (255 - maxpad) >> (sizeof(maxpad) * 8 - 8);
+            maxpad &= 255;
+
+            mask = constant_time_ge(maxpad, pad);
+            ret &= mask;
+            /*
+             * If pad is invalid then we will fail the above test but we must
+             * continue anyway because we are in constant time code. However,
+             * we'll use the maxpad value instead of the supplied pad to make
+             * sure we perform well defined pointer arithmetic.
+             */
+            pad = constant_time_select(mask, pad, maxpad);
+
+            inp_len = len - (SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH + pad + 1);
+
+            key->aux.tls_aad[plen - 2] = inp_len >> 8;
+            key->aux.tls_aad[plen - 1] = inp_len;
+
+            /* calculate HMAC */
+            key->md = key->head;
+            SHA256_Update(&key->md, key->aux.tls_aad, plen);
+
+# if 1
+            len -= SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH; /* amend mac */
+            if (len >= (256 + SHA256_CBLOCK)) {
+                j = (len - (256 + SHA256_CBLOCK)) & (0 - SHA256_CBLOCK);
+                j += SHA256_CBLOCK - key->md.num;
+                SHA256_Update(&key->md, out, j);
+                out += j;
+                len -= j;
+                inp_len -= j;
+            }
+
+            /* but pretend as if we hashed padded payload */
+            bitlen = key->md.Nl + (inp_len << 3); /* at most 18 bits */
+#  ifdef BSWAP4
+            bitlen = BSWAP4(bitlen);
+#  else
+            mac.c[0] = 0;
+            mac.c[1] = (unsigned char)(bitlen >> 16);
+            mac.c[2] = (unsigned char)(bitlen >> 8);
+            mac.c[3] = (unsigned char)bitlen;
+            bitlen = mac.u[0];
+#  endif
+
+            pmac->u[0] = 0;
+            pmac->u[1] = 0;
+            pmac->u[2] = 0;
+            pmac->u[3] = 0;
+            pmac->u[4] = 0;
+            pmac->u[5] = 0;
+            pmac->u[6] = 0;
+            pmac->u[7] = 0;
+
+            for (res = key->md.num, j = 0; j < len; j++) {
+                size_t c = out[j];
+                mask = (j - inp_len) >> (sizeof(j) * 8 - 8);
+                c &= mask;
+                c |= 0x80 & ~mask & ~((inp_len - j) >> (sizeof(j) * 8 - 8));
+                data->c[res++] = (unsigned char)c;
+
+                if (res != SHA256_CBLOCK)
+                    continue;
+
+                /* j is not incremented yet */
+                mask = 0 - ((inp_len + 7 - j) >> (sizeof(j) * 8 - 1));
+                data->u[SHA_LBLOCK - 1] |= bitlen & mask;
+                sha256_block_data_order(&key->md, data, 1);
+                mask &= 0 - ((j - inp_len - 72) >> (sizeof(j) * 8 - 1));
+                pmac->u[0] |= key->md.h[0] & mask;
+                pmac->u[1] |= key->md.h[1] & mask;
+                pmac->u[2] |= key->md.h[2] & mask;
+                pmac->u[3] |= key->md.h[3] & mask;
+                pmac->u[4] |= key->md.h[4] & mask;
+                pmac->u[5] |= key->md.h[5] & mask;
+                pmac->u[6] |= key->md.h[6] & mask;
+                pmac->u[7] |= key->md.h[7] & mask;
+                res = 0;
+            }
+
+            for (i = res; i < SHA256_CBLOCK; i++, j++)
+                data->c[i] = 0;
+
+            if (res > SHA256_CBLOCK - 8) {
+                mask = 0 - ((inp_len + 8 - j) >> (sizeof(j) * 8 - 1));
+                data->u[SHA_LBLOCK - 1] |= bitlen & mask;
+                sha256_block_data_order(&key->md, data, 1);
+                mask &= 0 - ((j - inp_len - 73) >> (sizeof(j) * 8 - 1));
+                pmac->u[0] |= key->md.h[0] & mask;
+                pmac->u[1] |= key->md.h[1] & mask;
+                pmac->u[2] |= key->md.h[2] & mask;
+                pmac->u[3] |= key->md.h[3] & mask;
+                pmac->u[4] |= key->md.h[4] & mask;
+                pmac->u[5] |= key->md.h[5] & mask;
+                pmac->u[6] |= key->md.h[6] & mask;
+                pmac->u[7] |= key->md.h[7] & mask;
+
+                memset(data, 0, SHA256_CBLOCK);
+                j += 64;
+            }
+            data->u[SHA_LBLOCK - 1] = bitlen;
+            sha256_block_data_order(&key->md, data, 1);
+            mask = 0 - ((j - inp_len - 73) >> (sizeof(j) * 8 - 1));
+            pmac->u[0] |= key->md.h[0] & mask;
+            pmac->u[1] |= key->md.h[1] & mask;
+            pmac->u[2] |= key->md.h[2] & mask;
+            pmac->u[3] |= key->md.h[3] & mask;
+            pmac->u[4] |= key->md.h[4] & mask;
+            pmac->u[5] |= key->md.h[5] & mask;
+            pmac->u[6] |= key->md.h[6] & mask;
+            pmac->u[7] |= key->md.h[7] & mask;
+
+#  ifdef BSWAP4
+            pmac->u[0] = BSWAP4(pmac->u[0]);
+            pmac->u[1] = BSWAP4(pmac->u[1]);
+            pmac->u[2] = BSWAP4(pmac->u[2]);
+            pmac->u[3] = BSWAP4(pmac->u[3]);
+            pmac->u[4] = BSWAP4(pmac->u[4]);
+            pmac->u[5] = BSWAP4(pmac->u[5]);
+            pmac->u[6] = BSWAP4(pmac->u[6]);
+            pmac->u[7] = BSWAP4(pmac->u[7]);
+#  else
+            for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+                res = pmac->u[i];
+                pmac->c[4 * i + 0] = (unsigned char)(res >> 24);
+                pmac->c[4 * i + 1] = (unsigned char)(res >> 16);
+                pmac->c[4 * i + 2] = (unsigned char)(res >> 8);
+                pmac->c[4 * i + 3] = (unsigned char)res;
+            }
+#  endif
+            len += SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+# else
+            SHA256_Update(&key->md, out, inp_len);
+            res = key->md.num;
+            SHA256_Final(pmac->c, &key->md);
+
+            {
+                unsigned int inp_blocks, pad_blocks;
+
+                /* but pretend as if we hashed padded payload */
+                inp_blocks =
+                    1 + ((SHA256_CBLOCK - 9 - res) >> (sizeof(res) * 8 - 1));
+                res += (unsigned int)(len - inp_len);
+                pad_blocks = res / SHA256_CBLOCK;
+                res %= SHA256_CBLOCK;
+                pad_blocks +=
+                    1 + ((SHA256_CBLOCK - 9 - res) >> (sizeof(res) * 8 - 1));
+                for (; inp_blocks < pad_blocks; inp_blocks++)
+                    sha1_block_data_order(&key->md, data, 1);
+            }
+# endif
+            key->md = key->tail;
+            SHA256_Update(&key->md, pmac->c, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+            SHA256_Final(pmac->c, &key->md);
+
+            /* verify HMAC */
+            out += inp_len;
+            len -= inp_len;
+# if 1
+            {
+                unsigned char *p =
+                    out + len - 1 - maxpad - SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+                size_t off = out - p;
+                unsigned int c, cmask;
+
+                maxpad += SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+                for (res = 0, i = 0, j = 0; j < maxpad; j++) {
+                    c = p[j];
+                    cmask =
+                        ((int)(j - off - SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)) >>
+                        (sizeof(int) * 8 - 1);
+                    res |= (c ^ pad) & ~cmask; /* ... and padding */
+                    cmask &= ((int)(off - 1 - j)) >> (sizeof(int) * 8 - 1);
+                    res |= (c ^ pmac->c[i]) & cmask;
+                    i += 1 & cmask;
+                }
+                maxpad -= SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+
+                res = 0 - ((0 - res) >> (sizeof(res) * 8 - 1));
+                ret &= (int)~res;
+            }
+# else
+            for (res = 0, i = 0; i < SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++)
+                res |= out[i] ^ pmac->c[i];
+            res = 0 - ((0 - res) >> (sizeof(res) * 8 - 1));
+            ret &= (int)~res;
+
+            /* verify padding */
+            pad = (pad & ~res) | (maxpad & res);
+            out = out + len - 1 - pad;
+            for (res = 0, i = 0; i < pad; i++)
+                res |= out[i] ^ pad;
+
+            res = (0 - res) >> (sizeof(res) * 8 - 1);
+            ret &= (int)~res;
+# endif
+            return ret;
+        } else {
+            SHA256_Update(&key->md, out, len);
+        }
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int aesni_cbc_hmac_sha256_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type, int arg,
+                                      void *ptr)
+{
+    EVP_AES_HMAC_SHA256 *key = data(ctx);
+    unsigned int u_arg = (unsigned int)arg;
+
+    switch (type) {
+    case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY:
+        {
+            unsigned int i;
+            unsigned char hmac_key[64];
+
+            memset(hmac_key, 0, sizeof(hmac_key));
+
+            if (arg < 0)
+                return -1;
+
+            if (u_arg > sizeof(hmac_key)) {
+                SHA256_Init(&key->head);
+                SHA256_Update(&key->head, ptr, arg);
+                SHA256_Final(hmac_key, &key->head);
+            } else {
+                memcpy(hmac_key, ptr, arg);
+            }
+
+            for (i = 0; i < sizeof(hmac_key); i++)
+                hmac_key[i] ^= 0x36; /* ipad */
+            SHA256_Init(&key->head);
+            SHA256_Update(&key->head, hmac_key, sizeof(hmac_key));
+
+            for (i = 0; i < sizeof(hmac_key); i++)
+                hmac_key[i] ^= 0x36 ^ 0x5c; /* opad */
+            SHA256_Init(&key->tail);
+            SHA256_Update(&key->tail, hmac_key, sizeof(hmac_key));
+
+            OPENSSL_cleanse(hmac_key, sizeof(hmac_key));
+
+            return 1;
+        }
+    case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD:
+        {
+            unsigned char *p = ptr;
+            unsigned int len;
+
+            if (arg != EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN)
+                return -1;
+
+            len = p[arg - 2] << 8 | p[arg - 1];
+
+            if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) {
+                key->payload_length = len;
+                if ((key->aux.tls_ver =
+                     p[arg - 4] << 8 | p[arg - 3]) >= TLS1_1_VERSION) {
+                    if (len < AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
+                        return 0;
+                    len -= AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+                    p[arg - 2] = len >> 8;
+                    p[arg - 1] = len;
+                }
+                key->md = key->head;
+                SHA256_Update(&key->md, p, arg);
+
+                return (int)(((len + SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH +
+                               AES_BLOCK_SIZE) & -AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
+                             - len);
+            } else {
+                memcpy(key->aux.tls_aad, ptr, arg);
+                key->payload_length = arg;
+
+                return SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+            }
+        }
+# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK)
+    case EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE:
+        return (int)(5 + 16 + ((arg + 32 + 16) & -16));
+    case EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD:
+        {
+            EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM *param =
+                (EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM *) ptr;
+            unsigned int n4x = 1, x4;
+            unsigned int frag, last, packlen, inp_len;
+
+            if (arg < 0)
+                return -1;
+
+            if (u_arg < sizeof(EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM))
+                return -1;
+
+            inp_len = param->inp[11] << 8 | param->inp[12];
+
+            if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) {
+                if ((param->inp[9] << 8 | param->inp[10]) < TLS1_1_VERSION)
+                    return -1;
+
+                if (inp_len) {
+                    if (inp_len < 4096)
+                        return 0; /* too short */
+
+                    if (inp_len >= 8192 && OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[2] & (1 << 5))
+                        n4x = 2; /* AVX2 */
+                } else if ((n4x = param->interleave / 4) && n4x <= 2)
+                    inp_len = param->len;
+                else
+                    return -1;
+
+                key->md = key->head;
+                SHA256_Update(&key->md, param->inp, 13);
+
+                x4 = 4 * n4x;
+                n4x += 1;
+
+                frag = inp_len >> n4x;
+                last = inp_len + frag - (frag << n4x);
+                if (last > frag && ((last + 13 + 9) % 64 < (x4 - 1))) {
+                    frag++;
+                    last -= x4 - 1;
+                }
+
+                packlen = 5 + 16 + ((frag + 32 + 16) & -16);
+                packlen = (packlen << n4x) - packlen;
+                packlen += 5 + 16 + ((last + 32 + 16) & -16);
+
+                param->interleave = x4;
+
+                return (int)packlen;
+            } else
+                return -1;      /* not yet */
+        }
+    case EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT:
+        {
+            EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM *param =
+                (EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM *) ptr;
+
+            return (int)tls1_1_multi_block_encrypt(key, param->out,
+                                                   param->inp, param->len,
+                                                   param->interleave / 4);
+        }
+    case EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_DECRYPT:
+# endif
+    default:
+        return -1;
+    }
+}
+
+static EVP_CIPHER aesni_128_cbc_hmac_sha256_cipher = {
+# ifdef NID_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha256
+    NID_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha256,
+# else
+    NID_undef,
+# endif
+    AES_BLOCK_SIZE, 16, AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+    EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1 |
+        EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK,
+    aesni_cbc_hmac_sha256_init_key,
+    aesni_cbc_hmac_sha256_cipher,
+    NULL,
+    sizeof(EVP_AES_HMAC_SHA256),
+    EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1 ? NULL : EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
+    EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1 ? NULL : EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
+    aesni_cbc_hmac_sha256_ctrl,
+    NULL
+};
+
+static EVP_CIPHER aesni_256_cbc_hmac_sha256_cipher = {
+# ifdef NID_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha256
+    NID_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha256,
+# else
+    NID_undef,
+# endif
+    AES_BLOCK_SIZE, 32, AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+    EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1 |
+        EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK,
+    aesni_cbc_hmac_sha256_init_key,
+    aesni_cbc_hmac_sha256_cipher,
+    NULL,
+    sizeof(EVP_AES_HMAC_SHA256),
+    EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1 ? NULL : EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
+    EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1 ? NULL : EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
+    aesni_cbc_hmac_sha256_ctrl,
+    NULL
+};
+
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha256(void)
+{
+    return ((OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & AESNI_CAPABLE) &&
+            aesni_cbc_sha256_enc(NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL) ?
+            &aesni_128_cbc_hmac_sha256_cipher : NULL);
+}
+
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha256(void)
+{
+    return ((OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & AESNI_CAPABLE) &&
+            aesni_cbc_sha256_enc(NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL) ?
+            &aesni_256_cbc_hmac_sha256_cipher : NULL);
+}
+#else
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha256(void)
+{
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha256(void)
+{
+    return NULL;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/e_bf.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/e_bf.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dc38690
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/e_bf.c
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BF
+# include <openssl/evp.h>
+# include "internal/evp_int.h"
+# include <openssl/objects.h>
+# include <openssl/blowfish.h>
+
+static int bf_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+                       const unsigned char *iv, int enc);
+
+typedef struct {
+    BF_KEY ks;
+} EVP_BF_KEY;
+
+# define data(ctx)       EVP_C_DATA(EVP_BF_KEY,ctx)
+
+IMPLEMENT_BLOCK_CIPHER(bf, ks, BF, EVP_BF_KEY, NID_bf, 8, 16, 8, 64,
+                       EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH, bf_init_key, NULL,
+                       EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, NULL)
+
+static int bf_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+                       const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
+{
+    BF_set_key(&data(ctx)->ks, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx), key);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/e_camellia.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/e_camellia.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2df4a6e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/e_camellia.c
@@ -0,0 +1,366 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2006-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA
+NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT
+#else
+
+# include <openssl/evp.h>
+# include <openssl/err.h>
+# include <string.h>
+# include <assert.h>
+# include <openssl/camellia.h>
+# include "internal/evp_int.h"
+# include "modes_lcl.h"
+
+static int camellia_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+                             const unsigned char *iv, int enc);
+
+/* Camellia subkey Structure */
+typedef struct {
+    CAMELLIA_KEY ks;
+    block128_f block;
+    union {
+        cbc128_f cbc;
+        ctr128_f ctr;
+    } stream;
+} EVP_CAMELLIA_KEY;
+
+# define MAXBITCHUNK     ((size_t)1<<(sizeof(size_t)*8-4))
+
+/* Attribute operation for Camellia */
+# define data(ctx)       EVP_C_DATA(EVP_CAMELLIA_KEY,ctx)
+
+# if defined(AES_ASM) && (defined(__sparc) || defined(__sparc__))
+/* ---------^^^ this is not a typo, just a way to detect that
+ * assembler support was in general requested... */
+#  include "sparc_arch.h"
+
+extern unsigned int OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[];
+
+#  define SPARC_CMLL_CAPABLE      (OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[1] & CFR_CAMELLIA)
+
+void cmll_t4_set_key(const unsigned char *key, int bits, CAMELLIA_KEY *ks);
+void cmll_t4_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                     const CAMELLIA_KEY *key);
+void cmll_t4_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                     const CAMELLIA_KEY *key);
+
+void cmll128_t4_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                            size_t len, const CAMELLIA_KEY *key,
+                            unsigned char *ivec);
+void cmll128_t4_cbc_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                            size_t len, const CAMELLIA_KEY *key,
+                            unsigned char *ivec);
+void cmll256_t4_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                            size_t len, const CAMELLIA_KEY *key,
+                            unsigned char *ivec);
+void cmll256_t4_cbc_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                            size_t len, const CAMELLIA_KEY *key,
+                            unsigned char *ivec);
+void cmll128_t4_ctr32_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                              size_t blocks, const CAMELLIA_KEY *key,
+                              unsigned char *ivec);
+void cmll256_t4_ctr32_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                              size_t blocks, const CAMELLIA_KEY *key,
+                              unsigned char *ivec);
+
+static int cmll_t4_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+                            const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
+{
+    int ret, mode, bits;
+    EVP_CAMELLIA_KEY *dat =
+        (EVP_CAMELLIA_KEY *)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(ctx);
+
+    mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx);
+    bits = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8;
+
+    cmll_t4_set_key(key, bits, &dat->ks);
+
+    if ((mode == EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE || mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
+        && !enc) {
+        ret = 0;
+        dat->block = (block128_f) cmll_t4_decrypt;
+        switch (bits) {
+        case 128:
+            dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ?
+                (cbc128_f) cmll128_t4_cbc_decrypt : NULL;
+            break;
+        case 192:
+        case 256:
+            dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ?
+                (cbc128_f) cmll256_t4_cbc_decrypt : NULL;
+            break;
+        default:
+            ret = -1;
+        }
+    } else {
+        ret = 0;
+        dat->block = (block128_f) cmll_t4_encrypt;
+        switch (bits) {
+        case 128:
+            if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
+                dat->stream.cbc = (cbc128_f) cmll128_t4_cbc_encrypt;
+            else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE)
+                dat->stream.ctr = (ctr128_f) cmll128_t4_ctr32_encrypt;
+            else
+                dat->stream.cbc = NULL;
+            break;
+        case 192:
+        case 256:
+            if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
+                dat->stream.cbc = (cbc128_f) cmll256_t4_cbc_encrypt;
+            else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE)
+                dat->stream.ctr = (ctr128_f) cmll256_t4_ctr32_encrypt;
+            else
+                dat->stream.cbc = NULL;
+            break;
+        default:
+            ret = -1;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (ret < 0) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_CMLL_T4_INIT_KEY, EVP_R_CAMELLIA_KEY_SETUP_FAILED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+#  define cmll_t4_cbc_cipher camellia_cbc_cipher
+static int cmll_t4_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                              const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
+
+#  define cmll_t4_ecb_cipher camellia_ecb_cipher
+static int cmll_t4_ecb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                              const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
+
+#  define cmll_t4_ofb_cipher camellia_ofb_cipher
+static int cmll_t4_ofb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                              const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
+
+#  define cmll_t4_cfb_cipher camellia_cfb_cipher
+static int cmll_t4_cfb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                              const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
+
+#  define cmll_t4_cfb8_cipher camellia_cfb8_cipher
+static int cmll_t4_cfb8_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                               const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
+
+#  define cmll_t4_cfb1_cipher camellia_cfb1_cipher
+static int cmll_t4_cfb1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                               const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
+
+#  define cmll_t4_ctr_cipher camellia_ctr_cipher
+static int cmll_t4_ctr_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                              const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
+
+#  define BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,blocksize,ivlen,nmode,mode,MODE,flags) \
+static const EVP_CIPHER cmll_t4_##keylen##_##mode = { \
+        nid##_##keylen##_##nmode,blocksize,keylen/8,ivlen, \
+        flags|EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE,   \
+        cmll_t4_init_key,               \
+        cmll_t4_##mode##_cipher,        \
+        NULL,                           \
+        sizeof(EVP_CAMELLIA_KEY),       \
+        NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL }; \
+static const EVP_CIPHER camellia_##keylen##_##mode = { \
+        nid##_##keylen##_##nmode,blocksize,     \
+        keylen/8,ivlen, \
+        flags|EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE,   \
+        camellia_init_key,              \
+        camellia_##mode##_cipher,       \
+        NULL,                           \
+        sizeof(EVP_CAMELLIA_KEY),       \
+        NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL }; \
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_camellia_##keylen##_##mode(void) \
+{ return SPARC_CMLL_CAPABLE?&cmll_t4_##keylen##_##mode:&camellia_##keylen##_##mode; }
+
+# else
+
+#  define BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,blocksize,ivlen,nmode,mode,MODE,flags) \
+static const EVP_CIPHER camellia_##keylen##_##mode = { \
+        nid##_##keylen##_##nmode,blocksize,keylen/8,ivlen, \
+        flags|EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE,   \
+        camellia_init_key,              \
+        camellia_##mode##_cipher,       \
+        NULL,                           \
+        sizeof(EVP_CAMELLIA_KEY),       \
+        NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL }; \
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_camellia_##keylen##_##mode(void) \
+{ return &camellia_##keylen##_##mode; }
+
+# endif
+
+# define BLOCK_CIPHER_generic_pack(nid,keylen,flags)             \
+        BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,16,16,cbc,cbc,CBC,flags|EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1)     \
+        BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,16,0,ecb,ecb,ECB,flags|EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1)      \
+        BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,1,16,ofb128,ofb,OFB,flags|EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1)   \
+        BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,1,16,cfb128,cfb,CFB,flags|EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1)   \
+        BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,1,16,cfb1,cfb1,CFB,flags)       \
+        BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,1,16,cfb8,cfb8,CFB,flags)       \
+        BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid, keylen, 1, 16, ctr, ctr, CTR, flags)
+
+/* The subkey for Camellia is generated. */
+static int camellia_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+                             const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
+{
+    int ret, mode;
+    EVP_CAMELLIA_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_CAMELLIA_KEY,ctx);
+
+    ret = Camellia_set_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8, &dat->ks);
+    if (ret < 0) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_CAMELLIA_INIT_KEY, EVP_R_CAMELLIA_KEY_SETUP_FAILED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx);
+    if ((mode == EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE || mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
+        && !enc) {
+        dat->block = (block128_f) Camellia_decrypt;
+        dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ?
+            (cbc128_f) Camellia_cbc_encrypt : NULL;
+    } else {
+        dat->block = (block128_f) Camellia_encrypt;
+        dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ?
+            (cbc128_f) Camellia_cbc_encrypt : NULL;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int camellia_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                               const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
+{
+    EVP_CAMELLIA_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_CAMELLIA_KEY,ctx);
+
+    if (dat->stream.cbc)
+        (*dat->stream.cbc) (in, out, len, &dat->ks,
+                            EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx),
+                            EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx));
+    else if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx))
+        CRYPTO_cbc128_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks,
+                              EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), dat->block);
+    else
+        CRYPTO_cbc128_decrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks,
+                              EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), dat->block);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int camellia_ecb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                               const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
+{
+    size_t bl = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(ctx);
+    size_t i;
+    EVP_CAMELLIA_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_CAMELLIA_KEY,ctx);
+
+    if (len < bl)
+        return 1;
+
+    for (i = 0, len -= bl; i <= len; i += bl)
+        (*dat->block) (in + i, out + i, &dat->ks);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int camellia_ofb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                               const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
+{
+    EVP_CAMELLIA_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_CAMELLIA_KEY,ctx);
+
+    int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_num(ctx);
+    CRYPTO_ofb128_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks,
+                          EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), &num, dat->block);
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int camellia_cfb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                               const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
+{
+    EVP_CAMELLIA_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_CAMELLIA_KEY,ctx);
+
+    int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_num(ctx);
+    CRYPTO_cfb128_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks,
+                          EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), &num, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx), dat->block);
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int camellia_cfb8_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                                const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
+{
+    EVP_CAMELLIA_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_CAMELLIA_KEY,ctx);
+
+    int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_num(ctx);
+    CRYPTO_cfb128_8_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks,
+                            EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), &num, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx), dat->block);
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int camellia_cfb1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                                const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
+{
+    EVP_CAMELLIA_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_CAMELLIA_KEY,ctx);
+
+    if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_test_flags(ctx, EVP_CIPH_FLAG_LENGTH_BITS)) {
+        int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_num(ctx);
+        CRYPTO_cfb128_1_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks,
+                                EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), &num, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx), dat->block);
+        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num);
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    while (len >= MAXBITCHUNK) {
+        int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_num(ctx);
+        CRYPTO_cfb128_1_encrypt(in, out, MAXBITCHUNK * 8, &dat->ks,
+                                EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), &num, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx), dat->block);
+        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num);
+        len -= MAXBITCHUNK;
+        out += MAXBITCHUNK;
+        in  += MAXBITCHUNK;
+    }
+    if (len) {
+        int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_num(ctx);
+        CRYPTO_cfb128_1_encrypt(in, out, len * 8, &dat->ks,
+                                EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), &num, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx), dat->block);
+        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num);
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int camellia_ctr_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                               const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
+{
+    unsigned int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_num(ctx);
+    EVP_CAMELLIA_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_CAMELLIA_KEY,ctx);
+
+    if (dat->stream.ctr)
+        CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt_ctr32(in, out, len, &dat->ks,
+                                    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx),
+                                    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx), &num,
+                                    dat->stream.ctr);
+    else
+        CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks,
+                              EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx),
+                              EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx), &num,
+                              dat->block);
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+BLOCK_CIPHER_generic_pack(NID_camellia, 128, 0)
+    BLOCK_CIPHER_generic_pack(NID_camellia, 192, 0)
+    BLOCK_CIPHER_generic_pack(NID_camellia, 256, 0)
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/e_cast.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/e_cast.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..259d440
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/e_cast.c
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAST
+# include <openssl/evp.h>
+# include <openssl/objects.h>
+# include "internal/evp_int.h"
+# include <openssl/cast.h>
+
+static int cast_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+                         const unsigned char *iv, int enc);
+
+typedef struct {
+    CAST_KEY ks;
+} EVP_CAST_KEY;
+
+# define data(ctx)       EVP_C_DATA(EVP_CAST_KEY,ctx)
+
+IMPLEMENT_BLOCK_CIPHER(cast5, ks, CAST, EVP_CAST_KEY,
+                       NID_cast5, 8, CAST_KEY_LENGTH, 8, 64,
+                       EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH, cast_init_key, NULL,
+                       EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, NULL)
+
+static int cast_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+                         const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
+{
+    CAST_set_key(&data(ctx)->ks, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx), key);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/e_chacha20_poly1305.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/e_chacha20_poly1305.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7fd4f8d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/e_chacha20_poly1305.c
@@ -0,0 +1,454 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CHACHA
+
+# include <openssl/evp.h>
+# include <openssl/objects.h>
+# include "evp_locl.h"
+# include "internal/evp_int.h"
+# include "internal/chacha.h"
+
+typedef struct {
+    union {
+        double align;   /* this ensures even sizeof(EVP_CHACHA_KEY)%8==0 */
+        unsigned int d[CHACHA_KEY_SIZE / 4];
+    } key;
+    unsigned int  counter[CHACHA_CTR_SIZE / 4];
+    unsigned char buf[CHACHA_BLK_SIZE];
+    unsigned int  partial_len;
+} EVP_CHACHA_KEY;
+
+#define data(ctx)   ((EVP_CHACHA_KEY *)(ctx)->cipher_data)
+
+static int chacha_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+                           const unsigned char user_key[CHACHA_KEY_SIZE],
+                           const unsigned char iv[CHACHA_CTR_SIZE], int enc)
+{
+    EVP_CHACHA_KEY *key = data(ctx);
+    unsigned int i;
+
+    if (user_key)
+        for (i = 0; i < CHACHA_KEY_SIZE; i+=4) {
+            key->key.d[i/4] = CHACHA_U8TOU32(user_key+i);
+        }
+
+    if (iv)
+        for (i = 0; i < CHACHA_CTR_SIZE; i+=4) {
+            key->counter[i/4] = CHACHA_U8TOU32(iv+i);
+        }
+
+    key->partial_len = 0;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int chacha_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX * ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                         const unsigned char *inp, size_t len)
+{
+    EVP_CHACHA_KEY *key = data(ctx);
+    unsigned int n, rem, ctr32;
+
+    if ((n = key->partial_len)) {
+        while (len && n < CHACHA_BLK_SIZE) {
+            *out++ = *inp++ ^ key->buf[n++];
+            len--;
+        }
+        key->partial_len = n;
+
+        if (len == 0)
+            return 1;
+
+        if (n == CHACHA_BLK_SIZE) {
+            key->partial_len = 0;
+            key->counter[0]++;
+            if (key->counter[0] == 0)
+                key->counter[1]++;
+        }
+    }
+
+    rem = (unsigned int)(len % CHACHA_BLK_SIZE);
+    len -= rem;
+    ctr32 = key->counter[0];
+    while (len >= CHACHA_BLK_SIZE) {
+        size_t blocks = len / CHACHA_BLK_SIZE;
+        /*
+         * 1<<28 is just a not-so-small yet not-so-large number...
+         * Below condition is practically never met, but it has to
+         * be checked for code correctness.
+         */
+        if (sizeof(size_t)>sizeof(unsigned int) && blocks>(1U<<28))
+            blocks = (1U<<28);
+
+        /*
+         * As ChaCha20_ctr32 operates on 32-bit counter, caller
+         * has to handle overflow. 'if' below detects the
+         * overflow, which is then handled by limiting the
+         * amount of blocks to the exact overflow point...
+         */
+        ctr32 += (unsigned int)blocks;
+        if (ctr32 < blocks) {
+            blocks -= ctr32;
+            ctr32 = 0;
+        }
+        blocks *= CHACHA_BLK_SIZE;
+        ChaCha20_ctr32(out, inp, blocks, key->key.d, key->counter);
+        len -= blocks;
+        inp += blocks;
+        out += blocks;
+
+        key->counter[0] = ctr32;
+        if (ctr32 == 0) key->counter[1]++;
+    }
+
+    if (rem) {
+        memset(key->buf, 0, sizeof(key->buf));
+        ChaCha20_ctr32(key->buf, key->buf, CHACHA_BLK_SIZE,
+                       key->key.d, key->counter);
+        for (n = 0; n < rem; n++)
+            out[n] = inp[n] ^ key->buf[n];
+        key->partial_len = rem;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static const EVP_CIPHER chacha20 = {
+    NID_chacha20,
+    1,                      /* block_size */
+    CHACHA_KEY_SIZE,        /* key_len */
+    CHACHA_CTR_SIZE,        /* iv_len, 128-bit counter in the context */
+    EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV | EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT,
+    chacha_init_key,
+    chacha_cipher,
+    NULL,
+    sizeof(EVP_CHACHA_KEY),
+    NULL,
+    NULL,
+    NULL,
+    NULL
+};
+
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_chacha20(void)
+{
+    return (&chacha20);
+}
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POLY1305
+#  include "internal/poly1305.h"
+
+typedef struct {
+    EVP_CHACHA_KEY key;
+    unsigned int nonce[12/4];
+    unsigned char tag[POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE];
+    struct { uint64_t aad, text; } len;
+    int aad, mac_inited, tag_len, nonce_len;
+    size_t tls_payload_length;
+} EVP_CHACHA_AEAD_CTX;
+
+#  define NO_TLS_PAYLOAD_LENGTH ((size_t)-1)
+#  define aead_data(ctx)        ((EVP_CHACHA_AEAD_CTX *)(ctx)->cipher_data)
+#  define POLY1305_ctx(actx)    ((POLY1305 *)(actx + 1))
+
+static int chacha20_poly1305_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+                                      const unsigned char *inkey,
+                                      const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
+{
+    EVP_CHACHA_AEAD_CTX *actx = aead_data(ctx);
+
+    if (!inkey && !iv)
+        return 1;
+
+    actx->len.aad = 0;
+    actx->len.text = 0;
+    actx->aad = 0;
+    actx->mac_inited = 0;
+    actx->tls_payload_length = NO_TLS_PAYLOAD_LENGTH;
+
+    if (iv != NULL) {
+        unsigned char temp[CHACHA_CTR_SIZE] = { 0 };
+
+        /* pad on the left */
+        if (actx->nonce_len <= CHACHA_CTR_SIZE)
+            memcpy(temp + CHACHA_CTR_SIZE - actx->nonce_len, iv, actx->nonce_len);
+
+        chacha_init_key(ctx, inkey, temp, enc);
+
+        actx->nonce[0] = actx->key.counter[1];
+        actx->nonce[1] = actx->key.counter[2];
+        actx->nonce[2] = actx->key.counter[3];
+    } else {
+        chacha_init_key(ctx, inkey, NULL, enc);
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int chacha20_poly1305_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                                    const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
+{
+    EVP_CHACHA_AEAD_CTX *actx = aead_data(ctx);
+    size_t rem, plen = actx->tls_payload_length;
+    static const unsigned char zero[POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE] = { 0 };
+
+    if (!actx->mac_inited) {
+        actx->key.counter[0] = 0;
+        memset(actx->key.buf, 0, sizeof(actx->key.buf));
+        ChaCha20_ctr32(actx->key.buf, actx->key.buf, CHACHA_BLK_SIZE,
+                       actx->key.key.d, actx->key.counter);
+        Poly1305_Init(POLY1305_ctx(actx), actx->key.buf);
+        actx->key.counter[0] = 1;
+        actx->key.partial_len = 0;
+        actx->len.aad = actx->len.text = 0;
+        actx->mac_inited = 1;
+    }
+
+    if (in) {                                   /* aad or text */
+        if (out == NULL) {                      /* aad */
+            Poly1305_Update(POLY1305_ctx(actx), in, len);
+            actx->len.aad += len;
+            actx->aad = 1;
+            return len;
+        } else {                                /* plain- or ciphertext */
+            if (actx->aad) {                    /* wrap up aad */
+                if ((rem = (size_t)actx->len.aad % POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE))
+                    Poly1305_Update(POLY1305_ctx(actx), zero,
+                                    POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE - rem);
+                actx->aad = 0;
+            }
+
+            actx->tls_payload_length = NO_TLS_PAYLOAD_LENGTH;
+            if (plen == NO_TLS_PAYLOAD_LENGTH)
+                plen = len;
+            else if (len != plen + POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE)
+                return -1;
+
+            if (ctx->encrypt) {                 /* plaintext */
+                chacha_cipher(ctx, out, in, plen);
+                Poly1305_Update(POLY1305_ctx(actx), out, plen);
+                in += plen;
+                out += plen;
+                actx->len.text += plen;
+            } else {                            /* ciphertext */
+                Poly1305_Update(POLY1305_ctx(actx), in, plen);
+                chacha_cipher(ctx, out, in, plen);
+                in += plen;
+                out += plen;
+                actx->len.text += plen;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    if (in == NULL                              /* explicit final */
+        || plen != len) {                       /* or tls mode */
+        const union {
+            long one;
+            char little;
+        } is_endian = { 1 };
+        unsigned char temp[POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE];
+
+        if (actx->aad) {                        /* wrap up aad */
+            if ((rem = (size_t)actx->len.aad % POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE))
+                Poly1305_Update(POLY1305_ctx(actx), zero,
+                                POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE - rem);
+            actx->aad = 0;
+        }
+
+        if ((rem = (size_t)actx->len.text % POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE))
+            Poly1305_Update(POLY1305_ctx(actx), zero,
+                            POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE - rem);
+
+        if (is_endian.little) {
+            Poly1305_Update(POLY1305_ctx(actx),
+                            (unsigned char *)&actx->len, POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE);
+        } else {
+            temp[0]  = (unsigned char)(actx->len.aad);
+            temp[1]  = (unsigned char)(actx->len.aad>>8);
+            temp[2]  = (unsigned char)(actx->len.aad>>16);
+            temp[3]  = (unsigned char)(actx->len.aad>>24);
+            temp[4]  = (unsigned char)(actx->len.aad>>32);
+            temp[5]  = (unsigned char)(actx->len.aad>>40);
+            temp[6]  = (unsigned char)(actx->len.aad>>48);
+            temp[7]  = (unsigned char)(actx->len.aad>>56);
+
+            temp[8]  = (unsigned char)(actx->len.text);
+            temp[9]  = (unsigned char)(actx->len.text>>8);
+            temp[10] = (unsigned char)(actx->len.text>>16);
+            temp[11] = (unsigned char)(actx->len.text>>24);
+            temp[12] = (unsigned char)(actx->len.text>>32);
+            temp[13] = (unsigned char)(actx->len.text>>40);
+            temp[14] = (unsigned char)(actx->len.text>>48);
+            temp[15] = (unsigned char)(actx->len.text>>56);
+
+            Poly1305_Update(POLY1305_ctx(actx), temp, POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE);
+        }
+        Poly1305_Final(POLY1305_ctx(actx), ctx->encrypt ? actx->tag
+                                                        : temp);
+        actx->mac_inited = 0;
+
+        if (in != NULL && len != plen) {        /* tls mode */
+            if (ctx->encrypt) {
+                memcpy(out, actx->tag, POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE);
+            } else {
+                if (CRYPTO_memcmp(temp, in, POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE)) {
+                    memset(out - plen, 0, plen);
+                    return -1;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        else if (!ctx->encrypt) {
+            if (CRYPTO_memcmp(temp, actx->tag, actx->tag_len))
+                return -1;
+        }
+    }
+    return len;
+}
+
+static int chacha20_poly1305_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    EVP_CHACHA_AEAD_CTX *actx = aead_data(ctx);
+    if (actx)
+        OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->cipher_data, sizeof(*actx) + Poly1305_ctx_size());
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int chacha20_poly1305_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type, int arg,
+                                  void *ptr)
+{
+    EVP_CHACHA_AEAD_CTX *actx = aead_data(ctx);
+
+    switch(type) {
+    case EVP_CTRL_INIT:
+        if (actx == NULL)
+            actx = ctx->cipher_data
+                 = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*actx) + Poly1305_ctx_size());
+        if (actx == NULL) {
+            EVPerr(EVP_F_CHACHA20_POLY1305_CTRL, EVP_R_INITIALIZATION_ERROR);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        actx->len.aad = 0;
+        actx->len.text = 0;
+        actx->aad = 0;
+        actx->mac_inited = 0;
+        actx->tag_len = 0;
+        actx->nonce_len = 12;
+        actx->tls_payload_length = NO_TLS_PAYLOAD_LENGTH;
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_CTRL_COPY:
+        if (actx) {
+            EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dst = (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *)ptr;
+
+            dst->cipher_data =
+                   OPENSSL_memdup(actx, sizeof(*actx) + Poly1305_ctx_size());
+            if (dst->cipher_data == NULL) {
+                EVPerr(EVP_F_CHACHA20_POLY1305_CTRL, EVP_R_COPY_ERROR);
+                return 0;
+            }
+        }
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN:
+        if (arg <= 0 || arg > CHACHA_CTR_SIZE)
+            return 0;
+        actx->nonce_len = arg;
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IV_FIXED:
+        if (arg != 12)
+            return 0;
+        actx->nonce[0] = actx->key.counter[1]
+                       = CHACHA_U8TOU32((unsigned char *)ptr);
+        actx->nonce[1] = actx->key.counter[2]
+                       = CHACHA_U8TOU32((unsigned char *)ptr+4);
+        actx->nonce[2] = actx->key.counter[3]
+                       = CHACHA_U8TOU32((unsigned char *)ptr+8);
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG:
+        if (arg <= 0 || arg > POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE)
+            return 0;
+        if (ptr != NULL) {
+            memcpy(actx->tag, ptr, arg);
+            actx->tag_len = arg;
+        }
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG:
+        if (arg <= 0 || arg > POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE || !ctx->encrypt)
+            return 0;
+        memcpy(ptr, actx->tag, arg);
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD:
+        if (arg != EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN)
+            return 0;
+        {
+            unsigned int len;
+            unsigned char *aad = ptr, temp[POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE];
+
+            len = aad[EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN - 2] << 8 |
+                  aad[EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN - 1];
+            if (!ctx->encrypt) {
+                if (len < POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE)
+                    return 0;
+                len -= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE;     /* discount attached tag */
+                memcpy(temp, aad, EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN - 2);
+                aad = temp;
+                temp[EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN - 2] = (unsigned char)(len >> 8);
+                temp[EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN - 1] = (unsigned char)len;
+            }
+            actx->tls_payload_length = len;
+
+            /*
+             * merge record sequence number as per RFC7905
+             */
+            actx->key.counter[1] = actx->nonce[0];
+            actx->key.counter[2] = actx->nonce[1] ^ CHACHA_U8TOU32(aad);
+            actx->key.counter[3] = actx->nonce[2] ^ CHACHA_U8TOU32(aad+4);
+            actx->mac_inited = 0;
+            chacha20_poly1305_cipher(ctx, NULL, aad, EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN);
+            return POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE;         /* tag length */
+        }
+
+    case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY:
+        /* no-op */
+        return 1;
+
+    default:
+        return -1;
+    }
+}
+
+static EVP_CIPHER chacha20_poly1305 = {
+    NID_chacha20_poly1305,
+    1,                  /* block_size */
+    CHACHA_KEY_SIZE,    /* key_len */
+    12,                 /* iv_len, 96-bit nonce in the context */
+    EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV |
+    EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CTRL_INIT |
+    EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_COPY | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER,
+    chacha20_poly1305_init_key,
+    chacha20_poly1305_cipher,
+    chacha20_poly1305_cleanup,
+    0,          /* 0 moves context-specific structure allocation to ctrl */
+    NULL,       /* set_asn1_parameters */
+    NULL,       /* get_asn1_parameters */
+    chacha20_poly1305_ctrl,
+    NULL        /* app_data */
+};
+
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_chacha20_poly1305(void)
+{
+    return(&chacha20_poly1305);
+}
+# endif
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/e_des.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/e_des.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9b2facf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/e_des.c
@@ -0,0 +1,242 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
+# include <openssl/evp.h>
+# include <openssl/objects.h>
+# include "internal/evp_int.h"
+# include <openssl/des.h>
+# include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+typedef struct {
+    union {
+        double align;
+        DES_key_schedule ks;
+    } ks;
+    union {
+        void (*cbc) (const void *, void *, size_t,
+                     const DES_key_schedule *, unsigned char *);
+    } stream;
+} EVP_DES_KEY;
+
+# if defined(AES_ASM) && (defined(__sparc) || defined(__sparc__))
+/* ----------^^^ this is not a typo, just a way to detect that
+ * assembler support was in general requested... */
+#  include "sparc_arch.h"
+
+extern unsigned int OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[];
+
+#  define SPARC_DES_CAPABLE       (OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[1] & CFR_DES)
+
+void des_t4_key_expand(const void *key, DES_key_schedule *ks);
+void des_t4_cbc_encrypt(const void *inp, void *out, size_t len,
+                        const DES_key_schedule *ks, unsigned char iv[8]);
+void des_t4_cbc_decrypt(const void *inp, void *out, size_t len,
+                        const DES_key_schedule *ks, unsigned char iv[8]);
+# endif
+
+static int des_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+                        const unsigned char *iv, int enc);
+static int des_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr);
+
+/*
+ * Because of various casts and different names can't use
+ * IMPLEMENT_BLOCK_CIPHER
+ */
+
+static int des_ecb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                          const unsigned char *in, size_t inl)
+{
+    BLOCK_CIPHER_ecb_loop()
+        DES_ecb_encrypt((DES_cblock *)(in + i), (DES_cblock *)(out + i),
+                        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(ctx),
+                        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx));
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int des_ofb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                          const unsigned char *in, size_t inl)
+{
+    while (inl >= EVP_MAXCHUNK) {
+        int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_num(ctx);
+        DES_ofb64_encrypt(in, out, (long)EVP_MAXCHUNK,
+                          EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(ctx),
+                          (DES_cblock *)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), &num);
+        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num);
+        inl -= EVP_MAXCHUNK;
+        in += EVP_MAXCHUNK;
+        out += EVP_MAXCHUNK;
+    }
+    if (inl) {
+        int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_num(ctx);
+        DES_ofb64_encrypt(in, out, (long)inl,
+                          EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(ctx),
+                          (DES_cblock *)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), &num);
+        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num);
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int des_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                          const unsigned char *in, size_t inl)
+{
+    EVP_DES_KEY *dat = (EVP_DES_KEY *) EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(ctx);
+
+    if (dat->stream.cbc != NULL) {
+        (*dat->stream.cbc) (in, out, inl, &dat->ks.ks,
+                            EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx));
+        return 1;
+    }
+    while (inl >= EVP_MAXCHUNK) {
+        DES_ncbc_encrypt(in, out, (long)EVP_MAXCHUNK,
+                         EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(ctx),
+                         (DES_cblock *)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx),
+                         EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx));
+        inl -= EVP_MAXCHUNK;
+        in += EVP_MAXCHUNK;
+        out += EVP_MAXCHUNK;
+    }
+    if (inl)
+        DES_ncbc_encrypt(in, out, (long)inl,
+                         EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(ctx),
+                         (DES_cblock *)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx),
+                         EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx));
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int des_cfb64_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                            const unsigned char *in, size_t inl)
+{
+    while (inl >= EVP_MAXCHUNK) {
+        int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_num(ctx);
+        DES_cfb64_encrypt(in, out, (long)EVP_MAXCHUNK,
+                          EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(ctx),
+                          (DES_cblock *)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), &num,
+                          EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx));
+        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num);
+        inl -= EVP_MAXCHUNK;
+        in += EVP_MAXCHUNK;
+        out += EVP_MAXCHUNK;
+    }
+    if (inl) {
+        int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_num(ctx);
+        DES_cfb64_encrypt(in, out, (long)inl,
+                          EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(ctx),
+                          (DES_cblock *)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), &num,
+                          EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx));
+        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num);
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Although we have a CFB-r implementation for DES, it doesn't pack the right
+ * way, so wrap it here
+ */
+static int des_cfb1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                           const unsigned char *in, size_t inl)
+{
+    size_t n, chunk = EVP_MAXCHUNK / 8;
+    unsigned char c[1], d[1];
+
+    if (inl < chunk)
+        chunk = inl;
+
+    while (inl && inl >= chunk) {
+        for (n = 0; n < chunk * 8; ++n) {
+            c[0] = (in[n / 8] & (1 << (7 - n % 8))) ? 0x80 : 0;
+            DES_cfb_encrypt(c, d, 1, 1, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(ctx),
+                            (DES_cblock *)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx),
+                            EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx));
+            out[n / 8] =
+                (out[n / 8] & ~(0x80 >> (unsigned int)(n % 8))) |
+                ((d[0] & 0x80) >> (unsigned int)(n % 8));
+        }
+        inl -= chunk;
+        in += chunk;
+        out += chunk;
+        if (inl < chunk)
+            chunk = inl;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int des_cfb8_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                           const unsigned char *in, size_t inl)
+{
+    while (inl >= EVP_MAXCHUNK) {
+        DES_cfb_encrypt(in, out, 8, (long)EVP_MAXCHUNK,
+                        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(ctx),
+                        (DES_cblock *)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx),
+                        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx));
+        inl -= EVP_MAXCHUNK;
+        in += EVP_MAXCHUNK;
+        out += EVP_MAXCHUNK;
+    }
+    if (inl)
+        DES_cfb_encrypt(in, out, 8, (long)inl,
+                        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(ctx),
+                        (DES_cblock *)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx),
+                        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx));
+    return 1;
+}
+
+BLOCK_CIPHER_defs(des, EVP_DES_KEY, NID_des, 8, 8, 8, 64,
+                  EVP_CIPH_RAND_KEY, des_init_key, NULL,
+                  EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, des_ctrl)
+
+    BLOCK_CIPHER_def_cfb(des, EVP_DES_KEY, NID_des, 8, 8, 1,
+                     EVP_CIPH_RAND_KEY, des_init_key, NULL,
+                     EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, des_ctrl)
+
+    BLOCK_CIPHER_def_cfb(des, EVP_DES_KEY, NID_des, 8, 8, 8,
+                     EVP_CIPH_RAND_KEY, des_init_key, NULL,
+                     EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, des_ctrl)
+
+static int des_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+                        const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
+{
+    DES_cblock *deskey = (DES_cblock *)key;
+    EVP_DES_KEY *dat = (EVP_DES_KEY *) EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(ctx);
+
+    dat->stream.cbc = NULL;
+# if defined(SPARC_DES_CAPABLE)
+    if (SPARC_DES_CAPABLE) {
+        int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx);
+
+        if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
+            des_t4_key_expand(key, &dat->ks.ks);
+            dat->stream.cbc = enc ? des_t4_cbc_encrypt : des_t4_cbc_decrypt;
+            return 1;
+        }
+    }
+# endif
+    DES_set_key_unchecked(deskey, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(ctx));
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int des_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr)
+{
+
+    switch (type) {
+    case EVP_CTRL_RAND_KEY:
+        if (RAND_bytes(ptr, 8) <= 0)
+            return 0;
+        DES_set_odd_parity((DES_cblock *)ptr);
+        return 1;
+
+    default:
+        return -1;
+    }
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/e_des3.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/e_des3.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..da77936
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/e_des3.c
@@ -0,0 +1,424 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
+# include <openssl/evp.h>
+# include <openssl/objects.h>
+# include "internal/evp_int.h"
+# include <openssl/des.h>
+# include <openssl/rand.h>
+# include "evp_locl.h"
+
+typedef struct {
+    union {
+        double align;
+        DES_key_schedule ks[3];
+    } ks;
+    union {
+        void (*cbc) (const void *, void *, size_t,
+                     const DES_key_schedule *, unsigned char *);
+    } stream;
+} DES_EDE_KEY;
+# define ks1 ks.ks[0]
+# define ks2 ks.ks[1]
+# define ks3 ks.ks[2]
+
+# if defined(AES_ASM) && (defined(__sparc) || defined(__sparc__))
+/* ---------^^^ this is not a typo, just a way to detect that
+ * assembler support was in general requested... */
+#  include "sparc_arch.h"
+
+extern unsigned int OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[];
+
+#  define SPARC_DES_CAPABLE       (OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[1] & CFR_DES)
+
+void des_t4_key_expand(const void *key, DES_key_schedule *ks);
+void des_t4_ede3_cbc_encrypt(const void *inp, void *out, size_t len,
+                             const DES_key_schedule ks[3], unsigned char iv[8]);
+void des_t4_ede3_cbc_decrypt(const void *inp, void *out, size_t len,
+                             const DES_key_schedule ks[3], unsigned char iv[8]);
+# endif
+
+static int des_ede_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+                            const unsigned char *iv, int enc);
+
+static int des_ede3_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+                             const unsigned char *iv, int enc);
+
+static int des3_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr);
+
+# define data(ctx) EVP_C_DATA(DES_EDE_KEY,ctx)
+
+/*
+ * Because of various casts and different args can't use
+ * IMPLEMENT_BLOCK_CIPHER
+ */
+
+static int des_ede_ecb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                              const unsigned char *in, size_t inl)
+{
+    BLOCK_CIPHER_ecb_loop()
+        DES_ecb3_encrypt((const_DES_cblock *)(in + i),
+                         (DES_cblock *)(out + i),
+                         &data(ctx)->ks1, &data(ctx)->ks2,
+                         &data(ctx)->ks3, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx));
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int des_ede_ofb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                              const unsigned char *in, size_t inl)
+{
+    while (inl >= EVP_MAXCHUNK) {
+        int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_num(ctx);
+        DES_ede3_ofb64_encrypt(in, out, (long)EVP_MAXCHUNK,
+                               &data(ctx)->ks1, &data(ctx)->ks2,
+                               &data(ctx)->ks3,
+                               (DES_cblock *)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx),
+                               &num);
+        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num);
+        inl -= EVP_MAXCHUNK;
+        in += EVP_MAXCHUNK;
+        out += EVP_MAXCHUNK;
+    }
+    if (inl) {
+        int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_num(ctx);
+        DES_ede3_ofb64_encrypt(in, out, (long)inl,
+                               &data(ctx)->ks1, &data(ctx)->ks2,
+                               &data(ctx)->ks3,
+                               (DES_cblock *)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx),
+                               &num);
+        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num);
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int des_ede_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                              const unsigned char *in, size_t inl)
+{
+    DES_EDE_KEY *dat = data(ctx);
+
+    if (dat->stream.cbc != NULL) {
+        (*dat->stream.cbc) (in, out, inl, dat->ks.ks,
+                            EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx));
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    while (inl >= EVP_MAXCHUNK) {
+        DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt(in, out, (long)EVP_MAXCHUNK,
+                             &dat->ks1, &dat->ks2, &dat->ks3,
+                             (DES_cblock *)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx),
+                             EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx));
+        inl -= EVP_MAXCHUNK;
+        in += EVP_MAXCHUNK;
+        out += EVP_MAXCHUNK;
+    }
+    if (inl)
+        DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt(in, out, (long)inl,
+                             &dat->ks1, &dat->ks2, &dat->ks3,
+                             (DES_cblock *)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx),
+                             EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx));
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int des_ede_cfb64_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                                const unsigned char *in, size_t inl)
+{
+    while (inl >= EVP_MAXCHUNK) {
+        int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_num(ctx);
+        DES_ede3_cfb64_encrypt(in, out, (long)EVP_MAXCHUNK,
+                               &data(ctx)->ks1, &data(ctx)->ks2,
+                               &data(ctx)->ks3,
+                               (DES_cblock *)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx),
+                               &num, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx));
+        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num);
+        inl -= EVP_MAXCHUNK;
+        in += EVP_MAXCHUNK;
+        out += EVP_MAXCHUNK;
+    }
+    if (inl) {
+        int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_num(ctx);
+        DES_ede3_cfb64_encrypt(in, out, (long)inl,
+                               &data(ctx)->ks1, &data(ctx)->ks2,
+                               &data(ctx)->ks3,
+                               (DES_cblock *)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx),
+                               &num, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx));
+        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num);
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Although we have a CFB-r implementation for 3-DES, it doesn't pack the
+ * right way, so wrap it here
+ */
+static int des_ede3_cfb1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                                const unsigned char *in, size_t inl)
+{
+    size_t n;
+    unsigned char c[1], d[1];
+
+    if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_test_flags(ctx, EVP_CIPH_FLAG_LENGTH_BITS))
+            inl *= 8;
+    for (n = 0; n < inl; ++n) {
+        c[0] = (in[n / 8] & (1 << (7 - n % 8))) ? 0x80 : 0;
+        DES_ede3_cfb_encrypt(c, d, 1, 1,
+                             &data(ctx)->ks1, &data(ctx)->ks2,
+                             &data(ctx)->ks3,
+                             (DES_cblock *)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx),
+                             EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx));
+        out[n / 8] = (out[n / 8] & ~(0x80 >> (unsigned int)(n % 8)))
+            | ((d[0] & 0x80) >> (unsigned int)(n % 8));
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int des_ede3_cfb8_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                                const unsigned char *in, size_t inl)
+{
+    while (inl >= EVP_MAXCHUNK) {
+        DES_ede3_cfb_encrypt(in, out, 8, (long)EVP_MAXCHUNK,
+                             &data(ctx)->ks1, &data(ctx)->ks2,
+                             &data(ctx)->ks3,
+                             (DES_cblock *)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx),
+                             EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx));
+        inl -= EVP_MAXCHUNK;
+        in += EVP_MAXCHUNK;
+        out += EVP_MAXCHUNK;
+    }
+    if (inl)
+        DES_ede3_cfb_encrypt(in, out, 8, (long)inl,
+                             &data(ctx)->ks1, &data(ctx)->ks2,
+                             &data(ctx)->ks3,
+                             (DES_cblock *)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx),
+                             EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx));
+    return 1;
+}
+
+BLOCK_CIPHER_defs(des_ede, DES_EDE_KEY, NID_des_ede, 8, 16, 8, 64,
+                  EVP_CIPH_RAND_KEY | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1,
+                  des_ede_init_key, NULL, NULL, NULL, des3_ctrl)
+# define des_ede3_cfb64_cipher des_ede_cfb64_cipher
+# define des_ede3_ofb_cipher des_ede_ofb_cipher
+# define des_ede3_cbc_cipher des_ede_cbc_cipher
+# define des_ede3_ecb_cipher des_ede_ecb_cipher
+    BLOCK_CIPHER_defs(des_ede3, DES_EDE_KEY, NID_des_ede3, 8, 24, 8, 64,
+                  EVP_CIPH_RAND_KEY | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1,
+                  des_ede3_init_key, NULL, NULL, NULL, des3_ctrl)
+
+    BLOCK_CIPHER_def_cfb(des_ede3, DES_EDE_KEY, NID_des_ede3, 24, 8, 1,
+                     EVP_CIPH_RAND_KEY | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1,
+                     des_ede3_init_key, NULL, NULL, NULL, des3_ctrl)
+
+    BLOCK_CIPHER_def_cfb(des_ede3, DES_EDE_KEY, NID_des_ede3, 24, 8, 8,
+                     EVP_CIPH_RAND_KEY | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1,
+                     des_ede3_init_key, NULL, NULL, NULL, des3_ctrl)
+
+static int des_ede_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+                            const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
+{
+    DES_cblock *deskey = (DES_cblock *)key;
+    DES_EDE_KEY *dat = data(ctx);
+
+    dat->stream.cbc = NULL;
+# if defined(SPARC_DES_CAPABLE)
+    if (SPARC_DES_CAPABLE) {
+        int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx);
+
+        if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
+            des_t4_key_expand(&deskey[0], &dat->ks1);
+            des_t4_key_expand(&deskey[1], &dat->ks2);
+            memcpy(&dat->ks3, &dat->ks1, sizeof(dat->ks1));
+            dat->stream.cbc = enc ? des_t4_ede3_cbc_encrypt :
+                des_t4_ede3_cbc_decrypt;
+            return 1;
+        }
+    }
+# endif
+    DES_set_key_unchecked(&deskey[0], &dat->ks1);
+    DES_set_key_unchecked(&deskey[1], &dat->ks2);
+    memcpy(&dat->ks3, &dat->ks1, sizeof(dat->ks1));
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int des_ede3_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+                             const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
+{
+    DES_cblock *deskey = (DES_cblock *)key;
+    DES_EDE_KEY *dat = data(ctx);
+
+    dat->stream.cbc = NULL;
+# if defined(SPARC_DES_CAPABLE)
+    if (SPARC_DES_CAPABLE) {
+        int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx);
+
+        if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
+            des_t4_key_expand(&deskey[0], &dat->ks1);
+            des_t4_key_expand(&deskey[1], &dat->ks2);
+            des_t4_key_expand(&deskey[2], &dat->ks3);
+            dat->stream.cbc = enc ? des_t4_ede3_cbc_encrypt :
+                des_t4_ede3_cbc_decrypt;
+            return 1;
+        }
+    }
+# endif
+    DES_set_key_unchecked(&deskey[0], &dat->ks1);
+    DES_set_key_unchecked(&deskey[1], &dat->ks2);
+    DES_set_key_unchecked(&deskey[2], &dat->ks3);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int des3_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type, int arg, void *ptr)
+{
+
+    DES_cblock *deskey = ptr;
+
+    switch (type) {
+    case EVP_CTRL_RAND_KEY:
+        if (RAND_bytes(ptr, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx)) <= 0)
+            return 0;
+        DES_set_odd_parity(deskey);
+        if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) >= 16)
+            DES_set_odd_parity(deskey + 1);
+        if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) >= 24)
+            DES_set_odd_parity(deskey + 2);
+        return 1;
+
+    default:
+        return -1;
+    }
+}
+
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ede(void)
+{
+    return &des_ede_ecb;
+}
+
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ede3(void)
+{
+    return &des_ede3_ecb;
+}
+
+
+# include <openssl/sha.h>
+
+static const unsigned char wrap_iv[8] =
+    { 0x4a, 0xdd, 0xa2, 0x2c, 0x79, 0xe8, 0x21, 0x05 };
+
+static int des_ede3_unwrap(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                           const unsigned char *in, size_t inl)
+{
+    unsigned char icv[8], iv[8], sha1tmp[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+    int rv = -1;
+    if (inl < 24)
+        return -1;
+    if (out == NULL)
+        return inl - 16;
+    memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), wrap_iv, 8);
+    /* Decrypt first block which will end up as icv */
+    des_ede_cbc_cipher(ctx, icv, in, 8);
+    /* Decrypt central blocks */
+    /*
+     * If decrypting in place move whole output along a block so the next
+     * des_ede_cbc_cipher is in place.
+     */
+    if (out == in) {
+        memmove(out, out + 8, inl - 8);
+        in -= 8;
+    }
+    des_ede_cbc_cipher(ctx, out, in + 8, inl - 16);
+    /* Decrypt final block which will be IV */
+    des_ede_cbc_cipher(ctx, iv, in + inl - 8, 8);
+    /* Reverse order of everything */
+    BUF_reverse(icv, NULL, 8);
+    BUF_reverse(out, NULL, inl - 16);
+    BUF_reverse(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), iv, 8);
+    /* Decrypt again using new IV */
+    des_ede_cbc_cipher(ctx, out, out, inl - 16);
+    des_ede_cbc_cipher(ctx, icv, icv, 8);
+    /* Work out SHA1 hash of first portion */
+    SHA1(out, inl - 16, sha1tmp);
+
+    if (!CRYPTO_memcmp(sha1tmp, icv, 8))
+        rv = inl - 16;
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(icv, 8);
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(sha1tmp, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(iv, 8);
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), 8);
+    if (rv == -1)
+        OPENSSL_cleanse(out, inl - 16);
+
+    return rv;
+}
+
+static int des_ede3_wrap(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                         const unsigned char *in, size_t inl)
+{
+    unsigned char sha1tmp[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+    if (out == NULL)
+        return inl + 16;
+    /* Copy input to output buffer + 8 so we have space for IV */
+    memmove(out + 8, in, inl);
+    /* Work out ICV */
+    SHA1(in, inl, sha1tmp);
+    memcpy(out + inl + 8, sha1tmp, 8);
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(sha1tmp, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+    /* Generate random IV */
+    if (RAND_bytes(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), 8) <= 0)
+        return -1;
+    memcpy(out, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), 8);
+    /* Encrypt everything after IV in place */
+    des_ede_cbc_cipher(ctx, out + 8, out + 8, inl + 8);
+    BUF_reverse(out, NULL, inl + 16);
+    memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), wrap_iv, 8);
+    des_ede_cbc_cipher(ctx, out, out, inl + 16);
+    return inl + 16;
+}
+
+static int des_ede3_wrap_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                                const unsigned char *in, size_t inl)
+{
+    /*
+     * Sanity check input length: we typically only wrap keys so EVP_MAXCHUNK
+     * is more than will ever be needed. Also input length must be a multiple
+     * of 8 bits.
+     */
+    if (inl >= EVP_MAXCHUNK || inl % 8)
+        return -1;
+
+    if (is_partially_overlapping(out, in, inl)) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_DES_EDE3_WRAP_CIPHER, EVP_R_PARTIALLY_OVERLAPPING);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx))
+        return des_ede3_wrap(ctx, out, in, inl);
+    else
+        return des_ede3_unwrap(ctx, out, in, inl);
+}
+
+static const EVP_CIPHER des3_wrap = {
+    NID_id_smime_alg_CMS3DESwrap,
+    8, 24, 0,
+    EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER
+        | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1,
+    des_ede3_init_key, des_ede3_wrap_cipher,
+    NULL,
+    sizeof(DES_EDE_KEY),
+    NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL
+};
+
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ede3_wrap(void)
+{
+    return &des3_wrap;
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/e_idea.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/e_idea.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..93f6a41
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/e_idea.c
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_IDEA
+# include <openssl/evp.h>
+# include <openssl/objects.h>
+# include "internal/evp_int.h"
+# include <openssl/idea.h>
+
+/* Can't use IMPLEMENT_BLOCK_CIPHER because IDEA_ecb_encrypt is different */
+
+typedef struct {
+    IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE ks;
+} EVP_IDEA_KEY;
+
+static int idea_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+                         const unsigned char *iv, int enc);
+
+/*
+ * NB IDEA_ecb_encrypt doesn't take an 'encrypt' argument so we treat it as a
+ * special case
+ */
+
+static int idea_ecb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                           const unsigned char *in, size_t inl)
+{
+    BLOCK_CIPHER_ecb_loop()
+        IDEA_ecb_encrypt(in + i, out + i, &EVP_C_DATA(EVP_IDEA_KEY,ctx)->ks);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+BLOCK_CIPHER_func_cbc(idea, IDEA, EVP_IDEA_KEY, ks)
+BLOCK_CIPHER_func_ofb(idea, IDEA, 64, EVP_IDEA_KEY, ks)
+BLOCK_CIPHER_func_cfb(idea, IDEA, 64, EVP_IDEA_KEY, ks)
+
+BLOCK_CIPHER_defs(idea, IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE, NID_idea, 8, 16, 8, 64,
+                  0, idea_init_key, NULL,
+                  EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, NULL)
+
+static int idea_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+                         const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
+{
+    if (!enc) {
+        if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx) == EVP_CIPH_OFB_MODE)
+            enc = 1;
+        else if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CFB_MODE)
+            enc = 1;
+    }
+    if (enc)
+        IDEA_set_encrypt_key(key, &EVP_C_DATA(EVP_IDEA_KEY,ctx)->ks);
+    else {
+        IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE tmp;
+
+        IDEA_set_encrypt_key(key, &tmp);
+        IDEA_set_decrypt_key(&tmp, &EVP_C_DATA(EVP_IDEA_KEY,ctx)->ks);
+        OPENSSL_cleanse((unsigned char *)&tmp, sizeof(IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE));
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/e_null.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/e_null.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0dfc48a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/e_null.c
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include "internal/evp_int.h"
+
+static int null_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+                         const unsigned char *iv, int enc);
+static int null_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                       const unsigned char *in, size_t inl);
+static const EVP_CIPHER n_cipher = {
+    NID_undef,
+    1, 0, 0, 0,
+    null_init_key,
+    null_cipher,
+    NULL,
+    0,
+    NULL,
+    NULL,
+    NULL,
+    NULL
+};
+
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_enc_null(void)
+{
+    return (&n_cipher);
+}
+
+static int null_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+                         const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
+{
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int null_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                       const unsigned char *in, size_t inl)
+{
+    if (in != out)
+        memcpy(out, in, inl);
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/e_old.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/e_old.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..927908f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/e_old.c
@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT >= 0x00908000L
+NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT
+#else
+
+# include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+/*
+ * Define some deprecated functions, so older programs don't crash and burn
+ * too quickly.  On Windows and VMS, these will never be used, since
+ * functions and variables in shared libraries are selected by entry point
+ * location, not by name.
+ */
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BF
+#  undef EVP_bf_cfb
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_bf_cfb(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_bf_cfb(void)
+{
+    return EVP_bf_cfb64();
+}
+# endif
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
+#  undef EVP_des_cfb
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_cfb(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_cfb(void)
+{
+    return EVP_des_cfb64();
+}
+
+#  undef EVP_des_ede3_cfb
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ede3_cfb(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ede3_cfb(void)
+{
+    return EVP_des_ede3_cfb64();
+}
+
+#  undef EVP_des_ede_cfb
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ede_cfb(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ede_cfb(void)
+{
+    return EVP_des_ede_cfb64();
+}
+# endif
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_IDEA
+#  undef EVP_idea_cfb
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_idea_cfb(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_idea_cfb(void)
+{
+    return EVP_idea_cfb64();
+}
+# endif
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC2
+#  undef EVP_rc2_cfb
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_rc2_cfb(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_rc2_cfb(void)
+{
+    return EVP_rc2_cfb64();
+}
+# endif
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAST
+#  undef EVP_cast5_cfb
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_cast5_cfb(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_cast5_cfb(void)
+{
+    return EVP_cast5_cfb64();
+}
+# endif
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC5
+#  undef EVP_rc5_32_12_16_cfb
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_rc5_32_12_16_cfb(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_rc5_32_12_16_cfb(void)
+{
+    return EVP_rc5_32_12_16_cfb64();
+}
+# endif
+
+# undef EVP_aes_128_cfb
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_128_cfb(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_128_cfb(void)
+{
+    return EVP_aes_128_cfb128();
+}
+
+# undef EVP_aes_192_cfb
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_192_cfb(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_192_cfb(void)
+{
+    return EVP_aes_192_cfb128();
+}
+
+# undef EVP_aes_256_cfb
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_256_cfb(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_256_cfb(void)
+{
+    return EVP_aes_256_cfb128();
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/e_rc2.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/e_rc2.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ed10bb3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/e_rc2.c
@@ -0,0 +1,189 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC2
+
+# include <openssl/evp.h>
+# include <openssl/objects.h>
+# include "internal/evp_int.h"
+# include <openssl/rc2.h>
+
+static int rc2_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+                        const unsigned char *iv, int enc);
+static int rc2_meth_to_magic(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx);
+static int rc2_magic_to_meth(int i);
+static int rc2_set_asn1_type_and_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type);
+static int rc2_get_asn1_type_and_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type);
+static int rc2_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr);
+
+typedef struct {
+    int key_bits;               /* effective key bits */
+    RC2_KEY ks;                 /* key schedule */
+} EVP_RC2_KEY;
+
+# define data(ctx)       EVP_C_DATA(EVP_RC2_KEY,ctx)
+
+IMPLEMENT_BLOCK_CIPHER(rc2, ks, RC2, EVP_RC2_KEY, NID_rc2,
+                       8,
+                       RC2_KEY_LENGTH, 8, 64,
+                       EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH | EVP_CIPH_CTRL_INIT,
+                       rc2_init_key, NULL,
+                       rc2_set_asn1_type_and_iv, rc2_get_asn1_type_and_iv,
+                       rc2_ctrl)
+# define RC2_40_MAGIC    0xa0
+# define RC2_64_MAGIC    0x78
+# define RC2_128_MAGIC   0x3a
+static const EVP_CIPHER r2_64_cbc_cipher = {
+    NID_rc2_64_cbc,
+    8, 8 /* 64 bit */ , 8,
+    EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE | EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH | EVP_CIPH_CTRL_INIT,
+    rc2_init_key,
+    rc2_cbc_cipher,
+    NULL,
+    sizeof(EVP_RC2_KEY),
+    rc2_set_asn1_type_and_iv,
+    rc2_get_asn1_type_and_iv,
+    rc2_ctrl,
+    NULL
+};
+
+static const EVP_CIPHER r2_40_cbc_cipher = {
+    NID_rc2_40_cbc,
+    8, 5 /* 40 bit */ , 8,
+    EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE | EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH | EVP_CIPH_CTRL_INIT,
+    rc2_init_key,
+    rc2_cbc_cipher,
+    NULL,
+    sizeof(EVP_RC2_KEY),
+    rc2_set_asn1_type_and_iv,
+    rc2_get_asn1_type_and_iv,
+    rc2_ctrl,
+    NULL
+};
+
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_rc2_64_cbc(void)
+{
+    return (&r2_64_cbc_cipher);
+}
+
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_rc2_40_cbc(void)
+{
+    return (&r2_40_cbc_cipher);
+}
+
+static int rc2_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+                        const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
+{
+    RC2_set_key(&data(ctx)->ks, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx),
+                key, data(ctx)->key_bits);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int rc2_meth_to_magic(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *e)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(e, EVP_CTRL_GET_RC2_KEY_BITS, 0, &i);
+    if (i == 128)
+        return (RC2_128_MAGIC);
+    else if (i == 64)
+        return (RC2_64_MAGIC);
+    else if (i == 40)
+        return (RC2_40_MAGIC);
+    else
+        return (0);
+}
+
+static int rc2_magic_to_meth(int i)
+{
+    if (i == RC2_128_MAGIC)
+        return 128;
+    else if (i == RC2_64_MAGIC)
+        return 64;
+    else if (i == RC2_40_MAGIC)
+        return 40;
+    else {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_RC2_MAGIC_TO_METH, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE);
+        return (0);
+    }
+}
+
+static int rc2_get_asn1_type_and_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type)
+{
+    long num = 0;
+    int i = 0;
+    int key_bits;
+    unsigned int l;
+    unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+
+    if (type != NULL) {
+        l = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(c);
+        OPENSSL_assert(l <= sizeof(iv));
+        i = ASN1_TYPE_get_int_octetstring(type, &num, iv, l);
+        if (i != (int)l)
+            return -1;
+        key_bits = rc2_magic_to_meth((int)num);
+        if (!key_bits)
+            return -1;
+        if (i > 0 && !EVP_CipherInit_ex(c, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv, -1))
+            return -1;
+        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(c, EVP_CTRL_SET_RC2_KEY_BITS, key_bits, NULL);
+        if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(c, key_bits / 8) <= 0)
+            return -1;
+    }
+    return i;
+}
+
+static int rc2_set_asn1_type_and_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type)
+{
+    long num;
+    int i = 0, j;
+
+    if (type != NULL) {
+        num = rc2_meth_to_magic(c);
+        j = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(c);
+        i = ASN1_TYPE_set_int_octetstring(type, num,
+                                          (unsigned char *)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_original_iv(c),
+                                          j);
+    }
+    return (i);
+}
+
+static int rc2_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr)
+{
+    switch (type) {
+    case EVP_CTRL_INIT:
+        data(c)->key_bits = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(c) * 8;
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_CTRL_GET_RC2_KEY_BITS:
+        *(int *)ptr = data(c)->key_bits;
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_CTRL_SET_RC2_KEY_BITS:
+        if (arg > 0) {
+            data(c)->key_bits = arg;
+            return 1;
+        }
+        return 0;
+# ifdef PBE_PRF_TEST
+    case EVP_CTRL_PBE_PRF_NID:
+        *(int *)ptr = NID_hmacWithMD5;
+        return 1;
+# endif
+
+    default:
+        return -1;
+    }
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/e_rc4.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/e_rc4.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ea95dea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/e_rc4.c
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
+
+# include <openssl/evp.h>
+# include <openssl/objects.h>
+# include <openssl/rc4.h>
+
+# include "internal/evp_int.h"
+
+typedef struct {
+    RC4_KEY ks;                 /* working key */
+} EVP_RC4_KEY;
+
+# define data(ctx) ((EVP_RC4_KEY *)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(ctx))
+
+static int rc4_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+                        const unsigned char *iv, int enc);
+static int rc4_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                      const unsigned char *in, size_t inl);
+static const EVP_CIPHER r4_cipher = {
+    NID_rc4,
+    1, EVP_RC4_KEY_SIZE, 0,
+    EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH,
+    rc4_init_key,
+    rc4_cipher,
+    NULL,
+    sizeof(EVP_RC4_KEY),
+    NULL,
+    NULL,
+    NULL,
+    NULL
+};
+
+static const EVP_CIPHER r4_40_cipher = {
+    NID_rc4_40,
+    1, 5 /* 40 bit */ , 0,
+    EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH,
+    rc4_init_key,
+    rc4_cipher,
+    NULL,
+    sizeof(EVP_RC4_KEY),
+    NULL,
+    NULL,
+    NULL,
+    NULL
+};
+
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_rc4(void)
+{
+    return (&r4_cipher);
+}
+
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_rc4_40(void)
+{
+    return (&r4_40_cipher);
+}
+
+static int rc4_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+                        const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
+{
+    RC4_set_key(&data(ctx)->ks, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx), key);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int rc4_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                      const unsigned char *in, size_t inl)
+{
+    RC4(&data(ctx)->ks, inl, in, out);
+    return 1;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/e_rc4_hmac_md5.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/e_rc4_hmac_md5.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8ab18c1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/e_rc4_hmac_md5.c
@@ -0,0 +1,262 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RC4) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MD5)
+
+# include <openssl/crypto.h>
+# include <openssl/evp.h>
+# include <openssl/objects.h>
+# include <openssl/rc4.h>
+# include <openssl/md5.h>
+# include "internal/evp_int.h"
+
+typedef struct {
+    RC4_KEY ks;
+    MD5_CTX head, tail, md;
+    size_t payload_length;
+} EVP_RC4_HMAC_MD5;
+
+# define NO_PAYLOAD_LENGTH       ((size_t)-1)
+
+void rc4_md5_enc(RC4_KEY *key, const void *in0, void *out,
+                 MD5_CTX *ctx, const void *inp, size_t blocks);
+
+# define data(ctx) ((EVP_RC4_HMAC_MD5 *)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(ctx))
+
+static int rc4_hmac_md5_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+                                 const unsigned char *inkey,
+                                 const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
+{
+    EVP_RC4_HMAC_MD5 *key = data(ctx);
+
+    RC4_set_key(&key->ks, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx), inkey);
+
+    MD5_Init(&key->head);       /* handy when benchmarking */
+    key->tail = key->head;
+    key->md = key->head;
+
+    key->payload_length = NO_PAYLOAD_LENGTH;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+# if     defined(RC4_ASM) && defined(MD5_ASM) &&     (	   \
+        defined(__x86_64)       || defined(__x86_64__)  || \
+        defined(_M_AMD64)       || defined(_M_X64)      )
+#  define STITCHED_CALL
+# endif
+
+# if !defined(STITCHED_CALL)
+#  define rc4_off 0
+#  define md5_off 0
+# endif
+
+static int rc4_hmac_md5_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                               const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
+{
+    EVP_RC4_HMAC_MD5 *key = data(ctx);
+# if defined(STITCHED_CALL)
+    size_t rc4_off = 32 - 1 - (key->ks.x & (32 - 1)), /* 32 is $MOD from
+                                                       * rc4_md5-x86_64.pl */
+        md5_off = MD5_CBLOCK - key->md.num, blocks;
+    unsigned int l;
+    extern unsigned int OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[];
+# endif
+    size_t plen = key->payload_length;
+
+    if (plen != NO_PAYLOAD_LENGTH && len != (plen + MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) {
+        if (plen == NO_PAYLOAD_LENGTH)
+            plen = len;
+# if defined(STITCHED_CALL)
+        /* cipher has to "fall behind" */
+        if (rc4_off > md5_off)
+            md5_off += MD5_CBLOCK;
+
+        if (plen > md5_off && (blocks = (plen - md5_off) / MD5_CBLOCK) &&
+            (OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[0] & (1 << 20)) == 0) {
+            MD5_Update(&key->md, in, md5_off);
+            RC4(&key->ks, rc4_off, in, out);
+
+            rc4_md5_enc(&key->ks, in + rc4_off, out + rc4_off,
+                        &key->md, in + md5_off, blocks);
+            blocks *= MD5_CBLOCK;
+            rc4_off += blocks;
+            md5_off += blocks;
+            key->md.Nh += blocks >> 29;
+            key->md.Nl += blocks <<= 3;
+            if (key->md.Nl < (unsigned int)blocks)
+                key->md.Nh++;
+        } else {
+            rc4_off = 0;
+            md5_off = 0;
+        }
+# endif
+        MD5_Update(&key->md, in + md5_off, plen - md5_off);
+
+        if (plen != len) {      /* "TLS" mode of operation */
+            if (in != out)
+                memcpy(out + rc4_off, in + rc4_off, plen - rc4_off);
+
+            /* calculate HMAC and append it to payload */
+            MD5_Final(out + plen, &key->md);
+            key->md = key->tail;
+            MD5_Update(&key->md, out + plen, MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+            MD5_Final(out + plen, &key->md);
+            /* encrypt HMAC at once */
+            RC4(&key->ks, len - rc4_off, out + rc4_off, out + rc4_off);
+        } else {
+            RC4(&key->ks, len - rc4_off, in + rc4_off, out + rc4_off);
+        }
+    } else {
+        unsigned char mac[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+# if defined(STITCHED_CALL)
+        /* digest has to "fall behind" */
+        if (md5_off > rc4_off)
+            rc4_off += 2 * MD5_CBLOCK;
+        else
+            rc4_off += MD5_CBLOCK;
+
+        if (len > rc4_off && (blocks = (len - rc4_off) / MD5_CBLOCK) &&
+            (OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[0] & (1 << 20)) == 0) {
+            RC4(&key->ks, rc4_off, in, out);
+            MD5_Update(&key->md, out, md5_off);
+
+            rc4_md5_enc(&key->ks, in + rc4_off, out + rc4_off,
+                        &key->md, out + md5_off, blocks);
+            blocks *= MD5_CBLOCK;
+            rc4_off += blocks;
+            md5_off += blocks;
+            l = (key->md.Nl + (blocks << 3)) & 0xffffffffU;
+            if (l < key->md.Nl)
+                key->md.Nh++;
+            key->md.Nl = l;
+            key->md.Nh += blocks >> 29;
+        } else {
+            md5_off = 0;
+            rc4_off = 0;
+        }
+# endif
+        /* decrypt HMAC at once */
+        RC4(&key->ks, len - rc4_off, in + rc4_off, out + rc4_off);
+        if (plen != NO_PAYLOAD_LENGTH) { /* "TLS" mode of operation */
+            MD5_Update(&key->md, out + md5_off, plen - md5_off);
+
+            /* calculate HMAC and verify it */
+            MD5_Final(mac, &key->md);
+            key->md = key->tail;
+            MD5_Update(&key->md, mac, MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+            MD5_Final(mac, &key->md);
+
+            if (CRYPTO_memcmp(out + plen, mac, MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH))
+                return 0;
+        } else {
+            MD5_Update(&key->md, out + md5_off, len - md5_off);
+        }
+    }
+
+    key->payload_length = NO_PAYLOAD_LENGTH;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int rc4_hmac_md5_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type, int arg,
+                             void *ptr)
+{
+    EVP_RC4_HMAC_MD5 *key = data(ctx);
+
+    switch (type) {
+    case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY:
+        {
+            unsigned int i;
+            unsigned char hmac_key[64];
+
+            memset(hmac_key, 0, sizeof(hmac_key));
+
+            if (arg > (int)sizeof(hmac_key)) {
+                MD5_Init(&key->head);
+                MD5_Update(&key->head, ptr, arg);
+                MD5_Final(hmac_key, &key->head);
+            } else {
+                memcpy(hmac_key, ptr, arg);
+            }
+
+            for (i = 0; i < sizeof(hmac_key); i++)
+                hmac_key[i] ^= 0x36; /* ipad */
+            MD5_Init(&key->head);
+            MD5_Update(&key->head, hmac_key, sizeof(hmac_key));
+
+            for (i = 0; i < sizeof(hmac_key); i++)
+                hmac_key[i] ^= 0x36 ^ 0x5c; /* opad */
+            MD5_Init(&key->tail);
+            MD5_Update(&key->tail, hmac_key, sizeof(hmac_key));
+
+            OPENSSL_cleanse(hmac_key, sizeof(hmac_key));
+
+            return 1;
+        }
+    case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD:
+        {
+            unsigned char *p = ptr;
+            unsigned int len;
+
+            if (arg != EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN)
+                return -1;
+
+            len = p[arg - 2] << 8 | p[arg - 1];
+
+            if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) {
+                if (len < MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH)
+                    return -1;
+                len -= MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+                p[arg - 2] = len >> 8;
+                p[arg - 1] = len;
+            }
+            key->payload_length = len;
+            key->md = key->head;
+            MD5_Update(&key->md, p, arg);
+
+            return MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+        }
+    default:
+        return -1;
+    }
+}
+
+static EVP_CIPHER r4_hmac_md5_cipher = {
+# ifdef NID_rc4_hmac_md5
+    NID_rc4_hmac_md5,
+# else
+    NID_undef,
+# endif
+    1, EVP_RC4_KEY_SIZE, 0,
+    EVP_CIPH_STREAM_CIPHER | EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH |
+        EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER,
+    rc4_hmac_md5_init_key,
+    rc4_hmac_md5_cipher,
+    NULL,
+    sizeof(EVP_RC4_HMAC_MD5),
+    NULL,
+    NULL,
+    rc4_hmac_md5_ctrl,
+    NULL
+};
+
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_rc4_hmac_md5(void)
+{
+    return (&r4_hmac_md5_cipher);
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/e_rc5.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/e_rc5.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f69ba5b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/e_rc5.c
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC5
+
+# include <openssl/evp.h>
+# include <internal/evp_int.h>
+# include <openssl/objects.h>
+# include "evp_locl.h"
+# include <openssl/rc5.h>
+
+static int r_32_12_16_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+                               const unsigned char *iv, int enc);
+static int rc5_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr);
+
+typedef struct {
+    int rounds;                 /* number of rounds */
+    RC5_32_KEY ks;              /* key schedule */
+} EVP_RC5_KEY;
+
+# define data(ctx)       EVP_C_DATA(EVP_RC5_KEY,ctx)
+
+IMPLEMENT_BLOCK_CIPHER(rc5_32_12_16, ks, RC5_32, EVP_RC5_KEY, NID_rc5,
+                       8, RC5_32_KEY_LENGTH, 8, 64,
+                       EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH | EVP_CIPH_CTRL_INIT,
+                       r_32_12_16_init_key, NULL, NULL, NULL, rc5_ctrl)
+
+static int rc5_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr)
+{
+    switch (type) {
+    case EVP_CTRL_INIT:
+        data(c)->rounds = RC5_12_ROUNDS;
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_CTRL_GET_RC5_ROUNDS:
+        *(int *)ptr = data(c)->rounds;
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_CTRL_SET_RC5_ROUNDS:
+        switch (arg) {
+        case RC5_8_ROUNDS:
+        case RC5_12_ROUNDS:
+        case RC5_16_ROUNDS:
+            data(c)->rounds = arg;
+            return 1;
+
+        default:
+            EVPerr(EVP_F_RC5_CTRL, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_NUMBER_OF_ROUNDS);
+            return 0;
+        }
+
+    default:
+        return -1;
+    }
+}
+
+static int r_32_12_16_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+                               const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
+{
+    RC5_32_set_key(&data(ctx)->ks, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx),
+                   key, data(ctx)->rounds);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/e_seed.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/e_seed.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..40aec5f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/e_seed.c
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2007-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SEED
+NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT
+#else
+# include <openssl/evp.h>
+# include <openssl/err.h>
+# include <string.h>
+# include <assert.h>
+# include <openssl/seed.h>
+# include "internal/evp_int.h"
+
+static int seed_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+                         const unsigned char *iv, int enc);
+
+typedef struct {
+    SEED_KEY_SCHEDULE ks;
+} EVP_SEED_KEY;
+
+IMPLEMENT_BLOCK_CIPHER(seed, ks, SEED, EVP_SEED_KEY, NID_seed,
+                       16, 16, 16, 128, EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1,
+                       seed_init_key, 0, 0, 0, 0)
+
+static int seed_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+                         const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
+{
+    SEED_set_key(key, &EVP_C_DATA(EVP_SEED_KEY,ctx)->ks);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/e_xcbc_d.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/e_xcbc_d.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..effaf5c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/e_xcbc_d.c
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
+
+# include <openssl/evp.h>
+# include <openssl/objects.h>
+# include "internal/evp_int.h"
+# include <openssl/des.h>
+
+static int desx_cbc_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+                             const unsigned char *iv, int enc);
+static int desx_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                           const unsigned char *in, size_t inl);
+
+typedef struct {
+    DES_key_schedule ks;        /* key schedule */
+    DES_cblock inw;
+    DES_cblock outw;
+} DESX_CBC_KEY;
+
+# define data(ctx) EVP_C_DATA(DESX_CBC_KEY,ctx)
+
+static const EVP_CIPHER d_xcbc_cipher = {
+    NID_desx_cbc,
+    8, 24, 8,
+    EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
+    desx_cbc_init_key,
+    desx_cbc_cipher,
+    NULL,
+    sizeof(DESX_CBC_KEY),
+    EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
+    EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
+    NULL,
+    NULL
+};
+
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_desx_cbc(void)
+{
+    return (&d_xcbc_cipher);
+}
+
+static int desx_cbc_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+                             const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
+{
+    DES_cblock *deskey = (DES_cblock *)key;
+
+    DES_set_key_unchecked(deskey, &data(ctx)->ks);
+    memcpy(&data(ctx)->inw[0], &key[8], 8);
+    memcpy(&data(ctx)->outw[0], &key[16], 8);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int desx_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                           const unsigned char *in, size_t inl)
+{
+    while (inl >= EVP_MAXCHUNK) {
+        DES_xcbc_encrypt(in, out, (long)EVP_MAXCHUNK, &data(ctx)->ks,
+                         (DES_cblock *)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx),
+                         &data(ctx)->inw, &data(ctx)->outw,
+                         EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx));
+        inl -= EVP_MAXCHUNK;
+        in += EVP_MAXCHUNK;
+        out += EVP_MAXCHUNK;
+    }
+    if (inl)
+        DES_xcbc_encrypt(in, out, (long)inl, &data(ctx)->ks,
+                         (DES_cblock *)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx),
+                         &data(ctx)->inw, &data(ctx)->outw,
+                         EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx));
+    return 1;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/encode.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/encode.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..abb1044
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/encode.c
@@ -0,0 +1,404 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include "evp_locl.h"
+
+static unsigned char conv_ascii2bin(unsigned char a);
+#ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+# define conv_bin2ascii(a)       (data_bin2ascii[(a)&0x3f])
+#else
+/*
+ * We assume that PEM encoded files are EBCDIC files (i.e., printable text
+ * files). Convert them here while decoding. When encoding, output is EBCDIC
+ * (text) format again. (No need for conversion in the conv_bin2ascii macro,
+ * as the underlying textstring data_bin2ascii[] is already EBCDIC)
+ */
+# define conv_bin2ascii(a)       (data_bin2ascii[(a)&0x3f])
+#endif
+
+/*-
+ * 64 char lines
+ * pad input with 0
+ * left over chars are set to =
+ * 1 byte  => xx==
+ * 2 bytes => xxx=
+ * 3 bytes => xxxx
+ */
+#define BIN_PER_LINE    (64/4*3)
+#define CHUNKS_PER_LINE (64/4)
+#define CHAR_PER_LINE   (64+1)
+
+static const unsigned char data_bin2ascii[65] = "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ\
+abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/";
+
+/*-
+ * 0xF0 is a EOLN
+ * 0xF1 is ignore but next needs to be 0xF0 (for \r\n processing).
+ * 0xF2 is EOF
+ * 0xE0 is ignore at start of line.
+ * 0xFF is error
+ */
+
+#define B64_EOLN                0xF0
+#define B64_CR                  0xF1
+#define B64_EOF                 0xF2
+#define B64_WS                  0xE0
+#define B64_ERROR               0xFF
+#define B64_NOT_BASE64(a)       (((a)|0x13) == 0xF3)
+#define B64_BASE64(a)           (!B64_NOT_BASE64(a))
+
+static const unsigned char data_ascii2bin[128] = {
+    0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+    0xFF, 0xE0, 0xF0, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xF1, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+    0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+    0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+    0xE0, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+    0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x3E, 0xFF, 0xF2, 0xFF, 0x3F,
+    0x34, 0x35, 0x36, 0x37, 0x38, 0x39, 0x3A, 0x3B,
+    0x3C, 0x3D, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+    0xFF, 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06,
+    0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0x0C, 0x0D, 0x0E,
+    0x0F, 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16,
+    0x17, 0x18, 0x19, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+    0xFF, 0x1A, 0x1B, 0x1C, 0x1D, 0x1E, 0x1F, 0x20,
+    0x21, 0x22, 0x23, 0x24, 0x25, 0x26, 0x27, 0x28,
+    0x29, 0x2A, 0x2B, 0x2C, 0x2D, 0x2E, 0x2F, 0x30,
+    0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+};
+
+#ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+static unsigned char conv_ascii2bin(unsigned char a)
+{
+    if (a & 0x80)
+        return B64_ERROR;
+    return data_ascii2bin[a];
+}
+#else
+static unsigned char conv_ascii2bin(unsigned char a)
+{
+    a = os_toascii[a];
+    if (a & 0x80)
+        return B64_ERROR;
+    return data_ascii2bin[a];
+}
+#endif
+
+EVP_ENCODE_CTX *EVP_ENCODE_CTX_new(void)
+{
+    return OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(EVP_ENCODE_CTX));
+}
+
+void EVP_ENCODE_CTX_free(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+}
+
+int EVP_ENCODE_CTX_copy(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *dctx, EVP_ENCODE_CTX *sctx)
+{
+    memcpy(dctx, sctx, sizeof(EVP_ENCODE_CTX));
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int EVP_ENCODE_CTX_num(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->num;
+}
+
+void EVP_EncodeInit(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    ctx->length = 48;
+    ctx->num = 0;
+    ctx->line_num = 0;
+}
+
+int EVP_EncodeUpdate(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
+                      const unsigned char *in, int inl)
+{
+    int i, j;
+    size_t total = 0;
+
+    *outl = 0;
+    if (inl <= 0)
+        return 0;
+    OPENSSL_assert(ctx->length <= (int)sizeof(ctx->enc_data));
+    if (ctx->length - ctx->num > inl) {
+        memcpy(&(ctx->enc_data[ctx->num]), in, inl);
+        ctx->num += inl;
+        return 1;
+    }
+    if (ctx->num != 0) {
+        i = ctx->length - ctx->num;
+        memcpy(&(ctx->enc_data[ctx->num]), in, i);
+        in += i;
+        inl -= i;
+        j = EVP_EncodeBlock(out, ctx->enc_data, ctx->length);
+        ctx->num = 0;
+        out += j;
+        *(out++) = '\n';
+        *out = '\0';
+        total = j + 1;
+    }
+    while (inl >= ctx->length && total <= INT_MAX) {
+        j = EVP_EncodeBlock(out, in, ctx->length);
+        in += ctx->length;
+        inl -= ctx->length;
+        out += j;
+        *(out++) = '\n';
+        *out = '\0';
+        total += j + 1;
+    }
+    if (total > INT_MAX) {
+        /* Too much output data! */
+        *outl = 0;
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (inl != 0)
+        memcpy(&(ctx->enc_data[0]), in, inl);
+    ctx->num = inl;
+    *outl = total;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+void EVP_EncodeFinal(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl)
+{
+    unsigned int ret = 0;
+
+    if (ctx->num != 0) {
+        ret = EVP_EncodeBlock(out, ctx->enc_data, ctx->num);
+        out[ret++] = '\n';
+        out[ret] = '\0';
+        ctx->num = 0;
+    }
+    *outl = ret;
+}
+
+int EVP_EncodeBlock(unsigned char *t, const unsigned char *f, int dlen)
+{
+    int i, ret = 0;
+    unsigned long l;
+
+    for (i = dlen; i > 0; i -= 3) {
+        if (i >= 3) {
+            l = (((unsigned long)f[0]) << 16L) |
+                (((unsigned long)f[1]) << 8L) | f[2];
+            *(t++) = conv_bin2ascii(l >> 18L);
+            *(t++) = conv_bin2ascii(l >> 12L);
+            *(t++) = conv_bin2ascii(l >> 6L);
+            *(t++) = conv_bin2ascii(l);
+        } else {
+            l = ((unsigned long)f[0]) << 16L;
+            if (i == 2)
+                l |= ((unsigned long)f[1] << 8L);
+
+            *(t++) = conv_bin2ascii(l >> 18L);
+            *(t++) = conv_bin2ascii(l >> 12L);
+            *(t++) = (i == 1) ? '=' : conv_bin2ascii(l >> 6L);
+            *(t++) = '=';
+        }
+        ret += 4;
+        f += 3;
+    }
+
+    *t = '\0';
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+void EVP_DecodeInit(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    /* Only ctx->num is used during decoding. */
+    ctx->num = 0;
+    ctx->length = 0;
+    ctx->line_num = 0;
+    ctx->expect_nl = 0;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * -1 for error
+ *  0 for last line
+ *  1 for full line
+ *
+ * Note: even though EVP_DecodeUpdate attempts to detect and report end of
+ * content, the context doesn't currently remember it and will accept more data
+ * in the next call. Therefore, the caller is responsible for checking and
+ * rejecting a 0 return value in the middle of content.
+ *
+ * Note: even though EVP_DecodeUpdate has historically tried to detect end of
+ * content based on line length, this has never worked properly. Therefore,
+ * we now return 0 when one of the following is true:
+ *   - Padding or B64_EOF was detected and the last block is complete.
+ *   - Input has zero-length.
+ * -1 is returned if:
+ *   - Invalid characters are detected.
+ *   - There is extra trailing padding, or data after padding.
+ *   - B64_EOF is detected after an incomplete base64 block.
+ */
+int EVP_DecodeUpdate(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
+                     const unsigned char *in, int inl)
+{
+    int seof = 0, eof = 0, rv = -1, ret = 0, i, v, tmp, n, decoded_len;
+    unsigned char *d;
+
+    n = ctx->num;
+    d = ctx->enc_data;
+
+    if (n > 0 && d[n - 1] == '=') {
+        eof++;
+        if (n > 1 && d[n - 2] == '=')
+            eof++;
+    }
+
+     /* Legacy behaviour: an empty input chunk signals end of input. */
+    if (inl == 0) {
+        rv = 0;
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0; i < inl; i++) {
+        tmp = *(in++);
+        v = conv_ascii2bin(tmp);
+        if (v == B64_ERROR) {
+            rv = -1;
+            goto end;
+        }
+
+        if (tmp == '=') {
+            eof++;
+        } else if (eof > 0 && B64_BASE64(v)) {
+            /* More data after padding. */
+            rv = -1;
+            goto end;
+        }
+
+        if (eof > 2) {
+            rv = -1;
+            goto end;
+        }
+
+        if (v == B64_EOF) {
+            seof = 1;
+            goto tail;
+        }
+
+        /* Only save valid base64 characters. */
+        if (B64_BASE64(v)) {
+            if (n >= 64) {
+                /*
+                 * We increment n once per loop, and empty the buffer as soon as
+                 * we reach 64 characters, so this can only happen if someone's
+                 * manually messed with the ctx. Refuse to write any more data.
+                 */
+                rv = -1;
+                goto end;
+            }
+            OPENSSL_assert(n < (int)sizeof(ctx->enc_data));
+            d[n++] = tmp;
+        }
+
+        if (n == 64) {
+            decoded_len = EVP_DecodeBlock(out, d, n);
+            n = 0;
+            if (decoded_len < 0 || eof > decoded_len) {
+                rv = -1;
+                goto end;
+            }
+            ret += decoded_len - eof;
+            out += decoded_len - eof;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Legacy behaviour: if the current line is a full base64-block (i.e., has
+     * 0 mod 4 base64 characters), it is processed immediately. We keep this
+     * behaviour as applications may not be calling EVP_DecodeFinal properly.
+     */
+tail:
+    if (n > 0) {
+        if ((n & 3) == 0) {
+            decoded_len = EVP_DecodeBlock(out, d, n);
+            n = 0;
+            if (decoded_len < 0 || eof > decoded_len) {
+                rv = -1;
+                goto end;
+            }
+            ret += (decoded_len - eof);
+        } else if (seof) {
+            /* EOF in the middle of a base64 block. */
+            rv = -1;
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+
+    rv = seof || (n == 0 && eof) ? 0 : 1;
+end:
+    /* Legacy behaviour. This should probably rather be zeroed on error. */
+    *outl = ret;
+    ctx->num = n;
+    return (rv);
+}
+
+int EVP_DecodeBlock(unsigned char *t, const unsigned char *f, int n)
+{
+    int i, ret = 0, a, b, c, d;
+    unsigned long l;
+
+    /* trim white space from the start of the line. */
+    while ((conv_ascii2bin(*f) == B64_WS) && (n > 0)) {
+        f++;
+        n--;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * strip off stuff at the end of the line ascii2bin values B64_WS,
+     * B64_EOLN, B64_EOLN and B64_EOF
+     */
+    while ((n > 3) && (B64_NOT_BASE64(conv_ascii2bin(f[n - 1]))))
+        n--;
+
+    if (n % 4 != 0)
+        return (-1);
+
+    for (i = 0; i < n; i += 4) {
+        a = conv_ascii2bin(*(f++));
+        b = conv_ascii2bin(*(f++));
+        c = conv_ascii2bin(*(f++));
+        d = conv_ascii2bin(*(f++));
+        if ((a & 0x80) || (b & 0x80) || (c & 0x80) || (d & 0x80))
+            return (-1);
+        l = ((((unsigned long)a) << 18L) |
+             (((unsigned long)b) << 12L) |
+             (((unsigned long)c) << 6L) | (((unsigned long)d)));
+        *(t++) = (unsigned char)(l >> 16L) & 0xff;
+        *(t++) = (unsigned char)(l >> 8L) & 0xff;
+        *(t++) = (unsigned char)(l) & 0xff;
+        ret += 3;
+    }
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+int EVP_DecodeFinal(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    *outl = 0;
+    if (ctx->num != 0) {
+        i = EVP_DecodeBlock(out, ctx->enc_data, ctx->num);
+        if (i < 0)
+            return (-1);
+        ctx->num = 0;
+        *outl = i;
+        return (1);
+    } else
+        return (1);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/evp_cnf.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/evp_cnf.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..71d13b8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/evp_cnf.c
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2012-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/conf.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+
+/* Algorithm configuration module. */
+
+static int alg_module_init(CONF_IMODULE *md, const CONF *cnf)
+{
+    int i;
+    const char *oid_section;
+    STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *sktmp;
+    CONF_VALUE *oval;
+
+    oid_section = CONF_imodule_get_value(md);
+    if ((sktmp = NCONF_get_section(cnf, oid_section)) == NULL) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_ALG_MODULE_INIT, EVP_R_ERROR_LOADING_SECTION);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(sktmp); i++) {
+        oval = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(sktmp, i);
+        if (strcmp(oval->name, "fips_mode") == 0) {
+            int m;
+            if (!X509V3_get_value_bool(oval, &m)) {
+                EVPerr(EVP_F_ALG_MODULE_INIT, EVP_R_INVALID_FIPS_MODE);
+                return 0;
+            }
+            if (m > 0) {
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+                if (!FIPS_mode() && !FIPS_mode_set(1)) {
+                    EVPerr(EVP_F_ALG_MODULE_INIT,
+                           EVP_R_ERROR_SETTING_FIPS_MODE);
+                    return 0;
+                }
+#else
+                EVPerr(EVP_F_ALG_MODULE_INIT, EVP_R_FIPS_MODE_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+                return 0;
+#endif
+            }
+        } else {
+            EVPerr(EVP_F_ALG_MODULE_INIT, EVP_R_UNKNOWN_OPTION);
+            ERR_add_error_data(4, "name=", oval->name,
+                               ", value=", oval->value);
+        }
+
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+void EVP_add_alg_module(void)
+{
+    CONF_module_add("alg_section", alg_module_init, 0);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e5807ed
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,642 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#include "internal/evp_int.h"
+#include "evp_locl.h"
+
+int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c)
+{
+    if (c == NULL)
+        return 1;
+    if (c->cipher != NULL) {
+        if (c->cipher->cleanup && !c->cipher->cleanup(c))
+            return 0;
+        /* Cleanse cipher context data */
+        if (c->cipher_data && c->cipher->ctx_size)
+            OPENSSL_cleanse(c->cipher_data, c->cipher->ctx_size);
+    }
+    OPENSSL_free(c->cipher_data);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    ENGINE_finish(c->engine);
+#endif
+    memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c));
+    return 1;
+}
+
+EVP_CIPHER_CTX *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(void)
+{
+    return OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX));
+}
+
+void EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(ctx);
+    OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+}
+
+int EVP_CipherInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
+                   const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
+{
+    if (cipher != NULL)
+        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(ctx);
+    return EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, key, iv, enc);
+}
+
+int EVP_CipherInit_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
+                      ENGINE *impl, const unsigned char *key,
+                      const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
+{
+    if (enc == -1)
+        enc = ctx->encrypt;
+    else {
+        if (enc)
+            enc = 1;
+        ctx->encrypt = enc;
+    }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    /*
+     * Whether it's nice or not, "Inits" can be used on "Final"'d contexts so
+     * this context may already have an ENGINE! Try to avoid releasing the
+     * previous handle, re-querying for an ENGINE, and having a
+     * reinitialisation, when it may all be unnecessary.
+     */
+    if (ctx->engine && ctx->cipher
+        && (cipher == NULL || cipher->nid == ctx->cipher->nid))
+        goto skip_to_init;
+#endif
+    if (cipher) {
+        /*
+         * Ensure a context left lying around from last time is cleared (the
+         * previous check attempted to avoid this if the same ENGINE and
+         * EVP_CIPHER could be used).
+         */
+        if (ctx->cipher) {
+            unsigned long flags = ctx->flags;
+            EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(ctx);
+            /* Restore encrypt and flags */
+            ctx->encrypt = enc;
+            ctx->flags = flags;
+        }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+        if (impl) {
+            if (!ENGINE_init(impl)) {
+                EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_CIPHERINIT_EX, EVP_R_INITIALIZATION_ERROR);
+                return 0;
+            }
+        } else
+            /* Ask if an ENGINE is reserved for this job */
+            impl = ENGINE_get_cipher_engine(cipher->nid);
+        if (impl) {
+            /* There's an ENGINE for this job ... (apparently) */
+            const EVP_CIPHER *c = ENGINE_get_cipher(impl, cipher->nid);
+            if (!c) {
+                /*
+                 * One positive side-effect of US's export control history,
+                 * is that we should at least be able to avoid using US
+                 * misspellings of "initialisation"?
+                 */
+                EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_CIPHERINIT_EX, EVP_R_INITIALIZATION_ERROR);
+                return 0;
+            }
+            /* We'll use the ENGINE's private cipher definition */
+            cipher = c;
+            /*
+             * Store the ENGINE functional reference so we know 'cipher' came
+             * from an ENGINE and we need to release it when done.
+             */
+            ctx->engine = impl;
+        } else
+            ctx->engine = NULL;
+#endif
+
+        ctx->cipher = cipher;
+        if (ctx->cipher->ctx_size) {
+            ctx->cipher_data = OPENSSL_zalloc(ctx->cipher->ctx_size);
+            if (ctx->cipher_data == NULL) {
+                ctx->cipher = NULL;
+                EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_CIPHERINIT_EX, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                return 0;
+            }
+        } else {
+            ctx->cipher_data = NULL;
+        }
+        ctx->key_len = cipher->key_len;
+        /* Preserve wrap enable flag, zero everything else */
+        ctx->flags &= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_FLAG_WRAP_ALLOW;
+        if (ctx->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_CTRL_INIT) {
+            if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_INIT, 0, NULL)) {
+                ctx->cipher = NULL;
+                EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_CIPHERINIT_EX, EVP_R_INITIALIZATION_ERROR);
+                return 0;
+            }
+        }
+    } else if (!ctx->cipher) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_CIPHERINIT_EX, EVP_R_NO_CIPHER_SET);
+        return 0;
+    }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+ skip_to_init:
+#endif
+    /* we assume block size is a power of 2 in *cryptUpdate */
+    OPENSSL_assert(ctx->cipher->block_size == 1
+                   || ctx->cipher->block_size == 8
+                   || ctx->cipher->block_size == 16);
+
+    if (!(ctx->flags & EVP_CIPHER_CTX_FLAG_WRAP_ALLOW)
+        && EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx) == EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_CIPHERINIT_EX, EVP_R_WRAP_MODE_NOT_ALLOWED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx)) & EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV)) {
+        switch (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx)) {
+
+        case EVP_CIPH_STREAM_CIPHER:
+        case EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE:
+            break;
+
+        case EVP_CIPH_CFB_MODE:
+        case EVP_CIPH_OFB_MODE:
+
+            ctx->num = 0;
+            /* fall-through */
+
+        case EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE:
+
+            OPENSSL_assert(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) <=
+                           (int)sizeof(ctx->iv));
+            if (iv)
+                memcpy(ctx->oiv, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx));
+            memcpy(ctx->iv, ctx->oiv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx));
+            break;
+
+        case EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE:
+            ctx->num = 0;
+            /* Don't reuse IV for CTR mode */
+            if (iv)
+                memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx));
+            break;
+
+        default:
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (key || (ctx->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT)) {
+        if (!ctx->cipher->init(ctx, key, iv, enc))
+            return 0;
+    }
+    ctx->buf_len = 0;
+    ctx->final_used = 0;
+    ctx->block_mask = ctx->cipher->block_size - 1;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int EVP_CipherUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
+                     const unsigned char *in, int inl)
+{
+    if (ctx->encrypt)
+        return EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, out, outl, in, inl);
+    else
+        return EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, out, outl, in, inl);
+}
+
+int EVP_CipherFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl)
+{
+    if (ctx->encrypt)
+        return EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, out, outl);
+    else
+        return EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, out, outl);
+}
+
+int EVP_CipherFinal(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl)
+{
+    if (ctx->encrypt)
+        return EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, out, outl);
+    else
+        return EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, out, outl);
+}
+
+int EVP_EncryptInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
+                    const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv)
+{
+    return EVP_CipherInit(ctx, cipher, key, iv, 1);
+}
+
+int EVP_EncryptInit_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
+                       ENGINE *impl, const unsigned char *key,
+                       const unsigned char *iv)
+{
+    return EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, cipher, impl, key, iv, 1);
+}
+
+int EVP_DecryptInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
+                    const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv)
+{
+    return EVP_CipherInit(ctx, cipher, key, iv, 0);
+}
+
+int EVP_DecryptInit_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
+                       ENGINE *impl, const unsigned char *key,
+                       const unsigned char *iv)
+{
+    return EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, cipher, impl, key, iv, 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * According to the letter of standard difference between pointers
+ * is specified to be valid only within same object. This makes
+ * it formally challenging to determine if input and output buffers
+ * are not partially overlapping with standard pointer arithmetic.
+ */
+#ifdef PTRDIFF_T
+# undef PTRDIFF_T
+#endif
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE==64
+/*
+ * Then we have VMS that distinguishes itself by adhering to
+ * sizeof(size_t)==4 even in 64-bit builds, which means that
+ * difference between two pointers might be truncated to 32 bits.
+ * In the context one can even wonder how comparison for
+ * equality is implemented. To be on the safe side we adhere to
+ * PTRDIFF_T even for comparison for equality.
+ */
+# define PTRDIFF_T uint64_t
+#else
+# define PTRDIFF_T size_t
+#endif
+
+int is_partially_overlapping(const void *ptr1, const void *ptr2, int len)
+{
+    PTRDIFF_T diff = (PTRDIFF_T)ptr1-(PTRDIFF_T)ptr2;
+    /*
+     * Check for partially overlapping buffers. [Binary logical
+     * operations are used instead of boolean to minimize number
+     * of conditional branches.]
+     */
+    int overlapped = (len > 0) & (diff != 0) & ((diff < (PTRDIFF_T)len) |
+                                                (diff > (0 - (PTRDIFF_T)len)));
+
+    return overlapped;
+}
+
+int EVP_EncryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
+                      const unsigned char *in, int inl)
+{
+    int i, j, bl, cmpl = inl;
+
+    if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_test_flags(ctx, EVP_CIPH_FLAG_LENGTH_BITS))
+        cmpl = (cmpl + 7) / 8;
+
+    bl = ctx->cipher->block_size;
+
+    if (ctx->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) {
+        /* If block size > 1 then the cipher will have to do this check */
+        if (bl == 1 && is_partially_overlapping(out, in, cmpl)) {
+            EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTUPDATE, EVP_R_PARTIALLY_OVERLAPPING);
+            return 0;
+        }
+
+        i = ctx->cipher->do_cipher(ctx, out, in, inl);
+        if (i < 0)
+            return 0;
+        else
+            *outl = i;
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    if (inl <= 0) {
+        *outl = 0;
+        return inl == 0;
+    }
+    if (is_partially_overlapping(out + ctx->buf_len, in, cmpl)) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTUPDATE, EVP_R_PARTIALLY_OVERLAPPING);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (ctx->buf_len == 0 && (inl & (ctx->block_mask)) == 0) {
+        if (ctx->cipher->do_cipher(ctx, out, in, inl)) {
+            *outl = inl;
+            return 1;
+        } else {
+            *outl = 0;
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+    i = ctx->buf_len;
+    OPENSSL_assert(bl <= (int)sizeof(ctx->buf));
+    if (i != 0) {
+        if (bl - i > inl) {
+            memcpy(&(ctx->buf[i]), in, inl);
+            ctx->buf_len += inl;
+            *outl = 0;
+            return 1;
+        } else {
+            j = bl - i;
+            memcpy(&(ctx->buf[i]), in, j);
+            inl -= j;
+            in += j;
+            if (!ctx->cipher->do_cipher(ctx, out, ctx->buf, bl))
+                return 0;
+            out += bl;
+            *outl = bl;
+        }
+    } else
+        *outl = 0;
+    i = inl & (bl - 1);
+    inl -= i;
+    if (inl > 0) {
+        if (!ctx->cipher->do_cipher(ctx, out, in, inl))
+            return 0;
+        *outl += inl;
+    }
+
+    if (i != 0)
+        memcpy(ctx->buf, &(in[inl]), i);
+    ctx->buf_len = i;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int EVP_EncryptFinal(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl)
+{
+    int ret;
+    ret = EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, out, outl);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl)
+{
+    int n, ret;
+    unsigned int i, b, bl;
+
+    if (ctx->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) {
+        ret = ctx->cipher->do_cipher(ctx, out, NULL, 0);
+        if (ret < 0)
+            return 0;
+        else
+            *outl = ret;
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    b = ctx->cipher->block_size;
+    OPENSSL_assert(b <= sizeof(ctx->buf));
+    if (b == 1) {
+        *outl = 0;
+        return 1;
+    }
+    bl = ctx->buf_len;
+    if (ctx->flags & EVP_CIPH_NO_PADDING) {
+        if (bl) {
+            EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTFINAL_EX,
+                   EVP_R_DATA_NOT_MULTIPLE_OF_BLOCK_LENGTH);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        *outl = 0;
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    n = b - bl;
+    for (i = bl; i < b; i++)
+        ctx->buf[i] = n;
+    ret = ctx->cipher->do_cipher(ctx, out, ctx->buf, b);
+
+    if (ret)
+        *outl = b;
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int EVP_DecryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
+                      const unsigned char *in, int inl)
+{
+    int fix_len, cmpl = inl;
+    unsigned int b;
+
+    b = ctx->cipher->block_size;
+
+    if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_test_flags(ctx, EVP_CIPH_FLAG_LENGTH_BITS))
+        cmpl = (cmpl + 7) / 8;
+
+    if (ctx->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) {
+        if (b == 1 && is_partially_overlapping(out, in, cmpl)) {
+            EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTUPDATE, EVP_R_PARTIALLY_OVERLAPPING);
+            return 0;
+        }
+
+        fix_len = ctx->cipher->do_cipher(ctx, out, in, inl);
+        if (fix_len < 0) {
+            *outl = 0;
+            return 0;
+        } else
+            *outl = fix_len;
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    if (inl <= 0) {
+        *outl = 0;
+        return inl == 0;
+    }
+
+    if (ctx->flags & EVP_CIPH_NO_PADDING)
+        return EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, out, outl, in, inl);
+
+    OPENSSL_assert(b <= sizeof(ctx->final));
+
+    if (ctx->final_used) {
+        /* see comment about PTRDIFF_T comparison above */
+        if (((PTRDIFF_T)out == (PTRDIFF_T)in)
+            || is_partially_overlapping(out, in, b)) {
+            EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTUPDATE, EVP_R_PARTIALLY_OVERLAPPING);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        memcpy(out, ctx->final, b);
+        out += b;
+        fix_len = 1;
+    } else
+        fix_len = 0;
+
+    if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, out, outl, in, inl))
+        return 0;
+
+    /*
+     * if we have 'decrypted' a multiple of block size, make sure we have a
+     * copy of this last block
+     */
+    if (b > 1 && !ctx->buf_len) {
+        *outl -= b;
+        ctx->final_used = 1;
+        memcpy(ctx->final, &out[*outl], b);
+    } else
+        ctx->final_used = 0;
+
+    if (fix_len)
+        *outl += b;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int EVP_DecryptFinal(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl)
+{
+    int ret;
+    ret = EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, out, outl);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl)
+{
+    int i, n;
+    unsigned int b;
+    *outl = 0;
+
+    if (ctx->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) {
+        i = ctx->cipher->do_cipher(ctx, out, NULL, 0);
+        if (i < 0)
+            return 0;
+        else
+            *outl = i;
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    b = ctx->cipher->block_size;
+    if (ctx->flags & EVP_CIPH_NO_PADDING) {
+        if (ctx->buf_len) {
+            EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTFINAL_EX,
+                   EVP_R_DATA_NOT_MULTIPLE_OF_BLOCK_LENGTH);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        *outl = 0;
+        return 1;
+    }
+    if (b > 1) {
+        if (ctx->buf_len || !ctx->final_used) {
+            EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTFINAL_EX, EVP_R_WRONG_FINAL_BLOCK_LENGTH);
+            return (0);
+        }
+        OPENSSL_assert(b <= sizeof(ctx->final));
+
+        /*
+         * The following assumes that the ciphertext has been authenticated.
+         * Otherwise it provides a padding oracle.
+         */
+        n = ctx->final[b - 1];
+        if (n == 0 || n > (int)b) {
+            EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTFINAL_EX, EVP_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
+            return (0);
+        }
+        for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+            if (ctx->final[--b] != n) {
+                EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTFINAL_EX, EVP_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
+                return (0);
+            }
+        }
+        n = ctx->cipher->block_size - n;
+        for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
+            out[i] = ctx->final[i];
+        *outl = n;
+    } else
+        *outl = 0;
+    return (1);
+}
+
+int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int keylen)
+{
+    if (c->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_KEY_LENGTH)
+        return EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(c, EVP_CTRL_SET_KEY_LENGTH, keylen, NULL);
+    if (c->key_len == keylen)
+        return 1;
+    if ((keylen > 0) && (c->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH)) {
+        c->key_len = keylen;
+        return 1;
+    }
+    EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_SET_KEY_LENGTH, EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int pad)
+{
+    if (pad)
+        ctx->flags &= ~EVP_CIPH_NO_PADDING;
+    else
+        ctx->flags |= EVP_CIPH_NO_PADDING;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type, int arg, void *ptr)
+{
+    int ret;
+    if (!ctx->cipher) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_CTRL, EVP_R_NO_CIPHER_SET);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (!ctx->cipher->ctrl) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_CTRL, EVP_R_CTRL_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    ret = ctx->cipher->ctrl(ctx, type, arg, ptr);
+    if (ret == -1) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_CTRL,
+               EVP_R_CTRL_OPERATION_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key)
+{
+    if (ctx->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_RAND_KEY)
+        return EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_RAND_KEY, 0, key);
+    if (RAND_bytes(key, ctx->key_len) <= 0)
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_copy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *out, const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *in)
+{
+    if ((in == NULL) || (in->cipher == NULL)) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_COPY, EVP_R_INPUT_NOT_INITIALIZED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    /* Make sure it's safe to copy a cipher context using an ENGINE */
+    if (in->engine && !ENGINE_init(in->engine)) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_COPY, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB);
+        return 0;
+    }
+#endif
+
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(out);
+    memcpy(out, in, sizeof(*out));
+
+    if (in->cipher_data && in->cipher->ctx_size) {
+        out->cipher_data = OPENSSL_malloc(in->cipher->ctx_size);
+        if (out->cipher_data == NULL) {
+            out->cipher = NULL;
+            EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_COPY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        memcpy(out->cipher_data, in->cipher_data, in->cipher->ctx_size);
+    }
+
+    if (in->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_COPY)
+        if (!in->cipher->ctrl((EVP_CIPHER_CTX *)in, EVP_CTRL_COPY, 0, out)) {
+            out->cipher = NULL;
+            EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_COPY, EVP_R_INITIALIZATION_ERROR);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/evp_err.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/evp_err.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c4b163f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/evp_err.c
@@ -0,0 +1,186 @@
+/*
+ * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
+ * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+
+# define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP,func,0)
+# define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP,0,reason)
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA EVP_str_functs[] = {
+    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_AESNI_INIT_KEY), "aesni_init_key"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_AES_INIT_KEY), "aes_init_key"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_AES_OCB_CIPHER), "aes_ocb_cipher"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_AES_T4_INIT_KEY), "aes_t4_init_key"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_AES_WRAP_CIPHER), "aes_wrap_cipher"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_ALG_MODULE_INIT), "alg_module_init"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_CAMELLIA_INIT_KEY), "camellia_init_key"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_CHACHA20_POLY1305_CTRL), "chacha20_poly1305_ctrl"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_CMLL_T4_INIT_KEY), "cmll_t4_init_key"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_DES_EDE3_WRAP_CIPHER), "des_ede3_wrap_cipher"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_DO_SIGVER_INIT), "do_sigver_init"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_CIPHERINIT_EX), "EVP_CipherInit_ex"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_COPY), "EVP_CIPHER_CTX_copy"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_CTRL), "EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_SET_KEY_LENGTH),
+     "EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTFINAL_EX), "EVP_DecryptFinal_ex"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTUPDATE), "EVP_DecryptUpdate"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_DIGESTINIT_EX), "EVP_DigestInit_ex"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTFINAL_EX), "EVP_EncryptFinal_ex"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTUPDATE), "EVP_EncryptUpdate"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_MD_CTX_COPY_EX), "EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_MD_SIZE), "EVP_MD_size"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_OPENINIT), "EVP_OpenInit"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PBE_ALG_ADD), "EVP_PBE_alg_add"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PBE_ALG_ADD_TYPE), "EVP_PBE_alg_add_type"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PBE_CIPHERINIT), "EVP_PBE_CipherInit"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PBE_SCRYPT), "EVP_PBE_scrypt"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PKCS82PKEY), "EVP_PKCS82PKEY"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY2PKCS8), "EVP_PKEY2PKCS8"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_ASN1_ADD0), "EVP_PKEY_asn1_add0"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_COPY_PARAMETERS), "EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_CTX_CTRL), "EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_CTX_CTRL_STR), "EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl_str"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_CTX_DUP), "EVP_PKEY_CTX_dup"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_DECRYPT), "EVP_PKEY_decrypt"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_DECRYPT_INIT), "EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_DECRYPT_OLD), "EVP_PKEY_decrypt_old"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_DERIVE), "EVP_PKEY_derive"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_DERIVE_INIT), "EVP_PKEY_derive_init"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_DERIVE_SET_PEER), "EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_ENCRYPT), "EVP_PKEY_encrypt"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_ENCRYPT_INIT), "EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_ENCRYPT_OLD), "EVP_PKEY_encrypt_old"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_GET0_DH), "EVP_PKEY_get0_DH"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_GET0_DSA), "EVP_PKEY_get0_DSA"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_GET0_EC_KEY), "EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_GET0_HMAC), "EVP_PKEY_get0_hmac"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_GET0_RSA), "EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_KEYGEN), "EVP_PKEY_keygen"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_KEYGEN_INIT), "EVP_PKEY_keygen_init"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_NEW), "EVP_PKEY_new"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_PARAMGEN), "EVP_PKEY_paramgen"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_PARAMGEN_INIT), "EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_SET1_ENGINE), "EVP_PKEY_set1_engine"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_SIGN), "EVP_PKEY_sign"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_SIGN_INIT), "EVP_PKEY_sign_init"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_VERIFY), "EVP_PKEY_verify"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_VERIFY_INIT), "EVP_PKEY_verify_init"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_VERIFY_RECOVER), "EVP_PKEY_verify_recover"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_VERIFY_RECOVER_INIT),
+     "EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_SIGNFINAL), "EVP_SignFinal"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_VERIFYFINAL), "EVP_VerifyFinal"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_INT_CTX_NEW), "int_ctx_new"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_PKCS5_PBE_KEYIVGEN), "PKCS5_PBE_keyivgen"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBE_KEYIVGEN), "PKCS5_v2_PBE_keyivgen"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBKDF2_KEYIVGEN), "PKCS5_v2_PBKDF2_keyivgen"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_SCRYPT_KEYIVGEN), "PKCS5_v2_scrypt_keyivgen"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_PKEY_SET_TYPE), "pkey_set_type"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_RC2_MAGIC_TO_METH), "rc2_magic_to_meth"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_RC5_CTRL), "rc5_ctrl"},
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA EVP_str_reasons[] = {
+    {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_AES_KEY_SETUP_FAILED), "aes key setup failed"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_BAD_DECRYPT), "bad decrypt"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL), "buffer too small"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_CAMELLIA_KEY_SETUP_FAILED),
+     "camellia key setup failed"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_CIPHER_PARAMETER_ERROR), "cipher parameter error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED), "command not supported"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_COPY_ERROR), "copy error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_CTRL_NOT_IMPLEMENTED), "ctrl not implemented"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_CTRL_OPERATION_NOT_IMPLEMENTED),
+     "ctrl operation not implemented"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_DATA_NOT_MULTIPLE_OF_BLOCK_LENGTH),
+     "data not multiple of block length"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR), "decode error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_DIFFERENT_KEY_TYPES), "different key types"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_DIFFERENT_PARAMETERS), "different parameters"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_ERROR_LOADING_SECTION), "error loading section"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_ERROR_SETTING_FIPS_MODE), "error setting fips mode"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_EXPECTING_AN_HMAC_KEY), "expecting an hmac key"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_EXPECTING_AN_RSA_KEY), "expecting an rsa key"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_EXPECTING_A_DH_KEY), "expecting a dh key"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_EXPECTING_A_DSA_KEY), "expecting a dsa key"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_EXPECTING_A_EC_KEY), "expecting a ec key"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_FIPS_MODE_NOT_SUPPORTED), "fips mode not supported"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_ILLEGAL_SCRYPT_PARAMETERS),
+     "illegal scrypt parameters"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_INITIALIZATION_ERROR), "initialization error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_INPUT_NOT_INITIALIZED), "input not initialized"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_INVALID_DIGEST), "invalid digest"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_INVALID_FIPS_MODE), "invalid fips mode"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_INVALID_KEY), "invalid key"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH), "invalid key length"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_INVALID_OPERATION), "invalid operation"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_KEYGEN_FAILURE), "keygen failure"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_MEMORY_LIMIT_EXCEEDED), "memory limit exceeded"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_MESSAGE_DIGEST_IS_NULL), "message digest is null"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_METHOD_NOT_SUPPORTED), "method not supported"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS), "missing parameters"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_NO_CIPHER_SET), "no cipher set"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_NO_DEFAULT_DIGEST), "no default digest"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_NO_DIGEST_SET), "no digest set"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_NO_KEY_SET), "no key set"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_NO_OPERATION_SET), "no operation set"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE),
+     "operation not supported for this keytype"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_OPERATON_NOT_INITIALIZED), "operaton not initialized"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_PARTIALLY_OVERLAPPING),
+     "partially overlapping buffers"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_PKEY_APPLICATION_ASN1_METHOD_ALREADY_REGISTERED),
+     "pkey application asn1 method already registered"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD_ALREADY_REGISTERED),
+     "pkey asn1 method already registered"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DECODE_ERROR), "private key decode error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_ENCODE_ERROR), "private key encode error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_PUBLIC_KEY_NOT_RSA), "public key not rsa"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER), "unknown cipher"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST), "unknown digest"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_UNKNOWN_OPTION), "unknown option"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_UNKNOWN_PBE_ALGORITHM), "unknown pbe algorithm"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM), "unsupported algorithm"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER), "unsupported cipher"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEYLENGTH), "unsupported keylength"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_DERIVATION_FUNCTION),
+     "unsupported key derivation function"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE), "unsupported key size"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_NUMBER_OF_ROUNDS),
+     "unsupported number of rounds"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_PRF), "unsupported prf"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_PRIVATE_KEY_ALGORITHM),
+     "unsupported private key algorithm"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_SALT_TYPE), "unsupported salt type"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_WRAP_MODE_NOT_ALLOWED), "wrap mode not allowed"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_WRONG_FINAL_BLOCK_LENGTH), "wrong final block length"},
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+
+#endif
+
+int ERR_load_EVP_strings(void)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+
+    if (ERR_func_error_string(EVP_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) {
+        ERR_load_strings(0, EVP_str_functs);
+        ERR_load_strings(0, EVP_str_reasons);
+    }
+#endif
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/evp_key.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/evp_key.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5201130
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/evp_key.c
@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/ui.h>
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_UI
+/* should be init to zeros. */
+static char prompt_string[80];
+
+void EVP_set_pw_prompt(const char *prompt)
+{
+    if (prompt == NULL)
+        prompt_string[0] = '\0';
+    else {
+        strncpy(prompt_string, prompt, 79);
+        prompt_string[79] = '\0';
+    }
+}
+
+char *EVP_get_pw_prompt(void)
+{
+    if (prompt_string[0] == '\0')
+        return (NULL);
+    else
+        return (prompt_string);
+}
+
+/*
+ * For historical reasons, the standard function for reading passwords is in
+ * the DES library -- if someone ever wants to disable DES, this function
+ * will fail
+ */
+int EVP_read_pw_string(char *buf, int len, const char *prompt, int verify)
+{
+    return EVP_read_pw_string_min(buf, 0, len, prompt, verify);
+}
+
+int EVP_read_pw_string_min(char *buf, int min, int len, const char *prompt,
+                           int verify)
+{
+    int ret = -1;
+    char buff[BUFSIZ];
+    UI *ui;
+
+    if ((prompt == NULL) && (prompt_string[0] != '\0'))
+        prompt = prompt_string;
+    ui = UI_new();
+    if (ui == NULL)
+        return ret;
+    if (UI_add_input_string(ui, prompt, 0, buf, min,
+                            (len >= BUFSIZ) ? BUFSIZ - 1 : len) < 0
+        || (verify
+            && UI_add_verify_string(ui, prompt, 0, buff, min,
+                                    (len >= BUFSIZ) ? BUFSIZ - 1 : len,
+                                    buf) < 0))
+        goto end;
+    ret = UI_process(ui);
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(buff, BUFSIZ);
+ end:
+    UI_free(ui);
+    return ret;
+}
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_UI */
+
+int EVP_BytesToKey(const EVP_CIPHER *type, const EVP_MD *md,
+                   const unsigned char *salt, const unsigned char *data,
+                   int datal, int count, unsigned char *key,
+                   unsigned char *iv)
+{
+    EVP_MD_CTX *c;
+    unsigned char md_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+    int niv, nkey, addmd = 0;
+    unsigned int mds = 0, i;
+    int rv = 0;
+    nkey = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(type);
+    niv = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(type);
+    OPENSSL_assert(nkey <= EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH);
+    OPENSSL_assert(niv <= EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH);
+
+    if (data == NULL)
+        return (nkey);
+
+    c = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+    if (c == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    for (;;) {
+        if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(c, md, NULL))
+            goto err;
+        if (addmd++)
+            if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(c, &(md_buf[0]), mds))
+                goto err;
+        if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(c, data, datal))
+            goto err;
+        if (salt != NULL)
+            if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(c, salt, PKCS5_SALT_LEN))
+                goto err;
+        if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(c, &(md_buf[0]), &mds))
+            goto err;
+
+        for (i = 1; i < (unsigned int)count; i++) {
+            if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(c, md, NULL))
+                goto err;
+            if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(c, &(md_buf[0]), mds))
+                goto err;
+            if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(c, &(md_buf[0]), &mds))
+                goto err;
+        }
+        i = 0;
+        if (nkey) {
+            for (;;) {
+                if (nkey == 0)
+                    break;
+                if (i == mds)
+                    break;
+                if (key != NULL)
+                    *(key++) = md_buf[i];
+                nkey--;
+                i++;
+            }
+        }
+        if (niv && (i != mds)) {
+            for (;;) {
+                if (niv == 0)
+                    break;
+                if (i == mds)
+                    break;
+                if (iv != NULL)
+                    *(iv++) = md_buf[i];
+                niv--;
+                i++;
+            }
+        }
+        if ((nkey == 0) && (niv == 0))
+            break;
+    }
+    rv = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(type);
+ err:
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(c);
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(md_buf, sizeof(md_buf));
+    return rv;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/evp_lib.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/evp_lib.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0c76db5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/evp_lib.c
@@ -0,0 +1,497 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include "internal/evp_int.h"
+#include "evp_locl.h"
+
+int EVP_CIPHER_param_to_asn1(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type)
+{
+    int ret;
+
+    if (c->cipher->set_asn1_parameters != NULL)
+        ret = c->cipher->set_asn1_parameters(c, type);
+    else if (c->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1) {
+        switch (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(c)) {
+        case EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE:
+            if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_nid(c) == NID_id_smime_alg_CMS3DESwrap)
+                ASN1_TYPE_set(type, V_ASN1_NULL, NULL);
+            ret = 1;
+            break;
+
+        case EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE:
+        case EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE:
+        case EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE:
+        case EVP_CIPH_OCB_MODE:
+            ret = -1;
+            break;
+
+        default:
+            ret = EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv(c, type);
+        }
+    } else
+        ret = -1;
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+int EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type)
+{
+    int ret;
+
+    if (c->cipher->get_asn1_parameters != NULL)
+        ret = c->cipher->get_asn1_parameters(c, type);
+    else if (c->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1) {
+        switch (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(c)) {
+
+        case EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE:
+            ret = 1;
+            break;
+
+        case EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE:
+        case EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE:
+        case EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE:
+        case EVP_CIPH_OCB_MODE:
+            ret = -1;
+            break;
+
+        default:
+            ret = EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv(c, type);
+            break;
+        }
+    } else
+        ret = -1;
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+int EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type)
+{
+    int i = 0;
+    unsigned int l;
+
+    if (type != NULL) {
+        l = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(c);
+        OPENSSL_assert(l <= sizeof(c->iv));
+        i = ASN1_TYPE_get_octetstring(type, c->oiv, l);
+        if (i != (int)l)
+            return (-1);
+        else if (i > 0)
+            memcpy(c->iv, c->oiv, l);
+    }
+    return (i);
+}
+
+int EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type)
+{
+    int i = 0;
+    unsigned int j;
+
+    if (type != NULL) {
+        j = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(c);
+        OPENSSL_assert(j <= sizeof(c->iv));
+        i = ASN1_TYPE_set_octetstring(type, c->oiv, j);
+    }
+    return (i);
+}
+
+/* Convert the various cipher NIDs and dummies to a proper OID NID */
+int EVP_CIPHER_type(const EVP_CIPHER *ctx)
+{
+    int nid;
+    ASN1_OBJECT *otmp;
+    nid = EVP_CIPHER_nid(ctx);
+
+    switch (nid) {
+
+    case NID_rc2_cbc:
+    case NID_rc2_64_cbc:
+    case NID_rc2_40_cbc:
+
+        return NID_rc2_cbc;
+
+    case NID_rc4:
+    case NID_rc4_40:
+
+        return NID_rc4;
+
+    case NID_aes_128_cfb128:
+    case NID_aes_128_cfb8:
+    case NID_aes_128_cfb1:
+
+        return NID_aes_128_cfb128;
+
+    case NID_aes_192_cfb128:
+    case NID_aes_192_cfb8:
+    case NID_aes_192_cfb1:
+
+        return NID_aes_192_cfb128;
+
+    case NID_aes_256_cfb128:
+    case NID_aes_256_cfb8:
+    case NID_aes_256_cfb1:
+
+        return NID_aes_256_cfb128;
+
+    case NID_des_cfb64:
+    case NID_des_cfb8:
+    case NID_des_cfb1:
+
+        return NID_des_cfb64;
+
+    case NID_des_ede3_cfb64:
+    case NID_des_ede3_cfb8:
+    case NID_des_ede3_cfb1:
+
+        return NID_des_cfb64;
+
+    default:
+        /* Check it has an OID and it is valid */
+        otmp = OBJ_nid2obj(nid);
+        if (OBJ_get0_data(otmp) == NULL)
+            nid = NID_undef;
+        ASN1_OBJECT_free(otmp);
+        return nid;
+    }
+}
+
+int EVP_CIPHER_block_size(const EVP_CIPHER *e)
+{
+    return e->block_size;
+}
+
+int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->cipher->block_size;
+}
+
+int EVP_CIPHER_impl_ctx_size(const EVP_CIPHER *e)
+{
+    return e->ctx_size;
+}
+
+int EVP_Cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+               const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inl)
+{
+    return ctx->cipher->do_cipher(ctx, out, in, inl);
+}
+
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->cipher;
+}
+
+int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->encrypt;
+}
+
+unsigned long EVP_CIPHER_flags(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher)
+{
+    return cipher->flags;
+}
+
+void *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->app_data;
+}
+
+void EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, void *data)
+{
+    ctx->app_data = data;
+}
+
+void *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->cipher_data;
+}
+
+void *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_cipher_data(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, void *cipher_data)
+{
+    void *old_cipher_data;
+
+    old_cipher_data = ctx->cipher_data;
+    ctx->cipher_data = cipher_data;
+
+    return old_cipher_data;
+}
+
+int EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher)
+{
+    return cipher->iv_len;
+}
+
+int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->cipher->iv_len;
+}
+
+const unsigned char *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_original_iv(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->oiv;
+}
+
+const unsigned char *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->iv;
+}
+
+unsigned char *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->iv;
+}
+
+unsigned char *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->buf;
+}
+
+int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_num(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->num;
+}
+
+void EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int num)
+{
+    ctx->num = num;
+}
+
+int EVP_CIPHER_key_length(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher)
+{
+    return cipher->key_len;
+}
+
+int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->key_len;
+}
+
+int EVP_CIPHER_nid(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher)
+{
+    return cipher->nid;
+}
+
+int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_nid(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->cipher->nid;
+}
+
+int EVP_MD_block_size(const EVP_MD *md)
+{
+    return md->block_size;
+}
+
+int EVP_MD_type(const EVP_MD *md)
+{
+    return md->type;
+}
+
+int EVP_MD_pkey_type(const EVP_MD *md)
+{
+    return md->pkey_type;
+}
+
+int EVP_MD_size(const EVP_MD *md)
+{
+    if (!md) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_MD_SIZE, EVP_R_MESSAGE_DIGEST_IS_NULL);
+        return -1;
+    }
+    return md->md_size;
+}
+
+unsigned long EVP_MD_flags(const EVP_MD *md)
+{
+    return md->flags;
+}
+
+EVP_MD *EVP_MD_meth_new(int md_type, int pkey_type)
+{
+    EVP_MD *md = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*md));
+
+    if (md != NULL) {
+        md->type = md_type;
+        md->pkey_type = pkey_type;
+    }
+    return md;
+}
+EVP_MD *EVP_MD_meth_dup(const EVP_MD *md)
+{
+    EVP_MD *to = EVP_MD_meth_new(md->type, md->pkey_type);
+
+    if (to != NULL)
+        memcpy(to, md, sizeof(*to));
+    return to;
+}
+void EVP_MD_meth_free(EVP_MD *md)
+{
+    OPENSSL_free(md);
+}
+int EVP_MD_meth_set_input_blocksize(EVP_MD *md, int blocksize)
+{
+    md->block_size = blocksize;
+    return 1;
+}
+int EVP_MD_meth_set_result_size(EVP_MD *md, int resultsize)
+{
+    md->md_size = resultsize;
+    return 1;
+}
+int EVP_MD_meth_set_app_datasize(EVP_MD *md, int datasize)
+{
+    md->ctx_size = datasize;
+    return 1;
+}
+int EVP_MD_meth_set_flags(EVP_MD *md, unsigned long flags)
+{
+    md->flags = flags;
+    return 1;
+}
+int EVP_MD_meth_set_init(EVP_MD *md, int (*init)(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx))
+{
+    md->init = init;
+    return 1;
+}
+int EVP_MD_meth_set_update(EVP_MD *md, int (*update)(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
+                                                     const void *data,
+                                                     size_t count))
+{
+    md->update = update;
+    return 1;
+}
+int EVP_MD_meth_set_final(EVP_MD *md, int (*final)(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
+                                                   unsigned char *md))
+{
+    md->final = final;
+    return 1;
+}
+int EVP_MD_meth_set_copy(EVP_MD *md, int (*copy)(EVP_MD_CTX *to,
+                                                 const EVP_MD_CTX *from))
+{
+    md->copy = copy;
+    return 1;
+}
+int EVP_MD_meth_set_cleanup(EVP_MD *md, int (*cleanup)(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx))
+{
+    md->cleanup = cleanup;
+    return 1;
+}
+int EVP_MD_meth_set_ctrl(EVP_MD *md, int (*ctrl)(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, int cmd,
+                                                 int p1, void *p2))
+{
+    md->md_ctrl = ctrl;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int EVP_MD_meth_get_input_blocksize(const EVP_MD *md)
+{
+    return md->block_size;
+}
+int EVP_MD_meth_get_result_size(const EVP_MD *md)
+{
+    return md->md_size;
+}
+int EVP_MD_meth_get_app_datasize(const EVP_MD *md)
+{
+    return md->ctx_size;
+}
+unsigned long EVP_MD_meth_get_flags(const EVP_MD *md)
+{
+    return md->flags;
+}
+int (*EVP_MD_meth_get_init(const EVP_MD *md))(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return md->init;
+}
+int (*EVP_MD_meth_get_update(const EVP_MD *md))(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
+                                                const void *data,
+                                                size_t count)
+{
+    return md->update;
+}
+int (*EVP_MD_meth_get_final(const EVP_MD *md))(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
+                                               unsigned char *md)
+{
+    return md->final;
+}
+int (*EVP_MD_meth_get_copy(const EVP_MD *md))(EVP_MD_CTX *to,
+                                              const EVP_MD_CTX *from)
+{
+    return md->copy;
+}
+int (*EVP_MD_meth_get_cleanup(const EVP_MD *md))(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return md->cleanup;
+}
+int (*EVP_MD_meth_get_ctrl(const EVP_MD *md))(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, int cmd,
+                                              int p1, void *p2)
+{
+    return md->md_ctrl;
+}
+
+const EVP_MD *EVP_MD_CTX_md(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    if (!ctx)
+        return NULL;
+    return ctx->digest;
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY_CTX *EVP_MD_CTX_pkey_ctx(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->pctx;
+}
+
+void *EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->md_data;
+}
+
+int (*EVP_MD_CTX_update_fn(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx))(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
+                                             const void *data, size_t count)
+{
+    return ctx->update;
+}
+
+void EVP_MD_CTX_set_update_fn(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
+                              int (*update) (EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
+                                             const void *data, size_t count))
+{
+    ctx->update = update;
+}
+
+void EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, int flags)
+{
+    ctx->flags |= flags;
+}
+
+void EVP_MD_CTX_clear_flags(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, int flags)
+{
+    ctx->flags &= ~flags;
+}
+
+int EVP_MD_CTX_test_flags(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, int flags)
+{
+    return (ctx->flags & flags);
+}
+
+void EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int flags)
+{
+    ctx->flags |= flags;
+}
+
+void EVP_CIPHER_CTX_clear_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int flags)
+{
+    ctx->flags &= ~flags;
+}
+
+int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_test_flags(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int flags)
+{
+    return (ctx->flags & flags);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/evp_locl.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/evp_locl.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..209577b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/evp_locl.h
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* EVP_MD_CTX related stuff */
+
+struct evp_md_ctx_st {
+    const EVP_MD *digest;
+    ENGINE *engine;             /* functional reference if 'digest' is
+                                 * ENGINE-provided */
+    unsigned long flags;
+    void *md_data;
+    /* Public key context for sign/verify */
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx;
+    /* Update function: usually copied from EVP_MD */
+    int (*update) (EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count);
+} /* EVP_MD_CTX */ ;
+
+struct evp_cipher_ctx_st {
+    const EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
+    ENGINE *engine;             /* functional reference if 'cipher' is
+                                 * ENGINE-provided */
+    int encrypt;                /* encrypt or decrypt */
+    int buf_len;                /* number we have left */
+    unsigned char oiv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; /* original iv */
+    unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; /* working iv */
+    unsigned char buf[EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH]; /* saved partial block */
+    int num;                    /* used by cfb/ofb/ctr mode */
+    /* FIXME: Should this even exist? It appears unused */
+    void *app_data;             /* application stuff */
+    int key_len;                /* May change for variable length cipher */
+    unsigned long flags;        /* Various flags */
+    void *cipher_data;          /* per EVP data */
+    int final_used;
+    int block_mask;
+    unsigned char final[EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH]; /* possible final block */
+} /* EVP_CIPHER_CTX */ ;
+
+int PKCS5_v2_PBKDF2_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const char *pass,
+                             int passlen, ASN1_TYPE *param,
+                             const EVP_CIPHER *c, const EVP_MD *md,
+                             int en_de);
+
+struct evp_Encode_Ctx_st {
+    /* number saved in a partial encode/decode */
+    int num;
+    /*
+     * The length is either the output line length (in input bytes) or the
+     * shortest input line length that is ok.  Once decoding begins, the
+     * length is adjusted up each time a longer line is decoded
+     */
+    int length;
+    /* data to encode */
+    unsigned char enc_data[80];
+    /* number read on current line */
+    int line_num;
+    int expect_nl;
+};
+
+typedef struct evp_pbe_st EVP_PBE_CTL;
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(EVP_PBE_CTL)
+
+int is_partially_overlapping(const void *ptr1, const void *ptr2, int len);
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/evp_pbe.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/evp_pbe.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..eb7344c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/evp_pbe.c
@@ -0,0 +1,259 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include "evp_locl.h"
+
+/* Password based encryption (PBE) functions */
+
+/* Setup a cipher context from a PBE algorithm */
+
+struct evp_pbe_st {
+    int pbe_type;
+    int pbe_nid;
+    int cipher_nid;
+    int md_nid;
+    EVP_PBE_KEYGEN *keygen;
+};
+
+static STACK_OF(EVP_PBE_CTL) *pbe_algs;
+
+static const EVP_PBE_CTL builtin_pbe[] = {
+    {EVP_PBE_TYPE_OUTER, NID_pbeWithMD2AndDES_CBC,
+     NID_des_cbc, NID_md2, PKCS5_PBE_keyivgen},
+    {EVP_PBE_TYPE_OUTER, NID_pbeWithMD5AndDES_CBC,
+     NID_des_cbc, NID_md5, PKCS5_PBE_keyivgen},
+    {EVP_PBE_TYPE_OUTER, NID_pbeWithSHA1AndRC2_CBC,
+     NID_rc2_64_cbc, NID_sha1, PKCS5_PBE_keyivgen},
+
+    {EVP_PBE_TYPE_OUTER, NID_id_pbkdf2, -1, -1, PKCS5_v2_PBKDF2_keyivgen},
+
+    {EVP_PBE_TYPE_OUTER, NID_pbe_WithSHA1And128BitRC4,
+     NID_rc4, NID_sha1, PKCS12_PBE_keyivgen},
+    {EVP_PBE_TYPE_OUTER, NID_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC4,
+     NID_rc4_40, NID_sha1, PKCS12_PBE_keyivgen},
+    {EVP_PBE_TYPE_OUTER, NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC,
+     NID_des_ede3_cbc, NID_sha1, PKCS12_PBE_keyivgen},
+    {EVP_PBE_TYPE_OUTER, NID_pbe_WithSHA1And2_Key_TripleDES_CBC,
+     NID_des_ede_cbc, NID_sha1, PKCS12_PBE_keyivgen},
+    {EVP_PBE_TYPE_OUTER, NID_pbe_WithSHA1And128BitRC2_CBC,
+     NID_rc2_cbc, NID_sha1, PKCS12_PBE_keyivgen},
+    {EVP_PBE_TYPE_OUTER, NID_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC,
+     NID_rc2_40_cbc, NID_sha1, PKCS12_PBE_keyivgen},
+
+    {EVP_PBE_TYPE_OUTER, NID_pbes2, -1, -1, PKCS5_v2_PBE_keyivgen},
+
+    {EVP_PBE_TYPE_OUTER, NID_pbeWithMD2AndRC2_CBC,
+     NID_rc2_64_cbc, NID_md2, PKCS5_PBE_keyivgen},
+    {EVP_PBE_TYPE_OUTER, NID_pbeWithMD5AndRC2_CBC,
+     NID_rc2_64_cbc, NID_md5, PKCS5_PBE_keyivgen},
+    {EVP_PBE_TYPE_OUTER, NID_pbeWithSHA1AndDES_CBC,
+     NID_des_cbc, NID_sha1, PKCS5_PBE_keyivgen},
+
+    {EVP_PBE_TYPE_PRF, NID_hmacWithSHA1, -1, NID_sha1, 0},
+    {EVP_PBE_TYPE_PRF, NID_hmacWithMD5, -1, NID_md5, 0},
+    {EVP_PBE_TYPE_PRF, NID_hmacWithSHA224, -1, NID_sha224, 0},
+    {EVP_PBE_TYPE_PRF, NID_hmacWithSHA256, -1, NID_sha256, 0},
+    {EVP_PBE_TYPE_PRF, NID_hmacWithSHA384, -1, NID_sha384, 0},
+    {EVP_PBE_TYPE_PRF, NID_hmacWithSHA512, -1, NID_sha512, 0},
+    {EVP_PBE_TYPE_PRF, NID_id_HMACGostR3411_94, -1, NID_id_GostR3411_94, 0},
+    {EVP_PBE_TYPE_PRF, NID_id_tc26_hmac_gost_3411_2012_256, -1,
+     NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 0},
+    {EVP_PBE_TYPE_PRF, NID_id_tc26_hmac_gost_3411_2012_512, -1,
+     NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 0},
+    {EVP_PBE_TYPE_KDF, NID_id_pbkdf2, -1, -1, PKCS5_v2_PBKDF2_keyivgen},
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCRYPT
+    {EVP_PBE_TYPE_KDF, NID_id_scrypt, -1, -1, PKCS5_v2_scrypt_keyivgen}
+#endif
+};
+
+int EVP_PBE_CipherInit(ASN1_OBJECT *pbe_obj, const char *pass, int passlen,
+                       ASN1_TYPE *param, EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int en_de)
+{
+    const EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
+    const EVP_MD *md;
+    int cipher_nid, md_nid;
+    EVP_PBE_KEYGEN *keygen;
+
+    if (!EVP_PBE_find(EVP_PBE_TYPE_OUTER, OBJ_obj2nid(pbe_obj),
+                      &cipher_nid, &md_nid, &keygen)) {
+        char obj_tmp[80];
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PBE_CIPHERINIT, EVP_R_UNKNOWN_PBE_ALGORITHM);
+        if (!pbe_obj)
+            OPENSSL_strlcpy(obj_tmp, "NULL", sizeof(obj_tmp));
+        else
+            i2t_ASN1_OBJECT(obj_tmp, sizeof(obj_tmp), pbe_obj);
+        ERR_add_error_data(2, "TYPE=", obj_tmp);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (!pass)
+        passlen = 0;
+    else if (passlen == -1)
+        passlen = strlen(pass);
+
+    if (cipher_nid == -1)
+        cipher = NULL;
+    else {
+        cipher = EVP_get_cipherbynid(cipher_nid);
+        if (!cipher) {
+            EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PBE_CIPHERINIT, EVP_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (md_nid == -1)
+        md = NULL;
+    else {
+        md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid);
+        if (!md) {
+            EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PBE_CIPHERINIT, EVP_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (!keygen(ctx, pass, passlen, param, cipher, md, en_de)) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PBE_CIPHERINIT, EVP_R_KEYGEN_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+DECLARE_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(EVP_PBE_CTL, EVP_PBE_CTL, pbe2);
+
+static int pbe2_cmp(const EVP_PBE_CTL *pbe1, const EVP_PBE_CTL *pbe2)
+{
+    int ret = pbe1->pbe_type - pbe2->pbe_type;
+    if (ret)
+        return ret;
+    else
+        return pbe1->pbe_nid - pbe2->pbe_nid;
+}
+
+IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(EVP_PBE_CTL, EVP_PBE_CTL, pbe2);
+
+static int pbe_cmp(const EVP_PBE_CTL *const *a, const EVP_PBE_CTL *const *b)
+{
+    int ret = (*a)->pbe_type - (*b)->pbe_type;
+    if (ret)
+        return ret;
+    else
+        return (*a)->pbe_nid - (*b)->pbe_nid;
+}
+
+/* Add a PBE algorithm */
+
+int EVP_PBE_alg_add_type(int pbe_type, int pbe_nid, int cipher_nid,
+                         int md_nid, EVP_PBE_KEYGEN *keygen)
+{
+    EVP_PBE_CTL *pbe_tmp;
+
+    if (pbe_algs == NULL) {
+        pbe_algs = sk_EVP_PBE_CTL_new(pbe_cmp);
+        if (pbe_algs == NULL)
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    if ((pbe_tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*pbe_tmp))) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    pbe_tmp->pbe_type = pbe_type;
+    pbe_tmp->pbe_nid = pbe_nid;
+    pbe_tmp->cipher_nid = cipher_nid;
+    pbe_tmp->md_nid = md_nid;
+    pbe_tmp->keygen = keygen;
+
+    if (!sk_EVP_PBE_CTL_push(pbe_algs, pbe_tmp)) {
+        OPENSSL_free(pbe_tmp);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    return 1;
+
+ err:
+    EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PBE_ALG_ADD_TYPE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int EVP_PBE_alg_add(int nid, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, const EVP_MD *md,
+                    EVP_PBE_KEYGEN *keygen)
+{
+    int cipher_nid, md_nid;
+
+    if (cipher)
+        cipher_nid = EVP_CIPHER_nid(cipher);
+    else
+        cipher_nid = -1;
+    if (md)
+        md_nid = EVP_MD_type(md);
+    else
+        md_nid = -1;
+
+    return EVP_PBE_alg_add_type(EVP_PBE_TYPE_OUTER, nid,
+                                cipher_nid, md_nid, keygen);
+}
+
+int EVP_PBE_find(int type, int pbe_nid,
+                 int *pcnid, int *pmnid, EVP_PBE_KEYGEN **pkeygen)
+{
+    EVP_PBE_CTL *pbetmp = NULL, pbelu;
+    int i;
+    if (pbe_nid == NID_undef)
+        return 0;
+
+    pbelu.pbe_type = type;
+    pbelu.pbe_nid = pbe_nid;
+
+    if (pbe_algs) {
+        i = sk_EVP_PBE_CTL_find(pbe_algs, &pbelu);
+        if (i != -1)
+            pbetmp = sk_EVP_PBE_CTL_value(pbe_algs, i);
+    }
+    if (pbetmp == NULL) {
+        pbetmp = OBJ_bsearch_pbe2(&pbelu, builtin_pbe, OSSL_NELEM(builtin_pbe));
+    }
+    if (pbetmp == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    if (pcnid)
+        *pcnid = pbetmp->cipher_nid;
+    if (pmnid)
+        *pmnid = pbetmp->md_nid;
+    if (pkeygen)
+        *pkeygen = pbetmp->keygen;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static void free_evp_pbe_ctl(EVP_PBE_CTL *pbe)
+{
+    OPENSSL_free(pbe);
+}
+
+void EVP_PBE_cleanup(void)
+{
+    sk_EVP_PBE_CTL_pop_free(pbe_algs, free_evp_pbe_ctl);
+    pbe_algs = NULL;
+}
+
+int EVP_PBE_get(int *ptype, int *ppbe_nid, size_t num)
+{
+    const EVP_PBE_CTL *tpbe;
+
+    if (num >= OSSL_NELEM(builtin_pbe))
+        return 0;
+
+    tpbe = builtin_pbe + num;
+    if (ptype)
+        *ptype = tpbe->pbe_type;
+    if (ppbe_nid)
+        *ppbe_nid = tpbe->pbe_nid;
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/evp_pkey.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/evp_pkey.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..81bffa6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/evp_pkey.c
@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include "internal/asn1_int.h"
+#include "internal/evp_int.h"
+#include "internal/x509_int.h"
+
+/* Extract a private key from a PKCS8 structure */
+
+EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKCS82PKEY(const PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+    const ASN1_OBJECT *algoid;
+    char obj_tmp[80];
+
+    if (!PKCS8_pkey_get0(&algoid, NULL, NULL, NULL, p8))
+        return NULL;
+
+    if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKCS82PKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    if (!EVP_PKEY_set_type(pkey, OBJ_obj2nid(algoid))) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKCS82PKEY, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_PRIVATE_KEY_ALGORITHM);
+        i2t_ASN1_OBJECT(obj_tmp, 80, algoid);
+        ERR_add_error_data(2, "TYPE=", obj_tmp);
+        goto error;
+    }
+
+    if (pkey->ameth->priv_decode) {
+        if (!pkey->ameth->priv_decode(pkey, p8)) {
+            EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKCS82PKEY, EVP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DECODE_ERROR);
+            goto error;
+        }
+    } else {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKCS82PKEY, EVP_R_METHOD_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+        goto error;
+    }
+
+    return pkey;
+
+ error:
+    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+/* Turn a private key into a PKCS8 structure */
+
+PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *EVP_PKEY2PKCS8(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8 = PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_new();
+    if (p8  == NULL) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY2PKCS8, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    if (pkey->ameth) {
+        if (pkey->ameth->priv_encode) {
+            if (!pkey->ameth->priv_encode(p8, pkey)) {
+                EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY2PKCS8, EVP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_ENCODE_ERROR);
+                goto error;
+            }
+        } else {
+            EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY2PKCS8, EVP_R_METHOD_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+            goto error;
+        }
+    } else {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY2PKCS8, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_PRIVATE_KEY_ALGORITHM);
+        goto error;
+    }
+    RAND_add(p8->pkey->data, p8->pkey->length, 0.0);
+    return p8;
+ error:
+    PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+/* EVP_PKEY attribute functions */
+
+int EVP_PKEY_get_attr_count(const EVP_PKEY *key)
+{
+    return X509at_get_attr_count(key->attributes);
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_get_attr_by_NID(const EVP_PKEY *key, int nid, int lastpos)
+{
+    return X509at_get_attr_by_NID(key->attributes, nid, lastpos);
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_get_attr_by_OBJ(const EVP_PKEY *key, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj,
+                             int lastpos)
+{
+    return X509at_get_attr_by_OBJ(key->attributes, obj, lastpos);
+}
+
+X509_ATTRIBUTE *EVP_PKEY_get_attr(const EVP_PKEY *key, int loc)
+{
+    return X509at_get_attr(key->attributes, loc);
+}
+
+X509_ATTRIBUTE *EVP_PKEY_delete_attr(EVP_PKEY *key, int loc)
+{
+    return X509at_delete_attr(key->attributes, loc);
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_add1_attr(EVP_PKEY *key, X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr)
+{
+    if (X509at_add1_attr(&key->attributes, attr))
+        return 1;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_add1_attr_by_OBJ(EVP_PKEY *key,
+                              const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int type,
+                              const unsigned char *bytes, int len)
+{
+    if (X509at_add1_attr_by_OBJ(&key->attributes, obj, type, bytes, len))
+        return 1;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_add1_attr_by_NID(EVP_PKEY *key,
+                              int nid, int type,
+                              const unsigned char *bytes, int len)
+{
+    if (X509at_add1_attr_by_NID(&key->attributes, nid, type, bytes, len))
+        return 1;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_add1_attr_by_txt(EVP_PKEY *key,
+                              const char *attrname, int type,
+                              const unsigned char *bytes, int len)
+{
+    if (X509at_add1_attr_by_txt(&key->attributes, attrname, type, bytes, len))
+        return 1;
+    return 0;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/m_md2.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/m_md2.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c4e28ae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/m_md2.c
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD2
+
+# include <openssl/evp.h>
+# include <openssl/objects.h>
+# include <openssl/x509.h>
+# include <openssl/md2.h>
+# include <openssl/rsa.h>
+
+#include "internal/evp_int.h"
+
+static int init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return MD2_Init(EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx));
+}
+
+static int update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count)
+{
+    return MD2_Update(EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx), data, count);
+}
+
+static int final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md)
+{
+    return MD2_Final(md, EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx));
+}
+
+static const EVP_MD md2_md = {
+    NID_md2,
+    NID_md2WithRSAEncryption,
+    MD2_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+    0,
+    init,
+    update,
+    final,
+    NULL,
+    NULL,
+    MD2_BLOCK,
+    sizeof(EVP_MD *) + sizeof(MD2_CTX),
+};
+
+const EVP_MD *EVP_md2(void)
+{
+    return &md2_md;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/m_md4.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/m_md4.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f3decaa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/m_md4.c
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD4
+
+# include <openssl/evp.h>
+# include <openssl/objects.h>
+# include <openssl/x509.h>
+# include <openssl/md4.h>
+# include <openssl/rsa.h>
+# include "internal/evp_int.h"
+
+static int init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return MD4_Init(EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx));
+}
+
+static int update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count)
+{
+    return MD4_Update(EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx), data, count);
+}
+
+static int final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md)
+{
+    return MD4_Final(md, EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx));
+}
+
+static const EVP_MD md4_md = {
+    NID_md4,
+    NID_md4WithRSAEncryption,
+    MD4_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+    0,
+    init,
+    update,
+    final,
+    NULL,
+    NULL,
+    MD4_CBLOCK,
+    sizeof(EVP_MD *) + sizeof(MD4_CTX),
+};
+
+const EVP_MD *EVP_md4(void)
+{
+    return (&md4_md);
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/m_md5.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/m_md5.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f4dc0c4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/m_md5.c
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+
+# include <openssl/evp.h>
+# include <openssl/objects.h>
+# include <openssl/x509.h>
+# include <openssl/md5.h>
+# include <openssl/rsa.h>
+# include "internal/evp_int.h"
+
+static int init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return MD5_Init(EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx));
+}
+
+static int update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count)
+{
+    return MD5_Update(EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx), data, count);
+}
+
+static int final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md)
+{
+    return MD5_Final(md, EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx));
+}
+
+static const EVP_MD md5_md = {
+    NID_md5,
+    NID_md5WithRSAEncryption,
+    MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+    0,
+    init,
+    update,
+    final,
+    NULL,
+    NULL,
+    MD5_CBLOCK,
+    sizeof(EVP_MD *) + sizeof(MD5_CTX),
+};
+
+const EVP_MD *EVP_md5(void)
+{
+    return (&md5_md);
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/m_md5_sha1.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/m_md5_sha1.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2d98886
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/m_md5_sha1.c
@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MD5)
+
+# include <openssl/evp.h>
+# include <openssl/objects.h>
+# include <openssl/x509.h>
+# include <openssl/md5.h>
+# include <openssl/sha.h>
+# include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+# include "internal/evp_int.h"
+# include <openssl/rsa.h>
+
+struct md5_sha1_ctx {
+    MD5_CTX md5;
+    SHA_CTX sha1;
+};
+
+static int init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    struct md5_sha1_ctx *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx);
+    if (!MD5_Init(&mctx->md5))
+        return 0;
+    return SHA1_Init(&mctx->sha1);
+}
+
+static int update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count)
+{
+    struct md5_sha1_ctx *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx);
+    if (!MD5_Update(&mctx->md5, data, count))
+        return 0;
+    return SHA1_Update(&mctx->sha1, data, count);
+}
+
+static int final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md)
+{
+    struct md5_sha1_ctx *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx);
+    if (!MD5_Final(md, &mctx->md5))
+        return 0;
+    return SHA1_Final(md + MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH, &mctx->sha1);
+}
+
+static int ctrl(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, int cmd, int mslen, void *ms)
+{
+    unsigned char padtmp[48];
+    unsigned char md5tmp[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+    unsigned char sha1tmp[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+    struct md5_sha1_ctx *mctx;
+
+    if (cmd != EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET)
+        return -2;
+
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx);
+
+    /* SSLv3 client auth handling: see RFC-6101 5.6.8 */
+    if (mslen != 48)
+        return 0;
+
+    /* At this point hash contains all handshake messages, update
+     * with master secret and pad_1.
+     */
+
+    if (update(ctx, ms, mslen) <= 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    /* Set padtmp to pad_1 value */
+    memset(padtmp, 0x36, sizeof(padtmp));
+
+    if (!MD5_Update(&mctx->md5, padtmp, sizeof(padtmp)))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (!MD5_Final(md5tmp, &mctx->md5))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (!SHA1_Update(&mctx->sha1, padtmp, 40))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (!SHA1_Final(sha1tmp, &mctx->sha1))
+        return 0;
+
+    /* Reinitialise context */
+
+    if (!init(ctx))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (update(ctx, ms, mslen) <= 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    /* Set padtmp to pad_2 value */
+    memset(padtmp, 0x5c, sizeof(padtmp));
+
+    if (!MD5_Update(&mctx->md5, padtmp, sizeof(padtmp)))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (!MD5_Update(&mctx->md5, md5tmp, sizeof(md5tmp)))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (!SHA1_Update(&mctx->sha1, padtmp, 40))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (!SHA1_Update(&mctx->sha1, sha1tmp, sizeof(sha1tmp)))
+        return 0;
+
+    /* Now when ctx is finalised it will return the SSL v3 hash value */
+
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(md5tmp, sizeof(md5tmp));
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(sha1tmp, sizeof(sha1tmp));
+
+    return 1;
+
+}
+
+static const EVP_MD md5_sha1_md = {
+    NID_md5_sha1,
+    NID_md5_sha1,
+    MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+    0,
+    init,
+    update,
+    final,
+    NULL,
+    NULL,
+    MD5_CBLOCK,
+    sizeof(EVP_MD *) + sizeof(struct md5_sha1_ctx),
+    ctrl
+};
+
+const EVP_MD *EVP_md5_sha1(void)
+{
+    return &md5_sha1_md;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/m_mdc2.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/m_mdc2.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b7f0fd8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/m_mdc2.c
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MDC2
+
+# include <openssl/evp.h>
+# include <openssl/objects.h>
+# include <openssl/x509.h>
+# include <openssl/mdc2.h>
+# include <openssl/rsa.h>
+# include "internal/evp_int.h"
+
+static int init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return MDC2_Init(EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx));
+}
+
+static int update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count)
+{
+    return MDC2_Update(EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx), data, count);
+}
+
+static int final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md)
+{
+    return MDC2_Final(md, EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx));
+}
+
+static const EVP_MD mdc2_md = {
+    NID_mdc2,
+    NID_mdc2WithRSA,
+    MDC2_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+    0,
+    init,
+    update,
+    final,
+    NULL,
+    NULL,
+    MDC2_BLOCK,
+    sizeof(EVP_MD *) + sizeof(MDC2_CTX),
+};
+
+const EVP_MD *EVP_mdc2(void)
+{
+    return (&mdc2_md);
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/m_null.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/m_null.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6c4daf5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/m_null.c
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include "internal/evp_int.h"
+
+static int init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count)
+{
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md)
+{
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static const EVP_MD null_md = {
+    NID_undef,
+    NID_undef,
+    0,
+    0,
+    init,
+    update,
+    final,
+    NULL,
+    NULL,
+    0,
+    sizeof(EVP_MD *),
+};
+
+const EVP_MD *EVP_md_null(void)
+{
+    return (&null_md);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/m_ripemd.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/m_ripemd.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..07b46bd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/m_ripemd.c
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RMD160
+
+# include <openssl/ripemd.h>
+# include <openssl/evp.h>
+# include <openssl/objects.h>
+# include <openssl/x509.h>
+# include <openssl/rsa.h>
+# include "internal/evp_int.h"
+
+static int init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return RIPEMD160_Init(EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx));
+}
+
+static int update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count)
+{
+    return RIPEMD160_Update(EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx), data, count);
+}
+
+static int final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md)
+{
+    return RIPEMD160_Final(md, EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx));
+}
+
+static const EVP_MD ripemd160_md = {
+    NID_ripemd160,
+    NID_ripemd160WithRSA,
+    RIPEMD160_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+    0,
+    init,
+    update,
+    final,
+    NULL,
+    NULL,
+    RIPEMD160_CBLOCK,
+    sizeof(EVP_MD *) + sizeof(RIPEMD160_CTX),
+};
+
+const EVP_MD *EVP_ripemd160(void)
+{
+    return (&ripemd160_md);
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/m_sha1.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/m_sha1.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e68f32a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/m_sha1.c
@@ -0,0 +1,248 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include "internal/evp_int.h"
+
+static int init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return SHA1_Init(EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx));
+}
+
+static int update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count)
+{
+    return SHA1_Update(EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx), data, count);
+}
+
+static int final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md)
+{
+    return SHA1_Final(md, EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx));
+}
+
+static int ctrl(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, int cmd, int mslen, void *ms)
+{
+    unsigned char padtmp[40];
+    unsigned char sha1tmp[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+
+    SHA_CTX *sha1;
+
+    if (cmd != EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET)
+        return -2;
+
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    sha1 = EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx);
+
+    /* SSLv3 client auth handling: see RFC-6101 5.6.8 */
+    if (mslen != 48)
+        return 0;
+
+    /* At this point hash contains all handshake messages, update
+     * with master secret and pad_1.
+     */
+
+    if (SHA1_Update(sha1, ms, mslen) <= 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    /* Set padtmp to pad_1 value */
+    memset(padtmp, 0x36, sizeof(padtmp));
+
+    if (!SHA1_Update(sha1, padtmp, sizeof(padtmp)))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (!SHA1_Final(sha1tmp, sha1))
+        return 0;
+
+    /* Reinitialise context */
+
+    if (!SHA1_Init(sha1))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (SHA1_Update(sha1, ms, mslen) <= 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    /* Set padtmp to pad_2 value */
+    memset(padtmp, 0x5c, sizeof(padtmp));
+
+    if (!SHA1_Update(sha1, padtmp, sizeof(padtmp)))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (!SHA1_Update(sha1, sha1tmp, sizeof(sha1tmp)))
+        return 0;
+
+    /* Now when ctx is finalised it will return the SSL v3 hash value */
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(sha1tmp, sizeof(sha1tmp));
+
+    return 1;
+
+}
+
+static const EVP_MD sha1_md = {
+    NID_sha1,
+    NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption,
+    SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+    EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT,
+    init,
+    update,
+    final,
+    NULL,
+    NULL,
+    SHA_CBLOCK,
+    sizeof(EVP_MD *) + sizeof(SHA_CTX),
+    ctrl
+};
+
+const EVP_MD *EVP_sha1(void)
+{
+    return (&sha1_md);
+}
+
+static int init224(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return SHA224_Init(EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx));
+}
+
+static int update224(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count)
+{
+    return SHA224_Update(EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx), data, count);
+}
+
+static int final224(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md)
+{
+    return SHA224_Final(md, EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx));
+}
+
+static int init256(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return SHA256_Init(EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx));
+}
+
+static int update256(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count)
+{
+    return SHA256_Update(EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx), data, count);
+}
+
+static int final256(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md)
+{
+    return SHA256_Final(md, EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx));
+}
+
+static const EVP_MD sha224_md = {
+    NID_sha224,
+    NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption,
+    SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+    EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT,
+    init224,
+    update224,
+    final224,
+    NULL,
+    NULL,
+    SHA256_CBLOCK,
+    sizeof(EVP_MD *) + sizeof(SHA256_CTX),
+};
+
+const EVP_MD *EVP_sha224(void)
+{
+    return (&sha224_md);
+}
+
+static const EVP_MD sha256_md = {
+    NID_sha256,
+    NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption,
+    SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+    EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT,
+    init256,
+    update256,
+    final256,
+    NULL,
+    NULL,
+    SHA256_CBLOCK,
+    sizeof(EVP_MD *) + sizeof(SHA256_CTX),
+};
+
+const EVP_MD *EVP_sha256(void)
+{
+    return (&sha256_md);
+}
+
+static int init384(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return SHA384_Init(EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx));
+}
+
+static int update384(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count)
+{
+    return SHA384_Update(EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx), data, count);
+}
+
+static int final384(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md)
+{
+    return SHA384_Final(md, EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx));
+}
+
+static int init512(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return SHA512_Init(EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx));
+}
+
+/* See comment in SHA224/256 section */
+static int update512(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count)
+{
+    return SHA512_Update(EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx), data, count);
+}
+
+static int final512(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md)
+{
+    return SHA512_Final(md, EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx));
+}
+
+static const EVP_MD sha384_md = {
+    NID_sha384,
+    NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption,
+    SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+    EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT,
+    init384,
+    update384,
+    final384,
+    NULL,
+    NULL,
+    SHA512_CBLOCK,
+    sizeof(EVP_MD *) + sizeof(SHA512_CTX),
+};
+
+const EVP_MD *EVP_sha384(void)
+{
+    return (&sha384_md);
+}
+
+static const EVP_MD sha512_md = {
+    NID_sha512,
+    NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption,
+    SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+    EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT,
+    init512,
+    update512,
+    final512,
+    NULL,
+    NULL,
+    SHA512_CBLOCK,
+    sizeof(EVP_MD *) + sizeof(SHA512_CTX),
+};
+
+const EVP_MD *EVP_sha512(void)
+{
+    return (&sha512_md);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..582e563
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c
@@ -0,0 +1,177 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include "internal/evp_int.h"
+#include "evp_locl.h"
+
+static int do_sigver_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx,
+                          const EVP_MD *type, ENGINE *e, EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+                          int ver)
+{
+    if (ctx->pctx == NULL)
+        ctx->pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, e);
+    if (ctx->pctx == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    if (!(ctx->pctx->pmeth->flags & EVP_PKEY_FLAG_SIGCTX_CUSTOM)) {
+
+        if (type == NULL) {
+            int def_nid;
+            if (EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid(pkey, &def_nid) > 0)
+                type = EVP_get_digestbynid(def_nid);
+        }
+
+        if (type == NULL) {
+            EVPerr(EVP_F_DO_SIGVER_INIT, EVP_R_NO_DEFAULT_DIGEST);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (ver) {
+        if (ctx->pctx->pmeth->verifyctx_init) {
+            if (ctx->pctx->pmeth->verifyctx_init(ctx->pctx, ctx) <= 0)
+                return 0;
+            ctx->pctx->operation = EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFYCTX;
+        } else if (EVP_PKEY_verify_init(ctx->pctx) <= 0)
+            return 0;
+    } else {
+        if (ctx->pctx->pmeth->signctx_init) {
+            if (ctx->pctx->pmeth->signctx_init(ctx->pctx, ctx) <= 0)
+                return 0;
+            ctx->pctx->operation = EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGNCTX;
+        } else if (EVP_PKEY_sign_init(ctx->pctx) <= 0)
+            return 0;
+    }
+    if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(ctx->pctx, type) <= 0)
+        return 0;
+    if (pctx)
+        *pctx = ctx->pctx;
+    if (ctx->pctx->pmeth->flags & EVP_PKEY_FLAG_SIGCTX_CUSTOM)
+        return 1;
+    if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, type, e))
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int EVP_DigestSignInit(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx,
+                       const EVP_MD *type, ENGINE *e, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    return do_sigver_init(ctx, pctx, type, e, pkey, 0);
+}
+
+int EVP_DigestVerifyInit(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx,
+                         const EVP_MD *type, ENGINE *e, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    return do_sigver_init(ctx, pctx, type, e, pkey, 1);
+}
+
+int EVP_DigestSignFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sigret,
+                        size_t *siglen)
+{
+    int sctx = 0, r = 0;
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = ctx->pctx;
+    if (pctx->pmeth->flags & EVP_PKEY_FLAG_SIGCTX_CUSTOM) {
+        if (!sigret)
+            return pctx->pmeth->signctx(pctx, sigret, siglen, ctx);
+        if (ctx->flags & EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_FINALISE)
+            r = pctx->pmeth->signctx(pctx, sigret, siglen, ctx);
+        else {
+            EVP_PKEY_CTX *dctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_dup(ctx->pctx);
+            if (!dctx)
+                return 0;
+            r = dctx->pmeth->signctx(dctx, sigret, siglen, ctx);
+            EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(dctx);
+        }
+        return r;
+    }
+    if (pctx->pmeth->signctx)
+        sctx = 1;
+    else
+        sctx = 0;
+    if (sigret) {
+        unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+        unsigned int mdlen = 0;
+        if (ctx->flags & EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_FINALISE) {
+            if (sctx)
+                r = ctx->pctx->pmeth->signctx(ctx->pctx, sigret, siglen, ctx);
+            else
+                r = EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, md, &mdlen);
+        } else {
+            EVP_MD_CTX *tmp_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+            if (tmp_ctx == NULL)
+                return 0;
+            if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(tmp_ctx, ctx)) {
+                EVP_MD_CTX_free(tmp_ctx);
+                return 0;
+            }
+            if (sctx)
+                r = tmp_ctx->pctx->pmeth->signctx(tmp_ctx->pctx,
+                                                  sigret, siglen, tmp_ctx);
+            else
+                r = EVP_DigestFinal_ex(tmp_ctx, md, &mdlen);
+            EVP_MD_CTX_free(tmp_ctx);
+        }
+        if (sctx || !r)
+            return r;
+        if (EVP_PKEY_sign(ctx->pctx, sigret, siglen, md, mdlen) <= 0)
+            return 0;
+    } else {
+        if (sctx) {
+            if (pctx->pmeth->signctx(pctx, sigret, siglen, ctx) <= 0)
+                return 0;
+        } else {
+            int s = EVP_MD_size(ctx->digest);
+            if (s < 0 || EVP_PKEY_sign(pctx, sigret, siglen, NULL, s) <= 0)
+                return 0;
+        }
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sig,
+                          size_t siglen)
+{
+    unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+    int r = 0;
+    unsigned int mdlen = 0;
+    int vctx = 0;
+
+    if (ctx->pctx->pmeth->verifyctx)
+        vctx = 1;
+    else
+        vctx = 0;
+    if (ctx->flags & EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_FINALISE) {
+        if (vctx) {
+            r = ctx->pctx->pmeth->verifyctx(ctx->pctx, sig, siglen, ctx);
+        } else
+            r = EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, md, &mdlen);
+    } else {
+        EVP_MD_CTX *tmp_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+        if (tmp_ctx == NULL)
+            return -1;
+        if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(tmp_ctx, ctx)) {
+            EVP_MD_CTX_free(tmp_ctx);
+            return -1;
+        }
+        if (vctx) {
+            r = tmp_ctx->pctx->pmeth->verifyctx(tmp_ctx->pctx,
+                                                sig, siglen, tmp_ctx);
+        } else
+            r = EVP_DigestFinal_ex(tmp_ctx, md, &mdlen);
+        EVP_MD_CTX_free(tmp_ctx);
+    }
+    if (vctx || !r)
+        return r;
+    return EVP_PKEY_verify(ctx->pctx, sig, siglen, md, mdlen);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/m_wp.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/m_wp.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..94fac22
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/m_wp.c
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WHIRLPOOL
+
+# include <openssl/evp.h>
+# include <openssl/objects.h>
+# include <openssl/x509.h>
+# include <openssl/whrlpool.h>
+# include "internal/evp_int.h"
+
+static int init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return WHIRLPOOL_Init(EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx));
+}
+
+static int update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count)
+{
+    return WHIRLPOOL_Update(EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx), data, count);
+}
+
+static int final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md)
+{
+    return WHIRLPOOL_Final(md, EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx));
+}
+
+static const EVP_MD whirlpool_md = {
+    NID_whirlpool,
+    0,
+    WHIRLPOOL_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+    0,
+    init,
+    update,
+    final,
+    NULL,
+    NULL,
+    WHIRLPOOL_BBLOCK / 8,
+    sizeof(EVP_MD *) + sizeof(WHIRLPOOL_CTX),
+};
+
+const EVP_MD *EVP_whirlpool(void)
+{
+    return (&whirlpool_md);
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/names.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/names.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a92be1f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/names.c
@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <internal/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include "internal/evp_int.h"
+
+int EVP_add_cipher(const EVP_CIPHER *c)
+{
+    int r;
+
+    if (c == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    r = OBJ_NAME_add(OBJ_nid2sn(c->nid), OBJ_NAME_TYPE_CIPHER_METH,
+                     (const char *)c);
+    if (r == 0)
+        return (0);
+    r = OBJ_NAME_add(OBJ_nid2ln(c->nid), OBJ_NAME_TYPE_CIPHER_METH,
+                     (const char *)c);
+    return (r);
+}
+
+int EVP_add_digest(const EVP_MD *md)
+{
+    int r;
+    const char *name;
+
+    name = OBJ_nid2sn(md->type);
+    r = OBJ_NAME_add(name, OBJ_NAME_TYPE_MD_METH, (const char *)md);
+    if (r == 0)
+        return (0);
+    r = OBJ_NAME_add(OBJ_nid2ln(md->type), OBJ_NAME_TYPE_MD_METH,
+                     (const char *)md);
+    if (r == 0)
+        return (0);
+
+    if (md->pkey_type && md->type != md->pkey_type) {
+        r = OBJ_NAME_add(OBJ_nid2sn(md->pkey_type),
+                         OBJ_NAME_TYPE_MD_METH | OBJ_NAME_ALIAS, name);
+        if (r == 0)
+            return (0);
+        r = OBJ_NAME_add(OBJ_nid2ln(md->pkey_type),
+                         OBJ_NAME_TYPE_MD_METH | OBJ_NAME_ALIAS, name);
+    }
+    return (r);
+}
+
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_get_cipherbyname(const char *name)
+{
+    const EVP_CIPHER *cp;
+
+    if (!OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_CIPHERS, NULL))
+        return NULL;
+
+    cp = (const EVP_CIPHER *)OBJ_NAME_get(name, OBJ_NAME_TYPE_CIPHER_METH);
+    return (cp);
+}
+
+const EVP_MD *EVP_get_digestbyname(const char *name)
+{
+    const EVP_MD *cp;
+
+    if (!OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_DIGESTS, NULL))
+        return NULL;
+
+    cp = (const EVP_MD *)OBJ_NAME_get(name, OBJ_NAME_TYPE_MD_METH);
+    return (cp);
+}
+
+void evp_cleanup_int(void)
+{
+    OBJ_NAME_cleanup(OBJ_NAME_TYPE_CIPHER_METH);
+    OBJ_NAME_cleanup(OBJ_NAME_TYPE_MD_METH);
+    /*
+     * The above calls will only clean out the contents of the name hash
+     * table, but not the hash table itself.  The following line does that
+     * part.  -- Richard Levitte
+     */
+    OBJ_NAME_cleanup(-1);
+
+    EVP_PBE_cleanup();
+    OBJ_sigid_free();
+}
+
+struct doall_cipher {
+    void *arg;
+    void (*fn) (const EVP_CIPHER *ciph,
+                const char *from, const char *to, void *arg);
+};
+
+static void do_all_cipher_fn(const OBJ_NAME *nm, void *arg)
+{
+    struct doall_cipher *dc = arg;
+    if (nm->alias)
+        dc->fn(NULL, nm->name, nm->data, dc->arg);
+    else
+        dc->fn((const EVP_CIPHER *)nm->data, nm->name, NULL, dc->arg);
+}
+
+void EVP_CIPHER_do_all(void (*fn) (const EVP_CIPHER *ciph,
+                                   const char *from, const char *to, void *x),
+                       void *arg)
+{
+    struct doall_cipher dc;
+
+    /* Ignore errors */
+    OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_CIPHERS, NULL);
+
+    dc.fn = fn;
+    dc.arg = arg;
+    OBJ_NAME_do_all(OBJ_NAME_TYPE_CIPHER_METH, do_all_cipher_fn, &dc);
+}
+
+void EVP_CIPHER_do_all_sorted(void (*fn) (const EVP_CIPHER *ciph,
+                                          const char *from, const char *to,
+                                          void *x), void *arg)
+{
+    struct doall_cipher dc;
+
+    /* Ignore errors */
+    OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_CIPHERS, NULL);
+
+    dc.fn = fn;
+    dc.arg = arg;
+    OBJ_NAME_do_all_sorted(OBJ_NAME_TYPE_CIPHER_METH, do_all_cipher_fn, &dc);
+}
+
+struct doall_md {
+    void *arg;
+    void (*fn) (const EVP_MD *ciph,
+                const char *from, const char *to, void *arg);
+};
+
+static void do_all_md_fn(const OBJ_NAME *nm, void *arg)
+{
+    struct doall_md *dc = arg;
+    if (nm->alias)
+        dc->fn(NULL, nm->name, nm->data, dc->arg);
+    else
+        dc->fn((const EVP_MD *)nm->data, nm->name, NULL, dc->arg);
+}
+
+void EVP_MD_do_all(void (*fn) (const EVP_MD *md,
+                               const char *from, const char *to, void *x),
+                   void *arg)
+{
+    struct doall_md dc;
+
+    /* Ignore errors */
+    OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_DIGESTS, NULL);
+
+    dc.fn = fn;
+    dc.arg = arg;
+    OBJ_NAME_do_all(OBJ_NAME_TYPE_MD_METH, do_all_md_fn, &dc);
+}
+
+void EVP_MD_do_all_sorted(void (*fn) (const EVP_MD *md,
+                                      const char *from, const char *to,
+                                      void *x), void *arg)
+{
+    struct doall_md dc;
+
+    OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_DIGESTS, NULL);
+
+    dc.fn = fn;
+    dc.arg = arg;
+    OBJ_NAME_do_all_sorted(OBJ_NAME_TYPE_MD_METH, do_all_md_fn, &dc);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/p5_crpt.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/p5_crpt.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7e55d0b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/p5_crpt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+/*
+ * Doesn't do anything now: Builtin PBE algorithms in static table.
+ */
+
+void PKCS5_PBE_add(void)
+{
+}
+
+int PKCS5_PBE_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cctx, const char *pass, int passlen,
+                       ASN1_TYPE *param, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
+                       const EVP_MD *md, int en_de)
+{
+    EVP_MD_CTX *ctx;
+    unsigned char md_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+    unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH], iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+    int i;
+    PBEPARAM *pbe;
+    int saltlen, iter;
+    unsigned char *salt;
+    int mdsize;
+    int rv = 0;
+
+    /* Extract useful info from parameter */
+    if (param == NULL || param->type != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE ||
+        param->value.sequence == NULL) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_PBE_KEYIVGEN, EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    pbe = ASN1_TYPE_unpack_sequence(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PBEPARAM), param);
+    if (pbe == NULL) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_PBE_KEYIVGEN, EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (!pbe->iter)
+        iter = 1;
+    else
+        iter = ASN1_INTEGER_get(pbe->iter);
+    salt = pbe->salt->data;
+    saltlen = pbe->salt->length;
+
+    if (!pass)
+        passlen = 0;
+    else if (passlen == -1)
+        passlen = strlen(pass);
+
+    ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_PBE_KEYIVGEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, md, NULL))
+        goto err;
+    if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, pass, passlen))
+        goto err;
+    if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, salt, saltlen))
+        goto err;
+    PBEPARAM_free(pbe);
+    if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, md_tmp, NULL))
+        goto err;
+    mdsize = EVP_MD_size(md);
+    if (mdsize < 0)
+        return 0;
+    for (i = 1; i < iter; i++) {
+        if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, md, NULL))
+            goto err;
+        if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, md_tmp, mdsize))
+            goto err;
+        if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, md_tmp, NULL))
+            goto err;
+    }
+    OPENSSL_assert(EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher) <= (int)sizeof(md_tmp));
+    memcpy(key, md_tmp, EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher));
+    OPENSSL_assert(EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher) <= 16);
+    memcpy(iv, md_tmp + (16 - EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher)),
+           EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher));
+    if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(cctx, cipher, NULL, key, iv, en_de))
+        goto err;
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(md_tmp, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(key, EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH);
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(iv, EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH);
+    rv = 1;
+ err:
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
+    return rv;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/p5_crpt2.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/p5_crpt2.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6d5f289
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/p5_crpt2.c
@@ -0,0 +1,280 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+# include <openssl/x509.h>
+# include <openssl/evp.h>
+# include <openssl/hmac.h>
+# include "evp_locl.h"
+
+/* set this to print out info about the keygen algorithm */
+/* #define OPENSSL_DEBUG_PKCS5V2 */
+
+# ifdef OPENSSL_DEBUG_PKCS5V2
+static void h__dump(const unsigned char *p, int len);
+# endif
+
+/*
+ * This is an implementation of PKCS#5 v2.0 password based encryption key
+ * derivation function PBKDF2. SHA1 version verified against test vectors
+ * posted by Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> to the PKCS-TNG
+ * <pkcs-tng@rsa.com> mailing list.
+ */
+
+int PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(const char *pass, int passlen,
+                      const unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, int iter,
+                      const EVP_MD *digest, int keylen, unsigned char *out)
+{
+    const char *empty = "";
+    unsigned char digtmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], *p, itmp[4];
+    int cplen, j, k, tkeylen, mdlen;
+    unsigned long i = 1;
+    HMAC_CTX *hctx_tpl = NULL, *hctx = NULL;
+
+    mdlen = EVP_MD_size(digest);
+    if (mdlen < 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    hctx_tpl = HMAC_CTX_new();
+    if (hctx_tpl == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    p = out;
+    tkeylen = keylen;
+    if (pass == NULL) {
+        pass = empty;
+        passlen = 0;
+    } else if (passlen == -1) {
+        passlen = strlen(pass);
+    }
+    if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx_tpl, pass, passlen, digest, NULL)) {
+        HMAC_CTX_free(hctx_tpl);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
+    if (hctx == NULL) {
+        HMAC_CTX_free(hctx_tpl);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    while (tkeylen) {
+        if (tkeylen > mdlen)
+            cplen = mdlen;
+        else
+            cplen = tkeylen;
+        /*
+         * We are unlikely to ever use more than 256 blocks (5120 bits!) but
+         * just in case...
+         */
+        itmp[0] = (unsigned char)((i >> 24) & 0xff);
+        itmp[1] = (unsigned char)((i >> 16) & 0xff);
+        itmp[2] = (unsigned char)((i >> 8) & 0xff);
+        itmp[3] = (unsigned char)(i & 0xff);
+        if (!HMAC_CTX_copy(hctx, hctx_tpl)) {
+            HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
+            HMAC_CTX_free(hctx_tpl);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        if (!HMAC_Update(hctx, salt, saltlen)
+            || !HMAC_Update(hctx, itmp, 4)
+            || !HMAC_Final(hctx, digtmp, NULL)) {
+            HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
+            HMAC_CTX_free(hctx_tpl);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        HMAC_CTX_reset(hctx);
+        memcpy(p, digtmp, cplen);
+        for (j = 1; j < iter; j++) {
+            if (!HMAC_CTX_copy(hctx, hctx_tpl)) {
+                HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
+                HMAC_CTX_free(hctx_tpl);
+                return 0;
+            }
+            if (!HMAC_Update(hctx, digtmp, mdlen)
+                || !HMAC_Final(hctx, digtmp, NULL)) {
+                HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
+                HMAC_CTX_free(hctx_tpl);
+                return 0;
+            }
+            HMAC_CTX_reset(hctx);
+            for (k = 0; k < cplen; k++)
+                p[k] ^= digtmp[k];
+        }
+        tkeylen -= cplen;
+        i++;
+        p += cplen;
+    }
+    HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
+    HMAC_CTX_free(hctx_tpl);
+# ifdef OPENSSL_DEBUG_PKCS5V2
+    fprintf(stderr, "Password:\n");
+    h__dump(pass, passlen);
+    fprintf(stderr, "Salt:\n");
+    h__dump(salt, saltlen);
+    fprintf(stderr, "Iteration count %d\n", iter);
+    fprintf(stderr, "Key:\n");
+    h__dump(out, keylen);
+# endif
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC_SHA1(const char *pass, int passlen,
+                           const unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, int iter,
+                           int keylen, unsigned char *out)
+{
+    return PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, iter, EVP_sha1(),
+                             keylen, out);
+}
+
+# ifdef DO_TEST
+main()
+{
+    unsigned char out[4];
+    unsigned char salt[] = { 0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78 };
+    PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC_SHA1("password", -1, salt, 4, 5, 4, out);
+    fprintf(stderr, "Out %02X %02X %02X %02X\n",
+            out[0], out[1], out[2], out[3]);
+}
+
+# endif
+
+/*
+ * Now the key derivation function itself. This is a bit evil because it has
+ * to check the ASN1 parameters are valid: and there are quite a few of
+ * them...
+ */
+
+int PKCS5_v2_PBE_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const char *pass, int passlen,
+                          ASN1_TYPE *param, const EVP_CIPHER *c,
+                          const EVP_MD *md, int en_de)
+{
+    PBE2PARAM *pbe2 = NULL;
+    const EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
+    EVP_PBE_KEYGEN *kdf;
+
+    int rv = 0;
+
+    pbe2 = ASN1_TYPE_unpack_sequence(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PBE2PARAM), param);
+    if (pbe2 == NULL) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBE_KEYIVGEN, EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* See if we recognise the key derivation function */
+    if (!EVP_PBE_find(EVP_PBE_TYPE_KDF, OBJ_obj2nid(pbe2->keyfunc->algorithm),
+                        NULL, NULL, &kdf)) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBE_KEYIVGEN,
+               EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_DERIVATION_FUNCTION);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * lets see if we recognise the encryption algorithm.
+     */
+
+    cipher = EVP_get_cipherbyobj(pbe2->encryption->algorithm);
+
+    if (!cipher) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBE_KEYIVGEN, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* Fixup cipher based on AlgorithmIdentifier */
+    if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, NULL, NULL, en_de))
+        goto err;
+    if (EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param(ctx, pbe2->encryption->parameter) < 0) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBE_KEYIVGEN, EVP_R_CIPHER_PARAMETER_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    rv = kdf(ctx, pass, passlen, pbe2->keyfunc->parameter, NULL, NULL, en_de);
+ err:
+    PBE2PARAM_free(pbe2);
+    return rv;
+}
+
+int PKCS5_v2_PBKDF2_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const char *pass,
+                             int passlen, ASN1_TYPE *param,
+                             const EVP_CIPHER *c, const EVP_MD *md, int en_de)
+{
+    unsigned char *salt, key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
+    int saltlen, iter;
+    int rv = 0;
+    unsigned int keylen = 0;
+    int prf_nid, hmac_md_nid;
+    PBKDF2PARAM *kdf = NULL;
+    const EVP_MD *prfmd;
+
+    if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx) == NULL) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBKDF2_KEYIVGEN, EVP_R_NO_CIPHER_SET);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
+    OPENSSL_assert(keylen <= sizeof(key));
+
+    /* Decode parameter */
+
+    kdf = ASN1_TYPE_unpack_sequence(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PBKDF2PARAM), param);
+
+    if (kdf == NULL) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBKDF2_KEYIVGEN, EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
+
+    /* Now check the parameters of the kdf */
+
+    if (kdf->keylength && (ASN1_INTEGER_get(kdf->keylength) != (int)keylen)) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBKDF2_KEYIVGEN, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEYLENGTH);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (kdf->prf)
+        prf_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(kdf->prf->algorithm);
+    else
+        prf_nid = NID_hmacWithSHA1;
+
+    if (!EVP_PBE_find(EVP_PBE_TYPE_PRF, prf_nid, NULL, &hmac_md_nid, 0)) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBKDF2_KEYIVGEN, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_PRF);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    prfmd = EVP_get_digestbynid(hmac_md_nid);
+    if (prfmd == NULL) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBKDF2_KEYIVGEN, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_PRF);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (kdf->salt->type != V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBKDF2_KEYIVGEN, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_SALT_TYPE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* it seems that its all OK */
+    salt = kdf->salt->value.octet_string->data;
+    saltlen = kdf->salt->value.octet_string->length;
+    iter = ASN1_INTEGER_get(kdf->iter);
+    if (!PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, iter, prfmd,
+                           keylen, key))
+        goto err;
+    rv = EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, key, NULL, en_de);
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(key, keylen);
+    PBKDF2PARAM_free(kdf);
+    return rv;
+}
+
+# ifdef OPENSSL_DEBUG_PKCS5V2
+static void h__dump(const unsigned char *p, int len)
+{
+    for (; len--; p++)
+        fprintf(stderr, "%02X ", *p);
+    fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+}
+# endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/p_dec.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/p_dec.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6bec406
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/p_dec.c
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+int EVP_PKEY_decrypt_old(unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *ek, int ekl,
+                         EVP_PKEY *priv)
+{
+    int ret = -1;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+    if (EVP_PKEY_id(priv) != EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
+#endif
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_DECRYPT_OLD, EVP_R_PUBLIC_KEY_NOT_RSA);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    ret =
+        RSA_private_decrypt(ekl, ek, key, EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(priv),
+                            RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+ err:
+#endif
+    return (ret);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/p_enc.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/p_enc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3277fbb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/p_enc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+int EVP_PKEY_encrypt_old(unsigned char *ek, const unsigned char *key,
+                         int key_len, EVP_PKEY *pubk)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+    if (EVP_PKEY_id(pubk) != EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
+#endif
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_ENCRYPT_OLD, EVP_R_PUBLIC_KEY_NOT_RSA);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+        goto err;
+    }
+    ret =
+        RSA_public_encrypt(key_len, key, ek, EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pubk),
+                           RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+ err:
+#endif
+    return (ret);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/p_lib.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/p_lib.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d7372aa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/p_lib.c
@@ -0,0 +1,506 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+
+#include "internal/asn1_int.h"
+#include "internal/evp_int.h"
+
+static void EVP_PKEY_free_it(EVP_PKEY *x);
+
+int EVP_PKEY_bits(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    if (pkey && pkey->ameth && pkey->ameth->pkey_bits)
+        return pkey->ameth->pkey_bits(pkey);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_security_bits(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    if (pkey == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    if (!pkey->ameth || !pkey->ameth->pkey_security_bits)
+        return -2;
+    return pkey->ameth->pkey_security_bits(pkey);
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_size(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    if (pkey && pkey->ameth && pkey->ameth->pkey_size)
+        return pkey->ameth->pkey_size(pkey);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_save_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int mode)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+    if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
+        int ret = pkey->save_parameters;
+
+        if (mode >= 0)
+            pkey->save_parameters = mode;
+        return (ret);
+    }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
+        int ret = pkey->save_parameters;
+
+        if (mode >= 0)
+            pkey->save_parameters = mode;
+        return (ret);
+    }
+#endif
+    return (0);
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(EVP_PKEY *to, const EVP_PKEY *from)
+{
+    if (to->type == EVP_PKEY_NONE) {
+        if (EVP_PKEY_set_type(to, from->type) == 0)
+            return 0;
+    } else if (to->type != from->type) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_COPY_PARAMETERS, EVP_R_DIFFERENT_KEY_TYPES);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(from)) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_COPY_PARAMETERS, EVP_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(to)) {
+        if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(to, from) == 1)
+            return 1;
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_COPY_PARAMETERS, EVP_R_DIFFERENT_PARAMETERS);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (from->ameth && from->ameth->param_copy)
+        return from->ameth->param_copy(to, from);
+ err:
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    if (pkey->ameth && pkey->ameth->param_missing)
+        return pkey->ameth->param_missing(pkey);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b)
+{
+    if (a->type != b->type)
+        return -1;
+    if (a->ameth && a->ameth->param_cmp)
+        return a->ameth->param_cmp(a, b);
+    return -2;
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_cmp(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b)
+{
+    if (a->type != b->type)
+        return -1;
+
+    if (a->ameth) {
+        int ret;
+        /* Compare parameters if the algorithm has them */
+        if (a->ameth->param_cmp) {
+            ret = a->ameth->param_cmp(a, b);
+            if (ret <= 0)
+                return ret;
+        }
+
+        if (a->ameth->pub_cmp)
+            return a->ameth->pub_cmp(a, b);
+    }
+
+    return -2;
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKEY_new(void)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
+
+    if (ret == NULL) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    ret->type = EVP_PKEY_NONE;
+    ret->save_type = EVP_PKEY_NONE;
+    ret->references = 1;
+    ret->save_parameters = 1;
+    ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
+    if (ret->lock == NULL) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        OPENSSL_free(ret);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_up_ref(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    if (CRYPTO_atomic_add(&pkey->references, 1, &i, pkey->lock) <= 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    REF_PRINT_COUNT("EVP_PKEY", pkey);
+    REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 2);
+    return ((i > 1) ? 1 : 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Setup a public key ASN1 method and ENGINE from a NID or a string. If pkey
+ * is NULL just return 1 or 0 if the algorithm exists.
+ */
+
+static int pkey_set_type(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int type, const char *str, int len)
+{
+    const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth;
+    ENGINE *e = NULL;
+    if (pkey) {
+        if (pkey->pkey.ptr)
+            EVP_PKEY_free_it(pkey);
+        /*
+         * If key type matches and a method exists then this lookup has
+         * succeeded once so just indicate success.
+         */
+        if ((type == pkey->save_type) && pkey->ameth)
+            return 1;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+        /* If we have ENGINEs release them */
+        ENGINE_finish(pkey->engine);
+        pkey->engine = NULL;
+        ENGINE_finish(pkey->pmeth_engine);
+        pkey->pmeth_engine = NULL;
+#endif
+    }
+    if (str)
+        ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str(&e, str, len);
+    else
+        ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find(&e, type);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    if (pkey == NULL)
+        ENGINE_finish(e);
+#endif
+    if (ameth == NULL) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_PKEY_SET_TYPE, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (pkey) {
+        pkey->ameth = ameth;
+        pkey->engine = e;
+
+        pkey->type = pkey->ameth->pkey_id;
+        pkey->save_type = type;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_set_type(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int type)
+{
+    return pkey_set_type(pkey, type, NULL, -1);
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_set_type_str(EVP_PKEY *pkey, const char *str, int len)
+{
+    return pkey_set_type(pkey, EVP_PKEY_NONE, str, len);
+}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+int EVP_PKEY_set1_engine(EVP_PKEY *pkey, ENGINE *e)
+{
+    if (e != NULL) {
+        if (!ENGINE_init(e)) {
+            EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_SET1_ENGINE, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        if (ENGINE_get_pkey_meth(e, pkey->type) == NULL) {
+            ENGINE_finish(e);
+            EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_SET1_ENGINE, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+    ENGINE_finish(pkey->pmeth_engine);
+    pkey->pmeth_engine = e;
+    return 1;
+}
+#endif
+int EVP_PKEY_assign(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int type, void *key)
+{
+    if (pkey == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(pkey, type))
+        return 0;
+    pkey->pkey.ptr = key;
+    return (key != NULL);
+}
+
+void *EVP_PKEY_get0(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    return pkey->pkey.ptr;
+}
+
+const unsigned char *EVP_PKEY_get0_hmac(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, size_t *len)
+{
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os = NULL;
+    if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_HMAC) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_GET0_HMAC, EVP_R_EXPECTING_AN_HMAC_KEY);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    os = EVP_PKEY_get0(pkey);
+    *len = os->length;
+    return os->data;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+int EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey, RSA *key)
+{
+    int ret = EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, key);
+    if (ret)
+        RSA_up_ref(key);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+RSA *EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_GET0_RSA, EVP_R_EXPECTING_AN_RSA_KEY);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    return pkey->pkey.rsa;
+}
+
+RSA *EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    RSA *ret = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey);
+    if (ret != NULL)
+        RSA_up_ref(ret);
+    return ret;
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+int EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey, DSA *key)
+{
+    int ret = EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(pkey, key);
+    if (ret)
+        DSA_up_ref(key);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+DSA *EVP_PKEY_get0_DSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_GET0_DSA, EVP_R_EXPECTING_A_DSA_KEY);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    return pkey->pkey.dsa;
+}
+
+DSA *EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    DSA *ret = EVP_PKEY_get0_DSA(pkey);
+    if (ret != NULL)
+        DSA_up_ref(ret);
+    return ret;
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+
+int EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(EVP_PKEY *pkey, EC_KEY *key)
+{
+    int ret = EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY(pkey, key);
+    if (ret)
+        EC_KEY_up_ref(key);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+EC_KEY *EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_GET0_EC_KEY, EVP_R_EXPECTING_A_EC_KEY);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    return pkey->pkey.ec;
+}
+
+EC_KEY *EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    EC_KEY *ret = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
+    if (ret != NULL)
+        EC_KEY_up_ref(ret);
+    return ret;
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+
+int EVP_PKEY_set1_DH(EVP_PKEY *pkey, DH *key)
+{
+    int ret = EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkey, key);
+    if (ret)
+        DH_up_ref(key);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+DH *EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH && pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_DHX) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_GET0_DH, EVP_R_EXPECTING_A_DH_KEY);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    return pkey->pkey.dh;
+}
+
+DH *EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    DH *ret = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(pkey);
+    if (ret != NULL)
+        DH_up_ref(ret);
+    return ret;
+}
+#endif
+
+int EVP_PKEY_type(int type)
+{
+    int ret;
+    const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth;
+    ENGINE *e;
+    ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find(&e, type);
+    if (ameth)
+        ret = ameth->pkey_id;
+    else
+        ret = NID_undef;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    ENGINE_finish(e);
+#endif
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_id(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    return pkey->type;
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_base_id(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    return EVP_PKEY_type(pkey->type);
+}
+
+void EVP_PKEY_free(EVP_PKEY *x)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    if (x == NULL)
+        return;
+
+    CRYPTO_atomic_add(&x->references, -1, &i, x->lock);
+    REF_PRINT_COUNT("EVP_PKEY", x);
+    if (i > 0)
+        return;
+    REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0);
+    EVP_PKEY_free_it(x);
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(x->lock);
+    sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_pop_free(x->attributes, X509_ATTRIBUTE_free);
+    OPENSSL_free(x);
+}
+
+static void EVP_PKEY_free_it(EVP_PKEY *x)
+{
+    /* internal function; x is never NULL */
+    if (x->ameth && x->ameth->pkey_free) {
+        x->ameth->pkey_free(x);
+        x->pkey.ptr = NULL;
+    }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    ENGINE_finish(x->engine);
+    x->engine = NULL;
+    ENGINE_finish(x->pmeth_engine);
+    x->pmeth_engine = NULL;
+#endif
+}
+
+static int unsup_alg(BIO *out, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent,
+                     const char *kstr)
+{
+    BIO_indent(out, indent, 128);
+    BIO_printf(out, "%s algorithm \"%s\" unsupported\n",
+               kstr, OBJ_nid2ln(pkey->type));
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_print_public(BIO *out, const EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+                          int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx)
+{
+    if (pkey->ameth && pkey->ameth->pub_print)
+        return pkey->ameth->pub_print(out, pkey, indent, pctx);
+
+    return unsup_alg(out, pkey, indent, "Public Key");
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_print_private(BIO *out, const EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+                           int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx)
+{
+    if (pkey->ameth && pkey->ameth->priv_print)
+        return pkey->ameth->priv_print(out, pkey, indent, pctx);
+
+    return unsup_alg(out, pkey, indent, "Private Key");
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_print_params(BIO *out, const EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+                          int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx)
+{
+    if (pkey->ameth && pkey->ameth->param_print)
+        return pkey->ameth->param_print(out, pkey, indent, pctx);
+    return unsup_alg(out, pkey, indent, "Parameters");
+}
+
+static int evp_pkey_asn1_ctrl(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int op, int arg1, void *arg2)
+{
+    if (pkey->ameth == NULL || pkey->ameth->pkey_ctrl == NULL)
+        return -2;
+    return pkey->ameth->pkey_ctrl(pkey, op, arg1, arg2);
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int *pnid)
+{
+    return evp_pkey_asn1_ctrl(pkey, ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_DEFAULT_MD_NID, 0, pnid);
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+                               const unsigned char *pt, size_t ptlen)
+{
+    if (ptlen > INT_MAX)
+        return 0;
+    if (evp_pkey_asn1_ctrl(pkey, ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_SET1_TLS_ENCPT, ptlen,
+                           (void *)pt) <= 0)
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+size_t EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(EVP_PKEY *pkey, unsigned char **ppt)
+{
+    int rv;
+    rv = evp_pkey_asn1_ctrl(pkey, ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_GET1_TLS_ENCPT, 0, ppt);
+    if (rv <= 0)
+        return 0;
+    return rv;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/p_open.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/p_open.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b65bc74
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/p_open.c
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT
+#else
+
+# include <stdio.h>
+# include <openssl/evp.h>
+# include <openssl/objects.h>
+# include <openssl/x509.h>
+# include <openssl/rsa.h>
+
+int EVP_OpenInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *type,
+                 const unsigned char *ek, int ekl, const unsigned char *iv,
+                 EVP_PKEY *priv)
+{
+    unsigned char *key = NULL;
+    int i, size = 0, ret = 0;
+
+    if (type) {
+        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(ctx);
+        if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, type, NULL, NULL, NULL))
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (!priv)
+        return 1;
+
+    if (EVP_PKEY_id(priv) != EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_OPENINIT, EVP_R_PUBLIC_KEY_NOT_RSA);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    size = EVP_PKEY_size(priv);
+    key = OPENSSL_malloc(size + 2);
+    if (key == NULL) {
+        /* ERROR */
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_OPENINIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    i = EVP_PKEY_decrypt_old(key, ek, ekl, priv);
+    if ((i <= 0) || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(ctx, i)) {
+        /* ERROR */
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, key, iv))
+        goto err;
+
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(key, size);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+int EVP_OpenFinal(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    i = EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, out, outl);
+    if (i)
+        i = EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+    return (i);
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/p_seal.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/p_seal.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..faa2464
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/p_seal.c
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+int EVP_SealInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *type,
+                 unsigned char **ek, int *ekl, unsigned char *iv,
+                 EVP_PKEY **pubk, int npubk)
+{
+    unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
+    int i;
+
+    if (type) {
+        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(ctx);
+        if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, type, NULL, NULL, NULL))
+            return 0;
+    }
+    if ((npubk <= 0) || !pubk)
+        return 1;
+    if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key(ctx, key) <= 0)
+        return 0;
+    if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx)
+        && RAND_bytes(iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx)) <= 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, key, iv))
+        return 0;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < npubk; i++) {
+        ekl[i] =
+            EVP_PKEY_encrypt_old(ek[i], key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx),
+                                 pubk[i]);
+        if (ekl[i] <= 0)
+            return (-1);
+    }
+    return (npubk);
+}
+
+/*- MACRO
+void EVP_SealUpdate(ctx,out,outl,in,inl)
+EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
+unsigned char *out;
+int *outl;
+unsigned char *in;
+int inl;
+        {
+        EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx,out,outl,in,inl);
+        }
+*/
+
+int EVP_SealFinal(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl)
+{
+    int i;
+    i = EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, out, outl);
+    if (i)
+        i = EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+    return i;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/p_sign.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/p_sign.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6cb442e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/p_sign.c
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include "internal/evp_int.h"
+
+int EVP_SignFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sigret,
+                  unsigned int *siglen, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    unsigned char m[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+    unsigned int m_len = 0;
+    int i = 0;
+    size_t sltmp;
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx = NULL;
+
+    *siglen = 0;
+    if (EVP_MD_CTX_test_flags(ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_FINALISE)) {
+        if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, m, &m_len))
+            goto err;
+    } else {
+        int rv = 0;
+        EVP_MD_CTX *tmp_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+        if (tmp_ctx == NULL) {
+            EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_SIGNFINAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        rv = EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(tmp_ctx, ctx);
+        if (rv)
+            rv = EVP_DigestFinal_ex(tmp_ctx, m, &m_len);
+        EVP_MD_CTX_free(tmp_ctx);
+        if (!rv)
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    sltmp = (size_t)EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
+    i = 0;
+    pkctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
+    if (pkctx == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (EVP_PKEY_sign_init(pkctx) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pkctx, EVP_MD_CTX_md(ctx)) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    if (EVP_PKEY_sign(pkctx, sigret, &sltmp, m, m_len) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    *siglen = sltmp;
+    i = 1;
+ err:
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkctx);
+    return i;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/p_verify.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/p_verify.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6e8c565
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/p_verify.c
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include "internal/evp_int.h"
+
+int EVP_VerifyFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sigbuf,
+                    unsigned int siglen, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    unsigned char m[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+    unsigned int m_len = 0;
+    int i = 0;
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx = NULL;
+
+    if (EVP_MD_CTX_test_flags(ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_FINALISE)) {
+        if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, m, &m_len))
+            goto err;
+    } else {
+        int rv = 0;
+        EVP_MD_CTX *tmp_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+        if (tmp_ctx == NULL) {
+            EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_VERIFYFINAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        rv = EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(tmp_ctx, ctx);
+        if (rv)
+            rv = EVP_DigestFinal_ex(tmp_ctx, m, &m_len);
+        EVP_MD_CTX_free(tmp_ctx);
+        if (!rv)
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    i = -1;
+    pkctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
+    if (pkctx == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pkctx) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pkctx, EVP_MD_CTX_md(ctx)) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    i = EVP_PKEY_verify(pkctx, sigbuf, siglen, m, m_len);
+ err:
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkctx);
+    return i;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/pmeth_fn.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/pmeth_fn.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..eb63801
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/pmeth_fn.c
@@ -0,0 +1,297 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include "internal/evp_int.h"
+
+#define M_check_autoarg(ctx, arg, arglen, err) \
+    if (ctx->pmeth->flags & EVP_PKEY_FLAG_AUTOARGLEN) {           \
+        size_t pksize = (size_t)EVP_PKEY_size(ctx->pkey);         \
+                                                                  \
+        if (pksize == 0) {                                        \
+            EVPerr(err, EVP_R_INVALID_KEY); /*ckerr_ignore*/      \
+            return 0;                                             \
+        }                                                         \
+        if (!arg) {                                               \
+            *arglen = pksize;                                     \
+            return 1;                                             \
+        }                                                         \
+        if (*arglen < pksize) {                                   \
+            EVPerr(err, EVP_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL); /*ckerr_ignore*/ \
+            return 0;                                             \
+        }                                                         \
+    }
+
+int EVP_PKEY_sign_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int ret;
+    if (!ctx || !ctx->pmeth || !ctx->pmeth->sign) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_SIGN_INIT,
+               EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
+        return -2;
+    }
+    ctx->operation = EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN;
+    if (!ctx->pmeth->sign_init)
+        return 1;
+    ret = ctx->pmeth->sign_init(ctx);
+    if (ret <= 0)
+        ctx->operation = EVP_PKEY_OP_UNDEFINED;
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                  unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen,
+                  const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)
+{
+    if (!ctx || !ctx->pmeth || !ctx->pmeth->sign) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_SIGN,
+               EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
+        return -2;
+    }
+    if (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_SIGN, EVP_R_OPERATON_NOT_INITIALIZED);
+        return -1;
+    }
+    M_check_autoarg(ctx, sig, siglen, EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_SIGN)
+        return ctx->pmeth->sign(ctx, sig, siglen, tbs, tbslen);
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_verify_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int ret;
+    if (!ctx || !ctx->pmeth || !ctx->pmeth->verify) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_VERIFY_INIT,
+               EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
+        return -2;
+    }
+    ctx->operation = EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY;
+    if (!ctx->pmeth->verify_init)
+        return 1;
+    ret = ctx->pmeth->verify_init(ctx);
+    if (ret <= 0)
+        ctx->operation = EVP_PKEY_OP_UNDEFINED;
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_verify(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                    const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen,
+                    const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)
+{
+    if (!ctx || !ctx->pmeth || !ctx->pmeth->verify) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_VERIFY,
+               EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
+        return -2;
+    }
+    if (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_VERIFY, EVP_R_OPERATON_NOT_INITIALIZED);
+        return -1;
+    }
+    return ctx->pmeth->verify(ctx, sig, siglen, tbs, tbslen);
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int ret;
+    if (!ctx || !ctx->pmeth || !ctx->pmeth->verify_recover) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_VERIFY_RECOVER_INIT,
+               EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
+        return -2;
+    }
+    ctx->operation = EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFYRECOVER;
+    if (!ctx->pmeth->verify_recover_init)
+        return 1;
+    ret = ctx->pmeth->verify_recover_init(ctx);
+    if (ret <= 0)
+        ctx->operation = EVP_PKEY_OP_UNDEFINED;
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                            unsigned char *rout, size_t *routlen,
+                            const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen)
+{
+    if (!ctx || !ctx->pmeth || !ctx->pmeth->verify_recover) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_VERIFY_RECOVER,
+               EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
+        return -2;
+    }
+    if (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFYRECOVER) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_VERIFY_RECOVER, EVP_R_OPERATON_NOT_INITIALIZED);
+        return -1;
+    }
+    M_check_autoarg(ctx, rout, routlen, EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_VERIFY_RECOVER)
+        return ctx->pmeth->verify_recover(ctx, rout, routlen, sig, siglen);
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int ret;
+    if (!ctx || !ctx->pmeth || !ctx->pmeth->encrypt) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_ENCRYPT_INIT,
+               EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
+        return -2;
+    }
+    ctx->operation = EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT;
+    if (!ctx->pmeth->encrypt_init)
+        return 1;
+    ret = ctx->pmeth->encrypt_init(ctx);
+    if (ret <= 0)
+        ctx->operation = EVP_PKEY_OP_UNDEFINED;
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_encrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                     unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
+                     const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen)
+{
+    if (!ctx || !ctx->pmeth || !ctx->pmeth->encrypt) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_ENCRYPT,
+               EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
+        return -2;
+    }
+    if (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_ENCRYPT, EVP_R_OPERATON_NOT_INITIALIZED);
+        return -1;
+    }
+    M_check_autoarg(ctx, out, outlen, EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_ENCRYPT)
+        return ctx->pmeth->encrypt(ctx, out, outlen, in, inlen);
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int ret;
+    if (!ctx || !ctx->pmeth || !ctx->pmeth->decrypt) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_DECRYPT_INIT,
+               EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
+        return -2;
+    }
+    ctx->operation = EVP_PKEY_OP_DECRYPT;
+    if (!ctx->pmeth->decrypt_init)
+        return 1;
+    ret = ctx->pmeth->decrypt_init(ctx);
+    if (ret <= 0)
+        ctx->operation = EVP_PKEY_OP_UNDEFINED;
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_decrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                     unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
+                     const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen)
+{
+    if (!ctx || !ctx->pmeth || !ctx->pmeth->decrypt) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_DECRYPT,
+               EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
+        return -2;
+    }
+    if (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_DECRYPT) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_DECRYPT, EVP_R_OPERATON_NOT_INITIALIZED);
+        return -1;
+    }
+    M_check_autoarg(ctx, out, outlen, EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_DECRYPT)
+        return ctx->pmeth->decrypt(ctx, out, outlen, in, inlen);
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_derive_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int ret;
+    if (!ctx || !ctx->pmeth || !ctx->pmeth->derive) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_DERIVE_INIT,
+               EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
+        return -2;
+    }
+    ctx->operation = EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE;
+    if (!ctx->pmeth->derive_init)
+        return 1;
+    ret = ctx->pmeth->derive_init(ctx);
+    if (ret <= 0)
+        ctx->operation = EVP_PKEY_OP_UNDEFINED;
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *peer)
+{
+    int ret;
+    if (!ctx || !ctx->pmeth
+        || !(ctx->pmeth->derive || ctx->pmeth->encrypt || ctx->pmeth->decrypt)
+        || !ctx->pmeth->ctrl) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_DERIVE_SET_PEER,
+               EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
+        return -2;
+    }
+    if (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE
+        && ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT
+        && ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_DECRYPT) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_DERIVE_SET_PEER,
+               EVP_R_OPERATON_NOT_INITIALIZED);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    ret = ctx->pmeth->ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 0, peer);
+
+    if (ret <= 0)
+        return ret;
+
+    if (ret == 2)
+        return 1;
+
+    if (!ctx->pkey) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_DERIVE_SET_PEER, EVP_R_NO_KEY_SET);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (ctx->pkey->type != peer->type) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_DERIVE_SET_PEER, EVP_R_DIFFERENT_KEY_TYPES);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * ran@cryptocom.ru: For clarity.  The error is if parameters in peer are
+     * present (!missing) but don't match.  EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters may return
+     * 1 (match), 0 (don't match) and -2 (comparison is not defined).  -1
+     * (different key types) is impossible here because it is checked earlier.
+     * -2 is OK for us here, as well as 1, so we can check for 0 only.
+     */
+    if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(peer) &&
+        !EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(ctx->pkey, peer)) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_DERIVE_SET_PEER, EVP_R_DIFFERENT_PARAMETERS);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    EVP_PKEY_free(ctx->peerkey);
+    ctx->peerkey = peer;
+
+    ret = ctx->pmeth->ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 1, peer);
+
+    if (ret <= 0) {
+        ctx->peerkey = NULL;
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    EVP_PKEY_up_ref(peer);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_derive(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key, size_t *pkeylen)
+{
+    if (!ctx || !ctx->pmeth || !ctx->pmeth->derive) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_DERIVE,
+               EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
+        return -2;
+    }
+    if (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_DERIVE, EVP_R_OPERATON_NOT_INITIALIZED);
+        return -1;
+    }
+    M_check_autoarg(ctx, key, pkeylen, EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_DERIVE)
+        return ctx->pmeth->derive(ctx, key, pkeylen);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/pmeth_gn.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/pmeth_gn.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6adc3a9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/pmeth_gn.c
@@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include "internal/bn_int.h"
+#include "internal/evp_int.h"
+
+int EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int ret;
+    if (!ctx || !ctx->pmeth || !ctx->pmeth->paramgen) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_PARAMGEN_INIT,
+               EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
+        return -2;
+    }
+    ctx->operation = EVP_PKEY_OP_PARAMGEN;
+    if (!ctx->pmeth->paramgen_init)
+        return 1;
+    ret = ctx->pmeth->paramgen_init(ctx);
+    if (ret <= 0)
+        ctx->operation = EVP_PKEY_OP_UNDEFINED;
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_paramgen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
+{
+    int ret;
+    if (!ctx || !ctx->pmeth || !ctx->pmeth->paramgen) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_PARAMGEN,
+               EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
+        return -2;
+    }
+
+    if (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_PARAMGEN) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_PARAMGEN, EVP_R_OPERATON_NOT_INITIALIZED);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (ppkey == NULL)
+        return -1;
+
+    if (*ppkey == NULL)
+        *ppkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
+
+    if (*ppkey == NULL) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_PARAMGEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    ret = ctx->pmeth->paramgen(ctx, *ppkey);
+    if (ret <= 0) {
+        EVP_PKEY_free(*ppkey);
+        *ppkey = NULL;
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int ret;
+    if (!ctx || !ctx->pmeth || !ctx->pmeth->keygen) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_KEYGEN_INIT,
+               EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
+        return -2;
+    }
+    ctx->operation = EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN;
+    if (!ctx->pmeth->keygen_init)
+        return 1;
+    ret = ctx->pmeth->keygen_init(ctx);
+    if (ret <= 0)
+        ctx->operation = EVP_PKEY_OP_UNDEFINED;
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_keygen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
+{
+    int ret;
+
+    if (!ctx || !ctx->pmeth || !ctx->pmeth->keygen) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_KEYGEN,
+               EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
+        return -2;
+    }
+    if (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_KEYGEN, EVP_R_OPERATON_NOT_INITIALIZED);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (ppkey == NULL)
+        return -1;
+
+    if (*ppkey == NULL)
+        *ppkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
+    if (*ppkey == NULL)
+        return -1;
+
+    ret = ctx->pmeth->keygen(ctx, *ppkey);
+    if (ret <= 0) {
+        EVP_PKEY_free(*ppkey);
+        *ppkey = NULL;
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+void EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_cb(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_gen_cb *cb)
+{
+    ctx->pkey_gencb = cb;
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY_gen_cb *EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_cb(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->pkey_gencb;
+}
+
+/*
+ * "translation callback" to call EVP_PKEY_CTX callbacks using BN_GENCB style
+ * callbacks.
+ */
+
+static int trans_cb(int a, int b, BN_GENCB *gcb)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = BN_GENCB_get_arg(gcb);
+    ctx->keygen_info[0] = a;
+    ctx->keygen_info[1] = b;
+    return ctx->pkey_gencb(ctx);
+}
+
+void evp_pkey_set_cb_translate(BN_GENCB *cb, EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    BN_GENCB_set(cb, trans_cb, ctx);
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_keygen_info(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int idx)
+{
+    if (idx == -1)
+        return ctx->keygen_info_count;
+    if (idx < 0 || idx > ctx->keygen_info_count)
+        return 0;
+    return ctx->keygen_info[idx];
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(int type, ENGINE *e,
+                               const unsigned char *key, int keylen)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX *mac_ctx = NULL;
+    EVP_PKEY *mac_key = NULL;
+    mac_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(type, e);
+    if (!mac_ctx)
+        return NULL;
+    if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(mac_ctx) <= 0)
+        goto merr;
+    if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_mac_key(mac_ctx, key, keylen) <= 0)
+        goto merr;
+    if (EVP_PKEY_keygen(mac_ctx, &mac_key) <= 0)
+        goto merr;
+ merr:
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(mac_ctx);
+    return mac_key;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5e650a9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c
@@ -0,0 +1,725 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include "internal/asn1_int.h"
+#include "internal/evp_int.h"
+#include "internal/numbers.h"
+
+typedef int sk_cmp_fn_type(const char *const *a, const char *const *b);
+
+static STACK_OF(EVP_PKEY_METHOD) *app_pkey_methods = NULL;
+
+static const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *standard_methods[] = {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+    &rsa_pkey_meth,
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+    &dh_pkey_meth,
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+    &dsa_pkey_meth,
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    &ec_pkey_meth,
+#endif
+    &hmac_pkey_meth,
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMAC
+    &cmac_pkey_meth,
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+    &dhx_pkey_meth,
+#endif
+    &tls1_prf_pkey_meth,
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    &ecx25519_pkey_meth,
+#endif
+    &hkdf_pkey_meth
+};
+
+DECLARE_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *, const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *,
+                           pmeth);
+
+static int pmeth_cmp(const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *const *a,
+                     const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *const *b)
+{
+    return ((*a)->pkey_id - (*b)->pkey_id);
+}
+
+IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *, const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *,
+                             pmeth);
+
+const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *EVP_PKEY_meth_find(int type)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY_METHOD tmp;
+    const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *t = &tmp, **ret;
+    tmp.pkey_id = type;
+    if (app_pkey_methods) {
+        int idx;
+        idx = sk_EVP_PKEY_METHOD_find(app_pkey_methods, &tmp);
+        if (idx >= 0)
+            return sk_EVP_PKEY_METHOD_value(app_pkey_methods, idx);
+    }
+    ret = OBJ_bsearch_pmeth(&t, standard_methods,
+                            sizeof(standard_methods) /
+                            sizeof(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *));
+    if (!ret || !*ret)
+        return NULL;
+    return *ret;
+}
+
+static EVP_PKEY_CTX *int_ctx_new(EVP_PKEY *pkey, ENGINE *e, int id)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX *ret;
+    const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth;
+    if (id == -1) {
+        if (!pkey || !pkey->ameth)
+            return NULL;
+        id = pkey->ameth->pkey_id;
+    }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    if (e == NULL && pkey != NULL)
+        e = pkey->pmeth_engine != NULL ? pkey->pmeth_engine : pkey->engine;
+    /* Try to find an ENGINE which implements this method */
+    if (e) {
+        if (!ENGINE_init(e)) {
+            EVPerr(EVP_F_INT_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+    } else {
+        e = ENGINE_get_pkey_meth_engine(id);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * If an ENGINE handled this method look it up. Otherwise use internal
+     * tables.
+     */
+
+    if (e)
+        pmeth = ENGINE_get_pkey_meth(e, id);
+    else
+#endif
+        pmeth = EVP_PKEY_meth_find(id);
+
+    if (pmeth == NULL) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+        ENGINE_finish(e);
+#endif
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_INT_CTX_NEW, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
+    if (ret == NULL) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+        ENGINE_finish(e);
+#endif
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_INT_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    ret->engine = e;
+    ret->pmeth = pmeth;
+    ret->operation = EVP_PKEY_OP_UNDEFINED;
+    ret->pkey = pkey;
+    if (pkey)
+        EVP_PKEY_up_ref(pkey);
+
+    if (pmeth->init) {
+        if (pmeth->init(ret) <= 0) {
+            ret->pmeth = NULL;
+            EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ret);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+    }
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY_METHOD *EVP_PKEY_meth_new(int id, int flags)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth;
+
+    pmeth = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*pmeth));
+    if (pmeth == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+
+    pmeth->pkey_id = id;
+    pmeth->flags = flags | EVP_PKEY_FLAG_DYNAMIC;
+    return pmeth;
+}
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_get0_info(int *ppkey_id, int *pflags,
+                             const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *meth)
+{
+    if (ppkey_id)
+        *ppkey_id = meth->pkey_id;
+    if (pflags)
+        *pflags = meth->flags;
+}
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_copy(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *dst, const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *src)
+{
+
+    dst->init = src->init;
+    dst->copy = src->copy;
+    dst->cleanup = src->cleanup;
+
+    dst->paramgen_init = src->paramgen_init;
+    dst->paramgen = src->paramgen;
+
+    dst->keygen_init = src->keygen_init;
+    dst->keygen = src->keygen;
+
+    dst->sign_init = src->sign_init;
+    dst->sign = src->sign;
+
+    dst->verify_init = src->verify_init;
+    dst->verify = src->verify;
+
+    dst->verify_recover_init = src->verify_recover_init;
+    dst->verify_recover = src->verify_recover;
+
+    dst->signctx_init = src->signctx_init;
+    dst->signctx = src->signctx;
+
+    dst->verifyctx_init = src->verifyctx_init;
+    dst->verifyctx = src->verifyctx;
+
+    dst->encrypt_init = src->encrypt_init;
+    dst->encrypt = src->encrypt;
+
+    dst->decrypt_init = src->decrypt_init;
+    dst->decrypt = src->decrypt;
+
+    dst->derive_init = src->derive_init;
+    dst->derive = src->derive;
+
+    dst->ctrl = src->ctrl;
+    dst->ctrl_str = src->ctrl_str;
+}
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_free(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth)
+{
+    if (pmeth && (pmeth->flags & EVP_PKEY_FLAG_DYNAMIC))
+        OPENSSL_free(pmeth);
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY_CTX *EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(EVP_PKEY *pkey, ENGINE *e)
+{
+    return int_ctx_new(pkey, e, -1);
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY_CTX *EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(int id, ENGINE *e)
+{
+    return int_ctx_new(NULL, e, id);
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY_CTX *EVP_PKEY_CTX_dup(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX *rctx;
+    if (!pctx->pmeth || !pctx->pmeth->copy)
+        return NULL;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    /* Make sure it's safe to copy a pkey context using an ENGINE */
+    if (pctx->engine && !ENGINE_init(pctx->engine)) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_CTX_DUP, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB);
+        return 0;
+    }
+#endif
+    rctx = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*rctx));
+    if (rctx == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+
+    rctx->pmeth = pctx->pmeth;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    rctx->engine = pctx->engine;
+#endif
+
+    if (pctx->pkey)
+        EVP_PKEY_up_ref(pctx->pkey);
+
+    rctx->pkey = pctx->pkey;
+
+    if (pctx->peerkey)
+        EVP_PKEY_up_ref(pctx->peerkey);
+
+    rctx->peerkey = pctx->peerkey;
+
+    rctx->data = NULL;
+    rctx->app_data = NULL;
+    rctx->operation = pctx->operation;
+
+    if (pctx->pmeth->copy(rctx, pctx) > 0)
+        return rctx;
+
+    rctx->pmeth = NULL;
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(rctx);
+    return NULL;
+
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_meth_add0(const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth)
+{
+    if (app_pkey_methods == NULL) {
+        app_pkey_methods = sk_EVP_PKEY_METHOD_new(pmeth_cmp);
+        if (app_pkey_methods == NULL)
+            return 0;
+    }
+    if (!sk_EVP_PKEY_METHOD_push(app_pkey_methods, pmeth))
+        return 0;
+    sk_EVP_PKEY_METHOD_sort(app_pkey_methods);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+void EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        return;
+    if (ctx->pmeth && ctx->pmeth->cleanup)
+        ctx->pmeth->cleanup(ctx);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(ctx->pkey);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(ctx->peerkey);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    ENGINE_finish(ctx->engine);
+#endif
+    OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int keytype, int optype,
+                      int cmd, int p1, void *p2)
+{
+    int ret;
+    if (!ctx || !ctx->pmeth || !ctx->pmeth->ctrl) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_CTX_CTRL, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+        return -2;
+    }
+    if ((keytype != -1) && (ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != keytype))
+        return -1;
+
+    if (ctx->operation == EVP_PKEY_OP_UNDEFINED) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_CTX_CTRL, EVP_R_NO_OPERATION_SET);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if ((optype != -1) && !(ctx->operation & optype)) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_CTX_CTRL, EVP_R_INVALID_OPERATION);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    ret = ctx->pmeth->ctrl(ctx, cmd, p1, p2);
+
+    if (ret == -2)
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_CTX_CTRL, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+
+    return ret;
+
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                          const char *name, const char *value)
+{
+    if (!ctx || !ctx->pmeth || !ctx->pmeth->ctrl_str) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_CTX_CTRL_STR, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+        return -2;
+    }
+    if (strcmp(name, "digest") == 0) {
+        const EVP_MD *md;
+        if (value == NULL || (md = EVP_get_digestbyname(value)) == NULL) {
+            EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_CTX_CTRL_STR, EVP_R_INVALID_DIGEST);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(ctx, md);
+    }
+    return ctx->pmeth->ctrl_str(ctx, name, value);
+}
+
+/* Utility functions to send a string of hex string to a ctrl */
+
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_str2ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int cmd, const char *str)
+{
+    size_t len;
+
+    len = strlen(str);
+    if (len > INT_MAX)
+        return -1;
+    return ctx->pmeth->ctrl(ctx, cmd, len, (void *)str);
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_hex2ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int cmd, const char *hex)
+{
+    unsigned char *bin;
+    long binlen;
+    int rv = -1;
+
+    bin = OPENSSL_hexstr2buf(hex, &binlen);
+    if (bin == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    if (binlen <= INT_MAX)
+        rv = ctx->pmeth->ctrl(ctx, cmd, binlen, bin);
+    OPENSSL_free(bin);
+    return rv;
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_operation(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->operation;
+}
+
+void EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_keygen_info(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int *dat, int datlen)
+{
+    ctx->keygen_info = dat;
+    ctx->keygen_info_count = datlen;
+}
+
+void EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_data(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, void *data)
+{
+    ctx->data = data;
+}
+
+void *EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->data;
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->pkey;
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_peerkey(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->peerkey;
+}
+
+void EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_app_data(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, void *data)
+{
+    ctx->app_data = data;
+}
+
+void *EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_app_data(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->app_data;
+}
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_set_init(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                            int (*init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx))
+{
+    pmeth->init = init;
+}
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_set_copy(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                            int (*copy) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *dst,
+                                         EVP_PKEY_CTX *src))
+{
+    pmeth->copy = copy;
+}
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_set_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                               void (*cleanup) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx))
+{
+    pmeth->cleanup = cleanup;
+}
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_set_paramgen(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                                int (*paramgen_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx),
+                                int (*paramgen) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                                 EVP_PKEY *pkey))
+{
+    pmeth->paramgen_init = paramgen_init;
+    pmeth->paramgen = paramgen;
+}
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_set_keygen(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                              int (*keygen_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx),
+                              int (*keygen) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                             EVP_PKEY *pkey))
+{
+    pmeth->keygen_init = keygen_init;
+    pmeth->keygen = keygen;
+}
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_set_sign(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                            int (*sign_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx),
+                            int (*sign) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                         unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen,
+                                         const unsigned char *tbs,
+                                         size_t tbslen))
+{
+    pmeth->sign_init = sign_init;
+    pmeth->sign = sign;
+}
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_set_verify(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                              int (*verify_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx),
+                              int (*verify) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                             const unsigned char *sig,
+                                             size_t siglen,
+                                             const unsigned char *tbs,
+                                             size_t tbslen))
+{
+    pmeth->verify_init = verify_init;
+    pmeth->verify = verify;
+}
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_set_verify_recover(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                                      int (*verify_recover_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX
+                                                                  *ctx),
+                                      int (*verify_recover) (EVP_PKEY_CTX
+                                                             *ctx,
+                                                             unsigned char
+                                                             *sig,
+                                                             size_t *siglen,
+                                                             const unsigned
+                                                             char *tbs,
+                                                             size_t tbslen))
+{
+    pmeth->verify_recover_init = verify_recover_init;
+    pmeth->verify_recover = verify_recover;
+}
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_set_signctx(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                               int (*signctx_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                                    EVP_MD_CTX *mctx),
+                               int (*signctx) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                               unsigned char *sig,
+                                               size_t *siglen,
+                                               EVP_MD_CTX *mctx))
+{
+    pmeth->signctx_init = signctx_init;
+    pmeth->signctx = signctx;
+}
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_set_verifyctx(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                                 int (*verifyctx_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                                        EVP_MD_CTX *mctx),
+                                 int (*verifyctx) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                                   const unsigned char *sig,
+                                                   int siglen,
+                                                   EVP_MD_CTX *mctx))
+{
+    pmeth->verifyctx_init = verifyctx_init;
+    pmeth->verifyctx = verifyctx;
+}
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_set_encrypt(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                               int (*encrypt_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx),
+                               int (*encryptfn) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                                 unsigned char *out,
+                                                 size_t *outlen,
+                                                 const unsigned char *in,
+                                                 size_t inlen))
+{
+    pmeth->encrypt_init = encrypt_init;
+    pmeth->encrypt = encryptfn;
+}
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_set_decrypt(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                               int (*decrypt_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx),
+                               int (*decrypt) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                               unsigned char *out,
+                                               size_t *outlen,
+                                               const unsigned char *in,
+                                               size_t inlen))
+{
+    pmeth->decrypt_init = decrypt_init;
+    pmeth->decrypt = decrypt;
+}
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_set_derive(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                              int (*derive_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx),
+                              int (*derive) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                             unsigned char *key,
+                                             size_t *keylen))
+{
+    pmeth->derive_init = derive_init;
+    pmeth->derive = derive;
+}
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_set_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                            int (*ctrl) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1,
+                                         void *p2),
+                            int (*ctrl_str) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                             const char *type,
+                                             const char *value))
+{
+    pmeth->ctrl = ctrl;
+    pmeth->ctrl_str = ctrl_str;
+}
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_init(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                            int (**pinit) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx))
+{
+    *pinit = pmeth->init;
+}
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_copy(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                            int (**pcopy) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *dst,
+                                           EVP_PKEY_CTX *src))
+{
+    *pcopy = pmeth->copy;
+}
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                               void (**pcleanup) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx))
+{
+    *pcleanup = pmeth->cleanup;
+}
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_paramgen(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                                int (**pparamgen_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx),
+                                int (**pparamgen) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                                   EVP_PKEY *pkey))
+{
+    if (pparamgen_init)
+        *pparamgen_init = pmeth->paramgen_init;
+    if (pparamgen)
+        *pparamgen = pmeth->paramgen;
+}
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_keygen(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                              int (**pkeygen_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx),
+                              int (**pkeygen) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                               EVP_PKEY *pkey))
+{
+    if (pkeygen_init)
+        *pkeygen_init = pmeth->keygen_init;
+    if (pkeygen)
+        *pkeygen = pmeth->keygen;
+}
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_sign(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                            int (**psign_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx),
+                            int (**psign) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                           unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen,
+                                           const unsigned char *tbs,
+                                           size_t tbslen))
+{
+    if (psign_init)
+        *psign_init = pmeth->sign_init;
+    if (psign)
+        *psign = pmeth->sign;
+}
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_verify(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                              int (**pverify_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx),
+                              int (**pverify) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                               const unsigned char *sig,
+                                               size_t siglen,
+                                               const unsigned char *tbs,
+                                               size_t tbslen))
+{
+    if (pverify_init)
+        *pverify_init = pmeth->verify_init;
+    if (pverify)
+        *pverify = pmeth->verify;
+}
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_verify_recover(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                                      int (**pverify_recover_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX
+                                                                    *ctx),
+                                      int (**pverify_recover) (EVP_PKEY_CTX
+                                                               *ctx,
+                                                               unsigned char
+                                                               *sig,
+                                                               size_t *siglen,
+                                                               const unsigned
+                                                               char *tbs,
+                                                               size_t tbslen))
+{
+    if (pverify_recover_init)
+        *pverify_recover_init = pmeth->verify_recover_init;
+    if (pverify_recover)
+        *pverify_recover = pmeth->verify_recover;
+}
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_signctx(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                               int (**psignctx_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                                      EVP_MD_CTX *mctx),
+                               int (**psignctx) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                                 unsigned char *sig,
+                                                 size_t *siglen,
+                                                 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx))
+{
+    if (psignctx_init)
+        *psignctx_init = pmeth->signctx_init;
+    if (psignctx)
+        *psignctx = pmeth->signctx;
+}
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_verifyctx(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                                 int (**pverifyctx_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                                          EVP_MD_CTX *mctx),
+                                 int (**pverifyctx) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                                     const unsigned char *sig,
+                                                     int siglen,
+                                                     EVP_MD_CTX *mctx))
+{
+    if (pverifyctx_init)
+        *pverifyctx_init = pmeth->verifyctx_init;
+    if (pverifyctx)
+        *pverifyctx = pmeth->verifyctx;
+}
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_encrypt(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                               int (**pencrypt_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx),
+                               int (**pencryptfn) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                                   unsigned char *out,
+                                                   size_t *outlen,
+                                                   const unsigned char *in,
+                                                   size_t inlen))
+{
+    if (pencrypt_init)
+        *pencrypt_init = pmeth->encrypt_init;
+    if (pencryptfn)
+        *pencryptfn = pmeth->encrypt;
+}
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_decrypt(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                               int (**pdecrypt_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx),
+                               int (**pdecrypt) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                                 unsigned char *out,
+                                                 size_t *outlen,
+                                                 const unsigned char *in,
+                                                 size_t inlen))
+{
+    if (pdecrypt_init)
+        *pdecrypt_init = pmeth->decrypt_init;
+    if (pdecrypt)
+        *pdecrypt = pmeth->decrypt;
+}
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_derive(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                              int (**pderive_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx),
+                              int (**pderive) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                               unsigned char *key,
+                                               size_t *keylen))
+{
+    if (pderive_init)
+        *pderive_init = pmeth->derive_init;
+    if (pderive)
+        *pderive = pmeth->derive;
+}
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                            int (**pctrl) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1,
+                                           void *p2),
+                            int (**pctrl_str) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                               const char *type,
+                                               const char *value))
+{
+    if (pctrl)
+        *pctrl = pmeth->ctrl;
+    if (pctrl_str)
+        *pctrl_str = pmeth->ctrl_str;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/scrypt.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/scrypt.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..101bb1e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/evp/scrypt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,248 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <internal/numbers.h>
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCRYPT
+
+#define R(a,b) (((a) << (b)) | ((a) >> (32 - (b))))
+static void salsa208_word_specification(uint32_t inout[16])
+{
+    int i;
+    uint32_t x[16];
+    memcpy(x, inout, sizeof(x));
+    for (i = 8; i > 0; i -= 2) {
+        x[4] ^= R(x[0] + x[12], 7);
+        x[8] ^= R(x[4] + x[0], 9);
+        x[12] ^= R(x[8] + x[4], 13);
+        x[0] ^= R(x[12] + x[8], 18);
+        x[9] ^= R(x[5] + x[1], 7);
+        x[13] ^= R(x[9] + x[5], 9);
+        x[1] ^= R(x[13] + x[9], 13);
+        x[5] ^= R(x[1] + x[13], 18);
+        x[14] ^= R(x[10] + x[6], 7);
+        x[2] ^= R(x[14] + x[10], 9);
+        x[6] ^= R(x[2] + x[14], 13);
+        x[10] ^= R(x[6] + x[2], 18);
+        x[3] ^= R(x[15] + x[11], 7);
+        x[7] ^= R(x[3] + x[15], 9);
+        x[11] ^= R(x[7] + x[3], 13);
+        x[15] ^= R(x[11] + x[7], 18);
+        x[1] ^= R(x[0] + x[3], 7);
+        x[2] ^= R(x[1] + x[0], 9);
+        x[3] ^= R(x[2] + x[1], 13);
+        x[0] ^= R(x[3] + x[2], 18);
+        x[6] ^= R(x[5] + x[4], 7);
+        x[7] ^= R(x[6] + x[5], 9);
+        x[4] ^= R(x[7] + x[6], 13);
+        x[5] ^= R(x[4] + x[7], 18);
+        x[11] ^= R(x[10] + x[9], 7);
+        x[8] ^= R(x[11] + x[10], 9);
+        x[9] ^= R(x[8] + x[11], 13);
+        x[10] ^= R(x[9] + x[8], 18);
+        x[12] ^= R(x[15] + x[14], 7);
+        x[13] ^= R(x[12] + x[15], 9);
+        x[14] ^= R(x[13] + x[12], 13);
+        x[15] ^= R(x[14] + x[13], 18);
+    }
+    for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i)
+        inout[i] += x[i];
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(x, sizeof(x));
+}
+
+static void scryptBlockMix(uint32_t *B_, uint32_t *B, uint64_t r)
+{
+    uint64_t i, j;
+    uint32_t X[16], *pB;
+
+    memcpy(X, B + (r * 2 - 1) * 16, sizeof(X));
+    pB = B;
+    for (i = 0; i < r * 2; i++) {
+        for (j = 0; j < 16; j++)
+            X[j] ^= *pB++;
+        salsa208_word_specification(X);
+        memcpy(B_ + (i / 2 + (i & 1) * r) * 16, X, sizeof(X));
+    }
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(X, sizeof(X));
+}
+
+static void scryptROMix(unsigned char *B, uint64_t r, uint64_t N,
+                        uint32_t *X, uint32_t *T, uint32_t *V)
+{
+    unsigned char *pB;
+    uint32_t *pV;
+    uint64_t i, k;
+
+    /* Convert from little endian input */
+    for (pV = V, i = 0, pB = B; i < 32 * r; i++, pV++) {
+        *pV = *pB++;
+        *pV |= *pB++ << 8;
+        *pV |= *pB++ << 16;
+        *pV |= (uint32_t)*pB++ << 24;
+    }
+
+    for (i = 1; i < N; i++, pV += 32 * r)
+        scryptBlockMix(pV, pV - 32 * r, r);
+
+    scryptBlockMix(X, V + (N - 1) * 32 * r, r);
+
+    for (i = 0; i < N; i++) {
+        uint32_t j;
+        j = X[16 * (2 * r - 1)] % N;
+        pV = V + 32 * r * j;
+        for (k = 0; k < 32 * r; k++)
+            T[k] = X[k] ^ *pV++;
+        scryptBlockMix(X, T, r);
+    }
+    /* Convert output to little endian */
+    for (i = 0, pB = B; i < 32 * r; i++) {
+        uint32_t xtmp = X[i];
+        *pB++ = xtmp & 0xff;
+        *pB++ = (xtmp >> 8) & 0xff;
+        *pB++ = (xtmp >> 16) & 0xff;
+        *pB++ = (xtmp >> 24) & 0xff;
+    }
+}
+
+#ifndef SIZE_MAX
+# define SIZE_MAX    ((size_t)-1)
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Maximum power of two that will fit in uint64_t: this should work on
+ * most (all?) platforms.
+ */
+
+#define LOG2_UINT64_MAX         (sizeof(uint64_t) * 8 - 1)
+
+/*
+ * Maximum value of p * r:
+ * p <= ((2^32-1) * hLen) / MFLen =>
+ * p <= ((2^32-1) * 32) / (128 * r) =>
+ * p * r <= (2^30-1)
+ *
+ */
+
+#define SCRYPT_PR_MAX   ((1 << 30) - 1)
+
+/*
+ * Maximum permitted memory allow this to be overridden with Configuration
+ * option: e.g. -DSCRYPT_MAX_MEM=0 for maximum possible.
+ */
+
+#ifdef SCRYPT_MAX_MEM
+# if SCRYPT_MAX_MEM == 0
+#  undef SCRYPT_MAX_MEM
+/*
+ * Although we could theoretically allocate SIZE_MAX memory that would leave
+ * no memory available for anything else so set limit as half that.
+ */
+#  define SCRYPT_MAX_MEM (SIZE_MAX/2)
+# endif
+#else
+/* Default memory limit: 32 MB */
+# define SCRYPT_MAX_MEM  (1024 * 1024 * 32)
+#endif
+
+int EVP_PBE_scrypt(const char *pass, size_t passlen,
+                   const unsigned char *salt, size_t saltlen,
+                   uint64_t N, uint64_t r, uint64_t p, uint64_t maxmem,
+                   unsigned char *key, size_t keylen)
+{
+    int rv = 0;
+    unsigned char *B;
+    uint32_t *X, *V, *T;
+    uint64_t i, Blen, Vlen;
+    size_t allocsize;
+
+    /* Sanity check parameters */
+    /* initial check, r,p must be non zero, N >= 2 and a power of 2 */
+    if (r == 0 || p == 0 || N < 2 || (N & (N - 1)))
+        return 0;
+    /* Check p * r < SCRYPT_PR_MAX avoiding overflow */
+    if (p > SCRYPT_PR_MAX / r)
+        return 0;
+
+    /*
+     * Need to check N: if 2^(128 * r / 8) overflows limit this is
+     * automatically satisfied since N <= UINT64_MAX.
+     */
+
+    if (16 * r <= LOG2_UINT64_MAX) {
+        if (N >= (((uint64_t)1) << (16 * r)))
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* Memory checks: check total allocated buffer size fits in uint64_t */
+
+    /*
+     * B size in section 5 step 1.S
+     * Note: we know p * 128 * r < UINT64_MAX because we already checked
+     * p * r < SCRYPT_PR_MAX
+     */
+    Blen = p * 128 * r;
+
+    /*
+     * Check 32 * r * (N + 2) * sizeof(uint32_t) fits in
+     * uint64_t and also size_t (their sizes are unrelated).
+     * This is combined size V, X and T (section 4)
+     */
+    i = UINT64_MAX / (32 * sizeof(uint32_t));
+    if (N + 2 > i / r)
+        return 0;
+    Vlen = 32 * r * (N + 2) * sizeof(uint32_t);
+
+    /* check total allocated size fits in uint64_t */
+    if (Blen > UINT64_MAX - Vlen)
+        return 0;
+    /* check total allocated size fits in size_t */
+    if (Blen > SIZE_MAX - Vlen)
+        return 0;
+
+    allocsize = (size_t)(Blen + Vlen);
+
+    if (maxmem == 0)
+        maxmem = SCRYPT_MAX_MEM;
+
+    if (allocsize > maxmem) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PBE_SCRYPT, EVP_R_MEMORY_LIMIT_EXCEEDED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* If no key return to indicate parameters are OK */
+    if (key == NULL)
+        return 1;
+
+    B = OPENSSL_malloc(allocsize);
+    if (B == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    X = (uint32_t *)(B + Blen);
+    T = X + 32 * r;
+    V = T + 32 * r;
+    if (PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, 1, EVP_sha256(),
+                          Blen, B) == 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < p; i++)
+        scryptROMix(B + 128 * r * i, r, N, X, T, V);
+
+    if (PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(pass, passlen, B, Blen, 1, EVP_sha256(),
+                          keylen, key) == 0)
+        goto err;
+    rv = 1;
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(B, allocsize);
+    return rv;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ex_data.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ex_data.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..22c4d3d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ex_data.c
@@ -0,0 +1,399 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "internal/cryptlib_int.h"
+#include "internal/thread_once.h"
+#include <openssl/lhash.h>
+
+/*
+ * Each structure type (sometimes called a class), that supports
+ * exdata has a stack of callbacks for each instance.
+ */
+struct ex_callback_st {
+    long argl;                  /* Arbitrary long */
+    void *argp;                 /* Arbitrary void * */
+    CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func;
+    CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func;
+    CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func;
+};
+
+/*
+ * The state for each class.  This could just be a typedef, but
+ * a structure allows future changes.
+ */
+typedef struct ex_callbacks_st {
+    STACK_OF(EX_CALLBACK) *meth;
+} EX_CALLBACKS;
+
+static EX_CALLBACKS ex_data[CRYPTO_EX_INDEX__COUNT];
+
+static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *ex_data_lock = NULL;
+static CRYPTO_ONCE ex_data_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
+
+DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_ex_data_init)
+{
+    OPENSSL_init_crypto(0, NULL);
+    ex_data_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
+    return ex_data_lock != NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return the EX_CALLBACKS from the |ex_data| array that corresponds to
+ * a given class.  On success, *holds the lock.*
+ */
+static EX_CALLBACKS *get_and_lock(int class_index)
+{
+    EX_CALLBACKS *ip;
+
+    if (class_index < 0 || class_index >= CRYPTO_EX_INDEX__COUNT) {
+        CRYPTOerr(CRYPTO_F_GET_AND_LOCK, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    if (!RUN_ONCE(&ex_data_init, do_ex_data_init)) {
+        CRYPTOerr(CRYPTO_F_GET_AND_LOCK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    if (ex_data_lock == NULL) {
+        /*
+         * This can happen in normal operation when using CRYPTO_mem_leaks().
+         * The CRYPTO_mem_leaks() function calls OPENSSL_cleanup() which cleans
+         * up the locks. Subsequently the BIO that CRYPTO_mem_leaks() uses gets
+         * freed, which also attempts to free the ex_data. However
+         * CRYPTO_mem_leaks() ensures that the ex_data is freed early (i.e.
+         * before OPENSSL_cleanup() is called), so if we get here we can safely
+         * ignore this operation. We just treat it as an error.
+         */
+         return NULL;
+    }
+
+    ip = &ex_data[class_index];
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(ex_data_lock);
+    return ip;
+}
+
+static void cleanup_cb(EX_CALLBACK *funcs)
+{
+    OPENSSL_free(funcs);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Release all "ex_data" state to prevent memory leaks. This can't be made
+ * thread-safe without overhauling a lot of stuff, and shouldn't really be
+ * called under potential race-conditions anyway (it's for program shutdown
+ * after all).
+ */
+void crypto_cleanup_all_ex_data_int(void)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < CRYPTO_EX_INDEX__COUNT; ++i) {
+        EX_CALLBACKS *ip = &ex_data[i];
+
+        sk_EX_CALLBACK_pop_free(ip->meth, cleanup_cb);
+        ip->meth = NULL;
+    }
+
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(ex_data_lock);
+    ex_data_lock = NULL;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Unregister a new index by replacing the callbacks with no-ops.
+ * Any in-use instances are leaked.
+ */
+static void dummy_new(void *parent, void *ptr, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, int idx,
+                     long argl, void *argp)
+{
+}
+
+static void dummy_free(void *parent, void *ptr, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, int idx,
+                       long argl, void *argp)
+{
+}
+
+static int dummy_dup(CRYPTO_EX_DATA *to, const CRYPTO_EX_DATA *from,
+                     void *from_d, int idx,
+                     long argl, void *argp)
+{
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int CRYPTO_free_ex_index(int class_index, int idx)
+{
+    EX_CALLBACKS *ip = get_and_lock(class_index);
+    EX_CALLBACK *a;
+    int toret = 0;
+
+    if (ip == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    if (idx < 0 || idx >= sk_EX_CALLBACK_num(ip->meth))
+        goto err;
+    a = sk_EX_CALLBACK_value(ip->meth, idx);
+    if (a == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    a->new_func = dummy_new;
+    a->dup_func = dummy_dup;
+    a->free_func = dummy_free;
+    toret = 1;
+err:
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ex_data_lock);
+    return toret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Register a new index.
+ */
+int CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(int class_index, long argl, void *argp,
+                            CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,
+                            CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
+{
+    int toret = -1;
+    EX_CALLBACK *a;
+    EX_CALLBACKS *ip = get_and_lock(class_index);
+
+    if (ip == NULL)
+        return -1;
+
+    if (ip->meth == NULL) {
+        ip->meth = sk_EX_CALLBACK_new_null();
+        /* We push an initial value on the stack because the SSL
+         * "app_data" routines use ex_data index zero.  See RT 3710. */
+        if (ip->meth == NULL
+            || !sk_EX_CALLBACK_push(ip->meth, NULL)) {
+            CRYPTOerr(CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_GET_EX_NEW_INDEX, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    a = (EX_CALLBACK *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*a));
+    if (a == NULL) {
+        CRYPTOerr(CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_GET_EX_NEW_INDEX, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    a->argl = argl;
+    a->argp = argp;
+    a->new_func = new_func;
+    a->dup_func = dup_func;
+    a->free_func = free_func;
+
+    if (!sk_EX_CALLBACK_push(ip->meth, NULL)) {
+        CRYPTOerr(CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_GET_EX_NEW_INDEX, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        OPENSSL_free(a);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    toret = sk_EX_CALLBACK_num(ip->meth) - 1;
+    (void)sk_EX_CALLBACK_set(ip->meth, toret, a);
+
+ err:
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ex_data_lock);
+    return toret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initialise a new CRYPTO_EX_DATA for use in a particular class - including
+ * calling new() callbacks for each index in the class used by this variable
+ * Thread-safe by copying a class's array of "EX_CALLBACK" entries
+ * in the lock, then using them outside the lock. Note this only applies
+ * to the global "ex_data" state (ie. class definitions), not 'ad' itself.
+ */
+int CRYPTO_new_ex_data(int class_index, void *obj, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad)
+{
+    int mx, i;
+    void *ptr;
+    EX_CALLBACK **storage = NULL;
+    EX_CALLBACK *stack[10];
+    EX_CALLBACKS *ip = get_and_lock(class_index);
+
+    if (ip == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    ad->sk = NULL;
+
+    mx = sk_EX_CALLBACK_num(ip->meth);
+    if (mx > 0) {
+        if (mx < (int)OSSL_NELEM(stack))
+            storage = stack;
+        else
+            storage = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*storage) * mx);
+        if (storage != NULL)
+            for (i = 0; i < mx; i++)
+                storage[i] = sk_EX_CALLBACK_value(ip->meth, i);
+    }
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ex_data_lock);
+
+    if (mx > 0 && storage == NULL) {
+        CRYPTOerr(CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_NEW_EX_DATA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    for (i = 0; i < mx; i++) {
+        if (storage[i] && storage[i]->new_func) {
+            ptr = CRYPTO_get_ex_data(ad, i);
+            storage[i]->new_func(obj, ptr, ad, i,
+                                 storage[i]->argl, storage[i]->argp);
+        }
+    }
+    if (storage != stack)
+        OPENSSL_free(storage);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Duplicate a CRYPTO_EX_DATA variable - including calling dup() callbacks
+ * for each index in the class used by this variable
+ */
+int CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(int class_index, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *to,
+                       const CRYPTO_EX_DATA *from)
+{
+    int mx, j, i;
+    void *ptr;
+    EX_CALLBACK *stack[10];
+    EX_CALLBACK **storage = NULL;
+    EX_CALLBACKS *ip;
+    int toret = 0;
+
+    if (from->sk == NULL)
+        /* Nothing to copy over */
+        return 1;
+    if ((ip = get_and_lock(class_index)) == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    mx = sk_EX_CALLBACK_num(ip->meth);
+    j = sk_void_num(from->sk);
+    if (j < mx)
+        mx = j;
+    if (mx > 0) {
+        if (mx < (int)OSSL_NELEM(stack))
+            storage = stack;
+        else
+            storage = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*storage) * mx);
+        if (storage != NULL)
+            for (i = 0; i < mx; i++)
+                storage[i] = sk_EX_CALLBACK_value(ip->meth, i);
+    }
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ex_data_lock);
+
+    if (mx == 0)
+        return 1;
+    if (storage == NULL) {
+        CRYPTOerr(CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_DUP_EX_DATA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    /*
+     * Make sure the ex_data stack is at least |mx| elements long to avoid
+     * issues in the for loop that follows; so go get the |mx|'th element
+     * (if it does not exist CRYPTO_get_ex_data() returns NULL), and assign
+     * to itself. This is normally a no-op; but ensures the stack is the
+     * proper size
+     */
+    if (!CRYPTO_set_ex_data(to, mx - 1, CRYPTO_get_ex_data(to, mx - 1)))
+        goto err;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < mx; i++) {
+        ptr = CRYPTO_get_ex_data(from, i);
+        if (storage[i] && storage[i]->dup_func)
+            if (!storage[i]->dup_func(to, from, &ptr, i,
+                                      storage[i]->argl, storage[i]->argp))
+                goto err;
+        CRYPTO_set_ex_data(to, i, ptr);
+    }
+    toret = 1;
+ err:
+    if (storage != stack)
+        OPENSSL_free(storage);
+    return toret;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Cleanup a CRYPTO_EX_DATA variable - including calling free() callbacks for
+ * each index in the class used by this variable
+ */
+void CRYPTO_free_ex_data(int class_index, void *obj, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad)
+{
+    int mx, i;
+    EX_CALLBACKS *ip;
+    void *ptr;
+    EX_CALLBACK *f;
+    EX_CALLBACK *stack[10];
+    EX_CALLBACK **storage = NULL;
+
+    if ((ip = get_and_lock(class_index)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    mx = sk_EX_CALLBACK_num(ip->meth);
+    if (mx > 0) {
+        if (mx < (int)OSSL_NELEM(stack))
+            storage = stack;
+        else
+            storage = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*storage) * mx);
+        if (storage != NULL)
+            for (i = 0; i < mx; i++)
+                storage[i] = sk_EX_CALLBACK_value(ip->meth, i);
+    }
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ex_data_lock);
+
+    for (i = 0; i < mx; i++) {
+        if (storage != NULL)
+            f = storage[i];
+        else {
+            CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(ex_data_lock);
+            f = sk_EX_CALLBACK_value(ip->meth, i);
+            CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ex_data_lock);
+        }
+        if (f != NULL && f->free_func != NULL) {
+            ptr = CRYPTO_get_ex_data(ad, i);
+            f->free_func(obj, ptr, ad, i, f->argl, f->argp);
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (storage != stack)
+        OPENSSL_free(storage);
+ err:
+    sk_void_free(ad->sk);
+    ad->sk = NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * For a given CRYPTO_EX_DATA variable, set the value corresponding to a
+ * particular index in the class used by this variable
+ */
+int CRYPTO_set_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, int idx, void *val)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    if (ad->sk == NULL) {
+        if ((ad->sk = sk_void_new_null()) == NULL) {
+            CRYPTOerr(CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_SET_EX_DATA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    for (i = sk_void_num(ad->sk); i <= idx; ++i) {
+        if (!sk_void_push(ad->sk, NULL)) {
+            CRYPTOerr(CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_SET_EX_DATA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+    sk_void_set(ad->sk, idx, val);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * For a given CRYPTO_EX_DATA_ variable, get the value corresponding to a
+ * particular index in the class used by this variable
+ */
+void *CRYPTO_get_ex_data(const CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, int idx)
+{
+    if (ad->sk == NULL || idx >= sk_void_num(ad->sk))
+        return NULL;
+    return sk_void_value(ad->sk, idx);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/hmac/build.info b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/hmac/build.info
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..09f67c2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/hmac/build.info
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+LIBS=../../libcrypto
+SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
+        hmac.c hm_ameth.c hm_pmeth.c
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/hmac/hm_ameth.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/hmac/hm_ameth.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..78ae0ea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/hmac/hm_ameth.c
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2007-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include "internal/asn1_int.h"
+
+#define HMAC_TEST_PRIVATE_KEY_FORMAT
+
+/*
+ * HMAC "ASN1" method. This is just here to indicate the maximum HMAC output
+ * length and to free up an HMAC key.
+ */
+
+static int hmac_size(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    return EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE;
+}
+
+static void hmac_key_free(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os = EVP_PKEY_get0(pkey);
+    if (os) {
+        if (os->data)
+            OPENSSL_cleanse(os->data, os->length);
+        ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os);
+    }
+}
+
+static int hmac_pkey_ctrl(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int op, long arg1, void *arg2)
+{
+    switch (op) {
+    case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_DEFAULT_MD_NID:
+        *(int *)arg2 = NID_sha256;
+        return 1;
+
+    default:
+        return -2;
+    }
+}
+
+static int hmac_pkey_public_cmp(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b)
+{
+    return ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(EVP_PKEY_get0(a), EVP_PKEY_get0(b));
+}
+
+#ifdef HMAC_TEST_PRIVATE_KEY_FORMAT
+/*
+ * A bogus private key format for test purposes. This is simply the HMAC key
+ * with "HMAC PRIVATE KEY" in the headers. When enabled the genpkey utility
+ * can be used to "generate" HMAC keys.
+ */
+
+static int old_hmac_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+                           const unsigned char **pder, int derlen)
+{
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os;
+    os = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
+    if (os == NULL || !ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(os, *pder, derlen))
+        goto err;
+    if (!EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, EVP_PKEY_HMAC, os))
+        goto err;
+    return 1;
+
+ err:
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int old_hmac_encode(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, unsigned char **pder)
+{
+    int inc;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os = EVP_PKEY_get0(pkey);
+    if (pder) {
+        if (!*pder) {
+            *pder = OPENSSL_malloc(os->length);
+            if (*pder == NULL)
+                return -1;
+            inc = 0;
+        } else
+            inc = 1;
+
+        memcpy(*pder, os->data, os->length);
+
+        if (inc)
+            *pder += os->length;
+    }
+
+    return os->length;
+}
+
+#endif
+
+const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD hmac_asn1_meth = {
+    EVP_PKEY_HMAC,
+    EVP_PKEY_HMAC,
+    0,
+
+    "HMAC",
+    "OpenSSL HMAC method",
+
+    0, 0, hmac_pkey_public_cmp, 0,
+
+    0, 0, 0,
+
+    hmac_size,
+    0, 0,
+    0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+
+    hmac_key_free,
+    hmac_pkey_ctrl,
+#ifdef HMAC_TEST_PRIVATE_KEY_FORMAT
+    old_hmac_decode,
+    old_hmac_encode
+#else
+    0, 0
+#endif
+};
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/hmac/hm_pmeth.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/hmac/hm_pmeth.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5b98477
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/hmac/hm_pmeth.c
@@ -0,0 +1,210 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2007-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+#include "internal/evp_int.h"
+
+/* HMAC pkey context structure */
+
+typedef struct {
+    const EVP_MD *md;           /* MD for HMAC use */
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING ktmp;     /* Temp storage for key */
+    HMAC_CTX *ctx;
+} HMAC_PKEY_CTX;
+
+static int pkey_hmac_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    HMAC_PKEY_CTX *hctx;
+
+    hctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*hctx));
+    if (hctx == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    hctx->ktmp.type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
+    hctx->ctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
+    if (hctx->ctx == NULL) {
+        OPENSSL_free(hctx);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    ctx->data = hctx;
+    ctx->keygen_info_count = 0;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static void pkey_hmac_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);
+
+static int pkey_hmac_copy(EVP_PKEY_CTX *dst, EVP_PKEY_CTX *src)
+{
+    HMAC_PKEY_CTX *sctx, *dctx;
+
+    /* allocate memory for dst->data and a new HMAC_CTX in dst->data->ctx */
+    if (!pkey_hmac_init(dst))
+        return 0;
+    sctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(src);
+    dctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(dst);
+    dctx->md = sctx->md;
+    if (!HMAC_CTX_copy(dctx->ctx, sctx->ctx))
+        goto err;
+    if (sctx->ktmp.data) {
+        if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(&dctx->ktmp,
+                                   sctx->ktmp.data, sctx->ktmp.length))
+            goto err;
+    }
+    return 1;
+err:
+    /* release HMAC_CTX in dst->data->ctx and memory allocated for dst->data */
+    pkey_hmac_cleanup (dst);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static void pkey_hmac_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    HMAC_PKEY_CTX *hctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(ctx);
+
+    if (hctx != NULL) {
+        HMAC_CTX_free(hctx->ctx);
+        OPENSSL_clear_free(hctx->ktmp.data, hctx->ktmp.length);
+        OPENSSL_free(hctx);
+        EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_data(ctx, NULL);
+    }
+}
+
+static int pkey_hmac_keygen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *hkey = NULL;
+    HMAC_PKEY_CTX *hctx = ctx->data;
+    if (!hctx->ktmp.data)
+        return 0;
+    hkey = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_dup(&hctx->ktmp);
+    if (!hkey)
+        return 0;
+    EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, EVP_PKEY_HMAC, hkey);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int int_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count)
+{
+    HMAC_PKEY_CTX *hctx = EVP_MD_CTX_pkey_ctx(ctx)->data;
+    if (!HMAC_Update(hctx->ctx, data, count))
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int hmac_signctx_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_MD_CTX *mctx)
+{
+    HMAC_PKEY_CTX *hctx = ctx->data;
+    HMAC_CTX_set_flags(hctx->ctx,
+                       EVP_MD_CTX_test_flags(mctx, ~EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NO_INIT));
+    EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(mctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NO_INIT);
+    EVP_MD_CTX_set_update_fn(mctx, int_update);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int hmac_signctx(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen,
+                        EVP_MD_CTX *mctx)
+{
+    unsigned int hlen;
+    HMAC_PKEY_CTX *hctx = ctx->data;
+    int l = EVP_MD_CTX_size(mctx);
+
+    if (l < 0)
+        return 0;
+    *siglen = l;
+    if (!sig)
+        return 1;
+
+    if (!HMAC_Final(hctx->ctx, sig, &hlen))
+        return 0;
+    *siglen = (size_t)hlen;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int pkey_hmac_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2)
+{
+    HMAC_PKEY_CTX *hctx = ctx->data;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *key;
+    switch (type) {
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_MAC_KEY:
+        if ((!p2 && p1 > 0) || (p1 < -1))
+            return 0;
+        if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(&hctx->ktmp, p2, p1))
+            return 0;
+        break;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_MD:
+        hctx->md = p2;
+        break;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DIGESTINIT:
+        key = (ASN1_OCTET_STRING *)ctx->pkey->pkey.ptr;
+        if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx->ctx, key->data, key->length, hctx->md,
+                          ctx->engine))
+            return 0;
+        break;
+
+    default:
+        return -2;
+
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int pkey_hmac_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                              const char *type, const char *value)
+{
+    if (!value) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (strcmp(type, "key") == 0)
+        return EVP_PKEY_CTX_str2ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_MAC_KEY, value);
+    if (strcmp(type, "hexkey") == 0)
+        return EVP_PKEY_CTX_hex2ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_MAC_KEY, value);
+    return -2;
+}
+
+const EVP_PKEY_METHOD hmac_pkey_meth = {
+    EVP_PKEY_HMAC,
+    0,
+    pkey_hmac_init,
+    pkey_hmac_copy,
+    pkey_hmac_cleanup,
+
+    0, 0,
+
+    0,
+    pkey_hmac_keygen,
+
+    0, 0,
+
+    0, 0,
+
+    0, 0,
+
+    hmac_signctx_init,
+    hmac_signctx,
+
+    0, 0,
+
+    0, 0,
+
+    0, 0,
+
+    0, 0,
+
+    pkey_hmac_ctrl,
+    pkey_hmac_ctrl_str
+};
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/hmac/hmac.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/hmac/hmac.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3374105
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/hmac/hmac.c
@@ -0,0 +1,240 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+#include "hmac_lcl.h"
+
+int HMAC_Init_ex(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const void *key, int len,
+                 const EVP_MD *md, ENGINE *impl)
+{
+    int i, j, reset = 0;
+    unsigned char pad[HMAC_MAX_MD_CBLOCK];
+
+    /* If we are changing MD then we must have a key */
+    if (md != NULL && md != ctx->md && (key == NULL || len < 0))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (md != NULL) {
+        reset = 1;
+        ctx->md = md;
+    } else if (ctx->md) {
+        md = ctx->md;
+    } else {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (key != NULL) {
+        reset = 1;
+        j = EVP_MD_block_size(md);
+        OPENSSL_assert(j <= (int)sizeof(ctx->key));
+        if (j < len) {
+            if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx->md_ctx, md, impl))
+                goto err;
+            if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx->md_ctx, key, len))
+                goto err;
+            if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx->md_ctx, ctx->key,
+                                    &ctx->key_length))
+                goto err;
+        } else {
+            if (len < 0 || len > (int)sizeof(ctx->key))
+                return 0;
+            memcpy(ctx->key, key, len);
+            ctx->key_length = len;
+        }
+        if (ctx->key_length != HMAC_MAX_MD_CBLOCK)
+            memset(&ctx->key[ctx->key_length], 0,
+                   HMAC_MAX_MD_CBLOCK - ctx->key_length);
+    }
+
+    if (reset) {
+        for (i = 0; i < HMAC_MAX_MD_CBLOCK; i++)
+            pad[i] = 0x36 ^ ctx->key[i];
+        if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx->i_ctx, md, impl))
+            goto err;
+        if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx->i_ctx, pad, EVP_MD_block_size(md)))
+            goto err;
+
+        for (i = 0; i < HMAC_MAX_MD_CBLOCK; i++)
+            pad[i] = 0x5c ^ ctx->key[i];
+        if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx->o_ctx, md, impl))
+            goto err;
+        if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx->o_ctx, pad, EVP_MD_block_size(md)))
+            goto err;
+    }
+    if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(ctx->md_ctx, ctx->i_ctx))
+        goto err;
+    return 1;
+ err:
+    return 0;
+}
+
+#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+int HMAC_Init(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const void *key, int len, const EVP_MD *md)
+{
+    if (key && md)
+        HMAC_CTX_reset(ctx);
+    return HMAC_Init_ex(ctx, key, len, md, NULL);
+}
+#endif
+
+int HMAC_Update(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *data, size_t len)
+{
+    if (!ctx->md)
+        return 0;
+    return EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx->md_ctx, data, len);
+}
+
+int HMAC_Final(HMAC_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *len)
+{
+    unsigned int i;
+    unsigned char buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+
+    if (!ctx->md)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx->md_ctx, buf, &i))
+        goto err;
+    if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(ctx->md_ctx, ctx->o_ctx))
+        goto err;
+    if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx->md_ctx, buf, i))
+        goto err;
+    if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx->md_ctx, md, len))
+        goto err;
+    return 1;
+ err:
+    return 0;
+}
+
+size_t HMAC_size(const HMAC_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return EVP_MD_size((ctx)->md);
+}
+
+HMAC_CTX *HMAC_CTX_new(void)
+{
+    HMAC_CTX *ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(HMAC_CTX));
+
+    if (ctx != NULL) {
+        if (!HMAC_CTX_reset(ctx)) {
+            HMAC_CTX_free(ctx);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+    }
+    return ctx;
+}
+
+static void hmac_ctx_cleanup(HMAC_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    EVP_MD_CTX_reset(ctx->i_ctx);
+    EVP_MD_CTX_reset(ctx->o_ctx);
+    EVP_MD_CTX_reset(ctx->md_ctx);
+    ctx->md = NULL;
+    ctx->key_length = 0;
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->key, sizeof(ctx->key));
+}
+
+void HMAC_CTX_free(HMAC_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    if (ctx != NULL) {
+        hmac_ctx_cleanup(ctx);
+        EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx->i_ctx);
+        EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx->o_ctx);
+        EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx->md_ctx);
+        OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+    }
+}
+
+int HMAC_CTX_reset(HMAC_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    hmac_ctx_cleanup(ctx);
+    if (ctx->i_ctx == NULL)
+        ctx->i_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+    if (ctx->i_ctx == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (ctx->o_ctx == NULL)
+        ctx->o_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+    if (ctx->o_ctx == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (ctx->md_ctx == NULL)
+        ctx->md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+    if (ctx->md_ctx == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    ctx->md = NULL;
+    return 1;
+ err:
+    hmac_ctx_cleanup(ctx);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int HMAC_CTX_copy(HMAC_CTX *dctx, HMAC_CTX *sctx)
+{
+    if (!HMAC_CTX_reset(dctx))
+        goto err;
+    if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(dctx->i_ctx, sctx->i_ctx))
+        goto err;
+    if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(dctx->o_ctx, sctx->o_ctx))
+        goto err;
+    if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(dctx->md_ctx, sctx->md_ctx))
+        goto err;
+    memcpy(dctx->key, sctx->key, HMAC_MAX_MD_CBLOCK);
+    dctx->key_length = sctx->key_length;
+    dctx->md = sctx->md;
+    return 1;
+ err:
+    hmac_ctx_cleanup(dctx);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+unsigned char *HMAC(const EVP_MD *evp_md, const void *key, int key_len,
+                    const unsigned char *d, size_t n, unsigned char *md,
+                    unsigned int *md_len)
+{
+    HMAC_CTX *c = NULL;
+    static unsigned char m[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+    static const unsigned char dummy_key[1] = {'\0'};
+
+    if (md == NULL)
+        md = m;
+    if ((c = HMAC_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* For HMAC_Init_ex, NULL key signals reuse. */
+    if (key == NULL && key_len == 0) {
+        key = dummy_key;
+    }
+
+    if (!HMAC_Init_ex(c, key, key_len, evp_md, NULL))
+        goto err;
+    if (!HMAC_Update(c, d, n))
+        goto err;
+    if (!HMAC_Final(c, md, md_len))
+        goto err;
+    HMAC_CTX_free(c);
+    return md;
+ err:
+    HMAC_CTX_free(c);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+void HMAC_CTX_set_flags(HMAC_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
+{
+    EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(ctx->i_ctx, flags);
+    EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(ctx->o_ctx, flags);
+    EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(ctx->md_ctx, flags);
+}
+
+const EVP_MD *HMAC_CTX_get_md(const HMAC_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->md;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/hmac/hmac_lcl.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/hmac/hmac_lcl.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4c156dc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/hmac/hmac_lcl.h
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_HMAC_LCL_H
+# define HEADER_HMAC_LCL_H
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+#if 0                            /* emacs indentation fix */
+}
+#endif
+
+struct hmac_ctx_st {
+    const EVP_MD *md;
+    EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx;
+    EVP_MD_CTX *i_ctx;
+    EVP_MD_CTX *o_ctx;
+    unsigned int key_length;
+    unsigned char key[HMAC_MAX_MD_CBLOCK];
+};
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+} /* extern "C" */
+#endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ia64cpuid.S b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ia64cpuid.S
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..92c5512
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ia64cpuid.S
@@ -0,0 +1,297 @@
+// Copyright 2004-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+//
+// Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+// this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+// in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+// https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+// Works on all IA-64 platforms: Linux, HP-UX, Win64i...
+// On Win64i compile with ias.exe.
+.text
+
+#if defined(_HPUX_SOURCE) && !defined(_LP64)
+#define	ADDP	addp4
+#else
+#define	ADDP	add
+#endif
+
+.global	OPENSSL_cpuid_setup#
+.proc	OPENSSL_cpuid_setup#
+OPENSSL_cpuid_setup:
+{ .mib;	br.ret.sptk.many	b0		};;
+.endp	OPENSSL_cpuid_setup#
+
+.global	OPENSSL_rdtsc#
+.proc	OPENSSL_rdtsc#
+OPENSSL_rdtsc:
+{ .mib;	mov			r8=ar.itc
+	br.ret.sptk.many	b0		};;
+.endp   OPENSSL_rdtsc#
+
+.global	OPENSSL_atomic_add#
+.proc	OPENSSL_atomic_add#
+.align	32
+OPENSSL_atomic_add:
+{ .mii;	ld4		r2=[r32]
+	nop.i		0
+	nop.i		0		};;
+.Lspin:
+{ .mii;	mov		ar.ccv=r2
+	add		r8=r2,r33
+	mov		r3=r2		};;
+{ .mmi;	mf;;
+	cmpxchg4.acq	r2=[r32],r8,ar.ccv
+	nop.i		0		};;
+{ .mib;	cmp.ne		p6,p0=r2,r3
+	nop.i		0
+(p6)	br.dpnt		.Lspin		};;
+{ .mib;	nop.m		0
+	sxt4		r8=r8
+	br.ret.sptk.many	b0	};;
+.endp	OPENSSL_atomic_add#
+
+// Returns a structure comprising pointer to the top of stack of
+// the caller and pointer beyond backing storage for the current
+// register frame. The latter is required, because it might be
+// insufficient to wipe backing storage for the current frame
+// (as this procedure does), one might have to go further, toward
+// higher addresses to reach for whole "retroactively" saved
+// context...
+.global	OPENSSL_wipe_cpu#
+.proc	OPENSSL_wipe_cpu#
+.align	32
+OPENSSL_wipe_cpu:
+	.prologue
+	.fframe	0
+	.save	ar.pfs,r2
+	.save	ar.lc,r3
+{ .mib;	alloc		r2=ar.pfs,0,96,0,96
+	mov		r3=ar.lc
+	brp.loop.imp	.L_wipe_top,.L_wipe_end-16
+					};;
+{ .mii;	mov		r9=ar.bsp
+	mov		r8=pr
+	mov		ar.lc=96	};;
+	.body
+{ .mii;	add		r9=96*8-8,r9
+	mov		ar.ec=1		};;
+
+// One can sweep double as fast, but then we can't guarantee
+// that backing storage is wiped...
+.L_wipe_top:
+{ .mfi;	st8		[r9]=r0,-8
+	mov		f127=f0
+	mov		r127=r0		}
+{ .mfb;	nop.m		0
+	nop.f		0
+	br.ctop.sptk	.L_wipe_top	};;
+.L_wipe_end:
+
+{ .mfi;	mov		r11=r0
+	mov		f6=f0
+	mov		r14=r0		}
+{ .mfi;	mov		r15=r0
+	mov		f7=f0
+	mov		r16=r0		}
+{ .mfi;	mov		r17=r0
+	mov		f8=f0
+	mov		r18=r0		}
+{ .mfi;	mov		r19=r0
+	mov		f9=f0
+	mov		r20=r0		}
+{ .mfi;	mov		r21=r0
+	mov		f10=f0
+	mov		r22=r0		}
+{ .mfi;	mov		r23=r0
+	mov		f11=f0
+	mov		r24=r0		}
+{ .mfi;	mov		r25=r0
+	mov		f12=f0
+	mov		r26=r0		}
+{ .mfi;	mov		r27=r0
+	mov		f13=f0
+	mov		r28=r0		}
+{ .mfi;	mov		r29=r0
+	mov		f14=f0
+	mov		r30=r0		}
+{ .mfi;	mov		r31=r0
+	mov		f15=f0
+	nop.i		0		}
+{ .mfi;	mov		f16=f0		}
+{ .mfi;	mov		f17=f0		}
+{ .mfi;	mov		f18=f0		}
+{ .mfi;	mov		f19=f0		}
+{ .mfi;	mov		f20=f0		}
+{ .mfi;	mov		f21=f0		}
+{ .mfi;	mov		f22=f0		}
+{ .mfi;	mov		f23=f0		}
+{ .mfi;	mov		f24=f0		}
+{ .mfi;	mov		f25=f0		}
+{ .mfi;	mov		f26=f0		}
+{ .mfi;	mov		f27=f0		}
+{ .mfi;	mov		f28=f0		}
+{ .mfi;	mov		f29=f0		}
+{ .mfi;	mov		f30=f0		}
+{ .mfi;	add		r9=96*8+8,r9
+	mov		f31=f0
+	mov		pr=r8,0x1ffff	}
+{ .mib;	mov		r8=sp
+	mov		ar.lc=r3
+	br.ret.sptk	b0		};;
+.endp	OPENSSL_wipe_cpu#
+
+.global	OPENSSL_cleanse#
+.proc	OPENSSL_cleanse#
+OPENSSL_cleanse:
+{ .mib;	cmp.eq		p6,p0=0,r33	    // len==0
+	ADDP		r32=0,r32
+(p6)	br.ret.spnt	b0		};;
+{ .mib;	and		r2=7,r32
+	cmp.leu		p6,p0=15,r33	    // len>=15
+(p6)	br.cond.dptk	.Lot		};;
+
+.Little:
+{ .mib;	st1		[r32]=r0,1
+	cmp.ltu		p6,p7=1,r33	}  // len>1
+{ .mbb;	add		r33=-1,r33	   // len--
+(p6)	br.cond.dptk	.Little
+(p7)	br.ret.sptk.many	b0	};;
+
+.Lot:
+{ .mib;	cmp.eq		p6,p0=0,r2
+(p6)	br.cond.dptk	.Laligned	};;
+{ .mmi;	st1		[r32]=r0,1;;
+	and		r2=7,r32	}
+{ .mib;	add		r33=-1,r33
+	br		.Lot		};;
+
+.Laligned:
+{ .mmi;	st8		[r32]=r0,8
+	and		r2=-8,r33	    // len&~7
+	add		r33=-8,r33	};; // len-=8
+{ .mib;	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=8,r2	    // ((len+8)&~7)>8
+(p6)	br.cond.dptk	.Laligned	};;
+
+{ .mbb;	cmp.eq		p6,p7=r0,r33
+(p7)	br.cond.dpnt	.Little
+(p6)	br.ret.sptk.many	b0	};;
+.endp	OPENSSL_cleanse#
+
+.global	CRYPTO_memcmp#
+.proc	CRYPTO_memcmp#
+.align	32
+.skip	16
+CRYPTO_memcmp:
+	.prologue
+{ .mib;	mov		r8=0
+	cmp.eq		p6,p0=0,r34	    // len==0?
+(p6)	br.ret.spnt	b0		};;
+	.save		ar.pfs,r2
+{ .mib;	alloc		r2=ar.pfs,3,5,0,8
+	.save		ar.lc,r3
+	mov		r3=ar.lc
+	brp.loop.imp	.Loop_cmp_ctop,.Loop_cmp_cend-16
+					}
+{ .mib;	sub		r10=r34,r0,1
+	.save		pr,r9
+	mov		r9=pr		};;
+{ .mii;	ADDP		r16=0,r32
+	mov		ar.lc=r10
+	mov		ar.ec=4		}
+{ .mib;	ADDP		r17=0,r33
+	mov		pr.rot=1<<16	};;
+
+.Loop_cmp_ctop:
+{ .mib;	(p16)	ld1	r32=[r16],1
+	(p18)	xor	r34=r34,r38	}
+{ .mib;	(p16)	ld1	r36=[r17],1
+	(p19)	or	r8=r8,r35
+	br.ctop.sptk	.Loop_cmp_ctop	};;
+.Loop_cmp_cend:
+
+{ .mib;	cmp.ne		p6,p0=0,r8
+	mov		ar.lc=r3	};;
+{ .mib;
+(p6)	mov		r8=1
+	mov		pr=r9,0x1ffff
+	br.ret.sptk.many	b0	};;
+.endp	CRYPTO_memcmp#
+
+.global	OPENSSL_instrument_bus#
+.proc	OPENSSL_instrument_bus#
+OPENSSL_instrument_bus:
+{ .mmi;	mov		r2=r33
+	ADDP		r32=0,r32	}
+{ .mmi;	mov		r8=ar.itc;;
+	mov		r10=r0
+	mov		r9=r8		};;
+
+{ .mmi;	fc		r32;;
+	ld4		r8=[r32]	};;
+{ .mmi;	mf
+	mov		ar.ccv=r8
+	add		r8=r8,r10	};;
+{ .mmi;	cmpxchg4.acq	r3=[r32],r8,ar.ccv
+					};;
+.Loop:
+{ .mmi;	mov		r8=ar.itc;;
+	sub		r10=r8,r9		// diff=tick-lasttick
+	mov		r9=r8		};;	// lasttick=tick
+{ .mmi;	fc		r32;;
+	ld4		r8=[r32]	};;
+{ .mmi;	mf
+	mov		ar.ccv=r8
+	add		r8=r8,r10	};;
+{ .mmi;	cmpxchg4.acq	r3=[r32],r8,ar.ccv
+	add		r33=-1,r33
+	add		r32=4,r32	};;
+{ .mib;	cmp4.ne		p6,p0=0,r33
+(p6)	br.cond.dptk	.Loop		};;
+
+{ .mib;	sub		r8=r2,r33
+	br.ret.sptk.many	b0	};;
+.endp	OPENSSL_instrument_bus#
+
+.global	OPENSSL_instrument_bus2#
+.proc	OPENSSL_instrument_bus2#
+OPENSSL_instrument_bus2:
+{ .mmi;	mov		r2=r33			// put aside cnt
+	ADDP		r32=0,r32	}
+{ .mmi;	mov		r8=ar.itc;;
+	mov		r10=r0
+	mov		r9=r8		};;
+
+{ .mmi;	fc		r32;;
+	ld4		r8=[r32]	};;
+{ .mmi;	mf
+	mov		ar.ccv=r8
+	add		r8=r8,r10	};;
+{ .mmi;	cmpxchg4.acq	r3=[r32],r8,ar.ccv
+					};;
+
+{ .mmi;	mov		r8=ar.itc;;
+	sub		r10=r8,r9
+	mov		r9=r8		};;
+.Loop2:
+{ .mmi;	mov		r11=r10			// lastdiff=diff
+	add		r34=-1,r34	};;	// --max
+{ .mmi;	fc		r32;;
+	ld4		r8=[r32]
+	cmp4.eq		p6,p0=0,r34	};;
+{ .mmi;	mf
+	mov		ar.ccv=r8
+	add		r8=r8,r10	};;
+{ .mmb;	cmpxchg4.acq	r3=[r32],r8,ar.ccv
+(p6)	br.cond.spnt	.Ldone2		};;
+
+{ .mmi;	mov		r8=ar.itc;;
+	sub		r10=r8,r9		// diff=tick-lasttick
+	mov		r9=r8		};;	// lasttick=tick
+{ .mmi;	cmp.ne		p6,p0=r10,r11;;		// diff!=lastdiff
+(p6)	add		r33=-1,r33	};;	// conditional --cnt
+{ .mib;	cmp4.ne		p7,p0=0,r33
+(p6)	add		r32=4,r32		// conditional ++out
+(p7)	br.cond.dptk	.Loop2		};;
+.Ldone2:
+{ .mib;	sub		r8=r2,r33
+	br.ret.sptk.many	b0	};;
+.endp	OPENSSL_instrument_bus2#
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/idea/build.info b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/idea/build.info
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2326123
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/idea/build.info
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+LIBS=../../libcrypto
+SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
+        i_cbc.c i_cfb64.c i_ofb64.c i_ecb.c i_skey.c
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/idea/i_cbc.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/idea/i_cbc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a70a868
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/idea/i_cbc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/idea.h>
+#include "idea_lcl.h"
+
+void IDEA_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                      long length, IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE *ks, unsigned char *iv,
+                      int encrypt)
+{
+    register unsigned long tin0, tin1;
+    register unsigned long tout0, tout1, xor0, xor1;
+    register long l = length;
+    unsigned long tin[2];
+
+    if (encrypt) {
+        n2l(iv, tout0);
+        n2l(iv, tout1);
+        iv -= 8;
+        for (l -= 8; l >= 0; l -= 8) {
+            n2l(in, tin0);
+            n2l(in, tin1);
+            tin0 ^= tout0;
+            tin1 ^= tout1;
+            tin[0] = tin0;
+            tin[1] = tin1;
+            IDEA_encrypt(tin, ks);
+            tout0 = tin[0];
+            l2n(tout0, out);
+            tout1 = tin[1];
+            l2n(tout1, out);
+        }
+        if (l != -8) {
+            n2ln(in, tin0, tin1, l + 8);
+            tin0 ^= tout0;
+            tin1 ^= tout1;
+            tin[0] = tin0;
+            tin[1] = tin1;
+            IDEA_encrypt(tin, ks);
+            tout0 = tin[0];
+            l2n(tout0, out);
+            tout1 = tin[1];
+            l2n(tout1, out);
+        }
+        l2n(tout0, iv);
+        l2n(tout1, iv);
+    } else {
+        n2l(iv, xor0);
+        n2l(iv, xor1);
+        iv -= 8;
+        for (l -= 8; l >= 0; l -= 8) {
+            n2l(in, tin0);
+            tin[0] = tin0;
+            n2l(in, tin1);
+            tin[1] = tin1;
+            IDEA_encrypt(tin, ks);
+            tout0 = tin[0] ^ xor0;
+            tout1 = tin[1] ^ xor1;
+            l2n(tout0, out);
+            l2n(tout1, out);
+            xor0 = tin0;
+            xor1 = tin1;
+        }
+        if (l != -8) {
+            n2l(in, tin0);
+            tin[0] = tin0;
+            n2l(in, tin1);
+            tin[1] = tin1;
+            IDEA_encrypt(tin, ks);
+            tout0 = tin[0] ^ xor0;
+            tout1 = tin[1] ^ xor1;
+            l2nn(tout0, tout1, out, l + 8);
+            xor0 = tin0;
+            xor1 = tin1;
+        }
+        l2n(xor0, iv);
+        l2n(xor1, iv);
+    }
+    tin0 = tin1 = tout0 = tout1 = xor0 = xor1 = 0;
+    tin[0] = tin[1] = 0;
+}
+
+void IDEA_encrypt(unsigned long *d, IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE *key)
+{
+    register IDEA_INT *p;
+    register unsigned long x1, x2, x3, x4, t0, t1, ul;
+
+    x2 = d[0];
+    x1 = (x2 >> 16);
+    x4 = d[1];
+    x3 = (x4 >> 16);
+
+    p = &(key->data[0][0]);
+
+    E_IDEA(0);
+    E_IDEA(1);
+    E_IDEA(2);
+    E_IDEA(3);
+    E_IDEA(4);
+    E_IDEA(5);
+    E_IDEA(6);
+    E_IDEA(7);
+
+    x1 &= 0xffff;
+    idea_mul(x1, x1, *p, ul);
+    p++;
+
+    t0 = x3 + *(p++);
+    t1 = x2 + *(p++);
+
+    x4 &= 0xffff;
+    idea_mul(x4, x4, *p, ul);
+
+    d[0] = (t0 & 0xffff) | ((x1 & 0xffff) << 16);
+    d[1] = (x4 & 0xffff) | ((t1 & 0xffff) << 16);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/idea/i_cfb64.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/idea/i_cfb64.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..daf467e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/idea/i_cfb64.c
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/idea.h>
+#include "idea_lcl.h"
+
+/*
+ * The input and output encrypted as though 64bit cfb mode is being used.
+ * The extra state information to record how much of the 64bit block we have
+ * used is contained in *num;
+ */
+
+void IDEA_cfb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                        long length, IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE *schedule,
+                        unsigned char *ivec, int *num, int encrypt)
+{
+    register unsigned long v0, v1, t;
+    register int n = *num;
+    register long l = length;
+    unsigned long ti[2];
+    unsigned char *iv, c, cc;
+
+    iv = (unsigned char *)ivec;
+    if (encrypt) {
+        while (l--) {
+            if (n == 0) {
+                n2l(iv, v0);
+                ti[0] = v0;
+                n2l(iv, v1);
+                ti[1] = v1;
+                IDEA_encrypt((unsigned long *)ti, schedule);
+                iv = (unsigned char *)ivec;
+                t = ti[0];
+                l2n(t, iv);
+                t = ti[1];
+                l2n(t, iv);
+                iv = (unsigned char *)ivec;
+            }
+            c = *(in++) ^ iv[n];
+            *(out++) = c;
+            iv[n] = c;
+            n = (n + 1) & 0x07;
+        }
+    } else {
+        while (l--) {
+            if (n == 0) {
+                n2l(iv, v0);
+                ti[0] = v0;
+                n2l(iv, v1);
+                ti[1] = v1;
+                IDEA_encrypt((unsigned long *)ti, schedule);
+                iv = (unsigned char *)ivec;
+                t = ti[0];
+                l2n(t, iv);
+                t = ti[1];
+                l2n(t, iv);
+                iv = (unsigned char *)ivec;
+            }
+            cc = *(in++);
+            c = iv[n];
+            iv[n] = cc;
+            *(out++) = c ^ cc;
+            n = (n + 1) & 0x07;
+        }
+    }
+    v0 = v1 = ti[0] = ti[1] = t = c = cc = 0;
+    *num = n;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/idea/i_ecb.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/idea/i_ecb.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2208287
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/idea/i_ecb.c
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/idea.h>
+#include "idea_lcl.h"
+#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+
+const char *IDEA_options(void)
+{
+    return ("idea(int)");
+}
+
+void IDEA_ecb_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                      IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE *ks)
+{
+    unsigned long l0, l1, d[2];
+
+    n2l(in, l0);
+    d[0] = l0;
+    n2l(in, l1);
+    d[1] = l1;
+    IDEA_encrypt(d, ks);
+    l0 = d[0];
+    l2n(l0, out);
+    l1 = d[1];
+    l2n(l1, out);
+    l0 = l1 = d[0] = d[1] = 0;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/idea/i_ofb64.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/idea/i_ofb64.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..997a7b8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/idea/i_ofb64.c
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/idea.h>
+#include "idea_lcl.h"
+
+/*
+ * The input and output encrypted as though 64bit ofb mode is being used.
+ * The extra state information to record how much of the 64bit block we have
+ * used is contained in *num;
+ */
+void IDEA_ofb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                        long length, IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE *schedule,
+                        unsigned char *ivec, int *num)
+{
+    register unsigned long v0, v1, t;
+    register int n = *num;
+    register long l = length;
+    unsigned char d[8];
+    register char *dp;
+    unsigned long ti[2];
+    unsigned char *iv;
+    int save = 0;
+
+    iv = (unsigned char *)ivec;
+    n2l(iv, v0);
+    n2l(iv, v1);
+    ti[0] = v0;
+    ti[1] = v1;
+    dp = (char *)d;
+    l2n(v0, dp);
+    l2n(v1, dp);
+    while (l--) {
+        if (n == 0) {
+            IDEA_encrypt((unsigned long *)ti, schedule);
+            dp = (char *)d;
+            t = ti[0];
+            l2n(t, dp);
+            t = ti[1];
+            l2n(t, dp);
+            save++;
+        }
+        *(out++) = *(in++) ^ d[n];
+        n = (n + 1) & 0x07;
+    }
+    if (save) {
+        v0 = ti[0];
+        v1 = ti[1];
+        iv = (unsigned char *)ivec;
+        l2n(v0, iv);
+        l2n(v1, iv);
+    }
+    t = v0 = v1 = ti[0] = ti[1] = 0;
+    *num = n;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/idea/i_skey.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/idea/i_skey.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0285324
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/idea/i_skey.c
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/idea.h>
+#include "idea_lcl.h"
+
+static IDEA_INT inverse(unsigned int xin);
+void IDEA_set_encrypt_key(const unsigned char *key, IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE *ks)
+{
+    int i;
+    register IDEA_INT *kt, *kf, r0, r1, r2;
+
+    kt = &(ks->data[0][0]);
+    n2s(key, kt[0]);
+    n2s(key, kt[1]);
+    n2s(key, kt[2]);
+    n2s(key, kt[3]);
+    n2s(key, kt[4]);
+    n2s(key, kt[5]);
+    n2s(key, kt[6]);
+    n2s(key, kt[7]);
+
+    kf = kt;
+    kt += 8;
+    for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
+        r2 = kf[1];
+        r1 = kf[2];
+        *(kt++) = ((r2 << 9) | (r1 >> 7)) & 0xffff;
+        r0 = kf[3];
+        *(kt++) = ((r1 << 9) | (r0 >> 7)) & 0xffff;
+        r1 = kf[4];
+        *(kt++) = ((r0 << 9) | (r1 >> 7)) & 0xffff;
+        r0 = kf[5];
+        *(kt++) = ((r1 << 9) | (r0 >> 7)) & 0xffff;
+        r1 = kf[6];
+        *(kt++) = ((r0 << 9) | (r1 >> 7)) & 0xffff;
+        r0 = kf[7];
+        *(kt++) = ((r1 << 9) | (r0 >> 7)) & 0xffff;
+        r1 = kf[0];
+        if (i >= 5)
+            break;
+        *(kt++) = ((r0 << 9) | (r1 >> 7)) & 0xffff;
+        *(kt++) = ((r1 << 9) | (r2 >> 7)) & 0xffff;
+        kf += 8;
+    }
+}
+
+void IDEA_set_decrypt_key(IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE *ek, IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE *dk)
+{
+    int r;
+    register IDEA_INT *fp, *tp, t;
+
+    tp = &(dk->data[0][0]);
+    fp = &(ek->data[8][0]);
+    for (r = 0; r < 9; r++) {
+        *(tp++) = inverse(fp[0]);
+        *(tp++) = ((int)(0x10000L - fp[2]) & 0xffff);
+        *(tp++) = ((int)(0x10000L - fp[1]) & 0xffff);
+        *(tp++) = inverse(fp[3]);
+        if (r == 8)
+            break;
+        fp -= 6;
+        *(tp++) = fp[4];
+        *(tp++) = fp[5];
+    }
+
+    tp = &(dk->data[0][0]);
+    t = tp[1];
+    tp[1] = tp[2];
+    tp[2] = t;
+
+    t = tp[49];
+    tp[49] = tp[50];
+    tp[50] = t;
+}
+
+/* taken directly from the 'paper' I'll have a look at it later */
+static IDEA_INT inverse(unsigned int xin)
+{
+    long n1, n2, q, r, b1, b2, t;
+
+    if (xin == 0)
+        b2 = 0;
+    else {
+        n1 = 0x10001;
+        n2 = xin;
+        b2 = 1;
+        b1 = 0;
+
+        do {
+            r = (n1 % n2);
+            q = (n1 - r) / n2;
+            if (r == 0) {
+                if (b2 < 0)
+                    b2 = 0x10001 + b2;
+            } else {
+                n1 = n2;
+                n2 = r;
+                t = b2;
+                b2 = b1 - q * b2;
+                b1 = t;
+            }
+        } while (r != 0);
+    }
+    return ((IDEA_INT) b2);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/idea/idea_lcl.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/idea/idea_lcl.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..825d000
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/idea/idea_lcl.h
@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * The new form of this macro (check if the a*b == 0) was suggested by Colin
+ * Plumb <colin@nyx10.cs.du.edu>
+ */
+/* Removal of the inner if from from Wei Dai 24/4/96 */
+#define idea_mul(r,a,b,ul) \
+ul=(unsigned long)a*b; \
+if (ul != 0) \
+        { \
+        r=(ul&0xffff)-(ul>>16); \
+        r-=((r)>>16); \
+        } \
+else \
+        r=(-(int)a-b+1);        /* assuming a or b is 0 and in range */
+
+/*
+ * 7/12/95 - Many thanks to Rhys Weatherley <rweather@us.oracle.com> for
+ * pointing out that I was assuming little endian byte order for all
+ * quantities what idea actually used bigendian.  No where in the spec does
+ * it mention this, it is all in terms of 16 bit numbers and even the example
+ * does not use byte streams for the input example :-(. If you byte swap each
+ * pair of input, keys and iv, the functions would produce the output as the
+ * old version :-(.
+ */
+
+/* NOTE - c is not incremented as per n2l */
+#define n2ln(c,l1,l2,n) { \
+                        c+=n; \
+                        l1=l2=0; \
+                        switch (n) { \
+                        case 8: l2 =((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))    ; \
+                        /* fall thru */                              \
+                        case 7: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<< 8; \
+                        /* fall thru */                              \
+                        case 6: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<16; \
+                        /* fall thru */                              \
+                        case 5: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<24; \
+                        /* fall thru */                              \
+                        case 4: l1 =((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))    ; \
+                        /* fall thru */                              \
+                        case 3: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<< 8; \
+                        /* fall thru */                              \
+                        case 2: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<16; \
+                        /* fall thru */                              \
+                        case 1: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<24; \
+                                } \
+                        }
+
+/* NOTE - c is not incremented as per l2n */
+#define l2nn(l1,l2,c,n) { \
+                        c+=n; \
+                        switch (n) { \
+                        case 8: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)    )&0xff); \
+                        /* fall thru */                                    \
+                        case 7: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>> 8)&0xff); \
+                        /* fall thru */                                    \
+                        case 6: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>>16)&0xff); \
+                        /* fall thru */                                    \
+                        case 5: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>>24)&0xff); \
+                        /* fall thru */                                    \
+                        case 4: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)    )&0xff); \
+                        /* fall thru */                                    \
+                        case 3: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>> 8)&0xff); \
+                        /* fall thru */                                    \
+                        case 2: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>>16)&0xff); \
+                        /* fall thru */                                    \
+                        case 1: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>>24)&0xff); \
+                                } \
+                        }
+
+#undef n2l
+#define n2l(c,l)        (l =((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<24L, \
+                         l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<16L, \
+                         l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<< 8L, \
+                         l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++))))
+
+#undef l2n
+#define l2n(l,c)        (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24L)&0xff), \
+                         *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16L)&0xff), \
+                         *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8L)&0xff), \
+                         *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)     )&0xff))
+
+#undef s2n
+#define s2n(l,c)        (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)     )&0xff), \
+                         *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8L)&0xff))
+
+#undef n2s
+#define n2s(c,l)        (l =((IDEA_INT)(*((c)++)))<< 8L, \
+                         l|=((IDEA_INT)(*((c)++)))      )
+
+
+#define E_IDEA(num) \
+        x1&=0xffff; \
+        idea_mul(x1,x1,*p,ul); p++; \
+        x2+= *(p++); \
+        x3+= *(p++); \
+        x4&=0xffff; \
+        idea_mul(x4,x4,*p,ul); p++; \
+        t0=(x1^x3)&0xffff; \
+        idea_mul(t0,t0,*p,ul); p++; \
+        t1=(t0+(x2^x4))&0xffff; \
+        idea_mul(t1,t1,*p,ul); p++; \
+        t0+=t1; \
+        x1^=t1; \
+        x4^=t0; \
+        ul=x2^t0; /* do the swap to x3 */ \
+        x2=x3^t1; \
+        x3=ul;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/include/internal/asn1_int.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/include/internal/asn1_int.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f70e3b4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/include/internal/asn1_int.h
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* Internal ASN1 structures and functions: not for application use */
+
+/* ASN1 public key method structure */
+
+struct evp_pkey_asn1_method_st {
+    int pkey_id;
+    int pkey_base_id;
+    unsigned long pkey_flags;
+    char *pem_str;
+    char *info;
+    int (*pub_decode) (EVP_PKEY *pk, X509_PUBKEY *pub);
+    int (*pub_encode) (X509_PUBKEY *pub, const EVP_PKEY *pk);
+    int (*pub_cmp) (const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b);
+    int (*pub_print) (BIO *out, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent,
+                      ASN1_PCTX *pctx);
+    int (*priv_decode) (EVP_PKEY *pk, const PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf);
+    int (*priv_encode) (PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, const EVP_PKEY *pk);
+    int (*priv_print) (BIO *out, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent,
+                       ASN1_PCTX *pctx);
+    int (*pkey_size) (const EVP_PKEY *pk);
+    int (*pkey_bits) (const EVP_PKEY *pk);
+    int (*pkey_security_bits) (const EVP_PKEY *pk);
+    int (*param_decode) (EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+                         const unsigned char **pder, int derlen);
+    int (*param_encode) (const EVP_PKEY *pkey, unsigned char **pder);
+    int (*param_missing) (const EVP_PKEY *pk);
+    int (*param_copy) (EVP_PKEY *to, const EVP_PKEY *from);
+    int (*param_cmp) (const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b);
+    int (*param_print) (BIO *out, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent,
+                        ASN1_PCTX *pctx);
+    int (*sig_print) (BIO *out,
+                      const X509_ALGOR *sigalg, const ASN1_STRING *sig,
+                      int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx);
+    void (*pkey_free) (EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+    int (*pkey_ctrl) (EVP_PKEY *pkey, int op, long arg1, void *arg2);
+    /* Legacy functions for old PEM */
+    int (*old_priv_decode) (EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+                            const unsigned char **pder, int derlen);
+    int (*old_priv_encode) (const EVP_PKEY *pkey, unsigned char **pder);
+    /* Custom ASN1 signature verification */
+    int (*item_verify) (EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *asn,
+                        X509_ALGOR *a, ASN1_BIT_STRING *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+    int (*item_sign) (EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *asn,
+                      X509_ALGOR *alg1, X509_ALGOR *alg2,
+                      ASN1_BIT_STRING *sig);
+} /* EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD */ ;
+
+DEFINE_STACK_OF_CONST(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD)
+
+extern const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD cmac_asn1_meth;
+extern const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD dh_asn1_meth;
+extern const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD dhx_asn1_meth;
+extern const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD dsa_asn1_meths[5];
+extern const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD eckey_asn1_meth;
+extern const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD ecx25519_asn1_meth;
+extern const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD hmac_asn1_meth;
+extern const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD rsa_asn1_meths[2];
+
+/*
+ * These are used internally in the ASN1_OBJECT to keep track of whether the
+ * names and data need to be free()ed
+ */
+# define ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC         0x01/* internal use */
+# define ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_CRITICAL        0x02/* critical x509v3 object id */
+# define ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_STRINGS 0x04/* internal use */
+# define ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_DATA    0x08/* internal use */
+struct asn1_object_st {
+    const char *sn, *ln;
+    int nid;
+    int length;
+    const unsigned char *data;  /* data remains const after init */
+    int flags;                  /* Should we free this one */
+};
+
+/* ASN1 print context structure */
+
+struct asn1_pctx_st {
+    unsigned long flags;
+    unsigned long nm_flags;
+    unsigned long cert_flags;
+    unsigned long oid_flags;
+    unsigned long str_flags;
+} /* ASN1_PCTX */ ;
+
+int asn1_valid_host(const ASN1_STRING *host);
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/include/internal/async.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/include/internal/async.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..db56258
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/include/internal/async.h
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/async.h>
+
+int async_init(void);
+void async_deinit(void);
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/include/internal/bn_conf.h.in b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/include/internal/bn_conf.h.in
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ec6e4f6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/include/internal/bn_conf.h.in
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{- join("\n",map { "/* $_ */" } @autowarntext) -}
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_BN_CONF_H
+# define HEADER_BN_CONF_H
+
+/*
+ * The contents of this file are not used in the UEFI build, as
+ * both 32-bit and 64-bit builds are supported from a single run
+ * of the Configure script.
+ */
+
+/* Should we define BN_DIV2W here? */
+
+/* Only one for the following should be defined */
+{- $config{b64l} ? "#define" : "#undef" -} SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG
+{- $config{b64}  ? "#define" : "#undef" -} SIXTY_FOUR_BIT
+{- $config{b32}  ? "#define" : "#undef" -} THIRTY_TWO_BIT
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/include/internal/bn_dh.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/include/internal/bn_dh.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f49f039
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/include/internal/bn_dh.h
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#define declare_dh_bn(x) \
+    extern const BIGNUM _bignum_dh##x##_p;              \
+    extern const BIGNUM _bignum_dh##x##_g;              \
+    extern const BIGNUM _bignum_dh##x##_q;
+
+declare_dh_bn(1024_160)
+declare_dh_bn(2048_224)
+declare_dh_bn(2048_256)
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/include/internal/bn_int.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/include/internal/bn_int.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9c984ba
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/include/internal/bn_int.h
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2014-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_BN_INT_H
+# define HEADER_BN_INT_H
+
+# include <openssl/bn.h>
+# include <limits.h>
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+BIGNUM *bn_wexpand(BIGNUM *a, int words);
+BIGNUM *bn_expand2(BIGNUM *a, int words);
+
+void bn_correct_top(BIGNUM *a);
+
+/*
+ * Determine the modified width-(w+1) Non-Adjacent Form (wNAF) of 'scalar'.
+ * This is an array r[] of values that are either zero or odd with an
+ * absolute value less than 2^w satisfying scalar = \sum_j r[j]*2^j where at
+ * most one of any w+1 consecutive digits is non-zero with the exception that
+ * the most significant digit may be only w-1 zeros away from that next
+ * non-zero digit.
+ */
+signed char *bn_compute_wNAF(const BIGNUM *scalar, int w, size_t *ret_len);
+
+int bn_get_top(const BIGNUM *a);
+
+void bn_set_top(BIGNUM *a, int top);
+
+int bn_get_dmax(const BIGNUM *a);
+
+/* Set all words to zero */
+void bn_set_all_zero(BIGNUM *a);
+
+/*
+ * Copy the internal BIGNUM words into out which holds size elements (and size
+ * must be bigger than top)
+ */
+int bn_copy_words(BN_ULONG *out, const BIGNUM *in, int size);
+
+BN_ULONG *bn_get_words(const BIGNUM *a);
+
+/*
+ * Set the internal data words in a to point to words which contains size
+ * elements. The BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA flag is set
+ */
+void bn_set_static_words(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG *words, int size);
+
+/*
+ * Copy words into the BIGNUM |a|, reallocating space as necessary.
+ * The negative flag of |a| is not modified.
+ * Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure.
+ */
+/*
+ * |num_words| is int because bn_expand2 takes an int. This is an internal
+ * function so we simply trust callers not to pass negative values.
+ */
+int bn_set_words(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG *words, int num_words);
+
+size_t bn_sizeof_BIGNUM(void);
+
+/*
+ * Return element el from an array of BIGNUMs starting at base (required
+ * because callers do not know the size of BIGNUM at compilation time)
+ */
+BIGNUM *bn_array_el(BIGNUM *base, int el);
+
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/include/internal/bn_srp.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/include/internal/bn_srp.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d4b282a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/include/internal/bn_srp.h
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2014-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+
+extern const BIGNUM bn_group_1024;
+
+extern const BIGNUM bn_group_1536;
+
+extern const BIGNUM bn_group_2048;
+
+extern const BIGNUM bn_group_3072;
+
+extern const BIGNUM bn_group_4096;
+
+extern const BIGNUM bn_group_6144;
+
+extern const BIGNUM bn_group_8192;
+
+extern const BIGNUM bn_generator_19;
+
+extern const BIGNUM bn_generator_5;
+
+extern const BIGNUM bn_generator_2;
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/include/internal/chacha.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/include/internal/chacha.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7d4366e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/include/internal/chacha.h
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_CHACHA_H
+#define HEADER_CHACHA_H
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * ChaCha20_ctr32 encrypts |len| bytes from |inp| with the given key and
+ * nonce and writes the result to |out|, which may be equal to |inp|.
+ * The |key| is not 32 bytes of verbatim key material though, but the
+ * said material collected into 8 32-bit elements array in host byte
+ * order. Same approach applies to nonce: the |counter| argument is
+ * pointer to concatenated nonce and counter values collected into 4
+ * 32-bit elements. This, passing crypto material collected into 32-bit
+ * elements as opposite to passing verbatim byte vectors, is chosen for
+ * efficiency in multi-call scenarios.
+ */
+void ChaCha20_ctr32(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *inp,
+                    size_t len, const unsigned int key[8],
+                    const unsigned int counter[4]);
+/*
+ * You can notice that there is no key setup procedure. Because it's
+ * as trivial as collecting bytes into 32-bit elements, it's reckoned
+ * that below macro is sufficient.
+ */
+#define CHACHA_U8TOU32(p)  ( \
+                ((unsigned int)(p)[0])     | ((unsigned int)(p)[1]<<8) | \
+                ((unsigned int)(p)[2]<<16) | ((unsigned int)(p)[3]<<24)  )
+
+#define CHACHA_KEY_SIZE		32
+#define CHACHA_CTR_SIZE		16
+#define CHACHA_BLK_SIZE		64
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/include/internal/cryptlib.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/include/internal/cryptlib.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f3ec9b6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/include/internal/cryptlib.h
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_CRYPTLIB_H
+# define HEADER_CRYPTLIB_H
+
+# include <stdlib.h>
+# include <string.h>
+
+# include "e_os.h"
+
+# ifdef OPENSSL_USE_APPLINK
+#  undef BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK
+#  define BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK 0x8000
+#  include "ms/uplink.h"
+# endif
+
+# include <openssl/crypto.h>
+# include <openssl/buffer.h>
+# include <openssl/bio.h>
+# include <openssl/err.h>
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+typedef struct ex_callback_st EX_CALLBACK;
+
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(EX_CALLBACK)
+
+typedef struct app_mem_info_st APP_INFO;
+
+typedef struct mem_st MEM;
+DEFINE_LHASH_OF(MEM);
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+#  define X509_CERT_AREA          OPENSSLDIR
+#  define X509_CERT_DIR           OPENSSLDIR "/certs"
+#  define X509_CERT_FILE          OPENSSLDIR "/cert.pem"
+#  define X509_PRIVATE_DIR        OPENSSLDIR "/private"
+#  define CTLOG_FILE              OPENSSLDIR "/ct_log_list.cnf"
+# else
+#  define X509_CERT_AREA          "OSSL$DATAROOT:[000000]"
+#  define X509_CERT_DIR           "OSSL$DATAROOT:[CERTS]"
+#  define X509_CERT_FILE          "OSSL$DATAROOT:[000000]cert.pem"
+#  define X509_PRIVATE_DIR        "OSSL$DATAROOT:[PRIVATE]"
+#  define CTLOG_FILE              "OSSL$DATAROOT:[000000]ct_log_list.cnf"
+# endif
+
+# define X509_CERT_DIR_EVP        "SSL_CERT_DIR"
+# define X509_CERT_FILE_EVP       "SSL_CERT_FILE"
+# define CTLOG_FILE_EVP           "CTLOG_FILE"
+
+/* size of string representations */
+# define DECIMAL_SIZE(type)      ((sizeof(type)*8+2)/3+1)
+# define HEX_SIZE(type)          (sizeof(type)*2)
+
+void OPENSSL_cpuid_setup(void);
+extern unsigned int OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[];
+void OPENSSL_showfatal(const char *fmta, ...);
+extern int OPENSSL_NONPIC_relocated;
+void crypto_cleanup_all_ex_data_int(void);
+
+int openssl_strerror_r(int errnum, char *buf, size_t buflen);
+# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_STDIO)
+FILE *openssl_fopen(const char *filename, const char *mode);
+# else
+void *openssl_fopen(const char *filename, const char *mode);
+# endif
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/include/internal/cryptlib_int.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/include/internal/cryptlib_int.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8e2a719
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/include/internal/cryptlib_int.h
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <internal/cryptlib.h>
+
+/* This file is not scanned by mkdef.pl, whereas cryptlib.h is */
+
+struct thread_local_inits_st {
+    int async;
+    int err_state;
+};
+
+int ossl_init_thread_start(uint64_t opts);
+
+/*
+ * OPENSSL_INIT flags. The primary list of these is in crypto.h. Flags below
+ * are those omitted from crypto.h because they are "reserved for internal
+ * use".
+ */
+# define OPENSSL_INIT_ZLIB                   0x00010000L
+
+/* OPENSSL_INIT_THREAD flags */
+# define OPENSSL_INIT_THREAD_ASYNC           0x01
+# define OPENSSL_INIT_THREAD_ERR_STATE       0x02
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/include/internal/dso_conf.h.in b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/include/internal/dso_conf.h.in
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..daa5e24
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/include/internal/dso_conf.h.in
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+{- join("\n",map { "/* $_ */" } @autowarntext) -}
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_DSO_CONF_H
+# define HEADER_DSO_CONF_H
+
+# define DSO_EXTENSION "{- $target{dso_extension} -}"
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/include/internal/engine.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/include/internal/engine.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..977cf06
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/include/internal/engine.h
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+
+void engine_load_openssl_int(void);
+void engine_load_cryptodev_int(void);
+void engine_load_rdrand_int(void);
+void engine_load_dynamic_int(void);
+void engine_load_padlock_int(void);
+void engine_load_capi_int(void);
+void engine_load_dasync_int(void);
+void engine_load_afalg_int(void);
+void engine_cleanup_int(void);
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/include/internal/err_int.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/include/internal/err_int.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7fec3ed
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/include/internal/err_int.h
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef INTERNAL_ERR_INT_H
+# define INTERNAL_ERR_INT_H
+
+int err_load_crypto_strings_int(void);
+void err_cleanup(void);
+void err_delete_thread_state(void);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/include/internal/evp_int.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/include/internal/evp_int.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f34699b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/include/internal/evp_int.h
@@ -0,0 +1,390 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2015-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+struct evp_pkey_ctx_st {
+    /* Method associated with this operation */
+    const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth;
+    /* Engine that implements this method or NULL if builtin */
+    ENGINE *engine;
+    /* Key: may be NULL */
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+    /* Peer key for key agreement, may be NULL */
+    EVP_PKEY *peerkey;
+    /* Actual operation */
+    int operation;
+    /* Algorithm specific data */
+    void *data;
+    /* Application specific data */
+    void *app_data;
+    /* Keygen callback */
+    EVP_PKEY_gen_cb *pkey_gencb;
+    /* implementation specific keygen data */
+    int *keygen_info;
+    int keygen_info_count;
+} /* EVP_PKEY_CTX */ ;
+
+#define EVP_PKEY_FLAG_DYNAMIC   1
+
+struct evp_pkey_method_st {
+    int pkey_id;
+    int flags;
+    int (*init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);
+    int (*copy) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *dst, EVP_PKEY_CTX *src);
+    void (*cleanup) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);
+    int (*paramgen_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);
+    int (*paramgen) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+    int (*keygen_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);
+    int (*keygen) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+    int (*sign_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);
+    int (*sign) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen,
+                 const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen);
+    int (*verify_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);
+    int (*verify) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                   const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen,
+                   const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen);
+    int (*verify_recover_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);
+    int (*verify_recover) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                           unsigned char *rout, size_t *routlen,
+                           const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen);
+    int (*signctx_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_MD_CTX *mctx);
+    int (*signctx) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen,
+                    EVP_MD_CTX *mctx);
+    int (*verifyctx_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_MD_CTX *mctx);
+    int (*verifyctx) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sig, int siglen,
+                      EVP_MD_CTX *mctx);
+    int (*encrypt_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);
+    int (*encrypt) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
+                    const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen);
+    int (*decrypt_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);
+    int (*decrypt) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
+                    const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen);
+    int (*derive_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);
+    int (*derive) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key, size_t *keylen);
+    int (*ctrl) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2);
+    int (*ctrl_str) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const char *type, const char *value);
+} /* EVP_PKEY_METHOD */ ;
+
+DEFINE_STACK_OF_CONST(EVP_PKEY_METHOD)
+
+void evp_pkey_set_cb_translate(BN_GENCB *cb, EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);
+
+extern const EVP_PKEY_METHOD cmac_pkey_meth;
+extern const EVP_PKEY_METHOD dh_pkey_meth;
+extern const EVP_PKEY_METHOD dhx_pkey_meth;
+extern const EVP_PKEY_METHOD dsa_pkey_meth;
+extern const EVP_PKEY_METHOD ec_pkey_meth;
+extern const EVP_PKEY_METHOD ecx25519_pkey_meth;
+extern const EVP_PKEY_METHOD hmac_pkey_meth;
+extern const EVP_PKEY_METHOD rsa_pkey_meth;
+extern const EVP_PKEY_METHOD tls1_prf_pkey_meth;
+extern const EVP_PKEY_METHOD hkdf_pkey_meth;
+
+struct evp_md_st {
+    int type;
+    int pkey_type;
+    int md_size;
+    unsigned long flags;
+    int (*init) (EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
+    int (*update) (EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count);
+    int (*final) (EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md);
+    int (*copy) (EVP_MD_CTX *to, const EVP_MD_CTX *from);
+    int (*cleanup) (EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
+    int block_size;
+    int ctx_size;               /* how big does the ctx->md_data need to be */
+    /* control function */
+    int (*md_ctrl) (EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, int cmd, int p1, void *p2);
+} /* EVP_MD */ ;
+
+struct evp_cipher_st {
+    int nid;
+    int block_size;
+    /* Default value for variable length ciphers */
+    int key_len;
+    int iv_len;
+    /* Various flags */
+    unsigned long flags;
+    /* init key */
+    int (*init) (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+                 const unsigned char *iv, int enc);
+    /* encrypt/decrypt data */
+    int (*do_cipher) (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                      const unsigned char *in, size_t inl);
+    /* cleanup ctx */
+    int (*cleanup) (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *);
+    /* how big ctx->cipher_data needs to be */
+    int ctx_size;
+    /* Populate a ASN1_TYPE with parameters */
+    int (*set_asn1_parameters) (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, ASN1_TYPE *);
+    /* Get parameters from a ASN1_TYPE */
+    int (*get_asn1_parameters) (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, ASN1_TYPE *);
+    /* Miscellaneous operations */
+    int (*ctrl) (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int type, int arg, void *ptr);
+    /* Application data */
+    void *app_data;
+} /* EVP_CIPHER */ ;
+
+/* Macros to code block cipher wrappers */
+
+/* Wrapper functions for each cipher mode */
+
+#define EVP_C_DATA(kstruct, ctx) \
+        ((kstruct *)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(ctx))
+
+#define BLOCK_CIPHER_ecb_loop() \
+        size_t i, bl; \
+        bl = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx)->block_size;    \
+        if (inl < bl) return 1;\
+        inl -= bl; \
+        for (i=0; i <= inl; i+=bl)
+
+#define BLOCK_CIPHER_func_ecb(cname, cprefix, kstruct, ksched) \
+static int cname##_ecb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t inl) \
+{\
+        BLOCK_CIPHER_ecb_loop() \
+            cprefix##_ecb_encrypt(in + i, out + i, &EVP_C_DATA(kstruct,ctx)->ksched, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)); \
+        return 1;\
+}
+
+#define EVP_MAXCHUNK ((size_t)1<<(sizeof(long)*8-2))
+
+#define BLOCK_CIPHER_func_ofb(cname, cprefix, cbits, kstruct, ksched) \
+    static int cname##_ofb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t inl) \
+{\
+        while(inl>=EVP_MAXCHUNK) {\
+            int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_num(ctx);\
+            cprefix##_ofb##cbits##_encrypt(in, out, (long)EVP_MAXCHUNK, &EVP_C_DATA(kstruct,ctx)->ksched, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), &num); \
+            EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num);\
+            inl-=EVP_MAXCHUNK;\
+            in +=EVP_MAXCHUNK;\
+            out+=EVP_MAXCHUNK;\
+        }\
+        if (inl) {\
+            int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_num(ctx);\
+            cprefix##_ofb##cbits##_encrypt(in, out, (long)inl, &EVP_C_DATA(kstruct,ctx)->ksched, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), &num); \
+            EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num);\
+        }\
+        return 1;\
+}
+
+#define BLOCK_CIPHER_func_cbc(cname, cprefix, kstruct, ksched) \
+static int cname##_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t inl) \
+{\
+        while(inl>=EVP_MAXCHUNK) \
+            {\
+            cprefix##_cbc_encrypt(in, out, (long)EVP_MAXCHUNK, &EVP_C_DATA(kstruct,ctx)->ksched, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx));\
+            inl-=EVP_MAXCHUNK;\
+            in +=EVP_MAXCHUNK;\
+            out+=EVP_MAXCHUNK;\
+            }\
+        if (inl)\
+            cprefix##_cbc_encrypt(in, out, (long)inl, &EVP_C_DATA(kstruct,ctx)->ksched, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx));\
+        return 1;\
+}
+
+#define BLOCK_CIPHER_func_cfb(cname, cprefix, cbits, kstruct, ksched)  \
+static int cname##_cfb##cbits##_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t inl) \
+{\
+    size_t chunk = EVP_MAXCHUNK;\
+    if (cbits == 1)  chunk >>= 3;\
+    if (inl < chunk) chunk = inl;\
+    while (inl && inl >= chunk)\
+    {\
+        int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_num(ctx);\
+        cprefix##_cfb##cbits##_encrypt(in, out, (long) \
+            ((cbits == 1) \
+                && !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_test_flags(ctx, EVP_CIPH_FLAG_LENGTH_BITS) \
+                ? chunk*8 : chunk), \
+            &EVP_C_DATA(kstruct, ctx)->ksched, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx),\
+            &num, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx));\
+        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num);\
+        inl -= chunk;\
+        in += chunk;\
+        out += chunk;\
+        if (inl < chunk) chunk = inl;\
+    }\
+    return 1;\
+}
+
+#define BLOCK_CIPHER_all_funcs(cname, cprefix, cbits, kstruct, ksched) \
+        BLOCK_CIPHER_func_cbc(cname, cprefix, kstruct, ksched) \
+        BLOCK_CIPHER_func_cfb(cname, cprefix, cbits, kstruct, ksched) \
+        BLOCK_CIPHER_func_ecb(cname, cprefix, kstruct, ksched) \
+        BLOCK_CIPHER_func_ofb(cname, cprefix, cbits, kstruct, ksched)
+
+#define BLOCK_CIPHER_def1(cname, nmode, mode, MODE, kstruct, nid, block_size, \
+                          key_len, iv_len, flags, init_key, cleanup, \
+                          set_asn1, get_asn1, ctrl) \
+static const EVP_CIPHER cname##_##mode = { \
+        nid##_##nmode, block_size, key_len, iv_len, \
+        flags | EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \
+        init_key, \
+        cname##_##mode##_cipher, \
+        cleanup, \
+        sizeof(kstruct), \
+        set_asn1, get_asn1,\
+        ctrl, \
+        NULL \
+}; \
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_##cname##_##mode(void) { return &cname##_##mode; }
+
+#define BLOCK_CIPHER_def_cbc(cname, kstruct, nid, block_size, key_len, \
+                             iv_len, flags, init_key, cleanup, set_asn1, \
+                             get_asn1, ctrl) \
+BLOCK_CIPHER_def1(cname, cbc, cbc, CBC, kstruct, nid, block_size, key_len, \
+                  iv_len, flags, init_key, cleanup, set_asn1, get_asn1, ctrl)
+
+#define BLOCK_CIPHER_def_cfb(cname, kstruct, nid, key_len, \
+                             iv_len, cbits, flags, init_key, cleanup, \
+                             set_asn1, get_asn1, ctrl) \
+BLOCK_CIPHER_def1(cname, cfb##cbits, cfb##cbits, CFB, kstruct, nid, 1, \
+                  key_len, iv_len, flags, init_key, cleanup, set_asn1, \
+                  get_asn1, ctrl)
+
+#define BLOCK_CIPHER_def_ofb(cname, kstruct, nid, key_len, \
+                             iv_len, cbits, flags, init_key, cleanup, \
+                             set_asn1, get_asn1, ctrl) \
+BLOCK_CIPHER_def1(cname, ofb##cbits, ofb, OFB, kstruct, nid, 1, \
+                  key_len, iv_len, flags, init_key, cleanup, set_asn1, \
+                  get_asn1, ctrl)
+
+#define BLOCK_CIPHER_def_ecb(cname, kstruct, nid, block_size, key_len, \
+                             flags, init_key, cleanup, set_asn1, \
+                             get_asn1, ctrl) \
+BLOCK_CIPHER_def1(cname, ecb, ecb, ECB, kstruct, nid, block_size, key_len, \
+                  0, flags, init_key, cleanup, set_asn1, get_asn1, ctrl)
+
+#define BLOCK_CIPHER_defs(cname, kstruct, \
+                          nid, block_size, key_len, iv_len, cbits, flags, \
+                          init_key, cleanup, set_asn1, get_asn1, ctrl) \
+BLOCK_CIPHER_def_cbc(cname, kstruct, nid, block_size, key_len, iv_len, flags, \
+                     init_key, cleanup, set_asn1, get_asn1, ctrl) \
+BLOCK_CIPHER_def_cfb(cname, kstruct, nid, key_len, iv_len, cbits, \
+                     flags, init_key, cleanup, set_asn1, get_asn1, ctrl) \
+BLOCK_CIPHER_def_ofb(cname, kstruct, nid, key_len, iv_len, cbits, \
+                     flags, init_key, cleanup, set_asn1, get_asn1, ctrl) \
+BLOCK_CIPHER_def_ecb(cname, kstruct, nid, block_size, key_len, flags, \
+                     init_key, cleanup, set_asn1, get_asn1, ctrl)
+
+/*-
+#define BLOCK_CIPHER_defs(cname, kstruct, \
+                                nid, block_size, key_len, iv_len, flags,\
+                                 init_key, cleanup, set_asn1, get_asn1, ctrl)\
+static const EVP_CIPHER cname##_cbc = {\
+        nid##_cbc, block_size, key_len, iv_len, \
+        flags | EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,\
+        init_key,\
+        cname##_cbc_cipher,\
+        cleanup,\
+        sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX)-sizeof((((EVP_CIPHER_CTX *)NULL)->c))+\
+                sizeof((((EVP_CIPHER_CTX *)NULL)->c.kstruct)),\
+        set_asn1, get_asn1,\
+        ctrl, \
+        NULL \
+};\
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_##cname##_cbc(void) { return &cname##_cbc; }\
+static const EVP_CIPHER cname##_cfb = {\
+        nid##_cfb64, 1, key_len, iv_len, \
+        flags | EVP_CIPH_CFB_MODE,\
+        init_key,\
+        cname##_cfb_cipher,\
+        cleanup,\
+        sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX)-sizeof((((EVP_CIPHER_CTX *)NULL)->c))+\
+                sizeof((((EVP_CIPHER_CTX *)NULL)->c.kstruct)),\
+        set_asn1, get_asn1,\
+        ctrl,\
+        NULL \
+};\
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_##cname##_cfb(void) { return &cname##_cfb; }\
+static const EVP_CIPHER cname##_ofb = {\
+        nid##_ofb64, 1, key_len, iv_len, \
+        flags | EVP_CIPH_OFB_MODE,\
+        init_key,\
+        cname##_ofb_cipher,\
+        cleanup,\
+        sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX)-sizeof((((EVP_CIPHER_CTX *)NULL)->c))+\
+                sizeof((((EVP_CIPHER_CTX *)NULL)->c.kstruct)),\
+        set_asn1, get_asn1,\
+        ctrl,\
+        NULL \
+};\
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_##cname##_ofb(void) { return &cname##_ofb; }\
+static const EVP_CIPHER cname##_ecb = {\
+        nid##_ecb, block_size, key_len, iv_len, \
+        flags | EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,\
+        init_key,\
+        cname##_ecb_cipher,\
+        cleanup,\
+        sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX)-sizeof((((EVP_CIPHER_CTX *)NULL)->c))+\
+                sizeof((((EVP_CIPHER_CTX *)NULL)->c.kstruct)),\
+        set_asn1, get_asn1,\
+        ctrl,\
+        NULL \
+};\
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_##cname##_ecb(void) { return &cname##_ecb; }
+*/
+
+#define IMPLEMENT_BLOCK_CIPHER(cname, ksched, cprefix, kstruct, nid, \
+                               block_size, key_len, iv_len, cbits, \
+                               flags, init_key, \
+                               cleanup, set_asn1, get_asn1, ctrl) \
+        BLOCK_CIPHER_all_funcs(cname, cprefix, cbits, kstruct, ksched) \
+        BLOCK_CIPHER_defs(cname, kstruct, nid, block_size, key_len, iv_len, \
+                          cbits, flags, init_key, cleanup, set_asn1, \
+                          get_asn1, ctrl)
+
+#define IMPLEMENT_CFBR(cipher,cprefix,kstruct,ksched,keysize,cbits,iv_len,fl) \
+        BLOCK_CIPHER_func_cfb(cipher##_##keysize,cprefix,cbits,kstruct,ksched) \
+        BLOCK_CIPHER_def_cfb(cipher##_##keysize,kstruct, \
+                             NID_##cipher##_##keysize, keysize/8, iv_len, cbits, \
+                             (fl)|EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1, \
+                             cipher##_init_key, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)
+
+
+/*
+ * Type needs to be a bit field Sub-type needs to be for variations on the
+ * method, as in, can it do arbitrary encryption....
+ */
+struct evp_pkey_st {
+    int type;
+    int save_type;
+    int references;
+    const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth;
+    ENGINE *engine;
+    ENGINE *pmeth_engine; /* If not NULL public key ENGINE to use */
+    union {
+        void *ptr;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+        struct rsa_st *rsa;     /* RSA */
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+        struct dsa_st *dsa;     /* DSA */
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+        struct dh_st *dh;       /* DH */
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+        struct ec_key_st *ec;   /* ECC */
+# endif
+    } pkey;
+    int save_parameters;
+    STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *attributes; /* [ 0 ] */
+    CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock;
+} /* EVP_PKEY */ ;
+
+
+void openssl_add_all_ciphers_int(void);
+void openssl_add_all_digests_int(void);
+void evp_cleanup_int(void);
+
+/* Pulling defines out of C soure files */
+
+#define EVP_RC4_KEY_SIZE 16
+#ifndef TLS1_1_VERSION
+# define TLS1_1_VERSION   0x0302
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/include/internal/md32_common.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/include/internal/md32_common.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6e4ce14
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/include/internal/md32_common.h
@@ -0,0 +1,383 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*-
+ * This is a generic 32 bit "collector" for message digest algorithms.
+ * Whenever needed it collects input character stream into chunks of
+ * 32 bit values and invokes a block function that performs actual hash
+ * calculations.
+ *
+ * Porting guide.
+ *
+ * Obligatory macros:
+ *
+ * DATA_ORDER_IS_BIG_ENDIAN or DATA_ORDER_IS_LITTLE_ENDIAN
+ *      this macro defines byte order of input stream.
+ * HASH_CBLOCK
+ *      size of a unit chunk HASH_BLOCK operates on.
+ * HASH_LONG
+ *      has to be at lest 32 bit wide.
+ * HASH_CTX
+ *      context structure that at least contains following
+ *      members:
+ *              typedef struct {
+ *                      ...
+ *                      HASH_LONG       Nl,Nh;
+ *                      either {
+ *                      HASH_LONG       data[HASH_LBLOCK];
+ *                      unsigned char   data[HASH_CBLOCK];
+ *                      };
+ *                      unsigned int    num;
+ *                      ...
+ *                      } HASH_CTX;
+ *      data[] vector is expected to be zeroed upon first call to
+ *      HASH_UPDATE.
+ * HASH_UPDATE
+ *      name of "Update" function, implemented here.
+ * HASH_TRANSFORM
+ *      name of "Transform" function, implemented here.
+ * HASH_FINAL
+ *      name of "Final" function, implemented here.
+ * HASH_BLOCK_DATA_ORDER
+ *      name of "block" function capable of treating *unaligned* input
+ *      message in original (data) byte order, implemented externally.
+ * HASH_MAKE_STRING
+ *      macro convering context variables to an ASCII hash string.
+ *
+ * MD5 example:
+ *
+ *      #define DATA_ORDER_IS_LITTLE_ENDIAN
+ *
+ *      #define HASH_LONG               MD5_LONG
+ *      #define HASH_CTX                MD5_CTX
+ *      #define HASH_CBLOCK             MD5_CBLOCK
+ *      #define HASH_UPDATE             MD5_Update
+ *      #define HASH_TRANSFORM          MD5_Transform
+ *      #define HASH_FINAL              MD5_Final
+ *      #define HASH_BLOCK_DATA_ORDER   md5_block_data_order
+ *
+ *                                      <appro@fy.chalmers.se>
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+
+#if !defined(DATA_ORDER_IS_BIG_ENDIAN) && !defined(DATA_ORDER_IS_LITTLE_ENDIAN)
+# error "DATA_ORDER must be defined!"
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HASH_CBLOCK
+# error "HASH_CBLOCK must be defined!"
+#endif
+#ifndef HASH_LONG
+# error "HASH_LONG must be defined!"
+#endif
+#ifndef HASH_CTX
+# error "HASH_CTX must be defined!"
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HASH_UPDATE
+# error "HASH_UPDATE must be defined!"
+#endif
+#ifndef HASH_TRANSFORM
+# error "HASH_TRANSFORM must be defined!"
+#endif
+#ifndef HASH_FINAL
+# error "HASH_FINAL must be defined!"
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HASH_BLOCK_DATA_ORDER
+# error "HASH_BLOCK_DATA_ORDER must be defined!"
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Engage compiler specific rotate intrinsic function if available.
+ */
+#undef ROTATE
+#ifndef PEDANTIC
+# if defined(_MSC_VER)
+#  define ROTATE(a,n)   _lrotl(a,n)
+# elif defined(__ICC)
+#  define ROTATE(a,n)   _rotl(a,n)
+# elif defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_INLINE_ASM)
+  /*
+   * Some GNU C inline assembler templates. Note that these are
+   * rotates by *constant* number of bits! But that's exactly
+   * what we need here...
+   *                                    <appro@fy.chalmers.se>
+   */
+#  if defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__)
+#   define ROTATE(a,n)  ({ register unsigned int ret;   \
+                                asm (                   \
+                                "roll %1,%0"            \
+                                : "=r"(ret)             \
+                                : "I"(n), "0"((unsigned int)(a))        \
+                                : "cc");                \
+                           ret;                         \
+                        })
+#  elif defined(_ARCH_PPC) || defined(_ARCH_PPC64) || \
+        defined(__powerpc) || defined(__ppc__) || defined(__powerpc64__)
+#   define ROTATE(a,n)  ({ register unsigned int ret;   \
+                                asm (                   \
+                                "rlwinm %0,%1,%2,0,31"  \
+                                : "=r"(ret)             \
+                                : "r"(a), "I"(n));      \
+                           ret;                         \
+                        })
+#  elif defined(__s390x__)
+#   define ROTATE(a,n) ({ register unsigned int ret;    \
+                                asm ("rll %0,%1,%2"     \
+                                : "=r"(ret)             \
+                                : "r"(a), "I"(n));      \
+                          ret;                          \
+                        })
+#  endif
+# endif
+#endif                          /* PEDANTIC */
+
+#ifndef ROTATE
+# define ROTATE(a,n)     (((a)<<(n))|(((a)&0xffffffff)>>(32-(n))))
+#endif
+
+#if defined(DATA_ORDER_IS_BIG_ENDIAN)
+
+# ifndef PEDANTIC
+#  if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_INLINE_ASM)
+#   if ((defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__)) && !defined(I386_ONLY)) || \
+      (defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__))
+#    if !defined(B_ENDIAN)
+    /*
+     * This gives ~30-40% performance improvement in SHA-256 compiled
+     * with gcc [on P4]. Well, first macro to be frank. We can pull
+     * this trick on x86* platforms only, because these CPUs can fetch
+     * unaligned data without raising an exception.
+     */
+#     define HOST_c2l(c,l)        ({ unsigned int r=*((const unsigned int *)(c)); \
+                                   asm ("bswapl %0":"=r"(r):"0"(r));    \
+                                   (c)+=4; (l)=r;                       })
+#     define HOST_l2c(l,c)        ({ unsigned int r=(l);                  \
+                                   asm ("bswapl %0":"=r"(r):"0"(r));    \
+                                   *((unsigned int *)(c))=r; (c)+=4; r; })
+#    endif
+#   elif defined(__aarch64__)
+#    if defined(__BYTE_ORDER__)
+#     if defined(__ORDER_LITTLE_ENDIAN__) && __BYTE_ORDER__==__ORDER_LITTLE_ENDIAN__
+#      define HOST_c2l(c,l)      ({ unsigned int r;              \
+                                   asm ("rev    %w0,%w1"        \
+                                        :"=r"(r)                \
+                                        :"r"(*((const unsigned int *)(c))));\
+                                   (c)+=4; (l)=r;               })
+#      define HOST_l2c(l,c)      ({ unsigned int r;              \
+                                   asm ("rev    %w0,%w1"        \
+                                        :"=r"(r)                \
+                                        :"r"((unsigned int)(l)));\
+                                   *((unsigned int *)(c))=r; (c)+=4; r; })
+#     elif defined(__ORDER_BIG_ENDIAN__) && __BYTE_ORDER__==__ORDER_BIG_ENDIAN__
+#      define HOST_c2l(c,l)      ((l)=*((const unsigned int *)(c)), (c)+=4, (l))
+#      define HOST_l2c(l,c)      (*((unsigned int *)(c))=(l), (c)+=4, (l))
+#     endif
+#    endif
+#   endif
+#  endif
+#  if defined(__s390__) || defined(__s390x__)
+#   define HOST_c2l(c,l) ((l)=*((const unsigned int *)(c)), (c)+=4, (l))
+#   define HOST_l2c(l,c) (*((unsigned int *)(c))=(l), (c)+=4, (l))
+#  endif
+# endif
+
+# ifndef HOST_c2l
+#  define HOST_c2l(c,l)   (l =(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<24),          \
+                         l|=(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<16),          \
+                         l|=(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<< 8),          \
+                         l|=(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))    )           )
+# endif
+# ifndef HOST_l2c
+#  define HOST_l2c(l,c)   (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24)&0xff),      \
+                         *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff),      \
+                         *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff),      \
+                         *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)    )&0xff),      \
+                         l)
+# endif
+
+#elif defined(DATA_ORDER_IS_LITTLE_ENDIAN)
+
+# ifndef PEDANTIC
+#  if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_INLINE_ASM)
+#   if defined(__s390x__)
+#    define HOST_c2l(c,l)        ({ asm ("lrv    %0,%1"                  \
+                                   :"=d"(l) :"m"(*(const unsigned int *)(c)));\
+                                   (c)+=4; (l);                         })
+#    define HOST_l2c(l,c)        ({ asm ("strv   %1,%0"                  \
+                                   :"=m"(*(unsigned int *)(c)) :"d"(l));\
+                                   (c)+=4; (l);                         })
+#   endif
+#  endif
+#  if defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__)
+#   ifndef B_ENDIAN
+    /* See comment in DATA_ORDER_IS_BIG_ENDIAN section. */
+#    define HOST_c2l(c,l)        ((l)=*((const unsigned int *)(c)), (c)+=4, l)
+#    define HOST_l2c(l,c)        (*((unsigned int *)(c))=(l), (c)+=4, l)
+#   endif
+#  endif
+# endif
+
+# ifndef HOST_c2l
+#  define HOST_c2l(c,l)   (l =(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))    ),          \
+                         l|=(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<< 8),          \
+                         l|=(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<16),          \
+                         l|=(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<24)           )
+# endif
+# ifndef HOST_l2c
+#  define HOST_l2c(l,c)   (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)    )&0xff),      \
+                         *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff),      \
+                         *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff),      \
+                         *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24)&0xff),      \
+                         l)
+# endif
+
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Time for some action:-)
+ */
+
+int HASH_UPDATE(HASH_CTX *c, const void *data_, size_t len)
+{
+    const unsigned char *data = data_;
+    unsigned char *p;
+    HASH_LONG l;
+    size_t n;
+
+    if (len == 0)
+        return 1;
+
+    l = (c->Nl + (((HASH_LONG) len) << 3)) & 0xffffffffUL;
+    /*
+     * 95-05-24 eay Fixed a bug with the overflow handling, thanks to Wei Dai
+     * <weidai@eskimo.com> for pointing it out.
+     */
+    if (l < c->Nl)              /* overflow */
+        c->Nh++;
+    c->Nh += (HASH_LONG) (len >> 29); /* might cause compiler warning on
+                                       * 16-bit */
+    c->Nl = l;
+
+    n = c->num;
+    if (n != 0) {
+        p = (unsigned char *)c->data;
+
+        if (len >= HASH_CBLOCK || len + n >= HASH_CBLOCK) {
+            memcpy(p + n, data, HASH_CBLOCK - n);
+            HASH_BLOCK_DATA_ORDER(c, p, 1);
+            n = HASH_CBLOCK - n;
+            data += n;
+            len -= n;
+            c->num = 0;
+            /*
+             * We use memset rather than OPENSSL_cleanse() here deliberately.
+             * Using OPENSSL_cleanse() here could be a performance issue. It
+             * will get properly cleansed on finalisation so this isn't a
+             * security problem.
+             */
+            memset(p, 0, HASH_CBLOCK); /* keep it zeroed */
+        } else {
+            memcpy(p + n, data, len);
+            c->num += (unsigned int)len;
+            return 1;
+        }
+    }
+
+    n = len / HASH_CBLOCK;
+    if (n > 0) {
+        HASH_BLOCK_DATA_ORDER(c, data, n);
+        n *= HASH_CBLOCK;
+        data += n;
+        len -= n;
+    }
+
+    if (len != 0) {
+        p = (unsigned char *)c->data;
+        c->num = (unsigned int)len;
+        memcpy(p, data, len);
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+void HASH_TRANSFORM(HASH_CTX *c, const unsigned char *data)
+{
+    HASH_BLOCK_DATA_ORDER(c, data, 1);
+}
+
+int HASH_FINAL(unsigned char *md, HASH_CTX *c)
+{
+    unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)c->data;
+    size_t n = c->num;
+
+    p[n] = 0x80;                /* there is always room for one */
+    n++;
+
+    if (n > (HASH_CBLOCK - 8)) {
+        memset(p + n, 0, HASH_CBLOCK - n);
+        n = 0;
+        HASH_BLOCK_DATA_ORDER(c, p, 1);
+    }
+    memset(p + n, 0, HASH_CBLOCK - 8 - n);
+
+    p += HASH_CBLOCK - 8;
+#if   defined(DATA_ORDER_IS_BIG_ENDIAN)
+    (void)HOST_l2c(c->Nh, p);
+    (void)HOST_l2c(c->Nl, p);
+#elif defined(DATA_ORDER_IS_LITTLE_ENDIAN)
+    (void)HOST_l2c(c->Nl, p);
+    (void)HOST_l2c(c->Nh, p);
+#endif
+    p -= HASH_CBLOCK;
+    HASH_BLOCK_DATA_ORDER(c, p, 1);
+    c->num = 0;
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(p, HASH_CBLOCK);
+
+#ifndef HASH_MAKE_STRING
+# error "HASH_MAKE_STRING must be defined!"
+#else
+    HASH_MAKE_STRING(c, md);
+#endif
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+#ifndef MD32_REG_T
+# if defined(__alpha) || defined(__sparcv9) || defined(__mips)
+#  define MD32_REG_T long
+/*
+ * This comment was originally written for MD5, which is why it
+ * discusses A-D. But it basically applies to all 32-bit digests,
+ * which is why it was moved to common header file.
+ *
+ * In case you wonder why A-D are declared as long and not
+ * as MD5_LONG. Doing so results in slight performance
+ * boost on LP64 architectures. The catch is we don't
+ * really care if 32 MSBs of a 64-bit register get polluted
+ * with eventual overflows as we *save* only 32 LSBs in
+ * *either* case. Now declaring 'em long excuses the compiler
+ * from keeping 32 MSBs zeroed resulting in 13% performance
+ * improvement under SPARC Solaris7/64 and 5% under AlphaLinux.
+ * Well, to be honest it should say that this *prevents*
+ * performance degradation.
+ *                              <appro@fy.chalmers.se>
+ */
+# else
+/*
+ * Above is not absolute and there are LP64 compilers that
+ * generate better code if MD32_REG_T is defined int. The above
+ * pre-processor condition reflects the circumstances under which
+ * the conclusion was made and is subject to further extension.
+ *                              <appro@fy.chalmers.se>
+ */
+#  define MD32_REG_T int
+# endif
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/include/internal/objects.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/include/internal/objects.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..76e1b4d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/include/internal/objects.h
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+
+void obj_cleanup_int(void);
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/include/internal/poly1305.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/include/internal/poly1305.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1bc8716
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/include/internal/poly1305.h
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+
+#define POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE 16
+
+typedef struct poly1305_context POLY1305;
+
+size_t Poly1305_ctx_size(void);
+void Poly1305_Init(POLY1305 *ctx, const unsigned char key[32]);
+void Poly1305_Update(POLY1305 *ctx, const unsigned char *inp, size_t len);
+void Poly1305_Final(POLY1305 *ctx, unsigned char mac[16]);
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/include/internal/rand.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/include/internal/rand.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..30887c4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/include/internal/rand.h
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL licenses, (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ * or in the file LICENSE in the source distribution.
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+void rand_cleanup_int(void);
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/include/internal/x509_int.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/include/internal/x509_int.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2845026
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/include/internal/x509_int.h
@@ -0,0 +1,267 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* Internal X509 structures and functions: not for application use */
+
+/* Note: unless otherwise stated a field pointer is mandatory and should
+ * never be set to NULL: the ASN.1 code and accessors rely on mandatory
+ * fields never being NULL.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * name entry structure, equivalent to AttributeTypeAndValue defined
+ * in RFC5280 et al.
+ */
+struct X509_name_entry_st {
+    ASN1_OBJECT *object;        /* AttributeType */
+    ASN1_STRING *value;         /* AttributeValue */
+    int set;                    /* index of RDNSequence for this entry */
+    int size;                   /* temp variable */
+};
+
+/* Name from RFC 5280. */
+struct X509_name_st {
+    STACK_OF(X509_NAME_ENTRY) *entries; /* DN components */
+    int modified;               /* true if 'bytes' needs to be built */
+    BUF_MEM *bytes;             /* cached encoding: cannot be NULL */
+    /* canonical encoding used for rapid Name comparison */
+    unsigned char *canon_enc;
+    int canon_enclen;
+} /* X509_NAME */ ;
+
+/* PKCS#10 certificate request */
+
+struct X509_req_info_st {
+    ASN1_ENCODING enc;          /* cached encoding of signed part */
+    ASN1_INTEGER *version;      /* version, defaults to v1(0) so can be NULL */
+    X509_NAME *subject;         /* certificate request DN */
+    X509_PUBKEY *pubkey;        /* public key of request */
+    /*
+     * Zero or more attributes.
+     * NB: although attributes is a mandatory field some broken
+     * encodings omit it so this may be NULL in that case.
+     */
+    STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *attributes;
+};
+
+struct X509_req_st {
+    X509_REQ_INFO req_info;     /* signed certificate request data */
+    X509_ALGOR sig_alg;         /* signature algorithm */
+    ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature; /* signature */
+    int references;
+    CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock;
+};
+
+struct X509_crl_info_st {
+    ASN1_INTEGER *version;      /* version: defaults to v1(0) so may be NULL */
+    X509_ALGOR sig_alg;         /* signature algorithm */
+    X509_NAME *issuer;          /* CRL issuer name */
+    ASN1_TIME *lastUpdate;      /* lastUpdate field */
+    ASN1_TIME *nextUpdate;      /* nextUpdate field: optional */
+    STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revoked;        /* revoked entries: optional */
+    STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *extensions;   /* extensions: optional */
+    ASN1_ENCODING enc;                      /* encoding of signed portion of CRL */
+};
+
+struct X509_crl_st {
+    X509_CRL_INFO crl;          /* signed CRL data */
+    X509_ALGOR sig_alg;         /* CRL signature algorithm */
+    ASN1_BIT_STRING signature;  /* CRL signature */
+    int references;
+    int flags;
+    /*
+     * Cached copies of decoded extension values, since extensions
+     * are optional any of these can be NULL.
+     */
+    AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid;
+    ISSUING_DIST_POINT *idp;
+    /* Convenient breakdown of IDP */
+    int idp_flags;
+    int idp_reasons;
+    /* CRL and base CRL numbers for delta processing */
+    ASN1_INTEGER *crl_number;
+    ASN1_INTEGER *base_crl_number;
+    STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAMES) *issuers;
+    /* hash of CRL */
+    unsigned char sha1_hash[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+    /* alternative method to handle this CRL */
+    const X509_CRL_METHOD *meth;
+    void *meth_data;
+    CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock;
+};
+
+struct x509_revoked_st {
+    ASN1_INTEGER serialNumber; /* revoked entry serial number */
+    ASN1_TIME *revocationDate;  /* revocation date */
+    STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *extensions;   /* CRL entry extensions: optional */
+    /* decoded value of CRLissuer extension: set if indirect CRL */
+    STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *issuer;
+    /* revocation reason: set to CRL_REASON_NONE if reason extension absent */
+    int reason;
+    /*
+     * CRL entries are reordered for faster lookup of serial numbers. This
+     * field contains the original load sequence for this entry.
+     */
+    int sequence;
+};
+
+/*
+ * This stuff is certificate "auxiliary info": it contains details which are
+ * useful in certificate stores and databases. When used this is tagged onto
+ * the end of the certificate itself. OpenSSL specific structure not defined
+ * in any RFC.
+ */
+
+struct x509_cert_aux_st {
+    STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *trust; /* trusted uses */
+    STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *reject; /* rejected uses */
+    ASN1_UTF8STRING *alias;     /* "friendly name" */
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *keyid;   /* key id of private key */
+    STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) *other; /* other unspecified info */
+};
+
+struct x509_cinf_st {
+    ASN1_INTEGER *version;      /* [ 0 ] default of v1 */
+    ASN1_INTEGER serialNumber;
+    X509_ALGOR signature;
+    X509_NAME *issuer;
+    X509_VAL validity;
+    X509_NAME *subject;
+    X509_PUBKEY *key;
+    ASN1_BIT_STRING *issuerUID; /* [ 1 ] optional in v2 */
+    ASN1_BIT_STRING *subjectUID; /* [ 2 ] optional in v2 */
+    STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *extensions; /* [ 3 ] optional in v3 */
+    ASN1_ENCODING enc;
+};
+
+struct x509_st {
+    X509_CINF cert_info;
+    X509_ALGOR sig_alg;
+    ASN1_BIT_STRING signature;
+    int references;
+    CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data;
+    /* These contain copies of various extension values */
+    long ex_pathlen;
+    long ex_pcpathlen;
+    uint32_t ex_flags;
+    uint32_t ex_kusage;
+    uint32_t ex_xkusage;
+    uint32_t ex_nscert;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *skid;
+    AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid;
+    X509_POLICY_CACHE *policy_cache;
+    STACK_OF(DIST_POINT) *crldp;
+    STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *altname;
+    NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
+    STACK_OF(IPAddressFamily) *rfc3779_addr;
+    struct ASIdentifiers_st *rfc3779_asid;
+# endif
+    unsigned char sha1_hash[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+    X509_CERT_AUX *aux;
+    CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock;
+} /* X509 */ ;
+
+/*
+ * This is a used when verifying cert chains.  Since the gathering of the
+ * cert chain can take some time (and have to be 'retried', this needs to be
+ * kept and passed around.
+ */
+struct x509_store_ctx_st {      /* X509_STORE_CTX */
+    X509_STORE *ctx;
+    /* The following are set by the caller */
+    /* The cert to check */
+    X509 *cert;
+    /* chain of X509s - untrusted - passed in */
+    STACK_OF(X509) *untrusted;
+    /* set of CRLs passed in */
+    STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls;
+    X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
+    /* Other info for use with get_issuer() */
+    void *other_ctx;
+    /* Callbacks for various operations */
+    /* called to verify a certificate */
+    int (*verify) (X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+    /* error callback */
+    int (*verify_cb) (int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+    /* get issuers cert from ctx */
+    int (*get_issuer) (X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
+    /* check issued */
+    int (*check_issued) (X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
+    /* Check revocation status of chain */
+    int (*check_revocation) (X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+    /* retrieve CRL */
+    int (*get_crl) (X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **crl, X509 *x);
+    /* Check CRL validity */
+    int (*check_crl) (X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl);
+    /* Check certificate against CRL */
+    int (*cert_crl) (X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
+    /* Check policy status of the chain */
+    int (*check_policy) (X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+    STACK_OF(X509) *(*lookup_certs) (X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_NAME *nm);
+    STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *(*lookup_crls) (X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_NAME *nm);
+    int (*cleanup) (X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+    /* The following is built up */
+    /* if 0, rebuild chain */
+    int valid;
+    /* number of untrusted certs */
+    int num_untrusted;
+    /* chain of X509s - built up and trusted */
+    STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
+    /* Valid policy tree */
+    X509_POLICY_TREE *tree;
+    /* Require explicit policy value */
+    int explicit_policy;
+    /* When something goes wrong, this is why */
+    int error_depth;
+    int error;
+    X509 *current_cert;
+    /* cert currently being tested as valid issuer */
+    X509 *current_issuer;
+    /* current CRL */
+    X509_CRL *current_crl;
+    /* score of current CRL */
+    int current_crl_score;
+    /* Reason mask */
+    unsigned int current_reasons;
+    /* For CRL path validation: parent context */
+    X509_STORE_CTX *parent;
+    CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data;
+    SSL_DANE *dane;
+    /* signed via bare TA public key, rather than CA certificate */
+    int bare_ta_signed;
+};
+
+/* PKCS#8 private key info structure */
+
+struct pkcs8_priv_key_info_st {
+    ASN1_INTEGER *version;
+    X509_ALGOR *pkeyalg;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *pkey;
+    STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *attributes;
+};
+
+struct X509_sig_st {
+    X509_ALGOR *algor;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *digest;
+};
+
+struct x509_object_st {
+    /* one of the above types */
+    X509_LOOKUP_TYPE type;
+    union {
+        char *ptr;
+        X509 *x509;
+        X509_CRL *crl;
+        EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+    } data;
+};
+
+int a2i_ipadd(unsigned char *ipout, const char *ipasc);
+int x509_set1_time(ASN1_TIME **ptm, const ASN1_TIME *tm);
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/init.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/init.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..173eac3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/init.c
@@ -0,0 +1,676 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <internal/cryptlib_int.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <internal/rand.h>
+#include <internal/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <internal/evp_int.h>
+#include <internal/conf.h>
+#include <internal/async.h>
+#include <internal/engine.h>
+#include <internal/comp.h>
+#include <internal/err.h>
+#include <internal/err_int.h>
+#include <internal/objects.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <internal/thread_once.h>
+#include <internal/dso.h>
+
+static int stopped = 0;
+
+static void ossl_init_thread_stop(struct thread_local_inits_st *locals);
+
+static CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL threadstopkey;
+
+static void ossl_init_thread_stop_wrap(void *local)
+{
+    ossl_init_thread_stop((struct thread_local_inits_st *)local);
+}
+
+static struct thread_local_inits_st *ossl_init_get_thread_local(int alloc)
+{
+    struct thread_local_inits_st *local =
+        CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&threadstopkey);
+
+    if (local == NULL && alloc) {
+        local = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*local));
+        if (local != NULL && !CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&threadstopkey, local)) {
+            OPENSSL_free(local);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+    }
+    if (!alloc) {
+        CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&threadstopkey, NULL);
+    }
+
+    return local;
+}
+
+typedef struct ossl_init_stop_st OPENSSL_INIT_STOP;
+struct ossl_init_stop_st {
+    void (*handler)(void);
+    OPENSSL_INIT_STOP *next;
+};
+
+static OPENSSL_INIT_STOP *stop_handlers = NULL;
+static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *init_lock = NULL;
+
+static CRYPTO_ONCE base = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
+static int base_inited = 0;
+DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(ossl_init_base)
+{
+#ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG
+    fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: ossl_init_base: Setting up stop handlers\n");
+#endif
+    /*
+     * We use a dummy thread local key here. We use the destructor to detect
+     * when the thread is going to stop (where that feature is available)
+     */
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local(&threadstopkey, ossl_init_thread_stop_wrap);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI
+    atexit(OPENSSL_cleanup);
+#endif
+    if ((init_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new()) == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    OPENSSL_cpuid_setup();
+
+    /*
+     * BIG FAT WARNING!
+     * Everything needed to be initialized in this function before threads
+     * come along MUST happen before base_inited is set to 1, or we will
+     * see race conditions.
+     */
+    base_inited = 1;
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSO) && !defined(OPENSSL_USE_NODELETE)
+# ifdef DSO_WIN32
+    {
+        HMODULE handle = NULL;
+        BOOL ret;
+
+        /* We don't use the DSO route for WIN32 because there is a better way */
+        ret = GetModuleHandleEx(GET_MODULE_HANDLE_EX_FLAG_FROM_ADDRESS
+                                | GET_MODULE_HANDLE_EX_FLAG_PIN,
+                                (void *)&base_inited, &handle);
+
+        return (ret == TRUE) ? 1 : 0;
+    }
+# else
+    /*
+     * Deliberately leak a reference to ourselves. This will force the library
+     * to remain loaded until the atexit() handler is run at process exit.
+     */
+    {
+        DSO *dso = NULL;
+
+        ERR_set_mark();
+        dso = DSO_dsobyaddr(&base_inited, DSO_FLAG_NO_UNLOAD_ON_FREE);
+        DSO_free(dso);
+        ERR_pop_to_mark();
+    }
+# endif
+#endif
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static CRYPTO_ONCE load_crypto_strings = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
+static int load_crypto_strings_inited = 0;
+DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(ossl_init_no_load_crypto_strings)
+{
+    /* Do nothing in this case */
+    return 1;
+}
+
+DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(ossl_init_load_crypto_strings)
+{
+    int ret = 1;
+    /*
+     * OPENSSL_NO_AUTOERRINIT is provided here to prevent at compile time
+     * pulling in all the error strings during static linking
+     */
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ERR) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_AUTOERRINIT)
+# ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG
+    fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: ossl_init_load_crypto_strings: "
+                    "err_load_crypto_strings_int()\n");
+# endif
+    ret = err_load_crypto_strings_int();
+    load_crypto_strings_inited = 1;
+#endif    
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static CRYPTO_ONCE add_all_ciphers = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
+DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(ossl_init_add_all_ciphers)
+{
+    /*
+     * OPENSSL_NO_AUTOALGINIT is provided here to prevent at compile time
+     * pulling in all the ciphers during static linking
+     */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_AUTOALGINIT
+# ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG
+    fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: ossl_init_add_all_ciphers: "
+                    "openssl_add_all_ciphers_int()\n");
+# endif
+    openssl_add_all_ciphers_int();
+#endif
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static CRYPTO_ONCE add_all_digests = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
+DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(ossl_init_add_all_digests)
+{
+    /*
+     * OPENSSL_NO_AUTOALGINIT is provided here to prevent at compile time
+     * pulling in all the ciphers during static linking
+     */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_AUTOALGINIT
+# ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG
+    fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: ossl_init_add_all_digests: "
+                    "openssl_add_all_digests()\n");
+# endif
+    openssl_add_all_digests_int();
+#endif
+    return 1;
+}
+
+DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(ossl_init_no_add_algs)
+{
+    /* Do nothing */
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static CRYPTO_ONCE config = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
+static int config_inited = 0;
+static const char *appname;
+DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(ossl_init_config)
+{
+#ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG
+    fprintf(stderr,
+            "OPENSSL_INIT: ossl_init_config: openssl_config(%s)\n",
+            appname == NULL ? "NULL" : appname);
+#endif
+    openssl_config_int(appname);
+    config_inited = 1;
+    return 1;
+}
+DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(ossl_init_no_config)
+{
+#ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG
+    fprintf(stderr,
+            "OPENSSL_INIT: ossl_init_config: openssl_no_config_int()\n");
+#endif
+    openssl_no_config_int();
+    config_inited = 1;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static CRYPTO_ONCE async = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
+static int async_inited = 0;
+DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(ossl_init_async)
+{
+#ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG
+    fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: ossl_init_async: async_init()\n");
+#endif
+    if (!async_init())
+        return 0;
+    async_inited = 1;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+static CRYPTO_ONCE engine_openssl = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
+DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(ossl_init_engine_openssl)
+{
+# ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG
+    fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: ossl_init_engine_openssl: "
+                    "engine_load_openssl_int()\n");
+# endif
+    engine_load_openssl_int();
+    return 1;
+}
+# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_HW) && \
+    (defined(__OpenBSD__) || defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(HAVE_CRYPTODEV))
+static CRYPTO_ONCE engine_cryptodev = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
+DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(ossl_init_engine_cryptodev)
+{
+#  ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG
+    fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: ossl_init_engine_cryptodev: "
+                    "engine_load_cryptodev_int()\n");
+#  endif
+    engine_load_cryptodev_int();
+    return 1;
+}
+# endif
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RDRAND
+static CRYPTO_ONCE engine_rdrand = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
+DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(ossl_init_engine_rdrand)
+{
+#  ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG
+    fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: ossl_init_engine_rdrand: "
+                    "engine_load_rdrand_int()\n");
+#  endif
+    engine_load_rdrand_int();
+    return 1;
+}
+# endif
+static CRYPTO_ONCE engine_dynamic = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
+DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(ossl_init_engine_dynamic)
+{
+# ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG
+    fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: ossl_init_engine_dynamic: "
+                    "engine_load_dynamic_int()\n");
+# endif
+    engine_load_dynamic_int();
+    return 1;
+}
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STATIC_ENGINE
+#  if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_HW) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_HW_PADLOCK)
+static CRYPTO_ONCE engine_padlock = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
+DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(ossl_init_engine_padlock)
+{
+#   ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG
+    fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: ossl_init_engine_padlock: "
+                    "engine_load_padlock_int()\n");
+#   endif
+    engine_load_padlock_int();
+    return 1;
+}
+#  endif
+#  if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_CAPIENG)
+static CRYPTO_ONCE engine_capi = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
+DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(ossl_init_engine_capi)
+{
+#   ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG
+    fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: ossl_init_engine_capi: "
+                    "engine_load_capi_int()\n");
+#   endif
+    engine_load_capi_int();
+    return 1;
+}
+#  endif
+#  if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_AFALGENG)
+static CRYPTO_ONCE engine_afalg = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
+DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(ossl_init_engine_afalg)
+{
+#   ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG
+    fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: ossl_init_engine_afalg: "
+                    "engine_load_afalg_int()\n");
+#   endif
+    engine_load_afalg_int();
+    return 1;
+}
+#  endif
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+static CRYPTO_ONCE zlib = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
+
+static int zlib_inited = 0;
+DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(ossl_init_zlib)
+{
+    /* Do nothing - we need to know about this for the later cleanup */
+    zlib_inited = 1;
+    return 1;
+}
+#endif
+
+static void ossl_init_thread_stop(struct thread_local_inits_st *locals)
+{
+    /* Can't do much about this */
+    if (locals == NULL)
+        return;
+
+    if (locals->async) {
+#ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG
+        fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: ossl_init_thread_stop: "
+                        "ASYNC_cleanup_thread()\n");
+#endif
+        ASYNC_cleanup_thread();
+    }
+
+    if (locals->err_state) {
+#ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG
+        fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: ossl_init_thread_stop: "
+                        "err_delete_thread_state()\n");
+#endif
+        err_delete_thread_state();
+    }
+
+    OPENSSL_free(locals);
+}
+
+void OPENSSL_thread_stop(void)
+{
+    ossl_init_thread_stop(
+        (struct thread_local_inits_st *)ossl_init_get_thread_local(0));
+}
+
+int ossl_init_thread_start(uint64_t opts)
+{
+    struct thread_local_inits_st *locals;
+
+    if (!OPENSSL_init_crypto(0, NULL))
+        return 0;
+
+    locals = ossl_init_get_thread_local(1);
+
+    if (locals == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    if (opts & OPENSSL_INIT_THREAD_ASYNC) {
+#ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG
+        fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: ossl_init_thread_start: "
+                        "marking thread for async\n");
+#endif
+        locals->async = 1;
+    }
+
+    if (opts & OPENSSL_INIT_THREAD_ERR_STATE) {
+#ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG
+        fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: ossl_init_thread_start: "
+                        "marking thread for err_state\n");
+#endif
+        locals->err_state = 1;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+void OPENSSL_cleanup(void)
+{
+    OPENSSL_INIT_STOP *currhandler, *lasthandler;
+
+    /* If we've not been inited then no need to deinit */
+    if (!base_inited)
+        return;
+
+    /* Might be explicitly called and also by atexit */
+    if (stopped)
+        return;
+    stopped = 1;
+
+    /*
+     * Thread stop may not get automatically called by the thread library for
+     * the very last thread in some situations, so call it directly.
+     */
+    ossl_init_thread_stop(ossl_init_get_thread_local(0));
+
+    currhandler = stop_handlers;
+    while (currhandler != NULL) {
+        currhandler->handler();
+        lasthandler = currhandler;
+        currhandler = currhandler->next;
+        OPENSSL_free(lasthandler);
+    }
+    stop_handlers = NULL;
+
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(init_lock);
+
+    /*
+     * We assume we are single-threaded for this function, i.e. no race
+     * conditions for the various "*_inited" vars below.
+     */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+    if (zlib_inited) {
+#ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG
+        fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: OPENSSL_cleanup: "
+                        "comp_zlib_cleanup_int()\n");
+#endif
+        comp_zlib_cleanup_int();
+    }
+#endif
+
+    if (async_inited) {
+# ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG
+        fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: OPENSSL_cleanup: "
+                        "async_deinit()\n");
+# endif
+        async_deinit();
+    }
+
+    if (load_crypto_strings_inited) {
+#ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG
+        fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: OPENSSL_cleanup: "
+                        "err_free_strings_int()\n");
+#endif
+        err_free_strings_int();
+    }
+
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&threadstopkey);
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG
+    fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: OPENSSL_cleanup: "
+                    "rand_cleanup_int()\n");
+    fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: OPENSSL_cleanup: "
+                    "conf_modules_free_int()\n");
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: OPENSSL_cleanup: "
+                    "engine_cleanup_int()\n");
+#endif
+    fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: OPENSSL_cleanup: "
+                    "crypto_cleanup_all_ex_data_int()\n");
+    fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: OPENSSL_cleanup: "
+                    "bio_sock_cleanup_int()\n");
+    fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: OPENSSL_cleanup: "
+                    "bio_cleanup()\n");
+    fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: OPENSSL_cleanup: "
+                    "evp_cleanup_int()\n");
+    fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: OPENSSL_cleanup: "
+                    "obj_cleanup_int()\n");
+    fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: OPENSSL_cleanup: "
+                    "err_cleanup()\n");
+#endif
+    /*
+     * Note that cleanup order is important:
+     * - rand_cleanup_int could call an ENGINE's RAND cleanup function so
+     * must be called before engine_cleanup_int()
+     * - ENGINEs use CRYPTO_EX_DATA and therefore, must be cleaned up
+     * before the ex data handlers are wiped in CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data().
+     * - conf_modules_free_int() can end up in ENGINE code so must be called
+     * before engine_cleanup_int()
+     * - ENGINEs and additional EVP algorithms might use added OIDs names so
+     * obj_cleanup_int() must be called last
+     */
+    rand_cleanup_int();
+    conf_modules_free_int();
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    engine_cleanup_int();
+#endif
+    crypto_cleanup_all_ex_data_int();
+    bio_cleanup();
+    evp_cleanup_int();
+    obj_cleanup_int();
+    err_cleanup();
+
+    base_inited = 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * If this function is called with a non NULL settings value then it must be
+ * called prior to any threads making calls to any OpenSSL functions,
+ * i.e. passing a non-null settings value is assumed to be single-threaded.
+ */
+int OPENSSL_init_crypto(uint64_t opts, const OPENSSL_INIT_SETTINGS *settings)
+{
+    static int stoperrset = 0;
+
+    if (stopped) {
+        if (!stoperrset) {
+            /*
+             * We only ever set this once to avoid getting into an infinite
+             * loop where the error system keeps trying to init and fails so
+             * sets an error etc
+             */
+            stoperrset = 1;
+            CRYPTOerr(CRYPTO_F_OPENSSL_INIT_CRYPTO, ERR_R_INIT_FAIL);
+        }
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (!base_inited && !RUN_ONCE(&base, ossl_init_base))
+        return 0;
+
+    if ((opts & OPENSSL_INIT_NO_LOAD_CRYPTO_STRINGS)
+            && !RUN_ONCE(&load_crypto_strings,
+                         ossl_init_no_load_crypto_strings))
+        return 0;
+
+    if ((opts & OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_CRYPTO_STRINGS)
+            && !RUN_ONCE(&load_crypto_strings, ossl_init_load_crypto_strings))
+        return 0;
+
+    if ((opts & OPENSSL_INIT_NO_ADD_ALL_CIPHERS)
+            && !RUN_ONCE(&add_all_ciphers, ossl_init_no_add_algs))
+        return 0;
+
+    if ((opts & OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_CIPHERS)
+            && !RUN_ONCE(&add_all_ciphers, ossl_init_add_all_ciphers))
+        return 0;
+
+    if ((opts & OPENSSL_INIT_NO_ADD_ALL_DIGESTS)
+            && !RUN_ONCE(&add_all_digests, ossl_init_no_add_algs))
+        return 0;
+
+    if ((opts & OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_DIGESTS)
+            && !RUN_ONCE(&add_all_digests, ossl_init_add_all_digests))
+        return 0;
+
+    if ((opts & OPENSSL_INIT_NO_LOAD_CONFIG)
+            && !RUN_ONCE(&config, ossl_init_no_config))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (opts & OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_CONFIG) {
+        int ret;
+        CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(init_lock);
+        appname = (settings == NULL) ? NULL : settings->appname;
+        ret = RUN_ONCE(&config, ossl_init_config);
+        CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(init_lock);
+        if (!ret)
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    if ((opts & OPENSSL_INIT_ASYNC)
+            && !RUN_ONCE(&async, ossl_init_async))
+        return 0;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    if ((opts & OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_OPENSSL)
+            && !RUN_ONCE(&engine_openssl, ossl_init_engine_openssl))
+        return 0;
+# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_HW) && \
+    (defined(__OpenBSD__) || defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(HAVE_CRYPTODEV))
+    if ((opts & OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_CRYPTODEV)
+            && !RUN_ONCE(&engine_cryptodev, ossl_init_engine_cryptodev))
+        return 0;
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RDRAND
+    if ((opts & OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_RDRAND)
+            && !RUN_ONCE(&engine_rdrand, ossl_init_engine_rdrand))
+        return 0;
+# endif
+    if ((opts & OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_DYNAMIC)
+            && !RUN_ONCE(&engine_dynamic, ossl_init_engine_dynamic))
+        return 0;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STATIC_ENGINE
+#  if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_HW) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_HW_PADLOCK)
+    if ((opts & OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_PADLOCK)
+            && !RUN_ONCE(&engine_padlock, ossl_init_engine_padlock))
+        return 0;
+#  endif
+#  if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_CAPIENG)
+    if ((opts & OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_CAPI)
+            && !RUN_ONCE(&engine_capi, ossl_init_engine_capi))
+        return 0;
+#  endif
+#  if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_AFALGENG)
+    if ((opts & OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_AFALG)
+            && !RUN_ONCE(&engine_afalg, ossl_init_engine_afalg))
+        return 0;
+#  endif
+# endif
+    if (opts & (OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_ALL_BUILTIN
+                | OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_OPENSSL
+                | OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_AFALG)) {
+        ENGINE_register_all_complete();
+    }
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+    if ((opts & OPENSSL_INIT_ZLIB)
+            && !RUN_ONCE(&zlib, ossl_init_zlib))
+        return 0;
+#endif
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int OPENSSL_atexit(void (*handler)(void))
+{
+    OPENSSL_INIT_STOP *newhand;
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSO) && !defined(OPENSSL_USE_NODELETE)
+    {
+        union {
+            void *sym;
+            void (*func)(void);
+        } handlersym;
+
+        handlersym.func = handler;
+# ifdef DSO_WIN32
+        {
+            HMODULE handle = NULL;
+            BOOL ret;
+
+            /*
+             * We don't use the DSO route for WIN32 because there is a better
+             * way
+             */
+            ret = GetModuleHandleEx(GET_MODULE_HANDLE_EX_FLAG_FROM_ADDRESS
+                                    | GET_MODULE_HANDLE_EX_FLAG_PIN,
+                                    handlersym.sym, &handle);
+
+            if (!ret)
+                return 0;
+        }
+# else
+        /*
+         * Deliberately leak a reference to the handler. This will force the
+         * library/code containing the handler to remain loaded until we run the
+         * atexit handler. If -znodelete has been used then this is
+         * unnecessary.
+         */
+        {
+            DSO *dso = NULL;
+
+            ERR_set_mark();
+            dso = DSO_dsobyaddr(handlersym.sym, DSO_FLAG_NO_UNLOAD_ON_FREE);
+            DSO_free(dso);
+            ERR_pop_to_mark();
+        }
+# endif
+    }
+#endif
+
+    newhand = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*newhand));
+    if (newhand == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    newhand->handler = handler;
+    newhand->next = stop_handlers;
+    stop_handlers = newhand;
+
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/kdf/build.info b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/kdf/build.info
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cbe2080
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/kdf/build.info
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+LIBS=../../libcrypto
+SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
+        tls1_prf.c kdf_err.c hkdf.c
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/kdf/hkdf.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/kdf/hkdf.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..00b95b5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/kdf/hkdf.c
@@ -0,0 +1,293 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+#include <openssl/kdf.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "internal/evp_int.h"
+
+#define HKDF_MAXBUF 1024
+
+static unsigned char *HKDF(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
+                           const unsigned char *salt, size_t salt_len,
+                           const unsigned char *key, size_t key_len,
+                           const unsigned char *info, size_t info_len,
+                           unsigned char *okm, size_t okm_len);
+
+static unsigned char *HKDF_Extract(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
+                                   const unsigned char *salt, size_t salt_len,
+                                   const unsigned char *key, size_t key_len,
+                                   unsigned char *prk, size_t *prk_len);
+
+static unsigned char *HKDF_Expand(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
+                                  const unsigned char *prk, size_t prk_len,
+                                  const unsigned char *info, size_t info_len,
+                                  unsigned char *okm, size_t okm_len);
+
+typedef struct {
+    const EVP_MD *md;
+    unsigned char *salt;
+    size_t salt_len;
+    unsigned char *key;
+    size_t key_len;
+    unsigned char info[HKDF_MAXBUF];
+    size_t info_len;
+} HKDF_PKEY_CTX;
+
+static int pkey_hkdf_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    HKDF_PKEY_CTX *kctx;
+
+    kctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*kctx));
+    if (kctx == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    ctx->data = kctx;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static void pkey_hkdf_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    HKDF_PKEY_CTX *kctx = ctx->data;
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(kctx->salt, kctx->salt_len);
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(kctx->key, kctx->key_len);
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(kctx->info, kctx->info_len);
+    OPENSSL_free(kctx);
+}
+
+static int pkey_hkdf_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2)
+{
+    HKDF_PKEY_CTX *kctx = ctx->data;
+
+    switch (type) {
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_HKDF_MD:
+        if (p2 == NULL)
+            return 0;
+
+        kctx->md = p2;
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_HKDF_SALT:
+        if (p1 == 0 || p2 == NULL)
+            return 1;
+
+        if (p1 < 0)
+            return 0;
+
+        if (kctx->salt != NULL)
+            OPENSSL_clear_free(kctx->salt, kctx->salt_len);
+
+        kctx->salt = OPENSSL_memdup(p2, p1);
+        if (kctx->salt == NULL)
+            return 0;
+
+        kctx->salt_len = p1;
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_HKDF_KEY:
+        if (p1 < 0)
+            return 0;
+
+        if (kctx->key != NULL)
+            OPENSSL_clear_free(kctx->key, kctx->key_len);
+
+        kctx->key = OPENSSL_memdup(p2, p1);
+        if (kctx->key == NULL)
+            return 0;
+
+        kctx->key_len  = p1;
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_HKDF_INFO:
+        if (p1 == 0 || p2 == NULL)
+            return 1;
+
+        if (p1 < 0 || p1 > (int)(HKDF_MAXBUF - kctx->info_len))
+            return 0;
+
+        memcpy(kctx->info + kctx->info_len, p2, p1);
+        kctx->info_len += p1;
+        return 1;
+
+    default:
+        return -2;
+
+    }
+}
+
+static int pkey_hkdf_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const char *type,
+                              const char *value)
+{
+    if (strcmp(type, "md") == 0)
+        return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_hkdf_md(ctx, EVP_get_digestbyname(value));
+
+    if (strcmp(type, "salt") == 0)
+        return EVP_PKEY_CTX_str2ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_HKDF_SALT, value);
+
+    if (strcmp(type, "hexsalt") == 0)
+        return EVP_PKEY_CTX_hex2ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_HKDF_SALT, value);
+
+    if (strcmp(type, "key") == 0)
+        return EVP_PKEY_CTX_str2ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_HKDF_KEY, value);
+
+    if (strcmp(type, "hexkey") == 0)
+        return EVP_PKEY_CTX_hex2ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_HKDF_KEY, value);
+
+    if (strcmp(type, "info") == 0)
+        return EVP_PKEY_CTX_str2ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_HKDF_INFO, value);
+
+    if (strcmp(type, "hexinfo") == 0)
+        return EVP_PKEY_CTX_hex2ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_HKDF_INFO, value);
+
+    return -2;
+}
+
+static int pkey_hkdf_derive(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key,
+                            size_t *keylen)
+{
+    HKDF_PKEY_CTX *kctx = ctx->data;
+
+    if (kctx->md == NULL || kctx->key == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    if (HKDF(kctx->md, kctx->salt, kctx->salt_len, kctx->key, kctx->key_len,
+             kctx->info, kctx->info_len, key, *keylen) == NULL)
+    {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+const EVP_PKEY_METHOD hkdf_pkey_meth = {
+    EVP_PKEY_HKDF,
+    0,
+    pkey_hkdf_init,
+    0,
+    pkey_hkdf_cleanup,
+
+    0, 0,
+    0, 0,
+
+    0,
+    0,
+
+    0,
+    0,
+
+    0, 0,
+
+    0, 0, 0, 0,
+
+    0, 0,
+
+    0, 0,
+
+    0,
+    pkey_hkdf_derive,
+    pkey_hkdf_ctrl,
+    pkey_hkdf_ctrl_str
+};
+
+static unsigned char *HKDF(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
+                           const unsigned char *salt, size_t salt_len,
+                           const unsigned char *key, size_t key_len,
+                           const unsigned char *info, size_t info_len,
+                           unsigned char *okm, size_t okm_len)
+{
+    unsigned char prk[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+    size_t prk_len;
+
+    if (!HKDF_Extract(evp_md, salt, salt_len, key, key_len, prk, &prk_len))
+        return NULL;
+
+    return HKDF_Expand(evp_md, prk, prk_len, info, info_len, okm, okm_len);
+}
+
+static unsigned char *HKDF_Extract(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
+                                   const unsigned char *salt, size_t salt_len,
+                                   const unsigned char *key, size_t key_len,
+                                   unsigned char *prk, size_t *prk_len)
+{
+    unsigned int tmp_len;
+
+    if (!HMAC(evp_md, salt, salt_len, key, key_len, prk, &tmp_len))
+        return NULL;
+
+    *prk_len = tmp_len;
+    return prk;
+}
+
+static unsigned char *HKDF_Expand(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
+                                  const unsigned char *prk, size_t prk_len,
+                                  const unsigned char *info, size_t info_len,
+                                  unsigned char *okm, size_t okm_len)
+{
+    HMAC_CTX *hmac;
+
+    unsigned int i;
+
+    unsigned char prev[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+
+    size_t done_len = 0, dig_len = EVP_MD_size(evp_md);
+
+    size_t n = okm_len / dig_len;
+    if (okm_len % dig_len)
+        n++;
+
+    if (n > 255)
+        return NULL;
+
+    if ((hmac = HMAC_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+
+    if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hmac, prk, prk_len, evp_md, NULL))
+        goto err;
+
+    for (i = 1; i <= n; i++) {
+        size_t copy_len;
+        const unsigned char ctr = i;
+
+        if (i > 1) {
+            if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hmac, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL))
+                goto err;
+
+            if (!HMAC_Update(hmac, prev, dig_len))
+                goto err;
+        }
+
+        if (!HMAC_Update(hmac, info, info_len))
+            goto err;
+
+        if (!HMAC_Update(hmac, &ctr, 1))
+            goto err;
+
+        if (!HMAC_Final(hmac, prev, NULL))
+            goto err;
+
+        copy_len = (done_len + dig_len > okm_len) ?
+                       okm_len - done_len :
+                       dig_len;
+
+        memcpy(okm + done_len, prev, copy_len);
+
+        done_len += copy_len;
+    }
+
+    HMAC_CTX_free(hmac);
+    return okm;
+
+ err:
+    HMAC_CTX_free(hmac);
+    return NULL;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/kdf/kdf_err.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/kdf/kdf_err.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d7d71b3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/kdf/kdf_err.c
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+/*
+ * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/kdf.h>
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+
+# define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF,func,0)
+# define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF,0,reason)
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA KDF_str_functs[] = {
+    {ERR_FUNC(KDF_F_PKEY_TLS1_PRF_CTRL_STR), "pkey_tls1_prf_ctrl_str"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(KDF_F_PKEY_TLS1_PRF_DERIVE), "pkey_tls1_prf_derive"},
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA KDF_str_reasons[] = {
+    {ERR_REASON(KDF_R_INVALID_DIGEST), "invalid digest"},
+    {ERR_REASON(KDF_R_MISSING_PARAMETER), "missing parameter"},
+    {ERR_REASON(KDF_R_VALUE_MISSING), "value missing"},
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+
+#endif
+
+int ERR_load_KDF_strings(void)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+
+    if (ERR_func_error_string(KDF_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) {
+        ERR_load_strings(0, KDF_str_functs);
+        ERR_load_strings(0, KDF_str_reasons);
+    }
+#endif
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/kdf/tls1_prf.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/kdf/tls1_prf.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fa13732
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/kdf/tls1_prf.c
@@ -0,0 +1,265 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/kdf.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include "internal/evp_int.h"
+
+static int tls1_prf_alg(const EVP_MD *md,
+                        const unsigned char *sec, size_t slen,
+                        const unsigned char *seed, size_t seed_len,
+                        unsigned char *out, size_t olen);
+
+#define TLS1_PRF_MAXBUF 1024
+
+/* TLS KDF pkey context structure */
+
+typedef struct {
+    /* Digest to use for PRF */
+    const EVP_MD *md;
+    /* Secret value to use for PRF */
+    unsigned char *sec;
+    size_t seclen;
+    /* Buffer of concatenated seed data */
+    unsigned char seed[TLS1_PRF_MAXBUF];
+    size_t seedlen;
+} TLS1_PRF_PKEY_CTX;
+
+static int pkey_tls1_prf_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    TLS1_PRF_PKEY_CTX *kctx;
+
+    kctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*kctx));
+    if (kctx == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    ctx->data = kctx;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static void pkey_tls1_prf_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    TLS1_PRF_PKEY_CTX *kctx = ctx->data;
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(kctx->sec, kctx->seclen);
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(kctx->seed, kctx->seedlen);
+    OPENSSL_free(kctx);
+}
+
+static int pkey_tls1_prf_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2)
+{
+    TLS1_PRF_PKEY_CTX *kctx = ctx->data;
+    switch (type) {
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_TLS_MD:
+        kctx->md = p2;
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_TLS_SECRET:
+        if (p1 < 0)
+            return 0;
+        if (kctx->sec != NULL)
+            OPENSSL_clear_free(kctx->sec, kctx->seclen);
+        OPENSSL_cleanse(kctx->seed, kctx->seedlen);
+        kctx->seedlen = 0;
+        kctx->sec = OPENSSL_memdup(p2, p1);
+        if (kctx->sec == NULL)
+            return 0;
+        kctx->seclen  = p1;
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_TLS_SEED:
+        if (p1 == 0 || p2 == NULL)
+            return 1;
+        if (p1 < 0 || p1 > (int)(TLS1_PRF_MAXBUF - kctx->seedlen))
+            return 0;
+        memcpy(kctx->seed + kctx->seedlen, p2, p1);
+        kctx->seedlen += p1;
+        return 1;
+
+    default:
+        return -2;
+
+    }
+}
+
+static int pkey_tls1_prf_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                  const char *type, const char *value)
+{
+    if (value == NULL) {
+        KDFerr(KDF_F_PKEY_TLS1_PRF_CTRL_STR, KDF_R_VALUE_MISSING);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (strcmp(type, "md") == 0) {
+        TLS1_PRF_PKEY_CTX *kctx = ctx->data;
+
+        const EVP_MD *md = EVP_get_digestbyname(value);
+        if (md == NULL) {
+            KDFerr(KDF_F_PKEY_TLS1_PRF_CTRL_STR, KDF_R_INVALID_DIGEST);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        kctx->md = md;
+        return 1;
+    }
+    if (strcmp(type, "secret") == 0)
+        return EVP_PKEY_CTX_str2ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_TLS_SECRET, value);
+    if (strcmp(type, "hexsecret") == 0)
+        return EVP_PKEY_CTX_hex2ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_TLS_SECRET, value);
+    if (strcmp(type, "seed") == 0)
+        return EVP_PKEY_CTX_str2ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_TLS_SEED, value);
+    if (strcmp(type, "hexseed") == 0)
+        return EVP_PKEY_CTX_hex2ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_TLS_SEED, value);
+    return -2;
+}
+
+static int pkey_tls1_prf_derive(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key,
+                                size_t *keylen)
+{
+    TLS1_PRF_PKEY_CTX *kctx = ctx->data;
+    if (kctx->md == NULL || kctx->sec == NULL || kctx->seedlen == 0) {
+        KDFerr(KDF_F_PKEY_TLS1_PRF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_PARAMETER);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return tls1_prf_alg(kctx->md, kctx->sec, kctx->seclen,
+                        kctx->seed, kctx->seedlen,
+                        key, *keylen);
+}
+
+const EVP_PKEY_METHOD tls1_prf_pkey_meth = {
+    EVP_PKEY_TLS1_PRF,
+    0,
+    pkey_tls1_prf_init,
+    0,
+    pkey_tls1_prf_cleanup,
+
+    0, 0,
+    0, 0,
+
+    0,
+    0,
+
+    0,
+    0,
+
+    0, 0,
+
+    0, 0, 0, 0,
+
+    0, 0,
+
+    0, 0,
+
+    0,
+    pkey_tls1_prf_derive,
+    pkey_tls1_prf_ctrl,
+    pkey_tls1_prf_ctrl_str
+};
+
+static int tls1_prf_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md,
+                           const unsigned char *sec, size_t sec_len,
+                           const unsigned char *seed, size_t seed_len,
+                           unsigned char *out, size_t olen)
+{
+    int chunk;
+    EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL, *ctx_tmp = NULL, *ctx_init = NULL;
+    EVP_PKEY *mac_key = NULL;
+    unsigned char A1[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+    size_t A1_len;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    chunk = EVP_MD_size(md);
+    OPENSSL_assert(chunk >= 0);
+
+    ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+    ctx_tmp = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+    ctx_init = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+    if (ctx == NULL || ctx_tmp == NULL || ctx_init == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(ctx_init, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
+    mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, sec, sec_len);
+    if (mac_key == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(ctx_init, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key))
+        goto err;
+    if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(ctx, ctx_init))
+        goto err;
+    if (seed != NULL && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(ctx, seed, seed_len))
+        goto err;
+    if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(ctx, A1, &A1_len))
+        goto err;
+
+    for (;;) {
+        /* Reinit mac contexts */
+        if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(ctx, ctx_init))
+            goto err;
+        if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(ctx, A1, A1_len))
+            goto err;
+        if (olen > (size_t)chunk && !EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(ctx_tmp, ctx))
+            goto err;
+        if (seed && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(ctx, seed, seed_len))
+            goto err;
+
+        if (olen > (size_t)chunk) {
+            size_t mac_len;
+            if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(ctx, out, &mac_len))
+                goto err;
+            out += mac_len;
+            olen -= mac_len;
+            /* calc the next A1 value */
+            if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(ctx_tmp, A1, &A1_len))
+                goto err;
+        } else {                /* last one */
+
+            if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(ctx, A1, &A1_len))
+                goto err;
+            memcpy(out, A1, olen);
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx_tmp);
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx_init);
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(A1, sizeof(A1));
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int tls1_prf_alg(const EVP_MD *md,
+                        const unsigned char *sec, size_t slen,
+                        const unsigned char *seed, size_t seed_len,
+                        unsigned char *out, size_t olen)
+{
+
+    if (EVP_MD_type(md) == NID_md5_sha1) {
+        size_t i;
+        unsigned char *tmp;
+        if (!tls1_prf_P_hash(EVP_md5(), sec, slen/2 + (slen & 1),
+                         seed, seed_len, out, olen))
+            return 0;
+
+        tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(olen);
+        if (tmp == NULL)
+            return 0;
+        if (!tls1_prf_P_hash(EVP_sha1(), sec + slen/2, slen/2 + (slen & 1),
+                         seed, seed_len, tmp, olen)) {
+            OPENSSL_clear_free(tmp, olen);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        for (i = 0; i < olen; i++)
+            out[i] ^= tmp[i];
+        OPENSSL_clear_free(tmp, olen);
+        return 1;
+    }
+    if (!tls1_prf_P_hash(md, sec, slen, seed, seed_len, out, olen))
+        return 0;
+
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/lhash/build.info b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/lhash/build.info
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..30797f2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/lhash/build.info
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+LIBS=../../libcrypto
+SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
+        lhash.c lh_stats.c
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/lhash/lh_stats.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/lhash/lh_stats.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5586afa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/lhash/lh_stats.c
@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+/*
+ * If you wish to build this outside of OpenSSL, remove the following lines
+ * and things should work as expected
+ */
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/lhash.h>
+#include "lhash_lcl.h"
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+void OPENSSL_LH_stats(const OPENSSL_LHASH *lh, FILE *fp)
+{
+    BIO *bp;
+
+    bp = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
+    if (bp == NULL)
+        return;
+    BIO_set_fp(bp, fp, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+    OPENSSL_LH_stats_bio(lh, bp);
+    BIO_free(bp);
+}
+
+void OPENSSL_LH_node_stats(const OPENSSL_LHASH *lh, FILE *fp)
+{
+    BIO *bp;
+
+    bp = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
+    if (bp == NULL)
+        return;
+    BIO_set_fp(bp, fp, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+    OPENSSL_LH_node_stats_bio(lh, bp);
+    BIO_free(bp);
+}
+
+void OPENSSL_LH_node_usage_stats(const OPENSSL_LHASH *lh, FILE *fp)
+{
+    BIO *bp;
+
+    bp = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
+    if (bp == NULL)
+        return;
+    BIO_set_fp(bp, fp, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+    OPENSSL_LH_node_usage_stats_bio(lh, bp);
+    BIO_free(bp);
+}
+
+# endif
+
+void OPENSSL_LH_stats_bio(const OPENSSL_LHASH *lh, BIO *out)
+{
+    OPENSSL_LHASH *lh_mut = (OPENSSL_LHASH *) lh;
+    int ret;
+
+    BIO_printf(out, "num_items             = %lu\n", lh->num_items);
+    BIO_printf(out, "num_nodes             = %u\n", lh->num_nodes);
+    BIO_printf(out, "num_alloc_nodes       = %u\n", lh->num_alloc_nodes);
+    BIO_printf(out, "num_expands           = %lu\n", lh->num_expands);
+    BIO_printf(out, "num_expand_reallocs   = %lu\n", lh->num_expand_reallocs);
+    BIO_printf(out, "num_contracts         = %lu\n", lh->num_contracts);
+    BIO_printf(out, "num_contract_reallocs = %lu\n",
+               lh->num_contract_reallocs);
+    CRYPTO_atomic_add(&lh_mut->num_hash_calls, 0, &ret,
+                      lh->retrieve_stats_lock);
+    BIO_printf(out, "num_hash_calls        = %d\n", ret);
+    CRYPTO_atomic_add(&lh_mut->num_comp_calls, 0, &ret,
+                      lh->retrieve_stats_lock);
+    BIO_printf(out, "num_comp_calls        = %d\n", ret);
+    BIO_printf(out, "num_insert            = %lu\n", lh->num_insert);
+    BIO_printf(out, "num_replace           = %lu\n", lh->num_replace);
+    BIO_printf(out, "num_delete            = %lu\n", lh->num_delete);
+    BIO_printf(out, "num_no_delete         = %lu\n", lh->num_no_delete);
+    CRYPTO_atomic_add(&lh_mut->num_retrieve, 0, &ret, lh->retrieve_stats_lock);
+    BIO_printf(out, "num_retrieve          = %d\n", ret);
+    CRYPTO_atomic_add(&lh_mut->num_retrieve_miss, 0, &ret,
+                      lh->retrieve_stats_lock);
+    BIO_printf(out, "num_retrieve_miss     = %d\n", ret);
+    CRYPTO_atomic_add(&lh_mut->num_hash_comps, 0, &ret,
+                      lh->retrieve_stats_lock);
+    BIO_printf(out, "num_hash_comps        = %d\n", ret);
+}
+
+void OPENSSL_LH_node_stats_bio(const OPENSSL_LHASH *lh, BIO *out)
+{
+    OPENSSL_LH_NODE *n;
+    unsigned int i, num;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < lh->num_nodes; i++) {
+        for (n = lh->b[i], num = 0; n != NULL; n = n->next)
+            num++;
+        BIO_printf(out, "node %6u -> %3u\n", i, num);
+    }
+}
+
+void OPENSSL_LH_node_usage_stats_bio(const OPENSSL_LHASH *lh, BIO *out)
+{
+    OPENSSL_LH_NODE *n;
+    unsigned long num;
+    unsigned int i;
+    unsigned long total = 0, n_used = 0;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < lh->num_nodes; i++) {
+        for (n = lh->b[i], num = 0; n != NULL; n = n->next)
+            num++;
+        if (num != 0) {
+            n_used++;
+            total += num;
+        }
+    }
+    BIO_printf(out, "%lu nodes used out of %u\n", n_used, lh->num_nodes);
+    BIO_printf(out, "%lu items\n", total);
+    if (n_used == 0)
+        return;
+    BIO_printf(out, "load %d.%02d  actual load %d.%02d\n",
+               (int)(total / lh->num_nodes),
+               (int)((total % lh->num_nodes) * 100 / lh->num_nodes),
+               (int)(total / n_used), (int)((total % n_used) * 100 / n_used));
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/lhash/lhash.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/lhash/lhash.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f485411
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/lhash/lhash.c
@@ -0,0 +1,372 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/lhash.h>
+#include "lhash_lcl.h"
+
+/*
+ * A hashing implementation that appears to be based on the linear hashing
+ * algorithm:
+ * https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linear_hashing
+ *
+ * Litwin, Witold (1980), "Linear hashing: A new tool for file and table
+ * addressing", Proc. 6th Conference on Very Large Databases: 212-223
+ * http://hackthology.com/pdfs/Litwin-1980-Linear_Hashing.pdf
+ *
+ * From the wikipedia article "Linear hashing is used in the BDB Berkeley
+ * database system, which in turn is used by many software systems such as
+ * OpenLDAP, using a C implementation derived from the CACM article and first
+ * published on the Usenet in 1988 by Esmond Pitt."
+ *
+ * The CACM paper is available here:
+ * https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/ff4d/1c5deca6269cc316bfd952172284dbf610ee.pdf
+ */
+
+#undef MIN_NODES
+#define MIN_NODES       16
+#define UP_LOAD         (2*LH_LOAD_MULT) /* load times 256 (default 2) */
+#define DOWN_LOAD       (LH_LOAD_MULT) /* load times 256 (default 1) */
+
+static int expand(OPENSSL_LHASH *lh);
+static void contract(OPENSSL_LHASH *lh);
+static OPENSSL_LH_NODE **getrn(OPENSSL_LHASH *lh, const void *data, unsigned long *rhash);
+
+OPENSSL_LHASH *OPENSSL_LH_new(OPENSSL_LH_HASHFUNC h, OPENSSL_LH_COMPFUNC c)
+{
+    OPENSSL_LHASH *ret;
+
+    if ((ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret))) == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    if ((ret->b = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret->b) * MIN_NODES)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if ((ret->retrieve_stats_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new()) == NULL) 
+        goto err;
+    ret->comp = ((c == NULL) ? (OPENSSL_LH_COMPFUNC)strcmp : c);
+    ret->hash = ((h == NULL) ? (OPENSSL_LH_HASHFUNC)OPENSSL_LH_strhash : h);
+    ret->num_nodes = MIN_NODES / 2;
+    ret->num_alloc_nodes = MIN_NODES;
+    ret->pmax = MIN_NODES / 2;
+    ret->up_load = UP_LOAD;
+    ret->down_load = DOWN_LOAD;
+    return (ret);
+
+err:
+    OPENSSL_free(ret->b);
+    OPENSSL_free(ret);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+void OPENSSL_LH_free(OPENSSL_LHASH *lh)
+{
+    unsigned int i;
+    OPENSSL_LH_NODE *n, *nn;
+
+    if (lh == NULL)
+        return;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < lh->num_nodes; i++) {
+        n = lh->b[i];
+        while (n != NULL) {
+            nn = n->next;
+            OPENSSL_free(n);
+            n = nn;
+        }
+    }
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(lh->retrieve_stats_lock);
+    OPENSSL_free(lh->b);
+    OPENSSL_free(lh);
+}
+
+void *OPENSSL_LH_insert(OPENSSL_LHASH *lh, void *data)
+{
+    unsigned long hash;
+    OPENSSL_LH_NODE *nn, **rn;
+    void *ret;
+
+    lh->error = 0;
+    if ((lh->up_load <= (lh->num_items * LH_LOAD_MULT / lh->num_nodes)) && !expand(lh))
+        return NULL;        /* 'lh->error++' already done in 'expand' */
+
+    rn = getrn(lh, data, &hash);
+
+    if (*rn == NULL) {
+        if ((nn = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*nn))) == NULL) {
+            lh->error++;
+            return (NULL);
+        }
+        nn->data = data;
+        nn->next = NULL;
+        nn->hash = hash;
+        *rn = nn;
+        ret = NULL;
+        lh->num_insert++;
+        lh->num_items++;
+    } else {                    /* replace same key */
+
+        ret = (*rn)->data;
+        (*rn)->data = data;
+        lh->num_replace++;
+    }
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+void *OPENSSL_LH_delete(OPENSSL_LHASH *lh, const void *data)
+{
+    unsigned long hash;
+    OPENSSL_LH_NODE *nn, **rn;
+    void *ret;
+
+    lh->error = 0;
+    rn = getrn(lh, data, &hash);
+
+    if (*rn == NULL) {
+        lh->num_no_delete++;
+        return (NULL);
+    } else {
+        nn = *rn;
+        *rn = nn->next;
+        ret = nn->data;
+        OPENSSL_free(nn);
+        lh->num_delete++;
+    }
+
+    lh->num_items--;
+    if ((lh->num_nodes > MIN_NODES) &&
+        (lh->down_load >= (lh->num_items * LH_LOAD_MULT / lh->num_nodes)))
+        contract(lh);
+
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+void *OPENSSL_LH_retrieve(OPENSSL_LHASH *lh, const void *data)
+{
+    unsigned long hash;
+    OPENSSL_LH_NODE **rn;
+    void *ret;
+    int scratch;
+
+    lh->error = 0;
+    rn = getrn(lh, data, &hash);
+
+    if (*rn == NULL) {
+        CRYPTO_atomic_add(&lh->num_retrieve_miss, 1, &scratch, lh->retrieve_stats_lock);
+        return NULL;
+    } else {
+        ret = (*rn)->data;
+        CRYPTO_atomic_add(&lh->num_retrieve, 1, &scratch, lh->retrieve_stats_lock);
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static void doall_util_fn(OPENSSL_LHASH *lh, int use_arg,
+                          OPENSSL_LH_DOALL_FUNC func,
+                          OPENSSL_LH_DOALL_FUNCARG func_arg, void *arg)
+{
+    int i;
+    OPENSSL_LH_NODE *a, *n;
+
+    if (lh == NULL)
+        return;
+
+    /*
+     * reverse the order so we search from 'top to bottom' We were having
+     * memory leaks otherwise
+     */
+    for (i = lh->num_nodes - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+        a = lh->b[i];
+        while (a != NULL) {
+            n = a->next;
+            if (use_arg)
+                func_arg(a->data, arg);
+            else
+                func(a->data);
+            a = n;
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+void OPENSSL_LH_doall(OPENSSL_LHASH *lh, OPENSSL_LH_DOALL_FUNC func)
+{
+    doall_util_fn(lh, 0, func, (OPENSSL_LH_DOALL_FUNCARG)0, NULL);
+}
+
+void OPENSSL_LH_doall_arg(OPENSSL_LHASH *lh, OPENSSL_LH_DOALL_FUNCARG func, void *arg)
+{
+    doall_util_fn(lh, 1, (OPENSSL_LH_DOALL_FUNC)0, func, arg);
+}
+
+static int expand(OPENSSL_LHASH *lh)
+{
+    OPENSSL_LH_NODE **n, **n1, **n2, *np;
+    unsigned int p, pmax, nni, j;
+    unsigned long hash;
+
+    nni = lh->num_alloc_nodes;
+    p = lh->p;
+    pmax = lh->pmax;
+    if (p + 1 >= pmax) {
+        j = nni * 2;
+        n = OPENSSL_realloc(lh->b, sizeof(OPENSSL_LH_NODE *) * j);
+        if (n == NULL) {
+            lh->error++;
+            return 0;
+        }
+        lh->b = n;
+        memset(n + nni, 0, sizeof(*n) * (j - nni));
+        lh->pmax = nni;
+        lh->num_alloc_nodes = j;
+        lh->num_expand_reallocs++;
+        lh->p = 0;
+    } else {
+        lh->p++;
+    }
+
+    lh->num_nodes++;
+    lh->num_expands++;
+    n1 = &(lh->b[p]);
+    n2 = &(lh->b[p + pmax]);
+    *n2 = NULL;
+
+    for (np = *n1; np != NULL;) {
+        hash = np->hash;
+        if ((hash % nni) != p) { /* move it */
+            *n1 = (*n1)->next;
+            np->next = *n2;
+            *n2 = np;
+        } else
+            n1 = &((*n1)->next);
+        np = *n1;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static void contract(OPENSSL_LHASH *lh)
+{
+    OPENSSL_LH_NODE **n, *n1, *np;
+
+    np = lh->b[lh->p + lh->pmax - 1];
+    lh->b[lh->p + lh->pmax - 1] = NULL; /* 24/07-92 - eay - weird but :-( */
+    if (lh->p == 0) {
+        n = OPENSSL_realloc(lh->b,
+                            (unsigned int)(sizeof(OPENSSL_LH_NODE *) * lh->pmax));
+        if (n == NULL) {
+            /* fputs("realloc error in lhash",stderr); */
+            lh->error++;
+            return;
+        }
+        lh->num_contract_reallocs++;
+        lh->num_alloc_nodes /= 2;
+        lh->pmax /= 2;
+        lh->p = lh->pmax - 1;
+        lh->b = n;
+    } else
+        lh->p--;
+
+    lh->num_nodes--;
+    lh->num_contracts++;
+
+    n1 = lh->b[(int)lh->p];
+    if (n1 == NULL)
+        lh->b[(int)lh->p] = np;
+    else {
+        while (n1->next != NULL)
+            n1 = n1->next;
+        n1->next = np;
+    }
+}
+
+static OPENSSL_LH_NODE **getrn(OPENSSL_LHASH *lh,
+                               const void *data, unsigned long *rhash)
+{
+    OPENSSL_LH_NODE **ret, *n1;
+    unsigned long hash, nn;
+    OPENSSL_LH_COMPFUNC cf;
+    int scratch;
+
+    hash = (*(lh->hash)) (data);
+    CRYPTO_atomic_add(&lh->num_hash_calls, 1, &scratch, lh->retrieve_stats_lock);
+    *rhash = hash;
+
+    nn = hash % lh->pmax;
+    if (nn < lh->p)
+        nn = hash % lh->num_alloc_nodes;
+
+    cf = lh->comp;
+    ret = &(lh->b[(int)nn]);
+    for (n1 = *ret; n1 != NULL; n1 = n1->next) {
+        CRYPTO_atomic_add(&lh->num_hash_comps, 1, &scratch, lh->retrieve_stats_lock);
+        if (n1->hash != hash) {
+            ret = &(n1->next);
+            continue;
+        }
+        CRYPTO_atomic_add(&lh->num_comp_calls, 1, &scratch, lh->retrieve_stats_lock);
+        if (cf(n1->data, data) == 0)
+            break;
+        ret = &(n1->next);
+    }
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+/*
+ * The following hash seems to work very well on normal text strings no
+ * collisions on /usr/dict/words and it distributes on %2^n quite well, not
+ * as good as MD5, but still good.
+ */
+unsigned long OPENSSL_LH_strhash(const char *c)
+{
+    unsigned long ret = 0;
+    long n;
+    unsigned long v;
+    int r;
+
+    if ((c == NULL) || (*c == '\0'))
+        return (ret);
+/*-
+    unsigned char b[16];
+    MD5(c,strlen(c),b);
+    return(b[0]|(b[1]<<8)|(b[2]<<16)|(b[3]<<24));
+*/
+
+    n = 0x100;
+    while (*c) {
+        v = n | (*c);
+        n += 0x100;
+        r = (int)((v >> 2) ^ v) & 0x0f;
+        ret = (ret << r) | (ret >> (32 - r));
+        ret &= 0xFFFFFFFFL;
+        ret ^= v * v;
+        c++;
+    }
+    return ((ret >> 16) ^ ret);
+}
+
+unsigned long OPENSSL_LH_num_items(const OPENSSL_LHASH *lh)
+{
+    return lh ? lh->num_items : 0;
+}
+
+unsigned long OPENSSL_LH_get_down_load(const OPENSSL_LHASH *lh)
+{
+    return lh->down_load;
+}
+
+void OPENSSL_LH_set_down_load(OPENSSL_LHASH *lh, unsigned long down_load)
+{
+    lh->down_load = down_load;
+}
+
+int OPENSSL_LH_error(OPENSSL_LHASH *lh)
+{
+    return lh->error;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/lhash/lhash_lcl.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/lhash/lhash_lcl.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..01d463f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/lhash/lhash_lcl.h
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+
+struct lhash_node_st {
+    void *data;
+    struct lhash_node_st *next;
+    unsigned long hash;
+};
+
+struct lhash_st {
+    OPENSSL_LH_NODE **b;
+    OPENSSL_LH_COMPFUNC comp;
+    OPENSSL_LH_HASHFUNC hash;
+    /*
+     * some stats are updated on lookup, which callers aren't expecting to have
+     * to take an exclusive lock around. This lock protects them on platforms
+     * without atomics, and their types are int rather than unsigned long below 
+     * so they can be adjusted with CRYPTO_atomic_add.
+     */
+    CRYPTO_RWLOCK *retrieve_stats_lock;
+    unsigned int num_nodes;
+    unsigned int num_alloc_nodes;
+    unsigned int p;
+    unsigned int pmax;
+    unsigned long up_load;      /* load times 256 */
+    unsigned long down_load;    /* load times 256 */
+    unsigned long num_items;
+    unsigned long num_expands;
+    unsigned long num_expand_reallocs;
+    unsigned long num_contracts;
+    unsigned long num_contract_reallocs;
+    int num_hash_calls;
+    int num_comp_calls;
+    unsigned long num_insert;
+    unsigned long num_replace;
+    unsigned long num_delete;
+    unsigned long num_no_delete;
+    int num_retrieve;
+    int num_retrieve_miss;
+    int num_hash_comps;
+    int error;
+};
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/lhash/num.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/lhash/num.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8a8c42c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/lhash/num.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+#node     10 ->   4
+
+while (<>)
+	{
+	next unless /^node/;
+	s|\R$||;                # Better chomp
+	@a=split;
+	$num{$a[3]}++;
+	}
+
+@a=sort {$a <=> $b } keys %num;
+foreach (0 .. $a[$#a])
+	{
+	printf "%4d:%4d\n",$_,$num{$_};
+	}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/md2/build.info b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/md2/build.info
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e31948c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/md2/build.info
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+LIBS=../../libcrypto
+SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
+        md2_dgst.c md2_one.c
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/md2/md2_dgst.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/md2/md2_dgst.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ff062fd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/md2/md2_dgst.c
@@ -0,0 +1,173 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/md2.h>
+#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+
+/*
+ * Implemented from RFC1319 The MD2 Message-Digest Algorithm
+ */
+
+#define UCHAR   unsigned char
+
+static void md2_block(MD2_CTX *c, const unsigned char *d);
+/*
+ * The magic S table - I have converted it to hex since it is basically just
+ * a random byte string.
+ */
+static const MD2_INT S[256] = {
+    0x29, 0x2E, 0x43, 0xC9, 0xA2, 0xD8, 0x7C, 0x01,
+    0x3D, 0x36, 0x54, 0xA1, 0xEC, 0xF0, 0x06, 0x13,
+    0x62, 0xA7, 0x05, 0xF3, 0xC0, 0xC7, 0x73, 0x8C,
+    0x98, 0x93, 0x2B, 0xD9, 0xBC, 0x4C, 0x82, 0xCA,
+    0x1E, 0x9B, 0x57, 0x3C, 0xFD, 0xD4, 0xE0, 0x16,
+    0x67, 0x42, 0x6F, 0x18, 0x8A, 0x17, 0xE5, 0x12,
+    0xBE, 0x4E, 0xC4, 0xD6, 0xDA, 0x9E, 0xDE, 0x49,
+    0xA0, 0xFB, 0xF5, 0x8E, 0xBB, 0x2F, 0xEE, 0x7A,
+    0xA9, 0x68, 0x79, 0x91, 0x15, 0xB2, 0x07, 0x3F,
+    0x94, 0xC2, 0x10, 0x89, 0x0B, 0x22, 0x5F, 0x21,
+    0x80, 0x7F, 0x5D, 0x9A, 0x5A, 0x90, 0x32, 0x27,
+    0x35, 0x3E, 0xCC, 0xE7, 0xBF, 0xF7, 0x97, 0x03,
+    0xFF, 0x19, 0x30, 0xB3, 0x48, 0xA5, 0xB5, 0xD1,
+    0xD7, 0x5E, 0x92, 0x2A, 0xAC, 0x56, 0xAA, 0xC6,
+    0x4F, 0xB8, 0x38, 0xD2, 0x96, 0xA4, 0x7D, 0xB6,
+    0x76, 0xFC, 0x6B, 0xE2, 0x9C, 0x74, 0x04, 0xF1,
+    0x45, 0x9D, 0x70, 0x59, 0x64, 0x71, 0x87, 0x20,
+    0x86, 0x5B, 0xCF, 0x65, 0xE6, 0x2D, 0xA8, 0x02,
+    0x1B, 0x60, 0x25, 0xAD, 0xAE, 0xB0, 0xB9, 0xF6,
+    0x1C, 0x46, 0x61, 0x69, 0x34, 0x40, 0x7E, 0x0F,
+    0x55, 0x47, 0xA3, 0x23, 0xDD, 0x51, 0xAF, 0x3A,
+    0xC3, 0x5C, 0xF9, 0xCE, 0xBA, 0xC5, 0xEA, 0x26,
+    0x2C, 0x53, 0x0D, 0x6E, 0x85, 0x28, 0x84, 0x09,
+    0xD3, 0xDF, 0xCD, 0xF4, 0x41, 0x81, 0x4D, 0x52,
+    0x6A, 0xDC, 0x37, 0xC8, 0x6C, 0xC1, 0xAB, 0xFA,
+    0x24, 0xE1, 0x7B, 0x08, 0x0C, 0xBD, 0xB1, 0x4A,
+    0x78, 0x88, 0x95, 0x8B, 0xE3, 0x63, 0xE8, 0x6D,
+    0xE9, 0xCB, 0xD5, 0xFE, 0x3B, 0x00, 0x1D, 0x39,
+    0xF2, 0xEF, 0xB7, 0x0E, 0x66, 0x58, 0xD0, 0xE4,
+    0xA6, 0x77, 0x72, 0xF8, 0xEB, 0x75, 0x4B, 0x0A,
+    0x31, 0x44, 0x50, 0xB4, 0x8F, 0xED, 0x1F, 0x1A,
+    0xDB, 0x99, 0x8D, 0x33, 0x9F, 0x11, 0x83, 0x14,
+};
+
+const char *MD2_options(void)
+{
+    if (sizeof(MD2_INT) == 1)
+        return ("md2(char)");
+    else
+        return ("md2(int)");
+}
+
+int MD2_Init(MD2_CTX *c)
+{
+    c->num = 0;
+    memset(c->state, 0, sizeof(c->state));
+    memset(c->cksm, 0, sizeof(c->cksm));
+    memset(c->data, 0, sizeof(c->data));
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int MD2_Update(MD2_CTX *c, const unsigned char *data, size_t len)
+{
+    register UCHAR *p;
+
+    if (len == 0)
+        return 1;
+
+    p = c->data;
+    if (c->num != 0) {
+        if ((c->num + len) >= MD2_BLOCK) {
+            memcpy(&(p[c->num]), data, MD2_BLOCK - c->num);
+            md2_block(c, c->data);
+            data += (MD2_BLOCK - c->num);
+            len -= (MD2_BLOCK - c->num);
+            c->num = 0;
+            /* drop through and do the rest */
+        } else {
+            memcpy(&(p[c->num]), data, len);
+            /* data+=len; */
+            c->num += (int)len;
+            return 1;
+        }
+    }
+    /*
+     * we now can process the input data in blocks of MD2_BLOCK chars and
+     * save the leftovers to c->data.
+     */
+    while (len >= MD2_BLOCK) {
+        md2_block(c, data);
+        data += MD2_BLOCK;
+        len -= MD2_BLOCK;
+    }
+    memcpy(p, data, len);
+    c->num = (int)len;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static void md2_block(MD2_CTX *c, const unsigned char *d)
+{
+    register MD2_INT t, *sp1, *sp2;
+    register int i, j;
+    MD2_INT state[48];
+
+    sp1 = c->state;
+    sp2 = c->cksm;
+    j = sp2[MD2_BLOCK - 1];
+    for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
+        state[i] = sp1[i];
+        state[i + 16] = t = d[i];
+        state[i + 32] = (t ^ sp1[i]);
+        j = sp2[i] ^= S[t ^ j];
+    }
+    t = 0;
+    for (i = 0; i < 18; i++) {
+        for (j = 0; j < 48; j += 8) {
+            t = state[j + 0] ^= S[t];
+            t = state[j + 1] ^= S[t];
+            t = state[j + 2] ^= S[t];
+            t = state[j + 3] ^= S[t];
+            t = state[j + 4] ^= S[t];
+            t = state[j + 5] ^= S[t];
+            t = state[j + 6] ^= S[t];
+            t = state[j + 7] ^= S[t];
+        }
+        t = (t + i) & 0xff;
+    }
+    memcpy(sp1, state, 16 * sizeof(MD2_INT));
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(state, 48 * sizeof(MD2_INT));
+}
+
+int MD2_Final(unsigned char *md, MD2_CTX *c)
+{
+    int i, v;
+    register UCHAR *cp;
+    register MD2_INT *p1, *p2;
+
+    cp = c->data;
+    p1 = c->state;
+    p2 = c->cksm;
+    v = MD2_BLOCK - c->num;
+    for (i = c->num; i < MD2_BLOCK; i++)
+        cp[i] = (UCHAR) v;
+
+    md2_block(c, cp);
+
+    for (i = 0; i < MD2_BLOCK; i++)
+        cp[i] = (UCHAR) p2[i];
+    md2_block(c, cp);
+
+    for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+        md[i] = (UCHAR) (p1[i] & 0xff);
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(c, sizeof(*c));
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/md2/md2_one.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/md2/md2_one.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..460f96e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/md2/md2_one.c
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/md2.h>
+
+/*
+ * This is a separate file so that #defines in cryptlib.h can map my MD
+ * functions to different names
+ */
+
+unsigned char *MD2(const unsigned char *d, size_t n, unsigned char *md)
+{
+    MD2_CTX c;
+    static unsigned char m[MD2_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+
+    if (md == NULL)
+        md = m;
+    if (!MD2_Init(&c))
+        return NULL;
+#ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+    MD2_Update(&c, d, n);
+#else
+    {
+        char temp[1024];
+        unsigned long chunk;
+
+        while (n > 0) {
+            chunk = (n > sizeof(temp)) ? sizeof(temp) : n;
+            ebcdic2ascii(temp, d, chunk);
+            MD2_Update(&c, temp, chunk);
+            n -= chunk;
+            d += chunk;
+        }
+    }
+#endif
+    MD2_Final(md, &c);
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(&c, sizeof(c)); /* Security consideration */
+    return (md);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/md4/build.info b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/md4/build.info
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..20846e0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/md4/build.info
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+LIBS=../../libcrypto
+SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
+        md4_dgst.c md4_one.c
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/md4/md4_dgst.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/md4/md4_dgst.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5319618
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/md4/md4_dgst.c
@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+#include "md4_locl.h"
+
+/*
+ * Implemented from RFC1186 The MD4 Message-Digest Algorithm
+ */
+
+#define INIT_DATA_A (unsigned long)0x67452301L
+#define INIT_DATA_B (unsigned long)0xefcdab89L
+#define INIT_DATA_C (unsigned long)0x98badcfeL
+#define INIT_DATA_D (unsigned long)0x10325476L
+
+int MD4_Init(MD4_CTX *c)
+{
+    memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c));
+    c->A = INIT_DATA_A;
+    c->B = INIT_DATA_B;
+    c->C = INIT_DATA_C;
+    c->D = INIT_DATA_D;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+#ifndef md4_block_data_order
+# ifdef X
+#  undef X
+# endif
+void md4_block_data_order(MD4_CTX *c, const void *data_, size_t num)
+{
+    const unsigned char *data = data_;
+    register unsigned MD32_REG_T A, B, C, D, l;
+# ifndef MD32_XARRAY
+    /* See comment in crypto/sha/sha_locl.h for details. */
+    unsigned MD32_REG_T XX0, XX1, XX2, XX3, XX4, XX5, XX6, XX7,
+        XX8, XX9, XX10, XX11, XX12, XX13, XX14, XX15;
+#  define X(i)   XX##i
+# else
+    MD4_LONG XX[MD4_LBLOCK];
+#  define X(i)   XX[i]
+# endif
+
+    A = c->A;
+    B = c->B;
+    C = c->C;
+    D = c->D;
+
+    for (; num--;) {
+        (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+        X(0) = l;
+        (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+        X(1) = l;
+        /* Round 0 */
+        R0(A, B, C, D, X(0), 3, 0);
+        (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+        X(2) = l;
+        R0(D, A, B, C, X(1), 7, 0);
+        (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+        X(3) = l;
+        R0(C, D, A, B, X(2), 11, 0);
+        (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+        X(4) = l;
+        R0(B, C, D, A, X(3), 19, 0);
+        (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+        X(5) = l;
+        R0(A, B, C, D, X(4), 3, 0);
+        (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+        X(6) = l;
+        R0(D, A, B, C, X(5), 7, 0);
+        (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+        X(7) = l;
+        R0(C, D, A, B, X(6), 11, 0);
+        (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+        X(8) = l;
+        R0(B, C, D, A, X(7), 19, 0);
+        (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+        X(9) = l;
+        R0(A, B, C, D, X(8), 3, 0);
+        (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+        X(10) = l;
+        R0(D, A, B, C, X(9), 7, 0);
+        (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+        X(11) = l;
+        R0(C, D, A, B, X(10), 11, 0);
+        (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+        X(12) = l;
+        R0(B, C, D, A, X(11), 19, 0);
+        (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+        X(13) = l;
+        R0(A, B, C, D, X(12), 3, 0);
+        (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+        X(14) = l;
+        R0(D, A, B, C, X(13), 7, 0);
+        (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+        X(15) = l;
+        R0(C, D, A, B, X(14), 11, 0);
+        R0(B, C, D, A, X(15), 19, 0);
+        /* Round 1 */
+        R1(A, B, C, D, X(0), 3, 0x5A827999L);
+        R1(D, A, B, C, X(4), 5, 0x5A827999L);
+        R1(C, D, A, B, X(8), 9, 0x5A827999L);
+        R1(B, C, D, A, X(12), 13, 0x5A827999L);
+        R1(A, B, C, D, X(1), 3, 0x5A827999L);
+        R1(D, A, B, C, X(5), 5, 0x5A827999L);
+        R1(C, D, A, B, X(9), 9, 0x5A827999L);
+        R1(B, C, D, A, X(13), 13, 0x5A827999L);
+        R1(A, B, C, D, X(2), 3, 0x5A827999L);
+        R1(D, A, B, C, X(6), 5, 0x5A827999L);
+        R1(C, D, A, B, X(10), 9, 0x5A827999L);
+        R1(B, C, D, A, X(14), 13, 0x5A827999L);
+        R1(A, B, C, D, X(3), 3, 0x5A827999L);
+        R1(D, A, B, C, X(7), 5, 0x5A827999L);
+        R1(C, D, A, B, X(11), 9, 0x5A827999L);
+        R1(B, C, D, A, X(15), 13, 0x5A827999L);
+        /* Round 2 */
+        R2(A, B, C, D, X(0), 3, 0x6ED9EBA1L);
+        R2(D, A, B, C, X(8), 9, 0x6ED9EBA1L);
+        R2(C, D, A, B, X(4), 11, 0x6ED9EBA1L);
+        R2(B, C, D, A, X(12), 15, 0x6ED9EBA1L);
+        R2(A, B, C, D, X(2), 3, 0x6ED9EBA1L);
+        R2(D, A, B, C, X(10), 9, 0x6ED9EBA1L);
+        R2(C, D, A, B, X(6), 11, 0x6ED9EBA1L);
+        R2(B, C, D, A, X(14), 15, 0x6ED9EBA1L);
+        R2(A, B, C, D, X(1), 3, 0x6ED9EBA1L);
+        R2(D, A, B, C, X(9), 9, 0x6ED9EBA1L);
+        R2(C, D, A, B, X(5), 11, 0x6ED9EBA1L);
+        R2(B, C, D, A, X(13), 15, 0x6ED9EBA1L);
+        R2(A, B, C, D, X(3), 3, 0x6ED9EBA1L);
+        R2(D, A, B, C, X(11), 9, 0x6ED9EBA1L);
+        R2(C, D, A, B, X(7), 11, 0x6ED9EBA1L);
+        R2(B, C, D, A, X(15), 15, 0x6ED9EBA1L);
+
+        A = c->A += A;
+        B = c->B += B;
+        C = c->C += C;
+        D = c->D += D;
+    }
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/md4/md4_locl.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/md4/md4_locl.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6aec556
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/md4/md4_locl.h
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+#include <openssl/md4.h>
+
+void md4_block_data_order(MD4_CTX *c, const void *p, size_t num);
+
+#define DATA_ORDER_IS_LITTLE_ENDIAN
+
+#define HASH_LONG               MD4_LONG
+#define HASH_CTX                MD4_CTX
+#define HASH_CBLOCK             MD4_CBLOCK
+#define HASH_UPDATE             MD4_Update
+#define HASH_TRANSFORM          MD4_Transform
+#define HASH_FINAL              MD4_Final
+#define HASH_MAKE_STRING(c,s)   do {    \
+        unsigned long ll;               \
+        ll=(c)->A; (void)HOST_l2c(ll,(s));      \
+        ll=(c)->B; (void)HOST_l2c(ll,(s));      \
+        ll=(c)->C; (void)HOST_l2c(ll,(s));      \
+        ll=(c)->D; (void)HOST_l2c(ll,(s));      \
+        } while (0)
+#define HASH_BLOCK_DATA_ORDER   md4_block_data_order
+
+#include "internal/md32_common.h"
+
+/*-
+#define F(x,y,z)        (((x) & (y))  |  ((~(x)) & (z)))
+#define G(x,y,z)        (((x) & (y))  |  ((x) & ((z))) | ((y) & ((z))))
+*/
+
+/*
+ * As pointed out by Wei Dai <weidai@eskimo.com>, the above can be simplified
+ * to the code below.  Wei attributes these optimizations to Peter Gutmann's
+ * SHS code, and he attributes it to Rich Schroeppel.
+ */
+#define F(b,c,d)        ((((c) ^ (d)) & (b)) ^ (d))
+#define G(b,c,d)        (((b) & (c)) | ((b) & (d)) | ((c) & (d)))
+#define H(b,c,d)        ((b) ^ (c) ^ (d))
+
+#define R0(a,b,c,d,k,s,t) { \
+        a+=((k)+(t)+F((b),(c),(d))); \
+        a=ROTATE(a,s); };
+
+#define R1(a,b,c,d,k,s,t) { \
+        a+=((k)+(t)+G((b),(c),(d))); \
+        a=ROTATE(a,s); };\
+
+#define R2(a,b,c,d,k,s,t) { \
+        a+=((k)+(t)+H((b),(c),(d))); \
+        a=ROTATE(a,s); };
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/md4/md4_one.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/md4/md4_one.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9f0989f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/md4/md4_one.c
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/md4.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+
+#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+# include <openssl/ebcdic.h>
+#endif
+
+unsigned char *MD4(const unsigned char *d, size_t n, unsigned char *md)
+{
+    MD4_CTX c;
+    static unsigned char m[MD4_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+
+    if (md == NULL)
+        md = m;
+    if (!MD4_Init(&c))
+        return NULL;
+#ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+    MD4_Update(&c, d, n);
+#else
+    {
+        char temp[1024];
+        unsigned long chunk;
+
+        while (n > 0) {
+            chunk = (n > sizeof(temp)) ? sizeof(temp) : n;
+            ebcdic2ascii(temp, d, chunk);
+            MD4_Update(&c, temp, chunk);
+            n -= chunk;
+            d += chunk;
+        }
+    }
+#endif
+    MD4_Final(md, &c);
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(&c, sizeof(c)); /* security consideration */
+    return (md);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/md5/asm/md5-586.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/md5/asm/md5-586.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..24f68af
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/md5/asm/md5-586.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,318 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+# Normal is the
+# md5_block_x86(MD5_CTX *c, ULONG *X);
+# version, non-normal is the
+# md5_block_x86(MD5_CTX *c, ULONG *X,int blocks);
+
+$normal=0;
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm");
+require "x86asm.pl";
+
+$output=pop;
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+&asm_init($ARGV[0],$0);
+
+$A="eax";
+$B="ebx";
+$C="ecx";
+$D="edx";
+$tmp1="edi";
+$tmp2="ebp";
+$X="esi";
+
+# What we need to load into $tmp for the next round
+%Ltmp1=("R0",&Np($C), "R1",&Np($C), "R2",&Np($C), "R3",&Np($D));
+@xo=(
+ 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15,	# R0
+ 1, 6, 11, 0, 5, 10, 15, 4, 9, 14, 3, 8, 13, 2, 7, 12,	# R1
+ 5, 8, 11, 14, 1, 4, 7, 10, 13, 0, 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, 2,	# R2
+ 0, 7, 14, 5, 12, 3, 10, 1, 8, 15, 6, 13, 4, 11, 2, 9,	# R3
+ );
+
+&md5_block("md5_block_asm_data_order");
+&asm_finish();
+
+close STDOUT;
+
+sub Np
+	{
+	local($p)=@_;
+	local(%n)=($A,$D,$B,$A,$C,$B,$D,$C);
+	return($n{$p});
+	}
+
+sub R0
+	{
+	local($pos,$a,$b,$c,$d,$K,$ki,$s,$t)=@_;
+
+	&mov($tmp1,$C)  if $pos < 0;
+	&mov($tmp2,&DWP($xo[$ki]*4,$K,"",0)) if $pos < 0; # very first one 
+
+	# body proper
+
+	&comment("R0 $ki");
+	&xor($tmp1,$d); # F function - part 2
+
+	&and($tmp1,$b); # F function - part 3
+	&lea($a,&DWP($t,$a,$tmp2,1));
+
+	&xor($tmp1,$d); # F function - part 4
+	&mov($tmp2,&DWP($xo[$ki+1]*4,$K,"",0)) if ($pos != 2);
+
+	&add($a,$tmp1);
+
+	&rotl($a,$s);
+
+	&mov($tmp1,&Np($c)) if $pos < 1;	# next tmp1 for R0
+	&mov($tmp1,&Np($c)) if $pos == 1;	# next tmp1 for R1
+
+	&add($a,$b);
+	}
+
+sub R1
+	{
+	local($pos,$a,$b,$c,$d,$K,$ki,$s,$t)=@_;
+
+	&comment("R1 $ki");
+
+	&xor($tmp1,$b); # G function - part 2
+	&and($tmp1,$d); # G function - part 3
+	&lea($a,&DWP($t,$a,$tmp2,1));
+
+	&xor($tmp1,$c);			# G function - part 4
+	&mov($tmp2,&DWP($xo[$ki+1]*4,$K,"",0)) if ($pos != 2);
+
+	&add($a,$tmp1);
+	&mov($tmp1,&Np($c)) if $pos < 1;	# G function - part 1
+	&mov($tmp1,&Np($c)) if $pos == 1;	# G function - part 1
+
+	&rotl($a,$s);
+
+	&add($a,$b);
+	}
+
+sub R2
+	{
+	local($n,$pos,$a,$b,$c,$d,$K,$ki,$s,$t)=@_;
+	# This one is different, only 3 logical operations
+
+if (($n & 1) == 0)
+	{
+	&comment("R2 $ki");
+	# make sure to do 'D' first, not 'B', else we clash with
+	# the last add from the previous round.
+
+	&xor($tmp1,$d); # H function - part 2
+
+	&xor($tmp1,$b); # H function - part 3
+	&lea($a,&DWP($t,$a,$tmp2,1));
+
+	&add($a,$tmp1);
+	&mov($tmp2,&DWP($xo[$ki+1]*4,$K,"",0));
+
+	&rotl($a,$s);
+
+	&mov($tmp1,&Np($c));
+	}
+else
+	{
+	&comment("R2 $ki");
+	# make sure to do 'D' first, not 'B', else we clash with
+	# the last add from the previous round.
+
+	&add($b,$c);			# MOVED FORWARD
+	&xor($tmp1,$d); # H function - part 2
+
+	&lea($a,&DWP($t,$a,$tmp2,1));
+
+	&xor($tmp1,$b); # H function - part 3
+	&mov($tmp2,&DWP($xo[$ki+1]*4,$K,"",0)) if ($pos != 2);
+
+	&add($a,$tmp1);
+	&mov($tmp1,&Np($c)) if $pos < 1;	# H function - part 1
+	&mov($tmp1,-1) if $pos == 1;		# I function - part 1
+
+	&rotl($a,$s);
+
+	&add($a,$b);
+	}
+	}
+
+sub R3
+	{
+	local($pos,$a,$b,$c,$d,$K,$ki,$s,$t)=@_;
+
+	&comment("R3 $ki");
+
+	# &not($tmp1)
+	&xor($tmp1,$d) if $pos < 0; 	# I function - part 2
+
+	&or($tmp1,$b);				# I function - part 3
+	&lea($a,&DWP($t,$a,$tmp2,1));
+
+	&xor($tmp1,$c); 			# I function - part 4
+	&mov($tmp2,&DWP($xo[$ki+1]*4,$K,"",0))	if $pos != 2; # load X/k value
+	&mov($tmp2,&wparam(0)) if $pos == 2;
+
+	&add($a,$tmp1);
+	&mov($tmp1,-1) if $pos < 1;	# H function - part 1
+	&add($K,64) if $pos >=1 && !$normal;
+
+	&rotl($a,$s);
+
+	&xor($tmp1,&Np($d)) if $pos <= 0; 	# I function - part = first time
+	&mov($tmp1,&DWP( 0,$tmp2,"",0)) if $pos > 0;
+	&add($a,$b);
+	}
+
+
+sub md5_block
+	{
+	local($name)=@_;
+
+	&function_begin_B($name,"",3);
+
+	# parameter 1 is the MD5_CTX structure.
+	# A	0
+	# B	4
+	# C	8
+	# D 	12
+
+	&push("esi");
+	 &push("edi");
+	&mov($tmp1,	&wparam(0)); # edi
+	 &mov($X,	&wparam(1)); # esi
+	&mov($C,	&wparam(2));
+	 &push("ebp");
+	&shl($C,	6);
+	&push("ebx");
+	 &add($C,	$X); # offset we end at
+	&sub($C,	64);
+	 &mov($A,	&DWP( 0,$tmp1,"",0));
+	&push($C);	# Put on the TOS
+	 &mov($B,	&DWP( 4,$tmp1,"",0));
+	&mov($C,	&DWP( 8,$tmp1,"",0));
+	 &mov($D,	&DWP(12,$tmp1,"",0));
+
+	&set_label("start") unless $normal;
+	&comment("");
+	&comment("R0 section");
+
+	&R0(-2,$A,$B,$C,$D,$X, 0, 7,0xd76aa478);
+	&R0( 0,$D,$A,$B,$C,$X, 1,12,0xe8c7b756);
+	&R0( 0,$C,$D,$A,$B,$X, 2,17,0x242070db);
+	&R0( 0,$B,$C,$D,$A,$X, 3,22,0xc1bdceee);
+	&R0( 0,$A,$B,$C,$D,$X, 4, 7,0xf57c0faf);
+	&R0( 0,$D,$A,$B,$C,$X, 5,12,0x4787c62a);
+	&R0( 0,$C,$D,$A,$B,$X, 6,17,0xa8304613);
+	&R0( 0,$B,$C,$D,$A,$X, 7,22,0xfd469501);
+	&R0( 0,$A,$B,$C,$D,$X, 8, 7,0x698098d8);
+	&R0( 0,$D,$A,$B,$C,$X, 9,12,0x8b44f7af);
+	&R0( 0,$C,$D,$A,$B,$X,10,17,0xffff5bb1);
+	&R0( 0,$B,$C,$D,$A,$X,11,22,0x895cd7be);
+	&R0( 0,$A,$B,$C,$D,$X,12, 7,0x6b901122);
+	&R0( 0,$D,$A,$B,$C,$X,13,12,0xfd987193);
+	&R0( 0,$C,$D,$A,$B,$X,14,17,0xa679438e);
+	&R0( 1,$B,$C,$D,$A,$X,15,22,0x49b40821);
+
+	&comment("");
+	&comment("R1 section");
+	&R1(-1,$A,$B,$C,$D,$X,16, 5,0xf61e2562);
+	&R1( 0,$D,$A,$B,$C,$X,17, 9,0xc040b340);
+	&R1( 0,$C,$D,$A,$B,$X,18,14,0x265e5a51);
+	&R1( 0,$B,$C,$D,$A,$X,19,20,0xe9b6c7aa);
+	&R1( 0,$A,$B,$C,$D,$X,20, 5,0xd62f105d);
+	&R1( 0,$D,$A,$B,$C,$X,21, 9,0x02441453);
+	&R1( 0,$C,$D,$A,$B,$X,22,14,0xd8a1e681);
+	&R1( 0,$B,$C,$D,$A,$X,23,20,0xe7d3fbc8);
+	&R1( 0,$A,$B,$C,$D,$X,24, 5,0x21e1cde6);
+	&R1( 0,$D,$A,$B,$C,$X,25, 9,0xc33707d6);
+	&R1( 0,$C,$D,$A,$B,$X,26,14,0xf4d50d87);
+	&R1( 0,$B,$C,$D,$A,$X,27,20,0x455a14ed);
+	&R1( 0,$A,$B,$C,$D,$X,28, 5,0xa9e3e905);
+	&R1( 0,$D,$A,$B,$C,$X,29, 9,0xfcefa3f8);
+	&R1( 0,$C,$D,$A,$B,$X,30,14,0x676f02d9);
+	&R1( 1,$B,$C,$D,$A,$X,31,20,0x8d2a4c8a);
+
+	&comment("");
+	&comment("R2 section");
+	&R2( 0,-1,$A,$B,$C,$D,$X,32, 4,0xfffa3942);
+	&R2( 1, 0,$D,$A,$B,$C,$X,33,11,0x8771f681);
+	&R2( 2, 0,$C,$D,$A,$B,$X,34,16,0x6d9d6122);
+	&R2( 3, 0,$B,$C,$D,$A,$X,35,23,0xfde5380c);
+	&R2( 4, 0,$A,$B,$C,$D,$X,36, 4,0xa4beea44);
+	&R2( 5, 0,$D,$A,$B,$C,$X,37,11,0x4bdecfa9);
+	&R2( 6, 0,$C,$D,$A,$B,$X,38,16,0xf6bb4b60);
+	&R2( 7, 0,$B,$C,$D,$A,$X,39,23,0xbebfbc70);
+	&R2( 8, 0,$A,$B,$C,$D,$X,40, 4,0x289b7ec6);
+	&R2( 9, 0,$D,$A,$B,$C,$X,41,11,0xeaa127fa);
+	&R2(10, 0,$C,$D,$A,$B,$X,42,16,0xd4ef3085);
+	&R2(11, 0,$B,$C,$D,$A,$X,43,23,0x04881d05);
+	&R2(12, 0,$A,$B,$C,$D,$X,44, 4,0xd9d4d039);
+	&R2(13, 0,$D,$A,$B,$C,$X,45,11,0xe6db99e5);
+	&R2(14, 0,$C,$D,$A,$B,$X,46,16,0x1fa27cf8);
+	&R2(15, 1,$B,$C,$D,$A,$X,47,23,0xc4ac5665);
+
+	&comment("");
+	&comment("R3 section");
+	&R3(-1,$A,$B,$C,$D,$X,48, 6,0xf4292244);
+	&R3( 0,$D,$A,$B,$C,$X,49,10,0x432aff97);
+	&R3( 0,$C,$D,$A,$B,$X,50,15,0xab9423a7);
+	&R3( 0,$B,$C,$D,$A,$X,51,21,0xfc93a039);
+	&R3( 0,$A,$B,$C,$D,$X,52, 6,0x655b59c3);
+	&R3( 0,$D,$A,$B,$C,$X,53,10,0x8f0ccc92);
+	&R3( 0,$C,$D,$A,$B,$X,54,15,0xffeff47d);
+	&R3( 0,$B,$C,$D,$A,$X,55,21,0x85845dd1);
+	&R3( 0,$A,$B,$C,$D,$X,56, 6,0x6fa87e4f);
+	&R3( 0,$D,$A,$B,$C,$X,57,10,0xfe2ce6e0);
+	&R3( 0,$C,$D,$A,$B,$X,58,15,0xa3014314);
+	&R3( 0,$B,$C,$D,$A,$X,59,21,0x4e0811a1);
+	&R3( 0,$A,$B,$C,$D,$X,60, 6,0xf7537e82);
+	&R3( 0,$D,$A,$B,$C,$X,61,10,0xbd3af235);
+	&R3( 0,$C,$D,$A,$B,$X,62,15,0x2ad7d2bb);
+	&R3( 2,$B,$C,$D,$A,$X,63,21,0xeb86d391);
+
+	# &mov($tmp2,&wparam(0));	# done in the last R3
+	# &mov($tmp1,	&DWP( 0,$tmp2,"",0)); # done is the last R3
+
+	&add($A,$tmp1);
+	 &mov($tmp1,	&DWP( 4,$tmp2,"",0));
+
+	&add($B,$tmp1);
+	&mov($tmp1,	&DWP( 8,$tmp2,"",0));
+
+	&add($C,$tmp1);
+	&mov($tmp1,	&DWP(12,$tmp2,"",0));
+
+	&add($D,$tmp1);
+	&mov(&DWP( 0,$tmp2,"",0),$A);
+
+	&mov(&DWP( 4,$tmp2,"",0),$B);
+	&mov($tmp1,&swtmp(0)) unless $normal;
+
+	&mov(&DWP( 8,$tmp2,"",0),$C);
+	 &mov(&DWP(12,$tmp2,"",0),$D);
+
+	&cmp($tmp1,$X) unless $normal;			# check count
+	 &jae(&label("start")) unless $normal;
+
+	&pop("eax"); # pop the temp variable off the stack
+	 &pop("ebx");
+	&pop("ebp");
+	 &pop("edi");
+	&pop("esi");
+	 &ret();
+	&function_end_B($name);
+	}
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/md5/asm/md5-ia64.S b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/md5/asm/md5-ia64.S
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c20467b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/md5/asm/md5-ia64.S
@@ -0,0 +1,1002 @@
+/*
+ *
+ * Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* Copyright (c) 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
+
+Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+"Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+the following conditions:
+
+The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+
+THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE
+LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
+OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION
+WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.  */
+
+//	Common registers are assigned as follows:
+//
+//	COMMON
+//
+//	t0		Const Tbl Ptr	TPtr
+//	t1		Round Constant	TRound
+//	t4		Block residual	LenResid
+//	t5		Residual Data	DTmp
+//
+//	{in,out}0	Block 0 Cycle	RotateM0
+//	{in,out}1	Block Value 12	M12
+//	{in,out}2	Block Value 8	M8
+//	{in,out}3	Block Value 4	M4
+//	{in,out}4	Block Value 0	M0
+//	{in,out}5	Block 1 Cycle	RotateM1
+//	{in,out}6	Block Value 13	M13
+//	{in,out}7	Block Value 9	M9
+//	{in,out}8	Block Value 5	M5
+//	{in,out}9	Block Value 1	M1
+//	{in,out}10	Block 2 Cycle	RotateM2
+//	{in,out}11	Block Value 14	M14
+//	{in,out}12	Block Value 10	M10
+//	{in,out}13	Block Value 6	M6
+//	{in,out}14	Block Value 2	M2
+//	{in,out}15	Block 3 Cycle	RotateM3
+//	{in,out}16	Block Value 15	M15
+//	{in,out}17	Block Value 11	M11
+//	{in,out}18	Block Value 7	M7
+//	{in,out}19	Block Value 3	M3
+//	{in,out}20	Scratch			Z
+//	{in,out}21	Scratch			Y
+//	{in,out}22	Scratch			X
+//	{in,out}23	Scratch			W
+//	{in,out}24	Digest A		A
+//	{in,out}25	Digest B		B
+//	{in,out}26	Digest C		C
+//	{in,out}27	Digest D		D
+//	{in,out}28	Active Data Ptr	DPtr
+//	in28		Dummy Value		-
+//	out28		Dummy Value		-
+//	bt0			Coroutine Link	QUICK_RTN
+//
+///	These predicates are used for computing the padding block(s) and
+///	are shared between the driver and digest co-routines
+//
+//	pt0			Extra Pad Block	pExtra
+//	pt1			Load next word	pLoad
+//	pt2			Skip next word	pSkip
+//	pt3			Search for Pad	pNoPad
+//	pt4			Pad Word 0		pPad0
+//	pt5			Pad Word 1		pPad1
+//	pt6			Pad Word 2		pPad2
+//	pt7			Pad Word 3		pPad3
+
+#define	DTmp		r19
+#define	LenResid	r18
+#define	QUICK_RTN	b6
+#define	TPtr		r14
+#define	TRound		r15
+#define	pExtra		p6
+#define	pLoad		p7
+#define	pNoPad		p9
+#define	pPad0		p10
+#define	pPad1		p11
+#define	pPad2		p12
+#define	pPad3		p13
+#define	pSkip		p8
+
+#define	A_		out24
+#define	B_		out25
+#define	C_		out26
+#define	D_		out27
+#define	DPtr_		out28
+#define	M0_		out4
+#define	M1_		out9
+#define	M10_		out12
+#define	M11_		out17
+#define	M12_		out1
+#define	M13_		out6
+#define	M14_		out11
+#define	M15_		out16
+#define	M2_		out14
+#define	M3_		out19
+#define	M4_		out3
+#define	M5_		out8
+#define	M6_		out13
+#define	M7_		out18
+#define	M8_		out2
+#define	M9_		out7
+#define	RotateM0_	out0
+#define	RotateM1_	out5
+#define	RotateM2_	out10
+#define	RotateM3_	out15
+#define	W_		out23
+#define	X_		out22
+#define	Y_		out21
+#define	Z_		out20
+
+#define	A		in24
+#define	B		in25
+#define	C		in26
+#define	D		in27
+#define	DPtr		in28
+#define	M0		in4
+#define	M1		in9
+#define	M10		in12
+#define	M11		in17
+#define	M12		in1
+#define	M13		in6
+#define	M14		in11
+#define	M15		in16
+#define	M2		in14
+#define	M3		in19
+#define	M4		in3
+#define	M5		in8
+#define	M6		in13
+#define	M7		in18
+#define	M8		in2
+#define	M9		in7
+#define	RotateM0	in0
+#define	RotateM1	in5
+#define	RotateM2	in10
+#define	RotateM3	in15
+#define	W		in23
+#define	X		in22
+#define	Y		in21
+#define	Z		in20
+
+/* register stack configuration for md5_block_asm_data_order(): */
+#define	MD5_NINP	3
+#define	MD5_NLOC	0
+#define MD5_NOUT	29
+#define MD5_NROT	0
+
+/* register stack configuration for helpers: */
+#define	_NINPUTS	MD5_NOUT
+#define	_NLOCALS	0
+#define _NOUTPUT	0
+#define	_NROTATE	24	/* this must be <= _NINPUTS */
+
+#if defined(_HPUX_SOURCE) && !defined(_LP64)
+#define	ADDP	addp4
+#else
+#define	ADDP	add
+#endif
+
+#if defined(_HPUX_SOURCE) || defined(B_ENDIAN)
+#define HOST_IS_BIG_ENDIAN
+#endif
+
+//	Macros for getting the left and right portions of little-endian words
+
+#define	GETLW(dst, src, align)	dep.z dst = src, 32 - 8 * align, 8 * align
+#define	GETRW(dst, src, align)	extr.u dst = src, 8 * align, 32 - 8 * align
+
+//	MD5 driver
+//
+//		Reads an input block, then calls the digest block
+//		subroutine and adds the results to the accumulated
+//		digest.  It allocates 32 outs which the subroutine
+//		uses as it's inputs and rotating
+//		registers. Initializes the round constant pointer and
+//		takes care of saving/restoring ar.lc
+//
+///	INPUT
+//
+//	in0		Context Ptr		CtxPtr0
+//	in1		Input Data Ptr		DPtrIn
+//	in2		Integral Blocks		BlockCount
+//	rp		Return Address		-
+//
+///	CODE
+//
+//	v2		Input Align		InAlign
+//	t0		Shared w/digest		-
+//	t1		Shared w/digest		-
+//	t2		Shared w/digest		-
+//	t3		Shared w/digest		-
+//	t4		Shared w/digest		-
+//	t5		Shared w/digest		-
+//	t6		PFS Save		PFSSave
+//	t7		ar.lc Save		LCSave
+//	t8		Saved PR		PRSave
+//	t9		2nd CtxPtr		CtxPtr1
+//	t10		Table Base		CTable
+//	t11		Table[0]		CTable0
+//	t13		Accumulator A		AccumA
+//	t14		Accumulator B		AccumB
+//	t15		Accumulator C		AccumC
+//	t16		Accumulator D		AccumD
+//	pt0		Shared w/digest		-
+//	pt1		Shared w/digest		-
+//	pt2		Shared w/digest		-
+//	pt3		Shared w/digest		-
+//	pt4		Shared w/digest		-
+//	pt5		Shared w/digest		-
+//	pt6		Shared w/digest		-
+//	pt7		Shared w/digest		-
+//	pt8		Not Aligned		pOff
+//	pt8		Blocks Left		pAgain
+
+#define	AccumA		r27
+#define	AccumB		r28
+#define	AccumC		r29
+#define	AccumD		r30
+#define	CTable		r24
+#define	CTable0		r25
+#define	CtxPtr0		in0
+#define	CtxPtr1		r23
+#define	DPtrIn		in1
+#define	BlockCount	in2
+#define	InAlign		r10
+#define	LCSave		r21
+#define	PFSSave		r20
+#define	PRSave		r22
+#define	pAgain		p63
+#define	pOff		p63
+
+	.text
+
+/* md5_block_asm_data_order(MD5_CTX *c, const void *data, size_t num)
+
+     where:
+      c: a pointer to a structure of this type:
+
+	   typedef struct MD5state_st
+	     {
+	       MD5_LONG A,B,C,D;
+	       MD5_LONG Nl,Nh;
+	       MD5_LONG data[MD5_LBLOCK];
+	       unsigned int num;
+	     }
+	   MD5_CTX;
+
+      data: a pointer to the input data (may be misaligned)
+      num:  the number of 16-byte blocks to hash (i.e., the length
+            of DATA is 16*NUM.
+
+   */
+
+	.type	md5_block_asm_data_order, @function
+	.global	md5_block_asm_data_order
+	.align	32
+	.proc	md5_block_asm_data_order
+md5_block_asm_data_order:
+.md5_block:
+	.prologue
+{	.mmi
+	.save	ar.pfs, PFSSave
+	alloc	PFSSave = ar.pfs, MD5_NINP, MD5_NLOC, MD5_NOUT, MD5_NROT
+	ADDP	CtxPtr1 = 8, CtxPtr0
+	mov	CTable = ip
+}
+{	.mmi
+	ADDP	DPtrIn = 0, DPtrIn
+	ADDP	CtxPtr0 = 0, CtxPtr0
+	.save	ar.lc, LCSave
+	mov	LCSave = ar.lc
+}
+;;
+{	.mmi
+	add	CTable = .md5_tbl_data_order#-.md5_block#, CTable
+	and	InAlign = 0x3, DPtrIn
+}
+
+{	.mmi
+	ld4	AccumA = [CtxPtr0], 4
+	ld4	AccumC = [CtxPtr1], 4
+	.save pr, PRSave
+	mov	PRSave = pr
+	.body
+}
+;;
+{	.mmi
+	ld4	AccumB = [CtxPtr0]
+	ld4	AccumD = [CtxPtr1]
+	dep	DPtr_ = 0, DPtrIn, 0, 2
+} ;;
+#ifdef HOST_IS_BIG_ENDIAN
+	rum	psr.be;;	// switch to little-endian
+#endif
+{	.mmb
+	ld4	CTable0 = [CTable], 4
+	cmp.ne	pOff, p0 = 0, InAlign
+(pOff)	br.cond.spnt.many .md5_unaligned
+} ;;
+
+//	The FF load/compute loop rotates values three times, so that
+//	loading into M12 here produces the M0 value, M13 -> M1, etc.
+
+.md5_block_loop0:
+{	.mmi
+	ld4	M12_ = [DPtr_], 4
+	mov	TPtr = CTable
+	mov	TRound = CTable0
+} ;;
+{	.mmi
+	ld4	M13_ = [DPtr_], 4
+	mov	A_ = AccumA
+	mov	B_ = AccumB
+} ;;
+{	.mmi
+	ld4	M14_ = [DPtr_], 4
+	mov	C_ = AccumC
+	mov	D_ = AccumD
+} ;;
+{	.mmb
+	ld4	M15_ = [DPtr_], 4
+	add	BlockCount = -1, BlockCount
+	br.call.sptk.many QUICK_RTN = md5_digest_block0
+} ;;
+
+//	Now, we add the new digest values and do some clean-up
+//	before checking if there's another full block to process
+
+{	.mmi
+	add	AccumA = AccumA, A_
+	add	AccumB = AccumB, B_
+	cmp.ne	pAgain, p0 = 0, BlockCount
+}
+{	.mib
+	add	AccumC = AccumC, C_
+	add	AccumD = AccumD, D_
+(pAgain) br.cond.dptk.many .md5_block_loop0
+} ;;
+
+.md5_exit:
+#ifdef HOST_IS_BIG_ENDIAN
+	sum	psr.be;;	// switch back to big-endian mode
+#endif
+{	.mmi
+	st4	[CtxPtr0] = AccumB, -4
+	st4	[CtxPtr1] = AccumD, -4
+	mov	pr = PRSave, 0x1ffff ;;
+}
+{	.mmi
+	st4	[CtxPtr0] = AccumA
+	st4	[CtxPtr1] = AccumC
+	mov	ar.lc = LCSave
+} ;;
+{	.mib
+	mov	ar.pfs = PFSSave
+	br.ret.sptk.few	rp
+} ;;
+
+#define	MD5UNALIGNED(offset)						\
+.md5_process##offset:							\
+{	.mib ;								\
+	nop	0x0	;						\
+	GETRW(DTmp, DTmp, offset) ;					\
+} ;;									\
+.md5_block_loop##offset:						\
+{	.mmi ;								\
+	ld4	Y_ = [DPtr_], 4 ;					\
+	mov	TPtr = CTable ;						\
+	mov	TRound = CTable0 ;					\
+} ;;									\
+{	.mmi ;								\
+	ld4	M13_ = [DPtr_], 4 ;					\
+	mov	A_ = AccumA ;						\
+	mov	B_ = AccumB ;						\
+} ;;									\
+{	.mii ;								\
+	ld4	M14_ = [DPtr_], 4 ;					\
+	GETLW(W_, Y_, offset) ;						\
+	mov	C_ = AccumC ;						\
+}									\
+{	.mmi ;								\
+	mov	D_ = AccumD ;;						\
+	or	M12_ = W_, DTmp ;					\
+	GETRW(DTmp, Y_, offset) ;					\
+}									\
+{	.mib ;								\
+	ld4	M15_ = [DPtr_], 4 ;					\
+	add	BlockCount = -1, BlockCount ;				\
+	br.call.sptk.many QUICK_RTN = md5_digest_block##offset;		\
+} ;;									\
+{	.mmi ;								\
+	add	AccumA = AccumA, A_ ;					\
+	add	AccumB = AccumB, B_ ;					\
+	cmp.ne	pAgain, p0 = 0, BlockCount ;				\
+}									\
+{	.mib ;								\
+	add	AccumC = AccumC, C_ ;					\
+	add	AccumD = AccumD, D_ ;					\
+(pAgain) br.cond.dptk.many .md5_block_loop##offset ;			\
+} ;;									\
+{	.mib ;								\
+	nop	0x0 ;							\
+	nop	0x0 ;							\
+	br.cond.sptk.many .md5_exit ;					\
+} ;;
+
+	.align	32
+.md5_unaligned:
+//
+//	Because variable shifts are expensive, we special case each of
+//	the four alignements. In practice, this won't hurt too much
+//	since only one working set of code will be loaded.
+//
+{	.mib
+	ld4	DTmp = [DPtr_], 4
+	cmp.eq	pOff, p0 = 1, InAlign
+(pOff)	br.cond.dpnt.many .md5_process1
+} ;;
+{	.mib
+	cmp.eq	pOff, p0 = 2, InAlign
+	nop	0x0
+(pOff)	br.cond.dpnt.many .md5_process2
+} ;;
+	MD5UNALIGNED(3)
+	MD5UNALIGNED(1)
+	MD5UNALIGNED(2)
+
+	.endp md5_block_asm_data_order
+
+
+// MD5 Perform the F function and load
+//
+// Passed the first 4 words (M0 - M3) and initial (A, B, C, D) values,
+// computes the FF() round of functions, then branches to the common
+// digest code to finish up with GG(), HH, and II().
+//
+// INPUT
+//
+// rp Return Address -
+//
+// CODE
+//
+// v0 PFS bit bucket PFS
+// v1 Loop Trip Count LTrip
+// pt0 Load next word pMore
+
+/* For F round: */
+#define LTrip	r9
+#define PFS	r8
+#define pMore	p6
+
+/* For GHI rounds: */
+#define T	r9
+#define U	r10
+#define V	r11
+
+#define COMPUTE(a, b, s, M, R)			\
+{						\
+	.mii ;					\
+	ld4 TRound = [TPtr], 4 ;		\
+	dep.z Y = Z, 32, 32 ;;			\
+	shrp Z = Z, Y, 64 - s ;			\
+} ;;						\
+{						\
+	.mmi ;					\
+	add a = Z, b ;				\
+	mov R = M ;				\
+	nop 0x0 ;				\
+} ;;
+
+#define LOOP(a, b, s, M, R, label)		\
+{	.mii ;					\
+	ld4 TRound = [TPtr], 4 ;		\
+	dep.z Y = Z, 32, 32 ;;			\
+	shrp Z = Z, Y, 64 - s ;			\
+} ;;						\
+{	.mib ;					\
+	add a = Z, b ;				\
+	mov R = M ;				\
+	br.ctop.sptk.many label ;		\
+} ;;
+
+// G(B, C, D) = (B & D) | (C & ~D)
+
+#define G(a, b, c, d, M)			\
+{	.mmi ;					\
+	add Z = M, TRound ;			\
+	and Y = b, d ;				\
+	andcm X = c, d ;			\
+} ;;						\
+{	.mii ;					\
+	add Z = Z, a ;				\
+	or Y = Y, X ;;				\
+	add Z = Z, Y ;				\
+} ;;
+
+// H(B, C, D) = B ^ C ^ D
+
+#define H(a, b, c, d, M)			\
+{	.mmi ;					\
+	add Z = M, TRound ;			\
+	xor Y = b, c ;				\
+	nop 0x0 ;				\
+} ;;						\
+{	.mii ;					\
+	add Z = Z, a ;				\
+	xor Y = Y, d ;;				\
+	add Z = Z, Y ;				\
+} ;;
+
+// I(B, C, D) = C ^ (B | ~D)
+//
+// However, since we have an andcm operator, we use the fact that
+//
+// Y ^ Z == ~Y ^ ~Z
+//
+// to rewrite the expression as
+//
+// I(B, C, D) = ~C ^ (~B & D)
+
+#define I(a, b, c, d, M)			\
+{	.mmi ;					\
+	add Z = M, TRound ;			\
+	andcm Y = d, b ;			\
+	andcm X = -1, c ;			\
+} ;;						\
+{	.mii ;					\
+	add Z = Z, a ;				\
+	xor Y = Y, X ;;				\
+	add Z = Z, Y ;				\
+} ;;
+
+#define GG4(label)				\
+	G(A, B, C, D, M0)			\
+	COMPUTE(A, B, 5, M0, RotateM0)		\
+	G(D, A, B, C, M1)			\
+	COMPUTE(D, A, 9, M1, RotateM1)		\
+	G(C, D, A, B, M2)			\
+	COMPUTE(C, D, 14, M2, RotateM2)		\
+	G(B, C, D, A, M3)			\
+	LOOP(B, C, 20, M3, RotateM3, label)
+
+#define HH4(label)				\
+	H(A, B, C, D, M0)			\
+	COMPUTE(A, B, 4, M0, RotateM0)		\
+	H(D, A, B, C, M1)			\
+	COMPUTE(D, A, 11, M1, RotateM1)		\
+	H(C, D, A, B, M2)			\
+	COMPUTE(C, D, 16, M2, RotateM2)		\
+	H(B, C, D, A, M3)			\
+	LOOP(B, C, 23, M3, RotateM3, label)
+
+#define II4(label)				\
+	I(A, B, C, D, M0)			\
+	COMPUTE(A, B, 6, M0, RotateM0)		\
+	I(D, A, B, C, M1)			\
+	COMPUTE(D, A, 10, M1, RotateM1)		\
+	I(C, D, A, B, M2)			\
+	COMPUTE(C, D, 15, M2, RotateM2)		\
+	I(B, C, D, A, M3)			\
+	LOOP(B, C, 21, M3, RotateM3, label)
+
+#define FFLOAD(a, b, c, d, M, N, s)		\
+{	.mii ;					\
+(pMore) ld4 N = [DPtr], 4 ;			\
+	add Z = M, TRound ;			\
+	and Y = c, b ;				\
+}						\
+{	.mmi ;					\
+	andcm X = d, b ;;			\
+	add Z = Z, a ;				\
+	or Y = Y, X ;				\
+} ;;						\
+{	.mii ;					\
+	ld4 TRound = [TPtr], 4 ;		\
+	add Z = Z, Y ;;				\
+	dep.z Y = Z, 32, 32 ;			\
+} ;;						\
+{	.mii ;					\
+	nop 0x0 ;				\
+	shrp Z = Z, Y, 64 - s ;;		\
+	add a = Z, b ;				\
+} ;;
+
+#define FFLOOP(a, b, c, d, M, N, s, dest)	\
+{	.mii ;					\
+(pMore)	ld4 N = [DPtr], 4 ;			\
+	add Z = M, TRound ;			\
+	and Y = c, b ;				\
+}						\
+{	.mmi ;					\
+	andcm X = d, b ;;			\
+	add Z = Z, a ;				\
+	or Y = Y, X ;				\
+} ;;						\
+{	.mii ;					\
+	ld4 TRound = [TPtr], 4 ;		\
+	add Z = Z, Y ;;				\
+	dep.z Y = Z, 32, 32 ;			\
+} ;;						\
+{	.mii ;					\
+	nop 0x0 ;				\
+	shrp Z = Z, Y, 64 - s ;;		\
+	add a = Z, b ;				\
+}						\
+{	.mib ;					\
+	cmp.ne pMore, p0 = 0, LTrip ;		\
+	add LTrip = -1, LTrip ;			\
+	br.ctop.dptk.many dest ;		\
+} ;;
+
+	.type md5_digest_block0, @function
+	.align 32
+
+	.proc md5_digest_block0
+	.prologue
+md5_digest_block0:
+	.altrp QUICK_RTN
+	.body
+{	.mmi
+	alloc PFS = ar.pfs, _NINPUTS, _NLOCALS, _NOUTPUT, _NROTATE
+	mov LTrip = 2
+	mov ar.lc = 3
+} ;;
+{	.mii
+	cmp.eq pMore, p0 = r0, r0
+	mov ar.ec = 0
+	nop 0x0
+} ;;
+
+.md5_FF_round0:
+	FFLOAD(A, B, C, D, M12, RotateM0, 7)
+	FFLOAD(D, A, B, C, M13, RotateM1, 12)
+	FFLOAD(C, D, A, B, M14, RotateM2, 17)
+	FFLOOP(B, C, D, A, M15, RotateM3, 22, .md5_FF_round0)
+	//
+	// !!! Fall through to md5_digest_GHI
+	//
+	.endp md5_digest_block0
+
+	.type md5_digest_GHI, @function
+	.align 32
+
+	.proc md5_digest_GHI
+	.prologue
+	.regstk _NINPUTS, _NLOCALS, _NOUTPUT, _NROTATE
+md5_digest_GHI:
+	.altrp QUICK_RTN
+	.body
+//
+// The following sequence shuffles the block counstants round for the
+// next round:
+//
+// 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
+// 1 6 11 0 5 10 14 4 9 14 3 8 13 2 7 12
+//
+{	.mmi
+	mov Z = M0
+	mov Y = M15
+	mov ar.lc = 3
+}
+{	.mmi
+	mov X = M2
+	mov W = M9
+	mov V = M4
+} ;;
+
+{	.mmi
+	mov M0 = M1
+	mov M15 = M12
+	mov ar.ec = 1
+}
+{	.mmi
+	mov M2 = M11
+	mov M9 = M14
+	mov M4 = M5
+} ;;
+
+{	.mmi
+	mov M1 = M6
+	mov M12 = M13
+	mov U = M3
+}
+{	.mmi
+	mov M11 = M8
+	mov M14 = M7
+	mov M5 = M10
+} ;;
+
+{	.mmi
+	mov M6 = Y
+	mov M13 = X
+	mov M3 = Z
+}
+{	.mmi
+	mov M8 = W
+	mov M7 = V
+	mov M10 = U
+} ;;
+
+.md5_GG_round:
+	GG4(.md5_GG_round)
+
+// The following sequence shuffles the block constants round for the
+// next round:
+//
+// 1 6 11 0 5 10 14 4 9 14 3 8 13 2 7 12
+// 5 8 11 14 1 4 7 10 13 0 3 6 9 12 15 2
+
+{	.mmi
+	mov Z = M0
+	mov Y = M1
+	mov ar.lc = 3
+}
+{	.mmi
+	mov X = M3
+	mov W = M5
+	mov V = M6
+} ;;
+
+{	.mmi
+	mov M0 = M4
+	mov M1 = M11
+	mov ar.ec = 1
+}
+{	.mmi
+	mov M3 = M9
+	mov U = M8
+	mov T = M13
+} ;;
+
+{	.mmi
+	mov M4 = Z
+	mov M11 = Y
+	mov M5 = M7
+}
+{	.mmi
+	mov M6 = M14
+	mov M8 = M12
+	mov M13 = M15
+} ;;
+
+{	.mmi
+	mov M7 = W
+	mov M14 = V
+	nop 0x0
+}
+{	.mmi
+	mov M9 = X
+	mov M12 = U
+	mov M15 = T
+} ;;
+
+.md5_HH_round:
+	HH4(.md5_HH_round)
+
+// The following sequence shuffles the block constants round for the
+// next round:
+//
+// 5 8 11 14 1 4 7 10 13 0 3 6 9 12 15 2
+// 0 7 14 5 12 3 10 1 8 15 6 13 4 11 2 9
+
+{	.mmi
+	mov Z = M0
+	mov Y = M15
+	mov ar.lc = 3
+}
+{	.mmi
+	mov X = M10
+	mov W = M1
+	mov V = M4
+} ;;
+
+{	.mmi
+	mov M0 = M9
+	mov M15 = M12
+	mov ar.ec = 1
+}
+{	.mmi
+	mov M10 = M11
+	mov M1 = M6
+	mov M4 = M13
+} ;;
+
+{	.mmi
+	mov M9 = M14
+	mov M12 = M5
+	mov U = M3
+}
+{	.mmi
+	mov M11 = M8
+	mov M6 = M7
+	mov M13 = M2
+} ;;
+
+{	.mmi
+	mov M14 = Y
+	mov M5 = X
+	mov M3 = Z
+}
+{	.mmi
+	mov M8 = W
+	mov M7 = V
+	mov M2 = U
+} ;;
+
+.md5_II_round:
+	II4(.md5_II_round)
+
+{	.mib
+	nop 0x0
+	nop 0x0
+	br.ret.sptk.many QUICK_RTN
+} ;;
+
+	.endp md5_digest_GHI
+
+#define FFLOADU(a, b, c, d, M, P, N, s, offset)	\
+{	.mii ;					\
+(pMore) ld4 N = [DPtr], 4 ;			\
+	add Z = M, TRound ;			\
+	and Y = c, b ;				\
+}						\
+{	.mmi ;					\
+	andcm X = d, b ;;			\
+	add Z = Z, a ;				\
+	or Y = Y, X ;				\
+} ;;						\
+{	.mii ;					\
+	ld4 TRound = [TPtr], 4 ;		\
+	GETLW(W, P, offset) ;			\
+	add Z = Z, Y ;				\
+} ;;						\
+{	.mii ;					\
+	or W = W, DTmp ;			\
+	dep.z Y = Z, 32, 32 ;;			\
+	shrp Z = Z, Y, 64 - s ;			\
+} ;;						\
+{	.mii ;					\
+	add a = Z, b ;				\
+	GETRW(DTmp, P, offset) ;		\
+	mov P = W ;				\
+} ;;
+
+#define FFLOOPU(a, b, c, d, M, P, N, s, offset)		\
+{	.mii ;						\
+(pMore) ld4 N = [DPtr], 4 ;				\
+	add Z = M, TRound ;				\
+	and Y = c, b ;					\
+}							\
+{	.mmi ;						\
+	andcm X = d, b ;;				\
+	add Z = Z, a ;					\
+	or Y = Y, X ;					\
+} ;;							\
+{	.mii ;						\
+	ld4 TRound = [TPtr], 4 ;			\
+(pMore) GETLW(W, P, offset) 	;			\
+	add Z = Z, Y ;					\
+} ;;							\
+{	.mii ;						\
+(pMore) or W = W, DTmp ;				\
+	dep.z Y = Z, 32, 32 ;;				\
+	shrp Z = Z, Y, 64 - s ;				\
+} ;;							\
+{	.mii ;						\
+	add a = Z, b ;					\
+(pMore) GETRW(DTmp, P, offset) 	;			\
+(pMore) mov P = W ;					\
+}							\
+{	.mib ;						\
+	cmp.ne pMore, p0 = 0, LTrip ;			\
+	add LTrip = -1, LTrip ;				\
+	br.ctop.sptk.many .md5_FF_round##offset ;	\
+} ;;
+
+#define MD5FBLOCK(offset)						\
+	.type md5_digest_block##offset, @function ;			\
+									\
+	.align 32 ;							\
+	.proc md5_digest_block##offset ;				\
+	.prologue ;							\
+	.altrp QUICK_RTN ;						\
+	.body ;								\
+md5_digest_block##offset:						\
+{	.mmi ;								\
+	alloc PFS = ar.pfs, _NINPUTS, _NLOCALS, _NOUTPUT, _NROTATE ;	\
+	mov LTrip = 2 ;							\
+	mov ar.lc = 3 ;							\
+} ;;									\
+{	.mii ;								\
+	cmp.eq pMore, p0 = r0, r0 ;					\
+	mov ar.ec = 0 ;							\
+	nop 0x0 ;							\
+} ;;									\
+									\
+	.pred.rel "mutex", pLoad, pSkip ;				\
+.md5_FF_round##offset:							\
+	FFLOADU(A, B, C, D, M12, M13, RotateM0, 7, offset)		\
+	FFLOADU(D, A, B, C, M13, M14, RotateM1, 12, offset)		\
+	FFLOADU(C, D, A, B, M14, M15, RotateM2, 17, offset)		\
+	FFLOOPU(B, C, D, A, M15, RotateM0, RotateM3, 22, offset)	\
+									\
+{	.mib ;								\
+	nop 0x0 ;							\
+	nop 0x0 ;							\
+	br.cond.sptk.many md5_digest_GHI ;				\
+} ;;									\
+	.endp md5_digest_block##offset
+
+MD5FBLOCK(1)
+MD5FBLOCK(2)
+MD5FBLOCK(3)
+
+	.align 64
+	.type md5_constants, @object
+md5_constants:
+.md5_tbl_data_order:			// To ensure little-endian data
+					// order, code as bytes.
+	data1 0x78, 0xa4, 0x6a, 0xd7	//     0
+	data1 0x56, 0xb7, 0xc7, 0xe8	//     1
+	data1 0xdb, 0x70, 0x20, 0x24	//     2
+	data1 0xee, 0xce, 0xbd, 0xc1	//     3
+	data1 0xaf, 0x0f, 0x7c, 0xf5	//     4
+	data1 0x2a, 0xc6, 0x87, 0x47	//     5
+	data1 0x13, 0x46, 0x30, 0xa8	//     6
+	data1 0x01, 0x95, 0x46, 0xfd	//     7
+	data1 0xd8, 0x98, 0x80, 0x69	//     8
+	data1 0xaf, 0xf7, 0x44, 0x8b	//     9
+	data1 0xb1, 0x5b, 0xff, 0xff	//    10
+	data1 0xbe, 0xd7, 0x5c, 0x89	//    11
+	data1 0x22, 0x11, 0x90, 0x6b	//    12
+	data1 0x93, 0x71, 0x98, 0xfd	//    13
+	data1 0x8e, 0x43, 0x79, 0xa6	//    14
+	data1 0x21, 0x08, 0xb4, 0x49	//    15
+	data1 0x62, 0x25, 0x1e, 0xf6	//    16
+	data1 0x40, 0xb3, 0x40, 0xc0	//    17
+	data1 0x51, 0x5a, 0x5e, 0x26	//    18
+	data1 0xaa, 0xc7, 0xb6, 0xe9	//    19
+	data1 0x5d, 0x10, 0x2f, 0xd6	//    20
+	data1 0x53, 0x14, 0x44, 0x02	//    21
+	data1 0x81, 0xe6, 0xa1, 0xd8	//    22
+	data1 0xc8, 0xfb, 0xd3, 0xe7	//    23
+	data1 0xe6, 0xcd, 0xe1, 0x21	//    24
+	data1 0xd6, 0x07, 0x37, 0xc3	//    25
+	data1 0x87, 0x0d, 0xd5, 0xf4	//    26
+	data1 0xed, 0x14, 0x5a, 0x45	//    27
+	data1 0x05, 0xe9, 0xe3, 0xa9	//    28
+	data1 0xf8, 0xa3, 0xef, 0xfc	//    29
+	data1 0xd9, 0x02, 0x6f, 0x67	//    30
+	data1 0x8a, 0x4c, 0x2a, 0x8d	//    31
+	data1 0x42, 0x39, 0xfa, 0xff	//    32
+	data1 0x81, 0xf6, 0x71, 0x87	//    33
+	data1 0x22, 0x61, 0x9d, 0x6d	//    34
+	data1 0x0c, 0x38, 0xe5, 0xfd	//    35
+	data1 0x44, 0xea, 0xbe, 0xa4	//    36
+	data1 0xa9, 0xcf, 0xde, 0x4b	//    37
+	data1 0x60, 0x4b, 0xbb, 0xf6	//    38
+	data1 0x70, 0xbc, 0xbf, 0xbe	//    39
+	data1 0xc6, 0x7e, 0x9b, 0x28	//    40
+	data1 0xfa, 0x27, 0xa1, 0xea	//    41
+	data1 0x85, 0x30, 0xef, 0xd4	//    42
+	data1 0x05, 0x1d, 0x88, 0x04	//    43
+	data1 0x39, 0xd0, 0xd4, 0xd9	//    44
+	data1 0xe5, 0x99, 0xdb, 0xe6	//    45
+	data1 0xf8, 0x7c, 0xa2, 0x1f	//    46
+	data1 0x65, 0x56, 0xac, 0xc4	//    47
+	data1 0x44, 0x22, 0x29, 0xf4	//    48
+	data1 0x97, 0xff, 0x2a, 0x43	//    49
+	data1 0xa7, 0x23, 0x94, 0xab	//    50
+	data1 0x39, 0xa0, 0x93, 0xfc	//    51
+	data1 0xc3, 0x59, 0x5b, 0x65	//    52
+	data1 0x92, 0xcc, 0x0c, 0x8f	//    53
+	data1 0x7d, 0xf4, 0xef, 0xff	//    54
+	data1 0xd1, 0x5d, 0x84, 0x85	//    55
+	data1 0x4f, 0x7e, 0xa8, 0x6f	//    56
+	data1 0xe0, 0xe6, 0x2c, 0xfe	//    57
+	data1 0x14, 0x43, 0x01, 0xa3	//    58
+	data1 0xa1, 0x11, 0x08, 0x4e	//    59
+	data1 0x82, 0x7e, 0x53, 0xf7	//    60
+	data1 0x35, 0xf2, 0x3a, 0xbd	//    61
+	data1 0xbb, 0xd2, 0xd7, 0x2a	//    62
+	data1 0x91, 0xd3, 0x86, 0xeb	//    63
+.size	md5_constants#,64*4
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/md5/asm/md5-sparcv9.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/md5/asm/md5-sparcv9.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..09e6d71
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/md5/asm/md5-sparcv9.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,437 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2012-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+#
+# Hardware SPARC T4 support by David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>.
+# ====================================================================
+
+# MD5 for SPARCv9, 6.9 cycles per byte on UltraSPARC, >40% faster than
+# code generated by Sun C 5.2.
+
+# SPARC T4 MD5 hardware achieves 3.20 cycles per byte, which is 2.1x
+# faster than software. Multi-process benchmark saturates at 12x
+# single-process result on 8-core processor, or ~11GBps per 2.85GHz
+# socket.
+
+$output=pop;
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+use integer;
+
+($ctx,$inp,$len)=("%i0","%i1","%i2");	# input arguments
+
+# 64-bit values
+@X=("%o0","%o1","%o2","%o3","%o4","%o5","%o7","%g1","%g2");
+$tx="%g3";
+($AB,$CD)=("%g4","%g5");
+
+# 32-bit values
+@V=($A,$B,$C,$D)=map("%l$_",(0..3));
+($t1,$t2,$t3,$saved_asi)=map("%l$_",(4..7));
+($shr,$shl1,$shl2)=("%i3","%i4","%i5");
+
+my @K=(	0xd76aa478,0xe8c7b756,0x242070db,0xc1bdceee,
+	0xf57c0faf,0x4787c62a,0xa8304613,0xfd469501,
+	0x698098d8,0x8b44f7af,0xffff5bb1,0x895cd7be,
+	0x6b901122,0xfd987193,0xa679438e,0x49b40821,
+
+	0xf61e2562,0xc040b340,0x265e5a51,0xe9b6c7aa,
+	0xd62f105d,0x02441453,0xd8a1e681,0xe7d3fbc8,
+	0x21e1cde6,0xc33707d6,0xf4d50d87,0x455a14ed,
+	0xa9e3e905,0xfcefa3f8,0x676f02d9,0x8d2a4c8a,
+
+	0xfffa3942,0x8771f681,0x6d9d6122,0xfde5380c,
+	0xa4beea44,0x4bdecfa9,0xf6bb4b60,0xbebfbc70,
+	0x289b7ec6,0xeaa127fa,0xd4ef3085,0x04881d05,
+	0xd9d4d039,0xe6db99e5,0x1fa27cf8,0xc4ac5665,
+
+	0xf4292244,0x432aff97,0xab9423a7,0xfc93a039,
+	0x655b59c3,0x8f0ccc92,0xffeff47d,0x85845dd1,
+	0x6fa87e4f,0xfe2ce6e0,0xa3014314,0x4e0811a1,
+	0xf7537e82,0xbd3af235,0x2ad7d2bb,0xeb86d391, 0	);
+
+sub R0 {
+  my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d) = @_;
+  my $rot = (7,12,17,22)[$i%4];
+  my $j   = ($i+1)/2;
+
+  if ($i&1) {
+    $code.=<<___;
+	 srlx	@X[$j],$shr,@X[$j]	! align X[`$i+1`]
+	and	$b,$t1,$t1		! round $i
+	 sllx	@X[$j+1],$shl1,$tx
+	add	$t2,$a,$a
+	 sllx	$tx,$shl2,$tx
+	xor	$d,$t1,$t1
+	 or	$tx,@X[$j],@X[$j]
+	 sethi	%hi(@K[$i+1]),$t2
+	add	$t1,$a,$a
+	 or	$t2,%lo(@K[$i+1]),$t2
+	sll	$a,$rot,$t3
+	 add	@X[$j],$t2,$t2		! X[`$i+1`]+K[`$i+1`]
+	srl	$a,32-$rot,$a
+	add	$b,$t3,$t3
+	 xor	 $b,$c,$t1
+	add	$t3,$a,$a
+___
+  } else {
+    $code.=<<___;
+	 srlx	@X[$j],32,$tx		! extract X[`2*$j+1`]
+	and	$b,$t1,$t1		! round $i
+	add	$t2,$a,$a
+	xor	$d,$t1,$t1
+	 sethi	%hi(@K[$i+1]),$t2
+	add	$t1,$a,$a
+	 or	$t2,%lo(@K[$i+1]),$t2
+	sll	$a,$rot,$t3
+	 add	$tx,$t2,$t2		! X[`2*$j+1`]+K[`$i+1`]
+	srl	$a,32-$rot,$a
+	add	$b,$t3,$t3
+	 xor	 $b,$c,$t1
+	add	$t3,$a,$a
+___
+  }
+}
+
+sub R0_1 {
+  my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d) = @_;
+  my $rot = (7,12,17,22)[$i%4];
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	 srlx	@X[0],32,$tx		! extract X[1]
+	and	$b,$t1,$t1		! round $i
+	add	$t2,$a,$a
+	xor	$d,$t1,$t1
+	 sethi	%hi(@K[$i+1]),$t2
+	add	$t1,$a,$a
+	 or	$t2,%lo(@K[$i+1]),$t2
+	sll	$a,$rot,$t3
+	 add	$tx,$t2,$t2		! X[1]+K[`$i+1`]
+	srl	$a,32-$rot,$a
+	add	$b,$t3,$t3
+	 andn	 $b,$c,$t1
+	add	$t3,$a,$a
+___
+}
+
+sub R1 {
+  my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d) = @_;
+  my $rot = (5,9,14,20)[$i%4];
+  my $j   = $i<31 ? (1+5*($i+1))%16 : (5+3*($i+1))%16;
+  my $xi  = @X[$j/2];
+
+$code.=<<___ if ($j&1 && ($xi=$tx));
+	 srlx	@X[$j/2],32,$xi		! extract X[$j]
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	and	$b,$d,$t3		! round $i
+	add	$t2,$a,$a
+	or	$t3,$t1,$t1
+	 sethi	%hi(@K[$i+1]),$t2
+	add	$t1,$a,$a
+	 or	$t2,%lo(@K[$i+1]),$t2
+	sll	$a,$rot,$t3
+	 add	$xi,$t2,$t2		! X[$j]+K[`$i+1`]
+	srl	$a,32-$rot,$a
+	add	$b,$t3,$t3
+	 `$i<31?"andn":"xor"`	 $b,$c,$t1
+	add	$t3,$a,$a
+___
+}
+
+sub R2 {
+  my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d) = @_;
+  my $rot = (4,11,16,23)[$i%4];
+  my $j   = $i<47 ? (5+3*($i+1))%16 : (0+7*($i+1))%16;
+  my $xi  = @X[$j/2];
+
+$code.=<<___ if ($j&1 && ($xi=$tx));
+	 srlx	@X[$j/2],32,$xi		! extract X[$j]
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	add	$t2,$a,$a		! round $i
+	xor	$b,$t1,$t1
+	 sethi	%hi(@K[$i+1]),$t2
+	add	$t1,$a,$a
+	 or	$t2,%lo(@K[$i+1]),$t2
+	sll	$a,$rot,$t3
+	 add	$xi,$t2,$t2		! X[$j]+K[`$i+1`]
+	srl	$a,32-$rot,$a
+	add	$b,$t3,$t3
+	 xor	 $b,$c,$t1
+	add	$t3,$a,$a
+___
+}
+
+sub R3 {
+  my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d) = @_;
+  my $rot = (6,10,15,21)[$i%4];
+  my $j   = (0+7*($i+1))%16;
+  my $xi  = @X[$j/2];
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	add	$t2,$a,$a		! round $i
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($j&1 && ($xi=$tx));
+	 srlx	@X[$j/2],32,$xi		! extract X[$j]
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	orn	$b,$d,$t1
+	 sethi	%hi(@K[$i+1]),$t2
+	xor	$c,$t1,$t1
+	 or	$t2,%lo(@K[$i+1]),$t2
+	add	$t1,$a,$a
+	sll	$a,$rot,$t3
+	 add	$xi,$t2,$t2		! X[$j]+K[`$i+1`]
+	srl	$a,32-$rot,$a
+	add	$b,$t3,$t3
+	add	$t3,$a,$a
+___
+}
+
+$code.=<<___;
+#include "sparc_arch.h"
+
+#ifdef __arch64__
+.register	%g2,#scratch
+.register	%g3,#scratch
+#endif
+
+.section	".text",#alloc,#execinstr
+
+#ifdef __PIC__
+SPARC_PIC_THUNK(%g1)
+#endif
+
+.globl	md5_block_asm_data_order
+.align	32
+md5_block_asm_data_order:
+	SPARC_LOAD_ADDRESS_LEAF(OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P,%g1,%g5)
+	ld	[%g1+4],%g1		! OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[1]
+
+	andcc	%g1, CFR_MD5, %g0
+	be	.Lsoftware
+	nop
+
+	mov	4, %g1
+	andcc	%o1, 0x7, %g0
+	lda	[%o0 + %g0]0x88, %f0		! load context
+	lda	[%o0 + %g1]0x88, %f1
+	add	%o0, 8, %o0
+	lda	[%o0 + %g0]0x88, %f2
+	lda	[%o0 + %g1]0x88, %f3
+	bne,pn	%icc, .Lhwunaligned
+	sub	%o0, 8, %o0
+
+.Lhw_loop:
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x00], %f8
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x08], %f10
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x10], %f12
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x18], %f14
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x20], %f16
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x28], %f18
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x30], %f20
+	subcc	%o2, 1, %o2		! done yet? 
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x38], %f22
+	add	%o1, 0x40, %o1
+	prefetch [%o1 + 63], 20
+
+	.word	0x81b02800		! MD5
+
+	bne,pt	SIZE_T_CC, .Lhw_loop
+	nop
+
+.Lhwfinish:
+	sta	%f0, [%o0 + %g0]0x88	! store context
+	sta	%f1, [%o0 + %g1]0x88
+	add	%o0, 8, %o0
+	sta	%f2, [%o0 + %g0]0x88
+	sta	%f3, [%o0 + %g1]0x88
+	retl
+	nop
+
+.align	8
+.Lhwunaligned:
+	alignaddr %o1, %g0, %o1
+
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x00], %f10
+.Lhwunaligned_loop:
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x08], %f12
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x10], %f14
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x18], %f16
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x20], %f18
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x28], %f20
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x30], %f22
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x38], %f24
+	subcc	%o2, 1, %o2		! done yet?
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x40], %f26
+	add	%o1, 0x40, %o1
+	prefetch [%o1 + 63], 20
+
+	faligndata %f10, %f12, %f8
+	faligndata %f12, %f14, %f10
+	faligndata %f14, %f16, %f12
+	faligndata %f16, %f18, %f14
+	faligndata %f18, %f20, %f16
+	faligndata %f20, %f22, %f18
+	faligndata %f22, %f24, %f20
+	faligndata %f24, %f26, %f22
+
+	.word	0x81b02800		! MD5
+
+	bne,pt	SIZE_T_CC, .Lhwunaligned_loop
+	for	%f26, %f26, %f10	! %f10=%f26
+
+	ba	.Lhwfinish
+	nop
+
+.align	16
+.Lsoftware:
+	save	%sp,-STACK_FRAME,%sp
+
+	rd	%asi,$saved_asi
+	wr	%g0,0x88,%asi		! ASI_PRIMARY_LITTLE
+	and	$inp,7,$shr
+	andn	$inp,7,$inp
+
+	sll	$shr,3,$shr		! *=8
+	mov	56,$shl2
+	ld	[$ctx+0],$A
+	sub	$shl2,$shr,$shl2
+	ld	[$ctx+4],$B
+	and	$shl2,32,$shl1
+	add	$shl2,8,$shl2
+	ld	[$ctx+8],$C
+	sub	$shl2,$shl1,$shl2	! shr+shl1+shl2==64
+	ld	[$ctx+12],$D
+	nop
+
+.Loop:
+	 cmp	$shr,0			! was inp aligned?
+	ldxa	[$inp+0]%asi,@X[0]	! load little-endian input
+	ldxa	[$inp+8]%asi,@X[1]
+	ldxa	[$inp+16]%asi,@X[2]
+	ldxa	[$inp+24]%asi,@X[3]
+	ldxa	[$inp+32]%asi,@X[4]
+	 sllx	$A,32,$AB		! pack A,B
+	ldxa	[$inp+40]%asi,@X[5]
+	 sllx	$C,32,$CD		! pack C,D
+	ldxa	[$inp+48]%asi,@X[6]
+	 or	$B,$AB,$AB
+	ldxa	[$inp+56]%asi,@X[7]
+	 or	$D,$CD,$CD
+	bnz,a,pn	%icc,.+8
+	ldxa	[$inp+64]%asi,@X[8]
+
+	srlx	@X[0],$shr,@X[0]	! align X[0]
+	sllx	@X[1],$shl1,$tx
+	 sethi	%hi(@K[0]),$t2
+	sllx	$tx,$shl2,$tx
+	 or	$t2,%lo(@K[0]),$t2
+	or	$tx,@X[0],@X[0]
+	 xor	$C,$D,$t1
+	 add	@X[0],$t2,$t2		! X[0]+K[0]
+___
+	for ($i=0;$i<15;$i++)	{ &R0($i,@V);	unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+	for (;$i<16;$i++)	{ &R0_1($i,@V);	unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+	for (;$i<32;$i++)	{ &R1($i,@V);	unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+	for (;$i<48;$i++)	{ &R2($i,@V);	unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+	for (;$i<64;$i++)	{ &R3($i,@V);	unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+$code.=<<___;
+	srlx	$AB,32,$t1		! unpack A,B,C,D and accumulate
+	add	$inp,64,$inp		! advance inp
+	srlx	$CD,32,$t2
+	add	$t1,$A,$A
+	subcc	$len,1,$len		! done yet?
+	add	$AB,$B,$B
+	add	$t2,$C,$C
+	add	$CD,$D,$D
+	srl	$B,0,$B			! clruw	$B
+	bne	SIZE_T_CC,.Loop
+	srl	$D,0,$D			! clruw	$D
+
+	st	$A,[$ctx+0]		! write out ctx
+	st	$B,[$ctx+4]
+	st	$C,[$ctx+8]
+	st	$D,[$ctx+12]
+
+	wr	%g0,$saved_asi,%asi
+	ret
+	restore
+.type	md5_block_asm_data_order,#function
+.size	md5_block_asm_data_order,(.-md5_block_asm_data_order)
+
+.asciz	"MD5 block transform for SPARCv9, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+.align	4
+___
+
+# Purpose of these subroutines is to explicitly encode VIS instructions,
+# so that one can compile the module without having to specify VIS
+# extensions on compiler command line, e.g. -xarch=v9 vs. -xarch=v9a.
+# Idea is to reserve for option to produce "universal" binary and let
+# programmer detect if current CPU is VIS capable at run-time.
+sub unvis {
+my ($mnemonic,$rs1,$rs2,$rd)=@_;
+my $ref,$opf;
+my %visopf = (	"faligndata"	=> 0x048,
+		"for"		=> 0x07c	);
+
+    $ref = "$mnemonic\t$rs1,$rs2,$rd";
+
+    if ($opf=$visopf{$mnemonic}) {
+	foreach ($rs1,$rs2,$rd) {
+	    return $ref if (!/%f([0-9]{1,2})/);
+	    $_=$1;
+	    if ($1>=32) {
+		return $ref if ($1&1);
+		# re-encode for upper double register addressing
+		$_=($1|$1>>5)&31;
+	    }
+	}
+
+	return	sprintf ".word\t0x%08x !%s",
+			0x81b00000|$rd<<25|$rs1<<14|$opf<<5|$rs2,
+			$ref;
+    } else {
+	return $ref;
+    }
+}
+sub unalignaddr {
+my ($mnemonic,$rs1,$rs2,$rd)=@_;
+my %bias = ( "g" => 0, "o" => 8, "l" => 16, "i" => 24 );
+my $ref="$mnemonic\t$rs1,$rs2,$rd";
+
+    foreach ($rs1,$rs2,$rd) {
+	if (/%([goli])([0-7])/)	{ $_=$bias{$1}+$2; }
+	else			{ return $ref; }
+    }
+    return  sprintf ".word\t0x%08x !%s",
+		    0x81b00300|$rd<<25|$rs1<<14|$rs2,
+		    $ref;
+}
+
+foreach (split("\n",$code)) {
+	s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/ge;
+
+	s/\b(f[^\s]*)\s+(%f[0-9]{1,2}),\s*(%f[0-9]{1,2}),\s*(%f[0-9]{1,2})/
+		&unvis($1,$2,$3,$4)
+	 /ge;
+	s/\b(alignaddr)\s+(%[goli][0-7]),\s*(%[goli][0-7]),\s*(%[goli][0-7])/
+		&unalignaddr($1,$2,$3,$4)
+	 /ge;
+
+	print $_,"\n";
+}
+
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/md5/asm/md5-x86_64.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/md5/asm/md5-x86_64.pl
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..3f656dc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/md5/asm/md5-x86_64.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,380 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Author: Marc Bevand <bevand_m (at) epita.fr>
+# Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+# MD5 optimized for AMD64.
+
+use strict;
+
+my $code;
+
+# round1_step() does:
+#   dst = x + ((dst + F(x,y,z) + X[k] + T_i) <<< s)
+#   %r10d = X[k_next]
+#   %r11d = z' (copy of z for the next step)
+# Each round1_step() takes about 5.3 clocks (9 instructions, 1.7 IPC)
+sub round1_step
+{
+    my ($pos, $dst, $x, $y, $z, $k_next, $T_i, $s) = @_;
+    $code .= " mov	0*4(%rsi),	%r10d		/* (NEXT STEP) X[0] */\n" if ($pos == -1);
+    $code .= " mov	%edx,		%r11d		/* (NEXT STEP) z' = %edx */\n" if ($pos == -1);
+    $code .= <<EOF;
+	xor	$y,		%r11d		/* y ^ ... */
+	lea	$T_i($dst,%r10d),$dst		/* Const + dst + ... */
+	and	$x,		%r11d		/* x & ... */
+	mov	$k_next*4(%rsi),%r10d		/* (NEXT STEP) X[$k_next] */
+	xor	$z,		%r11d		/* z ^ ... */
+	add	%r11d,		$dst		/* dst += ... */
+	rol	\$$s,		$dst		/* dst <<< s */
+	mov	$y,		%r11d		/* (NEXT STEP) z' = $y */
+	add	$x,		$dst		/* dst += x */
+EOF
+}
+
+# round2_step() does:
+#   dst = x + ((dst + G(x,y,z) + X[k] + T_i) <<< s)
+#   %r10d = X[k_next]
+#   %r11d = z' (copy of z for the next step)
+#   %r12d = z' (copy of z for the next step)
+# Each round2_step() takes about 5.4 clocks (11 instructions, 2.0 IPC)
+sub round2_step
+{
+    my ($pos, $dst, $x, $y, $z, $k_next, $T_i, $s) = @_;
+    $code .= " mov	%edx,		%r11d		/* (NEXT STEP) z' = %edx */\n" if ($pos == -1);
+    $code .= " mov	%edx,		%r12d		/* (NEXT STEP) z' = %edx */\n" if ($pos == -1);
+    $code .= <<EOF;
+	not	%r11d				/* not z */
+	and	$x,		%r12d		/* x & z */
+	lea	$T_i($dst,%r10d),$dst		/* Const + dst + ... */
+	and	$y,		%r11d		/* y & (not z) */
+	mov	$k_next*4(%rsi),%r10d		/* (NEXT STEP) X[$k_next] */
+	or	%r11d,		%r12d		/* (y & (not z)) | (x & z) */
+	mov	$y,		%r11d		/* (NEXT STEP) z' = $y */
+	add	%r12d,		$dst		/* dst += ... */
+	mov	$y,		%r12d		/* (NEXT STEP) z' = $y */
+	rol	\$$s,		$dst		/* dst <<< s */
+	add	$x,		$dst		/* dst += x */
+EOF
+}
+
+# round3_step() does:
+#   dst = x + ((dst + H(x,y,z) + X[k] + T_i) <<< s)
+#   %r10d = X[k_next]
+#   %r11d = y' (copy of y for the next step)
+# Each round3_step() takes about 4.2 clocks (8 instructions, 1.9 IPC)
+{ my $round3_alter=0;
+sub round3_step
+{
+    my ($pos, $dst, $x, $y, $z, $k_next, $T_i, $s) = @_;
+    $code .= " mov	%ecx,		%r11d		/* (NEXT STEP) y' = %ecx */\n" if ($pos == -1);
+    $code .= <<EOF;
+	lea	$T_i($dst,%r10d),$dst		/* Const + dst + ... */
+	xor	$z,		%r11d		/* z ^ ... */
+	mov	$k_next*4(%rsi),%r10d		/* (NEXT STEP) X[$k_next] */
+	xor	$x,		%r11d		/* x ^ ... */
+	add	%r11d,		$dst		/* dst += ... */
+EOF
+    $code .= <<EOF if ($round3_alter);
+	rol	\$$s,		$dst		/* dst <<< s */
+	mov	$x,		%r11d		/* (NEXT STEP) y' = $x */
+EOF
+    $code .= <<EOF if (!$round3_alter);
+	mov	$x,		%r11d		/* (NEXT STEP) y' = $x */
+	rol	\$$s,		$dst		/* dst <<< s */
+EOF
+    $code .= <<EOF;
+	add	$x,		$dst		/* dst += x */
+EOF
+    $round3_alter^=1;
+}
+}
+
+# round4_step() does:
+#   dst = x + ((dst + I(x,y,z) + X[k] + T_i) <<< s)
+#   %r10d = X[k_next]
+#   %r11d = not z' (copy of not z for the next step)
+# Each round4_step() takes about 5.2 clocks (9 instructions, 1.7 IPC)
+sub round4_step
+{
+    my ($pos, $dst, $x, $y, $z, $k_next, $T_i, $s) = @_;
+    $code .= " mov	\$0xffffffff,	%r11d\n" if ($pos == -1);
+    $code .= " xor	%edx,		%r11d		/* (NEXT STEP) not z' = not %edx*/\n"
+    if ($pos == -1);
+    $code .= <<EOF;
+	lea	$T_i($dst,%r10d),$dst		/* Const + dst + ... */
+	or	$x,		%r11d		/* x | ... */
+	mov	$k_next*4(%rsi),%r10d		/* (NEXT STEP) X[$k_next] */
+	xor	$y,		%r11d		/* y ^ ... */
+	add	%r11d,		$dst		/* dst += ... */
+	mov	\$0xffffffff,	%r11d
+	rol	\$$s,		$dst		/* dst <<< s */
+	xor	$y,		%r11d		/* (NEXT STEP) not z' = not $y */
+	add	$x,		$dst		/* dst += x */
+EOF
+}
+
+no warnings qw(uninitialized);
+my $flavour = shift;
+my $output  = shift;
+if ($flavour =~ /\./) { $output = $flavour; undef $flavour; }
+
+my $win64=0; $win64=1 if ($flavour =~ /[nm]asm|mingw64/ || $output =~ /\.asm$/);
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; my $dir=$1; my $xlate;
+( $xlate="${dir}x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
+( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
+die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl";
+
+open OUT,"| \"$^X\" \"$xlate\" $flavour \"$output\"";
+*STDOUT=*OUT;
+
+$code .= <<EOF;
+.text
+.align 16
+
+.globl md5_block_asm_data_order
+.type md5_block_asm_data_order,\@function,3
+md5_block_asm_data_order:
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+.Lprologue:
+
+	# rdi = arg #1 (ctx, MD5_CTX pointer)
+	# rsi = arg #2 (ptr, data pointer)
+	# rdx = arg #3 (nbr, number of 16-word blocks to process)
+	mov	%rdi,		%rbp	# rbp = ctx
+	shl	\$6,		%rdx	# rdx = nbr in bytes
+	lea	(%rsi,%rdx),	%rdi	# rdi = end
+	mov	0*4(%rbp),	%eax	# eax = ctx->A
+	mov	1*4(%rbp),	%ebx	# ebx = ctx->B
+	mov	2*4(%rbp),	%ecx	# ecx = ctx->C
+	mov	3*4(%rbp),	%edx	# edx = ctx->D
+	# end is 'rdi'
+	# ptr is 'rsi'
+	# A is 'eax'
+	# B is 'ebx'
+	# C is 'ecx'
+	# D is 'edx'
+
+	cmp	%rdi,		%rsi		# cmp end with ptr
+	je	.Lend				# jmp if ptr == end
+
+	# BEGIN of loop over 16-word blocks
+.Lloop:	# save old values of A, B, C, D
+	mov	%eax,		%r8d
+	mov	%ebx,		%r9d
+	mov	%ecx,		%r14d
+	mov	%edx,		%r15d
+EOF
+round1_step(-1,'%eax','%ebx','%ecx','%edx', '1','0xd76aa478', '7');
+round1_step( 0,'%edx','%eax','%ebx','%ecx', '2','0xe8c7b756','12');
+round1_step( 0,'%ecx','%edx','%eax','%ebx', '3','0x242070db','17');
+round1_step( 0,'%ebx','%ecx','%edx','%eax', '4','0xc1bdceee','22');
+round1_step( 0,'%eax','%ebx','%ecx','%edx', '5','0xf57c0faf', '7');
+round1_step( 0,'%edx','%eax','%ebx','%ecx', '6','0x4787c62a','12');
+round1_step( 0,'%ecx','%edx','%eax','%ebx', '7','0xa8304613','17');
+round1_step( 0,'%ebx','%ecx','%edx','%eax', '8','0xfd469501','22');
+round1_step( 0,'%eax','%ebx','%ecx','%edx', '9','0x698098d8', '7');
+round1_step( 0,'%edx','%eax','%ebx','%ecx','10','0x8b44f7af','12');
+round1_step( 0,'%ecx','%edx','%eax','%ebx','11','0xffff5bb1','17');
+round1_step( 0,'%ebx','%ecx','%edx','%eax','12','0x895cd7be','22');
+round1_step( 0,'%eax','%ebx','%ecx','%edx','13','0x6b901122', '7');
+round1_step( 0,'%edx','%eax','%ebx','%ecx','14','0xfd987193','12');
+round1_step( 0,'%ecx','%edx','%eax','%ebx','15','0xa679438e','17');
+round1_step( 1,'%ebx','%ecx','%edx','%eax', '1','0x49b40821','22');
+
+round2_step(-1,'%eax','%ebx','%ecx','%edx', '6','0xf61e2562', '5');
+round2_step( 0,'%edx','%eax','%ebx','%ecx','11','0xc040b340', '9');
+round2_step( 0,'%ecx','%edx','%eax','%ebx', '0','0x265e5a51','14');
+round2_step( 0,'%ebx','%ecx','%edx','%eax', '5','0xe9b6c7aa','20');
+round2_step( 0,'%eax','%ebx','%ecx','%edx','10','0xd62f105d', '5');
+round2_step( 0,'%edx','%eax','%ebx','%ecx','15', '0x2441453', '9');
+round2_step( 0,'%ecx','%edx','%eax','%ebx', '4','0xd8a1e681','14');
+round2_step( 0,'%ebx','%ecx','%edx','%eax', '9','0xe7d3fbc8','20');
+round2_step( 0,'%eax','%ebx','%ecx','%edx','14','0x21e1cde6', '5');
+round2_step( 0,'%edx','%eax','%ebx','%ecx', '3','0xc33707d6', '9');
+round2_step( 0,'%ecx','%edx','%eax','%ebx', '8','0xf4d50d87','14');
+round2_step( 0,'%ebx','%ecx','%edx','%eax','13','0x455a14ed','20');
+round2_step( 0,'%eax','%ebx','%ecx','%edx', '2','0xa9e3e905', '5');
+round2_step( 0,'%edx','%eax','%ebx','%ecx', '7','0xfcefa3f8', '9');
+round2_step( 0,'%ecx','%edx','%eax','%ebx','12','0x676f02d9','14');
+round2_step( 1,'%ebx','%ecx','%edx','%eax', '5','0x8d2a4c8a','20');
+
+round3_step(-1,'%eax','%ebx','%ecx','%edx', '8','0xfffa3942', '4');
+round3_step( 0,'%edx','%eax','%ebx','%ecx','11','0x8771f681','11');
+round3_step( 0,'%ecx','%edx','%eax','%ebx','14','0x6d9d6122','16');
+round3_step( 0,'%ebx','%ecx','%edx','%eax', '1','0xfde5380c','23');
+round3_step( 0,'%eax','%ebx','%ecx','%edx', '4','0xa4beea44', '4');
+round3_step( 0,'%edx','%eax','%ebx','%ecx', '7','0x4bdecfa9','11');
+round3_step( 0,'%ecx','%edx','%eax','%ebx','10','0xf6bb4b60','16');
+round3_step( 0,'%ebx','%ecx','%edx','%eax','13','0xbebfbc70','23');
+round3_step( 0,'%eax','%ebx','%ecx','%edx', '0','0x289b7ec6', '4');
+round3_step( 0,'%edx','%eax','%ebx','%ecx', '3','0xeaa127fa','11');
+round3_step( 0,'%ecx','%edx','%eax','%ebx', '6','0xd4ef3085','16');
+round3_step( 0,'%ebx','%ecx','%edx','%eax', '9', '0x4881d05','23');
+round3_step( 0,'%eax','%ebx','%ecx','%edx','12','0xd9d4d039', '4');
+round3_step( 0,'%edx','%eax','%ebx','%ecx','15','0xe6db99e5','11');
+round3_step( 0,'%ecx','%edx','%eax','%ebx', '2','0x1fa27cf8','16');
+round3_step( 1,'%ebx','%ecx','%edx','%eax', '0','0xc4ac5665','23');
+
+round4_step(-1,'%eax','%ebx','%ecx','%edx', '7','0xf4292244', '6');
+round4_step( 0,'%edx','%eax','%ebx','%ecx','14','0x432aff97','10');
+round4_step( 0,'%ecx','%edx','%eax','%ebx', '5','0xab9423a7','15');
+round4_step( 0,'%ebx','%ecx','%edx','%eax','12','0xfc93a039','21');
+round4_step( 0,'%eax','%ebx','%ecx','%edx', '3','0x655b59c3', '6');
+round4_step( 0,'%edx','%eax','%ebx','%ecx','10','0x8f0ccc92','10');
+round4_step( 0,'%ecx','%edx','%eax','%ebx', '1','0xffeff47d','15');
+round4_step( 0,'%ebx','%ecx','%edx','%eax', '8','0x85845dd1','21');
+round4_step( 0,'%eax','%ebx','%ecx','%edx','15','0x6fa87e4f', '6');
+round4_step( 0,'%edx','%eax','%ebx','%ecx', '6','0xfe2ce6e0','10');
+round4_step( 0,'%ecx','%edx','%eax','%ebx','13','0xa3014314','15');
+round4_step( 0,'%ebx','%ecx','%edx','%eax', '4','0x4e0811a1','21');
+round4_step( 0,'%eax','%ebx','%ecx','%edx','11','0xf7537e82', '6');
+round4_step( 0,'%edx','%eax','%ebx','%ecx', '2','0xbd3af235','10');
+round4_step( 0,'%ecx','%edx','%eax','%ebx', '9','0x2ad7d2bb','15');
+round4_step( 1,'%ebx','%ecx','%edx','%eax', '0','0xeb86d391','21');
+$code .= <<EOF;
+	# add old values of A, B, C, D
+	add	%r8d,	%eax
+	add	%r9d,	%ebx
+	add	%r14d,	%ecx
+	add	%r15d,	%edx
+
+	# loop control
+	add	\$64,		%rsi		# ptr += 64
+	cmp	%rdi,		%rsi		# cmp end with ptr
+	jb	.Lloop				# jmp if ptr < end
+	# END of loop over 16-word blocks
+
+.Lend:
+	mov	%eax,		0*4(%rbp)	# ctx->A = A
+	mov	%ebx,		1*4(%rbp)	# ctx->B = B
+	mov	%ecx,		2*4(%rbp)	# ctx->C = C
+	mov	%edx,		3*4(%rbp)	# ctx->D = D
+
+	mov	(%rsp),%r15
+	mov	8(%rsp),%r14
+	mov	16(%rsp),%r12
+	mov	24(%rsp),%rbx
+	mov	32(%rsp),%rbp
+	add	\$40,%rsp
+.Lepilogue:
+	ret
+.size md5_block_asm_data_order,.-md5_block_asm_data_order
+EOF
+
+# EXCEPTION_DISPOSITION handler (EXCEPTION_RECORD *rec,ULONG64 frame,
+#		CONTEXT *context,DISPATCHER_CONTEXT *disp)
+if ($win64) {
+my $rec="%rcx";
+my $frame="%rdx";
+my $context="%r8";
+my $disp="%r9";
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.extern	__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind
+.type	se_handler,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+se_handler:
+	push	%rsi
+	push	%rdi
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+	pushfq
+	sub	\$64,%rsp
+
+	mov	120($context),%rax	# pull context->Rax
+	mov	248($context),%rbx	# pull context->Rip
+
+	lea	.Lprologue(%rip),%r10
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip<.Lprologue
+	jb	.Lin_prologue
+
+	mov	152($context),%rax	# pull context->Rsp
+
+	lea	.Lepilogue(%rip),%r10
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip>=.Lepilogue
+	jae	.Lin_prologue
+
+	lea	40(%rax),%rax
+
+	mov	-8(%rax),%rbp
+	mov	-16(%rax),%rbx
+	mov	-24(%rax),%r12
+	mov	-32(%rax),%r14
+	mov	-40(%rax),%r15
+	mov	%rbx,144($context)	# restore context->Rbx
+	mov	%rbp,160($context)	# restore context->Rbp
+	mov	%r12,216($context)	# restore context->R12
+	mov	%r14,232($context)	# restore context->R14
+	mov	%r15,240($context)	# restore context->R15
+
+.Lin_prologue:
+	mov	8(%rax),%rdi
+	mov	16(%rax),%rsi
+	mov	%rax,152($context)	# restore context->Rsp
+	mov	%rsi,168($context)	# restore context->Rsi
+	mov	%rdi,176($context)	# restore context->Rdi
+
+	mov	40($disp),%rdi		# disp->ContextRecord
+	mov	$context,%rsi		# context
+	mov	\$154,%ecx		# sizeof(CONTEXT)
+	.long	0xa548f3fc		# cld; rep movsq
+
+	mov	$disp,%rsi
+	xor	%rcx,%rcx		# arg1, UNW_FLAG_NHANDLER
+	mov	8(%rsi),%rdx		# arg2, disp->ImageBase
+	mov	0(%rsi),%r8		# arg3, disp->ControlPc
+	mov	16(%rsi),%r9		# arg4, disp->FunctionEntry
+	mov	40(%rsi),%r10		# disp->ContextRecord
+	lea	56(%rsi),%r11		# &disp->HandlerData
+	lea	24(%rsi),%r12		# &disp->EstablisherFrame
+	mov	%r10,32(%rsp)		# arg5
+	mov	%r11,40(%rsp)		# arg6
+	mov	%r12,48(%rsp)		# arg7
+	mov	%rcx,56(%rsp)		# arg8, (NULL)
+	call	*__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind(%rip)
+
+	mov	\$1,%eax		# ExceptionContinueSearch
+	add	\$64,%rsp
+	popfq
+	pop	%r15
+	pop	%r14
+	pop	%r13
+	pop	%r12
+	pop	%rbp
+	pop	%rbx
+	pop	%rdi
+	pop	%rsi
+	ret
+.size	se_handler,.-se_handler
+
+.section	.pdata
+.align	4
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_md5_block_asm_data_order
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_md5_block_asm_data_order
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_md5_block_asm_data_order
+
+.section	.xdata
+.align	8
+.LSEH_info_md5_block_asm_data_order:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	se_handler
+___
+}
+
+print $code;
+
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/md5/build.info b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/md5/build.info
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..38323a3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/md5/build.info
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+LIBS=../../libcrypto
+SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
+        md5_dgst.c md5_one.c {- $target{md5_asm_src} -}
+
+GENERATE[md5-586.s]=asm/md5-586.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $(CFLAGS) $(LIB_CFLAGS)
+
+GENERATE[md5-x86_64.s]=asm/md5-x86_64.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+
+GENERATE[md5-sparcv9.S]=asm/md5-sparcv9.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+INCLUDE[md5-sparcv9.o]=..
+
+BEGINRAW[makefile(windows)]
+{- $builddir -}\md5-ia64.asm: {- $sourcedir -}\asm\md5-ia64.S
+	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) -EP {- $sourcedir -}\asm\md5-ia64.S > $@.i && move /Y $@.i $@
+ENDRAW[makefile(windows)]
+
+BEGINRAW[Makefile]
+{- $builddir -}/md5-ia64.s: {- $sourcedir -}/asm/md5-ia64.S
+	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) -E {- $sourcedir -}/asm/md5-ia64.S | \
+	$(PERL) -ne 's/;\s+/;\n/g; print;' > $@
+
+ENDRAW[Makefile]
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/md5/md5_dgst.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/md5/md5_dgst.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fbede67
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/md5/md5_dgst.c
@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "md5_locl.h"
+#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+
+/*
+ * Implemented from RFC1321 The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm
+ */
+
+#define INIT_DATA_A (unsigned long)0x67452301L
+#define INIT_DATA_B (unsigned long)0xefcdab89L
+#define INIT_DATA_C (unsigned long)0x98badcfeL
+#define INIT_DATA_D (unsigned long)0x10325476L
+
+int MD5_Init(MD5_CTX *c)
+{
+    memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c));
+    c->A = INIT_DATA_A;
+    c->B = INIT_DATA_B;
+    c->C = INIT_DATA_C;
+    c->D = INIT_DATA_D;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+#ifndef md5_block_data_order
+# ifdef X
+#  undef X
+# endif
+void md5_block_data_order(MD5_CTX *c, const void *data_, size_t num)
+{
+    const unsigned char *data = data_;
+    register unsigned MD32_REG_T A, B, C, D, l;
+# ifndef MD32_XARRAY
+    /* See comment in crypto/sha/sha_locl.h for details. */
+    unsigned MD32_REG_T XX0, XX1, XX2, XX3, XX4, XX5, XX6, XX7,
+        XX8, XX9, XX10, XX11, XX12, XX13, XX14, XX15;
+#  define X(i)   XX##i
+# else
+    MD5_LONG XX[MD5_LBLOCK];
+#  define X(i)   XX[i]
+# endif
+
+    A = c->A;
+    B = c->B;
+    C = c->C;
+    D = c->D;
+
+    for (; num--;) {
+        (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+        X(0) = l;
+        (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+        X(1) = l;
+        /* Round 0 */
+        R0(A, B, C, D, X(0), 7, 0xd76aa478L);
+        (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+        X(2) = l;
+        R0(D, A, B, C, X(1), 12, 0xe8c7b756L);
+        (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+        X(3) = l;
+        R0(C, D, A, B, X(2), 17, 0x242070dbL);
+        (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+        X(4) = l;
+        R0(B, C, D, A, X(3), 22, 0xc1bdceeeL);
+        (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+        X(5) = l;
+        R0(A, B, C, D, X(4), 7, 0xf57c0fafL);
+        (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+        X(6) = l;
+        R0(D, A, B, C, X(5), 12, 0x4787c62aL);
+        (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+        X(7) = l;
+        R0(C, D, A, B, X(6), 17, 0xa8304613L);
+        (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+        X(8) = l;
+        R0(B, C, D, A, X(7), 22, 0xfd469501L);
+        (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+        X(9) = l;
+        R0(A, B, C, D, X(8), 7, 0x698098d8L);
+        (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+        X(10) = l;
+        R0(D, A, B, C, X(9), 12, 0x8b44f7afL);
+        (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+        X(11) = l;
+        R0(C, D, A, B, X(10), 17, 0xffff5bb1L);
+        (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+        X(12) = l;
+        R0(B, C, D, A, X(11), 22, 0x895cd7beL);
+        (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+        X(13) = l;
+        R0(A, B, C, D, X(12), 7, 0x6b901122L);
+        (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+        X(14) = l;
+        R0(D, A, B, C, X(13), 12, 0xfd987193L);
+        (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+        X(15) = l;
+        R0(C, D, A, B, X(14), 17, 0xa679438eL);
+        R0(B, C, D, A, X(15), 22, 0x49b40821L);
+        /* Round 1 */
+        R1(A, B, C, D, X(1), 5, 0xf61e2562L);
+        R1(D, A, B, C, X(6), 9, 0xc040b340L);
+        R1(C, D, A, B, X(11), 14, 0x265e5a51L);
+        R1(B, C, D, A, X(0), 20, 0xe9b6c7aaL);
+        R1(A, B, C, D, X(5), 5, 0xd62f105dL);
+        R1(D, A, B, C, X(10), 9, 0x02441453L);
+        R1(C, D, A, B, X(15), 14, 0xd8a1e681L);
+        R1(B, C, D, A, X(4), 20, 0xe7d3fbc8L);
+        R1(A, B, C, D, X(9), 5, 0x21e1cde6L);
+        R1(D, A, B, C, X(14), 9, 0xc33707d6L);
+        R1(C, D, A, B, X(3), 14, 0xf4d50d87L);
+        R1(B, C, D, A, X(8), 20, 0x455a14edL);
+        R1(A, B, C, D, X(13), 5, 0xa9e3e905L);
+        R1(D, A, B, C, X(2), 9, 0xfcefa3f8L);
+        R1(C, D, A, B, X(7), 14, 0x676f02d9L);
+        R1(B, C, D, A, X(12), 20, 0x8d2a4c8aL);
+        /* Round 2 */
+        R2(A, B, C, D, X(5), 4, 0xfffa3942L);
+        R2(D, A, B, C, X(8), 11, 0x8771f681L);
+        R2(C, D, A, B, X(11), 16, 0x6d9d6122L);
+        R2(B, C, D, A, X(14), 23, 0xfde5380cL);
+        R2(A, B, C, D, X(1), 4, 0xa4beea44L);
+        R2(D, A, B, C, X(4), 11, 0x4bdecfa9L);
+        R2(C, D, A, B, X(7), 16, 0xf6bb4b60L);
+        R2(B, C, D, A, X(10), 23, 0xbebfbc70L);
+        R2(A, B, C, D, X(13), 4, 0x289b7ec6L);
+        R2(D, A, B, C, X(0), 11, 0xeaa127faL);
+        R2(C, D, A, B, X(3), 16, 0xd4ef3085L);
+        R2(B, C, D, A, X(6), 23, 0x04881d05L);
+        R2(A, B, C, D, X(9), 4, 0xd9d4d039L);
+        R2(D, A, B, C, X(12), 11, 0xe6db99e5L);
+        R2(C, D, A, B, X(15), 16, 0x1fa27cf8L);
+        R2(B, C, D, A, X(2), 23, 0xc4ac5665L);
+        /* Round 3 */
+        R3(A, B, C, D, X(0), 6, 0xf4292244L);
+        R3(D, A, B, C, X(7), 10, 0x432aff97L);
+        R3(C, D, A, B, X(14), 15, 0xab9423a7L);
+        R3(B, C, D, A, X(5), 21, 0xfc93a039L);
+        R3(A, B, C, D, X(12), 6, 0x655b59c3L);
+        R3(D, A, B, C, X(3), 10, 0x8f0ccc92L);
+        R3(C, D, A, B, X(10), 15, 0xffeff47dL);
+        R3(B, C, D, A, X(1), 21, 0x85845dd1L);
+        R3(A, B, C, D, X(8), 6, 0x6fa87e4fL);
+        R3(D, A, B, C, X(15), 10, 0xfe2ce6e0L);
+        R3(C, D, A, B, X(6), 15, 0xa3014314L);
+        R3(B, C, D, A, X(13), 21, 0x4e0811a1L);
+        R3(A, B, C, D, X(4), 6, 0xf7537e82L);
+        R3(D, A, B, C, X(11), 10, 0xbd3af235L);
+        R3(C, D, A, B, X(2), 15, 0x2ad7d2bbL);
+        R3(B, C, D, A, X(9), 21, 0xeb86d391L);
+
+        A = c->A += A;
+        B = c->B += B;
+        C = c->C += C;
+        D = c->D += D;
+    }
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/md5/md5_locl.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/md5/md5_locl.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9c7aade
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/md5/md5_locl.h
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/e_os2.h>
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+
+#ifdef MD5_ASM
+# if defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__) || defined(_M_IX86) || \
+     defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64)
+#  define md5_block_data_order md5_block_asm_data_order
+# elif defined(__ia64) || defined(__ia64__) || defined(_M_IA64)
+#  define md5_block_data_order md5_block_asm_data_order
+# elif defined(__sparc) || defined(__sparc__)
+#  define md5_block_data_order md5_block_asm_data_order
+# endif
+#endif
+
+void md5_block_data_order(MD5_CTX *c, const void *p, size_t num);
+
+#define DATA_ORDER_IS_LITTLE_ENDIAN
+
+#define HASH_LONG               MD5_LONG
+#define HASH_CTX                MD5_CTX
+#define HASH_CBLOCK             MD5_CBLOCK
+#define HASH_UPDATE             MD5_Update
+#define HASH_TRANSFORM          MD5_Transform
+#define HASH_FINAL              MD5_Final
+#define HASH_MAKE_STRING(c,s)   do {    \
+        unsigned long ll;               \
+        ll=(c)->A; (void)HOST_l2c(ll,(s));      \
+        ll=(c)->B; (void)HOST_l2c(ll,(s));      \
+        ll=(c)->C; (void)HOST_l2c(ll,(s));      \
+        ll=(c)->D; (void)HOST_l2c(ll,(s));      \
+        } while (0)
+#define HASH_BLOCK_DATA_ORDER   md5_block_data_order
+
+#include "internal/md32_common.h"
+
+/*-
+#define F(x,y,z)        (((x) & (y))  |  ((~(x)) & (z)))
+#define G(x,y,z)        (((x) & (z))  |  ((y) & (~(z))))
+*/
+
+/*
+ * As pointed out by Wei Dai <weidai@eskimo.com>, the above can be simplified
+ * to the code below.  Wei attributes these optimizations to Peter Gutmann's
+ * SHS code, and he attributes it to Rich Schroeppel.
+ */
+#define F(b,c,d)        ((((c) ^ (d)) & (b)) ^ (d))
+#define G(b,c,d)        ((((b) ^ (c)) & (d)) ^ (c))
+#define H(b,c,d)        ((b) ^ (c) ^ (d))
+#define I(b,c,d)        (((~(d)) | (b)) ^ (c))
+
+#define R0(a,b,c,d,k,s,t) { \
+        a+=((k)+(t)+F((b),(c),(d))); \
+        a=ROTATE(a,s); \
+        a+=b; };\
+
+#define R1(a,b,c,d,k,s,t) { \
+        a+=((k)+(t)+G((b),(c),(d))); \
+        a=ROTATE(a,s); \
+        a+=b; };
+
+#define R2(a,b,c,d,k,s,t) { \
+        a+=((k)+(t)+H((b),(c),(d))); \
+        a=ROTATE(a,s); \
+        a+=b; };
+
+#define R3(a,b,c,d,k,s,t) { \
+        a+=((k)+(t)+I((b),(c),(d))); \
+        a=ROTATE(a,s); \
+        a+=b; };
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/md5/md5_one.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/md5/md5_one.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..becd87e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/md5/md5_one.c
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+
+#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+# include <openssl/ebcdic.h>
+#endif
+
+unsigned char *MD5(const unsigned char *d, size_t n, unsigned char *md)
+{
+    MD5_CTX c;
+    static unsigned char m[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+
+    if (md == NULL)
+        md = m;
+    if (!MD5_Init(&c))
+        return NULL;
+#ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+    MD5_Update(&c, d, n);
+#else
+    {
+        char temp[1024];
+        unsigned long chunk;
+
+        while (n > 0) {
+            chunk = (n > sizeof(temp)) ? sizeof(temp) : n;
+            ebcdic2ascii(temp, d, chunk);
+            MD5_Update(&c, temp, chunk);
+            n -= chunk;
+            d += chunk;
+        }
+    }
+#endif
+    MD5_Final(md, &c);
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(&c, sizeof(c)); /* security consideration */
+    return (md);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/mdc2/build.info b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/mdc2/build.info
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8fe6878
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/mdc2/build.info
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+LIBS=../../libcrypto
+SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
+        mdc2dgst.c mdc2_one.c
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/mdc2/mdc2_one.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/mdc2/mdc2_one.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..472a5ec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/mdc2/mdc2_one.c
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/mdc2.h>
+
+unsigned char *MDC2(const unsigned char *d, size_t n, unsigned char *md)
+{
+    MDC2_CTX c;
+    static unsigned char m[MDC2_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+
+    if (md == NULL)
+        md = m;
+    if (!MDC2_Init(&c))
+        return NULL;
+    MDC2_Update(&c, d, n);
+    MDC2_Final(md, &c);
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(&c, sizeof(c)); /* security consideration */
+    return (md);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/mdc2/mdc2dgst.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/mdc2/mdc2dgst.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..37d99f4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/mdc2/mdc2dgst.c
@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/des.h>
+#include <openssl/mdc2.h>
+
+#undef c2l
+#define c2l(c,l)        (l =((DES_LONG)(*((c)++)))    , \
+                         l|=((DES_LONG)(*((c)++)))<< 8L, \
+                         l|=((DES_LONG)(*((c)++)))<<16L, \
+                         l|=((DES_LONG)(*((c)++)))<<24L)
+
+#undef l2c
+#define l2c(l,c)        (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)     )&0xff), \
+                        *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8L)&0xff), \
+                        *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16L)&0xff), \
+                        *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24L)&0xff))
+
+static void mdc2_body(MDC2_CTX *c, const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
+int MDC2_Init(MDC2_CTX *c)
+{
+    c->num = 0;
+    c->pad_type = 1;
+    memset(&(c->h[0]), 0x52, MDC2_BLOCK);
+    memset(&(c->hh[0]), 0x25, MDC2_BLOCK);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int MDC2_Update(MDC2_CTX *c, const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
+{
+    size_t i, j;
+
+    i = c->num;
+    if (i != 0) {
+        if (len < MDC2_BLOCK - i) {
+            /* partial block */
+            memcpy(&(c->data[i]), in, len);
+            c->num += (int)len;
+            return 1;
+        } else {
+            /* filled one */
+            j = MDC2_BLOCK - i;
+            memcpy(&(c->data[i]), in, j);
+            len -= j;
+            in += j;
+            c->num = 0;
+            mdc2_body(c, &(c->data[0]), MDC2_BLOCK);
+        }
+    }
+    i = len & ~((size_t)MDC2_BLOCK - 1);
+    if (i > 0)
+        mdc2_body(c, in, i);
+    j = len - i;
+    if (j > 0) {
+        memcpy(&(c->data[0]), &(in[i]), j);
+        c->num = (int)j;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static void mdc2_body(MDC2_CTX *c, const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
+{
+    register DES_LONG tin0, tin1;
+    register DES_LONG ttin0, ttin1;
+    DES_LONG d[2], dd[2];
+    DES_key_schedule k;
+    unsigned char *p;
+    size_t i;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < len; i += 8) {
+        c2l(in, tin0);
+        d[0] = dd[0] = tin0;
+        c2l(in, tin1);
+        d[1] = dd[1] = tin1;
+        c->h[0] = (c->h[0] & 0x9f) | 0x40;
+        c->hh[0] = (c->hh[0] & 0x9f) | 0x20;
+
+        DES_set_odd_parity(&c->h);
+        DES_set_key_unchecked(&c->h, &k);
+        DES_encrypt1(d, &k, 1);
+
+        DES_set_odd_parity(&c->hh);
+        DES_set_key_unchecked(&c->hh, &k);
+        DES_encrypt1(dd, &k, 1);
+
+        ttin0 = tin0 ^ dd[0];
+        ttin1 = tin1 ^ dd[1];
+        tin0 ^= d[0];
+        tin1 ^= d[1];
+
+        p = c->h;
+        l2c(tin0, p);
+        l2c(ttin1, p);
+        p = c->hh;
+        l2c(ttin0, p);
+        l2c(tin1, p);
+    }
+}
+
+int MDC2_Final(unsigned char *md, MDC2_CTX *c)
+{
+    unsigned int i;
+    int j;
+
+    i = c->num;
+    j = c->pad_type;
+    if ((i > 0) || (j == 2)) {
+        if (j == 2)
+            c->data[i++] = 0x80;
+        memset(&(c->data[i]), 0, MDC2_BLOCK - i);
+        mdc2_body(c, c->data, MDC2_BLOCK);
+    }
+    memcpy(md, (char *)c->h, MDC2_BLOCK);
+    memcpy(&(md[MDC2_BLOCK]), (char *)c->hh, MDC2_BLOCK);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+#undef TEST
+
+#ifdef TEST
+main()
+{
+    unsigned char md[MDC2_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+    int i;
+    MDC2_CTX c;
+    static char *text = "Now is the time for all ";
+
+    MDC2_Init(&c);
+    MDC2_Update(&c, text, strlen(text));
+    MDC2_Final(&(md[0]), &c);
+
+    for (i = 0; i < MDC2_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++)
+        printf("%02X", md[i]);
+    printf("\n");
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/mem.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/mem.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..72b04c8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/mem.c
@@ -0,0 +1,196 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+
+/*
+ * the following pointers may be changed as long as 'allow_customize' is set
+ */
+static int allow_customize = 1;
+
+static void *(*malloc_impl)(size_t, const char *, int)
+    = CRYPTO_malloc;
+static void *(*realloc_impl)(void *, size_t, const char *, int)
+    = CRYPTO_realloc;
+static void (*free_impl)(void *, const char *, int)
+    = CRYPTO_free;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG
+static int call_malloc_debug = 1;
+#else
+static int call_malloc_debug = 0;
+#endif
+
+int CRYPTO_set_mem_functions(
+        void *(*m)(size_t, const char *, int),
+        void *(*r)(void *, size_t, const char *, int),
+        void (*f)(void *, const char *, int))
+{
+    if (!allow_customize)
+        return 0;
+    if (m)
+        malloc_impl = m;
+    if (r)
+        realloc_impl = r;
+    if (f)
+        free_impl = f;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int CRYPTO_set_mem_debug(int flag)
+{
+    if (!allow_customize)
+        return 0;
+    call_malloc_debug = flag;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+void CRYPTO_get_mem_functions(
+        void *(**m)(size_t, const char *, int),
+        void *(**r)(void *, size_t, const char *, int),
+        void (**f)(void *, const char *, int))
+{
+    if (m != NULL)
+        *m = malloc_impl;
+    if (r != NULL)
+        *r = realloc_impl;
+    if (f != NULL)
+        *f = free_impl;
+}
+
+void *CRYPTO_malloc(size_t num, const char *file, int line)
+{
+    void *ret = NULL;
+
+    if (malloc_impl != NULL && malloc_impl != CRYPTO_malloc)
+        return malloc_impl(num, file, line);
+
+    if (num == 0)
+        return NULL;
+
+    if (allow_customize) {
+        /*
+         * Disallow customization after the first allocation. We only set this
+         * if necessary to avoid a store to the same cache line on every
+         * allocation.
+         */
+        allow_customize = 0;
+    }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG
+    if (call_malloc_debug) {
+        CRYPTO_mem_debug_malloc(NULL, num, 0, file, line);
+        ret = malloc(num);
+        CRYPTO_mem_debug_malloc(ret, num, 1, file, line);
+    } else {
+        ret = malloc(num);
+    }
+#else
+    osslargused(file); osslargused(line);
+    ret = malloc(num);
+#endif
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+void *CRYPTO_zalloc(size_t num, const char *file, int line)
+{
+    void *ret = CRYPTO_malloc(num, file, line);
+
+    if (ret != NULL)
+        memset(ret, 0, num);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+void *CRYPTO_realloc(void *str, size_t num, const char *file, int line)
+{
+    if (realloc_impl != NULL && realloc_impl != &CRYPTO_realloc)
+        return realloc_impl(str, num, file, line);
+
+    if (str == NULL)
+        return CRYPTO_malloc(num, file, line);
+
+    if (num == 0) {
+        CRYPTO_free(str, file, line);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG
+    if (call_malloc_debug) {
+        void *ret;
+        CRYPTO_mem_debug_realloc(str, NULL, num, 0, file, line);
+        ret = realloc(str, num);
+        CRYPTO_mem_debug_realloc(str, ret, num, 1, file, line);
+        return ret;
+    }
+#else
+    osslargused(file); osslargused(line);
+#endif
+    return realloc(str, num);
+
+}
+
+void *CRYPTO_clear_realloc(void *str, size_t old_len, size_t num,
+                           const char *file, int line)
+{
+    void *ret = NULL;
+
+    if (str == NULL)
+        return CRYPTO_malloc(num, file, line);
+
+    if (num == 0) {
+        CRYPTO_clear_free(str, old_len, file, line);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    /* Can't shrink the buffer since memcpy below copies |old_len| bytes. */
+    if (num < old_len) {
+        OPENSSL_cleanse((char*)str + num, old_len - num);
+        return str;
+    }
+
+    ret = CRYPTO_malloc(num, file, line);
+    if (ret != NULL) {
+        memcpy(ret, str, old_len);
+        CRYPTO_clear_free(str, old_len, file, line);
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+void CRYPTO_free(void *str, const char *file, int line)
+{
+    if (free_impl != NULL && free_impl != &CRYPTO_free) {
+        free_impl(str, file, line);
+        return;
+    }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG
+    if (call_malloc_debug) {
+        CRYPTO_mem_debug_free(str, 0, file, line);
+        free(str);
+        CRYPTO_mem_debug_free(str, 1, file, line);
+    } else {
+        free(str);
+    }
+#else
+    free(str);
+#endif
+}
+
+void CRYPTO_clear_free(void *str, size_t num, const char *file, int line)
+{
+    if (str == NULL)
+        return;
+    if (num)
+        OPENSSL_cleanse(str, num);
+    CRYPTO_free(str, file, line);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/mem_clr.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/mem_clr.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..35bfb74
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/mem_clr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+
+/*
+ * Pointer to memset is volatile so that compiler must de-reference
+ * the pointer and can't assume that it points to any function in
+ * particular (such as memset, which it then might further "optimize")
+ */
+typedef void *(*memset_t)(void *, int, size_t);
+
+static volatile memset_t memset_func = memset;
+
+void OPENSSL_cleanse(void *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+    memset_func(ptr, 0, len);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/mem_dbg.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/mem_dbg.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c884078
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/mem_dbg.c
@@ -0,0 +1,629 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "internal/thread_once.h"
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include "internal/bio.h"
+#include <openssl/lhash.h>
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG_BACKTRACE
+# include <execinfo.h>
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * The state changes to CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON | CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE when
+ * the application asks for it (usually after library initialisation for
+ * which no book-keeping is desired). State CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON exists only
+ * temporarily when the library thinks that certain allocations should not be
+ * checked (e.g. the data structures used for memory checking).  It is not
+ * suitable as an initial state: the library will unexpectedly enable memory
+ * checking when it executes one of those sections that want to disable
+ * checking temporarily. State CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE without ..._ON makes
+ * no sense whatsoever.
+ */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG
+static int mh_mode = CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_OFF;
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG
+static unsigned long order = 0; /* number of memory requests */
+
+/*-
+ * For application-defined information (static C-string `info')
+ * to be displayed in memory leak list.
+ * Each thread has its own stack.  For applications, there is
+ *   OPENSSL_mem_debug_push("...")     to push an entry,
+ *   OPENSSL_mem_debug_pop()     to pop an entry,
+ */
+struct app_mem_info_st {
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_ID threadid;
+    const char *file;
+    int line;
+    const char *info;
+    struct app_mem_info_st *next; /* tail of thread's stack */
+    int references;
+};
+
+static CRYPTO_ONCE memdbg_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
+static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *malloc_lock = NULL;
+static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *long_malloc_lock = NULL;
+static CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL appinfokey;
+
+/* memory-block description */
+struct mem_st {
+    void *addr;
+    int num;
+    const char *file;
+    int line;
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_ID threadid;
+    unsigned long order;
+    time_t time;
+    APP_INFO *app_info;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG_BACKTRACE
+    void *array[30];
+    size_t array_siz;
+#endif
+};
+
+static LHASH_OF(MEM) *mh = NULL; /* hash-table of memory requests (address as
+                                  * key); access requires MALLOC2 lock */
+
+/* num_disable > 0 iff mh_mode == CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON (w/o ..._ENABLE) */
+static unsigned int num_disable = 0;
+
+/*
+ * Valid iff num_disable > 0.  long_malloc_lock is locked exactly in this
+ * case (by the thread named in disabling_thread).
+ */
+static CRYPTO_THREAD_ID disabling_threadid;
+
+DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_memdbg_init)
+{
+    malloc_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
+    long_malloc_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
+    if (malloc_lock == NULL || long_malloc_lock == NULL
+        || !CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local(&appinfokey, NULL)) {
+        CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(malloc_lock);
+        malloc_lock = NULL;
+        CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(long_malloc_lock);
+        long_malloc_lock = NULL;
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static void app_info_free(APP_INFO *inf)
+{
+    if (!inf)
+        return;
+    if (--(inf->references) <= 0) {
+        app_info_free(inf->next);
+        OPENSSL_free(inf);
+    }
+}
+#endif
+
+int CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(int mode)
+{
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG
+    return mode - mode;
+#else
+    int ret = mh_mode;
+
+    if (!RUN_ONCE(&memdbg_init, do_memdbg_init))
+        return -1;
+
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(malloc_lock);
+    switch (mode) {
+    default:
+        break;
+
+    case CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON:
+        mh_mode = CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON | CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE;
+        num_disable = 0;
+        break;
+
+    case CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_OFF:
+        mh_mode = 0;
+        num_disable = 0;
+        break;
+
+    /* switch off temporarily (for library-internal use): */
+    case CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_DISABLE:
+        if (mh_mode & CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON) {
+            CRYPTO_THREAD_ID cur = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id();
+            /* see if we don't have long_malloc_lock already */
+            if (!num_disable
+                || !CRYPTO_THREAD_compare_id(disabling_threadid, cur)) {
+                /*
+                 * Long-time lock long_malloc_lock must not be claimed
+                 * while we're holding malloc_lock, or we'll deadlock
+                 * if somebody else holds long_malloc_lock (and cannot
+                 * release it because we block entry to this function). Give
+                 * them a chance, first, and then claim the locks in
+                 * appropriate order (long-time lock first).
+                 */
+                CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(malloc_lock);
+                /*
+                 * Note that after we have waited for long_malloc_lock and
+                 * malloc_lock, we'll still be in the right "case" and
+                 * "if" branch because MemCheck_start and MemCheck_stop may
+                 * never be used while there are multiple OpenSSL threads.
+                 */
+                CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(long_malloc_lock);
+                CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(malloc_lock);
+                mh_mode &= ~CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE;
+                disabling_threadid = cur;
+            }
+            num_disable++;
+        }
+        break;
+
+    case CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE:
+        if (mh_mode & CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON) {
+            if (num_disable) {  /* always true, or something is going wrong */
+                num_disable--;
+                if (num_disable == 0) {
+                    mh_mode |= CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE;
+                    CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(long_malloc_lock);
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        break;
+    }
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(malloc_lock);
+    return (ret);
+#endif
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG
+
+static int mem_check_on(void)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_ID cur;
+
+    if (mh_mode & CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON) {
+        if (!RUN_ONCE(&memdbg_init, do_memdbg_init))
+            return 0;
+
+        cur = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id();
+        CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(malloc_lock);
+
+        ret = (mh_mode & CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE)
+            || !CRYPTO_THREAD_compare_id(disabling_threadid, cur);
+
+        CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(malloc_lock);
+    }
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static int mem_cmp(const MEM *a, const MEM *b)
+{
+#ifdef _WIN64
+    const char *ap = (const char *)a->addr, *bp = (const char *)b->addr;
+    if (ap == bp)
+        return 0;
+    else if (ap > bp)
+        return 1;
+    else
+        return -1;
+#else
+    return (const char *)a->addr - (const char *)b->addr;
+#endif
+}
+
+static unsigned long mem_hash(const MEM *a)
+{
+    size_t ret;
+
+    ret = (size_t)a->addr;
+
+    ret = ret * 17851 + (ret >> 14) * 7 + (ret >> 4) * 251;
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+/* returns 1 if there was an info to pop, 0 if the stack was empty. */
+static int pop_info(void)
+{
+    APP_INFO *current = NULL;
+
+    if (!RUN_ONCE(&memdbg_init, do_memdbg_init))
+        return 0;
+
+    current = (APP_INFO *)CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&appinfokey);
+    if (current != NULL) {
+        APP_INFO *next = current->next;
+
+        if (next != NULL) {
+            next->references++;
+            CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&appinfokey, next);
+        } else {
+            CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&appinfokey, NULL);
+        }
+        if (--(current->references) <= 0) {
+            current->next = NULL;
+            if (next != NULL)
+                next->references--;
+            OPENSSL_free(current);
+        }
+        return 1;
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int CRYPTO_mem_debug_push(const char *info, const char *file, int line)
+{
+    APP_INFO *ami, *amim;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    if (mem_check_on()) {
+        CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_DISABLE);
+
+        if (!RUN_ONCE(&memdbg_init, do_memdbg_init)
+            || (ami = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ami))) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+
+        ami->threadid = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id();
+        ami->file = file;
+        ami->line = line;
+        ami->info = info;
+        ami->references = 1;
+        ami->next = NULL;
+
+        amim = (APP_INFO *)CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&appinfokey);
+        CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&appinfokey, ami);
+
+        if (amim != NULL)
+            ami->next = amim;
+        ret = 1;
+ err:
+        CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE);
+    }
+
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+int CRYPTO_mem_debug_pop(void)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    if (mem_check_on()) {
+        CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_DISABLE);
+        ret = pop_info();
+        CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE);
+    }
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static unsigned long break_order_num = 0;
+
+void CRYPTO_mem_debug_malloc(void *addr, size_t num, int before_p,
+                             const char *file, int line)
+{
+    MEM *m, *mm;
+    APP_INFO *amim;
+
+    switch (before_p & 127) {
+    case 0:
+        break;
+    case 1:
+        if (addr == NULL)
+            break;
+
+        if (mem_check_on()) {
+            CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_DISABLE);
+
+            if (!RUN_ONCE(&memdbg_init, do_memdbg_init)
+                || (m = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*m))) == NULL) {
+                OPENSSL_free(addr);
+                CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE);
+                return;
+            }
+            if (mh == NULL) {
+                if ((mh = lh_MEM_new(mem_hash, mem_cmp)) == NULL) {
+                    OPENSSL_free(addr);
+                    OPENSSL_free(m);
+                    addr = NULL;
+                    goto err;
+                }
+            }
+
+            m->addr = addr;
+            m->file = file;
+            m->line = line;
+            m->num = num;
+            m->threadid = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id();
+
+            if (order == break_order_num) {
+                /* BREAK HERE */
+                m->order = order;
+            }
+            m->order = order++;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG_BACKTRACE
+            m->array_siz = backtrace(m->array, OSSL_NELEM(m->array));
+# endif
+            m->time = time(NULL);
+
+            amim = (APP_INFO *)CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&appinfokey);
+            m->app_info = amim;
+            if (amim != NULL)
+                amim->references++;
+
+            if ((mm = lh_MEM_insert(mh, m)) != NULL) {
+                /* Not good, but don't sweat it */
+                if (mm->app_info != NULL) {
+                    mm->app_info->references--;
+                }
+                OPENSSL_free(mm);
+            }
+ err:
+            CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE);
+        }
+        break;
+    }
+    return;
+}
+
+void CRYPTO_mem_debug_free(void *addr, int before_p,
+        const char *file, int line)
+{
+    MEM m, *mp;
+
+    switch (before_p) {
+    case 0:
+        if (addr == NULL)
+            break;
+
+        if (mem_check_on() && (mh != NULL)) {
+            CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_DISABLE);
+
+            m.addr = addr;
+            mp = lh_MEM_delete(mh, &m);
+            if (mp != NULL) {
+                app_info_free(mp->app_info);
+                OPENSSL_free(mp);
+            }
+
+            CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE);
+        }
+        break;
+    case 1:
+        break;
+    }
+}
+
+void CRYPTO_mem_debug_realloc(void *addr1, void *addr2, size_t num,
+                              int before_p, const char *file, int line)
+{
+    MEM m, *mp;
+
+    switch (before_p) {
+    case 0:
+        break;
+    case 1:
+        if (addr2 == NULL)
+            break;
+
+        if (addr1 == NULL) {
+            CRYPTO_mem_debug_malloc(addr2, num, 128 | before_p, file, line);
+            break;
+        }
+
+        if (mem_check_on()) {
+            CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_DISABLE);
+
+            m.addr = addr1;
+            mp = lh_MEM_delete(mh, &m);
+            if (mp != NULL) {
+                mp->addr = addr2;
+                mp->num = num;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG_BACKTRACE
+                mp->array_siz = backtrace(mp->array, OSSL_NELEM(mp->array));
+#endif
+                (void)lh_MEM_insert(mh, mp);
+            }
+
+            CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE);
+        }
+        break;
+    }
+    return;
+}
+
+typedef struct mem_leak_st {
+    BIO *bio;
+    int chunks;
+    long bytes;
+} MEM_LEAK;
+
+static void print_leak(const MEM *m, MEM_LEAK *l)
+{
+    char buf[1024];
+    char *bufp = buf;
+    APP_INFO *amip;
+    int ami_cnt;
+    struct tm *lcl = NULL;
+    /*
+     * Convert between CRYPTO_THREAD_ID (which could be anything at all) and
+     * a long. This may not be meaningful depending on what CRYPTO_THREAD_ID is
+     * but hopefully should give something sensible on most platforms
+     */
+    union {
+        CRYPTO_THREAD_ID tid;
+        unsigned long ltid;
+    } tid;
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_ID ti;
+
+#define BUF_REMAIN (sizeof(buf) - (size_t)(bufp - buf))
+
+    lcl = localtime(&m->time);
+    BIO_snprintf(bufp, BUF_REMAIN, "[%02d:%02d:%02d] ",
+                 lcl->tm_hour, lcl->tm_min, lcl->tm_sec);
+    bufp += strlen(bufp);
+
+    BIO_snprintf(bufp, BUF_REMAIN, "%5lu file=%s, line=%d, ",
+                 m->order, m->file, m->line);
+    bufp += strlen(bufp);
+
+    tid.ltid = 0;
+    tid.tid = m->threadid;
+    BIO_snprintf(bufp, BUF_REMAIN, "thread=%lu, ", tid.ltid);
+    bufp += strlen(bufp);
+
+    BIO_snprintf(bufp, BUF_REMAIN, "number=%d, address=%p\n",
+                 m->num, m->addr);
+    bufp += strlen(bufp);
+
+    BIO_puts(l->bio, buf);
+
+    l->chunks++;
+    l->bytes += m->num;
+
+    amip = m->app_info;
+    ami_cnt = 0;
+
+    if (amip) {
+        ti = amip->threadid;
+
+        do {
+            int buf_len;
+            int info_len;
+
+            ami_cnt++;
+            memset(buf, '>', ami_cnt);
+            tid.ltid = 0;
+            tid.tid = amip->threadid;
+            BIO_snprintf(buf + ami_cnt, sizeof(buf) - ami_cnt,
+                         " thread=%lu, file=%s, line=%d, info=\"",
+                         tid.ltid, amip->file,
+                         amip->line);
+            buf_len = strlen(buf);
+            info_len = strlen(amip->info);
+            if (128 - buf_len - 3 < info_len) {
+                memcpy(buf + buf_len, amip->info, 128 - buf_len - 3);
+                buf_len = 128 - 3;
+            } else {
+                OPENSSL_strlcpy(buf + buf_len, amip->info, sizeof(buf) - buf_len);
+                buf_len = strlen(buf);
+            }
+            BIO_snprintf(buf + buf_len, sizeof(buf) - buf_len, "\"\n");
+
+            BIO_puts(l->bio, buf);
+
+            amip = amip->next;
+        }
+        while (amip && CRYPTO_THREAD_compare_id(amip->threadid, ti));
+    }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG_BACKTRACE
+    {
+        size_t i;
+        char **strings = backtrace_symbols(m->array, m->array_siz);
+
+        for (i = 0; i < m->array_siz; i++)
+            fprintf(stderr, "##> %s\n", strings[i]);
+        free(strings);
+    }
+#endif
+}
+
+IMPLEMENT_LHASH_DOALL_ARG_CONST(MEM, MEM_LEAK);
+
+int CRYPTO_mem_leaks(BIO *b)
+{
+    MEM_LEAK ml;
+
+    /*
+     * OPENSSL_cleanup() will free the ex_data locks so we can't have any
+     * ex_data hanging around
+     */
+    bio_free_ex_data(b);
+
+    /* Ensure all resources are released */
+    OPENSSL_cleanup();
+
+    if (!RUN_ONCE(&memdbg_init, do_memdbg_init))
+        return -1;
+
+    CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_DISABLE);
+
+    ml.bio = b;
+    ml.bytes = 0;
+    ml.chunks = 0;
+    if (mh != NULL)
+        lh_MEM_doall_MEM_LEAK(mh, print_leak, &ml);
+
+    if (ml.chunks != 0) {
+        BIO_printf(b, "%ld bytes leaked in %d chunks\n", ml.bytes, ml.chunks);
+    } else {
+        /*
+         * Make sure that, if we found no leaks, memory-leak debugging itself
+         * does not introduce memory leaks (which might irritate external
+         * debugging tools). (When someone enables leak checking, but does not
+         * call this function, we declare it to be their fault.)
+         */
+        int old_mh_mode;
+
+        CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(malloc_lock);
+
+        /*
+         * avoid deadlock when lh_free() uses CRYPTO_mem_debug_free(), which uses
+         * mem_check_on
+         */
+        old_mh_mode = mh_mode;
+        mh_mode = CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_OFF;
+
+        lh_MEM_free(mh);
+        mh = NULL;
+
+        mh_mode = old_mh_mode;
+        CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(malloc_lock);
+    }
+    CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_OFF);
+
+    /* Clean up locks etc */
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&appinfokey);
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(malloc_lock);
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(long_malloc_lock);
+    malloc_lock = NULL;
+    long_malloc_lock = NULL;
+
+    return ml.chunks == 0 ? 1 : 0;
+}
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+int CRYPTO_mem_leaks_fp(FILE *fp)
+{
+    BIO *b;
+    int ret;
+
+    /*
+     * Need to turn off memory checking when allocated BIOs ... especially as
+     * we're creating them at a time when we're trying to check we've not
+     * left anything un-free()'d!!
+     */
+    CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_DISABLE);
+    b = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
+    CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE);
+    if (b == NULL)
+        return -1;
+    BIO_set_fp(b, fp, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+    ret = CRYPTO_mem_leaks(b);
+    BIO_free(b);
+    return ret;
+}
+# endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/mem_sec.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/mem_sec.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..25cdb47
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/mem_sec.c
@@ -0,0 +1,630 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2015-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright 2004-2014, Akamai Technologies. All Rights Reserved.
+ * This file is distributed under the terms of the OpenSSL license.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * This file is in two halves. The first half implements the public API
+ * to be used by external consumers, and to be used by OpenSSL to store
+ * data in a "secure arena." The second half implements the secure arena.
+ * For details on that implementation, see below (look for uppercase
+ * "SECURE HEAP IMPLEMENTATION").
+ */
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <e_os.h>
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+/* e_os.h includes unistd.h, which defines _POSIX_VERSION */
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SECURE_MEMORY) && defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX) \
+    && ( (defined(_POSIX_VERSION) && _POSIX_VERSION >= 200112L) \
+         || defined(__sun) || defined(__hpux) || defined(__sgi) \
+         || defined(__osf__) )
+# define IMPLEMENTED
+# include <stdlib.h>
+# include <assert.h>
+# include <unistd.h>
+# include <sys/types.h>
+# include <sys/mman.h>
+# include <sys/param.h>
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+# include <fcntl.h>
+#endif
+
+#define CLEAR(p, s) OPENSSL_cleanse(p, s)
+#ifndef PAGE_SIZE
+# define PAGE_SIZE    4096
+#endif
+#if !defined(MAP_ANON) && defined(MAP_ANONYMOUS)
+# define MAP_ANON MAP_ANONYMOUS
+#endif
+
+#ifdef IMPLEMENTED
+static size_t secure_mem_used;
+
+static int secure_mem_initialized;
+
+static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *sec_malloc_lock = NULL;
+
+/*
+ * These are the functions that must be implemented by a secure heap (sh).
+ */
+static int sh_init(size_t size, int minsize);
+static char *sh_malloc(size_t size);
+static void sh_free(char *ptr);
+static void sh_done(void);
+static size_t sh_actual_size(char *ptr);
+static int sh_allocated(const char *ptr);
+#endif
+
+int CRYPTO_secure_malloc_init(size_t size, int minsize)
+{
+#ifdef IMPLEMENTED
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    if (!secure_mem_initialized) {
+        sec_malloc_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
+        if (sec_malloc_lock == NULL)
+            return 0;
+        if ((ret = sh_init(size, minsize)) != 0) {
+            secure_mem_initialized = 1;
+        } else {
+            CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(sec_malloc_lock);
+            sec_malloc_lock = NULL;
+        }
+    }
+
+    return ret;
+#else
+    return 0;
+#endif /* IMPLEMENTED */
+}
+
+int CRYPTO_secure_malloc_done()
+{
+#ifdef IMPLEMENTED
+    if (secure_mem_used == 0) {
+        sh_done();
+        secure_mem_initialized = 0;
+        CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(sec_malloc_lock);
+        sec_malloc_lock = NULL;
+        return 1;
+    }
+#endif /* IMPLEMENTED */
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int CRYPTO_secure_malloc_initialized()
+{
+#ifdef IMPLEMENTED
+    return secure_mem_initialized;
+#else
+    return 0;
+#endif /* IMPLEMENTED */
+}
+
+void *CRYPTO_secure_malloc(size_t num, const char *file, int line)
+{
+#ifdef IMPLEMENTED
+    void *ret;
+    size_t actual_size;
+
+    if (!secure_mem_initialized) {
+        return CRYPTO_malloc(num, file, line);
+    }
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(sec_malloc_lock);
+    ret = sh_malloc(num);
+    actual_size = ret ? sh_actual_size(ret) : 0;
+    secure_mem_used += actual_size;
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(sec_malloc_lock);
+    return ret;
+#else
+    return CRYPTO_malloc(num, file, line);
+#endif /* IMPLEMENTED */
+}
+
+void *CRYPTO_secure_zalloc(size_t num, const char *file, int line)
+{
+    void *ret = CRYPTO_secure_malloc(num, file, line);
+
+    if (ret != NULL)
+        memset(ret, 0, num);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+void CRYPTO_secure_free(void *ptr, const char *file, int line)
+{
+#ifdef IMPLEMENTED
+    size_t actual_size;
+
+    if (ptr == NULL)
+        return;
+    if (!CRYPTO_secure_allocated(ptr)) {
+        CRYPTO_free(ptr, file, line);
+        return;
+    }
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(sec_malloc_lock);
+    actual_size = sh_actual_size(ptr);
+    CLEAR(ptr, actual_size);
+    secure_mem_used -= actual_size;
+    sh_free(ptr);
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(sec_malloc_lock);
+#else
+    CRYPTO_free(ptr, file, line);
+#endif /* IMPLEMENTED */
+}
+
+void CRYPTO_secure_clear_free(void *ptr, size_t num,
+                              const char *file, int line)
+{
+#ifdef IMPLEMENTED
+    size_t actual_size;
+
+    if (ptr == NULL)
+        return;
+    if (!CRYPTO_secure_allocated(ptr)) {
+        OPENSSL_cleanse(ptr, num);
+        CRYPTO_free(ptr, file, line);
+        return;
+    }
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(sec_malloc_lock);
+    actual_size = sh_actual_size(ptr);
+    CLEAR(ptr, actual_size);
+    secure_mem_used -= actual_size;
+    sh_free(ptr);
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(sec_malloc_lock);
+#else
+    if (ptr == NULL)
+        return;
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(ptr, num);
+    CRYPTO_free(ptr, file, line);
+#endif /* IMPLEMENTED */
+}
+
+int CRYPTO_secure_allocated(const void *ptr)
+{
+#ifdef IMPLEMENTED
+    int ret;
+
+    if (!secure_mem_initialized)
+        return 0;
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(sec_malloc_lock);
+    ret = sh_allocated(ptr);
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(sec_malloc_lock);
+    return ret;
+#else
+    return 0;
+#endif /* IMPLEMENTED */
+}
+
+size_t CRYPTO_secure_used()
+{
+#ifdef IMPLEMENTED
+    return secure_mem_used;
+#else
+    return 0;
+#endif /* IMPLEMENTED */
+}
+
+size_t CRYPTO_secure_actual_size(void *ptr)
+{
+#ifdef IMPLEMENTED
+    size_t actual_size;
+
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(sec_malloc_lock);
+    actual_size = sh_actual_size(ptr);
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(sec_malloc_lock);
+    return actual_size;
+#else
+    return 0;
+#endif
+}
+/* END OF PAGE ...
+
+   ... START OF PAGE */
+
+/*
+ * SECURE HEAP IMPLEMENTATION
+ */
+#ifdef IMPLEMENTED
+
+
+/*
+ * The implementation provided here uses a fixed-sized mmap() heap,
+ * which is locked into memory, not written to core files, and protected
+ * on either side by an unmapped page, which will catch pointer overruns
+ * (or underruns) and an attempt to read data out of the secure heap.
+ * Free'd memory is zero'd or otherwise cleansed.
+ *
+ * This is a pretty standard buddy allocator.  We keep areas in a multiple
+ * of "sh.minsize" units.  The freelist and bitmaps are kept separately,
+ * so all (and only) data is kept in the mmap'd heap.
+ *
+ * This code assumes eight-bit bytes.  The numbers 3 and 7 are all over the
+ * place.
+ */
+
+#define ONE ((size_t)1)
+
+# define TESTBIT(t, b)  (t[(b) >> 3] &  (ONE << ((b) & 7)))
+# define SETBIT(t, b)   (t[(b) >> 3] |= (ONE << ((b) & 7)))
+# define CLEARBIT(t, b) (t[(b) >> 3] &= (0xFF & ~(ONE << ((b) & 7))))
+
+#define WITHIN_ARENA(p) \
+    ((char*)(p) >= sh.arena && (char*)(p) < &sh.arena[sh.arena_size])
+#define WITHIN_FREELIST(p) \
+    ((char*)(p) >= (char*)sh.freelist && (char*)(p) < (char*)&sh.freelist[sh.freelist_size])
+
+
+typedef struct sh_list_st
+{
+    struct sh_list_st *next;
+    struct sh_list_st **p_next;
+} SH_LIST;
+
+typedef struct sh_st
+{
+    char* map_result;
+    size_t map_size;
+    char *arena;
+    size_t arena_size;
+    char **freelist;
+    ossl_ssize_t freelist_size;
+    size_t minsize;
+    unsigned char *bittable;
+    unsigned char *bitmalloc;
+    size_t bittable_size; /* size in bits */
+} SH;
+
+static SH sh;
+
+static size_t sh_getlist(char *ptr)
+{
+    ossl_ssize_t list = sh.freelist_size - 1;
+    size_t bit = (sh.arena_size + ptr - sh.arena) / sh.minsize;
+
+    for (; bit; bit >>= 1, list--) {
+        if (TESTBIT(sh.bittable, bit))
+            break;
+        OPENSSL_assert((bit & 1) == 0);
+    }
+
+    return list;
+}
+
+
+static int sh_testbit(char *ptr, int list, unsigned char *table)
+{
+    size_t bit;
+
+    OPENSSL_assert(list >= 0 && list < sh.freelist_size);
+    OPENSSL_assert(((ptr - sh.arena) & ((sh.arena_size >> list) - 1)) == 0);
+    bit = (ONE << list) + ((ptr - sh.arena) / (sh.arena_size >> list));
+    OPENSSL_assert(bit > 0 && bit < sh.bittable_size);
+    return TESTBIT(table, bit);
+}
+
+static void sh_clearbit(char *ptr, int list, unsigned char *table)
+{
+    size_t bit;
+
+    OPENSSL_assert(list >= 0 && list < sh.freelist_size);
+    OPENSSL_assert(((ptr - sh.arena) & ((sh.arena_size >> list) - 1)) == 0);
+    bit = (ONE << list) + ((ptr - sh.arena) / (sh.arena_size >> list));
+    OPENSSL_assert(bit > 0 && bit < sh.bittable_size);
+    OPENSSL_assert(TESTBIT(table, bit));
+    CLEARBIT(table, bit);
+}
+
+static void sh_setbit(char *ptr, int list, unsigned char *table)
+{
+    size_t bit;
+
+    OPENSSL_assert(list >= 0 && list < sh.freelist_size);
+    OPENSSL_assert(((ptr - sh.arena) & ((sh.arena_size >> list) - 1)) == 0);
+    bit = (ONE << list) + ((ptr - sh.arena) / (sh.arena_size >> list));
+    OPENSSL_assert(bit > 0 && bit < sh.bittable_size);
+    OPENSSL_assert(!TESTBIT(table, bit));
+    SETBIT(table, bit);
+}
+
+static void sh_add_to_list(char **list, char *ptr)
+{
+    SH_LIST *temp;
+
+    OPENSSL_assert(WITHIN_FREELIST(list));
+    OPENSSL_assert(WITHIN_ARENA(ptr));
+
+    temp = (SH_LIST *)ptr;
+    temp->next = *(SH_LIST **)list;
+    OPENSSL_assert(temp->next == NULL || WITHIN_ARENA(temp->next));
+    temp->p_next = (SH_LIST **)list;
+
+    if (temp->next != NULL) {
+        OPENSSL_assert((char **)temp->next->p_next == list);
+        temp->next->p_next = &(temp->next);
+    }
+
+    *list = ptr;
+}
+
+static void sh_remove_from_list(char *ptr)
+{
+    SH_LIST *temp, *temp2;
+
+    temp = (SH_LIST *)ptr;
+    if (temp->next != NULL)
+        temp->next->p_next = temp->p_next;
+    *temp->p_next = temp->next;
+    if (temp->next == NULL)
+        return;
+
+    temp2 = temp->next;
+    OPENSSL_assert(WITHIN_FREELIST(temp2->p_next) || WITHIN_ARENA(temp2->p_next));
+}
+
+
+static int sh_init(size_t size, int minsize)
+{
+    int ret;
+    size_t i;
+    size_t pgsize;
+    size_t aligned;
+
+    memset(&sh, 0, sizeof(sh));
+
+    /* make sure size and minsize are powers of 2 */
+    OPENSSL_assert(size > 0);
+    OPENSSL_assert((size & (size - 1)) == 0);
+    OPENSSL_assert(minsize > 0);
+    OPENSSL_assert((minsize & (minsize - 1)) == 0);
+    if (size <= 0 || (size & (size - 1)) != 0)
+        goto err;
+    if (minsize <= 0 || (minsize & (minsize - 1)) != 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    while (minsize < (int)sizeof(SH_LIST))
+        minsize *= 2;
+
+    sh.arena_size = size;
+    sh.minsize = minsize;
+    sh.bittable_size = (sh.arena_size / sh.minsize) * 2;
+
+    /* Prevent allocations of size 0 later on */
+    if (sh.bittable_size >> 3 == 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    sh.freelist_size = -1;
+    for (i = sh.bittable_size; i; i >>= 1)
+        sh.freelist_size++;
+
+    sh.freelist = OPENSSL_zalloc(sh.freelist_size * sizeof(char *));
+    OPENSSL_assert(sh.freelist != NULL);
+    if (sh.freelist == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    sh.bittable = OPENSSL_zalloc(sh.bittable_size >> 3);
+    OPENSSL_assert(sh.bittable != NULL);
+    if (sh.bittable == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    sh.bitmalloc = OPENSSL_zalloc(sh.bittable_size >> 3);
+    OPENSSL_assert(sh.bitmalloc != NULL);
+    if (sh.bitmalloc == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* Allocate space for heap, and two extra pages as guards */
+#if defined(_SC_PAGE_SIZE) || defined (_SC_PAGESIZE)
+    {
+# if defined(_SC_PAGE_SIZE)
+        long tmppgsize = sysconf(_SC_PAGE_SIZE);
+# else
+        long tmppgsize = sysconf(_SC_PAGESIZE);
+# endif
+        if (tmppgsize < 1)
+            pgsize = PAGE_SIZE;
+        else
+            pgsize = (size_t)tmppgsize;
+    }
+#else
+    pgsize = PAGE_SIZE;
+#endif
+    sh.map_size = pgsize + sh.arena_size + pgsize;
+    if (1) {
+#ifdef MAP_ANON
+        sh.map_result = mmap(NULL, sh.map_size,
+                             PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_ANON|MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0);
+    } else {
+#endif
+        int fd;
+
+        sh.map_result = MAP_FAILED;
+        if ((fd = open("/dev/zero", O_RDWR)) >= 0) {
+            sh.map_result = mmap(NULL, sh.map_size,
+                                 PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE, fd, 0);
+            close(fd);
+        }
+    }
+    if (sh.map_result == MAP_FAILED)
+        goto err;
+    sh.arena = (char *)(sh.map_result + pgsize);
+    sh_setbit(sh.arena, 0, sh.bittable);
+    sh_add_to_list(&sh.freelist[0], sh.arena);
+
+    /* Now try to add guard pages and lock into memory. */
+    ret = 1;
+
+    /* Starting guard is already aligned from mmap. */
+    if (mprotect(sh.map_result, pgsize, PROT_NONE) < 0)
+        ret = 2;
+
+    /* Ending guard page - need to round up to page boundary */
+    aligned = (pgsize + sh.arena_size + (pgsize - 1)) & ~(pgsize - 1);
+    if (mprotect(sh.map_result + aligned, pgsize, PROT_NONE) < 0)
+        ret = 2;
+
+    if (mlock(sh.arena, sh.arena_size) < 0)
+        ret = 2;
+#ifdef MADV_DONTDUMP
+    if (madvise(sh.arena, sh.arena_size, MADV_DONTDUMP) < 0)
+        ret = 2;
+#endif
+
+    return ret;
+
+ err:
+    sh_done();
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static void sh_done()
+{
+    OPENSSL_free(sh.freelist);
+    OPENSSL_free(sh.bittable);
+    OPENSSL_free(sh.bitmalloc);
+    if (sh.map_result != NULL && sh.map_size)
+        munmap(sh.map_result, sh.map_size);
+    memset(&sh, 0, sizeof(sh));
+}
+
+static int sh_allocated(const char *ptr)
+{
+    return WITHIN_ARENA(ptr) ? 1 : 0;
+}
+
+static char *sh_find_my_buddy(char *ptr, int list)
+{
+    size_t bit;
+    char *chunk = NULL;
+
+    bit = (ONE << list) + (ptr - sh.arena) / (sh.arena_size >> list);
+    bit ^= 1;
+
+    if (TESTBIT(sh.bittable, bit) && !TESTBIT(sh.bitmalloc, bit))
+        chunk = sh.arena + ((bit & ((ONE << list) - 1)) * (sh.arena_size >> list));
+
+    return chunk;
+}
+
+static char *sh_malloc(size_t size)
+{
+    ossl_ssize_t list, slist;
+    size_t i;
+    char *chunk;
+
+    if (size > sh.arena_size)
+        return NULL;
+
+    list = sh.freelist_size - 1;
+    for (i = sh.minsize; i < size; i <<= 1)
+        list--;
+    if (list < 0)
+        return NULL;
+
+    /* try to find a larger entry to split */
+    for (slist = list; slist >= 0; slist--)
+        if (sh.freelist[slist] != NULL)
+            break;
+    if (slist < 0)
+        return NULL;
+
+    /* split larger entry */
+    while (slist != list) {
+        char *temp = sh.freelist[slist];
+
+        /* remove from bigger list */
+        OPENSSL_assert(!sh_testbit(temp, slist, sh.bitmalloc));
+        sh_clearbit(temp, slist, sh.bittable);
+        sh_remove_from_list(temp);
+        OPENSSL_assert(temp != sh.freelist[slist]);
+
+        /* done with bigger list */
+        slist++;
+
+        /* add to smaller list */
+        OPENSSL_assert(!sh_testbit(temp, slist, sh.bitmalloc));
+        sh_setbit(temp, slist, sh.bittable);
+        sh_add_to_list(&sh.freelist[slist], temp);
+        OPENSSL_assert(sh.freelist[slist] == temp);
+
+        /* split in 2 */
+        temp += sh.arena_size >> slist;
+        OPENSSL_assert(!sh_testbit(temp, slist, sh.bitmalloc));
+        sh_setbit(temp, slist, sh.bittable);
+        sh_add_to_list(&sh.freelist[slist], temp);
+        OPENSSL_assert(sh.freelist[slist] == temp);
+
+        OPENSSL_assert(temp-(sh.arena_size >> slist) == sh_find_my_buddy(temp, slist));
+    }
+
+    /* peel off memory to hand back */
+    chunk = sh.freelist[list];
+    OPENSSL_assert(sh_testbit(chunk, list, sh.bittable));
+    sh_setbit(chunk, list, sh.bitmalloc);
+    sh_remove_from_list(chunk);
+
+    OPENSSL_assert(WITHIN_ARENA(chunk));
+
+    return chunk;
+}
+
+static void sh_free(char *ptr)
+{
+    size_t list;
+    char *buddy;
+
+    if (ptr == NULL)
+        return;
+    OPENSSL_assert(WITHIN_ARENA(ptr));
+    if (!WITHIN_ARENA(ptr))
+        return;
+
+    list = sh_getlist(ptr);
+    OPENSSL_assert(sh_testbit(ptr, list, sh.bittable));
+    sh_clearbit(ptr, list, sh.bitmalloc);
+    sh_add_to_list(&sh.freelist[list], ptr);
+
+    /* Try to coalesce two adjacent free areas. */
+    while ((buddy = sh_find_my_buddy(ptr, list)) != NULL) {
+        OPENSSL_assert(ptr == sh_find_my_buddy(buddy, list));
+        OPENSSL_assert(ptr != NULL);
+        OPENSSL_assert(!sh_testbit(ptr, list, sh.bitmalloc));
+        sh_clearbit(ptr, list, sh.bittable);
+        sh_remove_from_list(ptr);
+        OPENSSL_assert(!sh_testbit(ptr, list, sh.bitmalloc));
+        sh_clearbit(buddy, list, sh.bittable);
+        sh_remove_from_list(buddy);
+
+        list--;
+
+        if (ptr > buddy)
+            ptr = buddy;
+
+        OPENSSL_assert(!sh_testbit(ptr, list, sh.bitmalloc));
+        sh_setbit(ptr, list, sh.bittable);
+        sh_add_to_list(&sh.freelist[list], ptr);
+        OPENSSL_assert(sh.freelist[list] == ptr);
+    }
+}
+
+static size_t sh_actual_size(char *ptr)
+{
+    int list;
+
+    OPENSSL_assert(WITHIN_ARENA(ptr));
+    if (!WITHIN_ARENA(ptr))
+        return 0;
+    list = sh_getlist(ptr);
+    OPENSSL_assert(sh_testbit(ptr, list, sh.bittable));
+    return sh.arena_size / (ONE << list);
+}
+#endif /* IMPLEMENTED */
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/modes/asm/aesni-gcm-x86_64.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/modes/asm/aesni-gcm-x86_64.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5ad62b3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/modes/asm/aesni-gcm-x86_64.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,1106 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2013-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+#
+# AES-NI-CTR+GHASH stitch.
+#
+# February 2013
+#
+# OpenSSL GCM implementation is organized in such way that its
+# performance is rather close to the sum of its streamed components,
+# in the context parallelized AES-NI CTR and modulo-scheduled
+# PCLMULQDQ-enabled GHASH. Unfortunately, as no stitch implementation
+# was observed to perform significantly better than the sum of the
+# components on contemporary CPUs, the effort was deemed impossible to
+# justify. This module is based on combination of Intel submissions,
+# [1] and [2], with MOVBE twist suggested by Ilya Albrekht and Max
+# Locktyukhin of Intel Corp. who verified that it reduces shuffles
+# pressure with notable relative improvement, achieving 1.0 cycle per
+# byte processed with 128-bit key on Haswell processor, 0.74 - on
+# Broadwell, 0.63 - on Skylake... [Mentioned results are raw profiled
+# measurements for favourable packet size, one divisible by 96.
+# Applications using the EVP interface will observe a few percent
+# worse performance.]
+#
+# [1] http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2900&user=guest&pass=guest
+# [2] http://www.intel.com/content/dam/www/public/us/en/documents/software-support/enabling-high-performance-gcm.pdf
+
+$flavour = shift;
+$output  = shift;
+if ($flavour =~ /\./) { $output = $flavour; undef $flavour; }
+
+$win64=0; $win64=1 if ($flavour =~ /[nm]asm|mingw64/ || $output =~ /\.asm$/);
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+( $xlate="${dir}x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
+( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
+die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl";
+
+if (`$ENV{CC} -Wa,-v -c -o /dev/null -x assembler /dev/null 2>&1`
+		=~ /GNU assembler version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
+	$avx = ($1>=2.20) + ($1>=2.22);
+}
+
+if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /nasm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /nasm/) &&
+	    `nasm -v 2>&1` =~ /NASM version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
+	$avx = ($1>=2.09) + ($1>=2.10);
+}
+
+if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
+	    `ml64 2>&1` =~ /Version ([0-9]+)\./) {
+	$avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=11);
+}
+
+if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
+	$avx = ($2>=3.0) + ($2>3.0);
+}
+
+open OUT,"| \"$^X\" \"$xlate\" $flavour \"$output\"";
+*STDOUT=*OUT;
+
+if ($avx>1) {{{
+
+($inp,$out,$len,$key,$ivp,$Xip)=("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx","%rcx","%r8","%r9");
+
+($Ii,$T1,$T2,$Hkey,
+ $Z0,$Z1,$Z2,$Z3,$Xi) = map("%xmm$_",(0..8));
+
+($inout0,$inout1,$inout2,$inout3,$inout4,$inout5,$rndkey) = map("%xmm$_",(9..15));
+
+($counter,$rounds,$ret,$const,$in0,$end0)=("%ebx","%ebp","%r10","%r11","%r14","%r15");
+
+$code=<<___;
+.text
+
+.type	_aesni_ctr32_ghash_6x,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	32
+_aesni_ctr32_ghash_6x:
+	vmovdqu		0x20($const),$T2	# borrow $T2, .Lone_msb
+	sub		\$6,$len
+	vpxor		$Z0,$Z0,$Z0		# $Z0   = 0
+	vmovdqu		0x00-0x80($key),$rndkey
+	vpaddb		$T2,$T1,$inout1
+	vpaddb		$T2,$inout1,$inout2
+	vpaddb		$T2,$inout2,$inout3
+	vpaddb		$T2,$inout3,$inout4
+	vpaddb		$T2,$inout4,$inout5
+	vpxor		$rndkey,$T1,$inout0
+	vmovdqu		$Z0,16+8(%rsp)		# "$Z3" = 0
+	jmp		.Loop6x
+
+.align	32
+.Loop6x:
+	add		\$`6<<24`,$counter
+	jc		.Lhandle_ctr32		# discard $inout[1-5]?
+	vmovdqu		0x00-0x20($Xip),$Hkey	# $Hkey^1
+	  vpaddb	$T2,$inout5,$T1		# next counter value
+	  vpxor		$rndkey,$inout1,$inout1
+	  vpxor		$rndkey,$inout2,$inout2
+
+.Lresume_ctr32:
+	vmovdqu		$T1,($ivp)		# save next counter value
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x10,$Hkey,$Z3,$Z1
+	  vpxor		$rndkey,$inout3,$inout3
+	  vmovups	0x10-0x80($key),$T2	# borrow $T2 for $rndkey
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x01,$Hkey,$Z3,$Z2
+
+	# At this point, the current block of 96 (0x60) bytes has already been
+	# loaded into registers. Concurrently with processing it, we want to
+	# load the next 96 bytes of input for the next round. Obviously, we can
+	# only do this if there are at least 96 more bytes of input beyond the
+	# input we're currently processing, or else we'd read past the end of
+	# the input buffer. Here, we set |%r12| to 96 if there are at least 96
+	# bytes of input beyond the 96 bytes we're already processing, and we
+	# set |%r12| to 0 otherwise. In the case where we set |%r12| to 96,
+	# we'll read in the next block so that it is in registers for the next
+	# loop iteration. In the case where we set |%r12| to 0, we'll re-read
+	# the current block and then ignore what we re-read.
+	#
+	# At this point, |$in0| points to the current (already read into
+	# registers) block, and |$end0| points to 2*96 bytes before the end of
+	# the input. Thus, |$in0| > |$end0| means that we do not have the next
+	# 96-byte block to read in, and |$in0| <= |$end0| means we do.
+	xor		%r12,%r12
+	cmp		$in0,$end0
+
+	  vaesenc	$T2,$inout0,$inout0
+	vmovdqu		0x30+8(%rsp),$Ii	# I[4]
+	  vpxor		$rndkey,$inout4,$inout4
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x00,$Hkey,$Z3,$T1
+	  vaesenc	$T2,$inout1,$inout1
+	  vpxor		$rndkey,$inout5,$inout5
+	setnc		%r12b
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x11,$Hkey,$Z3,$Z3
+	  vaesenc	$T2,$inout2,$inout2
+	vmovdqu		0x10-0x20($Xip),$Hkey	# $Hkey^2
+	neg		%r12
+	  vaesenc	$T2,$inout3,$inout3
+	 vpxor		$Z1,$Z2,$Z2
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x00,$Hkey,$Ii,$Z1
+	 vpxor		$Z0,$Xi,$Xi		# modulo-scheduled
+	  vaesenc	$T2,$inout4,$inout4
+	 vpxor		$Z1,$T1,$Z0
+	and		\$0x60,%r12
+	  vmovups	0x20-0x80($key),$rndkey
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x10,$Hkey,$Ii,$T1
+	  vaesenc	$T2,$inout5,$inout5
+
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x01,$Hkey,$Ii,$T2
+	lea		($in0,%r12),$in0
+	  vaesenc	$rndkey,$inout0,$inout0
+	 vpxor		16+8(%rsp),$Xi,$Xi	# modulo-scheduled [vpxor $Z3,$Xi,$Xi]
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x11,$Hkey,$Ii,$Hkey
+	 vmovdqu	0x40+8(%rsp),$Ii	# I[3]
+	  vaesenc	$rndkey,$inout1,$inout1
+	movbe		0x58($in0),%r13
+	  vaesenc	$rndkey,$inout2,$inout2
+	movbe		0x50($in0),%r12
+	  vaesenc	$rndkey,$inout3,$inout3
+	mov		%r13,0x20+8(%rsp)
+	  vaesenc	$rndkey,$inout4,$inout4
+	mov		%r12,0x28+8(%rsp)
+	vmovdqu		0x30-0x20($Xip),$Z1	# borrow $Z1 for $Hkey^3
+	  vaesenc	$rndkey,$inout5,$inout5
+
+	  vmovups	0x30-0x80($key),$rndkey
+	 vpxor		$T1,$Z2,$Z2
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x00,$Z1,$Ii,$T1
+	  vaesenc	$rndkey,$inout0,$inout0
+	 vpxor		$T2,$Z2,$Z2
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x10,$Z1,$Ii,$T2
+	  vaesenc	$rndkey,$inout1,$inout1
+	 vpxor		$Hkey,$Z3,$Z3
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x01,$Z1,$Ii,$Hkey
+	  vaesenc	$rndkey,$inout2,$inout2
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x11,$Z1,$Ii,$Z1
+	 vmovdqu	0x50+8(%rsp),$Ii	# I[2]
+	  vaesenc	$rndkey,$inout3,$inout3
+	  vaesenc	$rndkey,$inout4,$inout4
+	 vpxor		$T1,$Z0,$Z0
+	vmovdqu		0x40-0x20($Xip),$T1	# borrow $T1 for $Hkey^4
+	  vaesenc	$rndkey,$inout5,$inout5
+
+	  vmovups	0x40-0x80($key),$rndkey
+	 vpxor		$T2,$Z2,$Z2
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x00,$T1,$Ii,$T2
+	  vaesenc	$rndkey,$inout0,$inout0
+	 vpxor		$Hkey,$Z2,$Z2
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x10,$T1,$Ii,$Hkey
+	  vaesenc	$rndkey,$inout1,$inout1
+	movbe		0x48($in0),%r13
+	 vpxor		$Z1,$Z3,$Z3
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x01,$T1,$Ii,$Z1
+	  vaesenc	$rndkey,$inout2,$inout2
+	movbe		0x40($in0),%r12
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x11,$T1,$Ii,$T1
+	 vmovdqu	0x60+8(%rsp),$Ii	# I[1]
+	  vaesenc	$rndkey,$inout3,$inout3
+	mov		%r13,0x30+8(%rsp)
+	  vaesenc	$rndkey,$inout4,$inout4
+	mov		%r12,0x38+8(%rsp)
+	 vpxor		$T2,$Z0,$Z0
+	vmovdqu		0x60-0x20($Xip),$T2	# borrow $T2 for $Hkey^5
+	  vaesenc	$rndkey,$inout5,$inout5
+
+	  vmovups	0x50-0x80($key),$rndkey
+	 vpxor		$Hkey,$Z2,$Z2
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x00,$T2,$Ii,$Hkey
+	  vaesenc	$rndkey,$inout0,$inout0
+	 vpxor		$Z1,$Z2,$Z2
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x10,$T2,$Ii,$Z1
+	  vaesenc	$rndkey,$inout1,$inout1
+	movbe		0x38($in0),%r13
+	 vpxor		$T1,$Z3,$Z3
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x01,$T2,$Ii,$T1
+	 vpxor		0x70+8(%rsp),$Xi,$Xi	# accumulate I[0]
+	  vaesenc	$rndkey,$inout2,$inout2
+	movbe		0x30($in0),%r12
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x11,$T2,$Ii,$T2
+	  vaesenc	$rndkey,$inout3,$inout3
+	mov		%r13,0x40+8(%rsp)
+	  vaesenc	$rndkey,$inout4,$inout4
+	mov		%r12,0x48+8(%rsp)
+	 vpxor		$Hkey,$Z0,$Z0
+	 vmovdqu	0x70-0x20($Xip),$Hkey	# $Hkey^6
+	  vaesenc	$rndkey,$inout5,$inout5
+
+	  vmovups	0x60-0x80($key),$rndkey
+	 vpxor		$Z1,$Z2,$Z2
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x10,$Hkey,$Xi,$Z1
+	  vaesenc	$rndkey,$inout0,$inout0
+	 vpxor		$T1,$Z2,$Z2
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x01,$Hkey,$Xi,$T1
+	  vaesenc	$rndkey,$inout1,$inout1
+	movbe		0x28($in0),%r13
+	 vpxor		$T2,$Z3,$Z3
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x00,$Hkey,$Xi,$T2
+	  vaesenc	$rndkey,$inout2,$inout2
+	movbe		0x20($in0),%r12
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x11,$Hkey,$Xi,$Xi
+	  vaesenc	$rndkey,$inout3,$inout3
+	mov		%r13,0x50+8(%rsp)
+	  vaesenc	$rndkey,$inout4,$inout4
+	mov		%r12,0x58+8(%rsp)
+	vpxor		$Z1,$Z2,$Z2
+	  vaesenc	$rndkey,$inout5,$inout5
+	vpxor		$T1,$Z2,$Z2
+
+	  vmovups	0x70-0x80($key),$rndkey
+	vpslldq		\$8,$Z2,$Z1
+	vpxor		$T2,$Z0,$Z0
+	vmovdqu		0x10($const),$Hkey	# .Lpoly
+
+	  vaesenc	$rndkey,$inout0,$inout0
+	vpxor		$Xi,$Z3,$Z3
+	  vaesenc	$rndkey,$inout1,$inout1
+	vpxor		$Z1,$Z0,$Z0
+	movbe		0x18($in0),%r13
+	  vaesenc	$rndkey,$inout2,$inout2
+	movbe		0x10($in0),%r12
+	vpalignr	\$8,$Z0,$Z0,$Ii		# 1st phase
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x10,$Hkey,$Z0,$Z0
+	mov		%r13,0x60+8(%rsp)
+	  vaesenc	$rndkey,$inout3,$inout3
+	mov		%r12,0x68+8(%rsp)
+	  vaesenc	$rndkey,$inout4,$inout4
+	  vmovups	0x80-0x80($key),$T1	# borrow $T1 for $rndkey
+	  vaesenc	$rndkey,$inout5,$inout5
+
+	  vaesenc	$T1,$inout0,$inout0
+	  vmovups	0x90-0x80($key),$rndkey
+	  vaesenc	$T1,$inout1,$inout1
+	vpsrldq		\$8,$Z2,$Z2
+	  vaesenc	$T1,$inout2,$inout2
+	vpxor		$Z2,$Z3,$Z3
+	  vaesenc	$T1,$inout3,$inout3
+	vpxor		$Ii,$Z0,$Z0
+	movbe		0x08($in0),%r13
+	  vaesenc	$T1,$inout4,$inout4
+	movbe		0x00($in0),%r12
+	  vaesenc	$T1,$inout5,$inout5
+	  vmovups	0xa0-0x80($key),$T1
+	  cmp		\$11,$rounds
+	  jb		.Lenc_tail		# 128-bit key
+
+	  vaesenc	$rndkey,$inout0,$inout0
+	  vaesenc	$rndkey,$inout1,$inout1
+	  vaesenc	$rndkey,$inout2,$inout2
+	  vaesenc	$rndkey,$inout3,$inout3
+	  vaesenc	$rndkey,$inout4,$inout4
+	  vaesenc	$rndkey,$inout5,$inout5
+
+	  vaesenc	$T1,$inout0,$inout0
+	  vaesenc	$T1,$inout1,$inout1
+	  vaesenc	$T1,$inout2,$inout2
+	  vaesenc	$T1,$inout3,$inout3
+	  vaesenc	$T1,$inout4,$inout4
+	  vmovups	0xb0-0x80($key),$rndkey
+	  vaesenc	$T1,$inout5,$inout5
+	  vmovups	0xc0-0x80($key),$T1
+	  je		.Lenc_tail		# 192-bit key
+
+	  vaesenc	$rndkey,$inout0,$inout0
+	  vaesenc	$rndkey,$inout1,$inout1
+	  vaesenc	$rndkey,$inout2,$inout2
+	  vaesenc	$rndkey,$inout3,$inout3
+	  vaesenc	$rndkey,$inout4,$inout4
+	  vaesenc	$rndkey,$inout5,$inout5
+
+	  vaesenc	$T1,$inout0,$inout0
+	  vaesenc	$T1,$inout1,$inout1
+	  vaesenc	$T1,$inout2,$inout2
+	  vaesenc	$T1,$inout3,$inout3
+	  vaesenc	$T1,$inout4,$inout4
+	  vmovups	0xd0-0x80($key),$rndkey
+	  vaesenc	$T1,$inout5,$inout5
+	  vmovups	0xe0-0x80($key),$T1
+	  jmp		.Lenc_tail		# 256-bit key
+
+.align	32
+.Lhandle_ctr32:
+	vmovdqu		($const),$Ii		# borrow $Ii for .Lbswap_mask
+	  vpshufb	$Ii,$T1,$Z2		# byte-swap counter
+	  vmovdqu	0x30($const),$Z1	# borrow $Z1, .Ltwo_lsb
+	  vpaddd	0x40($const),$Z2,$inout1	# .Lone_lsb
+	  vpaddd	$Z1,$Z2,$inout2
+	vmovdqu		0x00-0x20($Xip),$Hkey	# $Hkey^1
+	  vpaddd	$Z1,$inout1,$inout3
+	  vpshufb	$Ii,$inout1,$inout1
+	  vpaddd	$Z1,$inout2,$inout4
+	  vpshufb	$Ii,$inout2,$inout2
+	  vpxor		$rndkey,$inout1,$inout1
+	  vpaddd	$Z1,$inout3,$inout5
+	  vpshufb	$Ii,$inout3,$inout3
+	  vpxor		$rndkey,$inout2,$inout2
+	  vpaddd	$Z1,$inout4,$T1		# byte-swapped next counter value
+	  vpshufb	$Ii,$inout4,$inout4
+	  vpshufb	$Ii,$inout5,$inout5
+	  vpshufb	$Ii,$T1,$T1		# next counter value
+	jmp		.Lresume_ctr32
+
+.align	32
+.Lenc_tail:
+	  vaesenc	$rndkey,$inout0,$inout0
+	vmovdqu		$Z3,16+8(%rsp)		# postpone vpxor $Z3,$Xi,$Xi
+	vpalignr	\$8,$Z0,$Z0,$Xi		# 2nd phase
+	  vaesenc	$rndkey,$inout1,$inout1
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x10,$Hkey,$Z0,$Z0
+	  vpxor		0x00($inp),$T1,$T2
+	  vaesenc	$rndkey,$inout2,$inout2
+	  vpxor		0x10($inp),$T1,$Ii
+	  vaesenc	$rndkey,$inout3,$inout3
+	  vpxor		0x20($inp),$T1,$Z1
+	  vaesenc	$rndkey,$inout4,$inout4
+	  vpxor		0x30($inp),$T1,$Z2
+	  vaesenc	$rndkey,$inout5,$inout5
+	  vpxor		0x40($inp),$T1,$Z3
+	  vpxor		0x50($inp),$T1,$Hkey
+	  vmovdqu	($ivp),$T1		# load next counter value
+
+	  vaesenclast	$T2,$inout0,$inout0
+	  vmovdqu	0x20($const),$T2	# borrow $T2, .Lone_msb
+	  vaesenclast	$Ii,$inout1,$inout1
+	 vpaddb		$T2,$T1,$Ii
+	mov		%r13,0x70+8(%rsp)
+	lea		0x60($inp),$inp
+	  vaesenclast	$Z1,$inout2,$inout2
+	 vpaddb		$T2,$Ii,$Z1
+	mov		%r12,0x78+8(%rsp)
+	lea		0x60($out),$out
+	  vmovdqu	0x00-0x80($key),$rndkey
+	  vaesenclast	$Z2,$inout3,$inout3
+	 vpaddb		$T2,$Z1,$Z2
+	  vaesenclast	$Z3, $inout4,$inout4
+	 vpaddb		$T2,$Z2,$Z3
+	  vaesenclast	$Hkey,$inout5,$inout5
+	 vpaddb		$T2,$Z3,$Hkey
+
+	add		\$0x60,$ret
+	sub		\$0x6,$len
+	jc		.L6x_done
+
+	  vmovups	$inout0,-0x60($out)	# save output
+	 vpxor		$rndkey,$T1,$inout0
+	  vmovups	$inout1,-0x50($out)
+	 vmovdqa	$Ii,$inout1		# 0 latency
+	  vmovups	$inout2,-0x40($out)
+	 vmovdqa	$Z1,$inout2		# 0 latency
+	  vmovups	$inout3,-0x30($out)
+	 vmovdqa	$Z2,$inout3		# 0 latency
+	  vmovups	$inout4,-0x20($out)
+	 vmovdqa	$Z3,$inout4		# 0 latency
+	  vmovups	$inout5,-0x10($out)
+	 vmovdqa	$Hkey,$inout5		# 0 latency
+	vmovdqu		0x20+8(%rsp),$Z3	# I[5]
+	jmp		.Loop6x
+
+.L6x_done:
+	vpxor		16+8(%rsp),$Xi,$Xi	# modulo-scheduled
+	vpxor		$Z0,$Xi,$Xi		# modulo-scheduled
+
+	ret
+.size	_aesni_ctr32_ghash_6x,.-_aesni_ctr32_ghash_6x
+___
+######################################################################
+#
+# size_t aesni_gcm_[en|de]crypt(const void *inp, void *out, size_t len,
+#		const AES_KEY *key, unsigned char iv[16],
+#		struct { u128 Xi,H,Htbl[9]; } *Xip);
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	aesni_gcm_decrypt
+.type	aesni_gcm_decrypt,\@function,6
+.align	32
+aesni_gcm_decrypt:
+	xor	$ret,$ret
+
+	# We call |_aesni_ctr32_ghash_6x|, which requires at least 96 (0x60)
+	# bytes of input.
+	cmp	\$0x60,$len			# minimal accepted length
+	jb	.Lgcm_dec_abort
+
+	lea	(%rsp),%rax			# save stack pointer
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	lea	-0xa8(%rsp),%rsp
+	movaps	%xmm6,-0xd8(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm7,-0xc8(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm8,-0xb8(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm9,-0xa8(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm10,-0x98(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm11,-0x88(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm12,-0x78(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm13,-0x68(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm14,-0x58(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm15,-0x48(%rax)
+.Lgcm_dec_body:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	vzeroupper
+
+	vmovdqu		($ivp),$T1		# input counter value
+	add		\$-128,%rsp
+	mov		12($ivp),$counter
+	lea		.Lbswap_mask(%rip),$const
+	lea		-0x80($key),$in0	# borrow $in0
+	mov		\$0xf80,$end0		# borrow $end0
+	vmovdqu		($Xip),$Xi		# load Xi
+	and		\$-128,%rsp		# ensure stack alignment
+	vmovdqu		($const),$Ii		# borrow $Ii for .Lbswap_mask
+	lea		0x80($key),$key		# size optimization
+	lea		0x20+0x20($Xip),$Xip	# size optimization
+	mov		0xf0-0x80($key),$rounds
+	vpshufb		$Ii,$Xi,$Xi
+
+	and		$end0,$in0
+	and		%rsp,$end0
+	sub		$in0,$end0
+	jc		.Ldec_no_key_aliasing
+	cmp		\$768,$end0
+	jnc		.Ldec_no_key_aliasing
+	sub		$end0,%rsp		# avoid aliasing with key
+.Ldec_no_key_aliasing:
+
+	vmovdqu		0x50($inp),$Z3		# I[5]
+	lea		($inp),$in0
+	vmovdqu		0x40($inp),$Z0
+
+	# |_aesni_ctr32_ghash_6x| requires |$end0| to point to 2*96 (0xc0)
+	# bytes before the end of the input. Note, in particular, that this is
+	# correct even if |$len| is not an even multiple of 96 or 16. XXX: This
+	# seems to require that |$inp| + |$len| >= 2*96 (0xc0); i.e. |$inp| must
+	# not be near the very beginning of the address space when |$len| < 2*96
+	# (0xc0).
+	lea		-0xc0($inp,$len),$end0
+
+	vmovdqu		0x30($inp),$Z1
+	shr		\$4,$len
+	xor		$ret,$ret
+	vmovdqu		0x20($inp),$Z2
+	 vpshufb	$Ii,$Z3,$Z3		# passed to _aesni_ctr32_ghash_6x
+	vmovdqu		0x10($inp),$T2
+	 vpshufb	$Ii,$Z0,$Z0
+	vmovdqu		($inp),$Hkey
+	 vpshufb	$Ii,$Z1,$Z1
+	vmovdqu		$Z0,0x30(%rsp)
+	 vpshufb	$Ii,$Z2,$Z2
+	vmovdqu		$Z1,0x40(%rsp)
+	 vpshufb	$Ii,$T2,$T2
+	vmovdqu		$Z2,0x50(%rsp)
+	 vpshufb	$Ii,$Hkey,$Hkey
+	vmovdqu		$T2,0x60(%rsp)
+	vmovdqu		$Hkey,0x70(%rsp)
+
+	call		_aesni_ctr32_ghash_6x
+
+	vmovups		$inout0,-0x60($out)	# save output
+	vmovups		$inout1,-0x50($out)
+	vmovups		$inout2,-0x40($out)
+	vmovups		$inout3,-0x30($out)
+	vmovups		$inout4,-0x20($out)
+	vmovups		$inout5,-0x10($out)
+
+	vpshufb		($const),$Xi,$Xi	# .Lbswap_mask
+	vmovdqu		$Xi,-0x40($Xip)		# output Xi
+
+	vzeroupper
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	movaps	-0xd8(%rax),%xmm6
+	movaps	-0xc8(%rax),%xmm7
+	movaps	-0xb8(%rax),%xmm8
+	movaps	-0xa8(%rax),%xmm9
+	movaps	-0x98(%rax),%xmm10
+	movaps	-0x88(%rax),%xmm11
+	movaps	-0x78(%rax),%xmm12
+	movaps	-0x68(%rax),%xmm13
+	movaps	-0x58(%rax),%xmm14
+	movaps	-0x48(%rax),%xmm15
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	-48(%rax),%r15
+	mov	-40(%rax),%r14
+	mov	-32(%rax),%r13
+	mov	-24(%rax),%r12
+	mov	-16(%rax),%rbp
+	mov	-8(%rax),%rbx
+	lea	(%rax),%rsp		# restore %rsp
+.Lgcm_dec_abort:
+	mov	$ret,%rax		# return value
+	ret
+.size	aesni_gcm_decrypt,.-aesni_gcm_decrypt
+___
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.type	_aesni_ctr32_6x,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	32
+_aesni_ctr32_6x:
+	vmovdqu		0x00-0x80($key),$Z0	# borrow $Z0 for $rndkey
+	vmovdqu		0x20($const),$T2	# borrow $T2, .Lone_msb
+	lea		-1($rounds),%r13
+	vmovups		0x10-0x80($key),$rndkey
+	lea		0x20-0x80($key),%r12
+	vpxor		$Z0,$T1,$inout0
+	add		\$`6<<24`,$counter
+	jc		.Lhandle_ctr32_2
+	vpaddb		$T2,$T1,$inout1
+	vpaddb		$T2,$inout1,$inout2
+	vpxor		$Z0,$inout1,$inout1
+	vpaddb		$T2,$inout2,$inout3
+	vpxor		$Z0,$inout2,$inout2
+	vpaddb		$T2,$inout3,$inout4
+	vpxor		$Z0,$inout3,$inout3
+	vpaddb		$T2,$inout4,$inout5
+	vpxor		$Z0,$inout4,$inout4
+	vpaddb		$T2,$inout5,$T1
+	vpxor		$Z0,$inout5,$inout5
+	jmp		.Loop_ctr32
+
+.align	16
+.Loop_ctr32:
+	vaesenc		$rndkey,$inout0,$inout0
+	vaesenc		$rndkey,$inout1,$inout1
+	vaesenc		$rndkey,$inout2,$inout2
+	vaesenc		$rndkey,$inout3,$inout3
+	vaesenc		$rndkey,$inout4,$inout4
+	vaesenc		$rndkey,$inout5,$inout5
+	vmovups		(%r12),$rndkey
+	lea		0x10(%r12),%r12
+	dec		%r13d
+	jnz		.Loop_ctr32
+
+	vmovdqu		(%r12),$Hkey		# last round key
+	vaesenc		$rndkey,$inout0,$inout0
+	vpxor		0x00($inp),$Hkey,$Z0
+	vaesenc		$rndkey,$inout1,$inout1
+	vpxor		0x10($inp),$Hkey,$Z1
+	vaesenc		$rndkey,$inout2,$inout2
+	vpxor		0x20($inp),$Hkey,$Z2
+	vaesenc		$rndkey,$inout3,$inout3
+	vpxor		0x30($inp),$Hkey,$Xi
+	vaesenc		$rndkey,$inout4,$inout4
+	vpxor		0x40($inp),$Hkey,$T2
+	vaesenc		$rndkey,$inout5,$inout5
+	vpxor		0x50($inp),$Hkey,$Hkey
+	lea		0x60($inp),$inp
+
+	vaesenclast	$Z0,$inout0,$inout0
+	vaesenclast	$Z1,$inout1,$inout1
+	vaesenclast	$Z2,$inout2,$inout2
+	vaesenclast	$Xi,$inout3,$inout3
+	vaesenclast	$T2,$inout4,$inout4
+	vaesenclast	$Hkey,$inout5,$inout5
+	vmovups		$inout0,0x00($out)
+	vmovups		$inout1,0x10($out)
+	vmovups		$inout2,0x20($out)
+	vmovups		$inout3,0x30($out)
+	vmovups		$inout4,0x40($out)
+	vmovups		$inout5,0x50($out)
+	lea		0x60($out),$out
+
+	ret
+.align	32
+.Lhandle_ctr32_2:
+	vpshufb		$Ii,$T1,$Z2		# byte-swap counter
+	vmovdqu		0x30($const),$Z1	# borrow $Z1, .Ltwo_lsb
+	vpaddd		0x40($const),$Z2,$inout1	# .Lone_lsb
+	vpaddd		$Z1,$Z2,$inout2
+	vpaddd		$Z1,$inout1,$inout3
+	vpshufb		$Ii,$inout1,$inout1
+	vpaddd		$Z1,$inout2,$inout4
+	vpshufb		$Ii,$inout2,$inout2
+	vpxor		$Z0,$inout1,$inout1
+	vpaddd		$Z1,$inout3,$inout5
+	vpshufb		$Ii,$inout3,$inout3
+	vpxor		$Z0,$inout2,$inout2
+	vpaddd		$Z1,$inout4,$T1		# byte-swapped next counter value
+	vpshufb		$Ii,$inout4,$inout4
+	vpxor		$Z0,$inout3,$inout3
+	vpshufb		$Ii,$inout5,$inout5
+	vpxor		$Z0,$inout4,$inout4
+	vpshufb		$Ii,$T1,$T1		# next counter value
+	vpxor		$Z0,$inout5,$inout5
+	jmp	.Loop_ctr32
+.size	_aesni_ctr32_6x,.-_aesni_ctr32_6x
+
+.globl	aesni_gcm_encrypt
+.type	aesni_gcm_encrypt,\@function,6
+.align	32
+aesni_gcm_encrypt:
+	xor	$ret,$ret
+
+	# We call |_aesni_ctr32_6x| twice, each call consuming 96 bytes of
+	# input. Then we call |_aesni_ctr32_ghash_6x|, which requires at
+	# least 96 more bytes of input.
+	cmp	\$0x60*3,$len			# minimal accepted length
+	jb	.Lgcm_enc_abort
+
+	lea	(%rsp),%rax			# save stack pointer
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	lea	-0xa8(%rsp),%rsp
+	movaps	%xmm6,-0xd8(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm7,-0xc8(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm8,-0xb8(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm9,-0xa8(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm10,-0x98(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm11,-0x88(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm12,-0x78(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm13,-0x68(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm14,-0x58(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm15,-0x48(%rax)
+.Lgcm_enc_body:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	vzeroupper
+
+	vmovdqu		($ivp),$T1		# input counter value
+	add		\$-128,%rsp
+	mov		12($ivp),$counter
+	lea		.Lbswap_mask(%rip),$const
+	lea		-0x80($key),$in0	# borrow $in0
+	mov		\$0xf80,$end0		# borrow $end0
+	lea		0x80($key),$key		# size optimization
+	vmovdqu		($const),$Ii		# borrow $Ii for .Lbswap_mask
+	and		\$-128,%rsp		# ensure stack alignment
+	mov		0xf0-0x80($key),$rounds
+
+	and		$end0,$in0
+	and		%rsp,$end0
+	sub		$in0,$end0
+	jc		.Lenc_no_key_aliasing
+	cmp		\$768,$end0
+	jnc		.Lenc_no_key_aliasing
+	sub		$end0,%rsp		# avoid aliasing with key
+.Lenc_no_key_aliasing:
+
+	lea		($out),$in0
+
+	# |_aesni_ctr32_ghash_6x| requires |$end0| to point to 2*96 (0xc0)
+	# bytes before the end of the input. Note, in particular, that this is
+	# correct even if |$len| is not an even multiple of 96 or 16. Unlike in
+	# the decryption case, there's no caveat that |$out| must not be near
+	# the very beginning of the address space, because we know that
+	# |$len| >= 3*96 from the check above, and so we know
+	# |$out| + |$len| >= 2*96 (0xc0).
+	lea		-0xc0($out,$len),$end0
+
+	shr		\$4,$len
+
+	call		_aesni_ctr32_6x
+	vpshufb		$Ii,$inout0,$Xi		# save bswapped output on stack
+	vpshufb		$Ii,$inout1,$T2
+	vmovdqu		$Xi,0x70(%rsp)
+	vpshufb		$Ii,$inout2,$Z0
+	vmovdqu		$T2,0x60(%rsp)
+	vpshufb		$Ii,$inout3,$Z1
+	vmovdqu		$Z0,0x50(%rsp)
+	vpshufb		$Ii,$inout4,$Z2
+	vmovdqu		$Z1,0x40(%rsp)
+	vpshufb		$Ii,$inout5,$Z3		# passed to _aesni_ctr32_ghash_6x
+	vmovdqu		$Z2,0x30(%rsp)
+
+	call		_aesni_ctr32_6x
+
+	vmovdqu		($Xip),$Xi		# load Xi
+	lea		0x20+0x20($Xip),$Xip	# size optimization
+	sub		\$12,$len
+	mov		\$0x60*2,$ret
+	vpshufb		$Ii,$Xi,$Xi
+
+	call		_aesni_ctr32_ghash_6x
+	vmovdqu		0x20(%rsp),$Z3		# I[5]
+	 vmovdqu	($const),$Ii		# borrow $Ii for .Lbswap_mask
+	vmovdqu		0x00-0x20($Xip),$Hkey	# $Hkey^1
+	vpunpckhqdq	$Z3,$Z3,$T1
+	vmovdqu		0x20-0x20($Xip),$rndkey	# borrow $rndkey for $HK
+	 vmovups	$inout0,-0x60($out)	# save output
+	 vpshufb	$Ii,$inout0,$inout0	# but keep bswapped copy
+	vpxor		$Z3,$T1,$T1
+	 vmovups	$inout1,-0x50($out)
+	 vpshufb	$Ii,$inout1,$inout1
+	 vmovups	$inout2,-0x40($out)
+	 vpshufb	$Ii,$inout2,$inout2
+	 vmovups	$inout3,-0x30($out)
+	 vpshufb	$Ii,$inout3,$inout3
+	 vmovups	$inout4,-0x20($out)
+	 vpshufb	$Ii,$inout4,$inout4
+	 vmovups	$inout5,-0x10($out)
+	 vpshufb	$Ii,$inout5,$inout5
+	 vmovdqu	$inout0,0x10(%rsp)	# free $inout0
+___
+{ my ($HK,$T3)=($rndkey,$inout0);
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	 vmovdqu	0x30(%rsp),$Z2		# I[4]
+	 vmovdqu	0x10-0x20($Xip),$Ii	# borrow $Ii for $Hkey^2
+	 vpunpckhqdq	$Z2,$Z2,$T2
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x00,$Hkey,$Z3,$Z1
+	 vpxor		$Z2,$T2,$T2
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x11,$Hkey,$Z3,$Z3
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x00,$HK,$T1,$T1
+
+	 vmovdqu	0x40(%rsp),$T3		# I[3]
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x00,$Ii,$Z2,$Z0
+	 vmovdqu	0x30-0x20($Xip),$Hkey	# $Hkey^3
+	vpxor		$Z1,$Z0,$Z0
+	 vpunpckhqdq	$T3,$T3,$Z1
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x11,$Ii,$Z2,$Z2
+	 vpxor		$T3,$Z1,$Z1
+	vpxor		$Z3,$Z2,$Z2
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x10,$HK,$T2,$T2
+	 vmovdqu	0x50-0x20($Xip),$HK
+	vpxor		$T1,$T2,$T2
+
+	 vmovdqu	0x50(%rsp),$T1		# I[2]
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x00,$Hkey,$T3,$Z3
+	 vmovdqu	0x40-0x20($Xip),$Ii	# borrow $Ii for $Hkey^4
+	vpxor		$Z0,$Z3,$Z3
+	 vpunpckhqdq	$T1,$T1,$Z0
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x11,$Hkey,$T3,$T3
+	 vpxor		$T1,$Z0,$Z0
+	vpxor		$Z2,$T3,$T3
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x00,$HK,$Z1,$Z1
+	vpxor		$T2,$Z1,$Z1
+
+	 vmovdqu	0x60(%rsp),$T2		# I[1]
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x00,$Ii,$T1,$Z2
+	 vmovdqu	0x60-0x20($Xip),$Hkey	# $Hkey^5
+	vpxor		$Z3,$Z2,$Z2
+	 vpunpckhqdq	$T2,$T2,$Z3
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x11,$Ii,$T1,$T1
+	 vpxor		$T2,$Z3,$Z3
+	vpxor		$T3,$T1,$T1
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x10,$HK,$Z0,$Z0
+	 vmovdqu	0x80-0x20($Xip),$HK
+	vpxor		$Z1,$Z0,$Z0
+
+	 vpxor		0x70(%rsp),$Xi,$Xi	# accumulate I[0]
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x00,$Hkey,$T2,$Z1
+	 vmovdqu	0x70-0x20($Xip),$Ii	# borrow $Ii for $Hkey^6
+	 vpunpckhqdq	$Xi,$Xi,$T3
+	vpxor		$Z2,$Z1,$Z1
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x11,$Hkey,$T2,$T2
+	 vpxor		$Xi,$T3,$T3
+	vpxor		$T1,$T2,$T2
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x00,$HK,$Z3,$Z3
+	vpxor		$Z0,$Z3,$Z0
+
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x00,$Ii,$Xi,$Z2
+	 vmovdqu	0x00-0x20($Xip),$Hkey	# $Hkey^1
+	 vpunpckhqdq	$inout5,$inout5,$T1
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x11,$Ii,$Xi,$Xi
+	 vpxor		$inout5,$T1,$T1
+	vpxor		$Z1,$Z2,$Z1
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x10,$HK,$T3,$T3
+	 vmovdqu	0x20-0x20($Xip),$HK
+	vpxor		$T2,$Xi,$Z3
+	vpxor		$Z0,$T3,$Z2
+
+	 vmovdqu	0x10-0x20($Xip),$Ii	# borrow $Ii for $Hkey^2
+	  vpxor		$Z1,$Z3,$T3		# aggregated Karatsuba post-processing
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x00,$Hkey,$inout5,$Z0
+	  vpxor		$T3,$Z2,$Z2
+	 vpunpckhqdq	$inout4,$inout4,$T2
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x11,$Hkey,$inout5,$inout5
+	 vpxor		$inout4,$T2,$T2
+	  vpslldq	\$8,$Z2,$T3
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x00,$HK,$T1,$T1
+	  vpxor		$T3,$Z1,$Xi
+	  vpsrldq	\$8,$Z2,$Z2
+	  vpxor		$Z2,$Z3,$Z3
+
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x00,$Ii,$inout4,$Z1
+	 vmovdqu	0x30-0x20($Xip),$Hkey	# $Hkey^3
+	vpxor		$Z0,$Z1,$Z1
+	 vpunpckhqdq	$inout3,$inout3,$T3
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x11,$Ii,$inout4,$inout4
+	 vpxor		$inout3,$T3,$T3
+	vpxor		$inout5,$inout4,$inout4
+	  vpalignr	\$8,$Xi,$Xi,$inout5	# 1st phase
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x10,$HK,$T2,$T2
+	 vmovdqu	0x50-0x20($Xip),$HK
+	vpxor		$T1,$T2,$T2
+
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x00,$Hkey,$inout3,$Z0
+	 vmovdqu	0x40-0x20($Xip),$Ii	# borrow $Ii for $Hkey^4
+	vpxor		$Z1,$Z0,$Z0
+	 vpunpckhqdq	$inout2,$inout2,$T1
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x11,$Hkey,$inout3,$inout3
+	 vpxor		$inout2,$T1,$T1
+	vpxor		$inout4,$inout3,$inout3
+	  vxorps	0x10(%rsp),$Z3,$Z3	# accumulate $inout0
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x00,$HK,$T3,$T3
+	vpxor		$T2,$T3,$T3
+
+	  vpclmulqdq	\$0x10,0x10($const),$Xi,$Xi
+	  vxorps	$inout5,$Xi,$Xi
+
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x00,$Ii,$inout2,$Z1
+	 vmovdqu	0x60-0x20($Xip),$Hkey	# $Hkey^5
+	vpxor		$Z0,$Z1,$Z1
+	 vpunpckhqdq	$inout1,$inout1,$T2
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x11,$Ii,$inout2,$inout2
+	 vpxor		$inout1,$T2,$T2
+	  vpalignr	\$8,$Xi,$Xi,$inout5	# 2nd phase
+	vpxor		$inout3,$inout2,$inout2
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x10,$HK,$T1,$T1
+	 vmovdqu	0x80-0x20($Xip),$HK
+	vpxor		$T3,$T1,$T1
+
+	  vxorps	$Z3,$inout5,$inout5
+	  vpclmulqdq	\$0x10,0x10($const),$Xi,$Xi
+	  vxorps	$inout5,$Xi,$Xi
+
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x00,$Hkey,$inout1,$Z0
+	 vmovdqu	0x70-0x20($Xip),$Ii	# borrow $Ii for $Hkey^6
+	vpxor		$Z1,$Z0,$Z0
+	 vpunpckhqdq	$Xi,$Xi,$T3
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x11,$Hkey,$inout1,$inout1
+	 vpxor		$Xi,$T3,$T3
+	vpxor		$inout2,$inout1,$inout1
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x00,$HK,$T2,$T2
+	vpxor		$T1,$T2,$T2
+
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x00,$Ii,$Xi,$Z1
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x11,$Ii,$Xi,$Z3
+	vpxor		$Z0,$Z1,$Z1
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x10,$HK,$T3,$Z2
+	vpxor		$inout1,$Z3,$Z3
+	vpxor		$T2,$Z2,$Z2
+
+	vpxor		$Z1,$Z3,$Z0		# aggregated Karatsuba post-processing
+	vpxor		$Z0,$Z2,$Z2
+	vpslldq		\$8,$Z2,$T1
+	vmovdqu		0x10($const),$Hkey	# .Lpoly
+	vpsrldq		\$8,$Z2,$Z2
+	vpxor		$T1,$Z1,$Xi
+	vpxor		$Z2,$Z3,$Z3
+
+	vpalignr	\$8,$Xi,$Xi,$T2		# 1st phase
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x10,$Hkey,$Xi,$Xi
+	vpxor		$T2,$Xi,$Xi
+
+	vpalignr	\$8,$Xi,$Xi,$T2		# 2nd phase
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x10,$Hkey,$Xi,$Xi
+	vpxor		$Z3,$T2,$T2
+	vpxor		$T2,$Xi,$Xi
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	vpshufb		($const),$Xi,$Xi	# .Lbswap_mask
+	vmovdqu		$Xi,-0x40($Xip)		# output Xi
+
+	vzeroupper
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	movaps	-0xd8(%rax),%xmm6
+	movaps	-0xc8(%rax),%xmm7
+	movaps	-0xb8(%rax),%xmm8
+	movaps	-0xa8(%rax),%xmm9
+	movaps	-0x98(%rax),%xmm10
+	movaps	-0x88(%rax),%xmm11
+	movaps	-0x78(%rax),%xmm12
+	movaps	-0x68(%rax),%xmm13
+	movaps	-0x58(%rax),%xmm14
+	movaps	-0x48(%rax),%xmm15
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	-48(%rax),%r15
+	mov	-40(%rax),%r14
+	mov	-32(%rax),%r13
+	mov	-24(%rax),%r12
+	mov	-16(%rax),%rbp
+	mov	-8(%rax),%rbx
+	lea	(%rax),%rsp		# restore %rsp
+.Lgcm_enc_abort:
+	mov	$ret,%rax		# return value
+	ret
+.size	aesni_gcm_encrypt,.-aesni_gcm_encrypt
+___
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.align	64
+.Lbswap_mask:
+	.byte	15,14,13,12,11,10,9,8,7,6,5,4,3,2,1,0
+.Lpoly:
+	.byte	0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0xc2
+.Lone_msb:
+	.byte	0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1
+.Ltwo_lsb:
+	.byte	2,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0
+.Lone_lsb:
+	.byte	1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0
+.asciz	"AES-NI GCM module for x86_64, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+.align	64
+___
+if ($win64) {
+$rec="%rcx";
+$frame="%rdx";
+$context="%r8";
+$disp="%r9";
+
+$code.=<<___
+.extern	__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind
+.type	gcm_se_handler,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+gcm_se_handler:
+	push	%rsi
+	push	%rdi
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+	pushfq
+	sub	\$64,%rsp
+
+	mov	120($context),%rax	# pull context->Rax
+	mov	248($context),%rbx	# pull context->Rip
+
+	mov	8($disp),%rsi		# disp->ImageBase
+	mov	56($disp),%r11		# disp->HandlerData
+
+	mov	0(%r11),%r10d		# HandlerData[0]
+	lea	(%rsi,%r10),%r10	# prologue label
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip<prologue label
+	jb	.Lcommon_seh_tail
+
+	mov	152($context),%rax	# pull context->Rsp
+
+	mov	4(%r11),%r10d		# HandlerData[1]
+	lea	(%rsi,%r10),%r10	# epilogue label
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip>=epilogue label
+	jae	.Lcommon_seh_tail
+
+	mov	120($context),%rax	# pull context->Rax
+
+	mov	-48(%rax),%r15
+	mov	-40(%rax),%r14
+	mov	-32(%rax),%r13
+	mov	-24(%rax),%r12
+	mov	-16(%rax),%rbp
+	mov	-8(%rax),%rbx
+	mov	%r15,240($context)
+	mov	%r14,232($context)
+	mov	%r13,224($context)
+	mov	%r12,216($context)
+	mov	%rbp,160($context)
+	mov	%rbx,144($context)
+
+	lea	-0xd8(%rax),%rsi	# %xmm save area
+	lea	512($context),%rdi	# & context.Xmm6
+	mov	\$20,%ecx		# 10*sizeof(%xmm0)/sizeof(%rax)
+	.long	0xa548f3fc		# cld; rep movsq
+
+.Lcommon_seh_tail:
+	mov	8(%rax),%rdi
+	mov	16(%rax),%rsi
+	mov	%rax,152($context)	# restore context->Rsp
+	mov	%rsi,168($context)	# restore context->Rsi
+	mov	%rdi,176($context)	# restore context->Rdi
+
+	mov	40($disp),%rdi		# disp->ContextRecord
+	mov	$context,%rsi		# context
+	mov	\$154,%ecx		# sizeof(CONTEXT)
+	.long	0xa548f3fc		# cld; rep movsq
+
+	mov	$disp,%rsi
+	xor	%rcx,%rcx		# arg1, UNW_FLAG_NHANDLER
+	mov	8(%rsi),%rdx		# arg2, disp->ImageBase
+	mov	0(%rsi),%r8		# arg3, disp->ControlPc
+	mov	16(%rsi),%r9		# arg4, disp->FunctionEntry
+	mov	40(%rsi),%r10		# disp->ContextRecord
+	lea	56(%rsi),%r11		# &disp->HandlerData
+	lea	24(%rsi),%r12		# &disp->EstablisherFrame
+	mov	%r10,32(%rsp)		# arg5
+	mov	%r11,40(%rsp)		# arg6
+	mov	%r12,48(%rsp)		# arg7
+	mov	%rcx,56(%rsp)		# arg8, (NULL)
+	call	*__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind(%rip)
+
+	mov	\$1,%eax		# ExceptionContinueSearch
+	add	\$64,%rsp
+	popfq
+	pop	%r15
+	pop	%r14
+	pop	%r13
+	pop	%r12
+	pop	%rbp
+	pop	%rbx
+	pop	%rdi
+	pop	%rsi
+	ret
+.size	gcm_se_handler,.-gcm_se_handler
+
+.section	.pdata
+.align	4
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_aesni_gcm_decrypt
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_aesni_gcm_decrypt
+	.rva	.LSEH_gcm_dec_info
+
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_aesni_gcm_encrypt
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_aesni_gcm_encrypt
+	.rva	.LSEH_gcm_enc_info
+.section	.xdata
+.align	8
+.LSEH_gcm_dec_info:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	gcm_se_handler
+	.rva	.Lgcm_dec_body,.Lgcm_dec_abort
+.LSEH_gcm_enc_info:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	gcm_se_handler
+	.rva	.Lgcm_enc_body,.Lgcm_enc_abort
+___
+}
+}}} else {{{
+$code=<<___;	# assembler is too old
+.text
+
+.globl	aesni_gcm_encrypt
+.type	aesni_gcm_encrypt,\@abi-omnipotent
+aesni_gcm_encrypt:
+	xor	%eax,%eax
+	ret
+.size	aesni_gcm_encrypt,.-aesni_gcm_encrypt
+
+.globl	aesni_gcm_decrypt
+.type	aesni_gcm_decrypt,\@abi-omnipotent
+aesni_gcm_decrypt:
+	xor	%eax,%eax
+	ret
+.size	aesni_gcm_decrypt,.-aesni_gcm_decrypt
+___
+}}}
+
+$code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval($1)/gem;
+
+print $code;
+
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-alpha.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-alpha.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ccf6b2b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-alpha.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,467 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2010-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# March 2010
+#
+# The module implements "4-bit" GCM GHASH function and underlying
+# single multiplication operation in GF(2^128). "4-bit" means that it
+# uses 256 bytes per-key table [+128 bytes shared table]. Even though
+# loops are aggressively modulo-scheduled in respect to references to
+# Htbl and Z.hi updates for 8 cycles per byte, measured performance is
+# ~12 cycles per processed byte on 21264 CPU. It seems to be a dynamic
+# scheduling "glitch," because uprofile(1) indicates uniform sample
+# distribution, as if all instruction bundles execute in 1.5 cycles.
+# Meaning that it could have been even faster, yet 12 cycles is ~60%
+# better than gcc-generated code and ~80% than code generated by vendor
+# compiler.
+
+$cnt="v0";	# $0
+$t0="t0";
+$t1="t1";
+$t2="t2";
+$Thi0="t3";	# $4
+$Tlo0="t4";
+$Thi1="t5";
+$Tlo1="t6";
+$rem="t7";	# $8
+#################
+$Xi="a0";	# $16, input argument block
+$Htbl="a1";
+$inp="a2";
+$len="a3";
+$nlo="a4";	# $20
+$nhi="a5";
+$Zhi="t8";
+$Zlo="t9";
+$Xhi="t10";	# $24
+$Xlo="t11";
+$remp="t12";
+$rem_4bit="AT";	# $28
+
+{ my $N;
+  sub loop() {
+
+	$N++;
+$code.=<<___;
+.align	4
+	extbl	$Xlo,7,$nlo
+	and	$nlo,0xf0,$nhi
+	sll	$nlo,4,$nlo
+	and	$nlo,0xf0,$nlo
+
+	addq	$nlo,$Htbl,$nlo
+	ldq	$Zlo,8($nlo)
+	addq	$nhi,$Htbl,$nhi
+	ldq	$Zhi,0($nlo)
+
+	and	$Zlo,0x0f,$remp
+	sll	$Zhi,60,$t0
+	lda	$cnt,6(zero)
+	extbl	$Xlo,6,$nlo
+
+	ldq	$Tlo1,8($nhi)
+	s8addq	$remp,$rem_4bit,$remp
+	ldq	$Thi1,0($nhi)
+	srl	$Zlo,4,$Zlo
+
+	ldq	$rem,0($remp)
+	srl	$Zhi,4,$Zhi
+	xor	$t0,$Zlo,$Zlo
+	and	$nlo,0xf0,$nhi
+
+	xor	$Tlo1,$Zlo,$Zlo
+	sll	$nlo,4,$nlo
+	xor	$Thi1,$Zhi,$Zhi
+	and	$nlo,0xf0,$nlo
+
+	addq	$nlo,$Htbl,$nlo
+	ldq	$Tlo0,8($nlo)
+	addq	$nhi,$Htbl,$nhi
+	ldq	$Thi0,0($nlo)
+
+.Looplo$N:
+	and	$Zlo,0x0f,$remp
+	sll	$Zhi,60,$t0
+	subq	$cnt,1,$cnt
+	srl	$Zlo,4,$Zlo
+
+	ldq	$Tlo1,8($nhi)
+	xor	$rem,$Zhi,$Zhi
+	ldq	$Thi1,0($nhi)
+	s8addq	$remp,$rem_4bit,$remp
+
+	ldq	$rem,0($remp)
+	srl	$Zhi,4,$Zhi
+	xor	$t0,$Zlo,$Zlo
+	extbl	$Xlo,$cnt,$nlo
+
+	and	$nlo,0xf0,$nhi
+	xor	$Thi0,$Zhi,$Zhi
+	xor	$Tlo0,$Zlo,$Zlo
+	sll	$nlo,4,$nlo
+
+
+	and	$Zlo,0x0f,$remp
+	sll	$Zhi,60,$t0
+	and	$nlo,0xf0,$nlo
+	srl	$Zlo,4,$Zlo
+
+	s8addq	$remp,$rem_4bit,$remp
+	xor	$rem,$Zhi,$Zhi
+	addq	$nlo,$Htbl,$nlo
+	addq	$nhi,$Htbl,$nhi
+
+	ldq	$rem,0($remp)
+	srl	$Zhi,4,$Zhi
+	ldq	$Tlo0,8($nlo)
+	xor	$t0,$Zlo,$Zlo
+
+	xor	$Tlo1,$Zlo,$Zlo
+	xor	$Thi1,$Zhi,$Zhi
+	ldq	$Thi0,0($nlo)
+	bne	$cnt,.Looplo$N
+
+
+	and	$Zlo,0x0f,$remp
+	sll	$Zhi,60,$t0
+	lda	$cnt,7(zero)
+	srl	$Zlo,4,$Zlo
+
+	ldq	$Tlo1,8($nhi)
+	xor	$rem,$Zhi,$Zhi
+	ldq	$Thi1,0($nhi)
+	s8addq	$remp,$rem_4bit,$remp
+
+	ldq	$rem,0($remp)
+	srl	$Zhi,4,$Zhi
+	xor	$t0,$Zlo,$Zlo
+	extbl	$Xhi,$cnt,$nlo
+
+	and	$nlo,0xf0,$nhi
+	xor	$Thi0,$Zhi,$Zhi
+	xor	$Tlo0,$Zlo,$Zlo
+	sll	$nlo,4,$nlo
+
+	and	$Zlo,0x0f,$remp
+	sll	$Zhi,60,$t0
+	and	$nlo,0xf0,$nlo
+	srl	$Zlo,4,$Zlo
+
+	s8addq	$remp,$rem_4bit,$remp
+	xor	$rem,$Zhi,$Zhi
+	addq	$nlo,$Htbl,$nlo
+	addq	$nhi,$Htbl,$nhi
+
+	ldq	$rem,0($remp)
+	srl	$Zhi,4,$Zhi
+	ldq	$Tlo0,8($nlo)
+	xor	$t0,$Zlo,$Zlo
+
+	xor	$Tlo1,$Zlo,$Zlo
+	xor	$Thi1,$Zhi,$Zhi
+	ldq	$Thi0,0($nlo)
+	unop
+
+
+.Loophi$N:
+	and	$Zlo,0x0f,$remp
+	sll	$Zhi,60,$t0
+	subq	$cnt,1,$cnt
+	srl	$Zlo,4,$Zlo
+
+	ldq	$Tlo1,8($nhi)
+	xor	$rem,$Zhi,$Zhi
+	ldq	$Thi1,0($nhi)
+	s8addq	$remp,$rem_4bit,$remp
+
+	ldq	$rem,0($remp)
+	srl	$Zhi,4,$Zhi
+	xor	$t0,$Zlo,$Zlo
+	extbl	$Xhi,$cnt,$nlo
+
+	and	$nlo,0xf0,$nhi
+	xor	$Thi0,$Zhi,$Zhi
+	xor	$Tlo0,$Zlo,$Zlo
+	sll	$nlo,4,$nlo
+
+
+	and	$Zlo,0x0f,$remp
+	sll	$Zhi,60,$t0
+	and	$nlo,0xf0,$nlo
+	srl	$Zlo,4,$Zlo
+
+	s8addq	$remp,$rem_4bit,$remp
+	xor	$rem,$Zhi,$Zhi
+	addq	$nlo,$Htbl,$nlo
+	addq	$nhi,$Htbl,$nhi
+
+	ldq	$rem,0($remp)
+	srl	$Zhi,4,$Zhi
+	ldq	$Tlo0,8($nlo)
+	xor	$t0,$Zlo,$Zlo
+
+	xor	$Tlo1,$Zlo,$Zlo
+	xor	$Thi1,$Zhi,$Zhi
+	ldq	$Thi0,0($nlo)
+	bne	$cnt,.Loophi$N
+
+
+	and	$Zlo,0x0f,$remp
+	sll	$Zhi,60,$t0
+	srl	$Zlo,4,$Zlo
+
+	ldq	$Tlo1,8($nhi)
+	xor	$rem,$Zhi,$Zhi
+	ldq	$Thi1,0($nhi)
+	s8addq	$remp,$rem_4bit,$remp
+
+	ldq	$rem,0($remp)
+	srl	$Zhi,4,$Zhi
+	xor	$t0,$Zlo,$Zlo
+
+	xor	$Tlo0,$Zlo,$Zlo
+	xor	$Thi0,$Zhi,$Zhi
+
+	and	$Zlo,0x0f,$remp
+	sll	$Zhi,60,$t0
+	srl	$Zlo,4,$Zlo
+
+	s8addq	$remp,$rem_4bit,$remp
+	xor	$rem,$Zhi,$Zhi
+
+	ldq	$rem,0($remp)
+	srl	$Zhi,4,$Zhi
+	xor	$Tlo1,$Zlo,$Zlo
+	xor	$Thi1,$Zhi,$Zhi
+	xor	$t0,$Zlo,$Zlo
+	xor	$rem,$Zhi,$Zhi
+___
+}}
+
+$code=<<___;
+#ifdef __linux__
+#include <asm/regdef.h>
+#else
+#include <asm.h>
+#include <regdef.h>
+#endif
+
+.text
+
+.set	noat
+.set	noreorder
+.globl	gcm_gmult_4bit
+.align	4
+.ent	gcm_gmult_4bit
+gcm_gmult_4bit:
+	.frame	sp,0,ra
+	.prologue 0
+
+	ldq	$Xlo,8($Xi)
+	ldq	$Xhi,0($Xi)
+
+	bsr	$t0,picmeup
+	nop
+___
+
+	&loop();
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	srl	$Zlo,24,$t0	# byte swap
+	srl	$Zlo,8,$t1
+
+	sll	$Zlo,8,$t2
+	sll	$Zlo,24,$Zlo
+	zapnot	$t0,0x11,$t0
+	zapnot	$t1,0x22,$t1
+
+	zapnot	$Zlo,0x88,$Zlo
+	or	$t0,$t1,$t0
+	zapnot	$t2,0x44,$t2
+
+	or	$Zlo,$t0,$Zlo
+	srl	$Zhi,24,$t0
+	srl	$Zhi,8,$t1
+
+	or	$Zlo,$t2,$Zlo
+	sll	$Zhi,8,$t2
+	sll	$Zhi,24,$Zhi
+
+	srl	$Zlo,32,$Xlo
+	sll	$Zlo,32,$Zlo
+
+	zapnot	$t0,0x11,$t0
+	zapnot	$t1,0x22,$t1
+	or	$Zlo,$Xlo,$Xlo
+
+	zapnot	$Zhi,0x88,$Zhi
+	or	$t0,$t1,$t0
+	zapnot	$t2,0x44,$t2
+
+	or	$Zhi,$t0,$Zhi
+	or	$Zhi,$t2,$Zhi
+
+	srl	$Zhi,32,$Xhi
+	sll	$Zhi,32,$Zhi
+
+	or	$Zhi,$Xhi,$Xhi
+	stq	$Xlo,8($Xi)
+	stq	$Xhi,0($Xi)
+
+	ret	(ra)
+.end	gcm_gmult_4bit
+___
+
+$inhi="s0";
+$inlo="s1";
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	gcm_ghash_4bit
+.align	4
+.ent	gcm_ghash_4bit
+gcm_ghash_4bit:
+	lda	sp,-32(sp)
+	stq	ra,0(sp)
+	stq	s0,8(sp)
+	stq	s1,16(sp)
+	.mask	0x04000600,-32
+	.frame	sp,32,ra
+	.prologue 0
+
+	ldq_u	$inhi,0($inp)
+	ldq_u	$Thi0,7($inp)
+	ldq_u	$inlo,8($inp)
+	ldq_u	$Tlo0,15($inp)
+	ldq	$Xhi,0($Xi)
+	ldq	$Xlo,8($Xi)
+
+	bsr	$t0,picmeup
+	nop
+
+.Louter:
+	extql	$inhi,$inp,$inhi
+	extqh	$Thi0,$inp,$Thi0
+	or	$inhi,$Thi0,$inhi
+	lda	$inp,16($inp)
+
+	extql	$inlo,$inp,$inlo
+	extqh	$Tlo0,$inp,$Tlo0
+	or	$inlo,$Tlo0,$inlo
+	subq	$len,16,$len
+
+	xor	$Xlo,$inlo,$Xlo
+	xor	$Xhi,$inhi,$Xhi
+___
+
+	&loop();
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	srl	$Zlo,24,$t0	# byte swap
+	srl	$Zlo,8,$t1
+
+	sll	$Zlo,8,$t2
+	sll	$Zlo,24,$Zlo
+	zapnot	$t0,0x11,$t0
+	zapnot	$t1,0x22,$t1
+
+	zapnot	$Zlo,0x88,$Zlo
+	or	$t0,$t1,$t0
+	zapnot	$t2,0x44,$t2
+
+	or	$Zlo,$t0,$Zlo
+	srl	$Zhi,24,$t0
+	srl	$Zhi,8,$t1
+
+	or	$Zlo,$t2,$Zlo
+	sll	$Zhi,8,$t2
+	sll	$Zhi,24,$Zhi
+
+	srl	$Zlo,32,$Xlo
+	sll	$Zlo,32,$Zlo
+	beq	$len,.Ldone
+
+	zapnot	$t0,0x11,$t0
+	zapnot	$t1,0x22,$t1
+	or	$Zlo,$Xlo,$Xlo
+	ldq_u	$inhi,0($inp)
+
+	zapnot	$Zhi,0x88,$Zhi
+	or	$t0,$t1,$t0
+	zapnot	$t2,0x44,$t2
+	ldq_u	$Thi0,7($inp)
+
+	or	$Zhi,$t0,$Zhi
+	or	$Zhi,$t2,$Zhi
+	ldq_u	$inlo,8($inp)
+	ldq_u	$Tlo0,15($inp)
+
+	srl	$Zhi,32,$Xhi
+	sll	$Zhi,32,$Zhi
+
+	or	$Zhi,$Xhi,$Xhi
+	br	zero,.Louter
+
+.Ldone:
+	zapnot	$t0,0x11,$t0
+	zapnot	$t1,0x22,$t1
+	or	$Zlo,$Xlo,$Xlo
+
+	zapnot	$Zhi,0x88,$Zhi
+	or	$t0,$t1,$t0
+	zapnot	$t2,0x44,$t2
+
+	or	$Zhi,$t0,$Zhi
+	or	$Zhi,$t2,$Zhi
+
+	srl	$Zhi,32,$Xhi
+	sll	$Zhi,32,$Zhi
+
+	or	$Zhi,$Xhi,$Xhi
+
+	stq	$Xlo,8($Xi)
+	stq	$Xhi,0($Xi)
+
+	.set	noreorder
+	/*ldq	ra,0(sp)*/
+	ldq	s0,8(sp)
+	ldq	s1,16(sp)
+	lda	sp,32(sp)
+	ret	(ra)
+.end	gcm_ghash_4bit
+
+.align	4
+.ent	picmeup
+picmeup:
+	.frame	sp,0,$t0
+	.prologue 0
+	br	$rem_4bit,.Lpic
+.Lpic:	lda	$rem_4bit,12($rem_4bit)
+	ret	($t0)
+.end	picmeup
+	nop
+rem_4bit:
+	.long	0,0x0000<<16, 0,0x1C20<<16, 0,0x3840<<16, 0,0x2460<<16
+	.long	0,0x7080<<16, 0,0x6CA0<<16, 0,0x48C0<<16, 0,0x54E0<<16
+	.long	0,0xE100<<16, 0,0xFD20<<16, 0,0xD940<<16, 0,0xC560<<16
+	.long	0,0x9180<<16, 0,0x8DA0<<16, 0,0xA9C0<<16, 0,0xB5E0<<16
+.ascii	"GHASH for Alpha, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+.align	4
+
+___
+$output=pop and open STDOUT,">$output";
+print $code;
+close STDOUT;
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-armv4.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-armv4.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7d880c9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-armv4.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,554 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2010-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# April 2010
+#
+# The module implements "4-bit" GCM GHASH function and underlying
+# single multiplication operation in GF(2^128). "4-bit" means that it
+# uses 256 bytes per-key table [+32 bytes shared table]. There is no
+# experimental performance data available yet. The only approximation
+# that can be made at this point is based on code size. Inner loop is
+# 32 instructions long and on single-issue core should execute in <40
+# cycles. Having verified that gcc 3.4 didn't unroll corresponding
+# loop, this assembler loop body was found to be ~3x smaller than
+# compiler-generated one...
+#
+# July 2010
+#
+# Rescheduling for dual-issue pipeline resulted in 8.5% improvement on
+# Cortex A8 core and ~25 cycles per processed byte (which was observed
+# to be ~3 times faster than gcc-generated code:-)
+#
+# February 2011
+#
+# Profiler-assisted and platform-specific optimization resulted in 7%
+# improvement on Cortex A8 core and ~23.5 cycles per byte.
+#
+# March 2011
+#
+# Add NEON implementation featuring polynomial multiplication, i.e. no
+# lookup tables involved. On Cortex A8 it was measured to process one
+# byte in 15 cycles or 55% faster than integer-only code.
+#
+# April 2014
+#
+# Switch to multiplication algorithm suggested in paper referred
+# below and combine it with reduction algorithm from x86 module.
+# Performance improvement over previous version varies from 65% on
+# Snapdragon S4 to 110% on Cortex A9. In absolute terms Cortex A8
+# processes one byte in 8.45 cycles, A9 - in 10.2, A15 - in 7.63,
+# Snapdragon S4 - in 9.33.
+#
+# Câmara, D.; Gouvêa, C. P. L.; López, J. & Dahab, R.: Fast Software
+# Polynomial Multiplication on ARM Processors using the NEON Engine.
+# 
+# http://conradoplg.cryptoland.net/files/2010/12/mocrysen13.pdf
+
+# ====================================================================
+# Note about "528B" variant. In ARM case it makes lesser sense to
+# implement it for following reasons:
+#
+# - performance improvement won't be anywhere near 50%, because 128-
+#   bit shift operation is neatly fused with 128-bit xor here, and
+#   "538B" variant would eliminate only 4-5 instructions out of 32
+#   in the inner loop (meaning that estimated improvement is ~15%);
+# - ARM-based systems are often embedded ones and extra memory
+#   consumption might be unappreciated (for so little improvement);
+#
+# Byte order [in]dependence. =========================================
+#
+# Caller is expected to maintain specific *dword* order in Htable,
+# namely with *least* significant dword of 128-bit value at *lower*
+# address. This differs completely from C code and has everything to
+# do with ldm instruction and order in which dwords are "consumed" by
+# algorithm. *Byte* order within these dwords in turn is whatever
+# *native* byte order on current platform. See gcm128.c for working
+# example...
+
+$flavour = shift;
+if ($flavour=~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/) { $output=$flavour; undef $flavour; }
+else { while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {} }
+
+if ($flavour && $flavour ne "void") {
+    $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+    ( $xlate="${dir}arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
+    ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
+    die "can't locate arm-xlate.pl";
+
+    open STDOUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output";
+} else {
+    open STDOUT,">$output";
+}
+
+$Xi="r0";	# argument block
+$Htbl="r1";
+$inp="r2";
+$len="r3";
+
+$Zll="r4";	# variables
+$Zlh="r5";
+$Zhl="r6";
+$Zhh="r7";
+$Tll="r8";
+$Tlh="r9";
+$Thl="r10";
+$Thh="r11";
+$nlo="r12";
+################# r13 is stack pointer
+$nhi="r14";
+################# r15 is program counter
+
+$rem_4bit=$inp;	# used in gcm_gmult_4bit
+$cnt=$len;
+
+sub Zsmash() {
+  my $i=12;
+  my @args=@_;
+  for ($Zll,$Zlh,$Zhl,$Zhh) {
+    $code.=<<___;
+#if __ARM_ARCH__>=7 && defined(__ARMEL__)
+	rev	$_,$_
+	str	$_,[$Xi,#$i]
+#elif defined(__ARMEB__)
+	str	$_,[$Xi,#$i]
+#else
+	mov	$Tlh,$_,lsr#8
+	strb	$_,[$Xi,#$i+3]
+	mov	$Thl,$_,lsr#16
+	strb	$Tlh,[$Xi,#$i+2]
+	mov	$Thh,$_,lsr#24
+	strb	$Thl,[$Xi,#$i+1]
+	strb	$Thh,[$Xi,#$i]
+#endif
+___
+    $code.="\t".shift(@args)."\n";
+    $i-=4;
+  }
+}
+
+$code=<<___;
+#include "arm_arch.h"
+
+.text
+#if defined(__thumb2__) || defined(__clang__)
+.syntax	unified
+#endif
+#if defined(__thumb2__)
+.thumb
+#else
+.code	32
+#endif
+
+#ifdef  __clang__
+#define ldrplb  ldrbpl
+#define ldrneb  ldrbne
+#endif
+
+.type	rem_4bit,%object
+.align	5
+rem_4bit:
+.short	0x0000,0x1C20,0x3840,0x2460
+.short	0x7080,0x6CA0,0x48C0,0x54E0
+.short	0xE100,0xFD20,0xD940,0xC560
+.short	0x9180,0x8DA0,0xA9C0,0xB5E0
+.size	rem_4bit,.-rem_4bit
+
+.type	rem_4bit_get,%function
+rem_4bit_get:
+#if defined(__thumb2__)
+	adr	$rem_4bit,rem_4bit
+#else
+	sub	$rem_4bit,pc,#8+32	@ &rem_4bit
+#endif
+	b	.Lrem_4bit_got
+	nop
+	nop
+.size	rem_4bit_get,.-rem_4bit_get
+
+.global	gcm_ghash_4bit
+.type	gcm_ghash_4bit,%function
+.align	4
+gcm_ghash_4bit:
+#if defined(__thumb2__)
+	adr	r12,rem_4bit
+#else
+	sub	r12,pc,#8+48		@ &rem_4bit
+#endif
+	add	$len,$inp,$len		@ $len to point at the end
+	stmdb	sp!,{r3-r11,lr}		@ save $len/end too
+
+	ldmia	r12,{r4-r11}		@ copy rem_4bit ...
+	stmdb	sp!,{r4-r11}		@ ... to stack
+
+	ldrb	$nlo,[$inp,#15]
+	ldrb	$nhi,[$Xi,#15]
+.Louter:
+	eor	$nlo,$nlo,$nhi
+	and	$nhi,$nlo,#0xf0
+	and	$nlo,$nlo,#0x0f
+	mov	$cnt,#14
+
+	add	$Zhh,$Htbl,$nlo,lsl#4
+	ldmia	$Zhh,{$Zll-$Zhh}	@ load Htbl[nlo]
+	add	$Thh,$Htbl,$nhi
+	ldrb	$nlo,[$inp,#14]
+
+	and	$nhi,$Zll,#0xf		@ rem
+	ldmia	$Thh,{$Tll-$Thh}	@ load Htbl[nhi]
+	add	$nhi,$nhi,$nhi
+	eor	$Zll,$Tll,$Zll,lsr#4
+	ldrh	$Tll,[sp,$nhi]		@ rem_4bit[rem]
+	eor	$Zll,$Zll,$Zlh,lsl#28
+	ldrb	$nhi,[$Xi,#14]
+	eor	$Zlh,$Tlh,$Zlh,lsr#4
+	eor	$Zlh,$Zlh,$Zhl,lsl#28
+	eor	$Zhl,$Thl,$Zhl,lsr#4
+	eor	$Zhl,$Zhl,$Zhh,lsl#28
+	eor	$Zhh,$Thh,$Zhh,lsr#4
+	eor	$nlo,$nlo,$nhi
+	and	$nhi,$nlo,#0xf0
+	and	$nlo,$nlo,#0x0f
+	eor	$Zhh,$Zhh,$Tll,lsl#16
+
+.Linner:
+	add	$Thh,$Htbl,$nlo,lsl#4
+	and	$nlo,$Zll,#0xf		@ rem
+	subs	$cnt,$cnt,#1
+	add	$nlo,$nlo,$nlo
+	ldmia	$Thh,{$Tll-$Thh}	@ load Htbl[nlo]
+	eor	$Zll,$Tll,$Zll,lsr#4
+	eor	$Zll,$Zll,$Zlh,lsl#28
+	eor	$Zlh,$Tlh,$Zlh,lsr#4
+	eor	$Zlh,$Zlh,$Zhl,lsl#28
+	ldrh	$Tll,[sp,$nlo]		@ rem_4bit[rem]
+	eor	$Zhl,$Thl,$Zhl,lsr#4
+#ifdef	__thumb2__
+	it	pl
+#endif
+	ldrplb	$nlo,[$inp,$cnt]
+	eor	$Zhl,$Zhl,$Zhh,lsl#28
+	eor	$Zhh,$Thh,$Zhh,lsr#4
+
+	add	$Thh,$Htbl,$nhi
+	and	$nhi,$Zll,#0xf		@ rem
+	eor	$Zhh,$Zhh,$Tll,lsl#16	@ ^= rem_4bit[rem]
+	add	$nhi,$nhi,$nhi
+	ldmia	$Thh,{$Tll-$Thh}	@ load Htbl[nhi]
+	eor	$Zll,$Tll,$Zll,lsr#4
+#ifdef	__thumb2__
+	it	pl
+#endif
+	ldrplb	$Tll,[$Xi,$cnt]
+	eor	$Zll,$Zll,$Zlh,lsl#28
+	eor	$Zlh,$Tlh,$Zlh,lsr#4
+	ldrh	$Tlh,[sp,$nhi]
+	eor	$Zlh,$Zlh,$Zhl,lsl#28
+	eor	$Zhl,$Thl,$Zhl,lsr#4
+	eor	$Zhl,$Zhl,$Zhh,lsl#28
+#ifdef	__thumb2__
+	it	pl
+#endif
+	eorpl	$nlo,$nlo,$Tll
+	eor	$Zhh,$Thh,$Zhh,lsr#4
+#ifdef	__thumb2__
+	itt	pl
+#endif
+	andpl	$nhi,$nlo,#0xf0
+	andpl	$nlo,$nlo,#0x0f
+	eor	$Zhh,$Zhh,$Tlh,lsl#16	@ ^= rem_4bit[rem]
+	bpl	.Linner
+
+	ldr	$len,[sp,#32]		@ re-load $len/end
+	add	$inp,$inp,#16
+	mov	$nhi,$Zll
+___
+	&Zsmash("cmp\t$inp,$len","\n".
+				 "#ifdef __thumb2__\n".
+				 "	it	ne\n".
+				 "#endif\n".
+				 "	ldrneb	$nlo,[$inp,#15]");
+$code.=<<___;
+	bne	.Louter
+
+	add	sp,sp,#36
+#if __ARM_ARCH__>=5
+	ldmia	sp!,{r4-r11,pc}
+#else
+	ldmia	sp!,{r4-r11,lr}
+	tst	lr,#1
+	moveq	pc,lr			@ be binary compatible with V4, yet
+	bx	lr			@ interoperable with Thumb ISA:-)
+#endif
+.size	gcm_ghash_4bit,.-gcm_ghash_4bit
+
+.global	gcm_gmult_4bit
+.type	gcm_gmult_4bit,%function
+gcm_gmult_4bit:
+	stmdb	sp!,{r4-r11,lr}
+	ldrb	$nlo,[$Xi,#15]
+	b	rem_4bit_get
+.Lrem_4bit_got:
+	and	$nhi,$nlo,#0xf0
+	and	$nlo,$nlo,#0x0f
+	mov	$cnt,#14
+
+	add	$Zhh,$Htbl,$nlo,lsl#4
+	ldmia	$Zhh,{$Zll-$Zhh}	@ load Htbl[nlo]
+	ldrb	$nlo,[$Xi,#14]
+
+	add	$Thh,$Htbl,$nhi
+	and	$nhi,$Zll,#0xf		@ rem
+	ldmia	$Thh,{$Tll-$Thh}	@ load Htbl[nhi]
+	add	$nhi,$nhi,$nhi
+	eor	$Zll,$Tll,$Zll,lsr#4
+	ldrh	$Tll,[$rem_4bit,$nhi]	@ rem_4bit[rem]
+	eor	$Zll,$Zll,$Zlh,lsl#28
+	eor	$Zlh,$Tlh,$Zlh,lsr#4
+	eor	$Zlh,$Zlh,$Zhl,lsl#28
+	eor	$Zhl,$Thl,$Zhl,lsr#4
+	eor	$Zhl,$Zhl,$Zhh,lsl#28
+	eor	$Zhh,$Thh,$Zhh,lsr#4
+	and	$nhi,$nlo,#0xf0
+	eor	$Zhh,$Zhh,$Tll,lsl#16
+	and	$nlo,$nlo,#0x0f
+
+.Loop:
+	add	$Thh,$Htbl,$nlo,lsl#4
+	and	$nlo,$Zll,#0xf		@ rem
+	subs	$cnt,$cnt,#1
+	add	$nlo,$nlo,$nlo
+	ldmia	$Thh,{$Tll-$Thh}	@ load Htbl[nlo]
+	eor	$Zll,$Tll,$Zll,lsr#4
+	eor	$Zll,$Zll,$Zlh,lsl#28
+	eor	$Zlh,$Tlh,$Zlh,lsr#4
+	eor	$Zlh,$Zlh,$Zhl,lsl#28
+	ldrh	$Tll,[$rem_4bit,$nlo]	@ rem_4bit[rem]
+	eor	$Zhl,$Thl,$Zhl,lsr#4
+#ifdef	__thumb2__
+	it	pl
+#endif
+	ldrplb	$nlo,[$Xi,$cnt]
+	eor	$Zhl,$Zhl,$Zhh,lsl#28
+	eor	$Zhh,$Thh,$Zhh,lsr#4
+
+	add	$Thh,$Htbl,$nhi
+	and	$nhi,$Zll,#0xf		@ rem
+	eor	$Zhh,$Zhh,$Tll,lsl#16	@ ^= rem_4bit[rem]
+	add	$nhi,$nhi,$nhi
+	ldmia	$Thh,{$Tll-$Thh}	@ load Htbl[nhi]
+	eor	$Zll,$Tll,$Zll,lsr#4
+	eor	$Zll,$Zll,$Zlh,lsl#28
+	eor	$Zlh,$Tlh,$Zlh,lsr#4
+	ldrh	$Tll,[$rem_4bit,$nhi]	@ rem_4bit[rem]
+	eor	$Zlh,$Zlh,$Zhl,lsl#28
+	eor	$Zhl,$Thl,$Zhl,lsr#4
+	eor	$Zhl,$Zhl,$Zhh,lsl#28
+	eor	$Zhh,$Thh,$Zhh,lsr#4
+#ifdef	__thumb2__
+	itt	pl
+#endif
+	andpl	$nhi,$nlo,#0xf0
+	andpl	$nlo,$nlo,#0x0f
+	eor	$Zhh,$Zhh,$Tll,lsl#16	@ ^= rem_4bit[rem]
+	bpl	.Loop
+___
+	&Zsmash();
+$code.=<<___;
+#if __ARM_ARCH__>=5
+	ldmia	sp!,{r4-r11,pc}
+#else
+	ldmia	sp!,{r4-r11,lr}
+	tst	lr,#1
+	moveq	pc,lr			@ be binary compatible with V4, yet
+	bx	lr			@ interoperable with Thumb ISA:-)
+#endif
+.size	gcm_gmult_4bit,.-gcm_gmult_4bit
+___
+{
+my ($Xl,$Xm,$Xh,$IN)=map("q$_",(0..3));
+my ($t0,$t1,$t2,$t3)=map("q$_",(8..12));
+my ($Hlo,$Hhi,$Hhl,$k48,$k32,$k16)=map("d$_",(26..31));
+
+sub clmul64x64 {
+my ($r,$a,$b)=@_;
+$code.=<<___;
+	vext.8		$t0#lo, $a, $a, #1	@ A1
+	vmull.p8	$t0, $t0#lo, $b		@ F = A1*B
+	vext.8		$r#lo, $b, $b, #1	@ B1
+	vmull.p8	$r, $a, $r#lo		@ E = A*B1
+	vext.8		$t1#lo, $a, $a, #2	@ A2
+	vmull.p8	$t1, $t1#lo, $b		@ H = A2*B
+	vext.8		$t3#lo, $b, $b, #2	@ B2
+	vmull.p8	$t3, $a, $t3#lo		@ G = A*B2
+	vext.8		$t2#lo, $a, $a, #3	@ A3
+	veor		$t0, $t0, $r		@ L = E + F
+	vmull.p8	$t2, $t2#lo, $b		@ J = A3*B
+	vext.8		$r#lo, $b, $b, #3	@ B3
+	veor		$t1, $t1, $t3		@ M = G + H
+	vmull.p8	$r, $a, $r#lo		@ I = A*B3
+	veor		$t0#lo, $t0#lo, $t0#hi	@ t0 = (L) (P0 + P1) << 8
+	vand		$t0#hi, $t0#hi, $k48
+	vext.8		$t3#lo, $b, $b, #4	@ B4
+	veor		$t1#lo, $t1#lo, $t1#hi	@ t1 = (M) (P2 + P3) << 16
+	vand		$t1#hi, $t1#hi, $k32
+	vmull.p8	$t3, $a, $t3#lo		@ K = A*B4
+	veor		$t2, $t2, $r		@ N = I + J
+	veor		$t0#lo, $t0#lo, $t0#hi
+	veor		$t1#lo, $t1#lo, $t1#hi
+	veor		$t2#lo, $t2#lo, $t2#hi	@ t2 = (N) (P4 + P5) << 24
+	vand		$t2#hi, $t2#hi, $k16
+	vext.8		$t0, $t0, $t0, #15
+	veor		$t3#lo, $t3#lo, $t3#hi	@ t3 = (K) (P6 + P7) << 32
+	vmov.i64	$t3#hi, #0
+	vext.8		$t1, $t1, $t1, #14
+	veor		$t2#lo, $t2#lo, $t2#hi
+	vmull.p8	$r, $a, $b		@ D = A*B
+	vext.8		$t3, $t3, $t3, #12
+	vext.8		$t2, $t2, $t2, #13
+	veor		$t0, $t0, $t1
+	veor		$t2, $t2, $t3
+	veor		$r, $r, $t0
+	veor		$r, $r, $t2
+___
+}
+
+$code.=<<___;
+#if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7
+.arch	armv7-a
+.fpu	neon
+
+.global	gcm_init_neon
+.type	gcm_init_neon,%function
+.align	4
+gcm_init_neon:
+	vld1.64		$IN#hi,[r1]!		@ load H
+	vmov.i8		$t0,#0xe1
+	vld1.64		$IN#lo,[r1]
+	vshl.i64	$t0#hi,#57
+	vshr.u64	$t0#lo,#63		@ t0=0xc2....01
+	vdup.8		$t1,$IN#hi[7]
+	vshr.u64	$Hlo,$IN#lo,#63
+	vshr.s8		$t1,#7			@ broadcast carry bit
+	vshl.i64	$IN,$IN,#1
+	vand		$t0,$t0,$t1
+	vorr		$IN#hi,$Hlo		@ H<<<=1
+	veor		$IN,$IN,$t0		@ twisted H
+	vstmia		r0,{$IN}
+
+	ret					@ bx lr
+.size	gcm_init_neon,.-gcm_init_neon
+
+.global	gcm_gmult_neon
+.type	gcm_gmult_neon,%function
+.align	4
+gcm_gmult_neon:
+	vld1.64		$IN#hi,[$Xi]!		@ load Xi
+	vld1.64		$IN#lo,[$Xi]!
+	vmov.i64	$k48,#0x0000ffffffffffff
+	vldmia		$Htbl,{$Hlo-$Hhi}	@ load twisted H
+	vmov.i64	$k32,#0x00000000ffffffff
+#ifdef __ARMEL__
+	vrev64.8	$IN,$IN
+#endif
+	vmov.i64	$k16,#0x000000000000ffff
+	veor		$Hhl,$Hlo,$Hhi		@ Karatsuba pre-processing
+	mov		$len,#16
+	b		.Lgmult_neon
+.size	gcm_gmult_neon,.-gcm_gmult_neon
+
+.global	gcm_ghash_neon
+.type	gcm_ghash_neon,%function
+.align	4
+gcm_ghash_neon:
+	vld1.64		$Xl#hi,[$Xi]!		@ load Xi
+	vld1.64		$Xl#lo,[$Xi]!
+	vmov.i64	$k48,#0x0000ffffffffffff
+	vldmia		$Htbl,{$Hlo-$Hhi}	@ load twisted H
+	vmov.i64	$k32,#0x00000000ffffffff
+#ifdef __ARMEL__
+	vrev64.8	$Xl,$Xl
+#endif
+	vmov.i64	$k16,#0x000000000000ffff
+	veor		$Hhl,$Hlo,$Hhi		@ Karatsuba pre-processing
+
+.Loop_neon:
+	vld1.64		$IN#hi,[$inp]!		@ load inp
+	vld1.64		$IN#lo,[$inp]!
+#ifdef __ARMEL__
+	vrev64.8	$IN,$IN
+#endif
+	veor		$IN,$Xl			@ inp^=Xi
+.Lgmult_neon:
+___
+	&clmul64x64	($Xl,$Hlo,"$IN#lo");	# H.lo·Xi.lo
+$code.=<<___;
+	veor		$IN#lo,$IN#lo,$IN#hi	@ Karatsuba pre-processing
+___
+	&clmul64x64	($Xm,$Hhl,"$IN#lo");	# (H.lo+H.hi)·(Xi.lo+Xi.hi)
+	&clmul64x64	($Xh,$Hhi,"$IN#hi");	# H.hi·Xi.hi
+$code.=<<___;
+	veor		$Xm,$Xm,$Xl		@ Karatsuba post-processing
+	veor		$Xm,$Xm,$Xh
+	veor		$Xl#hi,$Xl#hi,$Xm#lo
+	veor		$Xh#lo,$Xh#lo,$Xm#hi	@ Xh|Xl - 256-bit result
+
+	@ equivalent of reduction_avx from ghash-x86_64.pl
+	vshl.i64	$t1,$Xl,#57		@ 1st phase
+	vshl.i64	$t2,$Xl,#62
+	veor		$t2,$t2,$t1		@
+	vshl.i64	$t1,$Xl,#63
+	veor		$t2, $t2, $t1		@
+ 	veor		$Xl#hi,$Xl#hi,$t2#lo	@
+	veor		$Xh#lo,$Xh#lo,$t2#hi
+
+	vshr.u64	$t2,$Xl,#1		@ 2nd phase
+	veor		$Xh,$Xh,$Xl
+	veor		$Xl,$Xl,$t2		@
+	vshr.u64	$t2,$t2,#6
+	vshr.u64	$Xl,$Xl,#1		@
+	veor		$Xl,$Xl,$Xh		@
+	veor		$Xl,$Xl,$t2		@
+
+	subs		$len,#16
+	bne		.Loop_neon
+
+#ifdef __ARMEL__
+	vrev64.8	$Xl,$Xl
+#endif
+	sub		$Xi,#16	
+	vst1.64		$Xl#hi,[$Xi]!		@ write out Xi
+	vst1.64		$Xl#lo,[$Xi]
+
+	ret					@ bx lr
+.size	gcm_ghash_neon,.-gcm_ghash_neon
+#endif
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+.asciz  "GHASH for ARMv4/NEON, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+.align  2
+___
+
+foreach (split("\n",$code)) {
+	s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/geo;
+
+	s/\bq([0-9]+)#(lo|hi)/sprintf "d%d",2*$1+($2 eq "hi")/geo	or
+	s/\bret\b/bx	lr/go		or
+	s/\bbx\s+lr\b/.word\t0xe12fff1e/go;    # make it possible to compile with -march=armv4
+
+	print $_,"\n";
+}
+close STDOUT; # enforce flush
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-c64xplus.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-c64xplus.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3cadda3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-c64xplus.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,247 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2012-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# December 2011
+#
+# The module implements GCM GHASH function and underlying single
+# multiplication operation in GF(2^128). Even though subroutines
+# have _4bit suffix, they are not using any tables, but rely on
+# hardware Galois Field Multiply support. Streamed GHASH processes
+# byte in ~7 cycles, which is >6x faster than "4-bit" table-driven
+# code compiled with TI's cl6x 6.0 with -mv6400+ -o2 flags. We are
+# comparing apples vs. oranges, but compiler surely could have done
+# better, because theoretical [though not necessarily achievable]
+# estimate for "4-bit" table-driven implementation is ~12 cycles.
+
+while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {}
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+($Xip,$Htable,$inp,$len)=("A4","B4","A6","B6");	# arguments
+
+($Z0,$Z1,$Z2,$Z3,	$H0, $H1, $H2, $H3,
+			$H0x,$H1x,$H2x,$H3x)=map("A$_",(16..27));
+($H01u,$H01y,$H2u,$H3u,	$H0y,$H1y,$H2y,$H3y,
+			$H0z,$H1z,$H2z,$H3z)=map("B$_",(16..27));
+($FF000000,$E10000)=("B30","B31");
+($xip,$x0,$x1,$xib)=map("B$_",(6..9));	# $xip zaps $len
+ $xia="A9";
+($rem,$res)=("B4","B5");		# $rem zaps $Htable
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	.text
+
+	.if	.ASSEMBLER_VERSION<7000000
+	.asg	0,__TI_EABI__
+	.endif
+	.if	__TI_EABI__
+	.asg	gcm_gmult_1bit,_gcm_gmult_1bit
+	.asg	gcm_gmult_4bit,_gcm_gmult_4bit
+	.asg	gcm_ghash_4bit,_gcm_ghash_4bit
+	.endif
+
+	.asg	B3,RA
+
+	.if	0
+	.global	_gcm_gmult_1bit
+_gcm_gmult_1bit:
+	ADDAD	$Htable,2,$Htable
+	.endif
+	.global	_gcm_gmult_4bit
+_gcm_gmult_4bit:
+	.asmfunc
+	LDDW	*${Htable}[-1],$H1:$H0	; H.lo
+	LDDW	*${Htable}[-2],$H3:$H2	; H.hi
+||	MV	$Xip,${xip}		; reassign Xi
+||	MVK	15,B1			; SPLOOPD constant
+
+	MVK	0xE1,$E10000
+||	LDBU	*++${xip}[15],$x1	; Xi[15]
+	MVK	0xFF,$FF000000
+||	LDBU	*--${xip},$x0		; Xi[14]
+	SHL	$E10000,16,$E10000	; [pre-shifted] reduction polynomial
+	SHL	$FF000000,24,$FF000000	; upper byte mask
+||	BNOP	ghash_loop?
+||	MVK	1,B0			; take a single spin
+
+	PACKH2	$H0,$H1,$xia		; pack H0' and H1's upper bytes
+	AND	$H2,$FF000000,$H2u	; H2's upper byte
+	AND	$H3,$FF000000,$H3u	; H3's upper byte
+||	SHRU	$H2u,8,$H2u
+	SHRU	$H3u,8,$H3u
+||	ZERO	$Z1:$Z0
+	SHRU2	$xia,8,$H01u
+||	ZERO	$Z3:$Z2
+	.endasmfunc
+
+	.global	_gcm_ghash_4bit
+_gcm_ghash_4bit:
+	.asmfunc
+	LDDW	*${Htable}[-1],$H1:$H0	; H.lo
+||	SHRU	$len,4,B0		; reassign len
+	LDDW	*${Htable}[-2],$H3:$H2	; H.hi
+||	MV	$Xip,${xip}		; reassign Xi
+||	MVK	15,B1			; SPLOOPD constant
+
+	MVK	0xE1,$E10000
+|| [B0]	LDNDW	*${inp}[1],$H1x:$H0x
+	MVK	0xFF,$FF000000
+|| [B0]	LDNDW	*${inp}++[2],$H3x:$H2x
+	SHL	$E10000,16,$E10000	; [pre-shifted] reduction polynomial
+||	LDDW	*${xip}[1],$Z1:$Z0
+	SHL	$FF000000,24,$FF000000	; upper byte mask
+||	LDDW	*${xip}[0],$Z3:$Z2
+
+	PACKH2	$H0,$H1,$xia		; pack H0' and H1's upper bytes
+	AND	$H2,$FF000000,$H2u	; H2's upper byte
+	AND	$H3,$FF000000,$H3u	; H3's upper byte
+||	SHRU	$H2u,8,$H2u
+	SHRU	$H3u,8,$H3u
+	SHRU2	$xia,8,$H01u
+
+|| [B0]	XOR	$H0x,$Z0,$Z0		; Xi^=inp
+|| [B0]	XOR	$H1x,$Z1,$Z1
+	.if	.LITTLE_ENDIAN
+   [B0]	XOR	$H2x,$Z2,$Z2
+|| [B0]	XOR	$H3x,$Z3,$Z3
+|| [B0]	SHRU	$Z1,24,$xia		; Xi[15], avoid cross-path stall
+	STDW	$Z1:$Z0,*${xip}[1]
+|| [B0]	SHRU	$Z1,16,$x0		; Xi[14]
+|| [B0]	ZERO	$Z1:$Z0
+	.else
+   [B0]	XOR	$H2x,$Z2,$Z2
+|| [B0]	XOR	$H3x,$Z3,$Z3
+|| [B0]	MV	$Z0,$xia		; Xi[15], avoid cross-path stall
+	STDW	$Z1:$Z0,*${xip}[1]
+|| [B0] SHRU	$Z0,8,$x0		; Xi[14]
+|| [B0]	ZERO	$Z1:$Z0
+	.endif
+	STDW	$Z3:$Z2,*${xip}[0]
+|| [B0]	ZERO	$Z3:$Z2
+|| [B0]	MV	$xia,$x1
+   [B0]	ADDK	14,${xip}
+
+ghash_loop?:
+	SPLOOPD	6			; 6*16+7
+||	MVC	B1,ILC
+|| [B0]	SUB	B0,1,B0
+||	ZERO	A0
+||	ADD	$x1,$x1,$xib		; SHL	$x1,1,$xib
+||	SHL	$x1,1,$xia
+___
+
+########____________________________
+#  0    D2.     M1          M2      |
+#  1            M1                  |
+#  2            M1          M2      |
+#  3        D1. M1          M2      |
+#  4        S1. L1                  |
+#  5    S2  S1x L1          D2  L2  |____________________________
+#  6/0          L1  S1      L2  S2x |D2.     M1          M2      |
+#  7/1          L1  S1  D1x S2  M2  |        M1                  |
+#  8/2              S1  L1x S2      |        M1          M2      |
+#  9/3              S1  L1x         |    D1. M1          M2      |
+# 10/4                  D1x         |    S1. L1                  |
+# 11/5                              |S2  S1x L1          D2  L2  |____________
+# 12/6/0                D1x       __|        L1  S1      L2  S2x |D2.     ....
+#    7/1                                     L1  S1  D1x S2  M2  |        ....
+#    8/2                                         S1  L1x S2      |        ....
+#####...                                         ................|............
+$code.=<<___;
+	XORMPY	$H0,$xia,$H0x		; 0	; H·(Xi[i]<<1)
+||	XORMPY	$H01u,$xib,$H01y
+|| [A0]	LDBU	*--${xip},$x0
+	XORMPY	$H1,$xia,$H1x		; 1
+	XORMPY	$H2,$xia,$H2x		; 2
+||	XORMPY	$H2u,$xib,$H2y
+	XORMPY	$H3,$xia,$H3x		; 3
+||	XORMPY	$H3u,$xib,$H3y
+||[!A0]	MVK.D	15,A0				; *--${xip} counter
+	XOR.L	$H0x,$Z0,$Z0		; 4	; Z^=H·(Xi[i]<<1)
+|| [A0]	SUB.S	A0,1,A0
+	XOR.L	$H1x,$Z1,$Z1		; 5
+||	AND.D	$H01y,$FF000000,$H0z
+||	SWAP2.L	$H01y,$H1y		;	; SHL	$H01y,16,$H1y
+||	SHL	$x0,1,$xib
+||	SHL	$x0,1,$xia
+
+	XOR.L	$H2x,$Z2,$Z2		; 6/0	; [0,0] in epilogue
+||	SHL	$Z0,1,$rem		;	; rem=Z<<1
+||	SHRMB.S	$Z1,$Z0,$Z0		;	; Z>>=8
+||	AND.L	$H1y,$FF000000,$H1z
+	XOR.L	$H3x,$Z3,$Z3		; 7/1
+||	SHRMB.S	$Z2,$Z1,$Z1
+||	XOR.D	$H0z,$Z0,$Z0			; merge upper byte products
+||	AND.S	$H2y,$FF000000,$H2z
+||	XORMPY	$E10000,$rem,$res	;	; implicit rem&0x1FE
+	XOR.L	$H1z,$Z1,$Z1		; 8/2
+||	SHRMB.S	$Z3,$Z2,$Z2
+||	AND.S	$H3y,$FF000000,$H3z
+	XOR.L	$H2z,$Z2,$Z2		; 9/3
+||	SHRU	$Z3,8,$Z3
+	XOR.D	$H3z,$Z3,$Z3		; 10/4
+	NOP				; 11/5
+
+	SPKERNEL 0,2
+||	XOR.D	$res,$Z3,$Z3		; 12/6/0; Z^=res
+
+	; input pre-fetch is possible where D1 slot is available...
+   [B0]	LDNDW	*${inp}[1],$H1x:$H0x	; 8/-
+   [B0]	LDNDW	*${inp}++[2],$H3x:$H2x	; 9/-
+	NOP				; 10/-
+	.if	.LITTLE_ENDIAN
+	SWAP2	$Z0,$Z1			; 11/-
+||	SWAP4	$Z1,$Z0
+	SWAP4	$Z1,$Z1			; 12/-
+||	SWAP2	$Z0,$Z0
+	SWAP2	$Z2,$Z3
+||	SWAP4	$Z3,$Z2
+||[!B0]	BNOP	RA
+	SWAP4	$Z3,$Z3
+||	SWAP2	$Z2,$Z2
+|| [B0]	BNOP	ghash_loop?
+   [B0]	XOR	$H0x,$Z0,$Z0		; Xi^=inp
+|| [B0]	XOR	$H1x,$Z1,$Z1
+   [B0]	XOR	$H2x,$Z2,$Z2
+|| [B0]	XOR	$H3x,$Z3,$Z3
+|| [B0]	SHRU	$Z1,24,$xia		; Xi[15], avoid cross-path stall
+	STDW	$Z1:$Z0,*${xip}[1]
+|| [B0]	SHRU	$Z1,16,$x0		; Xi[14]
+|| [B0]	ZERO	$Z1:$Z0
+	.else
+  [!B0]	BNOP	RA			; 11/-
+   [B0]	BNOP	ghash_loop?		; 12/-
+   [B0]	XOR	$H0x,$Z0,$Z0		; Xi^=inp
+|| [B0]	XOR	$H1x,$Z1,$Z1
+   [B0]	XOR	$H2x,$Z2,$Z2
+|| [B0]	XOR	$H3x,$Z3,$Z3
+|| [B0]	MV	$Z0,$xia		; Xi[15], avoid cross-path stall
+	STDW	$Z1:$Z0,*${xip}[1]
+|| [B0] SHRU	$Z0,8,$x0		; Xi[14]
+|| [B0]	ZERO	$Z1:$Z0
+	.endif
+	STDW	$Z3:$Z2,*${xip}[0]
+|| [B0]	ZERO	$Z3:$Z2
+|| [B0]	MV	$xia,$x1
+   [B0]	ADDK	14,${xip}
+	.endasmfunc
+
+	.sect	.const
+	.cstring "GHASH for C64x+, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+	.align	4
+___
+
+print $code;
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-ia64.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-ia64.pl
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..81e75f7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-ia64.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,470 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2010-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# March 2010
+#
+# The module implements "4-bit" GCM GHASH function and underlying
+# single multiplication operation in GF(2^128). "4-bit" means that it
+# uses 256 bytes per-key table [+128 bytes shared table]. Streamed
+# GHASH performance was measured to be 6.67 cycles per processed byte
+# on Itanium 2, which is >90% better than Microsoft compiler generated
+# code. To anchor to something else sha1-ia64.pl module processes one
+# byte in 5.7 cycles. On Itanium GHASH should run at ~8.5 cycles per
+# byte.
+
+# September 2010
+#
+# It was originally thought that it makes lesser sense to implement
+# "528B" variant on Itanium 2 for following reason. Because number of
+# functional units is naturally limited, it appeared impossible to
+# implement "528B" loop in 4 cycles, only in 5. This would mean that
+# theoretically performance improvement couldn't be more than 20%.
+# But occasionally you prove yourself wrong:-) I figured out a way to
+# fold couple of instructions and having freed yet another instruction
+# slot by unrolling the loop... Resulting performance is 4.45 cycles
+# per processed byte and 50% better than "256B" version. On original
+# Itanium performance should remain the same as the "256B" version,
+# i.e. ~8.5 cycles.
+
+$output=pop and (open STDOUT,">$output" or die "can't open $output: $!");
+
+if ($^O eq "hpux") {
+    $ADDP="addp4";
+    for (@ARGV) { $ADDP="add" if (/[\+DD|\-mlp]64/); }
+} else { $ADDP="add"; }
+for (@ARGV)  {  $big_endian=1 if (/\-DB_ENDIAN/);
+                $big_endian=0 if (/\-DL_ENDIAN/);  }
+if (!defined($big_endian))
+             {  $big_endian=(unpack('L',pack('N',1))==1);  }
+
+sub loop() {
+my $label=shift;
+my ($p16,$p17)=(shift)?("p63","p63"):("p16","p17"); # mask references to inp
+
+# Loop is scheduled for 6 ticks on Itanium 2 and 8 on Itanium, i.e.
+# in scalable manner;-) Naturally assuming data in L1 cache...
+# Special note about 'dep' instruction, which is used to construct
+# &rem_4bit[Zlo&0xf]. It works, because rem_4bit is aligned at 128
+# bytes boundary and lower 7 bits of its address are guaranteed to
+# be zero.
+$code.=<<___;
+$label:
+{ .mfi;	(p18)	ld8	Hlo=[Hi[1]],-8
+	(p19)	dep	rem=Zlo,rem_4bitp,3,4	}
+{ .mfi;	(p19)	xor	Zhi=Zhi,Hhi
+	($p17)	xor	xi[1]=xi[1],in[1]	};;
+{ .mfi;	(p18)	ld8	Hhi=[Hi[1]]
+	(p19)	shrp	Zlo=Zhi,Zlo,4		}
+{ .mfi;	(p19)	ld8	rem=[rem]
+	(p18)	and	Hi[1]=mask0xf0,xi[2]	};;
+{ .mmi;	($p16)	ld1	in[0]=[inp],-1
+	(p18)	xor	Zlo=Zlo,Hlo
+	(p19)	shr.u	Zhi=Zhi,4		}
+{ .mib;	(p19)	xor	Hhi=Hhi,rem
+	(p18)	add	Hi[1]=Htbl,Hi[1]	};;
+
+{ .mfi;	(p18)	ld8	Hlo=[Hi[1]],-8
+	(p18)	dep	rem=Zlo,rem_4bitp,3,4	}
+{ .mfi;	(p17)	shladd	Hi[0]=xi[1],4,r0
+	(p18)	xor	Zhi=Zhi,Hhi		};;
+{ .mfi;	(p18)	ld8	Hhi=[Hi[1]]
+	(p18)	shrp	Zlo=Zhi,Zlo,4		}
+{ .mfi;	(p18)	ld8	rem=[rem]
+	(p17)	and	Hi[0]=mask0xf0,Hi[0]	};;
+{ .mmi;	(p16)	ld1	xi[0]=[Xi],-1
+	(p18)	xor	Zlo=Zlo,Hlo
+	(p18)	shr.u	Zhi=Zhi,4		}
+{ .mib;	(p18)	xor	Hhi=Hhi,rem
+	(p17)	add	Hi[0]=Htbl,Hi[0]
+	br.ctop.sptk	$label			};;
+___
+}
+
+$code=<<___;
+.explicit
+.text
+
+prevfs=r2;	prevlc=r3;	prevpr=r8;
+mask0xf0=r21;
+rem=r22;	rem_4bitp=r23;
+Xi=r24;		Htbl=r25;
+inp=r26;	end=r27;
+Hhi=r28;	Hlo=r29;
+Zhi=r30;	Zlo=r31;
+
+.align	128
+.skip	16					// aligns loop body
+.global	gcm_gmult_4bit#
+.proc	gcm_gmult_4bit#
+gcm_gmult_4bit:
+	.prologue
+{ .mmi;	.save	ar.pfs,prevfs
+	alloc	prevfs=ar.pfs,2,6,0,8
+	$ADDP	Xi=15,in0			// &Xi[15]
+	mov	rem_4bitp=ip		}
+{ .mii;	$ADDP	Htbl=8,in1			// &Htbl[0].lo
+	.save	ar.lc,prevlc
+	mov	prevlc=ar.lc
+	.save	pr,prevpr
+	mov	prevpr=pr		};;
+
+	.body
+	.rotr	in[3],xi[3],Hi[2]
+
+{ .mib;	ld1	xi[2]=[Xi],-1			// Xi[15]
+	mov	mask0xf0=0xf0
+	brp.loop.imp	.Loop1,.Lend1-16};;
+{ .mmi;	ld1	xi[1]=[Xi],-1			// Xi[14]
+					};;
+{ .mii;	shladd	Hi[1]=xi[2],4,r0
+	mov	pr.rot=0x7<<16
+	mov	ar.lc=13		};;
+{ .mii;	and	Hi[1]=mask0xf0,Hi[1]
+	mov	ar.ec=3
+	xor	Zlo=Zlo,Zlo		};;
+{ .mii;	add	Hi[1]=Htbl,Hi[1]		// &Htbl[nlo].lo
+	add	rem_4bitp=rem_4bit#-gcm_gmult_4bit#,rem_4bitp
+	xor	Zhi=Zhi,Zhi		};;
+___
+	&loop	(".Loop1",1);
+$code.=<<___;
+.Lend1:
+{ .mib;	xor	Zhi=Zhi,Hhi		};;	// modulo-scheduling artefact
+{ .mib;	mux1	Zlo=Zlo,\@rev		};;
+{ .mib;	mux1	Zhi=Zhi,\@rev		};;
+{ .mmi;	add	Hlo=9,Xi;;			// ;; is here to prevent
+	add	Hhi=1,Xi		};;	// pipeline flush on Itanium
+{ .mib;	st8	[Hlo]=Zlo
+	mov	pr=prevpr,0x1ffff	};;
+{ .mib;	st8	[Hhi]=Zhi
+	mov	ar.lc=prevlc
+	br.ret.sptk.many	b0	};;
+.endp	gcm_gmult_4bit#
+___
+
+######################################################################
+# "528B" (well, "512B" actualy) streamed GHASH
+#
+$Xip="in0";
+$Htbl="in1";
+$inp="in2";
+$len="in3";
+$rem_8bit="loc0";
+$mask0xff="loc1";
+($sum,$rum) = $big_endian ? ("nop.m","nop.m") : ("sum","rum");
+
+sub load_htable() {
+    for (my $i=0;$i<8;$i++) {
+	$code.=<<___;
+{ .mmi;	ld8	r`16+2*$i+1`=[r8],16		// Htable[$i].hi
+	ld8	r`16+2*$i`=[r9],16	}	// Htable[$i].lo
+{ .mmi;	ldf8	f`32+2*$i+1`=[r10],16		// Htable[`8+$i`].hi
+	ldf8	f`32+2*$i`=[r11],16		// Htable[`8+$i`].lo
+___
+	$code.=shift	if (($i+$#_)==7);
+	$code.="\t};;\n"
+    }
+}
+
+$code.=<<___;
+prevsp=r3;
+
+.align	32
+.skip	16					// aligns loop body
+.global	gcm_ghash_4bit#
+.proc	gcm_ghash_4bit#
+gcm_ghash_4bit:
+	.prologue
+{ .mmi;	.save	ar.pfs,prevfs
+	alloc	prevfs=ar.pfs,4,2,0,0
+	.vframe	prevsp
+	mov	prevsp=sp
+	mov	$rem_8bit=ip		};;
+	.body
+{ .mfi;	$ADDP	r8=0+0,$Htbl
+	$ADDP	r9=0+8,$Htbl		}
+{ .mfi;	$ADDP	r10=128+0,$Htbl
+	$ADDP	r11=128+8,$Htbl		};;
+___
+	&load_htable(
+	"	$ADDP	$Xip=15,$Xip",		# &Xi[15]
+	"	$ADDP	$len=$len,$inp",	# &inp[len]
+	"	$ADDP	$inp=15,$inp",		# &inp[15]
+	"	mov	$mask0xff=0xff",
+	"	add	sp=-512,sp",
+	"	andcm	sp=sp,$mask0xff",	# align stack frame
+	"	add	r14=0,sp",
+	"	add	r15=8,sp");
+$code.=<<___;
+{ .mmi;	$sum	1<<1				// go big-endian
+	add	r8=256+0,sp
+	add	r9=256+8,sp		}
+{ .mmi;	add	r10=256+128+0,sp
+	add	r11=256+128+8,sp
+	add	$len=-17,$len		};;
+___
+for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) {	# generate first half of Hshr4[]
+my ($rlo,$rhi)=("r".eval(16+2*$i),"r".eval(16+2*$i+1));
+$code.=<<___;
+{ .mmi;	st8	[r8]=$rlo,16			// Htable[$i].lo
+	st8	[r9]=$rhi,16			// Htable[$i].hi
+	shrp	$rlo=$rhi,$rlo,4	}//;;
+{ .mmi;	stf8	[r10]=f`32+2*$i`,16		// Htable[`8+$i`].lo
+	stf8	[r11]=f`32+2*$i+1`,16		// Htable[`8+$i`].hi
+	shr.u	$rhi=$rhi,4		};;
+{ .mmi;	st8	[r14]=$rlo,16			// Htable[$i].lo>>4
+	st8	[r15]=$rhi,16		}//;;	// Htable[$i].hi>>4
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+{ .mmi;	ld8	r16=[r8],16			// Htable[8].lo
+	ld8	r17=[r9],16		};;	// Htable[8].hi
+{ .mmi;	ld8	r18=[r8],16			// Htable[9].lo
+	ld8	r19=[r9],16		}	// Htable[9].hi
+{ .mmi;	rum	1<<5				// clear um.mfh
+	shrp	r16=r17,r16,4		};;
+___
+for($i=0;$i<6;$i++) {	# generate second half of Hshr4[]
+$code.=<<___;
+{ .mmi;	ld8	r`20+2*$i`=[r8],16		// Htable[`10+$i`].lo
+	ld8	r`20+2*$i+1`=[r9],16		// Htable[`10+$i`].hi
+	shr.u	r`16+2*$i+1`=r`16+2*$i+1`,4	};;
+{ .mmi;	st8	[r14]=r`16+2*$i`,16		// Htable[`8+$i`].lo>>4
+	st8	[r15]=r`16+2*$i+1`,16		// Htable[`8+$i`].hi>>4
+	shrp	r`18+2*$i`=r`18+2*$i+1`,r`18+2*$i`,4	}
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+{ .mmi;	shr.u	r`16+2*$i+1`=r`16+2*$i+1`,4	};;
+{ .mmi;	st8	[r14]=r`16+2*$i`,16		// Htable[`8+$i`].lo>>4
+	st8	[r15]=r`16+2*$i+1`,16		// Htable[`8+$i`].hi>>4
+	shrp	r`18+2*$i`=r`18+2*$i+1`,r`18+2*$i`,4	}
+{ .mmi;	add	$Htbl=256,sp			// &Htable[0]
+	add	$rem_8bit=rem_8bit#-gcm_ghash_4bit#,$rem_8bit
+	shr.u	r`18+2*$i+1`=r`18+2*$i+1`,4	};;
+{ .mmi;	st8	[r14]=r`18+2*$i`		// Htable[`8+$i`].lo>>4
+	st8	[r15]=r`18+2*$i+1`	}	// Htable[`8+$i`].hi>>4
+___
+
+$in="r15";
+@xi=("r16","r17");
+@rem=("r18","r19");
+($Alo,$Ahi,$Blo,$Bhi,$Zlo,$Zhi)=("r20","r21","r22","r23","r24","r25");
+($Atbl,$Btbl)=("r26","r27");
+
+$code.=<<___;	# (p16)
+{ .mmi;	ld1	$in=[$inp],-1			//(p16) *inp--
+	ld1	$xi[0]=[$Xip],-1		//(p16) *Xi--
+	cmp.eq	p0,p6=r0,r0		};;	//	clear p6
+___
+push (@xi,shift(@xi)); push (@rem,shift(@rem));	# "rotate" registers
+
+$code.=<<___;	# (p16),(p17)
+{ .mmi;	ld1	$xi[0]=[$Xip],-1		//(p16) *Xi--
+	xor	$xi[1]=$xi[1],$in	};;	//(p17) xi=$xi[i]^inp[i]
+{ .mii;	ld1	$in=[$inp],-1			//(p16) *inp--
+	dep	$Atbl=$xi[1],$Htbl,4,4		//(p17) &Htable[nlo].lo
+	and	$xi[1]=-16,$xi[1]	};;	//(p17) nhi=xi&0xf0
+.align	32
+.LOOP:
+{ .mmi;
+(p6)	st8	[$Xip]=$Zhi,13
+	xor	$Zlo=$Zlo,$Zlo
+	add	$Btbl=$xi[1],$Htbl	};;	//(p17) &Htable[nhi].lo
+___
+push (@xi,shift(@xi)); push (@rem,shift(@rem));	# "rotate" registers
+
+$code.=<<___;	# (p16),(p17),(p18)
+{ .mmi;	ld8	$Alo=[$Atbl],8			//(p18) Htable[nlo].lo,&Htable[nlo].hi
+	ld8	$rem[0]=[$Btbl],-256		//(p18) Htable[nhi].lo,&Hshr4[nhi].lo
+	xor	$xi[1]=$xi[1],$in	};;	//(p17) xi=$xi[i]^inp[i]
+{ .mfi;	ld8	$Ahi=[$Atbl]			//(p18) Htable[nlo].hi
+	dep	$Atbl=$xi[1],$Htbl,4,4	}	//(p17) &Htable[nlo].lo
+{ .mfi;	shladd	$rem[0]=$rem[0],4,r0		//(p18) Htable[nhi].lo<<4
+	xor	$Zlo=$Zlo,$Alo		};;	//(p18) Z.lo^=Htable[nlo].lo
+{ .mmi;	ld8	$Blo=[$Btbl],8			//(p18) Hshr4[nhi].lo,&Hshr4[nhi].hi
+	ld1	$in=[$inp],-1		}	//(p16) *inp--
+{ .mmi;	xor	$rem[0]=$rem[0],$Zlo		//(p18) Z.lo^(Htable[nhi].lo<<4)
+	mov	$Zhi=$Ahi			//(p18) Z.hi^=Htable[nlo].hi
+	and	$xi[1]=-16,$xi[1]	};;	//(p17) nhi=xi&0xf0
+{ .mmi;	ld8	$Bhi=[$Btbl]			//(p18) Hshr4[nhi].hi
+	ld1	$xi[0]=[$Xip],-1		//(p16) *Xi--
+	shrp	$Zlo=$Zhi,$Zlo,8	}	//(p18) Z.lo=(Z.hi<<56)|(Z.lo>>8)
+{ .mmi;	and	$rem[0]=$rem[0],$mask0xff	//(p18) rem=($Zlo^(Htable[nhi].lo<<4))&0xff
+	add	$Btbl=$xi[1],$Htbl	};;	//(p17) &Htable[nhi]
+___
+push (@xi,shift(@xi)); push (@rem,shift(@rem));	# "rotate" registers
+
+for ($i=1;$i<14;$i++) {
+# Above and below fragments are derived from this one by removing
+# unsuitable (p??) instructions.
+$code.=<<___;	# (p16),(p17),(p18),(p19)
+{ .mmi;	ld8	$Alo=[$Atbl],8			//(p18) Htable[nlo].lo,&Htable[nlo].hi
+	ld8	$rem[0]=[$Btbl],-256		//(p18) Htable[nhi].lo,&Hshr4[nhi].lo
+	shr.u	$Zhi=$Zhi,8		}	//(p19) Z.hi>>=8
+{ .mmi;	shladd	$rem[1]=$rem[1],1,$rem_8bit	//(p19) &rem_8bit[rem]
+	xor	$Zlo=$Zlo,$Blo			//(p19) Z.lo^=Hshr4[nhi].lo
+	xor	$xi[1]=$xi[1],$in	};;	//(p17) xi=$xi[i]^inp[i]
+{ .mmi;	ld8	$Ahi=[$Atbl]			//(p18) Htable[nlo].hi
+	ld2	$rem[1]=[$rem[1]]		//(p19) rem_8bit[rem]
+	dep	$Atbl=$xi[1],$Htbl,4,4	}	//(p17) &Htable[nlo].lo
+{ .mmi;	shladd	$rem[0]=$rem[0],4,r0		//(p18) Htable[nhi].lo<<4
+	xor	$Zlo=$Zlo,$Alo			//(p18) Z.lo^=Htable[nlo].lo
+	xor	$Zhi=$Zhi,$Bhi		};;	//(p19) Z.hi^=Hshr4[nhi].hi
+{ .mmi;	ld8	$Blo=[$Btbl],8			//(p18) Hshr4[nhi].lo,&Hshr4[nhi].hi
+	ld1	$in=[$inp],-1			//(p16) *inp--
+	shl	$rem[1]=$rem[1],48	}	//(p19) rem_8bit[rem]<<48
+{ .mmi;	xor	$rem[0]=$rem[0],$Zlo		//(p18) Z.lo^(Htable[nhi].lo<<4)
+	xor	$Zhi=$Zhi,$Ahi			//(p18) Z.hi^=Htable[nlo].hi
+	and	$xi[1]=-16,$xi[1]	};;	//(p17) nhi=xi&0xf0
+{ .mmi;	ld8	$Bhi=[$Btbl]			//(p18) Hshr4[nhi].hi
+	ld1	$xi[0]=[$Xip],-1		//(p16) *Xi--
+	shrp	$Zlo=$Zhi,$Zlo,8	}	//(p18) Z.lo=(Z.hi<<56)|(Z.lo>>8)
+{ .mmi;	and	$rem[0]=$rem[0],$mask0xff	//(p18) rem=($Zlo^(Htable[nhi].lo<<4))&0xff
+	xor	$Zhi=$Zhi,$rem[1]		//(p19) Z.hi^=rem_8bit[rem]<<48
+	add	$Btbl=$xi[1],$Htbl	};;	//(p17) &Htable[nhi]
+___
+push (@xi,shift(@xi)); push (@rem,shift(@rem));	# "rotate" registers
+}
+
+$code.=<<___;	# (p17),(p18),(p19)
+{ .mmi;	ld8	$Alo=[$Atbl],8			//(p18) Htable[nlo].lo,&Htable[nlo].hi
+	ld8	$rem[0]=[$Btbl],-256		//(p18) Htable[nhi].lo,&Hshr4[nhi].lo
+	shr.u	$Zhi=$Zhi,8		}	//(p19) Z.hi>>=8
+{ .mmi;	shladd	$rem[1]=$rem[1],1,$rem_8bit	//(p19) &rem_8bit[rem]
+	xor	$Zlo=$Zlo,$Blo			//(p19) Z.lo^=Hshr4[nhi].lo
+	xor	$xi[1]=$xi[1],$in	};;	//(p17) xi=$xi[i]^inp[i]
+{ .mmi;	ld8	$Ahi=[$Atbl]			//(p18) Htable[nlo].hi
+	ld2	$rem[1]=[$rem[1]]		//(p19) rem_8bit[rem]
+	dep	$Atbl=$xi[1],$Htbl,4,4	};;	//(p17) &Htable[nlo].lo
+{ .mmi;	shladd	$rem[0]=$rem[0],4,r0		//(p18) Htable[nhi].lo<<4
+	xor	$Zlo=$Zlo,$Alo			//(p18) Z.lo^=Htable[nlo].lo
+	xor	$Zhi=$Zhi,$Bhi		};;	//(p19) Z.hi^=Hshr4[nhi].hi
+{ .mmi;	ld8	$Blo=[$Btbl],8			//(p18) Hshr4[nhi].lo,&Hshr4[nhi].hi
+	shl	$rem[1]=$rem[1],48	}	//(p19) rem_8bit[rem]<<48
+{ .mmi;	xor	$rem[0]=$rem[0],$Zlo		//(p18) Z.lo^(Htable[nhi].lo<<4)
+	xor	$Zhi=$Zhi,$Ahi			//(p18) Z.hi^=Htable[nlo].hi
+	and	$xi[1]=-16,$xi[1]	};;	//(p17) nhi=xi&0xf0
+{ .mmi;	ld8	$Bhi=[$Btbl]			//(p18) Hshr4[nhi].hi
+	shrp	$Zlo=$Zhi,$Zlo,8	}	//(p18) Z.lo=(Z.hi<<56)|(Z.lo>>8)
+{ .mmi;	and	$rem[0]=$rem[0],$mask0xff	//(p18) rem=($Zlo^(Htable[nhi].lo<<4))&0xff
+	xor	$Zhi=$Zhi,$rem[1]		//(p19) Z.hi^=rem_8bit[rem]<<48
+	add	$Btbl=$xi[1],$Htbl	};;	//(p17) &Htable[nhi]
+___
+push (@xi,shift(@xi)); push (@rem,shift(@rem));	# "rotate" registers
+
+$code.=<<___;	# (p18),(p19)
+{ .mfi;	ld8	$Alo=[$Atbl],8			//(p18) Htable[nlo].lo,&Htable[nlo].hi
+	shr.u	$Zhi=$Zhi,8		}	//(p19) Z.hi>>=8
+{ .mfi;	shladd	$rem[1]=$rem[1],1,$rem_8bit	//(p19) &rem_8bit[rem]
+	xor	$Zlo=$Zlo,$Blo		};;	//(p19) Z.lo^=Hshr4[nhi].lo
+{ .mfi;	ld8	$Ahi=[$Atbl]			//(p18) Htable[nlo].hi
+	xor	$Zlo=$Zlo,$Alo		}	//(p18) Z.lo^=Htable[nlo].lo
+{ .mfi;	ld2	$rem[1]=[$rem[1]]		//(p19) rem_8bit[rem]
+	xor	$Zhi=$Zhi,$Bhi		};;	//(p19) Z.hi^=Hshr4[nhi].hi
+{ .mfi;	ld8	$Blo=[$Btbl],8			//(p18) Htable[nhi].lo,&Htable[nhi].hi
+	shl	$rem[1]=$rem[1],48	}	//(p19) rem_8bit[rem]<<48
+{ .mfi;	shladd	$rem[0]=$Zlo,4,r0		//(p18) Z.lo<<4
+	xor	$Zhi=$Zhi,$Ahi		};;	//(p18) Z.hi^=Htable[nlo].hi
+{ .mfi;	ld8	$Bhi=[$Btbl]			//(p18) Htable[nhi].hi
+	shrp	$Zlo=$Zhi,$Zlo,4	}	//(p18) Z.lo=(Z.hi<<60)|(Z.lo>>4)
+{ .mfi;	and	$rem[0]=$rem[0],$mask0xff	//(p18) rem=($Zlo^(Htable[nhi].lo<<4))&0xff
+	xor	$Zhi=$Zhi,$rem[1]	};;	//(p19) Z.hi^=rem_8bit[rem]<<48
+___
+push (@xi,shift(@xi)); push (@rem,shift(@rem));	# "rotate" registers
+
+$code.=<<___;	# (p19)
+{ .mmi;	cmp.ltu	p6,p0=$inp,$len
+	add	$inp=32,$inp
+	shr.u	$Zhi=$Zhi,4		}	//(p19) Z.hi>>=4
+{ .mmi;	shladd	$rem[1]=$rem[1],1,$rem_8bit	//(p19) &rem_8bit[rem]
+	xor	$Zlo=$Zlo,$Blo			//(p19) Z.lo^=Hshr4[nhi].lo
+	add	$Xip=9,$Xip		};;	//	&Xi.lo
+{ .mmi;	ld2	$rem[1]=[$rem[1]]		//(p19) rem_8bit[rem]
+(p6)	ld1	$in=[$inp],-1			//[p16] *inp--
+(p6)	extr.u	$xi[1]=$Zlo,8,8		}	//[p17] Xi[14]
+{ .mmi;	xor	$Zhi=$Zhi,$Bhi			//(p19) Z.hi^=Hshr4[nhi].hi
+(p6)	and	$xi[0]=$Zlo,$mask0xff	};;	//[p16] Xi[15]
+{ .mmi;	st8	[$Xip]=$Zlo,-8
+(p6)	xor	$xi[0]=$xi[0],$in		//[p17] xi=$xi[i]^inp[i]
+	shl	$rem[1]=$rem[1],48	};;	//(p19) rem_8bit[rem]<<48
+{ .mmi;
+(p6)	ld1	$in=[$inp],-1			//[p16] *inp--
+	xor	$Zhi=$Zhi,$rem[1]		//(p19) Z.hi^=rem_8bit[rem]<<48
+(p6)	dep	$Atbl=$xi[0],$Htbl,4,4	}	//[p17] &Htable[nlo].lo
+{ .mib;
+(p6)	and	$xi[0]=-16,$xi[0]		//[p17] nhi=xi&0xf0
+(p6)	br.cond.dptk.many	.LOOP	};;
+
+{ .mib;	st8	[$Xip]=$Zhi		};;
+{ .mib;	$rum	1<<1				// return to little-endian
+	.restore	sp
+	mov	sp=prevsp
+	br.ret.sptk.many	b0	};;
+.endp	gcm_ghash_4bit#
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+.align	128
+.type	rem_4bit#,\@object
+rem_4bit:
+        data8	0x0000<<48, 0x1C20<<48, 0x3840<<48, 0x2460<<48
+        data8	0x7080<<48, 0x6CA0<<48, 0x48C0<<48, 0x54E0<<48
+        data8	0xE100<<48, 0xFD20<<48, 0xD940<<48, 0xC560<<48
+        data8	0x9180<<48, 0x8DA0<<48, 0xA9C0<<48, 0xB5E0<<48
+.size	rem_4bit#,128
+.type	rem_8bit#,\@object
+rem_8bit:
+	data1	0x00,0x00, 0x01,0xC2, 0x03,0x84, 0x02,0x46, 0x07,0x08, 0x06,0xCA, 0x04,0x8C, 0x05,0x4E
+	data1	0x0E,0x10, 0x0F,0xD2, 0x0D,0x94, 0x0C,0x56, 0x09,0x18, 0x08,0xDA, 0x0A,0x9C, 0x0B,0x5E
+	data1	0x1C,0x20, 0x1D,0xE2, 0x1F,0xA4, 0x1E,0x66, 0x1B,0x28, 0x1A,0xEA, 0x18,0xAC, 0x19,0x6E
+	data1	0x12,0x30, 0x13,0xF2, 0x11,0xB4, 0x10,0x76, 0x15,0x38, 0x14,0xFA, 0x16,0xBC, 0x17,0x7E
+	data1	0x38,0x40, 0x39,0x82, 0x3B,0xC4, 0x3A,0x06, 0x3F,0x48, 0x3E,0x8A, 0x3C,0xCC, 0x3D,0x0E
+	data1	0x36,0x50, 0x37,0x92, 0x35,0xD4, 0x34,0x16, 0x31,0x58, 0x30,0x9A, 0x32,0xDC, 0x33,0x1E
+	data1	0x24,0x60, 0x25,0xA2, 0x27,0xE4, 0x26,0x26, 0x23,0x68, 0x22,0xAA, 0x20,0xEC, 0x21,0x2E
+	data1	0x2A,0x70, 0x2B,0xB2, 0x29,0xF4, 0x28,0x36, 0x2D,0x78, 0x2C,0xBA, 0x2E,0xFC, 0x2F,0x3E
+	data1	0x70,0x80, 0x71,0x42, 0x73,0x04, 0x72,0xC6, 0x77,0x88, 0x76,0x4A, 0x74,0x0C, 0x75,0xCE
+	data1	0x7E,0x90, 0x7F,0x52, 0x7D,0x14, 0x7C,0xD6, 0x79,0x98, 0x78,0x5A, 0x7A,0x1C, 0x7B,0xDE
+	data1	0x6C,0xA0, 0x6D,0x62, 0x6F,0x24, 0x6E,0xE6, 0x6B,0xA8, 0x6A,0x6A, 0x68,0x2C, 0x69,0xEE
+	data1	0x62,0xB0, 0x63,0x72, 0x61,0x34, 0x60,0xF6, 0x65,0xB8, 0x64,0x7A, 0x66,0x3C, 0x67,0xFE
+	data1	0x48,0xC0, 0x49,0x02, 0x4B,0x44, 0x4A,0x86, 0x4F,0xC8, 0x4E,0x0A, 0x4C,0x4C, 0x4D,0x8E
+	data1	0x46,0xD0, 0x47,0x12, 0x45,0x54, 0x44,0x96, 0x41,0xD8, 0x40,0x1A, 0x42,0x5C, 0x43,0x9E
+	data1	0x54,0xE0, 0x55,0x22, 0x57,0x64, 0x56,0xA6, 0x53,0xE8, 0x52,0x2A, 0x50,0x6C, 0x51,0xAE
+	data1	0x5A,0xF0, 0x5B,0x32, 0x59,0x74, 0x58,0xB6, 0x5D,0xF8, 0x5C,0x3A, 0x5E,0x7C, 0x5F,0xBE
+	data1	0xE1,0x00, 0xE0,0xC2, 0xE2,0x84, 0xE3,0x46, 0xE6,0x08, 0xE7,0xCA, 0xE5,0x8C, 0xE4,0x4E
+	data1	0xEF,0x10, 0xEE,0xD2, 0xEC,0x94, 0xED,0x56, 0xE8,0x18, 0xE9,0xDA, 0xEB,0x9C, 0xEA,0x5E
+	data1	0xFD,0x20, 0xFC,0xE2, 0xFE,0xA4, 0xFF,0x66, 0xFA,0x28, 0xFB,0xEA, 0xF9,0xAC, 0xF8,0x6E
+	data1	0xF3,0x30, 0xF2,0xF2, 0xF0,0xB4, 0xF1,0x76, 0xF4,0x38, 0xF5,0xFA, 0xF7,0xBC, 0xF6,0x7E
+	data1	0xD9,0x40, 0xD8,0x82, 0xDA,0xC4, 0xDB,0x06, 0xDE,0x48, 0xDF,0x8A, 0xDD,0xCC, 0xDC,0x0E
+	data1	0xD7,0x50, 0xD6,0x92, 0xD4,0xD4, 0xD5,0x16, 0xD0,0x58, 0xD1,0x9A, 0xD3,0xDC, 0xD2,0x1E
+	data1	0xC5,0x60, 0xC4,0xA2, 0xC6,0xE4, 0xC7,0x26, 0xC2,0x68, 0xC3,0xAA, 0xC1,0xEC, 0xC0,0x2E
+	data1	0xCB,0x70, 0xCA,0xB2, 0xC8,0xF4, 0xC9,0x36, 0xCC,0x78, 0xCD,0xBA, 0xCF,0xFC, 0xCE,0x3E
+	data1	0x91,0x80, 0x90,0x42, 0x92,0x04, 0x93,0xC6, 0x96,0x88, 0x97,0x4A, 0x95,0x0C, 0x94,0xCE
+	data1	0x9F,0x90, 0x9E,0x52, 0x9C,0x14, 0x9D,0xD6, 0x98,0x98, 0x99,0x5A, 0x9B,0x1C, 0x9A,0xDE
+	data1	0x8D,0xA0, 0x8C,0x62, 0x8E,0x24, 0x8F,0xE6, 0x8A,0xA8, 0x8B,0x6A, 0x89,0x2C, 0x88,0xEE
+	data1	0x83,0xB0, 0x82,0x72, 0x80,0x34, 0x81,0xF6, 0x84,0xB8, 0x85,0x7A, 0x87,0x3C, 0x86,0xFE
+	data1	0xA9,0xC0, 0xA8,0x02, 0xAA,0x44, 0xAB,0x86, 0xAE,0xC8, 0xAF,0x0A, 0xAD,0x4C, 0xAC,0x8E
+	data1	0xA7,0xD0, 0xA6,0x12, 0xA4,0x54, 0xA5,0x96, 0xA0,0xD8, 0xA1,0x1A, 0xA3,0x5C, 0xA2,0x9E
+	data1	0xB5,0xE0, 0xB4,0x22, 0xB6,0x64, 0xB7,0xA6, 0xB2,0xE8, 0xB3,0x2A, 0xB1,0x6C, 0xB0,0xAE
+	data1	0xBB,0xF0, 0xBA,0x32, 0xB8,0x74, 0xB9,0xB6, 0xBC,0xF8, 0xBD,0x3A, 0xBF,0x7C, 0xBE,0xBE
+.size	rem_8bit#,512
+stringz	"GHASH for IA64, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+___
+
+$code =~ s/mux1(\s+)\S+\@rev/nop.i$1 0x0/gm      if ($big_endian);
+$code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem;
+
+print $code;
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-parisc.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-parisc.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1d62545
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-parisc.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,738 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2010-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# April 2010
+#
+# The module implements "4-bit" GCM GHASH function and underlying
+# single multiplication operation in GF(2^128). "4-bit" means that it
+# uses 256 bytes per-key table [+128 bytes shared table]. On PA-7100LC
+# it processes one byte in 19.6 cycles, which is more than twice as
+# fast as code generated by gcc 3.2. PA-RISC 2.0 loop is scheduled for
+# 8 cycles, but measured performance on PA-8600 system is ~9 cycles per
+# processed byte. This is ~2.2x faster than 64-bit code generated by
+# vendor compiler (which used to be very hard to beat:-).
+#
+# Special thanks to polarhome.com for providing HP-UX account.
+
+$flavour = shift;
+$output = shift;
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+if ($flavour =~ /64/) {
+	$LEVEL		="2.0W";
+	$SIZE_T		=8;
+	$FRAME_MARKER	=80;
+	$SAVED_RP	=16;
+	$PUSH		="std";
+	$PUSHMA		="std,ma";
+	$POP		="ldd";
+	$POPMB		="ldd,mb";
+	$NREGS		=6;
+} else {
+	$LEVEL		="1.0";	#"\n\t.ALLOW\t2.0";
+	$SIZE_T		=4;
+	$FRAME_MARKER	=48;
+	$SAVED_RP	=20;
+	$PUSH		="stw";
+	$PUSHMA		="stwm";
+	$POP		="ldw";
+	$POPMB		="ldwm";
+	$NREGS		=11;
+}
+
+$FRAME=10*$SIZE_T+$FRAME_MARKER;# NREGS saved regs + frame marker
+				#                 [+ argument transfer]
+
+################# volatile registers
+$Xi="%r26";	# argument block
+$Htbl="%r25";
+$inp="%r24";
+$len="%r23";
+$Hhh=$Htbl;	# variables
+$Hll="%r22";
+$Zhh="%r21";
+$Zll="%r20";
+$cnt="%r19";
+$rem_4bit="%r28";
+$rem="%r29";
+$mask0xf0="%r31";
+
+################# preserved registers
+$Thh="%r1";
+$Tll="%r2";
+$nlo="%r3";
+$nhi="%r4";
+$byte="%r5";
+if ($SIZE_T==4) {
+	$Zhl="%r6";
+	$Zlh="%r7";
+	$Hhl="%r8";
+	$Hlh="%r9";
+	$Thl="%r10";
+	$Tlh="%r11";
+}
+$rem2="%r6";	# used in PA-RISC 2.0 code
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	.LEVEL	$LEVEL
+	.SPACE	\$TEXT\$
+	.SUBSPA	\$CODE\$,QUAD=0,ALIGN=8,ACCESS=0x2C,CODE_ONLY
+
+	.EXPORT	gcm_gmult_4bit,ENTRY,ARGW0=GR,ARGW1=GR
+	.ALIGN	64
+gcm_gmult_4bit
+	.PROC
+	.CALLINFO	FRAME=`$FRAME-10*$SIZE_T`,NO_CALLS,SAVE_RP,ENTRY_GR=$NREGS
+	.ENTRY
+	$PUSH	%r2,-$SAVED_RP(%sp)	; standard prologue
+	$PUSHMA	%r3,$FRAME(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r4,`-$FRAME+1*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r5,`-$FRAME+2*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r6,`-$FRAME+3*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==4);
+	$PUSH	%r7,`-$FRAME+4*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r8,`-$FRAME+5*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r9,`-$FRAME+6*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r10,`-$FRAME+7*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r11,`-$FRAME+8*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	blr	%r0,$rem_4bit
+	ldi	3,$rem
+L\$pic_gmult
+	andcm	$rem_4bit,$rem,$rem_4bit
+	addl	$inp,$len,$len
+	ldo	L\$rem_4bit-L\$pic_gmult($rem_4bit),$rem_4bit
+	ldi	0xf0,$mask0xf0
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==4);
+	ldi	31,$rem
+	mtctl	$rem,%cr11
+	extrd,u,*= $rem,%sar,1,$rem	; executes on PA-RISC 1.0
+	b	L\$parisc1_gmult
+	nop
+___
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	ldb	15($Xi),$nlo
+	ldo	8($Htbl),$Hll
+
+	and	$mask0xf0,$nlo,$nhi
+	depd,z	$nlo,59,4,$nlo
+
+	ldd	$nlo($Hll),$Zll
+	ldd	$nlo($Hhh),$Zhh
+
+	depd,z	$Zll,60,4,$rem
+	shrpd	$Zhh,$Zll,4,$Zll
+	extrd,u	$Zhh,59,60,$Zhh
+	ldb	14($Xi),$nlo
+
+	ldd	$nhi($Hll),$Tll
+	ldd	$nhi($Hhh),$Thh
+	and	$mask0xf0,$nlo,$nhi
+	depd,z	$nlo,59,4,$nlo
+
+	xor	$Tll,$Zll,$Zll
+	xor	$Thh,$Zhh,$Zhh
+	ldd	$rem($rem_4bit),$rem
+	b	L\$oop_gmult_pa2
+	ldi	13,$cnt
+
+	.ALIGN	8
+L\$oop_gmult_pa2
+	xor	$rem,$Zhh,$Zhh		; moved here to work around gas bug
+	depd,z	$Zll,60,4,$rem
+
+	shrpd	$Zhh,$Zll,4,$Zll
+	extrd,u	$Zhh,59,60,$Zhh
+	ldd	$nlo($Hll),$Tll
+	ldd	$nlo($Hhh),$Thh
+
+	xor	$Tll,$Zll,$Zll
+	xor	$Thh,$Zhh,$Zhh
+	ldd	$rem($rem_4bit),$rem
+
+	xor	$rem,$Zhh,$Zhh
+	depd,z	$Zll,60,4,$rem
+	ldbx	$cnt($Xi),$nlo
+
+	shrpd	$Zhh,$Zll,4,$Zll
+	extrd,u	$Zhh,59,60,$Zhh
+	ldd	$nhi($Hll),$Tll
+	ldd	$nhi($Hhh),$Thh
+
+	and	$mask0xf0,$nlo,$nhi
+	depd,z	$nlo,59,4,$nlo
+	ldd	$rem($rem_4bit),$rem
+
+	xor	$Tll,$Zll,$Zll
+	addib,uv -1,$cnt,L\$oop_gmult_pa2
+	xor	$Thh,$Zhh,$Zhh
+
+	xor	$rem,$Zhh,$Zhh
+	depd,z	$Zll,60,4,$rem
+
+	shrpd	$Zhh,$Zll,4,$Zll
+	extrd,u	$Zhh,59,60,$Zhh
+	ldd	$nlo($Hll),$Tll
+	ldd	$nlo($Hhh),$Thh
+
+	xor	$Tll,$Zll,$Zll
+	xor	$Thh,$Zhh,$Zhh
+	ldd	$rem($rem_4bit),$rem
+
+	xor	$rem,$Zhh,$Zhh
+	depd,z	$Zll,60,4,$rem
+
+	shrpd	$Zhh,$Zll,4,$Zll
+	extrd,u	$Zhh,59,60,$Zhh
+	ldd	$nhi($Hll),$Tll
+	ldd	$nhi($Hhh),$Thh
+
+	xor	$Tll,$Zll,$Zll
+	xor	$Thh,$Zhh,$Zhh
+	ldd	$rem($rem_4bit),$rem
+
+	xor	$rem,$Zhh,$Zhh
+	std	$Zll,8($Xi)
+	std	$Zhh,0($Xi)
+___
+
+$code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==4);
+	b	L\$done_gmult
+	nop
+
+L\$parisc1_gmult
+	ldb	15($Xi),$nlo
+	ldo	12($Htbl),$Hll
+	ldo	8($Htbl),$Hlh
+	ldo	4($Htbl),$Hhl
+
+	and	$mask0xf0,$nlo,$nhi
+	zdep	$nlo,27,4,$nlo
+
+	ldwx	$nlo($Hll),$Zll
+	ldwx	$nlo($Hlh),$Zlh
+	ldwx	$nlo($Hhl),$Zhl
+	ldwx	$nlo($Hhh),$Zhh
+	zdep	$Zll,28,4,$rem
+	ldb	14($Xi),$nlo
+	ldwx	$rem($rem_4bit),$rem
+	shrpw	$Zlh,$Zll,4,$Zll
+	ldwx	$nhi($Hll),$Tll
+	shrpw	$Zhl,$Zlh,4,$Zlh
+	ldwx	$nhi($Hlh),$Tlh
+	shrpw	$Zhh,$Zhl,4,$Zhl
+	ldwx	$nhi($Hhl),$Thl
+	extru	$Zhh,27,28,$Zhh
+	ldwx	$nhi($Hhh),$Thh
+	xor	$rem,$Zhh,$Zhh
+	and	$mask0xf0,$nlo,$nhi
+	zdep	$nlo,27,4,$nlo
+
+	xor	$Tll,$Zll,$Zll
+	ldwx	$nlo($Hll),$Tll
+	xor	$Tlh,$Zlh,$Zlh
+	ldwx	$nlo($Hlh),$Tlh
+	xor	$Thl,$Zhl,$Zhl
+	b	L\$oop_gmult_pa1
+	ldi	13,$cnt
+
+	.ALIGN	8
+L\$oop_gmult_pa1
+	zdep	$Zll,28,4,$rem
+	ldwx	$nlo($Hhl),$Thl
+	xor	$Thh,$Zhh,$Zhh
+	ldwx	$rem($rem_4bit),$rem
+	shrpw	$Zlh,$Zll,4,$Zll
+	ldwx	$nlo($Hhh),$Thh
+	shrpw	$Zhl,$Zlh,4,$Zlh
+	ldbx	$cnt($Xi),$nlo
+	xor	$Tll,$Zll,$Zll
+	ldwx	$nhi($Hll),$Tll
+	shrpw	$Zhh,$Zhl,4,$Zhl
+	xor	$Tlh,$Zlh,$Zlh
+	ldwx	$nhi($Hlh),$Tlh
+	extru	$Zhh,27,28,$Zhh
+	xor	$Thl,$Zhl,$Zhl
+	ldwx	$nhi($Hhl),$Thl
+	xor	$rem,$Zhh,$Zhh
+	zdep	$Zll,28,4,$rem
+	xor	$Thh,$Zhh,$Zhh
+	ldwx	$nhi($Hhh),$Thh
+	shrpw	$Zlh,$Zll,4,$Zll
+	ldwx	$rem($rem_4bit),$rem
+	shrpw	$Zhl,$Zlh,4,$Zlh
+	shrpw	$Zhh,$Zhl,4,$Zhl
+	and	$mask0xf0,$nlo,$nhi
+	extru	$Zhh,27,28,$Zhh
+	zdep	$nlo,27,4,$nlo
+	xor	$Tll,$Zll,$Zll
+	ldwx	$nlo($Hll),$Tll
+	xor	$Tlh,$Zlh,$Zlh
+	ldwx	$nlo($Hlh),$Tlh
+	xor	$rem,$Zhh,$Zhh
+	addib,uv -1,$cnt,L\$oop_gmult_pa1
+	xor	$Thl,$Zhl,$Zhl
+
+	zdep	$Zll,28,4,$rem
+	ldwx	$nlo($Hhl),$Thl
+	xor	$Thh,$Zhh,$Zhh
+	ldwx	$rem($rem_4bit),$rem
+	shrpw	$Zlh,$Zll,4,$Zll
+	ldwx	$nlo($Hhh),$Thh
+	shrpw	$Zhl,$Zlh,4,$Zlh
+	xor	$Tll,$Zll,$Zll
+	ldwx	$nhi($Hll),$Tll
+	shrpw	$Zhh,$Zhl,4,$Zhl
+	xor	$Tlh,$Zlh,$Zlh
+	ldwx	$nhi($Hlh),$Tlh
+	extru	$Zhh,27,28,$Zhh
+	xor	$rem,$Zhh,$Zhh
+	xor	$Thl,$Zhl,$Zhl
+	ldwx	$nhi($Hhl),$Thl
+	xor	$Thh,$Zhh,$Zhh
+	ldwx	$nhi($Hhh),$Thh
+	zdep	$Zll,28,4,$rem
+	ldwx	$rem($rem_4bit),$rem
+	shrpw	$Zlh,$Zll,4,$Zll
+	shrpw	$Zhl,$Zlh,4,$Zlh
+	shrpw	$Zhh,$Zhl,4,$Zhl
+	extru	$Zhh,27,28,$Zhh
+	xor	$Tll,$Zll,$Zll
+	xor	$Tlh,$Zlh,$Zlh
+	xor	$rem,$Zhh,$Zhh
+	stw	$Zll,12($Xi)
+	xor	$Thl,$Zhl,$Zhl
+	stw	$Zlh,8($Xi)
+	xor	$Thh,$Zhh,$Zhh
+	stw	$Zhl,4($Xi)
+	stw	$Zhh,0($Xi)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+L\$done_gmult
+	$POP	`-$FRAME-$SAVED_RP`(%sp),%r2		; standard epilogue
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+1*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r4
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+2*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r5
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+3*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r6
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==4);
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+4*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r7
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+5*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r8
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+6*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r9
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+7*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r10
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+8*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r11
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	bv	(%r2)
+	.EXIT
+	$POPMB	-$FRAME(%sp),%r3
+	.PROCEND
+
+	.EXPORT	gcm_ghash_4bit,ENTRY,ARGW0=GR,ARGW1=GR,ARGW2=GR,ARGW3=GR
+	.ALIGN	64
+gcm_ghash_4bit
+	.PROC
+	.CALLINFO	FRAME=`$FRAME-10*$SIZE_T`,NO_CALLS,SAVE_RP,ENTRY_GR=11
+	.ENTRY
+	$PUSH	%r2,-$SAVED_RP(%sp)	; standard prologue
+	$PUSHMA	%r3,$FRAME(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r4,`-$FRAME+1*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r5,`-$FRAME+2*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r6,`-$FRAME+3*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==4);
+	$PUSH	%r7,`-$FRAME+4*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r8,`-$FRAME+5*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r9,`-$FRAME+6*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r10,`-$FRAME+7*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r11,`-$FRAME+8*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	blr	%r0,$rem_4bit
+	ldi	3,$rem
+L\$pic_ghash
+	andcm	$rem_4bit,$rem,$rem_4bit
+	addl	$inp,$len,$len
+	ldo	L\$rem_4bit-L\$pic_ghash($rem_4bit),$rem_4bit
+	ldi	0xf0,$mask0xf0
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==4);
+	ldi	31,$rem
+	mtctl	$rem,%cr11
+	extrd,u,*= $rem,%sar,1,$rem	; executes on PA-RISC 1.0
+	b	L\$parisc1_ghash
+	nop
+___
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	ldb	15($Xi),$nlo
+	ldo	8($Htbl),$Hll
+
+L\$outer_ghash_pa2
+	ldb	15($inp),$nhi
+	xor	$nhi,$nlo,$nlo
+	and	$mask0xf0,$nlo,$nhi
+	depd,z	$nlo,59,4,$nlo
+
+	ldd	$nlo($Hll),$Zll
+	ldd	$nlo($Hhh),$Zhh
+
+	depd,z	$Zll,60,4,$rem
+	shrpd	$Zhh,$Zll,4,$Zll
+	extrd,u	$Zhh,59,60,$Zhh
+	ldb	14($Xi),$nlo
+	ldb	14($inp),$byte
+
+	ldd	$nhi($Hll),$Tll
+	ldd	$nhi($Hhh),$Thh
+	xor	$byte,$nlo,$nlo
+	and	$mask0xf0,$nlo,$nhi
+	depd,z	$nlo,59,4,$nlo
+
+	xor	$Tll,$Zll,$Zll
+	xor	$Thh,$Zhh,$Zhh
+	ldd	$rem($rem_4bit),$rem
+	b	L\$oop_ghash_pa2
+	ldi	13,$cnt
+
+	.ALIGN	8
+L\$oop_ghash_pa2
+	xor	$rem,$Zhh,$Zhh		; moved here to work around gas bug
+	depd,z	$Zll,60,4,$rem2
+
+	shrpd	$Zhh,$Zll,4,$Zll
+	extrd,u	$Zhh,59,60,$Zhh
+	ldd	$nlo($Hll),$Tll
+	ldd	$nlo($Hhh),$Thh
+
+	xor	$Tll,$Zll,$Zll
+	xor	$Thh,$Zhh,$Zhh
+	ldbx	$cnt($Xi),$nlo
+	ldbx	$cnt($inp),$byte
+
+	depd,z	$Zll,60,4,$rem
+	shrpd	$Zhh,$Zll,4,$Zll
+	ldd	$rem2($rem_4bit),$rem2
+
+	xor	$rem2,$Zhh,$Zhh
+	xor	$byte,$nlo,$nlo
+	ldd	$nhi($Hll),$Tll
+	ldd	$nhi($Hhh),$Thh
+
+	and	$mask0xf0,$nlo,$nhi
+	depd,z	$nlo,59,4,$nlo
+
+	extrd,u	$Zhh,59,60,$Zhh
+	xor	$Tll,$Zll,$Zll
+
+	ldd	$rem($rem_4bit),$rem
+	addib,uv -1,$cnt,L\$oop_ghash_pa2
+	xor	$Thh,$Zhh,$Zhh
+
+	xor	$rem,$Zhh,$Zhh
+	depd,z	$Zll,60,4,$rem2
+
+	shrpd	$Zhh,$Zll,4,$Zll
+	extrd,u	$Zhh,59,60,$Zhh
+	ldd	$nlo($Hll),$Tll
+	ldd	$nlo($Hhh),$Thh
+
+	xor	$Tll,$Zll,$Zll
+	xor	$Thh,$Zhh,$Zhh
+
+	depd,z	$Zll,60,4,$rem
+	shrpd	$Zhh,$Zll,4,$Zll
+	ldd	$rem2($rem_4bit),$rem2
+
+	xor	$rem2,$Zhh,$Zhh
+	ldd	$nhi($Hll),$Tll
+	ldd	$nhi($Hhh),$Thh
+
+	extrd,u	$Zhh,59,60,$Zhh
+	xor	$Tll,$Zll,$Zll
+	xor	$Thh,$Zhh,$Zhh
+	ldd	$rem($rem_4bit),$rem
+
+	xor	$rem,$Zhh,$Zhh
+	std	$Zll,8($Xi)
+	ldo	16($inp),$inp
+	std	$Zhh,0($Xi)
+	cmpb,*<> $inp,$len,L\$outer_ghash_pa2
+	copy	$Zll,$nlo
+___
+
+$code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==4);
+	b	L\$done_ghash
+	nop
+
+L\$parisc1_ghash
+	ldb	15($Xi),$nlo
+	ldo	12($Htbl),$Hll
+	ldo	8($Htbl),$Hlh
+	ldo	4($Htbl),$Hhl
+
+L\$outer_ghash_pa1
+	ldb	15($inp),$byte
+	xor	$byte,$nlo,$nlo
+	and	$mask0xf0,$nlo,$nhi
+	zdep	$nlo,27,4,$nlo
+
+	ldwx	$nlo($Hll),$Zll
+	ldwx	$nlo($Hlh),$Zlh
+	ldwx	$nlo($Hhl),$Zhl
+	ldwx	$nlo($Hhh),$Zhh
+	zdep	$Zll,28,4,$rem
+	ldb	14($Xi),$nlo
+	ldb	14($inp),$byte
+	ldwx	$rem($rem_4bit),$rem
+	shrpw	$Zlh,$Zll,4,$Zll
+	ldwx	$nhi($Hll),$Tll
+	shrpw	$Zhl,$Zlh,4,$Zlh
+	ldwx	$nhi($Hlh),$Tlh
+	shrpw	$Zhh,$Zhl,4,$Zhl
+	ldwx	$nhi($Hhl),$Thl
+	extru	$Zhh,27,28,$Zhh
+	ldwx	$nhi($Hhh),$Thh
+	xor	$byte,$nlo,$nlo
+	xor	$rem,$Zhh,$Zhh
+	and	$mask0xf0,$nlo,$nhi
+	zdep	$nlo,27,4,$nlo
+
+	xor	$Tll,$Zll,$Zll
+	ldwx	$nlo($Hll),$Tll
+	xor	$Tlh,$Zlh,$Zlh
+	ldwx	$nlo($Hlh),$Tlh
+	xor	$Thl,$Zhl,$Zhl
+	b	L\$oop_ghash_pa1
+	ldi	13,$cnt
+
+	.ALIGN	8
+L\$oop_ghash_pa1
+	zdep	$Zll,28,4,$rem
+	ldwx	$nlo($Hhl),$Thl
+	xor	$Thh,$Zhh,$Zhh
+	ldwx	$rem($rem_4bit),$rem
+	shrpw	$Zlh,$Zll,4,$Zll
+	ldwx	$nlo($Hhh),$Thh
+	shrpw	$Zhl,$Zlh,4,$Zlh
+	ldbx	$cnt($Xi),$nlo
+	xor	$Tll,$Zll,$Zll
+	ldwx	$nhi($Hll),$Tll
+	shrpw	$Zhh,$Zhl,4,$Zhl
+	ldbx	$cnt($inp),$byte
+	xor	$Tlh,$Zlh,$Zlh
+	ldwx	$nhi($Hlh),$Tlh
+	extru	$Zhh,27,28,$Zhh
+	xor	$Thl,$Zhl,$Zhl
+	ldwx	$nhi($Hhl),$Thl
+	xor	$rem,$Zhh,$Zhh
+	zdep	$Zll,28,4,$rem
+	xor	$Thh,$Zhh,$Zhh
+	ldwx	$nhi($Hhh),$Thh
+	shrpw	$Zlh,$Zll,4,$Zll
+	ldwx	$rem($rem_4bit),$rem
+	shrpw	$Zhl,$Zlh,4,$Zlh
+	xor	$byte,$nlo,$nlo
+	shrpw	$Zhh,$Zhl,4,$Zhl
+	and	$mask0xf0,$nlo,$nhi
+	extru	$Zhh,27,28,$Zhh
+	zdep	$nlo,27,4,$nlo
+	xor	$Tll,$Zll,$Zll
+	ldwx	$nlo($Hll),$Tll
+	xor	$Tlh,$Zlh,$Zlh
+	ldwx	$nlo($Hlh),$Tlh
+	xor	$rem,$Zhh,$Zhh
+	addib,uv -1,$cnt,L\$oop_ghash_pa1
+	xor	$Thl,$Zhl,$Zhl
+
+	zdep	$Zll,28,4,$rem
+	ldwx	$nlo($Hhl),$Thl
+	xor	$Thh,$Zhh,$Zhh
+	ldwx	$rem($rem_4bit),$rem
+	shrpw	$Zlh,$Zll,4,$Zll
+	ldwx	$nlo($Hhh),$Thh
+	shrpw	$Zhl,$Zlh,4,$Zlh
+	xor	$Tll,$Zll,$Zll
+	ldwx	$nhi($Hll),$Tll
+	shrpw	$Zhh,$Zhl,4,$Zhl
+	xor	$Tlh,$Zlh,$Zlh
+	ldwx	$nhi($Hlh),$Tlh
+	extru	$Zhh,27,28,$Zhh
+	xor	$rem,$Zhh,$Zhh
+	xor	$Thl,$Zhl,$Zhl
+	ldwx	$nhi($Hhl),$Thl
+	xor	$Thh,$Zhh,$Zhh
+	ldwx	$nhi($Hhh),$Thh
+	zdep	$Zll,28,4,$rem
+	ldwx	$rem($rem_4bit),$rem
+	shrpw	$Zlh,$Zll,4,$Zll
+	shrpw	$Zhl,$Zlh,4,$Zlh
+	shrpw	$Zhh,$Zhl,4,$Zhl
+	extru	$Zhh,27,28,$Zhh
+	xor	$Tll,$Zll,$Zll
+	xor	$Tlh,$Zlh,$Zlh
+	xor	$rem,$Zhh,$Zhh
+	stw	$Zll,12($Xi)
+	xor	$Thl,$Zhl,$Zhl
+	stw	$Zlh,8($Xi)
+	xor	$Thh,$Zhh,$Zhh
+	stw	$Zhl,4($Xi)
+	ldo	16($inp),$inp
+	stw	$Zhh,0($Xi)
+	comb,<>	$inp,$len,L\$outer_ghash_pa1
+	copy	$Zll,$nlo
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+L\$done_ghash
+	$POP	`-$FRAME-$SAVED_RP`(%sp),%r2		; standard epilogue
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+1*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r4
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+2*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r5
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+3*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r6
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==4);
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+4*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r7
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+5*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r8
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+6*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r9
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+7*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r10
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+8*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r11
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	bv	(%r2)
+	.EXIT
+	$POPMB	-$FRAME(%sp),%r3
+	.PROCEND
+
+	.ALIGN	64
+L\$rem_4bit
+	.WORD	`0x0000<<16`,0,`0x1C20<<16`,0,`0x3840<<16`,0,`0x2460<<16`,0
+	.WORD	`0x7080<<16`,0,`0x6CA0<<16`,0,`0x48C0<<16`,0,`0x54E0<<16`,0
+	.WORD	`0xE100<<16`,0,`0xFD20<<16`,0,`0xD940<<16`,0,`0xC560<<16`,0
+	.WORD	`0x9180<<16`,0,`0x8DA0<<16`,0,`0xA9C0<<16`,0,`0xB5E0<<16`,0
+	.STRINGZ "GHASH for PA-RISC, GRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+	.ALIGN	64
+___
+
+# Explicitly encode PA-RISC 2.0 instructions used in this module, so
+# that it can be compiled with .LEVEL 1.0. It should be noted that I
+# wouldn't have to do this, if GNU assembler understood .ALLOW 2.0
+# directive...
+
+my $ldd = sub {
+  my ($mod,$args) = @_;
+  my $orig = "ldd$mod\t$args";
+
+    if ($args =~ /%r([0-9]+)\(%r([0-9]+)\),%r([0-9]+)/)		# format 4
+    {	my $opcode=(0x03<<26)|($2<<21)|($1<<16)|(3<<6)|$3;
+	sprintf "\t.WORD\t0x%08x\t; %s",$opcode,$orig;
+    }
+    elsif ($args =~ /(\-?[0-9]+)\(%r([0-9]+)\),%r([0-9]+)/)	# format 5
+    {	my $opcode=(0x03<<26)|($2<<21)|(1<<12)|(3<<6)|$3;
+	$opcode|=(($1&0xF)<<17)|(($1&0x10)<<12);		# encode offset
+	$opcode|=(1<<5)  if ($mod =~ /^,m/);
+	$opcode|=(1<<13) if ($mod =~ /^,mb/);
+	sprintf "\t.WORD\t0x%08x\t; %s",$opcode,$orig;
+    }
+    else { "\t".$orig; }
+};
+
+my $std = sub {
+  my ($mod,$args) = @_;
+  my $orig = "std$mod\t$args";
+
+    if ($args =~ /%r([0-9]+),(\-?[0-9]+)\(%r([0-9]+)\)/) # format 3 suffices
+    {	my $opcode=(0x1c<<26)|($3<<21)|($1<<16)|(($2&0x1FF8)<<1)|(($2>>13)&1);
+	sprintf "\t.WORD\t0x%08x\t; %s",$opcode,$orig;
+    }
+    else { "\t".$orig; }
+};
+
+my $extrd = sub {
+  my ($mod,$args) = @_;
+  my $orig = "extrd$mod\t$args";
+
+    # I only have ",u" completer, it's implicitly encoded...
+    if ($args =~ /%r([0-9]+),([0-9]+),([0-9]+),%r([0-9]+)/)	# format 15
+    {	my $opcode=(0x36<<26)|($1<<21)|($4<<16);
+	my $len=32-$3;
+	$opcode |= (($2&0x20)<<6)|(($2&0x1f)<<5);		# encode pos
+	$opcode |= (($len&0x20)<<7)|($len&0x1f);		# encode len
+	sprintf "\t.WORD\t0x%08x\t; %s",$opcode,$orig;
+    }
+    elsif ($args =~ /%r([0-9]+),%sar,([0-9]+),%r([0-9]+)/)	# format 12
+    {	my $opcode=(0x34<<26)|($1<<21)|($3<<16)|(2<<11)|(1<<9);
+	my $len=32-$2;
+	$opcode |= (($len&0x20)<<3)|($len&0x1f);		# encode len
+	$opcode |= (1<<13) if ($mod =~ /,\**=/);
+	sprintf "\t.WORD\t0x%08x\t; %s",$opcode,$orig;
+    }
+    else { "\t".$orig; }
+};
+
+my $shrpd = sub {
+  my ($mod,$args) = @_;
+  my $orig = "shrpd$mod\t$args";
+
+    if ($args =~ /%r([0-9]+),%r([0-9]+),([0-9]+),%r([0-9]+)/)	# format 14
+    {	my $opcode=(0x34<<26)|($2<<21)|($1<<16)|(1<<10)|$4;
+	my $cpos=63-$3;
+	$opcode |= (($cpos&0x20)<<6)|(($cpos&0x1f)<<5);		# encode sa
+	sprintf "\t.WORD\t0x%08x\t; %s",$opcode,$orig;
+    }
+    elsif ($args =~ /%r([0-9]+),%r([0-9]+),%sar,%r([0-9]+)/)	# format 11
+    {	sprintf "\t.WORD\t0x%08x\t; %s",
+		(0x34<<26)|($2<<21)|($1<<16)|(1<<9)|$3,$orig;
+    }
+    else { "\t".$orig; }
+};
+
+my $depd = sub {
+  my ($mod,$args) = @_;
+  my $orig = "depd$mod\t$args";
+
+    # I only have ",z" completer, it's impicitly encoded...
+    if ($args =~ /%r([0-9]+),([0-9]+),([0-9]+),%r([0-9]+)/)	# format 16
+    {	my $opcode=(0x3c<<26)|($4<<21)|($1<<16);
+    	my $cpos=63-$2;
+	my $len=32-$3;
+	$opcode |= (($cpos&0x20)<<6)|(($cpos&0x1f)<<5);		# encode pos
+	$opcode |= (($len&0x20)<<7)|($len&0x1f);		# encode len
+	sprintf "\t.WORD\t0x%08x\t; %s",$opcode,$orig;
+    }
+    else { "\t".$orig; }
+};
+
+sub assemble {
+  my ($mnemonic,$mod,$args)=@_;
+  my $opcode = eval("\$$mnemonic");
+
+    ref($opcode) eq 'CODE' ? &$opcode($mod,$args) : "\t$mnemonic$mod\t$args";
+}
+
+foreach (split("\n",$code)) {
+	s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/ge;
+	if ($SIZE_T==4) {
+		s/^\s+([a-z]+)([\S]*)\s+([\S]*)/&assemble($1,$2,$3)/e;
+		s/cmpb,\*/comb,/;
+		s/,\*/,/;
+	}
+	s/\bbv\b/bve/	if ($SIZE_T==8);
+	print $_,"\n";
+}
+
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-s390x.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-s390x.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6e628d8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-s390x.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,258 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2010-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+
+# September 2010.
+#
+# The module implements "4-bit" GCM GHASH function and underlying
+# single multiplication operation in GF(2^128). "4-bit" means that it
+# uses 256 bytes per-key table [+128 bytes shared table]. Performance
+# was measured to be ~18 cycles per processed byte on z10, which is
+# almost 40% better than gcc-generated code. It should be noted that
+# 18 cycles is worse result than expected: loop is scheduled for 12
+# and the result should be close to 12. In the lack of instruction-
+# level profiling data it's impossible to tell why...
+
+# November 2010.
+#
+# Adapt for -m31 build. If kernel supports what's called "highgprs"
+# feature on Linux [see /proc/cpuinfo], it's possible to use 64-bit
+# instructions and achieve "64-bit" performance even in 31-bit legacy
+# application context. The feature is not specific to any particular
+# processor, as long as it's "z-CPU". Latter implies that the code
+# remains z/Architecture specific. On z990 it was measured to perform
+# 2.8x better than 32-bit code generated by gcc 4.3.
+
+# March 2011.
+#
+# Support for hardware KIMD-GHASH is verified to produce correct
+# result and therefore is engaged. On z196 it was measured to process
+# 8KB buffer ~7 faster than software implementation. It's not as
+# impressive for smaller buffer sizes and for smallest 16-bytes buffer
+# it's actually almost 2 times slower. Which is the reason why
+# KIMD-GHASH is not used in gcm_gmult_4bit.
+
+$flavour = shift;
+
+if ($flavour =~ /3[12]/) {
+	$SIZE_T=4;
+	$g="";
+} else {
+	$SIZE_T=8;
+	$g="g";
+}
+
+while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {}
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+$softonly=0;
+
+$Zhi="%r0";
+$Zlo="%r1";
+
+$Xi="%r2";	# argument block
+$Htbl="%r3";
+$inp="%r4";
+$len="%r5";
+
+$rem0="%r6";	# variables
+$rem1="%r7";
+$nlo="%r8";
+$nhi="%r9";
+$xi="%r10";
+$cnt="%r11";
+$tmp="%r12";
+$x78="%r13";
+$rem_4bit="%r14";
+
+$sp="%r15";
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.text
+
+.globl	gcm_gmult_4bit
+.align	32
+gcm_gmult_4bit:
+___
+$code.=<<___ if(!$softonly && 0);	# hardware is slow for single block...
+	larl	%r1,OPENSSL_s390xcap_P
+	lghi	%r0,0
+	lg	%r1,24(%r1)	# load second word of kimd capabilities vector
+	tmhh	%r1,0x4000	# check for function 65
+	jz	.Lsoft_gmult
+	stg	%r0,16($sp)	# arrange 16 bytes of zero input
+	stg	%r0,24($sp)
+	lghi	%r0,65		# function 65
+	la	%r1,0($Xi)	# H lies right after Xi in gcm128_context
+	la	$inp,16($sp)
+	lghi	$len,16
+	.long	0xb93e0004	# kimd %r0,$inp
+	brc	1,.-4		# pay attention to "partial completion"
+	br	%r14
+.align	32
+.Lsoft_gmult:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	stm${g}	%r6,%r14,6*$SIZE_T($sp)
+
+	aghi	$Xi,-1
+	lghi	$len,1
+	lghi	$x78,`0xf<<3`
+	larl	$rem_4bit,rem_4bit
+
+	lg	$Zlo,8+1($Xi)		# Xi
+	j	.Lgmult_shortcut
+.type	gcm_gmult_4bit,\@function
+.size	gcm_gmult_4bit,(.-gcm_gmult_4bit)
+
+.globl	gcm_ghash_4bit
+.align	32
+gcm_ghash_4bit:
+___
+$code.=<<___ if(!$softonly);
+	larl	%r1,OPENSSL_s390xcap_P
+	lg	%r0,24(%r1)	# load second word of kimd capabilities vector
+	tmhh	%r0,0x4000	# check for function 65
+	jz	.Lsoft_ghash
+	lghi	%r0,65		# function 65
+	la	%r1,0($Xi)	# H lies right after Xi in gcm128_context
+	.long	0xb93e0004	# kimd %r0,$inp
+	brc	1,.-4		# pay attention to "partial completion"
+	br	%r14
+.align	32
+.Lsoft_ghash:
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /3[12]/);
+	llgfr	$len,$len
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	stm${g}	%r6,%r14,6*$SIZE_T($sp)
+
+	aghi	$Xi,-1
+	srlg	$len,$len,4
+	lghi	$x78,`0xf<<3`
+	larl	$rem_4bit,rem_4bit
+
+	lg	$Zlo,8+1($Xi)		# Xi
+	lg	$Zhi,0+1($Xi)
+	lghi	$tmp,0
+.Louter:
+	xg	$Zhi,0($inp)		# Xi ^= inp 
+	xg	$Zlo,8($inp)
+	xgr	$Zhi,$tmp
+	stg	$Zlo,8+1($Xi)
+	stg	$Zhi,0+1($Xi)
+
+.Lgmult_shortcut:
+	lghi	$tmp,0xf0
+	sllg	$nlo,$Zlo,4
+	srlg	$xi,$Zlo,8		# extract second byte
+	ngr	$nlo,$tmp
+	lgr	$nhi,$Zlo
+	lghi	$cnt,14
+	ngr	$nhi,$tmp
+
+	lg	$Zlo,8($nlo,$Htbl)
+	lg	$Zhi,0($nlo,$Htbl)
+
+	sllg	$nlo,$xi,4
+	sllg	$rem0,$Zlo,3
+	ngr	$nlo,$tmp
+	ngr	$rem0,$x78
+	ngr	$xi,$tmp
+
+	sllg	$tmp,$Zhi,60
+	srlg	$Zlo,$Zlo,4
+	srlg	$Zhi,$Zhi,4
+	xg	$Zlo,8($nhi,$Htbl)
+	xg	$Zhi,0($nhi,$Htbl)
+	lgr	$nhi,$xi
+	sllg	$rem1,$Zlo,3
+	xgr	$Zlo,$tmp
+	ngr	$rem1,$x78
+	sllg	$tmp,$Zhi,60
+	j	.Lghash_inner
+.align	16
+.Lghash_inner:
+	srlg	$Zlo,$Zlo,4
+	srlg	$Zhi,$Zhi,4
+	xg	$Zlo,8($nlo,$Htbl)
+	llgc	$xi,0($cnt,$Xi)
+	xg	$Zhi,0($nlo,$Htbl)
+	sllg	$nlo,$xi,4
+	xg	$Zhi,0($rem0,$rem_4bit)
+	nill	$nlo,0xf0
+	sllg	$rem0,$Zlo,3
+	xgr	$Zlo,$tmp
+	ngr	$rem0,$x78
+	nill	$xi,0xf0
+
+	sllg	$tmp,$Zhi,60
+	srlg	$Zlo,$Zlo,4
+	srlg	$Zhi,$Zhi,4
+	xg	$Zlo,8($nhi,$Htbl)
+	xg	$Zhi,0($nhi,$Htbl)
+	lgr	$nhi,$xi
+	xg	$Zhi,0($rem1,$rem_4bit)
+	sllg	$rem1,$Zlo,3
+	xgr	$Zlo,$tmp
+	ngr	$rem1,$x78
+	sllg	$tmp,$Zhi,60
+	brct	$cnt,.Lghash_inner
+
+	srlg	$Zlo,$Zlo,4
+	srlg	$Zhi,$Zhi,4
+	xg	$Zlo,8($nlo,$Htbl)
+	xg	$Zhi,0($nlo,$Htbl)
+	sllg	$xi,$Zlo,3
+	xg	$Zhi,0($rem0,$rem_4bit)
+	xgr	$Zlo,$tmp
+	ngr	$xi,$x78
+
+	sllg	$tmp,$Zhi,60
+	srlg	$Zlo,$Zlo,4
+	srlg	$Zhi,$Zhi,4
+	xg	$Zlo,8($nhi,$Htbl)
+	xg	$Zhi,0($nhi,$Htbl)
+	xgr	$Zlo,$tmp
+	xg	$Zhi,0($rem1,$rem_4bit)
+
+	lg	$tmp,0($xi,$rem_4bit)
+	la	$inp,16($inp)
+	sllg	$tmp,$tmp,4		# correct last rem_4bit[rem]
+	brctg	$len,.Louter
+
+	xgr	$Zhi,$tmp
+	stg	$Zlo,8+1($Xi)
+	stg	$Zhi,0+1($Xi)
+	lm${g}	%r6,%r14,6*$SIZE_T($sp)
+	br	%r14
+.type	gcm_ghash_4bit,\@function
+.size	gcm_ghash_4bit,(.-gcm_ghash_4bit)
+
+.align	64
+rem_4bit:
+	.long	`0x0000<<12`,0,`0x1C20<<12`,0,`0x3840<<12`,0,`0x2460<<12`,0
+	.long	`0x7080<<12`,0,`0x6CA0<<12`,0,`0x48C0<<12`,0,`0x54E0<<12`,0
+	.long	`0xE100<<12`,0,`0xFD20<<12`,0,`0xD940<<12`,0,`0xC560<<12`,0
+	.long	`0x9180<<12`,0,`0x8DA0<<12`,0,`0xA9C0<<12`,0,`0xB5E0<<12`,0
+.type	rem_4bit,\@object
+.size	rem_4bit,(.-rem_4bit)
+.string	"GHASH for s390x, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+___
+
+$code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem;
+print $code;
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-sparcv9.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-sparcv9.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c4eb3b1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-sparcv9.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,581 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2010-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+
+# March 2010
+#
+# The module implements "4-bit" GCM GHASH function and underlying
+# single multiplication operation in GF(2^128). "4-bit" means that it
+# uses 256 bytes per-key table [+128 bytes shared table]. Performance
+# results are for streamed GHASH subroutine on UltraSPARC pre-Tx CPU
+# and are expressed in cycles per processed byte, less is better:
+#
+#		gcc 3.3.x	cc 5.2		this assembler
+#
+# 32-bit build	81.4		43.3		12.6	(+546%/+244%)
+# 64-bit build	20.2		21.2		12.6	(+60%/+68%)
+#
+# Here is data collected on UltraSPARC T1 system running Linux:
+#
+#		gcc 4.4.1			this assembler
+#
+# 32-bit build	566				50	(+1000%)
+# 64-bit build	56				50	(+12%)
+#
+# I don't quite understand why difference between 32-bit and 64-bit
+# compiler-generated code is so big. Compilers *were* instructed to
+# generate code for UltraSPARC and should have used 64-bit registers
+# for Z vector (see C code) even in 32-bit build... Oh well, it only
+# means more impressive improvement coefficients for this assembler
+# module;-) Loops are aggressively modulo-scheduled in respect to
+# references to input data and Z.hi updates to achieve 12 cycles
+# timing. To anchor to something else, sha1-sparcv9.pl spends 11.6
+# cycles to process one byte on UltraSPARC pre-Tx CPU and ~24 on T1.
+#
+# October 2012
+#
+# Add VIS3 lookup-table-free implementation using polynomial
+# multiplication xmulx[hi] and extended addition addxc[cc]
+# instructions. 4.52/7.63x improvement on T3/T4 or in absolute
+# terms 7.90/2.14 cycles per byte. On T4 multi-process benchmark
+# saturates at ~15.5x single-process result on 8-core processor,
+# or ~20.5GBps per 2.85GHz socket.
+
+$output=pop;
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+$frame="STACK_FRAME";
+$bias="STACK_BIAS";
+
+$Zhi="%o0";	# 64-bit values
+$Zlo="%o1";
+$Thi="%o2";
+$Tlo="%o3";
+$rem="%o4";
+$tmp="%o5";
+
+$nhi="%l0";	# small values and pointers
+$nlo="%l1";
+$xi0="%l2";
+$xi1="%l3";
+$rem_4bit="%l4";
+$remi="%l5";
+$Htblo="%l6";
+$cnt="%l7";
+
+$Xi="%i0";	# input argument block
+$Htbl="%i1";
+$inp="%i2";
+$len="%i3";
+
+$code.=<<___;
+#include "sparc_arch.h"
+
+#ifdef  __arch64__
+.register	%g2,#scratch
+.register	%g3,#scratch
+#endif
+
+.section	".text",#alloc,#execinstr
+
+.align	64
+rem_4bit:
+	.long	`0x0000<<16`,0,`0x1C20<<16`,0,`0x3840<<16`,0,`0x2460<<16`,0
+	.long	`0x7080<<16`,0,`0x6CA0<<16`,0,`0x48C0<<16`,0,`0x54E0<<16`,0
+	.long	`0xE100<<16`,0,`0xFD20<<16`,0,`0xD940<<16`,0,`0xC560<<16`,0
+	.long	`0x9180<<16`,0,`0x8DA0<<16`,0,`0xA9C0<<16`,0,`0xB5E0<<16`,0
+.type	rem_4bit,#object
+.size	rem_4bit,(.-rem_4bit)
+
+.globl	gcm_ghash_4bit
+.align	32
+gcm_ghash_4bit:
+	save	%sp,-$frame,%sp
+	ldub	[$inp+15],$nlo
+	ldub	[$Xi+15],$xi0
+	ldub	[$Xi+14],$xi1
+	add	$len,$inp,$len
+	add	$Htbl,8,$Htblo
+
+1:	call	.+8
+	add	%o7,rem_4bit-1b,$rem_4bit
+
+.Louter:
+	xor	$xi0,$nlo,$nlo
+	and	$nlo,0xf0,$nhi
+	and	$nlo,0x0f,$nlo
+	sll	$nlo,4,$nlo
+	ldx	[$Htblo+$nlo],$Zlo
+	ldx	[$Htbl+$nlo],$Zhi
+
+	ldub	[$inp+14],$nlo
+
+	ldx	[$Htblo+$nhi],$Tlo
+	and	$Zlo,0xf,$remi
+	ldx	[$Htbl+$nhi],$Thi
+	sll	$remi,3,$remi
+	ldx	[$rem_4bit+$remi],$rem
+	srlx	$Zlo,4,$Zlo
+	mov	13,$cnt
+	sllx	$Zhi,60,$tmp
+	xor	$Tlo,$Zlo,$Zlo
+	srlx	$Zhi,4,$Zhi
+	xor	$Zlo,$tmp,$Zlo
+
+	xor	$xi1,$nlo,$nlo
+	and	$Zlo,0xf,$remi
+	and	$nlo,0xf0,$nhi
+	and	$nlo,0x0f,$nlo
+	ba	.Lghash_inner
+	sll	$nlo,4,$nlo
+.align	32
+.Lghash_inner:
+	ldx	[$Htblo+$nlo],$Tlo
+	sll	$remi,3,$remi
+	xor	$Thi,$Zhi,$Zhi
+	ldx	[$Htbl+$nlo],$Thi
+	srlx	$Zlo,4,$Zlo
+	xor	$rem,$Zhi,$Zhi
+	ldx	[$rem_4bit+$remi],$rem
+	sllx	$Zhi,60,$tmp
+	xor	$Tlo,$Zlo,$Zlo
+	ldub	[$inp+$cnt],$nlo
+	srlx	$Zhi,4,$Zhi
+	xor	$Zlo,$tmp,$Zlo
+	ldub	[$Xi+$cnt],$xi1
+	xor	$Thi,$Zhi,$Zhi
+	and	$Zlo,0xf,$remi
+
+	ldx	[$Htblo+$nhi],$Tlo
+	sll	$remi,3,$remi
+	xor	$rem,$Zhi,$Zhi
+	ldx	[$Htbl+$nhi],$Thi
+	srlx	$Zlo,4,$Zlo
+	ldx	[$rem_4bit+$remi],$rem
+	sllx	$Zhi,60,$tmp
+	xor	$xi1,$nlo,$nlo
+	srlx	$Zhi,4,$Zhi
+	and	$nlo,0xf0,$nhi
+	addcc	$cnt,-1,$cnt
+	xor	$Zlo,$tmp,$Zlo
+	and	$nlo,0x0f,$nlo
+	xor	$Tlo,$Zlo,$Zlo
+	sll	$nlo,4,$nlo
+	blu	.Lghash_inner
+	and	$Zlo,0xf,$remi
+
+	ldx	[$Htblo+$nlo],$Tlo
+	sll	$remi,3,$remi
+	xor	$Thi,$Zhi,$Zhi
+	ldx	[$Htbl+$nlo],$Thi
+	srlx	$Zlo,4,$Zlo
+	xor	$rem,$Zhi,$Zhi
+	ldx	[$rem_4bit+$remi],$rem
+	sllx	$Zhi,60,$tmp
+	xor	$Tlo,$Zlo,$Zlo
+	srlx	$Zhi,4,$Zhi
+	xor	$Zlo,$tmp,$Zlo
+	xor	$Thi,$Zhi,$Zhi
+
+	add	$inp,16,$inp
+	cmp	$inp,$len
+	be,pn	SIZE_T_CC,.Ldone
+	and	$Zlo,0xf,$remi
+
+	ldx	[$Htblo+$nhi],$Tlo
+	sll	$remi,3,$remi
+	xor	$rem,$Zhi,$Zhi
+	ldx	[$Htbl+$nhi],$Thi
+	srlx	$Zlo,4,$Zlo
+	ldx	[$rem_4bit+$remi],$rem
+	sllx	$Zhi,60,$tmp
+	xor	$Tlo,$Zlo,$Zlo
+	ldub	[$inp+15],$nlo
+	srlx	$Zhi,4,$Zhi
+	xor	$Zlo,$tmp,$Zlo
+	xor	$Thi,$Zhi,$Zhi
+	stx	$Zlo,[$Xi+8]
+	xor	$rem,$Zhi,$Zhi
+	stx	$Zhi,[$Xi]
+	srl	$Zlo,8,$xi1
+	and	$Zlo,0xff,$xi0
+	ba	.Louter
+	and	$xi1,0xff,$xi1
+.align	32
+.Ldone:
+	ldx	[$Htblo+$nhi],$Tlo
+	sll	$remi,3,$remi
+	xor	$rem,$Zhi,$Zhi
+	ldx	[$Htbl+$nhi],$Thi
+	srlx	$Zlo,4,$Zlo
+	ldx	[$rem_4bit+$remi],$rem
+	sllx	$Zhi,60,$tmp
+	xor	$Tlo,$Zlo,$Zlo
+	srlx	$Zhi,4,$Zhi
+	xor	$Zlo,$tmp,$Zlo
+	xor	$Thi,$Zhi,$Zhi
+	stx	$Zlo,[$Xi+8]
+	xor	$rem,$Zhi,$Zhi
+	stx	$Zhi,[$Xi]
+
+	ret
+	restore
+.type	gcm_ghash_4bit,#function
+.size	gcm_ghash_4bit,(.-gcm_ghash_4bit)
+___
+
+undef $inp;
+undef $len;
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	gcm_gmult_4bit
+.align	32
+gcm_gmult_4bit:
+	save	%sp,-$frame,%sp
+	ldub	[$Xi+15],$nlo
+	add	$Htbl,8,$Htblo
+
+1:	call	.+8
+	add	%o7,rem_4bit-1b,$rem_4bit
+
+	and	$nlo,0xf0,$nhi
+	and	$nlo,0x0f,$nlo
+	sll	$nlo,4,$nlo
+	ldx	[$Htblo+$nlo],$Zlo
+	ldx	[$Htbl+$nlo],$Zhi
+
+	ldub	[$Xi+14],$nlo
+
+	ldx	[$Htblo+$nhi],$Tlo
+	and	$Zlo,0xf,$remi
+	ldx	[$Htbl+$nhi],$Thi
+	sll	$remi,3,$remi
+	ldx	[$rem_4bit+$remi],$rem
+	srlx	$Zlo,4,$Zlo
+	mov	13,$cnt
+	sllx	$Zhi,60,$tmp
+	xor	$Tlo,$Zlo,$Zlo
+	srlx	$Zhi,4,$Zhi
+	xor	$Zlo,$tmp,$Zlo
+
+	and	$Zlo,0xf,$remi
+	and	$nlo,0xf0,$nhi
+	and	$nlo,0x0f,$nlo
+	ba	.Lgmult_inner
+	sll	$nlo,4,$nlo
+.align	32
+.Lgmult_inner:
+	ldx	[$Htblo+$nlo],$Tlo
+	sll	$remi,3,$remi
+	xor	$Thi,$Zhi,$Zhi
+	ldx	[$Htbl+$nlo],$Thi
+	srlx	$Zlo,4,$Zlo
+	xor	$rem,$Zhi,$Zhi
+	ldx	[$rem_4bit+$remi],$rem
+	sllx	$Zhi,60,$tmp
+	xor	$Tlo,$Zlo,$Zlo
+	ldub	[$Xi+$cnt],$nlo
+	srlx	$Zhi,4,$Zhi
+	xor	$Zlo,$tmp,$Zlo
+	xor	$Thi,$Zhi,$Zhi
+	and	$Zlo,0xf,$remi
+
+	ldx	[$Htblo+$nhi],$Tlo
+	sll	$remi,3,$remi
+	xor	$rem,$Zhi,$Zhi
+	ldx	[$Htbl+$nhi],$Thi
+	srlx	$Zlo,4,$Zlo
+	ldx	[$rem_4bit+$remi],$rem
+	sllx	$Zhi,60,$tmp
+	srlx	$Zhi,4,$Zhi
+	and	$nlo,0xf0,$nhi
+	addcc	$cnt,-1,$cnt
+	xor	$Zlo,$tmp,$Zlo
+	and	$nlo,0x0f,$nlo
+	xor	$Tlo,$Zlo,$Zlo
+	sll	$nlo,4,$nlo
+	blu	.Lgmult_inner
+	and	$Zlo,0xf,$remi
+
+	ldx	[$Htblo+$nlo],$Tlo
+	sll	$remi,3,$remi
+	xor	$Thi,$Zhi,$Zhi
+	ldx	[$Htbl+$nlo],$Thi
+	srlx	$Zlo,4,$Zlo
+	xor	$rem,$Zhi,$Zhi
+	ldx	[$rem_4bit+$remi],$rem
+	sllx	$Zhi,60,$tmp
+	xor	$Tlo,$Zlo,$Zlo
+	srlx	$Zhi,4,$Zhi
+	xor	$Zlo,$tmp,$Zlo
+	xor	$Thi,$Zhi,$Zhi
+	and	$Zlo,0xf,$remi
+
+	ldx	[$Htblo+$nhi],$Tlo
+	sll	$remi,3,$remi
+	xor	$rem,$Zhi,$Zhi
+	ldx	[$Htbl+$nhi],$Thi
+	srlx	$Zlo,4,$Zlo
+	ldx	[$rem_4bit+$remi],$rem
+	sllx	$Zhi,60,$tmp
+	xor	$Tlo,$Zlo,$Zlo
+	srlx	$Zhi,4,$Zhi
+	xor	$Zlo,$tmp,$Zlo
+	xor	$Thi,$Zhi,$Zhi
+	stx	$Zlo,[$Xi+8]
+	xor	$rem,$Zhi,$Zhi
+	stx	$Zhi,[$Xi]
+
+	ret
+	restore
+.type	gcm_gmult_4bit,#function
+.size	gcm_gmult_4bit,(.-gcm_gmult_4bit)
+___
+
+{{{
+# Straightforward 128x128-bit multiplication using Karatsuba algorithm
+# followed by pair of 64-bit reductions [with a shortcut in first one,
+# which allowed to break dependency between reductions and remove one
+# multiplication from critical path]. While it might be suboptimal
+# with regard to sheer number of multiplications, other methods [such
+# as aggregate reduction] would require more 64-bit registers, which
+# we don't have in 32-bit application context.
+
+($Xip,$Htable,$inp,$len)=map("%i$_",(0..3));
+
+($Hhl,$Hlo,$Hhi,$Xlo,$Xhi,$xE1,$sqr, $C0,$C1,$C2,$C3,$V)=
+	(map("%o$_",(0..5,7)),map("%g$_",(1..5)));
+
+($shl,$shr)=map("%l$_",(0..7));
+
+# For details regarding "twisted H" see ghash-x86.pl.
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	gcm_init_vis3
+.align	32
+gcm_init_vis3:
+	save	%sp,-$frame,%sp
+
+	ldx	[%i1+0],$Hhi
+	ldx	[%i1+8],$Hlo
+	mov	0xE1,$Xhi
+	mov	1,$Xlo
+	sllx	$Xhi,57,$Xhi
+	srax	$Hhi,63,$C0		! broadcast carry
+	addcc	$Hlo,$Hlo,$Hlo		! H<<=1
+	addxc	$Hhi,$Hhi,$Hhi
+	and	$C0,$Xlo,$Xlo
+	and	$C0,$Xhi,$Xhi
+	xor	$Xlo,$Hlo,$Hlo
+	xor	$Xhi,$Hhi,$Hhi
+	stx	$Hlo,[%i0+8]		! save twisted H
+	stx	$Hhi,[%i0+0]
+
+	sethi	%hi(0xA0406080),$V
+	sethi	%hi(0x20C0E000),%l0
+	or	$V,%lo(0xA0406080),$V
+	or	%l0,%lo(0x20C0E000),%l0
+	sllx	$V,32,$V
+	or	%l0,$V,$V		! (0xE0·i)&0xff=0xA040608020C0E000
+	stx	$V,[%i0+16]
+
+	ret
+	restore
+.type	gcm_init_vis3,#function
+.size	gcm_init_vis3,.-gcm_init_vis3
+
+.globl	gcm_gmult_vis3
+.align	32
+gcm_gmult_vis3:
+	save	%sp,-$frame,%sp
+
+	ldx	[$Xip+8],$Xlo		! load Xi
+	ldx	[$Xip+0],$Xhi
+	ldx	[$Htable+8],$Hlo	! load twisted H
+	ldx	[$Htable+0],$Hhi
+
+	mov	0xE1,%l7
+	sllx	%l7,57,$xE1		! 57 is not a typo
+	ldx	[$Htable+16],$V		! (0xE0·i)&0xff=0xA040608020C0E000
+
+	xor	$Hhi,$Hlo,$Hhl		! Karatsuba pre-processing
+	xmulx	$Xlo,$Hlo,$C0
+	xor	$Xlo,$Xhi,$C2		! Karatsuba pre-processing
+	xmulx	$C2,$Hhl,$C1
+	xmulxhi	$Xlo,$Hlo,$Xlo
+	xmulxhi	$C2,$Hhl,$C2
+	xmulxhi	$Xhi,$Hhi,$C3
+	xmulx	$Xhi,$Hhi,$Xhi
+
+	sll	$C0,3,$sqr
+	srlx	$V,$sqr,$sqr		! ·0xE0 [implicit &(7<<3)]
+	xor	$C0,$sqr,$sqr
+	sllx	$sqr,57,$sqr		! ($C0·0xE1)<<1<<56 [implicit &0x7f]
+
+	xor	$C0,$C1,$C1		! Karatsuba post-processing
+	xor	$Xlo,$C2,$C2
+	 xor	$sqr,$Xlo,$Xlo		! real destination is $C1
+	xor	$C3,$C2,$C2
+	xor	$Xlo,$C1,$C1
+	xor	$Xhi,$C2,$C2
+	xor	$Xhi,$C1,$C1
+
+	xmulxhi	$C0,$xE1,$Xlo		! ·0xE1<<1<<56
+	 xor	$C0,$C2,$C2
+	xmulx	$C1,$xE1,$C0
+	 xor	$C1,$C3,$C3
+	xmulxhi	$C1,$xE1,$C1
+
+	xor	$Xlo,$C2,$C2
+	xor	$C0,$C2,$C2
+	xor	$C1,$C3,$C3
+
+	stx	$C2,[$Xip+8]		! save Xi
+	stx	$C3,[$Xip+0]
+
+	ret
+	restore
+.type	gcm_gmult_vis3,#function
+.size	gcm_gmult_vis3,.-gcm_gmult_vis3
+
+.globl	gcm_ghash_vis3
+.align	32
+gcm_ghash_vis3:
+	save	%sp,-$frame,%sp
+	nop
+	srln	$len,0,$len		! needed on v8+, "nop" on v9
+
+	ldx	[$Xip+8],$C2		! load Xi
+	ldx	[$Xip+0],$C3
+	ldx	[$Htable+8],$Hlo	! load twisted H
+	ldx	[$Htable+0],$Hhi
+
+	mov	0xE1,%l7
+	sllx	%l7,57,$xE1		! 57 is not a typo
+	ldx	[$Htable+16],$V		! (0xE0·i)&0xff=0xA040608020C0E000
+
+	and	$inp,7,$shl
+	andn	$inp,7,$inp
+	sll	$shl,3,$shl
+	prefetch [$inp+63], 20
+	sub	%g0,$shl,$shr
+
+	xor	$Hhi,$Hlo,$Hhl		! Karatsuba pre-processing
+.Loop:
+	ldx	[$inp+8],$Xlo
+	brz,pt	$shl,1f
+	ldx	[$inp+0],$Xhi
+
+	ldx	[$inp+16],$C1		! align data
+	srlx	$Xlo,$shr,$C0
+	sllx	$Xlo,$shl,$Xlo
+	sllx	$Xhi,$shl,$Xhi
+	srlx	$C1,$shr,$C1
+	or	$C0,$Xhi,$Xhi
+	or	$C1,$Xlo,$Xlo
+1:
+	add	$inp,16,$inp
+	sub	$len,16,$len
+	xor	$C2,$Xlo,$Xlo
+	xor	$C3,$Xhi,$Xhi
+	prefetch [$inp+63], 20
+
+	xmulx	$Xlo,$Hlo,$C0
+	xor	$Xlo,$Xhi,$C2		! Karatsuba pre-processing
+	xmulx	$C2,$Hhl,$C1
+	xmulxhi	$Xlo,$Hlo,$Xlo
+	xmulxhi	$C2,$Hhl,$C2
+	xmulxhi	$Xhi,$Hhi,$C3
+	xmulx	$Xhi,$Hhi,$Xhi
+
+	sll	$C0,3,$sqr
+	srlx	$V,$sqr,$sqr		! ·0xE0 [implicit &(7<<3)]
+	xor	$C0,$sqr,$sqr
+	sllx	$sqr,57,$sqr		! ($C0·0xE1)<<1<<56 [implicit &0x7f]
+
+	xor	$C0,$C1,$C1		! Karatsuba post-processing
+	xor	$Xlo,$C2,$C2
+	 xor	$sqr,$Xlo,$Xlo		! real destination is $C1
+	xor	$C3,$C2,$C2
+	xor	$Xlo,$C1,$C1
+	xor	$Xhi,$C2,$C2
+	xor	$Xhi,$C1,$C1
+
+	xmulxhi	$C0,$xE1,$Xlo		! ·0xE1<<1<<56
+	 xor	$C0,$C2,$C2
+	xmulx	$C1,$xE1,$C0
+	 xor	$C1,$C3,$C3
+	xmulxhi	$C1,$xE1,$C1
+
+	xor	$Xlo,$C2,$C2
+	xor	$C0,$C2,$C2
+	brnz,pt	$len,.Loop
+	xor	$C1,$C3,$C3
+
+	stx	$C2,[$Xip+8]		! save Xi
+	stx	$C3,[$Xip+0]
+
+	ret
+	restore
+.type	gcm_ghash_vis3,#function
+.size	gcm_ghash_vis3,.-gcm_ghash_vis3
+___
+}}}
+$code.=<<___;
+.asciz	"GHASH for SPARCv9/VIS3, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+.align	4
+___
+
+
+# Purpose of these subroutines is to explicitly encode VIS instructions,
+# so that one can compile the module without having to specify VIS
+# extensions on compiler command line, e.g. -xarch=v9 vs. -xarch=v9a.
+# Idea is to reserve for option to produce "universal" binary and let
+# programmer detect if current CPU is VIS capable at run-time.
+sub unvis3 {
+my ($mnemonic,$rs1,$rs2,$rd)=@_;
+my %bias = ( "g" => 0, "o" => 8, "l" => 16, "i" => 24 );
+my ($ref,$opf);
+my %visopf = (	"addxc"		=> 0x011,
+		"addxccc"	=> 0x013,
+		"xmulx"		=> 0x115,
+		"xmulxhi"	=> 0x116	);
+
+    $ref = "$mnemonic\t$rs1,$rs2,$rd";
+
+    if ($opf=$visopf{$mnemonic}) {
+	foreach ($rs1,$rs2,$rd) {
+	    return $ref if (!/%([goli])([0-9])/);
+	    $_=$bias{$1}+$2;
+	}
+
+	return	sprintf ".word\t0x%08x !%s",
+			0x81b00000|$rd<<25|$rs1<<14|$opf<<5|$rs2,
+			$ref;
+    } else {
+	return $ref;
+    }
+}
+
+foreach (split("\n",$code)) {
+	s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/ge;
+
+	s/\b(xmulx[hi]*|addxc[c]{0,2})\s+(%[goli][0-7]),\s*(%[goli][0-7]),\s*(%[goli][0-7])/
+		&unvis3($1,$2,$3,$4)
+	 /ge;
+
+	print $_,"\n";
+}
+
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cd84582
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,1405 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2010-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# March, May, June 2010
+#
+# The module implements "4-bit" GCM GHASH function and underlying
+# single multiplication operation in GF(2^128). "4-bit" means that it
+# uses 256 bytes per-key table [+64/128 bytes fixed table]. It has two
+# code paths: vanilla x86 and vanilla SSE. Former will be executed on
+# 486 and Pentium, latter on all others. SSE GHASH features so called
+# "528B" variant of "4-bit" method utilizing additional 256+16 bytes
+# of per-key storage [+512 bytes shared table]. Performance results
+# are for streamed GHASH subroutine and are expressed in cycles per
+# processed byte, less is better:
+#
+#		gcc 2.95.3(*)	SSE assembler	x86 assembler
+#
+# Pentium	105/111(**)	-		50
+# PIII		68 /75		12.2		24
+# P4		125/125		17.8		84(***)
+# Opteron	66 /70		10.1		30
+# Core2		54 /67		8.4		18
+# Atom		105/105		16.8		53
+# VIA Nano	69 /71		13.0		27
+#
+# (*)	gcc 3.4.x was observed to generate few percent slower code,
+#	which is one of reasons why 2.95.3 results were chosen,
+#	another reason is lack of 3.4.x results for older CPUs;
+#	comparison with SSE results is not completely fair, because C
+#	results are for vanilla "256B" implementation, while
+#	assembler results are for "528B";-)
+# (**)	second number is result for code compiled with -fPIC flag,
+#	which is actually more relevant, because assembler code is
+#	position-independent;
+# (***)	see comment in non-MMX routine for further details;
+#
+# To summarize, it's >2-5 times faster than gcc-generated code. To
+# anchor it to something else SHA1 assembler processes one byte in
+# ~7 cycles on contemporary x86 cores. As for choice of MMX/SSE
+# in particular, see comment at the end of the file...
+
+# May 2010
+#
+# Add PCLMULQDQ version performing at 2.10 cycles per processed byte.
+# The question is how close is it to theoretical limit? The pclmulqdq
+# instruction latency appears to be 14 cycles and there can't be more
+# than 2 of them executing at any given time. This means that single
+# Karatsuba multiplication would take 28 cycles *plus* few cycles for
+# pre- and post-processing. Then multiplication has to be followed by
+# modulo-reduction. Given that aggregated reduction method [see
+# "Carry-less Multiplication and Its Usage for Computing the GCM Mode"
+# white paper by Intel] allows you to perform reduction only once in
+# a while we can assume that asymptotic performance can be estimated
+# as (28+Tmod/Naggr)/16, where Tmod is time to perform reduction
+# and Naggr is the aggregation factor.
+#
+# Before we proceed to this implementation let's have closer look at
+# the best-performing code suggested by Intel in their white paper.
+# By tracing inter-register dependencies Tmod is estimated as ~19
+# cycles and Naggr chosen by Intel is 4, resulting in 2.05 cycles per
+# processed byte. As implied, this is quite optimistic estimate,
+# because it does not account for Karatsuba pre- and post-processing,
+# which for a single multiplication is ~5 cycles. Unfortunately Intel
+# does not provide performance data for GHASH alone. But benchmarking
+# AES_GCM_encrypt ripped out of Fig. 15 of the white paper with aadt
+# alone resulted in 2.46 cycles per byte of out 16KB buffer. Note that
+# the result accounts even for pre-computing of degrees of the hash
+# key H, but its portion is negligible at 16KB buffer size.
+#
+# Moving on to the implementation in question. Tmod is estimated as
+# ~13 cycles and Naggr is 2, giving asymptotic performance of ...
+# 2.16. How is it possible that measured performance is better than
+# optimistic theoretical estimate? There is one thing Intel failed
+# to recognize. By serializing GHASH with CTR in same subroutine
+# former's performance is really limited to above (Tmul + Tmod/Naggr)
+# equation. But if GHASH procedure is detached, the modulo-reduction
+# can be interleaved with Naggr-1 multiplications at instruction level
+# and under ideal conditions even disappear from the equation. So that
+# optimistic theoretical estimate for this implementation is ...
+# 28/16=1.75, and not 2.16. Well, it's probably way too optimistic,
+# at least for such small Naggr. I'd argue that (28+Tproc/Naggr),
+# where Tproc is time required for Karatsuba pre- and post-processing,
+# is more realistic estimate. In this case it gives ... 1.91 cycles.
+# Or in other words, depending on how well we can interleave reduction
+# and one of the two multiplications the performance should be between
+# 1.91 and 2.16. As already mentioned, this implementation processes
+# one byte out of 8KB buffer in 2.10 cycles, while x86_64 counterpart
+# - in 2.02. x86_64 performance is better, because larger register
+# bank allows to interleave reduction and multiplication better.
+#
+# Does it make sense to increase Naggr? To start with it's virtually
+# impossible in 32-bit mode, because of limited register bank
+# capacity. Otherwise improvement has to be weighed agiainst slower
+# setup, as well as code size and complexity increase. As even
+# optimistic estimate doesn't promise 30% performance improvement,
+# there are currently no plans to increase Naggr.
+#
+# Special thanks to David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> for
+# providing access to a Westmere-based system on behalf of Intel
+# Open Source Technology Centre.
+
+# January 2010
+#
+# Tweaked to optimize transitions between integer and FP operations
+# on same XMM register, PCLMULQDQ subroutine was measured to process
+# one byte in 2.07 cycles on Sandy Bridge, and in 2.12 - on Westmere.
+# The minor regression on Westmere is outweighed by ~15% improvement
+# on Sandy Bridge. Strangely enough attempt to modify 64-bit code in
+# similar manner resulted in almost 20% degradation on Sandy Bridge,
+# where original 64-bit code processes one byte in 1.95 cycles.
+
+#####################################################################
+# For reference, AMD Bulldozer processes one byte in 1.98 cycles in
+# 32-bit mode and 1.89 in 64-bit.
+
+# February 2013
+#
+# Overhaul: aggregate Karatsuba post-processing, improve ILP in
+# reduction_alg9. Resulting performance is 1.96 cycles per byte on
+# Westmere, 1.95 - on Sandy/Ivy Bridge, 1.76 - on Bulldozer.
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm");
+require "x86asm.pl";
+
+$output=pop;
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+&asm_init($ARGV[0],"ghash-x86.pl",$x86only = $ARGV[$#ARGV] eq "386");
+
+$sse2=0;
+for (@ARGV) { $sse2=1 if (/-DOPENSSL_IA32_SSE2/); }
+
+($Zhh,$Zhl,$Zlh,$Zll) = ("ebp","edx","ecx","ebx");
+$inp  = "edi";
+$Htbl = "esi";
+
+$unroll = 0;	# Affects x86 loop. Folded loop performs ~7% worse
+		# than unrolled, which has to be weighted against
+		# 2.5x x86-specific code size reduction.
+
+sub x86_loop {
+    my $off = shift;
+    my $rem = "eax";
+
+	&mov	($Zhh,&DWP(4,$Htbl,$Zll));
+	&mov	($Zhl,&DWP(0,$Htbl,$Zll));
+	&mov	($Zlh,&DWP(12,$Htbl,$Zll));
+	&mov	($Zll,&DWP(8,$Htbl,$Zll));
+	&xor	($rem,$rem);	# avoid partial register stalls on PIII
+
+	# shrd practically kills P4, 2.5x deterioration, but P4 has
+	# MMX code-path to execute. shrd runs tad faster [than twice
+	# the shifts, move's and or's] on pre-MMX Pentium (as well as
+	# PIII and Core2), *but* minimizes code size, spares register
+	# and thus allows to fold the loop...
+	if (!$unroll) {
+	my $cnt = $inp;
+	&mov	($cnt,15);
+	&jmp	(&label("x86_loop"));
+	&set_label("x86_loop",16);
+	    for($i=1;$i<=2;$i++) {
+		&mov	(&LB($rem),&LB($Zll));
+		&shrd	($Zll,$Zlh,4);
+		&and	(&LB($rem),0xf);
+		&shrd	($Zlh,$Zhl,4);
+		&shrd	($Zhl,$Zhh,4);
+		&shr	($Zhh,4);
+		&xor	($Zhh,&DWP($off+16,"esp",$rem,4));
+
+		&mov	(&LB($rem),&BP($off,"esp",$cnt));
+		if ($i&1) {
+			&and	(&LB($rem),0xf0);
+		} else {
+			&shl	(&LB($rem),4);
+		}
+
+		&xor	($Zll,&DWP(8,$Htbl,$rem));
+		&xor	($Zlh,&DWP(12,$Htbl,$rem));
+		&xor	($Zhl,&DWP(0,$Htbl,$rem));
+		&xor	($Zhh,&DWP(4,$Htbl,$rem));
+
+		if ($i&1) {
+			&dec	($cnt);
+			&js	(&label("x86_break"));
+		} else {
+			&jmp	(&label("x86_loop"));
+		}
+	    }
+	&set_label("x86_break",16);
+	} else {
+	    for($i=1;$i<32;$i++) {
+		&comment($i);
+		&mov	(&LB($rem),&LB($Zll));
+		&shrd	($Zll,$Zlh,4);
+		&and	(&LB($rem),0xf);
+		&shrd	($Zlh,$Zhl,4);
+		&shrd	($Zhl,$Zhh,4);
+		&shr	($Zhh,4);
+		&xor	($Zhh,&DWP($off+16,"esp",$rem,4));
+
+		if ($i&1) {
+			&mov	(&LB($rem),&BP($off+15-($i>>1),"esp"));
+			&and	(&LB($rem),0xf0);
+		} else {
+			&mov	(&LB($rem),&BP($off+15-($i>>1),"esp"));
+			&shl	(&LB($rem),4);
+		}
+
+		&xor	($Zll,&DWP(8,$Htbl,$rem));
+		&xor	($Zlh,&DWP(12,$Htbl,$rem));
+		&xor	($Zhl,&DWP(0,$Htbl,$rem));
+		&xor	($Zhh,&DWP(4,$Htbl,$rem));
+	    }
+	}
+	&bswap	($Zll);
+	&bswap	($Zlh);
+	&bswap	($Zhl);
+	if (!$x86only) {
+		&bswap	($Zhh);
+	} else {
+		&mov	("eax",$Zhh);
+		&bswap	("eax");
+		&mov	($Zhh,"eax");
+	}
+}
+
+if ($unroll) {
+    &function_begin_B("_x86_gmult_4bit_inner");
+	&x86_loop(4);
+	&ret	();
+    &function_end_B("_x86_gmult_4bit_inner");
+}
+
+sub deposit_rem_4bit {
+    my $bias = shift;
+
+	&mov	(&DWP($bias+0, "esp"),0x0000<<16);
+	&mov	(&DWP($bias+4, "esp"),0x1C20<<16);
+	&mov	(&DWP($bias+8, "esp"),0x3840<<16);
+	&mov	(&DWP($bias+12,"esp"),0x2460<<16);
+	&mov	(&DWP($bias+16,"esp"),0x7080<<16);
+	&mov	(&DWP($bias+20,"esp"),0x6CA0<<16);
+	&mov	(&DWP($bias+24,"esp"),0x48C0<<16);
+	&mov	(&DWP($bias+28,"esp"),0x54E0<<16);
+	&mov	(&DWP($bias+32,"esp"),0xE100<<16);
+	&mov	(&DWP($bias+36,"esp"),0xFD20<<16);
+	&mov	(&DWP($bias+40,"esp"),0xD940<<16);
+	&mov	(&DWP($bias+44,"esp"),0xC560<<16);
+	&mov	(&DWP($bias+48,"esp"),0x9180<<16);
+	&mov	(&DWP($bias+52,"esp"),0x8DA0<<16);
+	&mov	(&DWP($bias+56,"esp"),0xA9C0<<16);
+	&mov	(&DWP($bias+60,"esp"),0xB5E0<<16);
+}
+
+$suffix = $x86only ? "" : "_x86";
+
+&function_begin("gcm_gmult_4bit".$suffix);
+	&stack_push(16+4+1);			# +1 for stack alignment
+	&mov	($inp,&wparam(0));		# load Xi
+	&mov	($Htbl,&wparam(1));		# load Htable
+
+	&mov	($Zhh,&DWP(0,$inp));		# load Xi[16]
+	&mov	($Zhl,&DWP(4,$inp));
+	&mov	($Zlh,&DWP(8,$inp));
+	&mov	($Zll,&DWP(12,$inp));
+
+	&deposit_rem_4bit(16);
+
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,"esp"),$Zhh);		# copy Xi[16] on stack
+	&mov	(&DWP(4,"esp"),$Zhl);
+	&mov	(&DWP(8,"esp"),$Zlh);
+	&mov	(&DWP(12,"esp"),$Zll);
+	&shr	($Zll,20);
+	&and	($Zll,0xf0);
+
+	if ($unroll) {
+		&call	("_x86_gmult_4bit_inner");
+	} else {
+		&x86_loop(0);
+		&mov	($inp,&wparam(0));
+	}
+
+	&mov	(&DWP(12,$inp),$Zll);
+	&mov	(&DWP(8,$inp),$Zlh);
+	&mov	(&DWP(4,$inp),$Zhl);
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,$inp),$Zhh);
+	&stack_pop(16+4+1);
+&function_end("gcm_gmult_4bit".$suffix);
+
+&function_begin("gcm_ghash_4bit".$suffix);
+	&stack_push(16+4+1);			# +1 for 64-bit alignment
+	&mov	($Zll,&wparam(0));		# load Xi
+	&mov	($Htbl,&wparam(1));		# load Htable
+	&mov	($inp,&wparam(2));		# load in
+	&mov	("ecx",&wparam(3));		# load len
+	&add	("ecx",$inp);
+	&mov	(&wparam(3),"ecx");
+
+	&mov	($Zhh,&DWP(0,$Zll));		# load Xi[16]
+	&mov	($Zhl,&DWP(4,$Zll));
+	&mov	($Zlh,&DWP(8,$Zll));
+	&mov	($Zll,&DWP(12,$Zll));
+
+	&deposit_rem_4bit(16);
+
+    &set_label("x86_outer_loop",16);
+	&xor	($Zll,&DWP(12,$inp));		# xor with input
+	&xor	($Zlh,&DWP(8,$inp));
+	&xor	($Zhl,&DWP(4,$inp));
+	&xor	($Zhh,&DWP(0,$inp));
+	&mov	(&DWP(12,"esp"),$Zll);		# dump it on stack
+	&mov	(&DWP(8,"esp"),$Zlh);
+	&mov	(&DWP(4,"esp"),$Zhl);
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,"esp"),$Zhh);
+
+	&shr	($Zll,20);
+	&and	($Zll,0xf0);
+
+	if ($unroll) {
+		&call	("_x86_gmult_4bit_inner");
+	} else {
+		&x86_loop(0);
+		&mov	($inp,&wparam(2));
+	}
+	&lea	($inp,&DWP(16,$inp));
+	&cmp	($inp,&wparam(3));
+	&mov	(&wparam(2),$inp)	if (!$unroll);
+	&jb	(&label("x86_outer_loop"));
+
+	&mov	($inp,&wparam(0));	# load Xi
+	&mov	(&DWP(12,$inp),$Zll);
+	&mov	(&DWP(8,$inp),$Zlh);
+	&mov	(&DWP(4,$inp),$Zhl);
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,$inp),$Zhh);
+	&stack_pop(16+4+1);
+&function_end("gcm_ghash_4bit".$suffix);
+
+if (!$x86only) {{{
+
+&static_label("rem_4bit");
+
+if (!$sse2) {{	# pure-MMX "May" version...
+
+$S=12;		# shift factor for rem_4bit
+
+&function_begin_B("_mmx_gmult_4bit_inner");
+# MMX version performs 3.5 times better on P4 (see comment in non-MMX
+# routine for further details), 100% better on Opteron, ~70% better
+# on Core2 and PIII... In other words effort is considered to be well
+# spent... Since initial release the loop was unrolled in order to
+# "liberate" register previously used as loop counter. Instead it's
+# used to optimize critical path in 'Z.hi ^= rem_4bit[Z.lo&0xf]'.
+# The path involves move of Z.lo from MMX to integer register,
+# effective address calculation and finally merge of value to Z.hi.
+# Reference to rem_4bit is scheduled so late that I had to >>4
+# rem_4bit elements. This resulted in 20-45% procent improvement
+# on contemporary µ-archs.
+{
+    my $cnt;
+    my $rem_4bit = "eax";
+    my @rem = ($Zhh,$Zll);
+    my $nhi = $Zhl;
+    my $nlo = $Zlh;
+
+    my ($Zlo,$Zhi) = ("mm0","mm1");
+    my $tmp = "mm2";
+
+	&xor	($nlo,$nlo);	# avoid partial register stalls on PIII
+	&mov	($nhi,$Zll);
+	&mov	(&LB($nlo),&LB($nhi));
+	&shl	(&LB($nlo),4);
+	&and	($nhi,0xf0);
+	&movq	($Zlo,&QWP(8,$Htbl,$nlo));
+	&movq	($Zhi,&QWP(0,$Htbl,$nlo));
+	&movd	($rem[0],$Zlo);
+
+	for ($cnt=28;$cnt>=-2;$cnt--) {
+	    my $odd = $cnt&1;
+	    my $nix = $odd ? $nlo : $nhi;
+
+		&shl	(&LB($nlo),4)			if ($odd);
+		&psrlq	($Zlo,4);
+		&movq	($tmp,$Zhi);
+		&psrlq	($Zhi,4);
+		&pxor	($Zlo,&QWP(8,$Htbl,$nix));
+		&mov	(&LB($nlo),&BP($cnt/2,$inp))	if (!$odd && $cnt>=0);
+		&psllq	($tmp,60);
+		&and	($nhi,0xf0)			if ($odd);
+		&pxor	($Zhi,&QWP(0,$rem_4bit,$rem[1],8)) if ($cnt<28);
+		&and	($rem[0],0xf);
+		&pxor	($Zhi,&QWP(0,$Htbl,$nix));
+		&mov	($nhi,$nlo)			if (!$odd && $cnt>=0);
+		&movd	($rem[1],$Zlo);
+		&pxor	($Zlo,$tmp);
+
+		push	(@rem,shift(@rem));		# "rotate" registers
+	}
+
+	&mov	($inp,&DWP(4,$rem_4bit,$rem[1],8));	# last rem_4bit[rem]
+
+	&psrlq	($Zlo,32);	# lower part of Zlo is already there
+	&movd	($Zhl,$Zhi);
+	&psrlq	($Zhi,32);
+	&movd	($Zlh,$Zlo);
+	&movd	($Zhh,$Zhi);
+	&shl	($inp,4);	# compensate for rem_4bit[i] being >>4
+
+	&bswap	($Zll);
+	&bswap	($Zhl);
+	&bswap	($Zlh);
+	&xor	($Zhh,$inp);
+	&bswap	($Zhh);
+
+	&ret	();
+}
+&function_end_B("_mmx_gmult_4bit_inner");
+
+&function_begin("gcm_gmult_4bit_mmx");
+	&mov	($inp,&wparam(0));	# load Xi
+	&mov	($Htbl,&wparam(1));	# load Htable
+
+	&call	(&label("pic_point"));
+	&set_label("pic_point");
+	&blindpop("eax");
+	&lea	("eax",&DWP(&label("rem_4bit")."-".&label("pic_point"),"eax"));
+
+	&movz	($Zll,&BP(15,$inp));
+
+	&call	("_mmx_gmult_4bit_inner");
+
+	&mov	($inp,&wparam(0));	# load Xi
+	&emms	();
+	&mov	(&DWP(12,$inp),$Zll);
+	&mov	(&DWP(4,$inp),$Zhl);
+	&mov	(&DWP(8,$inp),$Zlh);
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,$inp),$Zhh);
+&function_end("gcm_gmult_4bit_mmx");
+
+# Streamed version performs 20% better on P4, 7% on Opteron,
+# 10% on Core2 and PIII...
+&function_begin("gcm_ghash_4bit_mmx");
+	&mov	($Zhh,&wparam(0));	# load Xi
+	&mov	($Htbl,&wparam(1));	# load Htable
+	&mov	($inp,&wparam(2));	# load in
+	&mov	($Zlh,&wparam(3));	# load len
+
+	&call	(&label("pic_point"));
+	&set_label("pic_point");
+	&blindpop("eax");
+	&lea	("eax",&DWP(&label("rem_4bit")."-".&label("pic_point"),"eax"));
+
+	&add	($Zlh,$inp);
+	&mov	(&wparam(3),$Zlh);	# len to point at the end of input
+	&stack_push(4+1);		# +1 for stack alignment
+
+	&mov	($Zll,&DWP(12,$Zhh));	# load Xi[16]
+	&mov	($Zhl,&DWP(4,$Zhh));
+	&mov	($Zlh,&DWP(8,$Zhh));
+	&mov	($Zhh,&DWP(0,$Zhh));
+	&jmp	(&label("mmx_outer_loop"));
+
+    &set_label("mmx_outer_loop",16);
+	&xor	($Zll,&DWP(12,$inp));
+	&xor	($Zhl,&DWP(4,$inp));
+	&xor	($Zlh,&DWP(8,$inp));
+	&xor	($Zhh,&DWP(0,$inp));
+	&mov	(&wparam(2),$inp);
+	&mov	(&DWP(12,"esp"),$Zll);
+	&mov	(&DWP(4,"esp"),$Zhl);
+	&mov	(&DWP(8,"esp"),$Zlh);
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,"esp"),$Zhh);
+
+	&mov	($inp,"esp");
+	&shr	($Zll,24);
+
+	&call	("_mmx_gmult_4bit_inner");
+
+	&mov	($inp,&wparam(2));
+	&lea	($inp,&DWP(16,$inp));
+	&cmp	($inp,&wparam(3));
+	&jb	(&label("mmx_outer_loop"));
+
+	&mov	($inp,&wparam(0));	# load Xi
+	&emms	();
+	&mov	(&DWP(12,$inp),$Zll);
+	&mov	(&DWP(4,$inp),$Zhl);
+	&mov	(&DWP(8,$inp),$Zlh);
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,$inp),$Zhh);
+
+	&stack_pop(4+1);
+&function_end("gcm_ghash_4bit_mmx");
+
+}} else {{	# "June" MMX version...
+		# ... has slower "April" gcm_gmult_4bit_mmx with folded
+		# loop. This is done to conserve code size...
+$S=16;		# shift factor for rem_4bit
+
+sub mmx_loop() {
+# MMX version performs 2.8 times better on P4 (see comment in non-MMX
+# routine for further details), 40% better on Opteron and Core2, 50%
+# better on PIII... In other words effort is considered to be well
+# spent...
+    my $inp = shift;
+    my $rem_4bit = shift;
+    my $cnt = $Zhh;
+    my $nhi = $Zhl;
+    my $nlo = $Zlh;
+    my $rem = $Zll;
+
+    my ($Zlo,$Zhi) = ("mm0","mm1");
+    my $tmp = "mm2";
+
+	&xor	($nlo,$nlo);	# avoid partial register stalls on PIII
+	&mov	($nhi,$Zll);
+	&mov	(&LB($nlo),&LB($nhi));
+	&mov	($cnt,14);
+	&shl	(&LB($nlo),4);
+	&and	($nhi,0xf0);
+	&movq	($Zlo,&QWP(8,$Htbl,$nlo));
+	&movq	($Zhi,&QWP(0,$Htbl,$nlo));
+	&movd	($rem,$Zlo);
+	&jmp	(&label("mmx_loop"));
+
+    &set_label("mmx_loop",16);
+	&psrlq	($Zlo,4);
+	&and	($rem,0xf);
+	&movq	($tmp,$Zhi);
+	&psrlq	($Zhi,4);
+	&pxor	($Zlo,&QWP(8,$Htbl,$nhi));
+	&mov	(&LB($nlo),&BP(0,$inp,$cnt));
+	&psllq	($tmp,60);
+	&pxor	($Zhi,&QWP(0,$rem_4bit,$rem,8));
+	&dec	($cnt);
+	&movd	($rem,$Zlo);
+	&pxor	($Zhi,&QWP(0,$Htbl,$nhi));
+	&mov	($nhi,$nlo);
+	&pxor	($Zlo,$tmp);
+	&js	(&label("mmx_break"));
+
+	&shl	(&LB($nlo),4);
+	&and	($rem,0xf);
+	&psrlq	($Zlo,4);
+	&and	($nhi,0xf0);
+	&movq	($tmp,$Zhi);
+	&psrlq	($Zhi,4);
+	&pxor	($Zlo,&QWP(8,$Htbl,$nlo));
+	&psllq	($tmp,60);
+	&pxor	($Zhi,&QWP(0,$rem_4bit,$rem,8));
+	&movd	($rem,$Zlo);
+	&pxor	($Zhi,&QWP(0,$Htbl,$nlo));
+	&pxor	($Zlo,$tmp);
+	&jmp	(&label("mmx_loop"));
+
+    &set_label("mmx_break",16);
+	&shl	(&LB($nlo),4);
+	&and	($rem,0xf);
+	&psrlq	($Zlo,4);
+	&and	($nhi,0xf0);
+	&movq	($tmp,$Zhi);
+	&psrlq	($Zhi,4);
+	&pxor	($Zlo,&QWP(8,$Htbl,$nlo));
+	&psllq	($tmp,60);
+	&pxor	($Zhi,&QWP(0,$rem_4bit,$rem,8));
+	&movd	($rem,$Zlo);
+	&pxor	($Zhi,&QWP(0,$Htbl,$nlo));
+	&pxor	($Zlo,$tmp);
+
+	&psrlq	($Zlo,4);
+	&and	($rem,0xf);
+	&movq	($tmp,$Zhi);
+	&psrlq	($Zhi,4);
+	&pxor	($Zlo,&QWP(8,$Htbl,$nhi));
+	&psllq	($tmp,60);
+	&pxor	($Zhi,&QWP(0,$rem_4bit,$rem,8));
+	&movd	($rem,$Zlo);
+	&pxor	($Zhi,&QWP(0,$Htbl,$nhi));
+	&pxor	($Zlo,$tmp);
+
+	&psrlq	($Zlo,32);	# lower part of Zlo is already there
+	&movd	($Zhl,$Zhi);
+	&psrlq	($Zhi,32);
+	&movd	($Zlh,$Zlo);
+	&movd	($Zhh,$Zhi);
+
+	&bswap	($Zll);
+	&bswap	($Zhl);
+	&bswap	($Zlh);
+	&bswap	($Zhh);
+}
+
+&function_begin("gcm_gmult_4bit_mmx");
+	&mov	($inp,&wparam(0));	# load Xi
+	&mov	($Htbl,&wparam(1));	# load Htable
+
+	&call	(&label("pic_point"));
+	&set_label("pic_point");
+	&blindpop("eax");
+	&lea	("eax",&DWP(&label("rem_4bit")."-".&label("pic_point"),"eax"));
+
+	&movz	($Zll,&BP(15,$inp));
+
+	&mmx_loop($inp,"eax");
+
+	&emms	();
+	&mov	(&DWP(12,$inp),$Zll);
+	&mov	(&DWP(4,$inp),$Zhl);
+	&mov	(&DWP(8,$inp),$Zlh);
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,$inp),$Zhh);
+&function_end("gcm_gmult_4bit_mmx");
+
+######################################################################
+# Below subroutine is "528B" variant of "4-bit" GCM GHASH function
+# (see gcm128.c for details). It provides further 20-40% performance
+# improvement over above mentioned "May" version.
+
+&static_label("rem_8bit");
+
+&function_begin("gcm_ghash_4bit_mmx");
+{ my ($Zlo,$Zhi) = ("mm7","mm6");
+  my $rem_8bit = "esi";
+  my $Htbl = "ebx";
+
+    # parameter block
+    &mov	("eax",&wparam(0));		# Xi
+    &mov	("ebx",&wparam(1));		# Htable
+    &mov	("ecx",&wparam(2));		# inp
+    &mov	("edx",&wparam(3));		# len
+    &mov	("ebp","esp");			# original %esp
+    &call	(&label("pic_point"));
+    &set_label	("pic_point");
+    &blindpop	($rem_8bit);
+    &lea	($rem_8bit,&DWP(&label("rem_8bit")."-".&label("pic_point"),$rem_8bit));
+
+    &sub	("esp",512+16+16);		# allocate stack frame...
+    &and	("esp",-64);			# ...and align it
+    &sub	("esp",16);			# place for (u8)(H[]<<4)
+
+    &add	("edx","ecx");			# pointer to the end of input
+    &mov	(&DWP(528+16+0,"esp"),"eax");	# save Xi
+    &mov	(&DWP(528+16+8,"esp"),"edx");	# save inp+len
+    &mov	(&DWP(528+16+12,"esp"),"ebp");	# save original %esp
+
+    { my @lo  = ("mm0","mm1","mm2");
+      my @hi  = ("mm3","mm4","mm5");
+      my @tmp = ("mm6","mm7");
+      my ($off1,$off2,$i) = (0,0,);
+
+      &add	($Htbl,128);			# optimize for size
+      &lea	("edi",&DWP(16+128,"esp"));
+      &lea	("ebp",&DWP(16+256+128,"esp"));
+
+      # decompose Htable (low and high parts are kept separately),
+      # generate Htable[]>>4, (u8)(Htable[]<<4), save to stack...
+      for ($i=0;$i<18;$i++) {
+
+	&mov	("edx",&DWP(16*$i+8-128,$Htbl))		if ($i<16);
+	&movq	($lo[0],&QWP(16*$i+8-128,$Htbl))	if ($i<16);
+	&psllq	($tmp[1],60)				if ($i>1);
+	&movq	($hi[0],&QWP(16*$i+0-128,$Htbl))	if ($i<16);
+	&por	($lo[2],$tmp[1])			if ($i>1);
+	&movq	(&QWP($off1-128,"edi"),$lo[1])		if ($i>0 && $i<17);
+	&psrlq	($lo[1],4)				if ($i>0 && $i<17);
+	&movq	(&QWP($off1,"edi"),$hi[1])		if ($i>0 && $i<17);
+	&movq	($tmp[0],$hi[1])			if ($i>0 && $i<17);
+	&movq	(&QWP($off2-128,"ebp"),$lo[2])		if ($i>1);
+	&psrlq	($hi[1],4)				if ($i>0 && $i<17);
+	&movq	(&QWP($off2,"ebp"),$hi[2])		if ($i>1);
+	&shl	("edx",4)				if ($i<16);
+	&mov	(&BP($i,"esp"),&LB("edx"))		if ($i<16);
+
+	unshift	(@lo,pop(@lo));			# "rotate" registers
+	unshift	(@hi,pop(@hi));
+	unshift	(@tmp,pop(@tmp));
+	$off1 += 8	if ($i>0);
+	$off2 += 8	if ($i>1);
+      }
+    }
+
+    &movq	($Zhi,&QWP(0,"eax"));
+    &mov	("ebx",&DWP(8,"eax"));
+    &mov	("edx",&DWP(12,"eax"));		# load Xi
+
+&set_label("outer",16);
+  { my $nlo = "eax";
+    my $dat = "edx";
+    my @nhi = ("edi","ebp");
+    my @rem = ("ebx","ecx");
+    my @red = ("mm0","mm1","mm2");
+    my $tmp = "mm3";
+
+    &xor	($dat,&DWP(12,"ecx"));		# merge input data
+    &xor	("ebx",&DWP(8,"ecx"));
+    &pxor	($Zhi,&QWP(0,"ecx"));
+    &lea	("ecx",&DWP(16,"ecx"));		# inp+=16
+    #&mov	(&DWP(528+12,"esp"),$dat);	# save inp^Xi
+    &mov	(&DWP(528+8,"esp"),"ebx");
+    &movq	(&QWP(528+0,"esp"),$Zhi);
+    &mov	(&DWP(528+16+4,"esp"),"ecx");	# save inp
+
+    &xor	($nlo,$nlo);
+    &rol	($dat,8);
+    &mov	(&LB($nlo),&LB($dat));
+    &mov	($nhi[1],$nlo);
+    &and	(&LB($nlo),0x0f);
+    &shr	($nhi[1],4);
+    &pxor	($red[0],$red[0]);
+    &rol	($dat,8);			# next byte
+    &pxor	($red[1],$red[1]);
+    &pxor	($red[2],$red[2]);
+
+    # Just like in "May" version modulo-schedule for critical path in
+    # 'Z.hi ^= rem_8bit[Z.lo&0xff^((u8)H[nhi]<<4)]<<48'. Final 'pxor'
+    # is scheduled so late that rem_8bit[] has to be shifted *right*
+    # by 16, which is why last argument to pinsrw is 2, which
+    # corresponds to <<32=<<48>>16...
+    for ($j=11,$i=0;$i<15;$i++) {
+
+      if ($i>0) {
+	&pxor	($Zlo,&QWP(16,"esp",$nlo,8));		# Z^=H[nlo]
+	&rol	($dat,8);				# next byte
+	&pxor	($Zhi,&QWP(16+128,"esp",$nlo,8));
+
+	&pxor	($Zlo,$tmp);
+	&pxor	($Zhi,&QWP(16+256+128,"esp",$nhi[0],8));
+	&xor	(&LB($rem[1]),&BP(0,"esp",$nhi[0]));	# rem^(H[nhi]<<4)
+      } else {
+	&movq	($Zlo,&QWP(16,"esp",$nlo,8));
+	&movq	($Zhi,&QWP(16+128,"esp",$nlo,8));
+      }
+
+	&mov	(&LB($nlo),&LB($dat));
+	&mov	($dat,&DWP(528+$j,"esp"))		if (--$j%4==0);
+
+	&movd	($rem[0],$Zlo);
+	&movz	($rem[1],&LB($rem[1]))			if ($i>0);
+	&psrlq	($Zlo,8);				# Z>>=8
+
+	&movq	($tmp,$Zhi);
+	&mov	($nhi[0],$nlo);
+	&psrlq	($Zhi,8);
+
+	&pxor	($Zlo,&QWP(16+256+0,"esp",$nhi[1],8));	# Z^=H[nhi]>>4
+	&and	(&LB($nlo),0x0f);
+	&psllq	($tmp,56);
+
+	&pxor	($Zhi,$red[1])				if ($i>1);
+	&shr	($nhi[0],4);
+	&pinsrw	($red[0],&WP(0,$rem_8bit,$rem[1],2),2)	if ($i>0);
+
+	unshift	(@red,pop(@red));			# "rotate" registers
+	unshift	(@rem,pop(@rem));
+	unshift	(@nhi,pop(@nhi));
+    }
+
+    &pxor	($Zlo,&QWP(16,"esp",$nlo,8));		# Z^=H[nlo]
+    &pxor	($Zhi,&QWP(16+128,"esp",$nlo,8));
+    &xor	(&LB($rem[1]),&BP(0,"esp",$nhi[0]));	# rem^(H[nhi]<<4)
+
+    &pxor	($Zlo,$tmp);
+    &pxor	($Zhi,&QWP(16+256+128,"esp",$nhi[0],8));
+    &movz	($rem[1],&LB($rem[1]));
+
+    &pxor	($red[2],$red[2]);			# clear 2nd word
+    &psllq	($red[1],4);
+
+    &movd	($rem[0],$Zlo);
+    &psrlq	($Zlo,4);				# Z>>=4
+
+    &movq	($tmp,$Zhi);
+    &psrlq	($Zhi,4);
+    &shl	($rem[0],4);				# rem<<4
+
+    &pxor	($Zlo,&QWP(16,"esp",$nhi[1],8));	# Z^=H[nhi]
+    &psllq	($tmp,60);
+    &movz	($rem[0],&LB($rem[0]));
+
+    &pxor	($Zlo,$tmp);
+    &pxor	($Zhi,&QWP(16+128,"esp",$nhi[1],8));
+
+    &pinsrw	($red[0],&WP(0,$rem_8bit,$rem[1],2),2);
+    &pxor	($Zhi,$red[1]);
+
+    &movd	($dat,$Zlo);
+    &pinsrw	($red[2],&WP(0,$rem_8bit,$rem[0],2),3);	# last is <<48
+
+    &psllq	($red[0],12);				# correct by <<16>>4
+    &pxor	($Zhi,$red[0]);
+    &psrlq	($Zlo,32);
+    &pxor	($Zhi,$red[2]);
+
+    &mov	("ecx",&DWP(528+16+4,"esp"));	# restore inp
+    &movd	("ebx",$Zlo);
+    &movq	($tmp,$Zhi);			# 01234567
+    &psllw	($Zhi,8);			# 1.3.5.7.
+    &psrlw	($tmp,8);			# .0.2.4.6
+    &por	($Zhi,$tmp);			# 10325476
+    &bswap	($dat);
+    &pshufw	($Zhi,$Zhi,0b00011011);		# 76543210
+    &bswap	("ebx");
+    
+    &cmp	("ecx",&DWP(528+16+8,"esp"));	# are we done?
+    &jne	(&label("outer"));
+  }
+
+    &mov	("eax",&DWP(528+16+0,"esp"));	# restore Xi
+    &mov	(&DWP(12,"eax"),"edx");
+    &mov	(&DWP(8,"eax"),"ebx");
+    &movq	(&QWP(0,"eax"),$Zhi);
+
+    &mov	("esp",&DWP(528+16+12,"esp"));	# restore original %esp
+    &emms	();
+}
+&function_end("gcm_ghash_4bit_mmx");
+}}
+
+if ($sse2) {{
+######################################################################
+# PCLMULQDQ version.
+
+$Xip="eax";
+$Htbl="edx";
+$const="ecx";
+$inp="esi";
+$len="ebx";
+
+($Xi,$Xhi)=("xmm0","xmm1");	$Hkey="xmm2";
+($T1,$T2,$T3)=("xmm3","xmm4","xmm5");
+($Xn,$Xhn)=("xmm6","xmm7");
+
+&static_label("bswap");
+
+sub clmul64x64_T2 {	# minimal "register" pressure
+my ($Xhi,$Xi,$Hkey,$HK)=@_;
+
+	&movdqa		($Xhi,$Xi);		#
+	&pshufd		($T1,$Xi,0b01001110);
+	&pshufd		($T2,$Hkey,0b01001110)	if (!defined($HK));
+	&pxor		($T1,$Xi);		#
+	&pxor		($T2,$Hkey)		if (!defined($HK));
+			$HK=$T2			if (!defined($HK));
+
+	&pclmulqdq	($Xi,$Hkey,0x00);	#######
+	&pclmulqdq	($Xhi,$Hkey,0x11);	#######
+	&pclmulqdq	($T1,$HK,0x00);		#######
+	&xorps		($T1,$Xi);		#
+	&xorps		($T1,$Xhi);		#
+
+	&movdqa		($T2,$T1);		#
+	&psrldq		($T1,8);
+	&pslldq		($T2,8);		#
+	&pxor		($Xhi,$T1);
+	&pxor		($Xi,$T2);		#
+}
+
+sub clmul64x64_T3 {
+# Even though this subroutine offers visually better ILP, it
+# was empirically found to be a tad slower than above version.
+# At least in gcm_ghash_clmul context. But it's just as well,
+# because loop modulo-scheduling is possible only thanks to
+# minimized "register" pressure...
+my ($Xhi,$Xi,$Hkey)=@_;
+
+	&movdqa		($T1,$Xi);		#
+	&movdqa		($Xhi,$Xi);
+	&pclmulqdq	($Xi,$Hkey,0x00);	#######
+	&pclmulqdq	($Xhi,$Hkey,0x11);	#######
+	&pshufd		($T2,$T1,0b01001110);	#
+	&pshufd		($T3,$Hkey,0b01001110);
+	&pxor		($T2,$T1);		#
+	&pxor		($T3,$Hkey);
+	&pclmulqdq	($T2,$T3,0x00);		#######
+	&pxor		($T2,$Xi);		#
+	&pxor		($T2,$Xhi);		#
+
+	&movdqa		($T3,$T2);		#
+	&psrldq		($T2,8);
+	&pslldq		($T3,8);		#
+	&pxor		($Xhi,$T2);
+	&pxor		($Xi,$T3);		#
+}
+
+if (1) {		# Algorithm 9 with <<1 twist.
+			# Reduction is shorter and uses only two
+			# temporary registers, which makes it better
+			# candidate for interleaving with 64x64
+			# multiplication. Pre-modulo-scheduled loop
+			# was found to be ~20% faster than Algorithm 5
+			# below. Algorithm 9 was therefore chosen for
+			# further optimization...
+
+sub reduction_alg9 {	# 17/11 times faster than Intel version
+my ($Xhi,$Xi) = @_;
+
+	# 1st phase
+	&movdqa		($T2,$Xi);		#
+	&movdqa		($T1,$Xi);
+	&psllq		($Xi,5);
+	&pxor		($T1,$Xi);		#
+	&psllq		($Xi,1);
+	&pxor		($Xi,$T1);		#
+	&psllq		($Xi,57);		#
+	&movdqa		($T1,$Xi);		#
+	&pslldq		($Xi,8);
+	&psrldq		($T1,8);		#	
+	&pxor		($Xi,$T2);
+	&pxor		($Xhi,$T1);		#
+
+	# 2nd phase
+	&movdqa		($T2,$Xi);
+	&psrlq		($Xi,1);
+	&pxor		($Xhi,$T2);		#
+	&pxor		($T2,$Xi);
+	&psrlq		($Xi,5);
+	&pxor		($Xi,$T2);		#
+	&psrlq		($Xi,1);		#
+	&pxor		($Xi,$Xhi)		#
+}
+
+&function_begin_B("gcm_init_clmul");
+	&mov		($Htbl,&wparam(0));
+	&mov		($Xip,&wparam(1));
+
+	&call		(&label("pic"));
+&set_label("pic");
+	&blindpop	($const);
+	&lea		($const,&DWP(&label("bswap")."-".&label("pic"),$const));
+
+	&movdqu		($Hkey,&QWP(0,$Xip));
+	&pshufd		($Hkey,$Hkey,0b01001110);# dword swap
+
+	# <<1 twist
+	&pshufd		($T2,$Hkey,0b11111111);	# broadcast uppermost dword
+	&movdqa		($T1,$Hkey);
+	&psllq		($Hkey,1);
+	&pxor		($T3,$T3);		#
+	&psrlq		($T1,63);
+	&pcmpgtd	($T3,$T2);		# broadcast carry bit
+	&pslldq		($T1,8);
+	&por		($Hkey,$T1);		# H<<=1
+
+	# magic reduction
+	&pand		($T3,&QWP(16,$const));	# 0x1c2_polynomial
+	&pxor		($Hkey,$T3);		# if(carry) H^=0x1c2_polynomial
+
+	# calculate H^2
+	&movdqa		($Xi,$Hkey);
+	&clmul64x64_T2	($Xhi,$Xi,$Hkey);
+	&reduction_alg9	($Xhi,$Xi);
+
+	&pshufd		($T1,$Hkey,0b01001110);
+	&pshufd		($T2,$Xi,0b01001110);
+	&pxor		($T1,$Hkey);		# Karatsuba pre-processing
+	&movdqu		(&QWP(0,$Htbl),$Hkey);	# save H
+	&pxor		($T2,$Xi);		# Karatsuba pre-processing
+	&movdqu		(&QWP(16,$Htbl),$Xi);	# save H^2
+	&palignr	($T2,$T1,8);		# low part is H.lo^H.hi
+	&movdqu		(&QWP(32,$Htbl),$T2);	# save Karatsuba "salt"
+
+	&ret		();
+&function_end_B("gcm_init_clmul");
+
+&function_begin_B("gcm_gmult_clmul");
+	&mov		($Xip,&wparam(0));
+	&mov		($Htbl,&wparam(1));
+
+	&call		(&label("pic"));
+&set_label("pic");
+	&blindpop	($const);
+	&lea		($const,&DWP(&label("bswap")."-".&label("pic"),$const));
+
+	&movdqu		($Xi,&QWP(0,$Xip));
+	&movdqa		($T3,&QWP(0,$const));
+	&movups		($Hkey,&QWP(0,$Htbl));
+	&pshufb		($Xi,$T3);
+	&movups		($T2,&QWP(32,$Htbl));
+
+	&clmul64x64_T2	($Xhi,$Xi,$Hkey,$T2);
+	&reduction_alg9	($Xhi,$Xi);
+
+	&pshufb		($Xi,$T3);
+	&movdqu		(&QWP(0,$Xip),$Xi);
+
+	&ret	();
+&function_end_B("gcm_gmult_clmul");
+
+&function_begin("gcm_ghash_clmul");
+	&mov		($Xip,&wparam(0));
+	&mov		($Htbl,&wparam(1));
+	&mov		($inp,&wparam(2));
+	&mov		($len,&wparam(3));
+
+	&call		(&label("pic"));
+&set_label("pic");
+	&blindpop	($const);
+	&lea		($const,&DWP(&label("bswap")."-".&label("pic"),$const));
+
+	&movdqu		($Xi,&QWP(0,$Xip));
+	&movdqa		($T3,&QWP(0,$const));
+	&movdqu		($Hkey,&QWP(0,$Htbl));
+	&pshufb		($Xi,$T3);
+
+	&sub		($len,0x10);
+	&jz		(&label("odd_tail"));
+
+	#######
+	# Xi+2 =[H*(Ii+1 + Xi+1)] mod P =
+	#	[(H*Ii+1) + (H*Xi+1)] mod P =
+	#	[(H*Ii+1) + H^2*(Ii+Xi)] mod P
+	#
+	&movdqu		($T1,&QWP(0,$inp));	# Ii
+	&movdqu		($Xn,&QWP(16,$inp));	# Ii+1
+	&pshufb		($T1,$T3);
+	&pshufb		($Xn,$T3);
+	&movdqu		($T3,&QWP(32,$Htbl));
+	&pxor		($Xi,$T1);		# Ii+Xi
+
+	&pshufd		($T1,$Xn,0b01001110);	# H*Ii+1
+	&movdqa		($Xhn,$Xn);
+	&pxor		($T1,$Xn);		#
+	&lea		($inp,&DWP(32,$inp));	# i+=2
+
+	&pclmulqdq	($Xn,$Hkey,0x00);	#######
+	&pclmulqdq	($Xhn,$Hkey,0x11);	#######
+	&pclmulqdq	($T1,$T3,0x00);		#######
+	&movups		($Hkey,&QWP(16,$Htbl));	# load H^2
+	&nop		();
+
+	&sub		($len,0x20);
+	&jbe		(&label("even_tail"));
+	&jmp		(&label("mod_loop"));
+
+&set_label("mod_loop",32);
+	&pshufd		($T2,$Xi,0b01001110);	# H^2*(Ii+Xi)
+	&movdqa		($Xhi,$Xi);
+	&pxor		($T2,$Xi);		#
+	&nop		();
+
+	&pclmulqdq	($Xi,$Hkey,0x00);	#######
+	&pclmulqdq	($Xhi,$Hkey,0x11);	#######
+	&pclmulqdq	($T2,$T3,0x10);		#######
+	&movups		($Hkey,&QWP(0,$Htbl));	# load H
+
+	&xorps		($Xi,$Xn);		# (H*Ii+1) + H^2*(Ii+Xi)
+	&movdqa		($T3,&QWP(0,$const));
+	&xorps		($Xhi,$Xhn);
+	 &movdqu	($Xhn,&QWP(0,$inp));	# Ii
+	&pxor		($T1,$Xi);		# aggregated Karatsuba post-processing
+	 &movdqu	($Xn,&QWP(16,$inp));	# Ii+1
+	&pxor		($T1,$Xhi);		#
+
+	 &pshufb	($Xhn,$T3);
+	&pxor		($T2,$T1);		#
+
+	&movdqa		($T1,$T2);		#
+	&psrldq		($T2,8);
+	&pslldq		($T1,8);		#
+	&pxor		($Xhi,$T2);
+	&pxor		($Xi,$T1);		#
+	 &pshufb	($Xn,$T3);
+	 &pxor		($Xhi,$Xhn);		# "Ii+Xi", consume early
+
+	&movdqa		($Xhn,$Xn);		#&clmul64x64_TX	($Xhn,$Xn,$Hkey); H*Ii+1
+	  &movdqa	($T2,$Xi);		#&reduction_alg9($Xhi,$Xi); 1st phase
+	  &movdqa	($T1,$Xi);
+	  &psllq	($Xi,5);
+	  &pxor		($T1,$Xi);		#
+	  &psllq	($Xi,1);
+	  &pxor		($Xi,$T1);		#
+	&pclmulqdq	($Xn,$Hkey,0x00);	#######
+	&movups		($T3,&QWP(32,$Htbl));
+	  &psllq	($Xi,57);		#
+	  &movdqa	($T1,$Xi);		#
+	  &pslldq	($Xi,8);
+	  &psrldq	($T1,8);		#	
+	  &pxor		($Xi,$T2);
+	  &pxor		($Xhi,$T1);		#
+	&pshufd		($T1,$Xhn,0b01001110);
+	  &movdqa	($T2,$Xi);		# 2nd phase
+	  &psrlq	($Xi,1);
+	&pxor		($T1,$Xhn);
+	  &pxor		($Xhi,$T2);		#
+	&pclmulqdq	($Xhn,$Hkey,0x11);	#######
+	&movups		($Hkey,&QWP(16,$Htbl));	# load H^2
+	  &pxor		($T2,$Xi);
+	  &psrlq	($Xi,5);
+	  &pxor		($Xi,$T2);		#
+	  &psrlq	($Xi,1);		#
+	  &pxor		($Xi,$Xhi)		#
+	&pclmulqdq	($T1,$T3,0x00);		#######
+
+	&lea		($inp,&DWP(32,$inp));
+	&sub		($len,0x20);
+	&ja		(&label("mod_loop"));
+
+&set_label("even_tail");
+	&pshufd		($T2,$Xi,0b01001110);	# H^2*(Ii+Xi)
+	&movdqa		($Xhi,$Xi);
+	&pxor		($T2,$Xi);		#
+
+	&pclmulqdq	($Xi,$Hkey,0x00);	#######
+	&pclmulqdq	($Xhi,$Hkey,0x11);	#######
+	&pclmulqdq	($T2,$T3,0x10);		#######
+	&movdqa		($T3,&QWP(0,$const));
+
+	&xorps		($Xi,$Xn);		# (H*Ii+1) + H^2*(Ii+Xi)
+	&xorps		($Xhi,$Xhn);
+	&pxor		($T1,$Xi);		# aggregated Karatsuba post-processing
+	&pxor		($T1,$Xhi);		#
+
+	&pxor		($T2,$T1);		#
+
+	&movdqa		($T1,$T2);		#
+	&psrldq		($T2,8);
+	&pslldq		($T1,8);		#
+	&pxor		($Xhi,$T2);
+	&pxor		($Xi,$T1);		#
+
+	&reduction_alg9	($Xhi,$Xi);
+
+	&test		($len,$len);
+	&jnz		(&label("done"));
+
+	&movups		($Hkey,&QWP(0,$Htbl));	# load H
+&set_label("odd_tail");
+	&movdqu		($T1,&QWP(0,$inp));	# Ii
+	&pshufb		($T1,$T3);
+	&pxor		($Xi,$T1);		# Ii+Xi
+
+	&clmul64x64_T2	($Xhi,$Xi,$Hkey);	# H*(Ii+Xi)
+	&reduction_alg9	($Xhi,$Xi);
+
+&set_label("done");
+	&pshufb		($Xi,$T3);
+	&movdqu		(&QWP(0,$Xip),$Xi);
+&function_end("gcm_ghash_clmul");
+
+} else {		# Algorithm 5. Kept for reference purposes.
+
+sub reduction_alg5 {	# 19/16 times faster than Intel version
+my ($Xhi,$Xi)=@_;
+
+	# <<1
+	&movdqa		($T1,$Xi);		#
+	&movdqa		($T2,$Xhi);
+	&pslld		($Xi,1);
+	&pslld		($Xhi,1);		#
+	&psrld		($T1,31);
+	&psrld		($T2,31);		#
+	&movdqa		($T3,$T1);
+	&pslldq		($T1,4);
+	&psrldq		($T3,12);		#
+	&pslldq		($T2,4);
+	&por		($Xhi,$T3);		#
+	&por		($Xi,$T1);
+	&por		($Xhi,$T2);		#
+
+	# 1st phase
+	&movdqa		($T1,$Xi);
+	&movdqa		($T2,$Xi);
+	&movdqa		($T3,$Xi);		#
+	&pslld		($T1,31);
+	&pslld		($T2,30);
+	&pslld		($Xi,25);		#
+	&pxor		($T1,$T2);
+	&pxor		($T1,$Xi);		#
+	&movdqa		($T2,$T1);		#
+	&pslldq		($T1,12);
+	&psrldq		($T2,4);		#
+	&pxor		($T3,$T1);
+
+	# 2nd phase
+	&pxor		($Xhi,$T3);		#
+	&movdqa		($Xi,$T3);
+	&movdqa		($T1,$T3);
+	&psrld		($Xi,1);		#
+	&psrld		($T1,2);
+	&psrld		($T3,7);		#
+	&pxor		($Xi,$T1);
+	&pxor		($Xhi,$T2);
+	&pxor		($Xi,$T3);		#
+	&pxor		($Xi,$Xhi);		#
+}
+
+&function_begin_B("gcm_init_clmul");
+	&mov		($Htbl,&wparam(0));
+	&mov		($Xip,&wparam(1));
+
+	&call		(&label("pic"));
+&set_label("pic");
+	&blindpop	($const);
+	&lea		($const,&DWP(&label("bswap")."-".&label("pic"),$const));
+
+	&movdqu		($Hkey,&QWP(0,$Xip));
+	&pshufd		($Hkey,$Hkey,0b01001110);# dword swap
+
+	# calculate H^2
+	&movdqa		($Xi,$Hkey);
+	&clmul64x64_T3	($Xhi,$Xi,$Hkey);
+	&reduction_alg5	($Xhi,$Xi);
+
+	&movdqu		(&QWP(0,$Htbl),$Hkey);	# save H
+	&movdqu		(&QWP(16,$Htbl),$Xi);	# save H^2
+
+	&ret		();
+&function_end_B("gcm_init_clmul");
+
+&function_begin_B("gcm_gmult_clmul");
+	&mov		($Xip,&wparam(0));
+	&mov		($Htbl,&wparam(1));
+
+	&call		(&label("pic"));
+&set_label("pic");
+	&blindpop	($const);
+	&lea		($const,&DWP(&label("bswap")."-".&label("pic"),$const));
+
+	&movdqu		($Xi,&QWP(0,$Xip));
+	&movdqa		($Xn,&QWP(0,$const));
+	&movdqu		($Hkey,&QWP(0,$Htbl));
+	&pshufb		($Xi,$Xn);
+
+	&clmul64x64_T3	($Xhi,$Xi,$Hkey);
+	&reduction_alg5	($Xhi,$Xi);
+
+	&pshufb		($Xi,$Xn);
+	&movdqu		(&QWP(0,$Xip),$Xi);
+
+	&ret	();
+&function_end_B("gcm_gmult_clmul");
+
+&function_begin("gcm_ghash_clmul");
+	&mov		($Xip,&wparam(0));
+	&mov		($Htbl,&wparam(1));
+	&mov		($inp,&wparam(2));
+	&mov		($len,&wparam(3));
+
+	&call		(&label("pic"));
+&set_label("pic");
+	&blindpop	($const);
+	&lea		($const,&DWP(&label("bswap")."-".&label("pic"),$const));
+
+	&movdqu		($Xi,&QWP(0,$Xip));
+	&movdqa		($T3,&QWP(0,$const));
+	&movdqu		($Hkey,&QWP(0,$Htbl));
+	&pshufb		($Xi,$T3);
+
+	&sub		($len,0x10);
+	&jz		(&label("odd_tail"));
+
+	#######
+	# Xi+2 =[H*(Ii+1 + Xi+1)] mod P =
+	#	[(H*Ii+1) + (H*Xi+1)] mod P =
+	#	[(H*Ii+1) + H^2*(Ii+Xi)] mod P
+	#
+	&movdqu		($T1,&QWP(0,$inp));	# Ii
+	&movdqu		($Xn,&QWP(16,$inp));	# Ii+1
+	&pshufb		($T1,$T3);
+	&pshufb		($Xn,$T3);
+	&pxor		($Xi,$T1);		# Ii+Xi
+
+	&clmul64x64_T3	($Xhn,$Xn,$Hkey);	# H*Ii+1
+	&movdqu		($Hkey,&QWP(16,$Htbl));	# load H^2
+
+	&sub		($len,0x20);
+	&lea		($inp,&DWP(32,$inp));	# i+=2
+	&jbe		(&label("even_tail"));
+
+&set_label("mod_loop");
+	&clmul64x64_T3	($Xhi,$Xi,$Hkey);	# H^2*(Ii+Xi)
+	&movdqu		($Hkey,&QWP(0,$Htbl));	# load H
+
+	&pxor		($Xi,$Xn);		# (H*Ii+1) + H^2*(Ii+Xi)
+	&pxor		($Xhi,$Xhn);
+
+	&reduction_alg5	($Xhi,$Xi);
+
+	#######
+	&movdqa		($T3,&QWP(0,$const));
+	&movdqu		($T1,&QWP(0,$inp));	# Ii
+	&movdqu		($Xn,&QWP(16,$inp));	# Ii+1
+	&pshufb		($T1,$T3);
+	&pshufb		($Xn,$T3);
+	&pxor		($Xi,$T1);		# Ii+Xi
+
+	&clmul64x64_T3	($Xhn,$Xn,$Hkey);	# H*Ii+1
+	&movdqu		($Hkey,&QWP(16,$Htbl));	# load H^2
+
+	&sub		($len,0x20);
+	&lea		($inp,&DWP(32,$inp));
+	&ja		(&label("mod_loop"));
+
+&set_label("even_tail");
+	&clmul64x64_T3	($Xhi,$Xi,$Hkey);	# H^2*(Ii+Xi)
+
+	&pxor		($Xi,$Xn);		# (H*Ii+1) + H^2*(Ii+Xi)
+	&pxor		($Xhi,$Xhn);
+
+	&reduction_alg5	($Xhi,$Xi);
+
+	&movdqa		($T3,&QWP(0,$const));
+	&test		($len,$len);
+	&jnz		(&label("done"));
+
+	&movdqu		($Hkey,&QWP(0,$Htbl));	# load H
+&set_label("odd_tail");
+	&movdqu		($T1,&QWP(0,$inp));	# Ii
+	&pshufb		($T1,$T3);
+	&pxor		($Xi,$T1);		# Ii+Xi
+
+	&clmul64x64_T3	($Xhi,$Xi,$Hkey);	# H*(Ii+Xi)
+	&reduction_alg5	($Xhi,$Xi);
+
+	&movdqa		($T3,&QWP(0,$const));
+&set_label("done");
+	&pshufb		($Xi,$T3);
+	&movdqu		(&QWP(0,$Xip),$Xi);
+&function_end("gcm_ghash_clmul");
+
+}
+
+&set_label("bswap",64);
+	&data_byte(15,14,13,12,11,10,9,8,7,6,5,4,3,2,1,0);
+	&data_byte(1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0xc2);	# 0x1c2_polynomial
+&set_label("rem_8bit",64);
+	&data_short(0x0000,0x01C2,0x0384,0x0246,0x0708,0x06CA,0x048C,0x054E);
+	&data_short(0x0E10,0x0FD2,0x0D94,0x0C56,0x0918,0x08DA,0x0A9C,0x0B5E);
+	&data_short(0x1C20,0x1DE2,0x1FA4,0x1E66,0x1B28,0x1AEA,0x18AC,0x196E);
+	&data_short(0x1230,0x13F2,0x11B4,0x1076,0x1538,0x14FA,0x16BC,0x177E);
+	&data_short(0x3840,0x3982,0x3BC4,0x3A06,0x3F48,0x3E8A,0x3CCC,0x3D0E);
+	&data_short(0x3650,0x3792,0x35D4,0x3416,0x3158,0x309A,0x32DC,0x331E);
+	&data_short(0x2460,0x25A2,0x27E4,0x2626,0x2368,0x22AA,0x20EC,0x212E);
+	&data_short(0x2A70,0x2BB2,0x29F4,0x2836,0x2D78,0x2CBA,0x2EFC,0x2F3E);
+	&data_short(0x7080,0x7142,0x7304,0x72C6,0x7788,0x764A,0x740C,0x75CE);
+	&data_short(0x7E90,0x7F52,0x7D14,0x7CD6,0x7998,0x785A,0x7A1C,0x7BDE);
+	&data_short(0x6CA0,0x6D62,0x6F24,0x6EE6,0x6BA8,0x6A6A,0x682C,0x69EE);
+	&data_short(0x62B0,0x6372,0x6134,0x60F6,0x65B8,0x647A,0x663C,0x67FE);
+	&data_short(0x48C0,0x4902,0x4B44,0x4A86,0x4FC8,0x4E0A,0x4C4C,0x4D8E);
+	&data_short(0x46D0,0x4712,0x4554,0x4496,0x41D8,0x401A,0x425C,0x439E);
+	&data_short(0x54E0,0x5522,0x5764,0x56A6,0x53E8,0x522A,0x506C,0x51AE);
+	&data_short(0x5AF0,0x5B32,0x5974,0x58B6,0x5DF8,0x5C3A,0x5E7C,0x5FBE);
+	&data_short(0xE100,0xE0C2,0xE284,0xE346,0xE608,0xE7CA,0xE58C,0xE44E);
+	&data_short(0xEF10,0xEED2,0xEC94,0xED56,0xE818,0xE9DA,0xEB9C,0xEA5E);
+	&data_short(0xFD20,0xFCE2,0xFEA4,0xFF66,0xFA28,0xFBEA,0xF9AC,0xF86E);
+	&data_short(0xF330,0xF2F2,0xF0B4,0xF176,0xF438,0xF5FA,0xF7BC,0xF67E);
+	&data_short(0xD940,0xD882,0xDAC4,0xDB06,0xDE48,0xDF8A,0xDDCC,0xDC0E);
+	&data_short(0xD750,0xD692,0xD4D4,0xD516,0xD058,0xD19A,0xD3DC,0xD21E);
+	&data_short(0xC560,0xC4A2,0xC6E4,0xC726,0xC268,0xC3AA,0xC1EC,0xC02E);
+	&data_short(0xCB70,0xCAB2,0xC8F4,0xC936,0xCC78,0xCDBA,0xCFFC,0xCE3E);
+	&data_short(0x9180,0x9042,0x9204,0x93C6,0x9688,0x974A,0x950C,0x94CE);
+	&data_short(0x9F90,0x9E52,0x9C14,0x9DD6,0x9898,0x995A,0x9B1C,0x9ADE);
+	&data_short(0x8DA0,0x8C62,0x8E24,0x8FE6,0x8AA8,0x8B6A,0x892C,0x88EE);
+	&data_short(0x83B0,0x8272,0x8034,0x81F6,0x84B8,0x857A,0x873C,0x86FE);
+	&data_short(0xA9C0,0xA802,0xAA44,0xAB86,0xAEC8,0xAF0A,0xAD4C,0xAC8E);
+	&data_short(0xA7D0,0xA612,0xA454,0xA596,0xA0D8,0xA11A,0xA35C,0xA29E);
+	&data_short(0xB5E0,0xB422,0xB664,0xB7A6,0xB2E8,0xB32A,0xB16C,0xB0AE);
+	&data_short(0xBBF0,0xBA32,0xB874,0xB9B6,0xBCF8,0xBD3A,0xBF7C,0xBEBE);
+}}	# $sse2
+
+&set_label("rem_4bit",64);
+	&data_word(0,0x0000<<$S,0,0x1C20<<$S,0,0x3840<<$S,0,0x2460<<$S);
+	&data_word(0,0x7080<<$S,0,0x6CA0<<$S,0,0x48C0<<$S,0,0x54E0<<$S);
+	&data_word(0,0xE100<<$S,0,0xFD20<<$S,0,0xD940<<$S,0,0xC560<<$S);
+	&data_word(0,0x9180<<$S,0,0x8DA0<<$S,0,0xA9C0<<$S,0,0xB5E0<<$S);
+}}}	# !$x86only
+
+&asciz("GHASH for x86, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>");
+&asm_finish();
+
+close STDOUT;
+
+# A question was risen about choice of vanilla MMX. Or rather why wasn't
+# SSE2 chosen instead? In addition to the fact that MMX runs on legacy
+# CPUs such as PIII, "4-bit" MMX version was observed to provide better
+# performance than *corresponding* SSE2 one even on contemporary CPUs.
+# SSE2 results were provided by Peter-Michael Hager. He maintains SSE2
+# implementation featuring full range of lookup-table sizes, but with
+# per-invocation lookup table setup. Latter means that table size is
+# chosen depending on how much data is to be hashed in every given call,
+# more data - larger table. Best reported result for Core2 is ~4 cycles
+# per processed byte out of 64KB block. This number accounts even for
+# 64KB table setup overhead. As discussed in gcm128.c we choose to be
+# more conservative in respect to lookup table sizes, but how do the
+# results compare? Minimalistic "256B" MMX version delivers ~11 cycles
+# on same platform. As also discussed in gcm128.c, next in line "8-bit
+# Shoup's" or "4KB" method should deliver twice the performance of
+# "256B" one, in other words not worse than ~6 cycles per byte. It
+# should be also be noted that in SSE2 case improvement can be "super-
+# linear," i.e. more than twice, mostly because >>8 maps to single
+# instruction on SSE2 register. This is unlike "4-bit" case when >>4
+# maps to same amount of instructions in both MMX and SSE2 cases.
+# Bottom line is that switch to SSE2 is considered to be justifiable
+# only in case we choose to implement "8-bit" method...
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86_64.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86_64.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..387e3f8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86_64.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,1762 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2010-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# March, June 2010
+#
+# The module implements "4-bit" GCM GHASH function and underlying
+# single multiplication operation in GF(2^128). "4-bit" means that
+# it uses 256 bytes per-key table [+128 bytes shared table]. GHASH
+# function features so called "528B" variant utilizing additional
+# 256+16 bytes of per-key storage [+512 bytes shared table].
+# Performance results are for this streamed GHASH subroutine and are
+# expressed in cycles per processed byte, less is better:
+#
+#		gcc 3.4.x(*)	assembler
+#
+# P4		28.6		14.0		+100%
+# Opteron	19.3		7.7		+150%
+# Core2		17.8		8.1(**)		+120%
+# Atom		31.6		16.8		+88%
+# VIA Nano	21.8		10.1		+115%
+#
+# (*)	comparison is not completely fair, because C results are
+#	for vanilla "256B" implementation, while assembler results
+#	are for "528B";-)
+# (**)	it's mystery [to me] why Core2 result is not same as for
+#	Opteron;
+
+# May 2010
+#
+# Add PCLMULQDQ version performing at 2.02 cycles per processed byte.
+# See ghash-x86.pl for background information and details about coding
+# techniques.
+#
+# Special thanks to David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> for
+# providing access to a Westmere-based system on behalf of Intel
+# Open Source Technology Centre.
+
+# December 2012
+#
+# Overhaul: aggregate Karatsuba post-processing, improve ILP in
+# reduction_alg9, increase reduction aggregate factor to 4x. As for
+# the latter. ghash-x86.pl discusses that it makes lesser sense to
+# increase aggregate factor. Then why increase here? Critical path
+# consists of 3 independent pclmulqdq instructions, Karatsuba post-
+# processing and reduction. "On top" of this we lay down aggregated
+# multiplication operations, triplets of independent pclmulqdq's. As
+# issue rate for pclmulqdq is limited, it makes lesser sense to
+# aggregate more multiplications than it takes to perform remaining
+# non-multiplication operations. 2x is near-optimal coefficient for
+# contemporary Intel CPUs (therefore modest improvement coefficient),
+# but not for Bulldozer. Latter is because logical SIMD operations
+# are twice as slow in comparison to Intel, so that critical path is
+# longer. A CPU with higher pclmulqdq issue rate would also benefit
+# from higher aggregate factor...
+#
+# Westmere	1.78(+13%)
+# Sandy Bridge	1.80(+8%)
+# Ivy Bridge	1.80(+7%)
+# Haswell	0.55(+93%) (if system doesn't support AVX)
+# Broadwell	0.45(+110%)(if system doesn't support AVX)
+# Skylake	0.44(+110%)(if system doesn't support AVX)
+# Bulldozer	1.49(+27%)
+# Silvermont	2.88(+13%)
+# Goldmont	1.08(+24%)
+
+# March 2013
+#
+# ... 8x aggregate factor AVX code path is using reduction algorithm
+# suggested by Shay Gueron[1]. Even though contemporary AVX-capable
+# CPUs such as Sandy and Ivy Bridge can execute it, the code performs
+# sub-optimally in comparison to above mentioned version. But thanks
+# to Ilya Albrekht and Max Locktyukhin of Intel Corp. we knew that
+# it performs in 0.41 cycles per byte on Haswell processor, in
+# 0.29 on Broadwell, and in 0.36 on Skylake.
+#
+# [1] http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2900&user=guest&pass=guest
+
+$flavour = shift;
+$output  = shift;
+if ($flavour =~ /\./) { $output = $flavour; undef $flavour; }
+
+$win64=0; $win64=1 if ($flavour =~ /[nm]asm|mingw64/ || $output =~ /\.asm$/);
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+( $xlate="${dir}x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
+( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
+die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl";
+
+if (`$ENV{CC} -Wa,-v -c -o /dev/null -x assembler /dev/null 2>&1`
+		=~ /GNU assembler version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
+	$avx = ($1>=2.20) + ($1>=2.22);
+}
+
+if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /nasm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /nasm/) &&
+	    `nasm -v 2>&1` =~ /NASM version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
+	$avx = ($1>=2.09) + ($1>=2.10);
+}
+
+if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
+	    `ml64 2>&1` =~ /Version ([0-9]+)\./) {
+	$avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=11);
+}
+
+if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
+	$avx = ($2>=3.0) + ($2>3.0);
+}
+
+open OUT,"| \"$^X\" \"$xlate\" $flavour \"$output\"";
+*STDOUT=*OUT;
+
+$do4xaggr=1;
+
+# common register layout
+$nlo="%rax";
+$nhi="%rbx";
+$Zlo="%r8";
+$Zhi="%r9";
+$tmp="%r10";
+$rem_4bit = "%r11";
+
+$Xi="%rdi";
+$Htbl="%rsi";
+
+# per-function register layout
+$cnt="%rcx";
+$rem="%rdx";
+
+sub LB() { my $r=shift; $r =~ s/%[er]([a-d])x/%\1l/	or
+			$r =~ s/%[er]([sd]i)/%\1l/	or
+			$r =~ s/%[er](bp)/%\1l/		or
+			$r =~ s/%(r[0-9]+)[d]?/%\1b/;   $r; }
+
+sub AUTOLOAD()		# thunk [simplified] 32-bit style perlasm
+{ my $opcode = $AUTOLOAD; $opcode =~ s/.*:://;
+  my $arg = pop;
+    $arg = "\$$arg" if ($arg*1 eq $arg);
+    $code .= "\t$opcode\t".join(',',$arg,reverse @_)."\n";
+}
+
+{ my $N;
+  sub loop() {
+  my $inp = shift;
+
+	$N++;
+$code.=<<___;
+	xor	$nlo,$nlo
+	xor	$nhi,$nhi
+	mov	`&LB("$Zlo")`,`&LB("$nlo")`
+	mov	`&LB("$Zlo")`,`&LB("$nhi")`
+	shl	\$4,`&LB("$nlo")`
+	mov	\$14,$cnt
+	mov	8($Htbl,$nlo),$Zlo
+	mov	($Htbl,$nlo),$Zhi
+	and	\$0xf0,`&LB("$nhi")`
+	mov	$Zlo,$rem
+	jmp	.Loop$N
+
+.align	16
+.Loop$N:
+	shr	\$4,$Zlo
+	and	\$0xf,$rem
+	mov	$Zhi,$tmp
+	mov	($inp,$cnt),`&LB("$nlo")`
+	shr	\$4,$Zhi
+	xor	8($Htbl,$nhi),$Zlo
+	shl	\$60,$tmp
+	xor	($Htbl,$nhi),$Zhi
+	mov	`&LB("$nlo")`,`&LB("$nhi")`
+	xor	($rem_4bit,$rem,8),$Zhi
+	mov	$Zlo,$rem
+	shl	\$4,`&LB("$nlo")`
+	xor	$tmp,$Zlo
+	dec	$cnt
+	js	.Lbreak$N
+
+	shr	\$4,$Zlo
+	and	\$0xf,$rem
+	mov	$Zhi,$tmp
+	shr	\$4,$Zhi
+	xor	8($Htbl,$nlo),$Zlo
+	shl	\$60,$tmp
+	xor	($Htbl,$nlo),$Zhi
+	and	\$0xf0,`&LB("$nhi")`
+	xor	($rem_4bit,$rem,8),$Zhi
+	mov	$Zlo,$rem
+	xor	$tmp,$Zlo
+	jmp	.Loop$N
+
+.align	16
+.Lbreak$N:
+	shr	\$4,$Zlo
+	and	\$0xf,$rem
+	mov	$Zhi,$tmp
+	shr	\$4,$Zhi
+	xor	8($Htbl,$nlo),$Zlo
+	shl	\$60,$tmp
+	xor	($Htbl,$nlo),$Zhi
+	and	\$0xf0,`&LB("$nhi")`
+	xor	($rem_4bit,$rem,8),$Zhi
+	mov	$Zlo,$rem
+	xor	$tmp,$Zlo
+
+	shr	\$4,$Zlo
+	and	\$0xf,$rem
+	mov	$Zhi,$tmp
+	shr	\$4,$Zhi
+	xor	8($Htbl,$nhi),$Zlo
+	shl	\$60,$tmp
+	xor	($Htbl,$nhi),$Zhi
+	xor	$tmp,$Zlo
+	xor	($rem_4bit,$rem,8),$Zhi
+
+	bswap	$Zlo
+	bswap	$Zhi
+___
+}}
+
+$code=<<___;
+.text
+.extern	OPENSSL_ia32cap_P
+
+.globl	gcm_gmult_4bit
+.type	gcm_gmult_4bit,\@function,2
+.align	16
+gcm_gmult_4bit:
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp		# %rbp and %r12 are pushed exclusively in
+	push	%r12		# order to reuse Win64 exception handler...
+.Lgmult_prologue:
+
+	movzb	15($Xi),$Zlo
+	lea	.Lrem_4bit(%rip),$rem_4bit
+___
+	&loop	($Xi);
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	$Zlo,8($Xi)
+	mov	$Zhi,($Xi)
+
+	mov	16(%rsp),%rbx
+	lea	24(%rsp),%rsp
+.Lgmult_epilogue:
+	ret
+.size	gcm_gmult_4bit,.-gcm_gmult_4bit
+___
+
+# per-function register layout
+$inp="%rdx";
+$len="%rcx";
+$rem_8bit=$rem_4bit;
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	gcm_ghash_4bit
+.type	gcm_ghash_4bit,\@function,4
+.align	16
+gcm_ghash_4bit:
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+	sub	\$280,%rsp
+.Lghash_prologue:
+	mov	$inp,%r14		# reassign couple of args
+	mov	$len,%r15
+___
+{ my $inp="%r14";
+  my $dat="%edx";
+  my $len="%r15";
+  my @nhi=("%ebx","%ecx");
+  my @rem=("%r12","%r13");
+  my $Hshr4="%rbp";
+
+	&sub	($Htbl,-128);		# size optimization
+	&lea	($Hshr4,"16+128(%rsp)");
+	{ my @lo =($nlo,$nhi);
+          my @hi =($Zlo,$Zhi);
+
+	  &xor	($dat,$dat);
+	  for ($i=0,$j=-2;$i<18;$i++,$j++) {
+	    &mov	("$j(%rsp)",&LB($dat))		if ($i>1);
+	    &or		($lo[0],$tmp)			if ($i>1);
+	    &mov	(&LB($dat),&LB($lo[1]))		if ($i>0 && $i<17);
+	    &shr	($lo[1],4)			if ($i>0 && $i<17);
+	    &mov	($tmp,$hi[1])			if ($i>0 && $i<17);
+	    &shr	($hi[1],4)			if ($i>0 && $i<17);
+	    &mov	("8*$j($Hshr4)",$hi[0])		if ($i>1);
+	    &mov	($hi[0],"16*$i+0-128($Htbl)")	if ($i<16);
+	    &shl	(&LB($dat),4)			if ($i>0 && $i<17);
+	    &mov	("8*$j-128($Hshr4)",$lo[0])	if ($i>1);
+	    &mov	($lo[0],"16*$i+8-128($Htbl)")	if ($i<16);
+	    &shl	($tmp,60)			if ($i>0 && $i<17);
+
+	    push	(@lo,shift(@lo));
+	    push	(@hi,shift(@hi));
+	  }
+	}
+	&add	($Htbl,-128);
+	&mov	($Zlo,"8($Xi)");
+	&mov	($Zhi,"0($Xi)");
+	&add	($len,$inp);		# pointer to the end of data
+	&lea	($rem_8bit,".Lrem_8bit(%rip)");
+	&jmp	(".Louter_loop");
+
+$code.=".align	16\n.Louter_loop:\n";
+	&xor	($Zhi,"($inp)");
+	&mov	("%rdx","8($inp)");
+	&lea	($inp,"16($inp)");
+	&xor	("%rdx",$Zlo);
+	&mov	("($Xi)",$Zhi);
+	&mov	("8($Xi)","%rdx");
+	&shr	("%rdx",32);
+
+	&xor	($nlo,$nlo);
+	&rol	($dat,8);
+	&mov	(&LB($nlo),&LB($dat));
+	&movz	($nhi[0],&LB($dat));
+	&shl	(&LB($nlo),4);
+	&shr	($nhi[0],4);
+
+	for ($j=11,$i=0;$i<15;$i++) {
+	    &rol	($dat,8);
+	    &xor	($Zlo,"8($Htbl,$nlo)")			if ($i>0);
+	    &xor	($Zhi,"($Htbl,$nlo)")			if ($i>0);
+	    &mov	($Zlo,"8($Htbl,$nlo)")			if ($i==0);
+	    &mov	($Zhi,"($Htbl,$nlo)")			if ($i==0);
+
+	    &mov	(&LB($nlo),&LB($dat));
+	    &xor	($Zlo,$tmp)				if ($i>0);
+	    &movzw	($rem[1],"($rem_8bit,$rem[1],2)")	if ($i>0);
+
+	    &movz	($nhi[1],&LB($dat));
+	    &shl	(&LB($nlo),4);
+	    &movzb	($rem[0],"(%rsp,$nhi[0])");
+
+	    &shr	($nhi[1],4)				if ($i<14);
+	    &and	($nhi[1],0xf0)				if ($i==14);
+	    &shl	($rem[1],48)				if ($i>0);
+	    &xor	($rem[0],$Zlo);
+
+	    &mov	($tmp,$Zhi);
+	    &xor	($Zhi,$rem[1])				if ($i>0);
+	    &shr	($Zlo,8);
+
+	    &movz	($rem[0],&LB($rem[0]));
+	    &mov	($dat,"$j($Xi)")			if (--$j%4==0);
+	    &shr	($Zhi,8);
+
+	    &xor	($Zlo,"-128($Hshr4,$nhi[0],8)");
+	    &shl	($tmp,56);
+	    &xor	($Zhi,"($Hshr4,$nhi[0],8)");
+
+	    unshift	(@nhi,pop(@nhi));		# "rotate" registers
+	    unshift	(@rem,pop(@rem));
+	}
+	&movzw	($rem[1],"($rem_8bit,$rem[1],2)");
+	&xor	($Zlo,"8($Htbl,$nlo)");
+	&xor	($Zhi,"($Htbl,$nlo)");
+
+	&shl	($rem[1],48);
+	&xor	($Zlo,$tmp);
+
+	&xor	($Zhi,$rem[1]);
+	&movz	($rem[0],&LB($Zlo));
+	&shr	($Zlo,4);
+
+	&mov	($tmp,$Zhi);
+	&shl	(&LB($rem[0]),4);
+	&shr	($Zhi,4);
+
+	&xor	($Zlo,"8($Htbl,$nhi[0])");
+	&movzw	($rem[0],"($rem_8bit,$rem[0],2)");
+	&shl	($tmp,60);
+
+	&xor	($Zhi,"($Htbl,$nhi[0])");
+	&xor	($Zlo,$tmp);
+	&shl	($rem[0],48);
+
+	&bswap	($Zlo);
+	&xor	($Zhi,$rem[0]);
+
+	&bswap	($Zhi);
+	&cmp	($inp,$len);
+	&jb	(".Louter_loop");
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	$Zlo,8($Xi)
+	mov	$Zhi,($Xi)
+
+	lea	280(%rsp),%rsi
+	mov	0(%rsi),%r15
+	mov	8(%rsi),%r14
+	mov	16(%rsi),%r13
+	mov	24(%rsi),%r12
+	mov	32(%rsi),%rbp
+	mov	40(%rsi),%rbx
+	lea	48(%rsi),%rsp
+.Lghash_epilogue:
+	ret
+.size	gcm_ghash_4bit,.-gcm_ghash_4bit
+___
+
+######################################################################
+# PCLMULQDQ version.
+
+@_4args=$win64?	("%rcx","%rdx","%r8", "%r9") :	# Win64 order
+		("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx","%rcx");	# Unix order
+
+($Xi,$Xhi)=("%xmm0","%xmm1");	$Hkey="%xmm2";
+($T1,$T2,$T3)=("%xmm3","%xmm4","%xmm5");
+
+sub clmul64x64_T2 {	# minimal register pressure
+my ($Xhi,$Xi,$Hkey,$HK)=@_;
+
+if (!defined($HK)) {	$HK = $T2;
+$code.=<<___;
+	movdqa		$Xi,$Xhi		#
+	pshufd		\$0b01001110,$Xi,$T1
+	pshufd		\$0b01001110,$Hkey,$T2
+	pxor		$Xi,$T1			#
+	pxor		$Hkey,$T2
+___
+} else {
+$code.=<<___;
+	movdqa		$Xi,$Xhi		#
+	pshufd		\$0b01001110,$Xi,$T1
+	pxor		$Xi,$T1			#
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	pclmulqdq	\$0x00,$Hkey,$Xi	#######
+	pclmulqdq	\$0x11,$Hkey,$Xhi	#######
+	pclmulqdq	\$0x00,$HK,$T1		#######
+	pxor		$Xi,$T1			#
+	pxor		$Xhi,$T1		#
+
+	movdqa		$T1,$T2			#
+	psrldq		\$8,$T1
+	pslldq		\$8,$T2			#
+	pxor		$T1,$Xhi
+	pxor		$T2,$Xi			#
+___
+}
+
+sub reduction_alg9 {	# 17/11 times faster than Intel version
+my ($Xhi,$Xi) = @_;
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	# 1st phase
+	movdqa		$Xi,$T2			#
+	movdqa		$Xi,$T1
+	psllq		\$5,$Xi
+	pxor		$Xi,$T1			#
+	psllq		\$1,$Xi
+	pxor		$T1,$Xi			#
+	psllq		\$57,$Xi		#
+	movdqa		$Xi,$T1			#
+	pslldq		\$8,$Xi
+	psrldq		\$8,$T1			#	
+	pxor		$T2,$Xi
+	pxor		$T1,$Xhi		#
+
+	# 2nd phase
+	movdqa		$Xi,$T2
+	psrlq		\$1,$Xi
+	pxor		$T2,$Xhi		#
+	pxor		$Xi,$T2
+	psrlq		\$5,$Xi
+	pxor		$T2,$Xi			#
+	psrlq		\$1,$Xi			#
+	pxor		$Xhi,$Xi		#
+___
+}
+
+{ my ($Htbl,$Xip)=@_4args;
+  my $HK="%xmm6";
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	gcm_init_clmul
+.type	gcm_init_clmul,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+gcm_init_clmul:
+.L_init_clmul:
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+.LSEH_begin_gcm_init_clmul:
+	# I can't trust assembler to use specific encoding:-(
+	.byte	0x48,0x83,0xec,0x18		#sub	$0x18,%rsp
+	.byte	0x0f,0x29,0x34,0x24		#movaps	%xmm6,(%rsp)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	movdqu		($Xip),$Hkey
+	pshufd		\$0b01001110,$Hkey,$Hkey	# dword swap
+
+	# <<1 twist
+	pshufd		\$0b11111111,$Hkey,$T2	# broadcast uppermost dword
+	movdqa		$Hkey,$T1
+	psllq		\$1,$Hkey
+	pxor		$T3,$T3			#
+	psrlq		\$63,$T1
+	pcmpgtd		$T2,$T3			# broadcast carry bit
+	pslldq		\$8,$T1
+	por		$T1,$Hkey		# H<<=1
+
+	# magic reduction
+	pand		.L0x1c2_polynomial(%rip),$T3
+	pxor		$T3,$Hkey		# if(carry) H^=0x1c2_polynomial
+
+	# calculate H^2
+	pshufd		\$0b01001110,$Hkey,$HK
+	movdqa		$Hkey,$Xi
+	pxor		$Hkey,$HK
+___
+	&clmul64x64_T2	($Xhi,$Xi,$Hkey,$HK);
+	&reduction_alg9	($Xhi,$Xi);
+$code.=<<___;
+	pshufd		\$0b01001110,$Hkey,$T1
+	pshufd		\$0b01001110,$Xi,$T2
+	pxor		$Hkey,$T1		# Karatsuba pre-processing
+	movdqu		$Hkey,0x00($Htbl)	# save H
+	pxor		$Xi,$T2			# Karatsuba pre-processing
+	movdqu		$Xi,0x10($Htbl)		# save H^2
+	palignr		\$8,$T1,$T2		# low part is H.lo^H.hi...
+	movdqu		$T2,0x20($Htbl)		# save Karatsuba "salt"
+___
+if ($do4xaggr) {
+	&clmul64x64_T2	($Xhi,$Xi,$Hkey,$HK);	# H^3
+	&reduction_alg9	($Xhi,$Xi);
+$code.=<<___;
+	movdqa		$Xi,$T3
+___
+	&clmul64x64_T2	($Xhi,$Xi,$Hkey,$HK);	# H^4
+	&reduction_alg9	($Xhi,$Xi);
+$code.=<<___;
+	pshufd		\$0b01001110,$T3,$T1
+	pshufd		\$0b01001110,$Xi,$T2
+	pxor		$T3,$T1			# Karatsuba pre-processing
+	movdqu		$T3,0x30($Htbl)		# save H^3
+	pxor		$Xi,$T2			# Karatsuba pre-processing
+	movdqu		$Xi,0x40($Htbl)		# save H^4
+	palignr		\$8,$T1,$T2		# low part is H^3.lo^H^3.hi...
+	movdqu		$T2,0x50($Htbl)		# save Karatsuba "salt"
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	movaps	(%rsp),%xmm6
+	lea	0x18(%rsp),%rsp
+.LSEH_end_gcm_init_clmul:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	ret
+.size	gcm_init_clmul,.-gcm_init_clmul
+___
+}
+
+{ my ($Xip,$Htbl)=@_4args;
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	gcm_gmult_clmul
+.type	gcm_gmult_clmul,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+gcm_gmult_clmul:
+.L_gmult_clmul:
+	movdqu		($Xip),$Xi
+	movdqa		.Lbswap_mask(%rip),$T3
+	movdqu		($Htbl),$Hkey
+	movdqu		0x20($Htbl),$T2
+	pshufb		$T3,$Xi
+___
+	&clmul64x64_T2	($Xhi,$Xi,$Hkey,$T2);
+$code.=<<___ if (0 || (&reduction_alg9($Xhi,$Xi)&&0));
+	# experimental alternative. special thing about is that there
+	# no dependency between the two multiplications... 
+	mov		\$`0xE1<<1`,%eax
+	mov		\$0xA040608020C0E000,%r10	# ((7..0)·0xE0)&0xff
+	mov		\$0x07,%r11d
+	movq		%rax,$T1
+	movq		%r10,$T2
+	movq		%r11,$T3		# borrow $T3
+	pand		$Xi,$T3
+	pshufb		$T3,$T2			# ($Xi&7)·0xE0
+	movq		%rax,$T3
+	pclmulqdq	\$0x00,$Xi,$T1		# ·(0xE1<<1)
+	pxor		$Xi,$T2
+	pslldq		\$15,$T2
+	paddd		$T2,$T2			# <<(64+56+1)
+	pxor		$T2,$Xi
+	pclmulqdq	\$0x01,$T3,$Xi
+	movdqa		.Lbswap_mask(%rip),$T3	# reload $T3
+	psrldq		\$1,$T1
+	pxor		$T1,$Xhi
+	pslldq		\$7,$Xi
+	pxor		$Xhi,$Xi
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	pshufb		$T3,$Xi
+	movdqu		$Xi,($Xip)
+	ret
+.size	gcm_gmult_clmul,.-gcm_gmult_clmul
+___
+}
+
+{ my ($Xip,$Htbl,$inp,$len)=@_4args;
+  my ($Xln,$Xmn,$Xhn,$Hkey2,$HK) = map("%xmm$_",(3..7));
+  my ($T1,$T2,$T3)=map("%xmm$_",(8..10));
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	gcm_ghash_clmul
+.type	gcm_ghash_clmul,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	32
+gcm_ghash_clmul:
+.L_ghash_clmul:
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	lea	-0x88(%rsp),%rax
+.LSEH_begin_gcm_ghash_clmul:
+	# I can't trust assembler to use specific encoding:-(
+	.byte	0x48,0x8d,0x60,0xe0		#lea	-0x20(%rax),%rsp
+	.byte	0x0f,0x29,0x70,0xe0		#movaps	%xmm6,-0x20(%rax)
+	.byte	0x0f,0x29,0x78,0xf0		#movaps	%xmm7,-0x10(%rax)
+	.byte	0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x00		#movaps	%xmm8,0(%rax)
+	.byte	0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x48,0x10	#movaps	%xmm9,0x10(%rax)
+	.byte	0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x50,0x20	#movaps	%xmm10,0x20(%rax)
+	.byte	0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x58,0x30	#movaps	%xmm11,0x30(%rax)
+	.byte	0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x60,0x40	#movaps	%xmm12,0x40(%rax)
+	.byte	0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x68,0x50	#movaps	%xmm13,0x50(%rax)
+	.byte	0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x70,0x60	#movaps	%xmm14,0x60(%rax)
+	.byte	0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x78,0x70	#movaps	%xmm15,0x70(%rax)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	movdqa		.Lbswap_mask(%rip),$T3
+
+	movdqu		($Xip),$Xi
+	movdqu		($Htbl),$Hkey
+	movdqu		0x20($Htbl),$HK
+	pshufb		$T3,$Xi
+
+	sub		\$0x10,$len
+	jz		.Lodd_tail
+
+	movdqu		0x10($Htbl),$Hkey2
+___
+if ($do4xaggr) {
+my ($Xl,$Xm,$Xh,$Hkey3,$Hkey4)=map("%xmm$_",(11..15));
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov		OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+4(%rip),%eax
+	cmp		\$0x30,$len
+	jb		.Lskip4x
+
+	and		\$`1<<26|1<<22`,%eax	# isolate MOVBE+XSAVE
+	cmp		\$`1<<22`,%eax		# check for MOVBE without XSAVE
+	je		.Lskip4x
+
+	sub		\$0x30,$len
+	mov		\$0xA040608020C0E000,%rax	# ((7..0)·0xE0)&0xff
+	movdqu		0x30($Htbl),$Hkey3
+	movdqu		0x40($Htbl),$Hkey4
+
+	#######
+	# Xi+4 =[(H*Ii+3) + (H^2*Ii+2) + (H^3*Ii+1) + H^4*(Ii+Xi)] mod P
+	#
+	movdqu		0x30($inp),$Xln
+	 movdqu		0x20($inp),$Xl
+	pshufb		$T3,$Xln
+	 pshufb		$T3,$Xl
+	movdqa		$Xln,$Xhn
+	pshufd		\$0b01001110,$Xln,$Xmn
+	pxor		$Xln,$Xmn
+	pclmulqdq	\$0x00,$Hkey,$Xln
+	pclmulqdq	\$0x11,$Hkey,$Xhn
+	pclmulqdq	\$0x00,$HK,$Xmn
+
+	movdqa		$Xl,$Xh
+	pshufd		\$0b01001110,$Xl,$Xm
+	pxor		$Xl,$Xm
+	pclmulqdq	\$0x00,$Hkey2,$Xl
+	pclmulqdq	\$0x11,$Hkey2,$Xh
+	pclmulqdq	\$0x10,$HK,$Xm
+	xorps		$Xl,$Xln
+	xorps		$Xh,$Xhn
+	movups		0x50($Htbl),$HK
+	xorps		$Xm,$Xmn
+
+	movdqu		0x10($inp),$Xl
+	 movdqu		0($inp),$T1
+	pshufb		$T3,$Xl
+	 pshufb		$T3,$T1
+	movdqa		$Xl,$Xh
+	pshufd		\$0b01001110,$Xl,$Xm
+	 pxor		$T1,$Xi
+	pxor		$Xl,$Xm
+	pclmulqdq	\$0x00,$Hkey3,$Xl
+	 movdqa		$Xi,$Xhi
+	 pshufd		\$0b01001110,$Xi,$T1
+	 pxor		$Xi,$T1
+	pclmulqdq	\$0x11,$Hkey3,$Xh
+	pclmulqdq	\$0x00,$HK,$Xm
+	xorps		$Xl,$Xln
+	xorps		$Xh,$Xhn
+
+	lea	0x40($inp),$inp
+	sub	\$0x40,$len
+	jc	.Ltail4x
+
+	jmp	.Lmod4_loop
+.align	32
+.Lmod4_loop:
+	pclmulqdq	\$0x00,$Hkey4,$Xi
+	xorps		$Xm,$Xmn
+	 movdqu		0x30($inp),$Xl
+	 pshufb		$T3,$Xl
+	pclmulqdq	\$0x11,$Hkey4,$Xhi
+	xorps		$Xln,$Xi
+	 movdqu		0x20($inp),$Xln
+	 movdqa		$Xl,$Xh
+	pclmulqdq	\$0x10,$HK,$T1
+	 pshufd		\$0b01001110,$Xl,$Xm
+	xorps		$Xhn,$Xhi
+	 pxor		$Xl,$Xm
+	 pshufb		$T3,$Xln
+	movups		0x20($Htbl),$HK
+	xorps		$Xmn,$T1
+	 pclmulqdq	\$0x00,$Hkey,$Xl
+	 pshufd		\$0b01001110,$Xln,$Xmn
+
+	pxor		$Xi,$T1			# aggregated Karatsuba post-processing
+	 movdqa		$Xln,$Xhn
+	pxor		$Xhi,$T1		#
+	 pxor		$Xln,$Xmn
+	movdqa		$T1,$T2			#
+	 pclmulqdq	\$0x11,$Hkey,$Xh
+	pslldq		\$8,$T1
+	psrldq		\$8,$T2			#
+	pxor		$T1,$Xi
+	movdqa		.L7_mask(%rip),$T1
+	pxor		$T2,$Xhi		#
+	movq		%rax,$T2
+
+	pand		$Xi,$T1			# 1st phase
+	pshufb		$T1,$T2			#
+	pxor		$Xi,$T2			#
+	 pclmulqdq	\$0x00,$HK,$Xm
+	psllq		\$57,$T2		#
+	movdqa		$T2,$T1			#
+	pslldq		\$8,$T2
+	 pclmulqdq	\$0x00,$Hkey2,$Xln
+	psrldq		\$8,$T1			#	
+	pxor		$T2,$Xi
+	pxor		$T1,$Xhi		#
+	movdqu		0($inp),$T1
+
+	movdqa		$Xi,$T2			# 2nd phase
+	psrlq		\$1,$Xi
+	 pclmulqdq	\$0x11,$Hkey2,$Xhn
+	 xorps		$Xl,$Xln
+	 movdqu		0x10($inp),$Xl
+	 pshufb		$T3,$Xl
+	 pclmulqdq	\$0x10,$HK,$Xmn
+	 xorps		$Xh,$Xhn
+	 movups		0x50($Htbl),$HK
+	pshufb		$T3,$T1
+	pxor		$T2,$Xhi		#
+	pxor		$Xi,$T2
+	psrlq		\$5,$Xi
+
+	 movdqa		$Xl,$Xh
+	 pxor		$Xm,$Xmn
+	 pshufd		\$0b01001110,$Xl,$Xm
+	pxor		$T2,$Xi			#
+	pxor		$T1,$Xhi
+	 pxor		$Xl,$Xm
+	 pclmulqdq	\$0x00,$Hkey3,$Xl
+	psrlq		\$1,$Xi			#
+	pxor		$Xhi,$Xi		#
+	movdqa		$Xi,$Xhi
+	 pclmulqdq	\$0x11,$Hkey3,$Xh
+	 xorps		$Xl,$Xln
+	pshufd		\$0b01001110,$Xi,$T1
+	pxor		$Xi,$T1
+
+	 pclmulqdq	\$0x00,$HK,$Xm
+	 xorps		$Xh,$Xhn
+
+	lea	0x40($inp),$inp
+	sub	\$0x40,$len
+	jnc	.Lmod4_loop
+
+.Ltail4x:
+	pclmulqdq	\$0x00,$Hkey4,$Xi
+	pclmulqdq	\$0x11,$Hkey4,$Xhi
+	pclmulqdq	\$0x10,$HK,$T1
+	xorps		$Xm,$Xmn
+	xorps		$Xln,$Xi
+	xorps		$Xhn,$Xhi
+	pxor		$Xi,$Xhi		# aggregated Karatsuba post-processing
+	pxor		$Xmn,$T1
+
+	pxor		$Xhi,$T1		#
+	pxor		$Xi,$Xhi
+
+	movdqa		$T1,$T2			#
+	psrldq		\$8,$T1
+	pslldq		\$8,$T2			#
+	pxor		$T1,$Xhi
+	pxor		$T2,$Xi			#
+___
+	&reduction_alg9($Xhi,$Xi);
+$code.=<<___;
+	add	\$0x40,$len
+	jz	.Ldone
+	movdqu	0x20($Htbl),$HK
+	sub	\$0x10,$len
+	jz	.Lodd_tail
+.Lskip4x:
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	#######
+	# Xi+2 =[H*(Ii+1 + Xi+1)] mod P =
+	#	[(H*Ii+1) + (H*Xi+1)] mod P =
+	#	[(H*Ii+1) + H^2*(Ii+Xi)] mod P
+	#
+	movdqu		($inp),$T1		# Ii
+	movdqu		16($inp),$Xln		# Ii+1
+	pshufb		$T3,$T1
+	pshufb		$T3,$Xln
+	pxor		$T1,$Xi			# Ii+Xi
+
+	movdqa		$Xln,$Xhn
+	pshufd		\$0b01001110,$Xln,$Xmn
+	pxor		$Xln,$Xmn
+	pclmulqdq	\$0x00,$Hkey,$Xln
+	pclmulqdq	\$0x11,$Hkey,$Xhn
+	pclmulqdq	\$0x00,$HK,$Xmn
+
+	lea		32($inp),$inp		# i+=2
+	nop
+	sub		\$0x20,$len
+	jbe		.Leven_tail
+	nop
+	jmp		.Lmod_loop
+
+.align	32
+.Lmod_loop:
+	movdqa		$Xi,$Xhi
+	movdqa		$Xmn,$T1
+	pshufd		\$0b01001110,$Xi,$Xmn	#
+	pxor		$Xi,$Xmn		#
+
+	pclmulqdq	\$0x00,$Hkey2,$Xi
+	pclmulqdq	\$0x11,$Hkey2,$Xhi
+	pclmulqdq	\$0x10,$HK,$Xmn
+
+	pxor		$Xln,$Xi		# (H*Ii+1) + H^2*(Ii+Xi)
+	pxor		$Xhn,$Xhi
+	  movdqu	($inp),$T2		# Ii
+	pxor		$Xi,$T1			# aggregated Karatsuba post-processing
+	  pshufb	$T3,$T2
+	  movdqu	16($inp),$Xln		# Ii+1
+
+	pxor		$Xhi,$T1
+	  pxor		$T2,$Xhi		# "Ii+Xi", consume early
+	pxor		$T1,$Xmn
+	 pshufb		$T3,$Xln
+	movdqa		$Xmn,$T1		#
+	psrldq		\$8,$T1
+	pslldq		\$8,$Xmn		#
+	pxor		$T1,$Xhi
+	pxor		$Xmn,$Xi		#
+
+	movdqa		$Xln,$Xhn		#
+
+	  movdqa	$Xi,$T2			# 1st phase
+	  movdqa	$Xi,$T1
+	  psllq		\$5,$Xi
+	  pxor		$Xi,$T1			#
+	pclmulqdq	\$0x00,$Hkey,$Xln	#######
+	  psllq		\$1,$Xi
+	  pxor		$T1,$Xi			#
+	  psllq		\$57,$Xi		#
+	  movdqa	$Xi,$T1			#
+	  pslldq	\$8,$Xi
+	  psrldq	\$8,$T1			#	
+	  pxor		$T2,$Xi
+	pshufd		\$0b01001110,$Xhn,$Xmn
+	  pxor		$T1,$Xhi		#
+	pxor		$Xhn,$Xmn		#
+
+	  movdqa	$Xi,$T2			# 2nd phase
+	  psrlq		\$1,$Xi
+	pclmulqdq	\$0x11,$Hkey,$Xhn	#######
+	  pxor		$T2,$Xhi		#
+	  pxor		$Xi,$T2
+	  psrlq		\$5,$Xi
+	  pxor		$T2,$Xi			#
+	lea		32($inp),$inp
+	  psrlq		\$1,$Xi			#
+	pclmulqdq	\$0x00,$HK,$Xmn		#######
+	  pxor		$Xhi,$Xi		#
+
+	sub		\$0x20,$len
+	ja		.Lmod_loop
+
+.Leven_tail:
+	 movdqa		$Xi,$Xhi
+	 movdqa		$Xmn,$T1
+	 pshufd		\$0b01001110,$Xi,$Xmn	#
+	 pxor		$Xi,$Xmn		#
+
+	pclmulqdq	\$0x00,$Hkey2,$Xi
+	pclmulqdq	\$0x11,$Hkey2,$Xhi
+	pclmulqdq	\$0x10,$HK,$Xmn
+
+	pxor		$Xln,$Xi		# (H*Ii+1) + H^2*(Ii+Xi)
+	pxor		$Xhn,$Xhi
+	pxor		$Xi,$T1
+	pxor		$Xhi,$T1
+	pxor		$T1,$Xmn
+	movdqa		$Xmn,$T1		#
+	psrldq		\$8,$T1
+	pslldq		\$8,$Xmn		#
+	pxor		$T1,$Xhi
+	pxor		$Xmn,$Xi		#
+___
+	&reduction_alg9	($Xhi,$Xi);
+$code.=<<___;
+	test		$len,$len
+	jnz		.Ldone
+
+.Lodd_tail:
+	movdqu		($inp),$T1		# Ii
+	pshufb		$T3,$T1
+	pxor		$T1,$Xi			# Ii+Xi
+___
+	&clmul64x64_T2	($Xhi,$Xi,$Hkey,$HK);	# H*(Ii+Xi)
+	&reduction_alg9	($Xhi,$Xi);
+$code.=<<___;
+.Ldone:
+	pshufb		$T3,$Xi
+	movdqu		$Xi,($Xip)
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	movaps	(%rsp),%xmm6
+	movaps	0x10(%rsp),%xmm7
+	movaps	0x20(%rsp),%xmm8
+	movaps	0x30(%rsp),%xmm9
+	movaps	0x40(%rsp),%xmm10
+	movaps	0x50(%rsp),%xmm11
+	movaps	0x60(%rsp),%xmm12
+	movaps	0x70(%rsp),%xmm13
+	movaps	0x80(%rsp),%xmm14
+	movaps	0x90(%rsp),%xmm15
+	lea	0xa8(%rsp),%rsp
+.LSEH_end_gcm_ghash_clmul:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	ret
+.size	gcm_ghash_clmul,.-gcm_ghash_clmul
+___
+}
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	gcm_init_avx
+.type	gcm_init_avx,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	32
+gcm_init_avx:
+___
+if ($avx) {
+my ($Htbl,$Xip)=@_4args;
+my $HK="%xmm6";
+
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+.LSEH_begin_gcm_init_avx:
+	# I can't trust assembler to use specific encoding:-(
+	.byte	0x48,0x83,0xec,0x18		#sub	$0x18,%rsp
+	.byte	0x0f,0x29,0x34,0x24		#movaps	%xmm6,(%rsp)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	vzeroupper
+
+	vmovdqu		($Xip),$Hkey
+	vpshufd		\$0b01001110,$Hkey,$Hkey	# dword swap
+
+	# <<1 twist
+	vpshufd		\$0b11111111,$Hkey,$T2	# broadcast uppermost dword
+	vpsrlq		\$63,$Hkey,$T1
+	vpsllq		\$1,$Hkey,$Hkey
+	vpxor		$T3,$T3,$T3		#
+	vpcmpgtd	$T2,$T3,$T3		# broadcast carry bit
+	vpslldq		\$8,$T1,$T1
+	vpor		$T1,$Hkey,$Hkey		# H<<=1
+
+	# magic reduction
+	vpand		.L0x1c2_polynomial(%rip),$T3,$T3
+	vpxor		$T3,$Hkey,$Hkey		# if(carry) H^=0x1c2_polynomial
+
+	vpunpckhqdq	$Hkey,$Hkey,$HK
+	vmovdqa		$Hkey,$Xi
+	vpxor		$Hkey,$HK,$HK
+	mov		\$4,%r10		# up to H^8
+	jmp		.Linit_start_avx
+___
+
+sub clmul64x64_avx {
+my ($Xhi,$Xi,$Hkey,$HK)=@_;
+
+if (!defined($HK)) {	$HK = $T2;
+$code.=<<___;
+	vpunpckhqdq	$Xi,$Xi,$T1
+	vpunpckhqdq	$Hkey,$Hkey,$T2
+	vpxor		$Xi,$T1,$T1		#
+	vpxor		$Hkey,$T2,$T2
+___
+} else {
+$code.=<<___;
+	vpunpckhqdq	$Xi,$Xi,$T1
+	vpxor		$Xi,$T1,$T1		#
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x11,$Hkey,$Xi,$Xhi	#######
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x00,$Hkey,$Xi,$Xi	#######
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x00,$HK,$T1,$T1	#######
+	vpxor		$Xi,$Xhi,$T2		#
+	vpxor		$T2,$T1,$T1		#
+
+	vpslldq		\$8,$T1,$T2		#
+	vpsrldq		\$8,$T1,$T1
+	vpxor		$T2,$Xi,$Xi		#
+	vpxor		$T1,$Xhi,$Xhi
+___
+}
+
+sub reduction_avx {
+my ($Xhi,$Xi) = @_;
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	vpsllq		\$57,$Xi,$T1		# 1st phase
+	vpsllq		\$62,$Xi,$T2
+	vpxor		$T1,$T2,$T2		#
+	vpsllq		\$63,$Xi,$T1
+	vpxor		$T1,$T2,$T2		#
+	vpslldq		\$8,$T2,$T1		#
+	vpsrldq		\$8,$T2,$T2
+	vpxor		$T1,$Xi,$Xi		#
+	vpxor		$T2,$Xhi,$Xhi
+
+	vpsrlq		\$1,$Xi,$T2		# 2nd phase
+	vpxor		$Xi,$Xhi,$Xhi
+	vpxor		$T2,$Xi,$Xi		#
+	vpsrlq		\$5,$T2,$T2
+	vpxor		$T2,$Xi,$Xi		#
+	vpsrlq		\$1,$Xi,$Xi		#
+	vpxor		$Xhi,$Xi,$Xi		#
+___
+}
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.align	32
+.Linit_loop_avx:
+	vpalignr	\$8,$T1,$T2,$T3		# low part is H.lo^H.hi...
+	vmovdqu		$T3,-0x10($Htbl)	# save Karatsuba "salt"
+___
+	&clmul64x64_avx	($Xhi,$Xi,$Hkey,$HK);	# calculate H^3,5,7
+	&reduction_avx	($Xhi,$Xi);
+$code.=<<___;
+.Linit_start_avx:
+	vmovdqa		$Xi,$T3
+___
+	&clmul64x64_avx	($Xhi,$Xi,$Hkey,$HK);	# calculate H^2,4,6,8
+	&reduction_avx	($Xhi,$Xi);
+$code.=<<___;
+	vpshufd		\$0b01001110,$T3,$T1
+	vpshufd		\$0b01001110,$Xi,$T2
+	vpxor		$T3,$T1,$T1		# Karatsuba pre-processing
+	vmovdqu		$T3,0x00($Htbl)		# save H^1,3,5,7
+	vpxor		$Xi,$T2,$T2		# Karatsuba pre-processing
+	vmovdqu		$Xi,0x10($Htbl)		# save H^2,4,6,8
+	lea		0x30($Htbl),$Htbl
+	sub		\$1,%r10
+	jnz		.Linit_loop_avx
+
+	vpalignr	\$8,$T2,$T1,$T3		# last "salt" is flipped
+	vmovdqu		$T3,-0x10($Htbl)
+
+	vzeroupper
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	movaps	(%rsp),%xmm6
+	lea	0x18(%rsp),%rsp
+.LSEH_end_gcm_init_avx:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	ret
+.size	gcm_init_avx,.-gcm_init_avx
+___
+} else {
+$code.=<<___;
+	jmp	.L_init_clmul
+.size	gcm_init_avx,.-gcm_init_avx
+___
+}
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	gcm_gmult_avx
+.type	gcm_gmult_avx,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	32
+gcm_gmult_avx:
+	jmp	.L_gmult_clmul
+.size	gcm_gmult_avx,.-gcm_gmult_avx
+___
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	gcm_ghash_avx
+.type	gcm_ghash_avx,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	32
+gcm_ghash_avx:
+___
+if ($avx) {
+my ($Xip,$Htbl,$inp,$len)=@_4args;
+my ($Xlo,$Xhi,$Xmi,
+    $Zlo,$Zhi,$Zmi,
+    $Hkey,$HK,$T1,$T2,
+    $Xi,$Xo,$Tred,$bswap,$Ii,$Ij) = map("%xmm$_",(0..15));
+
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	lea	-0x88(%rsp),%rax
+.LSEH_begin_gcm_ghash_avx:
+	# I can't trust assembler to use specific encoding:-(
+	.byte	0x48,0x8d,0x60,0xe0		#lea	-0x20(%rax),%rsp
+	.byte	0x0f,0x29,0x70,0xe0		#movaps	%xmm6,-0x20(%rax)
+	.byte	0x0f,0x29,0x78,0xf0		#movaps	%xmm7,-0x10(%rax)
+	.byte	0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x00		#movaps	%xmm8,0(%rax)
+	.byte	0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x48,0x10	#movaps	%xmm9,0x10(%rax)
+	.byte	0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x50,0x20	#movaps	%xmm10,0x20(%rax)
+	.byte	0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x58,0x30	#movaps	%xmm11,0x30(%rax)
+	.byte	0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x60,0x40	#movaps	%xmm12,0x40(%rax)
+	.byte	0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x68,0x50	#movaps	%xmm13,0x50(%rax)
+	.byte	0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x70,0x60	#movaps	%xmm14,0x60(%rax)
+	.byte	0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x78,0x70	#movaps	%xmm15,0x70(%rax)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	vzeroupper
+
+	vmovdqu		($Xip),$Xi		# load $Xi
+	lea		.L0x1c2_polynomial(%rip),%r10
+	lea		0x40($Htbl),$Htbl	# size optimization
+	vmovdqu		.Lbswap_mask(%rip),$bswap
+	vpshufb		$bswap,$Xi,$Xi
+	cmp		\$0x80,$len
+	jb		.Lshort_avx
+	sub		\$0x80,$len
+
+	vmovdqu		0x70($inp),$Ii		# I[7]
+	vmovdqu		0x00-0x40($Htbl),$Hkey	# $Hkey^1
+	vpshufb		$bswap,$Ii,$Ii
+	vmovdqu		0x20-0x40($Htbl),$HK
+
+	vpunpckhqdq	$Ii,$Ii,$T2
+	 vmovdqu	0x60($inp),$Ij		# I[6]
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x00,$Hkey,$Ii,$Xlo
+	vpxor		$Ii,$T2,$T2
+	 vpshufb	$bswap,$Ij,$Ij
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x11,$Hkey,$Ii,$Xhi
+	 vmovdqu	0x10-0x40($Htbl),$Hkey	# $Hkey^2
+	 vpunpckhqdq	$Ij,$Ij,$T1
+	 vmovdqu	0x50($inp),$Ii		# I[5]
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x00,$HK,$T2,$Xmi
+	 vpxor		$Ij,$T1,$T1
+
+	 vpshufb	$bswap,$Ii,$Ii
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x00,$Hkey,$Ij,$Zlo
+	 vpunpckhqdq	$Ii,$Ii,$T2
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x11,$Hkey,$Ij,$Zhi
+	 vmovdqu	0x30-0x40($Htbl),$Hkey	# $Hkey^3
+	 vpxor		$Ii,$T2,$T2
+	 vmovdqu	0x40($inp),$Ij		# I[4]
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x10,$HK,$T1,$Zmi
+	 vmovdqu	0x50-0x40($Htbl),$HK
+
+	 vpshufb	$bswap,$Ij,$Ij
+	vpxor		$Xlo,$Zlo,$Zlo
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x00,$Hkey,$Ii,$Xlo
+	vpxor		$Xhi,$Zhi,$Zhi
+	 vpunpckhqdq	$Ij,$Ij,$T1
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x11,$Hkey,$Ii,$Xhi
+	 vmovdqu	0x40-0x40($Htbl),$Hkey	# $Hkey^4
+	vpxor		$Xmi,$Zmi,$Zmi
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x00,$HK,$T2,$Xmi
+	 vpxor		$Ij,$T1,$T1
+
+	 vmovdqu	0x30($inp),$Ii		# I[3]
+	vpxor		$Zlo,$Xlo,$Xlo
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x00,$Hkey,$Ij,$Zlo
+	vpxor		$Zhi,$Xhi,$Xhi
+	 vpshufb	$bswap,$Ii,$Ii
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x11,$Hkey,$Ij,$Zhi
+	 vmovdqu	0x60-0x40($Htbl),$Hkey	# $Hkey^5
+	vpxor		$Zmi,$Xmi,$Xmi
+	 vpunpckhqdq	$Ii,$Ii,$T2
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x10,$HK,$T1,$Zmi
+	 vmovdqu	0x80-0x40($Htbl),$HK
+	 vpxor		$Ii,$T2,$T2
+
+	 vmovdqu	0x20($inp),$Ij		# I[2]
+	vpxor		$Xlo,$Zlo,$Zlo
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x00,$Hkey,$Ii,$Xlo
+	vpxor		$Xhi,$Zhi,$Zhi
+	 vpshufb	$bswap,$Ij,$Ij
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x11,$Hkey,$Ii,$Xhi
+	 vmovdqu	0x70-0x40($Htbl),$Hkey	# $Hkey^6
+	vpxor		$Xmi,$Zmi,$Zmi
+	 vpunpckhqdq	$Ij,$Ij,$T1
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x00,$HK,$T2,$Xmi
+	 vpxor		$Ij,$T1,$T1
+
+	 vmovdqu	0x10($inp),$Ii		# I[1]
+	vpxor		$Zlo,$Xlo,$Xlo
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x00,$Hkey,$Ij,$Zlo
+	vpxor		$Zhi,$Xhi,$Xhi
+	 vpshufb	$bswap,$Ii,$Ii
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x11,$Hkey,$Ij,$Zhi
+	 vmovdqu	0x90-0x40($Htbl),$Hkey	# $Hkey^7
+	vpxor		$Zmi,$Xmi,$Xmi
+	 vpunpckhqdq	$Ii,$Ii,$T2
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x10,$HK,$T1,$Zmi
+	 vmovdqu	0xb0-0x40($Htbl),$HK
+	 vpxor		$Ii,$T2,$T2
+
+	 vmovdqu	($inp),$Ij		# I[0]
+	vpxor		$Xlo,$Zlo,$Zlo
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x00,$Hkey,$Ii,$Xlo
+	vpxor		$Xhi,$Zhi,$Zhi
+	 vpshufb	$bswap,$Ij,$Ij
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x11,$Hkey,$Ii,$Xhi
+	 vmovdqu	0xa0-0x40($Htbl),$Hkey	# $Hkey^8
+	vpxor		$Xmi,$Zmi,$Zmi
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x10,$HK,$T2,$Xmi
+
+	lea		0x80($inp),$inp
+	cmp		\$0x80,$len
+	jb		.Ltail_avx
+
+	vpxor		$Xi,$Ij,$Ij		# accumulate $Xi
+	sub		\$0x80,$len
+	jmp		.Loop8x_avx
+
+.align	32
+.Loop8x_avx:
+	vpunpckhqdq	$Ij,$Ij,$T1
+	 vmovdqu	0x70($inp),$Ii		# I[7]
+	vpxor		$Xlo,$Zlo,$Zlo
+	vpxor		$Ij,$T1,$T1
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x00,$Hkey,$Ij,$Xi
+	 vpshufb	$bswap,$Ii,$Ii
+	vpxor		$Xhi,$Zhi,$Zhi
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x11,$Hkey,$Ij,$Xo
+	 vmovdqu	0x00-0x40($Htbl),$Hkey	# $Hkey^1
+	 vpunpckhqdq	$Ii,$Ii,$T2
+	vpxor		$Xmi,$Zmi,$Zmi
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x00,$HK,$T1,$Tred
+	 vmovdqu	0x20-0x40($Htbl),$HK
+	 vpxor		$Ii,$T2,$T2
+
+	  vmovdqu	0x60($inp),$Ij		# I[6]
+	 vpclmulqdq	\$0x00,$Hkey,$Ii,$Xlo
+	vpxor		$Zlo,$Xi,$Xi		# collect result
+	  vpshufb	$bswap,$Ij,$Ij
+	 vpclmulqdq	\$0x11,$Hkey,$Ii,$Xhi
+	vxorps		$Zhi,$Xo,$Xo
+	  vmovdqu	0x10-0x40($Htbl),$Hkey	# $Hkey^2
+	 vpunpckhqdq	$Ij,$Ij,$T1
+	 vpclmulqdq	\$0x00,$HK,  $T2,$Xmi
+	vpxor		$Zmi,$Tred,$Tred
+	 vxorps		$Ij,$T1,$T1
+
+	  vmovdqu	0x50($inp),$Ii		# I[5]
+	vpxor		$Xi,$Tred,$Tred		# aggregated Karatsuba post-processing
+	 vpclmulqdq	\$0x00,$Hkey,$Ij,$Zlo
+	vpxor		$Xo,$Tred,$Tred
+	vpslldq		\$8,$Tred,$T2
+	 vpxor		$Xlo,$Zlo,$Zlo
+	 vpclmulqdq	\$0x11,$Hkey,$Ij,$Zhi
+	vpsrldq		\$8,$Tred,$Tred
+	vpxor		$T2, $Xi, $Xi
+	  vmovdqu	0x30-0x40($Htbl),$Hkey	# $Hkey^3
+	  vpshufb	$bswap,$Ii,$Ii
+	vxorps		$Tred,$Xo, $Xo
+	 vpxor		$Xhi,$Zhi,$Zhi
+	 vpunpckhqdq	$Ii,$Ii,$T2
+	 vpclmulqdq	\$0x10,$HK,  $T1,$Zmi
+	  vmovdqu	0x50-0x40($Htbl),$HK
+	 vpxor		$Ii,$T2,$T2
+	 vpxor		$Xmi,$Zmi,$Zmi
+
+	  vmovdqu	0x40($inp),$Ij		# I[4]
+	vpalignr	\$8,$Xi,$Xi,$Tred	# 1st phase
+	 vpclmulqdq	\$0x00,$Hkey,$Ii,$Xlo
+	  vpshufb	$bswap,$Ij,$Ij
+	 vpxor		$Zlo,$Xlo,$Xlo
+	 vpclmulqdq	\$0x11,$Hkey,$Ii,$Xhi
+	  vmovdqu	0x40-0x40($Htbl),$Hkey	# $Hkey^4
+	 vpunpckhqdq	$Ij,$Ij,$T1
+	 vpxor		$Zhi,$Xhi,$Xhi
+	 vpclmulqdq	\$0x00,$HK,  $T2,$Xmi
+	 vxorps		$Ij,$T1,$T1
+	 vpxor		$Zmi,$Xmi,$Xmi
+
+	  vmovdqu	0x30($inp),$Ii		# I[3]
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x10,(%r10),$Xi,$Xi
+	 vpclmulqdq	\$0x00,$Hkey,$Ij,$Zlo
+	  vpshufb	$bswap,$Ii,$Ii
+	 vpxor		$Xlo,$Zlo,$Zlo
+	 vpclmulqdq	\$0x11,$Hkey,$Ij,$Zhi
+	  vmovdqu	0x60-0x40($Htbl),$Hkey	# $Hkey^5
+	 vpunpckhqdq	$Ii,$Ii,$T2
+	 vpxor		$Xhi,$Zhi,$Zhi
+	 vpclmulqdq	\$0x10,$HK,  $T1,$Zmi
+	  vmovdqu	0x80-0x40($Htbl),$HK
+	 vpxor		$Ii,$T2,$T2
+	 vpxor		$Xmi,$Zmi,$Zmi
+
+	  vmovdqu	0x20($inp),$Ij		# I[2]
+	 vpclmulqdq	\$0x00,$Hkey,$Ii,$Xlo
+	  vpshufb	$bswap,$Ij,$Ij
+	 vpxor		$Zlo,$Xlo,$Xlo
+	 vpclmulqdq	\$0x11,$Hkey,$Ii,$Xhi
+	  vmovdqu	0x70-0x40($Htbl),$Hkey	# $Hkey^6
+	 vpunpckhqdq	$Ij,$Ij,$T1
+	 vpxor		$Zhi,$Xhi,$Xhi
+	 vpclmulqdq	\$0x00,$HK,  $T2,$Xmi
+	 vpxor		$Ij,$T1,$T1
+	 vpxor		$Zmi,$Xmi,$Xmi
+	vxorps		$Tred,$Xi,$Xi
+
+	  vmovdqu	0x10($inp),$Ii		# I[1]
+	vpalignr	\$8,$Xi,$Xi,$Tred	# 2nd phase
+	 vpclmulqdq	\$0x00,$Hkey,$Ij,$Zlo
+	  vpshufb	$bswap,$Ii,$Ii
+	 vpxor		$Xlo,$Zlo,$Zlo
+	 vpclmulqdq	\$0x11,$Hkey,$Ij,$Zhi
+	  vmovdqu	0x90-0x40($Htbl),$Hkey	# $Hkey^7
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x10,(%r10),$Xi,$Xi
+	vxorps		$Xo,$Tred,$Tred
+	 vpunpckhqdq	$Ii,$Ii,$T2
+	 vpxor		$Xhi,$Zhi,$Zhi
+	 vpclmulqdq	\$0x10,$HK,  $T1,$Zmi
+	  vmovdqu	0xb0-0x40($Htbl),$HK
+	 vpxor		$Ii,$T2,$T2
+	 vpxor		$Xmi,$Zmi,$Zmi
+
+	  vmovdqu	($inp),$Ij		# I[0]
+	 vpclmulqdq	\$0x00,$Hkey,$Ii,$Xlo
+	  vpshufb	$bswap,$Ij,$Ij
+	 vpclmulqdq	\$0x11,$Hkey,$Ii,$Xhi
+	  vmovdqu	0xa0-0x40($Htbl),$Hkey	# $Hkey^8
+	vpxor		$Tred,$Ij,$Ij
+	 vpclmulqdq	\$0x10,$HK,  $T2,$Xmi
+	vpxor		$Xi,$Ij,$Ij		# accumulate $Xi
+
+	lea		0x80($inp),$inp
+	sub		\$0x80,$len
+	jnc		.Loop8x_avx
+
+	add		\$0x80,$len
+	jmp		.Ltail_no_xor_avx
+
+.align	32
+.Lshort_avx:
+	vmovdqu		-0x10($inp,$len),$Ii	# very last word
+	lea		($inp,$len),$inp
+	vmovdqu		0x00-0x40($Htbl),$Hkey	# $Hkey^1
+	vmovdqu		0x20-0x40($Htbl),$HK
+	vpshufb		$bswap,$Ii,$Ij
+
+	vmovdqa		$Xlo,$Zlo		# subtle way to zero $Zlo,
+	vmovdqa		$Xhi,$Zhi		# $Zhi and
+	vmovdqa		$Xmi,$Zmi		# $Zmi
+	sub		\$0x10,$len
+	jz		.Ltail_avx
+
+	vpunpckhqdq	$Ij,$Ij,$T1
+	vpxor		$Xlo,$Zlo,$Zlo
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x00,$Hkey,$Ij,$Xlo
+	vpxor		$Ij,$T1,$T1
+	 vmovdqu	-0x20($inp),$Ii
+	vpxor		$Xhi,$Zhi,$Zhi
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x11,$Hkey,$Ij,$Xhi
+	vmovdqu		0x10-0x40($Htbl),$Hkey	# $Hkey^2
+	 vpshufb	$bswap,$Ii,$Ij
+	vpxor		$Xmi,$Zmi,$Zmi
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x00,$HK,$T1,$Xmi
+	vpsrldq		\$8,$HK,$HK
+	sub		\$0x10,$len
+	jz		.Ltail_avx
+
+	vpunpckhqdq	$Ij,$Ij,$T1
+	vpxor		$Xlo,$Zlo,$Zlo
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x00,$Hkey,$Ij,$Xlo
+	vpxor		$Ij,$T1,$T1
+	 vmovdqu	-0x30($inp),$Ii
+	vpxor		$Xhi,$Zhi,$Zhi
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x11,$Hkey,$Ij,$Xhi
+	vmovdqu		0x30-0x40($Htbl),$Hkey	# $Hkey^3
+	 vpshufb	$bswap,$Ii,$Ij
+	vpxor		$Xmi,$Zmi,$Zmi
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x00,$HK,$T1,$Xmi
+	vmovdqu		0x50-0x40($Htbl),$HK
+	sub		\$0x10,$len
+	jz		.Ltail_avx
+
+	vpunpckhqdq	$Ij,$Ij,$T1
+	vpxor		$Xlo,$Zlo,$Zlo
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x00,$Hkey,$Ij,$Xlo
+	vpxor		$Ij,$T1,$T1
+	 vmovdqu	-0x40($inp),$Ii
+	vpxor		$Xhi,$Zhi,$Zhi
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x11,$Hkey,$Ij,$Xhi
+	vmovdqu		0x40-0x40($Htbl),$Hkey	# $Hkey^4
+	 vpshufb	$bswap,$Ii,$Ij
+	vpxor		$Xmi,$Zmi,$Zmi
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x00,$HK,$T1,$Xmi
+	vpsrldq		\$8,$HK,$HK
+	sub		\$0x10,$len
+	jz		.Ltail_avx
+
+	vpunpckhqdq	$Ij,$Ij,$T1
+	vpxor		$Xlo,$Zlo,$Zlo
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x00,$Hkey,$Ij,$Xlo
+	vpxor		$Ij,$T1,$T1
+	 vmovdqu	-0x50($inp),$Ii
+	vpxor		$Xhi,$Zhi,$Zhi
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x11,$Hkey,$Ij,$Xhi
+	vmovdqu		0x60-0x40($Htbl),$Hkey	# $Hkey^5
+	 vpshufb	$bswap,$Ii,$Ij
+	vpxor		$Xmi,$Zmi,$Zmi
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x00,$HK,$T1,$Xmi
+	vmovdqu		0x80-0x40($Htbl),$HK
+	sub		\$0x10,$len
+	jz		.Ltail_avx
+
+	vpunpckhqdq	$Ij,$Ij,$T1
+	vpxor		$Xlo,$Zlo,$Zlo
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x00,$Hkey,$Ij,$Xlo
+	vpxor		$Ij,$T1,$T1
+	 vmovdqu	-0x60($inp),$Ii
+	vpxor		$Xhi,$Zhi,$Zhi
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x11,$Hkey,$Ij,$Xhi
+	vmovdqu		0x70-0x40($Htbl),$Hkey	# $Hkey^6
+	 vpshufb	$bswap,$Ii,$Ij
+	vpxor		$Xmi,$Zmi,$Zmi
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x00,$HK,$T1,$Xmi
+	vpsrldq		\$8,$HK,$HK
+	sub		\$0x10,$len
+	jz		.Ltail_avx
+
+	vpunpckhqdq	$Ij,$Ij,$T1
+	vpxor		$Xlo,$Zlo,$Zlo
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x00,$Hkey,$Ij,$Xlo
+	vpxor		$Ij,$T1,$T1
+	 vmovdqu	-0x70($inp),$Ii
+	vpxor		$Xhi,$Zhi,$Zhi
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x11,$Hkey,$Ij,$Xhi
+	vmovdqu		0x90-0x40($Htbl),$Hkey	# $Hkey^7
+	 vpshufb	$bswap,$Ii,$Ij
+	vpxor		$Xmi,$Zmi,$Zmi
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x00,$HK,$T1,$Xmi
+	vmovq		0xb8-0x40($Htbl),$HK
+	sub		\$0x10,$len
+	jmp		.Ltail_avx
+
+.align	32
+.Ltail_avx:
+	vpxor		$Xi,$Ij,$Ij		# accumulate $Xi
+.Ltail_no_xor_avx:
+	vpunpckhqdq	$Ij,$Ij,$T1
+	vpxor		$Xlo,$Zlo,$Zlo
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x00,$Hkey,$Ij,$Xlo
+	vpxor		$Ij,$T1,$T1
+	vpxor		$Xhi,$Zhi,$Zhi
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x11,$Hkey,$Ij,$Xhi
+	vpxor		$Xmi,$Zmi,$Zmi
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x00,$HK,$T1,$Xmi
+
+	vmovdqu		(%r10),$Tred
+
+	vpxor		$Xlo,$Zlo,$Xi
+	vpxor		$Xhi,$Zhi,$Xo
+	vpxor		$Xmi,$Zmi,$Zmi
+
+	vpxor		$Xi, $Zmi,$Zmi		# aggregated Karatsuba post-processing
+	vpxor		$Xo, $Zmi,$Zmi
+	vpslldq		\$8, $Zmi,$T2
+	vpsrldq		\$8, $Zmi,$Zmi
+	vpxor		$T2, $Xi, $Xi
+	vpxor		$Zmi,$Xo, $Xo
+
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x10,$Tred,$Xi,$T2	# 1st phase
+	vpalignr	\$8,$Xi,$Xi,$Xi
+	vpxor		$T2,$Xi,$Xi
+
+	vpclmulqdq	\$0x10,$Tred,$Xi,$T2	# 2nd phase
+	vpalignr	\$8,$Xi,$Xi,$Xi
+	vpxor		$Xo,$Xi,$Xi
+	vpxor		$T2,$Xi,$Xi
+
+	cmp		\$0,$len
+	jne		.Lshort_avx
+
+	vpshufb		$bswap,$Xi,$Xi
+	vmovdqu		$Xi,($Xip)
+	vzeroupper
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	movaps	(%rsp),%xmm6
+	movaps	0x10(%rsp),%xmm7
+	movaps	0x20(%rsp),%xmm8
+	movaps	0x30(%rsp),%xmm9
+	movaps	0x40(%rsp),%xmm10
+	movaps	0x50(%rsp),%xmm11
+	movaps	0x60(%rsp),%xmm12
+	movaps	0x70(%rsp),%xmm13
+	movaps	0x80(%rsp),%xmm14
+	movaps	0x90(%rsp),%xmm15
+	lea	0xa8(%rsp),%rsp
+.LSEH_end_gcm_ghash_avx:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	ret
+.size	gcm_ghash_avx,.-gcm_ghash_avx
+___
+} else {
+$code.=<<___;
+	jmp	.L_ghash_clmul
+.size	gcm_ghash_avx,.-gcm_ghash_avx
+___
+}
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.align	64
+.Lbswap_mask:
+	.byte	15,14,13,12,11,10,9,8,7,6,5,4,3,2,1,0
+.L0x1c2_polynomial:
+	.byte	1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0xc2
+.L7_mask:
+	.long	7,0,7,0
+.L7_mask_poly:
+	.long	7,0,`0xE1<<1`,0
+.align	64
+.type	.Lrem_4bit,\@object
+.Lrem_4bit:
+	.long	0,`0x0000<<16`,0,`0x1C20<<16`,0,`0x3840<<16`,0,`0x2460<<16`
+	.long	0,`0x7080<<16`,0,`0x6CA0<<16`,0,`0x48C0<<16`,0,`0x54E0<<16`
+	.long	0,`0xE100<<16`,0,`0xFD20<<16`,0,`0xD940<<16`,0,`0xC560<<16`
+	.long	0,`0x9180<<16`,0,`0x8DA0<<16`,0,`0xA9C0<<16`,0,`0xB5E0<<16`
+.type	.Lrem_8bit,\@object
+.Lrem_8bit:
+	.value	0x0000,0x01C2,0x0384,0x0246,0x0708,0x06CA,0x048C,0x054E
+	.value	0x0E10,0x0FD2,0x0D94,0x0C56,0x0918,0x08DA,0x0A9C,0x0B5E
+	.value	0x1C20,0x1DE2,0x1FA4,0x1E66,0x1B28,0x1AEA,0x18AC,0x196E
+	.value	0x1230,0x13F2,0x11B4,0x1076,0x1538,0x14FA,0x16BC,0x177E
+	.value	0x3840,0x3982,0x3BC4,0x3A06,0x3F48,0x3E8A,0x3CCC,0x3D0E
+	.value	0x3650,0x3792,0x35D4,0x3416,0x3158,0x309A,0x32DC,0x331E
+	.value	0x2460,0x25A2,0x27E4,0x2626,0x2368,0x22AA,0x20EC,0x212E
+	.value	0x2A70,0x2BB2,0x29F4,0x2836,0x2D78,0x2CBA,0x2EFC,0x2F3E
+	.value	0x7080,0x7142,0x7304,0x72C6,0x7788,0x764A,0x740C,0x75CE
+	.value	0x7E90,0x7F52,0x7D14,0x7CD6,0x7998,0x785A,0x7A1C,0x7BDE
+	.value	0x6CA0,0x6D62,0x6F24,0x6EE6,0x6BA8,0x6A6A,0x682C,0x69EE
+	.value	0x62B0,0x6372,0x6134,0x60F6,0x65B8,0x647A,0x663C,0x67FE
+	.value	0x48C0,0x4902,0x4B44,0x4A86,0x4FC8,0x4E0A,0x4C4C,0x4D8E
+	.value	0x46D0,0x4712,0x4554,0x4496,0x41D8,0x401A,0x425C,0x439E
+	.value	0x54E0,0x5522,0x5764,0x56A6,0x53E8,0x522A,0x506C,0x51AE
+	.value	0x5AF0,0x5B32,0x5974,0x58B6,0x5DF8,0x5C3A,0x5E7C,0x5FBE
+	.value	0xE100,0xE0C2,0xE284,0xE346,0xE608,0xE7CA,0xE58C,0xE44E
+	.value	0xEF10,0xEED2,0xEC94,0xED56,0xE818,0xE9DA,0xEB9C,0xEA5E
+	.value	0xFD20,0xFCE2,0xFEA4,0xFF66,0xFA28,0xFBEA,0xF9AC,0xF86E
+	.value	0xF330,0xF2F2,0xF0B4,0xF176,0xF438,0xF5FA,0xF7BC,0xF67E
+	.value	0xD940,0xD882,0xDAC4,0xDB06,0xDE48,0xDF8A,0xDDCC,0xDC0E
+	.value	0xD750,0xD692,0xD4D4,0xD516,0xD058,0xD19A,0xD3DC,0xD21E
+	.value	0xC560,0xC4A2,0xC6E4,0xC726,0xC268,0xC3AA,0xC1EC,0xC02E
+	.value	0xCB70,0xCAB2,0xC8F4,0xC936,0xCC78,0xCDBA,0xCFFC,0xCE3E
+	.value	0x9180,0x9042,0x9204,0x93C6,0x9688,0x974A,0x950C,0x94CE
+	.value	0x9F90,0x9E52,0x9C14,0x9DD6,0x9898,0x995A,0x9B1C,0x9ADE
+	.value	0x8DA0,0x8C62,0x8E24,0x8FE6,0x8AA8,0x8B6A,0x892C,0x88EE
+	.value	0x83B0,0x8272,0x8034,0x81F6,0x84B8,0x857A,0x873C,0x86FE
+	.value	0xA9C0,0xA802,0xAA44,0xAB86,0xAEC8,0xAF0A,0xAD4C,0xAC8E
+	.value	0xA7D0,0xA612,0xA454,0xA596,0xA0D8,0xA11A,0xA35C,0xA29E
+	.value	0xB5E0,0xB422,0xB664,0xB7A6,0xB2E8,0xB32A,0xB16C,0xB0AE
+	.value	0xBBF0,0xBA32,0xB874,0xB9B6,0xBCF8,0xBD3A,0xBF7C,0xBEBE
+
+.asciz	"GHASH for x86_64, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+.align	64
+___
+
+# EXCEPTION_DISPOSITION handler (EXCEPTION_RECORD *rec,ULONG64 frame,
+#		CONTEXT *context,DISPATCHER_CONTEXT *disp)
+if ($win64) {
+$rec="%rcx";
+$frame="%rdx";
+$context="%r8";
+$disp="%r9";
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.extern	__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind
+.type	se_handler,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+se_handler:
+	push	%rsi
+	push	%rdi
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+	pushfq
+	sub	\$64,%rsp
+
+	mov	120($context),%rax	# pull context->Rax
+	mov	248($context),%rbx	# pull context->Rip
+
+	mov	8($disp),%rsi		# disp->ImageBase
+	mov	56($disp),%r11		# disp->HandlerData
+
+	mov	0(%r11),%r10d		# HandlerData[0]
+	lea	(%rsi,%r10),%r10	# prologue label
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip<prologue label
+	jb	.Lin_prologue
+
+	mov	152($context),%rax	# pull context->Rsp
+
+	mov	4(%r11),%r10d		# HandlerData[1]
+	lea	(%rsi,%r10),%r10	# epilogue label
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip>=epilogue label
+	jae	.Lin_prologue
+
+	lea	24(%rax),%rax		# adjust "rsp"
+
+	mov	-8(%rax),%rbx
+	mov	-16(%rax),%rbp
+	mov	-24(%rax),%r12
+	mov	%rbx,144($context)	# restore context->Rbx
+	mov	%rbp,160($context)	# restore context->Rbp
+	mov	%r12,216($context)	# restore context->R12
+
+.Lin_prologue:
+	mov	8(%rax),%rdi
+	mov	16(%rax),%rsi
+	mov	%rax,152($context)	# restore context->Rsp
+	mov	%rsi,168($context)	# restore context->Rsi
+	mov	%rdi,176($context)	# restore context->Rdi
+
+	mov	40($disp),%rdi		# disp->ContextRecord
+	mov	$context,%rsi		# context
+	mov	\$`1232/8`,%ecx		# sizeof(CONTEXT)
+	.long	0xa548f3fc		# cld; rep movsq
+
+	mov	$disp,%rsi
+	xor	%rcx,%rcx		# arg1, UNW_FLAG_NHANDLER
+	mov	8(%rsi),%rdx		# arg2, disp->ImageBase
+	mov	0(%rsi),%r8		# arg3, disp->ControlPc
+	mov	16(%rsi),%r9		# arg4, disp->FunctionEntry
+	mov	40(%rsi),%r10		# disp->ContextRecord
+	lea	56(%rsi),%r11		# &disp->HandlerData
+	lea	24(%rsi),%r12		# &disp->EstablisherFrame
+	mov	%r10,32(%rsp)		# arg5
+	mov	%r11,40(%rsp)		# arg6
+	mov	%r12,48(%rsp)		# arg7
+	mov	%rcx,56(%rsp)		# arg8, (NULL)
+	call	*__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind(%rip)
+
+	mov	\$1,%eax		# ExceptionContinueSearch
+	add	\$64,%rsp
+	popfq
+	pop	%r15
+	pop	%r14
+	pop	%r13
+	pop	%r12
+	pop	%rbp
+	pop	%rbx
+	pop	%rdi
+	pop	%rsi
+	ret
+.size	se_handler,.-se_handler
+
+.section	.pdata
+.align	4
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_gcm_gmult_4bit
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_gcm_gmult_4bit
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_gcm_gmult_4bit
+
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_gcm_ghash_4bit
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_gcm_ghash_4bit
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_gcm_ghash_4bit
+
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_gcm_init_clmul
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_gcm_init_clmul
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_gcm_init_clmul
+
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_gcm_ghash_clmul
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_gcm_ghash_clmul
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_gcm_ghash_clmul
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($avx);
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_gcm_init_avx
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_gcm_init_avx
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_gcm_init_clmul
+
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_gcm_ghash_avx
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_gcm_ghash_avx
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_gcm_ghash_clmul
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+.section	.xdata
+.align	8
+.LSEH_info_gcm_gmult_4bit:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	se_handler
+	.rva	.Lgmult_prologue,.Lgmult_epilogue	# HandlerData
+.LSEH_info_gcm_ghash_4bit:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	se_handler
+	.rva	.Lghash_prologue,.Lghash_epilogue	# HandlerData
+.LSEH_info_gcm_init_clmul:
+	.byte	0x01,0x08,0x03,0x00
+	.byte	0x08,0x68,0x00,0x00	#movaps	0x00(rsp),xmm6
+	.byte	0x04,0x22,0x00,0x00	#sub	rsp,0x18
+.LSEH_info_gcm_ghash_clmul:
+	.byte	0x01,0x33,0x16,0x00
+	.byte	0x33,0xf8,0x09,0x00	#movaps 0x90(rsp),xmm15
+	.byte	0x2e,0xe8,0x08,0x00	#movaps 0x80(rsp),xmm14
+	.byte	0x29,0xd8,0x07,0x00	#movaps 0x70(rsp),xmm13
+	.byte	0x24,0xc8,0x06,0x00	#movaps 0x60(rsp),xmm12
+	.byte	0x1f,0xb8,0x05,0x00	#movaps 0x50(rsp),xmm11
+	.byte	0x1a,0xa8,0x04,0x00	#movaps 0x40(rsp),xmm10
+	.byte	0x15,0x98,0x03,0x00	#movaps 0x30(rsp),xmm9
+	.byte	0x10,0x88,0x02,0x00	#movaps 0x20(rsp),xmm8
+	.byte	0x0c,0x78,0x01,0x00	#movaps 0x10(rsp),xmm7
+	.byte	0x08,0x68,0x00,0x00	#movaps 0x00(rsp),xmm6
+	.byte	0x04,0x01,0x15,0x00	#sub	rsp,0xa8
+___
+}
+
+$code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval($1)/gem;
+
+print $code;
+
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/modes/asm/ghashp8-ppc.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/modes/asm/ghashp8-ppc.pl
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..f0598cb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/modes/asm/ghashp8-ppc.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,670 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2014-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# GHASH for for PowerISA v2.07.
+#
+# July 2014
+#
+# Accurate performance measurements are problematic, because it's
+# always virtualized setup with possibly throttled processor.
+# Relative comparison is therefore more informative. This initial
+# version is ~2.1x slower than hardware-assisted AES-128-CTR, ~12x
+# faster than "4-bit" integer-only compiler-generated 64-bit code.
+# "Initial version" means that there is room for futher improvement.
+
+# May 2016
+#
+# 2x aggregated reduction improves performance by 50% (resulting
+# performance on POWER8 is 1 cycle per processed byte), and 4x
+# aggregated reduction - by 170% or 2.7x (resulting in 0.55 cpb).
+
+$flavour=shift;
+$output =shift;
+
+if ($flavour =~ /64/) {
+	$SIZE_T=8;
+	$LRSAVE=2*$SIZE_T;
+	$STU="stdu";
+	$POP="ld";
+	$PUSH="std";
+	$UCMP="cmpld";
+	$SHRI="srdi";
+} elsif ($flavour =~ /32/) {
+	$SIZE_T=4;
+	$LRSAVE=$SIZE_T;
+	$STU="stwu";
+	$POP="lwz";
+	$PUSH="stw";
+	$UCMP="cmplw";
+	$SHRI="srwi";
+} else { die "nonsense $flavour"; }
+
+$sp="r1";
+$FRAME=6*$SIZE_T+13*16;	# 13*16 is for v20-v31 offload
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+( $xlate="${dir}ppc-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
+( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/ppc-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
+die "can't locate ppc-xlate.pl";
+
+open STDOUT,"| $^X $xlate $flavour $output" || die "can't call $xlate: $!";
+
+my ($Xip,$Htbl,$inp,$len)=map("r$_",(3..6));	# argument block
+
+my ($Xl,$Xm,$Xh,$IN)=map("v$_",(0..3));
+my ($zero,$t0,$t1,$t2,$xC2,$H,$Hh,$Hl,$lemask)=map("v$_",(4..12));
+my ($Xl1,$Xm1,$Xh1,$IN1,$H2,$H2h,$H2l)=map("v$_",(13..19));
+my $vrsave="r12";
+
+$code=<<___;
+.machine	"any"
+
+.text
+
+.globl	.gcm_init_p8
+.align	5
+.gcm_init_p8:
+	li		r0,-4096
+	li		r8,0x10
+	mfspr		$vrsave,256
+	li		r9,0x20
+	mtspr		256,r0
+	li		r10,0x30
+	lvx_u		$H,0,r4			# load H
+
+	vspltisb	$xC2,-16		# 0xf0
+	vspltisb	$t0,1			# one
+	vaddubm		$xC2,$xC2,$xC2		# 0xe0
+	vxor		$zero,$zero,$zero
+	vor		$xC2,$xC2,$t0		# 0xe1
+	vsldoi		$xC2,$xC2,$zero,15	# 0xe1...
+	vsldoi		$t1,$zero,$t0,1		# ...1
+	vaddubm		$xC2,$xC2,$xC2		# 0xc2...
+	vspltisb	$t2,7
+	vor		$xC2,$xC2,$t1		# 0xc2....01
+	vspltb		$t1,$H,0		# most significant byte
+	vsl		$H,$H,$t0		# H<<=1
+	vsrab		$t1,$t1,$t2		# broadcast carry bit
+	vand		$t1,$t1,$xC2
+	vxor		$IN,$H,$t1		# twisted H
+
+	vsldoi		$H,$IN,$IN,8		# twist even more ...
+	vsldoi		$xC2,$zero,$xC2,8	# 0xc2.0
+	vsldoi		$Hl,$zero,$H,8		# ... and split
+	vsldoi		$Hh,$H,$zero,8
+
+	stvx_u		$xC2,0,r3		# save pre-computed table
+	stvx_u		$Hl,r8,r3
+	li		r8,0x40
+	stvx_u		$H, r9,r3
+	li		r9,0x50
+	stvx_u		$Hh,r10,r3
+	li		r10,0x60
+
+	vpmsumd		$Xl,$IN,$Hl		# H.lo·H.lo
+	vpmsumd		$Xm,$IN,$H		# H.hi·H.lo+H.lo·H.hi
+	vpmsumd		$Xh,$IN,$Hh		# H.hi·H.hi
+
+	vpmsumd		$t2,$Xl,$xC2		# 1st reduction phase
+
+	vsldoi		$t0,$Xm,$zero,8
+	vsldoi		$t1,$zero,$Xm,8
+	vxor		$Xl,$Xl,$t0
+	vxor		$Xh,$Xh,$t1
+
+	vsldoi		$Xl,$Xl,$Xl,8
+	vxor		$Xl,$Xl,$t2
+
+	vsldoi		$t1,$Xl,$Xl,8		# 2nd reduction phase
+	vpmsumd		$Xl,$Xl,$xC2
+	vxor		$t1,$t1,$Xh
+	vxor		$IN1,$Xl,$t1
+
+	vsldoi		$H2,$IN1,$IN1,8
+	vsldoi		$H2l,$zero,$H2,8
+	vsldoi		$H2h,$H2,$zero,8
+
+	stvx_u		$H2l,r8,r3		# save H^2
+	li		r8,0x70
+	stvx_u		$H2,r9,r3
+	li		r9,0x80
+	stvx_u		$H2h,r10,r3
+	li		r10,0x90
+___
+{
+my ($t4,$t5,$t6) = ($Hl,$H,$Hh);
+$code.=<<___;
+	vpmsumd		$Xl,$IN,$H2l		# H.lo·H^2.lo
+	 vpmsumd	$Xl1,$IN1,$H2l		# H^2.lo·H^2.lo
+	vpmsumd		$Xm,$IN,$H2		# H.hi·H^2.lo+H.lo·H^2.hi
+	 vpmsumd	$Xm1,$IN1,$H2		# H^2.hi·H^2.lo+H^2.lo·H^2.hi
+	vpmsumd		$Xh,$IN,$H2h		# H.hi·H^2.hi
+	 vpmsumd	$Xh1,$IN1,$H2h		# H^2.hi·H^2.hi
+
+	vpmsumd		$t2,$Xl,$xC2		# 1st reduction phase
+	 vpmsumd	$t6,$Xl1,$xC2		# 1st reduction phase
+
+	vsldoi		$t0,$Xm,$zero,8
+	vsldoi		$t1,$zero,$Xm,8
+	 vsldoi		$t4,$Xm1,$zero,8
+	 vsldoi		$t5,$zero,$Xm1,8
+	vxor		$Xl,$Xl,$t0
+	vxor		$Xh,$Xh,$t1
+	 vxor		$Xl1,$Xl1,$t4
+	 vxor		$Xh1,$Xh1,$t5
+
+	vsldoi		$Xl,$Xl,$Xl,8
+	 vsldoi		$Xl1,$Xl1,$Xl1,8
+	vxor		$Xl,$Xl,$t2
+	 vxor		$Xl1,$Xl1,$t6
+
+	vsldoi		$t1,$Xl,$Xl,8		# 2nd reduction phase
+	 vsldoi		$t5,$Xl1,$Xl1,8		# 2nd reduction phase
+	vpmsumd		$Xl,$Xl,$xC2
+	 vpmsumd	$Xl1,$Xl1,$xC2
+	vxor		$t1,$t1,$Xh
+	 vxor		$t5,$t5,$Xh1
+	vxor		$Xl,$Xl,$t1
+	 vxor		$Xl1,$Xl1,$t5
+
+	vsldoi		$H,$Xl,$Xl,8
+	 vsldoi		$H2,$Xl1,$Xl1,8
+	vsldoi		$Hl,$zero,$H,8
+	vsldoi		$Hh,$H,$zero,8
+	 vsldoi		$H2l,$zero,$H2,8
+	 vsldoi		$H2h,$H2,$zero,8
+
+	stvx_u		$Hl,r8,r3		# save H^3
+	li		r8,0xa0
+	stvx_u		$H,r9,r3
+	li		r9,0xb0
+	stvx_u		$Hh,r10,r3
+	li		r10,0xc0
+	 stvx_u		$H2l,r8,r3		# save H^4
+	 stvx_u		$H2,r9,r3
+	 stvx_u		$H2h,r10,r3
+
+	mtspr		256,$vrsave
+	blr
+	.long		0
+	.byte		0,12,0x14,0,0,0,2,0
+	.long		0
+.size	.gcm_init_p8,.-.gcm_init_p8
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	.gcm_gmult_p8
+.align	5
+.gcm_gmult_p8:
+	lis		r0,0xfff8
+	li		r8,0x10
+	mfspr		$vrsave,256
+	li		r9,0x20
+	mtspr		256,r0
+	li		r10,0x30
+	lvx_u		$IN,0,$Xip		# load Xi
+
+	lvx_u		$Hl,r8,$Htbl		# load pre-computed table
+	 le?lvsl	$lemask,r0,r0
+	lvx_u		$H, r9,$Htbl
+	 le?vspltisb	$t0,0x07
+	lvx_u		$Hh,r10,$Htbl
+	 le?vxor	$lemask,$lemask,$t0
+	lvx_u		$xC2,0,$Htbl
+	 le?vperm	$IN,$IN,$IN,$lemask
+	vxor		$zero,$zero,$zero
+
+	vpmsumd		$Xl,$IN,$Hl		# H.lo·Xi.lo
+	vpmsumd		$Xm,$IN,$H		# H.hi·Xi.lo+H.lo·Xi.hi
+	vpmsumd		$Xh,$IN,$Hh		# H.hi·Xi.hi
+
+	vpmsumd		$t2,$Xl,$xC2		# 1st reduction phase
+
+	vsldoi		$t0,$Xm,$zero,8
+	vsldoi		$t1,$zero,$Xm,8
+	vxor		$Xl,$Xl,$t0
+	vxor		$Xh,$Xh,$t1
+
+	vsldoi		$Xl,$Xl,$Xl,8
+	vxor		$Xl,$Xl,$t2
+
+	vsldoi		$t1,$Xl,$Xl,8		# 2nd reduction phase
+	vpmsumd		$Xl,$Xl,$xC2
+	vxor		$t1,$t1,$Xh
+	vxor		$Xl,$Xl,$t1
+
+	le?vperm	$Xl,$Xl,$Xl,$lemask
+	stvx_u		$Xl,0,$Xip		# write out Xi
+
+	mtspr		256,$vrsave
+	blr
+	.long		0
+	.byte		0,12,0x14,0,0,0,2,0
+	.long		0
+.size	.gcm_gmult_p8,.-.gcm_gmult_p8
+
+.globl	.gcm_ghash_p8
+.align	5
+.gcm_ghash_p8:
+	li		r0,-4096
+	li		r8,0x10
+	mfspr		$vrsave,256
+	li		r9,0x20
+	mtspr		256,r0
+	li		r10,0x30
+	lvx_u		$Xl,0,$Xip		# load Xi
+
+	lvx_u		$Hl,r8,$Htbl		# load pre-computed table
+	li		r8,0x40
+	 le?lvsl	$lemask,r0,r0
+	lvx_u		$H, r9,$Htbl
+	li		r9,0x50
+	 le?vspltisb	$t0,0x07
+	lvx_u		$Hh,r10,$Htbl
+	li		r10,0x60
+	 le?vxor	$lemask,$lemask,$t0
+	lvx_u		$xC2,0,$Htbl
+	 le?vperm	$Xl,$Xl,$Xl,$lemask
+	vxor		$zero,$zero,$zero
+
+	${UCMP}i	$len,64
+	bge		Lgcm_ghash_p8_4x
+
+	lvx_u		$IN,0,$inp
+	addi		$inp,$inp,16
+	subic.		$len,$len,16
+	 le?vperm	$IN,$IN,$IN,$lemask
+	vxor		$IN,$IN,$Xl
+	beq		Lshort
+
+	lvx_u		$H2l,r8,$Htbl		# load H^2
+	li		r8,16
+	lvx_u		$H2, r9,$Htbl
+	add		r9,$inp,$len		# end of input
+	lvx_u		$H2h,r10,$Htbl
+	be?b		Loop_2x
+
+.align	5
+Loop_2x:
+	lvx_u		$IN1,0,$inp
+	le?vperm	$IN1,$IN1,$IN1,$lemask
+
+	 subic		$len,$len,32
+	vpmsumd		$Xl,$IN,$H2l		# H^2.lo·Xi.lo
+	 vpmsumd	$Xl1,$IN1,$Hl		# H.lo·Xi+1.lo
+	 subfe		r0,r0,r0		# borrow?-1:0
+	vpmsumd		$Xm,$IN,$H2		# H^2.hi·Xi.lo+H^2.lo·Xi.hi
+	 vpmsumd	$Xm1,$IN1,$H		# H.hi·Xi+1.lo+H.lo·Xi+1.hi
+	 and		r0,r0,$len
+	vpmsumd		$Xh,$IN,$H2h		# H^2.hi·Xi.hi
+	 vpmsumd	$Xh1,$IN1,$Hh		# H.hi·Xi+1.hi
+	 add		$inp,$inp,r0
+
+	vxor		$Xl,$Xl,$Xl1
+	vxor		$Xm,$Xm,$Xm1
+
+	vpmsumd		$t2,$Xl,$xC2		# 1st reduction phase
+
+	vsldoi		$t0,$Xm,$zero,8
+	vsldoi		$t1,$zero,$Xm,8
+	 vxor		$Xh,$Xh,$Xh1
+	vxor		$Xl,$Xl,$t0
+	vxor		$Xh,$Xh,$t1
+
+	vsldoi		$Xl,$Xl,$Xl,8
+	vxor		$Xl,$Xl,$t2
+	 lvx_u		$IN,r8,$inp
+	 addi		$inp,$inp,32
+
+	vsldoi		$t1,$Xl,$Xl,8		# 2nd reduction phase
+	vpmsumd		$Xl,$Xl,$xC2
+	 le?vperm	$IN,$IN,$IN,$lemask
+	vxor		$t1,$t1,$Xh
+	vxor		$IN,$IN,$t1
+	vxor		$IN,$IN,$Xl
+	$UCMP		r9,$inp
+	bgt		Loop_2x			# done yet?
+
+	cmplwi		$len,0
+	bne		Leven
+
+Lshort:
+	vpmsumd		$Xl,$IN,$Hl		# H.lo·Xi.lo
+	vpmsumd		$Xm,$IN,$H		# H.hi·Xi.lo+H.lo·Xi.hi
+	vpmsumd		$Xh,$IN,$Hh		# H.hi·Xi.hi
+
+	vpmsumd		$t2,$Xl,$xC2		# 1st reduction phase
+
+	vsldoi		$t0,$Xm,$zero,8
+	vsldoi		$t1,$zero,$Xm,8
+	vxor		$Xl,$Xl,$t0
+	vxor		$Xh,$Xh,$t1
+
+	vsldoi		$Xl,$Xl,$Xl,8
+	vxor		$Xl,$Xl,$t2
+
+	vsldoi		$t1,$Xl,$Xl,8		# 2nd reduction phase
+	vpmsumd		$Xl,$Xl,$xC2
+	vxor		$t1,$t1,$Xh
+
+Leven:
+	vxor		$Xl,$Xl,$t1
+	le?vperm	$Xl,$Xl,$Xl,$lemask
+	stvx_u		$Xl,0,$Xip		# write out Xi
+
+	mtspr		256,$vrsave
+	blr
+	.long		0
+	.byte		0,12,0x14,0,0,0,4,0
+	.long		0
+___
+{
+my ($Xl3,$Xm2,$IN2,$H3l,$H3,$H3h,
+    $Xh3,$Xm3,$IN3,$H4l,$H4,$H4h) = map("v$_",(20..31));
+my $IN0=$IN;
+my ($H21l,$H21h,$loperm,$hiperm) = ($Hl,$Hh,$H2l,$H2h);
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.align	5
+.gcm_ghash_p8_4x:
+Lgcm_ghash_p8_4x:
+	$STU		$sp,-$FRAME($sp)
+	li		r10,`15+6*$SIZE_T`
+	li		r11,`31+6*$SIZE_T`
+	stvx		v20,r10,$sp
+	addi		r10,r10,32
+	stvx		v21,r11,$sp
+	addi		r11,r11,32
+	stvx		v22,r10,$sp
+	addi		r10,r10,32
+	stvx		v23,r11,$sp
+	addi		r11,r11,32
+	stvx		v24,r10,$sp
+	addi		r10,r10,32
+	stvx		v25,r11,$sp
+	addi		r11,r11,32
+	stvx		v26,r10,$sp
+	addi		r10,r10,32
+	stvx		v27,r11,$sp
+	addi		r11,r11,32
+	stvx		v28,r10,$sp
+	addi		r10,r10,32
+	stvx		v29,r11,$sp
+	addi		r11,r11,32
+	stvx		v30,r10,$sp
+	li		r10,0x60
+	stvx		v31,r11,$sp
+	li		r0,-1
+	stw		$vrsave,`$FRAME-4`($sp)	# save vrsave
+	mtspr		256,r0			# preserve all AltiVec registers
+
+	lvsl		$t0,0,r8		# 0x0001..0e0f
+	#lvx_u		$H2l,r8,$Htbl		# load H^2
+	li		r8,0x70
+	lvx_u		$H2, r9,$Htbl
+	li		r9,0x80
+	vspltisb	$t1,8			# 0x0808..0808
+	#lvx_u		$H2h,r10,$Htbl
+	li		r10,0x90
+	lvx_u		$H3l,r8,$Htbl		# load H^3
+	li		r8,0xa0
+	lvx_u		$H3, r9,$Htbl
+	li		r9,0xb0
+	lvx_u		$H3h,r10,$Htbl
+	li		r10,0xc0
+	lvx_u		$H4l,r8,$Htbl		# load H^4
+	li		r8,0x10
+	lvx_u		$H4, r9,$Htbl
+	li		r9,0x20
+	lvx_u		$H4h,r10,$Htbl
+	li		r10,0x30
+
+	vsldoi		$t2,$zero,$t1,8		# 0x0000..0808
+	vaddubm		$hiperm,$t0,$t2		# 0x0001..1617
+	vaddubm		$loperm,$t1,$hiperm	# 0x0809..1e1f
+
+	$SHRI		$len,$len,4		# this allows to use sign bit
+						# as carry
+	lvx_u		$IN0,0,$inp		# load input
+	lvx_u		$IN1,r8,$inp
+	subic.		$len,$len,8
+	lvx_u		$IN2,r9,$inp
+	lvx_u		$IN3,r10,$inp
+	addi		$inp,$inp,0x40
+	le?vperm	$IN0,$IN0,$IN0,$lemask
+	le?vperm	$IN1,$IN1,$IN1,$lemask
+	le?vperm	$IN2,$IN2,$IN2,$lemask
+	le?vperm	$IN3,$IN3,$IN3,$lemask
+
+	vxor		$Xh,$IN0,$Xl
+
+	 vpmsumd	$Xl1,$IN1,$H3l
+	 vpmsumd	$Xm1,$IN1,$H3
+	 vpmsumd	$Xh1,$IN1,$H3h
+
+	 vperm		$H21l,$H2,$H,$hiperm
+	 vperm		$t0,$IN2,$IN3,$loperm
+	 vperm		$H21h,$H2,$H,$loperm
+	 vperm		$t1,$IN2,$IN3,$hiperm
+	 vpmsumd	$Xm2,$IN2,$H2		# H^2.lo·Xi+2.hi+H^2.hi·Xi+2.lo
+	 vpmsumd	$Xl3,$t0,$H21l		# H^2.lo·Xi+2.lo+H.lo·Xi+3.lo
+	 vpmsumd	$Xm3,$IN3,$H		# H.hi·Xi+3.lo  +H.lo·Xi+3.hi
+	 vpmsumd	$Xh3,$t1,$H21h		# H^2.hi·Xi+2.hi+H.hi·Xi+3.hi
+
+	 vxor		$Xm2,$Xm2,$Xm1
+	 vxor		$Xl3,$Xl3,$Xl1
+	 vxor		$Xm3,$Xm3,$Xm2
+	 vxor		$Xh3,$Xh3,$Xh1
+
+	blt		Ltail_4x
+
+Loop_4x:
+	lvx_u		$IN0,0,$inp
+	lvx_u		$IN1,r8,$inp
+	subic.		$len,$len,4
+	lvx_u		$IN2,r9,$inp
+	lvx_u		$IN3,r10,$inp
+	addi		$inp,$inp,0x40
+	le?vperm	$IN1,$IN1,$IN1,$lemask
+	le?vperm	$IN2,$IN2,$IN2,$lemask
+	le?vperm	$IN3,$IN3,$IN3,$lemask
+	le?vperm	$IN0,$IN0,$IN0,$lemask
+
+	vpmsumd		$Xl,$Xh,$H4l		# H^4.lo·Xi.lo
+	vpmsumd		$Xm,$Xh,$H4		# H^4.hi·Xi.lo+H^4.lo·Xi.hi
+	vpmsumd		$Xh,$Xh,$H4h		# H^4.hi·Xi.hi
+	 vpmsumd	$Xl1,$IN1,$H3l
+	 vpmsumd	$Xm1,$IN1,$H3
+	 vpmsumd	$Xh1,$IN1,$H3h
+
+	vxor		$Xl,$Xl,$Xl3
+	vxor		$Xm,$Xm,$Xm3
+	vxor		$Xh,$Xh,$Xh3
+	 vperm		$t0,$IN2,$IN3,$loperm
+	 vperm		$t1,$IN2,$IN3,$hiperm
+
+	vpmsumd		$t2,$Xl,$xC2		# 1st reduction phase
+	 vpmsumd	$Xl3,$t0,$H21l		# H.lo·Xi+3.lo  +H^2.lo·Xi+2.lo
+	 vpmsumd	$Xh3,$t1,$H21h		# H.hi·Xi+3.hi  +H^2.hi·Xi+2.hi
+
+	vsldoi		$t0,$Xm,$zero,8
+	vsldoi		$t1,$zero,$Xm,8
+	vxor		$Xl,$Xl,$t0
+	vxor		$Xh,$Xh,$t1
+
+	vsldoi		$Xl,$Xl,$Xl,8
+	vxor		$Xl,$Xl,$t2
+
+	vsldoi		$t1,$Xl,$Xl,8		# 2nd reduction phase
+	 vpmsumd	$Xm2,$IN2,$H2		# H^2.hi·Xi+2.lo+H^2.lo·Xi+2.hi
+	 vpmsumd	$Xm3,$IN3,$H		# H.hi·Xi+3.lo  +H.lo·Xi+3.hi
+	vpmsumd		$Xl,$Xl,$xC2
+
+	 vxor		$Xl3,$Xl3,$Xl1
+	 vxor		$Xh3,$Xh3,$Xh1
+	vxor		$Xh,$Xh,$IN0
+	 vxor		$Xm2,$Xm2,$Xm1
+	vxor		$Xh,$Xh,$t1
+	 vxor		$Xm3,$Xm3,$Xm2
+	vxor		$Xh,$Xh,$Xl
+	bge		Loop_4x
+
+Ltail_4x:
+	vpmsumd		$Xl,$Xh,$H4l		# H^4.lo·Xi.lo
+	vpmsumd		$Xm,$Xh,$H4		# H^4.hi·Xi.lo+H^4.lo·Xi.hi
+	vpmsumd		$Xh,$Xh,$H4h		# H^4.hi·Xi.hi
+
+	vxor		$Xl,$Xl,$Xl3
+	vxor		$Xm,$Xm,$Xm3
+
+	vpmsumd		$t2,$Xl,$xC2		# 1st reduction phase
+
+	vsldoi		$t0,$Xm,$zero,8
+	vsldoi		$t1,$zero,$Xm,8
+	 vxor		$Xh,$Xh,$Xh3
+	vxor		$Xl,$Xl,$t0
+	vxor		$Xh,$Xh,$t1
+
+	vsldoi		$Xl,$Xl,$Xl,8
+	vxor		$Xl,$Xl,$t2
+
+	vsldoi		$t1,$Xl,$Xl,8		# 2nd reduction phase
+	vpmsumd		$Xl,$Xl,$xC2
+	vxor		$t1,$t1,$Xh
+	vxor		$Xl,$Xl,$t1
+
+	addic.		$len,$len,4
+	beq		Ldone_4x
+
+	lvx_u		$IN0,0,$inp
+	${UCMP}i	$len,2
+	li		$len,-4
+	blt		Lone
+	lvx_u		$IN1,r8,$inp
+	beq		Ltwo
+
+Lthree:
+	lvx_u		$IN2,r9,$inp
+	le?vperm	$IN0,$IN0,$IN0,$lemask
+	le?vperm	$IN1,$IN1,$IN1,$lemask
+	le?vperm	$IN2,$IN2,$IN2,$lemask
+
+	vxor		$Xh,$IN0,$Xl
+	vmr		$H4l,$H3l
+	vmr		$H4, $H3
+	vmr		$H4h,$H3h
+
+	vperm		$t0,$IN1,$IN2,$loperm
+	vperm		$t1,$IN1,$IN2,$hiperm
+	vpmsumd		$Xm2,$IN1,$H2		# H^2.lo·Xi+1.hi+H^2.hi·Xi+1.lo
+	vpmsumd		$Xm3,$IN2,$H		# H.hi·Xi+2.lo  +H.lo·Xi+2.hi
+	vpmsumd		$Xl3,$t0,$H21l		# H^2.lo·Xi+1.lo+H.lo·Xi+2.lo
+	vpmsumd		$Xh3,$t1,$H21h		# H^2.hi·Xi+1.hi+H.hi·Xi+2.hi
+
+	vxor		$Xm3,$Xm3,$Xm2
+	b		Ltail_4x
+
+.align	4
+Ltwo:
+	le?vperm	$IN0,$IN0,$IN0,$lemask
+	le?vperm	$IN1,$IN1,$IN1,$lemask
+
+	vxor		$Xh,$IN0,$Xl
+	vperm		$t0,$zero,$IN1,$loperm
+	vperm		$t1,$zero,$IN1,$hiperm
+
+	vsldoi		$H4l,$zero,$H2,8
+	vmr		$H4, $H2
+	vsldoi		$H4h,$H2,$zero,8
+
+	vpmsumd		$Xl3,$t0, $H21l		# H.lo·Xi+1.lo
+	vpmsumd		$Xm3,$IN1,$H		# H.hi·Xi+1.lo+H.lo·Xi+2.hi
+	vpmsumd		$Xh3,$t1, $H21h		# H.hi·Xi+1.hi
+
+	b		Ltail_4x
+
+.align	4
+Lone:
+	le?vperm	$IN0,$IN0,$IN0,$lemask
+
+	vsldoi		$H4l,$zero,$H,8
+	vmr		$H4, $H
+	vsldoi		$H4h,$H,$zero,8
+
+	vxor		$Xh,$IN0,$Xl
+	vxor		$Xl3,$Xl3,$Xl3
+	vxor		$Xm3,$Xm3,$Xm3
+	vxor		$Xh3,$Xh3,$Xh3
+
+	b		Ltail_4x
+
+Ldone_4x:
+	le?vperm	$Xl,$Xl,$Xl,$lemask
+	stvx_u		$Xl,0,$Xip		# write out Xi
+
+	li		r10,`15+6*$SIZE_T`
+	li		r11,`31+6*$SIZE_T`
+	mtspr		256,$vrsave
+	lvx		v20,r10,$sp
+	addi		r10,r10,32
+	lvx		v21,r11,$sp
+	addi		r11,r11,32
+	lvx		v22,r10,$sp
+	addi		r10,r10,32
+	lvx		v23,r11,$sp
+	addi		r11,r11,32
+	lvx		v24,r10,$sp
+	addi		r10,r10,32
+	lvx		v25,r11,$sp
+	addi		r11,r11,32
+	lvx		v26,r10,$sp
+	addi		r10,r10,32
+	lvx		v27,r11,$sp
+	addi		r11,r11,32
+	lvx		v28,r10,$sp
+	addi		r10,r10,32
+	lvx		v29,r11,$sp
+	addi		r11,r11,32
+	lvx		v30,r10,$sp
+	lvx		v31,r11,$sp
+	addi		$sp,$sp,$FRAME
+	blr
+	.long		0
+	.byte		0,12,0x04,0,0x80,0,4,0
+	.long		0
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+.size	.gcm_ghash_p8,.-.gcm_ghash_p8
+
+.asciz  "GHASH for PowerISA 2.07, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+.align  2
+___
+
+foreach (split("\n",$code)) {
+	s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/geo;
+
+	if ($flavour =~ /le$/o) {	# little-endian
+	    s/le\?//o		or
+	    s/be\?/#be#/o;
+	} else {
+	    s/le\?/#le#/o	or
+	    s/be\?//o;
+	}
+	print $_,"\n";
+}
+
+close STDOUT; # enforce flush
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/modes/asm/ghashv8-armx.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/modes/asm/ghashv8-armx.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dcd5f59
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/modes/asm/ghashv8-armx.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,430 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2014-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# GHASH for ARMv8 Crypto Extension, 64-bit polynomial multiplication.
+#
+# June 2014
+#
+# Initial version was developed in tight cooperation with Ard
+# Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> from bits-n-pieces from
+# other assembly modules. Just like aesv8-armx.pl this module
+# supports both AArch32 and AArch64 execution modes.
+#
+# July 2014
+#
+# Implement 2x aggregated reduction [see ghash-x86.pl for background
+# information].
+#
+# Current performance in cycles per processed byte:
+#
+#		PMULL[2]	32-bit NEON(*)
+# Apple A7	0.92		5.62
+# Cortex-A53	1.01		8.39
+# Cortex-A57	1.17		7.61
+# Denver	0.71		6.02
+# Mongoose	1.10		8.06
+#
+# (*)	presented for reference/comparison purposes;
+
+$flavour = shift;
+$output  = shift;
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+( $xlate="${dir}arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
+( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
+die "can't locate arm-xlate.pl";
+
+open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output";
+*STDOUT=*OUT;
+
+$Xi="x0";	# argument block
+$Htbl="x1";
+$inp="x2";
+$len="x3";
+
+$inc="x12";
+
+{
+my ($Xl,$Xm,$Xh,$IN)=map("q$_",(0..3));
+my ($t0,$t1,$t2,$xC2,$H,$Hhl,$H2)=map("q$_",(8..14));
+
+$code=<<___;
+#include "arm_arch.h"
+
+.text
+___
+$code.=".arch	armv8-a+crypto\n"	if ($flavour =~ /64/);
+$code.=<<___				if ($flavour !~ /64/);
+.fpu	neon
+.code	32
+#undef	__thumb2__
+___
+
+################################################################################
+# void gcm_init_v8(u128 Htable[16],const u64 H[2]);
+#
+# input:	128-bit H - secret parameter E(K,0^128)
+# output:	precomputed table filled with degrees of twisted H;
+#		H is twisted to handle reverse bitness of GHASH;
+#		only few of 16 slots of Htable[16] are used;
+#		data is opaque to outside world (which allows to
+#		optimize the code independently);
+#
+$code.=<<___;
+.global	gcm_init_v8
+.type	gcm_init_v8,%function
+.align	4
+gcm_init_v8:
+	vld1.64		{$t1},[x1]		@ load input H
+	vmov.i8		$xC2,#0xe1
+	vshl.i64	$xC2,$xC2,#57		@ 0xc2.0
+	vext.8		$IN,$t1,$t1,#8
+	vshr.u64	$t2,$xC2,#63
+	vdup.32		$t1,${t1}[1]
+	vext.8		$t0,$t2,$xC2,#8		@ t0=0xc2....01
+	vshr.u64	$t2,$IN,#63
+	vshr.s32	$t1,$t1,#31		@ broadcast carry bit
+	vand		$t2,$t2,$t0
+	vshl.i64	$IN,$IN,#1
+	vext.8		$t2,$t2,$t2,#8
+	vand		$t0,$t0,$t1
+	vorr		$IN,$IN,$t2		@ H<<<=1
+	veor		$H,$IN,$t0		@ twisted H
+	vst1.64		{$H},[x0],#16		@ store Htable[0]
+
+	@ calculate H^2
+	vext.8		$t0,$H,$H,#8		@ Karatsuba pre-processing
+	vpmull.p64	$Xl,$H,$H
+	veor		$t0,$t0,$H
+	vpmull2.p64	$Xh,$H,$H
+	vpmull.p64	$Xm,$t0,$t0
+
+	vext.8		$t1,$Xl,$Xh,#8		@ Karatsuba post-processing
+	veor		$t2,$Xl,$Xh
+	veor		$Xm,$Xm,$t1
+	veor		$Xm,$Xm,$t2
+	vpmull.p64	$t2,$Xl,$xC2		@ 1st phase
+
+	vmov		$Xh#lo,$Xm#hi		@ Xh|Xm - 256-bit result
+	vmov		$Xm#hi,$Xl#lo		@ Xm is rotated Xl
+	veor		$Xl,$Xm,$t2
+
+	vext.8		$t2,$Xl,$Xl,#8		@ 2nd phase
+	vpmull.p64	$Xl,$Xl,$xC2
+	veor		$t2,$t2,$Xh
+	veor		$H2,$Xl,$t2
+
+	vext.8		$t1,$H2,$H2,#8		@ Karatsuba pre-processing
+	veor		$t1,$t1,$H2
+	vext.8		$Hhl,$t0,$t1,#8		@ pack Karatsuba pre-processed
+	vst1.64		{$Hhl-$H2},[x0]		@ store Htable[1..2]
+
+	ret
+.size	gcm_init_v8,.-gcm_init_v8
+___
+################################################################################
+# void gcm_gmult_v8(u64 Xi[2],const u128 Htable[16]);
+#
+# input:	Xi - current hash value;
+#		Htable - table precomputed in gcm_init_v8;
+# output:	Xi - next hash value Xi;
+#
+$code.=<<___;
+.global	gcm_gmult_v8
+.type	gcm_gmult_v8,%function
+.align	4
+gcm_gmult_v8:
+	vld1.64		{$t1},[$Xi]		@ load Xi
+	vmov.i8		$xC2,#0xe1
+	vld1.64		{$H-$Hhl},[$Htbl]	@ load twisted H, ...
+	vshl.u64	$xC2,$xC2,#57
+#ifndef __ARMEB__
+	vrev64.8	$t1,$t1
+#endif
+	vext.8		$IN,$t1,$t1,#8
+
+	vpmull.p64	$Xl,$H,$IN		@ H.lo·Xi.lo
+	veor		$t1,$t1,$IN		@ Karatsuba pre-processing
+	vpmull2.p64	$Xh,$H,$IN		@ H.hi·Xi.hi
+	vpmull.p64	$Xm,$Hhl,$t1		@ (H.lo+H.hi)·(Xi.lo+Xi.hi)
+
+	vext.8		$t1,$Xl,$Xh,#8		@ Karatsuba post-processing
+	veor		$t2,$Xl,$Xh
+	veor		$Xm,$Xm,$t1
+	veor		$Xm,$Xm,$t2
+	vpmull.p64	$t2,$Xl,$xC2		@ 1st phase of reduction
+
+	vmov		$Xh#lo,$Xm#hi		@ Xh|Xm - 256-bit result
+	vmov		$Xm#hi,$Xl#lo		@ Xm is rotated Xl
+	veor		$Xl,$Xm,$t2
+
+	vext.8		$t2,$Xl,$Xl,#8		@ 2nd phase of reduction
+	vpmull.p64	$Xl,$Xl,$xC2
+	veor		$t2,$t2,$Xh
+	veor		$Xl,$Xl,$t2
+
+#ifndef __ARMEB__
+	vrev64.8	$Xl,$Xl
+#endif
+	vext.8		$Xl,$Xl,$Xl,#8
+	vst1.64		{$Xl},[$Xi]		@ write out Xi
+
+	ret
+.size	gcm_gmult_v8,.-gcm_gmult_v8
+___
+################################################################################
+# void gcm_ghash_v8(u64 Xi[2],const u128 Htable[16],const u8 *inp,size_t len);
+#
+# input:	table precomputed in gcm_init_v8;
+#		current hash value Xi;
+#		pointer to input data;
+#		length of input data in bytes, but divisible by block size;
+# output:	next hash value Xi;
+#
+$code.=<<___;
+.global	gcm_ghash_v8
+.type	gcm_ghash_v8,%function
+.align	4
+gcm_ghash_v8:
+___
+$code.=<<___		if ($flavour !~ /64/);
+	vstmdb		sp!,{d8-d15}		@ 32-bit ABI says so
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	vld1.64		{$Xl},[$Xi]		@ load [rotated] Xi
+						@ "[rotated]" means that
+						@ loaded value would have
+						@ to be rotated in order to
+						@ make it appear as in
+						@ alorithm specification
+	subs		$len,$len,#32		@ see if $len is 32 or larger
+	mov		$inc,#16		@ $inc is used as post-
+						@ increment for input pointer;
+						@ as loop is modulo-scheduled
+						@ $inc is zeroed just in time
+						@ to preclude oversteping
+						@ inp[len], which means that
+						@ last block[s] are actually
+						@ loaded twice, but last
+						@ copy is not processed
+	vld1.64		{$H-$Hhl},[$Htbl],#32	@ load twisted H, ..., H^2
+	vmov.i8		$xC2,#0xe1
+	vld1.64		{$H2},[$Htbl]
+	cclr		$inc,eq			@ is it time to zero $inc?
+	vext.8		$Xl,$Xl,$Xl,#8		@ rotate Xi
+	vld1.64		{$t0},[$inp],#16	@ load [rotated] I[0]
+	vshl.u64	$xC2,$xC2,#57		@ compose 0xc2.0 constant
+#ifndef __ARMEB__
+	vrev64.8	$t0,$t0
+	vrev64.8	$Xl,$Xl
+#endif
+	vext.8		$IN,$t0,$t0,#8		@ rotate I[0]
+	b.lo		.Lodd_tail_v8		@ $len was less than 32
+___
+{ my ($Xln,$Xmn,$Xhn,$In) = map("q$_",(4..7));
+	#######
+	# Xi+2 =[H*(Ii+1 + Xi+1)] mod P =
+	#	[(H*Ii+1) + (H*Xi+1)] mod P =
+	#	[(H*Ii+1) + H^2*(Ii+Xi)] mod P
+	#
+$code.=<<___;
+	vld1.64		{$t1},[$inp],$inc	@ load [rotated] I[1]
+#ifndef __ARMEB__
+	vrev64.8	$t1,$t1
+#endif
+	vext.8		$In,$t1,$t1,#8
+	veor		$IN,$IN,$Xl		@ I[i]^=Xi
+	vpmull.p64	$Xln,$H,$In		@ H·Ii+1
+	veor		$t1,$t1,$In		@ Karatsuba pre-processing
+	vpmull2.p64	$Xhn,$H,$In
+	b		.Loop_mod2x_v8
+
+.align	4
+.Loop_mod2x_v8:
+	vext.8		$t2,$IN,$IN,#8
+	subs		$len,$len,#32		@ is there more data?
+	vpmull.p64	$Xl,$H2,$IN		@ H^2.lo·Xi.lo
+	cclr		$inc,lo			@ is it time to zero $inc?
+
+	 vpmull.p64	$Xmn,$Hhl,$t1
+	veor		$t2,$t2,$IN		@ Karatsuba pre-processing
+	vpmull2.p64	$Xh,$H2,$IN		@ H^2.hi·Xi.hi
+	veor		$Xl,$Xl,$Xln		@ accumulate
+	vpmull2.p64	$Xm,$Hhl,$t2		@ (H^2.lo+H^2.hi)·(Xi.lo+Xi.hi)
+	 vld1.64	{$t0},[$inp],$inc	@ load [rotated] I[i+2]
+
+	veor		$Xh,$Xh,$Xhn
+	 cclr		$inc,eq			@ is it time to zero $inc?
+	veor		$Xm,$Xm,$Xmn
+
+	vext.8		$t1,$Xl,$Xh,#8		@ Karatsuba post-processing
+	veor		$t2,$Xl,$Xh
+	veor		$Xm,$Xm,$t1
+	 vld1.64	{$t1},[$inp],$inc	@ load [rotated] I[i+3]
+#ifndef __ARMEB__
+	 vrev64.8	$t0,$t0
+#endif
+	veor		$Xm,$Xm,$t2
+	vpmull.p64	$t2,$Xl,$xC2		@ 1st phase of reduction
+
+#ifndef __ARMEB__
+	 vrev64.8	$t1,$t1
+#endif
+	vmov		$Xh#lo,$Xm#hi		@ Xh|Xm - 256-bit result
+	vmov		$Xm#hi,$Xl#lo		@ Xm is rotated Xl
+	 vext.8		$In,$t1,$t1,#8
+	 vext.8		$IN,$t0,$t0,#8
+	veor		$Xl,$Xm,$t2
+	 vpmull.p64	$Xln,$H,$In		@ H·Ii+1
+	veor		$IN,$IN,$Xh		@ accumulate $IN early
+
+	vext.8		$t2,$Xl,$Xl,#8		@ 2nd phase of reduction
+	vpmull.p64	$Xl,$Xl,$xC2
+	veor		$IN,$IN,$t2
+	 veor		$t1,$t1,$In		@ Karatsuba pre-processing
+	veor		$IN,$IN,$Xl
+	 vpmull2.p64	$Xhn,$H,$In
+	b.hs		.Loop_mod2x_v8		@ there was at least 32 more bytes
+
+	veor		$Xh,$Xh,$t2
+	vext.8		$IN,$t0,$t0,#8		@ re-construct $IN
+	adds		$len,$len,#32		@ re-construct $len
+	veor		$Xl,$Xl,$Xh		@ re-construct $Xl
+	b.eq		.Ldone_v8		@ is $len zero?
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+.Lodd_tail_v8:
+	vext.8		$t2,$Xl,$Xl,#8
+	veor		$IN,$IN,$Xl		@ inp^=Xi
+	veor		$t1,$t0,$t2		@ $t1 is rotated inp^Xi
+
+	vpmull.p64	$Xl,$H,$IN		@ H.lo·Xi.lo
+	veor		$t1,$t1,$IN		@ Karatsuba pre-processing
+	vpmull2.p64	$Xh,$H,$IN		@ H.hi·Xi.hi
+	vpmull.p64	$Xm,$Hhl,$t1		@ (H.lo+H.hi)·(Xi.lo+Xi.hi)
+
+	vext.8		$t1,$Xl,$Xh,#8		@ Karatsuba post-processing
+	veor		$t2,$Xl,$Xh
+	veor		$Xm,$Xm,$t1
+	veor		$Xm,$Xm,$t2
+	vpmull.p64	$t2,$Xl,$xC2		@ 1st phase of reduction
+
+	vmov		$Xh#lo,$Xm#hi		@ Xh|Xm - 256-bit result
+	vmov		$Xm#hi,$Xl#lo		@ Xm is rotated Xl
+	veor		$Xl,$Xm,$t2
+
+	vext.8		$t2,$Xl,$Xl,#8		@ 2nd phase of reduction
+	vpmull.p64	$Xl,$Xl,$xC2
+	veor		$t2,$t2,$Xh
+	veor		$Xl,$Xl,$t2
+
+.Ldone_v8:
+#ifndef __ARMEB__
+	vrev64.8	$Xl,$Xl
+#endif
+	vext.8		$Xl,$Xl,$Xl,#8
+	vst1.64		{$Xl},[$Xi]		@ write out Xi
+
+___
+$code.=<<___		if ($flavour !~ /64/);
+	vldmia		sp!,{d8-d15}		@ 32-bit ABI says so
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	ret
+.size	gcm_ghash_v8,.-gcm_ghash_v8
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+.asciz  "GHASH for ARMv8, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+.align  2
+___
+
+if ($flavour =~ /64/) {			######## 64-bit code
+    sub unvmov {
+	my $arg=shift;
+
+	$arg =~ m/q([0-9]+)#(lo|hi),\s*q([0-9]+)#(lo|hi)/o &&
+	sprintf	"ins	v%d.d[%d],v%d.d[%d]",$1,($2 eq "lo")?0:1,$3,($4 eq "lo")?0:1;
+    }
+    foreach(split("\n",$code)) {
+	s/cclr\s+([wx])([^,]+),\s*([a-z]+)/csel	$1$2,$1zr,$1$2,$3/o	or
+	s/vmov\.i8/movi/o		or	# fix up legacy mnemonics
+	s/vmov\s+(.*)/unvmov($1)/geo	or
+	s/vext\.8/ext/o			or
+	s/vshr\.s/sshr\.s/o		or
+	s/vshr/ushr/o			or
+	s/^(\s+)v/$1/o			or	# strip off v prefix
+	s/\bbx\s+lr\b/ret/o;
+
+	s/\bq([0-9]+)\b/"v".($1<8?$1:$1+8).".16b"/geo;	# old->new registers
+	s/@\s/\/\//o;				# old->new style commentary
+
+	# fix up remainig legacy suffixes
+	s/\.[ui]?8(\s)/$1/o;
+	s/\.[uis]?32//o and s/\.16b/\.4s/go;
+	m/\.p64/o and s/\.16b/\.1q/o;		# 1st pmull argument
+	m/l\.p64/o and s/\.16b/\.1d/go;		# 2nd and 3rd pmull arguments
+	s/\.[uisp]?64//o and s/\.16b/\.2d/go;
+	s/\.[42]([sd])\[([0-3])\]/\.$1\[$2\]/o;
+
+	print $_,"\n";
+    }
+} else {				######## 32-bit code
+    sub unvdup32 {
+	my $arg=shift;
+
+	$arg =~ m/q([0-9]+),\s*q([0-9]+)\[([0-3])\]/o &&
+	sprintf	"vdup.32	q%d,d%d[%d]",$1,2*$2+($3>>1),$3&1;
+    }
+    sub unvpmullp64 {
+	my ($mnemonic,$arg)=@_;
+
+	if ($arg =~ m/q([0-9]+),\s*q([0-9]+),\s*q([0-9]+)/o) {
+	    my $word = 0xf2a00e00|(($1&7)<<13)|(($1&8)<<19)
+				 |(($2&7)<<17)|(($2&8)<<4)
+				 |(($3&7)<<1) |(($3&8)<<2);
+	    $word |= 0x00010001	 if ($mnemonic =~ "2");
+	    # since ARMv7 instructions are always encoded little-endian.
+	    # correct solution is to use .inst directive, but older
+	    # assemblers don't implement it:-(
+	    sprintf ".byte\t0x%02x,0x%02x,0x%02x,0x%02x\t@ %s %s",
+			$word&0xff,($word>>8)&0xff,
+			($word>>16)&0xff,($word>>24)&0xff,
+			$mnemonic,$arg;
+	}
+    }
+
+    foreach(split("\n",$code)) {
+	s/\b[wx]([0-9]+)\b/r$1/go;		# new->old registers
+	s/\bv([0-9])\.[12468]+[bsd]\b/q$1/go;	# new->old registers
+	s/\/\/\s?/@ /o;				# new->old style commentary
+
+	# fix up remainig new-style suffixes
+	s/\],#[0-9]+/]!/o;
+
+	s/cclr\s+([^,]+),\s*([a-z]+)/mov$2	$1,#0/o			or
+	s/vdup\.32\s+(.*)/unvdup32($1)/geo				or
+	s/v?(pmull2?)\.p64\s+(.*)/unvpmullp64($1,$2)/geo		or
+	s/\bq([0-9]+)#(lo|hi)/sprintf "d%d",2*$1+($2 eq "hi")/geo	or
+	s/^(\s+)b\./$1b/o						or
+	s/^(\s+)ret/$1bx\tlr/o;
+
+	print $_,"\n";
+    }
+}
+
+close STDOUT; # enforce flush
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/modes/build.info b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/modes/build.info
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..38195c4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/modes/build.info
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+LIBS=../../libcrypto
+SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
+        cbc128.c ctr128.c cts128.c cfb128.c ofb128.c gcm128.c \
+        ccm128.c xts128.c wrap128.c ocb128.c \
+        {- $target{modes_asm_src} -}
+
+INCLUDE[gcm128.o]=..
+
+GENERATE[ghash-ia64.s]=asm/ghash-ia64.pl $(CFLAGS) $(LIB_CFLAGS)
+GENERATE[ghash-x86.s]=asm/ghash-x86.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $(CFLAGS) $(LIB_CFLAGS) $(PROCESSOR)
+GENERATE[ghash-x86_64.s]=asm/ghash-x86_64.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+GENERATE[aesni-gcm-x86_64.s]=asm/aesni-gcm-x86_64.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+GENERATE[ghash-sparcv9.S]=asm/ghash-sparcv9.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+INCLUDE[ghash-sparcv9.o]=..
+GENERATE[ghash-alpha.S]=asm/ghash-alpha.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+GENERATE[ghash-parisc.s]=asm/ghash-parisc.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+GENERATE[ghashp8-ppc.s]=asm/ghashp8-ppc.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+GENERATE[ghash-armv4.S]=asm/ghash-armv4.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+INCLUDE[ghash-armv4.o]=..
+GENERATE[ghashv8-armx.S]=asm/ghashv8-armx.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+INCLUDE[ghashv8-armx.o]=..
+
+BEGINRAW[Makefile]
+# GNU make "catch all"
+{- $builddir -}/ghash-%.S:	{- $sourcedir -}/asm/ghash-%.pl
+	CC="$(CC)" $(PERL) $< $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $@
+ENDRAW[Makefile]
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/modes/cbc128.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/modes/cbc128.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4ce5eb2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/modes/cbc128.c
@@ -0,0 +1,161 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include "modes_lcl.h"
+#include <string.h>
+
+#if !defined(STRICT_ALIGNMENT) && !defined(PEDANTIC)
+# define STRICT_ALIGNMENT 0
+#endif
+
+void CRYPTO_cbc128_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                           size_t len, const void *key,
+                           unsigned char ivec[16], block128_f block)
+{
+    size_t n;
+    const unsigned char *iv = ivec;
+
+    if (len == 0)
+        return;
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT)
+    if (STRICT_ALIGNMENT &&
+        ((size_t)in | (size_t)out | (size_t)ivec) % sizeof(size_t) != 0) {
+        while (len >= 16) {
+            for (n = 0; n < 16; ++n)
+                out[n] = in[n] ^ iv[n];
+            (*block) (out, out, key);
+            iv = out;
+            len -= 16;
+            in += 16;
+            out += 16;
+        }
+    } else {
+        while (len >= 16) {
+            for (n = 0; n < 16; n += sizeof(size_t))
+                *(size_t *)(out + n) =
+                    *(size_t *)(in + n) ^ *(size_t *)(iv + n);
+            (*block) (out, out, key);
+            iv = out;
+            len -= 16;
+            in += 16;
+            out += 16;
+        }
+    }
+#endif
+    while (len) {
+        for (n = 0; n < 16 && n < len; ++n)
+            out[n] = in[n] ^ iv[n];
+        for (; n < 16; ++n)
+            out[n] = iv[n];
+        (*block) (out, out, key);
+        iv = out;
+        if (len <= 16)
+            break;
+        len -= 16;
+        in += 16;
+        out += 16;
+    }
+    memcpy(ivec, iv, 16);
+}
+
+void CRYPTO_cbc128_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                           size_t len, const void *key,
+                           unsigned char ivec[16], block128_f block)
+{
+    size_t n;
+    union {
+        size_t t[16 / sizeof(size_t)];
+        unsigned char c[16];
+    } tmp;
+
+    if (len == 0)
+        return;
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT)
+    if (in != out) {
+        const unsigned char *iv = ivec;
+
+        if (STRICT_ALIGNMENT &&
+            ((size_t)in | (size_t)out | (size_t)ivec) % sizeof(size_t) != 0) {
+            while (len >= 16) {
+                (*block) (in, out, key);
+                for (n = 0; n < 16; ++n)
+                    out[n] ^= iv[n];
+                iv = in;
+                len -= 16;
+                in += 16;
+                out += 16;
+            }
+        } else if (16 % sizeof(size_t) == 0) { /* always true */
+            while (len >= 16) {
+                size_t *out_t = (size_t *)out, *iv_t = (size_t *)iv;
+
+                (*block) (in, out, key);
+                for (n = 0; n < 16 / sizeof(size_t); n++)
+                    out_t[n] ^= iv_t[n];
+                iv = in;
+                len -= 16;
+                in += 16;
+                out += 16;
+            }
+        }
+        memcpy(ivec, iv, 16);
+    } else {
+        if (STRICT_ALIGNMENT &&
+            ((size_t)in | (size_t)out | (size_t)ivec) % sizeof(size_t) != 0) {
+            unsigned char c;
+            while (len >= 16) {
+                (*block) (in, tmp.c, key);
+                for (n = 0; n < 16; ++n) {
+                    c = in[n];
+                    out[n] = tmp.c[n] ^ ivec[n];
+                    ivec[n] = c;
+                }
+                len -= 16;
+                in += 16;
+                out += 16;
+            }
+        } else if (16 % sizeof(size_t) == 0) { /* always true */
+            while (len >= 16) {
+                size_t c, *out_t = (size_t *)out, *ivec_t = (size_t *)ivec;
+                const size_t *in_t = (const size_t *)in;
+
+                (*block) (in, tmp.c, key);
+                for (n = 0; n < 16 / sizeof(size_t); n++) {
+                    c = in_t[n];
+                    out_t[n] = tmp.t[n] ^ ivec_t[n];
+                    ivec_t[n] = c;
+                }
+                len -= 16;
+                in += 16;
+                out += 16;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+#endif
+    while (len) {
+        unsigned char c;
+        (*block) (in, tmp.c, key);
+        for (n = 0; n < 16 && n < len; ++n) {
+            c = in[n];
+            out[n] = tmp.c[n] ^ ivec[n];
+            ivec[n] = c;
+        }
+        if (len <= 16) {
+            for (; n < 16; ++n)
+                ivec[n] = in[n];
+            break;
+        }
+        len -= 16;
+        in += 16;
+        out += 16;
+    }
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/modes/ccm128.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/modes/ccm128.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..85ce84f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/modes/ccm128.c
@@ -0,0 +1,432 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include "modes_lcl.h"
+#include <string.h>
+
+/*
+ * First you setup M and L parameters and pass the key schedule. This is
+ * called once per session setup...
+ */
+void CRYPTO_ccm128_init(CCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
+                        unsigned int M, unsigned int L, void *key,
+                        block128_f block)
+{
+    memset(ctx->nonce.c, 0, sizeof(ctx->nonce.c));
+    ctx->nonce.c[0] = ((u8)(L - 1) & 7) | (u8)(((M - 2) / 2) & 7) << 3;
+    ctx->blocks = 0;
+    ctx->block = block;
+    ctx->key = key;
+}
+
+/* !!! Following interfaces are to be called *once* per packet !!! */
+
+/* Then you setup per-message nonce and pass the length of the message */
+int CRYPTO_ccm128_setiv(CCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
+                        const unsigned char *nonce, size_t nlen, size_t mlen)
+{
+    unsigned int L = ctx->nonce.c[0] & 7; /* the L parameter */
+
+    if (nlen < (14 - L))
+        return -1;              /* nonce is too short */
+
+    if (sizeof(mlen) == 8 && L >= 3) {
+        ctx->nonce.c[8] = (u8)(mlen >> (56 % (sizeof(mlen) * 8)));
+        ctx->nonce.c[9] = (u8)(mlen >> (48 % (sizeof(mlen) * 8)));
+        ctx->nonce.c[10] = (u8)(mlen >> (40 % (sizeof(mlen) * 8)));
+        ctx->nonce.c[11] = (u8)(mlen >> (32 % (sizeof(mlen) * 8)));
+    } else
+        ctx->nonce.u[1] = 0;
+
+    ctx->nonce.c[12] = (u8)(mlen >> 24);
+    ctx->nonce.c[13] = (u8)(mlen >> 16);
+    ctx->nonce.c[14] = (u8)(mlen >> 8);
+    ctx->nonce.c[15] = (u8)mlen;
+
+    ctx->nonce.c[0] &= ~0x40;   /* clear Adata flag */
+    memcpy(&ctx->nonce.c[1], nonce, 14 - L);
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/* Then you pass additional authentication data, this is optional */
+void CRYPTO_ccm128_aad(CCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
+                       const unsigned char *aad, size_t alen)
+{
+    unsigned int i;
+    block128_f block = ctx->block;
+
+    if (alen == 0)
+        return;
+
+    ctx->nonce.c[0] |= 0x40;    /* set Adata flag */
+    (*block) (ctx->nonce.c, ctx->cmac.c, ctx->key), ctx->blocks++;
+
+    if (alen < (0x10000 - 0x100)) {
+        ctx->cmac.c[0] ^= (u8)(alen >> 8);
+        ctx->cmac.c[1] ^= (u8)alen;
+        i = 2;
+    } else if (sizeof(alen) == 8
+               && alen >= (size_t)1 << (32 % (sizeof(alen) * 8))) {
+        ctx->cmac.c[0] ^= 0xFF;
+        ctx->cmac.c[1] ^= 0xFF;
+        ctx->cmac.c[2] ^= (u8)(alen >> (56 % (sizeof(alen) * 8)));
+        ctx->cmac.c[3] ^= (u8)(alen >> (48 % (sizeof(alen) * 8)));
+        ctx->cmac.c[4] ^= (u8)(alen >> (40 % (sizeof(alen) * 8)));
+        ctx->cmac.c[5] ^= (u8)(alen >> (32 % (sizeof(alen) * 8)));
+        ctx->cmac.c[6] ^= (u8)(alen >> 24);
+        ctx->cmac.c[7] ^= (u8)(alen >> 16);
+        ctx->cmac.c[8] ^= (u8)(alen >> 8);
+        ctx->cmac.c[9] ^= (u8)alen;
+        i = 10;
+    } else {
+        ctx->cmac.c[0] ^= 0xFF;
+        ctx->cmac.c[1] ^= 0xFE;
+        ctx->cmac.c[2] ^= (u8)(alen >> 24);
+        ctx->cmac.c[3] ^= (u8)(alen >> 16);
+        ctx->cmac.c[4] ^= (u8)(alen >> 8);
+        ctx->cmac.c[5] ^= (u8)alen;
+        i = 6;
+    }
+
+    do {
+        for (; i < 16 && alen; ++i, ++aad, --alen)
+            ctx->cmac.c[i] ^= *aad;
+        (*block) (ctx->cmac.c, ctx->cmac.c, ctx->key), ctx->blocks++;
+        i = 0;
+    } while (alen);
+}
+
+/* Finally you encrypt or decrypt the message */
+
+/*
+ * counter part of nonce may not be larger than L*8 bits, L is not larger
+ * than 8, therefore 64-bit counter...
+ */
+static void ctr64_inc(unsigned char *counter)
+{
+    unsigned int n = 8;
+    u8 c;
+
+    counter += 8;
+    do {
+        --n;
+        c = counter[n];
+        ++c;
+        counter[n] = c;
+        if (c)
+            return;
+    } while (n);
+}
+
+int CRYPTO_ccm128_encrypt(CCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
+                          const unsigned char *inp, unsigned char *out,
+                          size_t len)
+{
+    size_t n;
+    unsigned int i, L;
+    unsigned char flags0 = ctx->nonce.c[0];
+    block128_f block = ctx->block;
+    void *key = ctx->key;
+    union {
+        u64 u[2];
+        u8 c[16];
+    } scratch;
+
+    if (!(flags0 & 0x40))
+        (*block) (ctx->nonce.c, ctx->cmac.c, key), ctx->blocks++;
+
+    ctx->nonce.c[0] = L = flags0 & 7;
+    for (n = 0, i = 15 - L; i < 15; ++i) {
+        n |= ctx->nonce.c[i];
+        ctx->nonce.c[i] = 0;
+        n <<= 8;
+    }
+    n |= ctx->nonce.c[15];      /* reconstructed length */
+    ctx->nonce.c[15] = 1;
+
+    if (n != len)
+        return -1;              /* length mismatch */
+
+    ctx->blocks += ((len + 15) >> 3) | 1;
+    if (ctx->blocks > (U64(1) << 61))
+        return -2;              /* too much data */
+
+    while (len >= 16) {
+#if defined(STRICT_ALIGNMENT)
+        union {
+            u64 u[2];
+            u8 c[16];
+        } temp;
+
+        memcpy(temp.c, inp, 16);
+        ctx->cmac.u[0] ^= temp.u[0];
+        ctx->cmac.u[1] ^= temp.u[1];
+#else
+        ctx->cmac.u[0] ^= ((u64 *)inp)[0];
+        ctx->cmac.u[1] ^= ((u64 *)inp)[1];
+#endif
+        (*block) (ctx->cmac.c, ctx->cmac.c, key);
+        (*block) (ctx->nonce.c, scratch.c, key);
+        ctr64_inc(ctx->nonce.c);
+#if defined(STRICT_ALIGNMENT)
+        temp.u[0] ^= scratch.u[0];
+        temp.u[1] ^= scratch.u[1];
+        memcpy(out, temp.c, 16);
+#else
+        ((u64 *)out)[0] = scratch.u[0] ^ ((u64 *)inp)[0];
+        ((u64 *)out)[1] = scratch.u[1] ^ ((u64 *)inp)[1];
+#endif
+        inp += 16;
+        out += 16;
+        len -= 16;
+    }
+
+    if (len) {
+        for (i = 0; i < len; ++i)
+            ctx->cmac.c[i] ^= inp[i];
+        (*block) (ctx->cmac.c, ctx->cmac.c, key);
+        (*block) (ctx->nonce.c, scratch.c, key);
+        for (i = 0; i < len; ++i)
+            out[i] = scratch.c[i] ^ inp[i];
+    }
+
+    for (i = 15 - L; i < 16; ++i)
+        ctx->nonce.c[i] = 0;
+
+    (*block) (ctx->nonce.c, scratch.c, key);
+    ctx->cmac.u[0] ^= scratch.u[0];
+    ctx->cmac.u[1] ^= scratch.u[1];
+
+    ctx->nonce.c[0] = flags0;
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int CRYPTO_ccm128_decrypt(CCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
+                          const unsigned char *inp, unsigned char *out,
+                          size_t len)
+{
+    size_t n;
+    unsigned int i, L;
+    unsigned char flags0 = ctx->nonce.c[0];
+    block128_f block = ctx->block;
+    void *key = ctx->key;
+    union {
+        u64 u[2];
+        u8 c[16];
+    } scratch;
+
+    if (!(flags0 & 0x40))
+        (*block) (ctx->nonce.c, ctx->cmac.c, key);
+
+    ctx->nonce.c[0] = L = flags0 & 7;
+    for (n = 0, i = 15 - L; i < 15; ++i) {
+        n |= ctx->nonce.c[i];
+        ctx->nonce.c[i] = 0;
+        n <<= 8;
+    }
+    n |= ctx->nonce.c[15];      /* reconstructed length */
+    ctx->nonce.c[15] = 1;
+
+    if (n != len)
+        return -1;
+
+    while (len >= 16) {
+#if defined(STRICT_ALIGNMENT)
+        union {
+            u64 u[2];
+            u8 c[16];
+        } temp;
+#endif
+        (*block) (ctx->nonce.c, scratch.c, key);
+        ctr64_inc(ctx->nonce.c);
+#if defined(STRICT_ALIGNMENT)
+        memcpy(temp.c, inp, 16);
+        ctx->cmac.u[0] ^= (scratch.u[0] ^= temp.u[0]);
+        ctx->cmac.u[1] ^= (scratch.u[1] ^= temp.u[1]);
+        memcpy(out, scratch.c, 16);
+#else
+        ctx->cmac.u[0] ^= (((u64 *)out)[0] = scratch.u[0] ^ ((u64 *)inp)[0]);
+        ctx->cmac.u[1] ^= (((u64 *)out)[1] = scratch.u[1] ^ ((u64 *)inp)[1]);
+#endif
+        (*block) (ctx->cmac.c, ctx->cmac.c, key);
+
+        inp += 16;
+        out += 16;
+        len -= 16;
+    }
+
+    if (len) {
+        (*block) (ctx->nonce.c, scratch.c, key);
+        for (i = 0; i < len; ++i)
+            ctx->cmac.c[i] ^= (out[i] = scratch.c[i] ^ inp[i]);
+        (*block) (ctx->cmac.c, ctx->cmac.c, key);
+    }
+
+    for (i = 15 - L; i < 16; ++i)
+        ctx->nonce.c[i] = 0;
+
+    (*block) (ctx->nonce.c, scratch.c, key);
+    ctx->cmac.u[0] ^= scratch.u[0];
+    ctx->cmac.u[1] ^= scratch.u[1];
+
+    ctx->nonce.c[0] = flags0;
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static void ctr64_add(unsigned char *counter, size_t inc)
+{
+    size_t n = 8, val = 0;
+
+    counter += 8;
+    do {
+        --n;
+        val += counter[n] + (inc & 0xff);
+        counter[n] = (unsigned char)val;
+        val >>= 8;              /* carry bit */
+        inc >>= 8;
+    } while (n && (inc || val));
+}
+
+int CRYPTO_ccm128_encrypt_ccm64(CCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
+                                const unsigned char *inp, unsigned char *out,
+                                size_t len, ccm128_f stream)
+{
+    size_t n;
+    unsigned int i, L;
+    unsigned char flags0 = ctx->nonce.c[0];
+    block128_f block = ctx->block;
+    void *key = ctx->key;
+    union {
+        u64 u[2];
+        u8 c[16];
+    } scratch;
+
+    if (!(flags0 & 0x40))
+        (*block) (ctx->nonce.c, ctx->cmac.c, key), ctx->blocks++;
+
+    ctx->nonce.c[0] = L = flags0 & 7;
+    for (n = 0, i = 15 - L; i < 15; ++i) {
+        n |= ctx->nonce.c[i];
+        ctx->nonce.c[i] = 0;
+        n <<= 8;
+    }
+    n |= ctx->nonce.c[15];      /* reconstructed length */
+    ctx->nonce.c[15] = 1;
+
+    if (n != len)
+        return -1;              /* length mismatch */
+
+    ctx->blocks += ((len + 15) >> 3) | 1;
+    if (ctx->blocks > (U64(1) << 61))
+        return -2;              /* too much data */
+
+    if ((n = len / 16)) {
+        (*stream) (inp, out, n, key, ctx->nonce.c, ctx->cmac.c);
+        n *= 16;
+        inp += n;
+        out += n;
+        len -= n;
+        if (len)
+            ctr64_add(ctx->nonce.c, n / 16);
+    }
+
+    if (len) {
+        for (i = 0; i < len; ++i)
+            ctx->cmac.c[i] ^= inp[i];
+        (*block) (ctx->cmac.c, ctx->cmac.c, key);
+        (*block) (ctx->nonce.c, scratch.c, key);
+        for (i = 0; i < len; ++i)
+            out[i] = scratch.c[i] ^ inp[i];
+    }
+
+    for (i = 15 - L; i < 16; ++i)
+        ctx->nonce.c[i] = 0;
+
+    (*block) (ctx->nonce.c, scratch.c, key);
+    ctx->cmac.u[0] ^= scratch.u[0];
+    ctx->cmac.u[1] ^= scratch.u[1];
+
+    ctx->nonce.c[0] = flags0;
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int CRYPTO_ccm128_decrypt_ccm64(CCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
+                                const unsigned char *inp, unsigned char *out,
+                                size_t len, ccm128_f stream)
+{
+    size_t n;
+    unsigned int i, L;
+    unsigned char flags0 = ctx->nonce.c[0];
+    block128_f block = ctx->block;
+    void *key = ctx->key;
+    union {
+        u64 u[2];
+        u8 c[16];
+    } scratch;
+
+    if (!(flags0 & 0x40))
+        (*block) (ctx->nonce.c, ctx->cmac.c, key);
+
+    ctx->nonce.c[0] = L = flags0 & 7;
+    for (n = 0, i = 15 - L; i < 15; ++i) {
+        n |= ctx->nonce.c[i];
+        ctx->nonce.c[i] = 0;
+        n <<= 8;
+    }
+    n |= ctx->nonce.c[15];      /* reconstructed length */
+    ctx->nonce.c[15] = 1;
+
+    if (n != len)
+        return -1;
+
+    if ((n = len / 16)) {
+        (*stream) (inp, out, n, key, ctx->nonce.c, ctx->cmac.c);
+        n *= 16;
+        inp += n;
+        out += n;
+        len -= n;
+        if (len)
+            ctr64_add(ctx->nonce.c, n / 16);
+    }
+
+    if (len) {
+        (*block) (ctx->nonce.c, scratch.c, key);
+        for (i = 0; i < len; ++i)
+            ctx->cmac.c[i] ^= (out[i] = scratch.c[i] ^ inp[i]);
+        (*block) (ctx->cmac.c, ctx->cmac.c, key);
+    }
+
+    for (i = 15 - L; i < 16; ++i)
+        ctx->nonce.c[i] = 0;
+
+    (*block) (ctx->nonce.c, scratch.c, key);
+    ctx->cmac.u[0] ^= scratch.u[0];
+    ctx->cmac.u[1] ^= scratch.u[1];
+
+    ctx->nonce.c[0] = flags0;
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+size_t CRYPTO_ccm128_tag(CCM128_CONTEXT *ctx, unsigned char *tag, size_t len)
+{
+    unsigned int M = (ctx->nonce.c[0] >> 3) & 7; /* the M parameter */
+
+    M *= 2;
+    M += 2;
+    if (len < M)
+        return 0;
+    memcpy(tag, ctx->cmac.c, M);
+    return M;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/modes/cfb128.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/modes/cfb128.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e439567
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/modes/cfb128.c
@@ -0,0 +1,198 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include "modes_lcl.h"
+#include <string.h>
+
+/*
+ * The input and output encrypted as though 128bit cfb mode is being used.
+ * The extra state information to record how much of the 128bit block we have
+ * used is contained in *num;
+ */
+void CRYPTO_cfb128_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                           size_t len, const void *key,
+                           unsigned char ivec[16], int *num,
+                           int enc, block128_f block)
+{
+    unsigned int n;
+    size_t l = 0;
+
+    n = *num;
+
+    if (enc) {
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT)
+        if (16 % sizeof(size_t) == 0) { /* always true actually */
+            do {
+                while (n && len) {
+                    *(out++) = ivec[n] ^= *(in++);
+                    --len;
+                    n = (n + 1) % 16;
+                }
+# if defined(STRICT_ALIGNMENT)
+                if (((size_t)in | (size_t)out | (size_t)ivec) %
+                    sizeof(size_t) != 0)
+                    break;
+# endif
+                while (len >= 16) {
+                    (*block) (ivec, ivec, key);
+                    for (; n < 16; n += sizeof(size_t)) {
+                        *(size_t *)(out + n) =
+                            *(size_t *)(ivec + n) ^= *(size_t *)(in + n);
+                    }
+                    len -= 16;
+                    out += 16;
+                    in += 16;
+                    n = 0;
+                }
+                if (len) {
+                    (*block) (ivec, ivec, key);
+                    while (len--) {
+                        out[n] = ivec[n] ^= in[n];
+                        ++n;
+                    }
+                }
+                *num = n;
+                return;
+            } while (0);
+        }
+        /* the rest would be commonly eliminated by x86* compiler */
+#endif
+        while (l < len) {
+            if (n == 0) {
+                (*block) (ivec, ivec, key);
+            }
+            out[l] = ivec[n] ^= in[l];
+            ++l;
+            n = (n + 1) % 16;
+        }
+        *num = n;
+    } else {
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT)
+        if (16 % sizeof(size_t) == 0) { /* always true actually */
+            do {
+                while (n && len) {
+                    unsigned char c;
+                    *(out++) = ivec[n] ^ (c = *(in++));
+                    ivec[n] = c;
+                    --len;
+                    n = (n + 1) % 16;
+                }
+# if defined(STRICT_ALIGNMENT)
+                if (((size_t)in | (size_t)out | (size_t)ivec) %
+                    sizeof(size_t) != 0)
+                    break;
+# endif
+                while (len >= 16) {
+                    (*block) (ivec, ivec, key);
+                    for (; n < 16; n += sizeof(size_t)) {
+                        size_t t = *(size_t *)(in + n);
+                        *(size_t *)(out + n) = *(size_t *)(ivec + n) ^ t;
+                        *(size_t *)(ivec + n) = t;
+                    }
+                    len -= 16;
+                    out += 16;
+                    in += 16;
+                    n = 0;
+                }
+                if (len) {
+                    (*block) (ivec, ivec, key);
+                    while (len--) {
+                        unsigned char c;
+                        out[n] = ivec[n] ^ (c = in[n]);
+                        ivec[n] = c;
+                        ++n;
+                    }
+                }
+                *num = n;
+                return;
+            } while (0);
+        }
+        /* the rest would be commonly eliminated by x86* compiler */
+#endif
+        while (l < len) {
+            unsigned char c;
+            if (n == 0) {
+                (*block) (ivec, ivec, key);
+            }
+            out[l] = ivec[n] ^ (c = in[l]);
+            ivec[n] = c;
+            ++l;
+            n = (n + 1) % 16;
+        }
+        *num = n;
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * This expects a single block of size nbits for both in and out. Note that
+ * it corrupts any extra bits in the last byte of out
+ */
+static void cfbr_encrypt_block(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                               int nbits, const void *key,
+                               unsigned char ivec[16], int enc,
+                               block128_f block)
+{
+    int n, rem, num;
+    unsigned char ovec[16 * 2 + 1]; /* +1 because we dereference (but don't
+                                     * use) one byte off the end */
+
+    if (nbits <= 0 || nbits > 128)
+        return;
+
+    /* fill in the first half of the new IV with the current IV */
+    memcpy(ovec, ivec, 16);
+    /* construct the new IV */
+    (*block) (ivec, ivec, key);
+    num = (nbits + 7) / 8;
+    if (enc)                    /* encrypt the input */
+        for (n = 0; n < num; ++n)
+            out[n] = (ovec[16 + n] = in[n] ^ ivec[n]);
+    else                        /* decrypt the input */
+        for (n = 0; n < num; ++n)
+            out[n] = (ovec[16 + n] = in[n]) ^ ivec[n];
+    /* shift ovec left... */
+    rem = nbits % 8;
+    num = nbits / 8;
+    if (rem == 0)
+        memcpy(ivec, ovec + num, 16);
+    else
+        for (n = 0; n < 16; ++n)
+            ivec[n] = ovec[n + num] << rem | ovec[n + num + 1] >> (8 - rem);
+
+    /* it is not necessary to cleanse ovec, since the IV is not secret */
+}
+
+/* N.B. This expects the input to be packed, MS bit first */
+void CRYPTO_cfb128_1_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                             size_t bits, const void *key,
+                             unsigned char ivec[16], int *num,
+                             int enc, block128_f block)
+{
+    size_t n;
+    unsigned char c[1], d[1];
+
+    for (n = 0; n < bits; ++n) {
+        c[0] = (in[n / 8] & (1 << (7 - n % 8))) ? 0x80 : 0;
+        cfbr_encrypt_block(c, d, 1, key, ivec, enc, block);
+        out[n / 8] = (out[n / 8] & ~(1 << (unsigned int)(7 - n % 8))) |
+            ((d[0] & 0x80) >> (unsigned int)(n % 8));
+    }
+}
+
+void CRYPTO_cfb128_8_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                             size_t length, const void *key,
+                             unsigned char ivec[16], int *num,
+                             int enc, block128_f block)
+{
+    size_t n;
+
+    for (n = 0; n < length; ++n)
+        cfbr_encrypt_block(&in[n], &out[n], 8, key, ivec, enc, block);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/modes/ctr128.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/modes/ctr128.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..03920b4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/modes/ctr128.c
@@ -0,0 +1,209 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include "modes_lcl.h"
+#include <string.h>
+
+/*
+ * NOTE: the IV/counter CTR mode is big-endian.  The code itself is
+ * endian-neutral.
+ */
+
+/* increment counter (128-bit int) by 1 */
+static void ctr128_inc(unsigned char *counter)
+{
+    u32 n = 16, c = 1;
+
+    do {
+        --n;
+        c += counter[n];
+        counter[n] = (u8)c;
+        c >>= 8;
+    } while (n);
+}
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT)
+static void ctr128_inc_aligned(unsigned char *counter)
+{
+    size_t *data, c, d, n;
+    const union {
+        long one;
+        char little;
+    } is_endian = {
+        1
+    };
+
+    if (is_endian.little || ((size_t)counter % sizeof(size_t)) != 0) {
+        ctr128_inc(counter);
+        return;
+    }
+
+    data = (size_t *)counter;
+    c = 1;
+    n = 16 / sizeof(size_t);
+    do {
+        --n;
+        d = data[n] += c;
+        /* did addition carry? */
+        c = ((d - c) & ~d) >> (sizeof(size_t) * 8 - 1);
+    } while (n);
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * The input encrypted as though 128bit counter mode is being used.  The
+ * extra state information to record how much of the 128bit block we have
+ * used is contained in *num, and the encrypted counter is kept in
+ * ecount_buf.  Both *num and ecount_buf must be initialised with zeros
+ * before the first call to CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt(). This algorithm assumes
+ * that the counter is in the x lower bits of the IV (ivec), and that the
+ * application has full control over overflow and the rest of the IV.  This
+ * implementation takes NO responsibility for checking that the counter
+ * doesn't overflow into the rest of the IV when incremented.
+ */
+void CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                           size_t len, const void *key,
+                           unsigned char ivec[16],
+                           unsigned char ecount_buf[16], unsigned int *num,
+                           block128_f block)
+{
+    unsigned int n;
+    size_t l = 0;
+
+    n = *num;
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT)
+    if (16 % sizeof(size_t) == 0) { /* always true actually */
+        do {
+            while (n && len) {
+                *(out++) = *(in++) ^ ecount_buf[n];
+                --len;
+                n = (n + 1) % 16;
+            }
+
+# if defined(STRICT_ALIGNMENT)
+            if (((size_t)in | (size_t)out | (size_t)ecount_buf)
+                % sizeof(size_t) != 0)
+                break;
+# endif
+            while (len >= 16) {
+                (*block) (ivec, ecount_buf, key);
+                ctr128_inc_aligned(ivec);
+                for (n = 0; n < 16; n += sizeof(size_t))
+                    *(size_t *)(out + n) =
+                        *(size_t *)(in + n) ^ *(size_t *)(ecount_buf + n);
+                len -= 16;
+                out += 16;
+                in += 16;
+                n = 0;
+            }
+            if (len) {
+                (*block) (ivec, ecount_buf, key);
+                ctr128_inc_aligned(ivec);
+                while (len--) {
+                    out[n] = in[n] ^ ecount_buf[n];
+                    ++n;
+                }
+            }
+            *num = n;
+            return;
+        } while (0);
+    }
+    /* the rest would be commonly eliminated by x86* compiler */
+#endif
+    while (l < len) {
+        if (n == 0) {
+            (*block) (ivec, ecount_buf, key);
+            ctr128_inc(ivec);
+        }
+        out[l] = in[l] ^ ecount_buf[n];
+        ++l;
+        n = (n + 1) % 16;
+    }
+
+    *num = n;
+}
+
+/* increment upper 96 bits of 128-bit counter by 1 */
+static void ctr96_inc(unsigned char *counter)
+{
+    u32 n = 12, c = 1;
+
+    do {
+        --n;
+        c += counter[n];
+        counter[n] = (u8)c;
+        c >>= 8;
+    } while (n);
+}
+
+void CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt_ctr32(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                                 size_t len, const void *key,
+                                 unsigned char ivec[16],
+                                 unsigned char ecount_buf[16],
+                                 unsigned int *num, ctr128_f func)
+{
+    unsigned int n, ctr32;
+
+    n = *num;
+
+    while (n && len) {
+        *(out++) = *(in++) ^ ecount_buf[n];
+        --len;
+        n = (n + 1) % 16;
+    }
+
+    ctr32 = GETU32(ivec + 12);
+    while (len >= 16) {
+        size_t blocks = len / 16;
+        /*
+         * 1<<28 is just a not-so-small yet not-so-large number...
+         * Below condition is practically never met, but it has to
+         * be checked for code correctness.
+         */
+        if (sizeof(size_t) > sizeof(unsigned int) && blocks > (1U << 28))
+            blocks = (1U << 28);
+        /*
+         * As (*func) operates on 32-bit counter, caller
+         * has to handle overflow. 'if' below detects the
+         * overflow, which is then handled by limiting the
+         * amount of blocks to the exact overflow point...
+         */
+        ctr32 += (u32)blocks;
+        if (ctr32 < blocks) {
+            blocks -= ctr32;
+            ctr32 = 0;
+        }
+        (*func) (in, out, blocks, key, ivec);
+        /* (*ctr) does not update ivec, caller does: */
+        PUTU32(ivec + 12, ctr32);
+        /* ... overflow was detected, propagate carry. */
+        if (ctr32 == 0)
+            ctr96_inc(ivec);
+        blocks *= 16;
+        len -= blocks;
+        out += blocks;
+        in += blocks;
+    }
+    if (len) {
+        memset(ecount_buf, 0, 16);
+        (*func) (ecount_buf, ecount_buf, 1, key, ivec);
+        ++ctr32;
+        PUTU32(ivec + 12, ctr32);
+        if (ctr32 == 0)
+            ctr96_inc(ivec);
+        while (len--) {
+            out[n] = in[n] ^ ecount_buf[n];
+            ++n;
+        }
+    }
+
+    *num = n;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/modes/cts128.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/modes/cts128.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..77ec994
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/modes/cts128.c
@@ -0,0 +1,523 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include "modes_lcl.h"
+#include <string.h>
+
+/*
+ * Trouble with Ciphertext Stealing, CTS, mode is that there is no
+ * common official specification, but couple of cipher/application
+ * specific ones: RFC2040 and RFC3962. Then there is 'Proposal to
+ * Extend CBC Mode By "Ciphertext Stealing"' at NIST site, which
+ * deviates from mentioned RFCs. Most notably it allows input to be
+ * of block length and it doesn't flip the order of the last two
+ * blocks. CTS is being discussed even in ECB context, but it's not
+ * adopted for any known application. This implementation provides
+ * two interfaces: one compliant with above mentioned RFCs and one
+ * compliant with the NIST proposal, both extending CBC mode.
+ */
+
+size_t CRYPTO_cts128_encrypt_block(const unsigned char *in,
+                                   unsigned char *out, size_t len,
+                                   const void *key, unsigned char ivec[16],
+                                   block128_f block)
+{
+    size_t residue, n;
+
+    if (len <= 16)
+        return 0;
+
+    if ((residue = len % 16) == 0)
+        residue = 16;
+
+    len -= residue;
+
+    CRYPTO_cbc128_encrypt(in, out, len, key, ivec, block);
+
+    in += len;
+    out += len;
+
+    for (n = 0; n < residue; ++n)
+        ivec[n] ^= in[n];
+    (*block) (ivec, ivec, key);
+    memcpy(out, out - 16, residue);
+    memcpy(out - 16, ivec, 16);
+
+    return len + residue;
+}
+
+size_t CRYPTO_nistcts128_encrypt_block(const unsigned char *in,
+                                       unsigned char *out, size_t len,
+                                       const void *key,
+                                       unsigned char ivec[16],
+                                       block128_f block)
+{
+    size_t residue, n;
+
+    if (len < 16)
+        return 0;
+
+    residue = len % 16;
+
+    len -= residue;
+
+    CRYPTO_cbc128_encrypt(in, out, len, key, ivec, block);
+
+    if (residue == 0)
+        return len;
+
+    in += len;
+    out += len;
+
+    for (n = 0; n < residue; ++n)
+        ivec[n] ^= in[n];
+    (*block) (ivec, ivec, key);
+    memcpy(out - 16 + residue, ivec, 16);
+
+    return len + residue;
+}
+
+size_t CRYPTO_cts128_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                             size_t len, const void *key,
+                             unsigned char ivec[16], cbc128_f cbc)
+{
+    size_t residue;
+    union {
+        size_t align;
+        unsigned char c[16];
+    } tmp;
+
+    if (len <= 16)
+        return 0;
+
+    if ((residue = len % 16) == 0)
+        residue = 16;
+
+    len -= residue;
+
+    (*cbc) (in, out, len, key, ivec, 1);
+
+    in += len;
+    out += len;
+
+#if defined(CBC_HANDLES_TRUNCATED_IO)
+    memcpy(tmp.c, out - 16, 16);
+    (*cbc) (in, out - 16, residue, key, ivec, 1);
+    memcpy(out, tmp.c, residue);
+#else
+    memset(tmp.c, 0, sizeof(tmp));
+    memcpy(tmp.c, in, residue);
+    memcpy(out, out - 16, residue);
+    (*cbc) (tmp.c, out - 16, 16, key, ivec, 1);
+#endif
+    return len + residue;
+}
+
+size_t CRYPTO_nistcts128_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                                 size_t len, const void *key,
+                                 unsigned char ivec[16], cbc128_f cbc)
+{
+    size_t residue;
+    union {
+        size_t align;
+        unsigned char c[16];
+    } tmp;
+
+    if (len < 16)
+        return 0;
+
+    residue = len % 16;
+
+    len -= residue;
+
+    (*cbc) (in, out, len, key, ivec, 1);
+
+    if (residue == 0)
+        return len;
+
+    in += len;
+    out += len;
+
+#if defined(CBC_HANDLES_TRUNCATED_IO)
+    (*cbc) (in, out - 16 + residue, residue, key, ivec, 1);
+#else
+    memset(tmp.c, 0, sizeof(tmp));
+    memcpy(tmp.c, in, residue);
+    (*cbc) (tmp.c, out - 16 + residue, 16, key, ivec, 1);
+#endif
+    return len + residue;
+}
+
+size_t CRYPTO_cts128_decrypt_block(const unsigned char *in,
+                                   unsigned char *out, size_t len,
+                                   const void *key, unsigned char ivec[16],
+                                   block128_f block)
+{
+    size_t residue, n;
+    union {
+        size_t align;
+        unsigned char c[32];
+    } tmp;
+
+    if (len <= 16)
+        return 0;
+
+    if ((residue = len % 16) == 0)
+        residue = 16;
+
+    len -= 16 + residue;
+
+    if (len) {
+        CRYPTO_cbc128_decrypt(in, out, len, key, ivec, block);
+        in += len;
+        out += len;
+    }
+
+    (*block) (in, tmp.c + 16, key);
+
+    memcpy(tmp.c, tmp.c + 16, 16);
+    memcpy(tmp.c, in + 16, residue);
+    (*block) (tmp.c, tmp.c, key);
+
+    for (n = 0; n < 16; ++n) {
+        unsigned char c = in[n];
+        out[n] = tmp.c[n] ^ ivec[n];
+        ivec[n] = c;
+    }
+    for (residue += 16; n < residue; ++n)
+        out[n] = tmp.c[n] ^ in[n];
+
+    return 16 + len + residue;
+}
+
+size_t CRYPTO_nistcts128_decrypt_block(const unsigned char *in,
+                                       unsigned char *out, size_t len,
+                                       const void *key,
+                                       unsigned char ivec[16],
+                                       block128_f block)
+{
+    size_t residue, n;
+    union {
+        size_t align;
+        unsigned char c[32];
+    } tmp;
+
+    if (len < 16)
+        return 0;
+
+    residue = len % 16;
+
+    if (residue == 0) {
+        CRYPTO_cbc128_decrypt(in, out, len, key, ivec, block);
+        return len;
+    }
+
+    len -= 16 + residue;
+
+    if (len) {
+        CRYPTO_cbc128_decrypt(in, out, len, key, ivec, block);
+        in += len;
+        out += len;
+    }
+
+    (*block) (in + residue, tmp.c + 16, key);
+
+    memcpy(tmp.c, tmp.c + 16, 16);
+    memcpy(tmp.c, in, residue);
+    (*block) (tmp.c, tmp.c, key);
+
+    for (n = 0; n < 16; ++n) {
+        unsigned char c = in[n];
+        out[n] = tmp.c[n] ^ ivec[n];
+        ivec[n] = in[n + residue];
+        tmp.c[n] = c;
+    }
+    for (residue += 16; n < residue; ++n)
+        out[n] = tmp.c[n] ^ tmp.c[n - 16];
+
+    return 16 + len + residue;
+}
+
+size_t CRYPTO_cts128_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                             size_t len, const void *key,
+                             unsigned char ivec[16], cbc128_f cbc)
+{
+    size_t residue;
+    union {
+        size_t align;
+        unsigned char c[32];
+    } tmp;
+
+    if (len <= 16)
+        return 0;
+
+    if ((residue = len % 16) == 0)
+        residue = 16;
+
+    len -= 16 + residue;
+
+    if (len) {
+        (*cbc) (in, out, len, key, ivec, 0);
+        in += len;
+        out += len;
+    }
+
+    memset(tmp.c, 0, sizeof(tmp));
+    /*
+     * this places in[16] at &tmp.c[16] and decrypted block at &tmp.c[0]
+     */
+    (*cbc) (in, tmp.c, 16, key, tmp.c + 16, 0);
+
+    memcpy(tmp.c, in + 16, residue);
+#if defined(CBC_HANDLES_TRUNCATED_IO)
+    (*cbc) (tmp.c, out, 16 + residue, key, ivec, 0);
+#else
+    (*cbc) (tmp.c, tmp.c, 32, key, ivec, 0);
+    memcpy(out, tmp.c, 16 + residue);
+#endif
+    return 16 + len + residue;
+}
+
+size_t CRYPTO_nistcts128_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                                 size_t len, const void *key,
+                                 unsigned char ivec[16], cbc128_f cbc)
+{
+    size_t residue;
+    union {
+        size_t align;
+        unsigned char c[32];
+    } tmp;
+
+    if (len < 16)
+        return 0;
+
+    residue = len % 16;
+
+    if (residue == 0) {
+        (*cbc) (in, out, len, key, ivec, 0);
+        return len;
+    }
+
+    len -= 16 + residue;
+
+    if (len) {
+        (*cbc) (in, out, len, key, ivec, 0);
+        in += len;
+        out += len;
+    }
+
+    memset(tmp.c, 0, sizeof(tmp));
+    /*
+     * this places in[16] at &tmp.c[16] and decrypted block at &tmp.c[0]
+     */
+    (*cbc) (in + residue, tmp.c, 16, key, tmp.c + 16, 0);
+
+    memcpy(tmp.c, in, residue);
+#if defined(CBC_HANDLES_TRUNCATED_IO)
+    (*cbc) (tmp.c, out, 16 + residue, key, ivec, 0);
+#else
+    (*cbc) (tmp.c, tmp.c, 32, key, ivec, 0);
+    memcpy(out, tmp.c, 16 + residue);
+#endif
+    return 16 + len + residue;
+}
+
+#if defined(SELFTEST)
+# include <stdio.h>
+# include <openssl/aes.h>
+
+/* test vectors from RFC 3962 */
+static const unsigned char test_key[16] = "chicken teriyaki";
+static const unsigned char test_input[64] =
+    "I would like the" " General Gau's C"
+    "hicken, please, " "and wonton soup.";
+static const unsigned char test_iv[16] =
+    { 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 };
+
+static const unsigned char vector_17[17] = {
+    0xc6, 0x35, 0x35, 0x68, 0xf2, 0xbf, 0x8c, 0xb4,
+    0xd8, 0xa5, 0x80, 0x36, 0x2d, 0xa7, 0xff, 0x7f,
+    0x97
+};
+
+static const unsigned char vector_31[31] = {
+    0xfc, 0x00, 0x78, 0x3e, 0x0e, 0xfd, 0xb2, 0xc1,
+    0xd4, 0x45, 0xd4, 0xc8, 0xef, 0xf7, 0xed, 0x22,
+    0x97, 0x68, 0x72, 0x68, 0xd6, 0xec, 0xcc, 0xc0,
+    0xc0, 0x7b, 0x25, 0xe2, 0x5e, 0xcf, 0xe5
+};
+
+static const unsigned char vector_32[32] = {
+    0x39, 0x31, 0x25, 0x23, 0xa7, 0x86, 0x62, 0xd5,
+    0xbe, 0x7f, 0xcb, 0xcc, 0x98, 0xeb, 0xf5, 0xa8,
+    0x97, 0x68, 0x72, 0x68, 0xd6, 0xec, 0xcc, 0xc0,
+    0xc0, 0x7b, 0x25, 0xe2, 0x5e, 0xcf, 0xe5, 0x84
+};
+
+static const unsigned char vector_47[47] = {
+    0x97, 0x68, 0x72, 0x68, 0xd6, 0xec, 0xcc, 0xc0,
+    0xc0, 0x7b, 0x25, 0xe2, 0x5e, 0xcf, 0xe5, 0x84,
+    0xb3, 0xff, 0xfd, 0x94, 0x0c, 0x16, 0xa1, 0x8c,
+    0x1b, 0x55, 0x49, 0xd2, 0xf8, 0x38, 0x02, 0x9e,
+    0x39, 0x31, 0x25, 0x23, 0xa7, 0x86, 0x62, 0xd5,
+    0xbe, 0x7f, 0xcb, 0xcc, 0x98, 0xeb, 0xf5
+};
+
+static const unsigned char vector_48[48] = {
+    0x97, 0x68, 0x72, 0x68, 0xd6, 0xec, 0xcc, 0xc0,
+    0xc0, 0x7b, 0x25, 0xe2, 0x5e, 0xcf, 0xe5, 0x84,
+    0x9d, 0xad, 0x8b, 0xbb, 0x96, 0xc4, 0xcd, 0xc0,
+    0x3b, 0xc1, 0x03, 0xe1, 0xa1, 0x94, 0xbb, 0xd8,
+    0x39, 0x31, 0x25, 0x23, 0xa7, 0x86, 0x62, 0xd5,
+    0xbe, 0x7f, 0xcb, 0xcc, 0x98, 0xeb, 0xf5, 0xa8
+};
+
+static const unsigned char vector_64[64] = {
+    0x97, 0x68, 0x72, 0x68, 0xd6, 0xec, 0xcc, 0xc0,
+    0xc0, 0x7b, 0x25, 0xe2, 0x5e, 0xcf, 0xe5, 0x84,
+    0x39, 0x31, 0x25, 0x23, 0xa7, 0x86, 0x62, 0xd5,
+    0xbe, 0x7f, 0xcb, 0xcc, 0x98, 0xeb, 0xf5, 0xa8,
+    0x48, 0x07, 0xef, 0xe8, 0x36, 0xee, 0x89, 0xa5,
+    0x26, 0x73, 0x0d, 0xbc, 0x2f, 0x7b, 0xc8, 0x40,
+    0x9d, 0xad, 0x8b, 0xbb, 0x96, 0xc4, 0xcd, 0xc0,
+    0x3b, 0xc1, 0x03, 0xe1, 0xa1, 0x94, 0xbb, 0xd8
+};
+
+static AES_KEY encks, decks;
+
+void test_vector(const unsigned char *vector, size_t len)
+{
+    unsigned char iv[sizeof(test_iv)];
+    unsigned char cleartext[64], ciphertext[64];
+    size_t tail;
+
+    printf("vector_%d\n", len);
+    fflush(stdout);
+
+    if ((tail = len % 16) == 0)
+        tail = 16;
+    tail += 16;
+
+    /* test block-based encryption */
+    memcpy(iv, test_iv, sizeof(test_iv));
+    CRYPTO_cts128_encrypt_block(test_input, ciphertext, len, &encks, iv,
+                                (block128_f) AES_encrypt);
+    if (memcmp(ciphertext, vector, len))
+        fprintf(stderr, "output_%d mismatch\n", len), exit(1);
+    if (memcmp(iv, vector + len - tail, sizeof(iv)))
+        fprintf(stderr, "iv_%d mismatch\n", len), exit(1);
+
+    /* test block-based decryption */
+    memcpy(iv, test_iv, sizeof(test_iv));
+    CRYPTO_cts128_decrypt_block(ciphertext, cleartext, len, &decks, iv,
+                                (block128_f) AES_decrypt);
+    if (memcmp(cleartext, test_input, len))
+        fprintf(stderr, "input_%d mismatch\n", len), exit(2);
+    if (memcmp(iv, vector + len - tail, sizeof(iv)))
+        fprintf(stderr, "iv_%d mismatch\n", len), exit(2);
+
+    /* test streamed encryption */
+    memcpy(iv, test_iv, sizeof(test_iv));
+    CRYPTO_cts128_encrypt(test_input, ciphertext, len, &encks, iv,
+                          (cbc128_f) AES_cbc_encrypt);
+    if (memcmp(ciphertext, vector, len))
+        fprintf(stderr, "output_%d mismatch\n", len), exit(3);
+    if (memcmp(iv, vector + len - tail, sizeof(iv)))
+        fprintf(stderr, "iv_%d mismatch\n", len), exit(3);
+
+    /* test streamed decryption */
+    memcpy(iv, test_iv, sizeof(test_iv));
+    CRYPTO_cts128_decrypt(ciphertext, cleartext, len, &decks, iv,
+                          (cbc128_f) AES_cbc_encrypt);
+    if (memcmp(cleartext, test_input, len))
+        fprintf(stderr, "input_%d mismatch\n", len), exit(4);
+    if (memcmp(iv, vector + len - tail, sizeof(iv)))
+        fprintf(stderr, "iv_%d mismatch\n", len), exit(4);
+}
+
+void test_nistvector(const unsigned char *vector, size_t len)
+{
+    unsigned char iv[sizeof(test_iv)];
+    unsigned char cleartext[64], ciphertext[64], nistvector[64];
+    size_t tail;
+
+    printf("nistvector_%d\n", len);
+    fflush(stdout);
+
+    if ((tail = len % 16) == 0)
+        tail = 16;
+
+    len -= 16 + tail;
+    memcpy(nistvector, vector, len);
+    /* flip two last blocks */
+    memcpy(nistvector + len, vector + len + 16, tail);
+    memcpy(nistvector + len + tail, vector + len, 16);
+    len += 16 + tail;
+    tail = 16;
+
+    /* test block-based encryption */
+    memcpy(iv, test_iv, sizeof(test_iv));
+    CRYPTO_nistcts128_encrypt_block(test_input, ciphertext, len, &encks, iv,
+                                    (block128_f) AES_encrypt);
+    if (memcmp(ciphertext, nistvector, len))
+        fprintf(stderr, "output_%d mismatch\n", len), exit(1);
+    if (memcmp(iv, nistvector + len - tail, sizeof(iv)))
+        fprintf(stderr, "iv_%d mismatch\n", len), exit(1);
+
+    /* test block-based decryption */
+    memcpy(iv, test_iv, sizeof(test_iv));
+    CRYPTO_nistcts128_decrypt_block(ciphertext, cleartext, len, &decks, iv,
+                                    (block128_f) AES_decrypt);
+    if (memcmp(cleartext, test_input, len))
+        fprintf(stderr, "input_%d mismatch\n", len), exit(2);
+    if (memcmp(iv, nistvector + len - tail, sizeof(iv)))
+        fprintf(stderr, "iv_%d mismatch\n", len), exit(2);
+
+    /* test streamed encryption */
+    memcpy(iv, test_iv, sizeof(test_iv));
+    CRYPTO_nistcts128_encrypt(test_input, ciphertext, len, &encks, iv,
+                              (cbc128_f) AES_cbc_encrypt);
+    if (memcmp(ciphertext, nistvector, len))
+        fprintf(stderr, "output_%d mismatch\n", len), exit(3);
+    if (memcmp(iv, nistvector + len - tail, sizeof(iv)))
+        fprintf(stderr, "iv_%d mismatch\n", len), exit(3);
+
+    /* test streamed decryption */
+    memcpy(iv, test_iv, sizeof(test_iv));
+    CRYPTO_nistcts128_decrypt(ciphertext, cleartext, len, &decks, iv,
+                              (cbc128_f) AES_cbc_encrypt);
+    if (memcmp(cleartext, test_input, len))
+        fprintf(stderr, "input_%d mismatch\n", len), exit(4);
+    if (memcmp(iv, nistvector + len - tail, sizeof(iv)))
+        fprintf(stderr, "iv_%d mismatch\n", len), exit(4);
+}
+
+int main()
+{
+    AES_set_encrypt_key(test_key, 128, &encks);
+    AES_set_decrypt_key(test_key, 128, &decks);
+
+    test_vector(vector_17, sizeof(vector_17));
+    test_vector(vector_31, sizeof(vector_31));
+    test_vector(vector_32, sizeof(vector_32));
+    test_vector(vector_47, sizeof(vector_47));
+    test_vector(vector_48, sizeof(vector_48));
+    test_vector(vector_64, sizeof(vector_64));
+
+    test_nistvector(vector_17, sizeof(vector_17));
+    test_nistvector(vector_31, sizeof(vector_31));
+    test_nistvector(vector_32, sizeof(vector_32));
+    test_nistvector(vector_47, sizeof(vector_47));
+    test_nistvector(vector_48, sizeof(vector_48));
+    test_nistvector(vector_64, sizeof(vector_64));
+
+    return 0;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/modes/gcm128.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/modes/gcm128.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a2b05c4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/modes/gcm128.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2301 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2010-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include "modes_lcl.h"
+#include <string.h>
+
+#if defined(BSWAP4) && defined(STRICT_ALIGNMENT)
+/* redefine, because alignment is ensured */
+# undef  GETU32
+# define GETU32(p)       BSWAP4(*(const u32 *)(p))
+# undef  PUTU32
+# define PUTU32(p,v)     *(u32 *)(p) = BSWAP4(v)
+#endif
+
+#define PACK(s)         ((size_t)(s)<<(sizeof(size_t)*8-16))
+#define REDUCE1BIT(V)   do { \
+        if (sizeof(size_t)==8) { \
+                u64 T = U64(0xe100000000000000) & (0-(V.lo&1)); \
+                V.lo  = (V.hi<<63)|(V.lo>>1); \
+                V.hi  = (V.hi>>1 )^T; \
+        } \
+        else { \
+                u32 T = 0xe1000000U & (0-(u32)(V.lo&1)); \
+                V.lo  = (V.hi<<63)|(V.lo>>1); \
+                V.hi  = (V.hi>>1 )^((u64)T<<32); \
+        } \
+} while(0)
+
+/*-
+ * Even though permitted values for TABLE_BITS are 8, 4 and 1, it should
+ * never be set to 8. 8 is effectively reserved for testing purposes.
+ * TABLE_BITS>1 are lookup-table-driven implementations referred to as
+ * "Shoup's" in GCM specification. In other words OpenSSL does not cover
+ * whole spectrum of possible table driven implementations. Why? In
+ * non-"Shoup's" case memory access pattern is segmented in such manner,
+ * that it's trivial to see that cache timing information can reveal
+ * fair portion of intermediate hash value. Given that ciphertext is
+ * always available to attacker, it's possible for him to attempt to
+ * deduce secret parameter H and if successful, tamper with messages
+ * [which is nothing but trivial in CTR mode]. In "Shoup's" case it's
+ * not as trivial, but there is no reason to believe that it's resistant
+ * to cache-timing attack. And the thing about "8-bit" implementation is
+ * that it consumes 16 (sixteen) times more memory, 4KB per individual
+ * key + 1KB shared. Well, on pros side it should be twice as fast as
+ * "4-bit" version. And for gcc-generated x86[_64] code, "8-bit" version
+ * was observed to run ~75% faster, closer to 100% for commercial
+ * compilers... Yet "4-bit" procedure is preferred, because it's
+ * believed to provide better security-performance balance and adequate
+ * all-round performance. "All-round" refers to things like:
+ *
+ * - shorter setup time effectively improves overall timing for
+ *   handling short messages;
+ * - larger table allocation can become unbearable because of VM
+ *   subsystem penalties (for example on Windows large enough free
+ *   results in VM working set trimming, meaning that consequent
+ *   malloc would immediately incur working set expansion);
+ * - larger table has larger cache footprint, which can affect
+ *   performance of other code paths (not necessarily even from same
+ *   thread in Hyper-Threading world);
+ *
+ * Value of 1 is not appropriate for performance reasons.
+ */
+#if     TABLE_BITS==8
+
+static void gcm_init_8bit(u128 Htable[256], u64 H[2])
+{
+    int i, j;
+    u128 V;
+
+    Htable[0].hi = 0;
+    Htable[0].lo = 0;
+    V.hi = H[0];
+    V.lo = H[1];
+
+    for (Htable[128] = V, i = 64; i > 0; i >>= 1) {
+        REDUCE1BIT(V);
+        Htable[i] = V;
+    }
+
+    for (i = 2; i < 256; i <<= 1) {
+        u128 *Hi = Htable + i, H0 = *Hi;
+        for (j = 1; j < i; ++j) {
+            Hi[j].hi = H0.hi ^ Htable[j].hi;
+            Hi[j].lo = H0.lo ^ Htable[j].lo;
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+static void gcm_gmult_8bit(u64 Xi[2], const u128 Htable[256])
+{
+    u128 Z = { 0, 0 };
+    const u8 *xi = (const u8 *)Xi + 15;
+    size_t rem, n = *xi;
+    const union {
+        long one;
+        char little;
+    } is_endian = { 1 };
+    static const size_t rem_8bit[256] = {
+        PACK(0x0000), PACK(0x01C2), PACK(0x0384), PACK(0x0246),
+        PACK(0x0708), PACK(0x06CA), PACK(0x048C), PACK(0x054E),
+        PACK(0x0E10), PACK(0x0FD2), PACK(0x0D94), PACK(0x0C56),
+        PACK(0x0918), PACK(0x08DA), PACK(0x0A9C), PACK(0x0B5E),
+        PACK(0x1C20), PACK(0x1DE2), PACK(0x1FA4), PACK(0x1E66),
+        PACK(0x1B28), PACK(0x1AEA), PACK(0x18AC), PACK(0x196E),
+        PACK(0x1230), PACK(0x13F2), PACK(0x11B4), PACK(0x1076),
+        PACK(0x1538), PACK(0x14FA), PACK(0x16BC), PACK(0x177E),
+        PACK(0x3840), PACK(0x3982), PACK(0x3BC4), PACK(0x3A06),
+        PACK(0x3F48), PACK(0x3E8A), PACK(0x3CCC), PACK(0x3D0E),
+        PACK(0x3650), PACK(0x3792), PACK(0x35D4), PACK(0x3416),
+        PACK(0x3158), PACK(0x309A), PACK(0x32DC), PACK(0x331E),
+        PACK(0x2460), PACK(0x25A2), PACK(0x27E4), PACK(0x2626),
+        PACK(0x2368), PACK(0x22AA), PACK(0x20EC), PACK(0x212E),
+        PACK(0x2A70), PACK(0x2BB2), PACK(0x29F4), PACK(0x2836),
+        PACK(0x2D78), PACK(0x2CBA), PACK(0x2EFC), PACK(0x2F3E),
+        PACK(0x7080), PACK(0x7142), PACK(0x7304), PACK(0x72C6),
+        PACK(0x7788), PACK(0x764A), PACK(0x740C), PACK(0x75CE),
+        PACK(0x7E90), PACK(0x7F52), PACK(0x7D14), PACK(0x7CD6),
+        PACK(0x7998), PACK(0x785A), PACK(0x7A1C), PACK(0x7BDE),
+        PACK(0x6CA0), PACK(0x6D62), PACK(0x6F24), PACK(0x6EE6),
+        PACK(0x6BA8), PACK(0x6A6A), PACK(0x682C), PACK(0x69EE),
+        PACK(0x62B0), PACK(0x6372), PACK(0x6134), PACK(0x60F6),
+        PACK(0x65B8), PACK(0x647A), PACK(0x663C), PACK(0x67FE),
+        PACK(0x48C0), PACK(0x4902), PACK(0x4B44), PACK(0x4A86),
+        PACK(0x4FC8), PACK(0x4E0A), PACK(0x4C4C), PACK(0x4D8E),
+        PACK(0x46D0), PACK(0x4712), PACK(0x4554), PACK(0x4496),
+        PACK(0x41D8), PACK(0x401A), PACK(0x425C), PACK(0x439E),
+        PACK(0x54E0), PACK(0x5522), PACK(0x5764), PACK(0x56A6),
+        PACK(0x53E8), PACK(0x522A), PACK(0x506C), PACK(0x51AE),
+        PACK(0x5AF0), PACK(0x5B32), PACK(0x5974), PACK(0x58B6),
+        PACK(0x5DF8), PACK(0x5C3A), PACK(0x5E7C), PACK(0x5FBE),
+        PACK(0xE100), PACK(0xE0C2), PACK(0xE284), PACK(0xE346),
+        PACK(0xE608), PACK(0xE7CA), PACK(0xE58C), PACK(0xE44E),
+        PACK(0xEF10), PACK(0xEED2), PACK(0xEC94), PACK(0xED56),
+        PACK(0xE818), PACK(0xE9DA), PACK(0xEB9C), PACK(0xEA5E),
+        PACK(0xFD20), PACK(0xFCE2), PACK(0xFEA4), PACK(0xFF66),
+        PACK(0xFA28), PACK(0xFBEA), PACK(0xF9AC), PACK(0xF86E),
+        PACK(0xF330), PACK(0xF2F2), PACK(0xF0B4), PACK(0xF176),
+        PACK(0xF438), PACK(0xF5FA), PACK(0xF7BC), PACK(0xF67E),
+        PACK(0xD940), PACK(0xD882), PACK(0xDAC4), PACK(0xDB06),
+        PACK(0xDE48), PACK(0xDF8A), PACK(0xDDCC), PACK(0xDC0E),
+        PACK(0xD750), PACK(0xD692), PACK(0xD4D4), PACK(0xD516),
+        PACK(0xD058), PACK(0xD19A), PACK(0xD3DC), PACK(0xD21E),
+        PACK(0xC560), PACK(0xC4A2), PACK(0xC6E4), PACK(0xC726),
+        PACK(0xC268), PACK(0xC3AA), PACK(0xC1EC), PACK(0xC02E),
+        PACK(0xCB70), PACK(0xCAB2), PACK(0xC8F4), PACK(0xC936),
+        PACK(0xCC78), PACK(0xCDBA), PACK(0xCFFC), PACK(0xCE3E),
+        PACK(0x9180), PACK(0x9042), PACK(0x9204), PACK(0x93C6),
+        PACK(0x9688), PACK(0x974A), PACK(0x950C), PACK(0x94CE),
+        PACK(0x9F90), PACK(0x9E52), PACK(0x9C14), PACK(0x9DD6),
+        PACK(0x9898), PACK(0x995A), PACK(0x9B1C), PACK(0x9ADE),
+        PACK(0x8DA0), PACK(0x8C62), PACK(0x8E24), PACK(0x8FE6),
+        PACK(0x8AA8), PACK(0x8B6A), PACK(0x892C), PACK(0x88EE),
+        PACK(0x83B0), PACK(0x8272), PACK(0x8034), PACK(0x81F6),
+        PACK(0x84B8), PACK(0x857A), PACK(0x873C), PACK(0x86FE),
+        PACK(0xA9C0), PACK(0xA802), PACK(0xAA44), PACK(0xAB86),
+        PACK(0xAEC8), PACK(0xAF0A), PACK(0xAD4C), PACK(0xAC8E),
+        PACK(0xA7D0), PACK(0xA612), PACK(0xA454), PACK(0xA596),
+        PACK(0xA0D8), PACK(0xA11A), PACK(0xA35C), PACK(0xA29E),
+        PACK(0xB5E0), PACK(0xB422), PACK(0xB664), PACK(0xB7A6),
+        PACK(0xB2E8), PACK(0xB32A), PACK(0xB16C), PACK(0xB0AE),
+        PACK(0xBBF0), PACK(0xBA32), PACK(0xB874), PACK(0xB9B6),
+        PACK(0xBCF8), PACK(0xBD3A), PACK(0xBF7C), PACK(0xBEBE)
+    };
+
+    while (1) {
+        Z.hi ^= Htable[n].hi;
+        Z.lo ^= Htable[n].lo;
+
+        if ((u8 *)Xi == xi)
+            break;
+
+        n = *(--xi);
+
+        rem = (size_t)Z.lo & 0xff;
+        Z.lo = (Z.hi << 56) | (Z.lo >> 8);
+        Z.hi = (Z.hi >> 8);
+        if (sizeof(size_t) == 8)
+            Z.hi ^= rem_8bit[rem];
+        else
+            Z.hi ^= (u64)rem_8bit[rem] << 32;
+    }
+
+    if (is_endian.little) {
+# ifdef BSWAP8
+        Xi[0] = BSWAP8(Z.hi);
+        Xi[1] = BSWAP8(Z.lo);
+# else
+        u8 *p = (u8 *)Xi;
+        u32 v;
+        v = (u32)(Z.hi >> 32);
+        PUTU32(p, v);
+        v = (u32)(Z.hi);
+        PUTU32(p + 4, v);
+        v = (u32)(Z.lo >> 32);
+        PUTU32(p + 8, v);
+        v = (u32)(Z.lo);
+        PUTU32(p + 12, v);
+# endif
+    } else {
+        Xi[0] = Z.hi;
+        Xi[1] = Z.lo;
+    }
+}
+
+# define GCM_MUL(ctx,Xi)   gcm_gmult_8bit(ctx->Xi.u,ctx->Htable)
+
+#elif   TABLE_BITS==4
+
+static void gcm_init_4bit(u128 Htable[16], u64 H[2])
+{
+    u128 V;
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT)
+    int i;
+# endif
+
+    Htable[0].hi = 0;
+    Htable[0].lo = 0;
+    V.hi = H[0];
+    V.lo = H[1];
+
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT)
+    for (Htable[8] = V, i = 4; i > 0; i >>= 1) {
+        REDUCE1BIT(V);
+        Htable[i] = V;
+    }
+
+    for (i = 2; i < 16; i <<= 1) {
+        u128 *Hi = Htable + i;
+        int j;
+        for (V = *Hi, j = 1; j < i; ++j) {
+            Hi[j].hi = V.hi ^ Htable[j].hi;
+            Hi[j].lo = V.lo ^ Htable[j].lo;
+        }
+    }
+# else
+    Htable[8] = V;
+    REDUCE1BIT(V);
+    Htable[4] = V;
+    REDUCE1BIT(V);
+    Htable[2] = V;
+    REDUCE1BIT(V);
+    Htable[1] = V;
+    Htable[3].hi = V.hi ^ Htable[2].hi, Htable[3].lo = V.lo ^ Htable[2].lo;
+    V = Htable[4];
+    Htable[5].hi = V.hi ^ Htable[1].hi, Htable[5].lo = V.lo ^ Htable[1].lo;
+    Htable[6].hi = V.hi ^ Htable[2].hi, Htable[6].lo = V.lo ^ Htable[2].lo;
+    Htable[7].hi = V.hi ^ Htable[3].hi, Htable[7].lo = V.lo ^ Htable[3].lo;
+    V = Htable[8];
+    Htable[9].hi = V.hi ^ Htable[1].hi, Htable[9].lo = V.lo ^ Htable[1].lo;
+    Htable[10].hi = V.hi ^ Htable[2].hi, Htable[10].lo = V.lo ^ Htable[2].lo;
+    Htable[11].hi = V.hi ^ Htable[3].hi, Htable[11].lo = V.lo ^ Htable[3].lo;
+    Htable[12].hi = V.hi ^ Htable[4].hi, Htable[12].lo = V.lo ^ Htable[4].lo;
+    Htable[13].hi = V.hi ^ Htable[5].hi, Htable[13].lo = V.lo ^ Htable[5].lo;
+    Htable[14].hi = V.hi ^ Htable[6].hi, Htable[14].lo = V.lo ^ Htable[6].lo;
+    Htable[15].hi = V.hi ^ Htable[7].hi, Htable[15].lo = V.lo ^ Htable[7].lo;
+# endif
+# if defined(GHASH_ASM) && (defined(__arm__) || defined(__arm))
+    /*
+     * ARM assembler expects specific dword order in Htable.
+     */
+    {
+        int j;
+        const union {
+            long one;
+            char little;
+        } is_endian = { 1 };
+
+        if (is_endian.little)
+            for (j = 0; j < 16; ++j) {
+                V = Htable[j];
+                Htable[j].hi = V.lo;
+                Htable[j].lo = V.hi;
+        } else
+            for (j = 0; j < 16; ++j) {
+                V = Htable[j];
+                Htable[j].hi = V.lo << 32 | V.lo >> 32;
+                Htable[j].lo = V.hi << 32 | V.hi >> 32;
+            }
+    }
+# endif
+}
+
+# ifndef GHASH_ASM
+static const size_t rem_4bit[16] = {
+    PACK(0x0000), PACK(0x1C20), PACK(0x3840), PACK(0x2460),
+    PACK(0x7080), PACK(0x6CA0), PACK(0x48C0), PACK(0x54E0),
+    PACK(0xE100), PACK(0xFD20), PACK(0xD940), PACK(0xC560),
+    PACK(0x9180), PACK(0x8DA0), PACK(0xA9C0), PACK(0xB5E0)
+};
+
+static void gcm_gmult_4bit(u64 Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16])
+{
+    u128 Z;
+    int cnt = 15;
+    size_t rem, nlo, nhi;
+    const union {
+        long one;
+        char little;
+    } is_endian = { 1 };
+
+    nlo = ((const u8 *)Xi)[15];
+    nhi = nlo >> 4;
+    nlo &= 0xf;
+
+    Z.hi = Htable[nlo].hi;
+    Z.lo = Htable[nlo].lo;
+
+    while (1) {
+        rem = (size_t)Z.lo & 0xf;
+        Z.lo = (Z.hi << 60) | (Z.lo >> 4);
+        Z.hi = (Z.hi >> 4);
+        if (sizeof(size_t) == 8)
+            Z.hi ^= rem_4bit[rem];
+        else
+            Z.hi ^= (u64)rem_4bit[rem] << 32;
+
+        Z.hi ^= Htable[nhi].hi;
+        Z.lo ^= Htable[nhi].lo;
+
+        if (--cnt < 0)
+            break;
+
+        nlo = ((const u8 *)Xi)[cnt];
+        nhi = nlo >> 4;
+        nlo &= 0xf;
+
+        rem = (size_t)Z.lo & 0xf;
+        Z.lo = (Z.hi << 60) | (Z.lo >> 4);
+        Z.hi = (Z.hi >> 4);
+        if (sizeof(size_t) == 8)
+            Z.hi ^= rem_4bit[rem];
+        else
+            Z.hi ^= (u64)rem_4bit[rem] << 32;
+
+        Z.hi ^= Htable[nlo].hi;
+        Z.lo ^= Htable[nlo].lo;
+    }
+
+    if (is_endian.little) {
+#  ifdef BSWAP8
+        Xi[0] = BSWAP8(Z.hi);
+        Xi[1] = BSWAP8(Z.lo);
+#  else
+        u8 *p = (u8 *)Xi;
+        u32 v;
+        v = (u32)(Z.hi >> 32);
+        PUTU32(p, v);
+        v = (u32)(Z.hi);
+        PUTU32(p + 4, v);
+        v = (u32)(Z.lo >> 32);
+        PUTU32(p + 8, v);
+        v = (u32)(Z.lo);
+        PUTU32(p + 12, v);
+#  endif
+    } else {
+        Xi[0] = Z.hi;
+        Xi[1] = Z.lo;
+    }
+}
+
+#  if !defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT)
+/*
+ * Streamed gcm_mult_4bit, see CRYPTO_gcm128_[en|de]crypt for
+ * details... Compiler-generated code doesn't seem to give any
+ * performance improvement, at least not on x86[_64]. It's here
+ * mostly as reference and a placeholder for possible future
+ * non-trivial optimization[s]...
+ */
+static void gcm_ghash_4bit(u64 Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16],
+                           const u8 *inp, size_t len)
+{
+    u128 Z;
+    int cnt;
+    size_t rem, nlo, nhi;
+    const union {
+        long one;
+        char little;
+    } is_endian = { 1 };
+
+#   if 1
+    do {
+        cnt = 15;
+        nlo = ((const u8 *)Xi)[15];
+        nlo ^= inp[15];
+        nhi = nlo >> 4;
+        nlo &= 0xf;
+
+        Z.hi = Htable[nlo].hi;
+        Z.lo = Htable[nlo].lo;
+
+        while (1) {
+            rem = (size_t)Z.lo & 0xf;
+            Z.lo = (Z.hi << 60) | (Z.lo >> 4);
+            Z.hi = (Z.hi >> 4);
+            if (sizeof(size_t) == 8)
+                Z.hi ^= rem_4bit[rem];
+            else
+                Z.hi ^= (u64)rem_4bit[rem] << 32;
+
+            Z.hi ^= Htable[nhi].hi;
+            Z.lo ^= Htable[nhi].lo;
+
+            if (--cnt < 0)
+                break;
+
+            nlo = ((const u8 *)Xi)[cnt];
+            nlo ^= inp[cnt];
+            nhi = nlo >> 4;
+            nlo &= 0xf;
+
+            rem = (size_t)Z.lo & 0xf;
+            Z.lo = (Z.hi << 60) | (Z.lo >> 4);
+            Z.hi = (Z.hi >> 4);
+            if (sizeof(size_t) == 8)
+                Z.hi ^= rem_4bit[rem];
+            else
+                Z.hi ^= (u64)rem_4bit[rem] << 32;
+
+            Z.hi ^= Htable[nlo].hi;
+            Z.lo ^= Htable[nlo].lo;
+        }
+#   else
+    /*
+     * Extra 256+16 bytes per-key plus 512 bytes shared tables
+     * [should] give ~50% improvement... One could have PACK()-ed
+     * the rem_8bit even here, but the priority is to minimize
+     * cache footprint...
+     */
+    u128 Hshr4[16];             /* Htable shifted right by 4 bits */
+    u8 Hshl4[16];               /* Htable shifted left by 4 bits */
+    static const unsigned short rem_8bit[256] = {
+        0x0000, 0x01C2, 0x0384, 0x0246, 0x0708, 0x06CA, 0x048C, 0x054E,
+        0x0E10, 0x0FD2, 0x0D94, 0x0C56, 0x0918, 0x08DA, 0x0A9C, 0x0B5E,
+        0x1C20, 0x1DE2, 0x1FA4, 0x1E66, 0x1B28, 0x1AEA, 0x18AC, 0x196E,
+        0x1230, 0x13F2, 0x11B4, 0x1076, 0x1538, 0x14FA, 0x16BC, 0x177E,
+        0x3840, 0x3982, 0x3BC4, 0x3A06, 0x3F48, 0x3E8A, 0x3CCC, 0x3D0E,
+        0x3650, 0x3792, 0x35D4, 0x3416, 0x3158, 0x309A, 0x32DC, 0x331E,
+        0x2460, 0x25A2, 0x27E4, 0x2626, 0x2368, 0x22AA, 0x20EC, 0x212E,
+        0x2A70, 0x2BB2, 0x29F4, 0x2836, 0x2D78, 0x2CBA, 0x2EFC, 0x2F3E,
+        0x7080, 0x7142, 0x7304, 0x72C6, 0x7788, 0x764A, 0x740C, 0x75CE,
+        0x7E90, 0x7F52, 0x7D14, 0x7CD6, 0x7998, 0x785A, 0x7A1C, 0x7BDE,
+        0x6CA0, 0x6D62, 0x6F24, 0x6EE6, 0x6BA8, 0x6A6A, 0x682C, 0x69EE,
+        0x62B0, 0x6372, 0x6134, 0x60F6, 0x65B8, 0x647A, 0x663C, 0x67FE,
+        0x48C0, 0x4902, 0x4B44, 0x4A86, 0x4FC8, 0x4E0A, 0x4C4C, 0x4D8E,
+        0x46D0, 0x4712, 0x4554, 0x4496, 0x41D8, 0x401A, 0x425C, 0x439E,
+        0x54E0, 0x5522, 0x5764, 0x56A6, 0x53E8, 0x522A, 0x506C, 0x51AE,
+        0x5AF0, 0x5B32, 0x5974, 0x58B6, 0x5DF8, 0x5C3A, 0x5E7C, 0x5FBE,
+        0xE100, 0xE0C2, 0xE284, 0xE346, 0xE608, 0xE7CA, 0xE58C, 0xE44E,
+        0xEF10, 0xEED2, 0xEC94, 0xED56, 0xE818, 0xE9DA, 0xEB9C, 0xEA5E,
+        0xFD20, 0xFCE2, 0xFEA4, 0xFF66, 0xFA28, 0xFBEA, 0xF9AC, 0xF86E,
+        0xF330, 0xF2F2, 0xF0B4, 0xF176, 0xF438, 0xF5FA, 0xF7BC, 0xF67E,
+        0xD940, 0xD882, 0xDAC4, 0xDB06, 0xDE48, 0xDF8A, 0xDDCC, 0xDC0E,
+        0xD750, 0xD692, 0xD4D4, 0xD516, 0xD058, 0xD19A, 0xD3DC, 0xD21E,
+        0xC560, 0xC4A2, 0xC6E4, 0xC726, 0xC268, 0xC3AA, 0xC1EC, 0xC02E,
+        0xCB70, 0xCAB2, 0xC8F4, 0xC936, 0xCC78, 0xCDBA, 0xCFFC, 0xCE3E,
+        0x9180, 0x9042, 0x9204, 0x93C6, 0x9688, 0x974A, 0x950C, 0x94CE,
+        0x9F90, 0x9E52, 0x9C14, 0x9DD6, 0x9898, 0x995A, 0x9B1C, 0x9ADE,
+        0x8DA0, 0x8C62, 0x8E24, 0x8FE6, 0x8AA8, 0x8B6A, 0x892C, 0x88EE,
+        0x83B0, 0x8272, 0x8034, 0x81F6, 0x84B8, 0x857A, 0x873C, 0x86FE,
+        0xA9C0, 0xA802, 0xAA44, 0xAB86, 0xAEC8, 0xAF0A, 0xAD4C, 0xAC8E,
+        0xA7D0, 0xA612, 0xA454, 0xA596, 0xA0D8, 0xA11A, 0xA35C, 0xA29E,
+        0xB5E0, 0xB422, 0xB664, 0xB7A6, 0xB2E8, 0xB32A, 0xB16C, 0xB0AE,
+        0xBBF0, 0xBA32, 0xB874, 0xB9B6, 0xBCF8, 0xBD3A, 0xBF7C, 0xBEBE
+    };
+    /*
+     * This pre-processing phase slows down procedure by approximately
+     * same time as it makes each loop spin faster. In other words
+     * single block performance is approximately same as straightforward
+     * "4-bit" implementation, and then it goes only faster...
+     */
+    for (cnt = 0; cnt < 16; ++cnt) {
+        Z.hi = Htable[cnt].hi;
+        Z.lo = Htable[cnt].lo;
+        Hshr4[cnt].lo = (Z.hi << 60) | (Z.lo >> 4);
+        Hshr4[cnt].hi = (Z.hi >> 4);
+        Hshl4[cnt] = (u8)(Z.lo << 4);
+    }
+
+    do {
+        for (Z.lo = 0, Z.hi = 0, cnt = 15; cnt; --cnt) {
+            nlo = ((const u8 *)Xi)[cnt];
+            nlo ^= inp[cnt];
+            nhi = nlo >> 4;
+            nlo &= 0xf;
+
+            Z.hi ^= Htable[nlo].hi;
+            Z.lo ^= Htable[nlo].lo;
+
+            rem = (size_t)Z.lo & 0xff;
+
+            Z.lo = (Z.hi << 56) | (Z.lo >> 8);
+            Z.hi = (Z.hi >> 8);
+
+            Z.hi ^= Hshr4[nhi].hi;
+            Z.lo ^= Hshr4[nhi].lo;
+            Z.hi ^= (u64)rem_8bit[rem ^ Hshl4[nhi]] << 48;
+        }
+
+        nlo = ((const u8 *)Xi)[0];
+        nlo ^= inp[0];
+        nhi = nlo >> 4;
+        nlo &= 0xf;
+
+        Z.hi ^= Htable[nlo].hi;
+        Z.lo ^= Htable[nlo].lo;
+
+        rem = (size_t)Z.lo & 0xf;
+
+        Z.lo = (Z.hi << 60) | (Z.lo >> 4);
+        Z.hi = (Z.hi >> 4);
+
+        Z.hi ^= Htable[nhi].hi;
+        Z.lo ^= Htable[nhi].lo;
+        Z.hi ^= ((u64)rem_8bit[rem << 4]) << 48;
+#   endif
+
+        if (is_endian.little) {
+#   ifdef BSWAP8
+            Xi[0] = BSWAP8(Z.hi);
+            Xi[1] = BSWAP8(Z.lo);
+#   else
+            u8 *p = (u8 *)Xi;
+            u32 v;
+            v = (u32)(Z.hi >> 32);
+            PUTU32(p, v);
+            v = (u32)(Z.hi);
+            PUTU32(p + 4, v);
+            v = (u32)(Z.lo >> 32);
+            PUTU32(p + 8, v);
+            v = (u32)(Z.lo);
+            PUTU32(p + 12, v);
+#   endif
+        } else {
+            Xi[0] = Z.hi;
+            Xi[1] = Z.lo;
+        }
+    } while (inp += 16, len -= 16);
+}
+#  endif
+# else
+void gcm_gmult_4bit(u64 Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16]);
+void gcm_ghash_4bit(u64 Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16], const u8 *inp,
+                    size_t len);
+# endif
+
+# define GCM_MUL(ctx,Xi)   gcm_gmult_4bit(ctx->Xi.u,ctx->Htable)
+# if defined(GHASH_ASM) || !defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT)
+#  define GHASH(ctx,in,len) gcm_ghash_4bit((ctx)->Xi.u,(ctx)->Htable,in,len)
+/*
+ * GHASH_CHUNK is "stride parameter" missioned to mitigate cache trashing
+ * effect. In other words idea is to hash data while it's still in L1 cache
+ * after encryption pass...
+ */
+#  define GHASH_CHUNK       (3*1024)
+# endif
+
+#else                           /* TABLE_BITS */
+
+static void gcm_gmult_1bit(u64 Xi[2], const u64 H[2])
+{
+    u128 V, Z = { 0, 0 };
+    long X;
+    int i, j;
+    const long *xi = (const long *)Xi;
+    const union {
+        long one;
+        char little;
+    } is_endian = { 1 };
+
+    V.hi = H[0];                /* H is in host byte order, no byte swapping */
+    V.lo = H[1];
+
+    for (j = 0; j < 16 / sizeof(long); ++j) {
+        if (is_endian.little) {
+            if (sizeof(long) == 8) {
+# ifdef BSWAP8
+                X = (long)(BSWAP8(xi[j]));
+# else
+                const u8 *p = (const u8 *)(xi + j);
+                X = (long)((u64)GETU32(p) << 32 | GETU32(p + 4));
+# endif
+            } else {
+                const u8 *p = (const u8 *)(xi + j);
+                X = (long)GETU32(p);
+            }
+        } else
+            X = xi[j];
+
+        for (i = 0; i < 8 * sizeof(long); ++i, X <<= 1) {
+            u64 M = (u64)(X >> (8 * sizeof(long) - 1));
+            Z.hi ^= V.hi & M;
+            Z.lo ^= V.lo & M;
+
+            REDUCE1BIT(V);
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (is_endian.little) {
+# ifdef BSWAP8
+        Xi[0] = BSWAP8(Z.hi);
+        Xi[1] = BSWAP8(Z.lo);
+# else
+        u8 *p = (u8 *)Xi;
+        u32 v;
+        v = (u32)(Z.hi >> 32);
+        PUTU32(p, v);
+        v = (u32)(Z.hi);
+        PUTU32(p + 4, v);
+        v = (u32)(Z.lo >> 32);
+        PUTU32(p + 8, v);
+        v = (u32)(Z.lo);
+        PUTU32(p + 12, v);
+# endif
+    } else {
+        Xi[0] = Z.hi;
+        Xi[1] = Z.lo;
+    }
+}
+
+# define GCM_MUL(ctx,Xi)   gcm_gmult_1bit(ctx->Xi.u,ctx->H.u)
+
+#endif
+
+#if     TABLE_BITS==4 && (defined(GHASH_ASM) || defined(OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ))
+# if    !defined(I386_ONLY) && \
+        (defined(__i386)        || defined(__i386__)    || \
+         defined(__x86_64)      || defined(__x86_64__)  || \
+         defined(_M_IX86)       || defined(_M_AMD64)    || defined(_M_X64))
+#  define GHASH_ASM_X86_OR_64
+#  define GCM_FUNCREF_4BIT
+extern unsigned int OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[];
+
+void gcm_init_clmul(u128 Htable[16], const u64 Xi[2]);
+void gcm_gmult_clmul(u64 Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16]);
+void gcm_ghash_clmul(u64 Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16], const u8 *inp,
+                     size_t len);
+
+#  if defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__) || defined(_M_IX86)
+#   define gcm_init_avx   gcm_init_clmul
+#   define gcm_gmult_avx  gcm_gmult_clmul
+#   define gcm_ghash_avx  gcm_ghash_clmul
+#  else
+void gcm_init_avx(u128 Htable[16], const u64 Xi[2]);
+void gcm_gmult_avx(u64 Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16]);
+void gcm_ghash_avx(u64 Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16], const u8 *inp,
+                   size_t len);
+#  endif
+
+#  if   defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__) || defined(_M_IX86)
+#   define GHASH_ASM_X86
+void gcm_gmult_4bit_mmx(u64 Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16]);
+void gcm_ghash_4bit_mmx(u64 Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16], const u8 *inp,
+                        size_t len);
+
+void gcm_gmult_4bit_x86(u64 Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16]);
+void gcm_ghash_4bit_x86(u64 Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16], const u8 *inp,
+                        size_t len);
+#  endif
+# elif defined(__arm__) || defined(__arm) || defined(__aarch64__)
+#  include "arm_arch.h"
+#  if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7
+#   define GHASH_ASM_ARM
+#   define GCM_FUNCREF_4BIT
+#   define PMULL_CAPABLE        (OPENSSL_armcap_P & ARMV8_PMULL)
+#   if defined(__arm__) || defined(__arm)
+#    define NEON_CAPABLE        (OPENSSL_armcap_P & ARMV7_NEON)
+#   endif
+void gcm_init_neon(u128 Htable[16], const u64 Xi[2]);
+void gcm_gmult_neon(u64 Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16]);
+void gcm_ghash_neon(u64 Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16], const u8 *inp,
+                    size_t len);
+void gcm_init_v8(u128 Htable[16], const u64 Xi[2]);
+void gcm_gmult_v8(u64 Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16]);
+void gcm_ghash_v8(u64 Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16], const u8 *inp,
+                  size_t len);
+#  endif
+# elif defined(__sparc__) || defined(__sparc)
+#  include "sparc_arch.h"
+#  define GHASH_ASM_SPARC
+#  define GCM_FUNCREF_4BIT
+extern unsigned int OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[];
+void gcm_init_vis3(u128 Htable[16], const u64 Xi[2]);
+void gcm_gmult_vis3(u64 Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16]);
+void gcm_ghash_vis3(u64 Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16], const u8 *inp,
+                    size_t len);
+# elif defined(OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ) && (defined(__powerpc__) || defined(__ppc__) || defined(_ARCH_PPC))
+#  include "ppc_arch.h"
+#  define GHASH_ASM_PPC
+#  define GCM_FUNCREF_4BIT
+void gcm_init_p8(u128 Htable[16], const u64 Xi[2]);
+void gcm_gmult_p8(u64 Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16]);
+void gcm_ghash_p8(u64 Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16], const u8 *inp,
+                  size_t len);
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#ifdef GCM_FUNCREF_4BIT
+# undef  GCM_MUL
+# define GCM_MUL(ctx,Xi)        (*gcm_gmult_p)(ctx->Xi.u,ctx->Htable)
+# ifdef GHASH
+#  undef  GHASH
+#  define GHASH(ctx,in,len)     (*gcm_ghash_p)(ctx->Xi.u,ctx->Htable,in,len)
+# endif
+#endif
+
+void CRYPTO_gcm128_init(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx, void *key, block128_f block)
+{
+    const union {
+        long one;
+        char little;
+    } is_endian = { 1 };
+
+    memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
+    ctx->block = block;
+    ctx->key = key;
+
+    (*block) (ctx->H.c, ctx->H.c, key);
+
+    if (is_endian.little) {
+        /* H is stored in host byte order */
+#ifdef BSWAP8
+        ctx->H.u[0] = BSWAP8(ctx->H.u[0]);
+        ctx->H.u[1] = BSWAP8(ctx->H.u[1]);
+#else
+        u8 *p = ctx->H.c;
+        u64 hi, lo;
+        hi = (u64)GETU32(p) << 32 | GETU32(p + 4);
+        lo = (u64)GETU32(p + 8) << 32 | GETU32(p + 12);
+        ctx->H.u[0] = hi;
+        ctx->H.u[1] = lo;
+#endif
+    }
+#if     TABLE_BITS==8
+    gcm_init_8bit(ctx->Htable, ctx->H.u);
+#elif   TABLE_BITS==4
+# if    defined(GHASH)
+#  define CTX__GHASH(f) (ctx->ghash = (f))
+# else
+#  define CTX__GHASH(f) (ctx->ghash = NULL)
+# endif
+# if    defined(GHASH_ASM_X86_OR_64)
+#  if   !defined(GHASH_ASM_X86) || defined(OPENSSL_IA32_SSE2)
+    if (OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1 << 1)) { /* check PCLMULQDQ bit */
+        if (((OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] >> 22) & 0x41) == 0x41) { /* AVX+MOVBE */
+            gcm_init_avx(ctx->Htable, ctx->H.u);
+            ctx->gmult = gcm_gmult_avx;
+            CTX__GHASH(gcm_ghash_avx);
+        } else {
+            gcm_init_clmul(ctx->Htable, ctx->H.u);
+            ctx->gmult = gcm_gmult_clmul;
+            CTX__GHASH(gcm_ghash_clmul);
+        }
+        return;
+    }
+#  endif
+    gcm_init_4bit(ctx->Htable, ctx->H.u);
+#  if   defined(GHASH_ASM_X86)  /* x86 only */
+#   if  defined(OPENSSL_IA32_SSE2)
+    if (OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[0] & (1 << 25)) { /* check SSE bit */
+#   else
+    if (OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[0] & (1 << 23)) { /* check MMX bit */
+#   endif
+        ctx->gmult = gcm_gmult_4bit_mmx;
+        CTX__GHASH(gcm_ghash_4bit_mmx);
+    } else {
+        ctx->gmult = gcm_gmult_4bit_x86;
+        CTX__GHASH(gcm_ghash_4bit_x86);
+    }
+#  else
+    ctx->gmult = gcm_gmult_4bit;
+    CTX__GHASH(gcm_ghash_4bit);
+#  endif
+# elif  defined(GHASH_ASM_ARM)
+#  ifdef PMULL_CAPABLE
+    if (PMULL_CAPABLE) {
+        gcm_init_v8(ctx->Htable, ctx->H.u);
+        ctx->gmult = gcm_gmult_v8;
+        CTX__GHASH(gcm_ghash_v8);
+    } else
+#  endif
+#  ifdef NEON_CAPABLE
+    if (NEON_CAPABLE) {
+        gcm_init_neon(ctx->Htable, ctx->H.u);
+        ctx->gmult = gcm_gmult_neon;
+        CTX__GHASH(gcm_ghash_neon);
+    } else
+#  endif
+    {
+        gcm_init_4bit(ctx->Htable, ctx->H.u);
+        ctx->gmult = gcm_gmult_4bit;
+        CTX__GHASH(gcm_ghash_4bit);
+    }
+# elif  defined(GHASH_ASM_SPARC)
+    if (OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] & SPARCV9_VIS3) {
+        gcm_init_vis3(ctx->Htable, ctx->H.u);
+        ctx->gmult = gcm_gmult_vis3;
+        CTX__GHASH(gcm_ghash_vis3);
+    } else {
+        gcm_init_4bit(ctx->Htable, ctx->H.u);
+        ctx->gmult = gcm_gmult_4bit;
+        CTX__GHASH(gcm_ghash_4bit);
+    }
+# elif  defined(GHASH_ASM_PPC)
+    if (OPENSSL_ppccap_P & PPC_CRYPTO207) {
+        gcm_init_p8(ctx->Htable, ctx->H.u);
+        ctx->gmult = gcm_gmult_p8;
+        CTX__GHASH(gcm_ghash_p8);
+    } else {
+        gcm_init_4bit(ctx->Htable, ctx->H.u);
+        ctx->gmult = gcm_gmult_4bit;
+        CTX__GHASH(gcm_ghash_4bit);
+    }
+# else
+    gcm_init_4bit(ctx->Htable, ctx->H.u);
+# endif
+# undef CTX__GHASH
+#endif
+}
+
+void CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx, const unsigned char *iv,
+                         size_t len)
+{
+    const union {
+        long one;
+        char little;
+    } is_endian = { 1 };
+    unsigned int ctr;
+#ifdef GCM_FUNCREF_4BIT
+    void (*gcm_gmult_p) (u64 Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16]) = ctx->gmult;
+#endif
+
+    ctx->Yi.u[0] = 0;
+    ctx->Yi.u[1] = 0;
+    ctx->Xi.u[0] = 0;
+    ctx->Xi.u[1] = 0;
+    ctx->len.u[0] = 0;          /* AAD length */
+    ctx->len.u[1] = 0;          /* message length */
+    ctx->ares = 0;
+    ctx->mres = 0;
+
+    if (len == 12) {
+        memcpy(ctx->Yi.c, iv, 12);
+        ctx->Yi.c[15] = 1;
+        ctr = 1;
+    } else {
+        size_t i;
+        u64 len0 = len;
+
+        while (len >= 16) {
+            for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i)
+                ctx->Yi.c[i] ^= iv[i];
+            GCM_MUL(ctx, Yi);
+            iv += 16;
+            len -= 16;
+        }
+        if (len) {
+            for (i = 0; i < len; ++i)
+                ctx->Yi.c[i] ^= iv[i];
+            GCM_MUL(ctx, Yi);
+        }
+        len0 <<= 3;
+        if (is_endian.little) {
+#ifdef BSWAP8
+            ctx->Yi.u[1] ^= BSWAP8(len0);
+#else
+            ctx->Yi.c[8] ^= (u8)(len0 >> 56);
+            ctx->Yi.c[9] ^= (u8)(len0 >> 48);
+            ctx->Yi.c[10] ^= (u8)(len0 >> 40);
+            ctx->Yi.c[11] ^= (u8)(len0 >> 32);
+            ctx->Yi.c[12] ^= (u8)(len0 >> 24);
+            ctx->Yi.c[13] ^= (u8)(len0 >> 16);
+            ctx->Yi.c[14] ^= (u8)(len0 >> 8);
+            ctx->Yi.c[15] ^= (u8)(len0);
+#endif
+        } else
+            ctx->Yi.u[1] ^= len0;
+
+        GCM_MUL(ctx, Yi);
+
+        if (is_endian.little)
+#ifdef BSWAP4
+            ctr = BSWAP4(ctx->Yi.d[3]);
+#else
+            ctr = GETU32(ctx->Yi.c + 12);
+#endif
+        else
+            ctr = ctx->Yi.d[3];
+    }
+
+    (*ctx->block) (ctx->Yi.c, ctx->EK0.c, ctx->key);
+    ++ctr;
+    if (is_endian.little)
+#ifdef BSWAP4
+        ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr);
+#else
+        PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c + 12, ctr);
+#endif
+    else
+        ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
+}
+
+int CRYPTO_gcm128_aad(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx, const unsigned char *aad,
+                      size_t len)
+{
+    size_t i;
+    unsigned int n;
+    u64 alen = ctx->len.u[0];
+#ifdef GCM_FUNCREF_4BIT
+    void (*gcm_gmult_p) (u64 Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16]) = ctx->gmult;
+# ifdef GHASH
+    void (*gcm_ghash_p) (u64 Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16],
+                         const u8 *inp, size_t len) = ctx->ghash;
+# endif
+#endif
+
+    if (ctx->len.u[1])
+        return -2;
+
+    alen += len;
+    if (alen > (U64(1) << 61) || (sizeof(len) == 8 && alen < len))
+        return -1;
+    ctx->len.u[0] = alen;
+
+    n = ctx->ares;
+    if (n) {
+        while (n && len) {
+            ctx->Xi.c[n] ^= *(aad++);
+            --len;
+            n = (n + 1) % 16;
+        }
+        if (n == 0)
+            GCM_MUL(ctx, Xi);
+        else {
+            ctx->ares = n;
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+#ifdef GHASH
+    if ((i = (len & (size_t)-16))) {
+        GHASH(ctx, aad, i);
+        aad += i;
+        len -= i;
+    }
+#else
+    while (len >= 16) {
+        for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i)
+            ctx->Xi.c[i] ^= aad[i];
+        GCM_MUL(ctx, Xi);
+        aad += 16;
+        len -= 16;
+    }
+#endif
+    if (len) {
+        n = (unsigned int)len;
+        for (i = 0; i < len; ++i)
+            ctx->Xi.c[i] ^= aad[i];
+    }
+
+    ctx->ares = n;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
+                          const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                          size_t len)
+{
+    const union {
+        long one;
+        char little;
+    } is_endian = { 1 };
+    unsigned int n, ctr;
+    size_t i;
+    u64 mlen = ctx->len.u[1];
+    block128_f block = ctx->block;
+    void *key = ctx->key;
+#ifdef GCM_FUNCREF_4BIT
+    void (*gcm_gmult_p) (u64 Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16]) = ctx->gmult;
+# if defined(GHASH) && !defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT)
+    void (*gcm_ghash_p) (u64 Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16],
+                         const u8 *inp, size_t len) = ctx->ghash;
+# endif
+#endif
+
+    mlen += len;
+    if (mlen > ((U64(1) << 36) - 32) || (sizeof(len) == 8 && mlen < len))
+        return -1;
+    ctx->len.u[1] = mlen;
+
+    if (ctx->ares) {
+        /* First call to encrypt finalizes GHASH(AAD) */
+        GCM_MUL(ctx, Xi);
+        ctx->ares = 0;
+    }
+
+    if (is_endian.little)
+#ifdef BSWAP4
+        ctr = BSWAP4(ctx->Yi.d[3]);
+#else
+        ctr = GETU32(ctx->Yi.c + 12);
+#endif
+    else
+        ctr = ctx->Yi.d[3];
+
+    n = ctx->mres;
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT)
+    if (16 % sizeof(size_t) == 0) { /* always true actually */
+        do {
+            if (n) {
+                while (n && len) {
+                    ctx->Xi.c[n] ^= *(out++) = *(in++) ^ ctx->EKi.c[n];
+                    --len;
+                    n = (n + 1) % 16;
+                }
+                if (n == 0)
+                    GCM_MUL(ctx, Xi);
+                else {
+                    ctx->mres = n;
+                    return 0;
+                }
+            }
+# if defined(STRICT_ALIGNMENT)
+            if (((size_t)in | (size_t)out) % sizeof(size_t) != 0)
+                break;
+# endif
+# if defined(GHASH)
+#  if defined(GHASH_CHUNK)
+            while (len >= GHASH_CHUNK) {
+                size_t j = GHASH_CHUNK;
+
+                while (j) {
+                    size_t *out_t = (size_t *)out;
+                    const size_t *in_t = (const size_t *)in;
+
+                    (*block) (ctx->Yi.c, ctx->EKi.c, key);
+                    ++ctr;
+                    if (is_endian.little)
+#   ifdef BSWAP4
+                        ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr);
+#   else
+                        PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c + 12, ctr);
+#   endif
+                    else
+                        ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
+                    for (i = 0; i < 16 / sizeof(size_t); ++i)
+                        out_t[i] = in_t[i] ^ ctx->EKi.t[i];
+                    out += 16;
+                    in += 16;
+                    j -= 16;
+                }
+                GHASH(ctx, out - GHASH_CHUNK, GHASH_CHUNK);
+                len -= GHASH_CHUNK;
+            }
+#  endif
+            if ((i = (len & (size_t)-16))) {
+                size_t j = i;
+
+                while (len >= 16) {
+                    size_t *out_t = (size_t *)out;
+                    const size_t *in_t = (const size_t *)in;
+
+                    (*block) (ctx->Yi.c, ctx->EKi.c, key);
+                    ++ctr;
+                    if (is_endian.little)
+#  ifdef BSWAP4
+                        ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr);
+#  else
+                        PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c + 12, ctr);
+#  endif
+                    else
+                        ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
+                    for (i = 0; i < 16 / sizeof(size_t); ++i)
+                        out_t[i] = in_t[i] ^ ctx->EKi.t[i];
+                    out += 16;
+                    in += 16;
+                    len -= 16;
+                }
+                GHASH(ctx, out - j, j);
+            }
+# else
+            while (len >= 16) {
+                size_t *out_t = (size_t *)out;
+                const size_t *in_t = (const size_t *)in;
+
+                (*block) (ctx->Yi.c, ctx->EKi.c, key);
+                ++ctr;
+                if (is_endian.little)
+#  ifdef BSWAP4
+                    ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr);
+#  else
+                    PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c + 12, ctr);
+#  endif
+                else
+                    ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
+                for (i = 0; i < 16 / sizeof(size_t); ++i)
+                    ctx->Xi.t[i] ^= out_t[i] = in_t[i] ^ ctx->EKi.t[i];
+                GCM_MUL(ctx, Xi);
+                out += 16;
+                in += 16;
+                len -= 16;
+            }
+# endif
+            if (len) {
+                (*block) (ctx->Yi.c, ctx->EKi.c, key);
+                ++ctr;
+                if (is_endian.little)
+# ifdef BSWAP4
+                    ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr);
+# else
+                    PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c + 12, ctr);
+# endif
+                else
+                    ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
+                while (len--) {
+                    ctx->Xi.c[n] ^= out[n] = in[n] ^ ctx->EKi.c[n];
+                    ++n;
+                }
+            }
+
+            ctx->mres = n;
+            return 0;
+        } while (0);
+    }
+#endif
+    for (i = 0; i < len; ++i) {
+        if (n == 0) {
+            (*block) (ctx->Yi.c, ctx->EKi.c, key);
+            ++ctr;
+            if (is_endian.little)
+#ifdef BSWAP4
+                ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr);
+#else
+                PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c + 12, ctr);
+#endif
+            else
+                ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
+        }
+        ctx->Xi.c[n] ^= out[i] = in[i] ^ ctx->EKi.c[n];
+        n = (n + 1) % 16;
+        if (n == 0)
+            GCM_MUL(ctx, Xi);
+    }
+
+    ctx->mres = n;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
+                          const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                          size_t len)
+{
+    const union {
+        long one;
+        char little;
+    } is_endian = { 1 };
+    unsigned int n, ctr;
+    size_t i;
+    u64 mlen = ctx->len.u[1];
+    block128_f block = ctx->block;
+    void *key = ctx->key;
+#ifdef GCM_FUNCREF_4BIT
+    void (*gcm_gmult_p) (u64 Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16]) = ctx->gmult;
+# if defined(GHASH) && !defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT)
+    void (*gcm_ghash_p) (u64 Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16],
+                         const u8 *inp, size_t len) = ctx->ghash;
+# endif
+#endif
+
+    mlen += len;
+    if (mlen > ((U64(1) << 36) - 32) || (sizeof(len) == 8 && mlen < len))
+        return -1;
+    ctx->len.u[1] = mlen;
+
+    if (ctx->ares) {
+        /* First call to decrypt finalizes GHASH(AAD) */
+        GCM_MUL(ctx, Xi);
+        ctx->ares = 0;
+    }
+
+    if (is_endian.little)
+#ifdef BSWAP4
+        ctr = BSWAP4(ctx->Yi.d[3]);
+#else
+        ctr = GETU32(ctx->Yi.c + 12);
+#endif
+    else
+        ctr = ctx->Yi.d[3];
+
+    n = ctx->mres;
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT)
+    if (16 % sizeof(size_t) == 0) { /* always true actually */
+        do {
+            if (n) {
+                while (n && len) {
+                    u8 c = *(in++);
+                    *(out++) = c ^ ctx->EKi.c[n];
+                    ctx->Xi.c[n] ^= c;
+                    --len;
+                    n = (n + 1) % 16;
+                }
+                if (n == 0)
+                    GCM_MUL(ctx, Xi);
+                else {
+                    ctx->mres = n;
+                    return 0;
+                }
+            }
+# if defined(STRICT_ALIGNMENT)
+            if (((size_t)in | (size_t)out) % sizeof(size_t) != 0)
+                break;
+# endif
+# if defined(GHASH)
+#  if defined(GHASH_CHUNK)
+            while (len >= GHASH_CHUNK) {
+                size_t j = GHASH_CHUNK;
+
+                GHASH(ctx, in, GHASH_CHUNK);
+                while (j) {
+                    size_t *out_t = (size_t *)out;
+                    const size_t *in_t = (const size_t *)in;
+
+                    (*block) (ctx->Yi.c, ctx->EKi.c, key);
+                    ++ctr;
+                    if (is_endian.little)
+#   ifdef BSWAP4
+                        ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr);
+#   else
+                        PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c + 12, ctr);
+#   endif
+                    else
+                        ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
+                    for (i = 0; i < 16 / sizeof(size_t); ++i)
+                        out_t[i] = in_t[i] ^ ctx->EKi.t[i];
+                    out += 16;
+                    in += 16;
+                    j -= 16;
+                }
+                len -= GHASH_CHUNK;
+            }
+#  endif
+            if ((i = (len & (size_t)-16))) {
+                GHASH(ctx, in, i);
+                while (len >= 16) {
+                    size_t *out_t = (size_t *)out;
+                    const size_t *in_t = (const size_t *)in;
+
+                    (*block) (ctx->Yi.c, ctx->EKi.c, key);
+                    ++ctr;
+                    if (is_endian.little)
+#  ifdef BSWAP4
+                        ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr);
+#  else
+                        PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c + 12, ctr);
+#  endif
+                    else
+                        ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
+                    for (i = 0; i < 16 / sizeof(size_t); ++i)
+                        out_t[i] = in_t[i] ^ ctx->EKi.t[i];
+                    out += 16;
+                    in += 16;
+                    len -= 16;
+                }
+            }
+# else
+            while (len >= 16) {
+                size_t *out_t = (size_t *)out;
+                const size_t *in_t = (const size_t *)in;
+
+                (*block) (ctx->Yi.c, ctx->EKi.c, key);
+                ++ctr;
+                if (is_endian.little)
+#  ifdef BSWAP4
+                    ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr);
+#  else
+                    PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c + 12, ctr);
+#  endif
+                else
+                    ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
+                for (i = 0; i < 16 / sizeof(size_t); ++i) {
+                    size_t c = in[i];
+                    out[i] = c ^ ctx->EKi.t[i];
+                    ctx->Xi.t[i] ^= c;
+                }
+                GCM_MUL(ctx, Xi);
+                out += 16;
+                in += 16;
+                len -= 16;
+            }
+# endif
+            if (len) {
+                (*block) (ctx->Yi.c, ctx->EKi.c, key);
+                ++ctr;
+                if (is_endian.little)
+# ifdef BSWAP4
+                    ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr);
+# else
+                    PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c + 12, ctr);
+# endif
+                else
+                    ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
+                while (len--) {
+                    u8 c = in[n];
+                    ctx->Xi.c[n] ^= c;
+                    out[n] = c ^ ctx->EKi.c[n];
+                    ++n;
+                }
+            }
+
+            ctx->mres = n;
+            return 0;
+        } while (0);
+    }
+#endif
+    for (i = 0; i < len; ++i) {
+        u8 c;
+        if (n == 0) {
+            (*block) (ctx->Yi.c, ctx->EKi.c, key);
+            ++ctr;
+            if (is_endian.little)
+#ifdef BSWAP4
+                ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr);
+#else
+                PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c + 12, ctr);
+#endif
+            else
+                ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
+        }
+        c = in[i];
+        out[i] = c ^ ctx->EKi.c[n];
+        ctx->Xi.c[n] ^= c;
+        n = (n + 1) % 16;
+        if (n == 0)
+            GCM_MUL(ctx, Xi);
+    }
+
+    ctx->mres = n;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt_ctr32(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
+                                const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                                size_t len, ctr128_f stream)
+{
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT)
+    return CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(ctx, in, out, len);
+#else
+    const union {
+        long one;
+        char little;
+    } is_endian = { 1 };
+    unsigned int n, ctr;
+    size_t i;
+    u64 mlen = ctx->len.u[1];
+    void *key = ctx->key;
+# ifdef GCM_FUNCREF_4BIT
+    void (*gcm_gmult_p) (u64 Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16]) = ctx->gmult;
+#  ifdef GHASH
+    void (*gcm_ghash_p) (u64 Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16],
+                         const u8 *inp, size_t len) = ctx->ghash;
+#  endif
+# endif
+
+    mlen += len;
+    if (mlen > ((U64(1) << 36) - 32) || (sizeof(len) == 8 && mlen < len))
+        return -1;
+    ctx->len.u[1] = mlen;
+
+    if (ctx->ares) {
+        /* First call to encrypt finalizes GHASH(AAD) */
+        GCM_MUL(ctx, Xi);
+        ctx->ares = 0;
+    }
+
+    if (is_endian.little)
+# ifdef BSWAP4
+        ctr = BSWAP4(ctx->Yi.d[3]);
+# else
+        ctr = GETU32(ctx->Yi.c + 12);
+# endif
+    else
+        ctr = ctx->Yi.d[3];
+
+    n = ctx->mres;
+    if (n) {
+        while (n && len) {
+            ctx->Xi.c[n] ^= *(out++) = *(in++) ^ ctx->EKi.c[n];
+            --len;
+            n = (n + 1) % 16;
+        }
+        if (n == 0)
+            GCM_MUL(ctx, Xi);
+        else {
+            ctx->mres = n;
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+# if defined(GHASH) && defined(GHASH_CHUNK)
+    while (len >= GHASH_CHUNK) {
+        (*stream) (in, out, GHASH_CHUNK / 16, key, ctx->Yi.c);
+        ctr += GHASH_CHUNK / 16;
+        if (is_endian.little)
+#  ifdef BSWAP4
+            ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr);
+#  else
+            PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c + 12, ctr);
+#  endif
+        else
+            ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
+        GHASH(ctx, out, GHASH_CHUNK);
+        out += GHASH_CHUNK;
+        in += GHASH_CHUNK;
+        len -= GHASH_CHUNK;
+    }
+# endif
+    if ((i = (len & (size_t)-16))) {
+        size_t j = i / 16;
+
+        (*stream) (in, out, j, key, ctx->Yi.c);
+        ctr += (unsigned int)j;
+        if (is_endian.little)
+# ifdef BSWAP4
+            ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr);
+# else
+            PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c + 12, ctr);
+# endif
+        else
+            ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
+        in += i;
+        len -= i;
+# if defined(GHASH)
+        GHASH(ctx, out, i);
+        out += i;
+# else
+        while (j--) {
+            for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i)
+                ctx->Xi.c[i] ^= out[i];
+            GCM_MUL(ctx, Xi);
+            out += 16;
+        }
+# endif
+    }
+    if (len) {
+        (*ctx->block) (ctx->Yi.c, ctx->EKi.c, key);
+        ++ctr;
+        if (is_endian.little)
+# ifdef BSWAP4
+            ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr);
+# else
+            PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c + 12, ctr);
+# endif
+        else
+            ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
+        while (len--) {
+            ctx->Xi.c[n] ^= out[n] = in[n] ^ ctx->EKi.c[n];
+            ++n;
+        }
+    }
+
+    ctx->mres = n;
+    return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+int CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt_ctr32(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
+                                const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                                size_t len, ctr128_f stream)
+{
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT)
+    return CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(ctx, in, out, len);
+#else
+    const union {
+        long one;
+        char little;
+    } is_endian = { 1 };
+    unsigned int n, ctr;
+    size_t i;
+    u64 mlen = ctx->len.u[1];
+    void *key = ctx->key;
+# ifdef GCM_FUNCREF_4BIT
+    void (*gcm_gmult_p) (u64 Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16]) = ctx->gmult;
+#  ifdef GHASH
+    void (*gcm_ghash_p) (u64 Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16],
+                         const u8 *inp, size_t len) = ctx->ghash;
+#  endif
+# endif
+
+    mlen += len;
+    if (mlen > ((U64(1) << 36) - 32) || (sizeof(len) == 8 && mlen < len))
+        return -1;
+    ctx->len.u[1] = mlen;
+
+    if (ctx->ares) {
+        /* First call to decrypt finalizes GHASH(AAD) */
+        GCM_MUL(ctx, Xi);
+        ctx->ares = 0;
+    }
+
+    if (is_endian.little)
+# ifdef BSWAP4
+        ctr = BSWAP4(ctx->Yi.d[3]);
+# else
+        ctr = GETU32(ctx->Yi.c + 12);
+# endif
+    else
+        ctr = ctx->Yi.d[3];
+
+    n = ctx->mres;
+    if (n) {
+        while (n && len) {
+            u8 c = *(in++);
+            *(out++) = c ^ ctx->EKi.c[n];
+            ctx->Xi.c[n] ^= c;
+            --len;
+            n = (n + 1) % 16;
+        }
+        if (n == 0)
+            GCM_MUL(ctx, Xi);
+        else {
+            ctx->mres = n;
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+# if defined(GHASH) && defined(GHASH_CHUNK)
+    while (len >= GHASH_CHUNK) {
+        GHASH(ctx, in, GHASH_CHUNK);
+        (*stream) (in, out, GHASH_CHUNK / 16, key, ctx->Yi.c);
+        ctr += GHASH_CHUNK / 16;
+        if (is_endian.little)
+#  ifdef BSWAP4
+            ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr);
+#  else
+            PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c + 12, ctr);
+#  endif
+        else
+            ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
+        out += GHASH_CHUNK;
+        in += GHASH_CHUNK;
+        len -= GHASH_CHUNK;
+    }
+# endif
+    if ((i = (len & (size_t)-16))) {
+        size_t j = i / 16;
+
+# if defined(GHASH)
+        GHASH(ctx, in, i);
+# else
+        while (j--) {
+            size_t k;
+            for (k = 0; k < 16; ++k)
+                ctx->Xi.c[k] ^= in[k];
+            GCM_MUL(ctx, Xi);
+            in += 16;
+        }
+        j = i / 16;
+        in -= i;
+# endif
+        (*stream) (in, out, j, key, ctx->Yi.c);
+        ctr += (unsigned int)j;
+        if (is_endian.little)
+# ifdef BSWAP4
+            ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr);
+# else
+            PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c + 12, ctr);
+# endif
+        else
+            ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
+        out += i;
+        in += i;
+        len -= i;
+    }
+    if (len) {
+        (*ctx->block) (ctx->Yi.c, ctx->EKi.c, key);
+        ++ctr;
+        if (is_endian.little)
+# ifdef BSWAP4
+            ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr);
+# else
+            PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c + 12, ctr);
+# endif
+        else
+            ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
+        while (len--) {
+            u8 c = in[n];
+            ctx->Xi.c[n] ^= c;
+            out[n] = c ^ ctx->EKi.c[n];
+            ++n;
+        }
+    }
+
+    ctx->mres = n;
+    return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+int CRYPTO_gcm128_finish(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx, const unsigned char *tag,
+                         size_t len)
+{
+    const union {
+        long one;
+        char little;
+    } is_endian = { 1 };
+    u64 alen = ctx->len.u[0] << 3;
+    u64 clen = ctx->len.u[1] << 3;
+#ifdef GCM_FUNCREF_4BIT
+    void (*gcm_gmult_p) (u64 Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16]) = ctx->gmult;
+#endif
+
+    if (ctx->mres || ctx->ares)
+        GCM_MUL(ctx, Xi);
+
+    if (is_endian.little) {
+#ifdef BSWAP8
+        alen = BSWAP8(alen);
+        clen = BSWAP8(clen);
+#else
+        u8 *p = ctx->len.c;
+
+        ctx->len.u[0] = alen;
+        ctx->len.u[1] = clen;
+
+        alen = (u64)GETU32(p) << 32 | GETU32(p + 4);
+        clen = (u64)GETU32(p + 8) << 32 | GETU32(p + 12);
+#endif
+    }
+
+    ctx->Xi.u[0] ^= alen;
+    ctx->Xi.u[1] ^= clen;
+    GCM_MUL(ctx, Xi);
+
+    ctx->Xi.u[0] ^= ctx->EK0.u[0];
+    ctx->Xi.u[1] ^= ctx->EK0.u[1];
+
+    if (tag && len <= sizeof(ctx->Xi))
+        return CRYPTO_memcmp(ctx->Xi.c, tag, len);
+    else
+        return -1;
+}
+
+void CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx, unsigned char *tag, size_t len)
+{
+    CRYPTO_gcm128_finish(ctx, NULL, 0);
+    memcpy(tag, ctx->Xi.c,
+           len <= sizeof(ctx->Xi.c) ? len : sizeof(ctx->Xi.c));
+}
+
+GCM128_CONTEXT *CRYPTO_gcm128_new(void *key, block128_f block)
+{
+    GCM128_CONTEXT *ret;
+
+    if ((ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ret))) != NULL)
+        CRYPTO_gcm128_init(ret, key, block);
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+void CRYPTO_gcm128_release(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx)
+{
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx, sizeof(*ctx));
+}
+
+#if defined(SELFTEST)
+# include <stdio.h>
+# include <openssl/aes.h>
+
+/* Test Case 1 */
+static const u8 K1[16], *P1 = NULL, *A1 = NULL, IV1[12], *C1 = NULL;
+static const u8 T1[] = {
+    0x58, 0xe2, 0xfc, 0xce, 0xfa, 0x7e, 0x30, 0x61,
+    0x36, 0x7f, 0x1d, 0x57, 0xa4, 0xe7, 0x45, 0x5a
+};
+
+/* Test Case 2 */
+# define K2 K1
+# define A2 A1
+# define IV2 IV1
+static const u8 P2[16];
+static const u8 C2[] = {
+    0x03, 0x88, 0xda, 0xce, 0x60, 0xb6, 0xa3, 0x92,
+    0xf3, 0x28, 0xc2, 0xb9, 0x71, 0xb2, 0xfe, 0x78
+};
+
+static const u8 T2[] = {
+    0xab, 0x6e, 0x47, 0xd4, 0x2c, 0xec, 0x13, 0xbd,
+    0xf5, 0x3a, 0x67, 0xb2, 0x12, 0x57, 0xbd, 0xdf
+};
+
+/* Test Case 3 */
+# define A3 A2
+static const u8 K3[] = {
+    0xfe, 0xff, 0xe9, 0x92, 0x86, 0x65, 0x73, 0x1c,
+    0x6d, 0x6a, 0x8f, 0x94, 0x67, 0x30, 0x83, 0x08
+};
+
+static const u8 P3[] = {
+    0xd9, 0x31, 0x32, 0x25, 0xf8, 0x84, 0x06, 0xe5,
+    0xa5, 0x59, 0x09, 0xc5, 0xaf, 0xf5, 0x26, 0x9a,
+    0x86, 0xa7, 0xa9, 0x53, 0x15, 0x34, 0xf7, 0xda,
+    0x2e, 0x4c, 0x30, 0x3d, 0x8a, 0x31, 0x8a, 0x72,
+    0x1c, 0x3c, 0x0c, 0x95, 0x95, 0x68, 0x09, 0x53,
+    0x2f, 0xcf, 0x0e, 0x24, 0x49, 0xa6, 0xb5, 0x25,
+    0xb1, 0x6a, 0xed, 0xf5, 0xaa, 0x0d, 0xe6, 0x57,
+    0xba, 0x63, 0x7b, 0x39, 0x1a, 0xaf, 0xd2, 0x55
+};
+
+static const u8 IV3[] = {
+    0xca, 0xfe, 0xba, 0xbe, 0xfa, 0xce, 0xdb, 0xad,
+    0xde, 0xca, 0xf8, 0x88
+};
+
+static const u8 C3[] = {
+    0x42, 0x83, 0x1e, 0xc2, 0x21, 0x77, 0x74, 0x24,
+    0x4b, 0x72, 0x21, 0xb7, 0x84, 0xd0, 0xd4, 0x9c,
+    0xe3, 0xaa, 0x21, 0x2f, 0x2c, 0x02, 0xa4, 0xe0,
+    0x35, 0xc1, 0x7e, 0x23, 0x29, 0xac, 0xa1, 0x2e,
+    0x21, 0xd5, 0x14, 0xb2, 0x54, 0x66, 0x93, 0x1c,
+    0x7d, 0x8f, 0x6a, 0x5a, 0xac, 0x84, 0xaa, 0x05,
+    0x1b, 0xa3, 0x0b, 0x39, 0x6a, 0x0a, 0xac, 0x97,
+    0x3d, 0x58, 0xe0, 0x91, 0x47, 0x3f, 0x59, 0x85
+};
+
+static const u8 T3[] = {
+    0x4d, 0x5c, 0x2a, 0xf3, 0x27, 0xcd, 0x64, 0xa6,
+    0x2c, 0xf3, 0x5a, 0xbd, 0x2b, 0xa6, 0xfa, 0xb4
+};
+
+/* Test Case 4 */
+# define K4 K3
+# define IV4 IV3
+static const u8 P4[] = {
+    0xd9, 0x31, 0x32, 0x25, 0xf8, 0x84, 0x06, 0xe5,
+    0xa5, 0x59, 0x09, 0xc5, 0xaf, 0xf5, 0x26, 0x9a,
+    0x86, 0xa7, 0xa9, 0x53, 0x15, 0x34, 0xf7, 0xda,
+    0x2e, 0x4c, 0x30, 0x3d, 0x8a, 0x31, 0x8a, 0x72,
+    0x1c, 0x3c, 0x0c, 0x95, 0x95, 0x68, 0x09, 0x53,
+    0x2f, 0xcf, 0x0e, 0x24, 0x49, 0xa6, 0xb5, 0x25,
+    0xb1, 0x6a, 0xed, 0xf5, 0xaa, 0x0d, 0xe6, 0x57,
+    0xba, 0x63, 0x7b, 0x39
+};
+
+static const u8 A4[] = {
+    0xfe, 0xed, 0xfa, 0xce, 0xde, 0xad, 0xbe, 0xef,
+    0xfe, 0xed, 0xfa, 0xce, 0xde, 0xad, 0xbe, 0xef,
+    0xab, 0xad, 0xda, 0xd2
+};
+
+static const u8 C4[] = {
+    0x42, 0x83, 0x1e, 0xc2, 0x21, 0x77, 0x74, 0x24,
+    0x4b, 0x72, 0x21, 0xb7, 0x84, 0xd0, 0xd4, 0x9c,
+    0xe3, 0xaa, 0x21, 0x2f, 0x2c, 0x02, 0xa4, 0xe0,
+    0x35, 0xc1, 0x7e, 0x23, 0x29, 0xac, 0xa1, 0x2e,
+    0x21, 0xd5, 0x14, 0xb2, 0x54, 0x66, 0x93, 0x1c,
+    0x7d, 0x8f, 0x6a, 0x5a, 0xac, 0x84, 0xaa, 0x05,
+    0x1b, 0xa3, 0x0b, 0x39, 0x6a, 0x0a, 0xac, 0x97,
+    0x3d, 0x58, 0xe0, 0x91
+};
+
+static const u8 T4[] = {
+    0x5b, 0xc9, 0x4f, 0xbc, 0x32, 0x21, 0xa5, 0xdb,
+    0x94, 0xfa, 0xe9, 0x5a, 0xe7, 0x12, 0x1a, 0x47
+};
+
+/* Test Case 5 */
+# define K5 K4
+# define P5 P4
+# define A5 A4
+static const u8 IV5[] = {
+    0xca, 0xfe, 0xba, 0xbe, 0xfa, 0xce, 0xdb, 0xad
+};
+
+static const u8 C5[] = {
+    0x61, 0x35, 0x3b, 0x4c, 0x28, 0x06, 0x93, 0x4a,
+    0x77, 0x7f, 0xf5, 0x1f, 0xa2, 0x2a, 0x47, 0x55,
+    0x69, 0x9b, 0x2a, 0x71, 0x4f, 0xcd, 0xc6, 0xf8,
+    0x37, 0x66, 0xe5, 0xf9, 0x7b, 0x6c, 0x74, 0x23,
+    0x73, 0x80, 0x69, 0x00, 0xe4, 0x9f, 0x24, 0xb2,
+    0x2b, 0x09, 0x75, 0x44, 0xd4, 0x89, 0x6b, 0x42,
+    0x49, 0x89, 0xb5, 0xe1, 0xeb, 0xac, 0x0f, 0x07,
+    0xc2, 0x3f, 0x45, 0x98
+};
+
+static const u8 T5[] = {
+    0x36, 0x12, 0xd2, 0xe7, 0x9e, 0x3b, 0x07, 0x85,
+    0x56, 0x1b, 0xe1, 0x4a, 0xac, 0xa2, 0xfc, 0xcb
+};
+
+/* Test Case 6 */
+# define K6 K5
+# define P6 P5
+# define A6 A5
+static const u8 IV6[] = {
+    0x93, 0x13, 0x22, 0x5d, 0xf8, 0x84, 0x06, 0xe5,
+    0x55, 0x90, 0x9c, 0x5a, 0xff, 0x52, 0x69, 0xaa,
+    0x6a, 0x7a, 0x95, 0x38, 0x53, 0x4f, 0x7d, 0xa1,
+    0xe4, 0xc3, 0x03, 0xd2, 0xa3, 0x18, 0xa7, 0x28,
+    0xc3, 0xc0, 0xc9, 0x51, 0x56, 0x80, 0x95, 0x39,
+    0xfc, 0xf0, 0xe2, 0x42, 0x9a, 0x6b, 0x52, 0x54,
+    0x16, 0xae, 0xdb, 0xf5, 0xa0, 0xde, 0x6a, 0x57,
+    0xa6, 0x37, 0xb3, 0x9b
+};
+
+static const u8 C6[] = {
+    0x8c, 0xe2, 0x49, 0x98, 0x62, 0x56, 0x15, 0xb6,
+    0x03, 0xa0, 0x33, 0xac, 0xa1, 0x3f, 0xb8, 0x94,
+    0xbe, 0x91, 0x12, 0xa5, 0xc3, 0xa2, 0x11, 0xa8,
+    0xba, 0x26, 0x2a, 0x3c, 0xca, 0x7e, 0x2c, 0xa7,
+    0x01, 0xe4, 0xa9, 0xa4, 0xfb, 0xa4, 0x3c, 0x90,
+    0xcc, 0xdc, 0xb2, 0x81, 0xd4, 0x8c, 0x7c, 0x6f,
+    0xd6, 0x28, 0x75, 0xd2, 0xac, 0xa4, 0x17, 0x03,
+    0x4c, 0x34, 0xae, 0xe5
+};
+
+static const u8 T6[] = {
+    0x61, 0x9c, 0xc5, 0xae, 0xff, 0xfe, 0x0b, 0xfa,
+    0x46, 0x2a, 0xf4, 0x3c, 0x16, 0x99, 0xd0, 0x50
+};
+
+/* Test Case 7 */
+static const u8 K7[24], *P7 = NULL, *A7 = NULL, IV7[12], *C7 = NULL;
+static const u8 T7[] = {
+    0xcd, 0x33, 0xb2, 0x8a, 0xc7, 0x73, 0xf7, 0x4b,
+    0xa0, 0x0e, 0xd1, 0xf3, 0x12, 0x57, 0x24, 0x35
+};
+
+/* Test Case 8 */
+# define K8 K7
+# define IV8 IV7
+# define A8 A7
+static const u8 P8[16];
+static const u8 C8[] = {
+    0x98, 0xe7, 0x24, 0x7c, 0x07, 0xf0, 0xfe, 0x41,
+    0x1c, 0x26, 0x7e, 0x43, 0x84, 0xb0, 0xf6, 0x00
+};
+
+static const u8 T8[] = {
+    0x2f, 0xf5, 0x8d, 0x80, 0x03, 0x39, 0x27, 0xab,
+    0x8e, 0xf4, 0xd4, 0x58, 0x75, 0x14, 0xf0, 0xfb
+};
+
+/* Test Case 9 */
+# define A9 A8
+static const u8 K9[] = {
+    0xfe, 0xff, 0xe9, 0x92, 0x86, 0x65, 0x73, 0x1c,
+    0x6d, 0x6a, 0x8f, 0x94, 0x67, 0x30, 0x83, 0x08,
+    0xfe, 0xff, 0xe9, 0x92, 0x86, 0x65, 0x73, 0x1c
+};
+
+static const u8 P9[] = {
+    0xd9, 0x31, 0x32, 0x25, 0xf8, 0x84, 0x06, 0xe5,
+    0xa5, 0x59, 0x09, 0xc5, 0xaf, 0xf5, 0x26, 0x9a,
+    0x86, 0xa7, 0xa9, 0x53, 0x15, 0x34, 0xf7, 0xda,
+    0x2e, 0x4c, 0x30, 0x3d, 0x8a, 0x31, 0x8a, 0x72,
+    0x1c, 0x3c, 0x0c, 0x95, 0x95, 0x68, 0x09, 0x53,
+    0x2f, 0xcf, 0x0e, 0x24, 0x49, 0xa6, 0xb5, 0x25,
+    0xb1, 0x6a, 0xed, 0xf5, 0xaa, 0x0d, 0xe6, 0x57,
+    0xba, 0x63, 0x7b, 0x39, 0x1a, 0xaf, 0xd2, 0x55
+};
+
+static const u8 IV9[] = {
+    0xca, 0xfe, 0xba, 0xbe, 0xfa, 0xce, 0xdb, 0xad,
+    0xde, 0xca, 0xf8, 0x88
+};
+
+static const u8 C9[] = {
+    0x39, 0x80, 0xca, 0x0b, 0x3c, 0x00, 0xe8, 0x41,
+    0xeb, 0x06, 0xfa, 0xc4, 0x87, 0x2a, 0x27, 0x57,
+    0x85, 0x9e, 0x1c, 0xea, 0xa6, 0xef, 0xd9, 0x84,
+    0x62, 0x85, 0x93, 0xb4, 0x0c, 0xa1, 0xe1, 0x9c,
+    0x7d, 0x77, 0x3d, 0x00, 0xc1, 0x44, 0xc5, 0x25,
+    0xac, 0x61, 0x9d, 0x18, 0xc8, 0x4a, 0x3f, 0x47,
+    0x18, 0xe2, 0x44, 0x8b, 0x2f, 0xe3, 0x24, 0xd9,
+    0xcc, 0xda, 0x27, 0x10, 0xac, 0xad, 0xe2, 0x56
+};
+
+static const u8 T9[] = {
+    0x99, 0x24, 0xa7, 0xc8, 0x58, 0x73, 0x36, 0xbf,
+    0xb1, 0x18, 0x02, 0x4d, 0xb8, 0x67, 0x4a, 0x14
+};
+
+/* Test Case 10 */
+# define K10 K9
+# define IV10 IV9
+static const u8 P10[] = {
+    0xd9, 0x31, 0x32, 0x25, 0xf8, 0x84, 0x06, 0xe5,
+    0xa5, 0x59, 0x09, 0xc5, 0xaf, 0xf5, 0x26, 0x9a,
+    0x86, 0xa7, 0xa9, 0x53, 0x15, 0x34, 0xf7, 0xda,
+    0x2e, 0x4c, 0x30, 0x3d, 0x8a, 0x31, 0x8a, 0x72,
+    0x1c, 0x3c, 0x0c, 0x95, 0x95, 0x68, 0x09, 0x53,
+    0x2f, 0xcf, 0x0e, 0x24, 0x49, 0xa6, 0xb5, 0x25,
+    0xb1, 0x6a, 0xed, 0xf5, 0xaa, 0x0d, 0xe6, 0x57,
+    0xba, 0x63, 0x7b, 0x39
+};
+
+static const u8 A10[] = {
+    0xfe, 0xed, 0xfa, 0xce, 0xde, 0xad, 0xbe, 0xef,
+    0xfe, 0xed, 0xfa, 0xce, 0xde, 0xad, 0xbe, 0xef,
+    0xab, 0xad, 0xda, 0xd2
+};
+
+static const u8 C10[] = {
+    0x39, 0x80, 0xca, 0x0b, 0x3c, 0x00, 0xe8, 0x41,
+    0xeb, 0x06, 0xfa, 0xc4, 0x87, 0x2a, 0x27, 0x57,
+    0x85, 0x9e, 0x1c, 0xea, 0xa6, 0xef, 0xd9, 0x84,
+    0x62, 0x85, 0x93, 0xb4, 0x0c, 0xa1, 0xe1, 0x9c,
+    0x7d, 0x77, 0x3d, 0x00, 0xc1, 0x44, 0xc5, 0x25,
+    0xac, 0x61, 0x9d, 0x18, 0xc8, 0x4a, 0x3f, 0x47,
+    0x18, 0xe2, 0x44, 0x8b, 0x2f, 0xe3, 0x24, 0xd9,
+    0xcc, 0xda, 0x27, 0x10
+};
+
+static const u8 T10[] = {
+    0x25, 0x19, 0x49, 0x8e, 0x80, 0xf1, 0x47, 0x8f,
+    0x37, 0xba, 0x55, 0xbd, 0x6d, 0x27, 0x61, 0x8c
+};
+
+/* Test Case 11 */
+# define K11 K10
+# define P11 P10
+# define A11 A10
+static const u8 IV11[] = { 0xca, 0xfe, 0xba, 0xbe, 0xfa, 0xce, 0xdb, 0xad };
+
+static const u8 C11[] = {
+    0x0f, 0x10, 0xf5, 0x99, 0xae, 0x14, 0xa1, 0x54,
+    0xed, 0x24, 0xb3, 0x6e, 0x25, 0x32, 0x4d, 0xb8,
+    0xc5, 0x66, 0x63, 0x2e, 0xf2, 0xbb, 0xb3, 0x4f,
+    0x83, 0x47, 0x28, 0x0f, 0xc4, 0x50, 0x70, 0x57,
+    0xfd, 0xdc, 0x29, 0xdf, 0x9a, 0x47, 0x1f, 0x75,
+    0xc6, 0x65, 0x41, 0xd4, 0xd4, 0xda, 0xd1, 0xc9,
+    0xe9, 0x3a, 0x19, 0xa5, 0x8e, 0x8b, 0x47, 0x3f,
+    0xa0, 0xf0, 0x62, 0xf7
+};
+
+static const u8 T11[] = {
+    0x65, 0xdc, 0xc5, 0x7f, 0xcf, 0x62, 0x3a, 0x24,
+    0x09, 0x4f, 0xcc, 0xa4, 0x0d, 0x35, 0x33, 0xf8
+};
+
+/* Test Case 12 */
+# define K12 K11
+# define P12 P11
+# define A12 A11
+static const u8 IV12[] = {
+    0x93, 0x13, 0x22, 0x5d, 0xf8, 0x84, 0x06, 0xe5,
+    0x55, 0x90, 0x9c, 0x5a, 0xff, 0x52, 0x69, 0xaa,
+    0x6a, 0x7a, 0x95, 0x38, 0x53, 0x4f, 0x7d, 0xa1,
+    0xe4, 0xc3, 0x03, 0xd2, 0xa3, 0x18, 0xa7, 0x28,
+    0xc3, 0xc0, 0xc9, 0x51, 0x56, 0x80, 0x95, 0x39,
+    0xfc, 0xf0, 0xe2, 0x42, 0x9a, 0x6b, 0x52, 0x54,
+    0x16, 0xae, 0xdb, 0xf5, 0xa0, 0xde, 0x6a, 0x57,
+    0xa6, 0x37, 0xb3, 0x9b
+};
+
+static const u8 C12[] = {
+    0xd2, 0x7e, 0x88, 0x68, 0x1c, 0xe3, 0x24, 0x3c,
+    0x48, 0x30, 0x16, 0x5a, 0x8f, 0xdc, 0xf9, 0xff,
+    0x1d, 0xe9, 0xa1, 0xd8, 0xe6, 0xb4, 0x47, 0xef,
+    0x6e, 0xf7, 0xb7, 0x98, 0x28, 0x66, 0x6e, 0x45,
+    0x81, 0xe7, 0x90, 0x12, 0xaf, 0x34, 0xdd, 0xd9,
+    0xe2, 0xf0, 0x37, 0x58, 0x9b, 0x29, 0x2d, 0xb3,
+    0xe6, 0x7c, 0x03, 0x67, 0x45, 0xfa, 0x22, 0xe7,
+    0xe9, 0xb7, 0x37, 0x3b
+};
+
+static const u8 T12[] = {
+    0xdc, 0xf5, 0x66, 0xff, 0x29, 0x1c, 0x25, 0xbb,
+    0xb8, 0x56, 0x8f, 0xc3, 0xd3, 0x76, 0xa6, 0xd9
+};
+
+/* Test Case 13 */
+static const u8 K13[32], *P13 = NULL, *A13 = NULL, IV13[12], *C13 = NULL;
+static const u8 T13[] = {
+    0x53, 0x0f, 0x8a, 0xfb, 0xc7, 0x45, 0x36, 0xb9,
+    0xa9, 0x63, 0xb4, 0xf1, 0xc4, 0xcb, 0x73, 0x8b
+};
+
+/* Test Case 14 */
+# define K14 K13
+# define A14 A13
+static const u8 P14[16], IV14[12];
+static const u8 C14[] = {
+    0xce, 0xa7, 0x40, 0x3d, 0x4d, 0x60, 0x6b, 0x6e,
+    0x07, 0x4e, 0xc5, 0xd3, 0xba, 0xf3, 0x9d, 0x18
+};
+
+static const u8 T14[] = {
+    0xd0, 0xd1, 0xc8, 0xa7, 0x99, 0x99, 0x6b, 0xf0,
+    0x26, 0x5b, 0x98, 0xb5, 0xd4, 0x8a, 0xb9, 0x19
+};
+
+/* Test Case 15 */
+# define A15 A14
+static const u8 K15[] = {
+    0xfe, 0xff, 0xe9, 0x92, 0x86, 0x65, 0x73, 0x1c,
+    0x6d, 0x6a, 0x8f, 0x94, 0x67, 0x30, 0x83, 0x08,
+    0xfe, 0xff, 0xe9, 0x92, 0x86, 0x65, 0x73, 0x1c,
+    0x6d, 0x6a, 0x8f, 0x94, 0x67, 0x30, 0x83, 0x08
+};
+
+static const u8 P15[] = {
+    0xd9, 0x31, 0x32, 0x25, 0xf8, 0x84, 0x06, 0xe5,
+    0xa5, 0x59, 0x09, 0xc5, 0xaf, 0xf5, 0x26, 0x9a,
+    0x86, 0xa7, 0xa9, 0x53, 0x15, 0x34, 0xf7, 0xda,
+    0x2e, 0x4c, 0x30, 0x3d, 0x8a, 0x31, 0x8a, 0x72,
+    0x1c, 0x3c, 0x0c, 0x95, 0x95, 0x68, 0x09, 0x53,
+    0x2f, 0xcf, 0x0e, 0x24, 0x49, 0xa6, 0xb5, 0x25,
+    0xb1, 0x6a, 0xed, 0xf5, 0xaa, 0x0d, 0xe6, 0x57,
+    0xba, 0x63, 0x7b, 0x39, 0x1a, 0xaf, 0xd2, 0x55
+};
+
+static const u8 IV15[] = {
+    0xca, 0xfe, 0xba, 0xbe, 0xfa, 0xce, 0xdb, 0xad,
+    0xde, 0xca, 0xf8, 0x88
+};
+
+static const u8 C15[] = {
+    0x52, 0x2d, 0xc1, 0xf0, 0x99, 0x56, 0x7d, 0x07,
+    0xf4, 0x7f, 0x37, 0xa3, 0x2a, 0x84, 0x42, 0x7d,
+    0x64, 0x3a, 0x8c, 0xdc, 0xbf, 0xe5, 0xc0, 0xc9,
+    0x75, 0x98, 0xa2, 0xbd, 0x25, 0x55, 0xd1, 0xaa,
+    0x8c, 0xb0, 0x8e, 0x48, 0x59, 0x0d, 0xbb, 0x3d,
+    0xa7, 0xb0, 0x8b, 0x10, 0x56, 0x82, 0x88, 0x38,
+    0xc5, 0xf6, 0x1e, 0x63, 0x93, 0xba, 0x7a, 0x0a,
+    0xbc, 0xc9, 0xf6, 0x62, 0x89, 0x80, 0x15, 0xad
+};
+
+static const u8 T15[] = {
+    0xb0, 0x94, 0xda, 0xc5, 0xd9, 0x34, 0x71, 0xbd,
+    0xec, 0x1a, 0x50, 0x22, 0x70, 0xe3, 0xcc, 0x6c
+};
+
+/* Test Case 16 */
+# define K16 K15
+# define IV16 IV15
+static const u8 P16[] = {
+    0xd9, 0x31, 0x32, 0x25, 0xf8, 0x84, 0x06, 0xe5,
+    0xa5, 0x59, 0x09, 0xc5, 0xaf, 0xf5, 0x26, 0x9a,
+    0x86, 0xa7, 0xa9, 0x53, 0x15, 0x34, 0xf7, 0xda,
+    0x2e, 0x4c, 0x30, 0x3d, 0x8a, 0x31, 0x8a, 0x72,
+    0x1c, 0x3c, 0x0c, 0x95, 0x95, 0x68, 0x09, 0x53,
+    0x2f, 0xcf, 0x0e, 0x24, 0x49, 0xa6, 0xb5, 0x25,
+    0xb1, 0x6a, 0xed, 0xf5, 0xaa, 0x0d, 0xe6, 0x57,
+    0xba, 0x63, 0x7b, 0x39
+};
+
+static const u8 A16[] = {
+    0xfe, 0xed, 0xfa, 0xce, 0xde, 0xad, 0xbe, 0xef,
+    0xfe, 0xed, 0xfa, 0xce, 0xde, 0xad, 0xbe, 0xef,
+    0xab, 0xad, 0xda, 0xd2
+};
+
+static const u8 C16[] = {
+    0x52, 0x2d, 0xc1, 0xf0, 0x99, 0x56, 0x7d, 0x07,
+    0xf4, 0x7f, 0x37, 0xa3, 0x2a, 0x84, 0x42, 0x7d,
+    0x64, 0x3a, 0x8c, 0xdc, 0xbf, 0xe5, 0xc0, 0xc9,
+    0x75, 0x98, 0xa2, 0xbd, 0x25, 0x55, 0xd1, 0xaa,
+    0x8c, 0xb0, 0x8e, 0x48, 0x59, 0x0d, 0xbb, 0x3d,
+    0xa7, 0xb0, 0x8b, 0x10, 0x56, 0x82, 0x88, 0x38,
+    0xc5, 0xf6, 0x1e, 0x63, 0x93, 0xba, 0x7a, 0x0a,
+    0xbc, 0xc9, 0xf6, 0x62
+};
+
+static const u8 T16[] = {
+    0x76, 0xfc, 0x6e, 0xce, 0x0f, 0x4e, 0x17, 0x68,
+    0xcd, 0xdf, 0x88, 0x53, 0xbb, 0x2d, 0x55, 0x1b
+};
+
+/* Test Case 17 */
+# define K17 K16
+# define P17 P16
+# define A17 A16
+static const u8 IV17[] = { 0xca, 0xfe, 0xba, 0xbe, 0xfa, 0xce, 0xdb, 0xad };
+
+static const u8 C17[] = {
+    0xc3, 0x76, 0x2d, 0xf1, 0xca, 0x78, 0x7d, 0x32,
+    0xae, 0x47, 0xc1, 0x3b, 0xf1, 0x98, 0x44, 0xcb,
+    0xaf, 0x1a, 0xe1, 0x4d, 0x0b, 0x97, 0x6a, 0xfa,
+    0xc5, 0x2f, 0xf7, 0xd7, 0x9b, 0xba, 0x9d, 0xe0,
+    0xfe, 0xb5, 0x82, 0xd3, 0x39, 0x34, 0xa4, 0xf0,
+    0x95, 0x4c, 0xc2, 0x36, 0x3b, 0xc7, 0x3f, 0x78,
+    0x62, 0xac, 0x43, 0x0e, 0x64, 0xab, 0xe4, 0x99,
+    0xf4, 0x7c, 0x9b, 0x1f
+};
+
+static const u8 T17[] = {
+    0x3a, 0x33, 0x7d, 0xbf, 0x46, 0xa7, 0x92, 0xc4,
+    0x5e, 0x45, 0x49, 0x13, 0xfe, 0x2e, 0xa8, 0xf2
+};
+
+/* Test Case 18 */
+# define K18 K17
+# define P18 P17
+# define A18 A17
+static const u8 IV18[] = {
+    0x93, 0x13, 0x22, 0x5d, 0xf8, 0x84, 0x06, 0xe5,
+    0x55, 0x90, 0x9c, 0x5a, 0xff, 0x52, 0x69, 0xaa,
+    0x6a, 0x7a, 0x95, 0x38, 0x53, 0x4f, 0x7d, 0xa1,
+    0xe4, 0xc3, 0x03, 0xd2, 0xa3, 0x18, 0xa7, 0x28,
+    0xc3, 0xc0, 0xc9, 0x51, 0x56, 0x80, 0x95, 0x39,
+    0xfc, 0xf0, 0xe2, 0x42, 0x9a, 0x6b, 0x52, 0x54,
+    0x16, 0xae, 0xdb, 0xf5, 0xa0, 0xde, 0x6a, 0x57,
+    0xa6, 0x37, 0xb3, 0x9b
+};
+
+static const u8 C18[] = {
+    0x5a, 0x8d, 0xef, 0x2f, 0x0c, 0x9e, 0x53, 0xf1,
+    0xf7, 0x5d, 0x78, 0x53, 0x65, 0x9e, 0x2a, 0x20,
+    0xee, 0xb2, 0xb2, 0x2a, 0xaf, 0xde, 0x64, 0x19,
+    0xa0, 0x58, 0xab, 0x4f, 0x6f, 0x74, 0x6b, 0xf4,
+    0x0f, 0xc0, 0xc3, 0xb7, 0x80, 0xf2, 0x44, 0x45,
+    0x2d, 0xa3, 0xeb, 0xf1, 0xc5, 0xd8, 0x2c, 0xde,
+    0xa2, 0x41, 0x89, 0x97, 0x20, 0x0e, 0xf8, 0x2e,
+    0x44, 0xae, 0x7e, 0x3f
+};
+
+static const u8 T18[] = {
+    0xa4, 0x4a, 0x82, 0x66, 0xee, 0x1c, 0x8e, 0xb0,
+    0xc8, 0xb5, 0xd4, 0xcf, 0x5a, 0xe9, 0xf1, 0x9a
+};
+
+/* Test Case 19 */
+# define K19 K1
+# define P19 P1
+# define IV19 IV1
+# define C19 C1
+static const u8 A19[] = {
+    0xd9, 0x31, 0x32, 0x25, 0xf8, 0x84, 0x06, 0xe5,
+    0xa5, 0x59, 0x09, 0xc5, 0xaf, 0xf5, 0x26, 0x9a,
+    0x86, 0xa7, 0xa9, 0x53, 0x15, 0x34, 0xf7, 0xda,
+    0x2e, 0x4c, 0x30, 0x3d, 0x8a, 0x31, 0x8a, 0x72,
+    0x1c, 0x3c, 0x0c, 0x95, 0x95, 0x68, 0x09, 0x53,
+    0x2f, 0xcf, 0x0e, 0x24, 0x49, 0xa6, 0xb5, 0x25,
+    0xb1, 0x6a, 0xed, 0xf5, 0xaa, 0x0d, 0xe6, 0x57,
+    0xba, 0x63, 0x7b, 0x39, 0x1a, 0xaf, 0xd2, 0x55,
+    0x52, 0x2d, 0xc1, 0xf0, 0x99, 0x56, 0x7d, 0x07,
+    0xf4, 0x7f, 0x37, 0xa3, 0x2a, 0x84, 0x42, 0x7d,
+    0x64, 0x3a, 0x8c, 0xdc, 0xbf, 0xe5, 0xc0, 0xc9,
+    0x75, 0x98, 0xa2, 0xbd, 0x25, 0x55, 0xd1, 0xaa,
+    0x8c, 0xb0, 0x8e, 0x48, 0x59, 0x0d, 0xbb, 0x3d,
+    0xa7, 0xb0, 0x8b, 0x10, 0x56, 0x82, 0x88, 0x38,
+    0xc5, 0xf6, 0x1e, 0x63, 0x93, 0xba, 0x7a, 0x0a,
+    0xbc, 0xc9, 0xf6, 0x62, 0x89, 0x80, 0x15, 0xad
+};
+
+static const u8 T19[] = {
+    0x5f, 0xea, 0x79, 0x3a, 0x2d, 0x6f, 0x97, 0x4d,
+    0x37, 0xe6, 0x8e, 0x0c, 0xb8, 0xff, 0x94, 0x92
+};
+
+/* Test Case 20 */
+# define K20 K1
+# define A20 A1
+/* this results in 0xff in counter LSB */
+static const u8 IV20[64] = { 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff };
+
+static const u8 P20[288];
+static const u8 C20[] = {
+    0x56, 0xb3, 0x37, 0x3c, 0xa9, 0xef, 0x6e, 0x4a,
+    0x2b, 0x64, 0xfe, 0x1e, 0x9a, 0x17, 0xb6, 0x14,
+    0x25, 0xf1, 0x0d, 0x47, 0xa7, 0x5a, 0x5f, 0xce,
+    0x13, 0xef, 0xc6, 0xbc, 0x78, 0x4a, 0xf2, 0x4f,
+    0x41, 0x41, 0xbd, 0xd4, 0x8c, 0xf7, 0xc7, 0x70,
+    0x88, 0x7a, 0xfd, 0x57, 0x3c, 0xca, 0x54, 0x18,
+    0xa9, 0xae, 0xff, 0xcd, 0x7c, 0x5c, 0xed, 0xdf,
+    0xc6, 0xa7, 0x83, 0x97, 0xb9, 0xa8, 0x5b, 0x49,
+    0x9d, 0xa5, 0x58, 0x25, 0x72, 0x67, 0xca, 0xab,
+    0x2a, 0xd0, 0xb2, 0x3c, 0xa4, 0x76, 0xa5, 0x3c,
+    0xb1, 0x7f, 0xb4, 0x1c, 0x4b, 0x8b, 0x47, 0x5c,
+    0xb4, 0xf3, 0xf7, 0x16, 0x50, 0x94, 0xc2, 0x29,
+    0xc9, 0xe8, 0xc4, 0xdc, 0x0a, 0x2a, 0x5f, 0xf1,
+    0x90, 0x3e, 0x50, 0x15, 0x11, 0x22, 0x13, 0x76,
+    0xa1, 0xcd, 0xb8, 0x36, 0x4c, 0x50, 0x61, 0xa2,
+    0x0c, 0xae, 0x74, 0xbc, 0x4a, 0xcd, 0x76, 0xce,
+    0xb0, 0xab, 0xc9, 0xfd, 0x32, 0x17, 0xef, 0x9f,
+    0x8c, 0x90, 0xbe, 0x40, 0x2d, 0xdf, 0x6d, 0x86,
+    0x97, 0xf4, 0xf8, 0x80, 0xdf, 0xf1, 0x5b, 0xfb,
+    0x7a, 0x6b, 0x28, 0x24, 0x1e, 0xc8, 0xfe, 0x18,
+    0x3c, 0x2d, 0x59, 0xe3, 0xf9, 0xdf, 0xff, 0x65,
+    0x3c, 0x71, 0x26, 0xf0, 0xac, 0xb9, 0xe6, 0x42,
+    0x11, 0xf4, 0x2b, 0xae, 0x12, 0xaf, 0x46, 0x2b,
+    0x10, 0x70, 0xbe, 0xf1, 0xab, 0x5e, 0x36, 0x06,
+    0x87, 0x2c, 0xa1, 0x0d, 0xee, 0x15, 0xb3, 0x24,
+    0x9b, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x95, 0x8f, 0x23, 0x13, 0x4c,
+    0x4b, 0xcc, 0xb7, 0xd0, 0x32, 0x00, 0xbc, 0xe4,
+    0x20, 0xa2, 0xf8, 0xeb, 0x66, 0xdc, 0xf3, 0x64,
+    0x4d, 0x14, 0x23, 0xc1, 0xb5, 0x69, 0x90, 0x03,
+    0xc1, 0x3e, 0xce, 0xf4, 0xbf, 0x38, 0xa3, 0xb6,
+    0x0e, 0xed, 0xc3, 0x40, 0x33, 0xba, 0xc1, 0x90,
+    0x27, 0x83, 0xdc, 0x6d, 0x89, 0xe2, 0xe7, 0x74,
+    0x18, 0x8a, 0x43, 0x9c, 0x7e, 0xbc, 0xc0, 0x67,
+    0x2d, 0xbd, 0xa4, 0xdd, 0xcf, 0xb2, 0x79, 0x46,
+    0x13, 0xb0, 0xbe, 0x41, 0x31, 0x5e, 0xf7, 0x78,
+    0x70, 0x8a, 0x70, 0xee, 0x7d, 0x75, 0x16, 0x5c
+};
+
+static const u8 T20[] = {
+    0x8b, 0x30, 0x7f, 0x6b, 0x33, 0x28, 0x6d, 0x0a,
+    0xb0, 0x26, 0xa9, 0xed, 0x3f, 0xe1, 0xe8, 0x5f
+};
+
+# define TEST_CASE(n)    do {                                    \
+        u8 out[sizeof(P##n)];                                   \
+        AES_set_encrypt_key(K##n,sizeof(K##n)*8,&key);          \
+        CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&ctx,&key,(block128_f)AES_encrypt);  \
+        CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&ctx,IV##n,sizeof(IV##n));          \
+        memset(out,0,sizeof(out));                              \
+        if (A##n) CRYPTO_gcm128_aad(&ctx,A##n,sizeof(A##n));    \
+        if (P##n) CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(&ctx,P##n,out,sizeof(out));     \
+        if (CRYPTO_gcm128_finish(&ctx,T##n,16) ||               \
+            (C##n && memcmp(out,C##n,sizeof(out))))             \
+                ret++, printf ("encrypt test#%d failed.\n",n);  \
+        CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&ctx,IV##n,sizeof(IV##n));          \
+        memset(out,0,sizeof(out));                              \
+        if (A##n) CRYPTO_gcm128_aad(&ctx,A##n,sizeof(A##n));    \
+        if (C##n) CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(&ctx,C##n,out,sizeof(out));     \
+        if (CRYPTO_gcm128_finish(&ctx,T##n,16) ||               \
+            (P##n && memcmp(out,P##n,sizeof(out))))             \
+                ret++, printf ("decrypt test#%d failed.\n",n);  \
+        } while(0)
+
+int main()
+{
+    GCM128_CONTEXT ctx;
+    AES_KEY key;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    TEST_CASE(1);
+    TEST_CASE(2);
+    TEST_CASE(3);
+    TEST_CASE(4);
+    TEST_CASE(5);
+    TEST_CASE(6);
+    TEST_CASE(7);
+    TEST_CASE(8);
+    TEST_CASE(9);
+    TEST_CASE(10);
+    TEST_CASE(11);
+    TEST_CASE(12);
+    TEST_CASE(13);
+    TEST_CASE(14);
+    TEST_CASE(15);
+    TEST_CASE(16);
+    TEST_CASE(17);
+    TEST_CASE(18);
+    TEST_CASE(19);
+    TEST_CASE(20);
+
+# ifdef OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ
+    {
+        size_t start, stop, gcm_t, ctr_t, OPENSSL_rdtsc();
+        union {
+            u64 u;
+            u8 c[1024];
+        } buf;
+        int i;
+
+        AES_set_encrypt_key(K1, sizeof(K1) * 8, &key);
+        CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&ctx, &key, (block128_f) AES_encrypt);
+        CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&ctx, IV1, sizeof(IV1));
+
+        CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(&ctx, buf.c, buf.c, sizeof(buf));
+        start = OPENSSL_rdtsc();
+        CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(&ctx, buf.c, buf.c, sizeof(buf));
+        gcm_t = OPENSSL_rdtsc() - start;
+
+        CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt(buf.c, buf.c, sizeof(buf),
+                              &key, ctx.Yi.c, ctx.EKi.c, &ctx.mres,
+                              (block128_f) AES_encrypt);
+        start = OPENSSL_rdtsc();
+        CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt(buf.c, buf.c, sizeof(buf),
+                              &key, ctx.Yi.c, ctx.EKi.c, &ctx.mres,
+                              (block128_f) AES_encrypt);
+        ctr_t = OPENSSL_rdtsc() - start;
+
+        printf("%.2f-%.2f=%.2f\n",
+               gcm_t / (double)sizeof(buf),
+               ctr_t / (double)sizeof(buf),
+               (gcm_t - ctr_t) / (double)sizeof(buf));
+#  ifdef GHASH
+        {
+            void (*gcm_ghash_p) (u64 Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16],
+                                 const u8 *inp, size_t len) = ctx.ghash;
+
+            GHASH((&ctx), buf.c, sizeof(buf));
+            start = OPENSSL_rdtsc();
+            for (i = 0; i < 100; ++i)
+                GHASH((&ctx), buf.c, sizeof(buf));
+            gcm_t = OPENSSL_rdtsc() - start;
+            printf("%.2f\n", gcm_t / (double)sizeof(buf) / (double)i);
+        }
+#  endif
+    }
+# endif
+
+    return ret;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/modes/modes_lcl.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/modes/modes_lcl.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7a1603b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/modes/modes_lcl.h
@@ -0,0 +1,185 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2010-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/modes.h>
+
+#if (defined(_WIN32) || defined(_WIN64)) && !defined(__MINGW32__)
+typedef __int64 i64;
+typedef unsigned __int64 u64;
+# define U64(C) C##UI64
+#elif defined(__arch64__)
+typedef long i64;
+typedef unsigned long u64;
+# define U64(C) C##UL
+#else
+typedef long long i64;
+typedef unsigned long long u64;
+# define U64(C) C##ULL
+#endif
+
+typedef unsigned int u32;
+typedef unsigned char u8;
+
+#define STRICT_ALIGNMENT 1
+#ifndef PEDANTIC
+# if defined(__i386)    || defined(__i386__)    || \
+     defined(__x86_64)  || defined(__x86_64__)  || \
+     defined(_M_IX86)   || defined(_M_AMD64)    || defined(_M_X64) || \
+     defined(__aarch64__)                       || \
+     defined(__s390__)  || defined(__s390x__)
+#  undef STRICT_ALIGNMENT
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(PEDANTIC) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_INLINE_ASM)
+# if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2
+#  if defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__)
+#   define BSWAP8(x) ({ u64 ret_=(x);                   \
+                        asm ("bswapq %0"                \
+                        : "+r"(ret_));   ret_;          })
+#   define BSWAP4(x) ({ u32 ret_=(x);                   \
+                        asm ("bswapl %0"                \
+                        : "+r"(ret_));   ret_;          })
+#  elif (defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__)) && !defined(I386_ONLY)
+#   define BSWAP8(x) ({ u32 lo_=(u64)(x)>>32,hi_=(x);   \
+                        asm ("bswapl %0; bswapl %1"     \
+                        : "+r"(hi_),"+r"(lo_));         \
+                        (u64)hi_<<32|lo_;               })
+#   define BSWAP4(x) ({ u32 ret_=(x);                   \
+                        asm ("bswapl %0"                \
+                        : "+r"(ret_));   ret_;          })
+#  elif defined(__aarch64__)
+#   define BSWAP8(x) ({ u64 ret_;                       \
+                        asm ("rev %0,%1"                \
+                        : "=r"(ret_) : "r"(x)); ret_;   })
+#   define BSWAP4(x) ({ u32 ret_;                       \
+                        asm ("rev %w0,%w1"              \
+                        : "=r"(ret_) : "r"(x)); ret_;   })
+#  elif (defined(__arm__) || defined(__arm)) && !defined(STRICT_ALIGNMENT)
+#   define BSWAP8(x) ({ u32 lo_=(u64)(x)>>32,hi_=(x);   \
+                        asm ("rev %0,%0; rev %1,%1"     \
+                        : "+r"(hi_),"+r"(lo_));         \
+                        (u64)hi_<<32|lo_;               })
+#   define BSWAP4(x) ({ u32 ret_;                       \
+                        asm ("rev %0,%1"                \
+                        : "=r"(ret_) : "r"((u32)(x)));  \
+                        ret_;                           })
+#  endif
+# elif defined(_MSC_VER)
+#  if _MSC_VER>=1300
+#   pragma intrinsic(_byteswap_uint64,_byteswap_ulong)
+#   define BSWAP8(x)    _byteswap_uint64((u64)(x))
+#   define BSWAP4(x)    _byteswap_ulong((u32)(x))
+#  elif defined(_M_IX86)
+__inline u32 _bswap4(u32 val)
+{
+_asm mov eax, val _asm bswap eax}
+#   define BSWAP4(x)    _bswap4(x)
+#  endif
+# endif
+#endif
+#if defined(BSWAP4) && !defined(STRICT_ALIGNMENT)
+# define GETU32(p)       BSWAP4(*(const u32 *)(p))
+# define PUTU32(p,v)     *(u32 *)(p) = BSWAP4(v)
+#else
+# define GETU32(p)       ((u32)(p)[0]<<24|(u32)(p)[1]<<16|(u32)(p)[2]<<8|(u32)(p)[3])
+# define PUTU32(p,v)     ((p)[0]=(u8)((v)>>24),(p)[1]=(u8)((v)>>16),(p)[2]=(u8)((v)>>8),(p)[3]=(u8)(v))
+#endif
+/*- GCM definitions */ typedef struct {
+    u64 hi, lo;
+} u128;
+
+#ifdef  TABLE_BITS
+# undef  TABLE_BITS
+#endif
+/*
+ * Even though permitted values for TABLE_BITS are 8, 4 and 1, it should
+ * never be set to 8 [or 1]. For further information see gcm128.c.
+ */
+#define TABLE_BITS 4
+
+struct gcm128_context {
+    /* Following 6 names follow names in GCM specification */
+    union {
+        u64 u[2];
+        u32 d[4];
+        u8 c[16];
+        size_t t[16 / sizeof(size_t)];
+    } Yi, EKi, EK0, len, Xi, H;
+    /*
+     * Relative position of Xi, H and pre-computed Htable is used in some
+     * assembler modules, i.e. don't change the order!
+     */
+#if TABLE_BITS==8
+    u128 Htable[256];
+#else
+    u128 Htable[16];
+    void (*gmult) (u64 Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16]);
+    void (*ghash) (u64 Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16], const u8 *inp,
+                   size_t len);
+#endif
+    unsigned int mres, ares;
+    block128_f block;
+    void *key;
+};
+
+struct xts128_context {
+    void *key1, *key2;
+    block128_f block1, block2;
+};
+
+struct ccm128_context {
+    union {
+        u64 u[2];
+        u8 c[16];
+    } nonce, cmac;
+    u64 blocks;
+    block128_f block;
+    void *key;
+};
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCB
+
+typedef union {
+    u64 a[2];
+    unsigned char c[16];
+} OCB_BLOCK;
+# define ocb_block16_xor(in1,in2,out) \
+    ( (out)->a[0]=(in1)->a[0]^(in2)->a[0], \
+      (out)->a[1]=(in1)->a[1]^(in2)->a[1] )
+# if STRICT_ALIGNMENT
+#  define ocb_block16_xor_misaligned(in1,in2,out) \
+    ocb_block_xor((in1)->c,(in2)->c,16,(out)->c)
+# else
+#  define ocb_block16_xor_misaligned ocb_block16_xor
+# endif
+
+struct ocb128_context {
+    /* Need both encrypt and decrypt key schedules for decryption */
+    block128_f encrypt;
+    block128_f decrypt;
+    void *keyenc;
+    void *keydec;
+    ocb128_f stream;    /* direction dependent */
+    /* Key dependent variables. Can be reused if key remains the same */
+    size_t l_index;
+    size_t max_l_index;
+    OCB_BLOCK l_star;
+    OCB_BLOCK l_dollar;
+    OCB_BLOCK *l;
+    /* Must be reset for each session */
+    u64 blocks_hashed;
+    u64 blocks_processed;
+    OCB_BLOCK tag;
+    OCB_BLOCK offset_aad;
+    OCB_BLOCK sum;
+    OCB_BLOCK offset;
+    OCB_BLOCK checksum;
+};
+#endif                          /* OPENSSL_NO_OCB */
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/modes/ocb128.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/modes/ocb128.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..db794d0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/modes/ocb128.c
@@ -0,0 +1,568 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2014-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include "modes_lcl.h"
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCB
+
+/*
+ * Calculate the number of binary trailing zero's in any given number
+ */
+static u32 ocb_ntz(u64 n)
+{
+    u32 cnt = 0;
+
+    /*
+     * We do a right-to-left simple sequential search. This is surprisingly
+     * efficient as the distribution of trailing zeros is not uniform,
+     * e.g. the number of possible inputs with no trailing zeros is equal to
+     * the number with 1 or more; the number with exactly 1 is equal to the
+     * number with 2 or more, etc. Checking the last two bits covers 75% of
+     * all numbers. Checking the last three covers 87.5%
+     */
+    while (!(n & 1)) {
+        n >>= 1;
+        cnt++;
+    }
+    return cnt;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Shift a block of 16 bytes left by shift bits
+ */
+static void ocb_block_lshift(const unsigned char *in, size_t shift,
+                             unsigned char *out)
+{
+    unsigned char shift_mask;
+    int i;
+    unsigned char mask[15];
+
+    shift_mask = 0xff;
+    shift_mask <<= (8 - shift);
+    for (i = 15; i >= 0; i--) {
+        if (i > 0) {
+            mask[i - 1] = in[i] & shift_mask;
+            mask[i - 1] >>= 8 - shift;
+        }
+        out[i] = in[i] << shift;
+
+        if (i != 15) {
+            out[i] ^= mask[i];
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Perform a "double" operation as per OCB spec
+ */
+static void ocb_double(OCB_BLOCK *in, OCB_BLOCK *out)
+{
+    unsigned char mask;
+
+    /*
+     * Calculate the mask based on the most significant bit. There are more
+     * efficient ways to do this - but this way is constant time
+     */
+    mask = in->c[0] & 0x80;
+    mask >>= 7;
+    mask *= 135;
+
+    ocb_block_lshift(in->c, 1, out->c);
+
+    out->c[15] ^= mask;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Perform an xor on in1 and in2 - each of len bytes. Store result in out
+ */
+static void ocb_block_xor(const unsigned char *in1,
+                          const unsigned char *in2, size_t len,
+                          unsigned char *out)
+{
+    size_t i;
+    for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+        out[i] = in1[i] ^ in2[i];
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Lookup L_index in our lookup table. If we haven't already got it we need to
+ * calculate it
+ */
+static OCB_BLOCK *ocb_lookup_l(OCB128_CONTEXT *ctx, size_t idx)
+{
+    size_t l_index = ctx->l_index;
+
+    if (idx <= l_index) {
+        return ctx->l + idx;
+    }
+
+    /* We don't have it - so calculate it */
+    if (idx >= ctx->max_l_index) {
+        void *tmp_ptr;
+        /*
+         * Each additional entry allows to process almost double as
+         * much data, so that in linear world the table will need to
+         * be expanded with smaller and smaller increments. Originally
+         * it was doubling in size, which was a waste. Growing it
+         * linearly is not formally optimal, but is simpler to implement.
+         * We grow table by minimally required 4*n that would accommodate
+         * the index.
+         */
+        ctx->max_l_index += (idx - ctx->max_l_index + 4) & ~3;
+        tmp_ptr =
+            OPENSSL_realloc(ctx->l, ctx->max_l_index * sizeof(OCB_BLOCK));
+        if (tmp_ptr == NULL) /* prevent ctx->l from being clobbered */
+            return NULL;
+        ctx->l = tmp_ptr;
+    }
+    while (l_index < idx) {
+        ocb_double(ctx->l + l_index, ctx->l + l_index + 1);
+        l_index++;
+    }
+    ctx->l_index = l_index;
+
+    return ctx->l + idx;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Create a new OCB128_CONTEXT
+ */
+OCB128_CONTEXT *CRYPTO_ocb128_new(void *keyenc, void *keydec,
+                                  block128_f encrypt, block128_f decrypt,
+                                  ocb128_f stream)
+{
+    OCB128_CONTEXT *octx;
+    int ret;
+
+    if ((octx = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*octx))) != NULL) {
+        ret = CRYPTO_ocb128_init(octx, keyenc, keydec, encrypt, decrypt,
+                                 stream);
+        if (ret)
+            return octx;
+        OPENSSL_free(octx);
+    }
+
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initialise an existing OCB128_CONTEXT
+ */
+int CRYPTO_ocb128_init(OCB128_CONTEXT *ctx, void *keyenc, void *keydec,
+                       block128_f encrypt, block128_f decrypt,
+                       ocb128_f stream)
+{
+    memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
+    ctx->l_index = 0;
+    ctx->max_l_index = 5;
+    ctx->l = OPENSSL_malloc(ctx->max_l_index * 16);
+    if (ctx->l == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    /*
+     * We set both the encryption and decryption key schedules - decryption
+     * needs both. Don't really need decryption schedule if only doing
+     * encryption - but it simplifies things to take it anyway
+     */
+    ctx->encrypt = encrypt;
+    ctx->decrypt = decrypt;
+    ctx->stream = stream;
+    ctx->keyenc = keyenc;
+    ctx->keydec = keydec;
+
+    /* L_* = ENCIPHER(K, zeros(128)) */
+    ctx->encrypt(ctx->l_star.c, ctx->l_star.c, ctx->keyenc);
+
+    /* L_$ = double(L_*) */
+    ocb_double(&ctx->l_star, &ctx->l_dollar);
+
+    /* L_0 = double(L_$) */
+    ocb_double(&ctx->l_dollar, ctx->l);
+
+    /* L_{i} = double(L_{i-1}) */
+    ocb_double(ctx->l, ctx->l+1);
+    ocb_double(ctx->l+1, ctx->l+2);
+    ocb_double(ctx->l+2, ctx->l+3);
+    ocb_double(ctx->l+3, ctx->l+4);
+    ctx->l_index = 4;   /* enough to process up to 496 bytes */
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Copy an OCB128_CONTEXT object
+ */
+int CRYPTO_ocb128_copy_ctx(OCB128_CONTEXT *dest, OCB128_CONTEXT *src,
+                           void *keyenc, void *keydec)
+{
+    memcpy(dest, src, sizeof(OCB128_CONTEXT));
+    if (keyenc)
+        dest->keyenc = keyenc;
+    if (keydec)
+        dest->keydec = keydec;
+    if (src->l) {
+        dest->l = OPENSSL_malloc(src->max_l_index * 16);
+        if (dest->l == NULL)
+            return 0;
+        memcpy(dest->l, src->l, (src->l_index + 1) * 16);
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set the IV to be used for this operation. Must be 1 - 15 bytes.
+ */
+int CRYPTO_ocb128_setiv(OCB128_CONTEXT *ctx, const unsigned char *iv,
+                        size_t len, size_t taglen)
+{
+    unsigned char ktop[16], tmp[16], mask;
+    unsigned char stretch[24], nonce[16];
+    size_t bottom, shift;
+
+    /*
+     * Spec says IV is 120 bits or fewer - it allows non byte aligned lengths.
+     * We don't support this at this stage
+     */
+    if ((len > 15) || (len < 1) || (taglen > 16) || (taglen < 1)) {
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    /* Nonce = num2str(TAGLEN mod 128,7) || zeros(120-bitlen(N)) || 1 || N */
+    nonce[0] = ((taglen * 8) % 128) << 1;
+    memset(nonce + 1, 0, 15);
+    memcpy(nonce + 16 - len, iv, len);
+    nonce[15 - len] |= 1;
+
+    /* Ktop = ENCIPHER(K, Nonce[1..122] || zeros(6)) */
+    memcpy(tmp, nonce, 16);
+    tmp[15] &= 0xc0;
+    ctx->encrypt(tmp, ktop, ctx->keyenc);
+
+    /* Stretch = Ktop || (Ktop[1..64] xor Ktop[9..72]) */
+    memcpy(stretch, ktop, 16);
+    ocb_block_xor(ktop, ktop + 1, 8, stretch + 16);
+
+    /* bottom = str2num(Nonce[123..128]) */
+    bottom = nonce[15] & 0x3f;
+
+    /* Offset_0 = Stretch[1+bottom..128+bottom] */
+    shift = bottom % 8;
+    ocb_block_lshift(stretch + (bottom / 8), shift, ctx->offset.c);
+    mask = 0xff;
+    mask <<= 8 - shift;
+    ctx->offset.c[15] |=
+        (*(stretch + (bottom / 8) + 16) & mask) >> (8 - shift);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Provide any AAD. This can be called multiple times. Only the final time can
+ * have a partial block
+ */
+int CRYPTO_ocb128_aad(OCB128_CONTEXT *ctx, const unsigned char *aad,
+                      size_t len)
+{
+    u64 i, all_num_blocks;
+    size_t num_blocks, last_len;
+    OCB_BLOCK tmp;
+
+    /* Calculate the number of blocks of AAD provided now, and so far */
+    num_blocks = len / 16;
+    all_num_blocks = num_blocks + ctx->blocks_hashed;
+
+    /* Loop through all full blocks of AAD */
+    for (i = ctx->blocks_hashed + 1; i <= all_num_blocks; i++) {
+        OCB_BLOCK *lookup;
+
+        /* Offset_i = Offset_{i-1} xor L_{ntz(i)} */
+        lookup = ocb_lookup_l(ctx, ocb_ntz(i));
+        if (lookup == NULL)
+            return 0;
+        ocb_block16_xor(&ctx->offset_aad, lookup, &ctx->offset_aad);
+
+        memcpy(tmp.c, aad, 16);
+        aad += 16;
+
+        /* Sum_i = Sum_{i-1} xor ENCIPHER(K, A_i xor Offset_i) */
+        ocb_block16_xor(&ctx->offset_aad, &tmp, &tmp);
+        ctx->encrypt(tmp.c, tmp.c, ctx->keyenc);
+        ocb_block16_xor(&tmp, &ctx->sum, &ctx->sum);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Check if we have any partial blocks left over. This is only valid in the
+     * last call to this function
+     */
+    last_len = len % 16;
+
+    if (last_len > 0) {
+        /* Offset_* = Offset_m xor L_* */
+        ocb_block16_xor(&ctx->offset_aad, &ctx->l_star, &ctx->offset_aad);
+
+        /* CipherInput = (A_* || 1 || zeros(127-bitlen(A_*))) xor Offset_* */
+        memset(tmp.c, 0, 16);
+        memcpy(tmp.c, aad, last_len);
+        tmp.c[last_len] = 0x80;
+        ocb_block16_xor(&ctx->offset_aad, &tmp, &tmp);
+
+        /* Sum = Sum_m xor ENCIPHER(K, CipherInput) */
+        ctx->encrypt(tmp.c, tmp.c, ctx->keyenc);
+        ocb_block16_xor(&tmp, &ctx->sum, &ctx->sum);
+    }
+
+    ctx->blocks_hashed = all_num_blocks;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Provide any data to be encrypted. This can be called multiple times. Only
+ * the final time can have a partial block
+ */
+int CRYPTO_ocb128_encrypt(OCB128_CONTEXT *ctx,
+                          const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                          size_t len)
+{
+    u64 i, all_num_blocks;
+    size_t num_blocks, last_len;
+
+    /*
+     * Calculate the number of blocks of data to be encrypted provided now, and
+     * so far
+     */
+    num_blocks = len / 16;
+    all_num_blocks = num_blocks + ctx->blocks_processed;
+
+    if (num_blocks && all_num_blocks == (size_t)all_num_blocks
+        && ctx->stream != NULL) {
+        size_t max_idx = 0, top = (size_t)all_num_blocks;
+
+        /*
+         * See how many L_{i} entries we need to process data at hand
+         * and pre-compute missing entries in the table [if any]...
+         */
+        while (top >>= 1)
+            max_idx++;
+        if (ocb_lookup_l(ctx, max_idx) == NULL)
+            return 0;
+
+        ctx->stream(in, out, num_blocks, ctx->keyenc,
+                    (size_t)ctx->blocks_processed + 1, ctx->offset.c,
+                    (const unsigned char (*)[16])ctx->l, ctx->checksum.c);
+    } else {
+        /* Loop through all full blocks to be encrypted */
+        for (i = ctx->blocks_processed + 1; i <= all_num_blocks; i++) {
+            OCB_BLOCK *lookup;
+            OCB_BLOCK tmp;
+
+            /* Offset_i = Offset_{i-1} xor L_{ntz(i)} */
+            lookup = ocb_lookup_l(ctx, ocb_ntz(i));
+            if (lookup == NULL)
+                return 0;
+            ocb_block16_xor(&ctx->offset, lookup, &ctx->offset);
+
+            memcpy(tmp.c, in, 16);
+            in += 16;
+
+            /* Checksum_i = Checksum_{i-1} xor P_i */
+            ocb_block16_xor(&tmp, &ctx->checksum, &ctx->checksum);
+
+            /* C_i = Offset_i xor ENCIPHER(K, P_i xor Offset_i) */
+            ocb_block16_xor(&ctx->offset, &tmp, &tmp);
+            ctx->encrypt(tmp.c, tmp.c, ctx->keyenc);
+            ocb_block16_xor(&ctx->offset, &tmp, &tmp);
+
+            memcpy(out, tmp.c, 16);
+            out += 16;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Check if we have any partial blocks left over. This is only valid in the
+     * last call to this function
+     */
+    last_len = len % 16;
+
+    if (last_len > 0) {
+        OCB_BLOCK pad;
+
+        /* Offset_* = Offset_m xor L_* */
+        ocb_block16_xor(&ctx->offset, &ctx->l_star, &ctx->offset);
+
+        /* Pad = ENCIPHER(K, Offset_*) */
+        ctx->encrypt(ctx->offset.c, pad.c, ctx->keyenc);
+
+        /* C_* = P_* xor Pad[1..bitlen(P_*)] */
+        ocb_block_xor(in, pad.c, last_len, out);
+
+        /* Checksum_* = Checksum_m xor (P_* || 1 || zeros(127-bitlen(P_*))) */
+        memset(pad.c, 0, 16);           /* borrow pad */
+        memcpy(pad.c, in, last_len);
+        pad.c[last_len] = 0x80;
+        ocb_block16_xor(&pad, &ctx->checksum, &ctx->checksum);
+    }
+
+    ctx->blocks_processed = all_num_blocks;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Provide any data to be decrypted. This can be called multiple times. Only
+ * the final time can have a partial block
+ */
+int CRYPTO_ocb128_decrypt(OCB128_CONTEXT *ctx,
+                          const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                          size_t len)
+{
+    u64 i, all_num_blocks;
+    size_t num_blocks, last_len;
+
+    /*
+     * Calculate the number of blocks of data to be decrypted provided now, and
+     * so far
+     */
+    num_blocks = len / 16;
+    all_num_blocks = num_blocks + ctx->blocks_processed;
+
+    if (num_blocks && all_num_blocks == (size_t)all_num_blocks
+        && ctx->stream != NULL) {
+        size_t max_idx = 0, top = (size_t)all_num_blocks;
+
+        /*
+         * See how many L_{i} entries we need to process data at hand
+         * and pre-compute missing entries in the table [if any]...
+         */
+        while (top >>= 1)
+            max_idx++;
+        if (ocb_lookup_l(ctx, max_idx) == NULL)
+            return 0;
+
+        ctx->stream(in, out, num_blocks, ctx->keydec,
+                    (size_t)ctx->blocks_processed + 1, ctx->offset.c,
+                    (const unsigned char (*)[16])ctx->l, ctx->checksum.c);
+    } else {
+        OCB_BLOCK tmp;
+
+        /* Loop through all full blocks to be decrypted */
+        for (i = ctx->blocks_processed + 1; i <= all_num_blocks; i++) {
+
+            /* Offset_i = Offset_{i-1} xor L_{ntz(i)} */
+            OCB_BLOCK *lookup = ocb_lookup_l(ctx, ocb_ntz(i));
+            if (lookup == NULL)
+                return 0;
+            ocb_block16_xor(&ctx->offset, lookup, &ctx->offset);
+
+            memcpy(tmp.c, in, 16);
+            in += 16;
+
+            /* P_i = Offset_i xor DECIPHER(K, C_i xor Offset_i) */
+            ocb_block16_xor(&ctx->offset, &tmp, &tmp);
+            ctx->decrypt(tmp.c, tmp.c, ctx->keydec);
+            ocb_block16_xor(&ctx->offset, &tmp, &tmp);
+
+            /* Checksum_i = Checksum_{i-1} xor P_i */
+            ocb_block16_xor(&tmp, &ctx->checksum, &ctx->checksum);
+
+            memcpy(out, tmp.c, 16);
+            out += 16;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Check if we have any partial blocks left over. This is only valid in the
+     * last call to this function
+     */
+    last_len = len % 16;
+
+    if (last_len > 0) {
+        OCB_BLOCK pad;
+
+        /* Offset_* = Offset_m xor L_* */
+        ocb_block16_xor(&ctx->offset, &ctx->l_star, &ctx->offset);
+
+        /* Pad = ENCIPHER(K, Offset_*) */
+        ctx->encrypt(ctx->offset.c, pad.c, ctx->keyenc);
+
+        /* P_* = C_* xor Pad[1..bitlen(C_*)] */
+        ocb_block_xor(in, pad.c, last_len, out);
+
+        /* Checksum_* = Checksum_m xor (P_* || 1 || zeros(127-bitlen(P_*))) */
+        memset(pad.c, 0, 16);           /* borrow pad */
+        memcpy(pad.c, out, last_len);
+        pad.c[last_len] = 0x80;
+        ocb_block16_xor(&pad, &ctx->checksum, &ctx->checksum);
+    }
+
+    ctx->blocks_processed = all_num_blocks;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Calculate the tag and verify it against the supplied tag
+ */
+int CRYPTO_ocb128_finish(OCB128_CONTEXT *ctx, const unsigned char *tag,
+                         size_t len)
+{
+    OCB_BLOCK tmp;
+
+    /*
+     * Tag = ENCIPHER(K, Checksum_* xor Offset_* xor L_$) xor HASH(K,A)
+     */
+    ocb_block16_xor(&ctx->checksum, &ctx->offset, &tmp);
+    ocb_block16_xor(&ctx->l_dollar, &tmp, &tmp);
+    ctx->encrypt(tmp.c, tmp.c, ctx->keyenc);
+    ocb_block16_xor(&tmp, &ctx->sum, &ctx->tag);
+
+    if (len > 16 || len < 1) {
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    /* Compare the tag if we've been given one */
+    if (tag)
+        return CRYPTO_memcmp(&ctx->tag, tag, len);
+    else
+        return -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Retrieve the calculated tag
+ */
+int CRYPTO_ocb128_tag(OCB128_CONTEXT *ctx, unsigned char *tag, size_t len)
+{
+    if (len > 16 || len < 1) {
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    /* Calculate the tag */
+    CRYPTO_ocb128_finish(ctx, NULL, 0);
+
+    /* Copy the tag into the supplied buffer */
+    memcpy(tag, ctx->tag.c, len);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Release all resources
+ */
+void CRYPTO_ocb128_cleanup(OCB128_CONTEXT *ctx)
+{
+    if (ctx) {
+        OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->l, ctx->max_l_index * 16);
+        OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx, sizeof(*ctx));
+    }
+}
+
+#endif                          /* OPENSSL_NO_OCB */
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/modes/ofb128.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/modes/ofb128.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8309256
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/modes/ofb128.c
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include "modes_lcl.h"
+#include <string.h>
+
+/*
+ * The input and output encrypted as though 128bit ofb mode is being used.
+ * The extra state information to record how much of the 128bit block we have
+ * used is contained in *num;
+ */
+void CRYPTO_ofb128_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                           size_t len, const void *key,
+                           unsigned char ivec[16], int *num, block128_f block)
+{
+    unsigned int n;
+    size_t l = 0;
+
+    n = *num;
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT)
+    if (16 % sizeof(size_t) == 0) { /* always true actually */
+        do {
+            while (n && len) {
+                *(out++) = *(in++) ^ ivec[n];
+                --len;
+                n = (n + 1) % 16;
+            }
+# if defined(STRICT_ALIGNMENT)
+            if (((size_t)in | (size_t)out | (size_t)ivec) % sizeof(size_t) !=
+                0)
+                break;
+# endif
+            while (len >= 16) {
+                (*block) (ivec, ivec, key);
+                for (; n < 16; n += sizeof(size_t))
+                    *(size_t *)(out + n) =
+                        *(size_t *)(in + n) ^ *(size_t *)(ivec + n);
+                len -= 16;
+                out += 16;
+                in += 16;
+                n = 0;
+            }
+            if (len) {
+                (*block) (ivec, ivec, key);
+                while (len--) {
+                    out[n] = in[n] ^ ivec[n];
+                    ++n;
+                }
+            }
+            *num = n;
+            return;
+        } while (0);
+    }
+    /* the rest would be commonly eliminated by x86* compiler */
+#endif
+    while (l < len) {
+        if (n == 0) {
+            (*block) (ivec, ivec, key);
+        }
+        out[l] = in[l] ^ ivec[n];
+        ++l;
+        n = (n + 1) % 16;
+    }
+
+    *num = n;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/modes/wrap128.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/modes/wrap128.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..46809a0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/modes/wrap128.c
@@ -0,0 +1,329 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2013-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/**  Beware!
+ *
+ *  Following wrapping modes were designed for AES but this implementation
+ *  allows you to use them for any 128 bit block cipher.
+ */
+
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/modes.h>
+
+/** RFC 3394 section 2.2.3.1 Default Initial Value */
+static const unsigned char default_iv[] = {
+    0xA6, 0xA6, 0xA6, 0xA6, 0xA6, 0xA6, 0xA6, 0xA6,
+};
+
+/** RFC 5649 section 3 Alternative Initial Value 32-bit constant */
+static const unsigned char default_aiv[] = {
+    0xA6, 0x59, 0x59, 0xA6
+};
+
+/** Input size limit: lower than maximum of standards but far larger than
+ *  anything that will be used in practice.
+ */
+#define CRYPTO128_WRAP_MAX (1UL << 31)
+
+/** Wrapping according to RFC 3394 section 2.2.1.
+ *
+ *  @param[in]  key    Key value.
+ *  @param[in]  iv     IV value. Length = 8 bytes. NULL = use default_iv.
+ *  @param[in]  in     Plaintext as n 64-bit blocks, n >= 2.
+ *  @param[in]  inlen  Length of in.
+ *  @param[out] out    Ciphertext. Minimal buffer length = (inlen + 8) bytes.
+ *                     Input and output buffers can overlap if block function
+ *                     supports that.
+ *  @param[in]  block  Block processing function.
+ *  @return            0 if inlen does not consist of n 64-bit blocks, n >= 2.
+ *                     or if inlen > CRYPTO128_WRAP_MAX.
+ *                     Output length if wrapping succeeded.
+ */
+size_t CRYPTO_128_wrap(void *key, const unsigned char *iv,
+                       unsigned char *out,
+                       const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen,
+                       block128_f block)
+{
+    unsigned char *A, B[16], *R;
+    size_t i, j, t;
+    if ((inlen & 0x7) || (inlen < 16) || (inlen > CRYPTO128_WRAP_MAX))
+        return 0;
+    A = B;
+    t = 1;
+    memmove(out + 8, in, inlen);
+    if (!iv)
+        iv = default_iv;
+
+    memcpy(A, iv, 8);
+
+    for (j = 0; j < 6; j++) {
+        R = out + 8;
+        for (i = 0; i < inlen; i += 8, t++, R += 8) {
+            memcpy(B + 8, R, 8);
+            block(B, B, key);
+            A[7] ^= (unsigned char)(t & 0xff);
+            if (t > 0xff) {
+                A[6] ^= (unsigned char)((t >> 8) & 0xff);
+                A[5] ^= (unsigned char)((t >> 16) & 0xff);
+                A[4] ^= (unsigned char)((t >> 24) & 0xff);
+            }
+            memcpy(R, B + 8, 8);
+        }
+    }
+    memcpy(out, A, 8);
+    return inlen + 8;
+}
+
+/** Unwrapping according to RFC 3394 section 2.2.2 steps 1-2.
+ *  The IV check (step 3) is responsibility of the caller.
+ *
+ *  @param[in]  key    Key value.
+ *  @param[out] iv     Unchecked IV value. Minimal buffer length = 8 bytes.
+ *  @param[out] out    Plaintext without IV.
+ *                     Minimal buffer length = (inlen - 8) bytes.
+ *                     Input and output buffers can overlap if block function
+ *                     supports that.
+ *  @param[in]  in     Ciphertext as n 64-bit blocks.
+ *  @param[in]  inlen  Length of in.
+ *  @param[in]  block  Block processing function.
+ *  @return            0 if inlen is out of range [24, CRYPTO128_WRAP_MAX]
+ *                     or if inlen is not a multiple of 8.
+ *                     Output length otherwise.
+ */
+static size_t crypto_128_unwrap_raw(void *key, unsigned char *iv,
+                                    unsigned char *out,
+                                    const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen,
+                                    block128_f block)
+{
+    unsigned char *A, B[16], *R;
+    size_t i, j, t;
+    inlen -= 8;
+    if ((inlen & 0x7) || (inlen < 16) || (inlen > CRYPTO128_WRAP_MAX))
+        return 0;
+    A = B;
+    t = 6 * (inlen >> 3);
+    memcpy(A, in, 8);
+    memmove(out, in + 8, inlen);
+    for (j = 0; j < 6; j++) {
+        R = out + inlen - 8;
+        for (i = 0; i < inlen; i += 8, t--, R -= 8) {
+            A[7] ^= (unsigned char)(t & 0xff);
+            if (t > 0xff) {
+                A[6] ^= (unsigned char)((t >> 8) & 0xff);
+                A[5] ^= (unsigned char)((t >> 16) & 0xff);
+                A[4] ^= (unsigned char)((t >> 24) & 0xff);
+            }
+            memcpy(B + 8, R, 8);
+            block(B, B, key);
+            memcpy(R, B + 8, 8);
+        }
+    }
+    memcpy(iv, A, 8);
+    return inlen;
+}
+
+/** Unwrapping according to RFC 3394 section 2.2.2, including the IV check.
+ *  The first block of plaintext has to match the supplied IV, otherwise an
+ *  error is returned.
+ *
+ *  @param[in]  key    Key value.
+ *  @param[out] iv     IV value to match against. Length = 8 bytes.
+ *                     NULL = use default_iv.
+ *  @param[out] out    Plaintext without IV.
+ *                     Minimal buffer length = (inlen - 8) bytes.
+ *                     Input and output buffers can overlap if block function
+ *                     supports that.
+ *  @param[in]  in     Ciphertext as n 64-bit blocks.
+ *  @param[in]  inlen  Length of in.
+ *  @param[in]  block  Block processing function.
+ *  @return            0 if inlen is out of range [24, CRYPTO128_WRAP_MAX]
+ *                     or if inlen is not a multiple of 8
+ *                     or if IV doesn't match expected value.
+ *                     Output length otherwise.
+ */
+size_t CRYPTO_128_unwrap(void *key, const unsigned char *iv,
+                         unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+                         size_t inlen, block128_f block)
+{
+    size_t ret;
+    unsigned char got_iv[8];
+
+    ret = crypto_128_unwrap_raw(key, got_iv, out, in, inlen, block);
+    if (ret == 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    if (!iv)
+        iv = default_iv;
+    if (CRYPTO_memcmp(got_iv, iv, 8)) {
+        OPENSSL_cleanse(out, ret);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/** Wrapping according to RFC 5649 section 4.1.
+ *
+ *  @param[in]  key    Key value.
+ *  @param[in]  icv    (Non-standard) IV, 4 bytes. NULL = use default_aiv.
+ *  @param[out] out    Ciphertext. Minimal buffer length = (inlen + 15) bytes.
+ *                     Input and output buffers can overlap if block function
+ *                     supports that.
+ *  @param[in]  in     Plaintext as n 64-bit blocks, n >= 2.
+ *  @param[in]  inlen  Length of in.
+ *  @param[in]  block  Block processing function.
+ *  @return            0 if inlen is out of range [1, CRYPTO128_WRAP_MAX].
+ *                     Output length if wrapping succeeded.
+ */
+size_t CRYPTO_128_wrap_pad(void *key, const unsigned char *icv,
+                           unsigned char *out,
+                           const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen,
+                           block128_f block)
+{
+    /* n: number of 64-bit blocks in the padded key data
+     *
+     * If length of plain text is not a multiple of 8, pad the plain text octet
+     * string on the right with octets of zeros, where final length is the
+     * smallest multiple of 8 that is greater than length of plain text.
+     * If length of plain text is a multiple of 8, then there is no padding. */
+    const size_t blocks_padded = (inlen + 7) / 8; /* CEILING(m/8) */
+    const size_t padded_len = blocks_padded * 8;
+    const size_t padding_len = padded_len - inlen;
+    /* RFC 5649 section 3: Alternative Initial Value */
+    unsigned char aiv[8];
+    int ret;
+
+    /* Section 1: use 32-bit fixed field for plaintext octet length */
+    if (inlen == 0 || inlen >= CRYPTO128_WRAP_MAX)
+        return 0;
+
+    /* Section 3: Alternative Initial Value */
+    if (!icv)
+        memcpy(aiv, default_aiv, 4);
+    else
+        memcpy(aiv, icv, 4);    /* Standard doesn't mention this. */
+
+    aiv[4] = (inlen >> 24) & 0xFF;
+    aiv[5] = (inlen >> 16) & 0xFF;
+    aiv[6] = (inlen >> 8) & 0xFF;
+    aiv[7] = inlen & 0xFF;
+
+    if (padded_len == 8) {
+        /*
+         * Section 4.1 - special case in step 2: If the padded plaintext
+         * contains exactly eight octets, then prepend the AIV and encrypt
+         * the resulting 128-bit block using AES in ECB mode.
+         */
+        memmove(out + 8, in, inlen);
+        memcpy(out, aiv, 8);
+        memset(out + 8 + inlen, 0, padding_len);
+        block(out, out, key);
+        ret = 16;               /* AIV + padded input */
+    } else {
+        memmove(out, in, inlen);
+        memset(out + inlen, 0, padding_len); /* Section 4.1 step 1 */
+        ret = CRYPTO_128_wrap(key, aiv, out, out, padded_len, block);
+    }
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/** Unwrapping according to RFC 5649 section 4.2.
+ *
+ *  @param[in]  key    Key value.
+ *  @param[in]  icv    (Non-standard) IV, 4 bytes. NULL = use default_aiv.
+ *  @param[out] out    Plaintext. Minimal buffer length = inlen bytes.
+ *                     Input and output buffers can overlap if block function
+ *                     supports that.
+ *  @param[in]  in     Ciphertext as n 64-bit blocks.
+ *  @param[in]  inlen  Length of in.
+ *  @param[in]  block  Block processing function.
+ *  @return            0 if inlen is out of range [16, CRYPTO128_WRAP_MAX],
+ *                     or if inlen is not a multiple of 8
+ *                     or if IV and message length indicator doesn't match.
+ *                     Output length if unwrapping succeeded and IV matches.
+ */
+size_t CRYPTO_128_unwrap_pad(void *key, const unsigned char *icv,
+                             unsigned char *out,
+                             const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen,
+                             block128_f block)
+{
+    /* n: number of 64-bit blocks in the padded key data */
+    size_t n = inlen / 8 - 1;
+    size_t padded_len;
+    size_t padding_len;
+    size_t ptext_len;
+    /* RFC 5649 section 3: Alternative Initial Value */
+    unsigned char aiv[8];
+    static unsigned char zeros[8] = { 0x0 };
+    size_t ret;
+
+    /* Section 4.2: Ciphertext length has to be (n+1) 64-bit blocks. */
+    if ((inlen & 0x7) != 0 || inlen < 16 || inlen >= CRYPTO128_WRAP_MAX)
+        return 0;
+
+    memmove(out, in, inlen);
+    if (inlen == 16) {
+        /*
+         * Section 4.2 - special case in step 1: When n=1, the ciphertext
+         * contains exactly two 64-bit blocks and they are decrypted as a
+         * single AES block using AES in ECB mode: AIV | P[1] = DEC(K, C[0] |
+         * C[1])
+         */
+        block(out, out, key);
+        memcpy(aiv, out, 8);
+        /* Remove AIV */
+        memmove(out, out + 8, 8);
+        padded_len = 8;
+    } else {
+        padded_len = inlen - 8;
+        ret = crypto_128_unwrap_raw(key, aiv, out, out, inlen, block);
+        if (padded_len != ret) {
+            OPENSSL_cleanse(out, inlen);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Section 3: AIV checks: Check that MSB(32,A) = A65959A6. Optionally a
+     * user-supplied value can be used (even if standard doesn't mention
+     * this).
+     */
+    if ((!icv && CRYPTO_memcmp(aiv, default_aiv, 4))
+        || (icv && CRYPTO_memcmp(aiv, icv, 4))) {
+        OPENSSL_cleanse(out, inlen);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Check that 8*(n-1) < LSB(32,AIV) <= 8*n. If so, let ptext_len =
+     * LSB(32,AIV).
+     */
+
+    ptext_len =   ((unsigned int)aiv[4] << 24)
+                | ((unsigned int)aiv[5] << 16)
+                | ((unsigned int)aiv[6] <<  8)
+                |  (unsigned int)aiv[7];
+    if (8 * (n - 1) >= ptext_len || ptext_len > 8 * n) {
+        OPENSSL_cleanse(out, inlen);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Check that the rightmost padding_len octets of the output data are
+     * zero.
+     */
+    padding_len = padded_len - ptext_len;
+    if (CRYPTO_memcmp(out + ptext_len, zeros, padding_len) != 0) {
+        OPENSSL_cleanse(out, inlen);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* Section 4.2 step 3: Remove padding */
+    return ptext_len;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/modes/xts128.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/modes/xts128.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..81b1eac
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/modes/xts128.c
@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include "modes_lcl.h"
+#include <string.h>
+
+int CRYPTO_xts128_encrypt(const XTS128_CONTEXT *ctx,
+                          const unsigned char iv[16],
+                          const unsigned char *inp, unsigned char *out,
+                          size_t len, int enc)
+{
+    const union {
+        long one;
+        char little;
+    } is_endian = {
+        1
+    };
+    union {
+        u64 u[2];
+        u32 d[4];
+        u8 c[16];
+    } tweak, scratch;
+    unsigned int i;
+
+    if (len < 16)
+        return -1;
+
+    memcpy(tweak.c, iv, 16);
+
+    (*ctx->block2) (tweak.c, tweak.c, ctx->key2);
+
+    if (!enc && (len % 16))
+        len -= 16;
+
+    while (len >= 16) {
+#if defined(STRICT_ALIGNMENT)
+        memcpy(scratch.c, inp, 16);
+        scratch.u[0] ^= tweak.u[0];
+        scratch.u[1] ^= tweak.u[1];
+#else
+        scratch.u[0] = ((u64 *)inp)[0] ^ tweak.u[0];
+        scratch.u[1] = ((u64 *)inp)[1] ^ tweak.u[1];
+#endif
+        (*ctx->block1) (scratch.c, scratch.c, ctx->key1);
+#if defined(STRICT_ALIGNMENT)
+        scratch.u[0] ^= tweak.u[0];
+        scratch.u[1] ^= tweak.u[1];
+        memcpy(out, scratch.c, 16);
+#else
+        ((u64 *)out)[0] = scratch.u[0] ^= tweak.u[0];
+        ((u64 *)out)[1] = scratch.u[1] ^= tweak.u[1];
+#endif
+        inp += 16;
+        out += 16;
+        len -= 16;
+
+        if (len == 0)
+            return 0;
+
+        if (is_endian.little) {
+            unsigned int carry, res;
+
+            res = 0x87 & (((int)tweak.d[3]) >> 31);
+            carry = (unsigned int)(tweak.u[0] >> 63);
+            tweak.u[0] = (tweak.u[0] << 1) ^ res;
+            tweak.u[1] = (tweak.u[1] << 1) | carry;
+        } else {
+            size_t c;
+
+            for (c = 0, i = 0; i < 16; ++i) {
+                /*
+                 * + substitutes for |, because c is 1 bit
+                 */
+                c += ((size_t)tweak.c[i]) << 1;
+                tweak.c[i] = (u8)c;
+                c = c >> 8;
+            }
+            tweak.c[0] ^= (u8)(0x87 & (0 - c));
+        }
+    }
+    if (enc) {
+        for (i = 0; i < len; ++i) {
+            u8 c = inp[i];
+            out[i] = scratch.c[i];
+            scratch.c[i] = c;
+        }
+        scratch.u[0] ^= tweak.u[0];
+        scratch.u[1] ^= tweak.u[1];
+        (*ctx->block1) (scratch.c, scratch.c, ctx->key1);
+        scratch.u[0] ^= tweak.u[0];
+        scratch.u[1] ^= tweak.u[1];
+        memcpy(out - 16, scratch.c, 16);
+    } else {
+        union {
+            u64 u[2];
+            u8 c[16];
+        } tweak1;
+
+        if (is_endian.little) {
+            unsigned int carry, res;
+
+            res = 0x87 & (((int)tweak.d[3]) >> 31);
+            carry = (unsigned int)(tweak.u[0] >> 63);
+            tweak1.u[0] = (tweak.u[0] << 1) ^ res;
+            tweak1.u[1] = (tweak.u[1] << 1) | carry;
+        } else {
+            size_t c;
+
+            for (c = 0, i = 0; i < 16; ++i) {
+                /*
+                 * + substitutes for |, because c is 1 bit
+                 */
+                c += ((size_t)tweak.c[i]) << 1;
+                tweak1.c[i] = (u8)c;
+                c = c >> 8;
+            }
+            tweak1.c[0] ^= (u8)(0x87 & (0 - c));
+        }
+#if defined(STRICT_ALIGNMENT)
+        memcpy(scratch.c, inp, 16);
+        scratch.u[0] ^= tweak1.u[0];
+        scratch.u[1] ^= tweak1.u[1];
+#else
+        scratch.u[0] = ((u64 *)inp)[0] ^ tweak1.u[0];
+        scratch.u[1] = ((u64 *)inp)[1] ^ tweak1.u[1];
+#endif
+        (*ctx->block1) (scratch.c, scratch.c, ctx->key1);
+        scratch.u[0] ^= tweak1.u[0];
+        scratch.u[1] ^= tweak1.u[1];
+
+        for (i = 0; i < len; ++i) {
+            u8 c = inp[16 + i];
+            out[16 + i] = scratch.c[i];
+            scratch.c[i] = c;
+        }
+        scratch.u[0] ^= tweak.u[0];
+        scratch.u[1] ^= tweak.u[1];
+        (*ctx->block1) (scratch.c, scratch.c, ctx->key1);
+#if defined(STRICT_ALIGNMENT)
+        scratch.u[0] ^= tweak.u[0];
+        scratch.u[1] ^= tweak.u[1];
+        memcpy(out, scratch.c, 16);
+#else
+        ((u64 *)out)[0] = scratch.u[0] ^ tweak.u[0];
+        ((u64 *)out)[1] = scratch.u[1] ^ tweak.u[1];
+#endif
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/o_dir.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/o_dir.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7019383
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/o_dir.c
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <e_os.h>
+
+/*
+ * The routines really come from the Levitte Programming, so to make life
+ * simple, let's just use the raw files and hack the symbols to fit our
+ * namespace.
+ */
+#define LP_DIR_CTX OPENSSL_DIR_CTX
+#define LP_dir_context_st OPENSSL_dir_context_st
+#define LP_find_file OPENSSL_DIR_read
+#define LP_find_file_end OPENSSL_DIR_end
+
+#include "internal/o_dir.h"
+
+#define LPDIR_H
+#if defined OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX || defined DJGPP \
+    || (defined __VMS_VER && __VMS_VER >= 70000000)
+# include "LPdir_unix.c"
+#elif defined OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+# include "LPdir_vms.c"
+#elif defined OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
+# include "LPdir_win32.c"
+#elif defined OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE
+# include "LPdir_wince.c"
+#else
+# include "LPdir_nyi.c"
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/o_fips.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/o_fips.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bf6db65
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/o_fips.c
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+# include <openssl/fips.h>
+#endif
+
+int FIPS_mode(void)
+{
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+    return FIPS_module_mode();
+#else
+    return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+int FIPS_mode_set(int r)
+{
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+    return FIPS_module_mode_set(r);
+#else
+    if (r == 0)
+        return 1;
+    CRYPTOerr(CRYPTO_F_FIPS_MODE_SET, CRYPTO_R_FIPS_MODE_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+    return 0;
+#endif
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/o_fopen.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/o_fopen.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a3a0065
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/o_fopen.c
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_STDIO)
+
+# include <stdio.h>
+
+FILE *openssl_fopen(const char *filename, const char *mode)
+{
+    FILE *file = NULL;
+# if defined(_WIN32) && defined(CP_UTF8)
+    int sz, len_0 = (int)strlen(filename) + 1;
+    DWORD flags;
+
+    /*
+     * Basically there are three cases to cover: a) filename is
+     * pure ASCII string; b) actual UTF-8 encoded string and
+     * c) locale-ized string, i.e. one containing 8-bit
+     * characters that are meaningful in current system locale.
+     * If filename is pure ASCII or real UTF-8 encoded string,
+     * MultiByteToWideChar succeeds and _wfopen works. If
+     * filename is locale-ized string, chances are that
+     * MultiByteToWideChar fails reporting
+     * ERROR_NO_UNICODE_TRANSLATION, in which case we fall
+     * back to fopen...
+     */
+    if ((sz = MultiByteToWideChar(CP_UTF8, (flags = MB_ERR_INVALID_CHARS),
+                                  filename, len_0, NULL, 0)) > 0 ||
+        (GetLastError() == ERROR_INVALID_FLAGS &&
+         (sz = MultiByteToWideChar(CP_UTF8, (flags = 0),
+                                   filename, len_0, NULL, 0)) > 0)
+        ) {
+        WCHAR wmode[8];
+        WCHAR *wfilename = _alloca(sz * sizeof(WCHAR));
+
+        if (MultiByteToWideChar(CP_UTF8, flags,
+                                filename, len_0, wfilename, sz) &&
+            MultiByteToWideChar(CP_UTF8, 0, mode, strlen(mode) + 1,
+                                wmode, OSSL_NELEM(wmode)) &&
+            (file = _wfopen(wfilename, wmode)) == NULL &&
+            (errno == ENOENT || errno == EBADF)
+            ) {
+            /*
+             * UTF-8 decode succeeded, but no file, filename
+             * could still have been locale-ized...
+             */
+            file = fopen(filename, mode);
+        }
+    } else if (GetLastError() == ERROR_NO_UNICODE_TRANSLATION) {
+        file = fopen(filename, mode);
+    }
+# elif defined(__DJGPP__)
+    {
+        char *newname = NULL;
+
+        if (!HAS_LFN_SUPPORT(filename)) {
+            char *iterator;
+            char lastchar;
+
+            newname = OPENSSL_malloc(strlen(filename) + 1);
+            if (newname == NULL)
+                return NULL;
+
+            for (iterator = newname, lastchar = '\0';
+                *filename; filename++, iterator++) {
+                if (lastchar == '/' && filename[0] == '.'
+                    && filename[1] != '.' && filename[1] != '/') {
+                    /* Leading dots are not permitted in plain DOS. */
+                    *iterator = '_';
+                } else {
+                    *iterator = *filename;
+                }
+                lastchar = *filename;
+            }
+            *iterator = '\0';
+            filename = newname;
+        }
+        file = fopen(filename, mode);
+
+        OPENSSL_free(newname);
+    }
+# else
+    file = fopen(filename, mode);
+# endif
+    return file;
+}
+
+#else
+
+void *openssl_fopen(const char *filename, const char *mode)
+{
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/o_init.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/o_init.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2e0c126
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/o_init.c
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <e_os.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+# include <openssl/fips.h>
+# include <openssl/rand.h>
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Perform any essential OpenSSL initialization operations. Currently only
+ * sets FIPS callbacks
+ */
+
+void OPENSSL_init(void)
+{
+    static int done = 0;
+    if (done)
+        return;
+    done = 1;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+    FIPS_set_locking_callbacks(CRYPTO_lock, CRYPTO_add_lock);
+    FIPS_set_error_callbacks(ERR_put_error, ERR_add_error_vdata);
+    FIPS_set_malloc_callbacks(CRYPTO_malloc, CRYPTO_free);
+    RAND_init_fips();
+#endif
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/o_str.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/o_str.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..528655a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/o_str.c
@@ -0,0 +1,251 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2003-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <e_os.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "internal/o_str.h"
+
+int OPENSSL_memcmp(const void *v1, const void *v2, size_t n)
+{
+    const unsigned char *c1 = v1, *c2 = v2;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    while (n && (ret = *c1 - *c2) == 0)
+        n--, c1++, c2++;
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+char *CRYPTO_strdup(const char *str, const char* file, int line)
+{
+    char *ret;
+    size_t size;
+
+    if (str == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    size = strlen(str) + 1;
+    ret = CRYPTO_malloc(size, file, line);
+    if (ret != NULL)
+        memcpy(ret, str, size);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+char *CRYPTO_strndup(const char *str, size_t s, const char* file, int line)
+{
+    size_t maxlen;
+    char *ret;
+
+    if (str == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+
+    maxlen = OPENSSL_strnlen(str, s);
+
+    ret = CRYPTO_malloc(maxlen + 1, file, line);
+    if (ret) {
+        memcpy(ret, str, maxlen);
+        ret[maxlen] = '\0';
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+void *CRYPTO_memdup(const void *data, size_t siz, const char* file, int line)
+{
+    void *ret;
+
+    if (data == NULL || siz >= INT_MAX)
+        return NULL;
+
+    ret = CRYPTO_malloc(siz, file, line);
+    if (ret == NULL) {
+        CRYPTOerr(CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_MEMDUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    return memcpy(ret, data, siz);
+}
+
+size_t OPENSSL_strnlen(const char *str, size_t maxlen)
+{
+    const char *p;
+
+    for (p = str; maxlen-- != 0 && *p != '\0'; ++p) ;
+
+    return p - str;
+}
+
+size_t OPENSSL_strlcpy(char *dst, const char *src, size_t size)
+{
+    size_t l = 0;
+    for (; size > 1 && *src; size--) {
+        *dst++ = *src++;
+        l++;
+    }
+    if (size)
+        *dst = '\0';
+    return l + strlen(src);
+}
+
+size_t OPENSSL_strlcat(char *dst, const char *src, size_t size)
+{
+    size_t l = 0;
+    for (; size > 0 && *dst; size--, dst++)
+        l++;
+    return l + OPENSSL_strlcpy(dst, src, size);
+}
+
+int OPENSSL_hexchar2int(unsigned char c)
+{
+#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+    c = os_toebcdic[c];
+#endif
+
+    switch (c) {
+    case '0':
+        return 0;
+    case '1':
+        return 1;
+    case '2':
+        return 2;
+    case '3':
+        return 3;
+    case '4':
+          return 4;
+    case '5':
+          return 5;
+    case '6':
+          return 6;
+    case '7':
+          return 7;
+    case '8':
+          return 8;
+    case '9':
+          return 9;
+    case 'a': case 'A':
+          return 0x0A;
+    case 'b': case 'B':
+          return 0x0B;
+    case 'c': case 'C':
+          return 0x0C;
+    case 'd': case 'D':
+          return 0x0D;
+    case 'e': case 'E':
+          return 0x0E;
+    case 'f': case 'F':
+          return 0x0F;
+    }
+    return -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Give a string of hex digits convert to a buffer
+ */
+unsigned char *OPENSSL_hexstr2buf(const char *str, long *len)
+{
+    unsigned char *hexbuf, *q;
+    unsigned char ch, cl;
+    int chi, cli;
+    const unsigned char *p;
+    size_t s;
+
+    s = strlen(str);
+    if ((hexbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(s >> 1)) == NULL) {
+        CRYPTOerr(CRYPTO_F_OPENSSL_HEXSTR2BUF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    for (p = (const unsigned char *)str, q = hexbuf; *p; ) {
+        ch = *p++;
+        if (ch == ':')
+            continue;
+        cl = *p++;
+        if (!cl) {
+            CRYPTOerr(CRYPTO_F_OPENSSL_HEXSTR2BUF,
+                      CRYPTO_R_ODD_NUMBER_OF_DIGITS);
+            OPENSSL_free(hexbuf);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+        cli = OPENSSL_hexchar2int(cl);
+        chi = OPENSSL_hexchar2int(ch);
+        if (cli < 0 || chi < 0) {
+            OPENSSL_free(hexbuf);
+            CRYPTOerr(CRYPTO_F_OPENSSL_HEXSTR2BUF, CRYPTO_R_ILLEGAL_HEX_DIGIT);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+        *q++ = (unsigned char)((chi << 4) | cli);
+    }
+
+    if (len)
+        *len = q - hexbuf;
+    return hexbuf;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Given a buffer of length 'len' return a OPENSSL_malloc'ed string with its
+ * hex representation @@@ (Contents of buffer are always kept in ASCII, also
+ * on EBCDIC machines)
+ */
+char *OPENSSL_buf2hexstr(const unsigned char *buffer, long len)
+{
+    static const char hexdig[] = "0123456789ABCDEF";
+    char *tmp, *q;
+    const unsigned char *p;
+    int i;
+
+    if (len == 0)
+    {
+        return OPENSSL_zalloc(1);
+    }
+
+    if ((tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(len * 3)) == NULL) {
+        CRYPTOerr(CRYPTO_F_OPENSSL_BUF2HEXSTR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    q = tmp;
+    for (i = 0, p = buffer; i < len; i++, p++) {
+        *q++ = hexdig[(*p >> 4) & 0xf];
+        *q++ = hexdig[*p & 0xf];
+        *q++ = ':';
+    }
+    q[-1] = 0;
+#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+    ebcdic2ascii(tmp, tmp, q - tmp - 1);
+#endif
+
+    return tmp;
+}
+
+int openssl_strerror_r(int errnum, char *buf, size_t buflen)
+{
+#if defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER>=1400
+    return !strerror_s(buf, buflen, errnum);
+#elif defined(_GNU_SOURCE)
+    return strerror_r(errnum, buf, buflen) != NULL;
+#elif (defined(_POSIX_C_SOURCE) && _POSIX_C_SOURCE >= 200112L) || \
+      (defined(_XOPEN_SOURCE) && _XOPEN_SOURCE >= 600)
+    /*
+     * We can use "real" strerror_r. The OpenSSL version differs in that it
+     * gives 1 on success and 0 on failure for consistency with other OpenSSL
+     * functions. Real strerror_r does it the other way around
+     */
+    return !strerror_r(errnum, buf, buflen);
+#else
+    char *err;
+    /* Fall back to non-thread safe strerror()...its all we can do */
+    if (buflen < 2)
+        return 0;
+    err = strerror(errnum);
+    /* Can this ever happen? */
+    if (err == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    strncpy(buf, err, buflen - 1);
+    buf[buflen - 1] = '\0';
+    return 1;
+#endif
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/o_time.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/o_time.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b2fb38a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/o_time.c
@@ -0,0 +1,196 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2001-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/e_os2.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+
+struct tm *OPENSSL_gmtime(const time_t *timer, struct tm *result)
+{
+    struct tm *ts = NULL;
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_THREADS) && defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
+    {
+        /*
+         * On VMS, gmtime_r() takes a 32-bit pointer as second argument.
+         * Since we can't know that |result| is in a space that can easily
+         * translate to a 32-bit pointer, we must store temporarily on stack
+         * and copy the result.  The stack is always reachable with 32-bit
+         * pointers.
+         */
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE
+# pragma pointer_size save
+# pragma pointer_size 32
+#endif
+        struct tm data, *ts2 = &data;
+#if defined OPENSSL_SYS_VMS && __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE
+# pragma pointer_size restore
+#endif
+        if (gmtime_r(timer, ts2) == NULL)
+            return NULL;
+        memcpy(result, ts2, sizeof(struct tm));
+        ts = result;
+    }
+#elif defined(OPENSSL_THREADS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MACOSX)
+    if (gmtime_r(timer, result) == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    ts = result;
+#else
+    ts = gmtime(timer);
+    if (ts == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+
+    memcpy(result, ts, sizeof(struct tm));
+    ts = result;
+#endif
+    return ts;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Take a tm structure and add an offset to it. This avoids any OS issues
+ * with restricted date types and overflows which cause the year 2038
+ * problem.
+ */
+
+#define SECS_PER_DAY (24 * 60 * 60)
+
+static long date_to_julian(int y, int m, int d);
+static void julian_to_date(long jd, int *y, int *m, int *d);
+static int julian_adj(const struct tm *tm, int off_day, long offset_sec,
+                      long *pday, int *psec);
+
+int OPENSSL_gmtime_adj(struct tm *tm, int off_day, long offset_sec)
+{
+    int time_sec, time_year, time_month, time_day;
+    long time_jd;
+
+    /* Convert time and offset into Julian day and seconds */
+    if (!julian_adj(tm, off_day, offset_sec, &time_jd, &time_sec))
+        return 0;
+
+    /* Convert Julian day back to date */
+
+    julian_to_date(time_jd, &time_year, &time_month, &time_day);
+
+    if (time_year < 1900 || time_year > 9999)
+        return 0;
+
+    /* Update tm structure */
+
+    tm->tm_year = time_year - 1900;
+    tm->tm_mon = time_month - 1;
+    tm->tm_mday = time_day;
+
+    tm->tm_hour = time_sec / 3600;
+    tm->tm_min = (time_sec / 60) % 60;
+    tm->tm_sec = time_sec % 60;
+
+    return 1;
+
+}
+
+int OPENSSL_gmtime_diff(int *pday, int *psec,
+                        const struct tm *from, const struct tm *to)
+{
+    int from_sec, to_sec, diff_sec;
+    long from_jd, to_jd, diff_day;
+    if (!julian_adj(from, 0, 0, &from_jd, &from_sec))
+        return 0;
+    if (!julian_adj(to, 0, 0, &to_jd, &to_sec))
+        return 0;
+    diff_day = to_jd - from_jd;
+    diff_sec = to_sec - from_sec;
+    /* Adjust differences so both positive or both negative */
+    if (diff_day > 0 && diff_sec < 0) {
+        diff_day--;
+        diff_sec += SECS_PER_DAY;
+    }
+    if (diff_day < 0 && diff_sec > 0) {
+        diff_day++;
+        diff_sec -= SECS_PER_DAY;
+    }
+
+    if (pday)
+        *pday = (int)diff_day;
+    if (psec)
+        *psec = diff_sec;
+
+    return 1;
+
+}
+
+/* Convert tm structure and offset into julian day and seconds */
+static int julian_adj(const struct tm *tm, int off_day, long offset_sec,
+                      long *pday, int *psec)
+{
+    int offset_hms, offset_day;
+    long time_jd;
+    int time_year, time_month, time_day;
+    /* split offset into days and day seconds */
+    offset_day = offset_sec / SECS_PER_DAY;
+    /* Avoid sign issues with % operator */
+    offset_hms = offset_sec - (offset_day * SECS_PER_DAY);
+    offset_day += off_day;
+    /* Add current time seconds to offset */
+    offset_hms += tm->tm_hour * 3600 + tm->tm_min * 60 + tm->tm_sec;
+    /* Adjust day seconds if overflow */
+    if (offset_hms >= SECS_PER_DAY) {
+        offset_day++;
+        offset_hms -= SECS_PER_DAY;
+    } else if (offset_hms < 0) {
+        offset_day--;
+        offset_hms += SECS_PER_DAY;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Convert date of time structure into a Julian day number.
+     */
+
+    time_year = tm->tm_year + 1900;
+    time_month = tm->tm_mon + 1;
+    time_day = tm->tm_mday;
+
+    time_jd = date_to_julian(time_year, time_month, time_day);
+
+    /* Work out Julian day of new date */
+    time_jd += offset_day;
+
+    if (time_jd < 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    *pday = time_jd;
+    *psec = offset_hms;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convert date to and from julian day Uses Fliegel & Van Flandern algorithm
+ */
+static long date_to_julian(int y, int m, int d)
+{
+    return (1461 * (y + 4800 + (m - 14) / 12)) / 4 +
+        (367 * (m - 2 - 12 * ((m - 14) / 12))) / 12 -
+        (3 * ((y + 4900 + (m - 14) / 12) / 100)) / 4 + d - 32075;
+}
+
+static void julian_to_date(long jd, int *y, int *m, int *d)
+{
+    long L = jd + 68569;
+    long n = (4 * L) / 146097;
+    long i, j;
+
+    L = L - (146097 * n + 3) / 4;
+    i = (4000 * (L + 1)) / 1461001;
+    L = L - (1461 * i) / 4 + 31;
+    j = (80 * L) / 2447;
+    *d = L - (2447 * j) / 80;
+    L = j / 11;
+    *m = j + 2 - (12 * L);
+    *y = 100 * (n - 49) + i + L;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/objects/README b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/objects/README
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cb1d216
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/objects/README
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+objects.txt syntax
+------------------
+
+To cover all the naming hacks that were previously in objects.h needed some
+kind of hacks in objects.txt.
+
+The basic syntax for adding an object is as follows:
+
+	1 2 3 4		: shortName	: Long Name
+
+		If Long Name contains only word characters and hyphen-minus
+		(0x2D) or full stop (0x2E) then Long Name is used as basis
+		for the base name in C. Otherwise, the shortName is used.
+
+		The base name (let's call it 'base') will then be used to
+		create the C macros SN_base, LN_base, NID_base and OBJ_base.
+
+		Note that if the base name contains spaces, dashes or periods,
+		those will be converte to underscore.
+
+Then there are some extra commands:
+
+	!Alias foo 1 2 3 4
+
+		This just makes a name foo for an OID.  The C macro
+		OBJ_foo will be created as a result.
+
+	!Cname foo
+
+		This makes sure that the name foo will be used as base name
+		in C.
+
+	!module foo
+	1 2 3 4		: shortName	: Long Name
+	!global
+
+		The !module command was meant to define a kind of modularity.
+		What it does is to make sure the module name is prepended
+		to the base name.  !global turns this off.  This construction
+		is not recursive.
+
+Lines starting with # are treated as comments, as well as any line starting
+with ! and not matching the commands above.
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/objects/build.info b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/objects/build.info
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..38e2907
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/objects/build.info
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+LIBS=../../libcrypto
+SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
+        o_names.c obj_dat.c obj_lib.c obj_err.c obj_xref.c
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/objects/o_names.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/objects/o_names.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..15fe653
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/objects/o_names.c
@@ -0,0 +1,407 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1998-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/lhash.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/safestack.h>
+#include <openssl/e_os2.h>
+#include <internal/thread_once.h>
+#include "obj_lcl.h"
+
+/*
+ * We define this wrapper for two reasons. Firstly, later versions of
+ * DEC C add linkage information to certain functions, which makes it
+ * tricky to use them as values to regular function pointers.
+ * Secondly, in the EDK2 build environment, the strcmp function is
+ * actually an external function (AsciiStrCmp) with the Microsoft ABI,
+ * so we can't transparently assign function pointers to it.
+ * Arguably the latter is a stupidity of the UEFI environment, but
+ * since the wrapper solves the DEC C issue too, let's just use the
+ * same solution.
+ */
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS_DECC) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI)
+static int obj_strcmp(const char *a, const char *b)
+{
+    return strcmp(a, b);
+}
+#else
+#define obj_strcmp strcmp
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * I use the ex_data stuff to manage the identifiers for the obj_name_types
+ * that applications may define.  I only really use the free function field.
+ */
+static LHASH_OF(OBJ_NAME) *names_lh = NULL;
+static int names_type_num = OBJ_NAME_TYPE_NUM;
+static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock = NULL;
+
+struct name_funcs_st {
+    unsigned long (*hash_func) (const char *name);
+    int (*cmp_func) (const char *a, const char *b);
+    void (*free_func) (const char *, int, const char *);
+};
+
+static STACK_OF(NAME_FUNCS) *name_funcs_stack;
+
+/*
+ * The LHASH callbacks now use the raw "void *" prototypes and do
+ * per-variable casting in the functions. This prevents function pointer
+ * casting without the need for macro-generated wrapper functions.
+ */
+
+static unsigned long obj_name_hash(const OBJ_NAME *a);
+static int obj_name_cmp(const OBJ_NAME *a, const OBJ_NAME *b);
+
+static CRYPTO_ONCE init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
+DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(o_names_init)
+{
+    CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_DISABLE);
+    names_lh = lh_OBJ_NAME_new(obj_name_hash, obj_name_cmp);
+    lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
+    CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE);
+    return names_lh != NULL && lock != NULL;
+}
+
+int OBJ_NAME_init(void)
+{
+    return RUN_ONCE(&init, o_names_init);
+}
+
+int OBJ_NAME_new_index(unsigned long (*hash_func) (const char *),
+                       int (*cmp_func) (const char *, const char *),
+                       void (*free_func) (const char *, int, const char *))
+{
+    int ret = 0, i, push;
+    NAME_FUNCS *name_funcs;
+
+    if (!OBJ_NAME_init())
+        return 0;
+
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(lock);
+
+    if (name_funcs_stack == NULL) {
+        CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_DISABLE);
+        name_funcs_stack = sk_NAME_FUNCS_new_null();
+        CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE);
+    }
+    if (name_funcs_stack == NULL) {
+        /* ERROR */
+        goto out;
+    }
+    ret = names_type_num;
+    names_type_num++;
+    for (i = sk_NAME_FUNCS_num(name_funcs_stack); i < names_type_num; i++) {
+        CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_DISABLE);
+        name_funcs = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*name_funcs));
+        CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE);
+        if (name_funcs == NULL) {
+            OBJerr(OBJ_F_OBJ_NAME_NEW_INDEX, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            ret = 0;
+            goto out;
+        }
+        name_funcs->hash_func = OPENSSL_LH_strhash;
+        name_funcs->cmp_func = obj_strcmp;
+        CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_DISABLE);
+
+        push = sk_NAME_FUNCS_push(name_funcs_stack, name_funcs);
+        CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE);
+
+        if (!push) {
+            OBJerr(OBJ_F_OBJ_NAME_NEW_INDEX, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            OPENSSL_free(name_funcs);
+            ret = 0;
+            goto out;
+        }
+    }
+    name_funcs = sk_NAME_FUNCS_value(name_funcs_stack, ret);
+    if (hash_func != NULL)
+        name_funcs->hash_func = hash_func;
+    if (cmp_func != NULL)
+        name_funcs->cmp_func = cmp_func;
+    if (free_func != NULL)
+        name_funcs->free_func = free_func;
+
+out:
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(lock);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int obj_name_cmp(const OBJ_NAME *a, const OBJ_NAME *b)
+{
+    int ret;
+
+    ret = a->type - b->type;
+    if (ret == 0) {
+        if ((name_funcs_stack != NULL)
+            && (sk_NAME_FUNCS_num(name_funcs_stack) > a->type)) {
+            ret = sk_NAME_FUNCS_value(name_funcs_stack,
+                                      a->type)->cmp_func(a->name, b->name);
+        } else
+            ret = strcmp(a->name, b->name);
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static unsigned long obj_name_hash(const OBJ_NAME *a)
+{
+    unsigned long ret;
+
+    if ((name_funcs_stack != NULL)
+        && (sk_NAME_FUNCS_num(name_funcs_stack) > a->type)) {
+        ret =
+            sk_NAME_FUNCS_value(name_funcs_stack,
+                                a->type)->hash_func(a->name);
+    } else {
+        ret = OPENSSL_LH_strhash(a->name);
+    }
+    ret ^= a->type;
+    return ret;
+}
+
+const char *OBJ_NAME_get(const char *name, int type)
+{
+    OBJ_NAME on, *ret;
+    int num = 0, alias;
+    const char *value = NULL;
+
+    if (name == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    if (!OBJ_NAME_init())
+        return NULL;
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(lock);
+
+    alias = type & OBJ_NAME_ALIAS;
+    type &= ~OBJ_NAME_ALIAS;
+
+    on.name = name;
+    on.type = type;
+
+    for (;;) {
+        ret = lh_OBJ_NAME_retrieve(names_lh, &on);
+        if (ret == NULL)
+            break;
+        if ((ret->alias) && !alias) {
+            if (++num > 10)
+                break;
+            on.name = ret->data;
+        } else {
+            value = ret->data;
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(lock);    
+    return value;
+}
+
+int OBJ_NAME_add(const char *name, int type, const char *data)
+{
+    OBJ_NAME *onp, *ret;
+    int alias, ok = 0;
+
+    if (!OBJ_NAME_init())
+        return 0;    
+
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(lock);
+
+    alias = type & OBJ_NAME_ALIAS;
+    type &= ~OBJ_NAME_ALIAS;
+
+    onp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*onp));
+    if (onp == NULL) {
+        /* ERROR */
+        goto unlock;
+    }
+
+    onp->name = name;
+    onp->alias = alias;
+    onp->type = type;
+    onp->data = data;
+
+    ret = lh_OBJ_NAME_insert(names_lh, onp);
+    if (ret != NULL) {
+        /* free things */
+        if ((name_funcs_stack != NULL)
+            && (sk_NAME_FUNCS_num(name_funcs_stack) > ret->type)) {
+            /*
+             * XXX: I'm not sure I understand why the free function should
+             * get three arguments... -- Richard Levitte
+             */
+            sk_NAME_FUNCS_value(name_funcs_stack,
+                                ret->type)->free_func(ret->name, ret->type,
+                                                      ret->data);
+        }
+        OPENSSL_free(ret);
+    } else {
+        if (lh_OBJ_NAME_error(names_lh)) {
+            /* ERROR */
+            OPENSSL_free(onp);
+            goto unlock;
+        }
+    }
+
+    ok = 1;
+
+unlock:
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(lock);
+    return ok;
+}
+
+int OBJ_NAME_remove(const char *name, int type)
+{
+    OBJ_NAME on, *ret;
+    int ok = 0;
+
+    if (!OBJ_NAME_init())
+        return 0;
+
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(lock);
+
+    type &= ~OBJ_NAME_ALIAS;
+    on.name = name;
+    on.type = type;
+    ret = lh_OBJ_NAME_delete(names_lh, &on);
+    if (ret != NULL) {
+        /* free things */
+        if ((name_funcs_stack != NULL)
+            && (sk_NAME_FUNCS_num(name_funcs_stack) > ret->type)) {
+            /*
+             * XXX: I'm not sure I understand why the free function should
+             * get three arguments... -- Richard Levitte
+             */
+            sk_NAME_FUNCS_value(name_funcs_stack,
+                                ret->type)->free_func(ret->name, ret->type,
+                                                      ret->data);
+        }
+        OPENSSL_free(ret);
+        ok = 1;
+    }
+
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(lock);
+    return ok;
+}
+
+typedef struct {
+    int type;
+    void (*fn) (const OBJ_NAME *, void *arg);
+    void *arg;
+} OBJ_DOALL;
+
+static void do_all_fn(const OBJ_NAME *name, OBJ_DOALL *d)
+{
+    if (name->type == d->type)
+        d->fn(name, d->arg);
+}
+
+IMPLEMENT_LHASH_DOALL_ARG_CONST(OBJ_NAME, OBJ_DOALL);
+
+void OBJ_NAME_do_all(int type, void (*fn) (const OBJ_NAME *, void *arg),
+                     void *arg)
+{
+    OBJ_DOALL d;
+
+    d.type = type;
+    d.fn = fn;
+    d.arg = arg;
+
+    lh_OBJ_NAME_doall_OBJ_DOALL(names_lh, do_all_fn, &d);
+}
+
+struct doall_sorted {
+    int type;
+    int n;
+    const OBJ_NAME **names;
+};
+
+static void do_all_sorted_fn(const OBJ_NAME *name, void *d_)
+{
+    struct doall_sorted *d = d_;
+
+    if (name->type != d->type)
+        return;
+
+    d->names[d->n++] = name;
+}
+
+static int do_all_sorted_cmp(const void *n1_, const void *n2_)
+{
+    const OBJ_NAME *const *n1 = n1_;
+    const OBJ_NAME *const *n2 = n2_;
+
+    return strcmp((*n1)->name, (*n2)->name);
+}
+
+void OBJ_NAME_do_all_sorted(int type,
+                            void (*fn) (const OBJ_NAME *, void *arg),
+                            void *arg)
+{
+    struct doall_sorted d;
+    int n;
+
+    d.type = type;
+    d.names =
+        OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*d.names) * lh_OBJ_NAME_num_items(names_lh));
+    /* Really should return an error if !d.names...but its a void function! */
+    if (d.names != NULL) {
+        d.n = 0;
+        OBJ_NAME_do_all(type, do_all_sorted_fn, &d);
+
+        qsort((void *)d.names, d.n, sizeof(*d.names), do_all_sorted_cmp);
+
+        for (n = 0; n < d.n; ++n)
+            fn(d.names[n], arg);
+
+        OPENSSL_free((void *)d.names);
+    }
+}
+
+static int free_type;
+
+static void names_lh_free_doall(OBJ_NAME *onp)
+{
+    if (onp == NULL)
+        return;
+
+    if (free_type < 0 || free_type == onp->type)
+        OBJ_NAME_remove(onp->name, onp->type);
+}
+
+static void name_funcs_free(NAME_FUNCS *ptr)
+{
+    OPENSSL_free(ptr);
+}
+
+void OBJ_NAME_cleanup(int type)
+{
+    unsigned long down_load;
+
+    if (names_lh == NULL)
+        return;
+
+    free_type = type;
+    down_load = lh_OBJ_NAME_get_down_load(names_lh);
+    lh_OBJ_NAME_set_down_load(names_lh, 0);
+
+    lh_OBJ_NAME_doall(names_lh, names_lh_free_doall);
+    if (type < 0) {
+        lh_OBJ_NAME_free(names_lh);
+        sk_NAME_FUNCS_pop_free(name_funcs_stack, name_funcs_free);
+        CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(lock);
+        names_lh = NULL;
+        name_funcs_stack = NULL;
+        lock = NULL;
+    } else
+        lh_OBJ_NAME_set_down_load(names_lh, down_load);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..21a1f05
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c
@@ -0,0 +1,738 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/lhash.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include "internal/objects.h"
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include "internal/asn1_int.h"
+#include "obj_lcl.h"
+
+/* obj_dat.h is generated from objects.h by obj_dat.pl */
+#include "obj_dat.h"
+
+DECLARE_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(const ASN1_OBJECT *, unsigned int, sn);
+DECLARE_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(const ASN1_OBJECT *, unsigned int, ln);
+DECLARE_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(const ASN1_OBJECT *, unsigned int, obj);
+
+#define ADDED_DATA      0
+#define ADDED_SNAME     1
+#define ADDED_LNAME     2
+#define ADDED_NID       3
+
+struct added_obj_st {
+    int type;
+    ASN1_OBJECT *obj;
+};
+
+static int new_nid = NUM_NID;
+static LHASH_OF(ADDED_OBJ) *added = NULL;
+
+static int sn_cmp(const ASN1_OBJECT *const *a, const unsigned int *b)
+{
+    return (strcmp((*a)->sn, nid_objs[*b].sn));
+}
+
+IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(const ASN1_OBJECT *, unsigned int, sn);
+
+static int ln_cmp(const ASN1_OBJECT *const *a, const unsigned int *b)
+{
+    return (strcmp((*a)->ln, nid_objs[*b].ln));
+}
+
+IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(const ASN1_OBJECT *, unsigned int, ln);
+
+static unsigned long added_obj_hash(const ADDED_OBJ *ca)
+{
+    const ASN1_OBJECT *a;
+    int i;
+    unsigned long ret = 0;
+    unsigned char *p;
+
+    a = ca->obj;
+    switch (ca->type) {
+    case ADDED_DATA:
+        ret = a->length << 20L;
+        p = (unsigned char *)a->data;
+        for (i = 0; i < a->length; i++)
+            ret ^= p[i] << ((i * 3) % 24);
+        break;
+    case ADDED_SNAME:
+        ret = OPENSSL_LH_strhash(a->sn);
+        break;
+    case ADDED_LNAME:
+        ret = OPENSSL_LH_strhash(a->ln);
+        break;
+    case ADDED_NID:
+        ret = a->nid;
+        break;
+    default:
+        /* abort(); */
+        return 0;
+    }
+    ret &= 0x3fffffffL;
+    ret |= ((unsigned long)ca->type) << 30L;
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static int added_obj_cmp(const ADDED_OBJ *ca, const ADDED_OBJ *cb)
+{
+    ASN1_OBJECT *a, *b;
+    int i;
+
+    i = ca->type - cb->type;
+    if (i)
+        return (i);
+    a = ca->obj;
+    b = cb->obj;
+    switch (ca->type) {
+    case ADDED_DATA:
+        i = (a->length - b->length);
+        if (i)
+            return (i);
+        return (memcmp(a->data, b->data, (size_t)a->length));
+    case ADDED_SNAME:
+        if (a->sn == NULL)
+            return (-1);
+        else if (b->sn == NULL)
+            return (1);
+        else
+            return (strcmp(a->sn, b->sn));
+    case ADDED_LNAME:
+        if (a->ln == NULL)
+            return (-1);
+        else if (b->ln == NULL)
+            return (1);
+        else
+            return (strcmp(a->ln, b->ln));
+    case ADDED_NID:
+        return (a->nid - b->nid);
+    default:
+        /* abort(); */
+        return 0;
+    }
+}
+
+static int init_added(void)
+{
+    if (added != NULL)
+        return (1);
+    added = lh_ADDED_OBJ_new(added_obj_hash, added_obj_cmp);
+    return (added != NULL);
+}
+
+static void cleanup1_doall(ADDED_OBJ *a)
+{
+    a->obj->nid = 0;
+    a->obj->flags |= ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC |
+        ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_STRINGS | ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_DATA;
+}
+
+static void cleanup2_doall(ADDED_OBJ *a)
+{
+    a->obj->nid++;
+}
+
+static void cleanup3_doall(ADDED_OBJ *a)
+{
+    if (--a->obj->nid == 0)
+        ASN1_OBJECT_free(a->obj);
+    OPENSSL_free(a);
+}
+
+void obj_cleanup_int(void)
+{
+    if (added == NULL)
+        return;
+    lh_ADDED_OBJ_set_down_load(added, 0);
+    lh_ADDED_OBJ_doall(added, cleanup1_doall); /* zero counters */
+    lh_ADDED_OBJ_doall(added, cleanup2_doall); /* set counters */
+    lh_ADDED_OBJ_doall(added, cleanup3_doall); /* free objects */
+    lh_ADDED_OBJ_free(added);
+    added = NULL;
+}
+
+int OBJ_new_nid(int num)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    i = new_nid;
+    new_nid += num;
+    return (i);
+}
+
+int OBJ_add_object(const ASN1_OBJECT *obj)
+{
+    ASN1_OBJECT *o;
+    ADDED_OBJ *ao[4] = { NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL }, *aop;
+    int i;
+
+    if (added == NULL)
+        if (!init_added())
+            return (0);
+    if ((o = OBJ_dup(obj)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if ((ao[ADDED_NID] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ao[0]))) == NULL)
+        goto err2;
+    if ((o->length != 0) && (obj->data != NULL))
+        if ((ao[ADDED_DATA] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ao[0]))) == NULL)
+            goto err2;
+    if (o->sn != NULL)
+        if ((ao[ADDED_SNAME] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ao[0]))) == NULL)
+            goto err2;
+    if (o->ln != NULL)
+        if ((ao[ADDED_LNAME] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ao[0]))) == NULL)
+            goto err2;
+
+    for (i = ADDED_DATA; i <= ADDED_NID; i++) {
+        if (ao[i] != NULL) {
+            ao[i]->type = i;
+            ao[i]->obj = o;
+            aop = lh_ADDED_OBJ_insert(added, ao[i]);
+            /* memory leak, but should not normally matter */
+            OPENSSL_free(aop);
+        }
+    }
+    o->flags &=
+        ~(ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC | ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_STRINGS |
+          ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_DATA);
+
+    return (o->nid);
+ err2:
+    OBJerr(OBJ_F_OBJ_ADD_OBJECT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ err:
+    for (i = ADDED_DATA; i <= ADDED_NID; i++)
+        OPENSSL_free(ao[i]);
+    ASN1_OBJECT_free(o);
+    return NID_undef;
+}
+
+ASN1_OBJECT *OBJ_nid2obj(int n)
+{
+    ADDED_OBJ ad, *adp;
+    ASN1_OBJECT ob;
+
+    if ((n >= 0) && (n < NUM_NID)) {
+        if ((n != NID_undef) && (nid_objs[n].nid == NID_undef)) {
+            OBJerr(OBJ_F_OBJ_NID2OBJ, OBJ_R_UNKNOWN_NID);
+            return (NULL);
+        }
+        return ((ASN1_OBJECT *)&(nid_objs[n]));
+    } else if (added == NULL)
+        return (NULL);
+    else {
+        ad.type = ADDED_NID;
+        ad.obj = &ob;
+        ob.nid = n;
+        adp = lh_ADDED_OBJ_retrieve(added, &ad);
+        if (adp != NULL)
+            return (adp->obj);
+        else {
+            OBJerr(OBJ_F_OBJ_NID2OBJ, OBJ_R_UNKNOWN_NID);
+            return (NULL);
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+const char *OBJ_nid2sn(int n)
+{
+    ADDED_OBJ ad, *adp;
+    ASN1_OBJECT ob;
+
+    if ((n >= 0) && (n < NUM_NID)) {
+        if ((n != NID_undef) && (nid_objs[n].nid == NID_undef)) {
+            OBJerr(OBJ_F_OBJ_NID2SN, OBJ_R_UNKNOWN_NID);
+            return (NULL);
+        }
+        return (nid_objs[n].sn);
+    } else if (added == NULL)
+        return (NULL);
+    else {
+        ad.type = ADDED_NID;
+        ad.obj = &ob;
+        ob.nid = n;
+        adp = lh_ADDED_OBJ_retrieve(added, &ad);
+        if (adp != NULL)
+            return (adp->obj->sn);
+        else {
+            OBJerr(OBJ_F_OBJ_NID2SN, OBJ_R_UNKNOWN_NID);
+            return (NULL);
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+const char *OBJ_nid2ln(int n)
+{
+    ADDED_OBJ ad, *adp;
+    ASN1_OBJECT ob;
+
+    if ((n >= 0) && (n < NUM_NID)) {
+        if ((n != NID_undef) && (nid_objs[n].nid == NID_undef)) {
+            OBJerr(OBJ_F_OBJ_NID2LN, OBJ_R_UNKNOWN_NID);
+            return (NULL);
+        }
+        return (nid_objs[n].ln);
+    } else if (added == NULL)
+        return (NULL);
+    else {
+        ad.type = ADDED_NID;
+        ad.obj = &ob;
+        ob.nid = n;
+        adp = lh_ADDED_OBJ_retrieve(added, &ad);
+        if (adp != NULL)
+            return (adp->obj->ln);
+        else {
+            OBJerr(OBJ_F_OBJ_NID2LN, OBJ_R_UNKNOWN_NID);
+            return (NULL);
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+static int obj_cmp(const ASN1_OBJECT *const *ap, const unsigned int *bp)
+{
+    int j;
+    const ASN1_OBJECT *a = *ap;
+    const ASN1_OBJECT *b = &nid_objs[*bp];
+
+    j = (a->length - b->length);
+    if (j)
+        return (j);
+    if (a->length == 0)
+        return 0;
+    return (memcmp(a->data, b->data, a->length));
+}
+
+IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(const ASN1_OBJECT *, unsigned int, obj);
+
+int OBJ_obj2nid(const ASN1_OBJECT *a)
+{
+    const unsigned int *op;
+    ADDED_OBJ ad, *adp;
+
+    if (a == NULL)
+        return (NID_undef);
+    if (a->nid != 0)
+        return (a->nid);
+
+    if (a->length == 0)
+        return NID_undef;
+
+    if (added != NULL) {
+        ad.type = ADDED_DATA;
+        ad.obj = (ASN1_OBJECT *)a; /* XXX: ugly but harmless */
+        adp = lh_ADDED_OBJ_retrieve(added, &ad);
+        if (adp != NULL)
+            return (adp->obj->nid);
+    }
+    op = OBJ_bsearch_obj(&a, obj_objs, NUM_OBJ);
+    if (op == NULL)
+        return (NID_undef);
+    return (nid_objs[*op].nid);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convert an object name into an ASN1_OBJECT if "noname" is not set then
+ * search for short and long names first. This will convert the "dotted" form
+ * into an object: unlike OBJ_txt2nid it can be used with any objects, not
+ * just registered ones.
+ */
+
+ASN1_OBJECT *OBJ_txt2obj(const char *s, int no_name)
+{
+    int nid = NID_undef;
+    ASN1_OBJECT *op = NULL;
+    unsigned char *buf;
+    unsigned char *p;
+    const unsigned char *cp;
+    int i, j;
+
+    if (!no_name) {
+        if (((nid = OBJ_sn2nid(s)) != NID_undef) ||
+            ((nid = OBJ_ln2nid(s)) != NID_undef))
+            return OBJ_nid2obj(nid);
+    }
+
+    /* Work out size of content octets */
+    i = a2d_ASN1_OBJECT(NULL, 0, s, -1);
+    if (i <= 0) {
+        /* Don't clear the error */
+        /*
+         * ERR_clear_error();
+         */
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    /* Work out total size */
+    j = ASN1_object_size(0, i, V_ASN1_OBJECT);
+    if (j < 0)
+        return NULL;
+
+    if ((buf = OPENSSL_malloc(j)) == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+
+    p = buf;
+    /* Write out tag+length */
+    ASN1_put_object(&p, 0, i, V_ASN1_OBJECT, V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL);
+    /* Write out contents */
+    a2d_ASN1_OBJECT(p, i, s, -1);
+
+    cp = buf;
+    op = d2i_ASN1_OBJECT(NULL, &cp, j);
+    OPENSSL_free(buf);
+    return op;
+}
+
+int OBJ_obj2txt(char *buf, int buf_len, const ASN1_OBJECT *a, int no_name)
+{
+    int i, n = 0, len, nid, first, use_bn;
+    BIGNUM *bl;
+    unsigned long l;
+    const unsigned char *p;
+    char tbuf[DECIMAL_SIZE(i) + DECIMAL_SIZE(l) + 2];
+
+    /* Ensure that, at every state, |buf| is NUL-terminated. */
+    if (buf && buf_len > 0)
+        buf[0] = '\0';
+
+    if ((a == NULL) || (a->data == NULL))
+        return (0);
+
+    if (!no_name && (nid = OBJ_obj2nid(a)) != NID_undef) {
+        const char *s;
+        s = OBJ_nid2ln(nid);
+        if (s == NULL)
+            s = OBJ_nid2sn(nid);
+        if (s) {
+            if (buf)
+                OPENSSL_strlcpy(buf, s, buf_len);
+            n = strlen(s);
+            return n;
+        }
+    }
+
+    len = a->length;
+    p = a->data;
+
+    first = 1;
+    bl = NULL;
+
+    while (len > 0) {
+        l = 0;
+        use_bn = 0;
+        for (;;) {
+            unsigned char c = *p++;
+            len--;
+            if ((len == 0) && (c & 0x80))
+                goto err;
+            if (use_bn) {
+                if (!BN_add_word(bl, c & 0x7f))
+                    goto err;
+            } else
+                l |= c & 0x7f;
+            if (!(c & 0x80))
+                break;
+            if (!use_bn && (l > (ULONG_MAX >> 7L))) {
+                if (bl == NULL && (bl = BN_new()) == NULL)
+                    goto err;
+                if (!BN_set_word(bl, l))
+                    goto err;
+                use_bn = 1;
+            }
+            if (use_bn) {
+                if (!BN_lshift(bl, bl, 7))
+                    goto err;
+            } else
+                l <<= 7L;
+        }
+
+        if (first) {
+            first = 0;
+            if (l >= 80) {
+                i = 2;
+                if (use_bn) {
+                    if (!BN_sub_word(bl, 80))
+                        goto err;
+                } else
+                    l -= 80;
+            } else {
+                i = (int)(l / 40);
+                l -= (long)(i * 40);
+            }
+            if (buf && (buf_len > 1)) {
+                *buf++ = i + '0';
+                *buf = '\0';
+                buf_len--;
+            }
+            n++;
+        }
+
+        if (use_bn) {
+            char *bndec;
+            bndec = BN_bn2dec(bl);
+            if (!bndec)
+                goto err;
+            i = strlen(bndec);
+            if (buf) {
+                if (buf_len > 1) {
+                    *buf++ = '.';
+                    *buf = '\0';
+                    buf_len--;
+                }
+                OPENSSL_strlcpy(buf, bndec, buf_len);
+                if (i > buf_len) {
+                    buf += buf_len;
+                    buf_len = 0;
+                } else {
+                    buf += i;
+                    buf_len -= i;
+                }
+            }
+            n++;
+            n += i;
+            OPENSSL_free(bndec);
+        } else {
+            BIO_snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), ".%lu", l);
+            i = strlen(tbuf);
+            if (buf && (buf_len > 0)) {
+                OPENSSL_strlcpy(buf, tbuf, buf_len);
+                if (i > buf_len) {
+                    buf += buf_len;
+                    buf_len = 0;
+                } else {
+                    buf += i;
+                    buf_len -= i;
+                }
+            }
+            n += i;
+            l = 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    BN_free(bl);
+    return n;
+
+ err:
+    BN_free(bl);
+    return -1;
+}
+
+int OBJ_txt2nid(const char *s)
+{
+    ASN1_OBJECT *obj;
+    int nid;
+    obj = OBJ_txt2obj(s, 0);
+    nid = OBJ_obj2nid(obj);
+    ASN1_OBJECT_free(obj);
+    return nid;
+}
+
+int OBJ_ln2nid(const char *s)
+{
+    ASN1_OBJECT o;
+    const ASN1_OBJECT *oo = &o;
+    ADDED_OBJ ad, *adp;
+    const unsigned int *op;
+
+    o.ln = s;
+    if (added != NULL) {
+        ad.type = ADDED_LNAME;
+        ad.obj = &o;
+        adp = lh_ADDED_OBJ_retrieve(added, &ad);
+        if (adp != NULL)
+            return (adp->obj->nid);
+    }
+    op = OBJ_bsearch_ln(&oo, ln_objs, NUM_LN);
+    if (op == NULL)
+        return (NID_undef);
+    return (nid_objs[*op].nid);
+}
+
+int OBJ_sn2nid(const char *s)
+{
+    ASN1_OBJECT o;
+    const ASN1_OBJECT *oo = &o;
+    ADDED_OBJ ad, *adp;
+    const unsigned int *op;
+
+    o.sn = s;
+    if (added != NULL) {
+        ad.type = ADDED_SNAME;
+        ad.obj = &o;
+        adp = lh_ADDED_OBJ_retrieve(added, &ad);
+        if (adp != NULL)
+            return (adp->obj->nid);
+    }
+    op = OBJ_bsearch_sn(&oo, sn_objs, NUM_SN);
+    if (op == NULL)
+        return (NID_undef);
+    return (nid_objs[*op].nid);
+}
+
+const void *OBJ_bsearch_(const void *key, const void *base, int num, int size,
+                         int (*cmp) (const void *, const void *))
+{
+    return OBJ_bsearch_ex_(key, base, num, size, cmp, 0);
+}
+
+const void *OBJ_bsearch_ex_(const void *key, const void *base_, int num,
+                            int size,
+                            int (*cmp) (const void *, const void *),
+                            int flags)
+{
+    const char *base = base_;
+    int l, h, i = 0, c = 0;
+    const char *p = NULL;
+
+    if (num == 0)
+        return (NULL);
+    l = 0;
+    h = num;
+    while (l < h) {
+        i = (l + h) / 2;
+        p = &(base[i * size]);
+        c = (*cmp) (key, p);
+        if (c < 0)
+            h = i;
+        else if (c > 0)
+            l = i + 1;
+        else
+            break;
+    }
+#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+    /*
+     * THIS IS A KLUDGE - Because the *_obj is sorted in ASCII order, and I
+     * don't have perl (yet), we revert to a *LINEAR* search when the object
+     * wasn't found in the binary search.
+     */
+    if (c != 0) {
+        for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) {
+            p = &(base[i * size]);
+            c = (*cmp) (key, p);
+            if (c == 0 || (c < 0 && (flags & OBJ_BSEARCH_VALUE_ON_NOMATCH)))
+                return p;
+        }
+    }
+#endif
+    if (c != 0 && !(flags & OBJ_BSEARCH_VALUE_ON_NOMATCH))
+        p = NULL;
+    else if (c == 0 && (flags & OBJ_BSEARCH_FIRST_VALUE_ON_MATCH)) {
+        while (i > 0 && (*cmp) (key, &(base[(i - 1) * size])) == 0)
+            i--;
+        p = &(base[i * size]);
+    }
+    return (p);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Parse a BIO sink to create some extra oid's objects.
+ * Line format:<OID:isdigit or '.']><isspace><SN><isspace><LN>
+ */
+int OBJ_create_objects(BIO *in)
+{
+    char buf[512];
+    int i, num = 0;
+    char *o, *s, *l = NULL;
+
+    for (;;) {
+        s = o = NULL;
+        i = BIO_gets(in, buf, 512);
+        if (i <= 0)
+            return (num);
+        buf[i - 1] = '\0';
+        if (!isalnum((unsigned char)buf[0]))
+            return (num);
+        o = s = buf;
+        while (isdigit((unsigned char)*s) || (*s == '.'))
+            s++;
+        if (*s != '\0') {
+            *(s++) = '\0';
+            while (isspace((unsigned char)*s))
+                s++;
+            if (*s == '\0') {
+                s = NULL;
+            } else {
+                l = s;
+                while ((*l != '\0') && !isspace((unsigned char)*l))
+                    l++;
+                if (*l != '\0') {
+                    *(l++) = '\0';
+                    while (isspace((unsigned char)*l))
+                        l++;
+                    if (*l == '\0') {
+                        l = NULL;
+                    }
+                } else {
+                    l = NULL;
+                }
+            }
+        } else {
+            s = NULL;
+        }
+        if (*o == '\0')
+            return num;
+        if (!OBJ_create(o, s, l))
+            return (num);
+        num++;
+    }
+    /* return(num); */
+}
+
+int OBJ_create(const char *oid, const char *sn, const char *ln)
+{
+    ASN1_OBJECT *tmpoid = NULL;
+    int ok = 0;
+
+    /* Check to see if short or long name already present */
+    if ((sn != NULL && OBJ_sn2nid(sn) != NID_undef)
+            || (ln != NULL && OBJ_ln2nid(ln) != NID_undef)) {
+        OBJerr(OBJ_F_OBJ_CREATE, OBJ_R_OID_EXISTS);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* Convert numerical OID string to an ASN1_OBJECT structure */
+    tmpoid = OBJ_txt2obj(oid, 1);
+    if (tmpoid == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    /* If NID is not NID_undef then object already exists */
+    if (OBJ_obj2nid(tmpoid) != NID_undef) {
+        OBJerr(OBJ_F_OBJ_CREATE, OBJ_R_OID_EXISTS);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    tmpoid->nid = OBJ_new_nid(1);
+    tmpoid->sn = (char *)sn;
+    tmpoid->ln = (char *)ln;
+
+    ok = OBJ_add_object(tmpoid);
+
+    tmpoid->sn = NULL;
+    tmpoid->ln = NULL;
+
+ err:
+    ASN1_OBJECT_free(tmpoid);
+    return ok;
+}
+
+size_t OBJ_length(const ASN1_OBJECT *obj)
+{
+    if (obj == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    return obj->length;
+}
+
+const unsigned char *OBJ_get0_data(const ASN1_OBJECT *obj)
+{
+    if (obj == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    return obj->data;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/objects/obj_dat.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/objects/obj_dat.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e1fc64f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/objects/obj_dat.h
@@ -0,0 +1,5101 @@
+/*
+ * WARNING: do not edit!
+ * Generated by crypto/objects/obj_dat.pl
+ *
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* Serialized OID's */
+static const unsigned char so[6765] = {
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,                 /* [    0] OBJ_rsadsi */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,            /* [    6] OBJ_pkcs */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x02,0x02,       /* [   13] OBJ_md2 */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x02,0x05,       /* [   21] OBJ_md5 */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x03,0x04,       /* [   29] OBJ_rc4 */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x01,0x01,  /* [   37] OBJ_rsaEncryption */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x01,0x02,  /* [   46] OBJ_md2WithRSAEncryption */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x01,0x04,  /* [   55] OBJ_md5WithRSAEncryption */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x05,0x01,  /* [   64] OBJ_pbeWithMD2AndDES_CBC */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x05,0x03,  /* [   73] OBJ_pbeWithMD5AndDES_CBC */
+    0x55,                                          /* [   82] OBJ_X500 */
+    0x55,0x04,                                     /* [   83] OBJ_X509 */
+    0x55,0x04,0x03,                                /* [   85] OBJ_commonName */
+    0x55,0x04,0x06,                                /* [   88] OBJ_countryName */
+    0x55,0x04,0x07,                                /* [   91] OBJ_localityName */
+    0x55,0x04,0x08,                                /* [   94] OBJ_stateOrProvinceName */
+    0x55,0x04,0x0A,                                /* [   97] OBJ_organizationName */
+    0x55,0x04,0x0B,                                /* [  100] OBJ_organizationalUnitName */
+    0x55,0x08,0x01,0x01,                           /* [  103] OBJ_rsa */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x07,       /* [  107] OBJ_pkcs7 */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x07,0x01,  /* [  115] OBJ_pkcs7_data */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x07,0x02,  /* [  124] OBJ_pkcs7_signed */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x07,0x03,  /* [  133] OBJ_pkcs7_enveloped */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x07,0x04,  /* [  142] OBJ_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x07,0x05,  /* [  151] OBJ_pkcs7_digest */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x07,0x06,  /* [  160] OBJ_pkcs7_encrypted */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x03,       /* [  169] OBJ_pkcs3 */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x03,0x01,  /* [  177] OBJ_dhKeyAgreement */
+    0x2B,0x0E,0x03,0x02,0x06,                      /* [  186] OBJ_des_ecb */
+    0x2B,0x0E,0x03,0x02,0x09,                      /* [  191] OBJ_des_cfb64 */
+    0x2B,0x0E,0x03,0x02,0x07,                      /* [  196] OBJ_des_cbc */
+    0x2B,0x0E,0x03,0x02,0x11,                      /* [  201] OBJ_des_ede_ecb */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x04,0x01,0x81,0x3C,0x07,0x01,0x01,0x02,  /* [  206] OBJ_idea_cbc */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x03,0x02,       /* [  217] OBJ_rc2_cbc */
+    0x2B,0x0E,0x03,0x02,0x12,                      /* [  225] OBJ_sha */
+    0x2B,0x0E,0x03,0x02,0x0F,                      /* [  230] OBJ_shaWithRSAEncryption */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x03,0x07,       /* [  235] OBJ_des_ede3_cbc */
+    0x2B,0x0E,0x03,0x02,0x08,                      /* [  243] OBJ_des_ofb64 */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,       /* [  248] OBJ_pkcs9 */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x01,  /* [  256] OBJ_pkcs9_emailAddress */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x02,  /* [  265] OBJ_pkcs9_unstructuredName */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x03,  /* [  274] OBJ_pkcs9_contentType */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x04,  /* [  283] OBJ_pkcs9_messageDigest */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x05,  /* [  292] OBJ_pkcs9_signingTime */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x06,  /* [  301] OBJ_pkcs9_countersignature */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x07,  /* [  310] OBJ_pkcs9_challengePassword */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x08,  /* [  319] OBJ_pkcs9_unstructuredAddress */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x09,  /* [  328] OBJ_pkcs9_extCertAttributes */
+    0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x86,0xF8,0x42,            /* [  337] OBJ_netscape */
+    0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x86,0xF8,0x42,0x01,       /* [  344] OBJ_netscape_cert_extension */
+    0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x86,0xF8,0x42,0x02,       /* [  352] OBJ_netscape_data_type */
+    0x2B,0x0E,0x03,0x02,0x1A,                      /* [  360] OBJ_sha1 */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x01,0x05,  /* [  365] OBJ_sha1WithRSAEncryption */
+    0x2B,0x0E,0x03,0x02,0x0D,                      /* [  374] OBJ_dsaWithSHA */
+    0x2B,0x0E,0x03,0x02,0x0C,                      /* [  379] OBJ_dsa_2 */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x05,0x0B,  /* [  384] OBJ_pbeWithSHA1AndRC2_CBC */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x05,0x0C,  /* [  393] OBJ_id_pbkdf2 */
+    0x2B,0x0E,0x03,0x02,0x1B,                      /* [  402] OBJ_dsaWithSHA1_2 */
+    0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x86,0xF8,0x42,0x01,0x01,  /* [  407] OBJ_netscape_cert_type */
+    0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x86,0xF8,0x42,0x01,0x02,  /* [  416] OBJ_netscape_base_url */
+    0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x86,0xF8,0x42,0x01,0x03,  /* [  425] OBJ_netscape_revocation_url */
+    0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x86,0xF8,0x42,0x01,0x04,  /* [  434] OBJ_netscape_ca_revocation_url */
+    0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x86,0xF8,0x42,0x01,0x07,  /* [  443] OBJ_netscape_renewal_url */
+    0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x86,0xF8,0x42,0x01,0x08,  /* [  452] OBJ_netscape_ca_policy_url */
+    0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x86,0xF8,0x42,0x01,0x0C,  /* [  461] OBJ_netscape_ssl_server_name */
+    0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x86,0xF8,0x42,0x01,0x0D,  /* [  470] OBJ_netscape_comment */
+    0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x86,0xF8,0x42,0x02,0x05,  /* [  479] OBJ_netscape_cert_sequence */
+    0x55,0x1D,                                     /* [  488] OBJ_id_ce */
+    0x55,0x1D,0x0E,                                /* [  490] OBJ_subject_key_identifier */
+    0x55,0x1D,0x0F,                                /* [  493] OBJ_key_usage */
+    0x55,0x1D,0x10,                                /* [  496] OBJ_private_key_usage_period */
+    0x55,0x1D,0x11,                                /* [  499] OBJ_subject_alt_name */
+    0x55,0x1D,0x12,                                /* [  502] OBJ_issuer_alt_name */
+    0x55,0x1D,0x13,                                /* [  505] OBJ_basic_constraints */
+    0x55,0x1D,0x14,                                /* [  508] OBJ_crl_number */
+    0x55,0x1D,0x20,                                /* [  511] OBJ_certificate_policies */
+    0x55,0x1D,0x23,                                /* [  514] OBJ_authority_key_identifier */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x04,0x01,0x97,0x55,0x01,0x02,  /* [  517] OBJ_bf_cbc */
+    0x55,0x08,0x03,0x65,                           /* [  526] OBJ_mdc2 */
+    0x55,0x08,0x03,0x64,                           /* [  530] OBJ_mdc2WithRSA */
+    0x55,0x04,0x2A,                                /* [  534] OBJ_givenName */
+    0x55,0x04,0x04,                                /* [  537] OBJ_surname */
+    0x55,0x04,0x2B,                                /* [  540] OBJ_initials */
+    0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x2C,  /* [  543] OBJ_uniqueIdentifier */
+    0x55,0x1D,0x1F,                                /* [  553] OBJ_crl_distribution_points */
+    0x2B,0x0E,0x03,0x02,0x03,                      /* [  556] OBJ_md5WithRSA */
+    0x55,0x04,0x05,                                /* [  561] OBJ_serialNumber */
+    0x55,0x04,0x0C,                                /* [  564] OBJ_title */
+    0x55,0x04,0x0D,                                /* [  567] OBJ_description */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF6,0x7D,0x07,0x42,0x0A,  /* [  570] OBJ_cast5_cbc */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF6,0x7D,0x07,0x42,0x0C,  /* [  579] OBJ_pbeWithMD5AndCast5_CBC */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x38,0x04,0x03,            /* [  588] OBJ_dsaWithSHA1 */
+    0x2B,0x0E,0x03,0x02,0x1D,                      /* [  595] OBJ_sha1WithRSA */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x38,0x04,0x01,            /* [  600] OBJ_dsa */
+    0x2B,0x24,0x03,0x02,0x01,                      /* [  607] OBJ_ripemd160 */
+    0x2B,0x24,0x03,0x03,0x01,0x02,                 /* [  612] OBJ_ripemd160WithRSA */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x03,0x08,       /* [  618] OBJ_rc5_cbc */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x03,0x08,  /* [  626] OBJ_zlib_compression */
+    0x55,0x1D,0x25,                                /* [  637] OBJ_ext_key_usage */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,                 /* [  640] OBJ_id_pkix */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x03,            /* [  646] OBJ_id_kp */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x03,0x01,       /* [  653] OBJ_server_auth */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x03,0x02,       /* [  661] OBJ_client_auth */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x03,0x03,       /* [  669] OBJ_code_sign */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x03,0x04,       /* [  677] OBJ_email_protect */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x03,0x08,       /* [  685] OBJ_time_stamp */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x04,0x01,0x82,0x37,0x02,0x01,0x15,  /* [  693] OBJ_ms_code_ind */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x04,0x01,0x82,0x37,0x02,0x01,0x16,  /* [  703] OBJ_ms_code_com */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x04,0x01,0x82,0x37,0x0A,0x03,0x01,  /* [  713] OBJ_ms_ctl_sign */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x04,0x01,0x82,0x37,0x0A,0x03,0x03,  /* [  723] OBJ_ms_sgc */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x04,0x01,0x82,0x37,0x0A,0x03,0x04,  /* [  733] OBJ_ms_efs */
+    0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x86,0xF8,0x42,0x04,0x01,  /* [  743] OBJ_ns_sgc */
+    0x55,0x1D,0x1B,                                /* [  752] OBJ_delta_crl */
+    0x55,0x1D,0x15,                                /* [  755] OBJ_crl_reason */
+    0x55,0x1D,0x18,                                /* [  758] OBJ_invalidity_date */
+    0x2B,0x65,0x01,0x04,0x01,                      /* [  761] OBJ_sxnet */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x0C,0x01,0x01,  /* [  766] OBJ_pbe_WithSHA1And128BitRC4 */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x0C,0x01,0x02,  /* [  776] OBJ_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC4 */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x0C,0x01,0x03,  /* [  786] OBJ_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x0C,0x01,0x04,  /* [  796] OBJ_pbe_WithSHA1And2_Key_TripleDES_CBC */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x0C,0x01,0x05,  /* [  806] OBJ_pbe_WithSHA1And128BitRC2_CBC */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x0C,0x01,0x06,  /* [  816] OBJ_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x0C,0x0A,0x01,0x01,  /* [  826] OBJ_keyBag */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x0C,0x0A,0x01,0x02,  /* [  837] OBJ_pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x0C,0x0A,0x01,0x03,  /* [  848] OBJ_certBag */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x0C,0x0A,0x01,0x04,  /* [  859] OBJ_crlBag */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x0C,0x0A,0x01,0x05,  /* [  870] OBJ_secretBag */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x0C,0x0A,0x01,0x06,  /* [  881] OBJ_safeContentsBag */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x14,  /* [  892] OBJ_friendlyName */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x15,  /* [  901] OBJ_localKeyID */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x16,0x01,  /* [  910] OBJ_x509Certificate */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x16,0x02,  /* [  920] OBJ_sdsiCertificate */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x17,0x01,  /* [  930] OBJ_x509Crl */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x05,0x0D,  /* [  940] OBJ_pbes2 */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x05,0x0E,  /* [  949] OBJ_pbmac1 */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x02,0x07,       /* [  958] OBJ_hmacWithSHA1 */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x02,0x01,       /* [  966] OBJ_id_qt_cps */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x02,0x02,       /* [  974] OBJ_id_qt_unotice */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x0F,  /* [  982] OBJ_SMIMECapabilities */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x05,0x04,  /* [  991] OBJ_pbeWithMD2AndRC2_CBC */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x05,0x06,  /* [ 1000] OBJ_pbeWithMD5AndRC2_CBC */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x05,0x0A,  /* [ 1009] OBJ_pbeWithSHA1AndDES_CBC */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x04,0x01,0x82,0x37,0x02,0x01,0x0E,  /* [ 1018] OBJ_ms_ext_req */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x0E,  /* [ 1028] OBJ_ext_req */
+    0x55,0x04,0x29,                                /* [ 1037] OBJ_name */
+    0x55,0x04,0x2E,                                /* [ 1040] OBJ_dnQualifier */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x01,            /* [ 1043] OBJ_id_pe */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x30,            /* [ 1050] OBJ_id_ad */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x01,0x01,       /* [ 1057] OBJ_info_access */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x30,0x01,       /* [ 1065] OBJ_ad_OCSP */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x30,0x02,       /* [ 1073] OBJ_ad_ca_issuers */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x03,0x09,       /* [ 1081] OBJ_OCSP_sign */
+    0x2A,                                          /* [ 1089] OBJ_member_body */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,                                /* [ 1090] OBJ_ISO_US */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x38,                      /* [ 1093] OBJ_X9_57 */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x38,0x04,                 /* [ 1098] OBJ_X9cm */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x01,       /* [ 1104] OBJ_pkcs1 */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x05,       /* [ 1112] OBJ_pkcs5 */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,  /* [ 1120] OBJ_SMIME */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x00,  /* [ 1129] OBJ_id_smime_mod */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x01,  /* [ 1139] OBJ_id_smime_ct */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,  /* [ 1149] OBJ_id_smime_aa */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x03,  /* [ 1159] OBJ_id_smime_alg */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x04,  /* [ 1169] OBJ_id_smime_cd */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x05,  /* [ 1179] OBJ_id_smime_spq */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x06,  /* [ 1189] OBJ_id_smime_cti */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x00,0x01,  /* [ 1199] OBJ_id_smime_mod_cms */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x00,0x02,  /* [ 1210] OBJ_id_smime_mod_ess */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x00,0x03,  /* [ 1221] OBJ_id_smime_mod_oid */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x00,0x04,  /* [ 1232] OBJ_id_smime_mod_msg_v3 */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x00,0x05,  /* [ 1243] OBJ_id_smime_mod_ets_eSignature_88 */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x00,0x06,  /* [ 1254] OBJ_id_smime_mod_ets_eSignature_97 */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x00,0x07,  /* [ 1265] OBJ_id_smime_mod_ets_eSigPolicy_88 */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x00,0x08,  /* [ 1276] OBJ_id_smime_mod_ets_eSigPolicy_97 */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x01,0x01,  /* [ 1287] OBJ_id_smime_ct_receipt */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x01,0x02,  /* [ 1298] OBJ_id_smime_ct_authData */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x01,0x03,  /* [ 1309] OBJ_id_smime_ct_publishCert */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x01,0x04,  /* [ 1320] OBJ_id_smime_ct_TSTInfo */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x01,0x05,  /* [ 1331] OBJ_id_smime_ct_TDTInfo */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x01,0x06,  /* [ 1342] OBJ_id_smime_ct_contentInfo */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x01,0x07,  /* [ 1353] OBJ_id_smime_ct_DVCSRequestData */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x01,0x08,  /* [ 1364] OBJ_id_smime_ct_DVCSResponseData */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x01,  /* [ 1375] OBJ_id_smime_aa_receiptRequest */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x02,  /* [ 1386] OBJ_id_smime_aa_securityLabel */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x03,  /* [ 1397] OBJ_id_smime_aa_mlExpandHistory */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x04,  /* [ 1408] OBJ_id_smime_aa_contentHint */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x05,  /* [ 1419] OBJ_id_smime_aa_msgSigDigest */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x06,  /* [ 1430] OBJ_id_smime_aa_encapContentType */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x07,  /* [ 1441] OBJ_id_smime_aa_contentIdentifier */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x08,  /* [ 1452] OBJ_id_smime_aa_macValue */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x09,  /* [ 1463] OBJ_id_smime_aa_equivalentLabels */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x0A,  /* [ 1474] OBJ_id_smime_aa_contentReference */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x0B,  /* [ 1485] OBJ_id_smime_aa_encrypKeyPref */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x0C,  /* [ 1496] OBJ_id_smime_aa_signingCertificate */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x0D,  /* [ 1507] OBJ_id_smime_aa_smimeEncryptCerts */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x0E,  /* [ 1518] OBJ_id_smime_aa_timeStampToken */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x0F,  /* [ 1529] OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_sigPolicyId */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x10,  /* [ 1540] OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_commitmentType */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x11,  /* [ 1551] OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_signerLocation */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x12,  /* [ 1562] OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_signerAttr */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x13,  /* [ 1573] OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_otherSigCert */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x14,  /* [ 1584] OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_contentTimestamp */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x15,  /* [ 1595] OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_CertificateRefs */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x16,  /* [ 1606] OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_RevocationRefs */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x17,  /* [ 1617] OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_certValues */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x18,  /* [ 1628] OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_revocationValues */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x19,  /* [ 1639] OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_escTimeStamp */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x1A,  /* [ 1650] OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_certCRLTimestamp */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x1B,  /* [ 1661] OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_archiveTimeStamp */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x1C,  /* [ 1672] OBJ_id_smime_aa_signatureType */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x1D,  /* [ 1683] OBJ_id_smime_aa_dvcs_dvc */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x03,0x01,  /* [ 1694] OBJ_id_smime_alg_ESDHwith3DES */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x03,0x02,  /* [ 1705] OBJ_id_smime_alg_ESDHwithRC2 */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x03,0x03,  /* [ 1716] OBJ_id_smime_alg_3DESwrap */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x03,0x04,  /* [ 1727] OBJ_id_smime_alg_RC2wrap */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x03,0x05,  /* [ 1738] OBJ_id_smime_alg_ESDH */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x03,0x06,  /* [ 1749] OBJ_id_smime_alg_CMS3DESwrap */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x03,0x07,  /* [ 1760] OBJ_id_smime_alg_CMSRC2wrap */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x04,0x01,  /* [ 1771] OBJ_id_smime_cd_ldap */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x05,0x01,  /* [ 1782] OBJ_id_smime_spq_ets_sqt_uri */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x05,0x02,  /* [ 1793] OBJ_id_smime_spq_ets_sqt_unotice */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x06,0x01,  /* [ 1804] OBJ_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfOrigin */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x06,0x02,  /* [ 1815] OBJ_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfReceipt */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x06,0x03,  /* [ 1826] OBJ_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfDelivery */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x06,0x04,  /* [ 1837] OBJ_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfSender */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x06,0x05,  /* [ 1848] OBJ_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfApproval */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x06,0x06,  /* [ 1859] OBJ_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfCreation */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x02,0x04,       /* [ 1870] OBJ_md4 */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x00,            /* [ 1878] OBJ_id_pkix_mod */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x02,            /* [ 1885] OBJ_id_qt */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x04,            /* [ 1892] OBJ_id_it */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x05,            /* [ 1899] OBJ_id_pkip */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x06,            /* [ 1906] OBJ_id_alg */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x07,            /* [ 1913] OBJ_id_cmc */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x08,            /* [ 1920] OBJ_id_on */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x09,            /* [ 1927] OBJ_id_pda */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x0A,            /* [ 1934] OBJ_id_aca */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x0B,            /* [ 1941] OBJ_id_qcs */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x0C,            /* [ 1948] OBJ_id_cct */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x00,0x01,       /* [ 1955] OBJ_id_pkix1_explicit_88 */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x00,0x02,       /* [ 1963] OBJ_id_pkix1_implicit_88 */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x00,0x03,       /* [ 1971] OBJ_id_pkix1_explicit_93 */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x00,0x04,       /* [ 1979] OBJ_id_pkix1_implicit_93 */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x00,0x05,       /* [ 1987] OBJ_id_mod_crmf */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x00,0x06,       /* [ 1995] OBJ_id_mod_cmc */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x00,0x07,       /* [ 2003] OBJ_id_mod_kea_profile_88 */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x00,0x08,       /* [ 2011] OBJ_id_mod_kea_profile_93 */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x00,0x09,       /* [ 2019] OBJ_id_mod_cmp */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x00,0x0A,       /* [ 2027] OBJ_id_mod_qualified_cert_88 */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x00,0x0B,       /* [ 2035] OBJ_id_mod_qualified_cert_93 */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x00,0x0C,       /* [ 2043] OBJ_id_mod_attribute_cert */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x00,0x0D,       /* [ 2051] OBJ_id_mod_timestamp_protocol */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x00,0x0E,       /* [ 2059] OBJ_id_mod_ocsp */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x00,0x0F,       /* [ 2067] OBJ_id_mod_dvcs */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x00,0x10,       /* [ 2075] OBJ_id_mod_cmp2000 */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x01,0x02,       /* [ 2083] OBJ_biometricInfo */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x01,0x03,       /* [ 2091] OBJ_qcStatements */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x01,0x04,       /* [ 2099] OBJ_ac_auditEntity */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x01,0x05,       /* [ 2107] OBJ_ac_targeting */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x01,0x06,       /* [ 2115] OBJ_aaControls */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x01,0x07,       /* [ 2123] OBJ_sbgp_ipAddrBlock */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x01,0x08,       /* [ 2131] OBJ_sbgp_autonomousSysNum */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x01,0x09,       /* [ 2139] OBJ_sbgp_routerIdentifier */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x02,0x03,       /* [ 2147] OBJ_textNotice */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x03,0x05,       /* [ 2155] OBJ_ipsecEndSystem */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x03,0x06,       /* [ 2163] OBJ_ipsecTunnel */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x03,0x07,       /* [ 2171] OBJ_ipsecUser */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x03,0x0A,       /* [ 2179] OBJ_dvcs */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x04,0x01,       /* [ 2187] OBJ_id_it_caProtEncCert */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x04,0x02,       /* [ 2195] OBJ_id_it_signKeyPairTypes */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x04,0x03,       /* [ 2203] OBJ_id_it_encKeyPairTypes */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x04,0x04,       /* [ 2211] OBJ_id_it_preferredSymmAlg */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x04,0x05,       /* [ 2219] OBJ_id_it_caKeyUpdateInfo */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x04,0x06,       /* [ 2227] OBJ_id_it_currentCRL */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x04,0x07,       /* [ 2235] OBJ_id_it_unsupportedOIDs */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x04,0x08,       /* [ 2243] OBJ_id_it_subscriptionRequest */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x04,0x09,       /* [ 2251] OBJ_id_it_subscriptionResponse */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x04,0x0A,       /* [ 2259] OBJ_id_it_keyPairParamReq */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x04,0x0B,       /* [ 2267] OBJ_id_it_keyPairParamRep */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x04,0x0C,       /* [ 2275] OBJ_id_it_revPassphrase */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x04,0x0D,       /* [ 2283] OBJ_id_it_implicitConfirm */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x04,0x0E,       /* [ 2291] OBJ_id_it_confirmWaitTime */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x04,0x0F,       /* [ 2299] OBJ_id_it_origPKIMessage */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x05,0x01,       /* [ 2307] OBJ_id_regCtrl */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x05,0x02,       /* [ 2315] OBJ_id_regInfo */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x05,0x01,0x01,  /* [ 2323] OBJ_id_regCtrl_regToken */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x05,0x01,0x02,  /* [ 2332] OBJ_id_regCtrl_authenticator */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x05,0x01,0x03,  /* [ 2341] OBJ_id_regCtrl_pkiPublicationInfo */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x05,0x01,0x04,  /* [ 2350] OBJ_id_regCtrl_pkiArchiveOptions */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x05,0x01,0x05,  /* [ 2359] OBJ_id_regCtrl_oldCertID */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x05,0x01,0x06,  /* [ 2368] OBJ_id_regCtrl_protocolEncrKey */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x05,0x02,0x01,  /* [ 2377] OBJ_id_regInfo_utf8Pairs */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x05,0x02,0x02,  /* [ 2386] OBJ_id_regInfo_certReq */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x06,0x01,       /* [ 2395] OBJ_id_alg_des40 */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x06,0x02,       /* [ 2403] OBJ_id_alg_noSignature */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x06,0x03,       /* [ 2411] OBJ_id_alg_dh_sig_hmac_sha1 */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x06,0x04,       /* [ 2419] OBJ_id_alg_dh_pop */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x07,0x01,       /* [ 2427] OBJ_id_cmc_statusInfo */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x07,0x02,       /* [ 2435] OBJ_id_cmc_identification */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x07,0x03,       /* [ 2443] OBJ_id_cmc_identityProof */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x07,0x04,       /* [ 2451] OBJ_id_cmc_dataReturn */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x07,0x05,       /* [ 2459] OBJ_id_cmc_transactionId */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x07,0x06,       /* [ 2467] OBJ_id_cmc_senderNonce */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x07,0x07,       /* [ 2475] OBJ_id_cmc_recipientNonce */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x07,0x08,       /* [ 2483] OBJ_id_cmc_addExtensions */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x07,0x09,       /* [ 2491] OBJ_id_cmc_encryptedPOP */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x07,0x0A,       /* [ 2499] OBJ_id_cmc_decryptedPOP */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x07,0x0B,       /* [ 2507] OBJ_id_cmc_lraPOPWitness */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x07,0x0F,       /* [ 2515] OBJ_id_cmc_getCert */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x07,0x10,       /* [ 2523] OBJ_id_cmc_getCRL */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x07,0x11,       /* [ 2531] OBJ_id_cmc_revokeRequest */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x07,0x12,       /* [ 2539] OBJ_id_cmc_regInfo */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x07,0x13,       /* [ 2547] OBJ_id_cmc_responseInfo */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x07,0x15,       /* [ 2555] OBJ_id_cmc_queryPending */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x07,0x16,       /* [ 2563] OBJ_id_cmc_popLinkRandom */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x07,0x17,       /* [ 2571] OBJ_id_cmc_popLinkWitness */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x07,0x18,       /* [ 2579] OBJ_id_cmc_confirmCertAcceptance */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x08,0x01,       /* [ 2587] OBJ_id_on_personalData */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x09,0x01,       /* [ 2595] OBJ_id_pda_dateOfBirth */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x09,0x02,       /* [ 2603] OBJ_id_pda_placeOfBirth */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x09,0x03,       /* [ 2611] OBJ_id_pda_gender */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x09,0x04,       /* [ 2619] OBJ_id_pda_countryOfCitizenship */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x09,0x05,       /* [ 2627] OBJ_id_pda_countryOfResidence */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x0A,0x01,       /* [ 2635] OBJ_id_aca_authenticationInfo */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x0A,0x02,       /* [ 2643] OBJ_id_aca_accessIdentity */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x0A,0x03,       /* [ 2651] OBJ_id_aca_chargingIdentity */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x0A,0x04,       /* [ 2659] OBJ_id_aca_group */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x0A,0x05,       /* [ 2667] OBJ_id_aca_role */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x0B,0x01,       /* [ 2675] OBJ_id_qcs_pkixQCSyntax_v1 */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x0C,0x01,       /* [ 2683] OBJ_id_cct_crs */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x0C,0x02,       /* [ 2691] OBJ_id_cct_PKIData */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x0C,0x03,       /* [ 2699] OBJ_id_cct_PKIResponse */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x30,0x03,       /* [ 2707] OBJ_ad_timeStamping */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x30,0x04,       /* [ 2715] OBJ_ad_dvcs */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x30,0x01,0x01,  /* [ 2723] OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_basic */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x30,0x01,0x02,  /* [ 2732] OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_Nonce */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x30,0x01,0x03,  /* [ 2741] OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_CrlID */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x30,0x01,0x04,  /* [ 2750] OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_acceptableResponses */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x30,0x01,0x05,  /* [ 2759] OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_noCheck */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x30,0x01,0x06,  /* [ 2768] OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_archiveCutoff */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x30,0x01,0x07,  /* [ 2777] OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_serviceLocator */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x30,0x01,0x08,  /* [ 2786] OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_extendedStatus */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x30,0x01,0x09,  /* [ 2795] OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_valid */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x30,0x01,0x0A,  /* [ 2804] OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_path */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x30,0x01,0x0B,  /* [ 2813] OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_trustRoot */
+    0x2B,0x0E,0x03,0x02,                           /* [ 2822] OBJ_algorithm */
+    0x2B,0x0E,0x03,0x02,0x0B,                      /* [ 2826] OBJ_rsaSignature */
+    0x55,0x08,                                     /* [ 2831] OBJ_X500algorithms */
+    0x2B,                                          /* [ 2833] OBJ_org */
+    0x2B,0x06,                                     /* [ 2834] OBJ_dod */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,                                /* [ 2836] OBJ_iana */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x01,                           /* [ 2839] OBJ_Directory */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x02,                           /* [ 2843] OBJ_Management */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x03,                           /* [ 2847] OBJ_Experimental */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x04,                           /* [ 2851] OBJ_Private */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,                           /* [ 2855] OBJ_Security */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x06,                           /* [ 2859] OBJ_SNMPv2 */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x07,                           /* [ 2863] OBJ_Mail */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x04,0x01,                      /* [ 2867] OBJ_Enterprises */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x04,0x01,0x8B,0x3A,0x82,0x58,  /* [ 2872] OBJ_dcObject */
+    0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x19,  /* [ 2881] OBJ_domainComponent */
+    0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x04,0x0D,  /* [ 2891] OBJ_Domain */
+    0x55,0x01,0x05,                                /* [ 2901] OBJ_selected_attribute_types */
+    0x55,0x01,0x05,0x37,                           /* [ 2904] OBJ_clearance */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x01,0x03,  /* [ 2908] OBJ_md4WithRSAEncryption */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x01,0x0A,       /* [ 2917] OBJ_ac_proxying */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x01,0x0B,       /* [ 2925] OBJ_sinfo_access */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x0A,0x06,       /* [ 2933] OBJ_id_aca_encAttrs */
+    0x55,0x04,0x48,                                /* [ 2941] OBJ_role */
+    0x55,0x1D,0x24,                                /* [ 2944] OBJ_policy_constraints */
+    0x55,0x1D,0x37,                                /* [ 2947] OBJ_target_information */
+    0x55,0x1D,0x38,                                /* [ 2950] OBJ_no_rev_avail */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,                      /* [ 2953] OBJ_ansi_X9_62 */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x01,0x01,            /* [ 2958] OBJ_X9_62_prime_field */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x01,0x02,            /* [ 2965] OBJ_X9_62_characteristic_two_field */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x02,0x01,            /* [ 2972] OBJ_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x01,0x01,       /* [ 2979] OBJ_X9_62_prime192v1 */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x01,0x02,       /* [ 2987] OBJ_X9_62_prime192v2 */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x01,0x03,       /* [ 2995] OBJ_X9_62_prime192v3 */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x01,0x04,       /* [ 3003] OBJ_X9_62_prime239v1 */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x01,0x05,       /* [ 3011] OBJ_X9_62_prime239v2 */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x01,0x06,       /* [ 3019] OBJ_X9_62_prime239v3 */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x01,0x07,       /* [ 3027] OBJ_X9_62_prime256v1 */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x04,0x01,            /* [ 3035] OBJ_ecdsa_with_SHA1 */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x04,0x01,0x82,0x37,0x11,0x01,  /* [ 3042] OBJ_ms_csp_name */
+    0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x01,0x01,  /* [ 3051] OBJ_aes_128_ecb */
+    0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x01,0x02,  /* [ 3060] OBJ_aes_128_cbc */
+    0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x01,0x03,  /* [ 3069] OBJ_aes_128_ofb128 */
+    0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x01,0x04,  /* [ 3078] OBJ_aes_128_cfb128 */
+    0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x01,0x15,  /* [ 3087] OBJ_aes_192_ecb */
+    0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x01,0x16,  /* [ 3096] OBJ_aes_192_cbc */
+    0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x01,0x17,  /* [ 3105] OBJ_aes_192_ofb128 */
+    0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x01,0x18,  /* [ 3114] OBJ_aes_192_cfb128 */
+    0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x01,0x29,  /* [ 3123] OBJ_aes_256_ecb */
+    0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x01,0x2A,  /* [ 3132] OBJ_aes_256_cbc */
+    0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x01,0x2B,  /* [ 3141] OBJ_aes_256_ofb128 */
+    0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x01,0x2C,  /* [ 3150] OBJ_aes_256_cfb128 */
+    0x55,0x1D,0x17,                                /* [ 3159] OBJ_hold_instruction_code */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x38,0x02,0x01,            /* [ 3162] OBJ_hold_instruction_none */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x38,0x02,0x02,            /* [ 3169] OBJ_hold_instruction_call_issuer */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x38,0x02,0x03,            /* [ 3176] OBJ_hold_instruction_reject */
+    0x09,                                          /* [ 3183] OBJ_data */
+    0x09,0x92,0x26,                                /* [ 3184] OBJ_pss */
+    0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,            /* [ 3187] OBJ_ucl */
+    0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,       /* [ 3194] OBJ_pilot */
+    0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,  /* [ 3202] OBJ_pilotAttributeType */
+    0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x03,  /* [ 3211] OBJ_pilotAttributeSyntax */
+    0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x04,  /* [ 3220] OBJ_pilotObjectClass */
+    0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x0A,  /* [ 3229] OBJ_pilotGroups */
+    0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x03,0x04,  /* [ 3238] OBJ_iA5StringSyntax */
+    0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x03,0x05,  /* [ 3248] OBJ_caseIgnoreIA5StringSyntax */
+    0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x04,0x03,  /* [ 3258] OBJ_pilotObject */
+    0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x04,0x04,  /* [ 3268] OBJ_pilotPerson */
+    0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x04,0x05,  /* [ 3278] OBJ_account */
+    0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x04,0x06,  /* [ 3288] OBJ_document */
+    0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x04,0x07,  /* [ 3298] OBJ_room */
+    0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x04,0x09,  /* [ 3308] OBJ_documentSeries */
+    0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x04,0x0E,  /* [ 3318] OBJ_rFC822localPart */
+    0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x04,0x0F,  /* [ 3328] OBJ_dNSDomain */
+    0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x04,0x11,  /* [ 3338] OBJ_domainRelatedObject */
+    0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x04,0x12,  /* [ 3348] OBJ_friendlyCountry */
+    0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x04,0x13,  /* [ 3358] OBJ_simpleSecurityObject */
+    0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x04,0x14,  /* [ 3368] OBJ_pilotOrganization */
+    0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x04,0x15,  /* [ 3378] OBJ_pilotDSA */
+    0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x04,0x16,  /* [ 3388] OBJ_qualityLabelledData */
+    0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x01,  /* [ 3398] OBJ_userId */
+    0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x02,  /* [ 3408] OBJ_textEncodedORAddress */
+    0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x03,  /* [ 3418] OBJ_rfc822Mailbox */
+    0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x04,  /* [ 3428] OBJ_info */
+    0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x05,  /* [ 3438] OBJ_favouriteDrink */
+    0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x06,  /* [ 3448] OBJ_roomNumber */
+    0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x07,  /* [ 3458] OBJ_photo */
+    0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x08,  /* [ 3468] OBJ_userClass */
+    0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x09,  /* [ 3478] OBJ_host */
+    0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x0A,  /* [ 3488] OBJ_manager */
+    0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x0B,  /* [ 3498] OBJ_documentIdentifier */
+    0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x0C,  /* [ 3508] OBJ_documentTitle */
+    0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x0D,  /* [ 3518] OBJ_documentVersion */
+    0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x0E,  /* [ 3528] OBJ_documentAuthor */
+    0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x0F,  /* [ 3538] OBJ_documentLocation */
+    0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x14,  /* [ 3548] OBJ_homeTelephoneNumber */
+    0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x15,  /* [ 3558] OBJ_secretary */
+    0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x16,  /* [ 3568] OBJ_otherMailbox */
+    0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x17,  /* [ 3578] OBJ_lastModifiedTime */
+    0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x18,  /* [ 3588] OBJ_lastModifiedBy */
+    0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x1A,  /* [ 3598] OBJ_aRecord */
+    0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x1B,  /* [ 3608] OBJ_pilotAttributeType27 */
+    0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x1C,  /* [ 3618] OBJ_mXRecord */
+    0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x1D,  /* [ 3628] OBJ_nSRecord */
+    0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x1E,  /* [ 3638] OBJ_sOARecord */
+    0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x1F,  /* [ 3648] OBJ_cNAMERecord */
+    0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x25,  /* [ 3658] OBJ_associatedDomain */
+    0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x26,  /* [ 3668] OBJ_associatedName */
+    0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x27,  /* [ 3678] OBJ_homePostalAddress */
+    0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x28,  /* [ 3688] OBJ_personalTitle */
+    0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x29,  /* [ 3698] OBJ_mobileTelephoneNumber */
+    0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x2A,  /* [ 3708] OBJ_pagerTelephoneNumber */
+    0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x2B,  /* [ 3718] OBJ_friendlyCountryName */
+    0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x2D,  /* [ 3728] OBJ_organizationalStatus */
+    0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x2E,  /* [ 3738] OBJ_janetMailbox */
+    0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x2F,  /* [ 3748] OBJ_mailPreferenceOption */
+    0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x30,  /* [ 3758] OBJ_buildingName */
+    0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x31,  /* [ 3768] OBJ_dSAQuality */
+    0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x32,  /* [ 3778] OBJ_singleLevelQuality */
+    0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x33,  /* [ 3788] OBJ_subtreeMinimumQuality */
+    0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x34,  /* [ 3798] OBJ_subtreeMaximumQuality */
+    0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x35,  /* [ 3808] OBJ_personalSignature */
+    0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x36,  /* [ 3818] OBJ_dITRedirect */
+    0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x37,  /* [ 3828] OBJ_audio */
+    0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x38,  /* [ 3838] OBJ_documentPublisher */
+    0x55,0x04,0x2D,                                /* [ 3848] OBJ_x500UniqueIdentifier */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x07,0x01,                      /* [ 3851] OBJ_mime_mhs */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x07,0x01,0x01,                 /* [ 3856] OBJ_mime_mhs_headings */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x07,0x01,0x02,                 /* [ 3862] OBJ_mime_mhs_bodies */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x07,0x01,0x01,0x01,            /* [ 3868] OBJ_id_hex_partial_message */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x07,0x01,0x01,0x02,            /* [ 3875] OBJ_id_hex_multipart_message */
+    0x55,0x04,0x2C,                                /* [ 3882] OBJ_generationQualifier */
+    0x55,0x04,0x41,                                /* [ 3885] OBJ_pseudonym */
+    0x67,0x2A,                                     /* [ 3888] OBJ_id_set */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,                                /* [ 3890] OBJ_set_ctype */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x01,                                /* [ 3893] OBJ_set_msgExt */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x03,                                /* [ 3896] OBJ_set_attr */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x05,                                /* [ 3899] OBJ_set_policy */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x07,                                /* [ 3902] OBJ_set_certExt */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x08,                                /* [ 3905] OBJ_set_brand */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x00,                           /* [ 3908] OBJ_setct_PANData */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x01,                           /* [ 3912] OBJ_setct_PANToken */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x02,                           /* [ 3916] OBJ_setct_PANOnly */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x03,                           /* [ 3920] OBJ_setct_OIData */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x04,                           /* [ 3924] OBJ_setct_PI */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x05,                           /* [ 3928] OBJ_setct_PIData */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x06,                           /* [ 3932] OBJ_setct_PIDataUnsigned */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x07,                           /* [ 3936] OBJ_setct_HODInput */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x08,                           /* [ 3940] OBJ_setct_AuthResBaggage */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x09,                           /* [ 3944] OBJ_setct_AuthRevReqBaggage */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x0A,                           /* [ 3948] OBJ_setct_AuthRevResBaggage */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x0B,                           /* [ 3952] OBJ_setct_CapTokenSeq */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x0C,                           /* [ 3956] OBJ_setct_PInitResData */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x0D,                           /* [ 3960] OBJ_setct_PI_TBS */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x0E,                           /* [ 3964] OBJ_setct_PResData */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x10,                           /* [ 3968] OBJ_setct_AuthReqTBS */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x11,                           /* [ 3972] OBJ_setct_AuthResTBS */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x12,                           /* [ 3976] OBJ_setct_AuthResTBSX */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x13,                           /* [ 3980] OBJ_setct_AuthTokenTBS */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x14,                           /* [ 3984] OBJ_setct_CapTokenData */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x15,                           /* [ 3988] OBJ_setct_CapTokenTBS */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x16,                           /* [ 3992] OBJ_setct_AcqCardCodeMsg */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x17,                           /* [ 3996] OBJ_setct_AuthRevReqTBS */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x18,                           /* [ 4000] OBJ_setct_AuthRevResData */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x19,                           /* [ 4004] OBJ_setct_AuthRevResTBS */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x1A,                           /* [ 4008] OBJ_setct_CapReqTBS */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x1B,                           /* [ 4012] OBJ_setct_CapReqTBSX */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x1C,                           /* [ 4016] OBJ_setct_CapResData */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x1D,                           /* [ 4020] OBJ_setct_CapRevReqTBS */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x1E,                           /* [ 4024] OBJ_setct_CapRevReqTBSX */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x1F,                           /* [ 4028] OBJ_setct_CapRevResData */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x20,                           /* [ 4032] OBJ_setct_CredReqTBS */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x21,                           /* [ 4036] OBJ_setct_CredReqTBSX */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x22,                           /* [ 4040] OBJ_setct_CredResData */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x23,                           /* [ 4044] OBJ_setct_CredRevReqTBS */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x24,                           /* [ 4048] OBJ_setct_CredRevReqTBSX */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x25,                           /* [ 4052] OBJ_setct_CredRevResData */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x26,                           /* [ 4056] OBJ_setct_PCertReqData */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x27,                           /* [ 4060] OBJ_setct_PCertResTBS */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x28,                           /* [ 4064] OBJ_setct_BatchAdminReqData */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x29,                           /* [ 4068] OBJ_setct_BatchAdminResData */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x2A,                           /* [ 4072] OBJ_setct_CardCInitResTBS */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x2B,                           /* [ 4076] OBJ_setct_MeAqCInitResTBS */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x2C,                           /* [ 4080] OBJ_setct_RegFormResTBS */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x2D,                           /* [ 4084] OBJ_setct_CertReqData */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x2E,                           /* [ 4088] OBJ_setct_CertReqTBS */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x2F,                           /* [ 4092] OBJ_setct_CertResData */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x30,                           /* [ 4096] OBJ_setct_CertInqReqTBS */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x31,                           /* [ 4100] OBJ_setct_ErrorTBS */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x32,                           /* [ 4104] OBJ_setct_PIDualSignedTBE */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x33,                           /* [ 4108] OBJ_setct_PIUnsignedTBE */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x34,                           /* [ 4112] OBJ_setct_AuthReqTBE */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x35,                           /* [ 4116] OBJ_setct_AuthResTBE */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x36,                           /* [ 4120] OBJ_setct_AuthResTBEX */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x37,                           /* [ 4124] OBJ_setct_AuthTokenTBE */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x38,                           /* [ 4128] OBJ_setct_CapTokenTBE */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x39,                           /* [ 4132] OBJ_setct_CapTokenTBEX */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x3A,                           /* [ 4136] OBJ_setct_AcqCardCodeMsgTBE */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x3B,                           /* [ 4140] OBJ_setct_AuthRevReqTBE */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x3C,                           /* [ 4144] OBJ_setct_AuthRevResTBE */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x3D,                           /* [ 4148] OBJ_setct_AuthRevResTBEB */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x3E,                           /* [ 4152] OBJ_setct_CapReqTBE */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x3F,                           /* [ 4156] OBJ_setct_CapReqTBEX */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x40,                           /* [ 4160] OBJ_setct_CapResTBE */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x41,                           /* [ 4164] OBJ_setct_CapRevReqTBE */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x42,                           /* [ 4168] OBJ_setct_CapRevReqTBEX */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x43,                           /* [ 4172] OBJ_setct_CapRevResTBE */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x44,                           /* [ 4176] OBJ_setct_CredReqTBE */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x45,                           /* [ 4180] OBJ_setct_CredReqTBEX */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x46,                           /* [ 4184] OBJ_setct_CredResTBE */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x47,                           /* [ 4188] OBJ_setct_CredRevReqTBE */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x48,                           /* [ 4192] OBJ_setct_CredRevReqTBEX */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x49,                           /* [ 4196] OBJ_setct_CredRevResTBE */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x4A,                           /* [ 4200] OBJ_setct_BatchAdminReqTBE */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x4B,                           /* [ 4204] OBJ_setct_BatchAdminResTBE */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x4C,                           /* [ 4208] OBJ_setct_RegFormReqTBE */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x4D,                           /* [ 4212] OBJ_setct_CertReqTBE */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x4E,                           /* [ 4216] OBJ_setct_CertReqTBEX */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x4F,                           /* [ 4220] OBJ_setct_CertResTBE */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x50,                           /* [ 4224] OBJ_setct_CRLNotificationTBS */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x51,                           /* [ 4228] OBJ_setct_CRLNotificationResTBS */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x52,                           /* [ 4232] OBJ_setct_BCIDistributionTBS */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x01,0x01,                           /* [ 4236] OBJ_setext_genCrypt */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x01,0x03,                           /* [ 4240] OBJ_setext_miAuth */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x01,0x04,                           /* [ 4244] OBJ_setext_pinSecure */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x01,0x05,                           /* [ 4248] OBJ_setext_pinAny */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x01,0x07,                           /* [ 4252] OBJ_setext_track2 */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x01,0x08,                           /* [ 4256] OBJ_setext_cv */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x05,0x00,                           /* [ 4260] OBJ_set_policy_root */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x07,0x00,                           /* [ 4264] OBJ_setCext_hashedRoot */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x07,0x01,                           /* [ 4268] OBJ_setCext_certType */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x07,0x02,                           /* [ 4272] OBJ_setCext_merchData */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x07,0x03,                           /* [ 4276] OBJ_setCext_cCertRequired */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x07,0x04,                           /* [ 4280] OBJ_setCext_tunneling */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x07,0x05,                           /* [ 4284] OBJ_setCext_setExt */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x07,0x06,                           /* [ 4288] OBJ_setCext_setQualf */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x07,0x07,                           /* [ 4292] OBJ_setCext_PGWYcapabilities */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x07,0x08,                           /* [ 4296] OBJ_setCext_TokenIdentifier */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x07,0x09,                           /* [ 4300] OBJ_setCext_Track2Data */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x07,0x0A,                           /* [ 4304] OBJ_setCext_TokenType */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x07,0x0B,                           /* [ 4308] OBJ_setCext_IssuerCapabilities */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x03,0x00,                           /* [ 4312] OBJ_setAttr_Cert */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x03,0x01,                           /* [ 4316] OBJ_setAttr_PGWYcap */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x03,0x02,                           /* [ 4320] OBJ_setAttr_TokenType */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x03,0x03,                           /* [ 4324] OBJ_setAttr_IssCap */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x03,0x00,0x00,                      /* [ 4328] OBJ_set_rootKeyThumb */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x03,0x00,0x01,                      /* [ 4333] OBJ_set_addPolicy */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x03,0x02,0x01,                      /* [ 4338] OBJ_setAttr_Token_EMV */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x03,0x02,0x02,                      /* [ 4343] OBJ_setAttr_Token_B0Prime */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x03,0x03,0x03,                      /* [ 4348] OBJ_setAttr_IssCap_CVM */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x03,0x03,0x04,                      /* [ 4353] OBJ_setAttr_IssCap_T2 */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x03,0x03,0x05,                      /* [ 4358] OBJ_setAttr_IssCap_Sig */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x03,0x03,0x03,0x01,                 /* [ 4363] OBJ_setAttr_GenCryptgrm */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x03,0x03,0x04,0x01,                 /* [ 4369] OBJ_setAttr_T2Enc */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x03,0x03,0x04,0x02,                 /* [ 4375] OBJ_setAttr_T2cleartxt */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x03,0x03,0x05,0x01,                 /* [ 4381] OBJ_setAttr_TokICCsig */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x03,0x03,0x05,0x02,                 /* [ 4387] OBJ_setAttr_SecDevSig */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x08,0x01,                           /* [ 4393] OBJ_set_brand_IATA_ATA */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x08,0x1E,                           /* [ 4397] OBJ_set_brand_Diners */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x08,0x22,                           /* [ 4401] OBJ_set_brand_AmericanExpress */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x08,0x23,                           /* [ 4405] OBJ_set_brand_JCB */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x08,0x04,                           /* [ 4409] OBJ_set_brand_Visa */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x08,0x05,                           /* [ 4413] OBJ_set_brand_MasterCard */
+    0x67,0x2A,0x08,0xAE,0x7B,                      /* [ 4417] OBJ_set_brand_Novus */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x03,0x0A,       /* [ 4422] OBJ_des_cdmf */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x01,0x06,  /* [ 4430] OBJ_rsaOAEPEncryptionSET */
+    0x67,                                          /* [ 4439] OBJ_international_organizations */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x04,0x01,0x82,0x37,0x14,0x02,0x02,  /* [ 4440] OBJ_ms_smartcard_login */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x04,0x01,0x82,0x37,0x14,0x02,0x03,  /* [ 4450] OBJ_ms_upn */
+    0x55,0x04,0x09,                                /* [ 4460] OBJ_streetAddress */
+    0x55,0x04,0x11,                                /* [ 4463] OBJ_postalCode */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x15,            /* [ 4466] OBJ_id_ppl */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x01,0x0E,       /* [ 4473] OBJ_proxyCertInfo */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x15,0x00,       /* [ 4481] OBJ_id_ppl_anyLanguage */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x15,0x01,       /* [ 4489] OBJ_id_ppl_inheritAll */
+    0x55,0x1D,0x1E,                                /* [ 4497] OBJ_name_constraints */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x15,0x02,       /* [ 4500] OBJ_Independent */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x01,0x0B,  /* [ 4508] OBJ_sha256WithRSAEncryption */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x01,0x0C,  /* [ 4517] OBJ_sha384WithRSAEncryption */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x01,0x0D,  /* [ 4526] OBJ_sha512WithRSAEncryption */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x01,0x0E,  /* [ 4535] OBJ_sha224WithRSAEncryption */
+    0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x02,0x01,  /* [ 4544] OBJ_sha256 */
+    0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x02,0x02,  /* [ 4553] OBJ_sha384 */
+    0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x02,0x03,  /* [ 4562] OBJ_sha512 */
+    0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x02,0x04,  /* [ 4571] OBJ_sha224 */
+    0x2B,                                          /* [ 4580] OBJ_identified_organization */
+    0x2B,0x81,0x04,                                /* [ 4581] OBJ_certicom_arc */
+    0x67,0x2B,                                     /* [ 4584] OBJ_wap */
+    0x67,0x2B,0x01,                                /* [ 4586] OBJ_wap_wsg */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x01,0x02,0x03,       /* [ 4589] OBJ_X9_62_id_characteristic_two_basis */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x01,0x02,0x03,0x01,  /* [ 4597] OBJ_X9_62_onBasis */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x01,0x02,0x03,0x02,  /* [ 4606] OBJ_X9_62_tpBasis */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x01,0x02,0x03,0x03,  /* [ 4615] OBJ_X9_62_ppBasis */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x00,0x01,       /* [ 4624] OBJ_X9_62_c2pnb163v1 */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x00,0x02,       /* [ 4632] OBJ_X9_62_c2pnb163v2 */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x00,0x03,       /* [ 4640] OBJ_X9_62_c2pnb163v3 */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x00,0x04,       /* [ 4648] OBJ_X9_62_c2pnb176v1 */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x00,0x05,       /* [ 4656] OBJ_X9_62_c2tnb191v1 */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x00,0x06,       /* [ 4664] OBJ_X9_62_c2tnb191v2 */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x00,0x07,       /* [ 4672] OBJ_X9_62_c2tnb191v3 */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x00,0x08,       /* [ 4680] OBJ_X9_62_c2onb191v4 */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x00,0x09,       /* [ 4688] OBJ_X9_62_c2onb191v5 */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x00,0x0A,       /* [ 4696] OBJ_X9_62_c2pnb208w1 */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x00,0x0B,       /* [ 4704] OBJ_X9_62_c2tnb239v1 */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x00,0x0C,       /* [ 4712] OBJ_X9_62_c2tnb239v2 */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x00,0x0D,       /* [ 4720] OBJ_X9_62_c2tnb239v3 */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x00,0x0E,       /* [ 4728] OBJ_X9_62_c2onb239v4 */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x00,0x0F,       /* [ 4736] OBJ_X9_62_c2onb239v5 */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x00,0x10,       /* [ 4744] OBJ_X9_62_c2pnb272w1 */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x00,0x11,       /* [ 4752] OBJ_X9_62_c2pnb304w1 */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x00,0x12,       /* [ 4760] OBJ_X9_62_c2tnb359v1 */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x00,0x13,       /* [ 4768] OBJ_X9_62_c2pnb368w1 */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x00,0x14,       /* [ 4776] OBJ_X9_62_c2tnb431r1 */
+    0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x06,                      /* [ 4784] OBJ_secp112r1 */
+    0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x07,                      /* [ 4789] OBJ_secp112r2 */
+    0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x1C,                      /* [ 4794] OBJ_secp128r1 */
+    0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x1D,                      /* [ 4799] OBJ_secp128r2 */
+    0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x09,                      /* [ 4804] OBJ_secp160k1 */
+    0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x08,                      /* [ 4809] OBJ_secp160r1 */
+    0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x1E,                      /* [ 4814] OBJ_secp160r2 */
+    0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x1F,                      /* [ 4819] OBJ_secp192k1 */
+    0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x20,                      /* [ 4824] OBJ_secp224k1 */
+    0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x21,                      /* [ 4829] OBJ_secp224r1 */
+    0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x0A,                      /* [ 4834] OBJ_secp256k1 */
+    0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x22,                      /* [ 4839] OBJ_secp384r1 */
+    0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x23,                      /* [ 4844] OBJ_secp521r1 */
+    0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x04,                      /* [ 4849] OBJ_sect113r1 */
+    0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x05,                      /* [ 4854] OBJ_sect113r2 */
+    0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x16,                      /* [ 4859] OBJ_sect131r1 */
+    0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x17,                      /* [ 4864] OBJ_sect131r2 */
+    0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x01,                      /* [ 4869] OBJ_sect163k1 */
+    0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x02,                      /* [ 4874] OBJ_sect163r1 */
+    0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x0F,                      /* [ 4879] OBJ_sect163r2 */
+    0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x18,                      /* [ 4884] OBJ_sect193r1 */
+    0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x19,                      /* [ 4889] OBJ_sect193r2 */
+    0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x1A,                      /* [ 4894] OBJ_sect233k1 */
+    0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x1B,                      /* [ 4899] OBJ_sect233r1 */
+    0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x03,                      /* [ 4904] OBJ_sect239k1 */
+    0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x10,                      /* [ 4909] OBJ_sect283k1 */
+    0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x11,                      /* [ 4914] OBJ_sect283r1 */
+    0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x24,                      /* [ 4919] OBJ_sect409k1 */
+    0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x25,                      /* [ 4924] OBJ_sect409r1 */
+    0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x26,                      /* [ 4929] OBJ_sect571k1 */
+    0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x27,                      /* [ 4934] OBJ_sect571r1 */
+    0x67,0x2B,0x01,0x04,0x01,                      /* [ 4939] OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls1 */
+    0x67,0x2B,0x01,0x04,0x03,                      /* [ 4944] OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls3 */
+    0x67,0x2B,0x01,0x04,0x04,                      /* [ 4949] OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls4 */
+    0x67,0x2B,0x01,0x04,0x05,                      /* [ 4954] OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls5 */
+    0x67,0x2B,0x01,0x04,0x06,                      /* [ 4959] OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls6 */
+    0x67,0x2B,0x01,0x04,0x07,                      /* [ 4964] OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls7 */
+    0x67,0x2B,0x01,0x04,0x08,                      /* [ 4969] OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls8 */
+    0x67,0x2B,0x01,0x04,0x09,                      /* [ 4974] OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls9 */
+    0x67,0x2B,0x01,0x04,0x0A,                      /* [ 4979] OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls10 */
+    0x67,0x2B,0x01,0x04,0x0B,                      /* [ 4984] OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls11 */
+    0x67,0x2B,0x01,0x04,0x0C,                      /* [ 4989] OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls12 */
+    0x55,0x1D,0x20,0x00,                           /* [ 4994] OBJ_any_policy */
+    0x55,0x1D,0x21,                                /* [ 4998] OBJ_policy_mappings */
+    0x55,0x1D,0x36,                                /* [ 5001] OBJ_inhibit_any_policy */
+    0x2A,0x83,0x08,0x8C,0x9A,0x4B,0x3D,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x02,  /* [ 5004] OBJ_camellia_128_cbc */
+    0x2A,0x83,0x08,0x8C,0x9A,0x4B,0x3D,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x03,  /* [ 5015] OBJ_camellia_192_cbc */
+    0x2A,0x83,0x08,0x8C,0x9A,0x4B,0x3D,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x04,  /* [ 5026] OBJ_camellia_256_cbc */
+    0x03,0xA2,0x31,0x05,0x03,0x01,0x09,0x01,       /* [ 5037] OBJ_camellia_128_ecb */
+    0x03,0xA2,0x31,0x05,0x03,0x01,0x09,0x15,       /* [ 5045] OBJ_camellia_192_ecb */
+    0x03,0xA2,0x31,0x05,0x03,0x01,0x09,0x29,       /* [ 5053] OBJ_camellia_256_ecb */
+    0x03,0xA2,0x31,0x05,0x03,0x01,0x09,0x04,       /* [ 5061] OBJ_camellia_128_cfb128 */
+    0x03,0xA2,0x31,0x05,0x03,0x01,0x09,0x18,       /* [ 5069] OBJ_camellia_192_cfb128 */
+    0x03,0xA2,0x31,0x05,0x03,0x01,0x09,0x2C,       /* [ 5077] OBJ_camellia_256_cfb128 */
+    0x03,0xA2,0x31,0x05,0x03,0x01,0x09,0x03,       /* [ 5085] OBJ_camellia_128_ofb128 */
+    0x03,0xA2,0x31,0x05,0x03,0x01,0x09,0x17,       /* [ 5093] OBJ_camellia_192_ofb128 */
+    0x03,0xA2,0x31,0x05,0x03,0x01,0x09,0x2B,       /* [ 5101] OBJ_camellia_256_ofb128 */
+    0x55,0x1D,0x09,                                /* [ 5109] OBJ_subject_directory_attributes */
+    0x55,0x1D,0x1C,                                /* [ 5112] OBJ_issuing_distribution_point */
+    0x55,0x1D,0x1D,                                /* [ 5115] OBJ_certificate_issuer */
+    0x2A,0x83,0x1A,0x8C,0x9A,0x44,                 /* [ 5118] OBJ_kisa */
+    0x2A,0x83,0x1A,0x8C,0x9A,0x44,0x01,0x03,       /* [ 5124] OBJ_seed_ecb */
+    0x2A,0x83,0x1A,0x8C,0x9A,0x44,0x01,0x04,       /* [ 5132] OBJ_seed_cbc */
+    0x2A,0x83,0x1A,0x8C,0x9A,0x44,0x01,0x06,       /* [ 5140] OBJ_seed_ofb128 */
+    0x2A,0x83,0x1A,0x8C,0x9A,0x44,0x01,0x05,       /* [ 5148] OBJ_seed_cfb128 */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x08,0x01,0x01,       /* [ 5156] OBJ_hmac_md5 */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x08,0x01,0x02,       /* [ 5164] OBJ_hmac_sha1 */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF6,0x7D,0x07,0x42,0x0D,  /* [ 5172] OBJ_id_PasswordBasedMAC */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF6,0x7D,0x07,0x42,0x1E,  /* [ 5181] OBJ_id_DHBasedMac */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x04,0x10,       /* [ 5190] OBJ_id_it_suppLangTags */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x30,0x05,       /* [ 5198] OBJ_caRepository */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x01,0x09,  /* [ 5206] OBJ_id_smime_ct_compressedData */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x01,0x1B,  /* [ 5217] OBJ_id_ct_asciiTextWithCRLF */
+    0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x01,0x05,  /* [ 5228] OBJ_id_aes128_wrap */
+    0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x01,0x19,  /* [ 5237] OBJ_id_aes192_wrap */
+    0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x01,0x2D,  /* [ 5246] OBJ_id_aes256_wrap */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x04,0x02,            /* [ 5255] OBJ_ecdsa_with_Recommended */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x04,0x03,            /* [ 5262] OBJ_ecdsa_with_Specified */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x04,0x03,0x01,       /* [ 5269] OBJ_ecdsa_with_SHA224 */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x04,0x03,0x02,       /* [ 5277] OBJ_ecdsa_with_SHA256 */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x04,0x03,0x03,       /* [ 5285] OBJ_ecdsa_with_SHA384 */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x04,0x03,0x04,       /* [ 5293] OBJ_ecdsa_with_SHA512 */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x02,0x06,       /* [ 5301] OBJ_hmacWithMD5 */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x02,0x08,       /* [ 5309] OBJ_hmacWithSHA224 */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x02,0x09,       /* [ 5317] OBJ_hmacWithSHA256 */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x02,0x0A,       /* [ 5325] OBJ_hmacWithSHA384 */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x02,0x0B,       /* [ 5333] OBJ_hmacWithSHA512 */
+    0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x03,0x01,  /* [ 5341] OBJ_dsa_with_SHA224 */
+    0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x03,0x02,  /* [ 5350] OBJ_dsa_with_SHA256 */
+    0x28,0xCF,0x06,0x03,0x00,0x37,                 /* [ 5359] OBJ_whirlpool */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,                      /* [ 5365] OBJ_cryptopro */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x09,                      /* [ 5370] OBJ_cryptocom */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x03,                 /* [ 5375] OBJ_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001 */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x04,                 /* [ 5381] OBJ_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_94 */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x09,                 /* [ 5387] OBJ_id_GostR3411_94 */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x0A,                 /* [ 5393] OBJ_id_HMACGostR3411_94 */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x13,                 /* [ 5399] OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001 */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x14,                 /* [ 5405] OBJ_id_GostR3410_94 */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x15,                 /* [ 5411] OBJ_id_Gost28147_89 */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x16,                 /* [ 5417] OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_MAC */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x17,                 /* [ 5423] OBJ_id_GostR3411_94_prf */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x62,                 /* [ 5429] OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001DH */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x63,                 /* [ 5435] OBJ_id_GostR3410_94DH */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x0E,0x01,            /* [ 5441] OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_KeyMeshing */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x0E,0x00,            /* [ 5448] OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_None_KeyMeshing */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x1E,0x00,            /* [ 5455] OBJ_id_GostR3411_94_TestParamSet */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x1E,0x01,            /* [ 5462] OBJ_id_GostR3411_94_CryptoProParamSet */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x1F,0x00,            /* [ 5469] OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_TestParamSet */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x1F,0x01,            /* [ 5476] OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_A_ParamSet */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x1F,0x02,            /* [ 5483] OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_B_ParamSet */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x1F,0x03,            /* [ 5490] OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_C_ParamSet */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x1F,0x04,            /* [ 5497] OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_D_ParamSet */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x1F,0x05,            /* [ 5504] OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_Oscar_1_1_ParamSet */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x1F,0x06,            /* [ 5511] OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_Oscar_1_0_ParamSet */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x1F,0x07,            /* [ 5518] OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_RIC_1_ParamSet */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x20,0x00,            /* [ 5525] OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_TestParamSet */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x20,0x02,            /* [ 5532] OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_A_ParamSet */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x20,0x03,            /* [ 5539] OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_B_ParamSet */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x20,0x04,            /* [ 5546] OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_C_ParamSet */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x20,0x05,            /* [ 5553] OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_D_ParamSet */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x21,0x01,            /* [ 5560] OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_XchA_ParamSet */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x21,0x02,            /* [ 5567] OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_XchB_ParamSet */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x21,0x03,            /* [ 5574] OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_XchC_ParamSet */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x23,0x00,            /* [ 5581] OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001_TestParamSet */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x23,0x01,            /* [ 5588] OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_A_ParamSet */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x23,0x02,            /* [ 5595] OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_B_ParamSet */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x23,0x03,            /* [ 5602] OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_C_ParamSet */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x24,0x00,            /* [ 5609] OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_XchA_ParamSet */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x24,0x01,            /* [ 5616] OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_XchB_ParamSet */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x14,0x01,            /* [ 5623] OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_a */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x14,0x02,            /* [ 5630] OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_aBis */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x14,0x03,            /* [ 5637] OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_b */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x14,0x04,            /* [ 5644] OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_bBis */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x09,0x01,0x06,0x01,       /* [ 5651] OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_cc */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x09,0x01,0x05,0x03,       /* [ 5659] OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_cc */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x09,0x01,0x05,0x04,       /* [ 5667] OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001_cc */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x09,0x01,0x03,0x03,       /* [ 5675] OBJ_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_94_cc */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x09,0x01,0x03,0x04,       /* [ 5683] OBJ_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001_cc */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x09,0x01,0x08,0x01,       /* [ 5691] OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001_ParamSet_cc */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x04,0x01,0x82,0x37,0x11,0x02,  /* [ 5699] OBJ_LocalKeySet */
+    0x55,0x1D,0x2E,                                /* [ 5708] OBJ_freshest_crl */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x08,0x03,       /* [ 5711] OBJ_id_on_permanentIdentifier */
+    0x55,0x04,0x0E,                                /* [ 5719] OBJ_searchGuide */
+    0x55,0x04,0x0F,                                /* [ 5722] OBJ_businessCategory */
+    0x55,0x04,0x10,                                /* [ 5725] OBJ_postalAddress */
+    0x55,0x04,0x12,                                /* [ 5728] OBJ_postOfficeBox */
+    0x55,0x04,0x13,                                /* [ 5731] OBJ_physicalDeliveryOfficeName */
+    0x55,0x04,0x14,                                /* [ 5734] OBJ_telephoneNumber */
+    0x55,0x04,0x15,                                /* [ 5737] OBJ_telexNumber */
+    0x55,0x04,0x16,                                /* [ 5740] OBJ_teletexTerminalIdentifier */
+    0x55,0x04,0x17,                                /* [ 5743] OBJ_facsimileTelephoneNumber */
+    0x55,0x04,0x18,                                /* [ 5746] OBJ_x121Address */
+    0x55,0x04,0x19,                                /* [ 5749] OBJ_internationaliSDNNumber */
+    0x55,0x04,0x1A,                                /* [ 5752] OBJ_registeredAddress */
+    0x55,0x04,0x1B,                                /* [ 5755] OBJ_destinationIndicator */
+    0x55,0x04,0x1C,                                /* [ 5758] OBJ_preferredDeliveryMethod */
+    0x55,0x04,0x1D,                                /* [ 5761] OBJ_presentationAddress */
+    0x55,0x04,0x1E,                                /* [ 5764] OBJ_supportedApplicationContext */
+    0x55,0x04,0x1F,                                /* [ 5767] OBJ_member */
+    0x55,0x04,0x20,                                /* [ 5770] OBJ_owner */
+    0x55,0x04,0x21,                                /* [ 5773] OBJ_roleOccupant */
+    0x55,0x04,0x22,                                /* [ 5776] OBJ_seeAlso */
+    0x55,0x04,0x23,                                /* [ 5779] OBJ_userPassword */
+    0x55,0x04,0x24,                                /* [ 5782] OBJ_userCertificate */
+    0x55,0x04,0x25,                                /* [ 5785] OBJ_cACertificate */
+    0x55,0x04,0x26,                                /* [ 5788] OBJ_authorityRevocationList */
+    0x55,0x04,0x27,                                /* [ 5791] OBJ_certificateRevocationList */
+    0x55,0x04,0x28,                                /* [ 5794] OBJ_crossCertificatePair */
+    0x55,0x04,0x2F,                                /* [ 5797] OBJ_enhancedSearchGuide */
+    0x55,0x04,0x30,                                /* [ 5800] OBJ_protocolInformation */
+    0x55,0x04,0x31,                                /* [ 5803] OBJ_distinguishedName */
+    0x55,0x04,0x32,                                /* [ 5806] OBJ_uniqueMember */
+    0x55,0x04,0x33,                                /* [ 5809] OBJ_houseIdentifier */
+    0x55,0x04,0x34,                                /* [ 5812] OBJ_supportedAlgorithms */
+    0x55,0x04,0x35,                                /* [ 5815] OBJ_deltaRevocationList */
+    0x55,0x04,0x36,                                /* [ 5818] OBJ_dmdName */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x03,0x09,  /* [ 5821] OBJ_id_alg_PWRI_KEK */
+    0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x01,0x06,  /* [ 5832] OBJ_aes_128_gcm */
+    0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x01,0x07,  /* [ 5841] OBJ_aes_128_ccm */
+    0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x01,0x08,  /* [ 5850] OBJ_id_aes128_wrap_pad */
+    0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x01,0x1A,  /* [ 5859] OBJ_aes_192_gcm */
+    0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x01,0x1B,  /* [ 5868] OBJ_aes_192_ccm */
+    0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x01,0x1C,  /* [ 5877] OBJ_id_aes192_wrap_pad */
+    0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x01,0x2E,  /* [ 5886] OBJ_aes_256_gcm */
+    0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x01,0x2F,  /* [ 5895] OBJ_aes_256_ccm */
+    0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x01,0x30,  /* [ 5904] OBJ_id_aes256_wrap_pad */
+    0x2A,0x83,0x08,0x8C,0x9A,0x4B,0x3D,0x01,0x01,0x03,0x02,  /* [ 5913] OBJ_id_camellia128_wrap */
+    0x2A,0x83,0x08,0x8C,0x9A,0x4B,0x3D,0x01,0x01,0x03,0x03,  /* [ 5924] OBJ_id_camellia192_wrap */
+    0x2A,0x83,0x08,0x8C,0x9A,0x4B,0x3D,0x01,0x01,0x03,0x04,  /* [ 5935] OBJ_id_camellia256_wrap */
+    0x55,0x1D,0x25,0x00,                           /* [ 5946] OBJ_anyExtendedKeyUsage */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x01,0x08,  /* [ 5950] OBJ_mgf1 */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x01,0x0A,  /* [ 5959] OBJ_rsassaPss */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x01,0x07,  /* [ 5968] OBJ_rsaesOaep */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3E,0x02,0x01,            /* [ 5977] OBJ_dhpublicnumber */
+    0x2B,0x24,0x03,0x03,0x02,0x08,0x01,0x01,0x01,  /* [ 5984] OBJ_brainpoolP160r1 */
+    0x2B,0x24,0x03,0x03,0x02,0x08,0x01,0x01,0x02,  /* [ 5993] OBJ_brainpoolP160t1 */
+    0x2B,0x24,0x03,0x03,0x02,0x08,0x01,0x01,0x03,  /* [ 6002] OBJ_brainpoolP192r1 */
+    0x2B,0x24,0x03,0x03,0x02,0x08,0x01,0x01,0x04,  /* [ 6011] OBJ_brainpoolP192t1 */
+    0x2B,0x24,0x03,0x03,0x02,0x08,0x01,0x01,0x05,  /* [ 6020] OBJ_brainpoolP224r1 */
+    0x2B,0x24,0x03,0x03,0x02,0x08,0x01,0x01,0x06,  /* [ 6029] OBJ_brainpoolP224t1 */
+    0x2B,0x24,0x03,0x03,0x02,0x08,0x01,0x01,0x07,  /* [ 6038] OBJ_brainpoolP256r1 */
+    0x2B,0x24,0x03,0x03,0x02,0x08,0x01,0x01,0x08,  /* [ 6047] OBJ_brainpoolP256t1 */
+    0x2B,0x24,0x03,0x03,0x02,0x08,0x01,0x01,0x09,  /* [ 6056] OBJ_brainpoolP320r1 */
+    0x2B,0x24,0x03,0x03,0x02,0x08,0x01,0x01,0x0A,  /* [ 6065] OBJ_brainpoolP320t1 */
+    0x2B,0x24,0x03,0x03,0x02,0x08,0x01,0x01,0x0B,  /* [ 6074] OBJ_brainpoolP384r1 */
+    0x2B,0x24,0x03,0x03,0x02,0x08,0x01,0x01,0x0C,  /* [ 6083] OBJ_brainpoolP384t1 */
+    0x2B,0x24,0x03,0x03,0x02,0x08,0x01,0x01,0x0D,  /* [ 6092] OBJ_brainpoolP512r1 */
+    0x2B,0x24,0x03,0x03,0x02,0x08,0x01,0x01,0x0E,  /* [ 6101] OBJ_brainpoolP512t1 */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x01,0x09,  /* [ 6110] OBJ_pSpecified */
+    0x2B,0x81,0x05,0x10,0x86,0x48,0x3F,0x00,0x02,  /* [ 6119] OBJ_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha1kdf_scheme */
+    0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x01,0x0B,0x00,                 /* [ 6128] OBJ_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha224kdf_scheme */
+    0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x01,0x0B,0x01,                 /* [ 6134] OBJ_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha256kdf_scheme */
+    0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x01,0x0B,0x02,                 /* [ 6140] OBJ_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha384kdf_scheme */
+    0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x01,0x0B,0x03,                 /* [ 6146] OBJ_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha512kdf_scheme */
+    0x2B,0x81,0x05,0x10,0x86,0x48,0x3F,0x00,0x03,  /* [ 6152] OBJ_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha1kdf_scheme */
+    0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x01,0x0E,0x00,                 /* [ 6161] OBJ_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha224kdf_scheme */
+    0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x01,0x0E,0x01,                 /* [ 6167] OBJ_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha256kdf_scheme */
+    0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x01,0x0E,0x02,                 /* [ 6173] OBJ_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha384kdf_scheme */
+    0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x01,0x0E,0x03,                 /* [ 6179] OBJ_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha512kdf_scheme */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x04,0x01,0xD6,0x79,0x02,0x04,0x02,  /* [ 6185] OBJ_ct_precert_scts */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x04,0x01,0xD6,0x79,0x02,0x04,0x03,  /* [ 6195] OBJ_ct_precert_poison */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x04,0x01,0xD6,0x79,0x02,0x04,0x04,  /* [ 6205] OBJ_ct_precert_signer */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x04,0x01,0xD6,0x79,0x02,0x04,0x05,  /* [ 6215] OBJ_ct_cert_scts */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x04,0x01,0x82,0x37,0x3C,0x02,0x01,0x01,  /* [ 6225] OBJ_jurisdictionLocalityName */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x04,0x01,0x82,0x37,0x3C,0x02,0x01,0x02,  /* [ 6236] OBJ_jurisdictionStateOrProvinceName */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x04,0x01,0x82,0x37,0x3C,0x02,0x01,0x03,  /* [ 6247] OBJ_jurisdictionCountryName */
+    0x03,0xA2,0x31,0x05,0x03,0x01,0x09,0x06,       /* [ 6258] OBJ_camellia_128_gcm */
+    0x03,0xA2,0x31,0x05,0x03,0x01,0x09,0x07,       /* [ 6266] OBJ_camellia_128_ccm */
+    0x03,0xA2,0x31,0x05,0x03,0x01,0x09,0x09,       /* [ 6274] OBJ_camellia_128_ctr */
+    0x03,0xA2,0x31,0x05,0x03,0x01,0x09,0x0A,       /* [ 6282] OBJ_camellia_128_cmac */
+    0x03,0xA2,0x31,0x05,0x03,0x01,0x09,0x1A,       /* [ 6290] OBJ_camellia_192_gcm */
+    0x03,0xA2,0x31,0x05,0x03,0x01,0x09,0x1B,       /* [ 6298] OBJ_camellia_192_ccm */
+    0x03,0xA2,0x31,0x05,0x03,0x01,0x09,0x1D,       /* [ 6306] OBJ_camellia_192_ctr */
+    0x03,0xA2,0x31,0x05,0x03,0x01,0x09,0x1E,       /* [ 6314] OBJ_camellia_192_cmac */
+    0x03,0xA2,0x31,0x05,0x03,0x01,0x09,0x2E,       /* [ 6322] OBJ_camellia_256_gcm */
+    0x03,0xA2,0x31,0x05,0x03,0x01,0x09,0x2F,       /* [ 6330] OBJ_camellia_256_ccm */
+    0x03,0xA2,0x31,0x05,0x03,0x01,0x09,0x31,       /* [ 6338] OBJ_camellia_256_ctr */
+    0x03,0xA2,0x31,0x05,0x03,0x01,0x09,0x32,       /* [ 6346] OBJ_camellia_256_cmac */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x04,0x01,0xDA,0x47,0x04,0x0B,  /* [ 6354] OBJ_id_scrypt */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,                      /* [ 6363] OBJ_id_tc26 */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x01,                 /* [ 6368] OBJ_id_tc26_algorithms */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x01,0x01,            /* [ 6374] OBJ_id_tc26_sign */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01,       /* [ 6381] OBJ_id_GostR3410_2012_256 */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x02,       /* [ 6389] OBJ_id_GostR3410_2012_512 */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x01,0x02,            /* [ 6397] OBJ_id_tc26_digest */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x01,0x02,0x02,       /* [ 6404] OBJ_id_GostR3411_2012_256 */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x01,0x02,0x03,       /* [ 6412] OBJ_id_GostR3411_2012_512 */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x01,0x03,            /* [ 6420] OBJ_id_tc26_signwithdigest */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x01,0x03,0x02,       /* [ 6427] OBJ_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256 */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x01,0x03,0x03,       /* [ 6435] OBJ_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512 */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x01,0x04,            /* [ 6443] OBJ_id_tc26_mac */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x01,0x04,0x01,       /* [ 6450] OBJ_id_tc26_hmac_gost_3411_2012_256 */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x01,0x04,0x02,       /* [ 6458] OBJ_id_tc26_hmac_gost_3411_2012_512 */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x01,0x05,            /* [ 6466] OBJ_id_tc26_cipher */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x01,0x06,            /* [ 6473] OBJ_id_tc26_agreement */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x01,0x06,0x01,       /* [ 6480] OBJ_id_tc26_agreement_gost_3410_2012_256 */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x01,0x06,0x02,       /* [ 6488] OBJ_id_tc26_agreement_gost_3410_2012_512 */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x02,                 /* [ 6496] OBJ_id_tc26_constants */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x02,0x01,            /* [ 6502] OBJ_id_tc26_sign_constants */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x02,0x01,0x02,       /* [ 6509] OBJ_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_constants */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x02,0x01,0x02,0x00,  /* [ 6517] OBJ_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetTest */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x02,0x01,0x02,0x01,  /* [ 6526] OBJ_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetA */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x02,0x01,0x02,0x02,  /* [ 6535] OBJ_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetB */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x02,0x02,            /* [ 6544] OBJ_id_tc26_digest_constants */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x02,0x05,            /* [ 6551] OBJ_id_tc26_cipher_constants */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x02,0x05,0x01,       /* [ 6558] OBJ_id_tc26_gost_28147_constants */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x02,0x05,0x01,0x01,  /* [ 6566] OBJ_id_tc26_gost_28147_param_Z */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x03,0x81,0x03,0x01,0x01,       /* [ 6575] OBJ_INN */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x64,0x01,                      /* [ 6583] OBJ_OGRN */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x64,0x03,                      /* [ 6588] OBJ_SNILS */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x64,0x6F,                      /* [ 6593] OBJ_subjectSignTool */
+    0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x64,0x70,                      /* [ 6598] OBJ_issuerSignTool */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x01,0x18,       /* [ 6603] OBJ_tlsfeature */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x03,0x11,       /* [ 6611] OBJ_ipsec_IKE */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x03,0x12,       /* [ 6619] OBJ_capwapAC */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x03,0x13,       /* [ 6627] OBJ_capwapWTP */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x03,0x15,       /* [ 6635] OBJ_sshClient */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x03,0x16,       /* [ 6643] OBJ_sshServer */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x03,0x17,       /* [ 6651] OBJ_sendRouter */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x03,0x18,       /* [ 6659] OBJ_sendProxiedRouter */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x03,0x19,       /* [ 6667] OBJ_sendOwner */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x03,0x1A,       /* [ 6675] OBJ_sendProxiedOwner */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x02,0x03,                 /* [ 6683] OBJ_id_pkinit */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x02,0x03,0x04,            /* [ 6689] OBJ_pkInitClientAuth */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x02,0x03,0x05,            /* [ 6696] OBJ_pkInitKDC */
+    0x2B,0x65,0x6E,                                /* [ 6703] OBJ_X25519 */
+    0x2B,0x65,0x6F,                                /* [ 6706] OBJ_X448 */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x04,0x01,0x8D,0x3A,0x0C,0x02,0x01,0x10,  /* [ 6709] OBJ_blake2b512 */
+    0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x04,0x01,0x8D,0x3A,0x0C,0x02,0x02,0x08,  /* [ 6720] OBJ_blake2s256 */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x01,0x13,  /* [ 6731] OBJ_id_smime_ct_contentCollection */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x01,0x17,  /* [ 6742] OBJ_id_smime_ct_authEnvelopedData */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x01,0x1C,  /* [ 6753] OBJ_id_ct_xml */
+};
+
+#define NUM_NID 1061
+static const ASN1_OBJECT nid_objs[NUM_NID] = {
+    {"UNDEF", "undefined", NID_undef},
+    {"rsadsi", "RSA Data Security, Inc.", NID_rsadsi, 6, &so[0]},
+    {"pkcs", "RSA Data Security, Inc. PKCS", NID_pkcs, 7, &so[6]},
+    {"MD2", "md2", NID_md2, 8, &so[13]},
+    {"MD5", "md5", NID_md5, 8, &so[21]},
+    {"RC4", "rc4", NID_rc4, 8, &so[29]},
+    {"rsaEncryption", "rsaEncryption", NID_rsaEncryption, 9, &so[37]},
+    {"RSA-MD2", "md2WithRSAEncryption", NID_md2WithRSAEncryption, 9, &so[46]},
+    {"RSA-MD5", "md5WithRSAEncryption", NID_md5WithRSAEncryption, 9, &so[55]},
+    {"PBE-MD2-DES", "pbeWithMD2AndDES-CBC", NID_pbeWithMD2AndDES_CBC, 9, &so[64]},
+    {"PBE-MD5-DES", "pbeWithMD5AndDES-CBC", NID_pbeWithMD5AndDES_CBC, 9, &so[73]},
+    {"X500", "directory services (X.500)", NID_X500, 1, &so[82]},
+    {"X509", "X509", NID_X509, 2, &so[83]},
+    {"CN", "commonName", NID_commonName, 3, &so[85]},
+    {"C", "countryName", NID_countryName, 3, &so[88]},
+    {"L", "localityName", NID_localityName, 3, &so[91]},
+    {"ST", "stateOrProvinceName", NID_stateOrProvinceName, 3, &so[94]},
+    {"O", "organizationName", NID_organizationName, 3, &so[97]},
+    {"OU", "organizationalUnitName", NID_organizationalUnitName, 3, &so[100]},
+    {"RSA", "rsa", NID_rsa, 4, &so[103]},
+    {"pkcs7", "pkcs7", NID_pkcs7, 8, &so[107]},
+    {"pkcs7-data", "pkcs7-data", NID_pkcs7_data, 9, &so[115]},
+    {"pkcs7-signedData", "pkcs7-signedData", NID_pkcs7_signed, 9, &so[124]},
+    {"pkcs7-envelopedData", "pkcs7-envelopedData", NID_pkcs7_enveloped, 9, &so[133]},
+    {"pkcs7-signedAndEnvelopedData", "pkcs7-signedAndEnvelopedData", NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped, 9, &so[142]},
+    {"pkcs7-digestData", "pkcs7-digestData", NID_pkcs7_digest, 9, &so[151]},
+    {"pkcs7-encryptedData", "pkcs7-encryptedData", NID_pkcs7_encrypted, 9, &so[160]},
+    {"pkcs3", "pkcs3", NID_pkcs3, 8, &so[169]},
+    {"dhKeyAgreement", "dhKeyAgreement", NID_dhKeyAgreement, 9, &so[177]},
+    {"DES-ECB", "des-ecb", NID_des_ecb, 5, &so[186]},
+    {"DES-CFB", "des-cfb", NID_des_cfb64, 5, &so[191]},
+    {"DES-CBC", "des-cbc", NID_des_cbc, 5, &so[196]},
+    {"DES-EDE", "des-ede", NID_des_ede_ecb, 5, &so[201]},
+    {"DES-EDE3", "des-ede3", NID_des_ede3_ecb},
+    {"IDEA-CBC", "idea-cbc", NID_idea_cbc, 11, &so[206]},
+    {"IDEA-CFB", "idea-cfb", NID_idea_cfb64},
+    {"IDEA-ECB", "idea-ecb", NID_idea_ecb},
+    {"RC2-CBC", "rc2-cbc", NID_rc2_cbc, 8, &so[217]},
+    {"RC2-ECB", "rc2-ecb", NID_rc2_ecb},
+    {"RC2-CFB", "rc2-cfb", NID_rc2_cfb64},
+    {"RC2-OFB", "rc2-ofb", NID_rc2_ofb64},
+    {"SHA", "sha", NID_sha, 5, &so[225]},
+    {"RSA-SHA", "shaWithRSAEncryption", NID_shaWithRSAEncryption, 5, &so[230]},
+    {"DES-EDE-CBC", "des-ede-cbc", NID_des_ede_cbc},
+    {"DES-EDE3-CBC", "des-ede3-cbc", NID_des_ede3_cbc, 8, &so[235]},
+    {"DES-OFB", "des-ofb", NID_des_ofb64, 5, &so[243]},
+    {"IDEA-OFB", "idea-ofb", NID_idea_ofb64},
+    {"pkcs9", "pkcs9", NID_pkcs9, 8, &so[248]},
+    {"emailAddress", "emailAddress", NID_pkcs9_emailAddress, 9, &so[256]},
+    {"unstructuredName", "unstructuredName", NID_pkcs9_unstructuredName, 9, &so[265]},
+    {"contentType", "contentType", NID_pkcs9_contentType, 9, &so[274]},
+    {"messageDigest", "messageDigest", NID_pkcs9_messageDigest, 9, &so[283]},
+    {"signingTime", "signingTime", NID_pkcs9_signingTime, 9, &so[292]},
+    {"countersignature", "countersignature", NID_pkcs9_countersignature, 9, &so[301]},
+    {"challengePassword", "challengePassword", NID_pkcs9_challengePassword, 9, &so[310]},
+    {"unstructuredAddress", "unstructuredAddress", NID_pkcs9_unstructuredAddress, 9, &so[319]},
+    {"extendedCertificateAttributes", "extendedCertificateAttributes", NID_pkcs9_extCertAttributes, 9, &so[328]},
+    {"Netscape", "Netscape Communications Corp.", NID_netscape, 7, &so[337]},
+    {"nsCertExt", "Netscape Certificate Extension", NID_netscape_cert_extension, 8, &so[344]},
+    {"nsDataType", "Netscape Data Type", NID_netscape_data_type, 8, &so[352]},
+    {"DES-EDE-CFB", "des-ede-cfb", NID_des_ede_cfb64},
+    {"DES-EDE3-CFB", "des-ede3-cfb", NID_des_ede3_cfb64},
+    {"DES-EDE-OFB", "des-ede-ofb", NID_des_ede_ofb64},
+    {"DES-EDE3-OFB", "des-ede3-ofb", NID_des_ede3_ofb64},
+    {"SHA1", "sha1", NID_sha1, 5, &so[360]},
+    {"RSA-SHA1", "sha1WithRSAEncryption", NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption, 9, &so[365]},
+    {"DSA-SHA", "dsaWithSHA", NID_dsaWithSHA, 5, &so[374]},
+    {"DSA-old", "dsaEncryption-old", NID_dsa_2, 5, &so[379]},
+    {"PBE-SHA1-RC2-64", "pbeWithSHA1AndRC2-CBC", NID_pbeWithSHA1AndRC2_CBC, 9, &so[384]},
+    {"PBKDF2", "PBKDF2", NID_id_pbkdf2, 9, &so[393]},
+    {"DSA-SHA1-old", "dsaWithSHA1-old", NID_dsaWithSHA1_2, 5, &so[402]},
+    {"nsCertType", "Netscape Cert Type", NID_netscape_cert_type, 9, &so[407]},
+    {"nsBaseUrl", "Netscape Base Url", NID_netscape_base_url, 9, &so[416]},
+    {"nsRevocationUrl", "Netscape Revocation Url", NID_netscape_revocation_url, 9, &so[425]},
+    {"nsCaRevocationUrl", "Netscape CA Revocation Url", NID_netscape_ca_revocation_url, 9, &so[434]},
+    {"nsRenewalUrl", "Netscape Renewal Url", NID_netscape_renewal_url, 9, &so[443]},
+    {"nsCaPolicyUrl", "Netscape CA Policy Url", NID_netscape_ca_policy_url, 9, &so[452]},
+    {"nsSslServerName", "Netscape SSL Server Name", NID_netscape_ssl_server_name, 9, &so[461]},
+    {"nsComment", "Netscape Comment", NID_netscape_comment, 9, &so[470]},
+    {"nsCertSequence", "Netscape Certificate Sequence", NID_netscape_cert_sequence, 9, &so[479]},
+    {"DESX-CBC", "desx-cbc", NID_desx_cbc},
+    {"id-ce", "id-ce", NID_id_ce, 2, &so[488]},
+    {"subjectKeyIdentifier", "X509v3 Subject Key Identifier", NID_subject_key_identifier, 3, &so[490]},
+    {"keyUsage", "X509v3 Key Usage", NID_key_usage, 3, &so[493]},
+    {"privateKeyUsagePeriod", "X509v3 Private Key Usage Period", NID_private_key_usage_period, 3, &so[496]},
+    {"subjectAltName", "X509v3 Subject Alternative Name", NID_subject_alt_name, 3, &so[499]},
+    {"issuerAltName", "X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name", NID_issuer_alt_name, 3, &so[502]},
+    {"basicConstraints", "X509v3 Basic Constraints", NID_basic_constraints, 3, &so[505]},
+    {"crlNumber", "X509v3 CRL Number", NID_crl_number, 3, &so[508]},
+    {"certificatePolicies", "X509v3 Certificate Policies", NID_certificate_policies, 3, &so[511]},
+    {"authorityKeyIdentifier", "X509v3 Authority Key Identifier", NID_authority_key_identifier, 3, &so[514]},
+    {"BF-CBC", "bf-cbc", NID_bf_cbc, 9, &so[517]},
+    {"BF-ECB", "bf-ecb", NID_bf_ecb},
+    {"BF-CFB", "bf-cfb", NID_bf_cfb64},
+    {"BF-OFB", "bf-ofb", NID_bf_ofb64},
+    {"MDC2", "mdc2", NID_mdc2, 4, &so[526]},
+    {"RSA-MDC2", "mdc2WithRSA", NID_mdc2WithRSA, 4, &so[530]},
+    {"RC4-40", "rc4-40", NID_rc4_40},
+    {"RC2-40-CBC", "rc2-40-cbc", NID_rc2_40_cbc},
+    {"GN", "givenName", NID_givenName, 3, &so[534]},
+    {"SN", "surname", NID_surname, 3, &so[537]},
+    {"initials", "initials", NID_initials, 3, &so[540]},
+    {"uid", "uniqueIdentifier", NID_uniqueIdentifier, 10, &so[543]},
+    {"crlDistributionPoints", "X509v3 CRL Distribution Points", NID_crl_distribution_points, 3, &so[553]},
+    {"RSA-NP-MD5", "md5WithRSA", NID_md5WithRSA, 5, &so[556]},
+    {"serialNumber", "serialNumber", NID_serialNumber, 3, &so[561]},
+    {"title", "title", NID_title, 3, &so[564]},
+    {"description", "description", NID_description, 3, &so[567]},
+    {"CAST5-CBC", "cast5-cbc", NID_cast5_cbc, 9, &so[570]},
+    {"CAST5-ECB", "cast5-ecb", NID_cast5_ecb},
+    {"CAST5-CFB", "cast5-cfb", NID_cast5_cfb64},
+    {"CAST5-OFB", "cast5-ofb", NID_cast5_ofb64},
+    {"pbeWithMD5AndCast5CBC", "pbeWithMD5AndCast5CBC", NID_pbeWithMD5AndCast5_CBC, 9, &so[579]},
+    {"DSA-SHA1", "dsaWithSHA1", NID_dsaWithSHA1, 7, &so[588]},
+    {"MD5-SHA1", "md5-sha1", NID_md5_sha1},
+    {"RSA-SHA1-2", "sha1WithRSA", NID_sha1WithRSA, 5, &so[595]},
+    {"DSA", "dsaEncryption", NID_dsa, 7, &so[600]},
+    {"RIPEMD160", "ripemd160", NID_ripemd160, 5, &so[607]},
+    { NULL, NULL, NID_undef },
+    {"RSA-RIPEMD160", "ripemd160WithRSA", NID_ripemd160WithRSA, 6, &so[612]},
+    {"RC5-CBC", "rc5-cbc", NID_rc5_cbc, 8, &so[618]},
+    {"RC5-ECB", "rc5-ecb", NID_rc5_ecb},
+    {"RC5-CFB", "rc5-cfb", NID_rc5_cfb64},
+    {"RC5-OFB", "rc5-ofb", NID_rc5_ofb64},
+    { NULL, NULL, NID_undef },
+    {"ZLIB", "zlib compression", NID_zlib_compression, 11, &so[626]},
+    {"extendedKeyUsage", "X509v3 Extended Key Usage", NID_ext_key_usage, 3, &so[637]},
+    {"PKIX", "PKIX", NID_id_pkix, 6, &so[640]},
+    {"id-kp", "id-kp", NID_id_kp, 7, &so[646]},
+    {"serverAuth", "TLS Web Server Authentication", NID_server_auth, 8, &so[653]},
+    {"clientAuth", "TLS Web Client Authentication", NID_client_auth, 8, &so[661]},
+    {"codeSigning", "Code Signing", NID_code_sign, 8, &so[669]},
+    {"emailProtection", "E-mail Protection", NID_email_protect, 8, &so[677]},
+    {"timeStamping", "Time Stamping", NID_time_stamp, 8, &so[685]},
+    {"msCodeInd", "Microsoft Individual Code Signing", NID_ms_code_ind, 10, &so[693]},
+    {"msCodeCom", "Microsoft Commercial Code Signing", NID_ms_code_com, 10, &so[703]},
+    {"msCTLSign", "Microsoft Trust List Signing", NID_ms_ctl_sign, 10, &so[713]},
+    {"msSGC", "Microsoft Server Gated Crypto", NID_ms_sgc, 10, &so[723]},
+    {"msEFS", "Microsoft Encrypted File System", NID_ms_efs, 10, &so[733]},
+    {"nsSGC", "Netscape Server Gated Crypto", NID_ns_sgc, 9, &so[743]},
+    {"deltaCRL", "X509v3 Delta CRL Indicator", NID_delta_crl, 3, &so[752]},
+    {"CRLReason", "X509v3 CRL Reason Code", NID_crl_reason, 3, &so[755]},
+    {"invalidityDate", "Invalidity Date", NID_invalidity_date, 3, &so[758]},
+    {"SXNetID", "Strong Extranet ID", NID_sxnet, 5, &so[761]},
+    {"PBE-SHA1-RC4-128", "pbeWithSHA1And128BitRC4", NID_pbe_WithSHA1And128BitRC4, 10, &so[766]},
+    {"PBE-SHA1-RC4-40", "pbeWithSHA1And40BitRC4", NID_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC4, 10, &so[776]},
+    {"PBE-SHA1-3DES", "pbeWithSHA1And3-KeyTripleDES-CBC", NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC, 10, &so[786]},
+    {"PBE-SHA1-2DES", "pbeWithSHA1And2-KeyTripleDES-CBC", NID_pbe_WithSHA1And2_Key_TripleDES_CBC, 10, &so[796]},
+    {"PBE-SHA1-RC2-128", "pbeWithSHA1And128BitRC2-CBC", NID_pbe_WithSHA1And128BitRC2_CBC, 10, &so[806]},
+    {"PBE-SHA1-RC2-40", "pbeWithSHA1And40BitRC2-CBC", NID_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC, 10, &so[816]},
+    {"keyBag", "keyBag", NID_keyBag, 11, &so[826]},
+    {"pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag", "pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag", NID_pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag, 11, &so[837]},
+    {"certBag", "certBag", NID_certBag, 11, &so[848]},
+    {"crlBag", "crlBag", NID_crlBag, 11, &so[859]},
+    {"secretBag", "secretBag", NID_secretBag, 11, &so[870]},
+    {"safeContentsBag", "safeContentsBag", NID_safeContentsBag, 11, &so[881]},
+    {"friendlyName", "friendlyName", NID_friendlyName, 9, &so[892]},
+    {"localKeyID", "localKeyID", NID_localKeyID, 9, &so[901]},
+    {"x509Certificate", "x509Certificate", NID_x509Certificate, 10, &so[910]},
+    {"sdsiCertificate", "sdsiCertificate", NID_sdsiCertificate, 10, &so[920]},
+    {"x509Crl", "x509Crl", NID_x509Crl, 10, &so[930]},
+    {"PBES2", "PBES2", NID_pbes2, 9, &so[940]},
+    {"PBMAC1", "PBMAC1", NID_pbmac1, 9, &so[949]},
+    {"hmacWithSHA1", "hmacWithSHA1", NID_hmacWithSHA1, 8, &so[958]},
+    {"id-qt-cps", "Policy Qualifier CPS", NID_id_qt_cps, 8, &so[966]},
+    {"id-qt-unotice", "Policy Qualifier User Notice", NID_id_qt_unotice, 8, &so[974]},
+    {"RC2-64-CBC", "rc2-64-cbc", NID_rc2_64_cbc},
+    {"SMIME-CAPS", "S/MIME Capabilities", NID_SMIMECapabilities, 9, &so[982]},
+    {"PBE-MD2-RC2-64", "pbeWithMD2AndRC2-CBC", NID_pbeWithMD2AndRC2_CBC, 9, &so[991]},
+    {"PBE-MD5-RC2-64", "pbeWithMD5AndRC2-CBC", NID_pbeWithMD5AndRC2_CBC, 9, &so[1000]},
+    {"PBE-SHA1-DES", "pbeWithSHA1AndDES-CBC", NID_pbeWithSHA1AndDES_CBC, 9, &so[1009]},
+    {"msExtReq", "Microsoft Extension Request", NID_ms_ext_req, 10, &so[1018]},
+    {"extReq", "Extension Request", NID_ext_req, 9, &so[1028]},
+    {"name", "name", NID_name, 3, &so[1037]},
+    {"dnQualifier", "dnQualifier", NID_dnQualifier, 3, &so[1040]},
+    {"id-pe", "id-pe", NID_id_pe, 7, &so[1043]},
+    {"id-ad", "id-ad", NID_id_ad, 7, &so[1050]},
+    {"authorityInfoAccess", "Authority Information Access", NID_info_access, 8, &so[1057]},
+    {"OCSP", "OCSP", NID_ad_OCSP, 8, &so[1065]},
+    {"caIssuers", "CA Issuers", NID_ad_ca_issuers, 8, &so[1073]},
+    {"OCSPSigning", "OCSP Signing", NID_OCSP_sign, 8, &so[1081]},
+    {"ISO", "iso", NID_iso},
+    {"member-body", "ISO Member Body", NID_member_body, 1, &so[1089]},
+    {"ISO-US", "ISO US Member Body", NID_ISO_US, 3, &so[1090]},
+    {"X9-57", "X9.57", NID_X9_57, 5, &so[1093]},
+    {"X9cm", "X9.57 CM ?", NID_X9cm, 6, &so[1098]},
+    {"pkcs1", "pkcs1", NID_pkcs1, 8, &so[1104]},
+    {"pkcs5", "pkcs5", NID_pkcs5, 8, &so[1112]},
+    {"SMIME", "S/MIME", NID_SMIME, 9, &so[1120]},
+    {"id-smime-mod", "id-smime-mod", NID_id_smime_mod, 10, &so[1129]},
+    {"id-smime-ct", "id-smime-ct", NID_id_smime_ct, 10, &so[1139]},
+    {"id-smime-aa", "id-smime-aa", NID_id_smime_aa, 10, &so[1149]},
+    {"id-smime-alg", "id-smime-alg", NID_id_smime_alg, 10, &so[1159]},
+    {"id-smime-cd", "id-smime-cd", NID_id_smime_cd, 10, &so[1169]},
+    {"id-smime-spq", "id-smime-spq", NID_id_smime_spq, 10, &so[1179]},
+    {"id-smime-cti", "id-smime-cti", NID_id_smime_cti, 10, &so[1189]},
+    {"id-smime-mod-cms", "id-smime-mod-cms", NID_id_smime_mod_cms, 11, &so[1199]},
+    {"id-smime-mod-ess", "id-smime-mod-ess", NID_id_smime_mod_ess, 11, &so[1210]},
+    {"id-smime-mod-oid", "id-smime-mod-oid", NID_id_smime_mod_oid, 11, &so[1221]},
+    {"id-smime-mod-msg-v3", "id-smime-mod-msg-v3", NID_id_smime_mod_msg_v3, 11, &so[1232]},
+    {"id-smime-mod-ets-eSignature-88", "id-smime-mod-ets-eSignature-88", NID_id_smime_mod_ets_eSignature_88, 11, &so[1243]},
+    {"id-smime-mod-ets-eSignature-97", "id-smime-mod-ets-eSignature-97", NID_id_smime_mod_ets_eSignature_97, 11, &so[1254]},
+    {"id-smime-mod-ets-eSigPolicy-88", "id-smime-mod-ets-eSigPolicy-88", NID_id_smime_mod_ets_eSigPolicy_88, 11, &so[1265]},
+    {"id-smime-mod-ets-eSigPolicy-97", "id-smime-mod-ets-eSigPolicy-97", NID_id_smime_mod_ets_eSigPolicy_97, 11, &so[1276]},
+    {"id-smime-ct-receipt", "id-smime-ct-receipt", NID_id_smime_ct_receipt, 11, &so[1287]},
+    {"id-smime-ct-authData", "id-smime-ct-authData", NID_id_smime_ct_authData, 11, &so[1298]},
+    {"id-smime-ct-publishCert", "id-smime-ct-publishCert", NID_id_smime_ct_publishCert, 11, &so[1309]},
+    {"id-smime-ct-TSTInfo", "id-smime-ct-TSTInfo", NID_id_smime_ct_TSTInfo, 11, &so[1320]},
+    {"id-smime-ct-TDTInfo", "id-smime-ct-TDTInfo", NID_id_smime_ct_TDTInfo, 11, &so[1331]},
+    {"id-smime-ct-contentInfo", "id-smime-ct-contentInfo", NID_id_smime_ct_contentInfo, 11, &so[1342]},
+    {"id-smime-ct-DVCSRequestData", "id-smime-ct-DVCSRequestData", NID_id_smime_ct_DVCSRequestData, 11, &so[1353]},
+    {"id-smime-ct-DVCSResponseData", "id-smime-ct-DVCSResponseData", NID_id_smime_ct_DVCSResponseData, 11, &so[1364]},
+    {"id-smime-aa-receiptRequest", "id-smime-aa-receiptRequest", NID_id_smime_aa_receiptRequest, 11, &so[1375]},
+    {"id-smime-aa-securityLabel", "id-smime-aa-securityLabel", NID_id_smime_aa_securityLabel, 11, &so[1386]},
+    {"id-smime-aa-mlExpandHistory", "id-smime-aa-mlExpandHistory", NID_id_smime_aa_mlExpandHistory, 11, &so[1397]},
+    {"id-smime-aa-contentHint", "id-smime-aa-contentHint", NID_id_smime_aa_contentHint, 11, &so[1408]},
+    {"id-smime-aa-msgSigDigest", "id-smime-aa-msgSigDigest", NID_id_smime_aa_msgSigDigest, 11, &so[1419]},
+    {"id-smime-aa-encapContentType", "id-smime-aa-encapContentType", NID_id_smime_aa_encapContentType, 11, &so[1430]},
+    {"id-smime-aa-contentIdentifier", "id-smime-aa-contentIdentifier", NID_id_smime_aa_contentIdentifier, 11, &so[1441]},
+    {"id-smime-aa-macValue", "id-smime-aa-macValue", NID_id_smime_aa_macValue, 11, &so[1452]},
+    {"id-smime-aa-equivalentLabels", "id-smime-aa-equivalentLabels", NID_id_smime_aa_equivalentLabels, 11, &so[1463]},
+    {"id-smime-aa-contentReference", "id-smime-aa-contentReference", NID_id_smime_aa_contentReference, 11, &so[1474]},
+    {"id-smime-aa-encrypKeyPref", "id-smime-aa-encrypKeyPref", NID_id_smime_aa_encrypKeyPref, 11, &so[1485]},
+    {"id-smime-aa-signingCertificate", "id-smime-aa-signingCertificate", NID_id_smime_aa_signingCertificate, 11, &so[1496]},
+    {"id-smime-aa-smimeEncryptCerts", "id-smime-aa-smimeEncryptCerts", NID_id_smime_aa_smimeEncryptCerts, 11, &so[1507]},
+    {"id-smime-aa-timeStampToken", "id-smime-aa-timeStampToken", NID_id_smime_aa_timeStampToken, 11, &so[1518]},
+    {"id-smime-aa-ets-sigPolicyId", "id-smime-aa-ets-sigPolicyId", NID_id_smime_aa_ets_sigPolicyId, 11, &so[1529]},
+    {"id-smime-aa-ets-commitmentType", "id-smime-aa-ets-commitmentType", NID_id_smime_aa_ets_commitmentType, 11, &so[1540]},
+    {"id-smime-aa-ets-signerLocation", "id-smime-aa-ets-signerLocation", NID_id_smime_aa_ets_signerLocation, 11, &so[1551]},
+    {"id-smime-aa-ets-signerAttr", "id-smime-aa-ets-signerAttr", NID_id_smime_aa_ets_signerAttr, 11, &so[1562]},
+    {"id-smime-aa-ets-otherSigCert", "id-smime-aa-ets-otherSigCert", NID_id_smime_aa_ets_otherSigCert, 11, &so[1573]},
+    {"id-smime-aa-ets-contentTimestamp", "id-smime-aa-ets-contentTimestamp", NID_id_smime_aa_ets_contentTimestamp, 11, &so[1584]},
+    {"id-smime-aa-ets-CertificateRefs", "id-smime-aa-ets-CertificateRefs", NID_id_smime_aa_ets_CertificateRefs, 11, &so[1595]},
+    {"id-smime-aa-ets-RevocationRefs", "id-smime-aa-ets-RevocationRefs", NID_id_smime_aa_ets_RevocationRefs, 11, &so[1606]},
+    {"id-smime-aa-ets-certValues", "id-smime-aa-ets-certValues", NID_id_smime_aa_ets_certValues, 11, &so[1617]},
+    {"id-smime-aa-ets-revocationValues", "id-smime-aa-ets-revocationValues", NID_id_smime_aa_ets_revocationValues, 11, &so[1628]},
+    {"id-smime-aa-ets-escTimeStamp", "id-smime-aa-ets-escTimeStamp", NID_id_smime_aa_ets_escTimeStamp, 11, &so[1639]},
+    {"id-smime-aa-ets-certCRLTimestamp", "id-smime-aa-ets-certCRLTimestamp", NID_id_smime_aa_ets_certCRLTimestamp, 11, &so[1650]},
+    {"id-smime-aa-ets-archiveTimeStamp", "id-smime-aa-ets-archiveTimeStamp", NID_id_smime_aa_ets_archiveTimeStamp, 11, &so[1661]},
+    {"id-smime-aa-signatureType", "id-smime-aa-signatureType", NID_id_smime_aa_signatureType, 11, &so[1672]},
+    {"id-smime-aa-dvcs-dvc", "id-smime-aa-dvcs-dvc", NID_id_smime_aa_dvcs_dvc, 11, &so[1683]},
+    {"id-smime-alg-ESDHwith3DES", "id-smime-alg-ESDHwith3DES", NID_id_smime_alg_ESDHwith3DES, 11, &so[1694]},
+    {"id-smime-alg-ESDHwithRC2", "id-smime-alg-ESDHwithRC2", NID_id_smime_alg_ESDHwithRC2, 11, &so[1705]},
+    {"id-smime-alg-3DESwrap", "id-smime-alg-3DESwrap", NID_id_smime_alg_3DESwrap, 11, &so[1716]},
+    {"id-smime-alg-RC2wrap", "id-smime-alg-RC2wrap", NID_id_smime_alg_RC2wrap, 11, &so[1727]},
+    {"id-smime-alg-ESDH", "id-smime-alg-ESDH", NID_id_smime_alg_ESDH, 11, &so[1738]},
+    {"id-smime-alg-CMS3DESwrap", "id-smime-alg-CMS3DESwrap", NID_id_smime_alg_CMS3DESwrap, 11, &so[1749]},
+    {"id-smime-alg-CMSRC2wrap", "id-smime-alg-CMSRC2wrap", NID_id_smime_alg_CMSRC2wrap, 11, &so[1760]},
+    {"id-smime-cd-ldap", "id-smime-cd-ldap", NID_id_smime_cd_ldap, 11, &so[1771]},
+    {"id-smime-spq-ets-sqt-uri", "id-smime-spq-ets-sqt-uri", NID_id_smime_spq_ets_sqt_uri, 11, &so[1782]},
+    {"id-smime-spq-ets-sqt-unotice", "id-smime-spq-ets-sqt-unotice", NID_id_smime_spq_ets_sqt_unotice, 11, &so[1793]},
+    {"id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfOrigin", "id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfOrigin", NID_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfOrigin, 11, &so[1804]},
+    {"id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfReceipt", "id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfReceipt", NID_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfReceipt, 11, &so[1815]},
+    {"id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfDelivery", "id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfDelivery", NID_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfDelivery, 11, &so[1826]},
+    {"id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfSender", "id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfSender", NID_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfSender, 11, &so[1837]},
+    {"id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfApproval", "id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfApproval", NID_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfApproval, 11, &so[1848]},
+    {"id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfCreation", "id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfCreation", NID_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfCreation, 11, &so[1859]},
+    {"MD4", "md4", NID_md4, 8, &so[1870]},
+    {"id-pkix-mod", "id-pkix-mod", NID_id_pkix_mod, 7, &so[1878]},
+    {"id-qt", "id-qt", NID_id_qt, 7, &so[1885]},
+    {"id-it", "id-it", NID_id_it, 7, &so[1892]},
+    {"id-pkip", "id-pkip", NID_id_pkip, 7, &so[1899]},
+    {"id-alg", "id-alg", NID_id_alg, 7, &so[1906]},
+    {"id-cmc", "id-cmc", NID_id_cmc, 7, &so[1913]},
+    {"id-on", "id-on", NID_id_on, 7, &so[1920]},
+    {"id-pda", "id-pda", NID_id_pda, 7, &so[1927]},
+    {"id-aca", "id-aca", NID_id_aca, 7, &so[1934]},
+    {"id-qcs", "id-qcs", NID_id_qcs, 7, &so[1941]},
+    {"id-cct", "id-cct", NID_id_cct, 7, &so[1948]},
+    {"id-pkix1-explicit-88", "id-pkix1-explicit-88", NID_id_pkix1_explicit_88, 8, &so[1955]},
+    {"id-pkix1-implicit-88", "id-pkix1-implicit-88", NID_id_pkix1_implicit_88, 8, &so[1963]},
+    {"id-pkix1-explicit-93", "id-pkix1-explicit-93", NID_id_pkix1_explicit_93, 8, &so[1971]},
+    {"id-pkix1-implicit-93", "id-pkix1-implicit-93", NID_id_pkix1_implicit_93, 8, &so[1979]},
+    {"id-mod-crmf", "id-mod-crmf", NID_id_mod_crmf, 8, &so[1987]},
+    {"id-mod-cmc", "id-mod-cmc", NID_id_mod_cmc, 8, &so[1995]},
+    {"id-mod-kea-profile-88", "id-mod-kea-profile-88", NID_id_mod_kea_profile_88, 8, &so[2003]},
+    {"id-mod-kea-profile-93", "id-mod-kea-profile-93", NID_id_mod_kea_profile_93, 8, &so[2011]},
+    {"id-mod-cmp", "id-mod-cmp", NID_id_mod_cmp, 8, &so[2019]},
+    {"id-mod-qualified-cert-88", "id-mod-qualified-cert-88", NID_id_mod_qualified_cert_88, 8, &so[2027]},
+    {"id-mod-qualified-cert-93", "id-mod-qualified-cert-93", NID_id_mod_qualified_cert_93, 8, &so[2035]},
+    {"id-mod-attribute-cert", "id-mod-attribute-cert", NID_id_mod_attribute_cert, 8, &so[2043]},
+    {"id-mod-timestamp-protocol", "id-mod-timestamp-protocol", NID_id_mod_timestamp_protocol, 8, &so[2051]},
+    {"id-mod-ocsp", "id-mod-ocsp", NID_id_mod_ocsp, 8, &so[2059]},
+    {"id-mod-dvcs", "id-mod-dvcs", NID_id_mod_dvcs, 8, &so[2067]},
+    {"id-mod-cmp2000", "id-mod-cmp2000", NID_id_mod_cmp2000, 8, &so[2075]},
+    {"biometricInfo", "Biometric Info", NID_biometricInfo, 8, &so[2083]},
+    {"qcStatements", "qcStatements", NID_qcStatements, 8, &so[2091]},
+    {"ac-auditEntity", "ac-auditEntity", NID_ac_auditEntity, 8, &so[2099]},
+    {"ac-targeting", "ac-targeting", NID_ac_targeting, 8, &so[2107]},
+    {"aaControls", "aaControls", NID_aaControls, 8, &so[2115]},
+    {"sbgp-ipAddrBlock", "sbgp-ipAddrBlock", NID_sbgp_ipAddrBlock, 8, &so[2123]},
+    {"sbgp-autonomousSysNum", "sbgp-autonomousSysNum", NID_sbgp_autonomousSysNum, 8, &so[2131]},
+    {"sbgp-routerIdentifier", "sbgp-routerIdentifier", NID_sbgp_routerIdentifier, 8, &so[2139]},
+    {"textNotice", "textNotice", NID_textNotice, 8, &so[2147]},
+    {"ipsecEndSystem", "IPSec End System", NID_ipsecEndSystem, 8, &so[2155]},
+    {"ipsecTunnel", "IPSec Tunnel", NID_ipsecTunnel, 8, &so[2163]},
+    {"ipsecUser", "IPSec User", NID_ipsecUser, 8, &so[2171]},
+    {"DVCS", "dvcs", NID_dvcs, 8, &so[2179]},
+    {"id-it-caProtEncCert", "id-it-caProtEncCert", NID_id_it_caProtEncCert, 8, &so[2187]},
+    {"id-it-signKeyPairTypes", "id-it-signKeyPairTypes", NID_id_it_signKeyPairTypes, 8, &so[2195]},
+    {"id-it-encKeyPairTypes", "id-it-encKeyPairTypes", NID_id_it_encKeyPairTypes, 8, &so[2203]},
+    {"id-it-preferredSymmAlg", "id-it-preferredSymmAlg", NID_id_it_preferredSymmAlg, 8, &so[2211]},
+    {"id-it-caKeyUpdateInfo", "id-it-caKeyUpdateInfo", NID_id_it_caKeyUpdateInfo, 8, &so[2219]},
+    {"id-it-currentCRL", "id-it-currentCRL", NID_id_it_currentCRL, 8, &so[2227]},
+    {"id-it-unsupportedOIDs", "id-it-unsupportedOIDs", NID_id_it_unsupportedOIDs, 8, &so[2235]},
+    {"id-it-subscriptionRequest", "id-it-subscriptionRequest", NID_id_it_subscriptionRequest, 8, &so[2243]},
+    {"id-it-subscriptionResponse", "id-it-subscriptionResponse", NID_id_it_subscriptionResponse, 8, &so[2251]},
+    {"id-it-keyPairParamReq", "id-it-keyPairParamReq", NID_id_it_keyPairParamReq, 8, &so[2259]},
+    {"id-it-keyPairParamRep", "id-it-keyPairParamRep", NID_id_it_keyPairParamRep, 8, &so[2267]},
+    {"id-it-revPassphrase", "id-it-revPassphrase", NID_id_it_revPassphrase, 8, &so[2275]},
+    {"id-it-implicitConfirm", "id-it-implicitConfirm", NID_id_it_implicitConfirm, 8, &so[2283]},
+    {"id-it-confirmWaitTime", "id-it-confirmWaitTime", NID_id_it_confirmWaitTime, 8, &so[2291]},
+    {"id-it-origPKIMessage", "id-it-origPKIMessage", NID_id_it_origPKIMessage, 8, &so[2299]},
+    {"id-regCtrl", "id-regCtrl", NID_id_regCtrl, 8, &so[2307]},
+    {"id-regInfo", "id-regInfo", NID_id_regInfo, 8, &so[2315]},
+    {"id-regCtrl-regToken", "id-regCtrl-regToken", NID_id_regCtrl_regToken, 9, &so[2323]},
+    {"id-regCtrl-authenticator", "id-regCtrl-authenticator", NID_id_regCtrl_authenticator, 9, &so[2332]},
+    {"id-regCtrl-pkiPublicationInfo", "id-regCtrl-pkiPublicationInfo", NID_id_regCtrl_pkiPublicationInfo, 9, &so[2341]},
+    {"id-regCtrl-pkiArchiveOptions", "id-regCtrl-pkiArchiveOptions", NID_id_regCtrl_pkiArchiveOptions, 9, &so[2350]},
+    {"id-regCtrl-oldCertID", "id-regCtrl-oldCertID", NID_id_regCtrl_oldCertID, 9, &so[2359]},
+    {"id-regCtrl-protocolEncrKey", "id-regCtrl-protocolEncrKey", NID_id_regCtrl_protocolEncrKey, 9, &so[2368]},
+    {"id-regInfo-utf8Pairs", "id-regInfo-utf8Pairs", NID_id_regInfo_utf8Pairs, 9, &so[2377]},
+    {"id-regInfo-certReq", "id-regInfo-certReq", NID_id_regInfo_certReq, 9, &so[2386]},
+    {"id-alg-des40", "id-alg-des40", NID_id_alg_des40, 8, &so[2395]},
+    {"id-alg-noSignature", "id-alg-noSignature", NID_id_alg_noSignature, 8, &so[2403]},
+    {"id-alg-dh-sig-hmac-sha1", "id-alg-dh-sig-hmac-sha1", NID_id_alg_dh_sig_hmac_sha1, 8, &so[2411]},
+    {"id-alg-dh-pop", "id-alg-dh-pop", NID_id_alg_dh_pop, 8, &so[2419]},
+    {"id-cmc-statusInfo", "id-cmc-statusInfo", NID_id_cmc_statusInfo, 8, &so[2427]},
+    {"id-cmc-identification", "id-cmc-identification", NID_id_cmc_identification, 8, &so[2435]},
+    {"id-cmc-identityProof", "id-cmc-identityProof", NID_id_cmc_identityProof, 8, &so[2443]},
+    {"id-cmc-dataReturn", "id-cmc-dataReturn", NID_id_cmc_dataReturn, 8, &so[2451]},
+    {"id-cmc-transactionId", "id-cmc-transactionId", NID_id_cmc_transactionId, 8, &so[2459]},
+    {"id-cmc-senderNonce", "id-cmc-senderNonce", NID_id_cmc_senderNonce, 8, &so[2467]},
+    {"id-cmc-recipientNonce", "id-cmc-recipientNonce", NID_id_cmc_recipientNonce, 8, &so[2475]},
+    {"id-cmc-addExtensions", "id-cmc-addExtensions", NID_id_cmc_addExtensions, 8, &so[2483]},
+    {"id-cmc-encryptedPOP", "id-cmc-encryptedPOP", NID_id_cmc_encryptedPOP, 8, &so[2491]},
+    {"id-cmc-decryptedPOP", "id-cmc-decryptedPOP", NID_id_cmc_decryptedPOP, 8, &so[2499]},
+    {"id-cmc-lraPOPWitness", "id-cmc-lraPOPWitness", NID_id_cmc_lraPOPWitness, 8, &so[2507]},
+    {"id-cmc-getCert", "id-cmc-getCert", NID_id_cmc_getCert, 8, &so[2515]},
+    {"id-cmc-getCRL", "id-cmc-getCRL", NID_id_cmc_getCRL, 8, &so[2523]},
+    {"id-cmc-revokeRequest", "id-cmc-revokeRequest", NID_id_cmc_revokeRequest, 8, &so[2531]},
+    {"id-cmc-regInfo", "id-cmc-regInfo", NID_id_cmc_regInfo, 8, &so[2539]},
+    {"id-cmc-responseInfo", "id-cmc-responseInfo", NID_id_cmc_responseInfo, 8, &so[2547]},
+    {"id-cmc-queryPending", "id-cmc-queryPending", NID_id_cmc_queryPending, 8, &so[2555]},
+    {"id-cmc-popLinkRandom", "id-cmc-popLinkRandom", NID_id_cmc_popLinkRandom, 8, &so[2563]},
+    {"id-cmc-popLinkWitness", "id-cmc-popLinkWitness", NID_id_cmc_popLinkWitness, 8, &so[2571]},
+    {"id-cmc-confirmCertAcceptance", "id-cmc-confirmCertAcceptance", NID_id_cmc_confirmCertAcceptance, 8, &so[2579]},
+    {"id-on-personalData", "id-on-personalData", NID_id_on_personalData, 8, &so[2587]},
+    {"id-pda-dateOfBirth", "id-pda-dateOfBirth", NID_id_pda_dateOfBirth, 8, &so[2595]},
+    {"id-pda-placeOfBirth", "id-pda-placeOfBirth", NID_id_pda_placeOfBirth, 8, &so[2603]},
+    { NULL, NULL, NID_undef },
+    {"id-pda-gender", "id-pda-gender", NID_id_pda_gender, 8, &so[2611]},
+    {"id-pda-countryOfCitizenship", "id-pda-countryOfCitizenship", NID_id_pda_countryOfCitizenship, 8, &so[2619]},
+    {"id-pda-countryOfResidence", "id-pda-countryOfResidence", NID_id_pda_countryOfResidence, 8, &so[2627]},
+    {"id-aca-authenticationInfo", "id-aca-authenticationInfo", NID_id_aca_authenticationInfo, 8, &so[2635]},
+    {"id-aca-accessIdentity", "id-aca-accessIdentity", NID_id_aca_accessIdentity, 8, &so[2643]},
+    {"id-aca-chargingIdentity", "id-aca-chargingIdentity", NID_id_aca_chargingIdentity, 8, &so[2651]},
+    {"id-aca-group", "id-aca-group", NID_id_aca_group, 8, &so[2659]},
+    {"id-aca-role", "id-aca-role", NID_id_aca_role, 8, &so[2667]},
+    {"id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v1", "id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v1", NID_id_qcs_pkixQCSyntax_v1, 8, &so[2675]},
+    {"id-cct-crs", "id-cct-crs", NID_id_cct_crs, 8, &so[2683]},
+    {"id-cct-PKIData", "id-cct-PKIData", NID_id_cct_PKIData, 8, &so[2691]},
+    {"id-cct-PKIResponse", "id-cct-PKIResponse", NID_id_cct_PKIResponse, 8, &so[2699]},
+    {"ad_timestamping", "AD Time Stamping", NID_ad_timeStamping, 8, &so[2707]},
+    {"AD_DVCS", "ad dvcs", NID_ad_dvcs, 8, &so[2715]},
+    {"basicOCSPResponse", "Basic OCSP Response", NID_id_pkix_OCSP_basic, 9, &so[2723]},
+    {"Nonce", "OCSP Nonce", NID_id_pkix_OCSP_Nonce, 9, &so[2732]},
+    {"CrlID", "OCSP CRL ID", NID_id_pkix_OCSP_CrlID, 9, &so[2741]},
+    {"acceptableResponses", "Acceptable OCSP Responses", NID_id_pkix_OCSP_acceptableResponses, 9, &so[2750]},
+    {"noCheck", "OCSP No Check", NID_id_pkix_OCSP_noCheck, 9, &so[2759]},
+    {"archiveCutoff", "OCSP Archive Cutoff", NID_id_pkix_OCSP_archiveCutoff, 9, &so[2768]},
+    {"serviceLocator", "OCSP Service Locator", NID_id_pkix_OCSP_serviceLocator, 9, &so[2777]},
+    {"extendedStatus", "Extended OCSP Status", NID_id_pkix_OCSP_extendedStatus, 9, &so[2786]},
+    {"valid", "valid", NID_id_pkix_OCSP_valid, 9, &so[2795]},
+    {"path", "path", NID_id_pkix_OCSP_path, 9, &so[2804]},
+    {"trustRoot", "Trust Root", NID_id_pkix_OCSP_trustRoot, 9, &so[2813]},
+    {"algorithm", "algorithm", NID_algorithm, 4, &so[2822]},
+    {"rsaSignature", "rsaSignature", NID_rsaSignature, 5, &so[2826]},
+    {"X500algorithms", "directory services - algorithms", NID_X500algorithms, 2, &so[2831]},
+    {"ORG", "org", NID_org, 1, &so[2833]},
+    {"DOD", "dod", NID_dod, 2, &so[2834]},
+    {"IANA", "iana", NID_iana, 3, &so[2836]},
+    {"directory", "Directory", NID_Directory, 4, &so[2839]},
+    {"mgmt", "Management", NID_Management, 4, &so[2843]},
+    {"experimental", "Experimental", NID_Experimental, 4, &so[2847]},
+    {"private", "Private", NID_Private, 4, &so[2851]},
+    {"security", "Security", NID_Security, 4, &so[2855]},
+    {"snmpv2", "SNMPv2", NID_SNMPv2, 4, &so[2859]},
+    {"Mail", "Mail", NID_Mail, 4, &so[2863]},
+    {"enterprises", "Enterprises", NID_Enterprises, 5, &so[2867]},
+    {"dcobject", "dcObject", NID_dcObject, 9, &so[2872]},
+    {"DC", "domainComponent", NID_domainComponent, 10, &so[2881]},
+    {"domain", "Domain", NID_Domain, 10, &so[2891]},
+    {"NULL", "NULL", NID_joint_iso_ccitt},
+    {"selected-attribute-types", "Selected Attribute Types", NID_selected_attribute_types, 3, &so[2901]},
+    {"clearance", "clearance", NID_clearance, 4, &so[2904]},
+    {"RSA-MD4", "md4WithRSAEncryption", NID_md4WithRSAEncryption, 9, &so[2908]},
+    {"ac-proxying", "ac-proxying", NID_ac_proxying, 8, &so[2917]},
+    {"subjectInfoAccess", "Subject Information Access", NID_sinfo_access, 8, &so[2925]},
+    {"id-aca-encAttrs", "id-aca-encAttrs", NID_id_aca_encAttrs, 8, &so[2933]},
+    {"role", "role", NID_role, 3, &so[2941]},
+    {"policyConstraints", "X509v3 Policy Constraints", NID_policy_constraints, 3, &so[2944]},
+    {"targetInformation", "X509v3 AC Targeting", NID_target_information, 3, &so[2947]},
+    {"noRevAvail", "X509v3 No Revocation Available", NID_no_rev_avail, 3, &so[2950]},
+    {"NULL", "NULL", NID_ccitt},
+    {"ansi-X9-62", "ANSI X9.62", NID_ansi_X9_62, 5, &so[2953]},
+    {"prime-field", "prime-field", NID_X9_62_prime_field, 7, &so[2958]},
+    {"characteristic-two-field", "characteristic-two-field", NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 7, &so[2965]},
+    {"id-ecPublicKey", "id-ecPublicKey", NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey, 7, &so[2972]},
+    {"prime192v1", "prime192v1", NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 8, &so[2979]},
+    {"prime192v2", "prime192v2", NID_X9_62_prime192v2, 8, &so[2987]},
+    {"prime192v3", "prime192v3", NID_X9_62_prime192v3, 8, &so[2995]},
+    {"prime239v1", "prime239v1", NID_X9_62_prime239v1, 8, &so[3003]},
+    {"prime239v2", "prime239v2", NID_X9_62_prime239v2, 8, &so[3011]},
+    {"prime239v3", "prime239v3", NID_X9_62_prime239v3, 8, &so[3019]},
+    {"prime256v1", "prime256v1", NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 8, &so[3027]},
+    {"ecdsa-with-SHA1", "ecdsa-with-SHA1", NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1, 7, &so[3035]},
+    {"CSPName", "Microsoft CSP Name", NID_ms_csp_name, 9, &so[3042]},
+    {"AES-128-ECB", "aes-128-ecb", NID_aes_128_ecb, 9, &so[3051]},
+    {"AES-128-CBC", "aes-128-cbc", NID_aes_128_cbc, 9, &so[3060]},
+    {"AES-128-OFB", "aes-128-ofb", NID_aes_128_ofb128, 9, &so[3069]},
+    {"AES-128-CFB", "aes-128-cfb", NID_aes_128_cfb128, 9, &so[3078]},
+    {"AES-192-ECB", "aes-192-ecb", NID_aes_192_ecb, 9, &so[3087]},
+    {"AES-192-CBC", "aes-192-cbc", NID_aes_192_cbc, 9, &so[3096]},
+    {"AES-192-OFB", "aes-192-ofb", NID_aes_192_ofb128, 9, &so[3105]},
+    {"AES-192-CFB", "aes-192-cfb", NID_aes_192_cfb128, 9, &so[3114]},
+    {"AES-256-ECB", "aes-256-ecb", NID_aes_256_ecb, 9, &so[3123]},
+    {"AES-256-CBC", "aes-256-cbc", NID_aes_256_cbc, 9, &so[3132]},
+    {"AES-256-OFB", "aes-256-ofb", NID_aes_256_ofb128, 9, &so[3141]},
+    {"AES-256-CFB", "aes-256-cfb", NID_aes_256_cfb128, 9, &so[3150]},
+    {"holdInstructionCode", "Hold Instruction Code", NID_hold_instruction_code, 3, &so[3159]},
+    {"holdInstructionNone", "Hold Instruction None", NID_hold_instruction_none, 7, &so[3162]},
+    {"holdInstructionCallIssuer", "Hold Instruction Call Issuer", NID_hold_instruction_call_issuer, 7, &so[3169]},
+    {"holdInstructionReject", "Hold Instruction Reject", NID_hold_instruction_reject, 7, &so[3176]},
+    {"data", "data", NID_data, 1, &so[3183]},
+    {"pss", "pss", NID_pss, 3, &so[3184]},
+    {"ucl", "ucl", NID_ucl, 7, &so[3187]},
+    {"pilot", "pilot", NID_pilot, 8, &so[3194]},
+    {"pilotAttributeType", "pilotAttributeType", NID_pilotAttributeType, 9, &so[3202]},
+    {"pilotAttributeSyntax", "pilotAttributeSyntax", NID_pilotAttributeSyntax, 9, &so[3211]},
+    {"pilotObjectClass", "pilotObjectClass", NID_pilotObjectClass, 9, &so[3220]},
+    {"pilotGroups", "pilotGroups", NID_pilotGroups, 9, &so[3229]},
+    {"iA5StringSyntax", "iA5StringSyntax", NID_iA5StringSyntax, 10, &so[3238]},
+    {"caseIgnoreIA5StringSyntax", "caseIgnoreIA5StringSyntax", NID_caseIgnoreIA5StringSyntax, 10, &so[3248]},
+    {"pilotObject", "pilotObject", NID_pilotObject, 10, &so[3258]},
+    {"pilotPerson", "pilotPerson", NID_pilotPerson, 10, &so[3268]},
+    {"account", "account", NID_account, 10, &so[3278]},
+    {"document", "document", NID_document, 10, &so[3288]},
+    {"room", "room", NID_room, 10, &so[3298]},
+    {"documentSeries", "documentSeries", NID_documentSeries, 10, &so[3308]},
+    {"rFC822localPart", "rFC822localPart", NID_rFC822localPart, 10, &so[3318]},
+    {"dNSDomain", "dNSDomain", NID_dNSDomain, 10, &so[3328]},
+    {"domainRelatedObject", "domainRelatedObject", NID_domainRelatedObject, 10, &so[3338]},
+    {"friendlyCountry", "friendlyCountry", NID_friendlyCountry, 10, &so[3348]},
+    {"simpleSecurityObject", "simpleSecurityObject", NID_simpleSecurityObject, 10, &so[3358]},
+    {"pilotOrganization", "pilotOrganization", NID_pilotOrganization, 10, &so[3368]},
+    {"pilotDSA", "pilotDSA", NID_pilotDSA, 10, &so[3378]},
+    {"qualityLabelledData", "qualityLabelledData", NID_qualityLabelledData, 10, &so[3388]},
+    {"UID", "userId", NID_userId, 10, &so[3398]},
+    {"textEncodedORAddress", "textEncodedORAddress", NID_textEncodedORAddress, 10, &so[3408]},
+    {"mail", "rfc822Mailbox", NID_rfc822Mailbox, 10, &so[3418]},
+    {"info", "info", NID_info, 10, &so[3428]},
+    {"favouriteDrink", "favouriteDrink", NID_favouriteDrink, 10, &so[3438]},
+    {"roomNumber", "roomNumber", NID_roomNumber, 10, &so[3448]},
+    {"photo", "photo", NID_photo, 10, &so[3458]},
+    {"userClass", "userClass", NID_userClass, 10, &so[3468]},
+    {"host", "host", NID_host, 10, &so[3478]},
+    {"manager", "manager", NID_manager, 10, &so[3488]},
+    {"documentIdentifier", "documentIdentifier", NID_documentIdentifier, 10, &so[3498]},
+    {"documentTitle", "documentTitle", NID_documentTitle, 10, &so[3508]},
+    {"documentVersion", "documentVersion", NID_documentVersion, 10, &so[3518]},
+    {"documentAuthor", "documentAuthor", NID_documentAuthor, 10, &so[3528]},
+    {"documentLocation", "documentLocation", NID_documentLocation, 10, &so[3538]},
+    {"homeTelephoneNumber", "homeTelephoneNumber", NID_homeTelephoneNumber, 10, &so[3548]},
+    {"secretary", "secretary", NID_secretary, 10, &so[3558]},
+    {"otherMailbox", "otherMailbox", NID_otherMailbox, 10, &so[3568]},
+    {"lastModifiedTime", "lastModifiedTime", NID_lastModifiedTime, 10, &so[3578]},
+    {"lastModifiedBy", "lastModifiedBy", NID_lastModifiedBy, 10, &so[3588]},
+    {"aRecord", "aRecord", NID_aRecord, 10, &so[3598]},
+    {"pilotAttributeType27", "pilotAttributeType27", NID_pilotAttributeType27, 10, &so[3608]},
+    {"mXRecord", "mXRecord", NID_mXRecord, 10, &so[3618]},
+    {"nSRecord", "nSRecord", NID_nSRecord, 10, &so[3628]},
+    {"sOARecord", "sOARecord", NID_sOARecord, 10, &so[3638]},
+    {"cNAMERecord", "cNAMERecord", NID_cNAMERecord, 10, &so[3648]},
+    {"associatedDomain", "associatedDomain", NID_associatedDomain, 10, &so[3658]},
+    {"associatedName", "associatedName", NID_associatedName, 10, &so[3668]},
+    {"homePostalAddress", "homePostalAddress", NID_homePostalAddress, 10, &so[3678]},
+    {"personalTitle", "personalTitle", NID_personalTitle, 10, &so[3688]},
+    {"mobileTelephoneNumber", "mobileTelephoneNumber", NID_mobileTelephoneNumber, 10, &so[3698]},
+    {"pagerTelephoneNumber", "pagerTelephoneNumber", NID_pagerTelephoneNumber, 10, &so[3708]},
+    {"friendlyCountryName", "friendlyCountryName", NID_friendlyCountryName, 10, &so[3718]},
+    {"organizationalStatus", "organizationalStatus", NID_organizationalStatus, 10, &so[3728]},
+    {"janetMailbox", "janetMailbox", NID_janetMailbox, 10, &so[3738]},
+    {"mailPreferenceOption", "mailPreferenceOption", NID_mailPreferenceOption, 10, &so[3748]},
+    {"buildingName", "buildingName", NID_buildingName, 10, &so[3758]},
+    {"dSAQuality", "dSAQuality", NID_dSAQuality, 10, &so[3768]},
+    {"singleLevelQuality", "singleLevelQuality", NID_singleLevelQuality, 10, &so[3778]},
+    {"subtreeMinimumQuality", "subtreeMinimumQuality", NID_subtreeMinimumQuality, 10, &so[3788]},
+    {"subtreeMaximumQuality", "subtreeMaximumQuality", NID_subtreeMaximumQuality, 10, &so[3798]},
+    {"personalSignature", "personalSignature", NID_personalSignature, 10, &so[3808]},
+    {"dITRedirect", "dITRedirect", NID_dITRedirect, 10, &so[3818]},
+    {"audio", "audio", NID_audio, 10, &so[3828]},
+    {"documentPublisher", "documentPublisher", NID_documentPublisher, 10, &so[3838]},
+    {"x500UniqueIdentifier", "x500UniqueIdentifier", NID_x500UniqueIdentifier, 3, &so[3848]},
+    {"mime-mhs", "MIME MHS", NID_mime_mhs, 5, &so[3851]},
+    {"mime-mhs-headings", "mime-mhs-headings", NID_mime_mhs_headings, 6, &so[3856]},
+    {"mime-mhs-bodies", "mime-mhs-bodies", NID_mime_mhs_bodies, 6, &so[3862]},
+    {"id-hex-partial-message", "id-hex-partial-message", NID_id_hex_partial_message, 7, &so[3868]},
+    {"id-hex-multipart-message", "id-hex-multipart-message", NID_id_hex_multipart_message, 7, &so[3875]},
+    {"generationQualifier", "generationQualifier", NID_generationQualifier, 3, &so[3882]},
+    {"pseudonym", "pseudonym", NID_pseudonym, 3, &so[3885]},
+    { NULL, NULL, NID_undef },
+    {"id-set", "Secure Electronic Transactions", NID_id_set, 2, &so[3888]},
+    {"set-ctype", "content types", NID_set_ctype, 3, &so[3890]},
+    {"set-msgExt", "message extensions", NID_set_msgExt, 3, &so[3893]},
+    {"set-attr", "set-attr", NID_set_attr, 3, &so[3896]},
+    {"set-policy", "set-policy", NID_set_policy, 3, &so[3899]},
+    {"set-certExt", "certificate extensions", NID_set_certExt, 3, &so[3902]},
+    {"set-brand", "set-brand", NID_set_brand, 3, &so[3905]},
+    {"setct-PANData", "setct-PANData", NID_setct_PANData, 4, &so[3908]},
+    {"setct-PANToken", "setct-PANToken", NID_setct_PANToken, 4, &so[3912]},
+    {"setct-PANOnly", "setct-PANOnly", NID_setct_PANOnly, 4, &so[3916]},
+    {"setct-OIData", "setct-OIData", NID_setct_OIData, 4, &so[3920]},
+    {"setct-PI", "setct-PI", NID_setct_PI, 4, &so[3924]},
+    {"setct-PIData", "setct-PIData", NID_setct_PIData, 4, &so[3928]},
+    {"setct-PIDataUnsigned", "setct-PIDataUnsigned", NID_setct_PIDataUnsigned, 4, &so[3932]},
+    {"setct-HODInput", "setct-HODInput", NID_setct_HODInput, 4, &so[3936]},
+    {"setct-AuthResBaggage", "setct-AuthResBaggage", NID_setct_AuthResBaggage, 4, &so[3940]},
+    {"setct-AuthRevReqBaggage", "setct-AuthRevReqBaggage", NID_setct_AuthRevReqBaggage, 4, &so[3944]},
+    {"setct-AuthRevResBaggage", "setct-AuthRevResBaggage", NID_setct_AuthRevResBaggage, 4, &so[3948]},
+    {"setct-CapTokenSeq", "setct-CapTokenSeq", NID_setct_CapTokenSeq, 4, &so[3952]},
+    {"setct-PInitResData", "setct-PInitResData", NID_setct_PInitResData, 4, &so[3956]},
+    {"setct-PI-TBS", "setct-PI-TBS", NID_setct_PI_TBS, 4, &so[3960]},
+    {"setct-PResData", "setct-PResData", NID_setct_PResData, 4, &so[3964]},
+    {"setct-AuthReqTBS", "setct-AuthReqTBS", NID_setct_AuthReqTBS, 4, &so[3968]},
+    {"setct-AuthResTBS", "setct-AuthResTBS", NID_setct_AuthResTBS, 4, &so[3972]},
+    {"setct-AuthResTBSX", "setct-AuthResTBSX", NID_setct_AuthResTBSX, 4, &so[3976]},
+    {"setct-AuthTokenTBS", "setct-AuthTokenTBS", NID_setct_AuthTokenTBS, 4, &so[3980]},
+    {"setct-CapTokenData", "setct-CapTokenData", NID_setct_CapTokenData, 4, &so[3984]},
+    {"setct-CapTokenTBS", "setct-CapTokenTBS", NID_setct_CapTokenTBS, 4, &so[3988]},
+    {"setct-AcqCardCodeMsg", "setct-AcqCardCodeMsg", NID_setct_AcqCardCodeMsg, 4, &so[3992]},
+    {"setct-AuthRevReqTBS", "setct-AuthRevReqTBS", NID_setct_AuthRevReqTBS, 4, &so[3996]},
+    {"setct-AuthRevResData", "setct-AuthRevResData", NID_setct_AuthRevResData, 4, &so[4000]},
+    {"setct-AuthRevResTBS", "setct-AuthRevResTBS", NID_setct_AuthRevResTBS, 4, &so[4004]},
+    {"setct-CapReqTBS", "setct-CapReqTBS", NID_setct_CapReqTBS, 4, &so[4008]},
+    {"setct-CapReqTBSX", "setct-CapReqTBSX", NID_setct_CapReqTBSX, 4, &so[4012]},
+    {"setct-CapResData", "setct-CapResData", NID_setct_CapResData, 4, &so[4016]},
+    {"setct-CapRevReqTBS", "setct-CapRevReqTBS", NID_setct_CapRevReqTBS, 4, &so[4020]},
+    {"setct-CapRevReqTBSX", "setct-CapRevReqTBSX", NID_setct_CapRevReqTBSX, 4, &so[4024]},
+    {"setct-CapRevResData", "setct-CapRevResData", NID_setct_CapRevResData, 4, &so[4028]},
+    {"setct-CredReqTBS", "setct-CredReqTBS", NID_setct_CredReqTBS, 4, &so[4032]},
+    {"setct-CredReqTBSX", "setct-CredReqTBSX", NID_setct_CredReqTBSX, 4, &so[4036]},
+    {"setct-CredResData", "setct-CredResData", NID_setct_CredResData, 4, &so[4040]},
+    {"setct-CredRevReqTBS", "setct-CredRevReqTBS", NID_setct_CredRevReqTBS, 4, &so[4044]},
+    {"setct-CredRevReqTBSX", "setct-CredRevReqTBSX", NID_setct_CredRevReqTBSX, 4, &so[4048]},
+    {"setct-CredRevResData", "setct-CredRevResData", NID_setct_CredRevResData, 4, &so[4052]},
+    {"setct-PCertReqData", "setct-PCertReqData", NID_setct_PCertReqData, 4, &so[4056]},
+    {"setct-PCertResTBS", "setct-PCertResTBS", NID_setct_PCertResTBS, 4, &so[4060]},
+    {"setct-BatchAdminReqData", "setct-BatchAdminReqData", NID_setct_BatchAdminReqData, 4, &so[4064]},
+    {"setct-BatchAdminResData", "setct-BatchAdminResData", NID_setct_BatchAdminResData, 4, &so[4068]},
+    {"setct-CardCInitResTBS", "setct-CardCInitResTBS", NID_setct_CardCInitResTBS, 4, &so[4072]},
+    {"setct-MeAqCInitResTBS", "setct-MeAqCInitResTBS", NID_setct_MeAqCInitResTBS, 4, &so[4076]},
+    {"setct-RegFormResTBS", "setct-RegFormResTBS", NID_setct_RegFormResTBS, 4, &so[4080]},
+    {"setct-CertReqData", "setct-CertReqData", NID_setct_CertReqData, 4, &so[4084]},
+    {"setct-CertReqTBS", "setct-CertReqTBS", NID_setct_CertReqTBS, 4, &so[4088]},
+    {"setct-CertResData", "setct-CertResData", NID_setct_CertResData, 4, &so[4092]},
+    {"setct-CertInqReqTBS", "setct-CertInqReqTBS", NID_setct_CertInqReqTBS, 4, &so[4096]},
+    {"setct-ErrorTBS", "setct-ErrorTBS", NID_setct_ErrorTBS, 4, &so[4100]},
+    {"setct-PIDualSignedTBE", "setct-PIDualSignedTBE", NID_setct_PIDualSignedTBE, 4, &so[4104]},
+    {"setct-PIUnsignedTBE", "setct-PIUnsignedTBE", NID_setct_PIUnsignedTBE, 4, &so[4108]},
+    {"setct-AuthReqTBE", "setct-AuthReqTBE", NID_setct_AuthReqTBE, 4, &so[4112]},
+    {"setct-AuthResTBE", "setct-AuthResTBE", NID_setct_AuthResTBE, 4, &so[4116]},
+    {"setct-AuthResTBEX", "setct-AuthResTBEX", NID_setct_AuthResTBEX, 4, &so[4120]},
+    {"setct-AuthTokenTBE", "setct-AuthTokenTBE", NID_setct_AuthTokenTBE, 4, &so[4124]},
+    {"setct-CapTokenTBE", "setct-CapTokenTBE", NID_setct_CapTokenTBE, 4, &so[4128]},
+    {"setct-CapTokenTBEX", "setct-CapTokenTBEX", NID_setct_CapTokenTBEX, 4, &so[4132]},
+    {"setct-AcqCardCodeMsgTBE", "setct-AcqCardCodeMsgTBE", NID_setct_AcqCardCodeMsgTBE, 4, &so[4136]},
+    {"setct-AuthRevReqTBE", "setct-AuthRevReqTBE", NID_setct_AuthRevReqTBE, 4, &so[4140]},
+    {"setct-AuthRevResTBE", "setct-AuthRevResTBE", NID_setct_AuthRevResTBE, 4, &so[4144]},
+    {"setct-AuthRevResTBEB", "setct-AuthRevResTBEB", NID_setct_AuthRevResTBEB, 4, &so[4148]},
+    {"setct-CapReqTBE", "setct-CapReqTBE", NID_setct_CapReqTBE, 4, &so[4152]},
+    {"setct-CapReqTBEX", "setct-CapReqTBEX", NID_setct_CapReqTBEX, 4, &so[4156]},
+    {"setct-CapResTBE", "setct-CapResTBE", NID_setct_CapResTBE, 4, &so[4160]},
+    {"setct-CapRevReqTBE", "setct-CapRevReqTBE", NID_setct_CapRevReqTBE, 4, &so[4164]},
+    {"setct-CapRevReqTBEX", "setct-CapRevReqTBEX", NID_setct_CapRevReqTBEX, 4, &so[4168]},
+    {"setct-CapRevResTBE", "setct-CapRevResTBE", NID_setct_CapRevResTBE, 4, &so[4172]},
+    {"setct-CredReqTBE", "setct-CredReqTBE", NID_setct_CredReqTBE, 4, &so[4176]},
+    {"setct-CredReqTBEX", "setct-CredReqTBEX", NID_setct_CredReqTBEX, 4, &so[4180]},
+    {"setct-CredResTBE", "setct-CredResTBE", NID_setct_CredResTBE, 4, &so[4184]},
+    {"setct-CredRevReqTBE", "setct-CredRevReqTBE", NID_setct_CredRevReqTBE, 4, &so[4188]},
+    {"setct-CredRevReqTBEX", "setct-CredRevReqTBEX", NID_setct_CredRevReqTBEX, 4, &so[4192]},
+    {"setct-CredRevResTBE", "setct-CredRevResTBE", NID_setct_CredRevResTBE, 4, &so[4196]},
+    {"setct-BatchAdminReqTBE", "setct-BatchAdminReqTBE", NID_setct_BatchAdminReqTBE, 4, &so[4200]},
+    {"setct-BatchAdminResTBE", "setct-BatchAdminResTBE", NID_setct_BatchAdminResTBE, 4, &so[4204]},
+    {"setct-RegFormReqTBE", "setct-RegFormReqTBE", NID_setct_RegFormReqTBE, 4, &so[4208]},
+    {"setct-CertReqTBE", "setct-CertReqTBE", NID_setct_CertReqTBE, 4, &so[4212]},
+    {"setct-CertReqTBEX", "setct-CertReqTBEX", NID_setct_CertReqTBEX, 4, &so[4216]},
+    {"setct-CertResTBE", "setct-CertResTBE", NID_setct_CertResTBE, 4, &so[4220]},
+    {"setct-CRLNotificationTBS", "setct-CRLNotificationTBS", NID_setct_CRLNotificationTBS, 4, &so[4224]},
+    {"setct-CRLNotificationResTBS", "setct-CRLNotificationResTBS", NID_setct_CRLNotificationResTBS, 4, &so[4228]},
+    {"setct-BCIDistributionTBS", "setct-BCIDistributionTBS", NID_setct_BCIDistributionTBS, 4, &so[4232]},
+    {"setext-genCrypt", "generic cryptogram", NID_setext_genCrypt, 4, &so[4236]},
+    {"setext-miAuth", "merchant initiated auth", NID_setext_miAuth, 4, &so[4240]},
+    {"setext-pinSecure", "setext-pinSecure", NID_setext_pinSecure, 4, &so[4244]},
+    {"setext-pinAny", "setext-pinAny", NID_setext_pinAny, 4, &so[4248]},
+    {"setext-track2", "setext-track2", NID_setext_track2, 4, &so[4252]},
+    {"setext-cv", "additional verification", NID_setext_cv, 4, &so[4256]},
+    {"set-policy-root", "set-policy-root", NID_set_policy_root, 4, &so[4260]},
+    {"setCext-hashedRoot", "setCext-hashedRoot", NID_setCext_hashedRoot, 4, &so[4264]},
+    {"setCext-certType", "setCext-certType", NID_setCext_certType, 4, &so[4268]},
+    {"setCext-merchData", "setCext-merchData", NID_setCext_merchData, 4, &so[4272]},
+    {"setCext-cCertRequired", "setCext-cCertRequired", NID_setCext_cCertRequired, 4, &so[4276]},
+    {"setCext-tunneling", "setCext-tunneling", NID_setCext_tunneling, 4, &so[4280]},
+    {"setCext-setExt", "setCext-setExt", NID_setCext_setExt, 4, &so[4284]},
+    {"setCext-setQualf", "setCext-setQualf", NID_setCext_setQualf, 4, &so[4288]},
+    {"setCext-PGWYcapabilities", "setCext-PGWYcapabilities", NID_setCext_PGWYcapabilities, 4, &so[4292]},
+    {"setCext-TokenIdentifier", "setCext-TokenIdentifier", NID_setCext_TokenIdentifier, 4, &so[4296]},
+    {"setCext-Track2Data", "setCext-Track2Data", NID_setCext_Track2Data, 4, &so[4300]},
+    {"setCext-TokenType", "setCext-TokenType", NID_setCext_TokenType, 4, &so[4304]},
+    {"setCext-IssuerCapabilities", "setCext-IssuerCapabilities", NID_setCext_IssuerCapabilities, 4, &so[4308]},
+    {"setAttr-Cert", "setAttr-Cert", NID_setAttr_Cert, 4, &so[4312]},
+    {"setAttr-PGWYcap", "payment gateway capabilities", NID_setAttr_PGWYcap, 4, &so[4316]},
+    {"setAttr-TokenType", "setAttr-TokenType", NID_setAttr_TokenType, 4, &so[4320]},
+    {"setAttr-IssCap", "issuer capabilities", NID_setAttr_IssCap, 4, &so[4324]},
+    {"set-rootKeyThumb", "set-rootKeyThumb", NID_set_rootKeyThumb, 5, &so[4328]},
+    {"set-addPolicy", "set-addPolicy", NID_set_addPolicy, 5, &so[4333]},
+    {"setAttr-Token-EMV", "setAttr-Token-EMV", NID_setAttr_Token_EMV, 5, &so[4338]},
+    {"setAttr-Token-B0Prime", "setAttr-Token-B0Prime", NID_setAttr_Token_B0Prime, 5, &so[4343]},
+    {"setAttr-IssCap-CVM", "setAttr-IssCap-CVM", NID_setAttr_IssCap_CVM, 5, &so[4348]},
+    {"setAttr-IssCap-T2", "setAttr-IssCap-T2", NID_setAttr_IssCap_T2, 5, &so[4353]},
+    {"setAttr-IssCap-Sig", "setAttr-IssCap-Sig", NID_setAttr_IssCap_Sig, 5, &so[4358]},
+    {"setAttr-GenCryptgrm", "generate cryptogram", NID_setAttr_GenCryptgrm, 6, &so[4363]},
+    {"setAttr-T2Enc", "encrypted track 2", NID_setAttr_T2Enc, 6, &so[4369]},
+    {"setAttr-T2cleartxt", "cleartext track 2", NID_setAttr_T2cleartxt, 6, &so[4375]},
+    {"setAttr-TokICCsig", "ICC or token signature", NID_setAttr_TokICCsig, 6, &so[4381]},
+    {"setAttr-SecDevSig", "secure device signature", NID_setAttr_SecDevSig, 6, &so[4387]},
+    {"set-brand-IATA-ATA", "set-brand-IATA-ATA", NID_set_brand_IATA_ATA, 4, &so[4393]},
+    {"set-brand-Diners", "set-brand-Diners", NID_set_brand_Diners, 4, &so[4397]},
+    {"set-brand-AmericanExpress", "set-brand-AmericanExpress", NID_set_brand_AmericanExpress, 4, &so[4401]},
+    {"set-brand-JCB", "set-brand-JCB", NID_set_brand_JCB, 4, &so[4405]},
+    {"set-brand-Visa", "set-brand-Visa", NID_set_brand_Visa, 4, &so[4409]},
+    {"set-brand-MasterCard", "set-brand-MasterCard", NID_set_brand_MasterCard, 4, &so[4413]},
+    {"set-brand-Novus", "set-brand-Novus", NID_set_brand_Novus, 5, &so[4417]},
+    {"DES-CDMF", "des-cdmf", NID_des_cdmf, 8, &so[4422]},
+    {"rsaOAEPEncryptionSET", "rsaOAEPEncryptionSET", NID_rsaOAEPEncryptionSET, 9, &so[4430]},
+    {"ITU-T", "itu-t", NID_itu_t},
+    {"JOINT-ISO-ITU-T", "joint-iso-itu-t", NID_joint_iso_itu_t},
+    {"international-organizations", "International Organizations", NID_international_organizations, 1, &so[4439]},
+    {"msSmartcardLogin", "Microsoft Smartcardlogin", NID_ms_smartcard_login, 10, &so[4440]},
+    {"msUPN", "Microsoft Universal Principal Name", NID_ms_upn, 10, &so[4450]},
+    {"AES-128-CFB1", "aes-128-cfb1", NID_aes_128_cfb1},
+    {"AES-192-CFB1", "aes-192-cfb1", NID_aes_192_cfb1},
+    {"AES-256-CFB1", "aes-256-cfb1", NID_aes_256_cfb1},
+    {"AES-128-CFB8", "aes-128-cfb8", NID_aes_128_cfb8},
+    {"AES-192-CFB8", "aes-192-cfb8", NID_aes_192_cfb8},
+    {"AES-256-CFB8", "aes-256-cfb8", NID_aes_256_cfb8},
+    {"DES-CFB1", "des-cfb1", NID_des_cfb1},
+    {"DES-CFB8", "des-cfb8", NID_des_cfb8},
+    {"DES-EDE3-CFB1", "des-ede3-cfb1", NID_des_ede3_cfb1},
+    {"DES-EDE3-CFB8", "des-ede3-cfb8", NID_des_ede3_cfb8},
+    {"street", "streetAddress", NID_streetAddress, 3, &so[4460]},
+    {"postalCode", "postalCode", NID_postalCode, 3, &so[4463]},
+    {"id-ppl", "id-ppl", NID_id_ppl, 7, &so[4466]},
+    {"proxyCertInfo", "Proxy Certificate Information", NID_proxyCertInfo, 8, &so[4473]},
+    {"id-ppl-anyLanguage", "Any language", NID_id_ppl_anyLanguage, 8, &so[4481]},
+    {"id-ppl-inheritAll", "Inherit all", NID_id_ppl_inheritAll, 8, &so[4489]},
+    {"nameConstraints", "X509v3 Name Constraints", NID_name_constraints, 3, &so[4497]},
+    {"id-ppl-independent", "Independent", NID_Independent, 8, &so[4500]},
+    {"RSA-SHA256", "sha256WithRSAEncryption", NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption, 9, &so[4508]},
+    {"RSA-SHA384", "sha384WithRSAEncryption", NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption, 9, &so[4517]},
+    {"RSA-SHA512", "sha512WithRSAEncryption", NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption, 9, &so[4526]},
+    {"RSA-SHA224", "sha224WithRSAEncryption", NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption, 9, &so[4535]},
+    {"SHA256", "sha256", NID_sha256, 9, &so[4544]},
+    {"SHA384", "sha384", NID_sha384, 9, &so[4553]},
+    {"SHA512", "sha512", NID_sha512, 9, &so[4562]},
+    {"SHA224", "sha224", NID_sha224, 9, &so[4571]},
+    {"identified-organization", "identified-organization", NID_identified_organization, 1, &so[4580]},
+    {"certicom-arc", "certicom-arc", NID_certicom_arc, 3, &so[4581]},
+    {"wap", "wap", NID_wap, 2, &so[4584]},
+    {"wap-wsg", "wap-wsg", NID_wap_wsg, 3, &so[4586]},
+    {"id-characteristic-two-basis", "id-characteristic-two-basis", NID_X9_62_id_characteristic_two_basis, 8, &so[4589]},
+    {"onBasis", "onBasis", NID_X9_62_onBasis, 9, &so[4597]},
+    {"tpBasis", "tpBasis", NID_X9_62_tpBasis, 9, &so[4606]},
+    {"ppBasis", "ppBasis", NID_X9_62_ppBasis, 9, &so[4615]},
+    {"c2pnb163v1", "c2pnb163v1", NID_X9_62_c2pnb163v1, 8, &so[4624]},
+    {"c2pnb163v2", "c2pnb163v2", NID_X9_62_c2pnb163v2, 8, &so[4632]},
+    {"c2pnb163v3", "c2pnb163v3", NID_X9_62_c2pnb163v3, 8, &so[4640]},
+    {"c2pnb176v1", "c2pnb176v1", NID_X9_62_c2pnb176v1, 8, &so[4648]},
+    {"c2tnb191v1", "c2tnb191v1", NID_X9_62_c2tnb191v1, 8, &so[4656]},
+    {"c2tnb191v2", "c2tnb191v2", NID_X9_62_c2tnb191v2, 8, &so[4664]},
+    {"c2tnb191v3", "c2tnb191v3", NID_X9_62_c2tnb191v3, 8, &so[4672]},
+    {"c2onb191v4", "c2onb191v4", NID_X9_62_c2onb191v4, 8, &so[4680]},
+    {"c2onb191v5", "c2onb191v5", NID_X9_62_c2onb191v5, 8, &so[4688]},
+    {"c2pnb208w1", "c2pnb208w1", NID_X9_62_c2pnb208w1, 8, &so[4696]},
+    {"c2tnb239v1", "c2tnb239v1", NID_X9_62_c2tnb239v1, 8, &so[4704]},
+    {"c2tnb239v2", "c2tnb239v2", NID_X9_62_c2tnb239v2, 8, &so[4712]},
+    {"c2tnb239v3", "c2tnb239v3", NID_X9_62_c2tnb239v3, 8, &so[4720]},
+    {"c2onb239v4", "c2onb239v4", NID_X9_62_c2onb239v4, 8, &so[4728]},
+    {"c2onb239v5", "c2onb239v5", NID_X9_62_c2onb239v5, 8, &so[4736]},
+    {"c2pnb272w1", "c2pnb272w1", NID_X9_62_c2pnb272w1, 8, &so[4744]},
+    {"c2pnb304w1", "c2pnb304w1", NID_X9_62_c2pnb304w1, 8, &so[4752]},
+    {"c2tnb359v1", "c2tnb359v1", NID_X9_62_c2tnb359v1, 8, &so[4760]},
+    {"c2pnb368w1", "c2pnb368w1", NID_X9_62_c2pnb368w1, 8, &so[4768]},
+    {"c2tnb431r1", "c2tnb431r1", NID_X9_62_c2tnb431r1, 8, &so[4776]},
+    {"secp112r1", "secp112r1", NID_secp112r1, 5, &so[4784]},
+    {"secp112r2", "secp112r2", NID_secp112r2, 5, &so[4789]},
+    {"secp128r1", "secp128r1", NID_secp128r1, 5, &so[4794]},
+    {"secp128r2", "secp128r2", NID_secp128r2, 5, &so[4799]},
+    {"secp160k1", "secp160k1", NID_secp160k1, 5, &so[4804]},
+    {"secp160r1", "secp160r1", NID_secp160r1, 5, &so[4809]},
+    {"secp160r2", "secp160r2", NID_secp160r2, 5, &so[4814]},
+    {"secp192k1", "secp192k1", NID_secp192k1, 5, &so[4819]},
+    {"secp224k1", "secp224k1", NID_secp224k1, 5, &so[4824]},
+    {"secp224r1", "secp224r1", NID_secp224r1, 5, &so[4829]},
+    {"secp256k1", "secp256k1", NID_secp256k1, 5, &so[4834]},
+    {"secp384r1", "secp384r1", NID_secp384r1, 5, &so[4839]},
+    {"secp521r1", "secp521r1", NID_secp521r1, 5, &so[4844]},
+    {"sect113r1", "sect113r1", NID_sect113r1, 5, &so[4849]},
+    {"sect113r2", "sect113r2", NID_sect113r2, 5, &so[4854]},
+    {"sect131r1", "sect131r1", NID_sect131r1, 5, &so[4859]},
+    {"sect131r2", "sect131r2", NID_sect131r2, 5, &so[4864]},
+    {"sect163k1", "sect163k1", NID_sect163k1, 5, &so[4869]},
+    {"sect163r1", "sect163r1", NID_sect163r1, 5, &so[4874]},
+    {"sect163r2", "sect163r2", NID_sect163r2, 5, &so[4879]},
+    {"sect193r1", "sect193r1", NID_sect193r1, 5, &so[4884]},
+    {"sect193r2", "sect193r2", NID_sect193r2, 5, &so[4889]},
+    {"sect233k1", "sect233k1", NID_sect233k1, 5, &so[4894]},
+    {"sect233r1", "sect233r1", NID_sect233r1, 5, &so[4899]},
+    {"sect239k1", "sect239k1", NID_sect239k1, 5, &so[4904]},
+    {"sect283k1", "sect283k1", NID_sect283k1, 5, &so[4909]},
+    {"sect283r1", "sect283r1", NID_sect283r1, 5, &so[4914]},
+    {"sect409k1", "sect409k1", NID_sect409k1, 5, &so[4919]},
+    {"sect409r1", "sect409r1", NID_sect409r1, 5, &so[4924]},
+    {"sect571k1", "sect571k1", NID_sect571k1, 5, &so[4929]},
+    {"sect571r1", "sect571r1", NID_sect571r1, 5, &so[4934]},
+    {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls1", "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls1", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls1, 5, &so[4939]},
+    {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls3", "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls3", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls3, 5, &so[4944]},
+    {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls4", "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls4", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls4, 5, &so[4949]},
+    {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls5", "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls5", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls5, 5, &so[4954]},
+    {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls6", "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls6", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls6, 5, &so[4959]},
+    {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls7", "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls7", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls7, 5, &so[4964]},
+    {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls8", "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls8", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls8, 5, &so[4969]},
+    {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls9", "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls9", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls9, 5, &so[4974]},
+    {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls10", "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls10", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls10, 5, &so[4979]},
+    {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls11", "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls11", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls11, 5, &so[4984]},
+    {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls12", "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls12", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls12, 5, &so[4989]},
+    {"anyPolicy", "X509v3 Any Policy", NID_any_policy, 4, &so[4994]},
+    {"policyMappings", "X509v3 Policy Mappings", NID_policy_mappings, 3, &so[4998]},
+    {"inhibitAnyPolicy", "X509v3 Inhibit Any Policy", NID_inhibit_any_policy, 3, &so[5001]},
+    {"Oakley-EC2N-3", "ipsec3", NID_ipsec3},
+    {"Oakley-EC2N-4", "ipsec4", NID_ipsec4},
+    {"CAMELLIA-128-CBC", "camellia-128-cbc", NID_camellia_128_cbc, 11, &so[5004]},
+    {"CAMELLIA-192-CBC", "camellia-192-cbc", NID_camellia_192_cbc, 11, &so[5015]},
+    {"CAMELLIA-256-CBC", "camellia-256-cbc", NID_camellia_256_cbc, 11, &so[5026]},
+    {"CAMELLIA-128-ECB", "camellia-128-ecb", NID_camellia_128_ecb, 8, &so[5037]},
+    {"CAMELLIA-192-ECB", "camellia-192-ecb", NID_camellia_192_ecb, 8, &so[5045]},
+    {"CAMELLIA-256-ECB", "camellia-256-ecb", NID_camellia_256_ecb, 8, &so[5053]},
+    {"CAMELLIA-128-CFB", "camellia-128-cfb", NID_camellia_128_cfb128, 8, &so[5061]},
+    {"CAMELLIA-192-CFB", "camellia-192-cfb", NID_camellia_192_cfb128, 8, &so[5069]},
+    {"CAMELLIA-256-CFB", "camellia-256-cfb", NID_camellia_256_cfb128, 8, &so[5077]},
+    {"CAMELLIA-128-CFB1", "camellia-128-cfb1", NID_camellia_128_cfb1},
+    {"CAMELLIA-192-CFB1", "camellia-192-cfb1", NID_camellia_192_cfb1},
+    {"CAMELLIA-256-CFB1", "camellia-256-cfb1", NID_camellia_256_cfb1},
+    {"CAMELLIA-128-CFB8", "camellia-128-cfb8", NID_camellia_128_cfb8},
+    {"CAMELLIA-192-CFB8", "camellia-192-cfb8", NID_camellia_192_cfb8},
+    {"CAMELLIA-256-CFB8", "camellia-256-cfb8", NID_camellia_256_cfb8},
+    {"CAMELLIA-128-OFB", "camellia-128-ofb", NID_camellia_128_ofb128, 8, &so[5085]},
+    {"CAMELLIA-192-OFB", "camellia-192-ofb", NID_camellia_192_ofb128, 8, &so[5093]},
+    {"CAMELLIA-256-OFB", "camellia-256-ofb", NID_camellia_256_ofb128, 8, &so[5101]},
+    {"subjectDirectoryAttributes", "X509v3 Subject Directory Attributes", NID_subject_directory_attributes, 3, &so[5109]},
+    {"issuingDistributionPoint", "X509v3 Issuing Distribution Point", NID_issuing_distribution_point, 3, &so[5112]},
+    {"certificateIssuer", "X509v3 Certificate Issuer", NID_certificate_issuer, 3, &so[5115]},
+    { NULL, NULL, NID_undef },
+    {"KISA", "kisa", NID_kisa, 6, &so[5118]},
+    { NULL, NULL, NID_undef },
+    { NULL, NULL, NID_undef },
+    {"SEED-ECB", "seed-ecb", NID_seed_ecb, 8, &so[5124]},
+    {"SEED-CBC", "seed-cbc", NID_seed_cbc, 8, &so[5132]},
+    {"SEED-OFB", "seed-ofb", NID_seed_ofb128, 8, &so[5140]},
+    {"SEED-CFB", "seed-cfb", NID_seed_cfb128, 8, &so[5148]},
+    {"HMAC-MD5", "hmac-md5", NID_hmac_md5, 8, &so[5156]},
+    {"HMAC-SHA1", "hmac-sha1", NID_hmac_sha1, 8, &so[5164]},
+    {"id-PasswordBasedMAC", "password based MAC", NID_id_PasswordBasedMAC, 9, &so[5172]},
+    {"id-DHBasedMac", "Diffie-Hellman based MAC", NID_id_DHBasedMac, 9, &so[5181]},
+    {"id-it-suppLangTags", "id-it-suppLangTags", NID_id_it_suppLangTags, 8, &so[5190]},
+    {"caRepository", "CA Repository", NID_caRepository, 8, &so[5198]},
+    {"id-smime-ct-compressedData", "id-smime-ct-compressedData", NID_id_smime_ct_compressedData, 11, &so[5206]},
+    {"id-ct-asciiTextWithCRLF", "id-ct-asciiTextWithCRLF", NID_id_ct_asciiTextWithCRLF, 11, &so[5217]},
+    {"id-aes128-wrap", "id-aes128-wrap", NID_id_aes128_wrap, 9, &so[5228]},
+    {"id-aes192-wrap", "id-aes192-wrap", NID_id_aes192_wrap, 9, &so[5237]},
+    {"id-aes256-wrap", "id-aes256-wrap", NID_id_aes256_wrap, 9, &so[5246]},
+    {"ecdsa-with-Recommended", "ecdsa-with-Recommended", NID_ecdsa_with_Recommended, 7, &so[5255]},
+    {"ecdsa-with-Specified", "ecdsa-with-Specified", NID_ecdsa_with_Specified, 7, &so[5262]},
+    {"ecdsa-with-SHA224", "ecdsa-with-SHA224", NID_ecdsa_with_SHA224, 8, &so[5269]},
+    {"ecdsa-with-SHA256", "ecdsa-with-SHA256", NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256, 8, &so[5277]},
+    {"ecdsa-with-SHA384", "ecdsa-with-SHA384", NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384, 8, &so[5285]},
+    {"ecdsa-with-SHA512", "ecdsa-with-SHA512", NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512, 8, &so[5293]},
+    {"hmacWithMD5", "hmacWithMD5", NID_hmacWithMD5, 8, &so[5301]},
+    {"hmacWithSHA224", "hmacWithSHA224", NID_hmacWithSHA224, 8, &so[5309]},
+    {"hmacWithSHA256", "hmacWithSHA256", NID_hmacWithSHA256, 8, &so[5317]},
+    {"hmacWithSHA384", "hmacWithSHA384", NID_hmacWithSHA384, 8, &so[5325]},
+    {"hmacWithSHA512", "hmacWithSHA512", NID_hmacWithSHA512, 8, &so[5333]},
+    {"dsa_with_SHA224", "dsa_with_SHA224", NID_dsa_with_SHA224, 9, &so[5341]},
+    {"dsa_with_SHA256", "dsa_with_SHA256", NID_dsa_with_SHA256, 9, &so[5350]},
+    {"whirlpool", "whirlpool", NID_whirlpool, 6, &so[5359]},
+    {"cryptopro", "cryptopro", NID_cryptopro, 5, &so[5365]},
+    {"cryptocom", "cryptocom", NID_cryptocom, 5, &so[5370]},
+    {"id-GostR3411-94-with-GostR3410-2001", "GOST R 34.11-94 with GOST R 34.10-2001", NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001, 6, &so[5375]},
+    {"id-GostR3411-94-with-GostR3410-94", "GOST R 34.11-94 with GOST R 34.10-94", NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_94, 6, &so[5381]},
+    {"md_gost94", "GOST R 34.11-94", NID_id_GostR3411_94, 6, &so[5387]},
+    {"id-HMACGostR3411-94", "HMAC GOST 34.11-94", NID_id_HMACGostR3411_94, 6, &so[5393]},
+    {"gost2001", "GOST R 34.10-2001", NID_id_GostR3410_2001, 6, &so[5399]},
+    {"gost94", "GOST R 34.10-94", NID_id_GostR3410_94, 6, &so[5405]},
+    {"gost89", "GOST 28147-89", NID_id_Gost28147_89, 6, &so[5411]},
+    {"gost89-cnt", "gost89-cnt", NID_gost89_cnt},
+    {"gost-mac", "GOST 28147-89 MAC", NID_id_Gost28147_89_MAC, 6, &so[5417]},
+    {"prf-gostr3411-94", "GOST R 34.11-94 PRF", NID_id_GostR3411_94_prf, 6, &so[5423]},
+    {"id-GostR3410-2001DH", "GOST R 34.10-2001 DH", NID_id_GostR3410_2001DH, 6, &so[5429]},
+    {"id-GostR3410-94DH", "GOST R 34.10-94 DH", NID_id_GostR3410_94DH, 6, &so[5435]},
+    {"id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-KeyMeshing", "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-KeyMeshing", NID_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_KeyMeshing, 7, &so[5441]},
+    {"id-Gost28147-89-None-KeyMeshing", "id-Gost28147-89-None-KeyMeshing", NID_id_Gost28147_89_None_KeyMeshing, 7, &so[5448]},
+    {"id-GostR3411-94-TestParamSet", "id-GostR3411-94-TestParamSet", NID_id_GostR3411_94_TestParamSet, 7, &so[5455]},
+    {"id-GostR3411-94-CryptoProParamSet", "id-GostR3411-94-CryptoProParamSet", NID_id_GostR3411_94_CryptoProParamSet, 7, &so[5462]},
+    {"id-Gost28147-89-TestParamSet", "id-Gost28147-89-TestParamSet", NID_id_Gost28147_89_TestParamSet, 7, &so[5469]},
+    {"id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet", "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet", NID_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_A_ParamSet, 7, &so[5476]},
+    {"id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-B-ParamSet", "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-B-ParamSet", NID_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_B_ParamSet, 7, &so[5483]},
+    {"id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-C-ParamSet", "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-C-ParamSet", NID_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_C_ParamSet, 7, &so[5490]},
+    {"id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-D-ParamSet", "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-D-ParamSet", NID_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_D_ParamSet, 7, &so[5497]},
+    {"id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-Oscar-1-1-ParamSet", "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-Oscar-1-1-ParamSet", NID_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_Oscar_1_1_ParamSet, 7, &so[5504]},
+    {"id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-Oscar-1-0-ParamSet", "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-Oscar-1-0-ParamSet", NID_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_Oscar_1_0_ParamSet, 7, &so[5511]},
+    {"id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-RIC-1-ParamSet", "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-RIC-1-ParamSet", NID_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_RIC_1_ParamSet, 7, &so[5518]},
+    {"id-GostR3410-94-TestParamSet", "id-GostR3410-94-TestParamSet", NID_id_GostR3410_94_TestParamSet, 7, &so[5525]},
+    {"id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet", "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet", NID_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_A_ParamSet, 7, &so[5532]},
+    {"id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-B-ParamSet", "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-B-ParamSet", NID_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_B_ParamSet, 7, &so[5539]},
+    {"id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-C-ParamSet", "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-C-ParamSet", NID_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_C_ParamSet, 7, &so[5546]},
+    {"id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-D-ParamSet", "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-D-ParamSet", NID_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_D_ParamSet, 7, &so[5553]},
+    {"id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-XchA-ParamSet", "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-XchA-ParamSet", NID_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_XchA_ParamSet, 7, &so[5560]},
+    {"id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-XchB-ParamSet", "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-XchB-ParamSet", NID_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_XchB_ParamSet, 7, &so[5567]},
+    {"id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-XchC-ParamSet", "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-XchC-ParamSet", NID_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_XchC_ParamSet, 7, &so[5574]},
+    {"id-GostR3410-2001-TestParamSet", "id-GostR3410-2001-TestParamSet", NID_id_GostR3410_2001_TestParamSet, 7, &so[5581]},
+    {"id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet", "id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet", NID_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_A_ParamSet, 7, &so[5588]},
+    {"id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-B-ParamSet", "id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-B-ParamSet", NID_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_B_ParamSet, 7, &so[5595]},
+    {"id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-C-ParamSet", "id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-C-ParamSet", NID_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_C_ParamSet, 7, &so[5602]},
+    {"id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-XchA-ParamSet", "id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-XchA-ParamSet", NID_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_XchA_ParamSet, 7, &so[5609]},
+    {"id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-XchB-ParamSet", "id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-XchB-ParamSet", NID_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_XchB_ParamSet, 7, &so[5616]},
+    {"id-GostR3410-94-a", "id-GostR3410-94-a", NID_id_GostR3410_94_a, 7, &so[5623]},
+    {"id-GostR3410-94-aBis", "id-GostR3410-94-aBis", NID_id_GostR3410_94_aBis, 7, &so[5630]},
+    {"id-GostR3410-94-b", "id-GostR3410-94-b", NID_id_GostR3410_94_b, 7, &so[5637]},
+    {"id-GostR3410-94-bBis", "id-GostR3410-94-bBis", NID_id_GostR3410_94_bBis, 7, &so[5644]},
+    {"id-Gost28147-89-cc", "GOST 28147-89 Cryptocom ParamSet", NID_id_Gost28147_89_cc, 8, &so[5651]},
+    {"gost94cc", "GOST 34.10-94 Cryptocom", NID_id_GostR3410_94_cc, 8, &so[5659]},
+    {"gost2001cc", "GOST 34.10-2001 Cryptocom", NID_id_GostR3410_2001_cc, 8, &so[5667]},
+    {"id-GostR3411-94-with-GostR3410-94-cc", "GOST R 34.11-94 with GOST R 34.10-94 Cryptocom", NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_94_cc, 8, &so[5675]},
+    {"id-GostR3411-94-with-GostR3410-2001-cc", "GOST R 34.11-94 with GOST R 34.10-2001 Cryptocom", NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001_cc, 8, &so[5683]},
+    {"id-GostR3410-2001-ParamSet-cc", "GOST R 3410-2001 Parameter Set Cryptocom", NID_id_GostR3410_2001_ParamSet_cc, 8, &so[5691]},
+    {"HMAC", "hmac", NID_hmac},
+    {"LocalKeySet", "Microsoft Local Key set", NID_LocalKeySet, 9, &so[5699]},
+    {"freshestCRL", "X509v3 Freshest CRL", NID_freshest_crl, 3, &so[5708]},
+    {"id-on-permanentIdentifier", "Permanent Identifier", NID_id_on_permanentIdentifier, 8, &so[5711]},
+    {"searchGuide", "searchGuide", NID_searchGuide, 3, &so[5719]},
+    {"businessCategory", "businessCategory", NID_businessCategory, 3, &so[5722]},
+    {"postalAddress", "postalAddress", NID_postalAddress, 3, &so[5725]},
+    {"postOfficeBox", "postOfficeBox", NID_postOfficeBox, 3, &so[5728]},
+    {"physicalDeliveryOfficeName", "physicalDeliveryOfficeName", NID_physicalDeliveryOfficeName, 3, &so[5731]},
+    {"telephoneNumber", "telephoneNumber", NID_telephoneNumber, 3, &so[5734]},
+    {"telexNumber", "telexNumber", NID_telexNumber, 3, &so[5737]},
+    {"teletexTerminalIdentifier", "teletexTerminalIdentifier", NID_teletexTerminalIdentifier, 3, &so[5740]},
+    {"facsimileTelephoneNumber", "facsimileTelephoneNumber", NID_facsimileTelephoneNumber, 3, &so[5743]},
+    {"x121Address", "x121Address", NID_x121Address, 3, &so[5746]},
+    {"internationaliSDNNumber", "internationaliSDNNumber", NID_internationaliSDNNumber, 3, &so[5749]},
+    {"registeredAddress", "registeredAddress", NID_registeredAddress, 3, &so[5752]},
+    {"destinationIndicator", "destinationIndicator", NID_destinationIndicator, 3, &so[5755]},
+    {"preferredDeliveryMethod", "preferredDeliveryMethod", NID_preferredDeliveryMethod, 3, &so[5758]},
+    {"presentationAddress", "presentationAddress", NID_presentationAddress, 3, &so[5761]},
+    {"supportedApplicationContext", "supportedApplicationContext", NID_supportedApplicationContext, 3, &so[5764]},
+    {"member", "member", NID_member, 3, &so[5767]},
+    {"owner", "owner", NID_owner, 3, &so[5770]},
+    {"roleOccupant", "roleOccupant", NID_roleOccupant, 3, &so[5773]},
+    {"seeAlso", "seeAlso", NID_seeAlso, 3, &so[5776]},
+    {"userPassword", "userPassword", NID_userPassword, 3, &so[5779]},
+    {"userCertificate", "userCertificate", NID_userCertificate, 3, &so[5782]},
+    {"cACertificate", "cACertificate", NID_cACertificate, 3, &so[5785]},
+    {"authorityRevocationList", "authorityRevocationList", NID_authorityRevocationList, 3, &so[5788]},
+    {"certificateRevocationList", "certificateRevocationList", NID_certificateRevocationList, 3, &so[5791]},
+    {"crossCertificatePair", "crossCertificatePair", NID_crossCertificatePair, 3, &so[5794]},
+    {"enhancedSearchGuide", "enhancedSearchGuide", NID_enhancedSearchGuide, 3, &so[5797]},
+    {"protocolInformation", "protocolInformation", NID_protocolInformation, 3, &so[5800]},
+    {"distinguishedName", "distinguishedName", NID_distinguishedName, 3, &so[5803]},
+    {"uniqueMember", "uniqueMember", NID_uniqueMember, 3, &so[5806]},
+    {"houseIdentifier", "houseIdentifier", NID_houseIdentifier, 3, &so[5809]},
+    {"supportedAlgorithms", "supportedAlgorithms", NID_supportedAlgorithms, 3, &so[5812]},
+    {"deltaRevocationList", "deltaRevocationList", NID_deltaRevocationList, 3, &so[5815]},
+    {"dmdName", "dmdName", NID_dmdName, 3, &so[5818]},
+    {"id-alg-PWRI-KEK", "id-alg-PWRI-KEK", NID_id_alg_PWRI_KEK, 11, &so[5821]},
+    {"CMAC", "cmac", NID_cmac},
+    {"id-aes128-GCM", "aes-128-gcm", NID_aes_128_gcm, 9, &so[5832]},
+    {"id-aes128-CCM", "aes-128-ccm", NID_aes_128_ccm, 9, &so[5841]},
+    {"id-aes128-wrap-pad", "id-aes128-wrap-pad", NID_id_aes128_wrap_pad, 9, &so[5850]},
+    {"id-aes192-GCM", "aes-192-gcm", NID_aes_192_gcm, 9, &so[5859]},
+    {"id-aes192-CCM", "aes-192-ccm", NID_aes_192_ccm, 9, &so[5868]},
+    {"id-aes192-wrap-pad", "id-aes192-wrap-pad", NID_id_aes192_wrap_pad, 9, &so[5877]},
+    {"id-aes256-GCM", "aes-256-gcm", NID_aes_256_gcm, 9, &so[5886]},
+    {"id-aes256-CCM", "aes-256-ccm", NID_aes_256_ccm, 9, &so[5895]},
+    {"id-aes256-wrap-pad", "id-aes256-wrap-pad", NID_id_aes256_wrap_pad, 9, &so[5904]},
+    {"AES-128-CTR", "aes-128-ctr", NID_aes_128_ctr},
+    {"AES-192-CTR", "aes-192-ctr", NID_aes_192_ctr},
+    {"AES-256-CTR", "aes-256-ctr", NID_aes_256_ctr},
+    {"id-camellia128-wrap", "id-camellia128-wrap", NID_id_camellia128_wrap, 11, &so[5913]},
+    {"id-camellia192-wrap", "id-camellia192-wrap", NID_id_camellia192_wrap, 11, &so[5924]},
+    {"id-camellia256-wrap", "id-camellia256-wrap", NID_id_camellia256_wrap, 11, &so[5935]},
+    {"anyExtendedKeyUsage", "Any Extended Key Usage", NID_anyExtendedKeyUsage, 4, &so[5946]},
+    {"MGF1", "mgf1", NID_mgf1, 9, &so[5950]},
+    {"RSASSA-PSS", "rsassaPss", NID_rsassaPss, 9, &so[5959]},
+    {"AES-128-XTS", "aes-128-xts", NID_aes_128_xts},
+    {"AES-256-XTS", "aes-256-xts", NID_aes_256_xts},
+    {"RC4-HMAC-MD5", "rc4-hmac-md5", NID_rc4_hmac_md5},
+    {"AES-128-CBC-HMAC-SHA1", "aes-128-cbc-hmac-sha1", NID_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1},
+    {"AES-192-CBC-HMAC-SHA1", "aes-192-cbc-hmac-sha1", NID_aes_192_cbc_hmac_sha1},
+    {"AES-256-CBC-HMAC-SHA1", "aes-256-cbc-hmac-sha1", NID_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha1},
+    {"RSAES-OAEP", "rsaesOaep", NID_rsaesOaep, 9, &so[5968]},
+    {"dhpublicnumber", "X9.42 DH", NID_dhpublicnumber, 7, &so[5977]},
+    {"brainpoolP160r1", "brainpoolP160r1", NID_brainpoolP160r1, 9, &so[5984]},
+    {"brainpoolP160t1", "brainpoolP160t1", NID_brainpoolP160t1, 9, &so[5993]},
+    {"brainpoolP192r1", "brainpoolP192r1", NID_brainpoolP192r1, 9, &so[6002]},
+    {"brainpoolP192t1", "brainpoolP192t1", NID_brainpoolP192t1, 9, &so[6011]},
+    {"brainpoolP224r1", "brainpoolP224r1", NID_brainpoolP224r1, 9, &so[6020]},
+    {"brainpoolP224t1", "brainpoolP224t1", NID_brainpoolP224t1, 9, &so[6029]},
+    {"brainpoolP256r1", "brainpoolP256r1", NID_brainpoolP256r1, 9, &so[6038]},
+    {"brainpoolP256t1", "brainpoolP256t1", NID_brainpoolP256t1, 9, &so[6047]},
+    {"brainpoolP320r1", "brainpoolP320r1", NID_brainpoolP320r1, 9, &so[6056]},
+    {"brainpoolP320t1", "brainpoolP320t1", NID_brainpoolP320t1, 9, &so[6065]},
+    {"brainpoolP384r1", "brainpoolP384r1", NID_brainpoolP384r1, 9, &so[6074]},
+    {"brainpoolP384t1", "brainpoolP384t1", NID_brainpoolP384t1, 9, &so[6083]},
+    {"brainpoolP512r1", "brainpoolP512r1", NID_brainpoolP512r1, 9, &so[6092]},
+    {"brainpoolP512t1", "brainpoolP512t1", NID_brainpoolP512t1, 9, &so[6101]},
+    {"PSPECIFIED", "pSpecified", NID_pSpecified, 9, &so[6110]},
+    {"dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme", "dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme", NID_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha1kdf_scheme, 9, &so[6119]},
+    {"dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme", "dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme", NID_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha224kdf_scheme, 6, &so[6128]},
+    {"dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme", "dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme", NID_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha256kdf_scheme, 6, &so[6134]},
+    {"dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme", "dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme", NID_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha384kdf_scheme, 6, &so[6140]},
+    {"dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme", "dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme", NID_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha512kdf_scheme, 6, &so[6146]},
+    {"dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme", "dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme", NID_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha1kdf_scheme, 9, &so[6152]},
+    {"dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme", "dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme", NID_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha224kdf_scheme, 6, &so[6161]},
+    {"dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme", "dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme", NID_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha256kdf_scheme, 6, &so[6167]},
+    {"dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme", "dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme", NID_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha384kdf_scheme, 6, &so[6173]},
+    {"dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme", "dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme", NID_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha512kdf_scheme, 6, &so[6179]},
+    {"dh-std-kdf", "dh-std-kdf", NID_dh_std_kdf},
+    {"dh-cofactor-kdf", "dh-cofactor-kdf", NID_dh_cofactor_kdf},
+    {"AES-128-CBC-HMAC-SHA256", "aes-128-cbc-hmac-sha256", NID_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha256},
+    {"AES-192-CBC-HMAC-SHA256", "aes-192-cbc-hmac-sha256", NID_aes_192_cbc_hmac_sha256},
+    {"AES-256-CBC-HMAC-SHA256", "aes-256-cbc-hmac-sha256", NID_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha256},
+    {"ct_precert_scts", "CT Precertificate SCTs", NID_ct_precert_scts, 10, &so[6185]},
+    {"ct_precert_poison", "CT Precertificate Poison", NID_ct_precert_poison, 10, &so[6195]},
+    {"ct_precert_signer", "CT Precertificate Signer", NID_ct_precert_signer, 10, &so[6205]},
+    {"ct_cert_scts", "CT Certificate SCTs", NID_ct_cert_scts, 10, &so[6215]},
+    {"jurisdictionL", "jurisdictionLocalityName", NID_jurisdictionLocalityName, 11, &so[6225]},
+    {"jurisdictionST", "jurisdictionStateOrProvinceName", NID_jurisdictionStateOrProvinceName, 11, &so[6236]},
+    {"jurisdictionC", "jurisdictionCountryName", NID_jurisdictionCountryName, 11, &so[6247]},
+    {"AES-128-OCB", "aes-128-ocb", NID_aes_128_ocb},
+    {"AES-192-OCB", "aes-192-ocb", NID_aes_192_ocb},
+    {"AES-256-OCB", "aes-256-ocb", NID_aes_256_ocb},
+    {"CAMELLIA-128-GCM", "camellia-128-gcm", NID_camellia_128_gcm, 8, &so[6258]},
+    {"CAMELLIA-128-CCM", "camellia-128-ccm", NID_camellia_128_ccm, 8, &so[6266]},
+    {"CAMELLIA-128-CTR", "camellia-128-ctr", NID_camellia_128_ctr, 8, &so[6274]},
+    {"CAMELLIA-128-CMAC", "camellia-128-cmac", NID_camellia_128_cmac, 8, &so[6282]},
+    {"CAMELLIA-192-GCM", "camellia-192-gcm", NID_camellia_192_gcm, 8, &so[6290]},
+    {"CAMELLIA-192-CCM", "camellia-192-ccm", NID_camellia_192_ccm, 8, &so[6298]},
+    {"CAMELLIA-192-CTR", "camellia-192-ctr", NID_camellia_192_ctr, 8, &so[6306]},
+    {"CAMELLIA-192-CMAC", "camellia-192-cmac", NID_camellia_192_cmac, 8, &so[6314]},
+    {"CAMELLIA-256-GCM", "camellia-256-gcm", NID_camellia_256_gcm, 8, &so[6322]},
+    {"CAMELLIA-256-CCM", "camellia-256-ccm", NID_camellia_256_ccm, 8, &so[6330]},
+    {"CAMELLIA-256-CTR", "camellia-256-ctr", NID_camellia_256_ctr, 8, &so[6338]},
+    {"CAMELLIA-256-CMAC", "camellia-256-cmac", NID_camellia_256_cmac, 8, &so[6346]},
+    {"id-scrypt", "id-scrypt", NID_id_scrypt, 9, &so[6354]},
+    {"id-tc26", "id-tc26", NID_id_tc26, 5, &so[6363]},
+    {"gost89-cnt-12", "gost89-cnt-12", NID_gost89_cnt_12},
+    {"gost-mac-12", "gost-mac-12", NID_gost_mac_12},
+    {"id-tc26-algorithms", "id-tc26-algorithms", NID_id_tc26_algorithms, 6, &so[6368]},
+    {"id-tc26-sign", "id-tc26-sign", NID_id_tc26_sign, 7, &so[6374]},
+    {"gost2012_256", "GOST R 34.10-2012 with 256 bit modulus", NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, 8, &so[6381]},
+    {"gost2012_512", "GOST R 34.10-2012 with 512 bit modulus", NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, 8, &so[6389]},
+    {"id-tc26-digest", "id-tc26-digest", NID_id_tc26_digest, 7, &so[6397]},
+    {"md_gost12_256", "GOST R 34.11-2012 with 256 bit hash", NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 8, &so[6404]},
+    {"md_gost12_512", "GOST R 34.11-2012 with 512 bit hash", NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 8, &so[6412]},
+    {"id-tc26-signwithdigest", "id-tc26-signwithdigest", NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest, 7, &so[6420]},
+    {"id-tc26-signwithdigest-gost3410-2012-256", "GOST R 34.10-2012 with GOST R 34.11-2012 (256 bit)", NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256, 8, &so[6427]},
+    {"id-tc26-signwithdigest-gost3410-2012-512", "GOST R 34.10-2012 with GOST R 34.11-2012 (512 bit)", NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512, 8, &so[6435]},
+    {"id-tc26-mac", "id-tc26-mac", NID_id_tc26_mac, 7, &so[6443]},
+    {"id-tc26-hmac-gost-3411-2012-256", "HMAC GOST 34.11-2012 256 bit", NID_id_tc26_hmac_gost_3411_2012_256, 8, &so[6450]},
+    {"id-tc26-hmac-gost-3411-2012-512", "HMAC GOST 34.11-2012 512 bit", NID_id_tc26_hmac_gost_3411_2012_512, 8, &so[6458]},
+    {"id-tc26-cipher", "id-tc26-cipher", NID_id_tc26_cipher, 7, &so[6466]},
+    {"id-tc26-agreement", "id-tc26-agreement", NID_id_tc26_agreement, 7, &so[6473]},
+    {"id-tc26-agreement-gost-3410-2012-256", "id-tc26-agreement-gost-3410-2012-256", NID_id_tc26_agreement_gost_3410_2012_256, 8, &so[6480]},
+    {"id-tc26-agreement-gost-3410-2012-512", "id-tc26-agreement-gost-3410-2012-512", NID_id_tc26_agreement_gost_3410_2012_512, 8, &so[6488]},
+    {"id-tc26-constants", "id-tc26-constants", NID_id_tc26_constants, 6, &so[6496]},
+    {"id-tc26-sign-constants", "id-tc26-sign-constants", NID_id_tc26_sign_constants, 7, &so[6502]},
+    {"id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-constants", "id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-constants", NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_constants, 8, &so[6509]},
+    {"id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-paramSetTest", "GOST R 34.10-2012 (512 bit) testing parameter set", NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetTest, 9, &so[6517]},
+    {"id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-paramSetA", "GOST R 34.10-2012 (512 bit) ParamSet A", NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetA, 9, &so[6526]},
+    {"id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-paramSetB", "GOST R 34.10-2012 (512 bit) ParamSet B", NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetB, 9, &so[6535]},
+    {"id-tc26-digest-constants", "id-tc26-digest-constants", NID_id_tc26_digest_constants, 7, &so[6544]},
+    {"id-tc26-cipher-constants", "id-tc26-cipher-constants", NID_id_tc26_cipher_constants, 7, &so[6551]},
+    {"id-tc26-gost-28147-constants", "id-tc26-gost-28147-constants", NID_id_tc26_gost_28147_constants, 8, &so[6558]},
+    {"id-tc26-gost-28147-param-Z", "GOST 28147-89 TC26 parameter set", NID_id_tc26_gost_28147_param_Z, 9, &so[6566]},
+    {"INN", "INN", NID_INN, 8, &so[6575]},
+    {"OGRN", "OGRN", NID_OGRN, 5, &so[6583]},
+    {"SNILS", "SNILS", NID_SNILS, 5, &so[6588]},
+    {"subjectSignTool", "Signing Tool of Subject", NID_subjectSignTool, 5, &so[6593]},
+    {"issuerSignTool", "Signing Tool of Issuer", NID_issuerSignTool, 5, &so[6598]},
+    {"gost89-cbc", "gost89-cbc", NID_gost89_cbc},
+    {"gost89-ecb", "gost89-ecb", NID_gost89_ecb},
+    {"gost89-ctr", "gost89-ctr", NID_gost89_ctr},
+    {"grasshopper-ecb", "grasshopper-ecb", NID_grasshopper_ecb},
+    {"grasshopper-ctr", "grasshopper-ctr", NID_grasshopper_ctr},
+    {"grasshopper-ofb", "grasshopper-ofb", NID_grasshopper_ofb},
+    {"grasshopper-cbc", "grasshopper-cbc", NID_grasshopper_cbc},
+    {"grasshopper-cfb", "grasshopper-cfb", NID_grasshopper_cfb},
+    {"grasshopper-mac", "grasshopper-mac", NID_grasshopper_mac},
+    {"ChaCha20-Poly1305", "chacha20-poly1305", NID_chacha20_poly1305},
+    {"ChaCha20", "chacha20", NID_chacha20},
+    {"tlsfeature", "TLS Feature", NID_tlsfeature, 8, &so[6603]},
+    {"TLS1-PRF", "tls1-prf", NID_tls1_prf},
+    {"ipsecIKE", "ipsec Internet Key Exchange", NID_ipsec_IKE, 8, &so[6611]},
+    {"capwapAC", "Ctrl/provision WAP Access", NID_capwapAC, 8, &so[6619]},
+    {"capwapWTP", "Ctrl/Provision WAP Termination", NID_capwapWTP, 8, &so[6627]},
+    {"secureShellClient", "SSH Client", NID_sshClient, 8, &so[6635]},
+    {"secureShellServer", "SSH Server", NID_sshServer, 8, &so[6643]},
+    {"sendRouter", "Send Router", NID_sendRouter, 8, &so[6651]},
+    {"sendProxiedRouter", "Send Proxied Router", NID_sendProxiedRouter, 8, &so[6659]},
+    {"sendOwner", "Send Owner", NID_sendOwner, 8, &so[6667]},
+    {"sendProxiedOwner", "Send Proxied Owner", NID_sendProxiedOwner, 8, &so[6675]},
+    {"id-pkinit", "id-pkinit", NID_id_pkinit, 6, &so[6683]},
+    {"pkInitClientAuth", "PKINIT Client Auth", NID_pkInitClientAuth, 7, &so[6689]},
+    {"pkInitKDC", "Signing KDC Response", NID_pkInitKDC, 7, &so[6696]},
+    {"X25519", "X25519", NID_X25519, 3, &so[6703]},
+    {"X448", "X448", NID_X448, 3, &so[6706]},
+    {"HKDF", "hkdf", NID_hkdf},
+    {"KxRSA", "kx-rsa", NID_kx_rsa},
+    {"KxECDHE", "kx-ecdhe", NID_kx_ecdhe},
+    {"KxDHE", "kx-dhe", NID_kx_dhe},
+    {"KxECDHE-PSK", "kx-ecdhe-psk", NID_kx_ecdhe_psk},
+    {"KxDHE-PSK", "kx-dhe-psk", NID_kx_dhe_psk},
+    {"KxRSA_PSK", "kx-rsa-psk", NID_kx_rsa_psk},
+    {"KxPSK", "kx-psk", NID_kx_psk},
+    {"KxSRP", "kx-srp", NID_kx_srp},
+    {"KxGOST", "kx-gost", NID_kx_gost},
+    {"AuthRSA", "auth-rsa", NID_auth_rsa},
+    {"AuthECDSA", "auth-ecdsa", NID_auth_ecdsa},
+    {"AuthPSK", "auth-psk", NID_auth_psk},
+    {"AuthDSS", "auth-dss", NID_auth_dss},
+    {"AuthGOST01", "auth-gost01", NID_auth_gost01},
+    {"AuthGOST12", "auth-gost12", NID_auth_gost12},
+    {"AuthSRP", "auth-srp", NID_auth_srp},
+    {"AuthNULL", "auth-null", NID_auth_null},
+    { NULL, NULL, NID_undef },
+    { NULL, NULL, NID_undef },
+    {"BLAKE2b512", "blake2b512", NID_blake2b512, 11, &so[6709]},
+    {"BLAKE2s256", "blake2s256", NID_blake2s256, 11, &so[6720]},
+    {"id-smime-ct-contentCollection", "id-smime-ct-contentCollection", NID_id_smime_ct_contentCollection, 11, &so[6731]},
+    {"id-smime-ct-authEnvelopedData", "id-smime-ct-authEnvelopedData", NID_id_smime_ct_authEnvelopedData, 11, &so[6742]},
+    {"id-ct-xml", "id-ct-xml", NID_id_ct_xml, 11, &so[6753]},
+};
+
+#define NUM_SN 1052
+static const unsigned int sn_objs[NUM_SN] = {
+     364,    /* "AD_DVCS" */
+     419,    /* "AES-128-CBC" */
+     916,    /* "AES-128-CBC-HMAC-SHA1" */
+     948,    /* "AES-128-CBC-HMAC-SHA256" */
+     421,    /* "AES-128-CFB" */
+     650,    /* "AES-128-CFB1" */
+     653,    /* "AES-128-CFB8" */
+     904,    /* "AES-128-CTR" */
+     418,    /* "AES-128-ECB" */
+     958,    /* "AES-128-OCB" */
+     420,    /* "AES-128-OFB" */
+     913,    /* "AES-128-XTS" */
+     423,    /* "AES-192-CBC" */
+     917,    /* "AES-192-CBC-HMAC-SHA1" */
+     949,    /* "AES-192-CBC-HMAC-SHA256" */
+     425,    /* "AES-192-CFB" */
+     651,    /* "AES-192-CFB1" */
+     654,    /* "AES-192-CFB8" */
+     905,    /* "AES-192-CTR" */
+     422,    /* "AES-192-ECB" */
+     959,    /* "AES-192-OCB" */
+     424,    /* "AES-192-OFB" */
+     427,    /* "AES-256-CBC" */
+     918,    /* "AES-256-CBC-HMAC-SHA1" */
+     950,    /* "AES-256-CBC-HMAC-SHA256" */
+     429,    /* "AES-256-CFB" */
+     652,    /* "AES-256-CFB1" */
+     655,    /* "AES-256-CFB8" */
+     906,    /* "AES-256-CTR" */
+     426,    /* "AES-256-ECB" */
+     960,    /* "AES-256-OCB" */
+     428,    /* "AES-256-OFB" */
+     914,    /* "AES-256-XTS" */
+    1049,    /* "AuthDSS" */
+    1047,    /* "AuthECDSA" */
+    1050,    /* "AuthGOST01" */
+    1051,    /* "AuthGOST12" */
+    1053,    /* "AuthNULL" */
+    1048,    /* "AuthPSK" */
+    1046,    /* "AuthRSA" */
+    1052,    /* "AuthSRP" */
+      91,    /* "BF-CBC" */
+      93,    /* "BF-CFB" */
+      92,    /* "BF-ECB" */
+      94,    /* "BF-OFB" */
+    1056,    /* "BLAKE2b512" */
+    1057,    /* "BLAKE2s256" */
+      14,    /* "C" */
+     751,    /* "CAMELLIA-128-CBC" */
+     962,    /* "CAMELLIA-128-CCM" */
+     757,    /* "CAMELLIA-128-CFB" */
+     760,    /* "CAMELLIA-128-CFB1" */
+     763,    /* "CAMELLIA-128-CFB8" */
+     964,    /* "CAMELLIA-128-CMAC" */
+     963,    /* "CAMELLIA-128-CTR" */
+     754,    /* "CAMELLIA-128-ECB" */
+     961,    /* "CAMELLIA-128-GCM" */
+     766,    /* "CAMELLIA-128-OFB" */
+     752,    /* "CAMELLIA-192-CBC" */
+     966,    /* "CAMELLIA-192-CCM" */
+     758,    /* "CAMELLIA-192-CFB" */
+     761,    /* "CAMELLIA-192-CFB1" */
+     764,    /* "CAMELLIA-192-CFB8" */
+     968,    /* "CAMELLIA-192-CMAC" */
+     967,    /* "CAMELLIA-192-CTR" */
+     755,    /* "CAMELLIA-192-ECB" */
+     965,    /* "CAMELLIA-192-GCM" */
+     767,    /* "CAMELLIA-192-OFB" */
+     753,    /* "CAMELLIA-256-CBC" */
+     970,    /* "CAMELLIA-256-CCM" */
+     759,    /* "CAMELLIA-256-CFB" */
+     762,    /* "CAMELLIA-256-CFB1" */
+     765,    /* "CAMELLIA-256-CFB8" */
+     972,    /* "CAMELLIA-256-CMAC" */
+     971,    /* "CAMELLIA-256-CTR" */
+     756,    /* "CAMELLIA-256-ECB" */
+     969,    /* "CAMELLIA-256-GCM" */
+     768,    /* "CAMELLIA-256-OFB" */
+     108,    /* "CAST5-CBC" */
+     110,    /* "CAST5-CFB" */
+     109,    /* "CAST5-ECB" */
+     111,    /* "CAST5-OFB" */
+     894,    /* "CMAC" */
+      13,    /* "CN" */
+     141,    /* "CRLReason" */
+     417,    /* "CSPName" */
+    1019,    /* "ChaCha20" */
+    1018,    /* "ChaCha20-Poly1305" */
+     367,    /* "CrlID" */
+     391,    /* "DC" */
+      31,    /* "DES-CBC" */
+     643,    /* "DES-CDMF" */
+      30,    /* "DES-CFB" */
+     656,    /* "DES-CFB1" */
+     657,    /* "DES-CFB8" */
+      29,    /* "DES-ECB" */
+      32,    /* "DES-EDE" */
+      43,    /* "DES-EDE-CBC" */
+      60,    /* "DES-EDE-CFB" */
+      62,    /* "DES-EDE-OFB" */
+      33,    /* "DES-EDE3" */
+      44,    /* "DES-EDE3-CBC" */
+      61,    /* "DES-EDE3-CFB" */
+     658,    /* "DES-EDE3-CFB1" */
+     659,    /* "DES-EDE3-CFB8" */
+      63,    /* "DES-EDE3-OFB" */
+      45,    /* "DES-OFB" */
+      80,    /* "DESX-CBC" */
+     380,    /* "DOD" */
+     116,    /* "DSA" */
+      66,    /* "DSA-SHA" */
+     113,    /* "DSA-SHA1" */
+      70,    /* "DSA-SHA1-old" */
+      67,    /* "DSA-old" */
+     297,    /* "DVCS" */
+      99,    /* "GN" */
+    1036,    /* "HKDF" */
+     855,    /* "HMAC" */
+     780,    /* "HMAC-MD5" */
+     781,    /* "HMAC-SHA1" */
+     381,    /* "IANA" */
+      34,    /* "IDEA-CBC" */
+      35,    /* "IDEA-CFB" */
+      36,    /* "IDEA-ECB" */
+      46,    /* "IDEA-OFB" */
+    1004,    /* "INN" */
+     181,    /* "ISO" */
+     183,    /* "ISO-US" */
+     645,    /* "ITU-T" */
+     646,    /* "JOINT-ISO-ITU-T" */
+     773,    /* "KISA" */
+    1039,    /* "KxDHE" */
+    1041,    /* "KxDHE-PSK" */
+    1038,    /* "KxECDHE" */
+    1040,    /* "KxECDHE-PSK" */
+    1045,    /* "KxGOST" */
+    1043,    /* "KxPSK" */
+    1037,    /* "KxRSA" */
+    1042,    /* "KxRSA_PSK" */
+    1044,    /* "KxSRP" */
+      15,    /* "L" */
+     856,    /* "LocalKeySet" */
+       3,    /* "MD2" */
+     257,    /* "MD4" */
+       4,    /* "MD5" */
+     114,    /* "MD5-SHA1" */
+      95,    /* "MDC2" */
+     911,    /* "MGF1" */
+     388,    /* "Mail" */
+     393,    /* "NULL" */
+     404,    /* "NULL" */
+      57,    /* "Netscape" */
+     366,    /* "Nonce" */
+      17,    /* "O" */
+     178,    /* "OCSP" */
+     180,    /* "OCSPSigning" */
+    1005,    /* "OGRN" */
+     379,    /* "ORG" */
+      18,    /* "OU" */
+     749,    /* "Oakley-EC2N-3" */
+     750,    /* "Oakley-EC2N-4" */
+       9,    /* "PBE-MD2-DES" */
+     168,    /* "PBE-MD2-RC2-64" */
+      10,    /* "PBE-MD5-DES" */
+     169,    /* "PBE-MD5-RC2-64" */
+     147,    /* "PBE-SHA1-2DES" */
+     146,    /* "PBE-SHA1-3DES" */
+     170,    /* "PBE-SHA1-DES" */
+     148,    /* "PBE-SHA1-RC2-128" */
+     149,    /* "PBE-SHA1-RC2-40" */
+      68,    /* "PBE-SHA1-RC2-64" */
+     144,    /* "PBE-SHA1-RC4-128" */
+     145,    /* "PBE-SHA1-RC4-40" */
+     161,    /* "PBES2" */
+      69,    /* "PBKDF2" */
+     162,    /* "PBMAC1" */
+     127,    /* "PKIX" */
+     935,    /* "PSPECIFIED" */
+      98,    /* "RC2-40-CBC" */
+     166,    /* "RC2-64-CBC" */
+      37,    /* "RC2-CBC" */
+      39,    /* "RC2-CFB" */
+      38,    /* "RC2-ECB" */
+      40,    /* "RC2-OFB" */
+       5,    /* "RC4" */
+      97,    /* "RC4-40" */
+     915,    /* "RC4-HMAC-MD5" */
+     120,    /* "RC5-CBC" */
+     122,    /* "RC5-CFB" */
+     121,    /* "RC5-ECB" */
+     123,    /* "RC5-OFB" */
+     117,    /* "RIPEMD160" */
+      19,    /* "RSA" */
+       7,    /* "RSA-MD2" */
+     396,    /* "RSA-MD4" */
+       8,    /* "RSA-MD5" */
+      96,    /* "RSA-MDC2" */
+     104,    /* "RSA-NP-MD5" */
+     119,    /* "RSA-RIPEMD160" */
+      42,    /* "RSA-SHA" */
+      65,    /* "RSA-SHA1" */
+     115,    /* "RSA-SHA1-2" */
+     671,    /* "RSA-SHA224" */
+     668,    /* "RSA-SHA256" */
+     669,    /* "RSA-SHA384" */
+     670,    /* "RSA-SHA512" */
+     919,    /* "RSAES-OAEP" */
+     912,    /* "RSASSA-PSS" */
+     777,    /* "SEED-CBC" */
+     779,    /* "SEED-CFB" */
+     776,    /* "SEED-ECB" */
+     778,    /* "SEED-OFB" */
+      41,    /* "SHA" */
+      64,    /* "SHA1" */
+     675,    /* "SHA224" */
+     672,    /* "SHA256" */
+     673,    /* "SHA384" */
+     674,    /* "SHA512" */
+     188,    /* "SMIME" */
+     167,    /* "SMIME-CAPS" */
+     100,    /* "SN" */
+    1006,    /* "SNILS" */
+      16,    /* "ST" */
+     143,    /* "SXNetID" */
+    1021,    /* "TLS1-PRF" */
+     458,    /* "UID" */
+       0,    /* "UNDEF" */
+    1034,    /* "X25519" */
+    1035,    /* "X448" */
+      11,    /* "X500" */
+     378,    /* "X500algorithms" */
+      12,    /* "X509" */
+     184,    /* "X9-57" */
+     185,    /* "X9cm" */
+     125,    /* "ZLIB" */
+     478,    /* "aRecord" */
+     289,    /* "aaControls" */
+     287,    /* "ac-auditEntity" */
+     397,    /* "ac-proxying" */
+     288,    /* "ac-targeting" */
+     368,    /* "acceptableResponses" */
+     446,    /* "account" */
+     363,    /* "ad_timestamping" */
+     376,    /* "algorithm" */
+     405,    /* "ansi-X9-62" */
+     910,    /* "anyExtendedKeyUsage" */
+     746,    /* "anyPolicy" */
+     370,    /* "archiveCutoff" */
+     484,    /* "associatedDomain" */
+     485,    /* "associatedName" */
+     501,    /* "audio" */
+     177,    /* "authorityInfoAccess" */
+      90,    /* "authorityKeyIdentifier" */
+     882,    /* "authorityRevocationList" */
+      87,    /* "basicConstraints" */
+     365,    /* "basicOCSPResponse" */
+     285,    /* "biometricInfo" */
+     921,    /* "brainpoolP160r1" */
+     922,    /* "brainpoolP160t1" */
+     923,    /* "brainpoolP192r1" */
+     924,    /* "brainpoolP192t1" */
+     925,    /* "brainpoolP224r1" */
+     926,    /* "brainpoolP224t1" */
+     927,    /* "brainpoolP256r1" */
+     928,    /* "brainpoolP256t1" */
+     929,    /* "brainpoolP320r1" */
+     930,    /* "brainpoolP320t1" */
+     931,    /* "brainpoolP384r1" */
+     932,    /* "brainpoolP384t1" */
+     933,    /* "brainpoolP512r1" */
+     934,    /* "brainpoolP512t1" */
+     494,    /* "buildingName" */
+     860,    /* "businessCategory" */
+     691,    /* "c2onb191v4" */
+     692,    /* "c2onb191v5" */
+     697,    /* "c2onb239v4" */
+     698,    /* "c2onb239v5" */
+     684,    /* "c2pnb163v1" */
+     685,    /* "c2pnb163v2" */
+     686,    /* "c2pnb163v3" */
+     687,    /* "c2pnb176v1" */
+     693,    /* "c2pnb208w1" */
+     699,    /* "c2pnb272w1" */
+     700,    /* "c2pnb304w1" */
+     702,    /* "c2pnb368w1" */
+     688,    /* "c2tnb191v1" */
+     689,    /* "c2tnb191v2" */
+     690,    /* "c2tnb191v3" */
+     694,    /* "c2tnb239v1" */
+     695,    /* "c2tnb239v2" */
+     696,    /* "c2tnb239v3" */
+     701,    /* "c2tnb359v1" */
+     703,    /* "c2tnb431r1" */
+     881,    /* "cACertificate" */
+     483,    /* "cNAMERecord" */
+     179,    /* "caIssuers" */
+     785,    /* "caRepository" */
+    1023,    /* "capwapAC" */
+    1024,    /* "capwapWTP" */
+     443,    /* "caseIgnoreIA5StringSyntax" */
+     152,    /* "certBag" */
+     677,    /* "certicom-arc" */
+     771,    /* "certificateIssuer" */
+      89,    /* "certificatePolicies" */
+     883,    /* "certificateRevocationList" */
+      54,    /* "challengePassword" */
+     407,    /* "characteristic-two-field" */
+     395,    /* "clearance" */
+     130,    /* "clientAuth" */
+     131,    /* "codeSigning" */
+      50,    /* "contentType" */
+      53,    /* "countersignature" */
+     153,    /* "crlBag" */
+     103,    /* "crlDistributionPoints" */
+      88,    /* "crlNumber" */
+     884,    /* "crossCertificatePair" */
+     806,    /* "cryptocom" */
+     805,    /* "cryptopro" */
+     954,    /* "ct_cert_scts" */
+     952,    /* "ct_precert_poison" */
+     951,    /* "ct_precert_scts" */
+     953,    /* "ct_precert_signer" */
+     500,    /* "dITRedirect" */
+     451,    /* "dNSDomain" */
+     495,    /* "dSAQuality" */
+     434,    /* "data" */
+     390,    /* "dcobject" */
+     140,    /* "deltaCRL" */
+     891,    /* "deltaRevocationList" */
+     107,    /* "description" */
+     871,    /* "destinationIndicator" */
+     947,    /* "dh-cofactor-kdf" */
+     946,    /* "dh-std-kdf" */
+      28,    /* "dhKeyAgreement" */
+     941,    /* "dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme" */
+     942,    /* "dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme" */
+     943,    /* "dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme" */
+     944,    /* "dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme" */
+     945,    /* "dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme" */
+     936,    /* "dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme" */
+     937,    /* "dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme" */
+     938,    /* "dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme" */
+     939,    /* "dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme" */
+     940,    /* "dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme" */
+     920,    /* "dhpublicnumber" */
+     382,    /* "directory" */
+     887,    /* "distinguishedName" */
+     892,    /* "dmdName" */
+     174,    /* "dnQualifier" */
+     447,    /* "document" */
+     471,    /* "documentAuthor" */
+     468,    /* "documentIdentifier" */
+     472,    /* "documentLocation" */
+     502,    /* "documentPublisher" */
+     449,    /* "documentSeries" */
+     469,    /* "documentTitle" */
+     470,    /* "documentVersion" */
+     392,    /* "domain" */
+     452,    /* "domainRelatedObject" */
+     802,    /* "dsa_with_SHA224" */
+     803,    /* "dsa_with_SHA256" */
+     791,    /* "ecdsa-with-Recommended" */
+     416,    /* "ecdsa-with-SHA1" */
+     793,    /* "ecdsa-with-SHA224" */
+     794,    /* "ecdsa-with-SHA256" */
+     795,    /* "ecdsa-with-SHA384" */
+     796,    /* "ecdsa-with-SHA512" */
+     792,    /* "ecdsa-with-Specified" */
+      48,    /* "emailAddress" */
+     132,    /* "emailProtection" */
+     885,    /* "enhancedSearchGuide" */
+     389,    /* "enterprises" */
+     384,    /* "experimental" */
+     172,    /* "extReq" */
+      56,    /* "extendedCertificateAttributes" */
+     126,    /* "extendedKeyUsage" */
+     372,    /* "extendedStatus" */
+     867,    /* "facsimileTelephoneNumber" */
+     462,    /* "favouriteDrink" */
+     857,    /* "freshestCRL" */
+     453,    /* "friendlyCountry" */
+     490,    /* "friendlyCountryName" */
+     156,    /* "friendlyName" */
+     509,    /* "generationQualifier" */
+     815,    /* "gost-mac" */
+     976,    /* "gost-mac-12" */
+     811,    /* "gost2001" */
+     851,    /* "gost2001cc" */
+     979,    /* "gost2012_256" */
+     980,    /* "gost2012_512" */
+     813,    /* "gost89" */
+    1009,    /* "gost89-cbc" */
+     814,    /* "gost89-cnt" */
+     975,    /* "gost89-cnt-12" */
+    1011,    /* "gost89-ctr" */
+    1010,    /* "gost89-ecb" */
+     812,    /* "gost94" */
+     850,    /* "gost94cc" */
+    1015,    /* "grasshopper-cbc" */
+    1016,    /* "grasshopper-cfb" */
+    1013,    /* "grasshopper-ctr" */
+    1012,    /* "grasshopper-ecb" */
+    1017,    /* "grasshopper-mac" */
+    1014,    /* "grasshopper-ofb" */
+     797,    /* "hmacWithMD5" */
+     163,    /* "hmacWithSHA1" */
+     798,    /* "hmacWithSHA224" */
+     799,    /* "hmacWithSHA256" */
+     800,    /* "hmacWithSHA384" */
+     801,    /* "hmacWithSHA512" */
+     432,    /* "holdInstructionCallIssuer" */
+     430,    /* "holdInstructionCode" */
+     431,    /* "holdInstructionNone" */
+     433,    /* "holdInstructionReject" */
+     486,    /* "homePostalAddress" */
+     473,    /* "homeTelephoneNumber" */
+     466,    /* "host" */
+     889,    /* "houseIdentifier" */
+     442,    /* "iA5StringSyntax" */
+     783,    /* "id-DHBasedMac" */
+     824,    /* "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet" */
+     825,    /* "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-B-ParamSet" */
+     826,    /* "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-C-ParamSet" */
+     827,    /* "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-D-ParamSet" */
+     819,    /* "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-KeyMeshing" */
+     829,    /* "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-Oscar-1-0-ParamSet" */
+     828,    /* "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-Oscar-1-1-ParamSet" */
+     830,    /* "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-RIC-1-ParamSet" */
+     820,    /* "id-Gost28147-89-None-KeyMeshing" */
+     823,    /* "id-Gost28147-89-TestParamSet" */
+     849,    /* "id-Gost28147-89-cc" */
+     840,    /* "id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet" */
+     841,    /* "id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-B-ParamSet" */
+     842,    /* "id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-C-ParamSet" */
+     843,    /* "id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-XchA-ParamSet" */
+     844,    /* "id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-XchB-ParamSet" */
+     854,    /* "id-GostR3410-2001-ParamSet-cc" */
+     839,    /* "id-GostR3410-2001-TestParamSet" */
+     817,    /* "id-GostR3410-2001DH" */
+     832,    /* "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet" */
+     833,    /* "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-B-ParamSet" */
+     834,    /* "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-C-ParamSet" */
+     835,    /* "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-D-ParamSet" */
+     836,    /* "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-XchA-ParamSet" */
+     837,    /* "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-XchB-ParamSet" */
+     838,    /* "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-XchC-ParamSet" */
+     831,    /* "id-GostR3410-94-TestParamSet" */
+     845,    /* "id-GostR3410-94-a" */
+     846,    /* "id-GostR3410-94-aBis" */
+     847,    /* "id-GostR3410-94-b" */
+     848,    /* "id-GostR3410-94-bBis" */
+     818,    /* "id-GostR3410-94DH" */
+     822,    /* "id-GostR3411-94-CryptoProParamSet" */
+     821,    /* "id-GostR3411-94-TestParamSet" */
+     807,    /* "id-GostR3411-94-with-GostR3410-2001" */
+     853,    /* "id-GostR3411-94-with-GostR3410-2001-cc" */
+     808,    /* "id-GostR3411-94-with-GostR3410-94" */
+     852,    /* "id-GostR3411-94-with-GostR3410-94-cc" */
+     810,    /* "id-HMACGostR3411-94" */
+     782,    /* "id-PasswordBasedMAC" */
+     266,    /* "id-aca" */
+     355,    /* "id-aca-accessIdentity" */
+     354,    /* "id-aca-authenticationInfo" */
+     356,    /* "id-aca-chargingIdentity" */
+     399,    /* "id-aca-encAttrs" */
+     357,    /* "id-aca-group" */
+     358,    /* "id-aca-role" */
+     176,    /* "id-ad" */
+     896,    /* "id-aes128-CCM" */
+     895,    /* "id-aes128-GCM" */
+     788,    /* "id-aes128-wrap" */
+     897,    /* "id-aes128-wrap-pad" */
+     899,    /* "id-aes192-CCM" */
+     898,    /* "id-aes192-GCM" */
+     789,    /* "id-aes192-wrap" */
+     900,    /* "id-aes192-wrap-pad" */
+     902,    /* "id-aes256-CCM" */
+     901,    /* "id-aes256-GCM" */
+     790,    /* "id-aes256-wrap" */
+     903,    /* "id-aes256-wrap-pad" */
+     262,    /* "id-alg" */
+     893,    /* "id-alg-PWRI-KEK" */
+     323,    /* "id-alg-des40" */
+     326,    /* "id-alg-dh-pop" */
+     325,    /* "id-alg-dh-sig-hmac-sha1" */
+     324,    /* "id-alg-noSignature" */
+     907,    /* "id-camellia128-wrap" */
+     908,    /* "id-camellia192-wrap" */
+     909,    /* "id-camellia256-wrap" */
+     268,    /* "id-cct" */
+     361,    /* "id-cct-PKIData" */
+     362,    /* "id-cct-PKIResponse" */
+     360,    /* "id-cct-crs" */
+      81,    /* "id-ce" */
+     680,    /* "id-characteristic-two-basis" */
+     263,    /* "id-cmc" */
+     334,    /* "id-cmc-addExtensions" */
+     346,    /* "id-cmc-confirmCertAcceptance" */
+     330,    /* "id-cmc-dataReturn" */
+     336,    /* "id-cmc-decryptedPOP" */
+     335,    /* "id-cmc-encryptedPOP" */
+     339,    /* "id-cmc-getCRL" */
+     338,    /* "id-cmc-getCert" */
+     328,    /* "id-cmc-identification" */
+     329,    /* "id-cmc-identityProof" */
+     337,    /* "id-cmc-lraPOPWitness" */
+     344,    /* "id-cmc-popLinkRandom" */
+     345,    /* "id-cmc-popLinkWitness" */
+     343,    /* "id-cmc-queryPending" */
+     333,    /* "id-cmc-recipientNonce" */
+     341,    /* "id-cmc-regInfo" */
+     342,    /* "id-cmc-responseInfo" */
+     340,    /* "id-cmc-revokeRequest" */
+     332,    /* "id-cmc-senderNonce" */
+     327,    /* "id-cmc-statusInfo" */
+     331,    /* "id-cmc-transactionId" */
+     787,    /* "id-ct-asciiTextWithCRLF" */
+    1060,    /* "id-ct-xml" */
+     408,    /* "id-ecPublicKey" */
+     508,    /* "id-hex-multipart-message" */
+     507,    /* "id-hex-partial-message" */
+     260,    /* "id-it" */
+     302,    /* "id-it-caKeyUpdateInfo" */
+     298,    /* "id-it-caProtEncCert" */
+     311,    /* "id-it-confirmWaitTime" */
+     303,    /* "id-it-currentCRL" */
+     300,    /* "id-it-encKeyPairTypes" */
+     310,    /* "id-it-implicitConfirm" */
+     308,    /* "id-it-keyPairParamRep" */
+     307,    /* "id-it-keyPairParamReq" */
+     312,    /* "id-it-origPKIMessage" */
+     301,    /* "id-it-preferredSymmAlg" */
+     309,    /* "id-it-revPassphrase" */
+     299,    /* "id-it-signKeyPairTypes" */
+     305,    /* "id-it-subscriptionRequest" */
+     306,    /* "id-it-subscriptionResponse" */
+     784,    /* "id-it-suppLangTags" */
+     304,    /* "id-it-unsupportedOIDs" */
+     128,    /* "id-kp" */
+     280,    /* "id-mod-attribute-cert" */
+     274,    /* "id-mod-cmc" */
+     277,    /* "id-mod-cmp" */
+     284,    /* "id-mod-cmp2000" */
+     273,    /* "id-mod-crmf" */
+     283,    /* "id-mod-dvcs" */
+     275,    /* "id-mod-kea-profile-88" */
+     276,    /* "id-mod-kea-profile-93" */
+     282,    /* "id-mod-ocsp" */
+     278,    /* "id-mod-qualified-cert-88" */
+     279,    /* "id-mod-qualified-cert-93" */
+     281,    /* "id-mod-timestamp-protocol" */
+     264,    /* "id-on" */
+     858,    /* "id-on-permanentIdentifier" */
+     347,    /* "id-on-personalData" */
+     265,    /* "id-pda" */
+     352,    /* "id-pda-countryOfCitizenship" */
+     353,    /* "id-pda-countryOfResidence" */
+     348,    /* "id-pda-dateOfBirth" */
+     351,    /* "id-pda-gender" */
+     349,    /* "id-pda-placeOfBirth" */
+     175,    /* "id-pe" */
+    1031,    /* "id-pkinit" */
+     261,    /* "id-pkip" */
+     258,    /* "id-pkix-mod" */
+     269,    /* "id-pkix1-explicit-88" */
+     271,    /* "id-pkix1-explicit-93" */
+     270,    /* "id-pkix1-implicit-88" */
+     272,    /* "id-pkix1-implicit-93" */
+     662,    /* "id-ppl" */
+     664,    /* "id-ppl-anyLanguage" */
+     667,    /* "id-ppl-independent" */
+     665,    /* "id-ppl-inheritAll" */
+     267,    /* "id-qcs" */
+     359,    /* "id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v1" */
+     259,    /* "id-qt" */
+     164,    /* "id-qt-cps" */
+     165,    /* "id-qt-unotice" */
+     313,    /* "id-regCtrl" */
+     316,    /* "id-regCtrl-authenticator" */
+     319,    /* "id-regCtrl-oldCertID" */
+     318,    /* "id-regCtrl-pkiArchiveOptions" */
+     317,    /* "id-regCtrl-pkiPublicationInfo" */
+     320,    /* "id-regCtrl-protocolEncrKey" */
+     315,    /* "id-regCtrl-regToken" */
+     314,    /* "id-regInfo" */
+     322,    /* "id-regInfo-certReq" */
+     321,    /* "id-regInfo-utf8Pairs" */
+     973,    /* "id-scrypt" */
+     512,    /* "id-set" */
+     191,    /* "id-smime-aa" */
+     215,    /* "id-smime-aa-contentHint" */
+     218,    /* "id-smime-aa-contentIdentifier" */
+     221,    /* "id-smime-aa-contentReference" */
+     240,    /* "id-smime-aa-dvcs-dvc" */
+     217,    /* "id-smime-aa-encapContentType" */
+     222,    /* "id-smime-aa-encrypKeyPref" */
+     220,    /* "id-smime-aa-equivalentLabels" */
+     232,    /* "id-smime-aa-ets-CertificateRefs" */
+     233,    /* "id-smime-aa-ets-RevocationRefs" */
+     238,    /* "id-smime-aa-ets-archiveTimeStamp" */
+     237,    /* "id-smime-aa-ets-certCRLTimestamp" */
+     234,    /* "id-smime-aa-ets-certValues" */
+     227,    /* "id-smime-aa-ets-commitmentType" */
+     231,    /* "id-smime-aa-ets-contentTimestamp" */
+     236,    /* "id-smime-aa-ets-escTimeStamp" */
+     230,    /* "id-smime-aa-ets-otherSigCert" */
+     235,    /* "id-smime-aa-ets-revocationValues" */
+     226,    /* "id-smime-aa-ets-sigPolicyId" */
+     229,    /* "id-smime-aa-ets-signerAttr" */
+     228,    /* "id-smime-aa-ets-signerLocation" */
+     219,    /* "id-smime-aa-macValue" */
+     214,    /* "id-smime-aa-mlExpandHistory" */
+     216,    /* "id-smime-aa-msgSigDigest" */
+     212,    /* "id-smime-aa-receiptRequest" */
+     213,    /* "id-smime-aa-securityLabel" */
+     239,    /* "id-smime-aa-signatureType" */
+     223,    /* "id-smime-aa-signingCertificate" */
+     224,    /* "id-smime-aa-smimeEncryptCerts" */
+     225,    /* "id-smime-aa-timeStampToken" */
+     192,    /* "id-smime-alg" */
+     243,    /* "id-smime-alg-3DESwrap" */
+     246,    /* "id-smime-alg-CMS3DESwrap" */
+     247,    /* "id-smime-alg-CMSRC2wrap" */
+     245,    /* "id-smime-alg-ESDH" */
+     241,    /* "id-smime-alg-ESDHwith3DES" */
+     242,    /* "id-smime-alg-ESDHwithRC2" */
+     244,    /* "id-smime-alg-RC2wrap" */
+     193,    /* "id-smime-cd" */
+     248,    /* "id-smime-cd-ldap" */
+     190,    /* "id-smime-ct" */
+     210,    /* "id-smime-ct-DVCSRequestData" */
+     211,    /* "id-smime-ct-DVCSResponseData" */
+     208,    /* "id-smime-ct-TDTInfo" */
+     207,    /* "id-smime-ct-TSTInfo" */
+     205,    /* "id-smime-ct-authData" */
+    1059,    /* "id-smime-ct-authEnvelopedData" */
+     786,    /* "id-smime-ct-compressedData" */
+    1058,    /* "id-smime-ct-contentCollection" */
+     209,    /* "id-smime-ct-contentInfo" */
+     206,    /* "id-smime-ct-publishCert" */
+     204,    /* "id-smime-ct-receipt" */
+     195,    /* "id-smime-cti" */
+     255,    /* "id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfApproval" */
+     256,    /* "id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfCreation" */
+     253,    /* "id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfDelivery" */
+     251,    /* "id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfOrigin" */
+     252,    /* "id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfReceipt" */
+     254,    /* "id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfSender" */
+     189,    /* "id-smime-mod" */
+     196,    /* "id-smime-mod-cms" */
+     197,    /* "id-smime-mod-ess" */
+     202,    /* "id-smime-mod-ets-eSigPolicy-88" */
+     203,    /* "id-smime-mod-ets-eSigPolicy-97" */
+     200,    /* "id-smime-mod-ets-eSignature-88" */
+     201,    /* "id-smime-mod-ets-eSignature-97" */
+     199,    /* "id-smime-mod-msg-v3" */
+     198,    /* "id-smime-mod-oid" */
+     194,    /* "id-smime-spq" */
+     250,    /* "id-smime-spq-ets-sqt-unotice" */
+     249,    /* "id-smime-spq-ets-sqt-uri" */
+     974,    /* "id-tc26" */
+     991,    /* "id-tc26-agreement" */
+     992,    /* "id-tc26-agreement-gost-3410-2012-256" */
+     993,    /* "id-tc26-agreement-gost-3410-2012-512" */
+     977,    /* "id-tc26-algorithms" */
+     990,    /* "id-tc26-cipher" */
+    1001,    /* "id-tc26-cipher-constants" */
+     994,    /* "id-tc26-constants" */
+     981,    /* "id-tc26-digest" */
+    1000,    /* "id-tc26-digest-constants" */
+    1002,    /* "id-tc26-gost-28147-constants" */
+    1003,    /* "id-tc26-gost-28147-param-Z" */
+     996,    /* "id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-constants" */
+     998,    /* "id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-paramSetA" */
+     999,    /* "id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-paramSetB" */
+     997,    /* "id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-paramSetTest" */
+     988,    /* "id-tc26-hmac-gost-3411-2012-256" */
+     989,    /* "id-tc26-hmac-gost-3411-2012-512" */
+     987,    /* "id-tc26-mac" */
+     978,    /* "id-tc26-sign" */
+     995,    /* "id-tc26-sign-constants" */
+     984,    /* "id-tc26-signwithdigest" */
+     985,    /* "id-tc26-signwithdigest-gost3410-2012-256" */
+     986,    /* "id-tc26-signwithdigest-gost3410-2012-512" */
+     676,    /* "identified-organization" */
+     461,    /* "info" */
+     748,    /* "inhibitAnyPolicy" */
+     101,    /* "initials" */
+     647,    /* "international-organizations" */
+     869,    /* "internationaliSDNNumber" */
+     142,    /* "invalidityDate" */
+     294,    /* "ipsecEndSystem" */
+    1022,    /* "ipsecIKE" */
+     295,    /* "ipsecTunnel" */
+     296,    /* "ipsecUser" */
+      86,    /* "issuerAltName" */
+    1008,    /* "issuerSignTool" */
+     770,    /* "issuingDistributionPoint" */
+     492,    /* "janetMailbox" */
+     957,    /* "jurisdictionC" */
+     955,    /* "jurisdictionL" */
+     956,    /* "jurisdictionST" */
+     150,    /* "keyBag" */
+      83,    /* "keyUsage" */
+     477,    /* "lastModifiedBy" */
+     476,    /* "lastModifiedTime" */
+     157,    /* "localKeyID" */
+     480,    /* "mXRecord" */
+     460,    /* "mail" */
+     493,    /* "mailPreferenceOption" */
+     467,    /* "manager" */
+     982,    /* "md_gost12_256" */
+     983,    /* "md_gost12_512" */
+     809,    /* "md_gost94" */
+     875,    /* "member" */
+     182,    /* "member-body" */
+      51,    /* "messageDigest" */
+     383,    /* "mgmt" */
+     504,    /* "mime-mhs" */
+     506,    /* "mime-mhs-bodies" */
+     505,    /* "mime-mhs-headings" */
+     488,    /* "mobileTelephoneNumber" */
+     136,    /* "msCTLSign" */
+     135,    /* "msCodeCom" */
+     134,    /* "msCodeInd" */
+     138,    /* "msEFS" */
+     171,    /* "msExtReq" */
+     137,    /* "msSGC" */
+     648,    /* "msSmartcardLogin" */
+     649,    /* "msUPN" */
+     481,    /* "nSRecord" */
+     173,    /* "name" */
+     666,    /* "nameConstraints" */
+     369,    /* "noCheck" */
+     403,    /* "noRevAvail" */
+      72,    /* "nsBaseUrl" */
+      76,    /* "nsCaPolicyUrl" */
+      74,    /* "nsCaRevocationUrl" */
+      58,    /* "nsCertExt" */
+      79,    /* "nsCertSequence" */
+      71,    /* "nsCertType" */
+      78,    /* "nsComment" */
+      59,    /* "nsDataType" */
+      75,    /* "nsRenewalUrl" */
+      73,    /* "nsRevocationUrl" */
+     139,    /* "nsSGC" */
+      77,    /* "nsSslServerName" */
+     681,    /* "onBasis" */
+     491,    /* "organizationalStatus" */
+     475,    /* "otherMailbox" */
+     876,    /* "owner" */
+     489,    /* "pagerTelephoneNumber" */
+     374,    /* "path" */
+     112,    /* "pbeWithMD5AndCast5CBC" */
+     499,    /* "personalSignature" */
+     487,    /* "personalTitle" */
+     464,    /* "photo" */
+     863,    /* "physicalDeliveryOfficeName" */
+     437,    /* "pilot" */
+     439,    /* "pilotAttributeSyntax" */
+     438,    /* "pilotAttributeType" */
+     479,    /* "pilotAttributeType27" */
+     456,    /* "pilotDSA" */
+     441,    /* "pilotGroups" */
+     444,    /* "pilotObject" */
+     440,    /* "pilotObjectClass" */
+     455,    /* "pilotOrganization" */
+     445,    /* "pilotPerson" */
+    1032,    /* "pkInitClientAuth" */
+    1033,    /* "pkInitKDC" */
+       2,    /* "pkcs" */
+     186,    /* "pkcs1" */
+      27,    /* "pkcs3" */
+     187,    /* "pkcs5" */
+      20,    /* "pkcs7" */
+      21,    /* "pkcs7-data" */
+      25,    /* "pkcs7-digestData" */
+      26,    /* "pkcs7-encryptedData" */
+      23,    /* "pkcs7-envelopedData" */
+      24,    /* "pkcs7-signedAndEnvelopedData" */
+      22,    /* "pkcs7-signedData" */
+     151,    /* "pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag" */
+      47,    /* "pkcs9" */
+     401,    /* "policyConstraints" */
+     747,    /* "policyMappings" */
+     862,    /* "postOfficeBox" */
+     861,    /* "postalAddress" */
+     661,    /* "postalCode" */
+     683,    /* "ppBasis" */
+     872,    /* "preferredDeliveryMethod" */
+     873,    /* "presentationAddress" */
+     816,    /* "prf-gostr3411-94" */
+     406,    /* "prime-field" */
+     409,    /* "prime192v1" */
+     410,    /* "prime192v2" */
+     411,    /* "prime192v3" */
+     412,    /* "prime239v1" */
+     413,    /* "prime239v2" */
+     414,    /* "prime239v3" */
+     415,    /* "prime256v1" */
+     385,    /* "private" */
+      84,    /* "privateKeyUsagePeriod" */
+     886,    /* "protocolInformation" */
+     663,    /* "proxyCertInfo" */
+     510,    /* "pseudonym" */
+     435,    /* "pss" */
+     286,    /* "qcStatements" */
+     457,    /* "qualityLabelledData" */
+     450,    /* "rFC822localPart" */
+     870,    /* "registeredAddress" */
+     400,    /* "role" */
+     877,    /* "roleOccupant" */
+     448,    /* "room" */
+     463,    /* "roomNumber" */
+       6,    /* "rsaEncryption" */
+     644,    /* "rsaOAEPEncryptionSET" */
+     377,    /* "rsaSignature" */
+       1,    /* "rsadsi" */
+     482,    /* "sOARecord" */
+     155,    /* "safeContentsBag" */
+     291,    /* "sbgp-autonomousSysNum" */
+     290,    /* "sbgp-ipAddrBlock" */
+     292,    /* "sbgp-routerIdentifier" */
+     159,    /* "sdsiCertificate" */
+     859,    /* "searchGuide" */
+     704,    /* "secp112r1" */
+     705,    /* "secp112r2" */
+     706,    /* "secp128r1" */
+     707,    /* "secp128r2" */
+     708,    /* "secp160k1" */
+     709,    /* "secp160r1" */
+     710,    /* "secp160r2" */
+     711,    /* "secp192k1" */
+     712,    /* "secp224k1" */
+     713,    /* "secp224r1" */
+     714,    /* "secp256k1" */
+     715,    /* "secp384r1" */
+     716,    /* "secp521r1" */
+     154,    /* "secretBag" */
+     474,    /* "secretary" */
+     717,    /* "sect113r1" */
+     718,    /* "sect113r2" */
+     719,    /* "sect131r1" */
+     720,    /* "sect131r2" */
+     721,    /* "sect163k1" */
+     722,    /* "sect163r1" */
+     723,    /* "sect163r2" */
+     724,    /* "sect193r1" */
+     725,    /* "sect193r2" */
+     726,    /* "sect233k1" */
+     727,    /* "sect233r1" */
+     728,    /* "sect239k1" */
+     729,    /* "sect283k1" */
+     730,    /* "sect283r1" */
+     731,    /* "sect409k1" */
+     732,    /* "sect409r1" */
+     733,    /* "sect571k1" */
+     734,    /* "sect571r1" */
+    1025,    /* "secureShellClient" */
+    1026,    /* "secureShellServer" */
+     386,    /* "security" */
+     878,    /* "seeAlso" */
+     394,    /* "selected-attribute-types" */
+    1029,    /* "sendOwner" */
+    1030,    /* "sendProxiedOwner" */
+    1028,    /* "sendProxiedRouter" */
+    1027,    /* "sendRouter" */
+     105,    /* "serialNumber" */
+     129,    /* "serverAuth" */
+     371,    /* "serviceLocator" */
+     625,    /* "set-addPolicy" */
+     515,    /* "set-attr" */
+     518,    /* "set-brand" */
+     638,    /* "set-brand-AmericanExpress" */
+     637,    /* "set-brand-Diners" */
+     636,    /* "set-brand-IATA-ATA" */
+     639,    /* "set-brand-JCB" */
+     641,    /* "set-brand-MasterCard" */
+     642,    /* "set-brand-Novus" */
+     640,    /* "set-brand-Visa" */
+     517,    /* "set-certExt" */
+     513,    /* "set-ctype" */
+     514,    /* "set-msgExt" */
+     516,    /* "set-policy" */
+     607,    /* "set-policy-root" */
+     624,    /* "set-rootKeyThumb" */
+     620,    /* "setAttr-Cert" */
+     631,    /* "setAttr-GenCryptgrm" */
+     623,    /* "setAttr-IssCap" */
+     628,    /* "setAttr-IssCap-CVM" */
+     630,    /* "setAttr-IssCap-Sig" */
+     629,    /* "setAttr-IssCap-T2" */
+     621,    /* "setAttr-PGWYcap" */
+     635,    /* "setAttr-SecDevSig" */
+     632,    /* "setAttr-T2Enc" */
+     633,    /* "setAttr-T2cleartxt" */
+     634,    /* "setAttr-TokICCsig" */
+     627,    /* "setAttr-Token-B0Prime" */
+     626,    /* "setAttr-Token-EMV" */
+     622,    /* "setAttr-TokenType" */
+     619,    /* "setCext-IssuerCapabilities" */
+     615,    /* "setCext-PGWYcapabilities" */
+     616,    /* "setCext-TokenIdentifier" */
+     618,    /* "setCext-TokenType" */
+     617,    /* "setCext-Track2Data" */
+     611,    /* "setCext-cCertRequired" */
+     609,    /* "setCext-certType" */
+     608,    /* "setCext-hashedRoot" */
+     610,    /* "setCext-merchData" */
+     613,    /* "setCext-setExt" */
+     614,    /* "setCext-setQualf" */
+     612,    /* "setCext-tunneling" */
+     540,    /* "setct-AcqCardCodeMsg" */
+     576,    /* "setct-AcqCardCodeMsgTBE" */
+     570,    /* "setct-AuthReqTBE" */
+     534,    /* "setct-AuthReqTBS" */
+     527,    /* "setct-AuthResBaggage" */
+     571,    /* "setct-AuthResTBE" */
+     572,    /* "setct-AuthResTBEX" */
+     535,    /* "setct-AuthResTBS" */
+     536,    /* "setct-AuthResTBSX" */
+     528,    /* "setct-AuthRevReqBaggage" */
+     577,    /* "setct-AuthRevReqTBE" */
+     541,    /* "setct-AuthRevReqTBS" */
+     529,    /* "setct-AuthRevResBaggage" */
+     542,    /* "setct-AuthRevResData" */
+     578,    /* "setct-AuthRevResTBE" */
+     579,    /* "setct-AuthRevResTBEB" */
+     543,    /* "setct-AuthRevResTBS" */
+     573,    /* "setct-AuthTokenTBE" */
+     537,    /* "setct-AuthTokenTBS" */
+     600,    /* "setct-BCIDistributionTBS" */
+     558,    /* "setct-BatchAdminReqData" */
+     592,    /* "setct-BatchAdminReqTBE" */
+     559,    /* "setct-BatchAdminResData" */
+     593,    /* "setct-BatchAdminResTBE" */
+     599,    /* "setct-CRLNotificationResTBS" */
+     598,    /* "setct-CRLNotificationTBS" */
+     580,    /* "setct-CapReqTBE" */
+     581,    /* "setct-CapReqTBEX" */
+     544,    /* "setct-CapReqTBS" */
+     545,    /* "setct-CapReqTBSX" */
+     546,    /* "setct-CapResData" */
+     582,    /* "setct-CapResTBE" */
+     583,    /* "setct-CapRevReqTBE" */
+     584,    /* "setct-CapRevReqTBEX" */
+     547,    /* "setct-CapRevReqTBS" */
+     548,    /* "setct-CapRevReqTBSX" */
+     549,    /* "setct-CapRevResData" */
+     585,    /* "setct-CapRevResTBE" */
+     538,    /* "setct-CapTokenData" */
+     530,    /* "setct-CapTokenSeq" */
+     574,    /* "setct-CapTokenTBE" */
+     575,    /* "setct-CapTokenTBEX" */
+     539,    /* "setct-CapTokenTBS" */
+     560,    /* "setct-CardCInitResTBS" */
+     566,    /* "setct-CertInqReqTBS" */
+     563,    /* "setct-CertReqData" */
+     595,    /* "setct-CertReqTBE" */
+     596,    /* "setct-CertReqTBEX" */
+     564,    /* "setct-CertReqTBS" */
+     565,    /* "setct-CertResData" */
+     597,    /* "setct-CertResTBE" */
+     586,    /* "setct-CredReqTBE" */
+     587,    /* "setct-CredReqTBEX" */
+     550,    /* "setct-CredReqTBS" */
+     551,    /* "setct-CredReqTBSX" */
+     552,    /* "setct-CredResData" */
+     588,    /* "setct-CredResTBE" */
+     589,    /* "setct-CredRevReqTBE" */
+     590,    /* "setct-CredRevReqTBEX" */
+     553,    /* "setct-CredRevReqTBS" */
+     554,    /* "setct-CredRevReqTBSX" */
+     555,    /* "setct-CredRevResData" */
+     591,    /* "setct-CredRevResTBE" */
+     567,    /* "setct-ErrorTBS" */
+     526,    /* "setct-HODInput" */
+     561,    /* "setct-MeAqCInitResTBS" */
+     522,    /* "setct-OIData" */
+     519,    /* "setct-PANData" */
+     521,    /* "setct-PANOnly" */
+     520,    /* "setct-PANToken" */
+     556,    /* "setct-PCertReqData" */
+     557,    /* "setct-PCertResTBS" */
+     523,    /* "setct-PI" */
+     532,    /* "setct-PI-TBS" */
+     524,    /* "setct-PIData" */
+     525,    /* "setct-PIDataUnsigned" */
+     568,    /* "setct-PIDualSignedTBE" */
+     569,    /* "setct-PIUnsignedTBE" */
+     531,    /* "setct-PInitResData" */
+     533,    /* "setct-PResData" */
+     594,    /* "setct-RegFormReqTBE" */
+     562,    /* "setct-RegFormResTBS" */
+     606,    /* "setext-cv" */
+     601,    /* "setext-genCrypt" */
+     602,    /* "setext-miAuth" */
+     604,    /* "setext-pinAny" */
+     603,    /* "setext-pinSecure" */
+     605,    /* "setext-track2" */
+      52,    /* "signingTime" */
+     454,    /* "simpleSecurityObject" */
+     496,    /* "singleLevelQuality" */
+     387,    /* "snmpv2" */
+     660,    /* "street" */
+      85,    /* "subjectAltName" */
+     769,    /* "subjectDirectoryAttributes" */
+     398,    /* "subjectInfoAccess" */
+      82,    /* "subjectKeyIdentifier" */
+    1007,    /* "subjectSignTool" */
+     498,    /* "subtreeMaximumQuality" */
+     497,    /* "subtreeMinimumQuality" */
+     890,    /* "supportedAlgorithms" */
+     874,    /* "supportedApplicationContext" */
+     402,    /* "targetInformation" */
+     864,    /* "telephoneNumber" */
+     866,    /* "teletexTerminalIdentifier" */
+     865,    /* "telexNumber" */
+     459,    /* "textEncodedORAddress" */
+     293,    /* "textNotice" */
+     133,    /* "timeStamping" */
+     106,    /* "title" */
+    1020,    /* "tlsfeature" */
+     682,    /* "tpBasis" */
+     375,    /* "trustRoot" */
+     436,    /* "ucl" */
+     102,    /* "uid" */
+     888,    /* "uniqueMember" */
+      55,    /* "unstructuredAddress" */
+      49,    /* "unstructuredName" */
+     880,    /* "userCertificate" */
+     465,    /* "userClass" */
+     879,    /* "userPassword" */
+     373,    /* "valid" */
+     678,    /* "wap" */
+     679,    /* "wap-wsg" */
+     735,    /* "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls1" */
+     743,    /* "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls10" */
+     744,    /* "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls11" */
+     745,    /* "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls12" */
+     736,    /* "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls3" */
+     737,    /* "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls4" */
+     738,    /* "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls5" */
+     739,    /* "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls6" */
+     740,    /* "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls7" */
+     741,    /* "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls8" */
+     742,    /* "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls9" */
+     804,    /* "whirlpool" */
+     868,    /* "x121Address" */
+     503,    /* "x500UniqueIdentifier" */
+     158,    /* "x509Certificate" */
+     160,    /* "x509Crl" */
+};
+
+#define NUM_LN 1052
+static const unsigned int ln_objs[NUM_LN] = {
+     363,    /* "AD Time Stamping" */
+     405,    /* "ANSI X9.62" */
+     368,    /* "Acceptable OCSP Responses" */
+     910,    /* "Any Extended Key Usage" */
+     664,    /* "Any language" */
+     177,    /* "Authority Information Access" */
+     365,    /* "Basic OCSP Response" */
+     285,    /* "Biometric Info" */
+     179,    /* "CA Issuers" */
+     785,    /* "CA Repository" */
+     954,    /* "CT Certificate SCTs" */
+     952,    /* "CT Precertificate Poison" */
+     951,    /* "CT Precertificate SCTs" */
+     953,    /* "CT Precertificate Signer" */
+     131,    /* "Code Signing" */
+    1024,    /* "Ctrl/Provision WAP Termination" */
+    1023,    /* "Ctrl/provision WAP Access" */
+     783,    /* "Diffie-Hellman based MAC" */
+     382,    /* "Directory" */
+     392,    /* "Domain" */
+     132,    /* "E-mail Protection" */
+     389,    /* "Enterprises" */
+     384,    /* "Experimental" */
+     372,    /* "Extended OCSP Status" */
+     172,    /* "Extension Request" */
+     813,    /* "GOST 28147-89" */
+     849,    /* "GOST 28147-89 Cryptocom ParamSet" */
+     815,    /* "GOST 28147-89 MAC" */
+    1003,    /* "GOST 28147-89 TC26 parameter set" */
+     851,    /* "GOST 34.10-2001 Cryptocom" */
+     850,    /* "GOST 34.10-94 Cryptocom" */
+     811,    /* "GOST R 34.10-2001" */
+     817,    /* "GOST R 34.10-2001 DH" */
+     998,    /* "GOST R 34.10-2012 (512 bit) ParamSet A" */
+     999,    /* "GOST R 34.10-2012 (512 bit) ParamSet B" */
+     997,    /* "GOST R 34.10-2012 (512 bit) testing parameter set" */
+     979,    /* "GOST R 34.10-2012 with 256 bit modulus" */
+     980,    /* "GOST R 34.10-2012 with 512 bit modulus" */
+     985,    /* "GOST R 34.10-2012 with GOST R 34.11-2012 (256 bit)" */
+     986,    /* "GOST R 34.10-2012 with GOST R 34.11-2012 (512 bit)" */
+     812,    /* "GOST R 34.10-94" */
+     818,    /* "GOST R 34.10-94 DH" */
+     982,    /* "GOST R 34.11-2012 with 256 bit hash" */
+     983,    /* "GOST R 34.11-2012 with 512 bit hash" */
+     809,    /* "GOST R 34.11-94" */
+     816,    /* "GOST R 34.11-94 PRF" */
+     807,    /* "GOST R 34.11-94 with GOST R 34.10-2001" */
+     853,    /* "GOST R 34.11-94 with GOST R 34.10-2001 Cryptocom" */
+     808,    /* "GOST R 34.11-94 with GOST R 34.10-94" */
+     852,    /* "GOST R 34.11-94 with GOST R 34.10-94 Cryptocom" */
+     854,    /* "GOST R 3410-2001 Parameter Set Cryptocom" */
+     988,    /* "HMAC GOST 34.11-2012 256 bit" */
+     989,    /* "HMAC GOST 34.11-2012 512 bit" */
+     810,    /* "HMAC GOST 34.11-94" */
+     432,    /* "Hold Instruction Call Issuer" */
+     430,    /* "Hold Instruction Code" */
+     431,    /* "Hold Instruction None" */
+     433,    /* "Hold Instruction Reject" */
+     634,    /* "ICC or token signature" */
+    1004,    /* "INN" */
+     294,    /* "IPSec End System" */
+     295,    /* "IPSec Tunnel" */
+     296,    /* "IPSec User" */
+     182,    /* "ISO Member Body" */
+     183,    /* "ISO US Member Body" */
+     667,    /* "Independent" */
+     665,    /* "Inherit all" */
+     647,    /* "International Organizations" */
+     142,    /* "Invalidity Date" */
+     504,    /* "MIME MHS" */
+     388,    /* "Mail" */
+     383,    /* "Management" */
+     417,    /* "Microsoft CSP Name" */
+     135,    /* "Microsoft Commercial Code Signing" */
+     138,    /* "Microsoft Encrypted File System" */
+     171,    /* "Microsoft Extension Request" */
+     134,    /* "Microsoft Individual Code Signing" */
+     856,    /* "Microsoft Local Key set" */
+     137,    /* "Microsoft Server Gated Crypto" */
+     648,    /* "Microsoft Smartcardlogin" */
+     136,    /* "Microsoft Trust List Signing" */
+     649,    /* "Microsoft Universal Principal Name" */
+     393,    /* "NULL" */
+     404,    /* "NULL" */
+      72,    /* "Netscape Base Url" */
+      76,    /* "Netscape CA Policy Url" */
+      74,    /* "Netscape CA Revocation Url" */
+      71,    /* "Netscape Cert Type" */
+      58,    /* "Netscape Certificate Extension" */
+      79,    /* "Netscape Certificate Sequence" */
+      78,    /* "Netscape Comment" */
+      57,    /* "Netscape Communications Corp." */
+      59,    /* "Netscape Data Type" */
+      75,    /* "Netscape Renewal Url" */
+      73,    /* "Netscape Revocation Url" */
+      77,    /* "Netscape SSL Server Name" */
+     139,    /* "Netscape Server Gated Crypto" */
+     178,    /* "OCSP" */
+     370,    /* "OCSP Archive Cutoff" */
+     367,    /* "OCSP CRL ID" */
+     369,    /* "OCSP No Check" */
+     366,    /* "OCSP Nonce" */
+     371,    /* "OCSP Service Locator" */
+     180,    /* "OCSP Signing" */
+    1005,    /* "OGRN" */
+     161,    /* "PBES2" */
+      69,    /* "PBKDF2" */
+     162,    /* "PBMAC1" */
+    1032,    /* "PKINIT Client Auth" */
+     127,    /* "PKIX" */
+     858,    /* "Permanent Identifier" */
+     164,    /* "Policy Qualifier CPS" */
+     165,    /* "Policy Qualifier User Notice" */
+     385,    /* "Private" */
+     663,    /* "Proxy Certificate Information" */
+       1,    /* "RSA Data Security, Inc." */
+       2,    /* "RSA Data Security, Inc. PKCS" */
+     188,    /* "S/MIME" */
+     167,    /* "S/MIME Capabilities" */
+    1006,    /* "SNILS" */
+     387,    /* "SNMPv2" */
+    1025,    /* "SSH Client" */
+    1026,    /* "SSH Server" */
+     512,    /* "Secure Electronic Transactions" */
+     386,    /* "Security" */
+     394,    /* "Selected Attribute Types" */
+    1029,    /* "Send Owner" */
+    1030,    /* "Send Proxied Owner" */
+    1028,    /* "Send Proxied Router" */
+    1027,    /* "Send Router" */
+    1033,    /* "Signing KDC Response" */
+    1008,    /* "Signing Tool of Issuer" */
+    1007,    /* "Signing Tool of Subject" */
+     143,    /* "Strong Extranet ID" */
+     398,    /* "Subject Information Access" */
+    1020,    /* "TLS Feature" */
+     130,    /* "TLS Web Client Authentication" */
+     129,    /* "TLS Web Server Authentication" */
+     133,    /* "Time Stamping" */
+     375,    /* "Trust Root" */
+    1034,    /* "X25519" */
+    1035,    /* "X448" */
+      12,    /* "X509" */
+     402,    /* "X509v3 AC Targeting" */
+     746,    /* "X509v3 Any Policy" */
+      90,    /* "X509v3 Authority Key Identifier" */
+      87,    /* "X509v3 Basic Constraints" */
+     103,    /* "X509v3 CRL Distribution Points" */
+      88,    /* "X509v3 CRL Number" */
+     141,    /* "X509v3 CRL Reason Code" */
+     771,    /* "X509v3 Certificate Issuer" */
+      89,    /* "X509v3 Certificate Policies" */
+     140,    /* "X509v3 Delta CRL Indicator" */
+     126,    /* "X509v3 Extended Key Usage" */
+     857,    /* "X509v3 Freshest CRL" */
+     748,    /* "X509v3 Inhibit Any Policy" */
+      86,    /* "X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name" */
+     770,    /* "X509v3 Issuing Distribution Point" */
+      83,    /* "X509v3 Key Usage" */
+     666,    /* "X509v3 Name Constraints" */
+     403,    /* "X509v3 No Revocation Available" */
+     401,    /* "X509v3 Policy Constraints" */
+     747,    /* "X509v3 Policy Mappings" */
+      84,    /* "X509v3 Private Key Usage Period" */
+      85,    /* "X509v3 Subject Alternative Name" */
+     769,    /* "X509v3 Subject Directory Attributes" */
+      82,    /* "X509v3 Subject Key Identifier" */
+     920,    /* "X9.42 DH" */
+     184,    /* "X9.57" */
+     185,    /* "X9.57 CM ?" */
+     478,    /* "aRecord" */
+     289,    /* "aaControls" */
+     287,    /* "ac-auditEntity" */
+     397,    /* "ac-proxying" */
+     288,    /* "ac-targeting" */
+     446,    /* "account" */
+     364,    /* "ad dvcs" */
+     606,    /* "additional verification" */
+     419,    /* "aes-128-cbc" */
+     916,    /* "aes-128-cbc-hmac-sha1" */
+     948,    /* "aes-128-cbc-hmac-sha256" */
+     896,    /* "aes-128-ccm" */
+     421,    /* "aes-128-cfb" */
+     650,    /* "aes-128-cfb1" */
+     653,    /* "aes-128-cfb8" */
+     904,    /* "aes-128-ctr" */
+     418,    /* "aes-128-ecb" */
+     895,    /* "aes-128-gcm" */
+     958,    /* "aes-128-ocb" */
+     420,    /* "aes-128-ofb" */
+     913,    /* "aes-128-xts" */
+     423,    /* "aes-192-cbc" */
+     917,    /* "aes-192-cbc-hmac-sha1" */
+     949,    /* "aes-192-cbc-hmac-sha256" */
+     899,    /* "aes-192-ccm" */
+     425,    /* "aes-192-cfb" */
+     651,    /* "aes-192-cfb1" */
+     654,    /* "aes-192-cfb8" */
+     905,    /* "aes-192-ctr" */
+     422,    /* "aes-192-ecb" */
+     898,    /* "aes-192-gcm" */
+     959,    /* "aes-192-ocb" */
+     424,    /* "aes-192-ofb" */
+     427,    /* "aes-256-cbc" */
+     918,    /* "aes-256-cbc-hmac-sha1" */
+     950,    /* "aes-256-cbc-hmac-sha256" */
+     902,    /* "aes-256-ccm" */
+     429,    /* "aes-256-cfb" */
+     652,    /* "aes-256-cfb1" */
+     655,    /* "aes-256-cfb8" */
+     906,    /* "aes-256-ctr" */
+     426,    /* "aes-256-ecb" */
+     901,    /* "aes-256-gcm" */
+     960,    /* "aes-256-ocb" */
+     428,    /* "aes-256-ofb" */
+     914,    /* "aes-256-xts" */
+     376,    /* "algorithm" */
+     484,    /* "associatedDomain" */
+     485,    /* "associatedName" */
+     501,    /* "audio" */
+    1049,    /* "auth-dss" */
+    1047,    /* "auth-ecdsa" */
+    1050,    /* "auth-gost01" */
+    1051,    /* "auth-gost12" */
+    1053,    /* "auth-null" */
+    1048,    /* "auth-psk" */
+    1046,    /* "auth-rsa" */
+    1052,    /* "auth-srp" */
+     882,    /* "authorityRevocationList" */
+      91,    /* "bf-cbc" */
+      93,    /* "bf-cfb" */
+      92,    /* "bf-ecb" */
+      94,    /* "bf-ofb" */
+    1056,    /* "blake2b512" */
+    1057,    /* "blake2s256" */
+     921,    /* "brainpoolP160r1" */
+     922,    /* "brainpoolP160t1" */
+     923,    /* "brainpoolP192r1" */
+     924,    /* "brainpoolP192t1" */
+     925,    /* "brainpoolP224r1" */
+     926,    /* "brainpoolP224t1" */
+     927,    /* "brainpoolP256r1" */
+     928,    /* "brainpoolP256t1" */
+     929,    /* "brainpoolP320r1" */
+     930,    /* "brainpoolP320t1" */
+     931,    /* "brainpoolP384r1" */
+     932,    /* "brainpoolP384t1" */
+     933,    /* "brainpoolP512r1" */
+     934,    /* "brainpoolP512t1" */
+     494,    /* "buildingName" */
+     860,    /* "businessCategory" */
+     691,    /* "c2onb191v4" */
+     692,    /* "c2onb191v5" */
+     697,    /* "c2onb239v4" */
+     698,    /* "c2onb239v5" */
+     684,    /* "c2pnb163v1" */
+     685,    /* "c2pnb163v2" */
+     686,    /* "c2pnb163v3" */
+     687,    /* "c2pnb176v1" */
+     693,    /* "c2pnb208w1" */
+     699,    /* "c2pnb272w1" */
+     700,    /* "c2pnb304w1" */
+     702,    /* "c2pnb368w1" */
+     688,    /* "c2tnb191v1" */
+     689,    /* "c2tnb191v2" */
+     690,    /* "c2tnb191v3" */
+     694,    /* "c2tnb239v1" */
+     695,    /* "c2tnb239v2" */
+     696,    /* "c2tnb239v3" */
+     701,    /* "c2tnb359v1" */
+     703,    /* "c2tnb431r1" */
+     881,    /* "cACertificate" */
+     483,    /* "cNAMERecord" */
+     751,    /* "camellia-128-cbc" */
+     962,    /* "camellia-128-ccm" */
+     757,    /* "camellia-128-cfb" */
+     760,    /* "camellia-128-cfb1" */
+     763,    /* "camellia-128-cfb8" */
+     964,    /* "camellia-128-cmac" */
+     963,    /* "camellia-128-ctr" */
+     754,    /* "camellia-128-ecb" */
+     961,    /* "camellia-128-gcm" */
+     766,    /* "camellia-128-ofb" */
+     752,    /* "camellia-192-cbc" */
+     966,    /* "camellia-192-ccm" */
+     758,    /* "camellia-192-cfb" */
+     761,    /* "camellia-192-cfb1" */
+     764,    /* "camellia-192-cfb8" */
+     968,    /* "camellia-192-cmac" */
+     967,    /* "camellia-192-ctr" */
+     755,    /* "camellia-192-ecb" */
+     965,    /* "camellia-192-gcm" */
+     767,    /* "camellia-192-ofb" */
+     753,    /* "camellia-256-cbc" */
+     970,    /* "camellia-256-ccm" */
+     759,    /* "camellia-256-cfb" */
+     762,    /* "camellia-256-cfb1" */
+     765,    /* "camellia-256-cfb8" */
+     972,    /* "camellia-256-cmac" */
+     971,    /* "camellia-256-ctr" */
+     756,    /* "camellia-256-ecb" */
+     969,    /* "camellia-256-gcm" */
+     768,    /* "camellia-256-ofb" */
+     443,    /* "caseIgnoreIA5StringSyntax" */
+     108,    /* "cast5-cbc" */
+     110,    /* "cast5-cfb" */
+     109,    /* "cast5-ecb" */
+     111,    /* "cast5-ofb" */
+     152,    /* "certBag" */
+     677,    /* "certicom-arc" */
+     517,    /* "certificate extensions" */
+     883,    /* "certificateRevocationList" */
+    1019,    /* "chacha20" */
+    1018,    /* "chacha20-poly1305" */
+      54,    /* "challengePassword" */
+     407,    /* "characteristic-two-field" */
+     395,    /* "clearance" */
+     633,    /* "cleartext track 2" */
+     894,    /* "cmac" */
+      13,    /* "commonName" */
+     513,    /* "content types" */
+      50,    /* "contentType" */
+      53,    /* "countersignature" */
+      14,    /* "countryName" */
+     153,    /* "crlBag" */
+     884,    /* "crossCertificatePair" */
+     806,    /* "cryptocom" */
+     805,    /* "cryptopro" */
+     500,    /* "dITRedirect" */
+     451,    /* "dNSDomain" */
+     495,    /* "dSAQuality" */
+     434,    /* "data" */
+     390,    /* "dcObject" */
+     891,    /* "deltaRevocationList" */
+      31,    /* "des-cbc" */
+     643,    /* "des-cdmf" */
+      30,    /* "des-cfb" */
+     656,    /* "des-cfb1" */
+     657,    /* "des-cfb8" */
+      29,    /* "des-ecb" */
+      32,    /* "des-ede" */
+      43,    /* "des-ede-cbc" */
+      60,    /* "des-ede-cfb" */
+      62,    /* "des-ede-ofb" */
+      33,    /* "des-ede3" */
+      44,    /* "des-ede3-cbc" */
+      61,    /* "des-ede3-cfb" */
+     658,    /* "des-ede3-cfb1" */
+     659,    /* "des-ede3-cfb8" */
+      63,    /* "des-ede3-ofb" */
+      45,    /* "des-ofb" */
+     107,    /* "description" */
+     871,    /* "destinationIndicator" */
+      80,    /* "desx-cbc" */
+     947,    /* "dh-cofactor-kdf" */
+     946,    /* "dh-std-kdf" */
+      28,    /* "dhKeyAgreement" */
+     941,    /* "dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme" */
+     942,    /* "dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme" */
+     943,    /* "dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme" */
+     944,    /* "dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme" */
+     945,    /* "dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme" */
+     936,    /* "dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme" */
+     937,    /* "dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme" */
+     938,    /* "dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme" */
+     939,    /* "dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme" */
+     940,    /* "dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme" */
+      11,    /* "directory services (X.500)" */
+     378,    /* "directory services - algorithms" */
+     887,    /* "distinguishedName" */
+     892,    /* "dmdName" */
+     174,    /* "dnQualifier" */
+     447,    /* "document" */
+     471,    /* "documentAuthor" */
+     468,    /* "documentIdentifier" */
+     472,    /* "documentLocation" */
+     502,    /* "documentPublisher" */
+     449,    /* "documentSeries" */
+     469,    /* "documentTitle" */
+     470,    /* "documentVersion" */
+     380,    /* "dod" */
+     391,    /* "domainComponent" */
+     452,    /* "domainRelatedObject" */
+     116,    /* "dsaEncryption" */
+      67,    /* "dsaEncryption-old" */
+      66,    /* "dsaWithSHA" */
+     113,    /* "dsaWithSHA1" */
+      70,    /* "dsaWithSHA1-old" */
+     802,    /* "dsa_with_SHA224" */
+     803,    /* "dsa_with_SHA256" */
+     297,    /* "dvcs" */
+     791,    /* "ecdsa-with-Recommended" */
+     416,    /* "ecdsa-with-SHA1" */
+     793,    /* "ecdsa-with-SHA224" */
+     794,    /* "ecdsa-with-SHA256" */
+     795,    /* "ecdsa-with-SHA384" */
+     796,    /* "ecdsa-with-SHA512" */
+     792,    /* "ecdsa-with-Specified" */
+      48,    /* "emailAddress" */
+     632,    /* "encrypted track 2" */
+     885,    /* "enhancedSearchGuide" */
+      56,    /* "extendedCertificateAttributes" */
+     867,    /* "facsimileTelephoneNumber" */
+     462,    /* "favouriteDrink" */
+     453,    /* "friendlyCountry" */
+     490,    /* "friendlyCountryName" */
+     156,    /* "friendlyName" */
+     631,    /* "generate cryptogram" */
+     509,    /* "generationQualifier" */
+     601,    /* "generic cryptogram" */
+      99,    /* "givenName" */
+     976,    /* "gost-mac-12" */
+    1009,    /* "gost89-cbc" */
+     814,    /* "gost89-cnt" */
+     975,    /* "gost89-cnt-12" */
+    1011,    /* "gost89-ctr" */
+    1010,    /* "gost89-ecb" */
+    1015,    /* "grasshopper-cbc" */
+    1016,    /* "grasshopper-cfb" */
+    1013,    /* "grasshopper-ctr" */
+    1012,    /* "grasshopper-ecb" */
+    1017,    /* "grasshopper-mac" */
+    1014,    /* "grasshopper-ofb" */
+    1036,    /* "hkdf" */
+     855,    /* "hmac" */
+     780,    /* "hmac-md5" */
+     781,    /* "hmac-sha1" */
+     797,    /* "hmacWithMD5" */
+     163,    /* "hmacWithSHA1" */
+     798,    /* "hmacWithSHA224" */
+     799,    /* "hmacWithSHA256" */
+     800,    /* "hmacWithSHA384" */
+     801,    /* "hmacWithSHA512" */
+     486,    /* "homePostalAddress" */
+     473,    /* "homeTelephoneNumber" */
+     466,    /* "host" */
+     889,    /* "houseIdentifier" */
+     442,    /* "iA5StringSyntax" */
+     381,    /* "iana" */
+     824,    /* "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet" */
+     825,    /* "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-B-ParamSet" */
+     826,    /* "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-C-ParamSet" */
+     827,    /* "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-D-ParamSet" */
+     819,    /* "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-KeyMeshing" */
+     829,    /* "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-Oscar-1-0-ParamSet" */
+     828,    /* "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-Oscar-1-1-ParamSet" */
+     830,    /* "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-RIC-1-ParamSet" */
+     820,    /* "id-Gost28147-89-None-KeyMeshing" */
+     823,    /* "id-Gost28147-89-TestParamSet" */
+     840,    /* "id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet" */
+     841,    /* "id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-B-ParamSet" */
+     842,    /* "id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-C-ParamSet" */
+     843,    /* "id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-XchA-ParamSet" */
+     844,    /* "id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-XchB-ParamSet" */
+     839,    /* "id-GostR3410-2001-TestParamSet" */
+     832,    /* "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet" */
+     833,    /* "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-B-ParamSet" */
+     834,    /* "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-C-ParamSet" */
+     835,    /* "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-D-ParamSet" */
+     836,    /* "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-XchA-ParamSet" */
+     837,    /* "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-XchB-ParamSet" */
+     838,    /* "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-XchC-ParamSet" */
+     831,    /* "id-GostR3410-94-TestParamSet" */
+     845,    /* "id-GostR3410-94-a" */
+     846,    /* "id-GostR3410-94-aBis" */
+     847,    /* "id-GostR3410-94-b" */
+     848,    /* "id-GostR3410-94-bBis" */
+     822,    /* "id-GostR3411-94-CryptoProParamSet" */
+     821,    /* "id-GostR3411-94-TestParamSet" */
+     266,    /* "id-aca" */
+     355,    /* "id-aca-accessIdentity" */
+     354,    /* "id-aca-authenticationInfo" */
+     356,    /* "id-aca-chargingIdentity" */
+     399,    /* "id-aca-encAttrs" */
+     357,    /* "id-aca-group" */
+     358,    /* "id-aca-role" */
+     176,    /* "id-ad" */
+     788,    /* "id-aes128-wrap" */
+     897,    /* "id-aes128-wrap-pad" */
+     789,    /* "id-aes192-wrap" */
+     900,    /* "id-aes192-wrap-pad" */
+     790,    /* "id-aes256-wrap" */
+     903,    /* "id-aes256-wrap-pad" */
+     262,    /* "id-alg" */
+     893,    /* "id-alg-PWRI-KEK" */
+     323,    /* "id-alg-des40" */
+     326,    /* "id-alg-dh-pop" */
+     325,    /* "id-alg-dh-sig-hmac-sha1" */
+     324,    /* "id-alg-noSignature" */
+     907,    /* "id-camellia128-wrap" */
+     908,    /* "id-camellia192-wrap" */
+     909,    /* "id-camellia256-wrap" */
+     268,    /* "id-cct" */
+     361,    /* "id-cct-PKIData" */
+     362,    /* "id-cct-PKIResponse" */
+     360,    /* "id-cct-crs" */
+      81,    /* "id-ce" */
+     680,    /* "id-characteristic-two-basis" */
+     263,    /* "id-cmc" */
+     334,    /* "id-cmc-addExtensions" */
+     346,    /* "id-cmc-confirmCertAcceptance" */
+     330,    /* "id-cmc-dataReturn" */
+     336,    /* "id-cmc-decryptedPOP" */
+     335,    /* "id-cmc-encryptedPOP" */
+     339,    /* "id-cmc-getCRL" */
+     338,    /* "id-cmc-getCert" */
+     328,    /* "id-cmc-identification" */
+     329,    /* "id-cmc-identityProof" */
+     337,    /* "id-cmc-lraPOPWitness" */
+     344,    /* "id-cmc-popLinkRandom" */
+     345,    /* "id-cmc-popLinkWitness" */
+     343,    /* "id-cmc-queryPending" */
+     333,    /* "id-cmc-recipientNonce" */
+     341,    /* "id-cmc-regInfo" */
+     342,    /* "id-cmc-responseInfo" */
+     340,    /* "id-cmc-revokeRequest" */
+     332,    /* "id-cmc-senderNonce" */
+     327,    /* "id-cmc-statusInfo" */
+     331,    /* "id-cmc-transactionId" */
+     787,    /* "id-ct-asciiTextWithCRLF" */
+    1060,    /* "id-ct-xml" */
+     408,    /* "id-ecPublicKey" */
+     508,    /* "id-hex-multipart-message" */
+     507,    /* "id-hex-partial-message" */
+     260,    /* "id-it" */
+     302,    /* "id-it-caKeyUpdateInfo" */
+     298,    /* "id-it-caProtEncCert" */
+     311,    /* "id-it-confirmWaitTime" */
+     303,    /* "id-it-currentCRL" */
+     300,    /* "id-it-encKeyPairTypes" */
+     310,    /* "id-it-implicitConfirm" */
+     308,    /* "id-it-keyPairParamRep" */
+     307,    /* "id-it-keyPairParamReq" */
+     312,    /* "id-it-origPKIMessage" */
+     301,    /* "id-it-preferredSymmAlg" */
+     309,    /* "id-it-revPassphrase" */
+     299,    /* "id-it-signKeyPairTypes" */
+     305,    /* "id-it-subscriptionRequest" */
+     306,    /* "id-it-subscriptionResponse" */
+     784,    /* "id-it-suppLangTags" */
+     304,    /* "id-it-unsupportedOIDs" */
+     128,    /* "id-kp" */
+     280,    /* "id-mod-attribute-cert" */
+     274,    /* "id-mod-cmc" */
+     277,    /* "id-mod-cmp" */
+     284,    /* "id-mod-cmp2000" */
+     273,    /* "id-mod-crmf" */
+     283,    /* "id-mod-dvcs" */
+     275,    /* "id-mod-kea-profile-88" */
+     276,    /* "id-mod-kea-profile-93" */
+     282,    /* "id-mod-ocsp" */
+     278,    /* "id-mod-qualified-cert-88" */
+     279,    /* "id-mod-qualified-cert-93" */
+     281,    /* "id-mod-timestamp-protocol" */
+     264,    /* "id-on" */
+     347,    /* "id-on-personalData" */
+     265,    /* "id-pda" */
+     352,    /* "id-pda-countryOfCitizenship" */
+     353,    /* "id-pda-countryOfResidence" */
+     348,    /* "id-pda-dateOfBirth" */
+     351,    /* "id-pda-gender" */
+     349,    /* "id-pda-placeOfBirth" */
+     175,    /* "id-pe" */
+    1031,    /* "id-pkinit" */
+     261,    /* "id-pkip" */
+     258,    /* "id-pkix-mod" */
+     269,    /* "id-pkix1-explicit-88" */
+     271,    /* "id-pkix1-explicit-93" */
+     270,    /* "id-pkix1-implicit-88" */
+     272,    /* "id-pkix1-implicit-93" */
+     662,    /* "id-ppl" */
+     267,    /* "id-qcs" */
+     359,    /* "id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v1" */
+     259,    /* "id-qt" */
+     313,    /* "id-regCtrl" */
+     316,    /* "id-regCtrl-authenticator" */
+     319,    /* "id-regCtrl-oldCertID" */
+     318,    /* "id-regCtrl-pkiArchiveOptions" */
+     317,    /* "id-regCtrl-pkiPublicationInfo" */
+     320,    /* "id-regCtrl-protocolEncrKey" */
+     315,    /* "id-regCtrl-regToken" */
+     314,    /* "id-regInfo" */
+     322,    /* "id-regInfo-certReq" */
+     321,    /* "id-regInfo-utf8Pairs" */
+     973,    /* "id-scrypt" */
+     191,    /* "id-smime-aa" */
+     215,    /* "id-smime-aa-contentHint" */
+     218,    /* "id-smime-aa-contentIdentifier" */
+     221,    /* "id-smime-aa-contentReference" */
+     240,    /* "id-smime-aa-dvcs-dvc" */
+     217,    /* "id-smime-aa-encapContentType" */
+     222,    /* "id-smime-aa-encrypKeyPref" */
+     220,    /* "id-smime-aa-equivalentLabels" */
+     232,    /* "id-smime-aa-ets-CertificateRefs" */
+     233,    /* "id-smime-aa-ets-RevocationRefs" */
+     238,    /* "id-smime-aa-ets-archiveTimeStamp" */
+     237,    /* "id-smime-aa-ets-certCRLTimestamp" */
+     234,    /* "id-smime-aa-ets-certValues" */
+     227,    /* "id-smime-aa-ets-commitmentType" */
+     231,    /* "id-smime-aa-ets-contentTimestamp" */
+     236,    /* "id-smime-aa-ets-escTimeStamp" */
+     230,    /* "id-smime-aa-ets-otherSigCert" */
+     235,    /* "id-smime-aa-ets-revocationValues" */
+     226,    /* "id-smime-aa-ets-sigPolicyId" */
+     229,    /* "id-smime-aa-ets-signerAttr" */
+     228,    /* "id-smime-aa-ets-signerLocation" */
+     219,    /* "id-smime-aa-macValue" */
+     214,    /* "id-smime-aa-mlExpandHistory" */
+     216,    /* "id-smime-aa-msgSigDigest" */
+     212,    /* "id-smime-aa-receiptRequest" */
+     213,    /* "id-smime-aa-securityLabel" */
+     239,    /* "id-smime-aa-signatureType" */
+     223,    /* "id-smime-aa-signingCertificate" */
+     224,    /* "id-smime-aa-smimeEncryptCerts" */
+     225,    /* "id-smime-aa-timeStampToken" */
+     192,    /* "id-smime-alg" */
+     243,    /* "id-smime-alg-3DESwrap" */
+     246,    /* "id-smime-alg-CMS3DESwrap" */
+     247,    /* "id-smime-alg-CMSRC2wrap" */
+     245,    /* "id-smime-alg-ESDH" */
+     241,    /* "id-smime-alg-ESDHwith3DES" */
+     242,    /* "id-smime-alg-ESDHwithRC2" */
+     244,    /* "id-smime-alg-RC2wrap" */
+     193,    /* "id-smime-cd" */
+     248,    /* "id-smime-cd-ldap" */
+     190,    /* "id-smime-ct" */
+     210,    /* "id-smime-ct-DVCSRequestData" */
+     211,    /* "id-smime-ct-DVCSResponseData" */
+     208,    /* "id-smime-ct-TDTInfo" */
+     207,    /* "id-smime-ct-TSTInfo" */
+     205,    /* "id-smime-ct-authData" */
+    1059,    /* "id-smime-ct-authEnvelopedData" */
+     786,    /* "id-smime-ct-compressedData" */
+    1058,    /* "id-smime-ct-contentCollection" */
+     209,    /* "id-smime-ct-contentInfo" */
+     206,    /* "id-smime-ct-publishCert" */
+     204,    /* "id-smime-ct-receipt" */
+     195,    /* "id-smime-cti" */
+     255,    /* "id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfApproval" */
+     256,    /* "id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfCreation" */
+     253,    /* "id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfDelivery" */
+     251,    /* "id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfOrigin" */
+     252,    /* "id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfReceipt" */
+     254,    /* "id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfSender" */
+     189,    /* "id-smime-mod" */
+     196,    /* "id-smime-mod-cms" */
+     197,    /* "id-smime-mod-ess" */
+     202,    /* "id-smime-mod-ets-eSigPolicy-88" */
+     203,    /* "id-smime-mod-ets-eSigPolicy-97" */
+     200,    /* "id-smime-mod-ets-eSignature-88" */
+     201,    /* "id-smime-mod-ets-eSignature-97" */
+     199,    /* "id-smime-mod-msg-v3" */
+     198,    /* "id-smime-mod-oid" */
+     194,    /* "id-smime-spq" */
+     250,    /* "id-smime-spq-ets-sqt-unotice" */
+     249,    /* "id-smime-spq-ets-sqt-uri" */
+     974,    /* "id-tc26" */
+     991,    /* "id-tc26-agreement" */
+     992,    /* "id-tc26-agreement-gost-3410-2012-256" */
+     993,    /* "id-tc26-agreement-gost-3410-2012-512" */
+     977,    /* "id-tc26-algorithms" */
+     990,    /* "id-tc26-cipher" */
+    1001,    /* "id-tc26-cipher-constants" */
+     994,    /* "id-tc26-constants" */
+     981,    /* "id-tc26-digest" */
+    1000,    /* "id-tc26-digest-constants" */
+    1002,    /* "id-tc26-gost-28147-constants" */
+     996,    /* "id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-constants" */
+     987,    /* "id-tc26-mac" */
+     978,    /* "id-tc26-sign" */
+     995,    /* "id-tc26-sign-constants" */
+     984,    /* "id-tc26-signwithdigest" */
+      34,    /* "idea-cbc" */
+      35,    /* "idea-cfb" */
+      36,    /* "idea-ecb" */
+      46,    /* "idea-ofb" */
+     676,    /* "identified-organization" */
+     461,    /* "info" */
+     101,    /* "initials" */
+     869,    /* "internationaliSDNNumber" */
+    1022,    /* "ipsec Internet Key Exchange" */
+     749,    /* "ipsec3" */
+     750,    /* "ipsec4" */
+     181,    /* "iso" */
+     623,    /* "issuer capabilities" */
+     645,    /* "itu-t" */
+     492,    /* "janetMailbox" */
+     646,    /* "joint-iso-itu-t" */
+     957,    /* "jurisdictionCountryName" */
+     955,    /* "jurisdictionLocalityName" */
+     956,    /* "jurisdictionStateOrProvinceName" */
+     150,    /* "keyBag" */
+     773,    /* "kisa" */
+    1039,    /* "kx-dhe" */
+    1041,    /* "kx-dhe-psk" */
+    1038,    /* "kx-ecdhe" */
+    1040,    /* "kx-ecdhe-psk" */
+    1045,    /* "kx-gost" */
+    1043,    /* "kx-psk" */
+    1037,    /* "kx-rsa" */
+    1042,    /* "kx-rsa-psk" */
+    1044,    /* "kx-srp" */
+     477,    /* "lastModifiedBy" */
+     476,    /* "lastModifiedTime" */
+     157,    /* "localKeyID" */
+      15,    /* "localityName" */
+     480,    /* "mXRecord" */
+     493,    /* "mailPreferenceOption" */
+     467,    /* "manager" */
+       3,    /* "md2" */
+       7,    /* "md2WithRSAEncryption" */
+     257,    /* "md4" */
+     396,    /* "md4WithRSAEncryption" */
+       4,    /* "md5" */
+     114,    /* "md5-sha1" */
+     104,    /* "md5WithRSA" */
+       8,    /* "md5WithRSAEncryption" */
+      95,    /* "mdc2" */
+      96,    /* "mdc2WithRSA" */
+     875,    /* "member" */
+     602,    /* "merchant initiated auth" */
+     514,    /* "message extensions" */
+      51,    /* "messageDigest" */
+     911,    /* "mgf1" */
+     506,    /* "mime-mhs-bodies" */
+     505,    /* "mime-mhs-headings" */
+     488,    /* "mobileTelephoneNumber" */
+     481,    /* "nSRecord" */
+     173,    /* "name" */
+     681,    /* "onBasis" */
+     379,    /* "org" */
+      17,    /* "organizationName" */
+     491,    /* "organizationalStatus" */
+      18,    /* "organizationalUnitName" */
+     475,    /* "otherMailbox" */
+     876,    /* "owner" */
+     935,    /* "pSpecified" */
+     489,    /* "pagerTelephoneNumber" */
+     782,    /* "password based MAC" */
+     374,    /* "path" */
+     621,    /* "payment gateway capabilities" */
+       9,    /* "pbeWithMD2AndDES-CBC" */
+     168,    /* "pbeWithMD2AndRC2-CBC" */
+     112,    /* "pbeWithMD5AndCast5CBC" */
+      10,    /* "pbeWithMD5AndDES-CBC" */
+     169,    /* "pbeWithMD5AndRC2-CBC" */
+     148,    /* "pbeWithSHA1And128BitRC2-CBC" */
+     144,    /* "pbeWithSHA1And128BitRC4" */
+     147,    /* "pbeWithSHA1And2-KeyTripleDES-CBC" */
+     146,    /* "pbeWithSHA1And3-KeyTripleDES-CBC" */
+     149,    /* "pbeWithSHA1And40BitRC2-CBC" */
+     145,    /* "pbeWithSHA1And40BitRC4" */
+     170,    /* "pbeWithSHA1AndDES-CBC" */
+      68,    /* "pbeWithSHA1AndRC2-CBC" */
+     499,    /* "personalSignature" */
+     487,    /* "personalTitle" */
+     464,    /* "photo" */
+     863,    /* "physicalDeliveryOfficeName" */
+     437,    /* "pilot" */
+     439,    /* "pilotAttributeSyntax" */
+     438,    /* "pilotAttributeType" */
+     479,    /* "pilotAttributeType27" */
+     456,    /* "pilotDSA" */
+     441,    /* "pilotGroups" */
+     444,    /* "pilotObject" */
+     440,    /* "pilotObjectClass" */
+     455,    /* "pilotOrganization" */
+     445,    /* "pilotPerson" */
+     186,    /* "pkcs1" */
+      27,    /* "pkcs3" */
+     187,    /* "pkcs5" */
+      20,    /* "pkcs7" */
+      21,    /* "pkcs7-data" */
+      25,    /* "pkcs7-digestData" */
+      26,    /* "pkcs7-encryptedData" */
+      23,    /* "pkcs7-envelopedData" */
+      24,    /* "pkcs7-signedAndEnvelopedData" */
+      22,    /* "pkcs7-signedData" */
+     151,    /* "pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag" */
+      47,    /* "pkcs9" */
+     862,    /* "postOfficeBox" */
+     861,    /* "postalAddress" */
+     661,    /* "postalCode" */
+     683,    /* "ppBasis" */
+     872,    /* "preferredDeliveryMethod" */
+     873,    /* "presentationAddress" */
+     406,    /* "prime-field" */
+     409,    /* "prime192v1" */
+     410,    /* "prime192v2" */
+     411,    /* "prime192v3" */
+     412,    /* "prime239v1" */
+     413,    /* "prime239v2" */
+     414,    /* "prime239v3" */
+     415,    /* "prime256v1" */
+     886,    /* "protocolInformation" */
+     510,    /* "pseudonym" */
+     435,    /* "pss" */
+     286,    /* "qcStatements" */
+     457,    /* "qualityLabelledData" */
+     450,    /* "rFC822localPart" */
+      98,    /* "rc2-40-cbc" */
+     166,    /* "rc2-64-cbc" */
+      37,    /* "rc2-cbc" */
+      39,    /* "rc2-cfb" */
+      38,    /* "rc2-ecb" */
+      40,    /* "rc2-ofb" */
+       5,    /* "rc4" */
+      97,    /* "rc4-40" */
+     915,    /* "rc4-hmac-md5" */
+     120,    /* "rc5-cbc" */
+     122,    /* "rc5-cfb" */
+     121,    /* "rc5-ecb" */
+     123,    /* "rc5-ofb" */
+     870,    /* "registeredAddress" */
+     460,    /* "rfc822Mailbox" */
+     117,    /* "ripemd160" */
+     119,    /* "ripemd160WithRSA" */
+     400,    /* "role" */
+     877,    /* "roleOccupant" */
+     448,    /* "room" */
+     463,    /* "roomNumber" */
+      19,    /* "rsa" */
+       6,    /* "rsaEncryption" */
+     644,    /* "rsaOAEPEncryptionSET" */
+     377,    /* "rsaSignature" */
+     919,    /* "rsaesOaep" */
+     912,    /* "rsassaPss" */
+     482,    /* "sOARecord" */
+     155,    /* "safeContentsBag" */
+     291,    /* "sbgp-autonomousSysNum" */
+     290,    /* "sbgp-ipAddrBlock" */
+     292,    /* "sbgp-routerIdentifier" */
+     159,    /* "sdsiCertificate" */
+     859,    /* "searchGuide" */
+     704,    /* "secp112r1" */
+     705,    /* "secp112r2" */
+     706,    /* "secp128r1" */
+     707,    /* "secp128r2" */
+     708,    /* "secp160k1" */
+     709,    /* "secp160r1" */
+     710,    /* "secp160r2" */
+     711,    /* "secp192k1" */
+     712,    /* "secp224k1" */
+     713,    /* "secp224r1" */
+     714,    /* "secp256k1" */
+     715,    /* "secp384r1" */
+     716,    /* "secp521r1" */
+     154,    /* "secretBag" */
+     474,    /* "secretary" */
+     717,    /* "sect113r1" */
+     718,    /* "sect113r2" */
+     719,    /* "sect131r1" */
+     720,    /* "sect131r2" */
+     721,    /* "sect163k1" */
+     722,    /* "sect163r1" */
+     723,    /* "sect163r2" */
+     724,    /* "sect193r1" */
+     725,    /* "sect193r2" */
+     726,    /* "sect233k1" */
+     727,    /* "sect233r1" */
+     728,    /* "sect239k1" */
+     729,    /* "sect283k1" */
+     730,    /* "sect283r1" */
+     731,    /* "sect409k1" */
+     732,    /* "sect409r1" */
+     733,    /* "sect571k1" */
+     734,    /* "sect571r1" */
+     635,    /* "secure device signature" */
+     878,    /* "seeAlso" */
+     777,    /* "seed-cbc" */
+     779,    /* "seed-cfb" */
+     776,    /* "seed-ecb" */
+     778,    /* "seed-ofb" */
+     105,    /* "serialNumber" */
+     625,    /* "set-addPolicy" */
+     515,    /* "set-attr" */
+     518,    /* "set-brand" */
+     638,    /* "set-brand-AmericanExpress" */
+     637,    /* "set-brand-Diners" */
+     636,    /* "set-brand-IATA-ATA" */
+     639,    /* "set-brand-JCB" */
+     641,    /* "set-brand-MasterCard" */
+     642,    /* "set-brand-Novus" */
+     640,    /* "set-brand-Visa" */
+     516,    /* "set-policy" */
+     607,    /* "set-policy-root" */
+     624,    /* "set-rootKeyThumb" */
+     620,    /* "setAttr-Cert" */
+     628,    /* "setAttr-IssCap-CVM" */
+     630,    /* "setAttr-IssCap-Sig" */
+     629,    /* "setAttr-IssCap-T2" */
+     627,    /* "setAttr-Token-B0Prime" */
+     626,    /* "setAttr-Token-EMV" */
+     622,    /* "setAttr-TokenType" */
+     619,    /* "setCext-IssuerCapabilities" */
+     615,    /* "setCext-PGWYcapabilities" */
+     616,    /* "setCext-TokenIdentifier" */
+     618,    /* "setCext-TokenType" */
+     617,    /* "setCext-Track2Data" */
+     611,    /* "setCext-cCertRequired" */
+     609,    /* "setCext-certType" */
+     608,    /* "setCext-hashedRoot" */
+     610,    /* "setCext-merchData" */
+     613,    /* "setCext-setExt" */
+     614,    /* "setCext-setQualf" */
+     612,    /* "setCext-tunneling" */
+     540,    /* "setct-AcqCardCodeMsg" */
+     576,    /* "setct-AcqCardCodeMsgTBE" */
+     570,    /* "setct-AuthReqTBE" */
+     534,    /* "setct-AuthReqTBS" */
+     527,    /* "setct-AuthResBaggage" */
+     571,    /* "setct-AuthResTBE" */
+     572,    /* "setct-AuthResTBEX" */
+     535,    /* "setct-AuthResTBS" */
+     536,    /* "setct-AuthResTBSX" */
+     528,    /* "setct-AuthRevReqBaggage" */
+     577,    /* "setct-AuthRevReqTBE" */
+     541,    /* "setct-AuthRevReqTBS" */
+     529,    /* "setct-AuthRevResBaggage" */
+     542,    /* "setct-AuthRevResData" */
+     578,    /* "setct-AuthRevResTBE" */
+     579,    /* "setct-AuthRevResTBEB" */
+     543,    /* "setct-AuthRevResTBS" */
+     573,    /* "setct-AuthTokenTBE" */
+     537,    /* "setct-AuthTokenTBS" */
+     600,    /* "setct-BCIDistributionTBS" */
+     558,    /* "setct-BatchAdminReqData" */
+     592,    /* "setct-BatchAdminReqTBE" */
+     559,    /* "setct-BatchAdminResData" */
+     593,    /* "setct-BatchAdminResTBE" */
+     599,    /* "setct-CRLNotificationResTBS" */
+     598,    /* "setct-CRLNotificationTBS" */
+     580,    /* "setct-CapReqTBE" */
+     581,    /* "setct-CapReqTBEX" */
+     544,    /* "setct-CapReqTBS" */
+     545,    /* "setct-CapReqTBSX" */
+     546,    /* "setct-CapResData" */
+     582,    /* "setct-CapResTBE" */
+     583,    /* "setct-CapRevReqTBE" */
+     584,    /* "setct-CapRevReqTBEX" */
+     547,    /* "setct-CapRevReqTBS" */
+     548,    /* "setct-CapRevReqTBSX" */
+     549,    /* "setct-CapRevResData" */
+     585,    /* "setct-CapRevResTBE" */
+     538,    /* "setct-CapTokenData" */
+     530,    /* "setct-CapTokenSeq" */
+     574,    /* "setct-CapTokenTBE" */
+     575,    /* "setct-CapTokenTBEX" */
+     539,    /* "setct-CapTokenTBS" */
+     560,    /* "setct-CardCInitResTBS" */
+     566,    /* "setct-CertInqReqTBS" */
+     563,    /* "setct-CertReqData" */
+     595,    /* "setct-CertReqTBE" */
+     596,    /* "setct-CertReqTBEX" */
+     564,    /* "setct-CertReqTBS" */
+     565,    /* "setct-CertResData" */
+     597,    /* "setct-CertResTBE" */
+     586,    /* "setct-CredReqTBE" */
+     587,    /* "setct-CredReqTBEX" */
+     550,    /* "setct-CredReqTBS" */
+     551,    /* "setct-CredReqTBSX" */
+     552,    /* "setct-CredResData" */
+     588,    /* "setct-CredResTBE" */
+     589,    /* "setct-CredRevReqTBE" */
+     590,    /* "setct-CredRevReqTBEX" */
+     553,    /* "setct-CredRevReqTBS" */
+     554,    /* "setct-CredRevReqTBSX" */
+     555,    /* "setct-CredRevResData" */
+     591,    /* "setct-CredRevResTBE" */
+     567,    /* "setct-ErrorTBS" */
+     526,    /* "setct-HODInput" */
+     561,    /* "setct-MeAqCInitResTBS" */
+     522,    /* "setct-OIData" */
+     519,    /* "setct-PANData" */
+     521,    /* "setct-PANOnly" */
+     520,    /* "setct-PANToken" */
+     556,    /* "setct-PCertReqData" */
+     557,    /* "setct-PCertResTBS" */
+     523,    /* "setct-PI" */
+     532,    /* "setct-PI-TBS" */
+     524,    /* "setct-PIData" */
+     525,    /* "setct-PIDataUnsigned" */
+     568,    /* "setct-PIDualSignedTBE" */
+     569,    /* "setct-PIUnsignedTBE" */
+     531,    /* "setct-PInitResData" */
+     533,    /* "setct-PResData" */
+     594,    /* "setct-RegFormReqTBE" */
+     562,    /* "setct-RegFormResTBS" */
+     604,    /* "setext-pinAny" */
+     603,    /* "setext-pinSecure" */
+     605,    /* "setext-track2" */
+      41,    /* "sha" */
+      64,    /* "sha1" */
+     115,    /* "sha1WithRSA" */
+      65,    /* "sha1WithRSAEncryption" */
+     675,    /* "sha224" */
+     671,    /* "sha224WithRSAEncryption" */
+     672,    /* "sha256" */
+     668,    /* "sha256WithRSAEncryption" */
+     673,    /* "sha384" */
+     669,    /* "sha384WithRSAEncryption" */
+     674,    /* "sha512" */
+     670,    /* "sha512WithRSAEncryption" */
+      42,    /* "shaWithRSAEncryption" */
+      52,    /* "signingTime" */
+     454,    /* "simpleSecurityObject" */
+     496,    /* "singleLevelQuality" */
+      16,    /* "stateOrProvinceName" */
+     660,    /* "streetAddress" */
+     498,    /* "subtreeMaximumQuality" */
+     497,    /* "subtreeMinimumQuality" */
+     890,    /* "supportedAlgorithms" */
+     874,    /* "supportedApplicationContext" */
+     100,    /* "surname" */
+     864,    /* "telephoneNumber" */
+     866,    /* "teletexTerminalIdentifier" */
+     865,    /* "telexNumber" */
+     459,    /* "textEncodedORAddress" */
+     293,    /* "textNotice" */
+     106,    /* "title" */
+    1021,    /* "tls1-prf" */
+     682,    /* "tpBasis" */
+     436,    /* "ucl" */
+       0,    /* "undefined" */
+     102,    /* "uniqueIdentifier" */
+     888,    /* "uniqueMember" */
+      55,    /* "unstructuredAddress" */
+      49,    /* "unstructuredName" */
+     880,    /* "userCertificate" */
+     465,    /* "userClass" */
+     458,    /* "userId" */
+     879,    /* "userPassword" */
+     373,    /* "valid" */
+     678,    /* "wap" */
+     679,    /* "wap-wsg" */
+     735,    /* "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls1" */
+     743,    /* "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls10" */
+     744,    /* "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls11" */
+     745,    /* "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls12" */
+     736,    /* "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls3" */
+     737,    /* "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls4" */
+     738,    /* "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls5" */
+     739,    /* "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls6" */
+     740,    /* "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls7" */
+     741,    /* "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls8" */
+     742,    /* "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls9" */
+     804,    /* "whirlpool" */
+     868,    /* "x121Address" */
+     503,    /* "x500UniqueIdentifier" */
+     158,    /* "x509Certificate" */
+     160,    /* "x509Crl" */
+     125,    /* "zlib compression" */
+};
+
+#define NUM_OBJ 956
+static const unsigned int obj_objs[NUM_OBJ] = {
+       0,    /* OBJ_undef                        0 */
+     181,    /* OBJ_iso                          1 */
+     393,    /* OBJ_joint_iso_ccitt              OBJ_joint_iso_itu_t */
+     404,    /* OBJ_ccitt                        OBJ_itu_t */
+     645,    /* OBJ_itu_t                        0 */
+     646,    /* OBJ_joint_iso_itu_t              2 */
+     434,    /* OBJ_data                         0 9 */
+     182,    /* OBJ_member_body                  1 2 */
+     379,    /* OBJ_org                          1 3 */
+     676,    /* OBJ_identified_organization      1 3 */
+      11,    /* OBJ_X500                         2 5 */
+     647,    /* OBJ_international_organizations  2 23 */
+     380,    /* OBJ_dod                          1 3 6 */
+      12,    /* OBJ_X509                         2 5 4 */
+     378,    /* OBJ_X500algorithms               2 5 8 */
+      81,    /* OBJ_id_ce                        2 5 29 */
+     512,    /* OBJ_id_set                       2 23 42 */
+     678,    /* OBJ_wap                          2 23 43 */
+     435,    /* OBJ_pss                          0 9 2342 */
+     183,    /* OBJ_ISO_US                       1 2 840 */
+     381,    /* OBJ_iana                         1 3 6 1 */
+    1034,    /* OBJ_X25519                       1 3 101 110 */
+    1035,    /* OBJ_X448                         1 3 101 111 */
+     677,    /* OBJ_certicom_arc                 1 3 132 */
+     394,    /* OBJ_selected_attribute_types     2 5 1 5 */
+      13,    /* OBJ_commonName                   2 5 4 3 */
+     100,    /* OBJ_surname                      2 5 4 4 */
+     105,    /* OBJ_serialNumber                 2 5 4 5 */
+      14,    /* OBJ_countryName                  2 5 4 6 */
+      15,    /* OBJ_localityName                 2 5 4 7 */
+      16,    /* OBJ_stateOrProvinceName          2 5 4 8 */
+     660,    /* OBJ_streetAddress                2 5 4 9 */
+      17,    /* OBJ_organizationName             2 5 4 10 */
+      18,    /* OBJ_organizationalUnitName       2 5 4 11 */
+     106,    /* OBJ_title                        2 5 4 12 */
+     107,    /* OBJ_description                  2 5 4 13 */
+     859,    /* OBJ_searchGuide                  2 5 4 14 */
+     860,    /* OBJ_businessCategory             2 5 4 15 */
+     861,    /* OBJ_postalAddress                2 5 4 16 */
+     661,    /* OBJ_postalCode                   2 5 4 17 */
+     862,    /* OBJ_postOfficeBox                2 5 4 18 */
+     863,    /* OBJ_physicalDeliveryOfficeName   2 5 4 19 */
+     864,    /* OBJ_telephoneNumber              2 5 4 20 */
+     865,    /* OBJ_telexNumber                  2 5 4 21 */
+     866,    /* OBJ_teletexTerminalIdentifier    2 5 4 22 */
+     867,    /* OBJ_facsimileTelephoneNumber     2 5 4 23 */
+     868,    /* OBJ_x121Address                  2 5 4 24 */
+     869,    /* OBJ_internationaliSDNNumber      2 5 4 25 */
+     870,    /* OBJ_registeredAddress            2 5 4 26 */
+     871,    /* OBJ_destinationIndicator         2 5 4 27 */
+     872,    /* OBJ_preferredDeliveryMethod      2 5 4 28 */
+     873,    /* OBJ_presentationAddress          2 5 4 29 */
+     874,    /* OBJ_supportedApplicationContext  2 5 4 30 */
+     875,    /* OBJ_member                       2 5 4 31 */
+     876,    /* OBJ_owner                        2 5 4 32 */
+     877,    /* OBJ_roleOccupant                 2 5 4 33 */
+     878,    /* OBJ_seeAlso                      2 5 4 34 */
+     879,    /* OBJ_userPassword                 2 5 4 35 */
+     880,    /* OBJ_userCertificate              2 5 4 36 */
+     881,    /* OBJ_cACertificate                2 5 4 37 */
+     882,    /* OBJ_authorityRevocationList      2 5 4 38 */
+     883,    /* OBJ_certificateRevocationList    2 5 4 39 */
+     884,    /* OBJ_crossCertificatePair         2 5 4 40 */
+     173,    /* OBJ_name                         2 5 4 41 */
+      99,    /* OBJ_givenName                    2 5 4 42 */
+     101,    /* OBJ_initials                     2 5 4 43 */
+     509,    /* OBJ_generationQualifier          2 5 4 44 */
+     503,    /* OBJ_x500UniqueIdentifier         2 5 4 45 */
+     174,    /* OBJ_dnQualifier                  2 5 4 46 */
+     885,    /* OBJ_enhancedSearchGuide          2 5 4 47 */
+     886,    /* OBJ_protocolInformation          2 5 4 48 */
+     887,    /* OBJ_distinguishedName            2 5 4 49 */
+     888,    /* OBJ_uniqueMember                 2 5 4 50 */
+     889,    /* OBJ_houseIdentifier              2 5 4 51 */
+     890,    /* OBJ_supportedAlgorithms          2 5 4 52 */
+     891,    /* OBJ_deltaRevocationList          2 5 4 53 */
+     892,    /* OBJ_dmdName                      2 5 4 54 */
+     510,    /* OBJ_pseudonym                    2 5 4 65 */
+     400,    /* OBJ_role                         2 5 4 72 */
+     769,    /* OBJ_subject_directory_attributes 2 5 29 9 */
+      82,    /* OBJ_subject_key_identifier       2 5 29 14 */
+      83,    /* OBJ_key_usage                    2 5 29 15 */
+      84,    /* OBJ_private_key_usage_period     2 5 29 16 */
+      85,    /* OBJ_subject_alt_name             2 5 29 17 */
+      86,    /* OBJ_issuer_alt_name              2 5 29 18 */
+      87,    /* OBJ_basic_constraints            2 5 29 19 */
+      88,    /* OBJ_crl_number                   2 5 29 20 */
+     141,    /* OBJ_crl_reason                   2 5 29 21 */
+     430,    /* OBJ_hold_instruction_code        2 5 29 23 */
+     142,    /* OBJ_invalidity_date              2 5 29 24 */
+     140,    /* OBJ_delta_crl                    2 5 29 27 */
+     770,    /* OBJ_issuing_distribution_point   2 5 29 28 */
+     771,    /* OBJ_certificate_issuer           2 5 29 29 */
+     666,    /* OBJ_name_constraints             2 5 29 30 */
+     103,    /* OBJ_crl_distribution_points      2 5 29 31 */
+      89,    /* OBJ_certificate_policies         2 5 29 32 */
+     747,    /* OBJ_policy_mappings              2 5 29 33 */
+      90,    /* OBJ_authority_key_identifier     2 5 29 35 */
+     401,    /* OBJ_policy_constraints           2 5 29 36 */
+     126,    /* OBJ_ext_key_usage                2 5 29 37 */
+     857,    /* OBJ_freshest_crl                 2 5 29 46 */
+     748,    /* OBJ_inhibit_any_policy           2 5 29 54 */
+     402,    /* OBJ_target_information           2 5 29 55 */
+     403,    /* OBJ_no_rev_avail                 2 5 29 56 */
+     513,    /* OBJ_set_ctype                    2 23 42 0 */
+     514,    /* OBJ_set_msgExt                   2 23 42 1 */
+     515,    /* OBJ_set_attr                     2 23 42 3 */
+     516,    /* OBJ_set_policy                   2 23 42 5 */
+     517,    /* OBJ_set_certExt                  2 23 42 7 */
+     518,    /* OBJ_set_brand                    2 23 42 8 */
+     679,    /* OBJ_wap_wsg                      2 23 43 1 */
+     382,    /* OBJ_Directory                    1 3 6 1 1 */
+     383,    /* OBJ_Management                   1 3 6 1 2 */
+     384,    /* OBJ_Experimental                 1 3 6 1 3 */
+     385,    /* OBJ_Private                      1 3 6 1 4 */
+     386,    /* OBJ_Security                     1 3 6 1 5 */
+     387,    /* OBJ_SNMPv2                       1 3 6 1 6 */
+     388,    /* OBJ_Mail                         1 3 6 1 7 */
+     376,    /* OBJ_algorithm                    1 3 14 3 2 */
+     395,    /* OBJ_clearance                    2 5 1 5 55 */
+      19,    /* OBJ_rsa                          2 5 8 1 1 */
+      96,    /* OBJ_mdc2WithRSA                  2 5 8 3 100 */
+      95,    /* OBJ_mdc2                         2 5 8 3 101 */
+     746,    /* OBJ_any_policy                   2 5 29 32 0 */
+     910,    /* OBJ_anyExtendedKeyUsage          2 5 29 37 0 */
+     519,    /* OBJ_setct_PANData                2 23 42 0 0 */
+     520,    /* OBJ_setct_PANToken               2 23 42 0 1 */
+     521,    /* OBJ_setct_PANOnly                2 23 42 0 2 */
+     522,    /* OBJ_setct_OIData                 2 23 42 0 3 */
+     523,    /* OBJ_setct_PI                     2 23 42 0 4 */
+     524,    /* OBJ_setct_PIData                 2 23 42 0 5 */
+     525,    /* OBJ_setct_PIDataUnsigned         2 23 42 0 6 */
+     526,    /* OBJ_setct_HODInput               2 23 42 0 7 */
+     527,    /* OBJ_setct_AuthResBaggage         2 23 42 0 8 */
+     528,    /* OBJ_setct_AuthRevReqBaggage      2 23 42 0 9 */
+     529,    /* OBJ_setct_AuthRevResBaggage      2 23 42 0 10 */
+     530,    /* OBJ_setct_CapTokenSeq            2 23 42 0 11 */
+     531,    /* OBJ_setct_PInitResData           2 23 42 0 12 */
+     532,    /* OBJ_setct_PI_TBS                 2 23 42 0 13 */
+     533,    /* OBJ_setct_PResData               2 23 42 0 14 */
+     534,    /* OBJ_setct_AuthReqTBS             2 23 42 0 16 */
+     535,    /* OBJ_setct_AuthResTBS             2 23 42 0 17 */
+     536,    /* OBJ_setct_AuthResTBSX            2 23 42 0 18 */
+     537,    /* OBJ_setct_AuthTokenTBS           2 23 42 0 19 */
+     538,    /* OBJ_setct_CapTokenData           2 23 42 0 20 */
+     539,    /* OBJ_setct_CapTokenTBS            2 23 42 0 21 */
+     540,    /* OBJ_setct_AcqCardCodeMsg         2 23 42 0 22 */
+     541,    /* OBJ_setct_AuthRevReqTBS          2 23 42 0 23 */
+     542,    /* OBJ_setct_AuthRevResData         2 23 42 0 24 */
+     543,    /* OBJ_setct_AuthRevResTBS          2 23 42 0 25 */
+     544,    /* OBJ_setct_CapReqTBS              2 23 42 0 26 */
+     545,    /* OBJ_setct_CapReqTBSX             2 23 42 0 27 */
+     546,    /* OBJ_setct_CapResData             2 23 42 0 28 */
+     547,    /* OBJ_setct_CapRevReqTBS           2 23 42 0 29 */
+     548,    /* OBJ_setct_CapRevReqTBSX          2 23 42 0 30 */
+     549,    /* OBJ_setct_CapRevResData          2 23 42 0 31 */
+     550,    /* OBJ_setct_CredReqTBS             2 23 42 0 32 */
+     551,    /* OBJ_setct_CredReqTBSX            2 23 42 0 33 */
+     552,    /* OBJ_setct_CredResData            2 23 42 0 34 */
+     553,    /* OBJ_setct_CredRevReqTBS          2 23 42 0 35 */
+     554,    /* OBJ_setct_CredRevReqTBSX         2 23 42 0 36 */
+     555,    /* OBJ_setct_CredRevResData         2 23 42 0 37 */
+     556,    /* OBJ_setct_PCertReqData           2 23 42 0 38 */
+     557,    /* OBJ_setct_PCertResTBS            2 23 42 0 39 */
+     558,    /* OBJ_setct_BatchAdminReqData      2 23 42 0 40 */
+     559,    /* OBJ_setct_BatchAdminResData      2 23 42 0 41 */
+     560,    /* OBJ_setct_CardCInitResTBS        2 23 42 0 42 */
+     561,    /* OBJ_setct_MeAqCInitResTBS        2 23 42 0 43 */
+     562,    /* OBJ_setct_RegFormResTBS          2 23 42 0 44 */
+     563,    /* OBJ_setct_CertReqData            2 23 42 0 45 */
+     564,    /* OBJ_setct_CertReqTBS             2 23 42 0 46 */
+     565,    /* OBJ_setct_CertResData            2 23 42 0 47 */
+     566,    /* OBJ_setct_CertInqReqTBS          2 23 42 0 48 */
+     567,    /* OBJ_setct_ErrorTBS               2 23 42 0 49 */
+     568,    /* OBJ_setct_PIDualSignedTBE        2 23 42 0 50 */
+     569,    /* OBJ_setct_PIUnsignedTBE          2 23 42 0 51 */
+     570,    /* OBJ_setct_AuthReqTBE             2 23 42 0 52 */
+     571,    /* OBJ_setct_AuthResTBE             2 23 42 0 53 */
+     572,    /* OBJ_setct_AuthResTBEX            2 23 42 0 54 */
+     573,    /* OBJ_setct_AuthTokenTBE           2 23 42 0 55 */
+     574,    /* OBJ_setct_CapTokenTBE            2 23 42 0 56 */
+     575,    /* OBJ_setct_CapTokenTBEX           2 23 42 0 57 */
+     576,    /* OBJ_setct_AcqCardCodeMsgTBE      2 23 42 0 58 */
+     577,    /* OBJ_setct_AuthRevReqTBE          2 23 42 0 59 */
+     578,    /* OBJ_setct_AuthRevResTBE          2 23 42 0 60 */
+     579,    /* OBJ_setct_AuthRevResTBEB         2 23 42 0 61 */
+     580,    /* OBJ_setct_CapReqTBE              2 23 42 0 62 */
+     581,    /* OBJ_setct_CapReqTBEX             2 23 42 0 63 */
+     582,    /* OBJ_setct_CapResTBE              2 23 42 0 64 */
+     583,    /* OBJ_setct_CapRevReqTBE           2 23 42 0 65 */
+     584,    /* OBJ_setct_CapRevReqTBEX          2 23 42 0 66 */
+     585,    /* OBJ_setct_CapRevResTBE           2 23 42 0 67 */
+     586,    /* OBJ_setct_CredReqTBE             2 23 42 0 68 */
+     587,    /* OBJ_setct_CredReqTBEX            2 23 42 0 69 */
+     588,    /* OBJ_setct_CredResTBE             2 23 42 0 70 */
+     589,    /* OBJ_setct_CredRevReqTBE          2 23 42 0 71 */
+     590,    /* OBJ_setct_CredRevReqTBEX         2 23 42 0 72 */
+     591,    /* OBJ_setct_CredRevResTBE          2 23 42 0 73 */
+     592,    /* OBJ_setct_BatchAdminReqTBE       2 23 42 0 74 */
+     593,    /* OBJ_setct_BatchAdminResTBE       2 23 42 0 75 */
+     594,    /* OBJ_setct_RegFormReqTBE          2 23 42 0 76 */
+     595,    /* OBJ_setct_CertReqTBE             2 23 42 0 77 */
+     596,    /* OBJ_setct_CertReqTBEX            2 23 42 0 78 */
+     597,    /* OBJ_setct_CertResTBE             2 23 42 0 79 */
+     598,    /* OBJ_setct_CRLNotificationTBS     2 23 42 0 80 */
+     599,    /* OBJ_setct_CRLNotificationResTBS  2 23 42 0 81 */
+     600,    /* OBJ_setct_BCIDistributionTBS     2 23 42 0 82 */
+     601,    /* OBJ_setext_genCrypt              2 23 42 1 1 */
+     602,    /* OBJ_setext_miAuth                2 23 42 1 3 */
+     603,    /* OBJ_setext_pinSecure             2 23 42 1 4 */
+     604,    /* OBJ_setext_pinAny                2 23 42 1 5 */
+     605,    /* OBJ_setext_track2                2 23 42 1 7 */
+     606,    /* OBJ_setext_cv                    2 23 42 1 8 */
+     620,    /* OBJ_setAttr_Cert                 2 23 42 3 0 */
+     621,    /* OBJ_setAttr_PGWYcap              2 23 42 3 1 */
+     622,    /* OBJ_setAttr_TokenType            2 23 42 3 2 */
+     623,    /* OBJ_setAttr_IssCap               2 23 42 3 3 */
+     607,    /* OBJ_set_policy_root              2 23 42 5 0 */
+     608,    /* OBJ_setCext_hashedRoot           2 23 42 7 0 */
+     609,    /* OBJ_setCext_certType             2 23 42 7 1 */
+     610,    /* OBJ_setCext_merchData            2 23 42 7 2 */
+     611,    /* OBJ_setCext_cCertRequired        2 23 42 7 3 */
+     612,    /* OBJ_setCext_tunneling            2 23 42 7 4 */
+     613,    /* OBJ_setCext_setExt               2 23 42 7 5 */
+     614,    /* OBJ_setCext_setQualf             2 23 42 7 6 */
+     615,    /* OBJ_setCext_PGWYcapabilities     2 23 42 7 7 */
+     616,    /* OBJ_setCext_TokenIdentifier      2 23 42 7 8 */
+     617,    /* OBJ_setCext_Track2Data           2 23 42 7 9 */
+     618,    /* OBJ_setCext_TokenType            2 23 42 7 10 */
+     619,    /* OBJ_setCext_IssuerCapabilities   2 23 42 7 11 */
+     636,    /* OBJ_set_brand_IATA_ATA           2 23 42 8 1 */
+     640,    /* OBJ_set_brand_Visa               2 23 42 8 4 */
+     641,    /* OBJ_set_brand_MasterCard         2 23 42 8 5 */
+     637,    /* OBJ_set_brand_Diners             2 23 42 8 30 */
+     638,    /* OBJ_set_brand_AmericanExpress    2 23 42 8 34 */
+     639,    /* OBJ_set_brand_JCB                2 23 42 8 35 */
+     805,    /* OBJ_cryptopro                    1 2 643 2 2 */
+     806,    /* OBJ_cryptocom                    1 2 643 2 9 */
+     974,    /* OBJ_id_tc26                      1 2 643 7 1 */
+    1005,    /* OBJ_OGRN                         1 2 643 100 1 */
+    1006,    /* OBJ_SNILS                        1 2 643 100 3 */
+    1007,    /* OBJ_subjectSignTool              1 2 643 100 111 */
+    1008,    /* OBJ_issuerSignTool               1 2 643 100 112 */
+     184,    /* OBJ_X9_57                        1 2 840 10040 */
+     405,    /* OBJ_ansi_X9_62                   1 2 840 10045 */
+     389,    /* OBJ_Enterprises                  1 3 6 1 4 1 */
+     504,    /* OBJ_mime_mhs                     1 3 6 1 7 1 */
+     104,    /* OBJ_md5WithRSA                   1 3 14 3 2 3 */
+      29,    /* OBJ_des_ecb                      1 3 14 3 2 6 */
+      31,    /* OBJ_des_cbc                      1 3 14 3 2 7 */
+      45,    /* OBJ_des_ofb64                    1 3 14 3 2 8 */
+      30,    /* OBJ_des_cfb64                    1 3 14 3 2 9 */
+     377,    /* OBJ_rsaSignature                 1 3 14 3 2 11 */
+      67,    /* OBJ_dsa_2                        1 3 14 3 2 12 */
+      66,    /* OBJ_dsaWithSHA                   1 3 14 3 2 13 */
+      42,    /* OBJ_shaWithRSAEncryption         1 3 14 3 2 15 */
+      32,    /* OBJ_des_ede_ecb                  1 3 14 3 2 17 */
+      41,    /* OBJ_sha                          1 3 14 3 2 18 */
+      64,    /* OBJ_sha1                         1 3 14 3 2 26 */
+      70,    /* OBJ_dsaWithSHA1_2                1 3 14 3 2 27 */
+     115,    /* OBJ_sha1WithRSA                  1 3 14 3 2 29 */
+     117,    /* OBJ_ripemd160                    1 3 36 3 2 1 */
+     143,    /* OBJ_sxnet                        1 3 101 1 4 1 */
+     721,    /* OBJ_sect163k1                    1 3 132 0 1 */
+     722,    /* OBJ_sect163r1                    1 3 132 0 2 */
+     728,    /* OBJ_sect239k1                    1 3 132 0 3 */
+     717,    /* OBJ_sect113r1                    1 3 132 0 4 */
+     718,    /* OBJ_sect113r2                    1 3 132 0 5 */
+     704,    /* OBJ_secp112r1                    1 3 132 0 6 */
+     705,    /* OBJ_secp112r2                    1 3 132 0 7 */
+     709,    /* OBJ_secp160r1                    1 3 132 0 8 */
+     708,    /* OBJ_secp160k1                    1 3 132 0 9 */
+     714,    /* OBJ_secp256k1                    1 3 132 0 10 */
+     723,    /* OBJ_sect163r2                    1 3 132 0 15 */
+     729,    /* OBJ_sect283k1                    1 3 132 0 16 */
+     730,    /* OBJ_sect283r1                    1 3 132 0 17 */
+     719,    /* OBJ_sect131r1                    1 3 132 0 22 */
+     720,    /* OBJ_sect131r2                    1 3 132 0 23 */
+     724,    /* OBJ_sect193r1                    1 3 132 0 24 */
+     725,    /* OBJ_sect193r2                    1 3 132 0 25 */
+     726,    /* OBJ_sect233k1                    1 3 132 0 26 */
+     727,    /* OBJ_sect233r1                    1 3 132 0 27 */
+     706,    /* OBJ_secp128r1                    1 3 132 0 28 */
+     707,    /* OBJ_secp128r2                    1 3 132 0 29 */
+     710,    /* OBJ_secp160r2                    1 3 132 0 30 */
+     711,    /* OBJ_secp192k1                    1 3 132 0 31 */
+     712,    /* OBJ_secp224k1                    1 3 132 0 32 */
+     713,    /* OBJ_secp224r1                    1 3 132 0 33 */
+     715,    /* OBJ_secp384r1                    1 3 132 0 34 */
+     716,    /* OBJ_secp521r1                    1 3 132 0 35 */
+     731,    /* OBJ_sect409k1                    1 3 132 0 36 */
+     732,    /* OBJ_sect409r1                    1 3 132 0 37 */
+     733,    /* OBJ_sect571k1                    1 3 132 0 38 */
+     734,    /* OBJ_sect571r1                    1 3 132 0 39 */
+     624,    /* OBJ_set_rootKeyThumb             2 23 42 3 0 0 */
+     625,    /* OBJ_set_addPolicy                2 23 42 3 0 1 */
+     626,    /* OBJ_setAttr_Token_EMV            2 23 42 3 2 1 */
+     627,    /* OBJ_setAttr_Token_B0Prime        2 23 42 3 2 2 */
+     628,    /* OBJ_setAttr_IssCap_CVM           2 23 42 3 3 3 */
+     629,    /* OBJ_setAttr_IssCap_T2            2 23 42 3 3 4 */
+     630,    /* OBJ_setAttr_IssCap_Sig           2 23 42 3 3 5 */
+     642,    /* OBJ_set_brand_Novus              2 23 42 8 6011 */
+     735,    /* OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls1       2 23 43 1 4 1 */
+     736,    /* OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls3       2 23 43 1 4 3 */
+     737,    /* OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls4       2 23 43 1 4 4 */
+     738,    /* OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls5       2 23 43 1 4 5 */
+     739,    /* OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls6       2 23 43 1 4 6 */
+     740,    /* OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls7       2 23 43 1 4 7 */
+     741,    /* OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls8       2 23 43 1 4 8 */
+     742,    /* OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls9       2 23 43 1 4 9 */
+     743,    /* OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls10      2 23 43 1 4 10 */
+     744,    /* OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls11      2 23 43 1 4 11 */
+     745,    /* OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls12      2 23 43 1 4 12 */
+     804,    /* OBJ_whirlpool                    1 0 10118 3 0 55 */
+     773,    /* OBJ_kisa                         1 2 410 200004 */
+     807,    /* OBJ_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001 1 2 643 2 2 3 */
+     808,    /* OBJ_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_94 1 2 643 2 2 4 */
+     809,    /* OBJ_id_GostR3411_94              1 2 643 2 2 9 */
+     810,    /* OBJ_id_HMACGostR3411_94          1 2 643 2 2 10 */
+     811,    /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001            1 2 643 2 2 19 */
+     812,    /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_94              1 2 643 2 2 20 */
+     813,    /* OBJ_id_Gost28147_89              1 2 643 2 2 21 */
+     815,    /* OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_MAC          1 2 643 2 2 22 */
+     816,    /* OBJ_id_GostR3411_94_prf          1 2 643 2 2 23 */
+     817,    /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001DH          1 2 643 2 2 98 */
+     818,    /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_94DH            1 2 643 2 2 99 */
+     977,    /* OBJ_id_tc26_algorithms           1 2 643 7 1 1 */
+     994,    /* OBJ_id_tc26_constants            1 2 643 7 1 2 */
+       1,    /* OBJ_rsadsi                       1 2 840 113549 */
+     185,    /* OBJ_X9cm                         1 2 840 10040 4 */
+    1031,    /* OBJ_id_pkinit                    1 3 6 1 5 2 3 */
+     127,    /* OBJ_id_pkix                      1 3 6 1 5 5 7 */
+     505,    /* OBJ_mime_mhs_headings            1 3 6 1 7 1 1 */
+     506,    /* OBJ_mime_mhs_bodies              1 3 6 1 7 1 2 */
+     119,    /* OBJ_ripemd160WithRSA             1 3 36 3 3 1 2 */
+     937,    /* OBJ_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha224kdf_scheme 1 3 132 1 11 0 */
+     938,    /* OBJ_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha256kdf_scheme 1 3 132 1 11 1 */
+     939,    /* OBJ_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha384kdf_scheme 1 3 132 1 11 2 */
+     940,    /* OBJ_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha512kdf_scheme 1 3 132 1 11 3 */
+     942,    /* OBJ_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha224kdf_scheme 1 3 132 1 14 0 */
+     943,    /* OBJ_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha256kdf_scheme 1 3 132 1 14 1 */
+     944,    /* OBJ_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha384kdf_scheme 1 3 132 1 14 2 */
+     945,    /* OBJ_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha512kdf_scheme 1 3 132 1 14 3 */
+     631,    /* OBJ_setAttr_GenCryptgrm          2 23 42 3 3 3 1 */
+     632,    /* OBJ_setAttr_T2Enc                2 23 42 3 3 4 1 */
+     633,    /* OBJ_setAttr_T2cleartxt           2 23 42 3 3 4 2 */
+     634,    /* OBJ_setAttr_TokICCsig            2 23 42 3 3 5 1 */
+     635,    /* OBJ_setAttr_SecDevSig            2 23 42 3 3 5 2 */
+     436,    /* OBJ_ucl                          0 9 2342 19200300 */
+     820,    /* OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_None_KeyMeshing 1 2 643 2 2 14 0 */
+     819,    /* OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_KeyMeshing 1 2 643 2 2 14 1 */
+     845,    /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_a            1 2 643 2 2 20 1 */
+     846,    /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_aBis         1 2 643 2 2 20 2 */
+     847,    /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_b            1 2 643 2 2 20 3 */
+     848,    /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_bBis         1 2 643 2 2 20 4 */
+     821,    /* OBJ_id_GostR3411_94_TestParamSet 1 2 643 2 2 30 0 */
+     822,    /* OBJ_id_GostR3411_94_CryptoProParamSet 1 2 643 2 2 30 1 */
+     823,    /* OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_TestParamSet 1 2 643 2 2 31 0 */
+     824,    /* OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_A_ParamSet 1 2 643 2 2 31 1 */
+     825,    /* OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_B_ParamSet 1 2 643 2 2 31 2 */
+     826,    /* OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_C_ParamSet 1 2 643 2 2 31 3 */
+     827,    /* OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_D_ParamSet 1 2 643 2 2 31 4 */
+     828,    /* OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_Oscar_1_1_ParamSet 1 2 643 2 2 31 5 */
+     829,    /* OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_Oscar_1_0_ParamSet 1 2 643 2 2 31 6 */
+     830,    /* OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_RIC_1_ParamSet 1 2 643 2 2 31 7 */
+     831,    /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_TestParamSet 1 2 643 2 2 32 0 */
+     832,    /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_A_ParamSet 1 2 643 2 2 32 2 */
+     833,    /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_B_ParamSet 1 2 643 2 2 32 3 */
+     834,    /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_C_ParamSet 1 2 643 2 2 32 4 */
+     835,    /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_D_ParamSet 1 2 643 2 2 32 5 */
+     836,    /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_XchA_ParamSet 1 2 643 2 2 33 1 */
+     837,    /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_XchB_ParamSet 1 2 643 2 2 33 2 */
+     838,    /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_XchC_ParamSet 1 2 643 2 2 33 3 */
+     839,    /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001_TestParamSet 1 2 643 2 2 35 0 */
+     840,    /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_A_ParamSet 1 2 643 2 2 35 1 */
+     841,    /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_B_ParamSet 1 2 643 2 2 35 2 */
+     842,    /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_C_ParamSet 1 2 643 2 2 35 3 */
+     843,    /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_XchA_ParamSet 1 2 643 2 2 36 0 */
+     844,    /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_XchB_ParamSet 1 2 643 2 2 36 1 */
+     978,    /* OBJ_id_tc26_sign                 1 2 643 7 1 1 1 */
+     981,    /* OBJ_id_tc26_digest               1 2 643 7 1 1 2 */
+     984,    /* OBJ_id_tc26_signwithdigest       1 2 643 7 1 1 3 */
+     987,    /* OBJ_id_tc26_mac                  1 2 643 7 1 1 4 */
+     990,    /* OBJ_id_tc26_cipher               1 2 643 7 1 1 5 */
+     991,    /* OBJ_id_tc26_agreement            1 2 643 7 1 1 6 */
+     995,    /* OBJ_id_tc26_sign_constants       1 2 643 7 1 2 1 */
+    1000,    /* OBJ_id_tc26_digest_constants     1 2 643 7 1 2 2 */
+    1001,    /* OBJ_id_tc26_cipher_constants     1 2 643 7 1 2 5 */
+       2,    /* OBJ_pkcs                         1 2 840 113549 1 */
+     431,    /* OBJ_hold_instruction_none        1 2 840 10040 2 1 */
+     432,    /* OBJ_hold_instruction_call_issuer 1 2 840 10040 2 2 */
+     433,    /* OBJ_hold_instruction_reject      1 2 840 10040 2 3 */
+     116,    /* OBJ_dsa                          1 2 840 10040 4 1 */
+     113,    /* OBJ_dsaWithSHA1                  1 2 840 10040 4 3 */
+     406,    /* OBJ_X9_62_prime_field            1 2 840 10045 1 1 */
+     407,    /* OBJ_X9_62_characteristic_two_field 1 2 840 10045 1 2 */
+     408,    /* OBJ_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey         1 2 840 10045 2 1 */
+     416,    /* OBJ_ecdsa_with_SHA1              1 2 840 10045 4 1 */
+     791,    /* OBJ_ecdsa_with_Recommended       1 2 840 10045 4 2 */
+     792,    /* OBJ_ecdsa_with_Specified         1 2 840 10045 4 3 */
+     920,    /* OBJ_dhpublicnumber               1 2 840 10046 2 1 */
+    1032,    /* OBJ_pkInitClientAuth             1 3 6 1 5 2 3 4 */
+    1033,    /* OBJ_pkInitKDC                    1 3 6 1 5 2 3 5 */
+     258,    /* OBJ_id_pkix_mod                  1 3 6 1 5 5 7 0 */
+     175,    /* OBJ_id_pe                        1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 */
+     259,    /* OBJ_id_qt                        1 3 6 1 5 5 7 2 */
+     128,    /* OBJ_id_kp                        1 3 6 1 5 5 7 3 */
+     260,    /* OBJ_id_it                        1 3 6 1 5 5 7 4 */
+     261,    /* OBJ_id_pkip                      1 3 6 1 5 5 7 5 */
+     262,    /* OBJ_id_alg                       1 3 6 1 5 5 7 6 */
+     263,    /* OBJ_id_cmc                       1 3 6 1 5 5 7 7 */
+     264,    /* OBJ_id_on                        1 3 6 1 5 5 7 8 */
+     265,    /* OBJ_id_pda                       1 3 6 1 5 5 7 9 */
+     266,    /* OBJ_id_aca                       1 3 6 1 5 5 7 10 */
+     267,    /* OBJ_id_qcs                       1 3 6 1 5 5 7 11 */
+     268,    /* OBJ_id_cct                       1 3 6 1 5 5 7 12 */
+     662,    /* OBJ_id_ppl                       1 3 6 1 5 5 7 21 */
+     176,    /* OBJ_id_ad                        1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 */
+     507,    /* OBJ_id_hex_partial_message       1 3 6 1 7 1 1 1 */
+     508,    /* OBJ_id_hex_multipart_message     1 3 6 1 7 1 1 2 */
+      57,    /* OBJ_netscape                     2 16 840 1 113730 */
+     754,    /* OBJ_camellia_128_ecb             0 3 4401 5 3 1 9 1 */
+     766,    /* OBJ_camellia_128_ofb128          0 3 4401 5 3 1 9 3 */
+     757,    /* OBJ_camellia_128_cfb128          0 3 4401 5 3 1 9 4 */
+     961,    /* OBJ_camellia_128_gcm             0 3 4401 5 3 1 9 6 */
+     962,    /* OBJ_camellia_128_ccm             0 3 4401 5 3 1 9 7 */
+     963,    /* OBJ_camellia_128_ctr             0 3 4401 5 3 1 9 9 */
+     964,    /* OBJ_camellia_128_cmac            0 3 4401 5 3 1 9 10 */
+     755,    /* OBJ_camellia_192_ecb             0 3 4401 5 3 1 9 21 */
+     767,    /* OBJ_camellia_192_ofb128          0 3 4401 5 3 1 9 23 */
+     758,    /* OBJ_camellia_192_cfb128          0 3 4401 5 3 1 9 24 */
+     965,    /* OBJ_camellia_192_gcm             0 3 4401 5 3 1 9 26 */
+     966,    /* OBJ_camellia_192_ccm             0 3 4401 5 3 1 9 27 */
+     967,    /* OBJ_camellia_192_ctr             0 3 4401 5 3 1 9 29 */
+     968,    /* OBJ_camellia_192_cmac            0 3 4401 5 3 1 9 30 */
+     756,    /* OBJ_camellia_256_ecb             0 3 4401 5 3 1 9 41 */
+     768,    /* OBJ_camellia_256_ofb128          0 3 4401 5 3 1 9 43 */
+     759,    /* OBJ_camellia_256_cfb128          0 3 4401 5 3 1 9 44 */
+     969,    /* OBJ_camellia_256_gcm             0 3 4401 5 3 1 9 46 */
+     970,    /* OBJ_camellia_256_ccm             0 3 4401 5 3 1 9 47 */
+     971,    /* OBJ_camellia_256_ctr             0 3 4401 5 3 1 9 49 */
+     972,    /* OBJ_camellia_256_cmac            0 3 4401 5 3 1 9 50 */
+     437,    /* OBJ_pilot                        0 9 2342 19200300 100 */
+     776,    /* OBJ_seed_ecb                     1 2 410 200004 1 3 */
+     777,    /* OBJ_seed_cbc                     1 2 410 200004 1 4 */
+     779,    /* OBJ_seed_cfb128                  1 2 410 200004 1 5 */
+     778,    /* OBJ_seed_ofb128                  1 2 410 200004 1 6 */
+     852,    /* OBJ_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_94_cc 1 2 643 2 9 1 3 3 */
+     853,    /* OBJ_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001_cc 1 2 643 2 9 1 3 4 */
+     850,    /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_cc           1 2 643 2 9 1 5 3 */
+     851,    /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001_cc         1 2 643 2 9 1 5 4 */
+     849,    /* OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_cc           1 2 643 2 9 1 6 1 */
+     854,    /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001_ParamSet_cc 1 2 643 2 9 1 8 1 */
+    1004,    /* OBJ_INN                          1 2 643 3 131 1 1 */
+     979,    /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_2012_256        1 2 643 7 1 1 1 1 */
+     980,    /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_2012_512        1 2 643 7 1 1 1 2 */
+     982,    /* OBJ_id_GostR3411_2012_256        1 2 643 7 1 1 2 2 */
+     983,    /* OBJ_id_GostR3411_2012_512        1 2 643 7 1 1 2 3 */
+     985,    /* OBJ_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256 1 2 643 7 1 1 3 2 */
+     986,    /* OBJ_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512 1 2 643 7 1 1 3 3 */
+     988,    /* OBJ_id_tc26_hmac_gost_3411_2012_256 1 2 643 7 1 1 4 1 */
+     989,    /* OBJ_id_tc26_hmac_gost_3411_2012_512 1 2 643 7 1 1 4 2 */
+     992,    /* OBJ_id_tc26_agreement_gost_3410_2012_256 1 2 643 7 1 1 6 1 */
+     993,    /* OBJ_id_tc26_agreement_gost_3410_2012_512 1 2 643 7 1 1 6 2 */
+     996,    /* OBJ_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_constants 1 2 643 7 1 2 1 2 */
+    1002,    /* OBJ_id_tc26_gost_28147_constants 1 2 643 7 1 2 5 1 */
+     186,    /* OBJ_pkcs1                        1 2 840 113549 1 1 */
+      27,    /* OBJ_pkcs3                        1 2 840 113549 1 3 */
+     187,    /* OBJ_pkcs5                        1 2 840 113549 1 5 */
+      20,    /* OBJ_pkcs7                        1 2 840 113549 1 7 */
+      47,    /* OBJ_pkcs9                        1 2 840 113549 1 9 */
+       3,    /* OBJ_md2                          1 2 840 113549 2 2 */
+     257,    /* OBJ_md4                          1 2 840 113549 2 4 */
+       4,    /* OBJ_md5                          1 2 840 113549 2 5 */
+     797,    /* OBJ_hmacWithMD5                  1 2 840 113549 2 6 */
+     163,    /* OBJ_hmacWithSHA1                 1 2 840 113549 2 7 */
+     798,    /* OBJ_hmacWithSHA224               1 2 840 113549 2 8 */
+     799,    /* OBJ_hmacWithSHA256               1 2 840 113549 2 9 */
+     800,    /* OBJ_hmacWithSHA384               1 2 840 113549 2 10 */
+     801,    /* OBJ_hmacWithSHA512               1 2 840 113549 2 11 */
+      37,    /* OBJ_rc2_cbc                      1 2 840 113549 3 2 */
+       5,    /* OBJ_rc4                          1 2 840 113549 3 4 */
+      44,    /* OBJ_des_ede3_cbc                 1 2 840 113549 3 7 */
+     120,    /* OBJ_rc5_cbc                      1 2 840 113549 3 8 */
+     643,    /* OBJ_des_cdmf                     1 2 840 113549 3 10 */
+     680,    /* OBJ_X9_62_id_characteristic_two_basis 1 2 840 10045 1 2 3 */
+     684,    /* OBJ_X9_62_c2pnb163v1             1 2 840 10045 3 0 1 */
+     685,    /* OBJ_X9_62_c2pnb163v2             1 2 840 10045 3 0 2 */
+     686,    /* OBJ_X9_62_c2pnb163v3             1 2 840 10045 3 0 3 */
+     687,    /* OBJ_X9_62_c2pnb176v1             1 2 840 10045 3 0 4 */
+     688,    /* OBJ_X9_62_c2tnb191v1             1 2 840 10045 3 0 5 */
+     689,    /* OBJ_X9_62_c2tnb191v2             1 2 840 10045 3 0 6 */
+     690,    /* OBJ_X9_62_c2tnb191v3             1 2 840 10045 3 0 7 */
+     691,    /* OBJ_X9_62_c2onb191v4             1 2 840 10045 3 0 8 */
+     692,    /* OBJ_X9_62_c2onb191v5             1 2 840 10045 3 0 9 */
+     693,    /* OBJ_X9_62_c2pnb208w1             1 2 840 10045 3 0 10 */
+     694,    /* OBJ_X9_62_c2tnb239v1             1 2 840 10045 3 0 11 */
+     695,    /* OBJ_X9_62_c2tnb239v2             1 2 840 10045 3 0 12 */
+     696,    /* OBJ_X9_62_c2tnb239v3             1 2 840 10045 3 0 13 */
+     697,    /* OBJ_X9_62_c2onb239v4             1 2 840 10045 3 0 14 */
+     698,    /* OBJ_X9_62_c2onb239v5             1 2 840 10045 3 0 15 */
+     699,    /* OBJ_X9_62_c2pnb272w1             1 2 840 10045 3 0 16 */
+     700,    /* OBJ_X9_62_c2pnb304w1             1 2 840 10045 3 0 17 */
+     701,    /* OBJ_X9_62_c2tnb359v1             1 2 840 10045 3 0 18 */
+     702,    /* OBJ_X9_62_c2pnb368w1             1 2 840 10045 3 0 19 */
+     703,    /* OBJ_X9_62_c2tnb431r1             1 2 840 10045 3 0 20 */
+     409,    /* OBJ_X9_62_prime192v1             1 2 840 10045 3 1 1 */
+     410,    /* OBJ_X9_62_prime192v2             1 2 840 10045 3 1 2 */
+     411,    /* OBJ_X9_62_prime192v3             1 2 840 10045 3 1 3 */
+     412,    /* OBJ_X9_62_prime239v1             1 2 840 10045 3 1 4 */
+     413,    /* OBJ_X9_62_prime239v2             1 2 840 10045 3 1 5 */
+     414,    /* OBJ_X9_62_prime239v3             1 2 840 10045 3 1 6 */
+     415,    /* OBJ_X9_62_prime256v1             1 2 840 10045 3 1 7 */
+     793,    /* OBJ_ecdsa_with_SHA224            1 2 840 10045 4 3 1 */
+     794,    /* OBJ_ecdsa_with_SHA256            1 2 840 10045 4 3 2 */
+     795,    /* OBJ_ecdsa_with_SHA384            1 2 840 10045 4 3 3 */
+     796,    /* OBJ_ecdsa_with_SHA512            1 2 840 10045 4 3 4 */
+     269,    /* OBJ_id_pkix1_explicit_88         1 3 6 1 5 5 7 0 1 */
+     270,    /* OBJ_id_pkix1_implicit_88         1 3 6 1 5 5 7 0 2 */
+     271,    /* OBJ_id_pkix1_explicit_93         1 3 6 1 5 5 7 0 3 */
+     272,    /* OBJ_id_pkix1_implicit_93         1 3 6 1 5 5 7 0 4 */
+     273,    /* OBJ_id_mod_crmf                  1 3 6 1 5 5 7 0 5 */
+     274,    /* OBJ_id_mod_cmc                   1 3 6 1 5 5 7 0 6 */
+     275,    /* OBJ_id_mod_kea_profile_88        1 3 6 1 5 5 7 0 7 */
+     276,    /* OBJ_id_mod_kea_profile_93        1 3 6 1 5 5 7 0 8 */
+     277,    /* OBJ_id_mod_cmp                   1 3 6 1 5 5 7 0 9 */
+     278,    /* OBJ_id_mod_qualified_cert_88     1 3 6 1 5 5 7 0 10 */
+     279,    /* OBJ_id_mod_qualified_cert_93     1 3 6 1 5 5 7 0 11 */
+     280,    /* OBJ_id_mod_attribute_cert        1 3 6 1 5 5 7 0 12 */
+     281,    /* OBJ_id_mod_timestamp_protocol    1 3 6 1 5 5 7 0 13 */
+     282,    /* OBJ_id_mod_ocsp                  1 3 6 1 5 5 7 0 14 */
+     283,    /* OBJ_id_mod_dvcs                  1 3 6 1 5 5 7 0 15 */
+     284,    /* OBJ_id_mod_cmp2000               1 3 6 1 5 5 7 0 16 */
+     177,    /* OBJ_info_access                  1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 1 */
+     285,    /* OBJ_biometricInfo                1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 2 */
+     286,    /* OBJ_qcStatements                 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 3 */
+     287,    /* OBJ_ac_auditEntity               1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 4 */
+     288,    /* OBJ_ac_targeting                 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 5 */
+     289,    /* OBJ_aaControls                   1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 6 */
+     290,    /* OBJ_sbgp_ipAddrBlock             1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 7 */
+     291,    /* OBJ_sbgp_autonomousSysNum        1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 8 */
+     292,    /* OBJ_sbgp_routerIdentifier        1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 9 */
+     397,    /* OBJ_ac_proxying                  1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 10 */
+     398,    /* OBJ_sinfo_access                 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 11 */
+     663,    /* OBJ_proxyCertInfo                1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 14 */
+    1020,    /* OBJ_tlsfeature                   1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 24 */
+     164,    /* OBJ_id_qt_cps                    1 3 6 1 5 5 7 2 1 */
+     165,    /* OBJ_id_qt_unotice                1 3 6 1 5 5 7 2 2 */
+     293,    /* OBJ_textNotice                   1 3 6 1 5 5 7 2 3 */
+     129,    /* OBJ_server_auth                  1 3 6 1 5 5 7 3 1 */
+     130,    /* OBJ_client_auth                  1 3 6 1 5 5 7 3 2 */
+     131,    /* OBJ_code_sign                    1 3 6 1 5 5 7 3 3 */
+     132,    /* OBJ_email_protect                1 3 6 1 5 5 7 3 4 */
+     294,    /* OBJ_ipsecEndSystem               1 3 6 1 5 5 7 3 5 */
+     295,    /* OBJ_ipsecTunnel                  1 3 6 1 5 5 7 3 6 */
+     296,    /* OBJ_ipsecUser                    1 3 6 1 5 5 7 3 7 */
+     133,    /* OBJ_time_stamp                   1 3 6 1 5 5 7 3 8 */
+     180,    /* OBJ_OCSP_sign                    1 3 6 1 5 5 7 3 9 */
+     297,    /* OBJ_dvcs                         1 3 6 1 5 5 7 3 10 */
+    1022,    /* OBJ_ipsec_IKE                    1 3 6 1 5 5 7 3 17 */
+    1023,    /* OBJ_capwapAC                     1 3 6 1 5 5 7 3 18 */
+    1024,    /* OBJ_capwapWTP                    1 3 6 1 5 5 7 3 19 */
+    1025,    /* OBJ_sshClient                    1 3 6 1 5 5 7 3 21 */
+    1026,    /* OBJ_sshServer                    1 3 6 1 5 5 7 3 22 */
+    1027,    /* OBJ_sendRouter                   1 3 6 1 5 5 7 3 23 */
+    1028,    /* OBJ_sendProxiedRouter            1 3 6 1 5 5 7 3 24 */
+    1029,    /* OBJ_sendOwner                    1 3 6 1 5 5 7 3 25 */
+    1030,    /* OBJ_sendProxiedOwner             1 3 6 1 5 5 7 3 26 */
+     298,    /* OBJ_id_it_caProtEncCert          1 3 6 1 5 5 7 4 1 */
+     299,    /* OBJ_id_it_signKeyPairTypes       1 3 6 1 5 5 7 4 2 */
+     300,    /* OBJ_id_it_encKeyPairTypes        1 3 6 1 5 5 7 4 3 */
+     301,    /* OBJ_id_it_preferredSymmAlg       1 3 6 1 5 5 7 4 4 */
+     302,    /* OBJ_id_it_caKeyUpdateInfo        1 3 6 1 5 5 7 4 5 */
+     303,    /* OBJ_id_it_currentCRL             1 3 6 1 5 5 7 4 6 */
+     304,    /* OBJ_id_it_unsupportedOIDs        1 3 6 1 5 5 7 4 7 */
+     305,    /* OBJ_id_it_subscriptionRequest    1 3 6 1 5 5 7 4 8 */
+     306,    /* OBJ_id_it_subscriptionResponse   1 3 6 1 5 5 7 4 9 */
+     307,    /* OBJ_id_it_keyPairParamReq        1 3 6 1 5 5 7 4 10 */
+     308,    /* OBJ_id_it_keyPairParamRep        1 3 6 1 5 5 7 4 11 */
+     309,    /* OBJ_id_it_revPassphrase          1 3 6 1 5 5 7 4 12 */
+     310,    /* OBJ_id_it_implicitConfirm        1 3 6 1 5 5 7 4 13 */
+     311,    /* OBJ_id_it_confirmWaitTime        1 3 6 1 5 5 7 4 14 */
+     312,    /* OBJ_id_it_origPKIMessage         1 3 6 1 5 5 7 4 15 */
+     784,    /* OBJ_id_it_suppLangTags           1 3 6 1 5 5 7 4 16 */
+     313,    /* OBJ_id_regCtrl                   1 3 6 1 5 5 7 5 1 */
+     314,    /* OBJ_id_regInfo                   1 3 6 1 5 5 7 5 2 */
+     323,    /* OBJ_id_alg_des40                 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 6 1 */
+     324,    /* OBJ_id_alg_noSignature           1 3 6 1 5 5 7 6 2 */
+     325,    /* OBJ_id_alg_dh_sig_hmac_sha1      1 3 6 1 5 5 7 6 3 */
+     326,    /* OBJ_id_alg_dh_pop                1 3 6 1 5 5 7 6 4 */
+     327,    /* OBJ_id_cmc_statusInfo            1 3 6 1 5 5 7 7 1 */
+     328,    /* OBJ_id_cmc_identification        1 3 6 1 5 5 7 7 2 */
+     329,    /* OBJ_id_cmc_identityProof         1 3 6 1 5 5 7 7 3 */
+     330,    /* OBJ_id_cmc_dataReturn            1 3 6 1 5 5 7 7 4 */
+     331,    /* OBJ_id_cmc_transactionId         1 3 6 1 5 5 7 7 5 */
+     332,    /* OBJ_id_cmc_senderNonce           1 3 6 1 5 5 7 7 6 */
+     333,    /* OBJ_id_cmc_recipientNonce        1 3 6 1 5 5 7 7 7 */
+     334,    /* OBJ_id_cmc_addExtensions         1 3 6 1 5 5 7 7 8 */
+     335,    /* OBJ_id_cmc_encryptedPOP          1 3 6 1 5 5 7 7 9 */
+     336,    /* OBJ_id_cmc_decryptedPOP          1 3 6 1 5 5 7 7 10 */
+     337,    /* OBJ_id_cmc_lraPOPWitness         1 3 6 1 5 5 7 7 11 */
+     338,    /* OBJ_id_cmc_getCert               1 3 6 1 5 5 7 7 15 */
+     339,    /* OBJ_id_cmc_getCRL                1 3 6 1 5 5 7 7 16 */
+     340,    /* OBJ_id_cmc_revokeRequest         1 3 6 1 5 5 7 7 17 */
+     341,    /* OBJ_id_cmc_regInfo               1 3 6 1 5 5 7 7 18 */
+     342,    /* OBJ_id_cmc_responseInfo          1 3 6 1 5 5 7 7 19 */
+     343,    /* OBJ_id_cmc_queryPending          1 3 6 1 5 5 7 7 21 */
+     344,    /* OBJ_id_cmc_popLinkRandom         1 3 6 1 5 5 7 7 22 */
+     345,    /* OBJ_id_cmc_popLinkWitness        1 3 6 1 5 5 7 7 23 */
+     346,    /* OBJ_id_cmc_confirmCertAcceptance 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 7 24 */
+     347,    /* OBJ_id_on_personalData           1 3 6 1 5 5 7 8 1 */
+     858,    /* OBJ_id_on_permanentIdentifier    1 3 6 1 5 5 7 8 3 */
+     348,    /* OBJ_id_pda_dateOfBirth           1 3 6 1 5 5 7 9 1 */
+     349,    /* OBJ_id_pda_placeOfBirth          1 3 6 1 5 5 7 9 2 */
+     351,    /* OBJ_id_pda_gender                1 3 6 1 5 5 7 9 3 */
+     352,    /* OBJ_id_pda_countryOfCitizenship  1 3 6 1 5 5 7 9 4 */
+     353,    /* OBJ_id_pda_countryOfResidence    1 3 6 1 5 5 7 9 5 */
+     354,    /* OBJ_id_aca_authenticationInfo    1 3 6 1 5 5 7 10 1 */
+     355,    /* OBJ_id_aca_accessIdentity        1 3 6 1 5 5 7 10 2 */
+     356,    /* OBJ_id_aca_chargingIdentity      1 3 6 1 5 5 7 10 3 */
+     357,    /* OBJ_id_aca_group                 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 10 4 */
+     358,    /* OBJ_id_aca_role                  1 3 6 1 5 5 7 10 5 */
+     399,    /* OBJ_id_aca_encAttrs              1 3 6 1 5 5 7 10 6 */
+     359,    /* OBJ_id_qcs_pkixQCSyntax_v1       1 3 6 1 5 5 7 11 1 */
+     360,    /* OBJ_id_cct_crs                   1 3 6 1 5 5 7 12 1 */
+     361,    /* OBJ_id_cct_PKIData               1 3 6 1 5 5 7 12 2 */
+     362,    /* OBJ_id_cct_PKIResponse           1 3 6 1 5 5 7 12 3 */
+     664,    /* OBJ_id_ppl_anyLanguage           1 3 6 1 5 5 7 21 0 */
+     665,    /* OBJ_id_ppl_inheritAll            1 3 6 1 5 5 7 21 1 */
+     667,    /* OBJ_Independent                  1 3 6 1 5 5 7 21 2 */
+     178,    /* OBJ_ad_OCSP                      1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 1 */
+     179,    /* OBJ_ad_ca_issuers                1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 2 */
+     363,    /* OBJ_ad_timeStamping              1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 3 */
+     364,    /* OBJ_ad_dvcs                      1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 4 */
+     785,    /* OBJ_caRepository                 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 5 */
+     780,    /* OBJ_hmac_md5                     1 3 6 1 5 5 8 1 1 */
+     781,    /* OBJ_hmac_sha1                    1 3 6 1 5 5 8 1 2 */
+      58,    /* OBJ_netscape_cert_extension      2 16 840 1 113730 1 */
+      59,    /* OBJ_netscape_data_type           2 16 840 1 113730 2 */
+     438,    /* OBJ_pilotAttributeType           0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 */
+     439,    /* OBJ_pilotAttributeSyntax         0 9 2342 19200300 100 3 */
+     440,    /* OBJ_pilotObjectClass             0 9 2342 19200300 100 4 */
+     441,    /* OBJ_pilotGroups                  0 9 2342 19200300 100 10 */
+     997,    /* OBJ_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetTest 1 2 643 7 1 2 1 2 0 */
+     998,    /* OBJ_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetA 1 2 643 7 1 2 1 2 1 */
+     999,    /* OBJ_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetB 1 2 643 7 1 2 1 2 2 */
+    1003,    /* OBJ_id_tc26_gost_28147_param_Z   1 2 643 7 1 2 5 1 1 */
+     108,    /* OBJ_cast5_cbc                    1 2 840 113533 7 66 10 */
+     112,    /* OBJ_pbeWithMD5AndCast5_CBC       1 2 840 113533 7 66 12 */
+     782,    /* OBJ_id_PasswordBasedMAC          1 2 840 113533 7 66 13 */
+     783,    /* OBJ_id_DHBasedMac                1 2 840 113533 7 66 30 */
+       6,    /* OBJ_rsaEncryption                1 2 840 113549 1 1 1 */
+       7,    /* OBJ_md2WithRSAEncryption         1 2 840 113549 1 1 2 */
+     396,    /* OBJ_md4WithRSAEncryption         1 2 840 113549 1 1 3 */
+       8,    /* OBJ_md5WithRSAEncryption         1 2 840 113549 1 1 4 */
+      65,    /* OBJ_sha1WithRSAEncryption        1 2 840 113549 1 1 5 */
+     644,    /* OBJ_rsaOAEPEncryptionSET         1 2 840 113549 1 1 6 */
+     919,    /* OBJ_rsaesOaep                    1 2 840 113549 1 1 7 */
+     911,    /* OBJ_mgf1                         1 2 840 113549 1 1 8 */
+     935,    /* OBJ_pSpecified                   1 2 840 113549 1 1 9 */
+     912,    /* OBJ_rsassaPss                    1 2 840 113549 1 1 10 */
+     668,    /* OBJ_sha256WithRSAEncryption      1 2 840 113549 1 1 11 */
+     669,    /* OBJ_sha384WithRSAEncryption      1 2 840 113549 1 1 12 */
+     670,    /* OBJ_sha512WithRSAEncryption      1 2 840 113549 1 1 13 */
+     671,    /* OBJ_sha224WithRSAEncryption      1 2 840 113549 1 1 14 */
+      28,    /* OBJ_dhKeyAgreement               1 2 840 113549 1 3 1 */
+       9,    /* OBJ_pbeWithMD2AndDES_CBC         1 2 840 113549 1 5 1 */
+      10,    /* OBJ_pbeWithMD5AndDES_CBC         1 2 840 113549 1 5 3 */
+     168,    /* OBJ_pbeWithMD2AndRC2_CBC         1 2 840 113549 1 5 4 */
+     169,    /* OBJ_pbeWithMD5AndRC2_CBC         1 2 840 113549 1 5 6 */
+     170,    /* OBJ_pbeWithSHA1AndDES_CBC        1 2 840 113549 1 5 10 */
+      68,    /* OBJ_pbeWithSHA1AndRC2_CBC        1 2 840 113549 1 5 11 */
+      69,    /* OBJ_id_pbkdf2                    1 2 840 113549 1 5 12 */
+     161,    /* OBJ_pbes2                        1 2 840 113549 1 5 13 */
+     162,    /* OBJ_pbmac1                       1 2 840 113549 1 5 14 */
+      21,    /* OBJ_pkcs7_data                   1 2 840 113549 1 7 1 */
+      22,    /* OBJ_pkcs7_signed                 1 2 840 113549 1 7 2 */
+      23,    /* OBJ_pkcs7_enveloped              1 2 840 113549 1 7 3 */
+      24,    /* OBJ_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped     1 2 840 113549 1 7 4 */
+      25,    /* OBJ_pkcs7_digest                 1 2 840 113549 1 7 5 */
+      26,    /* OBJ_pkcs7_encrypted              1 2 840 113549 1 7 6 */
+      48,    /* OBJ_pkcs9_emailAddress           1 2 840 113549 1 9 1 */
+      49,    /* OBJ_pkcs9_unstructuredName       1 2 840 113549 1 9 2 */
+      50,    /* OBJ_pkcs9_contentType            1 2 840 113549 1 9 3 */
+      51,    /* OBJ_pkcs9_messageDigest          1 2 840 113549 1 9 4 */
+      52,    /* OBJ_pkcs9_signingTime            1 2 840 113549 1 9 5 */
+      53,    /* OBJ_pkcs9_countersignature       1 2 840 113549 1 9 6 */
+      54,    /* OBJ_pkcs9_challengePassword      1 2 840 113549 1 9 7 */
+      55,    /* OBJ_pkcs9_unstructuredAddress    1 2 840 113549 1 9 8 */
+      56,    /* OBJ_pkcs9_extCertAttributes      1 2 840 113549 1 9 9 */
+     172,    /* OBJ_ext_req                      1 2 840 113549 1 9 14 */
+     167,    /* OBJ_SMIMECapabilities            1 2 840 113549 1 9 15 */
+     188,    /* OBJ_SMIME                        1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 */
+     156,    /* OBJ_friendlyName                 1 2 840 113549 1 9 20 */
+     157,    /* OBJ_localKeyID                   1 2 840 113549 1 9 21 */
+     681,    /* OBJ_X9_62_onBasis                1 2 840 10045 1 2 3 1 */
+     682,    /* OBJ_X9_62_tpBasis                1 2 840 10045 1 2 3 2 */
+     683,    /* OBJ_X9_62_ppBasis                1 2 840 10045 1 2 3 3 */
+     417,    /* OBJ_ms_csp_name                  1 3 6 1 4 1 311 17 1 */
+     856,    /* OBJ_LocalKeySet                  1 3 6 1 4 1 311 17 2 */
+     390,    /* OBJ_dcObject                     1 3 6 1 4 1 1466 344 */
+      91,    /* OBJ_bf_cbc                       1 3 6 1 4 1 3029 1 2 */
+     973,    /* OBJ_id_scrypt                    1 3 6 1 4 1 11591 4 11 */
+     315,    /* OBJ_id_regCtrl_regToken          1 3 6 1 5 5 7 5 1 1 */
+     316,    /* OBJ_id_regCtrl_authenticator     1 3 6 1 5 5 7 5 1 2 */
+     317,    /* OBJ_id_regCtrl_pkiPublicationInfo 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 5 1 3 */
+     318,    /* OBJ_id_regCtrl_pkiArchiveOptions 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 5 1 4 */
+     319,    /* OBJ_id_regCtrl_oldCertID         1 3 6 1 5 5 7 5 1 5 */
+     320,    /* OBJ_id_regCtrl_protocolEncrKey   1 3 6 1 5 5 7 5 1 6 */
+     321,    /* OBJ_id_regInfo_utf8Pairs         1 3 6 1 5 5 7 5 2 1 */
+     322,    /* OBJ_id_regInfo_certReq           1 3 6 1 5 5 7 5 2 2 */
+     365,    /* OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_basic           1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 1 1 */
+     366,    /* OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_Nonce           1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 1 2 */
+     367,    /* OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_CrlID           1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 1 3 */
+     368,    /* OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_acceptableResponses 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 1 4 */
+     369,    /* OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_noCheck         1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 1 5 */
+     370,    /* OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_archiveCutoff   1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 1 6 */
+     371,    /* OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_serviceLocator  1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 1 7 */
+     372,    /* OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_extendedStatus  1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 1 8 */
+     373,    /* OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_valid           1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 1 9 */
+     374,    /* OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_path            1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 1 10 */
+     375,    /* OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_trustRoot       1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 1 11 */
+     921,    /* OBJ_brainpoolP160r1              1 3 36 3 3 2 8 1 1 1 */
+     922,    /* OBJ_brainpoolP160t1              1 3 36 3 3 2 8 1 1 2 */
+     923,    /* OBJ_brainpoolP192r1              1 3 36 3 3 2 8 1 1 3 */
+     924,    /* OBJ_brainpoolP192t1              1 3 36 3 3 2 8 1 1 4 */
+     925,    /* OBJ_brainpoolP224r1              1 3 36 3 3 2 8 1 1 5 */
+     926,    /* OBJ_brainpoolP224t1              1 3 36 3 3 2 8 1 1 6 */
+     927,    /* OBJ_brainpoolP256r1              1 3 36 3 3 2 8 1 1 7 */
+     928,    /* OBJ_brainpoolP256t1              1 3 36 3 3 2 8 1 1 8 */
+     929,    /* OBJ_brainpoolP320r1              1 3 36 3 3 2 8 1 1 9 */
+     930,    /* OBJ_brainpoolP320t1              1 3 36 3 3 2 8 1 1 10 */
+     931,    /* OBJ_brainpoolP384r1              1 3 36 3 3 2 8 1 1 11 */
+     932,    /* OBJ_brainpoolP384t1              1 3 36 3 3 2 8 1 1 12 */
+     933,    /* OBJ_brainpoolP512r1              1 3 36 3 3 2 8 1 1 13 */
+     934,    /* OBJ_brainpoolP512t1              1 3 36 3 3 2 8 1 1 14 */
+     936,    /* OBJ_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha1kdf_scheme 1 3 133 16 840 63 0 2 */
+     941,    /* OBJ_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha1kdf_scheme 1 3 133 16 840 63 0 3 */
+     418,    /* OBJ_aes_128_ecb                  2 16 840 1 101 3 4 1 1 */
+     419,    /* OBJ_aes_128_cbc                  2 16 840 1 101 3 4 1 2 */
+     420,    /* OBJ_aes_128_ofb128               2 16 840 1 101 3 4 1 3 */
+     421,    /* OBJ_aes_128_cfb128               2 16 840 1 101 3 4 1 4 */
+     788,    /* OBJ_id_aes128_wrap               2 16 840 1 101 3 4 1 5 */
+     895,    /* OBJ_aes_128_gcm                  2 16 840 1 101 3 4 1 6 */
+     896,    /* OBJ_aes_128_ccm                  2 16 840 1 101 3 4 1 7 */
+     897,    /* OBJ_id_aes128_wrap_pad           2 16 840 1 101 3 4 1 8 */
+     422,    /* OBJ_aes_192_ecb                  2 16 840 1 101 3 4 1 21 */
+     423,    /* OBJ_aes_192_cbc                  2 16 840 1 101 3 4 1 22 */
+     424,    /* OBJ_aes_192_ofb128               2 16 840 1 101 3 4 1 23 */
+     425,    /* OBJ_aes_192_cfb128               2 16 840 1 101 3 4 1 24 */
+     789,    /* OBJ_id_aes192_wrap               2 16 840 1 101 3 4 1 25 */
+     898,    /* OBJ_aes_192_gcm                  2 16 840 1 101 3 4 1 26 */
+     899,    /* OBJ_aes_192_ccm                  2 16 840 1 101 3 4 1 27 */
+     900,    /* OBJ_id_aes192_wrap_pad           2 16 840 1 101 3 4 1 28 */
+     426,    /* OBJ_aes_256_ecb                  2 16 840 1 101 3 4 1 41 */
+     427,    /* OBJ_aes_256_cbc                  2 16 840 1 101 3 4 1 42 */
+     428,    /* OBJ_aes_256_ofb128               2 16 840 1 101 3 4 1 43 */
+     429,    /* OBJ_aes_256_cfb128               2 16 840 1 101 3 4 1 44 */
+     790,    /* OBJ_id_aes256_wrap               2 16 840 1 101 3 4 1 45 */
+     901,    /* OBJ_aes_256_gcm                  2 16 840 1 101 3 4 1 46 */
+     902,    /* OBJ_aes_256_ccm                  2 16 840 1 101 3 4 1 47 */
+     903,    /* OBJ_id_aes256_wrap_pad           2 16 840 1 101 3 4 1 48 */
+     672,    /* OBJ_sha256                       2 16 840 1 101 3 4 2 1 */
+     673,    /* OBJ_sha384                       2 16 840 1 101 3 4 2 2 */
+     674,    /* OBJ_sha512                       2 16 840 1 101 3 4 2 3 */
+     675,    /* OBJ_sha224                       2 16 840 1 101 3 4 2 4 */
+     802,    /* OBJ_dsa_with_SHA224              2 16 840 1 101 3 4 3 1 */
+     803,    /* OBJ_dsa_with_SHA256              2 16 840 1 101 3 4 3 2 */
+      71,    /* OBJ_netscape_cert_type           2 16 840 1 113730 1 1 */
+      72,    /* OBJ_netscape_base_url            2 16 840 1 113730 1 2 */
+      73,    /* OBJ_netscape_revocation_url      2 16 840 1 113730 1 3 */
+      74,    /* OBJ_netscape_ca_revocation_url   2 16 840 1 113730 1 4 */
+      75,    /* OBJ_netscape_renewal_url         2 16 840 1 113730 1 7 */
+      76,    /* OBJ_netscape_ca_policy_url       2 16 840 1 113730 1 8 */
+      77,    /* OBJ_netscape_ssl_server_name     2 16 840 1 113730 1 12 */
+      78,    /* OBJ_netscape_comment             2 16 840 1 113730 1 13 */
+      79,    /* OBJ_netscape_cert_sequence       2 16 840 1 113730 2 5 */
+     139,    /* OBJ_ns_sgc                       2 16 840 1 113730 4 1 */
+     458,    /* OBJ_userId                       0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 1 */
+     459,    /* OBJ_textEncodedORAddress         0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 2 */
+     460,    /* OBJ_rfc822Mailbox                0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 3 */
+     461,    /* OBJ_info                         0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 4 */
+     462,    /* OBJ_favouriteDrink               0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 5 */
+     463,    /* OBJ_roomNumber                   0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 6 */
+     464,    /* OBJ_photo                        0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 7 */
+     465,    /* OBJ_userClass                    0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 8 */
+     466,    /* OBJ_host                         0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 9 */
+     467,    /* OBJ_manager                      0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 10 */
+     468,    /* OBJ_documentIdentifier           0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 11 */
+     469,    /* OBJ_documentTitle                0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 12 */
+     470,    /* OBJ_documentVersion              0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 13 */
+     471,    /* OBJ_documentAuthor               0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 14 */
+     472,    /* OBJ_documentLocation             0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 15 */
+     473,    /* OBJ_homeTelephoneNumber          0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 20 */
+     474,    /* OBJ_secretary                    0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 21 */
+     475,    /* OBJ_otherMailbox                 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 22 */
+     476,    /* OBJ_lastModifiedTime             0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 23 */
+     477,    /* OBJ_lastModifiedBy               0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 24 */
+     391,    /* OBJ_domainComponent              0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 25 */
+     478,    /* OBJ_aRecord                      0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 26 */
+     479,    /* OBJ_pilotAttributeType27         0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 27 */
+     480,    /* OBJ_mXRecord                     0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 28 */
+     481,    /* OBJ_nSRecord                     0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 29 */
+     482,    /* OBJ_sOARecord                    0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 30 */
+     483,    /* OBJ_cNAMERecord                  0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 31 */
+     484,    /* OBJ_associatedDomain             0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 37 */
+     485,    /* OBJ_associatedName               0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 38 */
+     486,    /* OBJ_homePostalAddress            0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 39 */
+     487,    /* OBJ_personalTitle                0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 40 */
+     488,    /* OBJ_mobileTelephoneNumber        0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 41 */
+     489,    /* OBJ_pagerTelephoneNumber         0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 42 */
+     490,    /* OBJ_friendlyCountryName          0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 43 */
+     102,    /* OBJ_uniqueIdentifier             0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 44 */
+     491,    /* OBJ_organizationalStatus         0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 45 */
+     492,    /* OBJ_janetMailbox                 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 46 */
+     493,    /* OBJ_mailPreferenceOption         0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 47 */
+     494,    /* OBJ_buildingName                 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 48 */
+     495,    /* OBJ_dSAQuality                   0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 49 */
+     496,    /* OBJ_singleLevelQuality           0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 50 */
+     497,    /* OBJ_subtreeMinimumQuality        0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 51 */
+     498,    /* OBJ_subtreeMaximumQuality        0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 52 */
+     499,    /* OBJ_personalSignature            0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 53 */
+     500,    /* OBJ_dITRedirect                  0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 54 */
+     501,    /* OBJ_audio                        0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 55 */
+     502,    /* OBJ_documentPublisher            0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 56 */
+     442,    /* OBJ_iA5StringSyntax              0 9 2342 19200300 100 3 4 */
+     443,    /* OBJ_caseIgnoreIA5StringSyntax    0 9 2342 19200300 100 3 5 */
+     444,    /* OBJ_pilotObject                  0 9 2342 19200300 100 4 3 */
+     445,    /* OBJ_pilotPerson                  0 9 2342 19200300 100 4 4 */
+     446,    /* OBJ_account                      0 9 2342 19200300 100 4 5 */
+     447,    /* OBJ_document                     0 9 2342 19200300 100 4 6 */
+     448,    /* OBJ_room                         0 9 2342 19200300 100 4 7 */
+     449,    /* OBJ_documentSeries               0 9 2342 19200300 100 4 9 */
+     392,    /* OBJ_Domain                       0 9 2342 19200300 100 4 13 */
+     450,    /* OBJ_rFC822localPart              0 9 2342 19200300 100 4 14 */
+     451,    /* OBJ_dNSDomain                    0 9 2342 19200300 100 4 15 */
+     452,    /* OBJ_domainRelatedObject          0 9 2342 19200300 100 4 17 */
+     453,    /* OBJ_friendlyCountry              0 9 2342 19200300 100 4 18 */
+     454,    /* OBJ_simpleSecurityObject         0 9 2342 19200300 100 4 19 */
+     455,    /* OBJ_pilotOrganization            0 9 2342 19200300 100 4 20 */
+     456,    /* OBJ_pilotDSA                     0 9 2342 19200300 100 4 21 */
+     457,    /* OBJ_qualityLabelledData          0 9 2342 19200300 100 4 22 */
+     189,    /* OBJ_id_smime_mod                 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 0 */
+     190,    /* OBJ_id_smime_ct                  1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 1 */
+     191,    /* OBJ_id_smime_aa                  1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 */
+     192,    /* OBJ_id_smime_alg                 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 3 */
+     193,    /* OBJ_id_smime_cd                  1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 4 */
+     194,    /* OBJ_id_smime_spq                 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 5 */
+     195,    /* OBJ_id_smime_cti                 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 6 */
+     158,    /* OBJ_x509Certificate              1 2 840 113549 1 9 22 1 */
+     159,    /* OBJ_sdsiCertificate              1 2 840 113549 1 9 22 2 */
+     160,    /* OBJ_x509Crl                      1 2 840 113549 1 9 23 1 */
+     144,    /* OBJ_pbe_WithSHA1And128BitRC4     1 2 840 113549 1 12 1 1 */
+     145,    /* OBJ_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC4      1 2 840 113549 1 12 1 2 */
+     146,    /* OBJ_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC 1 2 840 113549 1 12 1 3 */
+     147,    /* OBJ_pbe_WithSHA1And2_Key_TripleDES_CBC 1 2 840 113549 1 12 1 4 */
+     148,    /* OBJ_pbe_WithSHA1And128BitRC2_CBC 1 2 840 113549 1 12 1 5 */
+     149,    /* OBJ_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC  1 2 840 113549 1 12 1 6 */
+     171,    /* OBJ_ms_ext_req                   1 3 6 1 4 1 311 2 1 14 */
+     134,    /* OBJ_ms_code_ind                  1 3 6 1 4 1 311 2 1 21 */
+     135,    /* OBJ_ms_code_com                  1 3 6 1 4 1 311 2 1 22 */
+     136,    /* OBJ_ms_ctl_sign                  1 3 6 1 4 1 311 10 3 1 */
+     137,    /* OBJ_ms_sgc                       1 3 6 1 4 1 311 10 3 3 */
+     138,    /* OBJ_ms_efs                       1 3 6 1 4 1 311 10 3 4 */
+     648,    /* OBJ_ms_smartcard_login           1 3 6 1 4 1 311 20 2 2 */
+     649,    /* OBJ_ms_upn                       1 3 6 1 4 1 311 20 2 3 */
+     951,    /* OBJ_ct_precert_scts              1 3 6 1 4 1 11129 2 4 2 */
+     952,    /* OBJ_ct_precert_poison            1 3 6 1 4 1 11129 2 4 3 */
+     953,    /* OBJ_ct_precert_signer            1 3 6 1 4 1 11129 2 4 4 */
+     954,    /* OBJ_ct_cert_scts                 1 3 6 1 4 1 11129 2 4 5 */
+     751,    /* OBJ_camellia_128_cbc             1 2 392 200011 61 1 1 1 2 */
+     752,    /* OBJ_camellia_192_cbc             1 2 392 200011 61 1 1 1 3 */
+     753,    /* OBJ_camellia_256_cbc             1 2 392 200011 61 1 1 1 4 */
+     907,    /* OBJ_id_camellia128_wrap          1 2 392 200011 61 1 1 3 2 */
+     908,    /* OBJ_id_camellia192_wrap          1 2 392 200011 61 1 1 3 3 */
+     909,    /* OBJ_id_camellia256_wrap          1 2 392 200011 61 1 1 3 4 */
+     196,    /* OBJ_id_smime_mod_cms             1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 0 1 */
+     197,    /* OBJ_id_smime_mod_ess             1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 0 2 */
+     198,    /* OBJ_id_smime_mod_oid             1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 0 3 */
+     199,    /* OBJ_id_smime_mod_msg_v3          1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 0 4 */
+     200,    /* OBJ_id_smime_mod_ets_eSignature_88 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 0 5 */
+     201,    /* OBJ_id_smime_mod_ets_eSignature_97 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 0 6 */
+     202,    /* OBJ_id_smime_mod_ets_eSigPolicy_88 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 0 7 */
+     203,    /* OBJ_id_smime_mod_ets_eSigPolicy_97 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 0 8 */
+     204,    /* OBJ_id_smime_ct_receipt          1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 1 1 */
+     205,    /* OBJ_id_smime_ct_authData         1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 1 2 */
+     206,    /* OBJ_id_smime_ct_publishCert      1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 1 3 */
+     207,    /* OBJ_id_smime_ct_TSTInfo          1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 1 4 */
+     208,    /* OBJ_id_smime_ct_TDTInfo          1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 1 5 */
+     209,    /* OBJ_id_smime_ct_contentInfo      1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 1 6 */
+     210,    /* OBJ_id_smime_ct_DVCSRequestData  1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 1 7 */
+     211,    /* OBJ_id_smime_ct_DVCSResponseData 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 1 8 */
+     786,    /* OBJ_id_smime_ct_compressedData   1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 1 9 */
+    1058,    /* OBJ_id_smime_ct_contentCollection 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 1 19 */
+    1059,    /* OBJ_id_smime_ct_authEnvelopedData 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 1 23 */
+     787,    /* OBJ_id_ct_asciiTextWithCRLF      1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 1 27 */
+    1060,    /* OBJ_id_ct_xml                    1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 1 28 */
+     212,    /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_receiptRequest   1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 1 */
+     213,    /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_securityLabel    1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 2 */
+     214,    /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_mlExpandHistory  1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 3 */
+     215,    /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_contentHint      1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 4 */
+     216,    /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_msgSigDigest     1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 5 */
+     217,    /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_encapContentType 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 6 */
+     218,    /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_contentIdentifier 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 7 */
+     219,    /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_macValue         1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 8 */
+     220,    /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_equivalentLabels 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 9 */
+     221,    /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_contentReference 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 10 */
+     222,    /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_encrypKeyPref    1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 11 */
+     223,    /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_signingCertificate 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 12 */
+     224,    /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_smimeEncryptCerts 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 13 */
+     225,    /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_timeStampToken   1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 14 */
+     226,    /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_sigPolicyId  1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 15 */
+     227,    /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_commitmentType 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 16 */
+     228,    /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_signerLocation 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 17 */
+     229,    /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_signerAttr   1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 18 */
+     230,    /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_otherSigCert 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 19 */
+     231,    /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_contentTimestamp 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 20 */
+     232,    /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_CertificateRefs 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 21 */
+     233,    /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_RevocationRefs 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 22 */
+     234,    /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_certValues   1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 23 */
+     235,    /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_revocationValues 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 24 */
+     236,    /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_escTimeStamp 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 25 */
+     237,    /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_certCRLTimestamp 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 26 */
+     238,    /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_archiveTimeStamp 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 27 */
+     239,    /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_signatureType    1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 28 */
+     240,    /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_dvcs_dvc         1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 29 */
+     241,    /* OBJ_id_smime_alg_ESDHwith3DES    1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 3 1 */
+     242,    /* OBJ_id_smime_alg_ESDHwithRC2     1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 3 2 */
+     243,    /* OBJ_id_smime_alg_3DESwrap        1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 3 3 */
+     244,    /* OBJ_id_smime_alg_RC2wrap         1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 3 4 */
+     245,    /* OBJ_id_smime_alg_ESDH            1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 3 5 */
+     246,    /* OBJ_id_smime_alg_CMS3DESwrap     1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 3 6 */
+     247,    /* OBJ_id_smime_alg_CMSRC2wrap      1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 3 7 */
+     125,    /* OBJ_zlib_compression             1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 3 8 */
+     893,    /* OBJ_id_alg_PWRI_KEK              1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 3 9 */
+     248,    /* OBJ_id_smime_cd_ldap             1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 4 1 */
+     249,    /* OBJ_id_smime_spq_ets_sqt_uri     1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 5 1 */
+     250,    /* OBJ_id_smime_spq_ets_sqt_unotice 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 5 2 */
+     251,    /* OBJ_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfOrigin 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 6 1 */
+     252,    /* OBJ_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfReceipt 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 6 2 */
+     253,    /* OBJ_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfDelivery 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 6 3 */
+     254,    /* OBJ_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfSender 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 6 4 */
+     255,    /* OBJ_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfApproval 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 6 5 */
+     256,    /* OBJ_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfCreation 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 6 6 */
+     150,    /* OBJ_keyBag                       1 2 840 113549 1 12 10 1 1 */
+     151,    /* OBJ_pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag          1 2 840 113549 1 12 10 1 2 */
+     152,    /* OBJ_certBag                      1 2 840 113549 1 12 10 1 3 */
+     153,    /* OBJ_crlBag                       1 2 840 113549 1 12 10 1 4 */
+     154,    /* OBJ_secretBag                    1 2 840 113549 1 12 10 1 5 */
+     155,    /* OBJ_safeContentsBag              1 2 840 113549 1 12 10 1 6 */
+      34,    /* OBJ_idea_cbc                     1 3 6 1 4 1 188 7 1 1 2 */
+     955,    /* OBJ_jurisdictionLocalityName     1 3 6 1 4 1 311 60 2 1 1 */
+     956,    /* OBJ_jurisdictionStateOrProvinceName 1 3 6 1 4 1 311 60 2 1 2 */
+     957,    /* OBJ_jurisdictionCountryName      1 3 6 1 4 1 311 60 2 1 3 */
+    1056,    /* OBJ_blake2b512                   1 3 6 1 4 1 1722 12 2 1 16 */
+    1057,    /* OBJ_blake2s256                   1 3 6 1 4 1 1722 12 2 2 8 */
+};
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/objects/obj_dat.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/objects/obj_dat.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1cb3d1c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/objects/obj_dat.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,227 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+use integer;
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+
+# Generate the DER encoding for the given OID.
+sub der_it
+{
+    # Prologue
+    my ($v) = @_;
+    my @a = split(/\s+/, $v);
+    my $ret = pack("C*", $a[0] * 40 + $a[1]);
+    shift @a;
+    shift @a;
+
+    # Loop over rest of bytes; or in 0x80 for multi-byte numbers.
+    my $t;
+    foreach (@a) {
+        my @r = ();
+        $t = 0;
+        while ($_ >= 128) {
+            my $x = $_ % 128;
+            $_ /= 128;
+            push(@r, ($t++ ? 0x80 : 0) | $x);
+        }
+        push(@r, ($t++ ? 0x80 : 0) | $_);
+        $ret .= pack("C*", reverse(@r));
+    }
+    return $ret;
+}
+
+
+# Read input, parse all #define's into OID name and value.
+# Populate %ln and %sn with long and short names (%dupln and %dupsn)
+# are used to watch for duplicates.  Also %nid and %obj get the
+# NID and OBJ entries.
+my %ln;
+my %sn;
+my %dupln;
+my %dupsn;
+my %nid;
+my %obj;
+my %objd;
+open(IN, "$ARGV[0]") || die "Can't open input file $ARGV[0], $!";
+while (<IN>) {
+    next unless /^\#define\s+(\S+)\s+(.*)$/;
+    my $v = $1;
+    my $d = $2;
+    $d =~ s/^\"//;
+    $d =~ s/\"$//;
+    if ($v =~ /^SN_(.*)$/) {
+        if (defined $dupsn{$d}) {
+            print "WARNING: Duplicate short name \"$d\"\n";
+        } else {
+            $dupsn{$d} = 1;
+        }
+        $sn{$1} = $d;
+    }
+    elsif ($v =~ /^LN_(.*)$/) {
+        if (defined $dupln{$d}) {
+            print "WARNING: Duplicate long name \"$d\"\n";
+        } else {
+            $dupln{$d} = 1;
+        }
+        $ln{$1} = $d;
+    }
+    elsif ($v =~ /^NID_(.*)$/) {
+        $nid{$d} = $1;
+    }
+    elsif ($v =~ /^OBJ_(.*)$/) {
+        $obj{$1} = $v;
+        $objd{$v} = $d;
+    }
+}
+close IN;
+
+# For every value in %obj, recursively expand OBJ_xxx values.  That is:
+#     #define OBJ_iso 1L
+#     #define OBJ_identified_organization OBJ_iso,3L
+# Modify %objd values in-place.  Create an %objn array that has
+my $changed;
+do {
+    $changed = 0;
+    foreach my $k (keys %objd) {
+        $changed = 1 if $objd{$k} =~ s/(OBJ_[^,]+),/$objd{$1},/;
+    }
+} while ($changed);
+
+my @a = sort { $a <=> $b } keys %nid;
+my $n = $a[$#a] + 1;
+my @lvalues = ();
+my $lvalues = 0;
+
+# Scan all defined objects, building up the @out array.
+# %obj_der holds the DER encoding as an array of bytes, and %obj_len
+# holds the length in bytes.
+my @out;
+my %obj_der;
+my %obj_len;
+for (my $i = 0; $i < $n; $i++) {
+    if (!defined $nid{$i}) {
+        push(@out, "    { NULL, NULL, NID_undef },\n");
+        next;
+    }
+
+    my $sn = defined $sn{$nid{$i}} ? "$sn{$nid{$i}}" : "NULL";
+    my $ln = defined $ln{$nid{$i}} ? "$ln{$nid{$i}}" : "NULL";
+    if ($sn eq "NULL") {
+        $sn = $ln;
+        $sn{$nid{$i}} = $ln;
+    }
+    if ($ln eq "NULL") {
+        $ln = $sn;
+        $ln{$nid{$i}} = $sn;
+    }
+
+    my $out = "    {\"$sn\", \"$ln\", NID_$nid{$i}";
+    if (defined $obj{$nid{$i}} && $objd{$obj{$nid{$i}}} =~ /,/) {
+        my $v = $objd{$obj{$nid{$i}}};
+        $v =~ s/L//g;
+        $v =~ s/,/ /g;
+        my $r = &der_it($v);
+        my $z = "";
+        my $length = 0;
+        # Format using fixed-with because we use strcmp later.
+        foreach (unpack("C*",$r)) {
+            $z .= sprintf("0x%02X,", $_);
+            $length++;
+        }
+        $obj_der{$obj{$nid{$i}}} = $z;
+        $obj_len{$obj{$nid{$i}}} = $length;
+
+        push(@lvalues,
+            sprintf("    %-45s  /* [%5d] %s */\n",
+                $z, $lvalues, $obj{$nid{$i}}));
+        $out .= ", $length, &so[$lvalues]";
+        $lvalues += $length;
+    }
+    $out .= "},\n";
+    push(@out, $out);
+}
+
+# Finally ready to generate the output.
+open(OUT, ">$ARGV[1]") || die "Can't open output file $ARGV[1], $!";
+print OUT <<'EOF';
+/*
+ * WARNING: do not edit!
+ * Generated by crypto/objects/obj_dat.pl
+ *
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+EOF
+
+print OUT "/* Serialized OID's */\n";
+printf OUT "static const unsigned char so[%d] = {\n", $lvalues + 1;
+print OUT @lvalues;
+print OUT "};\n\n";
+
+printf OUT "#define NUM_NID %d\n", $n;
+printf OUT "static const ASN1_OBJECT nid_objs[NUM_NID] = {\n";
+print OUT @out;
+print  OUT "};\n\n";
+
+{
+    no warnings "uninitialized";
+    @a = grep(defined $sn{$nid{$_}}, 0 .. $n);
+}
+printf OUT "#define NUM_SN %d\n", $#a + 1;
+printf OUT "static const unsigned int sn_objs[NUM_SN] = {\n";
+foreach (sort { $sn{$nid{$a}} cmp $sn{$nid{$b}} } @a) {
+    printf OUT "    %4d,    /* \"$sn{$nid{$_}}\" */\n", $_;
+}
+print  OUT "};\n\n";
+
+{
+    no warnings "uninitialized";
+    @a = grep(defined $ln{$nid{$_}}, 0 .. $n);
+}
+printf OUT "#define NUM_LN %d\n", $#a + 1;
+printf OUT "static const unsigned int ln_objs[NUM_LN] = {\n";
+foreach (sort { $ln{$nid{$a}} cmp $ln{$nid{$b}} } @a) {
+    printf OUT "    %4d,    /* \"$ln{$nid{$_}}\" */\n", $_;
+}
+print  OUT "};\n\n";
+
+{
+    no warnings "uninitialized";
+    @a = grep(defined $obj{$nid{$_}}, 0 .. $n);
+}
+printf OUT "#define NUM_OBJ %d\n", $#a + 1;
+printf OUT "static const unsigned int obj_objs[NUM_OBJ] = {\n";
+
+# Compare DER; prefer shorter; if some length, use the "smaller" encoding.
+sub obj_cmp
+{
+    no warnings "uninitialized";
+    my $A = $obj_len{$obj{$nid{$a}}};
+    my $B = $obj_len{$obj{$nid{$b}}};
+    my $r = $A - $B;
+    return $r if $r != 0;
+
+    $A = $obj_der{$obj{$nid{$a}}};
+    $B = $obj_der{$obj{$nid{$b}}};
+    return $A cmp $B;
+}
+foreach (sort obj_cmp @a) {
+    my $m = $obj{$nid{$_}};
+    my $v = $objd{$m};
+    $v =~ s/L//g;
+    $v =~ s/,/ /g;
+    printf OUT "    %4d,    /* %-32s %s */\n", $_, $m, $v;
+}
+print  OUT "};\n";
+
+close OUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/objects/obj_err.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/objects/obj_err.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4677b67
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/objects/obj_err.c
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+/*
+ * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+
+# define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_OBJ,func,0)
+# define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_OBJ,0,reason)
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA OBJ_str_functs[] = {
+    {ERR_FUNC(OBJ_F_OBJ_ADD_OBJECT), "OBJ_add_object"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(OBJ_F_OBJ_CREATE), "OBJ_create"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(OBJ_F_OBJ_DUP), "OBJ_dup"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(OBJ_F_OBJ_NAME_NEW_INDEX), "OBJ_NAME_new_index"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(OBJ_F_OBJ_NID2LN), "OBJ_nid2ln"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(OBJ_F_OBJ_NID2OBJ), "OBJ_nid2obj"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(OBJ_F_OBJ_NID2SN), "OBJ_nid2sn"},
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA OBJ_str_reasons[] = {
+    {ERR_REASON(OBJ_R_OID_EXISTS), "oid exists"},
+    {ERR_REASON(OBJ_R_UNKNOWN_NID), "unknown nid"},
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+
+#endif
+
+int ERR_load_OBJ_strings(void)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+
+    if (ERR_func_error_string(OBJ_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) {
+        ERR_load_strings(0, OBJ_str_functs);
+        ERR_load_strings(0, OBJ_str_reasons);
+    }
+#endif
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/objects/obj_lcl.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/objects/obj_lcl.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a417f7c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/objects/obj_lcl.h
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+typedef struct name_funcs_st NAME_FUNCS;
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(NAME_FUNCS)
+DEFINE_LHASH_OF(OBJ_NAME);
+typedef struct added_obj_st ADDED_OBJ;
+DEFINE_LHASH_OF(ADDED_OBJ);
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/objects/obj_lib.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/objects/obj_lib.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..33075e6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/objects/obj_lib.c
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/lhash.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include "internal/asn1_int.h"
+
+ASN1_OBJECT *OBJ_dup(const ASN1_OBJECT *o)
+{
+    ASN1_OBJECT *r;
+
+    if (o == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    /* If object isn't dynamic it's an internal OID which is never freed */
+    if (!(o->flags & ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC))
+        return ((ASN1_OBJECT *)o);
+
+    r = ASN1_OBJECT_new();
+    if (r == NULL) {
+        OBJerr(OBJ_F_OBJ_DUP, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+
+    /* Set dynamic flags so everything gets freed up on error */
+
+    r->flags = o->flags | (ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC |
+                           ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_STRINGS |
+                           ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_DATA);
+
+    if (o->length > 0 && (r->data = OPENSSL_memdup(o->data, o->length)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    r->length = o->length;
+    r->nid = o->nid;
+
+    if (o->ln != NULL && (r->ln = OPENSSL_strdup(o->ln)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (o->sn != NULL && (r->sn = OPENSSL_strdup(o->sn)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    return r;
+ err:
+    ASN1_OBJECT_free(r);
+    OBJerr(OBJ_F_OBJ_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+int OBJ_cmp(const ASN1_OBJECT *a, const ASN1_OBJECT *b)
+{
+    int ret;
+
+    ret = (a->length - b->length);
+    if (ret)
+        return (ret);
+    return (memcmp(a->data, b->data, a->length));
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/objects/obj_mac.num b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/objects/obj_mac.num
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a5995a5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/objects/obj_mac.num
@@ -0,0 +1,1060 @@
+undef		0
+rsadsi		1
+pkcs		2
+md2		3
+md5		4
+rc4		5
+rsaEncryption		6
+md2WithRSAEncryption		7
+md5WithRSAEncryption		8
+pbeWithMD2AndDES_CBC		9
+pbeWithMD5AndDES_CBC		10
+X500		11
+X509		12
+commonName		13
+countryName		14
+localityName		15
+stateOrProvinceName		16
+organizationName		17
+organizationalUnitName		18
+rsa		19
+pkcs7		20
+pkcs7_data		21
+pkcs7_signed		22
+pkcs7_enveloped		23
+pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped		24
+pkcs7_digest		25
+pkcs7_encrypted		26
+pkcs3		27
+dhKeyAgreement		28
+des_ecb		29
+des_cfb64		30
+des_cbc		31
+des_ede_ecb		32
+des_ede3_ecb		33
+idea_cbc		34
+idea_cfb64		35
+idea_ecb		36
+rc2_cbc		37
+rc2_ecb		38
+rc2_cfb64		39
+rc2_ofb64		40
+sha		41
+shaWithRSAEncryption		42
+des_ede_cbc		43
+des_ede3_cbc		44
+des_ofb64		45
+idea_ofb64		46
+pkcs9		47
+pkcs9_emailAddress		48
+pkcs9_unstructuredName		49
+pkcs9_contentType		50
+pkcs9_messageDigest		51
+pkcs9_signingTime		52
+pkcs9_countersignature		53
+pkcs9_challengePassword		54
+pkcs9_unstructuredAddress		55
+pkcs9_extCertAttributes		56
+netscape		57
+netscape_cert_extension		58
+netscape_data_type		59
+des_ede_cfb64		60
+des_ede3_cfb64		61
+des_ede_ofb64		62
+des_ede3_ofb64		63
+sha1		64
+sha1WithRSAEncryption		65
+dsaWithSHA		66
+dsa_2		67
+pbeWithSHA1AndRC2_CBC		68
+id_pbkdf2		69
+dsaWithSHA1_2		70
+netscape_cert_type		71
+netscape_base_url		72
+netscape_revocation_url		73
+netscape_ca_revocation_url		74
+netscape_renewal_url		75
+netscape_ca_policy_url		76
+netscape_ssl_server_name		77
+netscape_comment		78
+netscape_cert_sequence		79
+desx_cbc		80
+id_ce		81
+subject_key_identifier		82
+key_usage		83
+private_key_usage_period		84
+subject_alt_name		85
+issuer_alt_name		86
+basic_constraints		87
+crl_number		88
+certificate_policies		89
+authority_key_identifier		90
+bf_cbc		91
+bf_ecb		92
+bf_cfb64		93
+bf_ofb64		94
+mdc2		95
+mdc2WithRSA		96
+rc4_40		97
+rc2_40_cbc		98
+givenName		99
+surname		100
+initials		101
+uniqueIdentifier		102
+crl_distribution_points		103
+md5WithRSA		104
+serialNumber		105
+title		106
+description		107
+cast5_cbc		108
+cast5_ecb		109
+cast5_cfb64		110
+cast5_ofb64		111
+pbeWithMD5AndCast5_CBC		112
+dsaWithSHA1		113
+md5_sha1		114
+sha1WithRSA		115
+dsa		116
+ripemd160		117
+ripemd160WithRSA		119
+rc5_cbc		120
+rc5_ecb		121
+rc5_cfb64		122
+rc5_ofb64		123
+rle_compression		124
+zlib_compression		125
+ext_key_usage		126
+id_pkix		127
+id_kp		128
+server_auth		129
+client_auth		130
+code_sign		131
+email_protect		132
+time_stamp		133
+ms_code_ind		134
+ms_code_com		135
+ms_ctl_sign		136
+ms_sgc		137
+ms_efs		138
+ns_sgc		139
+delta_crl		140
+crl_reason		141
+invalidity_date		142
+sxnet		143
+pbe_WithSHA1And128BitRC4		144
+pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC4		145
+pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC		146
+pbe_WithSHA1And2_Key_TripleDES_CBC		147
+pbe_WithSHA1And128BitRC2_CBC		148
+pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC		149
+keyBag		150
+pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag		151
+certBag		152
+crlBag		153
+secretBag		154
+safeContentsBag		155
+friendlyName		156
+localKeyID		157
+x509Certificate		158
+sdsiCertificate		159
+x509Crl		160
+pbes2		161
+pbmac1		162
+hmacWithSHA1		163
+id_qt_cps		164
+id_qt_unotice		165
+rc2_64_cbc		166
+SMIMECapabilities		167
+pbeWithMD2AndRC2_CBC		168
+pbeWithMD5AndRC2_CBC		169
+pbeWithSHA1AndDES_CBC		170
+ms_ext_req		171
+ext_req		172
+name		173
+dnQualifier		174
+id_pe		175
+id_ad		176
+info_access		177
+ad_OCSP		178
+ad_ca_issuers		179
+OCSP_sign		180
+iso		181
+member_body		182
+ISO_US		183
+X9_57		184
+X9cm		185
+pkcs1		186
+pkcs5		187
+SMIME		188
+id_smime_mod		189
+id_smime_ct		190
+id_smime_aa		191
+id_smime_alg		192
+id_smime_cd		193
+id_smime_spq		194
+id_smime_cti		195
+id_smime_mod_cms		196
+id_smime_mod_ess		197
+id_smime_mod_oid		198
+id_smime_mod_msg_v3		199
+id_smime_mod_ets_eSignature_88		200
+id_smime_mod_ets_eSignature_97		201
+id_smime_mod_ets_eSigPolicy_88		202
+id_smime_mod_ets_eSigPolicy_97		203
+id_smime_ct_receipt		204
+id_smime_ct_authData		205
+id_smime_ct_publishCert		206
+id_smime_ct_TSTInfo		207
+id_smime_ct_TDTInfo		208
+id_smime_ct_contentInfo		209
+id_smime_ct_DVCSRequestData		210
+id_smime_ct_DVCSResponseData		211
+id_smime_aa_receiptRequest		212
+id_smime_aa_securityLabel		213
+id_smime_aa_mlExpandHistory		214
+id_smime_aa_contentHint		215
+id_smime_aa_msgSigDigest		216
+id_smime_aa_encapContentType		217
+id_smime_aa_contentIdentifier		218
+id_smime_aa_macValue		219
+id_smime_aa_equivalentLabels		220
+id_smime_aa_contentReference		221
+id_smime_aa_encrypKeyPref		222
+id_smime_aa_signingCertificate		223
+id_smime_aa_smimeEncryptCerts		224
+id_smime_aa_timeStampToken		225
+id_smime_aa_ets_sigPolicyId		226
+id_smime_aa_ets_commitmentType		227
+id_smime_aa_ets_signerLocation		228
+id_smime_aa_ets_signerAttr		229
+id_smime_aa_ets_otherSigCert		230
+id_smime_aa_ets_contentTimestamp		231
+id_smime_aa_ets_CertificateRefs		232
+id_smime_aa_ets_RevocationRefs		233
+id_smime_aa_ets_certValues		234
+id_smime_aa_ets_revocationValues		235
+id_smime_aa_ets_escTimeStamp		236
+id_smime_aa_ets_certCRLTimestamp		237
+id_smime_aa_ets_archiveTimeStamp		238
+id_smime_aa_signatureType		239
+id_smime_aa_dvcs_dvc		240
+id_smime_alg_ESDHwith3DES		241
+id_smime_alg_ESDHwithRC2		242
+id_smime_alg_3DESwrap		243
+id_smime_alg_RC2wrap		244
+id_smime_alg_ESDH		245
+id_smime_alg_CMS3DESwrap		246
+id_smime_alg_CMSRC2wrap		247
+id_smime_cd_ldap		248
+id_smime_spq_ets_sqt_uri		249
+id_smime_spq_ets_sqt_unotice		250
+id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfOrigin		251
+id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfReceipt		252
+id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfDelivery		253
+id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfSender		254
+id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfApproval		255
+id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfCreation		256
+md4		257
+id_pkix_mod		258
+id_qt		259
+id_it		260
+id_pkip		261
+id_alg		262
+id_cmc		263
+id_on		264
+id_pda		265
+id_aca		266
+id_qcs		267
+id_cct		268
+id_pkix1_explicit_88		269
+id_pkix1_implicit_88		270
+id_pkix1_explicit_93		271
+id_pkix1_implicit_93		272
+id_mod_crmf		273
+id_mod_cmc		274
+id_mod_kea_profile_88		275
+id_mod_kea_profile_93		276
+id_mod_cmp		277
+id_mod_qualified_cert_88		278
+id_mod_qualified_cert_93		279
+id_mod_attribute_cert		280
+id_mod_timestamp_protocol		281
+id_mod_ocsp		282
+id_mod_dvcs		283
+id_mod_cmp2000		284
+biometricInfo		285
+qcStatements		286
+ac_auditEntity		287
+ac_targeting		288
+aaControls		289
+sbgp_ipAddrBlock		290
+sbgp_autonomousSysNum		291
+sbgp_routerIdentifier		292
+textNotice		293
+ipsecEndSystem		294
+ipsecTunnel		295
+ipsecUser		296
+dvcs		297
+id_it_caProtEncCert		298
+id_it_signKeyPairTypes		299
+id_it_encKeyPairTypes		300
+id_it_preferredSymmAlg		301
+id_it_caKeyUpdateInfo		302
+id_it_currentCRL		303
+id_it_unsupportedOIDs		304
+id_it_subscriptionRequest		305
+id_it_subscriptionResponse		306
+id_it_keyPairParamReq		307
+id_it_keyPairParamRep		308
+id_it_revPassphrase		309
+id_it_implicitConfirm		310
+id_it_confirmWaitTime		311
+id_it_origPKIMessage		312
+id_regCtrl		313
+id_regInfo		314
+id_regCtrl_regToken		315
+id_regCtrl_authenticator		316
+id_regCtrl_pkiPublicationInfo		317
+id_regCtrl_pkiArchiveOptions		318
+id_regCtrl_oldCertID		319
+id_regCtrl_protocolEncrKey		320
+id_regInfo_utf8Pairs		321
+id_regInfo_certReq		322
+id_alg_des40		323
+id_alg_noSignature		324
+id_alg_dh_sig_hmac_sha1		325
+id_alg_dh_pop		326
+id_cmc_statusInfo		327
+id_cmc_identification		328
+id_cmc_identityProof		329
+id_cmc_dataReturn		330
+id_cmc_transactionId		331
+id_cmc_senderNonce		332
+id_cmc_recipientNonce		333
+id_cmc_addExtensions		334
+id_cmc_encryptedPOP		335
+id_cmc_decryptedPOP		336
+id_cmc_lraPOPWitness		337
+id_cmc_getCert		338
+id_cmc_getCRL		339
+id_cmc_revokeRequest		340
+id_cmc_regInfo		341
+id_cmc_responseInfo		342
+id_cmc_queryPending		343
+id_cmc_popLinkRandom		344
+id_cmc_popLinkWitness		345
+id_cmc_confirmCertAcceptance		346
+id_on_personalData		347
+id_pda_dateOfBirth		348
+id_pda_placeOfBirth		349
+id_pda_pseudonym		350
+id_pda_gender		351
+id_pda_countryOfCitizenship		352
+id_pda_countryOfResidence		353
+id_aca_authenticationInfo		354
+id_aca_accessIdentity		355
+id_aca_chargingIdentity		356
+id_aca_group		357
+id_aca_role		358
+id_qcs_pkixQCSyntax_v1		359
+id_cct_crs		360
+id_cct_PKIData		361
+id_cct_PKIResponse		362
+ad_timeStamping		363
+ad_dvcs		364
+id_pkix_OCSP_basic		365
+id_pkix_OCSP_Nonce		366
+id_pkix_OCSP_CrlID		367
+id_pkix_OCSP_acceptableResponses		368
+id_pkix_OCSP_noCheck		369
+id_pkix_OCSP_archiveCutoff		370
+id_pkix_OCSP_serviceLocator		371
+id_pkix_OCSP_extendedStatus		372
+id_pkix_OCSP_valid		373
+id_pkix_OCSP_path		374
+id_pkix_OCSP_trustRoot		375
+algorithm		376
+rsaSignature		377
+X500algorithms		378
+org		379
+dod		380
+iana		381
+Directory		382
+Management		383
+Experimental		384
+Private		385
+Security		386
+SNMPv2		387
+Mail		388
+Enterprises		389
+dcObject		390
+domainComponent		391
+Domain		392
+joint_iso_ccitt		393
+selected_attribute_types		394
+clearance		395
+md4WithRSAEncryption		396
+ac_proxying		397
+sinfo_access		398
+id_aca_encAttrs		399
+role		400
+policy_constraints		401
+target_information		402
+no_rev_avail		403
+ccitt		404
+ansi_X9_62		405
+X9_62_prime_field		406
+X9_62_characteristic_two_field		407
+X9_62_id_ecPublicKey		408
+X9_62_prime192v1		409
+X9_62_prime192v2		410
+X9_62_prime192v3		411
+X9_62_prime239v1		412
+X9_62_prime239v2		413
+X9_62_prime239v3		414
+X9_62_prime256v1		415
+ecdsa_with_SHA1		416
+ms_csp_name		417
+aes_128_ecb		418
+aes_128_cbc		419
+aes_128_ofb128		420
+aes_128_cfb128		421
+aes_192_ecb		422
+aes_192_cbc		423
+aes_192_ofb128		424
+aes_192_cfb128		425
+aes_256_ecb		426
+aes_256_cbc		427
+aes_256_ofb128		428
+aes_256_cfb128		429
+hold_instruction_code		430
+hold_instruction_none		431
+hold_instruction_call_issuer		432
+hold_instruction_reject		433
+data		434
+pss		435
+ucl		436
+pilot		437
+pilotAttributeType		438
+pilotAttributeSyntax		439
+pilotObjectClass		440
+pilotGroups		441
+iA5StringSyntax		442
+caseIgnoreIA5StringSyntax		443
+pilotObject		444
+pilotPerson		445
+account		446
+document		447
+room		448
+documentSeries		449
+rFC822localPart		450
+dNSDomain		451
+domainRelatedObject		452
+friendlyCountry		453
+simpleSecurityObject		454
+pilotOrganization		455
+pilotDSA		456
+qualityLabelledData		457
+userId		458
+textEncodedORAddress		459
+rfc822Mailbox		460
+info		461
+favouriteDrink		462
+roomNumber		463
+photo		464
+userClass		465
+host		466
+manager		467
+documentIdentifier		468
+documentTitle		469
+documentVersion		470
+documentAuthor		471
+documentLocation		472
+homeTelephoneNumber		473
+secretary		474
+otherMailbox		475
+lastModifiedTime		476
+lastModifiedBy		477
+aRecord		478
+pilotAttributeType27		479
+mXRecord		480
+nSRecord		481
+sOARecord		482
+cNAMERecord		483
+associatedDomain		484
+associatedName		485
+homePostalAddress		486
+personalTitle		487
+mobileTelephoneNumber		488
+pagerTelephoneNumber		489
+friendlyCountryName		490
+organizationalStatus		491
+janetMailbox		492
+mailPreferenceOption		493
+buildingName		494
+dSAQuality		495
+singleLevelQuality		496
+subtreeMinimumQuality		497
+subtreeMaximumQuality		498
+personalSignature		499
+dITRedirect		500
+audio		501
+documentPublisher		502
+x500UniqueIdentifier		503
+mime_mhs		504
+mime_mhs_headings		505
+mime_mhs_bodies		506
+id_hex_partial_message		507
+id_hex_multipart_message		508
+generationQualifier		509
+pseudonym		510
+InternationalRA		511
+id_set		512
+set_ctype		513
+set_msgExt		514
+set_attr		515
+set_policy		516
+set_certExt		517
+set_brand		518
+setct_PANData		519
+setct_PANToken		520
+setct_PANOnly		521
+setct_OIData		522
+setct_PI		523
+setct_PIData		524
+setct_PIDataUnsigned		525
+setct_HODInput		526
+setct_AuthResBaggage		527
+setct_AuthRevReqBaggage		528
+setct_AuthRevResBaggage		529
+setct_CapTokenSeq		530
+setct_PInitResData		531
+setct_PI_TBS		532
+setct_PResData		533
+setct_AuthReqTBS		534
+setct_AuthResTBS		535
+setct_AuthResTBSX		536
+setct_AuthTokenTBS		537
+setct_CapTokenData		538
+setct_CapTokenTBS		539
+setct_AcqCardCodeMsg		540
+setct_AuthRevReqTBS		541
+setct_AuthRevResData		542
+setct_AuthRevResTBS		543
+setct_CapReqTBS		544
+setct_CapReqTBSX		545
+setct_CapResData		546
+setct_CapRevReqTBS		547
+setct_CapRevReqTBSX		548
+setct_CapRevResData		549
+setct_CredReqTBS		550
+setct_CredReqTBSX		551
+setct_CredResData		552
+setct_CredRevReqTBS		553
+setct_CredRevReqTBSX		554
+setct_CredRevResData		555
+setct_PCertReqData		556
+setct_PCertResTBS		557
+setct_BatchAdminReqData		558
+setct_BatchAdminResData		559
+setct_CardCInitResTBS		560
+setct_MeAqCInitResTBS		561
+setct_RegFormResTBS		562
+setct_CertReqData		563
+setct_CertReqTBS		564
+setct_CertResData		565
+setct_CertInqReqTBS		566
+setct_ErrorTBS		567
+setct_PIDualSignedTBE		568
+setct_PIUnsignedTBE		569
+setct_AuthReqTBE		570
+setct_AuthResTBE		571
+setct_AuthResTBEX		572
+setct_AuthTokenTBE		573
+setct_CapTokenTBE		574
+setct_CapTokenTBEX		575
+setct_AcqCardCodeMsgTBE		576
+setct_AuthRevReqTBE		577
+setct_AuthRevResTBE		578
+setct_AuthRevResTBEB		579
+setct_CapReqTBE		580
+setct_CapReqTBEX		581
+setct_CapResTBE		582
+setct_CapRevReqTBE		583
+setct_CapRevReqTBEX		584
+setct_CapRevResTBE		585
+setct_CredReqTBE		586
+setct_CredReqTBEX		587
+setct_CredResTBE		588
+setct_CredRevReqTBE		589
+setct_CredRevReqTBEX		590
+setct_CredRevResTBE		591
+setct_BatchAdminReqTBE		592
+setct_BatchAdminResTBE		593
+setct_RegFormReqTBE		594
+setct_CertReqTBE		595
+setct_CertReqTBEX		596
+setct_CertResTBE		597
+setct_CRLNotificationTBS		598
+setct_CRLNotificationResTBS		599
+setct_BCIDistributionTBS		600
+setext_genCrypt		601
+setext_miAuth		602
+setext_pinSecure		603
+setext_pinAny		604
+setext_track2		605
+setext_cv		606
+set_policy_root		607
+setCext_hashedRoot		608
+setCext_certType		609
+setCext_merchData		610
+setCext_cCertRequired		611
+setCext_tunneling		612
+setCext_setExt		613
+setCext_setQualf		614
+setCext_PGWYcapabilities		615
+setCext_TokenIdentifier		616
+setCext_Track2Data		617
+setCext_TokenType		618
+setCext_IssuerCapabilities		619
+setAttr_Cert		620
+setAttr_PGWYcap		621
+setAttr_TokenType		622
+setAttr_IssCap		623
+set_rootKeyThumb		624
+set_addPolicy		625
+setAttr_Token_EMV		626
+setAttr_Token_B0Prime		627
+setAttr_IssCap_CVM		628
+setAttr_IssCap_T2		629
+setAttr_IssCap_Sig		630
+setAttr_GenCryptgrm		631
+setAttr_T2Enc		632
+setAttr_T2cleartxt		633
+setAttr_TokICCsig		634
+setAttr_SecDevSig		635
+set_brand_IATA_ATA		636
+set_brand_Diners		637
+set_brand_AmericanExpress		638
+set_brand_JCB		639
+set_brand_Visa		640
+set_brand_MasterCard		641
+set_brand_Novus		642
+des_cdmf		643
+rsaOAEPEncryptionSET		644
+itu_t		645
+joint_iso_itu_t		646
+international_organizations		647
+ms_smartcard_login		648
+ms_upn		649
+aes_128_cfb1		650
+aes_192_cfb1		651
+aes_256_cfb1		652
+aes_128_cfb8		653
+aes_192_cfb8		654
+aes_256_cfb8		655
+des_cfb1		656
+des_cfb8		657
+des_ede3_cfb1		658
+des_ede3_cfb8		659
+streetAddress		660
+postalCode		661
+id_ppl		662
+proxyCertInfo		663
+id_ppl_anyLanguage		664
+id_ppl_inheritAll		665
+name_constraints		666
+Independent		667
+sha256WithRSAEncryption		668
+sha384WithRSAEncryption		669
+sha512WithRSAEncryption		670
+sha224WithRSAEncryption		671
+sha256		672
+sha384		673
+sha512		674
+sha224		675
+identified_organization		676
+certicom_arc		677
+wap		678
+wap_wsg		679
+X9_62_id_characteristic_two_basis		680
+X9_62_onBasis		681
+X9_62_tpBasis		682
+X9_62_ppBasis		683
+X9_62_c2pnb163v1		684
+X9_62_c2pnb163v2		685
+X9_62_c2pnb163v3		686
+X9_62_c2pnb176v1		687
+X9_62_c2tnb191v1		688
+X9_62_c2tnb191v2		689
+X9_62_c2tnb191v3		690
+X9_62_c2onb191v4		691
+X9_62_c2onb191v5		692
+X9_62_c2pnb208w1		693
+X9_62_c2tnb239v1		694
+X9_62_c2tnb239v2		695
+X9_62_c2tnb239v3		696
+X9_62_c2onb239v4		697
+X9_62_c2onb239v5		698
+X9_62_c2pnb272w1		699
+X9_62_c2pnb304w1		700
+X9_62_c2tnb359v1		701
+X9_62_c2pnb368w1		702
+X9_62_c2tnb431r1		703
+secp112r1		704
+secp112r2		705
+secp128r1		706
+secp128r2		707
+secp160k1		708
+secp160r1		709
+secp160r2		710
+secp192k1		711
+secp224k1		712
+secp224r1		713
+secp256k1		714
+secp384r1		715
+secp521r1		716
+sect113r1		717
+sect113r2		718
+sect131r1		719
+sect131r2		720
+sect163k1		721
+sect163r1		722
+sect163r2		723
+sect193r1		724
+sect193r2		725
+sect233k1		726
+sect233r1		727
+sect239k1		728
+sect283k1		729
+sect283r1		730
+sect409k1		731
+sect409r1		732
+sect571k1		733
+sect571r1		734
+wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls1		735
+wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls3		736
+wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls4		737
+wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls5		738
+wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls6		739
+wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls7		740
+wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls8		741
+wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls9		742
+wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls10		743
+wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls11		744
+wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls12		745
+any_policy		746
+policy_mappings		747
+inhibit_any_policy		748
+ipsec3		749
+ipsec4		750
+camellia_128_cbc		751
+camellia_192_cbc		752
+camellia_256_cbc		753
+camellia_128_ecb		754
+camellia_192_ecb		755
+camellia_256_ecb		756
+camellia_128_cfb128		757
+camellia_192_cfb128		758
+camellia_256_cfb128		759
+camellia_128_cfb1		760
+camellia_192_cfb1		761
+camellia_256_cfb1		762
+camellia_128_cfb8		763
+camellia_192_cfb8		764
+camellia_256_cfb8		765
+camellia_128_ofb128		766
+camellia_192_ofb128		767
+camellia_256_ofb128		768
+subject_directory_attributes		769
+issuing_distribution_point		770
+certificate_issuer		771
+korea		772
+kisa		773
+kftc		774
+npki_alg		775
+seed_ecb		776
+seed_cbc		777
+seed_ofb128		778
+seed_cfb128		779
+hmac_md5		780
+hmac_sha1		781
+id_PasswordBasedMAC		782
+id_DHBasedMac		783
+id_it_suppLangTags		784
+caRepository		785
+id_smime_ct_compressedData		786
+id_ct_asciiTextWithCRLF		787
+id_aes128_wrap		788
+id_aes192_wrap		789
+id_aes256_wrap		790
+ecdsa_with_Recommended		791
+ecdsa_with_Specified		792
+ecdsa_with_SHA224		793
+ecdsa_with_SHA256		794
+ecdsa_with_SHA384		795
+ecdsa_with_SHA512		796
+hmacWithMD5		797
+hmacWithSHA224		798
+hmacWithSHA256		799
+hmacWithSHA384		800
+hmacWithSHA512		801
+dsa_with_SHA224		802
+dsa_with_SHA256		803
+whirlpool		804
+cryptopro		805
+cryptocom		806
+id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001		807
+id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_94		808
+id_GostR3411_94		809
+id_HMACGostR3411_94		810
+id_GostR3410_2001		811
+id_GostR3410_94		812
+id_Gost28147_89		813
+gost89_cnt		814
+id_Gost28147_89_MAC		815
+id_GostR3411_94_prf		816
+id_GostR3410_2001DH		817
+id_GostR3410_94DH		818
+id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_KeyMeshing		819
+id_Gost28147_89_None_KeyMeshing		820
+id_GostR3411_94_TestParamSet		821
+id_GostR3411_94_CryptoProParamSet		822
+id_Gost28147_89_TestParamSet		823
+id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_A_ParamSet		824
+id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_B_ParamSet		825
+id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_C_ParamSet		826
+id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_D_ParamSet		827
+id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_Oscar_1_1_ParamSet		828
+id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_Oscar_1_0_ParamSet		829
+id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_RIC_1_ParamSet		830
+id_GostR3410_94_TestParamSet		831
+id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_A_ParamSet		832
+id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_B_ParamSet		833
+id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_C_ParamSet		834
+id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_D_ParamSet		835
+id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_XchA_ParamSet		836
+id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_XchB_ParamSet		837
+id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_XchC_ParamSet		838
+id_GostR3410_2001_TestParamSet		839
+id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_A_ParamSet		840
+id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_B_ParamSet		841
+id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_C_ParamSet		842
+id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_XchA_ParamSet		843
+id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_XchB_ParamSet		844
+id_GostR3410_94_a		845
+id_GostR3410_94_aBis		846
+id_GostR3410_94_b		847
+id_GostR3410_94_bBis		848
+id_Gost28147_89_cc		849
+id_GostR3410_94_cc		850
+id_GostR3410_2001_cc		851
+id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_94_cc		852
+id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001_cc		853
+id_GostR3410_2001_ParamSet_cc		854
+hmac		855
+LocalKeySet		856
+freshest_crl		857
+id_on_permanentIdentifier		858
+searchGuide		859
+businessCategory		860
+postalAddress		861
+postOfficeBox		862
+physicalDeliveryOfficeName		863
+telephoneNumber		864
+telexNumber		865
+teletexTerminalIdentifier		866
+facsimileTelephoneNumber		867
+x121Address		868
+internationaliSDNNumber		869
+registeredAddress		870
+destinationIndicator		871
+preferredDeliveryMethod		872
+presentationAddress		873
+supportedApplicationContext		874
+member		875
+owner		876
+roleOccupant		877
+seeAlso		878
+userPassword		879
+userCertificate		880
+cACertificate		881
+authorityRevocationList		882
+certificateRevocationList		883
+crossCertificatePair		884
+enhancedSearchGuide		885
+protocolInformation		886
+distinguishedName		887
+uniqueMember		888
+houseIdentifier		889
+supportedAlgorithms		890
+deltaRevocationList		891
+dmdName		892
+id_alg_PWRI_KEK		893
+cmac		894
+aes_128_gcm		895
+aes_128_ccm		896
+id_aes128_wrap_pad		897
+aes_192_gcm		898
+aes_192_ccm		899
+id_aes192_wrap_pad		900
+aes_256_gcm		901
+aes_256_ccm		902
+id_aes256_wrap_pad		903
+aes_128_ctr		904
+aes_192_ctr		905
+aes_256_ctr		906
+id_camellia128_wrap		907
+id_camellia192_wrap		908
+id_camellia256_wrap		909
+anyExtendedKeyUsage		910
+mgf1		911
+rsassaPss		912
+aes_128_xts		913
+aes_256_xts		914
+rc4_hmac_md5		915
+aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1		916
+aes_192_cbc_hmac_sha1		917
+aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha1		918
+rsaesOaep		919
+dhpublicnumber		920
+brainpoolP160r1		921
+brainpoolP160t1		922
+brainpoolP192r1		923
+brainpoolP192t1		924
+brainpoolP224r1		925
+brainpoolP224t1		926
+brainpoolP256r1		927
+brainpoolP256t1		928
+brainpoolP320r1		929
+brainpoolP320t1		930
+brainpoolP384r1		931
+brainpoolP384t1		932
+brainpoolP512r1		933
+brainpoolP512t1		934
+pSpecified		935
+dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha1kdf_scheme		936
+dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha224kdf_scheme		937
+dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha256kdf_scheme		938
+dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha384kdf_scheme		939
+dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha512kdf_scheme		940
+dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha1kdf_scheme		941
+dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha224kdf_scheme		942
+dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha256kdf_scheme		943
+dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha384kdf_scheme		944
+dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha512kdf_scheme		945
+dh_std_kdf		946
+dh_cofactor_kdf		947
+aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha256		948
+aes_192_cbc_hmac_sha256		949
+aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha256		950
+ct_precert_scts		951
+ct_precert_poison		952
+ct_precert_signer		953
+ct_cert_scts		954
+jurisdictionLocalityName		955
+jurisdictionStateOrProvinceName		956
+jurisdictionCountryName		957
+aes_128_ocb		958
+aes_192_ocb		959
+aes_256_ocb		960
+camellia_128_gcm		961
+camellia_128_ccm		962
+camellia_128_ctr		963
+camellia_128_cmac		964
+camellia_192_gcm		965
+camellia_192_ccm		966
+camellia_192_ctr		967
+camellia_192_cmac		968
+camellia_256_gcm		969
+camellia_256_ccm		970
+camellia_256_ctr		971
+camellia_256_cmac		972
+id_scrypt		973
+id_tc26		974
+gost89_cnt_12		975
+gost_mac_12		976
+id_tc26_algorithms		977
+id_tc26_sign		978
+id_GostR3410_2012_256		979
+id_GostR3410_2012_512		980
+id_tc26_digest		981
+id_GostR3411_2012_256		982
+id_GostR3411_2012_512		983
+id_tc26_signwithdigest		984
+id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256		985
+id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512		986
+id_tc26_mac		987
+id_tc26_hmac_gost_3411_2012_256		988
+id_tc26_hmac_gost_3411_2012_512		989
+id_tc26_cipher		990
+id_tc26_agreement		991
+id_tc26_agreement_gost_3410_2012_256		992
+id_tc26_agreement_gost_3410_2012_512		993
+id_tc26_constants		994
+id_tc26_sign_constants		995
+id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_constants		996
+id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetTest		997
+id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetA		998
+id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetB		999
+id_tc26_digest_constants		1000
+id_tc26_cipher_constants		1001
+id_tc26_gost_28147_constants		1002
+id_tc26_gost_28147_param_Z		1003
+INN		1004
+OGRN		1005
+SNILS		1006
+subjectSignTool		1007
+issuerSignTool		1008
+gost89_cbc		1009
+gost89_ecb		1010
+gost89_ctr		1011
+grasshopper_ecb		1012
+grasshopper_ctr		1013
+grasshopper_ofb		1014
+grasshopper_cbc		1015
+grasshopper_cfb		1016
+grasshopper_mac		1017
+chacha20_poly1305		1018
+chacha20		1019
+tlsfeature		1020
+tls1_prf		1021
+ipsec_IKE		1022
+capwapAC		1023
+capwapWTP		1024
+sshClient		1025
+sshServer		1026
+sendRouter		1027
+sendProxiedRouter		1028
+sendOwner		1029
+sendProxiedOwner		1030
+id_pkinit		1031
+pkInitClientAuth		1032
+pkInitKDC		1033
+X25519		1034
+X448		1035
+hkdf		1036
+kx_rsa		1037
+kx_ecdhe		1038
+kx_dhe		1039
+kx_ecdhe_psk		1040
+kx_dhe_psk		1041
+kx_rsa_psk		1042
+kx_psk		1043
+kx_srp		1044
+kx_gost		1045
+auth_rsa		1046
+auth_ecdsa		1047
+auth_psk		1048
+auth_dss		1049
+auth_gost01		1050
+auth_gost12		1051
+auth_srp		1052
+auth_null		1053
+fips_none		1054
+fips_140_2		1055
+blake2b512		1056
+blake2s256		1057
+id_smime_ct_contentCollection		1058
+id_smime_ct_authEnvelopedData		1059
+id_ct_xml		1060
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/objects/obj_xref.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/objects/obj_xref.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..627f5bc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/objects/obj_xref.c
@@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include "obj_xref.h"
+#include "e_os.h"
+
+static STACK_OF(nid_triple) *sig_app, *sigx_app;
+
+static int sig_cmp(const nid_triple *a, const nid_triple *b)
+{
+    return a->sign_id - b->sign_id;
+}
+
+DECLARE_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(nid_triple, nid_triple, sig);
+IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(nid_triple, nid_triple, sig);
+
+static int sig_sk_cmp(const nid_triple *const *a, const nid_triple *const *b)
+{
+    return (*a)->sign_id - (*b)->sign_id;
+}
+
+DECLARE_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(const nid_triple *, const nid_triple *, sigx);
+
+static int sigx_cmp(const nid_triple *const *a, const nid_triple *const *b)
+{
+    int ret;
+    ret = (*a)->hash_id - (*b)->hash_id;
+    if (ret)
+        return ret;
+    return (*a)->pkey_id - (*b)->pkey_id;
+}
+
+IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(const nid_triple *, const nid_triple *, sigx);
+
+int OBJ_find_sigid_algs(int signid, int *pdig_nid, int *ppkey_nid)
+{
+    nid_triple tmp;
+    const nid_triple *rv = NULL;
+    tmp.sign_id = signid;
+
+    if (sig_app) {
+        int idx = sk_nid_triple_find(sig_app, &tmp);
+        if (idx >= 0)
+            rv = sk_nid_triple_value(sig_app, idx);
+    }
+#ifndef OBJ_XREF_TEST2
+    if (rv == NULL) {
+        rv = OBJ_bsearch_sig(&tmp, sigoid_srt, OSSL_NELEM(sigoid_srt));
+    }
+#endif
+    if (rv == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    if (pdig_nid)
+        *pdig_nid = rv->hash_id;
+    if (ppkey_nid)
+        *ppkey_nid = rv->pkey_id;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(int *psignid, int dig_nid, int pkey_nid)
+{
+    nid_triple tmp;
+    const nid_triple *t = &tmp;
+    const nid_triple **rv = NULL;
+
+    tmp.hash_id = dig_nid;
+    tmp.pkey_id = pkey_nid;
+
+    if (sigx_app) {
+        int idx = sk_nid_triple_find(sigx_app, &tmp);
+        if (idx >= 0) {
+            t = sk_nid_triple_value(sigx_app, idx);
+            rv = &t;
+        }
+    }
+#ifndef OBJ_XREF_TEST2
+    if (rv == NULL) {
+        rv = OBJ_bsearch_sigx(&t, sigoid_srt_xref, OSSL_NELEM(sigoid_srt_xref));
+    }
+#endif
+    if (rv == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    if (psignid)
+        *psignid = (*rv)->sign_id;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int OBJ_add_sigid(int signid, int dig_id, int pkey_id)
+{
+    nid_triple *ntr;
+    if (sig_app == NULL)
+        sig_app = sk_nid_triple_new(sig_sk_cmp);
+    if (sig_app == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    if (sigx_app == NULL)
+        sigx_app = sk_nid_triple_new(sigx_cmp);
+    if (sigx_app == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    ntr = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ntr));
+    if (ntr == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    ntr->sign_id = signid;
+    ntr->hash_id = dig_id;
+    ntr->pkey_id = pkey_id;
+
+    if (!sk_nid_triple_push(sig_app, ntr)) {
+        OPENSSL_free(ntr);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (!sk_nid_triple_push(sigx_app, ntr))
+        return 0;
+
+    sk_nid_triple_sort(sig_app);
+    sk_nid_triple_sort(sigx_app);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static void sid_free(nid_triple *tt)
+{
+    OPENSSL_free(tt);
+}
+
+void OBJ_sigid_free(void)
+{
+    sk_nid_triple_pop_free(sig_app, sid_free);
+    sig_app = NULL;
+    sk_nid_triple_free(sigx_app);
+    sigx_app = NULL;
+}
+
+#ifdef OBJ_XREF_TEST
+
+main()
+{
+    int n1, n2, n3;
+
+    int i, rv;
+# ifdef OBJ_XREF_TEST2
+    for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigoid_srt); i++) {
+        OBJ_add_sigid(sigoid_srt[i][0], sigoid_srt[i][1], sigoid_srt[i][2]);
+    }
+# endif
+
+    for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigoid_srt); i++) {
+        n1 = sigoid_srt[i][0];
+        rv = OBJ_find_sigid_algs(n1, &n2, &n3);
+        printf("Forward: %d, %s %s %s\n", rv,
+               OBJ_nid2ln(n1), OBJ_nid2ln(n2), OBJ_nid2ln(n3));
+        n1 = 0;
+        rv = OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(&n1, n2, n3);
+        printf("Reverse: %d, %s %s %s\n", rv,
+               OBJ_nid2ln(n1), OBJ_nid2ln(n2), OBJ_nid2ln(n3));
+    }
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/objects/obj_xref.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/objects/obj_xref.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d09aa71
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/objects/obj_xref.h
@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+/*
+ * WARNING: do not edit!
+ * Generated by objxref.pl
+ *
+ * Copyright 1998-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+
+typedef struct {
+    int sign_id;
+    int hash_id;
+    int pkey_id;
+} nid_triple;
+
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(nid_triple)
+
+static const nid_triple sigoid_srt[] = {
+    {NID_md2WithRSAEncryption, NID_md2, NID_rsaEncryption},
+    {NID_md5WithRSAEncryption, NID_md5, NID_rsaEncryption},
+    {NID_shaWithRSAEncryption, NID_sha, NID_rsaEncryption},
+    {NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption, NID_sha1, NID_rsaEncryption},
+    {NID_dsaWithSHA, NID_sha, NID_dsa},
+    {NID_dsaWithSHA1_2, NID_sha1, NID_dsa_2},
+    {NID_mdc2WithRSA, NID_mdc2, NID_rsaEncryption},
+    {NID_md5WithRSA, NID_md5, NID_rsa},
+    {NID_dsaWithSHA1, NID_sha1, NID_dsa},
+    {NID_sha1WithRSA, NID_sha1, NID_rsa},
+    {NID_ripemd160WithRSA, NID_ripemd160, NID_rsaEncryption},
+    {NID_md4WithRSAEncryption, NID_md4, NID_rsaEncryption},
+    {NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1, NID_sha1, NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey},
+    {NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption, NID_sha256, NID_rsaEncryption},
+    {NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption, NID_sha384, NID_rsaEncryption},
+    {NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption, NID_sha512, NID_rsaEncryption},
+    {NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption, NID_sha224, NID_rsaEncryption},
+    {NID_ecdsa_with_Recommended, NID_undef, NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey},
+    {NID_ecdsa_with_Specified, NID_undef, NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey},
+    {NID_ecdsa_with_SHA224, NID_sha224, NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey},
+    {NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256, NID_sha256, NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey},
+    {NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384, NID_sha384, NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey},
+    {NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512, NID_sha512, NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey},
+    {NID_dsa_with_SHA224, NID_sha224, NID_dsa},
+    {NID_dsa_with_SHA256, NID_sha256, NID_dsa},
+    {NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001, NID_id_GostR3411_94,
+     NID_id_GostR3410_2001},
+    {NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_94, NID_id_GostR3411_94,
+     NID_id_GostR3410_94},
+    {NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_94_cc, NID_id_GostR3411_94,
+     NID_id_GostR3410_94_cc},
+    {NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001_cc, NID_id_GostR3411_94,
+     NID_id_GostR3410_2001_cc},
+    {NID_rsassaPss, NID_undef, NID_rsaEncryption},
+    {NID_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha1kdf_scheme, NID_sha1, NID_dh_std_kdf},
+    {NID_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha224kdf_scheme, NID_sha224, NID_dh_std_kdf},
+    {NID_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha256kdf_scheme, NID_sha256, NID_dh_std_kdf},
+    {NID_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha384kdf_scheme, NID_sha384, NID_dh_std_kdf},
+    {NID_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha512kdf_scheme, NID_sha512, NID_dh_std_kdf},
+    {NID_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha1kdf_scheme, NID_sha1,
+     NID_dh_cofactor_kdf},
+    {NID_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha224kdf_scheme, NID_sha224,
+     NID_dh_cofactor_kdf},
+    {NID_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha256kdf_scheme, NID_sha256,
+     NID_dh_cofactor_kdf},
+    {NID_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha384kdf_scheme, NID_sha384,
+     NID_dh_cofactor_kdf},
+    {NID_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha512kdf_scheme, NID_sha512,
+     NID_dh_cofactor_kdf},
+    {NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256, NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256,
+     NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256},
+    {NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512, NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512,
+     NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512},
+};
+
+static const nid_triple *const sigoid_srt_xref[] = {
+    &sigoid_srt[0],
+    &sigoid_srt[1],
+    &sigoid_srt[7],
+    &sigoid_srt[2],
+    &sigoid_srt[4],
+    &sigoid_srt[3],
+    &sigoid_srt[9],
+    &sigoid_srt[5],
+    &sigoid_srt[8],
+    &sigoid_srt[12],
+    &sigoid_srt[30],
+    &sigoid_srt[35],
+    &sigoid_srt[6],
+    &sigoid_srt[10],
+    &sigoid_srt[11],
+    &sigoid_srt[13],
+    &sigoid_srt[24],
+    &sigoid_srt[20],
+    &sigoid_srt[32],
+    &sigoid_srt[37],
+    &sigoid_srt[14],
+    &sigoid_srt[21],
+    &sigoid_srt[33],
+    &sigoid_srt[38],
+    &sigoid_srt[15],
+    &sigoid_srt[22],
+    &sigoid_srt[34],
+    &sigoid_srt[39],
+    &sigoid_srt[16],
+    &sigoid_srt[23],
+    &sigoid_srt[19],
+    &sigoid_srt[31],
+    &sigoid_srt[36],
+    &sigoid_srt[25],
+    &sigoid_srt[26],
+    &sigoid_srt[27],
+    &sigoid_srt[28],
+    &sigoid_srt[40],
+    &sigoid_srt[41],
+};
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/objects/obj_xref.txt b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/objects/obj_xref.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..981103b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/objects/obj_xref.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+# OID cross reference table.
+# Links signatures OIDs to their corresponding public key algorithms
+# and digests.
+
+md2WithRSAEncryption	md2	rsaEncryption
+md5WithRSAEncryption	md5	rsaEncryption
+shaWithRSAEncryption	sha	rsaEncryption
+sha1WithRSAEncryption	sha1	rsaEncryption
+md4WithRSAEncryption	md4	rsaEncryption
+sha256WithRSAEncryption sha256	rsaEncryption
+sha384WithRSAEncryption	sha384	rsaEncryption
+sha512WithRSAEncryption	sha512	rsaEncryption
+sha224WithRSAEncryption	sha224	rsaEncryption
+mdc2WithRSA		mdc2	rsaEncryption
+ripemd160WithRSA	ripemd160 rsaEncryption
+# For PSS the digest algorithm can vary and depends on the included
+# AlgorithmIdentifier. The digest "undef" indicates the public key
+# method should handle this explicitly.
+rsassaPss		undef	rsaEncryption
+
+# Alternative deprecated OIDs. By using the older "rsa" OID this
+# type will be recognized by not normally used.
+
+md5WithRSA		md5	rsa
+sha1WithRSA		sha1	rsa
+
+dsaWithSHA		sha	dsa
+dsaWithSHA1		sha1	dsa
+
+dsaWithSHA1_2		sha1	dsa_2
+
+ecdsa_with_SHA1		sha1	X9_62_id_ecPublicKey
+ecdsa_with_SHA224	sha224	X9_62_id_ecPublicKey
+ecdsa_with_SHA256	sha256	X9_62_id_ecPublicKey
+ecdsa_with_SHA384	sha384	X9_62_id_ecPublicKey
+ecdsa_with_SHA512	sha512	X9_62_id_ecPublicKey
+ecdsa_with_Recommended	undef	X9_62_id_ecPublicKey
+ecdsa_with_Specified	undef	X9_62_id_ecPublicKey
+
+dsa_with_SHA224		sha224	dsa
+dsa_with_SHA256		sha256	dsa
+
+id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001	id_GostR3411_94 id_GostR3410_2001
+id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_94	id_GostR3411_94 id_GostR3410_94
+id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_94_cc	id_GostR3411_94 id_GostR3410_94_cc
+id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001_cc	id_GostR3411_94 id_GostR3410_2001_cc
+id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256 id_GostR3411_2012_256 id_GostR3410_2012_256
+id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512 id_GostR3411_2012_512 id_GostR3410_2012_512
+# ECDH KDFs and their corresponding message digests and schemes
+dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha1kdf_scheme		sha1	dh_std_kdf
+dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha224kdf_scheme		sha224	dh_std_kdf
+dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha256kdf_scheme		sha256	dh_std_kdf
+dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha384kdf_scheme		sha384	dh_std_kdf
+dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha512kdf_scheme		sha512	dh_std_kdf
+
+dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha1kdf_scheme		sha1	dh_cofactor_kdf
+dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha224kdf_scheme	sha224	dh_cofactor_kdf
+dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha256kdf_scheme	sha256	dh_cofactor_kdf
+dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha384kdf_scheme	sha384	dh_cofactor_kdf
+dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha512kdf_scheme	sha512	dh_cofactor_kdf
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/objects/objects.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/objects/objects.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3b40277
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/objects/objects.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+open (NUMIN,"$ARGV[1]") || die "Can't open number file $ARGV[1]";
+$max_nid=0;
+$o=0;
+while(<NUMIN>)
+	{
+	s|\R$||;
+	$o++;
+	s/#.*$//;
+	next if /^\s*$/;
+	$_ = 'X'.$_;
+	($Cname,$mynum) = split;
+	$Cname =~ s/^X//;
+	if (defined($nidn{$mynum}))
+		{ die "$ARGV[1]:$o:There's already an object with NID ",$mynum," on line ",$order{$mynum},"\n"; }
+	if (defined($nid{$Cname}))
+		{ die "$ARGV[1]:$o:There's already an object with name ",$Cname," on line ",$order{$nid{$Cname}},"\n"; }
+	$nid{$Cname} = $mynum;
+	$nidn{$mynum} = $Cname;
+	$order{$mynum} = $o;
+	$max_nid = $mynum if $mynum > $max_nid;
+	}
+close NUMIN;
+
+open (IN,"$ARGV[0]") || die "Can't open input file $ARGV[0]";
+$Cname="";
+$o=0;
+while (<IN>)
+	{
+	s|\R$||;
+	$o++;
+        if (/^!module\s+(.*)$/)
+		{
+		$module = $1."-";
+		$module =~ s/\./_/g;
+		$module =~ s/-/_/g;
+		}
+        if (/^!global$/)
+		{ $module = ""; }
+	if (/^!Cname\s+(.*)$/)
+		{ $Cname = $1; }
+	if (/^!Alias\s+(.+?)\s+(.*)$/)
+		{
+		$Cname = $module.$1;
+		$myoid = $2;
+		$myoid = &process_oid($myoid);
+		$Cname =~ s/-/_/g;
+		$ordern{$o} = $Cname;
+		$order{$Cname} = $o;
+		$obj{$Cname} = $myoid;
+		$_ = "";
+		$Cname = "";
+		}
+	s/!.*$//;
+	s/#.*$//;
+	next if /^\s*$/;
+	($myoid,$mysn,$myln) = split ':';
+	$mysn =~ s/^\s*//;
+	$mysn =~ s/\s*$//;
+	$myln =~ s/^\s*//;
+	$myln =~ s/\s*$//;
+	$myoid =~ s/^\s*//;
+	$myoid =~ s/\s*$//;
+	if ($myoid ne "")
+		{
+		$myoid = &process_oid($myoid);
+		}
+
+	if ($Cname eq "" && ($myln =~ /^[_A-Za-z][\w.-]*$/ ))
+		{
+		$Cname = $myln;
+		$Cname =~ s/\./_/g;
+		$Cname =~ s/-/_/g;
+		if ($Cname ne "" && defined($ln{$module.$Cname}))
+			{ die "objects.txt:$o:There's already an object with long name ",$ln{$module.$Cname}," on line ",$order{$module.$Cname},"\n"; }
+		}
+	if ($Cname eq "")
+		{
+		$Cname = $mysn;
+		$Cname =~ s/-/_/g;
+		if ($Cname ne "" && defined($sn{$module.$Cname}))
+			{ die "objects.txt:$o:There's already an object with short name ",$sn{$module.$Cname}," on line ",$order{$module.$Cname},"\n"; }
+		}
+	if ($Cname eq "")
+		{
+		$Cname = $myln;
+		$Cname =~ s/-/_/g;
+		$Cname =~ s/\./_/g;
+		$Cname =~ s/ /_/g;
+		if ($Cname ne "" && defined($ln{$module.$Cname}))
+			{ die "objects.txt:$o:There's already an object with long name ",$ln{$module.$Cname}," on line ",$order{$module.$Cname},"\n"; }
+		}
+	$Cname =~ s/\./_/g;
+	$Cname =~ s/-/_/g;
+	$Cname = $module.$Cname;
+	$ordern{$o} = $Cname;
+	$order{$Cname} = $o;
+	$sn{$Cname} = $mysn;
+	$ln{$Cname} = $myln;
+	$obj{$Cname} = $myoid;
+	if (!defined($nid{$Cname}))
+		{
+		$max_nid++;
+		$nid{$Cname} = $max_nid;
+		$nidn{$max_nid} = $Cname;
+print STDERR "Added OID $Cname\n";
+		}
+	$Cname="";
+	}
+close IN;
+
+open (NUMOUT,">$ARGV[1]") || die "Can't open output file $ARGV[1]";
+foreach (sort { $a <=> $b } keys %nidn)
+	{
+	print NUMOUT $nidn{$_},"\t\t",$_,"\n";
+	}
+close NUMOUT;
+
+open (OUT,">$ARGV[2]") || die "Can't open output file $ARGV[2]";
+print OUT <<'EOF';
+/*
+ * WARNING: do not edit!
+ * Generated by crypto/objects/objects.pl
+ *
+ * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#define SN_undef                        "UNDEF"
+#define LN_undef                        "undefined"
+#define NID_undef                       0
+#define OBJ_undef                       0L
+EOF
+
+sub expand
+	{
+	my $string = shift;
+
+	1 while $string =~ s/\t+/' ' x (length($&) * 8 - length($`) % 8)/e;
+
+	return $string;
+	}
+
+foreach (sort { $a <=> $b } keys %ordern)
+	{
+	$Cname=$ordern{$_};
+	print OUT "\n";
+	print OUT expand("#define SN_$Cname\t\t\"$sn{$Cname}\"\n") if $sn{$Cname} ne "";
+	print OUT expand("#define LN_$Cname\t\t\"$ln{$Cname}\"\n") if $ln{$Cname} ne "";
+	print OUT expand("#define NID_$Cname\t\t$nid{$Cname}\n") if $nid{$Cname} ne "";
+	print OUT expand("#define OBJ_$Cname\t\t$obj{$Cname}\n") if $obj{$Cname} ne "";
+	}
+
+close OUT;
+
+sub process_oid
+	{
+	local($oid)=@_;
+	local(@a,$oid_pref);
+
+	@a = split(/\s+/,$myoid);
+	$pref_oid = "";
+	$pref_sep = "";
+	if (!($a[0] =~ /^[0-9]+$/))
+		{
+		$a[0] =~ s/-/_/g;
+		if (!defined($obj{$a[0]}))
+			{ die "$ARGV[0]:$o:Undefined identifier ",$a[0],"\n"; }
+		$pref_oid = "OBJ_" . $a[0];
+		$pref_sep = ",";
+		shift @a;
+		}
+	$oids = join('L,',@a) . "L";
+	if ($oids ne "L")
+		{
+		$oids = $pref_oid . $pref_sep . $oids;
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		$oids = $pref_oid;
+		}
+	return($oids);
+	}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/objects/objects.txt b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/objects/objects.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fc0781d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/objects/objects.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,1485 @@
+# CCITT was renamed to ITU-T quite some time ago
+0			: ITU-T			: itu-t
+!Alias ccitt itu-t
+
+1			: ISO			: iso
+
+2			: JOINT-ISO-ITU-T	: joint-iso-itu-t
+!Alias joint-iso-ccitt joint-iso-itu-t
+
+iso 2			: member-body		: ISO Member Body
+
+iso 3			: identified-organization
+
+# HMAC OIDs
+identified-organization 6 1 5 5 8 1 1	: HMAC-MD5	: hmac-md5
+identified-organization 6 1 5 5 8 1 2	: HMAC-SHA1	: hmac-sha1
+
+identified-organization 132	: certicom-arc
+
+joint-iso-itu-t 23	: international-organizations	: International Organizations
+
+international-organizations 43	: wap
+wap 1			: wap-wsg
+
+joint-iso-itu-t 5 1 5	: selected-attribute-types	: Selected Attribute Types
+
+selected-attribute-types 55	: clearance
+
+member-body 840		: ISO-US		: ISO US Member Body
+ISO-US 10040		: X9-57			: X9.57
+X9-57 4			: X9cm			: X9.57 CM ?
+
+!Cname dsa
+X9cm 1			: DSA			: dsaEncryption
+X9cm 3			: DSA-SHA1		: dsaWithSHA1
+
+
+ISO-US 10045		: ansi-X9-62		: ANSI X9.62
+!module X9-62
+!Alias id-fieldType ansi-X9-62 1
+X9-62_id-fieldType 1		: prime-field
+X9-62_id-fieldType 2		: characteristic-two-field
+X9-62_characteristic-two-field 3 : id-characteristic-two-basis
+X9-62_id-characteristic-two-basis 1 : onBasis
+X9-62_id-characteristic-two-basis 2 : tpBasis
+X9-62_id-characteristic-two-basis 3 : ppBasis
+!Alias id-publicKeyType ansi-X9-62 2
+X9-62_id-publicKeyType 1	: id-ecPublicKey
+!Alias ellipticCurve ansi-X9-62 3
+!Alias c-TwoCurve X9-62_ellipticCurve 0
+X9-62_c-TwoCurve 1		: c2pnb163v1
+X9-62_c-TwoCurve 2		: c2pnb163v2
+X9-62_c-TwoCurve 3		: c2pnb163v3
+X9-62_c-TwoCurve 4		: c2pnb176v1
+X9-62_c-TwoCurve 5		: c2tnb191v1
+X9-62_c-TwoCurve 6		: c2tnb191v2
+X9-62_c-TwoCurve 7		: c2tnb191v3
+X9-62_c-TwoCurve 8		: c2onb191v4
+X9-62_c-TwoCurve 9		: c2onb191v5
+X9-62_c-TwoCurve 10		: c2pnb208w1
+X9-62_c-TwoCurve 11		: c2tnb239v1
+X9-62_c-TwoCurve 12		: c2tnb239v2
+X9-62_c-TwoCurve 13		: c2tnb239v3
+X9-62_c-TwoCurve 14		: c2onb239v4
+X9-62_c-TwoCurve 15		: c2onb239v5
+X9-62_c-TwoCurve 16		: c2pnb272w1
+X9-62_c-TwoCurve 17		: c2pnb304w1
+X9-62_c-TwoCurve 18		: c2tnb359v1
+X9-62_c-TwoCurve 19		: c2pnb368w1
+X9-62_c-TwoCurve 20		: c2tnb431r1
+!Alias primeCurve X9-62_ellipticCurve 1
+X9-62_primeCurve 1	 	: prime192v1
+X9-62_primeCurve 2	 	: prime192v2
+X9-62_primeCurve 3	 	: prime192v3
+X9-62_primeCurve 4	 	: prime239v1
+X9-62_primeCurve 5	 	: prime239v2
+X9-62_primeCurve 6	 	: prime239v3
+X9-62_primeCurve 7	 	: prime256v1
+!Alias id-ecSigType ansi-X9-62 4
+!global
+X9-62_id-ecSigType 1		: ecdsa-with-SHA1
+X9-62_id-ecSigType 2		: ecdsa-with-Recommended
+X9-62_id-ecSigType 3		: ecdsa-with-Specified
+ecdsa-with-Specified 1		: ecdsa-with-SHA224
+ecdsa-with-Specified 2		: ecdsa-with-SHA256
+ecdsa-with-Specified 3		: ecdsa-with-SHA384
+ecdsa-with-Specified 4		: ecdsa-with-SHA512
+
+# SECG curve OIDs from "SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters"
+# (http://www.secg.org/)
+!Alias secg_ellipticCurve certicom-arc 0
+# SECG prime curves OIDs
+secg-ellipticCurve 6		: secp112r1
+secg-ellipticCurve 7		: secp112r2
+secg-ellipticCurve 28		: secp128r1
+secg-ellipticCurve 29		: secp128r2
+secg-ellipticCurve 9		: secp160k1
+secg-ellipticCurve 8		: secp160r1
+secg-ellipticCurve 30		: secp160r2
+secg-ellipticCurve 31		: secp192k1
+# NOTE: the curve secp192r1 is the same as prime192v1 defined above
+#       and is therefore omitted
+secg-ellipticCurve 32		: secp224k1
+secg-ellipticCurve 33		: secp224r1
+secg-ellipticCurve 10		: secp256k1
+# NOTE: the curve secp256r1 is the same as prime256v1 defined above
+#       and is therefore omitted
+secg-ellipticCurve 34		: secp384r1
+secg-ellipticCurve 35		: secp521r1
+# SECG characteristic two curves OIDs
+secg-ellipticCurve 4		: sect113r1
+secg-ellipticCurve 5		: sect113r2
+secg-ellipticCurve 22		: sect131r1
+secg-ellipticCurve 23		: sect131r2
+secg-ellipticCurve 1		: sect163k1
+secg-ellipticCurve 2		: sect163r1
+secg-ellipticCurve 15		: sect163r2
+secg-ellipticCurve 24		: sect193r1
+secg-ellipticCurve 25		: sect193r2
+secg-ellipticCurve 26		: sect233k1
+secg-ellipticCurve 27		: sect233r1
+secg-ellipticCurve 3		: sect239k1
+secg-ellipticCurve 16		: sect283k1
+secg-ellipticCurve 17		: sect283r1
+secg-ellipticCurve 36		: sect409k1
+secg-ellipticCurve 37		: sect409r1
+secg-ellipticCurve 38		: sect571k1
+secg-ellipticCurve 39		: sect571r1
+
+# WAP/TLS curve OIDs (http://www.wapforum.org/)
+!Alias wap-wsg-idm-ecid wap-wsg 4
+wap-wsg-idm-ecid 1	: wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls1
+wap-wsg-idm-ecid 3	: wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls3
+wap-wsg-idm-ecid 4	: wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls4
+wap-wsg-idm-ecid 5	: wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls5
+wap-wsg-idm-ecid 6	: wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls6
+wap-wsg-idm-ecid 7	: wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls7
+wap-wsg-idm-ecid 8	: wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls8
+wap-wsg-idm-ecid 9	: wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls9
+wap-wsg-idm-ecid 10	: wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls10
+wap-wsg-idm-ecid 11	: wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls11
+wap-wsg-idm-ecid 12	: wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls12
+
+
+ISO-US 113533 7 66 10	: CAST5-CBC		: cast5-cbc
+			: CAST5-ECB		: cast5-ecb
+!Cname cast5-cfb64
+			: CAST5-CFB		: cast5-cfb
+!Cname cast5-ofb64
+			: CAST5-OFB		: cast5-ofb
+!Cname pbeWithMD5AndCast5-CBC
+ISO-US 113533 7 66 12	:			: pbeWithMD5AndCast5CBC
+
+# Macs for CMP and CRMF
+ISO-US 113533 7 66 13	: id-PasswordBasedMAC	: password based MAC
+ISO-US 113533 7 66 30	: id-DHBasedMac		: Diffie-Hellman based MAC
+
+ISO-US 113549		: rsadsi		: RSA Data Security, Inc.
+
+rsadsi 1		: pkcs			: RSA Data Security, Inc. PKCS
+
+pkcs 1			: pkcs1
+pkcs1 1			:			: rsaEncryption
+pkcs1 2			: RSA-MD2		: md2WithRSAEncryption
+pkcs1 3			: RSA-MD4		: md4WithRSAEncryption
+pkcs1 4			: RSA-MD5		: md5WithRSAEncryption
+pkcs1 5			: RSA-SHA1		: sha1WithRSAEncryption
+# According to PKCS #1 version 2.1
+pkcs1 7			: RSAES-OAEP		: rsaesOaep
+pkcs1 8			: MGF1			: mgf1
+pkcs1 9			: PSPECIFIED		: pSpecified
+pkcs1 10		: RSASSA-PSS		: rsassaPss
+
+pkcs1 11		: RSA-SHA256		: sha256WithRSAEncryption
+pkcs1 12		: RSA-SHA384		: sha384WithRSAEncryption
+pkcs1 13		: RSA-SHA512		: sha512WithRSAEncryption
+pkcs1 14		: RSA-SHA224		: sha224WithRSAEncryption
+
+pkcs 3			: pkcs3
+pkcs3 1			:			: dhKeyAgreement
+
+pkcs 5			: pkcs5
+pkcs5 1			: PBE-MD2-DES		: pbeWithMD2AndDES-CBC
+pkcs5 3			: PBE-MD5-DES		: pbeWithMD5AndDES-CBC
+pkcs5 4			: PBE-MD2-RC2-64	: pbeWithMD2AndRC2-CBC
+pkcs5 6			: PBE-MD5-RC2-64	: pbeWithMD5AndRC2-CBC
+pkcs5 10		: PBE-SHA1-DES		: pbeWithSHA1AndDES-CBC
+pkcs5 11		: PBE-SHA1-RC2-64	: pbeWithSHA1AndRC2-CBC
+!Cname id_pbkdf2
+pkcs5 12		:			: PBKDF2
+!Cname pbes2
+pkcs5 13		:			: PBES2
+!Cname pbmac1
+pkcs5 14		:			: PBMAC1
+
+pkcs 7			: pkcs7
+pkcs7 1			:			: pkcs7-data
+!Cname pkcs7-signed
+pkcs7 2			:			: pkcs7-signedData
+!Cname pkcs7-enveloped
+pkcs7 3			:			: pkcs7-envelopedData
+!Cname pkcs7-signedAndEnveloped
+pkcs7 4			:			: pkcs7-signedAndEnvelopedData
+!Cname pkcs7-digest
+pkcs7 5			:			: pkcs7-digestData
+!Cname pkcs7-encrypted
+pkcs7 6			:			: pkcs7-encryptedData
+
+pkcs 9			: pkcs9
+!module pkcs9
+pkcs9 1			: 			: emailAddress
+pkcs9 2			:			: unstructuredName
+pkcs9 3			:			: contentType
+pkcs9 4			:			: messageDigest
+pkcs9 5			:			: signingTime
+pkcs9 6			:			: countersignature
+pkcs9 7			:			: challengePassword
+pkcs9 8			:			: unstructuredAddress
+!Cname extCertAttributes
+pkcs9 9			:			: extendedCertificateAttributes
+!global
+
+!Cname ext-req
+pkcs9 14		: extReq		: Extension Request
+
+!Cname SMIMECapabilities
+pkcs9 15		: SMIME-CAPS		: S/MIME Capabilities
+
+# S/MIME
+!Cname SMIME
+pkcs9 16		: SMIME			: S/MIME
+SMIME 0			: id-smime-mod
+SMIME 1			: id-smime-ct
+SMIME 2			: id-smime-aa
+SMIME 3			: id-smime-alg
+SMIME 4			: id-smime-cd
+SMIME 5			: id-smime-spq
+SMIME 6			: id-smime-cti
+
+# S/MIME Modules
+id-smime-mod 1		: id-smime-mod-cms
+id-smime-mod 2		: id-smime-mod-ess
+id-smime-mod 3		: id-smime-mod-oid
+id-smime-mod 4		: id-smime-mod-msg-v3
+id-smime-mod 5		: id-smime-mod-ets-eSignature-88
+id-smime-mod 6		: id-smime-mod-ets-eSignature-97
+id-smime-mod 7		: id-smime-mod-ets-eSigPolicy-88
+id-smime-mod 8		: id-smime-mod-ets-eSigPolicy-97
+
+# S/MIME Content Types
+id-smime-ct 1		: id-smime-ct-receipt
+id-smime-ct 2		: id-smime-ct-authData
+id-smime-ct 3		: id-smime-ct-publishCert
+id-smime-ct 4		: id-smime-ct-TSTInfo
+id-smime-ct 5		: id-smime-ct-TDTInfo
+id-smime-ct 6		: id-smime-ct-contentInfo
+id-smime-ct 7		: id-smime-ct-DVCSRequestData
+id-smime-ct 8		: id-smime-ct-DVCSResponseData
+id-smime-ct 9		: id-smime-ct-compressedData
+id-smime-ct 19		: id-smime-ct-contentCollection
+id-smime-ct 23		: id-smime-ct-authEnvelopedData
+id-smime-ct 27		: id-ct-asciiTextWithCRLF
+id-smime-ct 28		: id-ct-xml
+
+# S/MIME Attributes
+id-smime-aa 1		: id-smime-aa-receiptRequest
+id-smime-aa 2		: id-smime-aa-securityLabel
+id-smime-aa 3		: id-smime-aa-mlExpandHistory
+id-smime-aa 4		: id-smime-aa-contentHint
+id-smime-aa 5		: id-smime-aa-msgSigDigest
+# obsolete
+id-smime-aa 6		: id-smime-aa-encapContentType
+id-smime-aa 7		: id-smime-aa-contentIdentifier
+# obsolete
+id-smime-aa 8		: id-smime-aa-macValue
+id-smime-aa 9		: id-smime-aa-equivalentLabels
+id-smime-aa 10		: id-smime-aa-contentReference
+id-smime-aa 11		: id-smime-aa-encrypKeyPref
+id-smime-aa 12		: id-smime-aa-signingCertificate
+id-smime-aa 13		: id-smime-aa-smimeEncryptCerts
+id-smime-aa 14		: id-smime-aa-timeStampToken
+id-smime-aa 15		: id-smime-aa-ets-sigPolicyId
+id-smime-aa 16		: id-smime-aa-ets-commitmentType
+id-smime-aa 17		: id-smime-aa-ets-signerLocation
+id-smime-aa 18		: id-smime-aa-ets-signerAttr
+id-smime-aa 19		: id-smime-aa-ets-otherSigCert
+id-smime-aa 20		: id-smime-aa-ets-contentTimestamp
+id-smime-aa 21		: id-smime-aa-ets-CertificateRefs
+id-smime-aa 22		: id-smime-aa-ets-RevocationRefs
+id-smime-aa 23		: id-smime-aa-ets-certValues
+id-smime-aa 24		: id-smime-aa-ets-revocationValues
+id-smime-aa 25		: id-smime-aa-ets-escTimeStamp
+id-smime-aa 26		: id-smime-aa-ets-certCRLTimestamp
+id-smime-aa 27		: id-smime-aa-ets-archiveTimeStamp
+id-smime-aa 28		: id-smime-aa-signatureType
+id-smime-aa 29		: id-smime-aa-dvcs-dvc
+
+# S/MIME Algorithm Identifiers
+# obsolete
+id-smime-alg 1		: id-smime-alg-ESDHwith3DES
+# obsolete
+id-smime-alg 2		: id-smime-alg-ESDHwithRC2
+# obsolete
+id-smime-alg 3		: id-smime-alg-3DESwrap
+# obsolete
+id-smime-alg 4		: id-smime-alg-RC2wrap
+id-smime-alg 5		: id-smime-alg-ESDH
+id-smime-alg 6		: id-smime-alg-CMS3DESwrap
+id-smime-alg 7		: id-smime-alg-CMSRC2wrap
+id-smime-alg 9		: id-alg-PWRI-KEK
+
+# S/MIME Certificate Distribution
+id-smime-cd 1		: id-smime-cd-ldap
+
+# S/MIME Signature Policy Qualifier
+id-smime-spq 1		: id-smime-spq-ets-sqt-uri
+id-smime-spq 2		: id-smime-spq-ets-sqt-unotice
+
+# S/MIME Commitment Type Identifier
+id-smime-cti 1		: id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfOrigin
+id-smime-cti 2		: id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfReceipt
+id-smime-cti 3		: id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfDelivery
+id-smime-cti 4		: id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfSender
+id-smime-cti 5		: id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfApproval
+id-smime-cti 6		: id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfCreation
+
+pkcs9 20		:			: friendlyName
+pkcs9 21		:			: localKeyID
+!Cname ms-csp-name
+1 3 6 1 4 1 311 17 1	: CSPName		: Microsoft CSP Name
+1 3 6 1 4 1 311 17 2	: LocalKeySet		: Microsoft Local Key set
+!Alias certTypes pkcs9 22
+certTypes 1		:			: x509Certificate
+certTypes 2		:			: sdsiCertificate
+!Alias crlTypes pkcs9 23
+crlTypes 1		:			: x509Crl
+
+!Alias pkcs12 pkcs 12
+!Alias pkcs12-pbeids pkcs12 1
+
+!Cname pbe-WithSHA1And128BitRC4
+pkcs12-pbeids 1		: PBE-SHA1-RC4-128	: pbeWithSHA1And128BitRC4
+!Cname pbe-WithSHA1And40BitRC4
+pkcs12-pbeids 2		: PBE-SHA1-RC4-40	: pbeWithSHA1And40BitRC4
+!Cname pbe-WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES-CBC
+pkcs12-pbeids 3		: PBE-SHA1-3DES		: pbeWithSHA1And3-KeyTripleDES-CBC
+!Cname pbe-WithSHA1And2_Key_TripleDES-CBC
+pkcs12-pbeids 4		: PBE-SHA1-2DES		: pbeWithSHA1And2-KeyTripleDES-CBC
+!Cname pbe-WithSHA1And128BitRC2-CBC
+pkcs12-pbeids 5		: PBE-SHA1-RC2-128	: pbeWithSHA1And128BitRC2-CBC
+!Cname pbe-WithSHA1And40BitRC2-CBC
+pkcs12-pbeids 6		: PBE-SHA1-RC2-40	: pbeWithSHA1And40BitRC2-CBC
+
+!Alias pkcs12-Version1 pkcs12 10
+!Alias pkcs12-BagIds pkcs12-Version1 1
+pkcs12-BagIds 1		:			: keyBag
+pkcs12-BagIds 2		:			: pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag
+pkcs12-BagIds 3		:			: certBag
+pkcs12-BagIds 4		:			: crlBag
+pkcs12-BagIds 5		:			: secretBag
+pkcs12-BagIds 6		:			: safeContentsBag
+
+rsadsi 2 2		: MD2			: md2
+rsadsi 2 4		: MD4			: md4
+rsadsi 2 5		: MD5			: md5
+			: MD5-SHA1		: md5-sha1
+rsadsi 2 6		:			: hmacWithMD5
+rsadsi 2 7		:			: hmacWithSHA1
+
+# From RFC4231
+rsadsi 2 8		:			: hmacWithSHA224
+rsadsi 2 9		:			: hmacWithSHA256
+rsadsi 2 10		:			: hmacWithSHA384
+rsadsi 2 11		:			: hmacWithSHA512
+
+rsadsi 3 2		: RC2-CBC		: rc2-cbc
+			: RC2-ECB		: rc2-ecb
+!Cname rc2-cfb64
+			: RC2-CFB		: rc2-cfb
+!Cname rc2-ofb64
+			: RC2-OFB		: rc2-ofb
+			: RC2-40-CBC		: rc2-40-cbc
+			: RC2-64-CBC		: rc2-64-cbc
+rsadsi 3 4		: RC4			: rc4
+			: RC4-40		: rc4-40
+rsadsi 3 7		: DES-EDE3-CBC		: des-ede3-cbc
+rsadsi 3 8		: RC5-CBC		: rc5-cbc
+			: RC5-ECB		: rc5-ecb
+!Cname rc5-cfb64
+			: RC5-CFB		: rc5-cfb
+!Cname rc5-ofb64
+			: RC5-OFB		: rc5-ofb
+
+!Cname ms-ext-req
+1 3 6 1 4 1 311 2 1 14	: msExtReq		: Microsoft Extension Request
+!Cname ms-code-ind
+1 3 6 1 4 1 311 2 1 21	: msCodeInd		: Microsoft Individual Code Signing
+!Cname ms-code-com
+1 3 6 1 4 1 311 2 1 22	: msCodeCom		: Microsoft Commercial Code Signing
+!Cname ms-ctl-sign
+1 3 6 1 4 1 311 10 3 1	: msCTLSign		: Microsoft Trust List Signing
+!Cname ms-sgc
+1 3 6 1 4 1 311 10 3 3	: msSGC			: Microsoft Server Gated Crypto
+!Cname ms-efs
+1 3 6 1 4 1 311 10 3 4	: msEFS			: Microsoft Encrypted File System
+!Cname ms-smartcard-login
+1 3 6 1 4 1 311 20 2 2	: msSmartcardLogin	: Microsoft Smartcardlogin
+!Cname ms-upn
+1 3 6 1 4 1 311 20 2 3	: msUPN			: Microsoft Universal Principal Name
+
+1 3 6 1 4 1 188 7 1 1 2	: IDEA-CBC		: idea-cbc
+			: IDEA-ECB		: idea-ecb
+!Cname idea-cfb64
+			: IDEA-CFB		: idea-cfb
+!Cname idea-ofb64
+			: IDEA-OFB		: idea-ofb
+
+1 3 6 1 4 1 3029 1 2	: BF-CBC		: bf-cbc
+			: BF-ECB		: bf-ecb
+!Cname bf-cfb64
+			: BF-CFB		: bf-cfb
+!Cname bf-ofb64
+			: BF-OFB		: bf-ofb
+
+!Cname id-pkix
+1 3 6 1 5 5 7		: PKIX
+
+# PKIX Arcs
+id-pkix 0		: id-pkix-mod
+id-pkix 1		: id-pe
+id-pkix 2		: id-qt
+id-pkix 3		: id-kp
+id-pkix 4		: id-it
+id-pkix 5		: id-pkip
+id-pkix 6		: id-alg
+id-pkix 7		: id-cmc
+id-pkix 8		: id-on
+id-pkix 9		: id-pda
+id-pkix 10		: id-aca
+id-pkix 11		: id-qcs
+id-pkix 12		: id-cct
+id-pkix 21		: id-ppl
+id-pkix 48		: id-ad
+
+# PKIX Modules
+id-pkix-mod 1		: id-pkix1-explicit-88
+id-pkix-mod 2		: id-pkix1-implicit-88
+id-pkix-mod 3		: id-pkix1-explicit-93
+id-pkix-mod 4		: id-pkix1-implicit-93
+id-pkix-mod 5		: id-mod-crmf
+id-pkix-mod 6		: id-mod-cmc
+id-pkix-mod 7		: id-mod-kea-profile-88
+id-pkix-mod 8		: id-mod-kea-profile-93
+id-pkix-mod 9		: id-mod-cmp
+id-pkix-mod 10		: id-mod-qualified-cert-88
+id-pkix-mod 11		: id-mod-qualified-cert-93
+id-pkix-mod 12		: id-mod-attribute-cert
+id-pkix-mod 13		: id-mod-timestamp-protocol
+id-pkix-mod 14		: id-mod-ocsp
+id-pkix-mod 15		: id-mod-dvcs
+id-pkix-mod 16		: id-mod-cmp2000
+
+# PKIX Private Extensions
+!Cname info-access
+id-pe 1			: authorityInfoAccess	: Authority Information Access
+id-pe 2			: biometricInfo		: Biometric Info
+id-pe 3			: qcStatements
+id-pe 4			: ac-auditEntity
+id-pe 5			: ac-targeting
+id-pe 6			: aaControls
+id-pe 7			: sbgp-ipAddrBlock
+id-pe 8			: sbgp-autonomousSysNum
+id-pe 9			: sbgp-routerIdentifier
+id-pe 10		: ac-proxying
+!Cname sinfo-access
+id-pe 11		: subjectInfoAccess	: Subject Information Access
+id-pe 14		: proxyCertInfo		: Proxy Certificate Information
+id-pe 24		: tlsfeature		: TLS Feature
+
+# PKIX policyQualifiers for Internet policy qualifiers
+id-qt 1			: id-qt-cps		: Policy Qualifier CPS
+id-qt 2			: id-qt-unotice		: Policy Qualifier User Notice
+id-qt 3			: textNotice
+
+# PKIX key purpose identifiers
+!Cname server-auth
+id-kp 1			: serverAuth		: TLS Web Server Authentication
+!Cname client-auth
+id-kp 2			: clientAuth		: TLS Web Client Authentication
+!Cname code-sign
+id-kp 3			: codeSigning		: Code Signing
+!Cname email-protect
+id-kp 4			: emailProtection	: E-mail Protection
+id-kp 5			: ipsecEndSystem	: IPSec End System
+id-kp 6			: ipsecTunnel		: IPSec Tunnel
+id-kp 7			: ipsecUser		: IPSec User
+!Cname time-stamp
+id-kp 8			: timeStamping		: Time Stamping
+# From OCSP spec RFC2560
+!Cname OCSP-sign
+id-kp 9			: OCSPSigning		: OCSP Signing
+id-kp 10		: DVCS			: dvcs
+!Cname ipsec-IKE
+id-kp 17                : ipsecIKE              : ipsec Internet Key Exchange
+id-kp 18                : capwapAC              : Ctrl/provision WAP Access
+id-kp 19                : capwapWTP             : Ctrl/Provision WAP Termination
+!Cname sshClient
+id-kp 21                : secureShellClient     : SSH Client
+!Cname sshServer
+id-kp 22                : secureShellServer     : SSH Server
+id-kp 23                : sendRouter            : Send Router
+id-kp 24                : sendProxiedRouter     : Send Proxied Router
+id-kp 25                : sendOwner             : Send Owner
+id-kp 26                : sendProxiedOwner      : Send Proxied Owner
+
+# CMP information types
+id-it 1			: id-it-caProtEncCert
+id-it 2			: id-it-signKeyPairTypes
+id-it 3			: id-it-encKeyPairTypes
+id-it 4			: id-it-preferredSymmAlg
+id-it 5			: id-it-caKeyUpdateInfo
+id-it 6			: id-it-currentCRL
+id-it 7			: id-it-unsupportedOIDs
+# obsolete
+id-it 8			: id-it-subscriptionRequest
+# obsolete
+id-it 9			: id-it-subscriptionResponse
+id-it 10		: id-it-keyPairParamReq
+id-it 11		: id-it-keyPairParamRep
+id-it 12		: id-it-revPassphrase
+id-it 13		: id-it-implicitConfirm
+id-it 14		: id-it-confirmWaitTime
+id-it 15		: id-it-origPKIMessage
+id-it 16		: id-it-suppLangTags
+
+# CRMF registration
+id-pkip 1		: id-regCtrl
+id-pkip 2		: id-regInfo
+
+# CRMF registration controls
+id-regCtrl 1		: id-regCtrl-regToken
+id-regCtrl 2		: id-regCtrl-authenticator
+id-regCtrl 3		: id-regCtrl-pkiPublicationInfo
+id-regCtrl 4		: id-regCtrl-pkiArchiveOptions
+id-regCtrl 5		: id-regCtrl-oldCertID
+id-regCtrl 6		: id-regCtrl-protocolEncrKey
+
+# CRMF registration information
+id-regInfo 1		: id-regInfo-utf8Pairs
+id-regInfo 2		: id-regInfo-certReq
+
+# algorithms
+id-alg 1		: id-alg-des40
+id-alg 2		: id-alg-noSignature
+id-alg 3		: id-alg-dh-sig-hmac-sha1
+id-alg 4		: id-alg-dh-pop
+
+# CMC controls
+id-cmc 1		: id-cmc-statusInfo
+id-cmc 2		: id-cmc-identification
+id-cmc 3		: id-cmc-identityProof
+id-cmc 4		: id-cmc-dataReturn
+id-cmc 5		: id-cmc-transactionId
+id-cmc 6		: id-cmc-senderNonce
+id-cmc 7		: id-cmc-recipientNonce
+id-cmc 8		: id-cmc-addExtensions
+id-cmc 9		: id-cmc-encryptedPOP
+id-cmc 10		: id-cmc-decryptedPOP
+id-cmc 11		: id-cmc-lraPOPWitness
+id-cmc 15		: id-cmc-getCert
+id-cmc 16		: id-cmc-getCRL
+id-cmc 17		: id-cmc-revokeRequest
+id-cmc 18		: id-cmc-regInfo
+id-cmc 19		: id-cmc-responseInfo
+id-cmc 21		: id-cmc-queryPending
+id-cmc 22		: id-cmc-popLinkRandom
+id-cmc 23		: id-cmc-popLinkWitness
+id-cmc 24		: id-cmc-confirmCertAcceptance 
+
+# other names
+id-on 1			: id-on-personalData
+id-on 3			: id-on-permanentIdentifier : Permanent Identifier
+
+# personal data attributes
+id-pda 1		: id-pda-dateOfBirth
+id-pda 2		: id-pda-placeOfBirth
+id-pda 3		: id-pda-gender
+id-pda 4		: id-pda-countryOfCitizenship
+id-pda 5		: id-pda-countryOfResidence
+
+# attribute certificate attributes
+id-aca 1		: id-aca-authenticationInfo
+id-aca 2		: id-aca-accessIdentity
+id-aca 3		: id-aca-chargingIdentity
+id-aca 4		: id-aca-group
+# attention : the following seems to be obsolete, replace by 'role'
+id-aca 5		: id-aca-role
+id-aca 6		: id-aca-encAttrs
+
+# qualified certificate statements
+id-qcs 1		: id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v1
+
+# CMC content types
+id-cct 1		: id-cct-crs
+id-cct 2		: id-cct-PKIData
+id-cct 3		: id-cct-PKIResponse
+
+# Predefined Proxy Certificate policy languages
+id-ppl 0		: id-ppl-anyLanguage	: Any language
+id-ppl 1		: id-ppl-inheritAll	: Inherit all
+id-ppl 2		: id-ppl-independent	: Independent
+
+# access descriptors for authority info access extension
+!Cname ad-OCSP
+id-ad 1			: OCSP			: OCSP
+!Cname ad-ca-issuers
+id-ad 2			: caIssuers		: CA Issuers
+!Cname ad-timeStamping
+id-ad 3			: ad_timestamping	: AD Time Stamping
+!Cname ad-dvcs
+id-ad 4			: AD_DVCS		: ad dvcs
+id-ad 5			: caRepository		: CA Repository
+
+
+!Alias id-pkix-OCSP ad-OCSP
+!module id-pkix-OCSP
+!Cname basic
+id-pkix-OCSP 1		: basicOCSPResponse	: Basic OCSP Response
+id-pkix-OCSP 2		: Nonce			: OCSP Nonce
+id-pkix-OCSP 3		: CrlID			: OCSP CRL ID
+id-pkix-OCSP 4		: acceptableResponses	: Acceptable OCSP Responses
+id-pkix-OCSP 5		: noCheck		: OCSP No Check
+id-pkix-OCSP 6		: archiveCutoff		: OCSP Archive Cutoff
+id-pkix-OCSP 7		: serviceLocator	: OCSP Service Locator
+id-pkix-OCSP 8		: extendedStatus	: Extended OCSP Status
+id-pkix-OCSP 9		: valid
+id-pkix-OCSP 10		: path
+id-pkix-OCSP 11		: trustRoot		: Trust Root
+!global
+
+1 3 14 3 2		: algorithm		: algorithm
+algorithm 3		: RSA-NP-MD5		: md5WithRSA
+algorithm 6		: DES-ECB		: des-ecb
+algorithm 7		: DES-CBC		: des-cbc
+!Cname des-ofb64
+algorithm 8		: DES-OFB		: des-ofb
+!Cname des-cfb64
+algorithm 9		: DES-CFB		: des-cfb
+algorithm 11		: rsaSignature
+!Cname dsa-2
+algorithm 12		: DSA-old		: dsaEncryption-old
+algorithm 13		: DSA-SHA		: dsaWithSHA
+algorithm 15		: RSA-SHA		: shaWithRSAEncryption
+!Cname des-ede-ecb
+algorithm 17		: DES-EDE		: des-ede
+!Cname des-ede3-ecb
+			: DES-EDE3		: des-ede3
+			: DES-EDE-CBC		: des-ede-cbc
+!Cname des-ede-cfb64
+			: DES-EDE-CFB		: des-ede-cfb
+!Cname des-ede3-cfb64
+			: DES-EDE3-CFB		: des-ede3-cfb
+!Cname des-ede-ofb64
+			: DES-EDE-OFB		: des-ede-ofb
+!Cname des-ede3-ofb64
+			: DES-EDE3-OFB		: des-ede3-ofb
+			: DESX-CBC		: desx-cbc
+algorithm 18		: SHA			: sha
+algorithm 26		: SHA1			: sha1
+!Cname dsaWithSHA1-2
+algorithm 27		: DSA-SHA1-old		: dsaWithSHA1-old
+algorithm 29		: RSA-SHA1-2		: sha1WithRSA
+
+1 3 36 3 2 1		: RIPEMD160		: ripemd160
+1 3 36 3 3 1 2		: RSA-RIPEMD160		: ripemd160WithRSA
+
+1 3 6 1 4 1 1722 12 2 1 16 : BLAKE2b512        : blake2b512
+1 3 6 1 4 1 1722 12 2 2 8  : BLAKE2s256        : blake2s256
+
+!Cname sxnet
+1 3 101 1 4 1		: SXNetID		: Strong Extranet ID
+
+2 5			: X500			: directory services (X.500)
+
+X500 4			: X509
+X509 3			: CN			: commonName
+X509 4			: SN			: surname
+X509 5			: 			: serialNumber
+X509 6			: C			: countryName
+X509 7			: L			: localityName
+X509 8			: ST			: stateOrProvinceName
+X509 9			: street		: streetAddress
+X509 10			: O			: organizationName
+X509 11			: OU			: organizationalUnitName
+X509 12			: title			: title
+X509 13			: 			: description
+X509 14			: 			: searchGuide
+X509 15			: 			: businessCategory
+X509 16			: 			: postalAddress
+X509 17			: 			: postalCode
+X509 18			: 			: postOfficeBox
+X509 19			: 			: physicalDeliveryOfficeName
+X509 20			: 			: telephoneNumber
+X509 21			: 			: telexNumber
+X509 22			: 			: teletexTerminalIdentifier
+X509 23			: 			: facsimileTelephoneNumber
+X509 24			: 			: x121Address
+X509 25			: 			: internationaliSDNNumber
+X509 26			: 			: registeredAddress
+X509 27			: 			: destinationIndicator
+X509 28			: 			: preferredDeliveryMethod
+X509 29			: 			: presentationAddress
+X509 30			: 			: supportedApplicationContext
+X509 31			: member		:
+X509 32			: owner			:
+X509 33			: 			: roleOccupant
+X509 34			: seeAlso		:
+X509 35			: 			: userPassword
+X509 36			: 			: userCertificate
+X509 37			: 			: cACertificate
+X509 38			: 			: authorityRevocationList
+X509 39			: 			: certificateRevocationList
+X509 40			: 			: crossCertificatePair
+X509 41			: name			: name
+X509 42			: GN			: givenName
+X509 43			: initials		: initials
+X509 44			: 			: generationQualifier
+X509 45			: 			: x500UniqueIdentifier
+X509 46			: dnQualifier		: dnQualifier
+X509 47			: 			: enhancedSearchGuide
+X509 48			: 			: protocolInformation
+X509 49			: 			: distinguishedName
+X509 50			: 			: uniqueMember
+X509 51			: 			: houseIdentifier
+X509 52			: 			: supportedAlgorithms
+X509 53			: 			: deltaRevocationList
+X509 54			: dmdName		:
+X509 65			:			: pseudonym
+X509 72			: role			: role
+
+X500 8			: X500algorithms	: directory services - algorithms
+X500algorithms 1 1	: RSA			: rsa
+X500algorithms 3 100	: RSA-MDC2		: mdc2WithRSA
+X500algorithms 3 101	: MDC2			: mdc2
+
+X500 29			: id-ce
+!Cname subject-directory-attributes
+id-ce 9			: subjectDirectoryAttributes : X509v3 Subject Directory Attributes
+!Cname subject-key-identifier
+id-ce 14		: subjectKeyIdentifier	: X509v3 Subject Key Identifier
+!Cname key-usage
+id-ce 15		: keyUsage		: X509v3 Key Usage
+!Cname private-key-usage-period
+id-ce 16		: privateKeyUsagePeriod	: X509v3 Private Key Usage Period
+!Cname subject-alt-name
+id-ce 17		: subjectAltName	: X509v3 Subject Alternative Name
+!Cname issuer-alt-name
+id-ce 18		: issuerAltName		: X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name
+!Cname basic-constraints
+id-ce 19		: basicConstraints	: X509v3 Basic Constraints
+!Cname crl-number
+id-ce 20		: crlNumber		: X509v3 CRL Number
+!Cname crl-reason
+id-ce 21		: CRLReason		: X509v3 CRL Reason Code
+!Cname invalidity-date
+id-ce 24		: invalidityDate	: Invalidity Date
+!Cname delta-crl
+id-ce 27		: deltaCRL		: X509v3 Delta CRL Indicator
+!Cname issuing-distribution-point
+id-ce 28		: issuingDistributionPoint : X509v3 Issuing Distribution Point
+!Cname certificate-issuer
+id-ce 29		: certificateIssuer	: X509v3 Certificate Issuer
+!Cname name-constraints
+id-ce 30		: nameConstraints	: X509v3 Name Constraints
+!Cname crl-distribution-points
+id-ce 31		: crlDistributionPoints	: X509v3 CRL Distribution Points
+!Cname certificate-policies
+id-ce 32		: certificatePolicies	: X509v3 Certificate Policies
+!Cname any-policy
+certificate-policies 0	: anyPolicy		: X509v3 Any Policy
+!Cname policy-mappings
+id-ce 33		: policyMappings	: X509v3 Policy Mappings
+!Cname authority-key-identifier
+id-ce 35		: authorityKeyIdentifier : X509v3 Authority Key Identifier
+!Cname policy-constraints
+id-ce 36		: policyConstraints	: X509v3 Policy Constraints
+!Cname ext-key-usage
+id-ce 37		: extendedKeyUsage	: X509v3 Extended Key Usage
+!Cname freshest-crl
+id-ce 46		: freshestCRL		: X509v3 Freshest CRL
+!Cname inhibit-any-policy
+id-ce 54		: inhibitAnyPolicy	: X509v3 Inhibit Any Policy
+!Cname target-information
+id-ce 55		: targetInformation	: X509v3 AC Targeting
+!Cname no-rev-avail
+id-ce 56		: noRevAvail		: X509v3 No Revocation Available
+
+# From RFC5280
+ext-key-usage 0		: anyExtendedKeyUsage	: Any Extended Key Usage
+
+
+!Cname netscape
+2 16 840 1 113730	: Netscape		: Netscape Communications Corp.
+!Cname netscape-cert-extension
+netscape 1		: nsCertExt		: Netscape Certificate Extension
+!Cname netscape-data-type
+netscape 2		: nsDataType		: Netscape Data Type
+!Cname netscape-cert-type
+netscape-cert-extension 1 : nsCertType		: Netscape Cert Type
+!Cname netscape-base-url
+netscape-cert-extension 2 : nsBaseUrl		: Netscape Base Url
+!Cname netscape-revocation-url
+netscape-cert-extension 3 : nsRevocationUrl	: Netscape Revocation Url
+!Cname netscape-ca-revocation-url
+netscape-cert-extension 4 : nsCaRevocationUrl	: Netscape CA Revocation Url
+!Cname netscape-renewal-url
+netscape-cert-extension 7 : nsRenewalUrl	: Netscape Renewal Url
+!Cname netscape-ca-policy-url
+netscape-cert-extension 8 : nsCaPolicyUrl	: Netscape CA Policy Url
+!Cname netscape-ssl-server-name
+netscape-cert-extension 12 : nsSslServerName	: Netscape SSL Server Name
+!Cname netscape-comment
+netscape-cert-extension 13 : nsComment		: Netscape Comment
+!Cname netscape-cert-sequence
+netscape-data-type 5	: nsCertSequence	: Netscape Certificate Sequence
+!Cname ns-sgc
+netscape 4 1		: nsSGC			: Netscape Server Gated Crypto
+
+# iso(1)
+iso 3			: ORG			: org
+org 6			: DOD			: dod
+dod 1			: IANA			: iana
+!Alias internet iana
+
+internet 1		: directory		: Directory
+internet 2		: mgmt			: Management
+internet 3		: experimental		: Experimental
+internet 4		: private		: Private
+internet 5		: security		: Security
+internet 6		: snmpv2		: SNMPv2
+# Documents refer to "internet 7" as "mail". This however leads to ambiguities
+# with RFC2798, Section 9.1.3, where "mail" is defined as the short name for
+# rfc822Mailbox. The short name is therefore here left out for a reason.
+# Subclasses of "mail", e.g. "MIME MHS" don't consitute a problem, as
+# references are realized via long name "Mail" (with capital M).
+internet 7		:			: Mail
+
+Private 1		: enterprises		: Enterprises
+
+# RFC 2247
+Enterprises 1466 344	: dcobject		: dcObject
+
+# RFC 1495
+Mail 1			: mime-mhs		: MIME MHS
+mime-mhs 1		: mime-mhs-headings	: mime-mhs-headings
+mime-mhs 2		: mime-mhs-bodies	: mime-mhs-bodies
+mime-mhs-headings 1	: id-hex-partial-message : id-hex-partial-message
+mime-mhs-headings 2	: id-hex-multipart-message : id-hex-multipart-message
+
+# RFC 3274
+!Cname zlib-compression
+id-smime-alg 8		: ZLIB			: zlib compression
+
+# AES aka Rijndael
+
+!Alias csor 2 16 840 1 101 3
+!Alias nistAlgorithms csor 4
+!Alias aes nistAlgorithms 1
+
+aes 1			: AES-128-ECB		: aes-128-ecb
+aes 2			: AES-128-CBC		: aes-128-cbc
+!Cname aes-128-ofb128
+aes 3			: AES-128-OFB		: aes-128-ofb
+!Cname aes-128-cfb128
+aes 4			: AES-128-CFB		: aes-128-cfb
+aes 5			: id-aes128-wrap
+aes 6			: id-aes128-GCM		: aes-128-gcm
+aes 7			: id-aes128-CCM		: aes-128-ccm
+aes 8			: id-aes128-wrap-pad
+
+aes 21			: AES-192-ECB		: aes-192-ecb
+aes 22			: AES-192-CBC		: aes-192-cbc
+!Cname aes-192-ofb128
+aes 23			: AES-192-OFB		: aes-192-ofb
+!Cname aes-192-cfb128
+aes 24			: AES-192-CFB		: aes-192-cfb
+aes 25			: id-aes192-wrap
+aes 26			: id-aes192-GCM		: aes-192-gcm
+aes 27			: id-aes192-CCM		: aes-192-ccm
+aes 28			: id-aes192-wrap-pad
+
+aes 41			: AES-256-ECB		: aes-256-ecb
+aes 42			: AES-256-CBC		: aes-256-cbc
+!Cname aes-256-ofb128
+aes 43			: AES-256-OFB		: aes-256-ofb
+!Cname aes-256-cfb128
+aes 44			: AES-256-CFB		: aes-256-cfb
+aes 45			: id-aes256-wrap
+aes 46			: id-aes256-GCM		: aes-256-gcm
+aes 47			: id-aes256-CCM		: aes-256-ccm
+aes 48			: id-aes256-wrap-pad
+
+# There are no OIDs for these modes...
+
+			: AES-128-CFB1		: aes-128-cfb1
+			: AES-192-CFB1		: aes-192-cfb1
+			: AES-256-CFB1		: aes-256-cfb1
+			: AES-128-CFB8		: aes-128-cfb8
+			: AES-192-CFB8		: aes-192-cfb8
+			: AES-256-CFB8		: aes-256-cfb8
+			: AES-128-CTR		: aes-128-ctr
+			: AES-192-CTR		: aes-192-ctr
+			: AES-256-CTR		: aes-256-ctr
+			: AES-128-OCB		: aes-128-ocb
+			: AES-192-OCB		: aes-192-ocb
+			: AES-256-OCB		: aes-256-ocb
+			: AES-128-XTS		: aes-128-xts
+			: AES-256-XTS		: aes-256-xts
+			: DES-CFB1		: des-cfb1
+			: DES-CFB8		: des-cfb8
+			: DES-EDE3-CFB1		: des-ede3-cfb1
+			: DES-EDE3-CFB8		: des-ede3-cfb8
+
+# OIDs for SHA224, SHA256, SHA385 and SHA512, according to x9.84.
+!Alias nist_hashalgs nistAlgorithms 2
+nist_hashalgs 1		: SHA256		: sha256
+nist_hashalgs 2		: SHA384		: sha384
+nist_hashalgs 3		: SHA512		: sha512
+nist_hashalgs 4		: SHA224		: sha224
+
+# OIDs for dsa-with-sha224 and dsa-with-sha256
+!Alias dsa_with_sha2 nistAlgorithms 3
+dsa_with_sha2 1		: dsa_with_SHA224
+dsa_with_sha2 2		: dsa_with_SHA256
+
+# Hold instruction CRL entry extension
+!Cname hold-instruction-code
+id-ce 23		: holdInstructionCode	: Hold Instruction Code
+!Alias holdInstruction	X9-57 2
+!Cname hold-instruction-none
+holdInstruction 1	: holdInstructionNone	: Hold Instruction None
+!Cname hold-instruction-call-issuer
+holdInstruction 2	: holdInstructionCallIssuer : Hold Instruction Call Issuer
+!Cname hold-instruction-reject
+holdInstruction 3	: holdInstructionReject	: Hold Instruction Reject
+
+# OID's from ITU-T.  Most of this is defined in RFC 1274.  A couple of
+# them are also mentioned in RFC 2247
+itu-t 9			: data
+data 2342		: pss
+pss 19200300		: ucl
+ucl 100			: pilot
+pilot 1			:			: pilotAttributeType
+pilot 3			:			: pilotAttributeSyntax
+pilot 4			:			: pilotObjectClass
+pilot 10		:			: pilotGroups
+pilotAttributeSyntax 4	:			: iA5StringSyntax
+pilotAttributeSyntax 5	:			: caseIgnoreIA5StringSyntax
+pilotObjectClass 3	:			: pilotObject
+pilotObjectClass 4	:			: pilotPerson
+pilotObjectClass 5	: account
+pilotObjectClass 6	: document
+pilotObjectClass 7	: room
+pilotObjectClass 9	:			: documentSeries
+pilotObjectClass 13	: domain		: Domain
+pilotObjectClass 14	:			: rFC822localPart
+pilotObjectClass 15	:			: dNSDomain
+pilotObjectClass 17	:			: domainRelatedObject
+pilotObjectClass 18	:			: friendlyCountry
+pilotObjectClass 19	:			: simpleSecurityObject
+pilotObjectClass 20	:			: pilotOrganization
+pilotObjectClass 21	:			: pilotDSA
+pilotObjectClass 22	:			: qualityLabelledData
+pilotAttributeType 1	: UID			: userId
+pilotAttributeType 2	:			: textEncodedORAddress
+pilotAttributeType 3	: mail			: rfc822Mailbox
+pilotAttributeType 4	: info
+pilotAttributeType 5	:			: favouriteDrink
+pilotAttributeType 6	:			: roomNumber
+pilotAttributeType 7	: photo
+pilotAttributeType 8	:			: userClass
+pilotAttributeType 9	: host
+pilotAttributeType 10	: manager
+pilotAttributeType 11	:			: documentIdentifier
+pilotAttributeType 12	:			: documentTitle
+pilotAttributeType 13	:			: documentVersion
+pilotAttributeType 14	:			: documentAuthor
+pilotAttributeType 15	:			: documentLocation
+pilotAttributeType 20	:			: homeTelephoneNumber
+pilotAttributeType 21	: secretary
+pilotAttributeType 22	:			: otherMailbox
+pilotAttributeType 23	:			: lastModifiedTime
+pilotAttributeType 24	:			: lastModifiedBy
+pilotAttributeType 25	: DC			: domainComponent
+pilotAttributeType 26	:			: aRecord
+pilotAttributeType 27	:			: pilotAttributeType27
+pilotAttributeType 28	:			: mXRecord
+pilotAttributeType 29	:			: nSRecord
+pilotAttributeType 30	:			: sOARecord
+pilotAttributeType 31	:			: cNAMERecord
+pilotAttributeType 37	:			: associatedDomain
+pilotAttributeType 38	:			: associatedName
+pilotAttributeType 39	:			: homePostalAddress
+pilotAttributeType 40	:			: personalTitle
+pilotAttributeType 41	:			: mobileTelephoneNumber
+pilotAttributeType 42	:			: pagerTelephoneNumber
+pilotAttributeType 43	:			: friendlyCountryName
+pilotAttributeType 44	: uid			: uniqueIdentifier
+pilotAttributeType 45	:			: organizationalStatus
+pilotAttributeType 46	:			: janetMailbox
+pilotAttributeType 47	:			: mailPreferenceOption
+pilotAttributeType 48	:			: buildingName
+pilotAttributeType 49	:			: dSAQuality
+pilotAttributeType 50	:			: singleLevelQuality
+pilotAttributeType 51	:			: subtreeMinimumQuality
+pilotAttributeType 52	:			: subtreeMaximumQuality
+pilotAttributeType 53	:			: personalSignature
+pilotAttributeType 54	:			: dITRedirect
+pilotAttributeType 55	: audio
+pilotAttributeType 56	:			: documentPublisher
+
+international-organizations 42	: id-set	: Secure Electronic Transactions
+
+id-set 0		: set-ctype		: content types
+id-set 1		: set-msgExt		: message extensions
+id-set 3		: set-attr
+id-set 5		: set-policy
+id-set 7		: set-certExt		: certificate extensions
+id-set 8		: set-brand
+
+set-ctype 0		: setct-PANData
+set-ctype 1		: setct-PANToken
+set-ctype 2		: setct-PANOnly
+set-ctype 3		: setct-OIData
+set-ctype 4		: setct-PI
+set-ctype 5		: setct-PIData
+set-ctype 6		: setct-PIDataUnsigned
+set-ctype 7		: setct-HODInput
+set-ctype 8		: setct-AuthResBaggage
+set-ctype 9		: setct-AuthRevReqBaggage
+set-ctype 10		: setct-AuthRevResBaggage
+set-ctype 11		: setct-CapTokenSeq
+set-ctype 12		: setct-PInitResData
+set-ctype 13		: setct-PI-TBS
+set-ctype 14		: setct-PResData
+set-ctype 16		: setct-AuthReqTBS
+set-ctype 17		: setct-AuthResTBS
+set-ctype 18		: setct-AuthResTBSX
+set-ctype 19		: setct-AuthTokenTBS
+set-ctype 20		: setct-CapTokenData
+set-ctype 21		: setct-CapTokenTBS
+set-ctype 22		: setct-AcqCardCodeMsg
+set-ctype 23		: setct-AuthRevReqTBS
+set-ctype 24		: setct-AuthRevResData
+set-ctype 25		: setct-AuthRevResTBS
+set-ctype 26		: setct-CapReqTBS
+set-ctype 27		: setct-CapReqTBSX
+set-ctype 28		: setct-CapResData
+set-ctype 29		: setct-CapRevReqTBS
+set-ctype 30		: setct-CapRevReqTBSX
+set-ctype 31		: setct-CapRevResData
+set-ctype 32		: setct-CredReqTBS
+set-ctype 33		: setct-CredReqTBSX
+set-ctype 34		: setct-CredResData
+set-ctype 35		: setct-CredRevReqTBS
+set-ctype 36		: setct-CredRevReqTBSX
+set-ctype 37		: setct-CredRevResData
+set-ctype 38		: setct-PCertReqData
+set-ctype 39		: setct-PCertResTBS
+set-ctype 40		: setct-BatchAdminReqData
+set-ctype 41		: setct-BatchAdminResData
+set-ctype 42		: setct-CardCInitResTBS
+set-ctype 43		: setct-MeAqCInitResTBS
+set-ctype 44		: setct-RegFormResTBS
+set-ctype 45		: setct-CertReqData
+set-ctype 46		: setct-CertReqTBS
+set-ctype 47		: setct-CertResData
+set-ctype 48		: setct-CertInqReqTBS
+set-ctype 49		: setct-ErrorTBS
+set-ctype 50		: setct-PIDualSignedTBE
+set-ctype 51		: setct-PIUnsignedTBE
+set-ctype 52		: setct-AuthReqTBE
+set-ctype 53		: setct-AuthResTBE
+set-ctype 54		: setct-AuthResTBEX
+set-ctype 55		: setct-AuthTokenTBE
+set-ctype 56		: setct-CapTokenTBE
+set-ctype 57		: setct-CapTokenTBEX
+set-ctype 58		: setct-AcqCardCodeMsgTBE
+set-ctype 59		: setct-AuthRevReqTBE
+set-ctype 60		: setct-AuthRevResTBE
+set-ctype 61		: setct-AuthRevResTBEB
+set-ctype 62		: setct-CapReqTBE
+set-ctype 63		: setct-CapReqTBEX
+set-ctype 64		: setct-CapResTBE
+set-ctype 65		: setct-CapRevReqTBE
+set-ctype 66		: setct-CapRevReqTBEX
+set-ctype 67		: setct-CapRevResTBE
+set-ctype 68		: setct-CredReqTBE
+set-ctype 69		: setct-CredReqTBEX
+set-ctype 70		: setct-CredResTBE
+set-ctype 71		: setct-CredRevReqTBE
+set-ctype 72		: setct-CredRevReqTBEX
+set-ctype 73		: setct-CredRevResTBE
+set-ctype 74		: setct-BatchAdminReqTBE
+set-ctype 75		: setct-BatchAdminResTBE
+set-ctype 76		: setct-RegFormReqTBE
+set-ctype 77		: setct-CertReqTBE
+set-ctype 78		: setct-CertReqTBEX
+set-ctype 79		: setct-CertResTBE
+set-ctype 80		: setct-CRLNotificationTBS
+set-ctype 81		: setct-CRLNotificationResTBS
+set-ctype 82		: setct-BCIDistributionTBS
+
+set-msgExt 1		: setext-genCrypt	: generic cryptogram
+set-msgExt 3		: setext-miAuth		: merchant initiated auth
+set-msgExt 4		: setext-pinSecure
+set-msgExt 5		: setext-pinAny
+set-msgExt 7		: setext-track2
+set-msgExt 8		: setext-cv		: additional verification
+
+set-policy 0		: set-policy-root
+
+set-certExt 0		: setCext-hashedRoot
+set-certExt 1		: setCext-certType
+set-certExt 2		: setCext-merchData
+set-certExt 3		: setCext-cCertRequired
+set-certExt 4		: setCext-tunneling
+set-certExt 5		: setCext-setExt
+set-certExt 6		: setCext-setQualf
+set-certExt 7		: setCext-PGWYcapabilities
+set-certExt 8		: setCext-TokenIdentifier
+set-certExt 9		: setCext-Track2Data
+set-certExt 10		: setCext-TokenType
+set-certExt 11		: setCext-IssuerCapabilities
+
+set-attr 0		: setAttr-Cert
+set-attr 1		: setAttr-PGWYcap	: payment gateway capabilities
+set-attr 2		: setAttr-TokenType
+set-attr 3		: setAttr-IssCap	: issuer capabilities
+
+setAttr-Cert 0		: set-rootKeyThumb
+setAttr-Cert 1		: set-addPolicy
+
+setAttr-TokenType 1	: setAttr-Token-EMV
+setAttr-TokenType 2	: setAttr-Token-B0Prime
+
+setAttr-IssCap 3	: setAttr-IssCap-CVM
+setAttr-IssCap 4	: setAttr-IssCap-T2
+setAttr-IssCap 5	: setAttr-IssCap-Sig
+
+setAttr-IssCap-CVM 1	: setAttr-GenCryptgrm	: generate cryptogram
+setAttr-IssCap-T2 1	: setAttr-T2Enc		: encrypted track 2
+setAttr-IssCap-T2 2	: setAttr-T2cleartxt	: cleartext track 2
+
+setAttr-IssCap-Sig 1	: setAttr-TokICCsig	: ICC or token signature
+setAttr-IssCap-Sig 2	: setAttr-SecDevSig	: secure device signature
+
+set-brand 1		: set-brand-IATA-ATA
+set-brand 30		: set-brand-Diners
+set-brand 34		: set-brand-AmericanExpress
+set-brand 35		: set-brand-JCB
+set-brand 4		: set-brand-Visa
+set-brand 5		: set-brand-MasterCard
+set-brand 6011		: set-brand-Novus
+
+rsadsi 3 10		: DES-CDMF		: des-cdmf
+rsadsi 1 1 6		: rsaOAEPEncryptionSET
+
+			: Oakley-EC2N-3		: ipsec3
+			: Oakley-EC2N-4		: ipsec4
+
+iso 0 10118 3 0 55	: whirlpool
+
+# GOST OIDs
+
+member-body 643 2 2	: cryptopro
+member-body 643 2 9	: cryptocom
+member-body 643 7 1	: id-tc26
+
+cryptopro 3		: id-GostR3411-94-with-GostR3410-2001 : GOST R 34.11-94 with GOST R 34.10-2001
+cryptopro 4		: id-GostR3411-94-with-GostR3410-94 : GOST R 34.11-94 with GOST R 34.10-94
+!Cname id-GostR3411-94
+cryptopro 9		: md_gost94		: GOST R 34.11-94
+cryptopro 10		: id-HMACGostR3411-94	: HMAC GOST 34.11-94
+!Cname id-GostR3410-2001
+cryptopro 19		: gost2001	: GOST R 34.10-2001
+!Cname id-GostR3410-94
+cryptopro 20		: gost94	: GOST R 34.10-94
+!Cname id-Gost28147-89
+cryptopro 21		: gost89 		: GOST 28147-89
+			: gost89-cnt
+			: gost89-cnt-12
+			: gost89-cbc
+			: gost89-ecb
+			: gost89-ctr
+!Cname id-Gost28147-89-MAC
+cryptopro 22		: gost-mac	: GOST 28147-89 MAC
+			: gost-mac-12
+!Cname id-GostR3411-94-prf
+cryptopro 23		: prf-gostr3411-94	: GOST R 34.11-94 PRF
+cryptopro 98		: id-GostR3410-2001DH	: GOST R 34.10-2001 DH
+cryptopro 99		: id-GostR3410-94DH	: GOST R 34.10-94 DH
+
+cryptopro 14 1		: id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-KeyMeshing
+cryptopro 14 0		: id-Gost28147-89-None-KeyMeshing
+
+# GOST parameter set OIDs
+
+cryptopro 30 0		: id-GostR3411-94-TestParamSet
+cryptopro 30 1		: id-GostR3411-94-CryptoProParamSet
+
+cryptopro 31 0		: id-Gost28147-89-TestParamSet
+cryptopro 31 1		: id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet
+cryptopro 31 2		: id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-B-ParamSet
+cryptopro 31 3		: id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-C-ParamSet
+cryptopro 31 4		: id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-D-ParamSet
+cryptopro 31 5		: id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-Oscar-1-1-ParamSet
+cryptopro 31 6		: id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-Oscar-1-0-ParamSet
+cryptopro 31 7		: id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-RIC-1-ParamSet
+
+cryptopro 32 0		: id-GostR3410-94-TestParamSet
+cryptopro 32 2		: id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet
+cryptopro 32 3		: id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-B-ParamSet
+cryptopro 32 4		: id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-C-ParamSet
+cryptopro 32 5		: id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-D-ParamSet
+
+cryptopro 33 1		: id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-XchA-ParamSet
+cryptopro 33 2		: id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-XchB-ParamSet
+cryptopro 33 3		: id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-XchC-ParamSet
+
+cryptopro 35 0		: id-GostR3410-2001-TestParamSet
+cryptopro 35 1		: id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet
+cryptopro 35 2		: id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-B-ParamSet
+cryptopro 35 3		: id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-C-ParamSet
+
+cryptopro 36 0		: id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-XchA-ParamSet
+cryptopro 36 1		: id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-XchB-ParamSet
+
+id-GostR3410-94 1	: id-GostR3410-94-a
+id-GostR3410-94 2	: id-GostR3410-94-aBis
+id-GostR3410-94 3	: id-GostR3410-94-b
+id-GostR3410-94 4	: id-GostR3410-94-bBis
+
+# Cryptocom LTD GOST OIDs
+
+cryptocom 1 6 1		: id-Gost28147-89-cc	: GOST 28147-89 Cryptocom ParamSet
+!Cname id-GostR3410-94-cc
+cryptocom 1 5 3		: gost94cc	: GOST 34.10-94 Cryptocom
+!Cname id-GostR3410-2001-cc
+cryptocom 1 5 4		: gost2001cc	: GOST 34.10-2001 Cryptocom
+
+cryptocom 1 3 3		: id-GostR3411-94-with-GostR3410-94-cc : GOST R 34.11-94 with GOST R 34.10-94 Cryptocom
+cryptocom 1 3 4		: id-GostR3411-94-with-GostR3410-2001-cc : GOST R 34.11-94 with GOST R 34.10-2001 Cryptocom
+
+cryptocom 1 8 1		: id-GostR3410-2001-ParamSet-cc : GOST R 3410-2001 Parameter Set Cryptocom
+
+# TC26 GOST OIDs
+
+id-tc26 1 		: id-tc26-algorithms
+id-tc26-algorithms 1	: id-tc26-sign
+!Cname id-GostR3410-2012-256
+id-tc26-sign 1		: gost2012_256: GOST R 34.10-2012 with 256 bit modulus
+!Cname id-GostR3410-2012-512
+id-tc26-sign 2		: gost2012_512: GOST R 34.10-2012 with 512 bit modulus
+
+id-tc26-algorithms 2	: id-tc26-digest
+!Cname id-GostR3411-2012-256
+id-tc26-digest 2	: md_gost12_256: GOST R 34.11-2012 with 256 bit hash
+!Cname id-GostR3411-2012-512
+id-tc26-digest 3	: md_gost12_512: GOST R 34.11-2012 with 512 bit hash
+
+id-tc26-algorithms 3	: id-tc26-signwithdigest
+id-tc26-signwithdigest 2: id-tc26-signwithdigest-gost3410-2012-256: GOST R 34.10-2012 with GOST R 34.11-2012 (256 bit)
+id-tc26-signwithdigest 3: id-tc26-signwithdigest-gost3410-2012-512: GOST R 34.10-2012 with GOST R 34.11-2012 (512 bit)
+
+id-tc26-algorithms 4	: id-tc26-mac
+id-tc26-mac 1		: id-tc26-hmac-gost-3411-2012-256 : HMAC GOST 34.11-2012 256 bit
+id-tc26-mac 2		: id-tc26-hmac-gost-3411-2012-512 : HMAC GOST 34.11-2012 512 bit
+
+id-tc26-algorithms 5	: id-tc26-cipher
+
+id-tc26-algorithms 6	: id-tc26-agreement
+id-tc26-agreement 1	: id-tc26-agreement-gost-3410-2012-256
+id-tc26-agreement 2	: id-tc26-agreement-gost-3410-2012-512
+
+id-tc26 2 		: id-tc26-constants
+
+id-tc26-constants 1	: id-tc26-sign-constants
+id-tc26-sign-constants 2: id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-constants
+id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-constants 0	: id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-paramSetTest: GOST R 34.10-2012 (512 bit) testing parameter set
+id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-constants 1	: id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-paramSetA: GOST R 34.10-2012 (512 bit) ParamSet A
+id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-constants 2	: id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-paramSetB: GOST R 34.10-2012 (512 bit) ParamSet B
+
+id-tc26-constants 2     : id-tc26-digest-constants
+id-tc26-constants 5     : id-tc26-cipher-constants
+id-tc26-cipher-constants 1	: id-tc26-gost-28147-constants
+id-tc26-gost-28147-constants 1	: id-tc26-gost-28147-param-Z : GOST 28147-89 TC26 parameter set
+
+member-body 643 3 131 1 1	: INN	: INN
+member-body 643 100 1		: OGRN	: OGRN
+member-body 643 100 3		: SNILS	: SNILS
+member-body 643 100 111	: subjectSignTool	: Signing Tool of Subject
+member-body 643 100 112	: issuerSignTool	: Signing Tool of Issuer
+
+#GOST R34.13-2015 Grasshopper "Kuznechik"
+			: grasshopper-ecb
+			: grasshopper-ctr
+			: grasshopper-ofb
+			: grasshopper-cbc
+			: grasshopper-cfb
+			: grasshopper-mac
+
+# Definitions for Camellia cipher - CBC MODE
+
+1 2 392 200011 61 1 1 1 2 : CAMELLIA-128-CBC		: camellia-128-cbc
+1 2 392 200011 61 1 1 1 3 : CAMELLIA-192-CBC		: camellia-192-cbc
+1 2 392 200011 61 1 1 1 4 : CAMELLIA-256-CBC		: camellia-256-cbc
+1 2 392 200011 61 1 1 3 2 : id-camellia128-wrap
+1 2 392 200011 61 1 1 3 3 : id-camellia192-wrap
+1 2 392 200011 61 1 1 3 4 : id-camellia256-wrap
+
+# Definitions for Camellia cipher - ECB, CFB, OFB MODE
+
+!Alias ntt-ds 0 3 4401 5
+!Alias camellia ntt-ds 3 1 9 
+
+camellia 1		: CAMELLIA-128-ECB		: camellia-128-ecb
+!Cname camellia-128-ofb128
+camellia 3		: CAMELLIA-128-OFB		: camellia-128-ofb
+!Cname camellia-128-cfb128
+camellia 4		: CAMELLIA-128-CFB		: camellia-128-cfb
+camellia 6		: CAMELLIA-128-GCM		: camellia-128-gcm
+camellia 7		: CAMELLIA-128-CCM		: camellia-128-ccm
+camellia 9		: CAMELLIA-128-CTR		: camellia-128-ctr
+camellia 10		: CAMELLIA-128-CMAC		: camellia-128-cmac
+
+camellia 21		: CAMELLIA-192-ECB		: camellia-192-ecb
+!Cname camellia-192-ofb128
+camellia 23		: CAMELLIA-192-OFB		: camellia-192-ofb
+!Cname camellia-192-cfb128
+camellia 24		: CAMELLIA-192-CFB		: camellia-192-cfb
+camellia 26		: CAMELLIA-192-GCM		: camellia-192-gcm
+camellia 27		: CAMELLIA-192-CCM		: camellia-192-ccm
+camellia 29		: CAMELLIA-192-CTR		: camellia-192-ctr
+camellia 30		: CAMELLIA-192-CMAC		: camellia-192-cmac
+
+camellia 41		: CAMELLIA-256-ECB		: camellia-256-ecb
+!Cname camellia-256-ofb128
+camellia 43		: CAMELLIA-256-OFB		: camellia-256-ofb
+!Cname camellia-256-cfb128
+camellia 44		: CAMELLIA-256-CFB		: camellia-256-cfb
+camellia 46		: CAMELLIA-256-GCM		: camellia-256-gcm
+camellia 47		: CAMELLIA-256-CCM		: camellia-256-ccm
+camellia 49		: CAMELLIA-256-CTR		: camellia-256-ctr
+camellia 50		: CAMELLIA-256-CMAC		: camellia-256-cmac
+
+# There are no OIDs for these modes...
+
+			: CAMELLIA-128-CFB1		: camellia-128-cfb1
+			: CAMELLIA-192-CFB1		: camellia-192-cfb1
+			: CAMELLIA-256-CFB1		: camellia-256-cfb1
+			: CAMELLIA-128-CFB8		: camellia-128-cfb8
+			: CAMELLIA-192-CFB8		: camellia-192-cfb8
+			: CAMELLIA-256-CFB8		: camellia-256-cfb8
+
+# Definitions for SEED cipher - ECB, CBC, OFB mode
+
+member-body 410 200004  : KISA          : kisa
+kisa 1 3                : SEED-ECB      : seed-ecb
+kisa 1 4                : SEED-CBC      : seed-cbc
+!Cname seed-cfb128
+kisa 1 5                : SEED-CFB      : seed-cfb
+!Cname seed-ofb128
+kisa 1 6                : SEED-OFB      : seed-ofb
+
+# There is no OID that just denotes "HMAC" oddly enough...
+
+			: HMAC				: hmac
+# Nor CMAC either
+			: CMAC				: cmac
+
+# Synthetic composite ciphersuites
+			: RC4-HMAC-MD5			: rc4-hmac-md5
+			: AES-128-CBC-HMAC-SHA1		: aes-128-cbc-hmac-sha1
+			: AES-192-CBC-HMAC-SHA1		: aes-192-cbc-hmac-sha1
+			: AES-256-CBC-HMAC-SHA1		: aes-256-cbc-hmac-sha1
+			: AES-128-CBC-HMAC-SHA256	: aes-128-cbc-hmac-sha256
+			: AES-192-CBC-HMAC-SHA256	: aes-192-cbc-hmac-sha256
+			: AES-256-CBC-HMAC-SHA256	: aes-256-cbc-hmac-sha256
+			: ChaCha20-Poly1305		: chacha20-poly1305
+			: ChaCha20			: chacha20
+
+ISO-US 10046 2 1	: dhpublicnumber		: X9.42 DH
+
+# RFC 5639 curve OIDs (see http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5639.txt)
+# versionOne OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
+# iso(1) identifified-organization(3) teletrust(36) algorithm(3)
+# signature-algorithm(3) ecSign(2) ecStdCurvesAndGeneration(8)
+# ellipticCurve(1) 1 }
+1 3 36 3 3 2 8 1 1 1 : brainpoolP160r1
+1 3 36 3 3 2 8 1 1 2 : brainpoolP160t1
+1 3 36 3 3 2 8 1 1 3 : brainpoolP192r1
+1 3 36 3 3 2 8 1 1 4 : brainpoolP192t1
+1 3 36 3 3 2 8 1 1 5 : brainpoolP224r1
+1 3 36 3 3 2 8 1 1 6 : brainpoolP224t1
+1 3 36 3 3 2 8 1 1 7 : brainpoolP256r1
+1 3 36 3 3 2 8 1 1 8 : brainpoolP256t1
+1 3 36 3 3 2 8 1 1 9 : brainpoolP320r1
+1 3 36 3 3 2 8 1 1 10 : brainpoolP320t1
+1 3 36 3 3 2 8 1 1 11 : brainpoolP384r1
+1 3 36 3 3 2 8 1 1 12 : brainpoolP384t1
+1 3 36 3 3 2 8 1 1 13 : brainpoolP512r1
+1 3 36 3 3 2 8 1 1 14 : brainpoolP512t1            
+
+# ECDH schemes from RFC5753
+!Alias x9-63-scheme 1 3 133 16 840 63 0
+!Alias secg-scheme certicom-arc 1
+
+x9-63-scheme 2   : dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme
+secg-scheme 11 0 : dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme
+secg-scheme 11 1 : dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme
+secg-scheme 11 2 : dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme
+secg-scheme 11 3 : dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme
+
+x9-63-scheme 3   : dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme
+secg-scheme 14 0 : dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme
+secg-scheme 14 1 : dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme
+secg-scheme 14 2 : dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme
+secg-scheme 14 3 : dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme
+# NIDs for use with lookup tables.
+                 : dh-std-kdf
+                 : dh-cofactor-kdf
+
+# RFC 6962 Extension OIDs (see http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc6962.txt)
+1 3 6 1 4 1 11129 2 4 2	: ct_precert_scts		: CT Precertificate SCTs
+1 3 6 1 4 1 11129 2 4 3	: ct_precert_poison		: CT Precertificate Poison
+1 3 6 1 4 1 11129 2 4 4	: ct_precert_signer		: CT Precertificate Signer
+1 3 6 1 4 1 11129 2 4 5	: ct_cert_scts			: CT Certificate SCTs
+
+# CABForum EV SSL Certificate Guidelines
+# (see https://cabforum.org/extended-validation/)
+# OIDs for Subject Jurisdiction of Incorporation or Registration
+1 3 6 1 4 1 311 60 2 1 1	: jurisdictionL		: jurisdictionLocalityName
+1 3 6 1 4 1 311 60 2 1 2	: jurisdictionST	: jurisdictionStateOrProvinceName
+1 3 6 1 4 1 311 60 2 1 3	: jurisdictionC		: jurisdictionCountryName
+
+# SCRYPT algorithm
+1 3 6 1 4 1 11591 4 11		: id-scrypt
+
+# NID for TLS1 PRF
+                            : TLS1-PRF          : tls1-prf
+
+# NID for HKDF
+                            : HKDF              : hkdf
+
+# RFC 4556
+1 3 6 1 5 2 3 : id-pkinit
+id-pkinit 4                     : pkInitClientAuth      : PKINIT Client Auth
+id-pkinit 5                     : pkInitKDC             : Signing KDC Response
+
+# New curves from draft-ietf-curdle-pkix-00
+1 3 101 110 : X25519
+1 3 101 111 : X448
+
+# NIDs for cipher key exchange
+                            : KxRSA        : kx-rsa
+                            : KxECDHE      : kx-ecdhe
+                            : KxDHE        : kx-dhe
+                            : KxECDHE-PSK  : kx-ecdhe-psk
+                            : KxDHE-PSK    : kx-dhe-psk
+                            : KxRSA_PSK    : kx-rsa-psk
+                            : KxPSK        : kx-psk
+                            : KxSRP        : kx-srp
+                            : KxGOST       : kx-gost
+
+# NIDs for cipher authentication
+                            : AuthRSA      : auth-rsa
+                            : AuthECDSA    : auth-ecdsa
+                            : AuthPSK      : auth-psk
+                            : AuthDSS      : auth-dss
+                            : AuthGOST01   : auth-gost01
+                            : AuthGOST12   : auth-gost12
+                            : AuthSRP      : auth-srp
+                            : AuthNULL     : auth-null
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/objects/objxref.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/objects/objxref.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..53f9bd6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/objects/objxref.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 1998-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use strict;
+
+my %xref_tbl;
+my %oid_tbl;
+
+my ($mac_file, $xref_file) = @ARGV;
+
+open(IN, $mac_file) || die "Can't open $mac_file, $!\n";
+
+# Read in OID nid values for a lookup table.
+
+while (<IN>)
+	{
+	s|\R$||;                # Better chomp
+	my ($name, $num) = /^(\S+)\s+(\S+)$/;
+	$oid_tbl{$name} = $num;
+	}
+close IN;
+
+open(IN, $xref_file) || die "Can't open $xref_file, $!\n";
+
+my $ln = 1;
+
+while (<IN>)
+	{
+	s|\R$||;                # Better chomp
+	s/#.*$//;
+	next if (/^\S*$/);
+	my ($xr, $p1, $p2) = /^(\S+)\s+(\S+)\s+(\S+)/;
+	check_oid($xr);
+	check_oid($p1);
+	check_oid($p2);
+	$xref_tbl{$xr} = [$p1, $p2, $ln];
+	}
+
+my @xrkeys = keys %xref_tbl;
+
+my @srt1 = sort { $oid_tbl{$a} <=> $oid_tbl{$b}} @xrkeys;
+
+my $i;
+for($i = 0; $i <= $#srt1; $i++)
+	{
+	$xref_tbl{$srt1[$i]}[2] = $i;
+	}
+
+my @srt2 = sort
+	{
+	my$ap1 = $oid_tbl{$xref_tbl{$a}[0]};
+	my$bp1 = $oid_tbl{$xref_tbl{$b}[0]};
+	return $ap1 - $bp1 if ($ap1 != $bp1);
+	my$ap2 = $oid_tbl{$xref_tbl{$a}[1]};
+	my$bp2 = $oid_tbl{$xref_tbl{$b}[1]};
+
+	return $ap2 - $bp2;
+	} @xrkeys;
+
+my $pname = $0;
+$pname =~ s|.*/||;
+
+print <<EOF;
+/*
+ * WARNING: do not edit!
+ * Generated by $pname
+ *
+ * Copyright 1998-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+
+typedef struct {
+    int sign_id;
+    int hash_id;
+    int pkey_id;
+} nid_triple;
+
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(nid_triple)
+
+static const nid_triple sigoid_srt[] = {
+EOF
+
+foreach (@srt1)
+	{
+	my $xr = $_;
+	my ($p1, $p2) = @{$xref_tbl{$_}};
+	my $o1 = "    {NID_$xr, NID_$p1,";
+	my $o2 = "NID_$p2},";
+        if (length("$o1 $o2") < 78)
+		{
+		print "$o1 $o2\n";
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		print "$o1\n     $o2\n";
+		}
+        }
+
+print "};";
+print <<EOF;
+
+
+static const nid_triple *const sigoid_srt_xref[] = {
+EOF
+
+foreach (@srt2)
+	{
+	my ($p1, $p2, $x) = @{$xref_tbl{$_}};
+	# If digest or signature algorithm is "undef" then the algorithm
+	# needs special handling and is excluded from the cross reference table.
+	next if $p1 eq "undef" || $p2 eq "undef";
+	print "    \&sigoid_srt\[$x\],\n";
+	}
+
+print "};\n";
+
+sub check_oid
+	{
+	my ($chk) = @_;
+	if (!exists $oid_tbl{$chk})
+		{
+		die "Can't find \"$chk\"\n";
+		}
+	}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ocsp/build.info b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ocsp/build.info
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0902caa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ocsp/build.info
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+LIBS=../../libcrypto
+SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
+        ocsp_asn.c ocsp_ext.c ocsp_ht.c ocsp_lib.c ocsp_cl.c \
+        ocsp_srv.c ocsp_prn.c ocsp_vfy.c ocsp_err.c v3_ocsp.c
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_asn.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_asn.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1e0b827
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_asn.c
@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
+#include "ocsp_lcl.h"
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(OCSP_SIGNATURE) = {
+        ASN1_EMBED(OCSP_SIGNATURE, signatureAlgorithm, X509_ALGOR),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(OCSP_SIGNATURE, signature, ASN1_BIT_STRING),
+        ASN1_EXP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(OCSP_SIGNATURE, certs, X509, 0)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(OCSP_SIGNATURE)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OCSP_SIGNATURE)
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(OCSP_CERTID) = {
+        ASN1_EMBED(OCSP_CERTID, hashAlgorithm, X509_ALGOR),
+        ASN1_EMBED(OCSP_CERTID, issuerNameHash, ASN1_OCTET_STRING),
+        ASN1_EMBED(OCSP_CERTID, issuerKeyHash, ASN1_OCTET_STRING),
+        ASN1_EMBED(OCSP_CERTID, serialNumber, ASN1_INTEGER)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(OCSP_CERTID)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OCSP_CERTID)
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(OCSP_ONEREQ) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(OCSP_ONEREQ, reqCert, OCSP_CERTID),
+        ASN1_EXP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(OCSP_ONEREQ, singleRequestExtensions, X509_EXTENSION, 0)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(OCSP_ONEREQ)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OCSP_ONEREQ)
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(OCSP_REQINFO) = {
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(OCSP_REQINFO, version, ASN1_INTEGER, 0),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(OCSP_REQINFO, requestorName, GENERAL_NAME, 1),
+        ASN1_SEQUENCE_OF(OCSP_REQINFO, requestList, OCSP_ONEREQ),
+        ASN1_EXP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(OCSP_REQINFO, requestExtensions, X509_EXTENSION, 2)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(OCSP_REQINFO)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OCSP_REQINFO)
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(OCSP_REQUEST) = {
+        ASN1_EMBED(OCSP_REQUEST, tbsRequest, OCSP_REQINFO),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(OCSP_REQUEST, optionalSignature, OCSP_SIGNATURE, 0)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(OCSP_REQUEST)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OCSP_REQUEST)
+
+/* OCSP_RESPONSE templates */
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(OCSP_RESPBYTES) = {
+            ASN1_SIMPLE(OCSP_RESPBYTES, responseType, ASN1_OBJECT),
+            ASN1_SIMPLE(OCSP_RESPBYTES, response, ASN1_OCTET_STRING)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(OCSP_RESPBYTES)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OCSP_RESPBYTES)
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(OCSP_RESPONSE) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(OCSP_RESPONSE, responseStatus, ASN1_ENUMERATED),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(OCSP_RESPONSE, responseBytes, OCSP_RESPBYTES, 0)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(OCSP_RESPONSE)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OCSP_RESPONSE)
+
+ASN1_CHOICE(OCSP_RESPID) = {
+           ASN1_EXP(OCSP_RESPID, value.byName, X509_NAME, 1),
+           ASN1_EXP(OCSP_RESPID, value.byKey, ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 2)
+} ASN1_CHOICE_END(OCSP_RESPID)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OCSP_RESPID)
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(OCSP_REVOKEDINFO) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(OCSP_REVOKEDINFO, revocationTime, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(OCSP_REVOKEDINFO, revocationReason, ASN1_ENUMERATED, 0)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(OCSP_REVOKEDINFO)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OCSP_REVOKEDINFO)
+
+ASN1_CHOICE(OCSP_CERTSTATUS) = {
+        ASN1_IMP(OCSP_CERTSTATUS, value.good, ASN1_NULL, 0),
+        ASN1_IMP(OCSP_CERTSTATUS, value.revoked, OCSP_REVOKEDINFO, 1),
+        ASN1_IMP(OCSP_CERTSTATUS, value.unknown, ASN1_NULL, 2)
+} ASN1_CHOICE_END(OCSP_CERTSTATUS)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OCSP_CERTSTATUS)
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(OCSP_SINGLERESP) = {
+           ASN1_SIMPLE(OCSP_SINGLERESP, certId, OCSP_CERTID),
+           ASN1_SIMPLE(OCSP_SINGLERESP, certStatus, OCSP_CERTSTATUS),
+           ASN1_SIMPLE(OCSP_SINGLERESP, thisUpdate, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME),
+           ASN1_EXP_OPT(OCSP_SINGLERESP, nextUpdate, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME, 0),
+           ASN1_EXP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(OCSP_SINGLERESP, singleExtensions, X509_EXTENSION, 1)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(OCSP_SINGLERESP)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OCSP_SINGLERESP)
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(OCSP_RESPDATA) = {
+           ASN1_EXP_OPT(OCSP_RESPDATA, version, ASN1_INTEGER, 0),
+           ASN1_EMBED(OCSP_RESPDATA, responderId, OCSP_RESPID),
+           ASN1_SIMPLE(OCSP_RESPDATA, producedAt, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME),
+           ASN1_SEQUENCE_OF(OCSP_RESPDATA, responses, OCSP_SINGLERESP),
+           ASN1_EXP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(OCSP_RESPDATA, responseExtensions, X509_EXTENSION, 1)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(OCSP_RESPDATA)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OCSP_RESPDATA)
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(OCSP_BASICRESP) = {
+           ASN1_EMBED(OCSP_BASICRESP, tbsResponseData, OCSP_RESPDATA),
+           ASN1_EMBED(OCSP_BASICRESP, signatureAlgorithm, X509_ALGOR),
+           ASN1_SIMPLE(OCSP_BASICRESP, signature, ASN1_BIT_STRING),
+           ASN1_EXP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(OCSP_BASICRESP, certs, X509, 0)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(OCSP_BASICRESP)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OCSP_BASICRESP)
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(OCSP_CRLID) = {
+           ASN1_EXP_OPT(OCSP_CRLID, crlUrl, ASN1_IA5STRING, 0),
+           ASN1_EXP_OPT(OCSP_CRLID, crlNum, ASN1_INTEGER, 1),
+           ASN1_EXP_OPT(OCSP_CRLID, crlTime, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME, 2)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(OCSP_CRLID)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OCSP_CRLID)
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(OCSP_SERVICELOC) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(OCSP_SERVICELOC, issuer, X509_NAME),
+        ASN1_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(OCSP_SERVICELOC, locator, ACCESS_DESCRIPTION)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(OCSP_SERVICELOC)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OCSP_SERVICELOC)
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_cl.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_cl.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a42b80f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_cl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,365 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
+#include "ocsp_lcl.h"
+
+/*
+ * Utility functions related to sending OCSP requests and extracting relevant
+ * information from the response.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Add an OCSP_CERTID to an OCSP request. Return new OCSP_ONEREQ pointer:
+ * useful if we want to add extensions.
+ */
+
+OCSP_ONEREQ *OCSP_request_add0_id(OCSP_REQUEST *req, OCSP_CERTID *cid)
+{
+    OCSP_ONEREQ *one = NULL;
+
+    if ((one = OCSP_ONEREQ_new()) == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    OCSP_CERTID_free(one->reqCert);
+    one->reqCert = cid;
+    if (req && !sk_OCSP_ONEREQ_push(req->tbsRequest.requestList, one)) {
+        one->reqCert = NULL; /* do not free on error */
+        goto err;
+    }
+    return one;
+ err:
+    OCSP_ONEREQ_free(one);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+/* Set requestorName from an X509_NAME structure */
+
+int OCSP_request_set1_name(OCSP_REQUEST *req, X509_NAME *nm)
+{
+    GENERAL_NAME *gen;
+
+    gen = GENERAL_NAME_new();
+    if (gen == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    if (!X509_NAME_set(&gen->d.directoryName, nm)) {
+        GENERAL_NAME_free(gen);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    gen->type = GEN_DIRNAME;
+    GENERAL_NAME_free(req->tbsRequest.requestorName);
+    req->tbsRequest.requestorName = gen;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Add a certificate to an OCSP request */
+
+int OCSP_request_add1_cert(OCSP_REQUEST *req, X509 *cert)
+{
+    OCSP_SIGNATURE *sig;
+    if (req->optionalSignature == NULL)
+        req->optionalSignature = OCSP_SIGNATURE_new();
+    sig = req->optionalSignature;
+    if (sig == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    if (cert == NULL)
+        return 1;
+    if (sig->certs == NULL
+        && (sig->certs = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    if (!sk_X509_push(sig->certs, cert))
+        return 0;
+    X509_up_ref(cert);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Sign an OCSP request set the requestorName to the subject name of an
+ * optional signers certificate and include one or more optional certificates
+ * in the request. Behaves like PKCS7_sign().
+ */
+
+int OCSP_request_sign(OCSP_REQUEST *req,
+                      X509 *signer,
+                      EVP_PKEY *key,
+                      const EVP_MD *dgst,
+                      STACK_OF(X509) *certs, unsigned long flags)
+{
+    int i;
+    X509 *x;
+
+    if (!OCSP_request_set1_name(req, X509_get_subject_name(signer)))
+        goto err;
+
+    if ((req->optionalSignature = OCSP_SIGNATURE_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (key) {
+        if (!X509_check_private_key(signer, key)) {
+            OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_SIGN,
+                    OCSP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DOES_NOT_MATCH_CERTIFICATE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (!OCSP_REQUEST_sign(req, key, dgst))
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!(flags & OCSP_NOCERTS)) {
+        if (!OCSP_request_add1_cert(req, signer))
+            goto err;
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
+            x = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
+            if (!OCSP_request_add1_cert(req, x))
+                goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+ err:
+    OCSP_SIGNATURE_free(req->optionalSignature);
+    req->optionalSignature = NULL;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/* Get response status */
+
+int OCSP_response_status(OCSP_RESPONSE *resp)
+{
+    return ASN1_ENUMERATED_get(resp->responseStatus);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Extract basic response from OCSP_RESPONSE or NULL if no basic response
+ * present.
+ */
+
+OCSP_BASICRESP *OCSP_response_get1_basic(OCSP_RESPONSE *resp)
+{
+    OCSP_RESPBYTES *rb;
+    rb = resp->responseBytes;
+    if (!rb) {
+        OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_RESPONSE_GET1_BASIC, OCSP_R_NO_RESPONSE_DATA);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    if (OBJ_obj2nid(rb->responseType) != NID_id_pkix_OCSP_basic) {
+        OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_RESPONSE_GET1_BASIC, OCSP_R_NOT_BASIC_RESPONSE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    return ASN1_item_unpack(rb->response, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(OCSP_BASICRESP));
+}
+
+const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *OCSP_resp_get0_signature(const OCSP_BASICRESP *bs)
+{
+    return bs->signature;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return number of OCSP_SINGLERESP responses present in a basic response.
+ */
+
+int OCSP_resp_count(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs)
+{
+    if (!bs)
+        return -1;
+    return sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_num(bs->tbsResponseData.responses);
+}
+
+/* Extract an OCSP_SINGLERESP response with a given index */
+
+OCSP_SINGLERESP *OCSP_resp_get0(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, int idx)
+{
+    if (!bs)
+        return NULL;
+    return sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_value(bs->tbsResponseData.responses, idx);
+}
+
+const ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *OCSP_resp_get0_produced_at(const OCSP_BASICRESP* bs)
+{
+    return bs->tbsResponseData.producedAt;
+}
+
+const STACK_OF(X509) *OCSP_resp_get0_certs(const OCSP_BASICRESP *bs)
+{
+    return bs->certs;
+}
+
+int OCSP_resp_get0_id(const OCSP_BASICRESP *bs,
+                      const ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pid,
+                      const X509_NAME **pname)
+
+{
+    const OCSP_RESPID *rid = &bs->tbsResponseData.responderId;
+    if (rid->type == V_OCSP_RESPID_NAME) {
+        *pname = rid->value.byName;
+        *pid = NULL;
+    } else if (rid->type == V_OCSP_RESPID_KEY) {
+        *pid = rid->value.byKey;
+        *pname = NULL;
+    } else {
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Look single response matching a given certificate ID */
+
+int OCSP_resp_find(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, OCSP_CERTID *id, int last)
+{
+    int i;
+    STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp;
+    OCSP_SINGLERESP *single;
+    if (!bs)
+        return -1;
+    if (last < 0)
+        last = 0;
+    else
+        last++;
+    sresp = bs->tbsResponseData.responses;
+    for (i = last; i < sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_num(sresp); i++) {
+        single = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_value(sresp, i);
+        if (!OCSP_id_cmp(id, single->certId))
+            return i;
+    }
+    return -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Extract status information from an OCSP_SINGLERESP structure. Note: the
+ * revtime and reason values are only set if the certificate status is
+ * revoked. Returns numerical value of status.
+ */
+
+int OCSP_single_get0_status(OCSP_SINGLERESP *single, int *reason,
+                            ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **revtime,
+                            ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **thisupd,
+                            ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **nextupd)
+{
+    int ret;
+    OCSP_CERTSTATUS *cst;
+    if (!single)
+        return -1;
+    cst = single->certStatus;
+    ret = cst->type;
+    if (ret == V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_REVOKED) {
+        OCSP_REVOKEDINFO *rev = cst->value.revoked;
+        if (revtime)
+            *revtime = rev->revocationTime;
+        if (reason) {
+            if (rev->revocationReason)
+                *reason = ASN1_ENUMERATED_get(rev->revocationReason);
+            else
+                *reason = -1;
+        }
+    }
+    if (thisupd)
+        *thisupd = single->thisUpdate;
+    if (nextupd)
+        *nextupd = single->nextUpdate;
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function combines the previous ones: look up a certificate ID and if
+ * found extract status information. Return 0 is successful.
+ */
+
+int OCSP_resp_find_status(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, OCSP_CERTID *id, int *status,
+                          int *reason,
+                          ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **revtime,
+                          ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **thisupd,
+                          ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **nextupd)
+{
+    int i;
+    OCSP_SINGLERESP *single;
+    i = OCSP_resp_find(bs, id, -1);
+    /* Maybe check for multiple responses and give an error? */
+    if (i < 0)
+        return 0;
+    single = OCSP_resp_get0(bs, i);
+    i = OCSP_single_get0_status(single, reason, revtime, thisupd, nextupd);
+    if (status)
+        *status = i;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check validity of thisUpdate and nextUpdate fields. It is possible that
+ * the request will take a few seconds to process and/or the time won't be
+ * totally accurate. Therefore to avoid rejecting otherwise valid time we
+ * allow the times to be within 'nsec' of the current time. Also to avoid
+ * accepting very old responses without a nextUpdate field an optional maxage
+ * parameter specifies the maximum age the thisUpdate field can be.
+ */
+
+int OCSP_check_validity(ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *thisupd,
+                        ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *nextupd, long nsec, long maxsec)
+{
+    int ret = 1;
+    time_t t_now, t_tmp;
+    time(&t_now);
+    /* Check thisUpdate is valid and not more than nsec in the future */
+    if (!ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_check(thisupd)) {
+        OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_VALIDITY, OCSP_R_ERROR_IN_THISUPDATE_FIELD);
+        ret = 0;
+    } else {
+        t_tmp = t_now + nsec;
+        if (X509_cmp_time(thisupd, &t_tmp) > 0) {
+            OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_VALIDITY, OCSP_R_STATUS_NOT_YET_VALID);
+            ret = 0;
+        }
+
+        /*
+         * If maxsec specified check thisUpdate is not more than maxsec in
+         * the past
+         */
+        if (maxsec >= 0) {
+            t_tmp = t_now - maxsec;
+            if (X509_cmp_time(thisupd, &t_tmp) < 0) {
+                OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_VALIDITY, OCSP_R_STATUS_TOO_OLD);
+                ret = 0;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (!nextupd)
+        return ret;
+
+    /* Check nextUpdate is valid and not more than nsec in the past */
+    if (!ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_check(nextupd)) {
+        OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_VALIDITY, OCSP_R_ERROR_IN_NEXTUPDATE_FIELD);
+        ret = 0;
+    } else {
+        t_tmp = t_now - nsec;
+        if (X509_cmp_time(nextupd, &t_tmp) < 0) {
+            OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_VALIDITY, OCSP_R_STATUS_EXPIRED);
+            ret = 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* Also don't allow nextUpdate to precede thisUpdate */
+    if (ASN1_STRING_cmp(nextupd, thisupd) < 0) {
+        OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_VALIDITY,
+                OCSP_R_NEXTUPDATE_BEFORE_THISUPDATE);
+        ret = 0;
+    }
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+const OCSP_CERTID *OCSP_SINGLERESP_get0_id(const OCSP_SINGLERESP *single)
+{
+    return single->certId;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_err.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_err.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a2d96e9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_err.c
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+/*
+ * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+
+# define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_OCSP,func,0)
+# define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_OCSP,0,reason)
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA OCSP_str_functs[] = {
+    {ERR_FUNC(OCSP_F_D2I_OCSP_NONCE), "d2i_ocsp_nonce"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_ADD1_STATUS), "OCSP_basic_add1_status"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_SIGN), "OCSP_basic_sign"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY), "OCSP_basic_verify"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(OCSP_F_OCSP_CERT_ID_NEW), "OCSP_cert_id_new"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_DELEGATED), "ocsp_check_delegated"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_IDS), "ocsp_check_ids"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_ISSUER), "ocsp_check_issuer"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_VALIDITY), "OCSP_check_validity"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(OCSP_F_OCSP_MATCH_ISSUERID), "ocsp_match_issuerid"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(OCSP_F_OCSP_PARSE_URL), "OCSP_parse_url"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_SIGN), "OCSP_request_sign"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY), "OCSP_request_verify"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(OCSP_F_OCSP_RESPONSE_GET1_BASIC), "OCSP_response_get1_basic"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(OCSP_F_PARSE_HTTP_LINE1), "parse_http_line1"},
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA OCSP_str_reasons[] = {
+    {ERR_REASON(OCSP_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR), "certificate verify error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(OCSP_R_DIGEST_ERR), "digest err"},
+    {ERR_REASON(OCSP_R_ERROR_IN_NEXTUPDATE_FIELD),
+     "error in nextupdate field"},
+    {ERR_REASON(OCSP_R_ERROR_IN_THISUPDATE_FIELD),
+     "error in thisupdate field"},
+    {ERR_REASON(OCSP_R_ERROR_PARSING_URL), "error parsing url"},
+    {ERR_REASON(OCSP_R_MISSING_OCSPSIGNING_USAGE),
+     "missing ocspsigning usage"},
+    {ERR_REASON(OCSP_R_NEXTUPDATE_BEFORE_THISUPDATE),
+     "nextupdate before thisupdate"},
+    {ERR_REASON(OCSP_R_NOT_BASIC_RESPONSE), "not basic response"},
+    {ERR_REASON(OCSP_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_IN_CHAIN), "no certificates in chain"},
+    {ERR_REASON(OCSP_R_NO_RESPONSE_DATA), "no response data"},
+    {ERR_REASON(OCSP_R_NO_REVOKED_TIME), "no revoked time"},
+    {ERR_REASON(OCSP_R_NO_SIGNER_KEY), "no signer key"},
+    {ERR_REASON(OCSP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DOES_NOT_MATCH_CERTIFICATE),
+     "private key does not match certificate"},
+    {ERR_REASON(OCSP_R_REQUEST_NOT_SIGNED), "request not signed"},
+    {ERR_REASON(OCSP_R_RESPONSE_CONTAINS_NO_REVOCATION_DATA),
+     "response contains no revocation data"},
+    {ERR_REASON(OCSP_R_ROOT_CA_NOT_TRUSTED), "root ca not trusted"},
+    {ERR_REASON(OCSP_R_SERVER_RESPONSE_ERROR), "server response error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(OCSP_R_SERVER_RESPONSE_PARSE_ERROR),
+     "server response parse error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(OCSP_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE), "signature failure"},
+    {ERR_REASON(OCSP_R_SIGNER_CERTIFICATE_NOT_FOUND),
+     "signer certificate not found"},
+    {ERR_REASON(OCSP_R_STATUS_EXPIRED), "status expired"},
+    {ERR_REASON(OCSP_R_STATUS_NOT_YET_VALID), "status not yet valid"},
+    {ERR_REASON(OCSP_R_STATUS_TOO_OLD), "status too old"},
+    {ERR_REASON(OCSP_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST), "unknown message digest"},
+    {ERR_REASON(OCSP_R_UNKNOWN_NID), "unknown nid"},
+    {ERR_REASON(OCSP_R_UNSUPPORTED_REQUESTORNAME_TYPE),
+     "unsupported requestorname type"},
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+
+#endif
+
+int ERR_load_OCSP_strings(void)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+
+    if (ERR_func_error_string(OCSP_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) {
+        ERR_load_strings(0, OCSP_str_functs);
+        ERR_load_strings(0, OCSP_str_reasons);
+    }
+#endif
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_ext.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_ext.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b829b2e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_ext.c
@@ -0,0 +1,472 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
+#include "ocsp_lcl.h"
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+
+/* Standard wrapper functions for extensions */
+
+/* OCSP request extensions */
+
+int OCSP_REQUEST_get_ext_count(OCSP_REQUEST *x)
+{
+    return (X509v3_get_ext_count(x->tbsRequest.requestExtensions));
+}
+
+int OCSP_REQUEST_get_ext_by_NID(OCSP_REQUEST *x, int nid, int lastpos)
+{
+    return (X509v3_get_ext_by_NID
+            (x->tbsRequest.requestExtensions, nid, lastpos));
+}
+
+int OCSP_REQUEST_get_ext_by_OBJ(OCSP_REQUEST *x, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj,
+                                int lastpos)
+{
+    return (X509v3_get_ext_by_OBJ
+            (x->tbsRequest.requestExtensions, obj, lastpos));
+}
+
+int OCSP_REQUEST_get_ext_by_critical(OCSP_REQUEST *x, int crit, int lastpos)
+{
+    return (X509v3_get_ext_by_critical
+            (x->tbsRequest.requestExtensions, crit, lastpos));
+}
+
+X509_EXTENSION *OCSP_REQUEST_get_ext(OCSP_REQUEST *x, int loc)
+{
+    return (X509v3_get_ext(x->tbsRequest.requestExtensions, loc));
+}
+
+X509_EXTENSION *OCSP_REQUEST_delete_ext(OCSP_REQUEST *x, int loc)
+{
+    return (X509v3_delete_ext(x->tbsRequest.requestExtensions, loc));
+}
+
+void *OCSP_REQUEST_get1_ext_d2i(OCSP_REQUEST *x, int nid, int *crit, int *idx)
+{
+    return X509V3_get_d2i(x->tbsRequest.requestExtensions, nid, crit, idx);
+}
+
+int OCSP_REQUEST_add1_ext_i2d(OCSP_REQUEST *x, int nid, void *value, int crit,
+                              unsigned long flags)
+{
+    return X509V3_add1_i2d(&x->tbsRequest.requestExtensions, nid, value,
+                           crit, flags);
+}
+
+int OCSP_REQUEST_add_ext(OCSP_REQUEST *x, X509_EXTENSION *ex, int loc)
+{
+    return (X509v3_add_ext(&(x->tbsRequest.requestExtensions), ex, loc) !=
+            NULL);
+}
+
+/* Single extensions */
+
+int OCSP_ONEREQ_get_ext_count(OCSP_ONEREQ *x)
+{
+    return (X509v3_get_ext_count(x->singleRequestExtensions));
+}
+
+int OCSP_ONEREQ_get_ext_by_NID(OCSP_ONEREQ *x, int nid, int lastpos)
+{
+    return (X509v3_get_ext_by_NID(x->singleRequestExtensions, nid, lastpos));
+}
+
+int OCSP_ONEREQ_get_ext_by_OBJ(OCSP_ONEREQ *x, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj,
+                               int lastpos)
+{
+    return (X509v3_get_ext_by_OBJ(x->singleRequestExtensions, obj, lastpos));
+}
+
+int OCSP_ONEREQ_get_ext_by_critical(OCSP_ONEREQ *x, int crit, int lastpos)
+{
+    return (X509v3_get_ext_by_critical
+            (x->singleRequestExtensions, crit, lastpos));
+}
+
+X509_EXTENSION *OCSP_ONEREQ_get_ext(OCSP_ONEREQ *x, int loc)
+{
+    return (X509v3_get_ext(x->singleRequestExtensions, loc));
+}
+
+X509_EXTENSION *OCSP_ONEREQ_delete_ext(OCSP_ONEREQ *x, int loc)
+{
+    return (X509v3_delete_ext(x->singleRequestExtensions, loc));
+}
+
+void *OCSP_ONEREQ_get1_ext_d2i(OCSP_ONEREQ *x, int nid, int *crit, int *idx)
+{
+    return X509V3_get_d2i(x->singleRequestExtensions, nid, crit, idx);
+}
+
+int OCSP_ONEREQ_add1_ext_i2d(OCSP_ONEREQ *x, int nid, void *value, int crit,
+                             unsigned long flags)
+{
+    return X509V3_add1_i2d(&x->singleRequestExtensions, nid, value, crit,
+                           flags);
+}
+
+int OCSP_ONEREQ_add_ext(OCSP_ONEREQ *x, X509_EXTENSION *ex, int loc)
+{
+    return (X509v3_add_ext(&(x->singleRequestExtensions), ex, loc) != NULL);
+}
+
+/* OCSP Basic response */
+
+int OCSP_BASICRESP_get_ext_count(OCSP_BASICRESP *x)
+{
+    return (X509v3_get_ext_count(x->tbsResponseData.responseExtensions));
+}
+
+int OCSP_BASICRESP_get_ext_by_NID(OCSP_BASICRESP *x, int nid, int lastpos)
+{
+    return (X509v3_get_ext_by_NID
+            (x->tbsResponseData.responseExtensions, nid, lastpos));
+}
+
+int OCSP_BASICRESP_get_ext_by_OBJ(OCSP_BASICRESP *x, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj,
+                                  int lastpos)
+{
+    return (X509v3_get_ext_by_OBJ
+            (x->tbsResponseData.responseExtensions, obj, lastpos));
+}
+
+int OCSP_BASICRESP_get_ext_by_critical(OCSP_BASICRESP *x, int crit,
+                                       int lastpos)
+{
+    return (X509v3_get_ext_by_critical
+            (x->tbsResponseData.responseExtensions, crit, lastpos));
+}
+
+X509_EXTENSION *OCSP_BASICRESP_get_ext(OCSP_BASICRESP *x, int loc)
+{
+    return (X509v3_get_ext(x->tbsResponseData.responseExtensions, loc));
+}
+
+X509_EXTENSION *OCSP_BASICRESP_delete_ext(OCSP_BASICRESP *x, int loc)
+{
+    return (X509v3_delete_ext(x->tbsResponseData.responseExtensions, loc));
+}
+
+void *OCSP_BASICRESP_get1_ext_d2i(OCSP_BASICRESP *x, int nid, int *crit,
+                                  int *idx)
+{
+    return X509V3_get_d2i(x->tbsResponseData.responseExtensions, nid, crit,
+                          idx);
+}
+
+int OCSP_BASICRESP_add1_ext_i2d(OCSP_BASICRESP *x, int nid, void *value,
+                                int crit, unsigned long flags)
+{
+    return X509V3_add1_i2d(&x->tbsResponseData.responseExtensions, nid,
+                           value, crit, flags);
+}
+
+int OCSP_BASICRESP_add_ext(OCSP_BASICRESP *x, X509_EXTENSION *ex, int loc)
+{
+    return (X509v3_add_ext(&(x->tbsResponseData.responseExtensions), ex, loc)
+            != NULL);
+}
+
+/* OCSP single response extensions */
+
+int OCSP_SINGLERESP_get_ext_count(OCSP_SINGLERESP *x)
+{
+    return (X509v3_get_ext_count(x->singleExtensions));
+}
+
+int OCSP_SINGLERESP_get_ext_by_NID(OCSP_SINGLERESP *x, int nid, int lastpos)
+{
+    return (X509v3_get_ext_by_NID(x->singleExtensions, nid, lastpos));
+}
+
+int OCSP_SINGLERESP_get_ext_by_OBJ(OCSP_SINGLERESP *x, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj,
+                                   int lastpos)
+{
+    return (X509v3_get_ext_by_OBJ(x->singleExtensions, obj, lastpos));
+}
+
+int OCSP_SINGLERESP_get_ext_by_critical(OCSP_SINGLERESP *x, int crit,
+                                        int lastpos)
+{
+    return (X509v3_get_ext_by_critical(x->singleExtensions, crit, lastpos));
+}
+
+X509_EXTENSION *OCSP_SINGLERESP_get_ext(OCSP_SINGLERESP *x, int loc)
+{
+    return (X509v3_get_ext(x->singleExtensions, loc));
+}
+
+X509_EXTENSION *OCSP_SINGLERESP_delete_ext(OCSP_SINGLERESP *x, int loc)
+{
+    return (X509v3_delete_ext(x->singleExtensions, loc));
+}
+
+void *OCSP_SINGLERESP_get1_ext_d2i(OCSP_SINGLERESP *x, int nid, int *crit,
+                                   int *idx)
+{
+    return X509V3_get_d2i(x->singleExtensions, nid, crit, idx);
+}
+
+int OCSP_SINGLERESP_add1_ext_i2d(OCSP_SINGLERESP *x, int nid, void *value,
+                                 int crit, unsigned long flags)
+{
+    return X509V3_add1_i2d(&x->singleExtensions, nid, value, crit, flags);
+}
+
+int OCSP_SINGLERESP_add_ext(OCSP_SINGLERESP *x, X509_EXTENSION *ex, int loc)
+{
+    return (X509v3_add_ext(&(x->singleExtensions), ex, loc) != NULL);
+}
+
+/* also CRL Entry Extensions */
+
+/* Nonce handling functions */
+
+/*
+ * Add a nonce to an extension stack. A nonce can be specified or if NULL a
+ * random nonce will be generated. Note: OpenSSL 0.9.7d and later create an
+ * OCTET STRING containing the nonce, previous versions used the raw nonce.
+ */
+
+static int ocsp_add1_nonce(STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) **exts,
+                           unsigned char *val, int len)
+{
+    unsigned char *tmpval;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING os;
+    int ret = 0;
+    if (len <= 0)
+        len = OCSP_DEFAULT_NONCE_LENGTH;
+    /*
+     * Create the OCTET STRING manually by writing out the header and
+     * appending the content octets. This avoids an extra memory allocation
+     * operation in some cases. Applications should *NOT* do this because it
+     * relies on library internals.
+     */
+    os.length = ASN1_object_size(0, len, V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
+    if (os.length < 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    os.data = OPENSSL_malloc(os.length);
+    if (os.data == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    tmpval = os.data;
+    ASN1_put_object(&tmpval, 0, len, V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL);
+    if (val)
+        memcpy(tmpval, val, len);
+    else if (RAND_bytes(tmpval, len) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    if (!X509V3_add1_i2d(exts, NID_id_pkix_OCSP_Nonce,
+                         &os, 0, X509V3_ADD_REPLACE))
+        goto err;
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_free(os.data);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/* Add nonce to an OCSP request */
+
+int OCSP_request_add1_nonce(OCSP_REQUEST *req, unsigned char *val, int len)
+{
+    return ocsp_add1_nonce(&req->tbsRequest.requestExtensions, val, len);
+}
+
+/* Same as above but for a response */
+
+int OCSP_basic_add1_nonce(OCSP_BASICRESP *resp, unsigned char *val, int len)
+{
+    return ocsp_add1_nonce(&resp->tbsResponseData.responseExtensions, val,
+                           len);
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Check nonce validity in a request and response.
+ * Return value reflects result:
+ *  1: nonces present and equal.
+ *  2: nonces both absent.
+ *  3: nonce present in response only.
+ *  0: nonces both present and not equal.
+ * -1: nonce in request only.
+ *
+ *  For most responders clients can check return > 0.
+ *  If responder doesn't handle nonces return != 0 may be
+ *  necessary. return == 0 is always an error.
+ */
+
+int OCSP_check_nonce(OCSP_REQUEST *req, OCSP_BASICRESP *bs)
+{
+    /*
+     * Since we are only interested in the presence or absence of
+     * the nonce and comparing its value there is no need to use
+     * the X509V3 routines: this way we can avoid them allocating an
+     * ASN1_OCTET_STRING structure for the value which would be
+     * freed immediately anyway.
+     */
+
+    int req_idx, resp_idx;
+    X509_EXTENSION *req_ext, *resp_ext;
+    req_idx = OCSP_REQUEST_get_ext_by_NID(req, NID_id_pkix_OCSP_Nonce, -1);
+    resp_idx = OCSP_BASICRESP_get_ext_by_NID(bs, NID_id_pkix_OCSP_Nonce, -1);
+    /* Check both absent */
+    if ((req_idx < 0) && (resp_idx < 0))
+        return 2;
+    /* Check in request only */
+    if ((req_idx >= 0) && (resp_idx < 0))
+        return -1;
+    /* Check in response but not request */
+    if ((req_idx < 0) && (resp_idx >= 0))
+        return 3;
+    /*
+     * Otherwise nonce in request and response so retrieve the extensions
+     */
+    req_ext = OCSP_REQUEST_get_ext(req, req_idx);
+    resp_ext = OCSP_BASICRESP_get_ext(bs, resp_idx);
+    if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(X509_EXTENSION_get_data(req_ext),
+                              X509_EXTENSION_get_data(resp_ext)))
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Copy the nonce value (if any) from an OCSP request to a response.
+ */
+
+int OCSP_copy_nonce(OCSP_BASICRESP *resp, OCSP_REQUEST *req)
+{
+    X509_EXTENSION *req_ext;
+    int req_idx;
+    /* Check for nonce in request */
+    req_idx = OCSP_REQUEST_get_ext_by_NID(req, NID_id_pkix_OCSP_Nonce, -1);
+    /* If no nonce that's OK */
+    if (req_idx < 0)
+        return 2;
+    req_ext = OCSP_REQUEST_get_ext(req, req_idx);
+    return OCSP_BASICRESP_add_ext(resp, req_ext, -1);
+}
+
+X509_EXTENSION *OCSP_crlID_new(const char *url, long *n, char *tim)
+{
+    X509_EXTENSION *x = NULL;
+    OCSP_CRLID *cid = NULL;
+
+    if ((cid = OCSP_CRLID_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (url) {
+        if ((cid->crlUrl = ASN1_IA5STRING_new()) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        if (!(ASN1_STRING_set(cid->crlUrl, url, -1)))
+            goto err;
+    }
+    if (n) {
+        if ((cid->crlNum = ASN1_INTEGER_new()) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        if (!(ASN1_INTEGER_set(cid->crlNum, *n)))
+            goto err;
+    }
+    if (tim) {
+        if ((cid->crlTime = ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_new()) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        if (!(ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set_string(cid->crlTime, tim)))
+            goto err;
+    }
+    x = X509V3_EXT_i2d(NID_id_pkix_OCSP_CrlID, 0, cid);
+ err:
+    OCSP_CRLID_free(cid);
+    return x;
+}
+
+/*   AcceptableResponses ::= SEQUENCE OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER */
+X509_EXTENSION *OCSP_accept_responses_new(char **oids)
+{
+    int nid;
+    STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *sk = NULL;
+    ASN1_OBJECT *o = NULL;
+    X509_EXTENSION *x = NULL;
+
+    if ((sk = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_new_null()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    while (oids && *oids) {
+        if ((nid = OBJ_txt2nid(*oids)) != NID_undef && (o = OBJ_nid2obj(nid)))
+            sk_ASN1_OBJECT_push(sk, o);
+        oids++;
+    }
+    x = X509V3_EXT_i2d(NID_id_pkix_OCSP_acceptableResponses, 0, sk);
+ err:
+    sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(sk, ASN1_OBJECT_free);
+    return x;
+}
+
+/*  ArchiveCutoff ::= GeneralizedTime */
+X509_EXTENSION *OCSP_archive_cutoff_new(char *tim)
+{
+    X509_EXTENSION *x = NULL;
+    ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *gt = NULL;
+
+    if ((gt = ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (!(ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set_string(gt, tim)))
+        goto err;
+    x = X509V3_EXT_i2d(NID_id_pkix_OCSP_archiveCutoff, 0, gt);
+ err:
+    ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_free(gt);
+    return x;
+}
+
+/*
+ * per ACCESS_DESCRIPTION parameter are oids, of which there are currently
+ * two--NID_ad_ocsp, NID_id_ad_caIssuers--and GeneralName value.  This method
+ * forces NID_ad_ocsp and uniformResourceLocator [6] IA5String.
+ */
+X509_EXTENSION *OCSP_url_svcloc_new(X509_NAME *issuer, const char **urls)
+{
+    X509_EXTENSION *x = NULL;
+    ASN1_IA5STRING *ia5 = NULL;
+    OCSP_SERVICELOC *sloc = NULL;
+    ACCESS_DESCRIPTION *ad = NULL;
+
+    if ((sloc = OCSP_SERVICELOC_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if ((sloc->issuer = X509_NAME_dup(issuer)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (urls && *urls
+        && (sloc->locator = sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_new_null()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    while (urls && *urls) {
+        if ((ad = ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_new()) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        if ((ad->method = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_ad_OCSP)) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        if ((ad->location = GENERAL_NAME_new()) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        if ((ia5 = ASN1_IA5STRING_new()) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        if (!ASN1_STRING_set((ASN1_STRING *)ia5, *urls, -1))
+            goto err;
+        ad->location->type = GEN_URI;
+        ad->location->d.ia5 = ia5;
+        ia5 = NULL;
+        if (!sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_push(sloc->locator, ad))
+            goto err;
+        ad = NULL;
+        urls++;
+    }
+    x = X509V3_EXT_i2d(NID_id_pkix_OCSP_serviceLocator, 0, sloc);
+ err:
+    ASN1_IA5STRING_free(ia5);
+    ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_free(ad);
+    OCSP_SERVICELOC_free(sloc);
+    return x;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_ht.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_ht.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d8796ca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_ht.c
@@ -0,0 +1,502 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include "e_os.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+
+/* Stateful OCSP request code, supporting non-blocking I/O */
+
+/* Opaque OCSP request status structure */
+
+struct ocsp_req_ctx_st {
+    int state;                  /* Current I/O state */
+    unsigned char *iobuf;       /* Line buffer */
+    int iobuflen;               /* Line buffer length */
+    BIO *io;                    /* BIO to perform I/O with */
+    BIO *mem;                   /* Memory BIO response is built into */
+    unsigned long asn1_len;     /* ASN1 length of response */
+    unsigned long max_resp_len; /* Maximum length of response */
+};
+
+#define OCSP_MAX_RESP_LENGTH    (100 * 1024)
+#define OCSP_MAX_LINE_LEN       4096;
+
+/* OCSP states */
+
+/* If set no reading should be performed */
+#define OHS_NOREAD              0x1000
+/* Error condition */
+#define OHS_ERROR               (0 | OHS_NOREAD)
+/* First line being read */
+#define OHS_FIRSTLINE           1
+/* MIME headers being read */
+#define OHS_HEADERS             2
+/* OCSP initial header (tag + length) being read */
+#define OHS_ASN1_HEADER         3
+/* OCSP content octets being read */
+#define OHS_ASN1_CONTENT        4
+/* First call: ready to start I/O */
+#define OHS_ASN1_WRITE_INIT     (5 | OHS_NOREAD)
+/* Request being sent */
+#define OHS_ASN1_WRITE          (6 | OHS_NOREAD)
+/* Request being flushed */
+#define OHS_ASN1_FLUSH          (7 | OHS_NOREAD)
+/* Completed */
+#define OHS_DONE                (8 | OHS_NOREAD)
+/* Headers set, no final \r\n included */
+#define OHS_HTTP_HEADER         (9 | OHS_NOREAD)
+
+static int parse_http_line1(char *line);
+
+OCSP_REQ_CTX *OCSP_REQ_CTX_new(BIO *io, int maxline)
+{
+    OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*rctx));
+
+    if (rctx == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    rctx->state = OHS_ERROR;
+    rctx->max_resp_len = OCSP_MAX_RESP_LENGTH;
+    rctx->mem = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+    rctx->io = io;
+    if (maxline > 0)
+        rctx->iobuflen = maxline;
+    else
+        rctx->iobuflen = OCSP_MAX_LINE_LEN;
+    rctx->iobuf = OPENSSL_malloc(rctx->iobuflen);
+    if (rctx->iobuf == NULL || rctx->mem == NULL) {
+        OCSP_REQ_CTX_free(rctx);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    return rctx;
+}
+
+void OCSP_REQ_CTX_free(OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx)
+{
+    if (!rctx)
+        return;
+    BIO_free(rctx->mem);
+    OPENSSL_free(rctx->iobuf);
+    OPENSSL_free(rctx);
+}
+
+BIO *OCSP_REQ_CTX_get0_mem_bio(OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx)
+{
+    return rctx->mem;
+}
+
+void OCSP_set_max_response_length(OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx, unsigned long len)
+{
+    if (len == 0)
+        rctx->max_resp_len = OCSP_MAX_RESP_LENGTH;
+    else
+        rctx->max_resp_len = len;
+}
+
+int OCSP_REQ_CTX_i2d(OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx, const ASN1_ITEM *it, ASN1_VALUE *val)
+{
+    static const char req_hdr[] =
+        "Content-Type: application/ocsp-request\r\n"
+        "Content-Length: %d\r\n\r\n";
+    int reqlen = ASN1_item_i2d(val, NULL, it);
+    if (BIO_printf(rctx->mem, req_hdr, reqlen) <= 0)
+        return 0;
+    if (ASN1_item_i2d_bio(it, rctx->mem, val) <= 0)
+        return 0;
+    rctx->state = OHS_ASN1_WRITE_INIT;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int OCSP_REQ_CTX_nbio_d2i(OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx,
+                          ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
+{
+    int rv, len;
+    const unsigned char *p;
+
+    rv = OCSP_REQ_CTX_nbio(rctx);
+    if (rv != 1)
+        return rv;
+
+    len = BIO_get_mem_data(rctx->mem, &p);
+    *pval = ASN1_item_d2i(NULL, &p, len, it);
+    if (*pval == NULL) {
+        rctx->state = OHS_ERROR;
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int OCSP_REQ_CTX_http(OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx, const char *op, const char *path)
+{
+    static const char http_hdr[] = "%s %s HTTP/1.0\r\n";
+
+    if (!path)
+        path = "/";
+
+    if (BIO_printf(rctx->mem, http_hdr, op, path) <= 0)
+        return 0;
+    rctx->state = OHS_HTTP_HEADER;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int OCSP_REQ_CTX_set1_req(OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx, OCSP_REQUEST *req)
+{
+    return OCSP_REQ_CTX_i2d(rctx, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(OCSP_REQUEST),
+                            (ASN1_VALUE *)req);
+}
+
+int OCSP_REQ_CTX_add1_header(OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx,
+                             const char *name, const char *value)
+{
+    if (!name)
+        return 0;
+    if (BIO_puts(rctx->mem, name) <= 0)
+        return 0;
+    if (value) {
+        if (BIO_write(rctx->mem, ": ", 2) != 2)
+            return 0;
+        if (BIO_puts(rctx->mem, value) <= 0)
+            return 0;
+    }
+    if (BIO_write(rctx->mem, "\r\n", 2) != 2)
+        return 0;
+    rctx->state = OHS_HTTP_HEADER;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+OCSP_REQ_CTX *OCSP_sendreq_new(BIO *io, const char *path, OCSP_REQUEST *req,
+                               int maxline)
+{
+
+    OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx = NULL;
+    rctx = OCSP_REQ_CTX_new(io, maxline);
+    if (rctx == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+
+    if (!OCSP_REQ_CTX_http(rctx, "POST", path))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (req && !OCSP_REQ_CTX_set1_req(rctx, req))
+        goto err;
+
+    return rctx;
+
+ err:
+    OCSP_REQ_CTX_free(rctx);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Parse the HTTP response. This will look like this: "HTTP/1.0 200 OK". We
+ * need to obtain the numeric code and (optional) informational message.
+ */
+
+static int parse_http_line1(char *line)
+{
+    int retcode;
+    char *p, *q, *r;
+    /* Skip to first white space (passed protocol info) */
+
+    for (p = line; *p && !isspace((unsigned char)*p); p++)
+        continue;
+    if (!*p) {
+        OCSPerr(OCSP_F_PARSE_HTTP_LINE1, OCSP_R_SERVER_RESPONSE_PARSE_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* Skip past white space to start of response code */
+    while (*p && isspace((unsigned char)*p))
+        p++;
+
+    if (!*p) {
+        OCSPerr(OCSP_F_PARSE_HTTP_LINE1, OCSP_R_SERVER_RESPONSE_PARSE_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* Find end of response code: first whitespace after start of code */
+    for (q = p; *q && !isspace((unsigned char)*q); q++)
+        continue;
+
+    if (!*q) {
+        OCSPerr(OCSP_F_PARSE_HTTP_LINE1, OCSP_R_SERVER_RESPONSE_PARSE_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* Set end of response code and start of message */
+    *q++ = 0;
+
+    /* Attempt to parse numeric code */
+    retcode = strtoul(p, &r, 10);
+
+    if (*r)
+        return 0;
+
+    /* Skip over any leading white space in message */
+    while (*q && isspace((unsigned char)*q))
+        q++;
+
+    if (*q) {
+        /*
+         * Finally zap any trailing white space in message (include CRLF)
+         */
+
+        /* We know q has a non white space character so this is OK */
+        for (r = q + strlen(q) - 1; isspace((unsigned char)*r); r--)
+            *r = 0;
+    }
+    if (retcode != 200) {
+        OCSPerr(OCSP_F_PARSE_HTTP_LINE1, OCSP_R_SERVER_RESPONSE_ERROR);
+        if (!*q)
+            ERR_add_error_data(2, "Code=", p);
+        else
+            ERR_add_error_data(4, "Code=", p, ",Reason=", q);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+
+}
+
+int OCSP_REQ_CTX_nbio(OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx)
+{
+    int i, n;
+    const unsigned char *p;
+ next_io:
+    if (!(rctx->state & OHS_NOREAD)) {
+        n = BIO_read(rctx->io, rctx->iobuf, rctx->iobuflen);
+
+        if (n <= 0) {
+            if (BIO_should_retry(rctx->io))
+                return -1;
+            return 0;
+        }
+
+        /* Write data to memory BIO */
+
+        if (BIO_write(rctx->mem, rctx->iobuf, n) != n)
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    switch (rctx->state) {
+    case OHS_HTTP_HEADER:
+        /* Last operation was adding headers: need a final \r\n */
+        if (BIO_write(rctx->mem, "\r\n", 2) != 2) {
+            rctx->state = OHS_ERROR;
+            return 0;
+        }
+        rctx->state = OHS_ASN1_WRITE_INIT;
+
+        /* fall thru */
+    case OHS_ASN1_WRITE_INIT:
+        rctx->asn1_len = BIO_get_mem_data(rctx->mem, NULL);
+        rctx->state = OHS_ASN1_WRITE;
+
+        /* fall thru */
+    case OHS_ASN1_WRITE:
+        n = BIO_get_mem_data(rctx->mem, &p);
+
+        i = BIO_write(rctx->io, p + (n - rctx->asn1_len), rctx->asn1_len);
+
+        if (i <= 0) {
+            if (BIO_should_retry(rctx->io))
+                return -1;
+            rctx->state = OHS_ERROR;
+            return 0;
+        }
+
+        rctx->asn1_len -= i;
+
+        if (rctx->asn1_len > 0)
+            goto next_io;
+
+        rctx->state = OHS_ASN1_FLUSH;
+
+        (void)BIO_reset(rctx->mem);
+
+        /* fall thru */
+    case OHS_ASN1_FLUSH:
+
+        i = BIO_flush(rctx->io);
+
+        if (i > 0) {
+            rctx->state = OHS_FIRSTLINE;
+            goto next_io;
+        }
+
+        if (BIO_should_retry(rctx->io))
+            return -1;
+
+        rctx->state = OHS_ERROR;
+        return 0;
+
+    case OHS_ERROR:
+        return 0;
+
+    case OHS_FIRSTLINE:
+    case OHS_HEADERS:
+
+        /* Attempt to read a line in */
+
+ next_line:
+        /*
+         * Due to &%^*$" memory BIO behaviour with BIO_gets we have to check
+         * there's a complete line in there before calling BIO_gets or we'll
+         * just get a partial read.
+         */
+        n = BIO_get_mem_data(rctx->mem, &p);
+        if ((n <= 0) || !memchr(p, '\n', n)) {
+            if (n >= rctx->iobuflen) {
+                rctx->state = OHS_ERROR;
+                return 0;
+            }
+            goto next_io;
+        }
+        n = BIO_gets(rctx->mem, (char *)rctx->iobuf, rctx->iobuflen);
+
+        if (n <= 0) {
+            if (BIO_should_retry(rctx->mem))
+                goto next_io;
+            rctx->state = OHS_ERROR;
+            return 0;
+        }
+
+        /* Don't allow excessive lines */
+        if (n == rctx->iobuflen) {
+            rctx->state = OHS_ERROR;
+            return 0;
+        }
+
+        /* First line */
+        if (rctx->state == OHS_FIRSTLINE) {
+            if (parse_http_line1((char *)rctx->iobuf)) {
+                rctx->state = OHS_HEADERS;
+                goto next_line;
+            } else {
+                rctx->state = OHS_ERROR;
+                return 0;
+            }
+        } else {
+            /* Look for blank line: end of headers */
+            for (p = rctx->iobuf; *p; p++) {
+                if ((*p != '\r') && (*p != '\n'))
+                    break;
+            }
+            if (*p)
+                goto next_line;
+
+            rctx->state = OHS_ASN1_HEADER;
+
+        }
+
+        /* Fall thru */
+
+    case OHS_ASN1_HEADER:
+        /*
+         * Now reading ASN1 header: can read at least 2 bytes which is enough
+         * for ASN1 SEQUENCE header and either length field or at least the
+         * length of the length field.
+         */
+        n = BIO_get_mem_data(rctx->mem, &p);
+        if (n < 2)
+            goto next_io;
+
+        /* Check it is an ASN1 SEQUENCE */
+        if (*p++ != (V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)) {
+            rctx->state = OHS_ERROR;
+            return 0;
+        }
+
+        /* Check out length field */
+        if (*p & 0x80) {
+            /*
+             * If MSB set on initial length octet we can now always read 6
+             * octets: make sure we have them.
+             */
+            if (n < 6)
+                goto next_io;
+            n = *p & 0x7F;
+            /* Not NDEF or excessive length */
+            if (!n || (n > 4)) {
+                rctx->state = OHS_ERROR;
+                return 0;
+            }
+            p++;
+            rctx->asn1_len = 0;
+            for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+                rctx->asn1_len <<= 8;
+                rctx->asn1_len |= *p++;
+            }
+
+            if (rctx->asn1_len > rctx->max_resp_len) {
+                rctx->state = OHS_ERROR;
+                return 0;
+            }
+
+            rctx->asn1_len += n + 2;
+        } else
+            rctx->asn1_len = *p + 2;
+
+        rctx->state = OHS_ASN1_CONTENT;
+
+        /* Fall thru */
+
+    case OHS_ASN1_CONTENT:
+        n = BIO_get_mem_data(rctx->mem, NULL);
+        if (n < (int)rctx->asn1_len)
+            goto next_io;
+
+        rctx->state = OHS_DONE;
+        return 1;
+
+    case OHS_DONE:
+        return 1;
+
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+
+}
+
+int OCSP_sendreq_nbio(OCSP_RESPONSE **presp, OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx)
+{
+    return OCSP_REQ_CTX_nbio_d2i(rctx,
+                                 (ASN1_VALUE **)presp,
+                                 ASN1_ITEM_rptr(OCSP_RESPONSE));
+}
+
+/* Blocking OCSP request handler: now a special case of non-blocking I/O */
+
+OCSP_RESPONSE *OCSP_sendreq_bio(BIO *b, const char *path, OCSP_REQUEST *req)
+{
+    OCSP_RESPONSE *resp = NULL;
+    OCSP_REQ_CTX *ctx;
+    int rv;
+
+    ctx = OCSP_sendreq_new(b, path, req, -1);
+
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+
+    do {
+        rv = OCSP_sendreq_nbio(&resp, ctx);
+    } while ((rv == -1) && BIO_should_retry(b));
+
+    OCSP_REQ_CTX_free(ctx);
+
+    if (rv)
+        return resp;
+
+    return NULL;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_lcl.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_lcl.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d1cf158
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_lcl.h
@@ -0,0 +1,232 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*-  CertID ::= SEQUENCE {
+ *       hashAlgorithm            AlgorithmIdentifier,
+ *       issuerNameHash     OCTET STRING, -- Hash of Issuer's DN
+ *       issuerKeyHash      OCTET STRING, -- Hash of Issuers public key (excluding the tag & length fields)
+ *       serialNumber       CertificateSerialNumber }
+ */
+struct ocsp_cert_id_st {
+    X509_ALGOR hashAlgorithm;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING issuerNameHash;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING issuerKeyHash;
+    ASN1_INTEGER serialNumber;
+};
+
+/*-  Request ::=     SEQUENCE {
+ *       reqCert                    CertID,
+ *       singleRequestExtensions    [0] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL }
+ */
+struct ocsp_one_request_st {
+    OCSP_CERTID *reqCert;
+    STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *singleRequestExtensions;
+};
+
+/*-  TBSRequest      ::=     SEQUENCE {
+ *       version             [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1,
+ *       requestorName       [1] EXPLICIT GeneralName OPTIONAL,
+ *       requestList             SEQUENCE OF Request,
+ *       requestExtensions   [2] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL }
+ */
+struct ocsp_req_info_st {
+    ASN1_INTEGER *version;
+    GENERAL_NAME *requestorName;
+    STACK_OF(OCSP_ONEREQ) *requestList;
+    STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *requestExtensions;
+};
+
+/*-  Signature       ::=     SEQUENCE {
+ *       signatureAlgorithm   AlgorithmIdentifier,
+ *       signature            BIT STRING,
+ *       certs                [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL }
+ */
+struct ocsp_signature_st {
+    X509_ALGOR signatureAlgorithm;
+    ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature;
+    STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
+};
+
+/*-  OCSPRequest     ::=     SEQUENCE {
+ *       tbsRequest                  TBSRequest,
+ *       optionalSignature   [0]     EXPLICIT Signature OPTIONAL }
+ */
+struct ocsp_request_st {
+    OCSP_REQINFO tbsRequest;
+    OCSP_SIGNATURE *optionalSignature; /* OPTIONAL */
+};
+
+/*-  OCSPResponseStatus ::= ENUMERATED {
+ *       successful            (0),      --Response has valid confirmations
+ *       malformedRequest      (1),      --Illegal confirmation request
+ *       internalError         (2),      --Internal error in issuer
+ *       tryLater              (3),      --Try again later
+ *                                       --(4) is not used
+ *       sigRequired           (5),      --Must sign the request
+ *       unauthorized          (6)       --Request unauthorized
+ *   }
+ */
+
+/*-  ResponseBytes ::=       SEQUENCE {
+ *       responseType   OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
+ *       response       OCTET STRING }
+ */
+struct ocsp_resp_bytes_st {
+    ASN1_OBJECT *responseType;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *response;
+};
+
+/*-  OCSPResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
+ *      responseStatus         OCSPResponseStatus,
+ *      responseBytes          [0] EXPLICIT ResponseBytes OPTIONAL }
+ */
+struct ocsp_response_st {
+    ASN1_ENUMERATED *responseStatus;
+    OCSP_RESPBYTES *responseBytes;
+};
+
+/*-  ResponderID ::= CHOICE {
+ *      byName   [1] Name,
+ *      byKey    [2] KeyHash }
+ */
+struct ocsp_responder_id_st {
+    int type;
+    union {
+        X509_NAME *byName;
+        ASN1_OCTET_STRING *byKey;
+    } value;
+};
+
+/*-  KeyHash ::= OCTET STRING --SHA-1 hash of responder's public key
+ *                            --(excluding the tag and length fields)
+ */
+
+/*-  RevokedInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
+ *       revocationTime              GeneralizedTime,
+ *       revocationReason    [0]     EXPLICIT CRLReason OPTIONAL }
+ */
+struct ocsp_revoked_info_st {
+    ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *revocationTime;
+    ASN1_ENUMERATED *revocationReason;
+};
+
+/*-  CertStatus ::= CHOICE {
+ *       good                [0]     IMPLICIT NULL,
+ *       revoked             [1]     IMPLICIT RevokedInfo,
+ *       unknown             [2]     IMPLICIT UnknownInfo }
+ */
+struct ocsp_cert_status_st {
+    int type;
+    union {
+        ASN1_NULL *good;
+        OCSP_REVOKEDINFO *revoked;
+        ASN1_NULL *unknown;
+    } value;
+};
+
+/*-  SingleResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
+ *      certID                       CertID,
+ *      certStatus                   CertStatus,
+ *      thisUpdate                   GeneralizedTime,
+ *      nextUpdate           [0]     EXPLICIT GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
+ *      singleExtensions     [1]     EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL }
+ */
+struct ocsp_single_response_st {
+    OCSP_CERTID *certId;
+    OCSP_CERTSTATUS *certStatus;
+    ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *thisUpdate;
+    ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *nextUpdate;
+    STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *singleExtensions;
+};
+
+/*-  ResponseData ::= SEQUENCE {
+ *      version              [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1,
+ *      responderID              ResponderID,
+ *      producedAt               GeneralizedTime,
+ *      responses                SEQUENCE OF SingleResponse,
+ *      responseExtensions   [1] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL }
+ */
+struct ocsp_response_data_st {
+    ASN1_INTEGER *version;
+    OCSP_RESPID responderId;
+    ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *producedAt;
+    STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *responses;
+    STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *responseExtensions;
+};
+
+/*-  BasicOCSPResponse       ::= SEQUENCE {
+ *      tbsResponseData      ResponseData,
+ *      signatureAlgorithm   AlgorithmIdentifier,
+ *      signature            BIT STRING,
+ *      certs                [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL }
+ */
+  /*
+   * Note 1: The value for "signature" is specified in the OCSP rfc2560 as
+   * follows: "The value for the signature SHALL be computed on the hash of
+   * the DER encoding ResponseData." This means that you must hash the
+   * DER-encoded tbsResponseData, and then run it through a crypto-signing
+   * function, which will (at least w/RSA) do a hash-'n'-private-encrypt
+   * operation.  This seems a bit odd, but that's the spec.  Also note that
+   * the data structures do not leave anywhere to independently specify the
+   * algorithm used for the initial hash. So, we look at the
+   * signature-specification algorithm, and try to do something intelligent.
+   * -- Kathy Weinhold, CertCo
+   */
+  /*
+   * Note 2: It seems that the mentioned passage from RFC 2560 (section
+   * 4.2.1) is open for interpretation.  I've done tests against another
+   * responder, and found that it doesn't do the double hashing that the RFC
+   * seems to say one should.  Therefore, all relevant functions take a flag
+   * saying which variant should be used.  -- Richard Levitte, OpenSSL team
+   * and CeloCom
+   */
+struct ocsp_basic_response_st {
+    OCSP_RESPDATA tbsResponseData;
+    X509_ALGOR signatureAlgorithm;
+    ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature;
+    STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
+};
+
+/*-
+ * CrlID ::= SEQUENCE {
+ *     crlUrl               [0]     EXPLICIT IA5String OPTIONAL,
+ *     crlNum               [1]     EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+ *     crlTime              [2]     EXPLICIT GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL }
+ */
+struct ocsp_crl_id_st {
+    ASN1_IA5STRING *crlUrl;
+    ASN1_INTEGER *crlNum;
+    ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *crlTime;
+};
+
+/*-
+ * ServiceLocator ::= SEQUENCE {
+ *      issuer    Name,
+ *      locator   AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax OPTIONAL }
+ */
+struct ocsp_service_locator_st {
+    X509_NAME *issuer;
+    STACK_OF(ACCESS_DESCRIPTION) *locator;
+};
+
+#  define OCSP_REQUEST_sign(o,pkey,md) \
+        ASN1_item_sign(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(OCSP_REQINFO),\
+                &(o)->optionalSignature->signatureAlgorithm,NULL,\
+                (o)->optionalSignature->signature,&(o)->tbsRequest,pkey,md)
+
+#  define OCSP_BASICRESP_sign(o,pkey,md,d) \
+        ASN1_item_sign(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(OCSP_RESPDATA),&(o)->signatureAlgorithm,\
+                NULL,(o)->signature,&(o)->tbsResponseData,pkey,md)
+
+#  define OCSP_REQUEST_verify(a,r) ASN1_item_verify(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(OCSP_REQINFO),\
+        &(a)->optionalSignature->signatureAlgorithm,\
+        (a)->optionalSignature->signature,&(a)->tbsRequest,r)
+
+#  define OCSP_BASICRESP_verify(a,r,d) ASN1_item_verify(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(OCSP_RESPDATA),\
+        &(a)->signatureAlgorithm,(a)->signature,&(a)->tbsResponseData,r)
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_lib.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_lib.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8edd70a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_lib.c
@@ -0,0 +1,222 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
+#include "ocsp_lcl.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+
+/* Convert a certificate and its issuer to an OCSP_CERTID */
+
+OCSP_CERTID *OCSP_cert_to_id(const EVP_MD *dgst, const X509 *subject,
+                             const X509 *issuer)
+{
+    X509_NAME *iname;
+    const ASN1_INTEGER *serial;
+    ASN1_BIT_STRING *ikey;
+    if (!dgst)
+        dgst = EVP_sha1();
+    if (subject) {
+        iname = X509_get_issuer_name(subject);
+        serial = X509_get0_serialNumber(subject);
+    } else {
+        iname = X509_get_subject_name(issuer);
+        serial = NULL;
+    }
+    ikey = X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(issuer);
+    return OCSP_cert_id_new(dgst, iname, ikey, serial);
+}
+
+OCSP_CERTID *OCSP_cert_id_new(const EVP_MD *dgst,
+                              const X509_NAME *issuerName,
+                              const ASN1_BIT_STRING *issuerKey,
+                              const ASN1_INTEGER *serialNumber)
+{
+    int nid;
+    unsigned int i;
+    X509_ALGOR *alg;
+    OCSP_CERTID *cid = NULL;
+    unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+
+    if ((cid = OCSP_CERTID_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    alg = &cid->hashAlgorithm;
+    ASN1_OBJECT_free(alg->algorithm);
+    if ((nid = EVP_MD_type(dgst)) == NID_undef) {
+        OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CERT_ID_NEW, OCSP_R_UNKNOWN_NID);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if ((alg->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(nid)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if ((alg->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    alg->parameter->type = V_ASN1_NULL;
+
+    if (!X509_NAME_digest(issuerName, dgst, md, &i))
+        goto digerr;
+    if (!(ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(&cid->issuerNameHash, md, i)))
+        goto err;
+
+    /* Calculate the issuerKey hash, excluding tag and length */
+    if (!EVP_Digest(issuerKey->data, issuerKey->length, md, &i, dgst, NULL))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!(ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(&cid->issuerKeyHash, md, i)))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (serialNumber) {
+        if (ASN1_STRING_copy(&cid->serialNumber, serialNumber) == 0)
+            goto err;
+    }
+    return cid;
+ digerr:
+    OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CERT_ID_NEW, OCSP_R_DIGEST_ERR);
+ err:
+    OCSP_CERTID_free(cid);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+int OCSP_id_issuer_cmp(OCSP_CERTID *a, OCSP_CERTID *b)
+{
+    int ret;
+    ret = OBJ_cmp(a->hashAlgorithm.algorithm, b->hashAlgorithm.algorithm);
+    if (ret)
+        return ret;
+    ret = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(&a->issuerNameHash, &b->issuerNameHash);
+    if (ret)
+        return ret;
+    return ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(&a->issuerKeyHash, &b->issuerKeyHash);
+}
+
+int OCSP_id_cmp(OCSP_CERTID *a, OCSP_CERTID *b)
+{
+    int ret;
+    ret = OCSP_id_issuer_cmp(a, b);
+    if (ret)
+        return ret;
+    return ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(&a->serialNumber, &b->serialNumber);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Parse a URL and split it up into host, port and path components and
+ * whether it is SSL.
+ */
+
+int OCSP_parse_url(const char *url, char **phost, char **pport, char **ppath,
+                   int *pssl)
+{
+    char *p, *buf;
+
+    char *host, *port;
+
+    *phost = NULL;
+    *pport = NULL;
+    *ppath = NULL;
+
+    /* dup the buffer since we are going to mess with it */
+    buf = OPENSSL_strdup(url);
+    if (!buf)
+        goto mem_err;
+
+    /* Check for initial colon */
+    p = strchr(buf, ':');
+
+    if (!p)
+        goto parse_err;
+
+    *(p++) = '\0';
+
+    if (strcmp(buf, "http") == 0) {
+        *pssl = 0;
+        port = "80";
+    } else if (strcmp(buf, "https") == 0) {
+        *pssl = 1;
+        port = "443";
+    } else
+        goto parse_err;
+
+    /* Check for double slash */
+    if ((p[0] != '/') || (p[1] != '/'))
+        goto parse_err;
+
+    p += 2;
+
+    host = p;
+
+    /* Check for trailing part of path */
+
+    p = strchr(p, '/');
+
+    if (!p)
+        *ppath = OPENSSL_strdup("/");
+    else {
+        *ppath = OPENSSL_strdup(p);
+        /* Set start of path to 0 so hostname is valid */
+        *p = '\0';
+    }
+
+    if (!*ppath)
+        goto mem_err;
+
+    p = host;
+    if (host[0] == '[') {
+        /* ipv6 literal */
+        host++;
+        p = strchr(host, ']');
+        if (!p)
+            goto parse_err;
+        *p = '\0';
+        p++;
+    }
+
+    /* Look for optional ':' for port number */
+    if ((p = strchr(p, ':'))) {
+        *p = 0;
+        port = p + 1;
+    }
+
+    *pport = OPENSSL_strdup(port);
+    if (!*pport)
+        goto mem_err;
+
+    *phost = OPENSSL_strdup(host);
+
+    if (!*phost)
+        goto mem_err;
+
+    OPENSSL_free(buf);
+
+    return 1;
+
+ mem_err:
+    OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_PARSE_URL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    goto err;
+
+ parse_err:
+    OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_PARSE_URL, OCSP_R_ERROR_PARSING_URL);
+
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_free(buf);
+    OPENSSL_free(*ppath);
+    *ppath = NULL;
+    OPENSSL_free(*pport);
+    *pport = NULL;
+    OPENSSL_free(*phost);
+    *phost = NULL;
+    return 0;
+
+}
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(OCSP_CERTID)
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_prn.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_prn.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5605812
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_prn.c
@@ -0,0 +1,246 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
+#include "ocsp_lcl.h"
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+
+static int ocsp_certid_print(BIO *bp, OCSP_CERTID *a, int indent)
+{
+    BIO_printf(bp, "%*sCertificate ID:\n", indent, "");
+    indent += 2;
+    BIO_printf(bp, "%*sHash Algorithm: ", indent, "");
+    i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, a->hashAlgorithm.algorithm);
+    BIO_printf(bp, "\n%*sIssuer Name Hash: ", indent, "");
+    i2a_ASN1_STRING(bp, &a->issuerNameHash, 0);
+    BIO_printf(bp, "\n%*sIssuer Key Hash: ", indent, "");
+    i2a_ASN1_STRING(bp, &a->issuerKeyHash, 0);
+    BIO_printf(bp, "\n%*sSerial Number: ", indent, "");
+    i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(bp, &a->serialNumber);
+    BIO_printf(bp, "\n");
+    return 1;
+}
+
+typedef struct {
+    long t;
+    const char *m;
+} OCSP_TBLSTR;
+
+static const char *do_table2string(long s, const OCSP_TBLSTR *ts, size_t len)
+{
+    size_t i;
+    for (i = 0; i < len; i++, ts++)
+        if (ts->t == s)
+            return ts->m;
+    return "(UNKNOWN)";
+}
+
+#define table2string(s, tbl) do_table2string(s, tbl, OSSL_NELEM(tbl))
+
+const char *OCSP_response_status_str(long s)
+{
+    static const OCSP_TBLSTR rstat_tbl[] = {
+        {OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_SUCCESSFUL, "successful"},
+        {OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_MALFORMEDREQUEST, "malformedrequest"},
+        {OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_INTERNALERROR, "internalerror"},
+        {OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_TRYLATER, "trylater"},
+        {OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_SIGREQUIRED, "sigrequired"},
+        {OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_UNAUTHORIZED, "unauthorized"}
+    };
+    return table2string(s, rstat_tbl);
+}
+
+const char *OCSP_cert_status_str(long s)
+{
+    static const OCSP_TBLSTR cstat_tbl[] = {
+        {V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_GOOD, "good"},
+        {V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_REVOKED, "revoked"},
+        {V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_UNKNOWN, "unknown"}
+    };
+    return table2string(s, cstat_tbl);
+}
+
+const char *OCSP_crl_reason_str(long s)
+{
+    static const OCSP_TBLSTR reason_tbl[] = {
+        {OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_UNSPECIFIED, "unspecified"},
+        {OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_KEYCOMPROMISE, "keyCompromise"},
+        {OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_CACOMPROMISE, "cACompromise"},
+        {OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_AFFILIATIONCHANGED, "affiliationChanged"},
+        {OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_SUPERSEDED, "superseded"},
+        {OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_CESSATIONOFOPERATION, "cessationOfOperation"},
+        {OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_CERTIFICATEHOLD, "certificateHold"},
+        {OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_REMOVEFROMCRL, "removeFromCRL"}
+    };
+    return table2string(s, reason_tbl);
+}
+
+int OCSP_REQUEST_print(BIO *bp, OCSP_REQUEST *o, unsigned long flags)
+{
+    int i;
+    long l;
+    OCSP_CERTID *cid = NULL;
+    OCSP_ONEREQ *one = NULL;
+    OCSP_REQINFO *inf = &o->tbsRequest;
+    OCSP_SIGNATURE *sig = o->optionalSignature;
+
+    if (BIO_write(bp, "OCSP Request Data:\n", 19) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    l = ASN1_INTEGER_get(inf->version);
+    if (BIO_printf(bp, "    Version: %lu (0x%lx)", l + 1, l) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    if (inf->requestorName != NULL) {
+        if (BIO_write(bp, "\n    Requestor Name: ", 21) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+        GENERAL_NAME_print(bp, inf->requestorName);
+    }
+    if (BIO_write(bp, "\n    Requestor List:\n", 21) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_ONEREQ_num(inf->requestList); i++) {
+        one = sk_OCSP_ONEREQ_value(inf->requestList, i);
+        cid = one->reqCert;
+        ocsp_certid_print(bp, cid, 8);
+        if (!X509V3_extensions_print(bp,
+                                     "Request Single Extensions",
+                                     one->singleRequestExtensions, flags, 8))
+            goto err;
+    }
+    if (!X509V3_extensions_print(bp, "Request Extensions",
+                                 inf->requestExtensions, flags, 4))
+        goto err;
+    if (sig) {
+        X509_signature_print(bp, &sig->signatureAlgorithm, sig->signature);
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sig->certs); i++) {
+            X509_print(bp, sk_X509_value(sig->certs, i));
+            PEM_write_bio_X509(bp, sk_X509_value(sig->certs, i));
+        }
+    }
+    return 1;
+ err:
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int OCSP_RESPONSE_print(BIO *bp, OCSP_RESPONSE *o, unsigned long flags)
+{
+    int i, ret = 0;
+    long l;
+    OCSP_CERTID *cid = NULL;
+    OCSP_BASICRESP *br = NULL;
+    OCSP_RESPID *rid = NULL;
+    OCSP_RESPDATA *rd = NULL;
+    OCSP_CERTSTATUS *cst = NULL;
+    OCSP_REVOKEDINFO *rev = NULL;
+    OCSP_SINGLERESP *single = NULL;
+    OCSP_RESPBYTES *rb = o->responseBytes;
+
+    if (BIO_puts(bp, "OCSP Response Data:\n") <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    l = ASN1_ENUMERATED_get(o->responseStatus);
+    if (BIO_printf(bp, "    OCSP Response Status: %s (0x%lx)\n",
+                   OCSP_response_status_str(l), l) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    if (rb == NULL)
+        return 1;
+    if (BIO_puts(bp, "    Response Type: ") <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    if (i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, rb->responseType) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    if (OBJ_obj2nid(rb->responseType) != NID_id_pkix_OCSP_basic) {
+        BIO_puts(bp, " (unknown response type)\n");
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    if ((br = OCSP_response_get1_basic(o)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    rd = &br->tbsResponseData;
+    l = ASN1_INTEGER_get(rd->version);
+    if (BIO_printf(bp, "\n    Version: %lu (0x%lx)\n", l + 1, l) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    if (BIO_puts(bp, "    Responder Id: ") <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    rid = &rd->responderId;
+    switch (rid->type) {
+    case V_OCSP_RESPID_NAME:
+        X509_NAME_print_ex(bp, rid->value.byName, 0, XN_FLAG_ONELINE);
+        break;
+    case V_OCSP_RESPID_KEY:
+        i2a_ASN1_STRING(bp, rid->value.byKey, 0);
+        break;
+    }
+
+    if (BIO_printf(bp, "\n    Produced At: ") <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    if (!ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(bp, rd->producedAt))
+        goto err;
+    if (BIO_printf(bp, "\n    Responses:\n") <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_num(rd->responses); i++) {
+        if (!sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_value(rd->responses, i))
+            continue;
+        single = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_value(rd->responses, i);
+        cid = single->certId;
+        if (ocsp_certid_print(bp, cid, 4) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+        cst = single->certStatus;
+        if (BIO_printf(bp, "    Cert Status: %s",
+                       OCSP_cert_status_str(cst->type)) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+        if (cst->type == V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_REVOKED) {
+            rev = cst->value.revoked;
+            if (BIO_printf(bp, "\n    Revocation Time: ") <= 0)
+                goto err;
+            if (!ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(bp, rev->revocationTime))
+                goto err;
+            if (rev->revocationReason) {
+                l = ASN1_ENUMERATED_get(rev->revocationReason);
+                if (BIO_printf(bp,
+                               "\n    Revocation Reason: %s (0x%lx)",
+                               OCSP_crl_reason_str(l), l) <= 0)
+                    goto err;
+            }
+        }
+        if (BIO_printf(bp, "\n    This Update: ") <= 0)
+            goto err;
+        if (!ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(bp, single->thisUpdate))
+            goto err;
+        if (single->nextUpdate) {
+            if (BIO_printf(bp, "\n    Next Update: ") <= 0)
+                goto err;
+            if (!ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(bp, single->nextUpdate))
+                goto err;
+        }
+        if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+        if (!X509V3_extensions_print(bp,
+                                     "Response Single Extensions",
+                                     single->singleExtensions, flags, 8))
+            goto err;
+        if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+    }
+    if (!X509V3_extensions_print(bp, "Response Extensions",
+                                 rd->responseExtensions, flags, 4))
+        goto err;
+    if (X509_signature_print(bp, &br->signatureAlgorithm, br->signature) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(br->certs); i++) {
+        X509_print(bp, sk_X509_value(br->certs, i));
+        PEM_write_bio_X509(bp, sk_X509_value(br->certs, i));
+    }
+
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    OCSP_BASICRESP_free(br);
+    return ret;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_srv.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_srv.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..46a4bf7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_srv.c
@@ -0,0 +1,277 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
+#include "ocsp_lcl.h"
+
+/*
+ * Utility functions related to sending OCSP responses and extracting
+ * relevant information from the request.
+ */
+
+int OCSP_request_onereq_count(OCSP_REQUEST *req)
+{
+    return sk_OCSP_ONEREQ_num(req->tbsRequest.requestList);
+}
+
+OCSP_ONEREQ *OCSP_request_onereq_get0(OCSP_REQUEST *req, int i)
+{
+    return sk_OCSP_ONEREQ_value(req->tbsRequest.requestList, i);
+}
+
+OCSP_CERTID *OCSP_onereq_get0_id(OCSP_ONEREQ *one)
+{
+    return one->reqCert;
+}
+
+int OCSP_id_get0_info(ASN1_OCTET_STRING **piNameHash, ASN1_OBJECT **pmd,
+                      ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pikeyHash,
+                      ASN1_INTEGER **pserial, OCSP_CERTID *cid)
+{
+    if (!cid)
+        return 0;
+    if (pmd)
+        *pmd = cid->hashAlgorithm.algorithm;
+    if (piNameHash)
+        *piNameHash = &cid->issuerNameHash;
+    if (pikeyHash)
+        *pikeyHash = &cid->issuerKeyHash;
+    if (pserial)
+        *pserial = &cid->serialNumber;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int OCSP_request_is_signed(OCSP_REQUEST *req)
+{
+    if (req->optionalSignature)
+        return 1;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/* Create an OCSP response and encode an optional basic response */
+OCSP_RESPONSE *OCSP_response_create(int status, OCSP_BASICRESP *bs)
+{
+    OCSP_RESPONSE *rsp = NULL;
+
+    if ((rsp = OCSP_RESPONSE_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (!(ASN1_ENUMERATED_set(rsp->responseStatus, status)))
+        goto err;
+    if (!bs)
+        return rsp;
+    if ((rsp->responseBytes = OCSP_RESPBYTES_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    rsp->responseBytes->responseType = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_id_pkix_OCSP_basic);
+    if (!ASN1_item_pack
+        (bs, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(OCSP_BASICRESP), &rsp->responseBytes->response))
+         goto err;
+    return rsp;
+ err:
+    OCSP_RESPONSE_free(rsp);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+OCSP_SINGLERESP *OCSP_basic_add1_status(OCSP_BASICRESP *rsp,
+                                        OCSP_CERTID *cid,
+                                        int status, int reason,
+                                        ASN1_TIME *revtime,
+                                        ASN1_TIME *thisupd,
+                                        ASN1_TIME *nextupd)
+{
+    OCSP_SINGLERESP *single = NULL;
+    OCSP_CERTSTATUS *cs;
+    OCSP_REVOKEDINFO *ri;
+
+    if (rsp->tbsResponseData.responses == NULL
+        && (rsp->tbsResponseData.responses
+                = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_new_null()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if ((single = OCSP_SINGLERESP_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!ASN1_TIME_to_generalizedtime(thisupd, &single->thisUpdate))
+        goto err;
+    if (nextupd &&
+        !ASN1_TIME_to_generalizedtime(nextupd, &single->nextUpdate))
+        goto err;
+
+    OCSP_CERTID_free(single->certId);
+
+    if ((single->certId = OCSP_CERTID_dup(cid)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    cs = single->certStatus;
+    switch (cs->type = status) {
+    case V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_REVOKED:
+        if (!revtime) {
+            OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_ADD1_STATUS, OCSP_R_NO_REVOKED_TIME);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if ((cs->value.revoked = ri = OCSP_REVOKEDINFO_new()) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        if (!ASN1_TIME_to_generalizedtime(revtime, &ri->revocationTime))
+            goto err;
+        if (reason != OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_NOSTATUS) {
+            if ((ri->revocationReason = ASN1_ENUMERATED_new()) == NULL)
+                goto err;
+            if (!(ASN1_ENUMERATED_set(ri->revocationReason, reason)))
+                goto err;
+        }
+        break;
+
+    case V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_GOOD:
+        if ((cs->value.good = ASN1_NULL_new()) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        break;
+
+    case V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_UNKNOWN:
+        if ((cs->value.unknown = ASN1_NULL_new()) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        break;
+
+    default:
+        goto err;
+
+    }
+    if (!(sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_push(rsp->tbsResponseData.responses, single)))
+        goto err;
+    return single;
+ err:
+    OCSP_SINGLERESP_free(single);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+/* Add a certificate to an OCSP request */
+
+int OCSP_basic_add1_cert(OCSP_BASICRESP *resp, X509 *cert)
+{
+    if (resp->certs == NULL
+        && (resp->certs = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    if (!sk_X509_push(resp->certs, cert))
+        return 0;
+    X509_up_ref(cert);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int OCSP_basic_sign(OCSP_BASICRESP *brsp,
+                    X509 *signer, EVP_PKEY *key, const EVP_MD *dgst,
+                    STACK_OF(X509) *certs, unsigned long flags)
+{
+    int i;
+    OCSP_RESPID *rid;
+
+    if (!X509_check_private_key(signer, key)) {
+        OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_SIGN,
+                OCSP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DOES_NOT_MATCH_CERTIFICATE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!(flags & OCSP_NOCERTS)) {
+        if (!OCSP_basic_add1_cert(brsp, signer))
+            goto err;
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
+            X509 *tmpcert = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
+            if (!OCSP_basic_add1_cert(brsp, tmpcert))
+                goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    rid = &brsp->tbsResponseData.responderId;
+    if (flags & OCSP_RESPID_KEY) {
+        if (!OCSP_RESPID_set_by_key(rid, signer))
+            goto err;
+    } else if (!OCSP_RESPID_set_by_name(rid, signer)) {
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!(flags & OCSP_NOTIME) &&
+        !X509_gmtime_adj(brsp->tbsResponseData.producedAt, 0))
+        goto err;
+
+    /*
+     * Right now, I think that not doing double hashing is the right thing.
+     * -- Richard Levitte
+     */
+
+    if (!OCSP_BASICRESP_sign(brsp, key, dgst, 0))
+        goto err;
+
+    return 1;
+ err:
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int OCSP_RESPID_set_by_name(OCSP_RESPID *respid, X509 *cert)
+{
+    if (!X509_NAME_set(&respid->value.byName, X509_get_subject_name(cert)))
+        return 0;
+
+    respid->type = V_OCSP_RESPID_NAME;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int OCSP_RESPID_set_by_key(OCSP_RESPID *respid, X509 *cert)
+{
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *byKey = NULL;
+    unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+
+    /* RFC2560 requires SHA1 */
+    if (!X509_pubkey_digest(cert, EVP_sha1(), md, NULL))
+        return 0;
+
+    byKey = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
+    if (byKey == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    if (!(ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(byKey, md, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH))) {
+        ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(byKey);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    respid->type = V_OCSP_RESPID_KEY;
+    respid->value.byKey = byKey;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int OCSP_RESPID_match(OCSP_RESPID *respid, X509 *cert)
+{
+    if (respid->type == V_OCSP_RESPID_KEY) {
+        unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+
+        if (respid->value.byKey == NULL)
+            return 0;
+
+        /* RFC2560 requires SHA1 */
+        if (!X509_pubkey_digest(cert, EVP_sha1(), md, NULL))
+            return 0;
+
+        return (ASN1_STRING_length(respid->value.byKey) == SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH)
+            && (memcmp(ASN1_STRING_get0_data(respid->value.byKey), md,
+                       SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) == 0);
+    } else if(respid->type == V_OCSP_RESPID_NAME) {
+        if (respid->value.byName == NULL)
+            return 0;
+
+        return X509_NAME_cmp(respid->value.byName,
+                             X509_get_subject_name(cert)) == 0;
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9a8d343
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c
@@ -0,0 +1,435 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
+#include "ocsp_lcl.h"
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+static int ocsp_find_signer(X509 **psigner, OCSP_BASICRESP *bs,
+                            STACK_OF(X509) *certs, unsigned long flags);
+static X509 *ocsp_find_signer_sk(STACK_OF(X509) *certs, OCSP_RESPID *id);
+static int ocsp_check_issuer(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *chain);
+static int ocsp_check_ids(STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp,
+                          OCSP_CERTID **ret);
+static int ocsp_match_issuerid(X509 *cert, OCSP_CERTID *cid,
+                               STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp);
+static int ocsp_check_delegated(X509 *x);
+static int ocsp_req_find_signer(X509 **psigner, OCSP_REQUEST *req,
+                                X509_NAME *nm, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
+                                unsigned long flags);
+
+/* Verify a basic response message */
+
+int OCSP_basic_verify(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
+                      X509_STORE *st, unsigned long flags)
+{
+    X509 *signer, *x;
+    STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(X509) *untrusted = NULL;
+    X509_STORE_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+    int i, ret = ocsp_find_signer(&signer, bs, certs, flags);
+
+    if (!ret) {
+        OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY,
+                OCSP_R_SIGNER_CERTIFICATE_NOT_FOUND);
+        goto end;
+    }
+    ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+        OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+    if ((ret == 2) && (flags & OCSP_TRUSTOTHER))
+        flags |= OCSP_NOVERIFY;
+    if (!(flags & OCSP_NOSIGS)) {
+        EVP_PKEY *skey;
+        skey = X509_get0_pubkey(signer);
+        if (skey == NULL) {
+            OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, OCSP_R_NO_SIGNER_KEY);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        ret = OCSP_BASICRESP_verify(bs, skey, 0);
+        if (ret <= 0) {
+            OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, OCSP_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE);
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+    if (!(flags & OCSP_NOVERIFY)) {
+        int init_res;
+        if (flags & OCSP_NOCHAIN) {
+            untrusted = NULL;
+        } else if (bs->certs && certs) {
+            untrusted = sk_X509_dup(bs->certs);
+            for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
+                if (!sk_X509_push(untrusted, sk_X509_value(certs, i))) {
+                    OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                    goto f_err;
+                }
+            }
+        } else if (certs != NULL) {
+            untrusted = certs;
+        } else {
+            untrusted = bs->certs;
+        }
+        init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, st, signer, untrusted);
+        if (!init_res) {
+            OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+
+        X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(ctx, X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER);
+        ret = X509_verify_cert(ctx);
+        chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(ctx);
+        if (ret <= 0) {
+            i = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
+            OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY,
+                    OCSP_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR);
+            ERR_add_error_data(2, "Verify error:",
+                               X509_verify_cert_error_string(i));
+            goto end;
+        }
+        if (flags & OCSP_NOCHECKS) {
+            ret = 1;
+            goto end;
+        }
+        /*
+         * At this point we have a valid certificate chain need to verify it
+         * against the OCSP issuer criteria.
+         */
+        ret = ocsp_check_issuer(bs, chain);
+
+        /* If fatal error or valid match then finish */
+        if (ret != 0)
+            goto end;
+
+        /*
+         * Easy case: explicitly trusted. Get root CA and check for explicit
+         * trust
+         */
+        if (flags & OCSP_NOEXPLICIT)
+            goto end;
+
+        x = sk_X509_value(chain, sk_X509_num(chain) - 1);
+        if (X509_check_trust(x, NID_OCSP_sign, 0) != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED) {
+            OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, OCSP_R_ROOT_CA_NOT_TRUSTED);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        ret = 1;
+    }
+ end:
+    X509_STORE_CTX_free(ctx);
+    sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free);
+    if (bs->certs && certs)
+        sk_X509_free(untrusted);
+    return ret;
+
+ err:
+    ret = 0;
+    goto end;
+ f_err:
+    ret = -1;
+    goto end;
+}
+
+int OCSP_resp_get0_signer(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, X509 **signer,
+                          STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs)
+{
+    int ret;
+
+    ret = ocsp_find_signer(signer, bs, extra_certs, 0);
+    return (ret > 0) ? 1 : 0;
+}
+
+static int ocsp_find_signer(X509 **psigner, OCSP_BASICRESP *bs,
+                            STACK_OF(X509) *certs, unsigned long flags)
+{
+    X509 *signer;
+    OCSP_RESPID *rid = &bs->tbsResponseData.responderId;
+    if ((signer = ocsp_find_signer_sk(certs, rid))) {
+        *psigner = signer;
+        return 2;
+    }
+    if (!(flags & OCSP_NOINTERN) &&
+        (signer = ocsp_find_signer_sk(bs->certs, rid))) {
+        *psigner = signer;
+        return 1;
+    }
+    /* Maybe lookup from store if by subject name */
+
+    *psigner = NULL;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static X509 *ocsp_find_signer_sk(STACK_OF(X509) *certs, OCSP_RESPID *id)
+{
+    int i;
+    unsigned char tmphash[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH], *keyhash;
+    X509 *x;
+
+    /* Easy if lookup by name */
+    if (id->type == V_OCSP_RESPID_NAME)
+        return X509_find_by_subject(certs, id->value.byName);
+
+    /* Lookup by key hash */
+
+    /* If key hash isn't SHA1 length then forget it */
+    if (id->value.byKey->length != SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH)
+        return NULL;
+    keyhash = id->value.byKey->data;
+    /* Calculate hash of each key and compare */
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
+        x = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
+        X509_pubkey_digest(x, EVP_sha1(), tmphash, NULL);
+        if (!memcmp(keyhash, tmphash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH))
+            return x;
+    }
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+static int ocsp_check_issuer(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
+{
+    STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp;
+    X509 *signer, *sca;
+    OCSP_CERTID *caid = NULL;
+    int i;
+    sresp = bs->tbsResponseData.responses;
+
+    if (sk_X509_num(chain) <= 0) {
+        OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_ISSUER, OCSP_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_IN_CHAIN);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    /* See if the issuer IDs match. */
+    i = ocsp_check_ids(sresp, &caid);
+
+    /* If ID mismatch or other error then return */
+    if (i <= 0)
+        return i;
+
+    signer = sk_X509_value(chain, 0);
+    /* Check to see if OCSP responder CA matches request CA */
+    if (sk_X509_num(chain) > 1) {
+        sca = sk_X509_value(chain, 1);
+        i = ocsp_match_issuerid(sca, caid, sresp);
+        if (i < 0)
+            return i;
+        if (i) {
+            /* We have a match, if extensions OK then success */
+            if (ocsp_check_delegated(signer))
+                return 1;
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* Otherwise check if OCSP request signed directly by request CA */
+    return ocsp_match_issuerid(signer, caid, sresp);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check the issuer certificate IDs for equality. If there is a mismatch with
+ * the same algorithm then there's no point trying to match any certificates
+ * against the issuer. If the issuer IDs all match then we just need to check
+ * equality against one of them.
+ */
+
+static int ocsp_check_ids(STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp, OCSP_CERTID **ret)
+{
+    OCSP_CERTID *tmpid, *cid;
+    int i, idcount;
+
+    idcount = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_num(sresp);
+    if (idcount <= 0) {
+        OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_IDS,
+                OCSP_R_RESPONSE_CONTAINS_NO_REVOCATION_DATA);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    cid = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_value(sresp, 0)->certId;
+
+    *ret = NULL;
+
+    for (i = 1; i < idcount; i++) {
+        tmpid = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_value(sresp, i)->certId;
+        /* Check to see if IDs match */
+        if (OCSP_id_issuer_cmp(cid, tmpid)) {
+            /* If algorithm mismatch let caller deal with it */
+            if (OBJ_cmp(tmpid->hashAlgorithm.algorithm,
+                        cid->hashAlgorithm.algorithm))
+                return 2;
+            /* Else mismatch */
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* All IDs match: only need to check one ID */
+    *ret = cid;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int ocsp_match_issuerid(X509 *cert, OCSP_CERTID *cid,
+                               STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp)
+{
+    /* If only one ID to match then do it */
+    if (cid) {
+        const EVP_MD *dgst;
+        X509_NAME *iname;
+        int mdlen;
+        unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+        if ((dgst = EVP_get_digestbyobj(cid->hashAlgorithm.algorithm))
+                == NULL) {
+            OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_MATCH_ISSUERID,
+                    OCSP_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
+            return -1;
+        }
+
+        mdlen = EVP_MD_size(dgst);
+        if (mdlen < 0)
+            return -1;
+        if ((cid->issuerNameHash.length != mdlen) ||
+            (cid->issuerKeyHash.length != mdlen))
+            return 0;
+        iname = X509_get_subject_name(cert);
+        if (!X509_NAME_digest(iname, dgst, md, NULL))
+            return -1;
+        if (memcmp(md, cid->issuerNameHash.data, mdlen))
+            return 0;
+        X509_pubkey_digest(cert, dgst, md, NULL);
+        if (memcmp(md, cid->issuerKeyHash.data, mdlen))
+            return 0;
+
+        return 1;
+
+    } else {
+        /* We have to match the whole lot */
+        int i, ret;
+        OCSP_CERTID *tmpid;
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_num(sresp); i++) {
+            tmpid = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_value(sresp, i)->certId;
+            ret = ocsp_match_issuerid(cert, tmpid, NULL);
+            if (ret <= 0)
+                return ret;
+        }
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+}
+
+static int ocsp_check_delegated(X509 *x)
+{
+    if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE)
+        && (X509_get_extended_key_usage(x) & XKU_OCSP_SIGN))
+        return 1;
+    OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_DELEGATED, OCSP_R_MISSING_OCSPSIGNING_USAGE);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify an OCSP request. This is fortunately much easier than OCSP response
+ * verify. Just find the signers certificate and verify it against a given
+ * trust value.
+ */
+
+int OCSP_request_verify(OCSP_REQUEST *req, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
+                        X509_STORE *store, unsigned long flags)
+{
+    X509 *signer;
+    X509_NAME *nm;
+    GENERAL_NAME *gen;
+    int ret = 0;
+    X509_STORE_CTX *ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
+
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+        OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!req->optionalSignature) {
+        OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, OCSP_R_REQUEST_NOT_SIGNED);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    gen = req->tbsRequest.requestorName;
+    if (!gen || gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME) {
+        OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY,
+                OCSP_R_UNSUPPORTED_REQUESTORNAME_TYPE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    nm = gen->d.directoryName;
+    ret = ocsp_req_find_signer(&signer, req, nm, certs, flags);
+    if (ret <= 0) {
+        OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY,
+                OCSP_R_SIGNER_CERTIFICATE_NOT_FOUND);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if ((ret == 2) && (flags & OCSP_TRUSTOTHER))
+        flags |= OCSP_NOVERIFY;
+    if (!(flags & OCSP_NOSIGS)) {
+        EVP_PKEY *skey;
+        skey = X509_get0_pubkey(signer);
+        ret = OCSP_REQUEST_verify(req, skey);
+        if (ret <= 0) {
+            OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, OCSP_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+    if (!(flags & OCSP_NOVERIFY)) {
+        int init_res;
+        if (flags & OCSP_NOCHAIN)
+            init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, store, signer, NULL);
+        else
+            init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, store, signer,
+                                           req->optionalSignature->certs);
+        if (!init_res) {
+            OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(ctx, X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER);
+        X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(ctx, X509_TRUST_OCSP_REQUEST);
+        ret = X509_verify_cert(ctx);
+        if (ret <= 0) {
+            ret = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
+            OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY,
+                    OCSP_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR);
+            ERR_add_error_data(2, "Verify error:",
+                               X509_verify_cert_error_string(ret));
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+    ret = 1;
+    goto end;
+
+err:
+    ret = 0;
+end:
+    X509_STORE_CTX_free(ctx);
+    return ret;
+
+}
+
+static int ocsp_req_find_signer(X509 **psigner, OCSP_REQUEST *req,
+                                X509_NAME *nm, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
+                                unsigned long flags)
+{
+    X509 *signer;
+    if (!(flags & OCSP_NOINTERN)) {
+        signer = X509_find_by_subject(req->optionalSignature->certs, nm);
+        if (signer) {
+            *psigner = signer;
+            return 1;
+        }
+    }
+
+    signer = X509_find_by_subject(certs, nm);
+    if (signer) {
+        *psigner = signer;
+        return 2;
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ocsp/v3_ocsp.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ocsp/v3_ocsp.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2d425a8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ocsp/v3_ocsp.c
@@ -0,0 +1,264 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+# include <stdio.h>
+# include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+# include <openssl/conf.h>
+# include <openssl/asn1.h>
+# include <openssl/ocsp.h>
+# include "ocsp_lcl.h"
+# include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+# include "../x509v3/ext_dat.h"
+
+/*
+ * OCSP extensions and a couple of CRL entry extensions
+ */
+
+static int i2r_ocsp_crlid(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, void *nonce,
+                          BIO *out, int indent);
+static int i2r_ocsp_acutoff(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, void *nonce,
+                            BIO *out, int indent);
+static int i2r_object(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, void *obj, BIO *out,
+                      int indent);
+
+static void *ocsp_nonce_new(void);
+static int i2d_ocsp_nonce(void *a, unsigned char **pp);
+static void *d2i_ocsp_nonce(void *a, const unsigned char **pp, long length);
+static void ocsp_nonce_free(void *a);
+static int i2r_ocsp_nonce(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, void *nonce,
+                          BIO *out, int indent);
+
+static int i2r_ocsp_nocheck(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
+                            void *nocheck, BIO *out, int indent);
+static void *s2i_ocsp_nocheck(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
+                              X509V3_CTX *ctx, const char *str);
+static int i2r_ocsp_serviceloc(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, void *in,
+                               BIO *bp, int ind);
+
+const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_ocsp_crlid = {
+    NID_id_pkix_OCSP_CrlID, 0, ASN1_ITEM_ref(OCSP_CRLID),
+    0, 0, 0, 0,
+    0, 0,
+    0, 0,
+    i2r_ocsp_crlid, 0,
+    NULL
+};
+
+const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_ocsp_acutoff = {
+    NID_id_pkix_OCSP_archiveCutoff, 0, ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME),
+    0, 0, 0, 0,
+    0, 0,
+    0, 0,
+    i2r_ocsp_acutoff, 0,
+    NULL
+};
+
+const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_crl_invdate = {
+    NID_invalidity_date, 0, ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME),
+    0, 0, 0, 0,
+    0, 0,
+    0, 0,
+    i2r_ocsp_acutoff, 0,
+    NULL
+};
+
+const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_crl_hold = {
+    NID_hold_instruction_code, 0, ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_OBJECT),
+    0, 0, 0, 0,
+    0, 0,
+    0, 0,
+    i2r_object, 0,
+    NULL
+};
+
+const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_ocsp_nonce = {
+    NID_id_pkix_OCSP_Nonce, 0, NULL,
+    ocsp_nonce_new,
+    ocsp_nonce_free,
+    d2i_ocsp_nonce,
+    i2d_ocsp_nonce,
+    0, 0,
+    0, 0,
+    i2r_ocsp_nonce, 0,
+    NULL
+};
+
+const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_ocsp_nocheck = {
+    NID_id_pkix_OCSP_noCheck, 0, ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_NULL),
+    0, 0, 0, 0,
+    0, s2i_ocsp_nocheck,
+    0, 0,
+    i2r_ocsp_nocheck, 0,
+    NULL
+};
+
+const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_ocsp_serviceloc = {
+    NID_id_pkix_OCSP_serviceLocator, 0, ASN1_ITEM_ref(OCSP_SERVICELOC),
+    0, 0, 0, 0,
+    0, 0,
+    0, 0,
+    i2r_ocsp_serviceloc, 0,
+    NULL
+};
+
+static int i2r_ocsp_crlid(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, void *in, BIO *bp,
+                          int ind)
+{
+    OCSP_CRLID *a = in;
+    if (a->crlUrl) {
+        if (BIO_printf(bp, "%*scrlUrl: ", ind, "") <= 0)
+            goto err;
+        if (!ASN1_STRING_print(bp, (ASN1_STRING *)a->crlUrl))
+            goto err;
+        if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+    }
+    if (a->crlNum) {
+        if (BIO_printf(bp, "%*scrlNum: ", ind, "") <= 0)
+            goto err;
+        if (i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(bp, a->crlNum) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+        if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+    }
+    if (a->crlTime) {
+        if (BIO_printf(bp, "%*scrlTime: ", ind, "") <= 0)
+            goto err;
+        if (!ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(bp, a->crlTime))
+            goto err;
+        if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+    }
+    return 1;
+ err:
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int i2r_ocsp_acutoff(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, void *cutoff,
+                            BIO *bp, int ind)
+{
+    if (BIO_printf(bp, "%*s", ind, "") <= 0)
+        return 0;
+    if (!ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(bp, cutoff))
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int i2r_object(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, void *oid, BIO *bp,
+                      int ind)
+{
+    if (BIO_printf(bp, "%*s", ind, "") <= 0)
+        return 0;
+    if (i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, oid) <= 0)
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * OCSP nonce. This is needs special treatment because it doesn't have an
+ * ASN1 encoding at all: it just contains arbitrary data.
+ */
+
+static void *ocsp_nonce_new(void)
+{
+    return ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
+}
+
+static int i2d_ocsp_nonce(void *a, unsigned char **pp)
+{
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os = a;
+    if (pp) {
+        memcpy(*pp, os->data, os->length);
+        *pp += os->length;
+    }
+    return os->length;
+}
+
+static void *d2i_ocsp_nonce(void *a, const unsigned char **pp, long length)
+{
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os, **pos;
+    pos = a;
+    if (pos == NULL || *pos == NULL) {
+        os = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
+        if (os == NULL)
+            goto err;
+    } else {
+        os = *pos;
+    }
+    if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(os, *pp, length))
+        goto err;
+
+    *pp += length;
+
+    if (pos)
+        *pos = os;
+    return os;
+
+ err:
+    if ((pos == NULL) || (*pos != os))
+        ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os);
+    OCSPerr(OCSP_F_D2I_OCSP_NONCE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+static void ocsp_nonce_free(void *a)
+{
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(a);
+}
+
+static int i2r_ocsp_nonce(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, void *nonce,
+                          BIO *out, int indent)
+{
+    if (BIO_printf(out, "%*s", indent, "") <= 0)
+        return 0;
+    if (i2a_ASN1_STRING(out, nonce, V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING) <= 0)
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Nocheck is just a single NULL. Don't print anything and always set it */
+
+static int i2r_ocsp_nocheck(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, void *nocheck,
+                            BIO *out, int indent)
+{
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static void *s2i_ocsp_nocheck(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
+                              X509V3_CTX *ctx, const char *str)
+{
+    return ASN1_NULL_new();
+}
+
+static int i2r_ocsp_serviceloc(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, void *in,
+                               BIO *bp, int ind)
+{
+    int i;
+    OCSP_SERVICELOC *a = in;
+    ACCESS_DESCRIPTION *ad;
+
+    if (BIO_printf(bp, "%*sIssuer: ", ind, "") <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    if (X509_NAME_print_ex(bp, a->issuer, 0, XN_FLAG_ONELINE) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_num(a->locator); i++) {
+        ad = sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_value(a->locator, i);
+        if (BIO_printf(bp, "\n%*s", (2 * ind), "") <= 0)
+            goto err;
+        if (i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, ad->method) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+        if (BIO_puts(bp, " - ") <= 0)
+            goto err;
+        if (GENERAL_NAME_print(bp, ad->location) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+    }
+    return 1;
+ err:
+    return 0;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pariscid.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pariscid.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3d4a5f8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pariscid.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,263 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2009-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+$flavour = shift;
+$output = shift;
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+if ($flavour =~ /64/) {
+	$LEVEL		="2.0W";
+	$SIZE_T		=8;
+	$ST		="std";
+} else {
+	$LEVEL		="1.1";
+	$SIZE_T		=4;
+	$ST		="stw";
+}
+
+$rp="%r2";
+$sp="%r30";
+$rv="%r28";
+
+$code=<<___;
+	.LEVEL	$LEVEL
+	.SPACE	\$TEXT\$
+	.SUBSPA	\$CODE\$,QUAD=0,ALIGN=8,ACCESS=0x2C,CODE_ONLY
+
+	.EXPORT	OPENSSL_cpuid_setup,ENTRY
+	.ALIGN	8
+OPENSSL_cpuid_setup
+	.PROC
+	.CALLINFO	NO_CALLS
+	.ENTRY
+	bv	($rp)
+	.EXIT
+	nop
+	.PROCEND
+
+	.EXPORT	OPENSSL_rdtsc,ENTRY
+	.ALIGN	8
+OPENSSL_rdtsc
+	.PROC
+	.CALLINFO	NO_CALLS
+	.ENTRY
+	mfctl	%cr16,$rv
+	bv	($rp)
+	.EXIT
+	nop
+	.PROCEND
+
+	.EXPORT	OPENSSL_wipe_cpu,ENTRY
+	.ALIGN	8
+OPENSSL_wipe_cpu
+	.PROC
+	.CALLINFO	NO_CALLS
+	.ENTRY
+	xor		%r0,%r0,%r1
+	fcpy,dbl	%fr0,%fr4
+	xor		%r0,%r0,%r19
+	fcpy,dbl	%fr0,%fr5
+	xor		%r0,%r0,%r20
+	fcpy,dbl	%fr0,%fr6
+	xor		%r0,%r0,%r21
+	fcpy,dbl	%fr0,%fr7
+	xor		%r0,%r0,%r22
+	fcpy,dbl	%fr0,%fr8
+	xor		%r0,%r0,%r23
+	fcpy,dbl	%fr0,%fr9
+	xor		%r0,%r0,%r24
+	fcpy,dbl	%fr0,%fr10
+	xor		%r0,%r0,%r25
+	fcpy,dbl	%fr0,%fr11
+	xor		%r0,%r0,%r26
+	fcpy,dbl	%fr0,%fr22
+	xor		%r0,%r0,%r29
+	fcpy,dbl	%fr0,%fr23
+	xor		%r0,%r0,%r31
+	fcpy,dbl	%fr0,%fr24
+	fcpy,dbl	%fr0,%fr25
+	fcpy,dbl	%fr0,%fr26
+	fcpy,dbl	%fr0,%fr27
+	fcpy,dbl	%fr0,%fr28
+	fcpy,dbl	%fr0,%fr29
+	fcpy,dbl	%fr0,%fr30
+	fcpy,dbl	%fr0,%fr31
+	bv		($rp)
+	.EXIT
+	ldo		0($sp),$rv
+	.PROCEND
+___
+{
+my $inp="%r26";
+my $len="%r25";
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	.EXPORT	OPENSSL_cleanse,ENTRY,ARGW0=GR,ARGW1=GR
+	.ALIGN	8
+OPENSSL_cleanse
+	.PROC
+	.CALLINFO	NO_CALLS
+	.ENTRY
+	cmpib,*=	0,$len,L\$done
+	nop
+	cmpib,*>>=	15,$len,L\$ittle
+	ldi		$SIZE_T-1,%r1
+
+L\$align
+	and,*<>		$inp,%r1,%r28
+	b,n		L\$aligned
+	stb		%r0,0($inp)
+	ldo		-1($len),$len
+	b		L\$align
+	ldo		1($inp),$inp
+
+L\$aligned
+	andcm		$len,%r1,%r28
+L\$ot
+	$ST		%r0,0($inp)
+	addib,*<>	-$SIZE_T,%r28,L\$ot
+	ldo		$SIZE_T($inp),$inp
+
+	and,*<>		$len,%r1,$len
+	b,n		L\$done
+L\$ittle
+	stb		%r0,0($inp)
+	addib,*<>	-1,$len,L\$ittle
+	ldo		1($inp),$inp
+L\$done
+	bv		($rp)
+	.EXIT
+	nop
+	.PROCEND
+___
+}
+{
+my ($in1,$in2,$len)=("%r26","%r25","%r24");
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	.EXPORT	CRYPTO_memcmp,ENTRY,ARGW0=GR,ARGW1=GR,ARGW1=GR
+	.ALIGN	8
+CRYPTO_memcmp
+	.PROC
+	.CALLINFO	NO_CALLS
+	.ENTRY
+	cmpib,*=	0,$len,L\$no_data
+	xor		$rv,$rv,$rv
+
+L\$oop_cmp
+	ldb		0($in1),%r19
+	ldb		0($in2),%r20
+	ldo		1($in1),$in1
+	ldo		1($in2),$in2
+	xor		%r19,%r20,%r29
+	addib,*<>	-1,$len,L\$oop_cmp
+	or		%r29,$rv,$rv
+
+	sub		%r0,$rv,%r29
+	extru		%r29,0,1,$rv
+L\$no_data
+	bv		($rp)
+	.EXIT
+	nop
+	.PROCEND
+___
+}
+{
+my ($out,$cnt,$max)=("%r26","%r25","%r24");
+my ($tick,$lasttick)=("%r23","%r22");
+my ($diff,$lastdiff)=("%r21","%r20");
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	.EXPORT	OPENSSL_instrument_bus,ENTRY,ARGW0=GR,ARGW1=GR
+	.ALIGN	8
+OPENSSL_instrument_bus
+	.PROC
+	.CALLINFO	NO_CALLS
+	.ENTRY
+	copy		$cnt,$rv
+	mfctl		%cr16,$tick
+	copy		$tick,$lasttick
+	ldi		0,$diff
+
+	fdc		0($out)
+	ldw		0($out),$tick
+	add		$diff,$tick,$tick
+	stw		$tick,0($out)
+L\$oop
+	mfctl		%cr16,$tick
+	sub		$tick,$lasttick,$diff
+	copy		$tick,$lasttick
+
+	fdc		0($out)
+	ldw		0($out),$tick
+	add		$diff,$tick,$tick
+	stw		$tick,0($out)
+
+	addib,<>	-1,$cnt,L\$oop
+	addi		4,$out,$out
+
+	bv		($rp)
+	.EXIT
+	sub		$rv,$cnt,$rv
+	.PROCEND
+
+	.EXPORT	OPENSSL_instrument_bus2,ENTRY,ARGW0=GR,ARGW1=GR
+	.ALIGN	8
+OPENSSL_instrument_bus2
+	.PROC
+	.CALLINFO	NO_CALLS
+	.ENTRY
+	copy		$cnt,$rv
+	sub		%r0,$cnt,$cnt
+
+	mfctl		%cr16,$tick
+	copy		$tick,$lasttick
+	ldi		0,$diff
+
+	fdc		0($out)
+	ldw		0($out),$tick
+	add		$diff,$tick,$tick
+	stw		$tick,0($out)
+
+	mfctl		%cr16,$tick
+	sub		$tick,$lasttick,$diff
+	copy		$tick,$lasttick
+L\$oop2
+	copy		$diff,$lastdiff
+	fdc		0($out)
+	ldw		0($out),$tick
+	add		$diff,$tick,$tick
+	stw		$tick,0($out)
+
+	addib,=		-1,$max,L\$done2
+	nop
+
+	mfctl		%cr16,$tick
+	sub		$tick,$lasttick,$diff
+	copy		$tick,$lasttick
+	cmpclr,<>	$lastdiff,$diff,$tick
+	ldi		1,$tick
+
+	ldi		1,%r1
+	xor		%r1,$tick,$tick
+	addb,<>		$tick,$cnt,L\$oop2
+	shladd,l	$tick,2,$out,$out
+L\$done2
+	bv		($rp)
+	.EXIT
+	add		$rv,$cnt,$rv
+	.PROCEND
+___
+}
+$code =~ s/cmpib,\*/comib,/gm	if ($SIZE_T==4);
+$code =~ s/,\*/,/gm		if ($SIZE_T==4);
+$code =~ s/\bbv\b/bve/gm	if ($SIZE_T==8);
+print $code;
+close STDOUT;
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pem/build.info b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pem/build.info
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..357b328
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pem/build.info
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+LIBS=../../libcrypto
+SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
+        pem_sign.c pem_info.c pem_lib.c pem_all.c pem_err.c \
+        pem_x509.c pem_xaux.c pem_oth.c pem_pk8.c pem_pkey.c pvkfmt.c
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pem/pem_all.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pem/pem_all.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0e71813
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pem/pem_all.c
@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/pkcs7.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+static RSA *pkey_get_rsa(EVP_PKEY *key, RSA **rsa);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+static DSA *pkey_get_dsa(EVP_PKEY *key, DSA **dsa);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+static EC_KEY *pkey_get_eckey(EVP_PKEY *key, EC_KEY **eckey);
+#endif
+
+IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw(X509_REQ, X509_REQ, PEM_STRING_X509_REQ, X509_REQ)
+
+IMPLEMENT_PEM_write(X509_REQ_NEW, X509_REQ, PEM_STRING_X509_REQ_OLD, X509_REQ)
+IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw(X509_CRL, X509_CRL, PEM_STRING_X509_CRL, X509_CRL)
+IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw(PKCS7, PKCS7, PEM_STRING_PKCS7, PKCS7)
+
+IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw(NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE, NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE,
+                 PEM_STRING_X509, NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE)
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+/*
+ * We treat RSA or DSA private keys as a special case. For private keys we
+ * read in an EVP_PKEY structure with PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey() and extract
+ * the relevant private key: this means can handle "traditional" and PKCS#8
+ * formats transparently.
+ */
+static RSA *pkey_get_rsa(EVP_PKEY *key, RSA **rsa)
+{
+    RSA *rtmp;
+    if (!key)
+        return NULL;
+    rtmp = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(key);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(key);
+    if (!rtmp)
+        return NULL;
+    if (rsa) {
+        RSA_free(*rsa);
+        *rsa = rtmp;
+    }
+    return rtmp;
+}
+
+RSA *PEM_read_bio_RSAPrivateKey(BIO *bp, RSA **rsa, pem_password_cb *cb,
+                                void *u)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY *pktmp;
+    pktmp = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(bp, NULL, cb, u);
+    return pkey_get_rsa(pktmp, rsa);
+}
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+
+RSA *PEM_read_RSAPrivateKey(FILE *fp, RSA **rsa, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY *pktmp;
+    pktmp = PEM_read_PrivateKey(fp, NULL, cb, u);
+    return pkey_get_rsa(pktmp, rsa);
+}
+
+# endif
+
+IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_cb_const(RSAPrivateKey, RSA, PEM_STRING_RSA,
+                             RSAPrivateKey)
+
+
+IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw_const(RSAPublicKey, RSA, PEM_STRING_RSA_PUBLIC,
+                       RSAPublicKey) IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw(RSA_PUBKEY, RSA,
+                                                      PEM_STRING_PUBLIC,
+                                                      RSA_PUBKEY)
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+static DSA *pkey_get_dsa(EVP_PKEY *key, DSA **dsa)
+{
+    DSA *dtmp;
+    if (!key)
+        return NULL;
+    dtmp = EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA(key);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(key);
+    if (!dtmp)
+        return NULL;
+    if (dsa) {
+        DSA_free(*dsa);
+        *dsa = dtmp;
+    }
+    return dtmp;
+}
+
+DSA *PEM_read_bio_DSAPrivateKey(BIO *bp, DSA **dsa, pem_password_cb *cb,
+                                void *u)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY *pktmp;
+    pktmp = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(bp, NULL, cb, u);
+    return pkey_get_dsa(pktmp, dsa); /* will free pktmp */
+}
+
+IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_cb_const(DSAPrivateKey, DSA, PEM_STRING_DSA,
+                             DSAPrivateKey)
+    IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw(DSA_PUBKEY, DSA, PEM_STRING_PUBLIC, DSA_PUBKEY)
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+DSA *PEM_read_DSAPrivateKey(FILE *fp, DSA **dsa, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY *pktmp;
+    pktmp = PEM_read_PrivateKey(fp, NULL, cb, u);
+    return pkey_get_dsa(pktmp, dsa); /* will free pktmp */
+}
+
+# endif
+
+IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw_const(DSAparams, DSA, PEM_STRING_DSAPARAMS, DSAparams)
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+static EC_KEY *pkey_get_eckey(EVP_PKEY *key, EC_KEY **eckey)
+{
+    EC_KEY *dtmp;
+    if (!key)
+        return NULL;
+    dtmp = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(key);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(key);
+    if (!dtmp)
+        return NULL;
+    if (eckey) {
+        EC_KEY_free(*eckey);
+        *eckey = dtmp;
+    }
+    return dtmp;
+}
+
+EC_KEY *PEM_read_bio_ECPrivateKey(BIO *bp, EC_KEY **key, pem_password_cb *cb,
+                                  void *u)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY *pktmp;
+    pktmp = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(bp, NULL, cb, u);
+    return pkey_get_eckey(pktmp, key); /* will free pktmp */
+}
+
+IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw_const(ECPKParameters, EC_GROUP, PEM_STRING_ECPARAMETERS,
+                       ECPKParameters)
+
+
+IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_cb(ECPrivateKey, EC_KEY, PEM_STRING_ECPRIVATEKEY,
+                       ECPrivateKey)
+IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw(EC_PUBKEY, EC_KEY, PEM_STRING_PUBLIC, EC_PUBKEY)
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+EC_KEY *PEM_read_ECPrivateKey(FILE *fp, EC_KEY **eckey, pem_password_cb *cb,
+                              void *u)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY *pktmp;
+    pktmp = PEM_read_PrivateKey(fp, NULL, cb, u);
+    return pkey_get_eckey(pktmp, eckey); /* will free pktmp */
+}
+
+# endif
+
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+
+IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_const(DHparams, DH, PEM_STRING_DHPARAMS, DHparams)
+    IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_const(DHxparams, DH, PEM_STRING_DHXPARAMS, DHxparams)
+#endif
+IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw(PUBKEY, EVP_PKEY, PEM_STRING_PUBLIC, PUBKEY)
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pem/pem_err.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pem/pem_err.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f36d893
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pem/pem_err.c
@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+/*
+ * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+
+# define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PEM,func,0)
+# define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PEM,0,reason)
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA PEM_str_functs[] = {
+    {ERR_FUNC(PEM_F_B2I_DSS), "b2i_dss"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PEM_F_B2I_PVK_BIO), "b2i_PVK_bio"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PEM_F_B2I_RSA), "b2i_rsa"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PEM_F_CHECK_BITLEN_DSA), "check_bitlen_dsa"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PEM_F_CHECK_BITLEN_RSA), "check_bitlen_rsa"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PEM_F_D2I_PKCS8PRIVATEKEY_BIO), "d2i_PKCS8PrivateKey_bio"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PEM_F_D2I_PKCS8PRIVATEKEY_FP), "d2i_PKCS8PrivateKey_fp"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PEM_F_DO_B2I), "do_b2i"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PEM_F_DO_B2I_BIO), "do_b2i_bio"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PEM_F_DO_BLOB_HEADER), "do_blob_header"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PEM_F_DO_PK8PKEY), "do_pk8pkey"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PEM_F_DO_PK8PKEY_FP), "do_pk8pkey_fp"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PEM_F_DO_PVK_BODY), "do_PVK_body"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PEM_F_DO_PVK_HEADER), "do_PVK_header"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PEM_F_I2B_PVK), "i2b_PVK"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PEM_F_I2B_PVK_BIO), "i2b_PVK_bio"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PEM_F_LOAD_IV), "load_iv"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PEM_F_PEM_ASN1_READ), "PEM_ASN1_read"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PEM_F_PEM_ASN1_READ_BIO), "PEM_ASN1_read_bio"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PEM_F_PEM_ASN1_WRITE), "PEM_ASN1_write"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PEM_F_PEM_ASN1_WRITE_BIO), "PEM_ASN1_write_bio"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PEM_F_PEM_DEF_CALLBACK), "PEM_def_callback"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PEM_F_PEM_DO_HEADER), "PEM_do_header"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PEM_F_PEM_GET_EVP_CIPHER_INFO), "PEM_get_EVP_CIPHER_INFO"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PEM_F_PEM_READ), "PEM_read"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PEM_F_PEM_READ_BIO), "PEM_read_bio"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PEM_F_PEM_READ_BIO_DHPARAMS), "PEM_read_bio_DHparams"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PEM_F_PEM_READ_BIO_PARAMETERS), "PEM_read_bio_Parameters"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PEM_F_PEM_READ_BIO_PRIVATEKEY), "PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PEM_F_PEM_READ_DHPARAMS), "PEM_read_DHparams"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PEM_F_PEM_READ_PRIVATEKEY), "PEM_read_PrivateKey"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PEM_F_PEM_SIGNFINAL), "PEM_SignFinal"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PEM_F_PEM_WRITE), "PEM_write"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PEM_F_PEM_WRITE_BIO), "PEM_write_bio"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PEM_F_PEM_WRITE_PRIVATEKEY), "PEM_write_PrivateKey"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PEM_F_PEM_X509_INFO_READ), "PEM_X509_INFO_read"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PEM_F_PEM_X509_INFO_READ_BIO), "PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PEM_F_PEM_X509_INFO_WRITE_BIO), "PEM_X509_INFO_write_bio"},
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA PEM_str_reasons[] = {
+    {ERR_REASON(PEM_R_BAD_BASE64_DECODE), "bad base64 decode"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PEM_R_BAD_DECRYPT), "bad decrypt"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PEM_R_BAD_END_LINE), "bad end line"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PEM_R_BAD_IV_CHARS), "bad iv chars"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PEM_R_BAD_MAGIC_NUMBER), "bad magic number"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PEM_R_BAD_PASSWORD_READ), "bad password read"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PEM_R_BAD_VERSION_NUMBER), "bad version number"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PEM_R_BIO_WRITE_FAILURE), "bio write failure"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PEM_R_CIPHER_IS_NULL), "cipher is null"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PEM_R_ERROR_CONVERTING_PRIVATE_KEY),
+     "error converting private key"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PEM_R_EXPECTING_PRIVATE_KEY_BLOB),
+     "expecting private key blob"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PEM_R_EXPECTING_PUBLIC_KEY_BLOB),
+     "expecting public key blob"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PEM_R_HEADER_TOO_LONG), "header too long"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PEM_R_INCONSISTENT_HEADER), "inconsistent header"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PEM_R_KEYBLOB_HEADER_PARSE_ERROR),
+     "keyblob header parse error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PEM_R_KEYBLOB_TOO_SHORT), "keyblob too short"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PEM_R_MISSING_DEK_IV), "missing dek iv"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PEM_R_NOT_DEK_INFO), "not dek info"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PEM_R_NOT_ENCRYPTED), "not encrypted"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PEM_R_NOT_PROC_TYPE), "not proc type"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PEM_R_NO_START_LINE), "no start line"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PEM_R_PROBLEMS_GETTING_PASSWORD),
+     "problems getting password"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PEM_R_PVK_DATA_TOO_SHORT), "pvk data too short"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PEM_R_PVK_TOO_SHORT), "pvk too short"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PEM_R_READ_KEY), "read key"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PEM_R_SHORT_HEADER), "short header"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PEM_R_UNEXPECTED_DEK_IV), "unexpected dek iv"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PEM_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER), "unsupported cipher"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PEM_R_UNSUPPORTED_ENCRYPTION), "unsupported encryption"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PEM_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_COMPONENTS),
+     "unsupported key components"},
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+
+#endif
+
+int ERR_load_PEM_strings(void)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+
+    if (ERR_func_error_string(PEM_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) {
+        ERR_load_strings(0, PEM_str_functs);
+        ERR_load_strings(0, PEM_str_reasons);
+    }
+#endif
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pem/pem_info.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pem/pem_info.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..78d4476
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pem/pem_info.c
@@ -0,0 +1,334 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *PEM_X509_INFO_read(FILE *fp, STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *sk,
+                                        pem_password_cb *cb, void *u)
+{
+    BIO *b;
+    STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *ret;
+
+    if ((b = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL) {
+        PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_X509_INFO_READ, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+        return (0);
+    }
+    BIO_set_fp(b, fp, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+    ret = PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(b, sk, cb, u);
+    BIO_free(b);
+    return (ret);
+}
+#endif
+
+STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(BIO *bp, STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *sk,
+                                            pem_password_cb *cb, void *u)
+{
+    X509_INFO *xi = NULL;
+    char *name = NULL, *header = NULL;
+    void *pp;
+    unsigned char *data = NULL;
+    const unsigned char *p;
+    long len, error = 0;
+    int ok = 0;
+    STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *ret = NULL;
+    unsigned int i, raw, ptype;
+    d2i_of_void *d2i = 0;
+
+    if (sk == NULL) {
+        if ((ret = sk_X509_INFO_new_null()) == NULL) {
+            PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_X509_INFO_READ_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    } else
+        ret = sk;
+
+    if ((xi = X509_INFO_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    for (;;) {
+        raw = 0;
+        ptype = 0;
+        i = PEM_read_bio(bp, &name, &header, &data, &len);
+        if (i == 0) {
+            error = ERR_GET_REASON(ERR_peek_last_error());
+            if (error == PEM_R_NO_START_LINE) {
+                ERR_clear_error();
+                break;
+            }
+            goto err;
+        }
+ start:
+        if ((strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_X509) == 0) ||
+            (strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_X509_OLD) == 0)) {
+            d2i = (D2I_OF(void)) d2i_X509;
+            if (xi->x509 != NULL) {
+                if (!sk_X509_INFO_push(ret, xi))
+                    goto err;
+                if ((xi = X509_INFO_new()) == NULL)
+                    goto err;
+                goto start;
+            }
+            pp = &(xi->x509);
+        } else if ((strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_X509_TRUSTED) == 0)) {
+            d2i = (D2I_OF(void)) d2i_X509_AUX;
+            if (xi->x509 != NULL) {
+                if (!sk_X509_INFO_push(ret, xi))
+                    goto err;
+                if ((xi = X509_INFO_new()) == NULL)
+                    goto err;
+                goto start;
+            }
+            pp = &(xi->x509);
+        } else if (strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_X509_CRL) == 0) {
+            d2i = (D2I_OF(void)) d2i_X509_CRL;
+            if (xi->crl != NULL) {
+                if (!sk_X509_INFO_push(ret, xi))
+                    goto err;
+                if ((xi = X509_INFO_new()) == NULL)
+                    goto err;
+                goto start;
+            }
+            pp = &(xi->crl);
+        } else
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+        if (strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_RSA) == 0) {
+            d2i = (D2I_OF(void)) d2i_RSAPrivateKey;
+            if (xi->x_pkey != NULL) {
+                if (!sk_X509_INFO_push(ret, xi))
+                    goto err;
+                if ((xi = X509_INFO_new()) == NULL)
+                    goto err;
+                goto start;
+            }
+
+            xi->enc_data = NULL;
+            xi->enc_len = 0;
+
+            xi->x_pkey = X509_PKEY_new();
+            if (xi->x_pkey == NULL)
+                goto err;
+            ptype = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
+            pp = &xi->x_pkey->dec_pkey;
+            if ((int)strlen(header) > 10) /* assume encrypted */
+                raw = 1;
+        } else
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+        if (strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_DSA) == 0) {
+            d2i = (D2I_OF(void)) d2i_DSAPrivateKey;
+            if (xi->x_pkey != NULL) {
+                if (!sk_X509_INFO_push(ret, xi))
+                    goto err;
+                if ((xi = X509_INFO_new()) == NULL)
+                    goto err;
+                goto start;
+            }
+
+            xi->enc_data = NULL;
+            xi->enc_len = 0;
+
+            xi->x_pkey = X509_PKEY_new();
+            if (xi->x_pkey == NULL)
+                goto err;
+            ptype = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
+            pp = &xi->x_pkey->dec_pkey;
+            if ((int)strlen(header) > 10) /* assume encrypted */
+                raw = 1;
+        } else
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+        if (strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_ECPRIVATEKEY) == 0) {
+            d2i = (D2I_OF(void)) d2i_ECPrivateKey;
+            if (xi->x_pkey != NULL) {
+                if (!sk_X509_INFO_push(ret, xi))
+                    goto err;
+                if ((xi = X509_INFO_new()) == NULL)
+                    goto err;
+                goto start;
+            }
+
+            xi->enc_data = NULL;
+            xi->enc_len = 0;
+
+            xi->x_pkey = X509_PKEY_new();
+            if (xi->x_pkey == NULL)
+                goto err;
+            ptype = EVP_PKEY_EC;
+            pp = &xi->x_pkey->dec_pkey;
+            if ((int)strlen(header) > 10) /* assume encrypted */
+                raw = 1;
+        } else
+#endif
+        {
+            d2i = NULL;
+            pp = NULL;
+        }
+
+        if (d2i != NULL) {
+            if (!raw) {
+                EVP_CIPHER_INFO cipher;
+
+                if (!PEM_get_EVP_CIPHER_INFO(header, &cipher))
+                    goto err;
+                if (!PEM_do_header(&cipher, data, &len, cb, u))
+                    goto err;
+                p = data;
+                if (ptype) {
+                    if (!d2i_PrivateKey(ptype, pp, &p, len)) {
+                        PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_X509_INFO_READ_BIO, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+                        goto err;
+                    }
+                } else if (d2i(pp, &p, len) == NULL) {
+                    PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_X509_INFO_READ_BIO, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+                    goto err;
+                }
+            } else {            /* encrypted RSA data */
+                if (!PEM_get_EVP_CIPHER_INFO(header, &xi->enc_cipher))
+                    goto err;
+                xi->enc_data = (char *)data;
+                xi->enc_len = (int)len;
+                data = NULL;
+            }
+        } else {
+            /* unknown */
+        }
+        OPENSSL_free(name);
+        name = NULL;
+        OPENSSL_free(header);
+        header = NULL;
+        OPENSSL_free(data);
+        data = NULL;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * if the last one hasn't been pushed yet and there is anything in it
+     * then add it to the stack ...
+     */
+    if ((xi->x509 != NULL) || (xi->crl != NULL) ||
+        (xi->x_pkey != NULL) || (xi->enc_data != NULL)) {
+        if (!sk_X509_INFO_push(ret, xi))
+            goto err;
+        xi = NULL;
+    }
+    ok = 1;
+ err:
+    X509_INFO_free(xi);
+    if (!ok) {
+        for (i = 0; ((int)i) < sk_X509_INFO_num(ret); i++) {
+            xi = sk_X509_INFO_value(ret, i);
+            X509_INFO_free(xi);
+        }
+        if (ret != sk)
+            sk_X509_INFO_free(ret);
+        ret = NULL;
+    }
+
+    OPENSSL_free(name);
+    OPENSSL_free(header);
+    OPENSSL_free(data);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+/* A TJH addition */
+int PEM_X509_INFO_write_bio(BIO *bp, X509_INFO *xi, EVP_CIPHER *enc,
+                            unsigned char *kstr, int klen,
+                            pem_password_cb *cb, void *u)
+{
+    int i, ret = 0;
+    unsigned char *data = NULL;
+    const char *objstr = NULL;
+    char buf[PEM_BUFSIZE];
+    unsigned char *iv = NULL;
+
+    if (enc != NULL) {
+        objstr = OBJ_nid2sn(EVP_CIPHER_nid(enc));
+        if (objstr == NULL) {
+            PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_X509_INFO_WRITE_BIO, PEM_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * now for the fun part ... if we have a private key then we have to be
+     * able to handle a not-yet-decrypted key being written out correctly ...
+     * if it is decrypted or it is non-encrypted then we use the base code
+     */
+    if (xi->x_pkey != NULL) {
+        if ((xi->enc_data != NULL) && (xi->enc_len > 0)) {
+            if (enc == NULL) {
+                PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_X509_INFO_WRITE_BIO, PEM_R_CIPHER_IS_NULL);
+                goto err;
+            }
+
+            /* copy from weirdo names into more normal things */
+            iv = xi->enc_cipher.iv;
+            data = (unsigned char *)xi->enc_data;
+            i = xi->enc_len;
+
+            /*
+             * we take the encryption data from the internal stuff rather
+             * than what the user has passed us ... as we have to match
+             * exactly for some strange reason
+             */
+            objstr = OBJ_nid2sn(EVP_CIPHER_nid(xi->enc_cipher.cipher));
+            if (objstr == NULL) {
+                PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_X509_INFO_WRITE_BIO,
+                       PEM_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER);
+                goto err;
+            }
+
+            /* create the right magic header stuff */
+            OPENSSL_assert(strlen(objstr) + 23
+                           + 2 * EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc) + 13 <=
+                           sizeof(buf));
+            buf[0] = '\0';
+            PEM_proc_type(buf, PEM_TYPE_ENCRYPTED);
+            PEM_dek_info(buf, objstr, EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc),
+                         (char *)iv);
+
+            /* use the normal code to write things out */
+            i = PEM_write_bio(bp, PEM_STRING_RSA, buf, data, i);
+            if (i <= 0)
+                goto err;
+        } else {
+            /* Add DSA/DH */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+            /* normal optionally encrypted stuff */
+            if (PEM_write_bio_RSAPrivateKey(bp,
+                                            EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(xi->x_pkey->dec_pkey),
+                                            enc, kstr, klen, cb, u) <= 0)
+                goto err;
+#endif
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* if we have a certificate then write it out now */
+    if ((xi->x509 != NULL) && (PEM_write_bio_X509(bp, xi->x509) <= 0))
+        goto err;
+
+    /*
+     * we are ignoring anything else that is loaded into the X509_INFO
+     * structure for the moment ... as I don't need it so I'm not coding it
+     * here and Eric can do it when this makes it into the base library --tjh
+     */
+
+    ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, PEM_BUFSIZE);
+    return (ret);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e9202f4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c
@@ -0,0 +1,857 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
+#include "internal/asn1_int.h"
+#include <openssl/des.h>
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+
+#define MIN_LENGTH      4
+
+static int load_iv(char **fromp, unsigned char *to, int num);
+static int check_pem(const char *nm, const char *name);
+int pem_check_suffix(const char *pem_str, const char *suffix);
+
+int PEM_def_callback(char *buf, int num, int w, void *key)
+{
+#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_STDIO) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_UI)
+    int i;
+#else
+    int i, j;
+    const char *prompt;
+#endif
+
+    if (key) {
+        i = strlen(key);
+        i = (i > num) ? num : i;
+        memcpy(buf, key, i);
+        return i;
+    }
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_STDIO) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_UI)
+    PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_DEF_CALLBACK, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+    return -1;
+#else
+    prompt = EVP_get_pw_prompt();
+    if (prompt == NULL)
+        prompt = "Enter PEM pass phrase:";
+
+    for (;;) {
+        /*
+         * We assume that w == 0 means decryption,
+         * while w == 1 means encryption
+         */
+        int min_len = w ? MIN_LENGTH : 0;
+
+        i = EVP_read_pw_string_min(buf, min_len, num, prompt, w);
+        if (i != 0) {
+            PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_DEF_CALLBACK, PEM_R_PROBLEMS_GETTING_PASSWORD);
+            memset(buf, 0, (unsigned int)num);
+            return -1;
+        }
+        j = strlen(buf);
+        if (min_len && j < min_len) {
+            fprintf(stderr,
+                    "phrase is too short, needs to be at least %d chars\n",
+                    min_len);
+        } else
+            break;
+    }
+    return j;
+#endif
+}
+
+void PEM_proc_type(char *buf, int type)
+{
+    const char *str;
+
+    if (type == PEM_TYPE_ENCRYPTED)
+        str = "ENCRYPTED";
+    else if (type == PEM_TYPE_MIC_CLEAR)
+        str = "MIC-CLEAR";
+    else if (type == PEM_TYPE_MIC_ONLY)
+        str = "MIC-ONLY";
+    else
+        str = "BAD-TYPE";
+
+    OPENSSL_strlcat(buf, "Proc-Type: 4,", PEM_BUFSIZE);
+    OPENSSL_strlcat(buf, str, PEM_BUFSIZE);
+    OPENSSL_strlcat(buf, "\n", PEM_BUFSIZE);
+}
+
+void PEM_dek_info(char *buf, const char *type, int len, char *str)
+{
+    static const unsigned char map[17] = "0123456789ABCDEF";
+    long i;
+    int j;
+
+    OPENSSL_strlcat(buf, "DEK-Info: ", PEM_BUFSIZE);
+    OPENSSL_strlcat(buf, type, PEM_BUFSIZE);
+    OPENSSL_strlcat(buf, ",", PEM_BUFSIZE);
+    j = strlen(buf);
+    if (j + (len * 2) + 1 > PEM_BUFSIZE)
+        return;
+    for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+        buf[j + i * 2] = map[(str[i] >> 4) & 0x0f];
+        buf[j + i * 2 + 1] = map[(str[i]) & 0x0f];
+    }
+    buf[j + i * 2] = '\n';
+    buf[j + i * 2 + 1] = '\0';
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+void *PEM_ASN1_read(d2i_of_void *d2i, const char *name, FILE *fp, void **x,
+                    pem_password_cb *cb, void *u)
+{
+    BIO *b;
+    void *ret;
+
+    if ((b = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL) {
+        PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_ASN1_READ, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+        return (0);
+    }
+    BIO_set_fp(b, fp, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+    ret = PEM_ASN1_read_bio(d2i, name, b, x, cb, u);
+    BIO_free(b);
+    return (ret);
+}
+#endif
+
+static int check_pem(const char *nm, const char *name)
+{
+    /* Normal matching nm and name */
+    if (strcmp(nm, name) == 0)
+        return 1;
+
+    /* Make PEM_STRING_EVP_PKEY match any private key */
+
+    if (strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_EVP_PKEY) == 0) {
+        int slen;
+        const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth;
+        if (strcmp(nm, PEM_STRING_PKCS8) == 0)
+            return 1;
+        if (strcmp(nm, PEM_STRING_PKCS8INF) == 0)
+            return 1;
+        slen = pem_check_suffix(nm, "PRIVATE KEY");
+        if (slen > 0) {
+            /*
+             * NB: ENGINE implementations won't contain a deprecated old
+             * private key decode function so don't look for them.
+             */
+            ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str(NULL, nm, slen);
+            if (ameth && ameth->old_priv_decode)
+                return 1;
+        }
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_PARAMETERS) == 0) {
+        int slen;
+        const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth;
+        slen = pem_check_suffix(nm, "PARAMETERS");
+        if (slen > 0) {
+            ENGINE *e;
+            ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str(&e, nm, slen);
+            if (ameth) {
+                int r;
+                if (ameth->param_decode)
+                    r = 1;
+                else
+                    r = 0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+                ENGINE_finish(e);
+#endif
+                return r;
+            }
+        }
+        return 0;
+    }
+    /* If reading DH parameters handle X9.42 DH format too */
+    if (strcmp(nm, PEM_STRING_DHXPARAMS) == 0
+        && strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_DHPARAMS) == 0)
+        return 1;
+
+    /* Permit older strings */
+
+    if (strcmp(nm, PEM_STRING_X509_OLD) == 0
+        && strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_X509) == 0)
+        return 1;
+
+    if (strcmp(nm, PEM_STRING_X509_REQ_OLD) == 0
+        && strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_X509_REQ) == 0)
+        return 1;
+
+    /* Allow normal certs to be read as trusted certs */
+    if (strcmp(nm, PEM_STRING_X509) == 0
+        && strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_X509_TRUSTED) == 0)
+        return 1;
+
+    if (strcmp(nm, PEM_STRING_X509_OLD) == 0
+        && strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_X509_TRUSTED) == 0)
+        return 1;
+
+    /* Some CAs use PKCS#7 with CERTIFICATE headers */
+    if (strcmp(nm, PEM_STRING_X509) == 0
+        && strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_PKCS7) == 0)
+        return 1;
+
+    if (strcmp(nm, PEM_STRING_PKCS7_SIGNED) == 0
+        && strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_PKCS7) == 0)
+        return 1;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
+    if (strcmp(nm, PEM_STRING_X509) == 0
+        && strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_CMS) == 0)
+        return 1;
+    /* Allow CMS to be read from PKCS#7 headers */
+    if (strcmp(nm, PEM_STRING_PKCS7) == 0
+        && strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_CMS) == 0)
+        return 1;
+#endif
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int PEM_bytes_read_bio(unsigned char **pdata, long *plen, char **pnm,
+                       const char *name, BIO *bp, pem_password_cb *cb,
+                       void *u)
+{
+    EVP_CIPHER_INFO cipher;
+    char *nm = NULL, *header = NULL;
+    unsigned char *data = NULL;
+    long len;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    for (;;) {
+        if (!PEM_read_bio(bp, &nm, &header, &data, &len)) {
+            if (ERR_GET_REASON(ERR_peek_error()) == PEM_R_NO_START_LINE)
+                ERR_add_error_data(2, "Expecting: ", name);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        if (check_pem(nm, name))
+            break;
+        OPENSSL_free(nm);
+        OPENSSL_free(header);
+        OPENSSL_free(data);
+    }
+    if (!PEM_get_EVP_CIPHER_INFO(header, &cipher))
+        goto err;
+    if (!PEM_do_header(&cipher, data, &len, cb, u))
+        goto err;
+
+    *pdata = data;
+    *plen = len;
+
+    if (pnm)
+        *pnm = nm;
+
+    ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+    if (!ret || !pnm)
+        OPENSSL_free(nm);
+    OPENSSL_free(header);
+    if (!ret)
+        OPENSSL_free(data);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+int PEM_ASN1_write(i2d_of_void *i2d, const char *name, FILE *fp,
+                   void *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, unsigned char *kstr,
+                   int klen, pem_password_cb *callback, void *u)
+{
+    BIO *b;
+    int ret;
+
+    if ((b = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL) {
+        PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_ASN1_WRITE, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+        return (0);
+    }
+    BIO_set_fp(b, fp, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+    ret = PEM_ASN1_write_bio(i2d, name, b, x, enc, kstr, klen, callback, u);
+    BIO_free(b);
+    return (ret);
+}
+#endif
+
+int PEM_ASN1_write_bio(i2d_of_void *i2d, const char *name, BIO *bp,
+                       void *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, unsigned char *kstr,
+                       int klen, pem_password_cb *callback, void *u)
+{
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+    int dsize = 0, i = 0, j = 0, ret = 0;
+    unsigned char *p, *data = NULL;
+    const char *objstr = NULL;
+    char buf[PEM_BUFSIZE];
+    unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
+    unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+
+    if (enc != NULL) {
+        objstr = OBJ_nid2sn(EVP_CIPHER_nid(enc));
+        if (objstr == NULL || EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc) == 0) {
+            PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_ASN1_WRITE_BIO, PEM_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if ((dsize = i2d(x, NULL)) < 0) {
+        PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_ASN1_WRITE_BIO, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+        dsize = 0;
+        goto err;
+    }
+    /* dsize + 8 bytes are needed */
+    /* actually it needs the cipher block size extra... */
+    data = OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)dsize + 20);
+    if (data == NULL) {
+        PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_ASN1_WRITE_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    p = data;
+    i = i2d(x, &p);
+
+    if (enc != NULL) {
+        if (kstr == NULL) {
+            if (callback == NULL)
+                klen = PEM_def_callback(buf, PEM_BUFSIZE, 1, u);
+            else
+                klen = (*callback) (buf, PEM_BUFSIZE, 1, u);
+            if (klen <= 0) {
+                PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_ASN1_WRITE_BIO, PEM_R_READ_KEY);
+                goto err;
+            }
+#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+            /* Convert the pass phrase from EBCDIC */
+            ebcdic2ascii(buf, buf, klen);
+#endif
+            kstr = (unsigned char *)buf;
+        }
+        RAND_add(data, i, 0);   /* put in the RSA key. */
+        OPENSSL_assert(EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc) <= (int)sizeof(iv));
+        if (RAND_bytes(iv, EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc)) <= 0) /* Generate a salt */
+            goto err;
+        /*
+         * The 'iv' is used as the iv and as a salt.  It is NOT taken from
+         * the BytesToKey function
+         */
+        if (!EVP_BytesToKey(enc, EVP_md5(), iv, kstr, klen, 1, key, NULL))
+            goto err;
+
+        if (kstr == (unsigned char *)buf)
+            OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, PEM_BUFSIZE);
+
+        OPENSSL_assert(strlen(objstr) + 23 + 2 * EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc) + 13
+                       <= sizeof(buf));
+
+        buf[0] = '\0';
+        PEM_proc_type(buf, PEM_TYPE_ENCRYPTED);
+        PEM_dek_info(buf, objstr, EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc), (char *)iv);
+        /* k=strlen(buf); */
+
+        ret = 1;
+        if ((ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL
+            || !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, enc, NULL, key, iv)
+            || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, data, &j, data, i)
+            || !EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, &(data[j]), &i))
+            ret = 0;
+        if (ret == 0)
+            goto err;
+        i += j;
+    } else {
+        ret = 1;
+        buf[0] = '\0';
+    }
+    i = PEM_write_bio(bp, name, buf, data, i);
+    if (i <= 0)
+        ret = 0;
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(key, sizeof(key));
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(iv, sizeof(iv));
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, PEM_BUFSIZE);
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(data, (unsigned int)dsize);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+int PEM_do_header(EVP_CIPHER_INFO *cipher, unsigned char *data, long *plen,
+                  pem_password_cb *callback, void *u)
+{
+    int ok;
+    int keylen;
+    long len = *plen;
+    int ilen = (int) len;       /* EVP_DecryptUpdate etc. take int lengths */
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
+    unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
+    char buf[PEM_BUFSIZE];
+
+#if LONG_MAX > INT_MAX
+    /* Check that we did not truncate the length */
+    if (len > INT_MAX) {
+        PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_DO_HEADER, PEM_R_HEADER_TOO_LONG);
+        return 0;
+    }
+#endif
+
+    if (cipher->cipher == NULL)
+        return 1;
+    if (callback == NULL)
+        keylen = PEM_def_callback(buf, PEM_BUFSIZE, 0, u);
+    else
+        keylen = callback(buf, PEM_BUFSIZE, 0, u);
+    if (keylen <= 0) {
+        PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_DO_HEADER, PEM_R_BAD_PASSWORD_READ);
+        return 0;
+    }
+#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+    /* Convert the pass phrase from EBCDIC */
+    ebcdic2ascii(buf, buf, keylen);
+#endif
+
+    if (!EVP_BytesToKey(cipher->cipher, EVP_md5(), &(cipher->iv[0]),
+                        (unsigned char *)buf, keylen, 1, key, NULL))
+        return 0;
+
+    ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    ok = EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher->cipher, NULL, key, &(cipher->iv[0]));
+    if (ok)
+        ok = EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, data, &ilen, data, ilen);
+    if (ok) {
+        /* Squirrel away the length of data decrypted so far. */
+        *plen = ilen;
+        ok = EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, &(data[ilen]), &ilen);
+    }
+    if (ok)
+        *plen += ilen;
+    else
+        PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_DO_HEADER, PEM_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
+
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
+    OPENSSL_cleanse((char *)buf, sizeof(buf));
+    OPENSSL_cleanse((char *)key, sizeof(key));
+    return ok;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This implements a very limited PEM header parser that does not support the
+ * full grammar of rfc1421.  In particular, folded headers are not supported,
+ * nor is additional whitespace.
+ *
+ * A robust implementation would make use of a library that turns the headers
+ * into a BIO from which one folded line is read at a time, and is then split
+ * into a header label and content.  We would then parse the content of the
+ * headers we care about.  This is overkill for just this limited use-case, but
+ * presumably we also parse rfc822-style headers for S/MIME, so a common
+ * abstraction might well be more generally useful.
+ */
+int PEM_get_EVP_CIPHER_INFO(char *header, EVP_CIPHER_INFO *cipher)
+{
+    static const char ProcType[] = "Proc-Type:";
+    static const char ENCRYPTED[] = "ENCRYPTED";
+    static const char DEKInfo[] = "DEK-Info:";
+    const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
+    int ivlen;
+    char *dekinfostart, c;
+
+    cipher->cipher = NULL;
+    if ((header == NULL) || (*header == '\0') || (*header == '\n'))
+        return 1;
+
+    if (strncmp(header, ProcType, sizeof(ProcType)-1) != 0) {
+        PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_GET_EVP_CIPHER_INFO, PEM_R_NOT_PROC_TYPE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    header += sizeof(ProcType)-1;
+    header += strspn(header, " \t");
+
+    if (*header++ != '4' || *header++ != ',')
+        return 0;
+    header += strspn(header, " \t");
+
+    /* We expect "ENCRYPTED" followed by optional white-space + line break */
+    if (strncmp(header, ENCRYPTED, sizeof(ENCRYPTED)-1) != 0 ||
+        strspn(header+sizeof(ENCRYPTED)-1, " \t\r\n") == 0) {
+        PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_GET_EVP_CIPHER_INFO, PEM_R_NOT_ENCRYPTED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    header += sizeof(ENCRYPTED)-1;
+    header += strspn(header, " \t\r");
+    if (*header++ != '\n') {
+        PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_GET_EVP_CIPHER_INFO, PEM_R_SHORT_HEADER);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /*-
+     * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1421#section-4.6.1.3
+     * We expect "DEK-Info: algo[,hex-parameters]"
+     */
+    if (strncmp(header, DEKInfo, sizeof(DEKInfo)-1) != 0) {
+        PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_GET_EVP_CIPHER_INFO, PEM_R_NOT_DEK_INFO);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    header += sizeof(DEKInfo)-1;
+    header += strspn(header, " \t");
+
+    /*
+     * DEK-INFO is a comma-separated combination of algorithm name and optional
+     * parameters.
+     */
+    dekinfostart = header;
+    header += strcspn(header, " \t,");
+    c = *header;
+    *header = '\0';
+    cipher->cipher = enc = EVP_get_cipherbyname(dekinfostart);
+    *header = c;
+    header += strspn(header, " \t");
+
+    if (enc == NULL) {
+        PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_GET_EVP_CIPHER_INFO, PEM_R_UNSUPPORTED_ENCRYPTION);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc);
+    if (ivlen > 0 && *header++ != ',') {
+        PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_GET_EVP_CIPHER_INFO, PEM_R_MISSING_DEK_IV);
+        return 0;
+    } else if (ivlen == 0 && *header == ',') {
+        PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_GET_EVP_CIPHER_INFO, PEM_R_UNEXPECTED_DEK_IV);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (!load_iv(&header, cipher->iv, EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc)))
+        return 0;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int load_iv(char **fromp, unsigned char *to, int num)
+{
+    int v, i;
+    char *from;
+
+    from = *fromp;
+    for (i = 0; i < num; i++)
+        to[i] = 0;
+    num *= 2;
+    for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
+        v = OPENSSL_hexchar2int(*from);
+        if (v < 0) {
+            PEMerr(PEM_F_LOAD_IV, PEM_R_BAD_IV_CHARS);
+            return (0);
+        }
+        from++;
+        to[i / 2] |= v << (long)((!(i & 1)) * 4);
+    }
+
+    *fromp = from;
+    return (1);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+int PEM_write(FILE *fp, const char *name, const char *header,
+              const unsigned char *data, long len)
+{
+    BIO *b;
+    int ret;
+
+    if ((b = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL) {
+        PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_WRITE, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+        return (0);
+    }
+    BIO_set_fp(b, fp, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+    ret = PEM_write_bio(b, name, header, data, len);
+    BIO_free(b);
+    return (ret);
+}
+#endif
+
+int PEM_write_bio(BIO *bp, const char *name, const char *header,
+                  const unsigned char *data, long len)
+{
+    int nlen, n, i, j, outl;
+    unsigned char *buf = NULL;
+    EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx = EVP_ENCODE_CTX_new();
+    int reason = ERR_R_BUF_LIB;
+
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+        reason = ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE;
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    EVP_EncodeInit(ctx);
+    nlen = strlen(name);
+
+    if ((BIO_write(bp, "-----BEGIN ", 11) != 11) ||
+        (BIO_write(bp, name, nlen) != nlen) ||
+        (BIO_write(bp, "-----\n", 6) != 6))
+        goto err;
+
+    i = strlen(header);
+    if (i > 0) {
+        if ((BIO_write(bp, header, i) != i) || (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) != 1))
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    buf = OPENSSL_malloc(PEM_BUFSIZE * 8);
+    if (buf == NULL) {
+        reason = ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE;
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    i = j = 0;
+    while (len > 0) {
+        n = (int)((len > (PEM_BUFSIZE * 5)) ? (PEM_BUFSIZE * 5) : len);
+        if (!EVP_EncodeUpdate(ctx, buf, &outl, &(data[j]), n))
+            goto err;
+        if ((outl) && (BIO_write(bp, (char *)buf, outl) != outl))
+            goto err;
+        i += outl;
+        len -= n;
+        j += n;
+    }
+    EVP_EncodeFinal(ctx, buf, &outl);
+    if ((outl > 0) && (BIO_write(bp, (char *)buf, outl) != outl))
+        goto err;
+    if ((BIO_write(bp, "-----END ", 9) != 9) ||
+        (BIO_write(bp, name, nlen) != nlen) ||
+        (BIO_write(bp, "-----\n", 6) != 6))
+        goto err;
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(buf, PEM_BUFSIZE * 8);
+    EVP_ENCODE_CTX_free(ctx);
+    return (i + outl);
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(buf, PEM_BUFSIZE * 8);
+    EVP_ENCODE_CTX_free(ctx);
+    PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_WRITE_BIO, reason);
+    return (0);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+int PEM_read(FILE *fp, char **name, char **header, unsigned char **data,
+             long *len)
+{
+    BIO *b;
+    int ret;
+
+    if ((b = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL) {
+        PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_READ, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+        return (0);
+    }
+    BIO_set_fp(b, fp, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+    ret = PEM_read_bio(b, name, header, data, len);
+    BIO_free(b);
+    return (ret);
+}
+#endif
+
+int PEM_read_bio(BIO *bp, char **name, char **header, unsigned char **data,
+                 long *len)
+{
+    EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx = EVP_ENCODE_CTX_new();
+    int end = 0, i, k, bl = 0, hl = 0, nohead = 0;
+    char buf[256];
+    BUF_MEM *nameB;
+    BUF_MEM *headerB;
+    BUF_MEM *dataB, *tmpB;
+
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+        PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_READ_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return (0);
+    }
+
+    nameB = BUF_MEM_new();
+    headerB = BUF_MEM_new();
+    dataB = BUF_MEM_new();
+    if ((nameB == NULL) || (headerB == NULL) || (dataB == NULL)) {
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    buf[254] = '\0';
+    for (;;) {
+        i = BIO_gets(bp, buf, 254);
+
+        if (i <= 0) {
+            PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_READ_BIO, PEM_R_NO_START_LINE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        while ((i >= 0) && (buf[i] <= ' '))
+            i--;
+        buf[++i] = '\n';
+        buf[++i] = '\0';
+
+        if (strncmp(buf, "-----BEGIN ", 11) == 0) {
+            i = strlen(&(buf[11]));
+
+            if (strncmp(&(buf[11 + i - 6]), "-----\n", 6) != 0)
+                continue;
+            if (!BUF_MEM_grow(nameB, i + 9)) {
+                PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_READ_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            memcpy(nameB->data, &(buf[11]), i - 6);
+            nameB->data[i - 6] = '\0';
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    hl = 0;
+    if (!BUF_MEM_grow(headerB, 256)) {
+        PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_READ_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    headerB->data[0] = '\0';
+    for (;;) {
+        i = BIO_gets(bp, buf, 254);
+        if (i <= 0)
+            break;
+
+        while ((i >= 0) && (buf[i] <= ' '))
+            i--;
+        buf[++i] = '\n';
+        buf[++i] = '\0';
+
+        if (buf[0] == '\n')
+            break;
+        if (!BUF_MEM_grow(headerB, hl + i + 9)) {
+            PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_READ_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (strncmp(buf, "-----END ", 9) == 0) {
+            nohead = 1;
+            break;
+        }
+        memcpy(&(headerB->data[hl]), buf, i);
+        headerB->data[hl + i] = '\0';
+        hl += i;
+    }
+
+    bl = 0;
+    if (!BUF_MEM_grow(dataB, 1024)) {
+        PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_READ_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    dataB->data[0] = '\0';
+    if (!nohead) {
+        for (;;) {
+            i = BIO_gets(bp, buf, 254);
+            if (i <= 0)
+                break;
+
+            while ((i >= 0) && (buf[i] <= ' '))
+                i--;
+            buf[++i] = '\n';
+            buf[++i] = '\0';
+
+            if (i != 65)
+                end = 1;
+            if (strncmp(buf, "-----END ", 9) == 0)
+                break;
+            if (i > 65)
+                break;
+            if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(dataB, i + bl + 9)) {
+                PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_READ_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            memcpy(&(dataB->data[bl]), buf, i);
+            dataB->data[bl + i] = '\0';
+            bl += i;
+            if (end) {
+                buf[0] = '\0';
+                i = BIO_gets(bp, buf, 254);
+                if (i <= 0)
+                    break;
+
+                while ((i >= 0) && (buf[i] <= ' '))
+                    i--;
+                buf[++i] = '\n';
+                buf[++i] = '\0';
+
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+    } else {
+        tmpB = headerB;
+        headerB = dataB;
+        dataB = tmpB;
+        bl = hl;
+    }
+    i = strlen(nameB->data);
+    if ((strncmp(buf, "-----END ", 9) != 0) ||
+        (strncmp(nameB->data, &(buf[9]), i) != 0) ||
+        (strncmp(&(buf[9 + i]), "-----\n", 6) != 0)) {
+        PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_READ_BIO, PEM_R_BAD_END_LINE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    EVP_DecodeInit(ctx);
+    i = EVP_DecodeUpdate(ctx,
+                         (unsigned char *)dataB->data, &bl,
+                         (unsigned char *)dataB->data, bl);
+    if (i < 0) {
+        PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_READ_BIO, PEM_R_BAD_BASE64_DECODE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    i = EVP_DecodeFinal(ctx, (unsigned char *)&(dataB->data[bl]), &k);
+    if (i < 0) {
+        PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_READ_BIO, PEM_R_BAD_BASE64_DECODE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    bl += k;
+
+    if (bl == 0)
+        goto err;
+    *name = nameB->data;
+    *header = headerB->data;
+    *data = (unsigned char *)dataB->data;
+    *len = bl;
+    OPENSSL_free(nameB);
+    OPENSSL_free(headerB);
+    OPENSSL_free(dataB);
+    EVP_ENCODE_CTX_free(ctx);
+    return (1);
+ err:
+    BUF_MEM_free(nameB);
+    BUF_MEM_free(headerB);
+    BUF_MEM_free(dataB);
+    EVP_ENCODE_CTX_free(ctx);
+    return (0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check pem string and return prefix length. If for example the pem_str ==
+ * "RSA PRIVATE KEY" and suffix = "PRIVATE KEY" the return value is 3 for the
+ * string "RSA".
+ */
+
+int pem_check_suffix(const char *pem_str, const char *suffix)
+{
+    int pem_len = strlen(pem_str);
+    int suffix_len = strlen(suffix);
+    const char *p;
+    if (suffix_len + 1 >= pem_len)
+        return 0;
+    p = pem_str + pem_len - suffix_len;
+    if (strcmp(p, suffix))
+        return 0;
+    p--;
+    if (*p != ' ')
+        return 0;
+    return p - pem_str;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pem/pem_oth.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pem/pem_oth.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cc7a8db
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pem/pem_oth.c
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+
+/* Handle 'other' PEMs: not private keys */
+
+void *PEM_ASN1_read_bio(d2i_of_void *d2i, const char *name, BIO *bp, void **x,
+                        pem_password_cb *cb, void *u)
+{
+    const unsigned char *p = NULL;
+    unsigned char *data = NULL;
+    long len;
+    char *ret = NULL;
+
+    if (!PEM_bytes_read_bio(&data, &len, NULL, name, bp, cb, u))
+        return NULL;
+    p = data;
+    ret = d2i(x, &p, len);
+    if (ret == NULL)
+        PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_ASN1_READ_BIO, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+    OPENSSL_free(data);
+    return (ret);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pem/pem_pk8.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pem/pem_pk8.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5caad9f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pem/pem_pk8.c
@@ -0,0 +1,214 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+
+static int do_pk8pkey(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *x, int isder,
+                      int nid, const EVP_CIPHER *enc,
+                      char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+static int do_pk8pkey_fp(FILE *bp, EVP_PKEY *x, int isder,
+                         int nid, const EVP_CIPHER *enc,
+                         char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);
+#endif
+/*
+ * These functions write a private key in PKCS#8 format: it is a "drop in"
+ * replacement for PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey() and friends. As usual if 'enc'
+ * is NULL then it uses the unencrypted private key form. The 'nid' versions
+ * uses PKCS#5 v1.5 PBE algorithms whereas the others use PKCS#5 v2.0.
+ */
+
+int PEM_write_bio_PKCS8PrivateKey_nid(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *x, int nid,
+                                      char *kstr, int klen,
+                                      pem_password_cb *cb, void *u)
+{
+    return do_pk8pkey(bp, x, 0, nid, NULL, kstr, klen, cb, u);
+}
+
+int PEM_write_bio_PKCS8PrivateKey(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc,
+                                  char *kstr, int klen,
+                                  pem_password_cb *cb, void *u)
+{
+    return do_pk8pkey(bp, x, 0, -1, enc, kstr, klen, cb, u);
+}
+
+int i2d_PKCS8PrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc,
+                            char *kstr, int klen,
+                            pem_password_cb *cb, void *u)
+{
+    return do_pk8pkey(bp, x, 1, -1, enc, kstr, klen, cb, u);
+}
+
+int i2d_PKCS8PrivateKey_nid_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *x, int nid,
+                                char *kstr, int klen,
+                                pem_password_cb *cb, void *u)
+{
+    return do_pk8pkey(bp, x, 1, nid, NULL, kstr, klen, cb, u);
+}
+
+static int do_pk8pkey(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *x, int isder, int nid,
+                      const EVP_CIPHER *enc, char *kstr, int klen,
+                      pem_password_cb *cb, void *u)
+{
+    X509_SIG *p8;
+    PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf;
+    char buf[PEM_BUFSIZE];
+    int ret;
+
+    if ((p8inf = EVP_PKEY2PKCS8(x)) == NULL) {
+        PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PK8PKEY, PEM_R_ERROR_CONVERTING_PRIVATE_KEY);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (enc || (nid != -1)) {
+        if (!kstr) {
+            if (!cb)
+                klen = PEM_def_callback(buf, PEM_BUFSIZE, 1, u);
+            else
+                klen = cb(buf, PEM_BUFSIZE, 1, u);
+            if (klen <= 0) {
+                PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PK8PKEY, PEM_R_READ_KEY);
+                PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8inf);
+                return 0;
+            }
+
+            kstr = buf;
+        }
+        p8 = PKCS8_encrypt(nid, enc, kstr, klen, NULL, 0, 0, p8inf);
+        if (kstr == buf)
+            OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, klen);
+        PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8inf);
+        if (p8 == NULL)
+            return 0;
+        if (isder)
+            ret = i2d_PKCS8_bio(bp, p8);
+        else
+            ret = PEM_write_bio_PKCS8(bp, p8);
+        X509_SIG_free(p8);
+        return ret;
+    } else {
+        if (isder)
+            ret = i2d_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_bio(bp, p8inf);
+        else
+            ret = PEM_write_bio_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO(bp, p8inf);
+        PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8inf);
+        return ret;
+    }
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY *d2i_PKCS8PrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY **x, pem_password_cb *cb,
+                                  void *u)
+{
+    PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf = NULL;
+    X509_SIG *p8 = NULL;
+    int klen;
+    EVP_PKEY *ret;
+    char psbuf[PEM_BUFSIZE];
+    p8 = d2i_PKCS8_bio(bp, NULL);
+    if (!p8)
+        return NULL;
+    if (cb)
+        klen = cb(psbuf, PEM_BUFSIZE, 0, u);
+    else
+        klen = PEM_def_callback(psbuf, PEM_BUFSIZE, 0, u);
+    if (klen <= 0) {
+        PEMerr(PEM_F_D2I_PKCS8PRIVATEKEY_BIO, PEM_R_BAD_PASSWORD_READ);
+        X509_SIG_free(p8);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    p8inf = PKCS8_decrypt(p8, psbuf, klen);
+    X509_SIG_free(p8);
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(psbuf, klen);
+    if (!p8inf)
+        return NULL;
+    ret = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(p8inf);
+    PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8inf);
+    if (!ret)
+        return NULL;
+    if (x) {
+        EVP_PKEY_free(*x);
+        *x = ret;
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+
+int i2d_PKCS8PrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc,
+                           char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u)
+{
+    return do_pk8pkey_fp(fp, x, 1, -1, enc, kstr, klen, cb, u);
+}
+
+int i2d_PKCS8PrivateKey_nid_fp(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY *x, int nid,
+                               char *kstr, int klen,
+                               pem_password_cb *cb, void *u)
+{
+    return do_pk8pkey_fp(fp, x, 1, nid, NULL, kstr, klen, cb, u);
+}
+
+int PEM_write_PKCS8PrivateKey_nid(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY *x, int nid,
+                                  char *kstr, int klen,
+                                  pem_password_cb *cb, void *u)
+{
+    return do_pk8pkey_fp(fp, x, 0, nid, NULL, kstr, klen, cb, u);
+}
+
+int PEM_write_PKCS8PrivateKey(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc,
+                              char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb,
+                              void *u)
+{
+    return do_pk8pkey_fp(fp, x, 0, -1, enc, kstr, klen, cb, u);
+}
+
+static int do_pk8pkey_fp(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY *x, int isder, int nid,
+                         const EVP_CIPHER *enc, char *kstr, int klen,
+                         pem_password_cb *cb, void *u)
+{
+    BIO *bp;
+    int ret;
+
+    if ((bp = BIO_new_fp(fp, BIO_NOCLOSE)) == NULL) {
+        PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PK8PKEY_FP, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+        return (0);
+    }
+    ret = do_pk8pkey(bp, x, isder, nid, enc, kstr, klen, cb, u);
+    BIO_free(bp);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY *d2i_PKCS8PrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY **x, pem_password_cb *cb,
+                                 void *u)
+{
+    BIO *bp;
+    EVP_PKEY *ret;
+
+    if ((bp = BIO_new_fp(fp, BIO_NOCLOSE)) == NULL) {
+        PEMerr(PEM_F_D2I_PKCS8PRIVATEKEY_FP, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    ret = d2i_PKCS8PrivateKey_bio(bp, x, cb, u);
+    BIO_free(bp);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+#endif
+
+IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw(PKCS8, X509_SIG, PEM_STRING_PKCS8, X509_SIG)
+
+
+IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, PEM_STRING_PKCS8INF,
+             PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO)
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pem/pem_pkey.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pem/pem_pkey.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..671b374
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pem/pem_pkey.c
@@ -0,0 +1,244 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#include "internal/asn1_int.h"
+#include "internal/evp_int.h"
+
+int pem_check_suffix(const char *pem_str, const char *suffix);
+
+EVP_PKEY *PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY **x, pem_password_cb *cb,
+                                  void *u)
+{
+    char *nm = NULL;
+    const unsigned char *p = NULL;
+    unsigned char *data = NULL;
+    long len;
+    int slen;
+    EVP_PKEY *ret = NULL;
+
+    if (!PEM_bytes_read_bio(&data, &len, &nm, PEM_STRING_EVP_PKEY, bp, cb, u))
+        return NULL;
+    p = data;
+
+    if (strcmp(nm, PEM_STRING_PKCS8INF) == 0) {
+        PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf;
+        p8inf = d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO(NULL, &p, len);
+        if (!p8inf)
+            goto p8err;
+        ret = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(p8inf);
+        if (x) {
+            EVP_PKEY_free((EVP_PKEY *)*x);
+            *x = ret;
+        }
+        PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8inf);
+    } else if (strcmp(nm, PEM_STRING_PKCS8) == 0) {
+        PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf;
+        X509_SIG *p8;
+        int klen;
+        char psbuf[PEM_BUFSIZE];
+        p8 = d2i_X509_SIG(NULL, &p, len);
+        if (!p8)
+            goto p8err;
+        if (cb)
+            klen = cb(psbuf, PEM_BUFSIZE, 0, u);
+        else
+            klen = PEM_def_callback(psbuf, PEM_BUFSIZE, 0, u);
+        if (klen <= 0) {
+            PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_READ_BIO_PRIVATEKEY, PEM_R_BAD_PASSWORD_READ);
+            X509_SIG_free(p8);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        p8inf = PKCS8_decrypt(p8, psbuf, klen);
+        X509_SIG_free(p8);
+        OPENSSL_cleanse(psbuf, klen);
+        if (!p8inf)
+            goto p8err;
+        ret = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(p8inf);
+        if (x) {
+            EVP_PKEY_free((EVP_PKEY *)*x);
+            *x = ret;
+        }
+        PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8inf);
+    } else if ((slen = pem_check_suffix(nm, "PRIVATE KEY")) > 0) {
+        const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth;
+        ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str(NULL, nm, slen);
+        if (!ameth || !ameth->old_priv_decode)
+            goto p8err;
+        ret = d2i_PrivateKey(ameth->pkey_id, x, &p, len);
+    }
+ p8err:
+    if (ret == NULL)
+        PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_READ_BIO_PRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_free(nm);
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(data, len);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+int PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc,
+                             unsigned char *kstr, int klen,
+                             pem_password_cb *cb, void *u)
+{
+    if (x->ameth == NULL || x->ameth->priv_encode != NULL)
+        return PEM_write_bio_PKCS8PrivateKey(bp, x, enc,
+                                             (char *)kstr, klen, cb, u);
+    return PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey_traditional(bp, x, enc, kstr, klen, cb, u);
+}
+
+int PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey_traditional(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *x,
+                                         const EVP_CIPHER *enc,
+                                         unsigned char *kstr, int klen,
+                                         pem_password_cb *cb, void *u)
+{
+    char pem_str[80];
+    BIO_snprintf(pem_str, 80, "%s PRIVATE KEY", x->ameth->pem_str);
+    return PEM_ASN1_write_bio((i2d_of_void *)i2d_PrivateKey,
+                              pem_str, bp, x, enc, kstr, klen, cb, u);
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY *PEM_read_bio_Parameters(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY **x)
+{
+    char *nm = NULL;
+    const unsigned char *p = NULL;
+    unsigned char *data = NULL;
+    long len;
+    int slen;
+    EVP_PKEY *ret = NULL;
+
+    if (!PEM_bytes_read_bio(&data, &len, &nm, PEM_STRING_PARAMETERS,
+                            bp, 0, NULL))
+        return NULL;
+    p = data;
+
+    if ((slen = pem_check_suffix(nm, "PARAMETERS")) > 0) {
+        ret = EVP_PKEY_new();
+        if (ret == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        if (!EVP_PKEY_set_type_str(ret, nm, slen)
+            || !ret->ameth->param_decode
+            || !ret->ameth->param_decode(ret, &p, len)) {
+            EVP_PKEY_free(ret);
+            ret = NULL;
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (x) {
+            EVP_PKEY_free((EVP_PKEY *)*x);
+            *x = ret;
+        }
+    }
+ err:
+    if (ret == NULL)
+        PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_READ_BIO_PARAMETERS, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+    OPENSSL_free(nm);
+    OPENSSL_free(data);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+int PEM_write_bio_Parameters(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *x)
+{
+    char pem_str[80];
+    if (!x->ameth || !x->ameth->param_encode)
+        return 0;
+
+    BIO_snprintf(pem_str, 80, "%s PARAMETERS", x->ameth->pem_str);
+    return PEM_ASN1_write_bio((i2d_of_void *)x->ameth->param_encode,
+                              pem_str, bp, x, NULL, NULL, 0, 0, NULL);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+EVP_PKEY *PEM_read_PrivateKey(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY **x, pem_password_cb *cb,
+                              void *u)
+{
+    BIO *b;
+    EVP_PKEY *ret;
+
+    if ((b = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL) {
+        PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_READ_PRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+        return (0);
+    }
+    BIO_set_fp(b, fp, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+    ret = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(b, x, cb, u);
+    BIO_free(b);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+int PEM_write_PrivateKey(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc,
+                         unsigned char *kstr, int klen,
+                         pem_password_cb *cb, void *u)
+{
+    BIO *b;
+    int ret;
+
+    if ((b = BIO_new_fp(fp, BIO_NOCLOSE)) == NULL) {
+        PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_WRITE_PRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    ret = PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey(b, x, enc, kstr, klen, cb, u);
+    BIO_free(b);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+
+/* Transparently read in PKCS#3 or X9.42 DH parameters */
+
+DH *PEM_read_bio_DHparams(BIO *bp, DH **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u)
+{
+    char *nm = NULL;
+    const unsigned char *p = NULL;
+    unsigned char *data = NULL;
+    long len;
+    DH *ret = NULL;
+
+    if (!PEM_bytes_read_bio(&data, &len, &nm, PEM_STRING_DHPARAMS, bp, cb, u))
+        return NULL;
+    p = data;
+
+    if (strcmp(nm, PEM_STRING_DHXPARAMS) == 0)
+        ret = d2i_DHxparams(x, &p, len);
+    else
+        ret = d2i_DHparams(x, &p, len);
+
+    if (ret == NULL)
+        PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_READ_BIO_DHPARAMS, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+    OPENSSL_free(nm);
+    OPENSSL_free(data);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+DH *PEM_read_DHparams(FILE *fp, DH **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u)
+{
+    BIO *b;
+    DH *ret;
+
+    if ((b = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL) {
+        PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_READ_DHPARAMS, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+        return (0);
+    }
+    BIO_set_fp(b, fp, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+    ret = PEM_read_bio_DHparams(b, x, cb, u);
+    BIO_free(b);
+    return (ret);
+}
+# endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pem/pem_sign.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pem/pem_sign.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..12ad974
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pem/pem_sign.c
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+
+int PEM_SignInit(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_MD *type)
+{
+    return EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, type, NULL);
+}
+
+int PEM_SignUpdate(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *data, unsigned int count)
+{
+    return EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, data, count);
+}
+
+int PEM_SignFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sigret,
+                  unsigned int *siglen, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    unsigned char *m;
+    int i, ret = 0;
+    unsigned int m_len;
+
+    m = OPENSSL_malloc(EVP_PKEY_size(pkey) + 2);
+    if (m == NULL) {
+        PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_SIGNFINAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (EVP_SignFinal(ctx, m, &m_len, pkey) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    i = EVP_EncodeBlock(sigret, m, m_len);
+    *siglen = i;
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    /* ctx has been zeroed by EVP_SignFinal() */
+    OPENSSL_free(m);
+    return (ret);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pem/pem_x509.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pem/pem_x509.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3a99756
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pem/pem_x509.c
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/pkcs7.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+
+IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw(X509, X509, PEM_STRING_X509, X509)
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pem/pem_xaux.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pem/pem_xaux.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6d7e1db
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pem/pem_xaux.c
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/pkcs7.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+
+IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw(X509_AUX, X509, PEM_STRING_X509_TRUSTED, X509_AUX)
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pem/pvkfmt.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pem/pvkfmt.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d0a4239
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pem/pvkfmt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,881 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2005-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Support for PVK format keys and related structures (such a PUBLICKEYBLOB
+ * and PRIVATEKEYBLOB).
+ */
+
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
+# include <openssl/dsa.h>
+# include <openssl/rsa.h>
+
+/*
+ * Utility function: read a DWORD (4 byte unsigned integer) in little endian
+ * format
+ */
+
+static unsigned int read_ledword(const unsigned char **in)
+{
+    const unsigned char *p = *in;
+    unsigned int ret;
+    ret = *p++;
+    ret |= (*p++ << 8);
+    ret |= (*p++ << 16);
+    ret |= (*p++ << 24);
+    *in = p;
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read a BIGNUM in little endian format. The docs say that this should take
+ * up bitlen/8 bytes.
+ */
+
+static int read_lebn(const unsigned char **in, unsigned int nbyte, BIGNUM **r)
+{
+    *r = BN_lebin2bn(*in, nbyte, NULL);
+    if (*r == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    *in += nbyte;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Convert private key blob to EVP_PKEY: RSA and DSA keys supported */
+
+# define MS_PUBLICKEYBLOB        0x6
+# define MS_PRIVATEKEYBLOB       0x7
+# define MS_RSA1MAGIC            0x31415352L
+# define MS_RSA2MAGIC            0x32415352L
+# define MS_DSS1MAGIC            0x31535344L
+# define MS_DSS2MAGIC            0x32535344L
+
+# define MS_KEYALG_RSA_KEYX      0xa400
+# define MS_KEYALG_DSS_SIGN      0x2200
+
+# define MS_KEYTYPE_KEYX         0x1
+# define MS_KEYTYPE_SIGN         0x2
+
+/* Maximum length of a blob after header */
+# define BLOB_MAX_LENGTH          102400
+
+/* The PVK file magic number: seems to spell out "bobsfile", who is Bob? */
+# define MS_PVKMAGIC             0xb0b5f11eL
+/* Salt length for PVK files */
+# define PVK_SALTLEN             0x10
+/* Maximum length in PVK header */
+# define PVK_MAX_KEYLEN          102400
+/* Maximum salt length */
+# define PVK_MAX_SALTLEN         10240
+
+static EVP_PKEY *b2i_rsa(const unsigned char **in,
+                         unsigned int bitlen, int ispub);
+static EVP_PKEY *b2i_dss(const unsigned char **in,
+                         unsigned int bitlen, int ispub);
+
+static int do_blob_header(const unsigned char **in, unsigned int length,
+                          unsigned int *pmagic, unsigned int *pbitlen,
+                          int *pisdss, int *pispub)
+{
+    const unsigned char *p = *in;
+    if (length < 16)
+        return 0;
+    /* bType */
+    if (*p == MS_PUBLICKEYBLOB) {
+        if (*pispub == 0) {
+            PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_BLOB_HEADER, PEM_R_EXPECTING_PRIVATE_KEY_BLOB);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        *pispub = 1;
+    } else if (*p == MS_PRIVATEKEYBLOB) {
+        if (*pispub == 1) {
+            PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_BLOB_HEADER, PEM_R_EXPECTING_PUBLIC_KEY_BLOB);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        *pispub = 0;
+    } else
+        return 0;
+    p++;
+    /* Version */
+    if (*p++ != 0x2) {
+        PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_BLOB_HEADER, PEM_R_BAD_VERSION_NUMBER);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    /* Ignore reserved, aiKeyAlg */
+    p += 6;
+    *pmagic = read_ledword(&p);
+    *pbitlen = read_ledword(&p);
+    *pisdss = 0;
+    switch (*pmagic) {
+
+    case MS_DSS1MAGIC:
+        *pisdss = 1;
+        /* fall thru */
+    case MS_RSA1MAGIC:
+        if (*pispub == 0) {
+            PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_BLOB_HEADER, PEM_R_EXPECTING_PRIVATE_KEY_BLOB);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        break;
+
+    case MS_DSS2MAGIC:
+        *pisdss = 1;
+        /* fall thru */
+    case MS_RSA2MAGIC:
+        if (*pispub == 1) {
+            PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_BLOB_HEADER, PEM_R_EXPECTING_PUBLIC_KEY_BLOB);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        break;
+
+    default:
+        PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_BLOB_HEADER, PEM_R_BAD_MAGIC_NUMBER);
+        return -1;
+    }
+    *in = p;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static unsigned int blob_length(unsigned bitlen, int isdss, int ispub)
+{
+    unsigned int nbyte, hnbyte;
+    nbyte = (bitlen + 7) >> 3;
+    hnbyte = (bitlen + 15) >> 4;
+    if (isdss) {
+
+        /*
+         * Expected length: 20 for q + 3 components bitlen each + 24 for seed
+         * structure.
+         */
+        if (ispub)
+            return 44 + 3 * nbyte;
+        /*
+         * Expected length: 20 for q, priv, 2 bitlen components + 24 for seed
+         * structure.
+         */
+        else
+            return 64 + 2 * nbyte;
+    } else {
+        /* Expected length: 4 for 'e' + 'n' */
+        if (ispub)
+            return 4 + nbyte;
+        else
+            /*
+             * Expected length: 4 for 'e' and 7 other components. 2
+             * components are bitlen size, 5 are bitlen/2
+             */
+            return 4 + 2 * nbyte + 5 * hnbyte;
+    }
+
+}
+
+static EVP_PKEY *do_b2i(const unsigned char **in, unsigned int length,
+                        int ispub)
+{
+    const unsigned char *p = *in;
+    unsigned int bitlen, magic;
+    int isdss;
+    if (do_blob_header(&p, length, &magic, &bitlen, &isdss, &ispub) <= 0) {
+        PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_B2I, PEM_R_KEYBLOB_HEADER_PARSE_ERROR);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    length -= 16;
+    if (length < blob_length(bitlen, isdss, ispub)) {
+        PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_B2I, PEM_R_KEYBLOB_TOO_SHORT);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    if (isdss)
+        return b2i_dss(&p, bitlen, ispub);
+    else
+        return b2i_rsa(&p, bitlen, ispub);
+}
+
+static EVP_PKEY *do_b2i_bio(BIO *in, int ispub)
+{
+    const unsigned char *p;
+    unsigned char hdr_buf[16], *buf = NULL;
+    unsigned int bitlen, magic, length;
+    int isdss;
+    EVP_PKEY *ret = NULL;
+    if (BIO_read(in, hdr_buf, 16) != 16) {
+        PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_B2I_BIO, PEM_R_KEYBLOB_TOO_SHORT);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    p = hdr_buf;
+    if (do_blob_header(&p, 16, &magic, &bitlen, &isdss, &ispub) <= 0)
+        return NULL;
+
+    length = blob_length(bitlen, isdss, ispub);
+    if (length > BLOB_MAX_LENGTH) {
+        PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_B2I_BIO, PEM_R_HEADER_TOO_LONG);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    buf = OPENSSL_malloc(length);
+    if (buf == NULL) {
+        PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_B2I_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    p = buf;
+    if (BIO_read(in, buf, length) != (int)length) {
+        PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_B2I_BIO, PEM_R_KEYBLOB_TOO_SHORT);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (isdss)
+        ret = b2i_dss(&p, bitlen, ispub);
+    else
+        ret = b2i_rsa(&p, bitlen, ispub);
+
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_free(buf);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static EVP_PKEY *b2i_dss(const unsigned char **in,
+                         unsigned int bitlen, int ispub)
+{
+    const unsigned char *p = *in;
+    EVP_PKEY *ret = NULL;
+    DSA *dsa = NULL;
+    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+    unsigned int nbyte;
+    BIGNUM *pbn = NULL, *qbn = NULL, *gbn = NULL, *priv_key = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL;
+
+    nbyte = (bitlen + 7) >> 3;
+
+    dsa = DSA_new();
+    ret = EVP_PKEY_new();
+    if (dsa == NULL || ret == NULL)
+        goto memerr;
+    if (!read_lebn(&p, nbyte, &pbn))
+        goto memerr;
+
+    if (!read_lebn(&p, 20, &qbn))
+        goto memerr;
+
+    if (!read_lebn(&p, nbyte, &gbn))
+        goto memerr;
+
+    if (ispub) {
+        if (!read_lebn(&p, nbyte, &pub_key))
+            goto memerr;
+    } else {
+        if (!read_lebn(&p, 20, &priv_key))
+            goto memerr;
+
+        /* Calculate public key */
+        pub_key = BN_new();
+        if (pub_key == NULL)
+            goto memerr;
+        if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+            goto memerr;
+
+        if (!BN_mod_exp(pub_key, gbn, priv_key, pbn, ctx))
+            goto memerr;
+
+        BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+        ctx = NULL;
+    }
+    if (!DSA_set0_pqg(dsa, pbn, qbn, gbn))
+        goto memerr;
+    pbn = qbn = gbn = NULL;
+    if (!DSA_set0_key(dsa, pub_key, priv_key))
+        goto memerr;
+    pub_key = priv_key = NULL;
+
+    if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(ret, dsa))
+        goto memerr;
+    DSA_free(dsa);
+    *in = p;
+    return ret;
+
+ memerr:
+    PEMerr(PEM_F_B2I_DSS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    DSA_free(dsa);
+    BN_free(pbn);
+    BN_free(qbn);
+    BN_free(gbn);
+    BN_free(pub_key);
+    BN_free(priv_key);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(ret);
+    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+static EVP_PKEY *b2i_rsa(const unsigned char **in,
+                         unsigned int bitlen, int ispub)
+{
+    const unsigned char *pin = *in;
+    EVP_PKEY *ret = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *e = NULL, *n = NULL, *d = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL, *dmp1 = NULL, *dmq1 = NULL, *iqmp = NULL;
+    RSA *rsa = NULL;
+    unsigned int nbyte, hnbyte;
+    nbyte = (bitlen + 7) >> 3;
+    hnbyte = (bitlen + 15) >> 4;
+    rsa = RSA_new();
+    ret = EVP_PKEY_new();
+    if (rsa == NULL || ret == NULL)
+        goto memerr;
+    e = BN_new();
+    if (e == NULL)
+        goto memerr;
+    if (!BN_set_word(e, read_ledword(&pin)))
+        goto memerr;
+    if (!read_lebn(&pin, nbyte, &n))
+        goto memerr;
+    if (!ispub) {
+        if (!read_lebn(&pin, hnbyte, &p))
+            goto memerr;
+        if (!read_lebn(&pin, hnbyte, &q))
+            goto memerr;
+        if (!read_lebn(&pin, hnbyte, &dmp1))
+            goto memerr;
+        if (!read_lebn(&pin, hnbyte, &dmq1))
+            goto memerr;
+        if (!read_lebn(&pin, hnbyte, &iqmp))
+            goto memerr;
+        if (!read_lebn(&pin, nbyte, &d))
+            goto memerr;
+        if (!RSA_set0_factors(rsa, p, q))
+            goto memerr;
+        p = q = NULL;
+        if (!RSA_set0_crt_params(rsa, dmp1, dmq1, iqmp))
+            goto memerr;
+        dmp1 = dmq1 = iqmp = NULL;
+    }
+    if (!RSA_set0_key(rsa, n, e, d))
+        goto memerr;
+    n = e = d = NULL;
+
+    if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(ret, rsa))
+        goto memerr;
+    RSA_free(rsa);
+    *in = pin;
+    return ret;
+ memerr:
+    PEMerr(PEM_F_B2I_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    BN_free(e);
+    BN_free(n);
+    BN_free(p);
+    BN_free(q);
+    BN_free(dmp1);
+    BN_free(dmq1);
+    BN_free(iqmp);
+    BN_free(d);
+    RSA_free(rsa);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(ret);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY *b2i_PrivateKey(const unsigned char **in, long length)
+{
+    return do_b2i(in, length, 0);
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY *b2i_PublicKey(const unsigned char **in, long length)
+{
+    return do_b2i(in, length, 1);
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY *b2i_PrivateKey_bio(BIO *in)
+{
+    return do_b2i_bio(in, 0);
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY *b2i_PublicKey_bio(BIO *in)
+{
+    return do_b2i_bio(in, 1);
+}
+
+static void write_ledword(unsigned char **out, unsigned int dw)
+{
+    unsigned char *p = *out;
+    *p++ = dw & 0xff;
+    *p++ = (dw >> 8) & 0xff;
+    *p++ = (dw >> 16) & 0xff;
+    *p++ = (dw >> 24) & 0xff;
+    *out = p;
+}
+
+static void write_lebn(unsigned char **out, const BIGNUM *bn, int len)
+{
+    BN_bn2lebinpad(bn, *out, len);
+    *out += len;
+}
+
+static int check_bitlen_rsa(RSA *rsa, int ispub, unsigned int *magic);
+static int check_bitlen_dsa(DSA *dsa, int ispub, unsigned int *magic);
+
+static void write_rsa(unsigned char **out, RSA *rsa, int ispub);
+static void write_dsa(unsigned char **out, DSA *dsa, int ispub);
+
+static int do_i2b(unsigned char **out, EVP_PKEY *pk, int ispub)
+{
+    unsigned char *p;
+    unsigned int bitlen, magic = 0, keyalg;
+    int outlen, noinc = 0;
+    int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pk);
+    if (pktype == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
+        bitlen = check_bitlen_dsa(EVP_PKEY_get0_DSA(pk), ispub, &magic);
+        keyalg = MS_KEYALG_DSS_SIGN;
+    } else if (pktype == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
+        bitlen = check_bitlen_rsa(EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pk), ispub, &magic);
+        keyalg = MS_KEYALG_RSA_KEYX;
+    } else
+        return -1;
+    if (bitlen == 0)
+        return -1;
+    outlen = 16 + blob_length(bitlen,
+                              keyalg == MS_KEYALG_DSS_SIGN ? 1 : 0, ispub);
+    if (out == NULL)
+        return outlen;
+    if (*out)
+        p = *out;
+    else {
+        p = OPENSSL_malloc(outlen);
+        if (p == NULL)
+            return -1;
+        *out = p;
+        noinc = 1;
+    }
+    if (ispub)
+        *p++ = MS_PUBLICKEYBLOB;
+    else
+        *p++ = MS_PRIVATEKEYBLOB;
+    *p++ = 0x2;
+    *p++ = 0;
+    *p++ = 0;
+    write_ledword(&p, keyalg);
+    write_ledword(&p, magic);
+    write_ledword(&p, bitlen);
+    if (keyalg == MS_KEYALG_DSS_SIGN)
+        write_dsa(&p, EVP_PKEY_get0_DSA(pk), ispub);
+    else
+        write_rsa(&p, EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pk), ispub);
+    if (!noinc)
+        *out += outlen;
+    return outlen;
+}
+
+static int do_i2b_bio(BIO *out, EVP_PKEY *pk, int ispub)
+{
+    unsigned char *tmp = NULL;
+    int outlen, wrlen;
+    outlen = do_i2b(&tmp, pk, ispub);
+    if (outlen < 0)
+        return -1;
+    wrlen = BIO_write(out, tmp, outlen);
+    OPENSSL_free(tmp);
+    if (wrlen == outlen)
+        return outlen;
+    return -1;
+}
+
+static int check_bitlen_dsa(DSA *dsa, int ispub, unsigned int *pmagic)
+{
+    int bitlen;
+    const BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL, *g = NULL;
+    const BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL, *priv_key = NULL;
+
+    DSA_get0_pqg(dsa, &p, &q, &g);
+    DSA_get0_key(dsa, &pub_key, &priv_key);
+    bitlen = BN_num_bits(p);
+    if ((bitlen & 7) || (BN_num_bits(q) != 160)
+        || (BN_num_bits(g) > bitlen))
+        goto badkey;
+    if (ispub) {
+        if (BN_num_bits(pub_key) > bitlen)
+            goto badkey;
+        *pmagic = MS_DSS1MAGIC;
+    } else {
+        if (BN_num_bits(priv_key) > 160)
+            goto badkey;
+        *pmagic = MS_DSS2MAGIC;
+    }
+
+    return bitlen;
+ badkey:
+    PEMerr(PEM_F_CHECK_BITLEN_DSA, PEM_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_COMPONENTS);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int check_bitlen_rsa(RSA *rsa, int ispub, unsigned int *pmagic)
+{
+    int nbyte, hnbyte, bitlen;
+    const BIGNUM *e;
+
+    RSA_get0_key(rsa, NULL, &e, NULL);
+    if (BN_num_bits(e) > 32)
+        goto badkey;
+    bitlen = RSA_bits(rsa);
+    nbyte = RSA_size(rsa);
+    hnbyte = (bitlen + 15) >> 4;
+    if (ispub) {
+        *pmagic = MS_RSA1MAGIC;
+        return bitlen;
+    } else {
+        const BIGNUM *d, *p, *q, *iqmp, *dmp1, *dmq1;
+
+        *pmagic = MS_RSA2MAGIC;
+
+        /*
+         * For private key each component must fit within nbyte or hnbyte.
+         */
+        RSA_get0_key(rsa, NULL, NULL, &d);
+        if (BN_num_bytes(d) > nbyte)
+            goto badkey;
+        RSA_get0_factors(rsa, &p, &q);
+        RSA_get0_crt_params(rsa, &dmp1, &dmq1, &iqmp);
+        if ((BN_num_bytes(iqmp) > hnbyte)
+            || (BN_num_bytes(p) > hnbyte)
+            || (BN_num_bytes(q) > hnbyte)
+            || (BN_num_bytes(dmp1) > hnbyte)
+            || (BN_num_bytes(dmq1) > hnbyte))
+            goto badkey;
+    }
+    return bitlen;
+ badkey:
+    PEMerr(PEM_F_CHECK_BITLEN_RSA, PEM_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_COMPONENTS);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static void write_rsa(unsigned char **out, RSA *rsa, int ispub)
+{
+    int nbyte, hnbyte;
+    const BIGNUM *n, *d, *e, *p, *q, *iqmp, *dmp1, *dmq1;
+
+    nbyte = RSA_size(rsa);
+    hnbyte = (RSA_bits(rsa) + 15) >> 4;
+    RSA_get0_key(rsa, &n, &e, &d);
+    write_lebn(out, e, 4);
+    write_lebn(out, n, nbyte);
+    if (ispub)
+        return;
+    RSA_get0_factors(rsa, &p, &q);
+    RSA_get0_crt_params(rsa, &dmp1, &dmq1, &iqmp);
+    write_lebn(out, p, hnbyte);
+    write_lebn(out, q, hnbyte);
+    write_lebn(out, dmp1, hnbyte);
+    write_lebn(out, dmq1, hnbyte);
+    write_lebn(out, iqmp, hnbyte);
+    write_lebn(out, d, nbyte);
+}
+
+static void write_dsa(unsigned char **out, DSA *dsa, int ispub)
+{
+    int nbyte;
+    const BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL, *g = NULL;
+    const BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL, *priv_key = NULL;
+
+    DSA_get0_pqg(dsa, &p, &q, &g);
+    DSA_get0_key(dsa, &pub_key, &priv_key);
+    nbyte = BN_num_bytes(p);
+    write_lebn(out, p, nbyte);
+    write_lebn(out, q, 20);
+    write_lebn(out, g, nbyte);
+    if (ispub)
+        write_lebn(out, pub_key, nbyte);
+    else
+        write_lebn(out, priv_key, 20);
+    /* Set "invalid" for seed structure values */
+    memset(*out, 0xff, 24);
+    *out += 24;
+    return;
+}
+
+int i2b_PrivateKey_bio(BIO *out, EVP_PKEY *pk)
+{
+    return do_i2b_bio(out, pk, 0);
+}
+
+int i2b_PublicKey_bio(BIO *out, EVP_PKEY *pk)
+{
+    return do_i2b_bio(out, pk, 1);
+}
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
+
+static int do_PVK_header(const unsigned char **in, unsigned int length,
+                         int skip_magic,
+                         unsigned int *psaltlen, unsigned int *pkeylen)
+{
+    const unsigned char *p = *in;
+    unsigned int pvk_magic, is_encrypted;
+    if (skip_magic) {
+        if (length < 20) {
+            PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PVK_HEADER, PEM_R_PVK_TOO_SHORT);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    } else {
+        if (length < 24) {
+            PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PVK_HEADER, PEM_R_PVK_TOO_SHORT);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        pvk_magic = read_ledword(&p);
+        if (pvk_magic != MS_PVKMAGIC) {
+            PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PVK_HEADER, PEM_R_BAD_MAGIC_NUMBER);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+    /* Skip reserved */
+    p += 4;
+    /*
+     * keytype =
+     */ read_ledword(&p);
+    is_encrypted = read_ledword(&p);
+    *psaltlen = read_ledword(&p);
+    *pkeylen = read_ledword(&p);
+
+    if (*pkeylen > PVK_MAX_KEYLEN || *psaltlen > PVK_MAX_SALTLEN)
+        return 0;
+
+    if (is_encrypted && !*psaltlen) {
+        PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PVK_HEADER, PEM_R_INCONSISTENT_HEADER);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    *in = p;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int derive_pvk_key(unsigned char *key,
+                          const unsigned char *salt, unsigned int saltlen,
+                          const unsigned char *pass, int passlen)
+{
+    EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+    int rv = 1;
+    if (mctx == NULL
+        || !EVP_DigestInit_ex(mctx, EVP_sha1(), NULL)
+        || !EVP_DigestUpdate(mctx, salt, saltlen)
+        || !EVP_DigestUpdate(mctx, pass, passlen)
+        || !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mctx, key, NULL))
+        rv = 0;
+
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
+    return rv;
+}
+
+static EVP_PKEY *do_PVK_body(const unsigned char **in,
+                             unsigned int saltlen, unsigned int keylen,
+                             pem_password_cb *cb, void *u)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY *ret = NULL;
+    const unsigned char *p = *in;
+    unsigned int magic;
+    unsigned char *enctmp = NULL, *q;
+
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+    if (saltlen) {
+        char psbuf[PEM_BUFSIZE];
+        unsigned char keybuf[20];
+        int enctmplen, inlen;
+        if (cb)
+            inlen = cb(psbuf, PEM_BUFSIZE, 0, u);
+        else
+            inlen = PEM_def_callback(psbuf, PEM_BUFSIZE, 0, u);
+        if (inlen <= 0) {
+            PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PVK_BODY, PEM_R_BAD_PASSWORD_READ);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        enctmp = OPENSSL_malloc(keylen + 8);
+        if (enctmp == NULL) {
+            PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PVK_BODY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (!derive_pvk_key(keybuf, p, saltlen,
+                            (unsigned char *)psbuf, inlen))
+            goto err;
+        p += saltlen;
+        /* Copy BLOBHEADER across, decrypt rest */
+        memcpy(enctmp, p, 8);
+        p += 8;
+        if (keylen < 8) {
+            PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PVK_BODY, PEM_R_PVK_TOO_SHORT);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        inlen = keylen - 8;
+        q = enctmp + 8;
+        if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(cctx, EVP_rc4(), NULL, keybuf, NULL))
+            goto err;
+        if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(cctx, q, &enctmplen, p, inlen))
+            goto err;
+        if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(cctx, q + enctmplen, &enctmplen))
+            goto err;
+        magic = read_ledword((const unsigned char **)&q);
+        if (magic != MS_RSA2MAGIC && magic != MS_DSS2MAGIC) {
+            q = enctmp + 8;
+            memset(keybuf + 5, 0, 11);
+            if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(cctx, EVP_rc4(), NULL, keybuf, NULL))
+                goto err;
+            OPENSSL_cleanse(keybuf, 20);
+            if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(cctx, q, &enctmplen, p, inlen))
+                goto err;
+            if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(cctx, q + enctmplen, &enctmplen))
+                goto err;
+            magic = read_ledword((const unsigned char **)&q);
+            if (magic != MS_RSA2MAGIC && magic != MS_DSS2MAGIC) {
+                PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PVK_BODY, PEM_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
+                goto err;
+            }
+        } else
+            OPENSSL_cleanse(keybuf, 20);
+        p = enctmp;
+    }
+
+    ret = b2i_PrivateKey(&p, keylen);
+ err:
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(cctx);
+    OPENSSL_free(enctmp);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY *b2i_PVK_bio(BIO *in, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u)
+{
+    unsigned char pvk_hdr[24], *buf = NULL;
+    const unsigned char *p;
+    int buflen;
+    EVP_PKEY *ret = NULL;
+    unsigned int saltlen, keylen;
+    if (BIO_read(in, pvk_hdr, 24) != 24) {
+        PEMerr(PEM_F_B2I_PVK_BIO, PEM_R_PVK_DATA_TOO_SHORT);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    p = pvk_hdr;
+
+    if (!do_PVK_header(&p, 24, 0, &saltlen, &keylen))
+        return 0;
+    buflen = (int)keylen + saltlen;
+    buf = OPENSSL_malloc(buflen);
+    if (buf == NULL) {
+        PEMerr(PEM_F_B2I_PVK_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    p = buf;
+    if (BIO_read(in, buf, buflen) != buflen) {
+        PEMerr(PEM_F_B2I_PVK_BIO, PEM_R_PVK_DATA_TOO_SHORT);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    ret = do_PVK_body(&p, saltlen, keylen, cb, u);
+
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(buf, buflen);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int i2b_PVK(unsigned char **out, EVP_PKEY *pk, int enclevel,
+                   pem_password_cb *cb, void *u)
+{
+    int outlen = 24, pklen;
+    unsigned char *p = NULL, *start = NULL, *salt = NULL;
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cctx = NULL;
+    if (enclevel)
+        outlen += PVK_SALTLEN;
+    pklen = do_i2b(NULL, pk, 0);
+    if (pklen < 0)
+        return -1;
+    outlen += pklen;
+    if (out == NULL)
+        return outlen;
+    if (*out != NULL) {
+        p = *out;
+    } else {
+        start = p = OPENSSL_malloc(outlen);
+        if (p == NULL) {
+            PEMerr(PEM_F_I2B_PVK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            return -1;
+        }
+    }
+
+    cctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+    if (cctx == NULL)
+        goto error;
+
+    write_ledword(&p, MS_PVKMAGIC);
+    write_ledword(&p, 0);
+    if (EVP_PKEY_id(pk) == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
+        write_ledword(&p, MS_KEYTYPE_SIGN);
+    else
+        write_ledword(&p, MS_KEYTYPE_KEYX);
+    write_ledword(&p, enclevel ? 1 : 0);
+    write_ledword(&p, enclevel ? PVK_SALTLEN : 0);
+    write_ledword(&p, pklen);
+    if (enclevel) {
+        if (RAND_bytes(p, PVK_SALTLEN) <= 0)
+            goto error;
+        salt = p;
+        p += PVK_SALTLEN;
+    }
+    do_i2b(&p, pk, 0);
+    if (enclevel != 0) {
+        char psbuf[PEM_BUFSIZE];
+        unsigned char keybuf[20];
+        int enctmplen, inlen;
+        if (cb)
+            inlen = cb(psbuf, PEM_BUFSIZE, 1, u);
+        else
+            inlen = PEM_def_callback(psbuf, PEM_BUFSIZE, 1, u);
+        if (inlen <= 0) {
+            PEMerr(PEM_F_I2B_PVK, PEM_R_BAD_PASSWORD_READ);
+            goto error;
+        }
+        if (!derive_pvk_key(keybuf, salt, PVK_SALTLEN,
+                            (unsigned char *)psbuf, inlen))
+            goto error;
+        if (enclevel == 1)
+            memset(keybuf + 5, 0, 11);
+        p = salt + PVK_SALTLEN + 8;
+        if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(cctx, EVP_rc4(), NULL, keybuf, NULL))
+            goto error;
+        OPENSSL_cleanse(keybuf, 20);
+        if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(cctx, p, &enctmplen, p, pklen - 8))
+            goto error;
+        if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(cctx, p + enctmplen, &enctmplen))
+            goto error;
+    }
+
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(cctx);
+
+    if (*out == NULL)
+        *out = start;
+
+    return outlen;
+
+ error:
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(cctx);
+    if (*out == NULL)
+        OPENSSL_free(start);
+    return -1;
+}
+
+int i2b_PVK_bio(BIO *out, EVP_PKEY *pk, int enclevel,
+                pem_password_cb *cb, void *u)
+{
+    unsigned char *tmp = NULL;
+    int outlen, wrlen;
+    outlen = i2b_PVK(&tmp, pk, enclevel, cb, u);
+    if (outlen < 0)
+        return -1;
+    wrlen = BIO_write(out, tmp, outlen);
+    OPENSSL_free(tmp);
+    if (wrlen == outlen) {
+        PEMerr(PEM_F_I2B_PVK_BIO, PEM_R_BIO_WRITE_FAILURE);
+        return outlen;
+    }
+    return -1;
+}
+
+# endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/perlasm/README b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/perlasm/README
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e90bd8e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/perlasm/README
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+The perl scripts in this directory are my 'hack' to generate
+multiple different assembler formats via the one original script.
+
+The way to use this library is to start with adding the path to this directory
+and then include it.
+
+push(@INC,"perlasm","../../perlasm");
+require "x86asm.pl";
+
+The first thing we do is setup the file and type of assembler
+
+&asm_init($ARGV[0],$0);
+
+The first argument is the 'type'.  Currently
+'cpp', 'sol', 'a.out', 'elf' or 'win32'.
+Argument 2 is the file name.
+
+The reciprocal function is
+&asm_finish() which should be called at the end.
+
+There are 2 main 'packages'. x86ms.pl, which is the Microsoft assembler,
+and x86unix.pl which is the unix (gas) version.
+
+Functions of interest are:
+&external_label("des_SPtrans");	declare and external variable
+&LB(reg);			Low byte for a register
+&HB(reg);			High byte for a register
+&BP(off,base,index,scale)	Byte pointer addressing
+&DWP(off,base,index,scale)	Word pointer addressing
+&stack_push(num)		Basically a 'sub esp, num*4' with extra
+&stack_pop(num)			inverse of stack_push
+&function_begin(name,extra)	Start a function with pushing of
+				edi, esi, ebx and ebp.  extra is extra win32
+				external info that may be required.
+&function_begin_B(name,extra)	Same as normal function_begin but no pushing.
+&function_end(name)		Call at end of function.
+&function_end_A(name)		Standard pop and ret, for use inside functions
+&function_end_B(name)		Call at end but with poping or 'ret'.
+&swtmp(num)			Address on stack temp word.
+&wparam(num)			Parameter number num, that was push
+				in C convention.  This all works over pushes
+				and pops.
+&comment("hello there")		Put in a comment.
+&label("loop")			Refer to a label, normally a jmp target.
+&set_label("loop")		Set a label at this point.
+&data_word(word)		Put in a word of data.
+
+So how does this all hold together?  Given
+
+int calc(int len, int *data)
+	{
+	int i,j=0;
+
+	for (i=0; i<len; i++)
+		{
+		j+=other(data[i]);
+		}
+	}
+
+So a very simple version of this function could be coded as
+
+	push(@INC,"perlasm","../../perlasm");
+	require "x86asm.pl";
+	
+	&asm_init($ARGV[0],"cacl.pl");
+
+	&external_label("other");
+
+	$tmp1=	"eax";
+	$j=	"edi";
+	$data=	"esi";
+	$i=	"ebp";
+
+	&comment("a simple function");
+	&function_begin("calc");
+	&mov(	$data,		&wparam(1)); # data
+	&xor(	$j,		$j);
+	&xor(	$i,		$i);
+
+	&set_label("loop");
+	&cmp(	$i,		&wparam(0));
+	&jge(	&label("end"));
+
+	&mov(	$tmp1,		&DWP(0,$data,$i,4));
+	&push(	$tmp1);
+	&call(	"other");
+	&add(	$j,		"eax");
+	&pop(	$tmp1);
+	&inc(	$i);
+	&jmp(	&label("loop"));
+
+	&set_label("end");
+	&mov(	"eax",		$j);
+
+	&function_end("calc");
+
+	&asm_finish();
+
+The above example is very very unoptimised but gives an idea of how
+things work.
+
+There is also a cbc mode function generator in cbc.pl
+
+&cbc(	$name,
+	$encrypt_function_name,
+	$decrypt_function_name,
+	$true_if_byte_swap_needed,
+	$parameter_number_for_iv,
+	$parameter_number_for_encrypt_flag,
+	$first_parameter_to_pass,
+	$second_parameter_to_pass,
+	$third_parameter_to_pass);
+
+So for example, given
+void BF_encrypt(BF_LONG *data,BF_KEY *key);
+void BF_decrypt(BF_LONG *data,BF_KEY *key);
+void BF_cbc_encrypt(unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, long length,
+        BF_KEY *ks, unsigned char *iv, int enc);
+
+&cbc("BF_cbc_encrypt","BF_encrypt","BF_encrypt",1,4,5,3,-1,-1);
+
+&cbc("des_ncbc_encrypt","des_encrypt","des_encrypt",0,4,5,3,5,-1);
+&cbc("des_ede3_cbc_encrypt","des_encrypt3","des_decrypt3",0,6,7,3,4,5);
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/perlasm/arm-xlate.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/perlasm/arm-xlate.pl
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..ca2f8b9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/perlasm/arm-xlate.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,177 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+use strict;
+
+my $flavour = shift;
+my $output = shift;
+open STDOUT,">$output" || die "can't open $output: $!";
+
+$flavour = "linux32" if (!$flavour or $flavour eq "void");
+
+my %GLOBALS;
+my $dotinlocallabels=($flavour=~/linux/)?1:0;
+
+################################################################
+# directives which need special treatment on different platforms
+################################################################
+my $arch = sub {
+    if ($flavour =~ /linux/)	{ ".arch\t".join(',',@_); }
+    else			{ ""; }
+};
+my $fpu = sub {
+    if ($flavour =~ /linux/)	{ ".fpu\t".join(',',@_); }
+    else			{ ""; }
+};
+my $hidden = sub {
+    if ($flavour =~ /ios/)	{ ".private_extern\t".join(',',@_); }
+    else			{ ".hidden\t".join(',',@_); }
+};
+my $comm = sub {
+    my @args = split(/,\s*/,shift);
+    my $name = @args[0];
+    my $global = \$GLOBALS{$name};
+    my $ret;
+
+    if ($flavour =~ /ios32/)	{
+	$ret = ".comm\t_$name,@args[1]\n";
+	$ret .= ".non_lazy_symbol_pointer\n";
+	$ret .= "$name:\n";
+	$ret .= ".indirect_symbol\t_$name\n";
+	$ret .= ".long\t0";
+	$name = "_$name";
+    } else			{ $ret = ".comm\t".join(',',@args); }
+
+    $$global = $name;
+    $ret;
+};
+my $globl = sub {
+    my $name = shift;
+    my $global = \$GLOBALS{$name};
+    my $ret;
+
+    SWITCH: for ($flavour) {
+	/ios/		&& do { $name = "_$name";
+				last;
+			      };
+    }
+
+    $ret = ".globl	$name" if (!$ret);
+    $$global = $name;
+    $ret;
+};
+my $global = $globl;
+my $extern = sub {
+    &$globl(@_);
+    return;	# return nothing
+};
+my $type = sub {
+    if ($flavour =~ /linux/)	{ ".type\t".join(',',@_); }
+    elsif ($flavour =~ /ios32/)	{ if (join(',',@_) =~ /(\w+),%function/) {
+					"#ifdef __thumb2__\n".
+					".thumb_func	$1\n".
+					"#endif";
+				  }
+			        }
+    else			{ ""; }
+};
+my $size = sub {
+    if ($flavour =~ /linux/)	{ ".size\t".join(',',@_); }
+    else			{ ""; }
+};
+my $inst = sub {
+    if ($flavour =~ /linux/)    { ".inst\t".join(',',@_); }
+    else                        { ".long\t".join(',',@_); }
+};
+my $asciz = sub {
+    my $line = join(",",@_);
+    if ($line =~ /^"(.*)"$/)
+    {	".byte	" . join(",",unpack("C*",$1),0) . "\n.align	2";	}
+    else
+    {	"";	}
+};
+
+sub range {
+  my ($r,$sfx,$start,$end) = @_;
+
+    join(",",map("$r$_$sfx",($start..$end)));
+}
+
+sub expand_line {
+  my $line = shift;
+  my @ret = ();
+
+    pos($line)=0;
+
+    while ($line =~ m/\G[^@\/\{\"]*/g) {
+	if ($line =~ m/\G(@|\/\/|$)/gc) {
+	    last;
+	}
+	elsif ($line =~ m/\G\{/gc) {
+	    my $saved_pos = pos($line);
+	    $line =~ s/\G([rdqv])([0-9]+)([^\-]*)\-\1([0-9]+)\3/range($1,$3,$2,$4)/e;
+	    pos($line) = $saved_pos;
+	    $line =~ m/\G[^\}]*\}/g;
+	}
+	elsif ($line =~ m/\G\"/gc) {
+	    $line =~ m/\G[^\"]*\"/g;
+	}
+    }
+
+    $line =~ s/\b(\w+)/$GLOBALS{$1} or $1/ge;
+
+    return $line;
+}
+
+while(my $line=<>) {
+
+    if ($line =~ m/^\s*(#|@|\/\/)/)	{ print $line; next; }
+
+    $line =~ s|/\*.*\*/||;	# get rid of C-style comments...
+    $line =~ s|^\s+||;		# ... and skip white spaces in beginning...
+    $line =~ s|\s+$||;		# ... and at the end
+
+    {
+	$line =~ s|[\b\.]L(\w{2,})|L$1|g;	# common denominator for Locallabel
+	$line =~ s|\bL(\w{2,})|\.L$1|g	if ($dotinlocallabels);
+    }
+
+    {
+	$line =~ s|(^[\.\w]+)\:\s*||;
+	my $label = $1;
+	if ($label) {
+	    printf "%s:",($GLOBALS{$label} or $label);
+	}
+    }
+
+    if ($line !~ m/^[#@]/) {
+	$line =~ s|^\s*(\.?)(\S+)\s*||;
+	my $c = $1; $c = "\t" if ($c eq "");
+	my $mnemonic = $2;
+	my $opcode;
+	if ($mnemonic =~ m/([^\.]+)\.([^\.]+)/) {
+	    $opcode = eval("\$$1_$2");
+	} else {
+	    $opcode = eval("\$$mnemonic");
+	}
+
+	my $arg=expand_line($line);
+
+	if (ref($opcode) eq 'CODE') {
+		$line = &$opcode($arg);
+	} elsif ($mnemonic)         {
+		$line = $c.$mnemonic;
+		$line.= "\t$arg" if ($arg ne "");
+	}
+    }
+
+    print $line if ($line);
+    print "\n";
+}
+
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/perlasm/cbc.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/perlasm/cbc.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ad79b24
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/perlasm/cbc.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,356 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+# void des_ncbc_encrypt(input, output, length, schedule, ivec, enc)
+# des_cblock (*input);
+# des_cblock (*output);
+# long length;
+# des_key_schedule schedule;
+# des_cblock (*ivec);
+# int enc;
+#
+# calls 
+# des_encrypt((DES_LONG *)tin,schedule,DES_ENCRYPT);
+#
+
+#&cbc("des_ncbc_encrypt","des_encrypt",0);
+#&cbc("BF_cbc_encrypt","BF_encrypt","BF_encrypt",
+#	1,4,5,3,5,-1);
+#&cbc("des_ncbc_encrypt","des_encrypt","des_encrypt",
+#	0,4,5,3,5,-1);
+#&cbc("des_ede3_cbc_encrypt","des_encrypt3","des_decrypt3",
+#	0,6,7,3,4,5);
+#
+# When doing a cipher that needs bigendian order,
+# for encrypt, the iv is kept in bigendian form,
+# while for decrypt, it is kept in little endian.
+sub cbc
+	{
+	local($name,$enc_func,$dec_func,$swap,$iv_off,$enc_off,$p1,$p2,$p3)=@_;
+	# name is the function name
+	# enc_func and dec_func and the functions to call for encrypt/decrypt
+	# swap is true if byte order needs to be reversed
+	# iv_off is parameter number for the iv 
+	# enc_off is parameter number for the encrypt/decrypt flag
+	# p1,p2,p3 are the offsets for parameters to be passed to the
+	# underlying calls.
+
+	&function_begin_B($name,"");
+	&comment("");
+
+	$in="esi";
+	$out="edi";
+	$count="ebp";
+
+	&push("ebp");
+	&push("ebx");
+	&push("esi");
+	&push("edi");
+
+	$data_off=4;
+	$data_off+=4 if ($p1 > 0);
+	$data_off+=4 if ($p2 > 0);
+	$data_off+=4 if ($p3 > 0);
+
+	&mov($count,	&wparam(2));	# length
+
+	&comment("getting iv ptr from parameter $iv_off");
+	&mov("ebx",	&wparam($iv_off));	# Get iv ptr
+
+	&mov($in,	&DWP(0,"ebx","",0));#	iv[0]
+	&mov($out,	&DWP(4,"ebx","",0));#	iv[1]
+
+	&push($out);
+	&push($in);
+	&push($out);	# used in decrypt for iv[1]
+	&push($in);	# used in decrypt for iv[0]
+
+	&mov("ebx",	"esp");		# This is the address of tin[2]
+
+	&mov($in,	&wparam(0));	# in
+	&mov($out,	&wparam(1));	# out
+
+	# We have loaded them all, how lets push things
+	&comment("getting encrypt flag from parameter $enc_off");
+	&mov("ecx",	&wparam($enc_off));	# Get enc flag
+	if ($p3 > 0)
+		{
+		&comment("get and push parameter $p3");
+		if ($enc_off != $p3)
+			{ &mov("eax",	&wparam($p3)); &push("eax"); }
+		else	{ &push("ecx"); }
+		}
+	if ($p2 > 0)
+		{
+		&comment("get and push parameter $p2");
+		if ($enc_off != $p2)
+			{ &mov("eax",	&wparam($p2)); &push("eax"); }
+		else	{ &push("ecx"); }
+		}
+	if ($p1 > 0)
+		{
+		&comment("get and push parameter $p1");
+		if ($enc_off != $p1)
+			{ &mov("eax",	&wparam($p1)); &push("eax"); }
+		else	{ &push("ecx"); }
+		}
+	&push("ebx");		# push data/iv
+
+	&cmp("ecx",0);
+	&jz(&label("decrypt"));
+
+	&and($count,0xfffffff8);
+	&mov("eax",	&DWP($data_off,"esp","",0));	# load iv[0]
+	&mov("ebx",	&DWP($data_off+4,"esp","",0));	# load iv[1]
+
+	&jz(&label("encrypt_finish"));
+
+	#############################################################
+
+	&set_label("encrypt_loop");
+	# encrypt start 
+	# "eax" and "ebx" hold iv (or the last cipher text)
+
+	&mov("ecx",	&DWP(0,$in,"",0));	# load first 4 bytes
+	&mov("edx",	&DWP(4,$in,"",0));	# second 4 bytes
+
+	&xor("eax",	"ecx");
+	&xor("ebx",	"edx");
+
+	&bswap("eax")	if $swap;
+	&bswap("ebx")	if $swap;
+
+	&mov(&DWP($data_off,"esp","",0),	"eax");	# put in array for call
+	&mov(&DWP($data_off+4,"esp","",0),	"ebx");	#
+
+	&call($enc_func);
+
+	&mov("eax",	&DWP($data_off,"esp","",0));
+	&mov("ebx",	&DWP($data_off+4,"esp","",0));
+
+	&bswap("eax")	if $swap;
+	&bswap("ebx")	if $swap;
+
+	&mov(&DWP(0,$out,"",0),"eax");
+	&mov(&DWP(4,$out,"",0),"ebx");
+
+	# eax and ebx are the next iv.
+
+	&add($in,	8);
+	&add($out,	8);
+
+	&sub($count,	8);
+	&jnz(&label("encrypt_loop"));
+
+###################################################################3
+	&set_label("encrypt_finish");
+	&mov($count,	&wparam(2));	# length
+	&and($count,	7);
+	&jz(&label("finish"));
+	&call(&label("PIC_point"));
+&set_label("PIC_point");
+	&blindpop("edx");
+	&lea("ecx",&DWP(&label("cbc_enc_jmp_table")."-".&label("PIC_point"),"edx"));
+	&mov($count,&DWP(0,"ecx",$count,4));
+	&add($count,"edx");
+	&xor("ecx","ecx");
+	&xor("edx","edx");
+	#&mov($count,&DWP(&label("cbc_enc_jmp_table"),"",$count,4));
+	&jmp_ptr($count);
+
+&set_label("ej7");
+	&movb(&HB("edx"),	&BP(6,$in,"",0));
+	&shl("edx",8);
+&set_label("ej6");
+	&movb(&HB("edx"),	&BP(5,$in,"",0));
+&set_label("ej5");
+	&movb(&LB("edx"),	&BP(4,$in,"",0));
+&set_label("ej4");
+	&mov("ecx",		&DWP(0,$in,"",0));
+	&jmp(&label("ejend"));
+&set_label("ej3");
+	&movb(&HB("ecx"),	&BP(2,$in,"",0));
+	&shl("ecx",8);
+&set_label("ej2");
+	&movb(&HB("ecx"),	&BP(1,$in,"",0));
+&set_label("ej1");
+	&movb(&LB("ecx"),	&BP(0,$in,"",0));
+&set_label("ejend");
+
+	&xor("eax",	"ecx");
+	&xor("ebx",	"edx");
+
+	&bswap("eax")	if $swap;
+	&bswap("ebx")	if $swap;
+
+	&mov(&DWP($data_off,"esp","",0),	"eax");	# put in array for call
+	&mov(&DWP($data_off+4,"esp","",0),	"ebx");	#
+
+	&call($enc_func);
+
+	&mov("eax",	&DWP($data_off,"esp","",0));
+	&mov("ebx",	&DWP($data_off+4,"esp","",0));
+
+	&bswap("eax")	if $swap;
+	&bswap("ebx")	if $swap;
+
+	&mov(&DWP(0,$out,"",0),"eax");
+	&mov(&DWP(4,$out,"",0),"ebx");
+
+	&jmp(&label("finish"));
+
+	#############################################################
+	#############################################################
+	&set_label("decrypt",1);
+	# decrypt start 
+	&and($count,0xfffffff8);
+	# The next 2 instructions are only for if the jz is taken
+	&mov("eax",	&DWP($data_off+8,"esp","",0));	# get iv[0]
+	&mov("ebx",	&DWP($data_off+12,"esp","",0));	# get iv[1]
+	&jz(&label("decrypt_finish"));
+
+	&set_label("decrypt_loop");
+	&mov("eax",	&DWP(0,$in,"",0));	# load first 4 bytes
+	&mov("ebx",	&DWP(4,$in,"",0));	# second 4 bytes
+
+	&bswap("eax")	if $swap;
+	&bswap("ebx")	if $swap;
+
+	&mov(&DWP($data_off,"esp","",0),	"eax");	# put back
+	&mov(&DWP($data_off+4,"esp","",0),	"ebx");	#
+
+	&call($dec_func);
+
+	&mov("eax",	&DWP($data_off,"esp","",0));	# get return
+	&mov("ebx",	&DWP($data_off+4,"esp","",0));	#
+
+	&bswap("eax")	if $swap;
+	&bswap("ebx")	if $swap;
+
+	&mov("ecx",	&DWP($data_off+8,"esp","",0));	# get iv[0]
+	&mov("edx",	&DWP($data_off+12,"esp","",0));	# get iv[1]
+
+	&xor("ecx",	"eax");
+	&xor("edx",	"ebx");
+
+	&mov("eax",	&DWP(0,$in,"",0));	# get old cipher text,
+	&mov("ebx",	&DWP(4,$in,"",0));	# next iv actually
+
+	&mov(&DWP(0,$out,"",0),"ecx");
+	&mov(&DWP(4,$out,"",0),"edx");
+
+	&mov(&DWP($data_off+8,"esp","",0),	"eax");	# save iv
+	&mov(&DWP($data_off+12,"esp","",0),	"ebx");	#
+
+	&add($in,	8);
+	&add($out,	8);
+
+	&sub($count,	8);
+	&jnz(&label("decrypt_loop"));
+############################ ENDIT #######################3
+	&set_label("decrypt_finish");
+	&mov($count,	&wparam(2));	# length
+	&and($count,	7);
+	&jz(&label("finish"));
+
+	&mov("eax",	&DWP(0,$in,"",0));	# load first 4 bytes
+	&mov("ebx",	&DWP(4,$in,"",0));	# second 4 bytes
+
+	&bswap("eax")	if $swap;
+	&bswap("ebx")	if $swap;
+
+	&mov(&DWP($data_off,"esp","",0),	"eax");	# put back
+	&mov(&DWP($data_off+4,"esp","",0),	"ebx");	#
+
+	&call($dec_func);
+
+	&mov("eax",	&DWP($data_off,"esp","",0));	# get return
+	&mov("ebx",	&DWP($data_off+4,"esp","",0));	#
+
+	&bswap("eax")	if $swap;
+	&bswap("ebx")	if $swap;
+
+	&mov("ecx",	&DWP($data_off+8,"esp","",0));	# get iv[0]
+	&mov("edx",	&DWP($data_off+12,"esp","",0));	# get iv[1]
+
+	&xor("ecx",	"eax");
+	&xor("edx",	"ebx");
+
+	# this is for when we exit
+	&mov("eax",	&DWP(0,$in,"",0));	# get old cipher text,
+	&mov("ebx",	&DWP(4,$in,"",0));	# next iv actually
+
+&set_label("dj7");
+	&rotr("edx",	16);
+	&movb(&BP(6,$out,"",0),	&LB("edx"));
+	&shr("edx",16);
+&set_label("dj6");
+	&movb(&BP(5,$out,"",0),	&HB("edx"));
+&set_label("dj5");
+	&movb(&BP(4,$out,"",0),	&LB("edx"));
+&set_label("dj4");
+	&mov(&DWP(0,$out,"",0),	"ecx");
+	&jmp(&label("djend"));
+&set_label("dj3");
+	&rotr("ecx",	16);
+	&movb(&BP(2,$out,"",0),	&LB("ecx"));
+	&shl("ecx",16);
+&set_label("dj2");
+	&movb(&BP(1,$in,"",0),	&HB("ecx"));
+&set_label("dj1");
+	&movb(&BP(0,$in,"",0),	&LB("ecx"));
+&set_label("djend");
+
+	# final iv is still in eax:ebx
+	&jmp(&label("finish"));
+
+
+############################ FINISH #######################3
+	&set_label("finish",1);
+	&mov("ecx",	&wparam($iv_off));	# Get iv ptr
+
+	#################################################
+	$total=16+4;
+	$total+=4 if ($p1 > 0);
+	$total+=4 if ($p2 > 0);
+	$total+=4 if ($p3 > 0);
+	&add("esp",$total);
+
+	&mov(&DWP(0,"ecx","",0),	"eax");	# save iv
+	&mov(&DWP(4,"ecx","",0),	"ebx");	# save iv
+
+	&function_end_A($name);
+
+	&align(64);
+	&set_label("cbc_enc_jmp_table");
+	&data_word("0");
+	&data_word(&label("ej1")."-".&label("PIC_point"));
+	&data_word(&label("ej2")."-".&label("PIC_point"));
+	&data_word(&label("ej3")."-".&label("PIC_point"));
+	&data_word(&label("ej4")."-".&label("PIC_point"));
+	&data_word(&label("ej5")."-".&label("PIC_point"));
+	&data_word(&label("ej6")."-".&label("PIC_point"));
+	&data_word(&label("ej7")."-".&label("PIC_point"));
+	# not used
+	#&set_label("cbc_dec_jmp_table",1);
+	#&data_word("0");
+	#&data_word(&label("dj1")."-".&label("PIC_point"));
+	#&data_word(&label("dj2")."-".&label("PIC_point"));
+	#&data_word(&label("dj3")."-".&label("PIC_point"));
+	#&data_word(&label("dj4")."-".&label("PIC_point"));
+	#&data_word(&label("dj5")."-".&label("PIC_point"));
+	#&data_word(&label("dj6")."-".&label("PIC_point"));
+	#&data_word(&label("dj7")."-".&label("PIC_point"));
+	&align(64);
+
+	&function_end_B($name);
+	
+	}
+
+1;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/perlasm/ppc-xlate.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/perlasm/ppc-xlate.pl
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..2d46e24
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/perlasm/ppc-xlate.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,265 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+my $flavour = shift;
+my $output = shift;
+open STDOUT,">$output" || die "can't open $output: $!";
+
+my %GLOBALS;
+my $dotinlocallabels=($flavour=~/linux/)?1:0;
+
+################################################################
+# directives which need special treatment on different platforms
+################################################################
+my $globl = sub {
+    my $junk = shift;
+    my $name = shift;
+    my $global = \$GLOBALS{$name};
+    my $ret;
+
+    $name =~ s|^[\.\_]||;
+ 
+    SWITCH: for ($flavour) {
+	/aix/		&& do { $name = ".$name";
+				last;
+			      };
+	/osx/		&& do { $name = "_$name";
+				last;
+			      };
+	/linux.*(32|64le)/
+			&& do {	$ret .= ".globl	$name\n";
+				$ret .= ".type	$name,\@function";
+				last;
+			      };
+	/linux.*64/	&& do {	$ret .= ".globl	$name\n";
+				$ret .= ".type	$name,\@function\n";
+				$ret .= ".section	\".opd\",\"aw\"\n";
+				$ret .= ".align	3\n";
+				$ret .= "$name:\n";
+				$ret .= ".quad	.$name,.TOC.\@tocbase,0\n";
+				$ret .= ".previous\n";
+
+				$name = ".$name";
+				last;
+			      };
+    }
+
+    $ret = ".globl	$name" if (!$ret);
+    $$global = $name;
+    $ret;
+};
+my $text = sub {
+    my $ret = ($flavour =~ /aix/) ? ".csect\t.text[PR],7" : ".text";
+    $ret = ".abiversion	2\n".$ret	if ($flavour =~ /linux.*64le/);
+    $ret;
+};
+my $machine = sub {
+    my $junk = shift;
+    my $arch = shift;
+    if ($flavour =~ /osx/)
+    {	$arch =~ s/\"//g;
+	$arch = ($flavour=~/64/) ? "ppc970-64" : "ppc970" if ($arch eq "any");
+    }
+    ".machine	$arch";
+};
+my $size = sub {
+    if ($flavour =~ /linux/)
+    {	shift;
+	my $name = shift; $name =~ s|^[\.\_]||;
+	my $ret  = ".size	$name,.-".($flavour=~/64$/?".":"").$name;
+	$ret .= "\n.size	.$name,.-.$name" if ($flavour=~/64$/);
+	$ret;
+    }
+    else
+    {	"";	}
+};
+my $asciz = sub {
+    shift;
+    my $line = join(",",@_);
+    if ($line =~ /^"(.*)"$/)
+    {	".byte	" . join(",",unpack("C*",$1),0) . "\n.align	2";	}
+    else
+    {	"";	}
+};
+my $quad = sub {
+    shift;
+    my @ret;
+    my ($hi,$lo);
+    for (@_) {
+	if (/^0x([0-9a-f]*?)([0-9a-f]{1,8})$/io)
+	{  $hi=$1?"0x$1":"0"; $lo="0x$2";  }
+	elsif (/^([0-9]+)$/o)
+	{  $hi=$1>>32; $lo=$1&0xffffffff;  } # error-prone with 32-bit perl
+	else
+	{  $hi=undef; $lo=$_; }
+
+	if (defined($hi))
+	{  push(@ret,$flavour=~/le$/o?".long\t$lo,$hi":".long\t$hi,$lo");  }
+	else
+	{  push(@ret,".quad	$lo");  }
+    }
+    join("\n",@ret);
+};
+
+################################################################
+# simplified mnemonics not handled by at least one assembler
+################################################################
+my $cmplw = sub {
+    my $f = shift;
+    my $cr = 0; $cr = shift if ($#_>1);
+    # Some out-of-date 32-bit GNU assembler just can't handle cmplw...
+    ($flavour =~ /linux.*32/) ?
+	"	.long	".sprintf "0x%x",31<<26|$cr<<23|$_[0]<<16|$_[1]<<11|64 :
+	"	cmplw	".join(',',$cr,@_);
+};
+my $bdnz = sub {
+    my $f = shift;
+    my $bo = $f=~/[\+\-]/ ? 16+9 : 16;	# optional "to be taken" hint
+    "	bc	$bo,0,".shift;
+} if ($flavour!~/linux/);
+my $bltlr = sub {
+    my $f = shift;
+    my $bo = $f=~/\-/ ? 12+2 : 12;	# optional "not to be taken" hint
+    ($flavour =~ /linux/) ?		# GNU as doesn't allow most recent hints
+	"	.long	".sprintf "0x%x",19<<26|$bo<<21|16<<1 :
+	"	bclr	$bo,0";
+};
+my $bnelr = sub {
+    my $f = shift;
+    my $bo = $f=~/\-/ ? 4+2 : 4;	# optional "not to be taken" hint
+    ($flavour =~ /linux/) ?		# GNU as doesn't allow most recent hints
+	"	.long	".sprintf "0x%x",19<<26|$bo<<21|2<<16|16<<1 :
+	"	bclr	$bo,2";
+};
+my $beqlr = sub {
+    my $f = shift;
+    my $bo = $f=~/-/ ? 12+2 : 12;	# optional "not to be taken" hint
+    ($flavour =~ /linux/) ?		# GNU as doesn't allow most recent hints
+	"	.long	".sprintf "0x%X",19<<26|$bo<<21|2<<16|16<<1 :
+	"	bclr	$bo,2";
+};
+# GNU assembler can't handle extrdi rA,rS,16,48, or when sum of last two
+# arguments is 64, with "operand out of range" error.
+my $extrdi = sub {
+    my ($f,$ra,$rs,$n,$b) = @_;
+    $b = ($b+$n)&63; $n = 64-$n;
+    "	rldicl	$ra,$rs,$b,$n";
+};
+my $vmr = sub {
+    my ($f,$vx,$vy) = @_;
+    "	vor	$vx,$vy,$vy";
+};
+
+# Some ABIs specify vrsave, special-purpose register #256, as reserved
+# for system use.
+my $no_vrsave = ($flavour =~ /aix|linux64le/);
+my $mtspr = sub {
+    my ($f,$idx,$ra) = @_;
+    if ($idx == 256 && $no_vrsave) {
+	"	or	$ra,$ra,$ra";
+    } else {
+	"	mtspr	$idx,$ra";
+    }
+};
+my $mfspr = sub {
+    my ($f,$rd,$idx) = @_;
+    if ($idx == 256 && $no_vrsave) {
+	"	li	$rd,-1";
+    } else {
+	"	mfspr	$rd,$idx";
+    }
+};
+
+# PowerISA 2.06 stuff
+sub vsxmem_op {
+    my ($f, $vrt, $ra, $rb, $op) = @_;
+    "	.long	".sprintf "0x%X",(31<<26)|($vrt<<21)|($ra<<16)|($rb<<11)|($op*2+1);
+}
+# made-up unaligned memory reference AltiVec/VMX instructions
+my $lvx_u	= sub {	vsxmem_op(@_, 844); };	# lxvd2x
+my $stvx_u	= sub {	vsxmem_op(@_, 972); };	# stxvd2x
+my $lvdx_u	= sub {	vsxmem_op(@_, 588); };	# lxsdx
+my $stvdx_u	= sub {	vsxmem_op(@_, 716); };	# stxsdx
+my $lvx_4w	= sub { vsxmem_op(@_, 780); };	# lxvw4x
+my $stvx_4w	= sub { vsxmem_op(@_, 908); };	# stxvw4x
+
+# PowerISA 2.07 stuff
+sub vcrypto_op {
+    my ($f, $vrt, $vra, $vrb, $op) = @_;
+    "	.long	".sprintf "0x%X",(4<<26)|($vrt<<21)|($vra<<16)|($vrb<<11)|$op;
+}
+my $vcipher	= sub { vcrypto_op(@_, 1288); };
+my $vcipherlast	= sub { vcrypto_op(@_, 1289); };
+my $vncipher	= sub { vcrypto_op(@_, 1352); };
+my $vncipherlast= sub { vcrypto_op(@_, 1353); };
+my $vsbox	= sub { vcrypto_op(@_, 0, 1480); };
+my $vshasigmad	= sub { my ($st,$six)=splice(@_,-2); vcrypto_op(@_, $st<<4|$six, 1730); };
+my $vshasigmaw	= sub { my ($st,$six)=splice(@_,-2); vcrypto_op(@_, $st<<4|$six, 1666); };
+my $vpmsumb	= sub { vcrypto_op(@_, 1032); };
+my $vpmsumd	= sub { vcrypto_op(@_, 1224); };
+my $vpmsubh	= sub { vcrypto_op(@_, 1096); };
+my $vpmsumw	= sub { vcrypto_op(@_, 1160); };
+my $vaddudm	= sub { vcrypto_op(@_, 192);  };
+
+my $mtsle	= sub {
+    my ($f, $arg) = @_;
+    "	.long	".sprintf "0x%X",(31<<26)|($arg<<21)|(147*2);
+};
+
+# PowerISA 3.0 stuff
+my $maddhdu = sub {
+    my ($f, $rt, $ra, $rb, $rc) = @_;
+    "	.long	".sprintf "0x%X",(4<<26)|($rt<<21)|($ra<<16)|($rb<<11)|($rc<<6)|49;
+};
+my $maddld = sub {
+    my ($f, $rt, $ra, $rb, $rc) = @_;
+    "	.long	".sprintf "0x%X",(4<<26)|($rt<<21)|($ra<<16)|($rb<<11)|($rc<<6)|51;
+};
+
+my $darn = sub {
+    my ($f, $rt, $l) = @_;
+    "	.long	".sprintf "0x%X",(31<<26)|($rt<<21)|($l<<16)|(755<<1);
+};
+
+while($line=<>) {
+
+    $line =~ s|[#!;].*$||;	# get rid of asm-style comments...
+    $line =~ s|/\*.*\*/||;	# ... and C-style comments...
+    $line =~ s|^\s+||;		# ... and skip white spaces in beginning...
+    $line =~ s|\s+$||;		# ... and at the end
+
+    {
+	$line =~ s|\b\.L(\w+)|L$1|g;	# common denominator for Locallabel
+	$line =~ s|\bL(\w+)|\.L$1|g	if ($dotinlocallabels);
+    }
+
+    {
+	$line =~ s|(^[\.\w]+)\:\s*||;
+	my $label = $1;
+	if ($label) {
+	    printf "%s:",($GLOBALS{$label} or $label);
+	    printf "\n.localentry\t$GLOBALS{$label},0"	if ($GLOBALS{$label} && $flavour =~ /linux.*64le/);
+	}
+    }
+
+    {
+	$line =~ s|^\s*(\.?)(\w+)([\.\+\-]?)\s*||;
+	my $c = $1; $c = "\t" if ($c eq "");
+	my $mnemonic = $2;
+	my $f = $3;
+	my $opcode = eval("\$$mnemonic");
+	$line =~ s/\b(c?[rf]|v|vs)([0-9]+)\b/$2/g if ($c ne "." and $flavour !~ /osx/);
+	if (ref($opcode) eq 'CODE') { $line = &$opcode($f,split(',',$line)); }
+	elsif ($mnemonic)           { $line = $c.$mnemonic.$f."\t".$line; }
+    }
+
+    print $line if ($line);
+    print "\n";
+}
+
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/perlasm/sparcv9_modes.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/perlasm/sparcv9_modes.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bfdada8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/perlasm/sparcv9_modes.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,1702 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2012-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+# Specific modes implementations for SPARC Architecture 2011. There
+# is T4 dependency though, an ASI value that is not specified in the
+# Architecture Manual. But as SPARC universe is rather monocultural,
+# we imply that processor capable of executing crypto instructions
+# can handle the ASI in question as well. This means that we ought to
+# keep eyes open when new processors emerge...
+#
+# As for above mentioned ASI. It's so called "block initializing
+# store" which cancels "read" in "read-update-write" on cache lines.
+# This is "cooperative" optimization, as it reduces overall pressure
+# on memory interface. Benefits can't be observed/quantified with
+# usual benchmarks, on the contrary you can notice that single-thread
+# performance for parallelizable modes is ~1.5% worse for largest
+# block sizes [though few percent better for not so long ones]. All
+# this based on suggestions from David Miller.
+
+$::bias="STACK_BIAS";
+$::frame="STACK_FRAME";
+$::size_t_cc="SIZE_T_CC";
+
+sub asm_init {		# to be called with @ARGV as argument
+    for (@_)		{ $::abibits=64 if (/\-m64/ || /\-xarch\=v9/); }
+    if ($::abibits==64)	{ $::bias=2047; $::frame=192; $::size_t_cc="%xcc"; }
+    else		{ $::bias=0;    $::frame=112; $::size_t_cc="%icc"; }
+}
+
+# unified interface
+my ($inp,$out,$len,$key,$ivec)=map("%i$_",(0..5));
+# local variables
+my ($ileft,$iright,$ooff,$omask,$ivoff,$blk_init)=map("%l$_",(0..7));
+
+sub alg_cbc_encrypt_implement {
+my ($alg,$bits) = @_;
+
+$::code.=<<___;
+.globl	${alg}${bits}_t4_cbc_encrypt
+.align	32
+${alg}${bits}_t4_cbc_encrypt:
+	save		%sp, -$::frame, %sp
+	cmp		$len, 0
+	be,pn		$::size_t_cc, .L${bits}_cbc_enc_abort
+	srln		$len, 0, $len		! needed on v8+, "nop" on v9
+	sub		$inp, $out, $blk_init	! $inp!=$out
+___
+$::code.=<<___ if (!$::evp);
+	andcc		$ivec, 7, $ivoff
+	alignaddr	$ivec, %g0, $ivec
+
+	ldd		[$ivec + 0], %f0	! load ivec
+	bz,pt		%icc, 1f
+	ldd		[$ivec + 8], %f2
+	ldd		[$ivec + 16], %f4
+	faligndata	%f0, %f2, %f0
+	faligndata	%f2, %f4, %f2
+1:
+___
+$::code.=<<___ if ($::evp);
+	ld		[$ivec + 0], %f0
+	ld		[$ivec + 4], %f1
+	ld		[$ivec + 8], %f2
+	ld		[$ivec + 12], %f3
+___
+$::code.=<<___;
+	prefetch	[$inp], 20
+	prefetch	[$inp + 63], 20
+	call		_${alg}${bits}_load_enckey
+	and		$inp, 7, $ileft
+	andn		$inp, 7, $inp
+	sll		$ileft, 3, $ileft
+	mov		64, $iright
+	mov		0xff, $omask
+	sub		$iright, $ileft, $iright
+	and		$out, 7, $ooff
+	cmp		$len, 127
+	movrnz		$ooff, 0, $blk_init		! if (	$out&7 ||
+	movleu		$::size_t_cc, 0, $blk_init	!	$len<128 ||
+	brnz,pn		$blk_init, .L${bits}cbc_enc_blk	!	$inp==$out)
+	srl		$omask, $ooff, $omask
+
+	alignaddrl	$out, %g0, $out
+	srlx		$len, 4, $len
+	prefetch	[$out], 22
+
+.L${bits}_cbc_enc_loop:
+	ldx		[$inp + 0], %o0
+	brz,pt		$ileft, 4f
+	ldx		[$inp + 8], %o1
+
+	ldx		[$inp + 16], %o2
+	sllx		%o0, $ileft, %o0
+	srlx		%o1, $iright, %g1
+	sllx		%o1, $ileft, %o1
+	or		%g1, %o0, %o0
+	srlx		%o2, $iright, %o2
+	or		%o2, %o1, %o1
+4:
+	xor		%g4, %o0, %o0		! ^= rk[0]
+	xor		%g5, %o1, %o1
+	movxtod		%o0, %f12
+	movxtod		%o1, %f14
+
+	fxor		%f12, %f0, %f0		! ^= ivec
+	fxor		%f14, %f2, %f2
+	prefetch	[$out + 63], 22
+	prefetch	[$inp + 16+63], 20
+	call		_${alg}${bits}_encrypt_1x
+	add		$inp, 16, $inp
+
+	brnz,pn		$ooff, 2f
+	sub		$len, 1, $len
+		
+	std		%f0, [$out + 0]
+	std		%f2, [$out + 8]
+	brnz,pt		$len, .L${bits}_cbc_enc_loop
+	add		$out, 16, $out
+___
+$::code.=<<___ if ($::evp);
+	st		%f0, [$ivec + 0]
+	st		%f1, [$ivec + 4]
+	st		%f2, [$ivec + 8]
+	st		%f3, [$ivec + 12]
+___
+$::code.=<<___ if (!$::evp);
+	brnz,pn		$ivoff, 3f
+	nop
+
+	std		%f0, [$ivec + 0]	! write out ivec
+	std		%f2, [$ivec + 8]
+___
+$::code.=<<___;
+.L${bits}_cbc_enc_abort:
+	ret
+	restore
+
+.align	16
+2:	ldxa		[$inp]0x82, %o0		! avoid read-after-write hazard
+						! and ~3x deterioration
+						! in inp==out case
+	faligndata	%f0, %f0, %f4		! handle unaligned output
+	faligndata	%f0, %f2, %f6
+	faligndata	%f2, %f2, %f8
+
+	stda		%f4, [$out + $omask]0xc0	! partial store
+	std		%f6, [$out + 8]
+	add		$out, 16, $out
+	orn		%g0, $omask, $omask
+	stda		%f8, [$out + $omask]0xc0	! partial store
+
+	brnz,pt		$len, .L${bits}_cbc_enc_loop+4
+	orn		%g0, $omask, $omask
+___
+$::code.=<<___ if ($::evp);
+	st		%f0, [$ivec + 0]
+	st		%f1, [$ivec + 4]
+	st		%f2, [$ivec + 8]
+	st		%f3, [$ivec + 12]
+___
+$::code.=<<___ if (!$::evp);
+	brnz,pn		$ivoff, 3f
+	nop
+
+	std		%f0, [$ivec + 0]	! write out ivec
+	std		%f2, [$ivec + 8]
+	ret
+	restore
+
+.align	16
+3:	alignaddrl	$ivec, $ivoff, %g0	! handle unaligned ivec
+	mov		0xff, $omask
+	srl		$omask, $ivoff, $omask
+	faligndata	%f0, %f0, %f4
+	faligndata	%f0, %f2, %f6
+	faligndata	%f2, %f2, %f8
+	stda		%f4, [$ivec + $omask]0xc0
+	std		%f6, [$ivec + 8]
+	add		$ivec, 16, $ivec
+	orn		%g0, $omask, $omask
+	stda		%f8, [$ivec + $omask]0xc0
+___
+$::code.=<<___;
+	ret
+	restore
+
+!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
+.align	32
+.L${bits}cbc_enc_blk:
+	add	$out, $len, $blk_init
+	and	$blk_init, 63, $blk_init	! tail
+	sub	$len, $blk_init, $len
+	add	$blk_init, 15, $blk_init	! round up to 16n
+	srlx	$len, 4, $len
+	srl	$blk_init, 4, $blk_init
+
+.L${bits}_cbc_enc_blk_loop:
+	ldx		[$inp + 0], %o0
+	brz,pt		$ileft, 5f
+	ldx		[$inp + 8], %o1
+
+	ldx		[$inp + 16], %o2
+	sllx		%o0, $ileft, %o0
+	srlx		%o1, $iright, %g1
+	sllx		%o1, $ileft, %o1
+	or		%g1, %o0, %o0
+	srlx		%o2, $iright, %o2
+	or		%o2, %o1, %o1
+5:
+	xor		%g4, %o0, %o0		! ^= rk[0]
+	xor		%g5, %o1, %o1
+	movxtod		%o0, %f12
+	movxtod		%o1, %f14
+
+	fxor		%f12, %f0, %f0		! ^= ivec
+	fxor		%f14, %f2, %f2
+	prefetch	[$inp + 16+63], 20
+	call		_${alg}${bits}_encrypt_1x
+	add		$inp, 16, $inp
+	sub		$len, 1, $len
+		
+	stda		%f0, [$out]0xe2		! ASI_BLK_INIT, T4-specific
+	add		$out, 8, $out
+	stda		%f2, [$out]0xe2		! ASI_BLK_INIT, T4-specific
+	brnz,pt		$len, .L${bits}_cbc_enc_blk_loop
+	add		$out, 8, $out
+
+	membar		#StoreLoad|#StoreStore
+	brnz,pt		$blk_init, .L${bits}_cbc_enc_loop
+	mov		$blk_init, $len
+___
+$::code.=<<___ if ($::evp);
+	st		%f0, [$ivec + 0]
+	st		%f1, [$ivec + 4]
+	st		%f2, [$ivec + 8]
+	st		%f3, [$ivec + 12]
+___
+$::code.=<<___ if (!$::evp);
+	brnz,pn		$ivoff, 3b
+	nop
+
+	std		%f0, [$ivec + 0]	! write out ivec
+	std		%f2, [$ivec + 8]
+___
+$::code.=<<___;
+	ret
+	restore
+.type	${alg}${bits}_t4_cbc_encrypt,#function
+.size	${alg}${bits}_t4_cbc_encrypt,.-${alg}${bits}_t4_cbc_encrypt
+___
+}
+
+sub alg_cbc_decrypt_implement {
+my ($alg,$bits) = @_;
+
+$::code.=<<___;
+.globl	${alg}${bits}_t4_cbc_decrypt
+.align	32
+${alg}${bits}_t4_cbc_decrypt:
+	save		%sp, -$::frame, %sp
+	cmp		$len, 0
+	be,pn		$::size_t_cc, .L${bits}_cbc_dec_abort
+	srln		$len, 0, $len		! needed on v8+, "nop" on v9
+	sub		$inp, $out, $blk_init	! $inp!=$out
+___
+$::code.=<<___ if (!$::evp);
+	andcc		$ivec, 7, $ivoff
+	alignaddr	$ivec, %g0, $ivec
+
+	ldd		[$ivec + 0], %f12	! load ivec
+	bz,pt		%icc, 1f
+	ldd		[$ivec + 8], %f14
+	ldd		[$ivec + 16], %f0
+	faligndata	%f12, %f14, %f12
+	faligndata	%f14, %f0, %f14
+1:
+___
+$::code.=<<___ if ($::evp);
+	ld		[$ivec + 0], %f12	! load ivec
+	ld		[$ivec + 4], %f13
+	ld		[$ivec + 8], %f14
+	ld		[$ivec + 12], %f15
+___
+$::code.=<<___;
+	prefetch	[$inp], 20
+	prefetch	[$inp + 63], 20
+	call		_${alg}${bits}_load_deckey
+	and		$inp, 7, $ileft
+	andn		$inp, 7, $inp
+	sll		$ileft, 3, $ileft
+	mov		64, $iright
+	mov		0xff, $omask
+	sub		$iright, $ileft, $iright
+	and		$out, 7, $ooff
+	cmp		$len, 255
+	movrnz		$ooff, 0, $blk_init		! if (	$out&7 ||
+	movleu		$::size_t_cc, 0, $blk_init	!	$len<256 ||
+	brnz,pn		$blk_init, .L${bits}cbc_dec_blk	!	$inp==$out)
+	srl		$omask, $ooff, $omask
+
+	andcc		$len, 16, %g0		! is number of blocks even?
+	srlx		$len, 4, $len
+	alignaddrl	$out, %g0, $out
+	bz		%icc, .L${bits}_cbc_dec_loop2x
+	prefetch	[$out], 22
+.L${bits}_cbc_dec_loop:
+	ldx		[$inp + 0], %o0
+	brz,pt		$ileft, 4f
+	ldx		[$inp + 8], %o1
+
+	ldx		[$inp + 16], %o2
+	sllx		%o0, $ileft, %o0
+	srlx		%o1, $iright, %g1
+	sllx		%o1, $ileft, %o1
+	or		%g1, %o0, %o0
+	srlx		%o2, $iright, %o2
+	or		%o2, %o1, %o1
+4:
+	xor		%g4, %o0, %o2		! ^= rk[0]
+	xor		%g5, %o1, %o3
+	movxtod		%o2, %f0
+	movxtod		%o3, %f2
+
+	prefetch	[$out + 63], 22
+	prefetch	[$inp + 16+63], 20
+	call		_${alg}${bits}_decrypt_1x
+	add		$inp, 16, $inp
+
+	fxor		%f12, %f0, %f0		! ^= ivec
+	fxor		%f14, %f2, %f2
+	movxtod		%o0, %f12
+	movxtod		%o1, %f14
+
+	brnz,pn		$ooff, 2f
+	sub		$len, 1, $len
+		
+	std		%f0, [$out + 0]
+	std		%f2, [$out + 8]
+	brnz,pt		$len, .L${bits}_cbc_dec_loop2x
+	add		$out, 16, $out
+___
+$::code.=<<___ if ($::evp);
+	st		%f12, [$ivec + 0]
+	st		%f13, [$ivec + 4]
+	st		%f14, [$ivec + 8]
+	st		%f15, [$ivec + 12]
+___
+$::code.=<<___ if (!$::evp);
+	brnz,pn		$ivoff, .L${bits}_cbc_dec_unaligned_ivec
+	nop
+
+	std		%f12, [$ivec + 0]	! write out ivec
+	std		%f14, [$ivec + 8]
+___
+$::code.=<<___;
+.L${bits}_cbc_dec_abort:
+	ret
+	restore
+
+.align	16
+2:	ldxa		[$inp]0x82, %o0		! avoid read-after-write hazard
+						! and ~3x deterioration
+						! in inp==out case
+	faligndata	%f0, %f0, %f4		! handle unaligned output
+	faligndata	%f0, %f2, %f6
+	faligndata	%f2, %f2, %f8
+
+	stda		%f4, [$out + $omask]0xc0	! partial store
+	std		%f6, [$out + 8]
+	add		$out, 16, $out
+	orn		%g0, $omask, $omask
+	stda		%f8, [$out + $omask]0xc0	! partial store
+
+	brnz,pt		$len, .L${bits}_cbc_dec_loop2x+4
+	orn		%g0, $omask, $omask
+___
+$::code.=<<___ if ($::evp);
+	st		%f12, [$ivec + 0]
+	st		%f13, [$ivec + 4]
+	st		%f14, [$ivec + 8]
+	st		%f15, [$ivec + 12]
+___
+$::code.=<<___ if (!$::evp);
+	brnz,pn		$ivoff, .L${bits}_cbc_dec_unaligned_ivec
+	nop
+
+	std		%f12, [$ivec + 0]	! write out ivec
+	std		%f14, [$ivec + 8]
+___
+$::code.=<<___;
+	ret
+	restore
+
+!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
+.align	32
+.L${bits}_cbc_dec_loop2x:
+	ldx		[$inp + 0], %o0
+	ldx		[$inp + 8], %o1
+	ldx		[$inp + 16], %o2
+	brz,pt		$ileft, 4f
+	ldx		[$inp + 24], %o3
+
+	ldx		[$inp + 32], %o4
+	sllx		%o0, $ileft, %o0
+	srlx		%o1, $iright, %g1
+	or		%g1, %o0, %o0
+	sllx		%o1, $ileft, %o1
+	srlx		%o2, $iright, %g1
+	or		%g1, %o1, %o1
+	sllx		%o2, $ileft, %o2
+	srlx		%o3, $iright, %g1
+	or		%g1, %o2, %o2
+	sllx		%o3, $ileft, %o3
+	srlx		%o4, $iright, %o4
+	or		%o4, %o3, %o3
+4:
+	xor		%g4, %o0, %o4		! ^= rk[0]
+	xor		%g5, %o1, %o5
+	movxtod		%o4, %f0
+	movxtod		%o5, %f2
+	xor		%g4, %o2, %o4
+	xor		%g5, %o3, %o5
+	movxtod		%o4, %f4
+	movxtod		%o5, %f6
+
+	prefetch	[$out + 63], 22
+	prefetch	[$inp + 32+63], 20
+	call		_${alg}${bits}_decrypt_2x
+	add		$inp, 32, $inp
+
+	movxtod		%o0, %f8
+	movxtod		%o1, %f10
+	fxor		%f12, %f0, %f0		! ^= ivec
+	fxor		%f14, %f2, %f2
+	movxtod		%o2, %f12
+	movxtod		%o3, %f14
+	fxor		%f8, %f4, %f4
+	fxor		%f10, %f6, %f6
+
+	brnz,pn		$ooff, 2f
+	sub		$len, 2, $len
+		
+	std		%f0, [$out + 0]
+	std		%f2, [$out + 8]
+	std		%f4, [$out + 16]
+	std		%f6, [$out + 24]
+	brnz,pt		$len, .L${bits}_cbc_dec_loop2x
+	add		$out, 32, $out
+___
+$::code.=<<___ if ($::evp);
+	st		%f12, [$ivec + 0]
+	st		%f13, [$ivec + 4]
+	st		%f14, [$ivec + 8]
+	st		%f15, [$ivec + 12]
+___
+$::code.=<<___ if (!$::evp);
+	brnz,pn		$ivoff, .L${bits}_cbc_dec_unaligned_ivec
+	nop
+
+	std		%f12, [$ivec + 0]	! write out ivec
+	std		%f14, [$ivec + 8]
+___
+$::code.=<<___;
+	ret
+	restore
+
+.align	16
+2:	ldxa		[$inp]0x82, %o0		! avoid read-after-write hazard
+						! and ~3x deterioration
+						! in inp==out case
+	faligndata	%f0, %f0, %f8		! handle unaligned output
+	faligndata	%f0, %f2, %f0
+	faligndata	%f2, %f4, %f2
+	faligndata	%f4, %f6, %f4
+	faligndata	%f6, %f6, %f6
+	stda		%f8, [$out + $omask]0xc0	! partial store
+	std		%f0, [$out + 8]
+	std		%f2, [$out + 16]
+	std		%f4, [$out + 24]
+	add		$out, 32, $out
+	orn		%g0, $omask, $omask
+	stda		%f6, [$out + $omask]0xc0	! partial store
+
+	brnz,pt		$len, .L${bits}_cbc_dec_loop2x+4
+	orn		%g0, $omask, $omask
+___
+$::code.=<<___ if ($::evp);
+	st		%f12, [$ivec + 0]
+	st		%f13, [$ivec + 4]
+	st		%f14, [$ivec + 8]
+	st		%f15, [$ivec + 12]
+___
+$::code.=<<___ if (!$::evp);
+	brnz,pn		$ivoff, .L${bits}_cbc_dec_unaligned_ivec
+	nop
+
+	std		%f12, [$ivec + 0]	! write out ivec
+	std		%f14, [$ivec + 8]
+	ret
+	restore
+
+.align	16
+.L${bits}_cbc_dec_unaligned_ivec:
+	alignaddrl	$ivec, $ivoff, %g0	! handle unaligned ivec
+	mov		0xff, $omask
+	srl		$omask, $ivoff, $omask
+	faligndata	%f12, %f12, %f0
+	faligndata	%f12, %f14, %f2
+	faligndata	%f14, %f14, %f4
+	stda		%f0, [$ivec + $omask]0xc0
+	std		%f2, [$ivec + 8]
+	add		$ivec, 16, $ivec
+	orn		%g0, $omask, $omask
+	stda		%f4, [$ivec + $omask]0xc0
+___
+$::code.=<<___;
+	ret
+	restore
+
+!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
+.align	32
+.L${bits}cbc_dec_blk:
+	add	$out, $len, $blk_init
+	and	$blk_init, 63, $blk_init	! tail
+	sub	$len, $blk_init, $len
+	add	$blk_init, 15, $blk_init	! round up to 16n
+	srlx	$len, 4, $len
+	srl	$blk_init, 4, $blk_init
+	sub	$len, 1, $len
+	add	$blk_init, 1, $blk_init
+
+.L${bits}_cbc_dec_blk_loop2x:
+	ldx		[$inp + 0], %o0
+	ldx		[$inp + 8], %o1
+	ldx		[$inp + 16], %o2
+	brz,pt		$ileft, 5f
+	ldx		[$inp + 24], %o3
+
+	ldx		[$inp + 32], %o4
+	sllx		%o0, $ileft, %o0
+	srlx		%o1, $iright, %g1
+	or		%g1, %o0, %o0
+	sllx		%o1, $ileft, %o1
+	srlx		%o2, $iright, %g1
+	or		%g1, %o1, %o1
+	sllx		%o2, $ileft, %o2
+	srlx		%o3, $iright, %g1
+	or		%g1, %o2, %o2
+	sllx		%o3, $ileft, %o3
+	srlx		%o4, $iright, %o4
+	or		%o4, %o3, %o3
+5:
+	xor		%g4, %o0, %o4		! ^= rk[0]
+	xor		%g5, %o1, %o5
+	movxtod		%o4, %f0
+	movxtod		%o5, %f2
+	xor		%g4, %o2, %o4
+	xor		%g5, %o3, %o5
+	movxtod		%o4, %f4
+	movxtod		%o5, %f6
+
+	prefetch	[$inp + 32+63], 20
+	call		_${alg}${bits}_decrypt_2x
+	add		$inp, 32, $inp
+	subcc		$len, 2, $len
+
+	movxtod		%o0, %f8
+	movxtod		%o1, %f10
+	fxor		%f12, %f0, %f0		! ^= ivec
+	fxor		%f14, %f2, %f2
+	movxtod		%o2, %f12
+	movxtod		%o3, %f14
+	fxor		%f8, %f4, %f4
+	fxor		%f10, %f6, %f6
+
+	stda		%f0, [$out]0xe2		! ASI_BLK_INIT, T4-specific
+	add		$out, 8, $out
+	stda		%f2, [$out]0xe2		! ASI_BLK_INIT, T4-specific
+	add		$out, 8, $out
+	stda		%f4, [$out]0xe2		! ASI_BLK_INIT, T4-specific
+	add		$out, 8, $out
+	stda		%f6, [$out]0xe2		! ASI_BLK_INIT, T4-specific
+	bgu,pt		$::size_t_cc, .L${bits}_cbc_dec_blk_loop2x
+	add		$out, 8, $out
+
+	add		$blk_init, $len, $len
+	andcc		$len, 1, %g0		! is number of blocks even?
+	membar		#StoreLoad|#StoreStore
+	bnz,pt		%icc, .L${bits}_cbc_dec_loop
+	srl		$len, 0, $len
+	brnz,pn		$len, .L${bits}_cbc_dec_loop2x
+	nop
+___
+$::code.=<<___ if ($::evp);
+	st		%f12, [$ivec + 0]	! write out ivec
+	st		%f13, [$ivec + 4]
+	st		%f14, [$ivec + 8]
+	st		%f15, [$ivec + 12]
+___
+$::code.=<<___ if (!$::evp);
+	brnz,pn		$ivoff, 3b
+	nop
+
+	std		%f12, [$ivec + 0]	! write out ivec
+	std		%f14, [$ivec + 8]
+___
+$::code.=<<___;
+	ret
+	restore
+.type	${alg}${bits}_t4_cbc_decrypt,#function
+.size	${alg}${bits}_t4_cbc_decrypt,.-${alg}${bits}_t4_cbc_decrypt
+___
+}
+
+sub alg_ctr32_implement {
+my ($alg,$bits) = @_;
+
+$::code.=<<___;
+.globl	${alg}${bits}_t4_ctr32_encrypt
+.align	32
+${alg}${bits}_t4_ctr32_encrypt:
+	save		%sp, -$::frame, %sp
+	srln		$len, 0, $len		! needed on v8+, "nop" on v9
+
+	prefetch	[$inp], 20
+	prefetch	[$inp + 63], 20
+	call		_${alg}${bits}_load_enckey
+	sllx		$len, 4, $len
+
+	ld		[$ivec + 0], %l4	! counter
+	ld		[$ivec + 4], %l5
+	ld		[$ivec + 8], %l6
+	ld		[$ivec + 12], %l7
+
+	sllx		%l4, 32, %o5
+	or		%l5, %o5, %o5
+	sllx		%l6, 32, %g1
+	xor		%o5, %g4, %g4		! ^= rk[0]
+	xor		%g1, %g5, %g5
+	movxtod		%g4, %f14		! most significant 64 bits
+
+	sub		$inp, $out, $blk_init	! $inp!=$out
+	and		$inp, 7, $ileft
+	andn		$inp, 7, $inp
+	sll		$ileft, 3, $ileft
+	mov		64, $iright
+	mov		0xff, $omask
+	sub		$iright, $ileft, $iright
+	and		$out, 7, $ooff
+	cmp		$len, 255
+	movrnz		$ooff, 0, $blk_init		! if (	$out&7 ||
+	movleu		$::size_t_cc, 0, $blk_init	!	$len<256 ||
+	brnz,pn		$blk_init, .L${bits}_ctr32_blk	!	$inp==$out)
+	srl		$omask, $ooff, $omask
+
+	andcc		$len, 16, %g0		! is number of blocks even?
+	alignaddrl	$out, %g0, $out
+	bz		%icc, .L${bits}_ctr32_loop2x
+	srlx		$len, 4, $len
+.L${bits}_ctr32_loop:
+	ldx		[$inp + 0], %o0
+	brz,pt		$ileft, 4f
+	ldx		[$inp + 8], %o1
+
+	ldx		[$inp + 16], %o2
+	sllx		%o0, $ileft, %o0
+	srlx		%o1, $iright, %g1
+	sllx		%o1, $ileft, %o1
+	or		%g1, %o0, %o0
+	srlx		%o2, $iright, %o2
+	or		%o2, %o1, %o1
+4:
+	xor		%g5, %l7, %g1		! ^= rk[0]
+	add		%l7, 1, %l7
+	movxtod		%g1, %f2
+	srl		%l7, 0, %l7		! clruw
+	prefetch	[$out + 63], 22
+	prefetch	[$inp + 16+63], 20
+___
+$::code.=<<___ if ($alg eq "aes");
+	aes_eround01	%f16, %f14, %f2, %f4
+	aes_eround23	%f18, %f14, %f2, %f2
+___
+$::code.=<<___ if ($alg eq "cmll");
+	camellia_f	%f16, %f2, %f14, %f2
+	camellia_f	%f18, %f14, %f2, %f0
+___
+$::code.=<<___;
+	call		_${alg}${bits}_encrypt_1x+8
+	add		$inp, 16, $inp
+
+	movxtod		%o0, %f10
+	movxtod		%o1, %f12
+	fxor		%f10, %f0, %f0		! ^= inp
+	fxor		%f12, %f2, %f2
+
+	brnz,pn		$ooff, 2f
+	sub		$len, 1, $len
+		
+	std		%f0, [$out + 0]
+	std		%f2, [$out + 8]
+	brnz,pt		$len, .L${bits}_ctr32_loop2x
+	add		$out, 16, $out
+
+	ret
+	restore
+
+.align	16
+2:	ldxa		[$inp]0x82, %o0		! avoid read-after-write hazard
+						! and ~3x deterioration
+						! in inp==out case
+	faligndata	%f0, %f0, %f4		! handle unaligned output
+	faligndata	%f0, %f2, %f6
+	faligndata	%f2, %f2, %f8
+	stda		%f4, [$out + $omask]0xc0	! partial store
+	std		%f6, [$out + 8]
+	add		$out, 16, $out
+	orn		%g0, $omask, $omask
+	stda		%f8, [$out + $omask]0xc0	! partial store
+
+	brnz,pt		$len, .L${bits}_ctr32_loop2x+4
+	orn		%g0, $omask, $omask
+
+	ret
+	restore
+
+!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
+.align	32
+.L${bits}_ctr32_loop2x:
+	ldx		[$inp + 0], %o0
+	ldx		[$inp + 8], %o1
+	ldx		[$inp + 16], %o2
+	brz,pt		$ileft, 4f
+	ldx		[$inp + 24], %o3
+
+	ldx		[$inp + 32], %o4
+	sllx		%o0, $ileft, %o0
+	srlx		%o1, $iright, %g1
+	or		%g1, %o0, %o0
+	sllx		%o1, $ileft, %o1
+	srlx		%o2, $iright, %g1
+	or		%g1, %o1, %o1
+	sllx		%o2, $ileft, %o2
+	srlx		%o3, $iright, %g1
+	or		%g1, %o2, %o2
+	sllx		%o3, $ileft, %o3
+	srlx		%o4, $iright, %o4
+	or		%o4, %o3, %o3
+4:
+	xor		%g5, %l7, %g1		! ^= rk[0]
+	add		%l7, 1, %l7
+	movxtod		%g1, %f2
+	srl		%l7, 0, %l7		! clruw
+	xor		%g5, %l7, %g1
+	add		%l7, 1, %l7
+	movxtod		%g1, %f6
+	srl		%l7, 0, %l7		! clruw
+	prefetch	[$out + 63], 22
+	prefetch	[$inp + 32+63], 20
+___
+$::code.=<<___ if ($alg eq "aes");
+	aes_eround01	%f16, %f14, %f2, %f8
+	aes_eround23	%f18, %f14, %f2, %f2
+	aes_eround01	%f16, %f14, %f6, %f10
+	aes_eround23	%f18, %f14, %f6, %f6
+___
+$::code.=<<___ if ($alg eq "cmll");
+	camellia_f	%f16, %f2, %f14, %f2
+	camellia_f	%f16, %f6, %f14, %f6
+	camellia_f	%f18, %f14, %f2, %f0
+	camellia_f	%f18, %f14, %f6, %f4
+___
+$::code.=<<___;
+	call		_${alg}${bits}_encrypt_2x+16
+	add		$inp, 32, $inp
+
+	movxtod		%o0, %f8
+	movxtod		%o1, %f10
+	movxtod		%o2, %f12
+	fxor		%f8, %f0, %f0		! ^= inp
+	movxtod		%o3, %f8
+	fxor		%f10, %f2, %f2
+	fxor		%f12, %f4, %f4
+	fxor		%f8, %f6, %f6
+
+	brnz,pn		$ooff, 2f
+	sub		$len, 2, $len
+		
+	std		%f0, [$out + 0]
+	std		%f2, [$out + 8]
+	std		%f4, [$out + 16]
+	std		%f6, [$out + 24]
+	brnz,pt		$len, .L${bits}_ctr32_loop2x
+	add		$out, 32, $out
+
+	ret
+	restore
+
+.align	16
+2:	ldxa		[$inp]0x82, %o0		! avoid read-after-write hazard
+						! and ~3x deterioration
+						! in inp==out case
+	faligndata	%f0, %f0, %f8		! handle unaligned output
+	faligndata	%f0, %f2, %f0
+	faligndata	%f2, %f4, %f2
+	faligndata	%f4, %f6, %f4
+	faligndata	%f6, %f6, %f6
+
+	stda		%f8, [$out + $omask]0xc0	! partial store
+	std		%f0, [$out + 8]
+	std		%f2, [$out + 16]
+	std		%f4, [$out + 24]
+	add		$out, 32, $out
+	orn		%g0, $omask, $omask
+	stda		%f6, [$out + $omask]0xc0	! partial store
+
+	brnz,pt		$len, .L${bits}_ctr32_loop2x+4
+	orn		%g0, $omask, $omask
+
+	ret
+	restore
+
+!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
+.align	32
+.L${bits}_ctr32_blk:
+	add	$out, $len, $blk_init
+	and	$blk_init, 63, $blk_init	! tail
+	sub	$len, $blk_init, $len
+	add	$blk_init, 15, $blk_init	! round up to 16n
+	srlx	$len, 4, $len
+	srl	$blk_init, 4, $blk_init
+	sub	$len, 1, $len
+	add	$blk_init, 1, $blk_init
+
+.L${bits}_ctr32_blk_loop2x:
+	ldx		[$inp + 0], %o0
+	ldx		[$inp + 8], %o1
+	ldx		[$inp + 16], %o2
+	brz,pt		$ileft, 5f
+	ldx		[$inp + 24], %o3
+
+	ldx		[$inp + 32], %o4
+	sllx		%o0, $ileft, %o0
+	srlx		%o1, $iright, %g1
+	or		%g1, %o0, %o0
+	sllx		%o1, $ileft, %o1
+	srlx		%o2, $iright, %g1
+	or		%g1, %o1, %o1
+	sllx		%o2, $ileft, %o2
+	srlx		%o3, $iright, %g1
+	or		%g1, %o2, %o2
+	sllx		%o3, $ileft, %o3
+	srlx		%o4, $iright, %o4
+	or		%o4, %o3, %o3
+5:
+	xor		%g5, %l7, %g1		! ^= rk[0]
+	add		%l7, 1, %l7
+	movxtod		%g1, %f2
+	srl		%l7, 0, %l7		! clruw
+	xor		%g5, %l7, %g1
+	add		%l7, 1, %l7
+	movxtod		%g1, %f6
+	srl		%l7, 0, %l7		! clruw
+	prefetch	[$inp + 32+63], 20
+___
+$::code.=<<___ if ($alg eq "aes");
+	aes_eround01	%f16, %f14, %f2, %f8
+	aes_eround23	%f18, %f14, %f2, %f2
+	aes_eround01	%f16, %f14, %f6, %f10
+	aes_eround23	%f18, %f14, %f6, %f6
+___
+$::code.=<<___ if ($alg eq "cmll");
+	camellia_f	%f16, %f2, %f14, %f2
+	camellia_f	%f16, %f6, %f14, %f6
+	camellia_f	%f18, %f14, %f2, %f0
+	camellia_f	%f18, %f14, %f6, %f4
+___
+$::code.=<<___;
+	call		_${alg}${bits}_encrypt_2x+16
+	add		$inp, 32, $inp
+	subcc		$len, 2, $len
+
+	movxtod		%o0, %f8
+	movxtod		%o1, %f10
+	movxtod		%o2, %f12
+	fxor		%f8, %f0, %f0		! ^= inp
+	movxtod		%o3, %f8
+	fxor		%f10, %f2, %f2
+	fxor		%f12, %f4, %f4
+	fxor		%f8, %f6, %f6
+
+	stda		%f0, [$out]0xe2		! ASI_BLK_INIT, T4-specific
+	add		$out, 8, $out
+	stda		%f2, [$out]0xe2		! ASI_BLK_INIT, T4-specific
+	add		$out, 8, $out
+	stda		%f4, [$out]0xe2		! ASI_BLK_INIT, T4-specific
+	add		$out, 8, $out
+	stda		%f6, [$out]0xe2		! ASI_BLK_INIT, T4-specific
+	bgu,pt		$::size_t_cc, .L${bits}_ctr32_blk_loop2x
+	add		$out, 8, $out
+
+	add		$blk_init, $len, $len
+	andcc		$len, 1, %g0		! is number of blocks even?
+	membar		#StoreLoad|#StoreStore
+	bnz,pt		%icc, .L${bits}_ctr32_loop
+	srl		$len, 0, $len
+	brnz,pn		$len, .L${bits}_ctr32_loop2x
+	nop
+
+	ret
+	restore
+.type	${alg}${bits}_t4_ctr32_encrypt,#function
+.size	${alg}${bits}_t4_ctr32_encrypt,.-${alg}${bits}_t4_ctr32_encrypt
+___
+}
+
+sub alg_xts_implement {
+my ($alg,$bits,$dir) = @_;
+my ($inp,$out,$len,$key1,$key2,$ivec)=map("%i$_",(0..5));
+my $rem=$ivec;
+
+$::code.=<<___;
+.globl	${alg}${bits}_t4_xts_${dir}crypt
+.align	32
+${alg}${bits}_t4_xts_${dir}crypt:
+	save		%sp, -$::frame-16, %sp
+	srln		$len, 0, $len		! needed on v8+, "nop" on v9
+
+	mov		$ivec, %o0
+	add		%fp, $::bias-16, %o1
+	call		${alg}_t4_encrypt
+	mov		$key2, %o2
+
+	add		%fp, $::bias-16, %l7
+	ldxa		[%l7]0x88, %g2
+	add		%fp, $::bias-8, %l7
+	ldxa		[%l7]0x88, %g3		! %g3:%g2 is tweak
+
+	sethi		%hi(0x76543210), %l7
+	or		%l7, %lo(0x76543210), %l7
+	bmask		%l7, %g0, %g0		! byte swap mask
+
+	prefetch	[$inp], 20
+	prefetch	[$inp + 63], 20
+	call		_${alg}${bits}_load_${dir}ckey
+	and		$len, 15,  $rem
+	and		$len, -16, $len
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($dir eq "de");
+	mov		0, %l7
+	movrnz		$rem, 16,  %l7
+	sub		$len, %l7, $len
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+
+	sub		$inp, $out, $blk_init	! $inp!=$out
+	and		$inp, 7, $ileft
+	andn		$inp, 7, $inp
+	sll		$ileft, 3, $ileft
+	mov		64, $iright
+	mov		0xff, $omask
+	sub		$iright, $ileft, $iright
+	and		$out, 7, $ooff
+	cmp		$len, 255
+	movrnz		$ooff, 0, $blk_init		! if (	$out&7 ||
+	movleu		$::size_t_cc, 0, $blk_init	!	$len<256 ||
+	brnz,pn		$blk_init, .L${bits}_xts_${dir}blk !	$inp==$out)
+	srl		$omask, $ooff, $omask
+
+	andcc		$len, 16, %g0		! is number of blocks even?
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($dir eq "de");
+	brz,pn		$len, .L${bits}_xts_${dir}steal
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	alignaddrl	$out, %g0, $out
+	bz		%icc, .L${bits}_xts_${dir}loop2x
+	srlx		$len, 4, $len
+.L${bits}_xts_${dir}loop:
+	ldx		[$inp + 0], %o0
+	brz,pt		$ileft, 4f
+	ldx		[$inp + 8], %o1
+
+	ldx		[$inp + 16], %o2
+	sllx		%o0, $ileft, %o0
+	srlx		%o1, $iright, %g1
+	sllx		%o1, $ileft, %o1
+	or		%g1, %o0, %o0
+	srlx		%o2, $iright, %o2
+	or		%o2, %o1, %o1
+4:
+	movxtod		%g2, %f12
+	movxtod		%g3, %f14
+	bshuffle	%f12, %f12, %f12
+	bshuffle	%f14, %f14, %f14
+
+	xor		%g4, %o0, %o0		! ^= rk[0]
+	xor		%g5, %o1, %o1
+	movxtod		%o0, %f0
+	movxtod		%o1, %f2
+
+	fxor		%f12, %f0, %f0		! ^= tweak[0]
+	fxor		%f14, %f2, %f2
+
+	prefetch	[$out + 63], 22
+	prefetch	[$inp + 16+63], 20
+	call		_${alg}${bits}_${dir}crypt_1x
+	add		$inp, 16, $inp
+
+	fxor		%f12, %f0, %f0		! ^= tweak[0]
+	fxor		%f14, %f2, %f2
+
+	srax		%g3, 63, %l7		! next tweak value
+	addcc		%g2, %g2, %g2
+	and		%l7, 0x87, %l7
+	addxc		%g3, %g3, %g3
+	xor		%l7, %g2, %g2
+
+	brnz,pn		$ooff, 2f
+	sub		$len, 1, $len
+		
+	std		%f0, [$out + 0]
+	std		%f2, [$out + 8]
+	brnz,pt		$len, .L${bits}_xts_${dir}loop2x
+	add		$out, 16, $out
+
+	brnz,pn		$rem, .L${bits}_xts_${dir}steal
+	nop
+
+	ret
+	restore
+
+.align	16
+2:	ldxa		[$inp]0x82, %o0		! avoid read-after-write hazard
+						! and ~3x deterioration
+						! in inp==out case
+	faligndata	%f0, %f0, %f4		! handle unaligned output
+	faligndata	%f0, %f2, %f6
+	faligndata	%f2, %f2, %f8
+	stda		%f4, [$out + $omask]0xc0	! partial store
+	std		%f6, [$out + 8]
+	add		$out, 16, $out
+	orn		%g0, $omask, $omask
+	stda		%f8, [$out + $omask]0xc0	! partial store
+
+	brnz,pt		$len, .L${bits}_xts_${dir}loop2x+4
+	orn		%g0, $omask, $omask
+
+	brnz,pn		$rem, .L${bits}_xts_${dir}steal
+	nop
+
+	ret
+	restore
+
+!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
+.align	32
+.L${bits}_xts_${dir}loop2x:
+	ldx		[$inp + 0], %o0
+	ldx		[$inp + 8], %o1
+	ldx		[$inp + 16], %o2
+	brz,pt		$ileft, 4f
+	ldx		[$inp + 24], %o3
+
+	ldx		[$inp + 32], %o4
+	sllx		%o0, $ileft, %o0
+	srlx		%o1, $iright, %g1
+	or		%g1, %o0, %o0
+	sllx		%o1, $ileft, %o1
+	srlx		%o2, $iright, %g1
+	or		%g1, %o1, %o1
+	sllx		%o2, $ileft, %o2
+	srlx		%o3, $iright, %g1
+	or		%g1, %o2, %o2
+	sllx		%o3, $ileft, %o3
+	srlx		%o4, $iright, %o4
+	or		%o4, %o3, %o3
+4:
+	movxtod		%g2, %f12
+	movxtod		%g3, %f14
+	bshuffle	%f12, %f12, %f12
+	bshuffle	%f14, %f14, %f14
+
+	srax		%g3, 63, %l7		! next tweak value
+	addcc		%g2, %g2, %g2
+	and		%l7, 0x87, %l7
+	addxc		%g3, %g3, %g3
+	xor		%l7, %g2, %g2
+
+	movxtod		%g2, %f8
+	movxtod		%g3, %f10
+	bshuffle	%f8,  %f8,  %f8
+	bshuffle	%f10, %f10, %f10
+
+	xor		%g4, %o0, %o0		! ^= rk[0]
+	xor		%g5, %o1, %o1
+	xor		%g4, %o2, %o2		! ^= rk[0]
+	xor		%g5, %o3, %o3
+	movxtod		%o0, %f0
+	movxtod		%o1, %f2
+	movxtod		%o2, %f4
+	movxtod		%o3, %f6
+
+	fxor		%f12, %f0, %f0		! ^= tweak[0]
+	fxor		%f14, %f2, %f2
+	fxor		%f8,  %f4, %f4		! ^= tweak[0]
+	fxor		%f10, %f6, %f6
+
+	prefetch	[$out + 63], 22
+	prefetch	[$inp + 32+63], 20
+	call		_${alg}${bits}_${dir}crypt_2x
+	add		$inp, 32, $inp
+
+	movxtod		%g2, %f8
+	movxtod		%g3, %f10
+
+	srax		%g3, 63, %l7		! next tweak value
+	addcc		%g2, %g2, %g2
+	and		%l7, 0x87, %l7
+	addxc		%g3, %g3, %g3
+	xor		%l7, %g2, %g2
+
+	bshuffle	%f8,  %f8,  %f8
+	bshuffle	%f10, %f10, %f10
+
+	fxor		%f12, %f0, %f0		! ^= tweak[0]
+	fxor		%f14, %f2, %f2
+	fxor		%f8,  %f4, %f4
+	fxor		%f10, %f6, %f6
+
+	brnz,pn		$ooff, 2f
+	sub		$len, 2, $len
+		
+	std		%f0, [$out + 0]
+	std		%f2, [$out + 8]
+	std		%f4, [$out + 16]
+	std		%f6, [$out + 24]
+	brnz,pt		$len, .L${bits}_xts_${dir}loop2x
+	add		$out, 32, $out
+
+	fsrc2		%f4, %f0
+	fsrc2		%f6, %f2
+	brnz,pn		$rem, .L${bits}_xts_${dir}steal
+	nop
+
+	ret
+	restore
+
+.align	16
+2:	ldxa		[$inp]0x82, %o0		! avoid read-after-write hazard
+						! and ~3x deterioration
+						! in inp==out case
+	faligndata	%f0, %f0, %f8		! handle unaligned output
+	faligndata	%f0, %f2, %f10
+	faligndata	%f2, %f4, %f12
+	faligndata	%f4, %f6, %f14
+	faligndata	%f6, %f6, %f0
+
+	stda		%f8, [$out + $omask]0xc0	! partial store
+	std		%f10, [$out + 8]
+	std		%f12, [$out + 16]
+	std		%f14, [$out + 24]
+	add		$out, 32, $out
+	orn		%g0, $omask, $omask
+	stda		%f0, [$out + $omask]0xc0	! partial store
+
+	brnz,pt		$len, .L${bits}_xts_${dir}loop2x+4
+	orn		%g0, $omask, $omask
+
+	fsrc2		%f4, %f0
+	fsrc2		%f6, %f2
+	brnz,pn		$rem, .L${bits}_xts_${dir}steal
+	nop
+
+	ret
+	restore
+
+!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
+.align	32
+.L${bits}_xts_${dir}blk:
+	add	$out, $len, $blk_init
+	and	$blk_init, 63, $blk_init	! tail
+	sub	$len, $blk_init, $len
+	add	$blk_init, 15, $blk_init	! round up to 16n
+	srlx	$len, 4, $len
+	srl	$blk_init, 4, $blk_init
+	sub	$len, 1, $len
+	add	$blk_init, 1, $blk_init
+
+.L${bits}_xts_${dir}blk2x:
+	ldx		[$inp + 0], %o0
+	ldx		[$inp + 8], %o1
+	ldx		[$inp + 16], %o2
+	brz,pt		$ileft, 5f
+	ldx		[$inp + 24], %o3
+
+	ldx		[$inp + 32], %o4
+	sllx		%o0, $ileft, %o0
+	srlx		%o1, $iright, %g1
+	or		%g1, %o0, %o0
+	sllx		%o1, $ileft, %o1
+	srlx		%o2, $iright, %g1
+	or		%g1, %o1, %o1
+	sllx		%o2, $ileft, %o2
+	srlx		%o3, $iright, %g1
+	or		%g1, %o2, %o2
+	sllx		%o3, $ileft, %o3
+	srlx		%o4, $iright, %o4
+	or		%o4, %o3, %o3
+5:
+	movxtod		%g2, %f12
+	movxtod		%g3, %f14
+	bshuffle	%f12, %f12, %f12
+	bshuffle	%f14, %f14, %f14
+
+	srax		%g3, 63, %l7		! next tweak value
+	addcc		%g2, %g2, %g2
+	and		%l7, 0x87, %l7
+	addxc		%g3, %g3, %g3
+	xor		%l7, %g2, %g2
+
+	movxtod		%g2, %f8
+	movxtod		%g3, %f10
+	bshuffle	%f8,  %f8,  %f8
+	bshuffle	%f10, %f10, %f10
+
+	xor		%g4, %o0, %o0		! ^= rk[0]
+	xor		%g5, %o1, %o1
+	xor		%g4, %o2, %o2		! ^= rk[0]
+	xor		%g5, %o3, %o3
+	movxtod		%o0, %f0
+	movxtod		%o1, %f2
+	movxtod		%o2, %f4
+	movxtod		%o3, %f6
+
+	fxor		%f12, %f0, %f0		! ^= tweak[0]
+	fxor		%f14, %f2, %f2
+	fxor		%f8,  %f4, %f4		! ^= tweak[0]
+	fxor		%f10, %f6, %f6
+
+	prefetch	[$inp + 32+63], 20
+	call		_${alg}${bits}_${dir}crypt_2x
+	add		$inp, 32, $inp
+
+	movxtod		%g2, %f8
+	movxtod		%g3, %f10
+
+	srax		%g3, 63, %l7		! next tweak value
+	addcc		%g2, %g2, %g2
+	and		%l7, 0x87, %l7
+	addxc		%g3, %g3, %g3
+	xor		%l7, %g2, %g2
+
+	bshuffle	%f8,  %f8,  %f8
+	bshuffle	%f10, %f10, %f10
+
+	fxor		%f12, %f0, %f0		! ^= tweak[0]
+	fxor		%f14, %f2, %f2
+	fxor		%f8,  %f4, %f4
+	fxor		%f10, %f6, %f6
+
+	subcc		$len, 2, $len
+	stda		%f0, [$out]0xe2		! ASI_BLK_INIT, T4-specific
+	add		$out, 8, $out
+	stda		%f2, [$out]0xe2		! ASI_BLK_INIT, T4-specific
+	add		$out, 8, $out
+	stda		%f4, [$out]0xe2		! ASI_BLK_INIT, T4-specific
+	add		$out, 8, $out
+	stda		%f6, [$out]0xe2		! ASI_BLK_INIT, T4-specific
+	bgu,pt		$::size_t_cc, .L${bits}_xts_${dir}blk2x
+	add		$out, 8, $out
+
+	add		$blk_init, $len, $len
+	andcc		$len, 1, %g0		! is number of blocks even?
+	membar		#StoreLoad|#StoreStore
+	bnz,pt		%icc, .L${bits}_xts_${dir}loop
+	srl		$len, 0, $len
+	brnz,pn		$len, .L${bits}_xts_${dir}loop2x
+	nop
+
+	fsrc2		%f4, %f0
+	fsrc2		%f6, %f2
+	brnz,pn		$rem, .L${bits}_xts_${dir}steal
+	nop
+
+	ret
+	restore
+!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($dir eq "en");
+.align	32
+.L${bits}_xts_${dir}steal:
+	std		%f0, [%fp + $::bias-16]	! copy of output
+	std		%f2, [%fp + $::bias-8]
+
+	srl		$ileft, 3, $ileft
+	add		%fp, $::bias-16, %l7
+	add		$inp, $ileft, $inp	! original $inp+$len&-15
+	add		$out, $ooff, $out	! original $out+$len&-15
+	mov		0, $ileft
+	nop					! align
+
+.L${bits}_xts_${dir}stealing:
+	ldub		[$inp + $ileft], %o0
+	ldub		[%l7  + $ileft], %o1
+	dec		$rem
+	stb		%o0, [%l7  + $ileft]
+	stb		%o1, [$out + $ileft]
+	brnz		$rem, .L${bits}_xts_${dir}stealing
+	inc		$ileft
+
+	mov		%l7, $inp
+	sub		$out, 16, $out
+	mov		0, $ileft
+	sub		$out, $ooff, $out
+	ba		.L${bits}_xts_${dir}loop	! one more time
+	mov		1, $len				! $rem is 0
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($dir eq "de");
+.align	32
+.L${bits}_xts_${dir}steal:
+	ldx		[$inp + 0], %o0
+	brz,pt		$ileft, 8f
+	ldx		[$inp + 8], %o1
+
+	ldx		[$inp + 16], %o2
+	sllx		%o0, $ileft, %o0
+	srlx		%o1, $iright, %g1
+	sllx		%o1, $ileft, %o1
+	or		%g1, %o0, %o0
+	srlx		%o2, $iright, %o2
+	or		%o2, %o1, %o1
+8:
+	srax		%g3, 63, %l7		! next tweak value
+	addcc		%g2, %g2, %o2
+	and		%l7, 0x87, %l7
+	addxc		%g3, %g3, %o3
+	xor		%l7, %o2, %o2
+
+	movxtod		%o2, %f12
+	movxtod		%o3, %f14
+	bshuffle	%f12, %f12, %f12
+	bshuffle	%f14, %f14, %f14
+
+	xor		%g4, %o0, %o0		! ^= rk[0]
+	xor		%g5, %o1, %o1
+	movxtod		%o0, %f0
+	movxtod		%o1, %f2
+
+	fxor		%f12, %f0, %f0		! ^= tweak[0]
+	fxor		%f14, %f2, %f2
+
+	call		_${alg}${bits}_${dir}crypt_1x
+	add		$inp, 16, $inp
+
+	fxor		%f12, %f0, %f0		! ^= tweak[0]
+	fxor		%f14, %f2, %f2
+
+	std		%f0, [%fp + $::bias-16]
+	std		%f2, [%fp + $::bias-8]
+
+	srl		$ileft, 3, $ileft
+	add		%fp, $::bias-16, %l7
+	add		$inp, $ileft, $inp	! original $inp+$len&-15
+	add		$out, $ooff, $out	! original $out+$len&-15
+	mov		0, $ileft
+	add		$out, 16, $out
+	nop					! align
+
+.L${bits}_xts_${dir}stealing:
+	ldub		[$inp + $ileft], %o0
+	ldub		[%l7  + $ileft], %o1
+	dec		$rem
+	stb		%o0, [%l7  + $ileft]
+	stb		%o1, [$out + $ileft]
+	brnz		$rem, .L${bits}_xts_${dir}stealing
+	inc		$ileft
+
+	mov		%l7, $inp
+	sub		$out, 16, $out
+	mov		0, $ileft
+	sub		$out, $ooff, $out
+	ba		.L${bits}_xts_${dir}loop	! one more time
+	mov		1, $len				! $rem is 0
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	ret
+	restore
+.type	${alg}${bits}_t4_xts_${dir}crypt,#function
+.size	${alg}${bits}_t4_xts_${dir}crypt,.-${alg}${bits}_t4_xts_${dir}crypt
+___
+}
+
+# Purpose of these subroutines is to explicitly encode VIS instructions,
+# so that one can compile the module without having to specify VIS
+# extensions on compiler command line, e.g. -xarch=v9 vs. -xarch=v9a.
+# Idea is to reserve for option to produce "universal" binary and let
+# programmer detect if current CPU is VIS capable at run-time.
+sub unvis {
+my ($mnemonic,$rs1,$rs2,$rd)=@_;
+my ($ref,$opf);
+my %visopf = (	"faligndata"	=> 0x048,
+		"bshuffle"	=> 0x04c,
+		"fnot2"		=> 0x066,
+		"fxor"		=> 0x06c,
+		"fsrc2"		=> 0x078	);
+
+    $ref = "$mnemonic\t$rs1,$rs2,$rd";
+
+    if ($opf=$visopf{$mnemonic}) {
+	foreach ($rs1,$rs2,$rd) {
+	    return $ref if (!/%f([0-9]{1,2})/);
+	    $_=$1;
+	    if ($1>=32) {
+		return $ref if ($1&1);
+		# re-encode for upper double register addressing
+		$_=($1|$1>>5)&31;
+	    }
+	}
+
+	return	sprintf ".word\t0x%08x !%s",
+			0x81b00000|$rd<<25|$rs1<<14|$opf<<5|$rs2,
+			$ref;
+    } else {
+	return $ref;
+    }
+}
+
+sub unvis3 {
+my ($mnemonic,$rs1,$rs2,$rd)=@_;
+my %bias = ( "g" => 0, "o" => 8, "l" => 16, "i" => 24 );
+my ($ref,$opf);
+my %visopf = (	"addxc"		=> 0x011,
+		"addxccc"	=> 0x013,
+		"umulxhi"	=> 0x016,
+		"alignaddr"	=> 0x018,
+		"bmask"		=> 0x019,
+		"alignaddrl"	=> 0x01a	);
+
+    $ref = "$mnemonic\t$rs1,$rs2,$rd";
+
+    if ($opf=$visopf{$mnemonic}) {
+	foreach ($rs1,$rs2,$rd) {
+	    return $ref if (!/%([goli])([0-9])/);
+	    $_=$bias{$1}+$2;
+	}
+
+	return	sprintf ".word\t0x%08x !%s",
+			0x81b00000|$rd<<25|$rs1<<14|$opf<<5|$rs2,
+			$ref;
+    } else {
+	return $ref;
+    }
+}
+
+sub unaes_round {	# 4-argument instructions
+my ($mnemonic,$rs1,$rs2,$rs3,$rd)=@_;
+my ($ref,$opf);
+my %aesopf = (	"aes_eround01"	=> 0,
+		"aes_eround23"	=> 1,
+		"aes_dround01"	=> 2,
+		"aes_dround23"	=> 3,
+		"aes_eround01_l"=> 4,
+		"aes_eround23_l"=> 5,
+		"aes_dround01_l"=> 6,
+		"aes_dround23_l"=> 7,
+		"aes_kexpand1"	=> 8	);
+
+    $ref = "$mnemonic\t$rs1,$rs2,$rs3,$rd";
+
+    if (defined($opf=$aesopf{$mnemonic})) {
+	$rs3 = ($rs3 =~ /%f([0-6]*[02468])/) ? (($1|$1>>5)&31) : $rs3;
+	foreach ($rs1,$rs2,$rd) {
+	    return $ref if (!/%f([0-9]{1,2})/);
+	    $_=$1;
+	    if ($1>=32) {
+		return $ref if ($1&1);
+		# re-encode for upper double register addressing
+		$_=($1|$1>>5)&31;
+	    }
+	}
+
+	return	sprintf ".word\t0x%08x !%s",
+			2<<30|$rd<<25|0x19<<19|$rs1<<14|$rs3<<9|$opf<<5|$rs2,
+			$ref;
+    } else {
+	return $ref;
+    }
+}
+
+sub unaes_kexpand {	# 3-argument instructions
+my ($mnemonic,$rs1,$rs2,$rd)=@_;
+my ($ref,$opf);
+my %aesopf = (	"aes_kexpand0"	=> 0x130,
+		"aes_kexpand2"	=> 0x131	);
+
+    $ref = "$mnemonic\t$rs1,$rs2,$rd";
+
+    if (defined($opf=$aesopf{$mnemonic})) {
+	foreach ($rs1,$rs2,$rd) {
+	    return $ref if (!/%f([0-9]{1,2})/);
+	    $_=$1;
+	    if ($1>=32) {
+		return $ref if ($1&1);
+		# re-encode for upper double register addressing
+		$_=($1|$1>>5)&31;
+	    }
+	}
+
+	return	sprintf ".word\t0x%08x !%s",
+			2<<30|$rd<<25|0x36<<19|$rs1<<14|$opf<<5|$rs2,
+			$ref;
+    } else {
+	return $ref;
+    }
+}
+
+sub uncamellia_f {	# 4-argument instructions
+my ($mnemonic,$rs1,$rs2,$rs3,$rd)=@_;
+my ($ref,$opf);
+
+    $ref = "$mnemonic\t$rs1,$rs2,$rs3,$rd";
+
+    if (1) {
+	$rs3 = ($rs3 =~ /%f([0-6]*[02468])/) ? (($1|$1>>5)&31) : $rs3;
+	foreach ($rs1,$rs2,$rd) {
+	    return $ref if (!/%f([0-9]{1,2})/);
+	    $_=$1;
+	    if ($1>=32) {
+		return $ref if ($1&1);
+		# re-encode for upper double register addressing
+		$_=($1|$1>>5)&31;
+	    }
+	}
+
+	return	sprintf ".word\t0x%08x !%s",
+			2<<30|$rd<<25|0x19<<19|$rs1<<14|$rs3<<9|0xc<<5|$rs2,
+			$ref;
+    } else {
+	return $ref;
+    }
+}
+
+sub uncamellia3 {	# 3-argument instructions
+my ($mnemonic,$rs1,$rs2,$rd)=@_;
+my ($ref,$opf);
+my %cmllopf = (	"camellia_fl"	=> 0x13c,
+		"camellia_fli"	=> 0x13d	);
+
+    $ref = "$mnemonic\t$rs1,$rs2,$rd";
+
+    if (defined($opf=$cmllopf{$mnemonic})) {
+	foreach ($rs1,$rs2,$rd) {
+	    return $ref if (!/%f([0-9]{1,2})/);
+	    $_=$1;
+	    if ($1>=32) {
+		return $ref if ($1&1);
+		# re-encode for upper double register addressing
+		$_=($1|$1>>5)&31;
+	    }
+	}
+
+	return	sprintf ".word\t0x%08x !%s",
+			2<<30|$rd<<25|0x36<<19|$rs1<<14|$opf<<5|$rs2,
+			$ref;
+    } else {
+	return $ref;
+    }
+}
+
+sub unmovxtox {		# 2-argument instructions
+my ($mnemonic,$rs,$rd)=@_;
+my %bias = ( "g" => 0, "o" => 8, "l" => 16, "i" => 24, "f" => 0 );
+my ($ref,$opf);
+my %movxopf = (	"movdtox"	=> 0x110,
+		"movstouw"	=> 0x111,
+		"movstosw"	=> 0x113,
+		"movxtod"	=> 0x118,
+		"movwtos"	=> 0x119	);
+
+    $ref = "$mnemonic\t$rs,$rd";
+
+    if (defined($opf=$movxopf{$mnemonic})) {
+	foreach ($rs,$rd) {
+	    return $ref if (!/%([fgoli])([0-9]{1,2})/);
+	    $_=$bias{$1}+$2;
+	    if ($2>=32) {
+		return $ref if ($2&1);
+		# re-encode for upper double register addressing
+		$_=($2|$2>>5)&31;
+	    }
+	}
+
+	return	sprintf ".word\t0x%08x !%s",
+			2<<30|$rd<<25|0x36<<19|$opf<<5|$rs,
+			$ref;
+    } else {
+	return $ref;
+    }
+}
+
+sub undes {
+my ($mnemonic)=shift;
+my @args=@_;
+my ($ref,$opf);
+my %desopf = (	"des_round"	=> 0b1001,
+		"des_ip"	=> 0b100110100,
+		"des_iip"	=> 0b100110101,
+		"des_kexpand"	=> 0b100110110	);
+
+    $ref = "$mnemonic\t".join(",",@_);
+
+    if (defined($opf=$desopf{$mnemonic})) {	# 4-arg
+	if ($mnemonic eq "des_round") {
+	    foreach (@args[0..3]) {
+		return $ref if (!/%f([0-9]{1,2})/);
+		$_=$1;
+		if ($1>=32) {
+		    return $ref if ($1&1);
+		    # re-encode for upper double register addressing
+		    $_=($1|$1>>5)&31;
+		}
+	    }
+	    return  sprintf ".word\t0x%08x !%s",
+			    2<<30|0b011001<<19|$opf<<5|$args[0]<<14|$args[1]|$args[2]<<9|$args[3]<<25,
+			    $ref;
+	} elsif ($mnemonic eq "des_kexpand") {	# 3-arg
+	    foreach (@args[0..2]) {
+		return $ref if (!/(%f)?([0-9]{1,2})/);
+		$_=$2;
+		if ($2>=32) {
+		    return $ref if ($2&1);
+		    # re-encode for upper double register addressing
+		    $_=($2|$2>>5)&31;
+		}
+	    }
+	    return  sprintf ".word\t0x%08x !%s",
+			    2<<30|0b110110<<19|$opf<<5|$args[0]<<14|$args[1]|$args[2]<<25,
+			    $ref;
+	} else {				# 2-arg
+	    foreach (@args[0..1]) {
+		return $ref if (!/%f([0-9]{1,2})/);
+		$_=$1;
+		if ($1>=32) {
+		    return $ref if ($2&1);
+		    # re-encode for upper double register addressing
+		    $_=($1|$1>>5)&31;
+		}
+	    }
+	    return  sprintf ".word\t0x%08x !%s",
+			    2<<30|0b110110<<19|$opf<<5|$args[0]<<14|$args[1]<<25,
+			    $ref;
+	}
+    } else {
+	return $ref;
+    }
+}
+
+sub emit_assembler {
+    foreach (split("\n",$::code)) {
+	s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/ge;
+
+	s/\b(f[a-z]+2[sd]*)\s+(%f[0-9]{1,2}),\s*(%f[0-9]{1,2})\s*$/$1\t%f0,$2,$3/go;
+
+	s/\b(aes_[edk][^\s]*)\s+(%f[0-9]{1,2}),\s*(%f[0-9]{1,2}),\s*([%fx0-9]+),\s*(%f[0-9]{1,2})/
+		&unaes_round($1,$2,$3,$4,$5)
+	 /geo or
+	s/\b(aes_kexpand[02])\s+(%f[0-9]{1,2}),\s*(%f[0-9]{1,2}),\s*(%f[0-9]{1,2})/
+		&unaes_kexpand($1,$2,$3,$4)
+	 /geo or
+	s/\b(camellia_f)\s+(%f[0-9]{1,2}),\s*(%f[0-9]{1,2}),\s*([%fx0-9]+),\s*(%f[0-9]{1,2})/
+		&uncamellia_f($1,$2,$3,$4,$5)
+	 /geo or
+	s/\b(camellia_[^s]+)\s+(%f[0-9]{1,2}),\s*(%f[0-9]{1,2}),\s*(%f[0-9]{1,2})/
+		&uncamellia3($1,$2,$3,$4)
+	 /geo or
+	s/\b(des_\w+)\s+(%f[0-9]{1,2}),\s*([%fx0-9]+)(?:,\s*(%f[0-9]{1,2})(?:,\s*(%f[0-9]{1,2}))?)?/
+		&undes($1,$2,$3,$4,$5)
+	 /geo or
+	s/\b(mov[ds]to\w+)\s+(%f[0-9]{1,2}),\s*(%[goli][0-7])/
+		&unmovxtox($1,$2,$3)
+	 /geo or
+	s/\b(mov[xw]to[ds])\s+(%[goli][0-7]),\s*(%f[0-9]{1,2})/
+		&unmovxtox($1,$2,$3)
+	 /geo or
+	s/\b([fb][^\s]*)\s+(%f[0-9]{1,2}),\s*(%f[0-9]{1,2}),\s*(%f[0-9]{1,2})/
+		&unvis($1,$2,$3,$4)
+	 /geo or
+	s/\b(umulxhi|bmask|addxc[c]{0,2}|alignaddr[l]*)\s+(%[goli][0-7]),\s*(%[goli][0-7]),\s*(%[goli][0-7])/
+		&unvis3($1,$2,$3,$4)
+	 /geo;
+
+	print $_,"\n";
+    }
+}
+
+1;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..6eaefcf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,1186 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+# Ascetic x86_64 AT&T to MASM/NASM assembler translator by <appro>.
+#
+# Why AT&T to MASM and not vice versa? Several reasons. Because AT&T
+# format is way easier to parse. Because it's simpler to "gear" from
+# Unix ABI to Windows one [see cross-reference "card" at the end of
+# file]. Because Linux targets were available first...
+#
+# In addition the script also "distills" code suitable for GNU
+# assembler, so that it can be compiled with more rigid assemblers,
+# such as Solaris /usr/ccs/bin/as.
+#
+# This translator is not designed to convert *arbitrary* assembler
+# code from AT&T format to MASM one. It's designed to convert just
+# enough to provide for dual-ABI OpenSSL modules development...
+# There *are* limitations and you might have to modify your assembler
+# code or this script to achieve the desired result...
+#
+# Currently recognized limitations:
+#
+# - can't use multiple ops per line;
+#
+# Dual-ABI styling rules.
+#
+# 1. Adhere to Unix register and stack layout [see cross-reference
+#    ABI "card" at the end for explanation].
+# 2. Forget about "red zone," stick to more traditional blended
+#    stack frame allocation. If volatile storage is actually required
+#    that is. If not, just leave the stack as is.
+# 3. Functions tagged with ".type name,@function" get crafted with
+#    unified Win64 prologue and epilogue automatically. If you want
+#    to take care of ABI differences yourself, tag functions as
+#    ".type name,@abi-omnipotent" instead.
+# 4. To optimize the Win64 prologue you can specify number of input
+#    arguments as ".type name,@function,N." Keep in mind that if N is
+#    larger than 6, then you *have to* write "abi-omnipotent" code,
+#    because >6 cases can't be addressed with unified prologue.
+# 5. Name local labels as .L*, do *not* use dynamic labels such as 1:
+#    (sorry about latter).
+# 6. Don't use [or hand-code with .byte] "rep ret." "ret" mnemonic is
+#    required to identify the spots, where to inject Win64 epilogue!
+#    But on the pros, it's then prefixed with rep automatically:-)
+# 7. Stick to explicit ip-relative addressing. If you have to use
+#    GOTPCREL addressing, stick to mov symbol@GOTPCREL(%rip),%r??.
+#    Both are recognized and translated to proper Win64 addressing
+#    modes. To support legacy code a synthetic directive, .picmeup,
+#    is implemented. It puts address of the *next* instruction into
+#    target register, e.g.:
+#
+#		.picmeup	%rax
+#		lea		.Label-.(%rax),%rax
+#
+# 8. In order to provide for structured exception handling unified
+#    Win64 prologue copies %rsp value to %rax. For further details
+#    see SEH paragraph at the end.
+# 9. .init segment is allowed to contain calls to functions only.
+# a. If function accepts more than 4 arguments *and* >4th argument
+#    is declared as non 64-bit value, do clear its upper part.
+
+
+use strict;
+
+my $flavour = shift;
+my $output  = shift;
+if ($flavour =~ /\./) { $output = $flavour; undef $flavour; }
+
+open STDOUT,">$output" || die "can't open $output: $!"
+	if (defined($output));
+
+my $gas=1;	$gas=0 if ($output =~ /\.asm$/);
+my $elf=1;	$elf=0 if (!$gas);
+my $win64=0;
+my $prefix="";
+my $decor=".L";
+
+my $masmref=8 + 50727*2**-32;	# 8.00.50727 shipped with VS2005
+my $masm=0;
+my $PTR=" PTR";
+
+my $nasmref=2.03;
+my $nasm=0;
+
+if    ($flavour eq "mingw64")	{ $gas=1; $elf=0; $win64=1;
+				  $prefix=`echo __USER_LABEL_PREFIX__ | $ENV{CC} -E -P -`;
+				  $prefix =~ s|\R$||; # Better chomp
+				}
+elsif ($flavour eq "macosx")	{ $gas=1; $elf=0; $prefix="_"; $decor="L\$"; }
+elsif ($flavour eq "masm")	{ $gas=0; $elf=0; $masm=$masmref; $win64=1; $decor="\$L\$"; }
+elsif ($flavour eq "nasm")	{ $gas=0; $elf=0; $nasm=$nasmref; $win64=1; $decor="\$L\$"; $PTR=""; }
+elsif (!$gas)
+{   if ($ENV{ASM} =~ m/nasm/ && `nasm -v` =~ m/version ([0-9]+)\.([0-9]+)/i)
+    {	$nasm = $1 + $2*0.01; $PTR="";  }
+    elsif (`ml64 2>&1` =~ m/Version ([0-9]+)\.([0-9]+)(\.([0-9]+))?/)
+    {	$masm = $1 + $2*2**-16 + $4*2**-32;   }
+    die "no assembler found on %PATH" if (!($nasm || $masm));
+    $win64=1;
+    $elf=0;
+    $decor="\$L\$";
+}
+
+my $current_segment;
+my $current_function;
+my %globals;
+
+{ package opcode;	# pick up opcodes
+    sub re {
+	my	($class, $line) = @_;
+	my	$self = {};
+	my	$ret;
+
+	if ($$line =~ /^([a-z][a-z0-9]*)/i) {
+	    bless $self,$class;
+	    $self->{op} = $1;
+	    $ret = $self;
+	    $$line = substr($$line,@+[0]); $$line =~ s/^\s+//;
+
+	    undef $self->{sz};
+	    if ($self->{op} =~ /^(movz)x?([bw]).*/) {	# movz is pain...
+		$self->{op} = $1;
+		$self->{sz} = $2;
+	    } elsif ($self->{op} =~ /call|jmp/) {
+		$self->{sz} = "";
+	    } elsif ($self->{op} =~ /^p/ && $' !~ /^(ush|op|insrw)/) { # SSEn
+		$self->{sz} = "";
+	    } elsif ($self->{op} =~ /^v/) { # VEX
+		$self->{sz} = "";
+	    } elsif ($self->{op} =~ /mov[dq]/ && $$line =~ /%xmm/) {
+		$self->{sz} = "";
+	    } elsif ($self->{op} =~ /([a-z]{3,})([qlwb])$/) {
+		$self->{op} = $1;
+		$self->{sz} = $2;
+	    }
+	}
+	$ret;
+    }
+    sub size {
+	my ($self, $sz) = @_;
+	$self->{sz} = $sz if (defined($sz) && !defined($self->{sz}));
+	$self->{sz};
+    }
+    sub out {
+	my $self = shift;
+	if ($gas) {
+	    if ($self->{op} eq "movz") {	# movz is pain...
+		sprintf "%s%s%s",$self->{op},$self->{sz},shift;
+	    } elsif ($self->{op} =~ /^set/) { 
+		"$self->{op}";
+	    } elsif ($self->{op} eq "ret") {
+		my $epilogue = "";
+		if ($win64 && $current_function->{abi} eq "svr4") {
+		    $epilogue = "movq	8(%rsp),%rdi\n\t" .
+				"movq	16(%rsp),%rsi\n\t";
+		}
+	    	$epilogue . ".byte	0xf3,0xc3";
+	    } elsif ($self->{op} eq "call" && !$elf && $current_segment eq ".init") {
+		".p2align\t3\n\t.quad";
+	    } else {
+		"$self->{op}$self->{sz}";
+	    }
+	} else {
+	    $self->{op} =~ s/^movz/movzx/;
+	    if ($self->{op} eq "ret") {
+		$self->{op} = "";
+		if ($win64 && $current_function->{abi} eq "svr4") {
+		    $self->{op} = "mov	rdi,QWORD$PTR\[8+rsp\]\t;WIN64 epilogue\n\t".
+				  "mov	rsi,QWORD$PTR\[16+rsp\]\n\t";
+	    	}
+		$self->{op} .= "DB\t0F3h,0C3h\t\t;repret";
+	    } elsif ($self->{op} =~ /^(pop|push)f/) {
+		$self->{op} .= $self->{sz};
+	    } elsif ($self->{op} eq "call" && $current_segment eq ".CRT\$XCU") {
+		$self->{op} = "\tDQ";
+	    } 
+	    $self->{op};
+	}
+    }
+    sub mnemonic {
+	my ($self, $op) = @_;
+	$self->{op}=$op if (defined($op));
+	$self->{op};
+    }
+}
+{ package const;	# pick up constants, which start with $
+    sub re {
+	my	($class, $line) = @_;
+	my	$self = {};
+	my	$ret;
+
+	if ($$line =~ /^\$([^,]+)/) {
+	    bless $self, $class;
+	    $self->{value} = $1;
+	    $ret = $self;
+	    $$line = substr($$line,@+[0]); $$line =~ s/^\s+//;
+	}
+	$ret;
+    }
+    sub out {
+    	my $self = shift;
+
+	$self->{value} =~ s/\b(0b[0-1]+)/oct($1)/eig;
+	if ($gas) {
+	    # Solaris /usr/ccs/bin/as can't handle multiplications
+	    # in $self->{value}
+	    my $value = $self->{value};
+	    no warnings;    # oct might complain about overflow, ignore here...
+	    $value =~ s/(?<![\w\$\.])(0x?[0-9a-f]+)/oct($1)/egi;
+	    if ($value =~ s/([0-9]+\s*[\*\/\%]\s*[0-9]+)/eval($1)/eg) {
+		$self->{value} = $value;
+	    }
+	    sprintf "\$%s",$self->{value};
+	} else {
+	    my $value = $self->{value};
+	    $value =~ s/0x([0-9a-f]+)/0$1h/ig if ($masm);
+	    sprintf "%s",$value;
+	}
+    }
+}
+{ package ea;		# pick up effective addresses: expr(%reg,%reg,scale)
+    sub re {
+	my	($class, $line, $opcode) = @_;
+	my	$self = {};
+	my	$ret;
+
+	# optional * ----vvv--- appears in indirect jmp/call
+	if ($$line =~ /^(\*?)([^\(,]*)\(([%\w,]+)\)/) {
+	    bless $self, $class;
+	    $self->{asterisk} = $1;
+	    $self->{label} = $2;
+	    ($self->{base},$self->{index},$self->{scale})=split(/,/,$3);
+	    $self->{scale} = 1 if (!defined($self->{scale}));
+	    $ret = $self;
+	    $$line = substr($$line,@+[0]); $$line =~ s/^\s+//;
+
+	    if ($win64 && $self->{label} =~ s/\@GOTPCREL//) {
+		die if ($opcode->mnemonic() ne "mov");
+		$opcode->mnemonic("lea");
+	    }
+	    $self->{base}  =~ s/^%//;
+	    $self->{index} =~ s/^%// if (defined($self->{index}));
+	    $self->{opcode} = $opcode;
+	}
+	$ret;
+    }
+    sub size {}
+    sub out {
+	my ($self, $sz) = @_;
+
+	$self->{label} =~ s/([_a-z][_a-z0-9]*)/$globals{$1} or $1/gei;
+	$self->{label} =~ s/\.L/$decor/g;
+
+	# Silently convert all EAs to 64-bit. This is required for
+	# elder GNU assembler and results in more compact code,
+	# *but* most importantly AES module depends on this feature!
+	$self->{index} =~ s/^[er](.?[0-9xpi])[d]?$/r\1/;
+	$self->{base}  =~ s/^[er](.?[0-9xpi])[d]?$/r\1/;
+
+	# Solaris /usr/ccs/bin/as can't handle multiplications
+	# in $self->{label}...
+	use integer;
+	$self->{label} =~ s/(?<![\w\$\.])(0x?[0-9a-f]+)/oct($1)/egi;
+	$self->{label} =~ s/\b([0-9]+\s*[\*\/\%]\s*[0-9]+)\b/eval($1)/eg;
+
+	# Some assemblers insist on signed presentation of 32-bit
+	# offsets, but sign extension is a tricky business in perl...
+	if ((1<<31)<<1) {
+	    $self->{label} =~ s/\b([0-9]+)\b/$1<<32>>32/eg;
+	} else {
+	    $self->{label} =~ s/\b([0-9]+)\b/$1>>0/eg;
+	}
+
+	if (!$self->{label} && $self->{index} && $self->{scale}==1 &&
+	    $self->{base} =~ /(rbp|r13)/) {
+		$self->{base} = $self->{index}; $self->{index} = $1;
+	}
+
+	if ($gas) {
+	    $self->{label} =~ s/^___imp_/__imp__/   if ($flavour eq "mingw64");
+
+	    if (defined($self->{index})) {
+		sprintf "%s%s(%s,%%%s,%d)",$self->{asterisk},
+					$self->{label},
+					$self->{base}?"%$self->{base}":"",
+					$self->{index},$self->{scale};
+	    } else {
+		sprintf "%s%s(%%%s)",	$self->{asterisk},$self->{label},$self->{base};
+	    }
+	} else {
+	    my %szmap = (	b=>"BYTE$PTR",  w=>"WORD$PTR",
+			l=>"DWORD$PTR", d=>"DWORD$PTR",
+	    		q=>"QWORD$PTR", o=>"OWORD$PTR",
+			x=>"XMMWORD$PTR", y=>"YMMWORD$PTR", z=>"ZMMWORD$PTR" );
+
+	    $self->{label} =~ s/\./\$/g;
+	    $self->{label} =~ s/(?<![\w\$\.])0x([0-9a-f]+)/0$1h/ig;
+	    $self->{label} = "($self->{label})" if ($self->{label} =~ /[\*\+\-\/]/);
+
+	    my $mnemonic = $self->{opcode}->mnemonic();
+	    ($self->{asterisk})				&& ($sz="q") ||
+	    ($mnemonic =~ /^v?mov([qd])$/)		&& ($sz=$1)  ||
+	    ($mnemonic =~ /^v?pinsr([qdwb])$/)		&& ($sz=$1)  ||
+	    ($mnemonic =~ /^vpbroadcast([qdwb])$/)	&& ($sz=$1)  ||
+	    ($mnemonic =~ /^v(?!perm)[a-z]+[fi]128$/)	&& ($sz="x");
+
+	    if (defined($self->{index})) {
+		sprintf "%s[%s%s*%d%s]",$szmap{$sz},
+					$self->{label}?"$self->{label}+":"",
+					$self->{index},$self->{scale},
+					$self->{base}?"+$self->{base}":"";
+	    } elsif ($self->{base} eq "rip") {
+		sprintf "%s[%s]",$szmap{$sz},$self->{label};
+	    } else {
+		sprintf "%s[%s%s]",$szmap{$sz},
+					$self->{label}?"$self->{label}+":"",
+					$self->{base};
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+}
+{ package register;	# pick up registers, which start with %.
+    sub re {
+	my	($class, $line, $opcode) = @_;
+	my	$self = {};
+	my	$ret;
+
+	# optional * ----vvv--- appears in indirect jmp/call
+	if ($$line =~ /^(\*?)%(\w+)/) {
+	    bless $self,$class;
+	    $self->{asterisk} = $1;
+	    $self->{value} = $2;
+	    $opcode->size($self->size());
+	    $ret = $self;
+	    $$line = substr($$line,@+[0]); $$line =~ s/^\s+//;
+	}
+	$ret;
+    }
+    sub size {
+	my	$self = shift;
+	my	$ret;
+
+	if    ($self->{value} =~ /^r[\d]+b$/i)	{ $ret="b"; }
+	elsif ($self->{value} =~ /^r[\d]+w$/i)	{ $ret="w"; }
+	elsif ($self->{value} =~ /^r[\d]+d$/i)	{ $ret="l"; }
+	elsif ($self->{value} =~ /^r[\w]+$/i)	{ $ret="q"; }
+	elsif ($self->{value} =~ /^[a-d][hl]$/i){ $ret="b"; }
+	elsif ($self->{value} =~ /^[\w]{2}l$/i)	{ $ret="b"; }
+	elsif ($self->{value} =~ /^[\w]{2}$/i)	{ $ret="w"; }
+	elsif ($self->{value} =~ /^e[a-z]{2}$/i){ $ret="l"; }
+
+	$ret;
+    }
+    sub out {
+    	my $self = shift;
+	if ($gas)	{ sprintf "%s%%%s",$self->{asterisk},$self->{value}; }
+	else		{ $self->{value}; }
+    }
+}
+{ package label;	# pick up labels, which end with :
+    sub re {
+	my	($class, $line) = @_;
+	my	$self = {};
+	my	$ret;
+
+	if ($$line =~ /(^[\.\w]+)\:/) {
+	    bless $self,$class;
+	    $self->{value} = $1;
+	    $ret = $self;
+	    $$line = substr($$line,@+[0]); $$line =~ s/^\s+//;
+
+	    $self->{value} =~ s/^\.L/$decor/;
+	}
+	$ret;
+    }
+    sub out {
+	my $self = shift;
+
+	if ($gas) {
+	    my $func = ($globals{$self->{value}} or $self->{value}) . ":";
+	    if ($win64	&&
+			$current_function->{name} eq $self->{value} &&
+			$current_function->{abi} eq "svr4") {
+		$func .= "\n";
+		$func .= "	movq	%rdi,8(%rsp)\n";
+		$func .= "	movq	%rsi,16(%rsp)\n";
+		$func .= "	movq	%rsp,%rax\n";
+		$func .= "${decor}SEH_begin_$current_function->{name}:\n";
+		my $narg = $current_function->{narg};
+		$narg=6 if (!defined($narg));
+		$func .= "	movq	%rcx,%rdi\n" if ($narg>0);
+		$func .= "	movq	%rdx,%rsi\n" if ($narg>1);
+		$func .= "	movq	%r8,%rdx\n"  if ($narg>2);
+		$func .= "	movq	%r9,%rcx\n"  if ($narg>3);
+		$func .= "	movq	40(%rsp),%r8\n" if ($narg>4);
+		$func .= "	movq	48(%rsp),%r9\n" if ($narg>5);
+	    }
+	    $func;
+	} elsif ($self->{value} ne "$current_function->{name}") {
+	    # Make all labels in masm global.
+	    $self->{value} .= ":" if ($masm);
+	    $self->{value} . ":";
+	} elsif ($win64 && $current_function->{abi} eq "svr4") {
+	    my $func =	"$current_function->{name}" .
+			($nasm ? ":" : "\tPROC $current_function->{scope}") .
+			"\n";
+	    $func .= "	mov	QWORD$PTR\[8+rsp\],rdi\t;WIN64 prologue\n";
+	    $func .= "	mov	QWORD$PTR\[16+rsp\],rsi\n";
+	    $func .= "	mov	rax,rsp\n";
+	    $func .= "${decor}SEH_begin_$current_function->{name}:";
+	    $func .= ":" if ($masm);
+	    $func .= "\n";
+	    my $narg = $current_function->{narg};
+	    $narg=6 if (!defined($narg));
+	    $func .= "	mov	rdi,rcx\n" if ($narg>0);
+	    $func .= "	mov	rsi,rdx\n" if ($narg>1);
+	    $func .= "	mov	rdx,r8\n"  if ($narg>2);
+	    $func .= "	mov	rcx,r9\n"  if ($narg>3);
+	    $func .= "	mov	r8,QWORD$PTR\[40+rsp\]\n" if ($narg>4);
+	    $func .= "	mov	r9,QWORD$PTR\[48+rsp\]\n" if ($narg>5);
+	    $func .= "\n";
+	} else {
+	   "$current_function->{name}".
+			($nasm ? ":" : "\tPROC $current_function->{scope}");
+	}
+    }
+}
+{ package expr;		# pick up expressions
+    sub re {
+	my	($class, $line, $opcode) = @_;
+	my	$self = {};
+	my	$ret;
+
+	if ($$line =~ /(^[^,]+)/) {
+	    bless $self,$class;
+	    $self->{value} = $1;
+	    $ret = $self;
+	    $$line = substr($$line,@+[0]); $$line =~ s/^\s+//;
+
+	    $self->{value} =~ s/\@PLT// if (!$elf);
+	    $self->{value} =~ s/([_a-z][_a-z0-9]*)/$globals{$1} or $1/gei;
+	    $self->{value} =~ s/\.L/$decor/g;
+	    $self->{opcode} = $opcode;
+	}
+	$ret;
+    }
+    sub out {
+	my $self = shift;
+	if ($nasm && $self->{opcode}->mnemonic()=~m/^j(?![re]cxz)/) {
+	    "NEAR ".$self->{value};
+	} else {
+	    $self->{value};
+	}
+    }
+}
+{ package directive;	# pick up directives, which start with .
+    sub re {
+	my	($class, $line) = @_;
+	my	$self = {};
+	my	$ret;
+	my	$dir;
+	my	%opcode =	# lea 2f-1f(%rip),%dst; 1: nop; 2:
+		(	"%rax"=>0x01058d48,	"%rcx"=>0x010d8d48,
+			"%rdx"=>0x01158d48,	"%rbx"=>0x011d8d48,
+			"%rsp"=>0x01258d48,	"%rbp"=>0x012d8d48,
+			"%rsi"=>0x01358d48,	"%rdi"=>0x013d8d48,
+			"%r8" =>0x01058d4c,	"%r9" =>0x010d8d4c,
+			"%r10"=>0x01158d4c,	"%r11"=>0x011d8d4c,
+			"%r12"=>0x01258d4c,	"%r13"=>0x012d8d4c,
+			"%r14"=>0x01358d4c,	"%r15"=>0x013d8d4c	);
+
+	if ($$line =~ /^\s*(\.\w+)/) {
+	    bless $self,$class;
+	    $dir = $1;
+	    $ret = $self;
+	    undef $self->{value};
+	    $$line = substr($$line,@+[0]); $$line =~ s/^\s+//;
+
+	    SWITCH: for ($dir) {
+		/\.picmeup/ && do { if ($$line =~ /(%r[\w]+)/i) {
+			    		$dir="\t.long";
+					$$line=sprintf "0x%x,0x90000000",$opcode{$1};
+				    }
+				    last;
+				  };
+		/\.global|\.globl|\.extern/
+			    && do { $globals{$$line} = $prefix . $$line;
+				    $$line = $globals{$$line} if ($prefix);
+				    last;
+				  };
+		/\.type/    && do { my ($sym,$type,$narg) = split(',',$$line);
+				    if ($type eq "\@function") {
+					undef $current_function;
+					$current_function->{name} = $sym;
+					$current_function->{abi}  = "svr4";
+					$current_function->{narg} = $narg;
+					$current_function->{scope} = defined($globals{$sym})?"PUBLIC":"PRIVATE";
+				    } elsif ($type eq "\@abi-omnipotent") {
+					undef $current_function;
+					$current_function->{name} = $sym;
+					$current_function->{scope} = defined($globals{$sym})?"PUBLIC":"PRIVATE";
+				    }
+				    $$line =~ s/\@abi\-omnipotent/\@function/;
+				    $$line =~ s/\@function.*/\@function/;
+				    last;
+				  };
+		/\.asciz/   && do { if ($$line =~ /^"(.*)"$/) {
+					$dir  = ".byte";
+					$$line = join(",",unpack("C*",$1),0);
+				    }
+				    last;
+				  };
+		/\.rva|\.long|\.quad/
+			    && do { $$line =~ s/([_a-z][_a-z0-9]*)/$globals{$1} or $1/gei;
+				    $$line =~ s/\.L/$decor/g;
+				    last;
+				  };
+	    }
+
+	    if ($gas) {
+		$self->{value} = $dir . "\t" . $$line;
+
+		if ($dir =~ /\.extern/) {
+		    $self->{value} = ""; # swallow extern
+		} elsif (!$elf && $dir =~ /\.type/) {
+		    $self->{value} = "";
+		    $self->{value} = ".def\t" . ($globals{$1} or $1) . ";\t" .
+				(defined($globals{$1})?".scl 2;":".scl 3;") .
+				"\t.type 32;\t.endef"
+				if ($win64 && $$line =~ /([^,]+),\@function/);
+		} elsif (!$elf && $dir =~ /\.size/) {
+		    $self->{value} = "";
+		    if (defined($current_function)) {
+			$self->{value} .= "${decor}SEH_end_$current_function->{name}:"
+				if ($win64 && $current_function->{abi} eq "svr4");
+			undef $current_function;
+		    }
+		} elsif (!$elf && $dir =~ /\.align/) {
+		    $self->{value} = ".p2align\t" . (log($$line)/log(2));
+		} elsif ($dir eq ".section") {
+		    $current_segment=$$line;
+		    if (!$elf && $current_segment eq ".init") {
+			if	($flavour eq "macosx")	{ $self->{value} = ".mod_init_func"; }
+			elsif	($flavour eq "mingw64")	{ $self->{value} = ".section\t.ctors"; }
+		    }
+		} elsif ($dir =~ /\.(text|data)/) {
+		    $current_segment=".$1";
+		} elsif ($dir =~ /\.hidden/) {
+		    if    ($flavour eq "macosx")  { $self->{value} = ".private_extern\t$prefix$$line"; }
+		    elsif ($flavour eq "mingw64") { $self->{value} = ""; }
+		} elsif ($dir =~ /\.comm/) {
+		    $self->{value} = "$dir\t$prefix$$line";
+		    $self->{value} =~ s|,([0-9]+),([0-9]+)$|",$1,".log($2)/log(2)|e if ($flavour eq "macosx");
+		}
+		$$line = "";
+		return $self;
+	    }
+
+	    # non-gas case or nasm/masm
+	    SWITCH: for ($dir) {
+		/\.text/    && do { my $v=undef;
+				    if ($nasm) {
+					$v="section	.text code align=64\n";
+				    } else {
+					$v="$current_segment\tENDS\n" if ($current_segment);
+					$current_segment = ".text\$";
+					$v.="$current_segment\tSEGMENT ";
+					$v.=$masm>=$masmref ? "ALIGN(256)" : "PAGE";
+					$v.=" 'CODE'";
+				    }
+				    $self->{value} = $v;
+				    last;
+				  };
+		/\.data/    && do { my $v=undef;
+				    if ($nasm) {
+					$v="section	.data data align=8\n";
+				    } else {
+					$v="$current_segment\tENDS\n" if ($current_segment);
+					$current_segment = "_DATA";
+					$v.="$current_segment\tSEGMENT";
+				    }
+				    $self->{value} = $v;
+				    last;
+				  };
+		/\.section/ && do { my $v=undef;
+				    $$line =~ s/([^,]*).*/$1/;
+				    $$line = ".CRT\$XCU" if ($$line eq ".init");
+				    if ($nasm) {
+					$v="section	$$line";
+					if ($$line=~/\.([px])data/) {
+					    $v.=" rdata align=";
+					    $v.=$1 eq "p"? 4 : 8;
+					} elsif ($$line=~/\.CRT\$/i) {
+					    $v.=" rdata align=8";
+					}
+				    } else {
+					$v="$current_segment\tENDS\n" if ($current_segment);
+					$v.="$$line\tSEGMENT";
+					if ($$line=~/\.([px])data/) {
+					    $v.=" READONLY";
+					    $v.=" ALIGN(".($1 eq "p" ? 4 : 8).")" if ($masm>=$masmref);
+					} elsif ($$line=~/\.CRT\$/i) {
+					    $v.=" READONLY ";
+					    $v.=$masm>=$masmref ? "ALIGN(8)" : "DWORD";
+					}
+				    }
+				    $current_segment = $$line;
+				    $self->{value} = $v;
+				    last;
+				  };
+		/\.extern/  && do { $self->{value}  = "EXTERN\t".$$line;
+				    $self->{value} .= ":NEAR" if ($masm);
+				    last;
+				  };
+		/\.globl|.global/
+			    && do { $self->{value}  = $masm?"PUBLIC":"global";
+				    $self->{value} .= "\t".$$line;
+				    last;
+				  };
+		/\.size/    && do { if (defined($current_function)) {
+					undef $self->{value};
+					if ($current_function->{abi} eq "svr4") {
+					    $self->{value}="${decor}SEH_end_$current_function->{name}:";
+					    $self->{value}.=":\n" if($masm);
+					}
+					$self->{value}.="$current_function->{name}\tENDP" if($masm && $current_function->{name});
+					undef $current_function;
+				    }
+				    last;
+				  };
+		/\.align/   && do { my $max = ($masm && $masm>=$masmref) ? 256 : 4096;
+				    $self->{value} = "ALIGN\t".($$line>$max?$max:$$line);
+				    last;
+				  };
+		/\.(value|long|rva|quad)/
+			    && do { my $sz  = substr($1,0,1);
+				    my @arr = split(/,\s*/,$$line);
+				    my $last = pop(@arr);
+				    my $conv = sub  {	my $var=shift;
+							$var=~s/^(0b[0-1]+)/oct($1)/eig;
+							$var=~s/^0x([0-9a-f]+)/0$1h/ig if ($masm);
+							if ($sz eq "D" && ($current_segment=~/.[px]data/ || $dir eq ".rva"))
+							{ $var=~s/([_a-z\$\@][_a-z0-9\$\@]*)/$nasm?"$1 wrt ..imagebase":"imagerel $1"/egi; }
+							$var;
+						    };  
+
+				    $sz =~ tr/bvlrq/BWDDQ/;
+				    $self->{value} = "\tD$sz\t";
+				    for (@arr) { $self->{value} .= &$conv($_).","; }
+				    $self->{value} .= &$conv($last);
+				    last;
+				  };
+		/\.byte/    && do { my @str=split(/,\s*/,$$line);
+				    map(s/(0b[0-1]+)/oct($1)/eig,@str);
+				    map(s/0x([0-9a-f]+)/0$1h/ig,@str) if ($masm);	
+				    while ($#str>15) {
+					$self->{value}.="DB\t"
+						.join(",",@str[0..15])."\n";
+					foreach (0..15) { shift @str; }
+				    }
+				    $self->{value}.="DB\t"
+						.join(",",@str) if (@str);
+				    last;
+				  };
+		/\.comm/    && do { my @str=split(/,\s*/,$$line);
+				    my $v=undef;
+				    if ($nasm) {
+					$v.="common	$prefix@str[0] @str[1]";
+				    } else {
+					$v="$current_segment\tENDS\n" if ($current_segment);
+					$current_segment = "_DATA";
+					$v.="$current_segment\tSEGMENT\n";
+					$v.="COMM	@str[0]:DWORD:".@str[1]/4;
+				    }
+				    $self->{value} = $v;
+				    last;
+				  };
+	    }
+	    $$line = "";
+	}
+
+	$ret;
+    }
+    sub out {
+	my $self = shift;
+	$self->{value};
+    }
+}
+
+sub rex {
+ my $opcode=shift;
+ my ($dst,$src,$rex)=@_;
+
+   $rex|=0x04 if($dst>=8);
+   $rex|=0x01 if($src>=8);
+   push @$opcode,($rex|0x40) if ($rex);
+}
+
+# Upon initial x86_64 introduction SSE>2 extensions were not introduced
+# yet. In order not to be bothered by tracing exact assembler versions,
+# but at the same time to provide a bare security minimum of AES-NI, we
+# hard-code some instructions. Extensions past AES-NI on the other hand
+# are traced by examining assembler version in individual perlasm
+# modules...
+
+my %regrm = (	"%eax"=>0, "%ecx"=>1, "%edx"=>2, "%ebx"=>3,
+		"%esp"=>4, "%ebp"=>5, "%esi"=>6, "%edi"=>7	);
+
+my $movq = sub {	# elderly gas can't handle inter-register movq
+  my $arg = shift;
+  my @opcode=(0x66);
+    if ($arg =~ /%xmm([0-9]+),\s*%r(\w+)/) {
+	my ($src,$dst)=($1,$2);
+	if ($dst !~ /[0-9]+/)	{ $dst = $regrm{"%e$dst"}; }
+	rex(\@opcode,$src,$dst,0x8);
+	push @opcode,0x0f,0x7e;
+	push @opcode,0xc0|(($src&7)<<3)|($dst&7);	# ModR/M
+	@opcode;
+    } elsif ($arg =~ /%r(\w+),\s*%xmm([0-9]+)/) {
+	my ($src,$dst)=($2,$1);
+	if ($dst !~ /[0-9]+/)	{ $dst = $regrm{"%e$dst"}; }
+	rex(\@opcode,$src,$dst,0x8);
+	push @opcode,0x0f,0x6e;
+	push @opcode,0xc0|(($src&7)<<3)|($dst&7);	# ModR/M
+	@opcode;
+    } else {
+	();
+    }
+};
+
+my $pextrd = sub {
+    if (shift =~ /\$([0-9]+),\s*%xmm([0-9]+),\s*(%\w+)/) {
+      my @opcode=(0x66);
+	my $imm=$1;
+	my $src=$2;
+	my $dst=$3;
+	if ($dst =~ /%r([0-9]+)d/)	{ $dst = $1; }
+	elsif ($dst =~ /%e/)		{ $dst = $regrm{$dst}; }
+	rex(\@opcode,$src,$dst);
+	push @opcode,0x0f,0x3a,0x16;
+	push @opcode,0xc0|(($src&7)<<3)|($dst&7);	# ModR/M
+	push @opcode,$imm;
+	@opcode;
+    } else {
+	();
+    }
+};
+
+my $pinsrd = sub {
+    if (shift =~ /\$([0-9]+),\s*(%\w+),\s*%xmm([0-9]+)/) {
+      my @opcode=(0x66);
+	my $imm=$1;
+	my $src=$2;
+	my $dst=$3;
+	if ($src =~ /%r([0-9]+)/)	{ $src = $1; }
+	elsif ($src =~ /%e/)		{ $src = $regrm{$src}; }
+	rex(\@opcode,$dst,$src);
+	push @opcode,0x0f,0x3a,0x22;
+	push @opcode,0xc0|(($dst&7)<<3)|($src&7);	# ModR/M
+	push @opcode,$imm;
+	@opcode;
+    } else {
+	();
+    }
+};
+
+my $pshufb = sub {
+    if (shift =~ /%xmm([0-9]+),\s*%xmm([0-9]+)/) {
+      my @opcode=(0x66);
+	rex(\@opcode,$2,$1);
+	push @opcode,0x0f,0x38,0x00;
+	push @opcode,0xc0|($1&7)|(($2&7)<<3);		# ModR/M
+	@opcode;
+    } else {
+	();
+    }
+};
+
+my $palignr = sub {
+    if (shift =~ /\$([0-9]+),\s*%xmm([0-9]+),\s*%xmm([0-9]+)/) {
+      my @opcode=(0x66);
+	rex(\@opcode,$3,$2);
+	push @opcode,0x0f,0x3a,0x0f;
+	push @opcode,0xc0|($2&7)|(($3&7)<<3);		# ModR/M
+	push @opcode,$1;
+	@opcode;
+    } else {
+	();
+    }
+};
+
+my $pclmulqdq = sub {
+    if (shift =~ /\$([x0-9a-f]+),\s*%xmm([0-9]+),\s*%xmm([0-9]+)/) {
+      my @opcode=(0x66);
+	rex(\@opcode,$3,$2);
+	push @opcode,0x0f,0x3a,0x44;
+	push @opcode,0xc0|($2&7)|(($3&7)<<3);		# ModR/M
+	my $c=$1;
+	push @opcode,$c=~/^0/?oct($c):$c;
+	@opcode;
+    } else {
+	();
+    }
+};
+
+my $rdrand = sub {
+    if (shift =~ /%[er](\w+)/) {
+      my @opcode=();
+      my $dst=$1;
+	if ($dst !~ /[0-9]+/) { $dst = $regrm{"%e$dst"}; }
+	rex(\@opcode,0,$dst,8);
+	push @opcode,0x0f,0xc7,0xf0|($dst&7);
+	@opcode;
+    } else {
+	();
+    }
+};
+
+my $rdseed = sub {
+    if (shift =~ /%[er](\w+)/) {
+      my @opcode=();
+      my $dst=$1;
+	if ($dst !~ /[0-9]+/) { $dst = $regrm{"%e$dst"}; }
+	rex(\@opcode,0,$dst,8);
+	push @opcode,0x0f,0xc7,0xf8|($dst&7);
+	@opcode;
+    } else {
+	();
+    }
+};
+
+sub rxb {
+ my $opcode=shift;
+ my ($dst,$src1,$src2,$rxb)=@_;
+
+   $rxb|=0x7<<5;
+   $rxb&=~(0x04<<5) if($dst>=8);
+   $rxb&=~(0x01<<5) if($src1>=8);
+   $rxb&=~(0x02<<5) if($src2>=8);
+   push @$opcode,$rxb;
+}
+
+my $vprotd = sub {
+    if (shift =~ /\$([x0-9a-f]+),\s*%xmm([0-9]+),\s*%xmm([0-9]+)/) {
+      my @opcode=(0x8f);
+	rxb(\@opcode,$3,$2,-1,0x08);
+	push @opcode,0x78,0xc2;
+	push @opcode,0xc0|($2&7)|(($3&7)<<3);		# ModR/M
+	my $c=$1;
+	push @opcode,$c=~/^0/?oct($c):$c;
+	@opcode;
+    } else {
+	();
+    }
+};
+
+my $vprotq = sub {
+    if (shift =~ /\$([x0-9a-f]+),\s*%xmm([0-9]+),\s*%xmm([0-9]+)/) {
+      my @opcode=(0x8f);
+	rxb(\@opcode,$3,$2,-1,0x08);
+	push @opcode,0x78,0xc3;
+	push @opcode,0xc0|($2&7)|(($3&7)<<3);		# ModR/M
+	my $c=$1;
+	push @opcode,$c=~/^0/?oct($c):$c;
+	@opcode;
+    } else {
+	();
+    }
+};
+
+my $endbranch = sub {
+    (0xf3,0x0f,0x1e,0xfa);
+};
+
+if ($nasm) {
+    print <<___;
+default	rel
+%define XMMWORD
+%define YMMWORD
+%define ZMMWORD
+___
+} elsif ($masm) {
+    print <<___;
+OPTION	DOTNAME
+___
+}
+while(defined(my $line=<>)) {
+
+    $line =~ s|\R$||;           # Better chomp
+
+    $line =~ s|[#!].*$||;	# get rid of asm-style comments...
+    $line =~ s|/\*.*\*/||;	# ... and C-style comments...
+    $line =~ s|^\s+||;		# ... and skip white spaces in beginning
+    $line =~ s|\s+$||;		# ... and at the end
+
+    if (my $label=label->re(\$line))	{ print $label->out(); }
+
+    if (my $directive=directive->re(\$line)) {
+	printf "%s",$directive->out();
+    } elsif (my $opcode=opcode->re(\$line)) {
+	my $asm = eval("\$".$opcode->mnemonic());
+	
+	if ((ref($asm) eq 'CODE') && scalar(my @bytes=&$asm($line))) {
+	    print $gas?".byte\t":"DB\t",join(',',@bytes),"\n";
+	    next;
+	}
+
+	my @args;
+	ARGUMENT: while (1) {
+	    my $arg;
+
+	    ($arg=register->re(\$line, $opcode))||
+	    ($arg=const->re(\$line))		||
+	    ($arg=ea->re(\$line, $opcode))	||
+	    ($arg=expr->re(\$line, $opcode))	||
+	    last ARGUMENT;
+
+	    push @args,$arg;
+
+	    last ARGUMENT if ($line !~ /^,/);
+
+	    $line =~ s/^,\s*//;
+	} # ARGUMENT:
+
+	if ($#args>=0) {
+	    my $insn;
+	    my $sz=$opcode->size();
+
+	    if ($gas) {
+		$insn = $opcode->out($#args>=1?$args[$#args]->size():$sz);
+		@args = map($_->out($sz),@args);
+		printf "\t%s\t%s",$insn,join(",",@args);
+	    } else {
+		$insn = $opcode->out();
+		foreach (@args) {
+		    my $arg = $_->out();
+		    # $insn.=$sz compensates for movq, pinsrw, ...
+		    if ($arg =~ /^xmm[0-9]+$/) { $insn.=$sz; $sz="x" if(!$sz); last; }
+		    if ($arg =~ /^ymm[0-9]+$/) { $insn.=$sz; $sz="y" if(!$sz); last; }
+		    if ($arg =~ /^zmm[0-9]+$/) { $insn.=$sz; $sz="z" if(!$sz); last; }
+		    if ($arg =~ /^mm[0-9]+$/)  { $insn.=$sz; $sz="q" if(!$sz); last; }
+		}
+		@args = reverse(@args);
+		undef $sz if ($nasm && $opcode->mnemonic() eq "lea");
+		printf "\t%s\t%s",$insn,join(",",map($_->out($sz),@args));
+	    }
+	} else {
+	    printf "\t%s",$opcode->out();
+	}
+    }
+
+    print $line,"\n";
+}
+
+print "\n$current_segment\tENDS\n"	if ($current_segment && $masm);
+print "END\n"				if ($masm);
+
+close STDOUT;
+
+#################################################
+# Cross-reference x86_64 ABI "card"
+#
+# 		Unix		Win64
+# %rax		*		*
+# %rbx		-		-
+# %rcx		#4		#1
+# %rdx		#3		#2
+# %rsi		#2		-
+# %rdi		#1		-
+# %rbp		-		-
+# %rsp		-		-
+# %r8		#5		#3
+# %r9		#6		#4
+# %r10		*		*
+# %r11		*		*
+# %r12		-		-
+# %r13		-		-
+# %r14		-		-
+# %r15		-		-
+# 
+# (*)	volatile register
+# (-)	preserved by callee
+# (#)	Nth argument, volatile
+#
+# In Unix terms top of stack is argument transfer area for arguments
+# which could not be accommodated in registers. Or in other words 7th
+# [integer] argument resides at 8(%rsp) upon function entry point.
+# 128 bytes above %rsp constitute a "red zone" which is not touched
+# by signal handlers and can be used as temporal storage without
+# allocating a frame.
+#
+# In Win64 terms N*8 bytes on top of stack is argument transfer area,
+# which belongs to/can be overwritten by callee. N is the number of
+# arguments passed to callee, *but* not less than 4! This means that
+# upon function entry point 5th argument resides at 40(%rsp), as well
+# as that 32 bytes from 8(%rsp) can always be used as temporal
+# storage [without allocating a frame]. One can actually argue that
+# one can assume a "red zone" above stack pointer under Win64 as well.
+# Point is that at apparently no occasion Windows kernel would alter
+# the area above user stack pointer in true asynchronous manner...
+#
+# All the above means that if assembler programmer adheres to Unix
+# register and stack layout, but disregards the "red zone" existence,
+# it's possible to use following prologue and epilogue to "gear" from
+# Unix to Win64 ABI in leaf functions with not more than 6 arguments.
+#
+# omnipotent_function:
+# ifdef WIN64
+#	movq	%rdi,8(%rsp)
+#	movq	%rsi,16(%rsp)
+#	movq	%rcx,%rdi	; if 1st argument is actually present
+#	movq	%rdx,%rsi	; if 2nd argument is actually ...
+#	movq	%r8,%rdx	; if 3rd argument is ...
+#	movq	%r9,%rcx	; if 4th argument ...
+#	movq	40(%rsp),%r8	; if 5th ...
+#	movq	48(%rsp),%r9	; if 6th ...
+# endif
+#	...
+# ifdef WIN64
+#	movq	8(%rsp),%rdi
+#	movq	16(%rsp),%rsi
+# endif
+#	ret
+#
+#################################################
+# Win64 SEH, Structured Exception Handling.
+#
+# Unlike on Unix systems(*) lack of Win64 stack unwinding information
+# has undesired side-effect at run-time: if an exception is raised in
+# assembler subroutine such as those in question (basically we're
+# referring to segmentation violations caused by malformed input
+# parameters), the application is briskly terminated without invoking
+# any exception handlers, most notably without generating memory dump
+# or any user notification whatsoever. This poses a problem. It's
+# possible to address it by registering custom language-specific
+# handler that would restore processor context to the state at
+# subroutine entry point and return "exception is not handled, keep
+# unwinding" code. Writing such handler can be a challenge... But it's
+# doable, though requires certain coding convention. Consider following
+# snippet:
+#
+# .type	function,@function
+# function:
+#	movq	%rsp,%rax	# copy rsp to volatile register
+#	pushq	%r15		# save non-volatile registers
+#	pushq	%rbx
+#	pushq	%rbp
+#	movq	%rsp,%r11
+#	subq	%rdi,%r11	# prepare [variable] stack frame
+#	andq	$-64,%r11
+#	movq	%rax,0(%r11)	# check for exceptions
+#	movq	%r11,%rsp	# allocate [variable] stack frame
+#	movq	%rax,0(%rsp)	# save original rsp value
+# magic_point:
+#	...
+#	movq	0(%rsp),%rcx	# pull original rsp value
+#	movq	-24(%rcx),%rbp	# restore non-volatile registers
+#	movq	-16(%rcx),%rbx
+#	movq	-8(%rcx),%r15
+#	movq	%rcx,%rsp	# restore original rsp
+#	ret
+# .size function,.-function
+#
+# The key is that up to magic_point copy of original rsp value remains
+# in chosen volatile register and no non-volatile register, except for
+# rsp, is modified. While past magic_point rsp remains constant till
+# the very end of the function. In this case custom language-specific
+# exception handler would look like this:
+#
+# EXCEPTION_DISPOSITION handler (EXCEPTION_RECORD *rec,ULONG64 frame,
+#		CONTEXT *context,DISPATCHER_CONTEXT *disp)
+# {	ULONG64 *rsp = (ULONG64 *)context->Rax;
+#	if (context->Rip >= magic_point)
+#	{   rsp = ((ULONG64 **)context->Rsp)[0];
+#	    context->Rbp = rsp[-3];
+#	    context->Rbx = rsp[-2];
+#	    context->R15 = rsp[-1];
+#	}
+#	context->Rsp = (ULONG64)rsp;
+#	context->Rdi = rsp[1];
+#	context->Rsi = rsp[2];
+#
+#	memcpy (disp->ContextRecord,context,sizeof(CONTEXT));
+#	RtlVirtualUnwind(UNW_FLAG_NHANDLER,disp->ImageBase,
+#		dips->ControlPc,disp->FunctionEntry,disp->ContextRecord,
+#		&disp->HandlerData,&disp->EstablisherFrame,NULL);
+#	return ExceptionContinueSearch;
+# }
+#
+# It's appropriate to implement this handler in assembler, directly in
+# function's module. In order to do that one has to know members'
+# offsets in CONTEXT and DISPATCHER_CONTEXT structures and some constant
+# values. Here they are:
+#
+#	CONTEXT.Rax				120
+#	CONTEXT.Rcx				128
+#	CONTEXT.Rdx				136
+#	CONTEXT.Rbx				144
+#	CONTEXT.Rsp				152
+#	CONTEXT.Rbp				160
+#	CONTEXT.Rsi				168
+#	CONTEXT.Rdi				176
+#	CONTEXT.R8				184
+#	CONTEXT.R9				192
+#	CONTEXT.R10				200
+#	CONTEXT.R11				208
+#	CONTEXT.R12				216
+#	CONTEXT.R13				224
+#	CONTEXT.R14				232
+#	CONTEXT.R15				240
+#	CONTEXT.Rip				248
+#	CONTEXT.Xmm6				512
+#	sizeof(CONTEXT)				1232
+#	DISPATCHER_CONTEXT.ControlPc		0
+#	DISPATCHER_CONTEXT.ImageBase		8
+#	DISPATCHER_CONTEXT.FunctionEntry	16
+#	DISPATCHER_CONTEXT.EstablisherFrame	24
+#	DISPATCHER_CONTEXT.TargetIp		32
+#	DISPATCHER_CONTEXT.ContextRecord	40
+#	DISPATCHER_CONTEXT.LanguageHandler	48
+#	DISPATCHER_CONTEXT.HandlerData		56
+#	UNW_FLAG_NHANDLER			0
+#	ExceptionContinueSearch			1
+#
+# In order to tie the handler to the function one has to compose
+# couple of structures: one for .xdata segment and one for .pdata.
+#
+# UNWIND_INFO structure for .xdata segment would be
+#
+# function_unwind_info:
+#	.byte	9,0,0,0
+#	.rva	handler
+#
+# This structure designates exception handler for a function with
+# zero-length prologue, no stack frame or frame register.
+#
+# To facilitate composing of .pdata structures, auto-generated "gear"
+# prologue copies rsp value to rax and denotes next instruction with
+# .LSEH_begin_{function_name} label. This essentially defines the SEH
+# styling rule mentioned in the beginning. Position of this label is
+# chosen in such manner that possible exceptions raised in the "gear"
+# prologue would be accounted to caller and unwound from latter's frame.
+# End of function is marked with respective .LSEH_end_{function_name}
+# label. To summarize, .pdata segment would contain
+#
+#	.rva	.LSEH_begin_function
+#	.rva	.LSEH_end_function
+#	.rva	function_unwind_info
+#
+# Reference to function_unwind_info from .xdata segment is the anchor.
+# In case you wonder why references are 32-bit .rvas and not 64-bit
+# .quads. References put into these two segments are required to be
+# *relative* to the base address of the current binary module, a.k.a.
+# image base. No Win64 module, be it .exe or .dll, can be larger than
+# 2GB and thus such relative references can be and are accommodated in
+# 32 bits.
+#
+# Having reviewed the example function code, one can argue that "movq
+# %rsp,%rax" above is redundant. It is not! Keep in mind that on Unix
+# rax would contain an undefined value. If this "offends" you, use
+# another register and refrain from modifying rax till magic_point is
+# reached, i.e. as if it was a non-volatile register. If more registers
+# are required prior [variable] frame setup is completed, note that
+# nobody says that you can have only one "magic point." You can
+# "liberate" non-volatile registers by denoting last stack off-load
+# instruction and reflecting it in finer grade unwind logic in handler.
+# After all, isn't it why it's called *language-specific* handler...
+#
+# Attentive reader can notice that exceptions would be mishandled in
+# auto-generated "gear" epilogue. Well, exception effectively can't
+# occur there, because if memory area used by it was subject to
+# segmentation violation, then it would be raised upon call to the
+# function (and as already mentioned be accounted to caller, which is
+# not a problem). If you're still not comfortable, then define tail
+# "magic point" just prior ret instruction and have handler treat it...
+#
+# (*)	Note that we're talking about run-time, not debug-time. Lack of
+#	unwind information makes debugging hard on both Windows and
+#	Unix. "Unlike" referes to the fact that on Unix signal handler
+#	will always be invoked, core dumped and appropriate exit code
+#	returned to parent (for user notification).
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/perlasm/x86asm.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/perlasm/x86asm.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1ff46c9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/perlasm/x86asm.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,310 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+# require 'x86asm.pl';
+# &asm_init(<flavor>,"des-586.pl"[,$i386only]);
+# &function_begin("foo");
+# ...
+# &function_end("foo");
+# &asm_finish
+
+$out=();
+$i386=0;
+
+# AUTOLOAD is this context has quite unpleasant side effect, namely
+# that typos in function calls effectively go to assembler output,
+# but on the pros side we don't have to implement one subroutine per
+# each opcode...
+sub ::AUTOLOAD
+{ my $opcode = $AUTOLOAD;
+
+    die "more than 4 arguments passed to $opcode" if ($#_>3);
+
+    $opcode =~ s/.*:://;
+    if    ($opcode =~ /^push/) { $stack+=4; }
+    elsif ($opcode =~ /^pop/)  { $stack-=4; }
+
+    &generic($opcode,@_) or die "undefined subroutine \&$AUTOLOAD";
+}
+
+sub ::emit
+{ my $opcode=shift;
+
+    if ($#_==-1)    { push(@out,"\t$opcode\n");				}
+    else            { push(@out,"\t$opcode\t".join(',',@_)."\n");	}
+}
+
+sub ::LB
+{   $_[0] =~ m/^e?([a-d])x$/o or die "$_[0] does not have a 'low byte'";
+  $1."l";
+}
+sub ::HB
+{   $_[0] =~ m/^e?([a-d])x$/o or die "$_[0] does not have a 'high byte'";
+  $1."h";
+}
+sub ::stack_push{ my $num=$_[0]*4; $stack+=$num; &sub("esp",$num);	}
+sub ::stack_pop	{ my $num=$_[0]*4; $stack-=$num; &add("esp",$num);	}
+sub ::blindpop	{ &pop($_[0]); $stack+=4;				}
+sub ::wparam	{ &DWP($stack+4*$_[0],"esp");				}
+sub ::swtmp	{ &DWP(4*$_[0],"esp");					}
+
+sub ::bswap
+{   if ($i386)	# emulate bswap for i386
+    {	&comment("bswap @_");
+	&xchg(&HB(@_),&LB(@_));
+	&ror (@_,16);
+	&xchg(&HB(@_),&LB(@_));
+    }
+    else
+    {	&generic("bswap",@_);	}
+}
+# These are made-up opcodes introduced over the years essentially
+# by ignorance, just alias them to real ones...
+sub ::movb	{ &mov(@_);	}
+sub ::xorb	{ &xor(@_);	}
+sub ::rotl	{ &rol(@_);	}
+sub ::rotr	{ &ror(@_);	}
+sub ::exch	{ &xchg(@_);	}
+sub ::halt	{ &hlt;		}
+sub ::movz	{ &movzx(@_);	}
+sub ::pushf	{ &pushfd;	}
+sub ::popf	{ &popfd;	}
+
+# 3 argument instructions
+sub ::movq
+{ my($p1,$p2,$optimize)=@_;
+
+    if ($optimize && $p1=~/^mm[0-7]$/ && $p2=~/^mm[0-7]$/)
+    # movq between mmx registers can sink Intel CPUs
+    {	&::pshufw($p1,$p2,0xe4);		}
+    else
+    {	&::generic("movq",@_);			}
+}
+
+# SSE>2 instructions
+my %regrm = (	"eax"=>0, "ecx"=>1, "edx"=>2, "ebx"=>3,
+		"esp"=>4, "ebp"=>5, "esi"=>6, "edi"=>7	);
+sub ::pextrd
+{ my($dst,$src,$imm)=@_;
+    if ("$dst:$src" =~ /(e[a-dsd][ixp]):xmm([0-7])/)
+    {	&::data_byte(0x66,0x0f,0x3a,0x16,0xc0|($2<<3)|$regrm{$1},$imm);	}
+    else
+    {	&::generic("pextrd",@_);		}
+}
+
+sub ::pinsrd
+{ my($dst,$src,$imm)=@_;
+    if ("$dst:$src" =~ /xmm([0-7]):(e[a-dsd][ixp])/)
+    {	&::data_byte(0x66,0x0f,0x3a,0x22,0xc0|($1<<3)|$regrm{$2},$imm);	}
+    else
+    {	&::generic("pinsrd",@_);		}
+}
+
+sub ::pshufb
+{ my($dst,$src)=@_;
+    if ("$dst:$src" =~ /xmm([0-7]):xmm([0-7])/)
+    {	&data_byte(0x66,0x0f,0x38,0x00,0xc0|($1<<3)|$2);	}
+    else
+    {	&::generic("pshufb",@_);		}
+}
+
+sub ::palignr
+{ my($dst,$src,$imm)=@_;
+    if ("$dst:$src" =~ /xmm([0-7]):xmm([0-7])/)
+    {	&::data_byte(0x66,0x0f,0x3a,0x0f,0xc0|($1<<3)|$2,$imm);	}
+    else
+    {	&::generic("palignr",@_);		}
+}
+
+sub ::pclmulqdq
+{ my($dst,$src,$imm)=@_;
+    if ("$dst:$src" =~ /xmm([0-7]):xmm([0-7])/)
+    {	&::data_byte(0x66,0x0f,0x3a,0x44,0xc0|($1<<3)|$2,$imm);	}
+    else
+    {	&::generic("pclmulqdq",@_);		}
+}
+
+sub ::rdrand
+{ my ($dst)=@_;
+    if ($dst =~ /(e[a-dsd][ixp])/)
+    {	&::data_byte(0x0f,0xc7,0xf0|$regrm{$dst});	}
+    else
+    {	&::generic("rdrand",@_);	}
+}
+
+sub ::rdseed
+{ my ($dst)=@_;
+    if ($dst =~ /(e[a-dsd][ixp])/)
+    {	&::data_byte(0x0f,0xc7,0xf8|$regrm{$dst});	}
+    else
+    {	&::generic("rdrand",@_);	}
+}
+
+sub rxb {
+ local *opcode=shift;
+ my ($dst,$src1,$src2,$rxb)=@_;
+
+   $rxb|=0x7<<5;
+   $rxb&=~(0x04<<5) if($dst>=8);
+   $rxb&=~(0x01<<5) if($src1>=8);
+   $rxb&=~(0x02<<5) if($src2>=8);
+   push @opcode,$rxb;
+}
+
+sub ::vprotd
+{ my $args=join(',',@_);
+    if ($args =~ /xmm([0-7]),xmm([0-7]),([x0-9a-f]+)/)
+    { my @opcode=(0x8f);
+	rxb(\@opcode,$1,$2,-1,0x08);
+	push @opcode,0x78,0xc2;
+	push @opcode,0xc0|($2&7)|(($1&7)<<3);		# ModR/M
+	my $c=$3;
+	push @opcode,$c=~/^0/?oct($c):$c;
+	&::data_byte(@opcode);
+    }
+    else
+    {	&::generic("vprotd",@_);	}
+}
+
+sub ::endbranch
+{
+    &::data_byte(0xf3,0x0f,0x1e,0xfb);
+}
+
+# label management
+$lbdecor="L";		# local label decoration, set by package
+$label="000";
+
+sub ::islabel		# see is argument is a known label
+{ my $i;
+    foreach $i (values %label) { return $i if ($i eq $_[0]); }
+  $label{$_[0]};	# can be undef
+}
+
+sub ::label		# instantiate a function-scope label
+{   if (!defined($label{$_[0]}))
+    {	$label{$_[0]}="${lbdecor}${label}${_[0]}"; $label++;   }
+  $label{$_[0]};
+}
+
+sub ::LABEL		# instantiate a file-scope label
+{   $label{$_[0]}=$_[1] if (!defined($label{$_[0]}));
+  $label{$_[0]};
+}
+
+sub ::static_label	{ &::LABEL($_[0],$lbdecor.$_[0]); }
+
+sub ::set_label_B	{ push(@out,"@_:\n"); }
+sub ::set_label
+{ my $label=&::label($_[0]);
+    &::align($_[1]) if ($_[1]>1);
+    &::set_label_B($label);
+  $label;
+}
+
+sub ::wipe_labels	# wipes function-scope labels
+{   foreach $i (keys %label)
+    {	delete $label{$i} if ($label{$i} =~ /^\Q${lbdecor}\E[0-9]{3}/);	}
+}
+
+# subroutine management
+sub ::function_begin
+{   &function_begin_B(@_);
+    $stack=4;
+    &push("ebp");
+    &push("ebx");
+    &push("esi");
+    &push("edi");
+}
+
+sub ::function_end
+{   &pop("edi");
+    &pop("esi");
+    &pop("ebx");
+    &pop("ebp");
+    &ret();
+    &function_end_B(@_);
+    $stack=0;
+    &wipe_labels();
+}
+
+sub ::function_end_A
+{   &pop("edi");
+    &pop("esi");
+    &pop("ebx");
+    &pop("ebp");
+    &ret();
+    $stack+=16;	# readjust esp as if we didn't pop anything
+}
+
+sub ::asciz
+{ my @str=unpack("C*",shift);
+    push @str,0;
+    while ($#str>15) {
+	&data_byte(@str[0..15]);
+	foreach (0..15) { shift @str; }
+    }
+    &data_byte(@str) if (@str);
+}
+
+sub ::asm_finish
+{   &file_end();
+    print @out;
+}
+
+sub ::asm_init
+{ my ($type,$fn,$cpu)=@_;
+
+    $filename=$fn;
+    $i386=$cpu;
+
+    $elf=$cpp=$coff=$aout=$macosx=$win32=$netware=$mwerks=$android=0;
+    if    (($type eq "elf"))
+    {	$elf=1;			require "x86gas.pl";	}
+    elsif (($type eq "elf-1"))
+    {	$elf=-1;		require "x86gas.pl";	}
+    elsif (($type eq "a\.out"))
+    {	$aout=1;		require "x86gas.pl";	}
+    elsif (($type eq "coff" or $type eq "gaswin"))
+    {	$coff=1;		require "x86gas.pl";	}
+    elsif (($type eq "win32n"))
+    {	$win32=1;		require "x86nasm.pl";	}
+    elsif (($type eq "nw-nasm"))
+    {	$netware=1;		require "x86nasm.pl";	}
+    #elsif (($type eq "nw-mwasm"))
+    #{	$netware=1; $mwerks=1;	require "x86nasm.pl";	}
+    elsif (($type eq "win32"))
+    {	$win32=1;		require "x86masm.pl";	}
+    elsif (($type eq "macosx"))
+    {	$aout=1; $macosx=1;	require "x86gas.pl";	}
+    elsif (($type eq "android"))
+    {	$elf=1; $android=1;	require "x86gas.pl";	}
+    else
+    {	print STDERR <<"EOF";
+Pick one target type from
+	elf	- Linux, FreeBSD, Solaris x86, etc.
+	a.out	- DJGPP, elder OpenBSD, etc.
+	coff	- GAS/COFF such as Win32 targets
+	win32n	- Windows 95/Windows NT NASM format
+	nw-nasm - NetWare NASM format
+	macosx	- Mac OS X
+EOF
+	exit(1);
+    }
+
+    $pic=0;
+    for (@ARGV) { $pic=1 if (/\-[fK]PIC/i); }
+
+    $filename =~ s/\.pl$//;
+    &file($filename);
+}
+
+sub ::hidden {}
+
+1;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/perlasm/x86gas.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/perlasm/x86gas.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2c8fce0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/perlasm/x86gas.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,265 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2007-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+package x86gas;
+
+*out=\@::out;
+
+$::lbdecor=$::aout?"L":".L";		# local label decoration
+$nmdecor=($::aout or $::coff)?"_":"";	# external name decoration
+
+$initseg="";
+
+$align=16;
+$align=log($align)/log(2) if ($::aout);
+$com_start="#" if ($::aout or $::coff);
+
+sub opsize()
+{ my $reg=shift;
+    if    ($reg =~ m/^%e/o)		{ "l"; }
+    elsif ($reg =~ m/^%[a-d][hl]$/o)	{ "b"; }
+    elsif ($reg =~ m/^%[yxm]/o)		{ undef; }
+    else				{ "w"; }
+}
+
+# swap arguments;
+# expand opcode with size suffix;
+# prefix numeric constants with $;
+sub ::generic
+{ my($opcode,@arg)=@_;
+  my($suffix,$dst,$src);
+
+    @arg=reverse(@arg);
+
+    for (@arg)
+    {	s/^(\*?)(e?[a-dsixphl]{2})$/$1%$2/o;	# gp registers
+	s/^([xy]?mm[0-7])$/%$1/o;		# xmm/mmx registers
+	s/^(\-?[0-9]+)$/\$$1/o;			# constants
+	s/^(\-?0x[0-9a-f]+)$/\$$1/o;		# constants
+    }
+
+    $dst = $arg[$#arg]		if ($#arg>=0);
+    $src = $arg[$#arg-1]	if ($#arg>=1);
+    if    ($dst =~ m/^%/o)	{ $suffix=&opsize($dst); }
+    elsif ($src =~ m/^%/o)	{ $suffix=&opsize($src); }
+    else			{ $suffix="l";           }
+    undef $suffix if ($dst =~ m/^%[xm]/o || $src =~ m/^%[xm]/o);
+
+    if ($#_==0)				{ &::emit($opcode);		}
+    elsif ($#_==1 && $opcode =~ m/^(call|clflush|j|loop|set)/o)
+					{ &::emit($opcode,@arg);	}
+    else				{ &::emit($opcode.$suffix,@arg);}
+
+  1;
+}
+#
+# opcodes not covered by ::generic above, mostly inconsistent namings...
+#
+sub ::movzx	{ &::movzb(@_);			}
+sub ::pushfd	{ &::pushfl;			}
+sub ::popfd	{ &::popfl;			}
+sub ::cpuid	{ &::emit(".byte\t0x0f,0xa2");	}
+sub ::rdtsc	{ &::emit(".byte\t0x0f,0x31");	}
+
+sub ::call	{ &::emit("call",(&::islabel($_[0]) or "$nmdecor$_[0]")); }
+sub ::call_ptr	{ &::generic("call","*$_[0]");	}
+sub ::jmp_ptr	{ &::generic("jmp","*$_[0]");	}
+
+*::bswap = sub	{ &::emit("bswap","%$_[0]");	} if (!$::i386);
+
+sub ::DWP
+{ my($addr,$reg1,$reg2,$idx)=@_;
+  my $ret="";
+
+    if (!defined($idx) && 1*$reg2) { $idx=$reg2; $reg2=$reg1; undef $reg1; }
+
+    $addr =~ s/^\s+//;
+    # prepend global references with optional underscore
+    $addr =~ s/^([^\+\-0-9][^\+\-]*)/&::islabel($1) or "$nmdecor$1"/ige;
+
+    $reg1 = "%$reg1" if ($reg1);
+    $reg2 = "%$reg2" if ($reg2);
+
+    $ret .= $addr if (($addr ne "") && ($addr ne 0));
+
+    if ($reg2)
+    {	$idx!= 0 or $idx=1;
+	$ret .= "($reg1,$reg2,$idx)";
+    }
+    elsif ($reg1)
+    {	$ret .= "($reg1)";	}
+
+  $ret;
+}
+sub ::QWP	{ &::DWP(@_);	}
+sub ::BP	{ &::DWP(@_);	}
+sub ::WP	{ &::DWP(@_);	}
+sub ::BC	{ @_;		}
+sub ::DWC	{ @_;		}
+
+sub ::file
+{   push(@out,".file\t\"$_[0].s\"\n.text\n");	}
+
+sub ::function_begin_B
+{ my $func=shift;
+  my $global=($func !~ /^_/);
+  my $begin="${::lbdecor}_${func}_begin";
+
+    &::LABEL($func,$global?"$begin":"$nmdecor$func");
+    $func=$nmdecor.$func;
+
+    push(@out,".globl\t$func\n")	if ($global);
+    if ($::coff)
+    {	push(@out,".def\t$func;\t.scl\t".(3-$global).";\t.type\t32;\t.endef\n"); }
+    elsif (($::aout and !$::pic) or $::macosx)
+    { }
+    else
+    {	push(@out,".type	$func,\@function\n"); }
+    push(@out,".align\t$align\n");
+    push(@out,"$func:\n");
+    push(@out,"$begin:\n")		if ($global);
+    $::stack=4;
+}
+
+sub ::function_end_B
+{ my $func=shift;
+    push(@out,".size\t$nmdecor$func,.-".&::LABEL($func)."\n") if ($::elf);
+    $::stack=0;
+    &::wipe_labels();
+}
+
+sub ::comment
+	{
+	if (!defined($com_start) or $::elf)
+		{	# Regarding $::elf above...
+			# GNU and SVR4 as'es use different comment delimiters,
+		push(@out,"\n");	# so we just skip ELF comments...
+		return;
+		}
+	foreach (@_)
+		{
+		if (/^\s*$/)
+			{ push(@out,"\n"); }
+		else
+			{ push(@out,"\t$com_start $_ $com_end\n"); }
+		}
+	}
+
+sub ::external_label
+{   foreach(@_) { &::LABEL($_,$nmdecor.$_); }   }
+
+sub ::public_label
+{   push(@out,".globl\t".&::LABEL($_[0],$nmdecor.$_[0])."\n");   }
+
+sub ::file_end
+{   if ($::macosx)
+    {	if (%non_lazy_ptr)
+    	{   push(@out,".section __IMPORT,__pointers,non_lazy_symbol_pointers\n");
+	    foreach $i (keys %non_lazy_ptr)
+	    {	push(@out,"$non_lazy_ptr{$i}:\n.indirect_symbol\t$i\n.long\t0\n");   }
+	}
+    }
+    if (grep {/\b${nmdecor}OPENSSL_ia32cap_P\b/i} @out) {
+	my $tmp=".comm\t${nmdecor}OPENSSL_ia32cap_P,16";
+	if ($::macosx)	{ push (@out,"$tmp,2\n"); }
+	elsif ($::elf)	{ push (@out,"$tmp,4\n"); }
+	else		{ push (@out,"$tmp\n"); }
+    }
+    push(@out,$initseg) if ($initseg);
+}
+
+sub ::data_byte	{   push(@out,".byte\t".join(',',@_)."\n");   }
+sub ::data_short{   push(@out,".value\t".join(',',@_)."\n");  }
+sub ::data_word {   push(@out,".long\t".join(',',@_)."\n");   }
+
+sub ::align
+{ my $val=$_[0];
+    if ($::aout)
+    {	$val=int(log($val)/log(2));
+	$val.=",0x90";
+    }
+    push(@out,".align\t$val\n");
+}
+
+sub ::picmeup
+{ my($dst,$sym,$base,$reflabel)=@_;
+
+    if (($::pic && ($::elf || $::aout)) || $::macosx)
+    {	if (!defined($base))
+	{   &::call(&::label("PIC_me_up"));
+	    &::set_label("PIC_me_up");
+	    &::blindpop($dst);
+	    $base=$dst;
+	    $reflabel=&::label("PIC_me_up");
+	}
+	if ($::macosx)
+	{   my $indirect=&::static_label("$nmdecor$sym\$non_lazy_ptr");
+	    &::mov($dst,&::DWP("$indirect-$reflabel",$base));
+	    $non_lazy_ptr{"$nmdecor$sym"}=$indirect;
+	}
+	elsif ($sym eq "OPENSSL_ia32cap_P" && $::elf>0)
+	{   &::lea($dst,&::DWP("$sym-$reflabel",$base));   }
+	else
+	{   &::lea($dst,&::DWP("_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_+[.-$reflabel]",
+			    $base));
+	    &::mov($dst,&::DWP("$sym\@GOT",$dst));
+	}
+    }
+    else
+    {	&::lea($dst,&::DWP($sym));	}
+}
+
+sub ::initseg
+{ my $f=$nmdecor.shift;
+
+    if ($::android)
+    {	$initseg.=<<___;
+.section	.init_array
+.align	4
+.long	$f
+___
+    }
+    elsif ($::elf)
+    {	$initseg.=<<___;
+.section	.init
+	call	$f
+___
+    }
+    elsif ($::coff)
+    {   $initseg.=<<___;	# applies to both Cygwin and Mingw
+.section	.ctors
+.long	$f
+___
+    }
+    elsif ($::macosx)
+    {	$initseg.=<<___;
+.mod_init_func
+.align 2
+.long   $f
+___
+    }
+    elsif ($::aout)
+    {	my $ctor="${nmdecor}_GLOBAL_\$I\$$f";
+	$initseg.=".text\n";
+	$initseg.=".type	$ctor,\@function\n" if ($::pic);
+	$initseg.=<<___;	# OpenBSD way...
+.globl	$ctor
+.align	2
+$ctor:
+	jmp	$f
+___
+    }
+}
+
+sub ::dataseg
+{   push(@out,".data\n");   }
+
+*::hidden = sub { push(@out,".hidden\t$nmdecor$_[0]\n"); } if ($::elf);
+
+1;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/perlasm/x86masm.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/perlasm/x86masm.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d352f47
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/perlasm/x86masm.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,207 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2007-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+package x86masm;
+
+*out=\@::out;
+
+$::lbdecor="\$L";	# local label decoration
+$nmdecor="_";		# external name decoration
+
+$initseg="";
+$segment="";
+
+sub ::generic
+{ my ($opcode,@arg)=@_;
+
+    # fix hexadecimal constants
+    for (@arg) { s/(?<![\w\$\.])0x([0-9a-f]+)/0$1h/oi; }
+
+    if ($opcode =~ /lea/ && @arg[1] =~ s/.*PTR\s+(\(.*\))$/OFFSET $1/)	# no []
+    {	$opcode="mov";	}
+    elsif ($opcode !~ /mov[dq]$/)
+    {	# fix xmm references
+	$arg[0] =~ s/\b[A-Z]+WORD\s+PTR/XMMWORD PTR/i if ($arg[-1]=~/\bxmm[0-7]\b/i);
+	$arg[-1] =~ s/\b[A-Z]+WORD\s+PTR/XMMWORD PTR/i if ($arg[0]=~/\bxmm[0-7]\b/i);
+    }
+
+    &::emit($opcode,@arg);
+  1;
+}
+#
+# opcodes not covered by ::generic above, mostly inconsistent namings...
+#
+sub ::call	{ &::emit("call",(&::islabel($_[0]) or "$nmdecor$_[0]")); }
+sub ::call_ptr	{ &::emit("call",@_);	}
+sub ::jmp_ptr	{ &::emit("jmp",@_);	}
+sub ::lock	{ &::data_byte(0xf0);	}
+
+sub get_mem
+{ my($size,$addr,$reg1,$reg2,$idx)=@_;
+  my($post,$ret);
+
+    if (!defined($idx) && 1*$reg2) { $idx=$reg2; $reg2=$reg1; undef $reg1; }
+
+    $ret .= "$size PTR " if ($size ne "");
+
+    $addr =~ s/^\s+//;
+    # prepend global references with optional underscore
+    $addr =~ s/^([^\+\-0-9][^\+\-]*)/&::islabel($1) or "$nmdecor$1"/ige;
+    # put address arithmetic expression in parenthesis
+    $addr="($addr)" if ($addr =~ /^.+[\-\+].+$/);
+
+    if (($addr ne "") && ($addr ne 0))
+    {	if ($addr !~ /^-/)	{ $ret .= "$addr";  }
+	else			{ $post=$addr;      }
+    }
+    $ret .= "[";
+
+    if ($reg2 ne "")
+    {	$idx!=0 or $idx=1;
+	$ret .= "$reg2*$idx";
+	$ret .= "+$reg1" if ($reg1 ne "");
+    }
+    else
+    {	$ret .= "$reg1";   }
+
+    $ret .= "$post]";
+    $ret =~ s/\+\]/]/; # in case $addr was the only argument
+    $ret =~ s/\[\s*\]//;
+
+  $ret;
+}
+sub ::BP	{ &get_mem("BYTE",@_);  }
+sub ::WP	{ &get_mem("WORD",@_);	}
+sub ::DWP	{ &get_mem("DWORD",@_); }
+sub ::QWP	{ &get_mem("QWORD",@_); }
+sub ::BC	{ "@_";  }
+sub ::DWC	{ "@_"; }
+
+sub ::file
+{ my $tmp=<<___;
+TITLE	$_[0].asm
+IF \@Version LT 800
+ECHO MASM version 8.00 or later is strongly recommended.
+ENDIF
+.686
+.MODEL	FLAT
+OPTION	DOTNAME
+IF \@Version LT 800
+.text\$	SEGMENT PAGE 'CODE'
+ELSE
+.text\$	SEGMENT ALIGN(64) 'CODE'
+ENDIF
+___
+    push(@out,$tmp);
+    $segment = ".text\$";
+}
+
+sub ::function_begin_B
+{ my $func=shift;
+  my $global=($func !~ /^_/);
+  my $begin="${::lbdecor}_${func}_begin";
+
+    &::LABEL($func,$global?"$begin":"$nmdecor$func");
+    $func="ALIGN\t16\n".$nmdecor.$func."\tPROC";
+
+    if ($global)    { $func.=" PUBLIC\n${begin}::\n"; }
+    else	    { $func.=" PRIVATE\n";            }
+    push(@out,$func);
+    $::stack=4;
+}
+sub ::function_end_B
+{ my $func=shift;
+
+    push(@out,"$nmdecor$func ENDP\n");
+    $::stack=0;
+    &::wipe_labels();
+}
+
+sub ::file_end
+{ my $xmmheader=<<___;
+.686
+.XMM
+IF \@Version LT 800
+XMMWORD STRUCT 16
+DQ	2 dup (?)
+XMMWORD	ENDS
+ENDIF
+___
+    if (grep {/\b[x]?mm[0-7]\b/i} @out) {
+	grep {s/\.[3-7]86/$xmmheader/} @out;
+    }
+
+    push(@out,"$segment	ENDS\n");
+
+    if (grep {/\b${nmdecor}OPENSSL_ia32cap_P\b/i} @out)
+    {	my $comm=<<___;
+.bss	SEGMENT 'BSS'
+COMM	${nmdecor}OPENSSL_ia32cap_P:DWORD:4
+.bss	ENDS
+___
+	# comment out OPENSSL_ia32cap_P declarations
+	grep {s/(^EXTERN\s+${nmdecor}OPENSSL_ia32cap_P)/\;$1/} @out;
+	push (@out,$comm);
+    }
+    push (@out,$initseg) if ($initseg);
+    push (@out,"END\n");
+}
+
+sub ::comment {   foreach (@_) { push(@out,"\t; $_\n"); }   }
+
+*::set_label_B = sub
+{ my $l=shift; push(@out,$l.($l=~/^\Q${::lbdecor}\E[0-9]{3}/?":\n":"::\n")); };
+
+sub ::external_label
+{   foreach(@_)
+    {	push(@out, "EXTERN\t".&::LABEL($_,$nmdecor.$_).":NEAR\n");   }
+}
+
+sub ::public_label
+{   push(@out,"PUBLIC\t".&::LABEL($_[0],$nmdecor.$_[0])."\n");   }
+
+sub ::data_byte
+{   push(@out,("DB\t").join(',',splice(@_,0,16))."\n") while(@_);	}
+
+sub ::data_short
+{   push(@out,("DW\t").join(',',splice(@_,0,8))."\n") while(@_);	}
+
+sub ::data_word
+{   push(@out,("DD\t").join(',',splice(@_,0,4))."\n") while(@_);	}
+
+sub ::align
+{   push(@out,"ALIGN\t$_[0]\n");	}
+
+sub ::picmeup
+{ my($dst,$sym)=@_;
+    &::lea($dst,&::DWP($sym));
+}
+
+sub ::initseg
+{ my $f=$nmdecor.shift;
+
+    $initseg.=<<___;
+.CRT\$XCU	SEGMENT DWORD PUBLIC 'DATA'
+EXTERN	$f:NEAR
+DD	$f
+.CRT\$XCU	ENDS
+___
+}
+
+sub ::dataseg
+{   push(@out,"$segment\tENDS\n_DATA\tSEGMENT\n"); $segment="_DATA";   }
+
+sub ::safeseh
+{ my $nm=shift;
+    push(@out,"IF \@Version GE 710\n");
+    push(@out,".SAFESEH	".&::LABEL($nm,$nmdecor.$nm)."\n");
+    push(@out,"ENDIF\n");
+}
+
+1;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/perlasm/x86nasm.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/perlasm/x86nasm.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4b664a8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/perlasm/x86nasm.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,186 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+package x86nasm;
+
+*out=\@::out;
+
+$::lbdecor="L\$";		# local label decoration
+$nmdecor=$::netware?"":"_";	# external name decoration
+$drdecor=$::mwerks?".":"";	# directive decoration
+
+$initseg="";
+
+sub ::generic
+{ my $opcode=shift;
+  my $tmp;
+
+    if (!$::mwerks)
+    {   if    ($opcode =~ m/^j/o && $#_==0) # optimize jumps
+	{   $_[0] = "NEAR $_[0]";   	}
+	elsif ($opcode eq "lea" && $#_==1)  # wipe storage qualifier from lea
+	{   $_[1] =~ s/^[^\[]*\[/\[/o;	}
+	elsif ($opcode eq "clflush" && $#_==0)
+	{   $_[0] =~ s/^[^\[]*\[/\[/o;	}
+    }
+    &::emit($opcode,@_);
+  1;
+}
+#
+# opcodes not covered by ::generic above, mostly inconsistent namings...
+#
+sub ::call	{ &::emit("call",(&::islabel($_[0]) or "$nmdecor$_[0]")); }
+sub ::call_ptr	{ &::emit("call",@_);	}
+sub ::jmp_ptr	{ &::emit("jmp",@_);	}
+
+sub get_mem
+{ my($size,$addr,$reg1,$reg2,$idx)=@_;
+  my($post,$ret);
+
+    if (!defined($idx) && 1*$reg2) { $idx=$reg2; $reg2=$reg1; undef $reg1; }
+
+    if ($size ne "")
+    {	$ret .= "$size";
+	$ret .= " PTR" if ($::mwerks);
+	$ret .= " ";
+    }
+    $ret .= "[";
+
+    $addr =~ s/^\s+//;
+    # prepend global references with optional underscore
+    $addr =~ s/^([^\+\-0-9][^\+\-]*)/::islabel($1) or "$nmdecor$1"/ige;
+    # put address arithmetic expression in parenthesis
+    $addr="($addr)" if ($addr =~ /^.+[\-\+].+$/);
+
+    if (($addr ne "") && ($addr ne 0))
+    {	if ($addr !~ /^-/)	{ $ret .= "$addr+"; }
+	else			{ $post=$addr;      }
+    }
+
+    if ($reg2 ne "")
+    {	$idx!=0 or $idx=1;
+	$ret .= "$reg2*$idx";
+	$ret .= "+$reg1" if ($reg1 ne "");
+    }
+    else
+    {	$ret .= "$reg1";   }
+
+    $ret .= "$post]";
+    $ret =~ s/\+\]/]/; # in case $addr was the only argument
+
+  $ret;
+}
+sub ::BP	{ &get_mem("BYTE",@_);  }
+sub ::DWP	{ &get_mem("DWORD",@_); }
+sub ::WP	{ &get_mem("WORD",@_);	}
+sub ::QWP	{ &get_mem("",@_);      }
+sub ::BC	{ (($::mwerks)?"":"BYTE ")."@_";  }
+sub ::DWC	{ (($::mwerks)?"":"DWORD ")."@_"; }
+
+sub ::file
+{   if ($::mwerks)	{ push(@out,".section\t.text,64\n"); }
+    else
+    { my $tmp=<<___;
+%ifidn __OUTPUT_FORMAT__,obj
+section	code	use32 class=code align=64
+%elifidn __OUTPUT_FORMAT__,win32
+\$\@feat.00 equ 1
+section	.text	code align=64
+%else
+section	.text	code
+%endif
+___
+	push(@out,$tmp);
+    }
+}
+
+sub ::function_begin_B
+{ my $func=shift;
+  my $global=($func !~ /^_/);
+  my $begin="${::lbdecor}_${func}_begin";
+
+    $begin =~ s/^\@/./ if ($::mwerks);	# the torture never stops
+
+    &::LABEL($func,$global?"$begin":"$nmdecor$func");
+    $func=$nmdecor.$func;
+
+    push(@out,"${drdecor}global	$func\n")	if ($global);
+    push(@out,"${drdecor}align	16\n");
+    push(@out,"$func:\n");
+    push(@out,"$begin:\n")			if ($global);
+    $::stack=4;
+}
+
+sub ::function_end_B
+{   $::stack=0;
+    &::wipe_labels();
+}
+
+sub ::file_end
+{   if (grep {/\b${nmdecor}OPENSSL_ia32cap_P\b/i} @out)
+    {	my $comm=<<___;
+${drdecor}segment	.bss
+${drdecor}common	${nmdecor}OPENSSL_ia32cap_P 16
+___
+	# comment out OPENSSL_ia32cap_P declarations
+	grep {s/(^extern\s+${nmdecor}OPENSSL_ia32cap_P)/\;$1/} @out;
+	push (@out,$comm)
+    }
+    push (@out,$initseg) if ($initseg);		
+}
+
+sub ::comment {   foreach (@_) { push(@out,"\t; $_\n"); }   }
+
+sub ::external_label
+{   foreach(@_)
+    {	push(@out,"${drdecor}extern\t".&::LABEL($_,$nmdecor.$_)."\n");   }
+}
+
+sub ::public_label
+{   push(@out,"${drdecor}global\t".&::LABEL($_[0],$nmdecor.$_[0])."\n");  }
+
+sub ::data_byte
+{   push(@out,(($::mwerks)?".byte\t":"db\t").join(',',@_)."\n");	}
+sub ::data_short
+{   push(@out,(($::mwerks)?".word\t":"dw\t").join(',',@_)."\n");	}
+sub ::data_word
+{   push(@out,(($::mwerks)?".long\t":"dd\t").join(',',@_)."\n");	}
+
+sub ::align
+{   push(@out,"${drdecor}align\t$_[0]\n");	}
+
+sub ::picmeup
+{ my($dst,$sym)=@_;
+    &::lea($dst,&::DWP($sym));
+}
+
+sub ::initseg
+{ my $f=$nmdecor.shift;
+    if ($::win32)
+    {	$initseg=<<___;
+segment	.CRT\$XCU data align=4
+extern	$f
+dd	$f
+___
+    }
+}
+
+sub ::dataseg
+{   if ($mwerks)	{ push(@out,".section\t.data,4\n");   }
+    else		{ push(@out,"section\t.data align=4\n"); }
+}
+
+sub ::safeseh
+{ my $nm=shift;
+    push(@out,"%if	__NASM_VERSION_ID__ >= 0x02030000\n");
+    push(@out,"safeseh	".&::LABEL($nm,$nmdecor.$nm)."\n");
+    push(@out,"%endif\n");
+}
+
+1;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs12/build.info b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs12/build.info
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b87299e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs12/build.info
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+LIBS=../../libcrypto
+SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
+        p12_add.c p12_asn.c p12_attr.c p12_crpt.c p12_crt.c p12_decr.c \
+        p12_init.c p12_key.c p12_kiss.c p12_mutl.c p12_sbag.c \
+        p12_utl.c p12_npas.c pk12err.c p12_p8d.c p12_p8e.c
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs12/p12_add.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs12/p12_add.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..193ed80
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs12/p12_add.c
@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
+#include "p12_lcl.h"
+
+/* Pack an object into an OCTET STRING and turn into a safebag */
+
+PKCS12_SAFEBAG *PKCS12_item_pack_safebag(void *obj, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+                                         int nid1, int nid2)
+{
+    PKCS12_BAGS *bag;
+    PKCS12_SAFEBAG *safebag;
+
+    if ((bag = PKCS12_BAGS_new()) == NULL) {
+        PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_ITEM_PACK_SAFEBAG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    bag->type = OBJ_nid2obj(nid1);
+    if (!ASN1_item_pack(obj, it, &bag->value.octet)) {
+        PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_ITEM_PACK_SAFEBAG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if ((safebag = PKCS12_SAFEBAG_new()) == NULL) {
+        PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_ITEM_PACK_SAFEBAG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    safebag->value.bag = bag;
+    safebag->type = OBJ_nid2obj(nid2);
+    return safebag;
+
+ err:
+    PKCS12_BAGS_free(bag);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+/* Turn a stack of SAFEBAGS into a PKCS#7 data Contentinfo */
+PKCS7 *PKCS12_pack_p7data(STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *sk)
+{
+    PKCS7 *p7;
+
+    if ((p7 = PKCS7_new()) == NULL) {
+        PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PACK_P7DATA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    p7->type = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs7_data);
+    if ((p7->d.data = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new()) == NULL) {
+        PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PACK_P7DATA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!ASN1_item_pack(sk, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS12_SAFEBAGS), &p7->d.data)) {
+        PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PACK_P7DATA, PKCS12_R_CANT_PACK_STRUCTURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    return p7;
+
+ err:
+    PKCS7_free(p7);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+/* Unpack SAFEBAGS from PKCS#7 data ContentInfo */
+STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *PKCS12_unpack_p7data(PKCS7 *p7)
+{
+    if (!PKCS7_type_is_data(p7)) {
+        PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_UNPACK_P7DATA,
+                  PKCS12_R_CONTENT_TYPE_NOT_DATA);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    return ASN1_item_unpack(p7->d.data, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS12_SAFEBAGS));
+}
+
+/* Turn a stack of SAFEBAGS into a PKCS#7 encrypted data ContentInfo */
+
+PKCS7 *PKCS12_pack_p7encdata(int pbe_nid, const char *pass, int passlen,
+                             unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, int iter,
+                             STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags)
+{
+    PKCS7 *p7;
+    X509_ALGOR *pbe;
+    const EVP_CIPHER *pbe_ciph;
+
+    if ((p7 = PKCS7_new()) == NULL) {
+        PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PACK_P7ENCDATA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    if (!PKCS7_set_type(p7, NID_pkcs7_encrypted)) {
+        PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PACK_P7ENCDATA,
+                  PKCS12_R_ERROR_SETTING_ENCRYPTED_DATA_TYPE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    pbe_ciph = EVP_get_cipherbynid(pbe_nid);
+
+    if (pbe_ciph)
+        pbe = PKCS5_pbe2_set(pbe_ciph, iter, salt, saltlen);
+    else
+        pbe = PKCS5_pbe_set(pbe_nid, iter, salt, saltlen);
+
+    if (!pbe) {
+        PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PACK_P7ENCDATA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    X509_ALGOR_free(p7->d.encrypted->enc_data->algorithm);
+    p7->d.encrypted->enc_data->algorithm = pbe;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(p7->d.encrypted->enc_data->enc_data);
+    if (!(p7->d.encrypted->enc_data->enc_data =
+          PKCS12_item_i2d_encrypt(pbe, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS12_SAFEBAGS), pass,
+                                  passlen, bags, 1))) {
+        PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PACK_P7ENCDATA, PKCS12_R_ENCRYPT_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    return p7;
+
+ err:
+    PKCS7_free(p7);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *PKCS12_unpack_p7encdata(PKCS7 *p7, const char *pass,
+                                                  int passlen)
+{
+    if (!PKCS7_type_is_encrypted(p7))
+        return NULL;
+    return PKCS12_item_decrypt_d2i(p7->d.encrypted->enc_data->algorithm,
+                                   ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS12_SAFEBAGS),
+                                   pass, passlen,
+                                   p7->d.encrypted->enc_data->enc_data, 1);
+}
+
+PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *PKCS12_decrypt_skey(const PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag,
+                                         const char *pass, int passlen)
+{
+    return PKCS8_decrypt(bag->value.shkeybag, pass, passlen);
+}
+
+int PKCS12_pack_authsafes(PKCS12 *p12, STACK_OF(PKCS7) *safes)
+{
+    if (ASN1_item_pack(safes, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS12_AUTHSAFES),
+                       &p12->authsafes->d.data))
+        return 1;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(PKCS7) *PKCS12_unpack_authsafes(const PKCS12 *p12)
+{
+    if (!PKCS7_type_is_data(p12->authsafes)) {
+        PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_UNPACK_AUTHSAFES,
+                  PKCS12_R_CONTENT_TYPE_NOT_DATA);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    return ASN1_item_unpack(p12->authsafes->d.data,
+                            ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS12_AUTHSAFES));
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs12/p12_asn.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs12/p12_asn.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f2bfe32
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs12/p12_asn.c
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
+#include "p12_lcl.h"
+
+/* PKCS#12 ASN1 module */
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(PKCS12) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS12, version, ASN1_INTEGER),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS12, authsafes, PKCS7),
+        ASN1_OPT(PKCS12, mac, PKCS12_MAC_DATA)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(PKCS12)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PKCS12)
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(PKCS12_MAC_DATA) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS12_MAC_DATA, dinfo, X509_SIG),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS12_MAC_DATA, salt, ASN1_OCTET_STRING),
+        ASN1_OPT(PKCS12_MAC_DATA, iter, ASN1_INTEGER)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(PKCS12_MAC_DATA)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PKCS12_MAC_DATA)
+
+ASN1_ADB_TEMPLATE(bag_default) = ASN1_EXP(PKCS12_BAGS, value.other, ASN1_ANY, 0);
+
+ASN1_ADB(PKCS12_BAGS) = {
+        ADB_ENTRY(NID_x509Certificate, ASN1_EXP(PKCS12_BAGS, value.x509cert, ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 0)),
+        ADB_ENTRY(NID_x509Crl, ASN1_EXP(PKCS12_BAGS, value.x509crl, ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 0)),
+        ADB_ENTRY(NID_sdsiCertificate, ASN1_EXP(PKCS12_BAGS, value.sdsicert, ASN1_IA5STRING, 0)),
+} ASN1_ADB_END(PKCS12_BAGS, 0, type, 0, &bag_default_tt, NULL);
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(PKCS12_BAGS) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS12_BAGS, type, ASN1_OBJECT),
+        ASN1_ADB_OBJECT(PKCS12_BAGS),
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(PKCS12_BAGS)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PKCS12_BAGS)
+
+ASN1_ADB_TEMPLATE(safebag_default) = ASN1_EXP(PKCS12_SAFEBAG, value.other, ASN1_ANY, 0);
+
+ASN1_ADB(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) = {
+        ADB_ENTRY(NID_keyBag, ASN1_EXP(PKCS12_SAFEBAG, value.keybag, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, 0)),
+        ADB_ENTRY(NID_pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag, ASN1_EXP(PKCS12_SAFEBAG, value.shkeybag, X509_SIG, 0)),
+        ADB_ENTRY(NID_safeContentsBag, ASN1_EXP_SET_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG, value.safes, PKCS12_SAFEBAG, 0)),
+        ADB_ENTRY(NID_certBag, ASN1_EXP(PKCS12_SAFEBAG, value.bag, PKCS12_BAGS, 0)),
+        ADB_ENTRY(NID_crlBag, ASN1_EXP(PKCS12_SAFEBAG, value.bag, PKCS12_BAGS, 0)),
+        ADB_ENTRY(NID_secretBag, ASN1_EXP(PKCS12_SAFEBAG, value.bag, PKCS12_BAGS, 0))
+} ASN1_ADB_END(PKCS12_SAFEBAG, 0, type, 0, &safebag_default_tt, NULL);
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS12_SAFEBAG, type, ASN1_OBJECT),
+        ASN1_ADB_OBJECT(PKCS12_SAFEBAG),
+        ASN1_SET_OF_OPT(PKCS12_SAFEBAG, attrib, X509_ATTRIBUTE)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(PKCS12_SAFEBAG)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PKCS12_SAFEBAG)
+
+/* SEQUENCE OF SafeBag */
+ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE(PKCS12_SAFEBAGS) =
+        ASN1_EX_TEMPLATE_TYPE(ASN1_TFLG_SEQUENCE_OF, 0, PKCS12_SAFEBAGS, PKCS12_SAFEBAG)
+ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE_END(PKCS12_SAFEBAGS)
+
+/* Authsafes: SEQUENCE OF PKCS7 */
+ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE(PKCS12_AUTHSAFES) =
+        ASN1_EX_TEMPLATE_TYPE(ASN1_TFLG_SEQUENCE_OF, 0, PKCS12_AUTHSAFES, PKCS7)
+ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE_END(PKCS12_AUTHSAFES)
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs12/p12_attr.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs12/p12_attr.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c324f50
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs12/p12_attr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
+#include "p12_lcl.h"
+
+/* Add a local keyid to a safebag */
+
+int PKCS12_add_localkeyid(PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, unsigned char *name,
+                          int namelen)
+{
+    if (X509at_add1_attr_by_NID(&bag->attrib, NID_localKeyID,
+                                V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, name, namelen))
+        return 1;
+    else
+        return 0;
+}
+
+/* Add key usage to PKCS#8 structure */
+
+int PKCS8_add_keyusage(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, int usage)
+{
+    unsigned char us_val = (unsigned char)usage;
+    return PKCS8_pkey_add1_attr_by_NID(p8, NID_key_usage,
+                                       V_ASN1_BIT_STRING, &us_val, 1);
+}
+
+/* Add a friendlyname to a safebag */
+
+int PKCS12_add_friendlyname_asc(PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, const char *name,
+                                int namelen)
+{
+    if (X509at_add1_attr_by_NID(&bag->attrib, NID_friendlyName,
+                                MBSTRING_ASC, (unsigned char *)name, namelen))
+        return 1;
+    else
+        return 0;
+}
+
+int PKCS12_add_friendlyname_utf8(PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, const char *name,
+                                int namelen)
+{
+    if (X509at_add1_attr_by_NID(&bag->attrib, NID_friendlyName,
+                                MBSTRING_UTF8, (unsigned char *)name, namelen))
+        return 1;
+    else
+        return 0;
+}
+
+int PKCS12_add_friendlyname_uni(PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag,
+                                const unsigned char *name, int namelen)
+{
+    if (X509at_add1_attr_by_NID(&bag->attrib, NID_friendlyName,
+                                MBSTRING_BMP, name, namelen))
+        return 1;
+    else
+        return 0;
+}
+
+int PKCS12_add_CSPName_asc(PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, const char *name, int namelen)
+{
+    if (X509at_add1_attr_by_NID(&bag->attrib, NID_ms_csp_name,
+                                MBSTRING_ASC, (unsigned char *)name, namelen))
+        return 1;
+    else
+        return 0;
+}
+
+ASN1_TYPE *PKCS12_get_attr_gen(const STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *attrs,
+                               int attr_nid)
+{
+    X509_ATTRIBUTE *attrib;
+    int i;
+    i = X509at_get_attr_by_NID(attrs, attr_nid, -1);
+    attrib = X509at_get_attr(attrs, i);
+    return X509_ATTRIBUTE_get0_type(attrib, 0);
+}
+
+char *PKCS12_get_friendlyname(PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag)
+{
+    const ASN1_TYPE *atype;
+
+    if ((atype = PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get0_attr(bag, NID_friendlyName)) == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    if (atype->type != V_ASN1_BMPSTRING)
+        return NULL;
+    return OPENSSL_uni2utf8(atype->value.bmpstring->data,
+                            atype->value.bmpstring->length);
+}
+
+const STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *
+PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get0_attrs(const PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag)
+{
+    return bag->attrib;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs12/p12_crpt.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs12/p12_crpt.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..feef9d1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs12/p12_crpt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
+
+/* PKCS#12 PBE algorithms now in static table */
+
+void PKCS12_PBE_add(void)
+{
+}
+
+int PKCS12_PBE_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const char *pass, int passlen,
+                        ASN1_TYPE *param, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
+                        const EVP_MD *md, int en_de)
+{
+    PBEPARAM *pbe;
+    int saltlen, iter, ret;
+    unsigned char *salt;
+    unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH], iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+    int (*pkcs12_key_gen)(const char *pass, int passlen,
+                          unsigned char *salt, int slen,
+                          int id, int iter, int n,
+                          unsigned char *out,
+                          const EVP_MD *md_type);
+
+    pkcs12_key_gen = PKCS12_key_gen_utf8;
+
+    if (cipher == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    /* Extract useful info from parameter */
+
+    pbe = ASN1_TYPE_unpack_sequence(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PBEPARAM), param);
+    if (pbe == NULL) {
+        PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PBE_KEYIVGEN, PKCS12_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (!pbe->iter)
+        iter = 1;
+    else
+        iter = ASN1_INTEGER_get(pbe->iter);
+    salt = pbe->salt->data;
+    saltlen = pbe->salt->length;
+    if (!(*pkcs12_key_gen)(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, PKCS12_KEY_ID,
+                           iter, EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher), key, md)) {
+        PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PBE_KEYIVGEN, PKCS12_R_KEY_GEN_ERROR);
+        PBEPARAM_free(pbe);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (!(*pkcs12_key_gen)(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, PKCS12_IV_ID,
+                           iter, EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher), iv, md)) {
+        PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PBE_KEYIVGEN, PKCS12_R_IV_GEN_ERROR);
+        PBEPARAM_free(pbe);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    PBEPARAM_free(pbe);
+    ret = EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, key, iv, en_de);
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(key, EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH);
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(iv, EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH);
+    return ret;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs12/p12_crt.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs12/p12_crt.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..10cf8dd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs12/p12_crt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,291 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
+#include "p12_lcl.h"
+
+static int pkcs12_add_bag(STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) **pbags,
+                          PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag);
+
+static int copy_bag_attr(PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, EVP_PKEY *pkey, int nid)
+{
+    int idx;
+    X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr;
+    idx = EVP_PKEY_get_attr_by_NID(pkey, nid, -1);
+    if (idx < 0)
+        return 1;
+    attr = EVP_PKEY_get_attr(pkey, idx);
+    if (!X509at_add1_attr(&bag->attrib, attr))
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+PKCS12 *PKCS12_create(const char *pass, const char *name, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *cert,
+                      STACK_OF(X509) *ca, int nid_key, int nid_cert, int iter,
+                      int mac_iter, int keytype)
+{
+    PKCS12 *p12 = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(PKCS7) *safes = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags = NULL;
+    PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag = NULL;
+    int i;
+    unsigned char keyid[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+    unsigned int keyidlen = 0;
+
+    /* Set defaults */
+    if (!nid_cert)
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RC2
+        nid_cert = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC;
+#else
+        nid_cert = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC;
+#endif
+    if (!nid_key)
+        nid_key = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC;
+    if (!iter)
+        iter = PKCS12_DEFAULT_ITER;
+    if (!mac_iter)
+        mac_iter = 1;
+
+    if (!pkey && !cert && !ca) {
+        PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_CREATE, PKCS12_R_INVALID_NULL_ARGUMENT);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    if (pkey && cert) {
+        if (!X509_check_private_key(cert, pkey))
+            return NULL;
+        X509_digest(cert, EVP_sha1(), keyid, &keyidlen);
+    }
+
+    if (cert) {
+        bag = PKCS12_add_cert(&bags, cert);
+        if (name && !PKCS12_add_friendlyname(bag, name, -1))
+            goto err;
+        if (keyidlen && !PKCS12_add_localkeyid(bag, keyid, keyidlen))
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* Add all other certificates */
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ca); i++) {
+        if (!PKCS12_add_cert(&bags, sk_X509_value(ca, i)))
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (bags && !PKCS12_add_safe(&safes, bags, nid_cert, iter, pass))
+        goto err;
+
+    sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_pop_free(bags, PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free);
+    bags = NULL;
+
+    if (pkey) {
+        bag = PKCS12_add_key(&bags, pkey, keytype, iter, nid_key, pass);
+
+        if (!bag)
+            goto err;
+
+        if (!copy_bag_attr(bag, pkey, NID_ms_csp_name))
+            goto err;
+        if (!copy_bag_attr(bag, pkey, NID_LocalKeySet))
+            goto err;
+
+        if (name && !PKCS12_add_friendlyname(bag, name, -1))
+            goto err;
+        if (keyidlen && !PKCS12_add_localkeyid(bag, keyid, keyidlen))
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (bags && !PKCS12_add_safe(&safes, bags, -1, 0, NULL))
+        goto err;
+
+    sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_pop_free(bags, PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free);
+    bags = NULL;
+
+    p12 = PKCS12_add_safes(safes, 0);
+
+    if (!p12)
+        goto err;
+
+    sk_PKCS7_pop_free(safes, PKCS7_free);
+
+    safes = NULL;
+
+    if ((mac_iter != -1) &&
+        !PKCS12_set_mac(p12, pass, -1, NULL, 0, mac_iter, NULL))
+        goto err;
+
+    return p12;
+
+ err:
+    PKCS12_free(p12);
+    sk_PKCS7_pop_free(safes, PKCS7_free);
+    sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_pop_free(bags, PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free);
+    return NULL;
+
+}
+
+PKCS12_SAFEBAG *PKCS12_add_cert(STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) **pbags, X509 *cert)
+{
+    PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag = NULL;
+    char *name;
+    int namelen = -1;
+    unsigned char *keyid;
+    int keyidlen = -1;
+
+    /* Add user certificate */
+    if ((bag = PKCS12_SAFEBAG_create_cert(cert)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    /*
+     * Use friendlyName and localKeyID in certificate. (if present)
+     */
+
+    name = (char *)X509_alias_get0(cert, &namelen);
+
+    if (name && !PKCS12_add_friendlyname(bag, name, namelen))
+        goto err;
+
+    keyid = X509_keyid_get0(cert, &keyidlen);
+
+    if (keyid && !PKCS12_add_localkeyid(bag, keyid, keyidlen))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!pkcs12_add_bag(pbags, bag))
+        goto err;
+
+    return bag;
+
+ err:
+    PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free(bag);
+    return NULL;
+
+}
+
+PKCS12_SAFEBAG *PKCS12_add_key(STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) **pbags,
+                               EVP_PKEY *key, int key_usage, int iter,
+                               int nid_key, const char *pass)
+{
+
+    PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag = NULL;
+    PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8 = NULL;
+
+    /* Make a PKCS#8 structure */
+    if ((p8 = EVP_PKEY2PKCS8(key)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (key_usage && !PKCS8_add_keyusage(p8, key_usage))
+        goto err;
+    if (nid_key != -1) {
+        bag = PKCS12_SAFEBAG_create_pkcs8_encrypt(nid_key, pass, -1, NULL, 0,
+                                                  iter, p8);
+        PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8);
+    } else
+        bag = PKCS12_SAFEBAG_create0_p8inf(p8);
+
+    if (!bag)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!pkcs12_add_bag(pbags, bag))
+        goto err;
+
+    return bag;
+
+ err:
+    PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free(bag);
+    return NULL;
+
+}
+
+int PKCS12_add_safe(STACK_OF(PKCS7) **psafes, STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags,
+                    int nid_safe, int iter, const char *pass)
+{
+    PKCS7 *p7 = NULL;
+    int free_safes = 0;
+
+    if (!*psafes) {
+        *psafes = sk_PKCS7_new_null();
+        if (!*psafes)
+            return 0;
+        free_safes = 1;
+    } else
+        free_safes = 0;
+
+    if (nid_safe == 0)
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RC2
+        nid_safe = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC;
+#else
+        nid_safe = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC;
+#endif
+
+    if (nid_safe == -1)
+        p7 = PKCS12_pack_p7data(bags);
+    else
+        p7 = PKCS12_pack_p7encdata(nid_safe, pass, -1, NULL, 0, iter, bags);
+    if (!p7)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!sk_PKCS7_push(*psafes, p7))
+        goto err;
+
+    return 1;
+
+ err:
+    if (free_safes) {
+        sk_PKCS7_free(*psafes);
+        *psafes = NULL;
+    }
+    PKCS7_free(p7);
+    return 0;
+
+}
+
+static int pkcs12_add_bag(STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) **pbags,
+                          PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag)
+{
+    int free_bags;
+    if (!pbags)
+        return 1;
+    if (!*pbags) {
+        *pbags = sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_new_null();
+        if (!*pbags)
+            return 0;
+        free_bags = 1;
+    } else
+        free_bags = 0;
+
+    if (!sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_push(*pbags, bag)) {
+        if (free_bags) {
+            sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free(*pbags);
+            *pbags = NULL;
+        }
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+
+}
+
+PKCS12 *PKCS12_add_safes(STACK_OF(PKCS7) *safes, int nid_p7)
+{
+    PKCS12 *p12;
+    if (nid_p7 <= 0)
+        nid_p7 = NID_pkcs7_data;
+    p12 = PKCS12_init(nid_p7);
+
+    if (!p12)
+        return NULL;
+
+    if (!PKCS12_pack_authsafes(p12, safes)) {
+        PKCS12_free(p12);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    return p12;
+
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs12/p12_decr.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs12/p12_decr.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3c86058
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs12/p12_decr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
+
+/* Define this to dump decrypted output to files called DERnnn */
+/*
+ * #define OPENSSL_DEBUG_DECRYPT
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Encrypt/Decrypt a buffer based on password and algor, result in a
+ * OPENSSL_malloc'ed buffer
+ */
+unsigned char *PKCS12_pbe_crypt(const X509_ALGOR *algor,
+                                const char *pass, int passlen,
+                                const unsigned char *in, int inlen,
+                                unsigned char **data, int *datalen, int en_de)
+{
+    unsigned char *out = NULL;
+    int outlen, i;
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+        PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PBE_CRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* Decrypt data */
+    if (!EVP_PBE_CipherInit(algor->algorithm, pass, passlen,
+                            algor->parameter, ctx, en_de)) {
+        PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PBE_CRYPT,
+                  PKCS12_R_PKCS12_ALGOR_CIPHERINIT_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if ((out = OPENSSL_malloc(inlen + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(ctx)))
+            == NULL) {
+        PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PBE_CRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx, out, &i, in, inlen)) {
+        OPENSSL_free(out);
+        out = NULL;
+        PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PBE_CRYPT, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    outlen = i;
+    if (!EVP_CipherFinal_ex(ctx, out + i, &i)) {
+        OPENSSL_free(out);
+        out = NULL;
+        PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PBE_CRYPT,
+                  PKCS12_R_PKCS12_CIPHERFINAL_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    outlen += i;
+    if (datalen)
+        *datalen = outlen;
+    if (data)
+        *data = out;
+ err:
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
+    return out;
+
+}
+
+/*
+ * Decrypt an OCTET STRING and decode ASN1 structure if zbuf set zero buffer
+ * after use.
+ */
+
+void *PKCS12_item_decrypt_d2i(const X509_ALGOR *algor, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+                              const char *pass, int passlen,
+                              const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *oct, int zbuf)
+{
+    unsigned char *out;
+    const unsigned char *p;
+    void *ret;
+    int outlen;
+
+    if (!PKCS12_pbe_crypt(algor, pass, passlen, oct->data, oct->length,
+                          &out, &outlen, 0)) {
+        PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_ITEM_DECRYPT_D2I,
+                  PKCS12_R_PKCS12_PBE_CRYPT_ERROR);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    p = out;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_DEBUG_DECRYPT
+    {
+        FILE *op;
+
+        char fname[30];
+        static int fnm = 1;
+        sprintf(fname, "DER%d", fnm++);
+        op = fopen(fname, "wb");
+        fwrite(p, 1, outlen, op);
+        fclose(op);
+    }
+#endif
+    ret = ASN1_item_d2i(NULL, &p, outlen, it);
+    if (zbuf)
+        OPENSSL_cleanse(out, outlen);
+    if (!ret)
+        PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_ITEM_DECRYPT_D2I, PKCS12_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+    OPENSSL_free(out);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Encode ASN1 structure and encrypt, return OCTET STRING if zbuf set zero
+ * encoding.
+ */
+
+ASN1_OCTET_STRING *PKCS12_item_i2d_encrypt(X509_ALGOR *algor,
+                                           const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+                                           const char *pass, int passlen,
+                                           void *obj, int zbuf)
+{
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *oct = NULL;
+    unsigned char *in = NULL;
+    int inlen;
+
+    if ((oct = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new()) == NULL) {
+        PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_ITEM_I2D_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    inlen = ASN1_item_i2d(obj, &in, it);
+    if (!in) {
+        PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_ITEM_I2D_ENCRYPT, PKCS12_R_ENCODE_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (!PKCS12_pbe_crypt(algor, pass, passlen, in, inlen, &oct->data,
+                          &oct->length, 1)) {
+        PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_ITEM_I2D_ENCRYPT, PKCS12_R_ENCRYPT_ERROR);
+        OPENSSL_free(in);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (zbuf)
+        OPENSSL_cleanse(in, inlen);
+    OPENSSL_free(in);
+    return oct;
+ err:
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(oct);
+    return NULL;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs12/p12_init.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs12/p12_init.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a78e183
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs12/p12_init.c
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
+#include "p12_lcl.h"
+
+/* Initialise a PKCS12 structure to take data */
+
+PKCS12 *PKCS12_init(int mode)
+{
+    PKCS12 *pkcs12;
+
+    if ((pkcs12 = PKCS12_new()) == NULL) {
+        PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    ASN1_INTEGER_set(pkcs12->version, 3);
+    pkcs12->authsafes->type = OBJ_nid2obj(mode);
+    switch (mode) {
+    case NID_pkcs7_data:
+        if ((pkcs12->authsafes->d.data = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new()) == NULL) {
+            PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        break;
+    default:
+        PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_INIT, PKCS12_R_UNSUPPORTED_PKCS12_MODE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    return pkcs12;
+
+ err:
+    PKCS12_free(pkcs12);
+    return NULL;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs12/p12_key.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs12/p12_key.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9c13a45
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs12/p12_key.c
@@ -0,0 +1,205 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+/* Uncomment out this line to get debugging info about key generation */
+/*
+ * #define OPENSSL_DEBUG_KEYGEN
+ */
+#ifdef OPENSSL_DEBUG_KEYGEN
+# include <openssl/bio.h>
+extern BIO *bio_err;
+void h__dump(unsigned char *p, int len);
+#endif
+
+/* PKCS12 compatible key/IV generation */
+#ifndef min
+# define min(a,b) ((a) < (b) ? (a) : (b))
+#endif
+
+int PKCS12_key_gen_asc(const char *pass, int passlen, unsigned char *salt,
+                       int saltlen, int id, int iter, int n,
+                       unsigned char *out, const EVP_MD *md_type)
+{
+    int ret;
+    unsigned char *unipass;
+    int uniplen;
+
+    if (!pass) {
+        unipass = NULL;
+        uniplen = 0;
+    } else if (!OPENSSL_asc2uni(pass, passlen, &unipass, &uniplen)) {
+        PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_KEY_GEN_ASC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    ret = PKCS12_key_gen_uni(unipass, uniplen, salt, saltlen,
+                             id, iter, n, out, md_type);
+    if (ret <= 0)
+        return 0;
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(unipass, uniplen);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int PKCS12_key_gen_utf8(const char *pass, int passlen, unsigned char *salt,
+                        int saltlen, int id, int iter, int n,
+                        unsigned char *out, const EVP_MD *md_type)
+{
+    int ret;
+    unsigned char *unipass;
+    int uniplen;
+
+    if (!pass) {
+        unipass = NULL;
+        uniplen = 0;
+    } else if (!OPENSSL_utf82uni(pass, passlen, &unipass, &uniplen)) {
+        PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_KEY_GEN_UTF8, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    ret = PKCS12_key_gen_uni(unipass, uniplen, salt, saltlen,
+                             id, iter, n, out, md_type);
+    if (ret <= 0)
+        return 0;
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(unipass, uniplen);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int PKCS12_key_gen_uni(unsigned char *pass, int passlen, unsigned char *salt,
+                       int saltlen, int id, int iter, int n,
+                       unsigned char *out, const EVP_MD *md_type)
+{
+    unsigned char *B = NULL, *D = NULL, *I = NULL, *p = NULL, *Ai = NULL;
+    int Slen, Plen, Ilen, Ijlen;
+    int i, j, u, v;
+    int ret = 0;
+    BIGNUM *Ij = NULL, *Bpl1 = NULL; /* These hold Ij and B + 1 */
+    EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+#ifdef  OPENSSL_DEBUG_KEYGEN
+    unsigned char *tmpout = out;
+    int tmpn = n;
+#endif
+
+    ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+#ifdef  OPENSSL_DEBUG_KEYGEN
+    fprintf(stderr, "KEYGEN DEBUG\n");
+    fprintf(stderr, "ID %d, ITER %d\n", id, iter);
+    fprintf(stderr, "Password (length %d):\n", passlen);
+    h__dump(pass, passlen);
+    fprintf(stderr, "Salt (length %d):\n", saltlen);
+    h__dump(salt, saltlen);
+#endif
+    v = EVP_MD_block_size(md_type);
+    u = EVP_MD_size(md_type);
+    if (u < 0 || v <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    D = OPENSSL_malloc(v);
+    Ai = OPENSSL_malloc(u);
+    B = OPENSSL_malloc(v + 1);
+    Slen = v * ((saltlen + v - 1) / v);
+    if (passlen)
+        Plen = v * ((passlen + v - 1) / v);
+    else
+        Plen = 0;
+    Ilen = Slen + Plen;
+    I = OPENSSL_malloc(Ilen);
+    Ij = BN_new();
+    Bpl1 = BN_new();
+    if (D == NULL || Ai == NULL || B == NULL || I == NULL || Ij == NULL
+            || Bpl1 == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    for (i = 0; i < v; i++)
+        D[i] = id;
+    p = I;
+    for (i = 0; i < Slen; i++)
+        *p++ = salt[i % saltlen];
+    for (i = 0; i < Plen; i++)
+        *p++ = pass[i % passlen];
+    for (;;) {
+        if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, md_type, NULL)
+            || !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, D, v)
+            || !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, I, Ilen)
+            || !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, Ai, NULL))
+            goto err;
+        for (j = 1; j < iter; j++) {
+            if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, md_type, NULL)
+                || !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, Ai, u)
+                || !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, Ai, NULL))
+                goto err;
+        }
+        memcpy(out, Ai, min(n, u));
+        if (u >= n) {
+#ifdef OPENSSL_DEBUG_KEYGEN
+            fprintf(stderr, "Output KEY (length %d)\n", tmpn);
+            h__dump(tmpout, tmpn);
+#endif
+            ret = 1;
+            goto end;
+        }
+        n -= u;
+        out += u;
+        for (j = 0; j < v; j++)
+            B[j] = Ai[j % u];
+        /* Work out B + 1 first then can use B as tmp space */
+        if (!BN_bin2bn(B, v, Bpl1))
+            goto err;
+        if (!BN_add_word(Bpl1, 1))
+            goto err;
+        for (j = 0; j < Ilen; j += v) {
+            if (!BN_bin2bn(I + j, v, Ij))
+                goto err;
+            if (!BN_add(Ij, Ij, Bpl1))
+                goto err;
+            if (!BN_bn2bin(Ij, B))
+                goto err;
+            Ijlen = BN_num_bytes(Ij);
+            /* If more than 2^(v*8) - 1 cut off MSB */
+            if (Ijlen > v) {
+                if (!BN_bn2bin(Ij, B))
+                    goto err;
+                memcpy(I + j, B + 1, v);
+#ifndef PKCS12_BROKEN_KEYGEN
+                /* If less than v bytes pad with zeroes */
+            } else if (Ijlen < v) {
+                memset(I + j, 0, v - Ijlen);
+                if (!BN_bn2bin(Ij, I + j + v - Ijlen))
+                    goto err;
+#endif
+            } else if (!BN_bn2bin(Ij, I + j))
+                goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+ err:
+    PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_KEY_GEN_UNI, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+
+ end:
+    OPENSSL_free(Ai);
+    OPENSSL_free(B);
+    OPENSSL_free(D);
+    OPENSSL_free(I);
+    BN_free(Ij);
+    BN_free(Bpl1);
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_DEBUG_KEYGEN
+void h__dump(unsigned char *p, int len)
+{
+    for (; len--; p++)
+        fprintf(stderr, "%02X", *p);
+    fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs12/p12_kiss.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs12/p12_kiss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7ab9838
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs12/p12_kiss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,250 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
+
+/* Simplified PKCS#12 routines */
+
+static int parse_pk12(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen,
+                      EVP_PKEY **pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *ocerts);
+
+static int parse_bags(const STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags, const char *pass,
+                      int passlen, EVP_PKEY **pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *ocerts);
+
+static int parse_bag(PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, const char *pass, int passlen,
+                     EVP_PKEY **pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *ocerts);
+
+/*
+ * Parse and decrypt a PKCS#12 structure returning user key, user cert and
+ * other (CA) certs. Note either ca should be NULL, *ca should be NULL, or it
+ * should point to a valid STACK structure. pkey and cert can be passed
+ * uninitialised.
+ */
+
+int PKCS12_parse(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert,
+                 STACK_OF(X509) **ca)
+{
+    STACK_OF(X509) *ocerts = NULL;
+    X509 *x = NULL;
+
+    if (pkey)
+        *pkey = NULL;
+    if (cert)
+        *cert = NULL;
+
+    /* Check for NULL PKCS12 structure */
+
+    if (!p12) {
+        PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE,
+                  PKCS12_R_INVALID_NULL_PKCS12_POINTER);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* Check the mac */
+
+    /*
+     * If password is zero length or NULL then try verifying both cases to
+     * determine which password is correct. The reason for this is that under
+     * PKCS#12 password based encryption no password and a zero length
+     * password are two different things...
+     */
+
+    if (!pass || !*pass) {
+        if (PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, NULL, 0))
+            pass = NULL;
+        else if (PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, "", 0))
+            pass = "";
+        else {
+            PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE, PKCS12_R_MAC_VERIFY_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    } else if (!PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, pass, -1)) {
+        PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE, PKCS12_R_MAC_VERIFY_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* Allocate stack for other certificates */
+    ocerts = sk_X509_new_null();
+
+    if (!ocerts) {
+        PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!parse_pk12(p12, pass, -1, pkey, ocerts)) {
+        PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE, PKCS12_R_PARSE_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    while ((x = sk_X509_pop(ocerts))) {
+        if (pkey && *pkey && cert && !*cert) {
+            ERR_set_mark();
+            if (X509_check_private_key(x, *pkey)) {
+                *cert = x;
+                x = NULL;
+            }
+            ERR_pop_to_mark();
+        }
+
+        if (ca && x) {
+            if (!*ca)
+                *ca = sk_X509_new_null();
+            if (!*ca)
+                goto err;
+            if (!sk_X509_push(*ca, x))
+                goto err;
+            x = NULL;
+        }
+        X509_free(x);
+    }
+
+    sk_X509_pop_free(ocerts, X509_free);
+
+    return 1;
+
+ err:
+
+    if (pkey) {
+        EVP_PKEY_free(*pkey);
+        *pkey = NULL;
+    }
+    if (cert) {
+        X509_free(*cert);
+        *cert = NULL;
+    }
+    X509_free(x);
+    sk_X509_pop_free(ocerts, X509_free);
+    return 0;
+
+}
+
+/* Parse the outer PKCS#12 structure */
+
+static int parse_pk12(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen,
+                      EVP_PKEY **pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *ocerts)
+{
+    STACK_OF(PKCS7) *asafes;
+    STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags;
+    int i, bagnid;
+    PKCS7 *p7;
+
+    if ((asafes = PKCS12_unpack_authsafes(p12)) == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_PKCS7_num(asafes); i++) {
+        p7 = sk_PKCS7_value(asafes, i);
+        bagnid = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
+        if (bagnid == NID_pkcs7_data) {
+            bags = PKCS12_unpack_p7data(p7);
+        } else if (bagnid == NID_pkcs7_encrypted) {
+            bags = PKCS12_unpack_p7encdata(p7, pass, passlen);
+        } else
+            continue;
+        if (!bags) {
+            sk_PKCS7_pop_free(asafes, PKCS7_free);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        if (!parse_bags(bags, pass, passlen, pkey, ocerts)) {
+            sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_pop_free(bags, PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free);
+            sk_PKCS7_pop_free(asafes, PKCS7_free);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_pop_free(bags, PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free);
+    }
+    sk_PKCS7_pop_free(asafes, PKCS7_free);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int parse_bags(const STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags, const char *pass,
+                      int passlen, EVP_PKEY **pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *ocerts)
+{
+    int i;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_num(bags); i++) {
+        if (!parse_bag(sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_value(bags, i),
+                       pass, passlen, pkey, ocerts))
+            return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int parse_bag(PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, const char *pass, int passlen,
+                     EVP_PKEY **pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *ocerts)
+{
+    PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8;
+    X509 *x509;
+    const ASN1_TYPE *attrib;
+    ASN1_BMPSTRING *fname = NULL;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *lkid = NULL;
+
+    if ((attrib = PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get0_attr(bag, NID_friendlyName)))
+        fname = attrib->value.bmpstring;
+
+    if ((attrib = PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get0_attr(bag, NID_localKeyID)))
+        lkid = attrib->value.octet_string;
+
+    switch (PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get_nid(bag)) {
+    case NID_keyBag:
+        if (!pkey || *pkey)
+            return 1;
+        *pkey = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get0_p8inf(bag));
+        if (*pkey == NULL)
+            return 0;
+        break;
+
+    case NID_pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag:
+        if (!pkey || *pkey)
+            return 1;
+        if ((p8 = PKCS12_decrypt_skey(bag, pass, passlen)) == NULL)
+            return 0;
+        *pkey = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(p8);
+        PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8);
+        if (!(*pkey))
+            return 0;
+        break;
+
+    case NID_certBag:
+        if (PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get_bag_nid(bag) != NID_x509Certificate)
+            return 1;
+        if ((x509 = PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get1_cert(bag)) == NULL)
+            return 0;
+        if (lkid && !X509_keyid_set1(x509, lkid->data, lkid->length)) {
+            X509_free(x509);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        if (fname) {
+            int len, r;
+            unsigned char *data;
+            len = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&data, fname);
+            if (len >= 0) {
+                r = X509_alias_set1(x509, data, len);
+                OPENSSL_free(data);
+                if (!r) {
+                    X509_free(x509);
+                    return 0;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
+        if (!sk_X509_push(ocerts, x509)) {
+            X509_free(x509);
+            return 0;
+        }
+
+        break;
+
+    case NID_safeContentsBag:
+        return parse_bags(PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get0_safes(bag), pass, passlen, pkey,
+                          ocerts);
+
+    default:
+        return 1;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs12/p12_lcl.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs12/p12_lcl.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0b52f1e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs12/p12_lcl.h
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+struct PKCS12_MAC_DATA_st {
+    X509_SIG *dinfo;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *salt;
+    ASN1_INTEGER *iter;         /* defaults to 1 */
+};
+
+struct PKCS12_st {
+    ASN1_INTEGER *version;
+    PKCS12_MAC_DATA *mac;
+    PKCS7 *authsafes;
+};
+
+struct PKCS12_SAFEBAG_st {
+    ASN1_OBJECT *type;
+    union {
+        struct pkcs12_bag_st *bag; /* secret, crl and certbag */
+        struct pkcs8_priv_key_info_st *keybag; /* keybag */
+        X509_SIG *shkeybag;     /* shrouded key bag */
+        STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *safes;
+        ASN1_TYPE *other;
+    } value;
+    STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *attrib;
+};
+
+struct pkcs12_bag_st {
+    ASN1_OBJECT *type;
+    union {
+        ASN1_OCTET_STRING *x509cert;
+        ASN1_OCTET_STRING *x509crl;
+        ASN1_OCTET_STRING *octet;
+        ASN1_IA5STRING *sdsicert;
+        ASN1_TYPE *other;       /* Secret or other bag */
+    } value;
+};
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a9e2202
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,242 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+# include <stdio.h>
+# include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+# include <openssl/crypto.h>
+# include <openssl/hmac.h>
+# include <openssl/rand.h>
+# include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
+# include "p12_lcl.h"
+
+int PKCS12_mac_present(const PKCS12 *p12)
+{
+    return p12->mac ? 1 : 0;
+}
+
+void PKCS12_get0_mac(const ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pmac,
+                     const X509_ALGOR **pmacalg,
+                     const ASN1_OCTET_STRING **psalt,
+                     const ASN1_INTEGER **piter,
+                     const PKCS12 *p12)
+{
+    if (p12->mac) {
+        X509_SIG_get0(p12->mac->dinfo, pmacalg, pmac);
+        if (psalt)
+            *psalt = p12->mac->salt;
+        if (piter)
+            *piter = p12->mac->iter;
+    } else {
+        if (pmac)
+            *pmac = NULL;
+        if (pmacalg)
+            *pmacalg = NULL;
+        if (psalt)
+            *psalt = NULL;
+        if (piter)
+            *piter = NULL;
+    }
+}
+
+# define TK26_MAC_KEY_LEN 32
+
+static int pkcs12_gen_gost_mac_key(const char *pass, int passlen,
+                                   const unsigned char *salt, int saltlen,
+                                   int iter, int keylen, unsigned char *key,
+                                   const EVP_MD *digest)
+{
+    unsigned char out[96];
+
+    if (keylen != TK26_MAC_KEY_LEN) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (!PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, iter,
+                           digest, sizeof(out), out)) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+    memcpy(key, out + sizeof(out) - TK26_MAC_KEY_LEN, TK26_MAC_KEY_LEN);
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(out, sizeof(out));
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Generate a MAC */
+static int pkcs12_gen_mac(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen,
+                          unsigned char *mac, unsigned int *maclen,
+                          int (*pkcs12_key_gen)(const char *pass, int passlen,
+                                                unsigned char *salt, int slen,
+                                                int id, int iter, int n,
+                                                unsigned char *out,
+                                                const EVP_MD *md_type))
+{
+    const EVP_MD *md_type;
+    HMAC_CTX *hmac = NULL;
+    unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], *salt;
+    int saltlen, iter;
+    int md_size = 0;
+    int md_type_nid;
+    const X509_ALGOR *macalg;
+    const ASN1_OBJECT *macoid;
+
+    if (pkcs12_key_gen == NULL)
+        pkcs12_key_gen = PKCS12_key_gen_utf8;
+
+    if (!PKCS7_type_is_data(p12->authsafes)) {
+        PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_GEN_MAC, PKCS12_R_CONTENT_TYPE_NOT_DATA);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    salt = p12->mac->salt->data;
+    saltlen = p12->mac->salt->length;
+    if (!p12->mac->iter)
+        iter = 1;
+    else
+        iter = ASN1_INTEGER_get(p12->mac->iter);
+    X509_SIG_get0(p12->mac->dinfo, &macalg, NULL);
+    X509_ALGOR_get0(&macoid, NULL, NULL, macalg);
+    if ((md_type = EVP_get_digestbyobj(macoid)) == NULL) {
+        PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_GEN_MAC, PKCS12_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST_ALGORITHM);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    md_size = EVP_MD_size(md_type);
+    md_type_nid = EVP_MD_type(md_type);
+    if (md_size < 0)
+        return 0;
+    if ((md_type_nid == NID_id_GostR3411_94
+         || md_type_nid == NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
+         || md_type_nid == NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512)
+        && !getenv("LEGACY_GOST_PKCS12")) {
+        md_size = TK26_MAC_KEY_LEN;
+        if (!pkcs12_gen_gost_mac_key(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, iter,
+                                     md_size, key, md_type)) {
+            PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_GEN_MAC, PKCS12_R_KEY_GEN_ERROR);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    } else
+        if (!(*pkcs12_key_gen)(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, PKCS12_MAC_ID,
+                               iter, md_size, key, md_type)) {
+        PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_GEN_MAC, PKCS12_R_KEY_GEN_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if ((hmac = HMAC_CTX_new()) == NULL
+        || !HMAC_Init_ex(hmac, key, md_size, md_type, NULL)
+        || !HMAC_Update(hmac, p12->authsafes->d.data->data,
+                        p12->authsafes->d.data->length)
+        || !HMAC_Final(hmac, mac, maclen)) {
+        HMAC_CTX_free(hmac);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    HMAC_CTX_free(hmac);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int PKCS12_gen_mac(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen,
+                   unsigned char *mac, unsigned int *maclen)
+{
+    return pkcs12_gen_mac(p12, pass, passlen, mac, maclen, NULL);
+}
+
+/* Verify the mac */
+int PKCS12_verify_mac(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen)
+{
+    unsigned char mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+    unsigned int maclen;
+    const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *macoct;
+
+    if (p12->mac == NULL) {
+        PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_VERIFY_MAC, PKCS12_R_MAC_ABSENT);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (!pkcs12_gen_mac(p12, pass, passlen, mac, &maclen,
+                        PKCS12_key_gen_utf8)) {
+        PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_VERIFY_MAC, PKCS12_R_MAC_GENERATION_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    X509_SIG_get0(p12->mac->dinfo, NULL, &macoct);
+    if ((maclen != (unsigned int)ASN1_STRING_length(macoct))
+        || CRYPTO_memcmp(mac, ASN1_STRING_get0_data(macoct), maclen) != 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Set a mac */
+
+int PKCS12_set_mac(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen,
+                   unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, int iter,
+                   const EVP_MD *md_type)
+{
+    unsigned char mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+    unsigned int maclen;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *macoct;
+
+    if (!md_type)
+        md_type = EVP_sha1();
+    if (PKCS12_setup_mac(p12, iter, salt, saltlen, md_type) == PKCS12_ERROR) {
+        PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_SET_MAC, PKCS12_R_MAC_SETUP_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    /*
+     * Note that output mac is forced to UTF-8...
+     */
+    if (!pkcs12_gen_mac(p12, pass, passlen, mac, &maclen,
+                        PKCS12_key_gen_utf8)) {
+        PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_SET_MAC, PKCS12_R_MAC_GENERATION_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    X509_SIG_getm(p12->mac->dinfo, NULL, &macoct);
+    if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(macoct, mac, maclen)) {
+        PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_SET_MAC, PKCS12_R_MAC_STRING_SET_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Set up a mac structure */
+int PKCS12_setup_mac(PKCS12 *p12, int iter, unsigned char *salt, int saltlen,
+                     const EVP_MD *md_type)
+{
+    X509_ALGOR *macalg;
+
+    PKCS12_MAC_DATA_free(p12->mac);
+    p12->mac = NULL;
+
+    if ((p12->mac = PKCS12_MAC_DATA_new()) == NULL)
+        return PKCS12_ERROR;
+    if (iter > 1) {
+        if ((p12->mac->iter = ASN1_INTEGER_new()) == NULL) {
+            PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_SETUP_MAC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(p12->mac->iter, iter)) {
+            PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_SETUP_MAC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+    if (!saltlen)
+        saltlen = PKCS12_SALT_LEN;
+    if ((p12->mac->salt->data = OPENSSL_malloc(saltlen)) == NULL) {
+        PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_SETUP_MAC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    p12->mac->salt->length = saltlen;
+    if (!salt) {
+        if (RAND_bytes(p12->mac->salt->data, saltlen) <= 0)
+            return 0;
+    } else
+        memcpy(p12->mac->salt->data, salt, saltlen);
+    X509_SIG_getm(p12->mac->dinfo, &macalg, NULL);
+    if (!X509_ALGOR_set0(macalg, OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_MD_type(md_type)),
+                         V_ASN1_NULL, NULL)) {
+        PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_SETUP_MAC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs12/p12_npas.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs12/p12_npas.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0ce75ed
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs12/p12_npas.c
@@ -0,0 +1,184 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
+#include "p12_lcl.h"
+
+/* PKCS#12 password change routine */
+
+static int newpass_p12(PKCS12 *p12, const char *oldpass, const char *newpass);
+static int newpass_bags(STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags, const char *oldpass,
+                        const char *newpass);
+static int newpass_bag(PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, const char *oldpass,
+                        const char *newpass);
+static int alg_get(const X509_ALGOR *alg, int *pnid, int *piter,
+                   int *psaltlen);
+
+/*
+ * Change the password on a PKCS#12 structure.
+ */
+
+int PKCS12_newpass(PKCS12 *p12, const char *oldpass, const char *newpass)
+{
+    /* Check for NULL PKCS12 structure */
+
+    if (!p12) {
+        PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_NEWPASS,
+                  PKCS12_R_INVALID_NULL_PKCS12_POINTER);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* Check the mac */
+
+    if (!PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, oldpass, -1)) {
+        PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_NEWPASS, PKCS12_R_MAC_VERIFY_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (!newpass_p12(p12, oldpass, newpass)) {
+        PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_NEWPASS, PKCS12_R_PARSE_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Parse the outer PKCS#12 structure */
+
+static int newpass_p12(PKCS12 *p12, const char *oldpass, const char *newpass)
+{
+    STACK_OF(PKCS7) *asafes = NULL, *newsafes = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags = NULL;
+    int i, bagnid, pbe_nid = 0, pbe_iter = 0, pbe_saltlen = 0;
+    PKCS7 *p7, *p7new;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *p12_data_tmp = NULL, *macoct = NULL;
+    unsigned char mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+    unsigned int maclen;
+    int rv = 0;
+
+    if ((asafes = PKCS12_unpack_authsafes(p12)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if ((newsafes = sk_PKCS7_new_null()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_PKCS7_num(asafes); i++) {
+        p7 = sk_PKCS7_value(asafes, i);
+        bagnid = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
+        if (bagnid == NID_pkcs7_data) {
+            bags = PKCS12_unpack_p7data(p7);
+        } else if (bagnid == NID_pkcs7_encrypted) {
+            bags = PKCS12_unpack_p7encdata(p7, oldpass, -1);
+            if (!alg_get(p7->d.encrypted->enc_data->algorithm,
+                         &pbe_nid, &pbe_iter, &pbe_saltlen))
+                goto err;
+        } else {
+            continue;
+        }
+        if (bags == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        if (!newpass_bags(bags, oldpass, newpass))
+            goto err;
+        /* Repack bag in same form with new password */
+        if (bagnid == NID_pkcs7_data)
+            p7new = PKCS12_pack_p7data(bags);
+        else
+            p7new = PKCS12_pack_p7encdata(pbe_nid, newpass, -1, NULL,
+                                          pbe_saltlen, pbe_iter, bags);
+        if (!p7new || !sk_PKCS7_push(newsafes, p7new))
+            goto err;
+        sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_pop_free(bags, PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free);
+        bags = NULL;
+    }
+
+    /* Repack safe: save old safe in case of error */
+
+    p12_data_tmp = p12->authsafes->d.data;
+    if ((p12->authsafes->d.data = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (!PKCS12_pack_authsafes(p12, newsafes))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!PKCS12_gen_mac(p12, newpass, -1, mac, &maclen))
+        goto err;
+    X509_SIG_getm(p12->mac->dinfo, NULL, &macoct);
+    if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(macoct, mac, maclen))
+        goto err;
+
+    rv = 1;
+
+err:
+    /* Restore old safe if necessary */
+    if (rv == 1) {
+        ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(p12_data_tmp);
+    } else if (p12_data_tmp != NULL) {
+        ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(p12->authsafes->d.data);
+        p12->authsafes->d.data = p12_data_tmp;
+    }
+    sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_pop_free(bags, PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free);
+    sk_PKCS7_pop_free(asafes, PKCS7_free);
+    sk_PKCS7_pop_free(newsafes, PKCS7_free);
+    return rv;
+}
+
+static int newpass_bags(STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags, const char *oldpass,
+                        const char *newpass)
+{
+    int i;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_num(bags); i++) {
+        if (!newpass_bag(sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_value(bags, i), oldpass, newpass))
+            return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Change password of safebag: only needs handle shrouded keybags */
+
+static int newpass_bag(PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, const char *oldpass,
+                       const char *newpass)
+{
+    PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8;
+    X509_SIG *p8new;
+    int p8_nid, p8_saltlen, p8_iter;
+    const X509_ALGOR *shalg;
+
+    if (PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get_nid(bag) != NID_pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag)
+        return 1;
+
+    if ((p8 = PKCS8_decrypt(bag->value.shkeybag, oldpass, -1)) == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    X509_SIG_get0(bag->value.shkeybag, &shalg, NULL);
+    if (!alg_get(shalg, &p8_nid, &p8_iter, &p8_saltlen))
+        return 0;
+    p8new = PKCS8_encrypt(p8_nid, NULL, newpass, -1, NULL, p8_saltlen,
+                          p8_iter, p8);
+    PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8);
+    if (p8new == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    X509_SIG_free(bag->value.shkeybag);
+    bag->value.shkeybag = p8new;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int alg_get(const X509_ALGOR *alg, int *pnid, int *piter,
+                   int *psaltlen)
+{
+    PBEPARAM *pbe;
+    pbe = ASN1_TYPE_unpack_sequence(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PBEPARAM), alg->parameter);
+    if (!pbe)
+        return 0;
+    *pnid = OBJ_obj2nid(alg->algorithm);
+    *piter = ASN1_INTEGER_get(pbe->iter);
+    *psaltlen = pbe->salt->length;
+    PBEPARAM_free(pbe);
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs12/p12_p8d.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs12/p12_p8d.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d926a77
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs12/p12_p8d.c
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
+
+PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *PKCS8_decrypt(const X509_SIG *p8, const char *pass,
+                                   int passlen)
+{
+    const X509_ALGOR *dalg;
+    const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *doct;
+    X509_SIG_get0(p8, &dalg, &doct);
+    return PKCS12_item_decrypt_d2i(dalg,
+                                   ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO), pass,
+                                   passlen, doct, 1);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs12/p12_p8e.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs12/p12_p8e.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..86a07e1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs12/p12_p8e.c
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
+#include "internal/x509_int.h"
+
+X509_SIG *PKCS8_encrypt(int pbe_nid, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
+                        const char *pass, int passlen,
+                        unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, int iter,
+                        PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf)
+{
+    X509_SIG *p8 = NULL;
+    X509_ALGOR *pbe;
+
+    if (pbe_nid == -1)
+        pbe = PKCS5_pbe2_set(cipher, iter, salt, saltlen);
+    else if (EVP_PBE_find(EVP_PBE_TYPE_PRF, pbe_nid, NULL, NULL, 0))
+        pbe = PKCS5_pbe2_set_iv(cipher, iter, salt, saltlen, NULL, pbe_nid);
+    else {
+        ERR_clear_error();
+        pbe = PKCS5_pbe_set(pbe_nid, iter, salt, saltlen);
+    }
+    if (!pbe) {
+        PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS8_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    p8 = PKCS8_set0_pbe(pass, passlen, p8inf, pbe);
+    if (p8 == NULL) {
+        X509_ALGOR_free(pbe);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    return p8;
+}
+
+X509_SIG *PKCS8_set0_pbe(const char *pass, int passlen,
+                         PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf, X509_ALGOR *pbe)
+{
+    X509_SIG *p8;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *enckey;
+
+    enckey =
+        PKCS12_item_i2d_encrypt(pbe, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO),
+                                pass, passlen, p8inf, 1);
+    if (!enckey) {
+        PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS8_SET0_PBE, PKCS12_R_ENCRYPT_ERROR);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    p8 = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*p8));
+
+    if (p8 == NULL) {
+        PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS8_SET0_PBE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(enckey);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    p8->algor = pbe;
+    p8->digest = enckey;
+
+    return p8;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs12/p12_sbag.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs12/p12_sbag.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4a3d259
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs12/p12_sbag.c
@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
+#include "p12_lcl.h"
+
+#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+ASN1_TYPE *PKCS12_get_attr(const PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, int attr_nid)
+{
+    return PKCS12_get_attr_gen(bag->attrib, attr_nid);
+}
+#endif
+
+const ASN1_TYPE *PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get0_attr(const PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag,
+                                          int attr_nid)
+{
+    return PKCS12_get_attr_gen(bag->attrib, attr_nid);
+}
+
+ASN1_TYPE *PKCS8_get_attr(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, int attr_nid)
+{
+    return PKCS12_get_attr_gen(PKCS8_pkey_get0_attrs(p8), attr_nid);
+}
+
+const PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get0_p8inf(const PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag)
+{
+    if (PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get_nid(bag) != NID_keyBag)
+        return NULL;
+    return bag->value.keybag;
+}
+
+const X509_SIG *PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get0_pkcs8(const PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag)
+{
+    if (OBJ_obj2nid(bag->type) != NID_pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag)
+        return NULL;
+    return bag->value.shkeybag;
+}
+
+const STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *
+PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get0_safes(const PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag)
+{
+    if (OBJ_obj2nid(bag->type) != NID_safeContentsBag)
+        return NULL;
+    return bag->value.safes;
+}
+
+const ASN1_OBJECT *PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get0_type(const PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag)
+{
+    return bag->type;
+}
+
+int PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get_nid(const PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag)
+{
+    return OBJ_obj2nid(bag->type);
+}
+
+int PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get_bag_nid(const PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag)
+{
+    int btype = PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get_nid(bag);
+
+    if (btype != NID_certBag && btype != NID_crlBag && btype != NID_secretBag)
+        return -1;
+    return OBJ_obj2nid(bag->value.bag->type);
+}
+
+X509 *PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get1_cert(const PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag)
+{
+    if (PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get_nid(bag) != NID_certBag)
+        return NULL;
+    if (OBJ_obj2nid(bag->value.bag->type) != NID_x509Certificate)
+        return NULL;
+    return ASN1_item_unpack(bag->value.bag->value.octet,
+                            ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509));
+}
+
+X509_CRL *PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get1_crl(const PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag)
+{
+    if (PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get_nid(bag) != NID_crlBag)
+        return NULL;
+    if (OBJ_obj2nid(bag->value.bag->type) != NID_x509Crl)
+        return NULL;
+    return ASN1_item_unpack(bag->value.bag->value.octet,
+                            ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CRL));
+}
+
+PKCS12_SAFEBAG *PKCS12_SAFEBAG_create_cert(X509 *x509)
+{
+    return PKCS12_item_pack_safebag(x509, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509),
+                                    NID_x509Certificate, NID_certBag);
+}
+
+PKCS12_SAFEBAG *PKCS12_SAFEBAG_create_crl(X509_CRL *crl)
+{
+    return PKCS12_item_pack_safebag(crl, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CRL),
+                                    NID_x509Crl, NID_crlBag);
+}
+
+/* Turn PKCS8 object into a keybag */
+
+PKCS12_SAFEBAG *PKCS12_SAFEBAG_create0_p8inf(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8)
+{
+    PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag = PKCS12_SAFEBAG_new();
+
+    if (bag == NULL) {
+        PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_CREATE0_P8INF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    bag->type = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_keyBag);
+    bag->value.keybag = p8;
+    return bag;
+}
+
+/* Turn PKCS8 object into a shrouded keybag */
+
+PKCS12_SAFEBAG *PKCS12_SAFEBAG_create0_pkcs8(X509_SIG *p8)
+{
+    PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag = PKCS12_SAFEBAG_new();
+
+    /* Set up the safe bag */
+    if (bag == NULL) {
+        PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_CREATE0_PKCS8, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    bag->type = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag);
+    bag->value.shkeybag = p8;
+    return bag;
+}
+
+PKCS12_SAFEBAG *PKCS12_SAFEBAG_create_pkcs8_encrypt(int pbe_nid,
+                                                    const char *pass,
+                                                    int passlen,
+                                                    unsigned char *salt,
+                                                    int saltlen, int iter,
+                                                    PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf)
+{
+    PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag;
+    const EVP_CIPHER *pbe_ciph;
+    X509_SIG *p8;
+
+    pbe_ciph = EVP_get_cipherbynid(pbe_nid);
+
+    if (pbe_ciph)
+        pbe_nid = -1;
+
+    p8 = PKCS8_encrypt(pbe_nid, pbe_ciph, pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, iter,
+                       p8inf);
+
+    if (p8 == NULL) {
+        PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_CREATE_PKCS8_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    bag = PKCS12_SAFEBAG_create0_pkcs8(p8);
+
+    if (bag == NULL) {
+        PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_CREATE_PKCS8_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        X509_SIG_free(p8);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    return bag;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs12/p12_utl.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs12/p12_utl.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0701478
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs12/p12_utl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,237 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
+
+/* Cheap and nasty Unicode stuff */
+
+unsigned char *OPENSSL_asc2uni(const char *asc, int asclen,
+                               unsigned char **uni, int *unilen)
+{
+    int ulen, i;
+    unsigned char *unitmp;
+
+    if (asclen == -1)
+        asclen = strlen(asc);
+    ulen = asclen * 2 + 2;
+    if ((unitmp = OPENSSL_malloc(ulen)) == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    for (i = 0; i < ulen - 2; i += 2) {
+        unitmp[i] = 0;
+        unitmp[i + 1] = asc[i >> 1];
+    }
+    /* Make result double null terminated */
+    unitmp[ulen - 2] = 0;
+    unitmp[ulen - 1] = 0;
+    if (unilen)
+        *unilen = ulen;
+    if (uni)
+        *uni = unitmp;
+    return unitmp;
+}
+
+char *OPENSSL_uni2asc(const unsigned char *uni, int unilen)
+{
+    int asclen, i;
+    char *asctmp;
+    /* string must contain an even number of bytes */
+    if (unilen & 1)
+        return NULL;
+    asclen = unilen / 2;
+    /* If no terminating zero allow for one */
+    if (!unilen || uni[unilen - 1])
+        asclen++;
+    uni++;
+    if ((asctmp = OPENSSL_malloc(asclen)) == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    for (i = 0; i < unilen; i += 2)
+        asctmp[i >> 1] = uni[i];
+    asctmp[asclen - 1] = 0;
+    return asctmp;
+}
+
+/*
+ * OPENSSL_{utf82uni|uni2utf8} perform conversion between UTF-8 and
+ * PKCS#12 BMPString format, which is specified as big-endian UTF-16.
+ * One should keep in mind that even though BMPString is passed as
+ * unsigned char *, it's not the kind of string you can exercise e.g.
+ * strlen on. Caller also has to keep in mind that its length is
+ * expressed not in number of UTF-16 characters, but in number of
+ * bytes the string occupies, and treat it, the length, accordingly.
+ */
+unsigned char *OPENSSL_utf82uni(const char *asc, int asclen,
+                                unsigned char **uni, int *unilen)
+{
+    int ulen, i, j;
+    unsigned char *unitmp, *ret;
+    unsigned long utf32chr = 0;
+
+    if (asclen == -1)
+        asclen = strlen(asc);
+
+    for (ulen = 0, i = 0; i < asclen; i += j) {
+        j = UTF8_getc((const unsigned char *)asc+i, asclen-i, &utf32chr);
+
+        /*
+         * Following condition is somewhat opportunistic is sense that
+         * decoding failure is used as *indirect* indication that input
+         * string might in fact be extended ASCII/ANSI/ISO-8859-X. The
+         * fallback is taken in hope that it would allow to process
+         * files created with previous OpenSSL version, which used the
+         * naive OPENSSL_asc2uni all along. It might be worth noting
+         * that probability of false positive depends on language. In
+         * cases covered by ISO Latin 1 probability is very low, because
+         * any printable non-ASCII alphabet letter followed by another
+         * or any ASCII character will trigger failure and fallback.
+         * In other cases situation can be intensified by the fact that
+         * English letters are not part of alternative keyboard layout,
+         * but even then there should be plenty of pairs that trigger
+         * decoding failure...
+         */
+        if (j < 0)
+	    return OPENSSL_asc2uni(asc, asclen, uni, unilen);
+
+        if (utf32chr > 0x10FFFF)        /* UTF-16 cap */
+	    return NULL;
+
+        if (utf32chr >= 0x10000)        /* pair of UTF-16 characters */
+            ulen += 2*2;
+        else                            /* or just one */
+            ulen += 2;
+    }
+
+    ulen += 2;  /* for trailing UTF16 zero */
+
+    if ((ret = OPENSSL_malloc(ulen)) == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+
+    /* re-run the loop writing down UTF-16 characters in big-endian order */
+    for (unitmp = ret, i = 0; i < asclen; i += j) {
+        j = UTF8_getc((const unsigned char *)asc+i, asclen-i, &utf32chr);
+        if (utf32chr >= 0x10000) {      /* pair if UTF-16 characters */
+            unsigned int hi, lo;
+
+            utf32chr -= 0x10000;
+            hi = 0xD800 + (utf32chr>>10);
+            lo = 0xDC00 + (utf32chr&0x3ff);
+            *unitmp++ = (unsigned char)(hi>>8);
+            *unitmp++ = (unsigned char)(hi);
+            *unitmp++ = (unsigned char)(lo>>8);
+            *unitmp++ = (unsigned char)(lo);
+        } else {                        /* or just one */
+            *unitmp++ = (unsigned char)(utf32chr>>8);
+            *unitmp++ = (unsigned char)(utf32chr);
+        }
+    }
+    /* Make result double null terminated */
+    *unitmp++ = 0;
+    *unitmp++ = 0;
+    if (unilen)
+        *unilen = ulen;
+    if (uni)
+        *uni = ret;
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int bmp_to_utf8(char *str, const unsigned char *utf16, int len)
+{
+    unsigned long utf32chr;
+
+    if (len == 0) return 0;
+
+    if (len < 2) return -1;
+
+    /* pull UTF-16 character in big-endian order */
+    utf32chr = (utf16[0]<<8) | utf16[1];
+
+    if (utf32chr >= 0xD800 && utf32chr < 0xE000) {   /* two chars */
+        unsigned int lo;
+
+        if (len < 4) return -1;
+
+        utf32chr -= 0xD800;
+        utf32chr <<= 10;
+        lo = (utf16[2]<<8) | utf16[3];
+        if (lo < 0xDC00 || lo >= 0xE000) return -1;
+        utf32chr |= lo-0xDC00;
+        utf32chr += 0x10000;
+    }
+
+    return UTF8_putc((unsigned char *)str, len > 4 ? 4 : len, utf32chr);
+}
+
+char *OPENSSL_uni2utf8(const unsigned char *uni, int unilen)
+{
+    int asclen, i, j;
+    char *asctmp;
+
+    /* string must contain an even number of bytes */
+    if (unilen & 1)
+        return NULL;
+
+    for (asclen = 0, i = 0; i < unilen; ) {
+        j = bmp_to_utf8(NULL, uni+i, unilen-i);
+        /*
+         * falling back to OPENSSL_uni2asc makes lesser sense [than
+         * falling back to OPENSSL_asc2uni in OPENSSL_utf82uni above],
+         * it's done rather to maintain symmetry...
+         */
+        if (j < 0) return OPENSSL_uni2asc(uni, unilen);
+        if (j == 4) i += 4;
+        else        i += 2;
+        asclen += j;
+    }
+
+    /* If no terminating zero allow for one */
+    if (!unilen || (uni[unilen-2]||uni[unilen - 1]))
+        asclen++;
+
+    if ((asctmp = OPENSSL_malloc(asclen)) == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+
+    /* re-run the loop emitting UTF-8 string */
+    for (asclen = 0, i = 0; i < unilen; ) {
+        j = bmp_to_utf8(asctmp+asclen, uni+i, unilen-i);
+        if (j == 4) i += 4;
+        else        i += 2;
+        asclen += j;
+    }
+
+    /* If no terminating zero write one */
+    if (!unilen || (uni[unilen-2]||uni[unilen - 1]))
+        asctmp[asclen] = '\0';
+
+    return asctmp;
+}
+
+int i2d_PKCS12_bio(BIO *bp, PKCS12 *p12)
+{
+    return ASN1_item_i2d_bio(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS12), bp, p12);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+int i2d_PKCS12_fp(FILE *fp, PKCS12 *p12)
+{
+    return ASN1_item_i2d_fp(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS12), fp, p12);
+}
+#endif
+
+PKCS12 *d2i_PKCS12_bio(BIO *bp, PKCS12 **p12)
+{
+    return ASN1_item_d2i_bio(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS12), bp, p12);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+PKCS12 *d2i_PKCS12_fp(FILE *fp, PKCS12 **p12)
+{
+    return ASN1_item_d2i_fp(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS12), fp, p12);
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs12/pk12err.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs12/pk12err.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f705084
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs12/pk12err.c
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+/*
+ * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+
+# define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PKCS12,func,0)
+# define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PKCS12,0,reason)
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA PKCS12_str_functs[] = {
+    {ERR_FUNC(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_CREATE), "PKCS12_create"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_GEN_MAC), "PKCS12_gen_mac"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_INIT), "PKCS12_init"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_ITEM_DECRYPT_D2I), "PKCS12_item_decrypt_d2i"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_ITEM_I2D_ENCRYPT), "PKCS12_item_i2d_encrypt"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_ITEM_PACK_SAFEBAG), "PKCS12_item_pack_safebag"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_KEY_GEN_ASC), "PKCS12_key_gen_asc"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_KEY_GEN_UNI), "PKCS12_key_gen_uni"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_KEY_GEN_UTF8), "PKCS12_key_gen_utf8"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_NEWPASS), "PKCS12_newpass"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PACK_P7DATA), "PKCS12_pack_p7data"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PACK_P7ENCDATA), "PKCS12_pack_p7encdata"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE), "PKCS12_parse"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PBE_CRYPT), "PKCS12_pbe_crypt"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PBE_KEYIVGEN), "PKCS12_PBE_keyivgen"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_CREATE0_P8INF),
+     "PKCS12_SAFEBAG_create0_p8inf"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_CREATE0_PKCS8),
+     "PKCS12_SAFEBAG_create0_pkcs8"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_CREATE_PKCS8_ENCRYPT),
+     "PKCS12_SAFEBAG_create_pkcs8_encrypt"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_SETUP_MAC), "PKCS12_setup_mac"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_SET_MAC), "PKCS12_set_mac"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_UNPACK_AUTHSAFES), "PKCS12_unpack_authsafes"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_UNPACK_P7DATA), "PKCS12_unpack_p7data"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_VERIFY_MAC), "PKCS12_verify_mac"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PKCS12_F_PKCS8_ENCRYPT), "PKCS8_encrypt"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PKCS12_F_PKCS8_SET0_PBE), "PKCS8_set0_pbe"},
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA PKCS12_str_reasons[] = {
+    {ERR_REASON(PKCS12_R_CANT_PACK_STRUCTURE), "cant pack structure"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PKCS12_R_CONTENT_TYPE_NOT_DATA), "content type not data"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PKCS12_R_DECODE_ERROR), "decode error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PKCS12_R_ENCODE_ERROR), "encode error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PKCS12_R_ENCRYPT_ERROR), "encrypt error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PKCS12_R_ERROR_SETTING_ENCRYPTED_DATA_TYPE),
+     "error setting encrypted data type"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PKCS12_R_INVALID_NULL_ARGUMENT), "invalid null argument"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PKCS12_R_INVALID_NULL_PKCS12_POINTER),
+     "invalid null pkcs12 pointer"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PKCS12_R_IV_GEN_ERROR), "iv gen error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PKCS12_R_KEY_GEN_ERROR), "key gen error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PKCS12_R_MAC_ABSENT), "mac absent"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PKCS12_R_MAC_GENERATION_ERROR), "mac generation error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PKCS12_R_MAC_SETUP_ERROR), "mac setup error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PKCS12_R_MAC_STRING_SET_ERROR), "mac string set error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PKCS12_R_MAC_VERIFY_FAILURE), "mac verify failure"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PKCS12_R_PARSE_ERROR), "parse error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PKCS12_R_PKCS12_ALGOR_CIPHERINIT_ERROR),
+     "pkcs12 algor cipherinit error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PKCS12_R_PKCS12_CIPHERFINAL_ERROR),
+     "pkcs12 cipherfinal error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PKCS12_R_PKCS12_PBE_CRYPT_ERROR), "pkcs12 pbe crypt error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PKCS12_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST_ALGORITHM),
+     "unknown digest algorithm"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PKCS12_R_UNSUPPORTED_PKCS12_MODE), "unsupported pkcs12 mode"},
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+
+#endif
+
+int ERR_load_PKCS12_strings(void)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+
+    if (ERR_func_error_string(PKCS12_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) {
+        ERR_load_strings(0, PKCS12_str_functs);
+        ERR_load_strings(0, PKCS12_str_reasons);
+    }
+#endif
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs7/bio_pk7.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs7/bio_pk7.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..29feaa3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs7/bio_pk7.c
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/pkcs7.h>
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS)
+# include <memory.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+/* Streaming encode support for PKCS#7 */
+
+BIO *BIO_new_PKCS7(BIO *out, PKCS7 *p7)
+{
+    return BIO_new_NDEF(out, (ASN1_VALUE *)p7, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS7));
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs7/build.info b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs7/build.info
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2029d53
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs7/build.info
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+LIBS=../../libcrypto
+SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
+        pk7_asn1.c pk7_lib.c pkcs7err.c pk7_doit.c pk7_smime.c pk7_attr.c \
+        pk7_mime.c bio_pk7.c
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_asn1.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_asn1.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cd9fb4f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_asn1.c
@@ -0,0 +1,202 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/pkcs7.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+/* PKCS#7 ASN1 module */
+
+/* This is the ANY DEFINED BY table for the top level PKCS#7 structure */
+
+ASN1_ADB_TEMPLATE(p7default) = ASN1_EXP_OPT(PKCS7, d.other, ASN1_ANY, 0);
+
+ASN1_ADB(PKCS7) = {
+        ADB_ENTRY(NID_pkcs7_data, ASN1_NDEF_EXP_OPT(PKCS7, d.data, ASN1_OCTET_STRING_NDEF, 0)),
+        ADB_ENTRY(NID_pkcs7_signed, ASN1_NDEF_EXP_OPT(PKCS7, d.sign, PKCS7_SIGNED, 0)),
+        ADB_ENTRY(NID_pkcs7_enveloped, ASN1_NDEF_EXP_OPT(PKCS7, d.enveloped, PKCS7_ENVELOPE, 0)),
+        ADB_ENTRY(NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped, ASN1_NDEF_EXP_OPT(PKCS7, d.signed_and_enveloped, PKCS7_SIGN_ENVELOPE, 0)),
+        ADB_ENTRY(NID_pkcs7_digest, ASN1_NDEF_EXP_OPT(PKCS7, d.digest, PKCS7_DIGEST, 0)),
+        ADB_ENTRY(NID_pkcs7_encrypted, ASN1_NDEF_EXP_OPT(PKCS7, d.encrypted, PKCS7_ENCRYPT, 0))
+} ASN1_ADB_END(PKCS7, 0, type, 0, &p7default_tt, NULL);
+
+/* PKCS#7 streaming support */
+static int pk7_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+                  void *exarg)
+{
+    ASN1_STREAM_ARG *sarg = exarg;
+    PKCS7 **pp7 = (PKCS7 **)pval;
+
+    switch (operation) {
+
+    case ASN1_OP_STREAM_PRE:
+        if (PKCS7_stream(&sarg->boundary, *pp7) <= 0)
+            return 0;
+        /* fall thru */
+    case ASN1_OP_DETACHED_PRE:
+        sarg->ndef_bio = PKCS7_dataInit(*pp7, sarg->out);
+        if (!sarg->ndef_bio)
+            return 0;
+        break;
+
+    case ASN1_OP_STREAM_POST:
+    case ASN1_OP_DETACHED_POST:
+        if (PKCS7_dataFinal(*pp7, sarg->ndef_bio) <= 0)
+            return 0;
+        break;
+
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+ASN1_NDEF_SEQUENCE_cb(PKCS7, pk7_cb) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS7, type, ASN1_OBJECT),
+        ASN1_ADB_OBJECT(PKCS7)
+}ASN1_NDEF_SEQUENCE_END_cb(PKCS7, PKCS7)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PKCS7)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_NDEF_FUNCTION(PKCS7)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(PKCS7)
+
+ASN1_NDEF_SEQUENCE(PKCS7_SIGNED) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS7_SIGNED, version, ASN1_INTEGER),
+        ASN1_SET_OF(PKCS7_SIGNED, md_algs, X509_ALGOR),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS7_SIGNED, contents, PKCS7),
+        ASN1_IMP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(PKCS7_SIGNED, cert, X509, 0),
+        ASN1_IMP_SET_OF_OPT(PKCS7_SIGNED, crl, X509_CRL, 1),
+        ASN1_SET_OF(PKCS7_SIGNED, signer_info, PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO)
+} ASN1_NDEF_SEQUENCE_END(PKCS7_SIGNED)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PKCS7_SIGNED)
+
+/* Minor tweak to operation: free up EVP_PKEY */
+static int si_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+                 void *exarg)
+{
+    if (operation == ASN1_OP_FREE_POST) {
+        PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si = (PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *)*pval;
+        EVP_PKEY_free(si->pkey);
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE_cb(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO, si_cb) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO, version, ASN1_INTEGER),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO, issuer_and_serial, PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO, digest_alg, X509_ALGOR),
+        /* NB this should be a SET OF but we use a SEQUENCE OF so the
+         * original order * is retained when the structure is reencoded.
+         * Since the attributes are implicitly tagged this will not affect
+         * the encoding.
+         */
+        ASN1_IMP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO, auth_attr, X509_ATTRIBUTE, 0),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO, digest_enc_alg, X509_ALGOR),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO, enc_digest, ASN1_OCTET_STRING),
+        ASN1_IMP_SET_OF_OPT(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO, unauth_attr, X509_ATTRIBUTE, 1)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_cb(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO, PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO)
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL, issuer, X509_NAME),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL, serial, ASN1_INTEGER)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL)
+
+ASN1_NDEF_SEQUENCE(PKCS7_ENVELOPE) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS7_ENVELOPE, version, ASN1_INTEGER),
+        ASN1_SET_OF(PKCS7_ENVELOPE, recipientinfo, PKCS7_RECIP_INFO),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS7_ENVELOPE, enc_data, PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT)
+} ASN1_NDEF_SEQUENCE_END(PKCS7_ENVELOPE)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PKCS7_ENVELOPE)
+
+/* Minor tweak to operation: free up X509 */
+static int ri_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+                 void *exarg)
+{
+    if (operation == ASN1_OP_FREE_POST) {
+        PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri = (PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *)*pval;
+        X509_free(ri->cert);
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE_cb(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO, ri_cb) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO, version, ASN1_INTEGER),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO, issuer_and_serial, PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO, key_enc_algor, X509_ALGOR),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO, enc_key, ASN1_OCTET_STRING)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_cb(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO, PKCS7_RECIP_INFO)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO)
+
+ASN1_NDEF_SEQUENCE(PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT, content_type, ASN1_OBJECT),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT, algorithm, X509_ALGOR),
+        ASN1_IMP_OPT(PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT, enc_data, ASN1_OCTET_STRING_NDEF, 0)
+} ASN1_NDEF_SEQUENCE_END(PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT)
+
+ASN1_NDEF_SEQUENCE(PKCS7_SIGN_ENVELOPE) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS7_SIGN_ENVELOPE, version, ASN1_INTEGER),
+        ASN1_SET_OF(PKCS7_SIGN_ENVELOPE, recipientinfo, PKCS7_RECIP_INFO),
+        ASN1_SET_OF(PKCS7_SIGN_ENVELOPE, md_algs, X509_ALGOR),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS7_SIGN_ENVELOPE, enc_data, PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT),
+        ASN1_IMP_SET_OF_OPT(PKCS7_SIGN_ENVELOPE, cert, X509, 0),
+        ASN1_IMP_SET_OF_OPT(PKCS7_SIGN_ENVELOPE, crl, X509_CRL, 1),
+        ASN1_SET_OF(PKCS7_SIGN_ENVELOPE, signer_info, PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO)
+} ASN1_NDEF_SEQUENCE_END(PKCS7_SIGN_ENVELOPE)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PKCS7_SIGN_ENVELOPE)
+
+ASN1_NDEF_SEQUENCE(PKCS7_ENCRYPT) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS7_ENCRYPT, version, ASN1_INTEGER),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS7_ENCRYPT, enc_data, PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT)
+} ASN1_NDEF_SEQUENCE_END(PKCS7_ENCRYPT)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PKCS7_ENCRYPT)
+
+ASN1_NDEF_SEQUENCE(PKCS7_DIGEST) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS7_DIGEST, version, ASN1_INTEGER),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS7_DIGEST, md, X509_ALGOR),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS7_DIGEST, contents, PKCS7),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS7_DIGEST, digest, ASN1_OCTET_STRING)
+} ASN1_NDEF_SEQUENCE_END(PKCS7_DIGEST)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PKCS7_DIGEST)
+
+/* Specials for authenticated attributes */
+
+/*
+ * When signing attributes we want to reorder them to match the sorted
+ * encoding.
+ */
+
+ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE(PKCS7_ATTR_SIGN) =
+        ASN1_EX_TEMPLATE_TYPE(ASN1_TFLG_SET_ORDER, 0, PKCS7_ATTRIBUTES, X509_ATTRIBUTE)
+ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE_END(PKCS7_ATTR_SIGN)
+
+/*
+ * When verifying attributes we need to use the received order. So we use
+ * SEQUENCE OF and tag it to SET OF
+ */
+
+ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE(PKCS7_ATTR_VERIFY) =
+        ASN1_EX_TEMPLATE_TYPE(ASN1_TFLG_SEQUENCE_OF | ASN1_TFLG_IMPTAG | ASN1_TFLG_UNIVERSAL,
+                                V_ASN1_SET, PKCS7_ATTRIBUTES, X509_ATTRIBUTE)
+ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE_END(PKCS7_ATTR_VERIFY)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_PRINT_FUNCTION(PKCS7)
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_attr.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_attr.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e90bf03
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_attr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/pkcs7.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+int PKCS7_add_attrib_smimecap(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si,
+                              STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) *cap)
+{
+    ASN1_STRING *seq;
+
+    if ((seq = ASN1_STRING_new()) == NULL) {
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ADD_ATTRIB_SMIMECAP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    seq->length = ASN1_item_i2d((ASN1_VALUE *)cap, &seq->data,
+                                ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_ALGORS));
+    return PKCS7_add_signed_attribute(si, NID_SMIMECapabilities,
+                                      V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, seq);
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) *PKCS7_get_smimecap(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si)
+{
+    ASN1_TYPE *cap;
+    const unsigned char *p;
+
+    cap = PKCS7_get_signed_attribute(si, NID_SMIMECapabilities);
+    if (cap == NULL || (cap->type != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE))
+        return NULL;
+    p = cap->value.sequence->data;
+    return (STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) *)
+        ASN1_item_d2i(NULL, &p, cap->value.sequence->length,
+                      ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_ALGORS));
+}
+
+/* Basic smime-capabilities OID and optional integer arg */
+int PKCS7_simple_smimecap(STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) *sk, int nid, int arg)
+{
+    ASN1_INTEGER *nbit = NULL;
+    X509_ALGOR *alg;
+
+    if ((alg = X509_ALGOR_new()) == NULL) {
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIMPLE_SMIMECAP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    ASN1_OBJECT_free(alg->algorithm);
+    alg->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(nid);
+    if (arg > 0) {
+        if ((alg->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new()) == NULL) {
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if ((nbit = ASN1_INTEGER_new()) == NULL) {
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(nbit, arg)) {
+            goto err;
+        }
+        alg->parameter->value.integer = nbit;
+        alg->parameter->type = V_ASN1_INTEGER;
+        nbit = NULL;
+    }
+    if (!sk_X509_ALGOR_push(sk, alg)) {
+        goto err;
+    }
+    return 1;
+err:
+    PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIMPLE_SMIMECAP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    ASN1_INTEGER_free(nbit);
+    X509_ALGOR_free(alg);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int PKCS7_add_attrib_content_type(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si, ASN1_OBJECT *coid)
+{
+    if (PKCS7_get_signed_attribute(si, NID_pkcs9_contentType))
+        return 0;
+    if (!coid)
+        coid = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs7_data);
+    return PKCS7_add_signed_attribute(si, NID_pkcs9_contentType,
+                                      V_ASN1_OBJECT, coid);
+}
+
+int PKCS7_add0_attrib_signing_time(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si, ASN1_TIME *t)
+{
+    if (t == NULL && (t = X509_gmtime_adj(NULL, 0)) == NULL) {
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ADD0_ATTRIB_SIGNING_TIME,
+                 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return PKCS7_add_signed_attribute(si, NID_pkcs9_signingTime,
+                                      V_ASN1_UTCTIME, t);
+}
+
+int PKCS7_add1_attrib_digest(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si,
+                             const unsigned char *md, int mdlen)
+{
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os;
+    os = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
+    if (os == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    if (!ASN1_STRING_set(os, md, mdlen)
+        || !PKCS7_add_signed_attribute(si, NID_pkcs9_messageDigest,
+                                       V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, os)) {
+        ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_dgst.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_dgst.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..965fb37
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_dgst.c
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/pkcs7.h>
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e6e80f0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1180 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+static int add_attribute(STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) **sk, int nid, int atrtype,
+                         void *value);
+static ASN1_TYPE *get_attribute(STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *sk, int nid);
+
+static int PKCS7_type_is_other(PKCS7 *p7)
+{
+    int isOther = 1;
+
+    int nid = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
+
+    switch (nid) {
+    case NID_pkcs7_data:
+    case NID_pkcs7_signed:
+    case NID_pkcs7_enveloped:
+    case NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped:
+    case NID_pkcs7_digest:
+    case NID_pkcs7_encrypted:
+        isOther = 0;
+        break;
+    default:
+        isOther = 1;
+    }
+
+    return isOther;
+
+}
+
+static ASN1_OCTET_STRING *PKCS7_get_octet_string(PKCS7 *p7)
+{
+    if (PKCS7_type_is_data(p7))
+        return p7->d.data;
+    if (PKCS7_type_is_other(p7) && p7->d.other
+        && (p7->d.other->type == V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING))
+        return p7->d.other->value.octet_string;
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+static int PKCS7_bio_add_digest(BIO **pbio, X509_ALGOR *alg)
+{
+    BIO *btmp;
+    const EVP_MD *md;
+    if ((btmp = BIO_new(BIO_f_md())) == NULL) {
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_BIO_ADD_DIGEST, ERR_R_BIO_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    md = EVP_get_digestbyobj(alg->algorithm);
+    if (md == NULL) {
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_BIO_ADD_DIGEST, PKCS7_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST_TYPE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    BIO_set_md(btmp, md);
+    if (*pbio == NULL)
+        *pbio = btmp;
+    else if (!BIO_push(*pbio, btmp)) {
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_BIO_ADD_DIGEST, ERR_R_BIO_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    btmp = NULL;
+
+    return 1;
+
+ err:
+    BIO_free(btmp);
+    return 0;
+
+}
+
+static int pkcs7_encode_rinfo(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri,
+                              unsigned char *key, int keylen)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+    unsigned char *ek = NULL;
+    int ret = 0;
+    size_t eklen;
+
+    pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(ri->cert);
+
+    if (!pkey)
+        return 0;
+
+    pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
+    if (!pctx)
+        return 0;
+
+    if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
+                          EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_ENCRYPT, 0, ri) <= 0) {
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ENCODE_RINFO, PKCS7_R_CTRL_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &eklen, key, keylen) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    ek = OPENSSL_malloc(eklen);
+
+    if (ek == NULL) {
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ENCODE_RINFO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, ek, &eklen, key, keylen) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    ASN1_STRING_set0(ri->enc_key, ek, eklen);
+    ek = NULL;
+
+    ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+    OPENSSL_free(ek);
+    return ret;
+
+}
+
+static int pkcs7_decrypt_rinfo(unsigned char **pek, int *peklen,
+                               PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
+    unsigned char *ek = NULL;
+    size_t eklen;
+
+    int ret = -1;
+
+    pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
+    if (!pctx)
+        return -1;
+
+    if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pctx) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_DECRYPT,
+                          EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_DECRYPT, 0, ri) <= 0) {
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DECRYPT_RINFO, PKCS7_R_CTRL_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pctx, NULL, &eklen,
+                         ri->enc_key->data, ri->enc_key->length) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    ek = OPENSSL_malloc(eklen);
+
+    if (ek == NULL) {
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DECRYPT_RINFO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pctx, ek, &eklen,
+                         ri->enc_key->data, ri->enc_key->length) <= 0) {
+        ret = 0;
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DECRYPT_RINFO, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    ret = 1;
+
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(*pek, *peklen);
+    *pek = ek;
+    *peklen = eklen;
+
+ err:
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+    if (!ret)
+        OPENSSL_free(ek);
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+BIO *PKCS7_dataInit(PKCS7 *p7, BIO *bio)
+{
+    int i;
+    BIO *out = NULL, *btmp = NULL;
+    X509_ALGOR *xa = NULL;
+    const EVP_CIPHER *evp_cipher = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) *md_sk = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO) *rsk = NULL;
+    X509_ALGOR *xalg = NULL;
+    PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri = NULL;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os = NULL;
+
+    if (p7 == NULL) {
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAINIT, PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    /*
+     * The content field in the PKCS7 ContentInfo is optional, but that really
+     * only applies to inner content (precisely, detached signatures).
+     *
+     * When reading content, missing outer content is therefore treated as an
+     * error.
+     *
+     * When creating content, PKCS7_content_new() must be called before
+     * calling this method, so a NULL p7->d is always an error.
+     */
+    if (p7->d.ptr == NULL) {
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAINIT, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    i = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
+    p7->state = PKCS7_S_HEADER;
+
+    switch (i) {
+    case NID_pkcs7_signed:
+        md_sk = p7->d.sign->md_algs;
+        os = PKCS7_get_octet_string(p7->d.sign->contents);
+        break;
+    case NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped:
+        rsk = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->recipientinfo;
+        md_sk = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->md_algs;
+        xalg = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->enc_data->algorithm;
+        evp_cipher = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->enc_data->cipher;
+        if (evp_cipher == NULL) {
+            PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAINIT, PKCS7_R_CIPHER_NOT_INITIALIZED);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        break;
+    case NID_pkcs7_enveloped:
+        rsk = p7->d.enveloped->recipientinfo;
+        xalg = p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->algorithm;
+        evp_cipher = p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->cipher;
+        if (evp_cipher == NULL) {
+            PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAINIT, PKCS7_R_CIPHER_NOT_INITIALIZED);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        break;
+    case NID_pkcs7_digest:
+        xa = p7->d.digest->md;
+        os = PKCS7_get_octet_string(p7->d.digest->contents);
+        break;
+    case NID_pkcs7_data:
+        break;
+    default:
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAINIT, PKCS7_R_UNSUPPORTED_CONTENT_TYPE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_ALGOR_num(md_sk); i++)
+        if (!PKCS7_bio_add_digest(&out, sk_X509_ALGOR_value(md_sk, i)))
+            goto err;
+
+    if (xa && !PKCS7_bio_add_digest(&out, xa))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (evp_cipher != NULL) {
+        unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
+        unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+        int keylen, ivlen;
+        EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
+
+        if ((btmp = BIO_new(BIO_f_cipher())) == NULL) {
+            PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAINIT, ERR_R_BIO_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        BIO_get_cipher_ctx(btmp, &ctx);
+        keylen = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(evp_cipher);
+        ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(evp_cipher);
+        xalg->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_CIPHER_type(evp_cipher));
+        if (ivlen > 0)
+            if (RAND_bytes(iv, ivlen) <= 0)
+                goto err;
+        if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, evp_cipher, NULL, NULL, NULL, 1) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+        if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key(ctx, key) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+        if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, key, iv, 1) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+
+        if (ivlen > 0) {
+            if (xalg->parameter == NULL) {
+                xalg->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new();
+                if (xalg->parameter == NULL)
+                    goto err;
+            }
+            if (EVP_CIPHER_param_to_asn1(ctx, xalg->parameter) < 0)
+                goto err;
+        }
+
+        /* Lets do the pub key stuff :-) */
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_num(rsk); i++) {
+            ri = sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_value(rsk, i);
+            if (pkcs7_encode_rinfo(ri, key, keylen) <= 0)
+                goto err;
+        }
+        OPENSSL_cleanse(key, keylen);
+
+        if (out == NULL)
+            out = btmp;
+        else
+            BIO_push(out, btmp);
+        btmp = NULL;
+    }
+
+    if (bio == NULL) {
+        if (PKCS7_is_detached(p7)) {
+            bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_null());
+        } else if (os && os->length > 0) {
+            bio = BIO_new_mem_buf(os->data, os->length);
+        } else {
+            bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+            if (bio == NULL)
+                goto err;
+            BIO_set_mem_eof_return(bio, 0);
+        }
+        if (bio == NULL)
+            goto err;
+    }
+    if (out)
+        BIO_push(out, bio);
+    else
+        out = bio;
+    return out;
+
+ err:
+    BIO_free_all(out);
+    BIO_free_all(btmp);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+static int pkcs7_cmp_ri(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri, X509 *pcert)
+{
+    int ret;
+    ret = X509_NAME_cmp(ri->issuer_and_serial->issuer,
+                        X509_get_issuer_name(pcert));
+    if (ret)
+        return ret;
+    return ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(X509_get_serialNumber(pcert),
+                            ri->issuer_and_serial->serial);
+}
+
+/* int */
+BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKEY *pkey, BIO *in_bio, X509 *pcert)
+{
+    int i, j;
+    BIO *out = NULL, *btmp = NULL, *etmp = NULL, *bio = NULL;
+    X509_ALGOR *xa;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *data_body = NULL;
+    const EVP_MD *evp_md;
+    const EVP_CIPHER *evp_cipher = NULL;
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp_ctx = NULL;
+    X509_ALGOR *enc_alg = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) *md_sk = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO) *rsk = NULL;
+    PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri = NULL;
+    unsigned char *ek = NULL, *tkey = NULL;
+    int eklen = 0, tkeylen = 0;
+
+    if (p7 == NULL) {
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    if (p7->d.ptr == NULL) {
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    i = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
+    p7->state = PKCS7_S_HEADER;
+
+    switch (i) {
+    case NID_pkcs7_signed:
+        /*
+         * p7->d.sign->contents is a PKCS7 structure consisting of a contentType
+         * field and optional content.
+         * data_body is NULL if that structure has no (=detached) content
+         * or if the contentType is wrong (i.e., not "data").
+         */
+        data_body = PKCS7_get_octet_string(p7->d.sign->contents);
+        if (!PKCS7_is_detached(p7) && data_body == NULL) {
+            PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE,
+                     PKCS7_R_INVALID_SIGNED_DATA_TYPE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        md_sk = p7->d.sign->md_algs;
+        break;
+    case NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped:
+        rsk = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->recipientinfo;
+        md_sk = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->md_algs;
+        /* data_body is NULL if the optional EncryptedContent is missing. */
+        data_body = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->enc_data->enc_data;
+        enc_alg = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->enc_data->algorithm;
+        evp_cipher = EVP_get_cipherbyobj(enc_alg->algorithm);
+        if (evp_cipher == NULL) {
+            PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE,
+                     PKCS7_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER_TYPE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        break;
+    case NID_pkcs7_enveloped:
+        rsk = p7->d.enveloped->recipientinfo;
+        enc_alg = p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->algorithm;
+        /* data_body is NULL if the optional EncryptedContent is missing. */
+        data_body = p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->enc_data;
+        evp_cipher = EVP_get_cipherbyobj(enc_alg->algorithm);
+        if (evp_cipher == NULL) {
+            PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE,
+                     PKCS7_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER_TYPE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        break;
+    default:
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, PKCS7_R_UNSUPPORTED_CONTENT_TYPE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* Detached content must be supplied via in_bio instead. */
+    if (data_body == NULL && in_bio == NULL) {
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* We will be checking the signature */
+    if (md_sk != NULL) {
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_ALGOR_num(md_sk); i++) {
+            xa = sk_X509_ALGOR_value(md_sk, i);
+            if ((btmp = BIO_new(BIO_f_md())) == NULL) {
+                PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, ERR_R_BIO_LIB);
+                goto err;
+            }
+
+            j = OBJ_obj2nid(xa->algorithm);
+            evp_md = EVP_get_digestbynid(j);
+            if (evp_md == NULL) {
+                PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE,
+                         PKCS7_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST_TYPE);
+                goto err;
+            }
+
+            BIO_set_md(btmp, evp_md);
+            if (out == NULL)
+                out = btmp;
+            else
+                BIO_push(out, btmp);
+            btmp = NULL;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (evp_cipher != NULL) {
+        if ((etmp = BIO_new(BIO_f_cipher())) == NULL) {
+            PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, ERR_R_BIO_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        /*
+         * It was encrypted, we need to decrypt the secret key with the
+         * private key
+         */
+
+        /*
+         * Find the recipientInfo which matches the passed certificate (if
+         * any)
+         */
+
+        if (pcert) {
+            for (i = 0; i < sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_num(rsk); i++) {
+                ri = sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_value(rsk, i);
+                if (!pkcs7_cmp_ri(ri, pcert))
+                    break;
+                ri = NULL;
+            }
+            if (ri == NULL) {
+                PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE,
+                         PKCS7_R_NO_RECIPIENT_MATCHES_CERTIFICATE);
+                goto err;
+            }
+        }
+
+        /* If we haven't got a certificate try each ri in turn */
+        if (pcert == NULL) {
+            /*
+             * Always attempt to decrypt all rinfo even after success as a
+             * defence against MMA timing attacks.
+             */
+            for (i = 0; i < sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_num(rsk); i++) {
+                ri = sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_value(rsk, i);
+
+                if (pkcs7_decrypt_rinfo(&ek, &eklen, ri, pkey) < 0)
+                    goto err;
+                ERR_clear_error();
+            }
+        } else {
+            /* Only exit on fatal errors, not decrypt failure */
+            if (pkcs7_decrypt_rinfo(&ek, &eklen, ri, pkey) < 0)
+                goto err;
+            ERR_clear_error();
+        }
+
+        evp_ctx = NULL;
+        BIO_get_cipher_ctx(etmp, &evp_ctx);
+        if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(evp_ctx, evp_cipher, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+        if (EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param(evp_ctx, enc_alg->parameter) < 0)
+            goto err;
+        /* Generate random key as MMA defence */
+        tkeylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(evp_ctx);
+        tkey = OPENSSL_malloc(tkeylen);
+        if (tkey == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key(evp_ctx, tkey) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+        if (ek == NULL) {
+            ek = tkey;
+            eklen = tkeylen;
+            tkey = NULL;
+        }
+
+        if (eklen != EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(evp_ctx)) {
+            /*
+             * Some S/MIME clients don't use the same key and effective key
+             * length. The key length is determined by the size of the
+             * decrypted RSA key.
+             */
+            if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(evp_ctx, eklen)) {
+                /* Use random key as MMA defence */
+                OPENSSL_clear_free(ek, eklen);
+                ek = tkey;
+                eklen = tkeylen;
+                tkey = NULL;
+            }
+        }
+        /* Clear errors so we don't leak information useful in MMA */
+        ERR_clear_error();
+        if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(evp_ctx, NULL, NULL, ek, NULL, 0) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+
+        OPENSSL_clear_free(ek, eklen);
+        ek = NULL;
+        OPENSSL_clear_free(tkey, tkeylen);
+        tkey = NULL;
+
+        if (out == NULL)
+            out = etmp;
+        else
+            BIO_push(out, etmp);
+        etmp = NULL;
+    }
+    if (in_bio != NULL) {
+        bio = in_bio;
+    } else {
+        if (data_body->length > 0)
+            bio = BIO_new_mem_buf(data_body->data, data_body->length);
+        else {
+            bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+            if (bio == NULL)
+                goto err;
+            BIO_set_mem_eof_return(bio, 0);
+        }
+        if (bio == NULL)
+            goto err;
+    }
+    BIO_push(out, bio);
+    bio = NULL;
+    return out;
+
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(ek, eklen);
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(tkey, tkeylen);
+    BIO_free_all(out);
+    BIO_free_all(btmp);
+    BIO_free_all(etmp);
+    BIO_free_all(bio);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+static BIO *PKCS7_find_digest(EVP_MD_CTX **pmd, BIO *bio, int nid)
+{
+    for (;;) {
+        bio = BIO_find_type(bio, BIO_TYPE_MD);
+        if (bio == NULL) {
+            PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_FIND_DIGEST,
+                     PKCS7_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+        BIO_get_md_ctx(bio, pmd);
+        if (*pmd == NULL) {
+            PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_FIND_DIGEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+        if (EVP_MD_CTX_type(*pmd) == nid)
+            return bio;
+        bio = BIO_next(bio);
+    }
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+static int do_pkcs7_signed_attrib(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si, EVP_MD_CTX *mctx)
+{
+    unsigned char md_data[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+    unsigned int md_len;
+
+    /* Add signing time if not already present */
+    if (!PKCS7_get_signed_attribute(si, NID_pkcs9_signingTime)) {
+        if (!PKCS7_add0_attrib_signing_time(si, NULL)) {
+            PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_DO_PKCS7_SIGNED_ATTRIB, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* Add digest */
+    if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mctx, md_data, &md_len)) {
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_DO_PKCS7_SIGNED_ATTRIB, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (!PKCS7_add1_attrib_digest(si, md_data, md_len)) {
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_DO_PKCS7_SIGNED_ATTRIB, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* Now sign the attributes */
+    if (!PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_sign(si))
+        return 0;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int PKCS7_dataFinal(PKCS7 *p7, BIO *bio)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    int i, j;
+    BIO *btmp;
+    PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si;
+    EVP_MD_CTX *mdc, *ctx_tmp;
+    STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *sk;
+    STACK_OF(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO) *si_sk = NULL;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os = NULL;
+
+    if (p7 == NULL) {
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL, PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (p7->d.ptr == NULL) {
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    ctx_tmp = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+    if (ctx_tmp == NULL) {
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    i = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
+    p7->state = PKCS7_S_HEADER;
+
+    switch (i) {
+    case NID_pkcs7_data:
+        os = p7->d.data;
+        break;
+    case NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped:
+        /* XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX */
+        si_sk = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->signer_info;
+        os = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->enc_data->enc_data;
+        if (os == NULL) {
+            os = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
+            if (os == NULL) {
+                PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->enc_data->enc_data = os;
+        }
+        break;
+    case NID_pkcs7_enveloped:
+        /* XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX */
+        os = p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->enc_data;
+        if (os == NULL) {
+            os = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
+            if (os == NULL) {
+                PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->enc_data = os;
+        }
+        break;
+    case NID_pkcs7_signed:
+        si_sk = p7->d.sign->signer_info;
+        os = PKCS7_get_octet_string(p7->d.sign->contents);
+        /* If detached data then the content is excluded */
+        if (PKCS7_type_is_data(p7->d.sign->contents) && p7->detached) {
+            ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os);
+            os = NULL;
+            p7->d.sign->contents->d.data = NULL;
+        }
+        break;
+
+    case NID_pkcs7_digest:
+        os = PKCS7_get_octet_string(p7->d.digest->contents);
+        /* If detached data then the content is excluded */
+        if (PKCS7_type_is_data(p7->d.digest->contents) && p7->detached) {
+            ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os);
+            os = NULL;
+            p7->d.digest->contents->d.data = NULL;
+        }
+        break;
+
+    default:
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL, PKCS7_R_UNSUPPORTED_CONTENT_TYPE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (si_sk != NULL) {
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_num(si_sk); i++) {
+            si = sk_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_value(si_sk, i);
+            if (si->pkey == NULL)
+                continue;
+
+            j = OBJ_obj2nid(si->digest_alg->algorithm);
+
+            btmp = bio;
+
+            btmp = PKCS7_find_digest(&mdc, btmp, j);
+
+            if (btmp == NULL)
+                goto err;
+
+            /*
+             * We now have the EVP_MD_CTX, lets do the signing.
+             */
+            if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(ctx_tmp, mdc))
+                goto err;
+
+            sk = si->auth_attr;
+
+            /*
+             * If there are attributes, we add the digest attribute and only
+             * sign the attributes
+             */
+            if (sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_num(sk) > 0) {
+                if (!do_pkcs7_signed_attrib(si, ctx_tmp))
+                    goto err;
+            } else {
+                unsigned char *abuf = NULL;
+                unsigned int abuflen;
+                abuflen = EVP_PKEY_size(si->pkey);
+                abuf = OPENSSL_malloc(abuflen);
+                if (abuf == NULL)
+                    goto err;
+
+                if (!EVP_SignFinal(ctx_tmp, abuf, &abuflen, si->pkey)) {
+                    OPENSSL_free(abuf);
+                    PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+                    goto err;
+                }
+                ASN1_STRING_set0(si->enc_digest, abuf, abuflen);
+            }
+        }
+    } else if (i == NID_pkcs7_digest) {
+        unsigned char md_data[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+        unsigned int md_len;
+        if (!PKCS7_find_digest(&mdc, bio,
+                               OBJ_obj2nid(p7->d.digest->md->algorithm)))
+            goto err;
+        if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mdc, md_data, &md_len))
+            goto err;
+        if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(p7->d.digest->digest, md_data, md_len))
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!PKCS7_is_detached(p7)) {
+        /*
+         * NOTE(emilia): I think we only reach os == NULL here because detached
+         * digested data support is broken.
+         */
+        if (os == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        if (!(os->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_NDEF)) {
+            char *cont;
+            long contlen;
+            btmp = BIO_find_type(bio, BIO_TYPE_MEM);
+            if (btmp == NULL) {
+                PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL, PKCS7_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_MEM_BIO);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            contlen = BIO_get_mem_data(btmp, &cont);
+            /*
+             * Mark the BIO read only then we can use its copy of the data
+             * instead of making an extra copy.
+             */
+            BIO_set_flags(btmp, BIO_FLAGS_MEM_RDONLY);
+            BIO_set_mem_eof_return(btmp, 0);
+            ASN1_STRING_set0(os, (unsigned char *)cont, contlen);
+        }
+    }
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx_tmp);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+int PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_sign(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si)
+{
+    EVP_MD_CTX *mctx;
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx;
+    unsigned char *abuf = NULL;
+    int alen;
+    size_t siglen;
+    const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
+
+    md = EVP_get_digestbyobj(si->digest_alg->algorithm);
+    if (md == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+    if (mctx == NULL) {
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, si->pkey) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN,
+                          EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN, 0, si) <= 0) {
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_SIGN, PKCS7_R_CTRL_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    alen = ASN1_item_i2d((ASN1_VALUE *)si->auth_attr, &abuf,
+                         ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS7_ATTR_SIGN));
+    if (!abuf)
+        goto err;
+    if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx, abuf, alen) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    OPENSSL_free(abuf);
+    abuf = NULL;
+    if (EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, NULL, &siglen) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    abuf = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen);
+    if (abuf == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, abuf, &siglen) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN,
+                          EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN, 1, si) <= 0) {
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_SIGN, PKCS7_R_CTRL_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
+
+    ASN1_STRING_set0(si->enc_digest, abuf, siglen);
+
+    return 1;
+
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_free(abuf);
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
+    return 0;
+
+}
+
+int PKCS7_dataVerify(X509_STORE *cert_store, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, BIO *bio,
+                     PKCS7 *p7, PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si)
+{
+    PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL *ias;
+    int ret = 0, i;
+    STACK_OF(X509) *cert;
+    X509 *x509;
+
+    if (p7 == NULL) {
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAVERIFY, PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (p7->d.ptr == NULL) {
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAVERIFY, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (PKCS7_type_is_signed(p7)) {
+        cert = p7->d.sign->cert;
+    } else if (PKCS7_type_is_signedAndEnveloped(p7)) {
+        cert = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->cert;
+    } else {
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAVERIFY, PKCS7_R_WRONG_PKCS7_TYPE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    /* XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX */
+    ias = si->issuer_and_serial;
+
+    x509 = X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(cert, ias->issuer, ias->serial);
+
+    /* were we able to find the cert in passed to us */
+    if (x509 == NULL) {
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAVERIFY,
+                 PKCS7_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_CERTIFICATE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* Lets verify */
+    if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, cert_store, x509, cert)) {
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAVERIFY, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(ctx, X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_SIGN);
+    i = X509_verify_cert(ctx);
+    if (i <= 0) {
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAVERIFY, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
+        X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
+
+    return PKCS7_signatureVerify(bio, p7, si, x509);
+ err:
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int PKCS7_signatureVerify(BIO *bio, PKCS7 *p7, PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si,
+                          X509 *x509)
+{
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os;
+    EVP_MD_CTX *mdc_tmp, *mdc;
+    int ret = 0, i;
+    int md_type;
+    STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *sk;
+    BIO *btmp;
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+
+    mdc_tmp = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+    if (mdc_tmp == NULL) {
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGNATUREVERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!PKCS7_type_is_signed(p7) && !PKCS7_type_is_signedAndEnveloped(p7)) {
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGNATUREVERIFY, PKCS7_R_WRONG_PKCS7_TYPE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    md_type = OBJ_obj2nid(si->digest_alg->algorithm);
+
+    btmp = bio;
+    for (;;) {
+        if ((btmp == NULL) ||
+            ((btmp = BIO_find_type(btmp, BIO_TYPE_MD)) == NULL)) {
+            PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGNATUREVERIFY,
+                     PKCS7_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        BIO_get_md_ctx(btmp, &mdc);
+        if (mdc == NULL) {
+            PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGNATUREVERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (EVP_MD_CTX_type(mdc) == md_type)
+            break;
+        /*
+         * Workaround for some broken clients that put the signature OID
+         * instead of the digest OID in digest_alg->algorithm
+         */
+        if (EVP_MD_pkey_type(EVP_MD_CTX_md(mdc)) == md_type)
+            break;
+        btmp = BIO_next(btmp);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * mdc is the digest ctx that we want, unless there are attributes, in
+     * which case the digest is the signed attributes
+     */
+    if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(mdc_tmp, mdc))
+        goto err;
+
+    sk = si->auth_attr;
+    if ((sk != NULL) && (sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_num(sk) != 0)) {
+        unsigned char md_dat[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], *abuf = NULL;
+        unsigned int md_len;
+        int alen;
+        ASN1_OCTET_STRING *message_digest;
+
+        if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mdc_tmp, md_dat, &md_len))
+            goto err;
+        message_digest = PKCS7_digest_from_attributes(sk);
+        if (!message_digest) {
+            PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGNATUREVERIFY,
+                     PKCS7_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if ((message_digest->length != (int)md_len) ||
+            (memcmp(message_digest->data, md_dat, md_len))) {
+            PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGNATUREVERIFY, PKCS7_R_DIGEST_FAILURE);
+            ret = -1;
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(mdc_tmp, EVP_get_digestbynid(md_type), NULL))
+            goto err;
+
+        alen = ASN1_item_i2d((ASN1_VALUE *)sk, &abuf,
+                             ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS7_ATTR_VERIFY));
+        if (alen <= 0) {
+            PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGNATUREVERIFY, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+            ret = -1;
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (!EVP_VerifyUpdate(mdc_tmp, abuf, alen))
+            goto err;
+
+        OPENSSL_free(abuf);
+    }
+
+    os = si->enc_digest;
+    pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x509);
+    if (!pkey) {
+        ret = -1;
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    i = EVP_VerifyFinal(mdc_tmp, os->data, os->length, pkey);
+    if (i <= 0) {
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGNATUREVERIFY, PKCS7_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE);
+        ret = -1;
+        goto err;
+    }
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(mdc_tmp);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL *PKCS7_get_issuer_and_serial(PKCS7 *p7, int idx)
+{
+    STACK_OF(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO) *rsk;
+    PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri;
+    int i;
+
+    i = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
+    if (i != NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped)
+        return NULL;
+    if (p7->d.signed_and_enveloped == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    rsk = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->recipientinfo;
+    if (rsk == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    if (sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_num(rsk) <= idx)
+        return (NULL);
+    ri = sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_value(rsk, idx);
+    return (ri->issuer_and_serial);
+}
+
+ASN1_TYPE *PKCS7_get_signed_attribute(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si, int nid)
+{
+    return (get_attribute(si->auth_attr, nid));
+}
+
+ASN1_TYPE *PKCS7_get_attribute(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si, int nid)
+{
+    return (get_attribute(si->unauth_attr, nid));
+}
+
+static ASN1_TYPE *get_attribute(STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *sk, int nid)
+{
+    int idx;
+    X509_ATTRIBUTE *xa;
+    idx = X509at_get_attr_by_NID(sk, nid, -1);
+    xa = X509at_get_attr(sk, idx);
+    return X509_ATTRIBUTE_get0_type(xa, 0);
+}
+
+ASN1_OCTET_STRING *PKCS7_digest_from_attributes(STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *sk)
+{
+    ASN1_TYPE *astype;
+    if ((astype = get_attribute(sk, NID_pkcs9_messageDigest)) == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    return astype->value.octet_string;
+}
+
+int PKCS7_set_signed_attributes(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *p7si,
+                                STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *sk)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_pop_free(p7si->auth_attr, X509_ATTRIBUTE_free);
+    p7si->auth_attr = sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_dup(sk);
+    if (p7si->auth_attr == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_num(sk); i++) {
+        if ((sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_set(p7si->auth_attr, i,
+                                   X509_ATTRIBUTE_dup(sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_value
+                                                      (sk, i))))
+            == NULL)
+            return (0);
+    }
+    return (1);
+}
+
+int PKCS7_set_attributes(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *p7si,
+                         STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *sk)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_pop_free(p7si->unauth_attr, X509_ATTRIBUTE_free);
+    p7si->unauth_attr = sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_dup(sk);
+    if (p7si->unauth_attr == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_num(sk); i++) {
+        if ((sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_set(p7si->unauth_attr, i,
+                                   X509_ATTRIBUTE_dup(sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_value
+                                                      (sk, i))))
+            == NULL)
+            return (0);
+    }
+    return (1);
+}
+
+int PKCS7_add_signed_attribute(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *p7si, int nid, int atrtype,
+                               void *value)
+{
+    return (add_attribute(&(p7si->auth_attr), nid, atrtype, value));
+}
+
+int PKCS7_add_attribute(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *p7si, int nid, int atrtype,
+                        void *value)
+{
+    return (add_attribute(&(p7si->unauth_attr), nid, atrtype, value));
+}
+
+static int add_attribute(STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) **sk, int nid, int atrtype,
+                         void *value)
+{
+    X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr = NULL;
+
+    if (*sk == NULL) {
+        if ((*sk = sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_new_null()) == NULL)
+            return 0;
+ new_attrib:
+        if ((attr = X509_ATTRIBUTE_create(nid, atrtype, value)) == NULL)
+            return 0;
+        if (!sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_push(*sk, attr)) {
+            X509_ATTRIBUTE_free(attr);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    } else {
+        int i;
+
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_num(*sk); i++) {
+            attr = sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_value(*sk, i);
+            if (OBJ_obj2nid(X509_ATTRIBUTE_get0_object(attr)) == nid) {
+                X509_ATTRIBUTE_free(attr);
+                attr = X509_ATTRIBUTE_create(nid, atrtype, value);
+                if (attr == NULL)
+                    return 0;
+                if (!sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_set(*sk, i, attr)) {
+                    X509_ATTRIBUTE_free(attr);
+                    return 0;
+                }
+                goto end;
+            }
+        }
+        goto new_attrib;
+    }
+ end:
+    return (1);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_enc.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_enc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3c59f9c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_enc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/pkcs7.h>
+
+PKCS7_in_bio(PKCS7 *p7, BIO *in);
+PKCS7_out_bio(PKCS7 *p7, BIO *out);
+
+PKCS7_add_signer(PKCS7 *p7, X509 *cert, EVP_PKEY *key);
+PKCS7_cipher(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_CIPHER *cipher);
+
+PKCS7_Init(PKCS7 *p7);
+PKCS7_Update(PKCS7 *p7);
+PKCS7_Finish(PKCS7 *p7);
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_lib.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_lib.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..69c68cf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_lib.c
@@ -0,0 +1,589 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include "internal/asn1_int.h"
+#include "internal/evp_int.h"
+
+long PKCS7_ctrl(PKCS7 *p7, int cmd, long larg, char *parg)
+{
+    int nid;
+    long ret;
+
+    nid = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
+
+    switch (cmd) {
+    /* NOTE(emilia): does not support detached digested data. */
+    case PKCS7_OP_SET_DETACHED_SIGNATURE:
+        if (nid == NID_pkcs7_signed) {
+            ret = p7->detached = (int)larg;
+            if (ret && PKCS7_type_is_data(p7->d.sign->contents)) {
+                ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os;
+                os = p7->d.sign->contents->d.data;
+                ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os);
+                p7->d.sign->contents->d.data = NULL;
+            }
+        } else {
+            PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_CTRL,
+                     PKCS7_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_ON_THIS_TYPE);
+            ret = 0;
+        }
+        break;
+    case PKCS7_OP_GET_DETACHED_SIGNATURE:
+        if (nid == NID_pkcs7_signed) {
+            if (!p7->d.sign || !p7->d.sign->contents->d.ptr)
+                ret = 1;
+            else
+                ret = 0;
+
+            p7->detached = ret;
+        } else {
+            PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_CTRL,
+                     PKCS7_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_ON_THIS_TYPE);
+            ret = 0;
+        }
+
+        break;
+    default:
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_CTRL, PKCS7_R_UNKNOWN_OPERATION);
+        ret = 0;
+    }
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+int PKCS7_content_new(PKCS7 *p7, int type)
+{
+    PKCS7 *ret = NULL;
+
+    if ((ret = PKCS7_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (!PKCS7_set_type(ret, type))
+        goto err;
+    if (!PKCS7_set_content(p7, ret))
+        goto err;
+
+    return (1);
+ err:
+    PKCS7_free(ret);
+    return (0);
+}
+
+int PKCS7_set_content(PKCS7 *p7, PKCS7 *p7_data)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    i = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
+    switch (i) {
+    case NID_pkcs7_signed:
+        PKCS7_free(p7->d.sign->contents);
+        p7->d.sign->contents = p7_data;
+        break;
+    case NID_pkcs7_digest:
+        PKCS7_free(p7->d.digest->contents);
+        p7->d.digest->contents = p7_data;
+        break;
+    case NID_pkcs7_data:
+    case NID_pkcs7_enveloped:
+    case NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped:
+    case NID_pkcs7_encrypted:
+    default:
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SET_CONTENT, PKCS7_R_UNSUPPORTED_CONTENT_TYPE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    return (1);
+ err:
+    return (0);
+}
+
+int PKCS7_set_type(PKCS7 *p7, int type)
+{
+    ASN1_OBJECT *obj;
+
+    /*
+     * PKCS7_content_free(p7);
+     */
+    obj = OBJ_nid2obj(type);    /* will not fail */
+
+    switch (type) {
+    case NID_pkcs7_signed:
+        p7->type = obj;
+        if ((p7->d.sign = PKCS7_SIGNED_new()) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(p7->d.sign->version, 1)) {
+            PKCS7_SIGNED_free(p7->d.sign);
+            p7->d.sign = NULL;
+            goto err;
+        }
+        break;
+    case NID_pkcs7_data:
+        p7->type = obj;
+        if ((p7->d.data = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new()) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        break;
+    case NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped:
+        p7->type = obj;
+        if ((p7->d.signed_and_enveloped = PKCS7_SIGN_ENVELOPE_new())
+            == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        ASN1_INTEGER_set(p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->version, 1);
+        if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->version, 1))
+            goto err;
+        p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->enc_data->content_type
+            = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs7_data);
+        break;
+    case NID_pkcs7_enveloped:
+        p7->type = obj;
+        if ((p7->d.enveloped = PKCS7_ENVELOPE_new())
+            == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(p7->d.enveloped->version, 0))
+            goto err;
+        p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->content_type = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs7_data);
+        break;
+    case NID_pkcs7_encrypted:
+        p7->type = obj;
+        if ((p7->d.encrypted = PKCS7_ENCRYPT_new())
+            == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(p7->d.encrypted->version, 0))
+            goto err;
+        p7->d.encrypted->enc_data->content_type = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs7_data);
+        break;
+
+    case NID_pkcs7_digest:
+        p7->type = obj;
+        if ((p7->d.digest = PKCS7_DIGEST_new())
+            == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(p7->d.digest->version, 0))
+            goto err;
+        break;
+    default:
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SET_TYPE, PKCS7_R_UNSUPPORTED_CONTENT_TYPE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    return (1);
+ err:
+    return (0);
+}
+
+int PKCS7_set0_type_other(PKCS7 *p7, int type, ASN1_TYPE *other)
+{
+    p7->type = OBJ_nid2obj(type);
+    p7->d.other = other;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int PKCS7_add_signer(PKCS7 *p7, PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *psi)
+{
+    int i, j, nid;
+    X509_ALGOR *alg;
+    STACK_OF(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO) *signer_sk;
+    STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) *md_sk;
+
+    i = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
+    switch (i) {
+    case NID_pkcs7_signed:
+        signer_sk = p7->d.sign->signer_info;
+        md_sk = p7->d.sign->md_algs;
+        break;
+    case NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped:
+        signer_sk = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->signer_info;
+        md_sk = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->md_algs;
+        break;
+    default:
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ADD_SIGNER, PKCS7_R_WRONG_CONTENT_TYPE);
+        return (0);
+    }
+
+    nid = OBJ_obj2nid(psi->digest_alg->algorithm);
+
+    /* If the digest is not currently listed, add it */
+    j = 0;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_ALGOR_num(md_sk); i++) {
+        alg = sk_X509_ALGOR_value(md_sk, i);
+        if (OBJ_obj2nid(alg->algorithm) == nid) {
+            j = 1;
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    if (!j) {                   /* we need to add another algorithm */
+        if ((alg = X509_ALGOR_new()) == NULL
+            || (alg->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new()) == NULL) {
+            X509_ALGOR_free(alg);
+            PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ADD_SIGNER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            return (0);
+        }
+        alg->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(nid);
+        alg->parameter->type = V_ASN1_NULL;
+        if (!sk_X509_ALGOR_push(md_sk, alg)) {
+            X509_ALGOR_free(alg);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (!sk_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_push(signer_sk, psi))
+        return 0;
+    return (1);
+}
+
+int PKCS7_add_certificate(PKCS7 *p7, X509 *x509)
+{
+    int i;
+    STACK_OF(X509) **sk;
+
+    i = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
+    switch (i) {
+    case NID_pkcs7_signed:
+        sk = &(p7->d.sign->cert);
+        break;
+    case NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped:
+        sk = &(p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->cert);
+        break;
+    default:
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ADD_CERTIFICATE, PKCS7_R_WRONG_CONTENT_TYPE);
+        return (0);
+    }
+
+    if (*sk == NULL)
+        *sk = sk_X509_new_null();
+    if (*sk == NULL) {
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ADD_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    X509_up_ref(x509);
+    if (!sk_X509_push(*sk, x509)) {
+        X509_free(x509);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return (1);
+}
+
+int PKCS7_add_crl(PKCS7 *p7, X509_CRL *crl)
+{
+    int i;
+    STACK_OF(X509_CRL) **sk;
+
+    i = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
+    switch (i) {
+    case NID_pkcs7_signed:
+        sk = &(p7->d.sign->crl);
+        break;
+    case NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped:
+        sk = &(p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->crl);
+        break;
+    default:
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ADD_CRL, PKCS7_R_WRONG_CONTENT_TYPE);
+        return (0);
+    }
+
+    if (*sk == NULL)
+        *sk = sk_X509_CRL_new_null();
+    if (*sk == NULL) {
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ADD_CRL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    X509_CRL_up_ref(crl);
+    if (!sk_X509_CRL_push(*sk, crl)) {
+        X509_CRL_free(crl);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return (1);
+}
+
+int PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_set(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *p7i, X509 *x509, EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+                          const EVP_MD *dgst)
+{
+    int ret;
+
+    /* We now need to add another PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO entry */
+    if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(p7i->version, 1))
+        goto err;
+    if (!X509_NAME_set(&p7i->issuer_and_serial->issuer,
+                       X509_get_issuer_name(x509)))
+        goto err;
+
+    /*
+     * because ASN1_INTEGER_set is used to set a 'long' we will do things the
+     * ugly way.
+     */
+    ASN1_INTEGER_free(p7i->issuer_and_serial->serial);
+    if (!(p7i->issuer_and_serial->serial =
+          ASN1_INTEGER_dup(X509_get_serialNumber(x509))))
+        goto err;
+
+    /* lets keep the pkey around for a while */
+    EVP_PKEY_up_ref(pkey);
+    p7i->pkey = pkey;
+
+    /* Set the algorithms */
+
+    X509_ALGOR_set0(p7i->digest_alg, OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_MD_type(dgst)),
+                    V_ASN1_NULL, NULL);
+
+    if (pkey->ameth && pkey->ameth->pkey_ctrl) {
+        ret = pkey->ameth->pkey_ctrl(pkey, ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN, 0, p7i);
+        if (ret > 0)
+            return 1;
+        if (ret != -2) {
+            PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_SET,
+                     PKCS7_R_SIGNING_CTRL_FAILURE);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+    PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_SET,
+             PKCS7_R_SIGNING_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEY_TYPE);
+ err:
+    return 0;
+}
+
+PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *PKCS7_add_signature(PKCS7 *p7, X509 *x509, EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+                                       const EVP_MD *dgst)
+{
+    PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si = NULL;
+
+    if (dgst == NULL) {
+        int def_nid;
+        if (EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid(pkey, &def_nid) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+        dgst = EVP_get_digestbynid(def_nid);
+        if (dgst == NULL) {
+            PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ADD_SIGNATURE, PKCS7_R_NO_DEFAULT_DIGEST);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if ((si = PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (!PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_set(si, x509, pkey, dgst))
+        goto err;
+    if (!PKCS7_add_signer(p7, si))
+        goto err;
+    return (si);
+ err:
+    PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_free(si);
+    return (NULL);
+}
+
+int PKCS7_set_digest(PKCS7 *p7, const EVP_MD *md)
+{
+    if (PKCS7_type_is_digest(p7)) {
+        if ((p7->d.digest->md->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new()) == NULL) {
+            PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SET_DIGEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        p7->d.digest->md->parameter->type = V_ASN1_NULL;
+        p7->d.digest->md->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_MD_nid(md));
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SET_DIGEST, PKCS7_R_WRONG_CONTENT_TYPE);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO) *PKCS7_get_signer_info(PKCS7 *p7)
+{
+    if (p7 == NULL || p7->d.ptr == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    if (PKCS7_type_is_signed(p7)) {
+        return (p7->d.sign->signer_info);
+    } else if (PKCS7_type_is_signedAndEnveloped(p7)) {
+        return (p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->signer_info);
+    } else
+        return (NULL);
+}
+
+void PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_get0_algs(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si, EVP_PKEY **pk,
+                                 X509_ALGOR **pdig, X509_ALGOR **psig)
+{
+    if (pk)
+        *pk = si->pkey;
+    if (pdig)
+        *pdig = si->digest_alg;
+    if (psig)
+        *psig = si->digest_enc_alg;
+}
+
+void PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_get0_alg(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri, X509_ALGOR **penc)
+{
+    if (penc)
+        *penc = ri->key_enc_algor;
+}
+
+PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *PKCS7_add_recipient(PKCS7 *p7, X509 *x509)
+{
+    PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri;
+
+    if ((ri = PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (!PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_set(ri, x509))
+        goto err;
+    if (!PKCS7_add_recipient_info(p7, ri))
+        goto err;
+    return ri;
+ err:
+    PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_free(ri);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+int PKCS7_add_recipient_info(PKCS7 *p7, PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri)
+{
+    int i;
+    STACK_OF(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO) *sk;
+
+    i = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
+    switch (i) {
+    case NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped:
+        sk = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->recipientinfo;
+        break;
+    case NID_pkcs7_enveloped:
+        sk = p7->d.enveloped->recipientinfo;
+        break;
+    default:
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ADD_RECIPIENT_INFO,
+                 PKCS7_R_WRONG_CONTENT_TYPE);
+        return (0);
+    }
+
+    if (!sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_push(sk, ri))
+        return 0;
+    return (1);
+}
+
+int PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_set(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *p7i, X509 *x509)
+{
+    int ret;
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+    if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(p7i->version, 0))
+        return 0;
+    if (!X509_NAME_set(&p7i->issuer_and_serial->issuer,
+                       X509_get_issuer_name(x509)))
+        return 0;
+
+    ASN1_INTEGER_free(p7i->issuer_and_serial->serial);
+    if (!(p7i->issuer_and_serial->serial =
+          ASN1_INTEGER_dup(X509_get_serialNumber(x509))))
+        return 0;
+
+    pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x509);
+
+    if (!pkey || !pkey->ameth || !pkey->ameth->pkey_ctrl) {
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_SET,
+                 PKCS7_R_ENCRYPTION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEY_TYPE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    ret = pkey->ameth->pkey_ctrl(pkey, ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_ENCRYPT, 0, p7i);
+    if (ret == -2) {
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_SET,
+                 PKCS7_R_ENCRYPTION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEY_TYPE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (ret <= 0) {
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_SET,
+                 PKCS7_R_ENCRYPTION_CTRL_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    X509_up_ref(x509);
+    p7i->cert = x509;
+
+    return 1;
+
+ err:
+    return 0;
+}
+
+X509 *PKCS7_cert_from_signer_info(PKCS7 *p7, PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si)
+{
+    if (PKCS7_type_is_signed(p7))
+        return (X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(p7->d.sign->cert,
+                                               si->issuer_and_serial->issuer,
+                                               si->
+                                               issuer_and_serial->serial));
+    else
+        return (NULL);
+}
+
+int PKCS7_set_cipher(PKCS7 *p7, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher)
+{
+    int i;
+    PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT *ec;
+
+    i = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
+    switch (i) {
+    case NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped:
+        ec = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->enc_data;
+        break;
+    case NID_pkcs7_enveloped:
+        ec = p7->d.enveloped->enc_data;
+        break;
+    default:
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SET_CIPHER, PKCS7_R_WRONG_CONTENT_TYPE);
+        return (0);
+    }
+
+    /* Check cipher OID exists and has data in it */
+    i = EVP_CIPHER_type(cipher);
+    if (i == NID_undef) {
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SET_CIPHER,
+                 PKCS7_R_CIPHER_HAS_NO_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER);
+        return (0);
+    }
+
+    ec->cipher = cipher;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int PKCS7_stream(unsigned char ***boundary, PKCS7 *p7)
+{
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os = NULL;
+
+    switch (OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type)) {
+    case NID_pkcs7_data:
+        os = p7->d.data;
+        break;
+
+    case NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped:
+        os = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->enc_data->enc_data;
+        if (os == NULL) {
+            os = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
+            p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->enc_data->enc_data = os;
+        }
+        break;
+
+    case NID_pkcs7_enveloped:
+        os = p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->enc_data;
+        if (os == NULL) {
+            os = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
+            p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->enc_data = os;
+        }
+        break;
+
+    case NID_pkcs7_signed:
+        os = p7->d.sign->contents->d.data;
+        break;
+
+    default:
+        os = NULL;
+        break;
+    }
+
+    if (os == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    os->flags |= ASN1_STRING_FLAG_NDEF;
+    *boundary = &os->data;
+
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_mime.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_mime.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..97474cf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_mime.c
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+
+/* PKCS#7 wrappers round generalised stream and MIME routines */
+
+int i2d_PKCS7_bio_stream(BIO *out, PKCS7 *p7, BIO *in, int flags)
+{
+    return i2d_ASN1_bio_stream(out, (ASN1_VALUE *)p7, in, flags,
+                               ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS7));
+}
+
+int PEM_write_bio_PKCS7_stream(BIO *out, PKCS7 *p7, BIO *in, int flags)
+{
+    return PEM_write_bio_ASN1_stream(out, (ASN1_VALUE *)p7, in, flags,
+                                     "PKCS7", ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS7));
+}
+
+int SMIME_write_PKCS7(BIO *bio, PKCS7 *p7, BIO *data, int flags)
+{
+    STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) *mdalgs;
+    int ctype_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
+    if (ctype_nid == NID_pkcs7_signed)
+        mdalgs = p7->d.sign->md_algs;
+    else
+        mdalgs = NULL;
+
+    flags ^= SMIME_OLDMIME;
+
+    return SMIME_write_ASN1(bio, (ASN1_VALUE *)p7, data, flags,
+                            ctype_nid, NID_undef, mdalgs,
+                            ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS7));
+}
+
+PKCS7 *SMIME_read_PKCS7(BIO *bio, BIO **bcont)
+{
+    return (PKCS7 *)SMIME_read_ASN1(bio, bcont, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS7));
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_smime.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_smime.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4418723
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_smime.c
@@ -0,0 +1,549 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* Simple PKCS#7 processing functions */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+
+
+#define BUFFERSIZE 4096
+
+static int pkcs7_copy_existing_digest(PKCS7 *p7, PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si);
+
+PKCS7 *PKCS7_sign(X509 *signcert, EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
+                  BIO *data, int flags)
+{
+    PKCS7 *p7;
+    int i;
+
+    if ((p7 = PKCS7_new()) == NULL) {
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    if (!PKCS7_set_type(p7, NID_pkcs7_signed))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!PKCS7_content_new(p7, NID_pkcs7_data))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (pkey && !PKCS7_sign_add_signer(p7, signcert, pkey, NULL, flags)) {
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGN, PKCS7_R_PKCS7_ADD_SIGNER_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!(flags & PKCS7_NOCERTS)) {
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
+            if (!PKCS7_add_certificate(p7, sk_X509_value(certs, i)))
+                goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (flags & PKCS7_DETACHED)
+        PKCS7_set_detached(p7, 1);
+
+    if (flags & (PKCS7_STREAM | PKCS7_PARTIAL))
+        return p7;
+
+    if (PKCS7_final(p7, data, flags))
+        return p7;
+
+ err:
+    PKCS7_free(p7);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+int PKCS7_final(PKCS7 *p7, BIO *data, int flags)
+{
+    BIO *p7bio;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    if ((p7bio = PKCS7_dataInit(p7, NULL)) == NULL) {
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_FINAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    SMIME_crlf_copy(data, p7bio, flags);
+
+    (void)BIO_flush(p7bio);
+
+    if (!PKCS7_dataFinal(p7, p7bio)) {
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_FINAL, PKCS7_R_PKCS7_DATASIGN);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+    BIO_free_all(p7bio);
+
+    return ret;
+
+}
+
+/* Check to see if a cipher exists and if so add S/MIME capabilities */
+
+static int add_cipher_smcap(STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) *sk, int nid, int arg)
+{
+    if (EVP_get_cipherbynid(nid))
+        return PKCS7_simple_smimecap(sk, nid, arg);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int add_digest_smcap(STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) *sk, int nid, int arg)
+{
+    if (EVP_get_digestbynid(nid))
+        return PKCS7_simple_smimecap(sk, nid, arg);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *PKCS7_sign_add_signer(PKCS7 *p7, X509 *signcert,
+                                         EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *md,
+                                         int flags)
+{
+    PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) *smcap = NULL;
+    if (!X509_check_private_key(signcert, pkey)) {
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGN_ADD_SIGNER,
+                 PKCS7_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DOES_NOT_MATCH_CERTIFICATE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    if ((si = PKCS7_add_signature(p7, signcert, pkey, md)) == NULL) {
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGN_ADD_SIGNER,
+                 PKCS7_R_PKCS7_ADD_SIGNATURE_ERROR);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    if (!(flags & PKCS7_NOCERTS)) {
+        if (!PKCS7_add_certificate(p7, signcert))
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!(flags & PKCS7_NOATTR)) {
+        if (!PKCS7_add_attrib_content_type(si, NULL))
+            goto err;
+        /* Add SMIMECapabilities */
+        if (!(flags & PKCS7_NOSMIMECAP)) {
+            if ((smcap = sk_X509_ALGOR_new_null()) == NULL) {
+                PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGN_ADD_SIGNER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            if (!add_cipher_smcap(smcap, NID_aes_256_cbc, -1)
+                || !add_digest_smcap(smcap, NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, -1)
+                || !add_digest_smcap(smcap, NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, -1)
+                || !add_digest_smcap(smcap, NID_id_GostR3411_94, -1)
+                || !add_cipher_smcap(smcap, NID_id_Gost28147_89, -1)
+                || !add_cipher_smcap(smcap, NID_aes_192_cbc, -1)
+                || !add_cipher_smcap(smcap, NID_aes_128_cbc, -1)
+                || !add_cipher_smcap(smcap, NID_des_ede3_cbc, -1)
+                || !add_cipher_smcap(smcap, NID_rc2_cbc, 128)
+                || !add_cipher_smcap(smcap, NID_rc2_cbc, 64)
+                || !add_cipher_smcap(smcap, NID_des_cbc, -1)
+                || !add_cipher_smcap(smcap, NID_rc2_cbc, 40)
+                || !PKCS7_add_attrib_smimecap(si, smcap))
+                goto err;
+            sk_X509_ALGOR_pop_free(smcap, X509_ALGOR_free);
+            smcap = NULL;
+        }
+        if (flags & PKCS7_REUSE_DIGEST) {
+            if (!pkcs7_copy_existing_digest(p7, si))
+                goto err;
+            if (!(flags & PKCS7_PARTIAL) && !PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_sign(si))
+                goto err;
+        }
+    }
+    return si;
+ err:
+    sk_X509_ALGOR_pop_free(smcap, X509_ALGOR_free);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Search for a digest matching SignerInfo digest type and if found copy
+ * across.
+ */
+
+static int pkcs7_copy_existing_digest(PKCS7 *p7, PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si)
+{
+    int i;
+    STACK_OF(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO) *sinfos;
+    PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *sitmp;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *osdig = NULL;
+    sinfos = PKCS7_get_signer_info(p7);
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_num(sinfos); i++) {
+        sitmp = sk_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_value(sinfos, i);
+        if (si == sitmp)
+            break;
+        if (sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_num(sitmp->auth_attr) <= 0)
+            continue;
+        if (!OBJ_cmp(si->digest_alg->algorithm, sitmp->digest_alg->algorithm)) {
+            osdig = PKCS7_digest_from_attributes(sitmp->auth_attr);
+            break;
+        }
+
+    }
+
+    if (osdig)
+        return PKCS7_add1_attrib_digest(si, osdig->data, osdig->length);
+
+    PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_COPY_EXISTING_DIGEST,
+             PKCS7_R_NO_MATCHING_DIGEST_TYPE_FOUND);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int PKCS7_verify(PKCS7 *p7, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, X509_STORE *store,
+                 BIO *indata, BIO *out, int flags)
+{
+    STACK_OF(X509) *signers;
+    X509 *signer;
+    STACK_OF(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO) *sinfos;
+    PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si;
+    X509_STORE_CTX *cert_ctx = NULL;
+    char *buf = NULL;
+    int i, j = 0, k, ret = 0;
+    BIO *p7bio = NULL;
+    BIO *tmpin = NULL, *tmpout = NULL;
+
+    if (!p7) {
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_VERIFY, PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (!PKCS7_type_is_signed(p7)) {
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_VERIFY, PKCS7_R_WRONG_CONTENT_TYPE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* Check for no data and no content: no data to verify signature */
+    if (PKCS7_get_detached(p7) && !indata) {
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_VERIFY, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (flags & PKCS7_NO_DUAL_CONTENT) {
+        /*
+         * This was originally "#if 0" because we thought that only old broken
+         * Netscape did this.  It turns out that Authenticode uses this kind
+         * of "extended" PKCS7 format, and things like UEFI secure boot and
+         * tools like osslsigncode need it.  In Authenticode the verification
+         * process is different, but the existing PKCs7 verification works.
+         */
+        if (!PKCS7_get_detached(p7) && indata) {
+            PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_VERIFY, PKCS7_R_CONTENT_AND_DATA_PRESENT);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    sinfos = PKCS7_get_signer_info(p7);
+
+    if (!sinfos || !sk_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_num(sinfos)) {
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_VERIFY, PKCS7_R_NO_SIGNATURES_ON_DATA);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    signers = PKCS7_get0_signers(p7, certs, flags);
+    if (!signers)
+        return 0;
+
+    /* Now verify the certificates */
+
+    cert_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
+    if (cert_ctx == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (!(flags & PKCS7_NOVERIFY))
+        for (k = 0; k < sk_X509_num(signers); k++) {
+            signer = sk_X509_value(signers, k);
+            if (!(flags & PKCS7_NOCHAIN)) {
+                if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(cert_ctx, store, signer,
+                                         p7->d.sign->cert)) {
+                    PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_VERIFY, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
+                    goto err;
+                }
+                X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(cert_ctx, "smime_sign");
+            } else if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(cert_ctx, store, signer, NULL)) {
+                PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_VERIFY, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            if (!(flags & PKCS7_NOCRL))
+                X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(cert_ctx, p7->d.sign->crl);
+            i = X509_verify_cert(cert_ctx);
+            if (i <= 0)
+                j = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(cert_ctx);
+            X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(cert_ctx);
+            if (i <= 0) {
+                PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_VERIFY,
+                         PKCS7_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR);
+                ERR_add_error_data(2, "Verify error:",
+                                   X509_verify_cert_error_string(j));
+                goto err;
+            }
+            /* Check for revocation status here */
+        }
+
+    /*
+     * Performance optimization: if the content is a memory BIO then store
+     * its contents in a temporary read only memory BIO. This avoids
+     * potentially large numbers of slow copies of data which will occur when
+     * reading from a read write memory BIO when signatures are calculated.
+     */
+
+    if (indata && (BIO_method_type(indata) == BIO_TYPE_MEM)) {
+        char *ptr;
+        long len;
+        len = BIO_get_mem_data(indata, &ptr);
+        tmpin = BIO_new_mem_buf(ptr, len);
+        if (tmpin == NULL) {
+            PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    } else
+        tmpin = indata;
+
+    if ((p7bio = PKCS7_dataInit(p7, tmpin)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (flags & PKCS7_TEXT) {
+        if ((tmpout = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem())) == NULL) {
+            PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        BIO_set_mem_eof_return(tmpout, 0);
+    } else
+        tmpout = out;
+
+    /* We now have to 'read' from p7bio to calculate digests etc. */
+    if ((buf = OPENSSL_malloc(BUFFERSIZE)) == NULL) {
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    for (;;) {
+        i = BIO_read(p7bio, buf, BUFFERSIZE);
+        if (i <= 0)
+            break;
+        if (tmpout)
+            BIO_write(tmpout, buf, i);
+    }
+
+    if (flags & PKCS7_TEXT) {
+        if (!SMIME_text(tmpout, out)) {
+            PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_VERIFY, PKCS7_R_SMIME_TEXT_ERROR);
+            BIO_free(tmpout);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        BIO_free(tmpout);
+    }
+
+    /* Now Verify All Signatures */
+    if (!(flags & PKCS7_NOSIGS))
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_num(sinfos); i++) {
+            si = sk_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_value(sinfos, i);
+            signer = sk_X509_value(signers, i);
+            j = PKCS7_signatureVerify(p7bio, p7, si, signer);
+            if (j <= 0) {
+                PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_VERIFY, PKCS7_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE);
+                goto err;
+            }
+        }
+
+    ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+    X509_STORE_CTX_free(cert_ctx);
+    OPENSSL_free(buf);
+    if (tmpin == indata) {
+        if (indata)
+            BIO_pop(p7bio);
+    }
+    BIO_free_all(p7bio);
+    sk_X509_free(signers);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509) *PKCS7_get0_signers(PKCS7 *p7, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
+                                   int flags)
+{
+    STACK_OF(X509) *signers;
+    STACK_OF(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO) *sinfos;
+    PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si;
+    PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL *ias;
+    X509 *signer;
+    int i;
+
+    if (!p7) {
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_GET0_SIGNERS, PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    if (!PKCS7_type_is_signed(p7)) {
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_GET0_SIGNERS, PKCS7_R_WRONG_CONTENT_TYPE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    /* Collect all the signers together */
+
+    sinfos = PKCS7_get_signer_info(p7);
+
+    if (sk_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_num(sinfos) <= 0) {
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_GET0_SIGNERS, PKCS7_R_NO_SIGNERS);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if ((signers = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_GET0_SIGNERS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_num(sinfos); i++) {
+        si = sk_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_value(sinfos, i);
+        ias = si->issuer_and_serial;
+        signer = NULL;
+        /* If any certificates passed they take priority */
+        if (certs)
+            signer = X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(certs,
+                                                    ias->issuer, ias->serial);
+        if (!signer && !(flags & PKCS7_NOINTERN)
+            && p7->d.sign->cert)
+            signer =
+                X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(p7->d.sign->cert,
+                                               ias->issuer, ias->serial);
+        if (!signer) {
+            PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_GET0_SIGNERS,
+                     PKCS7_R_SIGNER_CERTIFICATE_NOT_FOUND);
+            sk_X509_free(signers);
+            return 0;
+        }
+
+        if (!sk_X509_push(signers, signer)) {
+            sk_X509_free(signers);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+    }
+    return signers;
+}
+
+/* Build a complete PKCS#7 enveloped data */
+
+PKCS7 *PKCS7_encrypt(STACK_OF(X509) *certs, BIO *in, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
+                     int flags)
+{
+    PKCS7 *p7;
+    BIO *p7bio = NULL;
+    int i;
+    X509 *x509;
+    if ((p7 = PKCS7_new()) == NULL) {
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    if (!PKCS7_set_type(p7, NID_pkcs7_enveloped))
+        goto err;
+    if (!PKCS7_set_cipher(p7, cipher)) {
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ENCRYPT, PKCS7_R_ERROR_SETTING_CIPHER);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
+        x509 = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
+        if (!PKCS7_add_recipient(p7, x509)) {
+            PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ENCRYPT, PKCS7_R_ERROR_ADDING_RECIPIENT);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (flags & PKCS7_STREAM)
+        return p7;
+
+    if (PKCS7_final(p7, in, flags))
+        return p7;
+
+ err:
+
+    BIO_free_all(p7bio);
+    PKCS7_free(p7);
+    return NULL;
+
+}
+
+int PKCS7_decrypt(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *cert, BIO *data, int flags)
+{
+    BIO *tmpmem;
+    int ret = 0, i;
+    char *buf = NULL;
+
+    if (!p7) {
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DECRYPT, PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (!PKCS7_type_is_enveloped(p7)) {
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DECRYPT, PKCS7_R_WRONG_CONTENT_TYPE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (cert && !X509_check_private_key(cert, pkey)) {
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DECRYPT,
+                 PKCS7_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DOES_NOT_MATCH_CERTIFICATE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if ((tmpmem = PKCS7_dataDecode(p7, pkey, NULL, cert)) == NULL) {
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DECRYPT, PKCS7_R_DECRYPT_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (flags & PKCS7_TEXT) {
+        BIO *tmpbuf, *bread;
+        /* Encrypt BIOs can't do BIO_gets() so add a buffer BIO */
+        if ((tmpbuf = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer())) == NULL) {
+            PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            BIO_free_all(tmpmem);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        if ((bread = BIO_push(tmpbuf, tmpmem)) == NULL) {
+            PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            BIO_free_all(tmpbuf);
+            BIO_free_all(tmpmem);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        ret = SMIME_text(bread, data);
+        if (ret > 0 && BIO_method_type(tmpmem) == BIO_TYPE_CIPHER) {
+            if (!BIO_get_cipher_status(tmpmem))
+                ret = 0;
+        }
+        BIO_free_all(bread);
+        return ret;
+    }
+    if ((buf = OPENSSL_malloc(BUFFERSIZE)) == NULL) {
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    for (;;) {
+        i = BIO_read(tmpmem, buf, BUFFERSIZE);
+        if (i <= 0) {
+            ret = 1;
+            if (BIO_method_type(tmpmem) == BIO_TYPE_CIPHER) {
+                if (!BIO_get_cipher_status(tmpmem))
+                    ret = 0;
+            }
+
+            break;
+        }
+        if (BIO_write(data, buf, i) != i) {
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+err:
+    OPENSSL_free(buf);
+    BIO_free_all(tmpmem);
+    return ret;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs7/pkcs7err.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs7/pkcs7err.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d5baa9b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/pkcs7/pkcs7err.c
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+/*
+ * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/pkcs7.h>
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+
+# define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PKCS7,func,0)
+# define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PKCS7,0,reason)
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA PKCS7_str_functs[] = {
+    {ERR_FUNC(PKCS7_F_DO_PKCS7_SIGNED_ATTRIB), "do_pkcs7_signed_attrib"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ADD0_ATTRIB_SIGNING_TIME),
+     "PKCS7_add0_attrib_signing_time"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ADD_ATTRIB_SMIMECAP),
+     "PKCS7_add_attrib_smimecap"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ADD_CERTIFICATE), "PKCS7_add_certificate"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ADD_CRL), "PKCS7_add_crl"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ADD_RECIPIENT_INFO), "PKCS7_add_recipient_info"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ADD_SIGNATURE), "PKCS7_add_signature"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ADD_SIGNER), "PKCS7_add_signer"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_BIO_ADD_DIGEST), "PKCS7_bio_add_digest"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_COPY_EXISTING_DIGEST),
+     "pkcs7_copy_existing_digest"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_CTRL), "PKCS7_ctrl"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE), "PKCS7_dataDecode"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL), "PKCS7_dataFinal"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAINIT), "PKCS7_dataInit"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAVERIFY), "PKCS7_dataVerify"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DECRYPT), "PKCS7_decrypt"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DECRYPT_RINFO), "pkcs7_decrypt_rinfo"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ENCODE_RINFO), "pkcs7_encode_rinfo"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ENCRYPT), "PKCS7_encrypt"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_FINAL), "PKCS7_final"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_FIND_DIGEST), "PKCS7_find_digest"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_GET0_SIGNERS), "PKCS7_get0_signers"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_SET), "PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_set"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SET_CIPHER), "PKCS7_set_cipher"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SET_CONTENT), "PKCS7_set_content"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SET_DIGEST), "PKCS7_set_digest"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SET_TYPE), "PKCS7_set_type"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGN), "PKCS7_sign"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGNATUREVERIFY), "PKCS7_signatureVerify"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_SET), "PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_set"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_SIGN), "PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_sign"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGN_ADD_SIGNER), "PKCS7_sign_add_signer"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIMPLE_SMIMECAP), "PKCS7_simple_smimecap"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_VERIFY), "PKCS7_verify"},
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA PKCS7_str_reasons[] = {
+    {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR),
+     "certificate verify error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_CIPHER_HAS_NO_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER),
+     "cipher has no object identifier"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_CIPHER_NOT_INITIALIZED), "cipher not initialized"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_CONTENT_AND_DATA_PRESENT),
+     "content and data present"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_CTRL_ERROR), "ctrl error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_DECRYPT_ERROR), "decrypt error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_DIGEST_FAILURE), "digest failure"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_ENCRYPTION_CTRL_FAILURE), "encryption ctrl failure"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_ENCRYPTION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEY_TYPE),
+     "encryption not supported for this key type"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_ERROR_ADDING_RECIPIENT), "error adding recipient"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_ERROR_SETTING_CIPHER), "error setting cipher"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER), "invalid null pointer"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_INVALID_SIGNED_DATA_TYPE),
+     "invalid signed data type"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT), "no content"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_NO_DEFAULT_DIGEST), "no default digest"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_NO_MATCHING_DIGEST_TYPE_FOUND),
+     "no matching digest type found"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_NO_RECIPIENT_MATCHES_CERTIFICATE),
+     "no recipient matches certificate"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_NO_SIGNATURES_ON_DATA), "no signatures on data"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_NO_SIGNERS), "no signers"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_ON_THIS_TYPE),
+     "operation not supported on this type"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_PKCS7_ADD_SIGNATURE_ERROR),
+     "pkcs7 add signature error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_PKCS7_ADD_SIGNER_ERROR), "pkcs7 add signer error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_PKCS7_DATASIGN), "pkcs7 datasign"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DOES_NOT_MATCH_CERTIFICATE),
+     "private key does not match certificate"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE), "signature failure"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_SIGNER_CERTIFICATE_NOT_FOUND),
+     "signer certificate not found"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_SIGNING_CTRL_FAILURE), "signing ctrl failure"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_SIGNING_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEY_TYPE),
+     "signing not supported for this key type"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_SMIME_TEXT_ERROR), "smime text error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_CERTIFICATE),
+     "unable to find certificate"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_MEM_BIO), "unable to find mem bio"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_MESSAGE_DIGEST),
+     "unable to find message digest"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST_TYPE), "unknown digest type"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_UNKNOWN_OPERATION), "unknown operation"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER_TYPE), "unsupported cipher type"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_UNSUPPORTED_CONTENT_TYPE),
+     "unsupported content type"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_WRONG_CONTENT_TYPE), "wrong content type"},
+    {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_WRONG_PKCS7_TYPE), "wrong pkcs7 type"},
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+
+#endif
+
+int ERR_load_PKCS7_strings(void)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+
+    if (ERR_func_error_string(PKCS7_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) {
+        ERR_load_strings(0, PKCS7_str_functs);
+        ERR_load_strings(0, PKCS7_str_reasons);
+    }
+#endif
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-armv4.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-armv4.pl
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..fc899ce
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-armv4.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,1252 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+#			IALU(*)/gcc-4.4		NEON
+#
+# ARM11xx(ARMv6)	7.78/+100%		-
+# Cortex-A5		6.35/+130%		3.00
+# Cortex-A8		6.25/+115%		2.36
+# Cortex-A9		5.10/+95%		2.55
+# Cortex-A15		3.85/+85%		1.25(**)
+# Snapdragon S4		5.70/+100%		1.48(**)
+#
+# (*)	this is for -march=armv6, i.e. with bunch of ldrb loading data;
+# (**)	these are trade-off results, they can be improved by ~8% but at
+#	the cost of 15/12% regression on Cortex-A5/A7, it's even possible
+#	to improve Cortex-A9 result, but then A5/A7 loose more than 20%;
+
+$flavour = shift;
+if ($flavour=~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/) { $output=$flavour; undef $flavour; }
+else { while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {} }
+
+if ($flavour && $flavour ne "void") {
+    $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+    ( $xlate="${dir}arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
+    ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
+    die "can't locate arm-xlate.pl";
+
+    open STDOUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output";
+} else {
+    open STDOUT,">$output";
+}
+
+($ctx,$inp,$len,$padbit)=map("r$_",(0..3));
+
+$code.=<<___;
+#include "arm_arch.h"
+
+.text
+#if defined(__thumb2__)
+.syntax	unified
+.thumb
+#else
+.code	32
+#endif
+
+.globl	poly1305_emit
+.globl	poly1305_blocks
+.globl	poly1305_init
+.type	poly1305_init,%function
+.align	5
+poly1305_init:
+.Lpoly1305_init:
+	stmdb	sp!,{r4-r11}
+
+	eor	r3,r3,r3
+	cmp	$inp,#0
+	str	r3,[$ctx,#0]		@ zero hash value
+	str	r3,[$ctx,#4]
+	str	r3,[$ctx,#8]
+	str	r3,[$ctx,#12]
+	str	r3,[$ctx,#16]
+	str	r3,[$ctx,#36]		@ is_base2_26
+	add	$ctx,$ctx,#20
+
+#ifdef	__thumb2__
+	it	eq
+#endif
+	moveq	r0,#0
+	beq	.Lno_key
+
+#if	__ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7
+	adr	r11,.Lpoly1305_init
+	ldr	r12,.LOPENSSL_armcap
+#endif
+	ldrb	r4,[$inp,#0]
+	mov	r10,#0x0fffffff
+	ldrb	r5,[$inp,#1]
+	and	r3,r10,#-4		@ 0x0ffffffc
+	ldrb	r6,[$inp,#2]
+	ldrb	r7,[$inp,#3]
+	orr	r4,r4,r5,lsl#8
+	ldrb	r5,[$inp,#4]
+	orr	r4,r4,r6,lsl#16
+	ldrb	r6,[$inp,#5]
+	orr	r4,r4,r7,lsl#24
+	ldrb	r7,[$inp,#6]
+	and	r4,r4,r10
+
+#if	__ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7
+	ldr	r12,[r11,r12]		@ OPENSSL_armcap_P
+# ifdef	__APPLE__
+	ldr	r12,[r12]
+# endif
+#endif
+	ldrb	r8,[$inp,#7]
+	orr	r5,r5,r6,lsl#8
+	ldrb	r6,[$inp,#8]
+	orr	r5,r5,r7,lsl#16
+	ldrb	r7,[$inp,#9]
+	orr	r5,r5,r8,lsl#24
+	ldrb	r8,[$inp,#10]
+	and	r5,r5,r3
+
+#if	__ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7
+	tst	r12,#ARMV7_NEON		@ check for NEON
+# ifdef	__APPLE__
+	adr	r9,poly1305_blocks_neon
+	adr	r11,poly1305_blocks
+#  ifdef __thumb2__
+	it	ne
+#  endif
+	movne	r11,r9
+	adr	r12,poly1305_emit
+	adr	r10,poly1305_emit_neon
+#  ifdef __thumb2__
+	it	ne
+#  endif
+	movne	r12,r10
+# else
+#  ifdef __thumb2__
+	itete	eq
+#  endif
+	addeq	r12,r11,#(poly1305_emit-.Lpoly1305_init)
+	addne	r12,r11,#(poly1305_emit_neon-.Lpoly1305_init)
+	addeq	r11,r11,#(poly1305_blocks-.Lpoly1305_init)
+	addne	r11,r11,#(poly1305_blocks_neon-.Lpoly1305_init)
+# endif
+# ifdef	__thumb2__
+	orr	r12,r12,#1	@ thumb-ify address
+	orr	r11,r11,#1
+# endif
+#endif
+	ldrb	r9,[$inp,#11]
+	orr	r6,r6,r7,lsl#8
+	ldrb	r7,[$inp,#12]
+	orr	r6,r6,r8,lsl#16
+	ldrb	r8,[$inp,#13]
+	orr	r6,r6,r9,lsl#24
+	ldrb	r9,[$inp,#14]
+	and	r6,r6,r3
+
+	ldrb	r10,[$inp,#15]
+	orr	r7,r7,r8,lsl#8
+	str	r4,[$ctx,#0]
+	orr	r7,r7,r9,lsl#16
+	str	r5,[$ctx,#4]
+	orr	r7,r7,r10,lsl#24
+	str	r6,[$ctx,#8]
+	and	r7,r7,r3
+	str	r7,[$ctx,#12]
+#if	__ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7
+	stmia	r2,{r11,r12}		@ fill functions table
+	mov	r0,#1
+#else
+	mov	r0,#0
+#endif
+.Lno_key:
+	ldmia	sp!,{r4-r11}
+#if	__ARM_ARCH__>=5
+	ret				@ bx	lr
+#else
+	tst	lr,#1
+	moveq	pc,lr			@ be binary compatible with V4, yet
+	bx	lr			@ interoperable with Thumb ISA:-)
+#endif
+.size	poly1305_init,.-poly1305_init
+___
+{
+my ($h0,$h1,$h2,$h3,$h4,$r0,$r1,$r2,$r3)=map("r$_",(4..12));
+my ($s1,$s2,$s3)=($r1,$r2,$r3);
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.type	poly1305_blocks,%function
+.align	5
+poly1305_blocks:
+	stmdb	sp!,{r3-r11,lr}
+
+	ands	$len,$len,#-16
+	beq	.Lno_data
+
+	cmp	$padbit,#0
+	add	$len,$len,$inp		@ end pointer
+	sub	sp,sp,#32
+
+	ldmia	$ctx,{$h0-$r3}		@ load context
+
+	str	$ctx,[sp,#12]		@ offload stuff
+	mov	lr,$inp
+	str	$len,[sp,#16]
+	str	$r1,[sp,#20]
+	str	$r2,[sp,#24]
+	str	$r3,[sp,#28]
+	b	.Loop
+
+.Loop:
+#if __ARM_ARCH__<7
+	ldrb	r0,[lr],#16		@ load input
+# ifdef	__thumb2__
+	it	hi
+# endif
+	addhi	$h4,$h4,#1		@ 1<<128
+	ldrb	r1,[lr,#-15]
+	ldrb	r2,[lr,#-14]
+	ldrb	r3,[lr,#-13]
+	orr	r1,r0,r1,lsl#8
+	ldrb	r0,[lr,#-12]
+	orr	r2,r1,r2,lsl#16
+	ldrb	r1,[lr,#-11]
+	orr	r3,r2,r3,lsl#24
+	ldrb	r2,[lr,#-10]
+	adds	$h0,$h0,r3		@ accumulate input
+
+	ldrb	r3,[lr,#-9]
+	orr	r1,r0,r1,lsl#8
+	ldrb	r0,[lr,#-8]
+	orr	r2,r1,r2,lsl#16
+	ldrb	r1,[lr,#-7]
+	orr	r3,r2,r3,lsl#24
+	ldrb	r2,[lr,#-6]
+	adcs	$h1,$h1,r3
+
+	ldrb	r3,[lr,#-5]
+	orr	r1,r0,r1,lsl#8
+	ldrb	r0,[lr,#-4]
+	orr	r2,r1,r2,lsl#16
+	ldrb	r1,[lr,#-3]
+	orr	r3,r2,r3,lsl#24
+	ldrb	r2,[lr,#-2]
+	adcs	$h2,$h2,r3
+
+	ldrb	r3,[lr,#-1]
+	orr	r1,r0,r1,lsl#8
+	str	lr,[sp,#8]		@ offload input pointer
+	orr	r2,r1,r2,lsl#16
+	add	$s1,$r1,$r1,lsr#2
+	orr	r3,r2,r3,lsl#24
+#else
+	ldr	r0,[lr],#16		@ load input
+# ifdef	__thumb2__
+	it	hi
+# endif
+	addhi	$h4,$h4,#1		@ padbit
+	ldr	r1,[lr,#-12]
+	ldr	r2,[lr,#-8]
+	ldr	r3,[lr,#-4]
+# ifdef	__ARMEB__
+	rev	r0,r0
+	rev	r1,r1
+	rev	r2,r2
+	rev	r3,r3
+# endif
+	adds	$h0,$h0,r0		@ accumulate input
+	str	lr,[sp,#8]		@ offload input pointer
+	adcs	$h1,$h1,r1
+	add	$s1,$r1,$r1,lsr#2
+	adcs	$h2,$h2,r2
+#endif
+	add	$s2,$r2,$r2,lsr#2
+	adcs	$h3,$h3,r3
+	add	$s3,$r3,$r3,lsr#2
+
+	umull	r2,r3,$h1,$r0
+	 adc	$h4,$h4,#0
+	umull	r0,r1,$h0,$r0
+	umlal	r2,r3,$h4,$s1
+	umlal	r0,r1,$h3,$s1
+	ldr	$r1,[sp,#20]		@ reload $r1
+	umlal	r2,r3,$h2,$s3
+	umlal	r0,r1,$h1,$s3
+	umlal	r2,r3,$h3,$s2
+	umlal	r0,r1,$h2,$s2
+	umlal	r2,r3,$h0,$r1
+	str	r0,[sp,#0]		@ future $h0
+	 mul	r0,$s2,$h4
+	ldr	$r2,[sp,#24]		@ reload $r2
+	adds	r2,r2,r1		@ d1+=d0>>32
+	 eor	r1,r1,r1
+	adc	lr,r3,#0		@ future $h2
+	str	r2,[sp,#4]		@ future $h1
+
+	mul	r2,$s3,$h4
+	eor	r3,r3,r3
+	umlal	r0,r1,$h3,$s3
+	ldr	$r3,[sp,#28]		@ reload $r3
+	umlal	r2,r3,$h3,$r0
+	umlal	r0,r1,$h2,$r0
+	umlal	r2,r3,$h2,$r1
+	umlal	r0,r1,$h1,$r1
+	umlal	r2,r3,$h1,$r2
+	umlal	r0,r1,$h0,$r2
+	umlal	r2,r3,$h0,$r3
+	ldr	$h0,[sp,#0]
+	mul	$h4,$r0,$h4
+	ldr	$h1,[sp,#4]
+
+	adds	$h2,lr,r0		@ d2+=d1>>32
+	ldr	lr,[sp,#8]		@ reload input pointer
+	adc	r1,r1,#0
+	adds	$h3,r2,r1		@ d3+=d2>>32
+	ldr	r0,[sp,#16]		@ reload end pointer
+	adc	r3,r3,#0
+	add	$h4,$h4,r3		@ h4+=d3>>32
+
+	and	r1,$h4,#-4
+	and	$h4,$h4,#3
+	add	r1,r1,r1,lsr#2		@ *=5
+	adds	$h0,$h0,r1
+	adcs	$h1,$h1,#0
+	adcs	$h2,$h2,#0
+	adcs	$h3,$h3,#0
+	adc	$h4,$h4,#0
+
+	cmp	r0,lr			@ done yet?
+	bhi	.Loop
+
+	ldr	$ctx,[sp,#12]
+	add	sp,sp,#32
+	stmia	$ctx,{$h0-$h4}		@ store the result
+
+.Lno_data:
+#if	__ARM_ARCH__>=5
+	ldmia	sp!,{r3-r11,pc}
+#else
+	ldmia	sp!,{r3-r11,lr}
+	tst	lr,#1
+	moveq	pc,lr			@ be binary compatible with V4, yet
+	bx	lr			@ interoperable with Thumb ISA:-)
+#endif
+.size	poly1305_blocks,.-poly1305_blocks
+___
+}
+{
+my ($ctx,$mac,$nonce)=map("r$_",(0..2));
+my ($h0,$h1,$h2,$h3,$h4,$g0,$g1,$g2,$g3)=map("r$_",(3..11));
+my $g4=$h4;
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.type	poly1305_emit,%function
+.align	5
+poly1305_emit:
+	stmdb	sp!,{r4-r11}
+.Lpoly1305_emit_enter:
+
+	ldmia	$ctx,{$h0-$h4}
+	adds	$g0,$h0,#5		@ compare to modulus
+	adcs	$g1,$h1,#0
+	adcs	$g2,$h2,#0
+	adcs	$g3,$h3,#0
+	adc	$g4,$h4,#0
+	tst	$g4,#4			@ did it carry/borrow?
+
+#ifdef	__thumb2__
+	it	ne
+#endif
+	movne	$h0,$g0
+	ldr	$g0,[$nonce,#0]
+#ifdef	__thumb2__
+	it	ne
+#endif
+	movne	$h1,$g1
+	ldr	$g1,[$nonce,#4]
+#ifdef	__thumb2__
+	it	ne
+#endif
+	movne	$h2,$g2
+	ldr	$g2,[$nonce,#8]
+#ifdef	__thumb2__
+	it	ne
+#endif
+	movne	$h3,$g3
+	ldr	$g3,[$nonce,#12]
+
+	adds	$h0,$h0,$g0
+	adcs	$h1,$h1,$g1
+	adcs	$h2,$h2,$g2
+	adc	$h3,$h3,$g3
+
+#if __ARM_ARCH__>=7
+# ifdef __ARMEB__
+	rev	$h0,$h0
+	rev	$h1,$h1
+	rev	$h2,$h2
+	rev	$h3,$h3
+# endif
+	str	$h0,[$mac,#0]
+	str	$h1,[$mac,#4]
+	str	$h2,[$mac,#8]
+	str	$h3,[$mac,#12]
+#else
+	strb	$h0,[$mac,#0]
+	mov	$h0,$h0,lsr#8
+	strb	$h1,[$mac,#4]
+	mov	$h1,$h1,lsr#8
+	strb	$h2,[$mac,#8]
+	mov	$h2,$h2,lsr#8
+	strb	$h3,[$mac,#12]
+	mov	$h3,$h3,lsr#8
+
+	strb	$h0,[$mac,#1]
+	mov	$h0,$h0,lsr#8
+	strb	$h1,[$mac,#5]
+	mov	$h1,$h1,lsr#8
+	strb	$h2,[$mac,#9]
+	mov	$h2,$h2,lsr#8
+	strb	$h3,[$mac,#13]
+	mov	$h3,$h3,lsr#8
+
+	strb	$h0,[$mac,#2]
+	mov	$h0,$h0,lsr#8
+	strb	$h1,[$mac,#6]
+	mov	$h1,$h1,lsr#8
+	strb	$h2,[$mac,#10]
+	mov	$h2,$h2,lsr#8
+	strb	$h3,[$mac,#14]
+	mov	$h3,$h3,lsr#8
+
+	strb	$h0,[$mac,#3]
+	strb	$h1,[$mac,#7]
+	strb	$h2,[$mac,#11]
+	strb	$h3,[$mac,#15]
+#endif
+	ldmia	sp!,{r4-r11}
+#if	__ARM_ARCH__>=5
+	ret				@ bx	lr
+#else
+	tst	lr,#1
+	moveq	pc,lr			@ be binary compatible with V4, yet
+	bx	lr			@ interoperable with Thumb ISA:-)
+#endif
+.size	poly1305_emit,.-poly1305_emit
+___
+{
+my ($R0,$R1,$S1,$R2,$S2,$R3,$S3,$R4,$S4) = map("d$_",(0..9));
+my ($D0,$D1,$D2,$D3,$D4, $H0,$H1,$H2,$H3,$H4) = map("q$_",(5..14));
+my ($T0,$T1,$MASK) = map("q$_",(15,4,0));
+
+my ($in2,$zeros,$tbl0,$tbl1) = map("r$_",(4..7));
+
+$code.=<<___;
+#if	__ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7
+.fpu	neon
+
+.type	poly1305_init_neon,%function
+.align	5
+poly1305_init_neon:
+	ldr	r4,[$ctx,#20]		@ load key base 2^32
+	ldr	r5,[$ctx,#24]
+	ldr	r6,[$ctx,#28]
+	ldr	r7,[$ctx,#32]
+
+	and	r2,r4,#0x03ffffff	@ base 2^32 -> base 2^26
+	mov	r3,r4,lsr#26
+	mov	r4,r5,lsr#20
+	orr	r3,r3,r5,lsl#6
+	mov	r5,r6,lsr#14
+	orr	r4,r4,r6,lsl#12
+	mov	r6,r7,lsr#8
+	orr	r5,r5,r7,lsl#18
+	and	r3,r3,#0x03ffffff
+	and	r4,r4,#0x03ffffff
+	and	r5,r5,#0x03ffffff
+
+	vdup.32	$R0,r2			@ r^1 in both lanes
+	add	r2,r3,r3,lsl#2		@ *5
+	vdup.32	$R1,r3
+	add	r3,r4,r4,lsl#2
+	vdup.32	$S1,r2
+	vdup.32	$R2,r4
+	add	r4,r5,r5,lsl#2
+	vdup.32	$S2,r3
+	vdup.32	$R3,r5
+	add	r5,r6,r6,lsl#2
+	vdup.32	$S3,r4
+	vdup.32	$R4,r6
+	vdup.32	$S4,r5
+
+	mov	$zeros,#2		@ counter
+
+.Lsquare_neon:
+	@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
+	@ d0 = h0*r0 + h4*5*r1 + h3*5*r2 + h2*5*r3 + h1*5*r4
+	@ d1 = h1*r0 + h0*r1   + h4*5*r2 + h3*5*r3 + h2*5*r4
+	@ d2 = h2*r0 + h1*r1   + h0*r2   + h4*5*r3 + h3*5*r4
+	@ d3 = h3*r0 + h2*r1   + h1*r2   + h0*r3   + h4*5*r4
+	@ d4 = h4*r0 + h3*r1   + h2*r2   + h1*r3   + h0*r4
+
+	vmull.u32	$D0,$R0,${R0}[1]
+	vmull.u32	$D1,$R1,${R0}[1]
+	vmull.u32	$D2,$R2,${R0}[1]
+	vmull.u32	$D3,$R3,${R0}[1]
+	vmull.u32	$D4,$R4,${R0}[1]
+
+	vmlal.u32	$D0,$R4,${S1}[1]
+	vmlal.u32	$D1,$R0,${R1}[1]
+	vmlal.u32	$D2,$R1,${R1}[1]
+	vmlal.u32	$D3,$R2,${R1}[1]
+	vmlal.u32	$D4,$R3,${R1}[1]
+
+	vmlal.u32	$D0,$R3,${S2}[1]
+	vmlal.u32	$D1,$R4,${S2}[1]
+	vmlal.u32	$D3,$R1,${R2}[1]
+	vmlal.u32	$D2,$R0,${R2}[1]
+	vmlal.u32	$D4,$R2,${R2}[1]
+
+	vmlal.u32	$D0,$R2,${S3}[1]
+	vmlal.u32	$D3,$R0,${R3}[1]
+	vmlal.u32	$D1,$R3,${S3}[1]
+	vmlal.u32	$D2,$R4,${S3}[1]
+	vmlal.u32	$D4,$R1,${R3}[1]
+
+	vmlal.u32	$D3,$R4,${S4}[1]
+	vmlal.u32	$D0,$R1,${S4}[1]
+	vmlal.u32	$D1,$R2,${S4}[1]
+	vmlal.u32	$D2,$R3,${S4}[1]
+	vmlal.u32	$D4,$R0,${R4}[1]
+
+	@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
+	@ lazy reduction as discussed in "NEON crypto" by D.J. Bernstein
+	@ and P. Schwabe
+	@
+	@ H0>>+H1>>+H2>>+H3>>+H4
+	@ H3>>+H4>>*5+H0>>+H1
+	@
+	@ Trivia.
+	@
+	@ Result of multiplication of n-bit number by m-bit number is
+	@ n+m bits wide. However! Even though 2^n is a n+1-bit number,
+	@ m-bit number multiplied by 2^n is still n+m bits wide.
+	@
+	@ Sum of two n-bit numbers is n+1 bits wide, sum of three - n+2,
+	@ and so is sum of four. Sum of 2^m n-m-bit numbers and n-bit
+	@ one is n+1 bits wide.
+	@
+	@ >>+ denotes Hnext += Hn>>26, Hn &= 0x3ffffff. This means that
+	@ H0, H2, H3 are guaranteed to be 26 bits wide, while H1 and H4
+	@ can be 27. However! In cases when their width exceeds 26 bits
+	@ they are limited by 2^26+2^6. This in turn means that *sum*
+	@ of the products with these values can still be viewed as sum
+	@ of 52-bit numbers as long as the amount of addends is not a
+	@ power of 2. For example,
+	@
+	@ H4 = H4*R0 + H3*R1 + H2*R2 + H1*R3 + H0 * R4,
+	@
+	@ which can't be larger than 5 * (2^26 + 2^6) * (2^26 + 2^6), or
+	@ 5 * (2^52 + 2*2^32 + 2^12), which in turn is smaller than
+	@ 8 * (2^52) or 2^55. However, the value is then multiplied by
+	@ by 5, so we should be looking at 5 * 5 * (2^52 + 2^33 + 2^12),
+	@ which is less than 32 * (2^52) or 2^57. And when processing
+	@ data we are looking at triple as many addends...
+	@
+	@ In key setup procedure pre-reduced H0 is limited by 5*4+1 and
+	@ 5*H4 - by 5*5 52-bit addends, or 57 bits. But when hashing the
+	@ input H0 is limited by (5*4+1)*3 addends, or 58 bits, while
+	@ 5*H4 by 5*5*3, or 59[!] bits. How is this relevant? vmlal.u32
+	@ instruction accepts 2x32-bit input and writes 2x64-bit result.
+	@ This means that result of reduction have to be compressed upon
+	@ loop wrap-around. This can be done in the process of reduction
+	@ to minimize amount of instructions [as well as amount of
+	@ 128-bit instructions, which benefits low-end processors], but
+	@ one has to watch for H2 (which is narrower than H0) and 5*H4
+	@ not being wider than 58 bits, so that result of right shift
+	@ by 26 bits fits in 32 bits. This is also useful on x86,
+	@ because it allows to use paddd in place for paddq, which
+	@ benefits Atom, where paddq is ridiculously slow.
+
+	vshr.u64	$T0,$D3,#26
+	vmovn.i64	$D3#lo,$D3
+	 vshr.u64	$T1,$D0,#26
+	 vmovn.i64	$D0#lo,$D0
+	vadd.i64	$D4,$D4,$T0		@ h3 -> h4
+	vbic.i32	$D3#lo,#0xfc000000	@ &=0x03ffffff
+	 vadd.i64	$D1,$D1,$T1		@ h0 -> h1
+	 vbic.i32	$D0#lo,#0xfc000000
+
+	vshrn.u64	$T0#lo,$D4,#26
+	vmovn.i64	$D4#lo,$D4
+	 vshr.u64	$T1,$D1,#26
+	 vmovn.i64	$D1#lo,$D1
+	 vadd.i64	$D2,$D2,$T1		@ h1 -> h2
+	vbic.i32	$D4#lo,#0xfc000000
+	 vbic.i32	$D1#lo,#0xfc000000
+
+	vadd.i32	$D0#lo,$D0#lo,$T0#lo
+	vshl.u32	$T0#lo,$T0#lo,#2
+	 vshrn.u64	$T1#lo,$D2,#26
+	 vmovn.i64	$D2#lo,$D2
+	vadd.i32	$D0#lo,$D0#lo,$T0#lo	@ h4 -> h0
+	 vadd.i32	$D3#lo,$D3#lo,$T1#lo	@ h2 -> h3
+	 vbic.i32	$D2#lo,#0xfc000000
+
+	vshr.u32	$T0#lo,$D0#lo,#26
+	vbic.i32	$D0#lo,#0xfc000000
+	 vshr.u32	$T1#lo,$D3#lo,#26
+	 vbic.i32	$D3#lo,#0xfc000000
+	vadd.i32	$D1#lo,$D1#lo,$T0#lo	@ h0 -> h1
+	 vadd.i32	$D4#lo,$D4#lo,$T1#lo	@ h3 -> h4
+
+	subs		$zeros,$zeros,#1
+	beq		.Lsquare_break_neon
+
+	add		$tbl0,$ctx,#(48+0*9*4)
+	add		$tbl1,$ctx,#(48+1*9*4)
+
+	vtrn.32		$R0,$D0#lo		@ r^2:r^1
+	vtrn.32		$R2,$D2#lo
+	vtrn.32		$R3,$D3#lo
+	vtrn.32		$R1,$D1#lo
+	vtrn.32		$R4,$D4#lo
+
+	vshl.u32	$S2,$R2,#2		@ *5
+	vshl.u32	$S3,$R3,#2
+	vshl.u32	$S1,$R1,#2
+	vshl.u32	$S4,$R4,#2
+	vadd.i32	$S2,$S2,$R2
+	vadd.i32	$S1,$S1,$R1
+	vadd.i32	$S3,$S3,$R3
+	vadd.i32	$S4,$S4,$R4
+
+	vst4.32		{${R0}[0],${R1}[0],${S1}[0],${R2}[0]},[$tbl0]!
+	vst4.32		{${R0}[1],${R1}[1],${S1}[1],${R2}[1]},[$tbl1]!
+	vst4.32		{${S2}[0],${R3}[0],${S3}[0],${R4}[0]},[$tbl0]!
+	vst4.32		{${S2}[1],${R3}[1],${S3}[1],${R4}[1]},[$tbl1]!
+	vst1.32		{${S4}[0]},[$tbl0,:32]
+	vst1.32		{${S4}[1]},[$tbl1,:32]
+
+	b		.Lsquare_neon
+
+.align	4
+.Lsquare_break_neon:
+	add		$tbl0,$ctx,#(48+2*4*9)
+	add		$tbl1,$ctx,#(48+3*4*9)
+
+	vmov		$R0,$D0#lo		@ r^4:r^3
+	vshl.u32	$S1,$D1#lo,#2		@ *5
+	vmov		$R1,$D1#lo
+	vshl.u32	$S2,$D2#lo,#2
+	vmov		$R2,$D2#lo
+	vshl.u32	$S3,$D3#lo,#2
+	vmov		$R3,$D3#lo
+	vshl.u32	$S4,$D4#lo,#2
+	vmov		$R4,$D4#lo
+	vadd.i32	$S1,$S1,$D1#lo
+	vadd.i32	$S2,$S2,$D2#lo
+	vadd.i32	$S3,$S3,$D3#lo
+	vadd.i32	$S4,$S4,$D4#lo
+
+	vst4.32		{${R0}[0],${R1}[0],${S1}[0],${R2}[0]},[$tbl0]!
+	vst4.32		{${R0}[1],${R1}[1],${S1}[1],${R2}[1]},[$tbl1]!
+	vst4.32		{${S2}[0],${R3}[0],${S3}[0],${R4}[0]},[$tbl0]!
+	vst4.32		{${S2}[1],${R3}[1],${S3}[1],${R4}[1]},[$tbl1]!
+	vst1.32		{${S4}[0]},[$tbl0]
+	vst1.32		{${S4}[1]},[$tbl1]
+
+	ret				@ bx	lr
+.size	poly1305_init_neon,.-poly1305_init_neon
+
+.type	poly1305_blocks_neon,%function
+.align	5
+poly1305_blocks_neon:
+	ldr	ip,[$ctx,#36]		@ is_base2_26
+	ands	$len,$len,#-16
+	beq	.Lno_data_neon
+
+	cmp	$len,#64
+	bhs	.Lenter_neon
+	tst	ip,ip			@ is_base2_26?
+	beq	poly1305_blocks
+
+.Lenter_neon:
+	stmdb	sp!,{r4-r7}
+	vstmdb	sp!,{d8-d15}		@ ABI specification says so
+
+	tst	ip,ip			@ is_base2_26?
+	bne	.Lbase2_26_neon
+
+	stmdb	sp!,{r1-r3,lr}
+	bl	poly1305_init_neon
+
+	ldr	r4,[$ctx,#0]		@ load hash value base 2^32
+	ldr	r5,[$ctx,#4]
+	ldr	r6,[$ctx,#8]
+	ldr	r7,[$ctx,#12]
+	ldr	ip,[$ctx,#16]
+
+	and	r2,r4,#0x03ffffff	@ base 2^32 -> base 2^26
+	mov	r3,r4,lsr#26
+	 veor	$D0#lo,$D0#lo,$D0#lo
+	mov	r4,r5,lsr#20
+	orr	r3,r3,r5,lsl#6
+	 veor	$D1#lo,$D1#lo,$D1#lo
+	mov	r5,r6,lsr#14
+	orr	r4,r4,r6,lsl#12
+	 veor	$D2#lo,$D2#lo,$D2#lo
+	mov	r6,r7,lsr#8
+	orr	r5,r5,r7,lsl#18
+	 veor	$D3#lo,$D3#lo,$D3#lo
+	and	r3,r3,#0x03ffffff
+	orr	r6,r6,ip,lsl#24
+	 veor	$D4#lo,$D4#lo,$D4#lo
+	and	r4,r4,#0x03ffffff
+	mov	r1,#1
+	and	r5,r5,#0x03ffffff
+	str	r1,[$ctx,#36]		@ is_base2_26
+
+	vmov.32	$D0#lo[0],r2
+	vmov.32	$D1#lo[0],r3
+	vmov.32	$D2#lo[0],r4
+	vmov.32	$D3#lo[0],r5
+	vmov.32	$D4#lo[0],r6
+	adr	$zeros,.Lzeros
+
+	ldmia	sp!,{r1-r3,lr}
+	b	.Lbase2_32_neon
+
+.align	4
+.Lbase2_26_neon:
+	@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
+	@ load hash value
+
+	veor		$D0#lo,$D0#lo,$D0#lo
+	veor		$D1#lo,$D1#lo,$D1#lo
+	veor		$D2#lo,$D2#lo,$D2#lo
+	veor		$D3#lo,$D3#lo,$D3#lo
+	veor		$D4#lo,$D4#lo,$D4#lo
+	vld4.32		{$D0#lo[0],$D1#lo[0],$D2#lo[0],$D3#lo[0]},[$ctx]!
+	adr		$zeros,.Lzeros
+	vld1.32		{$D4#lo[0]},[$ctx]
+	sub		$ctx,$ctx,#16		@ rewind
+
+.Lbase2_32_neon:
+	add		$in2,$inp,#32
+	mov		$padbit,$padbit,lsl#24
+	tst		$len,#31
+	beq		.Leven
+
+	vld4.32		{$H0#lo[0],$H1#lo[0],$H2#lo[0],$H3#lo[0]},[$inp]!
+	vmov.32		$H4#lo[0],$padbit
+	sub		$len,$len,#16
+	add		$in2,$inp,#32
+
+# ifdef	__ARMEB__
+	vrev32.8	$H0,$H0
+	vrev32.8	$H3,$H3
+	vrev32.8	$H1,$H1
+	vrev32.8	$H2,$H2
+# endif
+	vsri.u32	$H4#lo,$H3#lo,#8	@ base 2^32 -> base 2^26
+	vshl.u32	$H3#lo,$H3#lo,#18
+
+	vsri.u32	$H3#lo,$H2#lo,#14
+	vshl.u32	$H2#lo,$H2#lo,#12
+	vadd.i32	$H4#hi,$H4#lo,$D4#lo	@ add hash value and move to #hi
+
+	vbic.i32	$H3#lo,#0xfc000000
+	vsri.u32	$H2#lo,$H1#lo,#20
+	vshl.u32	$H1#lo,$H1#lo,#6
+
+	vbic.i32	$H2#lo,#0xfc000000
+	vsri.u32	$H1#lo,$H0#lo,#26
+	vadd.i32	$H3#hi,$H3#lo,$D3#lo
+
+	vbic.i32	$H0#lo,#0xfc000000
+	vbic.i32	$H1#lo,#0xfc000000
+	vadd.i32	$H2#hi,$H2#lo,$D2#lo
+
+	vadd.i32	$H0#hi,$H0#lo,$D0#lo
+	vadd.i32	$H1#hi,$H1#lo,$D1#lo
+
+	mov		$tbl1,$zeros
+	add		$tbl0,$ctx,#48
+
+	cmp		$len,$len
+	b		.Long_tail
+
+.align	4
+.Leven:
+	subs		$len,$len,#64
+	it		lo
+	movlo		$in2,$zeros
+
+	vmov.i32	$H4,#1<<24		@ padbit, yes, always
+	vld4.32		{$H0#lo,$H1#lo,$H2#lo,$H3#lo},[$inp]	@ inp[0:1]
+	add		$inp,$inp,#64
+	vld4.32		{$H0#hi,$H1#hi,$H2#hi,$H3#hi},[$in2]	@ inp[2:3] (or 0)
+	add		$in2,$in2,#64
+	itt		hi
+	addhi		$tbl1,$ctx,#(48+1*9*4)
+	addhi		$tbl0,$ctx,#(48+3*9*4)
+
+# ifdef	__ARMEB__
+	vrev32.8	$H0,$H0
+	vrev32.8	$H3,$H3
+	vrev32.8	$H1,$H1
+	vrev32.8	$H2,$H2
+# endif
+	vsri.u32	$H4,$H3,#8		@ base 2^32 -> base 2^26
+	vshl.u32	$H3,$H3,#18
+
+	vsri.u32	$H3,$H2,#14
+	vshl.u32	$H2,$H2,#12
+
+	vbic.i32	$H3,#0xfc000000
+	vsri.u32	$H2,$H1,#20
+	vshl.u32	$H1,$H1,#6
+
+	vbic.i32	$H2,#0xfc000000
+	vsri.u32	$H1,$H0,#26
+
+	vbic.i32	$H0,#0xfc000000
+	vbic.i32	$H1,#0xfc000000
+
+	bls		.Lskip_loop
+
+	vld4.32		{${R0}[1],${R1}[1],${S1}[1],${R2}[1]},[$tbl1]!	@ load r^2
+	vld4.32		{${R0}[0],${R1}[0],${S1}[0],${R2}[0]},[$tbl0]!	@ load r^4
+	vld4.32		{${S2}[1],${R3}[1],${S3}[1],${R4}[1]},[$tbl1]!
+	vld4.32		{${S2}[0],${R3}[0],${S3}[0],${R4}[0]},[$tbl0]!
+	b		.Loop_neon
+
+.align	5
+.Loop_neon:
+	@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
+	@ ((inp[0]*r^4+inp[2]*r^2+inp[4])*r^4+inp[6]*r^2
+	@ ((inp[1]*r^4+inp[3]*r^2+inp[5])*r^3+inp[7]*r
+	@   \___________________/
+	@ ((inp[0]*r^4+inp[2]*r^2+inp[4])*r^4+inp[6]*r^2+inp[8])*r^2
+	@ ((inp[1]*r^4+inp[3]*r^2+inp[5])*r^4+inp[7]*r^2+inp[9])*r
+	@   \___________________/ \____________________/
+	@
+	@ Note that we start with inp[2:3]*r^2. This is because it
+	@ doesn't depend on reduction in previous iteration.
+	@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
+	@ d4 = h4*r0 + h3*r1   + h2*r2   + h1*r3   + h0*r4
+	@ d3 = h3*r0 + h2*r1   + h1*r2   + h0*r3   + h4*5*r4
+	@ d2 = h2*r0 + h1*r1   + h0*r2   + h4*5*r3 + h3*5*r4
+	@ d1 = h1*r0 + h0*r1   + h4*5*r2 + h3*5*r3 + h2*5*r4
+	@ d0 = h0*r0 + h4*5*r1 + h3*5*r2 + h2*5*r3 + h1*5*r4
+
+	@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
+	@ inp[2:3]*r^2
+
+	vadd.i32	$H2#lo,$H2#lo,$D2#lo	@ accumulate inp[0:1]
+	vmull.u32	$D2,$H2#hi,${R0}[1]
+	vadd.i32	$H0#lo,$H0#lo,$D0#lo
+	vmull.u32	$D0,$H0#hi,${R0}[1]
+	vadd.i32	$H3#lo,$H3#lo,$D3#lo
+	vmull.u32	$D3,$H3#hi,${R0}[1]
+	vmlal.u32	$D2,$H1#hi,${R1}[1]
+	vadd.i32	$H1#lo,$H1#lo,$D1#lo
+	vmull.u32	$D1,$H1#hi,${R0}[1]
+
+	vadd.i32	$H4#lo,$H4#lo,$D4#lo
+	vmull.u32	$D4,$H4#hi,${R0}[1]
+	subs		$len,$len,#64
+	vmlal.u32	$D0,$H4#hi,${S1}[1]
+	it		lo
+	movlo		$in2,$zeros
+	vmlal.u32	$D3,$H2#hi,${R1}[1]
+	vld1.32		${S4}[1],[$tbl1,:32]
+	vmlal.u32	$D1,$H0#hi,${R1}[1]
+	vmlal.u32	$D4,$H3#hi,${R1}[1]
+
+	vmlal.u32	$D0,$H3#hi,${S2}[1]
+	vmlal.u32	$D3,$H1#hi,${R2}[1]
+	vmlal.u32	$D4,$H2#hi,${R2}[1]
+	vmlal.u32	$D1,$H4#hi,${S2}[1]
+	vmlal.u32	$D2,$H0#hi,${R2}[1]
+
+	vmlal.u32	$D3,$H0#hi,${R3}[1]
+	vmlal.u32	$D0,$H2#hi,${S3}[1]
+	vmlal.u32	$D4,$H1#hi,${R3}[1]
+	vmlal.u32	$D1,$H3#hi,${S3}[1]
+	vmlal.u32	$D2,$H4#hi,${S3}[1]
+
+	vmlal.u32	$D3,$H4#hi,${S4}[1]
+	vmlal.u32	$D0,$H1#hi,${S4}[1]
+	vmlal.u32	$D4,$H0#hi,${R4}[1]
+	vmlal.u32	$D1,$H2#hi,${S4}[1]
+	vmlal.u32	$D2,$H3#hi,${S4}[1]
+
+	vld4.32		{$H0#hi,$H1#hi,$H2#hi,$H3#hi},[$in2]	@ inp[2:3] (or 0)
+	add		$in2,$in2,#64
+
+	@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
+	@ (hash+inp[0:1])*r^4 and accumulate
+
+	vmlal.u32	$D3,$H3#lo,${R0}[0]
+	vmlal.u32	$D0,$H0#lo,${R0}[0]
+	vmlal.u32	$D4,$H4#lo,${R0}[0]
+	vmlal.u32	$D1,$H1#lo,${R0}[0]
+	vmlal.u32	$D2,$H2#lo,${R0}[0]
+	vld1.32		${S4}[0],[$tbl0,:32]
+
+	vmlal.u32	$D3,$H2#lo,${R1}[0]
+	vmlal.u32	$D0,$H4#lo,${S1}[0]
+	vmlal.u32	$D4,$H3#lo,${R1}[0]
+	vmlal.u32	$D1,$H0#lo,${R1}[0]
+	vmlal.u32	$D2,$H1#lo,${R1}[0]
+
+	vmlal.u32	$D3,$H1#lo,${R2}[0]
+	vmlal.u32	$D0,$H3#lo,${S2}[0]
+	vmlal.u32	$D4,$H2#lo,${R2}[0]
+	vmlal.u32	$D1,$H4#lo,${S2}[0]
+	vmlal.u32	$D2,$H0#lo,${R2}[0]
+
+	vmlal.u32	$D3,$H0#lo,${R3}[0]
+	vmlal.u32	$D0,$H2#lo,${S3}[0]
+	vmlal.u32	$D4,$H1#lo,${R3}[0]
+	vmlal.u32	$D1,$H3#lo,${S3}[0]
+	vmlal.u32	$D3,$H4#lo,${S4}[0]
+
+	vmlal.u32	$D2,$H4#lo,${S3}[0]
+	vmlal.u32	$D0,$H1#lo,${S4}[0]
+	vmlal.u32	$D4,$H0#lo,${R4}[0]
+	vmov.i32	$H4,#1<<24		@ padbit, yes, always
+	vmlal.u32	$D1,$H2#lo,${S4}[0]
+	vmlal.u32	$D2,$H3#lo,${S4}[0]
+
+	vld4.32		{$H0#lo,$H1#lo,$H2#lo,$H3#lo},[$inp]	@ inp[0:1]
+	add		$inp,$inp,#64
+# ifdef	__ARMEB__
+	vrev32.8	$H0,$H0
+	vrev32.8	$H1,$H1
+	vrev32.8	$H2,$H2
+	vrev32.8	$H3,$H3
+# endif
+
+	@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
+	@ lazy reduction interleaved with base 2^32 -> base 2^26 of
+	@ inp[0:3] previously loaded to $H0-$H3 and smashed to $H0-$H4.
+
+	vshr.u64	$T0,$D3,#26
+	vmovn.i64	$D3#lo,$D3
+	 vshr.u64	$T1,$D0,#26
+	 vmovn.i64	$D0#lo,$D0
+	vadd.i64	$D4,$D4,$T0		@ h3 -> h4
+	vbic.i32	$D3#lo,#0xfc000000
+	  vsri.u32	$H4,$H3,#8		@ base 2^32 -> base 2^26
+	 vadd.i64	$D1,$D1,$T1		@ h0 -> h1
+	  vshl.u32	$H3,$H3,#18
+	 vbic.i32	$D0#lo,#0xfc000000
+
+	vshrn.u64	$T0#lo,$D4,#26
+	vmovn.i64	$D4#lo,$D4
+	 vshr.u64	$T1,$D1,#26
+	 vmovn.i64	$D1#lo,$D1
+	 vadd.i64	$D2,$D2,$T1		@ h1 -> h2
+	  vsri.u32	$H3,$H2,#14
+	vbic.i32	$D4#lo,#0xfc000000
+	  vshl.u32	$H2,$H2,#12
+	 vbic.i32	$D1#lo,#0xfc000000
+
+	vadd.i32	$D0#lo,$D0#lo,$T0#lo
+	vshl.u32	$T0#lo,$T0#lo,#2
+	  vbic.i32	$H3,#0xfc000000
+	 vshrn.u64	$T1#lo,$D2,#26
+	 vmovn.i64	$D2#lo,$D2
+	vaddl.u32	$D0,$D0#lo,$T0#lo	@ h4 -> h0 [widen for a sec]
+	  vsri.u32	$H2,$H1,#20
+	 vadd.i32	$D3#lo,$D3#lo,$T1#lo	@ h2 -> h3
+	  vshl.u32	$H1,$H1,#6
+	 vbic.i32	$D2#lo,#0xfc000000
+	  vbic.i32	$H2,#0xfc000000
+
+	vshrn.u64	$T0#lo,$D0,#26		@ re-narrow
+	vmovn.i64	$D0#lo,$D0
+	  vsri.u32	$H1,$H0,#26
+	  vbic.i32	$H0,#0xfc000000
+	 vshr.u32	$T1#lo,$D3#lo,#26
+	 vbic.i32	$D3#lo,#0xfc000000
+	vbic.i32	$D0#lo,#0xfc000000
+	vadd.i32	$D1#lo,$D1#lo,$T0#lo	@ h0 -> h1
+	 vadd.i32	$D4#lo,$D4#lo,$T1#lo	@ h3 -> h4
+	  vbic.i32	$H1,#0xfc000000
+
+	bhi		.Loop_neon
+
+.Lskip_loop:
+	@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
+	@ multiply (inp[0:1]+hash) or inp[2:3] by r^2:r^1
+
+	add		$tbl1,$ctx,#(48+0*9*4)
+	add		$tbl0,$ctx,#(48+1*9*4)
+	adds		$len,$len,#32
+	it		ne
+	movne		$len,#0
+	bne		.Long_tail
+
+	vadd.i32	$H2#hi,$H2#lo,$D2#lo	@ add hash value and move to #hi
+	vadd.i32	$H0#hi,$H0#lo,$D0#lo
+	vadd.i32	$H3#hi,$H3#lo,$D3#lo
+	vadd.i32	$H1#hi,$H1#lo,$D1#lo
+	vadd.i32	$H4#hi,$H4#lo,$D4#lo
+
+.Long_tail:
+	vld4.32		{${R0}[1],${R1}[1],${S1}[1],${R2}[1]},[$tbl1]!	@ load r^1
+	vld4.32		{${R0}[0],${R1}[0],${S1}[0],${R2}[0]},[$tbl0]!	@ load r^2
+
+	vadd.i32	$H2#lo,$H2#lo,$D2#lo	@ can be redundant
+	vmull.u32	$D2,$H2#hi,$R0
+	vadd.i32	$H0#lo,$H0#lo,$D0#lo
+	vmull.u32	$D0,$H0#hi,$R0
+	vadd.i32	$H3#lo,$H3#lo,$D3#lo
+	vmull.u32	$D3,$H3#hi,$R0
+	vadd.i32	$H1#lo,$H1#lo,$D1#lo
+	vmull.u32	$D1,$H1#hi,$R0
+	vadd.i32	$H4#lo,$H4#lo,$D4#lo
+	vmull.u32	$D4,$H4#hi,$R0
+
+	vmlal.u32	$D0,$H4#hi,$S1
+	vld4.32		{${S2}[1],${R3}[1],${S3}[1],${R4}[1]},[$tbl1]!
+	vmlal.u32	$D3,$H2#hi,$R1
+	vld4.32		{${S2}[0],${R3}[0],${S3}[0],${R4}[0]},[$tbl0]!
+	vmlal.u32	$D1,$H0#hi,$R1
+	vmlal.u32	$D4,$H3#hi,$R1
+	vmlal.u32	$D2,$H1#hi,$R1
+
+	vmlal.u32	$D3,$H1#hi,$R2
+	vld1.32		${S4}[1],[$tbl1,:32]
+	vmlal.u32	$D0,$H3#hi,$S2
+	vld1.32		${S4}[0],[$tbl0,:32]
+	vmlal.u32	$D4,$H2#hi,$R2
+	vmlal.u32	$D1,$H4#hi,$S2
+	vmlal.u32	$D2,$H0#hi,$R2
+
+	vmlal.u32	$D3,$H0#hi,$R3
+	 it		ne
+	 addne		$tbl1,$ctx,#(48+2*9*4)
+	vmlal.u32	$D0,$H2#hi,$S3
+	 it		ne
+	 addne		$tbl0,$ctx,#(48+3*9*4)
+	vmlal.u32	$D4,$H1#hi,$R3
+	vmlal.u32	$D1,$H3#hi,$S3
+	vmlal.u32	$D2,$H4#hi,$S3
+
+	vmlal.u32	$D3,$H4#hi,$S4
+	 vorn		$MASK,$MASK,$MASK	@ all-ones, can be redundant
+	vmlal.u32	$D0,$H1#hi,$S4
+	 vshr.u64	$MASK,$MASK,#38
+	vmlal.u32	$D4,$H0#hi,$R4
+	vmlal.u32	$D1,$H2#hi,$S4
+	vmlal.u32	$D2,$H3#hi,$S4
+
+	beq		.Lshort_tail
+
+	@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
+	@ (hash+inp[0:1])*r^4:r^3 and accumulate
+
+	vld4.32		{${R0}[1],${R1}[1],${S1}[1],${R2}[1]},[$tbl1]!	@ load r^3
+	vld4.32		{${R0}[0],${R1}[0],${S1}[0],${R2}[0]},[$tbl0]!	@ load r^4
+
+	vmlal.u32	$D2,$H2#lo,$R0
+	vmlal.u32	$D0,$H0#lo,$R0
+	vmlal.u32	$D3,$H3#lo,$R0
+	vmlal.u32	$D1,$H1#lo,$R0
+	vmlal.u32	$D4,$H4#lo,$R0
+
+	vmlal.u32	$D0,$H4#lo,$S1
+	vld4.32		{${S2}[1],${R3}[1],${S3}[1],${R4}[1]},[$tbl1]!
+	vmlal.u32	$D3,$H2#lo,$R1
+	vld4.32		{${S2}[0],${R3}[0],${S3}[0],${R4}[0]},[$tbl0]!
+	vmlal.u32	$D1,$H0#lo,$R1
+	vmlal.u32	$D4,$H3#lo,$R1
+	vmlal.u32	$D2,$H1#lo,$R1
+
+	vmlal.u32	$D3,$H1#lo,$R2
+	vld1.32		${S4}[1],[$tbl1,:32]
+	vmlal.u32	$D0,$H3#lo,$S2
+	vld1.32		${S4}[0],[$tbl0,:32]
+	vmlal.u32	$D4,$H2#lo,$R2
+	vmlal.u32	$D1,$H4#lo,$S2
+	vmlal.u32	$D2,$H0#lo,$R2
+
+	vmlal.u32	$D3,$H0#lo,$R3
+	vmlal.u32	$D0,$H2#lo,$S3
+	vmlal.u32	$D4,$H1#lo,$R3
+	vmlal.u32	$D1,$H3#lo,$S3
+	vmlal.u32	$D2,$H4#lo,$S3
+
+	vmlal.u32	$D3,$H4#lo,$S4
+	 vorn		$MASK,$MASK,$MASK	@ all-ones
+	vmlal.u32	$D0,$H1#lo,$S4
+	 vshr.u64	$MASK,$MASK,#38
+	vmlal.u32	$D4,$H0#lo,$R4
+	vmlal.u32	$D1,$H2#lo,$S4
+	vmlal.u32	$D2,$H3#lo,$S4
+
+.Lshort_tail:
+	@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
+	@ horizontal addition
+
+	vadd.i64	$D3#lo,$D3#lo,$D3#hi
+	vadd.i64	$D0#lo,$D0#lo,$D0#hi
+	vadd.i64	$D4#lo,$D4#lo,$D4#hi
+	vadd.i64	$D1#lo,$D1#lo,$D1#hi
+	vadd.i64	$D2#lo,$D2#lo,$D2#hi
+
+	@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
+	@ lazy reduction, but without narrowing
+
+	vshr.u64	$T0,$D3,#26
+	vand.i64	$D3,$D3,$MASK
+	 vshr.u64	$T1,$D0,#26
+	 vand.i64	$D0,$D0,$MASK
+	vadd.i64	$D4,$D4,$T0		@ h3 -> h4
+	 vadd.i64	$D1,$D1,$T1		@ h0 -> h1
+
+	vshr.u64	$T0,$D4,#26
+	vand.i64	$D4,$D4,$MASK
+	 vshr.u64	$T1,$D1,#26
+	 vand.i64	$D1,$D1,$MASK
+	 vadd.i64	$D2,$D2,$T1		@ h1 -> h2
+
+	vadd.i64	$D0,$D0,$T0
+	vshl.u64	$T0,$T0,#2
+	 vshr.u64	$T1,$D2,#26
+	 vand.i64	$D2,$D2,$MASK
+	vadd.i64	$D0,$D0,$T0		@ h4 -> h0
+	 vadd.i64	$D3,$D3,$T1		@ h2 -> h3
+
+	vshr.u64	$T0,$D0,#26
+	vand.i64	$D0,$D0,$MASK
+	 vshr.u64	$T1,$D3,#26
+	 vand.i64	$D3,$D3,$MASK
+	vadd.i64	$D1,$D1,$T0		@ h0 -> h1
+	 vadd.i64	$D4,$D4,$T1		@ h3 -> h4
+
+	cmp		$len,#0
+	bne		.Leven
+
+	@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
+	@ store hash value
+
+	vst4.32		{$D0#lo[0],$D1#lo[0],$D2#lo[0],$D3#lo[0]},[$ctx]!
+	vst1.32		{$D4#lo[0]},[$ctx]
+
+	vldmia	sp!,{d8-d15}			@ epilogue
+	ldmia	sp!,{r4-r7}
+.Lno_data_neon:
+	ret					@ bx	lr
+.size	poly1305_blocks_neon,.-poly1305_blocks_neon
+
+.type	poly1305_emit_neon,%function
+.align	5
+poly1305_emit_neon:
+	ldr	ip,[$ctx,#36]		@ is_base2_26
+
+	stmdb	sp!,{r4-r11}
+
+	tst	ip,ip
+	beq	.Lpoly1305_emit_enter
+
+	ldmia	$ctx,{$h0-$h4}
+	eor	$g0,$g0,$g0
+
+	adds	$h0,$h0,$h1,lsl#26	@ base 2^26 -> base 2^32
+	mov	$h1,$h1,lsr#6
+	adcs	$h1,$h1,$h2,lsl#20
+	mov	$h2,$h2,lsr#12
+	adcs	$h2,$h2,$h3,lsl#14
+	mov	$h3,$h3,lsr#18
+	adcs	$h3,$h3,$h4,lsl#8
+	adc	$h4,$g0,$h4,lsr#24	@ can be partially reduced ...
+
+	and	$g0,$h4,#-4		@ ... so reduce
+	and	$h4,$h3,#3
+	add	$g0,$g0,$g0,lsr#2	@ *= 5
+	adds	$h0,$h0,$g0
+	adcs	$h1,$h1,#0
+	adcs	$h2,$h2,#0
+	adcs	$h3,$h3,#0
+	adc	$h4,$h4,#0
+
+	adds	$g0,$h0,#5		@ compare to modulus
+	adcs	$g1,$h1,#0
+	adcs	$g2,$h2,#0
+	adcs	$g3,$h3,#0
+	adc	$g4,$h4,#0
+	tst	$g4,#4			@ did it carry/borrow?
+
+	it	ne
+	movne	$h0,$g0
+	ldr	$g0,[$nonce,#0]
+	it	ne
+	movne	$h1,$g1
+	ldr	$g1,[$nonce,#4]
+	it	ne
+	movne	$h2,$g2
+	ldr	$g2,[$nonce,#8]
+	it	ne
+	movne	$h3,$g3
+	ldr	$g3,[$nonce,#12]
+
+	adds	$h0,$h0,$g0		@ accumulate nonce
+	adcs	$h1,$h1,$g1
+	adcs	$h2,$h2,$g2
+	adc	$h3,$h3,$g3
+
+# ifdef __ARMEB__
+	rev	$h0,$h0
+	rev	$h1,$h1
+	rev	$h2,$h2
+	rev	$h3,$h3
+# endif
+	str	$h0,[$mac,#0]		@ store the result
+	str	$h1,[$mac,#4]
+	str	$h2,[$mac,#8]
+	str	$h3,[$mac,#12]
+
+	ldmia	sp!,{r4-r11}
+	ret				@ bx	lr
+.size	poly1305_emit_neon,.-poly1305_emit_neon
+
+.align	5
+.Lzeros:
+.long	0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0
+.LOPENSSL_armcap:
+.word	OPENSSL_armcap_P-.Lpoly1305_init
+#endif
+___
+}	}
+$code.=<<___;
+.asciz	"Poly1305 for ARMv4/NEON, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+.align	2
+#if	__ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7
+.comm   OPENSSL_armcap_P,4,4
+#endif
+___
+
+foreach (split("\n",$code)) {
+	s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/geo;
+
+	s/\bq([0-9]+)#(lo|hi)/sprintf "d%d",2*$1+($2 eq "hi")/geo	or
+	s/\bret\b/bx	lr/go						or
+	s/\bbx\s+lr\b/.word\t0xe12fff1e/go;	# make it possible to compile with -march=armv4
+
+	print $_,"\n";
+}
+close STDOUT; # enforce flush
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-armv8.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-armv8.pl
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..0fc8667
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-armv8.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,943 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# This module implements Poly1305 hash for ARMv8.
+#
+# June 2015
+#
+# Numbers are cycles per processed byte with poly1305_blocks alone.
+#
+#		IALU/gcc-4.9	NEON
+#
+# Apple A7	1.86/+5%	0.72
+# Cortex-A53	2.69/+58%	1.47
+# Cortex-A57	2.70/+7%	1.14
+# Denver	1.64/+50%	1.18(*)
+# X-Gene	2.13/+68%	2.27
+# Mongoose	1.77/+75%	1.12
+#
+# (*)	estimate based on resources availability is less than 1.0,
+#	i.e. measured result is worse than expected, presumably binary
+#	translator is not almighty;
+
+$flavour=shift;
+$output=shift;
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+( $xlate="${dir}arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
+( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
+die "can't locate arm-xlate.pl";
+
+open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output";
+*STDOUT=*OUT;
+
+my ($ctx,$inp,$len,$padbit) = map("x$_",(0..3));
+my ($mac,$nonce)=($inp,$len);
+
+my ($h0,$h1,$h2,$r0,$r1,$s1,$t0,$t1,$d0,$d1,$d2) = map("x$_",(4..14));
+
+$code.=<<___;
+#include "arm_arch.h"
+
+.text
+
+// forward "declarations" are required for Apple
+.extern	OPENSSL_armcap_P
+.globl	poly1305_blocks
+.globl	poly1305_emit
+
+.globl	poly1305_init
+.type	poly1305_init,%function
+.align	5
+poly1305_init:
+	cmp	$inp,xzr
+	stp	xzr,xzr,[$ctx]		// zero hash value
+	stp	xzr,xzr,[$ctx,#16]	// [along with is_base2_26]
+
+	csel	x0,xzr,x0,eq
+	b.eq	.Lno_key
+
+#ifdef	__ILP32__
+	ldrsw	$t1,.LOPENSSL_armcap_P
+#else
+	ldr	$t1,.LOPENSSL_armcap_P
+#endif
+	adr	$t0,.LOPENSSL_armcap_P
+
+	ldp	$r0,$r1,[$inp]		// load key
+	mov	$s1,#0xfffffffc0fffffff
+	movk	$s1,#0x0fff,lsl#48
+	ldr	w17,[$t0,$t1]
+#ifdef	__ARMEB__
+	rev	$r0,$r0			// flip bytes
+	rev	$r1,$r1
+#endif
+	and	$r0,$r0,$s1		// &=0ffffffc0fffffff
+	and	$s1,$s1,#-4
+	and	$r1,$r1,$s1		// &=0ffffffc0ffffffc
+	stp	$r0,$r1,[$ctx,#32]	// save key value
+
+	tst	w17,#ARMV7_NEON
+
+	adr	$d0,poly1305_blocks
+	adr	$r0,poly1305_blocks_neon
+	adr	$d1,poly1305_emit
+	adr	$r1,poly1305_emit_neon
+
+	csel	$d0,$d0,$r0,eq
+	csel	$d1,$d1,$r1,eq
+
+#ifdef	__ILP32__
+	stp	w12,w13,[$len]
+#else
+	stp	$d0,$d1,[$len]
+#endif
+
+	mov	x0,#1
+.Lno_key:
+	ret
+.size	poly1305_init,.-poly1305_init
+
+.type	poly1305_blocks,%function
+.align	5
+poly1305_blocks:
+	ands	$len,$len,#-16
+	b.eq	.Lno_data
+
+	ldp	$h0,$h1,[$ctx]		// load hash value
+	ldp	$r0,$r1,[$ctx,#32]	// load key value
+	ldr	$h2,[$ctx,#16]
+	add	$s1,$r1,$r1,lsr#2	// s1 = r1 + (r1 >> 2)
+	b	.Loop
+
+.align	5
+.Loop:
+	ldp	$t0,$t1,[$inp],#16	// load input
+	sub	$len,$len,#16
+#ifdef	__ARMEB__
+	rev	$t0,$t0
+	rev	$t1,$t1
+#endif
+	adds	$h0,$h0,$t0		// accumulate input
+	adcs	$h1,$h1,$t1
+
+	mul	$d0,$h0,$r0		// h0*r0
+	adc	$h2,$h2,$padbit
+	umulh	$d1,$h0,$r0
+
+	mul	$t0,$h1,$s1		// h1*5*r1
+	umulh	$t1,$h1,$s1
+
+	adds	$d0,$d0,$t0
+	mul	$t0,$h0,$r1		// h0*r1
+	adc	$d1,$d1,$t1
+	umulh	$d2,$h0,$r1
+
+	adds	$d1,$d1,$t0
+	mul	$t0,$h1,$r0		// h1*r0
+	adc	$d2,$d2,xzr
+	umulh	$t1,$h1,$r0
+
+	adds	$d1,$d1,$t0
+	mul	$t0,$h2,$s1		// h2*5*r1
+	adc	$d2,$d2,$t1
+	mul	$t1,$h2,$r0		// h2*r0
+
+	adds	$d1,$d1,$t0
+	adc	$d2,$d2,$t1
+
+	and	$t0,$d2,#-4		// final reduction
+	and	$h2,$d2,#3
+	add	$t0,$t0,$d2,lsr#2
+	adds	$h0,$d0,$t0
+	adcs	$h1,$d1,xzr
+	adc	$h2,$h2,xzr
+
+	cbnz	$len,.Loop
+
+	stp	$h0,$h1,[$ctx]		// store hash value
+	str	$h2,[$ctx,#16]
+
+.Lno_data:
+	ret
+.size	poly1305_blocks,.-poly1305_blocks
+
+.type	poly1305_emit,%function
+.align	5
+poly1305_emit:
+	ldp	$h0,$h1,[$ctx]		// load hash base 2^64
+	ldr	$h2,[$ctx,#16]
+	ldp	$t0,$t1,[$nonce]	// load nonce
+
+	adds	$d0,$h0,#5		// compare to modulus
+	adcs	$d1,$h1,xzr
+	adc	$d2,$h2,xzr
+
+	tst	$d2,#-4			// see if it's carried/borrowed
+
+	csel	$h0,$h0,$d0,eq
+	csel	$h1,$h1,$d1,eq
+
+#ifdef	__ARMEB__
+	ror	$t0,$t0,#32		// flip nonce words
+	ror	$t1,$t1,#32
+#endif
+	adds	$h0,$h0,$t0		// accumulate nonce
+	adc	$h1,$h1,$t1
+#ifdef	__ARMEB__
+	rev	$h0,$h0			// flip output bytes
+	rev	$h1,$h1
+#endif
+	stp	$h0,$h1,[$mac]		// write result
+
+	ret
+.size	poly1305_emit,.-poly1305_emit
+___
+my ($R0,$R1,$S1,$R2,$S2,$R3,$S3,$R4,$S4) = map("v$_.4s",(0..8));
+my ($IN01_0,$IN01_1,$IN01_2,$IN01_3,$IN01_4) = map("v$_.2s",(9..13));
+my ($IN23_0,$IN23_1,$IN23_2,$IN23_3,$IN23_4) = map("v$_.2s",(14..18));
+my ($ACC0,$ACC1,$ACC2,$ACC3,$ACC4) = map("v$_.2d",(19..23));
+my ($H0,$H1,$H2,$H3,$H4) = map("v$_.2s",(24..28));
+my ($T0,$T1,$MASK) = map("v$_",(29..31));
+
+my ($in2,$zeros)=("x16","x17");
+my $is_base2_26 = $zeros;		# borrow
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.type	poly1305_mult,%function
+.align	5
+poly1305_mult:
+	mul	$d0,$h0,$r0		// h0*r0
+	umulh	$d1,$h0,$r0
+
+	mul	$t0,$h1,$s1		// h1*5*r1
+	umulh	$t1,$h1,$s1
+
+	adds	$d0,$d0,$t0
+	mul	$t0,$h0,$r1		// h0*r1
+	adc	$d1,$d1,$t1
+	umulh	$d2,$h0,$r1
+
+	adds	$d1,$d1,$t0
+	mul	$t0,$h1,$r0		// h1*r0
+	adc	$d2,$d2,xzr
+	umulh	$t1,$h1,$r0
+
+	adds	$d1,$d1,$t0
+	mul	$t0,$h2,$s1		// h2*5*r1
+	adc	$d2,$d2,$t1
+	mul	$t1,$h2,$r0		// h2*r0
+
+	adds	$d1,$d1,$t0
+	adc	$d2,$d2,$t1
+
+	and	$t0,$d2,#-4		// final reduction
+	and	$h2,$d2,#3
+	add	$t0,$t0,$d2,lsr#2
+	adds	$h0,$d0,$t0
+	adcs	$h1,$d1,xzr
+	adc	$h2,$h2,xzr
+
+	ret
+.size	poly1305_mult,.-poly1305_mult
+
+.type	poly1305_splat,%function
+.align	5
+poly1305_splat:
+	and	x12,$h0,#0x03ffffff	// base 2^64 -> base 2^26
+	ubfx	x13,$h0,#26,#26
+	extr	x14,$h1,$h0,#52
+	and	x14,x14,#0x03ffffff
+	ubfx	x15,$h1,#14,#26
+	extr	x16,$h2,$h1,#40
+
+	str	w12,[$ctx,#16*0]	// r0
+	add	w12,w13,w13,lsl#2	// r1*5
+	str	w13,[$ctx,#16*1]	// r1
+	add	w13,w14,w14,lsl#2	// r2*5
+	str	w12,[$ctx,#16*2]	// s1
+	str	w14,[$ctx,#16*3]	// r2
+	add	w14,w15,w15,lsl#2	// r3*5
+	str	w13,[$ctx,#16*4]	// s2
+	str	w15,[$ctx,#16*5]	// r3
+	add	w15,w16,w16,lsl#2	// r4*5
+	str	w14,[$ctx,#16*6]	// s3
+	str	w16,[$ctx,#16*7]	// r4
+	str	w15,[$ctx,#16*8]	// s4
+
+	ret
+.size	poly1305_splat,.-poly1305_splat
+
+.type	poly1305_blocks_neon,%function
+.align	5
+poly1305_blocks_neon:
+	ldr	$is_base2_26,[$ctx,#24]
+	cmp	$len,#128
+	b.hs	.Lblocks_neon
+	cbz	$is_base2_26,poly1305_blocks
+
+.Lblocks_neon:
+	stp	x29,x30,[sp,#-80]!
+	add	x29,sp,#0
+
+	ands	$len,$len,#-16
+	b.eq	.Lno_data_neon
+
+	cbz	$is_base2_26,.Lbase2_64_neon
+
+	ldp	w10,w11,[$ctx]		// load hash value base 2^26
+	ldp	w12,w13,[$ctx,#8]
+	ldr	w14,[$ctx,#16]
+
+	tst	$len,#31
+	b.eq	.Leven_neon
+
+	ldp	$r0,$r1,[$ctx,#32]	// load key value
+
+	add	$h0,x10,x11,lsl#26	// base 2^26 -> base 2^64
+	lsr	$h1,x12,#12
+	adds	$h0,$h0,x12,lsl#52
+	add	$h1,$h1,x13,lsl#14
+	adc	$h1,$h1,xzr
+	lsr	$h2,x14,#24
+	adds	$h1,$h1,x14,lsl#40
+	adc	$d2,$h2,xzr		// can be partially reduced...
+
+	ldp	$d0,$d1,[$inp],#16	// load input
+	sub	$len,$len,#16
+	add	$s1,$r1,$r1,lsr#2	// s1 = r1 + (r1 >> 2)
+
+	and	$t0,$d2,#-4		// ... so reduce
+	and	$h2,$d2,#3
+	add	$t0,$t0,$d2,lsr#2
+	adds	$h0,$h0,$t0
+	adcs	$h1,$h1,xzr
+	adc	$h2,$h2,xzr
+
+#ifdef	__ARMEB__
+	rev	$d0,$d0
+	rev	$d1,$d1
+#endif
+	adds	$h0,$h0,$d0		// accumulate input
+	adcs	$h1,$h1,$d1
+	adc	$h2,$h2,$padbit
+
+	bl	poly1305_mult
+	ldr	x30,[sp,#8]
+
+	cbz	$padbit,.Lstore_base2_64_neon
+
+	and	x10,$h0,#0x03ffffff	// base 2^64 -> base 2^26
+	ubfx	x11,$h0,#26,#26
+	extr	x12,$h1,$h0,#52
+	and	x12,x12,#0x03ffffff
+	ubfx	x13,$h1,#14,#26
+	extr	x14,$h2,$h1,#40
+
+	cbnz	$len,.Leven_neon
+
+	stp	w10,w11,[$ctx]		// store hash value base 2^26
+	stp	w12,w13,[$ctx,#8]
+	str	w14,[$ctx,#16]
+	b	.Lno_data_neon
+
+.align	4
+.Lstore_base2_64_neon:
+	stp	$h0,$h1,[$ctx]		// store hash value base 2^64
+	stp	$h2,xzr,[$ctx,#16]	// note that is_base2_26 is zeroed
+	b	.Lno_data_neon
+
+.align	4
+.Lbase2_64_neon:
+	ldp	$r0,$r1,[$ctx,#32]	// load key value
+
+	ldp	$h0,$h1,[$ctx]		// load hash value base 2^64
+	ldr	$h2,[$ctx,#16]
+
+	tst	$len,#31
+	b.eq	.Linit_neon
+
+	ldp	$d0,$d1,[$inp],#16	// load input
+	sub	$len,$len,#16
+	add	$s1,$r1,$r1,lsr#2	// s1 = r1 + (r1 >> 2)
+#ifdef	__ARMEB__
+	rev	$d0,$d0
+	rev	$d1,$d1
+#endif
+	adds	$h0,$h0,$d0		// accumulate input
+	adcs	$h1,$h1,$d1
+	adc	$h2,$h2,$padbit
+
+	bl	poly1305_mult
+
+.Linit_neon:
+	and	x10,$h0,#0x03ffffff	// base 2^64 -> base 2^26
+	ubfx	x11,$h0,#26,#26
+	extr	x12,$h1,$h0,#52
+	and	x12,x12,#0x03ffffff
+	ubfx	x13,$h1,#14,#26
+	extr	x14,$h2,$h1,#40
+
+	stp	d8,d9,[sp,#16]		// meet ABI requirements
+	stp	d10,d11,[sp,#32]
+	stp	d12,d13,[sp,#48]
+	stp	d14,d15,[sp,#64]
+
+	fmov	${H0},x10
+	fmov	${H1},x11
+	fmov	${H2},x12
+	fmov	${H3},x13
+	fmov	${H4},x14
+
+	////////////////////////////////// initialize r^n table
+	mov	$h0,$r0			// r^1
+	add	$s1,$r1,$r1,lsr#2	// s1 = r1 + (r1 >> 2)
+	mov	$h1,$r1
+	mov	$h2,xzr
+	add	$ctx,$ctx,#48+12
+	bl	poly1305_splat
+
+	bl	poly1305_mult		// r^2
+	sub	$ctx,$ctx,#4
+	bl	poly1305_splat
+
+	bl	poly1305_mult		// r^3
+	sub	$ctx,$ctx,#4
+	bl	poly1305_splat
+
+	bl	poly1305_mult		// r^4
+	sub	$ctx,$ctx,#4
+	bl	poly1305_splat
+	ldr	x30,[sp,#8]
+
+	add	$in2,$inp,#32
+	adr	$zeros,.Lzeros
+	subs	$len,$len,#64
+	csel	$in2,$zeros,$in2,lo
+
+	mov	x4,#1
+	str	x4,[$ctx,#-24]		// set is_base2_26
+	sub	$ctx,$ctx,#48		// restore original $ctx
+	b	.Ldo_neon
+
+.align	4
+.Leven_neon:
+	add	$in2,$inp,#32
+	adr	$zeros,.Lzeros
+	subs	$len,$len,#64
+	csel	$in2,$zeros,$in2,lo
+
+	stp	d8,d9,[sp,#16]		// meet ABI requirements
+	stp	d10,d11,[sp,#32]
+	stp	d12,d13,[sp,#48]
+	stp	d14,d15,[sp,#64]
+
+	fmov	${H0},x10
+	fmov	${H1},x11
+	fmov	${H2},x12
+	fmov	${H3},x13
+	fmov	${H4},x14
+
+.Ldo_neon:
+	ldp	x8,x12,[$in2],#16	// inp[2:3] (or zero)
+	ldp	x9,x13,[$in2],#48
+
+	lsl	$padbit,$padbit,#24
+	add	x15,$ctx,#48
+
+#ifdef	__ARMEB__
+	rev	x8,x8
+	rev	x12,x12
+	rev	x9,x9
+	rev	x13,x13
+#endif
+	and	x4,x8,#0x03ffffff	// base 2^64 -> base 2^26
+	and	x5,x9,#0x03ffffff
+	ubfx	x6,x8,#26,#26
+	ubfx	x7,x9,#26,#26
+	add	x4,x4,x5,lsl#32		// bfi	x4,x5,#32,#32
+	extr	x8,x12,x8,#52
+	extr	x9,x13,x9,#52
+	add	x6,x6,x7,lsl#32		// bfi	x6,x7,#32,#32
+	fmov	$IN23_0,x4
+	and	x8,x8,#0x03ffffff
+	and	x9,x9,#0x03ffffff
+	ubfx	x10,x12,#14,#26
+	ubfx	x11,x13,#14,#26
+	add	x12,$padbit,x12,lsr#40
+	add	x13,$padbit,x13,lsr#40
+	add	x8,x8,x9,lsl#32		// bfi	x8,x9,#32,#32
+	fmov	$IN23_1,x6
+	add	x10,x10,x11,lsl#32	// bfi	x10,x11,#32,#32
+	add	x12,x12,x13,lsl#32	// bfi	x12,x13,#32,#32
+	fmov	$IN23_2,x8
+	fmov	$IN23_3,x10
+	fmov	$IN23_4,x12
+
+	ldp	x8,x12,[$inp],#16	// inp[0:1]
+	ldp	x9,x13,[$inp],#48
+
+	ld1	{$R0,$R1,$S1,$R2},[x15],#64
+	ld1	{$S2,$R3,$S3,$R4},[x15],#64
+	ld1	{$S4},[x15]
+
+#ifdef	__ARMEB__
+	rev	x8,x8
+	rev	x12,x12
+	rev	x9,x9
+	rev	x13,x13
+#endif
+	and	x4,x8,#0x03ffffff	// base 2^64 -> base 2^26
+	and	x5,x9,#0x03ffffff
+	ubfx	x6,x8,#26,#26
+	ubfx	x7,x9,#26,#26
+	add	x4,x4,x5,lsl#32		// bfi	x4,x5,#32,#32
+	extr	x8,x12,x8,#52
+	extr	x9,x13,x9,#52
+	add	x6,x6,x7,lsl#32		// bfi	x6,x7,#32,#32
+	fmov	$IN01_0,x4
+	and	x8,x8,#0x03ffffff
+	and	x9,x9,#0x03ffffff
+	ubfx	x10,x12,#14,#26
+	ubfx	x11,x13,#14,#26
+	add	x12,$padbit,x12,lsr#40
+	add	x13,$padbit,x13,lsr#40
+	add	x8,x8,x9,lsl#32		// bfi	x8,x9,#32,#32
+	fmov	$IN01_1,x6
+	add	x10,x10,x11,lsl#32	// bfi	x10,x11,#32,#32
+	add	x12,x12,x13,lsl#32	// bfi	x12,x13,#32,#32
+	movi	$MASK.2d,#-1
+	fmov	$IN01_2,x8
+	fmov	$IN01_3,x10
+	fmov	$IN01_4,x12
+	ushr	$MASK.2d,$MASK.2d,#38
+
+	b.ls	.Lskip_loop
+
+.align	4
+.Loop_neon:
+	////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+	// ((inp[0]*r^4+inp[2]*r^2+inp[4])*r^4+inp[6]*r^2
+	// ((inp[1]*r^4+inp[3]*r^2+inp[5])*r^3+inp[7]*r
+	//   \___________________/
+	// ((inp[0]*r^4+inp[2]*r^2+inp[4])*r^4+inp[6]*r^2+inp[8])*r^2
+	// ((inp[1]*r^4+inp[3]*r^2+inp[5])*r^4+inp[7]*r^2+inp[9])*r
+	//   \___________________/ \____________________/
+	//
+	// Note that we start with inp[2:3]*r^2. This is because it
+	// doesn't depend on reduction in previous iteration.
+	////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+	// d4 = h0*r4 + h1*r3   + h2*r2   + h3*r1   + h4*r0
+	// d3 = h0*r3 + h1*r2   + h2*r1   + h3*r0   + h4*5*r4
+	// d2 = h0*r2 + h1*r1   + h2*r0   + h3*5*r4 + h4*5*r3
+	// d1 = h0*r1 + h1*r0   + h2*5*r4 + h3*5*r3 + h4*5*r2
+	// d0 = h0*r0 + h1*5*r4 + h2*5*r3 + h3*5*r2 + h4*5*r1
+
+	subs	$len,$len,#64
+	umull	$ACC4,$IN23_0,${R4}[2]
+	csel	$in2,$zeros,$in2,lo
+	umull	$ACC3,$IN23_0,${R3}[2]
+	umull	$ACC2,$IN23_0,${R2}[2]
+	 ldp	x8,x12,[$in2],#16	// inp[2:3] (or zero)
+	umull	$ACC1,$IN23_0,${R1}[2]
+	 ldp	x9,x13,[$in2],#48
+	umull	$ACC0,$IN23_0,${R0}[2]
+#ifdef	__ARMEB__
+	 rev	x8,x8
+	 rev	x12,x12
+	 rev	x9,x9
+	 rev	x13,x13
+#endif
+
+	umlal	$ACC4,$IN23_1,${R3}[2]
+	 and	x4,x8,#0x03ffffff	// base 2^64 -> base 2^26
+	umlal	$ACC3,$IN23_1,${R2}[2]
+	 and	x5,x9,#0x03ffffff
+	umlal	$ACC2,$IN23_1,${R1}[2]
+	 ubfx	x6,x8,#26,#26
+	umlal	$ACC1,$IN23_1,${R0}[2]
+	 ubfx	x7,x9,#26,#26
+	umlal	$ACC0,$IN23_1,${S4}[2]
+	 add	x4,x4,x5,lsl#32		// bfi	x4,x5,#32,#32
+
+	umlal	$ACC4,$IN23_2,${R2}[2]
+	 extr	x8,x12,x8,#52
+	umlal	$ACC3,$IN23_2,${R1}[2]
+	 extr	x9,x13,x9,#52
+	umlal	$ACC2,$IN23_2,${R0}[2]
+	 add	x6,x6,x7,lsl#32		// bfi	x6,x7,#32,#32
+	umlal	$ACC1,$IN23_2,${S4}[2]
+	 fmov	$IN23_0,x4
+	umlal	$ACC0,$IN23_2,${S3}[2]
+	 and	x8,x8,#0x03ffffff
+
+	umlal	$ACC4,$IN23_3,${R1}[2]
+	 and	x9,x9,#0x03ffffff
+	umlal	$ACC3,$IN23_3,${R0}[2]
+	 ubfx	x10,x12,#14,#26
+	umlal	$ACC2,$IN23_3,${S4}[2]
+	 ubfx	x11,x13,#14,#26
+	umlal	$ACC1,$IN23_3,${S3}[2]
+	 add	x8,x8,x9,lsl#32		// bfi	x8,x9,#32,#32
+	umlal	$ACC0,$IN23_3,${S2}[2]
+	 fmov	$IN23_1,x6
+
+	add	$IN01_2,$IN01_2,$H2
+	 add	x12,$padbit,x12,lsr#40
+	umlal	$ACC4,$IN23_4,${R0}[2]
+	 add	x13,$padbit,x13,lsr#40
+	umlal	$ACC3,$IN23_4,${S4}[2]
+	 add	x10,x10,x11,lsl#32	// bfi	x10,x11,#32,#32
+	umlal	$ACC2,$IN23_4,${S3}[2]
+	 add	x12,x12,x13,lsl#32	// bfi	x12,x13,#32,#32
+	umlal	$ACC1,$IN23_4,${S2}[2]
+	 fmov	$IN23_2,x8
+	umlal	$ACC0,$IN23_4,${S1}[2]
+	 fmov	$IN23_3,x10
+
+	////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+	// (hash+inp[0:1])*r^4 and accumulate
+
+	add	$IN01_0,$IN01_0,$H0
+	 fmov	$IN23_4,x12
+	umlal	$ACC3,$IN01_2,${R1}[0]
+	 ldp	x8,x12,[$inp],#16	// inp[0:1]
+	umlal	$ACC0,$IN01_2,${S3}[0]
+	 ldp	x9,x13,[$inp],#48
+	umlal	$ACC4,$IN01_2,${R2}[0]
+	umlal	$ACC1,$IN01_2,${S4}[0]
+	umlal	$ACC2,$IN01_2,${R0}[0]
+#ifdef	__ARMEB__
+	 rev	x8,x8
+	 rev	x12,x12
+	 rev	x9,x9
+	 rev	x13,x13
+#endif
+
+	add	$IN01_1,$IN01_1,$H1
+	umlal	$ACC3,$IN01_0,${R3}[0]
+	umlal	$ACC4,$IN01_0,${R4}[0]
+	 and	x4,x8,#0x03ffffff	// base 2^64 -> base 2^26
+	umlal	$ACC2,$IN01_0,${R2}[0]
+	 and	x5,x9,#0x03ffffff
+	umlal	$ACC0,$IN01_0,${R0}[0]
+	 ubfx	x6,x8,#26,#26
+	umlal	$ACC1,$IN01_0,${R1}[0]
+	 ubfx	x7,x9,#26,#26
+
+	add	$IN01_3,$IN01_3,$H3
+	 add	x4,x4,x5,lsl#32		// bfi	x4,x5,#32,#32
+	umlal	$ACC3,$IN01_1,${R2}[0]
+	 extr	x8,x12,x8,#52
+	umlal	$ACC4,$IN01_1,${R3}[0]
+	 extr	x9,x13,x9,#52
+	umlal	$ACC0,$IN01_1,${S4}[0]
+	 add	x6,x6,x7,lsl#32		// bfi	x6,x7,#32,#32
+	umlal	$ACC2,$IN01_1,${R1}[0]
+	 fmov	$IN01_0,x4
+	umlal	$ACC1,$IN01_1,${R0}[0]
+	 and	x8,x8,#0x03ffffff
+
+	add	$IN01_4,$IN01_4,$H4
+	 and	x9,x9,#0x03ffffff
+	umlal	$ACC3,$IN01_3,${R0}[0]
+	 ubfx	x10,x12,#14,#26
+	umlal	$ACC0,$IN01_3,${S2}[0]
+	 ubfx	x11,x13,#14,#26
+	umlal	$ACC4,$IN01_3,${R1}[0]
+	 add	x8,x8,x9,lsl#32		// bfi	x8,x9,#32,#32
+	umlal	$ACC1,$IN01_3,${S3}[0]
+	 fmov	$IN01_1,x6
+	umlal	$ACC2,$IN01_3,${S4}[0]
+	 add	x12,$padbit,x12,lsr#40
+
+	umlal	$ACC3,$IN01_4,${S4}[0]
+	 add	x13,$padbit,x13,lsr#40
+	umlal	$ACC0,$IN01_4,${S1}[0]
+	 add	x10,x10,x11,lsl#32	// bfi	x10,x11,#32,#32
+	umlal	$ACC4,$IN01_4,${R0}[0]
+	 add	x12,x12,x13,lsl#32	// bfi	x12,x13,#32,#32
+	umlal	$ACC1,$IN01_4,${S2}[0]
+	 fmov	$IN01_2,x8
+	umlal	$ACC2,$IN01_4,${S3}[0]
+	 fmov	$IN01_3,x10
+	 fmov	$IN01_4,x12
+
+	/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+	// lazy reduction as discussed in "NEON crypto" by D.J. Bernstein
+	// and P. Schwabe
+	//
+	// [see discussion in poly1305-armv4 module]
+
+	ushr	$T0.2d,$ACC3,#26
+	xtn	$H3,$ACC3
+	 ushr	$T1.2d,$ACC0,#26
+	 and	$ACC0,$ACC0,$MASK.2d
+	add	$ACC4,$ACC4,$T0.2d	// h3 -> h4
+	bic	$H3,#0xfc,lsl#24	// &=0x03ffffff
+	 add	$ACC1,$ACC1,$T1.2d	// h0 -> h1
+
+	ushr	$T0.2d,$ACC4,#26
+	xtn	$H4,$ACC4
+	 ushr	$T1.2d,$ACC1,#26
+	 xtn	$H1,$ACC1
+	bic	$H4,#0xfc,lsl#24
+	 add	$ACC2,$ACC2,$T1.2d	// h1 -> h2
+
+	add	$ACC0,$ACC0,$T0.2d
+	shl	$T0.2d,$T0.2d,#2
+	 shrn	$T1.2s,$ACC2,#26
+	 xtn	$H2,$ACC2
+	add	$ACC0,$ACC0,$T0.2d	// h4 -> h0
+	 bic	$H1,#0xfc,lsl#24
+	 add	$H3,$H3,$T1.2s		// h2 -> h3
+	 bic	$H2,#0xfc,lsl#24
+
+	shrn	$T0.2s,$ACC0,#26
+	xtn	$H0,$ACC0
+	 ushr	$T1.2s,$H3,#26
+	 bic	$H3,#0xfc,lsl#24
+	 bic	$H0,#0xfc,lsl#24
+	add	$H1,$H1,$T0.2s		// h0 -> h1
+	 add	$H4,$H4,$T1.2s		// h3 -> h4
+
+	b.hi	.Loop_neon
+
+.Lskip_loop:
+	dup	$IN23_2,${IN23_2}[0]
+	add	$IN01_2,$IN01_2,$H2
+
+	////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+	// multiply (inp[0:1]+hash) or inp[2:3] by r^2:r^1
+
+	adds	$len,$len,#32
+	b.ne	.Long_tail
+
+	dup	$IN23_2,${IN01_2}[0]
+	add	$IN23_0,$IN01_0,$H0
+	add	$IN23_3,$IN01_3,$H3
+	add	$IN23_1,$IN01_1,$H1
+	add	$IN23_4,$IN01_4,$H4
+
+.Long_tail:
+	dup	$IN23_0,${IN23_0}[0]
+	umull2	$ACC0,$IN23_2,${S3}
+	umull2	$ACC3,$IN23_2,${R1}
+	umull2	$ACC4,$IN23_2,${R2}
+	umull2	$ACC2,$IN23_2,${R0}
+	umull2	$ACC1,$IN23_2,${S4}
+
+	dup	$IN23_1,${IN23_1}[0]
+	umlal2	$ACC0,$IN23_0,${R0}
+	umlal2	$ACC2,$IN23_0,${R2}
+	umlal2	$ACC3,$IN23_0,${R3}
+	umlal2	$ACC4,$IN23_0,${R4}
+	umlal2	$ACC1,$IN23_0,${R1}
+
+	dup	$IN23_3,${IN23_3}[0]
+	umlal2	$ACC0,$IN23_1,${S4}
+	umlal2	$ACC3,$IN23_1,${R2}
+	umlal2	$ACC2,$IN23_1,${R1}
+	umlal2	$ACC4,$IN23_1,${R3}
+	umlal2	$ACC1,$IN23_1,${R0}
+
+	dup	$IN23_4,${IN23_4}[0]
+	umlal2	$ACC3,$IN23_3,${R0}
+	umlal2	$ACC4,$IN23_3,${R1}
+	umlal2	$ACC0,$IN23_3,${S2}
+	umlal2	$ACC1,$IN23_3,${S3}
+	umlal2	$ACC2,$IN23_3,${S4}
+
+	umlal2	$ACC3,$IN23_4,${S4}
+	umlal2	$ACC0,$IN23_4,${S1}
+	umlal2	$ACC4,$IN23_4,${R0}
+	umlal2	$ACC1,$IN23_4,${S2}
+	umlal2	$ACC2,$IN23_4,${S3}
+
+	b.eq	.Lshort_tail
+
+	////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+	// (hash+inp[0:1])*r^4:r^3 and accumulate
+
+	add	$IN01_0,$IN01_0,$H0
+	umlal	$ACC3,$IN01_2,${R1}
+	umlal	$ACC0,$IN01_2,${S3}
+	umlal	$ACC4,$IN01_2,${R2}
+	umlal	$ACC1,$IN01_2,${S4}
+	umlal	$ACC2,$IN01_2,${R0}
+
+	add	$IN01_1,$IN01_1,$H1
+	umlal	$ACC3,$IN01_0,${R3}
+	umlal	$ACC0,$IN01_0,${R0}
+	umlal	$ACC4,$IN01_0,${R4}
+	umlal	$ACC1,$IN01_0,${R1}
+	umlal	$ACC2,$IN01_0,${R2}
+
+	add	$IN01_3,$IN01_3,$H3
+	umlal	$ACC3,$IN01_1,${R2}
+	umlal	$ACC0,$IN01_1,${S4}
+	umlal	$ACC4,$IN01_1,${R3}
+	umlal	$ACC1,$IN01_1,${R0}
+	umlal	$ACC2,$IN01_1,${R1}
+
+	add	$IN01_4,$IN01_4,$H4
+	umlal	$ACC3,$IN01_3,${R0}
+	umlal	$ACC0,$IN01_3,${S2}
+	umlal	$ACC4,$IN01_3,${R1}
+	umlal	$ACC1,$IN01_3,${S3}
+	umlal	$ACC2,$IN01_3,${S4}
+
+	umlal	$ACC3,$IN01_4,${S4}
+	umlal	$ACC0,$IN01_4,${S1}
+	umlal	$ACC4,$IN01_4,${R0}
+	umlal	$ACC1,$IN01_4,${S2}
+	umlal	$ACC2,$IN01_4,${S3}
+
+.Lshort_tail:
+	////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+	// horizontal add
+
+	addp	$ACC3,$ACC3,$ACC3
+	 ldp	d8,d9,[sp,#16]		// meet ABI requirements
+	addp	$ACC0,$ACC0,$ACC0
+	 ldp	d10,d11,[sp,#32]
+	addp	$ACC4,$ACC4,$ACC4
+	 ldp	d12,d13,[sp,#48]
+	addp	$ACC1,$ACC1,$ACC1
+	 ldp	d14,d15,[sp,#64]
+	addp	$ACC2,$ACC2,$ACC2
+
+	////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+	// lazy reduction, but without narrowing
+
+	ushr	$T0.2d,$ACC3,#26
+	and	$ACC3,$ACC3,$MASK.2d
+	 ushr	$T1.2d,$ACC0,#26
+	 and	$ACC0,$ACC0,$MASK.2d
+
+	add	$ACC4,$ACC4,$T0.2d	// h3 -> h4
+	 add	$ACC1,$ACC1,$T1.2d	// h0 -> h1
+
+	ushr	$T0.2d,$ACC4,#26
+	and	$ACC4,$ACC4,$MASK.2d
+	 ushr	$T1.2d,$ACC1,#26
+	 and	$ACC1,$ACC1,$MASK.2d
+	 add	$ACC2,$ACC2,$T1.2d	// h1 -> h2
+
+	add	$ACC0,$ACC0,$T0.2d
+	shl	$T0.2d,$T0.2d,#2
+	 ushr	$T1.2d,$ACC2,#26
+	 and	$ACC2,$ACC2,$MASK.2d
+	add	$ACC0,$ACC0,$T0.2d	// h4 -> h0
+	 add	$ACC3,$ACC3,$T1.2d	// h2 -> h3
+
+	ushr	$T0.2d,$ACC0,#26
+	and	$ACC0,$ACC0,$MASK.2d
+	 ushr	$T1.2d,$ACC3,#26
+	 and	$ACC3,$ACC3,$MASK.2d
+	add	$ACC1,$ACC1,$T0.2d	// h0 -> h1
+	 add	$ACC4,$ACC4,$T1.2d	// h3 -> h4
+
+	////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+	// write the result, can be partially reduced
+
+	st4	{$ACC0,$ACC1,$ACC2,$ACC3}[0],[$ctx],#16
+	st1	{$ACC4}[0],[$ctx]
+
+.Lno_data_neon:
+	ldr	x29,[sp],#80
+	ret
+.size	poly1305_blocks_neon,.-poly1305_blocks_neon
+
+.type	poly1305_emit_neon,%function
+.align	5
+poly1305_emit_neon:
+	ldr	$is_base2_26,[$ctx,#24]
+	cbz	$is_base2_26,poly1305_emit
+
+	ldp	w10,w11,[$ctx]		// load hash value base 2^26
+	ldp	w12,w13,[$ctx,#8]
+	ldr	w14,[$ctx,#16]
+
+	add	$h0,x10,x11,lsl#26	// base 2^26 -> base 2^64
+	lsr	$h1,x12,#12
+	adds	$h0,$h0,x12,lsl#52
+	add	$h1,$h1,x13,lsl#14
+	adc	$h1,$h1,xzr
+	lsr	$h2,x14,#24
+	adds	$h1,$h1,x14,lsl#40
+	adc	$h2,$h2,xzr		// can be partially reduced...
+
+	ldp	$t0,$t1,[$nonce]	// load nonce
+
+	and	$d0,$h2,#-4		// ... so reduce
+	add	$d0,$d0,$h2,lsr#2
+	and	$h2,$h2,#3
+	adds	$h0,$h0,$d0
+	adcs	$h1,$h1,xzr
+	adc	$h2,$h2,xzr
+
+	adds	$d0,$h0,#5		// compare to modulus
+	adcs	$d1,$h1,xzr
+	adc	$d2,$h2,xzr
+
+	tst	$d2,#-4			// see if it's carried/borrowed
+
+	csel	$h0,$h0,$d0,eq
+	csel	$h1,$h1,$d1,eq
+
+#ifdef	__ARMEB__
+	ror	$t0,$t0,#32		// flip nonce words
+	ror	$t1,$t1,#32
+#endif
+	adds	$h0,$h0,$t0		// accumulate nonce
+	adc	$h1,$h1,$t1
+#ifdef	__ARMEB__
+	rev	$h0,$h0			// flip output bytes
+	rev	$h1,$h1
+#endif
+	stp	$h0,$h1,[$mac]		// write result
+
+	ret
+.size	poly1305_emit_neon,.-poly1305_emit_neon
+
+.align	5
+.Lzeros:
+.long	0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0
+.LOPENSSL_armcap_P:
+#ifdef	__ILP32__
+.long	OPENSSL_armcap_P-.
+#else
+.quad	OPENSSL_armcap_P-.
+#endif
+.asciz	"Poly1305 for ARMv8, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+.align	2
+___
+
+foreach (split("\n",$code)) {
+	s/\b(shrn\s+v[0-9]+)\.[24]d/$1.2s/			or
+	s/\b(fmov\s+)v([0-9]+)[^,]*,\s*x([0-9]+)/$1d$2,x$3/	or
+	(m/\bdup\b/ and (s/\.[24]s/.2d/g or 1))			or
+	(m/\b(eor|and)/ and (s/\.[248][sdh]/.16b/g or 1))	or
+	(m/\bum(ul|la)l\b/ and (s/\.4s/.2s/g or 1))		or
+	(m/\bum(ul|la)l2\b/ and (s/\.2s/.4s/g or 1))		or
+	(m/\bst[1-4]\s+{[^}]+}\[/ and (s/\.[24]d/.s/g or 1));
+
+	s/\.[124]([sd])\[/.$1\[/;
+
+	print $_,"\n";
+}
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-c64xplus.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-c64xplus.pl
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..93fef37
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-c64xplus.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,331 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# Poly1305 hash for C64x+.
+#
+# October 2015
+#
+# Performance is [incredible for a 32-bit processor] 1.82 cycles per
+# processed byte. Comparison to compiler-generated code is problematic,
+# because results were observed to vary from 2.1 to 7.6 cpb depending
+# on compiler's ability to inline small functions. Compiler also
+# disables interrupts for some reason, thus making interrupt response
+# time dependent on input length. This module on the other hand is free
+# from such limitation.
+
+$output=pop;
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+($CTXA,$INPB,$LEN,$PADBIT)=("A4","B4","A6","B6");
+($H0,$H1,$H2,$H3,$H4,$H4a)=("A8","B8","A10","B10","B2",$LEN);
+($D0,$D1,$D2,$D3)=         ("A9","B9","A11","B11");
+($R0,$R1,$R2,$R3,$S1,$S2,$S3,$S3b)=("A0","B0","A1","B1","A12","B12","A13","B13");
+($THREE,$R0b,$S2a)=("B7","B5","A5");
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	.text
+
+	.if	.ASSEMBLER_VERSION<7000000
+	.asg	0,__TI_EABI__
+	.endif
+	.if	__TI_EABI__
+	.asg	poly1305_init,_poly1305_init
+	.asg	poly1305_blocks,_poly1305_blocks
+	.asg	poly1305_emit,_poly1305_emit
+	.endif
+
+	.asg	B3,RA
+	.asg	A15,FP
+	.asg	B15,SP
+
+	.if	.LITTLE_ENDIAN
+	.asg	MV,SWAP2
+	.asg	MV.L,SWAP4
+	.endif
+
+	.global	_poly1305_init
+_poly1305_init:
+	.asmfunc
+	LDNDW	*${INPB}[0],B17:B16	; load key material
+	LDNDW	*${INPB}[1],A17:A16
+
+||	ZERO	B9:B8
+||	MVK	-1,B0
+	STDW	B9:B8,*${CTXA}[0]	; initialize h1:h0
+||	SHRU	B0,4,B0			; 0x0fffffff
+||	MVK	-4,B1
+	STDW	B9:B8,*${CTXA}[1]	; initialize h3:h2
+||	AND	B0,B1,B1		; 0x0ffffffc
+	STW	B8,*${CTXA}[4]		; initialize h4
+
+	.if	.BIG_ENDIAN
+	SWAP2	B16,B17
+||	SWAP2	B17,B16
+	SWAP2	A16,A17
+||	SWAP2	A17,A16
+	SWAP4	B16,B16
+||	SWAP4	A16,A16
+	SWAP4	B17,B17
+||	SWAP4	A17,A17
+	.endif
+
+	AND	B16,B0,B20		; r0 = key[0] & 0x0fffffff
+||	AND	B17,B1,B22		; r1 = key[1] & 0x0ffffffc
+||	EXTU	B17,4,6,B16		; r1>>2
+	AND	A16,B1,B21		; r2 = key[2] & 0x0ffffffc
+||	AND	A17,B1,A23		; r3 = key[3] & 0x0ffffffc
+||	BNOP	RA
+	SHRU	B21,2,B18
+||	ADD	B22,B16,B16		; s1 = r1 + r1>>2
+
+	STDW	B21:B20,*${CTXA}[3]	; save r2:r0
+||	ADD	B21,B18,B18		; s2 = r2 + r2>>2
+||	SHRU	A23,2,B17
+||	MV	A23,B23
+	STDW	B23:B22,*${CTXA}[4]	; save r3:r1
+||	ADD	B23,B17,B19		; s3 = r3 + r3>>2
+||	ADD	B23,B17,B17		; s3 = r3 + r3>>2
+	STDW	B17:B16,*${CTXA}[5]	; save s3:s1
+	STDW	B19:B18,*${CTXA}[6]	; save s3:s2
+||	ZERO	A4			; return 0
+	.endasmfunc
+
+	.global	_poly1305_blocks
+	.align	32
+_poly1305_blocks:
+	.asmfunc	stack_usage(40)
+	SHRU	$LEN,4,A2		; A2 is loop counter, number of blocks
+  [!A2]	BNOP	RA			; no data
+|| [A2]	STW	FP,*SP--(40)		; save frame pointer and alloca(40)
+|| [A2]	MV	SP,FP
+   [A2]	STDW	B13:B12,*SP[4]		; ABI says so
+|| [A2]	MV	$CTXA,$S3b		; borrow $S3b
+   [A2]	STDW	B11:B10,*SP[3]
+|| [A2]	STDW	A13:A12,*FP[-3]
+   [A2]	STDW	A11:A10,*FP[-4]
+
+|| [A2]	LDDW	*${S3b}[0],B25:B24	; load h1:h0
+   [A2]	LDNW	*${INPB}++[4],$D0	; load inp[0]
+   [A2]	LDNW	*${INPB}[-3],$D1	; load inp[1]
+
+	LDDW	*${CTXA}[1],B29:B28	; load h3:h2, B28 is h2
+	LDNW	*${INPB}[-2],$D2	; load inp[2]
+	LDNW	*${INPB}[-1],$D3	; load inp[3]
+
+	LDDW	*${CTXA}[3],$R2:$R0	; load r2:r0
+||	LDDW	*${S3b}[4],$R3:$R1	; load r3:r1
+||	SWAP2	$D0,$D0
+
+	LDDW	*${CTXA}[5],$S3:$S1	; load s3:s1
+||	LDDW	*${S3b}[6],$S3b:$S2	; load s3:s2
+||	SWAP4	$D0,$D0
+||	SWAP2	$D1,$D1
+
+	ADDU	$D0,B24,$D0:$H0		; h0+=inp[0]
+||	ADD	$D0,B24,B27		; B-copy of h0+inp[0]
+||	SWAP4	$D1,$D1
+	ADDU	$D1,B25,$D1:$H1		; h1+=inp[1]
+||	MVK	3,$THREE
+||	SWAP2	$D2,$D2
+	LDW	*${CTXA}[4],$H4		; load h4
+||	SWAP4	$D2,$D2
+||	MV	B29,B30			; B30 is h3
+	MV	$R0,$R0b
+
+loop?:
+	MPY32U	$H0,$R0,A17:A16
+||	MPY32U	B27,$R1,B17:B16		; MPY32U	$H0,$R1,B17:B16
+||	ADDU	$D0,$D1:$H1,B25:B24	; ADDU		$D0,$D1:$H1,$D1:$H1
+||	ADDU	$D2,B28,$D2:$H2		; h2+=inp[2]
+||	SWAP2	$D3,$D3
+	MPY32U	$H0,$R2,A19:A18
+||	MPY32U	B27,$R3,B19:B18		; MPY32U	$H0,$R3,B19:B18
+||	ADD	$D0,$H1,A24		; A-copy of B24
+||	SWAP4	$D3,$D3
+|| [A2]	SUB	A2,1,A2			; decrement loop counter
+
+	MPY32U	A24,$S3,A21:A20		; MPY32U	$H1,$S3,A21:A20
+||	MPY32U	B24,$R0b,B21:B20	; MPY32U	$H1,$R0,B21:B20
+||	ADDU	B25,$D2:$H2,$D2:$H2	; ADDU		$D1,$D2:$H2,$D2:$H2
+||	ADDU	$D3,B30,$D3:$H3		; h3+=inp[3]
+||	ADD	B25,$H2,B25		; B-copy of $H2
+	MPY32U	A24,$R1,A23:A22		; MPY32U	$H1,$R1,A23:A22
+||	MPY32U	B24,$R2,B23:B22		; MPY32U	$H1,$R2,B23:B22
+
+	MPY32U	$H2,$S2,A25:A24
+||	MPY32U	B25,$S3b,B25:B24	; MPY32U	$H2,$S3,B25:B24
+||	ADDU	$D2,$D3:$H3,$D3:$H3
+||	ADD	$PADBIT,$H4,$H4		; h4+=padbit
+	MPY32U	$H2,$R0,A27:A26
+||	MPY32U	$H2,$R1,B27:B26
+||	ADD	$D3,$H4,$H4
+||	MV	$S2,$S2a
+
+	MPY32U	$H3,$S1,A29:A28
+||	MPY32U	$H3,$S2,B29:B28
+||	ADD	A21,A17,A21		; start accumulating "d3:d0"
+||	ADD	B21,B17,B21
+||	ADDU	A20,A16,A17:A16
+||	ADDU	B20,B16,B17:B16
+|| [A2]	LDNW	*${INPB}++[4],$D0	; load inp[0]
+	MPY32U	$H3,$S3,A31:A30
+||	MPY32U	$H3,$R0b,B31:B30
+||	ADD	A23,A19,A23
+||	ADD	B23,B19,B23
+||	ADDU	A22,A18,A19:A18
+||	ADDU	B22,B18,B19:B18
+|| [A2]	LDNW	*${INPB}[-3],$D1	; load inp[1]
+
+	MPY32	$H4,$S1,B20
+||	MPY32	$H4,$S2a,A20
+||	ADD	A25,A21,A21
+||	ADD	B25,B21,B21
+||	ADDU	A24,A17:A16,A17:A16
+||	ADDU	B24,B17:B16,B17:B16
+|| [A2]	LDNW	*${INPB}[-2],$D2	; load inp[2]
+	MPY32	$H4,$S3b,B22
+||	ADD	A27,A23,A23
+||	ADD	B27,B23,B23
+||	ADDU	A26,A19:A18,A19:A18
+||	ADDU	B26,B19:B18,B19:B18
+|| [A2]	LDNW	*${INPB}[-1],$D3	; load inp[3]
+
+	MPY32	$H4,$R0b,$H4
+||	ADD	A29,A21,A21		; final hi("d0")
+||	ADD	B29,B21,B21		; final hi("d1")
+||	ADDU	A28,A17:A16,A17:A16	; final lo("d0")
+||	ADDU	B28,B17:B16,B17:B16
+	ADD	A31,A23,A23		; final hi("d2")
+||	ADD	B31,B23,B23		; final hi("d3")
+||	ADDU	A30,A19:A18,A19:A18
+||	ADDU	B30,B19:B18,B19:B18
+	ADDU	B20,B17:B16,B17:B16	; final lo("d1")
+||	ADDU	A20,A19:A18,A19:A18	; final lo("d2")
+	ADDU	B22,B19:B18,B19:B18	; final lo("d3")
+
+||	ADD	A17,A21,A21		; "flatten" "d3:d0"
+	MV	A19,B29			; move to avoid cross-path stalls
+	ADDU	A21,B17:B16,B27:B26	; B26 is h1
+	ADD	B21,B27,B27
+||	DMV	B29,A18,B29:B28		; move to avoid cross-path stalls
+	ADDU	B27,B29:B28,B29:B28	; B28 is h2
+|| [A2]	SWAP2	$D0,$D0
+	ADD	A23,B29,B29
+|| [A2]	SWAP4	$D0,$D0
+	ADDU	B29,B19:B18,B31:B30	; B30 is h3
+	ADD	B23,B31,B31
+||	MV	A16,B24			; B24 is h0
+|| [A2]	SWAP2	$D1,$D1
+	ADD	B31,$H4,$H4
+|| [A2]	SWAP4	$D1,$D1
+
+	SHRU	$H4,2,B16		; last reduction step
+||	AND	$H4,$THREE,$H4
+	ADDAW	B16,B16,B16		; 5*(h4>>2)
+|| [A2]	BNOP	loop?
+
+	ADDU	B24,B16,B25:B24		; B24 is h0
+|| [A2]	SWAP2	$D2,$D2
+	ADDU	B26,B25,B27:B26		; B26 is h1
+|| [A2]	SWAP4	$D2,$D2
+	ADDU	B28,B27,B29:B28		; B28 is h2
+|| [A2]	ADDU	$D0,B24,$D0:$H0		; h0+=inp[0]
+|| [A2]	ADD	$D0,B24,B27		; B-copy of h0+inp[0]
+	ADDU	B30,B29,B31:B30		; B30 is h3
+	ADD	B31,$H4,$H4
+|| [A2]	ADDU	$D1,B26,$D1:$H1		; h1+=inp[1]
+;;===== branch to loop? is taken here
+
+	LDDW	*FP[-4],A11:A10		; ABI says so
+	LDDW	*FP[-3],A13:A12
+||	LDDW	*SP[3],B11:B10
+	LDDW	*SP[4],B13:B12
+||	MV	B26,B25
+||	BNOP	RA
+	LDW	*++SP(40),FP		; restore frame pointer
+||	MV	B30,B29
+	STDW	B25:B24,*${CTXA}[0]	; save h1:h0
+	STDW	B29:B28,*${CTXA}[1]	; save h3:h2
+	STW	$H4,*${CTXA}[4]		; save h4
+	NOP	1
+	.endasmfunc
+___
+{
+my ($MAC,$NONCEA,$NONCEB)=($INPB,$LEN,$PADBIT);
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	.global	_poly1305_emit
+	.align	32
+_poly1305_emit:
+	.asmfunc
+	LDDW	*${CTXA}[0],A17:A16	; load h1:h0
+	LDDW	*${CTXA}[1],A19:A18	; load h3:h2
+	LDW	*${CTXA}[4],A20		; load h4
+	MV	$NONCEA,$NONCEB
+
+	MVK	5,A22			; compare to modulus
+	ADDU	A16,A22,A23:A22
+||	LDW	*${NONCEA}[0],A8
+||	LDW	*${NONCEB}[1],B8
+	ADDU	A17,A23,A25:A24
+||	LDW	*${NONCEA}[2],A9
+||	LDW	*${NONCEB}[3],B9
+	ADDU	A19,A25,A27:A26
+	ADDU	A19,A27,A29:A28
+	ADD	A20,A29,A29
+
+	SHRU	A29,2,A2		; check for overflow in 130-th bit
+
+   [A2]	MV	A22,A16			; select
+|| [A2]	MV	A24,A17
+   [A2]	MV	A26,A18
+|| [A2]	MV	A28,A19
+
+||	ADDU	A8,A16,A23:A22		; accumulate nonce
+	ADDU	B8,A17,A25:A24
+||	SWAP2	A22,A22
+	ADDU	A23,A25:A24,A25:A24
+	ADDU	A9,A18,A27:A26
+||	SWAP2	A24,A24
+	ADDU	A25,A27:A26,A27:A26
+||	ADD	B9,A19,A28
+	ADD	A27,A28,A28
+||	SWAP2	A26,A26
+
+	.if	.BIG_ENDIAN
+	SWAP2	A28,A28
+||	SWAP4	A22,A22
+||	SWAP4	A24,B24
+	SWAP4	A26,A26
+	SWAP4	A28,A28
+||	MV	B24,A24
+	.endif
+
+	BNOP	RA,1
+	STNW	A22,*${MAC}[0]		; write the result
+	STNW	A24,*${MAC}[1]
+	STNW	A26,*${MAC}[2]
+	STNW	A28,*${MAC}[3]
+	.endasmfunc
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	.sect	.const
+	.cstring "Poly1305 for C64x+, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+	.align	4
+___
+
+print $code;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-mips.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-mips.pl
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..d2b3e90
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-mips.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,425 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+
+# Poly1305 hash for MIPS64.
+#
+# May 2016
+#
+# Numbers are cycles per processed byte with poly1305_blocks alone.
+#
+#		IALU/gcc
+# R1x000	5.64/+120%	(big-endian)
+# Octeon II	3.80/+280%	(little-endian)
+
+######################################################################
+# There is a number of MIPS ABI in use, O32 and N32/64 are most
+# widely used. Then there is a new contender: NUBI. It appears that if
+# one picks the latter, it's possible to arrange code in ABI neutral
+# manner. Therefore let's stick to NUBI register layout:
+#
+($zero,$at,$t0,$t1,$t2)=map("\$$_",(0..2,24,25));
+($a0,$a1,$a2,$a3,$a4,$a5,$a6,$a7)=map("\$$_",(4..11));
+($s0,$s1,$s2,$s3,$s4,$s5,$s6,$s7,$s8,$s9,$s10,$s11)=map("\$$_",(12..23));
+($gp,$tp,$sp,$fp,$ra)=map("\$$_",(3,28..31));
+#
+# The return value is placed in $a0. Following coding rules facilitate
+# interoperability:
+#
+# - never ever touch $tp, "thread pointer", former $gp [o32 can be
+#   excluded from the rule, because it's specified volatile];
+# - copy return value to $t0, former $v0 [or to $a0 if you're adapting
+#   old code];
+# - on O32 populate $a4-$a7 with 'lw $aN,4*N($sp)' if necessary;
+#
+# For reference here is register layout for N32/64 MIPS ABIs:
+#
+# ($zero,$at,$v0,$v1)=map("\$$_",(0..3));
+# ($a0,$a1,$a2,$a3,$a4,$a5,$a6,$a7)=map("\$$_",(4..11));
+# ($t0,$t1,$t2,$t3,$t8,$t9)=map("\$$_",(12..15,24,25));
+# ($s0,$s1,$s2,$s3,$s4,$s5,$s6,$s7)=map("\$$_",(16..23));
+# ($gp,$sp,$fp,$ra)=map("\$$_",(28..31));
+#
+# <appro@openssl.org>
+#
+######################################################################
+
+$flavour = shift || "o32"; # supported flavours are o32,n32,64,nubi32,nubi64
+
+die "MIPS64 only" unless ($flavour =~ /64|n32/i);
+
+$v0 = ($flavour =~ /nubi/i) ? $a0 : $t0;
+$SAVED_REGS_MASK = ($flavour =~ /nubi/i) ? "0x0003f000" : "0x00030000";
+
+($ctx,$inp,$len,$padbit) = ($a0,$a1,$a2,$a3);
+($in0,$in1,$tmp0,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3,$tmp4) = ($a4,$a5,$a6,$a7,$at,$t0,$t1);
+
+$code.=<<___;
+#ifdef MIPSEB
+# define MSB 0
+# define LSB 7
+#else
+# define MSB 7
+# define LSB 0
+#endif
+
+.text
+.set	noat
+.set	noreorder
+
+.align	5
+.globl	poly1305_init
+.ent	poly1305_init
+poly1305_init:
+	.frame	$sp,0,$ra
+	.set	reorder
+
+	sd	$zero,0($ctx)
+	sd	$zero,8($ctx)
+	sd	$zero,16($ctx)
+
+	beqz	$inp,.Lno_key
+
+	ldl	$in0,0+MSB($inp)
+	ldl	$in1,8+MSB($inp)
+	ldr	$in0,0+LSB($inp)
+	ldr	$in1,8+LSB($inp)
+#ifdef	MIPSEB
+# if defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS64R2)
+	dsbh	$in0,$in0		# byte swap
+	 dsbh	$in1,$in1
+	dshd	$in0,$in0
+	 dshd	$in1,$in1
+# else
+	ori	$tmp0,$zero,0xFF
+	dsll	$tmp2,$tmp0,32
+	or	$tmp0,$tmp2		# 0x000000FF000000FF
+
+	and	$tmp1,$in0,$tmp0	# byte swap
+	 and	$tmp3,$in1,$tmp0
+	dsrl	$tmp2,$in0,24
+	 dsrl	$tmp4,$in1,24
+	dsll	$tmp1,24
+	 dsll	$tmp3,24
+	and	$tmp2,$tmp0
+	 and	$tmp4,$tmp0
+	dsll	$tmp0,8			# 0x0000FF000000FF00
+	or	$tmp1,$tmp2
+	 or	$tmp3,$tmp4
+	and	$tmp2,$in0,$tmp0
+	 and	$tmp4,$in1,$tmp0
+	dsrl	$in0,8
+	 dsrl	$in1,8
+	dsll	$tmp2,8
+	 dsll	$tmp4,8
+	and	$in0,$tmp0
+	 and	$in1,$tmp0
+	or	$tmp1,$tmp2
+	 or	$tmp3,$tmp4
+	or	$in0,$tmp1
+	 or	$in1,$tmp3
+	dsrl	$tmp1,$in0,32
+	 dsrl	$tmp3,$in1,32
+	dsll	$in0,32
+	 dsll	$in1,32
+	or	$in0,$tmp1
+	 or	$in1,$tmp3
+# endif
+#endif
+	li	$tmp0,1
+	dsll	$tmp0,32
+	daddiu	$tmp0,-63
+	dsll	$tmp0,28
+	daddiu	$tmp0,-1		# 0ffffffc0fffffff
+
+	and	$in0,$tmp0
+	daddiu	$tmp0,-3		# 0ffffffc0ffffffc
+	and	$in1,$tmp0
+
+	sd	$in0,24($ctx)
+	dsrl	$tmp0,$in1,2
+	sd	$in1,32($ctx)
+	daddu	$tmp0,$in1		# s1 = r1 + (r1 >> 2)
+	sd	$tmp0,40($ctx)
+
+.Lno_key:
+	li	$v0,0			# return 0
+	jr	$ra
+.end	poly1305_init
+___
+{
+my ($h0,$h1,$h2,$r0,$r1,$s1,$d0,$d1,$d2) =
+   ($s0,$s1,$s2,$s3,$s4,$s5,$in0,$in1,$t2);
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.align	5
+.globl	poly1305_blocks
+.ent	poly1305_blocks
+poly1305_blocks:
+	.set	noreorder
+	dsrl	$len,4			# number of complete blocks
+	bnez	$len,poly1305_blocks_internal
+	nop
+	jr	$ra
+	nop
+.end	poly1305_blocks
+
+.align	5
+.ent	poly1305_blocks_internal
+poly1305_blocks_internal:
+	.frame	$sp,6*8,$ra
+	.mask	$SAVED_REGS_MASK,-8
+	.set	noreorder
+	dsub	$sp,6*8
+	sd	$s5,40($sp)
+	sd	$s4,32($sp)
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i);	# optimize non-nubi prologue
+	sd	$s3,24($sp)
+	sd	$s2,16($sp)
+	sd	$s1,8($sp)
+	sd	$s0,0($sp)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	.set	reorder
+
+	ld	$h0,0($ctx)		# load hash value
+	ld	$h1,8($ctx)
+	ld	$h2,16($ctx)
+
+	ld	$r0,24($ctx)		# load key
+	ld	$r1,32($ctx)
+	ld	$s1,40($ctx)
+
+.Loop:
+	ldl	$in0,0+MSB($inp)	# load input
+	ldl	$in1,8+MSB($inp)
+	ldr	$in0,0+LSB($inp)
+	daddiu	$len,-1
+	ldr	$in1,8+LSB($inp)
+	daddiu	$inp,16
+#ifdef	MIPSEB
+# if defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS64R2)
+	dsbh	$in0,$in0		# byte swap
+	 dsbh	$in1,$in1
+	dshd	$in0,$in0
+	 dshd	$in1,$in1
+# else
+	ori	$tmp0,$zero,0xFF
+	dsll	$tmp2,$tmp0,32
+	or	$tmp0,$tmp2		# 0x000000FF000000FF
+
+	and	$tmp1,$in0,$tmp0	# byte swap
+	 and	$tmp3,$in1,$tmp0
+	dsrl	$tmp2,$in0,24
+	 dsrl	$tmp4,$in1,24
+	dsll	$tmp1,24
+	 dsll	$tmp3,24
+	and	$tmp2,$tmp0
+	 and	$tmp4,$tmp0
+	dsll	$tmp0,8			# 0x0000FF000000FF00
+	or	$tmp1,$tmp2
+	 or	$tmp3,$tmp4
+	and	$tmp2,$in0,$tmp0
+	 and	$tmp4,$in1,$tmp0
+	dsrl	$in0,8
+	 dsrl	$in1,8
+	dsll	$tmp2,8
+	 dsll	$tmp4,8
+	and	$in0,$tmp0
+	 and	$in1,$tmp0
+	or	$tmp1,$tmp2
+	 or	$tmp3,$tmp4
+	or	$in0,$tmp1
+	 or	$in1,$tmp3
+	dsrl	$tmp1,$in0,32
+	 dsrl	$tmp3,$in1,32
+	dsll	$in0,32
+	 dsll	$in1,32
+	or	$in0,$tmp1
+	 or	$in1,$tmp3
+# endif
+#endif
+	daddu	$h0,$in0		# accumulate input
+	daddu	$h1,$in1
+	sltu	$tmp0,$h0,$in0
+	sltu	$tmp1,$h1,$in1
+	daddu	$h1,$tmp0
+
+	dmultu	$r0,$h0			# h0*r0
+	 daddu	$h2,$padbit
+	 sltu	$tmp0,$h1,$tmp0
+	mflo	$d0
+	mfhi	$d1
+
+	dmultu	$s1,$h1			# h1*5*r1
+	 daddu	$tmp0,$tmp1
+	 daddu	$h2,$tmp0
+	mflo	$tmp0
+	mfhi	$tmp1
+
+	dmultu	$r1,$h0			# h0*r1
+	 daddu	$d0,$tmp0
+	 daddu	$d1,$tmp1
+	mflo	$tmp2
+	mfhi	$d2
+	 sltu	$tmp0,$d0,$tmp0
+	 daddu	$d1,$tmp0
+
+	dmultu	$r0,$h1			# h1*r0
+	 daddu	$d1,$tmp2
+	 sltu	$tmp2,$d1,$tmp2
+	mflo	$tmp0
+	mfhi	$tmp1
+	 daddu	$d2,$tmp2
+
+	dmultu	$s1,$h2			# h2*5*r1
+	 daddu	$d1,$tmp0
+	 daddu	$d2,$tmp1
+	mflo	$tmp2
+
+	dmultu	$r0,$h2			# h2*r0
+	 sltu	$tmp0,$d1,$tmp0
+	 daddu	$d2,$tmp0
+	mflo	$tmp3
+
+	daddu	$d1,$tmp2
+	daddu	$d2,$tmp3
+	sltu	$tmp2,$d1,$tmp2
+	daddu	$d2,$tmp2
+
+	li	$tmp0,-4		# final reduction
+	and	$tmp0,$d2
+	dsrl	$tmp1,$d2,2
+	andi	$h2,$d2,3
+	daddu	$tmp0,$tmp1
+	daddu	$h0,$d0,$tmp0
+	sltu	$tmp0,$h0,$tmp0
+	daddu	$h1,$d1,$tmp0
+	sltu	$tmp0,$h1,$tmp0
+	daddu	$h2,$h2,$tmp0
+
+	bnez	$len,.Loop
+
+	sd	$h0,0($ctx)		# store hash value
+	sd	$h1,8($ctx)
+	sd	$h2,16($ctx)
+
+	.set	noreorder
+	ld	$s5,40($sp)		# epilogue
+	ld	$s4,32($sp)
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i);	# optimize non-nubi epilogue
+	ld	$s3,24($sp)
+	ld	$s2,16($sp)
+	ld	$s1,8($sp)
+	ld	$s0,0($sp)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	jr	$ra
+	dadd	$sp,6*8
+.end	poly1305_blocks_internal
+___
+}
+{
+my ($ctx,$mac,$nonce) = ($a0,$a1,$a2);
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.align	5
+.globl	poly1305_emit
+.ent	poly1305_emit
+poly1305_emit:
+	.frame	$sp,0,$ra
+	.set	reorder
+
+	ld	$tmp0,0($ctx)
+	ld	$tmp1,8($ctx)
+	ld	$tmp2,16($ctx)
+
+	daddiu	$in0,$tmp0,5		# compare to modulus
+	sltiu	$tmp3,$in0,5
+	daddu	$in1,$tmp1,$tmp3
+	sltu	$tmp3,$in1,$tmp3
+	daddu	$tmp2,$tmp2,$tmp3
+
+	dsrl	$tmp2,2			# see if it carried/borrowed
+	dsubu	$tmp2,$zero,$tmp2
+	nor	$tmp3,$zero,$tmp2
+
+	and	$in0,$tmp2
+	and	$tmp0,$tmp3
+	and	$in1,$tmp2
+	and	$tmp1,$tmp3
+	or	$in0,$tmp0
+	or	$in1,$tmp1
+
+	lwu	$tmp0,0($nonce)		# load nonce
+	lwu	$tmp1,4($nonce)
+	lwu	$tmp2,8($nonce)
+	lwu	$tmp3,12($nonce)
+	dsll	$tmp1,32
+	dsll	$tmp3,32
+	or	$tmp0,$tmp1
+	or	$tmp2,$tmp3
+
+	daddu	$in0,$tmp0		# accumulate nonce
+	daddu	$in1,$tmp2
+	sltu	$tmp0,$in0,$tmp0
+	daddu	$in1,$tmp0
+
+	dsrl	$tmp0,$in0,8		# write mac value
+	dsrl	$tmp1,$in0,16
+	dsrl	$tmp2,$in0,24
+	sb	$in0,0($mac)
+	dsrl	$tmp3,$in0,32
+	sb	$tmp0,1($mac)
+	dsrl	$tmp0,$in0,40
+	sb	$tmp1,2($mac)
+	dsrl	$tmp1,$in0,48
+	sb	$tmp2,3($mac)
+	dsrl	$tmp2,$in0,56
+	sb	$tmp3,4($mac)
+	dsrl	$tmp3,$in1,8
+	sb	$tmp0,5($mac)
+	dsrl	$tmp0,$in1,16
+	sb	$tmp1,6($mac)
+	dsrl	$tmp1,$in1,24
+	sb	$tmp2,7($mac)
+
+	sb	$in1,8($mac)
+	dsrl	$tmp2,$in1,32
+	sb	$tmp3,9($mac)
+	dsrl	$tmp3,$in1,40
+	sb	$tmp0,10($mac)
+	dsrl	$tmp0,$in1,48
+	sb	$tmp1,11($mac)
+	dsrl	$tmp1,$in1,56
+	sb	$tmp2,12($mac)
+	sb	$tmp3,13($mac)
+	sb	$tmp0,14($mac)
+	sb	$tmp1,15($mac)
+
+	jr	$ra
+.end	poly1305_emit
+.rdata
+.asciiz	"Poly1305 for MIPS64, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+.align	2
+___
+}
+
+$output=pop and open STDOUT,">$output";
+print $code;
+close STDOUT;
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-ppc.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-ppc.pl
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..ab65910
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-ppc.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,644 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# This module implements Poly1305 hash for PowerPC.
+#
+# June 2015
+#
+# Numbers are cycles per processed byte with poly1305_blocks alone,
+# and improvement coefficients relative to gcc-generated code.
+#
+#			-m32		-m64
+#
+# Freescale e300	14.8/+80%	-
+# PPC74x0		7.60/+60%	-
+# PPC970		7.00/+114%	3.51/+205%
+# POWER7		3.75/+260%	1.93/+100%
+# POWER8		-		2.03/+200%
+#
+# Do we need floating-point implementation for PPC? Results presented
+# in poly1305_ieee754.c are tricky to compare to, because they are for
+# compiler-generated code. On the other hand it's known that floating-
+# point performance can be dominated by FPU latency, which means that
+# there is limit even for ideally optimized (and even vectorized) code.
+# And this limit is estimated to be higher than above -m64 results. Or
+# in other words floating-point implementation can be meaningful to
+# consider only in 32-bit application context. We probably have to
+# recognize that 32-bit builds are getting less popular on high-end
+# systems and therefore tend to target embedded ones, which might not
+# even have FPU...
+#
+# On side note, Power ISA 2.07 enables vector base 2^26 implementation,
+# and POWER8 might have capacity to break 1.0 cycle per byte barrier...
+
+$flavour = shift;
+
+if ($flavour =~ /64/) {
+	$SIZE_T	=8;
+	$LRSAVE	=2*$SIZE_T;
+	$UCMP	="cmpld";
+	$STU	="stdu";
+	$POP	="ld";
+	$PUSH	="std";
+} elsif ($flavour =~ /32/) {
+	$SIZE_T	=4;
+	$LRSAVE	=$SIZE_T;
+	$UCMP	="cmplw";
+	$STU	="stwu";
+	$POP	="lwz";
+	$PUSH	="stw";
+} else { die "nonsense $flavour"; }
+
+# Define endianness based on flavour
+# i.e.: linux64le
+$LITTLE_ENDIAN = ($flavour=~/le$/) ? $SIZE_T : 0;
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+( $xlate="${dir}ppc-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
+( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/ppc-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
+die "can't locate ppc-xlate.pl";
+
+open STDOUT,"| $^X $xlate $flavour ".shift || die "can't call $xlate: $!";
+
+$FRAME=24*$SIZE_T;
+
+$sp="r1";
+my ($ctx,$inp,$len,$padbit) = map("r$_",(3..6));
+my ($mac,$nonce)=($inp,$len);
+my $mask = "r0";
+
+$code=<<___;
+.machine	"any"
+.text
+___
+							if ($flavour =~ /64/) {
+###############################################################################
+# base 2^64 implementation
+
+my ($h0,$h1,$h2,$d0,$d1,$d2, $r0,$r1,$s1, $t0,$t1) = map("r$_",(7..12,27..31));
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	.poly1305_init_int
+.align	4
+.poly1305_init_int:
+	xor	r0,r0,r0
+	std	r0,0($ctx)		# zero hash value
+	std	r0,8($ctx)
+	std	r0,16($ctx)
+
+	$UCMP	$inp,r0
+	beq-	Lno_key
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+	ld	$d0,0($inp)		# load key material
+	ld	$d1,8($inp)
+___
+$code.=<<___	if (!$LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+	li	$h0,4
+	lwbrx	$d0,0,$inp		# load key material
+	li	$d1,8
+	lwbrx	$h0,$h0,$inp
+	li	$h1,12
+	lwbrx	$d1,$d1,$inp
+	lwbrx	$h1,$h1,$inp
+	insrdi	$d0,$h0,32,0
+	insrdi	$d1,$h1,32,0
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	lis	$h1,0xfff		# 0x0fff0000
+	ori	$h1,$h1,0xfffc		# 0x0ffffffc
+	insrdi	$h1,$h1,32,0		# 0x0ffffffc0ffffffc
+	ori	$h0,$h1,3		# 0x0ffffffc0fffffff
+
+	and	$d0,$d0,$h0
+	and	$d1,$d1,$h1
+
+	std	$d0,32($ctx)		# store key
+	std	$d1,40($ctx)
+
+Lno_key:
+	xor	r3,r3,r3
+	blr
+	.long	0
+	.byte	0,12,0x14,0,0,0,2,0
+.size	.poly1305_init_int,.-.poly1305_init_int
+
+.globl	.poly1305_blocks
+.align	4
+.poly1305_blocks:
+	srdi.	$len,$len,4
+	beq-	Labort
+
+	$STU	$sp,-$FRAME($sp)
+	mflr	r0
+	$PUSH	r27,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*5`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r28,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*4`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r29,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*3`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r30,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*2`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r31,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*1`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r0,`$FRAME+$LRSAVE`($sp)
+
+	ld	$r0,32($ctx)		# load key
+	ld	$r1,40($ctx)
+
+	ld	$h0,0($ctx)		# load hash value
+	ld	$h1,8($ctx)
+	ld	$h2,16($ctx)
+
+	srdi	$s1,$r1,2
+	mtctr	$len
+	add	$s1,$s1,$r1		# s1 = r1 + r1>>2
+	li	$mask,3
+	b	Loop
+
+.align	4
+Loop:
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+	ld	$t0,0($inp)		# load input
+	ld	$t1,8($inp)
+___
+$code.=<<___	if (!$LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+	li	$d0,4
+	lwbrx	$t0,0,$inp		# load input
+	li	$t1,8
+	lwbrx	$d0,$d0,$inp
+	li	$d1,12
+	lwbrx	$t1,$t1,$inp
+	lwbrx	$d1,$d1,$inp
+	insrdi	$t0,$d0,32,0
+	insrdi	$t1,$d1,32,0
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	addi	$inp,$inp,16
+
+	addc	$h0,$h0,$t0		# accumulate input
+	adde	$h1,$h1,$t1
+
+	mulld	$d0,$h0,$r0		# h0*r0
+	mulhdu	$d1,$h0,$r0
+	adde	$h2,$h2,$padbit
+
+	mulld	$t0,$h1,$s1		# h1*5*r1
+	mulhdu	$t1,$h1,$s1
+	addc	$d0,$d0,$t0
+	adde	$d1,$d1,$t1
+
+	mulld	$t0,$h0,$r1		# h0*r1
+	mulhdu	$d2,$h0,$r1
+	addc	$d1,$d1,$t0
+	addze	$d2,$d2
+
+	mulld	$t0,$h1,$r0		# h1*r0
+	mulhdu	$t1,$h1,$r0
+	addc	$d1,$d1,$t0
+	adde	$d2,$d2,$t1
+
+	mulld	$t0,$h2,$s1		# h2*5*r1
+	mulld	$t1,$h2,$r0		# h2*r0
+	addc	$d1,$d1,$t0
+	adde	$d2,$d2,$t1
+
+	andc	$t0,$d2,$mask		# final reduction step
+	and	$h2,$d2,$mask
+	srdi	$t1,$t0,2
+	add	$t0,$t0,$t1
+	addc	$h0,$d0,$t0
+	addze	$h1,$d1
+	addze	$h2,$h2
+
+	bdnz	Loop
+
+	std	$h0,0($ctx)		# store hash value
+	std	$h1,8($ctx)
+	std	$h2,16($ctx)
+
+	$POP	r27,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*5`($sp)
+	$POP	r28,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*4`($sp)
+	$POP	r29,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*3`($sp)
+	$POP	r30,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*2`($sp)
+	$POP	r31,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*1`($sp)
+	addi	$sp,$sp,$FRAME
+Labort:
+	blr
+	.long	0
+	.byte	0,12,4,1,0x80,5,4,0
+.size	.poly1305_blocks,.-.poly1305_blocks
+
+.globl	.poly1305_emit
+.align	4
+.poly1305_emit:
+	ld	$h0,0($ctx)		# load hash
+	ld	$h1,8($ctx)
+	ld	$h2,16($ctx)
+	ld	$padbit,0($nonce)	# load nonce
+	ld	$nonce,8($nonce)
+
+	addic	$d0,$h0,5		# compare to modulus
+	addze	$d1,$h1
+	addze	$d2,$h2
+
+	srdi	$mask,$d2,2		# did it carry/borrow?
+	neg	$mask,$mask
+
+	andc	$h0,$h0,$mask
+	and	$d0,$d0,$mask
+	andc	$h1,$h1,$mask
+	and	$d1,$d1,$mask
+	or	$h0,$h0,$d0
+	or	$h1,$h1,$d1
+___
+$code.=<<___	if (!$LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+	rotldi	$padbit,$padbit,32	# flip nonce words
+	rotldi	$nonce,$nonce,32
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	addc	$h0,$h0,$padbit		# accumulate nonce
+	adde	$h1,$h1,$nonce
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+	std	$h0,0($mac)		# write result
+	std	$h1,8($mac)
+___
+$code.=<<___	if (!$LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+	extrdi	r0,$h0,32,0
+	li	$d0,4
+	stwbrx	$h0,0,$mac		# write result
+	extrdi	$h0,$h1,32,0
+	li	$d1,8
+	stwbrx	r0,$d0,$mac
+	li	$d2,12
+	stwbrx	$h1,$d1,$mac
+	stwbrx	$h0,$d2,$mac
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	blr
+	.long	0
+	.byte	0,12,0x14,0,0,0,3,0
+.size	.poly1305_emit,.-.poly1305_emit
+___
+							} else {
+###############################################################################
+# base 2^32 implementation
+
+my ($h0,$h1,$h2,$h3,$h4, $r0,$r1,$r2,$r3, $s1,$s2,$s3,
+    $t0,$t1,$t2,$t3, $D0,$D1,$D2,$D3, $d0,$d1,$d2,$d3
+   ) = map("r$_",(7..12,14..31));
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	.poly1305_init_int
+.align	4
+.poly1305_init_int:
+	xor	r0,r0,r0
+	stw	r0,0($ctx)		# zero hash value
+	stw	r0,4($ctx)
+	stw	r0,8($ctx)
+	stw	r0,12($ctx)
+	stw	r0,16($ctx)
+
+	$UCMP	$inp,r0
+	beq-	Lno_key
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+	lw	$h0,0($inp)		# load key material
+	lw	$h1,4($inp)
+	lw	$h2,8($inp)
+	lw	$h3,12($inp)
+___
+$code.=<<___	if (!$LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+	li	$h1,4
+	lwbrx	$h0,0,$inp		# load key material
+	li	$h2,8
+	lwbrx	$h1,$h1,$inp
+	li	$h3,12
+	lwbrx	$h2,$h2,$inp
+	lwbrx	$h3,$h3,$inp
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	lis	$mask,0xf000		# 0xf0000000
+	li	$r0,-4
+	andc	$r0,$r0,$mask		# 0x0ffffffc
+
+	andc	$h0,$h0,$mask
+	and	$h1,$h1,$r0
+	and	$h2,$h2,$r0
+	and	$h3,$h3,$r0
+
+	stw	$h0,32($ctx)		# store key
+	stw	$h1,36($ctx)
+	stw	$h2,40($ctx)
+	stw	$h3,44($ctx)
+
+Lno_key:
+	xor	r3,r3,r3
+	blr
+	.long	0
+	.byte	0,12,0x14,0,0,0,2,0
+.size	.poly1305_init_int,.-.poly1305_init_int
+
+.globl	.poly1305_blocks
+.align	4
+.poly1305_blocks:
+	srwi.	$len,$len,4
+	beq-	Labort
+
+	$STU	$sp,-$FRAME($sp)
+	mflr	r0
+	$PUSH	r14,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*18`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r15,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*17`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r16,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*16`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r17,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*15`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r18,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*14`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r19,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*13`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r20,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*12`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r21,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*11`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r22,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*10`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r23,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*9`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r24,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*8`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r25,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*7`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r26,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*6`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r27,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*5`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r28,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*4`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r29,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*3`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r30,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*2`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r31,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*1`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r0,`$FRAME+$LRSAVE`($sp)
+
+	lwz	$r0,32($ctx)		# load key
+	lwz	$r1,36($ctx)
+	lwz	$r2,40($ctx)
+	lwz	$r3,44($ctx)
+
+	lwz	$h0,0($ctx)		# load hash value
+	lwz	$h1,4($ctx)
+	lwz	$h2,8($ctx)
+	lwz	$h3,12($ctx)
+	lwz	$h4,16($ctx)
+
+	srwi	$s1,$r1,2
+	srwi	$s2,$r2,2
+	srwi	$s3,$r3,2
+	add	$s1,$s1,$r1		# si = ri + ri>>2
+	add	$s2,$s2,$r2
+	add	$s3,$s3,$r3
+	mtctr	$len
+	li	$mask,3
+	b	Loop
+
+.align	4
+Loop:
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+	lwz	$d0,0($inp)		# load input
+	lwz	$d1,4($inp)
+	lwz	$d2,8($inp)
+	lwz	$d3,12($inp)
+___
+$code.=<<___	if (!$LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+	li	$d1,4
+	lwbrx	$d0,0,$inp		# load input
+	li	$d2,8
+	lwbrx	$d1,$d1,$inp
+	li	$d3,12
+	lwbrx	$d2,$d2,$inp
+	lwbrx	$d3,$d3,$inp
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	addi	$inp,$inp,16
+
+	addc	$h0,$h0,$d0		# accumulate input
+	adde	$h1,$h1,$d1
+	adde	$h2,$h2,$d2
+
+	mullw	$d0,$h0,$r0		# h0*r0
+	mulhwu	$D0,$h0,$r0
+
+	mullw	$d1,$h0,$r1		# h0*r1
+	mulhwu	$D1,$h0,$r1
+
+	mullw	$d2,$h0,$r2		# h0*r2
+	mulhwu	$D2,$h0,$r2
+
+	 adde	$h3,$h3,$d3
+	 adde	$h4,$h4,$padbit
+
+	mullw	$d3,$h0,$r3		# h0*r3
+	mulhwu	$D3,$h0,$r3
+
+	mullw	$t0,$h1,$s3		# h1*s3
+	mulhwu	$t1,$h1,$s3
+
+	mullw	$t2,$h1,$r0		# h1*r0
+	mulhwu	$t3,$h1,$r0
+	 addc	$d0,$d0,$t0
+	 adde	$D0,$D0,$t1
+
+	mullw	$t0,$h1,$r1		# h1*r1
+	mulhwu	$t1,$h1,$r1
+	 addc	$d1,$d1,$t2
+	 adde	$D1,$D1,$t3
+
+	mullw	$t2,$h1,$r2		# h1*r2
+	mulhwu	$t3,$h1,$r2
+	 addc	$d2,$d2,$t0
+	 adde	$D2,$D2,$t1
+
+	mullw	$t0,$h2,$s2		# h2*s2
+	mulhwu	$t1,$h2,$s2
+	 addc	$d3,$d3,$t2
+	 adde	$D3,$D3,$t3
+
+	mullw	$t2,$h2,$s3		# h2*s3
+	mulhwu	$t3,$h2,$s3
+	 addc	$d0,$d0,$t0
+	 adde	$D0,$D0,$t1
+
+	mullw	$t0,$h2,$r0		# h2*r0
+	mulhwu	$t1,$h2,$r0
+	 addc	$d1,$d1,$t2
+	 adde	$D1,$D1,$t3
+
+	mullw	$t2,$h2,$r1		# h2*r1
+	mulhwu	$t3,$h2,$r1
+	 addc	$d2,$d2,$t0
+	 adde	$D2,$D2,$t1
+
+	mullw	$t0,$h3,$s1		# h3*s1
+	mulhwu	$t1,$h3,$s1
+	 addc	$d3,$d3,$t2
+	 adde	$D3,$D3,$t3
+
+	mullw	$t2,$h3,$s2		# h3*s2
+	mulhwu	$t3,$h3,$s2
+	 addc	$d0,$d0,$t0
+	 adde	$D0,$D0,$t1
+
+	mullw	$t0,$h3,$s3		# h3*s3
+	mulhwu	$t1,$h3,$s3
+	 addc	$d1,$d1,$t2
+	 adde	$D1,$D1,$t3
+
+	mullw	$t2,$h3,$r0		# h3*r0
+	mulhwu	$t3,$h3,$r0
+	 addc	$d2,$d2,$t0
+	 adde	$D2,$D2,$t1
+
+	mullw	$t0,$h4,$s1		# h4*s1
+	 addc	$d3,$d3,$t2
+	 adde	$D3,$D3,$t3
+	addc	$d1,$d1,$t0
+
+	mullw	$t1,$h4,$s2		# h4*s2
+	 addze	$D1,$D1
+	addc	$d2,$d2,$t1
+	addze	$D2,$D2
+
+	mullw	$t2,$h4,$s3		# h4*s3
+	addc	$d3,$d3,$t2
+	addze	$D3,$D3
+
+	mullw	$h4,$h4,$r0		# h4*r0
+
+	addc	$h1,$d1,$D0
+	adde	$h2,$d2,$D1
+	adde	$h3,$d3,$D2
+	adde	$h4,$h4,$D3
+
+	andc	$D0,$h4,$mask		# final reduction step
+	and	$h4,$h4,$mask
+	srwi	$D1,$D0,2
+	add	$D0,$D0,$D1
+	addc	$h0,$d0,$D0
+	addze	$h1,$h1
+	addze	$h2,$h2
+	addze	$h3,$h3
+	addze	$h4,$h4
+
+	bdnz	Loop
+
+	stw	$h0,0($ctx)		# store hash value
+	stw	$h1,4($ctx)
+	stw	$h2,8($ctx)
+	stw	$h3,12($ctx)
+	stw	$h4,16($ctx)
+
+	$POP	r14,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*18`($sp)
+	$POP	r15,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*17`($sp)
+	$POP	r16,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*16`($sp)
+	$POP	r17,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*15`($sp)
+	$POP	r18,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*14`($sp)
+	$POP	r19,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*13`($sp)
+	$POP	r20,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*12`($sp)
+	$POP	r21,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*11`($sp)
+	$POP	r22,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*10`($sp)
+	$POP	r23,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*9`($sp)
+	$POP	r24,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*8`($sp)
+	$POP	r25,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*7`($sp)
+	$POP	r26,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*6`($sp)
+	$POP	r27,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*5`($sp)
+	$POP	r28,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*4`($sp)
+	$POP	r29,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*3`($sp)
+	$POP	r30,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*2`($sp)
+	$POP	r31,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*1`($sp)
+	addi	$sp,$sp,$FRAME
+Labort:
+	blr
+	.long	0
+	.byte	0,12,4,1,0x80,18,4,0
+.size	.poly1305_blocks,.-.poly1305_blocks
+
+.globl	.poly1305_emit
+.align	4
+.poly1305_emit:
+	$STU	$sp,-$FRAME($sp)
+	mflr	r0
+	$PUSH	r28,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*4`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r29,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*3`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r30,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*2`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r31,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*1`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r0,`$FRAME+$LRSAVE`($sp)
+
+	lwz	$h0,0($ctx)		# load hash
+	lwz	$h1,4($ctx)
+	lwz	$h2,8($ctx)
+	lwz	$h3,12($ctx)
+	lwz	$h4,16($ctx)
+
+	addic	$d0,$h0,5		# compare to modulus
+	addze	$d1,$h1
+	addze	$d2,$h2
+	addze	$d3,$h3
+	addze	$mask,$h4
+
+	srwi	$mask,$mask,2		# did it carry/borrow?
+	neg	$mask,$mask
+
+	andc	$h0,$h0,$mask
+	and	$d0,$d0,$mask
+	andc	$h1,$h1,$mask
+	and	$d1,$d1,$mask
+	or	$h0,$h0,$d0
+	lwz	$d0,0($nonce)		# load nonce
+	andc	$h2,$h2,$mask
+	and	$d2,$d2,$mask
+	or	$h1,$h1,$d1
+	lwz	$d1,4($nonce)
+	andc	$h3,$h3,$mask
+	and	$d3,$d3,$mask
+	or	$h2,$h2,$d2
+	lwz	$d2,8($nonce)
+	or	$h3,$h3,$d3
+	lwz	$d3,12($nonce)
+
+	addc	$h0,$h0,$d0		# accumulate nonce
+	adde	$h1,$h1,$d1
+	adde	$h2,$h2,$d2
+	adde	$h3,$h3,$d3
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+	stw	$h0,0($mac)		# write result
+	stw	$h1,4($mac)
+	stw	$h2,8($mac)
+	stw	$h3,12($mac)
+___
+$code.=<<___	if (!$LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+	li	$d1,4
+	stwbrx	$h0,0,$mac		# write result
+	li	$d2,8
+	stwbrx	$h1,$d1,$mac
+	li	$d3,12
+	stwbrx	$h2,$d2,$mac
+	stwbrx	$h3,$d3,$mac
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	$POP	r28,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*4`($sp)
+	$POP	r29,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*3`($sp)
+	$POP	r30,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*2`($sp)
+	$POP	r31,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*1`($sp)
+	addi	$sp,$sp,$FRAME
+	blr
+	.long	0
+	.byte	0,12,4,1,0x80,4,3,0
+.size	.poly1305_emit,.-.poly1305_emit
+___
+							}
+$code.=<<___;
+.asciz	"Poly1305 for PPC, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+___
+
+$code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem;
+print $code;
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-ppcfp.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-ppcfp.pl
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..49f70a8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-ppcfp.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,739 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# This module implements Poly1305 hash for PowerPC FPU.
+#
+# June 2015
+#
+# Numbers are cycles per processed byte with poly1305_blocks alone,
+# and improvement coefficients relative to gcc-generated code.
+#
+# Freescale e300	9.78/+30%
+# PPC74x0		6.92/+50%
+# PPC970		6.03/+80%
+# POWER7		3.50/+30%
+# POWER8		3.75/+10%
+
+$flavour = shift;
+
+if ($flavour =~ /64/) {
+	$SIZE_T	=8;
+	$LRSAVE	=2*$SIZE_T;
+	$UCMP	="cmpld";
+	$STU	="stdu";
+	$POP	="ld";
+	$PUSH	="std";
+} elsif ($flavour =~ /32/) {
+	$SIZE_T	=4;
+	$LRSAVE	=$SIZE_T;
+	$UCMP	="cmplw";
+	$STU	="stwu";
+	$POP	="lwz";
+	$PUSH	="stw";
+} else { die "nonsense $flavour"; }
+
+$LITTLE_ENDIAN = ($flavour=~/le$/) ? 4 : 0;
+
+$LWXLE = $LITTLE_ENDIAN ? "lwzx" : "lwbrx";
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+( $xlate="${dir}ppc-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
+( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/ppc-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
+die "can't locate ppc-xlate.pl";
+
+open STDOUT,"| $^X $xlate $flavour ".shift || die "can't call $xlate: $!";
+
+$LOCALS=6*$SIZE_T;
+$FRAME=$LOCALS+6*8+18*8;
+
+my $sp="r1";
+
+my ($ctx,$inp,$len,$padbit) = map("r$_",(3..6));
+my ($in0,$in1,$in2,$in3,$i1,$i2,$i3) = map("r$_",(7..12,6));
+
+my ($h0lo,$h0hi,$h1lo,$h1hi,$h2lo,$h2hi,$h3lo,$h3hi,
+    $two0,$two32,$two64,$two96,$two130,$five_two130,
+    $r0lo,$r0hi,$r1lo,$r1hi,$r2lo,$r2hi,
+    $s2lo,$s2hi,$s3lo,$s3hi,
+    $c0lo,$c0hi,$c1lo,$c1hi,$c2lo,$c2hi,$c3lo,$c3hi) = map("f$_",(0..31));
+# borrowings
+my ($r3lo,$r3hi,$s1lo,$s1hi) = ($c0lo,$c0hi,$c1lo,$c1hi);
+my ($x0,$x1,$x2,$x3) = ($c2lo,$c2hi,$c3lo,$c3hi);
+my ($y0,$y1,$y2,$y3) = ($c3lo,$c3hi,$c1lo,$c1hi);
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.machine	"any"
+.text
+
+.globl	.poly1305_init_fpu
+.align	6
+.poly1305_init_fpu:
+	$STU	$sp,-$LOCALS($sp)		# minimal frame
+	mflr	$padbit
+	$PUSH	$padbit,`$LOCALS+$LRSAVE`($sp)
+
+	bl	LPICmeup
+
+	xor	r0,r0,r0
+	mtlr	$padbit				# restore lr
+
+	lfd	$two0,8*0($len)			# load constants
+	lfd	$two32,8*1($len)
+	lfd	$two64,8*2($len)
+	lfd	$two96,8*3($len)
+	lfd	$two130,8*4($len)
+	lfd	$five_two130,8*5($len)
+
+	stfd	$two0,8*0($ctx)			# initial hash value, biased 0
+	stfd	$two32,8*1($ctx)
+	stfd	$two64,8*2($ctx)
+	stfd	$two96,8*3($ctx)
+
+	$UCMP	$inp,r0
+	beq-	Lno_key
+
+	lfd	$h3lo,8*13($len)		# new fpscr
+	mffs	$h3hi				# old fpscr
+
+	stfd	$two0,8*4($ctx)			# key "template"
+	stfd	$two32,8*5($ctx)
+	stfd	$two64,8*6($ctx)
+	stfd	$two96,8*7($ctx)
+
+	li	$in1,4
+	li	$in2,8
+	li	$in3,12
+	$LWXLE	$in0,0,$inp			# load key
+	$LWXLE	$in1,$in1,$inp
+	$LWXLE	$in2,$in2,$inp
+	$LWXLE	$in3,$in3,$inp
+
+	lis	$i1,0xf000			#   0xf0000000
+	ori	$i2,$i1,3			#   0xf0000003
+	andc	$in0,$in0,$i1			# &=0x0fffffff
+	andc	$in1,$in1,$i2			# &=0x0ffffffc
+	andc	$in2,$in2,$i2
+	andc	$in3,$in3,$i2
+
+	stw	$in0,`8*4+(4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN)`($ctx)	# fill "template"
+	stw	$in1,`8*5+(4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN)`($ctx)
+	stw	$in2,`8*6+(4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN)`($ctx)
+	stw	$in3,`8*7+(4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN)`($ctx)
+
+	mtfsf	255,$h3lo			# fpscr
+	stfd	$two0,8*18($ctx)		# copy constants to context
+	stfd	$two32,8*19($ctx)
+	stfd	$two64,8*20($ctx)
+	stfd	$two96,8*21($ctx)
+	stfd	$two130,8*22($ctx)
+	stfd	$five_two130,8*23($ctx)
+
+	lfd	$h0lo,8*4($ctx)			# load [biased] key
+	lfd	$h1lo,8*5($ctx)
+	lfd	$h2lo,8*6($ctx)
+	lfd	$h3lo,8*7($ctx)
+
+	fsub	$h0lo,$h0lo,$two0		# r0
+	fsub	$h1lo,$h1lo,$two32		# r1
+	fsub	$h2lo,$h2lo,$two64		# r2
+	fsub	$h3lo,$h3lo,$two96		# r3
+
+	lfd	$two0,8*6($len)			# more constants
+	lfd	$two32,8*7($len)
+	lfd	$two64,8*8($len)
+	lfd	$two96,8*9($len)
+
+	fmul	$h1hi,$h1lo,$five_two130	# s1
+	fmul	$h2hi,$h2lo,$five_two130	# s2
+	 stfd	$h3hi,8*15($ctx)		# borrow slot for original fpscr
+	fmul	$h3hi,$h3lo,$five_two130	# s3
+
+	fadd	$h0hi,$h0lo,$two0
+	 stfd	$h1hi,8*12($ctx)		# put aside for now
+	fadd	$h1hi,$h1lo,$two32
+	 stfd	$h2hi,8*13($ctx)
+	fadd	$h2hi,$h2lo,$two64
+	 stfd	$h3hi,8*14($ctx)
+	fadd	$h3hi,$h3lo,$two96
+
+	fsub	$h0hi,$h0hi,$two0
+	fsub	$h1hi,$h1hi,$two32
+	fsub	$h2hi,$h2hi,$two64
+	fsub	$h3hi,$h3hi,$two96
+
+	lfd	$two0,8*10($len)		# more constants
+	lfd	$two32,8*11($len)
+	lfd	$two64,8*12($len)
+
+	fsub	$h0lo,$h0lo,$h0hi
+	fsub	$h1lo,$h1lo,$h1hi
+	fsub	$h2lo,$h2lo,$h2hi
+	fsub	$h3lo,$h3lo,$h3hi
+
+	stfd	$h0hi,8*5($ctx)			# r0hi
+	stfd	$h1hi,8*7($ctx)			# r1hi
+	stfd	$h2hi,8*9($ctx)			# r2hi
+	stfd	$h3hi,8*11($ctx)		# r3hi
+
+	stfd	$h0lo,8*4($ctx)			# r0lo
+	stfd	$h1lo,8*6($ctx)			# r1lo
+	stfd	$h2lo,8*8($ctx)			# r2lo
+	stfd	$h3lo,8*10($ctx)		# r3lo
+
+	lfd	$h1lo,8*12($ctx)		# s1
+	lfd	$h2lo,8*13($ctx)		# s2
+	lfd	$h3lo,8*14($ctx)		# s3
+	lfd	$h0lo,8*15($ctx)		# pull original fpscr
+
+	fadd	$h1hi,$h1lo,$two0
+	fadd	$h2hi,$h2lo,$two32
+	fadd	$h3hi,$h3lo,$two64
+
+	fsub	$h1hi,$h1hi,$two0
+	fsub	$h2hi,$h2hi,$two32
+	fsub	$h3hi,$h3hi,$two64
+
+	fsub	$h1lo,$h1lo,$h1hi
+	fsub	$h2lo,$h2lo,$h2hi
+	fsub	$h3lo,$h3lo,$h3hi
+
+	stfd	$h1hi,8*13($ctx)		# s1hi
+	stfd	$h2hi,8*15($ctx)		# s2hi
+	stfd	$h3hi,8*17($ctx)		# s3hi
+
+	stfd	$h1lo,8*12($ctx)		# s1lo
+	stfd	$h2lo,8*14($ctx)		# s2lo
+	stfd	$h3lo,8*16($ctx)		# s3lo
+
+	mtfsf	255,$h0lo			# restore fpscr
+Lno_key:
+	xor	r3,r3,r3
+	addi	$sp,$sp,$LOCALS
+	blr
+	.long	0
+	.byte	0,12,4,1,0x80,0,2,0
+.size	.poly1305_init_fpu,.-.poly1305_init_fpu
+
+.globl	.poly1305_blocks_fpu
+.align	4
+.poly1305_blocks_fpu:
+	srwi.	$len,$len,4
+	beq-	Labort
+
+	$STU	$sp,-$FRAME($sp)
+	mflr	r0
+	stfd	f14,`$FRAME-8*18`($sp)
+	stfd	f15,`$FRAME-8*17`($sp)
+	stfd	f16,`$FRAME-8*16`($sp)
+	stfd	f17,`$FRAME-8*15`($sp)
+	stfd	f18,`$FRAME-8*14`($sp)
+	stfd	f19,`$FRAME-8*13`($sp)
+	stfd	f20,`$FRAME-8*12`($sp)
+	stfd	f21,`$FRAME-8*11`($sp)
+	stfd	f22,`$FRAME-8*10`($sp)
+	stfd	f23,`$FRAME-8*9`($sp)
+	stfd	f24,`$FRAME-8*8`($sp)
+	stfd	f25,`$FRAME-8*7`($sp)
+	stfd	f26,`$FRAME-8*6`($sp)
+	stfd	f27,`$FRAME-8*5`($sp)
+	stfd	f28,`$FRAME-8*4`($sp)
+	stfd	f29,`$FRAME-8*3`($sp)
+	stfd	f30,`$FRAME-8*2`($sp)
+	stfd	f31,`$FRAME-8*1`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r0,`$FRAME+$LRSAVE`($sp)
+
+	xor	r0,r0,r0
+	li	$in3,1
+	mtctr	$len
+	neg	$len,$len
+	stw	r0,`$LOCALS+8*4+(0^$LITTLE_ENDIAN)`($sp)
+	stw	$in3,`$LOCALS+8*4+(4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN)`($sp)
+
+	lfd	$two0,8*18($ctx)		# load constants
+	lfd	$two32,8*19($ctx)
+	lfd	$two64,8*20($ctx)
+	lfd	$two96,8*21($ctx)
+	lfd	$two130,8*22($ctx)
+	lfd	$five_two130,8*23($ctx)
+
+	lfd	$h0lo,8*0($ctx)			# load [biased] hash value
+	lfd	$h1lo,8*1($ctx)
+	lfd	$h2lo,8*2($ctx)
+	lfd	$h3lo,8*3($ctx)
+
+	stfd	$two0,`$LOCALS+8*0`($sp)	# input "template"
+	oris	$in3,$padbit,`(1023+52+96)<<4`
+	stfd	$two32,`$LOCALS+8*1`($sp)
+	stfd	$two64,`$LOCALS+8*2`($sp)
+	stw	$in3,`$LOCALS+8*3+(0^$LITTLE_ENDIAN)`($sp)
+
+	li	$i1,4
+	li	$i2,8
+	li	$i3,12
+	$LWXLE	$in0,0,$inp			# load input
+	$LWXLE	$in1,$i1,$inp
+	$LWXLE	$in2,$i2,$inp
+	$LWXLE	$in3,$i3,$inp
+	addi	$inp,$inp,16
+
+	stw	$in0,`$LOCALS+8*0+(4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN)`($sp)	# fill "template"
+	stw	$in1,`$LOCALS+8*1+(4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN)`($sp)
+	stw	$in2,`$LOCALS+8*2+(4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN)`($sp)
+	stw	$in3,`$LOCALS+8*3+(4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN)`($sp)
+
+	mffs	$x0				# original fpscr
+	lfd	$x1,`$LOCALS+8*4`($sp)		# new fpscr
+	lfd	$r0lo,8*4($ctx)			# load key
+	lfd	$r0hi,8*5($ctx)
+	lfd	$r1lo,8*6($ctx)
+	lfd	$r1hi,8*7($ctx)
+	lfd	$r2lo,8*8($ctx)
+	lfd	$r2hi,8*9($ctx)
+	lfd	$r3lo,8*10($ctx)
+	lfd	$r3hi,8*11($ctx)
+	lfd	$s1lo,8*12($ctx)
+	lfd	$s1hi,8*13($ctx)
+	lfd	$s2lo,8*14($ctx)
+	lfd	$s2hi,8*15($ctx)
+	lfd	$s3lo,8*16($ctx)
+	lfd	$s3hi,8*17($ctx)
+
+	stfd	$x0,`$LOCALS+8*4`($sp)		# save original fpscr
+	mtfsf	255,$x1
+
+	addic	$len,$len,1
+	addze	r0,r0
+	slwi.	r0,r0,4
+	sub	$inp,$inp,r0			# conditional rewind
+
+	lfd	$x0,`$LOCALS+8*0`($sp)
+	lfd	$x1,`$LOCALS+8*1`($sp)
+	lfd	$x2,`$LOCALS+8*2`($sp)
+	lfd	$x3,`$LOCALS+8*3`($sp)
+
+	fsub	$h0lo,$h0lo,$two0		# de-bias hash value
+	 $LWXLE	$in0,0,$inp			# modulo-scheduled input load
+	fsub	$h1lo,$h1lo,$two32
+	 $LWXLE	$in1,$i1,$inp
+	fsub	$h2lo,$h2lo,$two64
+	 $LWXLE	$in2,$i2,$inp
+	fsub	$h3lo,$h3lo,$two96
+	 $LWXLE	$in3,$i3,$inp
+
+	fsub	$x0,$x0,$two0			# de-bias input
+	 addi	$inp,$inp,16
+	fsub	$x1,$x1,$two32
+	fsub	$x2,$x2,$two64
+	fsub	$x3,$x3,$two96
+
+	fadd	$x0,$x0,$h0lo			# accumulate input
+	 stw	$in0,`$LOCALS+8*0+(4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN)`($sp)
+	fadd	$x1,$x1,$h1lo
+	 stw	$in1,`$LOCALS+8*1+(4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN)`($sp)
+	fadd	$x2,$x2,$h2lo
+	 stw	$in2,`$LOCALS+8*2+(4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN)`($sp)
+	fadd	$x3,$x3,$h3lo
+	 stw	$in3,`$LOCALS+8*3+(4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN)`($sp)
+
+	b	Lentry
+
+.align	4
+Loop:
+	fsub	$y0,$y0,$two0			# de-bias input
+	 addic	$len,$len,1
+	fsub	$y1,$y1,$two32
+	 addze	r0,r0
+	fsub	$y2,$y2,$two64
+	 slwi.	r0,r0,4
+	fsub	$y3,$y3,$two96
+	 sub	$inp,$inp,r0			# conditional rewind
+
+	fadd	$h0lo,$h0lo,$y0			# accumulate input
+	fadd	$h0hi,$h0hi,$y1
+	fadd	$h2lo,$h2lo,$y2
+	fadd	$h2hi,$h2hi,$y3
+
+	######################################### base 2^48 -> base 2^32
+	fadd	$c1lo,$h1lo,$two64
+	 $LWXLE	$in0,0,$inp			# modulo-scheduled input load
+	fadd	$c1hi,$h1hi,$two64
+	 $LWXLE	$in1,$i1,$inp
+	fadd	$c3lo,$h3lo,$two130
+	 $LWXLE	$in2,$i2,$inp
+	fadd	$c3hi,$h3hi,$two130
+	 $LWXLE	$in3,$i3,$inp
+	fadd	$c0lo,$h0lo,$two32
+	 addi	$inp,$inp,16
+	fadd	$c0hi,$h0hi,$two32
+	fadd	$c2lo,$h2lo,$two96
+	fadd	$c2hi,$h2hi,$two96
+
+	fsub	$c1lo,$c1lo,$two64
+	 stw	$in0,`$LOCALS+8*0+(4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN)`($sp)	# fill "template"
+	fsub	$c1hi,$c1hi,$two64
+	 stw	$in1,`$LOCALS+8*1+(4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN)`($sp)
+	fsub	$c3lo,$c3lo,$two130
+	 stw	$in2,`$LOCALS+8*2+(4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN)`($sp)
+	fsub	$c3hi,$c3hi,$two130
+	 stw	$in3,`$LOCALS+8*3+(4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN)`($sp)
+	fsub	$c0lo,$c0lo,$two32
+	fsub	$c0hi,$c0hi,$two32
+	fsub	$c2lo,$c2lo,$two96
+	fsub	$c2hi,$c2hi,$two96
+
+	fsub	$h1lo,$h1lo,$c1lo
+	fsub	$h1hi,$h1hi,$c1hi
+	fsub	$h3lo,$h3lo,$c3lo
+	fsub	$h3hi,$h3hi,$c3hi
+	fsub	$h2lo,$h2lo,$c2lo
+	fsub	$h2hi,$h2hi,$c2hi
+	fsub	$h0lo,$h0lo,$c0lo
+	fsub	$h0hi,$h0hi,$c0hi
+
+	fadd	$h1lo,$h1lo,$c0lo
+	fadd	$h1hi,$h1hi,$c0hi
+	fadd	$h3lo,$h3lo,$c2lo
+	fadd	$h3hi,$h3hi,$c2hi
+	fadd	$h2lo,$h2lo,$c1lo
+	fadd	$h2hi,$h2hi,$c1hi
+	fmadd	$h0lo,$c3lo,$five_two130,$h0lo
+	fmadd	$h0hi,$c3hi,$five_two130,$h0hi
+
+	fadd	$x1,$h1lo,$h1hi
+	 lfd	$s1lo,8*12($ctx)		# reload constants
+	fadd	$x3,$h3lo,$h3hi
+	 lfd	$s1hi,8*13($ctx)
+	fadd	$x2,$h2lo,$h2hi
+	 lfd	$r3lo,8*10($ctx)
+	fadd	$x0,$h0lo,$h0hi
+	 lfd	$r3hi,8*11($ctx)
+Lentry:
+	fmul	$h0lo,$s3lo,$x1
+	fmul	$h0hi,$s3hi,$x1
+	fmul	$h2lo,$r1lo,$x1
+	fmul	$h2hi,$r1hi,$x1
+	fmul	$h1lo,$r0lo,$x1
+	fmul	$h1hi,$r0hi,$x1
+	fmul	$h3lo,$r2lo,$x1
+	fmul	$h3hi,$r2hi,$x1
+
+	fmadd	$h0lo,$s1lo,$x3,$h0lo
+	fmadd	$h0hi,$s1hi,$x3,$h0hi
+	fmadd	$h2lo,$s3lo,$x3,$h2lo
+	fmadd	$h2hi,$s3hi,$x3,$h2hi
+	fmadd	$h1lo,$s2lo,$x3,$h1lo
+	fmadd	$h1hi,$s2hi,$x3,$h1hi
+	fmadd	$h3lo,$r0lo,$x3,$h3lo
+	fmadd	$h3hi,$r0hi,$x3,$h3hi
+
+	fmadd	$h0lo,$s2lo,$x2,$h0lo
+	fmadd	$h0hi,$s2hi,$x2,$h0hi
+	fmadd	$h2lo,$r0lo,$x2,$h2lo
+	fmadd	$h2hi,$r0hi,$x2,$h2hi
+	fmadd	$h1lo,$s3lo,$x2,$h1lo
+	fmadd	$h1hi,$s3hi,$x2,$h1hi
+	fmadd	$h3lo,$r1lo,$x2,$h3lo
+	fmadd	$h3hi,$r1hi,$x2,$h3hi
+
+	fmadd	$h0lo,$r0lo,$x0,$h0lo
+	 lfd	$y0,`$LOCALS+8*0`($sp)		# load [biased] input
+	fmadd	$h0hi,$r0hi,$x0,$h0hi
+	 lfd	$y1,`$LOCALS+8*1`($sp)
+	fmadd	$h2lo,$r2lo,$x0,$h2lo
+	 lfd	$y2,`$LOCALS+8*2`($sp)
+	fmadd	$h2hi,$r2hi,$x0,$h2hi
+	 lfd	$y3,`$LOCALS+8*3`($sp)
+	fmadd	$h1lo,$r1lo,$x0,$h1lo
+	fmadd	$h1hi,$r1hi,$x0,$h1hi
+	fmadd	$h3lo,$r3lo,$x0,$h3lo
+	fmadd	$h3hi,$r3hi,$x0,$h3hi
+
+	bdnz	Loop
+
+	######################################### base 2^48 -> base 2^32
+	fadd	$c0lo,$h0lo,$two32
+	fadd	$c0hi,$h0hi,$two32
+	fadd	$c2lo,$h2lo,$two96
+	fadd	$c2hi,$h2hi,$two96
+	fadd	$c1lo,$h1lo,$two64
+	fadd	$c1hi,$h1hi,$two64
+	fadd	$c3lo,$h3lo,$two130
+	fadd	$c3hi,$h3hi,$two130
+
+	fsub	$c0lo,$c0lo,$two32
+	fsub	$c0hi,$c0hi,$two32
+	fsub	$c2lo,$c2lo,$two96
+	fsub	$c2hi,$c2hi,$two96
+	fsub	$c1lo,$c1lo,$two64
+	fsub	$c1hi,$c1hi,$two64
+	fsub	$c3lo,$c3lo,$two130
+	fsub	$c3hi,$c3hi,$two130
+
+	fsub	$h1lo,$h1lo,$c1lo
+	fsub	$h1hi,$h1hi,$c1hi
+	fsub	$h3lo,$h3lo,$c3lo
+	fsub	$h3hi,$h3hi,$c3hi
+	fsub	$h2lo,$h2lo,$c2lo
+	fsub	$h2hi,$h2hi,$c2hi
+	fsub	$h0lo,$h0lo,$c0lo
+	fsub	$h0hi,$h0hi,$c0hi
+
+	fadd	$h1lo,$h1lo,$c0lo
+	fadd	$h1hi,$h1hi,$c0hi
+	fadd	$h3lo,$h3lo,$c2lo
+	fadd	$h3hi,$h3hi,$c2hi
+	fadd	$h2lo,$h2lo,$c1lo
+	fadd	$h2hi,$h2hi,$c1hi
+	fmadd	$h0lo,$c3lo,$five_two130,$h0lo
+	fmadd	$h0hi,$c3hi,$five_two130,$h0hi
+
+	fadd	$x1,$h1lo,$h1hi
+	fadd	$x3,$h3lo,$h3hi
+	fadd	$x2,$h2lo,$h2hi
+	fadd	$x0,$h0lo,$h0hi
+
+	lfd	$h0lo,`$LOCALS+8*4`($sp)	# pull saved fpscr
+	fadd	$x1,$x1,$two32			# bias
+	fadd	$x3,$x3,$two96
+	fadd	$x2,$x2,$two64
+	fadd	$x0,$x0,$two0
+
+	stfd	$x1,8*1($ctx)			# store [biased] hash value
+	stfd	$x3,8*3($ctx)
+	stfd	$x2,8*2($ctx)
+	stfd	$x0,8*0($ctx)
+
+	mtfsf	255,$h0lo			# restore original fpscr
+	lfd	f14,`$FRAME-8*18`($sp)
+	lfd	f15,`$FRAME-8*17`($sp)
+	lfd	f16,`$FRAME-8*16`($sp)
+	lfd	f17,`$FRAME-8*15`($sp)
+	lfd	f18,`$FRAME-8*14`($sp)
+	lfd	f19,`$FRAME-8*13`($sp)
+	lfd	f20,`$FRAME-8*12`($sp)
+	lfd	f21,`$FRAME-8*11`($sp)
+	lfd	f22,`$FRAME-8*10`($sp)
+	lfd	f23,`$FRAME-8*9`($sp)
+	lfd	f24,`$FRAME-8*8`($sp)
+	lfd	f25,`$FRAME-8*7`($sp)
+	lfd	f26,`$FRAME-8*6`($sp)
+	lfd	f27,`$FRAME-8*5`($sp)
+	lfd	f28,`$FRAME-8*4`($sp)
+	lfd	f29,`$FRAME-8*3`($sp)
+	lfd	f30,`$FRAME-8*2`($sp)
+	lfd	f31,`$FRAME-8*1`($sp)
+	addi	$sp,$sp,$FRAME
+Labort:
+	blr
+	.long	0
+	.byte	0,12,4,1,0x80,0,4,0
+.size	.poly1305_blocks_fpu,.-.poly1305_blocks_fpu
+___
+{
+my ($mac,$nonce)=($inp,$len);
+
+my ($h0,$h1,$h2,$h3,$h4, $d0,$d1,$d2,$d3
+   ) = map("r$_",(7..11,28..31));
+my $mask = "r0";
+my $FRAME = (6+4)*$SIZE_T;
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	.poly1305_emit_fpu
+.align	4
+.poly1305_emit_fpu:
+	$STU	$sp,-$FRAME($sp)
+	mflr	r0
+	$PUSH	r28,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*4`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r29,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*3`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r30,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*2`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r31,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*1`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r0,`$FRAME+$LRSAVE`($sp)
+
+	lwz	$d0,`8*0+(0^$LITTLE_ENDIAN)`($ctx)	# load hash
+	lwz	$h0,`8*0+(4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN)`($ctx)
+	lwz	$d1,`8*1+(0^$LITTLE_ENDIAN)`($ctx)
+	lwz	$h1,`8*1+(4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN)`($ctx)
+	lwz	$d2,`8*2+(0^$LITTLE_ENDIAN)`($ctx)
+	lwz	$h2,`8*2+(4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN)`($ctx)
+	lwz	$d3,`8*3+(0^$LITTLE_ENDIAN)`($ctx)
+	lwz	$h3,`8*3+(4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN)`($ctx)
+
+	lis	$mask,0xfff0
+	andc	$d0,$d0,$mask			# mask exponent
+	andc	$d1,$d1,$mask
+	andc	$d2,$d2,$mask
+	andc	$d3,$d3,$mask			# can be partially reduced...
+	li	$mask,3
+
+	srwi	$padbit,$d3,2			# ... so reduce
+	and	$h4,$d3,$mask
+	andc	$d3,$d3,$mask
+	add	$d3,$d3,$padbit
+___
+						if ($SIZE_T==4) {
+$code.=<<___;
+	addc	$h0,$h0,$d3
+	adde	$h1,$h1,$d0
+	adde	$h2,$h2,$d1
+	adde	$h3,$h3,$d2
+	addze	$h4,$h4
+
+	addic	$d0,$h0,5			# compare to modulus
+	addze	$d1,$h1
+	addze	$d2,$h2
+	addze	$d3,$h3
+	addze	$mask,$h4
+
+	srwi	$mask,$mask,2			# did it carry/borrow?
+	neg	$mask,$mask
+	srawi	$mask,$mask,31			# mask
+
+	andc	$h0,$h0,$mask
+	and	$d0,$d0,$mask
+	andc	$h1,$h1,$mask
+	and	$d1,$d1,$mask
+	or	$h0,$h0,$d0
+	lwz	$d0,0($nonce)			# load nonce
+	andc	$h2,$h2,$mask
+	and	$d2,$d2,$mask
+	or	$h1,$h1,$d1
+	lwz	$d1,4($nonce)
+	andc	$h3,$h3,$mask
+	and	$d3,$d3,$mask
+	or	$h2,$h2,$d2
+	lwz	$d2,8($nonce)
+	or	$h3,$h3,$d3
+	lwz	$d3,12($nonce)
+
+	addc	$h0,$h0,$d0			# accumulate nonce
+	adde	$h1,$h1,$d1
+	adde	$h2,$h2,$d2
+	adde	$h3,$h3,$d3
+___
+						} else {
+$code.=<<___;
+	add	$h0,$h0,$d3
+	add	$h1,$h1,$d0
+	add	$h2,$h2,$d1
+	add	$h3,$h3,$d2
+
+	srdi	$d0,$h0,32
+	add	$h1,$h1,$d0
+	srdi	$d1,$h1,32
+	add	$h2,$h2,$d1
+	srdi	$d2,$h2,32
+	add	$h3,$h3,$d2
+	srdi	$d3,$h3,32
+	add	$h4,$h4,$d3
+
+	insrdi	$h0,$h1,32,0
+	insrdi	$h2,$h3,32,0
+
+	addic	$d0,$h0,5			# compare to modulus
+	addze	$d1,$h2
+	addze	$d2,$h4
+
+	srdi	$mask,$d2,2			# did it carry/borrow?
+	neg	$mask,$mask
+	sradi	$mask,$mask,63			# mask
+	ld	$d2,0($nonce)			# load nonce
+	ld	$d3,8($nonce)
+
+	andc	$h0,$h0,$mask
+	and	$d0,$d0,$mask
+	andc	$h2,$h2,$mask
+	and	$d1,$d1,$mask
+	or	$h0,$h0,$d0
+	or	$h2,$h2,$d1
+___
+$code.=<<___	if (!$LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+	rotldi	$d2,$d2,32			# flip nonce words
+	rotldi	$d3,$d3,32
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	addc	$h0,$h0,$d2			# accumulate nonce
+	adde	$h2,$h2,$d3
+
+	srdi	$h1,$h0,32
+	srdi	$h3,$h2,32
+___
+						}
+$code.=<<___	if ($LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+	stw	$h0,0($mac)			# write result
+	stw	$h1,4($mac)
+	stw	$h2,8($mac)
+	stw	$h3,12($mac)
+___
+$code.=<<___	if (!$LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+	li	$d1,4
+	stwbrx	$h0,0,$mac			# write result
+	li	$d2,8
+	stwbrx	$h1,$d1,$mac
+	li	$d3,12
+	stwbrx	$h2,$d2,$mac
+	stwbrx	$h3,$d3,$mac
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	$POP	r28,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*4`($sp)
+	$POP	r29,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*3`($sp)
+	$POP	r30,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*2`($sp)
+	$POP	r31,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*1`($sp)
+	addi	$sp,$sp,$FRAME
+	blr
+	.long	0
+	.byte	0,12,4,1,0x80,4,3,0
+.size	.poly1305_emit_fpu,.-.poly1305_emit_fpu
+___
+}
+# Ugly hack here, because PPC assembler syntax seem to vary too
+# much from platforms to platform...
+$code.=<<___;
+.align	6
+LPICmeup:
+	mflr	r0
+	bcl	20,31,\$+4
+	mflr	$len	# vvvvvv "distance" between . and 1st data entry
+	addi	$len,$len,`64-8`	# borrow $len
+	mtlr	r0
+	blr
+	.long	0
+	.byte	0,12,0x14,0,0,0,0,0
+	.space	`64-9*4`
+
+.quad	0x4330000000000000		# 2^(52+0)
+.quad	0x4530000000000000		# 2^(52+32)
+.quad	0x4730000000000000		# 2^(52+64)
+.quad	0x4930000000000000		# 2^(52+96)
+.quad	0x4b50000000000000		# 2^(52+130)
+
+.quad	0x37f4000000000000		# 5/2^130
+
+.quad	0x4430000000000000		# 2^(52+16+0)
+.quad	0x4630000000000000		# 2^(52+16+32)
+.quad	0x4830000000000000		# 2^(52+16+64)
+.quad	0x4a30000000000000		# 2^(52+16+96)
+.quad	0x3e30000000000000		# 2^(52+16+0-96)
+.quad	0x4030000000000000		# 2^(52+16+32-96)
+.quad	0x4230000000000000		# 2^(52+16+64-96)
+
+.quad	0x0000000000000001		# fpscr: truncate, no exceptions
+.asciz	"Poly1305 for PPC FPU, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+.align	4
+___
+
+$code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem;
+print $code;
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-s390x.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-s390x.pl
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..82d757d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-s390x.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,227 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# This module implements Poly1305 hash for s390x.
+#
+# June 2015
+#
+# ~6.6/2.3 cpb on z10/z196+, >2x improvement over compiler-generated
+# code. For older compiler improvement coefficient is >3x, because
+# then base 2^64 and base 2^32 implementations are compared.
+#
+# On side note, z13 enables vector base 2^26 implementation...
+
+$flavour = shift;
+
+if ($flavour =~ /3[12]/) {
+	$SIZE_T=4;
+	$g="";
+} else {
+	$SIZE_T=8;
+	$g="g";
+}
+
+while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {}
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+$sp="%r15";
+
+my ($ctx,$inp,$len,$padbit) = map("%r$_",(2..5));
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.text
+
+.globl	poly1305_init
+.type	poly1305_init,\@function
+.align	16
+poly1305_init:
+	lghi	%r0,0
+	lghi	%r1,-1
+	stg	%r0,0($ctx)		# zero hash value
+	stg	%r0,8($ctx)
+	stg	%r0,16($ctx)
+
+	cl${g}r	$inp,%r0
+	je	.Lno_key
+
+	lrvg	%r4,0($inp)		# load little-endian key
+	lrvg	%r5,8($inp)
+
+	nihl	%r1,0xffc0		# 0xffffffc0ffffffff
+	srlg	%r0,%r1,4		# 0x0ffffffc0fffffff
+	srlg	%r1,%r1,4
+	nill	%r1,0xfffc		# 0x0ffffffc0ffffffc
+
+	ngr	%r4,%r0
+	ngr	%r5,%r1
+
+	stg	%r4,32($ctx)
+	stg	%r5,40($ctx)
+
+.Lno_key:
+	lghi	%r2,0
+	br	%r14
+.size	poly1305_init,.-poly1305_init
+___
+{
+my ($d0hi,$d0lo,$d1hi,$d1lo,$t0,$h0,$t1,$h1,$h2) = map("%r$_",(6..14));
+my ($r0,$r1,$s1) = map("%r$_",(0..2));
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	poly1305_blocks
+.type	poly1305_blocks,\@function
+.align	16
+poly1305_blocks:
+	srl${g}	$len,4			# fixed-up in 64-bit build
+	lghi	%r0,0
+	cl${g}r	$len,%r0
+	je	.Lno_data
+
+	stm${g}	%r6,%r14,`6*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+
+	llgfr   $padbit,$padbit		# clear upper half, much needed with
+					# non-64-bit ABI
+	lg	$r0,32($ctx)		# load key
+	lg	$r1,40($ctx)
+
+	lg	$h0,0($ctx)		# load hash value
+	lg	$h1,8($ctx)
+	lg	$h2,16($ctx)
+
+	st$g	$ctx,`2*$SIZE_T`($sp)	# off-load $ctx
+	srlg	$s1,$r1,2
+	algr	$s1,$r1			# s1 = r1 + r1>>2
+	j	.Loop
+
+.align	16
+.Loop:
+	lrvg	$d0lo,0($inp)		# load little-endian input
+	lrvg	$d1lo,8($inp)
+	la	$inp,16($inp)
+
+	algr	$d0lo,$h0		# accumulate input
+	alcgr	$d1lo,$h1
+
+	lgr	$h0,$d0lo
+	mlgr	$d0hi,$r0		# h0*r0	  -> $d0hi:$d0lo
+	lgr	$h1,$d1lo
+	mlgr	$d1hi,$s1		# h1*5*r1 -> $d1hi:$d1lo
+
+	mlgr	$t0,$r1			# h0*r1   -> $t0:$h0
+	mlgr	$t1,$r0			# h1*r0   -> $t1:$h1
+	alcgr	$h2,$padbit
+
+	algr	$d0lo,$d1lo
+	lgr	$d1lo,$h2
+	alcgr	$d0hi,$d1hi
+	lghi	$d1hi,0
+
+	algr	$h1,$h0
+	alcgr	$t1,$t0
+
+	msgr	$d1lo,$s1		# h2*s1
+	msgr	$h2,$r0			# h2*r0
+
+	algr	$h1,$d1lo
+	alcgr	$t1,$d1hi		# $d1hi is zero
+
+	algr	$h1,$d0hi
+	alcgr	$h2,$t1
+
+	lghi	$h0,-4			# final reduction step
+	ngr	$h0,$h2
+	srlg	$t0,$h2,2
+	algr	$h0,$t0
+	lghi	$t1,3
+	ngr	$h2,$t1
+
+	algr	$h0,$d0lo
+	alcgr	$h1,$d1hi		# $d1hi is still zero
+	alcgr	$h2,$d1hi		# $d1hi is still zero
+
+	brct$g	$len,.Loop
+
+	l$g	$ctx,`2*$SIZE_T`($sp)	# restore $ctx
+
+	stg	$h0,0($ctx)		# store hash value
+	stg	$h1,8($ctx)
+	stg	$h2,16($ctx)
+
+	lm${g}	%r6,%r14,`6*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+.Lno_data:
+	br	%r14
+.size	poly1305_blocks,.-poly1305_blocks
+___
+}
+{
+my ($mac,$nonce)=($inp,$len);
+my ($h0,$h1,$h2,$d0,$d1)=map("%r$_",(5..9));
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	poly1305_emit
+.type	poly1305_emit,\@function
+.align	16
+poly1305_emit:
+	stm${g}	%r6,%r9,`6*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+
+	lg	$h0,0($ctx)
+	lg	$h1,8($ctx)
+	lg	$h2,16($ctx)
+
+	lghi	%r0,5
+	lghi	%r1,0
+	lgr	$d0,$h0
+	lgr	$d1,$h1
+
+	algr	$h0,%r0			# compare to modulus
+	alcgr	$h1,%r1
+	alcgr	$h2,%r1
+
+	srlg	$h2,$h2,2		# did it borrow/carry?
+	slgr	%r1,$h2			# 0-$h2>>2
+	lg	$h2,0($nonce)		# load nonce
+	lghi	%r0,-1
+	lg	$ctx,8($nonce)
+	xgr	%r0,%r1			# ~%r1
+
+	ngr	$h0,%r1
+	ngr	$d0,%r0
+	ngr	$h1,%r1
+	ngr	$d1,%r0
+	ogr	$h0,$d0
+	rllg	$d0,$h2,32		# flip nonce words
+	ogr	$h1,$d1
+	rllg	$d1,$ctx,32
+
+	algr	$h0,$d0			# accumulate nonce
+	alcgr	$h1,$d1
+
+	strvg	$h0,0($mac)		# write little-endian result
+	strvg	$h1,8($mac)
+
+	lm${g}	%r6,%r9,`6*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+	br	%r14
+.size	poly1305_emit,.-poly1305_emit
+
+.string	"Poly1305 for s390x, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+___
+}
+
+$code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem;
+$code =~ s/\b(srlg\s+)(%r[0-9]+\s*,)\s*([0-9]+)/$1$2$2$3/gm;
+
+print $code;
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-sparcv9.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-sparcv9.pl
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..0bdd048
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-sparcv9.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,1120 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# This module implements Poly1305 hash for SPARCv9, vanilla, as well
+# as VIS3 and FMA extensions.
+#
+# May, August 2015
+#
+# Numbers are cycles per processed byte with poly1305_blocks alone.
+#
+#			IALU(*)		FMA
+#
+# UltraSPARC III	12.3(**)
+# SPARC T3		7.92
+# SPARC T4		1.70(***)	6.55
+# SPARC64 X		5.60		3.64
+#
+# (*)	Comparison to compiler-generated code is really problematic,
+#	because latter's performance varies too much depending on too
+#	many variables. For example, one can measure from 5x to 15x
+#	improvement on T4 for gcc-4.6. Well, in T4 case it's a bit
+#	unfair comparison, because compiler doesn't use VIS3, but
+#	given same initial conditions coefficient varies from 3x to 9x.
+# (**)	Pre-III performance should be even worse; floating-point
+#	performance for UltraSPARC I-IV on the other hand is reported
+#	to be 4.25 for hand-coded assembly, but they are just too old
+#	to care about.
+# (***)	Multi-process benchmark saturates at ~12.5x single-process
+#	result on 8-core processor, or ~21GBps per 2.85GHz socket.
+
+my $output = pop;
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+my ($ctx,$inp,$len,$padbit,$shl,$shr)	= map("%i$_",(0..5));
+my ($r0,$r1,$r2,$r3,$s1,$s2,$s3,$h4)	= map("%l$_",(0..7));
+my ($h0,$h1,$h2,$h3, $t0,$t1,$t2)	= map("%o$_",(0..5,7));
+my ($d0,$d1,$d2,$d3)			= map("%g$_",(1..4));
+
+my $output = pop;
+open STDOUT,">$stdout";
+
+$code.=<<___;
+#include "sparc_arch.h"
+
+#ifdef	__arch64__
+.register	%g2,#scratch
+.register	%g3,#scratch
+# define	STPTR	stx
+# define	SIZE_T	8
+#else
+# define	STPTR	st
+# define	SIZE_T	4
+#endif
+#define	LOCALS	(STACK_BIAS+STACK_FRAME)
+
+.section	".text",#alloc,#execinstr
+
+#ifdef __PIC__
+SPARC_PIC_THUNK(%g1)
+#endif
+
+.globl	poly1305_init
+.align	32
+poly1305_init:
+	save	%sp,-STACK_FRAME-16,%sp
+	nop
+
+	SPARC_LOAD_ADDRESS(OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P,%g1)
+	ld	[%g1],%g1
+
+	and	%g1,SPARCV9_FMADD|SPARCV9_VIS3,%g1
+	cmp	%g1,SPARCV9_FMADD
+	be	.Lpoly1305_init_fma
+	nop
+
+	stx	%g0,[$ctx+0]
+	stx	%g0,[$ctx+8]		! zero hash value
+	brz,pn	$inp,.Lno_key
+	stx	%g0,[$ctx+16]
+
+	and	$inp,7,$shr		! alignment factor
+	andn	$inp,7,$inp
+	sll	$shr,3,$shr		! *8
+	neg	$shr,$shl
+
+	sethi	%hi(0x0ffffffc),$t0
+	set	8,$h1
+	or	$t0,%lo(0x0ffffffc),$t0
+	set	16,$h2
+	sllx	$t0,32,$t1
+	or	$t0,$t1,$t1		! 0x0ffffffc0ffffffc
+	or	$t1,3,$t0		! 0x0ffffffc0fffffff
+
+	ldxa	[$inp+%g0]0x88,$h0	! load little-endian key
+	brz,pt	$shr,.Lkey_aligned
+	ldxa	[$inp+$h1]0x88,$h1
+
+	ldxa	[$inp+$h2]0x88,$h2
+	srlx	$h0,$shr,$h0
+	sllx	$h1,$shl,$t2
+	srlx	$h1,$shr,$h1
+	or	$t2,$h0,$h0
+	sllx	$h2,$shl,$h2
+	or	$h2,$h1,$h1
+
+.Lkey_aligned:
+	and	$t0,$h0,$h0
+	and	$t1,$h1,$h1
+	stx	$h0,[$ctx+32+0]		! store key
+	stx	$h1,[$ctx+32+8]
+
+	andcc	%g1,SPARCV9_VIS3,%g0
+	be	.Lno_key
+	nop
+
+1:	call	.+8
+	add	%o7,poly1305_blocks_vis3-1b,%o7
+
+	add	%o7,poly1305_emit-poly1305_blocks_vis3,%o5
+	STPTR	%o7,[%i2]
+	STPTR	%o5,[%i2+SIZE_T]
+
+	ret
+	restore	%g0,1,%o0		! return 1
+
+.Lno_key:
+	ret
+	restore	%g0,%g0,%o0		! return 0
+.type	poly1305_init,#function
+.size	poly1305_init,.-poly1305_init
+
+.globl	poly1305_blocks
+.align	32
+poly1305_blocks:
+	save	%sp,-STACK_FRAME,%sp
+	srln	$len,4,$len
+
+	brz,pn	$len,.Lno_data
+	nop
+
+	ld	[$ctx+32+0],$r1		! load key
+	ld	[$ctx+32+4],$r0
+	ld	[$ctx+32+8],$r3
+	ld	[$ctx+32+12],$r2
+
+	ld	[$ctx+0],$h1		! load hash value
+	ld	[$ctx+4],$h0
+	ld	[$ctx+8],$h3
+	ld	[$ctx+12],$h2
+	ld	[$ctx+16],$h4
+
+	and	$inp,7,$shr		! alignment factor
+	andn	$inp,7,$inp
+	set	8,$d1
+	sll	$shr,3,$shr		! *8
+	set	16,$d2
+	neg	$shr,$shl
+
+	srl	$r1,2,$s1
+	srl	$r2,2,$s2
+	add	$r1,$s1,$s1
+	srl	$r3,2,$s3
+	add	$r2,$s2,$s2
+	add	$r3,$s3,$s3
+
+.Loop:
+	ldxa	[$inp+%g0]0x88,$d0	! load little-endian input
+	brz,pt	$shr,.Linp_aligned
+	ldxa	[$inp+$d1]0x88,$d1
+
+	ldxa	[$inp+$d2]0x88,$d2
+	srlx	$d0,$shr,$d0
+	sllx	$d1,$shl,$t1
+	srlx	$d1,$shr,$d1
+	or	$t1,$d0,$d0
+	sllx	$d2,$shl,$d2
+	or	$d2,$d1,$d1
+
+.Linp_aligned:
+	srlx	$d0,32,$t0
+	addcc	$d0,$h0,$h0		! accumulate input
+	srlx	$d1,32,$t1
+	addccc	$t0,$h1,$h1
+	addccc	$d1,$h2,$h2
+	addccc	$t1,$h3,$h3
+	addc	$padbit,$h4,$h4
+
+	umul	$r0,$h0,$d0
+	umul	$r1,$h0,$d1
+	umul	$r2,$h0,$d2
+	umul	$r3,$h0,$d3
+	 sub	$len,1,$len
+	 add	$inp,16,$inp
+
+	umul	$s3,$h1,$t0
+	umul	$r0,$h1,$t1
+	umul	$r1,$h1,$t2
+	add	$t0,$d0,$d0
+	add	$t1,$d1,$d1
+	umul	$r2,$h1,$t0
+	add	$t2,$d2,$d2
+	add	$t0,$d3,$d3
+
+	umul	$s2,$h2,$t1
+	umul	$s3,$h2,$t2
+	umul	$r0,$h2,$t0
+	add	$t1,$d0,$d0
+	add	$t2,$d1,$d1
+	umul	$r1,$h2,$t1
+	add	$t0,$d2,$d2
+	add	$t1,$d3,$d3
+
+	umul	$s1,$h3,$t2
+	umul	$s2,$h3,$t0
+	umul	$s3,$h3,$t1
+	add	$t2,$d0,$d0
+	add	$t0,$d1,$d1
+	umul	$r0,$h3,$t2
+	add	$t1,$d2,$d2
+	add	$t2,$d3,$d3
+
+	umul	$s1,$h4,$t0
+	umul	$s2,$h4,$t1
+	umul	$s3,$h4,$t2
+	umul	$r0,$h4,$h4
+	add	$t0,$d1,$d1
+	add	$t1,$d2,$d2
+	srlx	$d0,32,$h1
+	add	$t2,$d3,$d3
+	srlx	$d1,32,$h2
+
+	addcc	$d1,$h1,$h1
+	srlx	$d2,32,$h3
+	 set	8,$d1
+	addccc	$d2,$h2,$h2
+	srlx	$d3,32,$t0
+	 set	16,$d2
+	addccc	$d3,$h3,$h3
+	addc	$t0,$h4,$h4
+
+	srl	$h4,2,$t0		! final reduction step
+	andn	$h4,3,$t1
+	and	$h4,3,$h4
+	add	$t1,$t0,$t0
+
+	addcc	$t0,$d0,$h0
+	addccc	%g0,$h1,$h1
+	addccc	%g0,$h2,$h2
+	addccc	%g0,$h3,$h3
+	brnz,pt	$len,.Loop
+	addc	%g0,$h4,$h4
+
+	st	$h1,[$ctx+0]		! store hash value
+	st	$h0,[$ctx+4]
+	st	$h3,[$ctx+8]
+	st	$h2,[$ctx+12]
+	st	$h4,[$ctx+16]
+
+.Lno_data:
+	ret
+	restore
+.type	poly1305_blocks,#function
+.size	poly1305_blocks,.-poly1305_blocks
+___
+########################################################################
+# VIS3 has umulxhi and addxc...
+{
+my ($H0,$H1,$H2,$R0,$R1,$S1,$T1) = map("%o$_",(0..5,7));
+my ($D0,$D1,$D2,$T0) = map("%g$_",(1..4));
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.align	32
+poly1305_blocks_vis3:
+	save	%sp,-STACK_FRAME,%sp
+	srln	$len,4,$len
+
+	brz,pn	$len,.Lno_data
+	nop
+
+	ldx	[$ctx+32+0],$R0		! load key
+	ldx	[$ctx+32+8],$R1
+
+	ldx	[$ctx+0],$H0		! load hash value
+	ldx	[$ctx+8],$H1
+	ld	[$ctx+16],$H2
+
+	and	$inp,7,$shr		! alignment factor
+	andn	$inp,7,$inp
+	set	8,$r1
+	sll	$shr,3,$shr		! *8
+	set	16,$r2
+	neg	$shr,$shl
+
+	srlx	$R1,2,$S1
+	b	.Loop_vis3
+	add	$R1,$S1,$S1
+
+.Loop_vis3:
+	ldxa	[$inp+%g0]0x88,$D0	! load little-endian input
+	brz,pt	$shr,.Linp_aligned_vis3
+	ldxa	[$inp+$r1]0x88,$D1
+
+	ldxa	[$inp+$r2]0x88,$D2
+	srlx	$D0,$shr,$D0
+	sllx	$D1,$shl,$T1
+	srlx	$D1,$shr,$D1
+	or	$T1,$D0,$D0
+	sllx	$D2,$shl,$D2
+	or	$D2,$D1,$D1
+
+.Linp_aligned_vis3:
+	addcc	$D0,$H0,$H0		! accumulate input
+	 sub	$len,1,$len
+	addxccc	$D1,$H1,$H1
+	 add	$inp,16,$inp
+
+	mulx	$R0,$H0,$D0		! r0*h0
+	addxc	$padbit,$H2,$H2
+	umulxhi	$R0,$H0,$D1
+	mulx	$S1,$H1,$T0		! s1*h1
+	umulxhi	$S1,$H1,$T1
+	addcc	$T0,$D0,$D0
+	mulx	$R1,$H0,$T0		! r1*h0
+	addxc	$T1,$D1,$D1
+	umulxhi	$R1,$H0,$D2
+	addcc	$T0,$D1,$D1
+	mulx	$R0,$H1,$T0		! r0*h1
+	addxc	%g0,$D2,$D2
+	umulxhi	$R0,$H1,$T1
+	addcc	$T0,$D1,$D1
+	mulx	$S1,$H2,$T0		! s1*h2
+	addxc	$T1,$D2,$D2
+	mulx	$R0,$H2,$T1		! r0*h2
+	addcc	$T0,$D1,$D1
+	addxc	$T1,$D2,$D2
+
+	srlx	$D2,2,$T0		! final reduction step
+	andn	$D2,3,$T1
+	and	$D2,3,$H2
+	add	$T1,$T0,$T0
+
+	addcc	$T0,$D0,$H0
+	addxccc	%g0,$D1,$H1
+	brnz,pt	$len,.Loop_vis3
+	addxc	%g0,$H2,$H2
+
+	stx	$H0,[$ctx+0]		! store hash value
+	stx	$H1,[$ctx+8]
+	st	$H2,[$ctx+16]
+
+	ret
+	restore
+.type	poly1305_blocks_vis3,#function
+.size	poly1305_blocks_vis3,.-poly1305_blocks_vis3
+___
+}
+my ($mac,$nonce) = ($inp,$len);
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	poly1305_emit
+.align	32
+poly1305_emit:
+	save	%sp,-STACK_FRAME,%sp
+
+	ld	[$ctx+0],$h1		! load hash value
+	ld	[$ctx+4],$h0
+	ld	[$ctx+8],$h3
+	ld	[$ctx+12],$h2
+	ld	[$ctx+16],$h4
+
+	addcc	$h0,5,$r0		! compare to modulus
+	addccc	$h1,0,$r1
+	addccc	$h2,0,$r2
+	addccc	$h3,0,$r3
+	addc	$h4,0,$h4
+	andcc	$h4,4,%g0		! did it carry/borrow?
+
+	movnz	%icc,$r0,$h0
+	ld	[$nonce+0],$r0		! load nonce
+	movnz	%icc,$r1,$h1
+	ld	[$nonce+4],$r1
+	movnz	%icc,$r2,$h2
+	ld	[$nonce+8],$r2
+	movnz	%icc,$r3,$h3
+	ld	[$nonce+12],$r3
+
+	addcc	$r0,$h0,$h0		! accumulate nonce
+	addccc	$r1,$h1,$h1
+	addccc	$r2,$h2,$h2
+	addc	$r3,$h3,$h3
+
+	srl	$h0,8,$r0
+	stb	$h0,[$mac+0]		! store little-endian result
+	srl	$h0,16,$r1
+	stb	$r0,[$mac+1]
+	srl	$h0,24,$r2
+	stb	$r1,[$mac+2]
+	stb	$r2,[$mac+3]
+
+	srl	$h1,8,$r0
+	stb	$h1,[$mac+4]
+	srl	$h1,16,$r1
+	stb	$r0,[$mac+5]
+	srl	$h1,24,$r2
+	stb	$r1,[$mac+6]
+	stb	$r2,[$mac+7]
+
+	srl	$h2,8,$r0
+	stb	$h2,[$mac+8]
+	srl	$h2,16,$r1
+	stb	$r0,[$mac+9]
+	srl	$h2,24,$r2
+	stb	$r1,[$mac+10]
+	stb	$r2,[$mac+11]
+
+	srl	$h3,8,$r0
+	stb	$h3,[$mac+12]
+	srl	$h3,16,$r1
+	stb	$r0,[$mac+13]
+	srl	$h3,24,$r2
+	stb	$r1,[$mac+14]
+	stb	$r2,[$mac+15]
+
+	ret
+	restore
+.type	poly1305_emit,#function
+.size	poly1305_emit,.-poly1305_emit
+___
+
+{
+my ($ctx,$inp,$len,$padbit) = map("%i$_",(0..3));
+my ($in0,$in1,$in2,$in3,$in4) = map("%o$_",(0..4));
+my ($i1,$step,$shr,$shl) = map("%l$_",(0..7));
+my $i2=$step;
+
+my ($h0lo,$h0hi,$h1lo,$h1hi,$h2lo,$h2hi,$h3lo,$h3hi,
+    $two0,$two32,$two64,$two96,$two130,$five_two130,
+    $r0lo,$r0hi,$r1lo,$r1hi,$r2lo,$r2hi,
+    $s2lo,$s2hi,$s3lo,$s3hi,
+    $c0lo,$c0hi,$c1lo,$c1hi,$c2lo,$c2hi,$c3lo,$c3hi) = map("%f".2*$_,(0..31));
+# borrowings
+my ($r3lo,$r3hi,$s1lo,$s1hi) = ($c0lo,$c0hi,$c1lo,$c1hi);
+my ($x0,$x1,$x2,$x3) = ($c2lo,$c2hi,$c3lo,$c3hi);
+my ($y0,$y1,$y2,$y3) = ($c1lo,$c1hi,$c3hi,$c3lo);
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.align	32
+poly1305_init_fma:
+	save	%sp,-STACK_FRAME-16,%sp
+	nop
+
+.Lpoly1305_init_fma:
+1:	call	.+8
+	add	%o7,.Lconsts_fma-1b,%o7
+
+	ldd	[%o7+8*0],$two0			! load constants
+	ldd	[%o7+8*1],$two32
+	ldd	[%o7+8*2],$two64
+	ldd	[%o7+8*3],$two96
+	ldd	[%o7+8*5],$five_two130
+
+	std	$two0,[$ctx+8*0]		! initial hash value, biased 0
+	std	$two32,[$ctx+8*1]
+	std	$two64,[$ctx+8*2]
+	std	$two96,[$ctx+8*3]
+
+	brz,pn	$inp,.Lno_key_fma
+	nop
+
+	stx	%fsr,[%sp+LOCALS]		! save original %fsr
+	ldx	[%o7+8*6],%fsr			! load new %fsr
+
+	std	$two0,[$ctx+8*4] 		! key "template"
+	std	$two32,[$ctx+8*5]
+	std	$two64,[$ctx+8*6]
+	std	$two96,[$ctx+8*7]
+
+	and	$inp,7,$shr
+	andn	$inp,7,$inp			! align pointer
+	mov	8,$i1
+	sll	$shr,3,$shr
+	mov	16,$i2
+	neg	$shr,$shl
+
+	ldxa	[$inp+%g0]0x88,$in0		! load little-endian key
+	ldxa	[$inp+$i1]0x88,$in2
+
+	brz	$shr,.Lkey_aligned_fma
+	sethi	%hi(0xf0000000),$i1		!   0xf0000000
+
+	ldxa	[$inp+$i2]0x88,$in4
+
+	srlx	$in0,$shr,$in0			! align data
+	sllx	$in2,$shl,$in1
+	srlx	$in2,$shr,$in2
+	or	$in1,$in0,$in0
+	sllx	$in4,$shl,$in3
+	or	$in3,$in2,$in2
+
+.Lkey_aligned_fma:
+	or	$i1,3,$i2			!   0xf0000003
+	srlx	$in0,32,$in1
+	andn	$in0,$i1,$in0			! &=0x0fffffff
+	andn	$in1,$i2,$in1			! &=0x0ffffffc
+	srlx	$in2,32,$in3
+	andn	$in2,$i2,$in2
+	andn	$in3,$i2,$in3
+
+	st	$in0,[$ctx+`8*4+4`]		! fill "template"
+	st	$in1,[$ctx+`8*5+4`]
+	st	$in2,[$ctx+`8*6+4`]
+	st	$in3,[$ctx+`8*7+4`]
+
+	ldd	[$ctx+8*4],$h0lo 		! load [biased] key
+	ldd	[$ctx+8*5],$h1lo
+	ldd	[$ctx+8*6],$h2lo
+	ldd	[$ctx+8*7],$h3lo
+
+	fsubd	$h0lo,$two0, $h0lo		! r0
+	 ldd	[%o7+8*7],$two0 		! more constants
+	fsubd	$h1lo,$two32,$h1lo		! r1
+	 ldd	[%o7+8*8],$two32
+	fsubd	$h2lo,$two64,$h2lo		! r2
+	 ldd	[%o7+8*9],$two64
+	fsubd	$h3lo,$two96,$h3lo		! r3
+	 ldd	[%o7+8*10],$two96
+
+	fmuld	$five_two130,$h1lo,$s1lo	! s1
+	fmuld	$five_two130,$h2lo,$s2lo	! s2
+	fmuld	$five_two130,$h3lo,$s3lo	! s3
+
+	faddd	$h0lo,$two0, $h0hi
+	faddd	$h1lo,$two32,$h1hi
+	faddd	$h2lo,$two64,$h2hi
+	faddd	$h3lo,$two96,$h3hi
+
+	fsubd	$h0hi,$two0, $h0hi
+	 ldd	[%o7+8*11],$two0		! more constants
+	fsubd	$h1hi,$two32,$h1hi
+	 ldd	[%o7+8*12],$two32
+	fsubd	$h2hi,$two64,$h2hi
+	 ldd	[%o7+8*13],$two64
+	fsubd	$h3hi,$two96,$h3hi
+
+	fsubd	$h0lo,$h0hi,$h0lo
+	 std	$h0hi,[$ctx+8*5] 		! r0hi
+	fsubd	$h1lo,$h1hi,$h1lo
+	 std	$h1hi,[$ctx+8*7] 		! r1hi
+	fsubd	$h2lo,$h2hi,$h2lo
+	 std	$h2hi,[$ctx+8*9] 		! r2hi
+	fsubd	$h3lo,$h3hi,$h3lo
+	 std	$h3hi,[$ctx+8*11]		! r3hi
+
+	faddd	$s1lo,$two0, $s1hi
+	faddd	$s2lo,$two32,$s2hi
+	faddd	$s3lo,$two64,$s3hi
+
+	fsubd	$s1hi,$two0, $s1hi
+	fsubd	$s2hi,$two32,$s2hi
+	fsubd	$s3hi,$two64,$s3hi
+
+	fsubd	$s1lo,$s1hi,$s1lo
+	fsubd	$s2lo,$s2hi,$s2lo
+	fsubd	$s3lo,$s3hi,$s3lo
+
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS],%fsr		! restore %fsr
+
+	std	$h0lo,[$ctx+8*4] 		! r0lo
+	std	$h1lo,[$ctx+8*6] 		! r1lo
+	std	$h2lo,[$ctx+8*8] 		! r2lo
+	std	$h3lo,[$ctx+8*10]		! r3lo
+
+	std	$s1hi,[$ctx+8*13]
+	std	$s2hi,[$ctx+8*15]
+	std	$s3hi,[$ctx+8*17]
+
+	std	$s1lo,[$ctx+8*12]
+	std	$s2lo,[$ctx+8*14]
+	std	$s3lo,[$ctx+8*16]
+
+	add	%o7,poly1305_blocks_fma-.Lconsts_fma,%o0
+	add	%o7,poly1305_emit_fma-.Lconsts_fma,%o1
+	STPTR	%o0,[%i2]
+	STPTR	%o1,[%i2+SIZE_T]
+
+	ret
+	restore	%g0,1,%o0			! return 1
+
+.Lno_key_fma:
+	ret
+	restore	%g0,%g0,%o0			! return 0
+.type	poly1305_init_fma,#function
+.size	poly1305_init_fma,.-poly1305_init_fma
+
+.align	32
+poly1305_blocks_fma:
+	save	%sp,-STACK_FRAME-48,%sp
+	srln	$len,4,$len
+
+	brz,pn	$len,.Labort
+	sub	$len,1,$len
+
+1:	call	.+8
+	add	%o7,.Lconsts_fma-1b,%o7
+
+	ldd	[%o7+8*0],$two0			! load constants
+	ldd	[%o7+8*1],$two32
+	ldd	[%o7+8*2],$two64
+	ldd	[%o7+8*3],$two96
+	ldd	[%o7+8*4],$two130
+	ldd	[%o7+8*5],$five_two130
+
+	ldd	[$ctx+8*0],$h0lo 		! load [biased] hash value
+	ldd	[$ctx+8*1],$h1lo
+	ldd	[$ctx+8*2],$h2lo
+	ldd	[$ctx+8*3],$h3lo
+
+	std	$two0,[%sp+LOCALS+8*0]		! input "template"
+	sethi	%hi((1023+52+96)<<20),$in3
+	std	$two32,[%sp+LOCALS+8*1]
+	or	$padbit,$in3,$in3
+	std	$two64,[%sp+LOCALS+8*2]
+	st	$in3,[%sp+LOCALS+8*3]
+
+	and	$inp,7,$shr
+	andn	$inp,7,$inp			! align pointer
+	mov	8,$i1
+	sll	$shr,3,$shr
+	mov	16,$step
+	neg	$shr,$shl
+
+	ldxa	[$inp+%g0]0x88,$in0		! load little-endian input
+	brz	$shr,.Linp_aligned_fma
+	ldxa	[$inp+$i1]0x88,$in2
+
+	ldxa	[$inp+$step]0x88,$in4
+	add	$inp,8,$inp
+
+	srlx	$in0,$shr,$in0			! align data
+	sllx	$in2,$shl,$in1
+	srlx	$in2,$shr,$in2
+	or	$in1,$in0,$in0
+	sllx	$in4,$shl,$in3
+	srlx	$in4,$shr,$in4			! pre-shift
+	or	$in3,$in2,$in2
+
+.Linp_aligned_fma:
+	srlx	$in0,32,$in1
+	movrz	$len,0,$step
+	srlx	$in2,32,$in3
+	add	$step,$inp,$inp			! conditional advance
+
+	st	$in0,[%sp+LOCALS+8*0+4]		! fill "template"
+	st	$in1,[%sp+LOCALS+8*1+4]
+	st	$in2,[%sp+LOCALS+8*2+4]
+	st	$in3,[%sp+LOCALS+8*3+4]
+
+	ldd	[$ctx+8*4],$r0lo 		! load key
+	ldd	[$ctx+8*5],$r0hi
+	ldd	[$ctx+8*6],$r1lo
+	ldd	[$ctx+8*7],$r1hi
+	ldd	[$ctx+8*8],$r2lo
+	ldd	[$ctx+8*9],$r2hi
+	ldd	[$ctx+8*10],$r3lo
+	ldd	[$ctx+8*11],$r3hi
+	ldd	[$ctx+8*12],$s1lo
+	ldd	[$ctx+8*13],$s1hi
+	ldd	[$ctx+8*14],$s2lo
+	ldd	[$ctx+8*15],$s2hi
+	ldd	[$ctx+8*16],$s3lo
+	ldd	[$ctx+8*17],$s3hi
+
+	stx	%fsr,[%sp+LOCALS+8*4]		! save original %fsr
+	ldx	[%o7+8*6],%fsr			! load new %fsr
+
+	subcc	$len,1,$len
+	movrz	$len,0,$step
+
+	ldd	[%sp+LOCALS+8*0],$x0		! load biased input
+	ldd	[%sp+LOCALS+8*1],$x1
+	ldd	[%sp+LOCALS+8*2],$x2
+	ldd	[%sp+LOCALS+8*3],$x3
+
+	fsubd	$h0lo,$two0, $h0lo		! de-bias hash value
+	fsubd	$h1lo,$two32,$h1lo
+	 ldxa	[$inp+%g0]0x88,$in0		! modulo-scheduled input load
+	fsubd	$h2lo,$two64,$h2lo
+	fsubd	$h3lo,$two96,$h3lo
+	 ldxa	[$inp+$i1]0x88,$in2
+
+	fsubd	$x0,$two0, $x0  		! de-bias input
+	fsubd	$x1,$two32,$x1
+	fsubd	$x2,$two64,$x2
+	fsubd	$x3,$two96,$x3
+
+	brz	$shr,.Linp_aligned_fma2
+	add	$step,$inp,$inp			! conditional advance
+
+	sllx	$in0,$shl,$in1			! align data
+	srlx	$in0,$shr,$in3
+	or	$in1,$in4,$in0
+	sllx	$in2,$shl,$in1
+	srlx	$in2,$shr,$in4			! pre-shift
+	or	$in3,$in1,$in2
+.Linp_aligned_fma2:
+	srlx	$in0,32,$in1
+	srlx	$in2,32,$in3
+
+	faddd	$h0lo,$x0,$x0			! accumulate input
+	 stw	$in0,[%sp+LOCALS+8*0+4]
+	faddd	$h1lo,$x1,$x1
+	 stw	$in1,[%sp+LOCALS+8*1+4]
+	faddd	$h2lo,$x2,$x2
+	 stw	$in2,[%sp+LOCALS+8*2+4]
+	faddd	$h3lo,$x3,$x3
+	 stw	$in3,[%sp+LOCALS+8*3+4]
+
+	b	.Lentry_fma
+	nop
+
+.align	16
+.Loop_fma:
+	ldxa	[$inp+%g0]0x88,$in0		! modulo-scheduled input load
+	ldxa	[$inp+$i1]0x88,$in2
+	movrz	$len,0,$step
+
+	faddd	$y0,$h0lo,$h0lo 		! accumulate input
+	faddd	$y1,$h0hi,$h0hi
+	faddd	$y2,$h2lo,$h2lo
+	faddd	$y3,$h2hi,$h2hi
+
+	brz,pn	$shr,.Linp_aligned_fma3
+	add	$step,$inp,$inp			! conditional advance
+
+	sllx	$in0,$shl,$in1			! align data
+	srlx	$in0,$shr,$in3
+	or	$in1,$in4,$in0
+	sllx	$in2,$shl,$in1
+	srlx	$in2,$shr,$in4			! pre-shift
+	or	$in3,$in1,$in2
+
+.Linp_aligned_fma3:
+	!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! base 2^48 -> base 2^32
+	faddd	$two64,$h1lo,$c1lo
+	 srlx	$in0,32,$in1
+	faddd	$two64,$h1hi,$c1hi
+	 srlx	$in2,32,$in3
+	faddd	$two130,$h3lo,$c3lo
+	 st	$in0,[%sp+LOCALS+8*0+4]		! fill "template"
+	faddd	$two130,$h3hi,$c3hi
+	 st	$in1,[%sp+LOCALS+8*1+4]
+	faddd	$two32,$h0lo,$c0lo
+	 st	$in2,[%sp+LOCALS+8*2+4]
+	faddd	$two32,$h0hi,$c0hi
+	 st	$in3,[%sp+LOCALS+8*3+4]
+	faddd	$two96,$h2lo,$c2lo
+	faddd	$two96,$h2hi,$c2hi
+
+	fsubd	$c1lo,$two64,$c1lo
+	fsubd	$c1hi,$two64,$c1hi
+	fsubd	$c3lo,$two130,$c3lo
+	fsubd	$c3hi,$two130,$c3hi
+	fsubd	$c0lo,$two32,$c0lo
+	fsubd	$c0hi,$two32,$c0hi
+	fsubd	$c2lo,$two96,$c2lo
+	fsubd	$c2hi,$two96,$c2hi
+
+	fsubd	$h1lo,$c1lo,$h1lo
+	fsubd	$h1hi,$c1hi,$h1hi
+	fsubd	$h3lo,$c3lo,$h3lo
+	fsubd	$h3hi,$c3hi,$h3hi
+	fsubd	$h2lo,$c2lo,$h2lo
+	fsubd	$h2hi,$c2hi,$h2hi
+	fsubd	$h0lo,$c0lo,$h0lo
+	fsubd	$h0hi,$c0hi,$h0hi
+
+	faddd	$h1lo,$c0lo,$h1lo
+	faddd	$h1hi,$c0hi,$h1hi
+	faddd	$h3lo,$c2lo,$h3lo
+	faddd	$h3hi,$c2hi,$h3hi
+	faddd	$h2lo,$c1lo,$h2lo
+	faddd	$h2hi,$c1hi,$h2hi
+	fmaddd	$five_two130,$c3lo,$h0lo,$h0lo
+	fmaddd	$five_two130,$c3hi,$h0hi,$h0hi
+
+	faddd	$h1lo,$h1hi,$x1
+	 ldd	[$ctx+8*12],$s1lo		! reload constants
+	faddd	$h3lo,$h3hi,$x3
+	 ldd	[$ctx+8*13],$s1hi
+	faddd	$h2lo,$h2hi,$x2
+	 ldd	[$ctx+8*10],$r3lo
+	faddd	$h0lo,$h0hi,$x0
+	 ldd	[$ctx+8*11],$r3hi
+
+.Lentry_fma:
+	fmuld	$x1,$s3lo,$h0lo
+	fmuld	$x1,$s3hi,$h0hi
+	fmuld	$x1,$r1lo,$h2lo
+	fmuld	$x1,$r1hi,$h2hi
+	fmuld	$x1,$r0lo,$h1lo
+	fmuld	$x1,$r0hi,$h1hi
+	fmuld	$x1,$r2lo,$h3lo
+	fmuld	$x1,$r2hi,$h3hi
+
+	fmaddd	$x3,$s1lo,$h0lo,$h0lo
+	fmaddd	$x3,$s1hi,$h0hi,$h0hi
+	fmaddd	$x3,$s3lo,$h2lo,$h2lo
+	fmaddd	$x3,$s3hi,$h2hi,$h2hi
+	fmaddd	$x3,$s2lo,$h1lo,$h1lo
+	fmaddd	$x3,$s2hi,$h1hi,$h1hi
+	fmaddd	$x3,$r0lo,$h3lo,$h3lo
+	fmaddd	$x3,$r0hi,$h3hi,$h3hi
+
+	fmaddd	$x2,$s2lo,$h0lo,$h0lo
+	fmaddd	$x2,$s2hi,$h0hi,$h0hi
+	fmaddd	$x2,$r0lo,$h2lo,$h2lo
+	fmaddd	$x2,$r0hi,$h2hi,$h2hi
+	fmaddd	$x2,$s3lo,$h1lo,$h1lo
+	 ldd	[%sp+LOCALS+8*0],$y0		! load [biased] input
+	fmaddd	$x2,$s3hi,$h1hi,$h1hi
+	 ldd	[%sp+LOCALS+8*1],$y1
+	fmaddd	$x2,$r1lo,$h3lo,$h3lo
+	 ldd	[%sp+LOCALS+8*2],$y2
+	fmaddd	$x2,$r1hi,$h3hi,$h3hi
+	 ldd	[%sp+LOCALS+8*3],$y3
+
+	fmaddd	$x0,$r0lo,$h0lo,$h0lo
+	 fsubd	$y0,$two0, $y0  		! de-bias input
+	fmaddd	$x0,$r0hi,$h0hi,$h0hi
+	 fsubd	$y1,$two32,$y1
+	fmaddd	$x0,$r2lo,$h2lo,$h2lo
+	 fsubd	$y2,$two64,$y2
+	fmaddd	$x0,$r2hi,$h2hi,$h2hi
+	 fsubd	$y3,$two96,$y3
+	fmaddd	$x0,$r1lo,$h1lo,$h1lo
+	fmaddd	$x0,$r1hi,$h1hi,$h1hi
+	fmaddd	$x0,$r3lo,$h3lo,$h3lo
+	fmaddd	$x0,$r3hi,$h3hi,$h3hi
+
+	bcc	SIZE_T_CC,.Loop_fma
+	subcc	$len,1,$len
+
+	!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! base 2^48 -> base 2^32
+	faddd	$h0lo,$two32,$c0lo
+	faddd	$h0hi,$two32,$c0hi
+	faddd	$h2lo,$two96,$c2lo
+	faddd	$h2hi,$two96,$c2hi
+	faddd	$h1lo,$two64,$c1lo
+	faddd	$h1hi,$two64,$c1hi
+	faddd	$h3lo,$two130,$c3lo
+	faddd	$h3hi,$two130,$c3hi
+
+	fsubd	$c0lo,$two32,$c0lo
+	fsubd	$c0hi,$two32,$c0hi
+	fsubd	$c2lo,$two96,$c2lo
+	fsubd	$c2hi,$two96,$c2hi
+	fsubd	$c1lo,$two64,$c1lo
+	fsubd	$c1hi,$two64,$c1hi
+	fsubd	$c3lo,$two130,$c3lo
+	fsubd	$c3hi,$two130,$c3hi
+
+	fsubd	$h1lo,$c1lo,$h1lo
+	fsubd	$h1hi,$c1hi,$h1hi
+	fsubd	$h3lo,$c3lo,$h3lo
+	fsubd	$h3hi,$c3hi,$h3hi
+	fsubd	$h2lo,$c2lo,$h2lo
+	fsubd	$h2hi,$c2hi,$h2hi
+	fsubd	$h0lo,$c0lo,$h0lo
+	fsubd	$h0hi,$c0hi,$h0hi
+
+	faddd	$h1lo,$c0lo,$h1lo
+	faddd	$h1hi,$c0hi,$h1hi
+	faddd	$h3lo,$c2lo,$h3lo
+	faddd	$h3hi,$c2hi,$h3hi
+	faddd	$h2lo,$c1lo,$h2lo
+	faddd	$h2hi,$c1hi,$h2hi
+	fmaddd	$five_two130,$c3lo,$h0lo,$h0lo
+	fmaddd	$five_two130,$c3hi,$h0hi,$h0hi
+
+	faddd	$h1lo,$h1hi,$x1
+	faddd	$h3lo,$h3hi,$x3
+	faddd	$h2lo,$h2hi,$x2
+	faddd	$h0lo,$h0hi,$x0
+
+	faddd	$x1,$two32,$x1  		! bias
+	faddd	$x3,$two96,$x3
+	faddd	$x2,$two64,$x2
+	faddd	$x0,$two0, $x0
+
+	ldx	[%sp+LOCALS+8*4],%fsr		! restore saved %fsr
+
+	std	$x1,[$ctx+8*1]			! store [biased] hash value
+	std	$x3,[$ctx+8*3]
+	std	$x2,[$ctx+8*2]
+	std	$x0,[$ctx+8*0]
+
+.Labort:
+	ret
+	restore
+.type	poly1305_blocks_fma,#function
+.size	poly1305_blocks_fma,.-poly1305_blocks_fma
+___
+{
+my ($mac,$nonce)=($inp,$len);
+
+my ($h0,$h1,$h2,$h3,$h4, $d0,$d1,$d2,$d3, $mask
+   ) = (map("%l$_",(0..5)),map("%o$_",(0..4)));
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.align	32
+poly1305_emit_fma:
+	save	%sp,-STACK_FRAME,%sp
+
+	ld	[$ctx+8*0+0],$d0		! load hash
+	ld	[$ctx+8*0+4],$h0
+	ld	[$ctx+8*1+0],$d1
+	ld	[$ctx+8*1+4],$h1
+	ld	[$ctx+8*2+0],$d2
+	ld	[$ctx+8*2+4],$h2
+	ld	[$ctx+8*3+0],$d3
+	ld	[$ctx+8*3+4],$h3
+
+	sethi	%hi(0xfff00000),$mask
+	andn	$d0,$mask,$d0			! mask exponent
+	andn	$d1,$mask,$d1
+	andn	$d2,$mask,$d2
+	andn	$d3,$mask,$d3			! can be partially reduced...
+	mov	3,$mask
+
+	srl	$d3,2,$padbit			! ... so reduce
+	and	$d3,$mask,$h4
+	andn	$d3,$mask,$d3
+	add	$padbit,$d3,$d3
+
+	addcc	$d3,$h0,$h0
+	addccc	$d0,$h1,$h1
+	addccc	$d1,$h2,$h2
+	addccc	$d2,$h3,$h3
+	addc	%g0,$h4,$h4
+
+	addcc	$h0,5,$d0			! compare to modulus
+	addccc	$h1,0,$d1
+	addccc	$h2,0,$d2
+	addccc	$h3,0,$d3
+	addc	$h4,0,$mask
+
+	srl	$mask,2,$mask			! did it carry/borrow?
+	neg	$mask,$mask
+	sra	$mask,31,$mask			! mask
+
+	andn	$h0,$mask,$h0
+	and	$d0,$mask,$d0
+	andn	$h1,$mask,$h1
+	and	$d1,$mask,$d1
+	or	$d0,$h0,$h0
+	ld	[$nonce+0],$d0			! load nonce
+	andn	$h2,$mask,$h2
+	and	$d2,$mask,$d2
+	or	$d1,$h1,$h1
+	ld	[$nonce+4],$d1
+	andn	$h3,$mask,$h3
+	and	$d3,$mask,$d3
+	or	$d2,$h2,$h2
+	ld	[$nonce+8],$d2
+	or	$d3,$h3,$h3
+	ld	[$nonce+12],$d3
+
+	addcc	$d0,$h0,$h0			! accumulate nonce
+	addccc	$d1,$h1,$h1
+	addccc	$d2,$h2,$h2
+	addc	$d3,$h3,$h3
+
+	stb	$h0,[$mac+0]			! write little-endian result
+	srl	$h0,8,$h0
+	stb	$h1,[$mac+4]
+	srl	$h1,8,$h1
+	stb	$h2,[$mac+8]
+	srl	$h2,8,$h2
+	stb	$h3,[$mac+12]
+	srl	$h3,8,$h3
+
+	stb	$h0,[$mac+1]
+	srl	$h0,8,$h0
+	stb	$h1,[$mac+5]
+	srl	$h1,8,$h1
+	stb	$h2,[$mac+9]
+	srl	$h2,8,$h2
+	stb	$h3,[$mac+13]
+	srl	$h3,8,$h3
+
+	stb	$h0,[$mac+2]
+	srl	$h0,8,$h0
+	stb	$h1,[$mac+6]
+	srl	$h1,8,$h1
+	stb	$h2,[$mac+10]
+	srl	$h2,8,$h2
+	stb	$h3,[$mac+14]
+	srl	$h3,8,$h3
+
+	stb	$h0,[$mac+3]
+	stb	$h1,[$mac+7]
+	stb	$h2,[$mac+11]
+	stb	$h3,[$mac+15]
+
+	ret
+	restore
+.type	poly1305_emit_fma,#function
+.size	poly1305_emit_fma,.-poly1305_emit_fma
+___
+}
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.align	64
+.Lconsts_fma:
+.word	0x43300000,0x00000000		! 2^(52+0)
+.word	0x45300000,0x00000000		! 2^(52+32)
+.word	0x47300000,0x00000000		! 2^(52+64)
+.word	0x49300000,0x00000000		! 2^(52+96)
+.word	0x4b500000,0x00000000		! 2^(52+130)
+
+.word	0x37f40000,0x00000000		! 5/2^130
+.word	0,1<<30				! fsr: truncate, no exceptions
+
+.word	0x44300000,0x00000000		! 2^(52+16+0)
+.word	0x46300000,0x00000000		! 2^(52+16+32)
+.word	0x48300000,0x00000000		! 2^(52+16+64)
+.word	0x4a300000,0x00000000		! 2^(52+16+96)
+.word	0x3e300000,0x00000000		! 2^(52+16+0-96)
+.word	0x40300000,0x00000000		! 2^(52+16+32-96)
+.word	0x42300000,0x00000000		! 2^(52+16+64-96)
+.asciz	"Poly1305 for SPARCv9/VIS3/FMA, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+.align	4
+___
+}
+
+# Purpose of these subroutines is to explicitly encode VIS instructions,
+# so that one can compile the module without having to specify VIS
+# extensions on compiler command line, e.g. -xarch=v9 vs. -xarch=v9a.
+# Idea is to reserve for option to produce "universal" binary and let
+# programmer detect if current CPU is VIS capable at run-time.
+sub unvis3 {
+my ($mnemonic,$rs1,$rs2,$rd)=@_;
+my %bias = ( "g" => 0, "o" => 8, "l" => 16, "i" => 24 );
+my ($ref,$opf);
+my %visopf = (	"addxc"		=> 0x011,
+		"addxccc"	=> 0x013,
+		"umulxhi"	=> 0x016	);
+
+    $ref = "$mnemonic\t$rs1,$rs2,$rd";
+
+    if ($opf=$visopf{$mnemonic}) {
+	foreach ($rs1,$rs2,$rd) {
+	    return $ref if (!/%([goli])([0-9])/);
+	    $_=$bias{$1}+$2;
+	}
+
+	return	sprintf ".word\t0x%08x !%s",
+			0x81b00000|$rd<<25|$rs1<<14|$opf<<5|$rs2,
+			$ref;
+    } else {
+	return $ref;
+    }
+}
+
+sub unfma {
+my ($mnemonic,$rs1,$rs2,$rs3,$rd)=@_;
+my ($ref,$opf);
+my %fmaopf = (	"fmadds"	=> 0x1,
+		"fmaddd"	=> 0x2,
+		"fmsubs"	=> 0x5,
+		"fmsubd"	=> 0x6		);
+
+    $ref = "$mnemonic\t$rs1,$rs2,$rs3,$rd";
+
+    if ($opf=$fmaopf{$mnemonic}) {
+	foreach ($rs1,$rs2,$rs3,$rd) {
+	    return $ref if (!/%f([0-9]{1,2})/);
+	    $_=$1;
+	    if ($1>=32) {
+		return $ref if ($1&1);
+		# re-encode for upper double register addressing
+		$_=($1|$1>>5)&31;
+	    }
+	}
+
+	return	sprintf ".word\t0x%08x !%s",
+			0x81b80000|$rd<<25|$rs1<<14|$rs3<<9|$opf<<5|$rs2,
+			$ref;
+    } else {
+	return $ref;
+    }
+}
+
+foreach (split("\n",$code)) {
+	s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/ge;
+
+	s/\b(umulxhi|addxc[c]{0,2})\s+(%[goli][0-7]),\s*(%[goli][0-7]),\s*(%[goli][0-7])/
+		&unvis3($1,$2,$3,$4)
+	 /ge	or
+	s/\b(fmadd[sd])\s+(%f[0-9]+),\s*(%f[0-9]+),\s*(%f[0-9]+),\s*(%f[0-9]+)/
+		&unfma($1,$2,$3,$4,$5)
+	 /ge;
+
+	print $_,"\n";
+}
+
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-x86.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-x86.pl
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..ab24dfc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-x86.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,1814 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# This module implements Poly1305 hash for x86.
+#
+# April 2015
+#
+# Numbers are cycles per processed byte with poly1305_blocks alone,
+# measured with rdtsc at fixed clock frequency.
+#
+#		IALU/gcc-3.4(*)	SSE2(**)	AVX2
+# Pentium	15.7/+80%	-
+# PIII		6.21/+90%	-
+# P4		19.8/+40%	3.24
+# Core 2	4.85/+90%	1.80
+# Westmere	4.58/+100%	1.43
+# Sandy Bridge	3.90/+100%	1.36
+# Haswell	3.88/+70%	1.18		0.72
+# Silvermont	11.0/+40%	4.80
+# Goldmont	4.10/+200%	2.10
+# VIA Nano	6.71/+90%	2.47
+# Sledgehammer	3.51/+180%	4.27
+# Bulldozer	4.53/+140%	1.31
+#
+# (*)	gcc 4.8 for some reason generated worse code;
+# (**)	besides SSE2 there are floating-point and AVX options; FP
+#	is deemed unnecessary, because pre-SSE2 processor are too
+#	old to care about, while it's not the fastest option on
+#	SSE2-capable ones; AVX is omitted, because it doesn't give
+#	a lot of improvement, 5-10% depending on processor;
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm");
+require "x86asm.pl";
+
+$output=pop;
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+&asm_init($ARGV[0],"poly1305-x86.pl",$ARGV[$#ARGV] eq "386");
+
+$sse2=$avx=0;
+for (@ARGV) { $sse2=1 if (/-DOPENSSL_IA32_SSE2/); }
+
+if ($sse2) {
+	&static_label("const_sse2");
+	&static_label("enter_blocks");
+	&static_label("enter_emit");
+	&external_label("OPENSSL_ia32cap_P");
+
+	if (`$ENV{CC} -Wa,-v -c -o /dev/null -x assembler /dev/null 2>&1`
+			=~ /GNU assembler version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
+		$avx = ($1>=2.19) + ($1>=2.22);
+	}
+
+	if (!$avx && $ARGV[0] eq "win32n" &&
+	   `nasm -v 2>&1` =~ /NASM version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
+	$avx = ($1>=2.09) + ($1>=2.10);
+	}
+
+	if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /(^clang version|based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
+		$avx = ($2>=3.0) + ($2>3.0);
+	}
+}
+
+########################################################################
+# Layout of opaque area is following.
+#
+#	unsigned __int32 h[5];		# current hash value base 2^32
+#	unsigned __int32 pad;		# is_base2_26 in vector context
+#	unsigned __int32 r[4];		# key value base 2^32
+
+&align(64);
+&function_begin("poly1305_init");
+	&mov	("edi",&wparam(0));		# context
+	&mov	("esi",&wparam(1));		# key
+	&mov	("ebp",&wparam(2));		# function table
+
+	&xor	("eax","eax");
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*0,"edi"),"eax");	# zero hash value
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*1,"edi"),"eax");
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*2,"edi"),"eax");
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*3,"edi"),"eax");
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*4,"edi"),"eax");
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*5,"edi"),"eax");	# is_base2_26
+
+	&cmp	("esi",0);
+	&je	(&label("nokey"));
+
+    if ($sse2) {
+	&call	(&label("pic_point"));
+    &set_label("pic_point");
+	&blindpop("ebx");
+
+	&lea	("eax",&DWP("poly1305_blocks-".&label("pic_point"),"ebx"));
+	&lea	("edx",&DWP("poly1305_emit-".&label("pic_point"),"ebx"));
+
+	&picmeup("edi","OPENSSL_ia32cap_P","ebx",&label("pic_point"));
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(0,"edi"));
+	&and	("ecx",1<<26|1<<24);
+	&cmp	("ecx",1<<26|1<<24);		# SSE2 and XMM?
+	&jne	(&label("no_sse2"));
+
+	&lea	("eax",&DWP("_poly1305_blocks_sse2-".&label("pic_point"),"ebx"));
+	&lea	("edx",&DWP("_poly1305_emit_sse2-".&label("pic_point"),"ebx"));
+
+      if ($avx>1) {
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(8,"edi"));
+	&test	("ecx",1<<5);			# AVX2?
+	&jz	(&label("no_sse2"));
+
+	&lea	("eax",&DWP("_poly1305_blocks_avx2-".&label("pic_point"),"ebx"));
+      }
+    &set_label("no_sse2");
+	&mov	("edi",&wparam(0));		# reload context
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,"ebp"),"eax");		# fill function table
+	&mov	(&DWP(4,"ebp"),"edx");
+    }
+
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(4*0,"esi"));	# load input key
+	&mov	("ebx",&DWP(4*1,"esi"));
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(4*2,"esi"));
+	&mov	("edx",&DWP(4*3,"esi"));
+	&and	("eax",0x0fffffff);
+	&and	("ebx",0x0ffffffc);
+	&and	("ecx",0x0ffffffc);
+	&and	("edx",0x0ffffffc);
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*6,"edi"),"eax");
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*7,"edi"),"ebx");
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*8,"edi"),"ecx");
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*9,"edi"),"edx");
+
+	&mov	("eax",$sse2);
+&set_label("nokey");
+&function_end("poly1305_init");
+
+($h0,$h1,$h2,$h3,$h4,
+ $d0,$d1,$d2,$d3,
+ $r0,$r1,$r2,$r3,
+     $s1,$s2,$s3)=map(4*$_,(0..15));
+
+&function_begin("poly1305_blocks");
+	&mov	("edi",&wparam(0));		# ctx
+	&mov	("esi",&wparam(1));		# inp
+	&mov	("ecx",&wparam(2));		# len
+&set_label("enter_blocks");
+	&and	("ecx",-15);
+	&jz	(&label("nodata"));
+
+	&stack_push(16);
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(4*6,"edi"));	# r0
+	&mov	("ebx",&DWP(4*7,"edi"));	# r1
+	 &lea	("ebp",&DWP(0,"esi","ecx"));	# end of input
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(4*8,"edi"));	# r2
+	&mov	("edx",&DWP(4*9,"edi"));	# r3
+
+	&mov	(&wparam(2),"ebp");
+	&mov	("ebp","esi");
+
+	&mov	(&DWP($r0,"esp"),"eax");	# r0
+	&mov	("eax","ebx");
+	&shr	("eax",2);
+	&mov	(&DWP($r1,"esp"),"ebx");	# r1
+	&add	("eax","ebx");			# s1
+	&mov	("ebx","ecx");
+	&shr	("ebx",2);
+	&mov	(&DWP($r2,"esp"),"ecx");	# r2
+	&add	("ebx","ecx");			# s2
+	&mov	("ecx","edx");
+	&shr	("ecx",2);
+	&mov	(&DWP($r3,"esp"),"edx");	# r3
+	&add	("ecx","edx");			# s3
+	&mov	(&DWP($s1,"esp"),"eax");	# s1
+	&mov	(&DWP($s2,"esp"),"ebx");	# s2
+	&mov	(&DWP($s3,"esp"),"ecx");	# s3
+
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(4*0,"edi"));	# load hash value
+	&mov	("ebx",&DWP(4*1,"edi"));
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(4*2,"edi"));
+	&mov	("esi",&DWP(4*3,"edi"));
+	&mov	("edi",&DWP(4*4,"edi"));
+	&jmp	(&label("loop"));
+
+&set_label("loop",32);
+	&add	("eax",&DWP(4*0,"ebp"));	# accumulate input
+	&adc	("ebx",&DWP(4*1,"ebp"));
+	&adc	("ecx",&DWP(4*2,"ebp"));
+	&adc	("esi",&DWP(4*3,"ebp"));
+	&lea	("ebp",&DWP(4*4,"ebp"));
+	&adc	("edi",&wparam(3));		# padbit
+
+	&mov	(&DWP($h0,"esp"),"eax");	# put aside hash[+inp]
+	&mov	(&DWP($h3,"esp"),"esi");
+
+	&mul	(&DWP($r0,"esp"));		# h0*r0
+	 &mov	(&DWP($h4,"esp"),"edi");
+	&mov	("edi","eax");
+	&mov	("eax","ebx");			# h1
+	&mov	("esi","edx");
+	&mul	(&DWP($s3,"esp"));		# h1*s3
+	&add	("edi","eax");
+	&mov	("eax","ecx");			# h2
+	&adc	("esi","edx");
+	&mul	(&DWP($s2,"esp"));		# h2*s2
+	&add	("edi","eax");
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP($h3,"esp"));
+	&adc	("esi","edx");
+	&mul	(&DWP($s1,"esp"));		# h3*s1
+	&add	("edi","eax");
+	 &mov	("eax",&DWP($h0,"esp"));
+	&adc	("esi","edx");
+
+	&mul	(&DWP($r1,"esp"));		# h0*r1
+	 &mov	(&DWP($d0,"esp"),"edi");
+	&xor	("edi","edi");
+	&add	("esi","eax");
+	&mov	("eax","ebx");			# h1
+	&adc	("edi","edx");
+	&mul	(&DWP($r0,"esp"));		# h1*r0
+	&add	("esi","eax");
+	&mov	("eax","ecx");			# h2
+	&adc	("edi","edx");
+	&mul	(&DWP($s3,"esp"));		# h2*s3
+	&add	("esi","eax");
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP($h3,"esp"));
+	&adc	("edi","edx");
+	&mul	(&DWP($s2,"esp"));		# h3*s2
+	&add	("esi","eax");
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP($h4,"esp"));
+	&adc	("edi","edx");
+	&imul	("eax",&DWP($s1,"esp"));	# h4*s1
+	&add	("esi","eax");
+	 &mov	("eax",&DWP($h0,"esp"));
+	&adc	("edi",0);
+
+	&mul	(&DWP($r2,"esp"));		# h0*r2
+	 &mov	(&DWP($d1,"esp"),"esi");
+	&xor	("esi","esi");
+	&add	("edi","eax");
+	&mov	("eax","ebx");			# h1
+	&adc	("esi","edx");
+	&mul	(&DWP($r1,"esp"));		# h1*r1
+	&add	("edi","eax");
+	&mov	("eax","ecx");			# h2
+	&adc	("esi","edx");
+	&mul	(&DWP($r0,"esp"));		# h2*r0
+	&add	("edi","eax");
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP($h3,"esp"));
+	&adc	("esi","edx");
+	&mul	(&DWP($s3,"esp"));		# h3*s3
+	&add	("edi","eax");
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP($h4,"esp"));
+	&adc	("esi","edx");
+	&imul	("eax",&DWP($s2,"esp"));	# h4*s2
+	&add	("edi","eax");
+	 &mov	("eax",&DWP($h0,"esp"));
+	&adc	("esi",0);
+
+	&mul	(&DWP($r3,"esp"));		# h0*r3
+	 &mov	(&DWP($d2,"esp"),"edi");
+	&xor	("edi","edi");
+	&add	("esi","eax");
+	&mov	("eax","ebx");			# h1
+	&adc	("edi","edx");
+	&mul	(&DWP($r2,"esp"));		# h1*r2
+	&add	("esi","eax");
+	&mov	("eax","ecx");			# h2
+	&adc	("edi","edx");
+	&mul	(&DWP($r1,"esp"));		# h2*r1
+	&add	("esi","eax");
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP($h3,"esp"));
+	&adc	("edi","edx");
+	&mul	(&DWP($r0,"esp"));		# h3*r0
+	&add	("esi","eax");
+	 &mov	("ecx",&DWP($h4,"esp"));
+	&adc	("edi","edx");
+
+	&mov	("edx","ecx");
+	&imul	("ecx",&DWP($s3,"esp"));	# h4*s3
+	&add	("esi","ecx");
+	 &mov	("eax",&DWP($d0,"esp"));
+	&adc	("edi",0);
+
+	&imul	("edx",&DWP($r0,"esp"));	# h4*r0
+	&add	("edx","edi");
+
+	&mov	("ebx",&DWP($d1,"esp"));
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP($d2,"esp"));
+
+	&mov	("edi","edx");			# last reduction step
+	&shr	("edx",2);
+	&and	("edi",3);
+	&lea	("edx",&DWP(0,"edx","edx",4));	# *5
+	&add	("eax","edx");
+	&adc	("ebx",0);
+	&adc	("ecx",0);
+	&adc	("esi",0);
+	&adc	("edi",0);
+
+	&cmp	("ebp",&wparam(2));		# done yet?
+	&jne	(&label("loop"));
+
+	&mov	("edx",&wparam(0));		# ctx
+	&stack_pop(16);
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*0,"edx"),"eax");	# store hash value
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*1,"edx"),"ebx");
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*2,"edx"),"ecx");
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*3,"edx"),"esi");
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*4,"edx"),"edi");
+&set_label("nodata");
+&function_end("poly1305_blocks");
+
+&function_begin("poly1305_emit");
+	&mov	("ebp",&wparam(0));		# context
+&set_label("enter_emit");
+	&mov	("edi",&wparam(1));		# output
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(4*0,"ebp"));	# load hash value
+	&mov	("ebx",&DWP(4*1,"ebp"));
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(4*2,"ebp"));
+	&mov	("edx",&DWP(4*3,"ebp"));
+	&mov	("esi",&DWP(4*4,"ebp"));
+
+	&add	("eax",5);			# compare to modulus
+	&adc	("ebx",0);
+	&adc	("ecx",0);
+	&adc	("edx",0);
+	&adc	("esi",0);
+	&shr	("esi",2);			# did it carry/borrow?
+	&neg	("esi");			# do we choose hash-modulus?
+
+	&and	("eax","esi");
+	&and	("ebx","esi");
+	&and	("ecx","esi");
+	&and	("edx","esi");
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*0,"edi"),"eax");
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*1,"edi"),"ebx");
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*2,"edi"),"ecx");
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*3,"edi"),"edx");
+
+	&not	("esi");			# or original hash value?
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(4*0,"ebp"));
+	&mov	("ebx",&DWP(4*1,"ebp"));
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(4*2,"ebp"));
+	&mov	("edx",&DWP(4*3,"ebp"));
+	&mov	("ebp",&wparam(2));
+	&and	("eax","esi");
+	&and	("ebx","esi");
+	&and	("ecx","esi");
+	&and	("edx","esi");
+	&or	("eax",&DWP(4*0,"edi"));
+	&or	("ebx",&DWP(4*1,"edi"));
+	&or	("ecx",&DWP(4*2,"edi"));
+	&or	("edx",&DWP(4*3,"edi"));
+
+	&add	("eax",&DWP(4*0,"ebp"));	# accumulate key
+	&adc	("ebx",&DWP(4*1,"ebp"));
+	&adc	("ecx",&DWP(4*2,"ebp"));
+	&adc	("edx",&DWP(4*3,"ebp"));
+
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*0,"edi"),"eax");
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*1,"edi"),"ebx");
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*2,"edi"),"ecx");
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*3,"edi"),"edx");
+&function_end("poly1305_emit");
+
+if ($sse2) {
+########################################################################
+# Layout of opaque area is following.
+#
+#	unsigned __int32 h[5];		# current hash value base 2^26
+#	unsigned __int32 is_base2_26;
+#	unsigned __int32 r[4];		# key value base 2^32
+#	unsigned __int32 pad[2];
+#	struct { unsigned __int32 r^4, r^3, r^2, r^1; } r[9];
+#
+# where r^n are base 2^26 digits of degrees of multiplier key. There are
+# 5 digits, but last four are interleaved with multiples of 5, totalling
+# in 9 elements: r0, r1, 5*r1, r2, 5*r2, r3, 5*r3, r4, 5*r4.
+
+my ($D0,$D1,$D2,$D3,$D4,$T0,$T1,$T2)=map("xmm$_",(0..7));
+my $MASK=$T2;	# borrow and keep in mind
+
+&align	(32);
+&function_begin_B("_poly1305_init_sse2");
+	&movdqu		($D4,&QWP(4*6,"edi"));		# key base 2^32
+	&lea		("edi",&DWP(16*3,"edi"));	# size optimization
+	&mov		("ebp","esp");
+	&sub		("esp",16*(9+5));
+	&and		("esp",-16);
+
+	#&pand		($D4,&QWP(96,"ebx"));		# magic mask
+	&movq		($MASK,&QWP(64,"ebx"));
+
+	&movdqa		($D0,$D4);
+	&movdqa		($D1,$D4);
+	&movdqa		($D2,$D4);
+
+	&pand		($D0,$MASK);			# -> base 2^26
+	&psrlq		($D1,26);
+	&psrldq		($D2,6);
+	&pand		($D1,$MASK);
+	&movdqa		($D3,$D2);
+	&psrlq		($D2,4)
+	&psrlq		($D3,30);
+	&pand		($D2,$MASK);
+	&pand		($D3,$MASK);
+	&psrldq		($D4,13);
+
+	&lea		("edx",&DWP(16*9,"esp"));	# size optimization
+	&mov		("ecx",2);
+&set_label("square");
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*0,"esp"),$D0);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*1,"esp"),$D1);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*2,"esp"),$D2);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*3,"esp"),$D3);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*4,"esp"),$D4);
+
+	&movdqa		($T1,$D1);
+	&movdqa		($T0,$D2);
+	&pslld		($T1,2);
+	&pslld		($T0,2);
+	&paddd		($T1,$D1);			# *5
+	&paddd		($T0,$D2);			# *5
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*5,"esp"),$T1);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*6,"esp"),$T0);
+	&movdqa		($T1,$D3);
+	&movdqa		($T0,$D4);
+	&pslld		($T1,2);
+	&pslld		($T0,2);
+	&paddd		($T1,$D3);			# *5
+	&paddd		($T0,$D4);			# *5
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*7,"esp"),$T1);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*8,"esp"),$T0);
+
+	&pshufd		($T1,$D0,0b01000100);
+	&movdqa		($T0,$D1);
+	&pshufd		($D1,$D1,0b01000100);
+	&pshufd		($D2,$D2,0b01000100);
+	&pshufd		($D3,$D3,0b01000100);
+	&pshufd		($D4,$D4,0b01000100);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*0,"edx"),$T1);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*1,"edx"),$D1);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*2,"edx"),$D2);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*3,"edx"),$D3);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*4,"edx"),$D4);
+
+	################################################################
+	# d4 = h4*r0 + h3*r1   + h2*r2   + h1*r3   + h0*r4
+	# d3 = h3*r0 + h2*r1   + h1*r2   + h0*r3   + h4*5*r4
+	# d2 = h2*r0 + h1*r1   + h0*r2   + h4*5*r3 + h3*5*r4
+	# d1 = h1*r0 + h0*r1   + h4*5*r2 + h3*5*r3 + h2*5*r4
+	# d0 = h0*r0 + h4*5*r1 + h3*5*r2 + h2*5*r3 + h1*5*r4
+
+	&pmuludq	($D4,$D0);			# h4*r0
+	&pmuludq	($D3,$D0);			# h3*r0
+	&pmuludq	($D2,$D0);			# h2*r0
+	&pmuludq	($D1,$D0);			# h1*r0
+	&pmuludq	($D0,$T1);			# h0*r0
+
+sub pmuladd {
+my $load = shift;
+my $base = shift; $base = "esp" if (!defined($base));
+
+	################################################################
+	# As for choice to "rotate" $T0-$T2 in order to move paddq
+	# past next multiplication. While it makes code harder to read
+	# and doesn't have significant effect on most processors, it
+	# makes a lot of difference on Atom, up to 30% improvement.
+
+	&movdqa		($T1,$T0);
+	&pmuludq	($T0,&QWP(16*3,$base));		# r1*h3
+	&movdqa		($T2,$T1);
+	&pmuludq	($T1,&QWP(16*2,$base));		# r1*h2
+	&paddq		($D4,$T0);
+	&movdqa		($T0,$T2);
+	&pmuludq	($T2,&QWP(16*1,$base));		# r1*h1
+	&paddq		($D3,$T1);
+	&$load		($T1,5);			# s1
+	&pmuludq	($T0,&QWP(16*0,$base));		# r1*h0
+	&paddq		($D2,$T2);
+	&pmuludq	($T1,&QWP(16*4,$base));		# s1*h4
+	 &$load		($T2,2);			# r2^n
+	&paddq		($D1,$T0);
+
+	&movdqa		($T0,$T2);
+	&pmuludq	($T2,&QWP(16*2,$base));		# r2*h2
+	 &paddq		($D0,$T1);
+	&movdqa		($T1,$T0);
+	&pmuludq	($T0,&QWP(16*1,$base));		# r2*h1
+	&paddq		($D4,$T2);
+	&$load		($T2,6);			# s2^n
+	&pmuludq	($T1,&QWP(16*0,$base));		# r2*h0
+	&paddq		($D3,$T0);
+	&movdqa		($T0,$T2);
+	&pmuludq	($T2,&QWP(16*4,$base));		# s2*h4
+	&paddq		($D2,$T1);
+	&pmuludq	($T0,&QWP(16*3,$base));		# s2*h3
+	 &$load		($T1,3);			# r3^n
+	&paddq		($D1,$T2);
+
+	&movdqa		($T2,$T1);
+	&pmuludq	($T1,&QWP(16*1,$base));		# r3*h1
+	 &paddq		($D0,$T0);
+	&$load		($T0,7);			# s3^n
+	&pmuludq	($T2,&QWP(16*0,$base));		# r3*h0
+	&paddq		($D4,$T1);
+	&movdqa		($T1,$T0);
+	&pmuludq	($T0,&QWP(16*4,$base));		# s3*h4
+	&paddq		($D3,$T2);
+	&movdqa		($T2,$T1);
+	&pmuludq	($T1,&QWP(16*3,$base));		# s3*h3
+	&paddq		($D2,$T0);
+	&pmuludq	($T2,&QWP(16*2,$base));		# s3*h2
+	 &$load		($T0,4);			# r4^n
+	&paddq		($D1,$T1);
+
+	&$load		($T1,8);			# s4^n
+	&pmuludq	($T0,&QWP(16*0,$base));		# r4*h0
+	 &paddq		($D0,$T2);
+	&movdqa		($T2,$T1);
+	&pmuludq	($T1,&QWP(16*4,$base));		# s4*h4
+	&paddq		($D4,$T0);
+	&movdqa		($T0,$T2);
+	&pmuludq	($T2,&QWP(16*1,$base));		# s4*h1
+	&paddq		($D3,$T1);
+	&movdqa		($T1,$T0);
+	&pmuludq	($T0,&QWP(16*2,$base));		# s4*h2
+	&paddq		($D0,$T2);
+	&pmuludq	($T1,&QWP(16*3,$base));		# s4*h3
+	 &movdqa	($MASK,&QWP(64,"ebx"));
+	&paddq		($D1,$T0);
+	&paddq		($D2,$T1);
+}
+	&pmuladd	(sub {	my ($reg,$i)=@_;
+				&movdqa ($reg,&QWP(16*$i,"esp"));
+			     },"edx");
+
+sub lazy_reduction {
+my $extra = shift;
+
+	################################################################
+	# lazy reduction as discussed in "NEON crypto" by D.J. Bernstein
+	# and P. Schwabe
+	#
+	# [(*) see discussion in poly1305-armv4 module]
+
+	 &movdqa	($T0,$D3);
+	 &pand		($D3,$MASK);
+	 &psrlq		($T0,26);
+	 &$extra	()				if (defined($extra));
+	 &paddq		($T0,$D4);			# h3 -> h4
+	&movdqa		($T1,$D0);
+	&pand		($D0,$MASK);
+	&psrlq		($T1,26);
+	 &movdqa	($D4,$T0);
+	&paddq		($T1,$D1);			# h0 -> h1
+	 &psrlq		($T0,26);
+	 &pand		($D4,$MASK);
+	&movdqa		($D1,$T1);
+	&psrlq		($T1,26);
+	 &paddd		($D0,$T0);			# favour paddd when
+							# possible, because
+							# paddq is "broken"
+							# on Atom
+	 &psllq		($T0,2);
+	&paddq		($T1,$D2);			# h1 -> h2
+	 &paddq		($T0,$D0);			# h4 -> h0 (*)
+	&pand		($D1,$MASK);
+	&movdqa		($D2,$T1);
+	&psrlq		($T1,26);
+	&pand		($D2,$MASK);
+	&paddd		($T1,$D3);			# h2 -> h3
+	 &movdqa	($D0,$T0);
+	 &psrlq		($T0,26);
+	&movdqa		($D3,$T1);
+	&psrlq		($T1,26);
+	 &pand		($D0,$MASK);
+	 &paddd		($D1,$T0);			# h0 -> h1
+	&pand		($D3,$MASK);
+	&paddd		($D4,$T1);			# h3 -> h4
+}
+	&lazy_reduction	();
+
+	&dec		("ecx");
+	&jz		(&label("square_break"));
+
+	&punpcklqdq	($D0,&QWP(16*0,"esp"));		# 0:r^1:0:r^2
+	&punpcklqdq	($D1,&QWP(16*1,"esp"));
+	&punpcklqdq	($D2,&QWP(16*2,"esp"));
+	&punpcklqdq	($D3,&QWP(16*3,"esp"));
+	&punpcklqdq	($D4,&QWP(16*4,"esp"));
+	&jmp		(&label("square"));
+
+&set_label("square_break");
+	&psllq		($D0,32);			# -> r^3:0:r^4:0
+	&psllq		($D1,32);
+	&psllq		($D2,32);
+	&psllq		($D3,32);
+	&psllq		($D4,32);
+	&por		($D0,&QWP(16*0,"esp"));		# r^3:r^1:r^4:r^2
+	&por		($D1,&QWP(16*1,"esp"));
+	&por		($D2,&QWP(16*2,"esp"));
+	&por		($D3,&QWP(16*3,"esp"));
+	&por		($D4,&QWP(16*4,"esp"));
+
+	&pshufd		($D0,$D0,0b10001101);		# -> r^1:r^2:r^3:r^4
+	&pshufd		($D1,$D1,0b10001101);
+	&pshufd		($D2,$D2,0b10001101);
+	&pshufd		($D3,$D3,0b10001101);
+	&pshufd		($D4,$D4,0b10001101);
+
+	&movdqu		(&QWP(16*0,"edi"),$D0);		# save the table
+	&movdqu		(&QWP(16*1,"edi"),$D1);
+	&movdqu		(&QWP(16*2,"edi"),$D2);
+	&movdqu		(&QWP(16*3,"edi"),$D3);
+	&movdqu		(&QWP(16*4,"edi"),$D4);
+
+	&movdqa		($T1,$D1);
+	&movdqa		($T0,$D2);
+	&pslld		($T1,2);
+	&pslld		($T0,2);
+	&paddd		($T1,$D1);			# *5
+	&paddd		($T0,$D2);			# *5
+	&movdqu		(&QWP(16*5,"edi"),$T1);
+	&movdqu		(&QWP(16*6,"edi"),$T0);
+	&movdqa		($T1,$D3);
+	&movdqa		($T0,$D4);
+	&pslld		($T1,2);
+	&pslld		($T0,2);
+	&paddd		($T1,$D3);			# *5
+	&paddd		($T0,$D4);			# *5
+	&movdqu		(&QWP(16*7,"edi"),$T1);
+	&movdqu		(&QWP(16*8,"edi"),$T0);
+
+	&mov		("esp","ebp");
+	&lea		("edi",&DWP(-16*3,"edi"));	# size de-optimization
+	&ret		();
+&function_end_B("_poly1305_init_sse2");
+
+&align	(32);
+&function_begin("_poly1305_blocks_sse2");
+	&mov	("edi",&wparam(0));			# ctx
+	&mov	("esi",&wparam(1));			# inp
+	&mov	("ecx",&wparam(2));			# len
+
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(4*5,"edi"));		# is_base2_26
+	&and	("ecx",-16);
+	&jz	(&label("nodata"));
+	&cmp	("ecx",64);
+	&jae	(&label("enter_sse2"));
+	&test	("eax","eax");				# is_base2_26?
+	&jz	(&label("enter_blocks"));
+
+&set_label("enter_sse2",16);
+	&call	(&label("pic_point"));
+&set_label("pic_point");
+	&blindpop("ebx");
+	&lea	("ebx",&DWP(&label("const_sse2")."-".&label("pic_point"),"ebx"));
+
+	&test	("eax","eax");				# is_base2_26?
+	&jnz	(&label("base2_26"));
+
+	&call	("_poly1305_init_sse2");
+
+	################################################# base 2^32 -> base 2^26
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(0,"edi"));
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(3,"edi"));
+	&mov	("edx",&DWP(6,"edi"));
+	&mov	("esi",&DWP(9,"edi"));
+	&mov	("ebp",&DWP(13,"edi"));
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*5,"edi"),1);			# is_base2_26
+
+	&shr	("ecx",2);
+	&and	("eax",0x3ffffff);
+	&shr	("edx",4);
+	&and	("ecx",0x3ffffff);
+	&shr	("esi",6);
+	&and	("edx",0x3ffffff);
+
+	&movd	($D0,"eax");
+	&movd	($D1,"ecx");
+	&movd	($D2,"edx");
+	&movd	($D3,"esi");
+	&movd	($D4,"ebp");
+
+	&mov	("esi",&wparam(1));			# [reload] inp
+	&mov	("ecx",&wparam(2));			# [reload] len
+	&jmp	(&label("base2_32"));
+
+&set_label("base2_26",16);
+	&movd	($D0,&DWP(4*0,"edi"));			# load hash value
+	&movd	($D1,&DWP(4*1,"edi"));
+	&movd	($D2,&DWP(4*2,"edi"));
+	&movd	($D3,&DWP(4*3,"edi"));
+	&movd	($D4,&DWP(4*4,"edi"));
+	&movdqa	($MASK,&QWP(64,"ebx"));
+
+&set_label("base2_32");
+	&mov	("eax",&wparam(3));			# padbit
+	&mov	("ebp","esp");
+
+	&sub	("esp",16*(5+5+5+9+9));
+	&and	("esp",-16);
+
+	&lea	("edi",&DWP(16*3,"edi"));		# size optimization
+	&shl	("eax",24);				# padbit
+
+	&test	("ecx",31);
+	&jz	(&label("even"));
+
+	################################################################
+	# process single block, with SSE2, because it's still faster
+	# even though half of result is discarded
+
+	&movdqu		($T1,&QWP(0,"esi"));		# input
+	&lea		("esi",&DWP(16,"esi"));
+
+	&movdqa		($T0,$T1);			# -> base 2^26 ...
+	&pand		($T1,$MASK);
+	&paddd		($D0,$T1);			# ... and accumuate
+
+	&movdqa		($T1,$T0);
+	&psrlq		($T0,26);
+	&psrldq		($T1,6);
+	&pand		($T0,$MASK);
+	&paddd		($D1,$T0);
+
+	&movdqa		($T0,$T1);
+	&psrlq		($T1,4);
+	&pand		($T1,$MASK);
+	&paddd		($D2,$T1);
+
+	&movdqa		($T1,$T0);
+	&psrlq		($T0,30);
+	&pand		($T0,$MASK);
+	&psrldq		($T1,7);
+	&paddd		($D3,$T0);
+
+	&movd		($T0,"eax");			# padbit
+	&paddd		($D4,$T1);
+	 &movd		($T1,&DWP(16*0+12,"edi"));	# r0
+	&paddd		($D4,$T0);
+
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*0,"esp"),$D0);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*1,"esp"),$D1);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*2,"esp"),$D2);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*3,"esp"),$D3);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*4,"esp"),$D4);
+
+	################################################################
+	# d4 = h4*r0 + h3*r1   + h2*r2   + h1*r3   + h0*r4
+	# d3 = h3*r0 + h2*r1   + h1*r2   + h0*r3   + h4*5*r4
+	# d2 = h2*r0 + h1*r1   + h0*r2   + h4*5*r3 + h3*5*r4
+	# d1 = h1*r0 + h0*r1   + h4*5*r2 + h3*5*r3 + h2*5*r4
+	# d0 = h0*r0 + h4*5*r1 + h3*5*r2 + h2*5*r3 + h1*5*r4
+
+	&pmuludq	($D0,$T1);			# h4*r0
+	&pmuludq	($D1,$T1);			# h3*r0
+	&pmuludq	($D2,$T1);			# h2*r0
+	 &movd		($T0,&DWP(16*1+12,"edi"));	# r1
+	&pmuludq	($D3,$T1);			# h1*r0
+	&pmuludq	($D4,$T1);			# h0*r0
+
+	&pmuladd	(sub {	my ($reg,$i)=@_;
+				&movd ($reg,&DWP(16*$i+12,"edi"));
+			     });
+
+	&lazy_reduction	();
+
+	&sub		("ecx",16);
+	&jz		(&label("done"));
+
+&set_label("even");
+	&lea		("edx",&DWP(16*(5+5+5+9),"esp"));# size optimization
+	&lea		("eax",&DWP(-16*2,"esi"));
+	&sub		("ecx",64);
+
+	################################################################
+	# expand and copy pre-calculated table to stack
+
+	&movdqu		($T0,&QWP(16*0,"edi"));		# r^1:r^2:r^3:r^4
+	&pshufd		($T1,$T0,0b01000100);		# duplicate r^3:r^4
+	&cmovb		("esi","eax");
+	&pshufd		($T0,$T0,0b11101110);		# duplicate r^1:r^2
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*0,"edx"),$T1);
+	&lea		("eax",&DWP(16*10,"esp"));
+	&movdqu		($T1,&QWP(16*1,"edi"));
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*(0-9),"edx"),$T0);
+	&pshufd		($T0,$T1,0b01000100);
+	&pshufd		($T1,$T1,0b11101110);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*1,"edx"),$T0);
+	&movdqu		($T0,&QWP(16*2,"edi"));
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*(1-9),"edx"),$T1);
+	&pshufd		($T1,$T0,0b01000100);
+	&pshufd		($T0,$T0,0b11101110);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*2,"edx"),$T1);
+	&movdqu		($T1,&QWP(16*3,"edi"));
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*(2-9),"edx"),$T0);
+	&pshufd		($T0,$T1,0b01000100);
+	&pshufd		($T1,$T1,0b11101110);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*3,"edx"),$T0);
+	&movdqu		($T0,&QWP(16*4,"edi"));
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*(3-9),"edx"),$T1);
+	&pshufd		($T1,$T0,0b01000100);
+	&pshufd		($T0,$T0,0b11101110);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*4,"edx"),$T1);
+	&movdqu		($T1,&QWP(16*5,"edi"));
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*(4-9),"edx"),$T0);
+	&pshufd		($T0,$T1,0b01000100);
+	&pshufd		($T1,$T1,0b11101110);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*5,"edx"),$T0);
+	&movdqu		($T0,&QWP(16*6,"edi"));
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*(5-9),"edx"),$T1);
+	&pshufd		($T1,$T0,0b01000100);
+	&pshufd		($T0,$T0,0b11101110);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*6,"edx"),$T1);
+	&movdqu		($T1,&QWP(16*7,"edi"));
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*(6-9),"edx"),$T0);
+	&pshufd		($T0,$T1,0b01000100);
+	&pshufd		($T1,$T1,0b11101110);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*7,"edx"),$T0);
+	&movdqu		($T0,&QWP(16*8,"edi"));
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*(7-9),"edx"),$T1);
+	&pshufd		($T1,$T0,0b01000100);
+	&pshufd		($T0,$T0,0b11101110);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*8,"edx"),$T1);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*(8-9),"edx"),$T0);
+
+sub load_input {
+my ($inpbase,$offbase)=@_;
+
+	&movdqu		($T0,&QWP($inpbase+0,"esi"));	# load input
+	&movdqu		($T1,&QWP($inpbase+16,"esi"));
+	&lea		("esi",&DWP(16*2,"esi"));
+
+	&movdqa		(&QWP($offbase+16*2,"esp"),$D2);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP($offbase+16*3,"esp"),$D3);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP($offbase+16*4,"esp"),$D4);
+
+	&movdqa		($D2,$T0);			# splat input
+	&movdqa		($D3,$T1);
+	&psrldq		($D2,6);
+	&psrldq		($D3,6);
+	&movdqa		($D4,$T0);
+	&punpcklqdq	($D2,$D3);			# 2:3
+	&punpckhqdq	($D4,$T1);			# 4
+	&punpcklqdq	($T0,$T1);			# 0:1
+
+	&movdqa		($D3,$D2);
+	&psrlq		($D2,4);
+	&psrlq		($D3,30);
+	&movdqa		($T1,$T0);
+	&psrlq		($D4,40);			# 4
+	&psrlq		($T1,26);
+	&pand		($T0,$MASK);			# 0
+	&pand		($T1,$MASK);			# 1
+	&pand		($D2,$MASK);			# 2
+	&pand		($D3,$MASK);			# 3
+	&por		($D4,&QWP(0,"ebx"));		# padbit, yes, always
+
+	&movdqa		(&QWP($offbase+16*0,"esp"),$D0)	if ($offbase);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP($offbase+16*1,"esp"),$D1)	if ($offbase);
+}
+	&load_input	(16*2,16*5);
+
+	&jbe		(&label("skip_loop"));
+	&jmp		(&label("loop"));
+
+&set_label("loop",32);
+	################################################################
+	# ((inp[0]*r^4+inp[2]*r^2+inp[4])*r^4+inp[6]*r^2
+	# ((inp[1]*r^4+inp[3]*r^2+inp[5])*r^3+inp[7]*r
+	#   \___________________/
+	# ((inp[0]*r^4+inp[2]*r^2+inp[4])*r^4+inp[6]*r^2+inp[8])*r^2
+	# ((inp[1]*r^4+inp[3]*r^2+inp[5])*r^4+inp[7]*r^2+inp[9])*r
+	#   \___________________/ \____________________/
+	################################################################
+
+	&movdqa		($T2,&QWP(16*(0-9),"edx"));	# r0^2
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*1,"eax"),$T1);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*2,"eax"),$D2);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*3,"eax"),$D3);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*4,"eax"),$D4);
+
+	################################################################
+	# d4 = h4*r0 + h0*r4   + h1*r3   + h2*r2   + h3*r1
+	# d3 = h3*r0 + h0*r3   + h1*r2   + h2*r1   + h4*5*r4
+	# d2 = h2*r0 + h0*r2   + h1*r1   + h3*5*r4 + h4*5*r3
+	# d1 = h1*r0 + h0*r1   + h2*5*r4 + h3*5*r3 + h4*5*r2
+	# d0 = h0*r0 + h1*5*r4 + h2*5*r3 + h3*5*r2 + h4*5*r1
+
+	&movdqa		($D1,$T0);
+	&pmuludq	($T0,$T2);			# h0*r0
+	&movdqa		($D0,$T1);
+	&pmuludq	($T1,$T2);			# h1*r0
+	&pmuludq	($D2,$T2);			# h2*r0
+	&pmuludq	($D3,$T2);			# h3*r0
+	&pmuludq	($D4,$T2);			# h4*r0
+
+sub pmuladd_alt {
+my $addr = shift;
+
+	&pmuludq	($D0,&$addr(8));		# h1*s4
+	&movdqa		($T2,$D1);
+	&pmuludq	($D1,&$addr(1));		# h0*r1
+	&paddq		($D0,$T0);
+	&movdqa		($T0,$T2);
+	&pmuludq	($T2,&$addr(2));		# h0*r2
+	&paddq		($D1,$T1);
+	&movdqa		($T1,$T0);
+	&pmuludq	($T0,&$addr(3));		# h0*r3
+	&paddq		($D2,$T2);
+	 &movdqa	($T2,&QWP(16*1,"eax"));		# pull h1
+	&pmuludq	($T1,&$addr(4));		# h0*r4
+	&paddq		($D3,$T0);
+
+	&movdqa		($T0,$T2);
+	&pmuludq	($T2,&$addr(1));		# h1*r1
+	 &paddq		($D4,$T1);
+	&movdqa		($T1,$T0);
+	&pmuludq	($T0,&$addr(2));		# h1*r2
+	&paddq		($D2,$T2);
+	&movdqa		($T2,&QWP(16*2,"eax"));		# pull h2
+	&pmuludq	($T1,&$addr(3));		# h1*r3
+	&paddq		($D3,$T0);
+	&movdqa		($T0,$T2);
+	&pmuludq	($T2,&$addr(7));		# h2*s3
+	&paddq		($D4,$T1);
+	&movdqa		($T1,$T0);
+	&pmuludq	($T0,&$addr(8));		# h2*s4
+	&paddq		($D0,$T2);
+
+	&movdqa		($T2,$T1);
+	&pmuludq	($T1,&$addr(1));		# h2*r1
+	 &paddq		($D1,$T0);
+	&movdqa		($T0,&QWP(16*3,"eax"));		# pull h3
+	&pmuludq	($T2,&$addr(2));		# h2*r2
+	&paddq		($D3,$T1);
+	&movdqa		($T1,$T0);
+	&pmuludq	($T0,&$addr(6));		# h3*s2
+	&paddq		($D4,$T2);
+	&movdqa		($T2,$T1);
+	&pmuludq	($T1,&$addr(7));		# h3*s3
+	&paddq		($D0,$T0);
+	&movdqa		($T0,$T2);
+	&pmuludq	($T2,&$addr(8));		# h3*s4
+	&paddq		($D1,$T1);
+
+	&movdqa		($T1,&QWP(16*4,"eax"));		# pull h4
+	&pmuludq	($T0,&$addr(1));		# h3*r1
+	 &paddq		($D2,$T2);
+	&movdqa		($T2,$T1);
+	&pmuludq	($T1,&$addr(8));		# h4*s4
+	&paddq		($D4,$T0);
+	&movdqa		($T0,$T2);
+	&pmuludq	($T2,&$addr(5));		# h4*s1
+	&paddq		($D3,$T1);
+	&movdqa		($T1,$T0);
+	&pmuludq	($T0,&$addr(6));		# h4*s2
+	&paddq		($D0,$T2);
+	 &movdqa	($MASK,&QWP(64,"ebx"));
+	&pmuludq	($T1,&$addr(7));		# h4*s3
+	&paddq		($D1,$T0);
+	&paddq		($D2,$T1);
+}
+	&pmuladd_alt	(sub {	my $i=shift; &QWP(16*($i-9),"edx");	});
+
+	&load_input	(-16*2,0);
+	&lea		("eax",&DWP(-16*2,"esi"));
+	&sub		("ecx",64);
+
+	&paddd		($T0,&QWP(16*(5+0),"esp"));	# add hash value
+	&paddd		($T1,&QWP(16*(5+1),"esp"));
+	&paddd		($D2,&QWP(16*(5+2),"esp"));
+	&paddd		($D3,&QWP(16*(5+3),"esp"));
+	&paddd		($D4,&QWP(16*(5+4),"esp"));
+
+	&cmovb		("esi","eax");
+	&lea		("eax",&DWP(16*10,"esp"));
+
+	&movdqa		($T2,&QWP(16*0,"edx"));		# r0^4
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*1,"esp"),$D1);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*1,"eax"),$T1);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*2,"eax"),$D2);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*3,"eax"),$D3);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*4,"eax"),$D4);
+
+	################################################################
+	# d4 += h4*r0 + h0*r4   + h1*r3   + h2*r2   + h3*r1
+	# d3 += h3*r0 + h0*r3   + h1*r2   + h2*r1   + h4*5*r4
+	# d2 += h2*r0 + h0*r2   + h1*r1   + h3*5*r4 + h4*5*r3
+	# d1 += h1*r0 + h0*r1   + h2*5*r4 + h3*5*r3 + h4*5*r2
+	# d0 += h0*r0 + h1*5*r4 + h2*5*r3 + h3*5*r2 + h4*5*r1
+
+	&movdqa		($D1,$T0);
+	&pmuludq	($T0,$T2);			# h0*r0
+	&paddq		($T0,$D0);
+	&movdqa		($D0,$T1);
+	&pmuludq	($T1,$T2);			# h1*r0
+	&pmuludq	($D2,$T2);			# h2*r0
+	&pmuludq	($D3,$T2);			# h3*r0
+	&pmuludq	($D4,$T2);			# h4*r0
+
+	&paddq		($T1,&QWP(16*1,"esp"));
+	&paddq		($D2,&QWP(16*2,"esp"));
+	&paddq		($D3,&QWP(16*3,"esp"));
+	&paddq		($D4,&QWP(16*4,"esp"));
+
+	&pmuladd_alt	(sub {	my $i=shift; &QWP(16*$i,"edx");	});
+
+	&lazy_reduction	();
+
+	&load_input	(16*2,16*5);
+
+	&ja		(&label("loop"));
+
+&set_label("skip_loop");
+	################################################################
+	# multiply (inp[0:1]+hash) or inp[2:3] by r^2:r^1
+
+	 &pshufd	($T2,&QWP(16*(0-9),"edx"),0x10);# r0^n
+	&add		("ecx",32);
+	&jnz		(&label("long_tail"));
+
+	&paddd		($T0,$D0);			# add hash value
+	&paddd		($T1,$D1);
+	&paddd		($D2,&QWP(16*7,"esp"));
+	&paddd		($D3,&QWP(16*8,"esp"));
+	&paddd		($D4,&QWP(16*9,"esp"));
+
+&set_label("long_tail");
+
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*0,"eax"),$T0);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*1,"eax"),$T1);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*2,"eax"),$D2);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*3,"eax"),$D3);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*4,"eax"),$D4);
+
+	################################################################
+	# d4 = h4*r0 + h3*r1   + h2*r2   + h1*r3   + h0*r4
+	# d3 = h3*r0 + h2*r1   + h1*r2   + h0*r3   + h4*5*r4
+	# d2 = h2*r0 + h1*r1   + h0*r2   + h4*5*r3 + h3*5*r4
+	# d1 = h1*r0 + h0*r1   + h4*5*r2 + h3*5*r3 + h2*5*r4
+	# d0 = h0*r0 + h4*5*r1 + h3*5*r2 + h2*5*r3 + h1*5*r4
+
+	&pmuludq	($T0,$T2);			# h0*r0
+	&pmuludq	($T1,$T2);			# h1*r0
+	&pmuludq	($D2,$T2);			# h2*r0
+	&movdqa		($D0,$T0);
+	 &pshufd	($T0,&QWP(16*(1-9),"edx"),0x10);# r1^n
+	&pmuludq	($D3,$T2);			# h3*r0
+	&movdqa		($D1,$T1);
+	&pmuludq	($D4,$T2);			# h4*r0
+
+	&pmuladd	(sub {	my ($reg,$i)=@_;
+				&pshufd ($reg,&QWP(16*($i-9),"edx"),0x10);
+			     },"eax");
+
+	&jz		(&label("short_tail"));
+
+	&load_input	(-16*2,0);
+
+	 &pshufd	($T2,&QWP(16*0,"edx"),0x10);	# r0^n
+	&paddd		($T0,&QWP(16*5,"esp"));		# add hash value
+	&paddd		($T1,&QWP(16*6,"esp"));
+	&paddd		($D2,&QWP(16*7,"esp"));
+	&paddd		($D3,&QWP(16*8,"esp"));
+	&paddd		($D4,&QWP(16*9,"esp"));
+
+	################################################################
+	# multiply inp[0:1] by r^4:r^3 and accumulate
+
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*0,"esp"),$T0);
+	&pmuludq	($T0,$T2);			# h0*r0
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*1,"esp"),$T1);
+	&pmuludq	($T1,$T2);			# h1*r0
+	&paddq		($D0,$T0);
+	&movdqa		($T0,$D2);
+	&pmuludq	($D2,$T2);			# h2*r0
+	&paddq		($D1,$T1);
+	&movdqa		($T1,$D3);
+	&pmuludq	($D3,$T2);			# h3*r0
+	&paddq		($D2,&QWP(16*2,"esp"));
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*2,"esp"),$T0);
+	 &pshufd	($T0,&QWP(16*1,"edx"),0x10);	# r1^n
+	&paddq		($D3,&QWP(16*3,"esp"));
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*3,"esp"),$T1);
+	&movdqa		($T1,$D4);
+	&pmuludq	($D4,$T2);			# h4*r0
+	&paddq		($D4,&QWP(16*4,"esp"));
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*4,"esp"),$T1);
+
+	&pmuladd	(sub {	my ($reg,$i)=@_;
+				&pshufd ($reg,&QWP(16*$i,"edx"),0x10);
+			     });
+
+&set_label("short_tail");
+
+	################################################################
+	# horizontal addition
+
+	&pshufd		($T1,$D4,0b01001110);
+	&pshufd		($T0,$D3,0b01001110);
+	&paddq		($D4,$T1);
+	&paddq		($D3,$T0);
+	&pshufd		($T1,$D0,0b01001110);
+	&pshufd		($T0,$D1,0b01001110);
+	&paddq		($D0,$T1);
+	&paddq		($D1,$T0);
+	&pshufd		($T1,$D2,0b01001110);
+	#&paddq		($D2,$T1);
+
+	&lazy_reduction	(sub { &paddq ($D2,$T1) });
+
+&set_label("done");
+	&movd		(&DWP(-16*3+4*0,"edi"),$D0);	# store hash value
+	&movd		(&DWP(-16*3+4*1,"edi"),$D1);
+	&movd		(&DWP(-16*3+4*2,"edi"),$D2);
+	&movd		(&DWP(-16*3+4*3,"edi"),$D3);
+	&movd		(&DWP(-16*3+4*4,"edi"),$D4);
+	&mov	("esp","ebp");
+&set_label("nodata");
+&function_end("_poly1305_blocks_sse2");
+
+&align	(32);
+&function_begin("_poly1305_emit_sse2");
+	&mov	("ebp",&wparam(0));		# context
+
+	&cmp	(&DWP(4*5,"ebp"),0);		# is_base2_26?
+	&je	(&label("enter_emit"));
+
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(4*0,"ebp"));	# load hash value
+	&mov	("edi",&DWP(4*1,"ebp"));
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(4*2,"ebp"));
+	&mov	("edx",&DWP(4*3,"ebp"));
+	&mov	("esi",&DWP(4*4,"ebp"));
+
+	&mov	("ebx","edi");			# base 2^26 -> base 2^32
+	&shl	("edi",26);
+	&shr	("ebx",6);
+	&add	("eax","edi");
+	&mov	("edi","ecx");
+	&adc	("ebx",0);
+
+	&shl	("edi",20);
+	&shr	("ecx",12);
+	&add	("ebx","edi");
+	&mov	("edi","edx");
+	&adc	("ecx",0);
+
+	&shl	("edi",14);
+	&shr	("edx",18);
+	&add	("ecx","edi");
+	&mov	("edi","esi");
+	&adc	("edx",0);
+
+	&shl	("edi",8);
+	&shr	("esi",24);
+	&add	("edx","edi");
+	&adc	("esi",0);			# can be partially reduced
+
+	&mov	("edi","esi");			# final reduction
+	&and	("esi",3);
+	&shr	("edi",2);
+	&lea	("ebp",&DWP(0,"edi","edi",4));	# *5
+	 &mov	("edi",&wparam(1));		# output
+	&add	("eax","ebp");
+	 &mov	("ebp",&wparam(2));		# key
+	&adc	("ebx",0);
+	&adc	("ecx",0);
+	&adc	("edx",0);
+	&adc	("esi",0);
+
+	&movd	($D0,"eax");			# offload original hash value
+	&add	("eax",5);			# compare to modulus
+	&movd	($D1,"ebx");
+	&adc	("ebx",0);
+	&movd	($D2,"ecx");
+	&adc	("ecx",0);
+	&movd	($D3,"edx");
+	&adc	("edx",0);
+	&adc	("esi",0);
+	&shr	("esi",2);			# did it carry/borrow?
+
+	&neg	("esi");			# do we choose (hash-modulus) ...
+	&and	("eax","esi");
+	&and	("ebx","esi");
+	&and	("ecx","esi");
+	&and	("edx","esi");
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*0,"edi"),"eax");
+	&movd	("eax",$D0);
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*1,"edi"),"ebx");
+	&movd	("ebx",$D1);
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*2,"edi"),"ecx");
+	&movd	("ecx",$D2);
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*3,"edi"),"edx");
+	&movd	("edx",$D3);
+
+	&not	("esi");			# ... or original hash value?
+	&and	("eax","esi");
+	&and	("ebx","esi");
+	&or	("eax",&DWP(4*0,"edi"));
+	&and	("ecx","esi");
+	&or	("ebx",&DWP(4*1,"edi"));
+	&and	("edx","esi");
+	&or	("ecx",&DWP(4*2,"edi"));
+	&or	("edx",&DWP(4*3,"edi"));
+
+	&add	("eax",&DWP(4*0,"ebp"));	# accumulate key
+	&adc	("ebx",&DWP(4*1,"ebp"));
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*0,"edi"),"eax");
+	&adc	("ecx",&DWP(4*2,"ebp"));
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*1,"edi"),"ebx");
+	&adc	("edx",&DWP(4*3,"ebp"));
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*2,"edi"),"ecx");
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*3,"edi"),"edx");
+&function_end("_poly1305_emit_sse2");
+
+if ($avx>1) {
+########################################################################
+# Note that poly1305_init_avx2 operates on %xmm, I could have used
+# poly1305_init_sse2...
+
+&align	(32);
+&function_begin_B("_poly1305_init_avx2");
+	&vmovdqu	($D4,&QWP(4*6,"edi"));		# key base 2^32
+	&lea		("edi",&DWP(16*3,"edi"));	# size optimization
+	&mov		("ebp","esp");
+	&sub		("esp",16*(9+5));
+	&and		("esp",-16);
+
+	#&vpand		($D4,$D4,&QWP(96,"ebx"));	# magic mask
+	&vmovdqa	($MASK,&QWP(64,"ebx"));
+
+	&vpand		($D0,$D4,$MASK);		# -> base 2^26
+	&vpsrlq		($D1,$D4,26);
+	&vpsrldq	($D3,$D4,6);
+	&vpand		($D1,$D1,$MASK);
+	&vpsrlq		($D2,$D3,4)
+	&vpsrlq		($D3,$D3,30);
+	&vpand		($D2,$D2,$MASK);
+	&vpand		($D3,$D3,$MASK);
+	&vpsrldq	($D4,$D4,13);
+
+	&lea		("edx",&DWP(16*9,"esp"));	# size optimization
+	&mov		("ecx",2);
+&set_label("square");
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(16*0,"esp"),$D0);
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(16*1,"esp"),$D1);
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(16*2,"esp"),$D2);
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(16*3,"esp"),$D3);
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(16*4,"esp"),$D4);
+
+	&vpslld		($T1,$D1,2);
+	&vpslld		($T0,$D2,2);
+	&vpaddd		($T1,$T1,$D1);			# *5
+	&vpaddd		($T0,$T0,$D2);			# *5
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(16*5,"esp"),$T1);
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(16*6,"esp"),$T0);
+	&vpslld		($T1,$D3,2);
+	&vpslld		($T0,$D4,2);
+	&vpaddd		($T1,$T1,$D3);			# *5
+	&vpaddd		($T0,$T0,$D4);			# *5
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(16*7,"esp"),$T1);
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(16*8,"esp"),$T0);
+
+	&vpshufd	($T0,$D0,0b01000100);
+	&vmovdqa	($T1,$D1);
+	&vpshufd	($D1,$D1,0b01000100);
+	&vpshufd	($D2,$D2,0b01000100);
+	&vpshufd	($D3,$D3,0b01000100);
+	&vpshufd	($D4,$D4,0b01000100);
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(16*0,"edx"),$T0);
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(16*1,"edx"),$D1);
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(16*2,"edx"),$D2);
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(16*3,"edx"),$D3);
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(16*4,"edx"),$D4);
+
+	################################################################
+	# d4 = h4*r0 + h3*r1   + h2*r2   + h1*r3   + h0*r4
+	# d3 = h3*r0 + h2*r1   + h1*r2   + h0*r3   + h4*5*r4
+	# d2 = h2*r0 + h1*r1   + h0*r2   + h4*5*r3 + h3*5*r4
+	# d1 = h1*r0 + h0*r1   + h4*5*r2 + h3*5*r3 + h2*5*r4
+	# d0 = h0*r0 + h4*5*r1 + h3*5*r2 + h2*5*r3 + h1*5*r4
+
+	&vpmuludq	($D4,$D4,$D0);			# h4*r0
+	&vpmuludq	($D3,$D3,$D0);			# h3*r0
+	&vpmuludq	($D2,$D2,$D0);			# h2*r0
+	&vpmuludq	($D1,$D1,$D0);			# h1*r0
+	&vpmuludq	($D0,$T0,$D0);			# h0*r0
+
+	&vpmuludq	($T0,$T1,&QWP(16*3,"edx"));	# r1*h3
+	&vpaddq		($D4,$D4,$T0);
+	&vpmuludq	($T2,$T1,&QWP(16*2,"edx"));	# r1*h2
+	&vpaddq		($D3,$D3,$T2);
+	&vpmuludq	($T0,$T1,&QWP(16*1,"edx"));	# r1*h1
+	&vpaddq		($D2,$D2,$T0);
+	&vmovdqa	($T2,&QWP(16*5,"esp"));		# s1
+	&vpmuludq	($T1,$T1,&QWP(16*0,"edx"));	# r1*h0
+	&vpaddq		($D1,$D1,$T1);
+	 &vmovdqa	($T0,&QWP(16*2,"esp"));		# r2
+	&vpmuludq	($T2,$T2,&QWP(16*4,"edx"));	# s1*h4
+	&vpaddq		($D0,$D0,$T2);
+
+	&vpmuludq	($T1,$T0,&QWP(16*2,"edx"));	# r2*h2
+	&vpaddq		($D4,$D4,$T1);
+	&vpmuludq	($T2,$T0,&QWP(16*1,"edx"));	# r2*h1
+	&vpaddq		($D3,$D3,$T2);
+	&vmovdqa	($T1,&QWP(16*6,"esp"));		# s2
+	&vpmuludq	($T0,$T0,&QWP(16*0,"edx"));	# r2*h0
+	&vpaddq		($D2,$D2,$T0);
+	&vpmuludq	($T2,$T1,&QWP(16*4,"edx"));	# s2*h4
+	&vpaddq		($D1,$D1,$T2);
+	 &vmovdqa	($T0,&QWP(16*3,"esp"));		# r3
+	&vpmuludq	($T1,$T1,&QWP(16*3,"edx"));	# s2*h3
+	&vpaddq		($D0,$D0,$T1);
+
+	&vpmuludq	($T2,$T0,&QWP(16*1,"edx"));	# r3*h1
+	&vpaddq		($D4,$D4,$T2);
+	&vmovdqa	($T1,&QWP(16*7,"esp"));		# s3
+	&vpmuludq	($T0,$T0,&QWP(16*0,"edx"));	# r3*h0
+	&vpaddq		($D3,$D3,$T0);
+	&vpmuludq	($T2,$T1,&QWP(16*4,"edx"));	# s3*h4
+	&vpaddq		($D2,$D2,$T2);
+	&vpmuludq	($T0,$T1,&QWP(16*3,"edx"));	# s3*h3
+	&vpaddq		($D1,$D1,$T0);
+	 &vmovdqa	($T2,&QWP(16*4,"esp"));		# r4
+	&vpmuludq	($T1,$T1,&QWP(16*2,"edx"));	# s3*h2
+	&vpaddq		($D0,$D0,$T1);
+
+	&vmovdqa	($T0,&QWP(16*8,"esp"));		# s4
+	&vpmuludq	($T2,$T2,&QWP(16*0,"edx"));	# r4*h0
+	&vpaddq		($D4,$D4,$T2);
+	&vpmuludq	($T1,$T0,&QWP(16*4,"edx"));	# s4*h4
+	&vpaddq		($D3,$D3,$T1);
+	&vpmuludq	($T2,$T0,&QWP(16*1,"edx"));	# s4*h1
+	&vpaddq		($D0,$D0,$T2);
+	&vpmuludq	($T1,$T0,&QWP(16*2,"edx"));	# s4*h2
+	&vpaddq		($D1,$D1,$T1);
+	 &vmovdqa	($MASK,&QWP(64,"ebx"));
+	&vpmuludq	($T0,$T0,&QWP(16*3,"edx"));	# s4*h3
+	&vpaddq		($D2,$D2,$T0);
+
+	################################################################
+	# lazy reduction
+	 &vpsrlq	($T0,$D3,26);
+	 &vpand		($D3,$D3,$MASK);
+	&vpsrlq		($T1,$D0,26);
+	&vpand		($D0,$D0,$MASK);
+	 &vpaddq	($D4,$D4,$T0);			# h3 -> h4
+	&vpaddq		($D1,$D1,$T1);			# h0 -> h1
+	 &vpsrlq	($T0,$D4,26);
+	 &vpand		($D4,$D4,$MASK);
+	&vpsrlq		($T1,$D1,26);
+	&vpand		($D1,$D1,$MASK);
+	&vpaddq		($D2,$D2,$T1);			# h1 -> h2
+	 &vpaddd	($D0,$D0,$T0);
+	 &vpsllq	($T0,$T0,2);
+	&vpsrlq		($T1,$D2,26);
+	&vpand		($D2,$D2,$MASK);
+	 &vpaddd	($D0,$D0,$T0);			# h4 -> h0
+	&vpaddd		($D3,$D3,$T1);			# h2 -> h3
+	&vpsrlq		($T1,$D3,26);
+	 &vpsrlq	($T0,$D0,26);
+	 &vpand		($D0,$D0,$MASK);
+	&vpand		($D3,$D3,$MASK);
+	 &vpaddd	($D1,$D1,$T0);			# h0 -> h1
+	&vpaddd		($D4,$D4,$T1);			# h3 -> h4
+
+	&dec		("ecx");
+	&jz		(&label("square_break"));
+
+	&vpunpcklqdq	($D0,$D0,&QWP(16*0,"esp"));	# 0:r^1:0:r^2
+	&vpunpcklqdq	($D1,$D1,&QWP(16*1,"esp"));
+	&vpunpcklqdq	($D2,$D2,&QWP(16*2,"esp"));
+	&vpunpcklqdq	($D3,$D3,&QWP(16*3,"esp"));
+	&vpunpcklqdq	($D4,$D4,&QWP(16*4,"esp"));
+	&jmp		(&label("square"));
+
+&set_label("square_break");
+	&vpsllq		($D0,$D0,32);			# -> r^3:0:r^4:0
+	&vpsllq		($D1,$D1,32);
+	&vpsllq		($D2,$D2,32);
+	&vpsllq		($D3,$D3,32);
+	&vpsllq		($D4,$D4,32);
+	&vpor		($D0,$D0,&QWP(16*0,"esp"));	# r^3:r^1:r^4:r^2
+	&vpor		($D1,$D1,&QWP(16*1,"esp"));
+	&vpor		($D2,$D2,&QWP(16*2,"esp"));
+	&vpor		($D3,$D3,&QWP(16*3,"esp"));
+	&vpor		($D4,$D4,&QWP(16*4,"esp"));
+
+	&vpshufd	($D0,$D0,0b10001101);		# -> r^1:r^2:r^3:r^4
+	&vpshufd	($D1,$D1,0b10001101);
+	&vpshufd	($D2,$D2,0b10001101);
+	&vpshufd	($D3,$D3,0b10001101);
+	&vpshufd	($D4,$D4,0b10001101);
+
+	&vmovdqu	(&QWP(16*0,"edi"),$D0);		# save the table
+	&vmovdqu	(&QWP(16*1,"edi"),$D1);
+	&vmovdqu	(&QWP(16*2,"edi"),$D2);
+	&vmovdqu	(&QWP(16*3,"edi"),$D3);
+	&vmovdqu	(&QWP(16*4,"edi"),$D4);
+
+	&vpslld		($T1,$D1,2);
+	&vpslld		($T0,$D2,2);
+	&vpaddd		($T1,$T1,$D1);			# *5
+	&vpaddd		($T0,$T0,$D2);			# *5
+	&vmovdqu	(&QWP(16*5,"edi"),$T1);
+	&vmovdqu	(&QWP(16*6,"edi"),$T0);
+	&vpslld		($T1,$D3,2);
+	&vpslld		($T0,$D4,2);
+	&vpaddd		($T1,$T1,$D3);			# *5
+	&vpaddd		($T0,$T0,$D4);			# *5
+	&vmovdqu	(&QWP(16*7,"edi"),$T1);
+	&vmovdqu	(&QWP(16*8,"edi"),$T0);
+
+	&mov		("esp","ebp");
+	&lea		("edi",&DWP(-16*3,"edi"));	# size de-optimization
+	&ret		();
+&function_end_B("_poly1305_init_avx2");
+
+########################################################################
+# now it's time to switch to %ymm
+
+my ($D0,$D1,$D2,$D3,$D4,$T0,$T1,$T2)=map("ymm$_",(0..7));
+my $MASK=$T2;
+
+sub X { my $reg=shift; $reg=~s/^ymm/xmm/; $reg; }
+
+&align	(32);
+&function_begin("_poly1305_blocks_avx2");
+	&mov	("edi",&wparam(0));			# ctx
+	&mov	("esi",&wparam(1));			# inp
+	&mov	("ecx",&wparam(2));			# len
+
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(4*5,"edi"));		# is_base2_26
+	&and	("ecx",-16);
+	&jz	(&label("nodata"));
+	&cmp	("ecx",64);
+	&jae	(&label("enter_avx2"));
+	&test	("eax","eax");				# is_base2_26?
+	&jz	(&label("enter_blocks"));
+
+&set_label("enter_avx2");
+	&vzeroupper	();
+
+	&call	(&label("pic_point"));
+&set_label("pic_point");
+	&blindpop("ebx");
+	&lea	("ebx",&DWP(&label("const_sse2")."-".&label("pic_point"),"ebx"));
+
+	&test	("eax","eax");				# is_base2_26?
+	&jnz	(&label("base2_26"));
+
+	&call	("_poly1305_init_avx2");
+
+	################################################# base 2^32 -> base 2^26
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(0,"edi"));
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(3,"edi"));
+	&mov	("edx",&DWP(6,"edi"));
+	&mov	("esi",&DWP(9,"edi"));
+	&mov	("ebp",&DWP(13,"edi"));
+
+	&shr	("ecx",2);
+	&and	("eax",0x3ffffff);
+	&shr	("edx",4);
+	&and	("ecx",0x3ffffff);
+	&shr	("esi",6);
+	&and	("edx",0x3ffffff);
+
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*0,"edi"),"eax");
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*1,"edi"),"ecx");
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*2,"edi"),"edx");
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*3,"edi"),"esi");
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*4,"edi"),"ebp");
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*5,"edi"),1);			# is_base2_26
+
+	&mov	("esi",&wparam(1));			# [reload] inp
+	&mov	("ecx",&wparam(2));			# [reload] len
+
+&set_label("base2_26");
+	&mov	("eax",&wparam(3));			# padbit
+	&mov	("ebp","esp");
+
+	&sub	("esp",32*(5+9));
+	&and	("esp",-512);				# ensure that frame
+							# doesn't cross page
+							# boundary, which is
+							# essential for
+							# misaligned 32-byte
+							# loads
+
+	################################################################
+        # expand and copy pre-calculated table to stack
+
+	&vmovdqu	(&X($D0),&QWP(16*(3+0),"edi"));
+	&lea		("edx",&DWP(32*5+128,"esp"));	# +128 size optimization
+	&vmovdqu	(&X($D1),&QWP(16*(3+1),"edi"));
+	&vmovdqu	(&X($D2),&QWP(16*(3+2),"edi"));
+	&vmovdqu	(&X($D3),&QWP(16*(3+3),"edi"));
+	&vmovdqu	(&X($D4),&QWP(16*(3+4),"edi"));
+	&lea		("edi",&DWP(16*3,"edi"));	# size optimization
+	&vpermq		($D0,$D0,0b01000000);		# 00001234 -> 12343434
+	&vpermq		($D1,$D1,0b01000000);
+	&vpermq		($D2,$D2,0b01000000);
+	&vpermq		($D3,$D3,0b01000000);
+	&vpermq		($D4,$D4,0b01000000);
+	&vpshufd	($D0,$D0,0b11001000);		# 12343434 -> 14243444
+	&vpshufd	($D1,$D1,0b11001000);
+	&vpshufd	($D2,$D2,0b11001000);
+	&vpshufd	($D3,$D3,0b11001000);
+	&vpshufd	($D4,$D4,0b11001000);
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(32*0-128,"edx"),$D0);
+	&vmovdqu	(&X($D0),&QWP(16*5,"edi"));
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(32*1-128,"edx"),$D1);
+	&vmovdqu	(&X($D1),&QWP(16*6,"edi"));
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(32*2-128,"edx"),$D2);
+	&vmovdqu	(&X($D2),&QWP(16*7,"edi"));
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(32*3-128,"edx"),$D3);
+	&vmovdqu	(&X($D3),&QWP(16*8,"edi"));
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(32*4-128,"edx"),$D4);
+	&vpermq		($D0,$D0,0b01000000);
+	&vpermq		($D1,$D1,0b01000000);
+	&vpermq		($D2,$D2,0b01000000);
+	&vpermq		($D3,$D3,0b01000000);
+	&vpshufd	($D0,$D0,0b11001000);
+	&vpshufd	($D1,$D1,0b11001000);
+	&vpshufd	($D2,$D2,0b11001000);
+	&vpshufd	($D3,$D3,0b11001000);
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(32*5-128,"edx"),$D0);
+	&vmovd		(&X($D0),&DWP(-16*3+4*0,"edi"));# load hash value
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(32*6-128,"edx"),$D1);
+	&vmovd		(&X($D1),&DWP(-16*3+4*1,"edi"));
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(32*7-128,"edx"),$D2);
+	&vmovd		(&X($D2),&DWP(-16*3+4*2,"edi"));
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(32*8-128,"edx"),$D3);
+	&vmovd		(&X($D3),&DWP(-16*3+4*3,"edi"));
+	&vmovd		(&X($D4),&DWP(-16*3+4*4,"edi"));
+	&vmovdqa	($MASK,&QWP(64,"ebx"));
+	&neg		("eax");			# padbit
+
+	&test		("ecx",63);
+	&jz		(&label("even"));
+
+	&mov		("edx","ecx");
+	&and		("ecx",-64);
+	&and		("edx",63);
+
+	&vmovdqu	(&X($T0),&QWP(16*0,"esi"));
+	&cmp		("edx",32);
+	&jb		(&label("one"));
+
+	&vmovdqu	(&X($T1),&QWP(16*1,"esi"));
+	&je		(&label("two"));
+
+	&vinserti128	($T0,$T0,&QWP(16*2,"esi"),1);
+	&lea		("esi",&DWP(16*3,"esi"));
+	&lea		("ebx",&DWP(8,"ebx"));		# three padbits
+	&lea		("edx",&DWP(32*5+128+8,"esp"));	# --:r^1:r^2:r^3 (*)
+	&jmp		(&label("tail"));
+
+&set_label("two");
+	&lea		("esi",&DWP(16*2,"esi"));
+	&lea		("ebx",&DWP(16,"ebx"));		# two padbits
+	&lea		("edx",&DWP(32*5+128+16,"esp"));# --:--:r^1:r^2 (*)
+	&jmp		(&label("tail"));
+
+&set_label("one");
+	&lea		("esi",&DWP(16*1,"esi"));
+	&vpxor		($T1,$T1,$T1);
+	&lea		("ebx",&DWP(32,"ebx","eax",8));	# one or no padbits
+	&lea		("edx",&DWP(32*5+128+24,"esp"));# --:--:--:r^1 (*)
+	&jmp		(&label("tail"));
+
+# (*)	spots marked with '--' are data from next table entry, but they
+#	are multiplied by 0 and therefore rendered insignificant
+
+&set_label("even",32);
+	&vmovdqu	(&X($T0),&QWP(16*0,"esi"));	# load input
+	&vmovdqu	(&X($T1),&QWP(16*1,"esi"));
+	&vinserti128	($T0,$T0,&QWP(16*2,"esi"),1);
+	&vinserti128	($T1,$T1,&QWP(16*3,"esi"),1);
+	&lea		("esi",&DWP(16*4,"esi"));
+	&sub		("ecx",64);
+	&jz		(&label("tail"));
+
+&set_label("loop");
+	################################################################
+	# ((inp[0]*r^4+r[4])*r^4+r[8])*r^4
+	# ((inp[1]*r^4+r[5])*r^4+r[9])*r^3
+	# ((inp[2]*r^4+r[6])*r^4+r[10])*r^2
+	# ((inp[3]*r^4+r[7])*r^4+r[11])*r^1
+	#   \________/ \_______/
+	################################################################
+
+sub vsplat_input {
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(32*2,"esp"),$D2);
+	&vpsrldq	($D2,$T0,6);			# splat input
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(32*0,"esp"),$D0);
+	&vpsrldq	($D0,$T1,6);
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(32*1,"esp"),$D1);
+	&vpunpckhqdq	($D1,$T0,$T1);			# 4
+	&vpunpcklqdq	($T0,$T0,$T1);			# 0:1
+	&vpunpcklqdq	($D2,$D2,$D0);			# 2:3
+
+	&vpsrlq		($D0,$D2,30);
+	&vpsrlq		($D2,$D2,4);
+	&vpsrlq		($T1,$T0,26);
+	&vpsrlq		($D1,$D1,40);			# 4
+	&vpand		($D2,$D2,$MASK);		# 2
+	&vpand		($T0,$T0,$MASK);		# 0
+	&vpand		($T1,$T1,$MASK);		# 1
+	&vpand		($D0,$D0,$MASK);		# 3 (*)
+	&vpor		($D1,$D1,&QWP(0,"ebx"));	# padbit, yes, always
+
+	# (*)	note that output is counterintuitive, inp[3:4] is
+	#	returned in $D1-2, while $D3-4 are preserved;
+}
+	&vsplat_input	();
+
+sub vpmuladd {
+my $addr = shift;
+
+	&vpaddq		($D2,$D2,&QWP(32*2,"esp"));	# add hash value
+	&vpaddq		($T0,$T0,&QWP(32*0,"esp"));
+	&vpaddq		($T1,$T1,&QWP(32*1,"esp"));
+	&vpaddq		($D0,$D0,$D3);
+	&vpaddq		($D1,$D1,$D4);
+
+	################################################################
+	# d3 = h2*r1   + h0*r3 + h1*r2   + h3*r0   + h4*5*r4
+	# d4 = h2*r2   + h0*r4 + h1*r3   + h3*r1   + h4*r0
+	# d0 = h2*5*r3 + h0*r0 + h1*5*r4 + h3*5*r2 + h4*5*r1
+	# d1 = h2*5*r4 + h0*r1 + h1*r0   + h3*5*r3 + h4*5*r2
+	# d2 = h2*r0   + h0*r2 + h1*r1   + h3*5*r4 + h4*5*r3
+
+	&vpmuludq	($D3,$D2,&$addr(1));		# d3 = h2*r1
+	 &vmovdqa	(QWP(32*1,"esp"),$T1);
+	&vpmuludq	($D4,$D2,&$addr(2));		# d4 = h2*r2
+	 &vmovdqa	(QWP(32*3,"esp"),$D0);
+	&vpmuludq	($D0,$D2,&$addr(7));		# d0 = h2*s3
+	 &vmovdqa	(QWP(32*4,"esp"),$D1);
+	&vpmuludq	($D1,$D2,&$addr(8));		# d1 = h2*s4
+	&vpmuludq	($D2,$D2,&$addr(0));		# d2 = h2*r0
+
+	&vpmuludq	($T2,$T0,&$addr(3));		# h0*r3
+	&vpaddq		($D3,$D3,$T2);			# d3 += h0*r3
+	&vpmuludq	($T1,$T0,&$addr(4));		# h0*r4
+	&vpaddq		($D4,$D4,$T1);			# d4 + h0*r4
+	&vpmuludq	($T2,$T0,&$addr(0));		# h0*r0
+	&vpaddq		($D0,$D0,$T2);			# d0 + h0*r0
+	 &vmovdqa	($T2,&QWP(32*1,"esp"));		# h1
+	&vpmuludq	($T1,$T0,&$addr(1));		# h0*r1
+	&vpaddq		($D1,$D1,$T1);			# d1 += h0*r1
+	&vpmuludq	($T0,$T0,&$addr(2));		# h0*r2
+	&vpaddq		($D2,$D2,$T0);			# d2 += h0*r2
+
+	&vpmuludq	($T1,$T2,&$addr(2));		# h1*r2
+	&vpaddq		($D3,$D3,$T1);			# d3 += h1*r2
+	&vpmuludq	($T0,$T2,&$addr(3));		# h1*r3
+	&vpaddq		($D4,$D4,$T0);			# d4 += h1*r3
+	&vpmuludq	($T1,$T2,&$addr(8));		# h1*s4
+	&vpaddq		($D0,$D0,$T1);			# d0 += h1*s4
+	 &vmovdqa	($T1,&QWP(32*3,"esp"));		# h3
+	&vpmuludq	($T0,$T2,&$addr(0));		# h1*r0
+	&vpaddq		($D1,$D1,$T0);			# d1 += h1*r0
+	&vpmuludq	($T2,$T2,&$addr(1));		# h1*r1
+	&vpaddq		($D2,$D2,$T2);			# d2 += h1*r1
+
+	&vpmuludq	($T0,$T1,&$addr(0));		# h3*r0
+	&vpaddq		($D3,$D3,$T0);			# d3 += h3*r0
+	&vpmuludq	($T2,$T1,&$addr(1));		# h3*r1
+	&vpaddq		($D4,$D4,$T2);			# d4 += h3*r1
+	&vpmuludq	($T0,$T1,&$addr(6));		# h3*s2
+	&vpaddq		($D0,$D0,$T0);			# d0 += h3*s2
+	 &vmovdqa	($T0,&QWP(32*4,"esp"));		# h4
+	&vpmuludq	($T2,$T1,&$addr(7));		# h3*s3
+	&vpaddq		($D1,$D1,$T2);			# d1+= h3*s3
+	&vpmuludq	($T1,$T1,&$addr(8));		# h3*s4
+	&vpaddq		($D2,$D2,$T1);			# d2 += h3*s4
+
+	&vpmuludq	($T2,$T0,&$addr(8));		# h4*s4
+	&vpaddq		($D3,$D3,$T2);			# d3 += h4*s4
+	&vpmuludq	($T1,$T0,&$addr(5));		# h4*s1
+	&vpaddq		($D0,$D0,$T1);			# d0 += h4*s1
+	&vpmuludq	($T2,$T0,&$addr(0));		# h4*r0
+	&vpaddq		($D4,$D4,$T2);			# d4 += h4*r0
+	 &vmovdqa	($MASK,&QWP(64,"ebx"));
+	&vpmuludq	($T1,$T0,&$addr(6));		# h4*s2
+	&vpaddq		($D1,$D1,$T1);			# d1 += h4*s2
+	&vpmuludq	($T0,$T0,&$addr(7));		# h4*s3
+	&vpaddq		($D2,$D2,$T0);			# d2 += h4*s3
+}
+	&vpmuladd	(sub {	my $i=shift; &QWP(32*$i-128,"edx");	});
+
+sub vlazy_reduction {
+	################################################################
+	# lazy reduction
+
+	 &vpsrlq	($T0,$D3,26);
+	 &vpand		($D3,$D3,$MASK);
+	&vpsrlq		($T1,$D0,26);
+	&vpand		($D0,$D0,$MASK);
+	 &vpaddq	($D4,$D4,$T0);			# h3 -> h4
+	&vpaddq		($D1,$D1,$T1);			# h0 -> h1
+	 &vpsrlq	($T0,$D4,26);
+	 &vpand		($D4,$D4,$MASK);
+	&vpsrlq		($T1,$D1,26);
+	&vpand		($D1,$D1,$MASK);
+	&vpaddq		($D2,$D2,$T1);			# h1 -> h2
+	 &vpaddq	($D0,$D0,$T0);
+	 &vpsllq	($T0,$T0,2);
+	&vpsrlq		($T1,$D2,26);
+	&vpand		($D2,$D2,$MASK);
+	 &vpaddq	($D0,$D0,$T0);			# h4 -> h0
+	&vpaddq		($D3,$D3,$T1);			# h2 -> h3
+	&vpsrlq		($T1,$D3,26);
+	 &vpsrlq	($T0,$D0,26);
+	 &vpand		($D0,$D0,$MASK);
+	&vpand		($D3,$D3,$MASK);
+	 &vpaddq	($D1,$D1,$T0);			# h0 -> h1
+	&vpaddq		($D4,$D4,$T1);			# h3 -> h4
+}
+	&vlazy_reduction();
+
+	&vmovdqu	(&X($T0),&QWP(16*0,"esi"));	# load input
+	&vmovdqu	(&X($T1),&QWP(16*1,"esi"));
+	&vinserti128	($T0,$T0,&QWP(16*2,"esi"),1);
+	&vinserti128	($T1,$T1,&QWP(16*3,"esi"),1);
+	&lea		("esi",&DWP(16*4,"esi"));
+	&sub		("ecx",64);
+	&jnz		(&label("loop"));
+
+&set_label("tail");
+	&vsplat_input	();
+	&and		("ebx",-64);			# restore pointer
+
+	&vpmuladd	(sub {	my $i=shift; &QWP(4+32*$i-128,"edx");	});
+
+	################################################################
+	# horizontal addition
+
+	&vpsrldq	($T0,$D4,8);
+	&vpsrldq	($T1,$D3,8);
+	&vpaddq		($D4,$D4,$T0);
+	&vpsrldq	($T0,$D0,8);
+	&vpaddq		($D3,$D3,$T1);
+	&vpsrldq	($T1,$D1,8);
+	&vpaddq		($D0,$D0,$T0);
+	&vpsrldq	($T0,$D2,8);
+	&vpaddq		($D1,$D1,$T1);
+	&vpermq		($T1,$D4,2);			# keep folding
+	&vpaddq		($D2,$D2,$T0);
+	&vpermq		($T0,$D3,2);
+	&vpaddq		($D4,$D4,$T1);
+	&vpermq		($T1,$D0,2);
+	&vpaddq		($D3,$D3,$T0);
+	&vpermq		($T0,$D1,2);
+	&vpaddq		($D0,$D0,$T1);
+	&vpermq		($T1,$D2,2);
+	&vpaddq		($D1,$D1,$T0);
+	&vpaddq		($D2,$D2,$T1);
+
+	&vlazy_reduction();
+
+	&cmp		("ecx",0);
+	&je		(&label("done"));
+
+	################################################################
+	# clear all but single word
+
+	&vpshufd	(&X($D0),&X($D0),0b11111100);
+	&lea		("edx",&DWP(32*5+128,"esp"));	# restore pointer
+	&vpshufd	(&X($D1),&X($D1),0b11111100);
+	&vpshufd	(&X($D2),&X($D2),0b11111100);
+	&vpshufd	(&X($D3),&X($D3),0b11111100);
+	&vpshufd	(&X($D4),&X($D4),0b11111100);
+	&jmp		(&label("even"));
+
+&set_label("done",16);
+	&vmovd		(&DWP(-16*3+4*0,"edi"),&X($D0));# store hash value
+	&vmovd		(&DWP(-16*3+4*1,"edi"),&X($D1));
+	&vmovd		(&DWP(-16*3+4*2,"edi"),&X($D2));
+	&vmovd		(&DWP(-16*3+4*3,"edi"),&X($D3));
+	&vmovd		(&DWP(-16*3+4*4,"edi"),&X($D4));
+	&vzeroupper	();
+	&mov	("esp","ebp");
+&set_label("nodata");
+&function_end("_poly1305_blocks_avx2");
+}
+&set_label("const_sse2",64);
+	&data_word(1<<24,0,	1<<24,0,	1<<24,0,	1<<24,0);
+	&data_word(0,0,		0,0,		0,0,		0,0);
+	&data_word(0x03ffffff,0,0x03ffffff,0,	0x03ffffff,0,	0x03ffffff,0);
+	&data_word(0x0fffffff,0x0ffffffc,0x0ffffffc,0x0ffffffc);
+}
+&asciz	("Poly1305 for x86, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>");
+&align	(4);
+
+&asm_finish();
+
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-x86_64.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-x86_64.pl
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..4c22ded
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-x86_64.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,2268 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# This module implements Poly1305 hash for x86_64.
+#
+# March 2015
+#
+# Numbers are cycles per processed byte with poly1305_blocks alone,
+# measured with rdtsc at fixed clock frequency.
+#
+#		IALU/gcc-4.8(*)	AVX(**)		AVX2
+# P4		4.46/+120%	-
+# Core 2	2.41/+90%	-
+# Westmere	1.88/+120%	-
+# Sandy Bridge	1.39/+140%	1.10
+# Haswell	1.14/+175%	1.11		0.65
+# Skylake	1.13/+120%	0.96		0.51
+# Silvermont	2.83/+95%	-
+# Goldmont	1.70/+180%	-
+# VIA Nano	1.82/+150%	-
+# Sledgehammer	1.38/+160%	-
+# Bulldozer	2.30/+130%	0.97
+#
+# (*)	improvement coefficients relative to clang are more modest and
+#	are ~50% on most processors, in both cases we are comparing to
+#	__int128 code;
+# (**)	SSE2 implementation was attempted, but among non-AVX processors
+#	it was faster than integer-only code only on older Intel P4 and
+#	Core processors, 50-30%, less newer processor is, but slower on
+#	contemporary ones, for example almost 2x slower on Atom, and as
+#	former are naturally disappearing, SSE2 is deemed unnecessary;
+
+$flavour = shift;
+$output  = shift;
+if ($flavour =~ /\./) { $output = $flavour; undef $flavour; }
+
+$win64=0; $win64=1 if ($flavour =~ /[nm]asm|mingw64/ || $output =~ /\.asm$/);
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+( $xlate="${dir}x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
+( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
+die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl";
+
+if (`$ENV{CC} -Wa,-v -c -o /dev/null -x assembler /dev/null 2>&1`
+		=~ /GNU assembler version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
+	$avx = ($1>=2.19) + ($1>=2.22);
+}
+
+if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /nasm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /nasm/) &&
+	   `nasm -v 2>&1` =~ /NASM version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
+	$avx = ($1>=2.09) + ($1>=2.10);
+}
+
+if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
+	   `ml64 2>&1` =~ /Version ([0-9]+)\./) {
+	$avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=12);
+}
+
+if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
+	$avx = ($2>=3.0) + ($2>3.0);
+}
+
+open OUT,"| \"$^X\" \"$xlate\" $flavour \"$output\"";
+*STDOUT=*OUT;
+
+my ($ctx,$inp,$len,$padbit)=("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx","%rcx");
+my ($mac,$nonce)=($inp,$len);	# *_emit arguments
+my ($d1,$d2,$d3, $r0,$r1,$s1)=map("%r$_",(8..13));
+my ($h0,$h1,$h2)=("%r14","%rbx","%rbp");
+
+sub poly1305_iteration {
+# input:	copy of $r1 in %rax, $h0-$h2, $r0-$r1
+# output:	$h0-$h2 *= $r0-$r1
+$code.=<<___;
+	mulq	$h0			# h0*r1
+	mov	%rax,$d2
+	 mov	$r0,%rax
+	mov	%rdx,$d3
+
+	mulq	$h0			# h0*r0
+	mov	%rax,$h0		# future $h0
+	 mov	$r0,%rax
+	mov	%rdx,$d1
+
+	mulq	$h1			# h1*r0
+	add	%rax,$d2
+	 mov	$s1,%rax
+	adc	%rdx,$d3
+
+	mulq	$h1			# h1*s1
+	 mov	$h2,$h1			# borrow $h1
+	add	%rax,$h0
+	adc	%rdx,$d1
+
+	imulq	$s1,$h1			# h2*s1
+	add	$h1,$d2
+	 mov	$d1,$h1
+	adc	\$0,$d3
+
+	imulq	$r0,$h2			# h2*r0
+	add	$d2,$h1
+	mov	\$-4,%rax		# mask value
+	adc	$h2,$d3
+
+	and	$d3,%rax		# last reduction step
+	mov	$d3,$h2
+	shr	\$2,$d3
+	and	\$3,$h2
+	add	$d3,%rax
+	add	%rax,$h0
+	adc	\$0,$h1
+	adc	\$0,$h2
+___
+}
+
+########################################################################
+# Layout of opaque area is following.
+#
+#	unsigned __int64 h[3];		# current hash value base 2^64
+#	unsigned __int64 r[2];		# key value base 2^64
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.text
+
+.extern	OPENSSL_ia32cap_P
+
+.globl	poly1305_init
+.hidden	poly1305_init
+.globl	poly1305_blocks
+.hidden	poly1305_blocks
+.globl	poly1305_emit
+.hidden	poly1305_emit
+
+.type	poly1305_init,\@function,3
+.align	32
+poly1305_init:
+	xor	%rax,%rax
+	mov	%rax,0($ctx)		# initialize hash value
+	mov	%rax,8($ctx)
+	mov	%rax,16($ctx)
+
+	cmp	\$0,$inp
+	je	.Lno_key
+
+	lea	poly1305_blocks(%rip),%r10
+	lea	poly1305_emit(%rip),%r11
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($avx);
+	mov	OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+4(%rip),%r9
+	lea	poly1305_blocks_avx(%rip),%rax
+	lea	poly1305_emit_avx(%rip),%rcx
+	bt	\$`60-32`,%r9		# AVX?
+	cmovc	%rax,%r10
+	cmovc	%rcx,%r11
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($avx>1);
+	lea	poly1305_blocks_avx2(%rip),%rax
+	bt	\$`5+32`,%r9		# AVX2?
+	cmovc	%rax,%r10
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	\$0x0ffffffc0fffffff,%rax
+	mov	\$0x0ffffffc0ffffffc,%rcx
+	and	0($inp),%rax
+	and	8($inp),%rcx
+	mov	%rax,24($ctx)
+	mov	%rcx,32($ctx)
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($flavour !~ /elf32/);
+	mov	%r10,0(%rdx)
+	mov	%r11,8(%rdx)
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($flavour =~ /elf32/);
+	mov	%r10d,0(%rdx)
+	mov	%r11d,4(%rdx)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	\$1,%eax
+.Lno_key:
+	ret
+.size	poly1305_init,.-poly1305_init
+
+.type	poly1305_blocks,\@function,4
+.align	32
+poly1305_blocks:
+.Lblocks:
+	shr	\$4,$len
+	jz	.Lno_data		# too short
+
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+.Lblocks_body:
+
+	mov	$len,%r15		# reassign $len
+
+	mov	24($ctx),$r0		# load r
+	mov	32($ctx),$s1
+
+	mov	0($ctx),$h0		# load hash value
+	mov	8($ctx),$h1
+	mov	16($ctx),$h2
+
+	mov	$s1,$r1
+	shr	\$2,$s1
+	mov	$r1,%rax
+	add	$r1,$s1			# s1 = r1 + (r1 >> 2)
+	jmp	.Loop
+
+.align	32
+.Loop:
+	add	0($inp),$h0		# accumulate input
+	adc	8($inp),$h1
+	lea	16($inp),$inp
+	adc	$padbit,$h2
+___
+	&poly1305_iteration();
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	$r1,%rax
+	dec	%r15			# len-=16
+	jnz	.Loop
+
+	mov	$h0,0($ctx)		# store hash value
+	mov	$h1,8($ctx)
+	mov	$h2,16($ctx)
+
+	mov	0(%rsp),%r15
+	mov	8(%rsp),%r14
+	mov	16(%rsp),%r13
+	mov	24(%rsp),%r12
+	mov	32(%rsp),%rbp
+	mov	40(%rsp),%rbx
+	lea	48(%rsp),%rsp
+.Lno_data:
+.Lblocks_epilogue:
+	ret
+.size	poly1305_blocks,.-poly1305_blocks
+
+.type	poly1305_emit,\@function,3
+.align	32
+poly1305_emit:
+.Lemit:
+	mov	0($ctx),%r8	# load hash value
+	mov	8($ctx),%r9
+	mov	16($ctx),%r10
+
+	mov	%r8,%rax
+	add	\$5,%r8		# compare to modulus
+	mov	%r9,%rcx
+	adc	\$0,%r9
+	adc	\$0,%r10
+	shr	\$2,%r10	# did 130-bit value overfow?
+	cmovnz	%r8,%rax
+	cmovnz	%r9,%rcx
+
+	add	0($nonce),%rax	# accumulate nonce
+	adc	8($nonce),%rcx
+	mov	%rax,0($mac)	# write result
+	mov	%rcx,8($mac)
+
+	ret
+.size	poly1305_emit,.-poly1305_emit
+___
+if ($avx) {
+
+########################################################################
+# Layout of opaque area is following.
+#
+#	unsigned __int32 h[5];		# current hash value base 2^26
+#	unsigned __int32 is_base2_26;
+#	unsigned __int64 r[2];		# key value base 2^64
+#	unsigned __int64 pad;
+#	struct { unsigned __int32 r^2, r^1, r^4, r^3; } r[9];
+#
+# where r^n are base 2^26 digits of degrees of multiplier key. There are
+# 5 digits, but last four are interleaved with multiples of 5, totalling
+# in 9 elements: r0, r1, 5*r1, r2, 5*r2, r3, 5*r3, r4, 5*r4.
+
+my ($H0,$H1,$H2,$H3,$H4, $T0,$T1,$T2,$T3,$T4, $D0,$D1,$D2,$D3,$D4, $MASK) =
+    map("%xmm$_",(0..15));
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.type	__poly1305_block,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	32
+__poly1305_block:
+___
+	&poly1305_iteration();
+$code.=<<___;
+	ret
+.size	__poly1305_block,.-__poly1305_block
+
+.type	__poly1305_init_avx,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	32
+__poly1305_init_avx:
+	mov	$r0,$h0
+	mov	$r1,$h1
+	xor	$h2,$h2
+
+	lea	48+64($ctx),$ctx	# size optimization
+
+	mov	$r1,%rax
+	call	__poly1305_block	# r^2
+
+	mov	\$0x3ffffff,%eax	# save interleaved r^2 and r base 2^26
+	mov	\$0x3ffffff,%edx
+	mov	$h0,$d1
+	and	$h0#d,%eax
+	mov	$r0,$d2
+	and	$r0#d,%edx
+	mov	%eax,`16*0+0-64`($ctx)
+	shr	\$26,$d1
+	mov	%edx,`16*0+4-64`($ctx)
+	shr	\$26,$d2
+
+	mov	\$0x3ffffff,%eax
+	mov	\$0x3ffffff,%edx
+	and	$d1#d,%eax
+	and	$d2#d,%edx
+	mov	%eax,`16*1+0-64`($ctx)
+	lea	(%rax,%rax,4),%eax	# *5
+	mov	%edx,`16*1+4-64`($ctx)
+	lea	(%rdx,%rdx,4),%edx	# *5
+	mov	%eax,`16*2+0-64`($ctx)
+	shr	\$26,$d1
+	mov	%edx,`16*2+4-64`($ctx)
+	shr	\$26,$d2
+
+	mov	$h1,%rax
+	mov	$r1,%rdx
+	shl	\$12,%rax
+	shl	\$12,%rdx
+	or	$d1,%rax
+	or	$d2,%rdx
+	and	\$0x3ffffff,%eax
+	and	\$0x3ffffff,%edx
+	mov	%eax,`16*3+0-64`($ctx)
+	lea	(%rax,%rax,4),%eax	# *5
+	mov	%edx,`16*3+4-64`($ctx)
+	lea	(%rdx,%rdx,4),%edx	# *5
+	mov	%eax,`16*4+0-64`($ctx)
+	mov	$h1,$d1
+	mov	%edx,`16*4+4-64`($ctx)
+	mov	$r1,$d2
+
+	mov	\$0x3ffffff,%eax
+	mov	\$0x3ffffff,%edx
+	shr	\$14,$d1
+	shr	\$14,$d2
+	and	$d1#d,%eax
+	and	$d2#d,%edx
+	mov	%eax,`16*5+0-64`($ctx)
+	lea	(%rax,%rax,4),%eax	# *5
+	mov	%edx,`16*5+4-64`($ctx)
+	lea	(%rdx,%rdx,4),%edx	# *5
+	mov	%eax,`16*6+0-64`($ctx)
+	shr	\$26,$d1
+	mov	%edx,`16*6+4-64`($ctx)
+	shr	\$26,$d2
+
+	mov	$h2,%rax
+	shl	\$24,%rax
+	or	%rax,$d1
+	mov	$d1#d,`16*7+0-64`($ctx)
+	lea	($d1,$d1,4),$d1		# *5
+	mov	$d2#d,`16*7+4-64`($ctx)
+	lea	($d2,$d2,4),$d2		# *5
+	mov	$d1#d,`16*8+0-64`($ctx)
+	mov	$d2#d,`16*8+4-64`($ctx)
+
+	mov	$r1,%rax
+	call	__poly1305_block	# r^3
+
+	mov	\$0x3ffffff,%eax	# save r^3 base 2^26
+	mov	$h0,$d1
+	and	$h0#d,%eax
+	shr	\$26,$d1
+	mov	%eax,`16*0+12-64`($ctx)
+
+	mov	\$0x3ffffff,%edx
+	and	$d1#d,%edx
+	mov	%edx,`16*1+12-64`($ctx)
+	lea	(%rdx,%rdx,4),%edx	# *5
+	shr	\$26,$d1
+	mov	%edx,`16*2+12-64`($ctx)
+
+	mov	$h1,%rax
+	shl	\$12,%rax
+	or	$d1,%rax
+	and	\$0x3ffffff,%eax
+	mov	%eax,`16*3+12-64`($ctx)
+	lea	(%rax,%rax,4),%eax	# *5
+	mov	$h1,$d1
+	mov	%eax,`16*4+12-64`($ctx)
+
+	mov	\$0x3ffffff,%edx
+	shr	\$14,$d1
+	and	$d1#d,%edx
+	mov	%edx,`16*5+12-64`($ctx)
+	lea	(%rdx,%rdx,4),%edx	# *5
+	shr	\$26,$d1
+	mov	%edx,`16*6+12-64`($ctx)
+
+	mov	$h2,%rax
+	shl	\$24,%rax
+	or	%rax,$d1
+	mov	$d1#d,`16*7+12-64`($ctx)
+	lea	($d1,$d1,4),$d1		# *5
+	mov	$d1#d,`16*8+12-64`($ctx)
+
+	mov	$r1,%rax
+	call	__poly1305_block	# r^4
+
+	mov	\$0x3ffffff,%eax	# save r^4 base 2^26
+	mov	$h0,$d1
+	and	$h0#d,%eax
+	shr	\$26,$d1
+	mov	%eax,`16*0+8-64`($ctx)
+
+	mov	\$0x3ffffff,%edx
+	and	$d1#d,%edx
+	mov	%edx,`16*1+8-64`($ctx)
+	lea	(%rdx,%rdx,4),%edx	# *5
+	shr	\$26,$d1
+	mov	%edx,`16*2+8-64`($ctx)
+
+	mov	$h1,%rax
+	shl	\$12,%rax
+	or	$d1,%rax
+	and	\$0x3ffffff,%eax
+	mov	%eax,`16*3+8-64`($ctx)
+	lea	(%rax,%rax,4),%eax	# *5
+	mov	$h1,$d1
+	mov	%eax,`16*4+8-64`($ctx)
+
+	mov	\$0x3ffffff,%edx
+	shr	\$14,$d1
+	and	$d1#d,%edx
+	mov	%edx,`16*5+8-64`($ctx)
+	lea	(%rdx,%rdx,4),%edx	# *5
+	shr	\$26,$d1
+	mov	%edx,`16*6+8-64`($ctx)
+
+	mov	$h2,%rax
+	shl	\$24,%rax
+	or	%rax,$d1
+	mov	$d1#d,`16*7+8-64`($ctx)
+	lea	($d1,$d1,4),$d1		# *5
+	mov	$d1#d,`16*8+8-64`($ctx)
+
+	lea	-48-64($ctx),$ctx	# size [de-]optimization
+	ret
+.size	__poly1305_init_avx,.-__poly1305_init_avx
+
+.type	poly1305_blocks_avx,\@function,4
+.align	32
+poly1305_blocks_avx:
+	mov	20($ctx),%r8d		# is_base2_26
+	cmp	\$128,$len
+	jae	.Lblocks_avx
+	test	%r8d,%r8d
+	jz	.Lblocks
+
+.Lblocks_avx:
+	and	\$-16,$len
+	jz	.Lno_data_avx
+
+	vzeroupper
+
+	test	%r8d,%r8d
+	jz	.Lbase2_64_avx
+
+	test	\$31,$len
+	jz	.Leven_avx
+
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+.Lblocks_avx_body:
+
+	mov	$len,%r15		# reassign $len
+
+	mov	0($ctx),$d1		# load hash value
+	mov	8($ctx),$d2
+	mov	16($ctx),$h2#d
+
+	mov	24($ctx),$r0		# load r
+	mov	32($ctx),$s1
+
+	################################# base 2^26 -> base 2^64
+	mov	$d1#d,$h0#d
+	and	\$`-1*(1<<31)`,$d1
+	mov	$d2,$r1			# borrow $r1
+	mov	$d2#d,$h1#d
+	and	\$`-1*(1<<31)`,$d2
+
+	shr	\$6,$d1
+	shl	\$52,$r1
+	add	$d1,$h0
+	shr	\$12,$h1
+	shr	\$18,$d2
+	add	$r1,$h0
+	adc	$d2,$h1
+
+	mov	$h2,$d1
+	shl	\$40,$d1
+	shr	\$24,$h2
+	add	$d1,$h1
+	adc	\$0,$h2			# can be partially reduced...
+
+	mov	\$-4,$d2		# ... so reduce
+	mov	$h2,$d1
+	and	$h2,$d2
+	shr	\$2,$d1
+	and	\$3,$h2
+	add	$d2,$d1			# =*5
+	add	$d1,$h0
+	adc	\$0,$h1
+	adc	\$0,$h2
+
+	mov	$s1,$r1
+	mov	$s1,%rax
+	shr	\$2,$s1
+	add	$r1,$s1			# s1 = r1 + (r1 >> 2)
+
+	add	0($inp),$h0		# accumulate input
+	adc	8($inp),$h1
+	lea	16($inp),$inp
+	adc	$padbit,$h2
+
+	call	__poly1305_block
+
+	test	$padbit,$padbit		# if $padbit is zero,
+	jz	.Lstore_base2_64_avx	# store hash in base 2^64 format
+
+	################################# base 2^64 -> base 2^26
+	mov	$h0,%rax
+	mov	$h0,%rdx
+	shr	\$52,$h0
+	mov	$h1,$r0
+	mov	$h1,$r1
+	shr	\$26,%rdx
+	and	\$0x3ffffff,%rax	# h[0]
+	shl	\$12,$r0
+	and	\$0x3ffffff,%rdx	# h[1]
+	shr	\$14,$h1
+	or	$r0,$h0
+	shl	\$24,$h2
+	and	\$0x3ffffff,$h0		# h[2]
+	shr	\$40,$r1
+	and	\$0x3ffffff,$h1		# h[3]
+	or	$r1,$h2			# h[4]
+
+	sub	\$16,%r15
+	jz	.Lstore_base2_26_avx
+
+	vmovd	%rax#d,$H0
+	vmovd	%rdx#d,$H1
+	vmovd	$h0#d,$H2
+	vmovd	$h1#d,$H3
+	vmovd	$h2#d,$H4
+	jmp	.Lproceed_avx
+
+.align	32
+.Lstore_base2_64_avx:
+	mov	$h0,0($ctx)
+	mov	$h1,8($ctx)
+	mov	$h2,16($ctx)		# note that is_base2_26 is zeroed
+	jmp	.Ldone_avx
+
+.align	16
+.Lstore_base2_26_avx:
+	mov	%rax#d,0($ctx)		# store hash value base 2^26
+	mov	%rdx#d,4($ctx)
+	mov	$h0#d,8($ctx)
+	mov	$h1#d,12($ctx)
+	mov	$h2#d,16($ctx)
+.align	16
+.Ldone_avx:
+	mov	0(%rsp),%r15
+	mov	8(%rsp),%r14
+	mov	16(%rsp),%r13
+	mov	24(%rsp),%r12
+	mov	32(%rsp),%rbp
+	mov	40(%rsp),%rbx
+	lea	48(%rsp),%rsp
+.Lno_data_avx:
+.Lblocks_avx_epilogue:
+	ret
+
+.align	32
+.Lbase2_64_avx:
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+.Lbase2_64_avx_body:
+
+	mov	$len,%r15		# reassign $len
+
+	mov	24($ctx),$r0		# load r
+	mov	32($ctx),$s1
+
+	mov	0($ctx),$h0		# load hash value
+	mov	8($ctx),$h1
+	mov	16($ctx),$h2#d
+
+	mov	$s1,$r1
+	mov	$s1,%rax
+	shr	\$2,$s1
+	add	$r1,$s1			# s1 = r1 + (r1 >> 2)
+
+	test	\$31,$len
+	jz	.Linit_avx
+
+	add	0($inp),$h0		# accumulate input
+	adc	8($inp),$h1
+	lea	16($inp),$inp
+	adc	$padbit,$h2
+	sub	\$16,%r15
+
+	call	__poly1305_block
+
+.Linit_avx:
+	################################# base 2^64 -> base 2^26
+	mov	$h0,%rax
+	mov	$h0,%rdx
+	shr	\$52,$h0
+	mov	$h1,$d1
+	mov	$h1,$d2
+	shr	\$26,%rdx
+	and	\$0x3ffffff,%rax	# h[0]
+	shl	\$12,$d1
+	and	\$0x3ffffff,%rdx	# h[1]
+	shr	\$14,$h1
+	or	$d1,$h0
+	shl	\$24,$h2
+	and	\$0x3ffffff,$h0		# h[2]
+	shr	\$40,$d2
+	and	\$0x3ffffff,$h1		# h[3]
+	or	$d2,$h2			# h[4]
+
+	vmovd	%rax#d,$H0
+	vmovd	%rdx#d,$H1
+	vmovd	$h0#d,$H2
+	vmovd	$h1#d,$H3
+	vmovd	$h2#d,$H4
+	movl	\$1,20($ctx)		# set is_base2_26
+
+	call	__poly1305_init_avx
+
+.Lproceed_avx:
+	mov	%r15,$len
+
+	mov	0(%rsp),%r15
+	mov	8(%rsp),%r14
+	mov	16(%rsp),%r13
+	mov	24(%rsp),%r12
+	mov	32(%rsp),%rbp
+	mov	40(%rsp),%rbx
+	lea	48(%rsp),%rax
+	lea	48(%rsp),%rsp
+.Lbase2_64_avx_epilogue:
+	jmp	.Ldo_avx
+
+.align	32
+.Leven_avx:
+	vmovd		4*0($ctx),$H0		# load hash value
+	vmovd		4*1($ctx),$H1
+	vmovd		4*2($ctx),$H2
+	vmovd		4*3($ctx),$H3
+	vmovd		4*4($ctx),$H4
+
+.Ldo_avx:
+___
+$code.=<<___	if (!$win64);
+	lea		-0x58(%rsp),%r11
+	sub		\$0x178,%rsp
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($win64);
+	lea		-0xf8(%rsp),%r11
+	sub		\$0x218,%rsp
+	vmovdqa		%xmm6,0x50(%r11)
+	vmovdqa		%xmm7,0x60(%r11)
+	vmovdqa		%xmm8,0x70(%r11)
+	vmovdqa		%xmm9,0x80(%r11)
+	vmovdqa		%xmm10,0x90(%r11)
+	vmovdqa		%xmm11,0xa0(%r11)
+	vmovdqa		%xmm12,0xb0(%r11)
+	vmovdqa		%xmm13,0xc0(%r11)
+	vmovdqa		%xmm14,0xd0(%r11)
+	vmovdqa		%xmm15,0xe0(%r11)
+.Ldo_avx_body:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	sub		\$64,$len
+	lea		-32($inp),%rax
+	cmovc		%rax,$inp
+
+	vmovdqu		`16*3`($ctx),$D4	# preload r0^2
+	lea		`16*3+64`($ctx),$ctx	# size optimization
+	lea		.Lconst(%rip),%rcx
+
+	################################################################
+	# load input
+	vmovdqu		16*2($inp),$T0
+	vmovdqu		16*3($inp),$T1
+	vmovdqa		64(%rcx),$MASK		# .Lmask26
+
+	vpsrldq		\$6,$T0,$T2		# splat input
+	vpsrldq		\$6,$T1,$T3
+	vpunpckhqdq	$T1,$T0,$T4		# 4
+	vpunpcklqdq	$T1,$T0,$T0		# 0:1
+	vpunpcklqdq	$T3,$T2,$T3		# 2:3
+
+	vpsrlq		\$40,$T4,$T4		# 4
+	vpsrlq		\$26,$T0,$T1
+	vpand		$MASK,$T0,$T0		# 0
+	vpsrlq		\$4,$T3,$T2
+	vpand		$MASK,$T1,$T1		# 1
+	vpsrlq		\$30,$T3,$T3
+	vpand		$MASK,$T2,$T2		# 2
+	vpand		$MASK,$T3,$T3		# 3
+	vpor		32(%rcx),$T4,$T4	# padbit, yes, always
+
+	jbe		.Lskip_loop_avx
+
+	# expand and copy pre-calculated table to stack
+	vmovdqu		`16*1-64`($ctx),$D1
+	vmovdqu		`16*2-64`($ctx),$D2
+	vpshufd		\$0xEE,$D4,$D3		# 34xx -> 3434
+	vpshufd		\$0x44,$D4,$D0		# xx12 -> 1212
+	vmovdqa		$D3,-0x90(%r11)
+	vmovdqa		$D0,0x00(%rsp)
+	vpshufd		\$0xEE,$D1,$D4
+	vmovdqu		`16*3-64`($ctx),$D0
+	vpshufd		\$0x44,$D1,$D1
+	vmovdqa		$D4,-0x80(%r11)
+	vmovdqa		$D1,0x10(%rsp)
+	vpshufd		\$0xEE,$D2,$D3
+	vmovdqu		`16*4-64`($ctx),$D1
+	vpshufd		\$0x44,$D2,$D2
+	vmovdqa		$D3,-0x70(%r11)
+	vmovdqa		$D2,0x20(%rsp)
+	vpshufd		\$0xEE,$D0,$D4
+	vmovdqu		`16*5-64`($ctx),$D2
+	vpshufd		\$0x44,$D0,$D0
+	vmovdqa		$D4,-0x60(%r11)
+	vmovdqa		$D0,0x30(%rsp)
+	vpshufd		\$0xEE,$D1,$D3
+	vmovdqu		`16*6-64`($ctx),$D0
+	vpshufd		\$0x44,$D1,$D1
+	vmovdqa		$D3,-0x50(%r11)
+	vmovdqa		$D1,0x40(%rsp)
+	vpshufd		\$0xEE,$D2,$D4
+	vmovdqu		`16*7-64`($ctx),$D1
+	vpshufd		\$0x44,$D2,$D2
+	vmovdqa		$D4,-0x40(%r11)
+	vmovdqa		$D2,0x50(%rsp)
+	vpshufd		\$0xEE,$D0,$D3
+	vmovdqu		`16*8-64`($ctx),$D2
+	vpshufd		\$0x44,$D0,$D0
+	vmovdqa		$D3,-0x30(%r11)
+	vmovdqa		$D0,0x60(%rsp)
+	vpshufd		\$0xEE,$D1,$D4
+	vpshufd		\$0x44,$D1,$D1
+	vmovdqa		$D4,-0x20(%r11)
+	vmovdqa		$D1,0x70(%rsp)
+	vpshufd		\$0xEE,$D2,$D3
+	 vmovdqa	0x00(%rsp),$D4		# preload r0^2
+	vpshufd		\$0x44,$D2,$D2
+	vmovdqa		$D3,-0x10(%r11)
+	vmovdqa		$D2,0x80(%rsp)
+
+	jmp		.Loop_avx
+
+.align	32
+.Loop_avx:
+	################################################################
+	# ((inp[0]*r^4+inp[2]*r^2+inp[4])*r^4+inp[6]*r^2
+	# ((inp[1]*r^4+inp[3]*r^2+inp[5])*r^3+inp[7]*r
+	#   \___________________/
+	# ((inp[0]*r^4+inp[2]*r^2+inp[4])*r^4+inp[6]*r^2+inp[8])*r^2
+	# ((inp[1]*r^4+inp[3]*r^2+inp[5])*r^4+inp[7]*r^2+inp[9])*r
+	#   \___________________/ \____________________/
+	#
+	# Note that we start with inp[2:3]*r^2. This is because it
+	# doesn't depend on reduction in previous iteration.
+	################################################################
+	# d4 = h4*r0 + h3*r1   + h2*r2   + h1*r3   + h0*r4
+	# d3 = h3*r0 + h2*r1   + h1*r2   + h0*r3   + h4*5*r4
+	# d2 = h2*r0 + h1*r1   + h0*r2   + h4*5*r3 + h3*5*r4
+	# d1 = h1*r0 + h0*r1   + h4*5*r2 + h3*5*r3 + h2*5*r4
+	# d0 = h0*r0 + h4*5*r1 + h3*5*r2 + h2*5*r3 + h1*5*r4
+	#
+	# though note that $Tx and $Hx are "reversed" in this section,
+	# and $D4 is preloaded with r0^2...
+
+	vpmuludq	$T0,$D4,$D0		# d0 = h0*r0
+	vpmuludq	$T1,$D4,$D1		# d1 = h1*r0
+	  vmovdqa	$H2,0x20(%r11)				# offload hash
+	vpmuludq	$T2,$D4,$D2		# d3 = h2*r0
+	 vmovdqa	0x10(%rsp),$H2		# r1^2
+	vpmuludq	$T3,$D4,$D3		# d3 = h3*r0
+	vpmuludq	$T4,$D4,$D4		# d4 = h4*r0
+
+	  vmovdqa	$H0,0x00(%r11)				#
+	vpmuludq	0x20(%rsp),$T4,$H0	# h4*s1
+	  vmovdqa	$H1,0x10(%r11)				#
+	vpmuludq	$T3,$H2,$H1		# h3*r1
+	vpaddq		$H0,$D0,$D0		# d0 += h4*s1
+	vpaddq		$H1,$D4,$D4		# d4 += h3*r1
+	  vmovdqa	$H3,0x30(%r11)				#
+	vpmuludq	$T2,$H2,$H0		# h2*r1
+	vpmuludq	$T1,$H2,$H1		# h1*r1
+	vpaddq		$H0,$D3,$D3		# d3 += h2*r1
+	 vmovdqa	0x30(%rsp),$H3		# r2^2
+	vpaddq		$H1,$D2,$D2		# d2 += h1*r1
+	  vmovdqa	$H4,0x40(%r11)				#
+	vpmuludq	$T0,$H2,$H2		# h0*r1
+	 vpmuludq	$T2,$H3,$H0		# h2*r2
+	vpaddq		$H2,$D1,$D1		# d1 += h0*r1
+
+	 vmovdqa	0x40(%rsp),$H4		# s2^2
+	vpaddq		$H0,$D4,$D4		# d4 += h2*r2
+	vpmuludq	$T1,$H3,$H1		# h1*r2
+	vpmuludq	$T0,$H3,$H3		# h0*r2
+	vpaddq		$H1,$D3,$D3		# d3 += h1*r2
+	 vmovdqa	0x50(%rsp),$H2		# r3^2
+	vpaddq		$H3,$D2,$D2		# d2 += h0*r2
+	vpmuludq	$T4,$H4,$H0		# h4*s2
+	vpmuludq	$T3,$H4,$H4		# h3*s2
+	vpaddq		$H0,$D1,$D1		# d1 += h4*s2
+	 vmovdqa	0x60(%rsp),$H3		# s3^2
+	vpaddq		$H4,$D0,$D0		# d0 += h3*s2
+
+	 vmovdqa	0x80(%rsp),$H4		# s4^2
+	vpmuludq	$T1,$H2,$H1		# h1*r3
+	vpmuludq	$T0,$H2,$H2		# h0*r3
+	vpaddq		$H1,$D4,$D4		# d4 += h1*r3
+	vpaddq		$H2,$D3,$D3		# d3 += h0*r3
+	vpmuludq	$T4,$H3,$H0		# h4*s3
+	vpmuludq	$T3,$H3,$H1		# h3*s3
+	vpaddq		$H0,$D2,$D2		# d2 += h4*s3
+	 vmovdqu	16*0($inp),$H0				# load input
+	vpaddq		$H1,$D1,$D1		# d1 += h3*s3
+	vpmuludq	$T2,$H3,$H3		# h2*s3
+	 vpmuludq	$T2,$H4,$T2		# h2*s4
+	vpaddq		$H3,$D0,$D0		# d0 += h2*s3
+
+	 vmovdqu	16*1($inp),$H1				#
+	vpaddq		$T2,$D1,$D1		# d1 += h2*s4
+	vpmuludq	$T3,$H4,$T3		# h3*s4
+	vpmuludq	$T4,$H4,$T4		# h4*s4
+	 vpsrldq	\$6,$H0,$H2				# splat input
+	vpaddq		$T3,$D2,$D2		# d2 += h3*s4
+	vpaddq		$T4,$D3,$D3		# d3 += h4*s4
+	 vpsrldq	\$6,$H1,$H3				#
+	vpmuludq	0x70(%rsp),$T0,$T4	# h0*r4
+	vpmuludq	$T1,$H4,$T0		# h1*s4
+	 vpunpckhqdq	$H1,$H0,$H4		# 4
+	vpaddq		$T4,$D4,$D4		# d4 += h0*r4
+	 vmovdqa	-0x90(%r11),$T4		# r0^4
+	vpaddq		$T0,$D0,$D0		# d0 += h1*s4
+
+	vpunpcklqdq	$H1,$H0,$H0		# 0:1
+	vpunpcklqdq	$H3,$H2,$H3		# 2:3
+
+	#vpsrlq		\$40,$H4,$H4		# 4
+	vpsrldq		\$`40/8`,$H4,$H4	# 4
+	vpsrlq		\$26,$H0,$H1
+	vpand		$MASK,$H0,$H0		# 0
+	vpsrlq		\$4,$H3,$H2
+	vpand		$MASK,$H1,$H1		# 1
+	vpand		0(%rcx),$H4,$H4		# .Lmask24
+	vpsrlq		\$30,$H3,$H3
+	vpand		$MASK,$H2,$H2		# 2
+	vpand		$MASK,$H3,$H3		# 3
+	vpor		32(%rcx),$H4,$H4	# padbit, yes, always
+
+	vpaddq		0x00(%r11),$H0,$H0	# add hash value
+	vpaddq		0x10(%r11),$H1,$H1
+	vpaddq		0x20(%r11),$H2,$H2
+	vpaddq		0x30(%r11),$H3,$H3
+	vpaddq		0x40(%r11),$H4,$H4
+
+	lea		16*2($inp),%rax
+	lea		16*4($inp),$inp
+	sub		\$64,$len
+	cmovc		%rax,$inp
+
+	################################################################
+	# Now we accumulate (inp[0:1]+hash)*r^4
+	################################################################
+	# d4 = h4*r0 + h3*r1   + h2*r2   + h1*r3   + h0*r4
+	# d3 = h3*r0 + h2*r1   + h1*r2   + h0*r3   + h4*5*r4
+	# d2 = h2*r0 + h1*r1   + h0*r2   + h4*5*r3 + h3*5*r4
+	# d1 = h1*r0 + h0*r1   + h4*5*r2 + h3*5*r3 + h2*5*r4
+	# d0 = h0*r0 + h4*5*r1 + h3*5*r2 + h2*5*r3 + h1*5*r4
+
+	vpmuludq	$H0,$T4,$T0		# h0*r0
+	vpmuludq	$H1,$T4,$T1		# h1*r0
+	vpaddq		$T0,$D0,$D0
+	vpaddq		$T1,$D1,$D1
+	 vmovdqa	-0x80(%r11),$T2		# r1^4
+	vpmuludq	$H2,$T4,$T0		# h2*r0
+	vpmuludq	$H3,$T4,$T1		# h3*r0
+	vpaddq		$T0,$D2,$D2
+	vpaddq		$T1,$D3,$D3
+	vpmuludq	$H4,$T4,$T4		# h4*r0
+	 vpmuludq	-0x70(%r11),$H4,$T0	# h4*s1
+	vpaddq		$T4,$D4,$D4
+
+	vpaddq		$T0,$D0,$D0		# d0 += h4*s1
+	vpmuludq	$H2,$T2,$T1		# h2*r1
+	vpmuludq	$H3,$T2,$T0		# h3*r1
+	vpaddq		$T1,$D3,$D3		# d3 += h2*r1
+	 vmovdqa	-0x60(%r11),$T3		# r2^4
+	vpaddq		$T0,$D4,$D4		# d4 += h3*r1
+	vpmuludq	$H1,$T2,$T1		# h1*r1
+	vpmuludq	$H0,$T2,$T2		# h0*r1
+	vpaddq		$T1,$D2,$D2		# d2 += h1*r1
+	vpaddq		$T2,$D1,$D1		# d1 += h0*r1
+
+	 vmovdqa	-0x50(%r11),$T4		# s2^4
+	vpmuludq	$H2,$T3,$T0		# h2*r2
+	vpmuludq	$H1,$T3,$T1		# h1*r2
+	vpaddq		$T0,$D4,$D4		# d4 += h2*r2
+	vpaddq		$T1,$D3,$D3		# d3 += h1*r2
+	 vmovdqa	-0x40(%r11),$T2		# r3^4
+	vpmuludq	$H0,$T3,$T3		# h0*r2
+	vpmuludq	$H4,$T4,$T0		# h4*s2
+	vpaddq		$T3,$D2,$D2		# d2 += h0*r2
+	vpaddq		$T0,$D1,$D1		# d1 += h4*s2
+	 vmovdqa	-0x30(%r11),$T3		# s3^4
+	vpmuludq	$H3,$T4,$T4		# h3*s2
+	 vpmuludq	$H1,$T2,$T1		# h1*r3
+	vpaddq		$T4,$D0,$D0		# d0 += h3*s2
+
+	 vmovdqa	-0x10(%r11),$T4		# s4^4
+	vpaddq		$T1,$D4,$D4		# d4 += h1*r3
+	vpmuludq	$H0,$T2,$T2		# h0*r3
+	vpmuludq	$H4,$T3,$T0		# h4*s3
+	vpaddq		$T2,$D3,$D3		# d3 += h0*r3
+	vpaddq		$T0,$D2,$D2		# d2 += h4*s3
+	 vmovdqu	16*2($inp),$T0				# load input
+	vpmuludq	$H3,$T3,$T2		# h3*s3
+	vpmuludq	$H2,$T3,$T3		# h2*s3
+	vpaddq		$T2,$D1,$D1		# d1 += h3*s3
+	 vmovdqu	16*3($inp),$T1				#
+	vpaddq		$T3,$D0,$D0		# d0 += h2*s3
+
+	vpmuludq	$H2,$T4,$H2		# h2*s4
+	vpmuludq	$H3,$T4,$H3		# h3*s4
+	 vpsrldq	\$6,$T0,$T2				# splat input
+	vpaddq		$H2,$D1,$D1		# d1 += h2*s4
+	vpmuludq	$H4,$T4,$H4		# h4*s4
+	 vpsrldq	\$6,$T1,$T3				#
+	vpaddq		$H3,$D2,$H2		# h2 = d2 + h3*s4
+	vpaddq		$H4,$D3,$H3		# h3 = d3 + h4*s4
+	vpmuludq	-0x20(%r11),$H0,$H4	# h0*r4
+	vpmuludq	$H1,$T4,$H0
+	 vpunpckhqdq	$T1,$T0,$T4		# 4
+	vpaddq		$H4,$D4,$H4		# h4 = d4 + h0*r4
+	vpaddq		$H0,$D0,$H0		# h0 = d0 + h1*s4
+
+	vpunpcklqdq	$T1,$T0,$T0		# 0:1
+	vpunpcklqdq	$T3,$T2,$T3		# 2:3
+
+	#vpsrlq		\$40,$T4,$T4		# 4
+	vpsrldq		\$`40/8`,$T4,$T4	# 4
+	vpsrlq		\$26,$T0,$T1
+	 vmovdqa	0x00(%rsp),$D4		# preload r0^2
+	vpand		$MASK,$T0,$T0		# 0
+	vpsrlq		\$4,$T3,$T2
+	vpand		$MASK,$T1,$T1		# 1
+	vpand		0(%rcx),$T4,$T4		# .Lmask24
+	vpsrlq		\$30,$T3,$T3
+	vpand		$MASK,$T2,$T2		# 2
+	vpand		$MASK,$T3,$T3		# 3
+	vpor		32(%rcx),$T4,$T4	# padbit, yes, always
+
+	################################################################
+	# lazy reduction as discussed in "NEON crypto" by D.J. Bernstein
+	# and P. Schwabe
+
+	vpsrlq		\$26,$H3,$D3
+	vpand		$MASK,$H3,$H3
+	vpaddq		$D3,$H4,$H4		# h3 -> h4
+
+	vpsrlq		\$26,$H0,$D0
+	vpand		$MASK,$H0,$H0
+	vpaddq		$D0,$D1,$H1		# h0 -> h1
+
+	vpsrlq		\$26,$H4,$D0
+	vpand		$MASK,$H4,$H4
+
+	vpsrlq		\$26,$H1,$D1
+	vpand		$MASK,$H1,$H1
+	vpaddq		$D1,$H2,$H2		# h1 -> h2
+
+	vpaddq		$D0,$H0,$H0
+	vpsllq		\$2,$D0,$D0
+	vpaddq		$D0,$H0,$H0		# h4 -> h0
+
+	vpsrlq		\$26,$H2,$D2
+	vpand		$MASK,$H2,$H2
+	vpaddq		$D2,$H3,$H3		# h2 -> h3
+
+	vpsrlq		\$26,$H0,$D0
+	vpand		$MASK,$H0,$H0
+	vpaddq		$D0,$H1,$H1		# h0 -> h1
+
+	vpsrlq		\$26,$H3,$D3
+	vpand		$MASK,$H3,$H3
+	vpaddq		$D3,$H4,$H4		# h3 -> h4
+
+	ja		.Loop_avx
+
+.Lskip_loop_avx:
+	################################################################
+	# multiply (inp[0:1]+hash) or inp[2:3] by r^2:r^1
+
+	vpshufd		\$0x10,$D4,$D4		# r0^n, xx12 -> x1x2
+	add		\$32,$len
+	jnz		.Long_tail_avx
+
+	vpaddq		$H2,$T2,$T2
+	vpaddq		$H0,$T0,$T0
+	vpaddq		$H1,$T1,$T1
+	vpaddq		$H3,$T3,$T3
+	vpaddq		$H4,$T4,$T4
+
+.Long_tail_avx:
+	vmovdqa		$H2,0x20(%r11)
+	vmovdqa		$H0,0x00(%r11)
+	vmovdqa		$H1,0x10(%r11)
+	vmovdqa		$H3,0x30(%r11)
+	vmovdqa		$H4,0x40(%r11)
+
+	# d4 = h4*r0 + h3*r1   + h2*r2   + h1*r3   + h0*r4
+	# d3 = h3*r0 + h2*r1   + h1*r2   + h0*r3   + h4*5*r4
+	# d2 = h2*r0 + h1*r1   + h0*r2   + h4*5*r3 + h3*5*r4
+	# d1 = h1*r0 + h0*r1   + h4*5*r2 + h3*5*r3 + h2*5*r4
+	# d0 = h0*r0 + h4*5*r1 + h3*5*r2 + h2*5*r3 + h1*5*r4
+
+	vpmuludq	$T2,$D4,$D2		# d2 = h2*r0
+	vpmuludq	$T0,$D4,$D0		# d0 = h0*r0
+	 vpshufd	\$0x10,`16*1-64`($ctx),$H2		# r1^n
+	vpmuludq	$T1,$D4,$D1		# d1 = h1*r0
+	vpmuludq	$T3,$D4,$D3		# d3 = h3*r0
+	vpmuludq	$T4,$D4,$D4		# d4 = h4*r0
+
+	vpmuludq	$T3,$H2,$H0		# h3*r1
+	vpaddq		$H0,$D4,$D4		# d4 += h3*r1
+	 vpshufd	\$0x10,`16*2-64`($ctx),$H3		# s1^n
+	vpmuludq	$T2,$H2,$H1		# h2*r1
+	vpaddq		$H1,$D3,$D3		# d3 += h2*r1
+	 vpshufd	\$0x10,`16*3-64`($ctx),$H4		# r2^n
+	vpmuludq	$T1,$H2,$H0		# h1*r1
+	vpaddq		$H0,$D2,$D2		# d2 += h1*r1
+	vpmuludq	$T0,$H2,$H2		# h0*r1
+	vpaddq		$H2,$D1,$D1		# d1 += h0*r1
+	vpmuludq	$T4,$H3,$H3		# h4*s1
+	vpaddq		$H3,$D0,$D0		# d0 += h4*s1
+
+	 vpshufd	\$0x10,`16*4-64`($ctx),$H2		# s2^n
+	vpmuludq	$T2,$H4,$H1		# h2*r2
+	vpaddq		$H1,$D4,$D4		# d4 += h2*r2
+	vpmuludq	$T1,$H4,$H0		# h1*r2
+	vpaddq		$H0,$D3,$D3		# d3 += h1*r2
+	 vpshufd	\$0x10,`16*5-64`($ctx),$H3		# r3^n
+	vpmuludq	$T0,$H4,$H4		# h0*r2
+	vpaddq		$H4,$D2,$D2		# d2 += h0*r2
+	vpmuludq	$T4,$H2,$H1		# h4*s2
+	vpaddq		$H1,$D1,$D1		# d1 += h4*s2
+	 vpshufd	\$0x10,`16*6-64`($ctx),$H4		# s3^n
+	vpmuludq	$T3,$H2,$H2		# h3*s2
+	vpaddq		$H2,$D0,$D0		# d0 += h3*s2
+
+	vpmuludq	$T1,$H3,$H0		# h1*r3
+	vpaddq		$H0,$D4,$D4		# d4 += h1*r3
+	vpmuludq	$T0,$H3,$H3		# h0*r3
+	vpaddq		$H3,$D3,$D3		# d3 += h0*r3
+	 vpshufd	\$0x10,`16*7-64`($ctx),$H2		# r4^n
+	vpmuludq	$T4,$H4,$H1		# h4*s3
+	vpaddq		$H1,$D2,$D2		# d2 += h4*s3
+	 vpshufd	\$0x10,`16*8-64`($ctx),$H3		# s4^n
+	vpmuludq	$T3,$H4,$H0		# h3*s3
+	vpaddq		$H0,$D1,$D1		# d1 += h3*s3
+	vpmuludq	$T2,$H4,$H4		# h2*s3
+	vpaddq		$H4,$D0,$D0		# d0 += h2*s3
+
+	vpmuludq	$T0,$H2,$H2		# h0*r4
+	vpaddq		$H2,$D4,$D4		# h4 = d4 + h0*r4
+	vpmuludq	$T4,$H3,$H1		# h4*s4
+	vpaddq		$H1,$D3,$D3		# h3 = d3 + h4*s4
+	vpmuludq	$T3,$H3,$H0		# h3*s4
+	vpaddq		$H0,$D2,$D2		# h2 = d2 + h3*s4
+	vpmuludq	$T2,$H3,$H1		# h2*s4
+	vpaddq		$H1,$D1,$D1		# h1 = d1 + h2*s4
+	vpmuludq	$T1,$H3,$H3		# h1*s4
+	vpaddq		$H3,$D0,$D0		# h0 = d0 + h1*s4
+
+	jz		.Lshort_tail_avx
+
+	vmovdqu		16*0($inp),$H0		# load input
+	vmovdqu		16*1($inp),$H1
+
+	vpsrldq		\$6,$H0,$H2		# splat input
+	vpsrldq		\$6,$H1,$H3
+	vpunpckhqdq	$H1,$H0,$H4		# 4
+	vpunpcklqdq	$H1,$H0,$H0		# 0:1
+	vpunpcklqdq	$H3,$H2,$H3		# 2:3
+
+	vpsrlq		\$40,$H4,$H4		# 4
+	vpsrlq		\$26,$H0,$H1
+	vpand		$MASK,$H0,$H0		# 0
+	vpsrlq		\$4,$H3,$H2
+	vpand		$MASK,$H1,$H1		# 1
+	vpsrlq		\$30,$H3,$H3
+	vpand		$MASK,$H2,$H2		# 2
+	vpand		$MASK,$H3,$H3		# 3
+	vpor		32(%rcx),$H4,$H4	# padbit, yes, always
+
+	vpshufd		\$0x32,`16*0-64`($ctx),$T4	# r0^n, 34xx -> x3x4
+	vpaddq		0x00(%r11),$H0,$H0
+	vpaddq		0x10(%r11),$H1,$H1
+	vpaddq		0x20(%r11),$H2,$H2
+	vpaddq		0x30(%r11),$H3,$H3
+	vpaddq		0x40(%r11),$H4,$H4
+
+	################################################################
+	# multiply (inp[0:1]+hash) by r^4:r^3 and accumulate
+
+	vpmuludq	$H0,$T4,$T0		# h0*r0
+	vpaddq		$T0,$D0,$D0		# d0 += h0*r0
+	vpmuludq	$H1,$T4,$T1		# h1*r0
+	vpaddq		$T1,$D1,$D1		# d1 += h1*r0
+	vpmuludq	$H2,$T4,$T0		# h2*r0
+	vpaddq		$T0,$D2,$D2		# d2 += h2*r0
+	 vpshufd	\$0x32,`16*1-64`($ctx),$T2		# r1^n
+	vpmuludq	$H3,$T4,$T1		# h3*r0
+	vpaddq		$T1,$D3,$D3		# d3 += h3*r0
+	vpmuludq	$H4,$T4,$T4		# h4*r0
+	vpaddq		$T4,$D4,$D4		# d4 += h4*r0
+
+	vpmuludq	$H3,$T2,$T0		# h3*r1
+	vpaddq		$T0,$D4,$D4		# d4 += h3*r1
+	 vpshufd	\$0x32,`16*2-64`($ctx),$T3		# s1
+	vpmuludq	$H2,$T2,$T1		# h2*r1
+	vpaddq		$T1,$D3,$D3		# d3 += h2*r1
+	 vpshufd	\$0x32,`16*3-64`($ctx),$T4		# r2
+	vpmuludq	$H1,$T2,$T0		# h1*r1
+	vpaddq		$T0,$D2,$D2		# d2 += h1*r1
+	vpmuludq	$H0,$T2,$T2		# h0*r1
+	vpaddq		$T2,$D1,$D1		# d1 += h0*r1
+	vpmuludq	$H4,$T3,$T3		# h4*s1
+	vpaddq		$T3,$D0,$D0		# d0 += h4*s1
+
+	 vpshufd	\$0x32,`16*4-64`($ctx),$T2		# s2
+	vpmuludq	$H2,$T4,$T1		# h2*r2
+	vpaddq		$T1,$D4,$D4		# d4 += h2*r2
+	vpmuludq	$H1,$T4,$T0		# h1*r2
+	vpaddq		$T0,$D3,$D3		# d3 += h1*r2
+	 vpshufd	\$0x32,`16*5-64`($ctx),$T3		# r3
+	vpmuludq	$H0,$T4,$T4		# h0*r2
+	vpaddq		$T4,$D2,$D2		# d2 += h0*r2
+	vpmuludq	$H4,$T2,$T1		# h4*s2
+	vpaddq		$T1,$D1,$D1		# d1 += h4*s2
+	 vpshufd	\$0x32,`16*6-64`($ctx),$T4		# s3
+	vpmuludq	$H3,$T2,$T2		# h3*s2
+	vpaddq		$T2,$D0,$D0		# d0 += h3*s2
+
+	vpmuludq	$H1,$T3,$T0		# h1*r3
+	vpaddq		$T0,$D4,$D4		# d4 += h1*r3
+	vpmuludq	$H0,$T3,$T3		# h0*r3
+	vpaddq		$T3,$D3,$D3		# d3 += h0*r3
+	 vpshufd	\$0x32,`16*7-64`($ctx),$T2		# r4
+	vpmuludq	$H4,$T4,$T1		# h4*s3
+	vpaddq		$T1,$D2,$D2		# d2 += h4*s3
+	 vpshufd	\$0x32,`16*8-64`($ctx),$T3		# s4
+	vpmuludq	$H3,$T4,$T0		# h3*s3
+	vpaddq		$T0,$D1,$D1		# d1 += h3*s3
+	vpmuludq	$H2,$T4,$T4		# h2*s3
+	vpaddq		$T4,$D0,$D0		# d0 += h2*s3
+
+	vpmuludq	$H0,$T2,$T2		# h0*r4
+	vpaddq		$T2,$D4,$D4		# d4 += h0*r4
+	vpmuludq	$H4,$T3,$T1		# h4*s4
+	vpaddq		$T1,$D3,$D3		# d3 += h4*s4
+	vpmuludq	$H3,$T3,$T0		# h3*s4
+	vpaddq		$T0,$D2,$D2		# d2 += h3*s4
+	vpmuludq	$H2,$T3,$T1		# h2*s4
+	vpaddq		$T1,$D1,$D1		# d1 += h2*s4
+	vpmuludq	$H1,$T3,$T3		# h1*s4
+	vpaddq		$T3,$D0,$D0		# d0 += h1*s4
+
+.Lshort_tail_avx:
+	################################################################
+	# horizontal addition
+
+	vpsrldq		\$8,$D4,$T4
+	vpsrldq		\$8,$D3,$T3
+	vpsrldq		\$8,$D1,$T1
+	vpsrldq		\$8,$D0,$T0
+	vpsrldq		\$8,$D2,$T2
+	vpaddq		$T3,$D3,$D3
+	vpaddq		$T4,$D4,$D4
+	vpaddq		$T0,$D0,$D0
+	vpaddq		$T1,$D1,$D1
+	vpaddq		$T2,$D2,$D2
+
+	################################################################
+	# lazy reduction
+
+	vpsrlq		\$26,$D3,$H3
+	vpand		$MASK,$D3,$D3
+	vpaddq		$H3,$D4,$D4		# h3 -> h4
+
+	vpsrlq		\$26,$D0,$H0
+	vpand		$MASK,$D0,$D0
+	vpaddq		$H0,$D1,$D1		# h0 -> h1
+
+	vpsrlq		\$26,$D4,$H4
+	vpand		$MASK,$D4,$D4
+
+	vpsrlq		\$26,$D1,$H1
+	vpand		$MASK,$D1,$D1
+	vpaddq		$H1,$D2,$D2		# h1 -> h2
+
+	vpaddq		$H4,$D0,$D0
+	vpsllq		\$2,$H4,$H4
+	vpaddq		$H4,$D0,$D0		# h4 -> h0
+
+	vpsrlq		\$26,$D2,$H2
+	vpand		$MASK,$D2,$D2
+	vpaddq		$H2,$D3,$D3		# h2 -> h3
+
+	vpsrlq		\$26,$D0,$H0
+	vpand		$MASK,$D0,$D0
+	vpaddq		$H0,$D1,$D1		# h0 -> h1
+
+	vpsrlq		\$26,$D3,$H3
+	vpand		$MASK,$D3,$D3
+	vpaddq		$H3,$D4,$D4		# h3 -> h4
+
+	vmovd		$D0,`4*0-48-64`($ctx)	# save partially reduced
+	vmovd		$D1,`4*1-48-64`($ctx)
+	vmovd		$D2,`4*2-48-64`($ctx)
+	vmovd		$D3,`4*3-48-64`($ctx)
+	vmovd		$D4,`4*4-48-64`($ctx)
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($win64);
+	vmovdqa		0x50(%r11),%xmm6
+	vmovdqa		0x60(%r11),%xmm7
+	vmovdqa		0x70(%r11),%xmm8
+	vmovdqa		0x80(%r11),%xmm9
+	vmovdqa		0x90(%r11),%xmm10
+	vmovdqa		0xa0(%r11),%xmm11
+	vmovdqa		0xb0(%r11),%xmm12
+	vmovdqa		0xc0(%r11),%xmm13
+	vmovdqa		0xd0(%r11),%xmm14
+	vmovdqa		0xe0(%r11),%xmm15
+	lea		0xf8(%r11),%rsp
+.Ldo_avx_epilogue:
+___
+$code.=<<___	if (!$win64);
+	lea		0x58(%r11),%rsp
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	vzeroupper
+	ret
+.size	poly1305_blocks_avx,.-poly1305_blocks_avx
+
+.type	poly1305_emit_avx,\@function,3
+.align	32
+poly1305_emit_avx:
+	cmpl	\$0,20($ctx)	# is_base2_26?
+	je	.Lemit
+
+	mov	0($ctx),%eax	# load hash value base 2^26
+	mov	4($ctx),%ecx
+	mov	8($ctx),%r8d
+	mov	12($ctx),%r11d
+	mov	16($ctx),%r10d
+
+	shl	\$26,%rcx	# base 2^26 -> base 2^64
+	mov	%r8,%r9
+	shl	\$52,%r8
+	add	%rcx,%rax
+	shr	\$12,%r9
+	add	%rax,%r8	# h0
+	adc	\$0,%r9
+
+	shl	\$14,%r11
+	mov	%r10,%rax
+	shr	\$24,%r10
+	add	%r11,%r9
+	shl	\$40,%rax
+	add	%rax,%r9	# h1
+	adc	\$0,%r10	# h2
+
+	mov	%r10,%rax	# could be partially reduced, so reduce
+	mov	%r10,%rcx
+	and	\$3,%r10
+	shr	\$2,%rax
+	and	\$-4,%rcx
+	add	%rcx,%rax
+	add	%rax,%r8
+	adc	\$0,%r9
+	adc	\$0,%r10
+
+	mov	%r8,%rax
+	add	\$5,%r8		# compare to modulus
+	mov	%r9,%rcx
+	adc	\$0,%r9
+	adc	\$0,%r10
+	shr	\$2,%r10	# did 130-bit value overfow?
+	cmovnz	%r8,%rax
+	cmovnz	%r9,%rcx
+
+	add	0($nonce),%rax	# accumulate nonce
+	adc	8($nonce),%rcx
+	mov	%rax,0($mac)	# write result
+	mov	%rcx,8($mac)
+
+	ret
+.size	poly1305_emit_avx,.-poly1305_emit_avx
+___
+
+if ($avx>1) {
+my ($H0,$H1,$H2,$H3,$H4, $MASK, $T4,$T0,$T1,$T2,$T3, $D0,$D1,$D2,$D3,$D4) =
+    map("%ymm$_",(0..15));
+my $S4=$MASK;
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.type	poly1305_blocks_avx2,\@function,4
+.align	32
+poly1305_blocks_avx2:
+	mov	20($ctx),%r8d		# is_base2_26
+	cmp	\$128,$len
+	jae	.Lblocks_avx2
+	test	%r8d,%r8d
+	jz	.Lblocks
+
+.Lblocks_avx2:
+	and	\$-16,$len
+	jz	.Lno_data_avx2
+
+	vzeroupper
+
+	test	%r8d,%r8d
+	jz	.Lbase2_64_avx2
+
+	test	\$63,$len
+	jz	.Leven_avx2
+
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+.Lblocks_avx2_body:
+
+	mov	$len,%r15		# reassign $len
+
+	mov	0($ctx),$d1		# load hash value
+	mov	8($ctx),$d2
+	mov	16($ctx),$h2#d
+
+	mov	24($ctx),$r0		# load r
+	mov	32($ctx),$s1
+
+	################################# base 2^26 -> base 2^64
+	mov	$d1#d,$h0#d
+	and	\$`-1*(1<<31)`,$d1
+	mov	$d2,$r1			# borrow $r1
+	mov	$d2#d,$h1#d
+	and	\$`-1*(1<<31)`,$d2
+
+	shr	\$6,$d1
+	shl	\$52,$r1
+	add	$d1,$h0
+	shr	\$12,$h1
+	shr	\$18,$d2
+	add	$r1,$h0
+	adc	$d2,$h1
+
+	mov	$h2,$d1
+	shl	\$40,$d1
+	shr	\$24,$h2
+	add	$d1,$h1
+	adc	\$0,$h2			# can be partially reduced...
+
+	mov	\$-4,$d2		# ... so reduce
+	mov	$h2,$d1
+	and	$h2,$d2
+	shr	\$2,$d1
+	and	\$3,$h2
+	add	$d2,$d1			# =*5
+	add	$d1,$h0
+	adc	\$0,$h1
+	adc	\$0,$h2
+
+	mov	$s1,$r1
+	mov	$s1,%rax
+	shr	\$2,$s1
+	add	$r1,$s1			# s1 = r1 + (r1 >> 2)
+
+.Lbase2_26_pre_avx2:
+	add	0($inp),$h0		# accumulate input
+	adc	8($inp),$h1
+	lea	16($inp),$inp
+	adc	$padbit,$h2
+	sub	\$16,%r15
+
+	call	__poly1305_block
+	mov	$r1,%rax
+
+	test	\$63,%r15
+	jnz	.Lbase2_26_pre_avx2
+
+	test	$padbit,$padbit		# if $padbit is zero,
+	jz	.Lstore_base2_64_avx2	# store hash in base 2^64 format
+
+	################################# base 2^64 -> base 2^26
+	mov	$h0,%rax
+	mov	$h0,%rdx
+	shr	\$52,$h0
+	mov	$h1,$r0
+	mov	$h1,$r1
+	shr	\$26,%rdx
+	and	\$0x3ffffff,%rax	# h[0]
+	shl	\$12,$r0
+	and	\$0x3ffffff,%rdx	# h[1]
+	shr	\$14,$h1
+	or	$r0,$h0
+	shl	\$24,$h2
+	and	\$0x3ffffff,$h0		# h[2]
+	shr	\$40,$r1
+	and	\$0x3ffffff,$h1		# h[3]
+	or	$r1,$h2			# h[4]
+
+	test	%r15,%r15
+	jz	.Lstore_base2_26_avx2
+
+	vmovd	%rax#d,%x#$H0
+	vmovd	%rdx#d,%x#$H1
+	vmovd	$h0#d,%x#$H2
+	vmovd	$h1#d,%x#$H3
+	vmovd	$h2#d,%x#$H4
+	jmp	.Lproceed_avx2
+
+.align	32
+.Lstore_base2_64_avx2:
+	mov	$h0,0($ctx)
+	mov	$h1,8($ctx)
+	mov	$h2,16($ctx)		# note that is_base2_26 is zeroed
+	jmp	.Ldone_avx2
+
+.align	16
+.Lstore_base2_26_avx2:
+	mov	%rax#d,0($ctx)		# store hash value base 2^26
+	mov	%rdx#d,4($ctx)
+	mov	$h0#d,8($ctx)
+	mov	$h1#d,12($ctx)
+	mov	$h2#d,16($ctx)
+.align	16
+.Ldone_avx2:
+	mov	0(%rsp),%r15
+	mov	8(%rsp),%r14
+	mov	16(%rsp),%r13
+	mov	24(%rsp),%r12
+	mov	32(%rsp),%rbp
+	mov	40(%rsp),%rbx
+	lea	48(%rsp),%rsp
+.Lno_data_avx2:
+.Lblocks_avx2_epilogue:
+	ret
+
+.align	32
+.Lbase2_64_avx2:
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+.Lbase2_64_avx2_body:
+
+	mov	$len,%r15		# reassign $len
+
+	mov	24($ctx),$r0		# load r
+	mov	32($ctx),$s1
+
+	mov	0($ctx),$h0		# load hash value
+	mov	8($ctx),$h1
+	mov	16($ctx),$h2#d
+
+	mov	$s1,$r1
+	mov	$s1,%rax
+	shr	\$2,$s1
+	add	$r1,$s1			# s1 = r1 + (r1 >> 2)
+
+	test	\$63,$len
+	jz	.Linit_avx2
+
+.Lbase2_64_pre_avx2:
+	add	0($inp),$h0		# accumulate input
+	adc	8($inp),$h1
+	lea	16($inp),$inp
+	adc	$padbit,$h2
+	sub	\$16,%r15
+
+	call	__poly1305_block
+	mov	$r1,%rax
+
+	test	\$63,%r15
+	jnz	.Lbase2_64_pre_avx2
+
+.Linit_avx2:
+	################################# base 2^64 -> base 2^26
+	mov	$h0,%rax
+	mov	$h0,%rdx
+	shr	\$52,$h0
+	mov	$h1,$d1
+	mov	$h1,$d2
+	shr	\$26,%rdx
+	and	\$0x3ffffff,%rax	# h[0]
+	shl	\$12,$d1
+	and	\$0x3ffffff,%rdx	# h[1]
+	shr	\$14,$h1
+	or	$d1,$h0
+	shl	\$24,$h2
+	and	\$0x3ffffff,$h0		# h[2]
+	shr	\$40,$d2
+	and	\$0x3ffffff,$h1		# h[3]
+	or	$d2,$h2			# h[4]
+
+	vmovd	%rax#d,%x#$H0
+	vmovd	%rdx#d,%x#$H1
+	vmovd	$h0#d,%x#$H2
+	vmovd	$h1#d,%x#$H3
+	vmovd	$h2#d,%x#$H4
+	movl	\$1,20($ctx)		# set is_base2_26
+
+	call	__poly1305_init_avx
+
+.Lproceed_avx2:
+	mov	%r15,$len
+
+	mov	0(%rsp),%r15
+	mov	8(%rsp),%r14
+	mov	16(%rsp),%r13
+	mov	24(%rsp),%r12
+	mov	32(%rsp),%rbp
+	mov	40(%rsp),%rbx
+	lea	48(%rsp),%rax
+	lea	48(%rsp),%rsp
+.Lbase2_64_avx2_epilogue:
+	jmp	.Ldo_avx2
+
+.align	32
+.Leven_avx2:
+	vmovd		4*0($ctx),%x#$H0	# load hash value base 2^26
+	vmovd		4*1($ctx),%x#$H1
+	vmovd		4*2($ctx),%x#$H2
+	vmovd		4*3($ctx),%x#$H3
+	vmovd		4*4($ctx),%x#$H4
+
+.Ldo_avx2:
+___
+$code.=<<___	if (!$win64);
+	lea		-8(%rsp),%r11
+	sub		\$0x128,%rsp
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($win64);
+	lea		-0xf8(%rsp),%r11
+	sub		\$0x1c8,%rsp
+	vmovdqa		%xmm6,0x50(%r11)
+	vmovdqa		%xmm7,0x60(%r11)
+	vmovdqa		%xmm8,0x70(%r11)
+	vmovdqa		%xmm9,0x80(%r11)
+	vmovdqa		%xmm10,0x90(%r11)
+	vmovdqa		%xmm11,0xa0(%r11)
+	vmovdqa		%xmm12,0xb0(%r11)
+	vmovdqa		%xmm13,0xc0(%r11)
+	vmovdqa		%xmm14,0xd0(%r11)
+	vmovdqa		%xmm15,0xe0(%r11)
+.Ldo_avx2_body:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	lea		48+64($ctx),$ctx	# size optimization
+	lea		.Lconst(%rip),%rcx
+
+	# expand and copy pre-calculated table to stack
+	vmovdqu		`16*0-64`($ctx),%x#$T2
+	and		\$-512,%rsp
+	vmovdqu		`16*1-64`($ctx),%x#$T3
+	vmovdqu		`16*2-64`($ctx),%x#$T4
+	vmovdqu		`16*3-64`($ctx),%x#$D0
+	vmovdqu		`16*4-64`($ctx),%x#$D1
+	vmovdqu		`16*5-64`($ctx),%x#$D2
+	vmovdqu		`16*6-64`($ctx),%x#$D3
+	vpermq		\$0x15,$T2,$T2		# 00003412 -> 12343434
+	vmovdqu		`16*7-64`($ctx),%x#$D4
+	vpermq		\$0x15,$T3,$T3
+	vpshufd		\$0xc8,$T2,$T2		# 12343434 -> 14243444
+	vmovdqu		`16*8-64`($ctx),%x#$MASK
+	vpermq		\$0x15,$T4,$T4
+	vpshufd		\$0xc8,$T3,$T3
+	vmovdqa		$T2,0x00(%rsp)
+	vpermq		\$0x15,$D0,$D0
+	vpshufd		\$0xc8,$T4,$T4
+	vmovdqa		$T3,0x20(%rsp)
+	vpermq		\$0x15,$D1,$D1
+	vpshufd		\$0xc8,$D0,$D0
+	vmovdqa		$T4,0x40(%rsp)
+	vpermq		\$0x15,$D2,$D2
+	vpshufd		\$0xc8,$D1,$D1
+	vmovdqa		$D0,0x60(%rsp)
+	vpermq		\$0x15,$D3,$D3
+	vpshufd		\$0xc8,$D2,$D2
+	vmovdqa		$D1,0x80(%rsp)
+	vpermq		\$0x15,$D4,$D4
+	vpshufd		\$0xc8,$D3,$D3
+	vmovdqa		$D2,0xa0(%rsp)
+	vpermq		\$0x15,$MASK,$MASK
+	vpshufd		\$0xc8,$D4,$D4
+	vmovdqa		$D3,0xc0(%rsp)
+	vpshufd		\$0xc8,$MASK,$MASK
+	vmovdqa		$D4,0xe0(%rsp)
+	vmovdqa		$MASK,0x100(%rsp)
+	vmovdqa		64(%rcx),$MASK		# .Lmask26
+
+	################################################################
+	# load input
+	vmovdqu		16*0($inp),%x#$T0
+	vmovdqu		16*1($inp),%x#$T1
+	vinserti128	\$1,16*2($inp),$T0,$T0
+	vinserti128	\$1,16*3($inp),$T1,$T1
+	lea		16*4($inp),$inp
+
+	vpsrldq		\$6,$T0,$T2		# splat input
+	vpsrldq		\$6,$T1,$T3
+	vpunpckhqdq	$T1,$T0,$T4		# 4
+	vpunpcklqdq	$T3,$T2,$T2		# 2:3
+	vpunpcklqdq	$T1,$T0,$T0		# 0:1
+
+	vpsrlq		\$30,$T2,$T3
+	vpsrlq		\$4,$T2,$T2
+	vpsrlq		\$26,$T0,$T1
+	vpsrlq		\$40,$T4,$T4		# 4
+	vpand		$MASK,$T2,$T2		# 2
+	vpand		$MASK,$T0,$T0		# 0
+	vpand		$MASK,$T1,$T1		# 1
+	vpand		$MASK,$T3,$T3		# 3
+	vpor		32(%rcx),$T4,$T4	# padbit, yes, always
+
+	lea		0x90(%rsp),%rax		# size optimization
+	vpaddq		$H2,$T2,$H2		# accumulate input
+	sub		\$64,$len
+	jz		.Ltail_avx2
+	jmp		.Loop_avx2
+
+.align	32
+.Loop_avx2:
+	################################################################
+	# ((inp[0]*r^4+r[4])*r^4+r[8])*r^4
+	# ((inp[1]*r^4+r[5])*r^4+r[9])*r^3
+	# ((inp[2]*r^4+r[6])*r^4+r[10])*r^2
+	# ((inp[3]*r^4+r[7])*r^4+r[11])*r^1
+	#   \________/\________/
+	################################################################
+	#vpaddq		$H2,$T2,$H2		# accumulate input
+	vpaddq		$H0,$T0,$H0
+	vmovdqa		`32*0`(%rsp),$T0	# r0^4
+	vpaddq		$H1,$T1,$H1
+	vmovdqa		`32*1`(%rsp),$T1	# r1^4
+	vpaddq		$H3,$T3,$H3
+	vmovdqa		`32*3`(%rsp),$T2	# r2^4
+	vpaddq		$H4,$T4,$H4
+	vmovdqa		`32*6-0x90`(%rax),$T3	# s3^4
+	vmovdqa		`32*8-0x90`(%rax),$S4	# s4^4
+
+	# d4 = h4*r0 + h3*r1   + h2*r2   + h1*r3   + h0*r4
+	# d3 = h3*r0 + h2*r1   + h1*r2   + h0*r3   + h4*5*r4
+	# d2 = h2*r0 + h1*r1   + h0*r2   + h4*5*r3 + h3*5*r4
+	# d1 = h1*r0 + h0*r1   + h4*5*r2 + h3*5*r3 + h2*5*r4
+	# d0 = h0*r0 + h4*5*r1 + h3*5*r2 + h2*5*r3 + h1*5*r4
+	#
+	# however, as h2 is "chronologically" first one available pull
+	# corresponding operations up, so it's
+	#
+	# d4 = h2*r2   + h4*r0 + h3*r1             + h1*r3   + h0*r4
+	# d3 = h2*r1   + h3*r0           + h1*r2   + h0*r3   + h4*5*r4
+	# d2 = h2*r0           + h1*r1   + h0*r2   + h4*5*r3 + h3*5*r4
+	# d1 = h2*5*r4 + h1*r0 + h0*r1   + h4*5*r2 + h3*5*r3
+	# d0 = h2*5*r3 + h0*r0 + h4*5*r1 + h3*5*r2           + h1*5*r4
+
+	vpmuludq	$H2,$T0,$D2		# d2 = h2*r0
+	vpmuludq	$H2,$T1,$D3		# d3 = h2*r1
+	vpmuludq	$H2,$T2,$D4		# d4 = h2*r2
+	vpmuludq	$H2,$T3,$D0		# d0 = h2*s3
+	vpmuludq	$H2,$S4,$D1		# d1 = h2*s4
+
+	vpmuludq	$H0,$T1,$T4		# h0*r1
+	vpmuludq	$H1,$T1,$H2		# h1*r1, borrow $H2 as temp
+	vpaddq		$T4,$D1,$D1		# d1 += h0*r1
+	vpaddq		$H2,$D2,$D2		# d2 += h1*r1
+	vpmuludq	$H3,$T1,$T4		# h3*r1
+	vpmuludq	`32*2`(%rsp),$H4,$H2	# h4*s1
+	vpaddq		$T4,$D4,$D4		# d4 += h3*r1
+	vpaddq		$H2,$D0,$D0		# d0 += h4*s1
+	 vmovdqa	`32*4-0x90`(%rax),$T1	# s2
+
+	vpmuludq	$H0,$T0,$T4		# h0*r0
+	vpmuludq	$H1,$T0,$H2		# h1*r0
+	vpaddq		$T4,$D0,$D0		# d0 += h0*r0
+	vpaddq		$H2,$D1,$D1		# d1 += h1*r0
+	vpmuludq	$H3,$T0,$T4		# h3*r0
+	vpmuludq	$H4,$T0,$H2		# h4*r0
+	 vmovdqu	16*0($inp),%x#$T0	# load input
+	vpaddq		$T4,$D3,$D3		# d3 += h3*r0
+	vpaddq		$H2,$D4,$D4		# d4 += h4*r0
+	 vinserti128	\$1,16*2($inp),$T0,$T0
+
+	vpmuludq	$H3,$T1,$T4		# h3*s2
+	vpmuludq	$H4,$T1,$H2		# h4*s2
+	 vmovdqu	16*1($inp),%x#$T1
+	vpaddq		$T4,$D0,$D0		# d0 += h3*s2
+	vpaddq		$H2,$D1,$D1		# d1 += h4*s2
+	 vmovdqa	`32*5-0x90`(%rax),$H2	# r3
+	vpmuludq	$H1,$T2,$T4		# h1*r2
+	vpmuludq	$H0,$T2,$T2		# h0*r2
+	vpaddq		$T4,$D3,$D3		# d3 += h1*r2
+	vpaddq		$T2,$D2,$D2		# d2 += h0*r2
+	 vinserti128	\$1,16*3($inp),$T1,$T1
+	 lea		16*4($inp),$inp
+
+	vpmuludq	$H1,$H2,$T4		# h1*r3
+	vpmuludq	$H0,$H2,$H2		# h0*r3
+	 vpsrldq	\$6,$T0,$T2		# splat input
+	vpaddq		$T4,$D4,$D4		# d4 += h1*r3
+	vpaddq		$H2,$D3,$D3		# d3 += h0*r3
+	vpmuludq	$H3,$T3,$T4		# h3*s3
+	vpmuludq	$H4,$T3,$H2		# h4*s3
+	 vpsrldq	\$6,$T1,$T3
+	vpaddq		$T4,$D1,$D1		# d1 += h3*s3
+	vpaddq		$H2,$D2,$D2		# d2 += h4*s3
+	 vpunpckhqdq	$T1,$T0,$T4		# 4
+
+	vpmuludq	$H3,$S4,$H3		# h3*s4
+	vpmuludq	$H4,$S4,$H4		# h4*s4
+	 vpunpcklqdq	$T1,$T0,$T0		# 0:1
+	vpaddq		$H3,$D2,$H2		# h2 = d2 + h3*r4
+	vpaddq		$H4,$D3,$H3		# h3 = d3 + h4*r4
+	 vpunpcklqdq	$T3,$T2,$T3		# 2:3
+	vpmuludq	`32*7-0x90`(%rax),$H0,$H4	# h0*r4
+	vpmuludq	$H1,$S4,$H0		# h1*s4
+	vmovdqa		64(%rcx),$MASK		# .Lmask26
+	vpaddq		$H4,$D4,$H4		# h4 = d4 + h0*r4
+	vpaddq		$H0,$D0,$H0		# h0 = d0 + h1*s4
+
+	################################################################
+	# lazy reduction (interleaved with tail of input splat)
+
+	vpsrlq		\$26,$H3,$D3
+	vpand		$MASK,$H3,$H3
+	vpaddq		$D3,$H4,$H4		# h3 -> h4
+
+	vpsrlq		\$26,$H0,$D0
+	vpand		$MASK,$H0,$H0
+	vpaddq		$D0,$D1,$H1		# h0 -> h1
+
+	vpsrlq		\$26,$H4,$D4
+	vpand		$MASK,$H4,$H4
+
+	 vpsrlq		\$4,$T3,$T2
+
+	vpsrlq		\$26,$H1,$D1
+	vpand		$MASK,$H1,$H1
+	vpaddq		$D1,$H2,$H2		# h1 -> h2
+
+	vpaddq		$D4,$H0,$H0
+	vpsllq		\$2,$D4,$D4
+	vpaddq		$D4,$H0,$H0		# h4 -> h0
+
+	 vpand		$MASK,$T2,$T2		# 2
+	 vpsrlq		\$26,$T0,$T1
+
+	vpsrlq		\$26,$H2,$D2
+	vpand		$MASK,$H2,$H2
+	vpaddq		$D2,$H3,$H3		# h2 -> h3
+
+	 vpaddq		$T2,$H2,$H2		# modulo-scheduled
+	 vpsrlq		\$30,$T3,$T3
+
+	vpsrlq		\$26,$H0,$D0
+	vpand		$MASK,$H0,$H0
+	vpaddq		$D0,$H1,$H1		# h0 -> h1
+
+	 vpsrlq		\$40,$T4,$T4		# 4
+
+	vpsrlq		\$26,$H3,$D3
+	vpand		$MASK,$H3,$H3
+	vpaddq		$D3,$H4,$H4		# h3 -> h4
+
+	 vpand		$MASK,$T0,$T0		# 0
+	 vpand		$MASK,$T1,$T1		# 1
+	 vpand		$MASK,$T3,$T3		# 3
+	 vpor		32(%rcx),$T4,$T4	# padbit, yes, always
+
+	sub		\$64,$len
+	jnz		.Loop_avx2
+
+	.byte		0x66,0x90
+.Ltail_avx2:
+	################################################################
+	# while above multiplications were by r^4 in all lanes, in last
+	# iteration we multiply least significant lane by r^4 and most
+	# significant one by r, so copy of above except that references
+	# to the precomputed table are displaced by 4...
+
+	#vpaddq		$H2,$T2,$H2		# accumulate input
+	vpaddq		$H0,$T0,$H0
+	vmovdqu		`32*0+4`(%rsp),$T0	# r0^4
+	vpaddq		$H1,$T1,$H1
+	vmovdqu		`32*1+4`(%rsp),$T1	# r1^4
+	vpaddq		$H3,$T3,$H3
+	vmovdqu		`32*3+4`(%rsp),$T2	# r2^4
+	vpaddq		$H4,$T4,$H4
+	vmovdqu		`32*6+4-0x90`(%rax),$T3	# s3^4
+	vmovdqu		`32*8+4-0x90`(%rax),$S4	# s4^4
+
+	vpmuludq	$H2,$T0,$D2		# d2 = h2*r0
+	vpmuludq	$H2,$T1,$D3		# d3 = h2*r1
+	vpmuludq	$H2,$T2,$D4		# d4 = h2*r2
+	vpmuludq	$H2,$T3,$D0		# d0 = h2*s3
+	vpmuludq	$H2,$S4,$D1		# d1 = h2*s4
+
+	vpmuludq	$H0,$T1,$T4		# h0*r1
+	vpmuludq	$H1,$T1,$H2		# h1*r1
+	vpaddq		$T4,$D1,$D1		# d1 += h0*r1
+	vpaddq		$H2,$D2,$D2		# d2 += h1*r1
+	vpmuludq	$H3,$T1,$T4		# h3*r1
+	vpmuludq	`32*2+4`(%rsp),$H4,$H2	# h4*s1
+	vpaddq		$T4,$D4,$D4		# d4 += h3*r1
+	vpaddq		$H2,$D0,$D0		# d0 += h4*s1
+
+	vpmuludq	$H0,$T0,$T4		# h0*r0
+	vpmuludq	$H1,$T0,$H2		# h1*r0
+	vpaddq		$T4,$D0,$D0		# d0 += h0*r0
+	 vmovdqu	`32*4+4-0x90`(%rax),$T1	# s2
+	vpaddq		$H2,$D1,$D1		# d1 += h1*r0
+	vpmuludq	$H3,$T0,$T4		# h3*r0
+	vpmuludq	$H4,$T0,$H2		# h4*r0
+	vpaddq		$T4,$D3,$D3		# d3 += h3*r0
+	vpaddq		$H2,$D4,$D4		# d4 += h4*r0
+
+	vpmuludq	$H3,$T1,$T4		# h3*s2
+	vpmuludq	$H4,$T1,$H2		# h4*s2
+	vpaddq		$T4,$D0,$D0		# d0 += h3*s2
+	vpaddq		$H2,$D1,$D1		# d1 += h4*s2
+	 vmovdqu	`32*5+4-0x90`(%rax),$H2	# r3
+	vpmuludq	$H1,$T2,$T4		# h1*r2
+	vpmuludq	$H0,$T2,$T2		# h0*r2
+	vpaddq		$T4,$D3,$D3		# d3 += h1*r2
+	vpaddq		$T2,$D2,$D2		# d2 += h0*r2
+
+	vpmuludq	$H1,$H2,$T4		# h1*r3
+	vpmuludq	$H0,$H2,$H2		# h0*r3
+	vpaddq		$T4,$D4,$D4		# d4 += h1*r3
+	vpaddq		$H2,$D3,$D3		# d3 += h0*r3
+	vpmuludq	$H3,$T3,$T4		# h3*s3
+	vpmuludq	$H4,$T3,$H2		# h4*s3
+	vpaddq		$T4,$D1,$D1		# d1 += h3*s3
+	vpaddq		$H2,$D2,$D2		# d2 += h4*s3
+
+	vpmuludq	$H3,$S4,$H3		# h3*s4
+	vpmuludq	$H4,$S4,$H4		# h4*s4
+	vpaddq		$H3,$D2,$H2		# h2 = d2 + h3*r4
+	vpaddq		$H4,$D3,$H3		# h3 = d3 + h4*r4
+	vpmuludq	`32*7+4-0x90`(%rax),$H0,$H4		# h0*r4
+	vpmuludq	$H1,$S4,$H0		# h1*s4
+	vmovdqa		64(%rcx),$MASK		# .Lmask26
+	vpaddq		$H4,$D4,$H4		# h4 = d4 + h0*r4
+	vpaddq		$H0,$D0,$H0		# h0 = d0 + h1*s4
+
+	################################################################
+	# horizontal addition
+
+	vpsrldq		\$8,$D1,$T1
+	vpsrldq		\$8,$H2,$T2
+	vpsrldq		\$8,$H3,$T3
+	vpsrldq		\$8,$H4,$T4
+	vpsrldq		\$8,$H0,$T0
+	vpaddq		$T1,$D1,$D1
+	vpaddq		$T2,$H2,$H2
+	vpaddq		$T3,$H3,$H3
+	vpaddq		$T4,$H4,$H4
+	vpaddq		$T0,$H0,$H0
+
+	vpermq		\$0x2,$H3,$T3
+	vpermq		\$0x2,$H4,$T4
+	vpermq		\$0x2,$H0,$T0
+	vpermq		\$0x2,$D1,$T1
+	vpermq		\$0x2,$H2,$T2
+	vpaddq		$T3,$H3,$H3
+	vpaddq		$T4,$H4,$H4
+	vpaddq		$T0,$H0,$H0
+	vpaddq		$T1,$D1,$D1
+	vpaddq		$T2,$H2,$H2
+
+	################################################################
+	# lazy reduction
+
+	vpsrlq		\$26,$H3,$D3
+	vpand		$MASK,$H3,$H3
+	vpaddq		$D3,$H4,$H4		# h3 -> h4
+
+	vpsrlq		\$26,$H0,$D0
+	vpand		$MASK,$H0,$H0
+	vpaddq		$D0,$D1,$H1		# h0 -> h1
+
+	vpsrlq		\$26,$H4,$D4
+	vpand		$MASK,$H4,$H4
+
+	vpsrlq		\$26,$H1,$D1
+	vpand		$MASK,$H1,$H1
+	vpaddq		$D1,$H2,$H2		# h1 -> h2
+
+	vpaddq		$D4,$H0,$H0
+	vpsllq		\$2,$D4,$D4
+	vpaddq		$D4,$H0,$H0		# h4 -> h0
+
+	vpsrlq		\$26,$H2,$D2
+	vpand		$MASK,$H2,$H2
+	vpaddq		$D2,$H3,$H3		# h2 -> h3
+
+	vpsrlq		\$26,$H0,$D0
+	vpand		$MASK,$H0,$H0
+	vpaddq		$D0,$H1,$H1		# h0 -> h1
+
+	vpsrlq		\$26,$H3,$D3
+	vpand		$MASK,$H3,$H3
+	vpaddq		$D3,$H4,$H4		# h3 -> h4
+
+	vmovd		%x#$H0,`4*0-48-64`($ctx)# save partially reduced
+	vmovd		%x#$H1,`4*1-48-64`($ctx)
+	vmovd		%x#$H2,`4*2-48-64`($ctx)
+	vmovd		%x#$H3,`4*3-48-64`($ctx)
+	vmovd		%x#$H4,`4*4-48-64`($ctx)
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($win64);
+	vmovdqa		0x50(%r11),%xmm6
+	vmovdqa		0x60(%r11),%xmm7
+	vmovdqa		0x70(%r11),%xmm8
+	vmovdqa		0x80(%r11),%xmm9
+	vmovdqa		0x90(%r11),%xmm10
+	vmovdqa		0xa0(%r11),%xmm11
+	vmovdqa		0xb0(%r11),%xmm12
+	vmovdqa		0xc0(%r11),%xmm13
+	vmovdqa		0xd0(%r11),%xmm14
+	vmovdqa		0xe0(%r11),%xmm15
+	lea		0xf8(%r11),%rsp
+.Ldo_avx2_epilogue:
+___
+$code.=<<___	if (!$win64);
+	lea		8(%r11),%rsp
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	vzeroupper
+	ret
+.size	poly1305_blocks_avx2,.-poly1305_blocks_avx2
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+.align	64
+.Lconst:
+.Lmask24:
+.long	0x0ffffff,0,0x0ffffff,0,0x0ffffff,0,0x0ffffff,0
+.L129:
+.long	`1<<24`,0,`1<<24`,0,`1<<24`,0,`1<<24`,0
+.Lmask26:
+.long	0x3ffffff,0,0x3ffffff,0,0x3ffffff,0,0x3ffffff,0
+.Lfive:
+.long	5,0,5,0,5,0,5,0
+___
+}
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.asciz	"Poly1305 for x86_64, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+.align	16
+___
+
+# EXCEPTION_DISPOSITION handler (EXCEPTION_RECORD *rec,ULONG64 frame,
+#		CONTEXT *context,DISPATCHER_CONTEXT *disp)
+if ($win64) {
+$rec="%rcx";
+$frame="%rdx";
+$context="%r8";
+$disp="%r9";
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.extern	__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind
+.type	se_handler,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+se_handler:
+	push	%rsi
+	push	%rdi
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+	pushfq
+	sub	\$64,%rsp
+
+	mov	120($context),%rax	# pull context->Rax
+	mov	248($context),%rbx	# pull context->Rip
+
+	mov	8($disp),%rsi		# disp->ImageBase
+	mov	56($disp),%r11		# disp->HandlerData
+
+	mov	0(%r11),%r10d		# HandlerData[0]
+	lea	(%rsi,%r10),%r10	# prologue label
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip<.Lprologue
+	jb	.Lcommon_seh_tail
+
+	mov	152($context),%rax	# pull context->Rsp
+
+	mov	4(%r11),%r10d		# HandlerData[1]
+	lea	(%rsi,%r10),%r10	# epilogue label
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip>=.Lepilogue
+	jae	.Lcommon_seh_tail
+
+	lea	48(%rax),%rax
+
+	mov	-8(%rax),%rbx
+	mov	-16(%rax),%rbp
+	mov	-24(%rax),%r12
+	mov	-32(%rax),%r13
+	mov	-40(%rax),%r14
+	mov	-48(%rax),%r15
+	mov	%rbx,144($context)	# restore context->Rbx
+	mov	%rbp,160($context)	# restore context->Rbp
+	mov	%r12,216($context)	# restore context->R12
+	mov	%r13,224($context)	# restore context->R13
+	mov	%r14,232($context)	# restore context->R14
+	mov	%r15,240($context)	# restore context->R14
+
+	jmp	.Lcommon_seh_tail
+.size	se_handler,.-se_handler
+
+.type	avx_handler,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+avx_handler:
+	push	%rsi
+	push	%rdi
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+	pushfq
+	sub	\$64,%rsp
+
+	mov	120($context),%rax	# pull context->Rax
+	mov	248($context),%rbx	# pull context->Rip
+
+	mov	8($disp),%rsi		# disp->ImageBase
+	mov	56($disp),%r11		# disp->HandlerData
+
+	mov	0(%r11),%r10d		# HandlerData[0]
+	lea	(%rsi,%r10),%r10	# prologue label
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip<prologue label
+	jb	.Lcommon_seh_tail
+
+	mov	152($context),%rax	# pull context->Rsp
+
+	mov	4(%r11),%r10d		# HandlerData[1]
+	lea	(%rsi,%r10),%r10	# epilogue label
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip>=epilogue label
+	jae	.Lcommon_seh_tail
+
+	mov	208($context),%rax	# pull context->R11
+
+	lea	0x50(%rax),%rsi
+	lea	0xf8(%rax),%rax
+	lea	512($context),%rdi	# &context.Xmm6
+	mov	\$20,%ecx
+	.long	0xa548f3fc		# cld; rep movsq
+
+.Lcommon_seh_tail:
+	mov	8(%rax),%rdi
+	mov	16(%rax),%rsi
+	mov	%rax,152($context)	# restore context->Rsp
+	mov	%rsi,168($context)	# restore context->Rsi
+	mov	%rdi,176($context)	# restore context->Rdi
+
+	mov	40($disp),%rdi		# disp->ContextRecord
+	mov	$context,%rsi		# context
+	mov	\$154,%ecx		# sizeof(CONTEXT)
+	.long	0xa548f3fc		# cld; rep movsq
+
+	mov	$disp,%rsi
+	xor	%rcx,%rcx		# arg1, UNW_FLAG_NHANDLER
+	mov	8(%rsi),%rdx		# arg2, disp->ImageBase
+	mov	0(%rsi),%r8		# arg3, disp->ControlPc
+	mov	16(%rsi),%r9		# arg4, disp->FunctionEntry
+	mov	40(%rsi),%r10		# disp->ContextRecord
+	lea	56(%rsi),%r11		# &disp->HandlerData
+	lea	24(%rsi),%r12		# &disp->EstablisherFrame
+	mov	%r10,32(%rsp)		# arg5
+	mov	%r11,40(%rsp)		# arg6
+	mov	%r12,48(%rsp)		# arg7
+	mov	%rcx,56(%rsp)		# arg8, (NULL)
+	call	*__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind(%rip)
+
+	mov	\$1,%eax		# ExceptionContinueSearch
+	add	\$64,%rsp
+	popfq
+	pop	%r15
+	pop	%r14
+	pop	%r13
+	pop	%r12
+	pop	%rbp
+	pop	%rbx
+	pop	%rdi
+	pop	%rsi
+	ret
+.size	avx_handler,.-avx_handler
+
+.section	.pdata
+.align	4
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_poly1305_init
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_poly1305_init
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_poly1305_init
+
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_poly1305_blocks
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_poly1305_blocks
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_poly1305_blocks
+
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_poly1305_emit
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_poly1305_emit
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_poly1305_emit
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($avx);
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_poly1305_blocks_avx
+	.rva	.Lbase2_64_avx
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_poly1305_blocks_avx_1
+
+	.rva	.Lbase2_64_avx
+	.rva	.Leven_avx
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_poly1305_blocks_avx_2
+
+	.rva	.Leven_avx
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_poly1305_blocks_avx
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_poly1305_blocks_avx_3
+
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_poly1305_emit_avx
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_poly1305_emit_avx
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_poly1305_emit_avx
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($avx>1);
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_poly1305_blocks_avx2
+	.rva	.Lbase2_64_avx2
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_poly1305_blocks_avx2_1
+
+	.rva	.Lbase2_64_avx2
+	.rva	.Leven_avx2
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_poly1305_blocks_avx2_2
+
+	.rva	.Leven_avx2
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_poly1305_blocks_avx2
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_poly1305_blocks_avx2_3
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+.section	.xdata
+.align	8
+.LSEH_info_poly1305_init:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	se_handler
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_poly1305_init,.LSEH_begin_poly1305_init
+
+.LSEH_info_poly1305_blocks:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	se_handler
+	.rva	.Lblocks_body,.Lblocks_epilogue
+
+.LSEH_info_poly1305_emit:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	se_handler
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_poly1305_emit,.LSEH_begin_poly1305_emit
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($avx);
+.LSEH_info_poly1305_blocks_avx_1:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	se_handler
+	.rva	.Lblocks_avx_body,.Lblocks_avx_epilogue		# HandlerData[]
+
+.LSEH_info_poly1305_blocks_avx_2:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	se_handler
+	.rva	.Lbase2_64_avx_body,.Lbase2_64_avx_epilogue	# HandlerData[]
+
+.LSEH_info_poly1305_blocks_avx_3:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	avx_handler
+	.rva	.Ldo_avx_body,.Ldo_avx_epilogue			# HandlerData[]
+
+.LSEH_info_poly1305_emit_avx:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	se_handler
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_poly1305_emit_avx,.LSEH_begin_poly1305_emit_avx
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($avx>1);
+.LSEH_info_poly1305_blocks_avx2_1:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	se_handler
+	.rva	.Lblocks_avx2_body,.Lblocks_avx2_epilogue	# HandlerData[]
+
+.LSEH_info_poly1305_blocks_avx2_2:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	se_handler
+	.rva	.Lbase2_64_avx2_body,.Lbase2_64_avx2_epilogue	# HandlerData[]
+
+.LSEH_info_poly1305_blocks_avx2_3:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	avx_handler
+	.rva	.Ldo_avx2_body,.Ldo_avx2_epilogue		# HandlerData[]
+___
+}
+
+foreach (split('\n',$code)) {
+	s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval($1)/ge;
+	s/%r([a-z]+)#d/%e$1/g;
+	s/%r([0-9]+)#d/%r$1d/g;
+	s/%x#%y/%x/g;
+
+	print $_,"\n";
+}
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/poly1305/build.info b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/poly1305/build.info
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d575f5a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/poly1305/build.info
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+LIBS=../../libcrypto
+SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
+        poly1305.c {- $target{poly1305_asm_src} -}
+
+GENERATE[poly1305-sparcv9.S]=asm/poly1305-sparcv9.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+INCLUDE[poly1305-sparcv9.o]=..
+GENERATE[poly1305-x86.s]=asm/poly1305-x86.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $(CFLAGS) $(LIB_CFLAGS) $(PROCESSOR)
+GENERATE[poly1305-x86_64.s]=asm/poly1305-x86_64.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+GENERATE[poly1305-ppc.s]=asm/poly1305-ppc.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+GENERATE[poly1305-ppcfp.s]=asm/poly1305-ppcfp.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+GENERATE[poly1305-armv4.S]=asm/poly1305-armv4.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+INCLUDE[poly1305-armv4.o]=..
+GENERATE[poly1305-armv8.S]=asm/poly1305-armv8.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+INCLUDE[poly1305-armv8.o]=..
+GENERATE[poly1305-mips.S]=asm/poly1305-mips.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+
+BEGINRAW[Makefile(unix)]
+{- $builddir -}/poly1305-%.S:	{- $sourcedir -}/asm/poly1305-%.pl
+	CC="$(CC)" $(PERL) $< $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $@
+ENDRAW[Makefile(unix)]
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/poly1305/poly1305.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/poly1305/poly1305.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..eec4d67
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/poly1305/poly1305.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1037 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+
+#include "internal/poly1305.h"
+
+typedef void (*poly1305_blocks_f) (void *ctx, const unsigned char *inp,
+                                   size_t len, unsigned int padbit);
+typedef void (*poly1305_emit_f) (void *ctx, unsigned char mac[16],
+                                 const unsigned int nonce[4]);
+
+struct poly1305_context {
+    double opaque[24];  /* large enough to hold internal state, declared
+                         * 'double' to ensure at least 64-bit invariant
+                         * alignment across all platforms and
+                         * configurations */
+    unsigned int nonce[4];
+    unsigned char data[POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE];
+    size_t num;
+    struct {
+        poly1305_blocks_f blocks;
+        poly1305_emit_f emit;
+    } func;
+};
+
+size_t Poly1305_ctx_size ()
+{
+    return sizeof(struct poly1305_context);
+}
+
+/* pick 32-bit unsigned integer in little endian order */
+static unsigned int U8TOU32(const unsigned char *p)
+{
+    return (((unsigned int)(p[0] & 0xff)) |
+            ((unsigned int)(p[1] & 0xff) << 8) |
+            ((unsigned int)(p[2] & 0xff) << 16) |
+            ((unsigned int)(p[3] & 0xff) << 24));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Implementations can be classified by amount of significant bits in
+ * words making up the multi-precision value, or in other words radix
+ * or base of numerical representation, e.g. base 2^64, base 2^32,
+ * base 2^26. Complementary characteristic is how wide is the result of
+ * multiplication of pair of digits, e.g. it would take 128 bits to
+ * accommodate multiplication result in base 2^64 case. These are used
+ * interchangeably. To describe implementation that is. But interface
+ * is designed to isolate this so that low-level primitives implemented
+ * in assembly can be self-contained/self-coherent.
+ */
+#ifndef POLY1305_ASM
+/*
+ * Even though there is __int128 reference implementation targeting
+ * 64-bit platforms provided below, it's not obvious that it's optimal
+ * choice for every one of them. Depending on instruction set overall
+ * amount of instructions can be comparable to one in __int64
+ * implementation. Amount of multiplication instructions would be lower,
+ * but not necessarily overall. And in out-of-order execution context,
+ * it is the latter that can be crucial...
+ *
+ * On related note. Poly1305 author, D. J. Bernstein, discusses and
+ * provides floating-point implementations of the algorithm in question.
+ * It made a lot of sense by the time of introduction, because most
+ * then-modern processors didn't have pipelined integer multiplier.
+ * [Not to mention that some had non-constant timing for integer
+ * multiplications.] Floating-point instructions on the other hand could
+ * be issued every cycle, which allowed to achieve better performance.
+ * Nowadays, with SIMD and/or out-or-order execution, shared or
+ * even emulated FPU, it's more complicated, and floating-point
+ * implementation is not necessarily optimal choice in every situation,
+ * rather contrary...
+ *
+ *                                              <appro@openssl.org>
+ */
+
+typedef unsigned int u32;
+
+/*
+ * poly1305_blocks processes a multiple of POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE blocks
+ * of |inp| no longer than |len|. Behaviour for |len| not divisible by
+ * block size is unspecified in general case, even though in reference
+ * implementation the trailing chunk is simply ignored. Per algorithm
+ * specification, every input block, complete or last partial, is to be
+ * padded with a bit past most significant byte. The latter kind is then
+ * padded with zeros till block size. This last partial block padding
+ * is caller(*)'s responsibility, and because of this the last partial
+ * block is always processed with separate call with |len| set to
+ * POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE and |padbit| to 0. In all other cases |padbit|
+ * should be set to 1 to perform implicit padding with 128th bit.
+ * poly1305_blocks does not actually check for this constraint though,
+ * it's caller(*)'s responsibility to comply.
+ *
+ * (*)  In the context "caller" is not application code, but higher
+ *      level Poly1305_* from this very module, so that quirks are
+ *      handled locally.
+ */
+static void
+poly1305_blocks(void *ctx, const unsigned char *inp, size_t len, u32 padbit);
+
+/*
+ * Type-agnostic "rip-off" from constant_time_locl.h
+ */
+# define CONSTANT_TIME_CARRY(a,b) ( \
+         (a ^ ((a ^ b) | ((a - b) ^ b))) >> (sizeof(a) * 8 - 1) \
+         )
+
+# if !defined(PEDANTIC) && \
+     (defined(__SIZEOF_INT128__) && __SIZEOF_INT128__==16) && \
+     (defined(__SIZEOF_LONG__) && __SIZEOF_LONG__==8)
+
+typedef unsigned long u64;
+typedef unsigned __int128 u128;
+
+typedef struct {
+    u64 h[3];
+    u64 r[2];
+} poly1305_internal;
+
+/* pick 32-bit unsigned integer in little endian order */
+static u64 U8TOU64(const unsigned char *p)
+{
+    return (((u64)(p[0] & 0xff)) |
+            ((u64)(p[1] & 0xff) << 8) |
+            ((u64)(p[2] & 0xff) << 16) |
+            ((u64)(p[3] & 0xff) << 24) |
+            ((u64)(p[4] & 0xff) << 32) |
+            ((u64)(p[5] & 0xff) << 40) |
+            ((u64)(p[6] & 0xff) << 48) |
+            ((u64)(p[7] & 0xff) << 56));
+}
+
+/* store a 32-bit unsigned integer in little endian */
+static void U64TO8(unsigned char *p, u64 v)
+{
+    p[0] = (unsigned char)((v) & 0xff);
+    p[1] = (unsigned char)((v >> 8) & 0xff);
+    p[2] = (unsigned char)((v >> 16) & 0xff);
+    p[3] = (unsigned char)((v >> 24) & 0xff);
+    p[4] = (unsigned char)((v >> 32) & 0xff);
+    p[5] = (unsigned char)((v >> 40) & 0xff);
+    p[6] = (unsigned char)((v >> 48) & 0xff);
+    p[7] = (unsigned char)((v >> 56) & 0xff);
+}
+
+static void poly1305_init(void *ctx, const unsigned char key[16])
+{
+    poly1305_internal *st = (poly1305_internal *) ctx;
+
+    /* h = 0 */
+    st->h[0] = 0;
+    st->h[1] = 0;
+    st->h[2] = 0;
+
+    /* r &= 0xffffffc0ffffffc0ffffffc0fffffff */
+    st->r[0] = U8TOU64(&key[0]) & 0x0ffffffc0fffffff;
+    st->r[1] = U8TOU64(&key[8]) & 0x0ffffffc0ffffffc;
+}
+
+static void
+poly1305_blocks(void *ctx, const unsigned char *inp, size_t len, u32 padbit)
+{
+    poly1305_internal *st = (poly1305_internal *)ctx;
+    u64 r0, r1;
+    u64 s1;
+    u64 h0, h1, h2, c;
+    u128 d0, d1;
+
+    r0 = st->r[0];
+    r1 = st->r[1];
+
+    s1 = r1 + (r1 >> 2);
+
+    h0 = st->h[0];
+    h1 = st->h[1];
+    h2 = st->h[2];
+
+    while (len >= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+        /* h += m[i] */
+        h0 = (u64)(d0 = (u128)h0 + U8TOU64(inp + 0));
+        h1 = (u64)(d1 = (u128)h1 + (d0 >> 64) + U8TOU64(inp + 8));
+        /*
+         * padbit can be zero only when original len was
+         * POLY1306_BLOCK_SIZE, but we don't check
+         */
+        h2 += (u64)(d1 >> 64) + padbit;
+
+        /* h *= r "%" p, where "%" stands for "partial remainder" */
+        d0 = ((u128)h0 * r0) +
+             ((u128)h1 * s1);
+        d1 = ((u128)h0 * r1) +
+             ((u128)h1 * r0) +
+             (h2 * s1);
+        h2 = (h2 * r0);
+
+        /* last reduction step: */
+        /* a) h2:h0 = h2<<128 + d1<<64 + d0 */
+        h0 = (u64)d0;
+        h1 = (u64)(d1 += d0 >> 64);
+        h2 += (u64)(d1 >> 64);
+        /* b) (h2:h0 += (h2:h0>>130) * 5) %= 2^130 */
+        c = (h2 >> 2) + (h2 & ~3UL);
+        h2 &= 3;
+        h0 += c;
+        h1 += (c = CONSTANT_TIME_CARRY(h0,c));
+        h2 += CONSTANT_TIME_CARRY(h1,c);
+        /*
+         * Occasional overflows to 3rd bit of h2 are taken care of
+         * "naturally". If after this point we end up at the top of
+         * this loop, then the overflow bit will be accounted for
+         * in next iteration. If we end up in poly1305_emit, then
+         * comparison to modulus below will still count as "carry
+         * into 131st bit", so that properly reduced value will be
+         * picked in conditional move.
+         */
+
+        inp += POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE;
+        len -= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE;
+    }
+
+    st->h[0] = h0;
+    st->h[1] = h1;
+    st->h[2] = h2;
+}
+
+static void poly1305_emit(void *ctx, unsigned char mac[16],
+                          const u32 nonce[4])
+{
+    poly1305_internal *st = (poly1305_internal *) ctx;
+    u64 h0, h1, h2;
+    u64 g0, g1, g2;
+    u128 t;
+    u64 mask;
+
+    h0 = st->h[0];
+    h1 = st->h[1];
+    h2 = st->h[2];
+
+    /* compare to modulus by computing h + -p */
+    g0 = (u64)(t = (u128)h0 + 5);
+    g1 = (u64)(t = (u128)h1 + (t >> 64));
+    g2 = h2 + (u64)(t >> 64);
+
+    /* if there was carry into 131st bit, h1:h0 = g1:g0 */
+    mask = 0 - (g2 >> 2);
+    g0 &= mask;
+    g1 &= mask;
+    mask = ~mask;
+    h0 = (h0 & mask) | g0;
+    h1 = (h1 & mask) | g1;
+
+    /* mac = (h + nonce) % (2^128) */
+    h0 = (u64)(t = (u128)h0 + nonce[0] + ((u64)nonce[1]<<32));
+    h1 = (u64)(t = (u128)h1 + nonce[2] + ((u64)nonce[3]<<32) + (t >> 64));
+
+    U64TO8(mac + 0, h0);
+    U64TO8(mac + 8, h1);
+}
+
+# else
+
+#  if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(__MINGW32__)
+typedef unsigned __int64 u64;
+#  elif defined(__arch64__)
+typedef unsigned long u64;
+#  else
+typedef unsigned long long u64;
+#  endif
+
+typedef struct {
+    u32 h[5];
+    u32 r[4];
+} poly1305_internal;
+
+/* store a 32-bit unsigned integer in little endian */
+static void U32TO8(unsigned char *p, unsigned int v)
+{
+    p[0] = (unsigned char)((v) & 0xff);
+    p[1] = (unsigned char)((v >> 8) & 0xff);
+    p[2] = (unsigned char)((v >> 16) & 0xff);
+    p[3] = (unsigned char)((v >> 24) & 0xff);
+}
+
+static void poly1305_init(void *ctx, const unsigned char key[16])
+{
+    poly1305_internal *st = (poly1305_internal *) ctx;
+
+    /* h = 0 */
+    st->h[0] = 0;
+    st->h[1] = 0;
+    st->h[2] = 0;
+    st->h[3] = 0;
+    st->h[4] = 0;
+
+    /* r &= 0xffffffc0ffffffc0ffffffc0fffffff */
+    st->r[0] = U8TOU32(&key[0]) & 0x0fffffff;
+    st->r[1] = U8TOU32(&key[4]) & 0x0ffffffc;
+    st->r[2] = U8TOU32(&key[8]) & 0x0ffffffc;
+    st->r[3] = U8TOU32(&key[12]) & 0x0ffffffc;
+}
+
+static void
+poly1305_blocks(void *ctx, const unsigned char *inp, size_t len, u32 padbit)
+{
+    poly1305_internal *st = (poly1305_internal *)ctx;
+    u32 r0, r1, r2, r3;
+    u32 s1, s2, s3;
+    u32 h0, h1, h2, h3, h4, c;
+    u64 d0, d1, d2, d3;
+
+    r0 = st->r[0];
+    r1 = st->r[1];
+    r2 = st->r[2];
+    r3 = st->r[3];
+
+    s1 = r1 + (r1 >> 2);
+    s2 = r2 + (r2 >> 2);
+    s3 = r3 + (r3 >> 2);
+
+    h0 = st->h[0];
+    h1 = st->h[1];
+    h2 = st->h[2];
+    h3 = st->h[3];
+    h4 = st->h[4];
+
+    while (len >= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+        /* h += m[i] */
+        h0 = (u32)(d0 = (u64)h0 + U8TOU32(inp + 0));
+        h1 = (u32)(d1 = (u64)h1 + (d0 >> 32) + U8TOU32(inp + 4));
+        h2 = (u32)(d2 = (u64)h2 + (d1 >> 32) + U8TOU32(inp + 8));
+        h3 = (u32)(d3 = (u64)h3 + (d2 >> 32) + U8TOU32(inp + 12));
+        h4 += (u32)(d3 >> 32) + padbit;
+
+        /* h *= r "%" p, where "%" stands for "partial remainder" */
+        d0 = ((u64)h0 * r0) +
+             ((u64)h1 * s3) +
+             ((u64)h2 * s2) +
+             ((u64)h3 * s1);
+        d1 = ((u64)h0 * r1) +
+             ((u64)h1 * r0) +
+             ((u64)h2 * s3) +
+             ((u64)h3 * s2) +
+             (h4 * s1);
+        d2 = ((u64)h0 * r2) +
+             ((u64)h1 * r1) +
+             ((u64)h2 * r0) +
+             ((u64)h3 * s3) +
+             (h4 * s2);
+        d3 = ((u64)h0 * r3) +
+             ((u64)h1 * r2) +
+             ((u64)h2 * r1) +
+             ((u64)h3 * r0) +
+             (h4 * s3);
+        h4 = (h4 * r0);
+
+        /* last reduction step: */
+        /* a) h4:h0 = h4<<128 + d3<<96 + d2<<64 + d1<<32 + d0 */
+        h0 = (u32)d0;
+        h1 = (u32)(d1 += d0 >> 32);
+        h2 = (u32)(d2 += d1 >> 32);
+        h3 = (u32)(d3 += d2 >> 32);
+        h4 += (u32)(d3 >> 32);
+        /* b) (h4:h0 += (h4:h0>>130) * 5) %= 2^130 */
+        c = (h4 >> 2) + (h4 & ~3U);
+        h4 &= 3;
+        h0 += c;
+        h1 += (c = CONSTANT_TIME_CARRY(h0,c));
+        h2 += (c = CONSTANT_TIME_CARRY(h1,c));
+        h3 += (c = CONSTANT_TIME_CARRY(h2,c));
+        h4 += CONSTANT_TIME_CARRY(h3,c);
+        /*
+         * Occasional overflows to 3rd bit of h4 are taken care of
+         * "naturally". If after this point we end up at the top of
+         * this loop, then the overflow bit will be accounted for
+         * in next iteration. If we end up in poly1305_emit, then
+         * comparison to modulus below will still count as "carry
+         * into 131st bit", so that properly reduced value will be
+         * picked in conditional move.
+         */
+
+        inp += POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE;
+        len -= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE;
+    }
+
+    st->h[0] = h0;
+    st->h[1] = h1;
+    st->h[2] = h2;
+    st->h[3] = h3;
+    st->h[4] = h4;
+}
+
+static void poly1305_emit(void *ctx, unsigned char mac[16],
+                          const u32 nonce[4])
+{
+    poly1305_internal *st = (poly1305_internal *) ctx;
+    u32 h0, h1, h2, h3, h4;
+    u32 g0, g1, g2, g3, g4;
+    u64 t;
+    u32 mask;
+
+    h0 = st->h[0];
+    h1 = st->h[1];
+    h2 = st->h[2];
+    h3 = st->h[3];
+    h4 = st->h[4];
+
+    /* compare to modulus by computing h + -p */
+    g0 = (u32)(t = (u64)h0 + 5);
+    g1 = (u32)(t = (u64)h1 + (t >> 32));
+    g2 = (u32)(t = (u64)h2 + (t >> 32));
+    g3 = (u32)(t = (u64)h3 + (t >> 32));
+    g4 = h4 + (u32)(t >> 32);
+
+    /* if there was carry into 131st bit, h3:h0 = g3:g0 */
+    mask = 0 - (g4 >> 2);
+    g0 &= mask;
+    g1 &= mask;
+    g2 &= mask;
+    g3 &= mask;
+    mask = ~mask;
+    h0 = (h0 & mask) | g0;
+    h1 = (h1 & mask) | g1;
+    h2 = (h2 & mask) | g2;
+    h3 = (h3 & mask) | g3;
+
+    /* mac = (h + nonce) % (2^128) */
+    h0 = (u32)(t = (u64)h0 + nonce[0]);
+    h1 = (u32)(t = (u64)h1 + (t >> 32) + nonce[1]);
+    h2 = (u32)(t = (u64)h2 + (t >> 32) + nonce[2]);
+    h3 = (u32)(t = (u64)h3 + (t >> 32) + nonce[3]);
+
+    U32TO8(mac + 0, h0);
+    U32TO8(mac + 4, h1);
+    U32TO8(mac + 8, h2);
+    U32TO8(mac + 12, h3);
+}
+# endif
+#else
+int poly1305_init(void *ctx, const unsigned char key[16], void *func);
+void poly1305_blocks(void *ctx, const unsigned char *inp, size_t len,
+                     unsigned int padbit);
+void poly1305_emit(void *ctx, unsigned char mac[16],
+                   const unsigned int nonce[4]);
+#endif
+
+void Poly1305_Init(POLY1305 *ctx, const unsigned char key[32])
+{
+    ctx->nonce[0] = U8TOU32(&key[16]);
+    ctx->nonce[1] = U8TOU32(&key[20]);
+    ctx->nonce[2] = U8TOU32(&key[24]);
+    ctx->nonce[3] = U8TOU32(&key[28]);
+
+#ifndef POLY1305_ASM
+    poly1305_init(ctx->opaque, key);
+#else
+    /*
+     * Unlike reference poly1305_init assembly counterpart is expected
+     * to return a value: non-zero if it initializes ctx->func, and zero
+     * otherwise. Latter is to simplify assembly in cases when there no
+     * multiple code paths to switch between.
+     */
+    if (!poly1305_init(ctx->opaque, key, &ctx->func)) {
+        ctx->func.blocks = poly1305_blocks;
+        ctx->func.emit = poly1305_emit;
+    }
+#endif
+
+    ctx->num = 0;
+
+}
+
+#ifdef POLY1305_ASM
+/*
+ * This "eclipses" poly1305_blocks and poly1305_emit, but it's
+ * conscious choice imposed by -Wshadow compiler warnings.
+ */
+# define poly1305_blocks (*poly1305_blocks_p)
+# define poly1305_emit   (*poly1305_emit_p)
+#endif
+
+void Poly1305_Update(POLY1305 *ctx, const unsigned char *inp, size_t len)
+{
+#ifdef POLY1305_ASM
+    /*
+     * As documented, poly1305_blocks is never called with input
+     * longer than single block and padbit argument set to 0. This
+     * property is fluently used in assembly modules to optimize
+     * padbit handling on loop boundary.
+     */
+    poly1305_blocks_f poly1305_blocks_p = ctx->func.blocks;
+#endif
+    size_t rem, num;
+
+    if ((num = ctx->num)) {
+        rem = POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE - num;
+        if (len >= rem) {
+            memcpy(ctx->data + num, inp, rem);
+            poly1305_blocks(ctx->opaque, ctx->data, POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE, 1);
+            inp += rem;
+            len -= rem;
+        } else {
+            /* Still not enough data to process a block. */
+            memcpy(ctx->data + num, inp, len);
+            ctx->num = num + len;
+            return;
+        }
+    }
+
+    rem = len % POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE;
+    len -= rem;
+
+    if (len >= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+        poly1305_blocks(ctx->opaque, inp, len, 1);
+        inp += len;
+    }
+
+    if (rem)
+        memcpy(ctx->data, inp, rem);
+
+    ctx->num = rem;
+}
+
+void Poly1305_Final(POLY1305 *ctx, unsigned char mac[16])
+{
+#ifdef POLY1305_ASM
+    poly1305_blocks_f poly1305_blocks_p = ctx->func.blocks;
+    poly1305_emit_f poly1305_emit_p = ctx->func.emit;
+#endif
+    size_t num;
+
+    if ((num = ctx->num)) {
+        ctx->data[num++] = 1;   /* pad bit */
+        while (num < POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE)
+            ctx->data[num++] = 0;
+        poly1305_blocks(ctx->opaque, ctx->data, POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE, 0);
+    }
+
+    poly1305_emit(ctx->opaque, mac, ctx->nonce);
+
+    /* zero out the state */
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx, sizeof(*ctx));
+}
+
+#ifdef SELFTEST
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+struct poly1305_test {
+    const char *inputhex;
+    const char *keyhex;
+    const char *outhex;
+};
+
+static const struct poly1305_test poly1305_tests[] = {
+    /*
+     * RFC7539
+     */
+    {
+     "43727970746f6772617068696320466f72756d2052657365617263682047726f"
+     "7570",
+     "85d6be7857556d337f4452fe42d506a8""0103808afb0db2fd4abff6af4149f51b",
+     "a8061dc1305136c6c22b8baf0c0127a9"
+    },
+    /*
+     * test vectors from "The Poly1305-AES message-authentication code"
+     */
+    {
+     "f3f6",
+     "851fc40c3467ac0be05cc20404f3f700""580b3b0f9447bb1e69d095b5928b6dbc",
+     "f4c633c3044fc145f84f335cb81953de"
+    },
+    {
+     "",
+     "a0f3080000f46400d0c7e9076c834403""dd3fab2251f11ac759f0887129cc2ee7",
+     "dd3fab2251f11ac759f0887129cc2ee7"
+    },
+    {
+     "663cea190ffb83d89593f3f476b6bc24d7e679107ea26adb8caf6652d0656136",
+     "48443d0bb0d21109c89a100b5ce2c208""83149c69b561dd88298a1798b10716ef",
+     "0ee1c16bb73f0f4fd19881753c01cdbe"
+    },
+    {
+     "ab0812724a7f1e342742cbed374d94d136c6b8795d45b3819830f2c04491faf0"
+     "990c62e48b8018b2c3e4a0fa3134cb67fa83e158c994d961c4cb21095c1bf9",
+     "12976a08c4426d0ce8a82407c4f48207""80f8c20aa71202d1e29179cbcb555a57",
+     "5154ad0d2cb26e01274fc51148491f1b"
+    },
+    /*
+     * self-generated vectors exercise "significant" lengths, such that
+     * are handled by different code paths
+     */
+    {
+     "ab0812724a7f1e342742cbed374d94d136c6b8795d45b3819830f2c04491faf0"
+     "990c62e48b8018b2c3e4a0fa3134cb67fa83e158c994d961c4cb21095c1bf9af",
+     "12976a08c4426d0ce8a82407c4f48207""80f8c20aa71202d1e29179cbcb555a57",
+     "812059a5da198637cac7c4a631bee466"
+    },
+    {
+     "ab0812724a7f1e342742cbed374d94d136c6b8795d45b3819830f2c04491faf0"
+     "990c62e48b8018b2c3e4a0fa3134cb67",
+     "12976a08c4426d0ce8a82407c4f48207""80f8c20aa71202d1e29179cbcb555a57",
+     "5b88d7f6228b11e2e28579a5c0c1f761"
+    },
+    {
+     "ab0812724a7f1e342742cbed374d94d136c6b8795d45b3819830f2c04491faf0"
+     "990c62e48b8018b2c3e4a0fa3134cb67fa83e158c994d961c4cb21095c1bf9af"
+     "663cea190ffb83d89593f3f476b6bc24d7e679107ea26adb8caf6652d0656136",
+     "12976a08c4426d0ce8a82407c4f48207""80f8c20aa71202d1e29179cbcb555a57",
+     "bbb613b2b6d753ba07395b916aaece15"
+    },
+    {
+     "ab0812724a7f1e342742cbed374d94d136c6b8795d45b3819830f2c04491faf0"
+     "990c62e48b8018b2c3e4a0fa3134cb67fa83e158c994d961c4cb21095c1bf9af"
+     "48443d0bb0d21109c89a100b5ce2c20883149c69b561dd88298a1798b10716ef"
+     "663cea190ffb83d89593f3f476b6bc24",
+     "12976a08c4426d0ce8a82407c4f48207""80f8c20aa71202d1e29179cbcb555a57",
+     "c794d7057d1778c4bbee0a39b3d97342"
+    },
+    {
+     "ab0812724a7f1e342742cbed374d94d136c6b8795d45b3819830f2c04491faf0"
+     "990c62e48b8018b2c3e4a0fa3134cb67fa83e158c994d961c4cb21095c1bf9af"
+     "48443d0bb0d21109c89a100b5ce2c20883149c69b561dd88298a1798b10716ef"
+     "663cea190ffb83d89593f3f476b6bc24d7e679107ea26adb8caf6652d0656136",
+     "12976a08c4426d0ce8a82407c4f48207""80f8c20aa71202d1e29179cbcb555a57",
+     "ffbcb9b371423152d7fca5ad042fbaa9"
+    },
+    {
+     "ab0812724a7f1e342742cbed374d94d136c6b8795d45b3819830f2c04491faf0"
+     "990c62e48b8018b2c3e4a0fa3134cb67fa83e158c994d961c4cb21095c1bf9af"
+     "48443d0bb0d21109c89a100b5ce2c20883149c69b561dd88298a1798b10716ef"
+     "663cea190ffb83d89593f3f476b6bc24d7e679107ea26adb8caf6652d0656136"
+     "812059a5da198637cac7c4a631bee466",
+     "12976a08c4426d0ce8a82407c4f48207""80f8c20aa71202d1e29179cbcb555a57",
+     "069ed6b8ef0f207b3e243bb1019fe632"
+    },
+    {
+     "ab0812724a7f1e342742cbed374d94d136c6b8795d45b3819830f2c04491faf0"
+     "990c62e48b8018b2c3e4a0fa3134cb67fa83e158c994d961c4cb21095c1bf9af"
+     "48443d0bb0d21109c89a100b5ce2c20883149c69b561dd88298a1798b10716ef"
+     "663cea190ffb83d89593f3f476b6bc24d7e679107ea26adb8caf6652d0656136"
+     "812059a5da198637cac7c4a631bee4665b88d7f6228b11e2e28579a5c0c1f761",
+     "12976a08c4426d0ce8a82407c4f48207""80f8c20aa71202d1e29179cbcb555a57",
+     "cca339d9a45fa2368c2c68b3a4179133"
+    },
+    {
+     "ab0812724a7f1e342742cbed374d94d136c6b8795d45b3819830f2c04491faf0"
+     "990c62e48b8018b2c3e4a0fa3134cb67fa83e158c994d961c4cb21095c1bf9af"
+     "48443d0bb0d21109c89a100b5ce2c20883149c69b561dd88298a1798b10716ef"
+     "663cea190ffb83d89593f3f476b6bc24d7e679107ea26adb8caf6652d0656136"
+     "812059a5da198637cac7c4a631bee4665b88d7f6228b11e2e28579a5c0c1f761"
+     "ab0812724a7f1e342742cbed374d94d136c6b8795d45b3819830f2c04491faf0"
+     "990c62e48b8018b2c3e4a0fa3134cb67fa83e158c994d961c4cb21095c1bf9af"
+     "48443d0bb0d21109c89a100b5ce2c20883149c69b561dd88298a1798b10716ef"
+     "663cea190ffb83d89593f3f476b6bc24d7e679107ea26adb8caf6652d0656136",
+     "12976a08c4426d0ce8a82407c4f48207""80f8c20aa71202d1e29179cbcb555a57",
+     "53f6e828a2f0fe0ee815bf0bd5841a34"
+    },
+    {
+     "ab0812724a7f1e342742cbed374d94d136c6b8795d45b3819830f2c04491faf0"
+     "990c62e48b8018b2c3e4a0fa3134cb67fa83e158c994d961c4cb21095c1bf9af"
+     "48443d0bb0d21109c89a100b5ce2c20883149c69b561dd88298a1798b10716ef"
+     "663cea190ffb83d89593f3f476b6bc24d7e679107ea26adb8caf6652d0656136"
+     "812059a5da198637cac7c4a631bee4665b88d7f6228b11e2e28579a5c0c1f761"
+     "ab0812724a7f1e342742cbed374d94d136c6b8795d45b3819830f2c04491faf0"
+     "990c62e48b8018b2c3e4a0fa3134cb67fa83e158c994d961c4cb21095c1bf9af"
+     "48443d0bb0d21109c89a100b5ce2c20883149c69b561dd88298a1798b10716ef"
+     "663cea190ffb83d89593f3f476b6bc24d7e679107ea26adb8caf6652d0656136"
+     "812059a5da198637cac7c4a631bee4665b88d7f6228b11e2e28579a5c0c1f761",
+     "12976a08c4426d0ce8a82407c4f48207""80f8c20aa71202d1e29179cbcb555a57",
+     "b846d44e9bbd53cedffbfbb6b7fa4933"
+    },
+    /*
+     * 4th power of the key spills to 131th bit in SIMD key setup
+     */
+    {
+     "ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff"
+     "ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff"
+     "ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff"
+     "ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff"
+     "ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff"
+     "ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff"
+     "ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff"
+     "ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff",
+     "ad628107e8351d0f2c231a05dc4a4106""00000000000000000000000000000000",
+     "07145a4c02fe5fa32036de68fabe9066"
+    },
+    {
+    /*
+     * poly1305_ieee754.c failed this in final stage
+     */
+     "842364e156336c0998b933a6237726180d9e3fdcbde4cd5d17080fc3beb49614"
+     "d7122c037463ff104d73f19c12704628d417c4c54a3fe30d3c3d7714382d43b0"
+     "382a50a5dee54be844b076e8df88201a1cd43b90eb21643fa96f39b518aa8340"
+     "c942ff3c31baf7c9bdbf0f31ae3fa096bf8c63030609829fe72e179824890bc8"
+     "e08c315c1cce2a83144dbbff09f74e3efc770b54d0984a8f19b14719e6363564"
+     "1d6b1eedf63efbf080e1783d32445412114c20de0b837a0dfa33d6b82825fff4"
+     "4c9a70ea54ce47f07df698e6b03323b53079364a5fc3e9dd034392bdde86dccd"
+     "da94321c5e44060489336cb65bf3989c36f7282c2f5d2b882c171e74",
+     "95d5c005503e510d8cd0aa072c4a4d06""6eabc52d11653df47fbf63ab198bcc26",
+     "f248312e578d9d58f8b7bb4d19105431"
+    },
+    /*
+     * AVX2 in poly1305-x86.pl failed this with 176+32 split
+     */
+    {
+    "248ac31085b6c2adaaa38259a0d7192c5c35d1bb4ef39ad94c38d1c82479e2dd"
+    "2159a077024b0589bc8a20101b506f0a1ad0bbab76e83a83f1b94be6beae74e8"
+    "74cab692c5963a75436b776121ec9f62399a3e66b2d22707dae81933b6277f3c"
+    "8516bcbe26dbbd86f373103d7cf4cad1888c952118fbfbd0d7b4bedc4ae4936a"
+    "ff91157e7aa47c54442ea78d6ac251d324a0fbe49d89cc3521b66d16e9c66a37"
+    "09894e4eb0a4eedc4ae19468e66b81f2"
+    "71351b1d921ea551047abcc6b87a901fde7db79fa1818c11336dbc07244a40eb",
+    "000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f""00000000000000000000000000000000",
+    "bc939bc5281480fa99c6d68c258ec42f"
+    },
+    /*
+     * test vectors from Google
+     */
+    {
+     "",
+     "c8afaac331ee372cd6082de134943b17""4710130e9f6fea8d72293850a667d86c",
+     "4710130e9f6fea8d72293850a667d86c",
+    },
+    {
+     "48656c6c6f20776f726c6421",
+     "746869732069732033322d6279746520""6b657920666f7220506f6c7931333035",
+     "a6f745008f81c916a20dcc74eef2b2f0"
+    },
+    {
+     "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000",
+     "746869732069732033322d6279746520""6b657920666f7220506f6c7931333035",
+     "49ec78090e481ec6c26b33b91ccc0307"
+    },
+    {
+     "89dab80b7717c1db5db437860a3f70218e93e1b8f461fb677f16f35f6f87e2a9"
+     "1c99bc3a47ace47640cc95c345be5ecca5a3523c35cc01893af0b64a62033427"
+     "0372ec12482d1b1e363561698a578b359803495bb4e2ef1930b17a5190b580f1"
+     "41300df30adbeca28f6427a8bc1a999fd51c554a017d095d8c3e3127daf9f595",
+     "2d773be37adb1e4d683bf0075e79c4ee""037918535a7f99ccb7040fb5f5f43aea",
+     "c85d15ed44c378d6b00e23064c7bcd51"
+    },
+    {
+     "000000000000000b1703030200000000"
+     "06db1f1f368d696a810a349c0c714c9a5e7850c2407d721acded95e018d7a852"
+     "66a6e1289cdb4aeb18da5ac8a2b0026d24a59ad485227f3eaedbb2e7e35e1c66"
+     "cd60f9abf716dcc9ac42682dd7dab287a7024c4eefc321cc0574e16793e37cec"
+     "03c5bda42b54c114a80b57af26416c7be742005e20855c73e21dc8e2edc9d435"
+     "cb6f6059280011c270b71570051c1c9b3052126620bc1e2730fa066c7a509d53"
+     "c60e5ae1b40aa6e39e49669228c90eecb4a50db32a50bc49e90b4f4b359a1dfd"
+     "11749cd3867fcf2fb7bb6cd4738f6a4ad6f7ca5058f7618845af9f020f6c3b96"
+     "7b8f4cd4a91e2813b507ae66f2d35c18284f7292186062e10fd5510d18775351"
+     "ef334e7634ab4743f5b68f49adcab384d3fd75f7390f4006ef2a295c8c7a076a"
+     "d54546cd25d2107fbe1436c840924aaebe5b370893cd63d1325b8616fc481088"
+     "6bc152c53221b6df373119393255ee72bcaa880174f1717f9184fa91646f17a2"
+     "4ac55d16bfddca9581a92eda479201f0edbf633600d6066d1ab36d5d2415d713"
+     "51bbcd608a25108d25641992c1f26c531cf9f90203bc4cc19f5927d834b0a471"
+     "16d3884bbb164b8ec883d1ac832e56b3918a98601a08d171881541d594db399c"
+     "6ae6151221745aec814c45b0b05b565436fd6f137aa10a0c0b643761dbd6f9a9"
+     "dcb99b1a6e690854ce0769cde39761d82fcdec15f0d92d7d8e94ade8eb83fbe0",
+     "99e5822dd4173c995e3dae0ddefb9774""3fde3b080134b39f76e9bf8d0e88d546",
+     "2637408fe13086ea73f971e3425e2820"
+    },
+    /*
+     * test vectors from Hanno Böck
+     */
+    {
+     "cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc80cccccccccccc"
+     "cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccecccccc"
+     "ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc5cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc"
+     "cccccccccce3cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc"
+     "ccccccccaccccccccccccccccccccce6cccccccccc000000afcccccccccccccc"
+     "ccccfffffff50000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
+     "00ffffffe7000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
+     "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000719205a8521d"
+     "fc",
+     "7f1b0264000000000000000000000000""0000000000000000cccccccccccccccc",
+     "8559b876eceed66eb37798c0457baff9"
+    },
+    {
+     "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa0000000000"
+     "00000000800264",
+     "e0001600000000000000000000000000""0000aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa",
+     "00bd1258978e205444c9aaaa82006fed"
+    },
+    {
+     "02fc",
+     "0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c""0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c",
+     "06120c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c"
+    },
+    {
+     "7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b"
+     "7b7b7b7b7b7b7a7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b"
+     "7b7b5c7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b"
+     "7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b6e7b007b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b"
+     "7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7a7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b"
+     "7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b5c7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b"
+     "7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b"
+     "7b6e7b001300000000b300000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
+     "f20000000000000000000000000000000000002000efff000900000000000000"
+     "0000000000100000000009000000640000000000000000000000001300000000"
+     "b300000000000000000000000000000000000000000000f20000000000000000"
+     "000000000000000000002000efff00090000000000000000007a000010000000"
+     "000900000064000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000fc",
+     "00ff0000000000000000000000000000""00000000001e00000000000000007b7b",
+     "33205bbf9e9f8f7212ab9e2ab9b7e4a5"
+    },
+    {
+     "7777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777"
+     "7777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777"
+     "777777777777777777777777ffffffe9e9acacacacacacacacacacac0000acac"
+     "ec0100acacac2caca2acacacacacacacacacacac64f2",
+     "0000007f0000007f0100002000000000""0000cf77777777777777777777777777",
+     "02ee7c8c546ddeb1a467e4c3981158b9"
+    },
+    /*
+     * test vectors from Andrew Moon
+     */
+    {   /* nacl */
+     "8e993b9f48681273c29650ba32fc76ce48332ea7164d96a4476fb8c531a1186a"
+     "c0dfc17c98dce87b4da7f011ec48c97271d2c20f9b928fe2270d6fb863d51738"
+     "b48eeee314a7cc8ab932164548e526ae90224368517acfeabd6bb3732bc0e9da"
+     "99832b61ca01b6de56244a9e88d5f9b37973f622a43d14a6599b1f654cb45a74"
+     "e355a5",
+     "eea6a7251c1e72916d11c2cb214d3c25""2539121d8e234e652d651fa4c8cff880",
+     "f3ffc7703f9400e52a7dfb4b3d3305d9"
+    },
+    {   /* wrap 2^130-5 */
+     "ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff",
+     "02000000000000000000000000000000""00000000000000000000000000000000",
+     "03000000000000000000000000000000"
+    },
+    {   /* wrap 2^128 */
+     "02000000000000000000000000000000",
+     "02000000000000000000000000000000""ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff",
+     "03000000000000000000000000000000"
+    },
+    {   /* limb carry */
+     "fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff"
+     "11000000000000000000000000000000",
+     "01000000000000000000000000000000""00000000000000000000000000000000",
+     "05000000000000000000000000000000"
+    },
+    {   /* 2^130-5 */
+     "fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffbfefefefefefefefefefefefefefefe"
+     "01010101010101010101010101010101",
+     "01000000000000000000000000000000""00000000000000000000000000000000",
+     "00000000000000000000000000000000"
+    },
+    {   /* 2^130-6 */
+     "fdffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff",
+     "02000000000000000000000000000000""00000000000000000000000000000000",
+     "faffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff"
+    },
+    {   /* 5*H+L reduction intermediate */
+     "e33594d7505e43b900000000000000003394d7505e4379cd0100000000000000"
+     "0000000000000000000000000000000001000000000000000000000000000000",
+     "01000000000000000400000000000000""00000000000000000000000000000000",
+     "14000000000000005500000000000000"
+    },
+    {   /* 5*H+L reduction final */
+     "e33594d7505e43b900000000000000003394d7505e4379cd0100000000000000"
+     "00000000000000000000000000000000",
+     "01000000000000000400000000000000""00000000000000000000000000000000",
+     "13000000000000000000000000000000"
+    }
+};
+
+static unsigned char hex_digit(char h)
+{
+    int i = OPENSSL_hexchar2int(h);
+
+    if (i < 0)
+        abort();
+    return i;
+}
+
+static void hex_decode(unsigned char *out, const char *hex)
+{
+    size_t j = 0;
+
+    while (*hex != 0) {
+        unsigned char v = hex_digit(*hex++);
+        v <<= 4;
+        v |= hex_digit(*hex++);
+        out[j++] = v;
+    }
+}
+
+static void hexdump(unsigned char *a, size_t len)
+{
+    size_t i;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
+        printf("%02x", a[i]);
+}
+
+int main()
+{
+    static const unsigned num_tests =
+        sizeof(poly1305_tests) / sizeof(struct poly1305_test);
+    unsigned i;
+    unsigned char key[32], out[16], expected[16];
+    POLY1305 poly1305;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < num_tests; i++) {
+        const struct poly1305_test *test = &poly1305_tests[i];
+        unsigned char *in;
+        size_t inlen = strlen(test->inputhex);
+
+        if (strlen(test->keyhex) != sizeof(key) * 2 ||
+            strlen(test->outhex) != sizeof(out) * 2 || (inlen & 1) == 1)
+            return 1;
+
+        inlen /= 2;
+
+        hex_decode(key, test->keyhex);
+        hex_decode(expected, test->outhex);
+
+        in = malloc(inlen);
+
+        hex_decode(in, test->inputhex);
+
+        Poly1305_Init(&poly1305, key);
+        Poly1305_Update(&poly1305, in, inlen);
+        Poly1305_Final(&poly1305, out);
+
+        if (memcmp(out, expected, sizeof(expected)) != 0) {
+            printf("Poly1305 test #%d failed.\n", i);
+            printf("got:      ");
+            hexdump(out, sizeof(out));
+            printf("\nexpected: ");
+            hexdump(expected, sizeof(expected));
+            printf("\n");
+            return 1;
+        }
+
+        if (inlen > 16) {
+            Poly1305_Init(&poly1305, key);
+            Poly1305_Update(&poly1305, in, 1);
+            Poly1305_Update(&poly1305, in+1, inlen-1);
+            Poly1305_Final(&poly1305, out);
+
+            if (memcmp(out, expected, sizeof(expected)) != 0) {
+                printf("Poly1305 test #%d/1+(N-1) failed.\n", i);
+                printf("got:      ");
+                hexdump(out, sizeof(out));
+                printf("\nexpected: ");
+                hexdump(expected, sizeof(expected));
+                printf("\n");
+                return 1;
+            }
+        }
+
+        if (inlen > 32) {
+            size_t half = inlen / 2;
+
+            Poly1305_Init(&poly1305, key);
+            Poly1305_Update(&poly1305, in, half);
+            Poly1305_Update(&poly1305, in+half, inlen-half);
+            Poly1305_Final(&poly1305, out);
+
+            if (memcmp(out, expected, sizeof(expected)) != 0) {
+                printf("Poly1305 test #%d/2 failed.\n", i);
+                printf("got:      ");
+                hexdump(out, sizeof(out));
+                printf("\nexpected: ");
+                hexdump(expected, sizeof(expected));
+                printf("\n");
+                return 1;
+            }
+
+            for (half = 16; half < inlen; half += 16) {
+                Poly1305_Init(&poly1305, key);
+                Poly1305_Update(&poly1305, in, half);
+                Poly1305_Update(&poly1305, in+half, inlen-half);
+                Poly1305_Final(&poly1305, out);
+
+                if (memcmp(out, expected, sizeof(expected)) != 0) {
+                    printf("Poly1305 test #%d/%d+%d failed.\n",
+                                           i, half, inlen-half);
+                    printf("got:      ");
+                    hexdump(out, sizeof(out));
+                    printf("\nexpected: ");
+                    hexdump(expected, sizeof(expected));
+                    printf("\n");
+                    return 1;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
+        free(in);
+    }
+
+    printf("PASS\n");
+
+# ifdef OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ
+    {
+        unsigned char buf[8192];
+        unsigned long long stopwatch;
+        unsigned long long OPENSSL_rdtsc();
+
+        memset (buf,0x55,sizeof(buf));
+        memset (key,0xAA,sizeof(key));
+
+        Poly1305_Init(&poly1305, key);
+
+        for (i=0;i<100000;i++)
+            Poly1305_Update(&poly1305,buf,sizeof(buf));
+
+        stopwatch = OPENSSL_rdtsc();
+        for (i=0;i<10000;i++)
+            Poly1305_Update(&poly1305,buf,sizeof(buf));
+        stopwatch = OPENSSL_rdtsc() - stopwatch;
+
+        printf("%g\n",stopwatch/(double)(i*sizeof(buf)));
+
+        stopwatch = OPENSSL_rdtsc();
+        for (i=0;i<10000;i++) {
+            Poly1305_Init(&poly1305, key);
+            Poly1305_Update(&poly1305,buf,16);
+            Poly1305_Final(&poly1305,buf);
+        }
+        stopwatch = OPENSSL_rdtsc() - stopwatch;
+
+        printf("%g\n",stopwatch/(double)(i));
+    }
+# endif
+    return 0;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/poly1305/poly1305_ieee754.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/poly1305/poly1305_ieee754.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..08a5b58
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/poly1305/poly1305_ieee754.c
@@ -0,0 +1,472 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * This module is meant to be used as template for non-x87 floating-
+ * point assembly modules. The template itself is x86_64-specific
+ * though, as it was debugged on x86_64. So that implementor would
+ * have to recognize platform-specific parts, UxTOy and inline asm,
+ * and act accordingly.
+ *
+ * Huh? x86_64-specific code as template for non-x87? Note seven, which
+ * is not a typo, but reference to 80-bit precision. This module on the
+ * other hand relies on 64-bit precision operations, which are default
+ * for x86_64 code. And since we are at it, just for sense of it,
+ * large-block performance in cycles per processed byte for *this* code
+ * is:
+ *			gcc-4.8		icc-15.0	clang-3.4(*)
+ *
+ * Westmere		4.96		5.09		4.37
+ * Sandy Bridge		4.95		4.90		4.17
+ * Haswell		4.92		4.87		3.78
+ * Bulldozer		4.67		4.49		4.68
+ * VIA Nano		7.07		7.05		5.98
+ * Silvermont		10.6		9.61		12.6
+ *
+ * (*)	clang managed to discover parallelism and deployed SIMD;
+ *
+ * And for range of other platforms with unspecified gcc versions:
+ *
+ * Freescale e300	12.5
+ * PPC74x0		10.8
+ * POWER6		4.92
+ * POWER7		4.50
+ * POWER8		4.10
+ *
+ * z10			11.2
+ * z196+		7.30
+ *
+ * UltraSPARC III	16.0
+ * SPARC T4		16.1
+ */
+
+#if !(defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2)
+# error "this is gcc-specific template"
+#endif
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+typedef unsigned char u8;
+typedef unsigned int u32;
+typedef unsigned long long u64;
+typedef union { double d; u64 u; } elem64;
+
+#define TWO(p)		((double)(1ULL<<(p)))
+#define TWO0		TWO(0)
+#define TWO32		TWO(32)
+#define TWO64		(TWO32*TWO(32))
+#define TWO96		(TWO64*TWO(32))
+#define TWO130		(TWO96*TWO(34))
+
+#define EXP(p)		((1023ULL+(p))<<52)
+
+#if defined(__x86_64__) || (defined(__PPC__) && defined(__LITTLE_ENDIAN__))
+# define U8TOU32(p)	(*(const u32 *)(p))
+# define U32TO8(p,v)	(*(u32 *)(p) = (v))
+#elif defined(__PPC__)
+# define U8TOU32(p)	({u32 ret; asm ("lwbrx	%0,0,%1":"=r"(ret):"b"(p)); ret; })
+# define U32TO8(p,v)	asm ("stwbrx %0,0,%1"::"r"(v),"b"(p):"memory")
+#elif defined(__s390x__)
+# define U8TOU32(p)	({u32 ret; asm ("lrv	%0,%1":"=d"(ret):"m"(*(u32 *)(p))); ret; })
+# define U32TO8(p,v)	asm ("strv	%1,%0":"=m"(*(u32 *)(p)):"d"(v))
+#endif
+
+#ifndef U8TOU32
+# define U8TOU32(p)	((u32)(p)[0]     | (u32)(p)[1]<<8 | \
+			 (u32)(p)[2]<<16 | (u32)(p)[3]<<24  )
+#endif
+#ifndef U32TO8
+# define U32TO8(p,v)	((p)[0] = (u8)(v),       (p)[1] = (u8)((v)>>8), \
+			 (p)[2] = (u8)((v)>>16), (p)[3] = (u8)((v)>>24) )
+#endif
+
+typedef struct {
+    elem64 h[4];
+    double r[8];
+    double s[6];
+} poly1305_internal;
+
+/* "round toward zero (truncate), mask all exceptions" */
+#if defined(__x86_64__)
+static const u32 mxcsr = 0x7f80;
+#elif defined(__PPC__)
+static const u64 one = 1;
+#elif defined(__s390x__)
+static const u32 fpc = 1;
+#elif defined(__sparc__)
+static const u64 fsr = 1ULL<<30;
+#else
+#error "unrecognized platform"
+#endif
+
+int poly1305_init(void *ctx, const unsigned char key[16])
+{
+    poly1305_internal *st = (poly1305_internal *) ctx;
+    elem64 r0, r1, r2, r3;
+
+    /* h = 0, biased */
+#if 0
+    st->h[0].d = TWO(52)*TWO0;
+    st->h[1].d = TWO(52)*TWO32;
+    st->h[2].d = TWO(52)*TWO64;
+    st->h[3].d = TWO(52)*TWO96;
+#else
+    st->h[0].u = EXP(52+0);
+    st->h[1].u = EXP(52+32);
+    st->h[2].u = EXP(52+64);
+    st->h[3].u = EXP(52+96);
+#endif
+
+    if (key) {
+        /*
+         * set "truncate" rounding mode
+         */
+#if defined(__x86_64__)
+        u32 mxcsr_orig;
+
+        asm volatile ("stmxcsr	%0":"=m"(mxcsr_orig));
+        asm volatile ("ldmxcsr	%0"::"m"(mxcsr));
+#elif defined(__PPC__)
+        double fpscr_orig, fpscr = *(double *)&one;
+
+        asm volatile ("mffs	%0":"=f"(fpscr_orig));
+        asm volatile ("mtfsf	255,%0"::"f"(fpscr));
+#elif defined(__s390x__)
+        u32 fpc_orig;
+
+        asm volatile ("stfpc	%0":"=m"(fpc_orig));
+        asm volatile ("lfpc	%0"::"m"(fpc));
+#elif defined(__sparc__)
+        u64 fsr_orig;
+
+        asm volatile ("stx	%%fsr,%0":"=m"(fsr_orig));
+        asm volatile ("ldx	%0,%%fsr"::"m"(fsr));
+#endif
+
+        /* r &= 0xffffffc0ffffffc0ffffffc0fffffff */
+        r0.u = EXP(52+0)  | (U8TOU32(&key[0])  & 0x0fffffff);
+        r1.u = EXP(52+32) | (U8TOU32(&key[4])  & 0x0ffffffc);
+        r2.u = EXP(52+64) | (U8TOU32(&key[8])  & 0x0ffffffc);
+        r3.u = EXP(52+96) | (U8TOU32(&key[12]) & 0x0ffffffc);
+
+        st->r[0] = r0.d - TWO(52)*TWO0;
+        st->r[2] = r1.d - TWO(52)*TWO32;
+        st->r[4] = r2.d - TWO(52)*TWO64;
+        st->r[6] = r3.d - TWO(52)*TWO96;
+
+        st->s[0] = st->r[2] * (5.0/TWO130);
+        st->s[2] = st->r[4] * (5.0/TWO130);
+        st->s[4] = st->r[6] * (5.0/TWO130);
+
+        /*
+         * base 2^32 -> base 2^16
+         */
+        st->r[1] = (st->r[0] + TWO(52)*TWO(16)*TWO0) -
+                               TWO(52)*TWO(16)*TWO0;
+        st->r[0] -= st->r[1];
+
+        st->r[3] = (st->r[2] + TWO(52)*TWO(16)*TWO32) -
+                               TWO(52)*TWO(16)*TWO32;
+        st->r[2] -= st->r[3];
+
+        st->r[5] = (st->r[4] + TWO(52)*TWO(16)*TWO64) -
+                               TWO(52)*TWO(16)*TWO64;
+        st->r[4] -= st->r[5];
+
+        st->r[7] = (st->r[6] + TWO(52)*TWO(16)*TWO96) -
+                               TWO(52)*TWO(16)*TWO96;
+        st->r[6] -= st->r[7];
+
+        st->s[1] = (st->s[0] + TWO(52)*TWO(16)*TWO0/TWO96) -
+                               TWO(52)*TWO(16)*TWO0/TWO96;
+        st->s[0] -= st->s[1];
+
+        st->s[3] = (st->s[2] + TWO(52)*TWO(16)*TWO32/TWO96) -
+                               TWO(52)*TWO(16)*TWO32/TWO96;
+        st->s[2] -= st->s[3];
+
+        st->s[5] = (st->s[4] + TWO(52)*TWO(16)*TWO64/TWO96) -
+                               TWO(52)*TWO(16)*TWO64/TWO96;
+        st->s[4] -= st->s[5];
+
+        /*
+         * restore original FPU control register
+         */
+#if defined(__x86_64__)
+        asm volatile ("ldmxcsr	%0"::"m"(mxcsr_orig));
+#elif defined(__PPC__)
+        asm volatile ("mtfsf	255,%0"::"f"(fpscr_orig));
+#elif defined(__s390x__)
+        asm volatile ("lfpc	%0"::"m"(fpc_orig));
+#elif defined(__sparc__)
+        asm volatile ("ldx	%0,%%fsr"::"m"(fsr_orig));
+#endif
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+void poly1305_blocks(void *ctx, const unsigned char *inp, size_t len,
+                     int padbit)
+{
+    poly1305_internal *st = (poly1305_internal *)ctx;
+    elem64 in0, in1, in2, in3;
+    u64 pad = (u64)padbit<<32;
+
+    double x0, x1, x2, x3;
+    double h0lo, h0hi, h1lo, h1hi, h2lo, h2hi, h3lo, h3hi;
+    double c0lo, c0hi, c1lo, c1hi, c2lo, c2hi, c3lo, c3hi;
+
+    const double r0lo = st->r[0];
+    const double r0hi = st->r[1];
+    const double r1lo = st->r[2];
+    const double r1hi = st->r[3];
+    const double r2lo = st->r[4];
+    const double r2hi = st->r[5];
+    const double r3lo = st->r[6];
+    const double r3hi = st->r[7];
+
+    const double s1lo = st->s[0];
+    const double s1hi = st->s[1];
+    const double s2lo = st->s[2];
+    const double s2hi = st->s[3];
+    const double s3lo = st->s[4];
+    const double s3hi = st->s[5];
+
+    /*
+     * set "truncate" rounding mode
+     */
+#if defined(__x86_64__)
+    u32 mxcsr_orig;
+
+    asm volatile ("stmxcsr	%0":"=m"(mxcsr_orig));
+    asm volatile ("ldmxcsr	%0"::"m"(mxcsr));
+#elif defined(__PPC__)
+    double fpscr_orig, fpscr = *(double *)&one;
+
+    asm volatile ("mffs		%0":"=f"(fpscr_orig));
+    asm volatile ("mtfsf	255,%0"::"f"(fpscr));
+#elif defined(__s390x__)
+    u32 fpc_orig;
+
+    asm volatile ("stfpc	%0":"=m"(fpc_orig));
+    asm volatile ("lfpc		%0"::"m"(fpc));
+#elif defined(__sparc__)
+    u64 fsr_orig;
+
+    asm volatile ("stx		%%fsr,%0":"=m"(fsr_orig));
+    asm volatile ("ldx		%0,%%fsr"::"m"(fsr));
+#endif
+
+    /*
+     * load base 2^32 and de-bias
+     */
+    h0lo = st->h[0].d - TWO(52)*TWO0;
+    h1lo = st->h[1].d - TWO(52)*TWO32;
+    h2lo = st->h[2].d - TWO(52)*TWO64;
+    h3lo = st->h[3].d - TWO(52)*TWO96;
+
+#ifdef __clang__
+    h0hi = 0;
+    h1hi = 0;
+    h2hi = 0;
+    h3hi = 0;
+#else
+    in0.u = EXP(52+0)  | U8TOU32(&inp[0]);
+    in1.u = EXP(52+32) | U8TOU32(&inp[4]);
+    in2.u = EXP(52+64) | U8TOU32(&inp[8]);
+    in3.u = EXP(52+96) | U8TOU32(&inp[12]) | pad;
+
+    x0 = in0.d - TWO(52)*TWO0;
+    x1 = in1.d - TWO(52)*TWO32;
+    x2 = in2.d - TWO(52)*TWO64;
+    x3 = in3.d - TWO(52)*TWO96;
+
+    x0 += h0lo;
+    x1 += h1lo;
+    x2 += h2lo;
+    x3 += h3lo;
+
+    goto fast_entry;
+#endif
+
+    do {
+        in0.u = EXP(52+0)  | U8TOU32(&inp[0]);
+        in1.u = EXP(52+32) | U8TOU32(&inp[4]);
+        in2.u = EXP(52+64) | U8TOU32(&inp[8]);
+        in3.u = EXP(52+96) | U8TOU32(&inp[12]) | pad;
+
+        x0 = in0.d - TWO(52)*TWO0;
+        x1 = in1.d - TWO(52)*TWO32;
+        x2 = in2.d - TWO(52)*TWO64;
+        x3 = in3.d - TWO(52)*TWO96;
+
+        /*
+         * note that there are multiple ways to accumulate input, e.g.
+         * one can as well accumulate to h0lo-h1lo-h1hi-h2hi...
+         */
+        h0lo += x0;
+        h0hi += x1;
+        h2lo += x2;
+        h2hi += x3;
+
+        /*
+         * carries that cross 32n-bit (and 130-bit) boundaries
+         */
+        c0lo = (h0lo + TWO(52)*TWO32)  - TWO(52)*TWO32;
+        c1lo = (h1lo + TWO(52)*TWO64)  - TWO(52)*TWO64;
+        c2lo = (h2lo + TWO(52)*TWO96)  - TWO(52)*TWO96;
+        c3lo = (h3lo + TWO(52)*TWO130) - TWO(52)*TWO130;
+
+        c0hi = (h0hi + TWO(52)*TWO32)  - TWO(52)*TWO32;
+        c1hi = (h1hi + TWO(52)*TWO64)  - TWO(52)*TWO64;
+        c2hi = (h2hi + TWO(52)*TWO96)  - TWO(52)*TWO96;
+        c3hi = (h3hi + TWO(52)*TWO130) - TWO(52)*TWO130;
+
+        /*
+         * base 2^48 -> base 2^32 with last reduction step
+         */
+        x1 =  (h1lo - c1lo) + c0lo;
+        x2 =  (h2lo - c2lo) + c1lo;
+        x3 =  (h3lo - c3lo) + c2lo;
+        x0 =  (h0lo - c0lo) + c3lo * (5.0/TWO130);
+
+        x1 += (h1hi - c1hi) + c0hi;
+        x2 += (h2hi - c2hi) + c1hi;
+        x3 += (h3hi - c3hi) + c2hi;
+        x0 += (h0hi - c0hi) + c3hi * (5.0/TWO130);
+
+#ifndef __clang__
+    fast_entry:
+#endif
+	/*
+	 * base 2^32 * base 2^16 = base 2^48
+	 */
+        h0lo = s3lo * x1 + s2lo * x2 + s1lo * x3 + r0lo * x0;
+        h1lo = r0lo * x1 + s3lo * x2 + s2lo * x3 + r1lo * x0;
+        h2lo = r1lo * x1 + r0lo * x2 + s3lo * x3 + r2lo * x0;
+        h3lo = r2lo * x1 + r1lo * x2 + r0lo * x3 + r3lo * x0;
+
+        h0hi = s3hi * x1 + s2hi * x2 + s1hi * x3 + r0hi * x0;
+        h1hi = r0hi * x1 + s3hi * x2 + s2hi * x3 + r1hi * x0;
+        h2hi = r1hi * x1 + r0hi * x2 + s3hi * x3 + r2hi * x0;
+        h3hi = r2hi * x1 + r1hi * x2 + r0hi * x3 + r3hi * x0;
+
+        inp += 16;
+        len -= 16;
+
+    } while (len >= 16);
+
+    /*
+     * carries that cross 32n-bit (and 130-bit) boundaries
+     */
+    c0lo = (h0lo + TWO(52)*TWO32)  - TWO(52)*TWO32;
+    c1lo = (h1lo + TWO(52)*TWO64)  - TWO(52)*TWO64;
+    c2lo = (h2lo + TWO(52)*TWO96)  - TWO(52)*TWO96;
+    c3lo = (h3lo + TWO(52)*TWO130) - TWO(52)*TWO130;
+
+    c0hi = (h0hi + TWO(52)*TWO32)  - TWO(52)*TWO32;
+    c1hi = (h1hi + TWO(52)*TWO64)  - TWO(52)*TWO64;
+    c2hi = (h2hi + TWO(52)*TWO96)  - TWO(52)*TWO96;
+    c3hi = (h3hi + TWO(52)*TWO130) - TWO(52)*TWO130;
+
+    /*
+     * base 2^48 -> base 2^32 with last reduction step
+     */
+    x1 =  (h1lo - c1lo) + c0lo;
+    x2 =  (h2lo - c2lo) + c1lo;
+    x3 =  (h3lo - c3lo) + c2lo;
+    x0 =  (h0lo - c0lo) + c3lo * (5.0/TWO130);
+
+    x1 += (h1hi - c1hi) + c0hi;
+    x2 += (h2hi - c2hi) + c1hi;
+    x3 += (h3hi - c3hi) + c2hi;
+    x0 += (h0hi - c0hi) + c3hi * (5.0/TWO130);
+
+    /*
+     * store base 2^32, with bias
+     */
+    st->h[1].d = x1 + TWO(52)*TWO32;
+    st->h[2].d = x2 + TWO(52)*TWO64;
+    st->h[3].d = x3 + TWO(52)*TWO96;
+    st->h[0].d = x0 + TWO(52)*TWO0;
+
+    /*
+     * restore original FPU control register
+     */
+#if defined(__x86_64__)
+    asm volatile ("ldmxcsr	%0"::"m"(mxcsr_orig));
+#elif defined(__PPC__)
+    asm volatile ("mtfsf	255,%0"::"f"(fpscr_orig));
+#elif defined(__s390x__)
+    asm volatile ("lfpc		%0"::"m"(fpc_orig));
+#elif defined(__sparc__)
+    asm volatile ("ldx		%0,%%fsr"::"m"(fsr_orig));
+#endif
+}
+
+void poly1305_emit(void *ctx, unsigned char mac[16], const u32 nonce[4])
+{
+    poly1305_internal *st = (poly1305_internal *) ctx;
+    u64 h0, h1, h2, h3, h4;
+    u32 g0, g1, g2, g3, g4;
+    u64 t;
+    u32 mask;
+
+    /*
+     * thanks to bias masking exponent gives integer result
+     */
+    h0 = st->h[0].u & 0x000fffffffffffffULL;
+    h1 = st->h[1].u & 0x000fffffffffffffULL;
+    h2 = st->h[2].u & 0x000fffffffffffffULL;
+    h3 = st->h[3].u & 0x000fffffffffffffULL;
+
+    /*
+     * can be partially reduced, so reduce...
+     */
+    h4 = h3>>32; h3 &= 0xffffffffU;
+    g4 = h4&-4;
+    h4 &= 3;
+    g4 += g4>>2;
+
+    h0 += g4;
+    h1 += h0>>32; h0 &= 0xffffffffU;
+    h2 += h1>>32; h1 &= 0xffffffffU;
+    h3 += h2>>32; h2 &= 0xffffffffU;
+
+    /* compute h + -p */
+    g0 = (u32)(t = h0 + 5);
+    g1 = (u32)(t = h1 + (t >> 32));
+    g2 = (u32)(t = h2 + (t >> 32));
+    g3 = (u32)(t = h3 + (t >> 32));
+    g4 = h4 + (u32)(t >> 32);
+
+    /* if there was carry, select g0-g3 */
+    mask = 0 - (g4 >> 2);
+    g0 &= mask;
+    g1 &= mask;
+    g2 &= mask;
+    g3 &= mask;
+    mask = ~mask;
+    g0 |= (h0 & mask);
+    g1 |= (h1 & mask);
+    g2 |= (h2 & mask);
+    g3 |= (h3 & mask);
+
+    /* mac = (h + nonce) % (2^128) */
+    g0 = (u32)(t = (u64)g0 + nonce[0]);
+    g1 = (u32)(t = (u64)g1 + (t >> 32) + nonce[1]);
+    g2 = (u32)(t = (u64)g2 + (t >> 32) + nonce[2]);
+    g3 = (u32)(t = (u64)g3 + (t >> 32) + nonce[3]);
+
+    U32TO8(mac + 0, g0);
+    U32TO8(mac + 4, g1);
+    U32TO8(mac + 8, g2);
+    U32TO8(mac + 12, g3);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ppc_arch.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ppc_arch.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..65cf96f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ppc_arch.h
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2014-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_PPC_ARCH_H
+# define HEADER_PPC_ARCH_H
+
+extern unsigned int OPENSSL_ppccap_P;
+
+/*
+ * Flags' usage can appear ambiguous, because they are set rather
+ * to reflect OpenSSL performance preferences than actual processor
+ * capabilities.
+ */
+# define PPC_FPU64       (1<<0)
+# define PPC_ALTIVEC     (1<<1)
+# define PPC_CRYPTO207   (1<<2)
+# define PPC_FPU         (1<<3)
+# define PPC_MADD300     (1<<4)
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ppccap.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ppccap.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3baf9f7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ppccap.c
@@ -0,0 +1,343 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2009-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <setjmp.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#if defined(__linux) || defined(_AIX)
+# include <sys/utsname.h>
+#endif
+#if defined(_AIX53)     /* defined even on post-5.3 */
+# include <sys/systemcfg.h>
+# if !defined(__power_set)
+#  define __power_set(a) (_system_configuration.implementation & (a))
+# endif
+#endif
+#if defined(__APPLE__) && defined(__MACH__)
+# include <sys/types.h>
+# include <sys/sysctl.h>
+#endif
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+#include "ppc_arch.h"
+
+unsigned int OPENSSL_ppccap_P = 0;
+
+static sigset_t all_masked;
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT
+int bn_mul_mont(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp,
+                const BN_ULONG *np, const BN_ULONG *n0, int num)
+{
+    int bn_mul_mont_fpu64(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap,
+                          const BN_ULONG *bp, const BN_ULONG *np,
+                          const BN_ULONG *n0, int num);
+    int bn_mul_mont_int(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp,
+                        const BN_ULONG *np, const BN_ULONG *n0, int num);
+
+    if (sizeof(size_t) == 4) {
+# if 1 || (defined(__APPLE__) && defined(__MACH__))
+        if (num >= 8 && (num & 3) == 0 && (OPENSSL_ppccap_P & PPC_FPU64))
+            return bn_mul_mont_fpu64(rp, ap, bp, np, n0, num);
+# else
+        /*
+         * boundary of 32 was experimentally determined on Linux 2.6.22,
+         * might have to be adjusted on AIX...
+         */
+        if (num >= 32 && (num & 3) == 0 && (OPENSSL_ppccap_P & PPC_FPU64)) {
+            sigset_t oset;
+            int ret;
+
+            sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &all_masked, &oset);
+            ret = bn_mul_mont_fpu64(rp, ap, bp, np, n0, num);
+            sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &oset, NULL);
+
+            return ret;
+        }
+# endif
+    } else if ((OPENSSL_ppccap_P & PPC_FPU64))
+        /*
+         * this is a "must" on POWER6, but run-time detection is not
+         * implemented yet...
+         */
+        return bn_mul_mont_fpu64(rp, ap, bp, np, n0, num);
+
+    return bn_mul_mont_int(rp, ap, bp, np, n0, num);
+}
+#endif
+
+void sha256_block_p8(void *ctx, const void *inp, size_t len);
+void sha256_block_ppc(void *ctx, const void *inp, size_t len);
+void sha256_block_data_order(void *ctx, const void *inp, size_t len)
+{
+    OPENSSL_ppccap_P & PPC_CRYPTO207 ? sha256_block_p8(ctx, inp, len) :
+        sha256_block_ppc(ctx, inp, len);
+}
+
+void sha512_block_p8(void *ctx, const void *inp, size_t len);
+void sha512_block_ppc(void *ctx, const void *inp, size_t len);
+void sha512_block_data_order(void *ctx, const void *inp, size_t len)
+{
+    OPENSSL_ppccap_P & PPC_CRYPTO207 ? sha512_block_p8(ctx, inp, len) :
+        sha512_block_ppc(ctx, inp, len);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CHACHA
+void ChaCha20_ctr32_int(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *inp,
+                        size_t len, const unsigned int key[8],
+                        const unsigned int counter[4]);
+void ChaCha20_ctr32_vmx(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *inp,
+                        size_t len, const unsigned int key[8],
+                        const unsigned int counter[4]);
+void ChaCha20_ctr32(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *inp,
+                    size_t len, const unsigned int key[8],
+                    const unsigned int counter[4])
+{
+    OPENSSL_ppccap_P & PPC_ALTIVEC
+        ? ChaCha20_ctr32_vmx(out, inp, len, key, counter)
+        : ChaCha20_ctr32_int(out, inp, len, key, counter);
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POLY1305
+void poly1305_init_int(void *ctx, const unsigned char key[16]);
+void poly1305_blocks(void *ctx, const unsigned char *inp, size_t len,
+                         unsigned int padbit);
+void poly1305_emit(void *ctx, unsigned char mac[16],
+                       const unsigned int nonce[4]);
+void poly1305_init_fpu(void *ctx, const unsigned char key[16]);
+void poly1305_blocks_fpu(void *ctx, const unsigned char *inp, size_t len,
+                         unsigned int padbit);
+void poly1305_emit_fpu(void *ctx, unsigned char mac[16],
+                       const unsigned int nonce[4]);
+int poly1305_init(void *ctx, const unsigned char key[16], void *func[2])
+{
+    if (sizeof(size_t) == 4 && (OPENSSL_ppccap_P & PPC_FPU)) {
+        poly1305_init_fpu(ctx, key);
+        func[0] = poly1305_blocks_fpu;
+        func[1] = poly1305_emit_fpu;
+    } else {
+        poly1305_init_int(ctx, key);
+        func[0] = poly1305_blocks;
+        func[1] = poly1305_emit;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+#endif
+
+static sigjmp_buf ill_jmp;
+static void ill_handler(int sig)
+{
+    siglongjmp(ill_jmp, sig);
+}
+
+void OPENSSL_fpu_probe(void);
+void OPENSSL_ppc64_probe(void);
+void OPENSSL_altivec_probe(void);
+void OPENSSL_crypto207_probe(void);
+void OPENSSL_madd300_probe(void);
+
+/*
+ * Use a weak reference to getauxval() so we can use it if it is available
+ * but don't break the build if it is not. Note that this is *link-time*
+ * feature detection, not *run-time*. In other words if we link with
+ * symbol present, it's expected to be present even at run-time.
+ */
+#if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 && defined(__ELF__)
+extern unsigned long getauxval(unsigned long type) __attribute__ ((weak));
+#else
+static unsigned long (*getauxval) (unsigned long) = NULL;
+#endif
+
+/* I wish <sys/auxv.h> was universally available */
+#define HWCAP                   16      /* AT_HWCAP */
+#define HWCAP_PPC64             (1U << 30)
+#define HWCAP_ALTIVEC           (1U << 28)
+#define HWCAP_FPU               (1U << 27)
+#define HWCAP_POWER6_EXT        (1U << 9)
+#define HWCAP_VSX               (1U << 7)
+
+#define HWCAP2                  26      /* AT_HWCAP2 */
+#define HWCAP_VEC_CRYPTO        (1U << 25)
+#define HWCAP_ARCH_3_00         (1U << 23)
+
+# if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2
+__attribute__ ((constructor))
+# endif
+void OPENSSL_cpuid_setup(void)
+{
+    char *e;
+    struct sigaction ill_oact, ill_act;
+    sigset_t oset;
+    static int trigger = 0;
+
+    if (trigger)
+        return;
+    trigger = 1;
+
+    if ((e = getenv("OPENSSL_ppccap"))) {
+        OPENSSL_ppccap_P = strtoul(e, NULL, 0);
+        return;
+    }
+
+    OPENSSL_ppccap_P = 0;
+
+#if defined(_AIX)
+    OPENSSL_ppccap_P |= PPC_FPU;
+
+    if (sizeof(size_t) == 4) {
+        struct utsname uts;
+# if defined(_SC_AIX_KERNEL_BITMODE)
+        if (sysconf(_SC_AIX_KERNEL_BITMODE) != 64)
+            return;
+# endif
+        if (uname(&uts) != 0 || atoi(uts.version) < 6)
+            return;
+    }
+
+# if defined(__power_set)
+    /*
+     * Value used in __power_set is a single-bit 1<<n one denoting
+     * specific processor class. Incidentally 0xffffffff<<n can be
+     * used to denote specific processor and its successors.
+     */
+    if (sizeof(size_t) == 4) {
+        /* In 32-bit case PPC_FPU64 is always fastest [if option] */
+        if (__power_set(0xffffffffU<<13))       /* POWER5 and later */
+            OPENSSL_ppccap_P |= PPC_FPU64;
+    } else {
+        /* In 64-bit case PPC_FPU64 is fastest only on POWER6 */
+        if (__power_set(0x1U<<14))              /* POWER6 */
+            OPENSSL_ppccap_P |= PPC_FPU64;
+    }
+
+    if (__power_set(0xffffffffU<<14))           /* POWER6 and later */
+        OPENSSL_ppccap_P |= PPC_ALTIVEC;
+
+    if (__power_set(0xffffffffU<<16))           /* POWER8 and later */
+        OPENSSL_ppccap_P |= PPC_CRYPTO207;
+
+    if (__power_set(0xffffffffU<<17))           /* POWER9 and later */
+        OPENSSL_ppccap_P |= PPC_MADD300;
+
+    return;
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#if defined(__APPLE__) && defined(__MACH__)
+    OPENSSL_ppccap_P |= PPC_FPU;
+
+    {
+        int val;
+        size_t len = sizeof(val);
+
+        if (sysctlbyname("hw.optional.64bitops", &val, &len, NULL, 0) == 0) {
+            if (val)
+                OPENSSL_ppccap_P |= PPC_FPU64;
+        }
+
+        len = sizeof(val);
+        if (sysctlbyname("hw.optional.altivec", &val, &len, NULL, 0) == 0) {
+            if (val)
+                OPENSSL_ppccap_P |= PPC_ALTIVEC;
+        }
+
+        return;
+    }
+#endif
+
+    if (getauxval != NULL) {
+        unsigned long hwcap = getauxval(HWCAP);
+
+        if (hwcap & HWCAP_FPU) {
+            OPENSSL_ppccap_P |= PPC_FPU;
+
+            if (sizeof(size_t) == 4) {
+                /* In 32-bit case PPC_FPU64 is always fastest [if option] */
+                if (hwcap & HWCAP_PPC64)
+                    OPENSSL_ppccap_P |= PPC_FPU64;
+            } else {
+                /* In 64-bit case PPC_FPU64 is fastest only on POWER6 */
+                if (hwcap & HWCAP_POWER6_EXT)
+                    OPENSSL_ppccap_P |= PPC_FPU64;
+            }
+        }
+
+        if (hwcap & HWCAP_ALTIVEC) {
+            OPENSSL_ppccap_P |= PPC_ALTIVEC;
+
+            if ((hwcap & HWCAP_VSX) && (getauxval(HWCAP2) & HWCAP_VEC_CRYPTO))
+                OPENSSL_ppccap_P |= PPC_CRYPTO207;
+        }
+
+        if (hwcap & HWCAP_ARCH_3_00) {
+            OPENSSL_ppccap_P |= PPC_MADD300;
+        }
+
+        return;
+    }
+
+    sigfillset(&all_masked);
+    sigdelset(&all_masked, SIGILL);
+    sigdelset(&all_masked, SIGTRAP);
+#ifdef SIGEMT
+    sigdelset(&all_masked, SIGEMT);
+#endif
+    sigdelset(&all_masked, SIGFPE);
+    sigdelset(&all_masked, SIGBUS);
+    sigdelset(&all_masked, SIGSEGV);
+
+    memset(&ill_act, 0, sizeof(ill_act));
+    ill_act.sa_handler = ill_handler;
+    ill_act.sa_mask = all_masked;
+
+    sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &ill_act.sa_mask, &oset);
+    sigaction(SIGILL, &ill_act, &ill_oact);
+
+    if (sigsetjmp(ill_jmp,1) == 0) {
+        OPENSSL_fpu_probe();
+        OPENSSL_ppccap_P |= PPC_FPU;
+
+        if (sizeof(size_t) == 4) {
+#ifdef __linux
+            struct utsname uts;
+            if (uname(&uts) == 0 && strcmp(uts.machine, "ppc64") == 0)
+#endif
+                if (sigsetjmp(ill_jmp, 1) == 0) {
+                    OPENSSL_ppc64_probe();
+                    OPENSSL_ppccap_P |= PPC_FPU64;
+                }
+        } else {
+            /*
+             * Wanted code detecting POWER6 CPU and setting PPC_FPU64
+             */
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (sigsetjmp(ill_jmp, 1) == 0) {
+        OPENSSL_altivec_probe();
+        OPENSSL_ppccap_P |= PPC_ALTIVEC;
+        if (sigsetjmp(ill_jmp, 1) == 0) {
+            OPENSSL_crypto207_probe();
+            OPENSSL_ppccap_P |= PPC_CRYPTO207;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (sigsetjmp(ill_jmp, 1) == 0) {
+        OPENSSL_madd300_probe();
+        OPENSSL_ppccap_P |= PPC_MADD300;
+    }
+
+    sigaction(SIGILL, &ill_oact, NULL);
+    sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &oset, NULL);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ppccpuid.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ppccpuid.pl
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..9d1cada
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ppccpuid.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,301 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2007-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+$flavour = shift;
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+( $xlate="${dir}ppc-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
+( $xlate="${dir}perlasm/ppc-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
+die "can't locate ppc-xlate.pl";
+
+open STDOUT,"| $^X $xlate $flavour ".shift || die "can't call $xlate: $!";
+
+if ($flavour=~/64/) {
+    $CMPLI="cmpldi";
+    $SHRLI="srdi";
+    $SIGNX="extsw";
+} else {
+    $CMPLI="cmplwi";
+    $SHRLI="srwi";
+    $SIGNX="mr";
+}
+
+$code=<<___;
+.machine	"any"
+.text
+
+.globl	.OPENSSL_fpu_probe
+.align	4
+.OPENSSL_fpu_probe:
+	fmr	f0,f0
+	blr
+	.long	0
+	.byte	0,12,0x14,0,0,0,0,0
+.size	.OPENSSL_fpu_probe,.-.OPENSSL_fpu_probe
+.globl	.OPENSSL_ppc64_probe
+.align	4
+.OPENSSL_ppc64_probe:
+	fcfid	f1,f1
+	extrdi	r0,r0,32,0
+	blr
+	.long	0
+	.byte	0,12,0x14,0,0,0,0,0
+.size	.OPENSSL_ppc64_probe,.-.OPENSSL_ppc64_probe
+
+.globl	.OPENSSL_altivec_probe
+.align	4
+.OPENSSL_altivec_probe:
+	.long	0x10000484	# vor	v0,v0,v0
+	blr
+	.long	0
+	.byte	0,12,0x14,0,0,0,0,0
+.size	.OPENSSL_altivec_probe,.-..OPENSSL_altivec_probe
+
+.globl	.OPENSSL_crypto207_probe
+.align	4
+.OPENSSL_crypto207_probe:
+	lvx_u	v0,0,r1
+	vcipher	v0,v0,v0
+	blr
+	.long	0
+	.byte	0,12,0x14,0,0,0,0,0
+.size	.OPENSSL_crypto207_probe,.-.OPENSSL_crypto207_probe
+
+.globl	.OPENSSL_madd300_probe
+.align	4
+.OPENSSL_madd300_probe:
+	xor	r0,r0,r0
+	maddld	r3,r0,r0,r0
+	maddhdu	r3,r0,r0,r0
+	blr
+	.long	0
+	.byte	0,12,0x14,0,0,0,0,0
+
+.globl	.OPENSSL_wipe_cpu
+.align	4
+.OPENSSL_wipe_cpu:
+	xor	r0,r0,r0
+	fmr	f0,f31
+	fmr	f1,f31
+	fmr	f2,f31
+	mr	r3,r1
+	fmr	f3,f31
+	xor	r4,r4,r4
+	fmr	f4,f31
+	xor	r5,r5,r5
+	fmr	f5,f31
+	xor	r6,r6,r6
+	fmr	f6,f31
+	xor	r7,r7,r7
+	fmr	f7,f31
+	xor	r8,r8,r8
+	fmr	f8,f31
+	xor	r9,r9,r9
+	fmr	f9,f31
+	xor	r10,r10,r10
+	fmr	f10,f31
+	xor	r11,r11,r11
+	fmr	f11,f31
+	xor	r12,r12,r12
+	fmr	f12,f31
+	fmr	f13,f31
+	blr
+	.long	0
+	.byte	0,12,0x14,0,0,0,0,0
+.size	.OPENSSL_wipe_cpu,.-.OPENSSL_wipe_cpu
+
+.globl	.OPENSSL_atomic_add
+.align	4
+.OPENSSL_atomic_add:
+Ladd:	lwarx	r5,0,r3
+	add	r0,r4,r5
+	stwcx.	r0,0,r3
+	bne-	Ladd
+	$SIGNX	r3,r0
+	blr
+	.long	0
+	.byte	0,12,0x14,0,0,0,2,0
+	.long	0
+.size	.OPENSSL_atomic_add,.-.OPENSSL_atomic_add
+
+.globl	.OPENSSL_rdtsc
+.align	4
+.OPENSSL_rdtsc:
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($flavour =~ /64/);
+	mftb	r3
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($flavour !~ /64/);
+Loop_rdtsc:
+	mftbu	r5
+	mftb	r3
+	mftbu	r4
+	cmplw	r4,r5
+	bne	Loop_rdtsc
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	blr
+	.long	0
+	.byte	0,12,0x14,0,0,0,0,0
+.size	.OPENSSL_rdtsc,.-.OPENSSL_rdtsc
+
+.globl	.OPENSSL_cleanse
+.align	4
+.OPENSSL_cleanse:
+	$CMPLI	r4,7
+	li	r0,0
+	bge	Lot
+	$CMPLI	r4,0
+	beqlr-
+Little:	mtctr	r4
+	stb	r0,0(r3)
+	addi	r3,r3,1
+	bdnz	\$-8
+	blr
+Lot:	andi.	r5,r3,3
+	beq	Laligned
+	stb	r0,0(r3)
+	subi	r4,r4,1
+	addi	r3,r3,1
+	b	Lot
+Laligned:
+	$SHRLI	r5,r4,2
+	mtctr	r5
+	stw	r0,0(r3)
+	addi	r3,r3,4
+	bdnz	\$-8
+	andi.	r4,r4,3
+	bne	Little
+	blr
+	.long	0
+	.byte	0,12,0x14,0,0,0,2,0
+	.long	0
+.size	.OPENSSL_cleanse,.-.OPENSSL_cleanse
+
+globl	.CRYPTO_memcmp
+.align	4
+.CRYPTO_memcmp:
+	$CMPLI	r5,0
+	li	r0,0
+	beq	Lno_data
+	mtctr	r5
+Loop_cmp:
+	lbz	r6,0(r3)
+	addi	r3,r3,1
+	lbz	r7,0(r4)
+	addi	r4,r4,1
+	xor	r6,r6,r7
+	or	r0,r0,r6
+	bdnz	Loop_cmp
+
+Lno_data:
+	li	r3,0
+	sub	r3,r3,r0
+	extrwi	r3,r3,1,0
+	blr
+	.long	0
+	.byte	0,12,0x14,0,0,0,3,0
+	.long	0
+.size	.CRYPTO_memcmp,.-.CRYPTO_memcmp
+___
+{
+my ($out,$cnt,$max)=("r3","r4","r5");
+my ($tick,$lasttick)=("r6","r7");
+my ($diff,$lastdiff)=("r8","r9");
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	.OPENSSL_instrument_bus
+.align	4
+.OPENSSL_instrument_bus:
+	mtctr	$cnt
+
+	mftb	$lasttick		# collect 1st tick
+	li	$diff,0
+
+	dcbf	0,$out			# flush cache line
+	lwarx	$tick,0,$out		# load and lock
+	add	$tick,$tick,$diff
+	stwcx.	$tick,0,$out
+	stwx	$tick,0,$out
+
+Loop:	mftb	$tick
+	sub	$diff,$tick,$lasttick
+	mr	$lasttick,$tick
+	dcbf	0,$out			# flush cache line
+	lwarx	$tick,0,$out		# load and lock
+	add	$tick,$tick,$diff
+	stwcx.	$tick,0,$out
+	stwx	$tick,0,$out
+	addi	$out,$out,4		# ++$out
+	bdnz	Loop
+
+	mr	r3,$cnt
+	blr
+	.long	0
+	.byte	0,12,0x14,0,0,0,2,0
+	.long	0
+.size	.OPENSSL_instrument_bus,.-.OPENSSL_instrument_bus
+
+.globl	.OPENSSL_instrument_bus2
+.align	4
+.OPENSSL_instrument_bus2:
+	mr	r0,$cnt
+	slwi	$cnt,$cnt,2
+
+	mftb	$lasttick		# collect 1st tick
+	li	$diff,0
+
+	dcbf	0,$out			# flush cache line
+	lwarx	$tick,0,$out		# load and lock
+	add	$tick,$tick,$diff
+	stwcx.	$tick,0,$out
+	stwx	$tick,0,$out
+
+	mftb	$tick			# collect 1st diff
+	sub	$diff,$tick,$lasttick
+	mr	$lasttick,$tick
+	mr	$lastdiff,$diff
+Loop2:
+	dcbf	0,$out			# flush cache line
+	lwarx	$tick,0,$out		# load and lock
+	add	$tick,$tick,$diff
+	stwcx.	$tick,0,$out
+	stwx	$tick,0,$out
+
+	addic.	$max,$max,-1
+	beq	Ldone2
+
+	mftb	$tick
+	sub	$diff,$tick,$lasttick
+	mr	$lasttick,$tick
+	cmplw	7,$diff,$lastdiff
+	mr	$lastdiff,$diff
+
+	mfcr	$tick			# pull cr
+	not	$tick,$tick		# flip bits
+	rlwinm	$tick,$tick,1,29,29	# isolate flipped eq bit and scale
+
+	sub.	$cnt,$cnt,$tick		# conditional --$cnt
+	add	$out,$out,$tick		# conditional ++$out
+	bne	Loop2
+
+Ldone2:
+	srwi	$cnt,$cnt,2
+	sub	r3,r0,$cnt
+	blr
+	.long	0
+	.byte	0,12,0x14,0,0,0,3,0
+	.long	0
+.size	.OPENSSL_instrument_bus2,.-.OPENSSL_instrument_bus2
+___
+}
+
+$code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem;
+print $code;
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rand/build.info b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rand/build.info
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3ad50e2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rand/build.info
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+LIBS=../../libcrypto
+SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
+        md_rand.c randfile.c rand_lib.c rand_err.c rand_egd.c \
+        rand_win.c rand_unix.c rand_vms.c
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rand/md_rand.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7d5fcb7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
@@ -0,0 +1,667 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "e_os.h"
+
+#if !(defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_DSPBIOS))
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS)
+# include <time.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/async.h>
+#include "rand_lcl.h"
+
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+#include <internal/thread_once.h>
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+# include <openssl/fips.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef BN_DEBUG
+# define PREDICT
+#endif
+
+/* #define PREDICT      1 */
+
+#define STATE_SIZE      1023
+static size_t state_num = 0, state_index = 0;
+static unsigned char state[STATE_SIZE + MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+static unsigned char md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+static long md_count[2] = { 0, 0 };
+
+static double entropy = 0;
+static int initialized = 0;
+
+static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_lock = NULL;
+static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_tmp_lock = NULL;
+static CRYPTO_ONCE rand_lock_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
+
+/* May be set only when a thread holds rand_lock (to prevent double locking) */
+static unsigned int crypto_lock_rand = 0;
+/* access to locking_threadid is synchronized by rand_tmp_lock */
+/* valid iff crypto_lock_rand is set */
+static CRYPTO_THREAD_ID locking_threadid;
+
+#ifdef PREDICT
+int rand_predictable = 0;
+#endif
+
+static int rand_hw_seed(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
+
+static void rand_cleanup(void);
+static int rand_seed(const void *buf, int num);
+static int rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add_entropy);
+static int rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo);
+static int rand_nopseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
+#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+static int rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
+#endif
+static int rand_status(void);
+
+static RAND_METHOD rand_meth = {
+    rand_seed,
+    rand_nopseudo_bytes,
+    rand_cleanup,
+    rand_add,
+#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+    rand_pseudo_bytes,
+#else
+    NULL,
+#endif
+    rand_status
+};
+
+DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_rand_lock_init)
+{
+    OPENSSL_init_crypto(0, NULL);
+    rand_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
+    rand_tmp_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
+    return rand_lock != NULL && rand_tmp_lock != NULL;
+}
+
+RAND_METHOD *RAND_OpenSSL(void)
+{
+    return (&rand_meth);
+}
+
+static void rand_cleanup(void)
+{
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(state, sizeof(state));
+    state_num = 0;
+    state_index = 0;
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+    md_count[0] = 0;
+    md_count[1] = 0;
+    entropy = 0;
+    initialized = 0;
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_lock);
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_tmp_lock);
+}
+
+static int rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
+{
+    int i, j, k, st_idx;
+    long md_c[2];
+    unsigned char local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+    EVP_MD_CTX *m;
+    int do_not_lock;
+    int rv = 0;
+
+    if (!num)
+        return 1;
+
+    /*
+     * (Based on the rand(3) manpage)
+     *
+     * The input is chopped up into units of 20 bytes (or less for
+     * the last block).  Each of these blocks is run through the hash
+     * function as follows:  The data passed to the hash function
+     * is the current 'md', the same number of bytes from the 'state'
+     * (the location determined by in incremented looping index) as
+     * the current 'block', the new key data 'block', and 'count'
+     * (which is incremented after each use).
+     * The result of this is kept in 'md' and also xored into the
+     * 'state' at the same locations that were used as input into the
+     * hash function.
+     */
+
+    m = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+    if (m == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_lock_init, do_rand_lock_init))
+        goto err;
+
+    /* check if we already have the lock */
+    if (crypto_lock_rand) {
+        CRYPTO_THREAD_ID cur = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id();
+        CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(rand_tmp_lock);
+        do_not_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_compare_id(locking_threadid, cur);
+        CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_tmp_lock);
+    } else
+        do_not_lock = 0;
+
+    if (!do_not_lock)
+        CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_lock);
+    st_idx = state_index;
+
+    /*
+     * use our own copies of the counters so that even if a concurrent thread
+     * seeds with exactly the same data and uses the same subarray there's
+     * _some_ difference
+     */
+    md_c[0] = md_count[0];
+    md_c[1] = md_count[1];
+
+    memcpy(local_md, md, sizeof(md));
+
+    /* state_index <= state_num <= STATE_SIZE */
+    state_index += num;
+    if (state_index >= STATE_SIZE) {
+        state_index %= STATE_SIZE;
+        state_num = STATE_SIZE;
+    } else if (state_num < STATE_SIZE) {
+        if (state_index > state_num)
+            state_num = state_index;
+    }
+    /* state_index <= state_num <= STATE_SIZE */
+
+    /*
+     * state[st_idx], ..., state[(st_idx + num - 1) % STATE_SIZE] are what we
+     * will use now, but other threads may use them as well
+     */
+
+    md_count[1] += (num / MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) + (num % MD_DIGEST_LENGTH > 0);
+
+    if (!do_not_lock)
+        CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_lock);
+
+    for (i = 0; i < num; i += MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) {
+        j = (num - i);
+        j = (j > MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) ? MD_DIGEST_LENGTH : j;
+
+        if (!MD_Init(m))
+            goto err;
+        if (!MD_Update(m, local_md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH))
+            goto err;
+        k = (st_idx + j) - STATE_SIZE;
+        if (k > 0) {
+            if (!MD_Update(m, &(state[st_idx]), j - k))
+                goto err;
+            if (!MD_Update(m, &(state[0]), k))
+                goto err;
+        } else if (!MD_Update(m, &(state[st_idx]), j))
+            goto err;
+
+        /* DO NOT REMOVE THE FOLLOWING CALL TO MD_Update()! */
+        if (!MD_Update(m, buf, j))
+            goto err;
+        /*
+         * We know that line may cause programs such as purify and valgrind
+         * to complain about use of uninitialized data.  The problem is not,
+         * it's with the caller.  Removing that line will make sure you get
+         * really bad randomness and thereby other problems such as very
+         * insecure keys.
+         */
+
+        if (!MD_Update(m, (unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]), sizeof(md_c)))
+            goto err;
+        if (!MD_Final(m, local_md))
+            goto err;
+        md_c[1]++;
+
+        buf = (const char *)buf + j;
+
+        for (k = 0; k < j; k++) {
+            /*
+             * Parallel threads may interfere with this, but always each byte
+             * of the new state is the XOR of some previous value of its and
+             * local_md (intermediate values may be lost). Alway using locking
+             * could hurt performance more than necessary given that
+             * conflicts occur only when the total seeding is longer than the
+             * random state.
+             */
+            state[st_idx++] ^= local_md[k];
+            if (st_idx >= STATE_SIZE)
+                st_idx = 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (!do_not_lock)
+        CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_lock);
+    /*
+     * Don't just copy back local_md into md -- this could mean that other
+     * thread's seeding remains without effect (except for the incremented
+     * counter).  By XORing it we keep at least as much entropy as fits into
+     * md.
+     */
+    for (k = 0; k < (int)sizeof(md); k++) {
+        md[k] ^= local_md[k];
+    }
+    if (entropy < ENTROPY_NEEDED) /* stop counting when we have enough */
+        entropy += add;
+    if (!do_not_lock)
+        CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_lock);
+
+    rv = 1;
+ err:
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(m);
+    return rv;
+}
+
+static int rand_seed(const void *buf, int num)
+{
+    return rand_add(buf, num, (double)num);
+}
+
+static int rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo)
+{
+    static volatile int stirred_pool = 0;
+    int i, j, k;
+    size_t num_ceil, st_idx, st_num;
+    int ok;
+    long md_c[2];
+    unsigned char local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+    EVP_MD_CTX *m;
+#ifndef GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS
+    pid_t curr_pid = getpid();
+#endif
+    time_t curr_time = time(NULL);
+    int do_stir_pool = 0;
+/* time value for various platforms */
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
+    FILETIME tv;
+# ifdef _WIN32_WCE
+    SYSTEMTIME t;
+    GetSystemTime(&t);
+    SystemTimeToFileTime(&t, &tv);
+# else
+    GetSystemTimeAsFileTime(&tv);
+# endif
+#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS)
+    struct timespec tv;
+    clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &ts);
+#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_DSPBIOS)
+    unsigned long long tv, OPENSSL_rdtsc();
+    tv = OPENSSL_rdtsc();
+#else
+    struct timeval tv;
+    gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef PREDICT
+    if (rand_predictable) {
+        static unsigned char val = 0;
+
+        for (i = 0; i < num; i++)
+            buf[i] = val++;
+        return (1);
+    }
+#endif
+
+    if (num <= 0)
+        return 1;
+
+    m = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+    if (m == NULL)
+        goto err_mem;
+
+    /* round upwards to multiple of MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2 */
+    num_ceil =
+        (1 + (num - 1) / (MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2)) * (MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2);
+
+    /*
+     * (Based on the rand(3) manpage:)
+     *
+     * For each group of 10 bytes (or less), we do the following:
+     *
+     * Input into the hash function the local 'md' (which is initialized from
+     * the global 'md' before any bytes are generated), the bytes that are to
+     * be overwritten by the random bytes, and bytes from the 'state'
+     * (incrementing looping index). From this digest output (which is kept
+     * in 'md'), the top (up to) 10 bytes are returned to the caller and the
+     * bottom 10 bytes are xored into the 'state'.
+     *
+     * Finally, after we have finished 'num' random bytes for the
+     * caller, 'count' (which is incremented) and the local and global 'md'
+     * are fed into the hash function and the results are kept in the
+     * global 'md'.
+     */
+
+    if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_lock_init, do_rand_lock_init))
+        goto err_mem;
+
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_lock);
+    /*
+     * We could end up in an async engine while holding this lock so ensure
+     * we don't pause and cause a deadlock
+     */
+    ASYNC_block_pause();
+
+    /* prevent rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again */
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_tmp_lock);
+    locking_threadid = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id();
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_tmp_lock);
+    crypto_lock_rand = 1;
+
+    if (!initialized) {
+        RAND_poll();
+        initialized = 1;
+    }
+
+    if (!stirred_pool)
+        do_stir_pool = 1;
+
+    ok = (entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED);
+    if (!ok) {
+        /*
+         * If the PRNG state is not yet unpredictable, then seeing the PRNG
+         * output may help attackers to determine the new state; thus we have
+         * to decrease the entropy estimate. Once we've had enough initial
+         * seeding we don't bother to adjust the entropy count, though,
+         * because we're not ambitious to provide *information-theoretic*
+         * randomness. NOTE: This approach fails if the program forks before
+         * we have enough entropy. Entropy should be collected in a separate
+         * input pool and be transferred to the output pool only when the
+         * entropy limit has been reached.
+         */
+        entropy -= num;
+        if (entropy < 0)
+            entropy = 0;
+    }
+
+    if (do_stir_pool) {
+        /*
+         * In the output function only half of 'md' remains secret, so we
+         * better make sure that the required entropy gets 'evenly
+         * distributed' through 'state', our randomness pool. The input
+         * function (rand_add) chains all of 'md', which makes it more
+         * suitable for this purpose.
+         */
+
+        int n = STATE_SIZE;     /* so that the complete pool gets accessed */
+        while (n > 0) {
+#if MD_DIGEST_LENGTH > 20
+# error "Please adjust DUMMY_SEED."
+#endif
+#define DUMMY_SEED "...................." /* at least MD_DIGEST_LENGTH */
+            /*
+             * Note that the seed does not matter, it's just that
+             * rand_add expects to have something to hash.
+             */
+            rand_add(DUMMY_SEED, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH, 0.0);
+            n -= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+        }
+        if (ok)
+            stirred_pool = 1;
+    }
+
+    st_idx = state_index;
+    st_num = state_num;
+    md_c[0] = md_count[0];
+    md_c[1] = md_count[1];
+    memcpy(local_md, md, sizeof(md));
+
+    state_index += num_ceil;
+    if (state_index > state_num)
+        state_index %= state_num;
+
+    /*
+     * state[st_idx], ..., state[(st_idx + num_ceil - 1) % st_num] are now
+     * ours (but other threads may use them too)
+     */
+
+    md_count[0] += 1;
+
+    /* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */
+    crypto_lock_rand = 0;
+    ASYNC_unblock_pause();
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_lock);
+
+    while (num > 0) {
+        /* num_ceil -= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2 */
+        j = (num >= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2) ? MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2 : num;
+        num -= j;
+        if (!MD_Init(m))
+            goto err;
+#ifndef GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS
+        if (curr_pid) {         /* just in the first iteration to save time */
+            if (!MD_Update(m, (unsigned char *)&curr_pid, sizeof(curr_pid)))
+                goto err;
+            curr_pid = 0;
+        }
+#endif
+        if (curr_time) {        /* just in the first iteration to save time */
+            if (!MD_Update(m, (unsigned char *)&curr_time, sizeof(curr_time)))
+                goto err;
+            if (!MD_Update(m, (unsigned char *)&tv, sizeof(tv)))
+                goto err;
+            curr_time = 0;
+            if (!rand_hw_seed(m))
+                goto err;
+        }
+        if (!MD_Update(m, local_md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH))
+            goto err;
+        if (!MD_Update(m, (unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]), sizeof(md_c)))
+            goto err;
+
+        k = (st_idx + MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2) - st_num;
+        if (k > 0) {
+            if (!MD_Update(m, &(state[st_idx]), MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2 - k))
+                goto err;
+            if (!MD_Update(m, &(state[0]), k))
+                goto err;
+        } else if (!MD_Update(m, &(state[st_idx]), MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2))
+            goto err;
+        if (!MD_Final(m, local_md))
+            goto err;
+
+        for (i = 0; i < MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2; i++) {
+            /* may compete with other threads */
+            state[st_idx++] ^= local_md[i];
+            if (st_idx >= st_num)
+                st_idx = 0;
+            if (i < j)
+                *(buf++) = local_md[i + MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2];
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (!MD_Init(m)
+        || !MD_Update(m, (unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]), sizeof(md_c))
+        || !MD_Update(m, local_md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH))
+        goto err;
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_lock);
+    /*
+     * Prevent deadlocks if we end up in an async engine
+     */
+    ASYNC_block_pause();
+    if (!MD_Update(m, md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) || !MD_Final(m, md)) {
+        ASYNC_unblock_pause();
+        CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_lock);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    ASYNC_unblock_pause();
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_lock);
+
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(m);
+    if (ok)
+        return (1);
+    else if (pseudo)
+        return 0;
+    else {
+        RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_BYTES, RAND_R_PRNG_NOT_SEEDED);
+        ERR_add_error_data(1, "You need to read the OpenSSL FAQ, "
+                           "https://www.openssl.org/docs/faq.html");
+        return (0);
+    }
+ err:
+    RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_BYTES, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(m);
+    return 0;
+ err_mem:
+    RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_BYTES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(m);
+    return 0;
+
+}
+
+static int rand_nopseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
+{
+    return rand_bytes(buf, num, 0);
+}
+
+#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+/*
+ * pseudo-random bytes that are guaranteed to be unique but not unpredictable
+ */
+static int rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
+{
+    return rand_bytes(buf, num, 1);
+}
+#endif
+
+static int rand_status(void)
+{
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_ID cur;
+    int ret;
+    int do_not_lock;
+
+    if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_lock_init, do_rand_lock_init))
+        return 0;
+
+    cur = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id();
+    /*
+     * check if we already have the lock (could happen if a RAND_poll()
+     * implementation calls RAND_status())
+     */
+    if (crypto_lock_rand) {
+        CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(rand_tmp_lock);
+        do_not_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_compare_id(locking_threadid, cur);
+        CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_tmp_lock);
+    } else
+        do_not_lock = 0;
+
+    if (!do_not_lock) {
+        CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_lock);
+        /*
+         * Prevent deadlocks in case we end up in an async engine
+         */
+        ASYNC_block_pause();
+
+        /*
+         * prevent rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again
+         */
+        CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_tmp_lock);
+        locking_threadid = cur;
+        CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_tmp_lock);
+        crypto_lock_rand = 1;
+    }
+
+    if (!initialized) {
+        RAND_poll();
+        initialized = 1;
+    }
+
+    ret = entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED;
+
+    if (!do_not_lock) {
+        /* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */
+        crypto_lock_rand = 0;
+
+        ASYNC_unblock_pause();
+        CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_lock);
+    }
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * rand_hw_seed: get seed data from any available hardware RNG. only
+ * currently supports rdrand.
+ */
+
+/* Adapted from eng_rdrand.c */
+
+#if (defined(__i386)   || defined(__i386__)   || defined(_M_IX86) || \
+     defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
+     defined(_M_AMD64) || defined (_M_X64)) && defined(OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ) \
+     && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RDRAND)
+
+# define RDRAND_CALLS    4
+
+size_t OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand(void);
+extern unsigned int OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[];
+
+static int rand_hw_seed(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int i;
+    if (!(OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1 << (62 - 32))))
+        return 1;
+    for (i = 0; i < RDRAND_CALLS; i++) {
+        size_t rnd;
+        rnd = OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand();
+        if (rnd == 0)
+            return 1;
+        if (!MD_Update(ctx, (unsigned char *)&rnd, sizeof(size_t)))
+            return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* XOR an existing buffer with random data */
+
+void rand_hw_xor(unsigned char *buf, size_t num)
+{
+    size_t rnd;
+    if (!(OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1 << (62 - 32))))
+        return;
+    while (num >= sizeof(size_t)) {
+        rnd = OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand();
+        if (rnd == 0)
+            return;
+        *((size_t *)buf) ^= rnd;
+        buf += sizeof(size_t);
+        num -= sizeof(size_t);
+    }
+    if (num) {
+        rnd = OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand();
+        if (rnd == 0)
+            return;
+        while (num) {
+            *buf ^= rnd & 0xff;
+            rnd >>= 8;
+            buf++;
+            num--;
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+#else
+
+static int rand_hw_seed(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return 1;
+}
+
+void rand_hw_xor(unsigned char *buf, size_t num)
+{
+    return;
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rand/rand_egd.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rand/rand_egd.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..50963b8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rand/rand_egd.c
@@ -0,0 +1,249 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EGD
+NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT
+#else
+
+# include <openssl/crypto.h>
+# include <openssl/e_os2.h>
+# include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+/*-
+ * Query the EGD <URL: http://www.lothar.com/tech/crypto/>.
+ *
+ * This module supplies three routines:
+ *
+ * RAND_query_egd_bytes(path, buf, bytes)
+ *   will actually query "bytes" bytes of entropy form the egd-socket located
+ *   at path and will write them to buf (if supplied) or will directly feed
+ *   it to RAND_seed() if buf==NULL.
+ *   The number of bytes is not limited by the maximum chunk size of EGD,
+ *   which is 255 bytes. If more than 255 bytes are wanted, several chunks
+ *   of entropy bytes are requested. The connection is left open until the
+ *   query is competed.
+ *   RAND_query_egd_bytes() returns with
+ *     -1  if an error occurred during connection or communication.
+ *     num the number of bytes read from the EGD socket. This number is either
+ *         the number of bytes requested or smaller, if the EGD pool is
+ *         drained and the daemon signals that the pool is empty.
+ *   This routine does not touch any RAND_status(). This is necessary, since
+ *   PRNG functions may call it during initialization.
+ *
+ * RAND_egd_bytes(path, bytes) will query "bytes" bytes and have them
+ *   used to seed the PRNG.
+ *   RAND_egd_bytes() is a wrapper for RAND_query_egd_bytes() with buf=NULL.
+ *   Unlike RAND_query_egd_bytes(), RAND_status() is used to test the
+ *   seed status so that the return value can reflect the seed state:
+ *     -1  if an error occurred during connection or communication _or_
+ *         if the PRNG has still not received the required seeding.
+ *     num the number of bytes read from the EGD socket. This number is either
+ *         the number of bytes requested or smaller, if the EGD pool is
+ *         drained and the daemon signals that the pool is empty.
+ *
+ * RAND_egd(path) will query 255 bytes and use the bytes retrieved to seed
+ *   the PRNG.
+ *   RAND_egd() is a wrapper for RAND_egd_bytes() with numbytes=255.
+ */
+
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VOS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI)
+int RAND_query_egd_bytes(const char *path, unsigned char *buf, int bytes)
+{
+    return (-1);
+}
+
+int RAND_egd(const char *path)
+{
+    return (-1);
+}
+
+int RAND_egd_bytes(const char *path, int bytes)
+{
+    return (-1);
+}
+# else
+#  include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+#  include OPENSSL_UNISTD
+#  include <stddef.h>
+#  include <sys/types.h>
+#  include <sys/socket.h>
+#  ifndef NO_SYS_UN_H
+#   ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS
+#    include <streams/un.h>
+#   else
+#    include <sys/un.h>
+#   endif
+#  else
+struct sockaddr_un {
+    short sun_family;           /* AF_UNIX */
+    char sun_path[108];         /* path name (gag) */
+};
+#  endif                         /* NO_SYS_UN_H */
+#  include <string.h>
+#  include <errno.h>
+
+int RAND_query_egd_bytes(const char *path, unsigned char *buf, int bytes)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    struct sockaddr_un addr;
+    int len, num, numbytes;
+    int fd = -1;
+    int success;
+    unsigned char egdbuf[2], tempbuf[255], *retrievebuf;
+
+    memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
+    addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
+    if (strlen(path) >= sizeof(addr.sun_path))
+        return (-1);
+    OPENSSL_strlcpy(addr.sun_path, path, sizeof(addr.sun_path));
+    len = offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) + strlen(path);
+    fd = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+    if (fd == -1)
+        return (-1);
+    success = 0;
+    while (!success) {
+        if (connect(fd, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, len) == 0)
+            success = 1;
+        else {
+            switch (errno) {
+#  ifdef EINTR
+            case EINTR:
+#  endif
+#  ifdef EAGAIN
+            case EAGAIN:
+#  endif
+#  ifdef EINPROGRESS
+            case EINPROGRESS:
+#  endif
+#  ifdef EALREADY
+            case EALREADY:
+#  endif
+                /* No error, try again */
+                break;
+#  ifdef EISCONN
+            case EISCONN:
+                success = 1;
+                break;
+#  endif
+            default:
+                ret = -1;
+                goto err;       /* failure */
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    while (bytes > 0) {
+        egdbuf[0] = 1;
+        egdbuf[1] = bytes < 255 ? bytes : 255;
+        numbytes = 0;
+        while (numbytes != 2) {
+            num = write(fd, egdbuf + numbytes, 2 - numbytes);
+            if (num >= 0)
+                numbytes += num;
+            else {
+                switch (errno) {
+#  ifdef EINTR
+                case EINTR:
+#  endif
+#  ifdef EAGAIN
+                case EAGAIN:
+#  endif
+                    /* No error, try again */
+                    break;
+                default:
+                    ret = -1;
+                    goto err;   /* failure */
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        numbytes = 0;
+        while (numbytes != 1) {
+            num = read(fd, egdbuf, 1);
+            if (num == 0)
+                goto err;       /* descriptor closed */
+            else if (num > 0)
+                numbytes += num;
+            else {
+                switch (errno) {
+#  ifdef EINTR
+                case EINTR:
+#  endif
+#  ifdef EAGAIN
+                case EAGAIN:
+#  endif
+                    /* No error, try again */
+                    break;
+                default:
+                    ret = -1;
+                    goto err;   /* failure */
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        if (egdbuf[0] == 0)
+            goto err;
+        if (buf)
+            retrievebuf = buf + ret;
+        else
+            retrievebuf = tempbuf;
+        numbytes = 0;
+        while (numbytes != egdbuf[0]) {
+            num = read(fd, retrievebuf + numbytes, egdbuf[0] - numbytes);
+            if (num == 0)
+                goto err;       /* descriptor closed */
+            else if (num > 0)
+                numbytes += num;
+            else {
+                switch (errno) {
+#  ifdef EINTR
+                case EINTR:
+#  endif
+#  ifdef EAGAIN
+                case EAGAIN:
+#  endif
+                    /* No error, try again */
+                    break;
+                default:
+                    ret = -1;
+                    goto err;   /* failure */
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        ret += egdbuf[0];
+        bytes -= egdbuf[0];
+        if (!buf)
+            RAND_seed(tempbuf, egdbuf[0]);
+    }
+ err:
+    if (fd != -1)
+        close(fd);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+int RAND_egd_bytes(const char *path, int bytes)
+{
+    int num, ret = -1;
+
+    num = RAND_query_egd_bytes(path, NULL, bytes);
+    if (num < 0)
+        goto err;
+    if (RAND_status() == 1)
+        ret = num;
+ err:
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+int RAND_egd(const char *path)
+{
+    return (RAND_egd_bytes(path, 255));
+}
+
+# endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rand/rand_err.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rand/rand_err.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5543126
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rand/rand_err.c
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+/*
+ * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+
+# define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RAND,func,0)
+# define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RAND,0,reason)
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA RAND_str_functs[] = {
+    {ERR_FUNC(RAND_F_RAND_BYTES), "RAND_bytes"},
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA RAND_str_reasons[] = {
+    {ERR_REASON(RAND_R_PRNG_NOT_SEEDED), "PRNG not seeded"},
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+
+#endif
+
+int ERR_load_RAND_strings(void)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+
+    if (ERR_func_error_string(RAND_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) {
+        ERR_load_strings(0, RAND_str_functs);
+        ERR_load_strings(0, RAND_str_reasons);
+    }
+#endif
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d98c90e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_RAND_LCL_H
+# define HEADER_RAND_LCL_H
+
+# define ENTROPY_NEEDED 32      /* require 256 bits = 32 bytes of randomness */
+
+# if !defined(USE_MD5_RAND) && !defined(USE_SHA1_RAND) && !defined(USE_MDC2_RAND) && !defined(USE_MD2_RAND)
+#  define USE_SHA1_RAND
+# endif
+
+# include <openssl/evp.h>
+# define MD_Update(a,b,c)        EVP_DigestUpdate(a,b,c)
+# define MD_Final(a,b)           EVP_DigestFinal_ex(a,b,NULL)
+# if defined(USE_MD5_RAND)
+#  include <openssl/md5.h>
+#  define MD_DIGEST_LENGTH        MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
+#  define MD_Init(a)              EVP_DigestInit_ex(a,EVP_md5(), NULL)
+#  define MD(a,b,c)               EVP_Digest(a,b,c,NULL,EVP_md5(), NULL)
+# elif defined(USE_SHA1_RAND)
+#  include <openssl/sha.h>
+#  define MD_DIGEST_LENGTH        SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
+#  define MD_Init(a)              EVP_DigestInit_ex(a,EVP_sha1(), NULL)
+#  define MD(a,b,c)               EVP_Digest(a,b,c,NULL,EVP_sha1(), NULL)
+# elif defined(USE_MDC2_RAND)
+#  include <openssl/mdc2.h>
+#  define MD_DIGEST_LENGTH        MDC2_DIGEST_LENGTH
+#  define MD_Init(a)              EVP_DigestInit_ex(a,EVP_mdc2(), NULL)
+#  define MD(a,b,c)               EVP_Digest(a,b,c,NULL,EVP_mdc2(), NULL)
+# elif defined(USE_MD2_RAND)
+#  include <openssl/md2.h>
+#  define MD_DIGEST_LENGTH        MD2_DIGEST_LENGTH
+#  define MD_Init(a)              EVP_DigestInit_ex(a,EVP_md2(), NULL)
+#  define MD(a,b,c)               EVP_Digest(a,b,c,NULL,EVP_md2(), NULL)
+# endif
+
+void rand_hw_xor(unsigned char *buf, size_t num);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..62770d4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+#include "internal/rand.h"
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#include "internal/thread_once.h"
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+# include <openssl/fips.h>
+# include <openssl/fips_rand.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+/* non-NULL if default_RAND_meth is ENGINE-provided */
+static ENGINE *funct_ref = NULL;
+static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_engine_lock = NULL;
+#endif
+static const RAND_METHOD *default_RAND_meth = NULL;
+static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_meth_lock = NULL;
+static CRYPTO_ONCE rand_lock_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
+
+DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_rand_lock_init)
+{
+    int ret = 1;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    rand_engine_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
+    ret &= rand_engine_lock != NULL;
+#endif
+    rand_meth_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
+    ret &= rand_meth_lock != NULL;
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int RAND_set_rand_method(const RAND_METHOD *meth)
+{
+    if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_lock_init, do_rand_lock_init))
+        return 0;
+
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_meth_lock);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    ENGINE_finish(funct_ref);
+    funct_ref = NULL;
+#endif
+    default_RAND_meth = meth;
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_meth_lock);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+const RAND_METHOD *RAND_get_rand_method(void)
+{
+    const RAND_METHOD *tmp_meth = NULL;
+
+    if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_lock_init, do_rand_lock_init))
+        return NULL;
+
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_meth_lock);
+    if (!default_RAND_meth) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+        ENGINE *e = ENGINE_get_default_RAND();
+        if (e) {
+            default_RAND_meth = ENGINE_get_RAND(e);
+            if (default_RAND_meth == NULL) {
+                ENGINE_finish(e);
+                e = NULL;
+            }
+        }
+        if (e)
+            funct_ref = e;
+        else
+#endif
+            default_RAND_meth = RAND_OpenSSL();
+    }
+    tmp_meth = default_RAND_meth;
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_meth_lock);
+    return tmp_meth;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+int RAND_set_rand_engine(ENGINE *engine)
+{
+    const RAND_METHOD *tmp_meth = NULL;
+
+    if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_lock_init, do_rand_lock_init))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (engine) {
+        if (!ENGINE_init(engine))
+            return 0;
+        tmp_meth = ENGINE_get_RAND(engine);
+        if (tmp_meth == NULL) {
+            ENGINE_finish(engine);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_engine_lock);
+    /* This function releases any prior ENGINE so call it first */
+    RAND_set_rand_method(tmp_meth);
+    funct_ref = engine;
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_engine_lock);
+    return 1;
+}
+#endif
+
+void rand_cleanup_int(void)
+{
+    const RAND_METHOD *meth = default_RAND_meth;
+    if (meth && meth->cleanup)
+        meth->cleanup();
+    RAND_set_rand_method(NULL);
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_meth_lock);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_engine_lock);
+#endif
+}
+
+void RAND_seed(const void *buf, int num)
+{
+    const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
+    if (meth && meth->seed)
+        meth->seed(buf, num);
+}
+
+void RAND_add(const void *buf, int num, double entropy)
+{
+    const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
+    if (meth && meth->add)
+        meth->add(buf, num, entropy);
+}
+
+int RAND_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
+{
+    const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
+    if (meth && meth->bytes)
+        return meth->bytes(buf, num);
+    return (-1);
+}
+
+#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+int RAND_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
+{
+    const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
+    if (meth && meth->pseudorand)
+        return meth->pseudorand(buf, num);
+    return (-1);
+}
+#endif
+
+int RAND_status(void)
+{
+    const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
+    if (meth && meth->status)
+        return meth->status();
+    return 0;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7a5a948
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c
@@ -0,0 +1,324 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+#define USE_SOCKETS
+#include "e_os.h"
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include "rand_lcl.h"
+
+#if !(defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI))
+
+# include <sys/types.h>
+# include <sys/time.h>
+# include <sys/times.h>
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+# include <fcntl.h>
+# include <unistd.h>
+# include <time.h>
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_LINUX) /* should actually be available virtually
+                                 * everywhere */
+#  include <poll.h>
+# endif
+# include <limits.h>
+# ifndef FD_SETSIZE
+#  define FD_SETSIZE (8*sizeof(fd_set))
+# endif
+
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VOS)
+
+/*
+ * The following algorithm repeatedly samples the real-time clock (RTC) to
+ * generate a sequence of unpredictable data.  The algorithm relies upon the
+ * uneven execution speed of the code (due to factors such as cache misses,
+ * interrupts, bus activity, and scheduling) and upon the rather large
+ * relative difference between the speed of the clock and the rate at which
+ * it can be read.
+ *
+ * If this code is ported to an environment where execution speed is more
+ * constant or where the RTC ticks at a much slower rate, or the clock can be
+ * read with fewer instructions, it is likely that the results would be far
+ * more predictable.
+ *
+ * As a precaution, we generate 4 times the minimum required amount of seed
+ * data.
+ */
+
+int RAND_poll(void)
+{
+    short int code;
+    gid_t curr_gid;
+    pid_t curr_pid;
+    uid_t curr_uid;
+    int i, k;
+    struct timespec ts;
+    unsigned char v;
+
+#  ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_HPPA
+    long duration;
+    extern void s$sleep(long *_duration, short int *_code);
+#  else
+#   ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_IA32
+    long long duration;
+    extern void s$sleep2(long long *_duration, short int *_code);
+#   else
+#    error "Unsupported Platform."
+#   endif                       /* OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_IA32 */
+#  endif                        /* OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_HPPA */
+
+    /*
+     * Seed with the gid, pid, and uid, to ensure *some* variation between
+     * different processes.
+     */
+
+    curr_gid = getgid();
+    RAND_add(&curr_gid, sizeof(curr_gid), 1);
+    curr_gid = 0;
+
+    curr_pid = getpid();
+    RAND_add(&curr_pid, sizeof(curr_pid), 1);
+    curr_pid = 0;
+
+    curr_uid = getuid();
+    RAND_add(&curr_uid, sizeof(curr_uid), 1);
+    curr_uid = 0;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < (ENTROPY_NEEDED * 4); i++) {
+        /*
+         * burn some cpu; hope for interrupts, cache collisions, bus
+         * interference, etc.
+         */
+        for (k = 0; k < 99; k++)
+            ts.tv_nsec = random();
+
+#  ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_HPPA
+        /* sleep for 1/1024 of a second (976 us).  */
+        duration = 1;
+        s$sleep(&duration, &code);
+#  else
+#   ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_IA32
+        /* sleep for 1/65536 of a second (15 us).  */
+        duration = 1;
+        s$sleep2(&duration, &code);
+#   endif                       /* OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_IA32 */
+#  endif                        /* OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_HPPA */
+
+        /* get wall clock time.  */
+        clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &ts);
+
+        /* take 8 bits */
+        v = (unsigned char)(ts.tv_nsec % 256);
+        RAND_add(&v, sizeof(v), 1);
+        v = 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+# elif defined __OpenBSD__
+int RAND_poll(void)
+{
+    u_int32_t rnd = 0, i;
+    unsigned char buf[ENTROPY_NEEDED];
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf); i++) {
+        if (i % 4 == 0)
+            rnd = arc4random();
+        buf[i] = rnd;
+        rnd >>= 8;
+    }
+    RAND_add(buf, sizeof(buf), ENTROPY_NEEDED);
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, sizeof(buf));
+
+    return 1;
+}
+# else                          /* !defined(__OpenBSD__) */
+int RAND_poll(void)
+{
+    unsigned long l;
+    pid_t curr_pid = getpid();
+#  if defined(DEVRANDOM) || (!defined(OPENSS_NO_EGD) && defined(DEVRANDOM_EGD))
+    unsigned char tmpbuf[ENTROPY_NEEDED];
+    int n = 0;
+#  endif
+#  ifdef DEVRANDOM
+    static const char *randomfiles[] = { DEVRANDOM };
+    struct stat randomstats[OSSL_NELEM(randomfiles)];
+    int fd;
+    unsigned int i;
+#  endif
+#  if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EGD) && defined(DEVRANDOM_EGD)
+    static const char *egdsockets[] = { DEVRANDOM_EGD, NULL };
+    const char **egdsocket = NULL;
+#  endif
+
+#  ifdef DEVRANDOM
+    memset(randomstats, 0, sizeof(randomstats));
+    /*
+     * Use a random entropy pool device. Linux, FreeBSD and OpenBSD have
+     * this. Use /dev/urandom if you can as /dev/random may block if it runs
+     * out of random entries.
+     */
+
+    for (i = 0; (i < OSSL_NELEM(randomfiles)) && (n < ENTROPY_NEEDED); i++) {
+        if ((fd = open(randomfiles[i], O_RDONLY
+#   ifdef O_NONBLOCK
+                       | O_NONBLOCK
+#   endif
+#   ifdef O_BINARY
+                       | O_BINARY
+#   endif
+#   ifdef O_NOCTTY              /* If it happens to be a TTY (god forbid), do
+                                 * not make it our controlling tty */
+                       | O_NOCTTY
+#   endif
+             )) >= 0) {
+            int usec = 10 * 1000; /* spend 10ms on each file */
+            int r;
+            unsigned int j;
+            struct stat *st = &randomstats[i];
+
+            /*
+             * Avoid using same input... Used to be O_NOFOLLOW above, but
+             * it's not universally appropriate...
+             */
+            if (fstat(fd, st) != 0) {
+                close(fd);
+                continue;
+            }
+            for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
+                if (randomstats[j].st_ino == st->st_ino &&
+                    randomstats[j].st_dev == st->st_dev)
+                    break;
+            }
+            if (j < i) {
+                close(fd);
+                continue;
+            }
+
+            do {
+                int try_read = 0;
+
+#   if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_LINUX)
+                /* use poll() */
+                struct pollfd pset;
+
+                pset.fd = fd;
+                pset.events = POLLIN;
+                pset.revents = 0;
+
+                if (poll(&pset, 1, usec / 1000) < 0)
+                    usec = 0;
+                else
+                    try_read = (pset.revents & POLLIN) != 0;
+
+#   else
+                /* use select() */
+                fd_set fset;
+                struct timeval t;
+
+                t.tv_sec = 0;
+                t.tv_usec = usec;
+
+                if (FD_SETSIZE > 0 && (unsigned)fd >= FD_SETSIZE) {
+                    /*
+                     * can't use select, so just try to read once anyway
+                     */
+                    try_read = 1;
+                } else {
+                    FD_ZERO(&fset);
+                    FD_SET(fd, &fset);
+
+                    if (select(fd + 1, &fset, NULL, NULL, &t) >= 0) {
+                        usec = t.tv_usec;
+                        if (FD_ISSET(fd, &fset))
+                            try_read = 1;
+                    } else
+                        usec = 0;
+                }
+#   endif
+
+                if (try_read) {
+                    r = read(fd, (unsigned char *)tmpbuf + n,
+                             ENTROPY_NEEDED - n);
+                    if (r > 0)
+                        n += r;
+                } else
+                    r = -1;
+
+                /*
+                 * Some Unixen will update t in select(), some won't.  For
+                 * those who won't, or if we didn't use select() in the first
+                 * place, give up here, otherwise, we will do this once again
+                 * for the remaining time.
+                 */
+                if (usec == 10 * 1000)
+                    usec = 0;
+            }
+            while ((r > 0 ||
+                    (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)) && usec != 0
+                   && n < ENTROPY_NEEDED);
+
+            close(fd);
+        }
+    }
+#  endif                        /* defined(DEVRANDOM) */
+
+#  if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EGD) && defined(DEVRANDOM_EGD)
+    /*
+     * Use an EGD socket to read entropy from an EGD or PRNGD entropy
+     * collecting daemon.
+     */
+
+    for (egdsocket = egdsockets; *egdsocket && n < ENTROPY_NEEDED;
+         egdsocket++) {
+        int r;
+
+        r = RAND_query_egd_bytes(*egdsocket, (unsigned char *)tmpbuf + n,
+                                 ENTROPY_NEEDED - n);
+        if (r > 0)
+            n += r;
+    }
+#  endif                        /* defined(DEVRANDOM_EGD) */
+
+#  if defined(DEVRANDOM) || (!defined(OPENSSL_NO_EGD) && defined(DEVRANDOM_EGD))
+    if (n > 0) {
+        RAND_add(tmpbuf, sizeof(tmpbuf), (double)n);
+        OPENSSL_cleanse(tmpbuf, n);
+    }
+#  endif
+
+    /* put in some default random data, we need more than just this */
+    l = curr_pid;
+    RAND_add(&l, sizeof(l), 0.0);
+    l = getuid();
+    RAND_add(&l, sizeof(l), 0.0);
+
+    l = time(NULL);
+    RAND_add(&l, sizeof(l), 0.0);
+
+#  if defined(DEVRANDOM) || (!defined(OPENSSL_NO_EGD) && defined(DEVRANDOM_EGD))
+    return 1;
+#  else
+    return 0;
+#  endif
+}
+
+# endif                         /* defined(__OpenBSD__) */
+#endif                          /* !(defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) ||
+                                 * defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) ||
+                                 * defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) ||
+                                 * defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) */
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI)
+int RAND_poll(void)
+{
+    return 0;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rand/rand_vms.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rand/rand_vms.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9c462dd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rand/rand_vms.c
@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Modified by VMS Software, Inc (2016)
+ *    Eliminate looping through all processes (performance)
+ *    Add additional randomizations using rand() function
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include "rand_lcl.h"
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
+# include <descrip.h>
+# include <jpidef.h>
+# include <ssdef.h>
+# include <starlet.h>
+# include <efndef>
+# ifdef __DECC
+#  pragma message disable DOLLARID
+# endif
+
+/*
+ * Use 32-bit pointers almost everywhere.  Define the type to which to cast a
+ * pointer passed to an external function.
+ */
+# if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64
+#  define PTR_T __void_ptr64
+#  pragma pointer_size save
+#  pragma pointer_size 32
+# else                          /* __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 */
+#  define PTR_T void *
+# endif                         /* __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 [else] */
+
+static struct items_data_st {
+    short length, code;         /* length is number of bytes */
+} items_data[] = {
+    {4, JPI$_BUFIO},
+    {4, JPI$_CPUTIM},
+    {4, JPI$_DIRIO},
+    {4, JPI$_IMAGECOUNT},
+    {8, JPI$_LAST_LOGIN_I},
+    {8, JPI$_LOGINTIM},
+    {4, JPI$_PAGEFLTS},
+    {4, JPI$_PID},
+    {4, JPI$_PPGCNT},
+    {4, JPI$_WSPEAK},
+    {4, JPI$_FINALEXC},
+    {0, 0}                      /* zero terminated */
+};
+
+int RAND_poll(void)
+{
+
+    /* determine the number of items in the JPI array */
+
+    struct items_data_st item_entry;
+    int item_entry_count = sizeof(items_data)/sizeof(item_entry);
+
+    /* Create the JPI itemlist array to hold item_data content */
+
+    struct {
+        short length, code;
+        int *buffer;
+        int *retlen;
+    } item[item_entry_count], *pitem; /* number of entries in items_data */
+
+    struct items_data_st *pitems_data;
+    int data_buffer[(item_entry_count*2)+4]; /* 8 bytes per entry max */
+    int iosb[2];
+    int sys_time[2];
+    int *ptr;
+    int i, j ;
+    int tmp_length   = 0;
+    int total_length = 0;
+
+    pitems_data = items_data;
+    pitem = item;
+
+
+    /* Setup itemlist for GETJPI */
+    while (pitems_data->length) {
+        pitem->length = pitems_data->length;
+        pitem->code   = pitems_data->code;
+        pitem->buffer = &data_buffer[total_length];
+        pitem->retlen = 0;
+        /* total_length is in longwords */
+        total_length += pitems_data->length/4;
+        pitems_data++;
+        pitem ++;
+    }
+    pitem->length = pitem->code = 0;
+
+    /* Fill data_buffer with various info bits from this process */
+    /* and twist that data to seed the SSL random number init    */
+
+    if (sys$getjpiw(EFN$C_ENF, NULL, NULL, item, &iosb, 0, 0) == SS$_NORMAL) {
+        for (i = 0; i < total_length; i++) {
+            sys$gettim((struct _generic_64 *)&sys_time[0]);
+            srand(sys_time[0] * data_buffer[0] * data_buffer[1] + i);
+
+            if (i == (total_length - 1)) { /* for JPI$_FINALEXC */
+                ptr = &data_buffer[i];
+                for (j = 0; j < 4; j++) {
+                    data_buffer[i + j] = ptr[j];
+                    /* OK to use rand() just to scramble the seed */
+                    data_buffer[i + j] ^= (sys_time[0] ^ rand());
+                    tmp_length++;
+                }
+            } else {
+                /* OK to use rand() just to scramble the seed */
+                data_buffer[i] ^= (sys_time[0] ^ rand());
+            }
+        }
+
+        total_length += (tmp_length - 1);
+
+        /* size of seed is total_length*4 bytes (64bytes) */
+        RAND_add((PTR_T) data_buffer, total_length*4, total_length * 2);
+    } else {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rand/rand_win.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rand/rand_win.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1be0ed3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rand/rand_win.c
@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include "rand_lcl.h"
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32)
+# include <windows.h>
+/* On Windows 7 or higher use BCrypt instead of the legacy CryptoAPI */
+# if defined(_MSC_VER) && defined(_WIN32_WINNT) && _WIN32_WINNT>=0x0601
+#  define RAND_WINDOWS_USE_BCRYPT
+# endif
+
+# ifdef RAND_WINDOWS_USE_BCRYPT
+#  include <bcrypt.h>
+#  pragma comment(lib, "bcrypt.lib")
+#  ifndef STATUS_SUCCESS
+#   define STATUS_SUCCESS ((NTSTATUS)0x00000000L)
+#  endif
+# else
+#  include <wincrypt.h>
+/*
+ * Intel hardware RNG CSP -- available from
+ * http://developer.intel.com/design/security/rng/redist_license.htm
+ */
+#  define PROV_INTEL_SEC 22
+#  define INTEL_DEF_PROV L"Intel Hardware Cryptographic Service Provider"
+# endif
+
+static void readtimer(void);
+
+int RAND_poll(void)
+{
+    MEMORYSTATUS mst;
+# ifndef RAND_WINDOWS_USE_BCRYPT
+    HCRYPTPROV hProvider;
+# endif
+    DWORD w;
+    BYTE buf[64];
+
+# ifdef RAND_WINDOWS_USE_BCRYPT
+    if (BCryptGenRandom(NULL, buf, (ULONG)sizeof(buf), BCRYPT_USE_SYSTEM_PREFERRED_RNG) == STATUS_SUCCESS) {
+        RAND_add(buf, sizeof(buf), sizeof(buf));
+    }
+# else
+    /* poll the CryptoAPI PRNG */
+    /* The CryptoAPI returns sizeof(buf) bytes of randomness */
+    if (CryptAcquireContextW(&hProvider, NULL, NULL, PROV_RSA_FULL, CRYPT_VERIFYCONTEXT | CRYPT_SILENT)) {
+        if (CryptGenRandom(hProvider, (DWORD)sizeof(buf), buf) != 0) {
+            RAND_add(buf, sizeof(buf), sizeof(buf));
+        }
+        CryptReleaseContext(hProvider, 0);
+    }
+
+    /* poll the Pentium PRG with CryptoAPI */
+    if (CryptAcquireContextW(&hProvider, NULL, INTEL_DEF_PROV, PROV_INTEL_SEC, CRYPT_VERIFYCONTEXT | CRYPT_SILENT)) {
+        if (CryptGenRandom(hProvider, (DWORD)sizeof(buf), buf) != 0) {
+            RAND_add(buf, sizeof(buf), sizeof(buf));
+        }
+        CryptReleaseContext(hProvider, 0);
+    }
+# endif
+
+    /* timer data */
+    readtimer();
+
+    /* memory usage statistics */
+    GlobalMemoryStatus(&mst);
+    RAND_add(&mst, sizeof(mst), 1);
+
+    /* process ID */
+    w = GetCurrentProcessId();
+    RAND_add(&w, sizeof(w), 1);
+
+    return (1);
+}
+
+#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+int RAND_event(UINT iMsg, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lParam)
+{
+    RAND_poll();
+    return RAND_status();
+}
+
+void RAND_screen(void)
+{
+    RAND_poll();
+}
+#endif
+
+/* feed timing information to the PRNG */
+static void readtimer(void)
+{
+    DWORD w;
+    LARGE_INTEGER l;
+    static int have_perfc = 1;
+# if defined(_MSC_VER) && defined(_M_X86)
+    static int have_tsc = 1;
+    DWORD cyclecount;
+
+    if (have_tsc) {
+        __try {
+            __asm {
+            _emit 0x0f _emit 0x31 mov cyclecount, eax}
+            RAND_add(&cyclecount, sizeof(cyclecount), 1);
+        }
+        __except(EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER) {
+            have_tsc = 0;
+        }
+    }
+# else
+#  define have_tsc 0
+# endif
+
+    if (have_perfc) {
+        if (QueryPerformanceCounter(&l) == 0)
+            have_perfc = 0;
+        else
+            RAND_add(&l, sizeof(l), 0);
+    }
+
+    if (!have_tsc && !have_perfc) {
+        w = GetTickCount();
+        RAND_add(&w, sizeof(w), 0);
+    }
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rand/randfile.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rand/randfile.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dbd03ff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rand/randfile.c
@@ -0,0 +1,364 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+# include <unixio.h>
+#endif
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+# include <fcntl.h>
+/*
+ * Following should not be needed, and we could have been stricter
+ * and demand S_IS*. But some systems just don't comply... Formally
+ * below macros are "anatomically incorrect", because normally they
+ * would look like ((m) & MASK == TYPE), but since MASK availability
+ * is as questionable, we settle for this poor-man fallback...
+ */
+# if !defined(S_ISBLK)
+#  if defined(_S_IFBLK)
+#   define S_ISBLK(m) ((m) & _S_IFBLK)
+#  elif defined(S_IFBLK)
+#   define S_ISBLK(m) ((m) & S_IFBLK)
+#  elif defined(_WIN32)
+#   define S_ISBLK(m) 0 /* no concept of block devices on Windows */
+#  endif
+# endif
+# if !defined(S_ISCHR)
+#  if defined(_S_IFCHR)
+#   define S_ISCHR(m) ((m) & _S_IFCHR)
+#  elif defined(S_IFCHR)
+#   define S_ISCHR(m) ((m) & S_IFCHR)
+#  endif
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#ifdef _WIN32
+# define stat    _stat
+# define chmod   _chmod
+# define open    _open
+# define fdopen  _fdopen
+# define fstat   _fstat
+# define fileno  _fileno
+#endif
+
+#undef BUFSIZE
+#define BUFSIZE 1024
+#define RAND_DATA 1024
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+/*
+ * Misc hacks needed for specific cases.
+ *
+ * __FILE_ptr32 is a type provided by DEC C headers (types.h specifically)
+ * to make sure the FILE* is a 32-bit pointer no matter what.  We know that
+ * stdio function return this type (a study of stdio.h proves it).
+ * Additionally, we create a similar char pointer type for the sake of
+ * vms_setbuf below.
+ */
+# if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64
+#  pragma pointer_size save
+#  pragma pointer_size 32
+typedef char *char_ptr32;
+#  pragma pointer_size restore
+/*
+ * On VMS, setbuf() will only take 32-bit pointers, and a compilation
+ * with /POINTER_SIZE=64 will give off a MAYLOSEDATA2 warning here.
+ * Since we know that the FILE* really is a 32-bit pointer expanded to
+ * 64 bits, we also know it's safe to convert it back to a 32-bit pointer.
+ * As for the buffer parameter, we only use NULL here, so that passes as
+ * well...
+ */
+#  define setbuf(fp,buf) (setbuf)((__FILE_ptr32)(fp), (char_ptr32)(buf))
+# endif
+
+/*
+ * This declaration is a nasty hack to get around vms' extension to fopen for
+ * passing in sharing options being disabled by /STANDARD=ANSI89
+ */
+static __FILE_ptr32 (*const vms_fopen)(const char *, const char *, ...) =
+      (__FILE_ptr32 (*)(const char *, const char *, ...))fopen;
+# define VMS_OPEN_ATTRS "shr=get,put,upd,del","ctx=bin,stm","rfm=stm","rat=none","mrs=0"
+
+# define openssl_fopen(fname,mode) vms_fopen((fname), (mode), VMS_OPEN_ATTRS)
+#endif
+
+#define RFILE ".rnd"
+
+/*
+ * Note that these functions are intended for seed files only. Entropy
+ * devices and EGD sockets are handled in rand_unix.c
+ */
+
+int RAND_load_file(const char *file, long bytes)
+{
+    /*-
+     * If bytes >= 0, read up to 'bytes' bytes.
+     * if bytes == -1, read complete file.
+     */
+
+    unsigned char buf[BUFSIZE];
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO
+    struct stat sb;
+#endif
+    int i, ret = 0, n;
+    FILE *in = NULL;
+
+    if (file == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    if (bytes == 0)
+        return ret;
+
+    in = openssl_fopen(file, "rb");
+    if (in == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO
+    /*
+     * struct stat can have padding and unused fields that may not be
+     * initialized in the call to stat(). We need to clear the entire
+     * structure before calling RAND_add() to avoid complaints from
+     * applications such as Valgrind.
+     */
+    memset(&sb, 0, sizeof(sb));
+    if (fstat(fileno(in), &sb) < 0)
+        goto err;
+    RAND_add(&sb, sizeof(sb), 0.0);
+
+# if defined(S_ISBLK) && defined(S_ISCHR)
+    if (S_ISBLK(sb.st_mode) || S_ISCHR(sb.st_mode)) {
+        /*
+         * this file is a device. we don't want read an infinite number of
+         * bytes from a random device, nor do we want to use buffered I/O
+         * because we will waste system entropy.
+         */
+        bytes = (bytes == -1) ? 2048 : bytes; /* ok, is 2048 enough? */
+        setbuf(in, NULL); /* don't do buffered reads */
+    }
+# endif
+#endif
+    for (;;) {
+        if (bytes > 0)
+            n = (bytes < BUFSIZE) ? (int)bytes : BUFSIZE;
+        else
+            n = BUFSIZE;
+        i = fread(buf, 1, n, in);
+        if (i <= 0)
+            break;
+
+        RAND_add(buf, i, (double)i);
+        ret += i;
+        if (bytes > 0) {
+            bytes -= n;
+            if (bytes <= 0)
+                break;
+        }
+    }
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, BUFSIZE);
+ err:
+    if (in != NULL)
+        fclose(in);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int RAND_write_file(const char *file)
+{
+    unsigned char buf[BUFSIZE];
+    int i, ret = 0, rand_err = 0;
+    FILE *out = NULL;
+    int n;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO
+    struct stat sb;
+
+# if defined(S_ISBLK) && defined(S_ISCHR)
+# ifdef _WIN32
+    /*
+     * Check for |file| being a driver as "ASCII-safe" on Windows,
+     * because driver paths are always ASCII.
+     */
+# endif
+    i = stat(file, &sb);
+    if (i != -1) {
+        if (S_ISBLK(sb.st_mode) || S_ISCHR(sb.st_mode)) {
+            /*
+             * this file is a device. we don't write back to it. we
+             * "succeed" on the assumption this is some sort of random
+             * device. Otherwise attempting to write to and chmod the device
+             * causes problems.
+             */
+            return 1;
+        }
+    }
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#if defined(O_CREAT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO) && \
+    !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS)
+    {
+# ifndef O_BINARY
+#  define O_BINARY 0
+# endif
+        /*
+         * chmod(..., 0600) is too late to protect the file, permissions
+         * should be restrictive from the start
+         */
+        int fd = open(file, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_BINARY, 0600);
+        if (fd != -1)
+            out = fdopen(fd, "wb");
+    }
+#endif
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+    /*
+     * VMS NOTE: Prior versions of this routine created a _new_ version of
+     * the rand file for each call into this routine, then deleted all
+     * existing versions named ;-1, and finally renamed the current version
+     * as ';1'. Under concurrent usage, this resulted in an RMS race
+     * condition in rename() which could orphan files (see vms message help
+     * for RMS$_REENT). With the fopen() calls below, openssl/VMS now shares
+     * the top-level version of the rand file. Note that there may still be
+     * conditions where the top-level rand file is locked. If so, this code
+     * will then create a new version of the rand file. Without the delete
+     * and rename code, this can result in ascending file versions that stop
+     * at version 32767, and this routine will then return an error. The
+     * remedy for this is to recode the calling application to avoid
+     * concurrent use of the rand file, or synchronize usage at the
+     * application level. Also consider whether or not you NEED a persistent
+     * rand file in a concurrent use situation.
+     */
+
+    out = openssl_fopen(file, "rb+");
+#endif
+    if (out == NULL)
+        out = openssl_fopen(file, "wb");
+    if (out == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+#if !defined(NO_CHMOD) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO)
+    chmod(file, 0600);
+#endif
+    n = RAND_DATA;
+    for (;;) {
+        i = (n > BUFSIZE) ? BUFSIZE : n;
+        n -= BUFSIZE;
+        if (RAND_bytes(buf, i) <= 0)
+            rand_err = 1;
+        i = fwrite(buf, 1, i, out);
+        if (i <= 0) {
+            ret = 0;
+            break;
+        }
+        ret += i;
+        if (n <= 0)
+            break;
+    }
+
+    fclose(out);
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, BUFSIZE);
+ err:
+    return (rand_err ? -1 : ret);
+}
+
+const char *RAND_file_name(char *buf, size_t size)
+{
+    char *s = NULL;
+    int use_randfile = 1;
+#ifdef __OpenBSD__
+    struct stat sb;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(_WIN32) && defined(CP_UTF8)
+    DWORD len;
+    WCHAR *var, *val;
+
+    if ((var = L"RANDFILE",
+         len = GetEnvironmentVariableW(var, NULL, 0)) == 0
+        && (var = L"HOME", use_randfile = 0,
+            len = GetEnvironmentVariableW(var, NULL, 0)) == 0
+        && (var = L"USERPROFILE",
+            len = GetEnvironmentVariableW(var, NULL, 0)) == 0) {
+        var = L"SYSTEMROOT",
+        len = GetEnvironmentVariableW(var, NULL, 0);
+    }
+
+    if (len != 0) {
+        int sz;
+
+        val = _alloca(len * sizeof(WCHAR));
+
+        if (GetEnvironmentVariableW(var, val, len) < len
+            && (sz = WideCharToMultiByte(CP_UTF8, 0, val, -1, NULL, 0,
+                                         NULL, NULL)) != 0) {
+            s = _alloca(sz);
+            if (WideCharToMultiByte(CP_UTF8, 0, val, -1, s, sz,
+                                    NULL, NULL) == 0)
+                s = NULL;
+        }
+    }
+#else
+    if (OPENSSL_issetugid() != 0) {
+        use_randfile = 0;
+    } else {
+        s = getenv("RANDFILE");
+        if (s == NULL || *s == '\0') {
+            use_randfile = 0;
+            s = getenv("HOME");
+        }
+    }
+#endif
+#ifdef DEFAULT_HOME
+    if (!use_randfile && s == NULL) {
+        s = DEFAULT_HOME;
+    }
+#endif
+    if (s != NULL && *s) {
+        size_t len = strlen(s);
+
+        if (use_randfile && len + 1 < size) {
+            if (OPENSSL_strlcpy(buf, s, size) >= size)
+                return NULL;
+        } else if (len + strlen(RFILE) + 2 < size) {
+            OPENSSL_strlcpy(buf, s, size);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+            OPENSSL_strlcat(buf, "/", size);
+#endif
+            OPENSSL_strlcat(buf, RFILE, size);
+        }
+    } else {
+        buf[0] = '\0';      /* no file name */
+    }
+
+#ifdef __OpenBSD__
+    /*
+     * given that all random loads just fail if the file can't be seen on a
+     * stat, we stat the file we're returning, if it fails, use /dev/arandom
+     * instead. this allows the user to use their own source for good random
+     * data, but defaults to something hopefully decent if that isn't
+     * available.
+     */
+
+    if (!buf[0] || stat(buf, &sb) == -1)
+        if (OPENSSL_strlcpy(buf, "/dev/arandom", size) >= size) {
+            return NULL;
+        }
+#endif
+    return buf[0] ? buf : NULL;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc2/build.info b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc2/build.info
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..47a3fd0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc2/build.info
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+LIBS=../../libcrypto
+SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
+        rc2_ecb.c rc2_skey.c rc2_cbc.c rc2cfb64.c rc2ofb64.c
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc2/rc2_cbc.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc2/rc2_cbc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2b59353
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc2/rc2_cbc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,179 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/rc2.h>
+#include "rc2_locl.h"
+
+void RC2_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, long length,
+                     RC2_KEY *ks, unsigned char *iv, int encrypt)
+{
+    register unsigned long tin0, tin1;
+    register unsigned long tout0, tout1, xor0, xor1;
+    register long l = length;
+    unsigned long tin[2];
+
+    if (encrypt) {
+        c2l(iv, tout0);
+        c2l(iv, tout1);
+        iv -= 8;
+        for (l -= 8; l >= 0; l -= 8) {
+            c2l(in, tin0);
+            c2l(in, tin1);
+            tin0 ^= tout0;
+            tin1 ^= tout1;
+            tin[0] = tin0;
+            tin[1] = tin1;
+            RC2_encrypt(tin, ks);
+            tout0 = tin[0];
+            l2c(tout0, out);
+            tout1 = tin[1];
+            l2c(tout1, out);
+        }
+        if (l != -8) {
+            c2ln(in, tin0, tin1, l + 8);
+            tin0 ^= tout0;
+            tin1 ^= tout1;
+            tin[0] = tin0;
+            tin[1] = tin1;
+            RC2_encrypt(tin, ks);
+            tout0 = tin[0];
+            l2c(tout0, out);
+            tout1 = tin[1];
+            l2c(tout1, out);
+        }
+        l2c(tout0, iv);
+        l2c(tout1, iv);
+    } else {
+        c2l(iv, xor0);
+        c2l(iv, xor1);
+        iv -= 8;
+        for (l -= 8; l >= 0; l -= 8) {
+            c2l(in, tin0);
+            tin[0] = tin0;
+            c2l(in, tin1);
+            tin[1] = tin1;
+            RC2_decrypt(tin, ks);
+            tout0 = tin[0] ^ xor0;
+            tout1 = tin[1] ^ xor1;
+            l2c(tout0, out);
+            l2c(tout1, out);
+            xor0 = tin0;
+            xor1 = tin1;
+        }
+        if (l != -8) {
+            c2l(in, tin0);
+            tin[0] = tin0;
+            c2l(in, tin1);
+            tin[1] = tin1;
+            RC2_decrypt(tin, ks);
+            tout0 = tin[0] ^ xor0;
+            tout1 = tin[1] ^ xor1;
+            l2cn(tout0, tout1, out, l + 8);
+            xor0 = tin0;
+            xor1 = tin1;
+        }
+        l2c(xor0, iv);
+        l2c(xor1, iv);
+    }
+    tin0 = tin1 = tout0 = tout1 = xor0 = xor1 = 0;
+    tin[0] = tin[1] = 0;
+}
+
+void RC2_encrypt(unsigned long *d, RC2_KEY *key)
+{
+    int i, n;
+    register RC2_INT *p0, *p1;
+    register RC2_INT x0, x1, x2, x3, t;
+    unsigned long l;
+
+    l = d[0];
+    x0 = (RC2_INT) l & 0xffff;
+    x1 = (RC2_INT) (l >> 16L);
+    l = d[1];
+    x2 = (RC2_INT) l & 0xffff;
+    x3 = (RC2_INT) (l >> 16L);
+
+    n = 3;
+    i = 5;
+
+    p0 = p1 = &(key->data[0]);
+    for (;;) {
+        t = (x0 + (x1 & ~x3) + (x2 & x3) + *(p0++)) & 0xffff;
+        x0 = (t << 1) | (t >> 15);
+        t = (x1 + (x2 & ~x0) + (x3 & x0) + *(p0++)) & 0xffff;
+        x1 = (t << 2) | (t >> 14);
+        t = (x2 + (x3 & ~x1) + (x0 & x1) + *(p0++)) & 0xffff;
+        x2 = (t << 3) | (t >> 13);
+        t = (x3 + (x0 & ~x2) + (x1 & x2) + *(p0++)) & 0xffff;
+        x3 = (t << 5) | (t >> 11);
+
+        if (--i == 0) {
+            if (--n == 0)
+                break;
+            i = (n == 2) ? 6 : 5;
+
+            x0 += p1[x3 & 0x3f];
+            x1 += p1[x0 & 0x3f];
+            x2 += p1[x1 & 0x3f];
+            x3 += p1[x2 & 0x3f];
+        }
+    }
+
+    d[0] =
+        (unsigned long)(x0 & 0xffff) | ((unsigned long)(x1 & 0xffff) << 16L);
+    d[1] =
+        (unsigned long)(x2 & 0xffff) | ((unsigned long)(x3 & 0xffff) << 16L);
+}
+
+void RC2_decrypt(unsigned long *d, RC2_KEY *key)
+{
+    int i, n;
+    register RC2_INT *p0, *p1;
+    register RC2_INT x0, x1, x2, x3, t;
+    unsigned long l;
+
+    l = d[0];
+    x0 = (RC2_INT) l & 0xffff;
+    x1 = (RC2_INT) (l >> 16L);
+    l = d[1];
+    x2 = (RC2_INT) l & 0xffff;
+    x3 = (RC2_INT) (l >> 16L);
+
+    n = 3;
+    i = 5;
+
+    p0 = &(key->data[63]);
+    p1 = &(key->data[0]);
+    for (;;) {
+        t = ((x3 << 11) | (x3 >> 5)) & 0xffff;
+        x3 = (t - (x0 & ~x2) - (x1 & x2) - *(p0--)) & 0xffff;
+        t = ((x2 << 13) | (x2 >> 3)) & 0xffff;
+        x2 = (t - (x3 & ~x1) - (x0 & x1) - *(p0--)) & 0xffff;
+        t = ((x1 << 14) | (x1 >> 2)) & 0xffff;
+        x1 = (t - (x2 & ~x0) - (x3 & x0) - *(p0--)) & 0xffff;
+        t = ((x0 << 15) | (x0 >> 1)) & 0xffff;
+        x0 = (t - (x1 & ~x3) - (x2 & x3) - *(p0--)) & 0xffff;
+
+        if (--i == 0) {
+            if (--n == 0)
+                break;
+            i = (n == 2) ? 6 : 5;
+
+            x3 = (x3 - p1[x2 & 0x3f]) & 0xffff;
+            x2 = (x2 - p1[x1 & 0x3f]) & 0xffff;
+            x1 = (x1 - p1[x0 & 0x3f]) & 0xffff;
+            x0 = (x0 - p1[x3 & 0x3f]) & 0xffff;
+        }
+    }
+
+    d[0] =
+        (unsigned long)(x0 & 0xffff) | ((unsigned long)(x1 & 0xffff) << 16L);
+    d[1] =
+        (unsigned long)(x2 & 0xffff) | ((unsigned long)(x3 & 0xffff) << 16L);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc2/rc2_ecb.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc2/rc2_ecb.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b87931f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc2/rc2_ecb.c
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/rc2.h>
+#include "rc2_locl.h"
+#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+
+/*-
+ * RC2 as implemented frm a posting from
+ * Newsgroups: sci.crypt
+ * Sender: pgut01@cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann)
+ * Subject: Specification for Ron Rivests Cipher No.2
+ * Message-ID: <4fk39f$f70@net.auckland.ac.nz>
+ * Date: 11 Feb 1996 06:45:03 GMT
+ */
+
+void RC2_ecb_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, RC2_KEY *ks,
+                     int encrypt)
+{
+    unsigned long l, d[2];
+
+    c2l(in, l);
+    d[0] = l;
+    c2l(in, l);
+    d[1] = l;
+    if (encrypt)
+        RC2_encrypt(d, ks);
+    else
+        RC2_decrypt(d, ks);
+    l = d[0];
+    l2c(l, out);
+    l = d[1];
+    l2c(l, out);
+    l = d[0] = d[1] = 0;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc2/rc2_locl.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc2/rc2_locl.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e4dad94
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc2/rc2_locl.h
@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#undef c2l
+#define c2l(c,l)        (l =((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))    , \
+                         l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<< 8L, \
+                         l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<16L, \
+                         l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<24L)
+
+/* NOTE - c is not incremented as per c2l */
+#undef c2ln
+#define c2ln(c,l1,l2,n) { \
+                        c+=n; \
+                        l1=l2=0; \
+                        switch (n) { \
+                        case 8: l2 =((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<24L; \
+                        /* fall thru */                               \
+                        case 7: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<16L; \
+                        /* fall thru */                               \
+                        case 6: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<< 8L; \
+                        /* fall thru */                               \
+                        case 5: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))));      \
+                        /* fall thru */                               \
+                        case 4: l1 =((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<24L; \
+                        /* fall thru */                               \
+                        case 3: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<16L; \
+                        /* fall thru */                               \
+                        case 2: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<< 8L; \
+                        /* fall thru */                               \
+                        case 1: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))));      \
+                                } \
+                        }
+
+#undef l2c
+#define l2c(l,c)        (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)     )&0xff), \
+                         *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8L)&0xff), \
+                         *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16L)&0xff), \
+                         *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24L)&0xff))
+
+/* NOTE - c is not incremented as per l2c */
+#undef l2cn
+#define l2cn(l1,l2,c,n) { \
+                        c+=n; \
+                        switch (n) { \
+                        case 8: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>>24L)&0xff); \
+                        /* fall thru */                                     \
+                        case 7: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>>16L)&0xff); \
+                        /* fall thru */                                     \
+                        case 6: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>> 8L)&0xff); \
+                        /* fall thru */                                     \
+                        case 5: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)     )&0xff); \
+                        /* fall thru */                                     \
+                        case 4: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>>24L)&0xff); \
+                        /* fall thru */                                     \
+                        case 3: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>>16L)&0xff); \
+                        /* fall thru */                                     \
+                        case 2: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>> 8L)&0xff); \
+                        /* fall thru */                                     \
+                        case 1: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)     )&0xff); \
+                                } \
+                        }
+
+/* NOTE - c is not incremented as per n2l */
+#define n2ln(c,l1,l2,n) { \
+                        c+=n; \
+                        l1=l2=0; \
+                        switch (n) { \
+                        case 8: l2 =((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))    ; \
+                        /* fall thru */                              \
+                        case 7: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<< 8; \
+                        /* fall thru */                              \
+                        case 6: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<16; \
+                        /* fall thru */                              \
+                        case 5: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<24; \
+                        /* fall thru */                              \
+                        case 4: l1 =((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))    ; \
+                        /* fall thru */                              \
+                        case 3: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<< 8; \
+                        /* fall thru */                              \
+                        case 2: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<16; \
+                        /* fall thru */                              \
+                        case 1: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<24; \
+                                } \
+                        }
+
+/* NOTE - c is not incremented as per l2n */
+#define l2nn(l1,l2,c,n) { \
+                        c+=n; \
+                        switch (n) { \
+                        case 8: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)    )&0xff); \
+                        /* fall thru */                                    \
+                        case 7: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>> 8)&0xff); \
+                        /* fall thru */                                    \
+                        case 6: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>>16)&0xff); \
+                        /* fall thru */                                    \
+                        case 5: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>>24)&0xff); \
+                        /* fall thru */                                    \
+                        case 4: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)    )&0xff); \
+                        /* fall thru */                                    \
+                        case 3: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>> 8)&0xff); \
+                        /* fall thru */                                    \
+                        case 2: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>>16)&0xff); \
+                        /* fall thru */                                    \
+                        case 1: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>>24)&0xff); \
+                                } \
+                        }
+
+#undef n2l
+#define n2l(c,l)        (l =((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<24L, \
+                         l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<16L, \
+                         l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<< 8L, \
+                         l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++))))
+
+#undef l2n
+#define l2n(l,c)        (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24L)&0xff), \
+                         *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16L)&0xff), \
+                         *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8L)&0xff), \
+                         *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)     )&0xff))
+
+#define C_RC2(n) \
+        t=(x0+(x1& ~x3)+(x2&x3)+ *(p0++))&0xffff; \
+        x0=(t<<1)|(t>>15); \
+        t=(x1+(x2& ~x0)+(x3&x0)+ *(p0++))&0xffff; \
+        x1=(t<<2)|(t>>14); \
+        t=(x2+(x3& ~x1)+(x0&x1)+ *(p0++))&0xffff; \
+        x2=(t<<3)|(t>>13); \
+        t=(x3+(x0& ~x2)+(x1&x2)+ *(p0++))&0xffff; \
+        x3=(t<<5)|(t>>11);
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc2/rc2_skey.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc2/rc2_skey.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..55d8ba3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc2/rc2_skey.c
@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/rc2.h>
+#include "rc2_locl.h"
+
+static const unsigned char key_table[256] = {
+    0xd9, 0x78, 0xf9, 0xc4, 0x19, 0xdd, 0xb5, 0xed, 0x28, 0xe9, 0xfd, 0x79,
+    0x4a, 0xa0, 0xd8, 0x9d, 0xc6, 0x7e, 0x37, 0x83, 0x2b, 0x76, 0x53, 0x8e,
+    0x62, 0x4c, 0x64, 0x88, 0x44, 0x8b, 0xfb, 0xa2, 0x17, 0x9a, 0x59, 0xf5,
+    0x87, 0xb3, 0x4f, 0x13, 0x61, 0x45, 0x6d, 0x8d, 0x09, 0x81, 0x7d, 0x32,
+    0xbd, 0x8f, 0x40, 0xeb, 0x86, 0xb7, 0x7b, 0x0b, 0xf0, 0x95, 0x21, 0x22,
+    0x5c, 0x6b, 0x4e, 0x82, 0x54, 0xd6, 0x65, 0x93, 0xce, 0x60, 0xb2, 0x1c,
+    0x73, 0x56, 0xc0, 0x14, 0xa7, 0x8c, 0xf1, 0xdc, 0x12, 0x75, 0xca, 0x1f,
+    0x3b, 0xbe, 0xe4, 0xd1, 0x42, 0x3d, 0xd4, 0x30, 0xa3, 0x3c, 0xb6, 0x26,
+    0x6f, 0xbf, 0x0e, 0xda, 0x46, 0x69, 0x07, 0x57, 0x27, 0xf2, 0x1d, 0x9b,
+    0xbc, 0x94, 0x43, 0x03, 0xf8, 0x11, 0xc7, 0xf6, 0x90, 0xef, 0x3e, 0xe7,
+    0x06, 0xc3, 0xd5, 0x2f, 0xc8, 0x66, 0x1e, 0xd7, 0x08, 0xe8, 0xea, 0xde,
+    0x80, 0x52, 0xee, 0xf7, 0x84, 0xaa, 0x72, 0xac, 0x35, 0x4d, 0x6a, 0x2a,
+    0x96, 0x1a, 0xd2, 0x71, 0x5a, 0x15, 0x49, 0x74, 0x4b, 0x9f, 0xd0, 0x5e,
+    0x04, 0x18, 0xa4, 0xec, 0xc2, 0xe0, 0x41, 0x6e, 0x0f, 0x51, 0xcb, 0xcc,
+    0x24, 0x91, 0xaf, 0x50, 0xa1, 0xf4, 0x70, 0x39, 0x99, 0x7c, 0x3a, 0x85,
+    0x23, 0xb8, 0xb4, 0x7a, 0xfc, 0x02, 0x36, 0x5b, 0x25, 0x55, 0x97, 0x31,
+    0x2d, 0x5d, 0xfa, 0x98, 0xe3, 0x8a, 0x92, 0xae, 0x05, 0xdf, 0x29, 0x10,
+    0x67, 0x6c, 0xba, 0xc9, 0xd3, 0x00, 0xe6, 0xcf, 0xe1, 0x9e, 0xa8, 0x2c,
+    0x63, 0x16, 0x01, 0x3f, 0x58, 0xe2, 0x89, 0xa9, 0x0d, 0x38, 0x34, 0x1b,
+    0xab, 0x33, 0xff, 0xb0, 0xbb, 0x48, 0x0c, 0x5f, 0xb9, 0xb1, 0xcd, 0x2e,
+    0xc5, 0xf3, 0xdb, 0x47, 0xe5, 0xa5, 0x9c, 0x77, 0x0a, 0xa6, 0x20, 0x68,
+    0xfe, 0x7f, 0xc1, 0xad,
+};
+
+#if defined(_MSC_VER) && defined(_ARM_)
+# pragma optimize("g",off)
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * It has come to my attention that there are 2 versions of the RC2 key
+ * schedule.  One which is normal, and anther which has a hook to use a
+ * reduced key length. BSAFE uses the 'retarded' version.  What I previously
+ * shipped is the same as specifying 1024 for the 'bits' parameter.  Bsafe
+ * uses a version where the bits parameter is the same as len*8
+ */
+void RC2_set_key(RC2_KEY *key, int len, const unsigned char *data, int bits)
+{
+    int i, j;
+    unsigned char *k;
+    RC2_INT *ki;
+    unsigned int c, d;
+
+    k = (unsigned char *)&(key->data[0]);
+    *k = 0;                     /* for if there is a zero length key */
+
+    if (len > 128)
+        len = 128;
+    if (bits <= 0)
+        bits = 1024;
+    if (bits > 1024)
+        bits = 1024;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
+        k[i] = data[i];
+
+    /* expand table */
+    d = k[len - 1];
+    j = 0;
+    for (i = len; i < 128; i++, j++) {
+        d = key_table[(k[j] + d) & 0xff];
+        k[i] = d;
+    }
+
+    /* hmm.... key reduction to 'bits' bits */
+
+    j = (bits + 7) >> 3;
+    i = 128 - j;
+    c = (0xff >> (-bits & 0x07));
+
+    d = key_table[k[i] & c];
+    k[i] = d;
+    while (i--) {
+        d = key_table[k[i + j] ^ d];
+        k[i] = d;
+    }
+
+    /* copy from bytes into RC2_INT's */
+    ki = &(key->data[63]);
+    for (i = 127; i >= 0; i -= 2)
+        *(ki--) = ((k[i] << 8) | k[i - 1]) & 0xffff;
+}
+
+#if defined(_MSC_VER)
+# pragma optimize("",on)
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc2/rc2cfb64.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc2/rc2cfb64.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e11093d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc2/rc2cfb64.c
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/rc2.h>
+#include "rc2_locl.h"
+
+/*
+ * The input and output encrypted as though 64bit cfb mode is being used.
+ * The extra state information to record how much of the 64bit block we have
+ * used is contained in *num;
+ */
+
+void RC2_cfb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                       long length, RC2_KEY *schedule, unsigned char *ivec,
+                       int *num, int encrypt)
+{
+    register unsigned long v0, v1, t;
+    register int n = *num;
+    register long l = length;
+    unsigned long ti[2];
+    unsigned char *iv, c, cc;
+
+    iv = (unsigned char *)ivec;
+    if (encrypt) {
+        while (l--) {
+            if (n == 0) {
+                c2l(iv, v0);
+                ti[0] = v0;
+                c2l(iv, v1);
+                ti[1] = v1;
+                RC2_encrypt((unsigned long *)ti, schedule);
+                iv = (unsigned char *)ivec;
+                t = ti[0];
+                l2c(t, iv);
+                t = ti[1];
+                l2c(t, iv);
+                iv = (unsigned char *)ivec;
+            }
+            c = *(in++) ^ iv[n];
+            *(out++) = c;
+            iv[n] = c;
+            n = (n + 1) & 0x07;
+        }
+    } else {
+        while (l--) {
+            if (n == 0) {
+                c2l(iv, v0);
+                ti[0] = v0;
+                c2l(iv, v1);
+                ti[1] = v1;
+                RC2_encrypt((unsigned long *)ti, schedule);
+                iv = (unsigned char *)ivec;
+                t = ti[0];
+                l2c(t, iv);
+                t = ti[1];
+                l2c(t, iv);
+                iv = (unsigned char *)ivec;
+            }
+            cc = *(in++);
+            c = iv[n];
+            iv[n] = cc;
+            *(out++) = c ^ cc;
+            n = (n + 1) & 0x07;
+        }
+    }
+    v0 = v1 = ti[0] = ti[1] = t = c = cc = 0;
+    *num = n;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc2/rc2ofb64.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc2/rc2ofb64.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d610278
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc2/rc2ofb64.c
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/rc2.h>
+#include "rc2_locl.h"
+
+/*
+ * The input and output encrypted as though 64bit ofb mode is being used.
+ * The extra state information to record how much of the 64bit block we have
+ * used is contained in *num;
+ */
+void RC2_ofb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                       long length, RC2_KEY *schedule, unsigned char *ivec,
+                       int *num)
+{
+    register unsigned long v0, v1, t;
+    register int n = *num;
+    register long l = length;
+    unsigned char d[8];
+    register char *dp;
+    unsigned long ti[2];
+    unsigned char *iv;
+    int save = 0;
+
+    iv = (unsigned char *)ivec;
+    c2l(iv, v0);
+    c2l(iv, v1);
+    ti[0] = v0;
+    ti[1] = v1;
+    dp = (char *)d;
+    l2c(v0, dp);
+    l2c(v1, dp);
+    while (l--) {
+        if (n == 0) {
+            RC2_encrypt((unsigned long *)ti, schedule);
+            dp = (char *)d;
+            t = ti[0];
+            l2c(t, dp);
+            t = ti[1];
+            l2c(t, dp);
+            save++;
+        }
+        *(out++) = *(in++) ^ d[n];
+        n = (n + 1) & 0x07;
+    }
+    if (save) {
+        v0 = ti[0];
+        v1 = ti[1];
+        iv = (unsigned char *)ivec;
+        l2c(v0, iv);
+        l2c(v1, iv);
+    }
+    t = v0 = v1 = ti[0] = ti[1] = 0;
+    *num = n;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc2/tab.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc2/tab.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bc95dc4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc2/tab.c
@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1998-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+unsigned char ebits_to_num[256] = {
+    0xbd, 0x56, 0xea, 0xf2, 0xa2, 0xf1, 0xac, 0x2a,
+    0xb0, 0x93, 0xd1, 0x9c, 0x1b, 0x33, 0xfd, 0xd0,
+    0x30, 0x04, 0xb6, 0xdc, 0x7d, 0xdf, 0x32, 0x4b,
+    0xf7, 0xcb, 0x45, 0x9b, 0x31, 0xbb, 0x21, 0x5a,
+    0x41, 0x9f, 0xe1, 0xd9, 0x4a, 0x4d, 0x9e, 0xda,
+    0xa0, 0x68, 0x2c, 0xc3, 0x27, 0x5f, 0x80, 0x36,
+    0x3e, 0xee, 0xfb, 0x95, 0x1a, 0xfe, 0xce, 0xa8,
+    0x34, 0xa9, 0x13, 0xf0, 0xa6, 0x3f, 0xd8, 0x0c,
+    0x78, 0x24, 0xaf, 0x23, 0x52, 0xc1, 0x67, 0x17,
+    0xf5, 0x66, 0x90, 0xe7, 0xe8, 0x07, 0xb8, 0x60,
+    0x48, 0xe6, 0x1e, 0x53, 0xf3, 0x92, 0xa4, 0x72,
+    0x8c, 0x08, 0x15, 0x6e, 0x86, 0x00, 0x84, 0xfa,
+    0xf4, 0x7f, 0x8a, 0x42, 0x19, 0xf6, 0xdb, 0xcd,
+    0x14, 0x8d, 0x50, 0x12, 0xba, 0x3c, 0x06, 0x4e,
+    0xec, 0xb3, 0x35, 0x11, 0xa1, 0x88, 0x8e, 0x2b,
+    0x94, 0x99, 0xb7, 0x71, 0x74, 0xd3, 0xe4, 0xbf,
+    0x3a, 0xde, 0x96, 0x0e, 0xbc, 0x0a, 0xed, 0x77,
+    0xfc, 0x37, 0x6b, 0x03, 0x79, 0x89, 0x62, 0xc6,
+    0xd7, 0xc0, 0xd2, 0x7c, 0x6a, 0x8b, 0x22, 0xa3,
+    0x5b, 0x05, 0x5d, 0x02, 0x75, 0xd5, 0x61, 0xe3,
+    0x18, 0x8f, 0x55, 0x51, 0xad, 0x1f, 0x0b, 0x5e,
+    0x85, 0xe5, 0xc2, 0x57, 0x63, 0xca, 0x3d, 0x6c,
+    0xb4, 0xc5, 0xcc, 0x70, 0xb2, 0x91, 0x59, 0x0d,
+    0x47, 0x20, 0xc8, 0x4f, 0x58, 0xe0, 0x01, 0xe2,
+    0x16, 0x38, 0xc4, 0x6f, 0x3b, 0x0f, 0x65, 0x46,
+    0xbe, 0x7e, 0x2d, 0x7b, 0x82, 0xf9, 0x40, 0xb5,
+    0x1d, 0x73, 0xf8, 0xeb, 0x26, 0xc7, 0x87, 0x97,
+    0x25, 0x54, 0xb1, 0x28, 0xaa, 0x98, 0x9d, 0xa5,
+    0x64, 0x6d, 0x7a, 0xd4, 0x10, 0x81, 0x44, 0xef,
+    0x49, 0xd6, 0xae, 0x2e, 0xdd, 0x76, 0x5c, 0x2f,
+    0xa7, 0x1c, 0xc9, 0x09, 0x69, 0x9a, 0x83, 0xcf,
+    0x29, 0x39, 0xb9, 0xe9, 0x4c, 0xff, 0x43, 0xab,
+};
+
+unsigned char num_to_ebits[256] = {
+    0x5d, 0xbe, 0x9b, 0x8b, 0x11, 0x99, 0x6e, 0x4d,
+    0x59, 0xf3, 0x85, 0xa6, 0x3f, 0xb7, 0x83, 0xc5,
+    0xe4, 0x73, 0x6b, 0x3a, 0x68, 0x5a, 0xc0, 0x47,
+    0xa0, 0x64, 0x34, 0x0c, 0xf1, 0xd0, 0x52, 0xa5,
+    0xb9, 0x1e, 0x96, 0x43, 0x41, 0xd8, 0xd4, 0x2c,
+    0xdb, 0xf8, 0x07, 0x77, 0x2a, 0xca, 0xeb, 0xef,
+    0x10, 0x1c, 0x16, 0x0d, 0x38, 0x72, 0x2f, 0x89,
+    0xc1, 0xf9, 0x80, 0xc4, 0x6d, 0xae, 0x30, 0x3d,
+    0xce, 0x20, 0x63, 0xfe, 0xe6, 0x1a, 0xc7, 0xb8,
+    0x50, 0xe8, 0x24, 0x17, 0xfc, 0x25, 0x6f, 0xbb,
+    0x6a, 0xa3, 0x44, 0x53, 0xd9, 0xa2, 0x01, 0xab,
+    0xbc, 0xb6, 0x1f, 0x98, 0xee, 0x9a, 0xa7, 0x2d,
+    0x4f, 0x9e, 0x8e, 0xac, 0xe0, 0xc6, 0x49, 0x46,
+    0x29, 0xf4, 0x94, 0x8a, 0xaf, 0xe1, 0x5b, 0xc3,
+    0xb3, 0x7b, 0x57, 0xd1, 0x7c, 0x9c, 0xed, 0x87,
+    0x40, 0x8c, 0xe2, 0xcb, 0x93, 0x14, 0xc9, 0x61,
+    0x2e, 0xe5, 0xcc, 0xf6, 0x5e, 0xa8, 0x5c, 0xd6,
+    0x75, 0x8d, 0x62, 0x95, 0x58, 0x69, 0x76, 0xa1,
+    0x4a, 0xb5, 0x55, 0x09, 0x78, 0x33, 0x82, 0xd7,
+    0xdd, 0x79, 0xf5, 0x1b, 0x0b, 0xde, 0x26, 0x21,
+    0x28, 0x74, 0x04, 0x97, 0x56, 0xdf, 0x3c, 0xf0,
+    0x37, 0x39, 0xdc, 0xff, 0x06, 0xa4, 0xea, 0x42,
+    0x08, 0xda, 0xb4, 0x71, 0xb0, 0xcf, 0x12, 0x7a,
+    0x4e, 0xfa, 0x6c, 0x1d, 0x84, 0x00, 0xc8, 0x7f,
+    0x91, 0x45, 0xaa, 0x2b, 0xc2, 0xb1, 0x8f, 0xd5,
+    0xba, 0xf2, 0xad, 0x19, 0xb2, 0x67, 0x36, 0xf7,
+    0x0f, 0x0a, 0x92, 0x7d, 0xe3, 0x9d, 0xe9, 0x90,
+    0x3e, 0x23, 0x27, 0x66, 0x13, 0xec, 0x81, 0x15,
+    0xbd, 0x22, 0xbf, 0x9f, 0x7e, 0xa9, 0x51, 0x4b,
+    0x4c, 0xfb, 0x02, 0xd3, 0x70, 0x86, 0x31, 0xe7,
+    0x3b, 0x05, 0x03, 0x54, 0x60, 0x48, 0x65, 0x18,
+    0xd2, 0xcd, 0x5f, 0x32, 0x88, 0x0e, 0x35, 0xfd,
+};
+
+main()
+{
+    int i, j;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
+        for (j = 0; j < 256; j++)
+            if (ebits_to_num[j] == i) {
+                printf("0x%02x,", j);
+                break;
+            }
+    }
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-586.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-586.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7d6f97c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-586.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,428 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 1998-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+# ====================================================================
+# [Re]written by Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+
+# At some point it became apparent that the original SSLeay RC4
+# assembler implementation performs suboptimally on latest IA-32
+# microarchitectures. After re-tuning performance has changed as
+# following:
+#
+# Pentium	-10%
+# Pentium III	+12%
+# AMD		+50%(*)
+# P4		+250%(**)
+#
+# (*)	This number is actually a trade-off:-) It's possible to
+#	achieve	+72%, but at the cost of -48% off PIII performance.
+#	In other words code performing further 13% faster on AMD
+#	would perform almost 2 times slower on Intel PIII...
+#	For reference! This code delivers ~80% of rc4-amd64.pl
+#	performance on the same Opteron machine.
+# (**)	This number requires compressed key schedule set up by
+#	RC4_set_key [see commentary below for further details].
+#
+#					<appro@fy.chalmers.se>
+
+# May 2011
+#
+# Optimize for Core2 and Westmere [and incidentally Opteron]. Current
+# performance in cycles per processed byte (less is better) and
+# improvement relative to previous version of this module is:
+#
+# Pentium	10.2			# original numbers
+# Pentium III	7.8(*)
+# Intel P4	7.5
+#
+# Opteron	6.1/+20%		# new MMX numbers
+# Core2		5.3/+67%(**)
+# Westmere	5.1/+94%(**)
+# Sandy Bridge	5.0/+8%
+# Atom		12.6/+6%
+# VIA Nano	6.4/+9%
+# Ivy Bridge	4.9/±0%
+# Bulldozer	4.9/+15%
+#
+# (*)	PIII can actually deliver 6.6 cycles per byte with MMX code,
+#	but this specific code performs poorly on Core2. And vice
+#	versa, below MMX/SSE code delivering 5.8/7.1 on Core2 performs
+#	poorly on PIII, at 8.0/14.5:-( As PIII is not a "hot" CPU
+#	[anymore], I chose to discard PIII-specific code path and opt
+#	for original IALU-only code, which is why MMX/SSE code path
+#	is guarded by SSE2 bit (see below), not MMX/SSE.
+# (**)	Performance vs. block size on Core2 and Westmere had a maximum
+#	at ... 64 bytes block size. And it was quite a maximum, 40-60%
+#	in comparison to largest 8KB block size. Above improvement
+#	coefficients are for the largest block size.
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm");
+require "x86asm.pl";
+
+$output=pop;
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+&asm_init($ARGV[0],"rc4-586.pl",$x86only = $ARGV[$#ARGV] eq "386");
+
+$xx="eax";
+$yy="ebx";
+$tx="ecx";
+$ty="edx";
+$inp="esi";
+$out="ebp";
+$dat="edi";
+
+sub RC4_loop {
+  my $i=shift;
+  my $func = ($i==0)?*mov:*or;
+
+	&add	(&LB($yy),&LB($tx));
+	&mov	($ty,&DWP(0,$dat,$yy,4));
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,$dat,$yy,4),$tx);
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,$dat,$xx,4),$ty);
+	&add	($ty,$tx);
+	&inc	(&LB($xx));
+	&and	($ty,0xff);
+	&ror	($out,8)	if ($i!=0);
+	if ($i<3) {
+	  &mov	($tx,&DWP(0,$dat,$xx,4));
+	} else {
+	  &mov	($tx,&wparam(3));	# reload [re-biased] out
+	}
+	&$func	($out,&DWP(0,$dat,$ty,4));
+}
+
+if ($alt=0) {
+  # >20% faster on Atom and Sandy Bridge[!], 8% faster on Opteron,
+  # but ~40% slower on Core2 and Westmere... Attempt to add movz
+  # brings down Opteron by 25%, Atom and Sandy Bridge by 15%, yet
+  # on Core2 with movz it's almost 20% slower than below alternative
+  # code... Yes, it's a total mess...
+  my @XX=($xx,$out);
+  $RC4_loop_mmx = sub {		# SSE actually...
+    my $i=shift;
+    my $j=$i<=0?0:$i>>1;
+    my $mm=$i<=0?"mm0":"mm".($i&1);
+
+	&add	(&LB($yy),&LB($tx));
+	&lea	(@XX[1],&DWP(1,@XX[0]));
+	&pxor	("mm2","mm0")				if ($i==0);
+	&psllq	("mm1",8)				if ($i==0);
+	&and	(@XX[1],0xff);
+	&pxor	("mm0","mm0")				if ($i<=0);
+	&mov	($ty,&DWP(0,$dat,$yy,4));
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,$dat,$yy,4),$tx);
+	&pxor	("mm1","mm2")				if ($i==0);
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,$dat,$XX[0],4),$ty);
+	&add	(&LB($ty),&LB($tx));
+	&movd	(@XX[0],"mm7")				if ($i==0);
+	&mov	($tx,&DWP(0,$dat,@XX[1],4));
+	&pxor	("mm1","mm1")				if ($i==1);
+	&movq	("mm2",&QWP(0,$inp))			if ($i==1);
+	&movq	(&QWP(-8,(@XX[0],$inp)),"mm1")		if ($i==0);
+	&pinsrw	($mm,&DWP(0,$dat,$ty,4),$j);
+
+	push	(@XX,shift(@XX))			if ($i>=0);
+  }
+} else {
+  # Using pinsrw here improves performane on Intel CPUs by 2-3%, but
+  # brings down AMD by 7%...
+  $RC4_loop_mmx = sub {
+    my $i=shift;
+
+	&add	(&LB($yy),&LB($tx));
+	&psllq	("mm1",8*(($i-1)&7))			if (abs($i)!=1);
+	&mov	($ty,&DWP(0,$dat,$yy,4));
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,$dat,$yy,4),$tx);
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,$dat,$xx,4),$ty);
+	&inc	($xx);
+	&add	($ty,$tx);
+	&movz	($xx,&LB($xx));				# (*)
+	&movz	($ty,&LB($ty));				# (*)
+	&pxor	("mm2",$i==1?"mm0":"mm1")		if ($i>=0);
+	&movq	("mm0",&QWP(0,$inp))			if ($i<=0);
+	&movq	(&QWP(-8,($out,$inp)),"mm2")		if ($i==0);
+	&mov	($tx,&DWP(0,$dat,$xx,4));
+	&movd	($i>0?"mm1":"mm2",&DWP(0,$dat,$ty,4));
+
+	# (*)	This is the key to Core2 and Westmere performance.
+	#	Without movz out-of-order execution logic confuses
+	#	itself and fails to reorder loads and stores. Problem
+	#	appears to be fixed in Sandy Bridge...
+  }
+}
+
+&external_label("OPENSSL_ia32cap_P");
+
+# void RC4(RC4_KEY *key,size_t len,const unsigned char *inp,unsigned char *out);
+&function_begin("RC4");
+	&mov	($dat,&wparam(0));	# load key schedule pointer
+	&mov	($ty, &wparam(1));	# load len
+	&mov	($inp,&wparam(2));	# load inp
+	&mov	($out,&wparam(3));	# load out
+
+	&xor	($xx,$xx);		# avoid partial register stalls
+	&xor	($yy,$yy);
+
+	&cmp	($ty,0);		# safety net
+	&je	(&label("abort"));
+
+	&mov	(&LB($xx),&BP(0,$dat));	# load key->x
+	&mov	(&LB($yy),&BP(4,$dat));	# load key->y
+	&add	($dat,8);
+
+	&lea	($tx,&DWP(0,$inp,$ty));
+	&sub	($out,$inp);		# re-bias out
+	&mov	(&wparam(1),$tx);	# save input+len
+
+	&inc	(&LB($xx));
+
+	# detect compressed key schedule...
+	&cmp	(&DWP(256,$dat),-1);
+	&je	(&label("RC4_CHAR"));
+
+	&mov	($tx,&DWP(0,$dat,$xx,4));
+
+	&and	($ty,-4);		# how many 4-byte chunks?
+	&jz	(&label("loop1"));
+
+	&mov	(&wparam(3),$out);	# $out as accumulator in these loops
+					if ($x86only) {
+	&jmp	(&label("go4loop4"));
+					} else {
+	&test	($ty,-8);
+	&jz	(&label("go4loop4"));
+
+	&picmeup($out,"OPENSSL_ia32cap_P");
+	&bt	(&DWP(0,$out),26);	# check SSE2 bit [could have been MMX]
+	&jnc	(&label("go4loop4"));
+
+	&mov	($out,&wparam(3))	if (!$alt);
+	&movd	("mm7",&wparam(3))	if ($alt);
+	&and	($ty,-8);
+	&lea	($ty,&DWP(-8,$inp,$ty));
+	&mov	(&DWP(-4,$dat),$ty);	# save input+(len/8)*8-8
+
+	&$RC4_loop_mmx(-1);
+	&jmp(&label("loop_mmx_enter"));
+
+	&set_label("loop_mmx",16);
+		&$RC4_loop_mmx(0);
+	&set_label("loop_mmx_enter");
+		for 	($i=1;$i<8;$i++) { &$RC4_loop_mmx($i); }
+		&mov	($ty,$yy);
+		&xor	($yy,$yy);		# this is second key to Core2
+		&mov	(&LB($yy),&LB($ty));	# and Westmere performance...
+		&cmp	($inp,&DWP(-4,$dat));
+		&lea	($inp,&DWP(8,$inp));
+	&jb	(&label("loop_mmx"));
+
+    if ($alt) {
+	&movd	($out,"mm7");
+	&pxor	("mm2","mm0");
+	&psllq	("mm1",8);
+	&pxor	("mm1","mm2");
+	&movq	(&QWP(-8,$out,$inp),"mm1");
+    } else {
+	&psllq	("mm1",56);
+	&pxor	("mm2","mm1");
+	&movq	(&QWP(-8,$out,$inp),"mm2");
+    }
+	&emms	();
+
+	&cmp	($inp,&wparam(1));	# compare to input+len
+	&je	(&label("done"));
+	&jmp	(&label("loop1"));
+					}
+
+&set_label("go4loop4",16);
+	&lea	($ty,&DWP(-4,$inp,$ty));
+	&mov	(&wparam(2),$ty);	# save input+(len/4)*4-4
+
+	&set_label("loop4");
+		for ($i=0;$i<4;$i++) { RC4_loop($i); }
+		&ror	($out,8);
+		&xor	($out,&DWP(0,$inp));
+		&cmp	($inp,&wparam(2));	# compare to input+(len/4)*4-4
+		&mov	(&DWP(0,$tx,$inp),$out);# $tx holds re-biased out here
+		&lea	($inp,&DWP(4,$inp));
+		&mov	($tx,&DWP(0,$dat,$xx,4));
+	&jb	(&label("loop4"));
+
+	&cmp	($inp,&wparam(1));	# compare to input+len
+	&je	(&label("done"));
+	&mov	($out,&wparam(3));	# restore $out
+
+	&set_label("loop1",16);
+		&add	(&LB($yy),&LB($tx));
+		&mov	($ty,&DWP(0,$dat,$yy,4));
+		&mov	(&DWP(0,$dat,$yy,4),$tx);
+		&mov	(&DWP(0,$dat,$xx,4),$ty);
+		&add	($ty,$tx);
+		&inc	(&LB($xx));
+		&and	($ty,0xff);
+		&mov	($ty,&DWP(0,$dat,$ty,4));
+		&xor	(&LB($ty),&BP(0,$inp));
+		&lea	($inp,&DWP(1,$inp));
+		&mov	($tx,&DWP(0,$dat,$xx,4));
+		&cmp	($inp,&wparam(1));	# compare to input+len
+		&mov	(&BP(-1,$out,$inp),&LB($ty));
+	&jb	(&label("loop1"));
+
+	&jmp	(&label("done"));
+
+# this is essentially Intel P4 specific codepath...
+&set_label("RC4_CHAR",16);
+	&movz	($tx,&BP(0,$dat,$xx));
+	# strangely enough unrolled loop performs over 20% slower...
+	&set_label("cloop1");
+		&add	(&LB($yy),&LB($tx));
+		&movz	($ty,&BP(0,$dat,$yy));
+		&mov	(&BP(0,$dat,$yy),&LB($tx));
+		&mov	(&BP(0,$dat,$xx),&LB($ty));
+		&add	(&LB($ty),&LB($tx));
+		&movz	($ty,&BP(0,$dat,$ty));
+		&add	(&LB($xx),1);
+		&xor	(&LB($ty),&BP(0,$inp));
+		&lea	($inp,&DWP(1,$inp));
+		&movz	($tx,&BP(0,$dat,$xx));
+		&cmp	($inp,&wparam(1));
+		&mov	(&BP(-1,$out,$inp),&LB($ty));
+	&jb	(&label("cloop1"));
+
+&set_label("done");
+	&dec	(&LB($xx));
+	&mov	(&DWP(-4,$dat),$yy);		# save key->y
+	&mov	(&BP(-8,$dat),&LB($xx));	# save key->x
+&set_label("abort");
+&function_end("RC4");
+
+########################################################################
+
+$inp="esi";
+$out="edi";
+$idi="ebp";
+$ido="ecx";
+$idx="edx";
+
+# void RC4_set_key(RC4_KEY *key,int len,const unsigned char *data);
+&function_begin("RC4_set_key");
+	&mov	($out,&wparam(0));		# load key
+	&mov	($idi,&wparam(1));		# load len
+	&mov	($inp,&wparam(2));		# load data
+	&picmeup($idx,"OPENSSL_ia32cap_P");
+
+	&lea	($out,&DWP(2*4,$out));		# &key->data
+	&lea	($inp,&DWP(0,$inp,$idi));	# $inp to point at the end
+	&neg	($idi);
+	&xor	("eax","eax");
+	&mov	(&DWP(-4,$out),$idi);		# borrow key->y
+
+	&bt	(&DWP(0,$idx),20);		# check for bit#20
+	&jc	(&label("c1stloop"));
+
+&set_label("w1stloop",16);
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,$out,"eax",4),"eax");	# key->data[i]=i;
+	&add	(&LB("eax"),1);			# i++;
+	&jnc	(&label("w1stloop"));
+
+	&xor	($ido,$ido);
+	&xor	($idx,$idx);
+
+&set_label("w2ndloop",16);
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(0,$out,$ido,4));
+	&add	(&LB($idx),&BP(0,$inp,$idi));
+	&add	(&LB($idx),&LB("eax"));
+	&add	($idi,1);
+	&mov	("ebx",&DWP(0,$out,$idx,4));
+	&jnz	(&label("wnowrap"));
+	  &mov	($idi,&DWP(-4,$out));
+	&set_label("wnowrap");
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,$out,$idx,4),"eax");
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,$out,$ido,4),"ebx");
+	&add	(&LB($ido),1);
+	&jnc	(&label("w2ndloop"));
+&jmp	(&label("exit"));
+
+# Unlike all other x86 [and x86_64] implementations, Intel P4 core
+# [including EM64T] was found to perform poorly with above "32-bit" key
+# schedule, a.k.a. RC4_INT. Performance improvement for IA-32 hand-coded
+# assembler turned out to be 3.5x if re-coded for compressed 8-bit one,
+# a.k.a. RC4_CHAR! It's however inappropriate to just switch to 8-bit
+# schedule for x86[_64], because non-P4 implementations suffer from
+# significant performance losses then, e.g. PIII exhibits >2x
+# deterioration, and so does Opteron. In order to assure optimal
+# all-round performance, we detect P4 at run-time and set up compressed
+# key schedule, which is recognized by RC4 procedure.
+
+&set_label("c1stloop",16);
+	&mov	(&BP(0,$out,"eax"),&LB("eax"));	# key->data[i]=i;
+	&add	(&LB("eax"),1);			# i++;
+	&jnc	(&label("c1stloop"));
+
+	&xor	($ido,$ido);
+	&xor	($idx,$idx);
+	&xor	("ebx","ebx");
+
+&set_label("c2ndloop",16);
+	&mov	(&LB("eax"),&BP(0,$out,$ido));
+	&add	(&LB($idx),&BP(0,$inp,$idi));
+	&add	(&LB($idx),&LB("eax"));
+	&add	($idi,1);
+	&mov	(&LB("ebx"),&BP(0,$out,$idx));
+	&jnz	(&label("cnowrap"));
+	  &mov	($idi,&DWP(-4,$out));
+	&set_label("cnowrap");
+	&mov	(&BP(0,$out,$idx),&LB("eax"));
+	&mov	(&BP(0,$out,$ido),&LB("ebx"));
+	&add	(&LB($ido),1);
+	&jnc	(&label("c2ndloop"));
+
+	&mov	(&DWP(256,$out),-1);		# mark schedule as compressed
+
+&set_label("exit");
+	&xor	("eax","eax");
+	&mov	(&DWP(-8,$out),"eax");		# key->x=0;
+	&mov	(&DWP(-4,$out),"eax");		# key->y=0;
+&function_end("RC4_set_key");
+
+# const char *RC4_options(void);
+&function_begin_B("RC4_options");
+	&call	(&label("pic_point"));
+&set_label("pic_point");
+	&blindpop("eax");
+	&lea	("eax",&DWP(&label("opts")."-".&label("pic_point"),"eax"));
+	&picmeup("edx","OPENSSL_ia32cap_P");
+	&mov	("edx",&DWP(0,"edx"));
+	&bt	("edx",20);
+	&jc	(&label("1xchar"));
+	&bt	("edx",26);
+	&jnc	(&label("ret"));
+	&add	("eax",25);
+	&ret	();
+&set_label("1xchar");
+	&add	("eax",12);
+&set_label("ret");
+	&ret	();
+&set_label("opts",64);
+&asciz	("rc4(4x,int)");
+&asciz	("rc4(1x,char)");
+&asciz	("rc4(8x,mmx)");
+&asciz	("RC4 for x86, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>");
+&align	(64);
+&function_end_B("RC4_options");
+
+&asm_finish();
+
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-c64xplus.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-c64xplus.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..184922c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-c64xplus.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,192 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2014-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# RC4 for C64x+.
+#
+# April 2014
+#
+# RC4 subroutine processes one byte in 7.0 cycles, which is 3x faster
+# than TI CGT-generated code. Loop is scheduled in such way that
+# there is only one reference to memory in each cycle. This is done
+# to avoid L1D memory banking conflicts, see SPRU871 TI publication
+# for further details. Otherwise it should be possible to schedule
+# the loop for iteration interval of 6...
+
+($KEY,$LEN,$INP,$OUT)=("A4","B4","A6","B6");
+
+($KEYA,$XX,$TY,$xx,$ONE,$ret)=map("A$_",(5,7,8,9,1,2));
+($KEYB,$YY,$TX,$tx,$SUM,$dat)=map("B$_",(5,7,8,9,1,2));
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	.text
+
+	.if	.ASSEMBLER_VERSION<7000000
+	.asg	0,__TI_EABI__
+	.endif
+	.if	__TI_EABI__
+	.nocmp
+	.asg	RC4,_RC4
+	.asg	RC4_set_key,_RC4_set_key
+	.asg	RC4_options,_RC4_options
+	.endif
+
+	.global	_RC4
+	.align	16
+_RC4:
+	.asmfunc
+	MV	$LEN,B0
+  [!B0]	BNOP	B3			; if (len==0) return;
+||[B0]	ADD	$KEY,2,$KEYA
+||[B0]	ADD	$KEY,2,$KEYB
+  [B0]	MVK	1,$ONE
+||[B0]	LDBU	*${KEYA}[-2],$XX	; key->x
+  [B0]	LDBU	*${KEYB}[-1],$YY	; key->y
+||	NOP	4
+
+	ADD4	$ONE,$XX,$XX
+	LDBU	*${KEYA}[$XX],$TX
+||	MVC	$LEN,ILC
+	NOP	4
+;;==================================================
+	SPLOOP	7
+||	ADD4	$TX,$YY,$YY
+
+	LDBU	*${KEYB}[$YY],$TY
+||	MVD	$XX,$xx
+||	ADD4	$ONE,$XX,$XX
+	LDBU	*${KEYA}[$XX],$tx
+	CMPEQ	$YY,$XX,B0
+||	NOP	3
+	STB	$TX,*${KEYB}[$YY]
+||[B0]	ADD4	$TX,$YY,$YY
+	STB	$TY,*${KEYA}[$xx]
+||[!B0]	ADD4	$tx,$YY,$YY
+||[!B0]	MVD	$tx,$TX
+	ADD4	$TY,$TX,$SUM		; [0,0] $TX is not replaced by $tx yet!
+||	NOP	2
+	LDBU	*$INP++,$dat
+||	NOP	2
+	LDBU	*${KEYB}[$SUM],$ret
+||	NOP	5
+	XOR.L	$dat,$ret,$ret
+	SPKERNEL
+||	STB	$ret,*$OUT++
+;;==================================================
+	SUB4	$XX,$ONE,$XX
+||	NOP	5
+	STB	$XX,*${KEYA}[-2]	; key->x
+||	SUB4	$YY,$TX,$YY
+||	BNOP	B3	
+	STB	$YY,*${KEYB}[-1]	; key->y
+||	NOP	5
+	.endasmfunc
+
+	.global	_RC4_set_key
+	.align	16
+_RC4_set_key:
+	.asmfunc
+	.if	.BIG_ENDIAN
+	MVK	0x00000404,$ONE
+||	MVK	0x00000203,B0
+	MVKH	0x04040000,$ONE
+||	MVKH	0x00010000,B0
+	.else
+	MVK	0x00000404,$ONE
+||	MVK	0x00000100,B0
+	MVKH	0x04040000,$ONE
+||	MVKH	0x03020000,B0
+	.endif
+	ADD	$KEY,2,$KEYA
+||	ADD	$KEY,2,$KEYB
+||	ADD	$INP,$LEN,$ret		; end of input
+	LDBU	*${INP}++,$dat
+||	MVK	0,$TX
+	STH	$TX,*${KEY}++		; key->x=key->y=0
+||	MV	B0,A0
+||	MVK	64-4,B0
+
+;;==================================================
+	SPLOOPD	1
+||	MVC	B0,ILC
+
+	STNW	A0,*${KEY}++
+||	ADD4	$ONE,A0,A0
+	SPKERNEL
+;;==================================================
+
+	MVK	0,$YY
+||	MVK	0,$XX
+	MVK	1,$ONE
+||	MVK	256-1,B0
+
+;;==================================================
+	SPLOOPD	8
+||	MVC	B0,ILC
+
+	ADD4	$dat,$YY,$YY
+||	CMPEQ	$INP,$ret,A0		; end of input?
+	LDBU	*${KEYB}[$YY],$TY
+||	MVD	$XX,$xx
+||	ADD4	$ONE,$XX,$XX
+	LDBU	*${KEYA}[$XX],$tx
+||[A0]	SUB	$INP,$LEN,$INP		; rewind
+	LDBU	*${INP}++,$dat
+||	CMPEQ	$YY,$XX,B0
+||	NOP	3
+	STB	$TX,*${KEYB}[$YY]
+||[B0]	ADD4	$TX,$YY,$YY
+	STB	$TY,*${KEYA}[$xx]
+||[!B0]	ADD4	$tx,$YY,$YY
+||[!B0]	MV	$tx,$TX
+	SPKERNEL
+;;==================================================
+
+	BNOP	B3,5
+	.endasmfunc
+
+	.global	_RC4_options
+	.align	16
+_RC4_options:
+_rc4_options:
+	.asmfunc
+	BNOP	B3,1
+	ADDKPC	_rc4_options,B4
+	.if	__TI_EABI__
+	MVKL	\$PCR_OFFSET(rc4_options,_rc4_options),A4
+	MVKH	\$PCR_OFFSET(rc4_options,_rc4_options),A4
+	.else
+	MVKL	(rc4_options-_rc4_options),A4
+	MVKH	(rc4_options-_rc4_options),A4
+	.endif
+	ADD	B4,A4,A4
+	.endasmfunc
+
+	.if	__TI_EABI__
+	.sect	".text:rc4_options.const"
+	.else
+	.sect	".const:rc4_options"
+	.endif
+	.align	4
+rc4_options:
+	.cstring "rc4(sploop,char)"
+	.cstring "RC4 for C64+, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+	.align	4
+___
+
+$output=pop;
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+print $code;
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-ia64.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-ia64.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5e8f5f5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-ia64.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,767 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by David Mosberger <David.Mosberger@acm.org> based on the
+# Itanium optimized Crypto code which was released by HP Labs at
+# http://www.hpl.hp.com/research/linux/crypto/.
+#
+# Copyright (c) 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
+#
+# Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+# a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+# "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+# without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+# distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+# permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+# the following conditions:
+#
+# The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+# included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+
+# THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+# EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+# MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+# NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE
+# LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
+# OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION
+# WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.  */
+
+
+
+# This is a little helper program which generates a software-pipelined
+# for RC4 encryption.  The basic algorithm looks like this:
+#
+#   for (counter = 0; counter < len; ++counter)
+#     {
+#       in = inp[counter];
+#       SI = S[I];
+#       J = (SI + J) & 0xff;
+#       SJ = S[J];
+#       T = (SI + SJ) & 0xff;
+#       S[I] = SJ, S[J] = SI;
+#       ST = S[T];
+#       outp[counter] = in ^ ST;
+#       I = (I + 1) & 0xff;
+#     }
+#
+# Pipelining this loop isn't easy, because the stores to the S[] array
+# need to be observed in the right order.  The loop generated by the
+# code below has the following pipeline diagram:
+#
+#      cycle
+#     | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 |10 |11 |12 |13 |14 |15 |16 |17 |
+# iter
+#   1: xxx LDI xxx xxx xxx LDJ xxx SWP xxx LDT xxx xxx
+#   2:             xxx LDI xxx xxx xxx LDJ xxx SWP xxx LDT xxx xxx
+#   3:                         xxx LDI xxx xxx xxx LDJ xxx SWP xxx LDT xxx xxx
+#
+#   where:
+# 	LDI = load of S[I]
+# 	LDJ = load of S[J]
+# 	SWP = swap of S[I] and S[J]
+# 	LDT = load of S[T]
+#
+# Note that in the above diagram, the major trouble-spot is that LDI
+# of the 2nd iteration is performed BEFORE the SWP of the first
+# iteration.  Fortunately, this is easy to detect (I of the 1st
+# iteration will be equal to J of the 2nd iteration) and when this
+# happens, we simply forward the proper value from the 1st iteration
+# to the 2nd one.  The proper value in this case is simply the value
+# of S[I] from the first iteration (thanks to the fact that SWP
+# simply swaps the contents of S[I] and S[J]).
+#
+# Another potential trouble-spot is in cycle 7, where SWP of the 1st
+# iteration issues at the same time as the LDI of the 3rd iteration.
+# However, thanks to IA-64 execution semantics, this can be taken
+# care of simply by placing LDI later in the instruction-group than
+# SWP.  IA-64 CPUs will automatically forward the value if they
+# detect that the SWP and LDI are accessing the same memory-location.
+
+# The core-loop that can be pipelined then looks like this (annotated
+# with McKinley/Madison issue port & latency numbers, assuming L1
+# cache hits for the most part):
+
+# operation:	    instruction:		    issue-ports:  latency
+# ------------------  -----------------------------   ------------- -------
+
+# Data = *inp++       ld1 data = [inp], 1             M0-M1         1 cyc     c0
+#                     shladd Iptr = I, KeyTable, 3    M0-M3, I0, I1 1 cyc
+# I = (I + 1) & 0xff  padd1 nextI = I, one            M0-M3, I0, I1 3 cyc
+#                     ;;
+# SI = S[I]           ld8 SI = [Iptr]                 M0-M1         1 cyc     c1 * after SWAP!
+#                     ;;
+#                     cmp.eq.unc pBypass = I, J                                  * after J is valid!
+# J = SI + J          add J = J, SI                   M0-M3, I0, I1 1 cyc     c2
+#                     (pBypass) br.cond.spnt Bypass
+#                     ;;
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# J = J & 0xff        zxt1 J = J                      I0, I1, 1 cyc           c3
+#                     ;;
+#                     shladd Jptr = J, KeyTable, 3    M0-M3, I0, I1 1 cyc     c4
+#                     ;;
+# SJ = S[J]           ld8 SJ = [Jptr]                 M0-M1         1 cyc     c5
+#                     ;;
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# T = (SI + SJ)       add T = SI, SJ                  M0-M3, I0, I1 1 cyc     c6
+#                     ;;
+# T = T & 0xff        zxt1 T = T                      I0, I1        1 cyc
+# S[I] = SJ           st8 [Iptr] = SJ                 M2-M3                   c7
+# S[J] = SI           st8 [Jptr] = SI                 M2-M3
+#                     ;;
+#                     shladd Tptr = T, KeyTable, 3    M0-M3, I0, I1 1 cyc     c8
+#                     ;;
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# T = S[T]            ld8 T = [Tptr]                  M0-M1         1 cyc     c9
+#                     ;;
+# data ^= T           xor data = data, T              M0-M3, I0, I1 1 cyc     c10
+#                     ;;
+# *out++ = Data ^ T   dep word = word, data, 8, POS   I0, I1        1 cyc     c11
+#                     ;;
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+# There are several points worth making here:
+
+#   - Note that due to the bypass/forwarding-path, the first two
+#     phases of the loop are strangly mingled together.  In
+#     particular, note that the first stage of the pipeline is
+#     using the value of "J", as calculated by the second stage.
+#   - Each bundle-pair will have exactly 6 instructions.
+#   - Pipelined, the loop can execute in 3 cycles/iteration and
+#     4 stages.  However, McKinley/Madison can issue "st1" to
+#     the same bank at a rate of at most one per 4 cycles.  Thus,
+#     instead of storing each byte, we accumulate them in a word
+#     and then write them back at once with a single "st8" (this
+#     implies that the setup code needs to ensure that the output
+#     buffer is properly aligned, if need be, by encoding the
+#     first few bytes separately).
+#   - There is no space for a "br.ctop" instruction.  For this
+#     reason we can't use module-loop support in IA-64 and have
+#     to do a traditional, purely software-pipelined loop.
+#   - We can't replace any of the remaining "add/zxt1" pairs with
+#     "padd1" because the latency for that instruction is too high
+#     and would push the loop to the point where more bypasses
+#     would be needed, which we don't have space for.
+#   - The above loop runs at around 3.26 cycles/byte, or roughly
+#     440 MByte/sec on a 1.5GHz Madison.  This is well below the
+#     system bus bandwidth and hence with judicious use of
+#     "lfetch" this loop can run at (almost) peak speed even when
+#     the input and output data reside in memory.  The
+#     max. latency that can be tolerated is (PREFETCH_DISTANCE *
+#     L2_LINE_SIZE * 3 cyc), or about 384 cycles assuming (at
+#     least) 1-ahead prefetching of 128 byte cache-lines.  Note
+#     that we do NOT prefetch into L1, since that would only
+#     interfere with the S[] table values stored there.  This is
+#     acceptable because there is a 10 cycle latency between
+#     load and first use of the input data.
+#   - We use a branch to out-of-line bypass-code of cycle-pressure:
+#     we calculate the next J, check for the need to activate the
+#     bypass path, and activate the bypass path ALL IN THE SAME
+#     CYCLE.  If we didn't have these constraints, we could do
+#     the bypass with a simple conditional move instruction.
+#     Fortunately, the bypass paths get activated relatively
+#     infrequently, so the extra branches don't cost all that much
+#     (about 0.04 cycles/byte, measured on a 16396 byte file with
+#     random input data).
+#
+
+$output = pop;
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+$phases = 4;		# number of stages/phases in the pipelined-loop
+$unroll_count = 6;	# number of times we unrolled it
+$pComI = (1 << 0);
+$pComJ = (1 << 1);
+$pComT = (1 << 2);
+$pOut  = (1 << 3);
+
+$NData = 4;
+$NIP = 3;
+$NJP = 2;
+$NI = 2;
+$NSI = 3;
+$NSJ = 2;
+$NT = 2;
+$NOutWord = 2;
+
+#
+# $threshold is the minimum length before we attempt to use the
+# big software-pipelined loop.  It MUST be greater-or-equal
+# to:
+#  		PHASES * (UNROLL_COUNT + 1) + 7
+#
+# The "+ 7" comes from the fact we may have to encode up to
+#   7 bytes separately before the output pointer is aligned.
+#
+$threshold = (3 * ($phases * ($unroll_count + 1)) + 7);
+
+sub I {
+    local *code = shift;
+    local $format = shift;
+    $code .= sprintf ("\t\t".$format."\n", @_);
+}
+
+sub P {
+    local *code = shift;
+    local $format = shift;
+    $code .= sprintf ($format."\n", @_);
+}
+
+sub STOP {
+    local *code = shift;
+    $code .=<<___;
+		;;
+___
+}
+
+sub emit_body {
+    local *c = shift;
+    local *bypass = shift;
+    local ($iteration, $p) = @_;
+
+    local $i0 = $iteration;
+    local $i1 = $iteration - 1;
+    local $i2 = $iteration - 2;
+    local $i3 = $iteration - 3;
+    local $iw0 = ($iteration - 3) / 8;
+    local $iw1 = ($iteration > 3) ? ($iteration - 4) / 8 : 1;
+    local $byte_num = ($iteration - 3) % 8;
+    local $label = $iteration + 1;
+    local $pAny = ($p & 0xf) == 0xf;
+    local $pByp = (($p & $pComI) && ($iteration > 0));
+
+    $c.=<<___;
+//////////////////////////////////////////////////
+___
+
+    if (($p & 0xf) == 0) {
+	$c.="#ifdef HOST_IS_BIG_ENDIAN\n";
+	&I(\$c,"shr.u	OutWord[%u] = OutWord[%u], 32;;",
+				$iw1 % $NOutWord, $iw1 % $NOutWord);
+	$c.="#endif\n";
+	&I(\$c, "st4 [OutPtr] = OutWord[%u], 4", $iw1 % $NOutWord);
+	return;
+    }
+
+    # Cycle 0
+    &I(\$c, "{ .mmi")					      if ($pAny);
+    &I(\$c, "ld1    Data[%u] = [InPtr], 1", $i0 % $NData)     if ($p & $pComI);
+    &I(\$c, "padd1  I[%u] = One, I[%u]", $i0 % $NI, $i1 % $NI)if ($p & $pComI);
+    &I(\$c, "zxt1   J = J")				      if ($p & $pComJ);
+    &I(\$c, "}")					      if ($pAny);
+    &I(\$c, "{ .mmi")					      if ($pAny);
+    &I(\$c, "LKEY   T[%u] = [T[%u]]", $i1 % $NT, $i1 % $NT)   if ($p & $pOut);
+    &I(\$c, "add    T[%u] = SI[%u], SJ[%u]",
+       $i0 % $NT, $i2 % $NSI, $i1 % $NSJ)		      if ($p & $pComT);
+    &I(\$c, "KEYADDR(IPr[%u], I[%u])", $i0 % $NIP, $i1 % $NI) if ($p & $pComI);
+    &I(\$c, "}")					      if ($pAny);
+    &STOP(\$c);
+
+    # Cycle 1
+    &I(\$c, "{ .mmi")					      if ($pAny);
+    &I(\$c, "SKEY   [IPr[%u]] = SJ[%u]", $i2 % $NIP, $i1%$NSJ)if ($p & $pComT);
+    &I(\$c, "SKEY   [JP[%u]] = SI[%u]", $i1 % $NJP, $i2%$NSI) if ($p & $pComT);
+    &I(\$c, "zxt1   T[%u] = T[%u]", $i0 % $NT, $i0 % $NT)     if ($p & $pComT);
+    &I(\$c, "}")					      if ($pAny);
+    &I(\$c, "{ .mmi")					      if ($pAny);
+    &I(\$c, "LKEY   SI[%u] = [IPr[%u]]", $i0 % $NSI, $i0%$NIP)if ($p & $pComI);
+    &I(\$c, "KEYADDR(JP[%u], J)", $i0 % $NJP)		      if ($p & $pComJ);
+    &I(\$c, "xor    Data[%u] = Data[%u], T[%u]",
+       $i3 % $NData, $i3 % $NData, $i1 % $NT)		      if ($p & $pOut);
+    &I(\$c, "}")					      if ($pAny);
+    &STOP(\$c);
+
+    # Cycle 2
+    &I(\$c, "{ .mmi")					      if ($pAny);
+    &I(\$c, "LKEY   SJ[%u] = [JP[%u]]", $i0 % $NSJ, $i0%$NJP) if ($p & $pComJ);
+    &I(\$c, "cmp.eq pBypass, p0 = I[%u], J", $i1 % $NI)	      if ($pByp);
+    &I(\$c, "dep OutWord[%u] = Data[%u], OutWord[%u], BYTE_POS(%u), 8",
+       $iw0%$NOutWord, $i3%$NData, $iw1%$NOutWord, $byte_num) if ($p & $pOut);
+    &I(\$c, "}")					      if ($pAny);
+    &I(\$c, "{ .mmb")					      if ($pAny);
+    &I(\$c, "add    J = J, SI[%u]", $i0 % $NSI)		      if ($p & $pComI);
+    &I(\$c, "KEYADDR(T[%u], T[%u])", $i0 % $NT, $i0 % $NT)    if ($p & $pComT);
+    &P(\$c, "(pBypass)\tbr.cond.spnt.many .rc4Bypass%u",$label)if ($pByp);
+    &I(\$c, "}") if ($pAny);
+    &STOP(\$c);
+
+    &P(\$c, ".rc4Resume%u:", $label)			      if ($pByp);
+    if ($byte_num == 0 && $iteration >= $phases) {
+	&I(\$c, "st8 [OutPtr] = OutWord[%u], 8",
+	   $iw1 % $NOutWord)				      if ($p & $pOut);
+	if ($iteration == (1 + $unroll_count) * $phases - 1) {
+	    if ($unroll_count == 6) {
+		&I(\$c, "mov OutWord[%u] = OutWord[%u]",
+		   $iw1 % $NOutWord, $iw0 % $NOutWord);
+	    }
+	    &I(\$c, "lfetch.nt1 [InPrefetch], %u",
+	       $unroll_count * $phases);
+	    &I(\$c, "lfetch.excl.nt1 [OutPrefetch], %u",
+	       $unroll_count * $phases);
+	    &I(\$c, "br.cloop.sptk.few .rc4Loop");
+	}
+    }
+
+    if ($pByp) {
+	&P(\$bypass, ".rc4Bypass%u:", $label);
+	&I(\$bypass, "sub J = J, SI[%u]", $i0 % $NSI);
+	&I(\$bypass, "nop 0");
+	&I(\$bypass, "nop 0");
+	&I(\$bypass, ";;");
+	&I(\$bypass, "add J = J, SI[%u]", $i1 % $NSI);
+	&I(\$bypass, "mov SI[%u] = SI[%u]", $i0 % $NSI, $i1 % $NSI);
+	&I(\$bypass, "br.sptk.many .rc4Resume%u\n", $label);
+	&I(\$bypass, ";;");
+    }
+}
+
+$code=<<___;
+.ident \"rc4-ia64.s, version 3.0\"
+.ident \"Copyright (c) 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.\"
+
+#define LCSave		r8
+#define PRSave		r9
+
+/* Inputs become invalid once rotation begins!  */
+
+#define StateTable	in0
+#define DataLen		in1
+#define InputBuffer	in2
+#define OutputBuffer	in3
+
+#define KTable		r14
+#define J		r15
+#define InPtr		r16
+#define OutPtr		r17
+#define InPrefetch	r18
+#define OutPrefetch	r19
+#define One		r20
+#define LoopCount	r21
+#define Remainder	r22
+#define IFinal		r23
+#define EndPtr		r24
+
+#define tmp0		r25
+#define tmp1		r26
+
+#define pBypass		p6
+#define pDone		p7
+#define pSmall		p8
+#define pAligned	p9
+#define pUnaligned	p10
+
+#define pComputeI	pPhase[0]
+#define pComputeJ	pPhase[1]
+#define pComputeT	pPhase[2]
+#define pOutput		pPhase[3]
+
+#define RetVal		r8
+#define L_OK		p7
+#define L_NOK		p8
+
+#define	_NINPUTS	4
+#define	_NOUTPUT	0
+
+#define	_NROTATE	24
+#define	_NLOCALS	(_NROTATE - _NINPUTS - _NOUTPUT)
+
+#ifndef SZ
+# define SZ	4	// this must be set to sizeof(RC4_INT)
+#endif
+
+#if SZ == 1
+# define LKEY			ld1
+# define SKEY			st1
+# define KEYADDR(dst, i)	add dst = i, KTable
+#elif SZ == 2
+# define LKEY			ld2
+# define SKEY			st2
+# define KEYADDR(dst, i)	shladd dst = i, 1, KTable
+#elif SZ == 4
+# define LKEY			ld4
+# define SKEY			st4
+# define KEYADDR(dst, i)	shladd dst = i, 2, KTable
+#else
+# define LKEY			ld8
+# define SKEY			st8
+# define KEYADDR(dst, i)	shladd dst = i, 3, KTable
+#endif
+
+#if defined(_HPUX_SOURCE) && !defined(_LP64)
+# define ADDP	addp4
+#else
+# define ADDP	add
+#endif
+
+/* Define a macro for the bit number of the n-th byte: */
+
+#if defined(_HPUX_SOURCE) || defined(B_ENDIAN)
+# define HOST_IS_BIG_ENDIAN
+# define BYTE_POS(n)	(56 - (8 * (n)))
+#else
+# define BYTE_POS(n)	(8 * (n))
+#endif
+
+/*
+   We must perform the first phase of the pipeline explicitly since
+   we will always load from the stable the first time. The br.cexit
+   will never be taken since regardless of the number of bytes because
+   the epilogue count is 4.
+*/
+/* MODSCHED_RC4 macro was split to _PROLOGUE and _LOOP, because HP-UX
+   assembler failed on original macro with syntax error. <appro> */
+#define MODSCHED_RC4_PROLOGUE						   \\
+	{								   \\
+				ld1		Data[0] = [InPtr], 1;	   \\
+				add		IFinal = 1, I[1];	   \\
+				KEYADDR(IPr[0], I[1]);			   \\
+	} ;;								   \\
+	{								   \\
+				LKEY		SI[0] = [IPr[0]];	   \\
+				mov		pr.rot = 0x10000;	   \\
+				mov		ar.ec = 4;		   \\
+	} ;;								   \\
+	{								   \\
+				add		J = J, SI[0];		   \\
+				zxt1		I[0] = IFinal;		   \\
+				br.cexit.spnt.few .+16; /* never taken */  \\
+	} ;;
+#define MODSCHED_RC4_LOOP(label)					   \\
+label:									   \\
+	{	.mmi;							   \\
+		(pComputeI)	ld1		Data[0] = [InPtr], 1;	   \\
+		(pComputeI)	add		IFinal = 1, I[1];	   \\
+		(pComputeJ)	zxt1		J = J;			   \\
+	}{	.mmi;							   \\
+		(pOutput)	LKEY		T[1] = [T[1]];		   \\
+		(pComputeT)	add		T[0] = SI[2], SJ[1];	   \\
+		(pComputeI)	KEYADDR(IPr[0], I[1]);			   \\
+	} ;;								   \\
+	{	.mmi;							   \\
+		(pComputeT)	SKEY		[IPr[2]] = SJ[1];	   \\
+		(pComputeT)	SKEY		[JP[1]] = SI[2];	   \\
+		(pComputeT)	zxt1		T[0] = T[0];		   \\
+	}{	.mmi;							   \\
+		(pComputeI)	LKEY		SI[0] = [IPr[0]];	   \\
+		(pComputeJ)	KEYADDR(JP[0], J);			   \\
+		(pComputeI)	cmp.eq.unc	pBypass, p0 = I[1], J;	   \\
+	} ;;								   \\
+	{	.mmi;							   \\
+		(pComputeJ)	LKEY		SJ[0] = [JP[0]];	   \\
+		(pOutput)	xor		Data[3] = Data[3], T[1];   \\
+				nop		0x0;			   \\
+	}{	.mmi;							   \\
+		(pComputeT)	KEYADDR(T[0], T[0]);			   \\
+		(pBypass)	mov		SI[0] = SI[1];		   \\
+		(pComputeI)	zxt1		I[0] = IFinal;		   \\
+	} ;;								   \\
+	{	.mmb;							   \\
+		(pOutput)	st1		[OutPtr] = Data[3], 1;	   \\
+		(pComputeI)	add		J = J, SI[0];		   \\
+				br.ctop.sptk.few label;			   \\
+	} ;;
+
+	.text
+
+	.align	32
+
+	.type	RC4, \@function
+	.global	RC4
+
+	.proc	RC4
+	.prologue
+
+RC4:
+	{
+	  	.mmi
+		alloc	r2 = ar.pfs, _NINPUTS, _NLOCALS, _NOUTPUT, _NROTATE
+
+		.rotr Data[4], I[2], IPr[3], SI[3], JP[2], SJ[2], T[2], \\
+		      OutWord[2]
+		.rotp pPhase[4]
+
+		ADDP		InPrefetch = 0, InputBuffer
+		ADDP		KTable = 0, StateTable
+	}
+	{
+		.mmi
+		ADDP		InPtr = 0, InputBuffer
+		ADDP		OutPtr = 0, OutputBuffer
+		mov		RetVal = r0
+	}
+	;;
+	{
+		.mmi
+		lfetch.nt1	[InPrefetch], 0x80
+		ADDP		OutPrefetch = 0, OutputBuffer
+	}
+	{               // Return 0 if the input length is nonsensical
+        	.mib
+		ADDP		StateTable = 0, StateTable
+        	cmp.ge.unc  	L_NOK, L_OK = r0, DataLen
+	(L_NOK) br.ret.sptk.few rp
+	}
+	;;
+	{
+        	.mib
+        	cmp.eq.or  	L_NOK, L_OK = r0, InPtr
+        	cmp.eq.or  	L_NOK, L_OK = r0, OutPtr
+		nop		0x0
+	}
+	{
+		.mib
+        	cmp.eq.or  	L_NOK, L_OK = r0, StateTable
+		nop		0x0
+	(L_NOK) br.ret.sptk.few rp
+	}
+	;;
+		LKEY		I[1] = [KTable], SZ
+/* Prefetch the state-table. It contains 256 elements of size SZ */
+
+#if SZ == 1
+		ADDP		tmp0 = 1*128, StateTable
+#elif SZ == 2
+		ADDP		tmp0 = 3*128, StateTable
+		ADDP		tmp1 = 2*128, StateTable
+#elif SZ == 4
+		ADDP		tmp0 = 7*128, StateTable
+		ADDP		tmp1 = 6*128, StateTable
+#elif SZ == 8
+		ADDP		tmp0 = 15*128, StateTable
+		ADDP		tmp1 = 14*128, StateTable
+#endif
+		;;
+#if SZ >= 8
+		lfetch.fault.nt1		[tmp0], -256	// 15
+		lfetch.fault.nt1		[tmp1], -256;;
+		lfetch.fault.nt1		[tmp0], -256	// 13
+		lfetch.fault.nt1		[tmp1], -256;;
+		lfetch.fault.nt1		[tmp0], -256	// 11
+		lfetch.fault.nt1		[tmp1], -256;;
+		lfetch.fault.nt1		[tmp0], -256	//  9
+		lfetch.fault.nt1		[tmp1], -256;;
+#endif
+#if SZ >= 4
+		lfetch.fault.nt1		[tmp0], -256	//  7
+		lfetch.fault.nt1		[tmp1], -256;;
+		lfetch.fault.nt1		[tmp0], -256	//  5
+		lfetch.fault.nt1		[tmp1], -256;;
+#endif
+#if SZ >= 2
+		lfetch.fault.nt1		[tmp0], -256	//  3
+		lfetch.fault.nt1		[tmp1], -256;;
+#endif
+	{
+		.mii
+		lfetch.fault.nt1		[tmp0]		//  1
+		add		I[1]=1,I[1];;
+		zxt1		I[1]=I[1]
+	}
+	{
+		.mmi
+		lfetch.nt1	[InPrefetch], 0x80
+		lfetch.excl.nt1	[OutPrefetch], 0x80
+		.save		pr, PRSave
+		mov		PRSave = pr
+	} ;;
+	{
+		.mmi
+		lfetch.excl.nt1	[OutPrefetch], 0x80
+		LKEY		J = [KTable], SZ
+		ADDP		EndPtr = DataLen, InPtr
+	}  ;;
+	{
+		.mmi
+		ADDP		EndPtr = -1, EndPtr	// Make it point to
+							// last data byte.
+		mov		One = 1
+		.save		ar.lc, LCSave
+		mov		LCSave = ar.lc
+		.body
+	} ;;
+	{
+		.mmb
+		sub		Remainder = 0, OutPtr
+		cmp.gtu		pSmall, p0 = $threshold, DataLen
+(pSmall)	br.cond.dpnt	.rc4Remainder		// Data too small for
+							// big loop.
+	} ;;
+	{
+		.mmi
+		and		Remainder = 0x7, Remainder
+		;;
+		cmp.eq		pAligned, pUnaligned = Remainder, r0
+		nop		0x0
+	} ;;
+	{
+		.mmb
+.pred.rel	"mutex",pUnaligned,pAligned
+(pUnaligned)	add		Remainder = -1, Remainder
+(pAligned)	sub		Remainder = EndPtr, InPtr
+(pAligned)	br.cond.dptk.many .rc4Aligned
+	} ;;
+	{
+		.mmi
+		nop		0x0
+		nop		0x0
+		mov.i		ar.lc = Remainder
+	}
+
+/* Do the initial few bytes via the compact, modulo-scheduled loop
+   until the output pointer is 8-byte-aligned.  */
+
+		MODSCHED_RC4_PROLOGUE
+		MODSCHED_RC4_LOOP(.RC4AlignLoop)
+
+	{
+		.mib
+		sub		Remainder = EndPtr, InPtr
+		zxt1		IFinal = IFinal
+		clrrrb				// Clear CFM.rrb.pr so
+		;;				// next "mov pr.rot = N"
+						// does the right thing.
+	}
+	{
+		.mmi
+		mov		I[1] = IFinal
+		nop		0x0
+		nop		0x0
+	} ;;
+
+
+.rc4Aligned:
+
+/*
+   Unrolled loop count = (Remainder - ($unroll_count+1)*$phases)/($unroll_count*$phases)
+ */
+
+	{
+		.mlx
+		add	LoopCount = 1 - ($unroll_count + 1)*$phases, Remainder
+		movl		Remainder = 0xaaaaaaaaaaaaaaab
+	} ;;
+	{
+		.mmi
+		setf.sig	f6 = LoopCount		// M2, M3	6 cyc
+		setf.sig	f7 = Remainder		// M2, M3	6 cyc
+		nop		0x0
+	} ;;
+	{
+		.mfb
+		nop		0x0
+		xmpy.hu		f6 = f6, f7
+		nop		0x0
+	} ;;
+	{
+		.mmi
+		getf.sig	LoopCount = f6;;	// M2		5 cyc
+		nop		0x0
+		shr.u		LoopCount = LoopCount, 4
+	} ;;
+	{
+		.mmi
+		nop		0x0
+		nop		0x0
+		mov.i		ar.lc = LoopCount
+	} ;;
+
+/* Now comes the unrolled loop: */
+
+.rc4Prologue:
+___
+
+$iteration = 0;
+
+# Generate the prologue:
+$predicates = 1;
+for ($i = 0; $i < $phases; ++$i) {
+    &emit_body (\$code, \$bypass, $iteration++, $predicates);
+    $predicates = ($predicates << 1) | 1;
+}
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.rc4Loop:
+___
+
+# Generate the body:
+for ($i = 0; $i < $unroll_count*$phases; ++$i) {
+    &emit_body (\$code, \$bypass, $iteration++, $predicates);
+}
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.rc4Epilogue:
+___
+
+# Generate the epilogue:
+for ($i = 0; $i < $phases; ++$i) {
+    $predicates <<= 1;
+    &emit_body (\$code, \$bypass, $iteration++, $predicates);
+}
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	{
+		.mmi
+		lfetch.nt1	[EndPtr]	// fetch line with last byte
+		mov		IFinal = I[1]
+		nop		0x0
+	}
+
+.rc4Remainder:
+	{
+		.mmi
+		sub		Remainder = EndPtr, InPtr	// Calculate
+								// # of bytes
+								// left - 1
+		nop		0x0
+		nop		0x0
+	} ;;
+	{
+		.mib
+		cmp.eq		pDone, p0 = -1, Remainder // done already?
+		mov.i		ar.lc = Remainder
+(pDone)		br.cond.dptk.few .rc4Complete
+	}
+
+/* Do the remaining bytes via the compact, modulo-scheduled loop */
+
+		MODSCHED_RC4_PROLOGUE
+		MODSCHED_RC4_LOOP(.RC4RestLoop)
+
+.rc4Complete:
+	{
+		.mmi
+		add		KTable = -SZ, KTable
+		add		IFinal = -1, IFinal
+		mov		ar.lc = LCSave
+	} ;;
+	{
+		.mii
+		SKEY		[KTable] = J,-SZ
+		zxt1		IFinal = IFinal
+		mov		pr = PRSave, 0x1FFFF
+	} ;;
+	{
+		.mib
+		SKEY		[KTable] = IFinal
+		add		RetVal = 1, r0
+		br.ret.sptk.few	rp
+	} ;;
+___
+
+# Last but not least, emit the code for the bypass-code of the unrolled loop:
+
+$code.=$bypass;
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	.endp RC4
+___
+
+print $code;
+
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-md5-x86_64.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-md5-x86_64.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..890161b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-md5-x86_64.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,645 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+
+# June 2011
+#
+# This is RC4+MD5 "stitch" implementation. The idea, as spelled in
+# http://download.intel.com/design/intarch/papers/323686.pdf, is that
+# since both algorithms exhibit instruction-level parallelism, ILP,
+# below theoretical maximum, interleaving them would allow to utilize
+# processor resources better and achieve better performance. RC4
+# instruction sequence is virtually identical to rc4-x86_64.pl, which
+# is heavily based on submission by Maxim Perminov, Maxim Locktyukhin
+# and Jim Guilford of Intel. MD5 is fresh implementation aiming to
+# minimize register usage, which was used as "main thread" with RC4
+# weaved into it, one RC4 round per one MD5 round. In addition to the
+# stiched subroutine the script can generate standalone replacement
+# md5_block_asm_data_order and RC4. Below are performance numbers in
+# cycles per processed byte, less is better, for these the standalone
+# subroutines, sum of them, and stitched one:
+#
+#		RC4	MD5	RC4+MD5	stitch	gain
+# Opteron	6.5(*)	5.4	11.9	7.0	+70%(*)
+# Core2		6.5	5.8	12.3	7.7	+60%
+# Westmere	4.3	5.2	9.5	7.0	+36%
+# Sandy Bridge	4.2	5.5	9.7	6.8	+43%
+# Ivy Bridge	4.1	5.2	9.3	6.0	+54%
+# Haswell	4.0	5.0	9.0	5.7	+60%
+# Skylake	6.3(**)	5.0	11.3	5.3	+110%
+# Atom		9.3	6.5	15.8	11.1	+42%
+# VIA Nano	6.3	5.4	11.7	8.6	+37%
+# Bulldozer	4.5	5.4	9.9	7.7	+29%
+#
+# (*)	rc4-x86_64.pl delivers 5.3 on Opteron, so real improvement
+#	is +53%...
+# (**)	unidentified anomaly;
+
+my ($rc4,$md5)=(1,1);	# what to generate?
+my $D="#" if (!$md5);	# if set to "#", MD5 is stitched into RC4(),
+			# but its result is discarded. Idea here is
+			# to be able to use 'openssl speed rc4' for
+			# benchmarking the stitched subroutine... 
+
+my $flavour = shift;
+my $output  = shift;
+if ($flavour =~ /\./) { $output = $flavour; undef $flavour; }
+
+my $win64=0; $win64=1 if ($flavour =~ /[nm]asm|mingw64/ || $output =~ /\.asm$/);
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; my $dir=$1; my $xlate;
+( $xlate="${dir}x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
+( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
+die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl";
+
+open OUT,"| \"$^X\" \"$xlate\" $flavour \"$output\"";
+*STDOUT=*OUT;
+
+my ($dat,$in0,$out,$ctx,$inp,$len, $func,$nargs);
+
+if ($rc4 && !$md5) {
+  ($dat,$len,$in0,$out) = ("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx","%rcx");
+  $func="RC4";				$nargs=4;
+} elsif ($md5 && !$rc4) {
+  ($ctx,$inp,$len) = ("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx");
+  $func="md5_block_asm_data_order";	$nargs=3;
+} else {
+  ($dat,$in0,$out,$ctx,$inp,$len) = ("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx","%rcx","%r8","%r9");
+  $func="rc4_md5_enc";			$nargs=6;
+  # void rc4_md5_enc(
+  #		RC4_KEY *key,		#
+  #		const void *in0,	# RC4 input
+  #		void *out,		# RC4 output
+  #		MD5_CTX *ctx,		#
+  #		const void *inp,	# MD5 input
+  #		size_t len);		# number of 64-byte blocks
+}
+
+my @K=(	0xd76aa478,0xe8c7b756,0x242070db,0xc1bdceee,
+	0xf57c0faf,0x4787c62a,0xa8304613,0xfd469501,
+	0x698098d8,0x8b44f7af,0xffff5bb1,0x895cd7be,
+	0x6b901122,0xfd987193,0xa679438e,0x49b40821,
+
+	0xf61e2562,0xc040b340,0x265e5a51,0xe9b6c7aa,
+	0xd62f105d,0x02441453,0xd8a1e681,0xe7d3fbc8,
+	0x21e1cde6,0xc33707d6,0xf4d50d87,0x455a14ed,
+	0xa9e3e905,0xfcefa3f8,0x676f02d9,0x8d2a4c8a,
+
+	0xfffa3942,0x8771f681,0x6d9d6122,0xfde5380c,
+	0xa4beea44,0x4bdecfa9,0xf6bb4b60,0xbebfbc70,
+	0x289b7ec6,0xeaa127fa,0xd4ef3085,0x04881d05,
+	0xd9d4d039,0xe6db99e5,0x1fa27cf8,0xc4ac5665,
+
+	0xf4292244,0x432aff97,0xab9423a7,0xfc93a039,
+	0x655b59c3,0x8f0ccc92,0xffeff47d,0x85845dd1,
+	0x6fa87e4f,0xfe2ce6e0,0xa3014314,0x4e0811a1,
+	0xf7537e82,0xbd3af235,0x2ad7d2bb,0xeb86d391	);
+
+my @V=("%r8d","%r9d","%r10d","%r11d");	# MD5 registers
+my $tmp="%r12d";
+
+my @XX=("%rbp","%rsi");			# RC4 registers
+my @TX=("%rax","%rbx");
+my $YY="%rcx";
+my $TY="%rdx";
+
+my $MOD=32;				# 16, 32 or 64
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.text
+.align 16
+
+.globl	$func
+.type	$func,\@function,$nargs
+$func:
+	cmp	\$0,$len
+	je	.Labort
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+	sub	\$40,%rsp
+.Lbody:
+___
+if ($rc4) {
+$code.=<<___;
+$D#md5#	mov	$ctx,%r11		# reassign arguments
+	mov	$len,%r12
+	mov	$in0,%r13
+	mov	$out,%r14
+$D#md5#	mov	$inp,%r15
+___
+    $ctx="%r11"	if ($md5);		# reassign arguments
+    $len="%r12";
+    $in0="%r13";
+    $out="%r14";
+    $inp="%r15"	if ($md5);
+    $inp=$in0	if (!$md5);
+$code.=<<___;
+	xor	$XX[0],$XX[0]
+	xor	$YY,$YY
+
+	lea	8($dat),$dat
+	mov	-8($dat),$XX[0]#b
+	mov	-4($dat),$YY#b
+
+	inc	$XX[0]#b
+	sub	$in0,$out
+	movl	($dat,$XX[0],4),$TX[0]#d
+___
+$code.=<<___ if (!$md5);
+	xor	$TX[1],$TX[1]
+	test	\$-128,$len
+	jz	.Loop1
+	sub	$XX[0],$TX[1]
+	and	\$`$MOD-1`,$TX[1]
+	jz	.Loop${MOD}_is_hot
+	sub	$TX[1],$len
+.Loop${MOD}_warmup:
+	add	$TX[0]#b,$YY#b
+	movl	($dat,$YY,4),$TY#d
+	movl	$TX[0]#d,($dat,$YY,4)
+	movl	$TY#d,($dat,$XX[0],4)
+	add	$TY#b,$TX[0]#b
+	inc	$XX[0]#b
+	movl	($dat,$TX[0],4),$TY#d
+	movl	($dat,$XX[0],4),$TX[0]#d
+	xorb	($in0),$TY#b
+	movb	$TY#b,($out,$in0)
+	lea	1($in0),$in0
+	dec	$TX[1]
+	jnz	.Loop${MOD}_warmup
+
+	mov	$YY,$TX[1]
+	xor	$YY,$YY
+	mov	$TX[1]#b,$YY#b
+
+.Loop${MOD}_is_hot:
+	mov	$len,32(%rsp)		# save original $len
+	shr	\$6,$len		# number of 64-byte blocks
+___
+  if ($D && !$md5) {			# stitch in dummy MD5
+    $md5=1;
+    $ctx="%r11";
+    $inp="%r15";
+    $code.=<<___;
+	mov	%rsp,$ctx
+	mov	$in0,$inp
+___
+  }
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+#rc4#	add	$TX[0]#b,$YY#b
+#rc4#	lea	($dat,$XX[0],4),$XX[1]
+	shl	\$6,$len
+	add	$inp,$len		# pointer to the end of input
+	mov	$len,16(%rsp)
+
+#md5#	mov	$ctx,24(%rsp)		# save pointer to MD5_CTX
+#md5#	mov	0*4($ctx),$V[0]		# load current hash value from MD5_CTX
+#md5#	mov	1*4($ctx),$V[1]
+#md5#	mov	2*4($ctx),$V[2]
+#md5#	mov	3*4($ctx),$V[3]
+	jmp	.Loop
+
+.align	16
+.Loop:
+#md5#	mov	$V[0],0*4(%rsp)		# put aside current hash value
+#md5#	mov	$V[1],1*4(%rsp)
+#md5#	mov	$V[2],2*4(%rsp)
+#md5#	mov	$V[3],$tmp		# forward reference
+#md5#	mov	$V[3],3*4(%rsp)
+___
+
+sub R0 {
+  my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d)=@_;
+  my @rot0=(7,12,17,22);
+  my $j=$i%16;
+  my $k=$i%$MOD;
+  my $xmm="%xmm".($j&1);
+    $code.="	movdqu	($in0),%xmm2\n"		if ($rc4 && $j==15);
+    $code.="	add	\$$MOD,$XX[0]#b\n"	if ($rc4 && $j==15 && $k==$MOD-1);
+    $code.="	pxor	$xmm,$xmm\n"		if ($rc4 && $j<=1);
+    $code.=<<___;
+#rc4#	movl	($dat,$YY,4),$TY#d
+#md5#	xor	$c,$tmp
+#rc4#	movl	$TX[0]#d,($dat,$YY,4)
+#md5#	and	$b,$tmp
+#md5#	add	4*`$j`($inp),$a
+#rc4#	add	$TY#b,$TX[0]#b
+#rc4#	movl	`4*(($k+1)%$MOD)`(`$k==$MOD-1?"$dat,$XX[0],4":"$XX[1]"`),$TX[1]#d
+#md5#	add	\$$K[$i],$a
+#md5#	xor	$d,$tmp
+#rc4#	movz	$TX[0]#b,$TX[0]#d
+#rc4#	movl	$TY#d,4*$k($XX[1])
+#md5#	add	$tmp,$a
+#rc4#	add	$TX[1]#b,$YY#b
+#md5#	rol	\$$rot0[$j%4],$a
+#md5#	mov	`$j==15?"$b":"$c"`,$tmp		# forward reference
+#rc4#	pinsrw	\$`($j>>1)&7`,($dat,$TX[0],4),$xmm\n
+#md5#	add	$b,$a
+___
+    $code.=<<___ if ($rc4 && $j==15 && $k==$MOD-1);
+	mov	$YY,$XX[1]
+	xor	$YY,$YY				# keyword to partial register
+	mov	$XX[1]#b,$YY#b
+	lea	($dat,$XX[0],4),$XX[1]
+___
+    $code.=<<___ if ($rc4 && $j==15);
+	psllq	\$8,%xmm1
+	pxor	%xmm0,%xmm2
+	pxor	%xmm1,%xmm2
+___
+}
+sub R1 {
+  my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d)=@_;
+  my @rot1=(5,9,14,20);
+  my $j=$i%16;
+  my $k=$i%$MOD;
+  my $xmm="%xmm".($j&1);
+    $code.="	movdqu	16($in0),%xmm3\n"	if ($rc4 && $j==15);
+    $code.="	add	\$$MOD,$XX[0]#b\n"	if ($rc4 && $j==15 && $k==$MOD-1);
+    $code.="	pxor	$xmm,$xmm\n"		if ($rc4 && $j<=1);
+    $code.=<<___;
+#rc4#	movl	($dat,$YY,4),$TY#d
+#md5#	xor	$b,$tmp
+#rc4#	movl	$TX[0]#d,($dat,$YY,4)
+#md5#	and	$d,$tmp
+#md5#	add	4*`((1+5*$j)%16)`($inp),$a
+#rc4#	add	$TY#b,$TX[0]#b
+#rc4#	movl	`4*(($k+1)%$MOD)`(`$k==$MOD-1?"$dat,$XX[0],4":"$XX[1]"`),$TX[1]#d
+#md5#	add	\$$K[$i],$a
+#md5#	xor	$c,$tmp
+#rc4#	movz	$TX[0]#b,$TX[0]#d
+#rc4#	movl	$TY#d,4*$k($XX[1])
+#md5#	add	$tmp,$a
+#rc4#	add	$TX[1]#b,$YY#b
+#md5#	rol	\$$rot1[$j%4],$a
+#md5#	mov	`$j==15?"$c":"$b"`,$tmp		# forward reference
+#rc4#	pinsrw	\$`($j>>1)&7`,($dat,$TX[0],4),$xmm\n
+#md5#	add	$b,$a
+___
+    $code.=<<___ if ($rc4 && $j==15 && $k==$MOD-1);
+	mov	$YY,$XX[1]
+	xor	$YY,$YY				# keyword to partial register
+	mov	$XX[1]#b,$YY#b
+	lea	($dat,$XX[0],4),$XX[1]
+___
+    $code.=<<___ if ($rc4 && $j==15);
+	psllq	\$8,%xmm1
+	pxor	%xmm0,%xmm3
+	pxor	%xmm1,%xmm3
+___
+}
+sub R2 {
+  my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d)=@_;
+  my @rot2=(4,11,16,23);
+  my $j=$i%16;
+  my $k=$i%$MOD;
+  my $xmm="%xmm".($j&1);
+    $code.="	movdqu	32($in0),%xmm4\n"	if ($rc4 && $j==15);
+    $code.="	add	\$$MOD,$XX[0]#b\n"	if ($rc4 && $j==15 && $k==$MOD-1);
+    $code.="	pxor	$xmm,$xmm\n"		if ($rc4 && $j<=1);
+    $code.=<<___;
+#rc4#	movl	($dat,$YY,4),$TY#d
+#md5#	xor	$c,$tmp
+#rc4#	movl	$TX[0]#d,($dat,$YY,4)
+#md5#	xor	$b,$tmp
+#md5#	add	4*`((5+3*$j)%16)`($inp),$a
+#rc4#	add	$TY#b,$TX[0]#b
+#rc4#	movl	`4*(($k+1)%$MOD)`(`$k==$MOD-1?"$dat,$XX[0],4":"$XX[1]"`),$TX[1]#d
+#md5#	add	\$$K[$i],$a
+#rc4#	movz	$TX[0]#b,$TX[0]#d
+#md5#	add	$tmp,$a
+#rc4#	movl	$TY#d,4*$k($XX[1])
+#rc4#	add	$TX[1]#b,$YY#b
+#md5#	rol	\$$rot2[$j%4],$a
+#md5#	mov	`$j==15?"\\\$-1":"$c"`,$tmp	# forward reference
+#rc4#	pinsrw	\$`($j>>1)&7`,($dat,$TX[0],4),$xmm\n
+#md5#	add	$b,$a
+___
+    $code.=<<___ if ($rc4 && $j==15 && $k==$MOD-1);
+	mov	$YY,$XX[1]
+	xor	$YY,$YY				# keyword to partial register
+	mov	$XX[1]#b,$YY#b
+	lea	($dat,$XX[0],4),$XX[1]
+___
+    $code.=<<___ if ($rc4 && $j==15);
+	psllq	\$8,%xmm1
+	pxor	%xmm0,%xmm4
+	pxor	%xmm1,%xmm4
+___
+}
+sub R3 {
+  my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d)=@_;
+  my @rot3=(6,10,15,21);
+  my $j=$i%16;
+  my $k=$i%$MOD;
+  my $xmm="%xmm".($j&1);
+    $code.="	movdqu	48($in0),%xmm5\n"	if ($rc4 && $j==15);
+    $code.="	add	\$$MOD,$XX[0]#b\n"	if ($rc4 && $j==15 && $k==$MOD-1);
+    $code.="	pxor	$xmm,$xmm\n"		if ($rc4 && $j<=1);
+    $code.=<<___;
+#rc4#	movl	($dat,$YY,4),$TY#d
+#md5#	xor	$d,$tmp
+#rc4#	movl	$TX[0]#d,($dat,$YY,4)
+#md5#	or	$b,$tmp
+#md5#	add	4*`((7*$j)%16)`($inp),$a
+#rc4#	add	$TY#b,$TX[0]#b
+#rc4#	movl	`4*(($k+1)%$MOD)`(`$k==$MOD-1?"$dat,$XX[0],4":"$XX[1]"`),$TX[1]#d
+#md5#	add	\$$K[$i],$a
+#rc4#	movz	$TX[0]#b,$TX[0]#d
+#md5#	xor	$c,$tmp
+#rc4#	movl	$TY#d,4*$k($XX[1])
+#md5#	add	$tmp,$a
+#rc4#	add	$TX[1]#b,$YY#b
+#md5#	rol	\$$rot3[$j%4],$a
+#md5#	mov	\$-1,$tmp			# forward reference
+#rc4#	pinsrw	\$`($j>>1)&7`,($dat,$TX[0],4),$xmm\n
+#md5#	add	$b,$a
+___
+    $code.=<<___ if ($rc4 && $j==15);
+	mov	$XX[0],$XX[1]
+	xor	$XX[0],$XX[0]			# keyword to partial register
+	mov	$XX[1]#b,$XX[0]#b
+	mov	$YY,$XX[1]
+	xor	$YY,$YY				# keyword to partial register
+	mov	$XX[1]#b,$YY#b
+	lea	($dat,$XX[0],4),$XX[1]
+	psllq	\$8,%xmm1
+	pxor	%xmm0,%xmm5
+	pxor	%xmm1,%xmm5
+___
+}
+
+my $i=0;
+for(;$i<16;$i++) { R0($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); push(@TX,shift(@TX)); }
+for(;$i<32;$i++) { R1($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); push(@TX,shift(@TX)); }
+for(;$i<48;$i++) { R2($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); push(@TX,shift(@TX)); }
+for(;$i<64;$i++) { R3($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); push(@TX,shift(@TX)); }
+
+$code.=<<___;
+#md5#	add	0*4(%rsp),$V[0]		# accumulate hash value
+#md5#	add	1*4(%rsp),$V[1]
+#md5#	add	2*4(%rsp),$V[2]
+#md5#	add	3*4(%rsp),$V[3]
+
+#rc4#	movdqu	%xmm2,($out,$in0)	# write RC4 output
+#rc4#	movdqu	%xmm3,16($out,$in0)
+#rc4#	movdqu	%xmm4,32($out,$in0)
+#rc4#	movdqu	%xmm5,48($out,$in0)
+#md5#	lea	64($inp),$inp
+#rc4#	lea	64($in0),$in0
+	cmp	16(%rsp),$inp		# are we done?
+	jb	.Loop
+
+#md5#	mov	24(%rsp),$len		# restore pointer to MD5_CTX
+#rc4#	sub	$TX[0]#b,$YY#b		# correct $YY
+#md5#	mov	$V[0],0*4($len)		# write MD5_CTX
+#md5#	mov	$V[1],1*4($len)
+#md5#	mov	$V[2],2*4($len)
+#md5#	mov	$V[3],3*4($len)
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($rc4 && (!$md5 || $D));
+	mov	32(%rsp),$len		# restore original $len
+	and	\$63,$len		# remaining bytes
+	jnz	.Loop1
+	jmp	.Ldone
+	
+.align	16
+.Loop1:
+	add	$TX[0]#b,$YY#b
+	movl	($dat,$YY,4),$TY#d
+	movl	$TX[0]#d,($dat,$YY,4)
+	movl	$TY#d,($dat,$XX[0],4)
+	add	$TY#b,$TX[0]#b
+	inc	$XX[0]#b
+	movl	($dat,$TX[0],4),$TY#d
+	movl	($dat,$XX[0],4),$TX[0]#d
+	xorb	($in0),$TY#b
+	movb	$TY#b,($out,$in0)
+	lea	1($in0),$in0
+	dec	$len
+	jnz	.Loop1
+
+.Ldone:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+#rc4#	sub	\$1,$XX[0]#b
+#rc4#	movl	$XX[0]#d,-8($dat)
+#rc4#	movl	$YY#d,-4($dat)
+
+	mov	40(%rsp),%r15
+	mov	48(%rsp),%r14
+	mov	56(%rsp),%r13
+	mov	64(%rsp),%r12
+	mov	72(%rsp),%rbp
+	mov	80(%rsp),%rbx
+	lea	88(%rsp),%rsp
+.Lepilogue:
+.Labort:
+	ret
+.size $func,.-$func
+___
+
+if ($rc4 && $D) {	# sole purpose of this section is to provide
+			# option to use the generated module as drop-in
+			# replacement for rc4-x86_64.pl for debugging
+			# and testing purposes...
+my ($idx,$ido)=("%r8","%r9");
+my ($dat,$len,$inp)=("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx");
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	RC4_set_key
+.type	RC4_set_key,\@function,3
+.align	16
+RC4_set_key:
+	lea	8($dat),$dat
+	lea	($inp,$len),$inp
+	neg	$len
+	mov	$len,%rcx
+	xor	%eax,%eax
+	xor	$ido,$ido
+	xor	%r10,%r10
+	xor	%r11,%r11
+	jmp	.Lw1stloop
+
+.align	16
+.Lw1stloop:
+	mov	%eax,($dat,%rax,4)
+	add	\$1,%al
+	jnc	.Lw1stloop
+
+	xor	$ido,$ido
+	xor	$idx,$idx
+.align	16
+.Lw2ndloop:
+	mov	($dat,$ido,4),%r10d
+	add	($inp,$len,1),$idx#b
+	add	%r10b,$idx#b
+	add	\$1,$len
+	mov	($dat,$idx,4),%r11d
+	cmovz	%rcx,$len
+	mov	%r10d,($dat,$idx,4)
+	mov	%r11d,($dat,$ido,4)
+	add	\$1,$ido#b
+	jnc	.Lw2ndloop
+
+	xor	%eax,%eax
+	mov	%eax,-8($dat)
+	mov	%eax,-4($dat)
+	ret
+.size	RC4_set_key,.-RC4_set_key
+
+.globl	RC4_options
+.type	RC4_options,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+RC4_options:
+	lea	.Lopts(%rip),%rax
+	ret
+.align	64
+.Lopts:
+.asciz	"rc4(64x,int)"
+.align	64
+.size	RC4_options,.-RC4_options
+___
+}
+# EXCEPTION_DISPOSITION handler (EXCEPTION_RECORD *rec,ULONG64 frame,
+#		CONTEXT *context,DISPATCHER_CONTEXT *disp)
+if ($win64) {
+my $rec="%rcx";
+my $frame="%rdx";
+my $context="%r8";
+my $disp="%r9";
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.extern	__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind
+.type	se_handler,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+se_handler:
+	push	%rsi
+	push	%rdi
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+	pushfq
+	sub	\$64,%rsp
+
+	mov	120($context),%rax	# pull context->Rax
+	mov	248($context),%rbx	# pull context->Rip
+
+	lea	.Lbody(%rip),%r10
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip<.Lbody
+	jb	.Lin_prologue
+
+	mov	152($context),%rax	# pull context->Rsp
+
+	lea	.Lepilogue(%rip),%r10
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip>=.Lepilogue
+	jae	.Lin_prologue
+
+	mov	40(%rax),%r15
+	mov	48(%rax),%r14
+	mov	56(%rax),%r13
+	mov	64(%rax),%r12
+	mov	72(%rax),%rbp
+	mov	80(%rax),%rbx
+	lea	88(%rax),%rax
+
+	mov	%rbx,144($context)	# restore context->Rbx
+	mov	%rbp,160($context)	# restore context->Rbp
+	mov	%r12,216($context)	# restore context->R12
+	mov	%r13,224($context)	# restore context->R12
+	mov	%r14,232($context)	# restore context->R14
+	mov	%r15,240($context)	# restore context->R15
+
+.Lin_prologue:
+	mov	8(%rax),%rdi
+	mov	16(%rax),%rsi
+	mov	%rax,152($context)	# restore context->Rsp
+	mov	%rsi,168($context)	# restore context->Rsi
+	mov	%rdi,176($context)	# restore context->Rdi
+
+	mov	40($disp),%rdi		# disp->ContextRecord
+	mov	$context,%rsi		# context
+	mov	\$154,%ecx		# sizeof(CONTEXT)
+	.long	0xa548f3fc		# cld; rep movsq
+
+	mov	$disp,%rsi
+	xor	%rcx,%rcx		# arg1, UNW_FLAG_NHANDLER
+	mov	8(%rsi),%rdx		# arg2, disp->ImageBase
+	mov	0(%rsi),%r8		# arg3, disp->ControlPc
+	mov	16(%rsi),%r9		# arg4, disp->FunctionEntry
+	mov	40(%rsi),%r10		# disp->ContextRecord
+	lea	56(%rsi),%r11		# &disp->HandlerData
+	lea	24(%rsi),%r12		# &disp->EstablisherFrame
+	mov	%r10,32(%rsp)		# arg5
+	mov	%r11,40(%rsp)		# arg6
+	mov	%r12,48(%rsp)		# arg7
+	mov	%rcx,56(%rsp)		# arg8, (NULL)
+	call	*__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind(%rip)
+
+	mov	\$1,%eax		# ExceptionContinueSearch
+	add	\$64,%rsp
+	popfq
+	pop	%r15
+	pop	%r14
+	pop	%r13
+	pop	%r12
+	pop	%rbp
+	pop	%rbx
+	pop	%rdi
+	pop	%rsi
+	ret
+.size	se_handler,.-se_handler
+
+.section	.pdata
+.align	4
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_$func
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_$func
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_$func
+
+.section	.xdata
+.align	8
+.LSEH_info_$func:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	se_handler
+___
+}
+
+sub reg_part {
+my ($reg,$conv)=@_;
+    if ($reg =~ /%r[0-9]+/)     { $reg .= $conv; }
+    elsif ($conv eq "b")        { $reg =~ s/%[er]([^x]+)x?/%$1l/;       }
+    elsif ($conv eq "w")        { $reg =~ s/%[er](.+)/%$1/;             }
+    elsif ($conv eq "d")        { $reg =~ s/%[er](.+)/%e$1/;            }
+    return $reg;
+}
+
+$code =~ s/(%[a-z0-9]+)#([bwd])/reg_part($1,$2)/gem;
+$code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem;
+$code =~ s/pinsrw\s+\$0,/movd	/gm;
+
+$code =~ s/#md5#//gm	if ($md5);
+$code =~ s/#rc4#//gm	if ($rc4);
+
+print $code;
+
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-parisc.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-parisc.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..006b6b0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-parisc.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,321 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2009-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+
+# RC4 for PA-RISC.
+
+# June 2009.
+#
+# Performance is 33% better than gcc 3.2 generated code on PA-7100LC.
+# For reference, [4x] unrolled loop is >40% faster than folded one.
+# It's possible to unroll loop 8 times on PA-RISC 2.0, but improvement
+# is believed to be not sufficient to justify the effort...
+#
+# Special thanks to polarhome.com for providing HP-UX account.
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+
+$flavour = shift;
+$output = shift;
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+if ($flavour =~ /64/) {
+	$LEVEL		="2.0W";
+	$SIZE_T		=8;
+	$FRAME_MARKER	=80;
+	$SAVED_RP	=16;
+	$PUSH		="std";
+	$PUSHMA		="std,ma";
+	$POP		="ldd";
+	$POPMB		="ldd,mb";
+} else {
+	$LEVEL		="1.0";
+	$SIZE_T		=4;
+	$FRAME_MARKER	=48;
+	$SAVED_RP	=20;
+	$PUSH		="stw";
+	$PUSHMA		="stwm";
+	$POP		="ldw";
+	$POPMB		="ldwm";
+}
+
+$FRAME=4*$SIZE_T+$FRAME_MARKER;	# 4 saved regs + frame marker
+				#                [+ argument transfer]
+$SZ=1;				# defaults to RC4_CHAR
+if (open CONF,"<${dir}../../opensslconf.h") {
+    while(<CONF>) {
+	if (m/#\s*define\s+RC4_INT\s+(.*)/) {
+	    $SZ = ($1=~/char$/) ? 1 : 4;
+	    last;
+	}
+    }
+    close CONF;
+}
+
+if ($SZ==1) {	# RC4_CHAR
+    $LD="ldb";
+    $LDX="ldbx";
+    $MKX="addl";
+    $ST="stb";
+} else {	# RC4_INT (~5% faster than RC4_CHAR on PA-7100LC)
+    $LD="ldw";
+    $LDX="ldwx,s";
+    $MKX="sh2addl";
+    $ST="stw";
+}
+
+$key="%r26";
+$len="%r25";
+$inp="%r24";
+$out="%r23";
+
+@XX=("%r19","%r20");
+@TX=("%r21","%r22");
+$YY="%r28";
+$TY="%r29";
+
+$acc="%r1";
+$ix="%r2";
+$iy="%r3";
+$dat0="%r4";
+$dat1="%r5";
+$rem="%r6";
+$mask="%r31";
+
+sub unrolledloopbody {
+for ($i=0;$i<4;$i++) {
+$code.=<<___;
+	ldo	1($XX[0]),$XX[1]
+	`sprintf("$LDX	%$TY(%$key),%$dat1") if ($i>0)`	
+	and	$mask,$XX[1],$XX[1]
+	$LDX	$YY($key),$TY
+	$MKX	$YY,$key,$ix
+	$LDX	$XX[1]($key),$TX[1]
+	$MKX	$XX[0],$key,$iy
+	$ST	$TX[0],0($ix)
+	comclr,<> $XX[1],$YY,%r0	; conditional
+	copy	$TX[0],$TX[1]		; move
+	`sprintf("%sdep	%$dat1,%d,8,%$acc",$i==1?"z":"",8*($i-1)+7) if ($i>0)`
+	$ST	$TY,0($iy)
+	addl	$TX[0],$TY,$TY
+	addl	$TX[1],$YY,$YY
+	and	$mask,$TY,$TY
+	and	$mask,$YY,$YY
+___
+push(@TX,shift(@TX)); push(@XX,shift(@XX));	# "rotate" registers
+} }
+
+sub foldedloop {
+my ($label,$count)=@_;
+$code.=<<___;
+$label
+	$MKX	$YY,$key,$iy
+	$LDX	$YY($key),$TY
+	$MKX	$XX[0],$key,$ix
+	$ST	$TX[0],0($iy)
+	ldo	1($XX[0]),$XX[0]
+	$ST	$TY,0($ix)
+	addl	$TX[0],$TY,$TY
+	ldbx	$inp($out),$dat1
+	and	$mask,$TY,$TY
+	and	$mask,$XX[0],$XX[0]
+	$LDX	$TY($key),$acc
+	$LDX	$XX[0]($key),$TX[0]
+	ldo	1($out),$out
+	xor	$dat1,$acc,$acc
+	addl	$TX[0],$YY,$YY
+	stb	$acc,-1($out)
+	addib,<> -1,$count,$label	; $count is always small
+	and	$mask,$YY,$YY
+___
+}
+
+$code=<<___;
+	.LEVEL	$LEVEL
+	.SPACE	\$TEXT\$
+	.SUBSPA	\$CODE\$,QUAD=0,ALIGN=8,ACCESS=0x2C,CODE_ONLY
+
+	.EXPORT	RC4,ENTRY,ARGW0=GR,ARGW1=GR,ARGW2=GR,ARGW3=GR
+RC4
+	.PROC
+	.CALLINFO	FRAME=`$FRAME-4*$SIZE_T`,NO_CALLS,SAVE_RP,ENTRY_GR=6
+	.ENTRY
+	$PUSH	%r2,-$SAVED_RP(%sp)	; standard prologue
+	$PUSHMA	%r3,$FRAME(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r4,`-$FRAME+1*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r5,`-$FRAME+2*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r6,`-$FRAME+3*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+
+	cmpib,*= 0,$len,L\$abort
+	sub	$inp,$out,$inp		; distance between $inp and $out
+
+	$LD	`0*$SZ`($key),$XX[0]
+	$LD	`1*$SZ`($key),$YY
+	ldo	`2*$SZ`($key),$key
+
+	ldi	0xff,$mask
+	ldi	3,$dat0		
+
+	ldo	1($XX[0]),$XX[0]	; warm up loop
+	and	$mask,$XX[0],$XX[0]
+	$LDX	$XX[0]($key),$TX[0]
+	addl	$TX[0],$YY,$YY
+	cmpib,*>>= 6,$len,L\$oop1	; is $len large enough to bother?
+	and	$mask,$YY,$YY
+
+	and,<>	$out,$dat0,$rem		; is $out aligned?
+	b	L\$alignedout
+	subi	4,$rem,$rem
+	sub	$len,$rem,$len
+___
+&foldedloop("L\$alignout",$rem);	# process till $out is aligned
+
+$code.=<<___;
+L\$alignedout				; $len is at least 4 here
+	and,<>	$inp,$dat0,$acc		; is $inp aligned?
+	b	L\$oop4
+	sub	$inp,$acc,$rem		; align $inp
+
+	sh3addl	$acc,%r0,$acc
+	subi	32,$acc,$acc
+	mtctl	$acc,%cr11		; load %sar with vshd align factor
+	ldwx	$rem($out),$dat0
+	ldo	4($rem),$rem
+L\$oop4misalignedinp
+___
+&unrolledloopbody();
+$code.=<<___;
+	$LDX	$TY($key),$ix
+	ldwx	$rem($out),$dat1
+	ldo	-4($len),$len
+	or	$ix,$acc,$acc		; last piece, no need to dep
+	vshd	$dat0,$dat1,$iy		; align data
+	copy	$dat1,$dat0
+	xor	$iy,$acc,$acc
+	stw	$acc,0($out)
+	cmpib,*<< 3,$len,L\$oop4misalignedinp
+	ldo	4($out),$out
+	cmpib,*= 0,$len,L\$done
+	nop
+	b	L\$oop1
+	nop
+
+	.ALIGN	8
+L\$oop4
+___
+&unrolledloopbody();
+$code.=<<___;
+	$LDX	$TY($key),$ix
+	ldwx	$inp($out),$dat0
+	ldo	-4($len),$len
+	or	$ix,$acc,$acc		; last piece, no need to dep
+	xor	$dat0,$acc,$acc
+	stw	$acc,0($out)
+	cmpib,*<< 3,$len,L\$oop4
+	ldo	4($out),$out
+	cmpib,*= 0,$len,L\$done
+	nop
+___
+&foldedloop("L\$oop1",$len);
+$code.=<<___;
+L\$done
+	$POP	`-$FRAME-$SAVED_RP`(%sp),%r2
+	ldo	-1($XX[0]),$XX[0]	; chill out loop
+	sub	$YY,$TX[0],$YY
+	and	$mask,$XX[0],$XX[0]
+	and	$mask,$YY,$YY
+	$ST	$XX[0],`-2*$SZ`($key)
+	$ST	$YY,`-1*$SZ`($key)
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+1*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r4
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+2*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r5
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+3*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r6
+L\$abort
+	bv	(%r2)
+	.EXIT
+	$POPMB	-$FRAME(%sp),%r3
+	.PROCEND
+___
+
+$code.=<<___;
+
+	.EXPORT	RC4_set_key,ENTRY,ARGW0=GR,ARGW1=GR,ARGW2=GR
+	.ALIGN	8
+RC4_set_key
+	.PROC
+	.CALLINFO	NO_CALLS
+	.ENTRY
+	$ST	%r0,`0*$SZ`($key)
+	$ST	%r0,`1*$SZ`($key)
+	ldo	`2*$SZ`($key),$key
+	copy	%r0,@XX[0]
+L\$1st
+	$ST	@XX[0],0($key)
+	ldo	1(@XX[0]),@XX[0]
+	bb,>=	@XX[0],`31-8`,L\$1st	; @XX[0]<256
+	ldo	$SZ($key),$key
+
+	ldo	`-256*$SZ`($key),$key	; rewind $key
+	addl	$len,$inp,$inp		; $inp to point at the end
+	sub	%r0,$len,%r23		; inverse index
+	copy	%r0,@XX[0]
+	copy	%r0,@XX[1]
+	ldi	0xff,$mask
+
+L\$2nd
+	$LDX	@XX[0]($key),@TX[0]
+	ldbx	%r23($inp),@TX[1]
+	addi,nuv 1,%r23,%r23		; increment and conditional
+	sub	%r0,$len,%r23		; inverse index
+	addl	@TX[0],@XX[1],@XX[1]
+	addl	@TX[1],@XX[1],@XX[1]
+	and	$mask,@XX[1],@XX[1]
+	$MKX	@XX[0],$key,$TY
+	$LDX	@XX[1]($key),@TX[1]
+	$MKX	@XX[1],$key,$YY
+	ldo	1(@XX[0]),@XX[0]
+	$ST	@TX[0],0($YY)
+	bb,>=	@XX[0],`31-8`,L\$2nd	; @XX[0]<256
+	$ST	@TX[1],0($TY)
+
+	bv,n	(%r2)
+	.EXIT
+	nop
+	.PROCEND
+
+	.EXPORT	RC4_options,ENTRY
+	.ALIGN	8
+RC4_options
+	.PROC
+	.CALLINFO	NO_CALLS
+	.ENTRY
+	blr	%r0,%r28
+	ldi	3,%r1
+L\$pic
+	andcm	%r28,%r1,%r28
+	bv	(%r2)
+	.EXIT
+	ldo	L\$opts-L\$pic(%r28),%r28
+	.PROCEND
+	.ALIGN	8
+L\$opts
+	.STRINGZ "rc4(4x,`$SZ==1?"char":"int"`)"
+	.STRINGZ "RC4 for PA-RISC, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+___
+$code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem;
+$code =~ s/cmpib,\*/comib,/gm	if ($SIZE_T==4);
+$code =~ s/\bbv\b/bve/gm	if ($SIZE_T==8);
+
+print $code;
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-s390x.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-s390x.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5589503
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-s390x.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,241 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2009-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# February 2009
+#
+# Performance is 2x of gcc 3.4.6 on z10. Coding "secret" is to
+# "cluster" Address Generation Interlocks, so that one pipeline stall
+# resolves several dependencies.
+
+# November 2010.
+#
+# Adapt for -m31 build. If kernel supports what's called "highgprs"
+# feature on Linux [see /proc/cpuinfo], it's possible to use 64-bit
+# instructions and achieve "64-bit" performance even in 31-bit legacy
+# application context. The feature is not specific to any particular
+# processor, as long as it's "z-CPU". Latter implies that the code
+# remains z/Architecture specific. On z990 it was measured to perform
+# 50% better than code generated by gcc 4.3.
+
+$flavour = shift;
+
+if ($flavour =~ /3[12]/) {
+	$SIZE_T=4;
+	$g="";
+} else {
+	$SIZE_T=8;
+	$g="g";
+}
+
+while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {}
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+$rp="%r14";
+$sp="%r15";
+$code=<<___;
+.text
+
+___
+
+# void RC4(RC4_KEY *key,size_t len,const void *inp,void *out)
+{
+$acc="%r0";
+$cnt="%r1";
+$key="%r2";
+$len="%r3";
+$inp="%r4";
+$out="%r5";
+
+@XX=("%r6","%r7");
+@TX=("%r8","%r9");
+$YY="%r10";
+$TY="%r11";
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	RC4
+.type	RC4,\@function
+.align	64
+RC4:
+	stm${g}	%r6,%r11,6*$SIZE_T($sp)
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /3[12]/);
+	llgfr	$len,$len
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	llgc	$XX[0],0($key)
+	llgc	$YY,1($key)
+	la	$XX[0],1($XX[0])
+	nill	$XX[0],0xff
+	srlg	$cnt,$len,3
+	ltgr	$cnt,$cnt
+	llgc	$TX[0],2($XX[0],$key)
+	jz	.Lshort
+	j	.Loop8
+
+.align	64
+.Loop8:
+___
+for ($i=0;$i<8;$i++) {
+$code.=<<___;
+	la	$YY,0($YY,$TX[0])	# $i
+	nill	$YY,255
+	la	$XX[1],1($XX[0])
+	nill	$XX[1],255
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i==1);
+	llgc	$acc,2($TY,$key)
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i>1);
+	sllg	$acc,$acc,8
+	ic	$acc,2($TY,$key)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	llgc	$TY,2($YY,$key)
+	stc	$TX[0],2($YY,$key)
+	llgc	$TX[1],2($XX[1],$key)
+	stc	$TY,2($XX[0],$key)
+	cr	$XX[1],$YY
+	jne	.Lcmov$i
+	la	$TX[1],0($TX[0])
+.Lcmov$i:
+	la	$TY,0($TY,$TX[0])
+	nill	$TY,255
+___
+push(@TX,shift(@TX)); push(@XX,shift(@XX));     # "rotate" registers
+}
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	lg	$TX[1],0($inp)
+	sllg	$acc,$acc,8
+	la	$inp,8($inp)
+	ic	$acc,2($TY,$key)
+	xgr	$acc,$TX[1]
+	stg	$acc,0($out)
+	la	$out,8($out)
+	brctg	$cnt,.Loop8
+
+.Lshort:
+	lghi	$acc,7
+	ngr	$len,$acc
+	jz	.Lexit
+	j	.Loop1
+
+.align	16
+.Loop1:
+	la	$YY,0($YY,$TX[0])
+	nill	$YY,255
+	llgc	$TY,2($YY,$key)
+	stc	$TX[0],2($YY,$key)
+	stc	$TY,2($XX[0],$key)
+	ar	$TY,$TX[0]
+	ahi	$XX[0],1
+	nill	$TY,255
+	nill	$XX[0],255
+	llgc	$acc,0($inp)
+	la	$inp,1($inp)
+	llgc	$TY,2($TY,$key)
+	llgc	$TX[0],2($XX[0],$key)
+	xr	$acc,$TY
+	stc	$acc,0($out)
+	la	$out,1($out)
+	brct	$len,.Loop1
+
+.Lexit:
+	ahi	$XX[0],-1
+	stc	$XX[0],0($key)
+	stc	$YY,1($key)
+	lm${g}	%r6,%r11,6*$SIZE_T($sp)
+	br	$rp
+.size	RC4,.-RC4
+.string	"RC4 for s390x, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+
+___
+}
+
+# void RC4_set_key(RC4_KEY *key,unsigned int len,const void *inp)
+{
+$cnt="%r0";
+$idx="%r1";
+$key="%r2";
+$len="%r3";
+$inp="%r4";
+$acc="%r5";
+$dat="%r6";
+$ikey="%r7";
+$iinp="%r8";
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	RC4_set_key
+.type	RC4_set_key,\@function
+.align	64
+RC4_set_key:
+	stm${g}	%r6,%r8,6*$SIZE_T($sp)
+	lhi	$cnt,256
+	la	$idx,0(%r0)
+	sth	$idx,0($key)
+.align	4
+.L1stloop:
+	stc	$idx,2($idx,$key)
+	la	$idx,1($idx)
+	brct	$cnt,.L1stloop
+
+	lghi	$ikey,-256
+	lr	$cnt,$len
+	la	$iinp,0(%r0)
+	la	$idx,0(%r0)
+.align	16
+.L2ndloop:
+	llgc	$acc,2+256($ikey,$key)
+	llgc	$dat,0($iinp,$inp)
+	la	$idx,0($idx,$acc)
+	la	$ikey,1($ikey)
+	la	$idx,0($idx,$dat)
+	nill	$idx,255
+	la	$iinp,1($iinp)
+	tml	$ikey,255
+	llgc	$dat,2($idx,$key)
+	stc	$dat,2+256-1($ikey,$key)
+	stc	$acc,2($idx,$key)
+	jz	.Ldone
+	brct	$cnt,.L2ndloop
+	lr	$cnt,$len
+	la	$iinp,0(%r0)
+	j	.L2ndloop
+.Ldone:
+	lm${g}	%r6,%r8,6*$SIZE_T($sp)
+	br	$rp
+.size	RC4_set_key,.-RC4_set_key
+
+___
+}
+
+# const char *RC4_options()
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	RC4_options
+.type	RC4_options,\@function
+.align	16
+RC4_options:
+	larl	%r2,.Loptions
+	br	%r14
+.size	RC4_options,.-RC4_options
+.section	.rodata
+.Loptions:
+.align	8
+.string	"rc4(8x,char)"
+___
+
+print $code;
+close STDOUT;	# force flush
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-x86_64.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-x86_64.pl
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..aaed2b1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-x86_64.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,687 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# July 2004
+#
+# 2.22x RC4 tune-up:-) It should be noted though that my hand [as in
+# "hand-coded assembler"] doesn't stand for the whole improvement
+# coefficient. It turned out that eliminating RC4_CHAR from config
+# line results in ~40% improvement (yes, even for C implementation).
+# Presumably it has everything to do with AMD cache architecture and
+# RAW or whatever penalties. Once again! The module *requires* config
+# line *without* RC4_CHAR! As for coding "secret," I bet on partial
+# register arithmetics. For example instead of 'inc %r8; and $255,%r8'
+# I simply 'inc %r8b'. Even though optimization manual discourages
+# to operate on partial registers, it turned out to be the best bet.
+# At least for AMD... How IA32E would perform remains to be seen...
+
+# November 2004
+#
+# As was shown by Marc Bevand reordering of couple of load operations
+# results in even higher performance gain of 3.3x:-) At least on
+# Opteron... For reference, 1x in this case is RC4_CHAR C-code
+# compiled with gcc 3.3.2, which performs at ~54MBps per 1GHz clock.
+# Latter means that if you want to *estimate* what to expect from
+# *your* Opteron, then multiply 54 by 3.3 and clock frequency in GHz.
+
+# November 2004
+#
+# Intel P4 EM64T core was found to run the AMD64 code really slow...
+# The only way to achieve comparable performance on P4 was to keep
+# RC4_CHAR. Kind of ironic, huh? As it's apparently impossible to
+# compose blended code, which would perform even within 30% marginal
+# on either AMD and Intel platforms, I implement both cases. See
+# rc4_skey.c for further details...
+
+# April 2005
+#
+# P4 EM64T core appears to be "allergic" to 64-bit inc/dec. Replacing 
+# those with add/sub results in 50% performance improvement of folded
+# loop...
+
+# May 2005
+#
+# As was shown by Zou Nanhai loop unrolling can improve Intel EM64T
+# performance by >30% [unlike P4 32-bit case that is]. But this is
+# provided that loads are reordered even more aggressively! Both code
+# paths, AMD64 and EM64T, reorder loads in essentially same manner
+# as my IA-64 implementation. On Opteron this resulted in modest 5%
+# improvement [I had to test it], while final Intel P4 performance
+# achieves respectful 432MBps on 2.8GHz processor now. For reference.
+# If executed on Xeon, current RC4_CHAR code-path is 2.7x faster than
+# RC4_INT code-path. While if executed on Opteron, it's only 25%
+# slower than the RC4_INT one [meaning that if CPU µ-arch detection
+# is not implemented, then this final RC4_CHAR code-path should be
+# preferred, as it provides better *all-round* performance].
+
+# March 2007
+#
+# Intel Core2 was observed to perform poorly on both code paths:-( It
+# apparently suffers from some kind of partial register stall, which
+# occurs in 64-bit mode only [as virtually identical 32-bit loop was
+# observed to outperform 64-bit one by almost 50%]. Adding two movzb to
+# cloop1 boosts its performance by 80%! This loop appears to be optimal
+# fit for Core2 and therefore the code was modified to skip cloop8 on
+# this CPU.
+
+# May 2010
+#
+# Intel Westmere was observed to perform suboptimally. Adding yet
+# another movzb to cloop1 improved performance by almost 50%! Core2
+# performance is improved too, but nominally...
+
+# May 2011
+#
+# The only code path that was not modified is P4-specific one. Non-P4
+# Intel code path optimization is heavily based on submission by Maxim
+# Perminov, Maxim Locktyukhin and Jim Guilford of Intel. I've used
+# some of the ideas even in attempt to optmize the original RC4_INT
+# code path... Current performance in cycles per processed byte (less
+# is better) and improvement coefficients relative to previous
+# version of this module are:
+#
+# Opteron	5.3/+0%(*)
+# P4		6.5
+# Core2		6.2/+15%(**)
+# Westmere	4.2/+60%
+# Sandy Bridge	4.2/+120%
+# Atom		9.3/+80%
+# VIA Nano	6.4/+4%
+# Ivy Bridge	4.1/+30%
+# Bulldozer	4.5/+30%(*)
+#
+# (*)	But corresponding loop has less instructions, which should have
+#	positive effect on upcoming Bulldozer, which has one less ALU.
+#	For reference, Intel code runs at 6.8 cpb rate on Opteron.
+# (**)	Note that Core2 result is ~15% lower than corresponding result
+#	for 32-bit code, meaning that it's possible to improve it,
+#	but more than likely at the cost of the others (see rc4-586.pl
+#	to get the idea)...
+
+$flavour = shift;
+$output  = shift;
+if ($flavour =~ /\./) { $output = $flavour; undef $flavour; }
+
+$win64=0; $win64=1 if ($flavour =~ /[nm]asm|mingw64/ || $output =~ /\.asm$/);
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+( $xlate="${dir}x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
+( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
+die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl";
+
+open OUT,"| \"$^X\" \"$xlate\" $flavour \"$output\"";
+*STDOUT=*OUT;
+
+$dat="%rdi";	    # arg1
+$len="%rsi";	    # arg2
+$inp="%rdx";	    # arg3
+$out="%rcx";	    # arg4
+
+{
+$code=<<___;
+.text
+.extern	OPENSSL_ia32cap_P
+
+.globl	RC4
+.type	RC4,\@function,4
+.align	16
+RC4:	or	$len,$len
+	jne	.Lentry
+	ret
+.Lentry:
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+.Lprologue:
+	mov	$len,%r11
+	mov	$inp,%r12
+	mov	$out,%r13
+___
+my $len="%r11";		# reassign input arguments
+my $inp="%r12";
+my $out="%r13";
+
+my @XX=("%r10","%rsi");
+my @TX=("%rax","%rbx");
+my $YY="%rcx";
+my $TY="%rdx";
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	xor	$XX[0],$XX[0]
+	xor	$YY,$YY
+
+	lea	8($dat),$dat
+	mov	-8($dat),$XX[0]#b
+	mov	-4($dat),$YY#b
+	cmpl	\$-1,256($dat)
+	je	.LRC4_CHAR
+	mov	OPENSSL_ia32cap_P(%rip),%r8d
+	xor	$TX[1],$TX[1]
+	inc	$XX[0]#b
+	sub	$XX[0],$TX[1]
+	sub	$inp,$out
+	movl	($dat,$XX[0],4),$TX[0]#d
+	test	\$-16,$len
+	jz	.Lloop1
+	bt	\$30,%r8d	# Intel CPU?
+	jc	.Lintel
+	and	\$7,$TX[1]
+	lea	1($XX[0]),$XX[1]
+	jz	.Loop8
+	sub	$TX[1],$len
+.Loop8_warmup:
+	add	$TX[0]#b,$YY#b
+	movl	($dat,$YY,4),$TY#d
+	movl	$TX[0]#d,($dat,$YY,4)
+	movl	$TY#d,($dat,$XX[0],4)
+	add	$TY#b,$TX[0]#b
+	inc	$XX[0]#b
+	movl	($dat,$TX[0],4),$TY#d
+	movl	($dat,$XX[0],4),$TX[0]#d
+	xorb	($inp),$TY#b
+	movb	$TY#b,($out,$inp)
+	lea	1($inp),$inp
+	dec	$TX[1]
+	jnz	.Loop8_warmup
+
+	lea	1($XX[0]),$XX[1]
+	jmp	.Loop8
+.align	16
+.Loop8:
+___
+for ($i=0;$i<8;$i++) {
+$code.=<<___ if ($i==7);
+	add	\$8,$XX[1]#b
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	add	$TX[0]#b,$YY#b
+	movl	($dat,$YY,4),$TY#d
+	movl	$TX[0]#d,($dat,$YY,4)
+	movl	`4*($i==7?-1:$i)`($dat,$XX[1],4),$TX[1]#d
+	ror	\$8,%r8				# ror is redundant when $i=0
+	movl	$TY#d,4*$i($dat,$XX[0],4)
+	add	$TX[0]#b,$TY#b
+	movb	($dat,$TY,4),%r8b
+___
+push(@TX,shift(@TX)); #push(@XX,shift(@XX));	# "rotate" registers
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	add	\$8,$XX[0]#b
+	ror	\$8,%r8
+	sub	\$8,$len
+
+	xor	($inp),%r8
+	mov	%r8,($out,$inp)
+	lea	8($inp),$inp
+
+	test	\$-8,$len
+	jnz	.Loop8
+	cmp	\$0,$len
+	jne	.Lloop1
+	jmp	.Lexit
+
+.align	16
+.Lintel:
+	test	\$-32,$len
+	jz	.Lloop1
+	and	\$15,$TX[1]
+	jz	.Loop16_is_hot
+	sub	$TX[1],$len
+.Loop16_warmup:
+	add	$TX[0]#b,$YY#b
+	movl	($dat,$YY,4),$TY#d
+	movl	$TX[0]#d,($dat,$YY,4)
+	movl	$TY#d,($dat,$XX[0],4)
+	add	$TY#b,$TX[0]#b
+	inc	$XX[0]#b
+	movl	($dat,$TX[0],4),$TY#d
+	movl	($dat,$XX[0],4),$TX[0]#d
+	xorb	($inp),$TY#b
+	movb	$TY#b,($out,$inp)
+	lea	1($inp),$inp
+	dec	$TX[1]
+	jnz	.Loop16_warmup
+
+	mov	$YY,$TX[1]
+	xor	$YY,$YY
+	mov	$TX[1]#b,$YY#b
+
+.Loop16_is_hot:
+	lea	($dat,$XX[0],4),$XX[1]
+___
+sub RC4_loop {
+  my $i=shift;
+  my $j=$i<0?0:$i;
+  my $xmm="%xmm".($j&1);
+
+    $code.="	add	\$16,$XX[0]#b\n"		if ($i==15);
+    $code.="	movdqu	($inp),%xmm2\n"			if ($i==15);
+    $code.="	add	$TX[0]#b,$YY#b\n"		if ($i<=0);
+    $code.="	movl	($dat,$YY,4),$TY#d\n";
+    $code.="	pxor	%xmm0,%xmm2\n"			if ($i==0);
+    $code.="	psllq	\$8,%xmm1\n"			if ($i==0);
+    $code.="	pxor	$xmm,$xmm\n"			if ($i<=1);
+    $code.="	movl	$TX[0]#d,($dat,$YY,4)\n";
+    $code.="	add	$TY#b,$TX[0]#b\n";
+    $code.="	movl	`4*($j+1)`($XX[1]),$TX[1]#d\n"	if ($i<15);
+    $code.="	movz	$TX[0]#b,$TX[0]#d\n";
+    $code.="	movl	$TY#d,4*$j($XX[1])\n";
+    $code.="	pxor	%xmm1,%xmm2\n"			if ($i==0);
+    $code.="	lea	($dat,$XX[0],4),$XX[1]\n"	if ($i==15);
+    $code.="	add	$TX[1]#b,$YY#b\n"		if ($i<15);
+    $code.="	pinsrw	\$`($j>>1)&7`,($dat,$TX[0],4),$xmm\n";
+    $code.="	movdqu	%xmm2,($out,$inp)\n"		if ($i==0);
+    $code.="	lea	16($inp),$inp\n"		if ($i==0);
+    $code.="	movl	($XX[1]),$TX[1]#d\n"		if ($i==15);
+}
+	RC4_loop(-1);
+$code.=<<___;
+	jmp	.Loop16_enter
+.align	16
+.Loop16:
+___
+
+for ($i=0;$i<16;$i++) {
+    $code.=".Loop16_enter:\n"		if ($i==1);
+	RC4_loop($i);
+	push(@TX,shift(@TX)); 		# "rotate" registers
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	$YY,$TX[1]
+	xor	$YY,$YY			# keyword to partial register
+	sub	\$16,$len
+	mov	$TX[1]#b,$YY#b
+	test	\$-16,$len
+	jnz	.Loop16
+
+	psllq	\$8,%xmm1
+	pxor	%xmm0,%xmm2
+	pxor	%xmm1,%xmm2
+	movdqu	%xmm2,($out,$inp)
+	lea	16($inp),$inp
+
+	cmp	\$0,$len
+	jne	.Lloop1
+	jmp	.Lexit
+
+.align	16
+.Lloop1:
+	add	$TX[0]#b,$YY#b
+	movl	($dat,$YY,4),$TY#d
+	movl	$TX[0]#d,($dat,$YY,4)
+	movl	$TY#d,($dat,$XX[0],4)
+	add	$TY#b,$TX[0]#b
+	inc	$XX[0]#b
+	movl	($dat,$TX[0],4),$TY#d
+	movl	($dat,$XX[0],4),$TX[0]#d
+	xorb	($inp),$TY#b
+	movb	$TY#b,($out,$inp)
+	lea	1($inp),$inp
+	dec	$len
+	jnz	.Lloop1
+	jmp	.Lexit
+
+.align	16
+.LRC4_CHAR:
+	add	\$1,$XX[0]#b
+	movzb	($dat,$XX[0]),$TX[0]#d
+	test	\$-8,$len
+	jz	.Lcloop1
+	jmp	.Lcloop8
+.align	16
+.Lcloop8:
+	mov	($inp),%r8d
+	mov	4($inp),%r9d
+___
+# unroll 2x4-wise, because 64-bit rotates kill Intel P4...
+for ($i=0;$i<4;$i++) {
+$code.=<<___;
+	add	$TX[0]#b,$YY#b
+	lea	1($XX[0]),$XX[1]
+	movzb	($dat,$YY),$TY#d
+	movzb	$XX[1]#b,$XX[1]#d
+	movzb	($dat,$XX[1]),$TX[1]#d
+	movb	$TX[0]#b,($dat,$YY)
+	cmp	$XX[1],$YY
+	movb	$TY#b,($dat,$XX[0])
+	jne	.Lcmov$i			# Intel cmov is sloooow...
+	mov	$TX[0],$TX[1]
+.Lcmov$i:
+	add	$TX[0]#b,$TY#b
+	xor	($dat,$TY),%r8b
+	ror	\$8,%r8d
+___
+push(@TX,shift(@TX)); push(@XX,shift(@XX));	# "rotate" registers
+}
+for ($i=4;$i<8;$i++) {
+$code.=<<___;
+	add	$TX[0]#b,$YY#b
+	lea	1($XX[0]),$XX[1]
+	movzb	($dat,$YY),$TY#d
+	movzb	$XX[1]#b,$XX[1]#d
+	movzb	($dat,$XX[1]),$TX[1]#d
+	movb	$TX[0]#b,($dat,$YY)
+	cmp	$XX[1],$YY
+	movb	$TY#b,($dat,$XX[0])
+	jne	.Lcmov$i			# Intel cmov is sloooow...
+	mov	$TX[0],$TX[1]
+.Lcmov$i:
+	add	$TX[0]#b,$TY#b
+	xor	($dat,$TY),%r9b
+	ror	\$8,%r9d
+___
+push(@TX,shift(@TX)); push(@XX,shift(@XX));	# "rotate" registers
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	lea	-8($len),$len
+	mov	%r8d,($out)
+	lea	8($inp),$inp
+	mov	%r9d,4($out)
+	lea	8($out),$out
+
+	test	\$-8,$len
+	jnz	.Lcloop8
+	cmp	\$0,$len
+	jne	.Lcloop1
+	jmp	.Lexit
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+.align	16
+.Lcloop1:
+	add	$TX[0]#b,$YY#b
+	movzb	$YY#b,$YY#d
+	movzb	($dat,$YY),$TY#d
+	movb	$TX[0]#b,($dat,$YY)
+	movb	$TY#b,($dat,$XX[0])
+	add	$TX[0]#b,$TY#b
+	add	\$1,$XX[0]#b
+	movzb	$TY#b,$TY#d
+	movzb	$XX[0]#b,$XX[0]#d
+	movzb	($dat,$TY),$TY#d
+	movzb	($dat,$XX[0]),$TX[0]#d
+	xorb	($inp),$TY#b
+	lea	1($inp),$inp
+	movb	$TY#b,($out)
+	lea	1($out),$out
+	sub	\$1,$len
+	jnz	.Lcloop1
+	jmp	.Lexit
+
+.align	16
+.Lexit:
+	sub	\$1,$XX[0]#b
+	movl	$XX[0]#d,-8($dat)
+	movl	$YY#d,-4($dat)
+
+	mov	(%rsp),%r13
+	mov	8(%rsp),%r12
+	mov	16(%rsp),%rbx
+	add	\$24,%rsp
+.Lepilogue:
+	ret
+.size	RC4,.-RC4
+___
+}
+
+$idx="%r8";
+$ido="%r9";
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	RC4_set_key
+.type	RC4_set_key,\@function,3
+.align	16
+RC4_set_key:
+	lea	8($dat),$dat
+	lea	($inp,$len),$inp
+	neg	$len
+	mov	$len,%rcx
+	xor	%eax,%eax
+	xor	$ido,$ido
+	xor	%r10,%r10
+	xor	%r11,%r11
+
+	mov	OPENSSL_ia32cap_P(%rip),$idx#d
+	bt	\$20,$idx#d	# RC4_CHAR?
+	jc	.Lc1stloop
+	jmp	.Lw1stloop
+
+.align	16
+.Lw1stloop:
+	mov	%eax,($dat,%rax,4)
+	add	\$1,%al
+	jnc	.Lw1stloop
+
+	xor	$ido,$ido
+	xor	$idx,$idx
+.align	16
+.Lw2ndloop:
+	mov	($dat,$ido,4),%r10d
+	add	($inp,$len,1),$idx#b
+	add	%r10b,$idx#b
+	add	\$1,$len
+	mov	($dat,$idx,4),%r11d
+	cmovz	%rcx,$len
+	mov	%r10d,($dat,$idx,4)
+	mov	%r11d,($dat,$ido,4)
+	add	\$1,$ido#b
+	jnc	.Lw2ndloop
+	jmp	.Lexit_key
+
+.align	16
+.Lc1stloop:
+	mov	%al,($dat,%rax)
+	add	\$1,%al
+	jnc	.Lc1stloop
+
+	xor	$ido,$ido
+	xor	$idx,$idx
+.align	16
+.Lc2ndloop:
+	mov	($dat,$ido),%r10b
+	add	($inp,$len),$idx#b
+	add	%r10b,$idx#b
+	add	\$1,$len
+	mov	($dat,$idx),%r11b
+	jnz	.Lcnowrap
+	mov	%rcx,$len
+.Lcnowrap:
+	mov	%r10b,($dat,$idx)
+	mov	%r11b,($dat,$ido)
+	add	\$1,$ido#b
+	jnc	.Lc2ndloop
+	movl	\$-1,256($dat)
+
+.align	16
+.Lexit_key:
+	xor	%eax,%eax
+	mov	%eax,-8($dat)
+	mov	%eax,-4($dat)
+	ret
+.size	RC4_set_key,.-RC4_set_key
+
+.globl	RC4_options
+.type	RC4_options,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+RC4_options:
+	lea	.Lopts(%rip),%rax
+	mov	OPENSSL_ia32cap_P(%rip),%edx
+	bt	\$20,%edx
+	jc	.L8xchar
+	bt	\$30,%edx
+	jnc	.Ldone
+	add	\$25,%rax
+	ret
+.L8xchar:
+	add	\$12,%rax
+.Ldone:
+	ret
+.align	64
+.Lopts:
+.asciz	"rc4(8x,int)"
+.asciz	"rc4(8x,char)"
+.asciz	"rc4(16x,int)"
+.asciz	"RC4 for x86_64, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+.align	64
+.size	RC4_options,.-RC4_options
+___
+
+# EXCEPTION_DISPOSITION handler (EXCEPTION_RECORD *rec,ULONG64 frame,
+#		CONTEXT *context,DISPATCHER_CONTEXT *disp)
+if ($win64) {
+$rec="%rcx";
+$frame="%rdx";
+$context="%r8";
+$disp="%r9";
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.extern	__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind
+.type	stream_se_handler,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+stream_se_handler:
+	push	%rsi
+	push	%rdi
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+	pushfq
+	sub	\$64,%rsp
+
+	mov	120($context),%rax	# pull context->Rax
+	mov	248($context),%rbx	# pull context->Rip
+
+	lea	.Lprologue(%rip),%r10
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip<prologue label
+	jb	.Lin_prologue
+
+	mov	152($context),%rax	# pull context->Rsp
+
+	lea	.Lepilogue(%rip),%r10
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip>=epilogue label
+	jae	.Lin_prologue
+
+	lea	24(%rax),%rax
+
+	mov	-8(%rax),%rbx
+	mov	-16(%rax),%r12
+	mov	-24(%rax),%r13
+	mov	%rbx,144($context)	# restore context->Rbx
+	mov	%r12,216($context)	# restore context->R12
+	mov	%r13,224($context)	# restore context->R13
+
+.Lin_prologue:
+	mov	8(%rax),%rdi
+	mov	16(%rax),%rsi
+	mov	%rax,152($context)	# restore context->Rsp
+	mov	%rsi,168($context)	# restore context->Rsi
+	mov	%rdi,176($context)	# restore context->Rdi
+
+	jmp	.Lcommon_seh_exit
+.size	stream_se_handler,.-stream_se_handler
+
+.type	key_se_handler,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+key_se_handler:
+	push	%rsi
+	push	%rdi
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+	pushfq
+	sub	\$64,%rsp
+
+	mov	152($context),%rax	# pull context->Rsp
+	mov	8(%rax),%rdi
+	mov	16(%rax),%rsi
+	mov	%rsi,168($context)	# restore context->Rsi
+	mov	%rdi,176($context)	# restore context->Rdi
+
+.Lcommon_seh_exit:
+
+	mov	40($disp),%rdi		# disp->ContextRecord
+	mov	$context,%rsi		# context
+	mov	\$154,%ecx		# sizeof(CONTEXT)
+	.long	0xa548f3fc		# cld; rep movsq
+
+	mov	$disp,%rsi
+	xor	%rcx,%rcx		# arg1, UNW_FLAG_NHANDLER
+	mov	8(%rsi),%rdx		# arg2, disp->ImageBase
+	mov	0(%rsi),%r8		# arg3, disp->ControlPc
+	mov	16(%rsi),%r9		# arg4, disp->FunctionEntry
+	mov	40(%rsi),%r10		# disp->ContextRecord
+	lea	56(%rsi),%r11		# &disp->HandlerData
+	lea	24(%rsi),%r12		# &disp->EstablisherFrame
+	mov	%r10,32(%rsp)		# arg5
+	mov	%r11,40(%rsp)		# arg6
+	mov	%r12,48(%rsp)		# arg7
+	mov	%rcx,56(%rsp)		# arg8, (NULL)
+	call	*__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind(%rip)
+
+	mov	\$1,%eax		# ExceptionContinueSearch
+	add	\$64,%rsp
+	popfq
+	pop	%r15
+	pop	%r14
+	pop	%r13
+	pop	%r12
+	pop	%rbp
+	pop	%rbx
+	pop	%rdi
+	pop	%rsi
+	ret
+.size	key_se_handler,.-key_se_handler
+
+.section	.pdata
+.align	4
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_RC4
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_RC4
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_RC4
+
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_RC4_set_key
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_RC4_set_key
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_RC4_set_key
+
+.section	.xdata
+.align	8
+.LSEH_info_RC4:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	stream_se_handler
+.LSEH_info_RC4_set_key:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	key_se_handler
+___
+}
+
+sub reg_part {
+my ($reg,$conv)=@_;
+    if ($reg =~ /%r[0-9]+/)	{ $reg .= $conv; }
+    elsif ($conv eq "b")	{ $reg =~ s/%[er]([^x]+)x?/%$1l/;	}
+    elsif ($conv eq "w")	{ $reg =~ s/%[er](.+)/%$1/;		}
+    elsif ($conv eq "d")	{ $reg =~ s/%[er](.+)/%e$1/;		}
+    return $reg;
+}
+
+$code =~ s/(%[a-z0-9]+)#([bwd])/reg_part($1,$2)/gem;
+$code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem;
+
+print $code;
+
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc4/build.info b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc4/build.info
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8659526
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc4/build.info
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+LIBS=../../libcrypto
+SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
+        {- $target{rc4_asm_src} -}
+
+GENERATE[rc4-586.s]=asm/rc4-586.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $(CFLAGS) $(LIB_CFLAGS) $(PROCESSOR)
+DEPEND[rc4-586.s]=../perlasm/x86asm.pl
+
+GENERATE[rc4-x86_64.s]=asm/rc4-x86_64.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+GENERATE[rc4-md5-x86_64.s]=asm/rc4-md5-x86_64.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+
+GENERATE[rc4-parisc.s]=asm/rc4-parisc.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+
+BEGINRAW[makefile(windows)]
+{- $builddir -}\rc4-ia64.asm: {- $sourcedir -}\asm\rc4-ia64.pl
+	$(PERL) {- $sourcedir -}\asm\rc4-ia64.pl $@.S
+	$(CC) -DSZ=4 -EP $@.S > $@.i && move /Y $@.i $@
+	del /Q $@.S
+ENDRAW[makefile(windows)]
+
+BEGINRAW[Makefile]
+{- $builddir -}/rc4-ia64.s: {- $sourcedir -}/asm/rc4-ia64.pl
+	@(trap "rm $@.*" INT 0; \
+	  $(PERL) {- $sourcedir -}/asm/rc4-ia64.pl $(CFLAGS) $(LIB_CFLAGS) $@.S; \
+	  case `awk '/^#define RC4_INT/{print$$NF}' $(BLDDIR)/include/openssl/opensslconf.h` in \
+	  int)	set -x; $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(LIB_CFLAGS) -DSZ=4 -E $@.S > $@.i && mv -f $@.i $@;; \
+	  char)	set -x; $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(LIB_CFLAGS) -DSZ=1 -E $@.S > $@.i && mv -f $@.i $@;; \
+	  *)	exit 1 ;; \
+	  esac )
+
+# GNU make "catch all"
+{- $builddir -}/rc4-%.s:	{- $sourcedir -}/asm/rc4-%.pl
+	CC="$(CC)" $(PERL) $< $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $@
+ENDRAW[Makefile]
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc4/rc4_enc.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc4/rc4_enc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..be11bad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc4/rc4_enc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/rc4.h>
+#include "rc4_locl.h"
+
+/*-
+ * RC4 as implemented from a posting from
+ * Newsgroups: sci.crypt
+ * From: sterndark@netcom.com (David Sterndark)
+ * Subject: RC4 Algorithm revealed.
+ * Message-ID: <sternCvKL4B.Hyy@netcom.com>
+ * Date: Wed, 14 Sep 1994 06:35:31 GMT
+ */
+
+void RC4(RC4_KEY *key, size_t len, const unsigned char *indata,
+         unsigned char *outdata)
+{
+    register RC4_INT *d;
+    register RC4_INT x, y, tx, ty;
+    size_t i;
+
+    x = key->x;
+    y = key->y;
+    d = key->data;
+
+#define LOOP(in,out) \
+                x=((x+1)&0xff); \
+                tx=d[x]; \
+                y=(tx+y)&0xff; \
+                d[x]=ty=d[y]; \
+                d[y]=tx; \
+                (out) = d[(tx+ty)&0xff]^ (in);
+
+    i = len >> 3;
+    if (i) {
+        for (;;) {
+            LOOP(indata[0], outdata[0]);
+            LOOP(indata[1], outdata[1]);
+            LOOP(indata[2], outdata[2]);
+            LOOP(indata[3], outdata[3]);
+            LOOP(indata[4], outdata[4]);
+            LOOP(indata[5], outdata[5]);
+            LOOP(indata[6], outdata[6]);
+            LOOP(indata[7], outdata[7]);
+            indata += 8;
+            outdata += 8;
+            if (--i == 0)
+                break;
+        }
+    }
+    i = len & 0x07;
+    if (i) {
+        for (;;) {
+            LOOP(indata[0], outdata[0]);
+            if (--i == 0)
+                break;
+            LOOP(indata[1], outdata[1]);
+            if (--i == 0)
+                break;
+            LOOP(indata[2], outdata[2]);
+            if (--i == 0)
+                break;
+            LOOP(indata[3], outdata[3]);
+            if (--i == 0)
+                break;
+            LOOP(indata[4], outdata[4]);
+            if (--i == 0)
+                break;
+            LOOP(indata[5], outdata[5]);
+            if (--i == 0)
+                break;
+            LOOP(indata[6], outdata[6]);
+            if (--i == 0)
+                break;
+        }
+    }
+    key->x = x;
+    key->y = y;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc4/rc4_locl.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc4/rc4_locl.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4380add
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc4/rc4_locl.h
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1998-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_RC4_LOCL_H
+# define HEADER_RC4_LOCL_H
+
+# include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+# include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc4/rc4_skey.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc4/rc4_skey.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..16f81a4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc4/rc4_skey.c
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/rc4.h>
+#include "rc4_locl.h"
+#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+
+const char *RC4_options(void)
+{
+    if (sizeof(RC4_INT) == 1)
+        return ("rc4(char)");
+    else
+        return ("rc4(int)");
+}
+
+/*-
+ * RC4 as implemented from a posting from
+ * Newsgroups: sci.crypt
+ * From: sterndark@netcom.com (David Sterndark)
+ * Subject: RC4 Algorithm revealed.
+ * Message-ID: <sternCvKL4B.Hyy@netcom.com>
+ * Date: Wed, 14 Sep 1994 06:35:31 GMT
+ */
+
+void RC4_set_key(RC4_KEY *key, int len, const unsigned char *data)
+{
+    register RC4_INT tmp;
+    register int id1, id2;
+    register RC4_INT *d;
+    unsigned int i;
+
+    d = &(key->data[0]);
+    key->x = 0;
+    key->y = 0;
+    id1 = id2 = 0;
+
+#define SK_LOOP(d,n) { \
+                tmp=d[(n)]; \
+                id2 = (data[id1] + tmp + id2) & 0xff; \
+                if (++id1 == len) id1=0; \
+                d[(n)]=d[id2]; \
+                d[id2]=tmp; }
+
+    for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
+        d[i] = i;
+    for (i = 0; i < 256; i += 4) {
+        SK_LOOP(d, i + 0);
+        SK_LOOP(d, i + 1);
+        SK_LOOP(d, i + 2);
+        SK_LOOP(d, i + 3);
+    }
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc5/asm/rc5-586.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc5/asm/rc5-586.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e3e1c64
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc5/asm/rc5-586.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm");
+require "x86asm.pl";
+require "cbc.pl";
+
+$output = pop;
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+&asm_init($ARGV[0],"rc5-586.pl");
+
+$RC5_MAX_ROUNDS=16;
+$RC5_32_OFF=($RC5_MAX_ROUNDS+2)*4;
+$A="edi";
+$B="esi";
+$S="ebp";
+$tmp1="eax";
+$r="ebx";
+$tmpc="ecx";
+$tmp4="edx";
+
+&RC5_32_encrypt("RC5_32_encrypt",1);
+&RC5_32_encrypt("RC5_32_decrypt",0);
+&cbc("RC5_32_cbc_encrypt","RC5_32_encrypt","RC5_32_decrypt",0,4,5,3,-1,-1);
+&asm_finish();
+
+close STDOUT;
+
+sub RC5_32_encrypt
+	{
+	local($name,$enc)=@_;
+
+	&function_begin_B($name,"");
+
+	&comment("");
+
+	&push("ebp");
+	 &push("esi");
+	&push("edi");
+	 &mov($tmp4,&wparam(0));
+	&mov($S,&wparam(1));
+
+	&comment("Load the 2 words");
+	 &mov($A,&DWP(0,$tmp4,"",0));
+	&mov($B,&DWP(4,$tmp4,"",0));
+
+	&push($r);
+	 &mov($r,	&DWP(0,$S,"",0));
+
+	# encrypting part
+
+	if ($enc)
+		{
+		 &add($A,	&DWP(4+0,$S,"",0));
+		&add($B,	&DWP(4+4,$S,"",0));
+
+		for ($i=0; $i<$RC5_MAX_ROUNDS; $i++)
+			{
+			 &xor($A,	$B);
+			&mov($tmp1,	&DWP(12+$i*8,$S,"",0));
+			 &mov($tmpc,	$B);
+			&rotl($A,	&LB("ecx"));
+			&add($A,	$tmp1);
+
+			 &xor($B,	$A);
+			&mov($tmp1,	&DWP(16+$i*8,$S,"",0));
+			 &mov($tmpc,	$A);
+			&rotl($B,	&LB("ecx"));
+			&add($B,	$tmp1);
+			if (($i == 7) || ($i == 11))
+				{
+			 &cmp($r,	$i+1);
+			&je(&label("rc5_exit"));
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		 &cmp($r,	12);
+		&je(&label("rc5_dec_12"));
+		 &cmp($r,	8);
+		&je(&label("rc5_dec_8"));
+		for ($i=$RC5_MAX_ROUNDS; $i > 0; $i--)
+			{
+			&set_label("rc5_dec_$i") if ($i == 12) || ($i == 8);
+			 &mov($tmp1,	&DWP($i*8+8,$S,"",0));
+			&sub($B,	$tmp1);
+			 &mov($tmpc,	$A);
+			&rotr($B,	&LB("ecx"));
+			&xor($B,	$A);
+
+			 &mov($tmp1,	&DWP($i*8+4,$S,"",0));
+			&sub($A,	$tmp1);
+			 &mov($tmpc,	$B);
+			&rotr($A,	&LB("ecx"));
+			&xor($A,	$B);
+			}
+		 &sub($B,	&DWP(4+4,$S,"",0));
+		&sub($A,	&DWP(4+0,$S,"",0));
+		}
+
+	&set_label("rc5_exit");
+	 &mov(&DWP(0,$tmp4,"",0),$A);
+	&mov(&DWP(4,$tmp4,"",0),$B);
+
+	 &pop("ebx");
+	&pop("edi");
+	 &pop("esi");
+	&pop("ebp");
+	 &ret();
+	&function_end_B($name);
+	}
+
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc5/build.info b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc5/build.info
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..baf8a0e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc5/build.info
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+LIBS=../../libcrypto
+SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
+        rc5_skey.c rc5_ecb.c {- $target{rc5_asm_src} -} rc5cfb64.c rc5ofb64.c
+
+GENERATE[rc5-586.s]=asm/rc5-586.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $(CFLAGS) $(LIB_CFLAGS)
+DEPEND[rc5-586.s]=../perlasm/x86asm.pl ../perlasm/cbc.pl
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc5/rc5_ecb.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc5/rc5_ecb.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c32f38e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc5/rc5_ecb.c
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/rc5.h>
+#include "rc5_locl.h"
+#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+
+void RC5_32_ecb_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                        RC5_32_KEY *ks, int encrypt)
+{
+    unsigned long l, d[2];
+
+    c2l(in, l);
+    d[0] = l;
+    c2l(in, l);
+    d[1] = l;
+    if (encrypt)
+        RC5_32_encrypt(d, ks);
+    else
+        RC5_32_decrypt(d, ks);
+    l = d[0];
+    l2c(l, out);
+    l = d[1];
+    l2c(l, out);
+    l = d[0] = d[1] = 0;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc5/rc5_enc.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc5/rc5_enc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..58631de
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc5/rc5_enc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/rc5.h>
+#include "rc5_locl.h"
+
+void RC5_32_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                        long length, RC5_32_KEY *ks, unsigned char *iv,
+                        int encrypt)
+{
+    register unsigned long tin0, tin1;
+    register unsigned long tout0, tout1, xor0, xor1;
+    register long l = length;
+    unsigned long tin[2];
+
+    if (encrypt) {
+        c2l(iv, tout0);
+        c2l(iv, tout1);
+        iv -= 8;
+        for (l -= 8; l >= 0; l -= 8) {
+            c2l(in, tin0);
+            c2l(in, tin1);
+            tin0 ^= tout0;
+            tin1 ^= tout1;
+            tin[0] = tin0;
+            tin[1] = tin1;
+            RC5_32_encrypt(tin, ks);
+            tout0 = tin[0];
+            l2c(tout0, out);
+            tout1 = tin[1];
+            l2c(tout1, out);
+        }
+        if (l != -8) {
+            c2ln(in, tin0, tin1, l + 8);
+            tin0 ^= tout0;
+            tin1 ^= tout1;
+            tin[0] = tin0;
+            tin[1] = tin1;
+            RC5_32_encrypt(tin, ks);
+            tout0 = tin[0];
+            l2c(tout0, out);
+            tout1 = tin[1];
+            l2c(tout1, out);
+        }
+        l2c(tout0, iv);
+        l2c(tout1, iv);
+    } else {
+        c2l(iv, xor0);
+        c2l(iv, xor1);
+        iv -= 8;
+        for (l -= 8; l >= 0; l -= 8) {
+            c2l(in, tin0);
+            tin[0] = tin0;
+            c2l(in, tin1);
+            tin[1] = tin1;
+            RC5_32_decrypt(tin, ks);
+            tout0 = tin[0] ^ xor0;
+            tout1 = tin[1] ^ xor1;
+            l2c(tout0, out);
+            l2c(tout1, out);
+            xor0 = tin0;
+            xor1 = tin1;
+        }
+        if (l != -8) {
+            c2l(in, tin0);
+            tin[0] = tin0;
+            c2l(in, tin1);
+            tin[1] = tin1;
+            RC5_32_decrypt(tin, ks);
+            tout0 = tin[0] ^ xor0;
+            tout1 = tin[1] ^ xor1;
+            l2cn(tout0, tout1, out, l + 8);
+            xor0 = tin0;
+            xor1 = tin1;
+        }
+        l2c(xor0, iv);
+        l2c(xor1, iv);
+    }
+    tin0 = tin1 = tout0 = tout1 = xor0 = xor1 = 0;
+    tin[0] = tin[1] = 0;
+}
+
+void RC5_32_encrypt(unsigned long *d, RC5_32_KEY *key)
+{
+    RC5_32_INT a, b, *s;
+
+    s = key->data;
+
+    a = d[0] + s[0];
+    b = d[1] + s[1];
+    E_RC5_32(a, b, s, 2);
+    E_RC5_32(a, b, s, 4);
+    E_RC5_32(a, b, s, 6);
+    E_RC5_32(a, b, s, 8);
+    E_RC5_32(a, b, s, 10);
+    E_RC5_32(a, b, s, 12);
+    E_RC5_32(a, b, s, 14);
+    E_RC5_32(a, b, s, 16);
+    if (key->rounds == 12) {
+        E_RC5_32(a, b, s, 18);
+        E_RC5_32(a, b, s, 20);
+        E_RC5_32(a, b, s, 22);
+        E_RC5_32(a, b, s, 24);
+    } else if (key->rounds == 16) {
+        /* Do a full expansion to avoid a jump */
+        E_RC5_32(a, b, s, 18);
+        E_RC5_32(a, b, s, 20);
+        E_RC5_32(a, b, s, 22);
+        E_RC5_32(a, b, s, 24);
+        E_RC5_32(a, b, s, 26);
+        E_RC5_32(a, b, s, 28);
+        E_RC5_32(a, b, s, 30);
+        E_RC5_32(a, b, s, 32);
+    }
+    d[0] = a;
+    d[1] = b;
+}
+
+void RC5_32_decrypt(unsigned long *d, RC5_32_KEY *key)
+{
+    RC5_32_INT a, b, *s;
+
+    s = key->data;
+
+    a = d[0];
+    b = d[1];
+    if (key->rounds == 16) {
+        D_RC5_32(a, b, s, 32);
+        D_RC5_32(a, b, s, 30);
+        D_RC5_32(a, b, s, 28);
+        D_RC5_32(a, b, s, 26);
+        /* Do a full expansion to avoid a jump */
+        D_RC5_32(a, b, s, 24);
+        D_RC5_32(a, b, s, 22);
+        D_RC5_32(a, b, s, 20);
+        D_RC5_32(a, b, s, 18);
+    } else if (key->rounds == 12) {
+        D_RC5_32(a, b, s, 24);
+        D_RC5_32(a, b, s, 22);
+        D_RC5_32(a, b, s, 20);
+        D_RC5_32(a, b, s, 18);
+    }
+    D_RC5_32(a, b, s, 16);
+    D_RC5_32(a, b, s, 14);
+    D_RC5_32(a, b, s, 12);
+    D_RC5_32(a, b, s, 10);
+    D_RC5_32(a, b, s, 8);
+    D_RC5_32(a, b, s, 6);
+    D_RC5_32(a, b, s, 4);
+    D_RC5_32(a, b, s, 2);
+    d[0] = a - s[0];
+    d[1] = b - s[1];
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc5/rc5_locl.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc5/rc5_locl.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..41130fe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc5/rc5_locl.h
@@ -0,0 +1,186 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+#undef c2l
+#define c2l(c,l)        (l =((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))    , \
+                         l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<< 8L, \
+                         l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<16L, \
+                         l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<24L)
+
+/* NOTE - c is not incremented as per c2l */
+#undef c2ln
+#define c2ln(c,l1,l2,n) { \
+                        c+=n; \
+                        l1=l2=0; \
+                        switch (n) { \
+                        case 8: l2 =((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<24L; \
+                        /* fall thru */                               \
+                        case 7: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<16L; \
+                        /* fall thru */                               \
+                        case 6: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<< 8L; \
+                        /* fall thru */                               \
+                        case 5: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))));      \
+                        /* fall thru */                               \
+                        case 4: l1 =((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<24L; \
+                        /* fall thru */                               \
+                        case 3: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<16L; \
+                        /* fall thru */                               \
+                        case 2: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<< 8L; \
+                        /* fall thru */                               \
+                        case 1: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))));      \
+                                } \
+                        }
+
+#undef l2c
+#define l2c(l,c)        (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)     )&0xff), \
+                         *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8L)&0xff), \
+                         *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16L)&0xff), \
+                         *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24L)&0xff))
+
+/* NOTE - c is not incremented as per l2c */
+#undef l2cn
+#define l2cn(l1,l2,c,n) { \
+                        c+=n; \
+                        switch (n) { \
+                        case 8: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>>24L)&0xff); \
+                        /* fall thru */                                     \
+                        case 7: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>>16L)&0xff); \
+                        /* fall thru */                                     \
+                        case 6: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>> 8L)&0xff); \
+                        /* fall thru */                                     \
+                        case 5: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)     )&0xff); \
+                        /* fall thru */                                     \
+                        case 4: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>>24L)&0xff); \
+                        /* fall thru */                                     \
+                        case 3: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>>16L)&0xff); \
+                        /* fall thru */                                     \
+                        case 2: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>> 8L)&0xff); \
+                        /* fall thru */                                     \
+                        case 1: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)     )&0xff); \
+                                } \
+                        }
+
+/* NOTE - c is not incremented as per n2l */
+#define n2ln(c,l1,l2,n) { \
+                        c+=n; \
+                        l1=l2=0; \
+                        switch (n) { \
+                        case 8: l2 =((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))    ; \
+                        /* fall thru */                              \
+                        case 7: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<< 8; \
+                        /* fall thru */                              \
+                        case 6: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<16; \
+                        /* fall thru */                              \
+                        case 5: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<24; \
+                        /* fall thru */                              \
+                        case 4: l1 =((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))    ; \
+                        /* fall thru */                              \
+                        case 3: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<< 8; \
+                        /* fall thru */                              \
+                        case 2: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<16; \
+                        /* fall thru */                              \
+                        case 1: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<24; \
+                                } \
+                        }
+
+/* NOTE - c is not incremented as per l2n */
+#define l2nn(l1,l2,c,n) { \
+                        c+=n; \
+                        switch (n) { \
+                        case 8: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)    )&0xff); \
+                        /* fall thru */                                    \
+                        case 7: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>> 8)&0xff); \
+                        /* fall thru */                                    \
+                        case 6: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>>16)&0xff); \
+                        /* fall thru */                                    \
+                        case 5: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>>24)&0xff); \
+                        /* fall thru */                                    \
+                        case 4: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)    )&0xff); \
+                        /* fall thru */                                    \
+                        case 3: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>> 8)&0xff); \
+                        /* fall thru */                                    \
+                        case 2: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>>16)&0xff); \
+                        /* fall thru */                                    \
+                        case 1: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>>24)&0xff); \
+                                } \
+                        }
+
+#undef n2l
+#define n2l(c,l)        (l =((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<24L, \
+                         l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<16L, \
+                         l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<< 8L, \
+                         l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++))))
+
+#undef l2n
+#define l2n(l,c)        (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24L)&0xff), \
+                         *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16L)&0xff), \
+                         *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8L)&0xff), \
+                         *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)     )&0xff))
+
+#if (defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) && defined(_MSC_VER))
+# define ROTATE_l32(a,n)     _lrotl(a,n)
+# define ROTATE_r32(a,n)     _lrotr(a,n)
+#elif defined(__ICC)
+# define ROTATE_l32(a,n)     _rotl(a,n)
+# define ROTATE_r32(a,n)     _rotr(a,n)
+#elif defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 && !defined(__STRICT_ANSI__) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_INLINE_ASM) && !defined(PEDANTIC)
+# if defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__)
+#  define ROTATE_l32(a,n)       ({ register unsigned int ret;   \
+                                        asm ("roll %%cl,%0"     \
+                                                : "=r"(ret)     \
+                                                : "c"(n),"0"((unsigned int)(a)) \
+                                                : "cc");        \
+                                        ret;                    \
+                                })
+#  define ROTATE_r32(a,n)       ({ register unsigned int ret;   \
+                                        asm ("rorl %%cl,%0"     \
+                                                : "=r"(ret)     \
+                                                : "c"(n),"0"((unsigned int)(a)) \
+                                                : "cc");        \
+                                        ret;                    \
+                                })
+# endif
+#endif
+#ifndef ROTATE_l32
+# define ROTATE_l32(a,n)     (((a)<<(n&0x1f))|(((a)&0xffffffff)>>((32-n)&0x1f)))
+#endif
+#ifndef ROTATE_r32
+# define ROTATE_r32(a,n)     (((a)<<((32-n)&0x1f))|(((a)&0xffffffff)>>(n&0x1f)))
+#endif
+
+#define RC5_32_MASK     0xffffffffL
+
+#define RC5_16_P        0xB7E1
+#define RC5_16_Q        0x9E37
+#define RC5_32_P        0xB7E15163L
+#define RC5_32_Q        0x9E3779B9L
+#define RC5_64_P        0xB7E151628AED2A6BLL
+#define RC5_64_Q        0x9E3779B97F4A7C15LL
+
+#define E_RC5_32(a,b,s,n) \
+        a^=b; \
+        a=ROTATE_l32(a,b); \
+        a+=s[n]; \
+        a&=RC5_32_MASK; \
+        b^=a; \
+        b=ROTATE_l32(b,a); \
+        b+=s[n+1]; \
+        b&=RC5_32_MASK;
+
+#define D_RC5_32(a,b,s,n) \
+        b-=s[n+1]; \
+        b&=RC5_32_MASK; \
+        b=ROTATE_r32(b,a); \
+        b^=a; \
+        a-=s[n]; \
+        a&=RC5_32_MASK; \
+        a=ROTATE_r32(a,b); \
+        a^=b;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc5/rc5_skey.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc5/rc5_skey.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..943a784
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc5/rc5_skey.c
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/rc5.h>
+#include "rc5_locl.h"
+
+void RC5_32_set_key(RC5_32_KEY *key, int len, const unsigned char *data,
+                    int rounds)
+{
+    RC5_32_INT L[64], l, ll, A, B, *S, k;
+    int i, j, m, c, t, ii, jj;
+
+    if ((rounds != RC5_16_ROUNDS) &&
+        (rounds != RC5_12_ROUNDS) && (rounds != RC5_8_ROUNDS))
+        rounds = RC5_16_ROUNDS;
+
+    key->rounds = rounds;
+    S = &(key->data[0]);
+    j = 0;
+    for (i = 0; i <= (len - 8); i += 8) {
+        c2l(data, l);
+        L[j++] = l;
+        c2l(data, l);
+        L[j++] = l;
+    }
+    ii = len - i;
+    if (ii) {
+        k = len & 0x07;
+        c2ln(data, l, ll, k);
+        L[j + 0] = l;
+        L[j + 1] = ll;
+    }
+
+    c = (len + 3) / 4;
+    t = (rounds + 1) * 2;
+    S[0] = RC5_32_P;
+    for (i = 1; i < t; i++)
+        S[i] = (S[i - 1] + RC5_32_Q) & RC5_32_MASK;
+
+    j = (t > c) ? t : c;
+    j *= 3;
+    ii = jj = 0;
+    A = B = 0;
+    for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
+        k = (S[ii] + A + B) & RC5_32_MASK;
+        A = S[ii] = ROTATE_l32(k, 3);
+        m = (int)(A + B);
+        k = (L[jj] + A + B) & RC5_32_MASK;
+        B = L[jj] = ROTATE_l32(k, m);
+        if (++ii >= t)
+            ii = 0;
+        if (++jj >= c)
+            jj = 0;
+    }
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc5/rc5cfb64.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc5/rc5cfb64.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9a8aa6b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc5/rc5cfb64.c
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/rc5.h>
+#include "rc5_locl.h"
+
+/*
+ * The input and output encrypted as though 64bit cfb mode is being used.
+ * The extra state information to record how much of the 64bit block we have
+ * used is contained in *num;
+ */
+
+void RC5_32_cfb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                          long length, RC5_32_KEY *schedule,
+                          unsigned char *ivec, int *num, int encrypt)
+{
+    register unsigned long v0, v1, t;
+    register int n = *num;
+    register long l = length;
+    unsigned long ti[2];
+    unsigned char *iv, c, cc;
+
+    iv = (unsigned char *)ivec;
+    if (encrypt) {
+        while (l--) {
+            if (n == 0) {
+                c2l(iv, v0);
+                ti[0] = v0;
+                c2l(iv, v1);
+                ti[1] = v1;
+                RC5_32_encrypt((unsigned long *)ti, schedule);
+                iv = (unsigned char *)ivec;
+                t = ti[0];
+                l2c(t, iv);
+                t = ti[1];
+                l2c(t, iv);
+                iv = (unsigned char *)ivec;
+            }
+            c = *(in++) ^ iv[n];
+            *(out++) = c;
+            iv[n] = c;
+            n = (n + 1) & 0x07;
+        }
+    } else {
+        while (l--) {
+            if (n == 0) {
+                c2l(iv, v0);
+                ti[0] = v0;
+                c2l(iv, v1);
+                ti[1] = v1;
+                RC5_32_encrypt((unsigned long *)ti, schedule);
+                iv = (unsigned char *)ivec;
+                t = ti[0];
+                l2c(t, iv);
+                t = ti[1];
+                l2c(t, iv);
+                iv = (unsigned char *)ivec;
+            }
+            cc = *(in++);
+            c = iv[n];
+            iv[n] = cc;
+            *(out++) = c ^ cc;
+            n = (n + 1) & 0x07;
+        }
+    }
+    v0 = v1 = ti[0] = ti[1] = t = c = cc = 0;
+    *num = n;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc5/rc5ofb64.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc5/rc5ofb64.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3a41d77
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rc5/rc5ofb64.c
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/rc5.h>
+#include "rc5_locl.h"
+
+/*
+ * The input and output encrypted as though 64bit ofb mode is being used.
+ * The extra state information to record how much of the 64bit block we have
+ * used is contained in *num;
+ */
+void RC5_32_ofb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                          long length, RC5_32_KEY *schedule,
+                          unsigned char *ivec, int *num)
+{
+    register unsigned long v0, v1, t;
+    register int n = *num;
+    register long l = length;
+    unsigned char d[8];
+    register char *dp;
+    unsigned long ti[2];
+    unsigned char *iv;
+    int save = 0;
+
+    iv = (unsigned char *)ivec;
+    c2l(iv, v0);
+    c2l(iv, v1);
+    ti[0] = v0;
+    ti[1] = v1;
+    dp = (char *)d;
+    l2c(v0, dp);
+    l2c(v1, dp);
+    while (l--) {
+        if (n == 0) {
+            RC5_32_encrypt((unsigned long *)ti, schedule);
+            dp = (char *)d;
+            t = ti[0];
+            l2c(t, dp);
+            t = ti[1];
+            l2c(t, dp);
+            save++;
+        }
+        *(out++) = *(in++) ^ d[n];
+        n = (n + 1) & 0x07;
+    }
+    if (save) {
+        v0 = ti[0];
+        v1 = ti[1];
+        iv = (unsigned char *)ivec;
+        l2c(v0, iv);
+        l2c(v1, iv);
+    }
+    t = v0 = v1 = ti[0] = ti[1] = 0;
+    *num = n;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ripemd/asm/rmd-586.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ripemd/asm/rmd-586.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..544c496
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ripemd/asm/rmd-586.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,603 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+# Normal is the
+# ripemd160_block_asm_data_order(RIPEMD160_CTX *c, ULONG *X,int blocks);
+
+$normal=0;
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm");
+require "x86asm.pl";
+
+$output=pop;
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+&asm_init($ARGV[0],$0);
+
+$A="ecx";
+$B="esi";
+$C="edi";
+$D="ebx";
+$E="ebp";
+$tmp1="eax";
+$tmp2="edx";
+
+$KL1=0x5A827999;
+$KL2=0x6ED9EBA1;
+$KL3=0x8F1BBCDC;
+$KL4=0xA953FD4E;
+$KR0=0x50A28BE6;
+$KR1=0x5C4DD124; 
+$KR2=0x6D703EF3;
+$KR3=0x7A6D76E9;
+
+
+@wl=(	 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9,10,11,12,13,14,15,
+	 7, 4,13, 1,10, 6,15, 3,12, 0, 9, 5, 2,14,11, 8,
+	 3,10,14, 4, 9,15, 8, 1, 2, 7, 0, 6,13,11, 5,12,
+	 1, 9,11,10, 0, 8,12, 4,13, 3, 7,15,14, 5, 6, 2,
+	 4, 0, 5, 9, 7,12, 2,10,14, 1, 3, 8,11, 6,15,13,
+	 );
+
+@wr=(	 5,14, 7, 0, 9, 2,11, 4,13, 6,15, 8, 1,10, 3,12,
+	 6,11, 3, 7, 0,13, 5,10,14,15, 8,12, 4, 9, 1, 2,
+	15, 5, 1, 3, 7,14, 6, 9,11, 8,12, 2,10, 0, 4,13,
+	 8, 6, 4, 1, 3,11,15, 0, 5,12, 2,13, 9, 7,10,14,
+	12,15,10, 4, 1, 5, 8, 7, 6, 2,13,14, 0, 3, 9,11,
+	);
+
+@sl=(	11,14,15,12, 5, 8, 7, 9,11,13,14,15, 6, 7, 9, 8,
+	 7, 6, 8,13,11, 9, 7,15, 7,12,15, 9,11, 7,13,12,
+	11,13, 6, 7,14, 9,13,15,14, 8,13, 6, 5,12, 7, 5,
+	11,12,14,15,14,15, 9, 8, 9,14, 5, 6, 8, 6, 5,12,
+	 9,15, 5,11, 6, 8,13,12, 5,12,13,14,11, 8, 5, 6,
+	 );
+
+@sr=(	 8, 9, 9,11,13,15,15, 5, 7, 7, 8,11,14,14,12, 6,
+	 9,13,15, 7,12, 8, 9,11, 7, 7,12, 7, 6,15,13,11,
+	 9, 7,15,11, 8, 6, 6,14,12,13, 5,14,13,13, 7, 5,
+	15, 5, 8,11,14,14, 6,14, 6, 9,12, 9,12, 5,15, 8,
+	 8, 5,12, 9,12, 5,14, 6, 8,13, 6, 5,15,13,11,11,
+ 	);
+
+&ripemd160_block("ripemd160_block_asm_data_order");
+&asm_finish();
+
+close STDOUT;
+
+sub Xv
+	{
+	local($n)=@_;
+	return(&swtmp($n));
+	# tmp on stack
+	}
+
+sub Np
+	{
+	local($p)=@_;
+	local(%n)=($A,$E,$B,$A,$C,$B,$D,$C,$E,$D);
+	return($n{$p});
+	}
+
+sub RIP1
+	{
+	local($a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$pos,$s,$o,$pos2)=@_;
+
+	&comment($p++);
+	if ($p & 1)
+		{
+	 #&mov($tmp1,	$c) if $o == -1;
+	&xor($tmp1,	$d) if $o == -1;
+	 &mov($tmp2,	&Xv($pos));
+	&xor($tmp1,	$b);
+	 &add($a,	$tmp2);
+	&rotl($c,	10);
+	&add($a,	$tmp1);
+	 &mov($tmp1,	&Np($c));	# NEXT
+	 # XXX
+	&rotl($a,	$s);
+	&add($a,	$e);
+		}
+	else
+		{
+	 &xor($tmp1,	$d);
+	&mov($tmp2,	&Xv($pos));
+	 &xor($tmp1,	$b);
+	&add($a,	$tmp1);
+	 &mov($tmp1,	&Np($c)) if $o <= 0;
+	 &mov($tmp1,	-1) if $o == 1;
+	 # XXX if $o == 2;
+	&rotl($c,	10);
+	&add($a,	$tmp2);
+	 &xor($tmp1,	&Np($d)) if $o <= 0;
+	 &mov($tmp2,	&Xv($pos2)) if $o == 1;
+	 &mov($tmp2,	&wparam(0)) if $o == 2;
+	&rotl($a,	$s);
+	&add($a,	$e);
+		}
+	}
+
+sub RIP2
+	{
+	local($a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$pos,$pos2,$s,$K,$o)=@_;
+
+# XXXXXX
+	&comment($p++);
+	if ($p & 1)
+		{
+#	 &mov($tmp2,	&Xv($pos)) if $o < -1;
+#	&mov($tmp1,	-1) if $o < -1;
+
+	 &add($a,	$tmp2);
+	&mov($tmp2,	$c);
+	 &sub($tmp1,	$b);
+	&and($tmp2,	$b);
+	 &and($tmp1,	$d);
+	&or($tmp2,	$tmp1);
+	 &mov($tmp1,	&Xv($pos2)) if $o <= 0; # XXXXXXXXXXXXXX
+	 # XXX
+	&rotl($c,	10);
+	&lea($a,	&DWP($K,$a,$tmp2,1));
+	 &mov($tmp2,	-1) if $o <= 0;
+	 # XXX
+	&rotl($a,	$s);
+	&add($a,	$e);
+		}
+	else
+		{
+	 # XXX
+	 &add($a,	$tmp1);
+	&mov($tmp1,	$c);
+	 &sub($tmp2,	$b);
+	&and($tmp1,	$b);
+	 &and($tmp2,	$d);
+	if ($o != 2)
+		{
+	&or($tmp1,	$tmp2);
+	 &mov($tmp2,	&Xv($pos2)) if $o <= 0;
+	 &mov($tmp2,	-1) if $o == 1;
+	&rotl($c,	10);
+	&lea($a,	&DWP($K,$a,$tmp1,1));
+	 &mov($tmp1,	-1) if $o <= 0;
+	 &sub($tmp2,	&Np($c)) if $o == 1;
+		} else {
+	&or($tmp2,	$tmp1);
+	 &mov($tmp1,	&Np($c));
+	&rotl($c,	10);
+	&lea($a,	&DWP($K,$a,$tmp2,1));
+	 &xor($tmp1,	&Np($d));
+		}
+	&rotl($a,	$s);
+	&add($a,	$e);
+		}
+	}
+
+sub RIP3
+	{
+	local($a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$pos,$s,$K,$o,$pos2)=@_;
+
+	&comment($p++);
+	if ($p & 1)
+		{
+#	 &mov($tmp2,	-1) if $o < -1;
+#	&sub($tmp2,	$c) if $o < -1;
+	 &mov($tmp1,	&Xv($pos));
+	&or($tmp2,	$b);
+	 &add($a,	$tmp1);
+	&xor($tmp2,	$d);
+	 &mov($tmp1,	-1) if $o <= 0;		# NEXT
+	 # XXX
+	&rotl($c,	10);
+	&lea($a,	&DWP($K,$a,$tmp2,1));
+	 &sub($tmp1,	&Np($c)) if $o <= 0;	# NEXT
+	 # XXX
+	&rotl($a,	$s);
+	&add($a,	$e);
+		}
+	else
+		{
+	 &mov($tmp2,	&Xv($pos));
+	&or($tmp1,	$b);
+	 &add($a,	$tmp2);
+	&xor($tmp1,	$d);
+	 &mov($tmp2,	-1) if $o <= 0;		# NEXT
+	 &mov($tmp2,	-1) if $o == 1;
+	 &mov($tmp2,	&Xv($pos2)) if $o == 2;
+	&rotl($c,	10);
+	&lea($a,	&DWP($K,$a,$tmp1,1));
+	 &sub($tmp2,	&Np($c)) if $o <= 0;	# NEXT
+	 &mov($tmp1,	&Np($d)) if $o == 1;
+	 &mov($tmp1,	-1) if $o == 2;
+	&rotl($a,	$s);
+	&add($a,	$e);
+		}
+	}
+
+sub RIP4
+	{
+	local($a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$pos,$s,$K,$o)=@_;
+
+	&comment($p++);
+	if ($p & 1)
+		{
+#	 &mov($tmp2,	-1) if $o == -2;
+#	&mov($tmp1,	$d) if $o == -2;
+	 &sub($tmp2,	$d);
+	&and($tmp1,	$b);
+	 &and($tmp2,	$c);
+	&or($tmp2,	$tmp1);
+	 &mov($tmp1,	&Xv($pos));
+	&rotl($c,	10);
+	&lea($a,	&DWP($K,$a,$tmp2));
+	 &mov($tmp2,	-1) unless $o > 0;	# NEXT
+	 # XXX
+	&add($a,	$tmp1);
+	 &mov($tmp1,	&Np($d)) unless $o > 0; # NEXT
+	 # XXX
+	&rotl($a,	$s);
+	&add($a,	$e);
+		}
+	else
+		{
+	 &sub($tmp2,	$d);
+	&and($tmp1,	$b);
+	 &and($tmp2,	$c);
+	&or($tmp2,	$tmp1);
+	 &mov($tmp1,	&Xv($pos));
+	&rotl($c,	10);
+	&lea($a,	&DWP($K,$a,$tmp2));
+	 &mov($tmp2,	-1) if $o == 0;	# NEXT
+	 &mov($tmp2,	-1) if $o == 1;
+	 &mov($tmp2,	-1) if $o == 2;
+	 # XXX
+	&add($a,	$tmp1);
+	 &mov($tmp1,	&Np($d)) if $o == 0;	# NEXT
+	 &sub($tmp2,	&Np($d)) if $o == 1;
+	 &sub($tmp2,	&Np($c)) if $o == 2;
+	 # XXX
+	&rotl($a,	$s);
+	&add($a,	$e);
+		}
+	}
+
+sub RIP5
+	{
+	local($a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$pos,$s,$K,$o)=@_;
+
+	&comment($p++);
+	if ($p & 1)
+		{
+	 &mov($tmp2,	-1) if $o == -2;
+	&sub($tmp2,	$d) if $o == -2;
+	 &mov($tmp1,	&Xv($pos));
+	&or($tmp2,	$c);
+	 &add($a,	$tmp1);
+	&xor($tmp2,	$b);
+	 &mov($tmp1,	-1) if $o <= 0;
+	 # XXX
+	&rotl($c,	10);
+	&lea($a,	&DWP($K,$a,$tmp2,1));
+	 &sub($tmp1,	&Np($d)) if $o <= 0;
+	 # XXX
+	&rotl($a,	$s);
+	&add($a,	$e);
+		}
+	else
+		{
+	 &mov($tmp2,	&Xv($pos));
+	&or($tmp1,	$c);
+	 &add($a,	$tmp2);
+	&xor($tmp1,	$b);
+	 &mov($tmp2,	-1) if $o <= 0;
+	 &mov($tmp2,	&wparam(0)) if $o == 1;	# Middle code
+	 &mov($tmp2,	-1) if $o == 2;
+	&rotl($c,	10);
+	&lea($a,	&DWP($K,$a,$tmp1,1));
+	 &sub($tmp2,	&Np($d)) if $o <= 0;
+	 &mov(&swtmp(16),	$A) if $o == 1;
+	 &mov($tmp1,	&Np($d)) if $o == 2;
+	&rotl($a,	$s);
+	&add($a,	$e);
+		}
+	}
+
+sub ripemd160_block
+	{
+	local($name)=@_;
+
+	&function_begin_B($name,"",3);
+
+	# parameter 1 is the RIPEMD160_CTX structure.
+	# A	0
+	# B	4
+	# C	8
+	# D 	12
+	# E 	16
+
+	&mov($tmp2,	&wparam(0));
+	 &mov($tmp1,	&wparam(1));
+	&push("esi");
+	 &mov($A,	&DWP( 0,$tmp2,"",0));
+	&push("edi");
+	 &mov($B,	&DWP( 4,$tmp2,"",0));
+	&push("ebp");
+	 &mov($C,	&DWP( 8,$tmp2,"",0));
+	&push("ebx");
+	 &stack_push(16+5+6);
+			  # Special comment about the figure of 6.
+			  # Idea is to pad the current frame so
+			  # that the top of the stack gets fairly
+			  # aligned. Well, as you realize it would
+			  # always depend on how the frame below is
+			  # aligned. The good news are that gcc-2.95
+			  # and later does keep first argument at
+			  # least double-wise aligned.
+			  #			<appro@fy.chalmers.se>
+
+	&set_label("start") unless $normal;
+	&comment("");
+
+	# &mov($tmp1,	&wparam(1)); # Done at end of loop
+	# &mov($tmp2,	&wparam(0)); # Done at end of loop
+
+	for ($z=0; $z<16; $z+=2)
+		{
+		&mov($D,		&DWP( $z*4,$tmp1,"",0));
+		 &mov($E,		&DWP( ($z+1)*4,$tmp1,"",0));
+		&mov(&swtmp($z),	$D);
+		 &mov(&swtmp($z+1),	$E);
+		}
+	&mov($tmp1,	$C);
+	 &mov($D,	&DWP(12,$tmp2,"",0));
+	&mov($E,	&DWP(16,$tmp2,"",0));
+
+	&RIP1($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$wl[ 0],$sl[ 0],-1);
+	&RIP1($E,$A,$B,$C,$D,$wl[ 1],$sl[ 1],0);
+	&RIP1($D,$E,$A,$B,$C,$wl[ 2],$sl[ 2],0);
+	&RIP1($C,$D,$E,$A,$B,$wl[ 3],$sl[ 3],0);
+	&RIP1($B,$C,$D,$E,$A,$wl[ 4],$sl[ 4],0);
+	&RIP1($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$wl[ 5],$sl[ 5],0);
+	&RIP1($E,$A,$B,$C,$D,$wl[ 6],$sl[ 6],0);
+	&RIP1($D,$E,$A,$B,$C,$wl[ 7],$sl[ 7],0);
+	&RIP1($C,$D,$E,$A,$B,$wl[ 8],$sl[ 8],0);
+	&RIP1($B,$C,$D,$E,$A,$wl[ 9],$sl[ 9],0);
+	&RIP1($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$wl[10],$sl[10],0);
+	&RIP1($E,$A,$B,$C,$D,$wl[11],$sl[11],0);
+	&RIP1($D,$E,$A,$B,$C,$wl[12],$sl[12],0);
+	&RIP1($C,$D,$E,$A,$B,$wl[13],$sl[13],0);
+	&RIP1($B,$C,$D,$E,$A,$wl[14],$sl[14],0);
+	&RIP1($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$wl[15],$sl[15],1,$wl[16]);
+
+	&RIP2($E,$A,$B,$C,$D,$wl[16],$wl[17],$sl[16],$KL1,-1);
+	&RIP2($D,$E,$A,$B,$C,$wl[17],$wl[18],$sl[17],$KL1,0);
+	&RIP2($C,$D,$E,$A,$B,$wl[18],$wl[19],$sl[18],$KL1,0);
+	&RIP2($B,$C,$D,$E,$A,$wl[19],$wl[20],$sl[19],$KL1,0);
+	&RIP2($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$wl[20],$wl[21],$sl[20],$KL1,0);
+	&RIP2($E,$A,$B,$C,$D,$wl[21],$wl[22],$sl[21],$KL1,0);
+	&RIP2($D,$E,$A,$B,$C,$wl[22],$wl[23],$sl[22],$KL1,0);
+	&RIP2($C,$D,$E,$A,$B,$wl[23],$wl[24],$sl[23],$KL1,0);
+	&RIP2($B,$C,$D,$E,$A,$wl[24],$wl[25],$sl[24],$KL1,0);
+	&RIP2($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$wl[25],$wl[26],$sl[25],$KL1,0);
+	&RIP2($E,$A,$B,$C,$D,$wl[26],$wl[27],$sl[26],$KL1,0);
+	&RIP2($D,$E,$A,$B,$C,$wl[27],$wl[28],$sl[27],$KL1,0);
+	&RIP2($C,$D,$E,$A,$B,$wl[28],$wl[29],$sl[28],$KL1,0);
+	&RIP2($B,$C,$D,$E,$A,$wl[29],$wl[30],$sl[29],$KL1,0);
+	&RIP2($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$wl[30],$wl[31],$sl[30],$KL1,0);
+	&RIP2($E,$A,$B,$C,$D,$wl[31],$wl[32],$sl[31],$KL1,1);
+
+	&RIP3($D,$E,$A,$B,$C,$wl[32],$sl[32],$KL2,-1);
+	&RIP3($C,$D,$E,$A,$B,$wl[33],$sl[33],$KL2,0);
+	&RIP3($B,$C,$D,$E,$A,$wl[34],$sl[34],$KL2,0);
+	&RIP3($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$wl[35],$sl[35],$KL2,0);
+	&RIP3($E,$A,$B,$C,$D,$wl[36],$sl[36],$KL2,0);
+	&RIP3($D,$E,$A,$B,$C,$wl[37],$sl[37],$KL2,0);
+	&RIP3($C,$D,$E,$A,$B,$wl[38],$sl[38],$KL2,0);
+	&RIP3($B,$C,$D,$E,$A,$wl[39],$sl[39],$KL2,0);
+	&RIP3($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$wl[40],$sl[40],$KL2,0);
+	&RIP3($E,$A,$B,$C,$D,$wl[41],$sl[41],$KL2,0);
+	&RIP3($D,$E,$A,$B,$C,$wl[42],$sl[42],$KL2,0);
+	&RIP3($C,$D,$E,$A,$B,$wl[43],$sl[43],$KL2,0);
+	&RIP3($B,$C,$D,$E,$A,$wl[44],$sl[44],$KL2,0);
+	&RIP3($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$wl[45],$sl[45],$KL2,0);
+	&RIP3($E,$A,$B,$C,$D,$wl[46],$sl[46],$KL2,0);
+	&RIP3($D,$E,$A,$B,$C,$wl[47],$sl[47],$KL2,1);
+
+	&RIP4($C,$D,$E,$A,$B,$wl[48],$sl[48],$KL3,-1);
+	&RIP4($B,$C,$D,$E,$A,$wl[49],$sl[49],$KL3,0);
+	&RIP4($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$wl[50],$sl[50],$KL3,0);
+	&RIP4($E,$A,$B,$C,$D,$wl[51],$sl[51],$KL3,0);
+	&RIP4($D,$E,$A,$B,$C,$wl[52],$sl[52],$KL3,0);
+	&RIP4($C,$D,$E,$A,$B,$wl[53],$sl[53],$KL3,0);
+	&RIP4($B,$C,$D,$E,$A,$wl[54],$sl[54],$KL3,0);
+	&RIP4($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$wl[55],$sl[55],$KL3,0);
+	&RIP4($E,$A,$B,$C,$D,$wl[56],$sl[56],$KL3,0);
+	&RIP4($D,$E,$A,$B,$C,$wl[57],$sl[57],$KL3,0);
+	&RIP4($C,$D,$E,$A,$B,$wl[58],$sl[58],$KL3,0);
+	&RIP4($B,$C,$D,$E,$A,$wl[59],$sl[59],$KL3,0);
+	&RIP4($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$wl[60],$sl[60],$KL3,0);
+	&RIP4($E,$A,$B,$C,$D,$wl[61],$sl[61],$KL3,0);
+	&RIP4($D,$E,$A,$B,$C,$wl[62],$sl[62],$KL3,0);
+	&RIP4($C,$D,$E,$A,$B,$wl[63],$sl[63],$KL3,1);
+
+	&RIP5($B,$C,$D,$E,$A,$wl[64],$sl[64],$KL4,-1);
+	&RIP5($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$wl[65],$sl[65],$KL4,0);
+	&RIP5($E,$A,$B,$C,$D,$wl[66],$sl[66],$KL4,0);
+	&RIP5($D,$E,$A,$B,$C,$wl[67],$sl[67],$KL4,0);
+	&RIP5($C,$D,$E,$A,$B,$wl[68],$sl[68],$KL4,0);
+	&RIP5($B,$C,$D,$E,$A,$wl[69],$sl[69],$KL4,0);
+	&RIP5($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$wl[70],$sl[70],$KL4,0);
+	&RIP5($E,$A,$B,$C,$D,$wl[71],$sl[71],$KL4,0);
+	&RIP5($D,$E,$A,$B,$C,$wl[72],$sl[72],$KL4,0);
+	&RIP5($C,$D,$E,$A,$B,$wl[73],$sl[73],$KL4,0);
+	&RIP5($B,$C,$D,$E,$A,$wl[74],$sl[74],$KL4,0);
+	&RIP5($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$wl[75],$sl[75],$KL4,0);
+	&RIP5($E,$A,$B,$C,$D,$wl[76],$sl[76],$KL4,0);
+	&RIP5($D,$E,$A,$B,$C,$wl[77],$sl[77],$KL4,0);
+	&RIP5($C,$D,$E,$A,$B,$wl[78],$sl[78],$KL4,0);
+	&RIP5($B,$C,$D,$E,$A,$wl[79],$sl[79],$KL4,1);
+
+	# &mov($tmp2,	&wparam(0)); # moved into last RIP5
+	# &mov(&swtmp(16),	$A);
+	 &mov($A,	&DWP( 0,$tmp2,"",0));
+	&mov(&swtmp(16+1),	$B);
+	 &mov(&swtmp(16+2),	$C);
+	&mov($B,	&DWP( 4,$tmp2,"",0));
+	 &mov(&swtmp(16+3),	$D);
+	&mov($C,	&DWP( 8,$tmp2,"",0));
+	 &mov(&swtmp(16+4),	$E);
+	&mov($D,	&DWP(12,$tmp2,"",0));
+	 &mov($E,	&DWP(16,$tmp2,"",0));
+
+	&RIP5($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$wr[ 0],$sr[ 0],$KR0,-2);
+	&RIP5($E,$A,$B,$C,$D,$wr[ 1],$sr[ 1],$KR0,0);
+	&RIP5($D,$E,$A,$B,$C,$wr[ 2],$sr[ 2],$KR0,0);
+	&RIP5($C,$D,$E,$A,$B,$wr[ 3],$sr[ 3],$KR0,0);
+	&RIP5($B,$C,$D,$E,$A,$wr[ 4],$sr[ 4],$KR0,0);
+	&RIP5($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$wr[ 5],$sr[ 5],$KR0,0);
+	&RIP5($E,$A,$B,$C,$D,$wr[ 6],$sr[ 6],$KR0,0);
+	&RIP5($D,$E,$A,$B,$C,$wr[ 7],$sr[ 7],$KR0,0);
+	&RIP5($C,$D,$E,$A,$B,$wr[ 8],$sr[ 8],$KR0,0);
+	&RIP5($B,$C,$D,$E,$A,$wr[ 9],$sr[ 9],$KR0,0);
+	&RIP5($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$wr[10],$sr[10],$KR0,0);
+	&RIP5($E,$A,$B,$C,$D,$wr[11],$sr[11],$KR0,0);
+	&RIP5($D,$E,$A,$B,$C,$wr[12],$sr[12],$KR0,0);
+	&RIP5($C,$D,$E,$A,$B,$wr[13],$sr[13],$KR0,0);
+	&RIP5($B,$C,$D,$E,$A,$wr[14],$sr[14],$KR0,0);
+	&RIP5($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$wr[15],$sr[15],$KR0,2);
+
+	&RIP4($E,$A,$B,$C,$D,$wr[16],$sr[16],$KR1,-2);
+	&RIP4($D,$E,$A,$B,$C,$wr[17],$sr[17],$KR1,0);
+	&RIP4($C,$D,$E,$A,$B,$wr[18],$sr[18],$KR1,0);
+	&RIP4($B,$C,$D,$E,$A,$wr[19],$sr[19],$KR1,0);
+	&RIP4($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$wr[20],$sr[20],$KR1,0);
+	&RIP4($E,$A,$B,$C,$D,$wr[21],$sr[21],$KR1,0);
+	&RIP4($D,$E,$A,$B,$C,$wr[22],$sr[22],$KR1,0);
+	&RIP4($C,$D,$E,$A,$B,$wr[23],$sr[23],$KR1,0);
+	&RIP4($B,$C,$D,$E,$A,$wr[24],$sr[24],$KR1,0);
+	&RIP4($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$wr[25],$sr[25],$KR1,0);
+	&RIP4($E,$A,$B,$C,$D,$wr[26],$sr[26],$KR1,0);
+	&RIP4($D,$E,$A,$B,$C,$wr[27],$sr[27],$KR1,0);
+	&RIP4($C,$D,$E,$A,$B,$wr[28],$sr[28],$KR1,0);
+	&RIP4($B,$C,$D,$E,$A,$wr[29],$sr[29],$KR1,0);
+	&RIP4($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$wr[30],$sr[30],$KR1,0);
+	&RIP4($E,$A,$B,$C,$D,$wr[31],$sr[31],$KR1,2);
+
+	&RIP3($D,$E,$A,$B,$C,$wr[32],$sr[32],$KR2,-2);
+	&RIP3($C,$D,$E,$A,$B,$wr[33],$sr[33],$KR2,0);
+	&RIP3($B,$C,$D,$E,$A,$wr[34],$sr[34],$KR2,0);
+	&RIP3($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$wr[35],$sr[35],$KR2,0);
+	&RIP3($E,$A,$B,$C,$D,$wr[36],$sr[36],$KR2,0);
+	&RIP3($D,$E,$A,$B,$C,$wr[37],$sr[37],$KR2,0);
+	&RIP3($C,$D,$E,$A,$B,$wr[38],$sr[38],$KR2,0);
+	&RIP3($B,$C,$D,$E,$A,$wr[39],$sr[39],$KR2,0);
+	&RIP3($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$wr[40],$sr[40],$KR2,0);
+	&RIP3($E,$A,$B,$C,$D,$wr[41],$sr[41],$KR2,0);
+	&RIP3($D,$E,$A,$B,$C,$wr[42],$sr[42],$KR2,0);
+	&RIP3($C,$D,$E,$A,$B,$wr[43],$sr[43],$KR2,0);
+	&RIP3($B,$C,$D,$E,$A,$wr[44],$sr[44],$KR2,0);
+	&RIP3($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$wr[45],$sr[45],$KR2,0);
+	&RIP3($E,$A,$B,$C,$D,$wr[46],$sr[46],$KR2,0);
+	&RIP3($D,$E,$A,$B,$C,$wr[47],$sr[47],$KR2,2,$wr[48]);
+
+	&RIP2($C,$D,$E,$A,$B,$wr[48],$wr[49],$sr[48],$KR3,-2);
+	&RIP2($B,$C,$D,$E,$A,$wr[49],$wr[50],$sr[49],$KR3,0);
+	&RIP2($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$wr[50],$wr[51],$sr[50],$KR3,0);
+	&RIP2($E,$A,$B,$C,$D,$wr[51],$wr[52],$sr[51],$KR3,0);
+	&RIP2($D,$E,$A,$B,$C,$wr[52],$wr[53],$sr[52],$KR3,0);
+	&RIP2($C,$D,$E,$A,$B,$wr[53],$wr[54],$sr[53],$KR3,0);
+	&RIP2($B,$C,$D,$E,$A,$wr[54],$wr[55],$sr[54],$KR3,0);
+	&RIP2($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$wr[55],$wr[56],$sr[55],$KR3,0);
+	&RIP2($E,$A,$B,$C,$D,$wr[56],$wr[57],$sr[56],$KR3,0);
+	&RIP2($D,$E,$A,$B,$C,$wr[57],$wr[58],$sr[57],$KR3,0);
+	&RIP2($C,$D,$E,$A,$B,$wr[58],$wr[59],$sr[58],$KR3,0);
+	&RIP2($B,$C,$D,$E,$A,$wr[59],$wr[60],$sr[59],$KR3,0);
+	&RIP2($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$wr[60],$wr[61],$sr[60],$KR3,0);
+	&RIP2($E,$A,$B,$C,$D,$wr[61],$wr[62],$sr[61],$KR3,0);
+	&RIP2($D,$E,$A,$B,$C,$wr[62],$wr[63],$sr[62],$KR3,0);
+	&RIP2($C,$D,$E,$A,$B,$wr[63],$wr[64],$sr[63],$KR3,2);
+
+	&RIP1($B,$C,$D,$E,$A,$wr[64],$sr[64],-2);
+	&RIP1($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$wr[65],$sr[65],0);
+	&RIP1($E,$A,$B,$C,$D,$wr[66],$sr[66],0);
+	&RIP1($D,$E,$A,$B,$C,$wr[67],$sr[67],0);
+	&RIP1($C,$D,$E,$A,$B,$wr[68],$sr[68],0);
+	&RIP1($B,$C,$D,$E,$A,$wr[69],$sr[69],0);
+	&RIP1($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$wr[70],$sr[70],0);
+	&RIP1($E,$A,$B,$C,$D,$wr[71],$sr[71],0);
+	&RIP1($D,$E,$A,$B,$C,$wr[72],$sr[72],0);
+	&RIP1($C,$D,$E,$A,$B,$wr[73],$sr[73],0);
+	&RIP1($B,$C,$D,$E,$A,$wr[74],$sr[74],0);
+	&RIP1($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$wr[75],$sr[75],0);
+	&RIP1($E,$A,$B,$C,$D,$wr[76],$sr[76],0);
+	&RIP1($D,$E,$A,$B,$C,$wr[77],$sr[77],0);
+	&RIP1($C,$D,$E,$A,$B,$wr[78],$sr[78],0);
+	&RIP1($B,$C,$D,$E,$A,$wr[79],$sr[79],2);
+
+	# &mov($tmp2,	&wparam(0)); # Moved into last round
+
+	 &mov($tmp1,	&DWP( 4,$tmp2,"",0));	# ctx->B
+ 	&add($D,	$tmp1);	
+	 &mov($tmp1,	&swtmp(16+2));		# $c
+	&add($D,	$tmp1);
+
+	 &mov($tmp1,	&DWP( 8,$tmp2,"",0));	# ctx->C
+	&add($E,	$tmp1);	
+	 &mov($tmp1,	&swtmp(16+3));		# $d
+	&add($E,	$tmp1);
+
+	 &mov($tmp1,	&DWP(12,$tmp2,"",0));	# ctx->D
+	&add($A,	$tmp1);	
+	 &mov($tmp1,	&swtmp(16+4));		# $e
+	&add($A,	$tmp1);
+
+
+	 &mov($tmp1,	&DWP(16,$tmp2,"",0));	# ctx->E
+	&add($B,	$tmp1);	
+	 &mov($tmp1,	&swtmp(16+0));		# $a
+	&add($B,	$tmp1);
+
+	 &mov($tmp1,	&DWP( 0,$tmp2,"",0));	# ctx->A
+	&add($C,	$tmp1);	
+	 &mov($tmp1,	&swtmp(16+1));		# $b
+	&add($C,	$tmp1);
+
+	 &mov($tmp1,	&wparam(2));
+
+	&mov(&DWP( 0,$tmp2,"",0),	$D);
+	 &mov(&DWP( 4,$tmp2,"",0),	$E);
+	&mov(&DWP( 8,$tmp2,"",0),	$A);
+	 &sub($tmp1,1);
+	&mov(&DWP(12,$tmp2,"",0),	$B);
+	 &mov(&DWP(16,$tmp2,"",0),	$C);
+
+	&jle(&label("get_out"));
+
+	&mov(&wparam(2),$tmp1);
+	 &mov($C,	$A);
+	&mov($tmp1,	&wparam(1));
+	 &mov($A,	$D);
+	&add($tmp1,	64);
+	 &mov($B,	$E);
+	&mov(&wparam(1),$tmp1);
+
+	&jmp(&label("start"));
+
+	&set_label("get_out");
+
+	&stack_pop(16+5+6);
+
+	&pop("ebx");
+	&pop("ebp");
+	&pop("edi");
+	&pop("esi");
+	&ret();
+	&function_end_B($name);
+	}
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ripemd/build.info b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ripemd/build.info
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c45050c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ripemd/build.info
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+LIBS=../../libcrypto
+SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
+        rmd_dgst.c rmd_one.c {- $target{rmd160_asm_src} -}
+
+GENERATE[rmd-586.s]=asm/rmd-586.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $(CFLAGS) $(LIB_CFLAGS)
+DEPEND[rmd-586.s]=../perlasm/x86asm.pl
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ripemd/rmd_dgst.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ripemd/rmd_dgst.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a1670c7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ripemd/rmd_dgst.c
@@ -0,0 +1,282 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "rmd_locl.h"
+#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+
+#ifdef RMD160_ASM
+void ripemd160_block_x86(RIPEMD160_CTX *c, unsigned long *p, size_t num);
+# define ripemd160_block ripemd160_block_x86
+#else
+void ripemd160_block(RIPEMD160_CTX *c, unsigned long *p, size_t num);
+#endif
+
+int RIPEMD160_Init(RIPEMD160_CTX *c)
+{
+    memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c));
+    c->A = RIPEMD160_A;
+    c->B = RIPEMD160_B;
+    c->C = RIPEMD160_C;
+    c->D = RIPEMD160_D;
+    c->E = RIPEMD160_E;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+#ifndef ripemd160_block_data_order
+# ifdef X
+#  undef X
+# endif
+void ripemd160_block_data_order(RIPEMD160_CTX *ctx, const void *p, size_t num)
+{
+    const unsigned char *data = p;
+    register unsigned MD32_REG_T A, B, C, D, E;
+    unsigned MD32_REG_T a, b, c, d, e, l;
+# ifndef MD32_XARRAY
+    /* See comment in crypto/sha/sha_locl.h for details. */
+    unsigned MD32_REG_T XX0, XX1, XX2, XX3, XX4, XX5, XX6, XX7,
+        XX8, XX9, XX10, XX11, XX12, XX13, XX14, XX15;
+#  define X(i)   XX##i
+# else
+    RIPEMD160_LONG XX[16];
+#  define X(i)   XX[i]
+# endif
+
+    for (; num--;) {
+
+        A = ctx->A;
+        B = ctx->B;
+        C = ctx->C;
+        D = ctx->D;
+        E = ctx->E;
+
+        (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+        X(0) = l;
+        (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+        X(1) = l;
+        RIP1(A, B, C, D, E, WL00, SL00);
+        (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+        X(2) = l;
+        RIP1(E, A, B, C, D, WL01, SL01);
+        (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+        X(3) = l;
+        RIP1(D, E, A, B, C, WL02, SL02);
+        (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+        X(4) = l;
+        RIP1(C, D, E, A, B, WL03, SL03);
+        (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+        X(5) = l;
+        RIP1(B, C, D, E, A, WL04, SL04);
+        (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+        X(6) = l;
+        RIP1(A, B, C, D, E, WL05, SL05);
+        (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+        X(7) = l;
+        RIP1(E, A, B, C, D, WL06, SL06);
+        (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+        X(8) = l;
+        RIP1(D, E, A, B, C, WL07, SL07);
+        (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+        X(9) = l;
+        RIP1(C, D, E, A, B, WL08, SL08);
+        (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+        X(10) = l;
+        RIP1(B, C, D, E, A, WL09, SL09);
+        (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+        X(11) = l;
+        RIP1(A, B, C, D, E, WL10, SL10);
+        (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+        X(12) = l;
+        RIP1(E, A, B, C, D, WL11, SL11);
+        (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+        X(13) = l;
+        RIP1(D, E, A, B, C, WL12, SL12);
+        (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+        X(14) = l;
+        RIP1(C, D, E, A, B, WL13, SL13);
+        (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+        X(15) = l;
+        RIP1(B, C, D, E, A, WL14, SL14);
+        RIP1(A, B, C, D, E, WL15, SL15);
+
+        RIP2(E, A, B, C, D, WL16, SL16, KL1);
+        RIP2(D, E, A, B, C, WL17, SL17, KL1);
+        RIP2(C, D, E, A, B, WL18, SL18, KL1);
+        RIP2(B, C, D, E, A, WL19, SL19, KL1);
+        RIP2(A, B, C, D, E, WL20, SL20, KL1);
+        RIP2(E, A, B, C, D, WL21, SL21, KL1);
+        RIP2(D, E, A, B, C, WL22, SL22, KL1);
+        RIP2(C, D, E, A, B, WL23, SL23, KL1);
+        RIP2(B, C, D, E, A, WL24, SL24, KL1);
+        RIP2(A, B, C, D, E, WL25, SL25, KL1);
+        RIP2(E, A, B, C, D, WL26, SL26, KL1);
+        RIP2(D, E, A, B, C, WL27, SL27, KL1);
+        RIP2(C, D, E, A, B, WL28, SL28, KL1);
+        RIP2(B, C, D, E, A, WL29, SL29, KL1);
+        RIP2(A, B, C, D, E, WL30, SL30, KL1);
+        RIP2(E, A, B, C, D, WL31, SL31, KL1);
+
+        RIP3(D, E, A, B, C, WL32, SL32, KL2);
+        RIP3(C, D, E, A, B, WL33, SL33, KL2);
+        RIP3(B, C, D, E, A, WL34, SL34, KL2);
+        RIP3(A, B, C, D, E, WL35, SL35, KL2);
+        RIP3(E, A, B, C, D, WL36, SL36, KL2);
+        RIP3(D, E, A, B, C, WL37, SL37, KL2);
+        RIP3(C, D, E, A, B, WL38, SL38, KL2);
+        RIP3(B, C, D, E, A, WL39, SL39, KL2);
+        RIP3(A, B, C, D, E, WL40, SL40, KL2);
+        RIP3(E, A, B, C, D, WL41, SL41, KL2);
+        RIP3(D, E, A, B, C, WL42, SL42, KL2);
+        RIP3(C, D, E, A, B, WL43, SL43, KL2);
+        RIP3(B, C, D, E, A, WL44, SL44, KL2);
+        RIP3(A, B, C, D, E, WL45, SL45, KL2);
+        RIP3(E, A, B, C, D, WL46, SL46, KL2);
+        RIP3(D, E, A, B, C, WL47, SL47, KL2);
+
+        RIP4(C, D, E, A, B, WL48, SL48, KL3);
+        RIP4(B, C, D, E, A, WL49, SL49, KL3);
+        RIP4(A, B, C, D, E, WL50, SL50, KL3);
+        RIP4(E, A, B, C, D, WL51, SL51, KL3);
+        RIP4(D, E, A, B, C, WL52, SL52, KL3);
+        RIP4(C, D, E, A, B, WL53, SL53, KL3);
+        RIP4(B, C, D, E, A, WL54, SL54, KL3);
+        RIP4(A, B, C, D, E, WL55, SL55, KL3);
+        RIP4(E, A, B, C, D, WL56, SL56, KL3);
+        RIP4(D, E, A, B, C, WL57, SL57, KL3);
+        RIP4(C, D, E, A, B, WL58, SL58, KL3);
+        RIP4(B, C, D, E, A, WL59, SL59, KL3);
+        RIP4(A, B, C, D, E, WL60, SL60, KL3);
+        RIP4(E, A, B, C, D, WL61, SL61, KL3);
+        RIP4(D, E, A, B, C, WL62, SL62, KL3);
+        RIP4(C, D, E, A, B, WL63, SL63, KL3);
+
+        RIP5(B, C, D, E, A, WL64, SL64, KL4);
+        RIP5(A, B, C, D, E, WL65, SL65, KL4);
+        RIP5(E, A, B, C, D, WL66, SL66, KL4);
+        RIP5(D, E, A, B, C, WL67, SL67, KL4);
+        RIP5(C, D, E, A, B, WL68, SL68, KL4);
+        RIP5(B, C, D, E, A, WL69, SL69, KL4);
+        RIP5(A, B, C, D, E, WL70, SL70, KL4);
+        RIP5(E, A, B, C, D, WL71, SL71, KL4);
+        RIP5(D, E, A, B, C, WL72, SL72, KL4);
+        RIP5(C, D, E, A, B, WL73, SL73, KL4);
+        RIP5(B, C, D, E, A, WL74, SL74, KL4);
+        RIP5(A, B, C, D, E, WL75, SL75, KL4);
+        RIP5(E, A, B, C, D, WL76, SL76, KL4);
+        RIP5(D, E, A, B, C, WL77, SL77, KL4);
+        RIP5(C, D, E, A, B, WL78, SL78, KL4);
+        RIP5(B, C, D, E, A, WL79, SL79, KL4);
+
+        a = A;
+        b = B;
+        c = C;
+        d = D;
+        e = E;
+        /* Do other half */
+        A = ctx->A;
+        B = ctx->B;
+        C = ctx->C;
+        D = ctx->D;
+        E = ctx->E;
+
+        RIP5(A, B, C, D, E, WR00, SR00, KR0);
+        RIP5(E, A, B, C, D, WR01, SR01, KR0);
+        RIP5(D, E, A, B, C, WR02, SR02, KR0);
+        RIP5(C, D, E, A, B, WR03, SR03, KR0);
+        RIP5(B, C, D, E, A, WR04, SR04, KR0);
+        RIP5(A, B, C, D, E, WR05, SR05, KR0);
+        RIP5(E, A, B, C, D, WR06, SR06, KR0);
+        RIP5(D, E, A, B, C, WR07, SR07, KR0);
+        RIP5(C, D, E, A, B, WR08, SR08, KR0);
+        RIP5(B, C, D, E, A, WR09, SR09, KR0);
+        RIP5(A, B, C, D, E, WR10, SR10, KR0);
+        RIP5(E, A, B, C, D, WR11, SR11, KR0);
+        RIP5(D, E, A, B, C, WR12, SR12, KR0);
+        RIP5(C, D, E, A, B, WR13, SR13, KR0);
+        RIP5(B, C, D, E, A, WR14, SR14, KR0);
+        RIP5(A, B, C, D, E, WR15, SR15, KR0);
+
+        RIP4(E, A, B, C, D, WR16, SR16, KR1);
+        RIP4(D, E, A, B, C, WR17, SR17, KR1);
+        RIP4(C, D, E, A, B, WR18, SR18, KR1);
+        RIP4(B, C, D, E, A, WR19, SR19, KR1);
+        RIP4(A, B, C, D, E, WR20, SR20, KR1);
+        RIP4(E, A, B, C, D, WR21, SR21, KR1);
+        RIP4(D, E, A, B, C, WR22, SR22, KR1);
+        RIP4(C, D, E, A, B, WR23, SR23, KR1);
+        RIP4(B, C, D, E, A, WR24, SR24, KR1);
+        RIP4(A, B, C, D, E, WR25, SR25, KR1);
+        RIP4(E, A, B, C, D, WR26, SR26, KR1);
+        RIP4(D, E, A, B, C, WR27, SR27, KR1);
+        RIP4(C, D, E, A, B, WR28, SR28, KR1);
+        RIP4(B, C, D, E, A, WR29, SR29, KR1);
+        RIP4(A, B, C, D, E, WR30, SR30, KR1);
+        RIP4(E, A, B, C, D, WR31, SR31, KR1);
+
+        RIP3(D, E, A, B, C, WR32, SR32, KR2);
+        RIP3(C, D, E, A, B, WR33, SR33, KR2);
+        RIP3(B, C, D, E, A, WR34, SR34, KR2);
+        RIP3(A, B, C, D, E, WR35, SR35, KR2);
+        RIP3(E, A, B, C, D, WR36, SR36, KR2);
+        RIP3(D, E, A, B, C, WR37, SR37, KR2);
+        RIP3(C, D, E, A, B, WR38, SR38, KR2);
+        RIP3(B, C, D, E, A, WR39, SR39, KR2);
+        RIP3(A, B, C, D, E, WR40, SR40, KR2);
+        RIP3(E, A, B, C, D, WR41, SR41, KR2);
+        RIP3(D, E, A, B, C, WR42, SR42, KR2);
+        RIP3(C, D, E, A, B, WR43, SR43, KR2);
+        RIP3(B, C, D, E, A, WR44, SR44, KR2);
+        RIP3(A, B, C, D, E, WR45, SR45, KR2);
+        RIP3(E, A, B, C, D, WR46, SR46, KR2);
+        RIP3(D, E, A, B, C, WR47, SR47, KR2);
+
+        RIP2(C, D, E, A, B, WR48, SR48, KR3);
+        RIP2(B, C, D, E, A, WR49, SR49, KR3);
+        RIP2(A, B, C, D, E, WR50, SR50, KR3);
+        RIP2(E, A, B, C, D, WR51, SR51, KR3);
+        RIP2(D, E, A, B, C, WR52, SR52, KR3);
+        RIP2(C, D, E, A, B, WR53, SR53, KR3);
+        RIP2(B, C, D, E, A, WR54, SR54, KR3);
+        RIP2(A, B, C, D, E, WR55, SR55, KR3);
+        RIP2(E, A, B, C, D, WR56, SR56, KR3);
+        RIP2(D, E, A, B, C, WR57, SR57, KR3);
+        RIP2(C, D, E, A, B, WR58, SR58, KR3);
+        RIP2(B, C, D, E, A, WR59, SR59, KR3);
+        RIP2(A, B, C, D, E, WR60, SR60, KR3);
+        RIP2(E, A, B, C, D, WR61, SR61, KR3);
+        RIP2(D, E, A, B, C, WR62, SR62, KR3);
+        RIP2(C, D, E, A, B, WR63, SR63, KR3);
+
+        RIP1(B, C, D, E, A, WR64, SR64);
+        RIP1(A, B, C, D, E, WR65, SR65);
+        RIP1(E, A, B, C, D, WR66, SR66);
+        RIP1(D, E, A, B, C, WR67, SR67);
+        RIP1(C, D, E, A, B, WR68, SR68);
+        RIP1(B, C, D, E, A, WR69, SR69);
+        RIP1(A, B, C, D, E, WR70, SR70);
+        RIP1(E, A, B, C, D, WR71, SR71);
+        RIP1(D, E, A, B, C, WR72, SR72);
+        RIP1(C, D, E, A, B, WR73, SR73);
+        RIP1(B, C, D, E, A, WR74, SR74);
+        RIP1(A, B, C, D, E, WR75, SR75);
+        RIP1(E, A, B, C, D, WR76, SR76);
+        RIP1(D, E, A, B, C, WR77, SR77);
+        RIP1(C, D, E, A, B, WR78, SR78);
+        RIP1(B, C, D, E, A, WR79, SR79);
+
+        D = ctx->B + c + D;
+        ctx->B = ctx->C + d + E;
+        ctx->C = ctx->D + e + A;
+        ctx->D = ctx->E + a + B;
+        ctx->E = ctx->A + b + C;
+        ctx->A = D;
+
+    }
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ripemd/rmd_locl.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ripemd/rmd_locl.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9c5ba15
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ripemd/rmd_locl.h
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+#include <openssl/ripemd.h>
+
+/*
+ * DO EXAMINE COMMENTS IN crypto/md5/md5_locl.h & crypto/md5/md5_dgst.c
+ * FOR EXPLANATIONS ON FOLLOWING "CODE."
+ *                                      <appro@fy.chalmers.se>
+ */
+#ifdef RMD160_ASM
+# if defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__) || defined(_M_IX86)
+#  define ripemd160_block_data_order ripemd160_block_asm_data_order
+# endif
+#endif
+
+void ripemd160_block_data_order(RIPEMD160_CTX *c, const void *p, size_t num);
+
+#define DATA_ORDER_IS_LITTLE_ENDIAN
+
+#define HASH_LONG               RIPEMD160_LONG
+#define HASH_CTX                RIPEMD160_CTX
+#define HASH_CBLOCK             RIPEMD160_CBLOCK
+#define HASH_UPDATE             RIPEMD160_Update
+#define HASH_TRANSFORM          RIPEMD160_Transform
+#define HASH_FINAL              RIPEMD160_Final
+#define HASH_MAKE_STRING(c,s)   do {    \
+        unsigned long ll;               \
+        ll=(c)->A; (void)HOST_l2c(ll,(s));      \
+        ll=(c)->B; (void)HOST_l2c(ll,(s));      \
+        ll=(c)->C; (void)HOST_l2c(ll,(s));      \
+        ll=(c)->D; (void)HOST_l2c(ll,(s));      \
+        ll=(c)->E; (void)HOST_l2c(ll,(s));      \
+        } while (0)
+#define HASH_BLOCK_DATA_ORDER   ripemd160_block_data_order
+
+#include "internal/md32_common.h"
+
+/*
+ * Transformed F2 and F4 are courtesy of Wei Dai <weidai@eskimo.com>
+ */
+#define F1(x,y,z)       ((x) ^ (y) ^ (z))
+#define F2(x,y,z)       ((((y) ^ (z)) & (x)) ^ (z))
+#define F3(x,y,z)       (((~(y)) | (x)) ^ (z))
+#define F4(x,y,z)       ((((x) ^ (y)) & (z)) ^ (y))
+#define F5(x,y,z)       (((~(z)) | (y)) ^ (x))
+
+#define RIPEMD160_A     0x67452301L
+#define RIPEMD160_B     0xEFCDAB89L
+#define RIPEMD160_C     0x98BADCFEL
+#define RIPEMD160_D     0x10325476L
+#define RIPEMD160_E     0xC3D2E1F0L
+
+#include "rmdconst.h"
+
+#define RIP1(a,b,c,d,e,w,s) { \
+        a+=F1(b,c,d)+X(w); \
+        a=ROTATE(a,s)+e; \
+        c=ROTATE(c,10); }
+
+#define RIP2(a,b,c,d,e,w,s,K) { \
+        a+=F2(b,c,d)+X(w)+K; \
+        a=ROTATE(a,s)+e; \
+        c=ROTATE(c,10); }
+
+#define RIP3(a,b,c,d,e,w,s,K) { \
+        a+=F3(b,c,d)+X(w)+K; \
+        a=ROTATE(a,s)+e; \
+        c=ROTATE(c,10); }
+
+#define RIP4(a,b,c,d,e,w,s,K) { \
+        a+=F4(b,c,d)+X(w)+K; \
+        a=ROTATE(a,s)+e; \
+        c=ROTATE(c,10); }
+
+#define RIP5(a,b,c,d,e,w,s,K) { \
+        a+=F5(b,c,d)+X(w)+K; \
+        a=ROTATE(a,s)+e; \
+        c=ROTATE(c,10); }
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ripemd/rmd_one.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ripemd/rmd_one.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c3193bd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ripemd/rmd_one.c
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/ripemd.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+
+unsigned char *RIPEMD160(const unsigned char *d, size_t n, unsigned char *md)
+{
+    RIPEMD160_CTX c;
+    static unsigned char m[RIPEMD160_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+
+    if (md == NULL)
+        md = m;
+    if (!RIPEMD160_Init(&c))
+        return NULL;
+    RIPEMD160_Update(&c, d, n);
+    RIPEMD160_Final(md, &c);
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(&c, sizeof(c)); /* security consideration */
+    return (md);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ripemd/rmdconst.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ripemd/rmdconst.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b810132
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ripemd/rmdconst.h
@@ -0,0 +1,350 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#define KL0 0x00000000L
+#define KL1 0x5A827999L
+#define KL2 0x6ED9EBA1L
+#define KL3 0x8F1BBCDCL
+#define KL4 0xA953FD4EL
+
+#define KR0 0x50A28BE6L
+#define KR1 0x5C4DD124L
+#define KR2 0x6D703EF3L
+#define KR3 0x7A6D76E9L
+#define KR4 0x00000000L
+
+#define WL00  0
+#define SL00 11
+#define WL01  1
+#define SL01 14
+#define WL02  2
+#define SL02 15
+#define WL03  3
+#define SL03 12
+#define WL04  4
+#define SL04  5
+#define WL05  5
+#define SL05  8
+#define WL06  6
+#define SL06  7
+#define WL07  7
+#define SL07  9
+#define WL08  8
+#define SL08 11
+#define WL09  9
+#define SL09 13
+#define WL10 10
+#define SL10 14
+#define WL11 11
+#define SL11 15
+#define WL12 12
+#define SL12  6
+#define WL13 13
+#define SL13  7
+#define WL14 14
+#define SL14  9
+#define WL15 15
+#define SL15  8
+
+#define WL16  7
+#define SL16  7
+#define WL17  4
+#define SL17  6
+#define WL18 13
+#define SL18  8
+#define WL19  1
+#define SL19 13
+#define WL20 10
+#define SL20 11
+#define WL21  6
+#define SL21  9
+#define WL22 15
+#define SL22  7
+#define WL23  3
+#define SL23 15
+#define WL24 12
+#define SL24  7
+#define WL25  0
+#define SL25 12
+#define WL26  9
+#define SL26 15
+#define WL27  5
+#define SL27  9
+#define WL28  2
+#define SL28 11
+#define WL29 14
+#define SL29  7
+#define WL30 11
+#define SL30 13
+#define WL31  8
+#define SL31 12
+
+#define WL32  3
+#define SL32 11
+#define WL33 10
+#define SL33 13
+#define WL34 14
+#define SL34  6
+#define WL35  4
+#define SL35  7
+#define WL36  9
+#define SL36 14
+#define WL37 15
+#define SL37  9
+#define WL38  8
+#define SL38 13
+#define WL39  1
+#define SL39 15
+#define WL40  2
+#define SL40 14
+#define WL41  7
+#define SL41  8
+#define WL42  0
+#define SL42 13
+#define WL43  6
+#define SL43  6
+#define WL44 13
+#define SL44  5
+#define WL45 11
+#define SL45 12
+#define WL46  5
+#define SL46  7
+#define WL47 12
+#define SL47  5
+
+#define WL48  1
+#define SL48 11
+#define WL49  9
+#define SL49 12
+#define WL50 11
+#define SL50 14
+#define WL51 10
+#define SL51 15
+#define WL52  0
+#define SL52 14
+#define WL53  8
+#define SL53 15
+#define WL54 12
+#define SL54  9
+#define WL55  4
+#define SL55  8
+#define WL56 13
+#define SL56  9
+#define WL57  3
+#define SL57 14
+#define WL58  7
+#define SL58  5
+#define WL59 15
+#define SL59  6
+#define WL60 14
+#define SL60  8
+#define WL61  5
+#define SL61  6
+#define WL62  6
+#define SL62  5
+#define WL63  2
+#define SL63 12
+
+#define WL64  4
+#define SL64  9
+#define WL65  0
+#define SL65 15
+#define WL66  5
+#define SL66  5
+#define WL67  9
+#define SL67 11
+#define WL68  7
+#define SL68  6
+#define WL69 12
+#define SL69  8
+#define WL70  2
+#define SL70 13
+#define WL71 10
+#define SL71 12
+#define WL72 14
+#define SL72  5
+#define WL73  1
+#define SL73 12
+#define WL74  3
+#define SL74 13
+#define WL75  8
+#define SL75 14
+#define WL76 11
+#define SL76 11
+#define WL77  6
+#define SL77  8
+#define WL78 15
+#define SL78  5
+#define WL79 13
+#define SL79  6
+
+#define WR00  5
+#define SR00  8
+#define WR01 14
+#define SR01  9
+#define WR02  7
+#define SR02  9
+#define WR03  0
+#define SR03 11
+#define WR04  9
+#define SR04 13
+#define WR05  2
+#define SR05 15
+#define WR06 11
+#define SR06 15
+#define WR07  4
+#define SR07  5
+#define WR08 13
+#define SR08  7
+#define WR09  6
+#define SR09  7
+#define WR10 15
+#define SR10  8
+#define WR11  8
+#define SR11 11
+#define WR12  1
+#define SR12 14
+#define WR13 10
+#define SR13 14
+#define WR14  3
+#define SR14 12
+#define WR15 12
+#define SR15  6
+
+#define WR16  6
+#define SR16  9
+#define WR17 11
+#define SR17 13
+#define WR18  3
+#define SR18 15
+#define WR19  7
+#define SR19  7
+#define WR20  0
+#define SR20 12
+#define WR21 13
+#define SR21  8
+#define WR22  5
+#define SR22  9
+#define WR23 10
+#define SR23 11
+#define WR24 14
+#define SR24  7
+#define WR25 15
+#define SR25  7
+#define WR26  8
+#define SR26 12
+#define WR27 12
+#define SR27  7
+#define WR28  4
+#define SR28  6
+#define WR29  9
+#define SR29 15
+#define WR30  1
+#define SR30 13
+#define WR31  2
+#define SR31 11
+
+#define WR32 15
+#define SR32  9
+#define WR33  5
+#define SR33  7
+#define WR34  1
+#define SR34 15
+#define WR35  3
+#define SR35 11
+#define WR36  7
+#define SR36  8
+#define WR37 14
+#define SR37  6
+#define WR38  6
+#define SR38  6
+#define WR39  9
+#define SR39 14
+#define WR40 11
+#define SR40 12
+#define WR41  8
+#define SR41 13
+#define WR42 12
+#define SR42  5
+#define WR43  2
+#define SR43 14
+#define WR44 10
+#define SR44 13
+#define WR45  0
+#define SR45 13
+#define WR46  4
+#define SR46  7
+#define WR47 13
+#define SR47  5
+
+#define WR48  8
+#define SR48 15
+#define WR49  6
+#define SR49  5
+#define WR50  4
+#define SR50  8
+#define WR51  1
+#define SR51 11
+#define WR52  3
+#define SR52 14
+#define WR53 11
+#define SR53 14
+#define WR54 15
+#define SR54  6
+#define WR55  0
+#define SR55 14
+#define WR56  5
+#define SR56  6
+#define WR57 12
+#define SR57  9
+#define WR58  2
+#define SR58 12
+#define WR59 13
+#define SR59  9
+#define WR60  9
+#define SR60 12
+#define WR61  7
+#define SR61  5
+#define WR62 10
+#define SR62 15
+#define WR63 14
+#define SR63  8
+
+#define WR64 12
+#define SR64  8
+#define WR65 15
+#define SR65  5
+#define WR66 10
+#define SR66 12
+#define WR67  4
+#define SR67  9
+#define WR68  1
+#define SR68 12
+#define WR69  5
+#define SR69  5
+#define WR70  8
+#define SR70 14
+#define WR71  7
+#define SR71  6
+#define WR72  6
+#define SR72  8
+#define WR73  2
+#define SR73 13
+#define WR74 13
+#define SR74  6
+#define WR75 14
+#define SR75  5
+#define WR76  0
+#define SR76 15
+#define WR77  3
+#define SR77 13
+#define WR78  9
+#define SR78 11
+#define WR79 11
+#define SR79 11
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/build.info b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/build.info
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..39b7464
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/build.info
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+LIBS=../../libcrypto
+SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
+        rsa_ossl.c rsa_gen.c rsa_lib.c rsa_sign.c rsa_saos.c rsa_err.c \
+        rsa_pk1.c rsa_ssl.c rsa_none.c rsa_oaep.c rsa_chk.c rsa_null.c \
+        rsa_pss.c rsa_x931.c rsa_asn1.c rsa_depr.c rsa_ameth.c rsa_prn.c \
+        rsa_pmeth.c rsa_crpt.c rsa_x931g.c rsa_meth.c
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4a12276
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c
@@ -0,0 +1,867 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2006-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/cms.h>
+#include "internal/asn1_int.h"
+#include "internal/evp_int.h"
+#include "rsa_locl.h"
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
+static int rsa_cms_sign(CMS_SignerInfo *si);
+static int rsa_cms_verify(CMS_SignerInfo *si);
+static int rsa_cms_decrypt(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri);
+static int rsa_cms_encrypt(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri);
+#endif
+
+static int rsa_pub_encode(X509_PUBKEY *pk, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    unsigned char *penc = NULL;
+    int penclen;
+    penclen = i2d_RSAPublicKey(pkey->pkey.rsa, &penc);
+    if (penclen <= 0)
+        return 0;
+    if (X509_PUBKEY_set0_param(pk, OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_PKEY_RSA),
+                               V_ASN1_NULL, NULL, penc, penclen))
+        return 1;
+
+    OPENSSL_free(penc);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int rsa_pub_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509_PUBKEY *pubkey)
+{
+    const unsigned char *p;
+    int pklen;
+    RSA *rsa = NULL;
+
+    if (!X509_PUBKEY_get0_param(NULL, &p, &pklen, NULL, pubkey))
+        return 0;
+    if ((rsa = d2i_RSAPublicKey(NULL, &p, pklen)) == NULL) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PUB_DECODE, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int rsa_pub_cmp(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b)
+{
+    if (BN_cmp(b->pkey.rsa->n, a->pkey.rsa->n) != 0
+        || BN_cmp(b->pkey.rsa->e, a->pkey.rsa->e) != 0)
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int old_rsa_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+                               const unsigned char **pder, int derlen)
+{
+    RSA *rsa;
+
+    if ((rsa = d2i_RSAPrivateKey(NULL, pder, derlen)) == NULL) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_OLD_RSA_PRIV_DECODE, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int old_rsa_priv_encode(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, unsigned char **pder)
+{
+    return i2d_RSAPrivateKey(pkey->pkey.rsa, pder);
+}
+
+static int rsa_priv_encode(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    unsigned char *rk = NULL;
+    int rklen;
+    rklen = i2d_RSAPrivateKey(pkey->pkey.rsa, &rk);
+
+    if (rklen <= 0) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PRIV_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (!PKCS8_pkey_set0(p8, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_rsaEncryption), 0,
+                         V_ASN1_NULL, NULL, rk, rklen)) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PRIV_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int rsa_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, const PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8)
+{
+    const unsigned char *p;
+    int pklen;
+    if (!PKCS8_pkey_get0(NULL, &p, &pklen, NULL, p8))
+        return 0;
+    return old_rsa_priv_decode(pkey, &p, pklen);
+}
+
+static int int_rsa_size(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    return RSA_size(pkey->pkey.rsa);
+}
+
+static int rsa_bits(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    return BN_num_bits(pkey->pkey.rsa->n);
+}
+
+static int rsa_security_bits(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    return RSA_security_bits(pkey->pkey.rsa);
+}
+
+static void int_rsa_free(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    RSA_free(pkey->pkey.rsa);
+}
+
+static int do_rsa_print(BIO *bp, const RSA *x, int off, int priv)
+{
+    char *str;
+    const char *s;
+    int ret = 0, mod_len = 0;
+
+    if (x->n != NULL)
+        mod_len = BN_num_bits(x->n);
+
+    if (!BIO_indent(bp, off, 128))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (priv && x->d) {
+        if (BIO_printf(bp, "Private-Key: (%d bit)\n", mod_len) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+        str = "modulus:";
+        s = "publicExponent:";
+    } else {
+        if (BIO_printf(bp, "Public-Key: (%d bit)\n", mod_len) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+        str = "Modulus:";
+        s = "Exponent:";
+    }
+    if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, str, x->n, NULL, off))
+        goto err;
+    if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, s, x->e, NULL, off))
+        goto err;
+    if (priv) {
+        if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "privateExponent:", x->d, NULL, off))
+            goto err;
+        if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "prime1:", x->p, NULL, off))
+            goto err;
+        if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "prime2:", x->q, NULL, off))
+            goto err;
+        if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "exponent1:", x->dmp1, NULL, off))
+            goto err;
+        if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "exponent2:", x->dmq1, NULL, off))
+            goto err;
+        if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "coefficient:", x->iqmp, NULL, off))
+            goto err;
+    }
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static int rsa_pub_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent,
+                         ASN1_PCTX *ctx)
+{
+    return do_rsa_print(bp, pkey->pkey.rsa, indent, 0);
+}
+
+static int rsa_priv_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent,
+                          ASN1_PCTX *ctx)
+{
+    return do_rsa_print(bp, pkey->pkey.rsa, indent, 1);
+}
+
+/* Given an MGF1 Algorithm ID decode to an Algorithm Identifier */
+static X509_ALGOR *rsa_mgf1_decode(X509_ALGOR *alg)
+{
+    if (alg == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    if (OBJ_obj2nid(alg->algorithm) != NID_mgf1)
+        return NULL;
+    return ASN1_TYPE_unpack_sequence(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_ALGOR),
+                                     alg->parameter);
+}
+
+static RSA_PSS_PARAMS *rsa_pss_decode(const X509_ALGOR *alg,
+                                      X509_ALGOR **pmaskHash)
+{
+    RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss;
+
+    *pmaskHash = NULL;
+
+    pss = ASN1_TYPE_unpack_sequence(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSA_PSS_PARAMS),
+                                    alg->parameter);
+
+    if (!pss)
+        return NULL;
+
+    *pmaskHash = rsa_mgf1_decode(pss->maskGenAlgorithm);
+
+    return pss;
+}
+
+static int rsa_pss_param_print(BIO *bp, RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss,
+                               X509_ALGOR *maskHash, int indent)
+{
+    int rv = 0;
+    if (!pss) {
+        if (BIO_puts(bp, " (INVALID PSS PARAMETERS)\n") <= 0)
+            return 0;
+        return 1;
+    }
+    if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n") <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    if (!BIO_indent(bp, indent, 128))
+        goto err;
+    if (BIO_puts(bp, "Hash Algorithm: ") <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (pss->hashAlgorithm) {
+        if (i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, pss->hashAlgorithm->algorithm) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+    } else if (BIO_puts(bp, "sha1 (default)") <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n") <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!BIO_indent(bp, indent, 128))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (BIO_puts(bp, "Mask Algorithm: ") <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    if (pss->maskGenAlgorithm) {
+        if (i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, pss->maskGenAlgorithm->algorithm) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+        if (BIO_puts(bp, " with ") <= 0)
+            goto err;
+        if (maskHash) {
+            if (i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, maskHash->algorithm) <= 0)
+                goto err;
+        } else if (BIO_puts(bp, "INVALID") <= 0)
+            goto err;
+    } else if (BIO_puts(bp, "mgf1 with sha1 (default)") <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
+
+    if (!BIO_indent(bp, indent, 128))
+        goto err;
+    if (BIO_puts(bp, "Salt Length: 0x") <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    if (pss->saltLength) {
+        if (i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(bp, pss->saltLength) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+    } else if (BIO_puts(bp, "14 (default)") <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
+
+    if (!BIO_indent(bp, indent, 128))
+        goto err;
+    if (BIO_puts(bp, "Trailer Field: 0x") <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    if (pss->trailerField) {
+        if (i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(bp, pss->trailerField) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+    } else if (BIO_puts(bp, "BC (default)") <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
+
+    rv = 1;
+
+ err:
+    return rv;
+
+}
+
+static int rsa_sig_print(BIO *bp, const X509_ALGOR *sigalg,
+                         const ASN1_STRING *sig, int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx)
+{
+    if (OBJ_obj2nid(sigalg->algorithm) == NID_rsassaPss) {
+        int rv;
+        RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss;
+        X509_ALGOR *maskHash;
+        pss = rsa_pss_decode(sigalg, &maskHash);
+        rv = rsa_pss_param_print(bp, pss, maskHash, indent);
+        RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(pss);
+        X509_ALGOR_free(maskHash);
+        if (!rv)
+            return 0;
+    } else if (!sig && BIO_puts(bp, "\n") <= 0)
+        return 0;
+    if (sig)
+        return X509_signature_dump(bp, sig, indent);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int rsa_pkey_ctrl(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int op, long arg1, void *arg2)
+{
+    X509_ALGOR *alg = NULL;
+    switch (op) {
+
+    case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN:
+        if (arg1 == 0)
+            PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_get0_algs(arg2, NULL, NULL, &alg);
+        break;
+
+    case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_ENCRYPT:
+        if (arg1 == 0)
+            PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_get0_alg(arg2, &alg);
+        break;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
+    case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_SIGN:
+        if (arg1 == 0)
+            return rsa_cms_sign(arg2);
+        else if (arg1 == 1)
+            return rsa_cms_verify(arg2);
+        break;
+
+    case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_ENVELOPE:
+        if (arg1 == 0)
+            return rsa_cms_encrypt(arg2);
+        else if (arg1 == 1)
+            return rsa_cms_decrypt(arg2);
+        break;
+
+    case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_RI_TYPE:
+        *(int *)arg2 = CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS;
+        return 1;
+#endif
+
+    case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_DEFAULT_MD_NID:
+        *(int *)arg2 = NID_sha256;
+        return 1;
+
+    default:
+        return -2;
+
+    }
+
+    if (alg)
+        X509_ALGOR_set0(alg, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_rsaEncryption), V_ASN1_NULL, 0);
+
+    return 1;
+
+}
+
+/* allocate and set algorithm ID from EVP_MD, default SHA1 */
+static int rsa_md_to_algor(X509_ALGOR **palg, const EVP_MD *md)
+{
+    if (EVP_MD_type(md) == NID_sha1)
+        return 1;
+    *palg = X509_ALGOR_new();
+    if (*palg == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    X509_ALGOR_set_md(*palg, md);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Allocate and set MGF1 algorithm ID from EVP_MD */
+static int rsa_md_to_mgf1(X509_ALGOR **palg, const EVP_MD *mgf1md)
+{
+    X509_ALGOR *algtmp = NULL;
+    ASN1_STRING *stmp = NULL;
+    *palg = NULL;
+    if (EVP_MD_type(mgf1md) == NID_sha1)
+        return 1;
+    /* need to embed algorithm ID inside another */
+    if (!rsa_md_to_algor(&algtmp, mgf1md))
+        goto err;
+    if (!ASN1_item_pack(algtmp, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_ALGOR), &stmp))
+         goto err;
+    *palg = X509_ALGOR_new();
+    if (*palg == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    X509_ALGOR_set0(*palg, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_mgf1), V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, stmp);
+    stmp = NULL;
+ err:
+    ASN1_STRING_free(stmp);
+    X509_ALGOR_free(algtmp);
+    if (*palg)
+        return 1;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/* convert algorithm ID to EVP_MD, default SHA1 */
+static const EVP_MD *rsa_algor_to_md(X509_ALGOR *alg)
+{
+    const EVP_MD *md;
+    if (!alg)
+        return EVP_sha1();
+    md = EVP_get_digestbyobj(alg->algorithm);
+    if (md == NULL)
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_ALGOR_TO_MD, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
+    return md;
+}
+
+/* convert MGF1 algorithm ID to EVP_MD, default SHA1 */
+static const EVP_MD *rsa_mgf1_to_md(X509_ALGOR *alg, X509_ALGOR *maskHash)
+{
+    const EVP_MD *md;
+    if (!alg)
+        return EVP_sha1();
+    /* Check mask and lookup mask hash algorithm */
+    if (OBJ_obj2nid(alg->algorithm) != NID_mgf1) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_MGF1_TO_MD, RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_MASK_ALGORITHM);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    if (!maskHash) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_MGF1_TO_MD, RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_MASK_PARAMETER);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    md = EVP_get_digestbyobj(maskHash->algorithm);
+    if (md == NULL) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_MGF1_TO_MD, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_MASK_DIGEST);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    return md;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convert EVP_PKEY_CTX is PSS mode into corresponding algorithm parameter,
+ * suitable for setting an AlgorithmIdentifier.
+ */
+
+static ASN1_STRING *rsa_ctx_to_pss(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx)
+{
+    const EVP_MD *sigmd, *mgf1md;
+    RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss = NULL;
+    ASN1_STRING *os = NULL;
+    EVP_PKEY *pk = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(pkctx);
+    int saltlen, rv = 0;
+    if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_signature_md(pkctx, &sigmd) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_mgf1_md(pkctx, &mgf1md) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_pss_saltlen(pkctx, &saltlen))
+        goto err;
+    if (saltlen == -1)
+        saltlen = EVP_MD_size(sigmd);
+    else if (saltlen == -2) {
+        saltlen = EVP_PKEY_size(pk) - EVP_MD_size(sigmd) - 2;
+        if (((EVP_PKEY_bits(pk) - 1) & 0x7) == 0)
+            saltlen--;
+    }
+    pss = RSA_PSS_PARAMS_new();
+    if (pss == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (saltlen != 20) {
+        pss->saltLength = ASN1_INTEGER_new();
+        if (pss->saltLength == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(pss->saltLength, saltlen))
+            goto err;
+    }
+    if (!rsa_md_to_algor(&pss->hashAlgorithm, sigmd))
+        goto err;
+    if (!rsa_md_to_mgf1(&pss->maskGenAlgorithm, mgf1md))
+        goto err;
+    /* Finally create string with pss parameter encoding. */
+    if (!ASN1_item_pack(pss, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSA_PSS_PARAMS), &os))
+         goto err;
+    rv = 1;
+ err:
+    RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(pss);
+    if (rv)
+        return os;
+    ASN1_STRING_free(os);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * From PSS AlgorithmIdentifier set public key parameters. If pkey isn't NULL
+ * then the EVP_MD_CTX is setup and initialised. If it is NULL parameters are
+ * passed to pkctx instead.
+ */
+
+static int rsa_pss_to_ctx(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx,
+                          X509_ALGOR *sigalg, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    int rv = -1;
+    int saltlen;
+    const EVP_MD *mgf1md = NULL, *md = NULL;
+    RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss;
+    X509_ALGOR *maskHash;
+    /* Sanity check: make sure it is PSS */
+    if (OBJ_obj2nid(sigalg->algorithm) != NID_rsassaPss) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PSS_TO_CTX, RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
+        return -1;
+    }
+    /* Decode PSS parameters */
+    pss = rsa_pss_decode(sigalg, &maskHash);
+
+    if (pss == NULL) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PSS_TO_CTX, RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_PARAMETERS);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    mgf1md = rsa_mgf1_to_md(pss->maskGenAlgorithm, maskHash);
+    if (!mgf1md)
+        goto err;
+    md = rsa_algor_to_md(pss->hashAlgorithm);
+    if (!md)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (pss->saltLength) {
+        saltlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(pss->saltLength);
+
+        /*
+         * Could perform more salt length sanity checks but the main RSA
+         * routines will trap other invalid values anyway.
+         */
+        if (saltlen < 0) {
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PSS_TO_CTX, RSA_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    } else
+        saltlen = 20;
+
+    /*
+     * low-level routines support only trailer field 0xbc (value 1) and
+     * PKCS#1 says we should reject any other value anyway.
+     */
+    if (pss->trailerField && ASN1_INTEGER_get(pss->trailerField) != 1) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PSS_TO_CTX, RSA_R_INVALID_TRAILER);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* We have all parameters now set up context */
+
+    if (pkey) {
+        if (!EVP_DigestVerifyInit(ctx, &pkctx, md, NULL, pkey))
+            goto err;
+    } else {
+        const EVP_MD *checkmd;
+        if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_signature_md(pkctx, &checkmd) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+        if (EVP_MD_type(md) != EVP_MD_type(checkmd)) {
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PSS_TO_CTX, RSA_R_DIGEST_DOES_NOT_MATCH);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pkctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pkctx, saltlen) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md(pkctx, mgf1md) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    /* Carry on */
+    rv = 1;
+
+ err:
+    RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(pss);
+    X509_ALGOR_free(maskHash);
+    return rv;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
+static int rsa_cms_verify(CMS_SignerInfo *si)
+{
+    int nid, nid2;
+    X509_ALGOR *alg;
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx = CMS_SignerInfo_get0_pkey_ctx(si);
+    CMS_SignerInfo_get0_algs(si, NULL, NULL, NULL, &alg);
+    nid = OBJ_obj2nid(alg->algorithm);
+    if (nid == NID_rsaEncryption)
+        return 1;
+    if (nid == NID_rsassaPss)
+        return rsa_pss_to_ctx(NULL, pkctx, alg, NULL);
+    /* Workaround for some implementation that use a signature OID */
+    if (OBJ_find_sigid_algs(nid, NULL, &nid2)) {
+        if (nid2 == NID_rsaEncryption)
+            return 1;
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Customised RSA item verification routine. This is called when a signature
+ * is encountered requiring special handling. We currently only handle PSS.
+ */
+
+static int rsa_item_verify(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *asn,
+                           X509_ALGOR *sigalg, ASN1_BIT_STRING *sig,
+                           EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    /* Sanity check: make sure it is PSS */
+    if (OBJ_obj2nid(sigalg->algorithm) != NID_rsassaPss) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY, RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
+        return -1;
+    }
+    if (rsa_pss_to_ctx(ctx, NULL, sigalg, pkey) > 0) {
+        /* Carry on */
+        return 2;
+    }
+    return -1;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
+static int rsa_cms_sign(CMS_SignerInfo *si)
+{
+    int pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
+    X509_ALGOR *alg;
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx = CMS_SignerInfo_get0_pkey_ctx(si);
+    ASN1_STRING *os = NULL;
+    CMS_SignerInfo_get0_algs(si, NULL, NULL, NULL, &alg);
+    if (pkctx) {
+        if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_padding(pkctx, &pad_mode) <= 0)
+            return 0;
+    }
+    if (pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) {
+        X509_ALGOR_set0(alg, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_rsaEncryption), V_ASN1_NULL, 0);
+        return 1;
+    }
+    /* We don't support it */
+    if (pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING)
+        return 0;
+    os = rsa_ctx_to_pss(pkctx);
+    if (!os)
+        return 0;
+    X509_ALGOR_set0(alg, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_rsassaPss), V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, os);
+    return 1;
+}
+#endif
+
+static int rsa_item_sign(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *asn,
+                         X509_ALGOR *alg1, X509_ALGOR *alg2,
+                         ASN1_BIT_STRING *sig)
+{
+    int pad_mode;
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx = EVP_MD_CTX_pkey_ctx(ctx);
+    if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_padding(pkctx, &pad_mode) <= 0)
+        return 0;
+    if (pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)
+        return 2;
+    if (pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
+        ASN1_STRING *os1 = NULL;
+        os1 = rsa_ctx_to_pss(pkctx);
+        if (!os1)
+            return 0;
+        /* Duplicate parameters if we have to */
+        if (alg2) {
+            ASN1_STRING *os2 = ASN1_STRING_dup(os1);
+            if (!os2) {
+                ASN1_STRING_free(os1);
+                return 0;
+            }
+            X509_ALGOR_set0(alg2, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_rsassaPss),
+                            V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, os2);
+        }
+        X509_ALGOR_set0(alg1, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_rsassaPss),
+                        V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, os1);
+        return 3;
+    }
+    return 2;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
+static RSA_OAEP_PARAMS *rsa_oaep_decode(const X509_ALGOR *alg,
+                                        X509_ALGOR **pmaskHash)
+{
+    RSA_OAEP_PARAMS *pss;
+
+    *pmaskHash = NULL;
+
+    pss = ASN1_TYPE_unpack_sequence(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSA_OAEP_PARAMS),
+                                    alg->parameter);
+
+    if (!pss)
+        return NULL;
+
+    *pmaskHash = rsa_mgf1_decode(pss->maskGenFunc);
+
+    return pss;
+}
+
+static int rsa_cms_decrypt(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx;
+    X509_ALGOR *cmsalg;
+    int nid;
+    int rv = -1;
+    unsigned char *label = NULL;
+    int labellen = 0;
+    const EVP_MD *mgf1md = NULL, *md = NULL;
+    RSA_OAEP_PARAMS *oaep;
+    X509_ALGOR *maskHash;
+    pkctx = CMS_RecipientInfo_get0_pkey_ctx(ri);
+    if (!pkctx)
+        return 0;
+    if (!CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_get0_algs(ri, NULL, NULL, &cmsalg))
+        return -1;
+    nid = OBJ_obj2nid(cmsalg->algorithm);
+    if (nid == NID_rsaEncryption)
+        return 1;
+    if (nid != NID_rsaesOaep) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CMS_DECRYPT, RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_ENCRYPTION_TYPE);
+        return -1;
+    }
+    /* Decode OAEP parameters */
+    oaep = rsa_oaep_decode(cmsalg, &maskHash);
+
+    if (oaep == NULL) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CMS_DECRYPT, RSA_R_INVALID_OAEP_PARAMETERS);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    mgf1md = rsa_mgf1_to_md(oaep->maskGenFunc, maskHash);
+    if (!mgf1md)
+        goto err;
+    md = rsa_algor_to_md(oaep->hashFunc);
+    if (!md)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (oaep->pSourceFunc) {
+        X509_ALGOR *plab = oaep->pSourceFunc;
+        if (OBJ_obj2nid(plab->algorithm) != NID_pSpecified) {
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CMS_DECRYPT, RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_LABEL_SOURCE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (plab->parameter->type != V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING) {
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CMS_DECRYPT, RSA_R_INVALID_LABEL);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        label = plab->parameter->value.octet_string->data;
+        /* Stop label being freed when OAEP parameters are freed */
+        plab->parameter->value.octet_string->data = NULL;
+        labellen = plab->parameter->value.octet_string->length;
+    }
+
+    if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pkctx, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_oaep_md(pkctx, md) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md(pkctx, mgf1md) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_rsa_oaep_label(pkctx, label, labellen) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    /* Carry on */
+    rv = 1;
+
+ err:
+    RSA_OAEP_PARAMS_free(oaep);
+    X509_ALGOR_free(maskHash);
+    return rv;
+}
+
+static int rsa_cms_encrypt(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
+{
+    const EVP_MD *md, *mgf1md;
+    RSA_OAEP_PARAMS *oaep = NULL;
+    ASN1_STRING *os = NULL;
+    X509_ALGOR *alg;
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx = CMS_RecipientInfo_get0_pkey_ctx(ri);
+    int pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING, rv = 0, labellen;
+    unsigned char *label;
+    if (CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_get0_algs(ri, NULL, NULL, &alg) <= 0)
+        return 0;
+    if (pkctx) {
+        if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_padding(pkctx, &pad_mode) <= 0)
+            return 0;
+    }
+    if (pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) {
+        X509_ALGOR_set0(alg, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_rsaEncryption), V_ASN1_NULL, 0);
+        return 1;
+    }
+    /* Not supported */
+    if (pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING)
+        return 0;
+    if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_oaep_md(pkctx, &md) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_mgf1_md(pkctx, &mgf1md) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    labellen = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_rsa_oaep_label(pkctx, &label);
+    if (labellen < 0)
+        goto err;
+    oaep = RSA_OAEP_PARAMS_new();
+    if (oaep == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (!rsa_md_to_algor(&oaep->hashFunc, md))
+        goto err;
+    if (!rsa_md_to_mgf1(&oaep->maskGenFunc, mgf1md))
+        goto err;
+    if (labellen > 0) {
+        ASN1_OCTET_STRING *los;
+        oaep->pSourceFunc = X509_ALGOR_new();
+        if (oaep->pSourceFunc == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        los = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
+        if (los == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(los, label, labellen)) {
+            ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(los);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        X509_ALGOR_set0(oaep->pSourceFunc, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pSpecified),
+                        V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, los);
+    }
+    /* create string with pss parameter encoding. */
+    if (!ASN1_item_pack(oaep, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSA_OAEP_PARAMS), &os))
+         goto err;
+    X509_ALGOR_set0(alg, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_rsaesOaep), V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, os);
+    os = NULL;
+    rv = 1;
+ err:
+    RSA_OAEP_PARAMS_free(oaep);
+    ASN1_STRING_free(os);
+    return rv;
+}
+#endif
+
+const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD rsa_asn1_meths[2] = {
+    {
+     EVP_PKEY_RSA,
+     EVP_PKEY_RSA,
+     ASN1_PKEY_SIGPARAM_NULL,
+
+     "RSA",
+     "OpenSSL RSA method",
+
+     rsa_pub_decode,
+     rsa_pub_encode,
+     rsa_pub_cmp,
+     rsa_pub_print,
+
+     rsa_priv_decode,
+     rsa_priv_encode,
+     rsa_priv_print,
+
+     int_rsa_size,
+     rsa_bits,
+     rsa_security_bits,
+
+     0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+
+     rsa_sig_print,
+     int_rsa_free,
+     rsa_pkey_ctrl,
+     old_rsa_priv_decode,
+     old_rsa_priv_encode,
+     rsa_item_verify,
+     rsa_item_sign},
+
+    {
+     EVP_PKEY_RSA2,
+     EVP_PKEY_RSA,
+     ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS}
+};
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_asn1.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_asn1.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..20f8ebf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_asn1.c
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include "rsa_locl.h"
+
+/* Override the default free and new methods */
+static int rsa_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+                  void *exarg)
+{
+    if (operation == ASN1_OP_NEW_PRE) {
+        *pval = (ASN1_VALUE *)RSA_new();
+        if (*pval != NULL)
+            return 2;
+        return 0;
+    } else if (operation == ASN1_OP_FREE_PRE) {
+        RSA_free((RSA *)*pval);
+        *pval = NULL;
+        return 2;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE_cb(RSAPrivateKey, rsa_cb) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA, version, LONG),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA, n, BIGNUM),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA, e, BIGNUM),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA, d, CBIGNUM),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA, p, CBIGNUM),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA, q, CBIGNUM),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA, dmp1, CBIGNUM),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA, dmq1, CBIGNUM),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA, iqmp, CBIGNUM)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_cb(RSA, RSAPrivateKey)
+
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE_cb(RSAPublicKey, rsa_cb) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA, n, BIGNUM),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA, e, BIGNUM),
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_cb(RSA, RSAPublicKey)
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(RSA_PSS_PARAMS) = {
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(RSA_PSS_PARAMS, hashAlgorithm, X509_ALGOR,0),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(RSA_PSS_PARAMS, maskGenAlgorithm, X509_ALGOR,1),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(RSA_PSS_PARAMS, saltLength, ASN1_INTEGER,2),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(RSA_PSS_PARAMS, trailerField, ASN1_INTEGER,3)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(RSA_PSS_PARAMS)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(RSA_PSS_PARAMS)
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(RSA_OAEP_PARAMS) = {
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(RSA_OAEP_PARAMS, hashFunc, X509_ALGOR, 0),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(RSA_OAEP_PARAMS, maskGenFunc, X509_ALGOR, 1),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(RSA_OAEP_PARAMS, pSourceFunc, X509_ALGOR, 2),
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(RSA_OAEP_PARAMS)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(RSA_OAEP_PARAMS)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const_fname(RSA, RSAPrivateKey, RSAPrivateKey)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const_fname(RSA, RSAPublicKey, RSAPublicKey)
+
+RSA *RSAPublicKey_dup(RSA *rsa)
+{
+    return ASN1_item_dup(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSAPublicKey), rsa);
+}
+
+RSA *RSAPrivateKey_dup(RSA *rsa)
+{
+    return ASN1_item_dup(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSAPrivateKey), rsa);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_chk.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_chk.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..00260fb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_chk.c
@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include "rsa_locl.h"
+
+int RSA_check_key(const RSA *key)
+{
+    return RSA_check_key_ex(key, NULL);
+}
+
+int RSA_check_key_ex(const RSA *key, BN_GENCB *cb)
+{
+    BIGNUM *i, *j, *k, *l, *m;
+    BN_CTX *ctx;
+    int ret = 1;
+
+    if (key->p == NULL || key->q == NULL || key->n == NULL
+            || key->e == NULL || key->d == NULL) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX, RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    i = BN_new();
+    j = BN_new();
+    k = BN_new();
+    l = BN_new();
+    m = BN_new();
+    ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+    if (i == NULL || j == NULL || k == NULL || l == NULL
+            || m == NULL || ctx == NULL) {
+        ret = -1;
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (BN_is_one(key->e)) {
+        ret = 0;
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
+    }
+    if (!BN_is_odd(key->e)) {
+        ret = 0;
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
+    }
+
+    /* p prime? */
+    if (BN_is_prime_ex(key->p, BN_prime_checks, NULL, cb) != 1) {
+        ret = 0;
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX, RSA_R_P_NOT_PRIME);
+    }
+
+    /* q prime? */
+    if (BN_is_prime_ex(key->q, BN_prime_checks, NULL, cb) != 1) {
+        ret = 0;
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX, RSA_R_Q_NOT_PRIME);
+    }
+
+    /* n = p*q? */
+    if (!BN_mul(i, key->p, key->q, ctx)) {
+        ret = -1;
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (BN_cmp(i, key->n) != 0) {
+        ret = 0;
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX, RSA_R_N_DOES_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q);
+    }
+
+    /* d*e = 1  mod lcm(p-1,q-1)? */
+    if (!BN_sub(i, key->p, BN_value_one())) {
+        ret = -1;
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (!BN_sub(j, key->q, BN_value_one())) {
+        ret = -1;
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* now compute k = lcm(i,j) */
+    if (!BN_mul(l, i, j, ctx)) {
+        ret = -1;
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (!BN_gcd(m, i, j, ctx)) {
+        ret = -1;
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (!BN_div(k, NULL, l, m, ctx)) { /* remainder is 0 */
+        ret = -1;
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (!BN_mod_mul(i, key->d, key->e, k, ctx)) {
+        ret = -1;
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!BN_is_one(i)) {
+        ret = 0;
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX, RSA_R_D_E_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_1);
+    }
+
+    if (key->dmp1 != NULL && key->dmq1 != NULL && key->iqmp != NULL) {
+        /* dmp1 = d mod (p-1)? */
+        if (!BN_sub(i, key->p, BN_value_one())) {
+            ret = -1;
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (!BN_mod(j, key->d, i, ctx)) {
+            ret = -1;
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (BN_cmp(j, key->dmp1) != 0) {
+            ret = 0;
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX, RSA_R_DMP1_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_D);
+        }
+
+        /* dmq1 = d mod (q-1)? */
+        if (!BN_sub(i, key->q, BN_value_one())) {
+            ret = -1;
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (!BN_mod(j, key->d, i, ctx)) {
+            ret = -1;
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (BN_cmp(j, key->dmq1) != 0) {
+            ret = 0;
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX, RSA_R_DMQ1_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_D);
+        }
+
+        /* iqmp = q^-1 mod p? */
+        if (!BN_mod_inverse(i, key->q, key->p, ctx)) {
+            ret = -1;
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (BN_cmp(i, key->iqmp) != 0) {
+            ret = 0;
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX, RSA_R_IQMP_NOT_INVERSE_OF_Q);
+        }
+    }
+
+ err:
+    BN_free(i);
+    BN_free(j);
+    BN_free(k);
+    BN_free(l);
+    BN_free(m);
+    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+    return ret;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_crpt.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_crpt.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9cd733b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_crpt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/lhash.h>
+#include "internal/bn_int.h"
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include "rsa_locl.h"
+
+int RSA_bits(const RSA *r)
+{
+    return (BN_num_bits(r->n));
+}
+
+int RSA_size(const RSA *r)
+{
+    return (BN_num_bytes(r->n));
+}
+
+int RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to,
+                       RSA *rsa, int padding)
+{
+    return (rsa->meth->rsa_pub_enc(flen, from, to, rsa, padding));
+}
+
+int RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+                        unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+{
+    return (rsa->meth->rsa_priv_enc(flen, from, to, rsa, padding));
+}
+
+int RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+                        unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+{
+    return (rsa->meth->rsa_priv_dec(flen, from, to, rsa, padding));
+}
+
+int RSA_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to,
+                       RSA *rsa, int padding)
+{
+    return (rsa->meth->rsa_pub_dec(flen, from, to, rsa, padding));
+}
+
+int RSA_flags(const RSA *r)
+{
+    return ((r == NULL) ? 0 : r->meth->flags);
+}
+
+void RSA_blinding_off(RSA *rsa)
+{
+    BN_BLINDING_free(rsa->blinding);
+    rsa->blinding = NULL;
+    rsa->flags &= ~RSA_FLAG_BLINDING;
+    rsa->flags |= RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING;
+}
+
+int RSA_blinding_on(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    if (rsa->blinding != NULL)
+        RSA_blinding_off(rsa);
+
+    rsa->blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx);
+    if (rsa->blinding == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    rsa->flags |= RSA_FLAG_BLINDING;
+    rsa->flags &= ~RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING;
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static BIGNUM *rsa_get_public_exp(const BIGNUM *d, const BIGNUM *p,
+                                  const BIGNUM *q, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    BIGNUM *ret = NULL, *r0, *r1, *r2;
+
+    if (d == NULL || p == NULL || q == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    r0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    r2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (r2 == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!BN_sub(r1, p, BN_value_one()))
+        goto err;
+    if (!BN_sub(r2, q, BN_value_one()))
+        goto err;
+    if (!BN_mul(r0, r1, r2, ctx))
+        goto err;
+
+    ret = BN_mod_inverse(NULL, d, r0, ctx);
+ err:
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+BN_BLINDING *RSA_setup_blinding(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *in_ctx)
+{
+    BIGNUM *e;
+    BN_CTX *ctx;
+    BN_BLINDING *ret = NULL;
+
+    if (in_ctx == NULL) {
+        if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+            return 0;
+    } else
+        ctx = in_ctx;
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    e = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (e == NULL) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SETUP_BLINDING, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (rsa->e == NULL) {
+        e = rsa_get_public_exp(rsa->d, rsa->p, rsa->q, ctx);
+        if (e == NULL) {
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SETUP_BLINDING, RSA_R_NO_PUBLIC_EXPONENT);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    } else
+        e = rsa->e;
+
+    if ((RAND_status() == 0) && rsa->d != NULL
+        && bn_get_words(rsa->d) != NULL) {
+        /*
+         * if PRNG is not properly seeded, resort to secret exponent as
+         * unpredictable seed
+         */
+        RAND_add(bn_get_words(rsa->d), bn_get_dmax(rsa->d) * sizeof(BN_ULONG),
+                 0.0);
+    }
+
+    {
+        BIGNUM *n = BN_new();
+
+        if (n == NULL) {
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SETUP_BLINDING, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        BN_with_flags(n, rsa->n, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+        ret = BN_BLINDING_create_param(NULL, e, n, ctx, rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp,
+                                       rsa->_method_mod_n);
+        /* We MUST free n before any further use of rsa->n */
+        BN_free(n);
+    }
+    if (ret == NULL) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SETUP_BLINDING, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    BN_BLINDING_set_current_thread(ret);
+
+ err:
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    if (ctx != in_ctx)
+        BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+    if (e != rsa->e)
+        BN_free(e);
+
+    return ret;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_depr.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_depr.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..21e0562
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_depr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * NB: This file contains deprecated functions (compatibility wrappers to the
+ * "new" versions).
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT >= 0x00908000L
+NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT
+
+#else
+
+# include <stdio.h>
+# include <time.h>
+# include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+# include <openssl/bn.h>
+# include <openssl/rsa.h>
+
+RSA *RSA_generate_key(int bits, unsigned long e_value,
+                      void (*callback) (int, int, void *), void *cb_arg)
+{
+    int i;
+    BN_GENCB *cb = BN_GENCB_new();
+    RSA *rsa = RSA_new();
+    BIGNUM *e = BN_new();
+
+    if (cb == NULL || rsa == NULL || e == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    /*
+     * The problem is when building with 8, 16, or 32 BN_ULONG, unsigned long
+     * can be larger
+     */
+    for (i = 0; i < (int)sizeof(unsigned long) * 8; i++) {
+        if (e_value & (1UL << i))
+            if (BN_set_bit(e, i) == 0)
+                goto err;
+    }
+
+    BN_GENCB_set_old(cb, callback, cb_arg);
+
+    if (RSA_generate_key_ex(rsa, bits, e, cb)) {
+        BN_free(e);
+        BN_GENCB_free(cb);
+        return rsa;
+    }
+ err:
+    BN_free(e);
+    RSA_free(rsa);
+    BN_GENCB_free(cb);
+    return 0;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bf54095
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c
@@ -0,0 +1,185 @@
+/*
+ * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+
+# define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA,func,0)
+# define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA,0,reason)
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA RSA_str_functs[] = {
+    {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_CHECK_PADDING_MD), "check_padding_md"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_ENCODE_PKCS1), "encode_pkcs1"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY), "int_rsa_verify"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_OLD_RSA_PRIV_DECODE), "old_rsa_priv_decode"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL), "pkey_rsa_ctrl"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL_STR), "pkey_rsa_ctrl_str"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_SIGN), "pkey_rsa_sign"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_VERIFY), "pkey_rsa_verify"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_VERIFYRECOVER), "pkey_rsa_verifyrecover"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_ALGOR_TO_MD), "rsa_algor_to_md"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN), "rsa_builtin_keygen"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY), "RSA_check_key"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX), "RSA_check_key_ex"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_CMS_DECRYPT), "rsa_cms_decrypt"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY), "rsa_item_verify"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_METH_DUP), "RSA_meth_dup"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_METH_NEW), "RSA_meth_new"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_METH_SET1_NAME), "RSA_meth_set1_name"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_MGF1_TO_MD), "rsa_mgf1_to_md"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_NEW_METHOD), "RSA_new_method"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_NULL), "RSA_NULL"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_NULL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT), "RSA_null_private_decrypt"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_NULL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT), "RSA_null_private_encrypt"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_NULL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT), "RSA_null_public_decrypt"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_NULL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT), "RSA_null_public_encrypt"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT), "rsa_ossl_private_decrypt"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT), "rsa_ossl_private_encrypt"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT), "rsa_ossl_public_decrypt"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT), "rsa_ossl_public_encrypt"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_NONE), "RSA_padding_add_none"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP),
+     "RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1),
+     "RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_PSS), "RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1),
+     "RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_TYPE_1),
+     "RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_TYPE_2),
+     "RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_SSLV23), "RSA_padding_add_SSLv23"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_X931), "RSA_padding_add_X931"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_NONE), "RSA_padding_check_none"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP),
+     "RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1),
+     "RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1),
+     "RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2),
+     "RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23), "RSA_padding_check_SSLv23"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_X931), "RSA_padding_check_X931"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PRINT), "RSA_print"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PRINT_FP), "RSA_print_fp"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PRIV_ENCODE), "rsa_priv_encode"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PSS_TO_CTX), "rsa_pss_to_ctx"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PUB_DECODE), "rsa_pub_decode"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_SETUP_BLINDING), "RSA_setup_blinding"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN), "RSA_sign"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN_ASN1_OCTET_STRING),
+     "RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY), "RSA_verify"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_ASN1_OCTET_STRING),
+     "RSA_verify_ASN1_OCTET_STRING"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1), "RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1"},
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA RSA_str_reasons[] = {
+    {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH), "algorithm mismatch"},
+    {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE), "bad e value"},
+    {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_BAD_FIXED_HEADER_DECRYPT), "bad fixed header decrypt"},
+    {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_BAD_PAD_BYTE_COUNT), "bad pad byte count"},
+    {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE), "bad signature"},
+    {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_01), "block type is not 01"},
+    {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_02), "block type is not 02"},
+    {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN),
+     "data greater than mod len"},
+    {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE), "data too large"},
+    {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE),
+     "data too large for key size"},
+    {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS),
+     "data too large for modulus"},
+    {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_DATA_TOO_SMALL), "data too small"},
+    {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_DATA_TOO_SMALL_FOR_KEY_SIZE),
+     "data too small for key size"},
+    {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_DIGEST_DOES_NOT_MATCH), "digest does not match"},
+    {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG_FOR_RSA_KEY),
+     "digest too big for rsa key"},
+    {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_DMP1_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_D), "dmp1 not congruent to d"},
+    {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_DMQ1_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_D), "dmq1 not congruent to d"},
+    {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_D_E_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_1), "d e not congruent to 1"},
+    {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_FIRST_OCTET_INVALID), "first octet invalid"},
+    {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE),
+     "illegal or unsupported padding mode"},
+    {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST), "invalid digest"},
+    {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH), "invalid digest length"},
+    {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_HEADER), "invalid header"},
+    {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_LABEL), "invalid label"},
+    {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH), "invalid message length"},
+    {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_MGF1_MD), "invalid mgf1 md"},
+    {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_OAEP_PARAMETERS), "invalid oaep parameters"},
+    {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING), "invalid padding"},
+    {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE), "invalid padding mode"},
+    {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_PARAMETERS), "invalid pss parameters"},
+    {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN), "invalid pss saltlen"},
+    {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH), "invalid salt length"},
+    {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_TRAILER), "invalid trailer"},
+    {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_X931_DIGEST), "invalid x931 digest"},
+    {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_IQMP_NOT_INVERSE_OF_Q), "iqmp not inverse of q"},
+    {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL), "key size too small"},
+    {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_LAST_OCTET_INVALID), "last octet invalid"},
+    {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE), "modulus too large"},
+    {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_NO_PUBLIC_EXPONENT), "no public exponent"},
+    {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING),
+     "null before block missing"},
+    {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_N_DOES_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q), "n does not equal p q"},
+    {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR), "oaep decoding error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE),
+     "operation not supported for this keytype"},
+    {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED), "padding check failed"},
+    {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_PKCS_DECODING_ERROR), "pkcs decoding error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_P_NOT_PRIME), "p not prime"},
+    {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_Q_NOT_PRIME), "q not prime"},
+    {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_RSA_OPERATIONS_NOT_SUPPORTED),
+     "rsa operations not supported"},
+    {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_SLEN_CHECK_FAILED), "salt length check failed"},
+    {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_SLEN_RECOVERY_FAILED), "salt length recovery failed"},
+    {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_SSLV3_ROLLBACK_ATTACK), "sslv3 rollback attack"},
+    {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_THE_ASN1_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER_IS_NOT_KNOWN_FOR_THIS_MD),
+     "the asn1 object identifier is not known for this md"},
+    {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE), "unknown algorithm type"},
+    {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST), "unknown digest"},
+    {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_UNKNOWN_MASK_DIGEST), "unknown mask digest"},
+    {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE), "unknown padding type"},
+    {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_ENCRYPTION_TYPE),
+     "unsupported encryption type"},
+    {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_LABEL_SOURCE), "unsupported label source"},
+    {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_MASK_ALGORITHM),
+     "unsupported mask algorithm"},
+    {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_MASK_PARAMETER),
+     "unsupported mask parameter"},
+    {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_TYPE),
+     "unsupported signature type"},
+    {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING), "value missing"},
+    {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH), "wrong signature length"},
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+
+#endif
+
+int ERR_load_RSA_strings(void)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+
+    if (ERR_func_error_string(RSA_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) {
+        ERR_load_strings(0, RSA_str_functs);
+        ERR_load_strings(0, RSA_str_reasons);
+    }
+#endif
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9af43e0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
@@ -0,0 +1,218 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * NB: these functions have been "upgraded", the deprecated versions (which
+ * are compatibility wrappers using these functions) are in rsa_depr.c. -
+ * Geoff
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include "rsa_locl.h"
+
+static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value,
+                              BN_GENCB *cb);
+
+/*
+ * NB: this wrapper would normally be placed in rsa_lib.c and the static
+ * implementation would probably be in rsa_eay.c. Nonetheless, is kept here
+ * so that we don't introduce a new linker dependency. Eg. any application
+ * that wasn't previously linking object code related to key-generation won't
+ * have to now just because key-generation is part of RSA_METHOD.
+ */
+int RSA_generate_key_ex(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb)
+{
+    if (rsa->meth->rsa_keygen)
+        return rsa->meth->rsa_keygen(rsa, bits, e_value, cb);
+    return rsa_builtin_keygen(rsa, bits, e_value, cb);
+}
+
+static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value,
+                              BN_GENCB *cb)
+{
+    BIGNUM *r0 = NULL, *r1 = NULL, *r2 = NULL, *r3 = NULL, *tmp;
+    int bitsp, bitsq, ok = -1, n = 0;
+    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+    unsigned long error = 0;
+
+    /*
+     * When generating ridiculously small keys, we can get stuck
+     * continually regenerating the same prime values.
+     */
+    if (bits < 16) {
+        ok = 0;             /* we set our own err */
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    r0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    r2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    r3 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (r3 == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    bitsp = (bits + 1) / 2;
+    bitsq = bits - bitsp;
+
+    /* We need the RSA components non-NULL */
+    if (!rsa->n && ((rsa->n = BN_new()) == NULL))
+        goto err;
+    if (!rsa->d && ((rsa->d = BN_secure_new()) == NULL))
+        goto err;
+    if (!rsa->e && ((rsa->e = BN_new()) == NULL))
+        goto err;
+    if (!rsa->p && ((rsa->p = BN_secure_new()) == NULL))
+        goto err;
+    if (!rsa->q && ((rsa->q = BN_secure_new()) == NULL))
+        goto err;
+    if (!rsa->dmp1 && ((rsa->dmp1 = BN_secure_new()) == NULL))
+        goto err;
+    if (!rsa->dmq1 && ((rsa->dmq1 = BN_secure_new()) == NULL))
+        goto err;
+    if (!rsa->iqmp && ((rsa->iqmp = BN_secure_new()) == NULL))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (BN_copy(rsa->e, e_value) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    BN_set_flags(r2, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+    /* generate p and q */
+    for (;;) {
+        if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(rsa->p, bitsp, 0, NULL, NULL, cb))
+            goto err;
+        if (!BN_sub(r2, rsa->p, BN_value_one()))
+            goto err;
+        ERR_set_mark();
+        if (BN_mod_inverse(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx) != NULL) {
+            /* GCD == 1 since inverse exists */
+            break;
+        }
+        error = ERR_peek_last_error();
+        if (ERR_GET_LIB(error) == ERR_LIB_BN
+            && ERR_GET_REASON(error) == BN_R_NO_INVERSE) {
+            /* GCD != 1 */
+            ERR_pop_to_mark();
+        } else {
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++))
+            goto err;
+    }
+    if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 0))
+        goto err;
+    for (;;) {
+        do {
+            if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(rsa->q, bitsq, 0, NULL, NULL, cb))
+                goto err;
+        } while (BN_cmp(rsa->p, rsa->q) == 0);
+        if (!BN_sub(r2, rsa->q, BN_value_one()))
+            goto err;
+        ERR_set_mark();
+        if (BN_mod_inverse(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx) != NULL) {
+            /* GCD == 1 since inverse exists */
+            break;
+        }
+        error = ERR_peek_last_error();
+        if (ERR_GET_LIB(error) == ERR_LIB_BN
+            && ERR_GET_REASON(error) == BN_R_NO_INVERSE) {
+            /* GCD != 1 */
+            ERR_pop_to_mark();
+        } else {
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++))
+            goto err;
+    }
+    if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 1))
+        goto err;
+    if (BN_cmp(rsa->p, rsa->q) < 0) {
+        tmp = rsa->p;
+        rsa->p = rsa->q;
+        rsa->q = tmp;
+    }
+
+    /* calculate n */
+    if (!BN_mul(rsa->n, rsa->p, rsa->q, ctx))
+        goto err;
+
+    /* calculate d */
+    if (!BN_sub(r1, rsa->p, BN_value_one()))
+        goto err;               /* p-1 */
+    if (!BN_sub(r2, rsa->q, BN_value_one()))
+        goto err;               /* q-1 */
+    if (!BN_mul(r0, r1, r2, ctx))
+        goto err;               /* (p-1)(q-1) */
+    {
+        BIGNUM *pr0 = BN_new();
+
+        if (pr0 == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        BN_with_flags(pr0, r0, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+        if (!BN_mod_inverse(rsa->d, rsa->e, pr0, ctx)) {
+            BN_free(pr0);
+            goto err;               /* d */
+        }
+        /* We MUST free pr0 before any further use of r0 */
+        BN_free(pr0);
+    }
+
+    {
+        BIGNUM *d = BN_new();
+
+        if (d == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+        if (   /* calculate d mod (p-1) */
+               !BN_mod(rsa->dmp1, d, r1, ctx)
+               /* calculate d mod (q-1) */
+            || !BN_mod(rsa->dmq1, d, r2, ctx)) {
+            BN_free(d);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        /* We MUST free d before any further use of rsa->d */
+        BN_free(d);
+    }
+
+    {
+        BIGNUM *p = BN_new();
+
+        if (p == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        BN_with_flags(p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+        /* calculate inverse of q mod p */
+        if (!BN_mod_inverse(rsa->iqmp, rsa->q, p, ctx)) {
+            BN_free(p);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        /* We MUST free p before any further use of rsa->p */
+        BN_free(p);
+    }
+
+    ok = 1;
+ err:
+    if (ok == -1) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN, ERR_LIB_BN);
+        ok = 0;
+    }
+    if (ctx != NULL)
+        BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+
+    return ok;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e1377a0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c
@@ -0,0 +1,288 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/lhash.h>
+#include "internal/bn_int.h"
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#include "rsa_locl.h"
+
+RSA *RSA_new(void)
+{
+    return RSA_new_method(NULL);
+}
+
+const RSA_METHOD *RSA_get_method(const RSA *rsa)
+{
+    return rsa->meth;
+}
+
+int RSA_set_method(RSA *rsa, const RSA_METHOD *meth)
+{
+    /*
+     * NB: The caller is specifically setting a method, so it's not up to us
+     * to deal with which ENGINE it comes from.
+     */
+    const RSA_METHOD *mtmp;
+    mtmp = rsa->meth;
+    if (mtmp->finish)
+        mtmp->finish(rsa);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    ENGINE_finish(rsa->engine);
+    rsa->engine = NULL;
+#endif
+    rsa->meth = meth;
+    if (meth->init)
+        meth->init(rsa);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+RSA *RSA_new_method(ENGINE *engine)
+{
+    RSA *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
+
+    if (ret == NULL) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    ret->references = 1;
+    ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
+    if (ret->lock == NULL) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        OPENSSL_free(ret);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    ret->meth = RSA_get_default_method();
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    ret->flags = ret->meth->flags & ~RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW;
+    if (engine) {
+        if (!ENGINE_init(engine)) {
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        ret->engine = engine;
+    } else
+        ret->engine = ENGINE_get_default_RSA();
+    if (ret->engine) {
+        ret->meth = ENGINE_get_RSA(ret->engine);
+        if (ret->meth == NULL) {
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+#endif
+
+    ret->flags = ret->meth->flags & ~RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW;
+    if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RSA, ret, &ret->ex_data)) {
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if ((ret->meth->init != NULL) && !ret->meth->init(ret)) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_INIT_FAIL);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    return ret;
+
+err:
+    RSA_free(ret);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+void RSA_free(RSA *r)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    if (r == NULL)
+        return;
+
+    CRYPTO_atomic_add(&r->references, -1, &i, r->lock);
+    REF_PRINT_COUNT("RSA", r);
+    if (i > 0)
+        return;
+    REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0);
+
+    if (r->meth->finish)
+        r->meth->finish(r);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    ENGINE_finish(r->engine);
+#endif
+
+    CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RSA, r, &r->ex_data);
+
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(r->lock);
+
+    BN_clear_free(r->n);
+    BN_clear_free(r->e);
+    BN_clear_free(r->d);
+    BN_clear_free(r->p);
+    BN_clear_free(r->q);
+    BN_clear_free(r->dmp1);
+    BN_clear_free(r->dmq1);
+    BN_clear_free(r->iqmp);
+    BN_BLINDING_free(r->blinding);
+    BN_BLINDING_free(r->mt_blinding);
+    OPENSSL_free(r->bignum_data);
+    OPENSSL_free(r);
+}
+
+int RSA_up_ref(RSA *r)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    if (CRYPTO_atomic_add(&r->references, 1, &i, r->lock) <= 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    REF_PRINT_COUNT("RSA", r);
+    REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 2);
+    return ((i > 1) ? 1 : 0);
+}
+
+int RSA_set_ex_data(RSA *r, int idx, void *arg)
+{
+    return (CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&r->ex_data, idx, arg));
+}
+
+void *RSA_get_ex_data(const RSA *r, int idx)
+{
+    return (CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&r->ex_data, idx));
+}
+
+int RSA_security_bits(const RSA *rsa)
+{
+    return BN_security_bits(BN_num_bits(rsa->n), -1);
+}
+
+int RSA_set0_key(RSA *r, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *d)
+{
+    /* If the fields n and e in r are NULL, the corresponding input
+     * parameters MUST be non-NULL for n and e.  d may be
+     * left NULL (in case only the public key is used).
+     */
+    if ((r->n == NULL && n == NULL)
+        || (r->e == NULL && e == NULL))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (n != NULL) {
+        BN_free(r->n);
+        r->n = n;
+    }
+    if (e != NULL) {
+        BN_free(r->e);
+        r->e = e;
+    }
+    if (d != NULL) {
+        BN_free(r->d);
+        r->d = d;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int RSA_set0_factors(RSA *r, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q)
+{
+    /* If the fields p and q in r are NULL, the corresponding input
+     * parameters MUST be non-NULL.
+     */
+    if ((r->p == NULL && p == NULL)
+        || (r->q == NULL && q == NULL))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (p != NULL) {
+        BN_free(r->p);
+        r->p = p;
+    }
+    if (q != NULL) {
+        BN_free(r->q);
+        r->q = q;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int RSA_set0_crt_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *dmp1, BIGNUM *dmq1, BIGNUM *iqmp)
+{
+    /* If the fields dmp1, dmq1 and iqmp in r are NULL, the corresponding input
+     * parameters MUST be non-NULL.
+     */
+    if ((r->dmp1 == NULL && dmp1 == NULL)
+        || (r->dmq1 == NULL && dmq1 == NULL)
+        || (r->iqmp == NULL && iqmp == NULL))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (dmp1 != NULL) {
+        BN_free(r->dmp1);
+        r->dmp1 = dmp1;
+    }
+    if (dmq1 != NULL) {
+        BN_free(r->dmq1);
+        r->dmq1 = dmq1;
+    }
+    if (iqmp != NULL) {
+        BN_free(r->iqmp);
+        r->iqmp = iqmp;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+void RSA_get0_key(const RSA *r,
+                  const BIGNUM **n, const BIGNUM **e, const BIGNUM **d)
+{
+    if (n != NULL)
+        *n = r->n;
+    if (e != NULL)
+        *e = r->e;
+    if (d != NULL)
+        *d = r->d;
+}
+
+void RSA_get0_factors(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q)
+{
+    if (p != NULL)
+        *p = r->p;
+    if (q != NULL)
+        *q = r->q;
+}
+
+void RSA_get0_crt_params(const RSA *r,
+                         const BIGNUM **dmp1, const BIGNUM **dmq1,
+                         const BIGNUM **iqmp)
+{
+    if (dmp1 != NULL)
+        *dmp1 = r->dmp1;
+    if (dmq1 != NULL)
+        *dmq1 = r->dmq1;
+    if (iqmp != NULL)
+        *iqmp = r->iqmp;
+}
+
+void RSA_clear_flags(RSA *r, int flags)
+{
+    r->flags &= ~flags;
+}
+
+int RSA_test_flags(const RSA *r, int flags)
+{
+    return r->flags & flags;
+}
+
+void RSA_set_flags(RSA *r, int flags)
+{
+    r->flags |= flags;
+}
+
+ENGINE *RSA_get0_engine(const RSA *r)
+{
+    return r->engine;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_locl.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_locl.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5d16aa6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_locl.h
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+
+struct rsa_st {
+    /*
+     * The first parameter is used to pickup errors where this is passed
+     * instead of aEVP_PKEY, it is set to 0
+     */
+    int pad;
+    long version;
+    const RSA_METHOD *meth;
+    /* functional reference if 'meth' is ENGINE-provided */
+    ENGINE *engine;
+    BIGNUM *n;
+    BIGNUM *e;
+    BIGNUM *d;
+    BIGNUM *p;
+    BIGNUM *q;
+    BIGNUM *dmp1;
+    BIGNUM *dmq1;
+    BIGNUM *iqmp;
+    /* be careful using this if the RSA structure is shared */
+    CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data;
+    int references;
+    int flags;
+    /* Used to cache montgomery values */
+    BN_MONT_CTX *_method_mod_n;
+    BN_MONT_CTX *_method_mod_p;
+    BN_MONT_CTX *_method_mod_q;
+    /*
+     * all BIGNUM values are actually in the following data, if it is not
+     * NULL
+     */
+    char *bignum_data;
+    BN_BLINDING *blinding;
+    BN_BLINDING *mt_blinding;
+    CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock;
+};
+
+struct rsa_meth_st {
+    char *name;
+    int (*rsa_pub_enc) (int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+                        unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+    int (*rsa_pub_dec) (int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+                        unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+    int (*rsa_priv_enc) (int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+                         unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+    int (*rsa_priv_dec) (int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+                         unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+    /* Can be null */
+    int (*rsa_mod_exp) (BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx);
+    /* Can be null */
+    int (*bn_mod_exp) (BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
+                       const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx);
+    /* called at new */
+    int (*init) (RSA *rsa);
+    /* called at free */
+    int (*finish) (RSA *rsa);
+    /* RSA_METHOD_FLAG_* things */
+    int flags;
+    /* may be needed! */
+    char *app_data;
+    /*
+     * New sign and verify functions: some libraries don't allow arbitrary
+     * data to be signed/verified: this allows them to be used. Note: for
+     * this to work the RSA_public_decrypt() and RSA_private_encrypt() should
+     * *NOT* be used RSA_sign(), RSA_verify() should be used instead.
+     */
+    int (*rsa_sign) (int type,
+                     const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_length,
+                     unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen,
+                     const RSA *rsa);
+    int (*rsa_verify) (int dtype, const unsigned char *m,
+                       unsigned int m_length, const unsigned char *sigbuf,
+                       unsigned int siglen, const RSA *rsa);
+    /*
+     * If this callback is NULL, the builtin software RSA key-gen will be
+     * used. This is for behavioural compatibility whilst the code gets
+     * rewired, but one day it would be nice to assume there are no such
+     * things as "builtin software" implementations.
+     */
+    int (*rsa_keygen) (RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e, BN_GENCB *cb);
+};
+
+extern int int_rsa_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m,
+                          unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *rm,
+                          size_t *prm_len, const unsigned char *sigbuf,
+                          size_t siglen, RSA *rsa);
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_meth.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_meth.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9480abd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_meth.c
@@ -0,0 +1,273 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include "rsa_locl.h"
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+RSA_METHOD *RSA_meth_new(const char *name, int flags)
+{
+    RSA_METHOD *meth = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*meth));
+
+    if (meth != NULL) {
+        meth->flags = flags;
+
+        meth->name = OPENSSL_strdup(name);
+        if (meth->name != NULL)
+            return meth;
+
+        OPENSSL_free(meth);
+    }
+
+    RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_METH_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+void RSA_meth_free(RSA_METHOD *meth)
+{
+    if (meth != NULL) {
+        OPENSSL_free(meth->name);
+        OPENSSL_free(meth);
+    }
+}
+
+RSA_METHOD *RSA_meth_dup(const RSA_METHOD *meth)
+{
+    RSA_METHOD *ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ret));
+
+    if (ret != NULL) {
+        memcpy(ret, meth, sizeof(*meth));
+
+        ret->name = OPENSSL_strdup(meth->name);
+        if (ret->name != NULL)
+            return ret;
+
+        OPENSSL_free(ret);
+    }
+
+    RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_METH_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+const char *RSA_meth_get0_name(const RSA_METHOD *meth)
+{
+    return meth->name;
+}
+
+int RSA_meth_set1_name(RSA_METHOD *meth, const char *name)
+{
+    char *tmpname = OPENSSL_strdup(name);
+
+    if (tmpname == NULL) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_METH_SET1_NAME, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    OPENSSL_free(meth->name);
+    meth->name = tmpname;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int RSA_meth_get_flags(RSA_METHOD *meth)
+{
+    return meth->flags;
+}
+
+int RSA_meth_set_flags(RSA_METHOD *meth, int flags)
+{
+    meth->flags = flags;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+void *RSA_meth_get0_app_data(const RSA_METHOD *meth)
+{
+    return meth->app_data;
+}
+
+int RSA_meth_set0_app_data(RSA_METHOD *meth, void *app_data)
+{
+    meth->app_data = app_data;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int (*RSA_meth_get_pub_enc(const RSA_METHOD *meth))
+    (int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+     unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+{
+    return meth->rsa_pub_enc;
+}
+
+int RSA_meth_set_pub_enc(RSA_METHOD *meth,
+                         int (*pub_enc) (int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+                                         unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,
+                                         int padding))
+{
+    meth->rsa_pub_enc = pub_enc;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int (*RSA_meth_get_pub_dec(const RSA_METHOD *meth))
+    (int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+     unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+{
+    return meth->rsa_pub_dec;
+}
+
+int RSA_meth_set_pub_dec(RSA_METHOD *meth,
+                         int (*pub_dec) (int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+                                         unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,
+                                         int padding))
+{
+    meth->rsa_pub_dec = pub_dec;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int (*RSA_meth_get_priv_enc(const RSA_METHOD *meth))
+    (int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+     unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+{
+    return meth->rsa_priv_enc;
+}
+
+int RSA_meth_set_priv_enc(RSA_METHOD *meth,
+                          int (*priv_enc) (int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+                                           unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,
+                                           int padding))
+{
+    meth->rsa_priv_enc = priv_enc;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int (*RSA_meth_get_priv_dec(const RSA_METHOD *meth))
+    (int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+     unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+{
+    return meth->rsa_priv_dec;
+}
+
+int RSA_meth_set_priv_dec(RSA_METHOD *meth,
+                          int (*priv_dec) (int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+                                           unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,
+                                           int padding))
+{
+    meth->rsa_priv_dec = priv_dec;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+    /* Can be null */
+int (*RSA_meth_get_mod_exp(const RSA_METHOD *meth))
+    (BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return meth->rsa_mod_exp;
+}
+
+int RSA_meth_set_mod_exp(RSA_METHOD *meth,
+                         int (*mod_exp) (BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa,
+                                         BN_CTX *ctx))
+{
+    meth->rsa_mod_exp = mod_exp;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+    /* Can be null */
+int (*RSA_meth_get_bn_mod_exp(const RSA_METHOD *meth))
+    (BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
+     const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx)
+{
+    return meth->bn_mod_exp;
+}
+
+int RSA_meth_set_bn_mod_exp(RSA_METHOD *meth,
+                            int (*bn_mod_exp) (BIGNUM *r,
+                                               const BIGNUM *a,
+                                               const BIGNUM *p,
+                                               const BIGNUM *m,
+                                               BN_CTX *ctx,
+                                               BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx))
+{
+    meth->bn_mod_exp = bn_mod_exp;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+    /* called at new */
+int (*RSA_meth_get_init(const RSA_METHOD *meth)) (RSA *rsa)
+{
+    return meth->init;
+}
+
+int RSA_meth_set_init(RSA_METHOD *meth, int (*init) (RSA *rsa))
+{
+    meth->init = init;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+    /* called at free */
+int (*RSA_meth_get_finish(const RSA_METHOD *meth)) (RSA *rsa)
+{
+    return meth->finish;
+}
+
+int RSA_meth_set_finish(RSA_METHOD *meth, int (*finish) (RSA *rsa))
+{
+    meth->finish = finish;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int (*RSA_meth_get_sign(const RSA_METHOD *meth))
+    (int type,
+     const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_length,
+     unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen,
+     const RSA *rsa)
+{
+    return meth->rsa_sign;
+}
+
+int RSA_meth_set_sign(RSA_METHOD *meth,
+                      int (*sign) (int type, const unsigned char *m,
+                                   unsigned int m_length,
+                                   unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen,
+                                   const RSA *rsa))
+{
+    meth->rsa_sign = sign;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int (*RSA_meth_get_verify(const RSA_METHOD *meth))
+    (int dtype, const unsigned char *m,
+     unsigned int m_length, const unsigned char *sigbuf,
+     unsigned int siglen, const RSA *rsa)
+{
+    return meth->rsa_verify;
+}
+
+int RSA_meth_set_verify(RSA_METHOD *meth,
+                        int (*verify) (int dtype, const unsigned char *m,
+                                       unsigned int m_length,
+                                       const unsigned char *sigbuf,
+                                       unsigned int siglen, const RSA *rsa))
+{
+    meth->rsa_verify = verify;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int (*RSA_meth_get_keygen(const RSA_METHOD *meth))
+    (RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e, BN_GENCB *cb)
+{
+    return meth->rsa_keygen;
+}
+
+int RSA_meth_set_keygen(RSA_METHOD *meth,
+                        int (*keygen) (RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e,
+                                       BN_GENCB *cb))
+{
+    meth->rsa_keygen = keygen;
+    return 1;
+}
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_none.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_none.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b78756d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_none.c
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+
+int RSA_padding_add_none(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+                         const unsigned char *from, int flen)
+{
+    if (flen > tlen) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_NONE, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
+        return (0);
+    }
+
+    if (flen < tlen) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_NONE, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_SMALL_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
+        return (0);
+    }
+
+    memcpy(to, from, (unsigned int)flen);
+    return (1);
+}
+
+int RSA_padding_check_none(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+                           const unsigned char *from, int flen, int num)
+{
+
+    if (flen > tlen) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_NONE, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
+        return (-1);
+    }
+
+    memset(to, 0, tlen - flen);
+    memcpy(to + tlen - flen, from, flen);
+    return (tlen);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_null.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_null.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d339494
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_null.c
@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include "rsa_locl.h"
+
+/*
+ * This is a dummy RSA implementation that just returns errors when called.
+ * It is designed to allow some RSA functions to work while stopping those
+ * covered by the RSA patent. That is RSA, encryption, decryption, signing
+ * and verify is not allowed but RSA key generation, key checking and other
+ * operations (like storing RSA keys) are permitted.
+ */
+
+static int RSA_null_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+                                   unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+static int RSA_null_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+                                    unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+static int RSA_null_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+                                   unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+static int RSA_null_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+                                    unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+static int RSA_null_init(RSA *rsa);
+static int RSA_null_finish(RSA *rsa);
+static RSA_METHOD rsa_null_meth = {
+    "Null RSA",
+    RSA_null_public_encrypt,
+    RSA_null_public_decrypt,
+    RSA_null_private_encrypt,
+    RSA_null_private_decrypt,
+    NULL,
+    NULL,
+    RSA_null_init,
+    RSA_null_finish,
+    0,
+    NULL,
+    NULL,
+    NULL,
+    NULL
+};
+
+const RSA_METHOD *RSA_null_method(void)
+{
+    return (&rsa_null_meth);
+}
+
+static int RSA_null_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+                                   unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+{
+    RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NULL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_RSA_OPERATIONS_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+    return -1;
+}
+
+static int RSA_null_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+                                    unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+{
+    RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NULL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,
+           RSA_R_RSA_OPERATIONS_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+    return -1;
+}
+
+static int RSA_null_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+                                    unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+{
+    RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NULL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,
+           RSA_R_RSA_OPERATIONS_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+    return -1;
+}
+
+static int RSA_null_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+                                   unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+{
+    RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NULL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_RSA_OPERATIONS_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+    return -1;
+}
+
+static int RSA_null_init(RSA *rsa)
+{
+    return (1);
+}
+
+static int RSA_null_finish(RSA *rsa)
+{
+    return (1);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4878d49
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
@@ -0,0 +1,286 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* EME-OAEP as defined in RFC 2437 (PKCS #1 v2.0) */
+
+/*
+ * See Victor Shoup, "OAEP reconsidered," Nov. 2000, <URL:
+ * http://www.shoup.net/papers/oaep.ps.Z> for problems with the security
+ * proof for the original OAEP scheme, which EME-OAEP is based on. A new
+ * proof can be found in E. Fujisaki, T. Okamoto, D. Pointcheval, J. Stern,
+ * "RSA-OEAP is Still Alive!", Dec. 2000, <URL:
+ * http://eprint.iacr.org/2000/061/>. The new proof has stronger requirements
+ * for the underlying permutation: "partial-one-wayness" instead of
+ * one-wayness.  For the RSA function, this is an equivalent notion.
+ */
+
+#include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
+#include "rsa_locl.h"
+
+int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+                               const unsigned char *from, int flen,
+                               const unsigned char *param, int plen)
+{
+    return RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(to, tlen, from, flen,
+                                           param, plen, NULL, NULL);
+}
+
+int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+                                    const unsigned char *from, int flen,
+                                    const unsigned char *param, int plen,
+                                    const EVP_MD *md, const EVP_MD *mgf1md)
+{
+    int i, emlen = tlen - 1;
+    unsigned char *db, *seed;
+    unsigned char *dbmask, seedmask[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+    int mdlen;
+
+    if (md == NULL)
+        md = EVP_sha1();
+    if (mgf1md == NULL)
+        mgf1md = md;
+
+    mdlen = EVP_MD_size(md);
+
+    if (flen > emlen - 2 * mdlen - 1) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1,
+               RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (emlen < 2 * mdlen + 1) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1,
+               RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    to[0] = 0;
+    seed = to + 1;
+    db = to + mdlen + 1;
+
+    if (!EVP_Digest((void *)param, plen, db, NULL, md, NULL))
+        return 0;
+    memset(db + mdlen, 0, emlen - flen - 2 * mdlen - 1);
+    db[emlen - flen - mdlen - 1] = 0x01;
+    memcpy(db + emlen - flen - mdlen, from, (unsigned int)flen);
+    if (RAND_bytes(seed, mdlen) <= 0)
+        return 0;
+#ifdef PKCS_TESTVECT
+    memcpy(seed,
+           "\xaa\xfd\x12\xf6\x59\xca\xe6\x34\x89\xb4\x79\xe5\x07\x6d\xde\xc2\xf0\x6c\xb5\x8f",
+           20);
+#endif
+
+    dbmask = OPENSSL_malloc(emlen - mdlen);
+    if (dbmask == NULL) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (PKCS1_MGF1(dbmask, emlen - mdlen, seed, mdlen, mgf1md) < 0)
+        goto err;
+    for (i = 0; i < emlen - mdlen; i++)
+        db[i] ^= dbmask[i];
+
+    if (PKCS1_MGF1(seedmask, mdlen, db, emlen - mdlen, mgf1md) < 0)
+        goto err;
+    for (i = 0; i < mdlen; i++)
+        seed[i] ^= seedmask[i];
+
+    OPENSSL_free(dbmask);
+    return 1;
+
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_free(dbmask);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+                                 const unsigned char *from, int flen, int num,
+                                 const unsigned char *param, int plen)
+{
+    return RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(to, tlen, from, flen, num,
+                                             param, plen, NULL, NULL);
+}
+
+int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+                                      const unsigned char *from, int flen,
+                                      int num, const unsigned char *param,
+                                      int plen, const EVP_MD *md,
+                                      const EVP_MD *mgf1md)
+{
+    int i, dblen = 0, mlen = -1, one_index = 0, msg_index;
+    unsigned int good, found_one_byte;
+    const unsigned char *maskedseed, *maskeddb;
+    /*
+     * |em| is the encoded message, zero-padded to exactly |num| bytes: em =
+     * Y || maskedSeed || maskedDB
+     */
+    unsigned char *db = NULL, *em = NULL, seed[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE],
+        phash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+    int mdlen;
+
+    if (md == NULL)
+        md = EVP_sha1();
+    if (mgf1md == NULL)
+        mgf1md = md;
+
+    mdlen = EVP_MD_size(md);
+
+    if (tlen <= 0 || flen <= 0)
+        return -1;
+    /*
+     * |num| is the length of the modulus; |flen| is the length of the
+     * encoded message. Therefore, for any |from| that was obtained by
+     * decrypting a ciphertext, we must have |flen| <= |num|. Similarly,
+     * num < 2 * mdlen + 2 must hold for the modulus irrespective of
+     * the ciphertext, see PKCS #1 v2.2, section 7.1.2.
+     * This does not leak any side-channel information.
+     */
+    if (num < flen || num < 2 * mdlen + 2)
+        goto decoding_err;
+
+    dblen = num - mdlen - 1;
+    db = OPENSSL_malloc(dblen);
+    em = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
+    if (db == NULL || em == NULL) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Always do this zero-padding copy (even when num == flen) to avoid
+     * leaking that information. The copy still leaks some side-channel
+     * information, but it's impossible to have a fixed  memory access
+     * pattern since we can't read out of the bounds of |from|.
+     *
+     * TODO(emilia): Consider porting BN_bn2bin_padded from BoringSSL.
+     */
+    memset(em, 0, num);
+    memcpy(em + num - flen, from, flen);
+
+    /*
+     * The first byte must be zero, however we must not leak if this is
+     * true. See James H. Manger, "A Chosen Ciphertext  Attack on RSA
+     * Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) [...]", CRYPTO 2001).
+     */
+    good = constant_time_is_zero(em[0]);
+
+    maskedseed = em + 1;
+    maskeddb = em + 1 + mdlen;
+
+    if (PKCS1_MGF1(seed, mdlen, maskeddb, dblen, mgf1md))
+        goto cleanup;
+    for (i = 0; i < mdlen; i++)
+        seed[i] ^= maskedseed[i];
+
+    if (PKCS1_MGF1(db, dblen, seed, mdlen, mgf1md))
+        goto cleanup;
+    for (i = 0; i < dblen; i++)
+        db[i] ^= maskeddb[i];
+
+    if (!EVP_Digest((void *)param, plen, phash, NULL, md, NULL))
+        goto cleanup;
+
+    good &= constant_time_is_zero(CRYPTO_memcmp(db, phash, mdlen));
+
+    found_one_byte = 0;
+    for (i = mdlen; i < dblen; i++) {
+        /*
+         * Padding consists of a number of 0-bytes, followed by a 1.
+         */
+        unsigned int equals1 = constant_time_eq(db[i], 1);
+        unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(db[i]);
+        one_index = constant_time_select_int(~found_one_byte & equals1,
+                                             i, one_index);
+        found_one_byte |= equals1;
+        good &= (found_one_byte | equals0);
+    }
+
+    good &= found_one_byte;
+
+    /*
+     * At this point |good| is zero unless the plaintext was valid,
+     * so plaintext-awareness ensures timing side-channels are no longer a
+     * concern.
+     */
+    if (!good)
+        goto decoding_err;
+
+    msg_index = one_index + 1;
+    mlen = dblen - msg_index;
+
+    if (tlen < mlen) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
+        mlen = -1;
+    } else {
+        memcpy(to, db + msg_index, mlen);
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+ decoding_err:
+    /*
+     * To avoid chosen ciphertext attacks, the error message should not
+     * reveal which kind of decoding error happened.
+     */
+    RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1,
+           RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR);
+ cleanup:
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(db, dblen);
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(em, num);
+    return mlen;
+}
+
+int PKCS1_MGF1(unsigned char *mask, long len,
+               const unsigned char *seed, long seedlen, const EVP_MD *dgst)
+{
+    long i, outlen = 0;
+    unsigned char cnt[4];
+    EVP_MD_CTX *c = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+    unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+    int mdlen;
+    int rv = -1;
+
+    if (c == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    mdlen = EVP_MD_size(dgst);
+    if (mdlen < 0)
+        goto err;
+    for (i = 0; outlen < len; i++) {
+        cnt[0] = (unsigned char)((i >> 24) & 255);
+        cnt[1] = (unsigned char)((i >> 16) & 255);
+        cnt[2] = (unsigned char)((i >> 8)) & 255;
+        cnt[3] = (unsigned char)(i & 255);
+        if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(c, dgst, NULL)
+            || !EVP_DigestUpdate(c, seed, seedlen)
+            || !EVP_DigestUpdate(c, cnt, 4))
+            goto err;
+        if (outlen + mdlen <= len) {
+            if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(c, mask + outlen, NULL))
+                goto err;
+            outlen += mdlen;
+        } else {
+            if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(c, md, NULL))
+                goto err;
+            memcpy(mask + outlen, md, len - outlen);
+            outlen = len;
+        }
+    }
+    rv = 0;
+ err:
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(c);
+    return rv;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..62a8895
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,800 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "internal/bn_int.h"
+#include "rsa_locl.h"
+
+static int rsa_ossl_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+                                  unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+static int rsa_ossl_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+                                   unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+static int rsa_ossl_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+                                  unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+static int rsa_ossl_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+                                   unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+static int rsa_ossl_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *i, RSA *rsa,
+                           BN_CTX *ctx);
+static int rsa_ossl_init(RSA *rsa);
+static int rsa_ossl_finish(RSA *rsa);
+static RSA_METHOD rsa_pkcs1_ossl_meth = {
+    "OpenSSL PKCS#1 RSA",
+    rsa_ossl_public_encrypt,
+    rsa_ossl_public_decrypt,     /* signature verification */
+    rsa_ossl_private_encrypt,    /* signing */
+    rsa_ossl_private_decrypt,
+    rsa_ossl_mod_exp,
+    BN_mod_exp_mont,            /* XXX probably we should not use Montgomery
+                                 * if e == 3 */
+    rsa_ossl_init,
+    rsa_ossl_finish,
+    RSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD,       /* flags */
+    NULL,
+    0,                          /* rsa_sign */
+    0,                          /* rsa_verify */
+    NULL                        /* rsa_keygen */
+};
+
+static const RSA_METHOD *default_RSA_meth = &rsa_pkcs1_ossl_meth;
+
+void RSA_set_default_method(const RSA_METHOD *meth)
+{
+    default_RSA_meth = meth;
+}
+
+const RSA_METHOD *RSA_get_default_method(void)
+{
+    return default_RSA_meth;
+}
+
+const RSA_METHOD *RSA_PKCS1_OpenSSL(void)
+{
+    return &rsa_pkcs1_ossl_meth;
+}
+
+static int rsa_ossl_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+                                  unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+{
+    BIGNUM *f, *ret;
+    int i, j, k, num = 0, r = -1;
+    unsigned char *buf = NULL;
+    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+
+    if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */
+    if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS) {
+        if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS) {
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
+            return -1;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+    buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
+    if (f == NULL || ret == NULL || buf == NULL) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    switch (padding) {
+    case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+        i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf, num, from, flen);
+        break;
+    case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
+        i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf, num, from, flen, NULL, 0);
+        break;
+    case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
+        i = RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf, num, from, flen);
+        break;
+    case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+        i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen);
+        break;
+    default:
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (i <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (BN_bin2bn(buf, num, f) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) {
+        /* usually the padding functions would catch this */
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,
+               RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
+        if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked
+            (&rsa->_method_mod_n, rsa->lock, rsa->n, ctx))
+            goto err;
+
+    if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx,
+                               rsa->_method_mod_n))
+        goto err;
+
+    /*
+     * put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the length of the
+     * modulus
+     */
+    j = BN_num_bytes(ret);
+    i = BN_bn2bin(ret, &(to[num - j]));
+    for (k = 0; k < (num - i); k++)
+        to[k] = 0;
+
+    r = num;
+ err:
+    if (ctx != NULL)
+        BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(buf, num);
+    return (r);
+}
+
+static BN_BLINDING *rsa_get_blinding(RSA *rsa, int *local, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    BN_BLINDING *ret;
+
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rsa->lock);
+
+    if (rsa->blinding == NULL) {
+        rsa->blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx);
+    }
+
+    ret = rsa->blinding;
+    if (ret == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (BN_BLINDING_is_current_thread(ret)) {
+        /* rsa->blinding is ours! */
+
+        *local = 1;
+    } else {
+        /* resort to rsa->mt_blinding instead */
+
+        /*
+         * instructs rsa_blinding_convert(), rsa_blinding_invert() that the
+         * BN_BLINDING is shared, meaning that accesses require locks, and
+         * that the blinding factor must be stored outside the BN_BLINDING
+         */
+        *local = 0;
+
+        if (rsa->mt_blinding == NULL) {
+            rsa->mt_blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx);
+        }
+        ret = rsa->mt_blinding;
+    }
+
+ err:
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rsa->lock);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int rsa_blinding_convert(BN_BLINDING *b, BIGNUM *f, BIGNUM *unblind,
+                                BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    if (unblind == NULL)
+        /*
+         * Local blinding: store the unblinding factor in BN_BLINDING.
+         */
+        return BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, NULL, b, ctx);
+    else {
+        /*
+         * Shared blinding: store the unblinding factor outside BN_BLINDING.
+         */
+        int ret;
+
+        BN_BLINDING_lock(b);
+        ret = BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, unblind, b, ctx);
+        BN_BLINDING_unlock(b);
+
+        return ret;
+    }
+}
+
+static int rsa_blinding_invert(BN_BLINDING *b, BIGNUM *f, BIGNUM *unblind,
+                               BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    /*
+     * For local blinding, unblind is set to NULL, and BN_BLINDING_invert_ex
+     * will use the unblinding factor stored in BN_BLINDING. If BN_BLINDING
+     * is shared between threads, unblind must be non-null:
+     * BN_BLINDING_invert_ex will then use the local unblinding factor, and
+     * will only read the modulus from BN_BLINDING. In both cases it's safe
+     * to access the blinding without a lock.
+     */
+    return BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f, unblind, b, ctx);
+}
+
+/* signing */
+static int rsa_ossl_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+                                   unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+{
+    BIGNUM *f, *ret, *res;
+    int i, j, k, num = 0, r = -1;
+    unsigned char *buf = NULL;
+    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+    int local_blinding = 0;
+    /*
+     * Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind
+     * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store
+     * the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure.
+     */
+    BIGNUM *unblind = NULL;
+    BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
+
+    if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+    buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
+    if (f == NULL || ret == NULL || buf == NULL) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    switch (padding) {
+    case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+        i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf, num, from, flen);
+        break;
+    case RSA_X931_PADDING:
+        i = RSA_padding_add_X931(buf, num, from, flen);
+        break;
+    case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+        i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen);
+        break;
+    case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
+    default:
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (i <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (BN_bin2bn(buf, num, f) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) {
+        /* usually the padding functions would catch this */
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,
+               RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) {
+        blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx);
+        if (blinding == NULL) {
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (blinding != NULL) {
+        if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)) {
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx))
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
+        ((rsa->p != NULL) &&
+         (rsa->q != NULL) &&
+         (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) && (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) && (rsa->iqmp != NULL))) {
+        if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa, ctx))
+            goto err;
+    } else {
+        BIGNUM *d = BN_new();
+        if (d == NULL) {
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+        if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
+            if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked
+                (&rsa->_method_mod_n, rsa->lock, rsa->n, ctx)) {
+                BN_free(d);
+                goto err;
+            }
+
+        if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, d, rsa->n, ctx,
+                                   rsa->_method_mod_n)) {
+            BN_free(d);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        /* We MUST free d before any further use of rsa->d */
+        BN_free(d);
+    }
+
+    if (blinding)
+        if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx))
+            goto err;
+
+    if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) {
+        BN_sub(f, rsa->n, ret);
+        if (BN_cmp(ret, f) > 0)
+            res = f;
+        else
+            res = ret;
+    } else
+        res = ret;
+
+    /*
+     * put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the length of the
+     * modulus
+     */
+    j = BN_num_bytes(res);
+    i = BN_bn2bin(res, &(to[num - j]));
+    for (k = 0; k < (num - i); k++)
+        to[k] = 0;
+
+    r = num;
+ err:
+    if (ctx != NULL)
+        BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(buf, num);
+    return (r);
+}
+
+static int rsa_ossl_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+                                   unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+{
+    BIGNUM *f, *ret;
+    int j, num = 0, r = -1;
+    unsigned char *p;
+    unsigned char *buf = NULL;
+    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+    int local_blinding = 0;
+    /*
+     * Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind
+     * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store
+     * the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure.
+     */
+    BIGNUM *unblind = NULL;
+    BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
+
+    if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+    buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
+    if (f == NULL || ret == NULL || buf == NULL) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things and chops off the
+     * top '0' bytes
+     */
+    if (flen > num) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,
+               RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* make data into a big number */
+    if (BN_bin2bn(from, (int)flen, f) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,
+               RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) {
+        blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx);
+        if (blinding == NULL) {
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (blinding != NULL) {
+        if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)) {
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx))
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* do the decrypt */
+    if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
+        ((rsa->p != NULL) &&
+         (rsa->q != NULL) &&
+         (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) && (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) && (rsa->iqmp != NULL))) {
+        if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa, ctx))
+            goto err;
+    } else {
+        BIGNUM *d = BN_new();
+        if (d == NULL) {
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+        if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
+            if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked
+                (&rsa->_method_mod_n, rsa->lock, rsa->n, ctx)) {
+                BN_free(d);
+                goto err;
+            }
+        if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, d, rsa->n, ctx,
+                                   rsa->_method_mod_n)) {
+            BN_free(d);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        /* We MUST free d before any further use of rsa->d */
+        BN_free(d);
+    }
+
+    if (blinding)
+        if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx))
+            goto err;
+
+    p = buf;
+    j = BN_bn2bin(ret, p);      /* j is only used with no-padding mode */
+
+    switch (padding) {
+    case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+        r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to, num, buf, j, num);
+        break;
+    case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
+        r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to, num, buf, j, num, NULL, 0);
+        break;
+    case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
+        r = RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to, num, buf, j, num);
+        break;
+    case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+        r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, buf, j, num);
+        break;
+    default:
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (r < 0)
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
+
+ err:
+    if (ctx != NULL)
+        BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(buf, num);
+    return (r);
+}
+
+/* signature verification */
+static int rsa_ossl_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+                                  unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+{
+    BIGNUM *f, *ret;
+    int i, num = 0, r = -1;
+    unsigned char *p;
+    unsigned char *buf = NULL;
+    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+
+    if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */
+    if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS) {
+        if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS) {
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
+            return -1;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+    buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
+    if (f == NULL || ret == NULL || buf == NULL) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things and chops off the
+     * top '0' bytes
+     */
+    if (flen > num) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (BN_bin2bn(from, flen, f) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,
+               RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
+        if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked
+            (&rsa->_method_mod_n, rsa->lock, rsa->n, ctx))
+            goto err;
+
+    if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx,
+                               rsa->_method_mod_n))
+        goto err;
+
+    if ((padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) && ((bn_get_words(ret)[0] & 0xf) != 12))
+        if (!BN_sub(ret, rsa->n, ret))
+            goto err;
+
+    p = buf;
+    i = BN_bn2bin(ret, p);
+
+    switch (padding) {
+    case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+        r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to, num, buf, i, num);
+        break;
+    case RSA_X931_PADDING:
+        r = RSA_padding_check_X931(to, num, buf, i, num);
+        break;
+    case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+        r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, buf, i, num);
+        break;
+    default:
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (r < 0)
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
+
+ err:
+    if (ctx != NULL)
+        BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(buf, num);
+    return (r);
+}
+
+static int rsa_ossl_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    BIGNUM *r1, *m1, *vrfy;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+
+    r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    m1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    vrfy = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (vrfy == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    {
+        BIGNUM *p = BN_new(), *q = BN_new();
+
+        /*
+         * Make sure BN_mod_inverse in Montgomery initialization uses the
+         * BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag
+         */
+        if (p == NULL || q == NULL) {
+            BN_free(p);
+            BN_free(q);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        BN_with_flags(p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+        BN_with_flags(q, rsa->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+        if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE) {
+            if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked
+                (&rsa->_method_mod_p, rsa->lock, p, ctx)
+                || !BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_q,
+                                           rsa->lock, q, ctx)) {
+                BN_free(p);
+                BN_free(q);
+                goto err;
+            }
+        }
+        /*
+         * We MUST free p and q before any further use of rsa->p and rsa->q
+         */
+        BN_free(p);
+        BN_free(q);
+    }
+
+    if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
+        if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked
+            (&rsa->_method_mod_n, rsa->lock, rsa->n, ctx))
+            goto err;
+
+    /* compute I mod q */
+    {
+        BIGNUM *c = BN_new();
+        if (c == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+        if (!BN_mod(r1, c, rsa->q, ctx)) {
+            BN_free(c);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        {
+            BIGNUM *dmq1 = BN_new();
+            if (dmq1 == NULL) {
+                BN_free(c);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            BN_with_flags(dmq1, rsa->dmq1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+            /* compute r1^dmq1 mod q */
+            if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(m1, r1, dmq1, rsa->q, ctx,
+                rsa->_method_mod_q)) {
+                BN_free(c);
+                BN_free(dmq1);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            /* We MUST free dmq1 before any further use of rsa->dmq1 */
+            BN_free(dmq1);
+        }
+
+        /* compute I mod p */
+        if (!BN_mod(r1, c, rsa->p, ctx)) {
+            BN_free(c);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        /* We MUST free c before any further use of I */
+        BN_free(c);
+    }
+
+    {
+        BIGNUM *dmp1 = BN_new();
+        if (dmp1 == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        BN_with_flags(dmp1, rsa->dmp1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+        /* compute r1^dmp1 mod p */
+        if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0, r1, dmp1, rsa->p, ctx,
+                                   rsa->_method_mod_p)) {
+            BN_free(dmp1);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        /* We MUST free dmp1 before any further use of rsa->dmp1 */
+        BN_free(dmp1);
+    }
+
+    if (!BN_sub(r0, r0, m1))
+        goto err;
+    /*
+     * This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does affect the
+     * multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size
+     */
+    if (BN_is_negative(r0))
+        if (!BN_add(r0, r0, rsa->p))
+            goto err;
+
+    if (!BN_mul(r1, r0, rsa->iqmp, ctx))
+        goto err;
+
+    {
+        BIGNUM *pr1 = BN_new();
+        if (pr1 == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        BN_with_flags(pr1, r1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+        if (!BN_mod(r0, pr1, rsa->p, ctx)) {
+            BN_free(pr1);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        /* We MUST free pr1 before any further use of r1 */
+        BN_free(pr1);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of adding 'p'
+     * if r0 is negative above to leave the result still negative. This can
+     * break the private key operations: the following second correction
+     * should *always* correct this rare occurrence. This will *never* happen
+     * with OpenSSL generated keys because they ensure p > q [steve]
+     */
+    if (BN_is_negative(r0))
+        if (!BN_add(r0, r0, rsa->p))
+            goto err;
+    if (!BN_mul(r1, r0, rsa->q, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    if (!BN_add(r0, r1, m1))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (rsa->e && rsa->n) {
+        if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(vrfy, r0, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx,
+                                   rsa->_method_mod_n))
+            goto err;
+        /*
+         * If 'I' was greater than (or equal to) rsa->n, the operation will
+         * be equivalent to using 'I mod n'. However, the result of the
+         * verify will *always* be less than 'n' so we don't check for
+         * absolute equality, just congruency.
+         */
+        if (!BN_sub(vrfy, vrfy, I))
+            goto err;
+        if (!BN_mod(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n, ctx))
+            goto err;
+        if (BN_is_negative(vrfy))
+            if (!BN_add(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n))
+                goto err;
+        if (!BN_is_zero(vrfy)) {
+            /*
+             * 'I' and 'vrfy' aren't congruent mod n. Don't leak
+             * miscalculated CRT output, just do a raw (slower) mod_exp and
+             * return that instead.
+             */
+
+            BIGNUM *d = BN_new();
+            if (d == NULL)
+                goto err;
+            BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+            if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0, I, d, rsa->n, ctx,
+                                       rsa->_method_mod_n)) {
+                BN_free(d);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            /* We MUST free d before any further use of rsa->d */
+            BN_free(d);
+        }
+    }
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static int rsa_ossl_init(RSA *rsa)
+{
+    rsa->flags |= RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC | RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE;
+    return (1);
+}
+
+static int rsa_ossl_finish(RSA *rsa)
+{
+    BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n);
+    BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p);
+    BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q);
+    return (1);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..aeeb32c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
@@ -0,0 +1,243 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+                                 const unsigned char *from, int flen)
+{
+    int j;
+    unsigned char *p;
+
+    if (flen > (tlen - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE)) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_TYPE_1,
+               RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
+        return (0);
+    }
+
+    p = (unsigned char *)to;
+
+    *(p++) = 0;
+    *(p++) = 1;                 /* Private Key BT (Block Type) */
+
+    /* pad out with 0xff data */
+    j = tlen - 3 - flen;
+    memset(p, 0xff, j);
+    p += j;
+    *(p++) = '\0';
+    memcpy(p, from, (unsigned int)flen);
+    return (1);
+}
+
+int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+                                   const unsigned char *from, int flen,
+                                   int num)
+{
+    int i, j;
+    const unsigned char *p;
+
+    p = from;
+
+    /*
+     * The format is
+     * 00 || 01 || PS || 00 || D
+     * PS - padding string, at least 8 bytes of FF
+     * D  - data.
+     */
+
+    if (num < 11)
+        return -1;
+
+    /* Accept inputs with and without the leading 0-byte. */
+    if (num == flen) {
+        if ((*p++) != 0x00) {
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1,
+                   RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING);
+            return -1;
+        }
+        flen--;
+    }
+
+    if ((num != (flen + 1)) || (*(p++) != 0x01)) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1,
+               RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_01);
+        return (-1);
+    }
+
+    /* scan over padding data */
+    j = flen - 1;               /* one for type. */
+    for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
+        if (*p != 0xff) {       /* should decrypt to 0xff */
+            if (*p == 0) {
+                p++;
+                break;
+            } else {
+                RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1,
+                       RSA_R_BAD_FIXED_HEADER_DECRYPT);
+                return (-1);
+            }
+        }
+        p++;
+    }
+
+    if (i == j) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1,
+               RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING);
+        return (-1);
+    }
+
+    if (i < 8) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1,
+               RSA_R_BAD_PAD_BYTE_COUNT);
+        return (-1);
+    }
+    i++;                        /* Skip over the '\0' */
+    j -= i;
+    if (j > tlen) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
+        return (-1);
+    }
+    memcpy(to, p, (unsigned int)j);
+
+    return (j);
+}
+
+int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+                                 const unsigned char *from, int flen)
+{
+    int i, j;
+    unsigned char *p;
+
+    if (flen > (tlen - 11)) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_TYPE_2,
+               RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
+        return (0);
+    }
+
+    p = (unsigned char *)to;
+
+    *(p++) = 0;
+    *(p++) = 2;                 /* Public Key BT (Block Type) */
+
+    /* pad out with non-zero random data */
+    j = tlen - 3 - flen;
+
+    if (RAND_bytes(p, j) <= 0)
+        return (0);
+    for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
+        if (*p == '\0')
+            do {
+                if (RAND_bytes(p, 1) <= 0)
+                    return (0);
+            } while (*p == '\0');
+        p++;
+    }
+
+    *(p++) = '\0';
+
+    memcpy(p, from, (unsigned int)flen);
+    return (1);
+}
+
+int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+                                   const unsigned char *from, int flen,
+                                   int num)
+{
+    int i;
+    /* |em| is the encoded message, zero-padded to exactly |num| bytes */
+    unsigned char *em = NULL;
+    unsigned int good, found_zero_byte;
+    int zero_index = 0, msg_index, mlen = -1;
+
+    if (tlen < 0 || flen < 0)
+        return -1;
+
+    /*
+     * PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption. See "PKCS #1 v2.2: RSA Cryptography Standard",
+     * section 7.2.2.
+     */
+
+    if (flen > num)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (num < 11)
+        goto err;
+
+    em = OPENSSL_zalloc(num);
+    if (em == NULL) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return -1;
+    }
+    /*
+     * Always do this zero-padding copy (even when num == flen) to avoid
+     * leaking that information. The copy still leaks some side-channel
+     * information, but it's impossible to have a fixed memory access
+     * pattern since we can't read out of the bounds of |from|.
+     *
+     * TODO(emilia): Consider porting BN_bn2bin_padded from BoringSSL.
+     */
+    memcpy(em + num - flen, from, flen);
+
+    good = constant_time_is_zero(em[0]);
+    good &= constant_time_eq(em[1], 2);
+
+    found_zero_byte = 0;
+    for (i = 2; i < num; i++) {
+        unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(em[i]);
+        zero_index =
+            constant_time_select_int(~found_zero_byte & equals0, i,
+                                     zero_index);
+        found_zero_byte |= equals0;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * PS must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two bytes into |em|.
+     * If we never found a 0-byte, then |zero_index| is 0 and the check
+     * also fails.
+     */
+    good &= constant_time_ge((unsigned int)(zero_index), 2 + 8);
+
+    /*
+     * Skip the zero byte. This is incorrect if we never found a zero-byte
+     * but in this case we also do not copy the message out.
+     */
+    msg_index = zero_index + 1;
+    mlen = num - msg_index;
+
+    /*
+     * For good measure, do this check in constant time as well; it could
+     * leak something if |tlen| was assuming valid padding.
+     */
+    good &= constant_time_ge((unsigned int)(tlen), (unsigned int)(mlen));
+
+    /*
+     * We can't continue in constant-time because we need to copy the result
+     * and we cannot fake its length. This unavoidably leaks timing
+     * information at the API boundary.
+     */
+    if (!good) {
+        mlen = -1;
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    memcpy(to, em + msg_index, mlen);
+
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(em, num);
+    if (mlen == -1)
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2,
+               RSA_R_PKCS_DECODING_ERROR);
+    return mlen;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2d1dffb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c
@@ -0,0 +1,668 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/cms.h>
+#include "internal/evp_int.h"
+#include "rsa_locl.h"
+
+/* RSA pkey context structure */
+
+typedef struct {
+    /* Key gen parameters */
+    int nbits;
+    BIGNUM *pub_exp;
+    /* Keygen callback info */
+    int gentmp[2];
+    /* RSA padding mode */
+    int pad_mode;
+    /* message digest */
+    const EVP_MD *md;
+    /* message digest for MGF1 */
+    const EVP_MD *mgf1md;
+    /* PSS salt length */
+    int saltlen;
+    /* Temp buffer */
+    unsigned char *tbuf;
+    /* OAEP label */
+    unsigned char *oaep_label;
+    size_t oaep_labellen;
+} RSA_PKEY_CTX;
+
+static int pkey_rsa_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx;
+    rctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*rctx));
+    if (rctx == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    rctx->nbits = 1024;
+    rctx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
+    rctx->saltlen = -2;
+    ctx->data = rctx;
+    ctx->keygen_info = rctx->gentmp;
+    ctx->keygen_info_count = 2;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int pkey_rsa_copy(EVP_PKEY_CTX *dst, EVP_PKEY_CTX *src)
+{
+    RSA_PKEY_CTX *dctx, *sctx;
+    if (!pkey_rsa_init(dst))
+        return 0;
+    sctx = src->data;
+    dctx = dst->data;
+    dctx->nbits = sctx->nbits;
+    if (sctx->pub_exp) {
+        dctx->pub_exp = BN_dup(sctx->pub_exp);
+        if (!dctx->pub_exp)
+            return 0;
+    }
+    dctx->pad_mode = sctx->pad_mode;
+    dctx->md = sctx->md;
+    dctx->mgf1md = sctx->mgf1md;
+    if (sctx->oaep_label) {
+        OPENSSL_free(dctx->oaep_label);
+        dctx->oaep_label = OPENSSL_memdup(sctx->oaep_label, sctx->oaep_labellen);
+        if (!dctx->oaep_label)
+            return 0;
+        dctx->oaep_labellen = sctx->oaep_labellen;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int setup_tbuf(RSA_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX *pk)
+{
+    if (ctx->tbuf)
+        return 1;
+    ctx->tbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(EVP_PKEY_size(pk->pkey));
+    if (ctx->tbuf == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static void pkey_rsa_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
+    if (rctx) {
+        BN_free(rctx->pub_exp);
+        OPENSSL_free(rctx->tbuf);
+        OPENSSL_free(rctx->oaep_label);
+        OPENSSL_free(rctx);
+    }
+}
+
+static int pkey_rsa_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig,
+                         size_t *siglen, const unsigned char *tbs,
+                         size_t tbslen)
+{
+    int ret;
+    RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
+    RSA *rsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa;
+
+    if (rctx->md) {
+        if (tbslen != (size_t)EVP_MD_size(rctx->md)) {
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_SIGN, RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+            return -1;
+        }
+
+        if (EVP_MD_type(rctx->md) == NID_mdc2) {
+            unsigned int sltmp;
+            if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)
+                return -1;
+            ret = RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(0,
+                                             tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp, rsa);
+
+            if (ret <= 0)
+                return ret;
+            ret = sltmp;
+        } else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_X931_PADDING) {
+            if ((size_t)EVP_PKEY_size(ctx->pkey) < tbslen + 1) {
+                RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_SIGN, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
+                return -1;
+            }
+            if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx)) {
+                RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                return -1;
+            }
+            memcpy(rctx->tbuf, tbs, tbslen);
+            rctx->tbuf[tbslen] = RSA_X931_hash_id(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md));
+            ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen + 1, rctx->tbuf,
+                                      sig, rsa, RSA_X931_PADDING);
+        } else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) {
+            unsigned int sltmp;
+            ret = RSA_sign(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md),
+                           tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp, rsa);
+            if (ret <= 0)
+                return ret;
+            ret = sltmp;
+        } else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
+            if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
+                return -1;
+            if (!RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa,
+                                                rctx->tbuf, tbs,
+                                                rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md,
+                                                rctx->saltlen))
+                return -1;
+            ret = RSA_private_encrypt(RSA_size(rsa), rctx->tbuf,
+                                      sig, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
+        } else
+            return -1;
+    } else
+        ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen, tbs, sig, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa,
+                                  rctx->pad_mode);
+    if (ret < 0)
+        return ret;
+    *siglen = ret;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int pkey_rsa_verifyrecover(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                  unsigned char *rout, size_t *routlen,
+                                  const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen)
+{
+    int ret;
+    RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
+
+    if (rctx->md) {
+        if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_X931_PADDING) {
+            if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
+                return -1;
+            ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig,
+                                     rctx->tbuf, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa,
+                                     RSA_X931_PADDING);
+            if (ret < 1)
+                return 0;
+            ret--;
+            if (rctx->tbuf[ret] != RSA_X931_hash_id(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md))) {
+                RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_VERIFYRECOVER,
+                       RSA_R_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH);
+                return 0;
+            }
+            if (ret != EVP_MD_size(rctx->md)) {
+                RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_VERIFYRECOVER,
+                       RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+                return 0;
+            }
+            if (rout)
+                memcpy(rout, rctx->tbuf, ret);
+        } else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) {
+            size_t sltmp;
+            ret = int_rsa_verify(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md),
+                                 NULL, 0, rout, &sltmp,
+                                 sig, siglen, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa);
+            if (ret <= 0)
+                return 0;
+            ret = sltmp;
+        } else
+            return -1;
+    } else
+        ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rout, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa,
+                                 rctx->pad_mode);
+    if (ret < 0)
+        return ret;
+    *routlen = ret;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int pkey_rsa_verify(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                           const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen,
+                           const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)
+{
+    RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
+    RSA *rsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa;
+    size_t rslen;
+    if (rctx->md) {
+        if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)
+            return RSA_verify(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md), tbs, tbslen,
+                              sig, siglen, rsa);
+        if (tbslen != (size_t)EVP_MD_size(rctx->md)) {
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+            return -1;
+        }
+        if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_X931_PADDING) {
+            if (pkey_rsa_verifyrecover(ctx, NULL, &rslen, sig, siglen) <= 0)
+                return 0;
+        } else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
+            int ret;
+            if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
+                return -1;
+            ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rctx->tbuf,
+                                     rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
+            if (ret <= 0)
+                return 0;
+            ret = RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa, tbs,
+                                            rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md,
+                                            rctx->tbuf, rctx->saltlen);
+            if (ret <= 0)
+                return 0;
+            return 1;
+        } else
+            return -1;
+    } else {
+        if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
+            return -1;
+        rslen = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rctx->tbuf,
+                                   rsa, rctx->pad_mode);
+        if (rslen == 0)
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    if ((rslen != tbslen) || memcmp(tbs, rctx->tbuf, rslen))
+        return 0;
+
+    return 1;
+
+}
+
+static int pkey_rsa_encrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                            unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
+                            const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen)
+{
+    int ret;
+    RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
+    if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
+        int klen = RSA_size(ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa);
+        if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
+            return -1;
+        if (!RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(rctx->tbuf, klen,
+                                             in, inlen,
+                                             rctx->oaep_label,
+                                             rctx->oaep_labellen,
+                                             rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md))
+            return -1;
+        ret = RSA_public_encrypt(klen, rctx->tbuf, out,
+                                 ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
+    } else
+        ret = RSA_public_encrypt(inlen, in, out, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa,
+                                 rctx->pad_mode);
+    if (ret < 0)
+        return ret;
+    *outlen = ret;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int pkey_rsa_decrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                            unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
+                            const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen)
+{
+    int ret;
+    RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
+    if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
+        if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
+            return -1;
+        ret = RSA_private_decrypt(inlen, in, rctx->tbuf,
+                                  ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
+        if (ret <= 0)
+            return ret;
+        ret = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(out, ret, rctx->tbuf,
+                                                ret, ret,
+                                                rctx->oaep_label,
+                                                rctx->oaep_labellen,
+                                                rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md);
+    } else
+        ret = RSA_private_decrypt(inlen, in, out, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa,
+                                  rctx->pad_mode);
+    if (ret < 0)
+        return ret;
+    *outlen = ret;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int check_padding_md(const EVP_MD *md, int padding)
+{
+    int mdnid;
+    if (!md)
+        return 1;
+
+    mdnid = EVP_MD_type(md);
+
+    if (padding == RSA_NO_PADDING) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_CHECK_PADDING_MD, RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) {
+        if (RSA_X931_hash_id(mdnid) == -1) {
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_CHECK_PADDING_MD, RSA_R_INVALID_X931_DIGEST);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    } else {
+        switch(mdnid) {
+        /* List of all supported RSA digests */
+        case NID_sha1:
+        case NID_sha224:
+        case NID_sha256:
+        case NID_sha384:
+        case NID_sha512:
+        case NID_md5:
+        case NID_md5_sha1:
+        case NID_md2:
+        case NID_md4:
+        case NID_mdc2:
+        case NID_ripemd160:
+            return 1;
+
+        default:
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_CHECK_PADDING_MD, RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST);
+            return 0;
+
+        }
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int pkey_rsa_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2)
+{
+    RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
+    switch (type) {
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PADDING:
+        if ((p1 >= RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) && (p1 <= RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING)) {
+            if (!check_padding_md(rctx->md, p1))
+                return 0;
+            if (p1 == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
+                if (!(ctx->operation &
+                      (EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN | EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY)))
+                    goto bad_pad;
+                if (!rctx->md)
+                    rctx->md = EVP_sha1();
+            }
+            if (p1 == RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
+                if (!(ctx->operation & EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT))
+                    goto bad_pad;
+                if (!rctx->md)
+                    rctx->md = EVP_sha1();
+            }
+            rctx->pad_mode = p1;
+            return 1;
+        }
+ bad_pad:
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL,
+               RSA_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE);
+        return -2;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PADDING:
+        *(int *)p2 = rctx->pad_mode;
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN:
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN:
+        if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL, RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN);
+            return -2;
+        }
+        if (type == EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN)
+            *(int *)p2 = rctx->saltlen;
+        else {
+            if (p1 < -2)
+                return -2;
+            rctx->saltlen = p1;
+        }
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_BITS:
+        if (p1 < 512) {
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
+            return -2;
+        }
+        rctx->nbits = p1;
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_PUBEXP:
+        if (p2 == NULL || !BN_is_odd((BIGNUM *)p2) || BN_is_one((BIGNUM *)p2)) {
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
+            return -2;
+        }
+        BN_free(rctx->pub_exp);
+        rctx->pub_exp = p2;
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_MD:
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_MD:
+        if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL, RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
+            return -2;
+        }
+        if (type == EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_MD)
+            *(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->md;
+        else
+            rctx->md = p2;
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_MD:
+        if (!check_padding_md(p2, rctx->pad_mode))
+            return 0;
+        rctx->md = p2;
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_MD:
+        *(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->md;
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD:
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_MGF1_MD:
+        if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING
+            && rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL, RSA_R_INVALID_MGF1_MD);
+            return -2;
+        }
+        if (type == EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_MGF1_MD) {
+            if (rctx->mgf1md)
+                *(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->mgf1md;
+            else
+                *(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->md;
+        } else
+            rctx->mgf1md = p2;
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_LABEL:
+        if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL, RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
+            return -2;
+        }
+        OPENSSL_free(rctx->oaep_label);
+        if (p2 && p1 > 0) {
+            rctx->oaep_label = p2;
+            rctx->oaep_labellen = p1;
+        } else {
+            rctx->oaep_label = NULL;
+            rctx->oaep_labellen = 0;
+        }
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_LABEL:
+        if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL, RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
+            return -2;
+        }
+        *(unsigned char **)p2 = rctx->oaep_label;
+        return rctx->oaep_labellen;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DIGESTINIT:
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_ENCRYPT:
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_DECRYPT:
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN:
+        return 1;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_DECRYPT:
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_ENCRYPT:
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_SIGN:
+        return 1;
+#endif
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY:
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL,
+               RSA_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
+        return -2;
+
+    default:
+        return -2;
+
+    }
+}
+
+static int pkey_rsa_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                             const char *type, const char *value)
+{
+    if (!value) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL_STR, RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (strcmp(type, "rsa_padding_mode") == 0) {
+        int pm;
+        if (strcmp(value, "pkcs1") == 0)
+            pm = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
+        else if (strcmp(value, "sslv23") == 0)
+            pm = RSA_SSLV23_PADDING;
+        else if (strcmp(value, "none") == 0)
+            pm = RSA_NO_PADDING;
+        else if (strcmp(value, "oeap") == 0)
+            pm = RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING;
+        else if (strcmp(value, "oaep") == 0)
+            pm = RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING;
+        else if (strcmp(value, "x931") == 0)
+            pm = RSA_X931_PADDING;
+        else if (strcmp(value, "pss") == 0)
+            pm = RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING;
+        else {
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL_STR, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
+            return -2;
+        }
+        return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, pm);
+    }
+
+    if (strcmp(type, "rsa_pss_saltlen") == 0) {
+        int saltlen;
+        saltlen = atoi(value);
+        return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(ctx, saltlen);
+    }
+
+    if (strcmp(type, "rsa_keygen_bits") == 0) {
+        int nbits;
+        nbits = atoi(value);
+        return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_bits(ctx, nbits);
+    }
+
+    if (strcmp(type, "rsa_keygen_pubexp") == 0) {
+        int ret;
+        BIGNUM *pubexp = NULL;
+        if (!BN_asc2bn(&pubexp, value))
+            return 0;
+        ret = EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_pubexp(ctx, pubexp);
+        if (ret <= 0)
+            BN_free(pubexp);
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    if (strcmp(type, "rsa_mgf1_md") == 0) {
+        const EVP_MD *md;
+        if ((md = EVP_get_digestbyname(value)) == NULL) {
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL_STR, RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md(ctx, md);
+    }
+
+    if (strcmp(type, "rsa_oaep_md") == 0) {
+        const EVP_MD *md;
+        if ((md = EVP_get_digestbyname(value)) == NULL) {
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL_STR, RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_oaep_md(ctx, md);
+    }
+    if (strcmp(type, "rsa_oaep_label") == 0) {
+        unsigned char *lab;
+        long lablen;
+        int ret;
+        lab = OPENSSL_hexstr2buf(value, &lablen);
+        if (!lab)
+            return 0;
+        ret = EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_rsa_oaep_label(ctx, lab, lablen);
+        if (ret <= 0)
+            OPENSSL_free(lab);
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    return -2;
+}
+
+static int pkey_rsa_keygen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    RSA *rsa = NULL;
+    RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
+    BN_GENCB *pcb;
+    int ret;
+    if (rctx->pub_exp == NULL) {
+        rctx->pub_exp = BN_new();
+        if (rctx->pub_exp == NULL || !BN_set_word(rctx->pub_exp, RSA_F4))
+            return 0;
+    }
+    rsa = RSA_new();
+    if (rsa == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    if (ctx->pkey_gencb) {
+        pcb = BN_GENCB_new();
+        if (pcb == NULL) {
+            RSA_free(rsa);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        evp_pkey_set_cb_translate(pcb, ctx);
+    } else
+        pcb = NULL;
+    ret = RSA_generate_key_ex(rsa, rctx->nbits, rctx->pub_exp, pcb);
+    BN_GENCB_free(pcb);
+    if (ret > 0)
+        EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa);
+    else
+        RSA_free(rsa);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+const EVP_PKEY_METHOD rsa_pkey_meth = {
+    EVP_PKEY_RSA,
+    EVP_PKEY_FLAG_AUTOARGLEN,
+    pkey_rsa_init,
+    pkey_rsa_copy,
+    pkey_rsa_cleanup,
+
+    0, 0,
+
+    0,
+    pkey_rsa_keygen,
+
+    0,
+    pkey_rsa_sign,
+
+    0,
+    pkey_rsa_verify,
+
+    0,
+    pkey_rsa_verifyrecover,
+
+    0, 0, 0, 0,
+
+    0,
+    pkey_rsa_encrypt,
+
+    0,
+    pkey_rsa_decrypt,
+
+    0, 0,
+
+    pkey_rsa_ctrl,
+    pkey_rsa_ctrl_str
+};
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_prn.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_prn.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5e6c599
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_prn.c
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+int RSA_print_fp(FILE *fp, const RSA *x, int off)
+{
+    BIO *b;
+    int ret;
+
+    if ((b = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PRINT_FP, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+        return (0);
+    }
+    BIO_set_fp(b, fp, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+    ret = RSA_print(b, x, off);
+    BIO_free(b);
+    return (ret);
+}
+#endif
+
+int RSA_print(BIO *bp, const RSA *x, int off)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY *pk;
+    int ret;
+    pk = EVP_PKEY_new();
+    if (pk == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pk, (RSA *)x))
+        return 0;
+    ret = EVP_PKEY_print_private(bp, pk, off, NULL);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
+    return ret;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_pss.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_pss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f814338
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_pss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,253 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
+#include "rsa_locl.h"
+
+static const unsigned char zeroes[] = { 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 };
+
+#if defined(_MSC_VER) && defined(_ARM_)
+# pragma optimize("g", off)
+#endif
+
+int RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS(RSA *rsa, const unsigned char *mHash,
+                         const EVP_MD *Hash, const unsigned char *EM,
+                         int sLen)
+{
+    return RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa, mHash, Hash, NULL, EM, sLen);
+}
+
+int RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(RSA *rsa, const unsigned char *mHash,
+                              const EVP_MD *Hash, const EVP_MD *mgf1Hash,
+                              const unsigned char *EM, int sLen)
+{
+    int i;
+    int ret = 0;
+    int hLen, maskedDBLen, MSBits, emLen;
+    const unsigned char *H;
+    unsigned char *DB = NULL;
+    EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+    unsigned char H_[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+
+
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (mgf1Hash == NULL)
+        mgf1Hash = Hash;
+
+    hLen = EVP_MD_size(Hash);
+    if (hLen < 0)
+        goto err;
+    /*-
+     * Negative sLen has special meanings:
+     *      -1      sLen == hLen
+     *      -2      salt length is autorecovered from signature
+     *      -N      reserved
+     */
+    if (sLen == -1)
+        sLen = hLen;
+    else if (sLen == -2)
+        sLen = -2;
+    else if (sLen < -2) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, RSA_R_SLEN_CHECK_FAILED);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    MSBits = (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) - 1) & 0x7;
+    emLen = RSA_size(rsa);
+    if (EM[0] & (0xFF << MSBits)) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, RSA_R_FIRST_OCTET_INVALID);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (MSBits == 0) {
+        EM++;
+        emLen--;
+    }
+    if (emLen < hLen + 2) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (sLen > emLen - hLen - 2) { /* sLen can be small negative */
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (EM[emLen - 1] != 0xbc) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, RSA_R_LAST_OCTET_INVALID);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    maskedDBLen = emLen - hLen - 1;
+    H = EM + maskedDBLen;
+    DB = OPENSSL_malloc(maskedDBLen);
+    if (DB == NULL) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (PKCS1_MGF1(DB, maskedDBLen, H, hLen, mgf1Hash) < 0)
+        goto err;
+    for (i = 0; i < maskedDBLen; i++)
+        DB[i] ^= EM[i];
+    if (MSBits)
+        DB[0] &= 0xFF >> (8 - MSBits);
+    for (i = 0; DB[i] == 0 && i < (maskedDBLen - 1); i++) ;
+    if (DB[i++] != 0x1) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, RSA_R_SLEN_RECOVERY_FAILED);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (sLen >= 0 && (maskedDBLen - i) != sLen) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, RSA_R_SLEN_CHECK_FAILED);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, Hash, NULL)
+        || !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, zeroes, sizeof(zeroes))
+        || !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, mHash, hLen))
+        goto err;
+    if (maskedDBLen - i) {
+        if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, DB + i, maskedDBLen - i))
+            goto err;
+    }
+    if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, H_, NULL))
+        goto err;
+    if (memcmp(H_, H, hLen)) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+        ret = 0;
+    } else
+        ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_free(DB);
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
+
+    return ret;
+
+}
+
+int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS(RSA *rsa, unsigned char *EM,
+                              const unsigned char *mHash,
+                              const EVP_MD *Hash, int sLen)
+{
+    return RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa, EM, mHash, Hash, NULL, sLen);
+}
+
+int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(RSA *rsa, unsigned char *EM,
+                                   const unsigned char *mHash,
+                                   const EVP_MD *Hash, const EVP_MD *mgf1Hash,
+                                   int sLen)
+{
+    int i;
+    int ret = 0;
+    int hLen, maskedDBLen, MSBits, emLen;
+    unsigned char *H, *salt = NULL, *p;
+    EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+
+    if (mgf1Hash == NULL)
+        mgf1Hash = Hash;
+
+    hLen = EVP_MD_size(Hash);
+    if (hLen < 0)
+        goto err;
+    /*-
+     * Negative sLen has special meanings:
+     *      -1      sLen == hLen
+     *      -2      salt length is maximized
+     *      -N      reserved
+     */
+    if (sLen == -1)
+        sLen = hLen;
+    else if (sLen == -2)
+        sLen = -2;
+    else if (sLen < -2) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, RSA_R_SLEN_CHECK_FAILED);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    MSBits = (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) - 1) & 0x7;
+    emLen = RSA_size(rsa);
+    if (MSBits == 0) {
+        *EM++ = 0;
+        emLen--;
+    }
+    if (emLen < hLen + 2) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1,
+               RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (sLen == -2) {
+        sLen = emLen - hLen - 2;
+    } else if (sLen > emLen - hLen - 2) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1,
+               RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (sLen > 0) {
+        salt = OPENSSL_malloc(sLen);
+        if (salt == NULL) {
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1,
+                   ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (RAND_bytes(salt, sLen) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+    }
+    maskedDBLen = emLen - hLen - 1;
+    H = EM + maskedDBLen;
+    ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, Hash, NULL)
+        || !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, zeroes, sizeof(zeroes))
+        || !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, mHash, hLen))
+        goto err;
+    if (sLen && !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, salt, sLen))
+        goto err;
+    if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, H, NULL))
+        goto err;
+
+    /* Generate dbMask in place then perform XOR on it */
+    if (PKCS1_MGF1(EM, maskedDBLen, H, hLen, mgf1Hash))
+        goto err;
+
+    p = EM;
+
+    /*
+     * Initial PS XORs with all zeroes which is a NOP so just update pointer.
+     * Note from a test above this value is guaranteed to be non-negative.
+     */
+    p += emLen - sLen - hLen - 2;
+    *p++ ^= 0x1;
+    if (sLen > 0) {
+        for (i = 0; i < sLen; i++)
+            *p++ ^= salt[i];
+    }
+    if (MSBits)
+        EM[0] &= 0xFF >> (8 - MSBits);
+
+    /* H is already in place so just set final 0xbc */
+
+    EM[emLen - 1] = 0xbc;
+
+    ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
+    OPENSSL_free(salt);
+
+    return ret;
+
+}
+
+#if defined(_MSC_VER)
+# pragma optimize("",on)
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_saos.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_saos.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9e5fff4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_saos.c
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+int RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(int type,
+                               const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
+                               unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen,
+                               RSA *rsa)
+{
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING sig;
+    int i, j, ret = 1;
+    unsigned char *p, *s;
+
+    sig.type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
+    sig.length = m_len;
+    sig.data = (unsigned char *)m;
+
+    i = i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(&sig, NULL);
+    j = RSA_size(rsa);
+    if (i > (j - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE)) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+               RSA_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG_FOR_RSA_KEY);
+        return (0);
+    }
+    s = OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)j + 1);
+    if (s == NULL) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return (0);
+    }
+    p = s;
+    i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(&sig, &p);
+    i = RSA_private_encrypt(i, s, sigret, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+    if (i <= 0)
+        ret = 0;
+    else
+        *siglen = i;
+
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(s, (unsigned int)j + 1);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+int RSA_verify_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(int dtype,
+                                 const unsigned char *m,
+                                 unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *sigbuf,
+                                 unsigned int siglen, RSA *rsa)
+{
+    int i, ret = 0;
+    unsigned char *s;
+    const unsigned char *p;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *sig = NULL;
+
+    if (siglen != (unsigned int)RSA_size(rsa)) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+               RSA_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
+        return (0);
+    }
+
+    s = OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)siglen);
+    if (s == NULL) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    i = RSA_public_decrypt((int)siglen, sigbuf, s, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+
+    if (i <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    p = s;
+    sig = d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(NULL, &p, (long)i);
+    if (sig == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (((unsigned int)sig->length != m_len) ||
+        (memcmp(m, sig->data, m_len) != 0)) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+    } else
+        ret = 1;
+ err:
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(sig);
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(s, (unsigned int)siglen);
+    return (ret);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..952d24f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c
@@ -0,0 +1,248 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include "internal/x509_int.h"
+#include "rsa_locl.h"
+
+/* Size of an SSL signature: MD5+SHA1 */
+#define SSL_SIG_LENGTH  36
+
+/*
+ * encode_pkcs1 encodes a DigestInfo prefix of hash |type| and digest |m|, as
+ * described in EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5-ENCODE, RFC 3447 section 9.2 step 2. This
+ * encodes the DigestInfo (T and tLen) but does not add the padding.
+ *
+ * On success, it returns one and sets |*out| to a newly allocated buffer
+ * containing the result and |*out_len| to its length. The caller must free
+ * |*out| with |OPENSSL_free|. Otherwise, it returns zero.
+ */
+static int encode_pkcs1(unsigned char **out, int *out_len, int type,
+                        const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len)
+{
+    X509_SIG sig;
+    X509_ALGOR algor;
+    ASN1_TYPE parameter;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest;
+    uint8_t *der = NULL;
+    int len;
+
+    sig.algor = &algor;
+    sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type);
+    if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_ENCODE_PKCS1, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (OBJ_length(sig.algor->algorithm) == 0) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_ENCODE_PKCS1,
+               RSA_R_THE_ASN1_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER_IS_NOT_KNOWN_FOR_THIS_MD);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL;
+    parameter.value.ptr = NULL;
+    sig.algor->parameter = &parameter;
+
+    sig.digest = &digest;
+    sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m;
+    sig.digest->length = m_len;
+
+    len = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &der);
+    if (len < 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    *out = der;
+    *out_len = len;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
+             unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, RSA *rsa)
+{
+    int encrypt_len, encoded_len = 0, ret = 0;
+    unsigned char *tmps = NULL;
+    const unsigned char *encoded = NULL;
+
+    if (rsa->meth->rsa_sign) {
+        return rsa->meth->rsa_sign(type, m, m_len, sigret, siglen, rsa);
+    }
+
+    /* Compute the encoded digest. */
+    if (type == NID_md5_sha1) {
+        /*
+         * NID_md5_sha1 corresponds to the MD5/SHA1 combination in TLS 1.1 and
+         * earlier. It has no DigestInfo wrapper but otherwise is
+         * RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5.
+         */
+        if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) {
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN, RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        encoded_len = SSL_SIG_LENGTH;
+        encoded = m;
+    } else {
+        if (!encode_pkcs1(&tmps, &encoded_len, type, m, m_len))
+            goto err;
+        encoded = tmps;
+    }
+
+    if (encoded_len > RSA_size(rsa) - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN, RSA_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG_FOR_RSA_KEY);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    encrypt_len = RSA_private_encrypt(encoded_len, encoded, sigret, rsa,
+                                      RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+    if (encrypt_len <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    *siglen = encrypt_len;
+    ret = 1;
+
+err:
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(tmps, (size_t)encoded_len);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * int_rsa_verify verifies an RSA signature in |sigbuf| using |rsa|. It may be
+ * called in two modes. If |rm| is NULL, it verifies the signature for digest
+ * |m|. Otherwise, it recovers the digest from the signature, writing the digest
+ * to |rm| and the length to |*prm_len|. |type| is the NID of the digest
+ * algorithm to use. It returns one on successful verification and zero
+ * otherwise.
+ */
+int int_rsa_verify(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
+                   unsigned char *rm, size_t *prm_len,
+                   const unsigned char *sigbuf, size_t siglen, RSA *rsa)
+{
+    int decrypt_len, ret = 0, encoded_len = 0;
+    unsigned char *decrypt_buf = NULL, *encoded = NULL;
+
+    if (siglen != (size_t)RSA_size(rsa)) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* Recover the encoded digest. */
+    decrypt_buf = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen);
+    if (decrypt_buf == NULL) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    decrypt_len = RSA_public_decrypt((int)siglen, sigbuf, decrypt_buf, rsa,
+                                     RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+    if (decrypt_len <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (type == NID_md5_sha1) {
+        /*
+         * NID_md5_sha1 corresponds to the MD5/SHA1 combination in TLS 1.1 and
+         * earlier. It has no DigestInfo wrapper but otherwise is
+         * RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5.
+         */
+        if (decrypt_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) {
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        if (rm != NULL) {
+            memcpy(rm, decrypt_buf, SSL_SIG_LENGTH);
+            *prm_len = SSL_SIG_LENGTH;
+        } else {
+            if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) {
+                RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
+                goto err;
+            }
+
+            if (memcmp(decrypt_buf, m, SSL_SIG_LENGTH) != 0) {
+                RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+                goto err;
+            }
+        }
+    } else if (type == NID_mdc2 && decrypt_len == 2 + 16
+               && decrypt_buf[0] == 0x04 && decrypt_buf[1] == 0x10) {
+        /*
+         * Oddball MDC2 case: signature can be OCTET STRING. check for correct
+         * tag and length octets.
+         */
+        if (rm != NULL) {
+            memcpy(rm, decrypt_buf + 2, 16);
+            *prm_len = 16;
+        } else {
+            if (m_len != 16) {
+                RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
+                goto err;
+            }
+
+            if (memcmp(m, decrypt_buf + 2, 16) != 0) {
+                RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+                goto err;
+            }
+        }
+    } else {
+        /*
+         * If recovering the digest, extract a digest-sized output from the end
+         * of |decrypt_buf| for |encode_pkcs1|, then compare the decryption
+         * output as in a standard verification.
+         */
+        if (rm != NULL) {
+            const EVP_MD *md = EVP_get_digestbynid(type);
+            if (md == NULL) {
+                RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE);
+                goto err;
+            }
+
+            m_len = EVP_MD_size(md);
+            if (m_len > (size_t)decrypt_len) {
+                RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            m = decrypt_buf + decrypt_len - m_len;
+        }
+
+        /* Construct the encoded digest and ensure it matches. */
+        if (!encode_pkcs1(&encoded, &encoded_len, type, m, m_len))
+            goto err;
+
+        if (encoded_len != decrypt_len
+            || memcmp(encoded, decrypt_buf, encoded_len) != 0) {
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        /* Output the recovered digest. */
+        if (rm != NULL) {
+            memcpy(rm, m, m_len);
+            *prm_len = m_len;
+        }
+    }
+
+    ret = 1;
+
+err:
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(encoded, (size_t)encoded_len);
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(decrypt_buf, siglen);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int RSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
+               const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, RSA *rsa)
+{
+
+    if (rsa->meth->rsa_verify) {
+        return rsa->meth->rsa_verify(type, m, m_len, sigbuf, siglen, rsa);
+    }
+
+    return int_rsa_verify(type, m, m_len, NULL, NULL, sigbuf, siglen, rsa);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9ef6b80
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+int RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+                           const unsigned char *from, int flen)
+{
+    int i, j;
+    unsigned char *p;
+
+    if (flen > (tlen - 11)) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_SSLV23,
+               RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
+        return (0);
+    }
+
+    p = (unsigned char *)to;
+
+    *(p++) = 0;
+    *(p++) = 2;                 /* Public Key BT (Block Type) */
+
+    /* pad out with non-zero random data */
+    j = tlen - 3 - 8 - flen;
+
+    if (RAND_bytes(p, j) <= 0)
+        return (0);
+    for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
+        if (*p == '\0')
+            do {
+                if (RAND_bytes(p, 1) <= 0)
+                    return (0);
+            } while (*p == '\0');
+        p++;
+    }
+
+    memset(p, 3, 8);
+    p += 8;
+    *(p++) = '\0';
+
+    memcpy(p, from, (unsigned int)flen);
+    return (1);
+}
+
+int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+                             const unsigned char *from, int flen, int num)
+{
+    int i, j, k;
+    const unsigned char *p;
+
+    p = from;
+    if (flen < 10) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_SMALL);
+        return (-1);
+    }
+    if ((num != (flen + 1)) || (*(p++) != 02)) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_02);
+        return (-1);
+    }
+
+    /* scan over padding data */
+    j = flen - 1;               /* one for type */
+    for (i = 0; i < j; i++)
+        if (*(p++) == 0)
+            break;
+
+    if ((i == j) || (i < 8)) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23,
+               RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING);
+        return (-1);
+    }
+    for (k = -9; k < -1; k++) {
+        if (p[k] != 0x03)
+            break;
+    }
+    if (k == -1) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, RSA_R_SSLV3_ROLLBACK_ATTACK);
+        return (-1);
+    }
+
+    i++;                        /* Skip over the '\0' */
+    j -= i;
+    if (j > tlen) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
+        return (-1);
+    }
+    memcpy(to, p, (unsigned int)j);
+
+    return (j);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_x931.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_x931.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b9301f3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_x931.c
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+
+int RSA_padding_add_X931(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+                         const unsigned char *from, int flen)
+{
+    int j;
+    unsigned char *p;
+
+    /*
+     * Absolute minimum amount of padding is 1 header nibble, 1 padding
+     * nibble and 2 trailer bytes: but 1 hash if is already in 'from'.
+     */
+
+    j = tlen - flen - 2;
+
+    if (j < 0) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_X931, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    p = (unsigned char *)to;
+
+    /* If no padding start and end nibbles are in one byte */
+    if (j == 0)
+        *p++ = 0x6A;
+    else {
+        *p++ = 0x6B;
+        if (j > 1) {
+            memset(p, 0xBB, j - 1);
+            p += j - 1;
+        }
+        *p++ = 0xBA;
+    }
+    memcpy(p, from, (unsigned int)flen);
+    p += flen;
+    *p = 0xCC;
+    return (1);
+}
+
+int RSA_padding_check_X931(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+                           const unsigned char *from, int flen, int num)
+{
+    int i = 0, j;
+    const unsigned char *p;
+
+    p = from;
+    if ((num != flen) || ((*p != 0x6A) && (*p != 0x6B))) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_X931, RSA_R_INVALID_HEADER);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (*p++ == 0x6B) {
+        j = flen - 3;
+        for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
+            unsigned char c = *p++;
+            if (c == 0xBA)
+                break;
+            if (c != 0xBB) {
+                RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_X931, RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING);
+                return -1;
+            }
+        }
+
+        j -= i;
+
+        if (i == 0) {
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_X931, RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING);
+            return -1;
+        }
+
+    } else
+        j = flen - 2;
+
+    if (p[j] != 0xCC) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_X931, RSA_R_INVALID_TRAILER);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    memcpy(to, p, (unsigned int)j);
+
+    return (j);
+}
+
+/* Translate between X931 hash ids and NIDs */
+
+int RSA_X931_hash_id(int nid)
+{
+    switch (nid) {
+    case NID_sha1:
+        return 0x33;
+
+    case NID_sha256:
+        return 0x34;
+
+    case NID_sha384:
+        return 0x36;
+
+    case NID_sha512:
+        return 0x35;
+
+    }
+    return -1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_x931g.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_x931g.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..877ee22
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_x931g.c
@@ -0,0 +1,197 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include "rsa_locl.h"
+
+/* X9.31 RSA key derivation and generation */
+
+int RSA_X931_derive_ex(RSA *rsa, BIGNUM *p1, BIGNUM *p2, BIGNUM *q1,
+                       BIGNUM *q2, const BIGNUM *Xp1, const BIGNUM *Xp2,
+                       const BIGNUM *Xp, const BIGNUM *Xq1, const BIGNUM *Xq2,
+                       const BIGNUM *Xq, const BIGNUM *e, BN_GENCB *cb)
+{
+    BIGNUM *r0 = NULL, *r1 = NULL, *r2 = NULL, *r3 = NULL;
+    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL, *ctx2 = NULL;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    if (!rsa)
+        goto err;
+
+    ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+
+    r0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    r2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    r3 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+
+    if (r3 == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (!rsa->e) {
+        rsa->e = BN_dup(e);
+        if (!rsa->e)
+            goto err;
+    } else
+        e = rsa->e;
+
+    /*
+     * If not all parameters present only calculate what we can. This allows
+     * test programs to output selective parameters.
+     */
+
+    if (Xp && rsa->p == NULL) {
+        rsa->p = BN_new();
+        if (rsa->p == NULL)
+            goto err;
+
+        if (!BN_X931_derive_prime_ex(rsa->p, p1, p2,
+                                     Xp, Xp1, Xp2, e, ctx, cb))
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (Xq && rsa->q == NULL) {
+        rsa->q = BN_new();
+        if (rsa->q == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        if (!BN_X931_derive_prime_ex(rsa->q, q1, q2,
+                                     Xq, Xq1, Xq2, e, ctx, cb))
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (rsa->p == NULL || rsa->q == NULL) {
+        BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+        BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+        return 2;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Since both primes are set we can now calculate all remaining
+     * components.
+     */
+
+    /* calculate n */
+    rsa->n = BN_new();
+    if (rsa->n == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (!BN_mul(rsa->n, rsa->p, rsa->q, ctx))
+        goto err;
+
+    /* calculate d */
+    if (!BN_sub(r1, rsa->p, BN_value_one()))
+        goto err;               /* p-1 */
+    if (!BN_sub(r2, rsa->q, BN_value_one()))
+        goto err;               /* q-1 */
+    if (!BN_mul(r0, r1, r2, ctx))
+        goto err;               /* (p-1)(q-1) */
+
+    if (!BN_gcd(r3, r1, r2, ctx))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!BN_div(r0, NULL, r0, r3, ctx))
+        goto err;               /* LCM((p-1)(q-1)) */
+
+    ctx2 = BN_CTX_new();
+    if (ctx2 == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    rsa->d = BN_mod_inverse(NULL, rsa->e, r0, ctx2); /* d */
+    if (rsa->d == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* calculate d mod (p-1) */
+    rsa->dmp1 = BN_new();
+    if (rsa->dmp1 == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmp1, rsa->d, r1, ctx))
+        goto err;
+
+    /* calculate d mod (q-1) */
+    rsa->dmq1 = BN_new();
+    if (rsa->dmq1 == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmq1, rsa->d, r2, ctx))
+        goto err;
+
+    /* calculate inverse of q mod p */
+    rsa->iqmp = BN_mod_inverse(NULL, rsa->q, rsa->p, ctx2);
+
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    if (ctx)
+        BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+    BN_CTX_free(ctx2);
+
+    return ret;
+
+}
+
+int RSA_X931_generate_key_ex(RSA *rsa, int bits, const BIGNUM *e,
+                             BN_GENCB *cb)
+{
+    int ok = 0;
+    BIGNUM *Xp = NULL, *Xq = NULL;
+    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+
+    ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        goto error;
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    Xp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    Xq = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (Xq == NULL)
+        goto error;
+    if (!BN_X931_generate_Xpq(Xp, Xq, bits, ctx))
+        goto error;
+
+    rsa->p = BN_new();
+    rsa->q = BN_new();
+    if (rsa->p == NULL || rsa->q == NULL)
+        goto error;
+
+    /* Generate two primes from Xp, Xq */
+
+    if (!BN_X931_generate_prime_ex(rsa->p, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, Xp,
+                                   e, ctx, cb))
+        goto error;
+
+    if (!BN_X931_generate_prime_ex(rsa->q, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, Xq,
+                                   e, ctx, cb))
+        goto error;
+
+    /*
+     * Since rsa->p and rsa->q are valid this call will just derive remaining
+     * RSA components.
+     */
+
+    if (!RSA_X931_derive_ex(rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
+                            NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, e, cb))
+        goto error;
+
+    ok = 1;
+
+ error:
+    if (ctx)
+        BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+
+    if (ok)
+        return 1;
+
+    return 0;
+
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/s390xcap.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/s390xcap.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..272c551
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/s390xcap.c
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2010-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <setjmp.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+
+unsigned long long OPENSSL_s390xcap_P[10];
+
+static sigjmp_buf ill_jmp;
+static void ill_handler(int sig)
+{
+    siglongjmp(ill_jmp, sig);
+}
+
+unsigned long OPENSSL_s390x_facilities(void);
+
+void OPENSSL_cpuid_setup(void)
+{
+    sigset_t oset;
+    struct sigaction ill_act, oact;
+
+    if (OPENSSL_s390xcap_P[0])
+        return;
+
+    OPENSSL_s390xcap_P[0] = 1UL << (8 * sizeof(unsigned long) - 1);
+
+    memset(&ill_act, 0, sizeof(ill_act));
+    ill_act.sa_handler = ill_handler;
+    sigfillset(&ill_act.sa_mask);
+    sigdelset(&ill_act.sa_mask, SIGILL);
+    sigdelset(&ill_act.sa_mask, SIGTRAP);
+    sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &ill_act.sa_mask, &oset);
+    sigaction(SIGILL, &ill_act, &oact);
+
+    /* protection against missing store-facility-list-extended */
+    if (sigsetjmp(ill_jmp, 1) == 0)
+        OPENSSL_s390x_facilities();
+
+    sigaction(SIGILL, &oact, NULL);
+    sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &oset, NULL);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/s390xcpuid.S b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/s390xcpuid.S
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fc141d9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/s390xcpuid.S
@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
+.text
+// Copyright 2009-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+//
+// Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+// this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+// in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+// https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+.globl	OPENSSL_s390x_facilities
+.type	OPENSSL_s390x_facilities,@function
+.align	16
+OPENSSL_s390x_facilities:
+	lghi	%r0,0
+	larl	%r4,OPENSSL_s390xcap_P
+	stg	%r0,8(%r4)	# wipe capability vectors
+	stg	%r0,16(%r4)
+	stg	%r0,24(%r4)
+	stg	%r0,32(%r4)
+	stg	%r0,40(%r4)
+	stg	%r0,48(%r4)
+	stg	%r0,56(%r4)
+	stg	%r0,64(%r4)
+	stg	%r0,72(%r4)
+
+	.long	0xb2b04000	# stfle	0(%r4)
+	brc	8,.Ldone
+	lghi	%r0,1
+	.long	0xb2b04000	# stfle 0(%r4)
+.Ldone:
+	lmg	%r2,%r3,0(%r4)
+	tmhl	%r2,0x4000	# check for message-security-assist
+	jz	.Lret
+
+	lghi	%r0,0		# query kimd capabilities
+	la	%r1,16(%r4)
+	.long	0xb93e0002	# kimd %r0,%r2
+
+	lghi	%r0,0		# query km capability vector
+	la	%r1,32(%r4)
+	.long	0xb92e0042	# km %r4,%r2
+
+	lghi	%r0,0		# query kmc capability vector
+	la	%r1,48(%r4)
+	.long	0xb92f0042	# kmc %r4,%r2
+
+	tmhh	%r3,0x0004	# check for message-security-assist-4
+	jz	.Lret
+
+	lghi	%r0,0		# query kmctr capability vector
+	la	%r1,64(%r4)
+	.long	0xb92d2042	# kmctr %r4,%r2,%r2
+
+.Lret:
+	br	%r14
+.size	OPENSSL_s390x_facilities,.-OPENSSL_s390x_facilities
+
+.globl	OPENSSL_rdtsc
+.type	OPENSSL_rdtsc,@function
+.align	16
+OPENSSL_rdtsc:
+	stck	16(%r15)
+	lg	%r2,16(%r15)
+	br	%r14
+.size	OPENSSL_rdtsc,.-OPENSSL_rdtsc
+
+.globl	OPENSSL_atomic_add
+.type	OPENSSL_atomic_add,@function
+.align	16
+OPENSSL_atomic_add:
+	l	%r1,0(%r2)
+.Lspin:	lr	%r0,%r1
+	ar	%r0,%r3
+	cs	%r1,%r0,0(%r2)
+	brc	4,.Lspin
+	lgfr	%r2,%r0		# OpenSSL expects the new value
+	br	%r14
+.size	OPENSSL_atomic_add,.-OPENSSL_atomic_add
+
+.globl	OPENSSL_wipe_cpu
+.type	OPENSSL_wipe_cpu,@function
+.align	16
+OPENSSL_wipe_cpu:
+	xgr	%r0,%r0
+	xgr	%r1,%r1
+	lgr	%r2,%r15
+	xgr	%r3,%r3
+	xgr	%r4,%r4
+	lzdr	%f0
+	lzdr	%f1
+	lzdr	%f2
+	lzdr	%f3
+	lzdr	%f4
+	lzdr	%f5
+	lzdr	%f6
+	lzdr	%f7
+	br	%r14
+.size	OPENSSL_wipe_cpu,.-OPENSSL_wipe_cpu
+
+.globl	OPENSSL_cleanse
+.type	OPENSSL_cleanse,@function
+.align	16
+OPENSSL_cleanse:
+#if !defined(__s390x__) && !defined(__s390x)
+	llgfr	%r3,%r3
+#endif
+	lghi	%r4,15
+	lghi	%r0,0
+	clgr	%r3,%r4
+	jh	.Lot
+	clgr	%r3,%r0
+	bcr	8,%r14
+.Little:
+	stc	%r0,0(%r2)
+	la	%r2,1(%r2)
+	brctg	%r3,.Little
+	br	%r14
+.align	4
+.Lot:	tmll	%r2,7
+	jz	.Laligned
+	stc	%r0,0(%r2)
+	la	%r2,1(%r2)
+	brctg	%r3,.Lot
+.Laligned:
+	srlg	%r4,%r3,3
+.Loop:	stg	%r0,0(%r2)
+	la	%r2,8(%r2)
+	brctg	%r4,.Loop
+	lghi	%r4,7
+	ngr	%r3,%r4
+	jnz	.Little
+	br	%r14
+.size	OPENSSL_cleanse,.-OPENSSL_cleanse
+
+.globl	CRYPTO_memcmp
+.type	CRYPTO_memcmp,@function
+.align	16
+CRYPTO_memcmp:
+#if !defined(__s390x__) && !defined(__s390x)
+	llgfr	%r4,%r4
+#endif
+	lghi	%r5,0
+	clgr	%r4,%r5
+	je	.Lno_data
+
+.Loop_cmp:
+	llgc	%r0,0(%r2)
+	la	%r2,1(%r2)
+	llgc	%r1,0(%r3)
+	la	%r3,1(%r3)
+	xr	%r1,%r0
+	or	%r5,%r1
+	brctg	%r4,.Loop_cmp
+
+	lnr	%r5,%r5
+	srl	%r5,31
+.Lno_data:
+	lgr	%r2,%r5
+	br	%r14
+.size	CRYPTO_memcmp,.-CRYPTO_memcmp
+
+.globl	OPENSSL_instrument_bus
+.type	OPENSSL_instrument_bus,@function
+.align	16
+OPENSSL_instrument_bus:
+	lghi	%r2,0
+	br	%r14
+.size	OPENSSL_instrument_bus,.-OPENSSL_instrument_bus
+
+.globl	OPENSSL_instrument_bus2
+.type	OPENSSL_instrument_bus2,@function
+.align	16
+OPENSSL_instrument_bus2:
+	lghi	%r2,0
+	br	%r14
+.size	OPENSSL_instrument_bus2,.-OPENSSL_instrument_bus2
+
+.section	.init
+	brasl	%r14,OPENSSL_cpuid_setup
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/seed/build.info b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/seed/build.info
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..abdcbca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/seed/build.info
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+LIBS=../../libcrypto
+SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=seed.c seed_ecb.c seed_cbc.c seed_cfb.c seed_ofb.c
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/seed/seed.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/seed/seed.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d62da91
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/seed/seed.c
@@ -0,0 +1,590 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2007-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2007 KISA(Korea Information Security Agency). All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Neither the name of author nor the names of its contributors may
+ *    be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SEED
+
+# include <stdio.h>
+# include <stdlib.h>
+# include <string.h>
+# ifdef _WIN32
+#  include <memory.h>
+# endif
+
+# include <openssl/seed.h>
+# include "seed_locl.h"
+
+# ifdef SS                      /* can get defined on Solaris by inclusion of
+                                 * <stdlib.h> */
+#  undef SS
+# endif
+
+# if !defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT)
+
+#  define G_FUNC(v)       \
+        SS[0][(unsigned char)      (v) & 0xff] ^ \
+        SS[1][(unsigned char) ((v)>>8) & 0xff] ^ \
+        SS[2][(unsigned char)((v)>>16) & 0xff] ^ \
+        SS[3][(unsigned char)((v)>>24) & 0xff]
+
+static const seed_word SS[4][256] = {
+    { 0x2989a1a8, 0x05858184, 0x16c6d2d4, 0x13c3d3d0,
+      0x14445054, 0x1d0d111c, 0x2c8ca0ac, 0x25052124,
+      0x1d4d515c, 0x03434340, 0x18081018, 0x1e0e121c,
+      0x11415150, 0x3cccf0fc, 0x0acac2c8, 0x23436360,
+      0x28082028, 0x04444044, 0x20002020, 0x1d8d919c,
+      0x20c0e0e0, 0x22c2e2e0, 0x08c8c0c8, 0x17071314,
+      0x2585a1a4, 0x0f8f838c, 0x03030300, 0x3b4b7378,
+      0x3b8bb3b8, 0x13031310, 0x12c2d2d0, 0x2ecee2ec,
+      0x30407070, 0x0c8c808c, 0x3f0f333c, 0x2888a0a8,
+      0x32023230, 0x1dcdd1dc, 0x36c6f2f4, 0x34447074,
+      0x2ccce0ec, 0x15859194, 0x0b0b0308, 0x17475354,
+      0x1c4c505c, 0x1b4b5358, 0x3d8db1bc, 0x01010100,
+      0x24042024, 0x1c0c101c, 0x33437370, 0x18889098,
+      0x10001010, 0x0cccc0cc, 0x32c2f2f0, 0x19c9d1d8,
+      0x2c0c202c, 0x27c7e3e4, 0x32427270, 0x03838380,
+      0x1b8b9398, 0x11c1d1d0, 0x06868284, 0x09c9c1c8,
+      0x20406060, 0x10405050, 0x2383a3a0, 0x2bcbe3e8,
+      0x0d0d010c, 0x3686b2b4, 0x1e8e929c, 0x0f4f434c,
+      0x3787b3b4, 0x1a4a5258, 0x06c6c2c4, 0x38487078,
+      0x2686a2a4, 0x12021210, 0x2f8fa3ac, 0x15c5d1d4,
+      0x21416160, 0x03c3c3c0, 0x3484b0b4, 0x01414140,
+      0x12425250, 0x3d4d717c, 0x0d8d818c, 0x08080008,
+      0x1f0f131c, 0x19899198, 0x00000000, 0x19091118,
+      0x04040004, 0x13435350, 0x37c7f3f4, 0x21c1e1e0,
+      0x3dcdf1fc, 0x36467274, 0x2f0f232c, 0x27072324,
+      0x3080b0b0, 0x0b8b8388, 0x0e0e020c, 0x2b8ba3a8,
+      0x2282a2a0, 0x2e4e626c, 0x13839390, 0x0d4d414c,
+      0x29496168, 0x3c4c707c, 0x09090108, 0x0a0a0208,
+      0x3f8fb3bc, 0x2fcfe3ec, 0x33c3f3f0, 0x05c5c1c4,
+      0x07878384, 0x14041014, 0x3ecef2fc, 0x24446064,
+      0x1eced2dc, 0x2e0e222c, 0x0b4b4348, 0x1a0a1218,
+      0x06060204, 0x21012120, 0x2b4b6368, 0x26466264,
+      0x02020200, 0x35c5f1f4, 0x12829290, 0x0a8a8288,
+      0x0c0c000c, 0x3383b3b0, 0x3e4e727c, 0x10c0d0d0,
+      0x3a4a7278, 0x07474344, 0x16869294, 0x25c5e1e4,
+      0x26062224, 0x00808080, 0x2d8da1ac, 0x1fcfd3dc,
+      0x2181a1a0, 0x30003030, 0x37073334, 0x2e8ea2ac,
+      0x36063234, 0x15051114, 0x22022220, 0x38083038,
+      0x34c4f0f4, 0x2787a3a4, 0x05454144, 0x0c4c404c,
+      0x01818180, 0x29c9e1e8, 0x04848084, 0x17879394,
+      0x35053134, 0x0bcbc3c8, 0x0ecec2cc, 0x3c0c303c,
+      0x31417170, 0x11011110, 0x07c7c3c4, 0x09898188,
+      0x35457174, 0x3bcbf3f8, 0x1acad2d8, 0x38c8f0f8,
+      0x14849094, 0x19495158, 0x02828280, 0x04c4c0c4,
+      0x3fcff3fc, 0x09494148, 0x39093138, 0x27476364,
+      0x00c0c0c0, 0x0fcfc3cc, 0x17c7d3d4, 0x3888b0b8,
+      0x0f0f030c, 0x0e8e828c, 0x02424240, 0x23032320,
+      0x11819190, 0x2c4c606c, 0x1bcbd3d8, 0x2484a0a4,
+      0x34043034, 0x31c1f1f0, 0x08484048, 0x02c2c2c0,
+      0x2f4f636c, 0x3d0d313c, 0x2d0d212c, 0x00404040,
+      0x3e8eb2bc, 0x3e0e323c, 0x3c8cb0bc, 0x01c1c1c0,
+      0x2a8aa2a8, 0x3a8ab2b8, 0x0e4e424c, 0x15455154,
+      0x3b0b3338, 0x1cccd0dc, 0x28486068, 0x3f4f737c,
+      0x1c8c909c, 0x18c8d0d8, 0x0a4a4248, 0x16465254,
+      0x37477374, 0x2080a0a0, 0x2dcde1ec, 0x06464244,
+      0x3585b1b4, 0x2b0b2328, 0x25456164, 0x3acaf2f8,
+      0x23c3e3e0, 0x3989b1b8, 0x3181b1b0, 0x1f8f939c,
+      0x1e4e525c, 0x39c9f1f8, 0x26c6e2e4, 0x3282b2b0,
+      0x31013130, 0x2acae2e8, 0x2d4d616c, 0x1f4f535c,
+      0x24c4e0e4, 0x30c0f0f0, 0x0dcdc1cc, 0x08888088,
+      0x16061214, 0x3a0a3238, 0x18485058, 0x14c4d0d4,
+      0x22426260, 0x29092128, 0x07070304, 0x33033330,
+      0x28c8e0e8, 0x1b0b1318, 0x05050104, 0x39497178,
+      0x10809090, 0x2a4a6268, 0x2a0a2228, 0x1a8a9298
+    },
+    { 0x38380830, 0xe828c8e0, 0x2c2d0d21, 0xa42686a2,
+      0xcc0fcfc3, 0xdc1eced2, 0xb03383b3, 0xb83888b0,
+      0xac2f8fa3, 0x60204060, 0x54154551, 0xc407c7c3,
+      0x44044440, 0x6c2f4f63, 0x682b4b63, 0x581b4b53,
+      0xc003c3c3, 0x60224262, 0x30330333, 0xb43585b1,
+      0x28290921, 0xa02080a0, 0xe022c2e2, 0xa42787a3,
+      0xd013c3d3, 0x90118191, 0x10110111, 0x04060602,
+      0x1c1c0c10, 0xbc3c8cb0, 0x34360632, 0x480b4b43,
+      0xec2fcfe3, 0x88088880, 0x6c2c4c60, 0xa82888a0,
+      0x14170713, 0xc404c4c0, 0x14160612, 0xf434c4f0,
+      0xc002c2c2, 0x44054541, 0xe021c1e1, 0xd416c6d2,
+      0x3c3f0f33, 0x3c3d0d31, 0x8c0e8e82, 0x98188890,
+      0x28280820, 0x4c0e4e42, 0xf436c6f2, 0x3c3e0e32,
+      0xa42585a1, 0xf839c9f1, 0x0c0d0d01, 0xdc1fcfd3,
+      0xd818c8d0, 0x282b0b23, 0x64264662, 0x783a4a72,
+      0x24270723, 0x2c2f0f23, 0xf031c1f1, 0x70324272,
+      0x40024242, 0xd414c4d0, 0x40014141, 0xc000c0c0,
+      0x70334373, 0x64274763, 0xac2c8ca0, 0x880b8b83,
+      0xf437c7f3, 0xac2d8da1, 0x80008080, 0x1c1f0f13,
+      0xc80acac2, 0x2c2c0c20, 0xa82a8aa2, 0x34340430,
+      0xd012c2d2, 0x080b0b03, 0xec2ecee2, 0xe829c9e1,
+      0x5c1d4d51, 0x94148490, 0x18180810, 0xf838c8f0,
+      0x54174753, 0xac2e8ea2, 0x08080800, 0xc405c5c1,
+      0x10130313, 0xcc0dcdc1, 0x84068682, 0xb83989b1,
+      0xfc3fcff3, 0x7c3d4d71, 0xc001c1c1, 0x30310131,
+      0xf435c5f1, 0x880a8a82, 0x682a4a62, 0xb03181b1,
+      0xd011c1d1, 0x20200020, 0xd417c7d3, 0x00020202,
+      0x20220222, 0x04040400, 0x68284860, 0x70314171,
+      0x04070703, 0xd81bcbd3, 0x9c1d8d91, 0x98198991,
+      0x60214161, 0xbc3e8eb2, 0xe426c6e2, 0x58194951,
+      0xdc1dcdd1, 0x50114151, 0x90108090, 0xdc1cccd0,
+      0x981a8a92, 0xa02383a3, 0xa82b8ba3, 0xd010c0d0,
+      0x80018181, 0x0c0f0f03, 0x44074743, 0x181a0a12,
+      0xe023c3e3, 0xec2ccce0, 0x8c0d8d81, 0xbc3f8fb3,
+      0x94168692, 0x783b4b73, 0x5c1c4c50, 0xa02282a2,
+      0xa02181a1, 0x60234363, 0x20230323, 0x4c0d4d41,
+      0xc808c8c0, 0x9c1e8e92, 0x9c1c8c90, 0x383a0a32,
+      0x0c0c0c00, 0x2c2e0e22, 0xb83a8ab2, 0x6c2e4e62,
+      0x9c1f8f93, 0x581a4a52, 0xf032c2f2, 0x90128292,
+      0xf033c3f3, 0x48094941, 0x78384870, 0xcc0cccc0,
+      0x14150511, 0xf83bcbf3, 0x70304070, 0x74354571,
+      0x7c3f4f73, 0x34350531, 0x10100010, 0x00030303,
+      0x64244460, 0x6c2d4d61, 0xc406c6c2, 0x74344470,
+      0xd415c5d1, 0xb43484b0, 0xe82acae2, 0x08090901,
+      0x74364672, 0x18190911, 0xfc3ecef2, 0x40004040,
+      0x10120212, 0xe020c0e0, 0xbc3d8db1, 0x04050501,
+      0xf83acaf2, 0x00010101, 0xf030c0f0, 0x282a0a22,
+      0x5c1e4e52, 0xa82989a1, 0x54164652, 0x40034343,
+      0x84058581, 0x14140410, 0x88098981, 0x981b8b93,
+      0xb03080b0, 0xe425c5e1, 0x48084840, 0x78394971,
+      0x94178793, 0xfc3cccf0, 0x1c1e0e12, 0x80028282,
+      0x20210121, 0x8c0c8c80, 0x181b0b13, 0x5c1f4f53,
+      0x74374773, 0x54144450, 0xb03282b2, 0x1c1d0d11,
+      0x24250521, 0x4c0f4f43, 0x00000000, 0x44064642,
+      0xec2dcde1, 0x58184850, 0x50124252, 0xe82bcbe3,
+      0x7c3e4e72, 0xd81acad2, 0xc809c9c1, 0xfc3dcdf1,
+      0x30300030, 0x94158591, 0x64254561, 0x3c3c0c30,
+      0xb43686b2, 0xe424c4e0, 0xb83b8bb3, 0x7c3c4c70,
+      0x0c0e0e02, 0x50104050, 0x38390931, 0x24260622,
+      0x30320232, 0x84048480, 0x68294961, 0x90138393,
+      0x34370733, 0xe427c7e3, 0x24240420, 0xa42484a0,
+      0xc80bcbc3, 0x50134353, 0x080a0a02, 0x84078783,
+      0xd819c9d1, 0x4c0c4c40, 0x80038383, 0x8c0f8f83,
+      0xcc0ecec2, 0x383b0b33, 0x480a4a42, 0xb43787b3
+    },
+    { 0xa1a82989, 0x81840585, 0xd2d416c6, 0xd3d013c3,
+      0x50541444, 0x111c1d0d, 0xa0ac2c8c, 0x21242505,
+      0x515c1d4d, 0x43400343, 0x10181808, 0x121c1e0e,
+      0x51501141, 0xf0fc3ccc, 0xc2c80aca, 0x63602343,
+      0x20282808, 0x40440444, 0x20202000, 0x919c1d8d,
+      0xe0e020c0, 0xe2e022c2, 0xc0c808c8, 0x13141707,
+      0xa1a42585, 0x838c0f8f, 0x03000303, 0x73783b4b,
+      0xb3b83b8b, 0x13101303, 0xd2d012c2, 0xe2ec2ece,
+      0x70703040, 0x808c0c8c, 0x333c3f0f, 0xa0a82888,
+      0x32303202, 0xd1dc1dcd, 0xf2f436c6, 0x70743444,
+      0xe0ec2ccc, 0x91941585, 0x03080b0b, 0x53541747,
+      0x505c1c4c, 0x53581b4b, 0xb1bc3d8d, 0x01000101,
+      0x20242404, 0x101c1c0c, 0x73703343, 0x90981888,
+      0x10101000, 0xc0cc0ccc, 0xf2f032c2, 0xd1d819c9,
+      0x202c2c0c, 0xe3e427c7, 0x72703242, 0x83800383,
+      0x93981b8b, 0xd1d011c1, 0x82840686, 0xc1c809c9,
+      0x60602040, 0x50501040, 0xa3a02383, 0xe3e82bcb,
+      0x010c0d0d, 0xb2b43686, 0x929c1e8e, 0x434c0f4f,
+      0xb3b43787, 0x52581a4a, 0xc2c406c6, 0x70783848,
+      0xa2a42686, 0x12101202, 0xa3ac2f8f, 0xd1d415c5,
+      0x61602141, 0xc3c003c3, 0xb0b43484, 0x41400141,
+      0x52501242, 0x717c3d4d, 0x818c0d8d, 0x00080808,
+      0x131c1f0f, 0x91981989, 0x00000000, 0x11181909,
+      0x00040404, 0x53501343, 0xf3f437c7, 0xe1e021c1,
+      0xf1fc3dcd, 0x72743646, 0x232c2f0f, 0x23242707,
+      0xb0b03080, 0x83880b8b, 0x020c0e0e, 0xa3a82b8b,
+      0xa2a02282, 0x626c2e4e, 0x93901383, 0x414c0d4d,
+      0x61682949, 0x707c3c4c, 0x01080909, 0x02080a0a,
+      0xb3bc3f8f, 0xe3ec2fcf, 0xf3f033c3, 0xc1c405c5,
+      0x83840787, 0x10141404, 0xf2fc3ece, 0x60642444,
+      0xd2dc1ece, 0x222c2e0e, 0x43480b4b, 0x12181a0a,
+      0x02040606, 0x21202101, 0x63682b4b, 0x62642646,
+      0x02000202, 0xf1f435c5, 0x92901282, 0x82880a8a,
+      0x000c0c0c, 0xb3b03383, 0x727c3e4e, 0xd0d010c0,
+      0x72783a4a, 0x43440747, 0x92941686, 0xe1e425c5,
+      0x22242606, 0x80800080, 0xa1ac2d8d, 0xd3dc1fcf,
+      0xa1a02181, 0x30303000, 0x33343707, 0xa2ac2e8e,
+      0x32343606, 0x11141505, 0x22202202, 0x30383808,
+      0xf0f434c4, 0xa3a42787, 0x41440545, 0x404c0c4c,
+      0x81800181, 0xe1e829c9, 0x80840484, 0x93941787,
+      0x31343505, 0xc3c80bcb, 0xc2cc0ece, 0x303c3c0c,
+      0x71703141, 0x11101101, 0xc3c407c7, 0x81880989,
+      0x71743545, 0xf3f83bcb, 0xd2d81aca, 0xf0f838c8,
+      0x90941484, 0x51581949, 0x82800282, 0xc0c404c4,
+      0xf3fc3fcf, 0x41480949, 0x31383909, 0x63642747,
+      0xc0c000c0, 0xc3cc0fcf, 0xd3d417c7, 0xb0b83888,
+      0x030c0f0f, 0x828c0e8e, 0x42400242, 0x23202303,
+      0x91901181, 0x606c2c4c, 0xd3d81bcb, 0xa0a42484,
+      0x30343404, 0xf1f031c1, 0x40480848, 0xc2c002c2,
+      0x636c2f4f, 0x313c3d0d, 0x212c2d0d, 0x40400040,
+      0xb2bc3e8e, 0x323c3e0e, 0xb0bc3c8c, 0xc1c001c1,
+      0xa2a82a8a, 0xb2b83a8a, 0x424c0e4e, 0x51541545,
+      0x33383b0b, 0xd0dc1ccc, 0x60682848, 0x737c3f4f,
+      0x909c1c8c, 0xd0d818c8, 0x42480a4a, 0x52541646,
+      0x73743747, 0xa0a02080, 0xe1ec2dcd, 0x42440646,
+      0xb1b43585, 0x23282b0b, 0x61642545, 0xf2f83aca,
+      0xe3e023c3, 0xb1b83989, 0xb1b03181, 0x939c1f8f,
+      0x525c1e4e, 0xf1f839c9, 0xe2e426c6, 0xb2b03282,
+      0x31303101, 0xe2e82aca, 0x616c2d4d, 0x535c1f4f,
+      0xe0e424c4, 0xf0f030c0, 0xc1cc0dcd, 0x80880888,
+      0x12141606, 0x32383a0a, 0x50581848, 0xd0d414c4,
+      0x62602242, 0x21282909, 0x03040707, 0x33303303,
+      0xe0e828c8, 0x13181b0b, 0x01040505, 0x71783949,
+      0x90901080, 0x62682a4a, 0x22282a0a, 0x92981a8a
+    },
+    { 0x08303838, 0xc8e0e828, 0x0d212c2d, 0x86a2a426,
+      0xcfc3cc0f, 0xced2dc1e, 0x83b3b033, 0x88b0b838,
+      0x8fa3ac2f, 0x40606020, 0x45515415, 0xc7c3c407,
+      0x44404404, 0x4f636c2f, 0x4b63682b, 0x4b53581b,
+      0xc3c3c003, 0x42626022, 0x03333033, 0x85b1b435,
+      0x09212829, 0x80a0a020, 0xc2e2e022, 0x87a3a427,
+      0xc3d3d013, 0x81919011, 0x01111011, 0x06020406,
+      0x0c101c1c, 0x8cb0bc3c, 0x06323436, 0x4b43480b,
+      0xcfe3ec2f, 0x88808808, 0x4c606c2c, 0x88a0a828,
+      0x07131417, 0xc4c0c404, 0x06121416, 0xc4f0f434,
+      0xc2c2c002, 0x45414405, 0xc1e1e021, 0xc6d2d416,
+      0x0f333c3f, 0x0d313c3d, 0x8e828c0e, 0x88909818,
+      0x08202828, 0x4e424c0e, 0xc6f2f436, 0x0e323c3e,
+      0x85a1a425, 0xc9f1f839, 0x0d010c0d, 0xcfd3dc1f,
+      0xc8d0d818, 0x0b23282b, 0x46626426, 0x4a72783a,
+      0x07232427, 0x0f232c2f, 0xc1f1f031, 0x42727032,
+      0x42424002, 0xc4d0d414, 0x41414001, 0xc0c0c000,
+      0x43737033, 0x47636427, 0x8ca0ac2c, 0x8b83880b,
+      0xc7f3f437, 0x8da1ac2d, 0x80808000, 0x0f131c1f,
+      0xcac2c80a, 0x0c202c2c, 0x8aa2a82a, 0x04303434,
+      0xc2d2d012, 0x0b03080b, 0xcee2ec2e, 0xc9e1e829,
+      0x4d515c1d, 0x84909414, 0x08101818, 0xc8f0f838,
+      0x47535417, 0x8ea2ac2e, 0x08000808, 0xc5c1c405,
+      0x03131013, 0xcdc1cc0d, 0x86828406, 0x89b1b839,
+      0xcff3fc3f, 0x4d717c3d, 0xc1c1c001, 0x01313031,
+      0xc5f1f435, 0x8a82880a, 0x4a62682a, 0x81b1b031,
+      0xc1d1d011, 0x00202020, 0xc7d3d417, 0x02020002,
+      0x02222022, 0x04000404, 0x48606828, 0x41717031,
+      0x07030407, 0xcbd3d81b, 0x8d919c1d, 0x89919819,
+      0x41616021, 0x8eb2bc3e, 0xc6e2e426, 0x49515819,
+      0xcdd1dc1d, 0x41515011, 0x80909010, 0xccd0dc1c,
+      0x8a92981a, 0x83a3a023, 0x8ba3a82b, 0xc0d0d010,
+      0x81818001, 0x0f030c0f, 0x47434407, 0x0a12181a,
+      0xc3e3e023, 0xcce0ec2c, 0x8d818c0d, 0x8fb3bc3f,
+      0x86929416, 0x4b73783b, 0x4c505c1c, 0x82a2a022,
+      0x81a1a021, 0x43636023, 0x03232023, 0x4d414c0d,
+      0xc8c0c808, 0x8e929c1e, 0x8c909c1c, 0x0a32383a,
+      0x0c000c0c, 0x0e222c2e, 0x8ab2b83a, 0x4e626c2e,
+      0x8f939c1f, 0x4a52581a, 0xc2f2f032, 0x82929012,
+      0xc3f3f033, 0x49414809, 0x48707838, 0xccc0cc0c,
+      0x05111415, 0xcbf3f83b, 0x40707030, 0x45717435,
+      0x4f737c3f, 0x05313435, 0x00101010, 0x03030003,
+      0x44606424, 0x4d616c2d, 0xc6c2c406, 0x44707434,
+      0xc5d1d415, 0x84b0b434, 0xcae2e82a, 0x09010809,
+      0x46727436, 0x09111819, 0xcef2fc3e, 0x40404000,
+      0x02121012, 0xc0e0e020, 0x8db1bc3d, 0x05010405,
+      0xcaf2f83a, 0x01010001, 0xc0f0f030, 0x0a22282a,
+      0x4e525c1e, 0x89a1a829, 0x46525416, 0x43434003,
+      0x85818405, 0x04101414, 0x89818809, 0x8b93981b,
+      0x80b0b030, 0xc5e1e425, 0x48404808, 0x49717839,
+      0x87939417, 0xccf0fc3c, 0x0e121c1e, 0x82828002,
+      0x01212021, 0x8c808c0c, 0x0b13181b, 0x4f535c1f,
+      0x47737437, 0x44505414, 0x82b2b032, 0x0d111c1d,
+      0x05212425, 0x4f434c0f, 0x00000000, 0x46424406,
+      0xcde1ec2d, 0x48505818, 0x42525012, 0xcbe3e82b,
+      0x4e727c3e, 0xcad2d81a, 0xc9c1c809, 0xcdf1fc3d,
+      0x00303030, 0x85919415, 0x45616425, 0x0c303c3c,
+      0x86b2b436, 0xc4e0e424, 0x8bb3b83b, 0x4c707c3c,
+      0x0e020c0e, 0x40505010, 0x09313839, 0x06222426,
+      0x02323032, 0x84808404, 0x49616829, 0x83939013,
+      0x07333437, 0xc7e3e427, 0x04202424, 0x84a0a424,
+      0xcbc3c80b, 0x43535013, 0x0a02080a, 0x87838407,
+      0xc9d1d819, 0x4c404c0c, 0x83838003, 0x8f838c0f,
+      0xcec2cc0e, 0x0b33383b, 0x4a42480a, 0x87b3b437
+    }
+};
+
+#else
+
+/* on x86_64 >5x size reduction at 40% performance penalty */
+static const unsigned char SEED_Sbox[2][256] = {
+{
+      0xA9, 0x85, 0xD6, 0xD3, 0x54, 0x1D, 0xAC, 0x25,
+      0x5D, 0x43, 0x18, 0x1E, 0x51, 0xFC, 0xCA, 0x63,
+      0x28, 0x44, 0x20, 0x9D, 0xE0, 0xE2, 0xC8, 0x17,
+      0xA5, 0x8F, 0x03, 0x7B, 0xBB, 0x13, 0xD2, 0xEE,
+      0x70, 0x8C, 0x3F, 0xA8, 0x32, 0xDD, 0xF6, 0x74,
+      0xEC, 0x95, 0x0B, 0x57, 0x5C, 0x5B, 0xBD, 0x01,
+      0x24, 0x1C, 0x73, 0x98, 0x10, 0xCC, 0xF2, 0xD9,
+      0x2C, 0xE7, 0x72, 0x83, 0x9B, 0xD1, 0x86, 0xC9,
+      0x60, 0x50, 0xA3, 0xEB, 0x0D, 0xB6, 0x9E, 0x4F,
+      0xB7, 0x5A, 0xC6, 0x78, 0xA6, 0x12, 0xAF, 0xD5,
+      0x61, 0xC3, 0xB4, 0x41, 0x52, 0x7D, 0x8D, 0x08,
+      0x1F, 0x99, 0x00, 0x19, 0x04, 0x53, 0xF7, 0xE1,
+      0xFD, 0x76, 0x2F, 0x27, 0xB0, 0x8B, 0x0E, 0xAB,
+      0xA2, 0x6E, 0x93, 0x4D, 0x69, 0x7C, 0x09, 0x0A,
+      0xBF, 0xEF, 0xF3, 0xC5, 0x87, 0x14, 0xFE, 0x64,
+      0xDE, 0x2E, 0x4B, 0x1A, 0x06, 0x21, 0x6B, 0x66,
+      0x02, 0xF5, 0x92, 0x8A, 0x0C, 0xB3, 0x7E, 0xD0,
+      0x7A, 0x47, 0x96, 0xE5, 0x26, 0x80, 0xAD, 0xDF,
+      0xA1, 0x30, 0x37, 0xAE, 0x36, 0x15, 0x22, 0x38,
+      0xF4, 0xA7, 0x45, 0x4C, 0x81, 0xE9, 0x84, 0x97,
+      0x35, 0xCB, 0xCE, 0x3C, 0x71, 0x11, 0xC7, 0x89,
+      0x75, 0xFB, 0xDA, 0xF8, 0x94, 0x59, 0x82, 0xC4,
+      0xFF, 0x49, 0x39, 0x67, 0xC0, 0xCF, 0xD7, 0xB8,
+      0x0F, 0x8E, 0x42, 0x23, 0x91, 0x6C, 0xDB, 0xA4,
+      0x34, 0xF1, 0x48, 0xC2, 0x6F, 0x3D, 0x2D, 0x40,
+      0xBE, 0x3E, 0xBC, 0xC1, 0xAA, 0xBA, 0x4E, 0x55,
+      0x3B, 0xDC, 0x68, 0x7F, 0x9C, 0xD8, 0x4A, 0x56,
+      0x77, 0xA0, 0xED, 0x46, 0xB5, 0x2B, 0x65, 0xFA,
+      0xE3, 0xB9, 0xB1, 0x9F, 0x5E, 0xF9, 0xE6, 0xB2,
+      0x31, 0xEA, 0x6D, 0x5F, 0xE4, 0xF0, 0xCD, 0x88,
+      0x16, 0x3A, 0x58, 0xD4, 0x62, 0x29, 0x07, 0x33,
+      0xE8, 0x1B, 0x05, 0x79, 0x90, 0x6A, 0x2A, 0x9A
+    },
+    {
+      0x38, 0xE8, 0x2D, 0xA6, 0xCF, 0xDE, 0xB3, 0xB8,
+      0xAF, 0x60, 0x55, 0xC7, 0x44, 0x6F, 0x6B, 0x5B,
+      0xC3, 0x62, 0x33, 0xB5, 0x29, 0xA0, 0xE2, 0xA7,
+      0xD3, 0x91, 0x11, 0x06, 0x1C, 0xBC, 0x36, 0x4B,
+      0xEF, 0x88, 0x6C, 0xA8, 0x17, 0xC4, 0x16, 0xF4,
+      0xC2, 0x45, 0xE1, 0xD6, 0x3F, 0x3D, 0x8E, 0x98,
+      0x28, 0x4E, 0xF6, 0x3E, 0xA5, 0xF9, 0x0D, 0xDF,
+      0xD8, 0x2B, 0x66, 0x7A, 0x27, 0x2F, 0xF1, 0x72,
+      0x42, 0xD4, 0x41, 0xC0, 0x73, 0x67, 0xAC, 0x8B,
+      0xF7, 0xAD, 0x80, 0x1F, 0xCA, 0x2C, 0xAA, 0x34,
+      0xD2, 0x0B, 0xEE, 0xE9, 0x5D, 0x94, 0x18, 0xF8,
+      0x57, 0xAE, 0x08, 0xC5, 0x13, 0xCD, 0x86, 0xB9,
+      0xFF, 0x7D, 0xC1, 0x31, 0xF5, 0x8A, 0x6A, 0xB1,
+      0xD1, 0x20, 0xD7, 0x02, 0x22, 0x04, 0x68, 0x71,
+      0x07, 0xDB, 0x9D, 0x99, 0x61, 0xBE, 0xE6, 0x59,
+      0xDD, 0x51, 0x90, 0xDC, 0x9A, 0xA3, 0xAB, 0xD0,
+      0x81, 0x0F, 0x47, 0x1A, 0xE3, 0xEC, 0x8D, 0xBF,
+      0x96, 0x7B, 0x5C, 0xA2, 0xA1, 0x63, 0x23, 0x4D,
+      0xC8, 0x9E, 0x9C, 0x3A, 0x0C, 0x2E, 0xBA, 0x6E,
+      0x9F, 0x5A, 0xF2, 0x92, 0xF3, 0x49, 0x78, 0xCC,
+      0x15, 0xFB, 0x70, 0x75, 0x7F, 0x35, 0x10, 0x03,
+      0x64, 0x6D, 0xC6, 0x74, 0xD5, 0xB4, 0xEA, 0x09,
+      0x76, 0x19, 0xFE, 0x40, 0x12, 0xE0, 0xBD, 0x05,
+      0xFA, 0x01, 0xF0, 0x2A, 0x5E, 0xA9, 0x56, 0x43,
+      0x85, 0x14, 0x89, 0x9B, 0xB0, 0xE5, 0x48, 0x79,
+      0x97, 0xFC, 0x1E, 0x82, 0x21, 0x8C, 0x1B, 0x5F,
+      0x77, 0x54, 0xB2, 0x1D, 0x25, 0x4F, 0x00, 0x46,
+      0xED, 0x58, 0x52, 0xEB, 0x7E, 0xDA, 0xC9, 0xFD,
+      0x30, 0x95, 0x65, 0x3C, 0xB6, 0xE4, 0xBB, 0x7C,
+      0x0E, 0x50, 0x39, 0x26, 0x32, 0x84, 0x69, 0x93,
+      0x37, 0xE7, 0x24, 0xA4, 0xCB, 0x53, 0x0A, 0x87,
+      0xD9, 0x4C, 0x83, 0x8F, 0xCE, 0x3B, 0x4A, 0xB7
+    }
+};
+
+static unsigned int G_FUNC(unsigned int v)
+{
+    unsigned int s0, s1, s2, s3, ret;
+
+    s0 = SEED_Sbox[0][(unsigned char)      (v) & 0xff];
+    s1 = SEED_Sbox[1][(unsigned char)((v)>> 8) & 0xff];
+    s2 = SEED_Sbox[0][(unsigned char)((v)>>16) & 0xff];
+    s3 = SEED_Sbox[1][(unsigned char)((v)>>24) & 0xff];
+
+    ret  = ((s0 & 0xFC) ^ (s1 & 0xF3) ^ (s2 & 0xCF) ^ (s3 & 0x3F));
+    ret |= ((s0 & 0xF3) ^ (s1 & 0xCF) ^ (s2 & 0x3F) ^ (s3 & 0xFC)) << 8;
+    ret |= ((s0 & 0xCF) ^ (s1 & 0x3F) ^ (s2 & 0xFC) ^ (s3 & 0xF3)) << 16;
+    ret |= ((s0 & 0x3F) ^ (s1 & 0xFC) ^ (s2 & 0xF3) ^ (s3 & 0xCF)) << 24;
+
+    return ret;
+}
+# endif
+
+/* key schedule constants - golden ratio */
+# define KC0     0x9e3779b9
+# define KC1     0x3c6ef373
+# define KC2     0x78dde6e6
+# define KC3     0xf1bbcdcc
+# define KC4     0xe3779b99
+# define KC5     0xc6ef3733
+# define KC6     0x8dde6e67
+# define KC7     0x1bbcdccf
+# define KC8     0x3779b99e
+# define KC9     0x6ef3733c
+# define KC10    0xdde6e678
+# define KC11    0xbbcdccf1
+# define KC12    0x779b99e3
+# define KC13    0xef3733c6
+# define KC14    0xde6e678d
+# define KC15    0xbcdccf1b
+
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT)
+static const seed_word KC[] = {
+    KC0, KC1, KC2, KC3, KC4, KC5, KC6, KC7,
+    KC8, KC9, KC10, KC11, KC12, KC13, KC14, KC15
+};
+# endif
+
+void SEED_set_key(const unsigned char rawkey[SEED_KEY_LENGTH],
+                  SEED_KEY_SCHEDULE *ks)
+{
+    seed_word x1, x2, x3, x4;
+    seed_word t0, t1;
+
+    char2word(rawkey, x1);
+    char2word(rawkey + 4, x2);
+    char2word(rawkey + 8, x3);
+    char2word(rawkey + 12, x4);
+
+    t0 = (x1 + x3 - KC0) & 0xffffffff;
+    t1 = (x2 - x4 + KC0) & 0xffffffff;
+    KEYUPDATE_TEMP(t0, t1, &ks->data[0]);
+    KEYSCHEDULE_UPDATE1(t0, t1, x1, x2, x3, x4, KC1);
+    KEYUPDATE_TEMP(t0, t1, &ks->data[2]);
+
+# if !defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT)
+    KEYSCHEDULE_UPDATE0(t0, t1, x1, x2, x3, x4, KC2);
+    KEYUPDATE_TEMP(t0, t1, &ks->data[4]);
+    KEYSCHEDULE_UPDATE1(t0, t1, x1, x2, x3, x4, KC3);
+    KEYUPDATE_TEMP(t0, t1, &ks->data[6]);
+    KEYSCHEDULE_UPDATE0(t0, t1, x1, x2, x3, x4, KC4);
+    KEYUPDATE_TEMP(t0, t1, &ks->data[8]);
+    KEYSCHEDULE_UPDATE1(t0, t1, x1, x2, x3, x4, KC5);
+    KEYUPDATE_TEMP(t0, t1, &ks->data[10]);
+    KEYSCHEDULE_UPDATE0(t0, t1, x1, x2, x3, x4, KC6);
+    KEYUPDATE_TEMP(t0, t1, &ks->data[12]);
+    KEYSCHEDULE_UPDATE1(t0, t1, x1, x2, x3, x4, KC7);
+    KEYUPDATE_TEMP(t0, t1, &ks->data[14]);
+    KEYSCHEDULE_UPDATE0(t0, t1, x1, x2, x3, x4, KC8);
+    KEYUPDATE_TEMP(t0, t1, &ks->data[16]);
+    KEYSCHEDULE_UPDATE1(t0, t1, x1, x2, x3, x4, KC9);
+    KEYUPDATE_TEMP(t0, t1, &ks->data[18]);
+    KEYSCHEDULE_UPDATE0(t0, t1, x1, x2, x3, x4, KC10);
+    KEYUPDATE_TEMP(t0, t1, &ks->data[20]);
+    KEYSCHEDULE_UPDATE1(t0, t1, x1, x2, x3, x4, KC11);
+    KEYUPDATE_TEMP(t0, t1, &ks->data[22]);
+    KEYSCHEDULE_UPDATE0(t0, t1, x1, x2, x3, x4, KC12);
+    KEYUPDATE_TEMP(t0, t1, &ks->data[24]);
+    KEYSCHEDULE_UPDATE1(t0, t1, x1, x2, x3, x4, KC13);
+    KEYUPDATE_TEMP(t0, t1, &ks->data[26]);
+    KEYSCHEDULE_UPDATE0(t0, t1, x1, x2, x3, x4, KC14);
+    KEYUPDATE_TEMP(t0, t1, &ks->data[28]);
+    KEYSCHEDULE_UPDATE1(t0, t1, x1, x2, x3, x4, KC15);
+    KEYUPDATE_TEMP(t0, t1, &ks->data[30]);
+# else
+    {
+        int i;
+        for (i = 2; i < 16; i += 2) {
+            KEYSCHEDULE_UPDATE0(t0, t1, x1, x2, x3, x4, KC[i]);
+            KEYUPDATE_TEMP(t0, t1, &ks->data[i * 2]);
+            KEYSCHEDULE_UPDATE1(t0, t1, x1, x2, x3, x4, KC[i + 1]);
+            KEYUPDATE_TEMP(t0, t1, &ks->data[i * 2 + 2]);
+        }
+    }
+# endif
+}
+
+void SEED_encrypt(const unsigned char s[SEED_BLOCK_SIZE],
+                  unsigned char d[SEED_BLOCK_SIZE],
+                  const SEED_KEY_SCHEDULE *ks)
+{
+    seed_word x1, x2, x3, x4;
+    seed_word t0, t1;
+
+    char2word(s, x1);
+    char2word(s + 4, x2);
+    char2word(s + 8, x3);
+    char2word(s + 12, x4);
+
+# if !defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT)
+    E_SEED(t0, t1, x1, x2, x3, x4, 0);
+    E_SEED(t0, t1, x3, x4, x1, x2, 2);
+    E_SEED(t0, t1, x1, x2, x3, x4, 4);
+    E_SEED(t0, t1, x3, x4, x1, x2, 6);
+    E_SEED(t0, t1, x1, x2, x3, x4, 8);
+    E_SEED(t0, t1, x3, x4, x1, x2, 10);
+    E_SEED(t0, t1, x1, x2, x3, x4, 12);
+    E_SEED(t0, t1, x3, x4, x1, x2, 14);
+    E_SEED(t0, t1, x1, x2, x3, x4, 16);
+    E_SEED(t0, t1, x3, x4, x1, x2, 18);
+    E_SEED(t0, t1, x1, x2, x3, x4, 20);
+    E_SEED(t0, t1, x3, x4, x1, x2, 22);
+    E_SEED(t0, t1, x1, x2, x3, x4, 24);
+    E_SEED(t0, t1, x3, x4, x1, x2, 26);
+    E_SEED(t0, t1, x1, x2, x3, x4, 28);
+    E_SEED(t0, t1, x3, x4, x1, x2, 30);
+# else
+    {
+        int i;
+        for (i = 0; i < 30; i += 4) {
+            E_SEED(t0, t1, x1, x2, x3, x4, i);
+            E_SEED(t0, t1, x3, x4, x1, x2, i + 2);
+        }
+    }
+# endif
+
+    word2char(x3, d);
+    word2char(x4, d + 4);
+    word2char(x1, d + 8);
+    word2char(x2, d + 12);
+}
+
+void SEED_decrypt(const unsigned char s[SEED_BLOCK_SIZE],
+                  unsigned char d[SEED_BLOCK_SIZE],
+                  const SEED_KEY_SCHEDULE *ks)
+{
+    seed_word x1, x2, x3, x4;
+    seed_word t0, t1;
+
+    char2word(s, x1);
+    char2word(s + 4, x2);
+    char2word(s + 8, x3);
+    char2word(s + 12, x4);
+
+# if !defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT)
+    E_SEED(t0, t1, x1, x2, x3, x4, 30);
+    E_SEED(t0, t1, x3, x4, x1, x2, 28);
+    E_SEED(t0, t1, x1, x2, x3, x4, 26);
+    E_SEED(t0, t1, x3, x4, x1, x2, 24);
+    E_SEED(t0, t1, x1, x2, x3, x4, 22);
+    E_SEED(t0, t1, x3, x4, x1, x2, 20);
+    E_SEED(t0, t1, x1, x2, x3, x4, 18);
+    E_SEED(t0, t1, x3, x4, x1, x2, 16);
+    E_SEED(t0, t1, x1, x2, x3, x4, 14);
+    E_SEED(t0, t1, x3, x4, x1, x2, 12);
+    E_SEED(t0, t1, x1, x2, x3, x4, 10);
+    E_SEED(t0, t1, x3, x4, x1, x2, 8);
+    E_SEED(t0, t1, x1, x2, x3, x4, 6);
+    E_SEED(t0, t1, x3, x4, x1, x2, 4);
+    E_SEED(t0, t1, x1, x2, x3, x4, 2);
+    E_SEED(t0, t1, x3, x4, x1, x2, 0);
+# else
+    {
+        int i;
+        for (i = 30; i > 0; i -= 4) {
+            E_SEED(t0, t1, x1, x2, x3, x4, i);
+            E_SEED(t0, t1, x3, x4, x1, x2, i - 2);
+
+        }
+    }
+# endif
+
+    word2char(x3, d);
+    word2char(x4, d + 4);
+    word2char(x1, d + 8);
+    word2char(x2, d + 12);
+}
+
+#endif                          /* OPENSSL_NO_SEED */
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/seed/seed_cbc.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/seed/seed_cbc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c9a4fe2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/seed/seed_cbc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2007-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/seed.h>
+#include <openssl/modes.h>
+
+void SEED_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                      size_t len, const SEED_KEY_SCHEDULE *ks,
+                      unsigned char ivec[SEED_BLOCK_SIZE], int enc)
+{
+    if (enc)
+        CRYPTO_cbc128_encrypt(in, out, len, ks, ivec,
+                              (block128_f) SEED_encrypt);
+    else
+        CRYPTO_cbc128_decrypt(in, out, len, ks, ivec,
+                              (block128_f) SEED_decrypt);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/seed/seed_cfb.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/seed/seed_cfb.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2aee1ff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/seed/seed_cfb.c
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2007-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/seed.h>
+#include <openssl/modes.h>
+
+void SEED_cfb128_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                         size_t len, const SEED_KEY_SCHEDULE *ks,
+                         unsigned char ivec[SEED_BLOCK_SIZE], int *num,
+                         int enc)
+{
+    CRYPTO_cfb128_encrypt(in, out, len, ks, ivec, num, enc,
+                          (block128_f) SEED_encrypt);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/seed/seed_ecb.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/seed/seed_ecb.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b6e301c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/seed/seed_ecb.c
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2007-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/seed.h>
+
+void SEED_ecb_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                      const SEED_KEY_SCHEDULE *ks, int enc)
+{
+    if (enc)
+        SEED_encrypt(in, out, ks);
+    else
+        SEED_decrypt(in, out, ks);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/seed/seed_locl.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/seed/seed_locl.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d4a03fc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/seed/seed_locl.h
@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2007-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2007 KISA(Korea Information Security Agency). All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Neither the name of author nor the names of its contributors may
+ *    be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ */
+#ifndef HEADER_SEED_LOCL_H
+# define HEADER_SEED_LOCL_H
+
+# include "openssl/e_os2.h"
+# include <openssl/seed.h>
+
+# ifdef SEED_LONG               /* need 32-bit type */
+typedef unsigned long seed_word;
+# else
+typedef unsigned int seed_word;
+# endif
+
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+# define char2word(c, i)  \
+        (i) = ((((seed_word)(c)[0]) << 24) | (((seed_word)(c)[1]) << 16) | (((seed_word)(c)[2]) << 8) | ((seed_word)(c)[3]))
+
+# define word2char(l, c)  \
+        *((c)+0) = (unsigned char)((l)>>24) & 0xff; \
+        *((c)+1) = (unsigned char)((l)>>16) & 0xff; \
+        *((c)+2) = (unsigned char)((l)>> 8) & 0xff; \
+        *((c)+3) = (unsigned char)((l))     & 0xff
+
+# define KEYSCHEDULE_UPDATE0(T0, T1, X1, X2, X3, X4, KC)  \
+        (T0) = (X3);                                     \
+        (X3) = (((X3)<<8) ^ ((X4)>>24)) & 0xffffffff;    \
+        (X4) = (((X4)<<8) ^ ((T0)>>24)) & 0xffffffff;    \
+        (T0) = ((X1) + (X3) - (KC))     & 0xffffffff;    \
+        (T1) = ((X2) + (KC) - (X4))     & 0xffffffff
+
+# define KEYSCHEDULE_UPDATE1(T0, T1, X1, X2, X3, X4, KC)  \
+        (T0) = (X1);                                     \
+        (X1) = (((X1)>>8) ^ ((X2)<<24)) & 0xffffffff;    \
+        (X2) = (((X2)>>8) ^ ((T0)<<24)) & 0xffffffff;    \
+        (T0) = ((X1) + (X3) - (KC))     & 0xffffffff;     \
+        (T1) = ((X2) + (KC) - (X4))     & 0xffffffff
+
+# define KEYUPDATE_TEMP(T0, T1, K)   \
+        (K)[0] = G_FUNC((T0));      \
+        (K)[1] = G_FUNC((T1))
+
+# define XOR_SEEDBLOCK(DST, SRC)      \
+        ((DST))[0] ^= ((SRC))[0];    \
+        ((DST))[1] ^= ((SRC))[1];    \
+        ((DST))[2] ^= ((SRC))[2];    \
+        ((DST))[3] ^= ((SRC))[3]
+
+# define MOV_SEEDBLOCK(DST, SRC)      \
+        ((DST))[0] = ((SRC))[0];     \
+        ((DST))[1] = ((SRC))[1];     \
+        ((DST))[2] = ((SRC))[2];     \
+        ((DST))[3] = ((SRC))[3]
+
+# define CHAR2WORD(C, I)              \
+        char2word((C),    (I)[0]);    \
+        char2word((C+4),  (I)[1]);    \
+        char2word((C+8),  (I)[2]);    \
+        char2word((C+12), (I)[3])
+
+# define WORD2CHAR(I, C)              \
+        word2char((I)[0], (C));       \
+        word2char((I)[1], (C+4));     \
+        word2char((I)[2], (C+8));     \
+        word2char((I)[3], (C+12))
+
+# define E_SEED(T0, T1, X1, X2, X3, X4, rbase)   \
+        (T0) = (X3) ^ (ks->data)[(rbase)];       \
+        (T1) = (X4) ^ (ks->data)[(rbase)+1];     \
+        (T1) ^= (T0);                            \
+        (T1) = G_FUNC((T1));                     \
+        (T0) = ((T0) + (T1)) & 0xffffffff;       \
+        (T0) = G_FUNC((T0));                     \
+        (T1) = ((T1) + (T0)) & 0xffffffff;       \
+        (T1) = G_FUNC((T1));                     \
+        (T0) = ((T0) + (T1)) & 0xffffffff;       \
+        (X1) ^= (T0);                            \
+        (X2) ^= (T1)
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif                          /* HEADER_SEED_LOCL_H */
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/seed/seed_ofb.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/seed/seed_ofb.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b455540
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/seed/seed_ofb.c
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2007-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/seed.h>
+#include <openssl/modes.h>
+
+void SEED_ofb128_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                         size_t len, const SEED_KEY_SCHEDULE *ks,
+                         unsigned char ivec[SEED_BLOCK_SIZE], int *num)
+{
+    CRYPTO_ofb128_encrypt(in, out, len, ks, ivec, num,
+                          (block128_f) SEED_encrypt);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-586.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-586.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5adca23
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-586.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,1488 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 1998-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+# ====================================================================
+# [Re]written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+
+# "[Re]written" was achieved in two major overhauls. In 2004 BODY_*
+# functions were re-implemented to address P4 performance issue [see
+# commentary below], and in 2006 the rest was rewritten in order to
+# gain freedom to liberate licensing terms.
+
+# January, September 2004.
+#
+# It was noted that Intel IA-32 C compiler generates code which
+# performs ~30% *faster* on P4 CPU than original *hand-coded*
+# SHA1 assembler implementation. To address this problem (and
+# prove that humans are still better than machines:-), the
+# original code was overhauled, which resulted in following
+# performance changes:
+#
+#		compared with original	compared with Intel cc
+#		assembler impl.		generated code
+# Pentium	-16%			+48%
+# PIII/AMD	+8%			+16%
+# P4		+85%(!)			+45%
+#
+# As you can see Pentium came out as looser:-( Yet I reckoned that
+# improvement on P4 outweights the loss and incorporate this
+# re-tuned code to 0.9.7 and later.
+# ----------------------------------------------------------------
+#					<appro@fy.chalmers.se>
+
+# August 2009.
+#
+# George Spelvin has tipped that F_40_59(b,c,d) can be rewritten as
+# '(c&d) + (b&(c^d))', which allows to accumulate partial results
+# and lighten "pressure" on scratch registers. This resulted in
+# >12% performance improvement on contemporary AMD cores (with no
+# degradation on other CPUs:-). Also, the code was revised to maximize
+# "distance" between instructions producing input to 'lea' instruction
+# and the 'lea' instruction itself, which is essential for Intel Atom
+# core and resulted in ~15% improvement.
+
+# October 2010.
+#
+# Add SSSE3, Supplemental[!] SSE3, implementation. The idea behind it
+# is to offload message schedule denoted by Wt in NIST specification,
+# or Xupdate in OpenSSL source, to SIMD unit. The idea is not novel,
+# and in SSE2 context was first explored by Dean Gaudet in 2004, see
+# http://arctic.org/~dean/crypto/sha1.html. Since then several things
+# have changed that made it interesting again:
+#
+# a) XMM units became faster and wider;
+# b) instruction set became more versatile;
+# c) an important observation was made by Max Locktykhin, which made
+#    it possible to reduce amount of instructions required to perform
+#    the operation in question, for further details see
+#    http://software.intel.com/en-us/articles/improving-the-performance-of-the-secure-hash-algorithm-1/.
+
+# April 2011.
+#
+# Add AVX code path, probably most controversial... The thing is that
+# switch to AVX alone improves performance by as little as 4% in
+# comparison to SSSE3 code path. But below result doesn't look like
+# 4% improvement... Trouble is that Sandy Bridge decodes 'ro[rl]' as
+# pair of µ-ops, and it's the additional µ-ops, two per round, that
+# make it run slower than Core2 and Westmere. But 'sh[rl]d' is decoded
+# as single µ-op by Sandy Bridge and it's replacing 'ro[rl]' with
+# equivalent 'sh[rl]d' that is responsible for the impressive 5.1
+# cycles per processed byte. But 'sh[rl]d' is not something that used
+# to be fast, nor does it appear to be fast in upcoming Bulldozer
+# [according to its optimization manual]. Which is why AVX code path
+# is guarded by *both* AVX and synthetic bit denoting Intel CPUs.
+# One can argue that it's unfair to AMD, but without 'sh[rl]d' it
+# makes no sense to keep the AVX code path. If somebody feels that
+# strongly, it's probably more appropriate to discuss possibility of
+# using vector rotate XOP on AMD...
+
+# March 2014.
+#
+# Add support for Intel SHA Extensions.
+
+######################################################################
+# Current performance is summarized in following table. Numbers are
+# CPU clock cycles spent to process single byte (less is better).
+#
+#		x86		SSSE3		AVX
+# Pentium	15.7		-
+# PIII		11.5		-
+# P4		10.6		-
+# AMD K8	7.1		-
+# Core2		7.3		6.0/+22%	-
+# Westmere	7.3		5.5/+33%	-
+# Sandy Bridge	8.8		6.2/+40%	5.1(**)/+73%
+# Ivy Bridge	7.2		4.8/+51%	4.7(**)/+53%
+# Haswell	6.5		4.3/+51%	4.1(**)/+58%
+# Bulldozer	11.6		6.0/+92%
+# VIA Nano	10.6		7.5/+41%
+# Atom		12.5		9.3(*)/+35%
+# Silvermont	14.5		9.9(*)/+46%
+#
+# (*)	Loop is 1056 instructions long and expected result is ~8.25.
+#	The discrepancy is because of front-end limitations, so
+#	called MS-ROM penalties, and on Silvermont even rotate's
+#	limited parallelism.
+#
+# (**)	As per above comment, the result is for AVX *plus* sh[rl]d.
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm");
+require "x86asm.pl";
+
+$output=pop;
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+&asm_init($ARGV[0],"sha1-586.pl",$ARGV[$#ARGV] eq "386");
+
+$xmm=$ymm=0;
+for (@ARGV) { $xmm=1 if (/-DOPENSSL_IA32_SSE2/); }
+
+$ymm=1 if ($xmm &&
+		`$ENV{CC} -Wa,-v -c -o /dev/null -x assembler /dev/null 2>&1`
+			=~ /GNU assembler version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/ &&
+		$1>=2.19);	# first version supporting AVX
+
+$ymm=1 if ($xmm && !$ymm && $ARGV[0] eq "win32n" && 
+		`nasm -v 2>&1` =~ /NASM version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/ &&
+		$1>=2.03);	# first version supporting AVX
+
+$ymm=1 if ($xmm && !$ymm && $ARGV[0] eq "win32" &&
+		`ml 2>&1` =~ /Version ([0-9]+)\./ &&
+		$1>=10);	# first version supporting AVX
+
+$ymm=1 if ($xmm && !$ymm && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /(^clang version|based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/ &&
+		$2>=3.0);	# first version supporting AVX
+
+$shaext=$xmm;	### set to zero if compiling for 1.0.1
+
+&external_label("OPENSSL_ia32cap_P") if ($xmm);
+
+
+$A="eax";
+$B="ebx";
+$C="ecx";
+$D="edx";
+$E="edi";
+$T="esi";
+$tmp1="ebp";
+
+@V=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$T);
+
+$alt=0;	# 1 denotes alternative IALU implementation, which performs
+	# 8% *worse* on P4, same on Westmere and Atom, 2% better on
+	# Sandy Bridge...
+
+sub BODY_00_15
+	{
+	local($n,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f)=@_;
+
+	&comment("00_15 $n");
+
+	&mov($f,$c);			# f to hold F_00_19(b,c,d)
+	 if ($n==0)  { &mov($tmp1,$a); }
+	 else        { &mov($a,$tmp1); }
+	&rotl($tmp1,5);			# tmp1=ROTATE(a,5)
+	 &xor($f,$d);
+	&add($tmp1,$e);			# tmp1+=e;
+	 &mov($e,&swtmp($n%16));	# e becomes volatile and is loaded
+	 				# with xi, also note that e becomes
+					# f in next round...
+	&and($f,$b);
+	&rotr($b,2);			# b=ROTATE(b,30)
+	 &xor($f,$d);			# f holds F_00_19(b,c,d)
+	&lea($tmp1,&DWP(0x5a827999,$tmp1,$e));	# tmp1+=K_00_19+xi
+
+	if ($n==15) { &mov($e,&swtmp(($n+1)%16));# pre-fetch f for next round
+		      &add($f,$tmp1); }	# f+=tmp1
+	else        { &add($tmp1,$f); }	# f becomes a in next round
+	&mov($tmp1,$a)			if ($alt && $n==15);
+	}
+
+sub BODY_16_19
+	{
+	local($n,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f)=@_;
+
+	&comment("16_19 $n");
+
+if ($alt) {
+	&xor($c,$d);
+	 &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+2)%16));	# f to hold Xupdate(xi,xa,xb,xc,xd)
+	&and($tmp1,$c);			# tmp1 to hold F_00_19(b,c,d), b&=c^d
+	 &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+8)%16));
+	&xor($tmp1,$d);			# tmp1=F_00_19(b,c,d)
+	 &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+13)%16));	# f holds xa^xb^xc^xd
+	&rotl($f,1);			# f=ROTATE(f,1)
+	 &add($e,$tmp1);		# e+=F_00_19(b,c,d)
+	&xor($c,$d);			# restore $c
+	 &mov($tmp1,$a);		# b in next round
+	&rotr($b,$n==16?2:7);		# b=ROTATE(b,30)
+	 &mov(&swtmp($n%16),$f);	# xi=f
+	&rotl($a,5);			# ROTATE(a,5)
+	 &lea($f,&DWP(0x5a827999,$f,$e));# f+=F_00_19(b,c,d)+e
+	&mov($e,&swtmp(($n+1)%16));	# pre-fetch f for next round
+	 &add($f,$a);			# f+=ROTATE(a,5)
+} else {
+	&mov($tmp1,$c);			# tmp1 to hold F_00_19(b,c,d)
+	 &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+2)%16));	# f to hold Xupdate(xi,xa,xb,xc,xd)
+	&xor($tmp1,$d);
+	 &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+8)%16));
+	&and($tmp1,$b);
+	 &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+13)%16));	# f holds xa^xb^xc^xd
+	&rotl($f,1);			# f=ROTATE(f,1)
+	 &xor($tmp1,$d);		# tmp1=F_00_19(b,c,d)
+	&add($e,$tmp1);			# e+=F_00_19(b,c,d)
+	 &mov($tmp1,$a);
+	&rotr($b,2);			# b=ROTATE(b,30)
+	 &mov(&swtmp($n%16),$f);	# xi=f
+	&rotl($tmp1,5);			# ROTATE(a,5)
+	 &lea($f,&DWP(0x5a827999,$f,$e));# f+=F_00_19(b,c,d)+e
+	&mov($e,&swtmp(($n+1)%16));	# pre-fetch f for next round
+	 &add($f,$tmp1);		# f+=ROTATE(a,5)
+}
+	}
+
+sub BODY_20_39
+	{
+	local($n,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f)=@_;
+	local $K=($n<40)?0x6ed9eba1:0xca62c1d6;
+
+	&comment("20_39 $n");
+
+if ($alt) {
+	&xor($tmp1,$c);			# tmp1 to hold F_20_39(b,c,d), b^=c
+	 &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+2)%16));	# f to hold Xupdate(xi,xa,xb,xc,xd)
+	&xor($tmp1,$d);			# tmp1 holds F_20_39(b,c,d)
+	 &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+8)%16));
+	&add($e,$tmp1);			# e+=F_20_39(b,c,d)
+	 &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+13)%16));	# f holds xa^xb^xc^xd
+	&rotl($f,1);			# f=ROTATE(f,1)
+	 &mov($tmp1,$a);		# b in next round
+	&rotr($b,7);			# b=ROTATE(b,30)
+	 &mov(&swtmp($n%16),$f)		if($n<77);# xi=f
+	&rotl($a,5);			# ROTATE(a,5)
+	 &xor($b,$c)			if($n==39);# warm up for BODY_40_59
+	&and($tmp1,$b)			if($n==39);
+	 &lea($f,&DWP($K,$f,$e));	# f+=e+K_XX_YY
+	&mov($e,&swtmp(($n+1)%16))	if($n<79);# pre-fetch f for next round
+	 &add($f,$a);			# f+=ROTATE(a,5)
+	&rotr($a,5)			if ($n==79);
+} else {
+	&mov($tmp1,$b);			# tmp1 to hold F_20_39(b,c,d)
+	 &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+2)%16));	# f to hold Xupdate(xi,xa,xb,xc,xd)
+	&xor($tmp1,$c);
+	 &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+8)%16));
+	&xor($tmp1,$d);			# tmp1 holds F_20_39(b,c,d)
+	 &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+13)%16));	# f holds xa^xb^xc^xd
+	&rotl($f,1);			# f=ROTATE(f,1)
+	 &add($e,$tmp1);		# e+=F_20_39(b,c,d)
+	&rotr($b,2);			# b=ROTATE(b,30)
+	 &mov($tmp1,$a);
+	&rotl($tmp1,5);			# ROTATE(a,5)
+	 &mov(&swtmp($n%16),$f) if($n<77);# xi=f
+	&lea($f,&DWP($K,$f,$e));	# f+=e+K_XX_YY
+	 &mov($e,&swtmp(($n+1)%16)) if($n<79);# pre-fetch f for next round
+	&add($f,$tmp1);			# f+=ROTATE(a,5)
+}
+	}
+
+sub BODY_40_59
+	{
+	local($n,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f)=@_;
+
+	&comment("40_59 $n");
+
+if ($alt) {
+	&add($e,$tmp1);			# e+=b&(c^d)
+	 &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+2)%16));	# f to hold Xupdate(xi,xa,xb,xc,xd)
+	&mov($tmp1,$d);
+	 &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+8)%16));
+	&xor($c,$d);			# restore $c
+	 &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+13)%16));	# f holds xa^xb^xc^xd
+	&rotl($f,1);			# f=ROTATE(f,1)
+	 &and($tmp1,$c);
+	&rotr($b,7);			# b=ROTATE(b,30)
+	 &add($e,$tmp1);		# e+=c&d
+	&mov($tmp1,$a);			# b in next round
+	 &mov(&swtmp($n%16),$f);	# xi=f
+	&rotl($a,5);			# ROTATE(a,5)
+	 &xor($b,$c)			if ($n<59);
+	&and($tmp1,$b)			if ($n<59);# tmp1 to hold F_40_59(b,c,d)
+	 &lea($f,&DWP(0x8f1bbcdc,$f,$e));# f+=K_40_59+e+(b&(c^d))
+	&mov($e,&swtmp(($n+1)%16));	# pre-fetch f for next round
+	 &add($f,$a);			# f+=ROTATE(a,5)
+} else {
+	&mov($tmp1,$c);			# tmp1 to hold F_40_59(b,c,d)
+	 &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+2)%16));	# f to hold Xupdate(xi,xa,xb,xc,xd)
+	&xor($tmp1,$d);
+	 &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+8)%16));
+	&and($tmp1,$b);
+	 &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+13)%16));	# f holds xa^xb^xc^xd
+	&rotl($f,1);			# f=ROTATE(f,1)
+	 &add($tmp1,$e);		# b&(c^d)+=e
+	&rotr($b,2);			# b=ROTATE(b,30)
+	 &mov($e,$a);			# e becomes volatile
+	&rotl($e,5);			# ROTATE(a,5)
+	 &mov(&swtmp($n%16),$f);	# xi=f
+	&lea($f,&DWP(0x8f1bbcdc,$f,$tmp1));# f+=K_40_59+e+(b&(c^d))
+	 &mov($tmp1,$c);
+	&add($f,$e);			# f+=ROTATE(a,5)
+	 &and($tmp1,$d);
+	&mov($e,&swtmp(($n+1)%16));	# pre-fetch f for next round
+	 &add($f,$tmp1);		# f+=c&d
+}
+	}
+
+&function_begin("sha1_block_data_order");
+if ($xmm) {
+  &static_label("shaext_shortcut")	if ($shaext);
+  &static_label("ssse3_shortcut");
+  &static_label("avx_shortcut")		if ($ymm);
+  &static_label("K_XX_XX");
+
+	&call	(&label("pic_point"));	# make it PIC!
+  &set_label("pic_point");
+	&blindpop($tmp1);
+	&picmeup($T,"OPENSSL_ia32cap_P",$tmp1,&label("pic_point"));
+	&lea	($tmp1,&DWP(&label("K_XX_XX")."-".&label("pic_point"),$tmp1));
+
+	&mov	($A,&DWP(0,$T));
+	&mov	($D,&DWP(4,$T));
+	&test	($D,1<<9);		# check SSSE3 bit
+	&jz	(&label("x86"));
+	&mov	($C,&DWP(8,$T));
+	&test	($A,1<<24);		# check FXSR bit
+	&jz	(&label("x86"));
+	if ($shaext) {
+		&test	($C,1<<29);		# check SHA bit
+		&jnz	(&label("shaext_shortcut"));
+	}
+	if ($ymm) {
+		&and	($D,1<<28);		# mask AVX bit
+		&and	($A,1<<30);		# mask "Intel CPU" bit
+		&or	($A,$D);
+		&cmp	($A,1<<28|1<<30);
+		&je	(&label("avx_shortcut"));
+	}
+	&jmp	(&label("ssse3_shortcut"));
+  &set_label("x86",16);
+}
+	&mov($tmp1,&wparam(0));	# SHA_CTX *c
+	&mov($T,&wparam(1));	# const void *input
+	&mov($A,&wparam(2));	# size_t num
+	&stack_push(16+3);	# allocate X[16]
+	&shl($A,6);
+	&add($A,$T);
+	&mov(&wparam(2),$A);	# pointer beyond the end of input
+	&mov($E,&DWP(16,$tmp1));# pre-load E
+	&jmp(&label("loop"));
+
+&set_label("loop",16);
+
+	# copy input chunk to X, but reversing byte order!
+	for ($i=0; $i<16; $i+=4)
+		{
+		&mov($A,&DWP(4*($i+0),$T));
+		&mov($B,&DWP(4*($i+1),$T));
+		&mov($C,&DWP(4*($i+2),$T));
+		&mov($D,&DWP(4*($i+3),$T));
+		&bswap($A);
+		&bswap($B);
+		&bswap($C);
+		&bswap($D);
+		&mov(&swtmp($i+0),$A);
+		&mov(&swtmp($i+1),$B);
+		&mov(&swtmp($i+2),$C);
+		&mov(&swtmp($i+3),$D);
+		}
+	&mov(&wparam(1),$T);	# redundant in 1st spin
+
+	&mov($A,&DWP(0,$tmp1));	# load SHA_CTX
+	&mov($B,&DWP(4,$tmp1));
+	&mov($C,&DWP(8,$tmp1));
+	&mov($D,&DWP(12,$tmp1));
+	# E is pre-loaded
+
+	for($i=0;$i<16;$i++)	{ &BODY_00_15($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+	for(;$i<20;$i++)	{ &BODY_16_19($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+	for(;$i<40;$i++)	{ &BODY_20_39($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+	for(;$i<60;$i++)	{ &BODY_40_59($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+	for(;$i<80;$i++)	{ &BODY_20_39($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+
+	(($V[5] eq $D) and ($V[0] eq $E)) or die;	# double-check
+
+	&mov($tmp1,&wparam(0));	# re-load SHA_CTX*
+	&mov($D,&wparam(1));	# D is last "T" and is discarded
+
+	&add($E,&DWP(0,$tmp1));	# E is last "A"...
+	&add($T,&DWP(4,$tmp1));
+	&add($A,&DWP(8,$tmp1));
+	&add($B,&DWP(12,$tmp1));
+	&add($C,&DWP(16,$tmp1));
+
+	&mov(&DWP(0,$tmp1),$E);	# update SHA_CTX
+	 &add($D,64);		# advance input pointer
+	&mov(&DWP(4,$tmp1),$T);
+	 &cmp($D,&wparam(2));	# have we reached the end yet?
+	&mov(&DWP(8,$tmp1),$A);
+	 &mov($E,$C);		# C is last "E" which needs to be "pre-loaded"
+	&mov(&DWP(12,$tmp1),$B);
+	 &mov($T,$D);		# input pointer
+	&mov(&DWP(16,$tmp1),$C);
+	&jb(&label("loop"));
+
+	&stack_pop(16+3);
+&function_end("sha1_block_data_order");
+
+if ($xmm) {
+if ($shaext) {
+######################################################################
+# Intel SHA Extensions implementation of SHA1 update function.
+#
+my ($ctx,$inp,$num)=("edi","esi","ecx");
+my ($ABCD,$E,$E_,$BSWAP)=map("xmm$_",(0..3));
+my @MSG=map("xmm$_",(4..7));
+
+sub sha1rnds4 {
+ my ($dst,$src,$imm)=@_;
+    if ("$dst:$src" =~ /xmm([0-7]):xmm([0-7])/)
+    {	&data_byte(0x0f,0x3a,0xcc,0xc0|($1<<3)|$2,$imm);	}
+}
+sub sha1op38 {
+ my ($opcodelet,$dst,$src)=@_;
+    if ("$dst:$src" =~ /xmm([0-7]):xmm([0-7])/)
+    {	&data_byte(0x0f,0x38,$opcodelet,0xc0|($1<<3)|$2);	}
+}
+sub sha1nexte	{ sha1op38(0xc8,@_); }
+sub sha1msg1	{ sha1op38(0xc9,@_); }
+sub sha1msg2	{ sha1op38(0xca,@_); }
+
+&function_begin("_sha1_block_data_order_shaext");
+	&call	(&label("pic_point"));	# make it PIC!
+	&set_label("pic_point");
+	&blindpop($tmp1);
+	&lea	($tmp1,&DWP(&label("K_XX_XX")."-".&label("pic_point"),$tmp1));
+&set_label("shaext_shortcut");
+	&mov	($ctx,&wparam(0));
+	&mov	("ebx","esp");
+	&mov	($inp,&wparam(1));
+	&mov	($num,&wparam(2));
+	&sub	("esp",32);
+
+	&movdqu	($ABCD,&QWP(0,$ctx));
+	&movd	($E,&DWP(16,$ctx));
+	&and	("esp",-32);
+	&movdqa	($BSWAP,&QWP(0x50,$tmp1));	# byte-n-word swap
+
+	&movdqu	(@MSG[0],&QWP(0,$inp));
+	&pshufd	($ABCD,$ABCD,0b00011011);	# flip word order
+	&movdqu	(@MSG[1],&QWP(0x10,$inp));
+	&pshufd	($E,$E,0b00011011);		# flip word order
+	&movdqu	(@MSG[2],&QWP(0x20,$inp));
+	&pshufb	(@MSG[0],$BSWAP);
+	&movdqu	(@MSG[3],&QWP(0x30,$inp));
+	&pshufb	(@MSG[1],$BSWAP);
+	&pshufb	(@MSG[2],$BSWAP);
+	&pshufb	(@MSG[3],$BSWAP);
+	&jmp	(&label("loop_shaext"));
+
+&set_label("loop_shaext",16);
+	&dec		($num);
+	&lea		("eax",&DWP(0x40,$inp));
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(0,"esp"),$E);	# offload $E
+	&paddd		($E,@MSG[0]);
+	&cmovne		($inp,"eax");
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16,"esp"),$ABCD);	# offload $ABCD
+
+for($i=0;$i<20-4;$i+=2) {
+	&sha1msg1	(@MSG[0],@MSG[1]);
+	&movdqa		($E_,$ABCD);
+	&sha1rnds4	($ABCD,$E,int($i/5));	# 0-3...
+	&sha1nexte	($E_,@MSG[1]);
+	&pxor		(@MSG[0],@MSG[2]);
+	&sha1msg1	(@MSG[1],@MSG[2]);
+	&sha1msg2	(@MSG[0],@MSG[3]);
+
+	&movdqa		($E,$ABCD);
+	&sha1rnds4	($ABCD,$E_,int(($i+1)/5));
+	&sha1nexte	($E,@MSG[2]);
+	&pxor		(@MSG[1],@MSG[3]);
+	&sha1msg2	(@MSG[1],@MSG[0]);
+
+	push(@MSG,shift(@MSG));	push(@MSG,shift(@MSG));
+}
+	&movdqu		(@MSG[0],&QWP(0,$inp));
+	&movdqa		($E_,$ABCD);
+	&sha1rnds4	($ABCD,$E,3);		# 64-67
+	&sha1nexte	($E_,@MSG[1]);
+	&movdqu		(@MSG[1],&QWP(0x10,$inp));
+	&pshufb		(@MSG[0],$BSWAP);
+
+	&movdqa		($E,$ABCD);
+	&sha1rnds4	($ABCD,$E_,3);		# 68-71
+	&sha1nexte	($E,@MSG[2]);
+	&movdqu		(@MSG[2],&QWP(0x20,$inp));
+	&pshufb		(@MSG[1],$BSWAP);
+
+	&movdqa		($E_,$ABCD);
+	&sha1rnds4	($ABCD,$E,3);		# 72-75
+	&sha1nexte	($E_,@MSG[3]);
+	&movdqu		(@MSG[3],&QWP(0x30,$inp));
+	&pshufb		(@MSG[2],$BSWAP);
+
+	&movdqa		($E,$ABCD);
+	&sha1rnds4	($ABCD,$E_,3);		# 76-79
+	&movdqa		($E_,&QWP(0,"esp"));
+	&pshufb		(@MSG[3],$BSWAP);
+	&sha1nexte	($E,$E_);
+	&paddd		($ABCD,&QWP(16,"esp"));
+
+	&jnz		(&label("loop_shaext"));
+
+	&pshufd	($ABCD,$ABCD,0b00011011);
+	&pshufd	($E,$E,0b00011011);
+	&movdqu	(&QWP(0,$ctx),$ABCD)
+	&movd	(&DWP(16,$ctx),$E);
+	&mov	("esp","ebx");
+&function_end("_sha1_block_data_order_shaext");
+}
+######################################################################
+# The SSSE3 implementation.
+#
+# %xmm[0-7] are used as ring @X[] buffer containing quadruples of last
+# 32 elements of the message schedule or Xupdate outputs. First 4
+# quadruples are simply byte-swapped input, next 4 are calculated
+# according to method originally suggested by Dean Gaudet (modulo
+# being implemented in SSSE3). Once 8 quadruples or 32 elements are
+# collected, it switches to routine proposed by Max Locktyukhin.
+#
+# Calculations inevitably require temporary reqisters, and there are
+# no %xmm registers left to spare. For this reason part of the ring
+# buffer, X[2..4] to be specific, is offloaded to 3 quadriples ring
+# buffer on the stack. Keep in mind that X[2] is alias X[-6], X[3] -
+# X[-5], and X[4] - X[-4]...
+#
+# Another notable optimization is aggressive stack frame compression
+# aiming to minimize amount of 9-byte instructions...
+#
+# Yet another notable optimization is "jumping" $B variable. It means
+# that there is no register permanently allocated for $B value. This
+# allowed to eliminate one instruction from body_20_39...
+#
+my $Xi=4;			# 4xSIMD Xupdate round, start pre-seeded
+my @X=map("xmm$_",(4..7,0..3));	# pre-seeded for $Xi=4
+my @V=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E);
+my $j=0;			# hash round
+my $rx=0;
+my @T=($T,$tmp1);
+my $inp;
+
+my $_rol=sub { &rol(@_) };
+my $_ror=sub { &ror(@_) };
+
+&function_begin("_sha1_block_data_order_ssse3");
+	&call	(&label("pic_point"));	# make it PIC!
+	&set_label("pic_point");
+	&blindpop($tmp1);
+	&lea	($tmp1,&DWP(&label("K_XX_XX")."-".&label("pic_point"),$tmp1));
+&set_label("ssse3_shortcut");
+
+	&movdqa	(@X[3],&QWP(0,$tmp1));		# K_00_19
+	&movdqa	(@X[4],&QWP(16,$tmp1));		# K_20_39
+	&movdqa	(@X[5],&QWP(32,$tmp1));		# K_40_59
+	&movdqa	(@X[6],&QWP(48,$tmp1));		# K_60_79
+	&movdqa	(@X[2],&QWP(64,$tmp1));		# pbswap mask
+
+	&mov	($E,&wparam(0));		# load argument block
+	&mov	($inp=@T[1],&wparam(1));
+	&mov	($D,&wparam(2));
+	&mov	(@T[0],"esp");
+
+	# stack frame layout
+	#
+	# +0	X[0]+K	X[1]+K	X[2]+K	X[3]+K	# XMM->IALU xfer area
+	#	X[4]+K	X[5]+K	X[6]+K	X[7]+K
+	#	X[8]+K	X[9]+K	X[10]+K	X[11]+K
+	#	X[12]+K	X[13]+K	X[14]+K	X[15]+K
+	#
+	# +64	X[0]	X[1]	X[2]	X[3]	# XMM->XMM backtrace area
+	#	X[4]	X[5]	X[6]	X[7]
+	#	X[8]	X[9]	X[10]	X[11]	# even borrowed for K_00_19
+	#
+	# +112	K_20_39	K_20_39	K_20_39	K_20_39	# constants
+	#	K_40_59	K_40_59	K_40_59	K_40_59
+	#	K_60_79	K_60_79	K_60_79	K_60_79
+	#	K_00_19	K_00_19	K_00_19	K_00_19
+	#	pbswap mask
+	#
+	# +192	ctx				# argument block
+	# +196	inp
+	# +200	end
+	# +204	esp
+	&sub	("esp",208);
+	&and	("esp",-64);
+
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(112+0,"esp"),@X[4]);	# copy constants
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(112+16,"esp"),@X[5]);
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(112+32,"esp"),@X[6]);
+	&shl	($D,6);				# len*64
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(112+48,"esp"),@X[3]);
+	&add	($D,$inp);			# end of input
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(112+64,"esp"),@X[2]);
+	&add	($inp,64);
+	&mov	(&DWP(192+0,"esp"),$E);		# save argument block
+	&mov	(&DWP(192+4,"esp"),$inp);
+	&mov	(&DWP(192+8,"esp"),$D);
+	&mov	(&DWP(192+12,"esp"),@T[0]);	# save original %esp
+
+	&mov	($A,&DWP(0,$E));		# load context
+	&mov	($B,&DWP(4,$E));
+	&mov	($C,&DWP(8,$E));
+	&mov	($D,&DWP(12,$E));
+	&mov	($E,&DWP(16,$E));
+	&mov	(@T[0],$B);			# magic seed
+
+	&movdqu	(@X[-4&7],&QWP(-64,$inp));	# load input to %xmm[0-3]
+	&movdqu	(@X[-3&7],&QWP(-48,$inp));
+	&movdqu	(@X[-2&7],&QWP(-32,$inp));
+	&movdqu	(@X[-1&7],&QWP(-16,$inp));
+	&pshufb	(@X[-4&7],@X[2]);		# byte swap
+	&pshufb	(@X[-3&7],@X[2]);
+	&pshufb	(@X[-2&7],@X[2]);
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(112-16,"esp"),@X[3]);	# borrow last backtrace slot
+	&pshufb	(@X[-1&7],@X[2]);
+	&paddd	(@X[-4&7],@X[3]);		# add K_00_19
+	&paddd	(@X[-3&7],@X[3]);
+	&paddd	(@X[-2&7],@X[3]);
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(0,"esp"),@X[-4&7]);	# X[]+K xfer to IALU
+	&psubd	(@X[-4&7],@X[3]);		# restore X[]
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(0+16,"esp"),@X[-3&7]);
+	&psubd	(@X[-3&7],@X[3]);
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(0+32,"esp"),@X[-2&7]);
+	&mov	(@T[1],$C);
+	&psubd	(@X[-2&7],@X[3]);
+	&xor	(@T[1],$D);
+	&pshufd	(@X[0],@X[-4&7],0xee);		# was &movdqa	(@X[0],@X[-3&7]);
+	&and	(@T[0],@T[1]);
+	&jmp	(&label("loop"));
+
+######################################################################
+# SSE instruction sequence is first broken to groups of independent
+# instructions, independent in respect to their inputs and shifter
+# (not all architectures have more than one). Then IALU instructions
+# are "knitted in" between the SSE groups. Distance is maintained for
+# SSE latency of 2 in hope that it fits better upcoming AMD Bulldozer
+# [which allegedly also implements SSSE3]...
+#
+# Temporary registers usage. X[2] is volatile at the entry and at the
+# end is restored from backtrace ring buffer. X[3] is expected to
+# contain current K_XX_XX constant and is used to calculate X[-1]+K
+# from previous round, it becomes volatile the moment the value is
+# saved to stack for transfer to IALU. X[4] becomes volatile whenever
+# X[-4] is accumulated and offloaded to backtrace ring buffer, at the
+# end it is loaded with next K_XX_XX [which becomes X[3] in next
+# round]...
+#
+sub Xupdate_ssse3_16_31()		# recall that $Xi starts with 4
+{ use integer;
+  my $body = shift;
+  my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body);	# 40 instructions
+  my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e);
+
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# ror
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&punpcklqdq(@X[0],@X[-3&7]);	# compose "X[-14]" in "X[0]", was &palignr(@X[0],@X[-4&7],8);
+	&movdqa	(@X[2],@X[-1&7]);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	  &paddd	(@X[3],@X[-1&7]);
+	  &movdqa	(&QWP(64+16*(($Xi-4)%3),"esp"),@X[-4&7]);# save X[] to backtrace buffer
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# rol
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&psrldq	(@X[2],4);		# "X[-3]", 3 dwords
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&pxor	(@X[0],@X[-4&7]);	# "X[0]"^="X[-16]"
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# ror
+
+	&pxor	(@X[2],@X[-2&7]);	# "X[-3]"^"X[-8]"
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	&pxor	(@X[0],@X[2]);		# "X[0]"^="X[-3]"^"X[-8]"
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# rol
+	  &movdqa	(&QWP(0+16*(($Xi-1)&3),"esp"),@X[3]);	# X[]+K xfer to IALU
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	&movdqa	(@X[4],@X[0]);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# ror
+	&movdqa (@X[2],@X[0]);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	&pslldq	(@X[4],12);		# "X[0]"<<96, extract one dword
+	&paddd	(@X[0],@X[0]);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	&psrld	(@X[2],31);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# rol
+	&movdqa	(@X[3],@X[4]);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	&psrld	(@X[4],30);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# ror
+	&por	(@X[0],@X[2]);		# "X[0]"<<<=1
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	  &movdqa	(@X[2],&QWP(64+16*(($Xi-6)%3),"esp")) if ($Xi>5);	# restore X[] from backtrace buffer
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	&pslld	(@X[3],2);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# rol
+	&pxor   (@X[0],@X[4]);
+	  &movdqa	(@X[4],&QWP(112-16+16*(($Xi)/5),"esp"));	# K_XX_XX
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	&pxor	(@X[0],@X[3]);		# "X[0]"^=("X[0]"<<96)<<<2
+	  &pshufd	(@X[1],@X[-3&7],0xee)	if ($Xi<7);	# was &movdqa	(@X[1],@X[-2&7])
+	  &pshufd	(@X[3],@X[-1&7],0xee)	if ($Xi==7);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	 foreach (@insns) { eval; }	# remaining instructions [if any]
+
+  $Xi++;	push(@X,shift(@X));	# "rotate" X[]
+}
+
+sub Xupdate_ssse3_32_79()
+{ use integer;
+  my $body = shift;
+  my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body);	# 32 to 44 instructions
+  my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e);
+
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# body_20_39
+	&pxor	(@X[0],@X[-4&7]);	# "X[0]"="X[-32]"^"X[-16]"
+	&punpcklqdq(@X[2],@X[-1&7]);	# compose "X[-6]", was &palignr(@X[2],@X[-2&7],8)
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# rol
+
+	&pxor	(@X[0],@X[-7&7]);	# "X[0]"^="X[-28]"
+	  &movdqa	(&QWP(64+16*(($Xi-4)%3),"esp"),@X[-4&7]);	# save X[] to backtrace buffer
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns))		if (@insns[0] =~ /_rol/);
+	 if ($Xi%5) {
+	  &movdqa	(@X[4],@X[3]);	# "perpetuate" K_XX_XX...
+	 } else {			# ... or load next one
+	  &movdqa	(@X[4],&QWP(112-16+16*($Xi/5),"esp"));
+	 }
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# ror
+	  &paddd	(@X[3],@X[-1&7]);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	&pxor	(@X[0],@X[2]);		# "X[0]"^="X[-6]"
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# body_20_39
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# rol
+
+	&movdqa	(@X[2],@X[0]);
+	  &movdqa	(&QWP(0+16*(($Xi-1)&3),"esp"),@X[3]);	# X[]+K xfer to IALU
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# ror
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns))		if (@insns[0] =~ /_rol/);
+
+	&pslld	(@X[0],2);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# body_20_39
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&psrld	(@X[2],30);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# rol
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# ror
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns))		if (@insns[1] =~ /_rol/);
+	 eval(shift(@insns))		if (@insns[0] =~ /_rol/);
+
+	&por	(@X[0],@X[2]);		# "X[0]"<<<=2
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# body_20_39
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	  &movdqa	(@X[2],&QWP(64+16*(($Xi-6)%3),"esp")) if($Xi<19);	# restore X[] from backtrace buffer
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# rol
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# ror
+	  &pshufd	(@X[3],@X[-1],0xee)	if ($Xi<19);	# was &movdqa	(@X[3],@X[0])
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	 foreach (@insns) { eval; }	# remaining instructions
+
+  $Xi++;	push(@X,shift(@X));	# "rotate" X[]
+}
+
+sub Xuplast_ssse3_80()
+{ use integer;
+  my $body = shift;
+  my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body);	# 32 instructions
+  my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e);
+
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	  &paddd	(@X[3],@X[-1&7]);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	  &movdqa	(&QWP(0+16*(($Xi-1)&3),"esp"),@X[3]);	# X[]+K xfer IALU
+
+	 foreach (@insns) { eval; }		# remaining instructions
+
+	&mov	($inp=@T[1],&DWP(192+4,"esp"));
+	&cmp	($inp,&DWP(192+8,"esp"));
+	&je	(&label("done"));
+
+	&movdqa	(@X[3],&QWP(112+48,"esp"));	# K_00_19
+	&movdqa	(@X[2],&QWP(112+64,"esp"));	# pbswap mask
+	&movdqu	(@X[-4&7],&QWP(0,$inp));	# load input
+	&movdqu	(@X[-3&7],&QWP(16,$inp));
+	&movdqu	(@X[-2&7],&QWP(32,$inp));
+	&movdqu	(@X[-1&7],&QWP(48,$inp));
+	&add	($inp,64);
+	&pshufb	(@X[-4&7],@X[2]);		# byte swap
+	&mov	(&DWP(192+4,"esp"),$inp);
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(112-16,"esp"),@X[3]);	# borrow last backtrace slot
+
+  $Xi=0;
+}
+
+sub Xloop_ssse3()
+{ use integer;
+  my $body = shift;
+  my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body);	# 32 instructions
+  my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e);
+
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&pshufb	(@X[($Xi-3)&7],@X[2]);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&paddd	(@X[($Xi-4)&7],@X[3]);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(0+16*$Xi,"esp"),@X[($Xi-4)&7]);	# X[]+K xfer to IALU
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&psubd	(@X[($Xi-4)&7],@X[3]);
+
+	foreach (@insns) { eval; }
+  $Xi++;
+}
+
+sub Xtail_ssse3()
+{ use integer;
+  my $body = shift;
+  my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body);	# 32 instructions
+  my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e);
+
+	foreach (@insns) { eval; }
+}
+
+sub body_00_19 () {	# ((c^d)&b)^d
+	# on start @T[0]=(c^d)&b
+	return &body_20_39()	if ($rx==19);	$rx++;
+	(
+	'($a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@V;'.
+	'&$_ror	($b,$j?7:2);',	# $b>>>2
+	'&xor	(@T[0],$d);',
+	'&mov	(@T[1],$a);',	# $b in next round
+
+	'&add	($e,&DWP(4*($j&15),"esp"));',	# X[]+K xfer
+	'&xor	($b,$c);',	# $c^$d for next round
+
+	'&$_rol	($a,5);',
+	'&add	($e,@T[0]);',
+	'&and	(@T[1],$b);',	# ($b&($c^$d)) for next round
+
+	'&xor	($b,$c);',	# restore $b
+	'&add	($e,$a);'	.'$j++; unshift(@V,pop(@V)); unshift(@T,pop(@T));'
+	);
+}
+
+sub body_20_39 () {	# b^d^c
+	# on entry @T[0]=b^d
+	return &body_40_59()	if ($rx==39);	$rx++;
+	(
+	'($a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@V;'.
+	'&add	($e,&DWP(4*($j&15),"esp"));',	# X[]+K xfer
+	'&xor	(@T[0],$d)	if($j==19);'.
+	'&xor	(@T[0],$c)	if($j> 19);',	# ($b^$d^$c)
+	'&mov	(@T[1],$a);',	# $b in next round
+
+	'&$_rol	($a,5);',
+	'&add	($e,@T[0]);',
+	'&xor	(@T[1],$c)	if ($j< 79);',	# $b^$d for next round
+
+	'&$_ror	($b,7);',	# $b>>>2
+	'&add	($e,$a);'	.'$j++; unshift(@V,pop(@V)); unshift(@T,pop(@T));'
+	);
+}
+
+sub body_40_59 () {	# ((b^c)&(c^d))^c
+	# on entry @T[0]=(b^c), (c^=d)
+	$rx++;
+	(
+	'($a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@V;'.
+	'&add	($e,&DWP(4*($j&15),"esp"));',	# X[]+K xfer
+	'&and	(@T[0],$c)	if ($j>=40);',	# (b^c)&(c^d)
+	'&xor	($c,$d)		if ($j>=40);',	# restore $c
+
+	'&$_ror	($b,7);',	# $b>>>2
+	'&mov	(@T[1],$a);',	# $b for next round
+	'&xor	(@T[0],$c);',
+
+	'&$_rol	($a,5);',
+	'&add	($e,@T[0]);',
+	'&xor	(@T[1],$c)	if ($j==59);'.
+	'&xor	(@T[1],$b)	if ($j< 59);',	# b^c for next round
+
+	'&xor	($b,$c)		if ($j< 59);',	# c^d for next round
+	'&add	($e,$a);'	.'$j++; unshift(@V,pop(@V)); unshift(@T,pop(@T));'
+	);
+}
+######
+sub bodyx_00_19 () {	# ((c^d)&b)^d
+	# on start @T[0]=(b&c)^(~b&d), $e+=X[]+K
+	return &bodyx_20_39()	if ($rx==19);	$rx++;
+	(
+	'($a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@V;'.
+
+	'&rorx	($b,$b,2)			if ($j==0);'.	# $b>>>2
+	'&rorx	($b,@T[1],7)			if ($j!=0);',	# $b>>>2
+	'&lea	($e,&DWP(0,$e,@T[0]));',
+	'&rorx	(@T[0],$a,5);',
+
+	'&andn	(@T[1],$a,$c);',
+	'&and	($a,$b)',
+	'&add	($d,&DWP(4*(($j+1)&15),"esp"));',	# X[]+K xfer
+
+	'&xor	(@T[1],$a)',
+	'&add	($e,@T[0]);'	.'$j++; unshift(@V,pop(@V)); unshift(@T,pop(@T));'
+	);
+}
+
+sub bodyx_20_39 () {	# b^d^c
+	# on start $b=b^c^d
+	return &bodyx_40_59()	if ($rx==39);	$rx++;
+	(
+	'($a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@V;'.
+
+	'&add	($e,($j==19?@T[0]:$b))',
+	'&rorx	($b,@T[1],7);',	# $b>>>2
+	'&rorx	(@T[0],$a,5);',
+
+	'&xor	($a,$b)				if ($j<79);',
+	'&add	($d,&DWP(4*(($j+1)&15),"esp"))	if ($j<79);',	# X[]+K xfer
+	'&xor	($a,$c)				if ($j<79);',
+	'&add	($e,@T[0]);'	.'$j++; unshift(@V,pop(@V)); unshift(@T,pop(@T));'
+	);
+}
+
+sub bodyx_40_59 () {	# ((b^c)&(c^d))^c
+	# on start $b=((b^c)&(c^d))^c
+	return &bodyx_20_39()	if ($rx==59);	$rx++;
+	(
+	'($a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@V;'.
+
+	'&rorx	(@T[0],$a,5)',
+	'&lea	($e,&DWP(0,$e,$b))',
+	'&rorx	($b,@T[1],7)',	# $b>>>2
+	'&add	($d,&DWP(4*(($j+1)&15),"esp"))',	# X[]+K xfer
+
+	'&mov	(@T[1],$c)',
+	'&xor	($a,$b)',	# b^c for next round
+	'&xor	(@T[1],$b)',	# c^d for next round
+
+	'&and	($a,@T[1])',
+	'&add	($e,@T[0])',
+	'&xor	($a,$b)'	.'$j++; unshift(@V,pop(@V)); unshift(@T,pop(@T));'
+	);
+}
+
+&set_label("loop",16);
+	&Xupdate_ssse3_16_31(\&body_00_19);
+	&Xupdate_ssse3_16_31(\&body_00_19);
+	&Xupdate_ssse3_16_31(\&body_00_19);
+	&Xupdate_ssse3_16_31(\&body_00_19);
+	&Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_00_19);
+	&Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_20_39);
+	&Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_20_39);
+	&Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_20_39);
+	&Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_20_39);
+	&Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_20_39);
+	&Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_40_59);
+	&Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_40_59);
+	&Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_40_59);
+	&Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_40_59);
+	&Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_40_59);
+	&Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_20_39);
+	&Xuplast_ssse3_80(\&body_20_39);	# can jump to "done"
+
+				$saved_j=$j; @saved_V=@V;
+
+	&Xloop_ssse3(\&body_20_39);
+	&Xloop_ssse3(\&body_20_39);
+	&Xloop_ssse3(\&body_20_39);
+
+	&mov	(@T[1],&DWP(192,"esp"));	# update context
+	&add	($A,&DWP(0,@T[1]));
+	&add	(@T[0],&DWP(4,@T[1]));		# $b
+	&add	($C,&DWP(8,@T[1]));
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,@T[1]),$A);
+	&add	($D,&DWP(12,@T[1]));
+	&mov	(&DWP(4,@T[1]),@T[0]);
+	&add	($E,&DWP(16,@T[1]));
+	&mov	(&DWP(8,@T[1]),$C);
+	&mov	($B,$C);
+	&mov	(&DWP(12,@T[1]),$D);
+	&xor	($B,$D);
+	&mov	(&DWP(16,@T[1]),$E);
+	&mov	(@T[1],@T[0]);
+	&pshufd	(@X[0],@X[-4&7],0xee);		# was &movdqa	(@X[0],@X[-3&7]);
+	&and	(@T[0],$B);
+	&mov	($B,$T[1]);
+
+	&jmp	(&label("loop"));
+
+&set_label("done",16);		$j=$saved_j; @V=@saved_V;
+
+	&Xtail_ssse3(\&body_20_39);
+	&Xtail_ssse3(\&body_20_39);
+	&Xtail_ssse3(\&body_20_39);
+
+	&mov	(@T[1],&DWP(192,"esp"));	# update context
+	&add	($A,&DWP(0,@T[1]));
+	&mov	("esp",&DWP(192+12,"esp"));	# restore %esp
+	&add	(@T[0],&DWP(4,@T[1]));		# $b
+	&add	($C,&DWP(8,@T[1]));
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,@T[1]),$A);
+	&add	($D,&DWP(12,@T[1]));
+	&mov	(&DWP(4,@T[1]),@T[0]);
+	&add	($E,&DWP(16,@T[1]));
+	&mov	(&DWP(8,@T[1]),$C);
+	&mov	(&DWP(12,@T[1]),$D);
+	&mov	(&DWP(16,@T[1]),$E);
+
+&function_end("_sha1_block_data_order_ssse3");
+
+$rx=0;	# reset
+
+if ($ymm) {
+my $Xi=4;			# 4xSIMD Xupdate round, start pre-seeded
+my @X=map("xmm$_",(4..7,0..3));	# pre-seeded for $Xi=4
+my @V=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E);
+my $j=0;			# hash round
+my @T=($T,$tmp1);
+my $inp;
+
+my $_rol=sub { &shld(@_[0],@_) };
+my $_ror=sub { &shrd(@_[0],@_) };
+
+&function_begin("_sha1_block_data_order_avx");
+	&call	(&label("pic_point"));	# make it PIC!
+	&set_label("pic_point");
+	&blindpop($tmp1);
+	&lea	($tmp1,&DWP(&label("K_XX_XX")."-".&label("pic_point"),$tmp1));
+&set_label("avx_shortcut");
+	&vzeroall();
+
+	&vmovdqa(@X[3],&QWP(0,$tmp1));		# K_00_19
+	&vmovdqa(@X[4],&QWP(16,$tmp1));		# K_20_39
+	&vmovdqa(@X[5],&QWP(32,$tmp1));		# K_40_59
+	&vmovdqa(@X[6],&QWP(48,$tmp1));		# K_60_79
+	&vmovdqa(@X[2],&QWP(64,$tmp1));		# pbswap mask
+
+	&mov	($E,&wparam(0));		# load argument block
+	&mov	($inp=@T[1],&wparam(1));
+	&mov	($D,&wparam(2));
+	&mov	(@T[0],"esp");
+
+	# stack frame layout
+	#
+	# +0	X[0]+K	X[1]+K	X[2]+K	X[3]+K	# XMM->IALU xfer area
+	#	X[4]+K	X[5]+K	X[6]+K	X[7]+K
+	#	X[8]+K	X[9]+K	X[10]+K	X[11]+K
+	#	X[12]+K	X[13]+K	X[14]+K	X[15]+K
+	#
+	# +64	X[0]	X[1]	X[2]	X[3]	# XMM->XMM backtrace area
+	#	X[4]	X[5]	X[6]	X[7]
+	#	X[8]	X[9]	X[10]	X[11]	# even borrowed for K_00_19
+	#
+	# +112	K_20_39	K_20_39	K_20_39	K_20_39	# constants
+	#	K_40_59	K_40_59	K_40_59	K_40_59
+	#	K_60_79	K_60_79	K_60_79	K_60_79
+	#	K_00_19	K_00_19	K_00_19	K_00_19
+	#	pbswap mask
+	#
+	# +192	ctx				# argument block
+	# +196	inp
+	# +200	end
+	# +204	esp
+	&sub	("esp",208);
+	&and	("esp",-64);
+
+	&vmovdqa(&QWP(112+0,"esp"),@X[4]);	# copy constants
+	&vmovdqa(&QWP(112+16,"esp"),@X[5]);
+	&vmovdqa(&QWP(112+32,"esp"),@X[6]);
+	&shl	($D,6);				# len*64
+	&vmovdqa(&QWP(112+48,"esp"),@X[3]);
+	&add	($D,$inp);			# end of input
+	&vmovdqa(&QWP(112+64,"esp"),@X[2]);
+	&add	($inp,64);
+	&mov	(&DWP(192+0,"esp"),$E);		# save argument block
+	&mov	(&DWP(192+4,"esp"),$inp);
+	&mov	(&DWP(192+8,"esp"),$D);
+	&mov	(&DWP(192+12,"esp"),@T[0]);	# save original %esp
+
+	&mov	($A,&DWP(0,$E));		# load context
+	&mov	($B,&DWP(4,$E));
+	&mov	($C,&DWP(8,$E));
+	&mov	($D,&DWP(12,$E));
+	&mov	($E,&DWP(16,$E));
+	&mov	(@T[0],$B);			# magic seed
+
+	&vmovdqu(@X[-4&7],&QWP(-64,$inp));	# load input to %xmm[0-3]
+	&vmovdqu(@X[-3&7],&QWP(-48,$inp));
+	&vmovdqu(@X[-2&7],&QWP(-32,$inp));
+	&vmovdqu(@X[-1&7],&QWP(-16,$inp));
+	&vpshufb(@X[-4&7],@X[-4&7],@X[2]);	# byte swap
+	&vpshufb(@X[-3&7],@X[-3&7],@X[2]);
+	&vpshufb(@X[-2&7],@X[-2&7],@X[2]);
+	&vmovdqa(&QWP(112-16,"esp"),@X[3]);	# borrow last backtrace slot
+	&vpshufb(@X[-1&7],@X[-1&7],@X[2]);
+	&vpaddd	(@X[0],@X[-4&7],@X[3]);		# add K_00_19
+	&vpaddd	(@X[1],@X[-3&7],@X[3]);
+	&vpaddd	(@X[2],@X[-2&7],@X[3]);
+	&vmovdqa(&QWP(0,"esp"),@X[0]);		# X[]+K xfer to IALU
+	&mov	(@T[1],$C);
+	&vmovdqa(&QWP(0+16,"esp"),@X[1]);
+	&xor	(@T[1],$D);
+	&vmovdqa(&QWP(0+32,"esp"),@X[2]);
+	&and	(@T[0],@T[1]);
+	&jmp	(&label("loop"));
+
+sub Xupdate_avx_16_31()		# recall that $Xi starts with 4
+{ use integer;
+  my $body = shift;
+  my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body);	# 40 instructions
+  my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e);
+
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&vpalignr(@X[0],@X[-3&7],@X[-4&7],8);	# compose "X[-14]" in "X[0]"
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	  &vpaddd	(@X[3],@X[3],@X[-1&7]);
+	  &vmovdqa	(&QWP(64+16*(($Xi-4)%3),"esp"),@X[-4&7]);# save X[] to backtrace buffer
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&vpsrldq(@X[2],@X[-1&7],4);		# "X[-3]", 3 dwords
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&vpxor	(@X[0],@X[0],@X[-4&7]);		# "X[0]"^="X[-16]"
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	&vpxor	(@X[2],@X[2],@X[-2&7]);		# "X[-3]"^"X[-8]"
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	  &vmovdqa	(&QWP(0+16*(($Xi-1)&3),"esp"),@X[3]);	# X[]+K xfer to IALU
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	&vpxor	(@X[0],@X[0],@X[2]);		# "X[0]"^="X[-3]"^"X[-8]"
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	&vpsrld	(@X[2],@X[0],31);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	&vpslldq(@X[4],@X[0],12);		# "X[0]"<<96, extract one dword
+	&vpaddd	(@X[0],@X[0],@X[0]);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	&vpsrld	(@X[3],@X[4],30);
+	&vpor	(@X[0],@X[0],@X[2]);		# "X[0]"<<<=1
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	&vpslld	(@X[4],@X[4],2);
+	  &vmovdqa	(@X[2],&QWP(64+16*(($Xi-6)%3),"esp")) if ($Xi>5);	# restore X[] from backtrace buffer
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&vpxor	(@X[0],@X[0],@X[3]);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	&vpxor	(@X[0],@X[0],@X[4]);		# "X[0]"^=("X[0]"<<96)<<<2
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	  &vmovdqa	(@X[4],&QWP(112-16+16*(($Xi)/5),"esp"));	# K_XX_XX
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	 foreach (@insns) { eval; }	# remaining instructions [if any]
+
+  $Xi++;	push(@X,shift(@X));	# "rotate" X[]
+}
+
+sub Xupdate_avx_32_79()
+{ use integer;
+  my $body = shift;
+  my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body);	# 32 to 44 instructions
+  my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e);
+
+	&vpalignr(@X[2],@X[-1&7],@X[-2&7],8);	# compose "X[-6]"
+	&vpxor	(@X[0],@X[0],@X[-4&7]);	# "X[0]"="X[-32]"^"X[-16]"
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# body_20_39
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# rol
+
+	&vpxor	(@X[0],@X[0],@X[-7&7]);	# "X[0]"^="X[-28]"
+	  &vmovdqa	(&QWP(64+16*(($Xi-4)%3),"esp"),@X[-4&7]);	# save X[] to backtrace buffer
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 if ($Xi%5) {
+	  &vmovdqa	(@X[4],@X[3]);	# "perpetuate" K_XX_XX...
+	 } else {			# ... or load next one
+	  &vmovdqa	(@X[4],&QWP(112-16+16*($Xi/5),"esp"));
+	 }
+	  &vpaddd	(@X[3],@X[3],@X[-1&7]);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# ror
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	&vpxor	(@X[0],@X[0],@X[2]);		# "X[0]"^="X[-6]"
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# body_20_39
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# rol
+
+	&vpsrld	(@X[2],@X[0],30);
+	  &vmovdqa	(&QWP(0+16*(($Xi-1)&3),"esp"),@X[3]);	# X[]+K xfer to IALU
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# ror
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	&vpslld	(@X[0],@X[0],2);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# body_20_39
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# rol
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# ror
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	&vpor	(@X[0],@X[0],@X[2]);	# "X[0]"<<<=2
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# body_20_39
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	  &vmovdqa	(@X[2],&QWP(64+16*(($Xi-6)%3),"esp")) if($Xi<19);	# restore X[] from backtrace buffer
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# rol
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# ror
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	 foreach (@insns) { eval; }	# remaining instructions
+
+  $Xi++;	push(@X,shift(@X));	# "rotate" X[]
+}
+
+sub Xuplast_avx_80()
+{ use integer;
+  my $body = shift;
+  my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body);	# 32 instructions
+  my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e);
+
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	  &vpaddd	(@X[3],@X[3],@X[-1&7]);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	  &vmovdqa	(&QWP(0+16*(($Xi-1)&3),"esp"),@X[3]);	# X[]+K xfer IALU
+
+	 foreach (@insns) { eval; }		# remaining instructions
+
+	&mov	($inp=@T[1],&DWP(192+4,"esp"));
+	&cmp	($inp,&DWP(192+8,"esp"));
+	&je	(&label("done"));
+
+	&vmovdqa(@X[3],&QWP(112+48,"esp"));	# K_00_19
+	&vmovdqa(@X[2],&QWP(112+64,"esp"));	# pbswap mask
+	&vmovdqu(@X[-4&7],&QWP(0,$inp));	# load input
+	&vmovdqu(@X[-3&7],&QWP(16,$inp));
+	&vmovdqu(@X[-2&7],&QWP(32,$inp));
+	&vmovdqu(@X[-1&7],&QWP(48,$inp));
+	&add	($inp,64);
+	&vpshufb(@X[-4&7],@X[-4&7],@X[2]);		# byte swap
+	&mov	(&DWP(192+4,"esp"),$inp);
+	&vmovdqa(&QWP(112-16,"esp"),@X[3]);	# borrow last backtrace slot
+
+  $Xi=0;
+}
+
+sub Xloop_avx()
+{ use integer;
+  my $body = shift;
+  my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body);	# 32 instructions
+  my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e);
+
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&vpshufb	(@X[($Xi-3)&7],@X[($Xi-3)&7],@X[2]);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&vpaddd	(@X[$Xi&7],@X[($Xi-4)&7],@X[3]);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(0+16*$Xi,"esp"),@X[$Xi&7]);	# X[]+K xfer to IALU
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	foreach (@insns) { eval; }
+  $Xi++;
+}
+
+sub Xtail_avx()
+{ use integer;
+  my $body = shift;
+  my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body);	# 32 instructions
+  my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e);
+
+	foreach (@insns) { eval; }
+}
+
+&set_label("loop",16);
+	&Xupdate_avx_16_31(\&body_00_19);
+	&Xupdate_avx_16_31(\&body_00_19);
+	&Xupdate_avx_16_31(\&body_00_19);
+	&Xupdate_avx_16_31(\&body_00_19);
+	&Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_00_19);
+	&Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_20_39);
+	&Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_20_39);
+	&Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_20_39);
+	&Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_20_39);
+	&Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_20_39);
+	&Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_40_59);
+	&Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_40_59);
+	&Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_40_59);
+	&Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_40_59);
+	&Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_40_59);
+	&Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_20_39);
+	&Xuplast_avx_80(\&body_20_39);	# can jump to "done"
+
+				$saved_j=$j; @saved_V=@V;
+
+	&Xloop_avx(\&body_20_39);
+	&Xloop_avx(\&body_20_39);
+	&Xloop_avx(\&body_20_39);
+
+	&mov	(@T[1],&DWP(192,"esp"));	# update context
+	&add	($A,&DWP(0,@T[1]));
+	&add	(@T[0],&DWP(4,@T[1]));		# $b
+	&add	($C,&DWP(8,@T[1]));
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,@T[1]),$A);
+	&add	($D,&DWP(12,@T[1]));
+	&mov	(&DWP(4,@T[1]),@T[0]);
+	&add	($E,&DWP(16,@T[1]));
+	&mov	($B,$C);
+	&mov	(&DWP(8,@T[1]),$C);
+	&xor	($B,$D);
+	&mov	(&DWP(12,@T[1]),$D);
+	&mov	(&DWP(16,@T[1]),$E);
+	&mov	(@T[1],@T[0]);
+	&and	(@T[0],$B);
+	&mov	($B,@T[1]);
+
+	&jmp	(&label("loop"));
+
+&set_label("done",16);		$j=$saved_j; @V=@saved_V;
+
+	&Xtail_avx(\&body_20_39);
+	&Xtail_avx(\&body_20_39);
+	&Xtail_avx(\&body_20_39);
+
+	&vzeroall();
+
+	&mov	(@T[1],&DWP(192,"esp"));	# update context
+	&add	($A,&DWP(0,@T[1]));
+	&mov	("esp",&DWP(192+12,"esp"));	# restore %esp
+	&add	(@T[0],&DWP(4,@T[1]));		# $b
+	&add	($C,&DWP(8,@T[1]));
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,@T[1]),$A);
+	&add	($D,&DWP(12,@T[1]));
+	&mov	(&DWP(4,@T[1]),@T[0]);
+	&add	($E,&DWP(16,@T[1]));
+	&mov	(&DWP(8,@T[1]),$C);
+	&mov	(&DWP(12,@T[1]),$D);
+	&mov	(&DWP(16,@T[1]),$E);
+&function_end("_sha1_block_data_order_avx");
+}
+&set_label("K_XX_XX",64);
+&data_word(0x5a827999,0x5a827999,0x5a827999,0x5a827999);	# K_00_19
+&data_word(0x6ed9eba1,0x6ed9eba1,0x6ed9eba1,0x6ed9eba1);	# K_20_39
+&data_word(0x8f1bbcdc,0x8f1bbcdc,0x8f1bbcdc,0x8f1bbcdc);	# K_40_59
+&data_word(0xca62c1d6,0xca62c1d6,0xca62c1d6,0xca62c1d6);	# K_60_79
+&data_word(0x00010203,0x04050607,0x08090a0b,0x0c0d0e0f);	# pbswap mask
+&data_byte(0xf,0xe,0xd,0xc,0xb,0xa,0x9,0x8,0x7,0x6,0x5,0x4,0x3,0x2,0x1,0x0);
+}
+&asciz("SHA1 block transform for x86, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>");
+
+&asm_finish();
+
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-alpha.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-alpha.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4124958
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-alpha.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,329 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2009-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+
+# SHA1 block procedure for Alpha.
+
+# On 21264 performance is 33% better than code generated by vendor
+# compiler, and 75% better than GCC [3.4], and in absolute terms is
+# 8.7 cycles per processed byte. Implementation features vectorized
+# byte swap, but not Xupdate.
+
+@X=(	"\$0",	"\$1",	"\$2",	"\$3",	"\$4",	"\$5",	"\$6",	"\$7",
+	"\$8",	"\$9",	"\$10",	"\$11",	"\$12",	"\$13",	"\$14",	"\$15");
+$ctx="a0";	# $16
+$inp="a1";
+$num="a2";
+$A="a3";
+$B="a4";	# 20
+$C="a5";
+$D="t8";
+$E="t9";	@V=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E);
+$t0="t10";	# 24
+$t1="t11";
+$t2="ra";
+$t3="t12";
+$K="AT";	# 28
+
+sub BODY_00_19 {
+my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_;
+my $j=$i+1;
+$code.=<<___ if ($i==0);
+	ldq_u	@X[0],0+0($inp)
+	ldq_u	@X[1],0+7($inp)
+___
+$code.=<<___ if (!($i&1) && $i<14);
+	ldq_u	@X[$i+2],($i+2)*4+0($inp)
+	ldq_u	@X[$i+3],($i+2)*4+7($inp)
+___
+$code.=<<___ if (!($i&1) && $i<15);
+	extql	@X[$i],$inp,@X[$i]
+	extqh	@X[$i+1],$inp,@X[$i+1]
+
+	or	@X[$i+1],@X[$i],@X[$i]	# pair of 32-bit values are fetched
+
+	srl	@X[$i],24,$t0		# vectorized byte swap
+	srl	@X[$i],8,$t2
+
+	sll	@X[$i],8,$t3
+	sll	@X[$i],24,@X[$i]
+	zapnot	$t0,0x11,$t0
+	zapnot	$t2,0x22,$t2
+
+	zapnot	@X[$i],0x88,@X[$i]
+	or	$t0,$t2,$t0
+	zapnot	$t3,0x44,$t3
+	sll	$a,5,$t1
+
+	or	@X[$i],$t0,@X[$i]
+	addl	$K,$e,$e
+	and	$b,$c,$t2
+	zapnot	$a,0xf,$a
+
+	or	@X[$i],$t3,@X[$i]
+	srl	$a,27,$t0
+	bic	$d,$b,$t3
+	sll	$b,30,$b
+
+	extll	@X[$i],4,@X[$i+1]	# extract upper half
+	or	$t2,$t3,$t2
+	addl	@X[$i],$e,$e
+
+	addl	$t1,$e,$e
+	srl	$b,32,$t3
+	zapnot	@X[$i],0xf,@X[$i]
+
+	addl	$t0,$e,$e
+	addl	$t2,$e,$e
+	or	$t3,$b,$b
+___
+$code.=<<___ if (($i&1) && $i<15);
+	sll	$a,5,$t1
+	addl	$K,$e,$e
+	and	$b,$c,$t2
+	zapnot	$a,0xf,$a
+
+	srl	$a,27,$t0
+	addl	@X[$i%16],$e,$e
+	bic	$d,$b,$t3
+	sll	$b,30,$b
+
+	or	$t2,$t3,$t2
+	addl	$t1,$e,$e
+	srl	$b,32,$t3
+	zapnot	@X[$i],0xf,@X[$i]
+
+	addl	$t0,$e,$e
+	addl	$t2,$e,$e
+	or	$t3,$b,$b
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i>=15);	# with forward Xupdate
+	sll	$a,5,$t1
+	addl	$K,$e,$e
+	and	$b,$c,$t2
+	xor	@X[($j+2)%16],@X[$j%16],@X[$j%16]
+
+	zapnot	$a,0xf,$a
+	addl	@X[$i%16],$e,$e
+	bic	$d,$b,$t3
+	xor	@X[($j+8)%16],@X[$j%16],@X[$j%16]
+
+	srl	$a,27,$t0
+	addl	$t1,$e,$e
+	or	$t2,$t3,$t2
+	xor	@X[($j+13)%16],@X[$j%16],@X[$j%16]
+
+	sll	$b,30,$b
+	addl	$t0,$e,$e
+	srl	@X[$j%16],31,$t1
+
+	addl	$t2,$e,$e
+	srl	$b,32,$t3
+	addl	@X[$j%16],@X[$j%16],@X[$j%16]
+
+	or	$t3,$b,$b
+	zapnot	@X[$i%16],0xf,@X[$i%16]
+	or	$t1,@X[$j%16],@X[$j%16]
+___
+}
+
+sub BODY_20_39 {
+my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_;
+my $j=$i+1;
+$code.=<<___ if ($i<79);	# with forward Xupdate
+	sll	$a,5,$t1
+	addl	$K,$e,$e
+	zapnot	$a,0xf,$a
+	xor	@X[($j+2)%16],@X[$j%16],@X[$j%16]
+
+	sll	$b,30,$t3
+	addl	$t1,$e,$e
+	xor	$b,$c,$t2
+	xor	@X[($j+8)%16],@X[$j%16],@X[$j%16]
+
+	srl	$b,2,$b
+	addl	@X[$i%16],$e,$e
+	xor	$d,$t2,$t2
+	xor	@X[($j+13)%16],@X[$j%16],@X[$j%16]
+
+	srl	@X[$j%16],31,$t1
+	addl	$t2,$e,$e
+	srl	$a,27,$t0
+	addl	@X[$j%16],@X[$j%16],@X[$j%16]
+
+	or	$t3,$b,$b
+	addl	$t0,$e,$e
+	or	$t1,@X[$j%16],@X[$j%16]
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i<77);
+	zapnot	@X[$i%16],0xf,@X[$i%16]
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i==79);	# with context fetch
+	sll	$a,5,$t1
+	addl	$K,$e,$e
+	zapnot	$a,0xf,$a
+	ldl	@X[0],0($ctx)
+
+	sll	$b,30,$t3
+	addl	$t1,$e,$e
+	xor	$b,$c,$t2
+	ldl	@X[1],4($ctx)
+
+	srl	$b,2,$b
+	addl	@X[$i%16],$e,$e
+	xor	$d,$t2,$t2
+	ldl	@X[2],8($ctx)
+
+	srl	$a,27,$t0
+	addl	$t2,$e,$e
+	ldl	@X[3],12($ctx)
+
+	or	$t3,$b,$b
+	addl	$t0,$e,$e
+	ldl	@X[4],16($ctx)
+___
+}
+
+sub BODY_40_59 {
+my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_;
+my $j=$i+1;
+$code.=<<___;	# with forward Xupdate
+	sll	$a,5,$t1
+	addl	$K,$e,$e
+	zapnot	$a,0xf,$a
+	xor	@X[($j+2)%16],@X[$j%16],@X[$j%16]
+
+	srl	$a,27,$t0
+	and	$b,$c,$t2
+	and	$b,$d,$t3
+	xor	@X[($j+8)%16],@X[$j%16],@X[$j%16]
+
+	sll	$b,30,$b
+	addl	$t1,$e,$e
+	xor	@X[($j+13)%16],@X[$j%16],@X[$j%16]
+
+	srl	@X[$j%16],31,$t1
+	addl	$t0,$e,$e
+	or	$t2,$t3,$t2
+	and	$c,$d,$t3
+
+	or	$t2,$t3,$t2
+	srl	$b,32,$t3
+	addl	@X[$i%16],$e,$e
+	addl	@X[$j%16],@X[$j%16],@X[$j%16]
+
+	or	$t3,$b,$b
+	addl	$t2,$e,$e
+	or	$t1,@X[$j%16],@X[$j%16]
+	zapnot	@X[$i%16],0xf,@X[$i%16]
+___
+}
+
+$code=<<___;
+#ifdef __linux__
+#include <asm/regdef.h>
+#else
+#include <asm.h>
+#include <regdef.h>
+#endif
+
+.text
+
+.set	noat
+.set	noreorder
+.globl	sha1_block_data_order
+.align	5
+.ent	sha1_block_data_order
+sha1_block_data_order:
+	lda	sp,-64(sp)
+	stq	ra,0(sp)
+	stq	s0,8(sp)
+	stq	s1,16(sp)
+	stq	s2,24(sp)
+	stq	s3,32(sp)
+	stq	s4,40(sp)
+	stq	s5,48(sp)
+	stq	fp,56(sp)
+	.mask	0x0400fe00,-64
+	.frame	sp,64,ra
+	.prologue 0
+
+	ldl	$A,0($ctx)
+	ldl	$B,4($ctx)
+	sll	$num,6,$num
+	ldl	$C,8($ctx)
+	ldl	$D,12($ctx)
+	ldl	$E,16($ctx)
+	addq	$inp,$num,$num
+
+.Lloop:
+	.set	noreorder
+	ldah	$K,23170(zero)
+	zapnot	$B,0xf,$B
+	lda	$K,31129($K)	# K_00_19
+___
+for ($i=0;$i<20;$i++) { &BODY_00_19($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	ldah	$K,28378(zero)
+	lda	$K,-5215($K)	# K_20_39
+___
+for (;$i<40;$i++) { &BODY_20_39($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	ldah	$K,-28900(zero)
+	lda	$K,-17188($K)	# K_40_59
+___
+for (;$i<60;$i++) { &BODY_40_59($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	ldah	$K,-13725(zero)
+	lda	$K,-15914($K)	# K_60_79
+___
+for (;$i<80;$i++) { &BODY_20_39($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	addl	@X[0],$A,$A
+	addl	@X[1],$B,$B
+	addl	@X[2],$C,$C
+	addl	@X[3],$D,$D
+	addl	@X[4],$E,$E
+	stl	$A,0($ctx)
+	stl	$B,4($ctx)
+	addq	$inp,64,$inp
+	stl	$C,8($ctx)
+	stl	$D,12($ctx)
+	stl	$E,16($ctx)
+	cmpult	$inp,$num,$t1
+	bne	$t1,.Lloop
+
+	.set	noreorder
+	ldq	ra,0(sp)
+	ldq	s0,8(sp)
+	ldq	s1,16(sp)
+	ldq	s2,24(sp)
+	ldq	s3,32(sp)
+	ldq	s4,40(sp)
+	ldq	s5,48(sp)
+	ldq	fp,56(sp)
+	lda	sp,64(sp)
+	ret	(ra)
+.end	sha1_block_data_order
+.ascii	"SHA1 block transform for Alpha, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+.align	2
+___
+$output=pop and open STDOUT,">$output";
+print $code;
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-armv4-large.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-armv4-large.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7ff5bfb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-armv4-large.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,742 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2007-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+
+# sha1_block procedure for ARMv4.
+#
+# January 2007.
+
+# Size/performance trade-off
+# ====================================================================
+# impl		size in bytes	comp cycles[*]	measured performance
+# ====================================================================
+# thumb		304		3212		4420
+# armv4-small	392/+29%	1958/+64%	2250/+96%
+# armv4-compact	740/+89%	1552/+26%	1840/+22%
+# armv4-large	1420/+92%	1307/+19%	1370/+34%[***]
+# full unroll	~5100/+260%	~1260/+4%	~1300/+5%
+# ====================================================================
+# thumb		= same as 'small' but in Thumb instructions[**] and
+#		  with recurring code in two private functions;
+# small		= detached Xload/update, loops are folded;
+# compact	= detached Xload/update, 5x unroll;
+# large		= interleaved Xload/update, 5x unroll;
+# full unroll	= interleaved Xload/update, full unroll, estimated[!];
+#
+# [*]	Manually counted instructions in "grand" loop body. Measured
+#	performance is affected by prologue and epilogue overhead,
+#	i-cache availability, branch penalties, etc.
+# [**]	While each Thumb instruction is twice smaller, they are not as
+#	diverse as ARM ones: e.g., there are only two arithmetic
+#	instructions with 3 arguments, no [fixed] rotate, addressing
+#	modes are limited. As result it takes more instructions to do
+#	the same job in Thumb, therefore the code is never twice as
+#	small and always slower.
+# [***]	which is also ~35% better than compiler generated code. Dual-
+#	issue Cortex A8 core was measured to process input block in
+#	~990 cycles.
+
+# August 2010.
+#
+# Rescheduling for dual-issue pipeline resulted in 13% improvement on
+# Cortex A8 core and in absolute terms ~870 cycles per input block
+# [or 13.6 cycles per byte].
+
+# February 2011.
+#
+# Profiler-assisted and platform-specific optimization resulted in 10%
+# improvement on Cortex A8 core and 12.2 cycles per byte.
+
+# September 2013.
+#
+# Add NEON implementation (see sha1-586.pl for background info). On
+# Cortex A8 it was measured to process one byte in 6.7 cycles or >80%
+# faster than integer-only code. Because [fully unrolled] NEON code
+# is ~2.5x larger and there are some redundant instructions executed
+# when processing last block, improvement is not as big for smallest
+# blocks, only ~30%. Snapdragon S4 is a tad faster, 6.4 cycles per
+# byte, which is also >80% faster than integer-only code. Cortex-A15
+# is even faster spending 5.6 cycles per byte outperforming integer-
+# only code by factor of 2.
+
+# May 2014.
+#
+# Add ARMv8 code path performing at 2.35 cpb on Apple A7.
+
+$flavour = shift;
+if ($flavour=~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/) { $output=$flavour; undef $flavour; }
+else { while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {} }
+
+if ($flavour && $flavour ne "void") {
+    $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+    ( $xlate="${dir}arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
+    ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
+    die "can't locate arm-xlate.pl";
+
+    open STDOUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output";
+} else {
+    open STDOUT,">$output";
+}
+
+$ctx="r0";
+$inp="r1";
+$len="r2";
+$a="r3";
+$b="r4";
+$c="r5";
+$d="r6";
+$e="r7";
+$K="r8";
+$t0="r9";
+$t1="r10";
+$t2="r11";
+$t3="r12";
+$Xi="r14";
+@V=($a,$b,$c,$d,$e);
+
+sub Xupdate {
+my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$opt1,$opt2)=@_;
+$code.=<<___;
+	ldr	$t0,[$Xi,#15*4]
+	ldr	$t1,[$Xi,#13*4]
+	ldr	$t2,[$Xi,#7*4]
+	add	$e,$K,$e,ror#2			@ E+=K_xx_xx
+	ldr	$t3,[$Xi,#2*4]
+	eor	$t0,$t0,$t1
+	eor	$t2,$t2,$t3			@ 1 cycle stall
+	eor	$t1,$c,$d			@ F_xx_xx
+	mov	$t0,$t0,ror#31
+	add	$e,$e,$a,ror#27			@ E+=ROR(A,27)
+	eor	$t0,$t0,$t2,ror#31
+	str	$t0,[$Xi,#-4]!
+	$opt1					@ F_xx_xx
+	$opt2					@ F_xx_xx
+	add	$e,$e,$t0			@ E+=X[i]
+___
+}
+
+sub BODY_00_15 {
+my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_;
+$code.=<<___;
+#if __ARM_ARCH__<7
+	ldrb	$t1,[$inp,#2]
+	ldrb	$t0,[$inp,#3]
+	ldrb	$t2,[$inp,#1]
+	add	$e,$K,$e,ror#2			@ E+=K_00_19
+	ldrb	$t3,[$inp],#4
+	orr	$t0,$t0,$t1,lsl#8
+	eor	$t1,$c,$d			@ F_xx_xx
+	orr	$t0,$t0,$t2,lsl#16
+	add	$e,$e,$a,ror#27			@ E+=ROR(A,27)
+	orr	$t0,$t0,$t3,lsl#24
+#else
+	ldr	$t0,[$inp],#4			@ handles unaligned
+	add	$e,$K,$e,ror#2			@ E+=K_00_19
+	eor	$t1,$c,$d			@ F_xx_xx
+	add	$e,$e,$a,ror#27			@ E+=ROR(A,27)
+#ifdef __ARMEL__
+	rev	$t0,$t0				@ byte swap
+#endif
+#endif
+	and	$t1,$b,$t1,ror#2
+	add	$e,$e,$t0			@ E+=X[i]
+	eor	$t1,$t1,$d,ror#2		@ F_00_19(B,C,D)
+	str	$t0,[$Xi,#-4]!
+	add	$e,$e,$t1			@ E+=F_00_19(B,C,D)
+___
+}
+
+sub BODY_16_19 {
+my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_;
+	&Xupdate(@_,"and $t1,$b,$t1,ror#2");
+$code.=<<___;
+	eor	$t1,$t1,$d,ror#2		@ F_00_19(B,C,D)
+	add	$e,$e,$t1			@ E+=F_00_19(B,C,D)
+___
+}
+
+sub BODY_20_39 {
+my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_;
+	&Xupdate(@_,"eor $t1,$b,$t1,ror#2");
+$code.=<<___;
+	add	$e,$e,$t1			@ E+=F_20_39(B,C,D)
+___
+}
+
+sub BODY_40_59 {
+my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_;
+	&Xupdate(@_,"and $t1,$b,$t1,ror#2","and $t2,$c,$d");
+$code.=<<___;
+	add	$e,$e,$t1			@ E+=F_40_59(B,C,D)
+	add	$e,$e,$t2,ror#2
+___
+}
+
+$code=<<___;
+#include "arm_arch.h"
+
+.text
+#if defined(__thumb2__)
+.syntax	unified
+.thumb
+#else
+.code	32
+#endif
+
+.global	sha1_block_data_order
+.type	sha1_block_data_order,%function
+
+.align	5
+sha1_block_data_order:
+#if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7
+.Lsha1_block:
+	adr	r3,.Lsha1_block
+	ldr	r12,.LOPENSSL_armcap
+	ldr	r12,[r3,r12]		@ OPENSSL_armcap_P
+#ifdef	__APPLE__
+	ldr	r12,[r12]
+#endif
+	tst	r12,#ARMV8_SHA1
+	bne	.LARMv8
+	tst	r12,#ARMV7_NEON
+	bne	.LNEON
+#endif
+	stmdb	sp!,{r4-r12,lr}
+	add	$len,$inp,$len,lsl#6	@ $len to point at the end of $inp
+	ldmia	$ctx,{$a,$b,$c,$d,$e}
+.Lloop:
+	ldr	$K,.LK_00_19
+	mov	$Xi,sp
+	sub	sp,sp,#15*4
+	mov	$c,$c,ror#30
+	mov	$d,$d,ror#30
+	mov	$e,$e,ror#30		@ [6]
+.L_00_15:
+___
+for($i=0;$i<5;$i++) {
+	&BODY_00_15(@V);	unshift(@V,pop(@V));
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+#if defined(__thumb2__)
+	mov	$t3,sp
+	teq	$Xi,$t3
+#else
+	teq	$Xi,sp
+#endif
+	bne	.L_00_15		@ [((11+4)*5+2)*3]
+	sub	sp,sp,#25*4
+___
+	&BODY_00_15(@V);	unshift(@V,pop(@V));
+	&BODY_16_19(@V);	unshift(@V,pop(@V));
+	&BODY_16_19(@V);	unshift(@V,pop(@V));
+	&BODY_16_19(@V);	unshift(@V,pop(@V));
+	&BODY_16_19(@V);	unshift(@V,pop(@V));
+$code.=<<___;
+
+	ldr	$K,.LK_20_39		@ [+15+16*4]
+	cmn	sp,#0			@ [+3], clear carry to denote 20_39
+.L_20_39_or_60_79:
+___
+for($i=0;$i<5;$i++) {
+	&BODY_20_39(@V);	unshift(@V,pop(@V));
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+#if defined(__thumb2__)
+	mov	$t3,sp
+	teq	$Xi,$t3
+#else
+	teq	$Xi,sp			@ preserve carry
+#endif
+	bne	.L_20_39_or_60_79	@ [+((12+3)*5+2)*4]
+	bcs	.L_done			@ [+((12+3)*5+2)*4], spare 300 bytes
+
+	ldr	$K,.LK_40_59
+	sub	sp,sp,#20*4		@ [+2]
+.L_40_59:
+___
+for($i=0;$i<5;$i++) {
+	&BODY_40_59(@V);	unshift(@V,pop(@V));
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+#if defined(__thumb2__)
+	mov	$t3,sp
+	teq	$Xi,$t3
+#else
+	teq	$Xi,sp
+#endif
+	bne	.L_40_59		@ [+((12+5)*5+2)*4]
+
+	ldr	$K,.LK_60_79
+	sub	sp,sp,#20*4
+	cmp	sp,#0			@ set carry to denote 60_79
+	b	.L_20_39_or_60_79	@ [+4], spare 300 bytes
+.L_done:
+	add	sp,sp,#80*4		@ "deallocate" stack frame
+	ldmia	$ctx,{$K,$t0,$t1,$t2,$t3}
+	add	$a,$K,$a
+	add	$b,$t0,$b
+	add	$c,$t1,$c,ror#2
+	add	$d,$t2,$d,ror#2
+	add	$e,$t3,$e,ror#2
+	stmia	$ctx,{$a,$b,$c,$d,$e}
+	teq	$inp,$len
+	bne	.Lloop			@ [+18], total 1307
+
+#if __ARM_ARCH__>=5
+	ldmia	sp!,{r4-r12,pc}
+#else
+	ldmia	sp!,{r4-r12,lr}
+	tst	lr,#1
+	moveq	pc,lr			@ be binary compatible with V4, yet
+	bx	lr			@ interoperable with Thumb ISA:-)
+#endif
+.size	sha1_block_data_order,.-sha1_block_data_order
+
+.align	5
+.LK_00_19:	.word	0x5a827999
+.LK_20_39:	.word	0x6ed9eba1
+.LK_40_59:	.word	0x8f1bbcdc
+.LK_60_79:	.word	0xca62c1d6
+#if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7
+.LOPENSSL_armcap:
+.word	OPENSSL_armcap_P-.Lsha1_block
+#endif
+.asciz	"SHA1 block transform for ARMv4/NEON/ARMv8, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+.align	5
+___
+#####################################################################
+# NEON stuff
+#
+{{{
+my @V=($a,$b,$c,$d,$e);
+my ($K_XX_XX,$Ki,$t0,$t1,$Xfer,$saved_sp)=map("r$_",(8..12,14));
+my $Xi=4;
+my @X=map("q$_",(8..11,0..3));
+my @Tx=("q12","q13");
+my ($K,$zero)=("q14","q15");
+my $j=0;
+
+sub AUTOLOAD()          # thunk [simplified] x86-style perlasm
+{ my $opcode = $AUTOLOAD; $opcode =~ s/.*:://; $opcode =~ s/_/\./;
+  my $arg = pop;
+    $arg = "#$arg" if ($arg*1 eq $arg);
+    $code .= "\t$opcode\t".join(',',@_,$arg)."\n";
+}
+
+sub body_00_19 () {
+	(
+	'($a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@V;'.		# '$code.="@ $j\n";'.
+	'&bic	($t0,$d,$b)',
+	'&add	($e,$e,$Ki)',		# e+=X[i]+K
+	'&and	($t1,$c,$b)',
+	'&ldr	($Ki,sprintf "[sp,#%d]",4*(($j+1)&15))',
+	'&add	($e,$e,$a,"ror#27")',	# e+=ROR(A,27)
+	'&eor	($t1,$t1,$t0)',		# F_00_19
+	'&mov	($b,$b,"ror#2")',	# b=ROR(b,2)
+	'&add	($e,$e,$t1);'.		# e+=F_00_19
+	'$j++;	unshift(@V,pop(@V));'
+	)
+}
+sub body_20_39 () {
+	(
+	'($a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@V;'.		# '$code.="@ $j\n";'.
+	'&eor	($t0,$b,$d)',
+	'&add	($e,$e,$Ki)',		# e+=X[i]+K
+	'&ldr	($Ki,sprintf "[sp,#%d]",4*(($j+1)&15)) if ($j<79)',
+	'&eor	($t1,$t0,$c)',		# F_20_39
+	'&add	($e,$e,$a,"ror#27")',	# e+=ROR(A,27)
+	'&mov	($b,$b,"ror#2")',	# b=ROR(b,2)
+	'&add	($e,$e,$t1);'.		# e+=F_20_39
+	'$j++;	unshift(@V,pop(@V));'
+	)
+}
+sub body_40_59 () {
+	(
+	'($a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@V;'.		# '$code.="@ $j\n";'.
+	'&add	($e,$e,$Ki)',		# e+=X[i]+K
+	'&and	($t0,$c,$d)',
+	'&ldr	($Ki,sprintf "[sp,#%d]",4*(($j+1)&15))',
+	'&add	($e,$e,$a,"ror#27")',	# e+=ROR(A,27)
+	'&eor	($t1,$c,$d)',
+	'&add	($e,$e,$t0)',
+	'&and	($t1,$t1,$b)',
+	'&mov	($b,$b,"ror#2")',	# b=ROR(b,2)
+	'&add	($e,$e,$t1);'.		# e+=F_40_59
+	'$j++;	unshift(@V,pop(@V));'
+	)
+}
+
+sub Xupdate_16_31 ()
+{ use integer;
+  my $body = shift;
+  my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body);
+  my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e);
+
+	&vext_8		(@X[0],@X[-4&7],@X[-3&7],8);	# compose "X[-14]" in "X[0]"
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	  &vadd_i32	(@Tx[1],@X[-1&7],$K);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	  &vld1_32	("{$K\[]}","[$K_XX_XX,:32]!")	if ($Xi%5==0);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&vext_8		(@Tx[0],@X[-1&7],$zero,4);	# "X[-3]", 3 words
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&veor		(@X[0],@X[0],@X[-4&7]);		# "X[0]"^="X[-16]"
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&veor		(@Tx[0],@Tx[0],@X[-2&7]);	# "X[-3]"^"X[-8]"
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&veor		(@Tx[0],@Tx[0],@X[0]);		# "X[0]"^="X[-3]"^"X[-8]
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	  &vst1_32	("{@Tx[1]}","[$Xfer,:128]!");	# X[]+K xfer
+	  &sub		($Xfer,$Xfer,64)		if ($Xi%4==0);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&vext_8		(@Tx[1],$zero,@Tx[0],4);	# "X[0]"<<96, extract one dword
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&vadd_i32	(@X[0],@Tx[0],@Tx[0]);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&vsri_32	(@X[0],@Tx[0],31);		# "X[0]"<<<=1
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&vshr_u32	(@Tx[0],@Tx[1],30);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&vshl_u32	(@Tx[1],@Tx[1],2);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&veor		(@X[0],@X[0],@Tx[0]);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&veor		(@X[0],@X[0],@Tx[1]);		# "X[0]"^=("X[0]">>96)<<<2
+
+	foreach (@insns) { eval; }	# remaining instructions [if any]
+
+  $Xi++;	push(@X,shift(@X));	# "rotate" X[]
+}
+
+sub Xupdate_32_79 ()
+{ use integer;
+  my $body = shift;
+  my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body);
+  my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e);
+
+	&vext_8		(@Tx[0],@X[-2&7],@X[-1&7],8);	# compose "X[-6]"
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&veor		(@X[0],@X[0],@X[-4&7]);		# "X[0]"="X[-32]"^"X[-16]"
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&veor		(@X[0],@X[0],@X[-7&7]);		# "X[0]"^="X[-28]"
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	  &vadd_i32	(@Tx[1],@X[-1&7],$K);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	  &vld1_32	("{$K\[]}","[$K_XX_XX,:32]!")	if ($Xi%5==0);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&veor		(@Tx[0],@Tx[0],@X[0]);		# "X[-6]"^="X[0]"
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&vshr_u32	(@X[0],@Tx[0],30);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	  &vst1_32	("{@Tx[1]}","[$Xfer,:128]!");	# X[]+K xfer
+	  &sub		($Xfer,$Xfer,64)		if ($Xi%4==0);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&vsli_32	(@X[0],@Tx[0],2);		# "X[0]"="X[-6]"<<<2
+
+	foreach (@insns) { eval; }	# remaining instructions [if any]
+
+  $Xi++;	push(@X,shift(@X));	# "rotate" X[]
+}
+
+sub Xuplast_80 ()
+{ use integer;
+  my $body = shift;
+  my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body);
+  my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e);
+
+	&vadd_i32	(@Tx[1],@X[-1&7],$K);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&vst1_32	("{@Tx[1]}","[$Xfer,:128]!");
+	&sub		($Xfer,$Xfer,64);
+
+	&teq		($inp,$len);
+	&sub		($K_XX_XX,$K_XX_XX,16);	# rewind $K_XX_XX
+	&it		("eq");
+	&subeq		($inp,$inp,64);		# reload last block to avoid SEGV
+	&vld1_8		("{@X[-4&7]-@X[-3&7]}","[$inp]!");
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&vld1_8		("{@X[-2&7]-@X[-1&7]}","[$inp]!");
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&vld1_32	("{$K\[]}","[$K_XX_XX,:32]!");	# load K_00_19
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&vrev32_8	(@X[-4&7],@X[-4&7]);
+
+	foreach (@insns) { eval; }		# remaining instructions
+
+   $Xi=0;
+}
+
+sub Xloop()
+{ use integer;
+  my $body = shift;
+  my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body);
+  my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e);
+
+	&vrev32_8	(@X[($Xi-3)&7],@X[($Xi-3)&7]);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&vadd_i32	(@X[$Xi&7],@X[($Xi-4)&7],$K);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&vst1_32	("{@X[$Xi&7]}","[$Xfer,:128]!");# X[]+K xfer to IALU
+
+	foreach (@insns) { eval; }
+
+  $Xi++;
+}
+
+$code.=<<___;
+#if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7
+.arch	armv7-a
+.fpu	neon
+
+.type	sha1_block_data_order_neon,%function
+.align	4
+sha1_block_data_order_neon:
+.LNEON:
+	stmdb	sp!,{r4-r12,lr}
+	add	$len,$inp,$len,lsl#6	@ $len to point at the end of $inp
+	@ dmb				@ errata #451034 on early Cortex A8
+	@ vstmdb	sp!,{d8-d15}	@ ABI specification says so
+	mov	$saved_sp,sp
+	sub	$Xfer,sp,#64
+	adr	$K_XX_XX,.LK_00_19
+	bic	$Xfer,$Xfer,#15		@ align for 128-bit stores
+
+	ldmia	$ctx,{$a,$b,$c,$d,$e}	@ load context
+	mov	sp,$Xfer		@ alloca
+
+	vld1.8		{@X[-4&7]-@X[-3&7]},[$inp]!	@ handles unaligned
+	veor		$zero,$zero,$zero
+	vld1.8		{@X[-2&7]-@X[-1&7]},[$inp]!
+	vld1.32		{${K}\[]},[$K_XX_XX,:32]!	@ load K_00_19
+	vrev32.8	@X[-4&7],@X[-4&7]		@ yes, even on
+	vrev32.8	@X[-3&7],@X[-3&7]		@ big-endian...
+	vrev32.8	@X[-2&7],@X[-2&7]
+	vadd.i32	@X[0],@X[-4&7],$K
+	vrev32.8	@X[-1&7],@X[-1&7]
+	vadd.i32	@X[1],@X[-3&7],$K
+	vst1.32		{@X[0]},[$Xfer,:128]!
+	vadd.i32	@X[2],@X[-2&7],$K
+	vst1.32		{@X[1]},[$Xfer,:128]!
+	vst1.32		{@X[2]},[$Xfer,:128]!
+	ldr		$Ki,[sp]			@ big RAW stall
+
+.Loop_neon:
+___
+	&Xupdate_16_31(\&body_00_19);
+	&Xupdate_16_31(\&body_00_19);
+	&Xupdate_16_31(\&body_00_19);
+	&Xupdate_16_31(\&body_00_19);
+	&Xupdate_32_79(\&body_00_19);
+	&Xupdate_32_79(\&body_20_39);
+	&Xupdate_32_79(\&body_20_39);
+	&Xupdate_32_79(\&body_20_39);
+	&Xupdate_32_79(\&body_20_39);
+	&Xupdate_32_79(\&body_20_39);
+	&Xupdate_32_79(\&body_40_59);
+	&Xupdate_32_79(\&body_40_59);
+	&Xupdate_32_79(\&body_40_59);
+	&Xupdate_32_79(\&body_40_59);
+	&Xupdate_32_79(\&body_40_59);
+	&Xupdate_32_79(\&body_20_39);
+	&Xuplast_80(\&body_20_39);
+	&Xloop(\&body_20_39);
+	&Xloop(\&body_20_39);
+	&Xloop(\&body_20_39);
+$code.=<<___;
+	ldmia	$ctx,{$Ki,$t0,$t1,$Xfer}	@ accumulate context
+	add	$a,$a,$Ki
+	ldr	$Ki,[$ctx,#16]
+	add	$b,$b,$t0
+	add	$c,$c,$t1
+	add	$d,$d,$Xfer
+	it	eq
+	moveq	sp,$saved_sp
+	add	$e,$e,$Ki
+	it	ne
+	ldrne	$Ki,[sp]
+	stmia	$ctx,{$a,$b,$c,$d,$e}
+	itt	ne
+	addne	$Xfer,sp,#3*16
+	bne	.Loop_neon
+
+	@ vldmia	sp!,{d8-d15}
+	ldmia	sp!,{r4-r12,pc}
+.size	sha1_block_data_order_neon,.-sha1_block_data_order_neon
+#endif
+___
+}}}
+#####################################################################
+# ARMv8 stuff
+#
+{{{
+my ($ABCD,$E,$E0,$E1)=map("q$_",(0..3));
+my @MSG=map("q$_",(4..7));
+my @Kxx=map("q$_",(8..11));
+my ($W0,$W1,$ABCD_SAVE)=map("q$_",(12..14));
+
+$code.=<<___;
+#if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7
+
+# if defined(__thumb2__)
+#  define INST(a,b,c,d)	.byte	c,d|0xf,a,b
+# else
+#  define INST(a,b,c,d)	.byte	a,b,c,d|0x10
+# endif
+
+.type	sha1_block_data_order_armv8,%function
+.align	5
+sha1_block_data_order_armv8:
+.LARMv8:
+	vstmdb	sp!,{d8-d15}		@ ABI specification says so
+
+	veor	$E,$E,$E
+	adr	r3,.LK_00_19
+	vld1.32	{$ABCD},[$ctx]!
+	vld1.32	{$E\[0]},[$ctx]
+	sub	$ctx,$ctx,#16
+	vld1.32	{@Kxx[0]\[]},[r3,:32]!
+	vld1.32	{@Kxx[1]\[]},[r3,:32]!
+	vld1.32	{@Kxx[2]\[]},[r3,:32]!
+	vld1.32	{@Kxx[3]\[]},[r3,:32]
+
+.Loop_v8:
+	vld1.8		{@MSG[0]-@MSG[1]},[$inp]!
+	vld1.8		{@MSG[2]-@MSG[3]},[$inp]!
+	vrev32.8	@MSG[0],@MSG[0]
+	vrev32.8	@MSG[1],@MSG[1]
+
+	vadd.i32	$W0,@Kxx[0],@MSG[0]
+	vrev32.8	@MSG[2],@MSG[2]
+	vmov		$ABCD_SAVE,$ABCD	@ offload
+	subs		$len,$len,#1
+
+	vadd.i32	$W1,@Kxx[0],@MSG[1]
+	vrev32.8	@MSG[3],@MSG[3]
+	sha1h		$E1,$ABCD		@ 0
+	sha1c		$ABCD,$E,$W0
+	vadd.i32	$W0,@Kxx[$j],@MSG[2]
+	sha1su0		@MSG[0],@MSG[1],@MSG[2]
+___
+for ($j=0,$i=1;$i<20-3;$i++) {
+my $f=("c","p","m","p")[$i/5];
+$code.=<<___;
+	sha1h		$E0,$ABCD		@ $i
+	sha1$f		$ABCD,$E1,$W1
+	vadd.i32	$W1,@Kxx[$j],@MSG[3]
+	sha1su1		@MSG[0],@MSG[3]
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i<20-4);
+	sha1su0		@MSG[1],@MSG[2],@MSG[3]
+___
+	($E0,$E1)=($E1,$E0);	($W0,$W1)=($W1,$W0);
+	push(@MSG,shift(@MSG));	$j++ if ((($i+3)%5)==0);
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	sha1h		$E0,$ABCD		@ $i
+	sha1p		$ABCD,$E1,$W1
+	vadd.i32	$W1,@Kxx[$j],@MSG[3]
+
+	sha1h		$E1,$ABCD		@ 18
+	sha1p		$ABCD,$E0,$W0
+
+	sha1h		$E0,$ABCD		@ 19
+	sha1p		$ABCD,$E1,$W1
+
+	vadd.i32	$E,$E,$E0
+	vadd.i32	$ABCD,$ABCD,$ABCD_SAVE
+	bne		.Loop_v8
+
+	vst1.32		{$ABCD},[$ctx]!
+	vst1.32		{$E\[0]},[$ctx]
+
+	vldmia	sp!,{d8-d15}
+	ret					@ bx lr
+.size	sha1_block_data_order_armv8,.-sha1_block_data_order_armv8
+#endif
+___
+}}}
+$code.=<<___;
+#if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7
+.comm	OPENSSL_armcap_P,4,4
+#endif
+___
+
+{   my  %opcode = (
+	"sha1c"		=> 0xf2000c40,	"sha1p"		=> 0xf2100c40,
+	"sha1m"		=> 0xf2200c40,	"sha1su0"	=> 0xf2300c40,
+	"sha1h"		=> 0xf3b902c0,	"sha1su1"	=> 0xf3ba0380	);
+
+    sub unsha1 {
+	my ($mnemonic,$arg)=@_;
+
+	if ($arg =~ m/q([0-9]+)(?:,\s*q([0-9]+))?,\s*q([0-9]+)/o) {
+	    my $word = $opcode{$mnemonic}|(($1&7)<<13)|(($1&8)<<19)
+					 |(($2&7)<<17)|(($2&8)<<4)
+					 |(($3&7)<<1) |(($3&8)<<2);
+	    # since ARMv7 instructions are always encoded little-endian.
+	    # correct solution is to use .inst directive, but older
+	    # assemblers don't implement it:-(
+
+	    # this fix-up provides Thumb encoding in conjunction with INST
+	    $word &= ~0x10000000 if (($word & 0x0f000000) == 0x02000000);
+	    sprintf "INST(0x%02x,0x%02x,0x%02x,0x%02x)\t@ %s %s",
+			$word&0xff,($word>>8)&0xff,
+			($word>>16)&0xff,($word>>24)&0xff,
+			$mnemonic,$arg;
+	}
+    }
+}
+
+foreach (split($/,$code)) {
+	s/{q([0-9]+)\[\]}/sprintf "{d%d[],d%d[]}",2*$1,2*$1+1/eo	or
+	s/{q([0-9]+)\[0\]}/sprintf "{d%d[0]}",2*$1/eo;
+
+	s/\b(sha1\w+)\s+(q.*)/unsha1($1,$2)/geo;
+
+	s/\bret\b/bx	lr/o		or
+	s/\bbx\s+lr\b/.word\t0xe12fff1e/o;	# make it possible to compile with -march=armv4
+
+	print $_,$/;
+}
+
+close STDOUT; # enforce flush
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-armv8.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-armv8.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..84a00bf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-armv8.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,363 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2014-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# SHA1 for ARMv8.
+#
+# Performance in cycles per processed byte and improvement coefficient
+# over code generated with "default" compiler:
+#
+#		hardware-assisted	software(*)
+# Apple A7	2.31			4.13 (+14%)
+# Cortex-A53	2.24			8.03 (+97%)
+# Cortex-A57	2.35			7.88 (+74%)
+# Denver	2.13			3.97 (+0%)(**)
+# X-Gene				8.80 (+200%)
+# Mongoose	2.05			6.50 (+160%)
+#
+# (*)	Software results are presented mostly for reference purposes.
+# (**)	Keep in mind that Denver relies on binary translation, which
+#	optimizes compiler output at run-time.
+
+$flavour = shift;
+$output  = shift;
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+( $xlate="${dir}arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
+( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
+die "can't locate arm-xlate.pl";
+
+open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output";
+*STDOUT=*OUT;
+
+($ctx,$inp,$num)=("x0","x1","x2");
+@Xw=map("w$_",(3..17,19));
+@Xx=map("x$_",(3..17,19));
+@V=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E)=map("w$_",(20..24));
+($t0,$t1,$t2,$K)=map("w$_",(25..28));
+
+
+sub BODY_00_19 {
+my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_;
+my $j=($i+2)&15;
+
+$code.=<<___ if ($i<15 && !($i&1));
+	lsr	@Xx[$i+1],@Xx[$i],#32
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i<14 && !($i&1));
+	ldr	@Xx[$i+2],[$inp,#`($i+2)*4-64`]
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i<14 && ($i&1));
+#ifdef	__ARMEB__
+	ror	@Xx[$i+1],@Xx[$i+1],#32
+#else
+	rev32	@Xx[$i+1],@Xx[$i+1]
+#endif
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i<14);
+	bic	$t0,$d,$b
+	and	$t1,$c,$b
+	ror	$t2,$a,#27
+	add	$d,$d,$K		// future e+=K
+	orr	$t0,$t0,$t1
+	add	$e,$e,$t2		// e+=rot(a,5)
+	ror	$b,$b,#2
+	add	$d,$d,@Xw[($i+1)&15]	// future e+=X[i]
+	add	$e,$e,$t0		// e+=F(b,c,d)
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i==19);
+	movz	$K,#0xeba1
+	movk	$K,#0x6ed9,lsl#16
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i>=14);
+	 eor	@Xw[$j],@Xw[$j],@Xw[($j+2)&15]
+	bic	$t0,$d,$b
+	and	$t1,$c,$b
+	ror	$t2,$a,#27
+	 eor	@Xw[$j],@Xw[$j],@Xw[($j+8)&15]
+	add	$d,$d,$K		// future e+=K
+	orr	$t0,$t0,$t1
+	add	$e,$e,$t2		// e+=rot(a,5)
+	 eor	@Xw[$j],@Xw[$j],@Xw[($j+13)&15]
+	ror	$b,$b,#2
+	add	$d,$d,@Xw[($i+1)&15]	// future e+=X[i]
+	add	$e,$e,$t0		// e+=F(b,c,d)
+	 ror	@Xw[$j],@Xw[$j],#31
+___
+}
+
+sub BODY_40_59 {
+my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_;
+my $j=($i+2)&15;
+
+$code.=<<___ if ($i==59);
+	movz	$K,#0xc1d6
+	movk	$K,#0xca62,lsl#16
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	orr	$t0,$b,$c
+	and	$t1,$b,$c
+	 eor	@Xw[$j],@Xw[$j],@Xw[($j+2)&15]
+	ror	$t2,$a,#27
+	and	$t0,$t0,$d
+	add	$d,$d,$K		// future e+=K
+	 eor	@Xw[$j],@Xw[$j],@Xw[($j+8)&15]
+	add	$e,$e,$t2		// e+=rot(a,5)
+	orr	$t0,$t0,$t1
+	ror	$b,$b,#2
+	 eor	@Xw[$j],@Xw[$j],@Xw[($j+13)&15]
+	add	$d,$d,@Xw[($i+1)&15]	// future e+=X[i]
+	add	$e,$e,$t0		// e+=F(b,c,d)
+	 ror	@Xw[$j],@Xw[$j],#31
+___
+}
+
+sub BODY_20_39 {
+my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_;
+my $j=($i+2)&15;
+
+$code.=<<___ if ($i==39);
+	movz	$K,#0xbcdc
+	movk	$K,#0x8f1b,lsl#16
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i<78);
+	 eor	@Xw[$j],@Xw[$j],@Xw[($j+2)&15]
+	eor	$t0,$d,$b
+	ror	$t2,$a,#27
+	add	$d,$d,$K		// future e+=K
+	 eor	@Xw[$j],@Xw[$j],@Xw[($j+8)&15]
+	eor	$t0,$t0,$c
+	add	$e,$e,$t2		// e+=rot(a,5)
+	ror	$b,$b,#2
+	 eor	@Xw[$j],@Xw[$j],@Xw[($j+13)&15]
+	add	$d,$d,@Xw[($i+1)&15]	// future e+=X[i]
+	add	$e,$e,$t0		// e+=F(b,c,d)
+	 ror	@Xw[$j],@Xw[$j],#31
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i==78);
+	ldp	@Xw[1],@Xw[2],[$ctx]
+	eor	$t0,$d,$b
+	ror	$t2,$a,#27
+	add	$d,$d,$K		// future e+=K
+	eor	$t0,$t0,$c
+	add	$e,$e,$t2		// e+=rot(a,5)
+	ror	$b,$b,#2
+	add	$d,$d,@Xw[($i+1)&15]	// future e+=X[i]
+	add	$e,$e,$t0		// e+=F(b,c,d)
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i==79);
+	ldp	@Xw[3],@Xw[4],[$ctx,#8]
+	eor	$t0,$d,$b
+	ror	$t2,$a,#27
+	eor	$t0,$t0,$c
+	add	$e,$e,$t2		// e+=rot(a,5)
+	ror	$b,$b,#2
+	ldr	@Xw[5],[$ctx,#16]
+	add	$e,$e,$t0		// e+=F(b,c,d)
+___
+}
+
+$code.=<<___;
+#include "arm_arch.h"
+
+.text
+
+.extern	OPENSSL_armcap_P
+.globl	sha1_block_data_order
+.type	sha1_block_data_order,%function
+.align	6
+sha1_block_data_order:
+#ifdef	__ILP32__
+	ldrsw	x16,.LOPENSSL_armcap_P
+#else
+	ldr	x16,.LOPENSSL_armcap_P
+#endif
+	adr	x17,.LOPENSSL_armcap_P
+	add	x16,x16,x17
+	ldr	w16,[x16]
+	tst	w16,#ARMV8_SHA1
+	b.ne	.Lv8_entry
+
+	stp	x29,x30,[sp,#-96]!
+	add	x29,sp,#0
+	stp	x19,x20,[sp,#16]
+	stp	x21,x22,[sp,#32]
+	stp	x23,x24,[sp,#48]
+	stp	x25,x26,[sp,#64]
+	stp	x27,x28,[sp,#80]
+
+	ldp	$A,$B,[$ctx]
+	ldp	$C,$D,[$ctx,#8]
+	ldr	$E,[$ctx,#16]
+
+.Loop:
+	ldr	@Xx[0],[$inp],#64
+	movz	$K,#0x7999
+	sub	$num,$num,#1
+	movk	$K,#0x5a82,lsl#16
+#ifdef	__ARMEB__
+	ror	$Xx[0],@Xx[0],#32
+#else
+	rev32	@Xx[0],@Xx[0]
+#endif
+	add	$E,$E,$K		// warm it up
+	add	$E,$E,@Xw[0]
+___
+for($i=0;$i<20;$i++)	{ &BODY_00_19($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+for(;$i<40;$i++)	{ &BODY_20_39($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+for(;$i<60;$i++)	{ &BODY_40_59($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+for(;$i<80;$i++)	{ &BODY_20_39($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+$code.=<<___;
+	add	$B,$B,@Xw[2]
+	add	$C,$C,@Xw[3]
+	add	$A,$A,@Xw[1]
+	add	$D,$D,@Xw[4]
+	add	$E,$E,@Xw[5]
+	stp	$A,$B,[$ctx]
+	stp	$C,$D,[$ctx,#8]
+	str	$E,[$ctx,#16]
+	cbnz	$num,.Loop
+
+	ldp	x19,x20,[sp,#16]
+	ldp	x21,x22,[sp,#32]
+	ldp	x23,x24,[sp,#48]
+	ldp	x25,x26,[sp,#64]
+	ldp	x27,x28,[sp,#80]
+	ldr	x29,[sp],#96
+	ret
+.size	sha1_block_data_order,.-sha1_block_data_order
+___
+{{{
+my ($ABCD,$E,$E0,$E1)=map("v$_.16b",(0..3));
+my @MSG=map("v$_.16b",(4..7));
+my @Kxx=map("v$_.4s",(16..19));
+my ($W0,$W1)=("v20.4s","v21.4s");
+my $ABCD_SAVE="v22.16b";
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.type	sha1_block_armv8,%function
+.align	6
+sha1_block_armv8:
+.Lv8_entry:
+	stp	x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
+	add	x29,sp,#0
+
+	adr	x4,.Lconst
+	eor	$E,$E,$E
+	ld1.32	{$ABCD},[$ctx],#16
+	ld1.32	{$E}[0],[$ctx]
+	sub	$ctx,$ctx,#16
+	ld1.32	{@Kxx[0]-@Kxx[3]},[x4]
+
+.Loop_hw:
+	ld1	{@MSG[0]-@MSG[3]},[$inp],#64
+	sub	$num,$num,#1
+	rev32	@MSG[0],@MSG[0]
+	rev32	@MSG[1],@MSG[1]
+
+	add.i32	$W0,@Kxx[0],@MSG[0]
+	rev32	@MSG[2],@MSG[2]
+	orr	$ABCD_SAVE,$ABCD,$ABCD	// offload
+
+	add.i32	$W1,@Kxx[0],@MSG[1]
+	rev32	@MSG[3],@MSG[3]
+	sha1h	$E1,$ABCD
+	sha1c	$ABCD,$E,$W0		// 0
+	add.i32	$W0,@Kxx[$j],@MSG[2]
+	sha1su0	@MSG[0],@MSG[1],@MSG[2]
+___
+for ($j=0,$i=1;$i<20-3;$i++) {
+my $f=("c","p","m","p")[$i/5];
+$code.=<<___;
+	sha1h	$E0,$ABCD		// $i
+	sha1$f	$ABCD,$E1,$W1
+	add.i32	$W1,@Kxx[$j],@MSG[3]
+	sha1su1	@MSG[0],@MSG[3]
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i<20-4);
+	sha1su0	@MSG[1],@MSG[2],@MSG[3]
+___
+	($E0,$E1)=($E1,$E0);		($W0,$W1)=($W1,$W0);
+	push(@MSG,shift(@MSG));		$j++ if ((($i+3)%5)==0);
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	sha1h	$E0,$ABCD		// $i
+	sha1p	$ABCD,$E1,$W1
+	add.i32	$W1,@Kxx[$j],@MSG[3]
+
+	sha1h	$E1,$ABCD		// 18
+	sha1p	$ABCD,$E0,$W0
+
+	sha1h	$E0,$ABCD		// 19
+	sha1p	$ABCD,$E1,$W1
+
+	add.i32	$E,$E,$E0
+	add.i32	$ABCD,$ABCD,$ABCD_SAVE
+
+	cbnz	$num,.Loop_hw
+
+	st1.32	{$ABCD},[$ctx],#16
+	st1.32	{$E}[0],[$ctx]
+
+	ldr	x29,[sp],#16
+	ret
+.size	sha1_block_armv8,.-sha1_block_armv8
+.align	6
+.Lconst:
+.long	0x5a827999,0x5a827999,0x5a827999,0x5a827999	//K_00_19
+.long	0x6ed9eba1,0x6ed9eba1,0x6ed9eba1,0x6ed9eba1	//K_20_39
+.long	0x8f1bbcdc,0x8f1bbcdc,0x8f1bbcdc,0x8f1bbcdc	//K_40_59
+.long	0xca62c1d6,0xca62c1d6,0xca62c1d6,0xca62c1d6	//K_60_79
+.LOPENSSL_armcap_P:
+#ifdef	__ILP32__
+.long	OPENSSL_armcap_P-.
+#else
+.quad	OPENSSL_armcap_P-.
+#endif
+.asciz	"SHA1 block transform for ARMv8, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+.align	2
+.comm	OPENSSL_armcap_P,4,4
+___
+}}}
+
+{   my	%opcode = (
+	"sha1c"		=> 0x5e000000,	"sha1p"		=> 0x5e001000,
+	"sha1m"		=> 0x5e002000,	"sha1su0"	=> 0x5e003000,
+	"sha1h"		=> 0x5e280800,	"sha1su1"	=> 0x5e281800	);
+
+    sub unsha1 {
+	my ($mnemonic,$arg)=@_;
+
+	$arg =~ m/[qv]([0-9]+)[^,]*,\s*[qv]([0-9]+)[^,]*(?:,\s*[qv]([0-9]+))?/o
+	&&
+	sprintf ".inst\t0x%08x\t//%s %s",
+			$opcode{$mnemonic}|$1|($2<<5)|($3<<16),
+			$mnemonic,$arg;
+    }
+}
+
+foreach(split("\n",$code)) {
+
+	s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval($1)/geo;
+
+	s/\b(sha1\w+)\s+([qv].*)/unsha1($1,$2)/geo;
+
+	s/\.\w?32\b//o		and s/\.16b/\.4s/go;
+	m/(ld|st)1[^\[]+\[0\]/o	and s/\.4s/\.s/go;
+
+	print $_,"\n";
+}
+
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-c64xplus.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-c64xplus.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4db2bcb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-c64xplus.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,337 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2012-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# SHA1 for C64x+.
+#
+# November 2011
+#
+# If compared to compiler-generated code with similar characteristics,
+# i.e. compiled with OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT and utilizing SPLOOPs,
+# this implementation is 25% smaller and >2x faster. In absolute terms
+# performance is (quite impressive) ~6.5 cycles per processed byte.
+# Fully unrolled assembler would be ~5x larger and is likely to be
+# ~15% faster. It would be free from references to intermediate ring
+# buffer, but put more pressure on L1P [both because the code would be
+# larger and won't be using SPLOOP buffer]. There are no plans to
+# realize fully unrolled variant though...
+#
+# !!! Note that this module uses AMR, which means that all interrupt
+# service routines are expected to preserve it and for own well-being
+# zero it upon entry.
+
+while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {}
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+($CTX,$INP,$NUM) = ("A4","B4","A6");		# arguments
+
+($A,$B,$C,$D,$E, $Arot,$F,$F0,$T,$K) = map("A$_",(16..20, 21..25));
+($X0,$X2,$X8,$X13) = ("A26","B26","A27","B27");
+($TX0,$TX1,$TX2,$TX3) = map("B$_",(28..31));
+($XPA,$XPB) = ("A5","B5");			# X circular buffer
+($Actx,$Bctx,$Cctx,$Dctx,$Ectx) = map("A$_",(3,6..9));	# zaps $NUM
+
+$code=<<___;
+	.text
+
+	.if	.ASSEMBLER_VERSION<7000000
+	.asg	0,__TI_EABI__
+	.endif
+	.if	__TI_EABI__
+	.asg	sha1_block_data_order,_sha1_block_data_order
+	.endif
+
+	.asg	B3,RA
+	.asg	A15,FP
+	.asg	B15,SP
+
+	.if	.BIG_ENDIAN
+	.asg	MV,SWAP2
+	.asg	MV,SWAP4
+	.endif
+
+	.global	_sha1_block_data_order
+_sha1_block_data_order:
+	.asmfunc stack_usage(64)
+	MV	$NUM,A0			; reassign $NUM
+||	MVK	-64,B0
+  [!A0]	BNOP	RA			; if ($NUM==0) return;
+|| [A0]	STW	FP,*SP--[16]		; save frame pointer and alloca(64)
+|| [A0]	MV	SP,FP
+   [A0]	LDW	*${CTX}[0],$A		; load A-E...
+|| [A0]	AND	B0,SP,SP		; align stack at 64 bytes
+   [A0]	LDW	*${CTX}[1],$B
+|| [A0]	SUBAW	SP,2,SP			; reserve two words above buffer
+   [A0]	LDW	*${CTX}[2],$C
+|| [A0]	MVK	0x00404,B0
+   [A0]	LDW	*${CTX}[3],$D
+|| [A0]	MVKH	0x50000,B0		; 0x050404, 64 bytes for $XP[AB]
+   [A0]	LDW	*${CTX}[4],$E
+|| [A0]	MVC	B0,AMR			; setup circular addressing
+	LDNW	*${INP}++,$TX1		; pre-fetch input
+	NOP	1
+
+loop?:
+	MVK	0x00007999,$K
+||	ADDAW	SP,2,$XPA
+||	SUB	A0,1,A0
+||	MVK	13,B0
+	MVKH	0x5a820000,$K		; K_00_19
+||	ADDAW	SP,2,$XPB
+||	MV	$A,$Actx
+||	MV	$B,$Bctx
+;;==================================================
+	SPLOOPD	5			; BODY_00_13
+||	MV	$C,$Cctx
+||	MV	$D,$Dctx
+||	MV	$E,$Ectx
+||	MVC	B0,ILC
+
+	ROTL	$A,5,$Arot
+||	AND	$C,$B,$F
+||	ANDN	$D,$B,$F0
+||	ADD	$K,$E,$T		; T=E+K
+
+	XOR	$F0,$F,$F		; F_00_19(B,C,D)
+||	MV	$D,$E			; E=D
+||	MV	$C,$D			; D=C
+||	SWAP2	$TX1,$TX2
+||	LDNW	*${INP}++,$TX1
+
+	ADD	$F,$T,$T		; T+=F_00_19(B,C,D)
+||	ROTL	$B,30,$C		; C=ROL(B,30)
+||	SWAP4	$TX2,$TX3		; byte swap
+
+	ADD	$Arot,$T,$T		; T+=ROL(A,5)
+||	MV	$A,$B			; B=A
+
+	ADD	$TX3,$T,$A		; A=T+Xi
+||	STW	$TX3,*${XPB}++
+	SPKERNEL
+;;==================================================
+	ROTL	$A,5,$Arot		; BODY_14
+||	AND	$C,$B,$F
+||	ANDN	$D,$B,$F0
+||	ADD	$K,$E,$T		; T=E+K
+
+	XOR	$F0,$F,$F		; F_00_19(B,C,D)
+||	MV	$D,$E			; E=D
+||	MV	$C,$D			; D=C
+||	SWAP2	$TX1,$TX2
+||	LDNW	*${INP}++,$TX1
+
+	ADD	$F,$T,$T		; T+=F_00_19(B,C,D)
+||	ROTL	$B,30,$C		; C=ROL(B,30)
+||	SWAP4	$TX2,$TX2		; byte swap
+||	LDW	*${XPA}++,$X0		; fetches from X ring buffer are
+||	LDW	*${XPB}[4],$X2		; 2 iterations ahead
+
+	ADD	$Arot,$T,$T		; T+=ROL(A,5)
+||	MV	$A,$B			; B=A
+||	LDW	*${XPA}[7],$X8
+||	MV	$TX3,$X13		; ||	LDW	*${XPB}[15],$X13
+||	MV	$TX2,$TX3
+
+	ADD	$TX2,$T,$A		; A=T+Xi
+||	STW	$TX2,*${XPB}++
+;;==================================================
+	ROTL	$A,5,$Arot		; BODY_15
+||	AND	$C,$B,$F
+||	ANDN	$D,$B,$F0
+||	ADD	$K,$E,$T		; T=E+K
+
+	XOR	$F0,$F,$F		; F_00_19(B,C,D)
+||	MV	$D,$E			; E=D
+||	MV	$C,$D			; D=C
+||	SWAP2	$TX1,$TX2
+
+	ADD	$F,$T,$T		; T+=F_00_19(B,C,D)
+||	ROTL	$B,30,$C		; C=ROL(B,30)
+||	SWAP4	$TX2,$TX2		; byte swap
+||	XOR	$X0,$X2,$TX0		; Xupdate XORs are 1 iteration ahead
+||	LDW	*${XPA}++,$X0
+||	LDW	*${XPB}[4],$X2
+
+	ADD	$Arot,$T,$T		; T+=ROL(A,5)
+||	MV	$A,$B			; B=A
+||	XOR	$X8,$X13,$TX1
+||	LDW	*${XPA}[7],$X8
+||	MV	$TX3,$X13		; ||	LDW	*${XPB}[15],$X13
+||	MV	$TX2,$TX3
+
+	ADD	$TX2,$T,$A		; A=T+Xi
+||	STW	$TX2,*${XPB}++
+||	XOR	$TX0,$TX1,$TX1
+||	MVK	3,B0
+;;==================================================
+	SPLOOPD	5			; BODY_16_19
+||	MVC	B0,ILC
+
+	ROTL	$A,5,$Arot
+||	AND	$C,$B,$F
+||	ANDN	$D,$B,$F0
+||	ADD	$K,$E,$T		; T=E+K
+||	ROTL	$TX1,1,$TX2		; Xupdate output
+
+	XOR	$F0,$F,$F		; F_00_19(B,C,D)
+||	MV	$D,$E			; E=D
+||	MV	$C,$D			; D=C
+
+	ADD	$F,$T,$T		; T+=F_00_19(B,C,D)
+||	ROTL	$B,30,$C		; C=ROL(B,30)
+||	XOR	$X0,$X2,$TX0
+||	LDW	*${XPA}++,$X0
+||	LDW	*${XPB}[4],$X2
+
+	ADD	$Arot,$T,$T		; T+=ROL(A,5)
+||	MV	$A,$B			; B=A
+||	XOR	$X8,$X13,$TX1
+||	LDW	*${XPA}[7],$X8
+||	MV	$TX3,$X13		; ||	LDW	*${XPB}[15],$X13
+||	MV	$TX2,$TX3
+
+	ADD	$TX2,$T,$A		; A=T+Xi
+||	STW	$TX2,*${XPB}++
+||	XOR	$TX0,$TX1,$TX1
+	SPKERNEL
+
+	MVK	0xffffeba1,$K
+||	MVK	19,B0
+	MVKH	0x6ed90000,$K		; K_20_39
+___
+sub BODY_20_39 {
+$code.=<<___;
+;;==================================================
+	SPLOOPD	5			; BODY_20_39
+||	MVC	B0,ILC
+
+	ROTL	$A,5,$Arot
+||	XOR	$B,$C,$F
+||	ADD	$K,$E,$T		; T=E+K
+||	ROTL	$TX1,1,$TX2		; Xupdate output
+
+	XOR	$D,$F,$F		; F_20_39(B,C,D)
+||	MV	$D,$E			; E=D
+||	MV	$C,$D			; D=C
+
+	ADD	$F,$T,$T		; T+=F_20_39(B,C,D)
+||	ROTL	$B,30,$C		; C=ROL(B,30)
+||	XOR	$X0,$X2,$TX0
+||	LDW	*${XPA}++,$X0
+||	LDW	*${XPB}[4],$X2
+
+	ADD	$Arot,$T,$T		; T+=ROL(A,5)
+||	MV	$A,$B			; B=A
+||	XOR	$X8,$X13,$TX1
+||	LDW	*${XPA}[7],$X8
+||	MV	$TX3,$X13		; ||	LDW	*${XPB}[15],$X13
+||	MV	$TX2,$TX3
+
+	ADD	$TX2,$T,$A		; A=T+Xi
+||	STW	$TX2,*${XPB}++		; last one is redundant
+||	XOR	$TX0,$TX1,$TX1
+	SPKERNEL
+___
+$code.=<<___ if (!shift);
+	MVK	0xffffbcdc,$K
+	MVKH	0x8f1b0000,$K		; K_40_59
+___
+}	&BODY_20_39();
+$code.=<<___;
+;;==================================================
+	SPLOOPD	5			; BODY_40_59
+||	MVC	B0,ILC
+||	AND	$B,$C,$F
+||	AND	$B,$D,$F0
+
+	ROTL	$A,5,$Arot
+||	XOR	$F0,$F,$F
+||	AND	$C,$D,$F0
+||	ADD	$K,$E,$T		; T=E+K
+||	ROTL	$TX1,1,$TX2		; Xupdate output
+
+	XOR	$F0,$F,$F		; F_40_59(B,C,D)
+||	MV	$D,$E			; E=D
+||	MV	$C,$D			; D=C
+
+	ADD	$F,$T,$T		; T+=F_40_59(B,C,D)
+||	ROTL	$B,30,$C		; C=ROL(B,30)
+||	XOR	$X0,$X2,$TX0
+||	LDW	*${XPA}++,$X0
+||	LDW	*${XPB}[4],$X2
+
+	ADD	$Arot,$T,$T		; T+=ROL(A,5)
+||	MV	$A,$B			; B=A
+||	XOR	$X8,$X13,$TX1
+||	LDW	*${XPA}[7],$X8
+||	MV	$TX3,$X13		; ||	LDW	*${XPB}[15],$X13
+||	MV	$TX2,$TX3
+
+	ADD	$TX2,$T,$A		; A=T+Xi
+||	STW	$TX2,*${XPB}++
+||	XOR	$TX0,$TX1,$TX1
+||	AND	$B,$C,$F
+||	AND	$B,$D,$F0
+	SPKERNEL
+
+	MVK	0xffffc1d6,$K
+||	MVK	18,B0
+	MVKH	0xca620000,$K		; K_60_79
+___
+	&BODY_20_39(-1);		# BODY_60_78
+$code.=<<___;
+;;==================================================
+   [A0]	B	loop?
+||	ROTL	$A,5,$Arot		; BODY_79
+||	XOR	$B,$C,$F
+||	ROTL	$TX1,1,$TX2		; Xupdate output
+
+   [A0]	LDNW	*${INP}++,$TX1		; pre-fetch input
+||	ADD	$K,$E,$T		; T=E+K
+||	XOR	$D,$F,$F		; F_20_39(B,C,D)
+
+	ADD	$F,$T,$T		; T+=F_20_39(B,C,D)
+||	ADD	$Ectx,$D,$E		; E=D,E+=Ectx
+||	ADD	$Dctx,$C,$D		; D=C,D+=Dctx
+||	ROTL	$B,30,$C		; C=ROL(B,30)
+
+	ADD	$Arot,$T,$T		; T+=ROL(A,5)
+||	ADD	$Bctx,$A,$B		; B=A,B+=Bctx
+
+	ADD	$TX2,$T,$A		; A=T+Xi
+
+	ADD	$Actx,$A,$A		; A+=Actx
+||	ADD	$Cctx,$C,$C		; C+=Cctx
+;; end of loop?
+
+	BNOP	RA			; return
+||	MV	FP,SP			; restore stack pointer
+||	LDW	*FP[0],FP		; restore frame pointer
+	STW	$A,*${CTX}[0]		; emit A-E...
+||	MVK	0,B0
+	STW	$B,*${CTX}[1]
+||	MVC	B0,AMR			; clear AMR
+	STW	$C,*${CTX}[2]
+	STW	$D,*${CTX}[3]
+	STW	$E,*${CTX}[4]
+	.endasmfunc
+
+	.sect	.const
+	.cstring "SHA1 block transform for C64x+, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+	.align	4
+___
+
+print $code;
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-ia64.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-ia64.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dec21f9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-ia64.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,314 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# Eternal question is what's wrong with compiler generated code? The
+# trick is that it's possible to reduce the number of shifts required
+# to perform rotations by maintaining copy of 32-bit value in upper
+# bits of 64-bit register. Just follow mux2 and shrp instructions...
+# Performance under big-endian OS such as HP-UX is 179MBps*1GHz, which
+# is >50% better than HP C and >2x better than gcc.
+
+$output = pop;
+
+$code=<<___;
+.ident  \"sha1-ia64.s, version 1.3\"
+.ident  \"IA-64 ISA artwork by Andy Polyakov <appro\@fy.chalmers.se>\"
+.explicit
+
+___
+
+
+if ($^O eq "hpux") {
+    $ADDP="addp4";
+    for (@ARGV) { $ADDP="add" if (/[\+DD|\-mlp]64/); }
+} else { $ADDP="add"; }
+
+#$human=1;
+if ($human) {	# useful for visual code auditing...
+	($A,$B,$C,$D,$E)   = ("A","B","C","D","E");
+	($h0,$h1,$h2,$h3,$h4) = ("h0","h1","h2","h3","h4");
+	($K_00_19, $K_20_39, $K_40_59, $K_60_79) =
+	    (	"K_00_19","K_20_39","K_40_59","K_60_79"	);
+	@X= (	"X0", "X1", "X2", "X3", "X4", "X5", "X6", "X7",
+		"X8", "X9","X10","X11","X12","X13","X14","X15"	);
+}
+else {
+	($A,$B,$C,$D,$E)   =    ("loc0","loc1","loc2","loc3","loc4");
+	($h0,$h1,$h2,$h3,$h4) = ("loc5","loc6","loc7","loc8","loc9");
+	($K_00_19, $K_20_39, $K_40_59, $K_60_79) =
+	    (	"r14", "r15", "loc10", "loc11"	);
+	@X= (	"r16", "r17", "r18", "r19", "r20", "r21", "r22", "r23",
+		"r24", "r25", "r26", "r27", "r28", "r29", "r30", "r31"	);
+}
+
+sub BODY_00_15 {
+local	*code=shift;
+my	($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_;
+my	$j=$i+1;
+my	$Xn=@X[$j%16];
+
+$code.=<<___ if ($i==0);
+{ .mmi;	ld1	$X[$i]=[inp],2		    // MSB
+	ld1	tmp2=[tmp3],2		};;
+{ .mmi;	ld1	tmp0=[inp],2
+	ld1	tmp4=[tmp3],2		    // LSB
+	dep	$X[$i]=$X[$i],tmp2,8,8	};;
+___
+if ($i<15) {
+	$code.=<<___;
+{ .mmi;	ld1	$Xn=[inp],2		    // forward Xload
+	nop.m	0x0
+	dep	tmp1=tmp0,tmp4,8,8	};;
+{ .mmi;	ld1	tmp2=[tmp3],2		    // forward Xload
+	and	tmp4=$c,$b
+	dep	$X[$i]=$X[$i],tmp1,16,16} //;;
+{ .mmi;	add	$e=$e,$K_00_19		    // e+=K_00_19
+	andcm	tmp1=$d,$b
+	dep.z	tmp5=$a,5,27		};; // a<<5
+{ .mmi;	add	$e=$e,$X[$i]		    // e+=Xload
+	or	tmp4=tmp4,tmp1		    // F_00_19(b,c,d)=(b&c)|(~b&d)
+	extr.u	tmp1=$a,27,5		};; // a>>27
+{ .mmi;	ld1	tmp0=[inp],2		    // forward Xload
+	add	$e=$e,tmp4		    // e+=F_00_19(b,c,d)
+	shrp	$b=tmp6,tmp6,2		}   // b=ROTATE(b,30)
+{ .mmi;	ld1	tmp4=[tmp3],2		    // forward Xload
+	or	tmp5=tmp1,tmp5		    // ROTATE(a,5)
+	mux2	tmp6=$a,0x44		};; // see b in next iteration
+{ .mii;	add	$e=$e,tmp5		    // e+=ROTATE(a,5)
+	dep	$Xn=$Xn,tmp2,8,8	    // forward Xload
+	mux2	$X[$i]=$X[$i],0x44	} //;;
+
+___
+	}
+else	{
+	$code.=<<___;
+{ .mii;	and	tmp3=$c,$b
+	dep	tmp1=tmp0,tmp4,8,8;;
+	dep	$X[$i]=$X[$i],tmp1,16,16} //;;
+{ .mmi;	add	$e=$e,$K_00_19		    // e+=K_00_19
+	andcm	tmp1=$d,$b
+	dep.z	tmp5=$a,5,27		};; // a<<5
+{ .mmi;	add	$e=$e,$X[$i]		    // e+=Xupdate
+	or	tmp4=tmp3,tmp1		    // F_00_19(b,c,d)=(b&c)|(~b&d)
+	extr.u	tmp1=$a,27,5		}   // a>>27
+{ .mmi;	xor	$Xn=$Xn,$X[($j+2)%16]	    // forward Xupdate
+	xor	tmp3=$X[($j+8)%16],$X[($j+13)%16] // forward Xupdate
+	nop.i	0			};;
+{ .mmi;	add	$e=$e,tmp4		    // e+=F_00_19(b,c,d)
+	xor	$Xn=$Xn,tmp3		    // forward Xupdate
+	shrp	$b=tmp6,tmp6,2		}   // b=ROTATE(b,30)
+{ .mmi; or	tmp1=tmp1,tmp5		    // ROTATE(a,5)
+	mux2	tmp6=$a,0x44		};; // see b in next iteration
+{ .mii;	add	$e=$e,tmp1		    // e+=ROTATE(a,5)
+	shrp	$Xn=$Xn,$Xn,31		    // ROTATE(x[0]^x[2]^x[8]^x[13],1)
+	mux2	$X[$i]=$X[$i],0x44	};;
+
+___
+	}
+}
+
+sub BODY_16_19 {
+local	*code=shift;
+my	($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_;
+my	$j=$i+1;
+my	$Xn=@X[$j%16];
+
+$code.=<<___;
+{ .mib;	add	$e=$e,$K_00_19		    // e+=K_00_19
+	dep.z	tmp5=$a,5,27		}   // a<<5
+{ .mib;	andcm	tmp1=$d,$b
+	and	tmp0=$c,$b		};;
+{ .mmi;	add	$e=$e,$X[$i%16]		    // e+=Xupdate
+	or	tmp0=tmp0,tmp1		    // F_00_19(b,c,d)=(b&c)|(~b&d)
+	extr.u	tmp1=$a,27,5		}   // a>>27
+{ .mmi;	xor	$Xn=$Xn,$X[($j+2)%16]	    // forward Xupdate
+	xor	tmp3=$X[($j+8)%16],$X[($j+13)%16]	// forward Xupdate
+	nop.i	0			};;
+{ .mmi;	add	$e=$e,tmp0		    // f+=F_00_19(b,c,d)
+	xor	$Xn=$Xn,tmp3		    // forward Xupdate
+	shrp	$b=tmp6,tmp6,2		}   // b=ROTATE(b,30)
+{ .mmi;	or	tmp1=tmp1,tmp5		    // ROTATE(a,5)
+	mux2	tmp6=$a,0x44		};; // see b in next iteration
+{ .mii;	add	$e=$e,tmp1		    // e+=ROTATE(a,5)
+	shrp	$Xn=$Xn,$Xn,31		    // ROTATE(x[0]^x[2]^x[8]^x[13],1)
+	nop.i	0			};;
+
+___
+}
+
+sub BODY_20_39 {
+local	*code=shift;
+my	($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$Konst)=@_;
+	$Konst = $K_20_39 if (!defined($Konst));
+my	$j=$i+1;
+my	$Xn=@X[$j%16];
+
+if ($i<79) {
+$code.=<<___;
+{ .mib;	add	$e=$e,$Konst		    // e+=K_XX_XX
+	dep.z	tmp5=$a,5,27		}   // a<<5
+{ .mib;	xor	tmp0=$c,$b
+	xor	$Xn=$Xn,$X[($j+2)%16]	};; // forward Xupdate
+{ .mib;	add	$e=$e,$X[$i%16]		    // e+=Xupdate
+	extr.u	tmp1=$a,27,5		}   // a>>27
+{ .mib;	xor	tmp0=tmp0,$d		    // F_20_39(b,c,d)=b^c^d
+	xor	$Xn=$Xn,$X[($j+8)%16]	};; // forward Xupdate
+{ .mmi;	add	$e=$e,tmp0		    // e+=F_20_39(b,c,d)
+	xor	$Xn=$Xn,$X[($j+13)%16]	    // forward Xupdate
+	shrp	$b=tmp6,tmp6,2		}   // b=ROTATE(b,30)
+{ .mmi;	or	tmp1=tmp1,tmp5		    // ROTATE(a,5)
+	mux2	tmp6=$a,0x44		};; // see b in next iteration
+{ .mii;	add	$e=$e,tmp1		    // e+=ROTATE(a,5)
+	shrp	$Xn=$Xn,$Xn,31		    // ROTATE(x[0]^x[2]^x[8]^x[13],1)
+	nop.i	0			};;
+
+___
+}
+else {
+$code.=<<___;
+{ .mib;	add	$e=$e,$Konst		    // e+=K_60_79
+	dep.z	tmp5=$a,5,27		}   // a<<5
+{ .mib;	xor	tmp0=$c,$b
+	add	$h1=$h1,$a		};; // wrap up
+{ .mib;	add	$e=$e,$X[$i%16]		    // e+=Xupdate
+	extr.u	tmp1=$a,27,5		}   // a>>27
+{ .mib;	xor	tmp0=tmp0,$d		    // F_20_39(b,c,d)=b^c^d
+	add	$h3=$h3,$c		};; // wrap up
+{ .mmi;	add	$e=$e,tmp0		    // e+=F_20_39(b,c,d)
+	or	tmp1=tmp1,tmp5		    // ROTATE(a,5)
+	shrp	$b=tmp6,tmp6,2		};; // b=ROTATE(b,30) ;;?
+{ .mmi;	add	$e=$e,tmp1		    // e+=ROTATE(a,5)
+	add	tmp3=1,inp		    // used in unaligned codepath
+	add	$h4=$h4,$d		};; // wrap up
+
+___
+}
+}
+
+sub BODY_40_59 {
+local	*code=shift;
+my	($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_;
+my	$j=$i+1;
+my	$Xn=@X[$j%16];
+
+$code.=<<___;
+{ .mib;	add	$e=$e,$K_40_59		    // e+=K_40_59
+	dep.z	tmp5=$a,5,27		}   // a<<5
+{ .mib;	and	tmp1=$c,$d
+	xor	tmp0=$c,$d		};;
+{ .mmi;	add	$e=$e,$X[$i%16]		    // e+=Xupdate
+	add	tmp5=tmp5,tmp1		    // a<<5+(c&d)
+	extr.u	tmp1=$a,27,5		}   // a>>27
+{ .mmi;	and	tmp0=tmp0,$b
+	xor	$Xn=$Xn,$X[($j+2)%16]	    // forward Xupdate
+	xor	tmp3=$X[($j+8)%16],$X[($j+13)%16] };;	// forward Xupdate
+{ .mmi;	add	$e=$e,tmp0		    // e+=b&(c^d)
+	add	tmp5=tmp5,tmp1		    // ROTATE(a,5)+(c&d)
+	shrp	$b=tmp6,tmp6,2		}   // b=ROTATE(b,30)
+{ .mmi;	xor	$Xn=$Xn,tmp3
+	mux2	tmp6=$a,0x44		};; // see b in next iteration
+{ .mii;	add	$e=$e,tmp5		    // e+=ROTATE(a,5)+(c&d)
+	shrp	$Xn=$Xn,$Xn,31		    // ROTATE(x[0]^x[2]^x[8]^x[13],1)
+	nop.i	0x0			};;
+
+___
+}
+sub BODY_60_79	{ &BODY_20_39(@_,$K_60_79); }
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.text
+
+tmp0=r8;
+tmp1=r9;
+tmp2=r10;
+tmp3=r11;
+ctx=r32;	// in0
+inp=r33;	// in1
+
+// void sha1_block_data_order(SHA_CTX *c,const void *p,size_t num);
+.global	sha1_block_data_order#
+.proc	sha1_block_data_order#
+.align	32
+sha1_block_data_order:
+	.prologue
+{ .mmi;	alloc	tmp1=ar.pfs,3,14,0,0
+	$ADDP	tmp0=4,ctx
+	.save	ar.lc,r3
+	mov	r3=ar.lc		}
+{ .mmi;	$ADDP	ctx=0,ctx
+	$ADDP	inp=0,inp
+	mov	r2=pr			};;
+tmp4=in2;
+tmp5=loc12;
+tmp6=loc13;
+	.body
+{ .mlx;	ld4	$h0=[ctx],8
+	movl	$K_00_19=0x5a827999	}
+{ .mlx;	ld4	$h1=[tmp0],8
+	movl	$K_20_39=0x6ed9eba1	};;
+{ .mlx;	ld4	$h2=[ctx],8
+	movl	$K_40_59=0x8f1bbcdc	}
+{ .mlx;	ld4	$h3=[tmp0]
+	movl	$K_60_79=0xca62c1d6	};;
+{ .mmi;	ld4	$h4=[ctx],-16
+	add	in2=-1,in2		    // adjust num for ar.lc
+	mov	ar.ec=1			};;
+{ .mmi;	nop.m	0
+	add	tmp3=1,inp
+	mov	ar.lc=in2		};; // brp.loop.imp: too far
+
+.Ldtop:
+{ .mmi;	mov	$A=$h0
+	mov	$B=$h1
+	mux2	tmp6=$h1,0x44		}
+{ .mmi;	mov	$C=$h2
+	mov	$D=$h3
+	mov	$E=$h4			};;
+
+___
+
+{ my $i;
+  my @V=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E);
+
+	for($i=0;$i<16;$i++)	{ &BODY_00_15(\$code,$i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+	for(;$i<20;$i++)	{ &BODY_16_19(\$code,$i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+	for(;$i<40;$i++)	{ &BODY_20_39(\$code,$i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+	for(;$i<60;$i++)	{ &BODY_40_59(\$code,$i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+	for(;$i<80;$i++)	{ &BODY_60_79(\$code,$i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+
+	(($V[0] eq $A) and ($V[4] eq $E)) or die;	# double-check
+}
+
+$code.=<<___;
+{ .mmb;	add	$h0=$h0,$A
+	add	$h2=$h2,$C
+	br.ctop.dptk.many	.Ldtop	};;
+.Ldend:
+{ .mmi;	add	tmp0=4,ctx
+	mov	ar.lc=r3		};;
+{ .mmi;	st4	[ctx]=$h0,8
+	st4	[tmp0]=$h1,8		};;
+{ .mmi;	st4	[ctx]=$h2,8
+	st4	[tmp0]=$h3		};;
+{ .mib;	st4	[ctx]=$h4,-16
+	mov	pr=r2,0x1ffff
+	br.ret.sptk.many	b0	};;
+.endp	sha1_block_data_order#
+stringz	"SHA1 block transform for IA64, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+___
+
+open STDOUT,">$output" if $output;
+print $code;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-mb-x86_64.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-mb-x86_64.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..51c73c0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-mb-x86_64.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,1582 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2013-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+
+# Multi-buffer SHA1 procedure processes n buffers in parallel by
+# placing buffer data to designated lane of SIMD register. n is
+# naturally limited to 4 on pre-AVX2 processors and to 8 on
+# AVX2-capable processors such as Haswell.
+#
+#		this	+aesni(i)	sha1	aesni-sha1	gain(iv)
+# -------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Westmere(ii)	10.7/n	+1.28=3.96(n=4)	5.30	6.66		+68%
+# Atom(ii)	18.1/n	+3.93=8.46(n=4)	9.37	12.8		+51%
+# Sandy Bridge	(8.16	+5.15=13.3)/n	4.99	5.98		+80%
+# Ivy Bridge	(8.08	+5.14=13.2)/n	4.60	5.54		+68%
+# Haswell(iii)	(8.96	+5.00=14.0)/n	3.57	4.55		+160%
+# Skylake	(8.70	+5.00=13.7)/n	3.64	4.20		+145%
+# Bulldozer	(9.76	+5.76=15.5)/n	5.95	6.37		+64%
+#
+# (i)	multi-block CBC encrypt with 128-bit key;
+# (ii)	(HASH+AES)/n does not apply to Westmere for n>3 and Atom,
+#	because of lower AES-NI instruction throughput;
+# (iii)	"this" is for n=8, when we gather twice as much data, result
+#	for n=4 is 8.00+4.44=12.4;
+# (iv)	presented improvement coefficients are asymptotic limits and
+#	in real-life application are somewhat lower, e.g. for 2KB
+#	fragments they range from 30% to 100% (on Haswell);
+
+$flavour = shift;
+$output  = shift;
+if ($flavour =~ /\./) { $output = $flavour; undef $flavour; }
+
+$win64=0; $win64=1 if ($flavour =~ /[nm]asm|mingw64/ || $output =~ /\.asm$/);
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+( $xlate="${dir}x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
+( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
+die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl";
+
+$avx=0;
+
+if (`$ENV{CC} -Wa,-v -c -o /dev/null -x assembler /dev/null 2>&1`
+		=~ /GNU assembler version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
+	$avx = ($1>=2.19) + ($1>=2.22);
+}
+
+if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /nasm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /nasm/) &&
+	   `nasm -v 2>&1` =~ /NASM version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
+	$avx = ($1>=2.09) + ($1>=2.10);
+}
+
+if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
+	   `ml64 2>&1` =~ /Version ([0-9]+)\./) {
+	$avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=11);
+}
+
+if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
+	$avx = ($2>=3.0) + ($2>3.0);
+}
+
+open OUT,"| \"$^X\" \"$xlate\" $flavour \"$output\"";
+*STDOUT=*OUT;
+
+# void sha1_multi_block (
+#     struct {	unsigned int A[8];
+#		unsigned int B[8];
+#		unsigned int C[8];
+#		unsigned int D[8];
+#		unsigned int E[8];	} *ctx,
+#     struct {	void *ptr; int blocks;	} inp[8],
+#     int num);		/* 1 or 2 */
+#
+$ctx="%rdi";	# 1st arg
+$inp="%rsi";	# 2nd arg
+$num="%edx";
+@ptr=map("%r$_",(8..11));
+$Tbl="%rbp";
+
+@V=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E)=map("%xmm$_",(0..4));
+($t0,$t1,$t2,$t3,$tx)=map("%xmm$_",(5..9));
+@Xi=map("%xmm$_",(10..14));
+$K="%xmm15";
+
+if (1) {
+    # Atom-specific optimization aiming to eliminate pshufb with high
+    # registers [and thus get rid of 48 cycles accumulated penalty] 
+    @Xi=map("%xmm$_",(0..4));
+    ($tx,$t0,$t1,$t2,$t3)=map("%xmm$_",(5..9));
+    @V=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E)=map("%xmm$_",(10..14));
+}
+
+$REG_SZ=16;
+
+sub Xi_off {
+my $off = shift;
+
+    $off %= 16; $off *= $REG_SZ;
+    $off<256 ? "$off-128(%rax)" : "$off-256-128(%rbx)";
+}
+
+sub BODY_00_19 {
+my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_;
+my $j=$i+1;
+my $k=$i+2;
+
+# Loads are performed 2+3/4 iterations in advance. 3/4 means that out
+# of 4 words you would expect to be loaded per given iteration one is
+# spilled to next iteration. In other words indices in four input
+# streams are distributed as following:
+#
+# $i==0:	0,0,0,0,1,1,1,1,2,2,2,
+# $i==1:	2,3,3,3,
+# $i==2:	3,4,4,4,
+# ...
+# $i==13:	14,15,15,15,
+# $i==14:	15
+# 
+# Then at $i==15 Xupdate is applied one iteration in advance...
+$code.=<<___ if ($i==0);
+	movd		(@ptr[0]),@Xi[0]
+	 lea		`16*4`(@ptr[0]),@ptr[0]
+	movd		(@ptr[1]),@Xi[2]	# borrow @Xi[2]
+	 lea		`16*4`(@ptr[1]),@ptr[1]
+	movd		(@ptr[2]),@Xi[3]	# borrow @Xi[3]
+	 lea		`16*4`(@ptr[2]),@ptr[2]
+	movd		(@ptr[3]),@Xi[4]	# borrow @Xi[4]
+	 lea		`16*4`(@ptr[3]),@ptr[3]
+	punpckldq	@Xi[3],@Xi[0]
+	 movd		`4*$j-16*4`(@ptr[0]),@Xi[1]
+	punpckldq	@Xi[4],@Xi[2]
+	 movd		`4*$j-16*4`(@ptr[1]),$t3
+	punpckldq	@Xi[2],@Xi[0]
+	 movd		`4*$j-16*4`(@ptr[2]),$t2
+	pshufb		$tx,@Xi[0]
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i<14);			# just load input
+	 movd		`4*$j-16*4`(@ptr[3]),$t1
+	 punpckldq	$t2,@Xi[1]
+	movdqa	$a,$t2
+	paddd	$K,$e				# e+=K_00_19
+	 punpckldq	$t1,$t3
+	movdqa	$b,$t1
+	movdqa	$b,$t0
+	pslld	\$5,$t2
+	pandn	$d,$t1
+	pand	$c,$t0
+	 punpckldq	$t3,@Xi[1]
+	movdqa	$a,$t3
+
+	movdqa	@Xi[0],`&Xi_off($i)`
+	paddd	@Xi[0],$e			# e+=X[i]
+	 movd		`4*$k-16*4`(@ptr[0]),@Xi[2]
+	psrld	\$27,$t3
+	pxor	$t1,$t0				# Ch(b,c,d)
+	movdqa	$b,$t1
+
+	por	$t3,$t2				# rol(a,5)
+	 movd		`4*$k-16*4`(@ptr[1]),$t3
+	pslld	\$30,$t1
+	paddd	$t0,$e				# e+=Ch(b,c,d)
+
+	psrld	\$2,$b
+	paddd	$t2,$e				# e+=rol(a,5)
+	 pshufb	$tx,@Xi[1]
+	 movd		`4*$k-16*4`(@ptr[2]),$t2
+	por	$t1,$b				# b=rol(b,30)
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i==14);			# just load input
+	 movd		`4*$j-16*4`(@ptr[3]),$t1
+	 punpckldq	$t2,@Xi[1]
+	movdqa	$a,$t2
+	paddd	$K,$e				# e+=K_00_19
+	 punpckldq	$t1,$t3
+	movdqa	$b,$t1
+	movdqa	$b,$t0
+	pslld	\$5,$t2
+	 prefetcht0	63(@ptr[0])
+	pandn	$d,$t1
+	pand	$c,$t0
+	 punpckldq	$t3,@Xi[1]
+	movdqa	$a,$t3
+
+	movdqa	@Xi[0],`&Xi_off($i)`
+	paddd	@Xi[0],$e			# e+=X[i]
+	psrld	\$27,$t3
+	pxor	$t1,$t0				# Ch(b,c,d)
+	movdqa	$b,$t1
+	 prefetcht0	63(@ptr[1])
+
+	por	$t3,$t2				# rol(a,5)
+	pslld	\$30,$t1
+	paddd	$t0,$e				# e+=Ch(b,c,d)
+	 prefetcht0	63(@ptr[2])
+
+	psrld	\$2,$b
+	paddd	$t2,$e				# e+=rol(a,5)
+	 pshufb	$tx,@Xi[1]
+	 prefetcht0	63(@ptr[3])
+	por	$t1,$b				# b=rol(b,30)
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i>=13 && $i<15);
+	movdqa	`&Xi_off($j+2)`,@Xi[3]		# preload "X[2]"
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i>=15);			# apply Xupdate
+	pxor	@Xi[-2],@Xi[1]			# "X[13]"
+	movdqa	`&Xi_off($j+2)`,@Xi[3]		# "X[2]"
+
+	movdqa	$a,$t2
+	 pxor	`&Xi_off($j+8)`,@Xi[1]
+	paddd	$K,$e				# e+=K_00_19
+	movdqa	$b,$t1
+	pslld	\$5,$t2
+	 pxor	@Xi[3],@Xi[1]
+	movdqa	$b,$t0
+	pandn	$d,$t1
+	 movdqa	@Xi[1],$tx
+	pand	$c,$t0
+	movdqa	$a,$t3
+	 psrld	\$31,$tx
+	 paddd	@Xi[1],@Xi[1]
+
+	movdqa	@Xi[0],`&Xi_off($i)`
+	paddd	@Xi[0],$e			# e+=X[i]
+	psrld	\$27,$t3
+	pxor	$t1,$t0				# Ch(b,c,d)
+
+	movdqa	$b,$t1
+	por	$t3,$t2				# rol(a,5)
+	pslld	\$30,$t1
+	paddd	$t0,$e				# e+=Ch(b,c,d)
+
+	psrld	\$2,$b
+	paddd	$t2,$e				# e+=rol(a,5)
+	 por	$tx,@Xi[1]			# rol	\$1,@Xi[1]
+	por	$t1,$b				# b=rol(b,30)
+___
+push(@Xi,shift(@Xi));
+}
+
+sub BODY_20_39 {
+my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_;
+my $j=$i+1;
+
+$code.=<<___ if ($i<79);
+	pxor	@Xi[-2],@Xi[1]			# "X[13]"
+	movdqa	`&Xi_off($j+2)`,@Xi[3]		# "X[2]"
+
+	movdqa	$a,$t2
+	movdqa	$d,$t0
+	 pxor	`&Xi_off($j+8)`,@Xi[1]
+	paddd	$K,$e				# e+=K_20_39
+	pslld	\$5,$t2
+	pxor	$b,$t0
+
+	movdqa	$a,$t3
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i<72);
+	movdqa	@Xi[0],`&Xi_off($i)`
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i<79);
+	paddd	@Xi[0],$e			# e+=X[i]
+	 pxor	@Xi[3],@Xi[1]
+	psrld	\$27,$t3
+	pxor	$c,$t0				# Parity(b,c,d)
+	movdqa	$b,$t1
+
+	pslld	\$30,$t1
+	 movdqa	@Xi[1],$tx
+	por	$t3,$t2				# rol(a,5)
+	 psrld	\$31,$tx
+	paddd	$t0,$e				# e+=Parity(b,c,d)
+	 paddd	@Xi[1],@Xi[1]
+
+	psrld	\$2,$b
+	paddd	$t2,$e				# e+=rol(a,5)
+	 por	$tx,@Xi[1]			# rol(@Xi[1],1)
+	por	$t1,$b				# b=rol(b,30)
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i==79);
+	movdqa	$a,$t2
+	paddd	$K,$e				# e+=K_20_39
+	movdqa	$d,$t0
+	pslld	\$5,$t2
+	pxor	$b,$t0
+
+	movdqa	$a,$t3
+	paddd	@Xi[0],$e			# e+=X[i]
+	psrld	\$27,$t3
+	movdqa	$b,$t1
+	pxor	$c,$t0				# Parity(b,c,d)
+
+	pslld	\$30,$t1
+	por	$t3,$t2				# rol(a,5)
+	paddd	$t0,$e				# e+=Parity(b,c,d)
+
+	psrld	\$2,$b
+	paddd	$t2,$e				# e+=rol(a,5)
+	por	$t1,$b				# b=rol(b,30)
+___
+push(@Xi,shift(@Xi));
+}
+
+sub BODY_40_59 {
+my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_;
+my $j=$i+1;
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	pxor	@Xi[-2],@Xi[1]			# "X[13]"
+	movdqa	`&Xi_off($j+2)`,@Xi[3]		# "X[2]"
+
+	movdqa	$a,$t2
+	movdqa	$d,$t1
+	 pxor	`&Xi_off($j+8)`,@Xi[1]
+	pxor	@Xi[3],@Xi[1]
+	paddd	$K,$e				# e+=K_40_59
+	pslld	\$5,$t2
+	movdqa	$a,$t3
+	pand	$c,$t1
+
+	movdqa	$d,$t0
+	 movdqa	@Xi[1],$tx
+	psrld	\$27,$t3
+	paddd	$t1,$e
+	pxor	$c,$t0
+
+	movdqa	@Xi[0],`&Xi_off($i)`
+	paddd	@Xi[0],$e			# e+=X[i]
+	por	$t3,$t2				# rol(a,5)
+	 psrld	\$31,$tx
+	pand	$b,$t0
+	movdqa	$b,$t1
+
+	pslld	\$30,$t1
+	 paddd	@Xi[1],@Xi[1]
+	paddd	$t0,$e				# e+=Maj(b,d,c)
+
+	psrld	\$2,$b
+	paddd	$t2,$e				# e+=rol(a,5)
+	 por	$tx,@Xi[1]			# rol(@X[1],1)
+	por	$t1,$b				# b=rol(b,30)
+___
+push(@Xi,shift(@Xi));
+}
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.text
+
+.extern	OPENSSL_ia32cap_P
+
+.globl	sha1_multi_block
+.type	sha1_multi_block,\@function,3
+.align	32
+sha1_multi_block:
+	mov	OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+4(%rip),%rcx
+	bt	\$61,%rcx			# check SHA bit
+	jc	_shaext_shortcut
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($avx);
+	test	\$`1<<28`,%ecx
+	jnz	_avx_shortcut
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	%rsp,%rax
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	lea	-0xa8(%rsp),%rsp
+	movaps	%xmm6,(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm7,0x10(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm8,0x20(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm9,0x30(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm10,-0x78(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm11,-0x68(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm12,-0x58(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm13,-0x48(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm14,-0x38(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm15,-0x28(%rax)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	sub	\$`$REG_SZ*18`,%rsp
+	and	\$-256,%rsp
+	mov	%rax,`$REG_SZ*17`(%rsp)		# original %rsp
+.Lbody:
+	lea	K_XX_XX(%rip),$Tbl
+	lea	`$REG_SZ*16`(%rsp),%rbx
+
+.Loop_grande:
+	mov	$num,`$REG_SZ*17+8`(%rsp)	# original $num
+	xor	$num,$num
+___
+for($i=0;$i<4;$i++) {
+    $code.=<<___;
+	mov	`16*$i+0`($inp),@ptr[$i]	# input pointer
+	mov	`16*$i+8`($inp),%ecx		# number of blocks
+	cmp	$num,%ecx
+	cmovg	%ecx,$num			# find maximum
+	test	%ecx,%ecx
+	mov	%ecx,`4*$i`(%rbx)		# initialize counters
+	cmovle	$Tbl,@ptr[$i]			# cancel input
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	test	$num,$num
+	jz	.Ldone
+
+	movdqu	0x00($ctx),$A			# load context
+	 lea	128(%rsp),%rax
+	movdqu	0x20($ctx),$B
+	movdqu	0x40($ctx),$C
+	movdqu	0x60($ctx),$D
+	movdqu	0x80($ctx),$E
+	movdqa	0x60($Tbl),$tx			# pbswap_mask
+	movdqa	-0x20($Tbl),$K			# K_00_19
+	jmp	.Loop
+
+.align	32
+.Loop:
+___
+for($i=0;$i<20;$i++)	{ &BODY_00_19($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+$code.="	movdqa	0x00($Tbl),$K\n";	# K_20_39
+for(;$i<40;$i++)	{ &BODY_20_39($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+$code.="	movdqa	0x20($Tbl),$K\n";	# K_40_59
+for(;$i<60;$i++)	{ &BODY_40_59($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+$code.="	movdqa	0x40($Tbl),$K\n";	# K_60_79
+for(;$i<80;$i++)	{ &BODY_20_39($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+$code.=<<___;
+	movdqa	(%rbx),@Xi[0]			# pull counters
+	mov	\$1,%ecx
+	cmp	4*0(%rbx),%ecx			# examinte counters
+	pxor	$t2,$t2
+	cmovge	$Tbl,@ptr[0]			# cancel input
+	cmp	4*1(%rbx),%ecx
+	movdqa	@Xi[0],@Xi[1]
+	cmovge	$Tbl,@ptr[1]
+	cmp	4*2(%rbx),%ecx
+	pcmpgtd	$t2,@Xi[1]			# mask value
+	cmovge	$Tbl,@ptr[2]
+	cmp	4*3(%rbx),%ecx
+	paddd	@Xi[1],@Xi[0]			# counters--
+	cmovge	$Tbl,@ptr[3]
+
+	movdqu	0x00($ctx),$t0
+	pand	@Xi[1],$A
+	movdqu	0x20($ctx),$t1
+	pand	@Xi[1],$B
+	paddd	$t0,$A
+	movdqu	0x40($ctx),$t2
+	pand	@Xi[1],$C
+	paddd	$t1,$B
+	movdqu	0x60($ctx),$t3
+	pand	@Xi[1],$D
+	paddd	$t2,$C
+	movdqu	0x80($ctx),$tx
+	pand	@Xi[1],$E
+	movdqu	$A,0x00($ctx)
+	paddd	$t3,$D
+	movdqu	$B,0x20($ctx)
+	paddd	$tx,$E
+	movdqu	$C,0x40($ctx)
+	movdqu	$D,0x60($ctx)
+	movdqu	$E,0x80($ctx)
+
+	movdqa	@Xi[0],(%rbx)			# save counters
+	movdqa	0x60($Tbl),$tx			# pbswap_mask
+	movdqa	-0x20($Tbl),$K			# K_00_19
+	dec	$num
+	jnz	.Loop
+
+	mov	`$REG_SZ*17+8`(%rsp),$num
+	lea	$REG_SZ($ctx),$ctx
+	lea	`16*$REG_SZ/4`($inp),$inp
+	dec	$num
+	jnz	.Loop_grande
+
+.Ldone:
+	mov	`$REG_SZ*17`(%rsp),%rax		# original %rsp
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	movaps	-0xb8(%rax),%xmm6
+	movaps	-0xa8(%rax),%xmm7
+	movaps	-0x98(%rax),%xmm8
+	movaps	-0x88(%rax),%xmm9
+	movaps	-0x78(%rax),%xmm10
+	movaps	-0x68(%rax),%xmm11
+	movaps	-0x58(%rax),%xmm12
+	movaps	-0x48(%rax),%xmm13
+	movaps	-0x38(%rax),%xmm14
+	movaps	-0x28(%rax),%xmm15
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	-16(%rax),%rbp
+	mov	-8(%rax),%rbx
+	lea	(%rax),%rsp
+.Lepilogue:
+	ret
+.size	sha1_multi_block,.-sha1_multi_block
+___
+						{{{
+my ($ABCD0,$E0,$E0_,$BSWAP,$ABCD1,$E1,$E1_)=map("%xmm$_",(0..3,8..10));
+my @MSG0=map("%xmm$_",(4..7));
+my @MSG1=map("%xmm$_",(11..14));
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.type	sha1_multi_block_shaext,\@function,3
+.align	32
+sha1_multi_block_shaext:
+_shaext_shortcut:
+	mov	%rsp,%rax
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	lea	-0xa8(%rsp),%rsp
+	movaps	%xmm6,(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm7,0x10(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm8,0x20(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm9,0x30(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm10,-0x78(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm11,-0x68(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm12,-0x58(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm13,-0x48(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm14,-0x38(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm15,-0x28(%rax)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	sub	\$`$REG_SZ*18`,%rsp
+	shl	\$1,$num			# we process pair at a time
+	and	\$-256,%rsp
+	lea	0x40($ctx),$ctx			# size optimization
+	mov	%rax,`$REG_SZ*17`(%rsp)		# original %rsp
+.Lbody_shaext:
+	lea	`$REG_SZ*16`(%rsp),%rbx
+	movdqa	K_XX_XX+0x80(%rip),$BSWAP	# byte-n-word swap
+
+.Loop_grande_shaext:
+	mov	$num,`$REG_SZ*17+8`(%rsp)	# original $num
+	xor	$num,$num
+___
+for($i=0;$i<2;$i++) {
+    $code.=<<___;
+	mov	`16*$i+0`($inp),@ptr[$i]	# input pointer
+	mov	`16*$i+8`($inp),%ecx		# number of blocks
+	cmp	$num,%ecx
+	cmovg	%ecx,$num			# find maximum
+	test	%ecx,%ecx
+	mov	%ecx,`4*$i`(%rbx)		# initialize counters
+	cmovle	%rsp,@ptr[$i]			# cancel input
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	test	$num,$num
+	jz	.Ldone_shaext
+
+	movq		0x00-0x40($ctx),$ABCD0	# a1.a0
+	movq		0x20-0x40($ctx),@MSG0[0]# b1.b0
+	movq		0x40-0x40($ctx),@MSG0[1]# c1.c0
+	movq		0x60-0x40($ctx),@MSG0[2]# d1.d0
+	movq		0x80-0x40($ctx),@MSG0[3]# e1.e0
+
+	punpckldq	@MSG0[0],$ABCD0		# b1.a1.b0.a0
+	punpckldq	@MSG0[2],@MSG0[1]	# d1.c1.d0.c0
+
+	movdqa		$ABCD0,$ABCD1
+	punpcklqdq	@MSG0[1],$ABCD0		# d0.c0.b0.a0
+	punpckhqdq	@MSG0[1],$ABCD1		# d1.c1.b1.a1
+
+	pshufd		\$0b00111111,@MSG0[3],$E0
+	pshufd		\$0b01111111,@MSG0[3],$E1
+	pshufd		\$0b00011011,$ABCD0,$ABCD0
+	pshufd		\$0b00011011,$ABCD1,$ABCD1
+	jmp		.Loop_shaext
+
+.align	32
+.Loop_shaext:
+	movdqu		0x00(@ptr[0]),@MSG0[0]
+	 movdqu		0x00(@ptr[1]),@MSG1[0]
+	movdqu		0x10(@ptr[0]),@MSG0[1]
+	 movdqu		0x10(@ptr[1]),@MSG1[1]
+	movdqu		0x20(@ptr[0]),@MSG0[2]
+	pshufb		$BSWAP,@MSG0[0]
+	 movdqu		0x20(@ptr[1]),@MSG1[2]
+	 pshufb		$BSWAP,@MSG1[0]
+	movdqu		0x30(@ptr[0]),@MSG0[3]
+	lea		0x40(@ptr[0]),@ptr[0]
+	pshufb		$BSWAP,@MSG0[1]
+	 movdqu		0x30(@ptr[1]),@MSG1[3]
+	 lea		0x40(@ptr[1]),@ptr[1]
+	 pshufb		$BSWAP,@MSG1[1]
+
+	movdqa		$E0,0x50(%rsp)		# offload
+	paddd		@MSG0[0],$E0
+	 movdqa		$E1,0x70(%rsp)
+	 paddd		@MSG1[0],$E1
+	movdqa		$ABCD0,0x40(%rsp)	# offload
+	movdqa		$ABCD0,$E0_
+	 movdqa		$ABCD1,0x60(%rsp)
+	 movdqa		$ABCD1,$E1_
+	sha1rnds4	\$0,$E0,$ABCD0		# 0-3
+	sha1nexte	@MSG0[1],$E0_
+	 sha1rnds4	\$0,$E1,$ABCD1		# 0-3
+	 sha1nexte	@MSG1[1],$E1_
+	pshufb		$BSWAP,@MSG0[2]
+	prefetcht0	127(@ptr[0])
+	sha1msg1	@MSG0[1],@MSG0[0]
+	 pshufb		$BSWAP,@MSG1[2]
+	 prefetcht0	127(@ptr[1])
+	 sha1msg1	@MSG1[1],@MSG1[0]
+
+	pshufb		$BSWAP,@MSG0[3]
+	movdqa		$ABCD0,$E0
+	 pshufb		$BSWAP,@MSG1[3]
+	 movdqa		$ABCD1,$E1
+	sha1rnds4	\$0,$E0_,$ABCD0		# 4-7
+	sha1nexte	@MSG0[2],$E0
+	 sha1rnds4	\$0,$E1_,$ABCD1		# 4-7
+	 sha1nexte	@MSG1[2],$E1
+	pxor		@MSG0[2],@MSG0[0]
+	sha1msg1	@MSG0[2],@MSG0[1]
+	 pxor		@MSG1[2],@MSG1[0]
+	 sha1msg1	@MSG1[2],@MSG1[1]
+___
+for($i=2;$i<20-4;$i++) {
+$code.=<<___;
+	movdqa		$ABCD0,$E0_
+	 movdqa		$ABCD1,$E1_
+	sha1rnds4	\$`int($i/5)`,$E0,$ABCD0	# 8-11
+	sha1nexte	@MSG0[3],$E0_
+	 sha1rnds4	\$`int($i/5)`,$E1,$ABCD1	# 8-11
+	 sha1nexte	@MSG1[3],$E1_
+	sha1msg2	@MSG0[3],@MSG0[0]
+	 sha1msg2	@MSG1[3],@MSG1[0]
+	pxor		@MSG0[3],@MSG0[1]
+	sha1msg1	@MSG0[3],@MSG0[2]
+	 pxor		@MSG1[3],@MSG1[1]
+	 sha1msg1	@MSG1[3],@MSG1[2]
+___
+	($E0,$E0_)=($E0_,$E0);		($E1,$E1_)=($E1_,$E1);
+	push(@MSG0,shift(@MSG0));	push(@MSG1,shift(@MSG1));
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	movdqa		$ABCD0,$E0_
+	 movdqa		$ABCD1,$E1_
+	sha1rnds4	\$3,$E0,$ABCD0		# 64-67
+	sha1nexte	@MSG0[3],$E0_
+	 sha1rnds4	\$3,$E1,$ABCD1		# 64-67
+	 sha1nexte	@MSG1[3],$E1_
+	sha1msg2	@MSG0[3],@MSG0[0]
+	 sha1msg2	@MSG1[3],@MSG1[0]
+	pxor		@MSG0[3],@MSG0[1]
+	 pxor		@MSG1[3],@MSG1[1]
+
+	mov		\$1,%ecx
+	pxor		@MSG0[2],@MSG0[2]	# zero
+	cmp		4*0(%rbx),%ecx		# examine counters
+	cmovge		%rsp,@ptr[0]		# cancel input
+
+	movdqa		$ABCD0,$E0
+	 movdqa		$ABCD1,$E1
+	sha1rnds4	\$3,$E0_,$ABCD0		# 68-71
+	sha1nexte	@MSG0[0],$E0
+	 sha1rnds4	\$3,$E1_,$ABCD1		# 68-71
+	 sha1nexte	@MSG1[0],$E1
+	sha1msg2	@MSG0[0],@MSG0[1]
+	 sha1msg2	@MSG1[0],@MSG1[1]
+
+	cmp		4*1(%rbx),%ecx
+	cmovge		%rsp,@ptr[1]
+	movq		(%rbx),@MSG0[0]		# pull counters
+
+	movdqa		$ABCD0,$E0_
+	 movdqa		$ABCD1,$E1_
+	sha1rnds4	\$3,$E0,$ABCD0		# 72-75
+	sha1nexte	@MSG0[1],$E0_
+	 sha1rnds4	\$3,$E1,$ABCD1		# 72-75
+	 sha1nexte	@MSG1[1],$E1_
+
+	pshufd		\$0x00,@MSG0[0],@MSG1[2]
+	pshufd		\$0x55,@MSG0[0],@MSG1[3]
+	movdqa		@MSG0[0],@MSG0[1]
+	pcmpgtd		@MSG0[2],@MSG1[2]
+	pcmpgtd		@MSG0[2],@MSG1[3]
+
+	movdqa		$ABCD0,$E0
+	 movdqa		$ABCD1,$E1
+	sha1rnds4	\$3,$E0_,$ABCD0		# 76-79
+	sha1nexte	$MSG0[2],$E0
+	 sha1rnds4	\$3,$E1_,$ABCD1		# 76-79
+	 sha1nexte	$MSG0[2],$E1
+
+	pcmpgtd		@MSG0[2],@MSG0[1]	# counter mask
+	pand		@MSG1[2],$ABCD0
+	pand		@MSG1[2],$E0
+	 pand		@MSG1[3],$ABCD1
+	 pand		@MSG1[3],$E1
+	paddd		@MSG0[1],@MSG0[0]	# counters--
+
+	paddd		0x40(%rsp),$ABCD0
+	paddd		0x50(%rsp),$E0
+	 paddd		0x60(%rsp),$ABCD1
+	 paddd		0x70(%rsp),$E1
+
+	movq		@MSG0[0],(%rbx)		# save counters
+	dec		$num
+	jnz		.Loop_shaext
+
+	mov		`$REG_SZ*17+8`(%rsp),$num
+
+	pshufd		\$0b00011011,$ABCD0,$ABCD0
+	pshufd		\$0b00011011,$ABCD1,$ABCD1
+
+	movdqa		$ABCD0,@MSG0[0]
+	punpckldq	$ABCD1,$ABCD0		# b1.b0.a1.a0
+	punpckhdq	$ABCD1,@MSG0[0]		# d1.d0.c1.c0
+	punpckhdq	$E1,$E0			# e1.e0.xx.xx
+	movq		$ABCD0,0x00-0x40($ctx)	# a1.a0
+	psrldq		\$8,$ABCD0
+	movq		@MSG0[0],0x40-0x40($ctx)# c1.c0
+	psrldq		\$8,@MSG0[0]
+	movq		$ABCD0,0x20-0x40($ctx)	# b1.b0
+	psrldq		\$8,$E0
+	movq		@MSG0[0],0x60-0x40($ctx)# d1.d0
+	movq		$E0,0x80-0x40($ctx)	# e1.e0
+
+	lea	`$REG_SZ/2`($ctx),$ctx
+	lea	`16*2`($inp),$inp
+	dec	$num
+	jnz	.Loop_grande_shaext
+
+.Ldone_shaext:
+	#mov	`$REG_SZ*17`(%rsp),%rax		# original %rsp
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	movaps	-0xb8(%rax),%xmm6
+	movaps	-0xa8(%rax),%xmm7
+	movaps	-0x98(%rax),%xmm8
+	movaps	-0x88(%rax),%xmm9
+	movaps	-0x78(%rax),%xmm10
+	movaps	-0x68(%rax),%xmm11
+	movaps	-0x58(%rax),%xmm12
+	movaps	-0x48(%rax),%xmm13
+	movaps	-0x38(%rax),%xmm14
+	movaps	-0x28(%rax),%xmm15
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	-16(%rax),%rbp
+	mov	-8(%rax),%rbx
+	lea	(%rax),%rsp
+.Lepilogue_shaext:
+	ret
+.size	sha1_multi_block_shaext,.-sha1_multi_block_shaext
+___
+						}}}
+
+						if ($avx) {{{
+sub BODY_00_19_avx {
+my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_;
+my $j=$i+1;
+my $k=$i+2;
+my $vpack = $REG_SZ==16 ? "vpunpckldq" : "vinserti128";
+my $ptr_n = $REG_SZ==16 ? @ptr[1] : @ptr[4];
+
+$code.=<<___ if ($i==0 && $REG_SZ==16);
+	vmovd		(@ptr[0]),@Xi[0]
+	 lea		`16*4`(@ptr[0]),@ptr[0]
+	vmovd		(@ptr[1]),@Xi[2]	# borrow Xi[2]
+	 lea		`16*4`(@ptr[1]),@ptr[1]
+	vpinsrd		\$1,(@ptr[2]),@Xi[0],@Xi[0]
+	 lea		`16*4`(@ptr[2]),@ptr[2]
+	vpinsrd		\$1,(@ptr[3]),@Xi[2],@Xi[2]
+	 lea		`16*4`(@ptr[3]),@ptr[3]
+	 vmovd		`4*$j-16*4`(@ptr[0]),@Xi[1]
+	vpunpckldq	@Xi[2],@Xi[0],@Xi[0]
+	 vmovd		`4*$j-16*4`($ptr_n),$t3
+	vpshufb		$tx,@Xi[0],@Xi[0]
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i<15 && $REG_SZ==16);		# just load input
+	 vpinsrd	\$1,`4*$j-16*4`(@ptr[2]),@Xi[1],@Xi[1]
+	 vpinsrd	\$1,`4*$j-16*4`(@ptr[3]),$t3,$t3
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i==0 && $REG_SZ==32);
+	vmovd		(@ptr[0]),@Xi[0]
+	 lea		`16*4`(@ptr[0]),@ptr[0]
+	vmovd		(@ptr[4]),@Xi[2]	# borrow Xi[2]
+	 lea		`16*4`(@ptr[4]),@ptr[4]
+	vmovd		(@ptr[1]),$t2
+	 lea		`16*4`(@ptr[1]),@ptr[1]
+	vmovd		(@ptr[5]),$t1
+	 lea		`16*4`(@ptr[5]),@ptr[5]
+	vpinsrd		\$1,(@ptr[2]),@Xi[0],@Xi[0]
+	 lea		`16*4`(@ptr[2]),@ptr[2]
+	vpinsrd		\$1,(@ptr[6]),@Xi[2],@Xi[2]
+	 lea		`16*4`(@ptr[6]),@ptr[6]
+	vpinsrd		\$1,(@ptr[3]),$t2,$t2
+	 lea		`16*4`(@ptr[3]),@ptr[3]
+	vpunpckldq	$t2,@Xi[0],@Xi[0]
+	vpinsrd		\$1,(@ptr[7]),$t1,$t1
+	 lea		`16*4`(@ptr[7]),@ptr[7]
+	vpunpckldq	$t1,@Xi[2],@Xi[2]
+	 vmovd		`4*$j-16*4`(@ptr[0]),@Xi[1]
+	vinserti128	@Xi[2],@Xi[0],@Xi[0]
+	 vmovd		`4*$j-16*4`($ptr_n),$t3
+	vpshufb		$tx,@Xi[0],@Xi[0]
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i<15 && $REG_SZ==32);		# just load input
+	 vmovd		`4*$j-16*4`(@ptr[1]),$t2
+	 vmovd		`4*$j-16*4`(@ptr[5]),$t1
+	 vpinsrd	\$1,`4*$j-16*4`(@ptr[2]),@Xi[1],@Xi[1]
+	 vpinsrd	\$1,`4*$j-16*4`(@ptr[6]),$t3,$t3
+	 vpinsrd	\$1,`4*$j-16*4`(@ptr[3]),$t2,$t2
+	 vpunpckldq	$t2,@Xi[1],@Xi[1]
+	 vpinsrd	\$1,`4*$j-16*4`(@ptr[7]),$t1,$t1
+	 vpunpckldq	$t1,$t3,$t3
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i<14);
+	vpaddd	$K,$e,$e			# e+=K_00_19
+	vpslld	\$5,$a,$t2
+	vpandn	$d,$b,$t1
+	vpand	$c,$b,$t0
+
+	vmovdqa	@Xi[0],`&Xi_off($i)`
+	vpaddd	@Xi[0],$e,$e			# e+=X[i]
+	 $vpack		$t3,@Xi[1],@Xi[1]
+	vpsrld	\$27,$a,$t3
+	vpxor	$t1,$t0,$t0			# Ch(b,c,d)
+	 vmovd		`4*$k-16*4`(@ptr[0]),@Xi[2]
+
+	vpslld	\$30,$b,$t1
+	vpor	$t3,$t2,$t2			# rol(a,5)
+	 vmovd		`4*$k-16*4`($ptr_n),$t3
+	vpaddd	$t0,$e,$e			# e+=Ch(b,c,d)
+
+	vpsrld	\$2,$b,$b
+	vpaddd	$t2,$e,$e			# e+=rol(a,5)
+	 vpshufb	$tx,@Xi[1],@Xi[1]
+	vpor	$t1,$b,$b			# b=rol(b,30)
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i==14);
+	vpaddd	$K,$e,$e			# e+=K_00_19
+	 prefetcht0	63(@ptr[0])
+	vpslld	\$5,$a,$t2
+	vpandn	$d,$b,$t1
+	vpand	$c,$b,$t0
+
+	vmovdqa	@Xi[0],`&Xi_off($i)`
+	vpaddd	@Xi[0],$e,$e			# e+=X[i]
+	 $vpack		$t3,@Xi[1],@Xi[1]
+	vpsrld	\$27,$a,$t3
+	 prefetcht0	63(@ptr[1])
+	vpxor	$t1,$t0,$t0			# Ch(b,c,d)
+
+	vpslld	\$30,$b,$t1
+	vpor	$t3,$t2,$t2			# rol(a,5)
+	 prefetcht0	63(@ptr[2])
+	vpaddd	$t0,$e,$e			# e+=Ch(b,c,d)
+
+	vpsrld	\$2,$b,$b
+	vpaddd	$t2,$e,$e			# e+=rol(a,5)
+	 prefetcht0	63(@ptr[3])
+	 vpshufb	$tx,@Xi[1],@Xi[1]
+	vpor	$t1,$b,$b			# b=rol(b,30)
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i>=13 && $i<15);
+	vmovdqa	`&Xi_off($j+2)`,@Xi[3]		# preload "X[2]"
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i>=15);			# apply Xupdate
+	vpxor	@Xi[-2],@Xi[1],@Xi[1]		# "X[13]"
+	vmovdqa	`&Xi_off($j+2)`,@Xi[3]		# "X[2]"
+
+	vpaddd	$K,$e,$e			# e+=K_00_19
+	vpslld	\$5,$a,$t2
+	vpandn	$d,$b,$t1
+	 `"prefetcht0	63(@ptr[4])"		if ($i==15 && $REG_SZ==32)`
+	vpand	$c,$b,$t0
+
+	vmovdqa	@Xi[0],`&Xi_off($i)`
+	vpaddd	@Xi[0],$e,$e			# e+=X[i]
+	 vpxor	`&Xi_off($j+8)`,@Xi[1],@Xi[1]
+	vpsrld	\$27,$a,$t3
+	vpxor	$t1,$t0,$t0			# Ch(b,c,d)
+	 vpxor	@Xi[3],@Xi[1],@Xi[1]
+	 `"prefetcht0	63(@ptr[5])"		if ($i==15 && $REG_SZ==32)`
+
+	vpslld	\$30,$b,$t1
+	vpor	$t3,$t2,$t2			# rol(a,5)
+	vpaddd	$t0,$e,$e			# e+=Ch(b,c,d)
+	 `"prefetcht0	63(@ptr[6])"		if ($i==15 && $REG_SZ==32)`
+	 vpsrld	\$31,@Xi[1],$tx
+	 vpaddd	@Xi[1],@Xi[1],@Xi[1]
+
+	vpsrld	\$2,$b,$b
+	 `"prefetcht0	63(@ptr[7])"		if ($i==15 && $REG_SZ==32)`
+	vpaddd	$t2,$e,$e			# e+=rol(a,5)
+	 vpor	$tx,@Xi[1],@Xi[1]		# rol	\$1,@Xi[1]
+	vpor	$t1,$b,$b			# b=rol(b,30)
+___
+push(@Xi,shift(@Xi));
+}
+
+sub BODY_20_39_avx {
+my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_;
+my $j=$i+1;
+
+$code.=<<___ if ($i<79);
+	vpxor	@Xi[-2],@Xi[1],@Xi[1]		# "X[13]"
+	vmovdqa	`&Xi_off($j+2)`,@Xi[3]		# "X[2]"
+
+	vpslld	\$5,$a,$t2
+	vpaddd	$K,$e,$e			# e+=K_20_39
+	vpxor	$b,$d,$t0
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i<72);
+	vmovdqa	@Xi[0],`&Xi_off($i)`
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i<79);
+	vpaddd	@Xi[0],$e,$e			# e+=X[i]
+	 vpxor	`&Xi_off($j+8)`,@Xi[1],@Xi[1]
+	vpsrld	\$27,$a,$t3
+	vpxor	$c,$t0,$t0			# Parity(b,c,d)
+	 vpxor	@Xi[3],@Xi[1],@Xi[1]
+
+	vpslld	\$30,$b,$t1
+	vpor	$t3,$t2,$t2			# rol(a,5)
+	vpaddd	$t0,$e,$e			# e+=Parity(b,c,d)
+	 vpsrld	\$31,@Xi[1],$tx
+	 vpaddd	@Xi[1],@Xi[1],@Xi[1]
+
+	vpsrld	\$2,$b,$b
+	vpaddd	$t2,$e,$e			# e+=rol(a,5)
+	 vpor	$tx,@Xi[1],@Xi[1]		# rol(@Xi[1],1)
+	vpor	$t1,$b,$b			# b=rol(b,30)
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i==79);
+	vpslld	\$5,$a,$t2
+	vpaddd	$K,$e,$e			# e+=K_20_39
+	vpxor	$b,$d,$t0
+
+	vpsrld	\$27,$a,$t3
+	vpaddd	@Xi[0],$e,$e			# e+=X[i]
+	vpxor	$c,$t0,$t0			# Parity(b,c,d)
+
+	vpslld	\$30,$b,$t1
+	vpor	$t3,$t2,$t2			# rol(a,5)
+	vpaddd	$t0,$e,$e			# e+=Parity(b,c,d)
+
+	vpsrld	\$2,$b,$b
+	vpaddd	$t2,$e,$e			# e+=rol(a,5)
+	vpor	$t1,$b,$b			# b=rol(b,30)
+___
+push(@Xi,shift(@Xi));
+}
+
+sub BODY_40_59_avx {
+my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_;
+my $j=$i+1;
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	vpxor	@Xi[-2],@Xi[1],@Xi[1]		# "X[13]"
+	vmovdqa	`&Xi_off($j+2)`,@Xi[3]		# "X[2]"
+
+	vpaddd	$K,$e,$e			# e+=K_40_59
+	vpslld	\$5,$a,$t2
+	vpand	$c,$d,$t1
+	 vpxor	`&Xi_off($j+8)`,@Xi[1],@Xi[1]
+
+	vpaddd	$t1,$e,$e
+	vpsrld	\$27,$a,$t3
+	vpxor	$c,$d,$t0
+	 vpxor	@Xi[3],@Xi[1],@Xi[1]
+
+	vmovdqu	@Xi[0],`&Xi_off($i)`
+	vpaddd	@Xi[0],$e,$e			# e+=X[i]
+	vpor	$t3,$t2,$t2			# rol(a,5)
+	 vpsrld	\$31,@Xi[1],$tx
+	vpand	$b,$t0,$t0
+	 vpaddd	@Xi[1],@Xi[1],@Xi[1]
+
+	vpslld	\$30,$b,$t1
+	vpaddd	$t0,$e,$e			# e+=Maj(b,d,c)
+
+	vpsrld	\$2,$b,$b
+	vpaddd	$t2,$e,$e			# e+=rol(a,5)
+	 vpor	$tx,@Xi[1],@Xi[1]		# rol(@X[1],1)
+	vpor	$t1,$b,$b			# b=rol(b,30)
+___
+push(@Xi,shift(@Xi));
+}
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.type	sha1_multi_block_avx,\@function,3
+.align	32
+sha1_multi_block_avx:
+_avx_shortcut:
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($avx>1);
+	shr	\$32,%rcx
+	cmp	\$2,$num
+	jb	.Lavx
+	test	\$`1<<5`,%ecx
+	jnz	_avx2_shortcut
+	jmp	.Lavx
+.align	32
+.Lavx:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	%rsp,%rax
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	lea	-0xa8(%rsp),%rsp
+	movaps	%xmm6,(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm7,0x10(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm8,0x20(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm9,0x30(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm10,-0x78(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm11,-0x68(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm12,-0x58(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm13,-0x48(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm14,-0x38(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm15,-0x28(%rax)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	sub	\$`$REG_SZ*18`, %rsp
+	and	\$-256,%rsp
+	mov	%rax,`$REG_SZ*17`(%rsp)		# original %rsp
+.Lbody_avx:
+	lea	K_XX_XX(%rip),$Tbl
+	lea	`$REG_SZ*16`(%rsp),%rbx
+
+	vzeroupper
+.Loop_grande_avx:
+	mov	$num,`$REG_SZ*17+8`(%rsp)	# original $num
+	xor	$num,$num
+___
+for($i=0;$i<4;$i++) {
+    $code.=<<___;
+	mov	`16*$i+0`($inp),@ptr[$i]	# input pointer
+	mov	`16*$i+8`($inp),%ecx		# number of blocks
+	cmp	$num,%ecx
+	cmovg	%ecx,$num			# find maximum
+	test	%ecx,%ecx
+	mov	%ecx,`4*$i`(%rbx)		# initialize counters
+	cmovle	$Tbl,@ptr[$i]			# cancel input
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	test	$num,$num
+	jz	.Ldone_avx
+
+	vmovdqu	0x00($ctx),$A			# load context
+	 lea	128(%rsp),%rax
+	vmovdqu	0x20($ctx),$B
+	vmovdqu	0x40($ctx),$C
+	vmovdqu	0x60($ctx),$D
+	vmovdqu	0x80($ctx),$E
+	vmovdqu	0x60($Tbl),$tx			# pbswap_mask
+	jmp	.Loop_avx
+
+.align	32
+.Loop_avx:
+___
+$code.="	vmovdqa	-0x20($Tbl),$K\n";	# K_00_19
+for($i=0;$i<20;$i++)	{ &BODY_00_19_avx($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+$code.="	vmovdqa	0x00($Tbl),$K\n";	# K_20_39
+for(;$i<40;$i++)	{ &BODY_20_39_avx($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+$code.="	vmovdqa	0x20($Tbl),$K\n";	# K_40_59
+for(;$i<60;$i++)	{ &BODY_40_59_avx($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+$code.="	vmovdqa	0x40($Tbl),$K\n";	# K_60_79
+for(;$i<80;$i++)	{ &BODY_20_39_avx($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	\$1,%ecx
+___
+for($i=0;$i<4;$i++) {
+    $code.=<<___;
+	cmp	`4*$i`(%rbx),%ecx		# examine counters
+	cmovge	$Tbl,@ptr[$i]			# cancel input
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	vmovdqu	(%rbx),$t0			# pull counters
+	vpxor	$t2,$t2,$t2
+	vmovdqa	$t0,$t1
+	vpcmpgtd $t2,$t1,$t1			# mask value
+	vpaddd	$t1,$t0,$t0			# counters--
+
+	vpand	$t1,$A,$A
+	vpand	$t1,$B,$B
+	vpaddd	0x00($ctx),$A,$A
+	vpand	$t1,$C,$C
+	vpaddd	0x20($ctx),$B,$B
+	vpand	$t1,$D,$D
+	vpaddd	0x40($ctx),$C,$C
+	vpand	$t1,$E,$E
+	vpaddd	0x60($ctx),$D,$D
+	vpaddd	0x80($ctx),$E,$E
+	vmovdqu	$A,0x00($ctx)
+	vmovdqu	$B,0x20($ctx)
+	vmovdqu	$C,0x40($ctx)
+	vmovdqu	$D,0x60($ctx)
+	vmovdqu	$E,0x80($ctx)
+
+	vmovdqu	$t0,(%rbx)			# save counters
+	vmovdqu	0x60($Tbl),$tx			# pbswap_mask
+	dec	$num
+	jnz	.Loop_avx
+
+	mov	`$REG_SZ*17+8`(%rsp),$num
+	lea	$REG_SZ($ctx),$ctx
+	lea	`16*$REG_SZ/4`($inp),$inp
+	dec	$num
+	jnz	.Loop_grande_avx
+
+.Ldone_avx:
+	mov	`$REG_SZ*17`(%rsp),%rax		# original %rsp
+	vzeroupper
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	movaps	-0xb8(%rax),%xmm6
+	movaps	-0xa8(%rax),%xmm7
+	movaps	-0x98(%rax),%xmm8
+	movaps	-0x88(%rax),%xmm9
+	movaps	-0x78(%rax),%xmm10
+	movaps	-0x68(%rax),%xmm11
+	movaps	-0x58(%rax),%xmm12
+	movaps	-0x48(%rax),%xmm13
+	movaps	-0x38(%rax),%xmm14
+	movaps	-0x28(%rax),%xmm15
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	-16(%rax),%rbp
+	mov	-8(%rax),%rbx
+	lea	(%rax),%rsp
+.Lepilogue_avx:
+	ret
+.size	sha1_multi_block_avx,.-sha1_multi_block_avx
+___
+
+						if ($avx>1) {
+$code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem;
+
+$REG_SZ=32;
+
+@ptr=map("%r$_",(12..15,8..11));
+
+@V=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E)=map("%ymm$_",(0..4));
+($t0,$t1,$t2,$t3,$tx)=map("%ymm$_",(5..9));
+@Xi=map("%ymm$_",(10..14));
+$K="%ymm15";
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.type	sha1_multi_block_avx2,\@function,3
+.align	32
+sha1_multi_block_avx2:
+_avx2_shortcut:
+	mov	%rsp,%rax
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	lea	-0xa8(%rsp),%rsp
+	movaps	%xmm6,(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm7,0x10(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm8,0x20(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm9,0x30(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm10,0x40(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm11,0x50(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm12,-0x78(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm13,-0x68(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm14,-0x58(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm15,-0x48(%rax)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	sub	\$`$REG_SZ*18`, %rsp
+	and	\$-256,%rsp
+	mov	%rax,`$REG_SZ*17`(%rsp)		# original %rsp
+.Lbody_avx2:
+	lea	K_XX_XX(%rip),$Tbl
+	shr	\$1,$num
+
+	vzeroupper
+.Loop_grande_avx2:
+	mov	$num,`$REG_SZ*17+8`(%rsp)	# original $num
+	xor	$num,$num
+	lea	`$REG_SZ*16`(%rsp),%rbx
+___
+for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) {
+    $code.=<<___;
+	mov	`16*$i+0`($inp),@ptr[$i]	# input pointer
+	mov	`16*$i+8`($inp),%ecx		# number of blocks
+	cmp	$num,%ecx
+	cmovg	%ecx,$num			# find maximum
+	test	%ecx,%ecx
+	mov	%ecx,`4*$i`(%rbx)		# initialize counters
+	cmovle	$Tbl,@ptr[$i]			# cancel input
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	vmovdqu	0x00($ctx),$A			# load context
+	 lea	128(%rsp),%rax
+	vmovdqu	0x20($ctx),$B
+	 lea	256+128(%rsp),%rbx
+	vmovdqu	0x40($ctx),$C
+	vmovdqu	0x60($ctx),$D
+	vmovdqu	0x80($ctx),$E
+	vmovdqu	0x60($Tbl),$tx			# pbswap_mask
+	jmp	.Loop_avx2
+
+.align	32
+.Loop_avx2:
+___
+$code.="	vmovdqa	-0x20($Tbl),$K\n";	# K_00_19
+for($i=0;$i<20;$i++)	{ &BODY_00_19_avx($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+$code.="	vmovdqa	0x00($Tbl),$K\n";	# K_20_39
+for(;$i<40;$i++)	{ &BODY_20_39_avx($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+$code.="	vmovdqa	0x20($Tbl),$K\n";	# K_40_59
+for(;$i<60;$i++)	{ &BODY_40_59_avx($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+$code.="	vmovdqa	0x40($Tbl),$K\n";	# K_60_79
+for(;$i<80;$i++)	{ &BODY_20_39_avx($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	\$1,%ecx
+	lea	`$REG_SZ*16`(%rsp),%rbx
+___
+for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) {
+    $code.=<<___;
+	cmp	`4*$i`(%rbx),%ecx		# examine counters
+	cmovge	$Tbl,@ptr[$i]			# cancel input
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	vmovdqu	(%rbx),$t0		# pull counters
+	vpxor	$t2,$t2,$t2
+	vmovdqa	$t0,$t1
+	vpcmpgtd $t2,$t1,$t1			# mask value
+	vpaddd	$t1,$t0,$t0			# counters--
+
+	vpand	$t1,$A,$A
+	vpand	$t1,$B,$B
+	vpaddd	0x00($ctx),$A,$A
+	vpand	$t1,$C,$C
+	vpaddd	0x20($ctx),$B,$B
+	vpand	$t1,$D,$D
+	vpaddd	0x40($ctx),$C,$C
+	vpand	$t1,$E,$E
+	vpaddd	0x60($ctx),$D,$D
+	vpaddd	0x80($ctx),$E,$E
+	vmovdqu	$A,0x00($ctx)
+	vmovdqu	$B,0x20($ctx)
+	vmovdqu	$C,0x40($ctx)
+	vmovdqu	$D,0x60($ctx)
+	vmovdqu	$E,0x80($ctx)
+
+	vmovdqu	$t0,(%rbx)			# save counters
+	lea	256+128(%rsp),%rbx
+	vmovdqu	0x60($Tbl),$tx			# pbswap_mask
+	dec	$num
+	jnz	.Loop_avx2
+
+	#mov	`$REG_SZ*17+8`(%rsp),$num
+	#lea	$REG_SZ($ctx),$ctx
+	#lea	`16*$REG_SZ/4`($inp),$inp
+	#dec	$num
+	#jnz	.Loop_grande_avx2
+
+.Ldone_avx2:
+	mov	`$REG_SZ*17`(%rsp),%rax		# original %rsp
+	vzeroupper
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	movaps	-0xd8(%rax),%xmm6
+	movaps	-0xc8(%rax),%xmm7
+	movaps	-0xb8(%rax),%xmm8
+	movaps	-0xa8(%rax),%xmm9
+	movaps	-0x98(%rax),%xmm10
+	movaps	-0x88(%rax),%xmm11
+	movaps	-0x78(%rax),%xmm12
+	movaps	-0x68(%rax),%xmm13
+	movaps	-0x58(%rax),%xmm14
+	movaps	-0x48(%rax),%xmm15
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	-48(%rax),%r15
+	mov	-40(%rax),%r14
+	mov	-32(%rax),%r13
+	mov	-24(%rax),%r12
+	mov	-16(%rax),%rbp
+	mov	-8(%rax),%rbx
+	lea	(%rax),%rsp
+.Lepilogue_avx2:
+	ret
+.size	sha1_multi_block_avx2,.-sha1_multi_block_avx2
+___
+						}	}}}
+$code.=<<___;
+
+.align	256
+	.long	0x5a827999,0x5a827999,0x5a827999,0x5a827999	# K_00_19
+	.long	0x5a827999,0x5a827999,0x5a827999,0x5a827999	# K_00_19
+K_XX_XX:
+	.long	0x6ed9eba1,0x6ed9eba1,0x6ed9eba1,0x6ed9eba1	# K_20_39
+	.long	0x6ed9eba1,0x6ed9eba1,0x6ed9eba1,0x6ed9eba1	# K_20_39
+	.long	0x8f1bbcdc,0x8f1bbcdc,0x8f1bbcdc,0x8f1bbcdc	# K_40_59
+	.long	0x8f1bbcdc,0x8f1bbcdc,0x8f1bbcdc,0x8f1bbcdc	# K_40_59
+	.long	0xca62c1d6,0xca62c1d6,0xca62c1d6,0xca62c1d6	# K_60_79
+	.long	0xca62c1d6,0xca62c1d6,0xca62c1d6,0xca62c1d6	# K_60_79
+	.long	0x00010203,0x04050607,0x08090a0b,0x0c0d0e0f	# pbswap
+	.long	0x00010203,0x04050607,0x08090a0b,0x0c0d0e0f	# pbswap
+	.byte	0xf,0xe,0xd,0xc,0xb,0xa,0x9,0x8,0x7,0x6,0x5,0x4,0x3,0x2,0x1,0x0
+	.asciz	"SHA1 multi-block transform for x86_64, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+___
+
+if ($win64) {
+# EXCEPTION_DISPOSITION handler (EXCEPTION_RECORD *rec,ULONG64 frame,
+#		CONTEXT *context,DISPATCHER_CONTEXT *disp)
+$rec="%rcx";
+$frame="%rdx";
+$context="%r8";
+$disp="%r9";
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.extern	__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind
+.type	se_handler,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+se_handler:
+	push	%rsi
+	push	%rdi
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+	pushfq
+	sub	\$64,%rsp
+
+	mov	120($context),%rax	# pull context->Rax
+	mov	248($context),%rbx	# pull context->Rip
+
+	mov	8($disp),%rsi		# disp->ImageBase
+	mov	56($disp),%r11		# disp->HandlerData
+
+	mov	0(%r11),%r10d		# HandlerData[0]
+	lea	(%rsi,%r10),%r10	# end of prologue label
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip<.Lbody
+	jb	.Lin_prologue
+
+	mov	152($context),%rax	# pull context->Rsp
+
+	mov	4(%r11),%r10d		# HandlerData[1]
+	lea	(%rsi,%r10),%r10	# epilogue label
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip>=.Lepilogue
+	jae	.Lin_prologue
+
+	mov	`16*17`(%rax),%rax	# pull saved stack pointer
+
+	mov	-8(%rax),%rbx
+	mov	-16(%rax),%rbp
+	mov	%rbx,144($context)	# restore context->Rbx
+	mov	%rbp,160($context)	# restore context->Rbp
+
+	lea	-24-10*16(%rax),%rsi
+	lea	512($context),%rdi	# &context.Xmm6
+	mov	\$20,%ecx
+	.long	0xa548f3fc		# cld; rep movsq
+
+.Lin_prologue:
+	mov	8(%rax),%rdi
+	mov	16(%rax),%rsi
+	mov	%rax,152($context)	# restore context->Rsp
+	mov	%rsi,168($context)	# restore context->Rsi
+	mov	%rdi,176($context)	# restore context->Rdi
+
+	mov	40($disp),%rdi		# disp->ContextRecord
+	mov	$context,%rsi		# context
+	mov	\$154,%ecx		# sizeof(CONTEXT)
+	.long	0xa548f3fc		# cld; rep movsq
+
+	mov	$disp,%rsi
+	xor	%rcx,%rcx		# arg1, UNW_FLAG_NHANDLER
+	mov	8(%rsi),%rdx		# arg2, disp->ImageBase
+	mov	0(%rsi),%r8		# arg3, disp->ControlPc
+	mov	16(%rsi),%r9		# arg4, disp->FunctionEntry
+	mov	40(%rsi),%r10		# disp->ContextRecord
+	lea	56(%rsi),%r11		# &disp->HandlerData
+	lea	24(%rsi),%r12		# &disp->EstablisherFrame
+	mov	%r10,32(%rsp)		# arg5
+	mov	%r11,40(%rsp)		# arg6
+	mov	%r12,48(%rsp)		# arg7
+	mov	%rcx,56(%rsp)		# arg8, (NULL)
+	call	*__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind(%rip)
+
+	mov	\$1,%eax		# ExceptionContinueSearch
+	add	\$64,%rsp
+	popfq
+	pop	%r15
+	pop	%r14
+	pop	%r13
+	pop	%r12
+	pop	%rbp
+	pop	%rbx
+	pop	%rdi
+	pop	%rsi
+	ret
+.size	se_handler,.-se_handler
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($avx>1);
+.type	avx2_handler,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+avx2_handler:
+	push	%rsi
+	push	%rdi
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+	pushfq
+	sub	\$64,%rsp
+
+	mov	120($context),%rax	# pull context->Rax
+	mov	248($context),%rbx	# pull context->Rip
+
+	mov	8($disp),%rsi		# disp->ImageBase
+	mov	56($disp),%r11		# disp->HandlerData
+
+	mov	0(%r11),%r10d		# HandlerData[0]
+	lea	(%rsi,%r10),%r10	# end of prologue label
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip<body label
+	jb	.Lin_prologue
+
+	mov	152($context),%rax	# pull context->Rsp
+
+	mov	4(%r11),%r10d		# HandlerData[1]
+	lea	(%rsi,%r10),%r10	# epilogue label
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip>=epilogue label
+	jae	.Lin_prologue
+
+	mov	`32*17`($context),%rax	# pull saved stack pointer
+
+	mov	-8(%rax),%rbx
+	mov	-16(%rax),%rbp
+	mov	-24(%rax),%r12
+	mov	-32(%rax),%r13
+	mov	-40(%rax),%r14
+	mov	-48(%rax),%r15
+	mov	%rbx,144($context)	# restore context->Rbx
+	mov	%rbp,160($context)	# restore context->Rbp
+	mov	%r12,216($context)	# restore cotnext->R12
+	mov	%r13,224($context)	# restore cotnext->R13
+	mov	%r14,232($context)	# restore cotnext->R14
+	mov	%r15,240($context)	# restore cotnext->R15
+
+	lea	-56-10*16(%rax),%rsi
+	lea	512($context),%rdi	# &context.Xmm6
+	mov	\$20,%ecx
+	.long	0xa548f3fc		# cld; rep movsq
+
+	jmp	.Lin_prologue
+.size	avx2_handler,.-avx2_handler
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+.section	.pdata
+.align	4
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_sha1_multi_block
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_sha1_multi_block
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_sha1_multi_block
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_sha1_multi_block_shaext
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_sha1_multi_block_shaext
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_sha1_multi_block_shaext
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($avx);
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_sha1_multi_block_avx
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_sha1_multi_block_avx
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_sha1_multi_block_avx
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($avx>1);
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_sha1_multi_block_avx2
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_sha1_multi_block_avx2
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_sha1_multi_block_avx2
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+.section	.xdata
+.align	8
+.LSEH_info_sha1_multi_block:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	se_handler
+	.rva	.Lbody,.Lepilogue			# HandlerData[]
+.LSEH_info_sha1_multi_block_shaext:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	se_handler
+	.rva	.Lbody_shaext,.Lepilogue_shaext	# HandlerData[]
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($avx);
+.LSEH_info_sha1_multi_block_avx:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	se_handler
+	.rva	.Lbody_avx,.Lepilogue_avx		# HandlerData[]
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($avx>1);
+.LSEH_info_sha1_multi_block_avx2:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	avx2_handler
+	.rva	.Lbody_avx2,.Lepilogue_avx2		# HandlerData[]
+___
+}
+####################################################################
+
+sub rex {
+  local *opcode=shift;
+  my ($dst,$src)=@_;
+  my $rex=0;
+
+    $rex|=0x04			if ($dst>=8);
+    $rex|=0x01			if ($src>=8);
+    unshift @opcode,$rex|0x40	if ($rex);
+}
+
+sub sha1rnds4 {
+    if (@_[0] =~ /\$([x0-9a-f]+),\s*%xmm([0-9]+),\s*%xmm([0-9]+)/) {
+      my @opcode=(0x0f,0x3a,0xcc);
+	rex(\@opcode,$3,$2);
+	push @opcode,0xc0|($2&7)|(($3&7)<<3);		# ModR/M
+	my $c=$1;
+	push @opcode,$c=~/^0/?oct($c):$c;
+	return ".byte\t".join(',',@opcode);
+    } else {
+	return "sha1rnds4\t".@_[0];
+    }
+}
+
+sub sha1op38 {
+    my $instr = shift;
+    my %opcodelet = (
+		"sha1nexte" => 0xc8,
+  		"sha1msg1"  => 0xc9,
+		"sha1msg2"  => 0xca	);
+
+    if (defined($opcodelet{$instr}) && @_[0] =~ /%xmm([0-9]+),\s*%xmm([0-9]+)/) {
+      my @opcode=(0x0f,0x38);
+	rex(\@opcode,$2,$1);
+	push @opcode,$opcodelet{$instr};
+	push @opcode,0xc0|($1&7)|(($2&7)<<3);		# ModR/M
+	return ".byte\t".join(',',@opcode);
+    } else {
+	return $instr."\t".@_[0];
+    }
+}
+
+foreach (split("\n",$code)) {
+	s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval($1)/ge;
+
+	s/\b(sha1rnds4)\s+(.*)/sha1rnds4($2)/geo		or
+	s/\b(sha1[^\s]*)\s+(.*)/sha1op38($1,$2)/geo		or
+
+	s/\b(vmov[dq])\b(.+)%ymm([0-9]+)/$1$2%xmm$3/go		or
+	s/\b(vmovdqu)\b(.+)%x%ymm([0-9]+)/$1$2%xmm$3/go		or
+	s/\b(vpinsr[qd])\b(.+)%ymm([0-9]+),%ymm([0-9]+)/$1$2%xmm$3,%xmm$4/go	or
+	s/\b(vpextr[qd])\b(.+)%ymm([0-9]+)/$1$2%xmm$3/go	or
+	s/\b(vinserti128)\b(\s+)%ymm/$1$2\$1,%xmm/go		or
+	s/\b(vpbroadcast[qd]\s+)%ymm([0-9]+)/$1%xmm$2/go;
+
+	print $_,"\n";
+}
+
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-mips.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-mips.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..882f973
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-mips.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,457 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2009-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+
+# SHA1 block procedure for MIPS.
+
+# Performance improvement is 30% on unaligned input. The "secret" is
+# to deploy lwl/lwr pair to load unaligned input. One could have
+# vectorized Xupdate on MIPSIII/IV, but the goal was to code MIPS32-
+# compatible subroutine. There is room for minor optimization on
+# little-endian platforms...
+
+# September 2012.
+#
+# Add MIPS32r2 code (>25% less instructions).
+
+######################################################################
+# There is a number of MIPS ABI in use, O32 and N32/64 are most
+# widely used. Then there is a new contender: NUBI. It appears that if
+# one picks the latter, it's possible to arrange code in ABI neutral
+# manner. Therefore let's stick to NUBI register layout:
+#
+($zero,$at,$t0,$t1,$t2)=map("\$$_",(0..2,24,25));
+($a0,$a1,$a2,$a3,$a4,$a5,$a6,$a7)=map("\$$_",(4..11));
+($s0,$s1,$s2,$s3,$s4,$s5,$s6,$s7,$s8,$s9,$s10,$s11)=map("\$$_",(12..23));
+($gp,$tp,$sp,$fp,$ra)=map("\$$_",(3,28..31));
+#
+# The return value is placed in $a0. Following coding rules facilitate
+# interoperability:
+#
+# - never ever touch $tp, "thread pointer", former $gp;
+# - copy return value to $t0, former $v0 [or to $a0 if you're adapting
+#   old code];
+# - on O32 populate $a4-$a7 with 'lw $aN,4*N($sp)' if necessary;
+#
+# For reference here is register layout for N32/64 MIPS ABIs:
+#
+# ($zero,$at,$v0,$v1)=map("\$$_",(0..3));
+# ($a0,$a1,$a2,$a3,$a4,$a5,$a6,$a7)=map("\$$_",(4..11));
+# ($t0,$t1,$t2,$t3,$t8,$t9)=map("\$$_",(12..15,24,25));
+# ($s0,$s1,$s2,$s3,$s4,$s5,$s6,$s7)=map("\$$_",(16..23));
+# ($gp,$sp,$fp,$ra)=map("\$$_",(28..31));
+#
+$flavour = shift || "o32"; # supported flavours are o32,n32,64,nubi32,nubi64
+
+if ($flavour =~ /64|n32/i) {
+	$PTR_ADD="dadd";	# incidentally works even on n32
+	$PTR_SUB="dsub";	# incidentally works even on n32
+	$REG_S="sd";
+	$REG_L="ld";
+	$PTR_SLL="dsll";	# incidentally works even on n32
+	$SZREG=8;
+} else {
+	$PTR_ADD="add";
+	$PTR_SUB="sub";
+	$REG_S="sw";
+	$REG_L="lw";
+	$PTR_SLL="sll";
+	$SZREG=4;
+}
+#
+# <appro@openssl.org>
+#
+######################################################################
+
+$big_endian=(`echo MIPSEL | $ENV{CC} -E -`=~/MIPSEL/)?1:0 if ($ENV{CC});
+
+for (@ARGV) {	$output=$_ if (/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/);   }
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+if (!defined($big_endian))
+            {   $big_endian=(unpack('L',pack('N',1))==1);   }
+
+# offsets of the Most and Least Significant Bytes
+$MSB=$big_endian?0:3;
+$LSB=3&~$MSB;
+
+@X=map("\$$_",(8..23));	# a4-a7,s0-s11
+
+$ctx=$a0;
+$inp=$a1;
+$num=$a2;
+$A="\$1";
+$B="\$2";
+$C="\$3";
+$D="\$7";
+$E="\$24";	@V=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E);
+$t0="\$25";
+$t1=$num;	# $num is offloaded to stack
+$t2="\$30";	# fp
+$K="\$31";	# ra
+
+sub BODY_00_14 {
+my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_;
+my $j=$i+1;
+$code.=<<___	if (!$big_endian);
+#if defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS32R2) || defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS64R2)
+	wsbh	@X[$i],@X[$i]	# byte swap($i)
+	rotr	@X[$i],@X[$i],16
+#else
+	srl	$t0,@X[$i],24	# byte swap($i)
+	srl	$t1,@X[$i],8
+	andi	$t2,@X[$i],0xFF00
+	sll	@X[$i],@X[$i],24
+	andi	$t1,0xFF00
+	sll	$t2,$t2,8
+	or	@X[$i],$t0
+	or	$t1,$t2
+	or	@X[$i],$t1
+#endif
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+#if defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS32R2) || defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS64R2)
+	addu	$e,$K		# $i
+	xor	$t0,$c,$d
+	rotr	$t1,$a,27
+	 lwl	@X[$j],$j*4+$MSB($inp)
+	and	$t0,$b
+	addu	$e,$t1
+	 lwr	@X[$j],$j*4+$LSB($inp)
+	xor	$t0,$d
+	addu	$e,@X[$i]
+	rotr	$b,$b,2
+	addu	$e,$t0
+#else
+	 lwl	@X[$j],$j*4+$MSB($inp)
+	sll	$t0,$a,5	# $i
+	addu	$e,$K
+	 lwr	@X[$j],$j*4+$LSB($inp)
+	srl	$t1,$a,27
+	addu	$e,$t0
+	xor	$t0,$c,$d
+	addu	$e,$t1
+	sll	$t2,$b,30
+	and	$t0,$b
+	srl	$b,$b,2
+	xor	$t0,$d
+	addu	$e,@X[$i]
+	or	$b,$t2
+	addu	$e,$t0
+#endif
+___
+}
+
+sub BODY_15_19 {
+my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_;
+my $j=$i+1;
+
+$code.=<<___	if (!$big_endian && $i==15);
+#if defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS32R2) || defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS64R2)
+	wsbh	@X[$i],@X[$i]	# byte swap($i)
+	rotr	@X[$i],@X[$i],16
+#else
+	srl	$t0,@X[$i],24	# byte swap($i)
+	srl	$t1,@X[$i],8
+	andi	$t2,@X[$i],0xFF00
+	sll	@X[$i],@X[$i],24
+	andi	$t1,0xFF00
+	sll	$t2,$t2,8
+	or	@X[$i],$t0
+	or	@X[$i],$t1
+	or	@X[$i],$t2
+#endif
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+#if defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS32R2) || defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS64R2)
+	addu	$e,$K		# $i
+	 xor	@X[$j%16],@X[($j+2)%16]
+	xor	$t0,$c,$d
+	rotr	$t1,$a,27
+	 xor	@X[$j%16],@X[($j+8)%16]
+	and	$t0,$b
+	addu	$e,$t1
+	 xor	@X[$j%16],@X[($j+13)%16]
+	xor	$t0,$d
+	addu	$e,@X[$i%16]
+	 rotr	@X[$j%16],@X[$j%16],31
+	rotr	$b,$b,2
+	addu	$e,$t0
+#else
+	 xor	@X[$j%16],@X[($j+2)%16]
+	sll	$t0,$a,5	# $i
+	addu	$e,$K
+	srl	$t1,$a,27
+	addu	$e,$t0
+	 xor	@X[$j%16],@X[($j+8)%16]
+	xor	$t0,$c,$d
+	addu	$e,$t1
+	 xor	@X[$j%16],@X[($j+13)%16]
+	sll	$t2,$b,30
+	and	$t0,$b
+	 srl	$t1,@X[$j%16],31
+	 addu	@X[$j%16],@X[$j%16]
+	srl	$b,$b,2
+	xor	$t0,$d
+	 or	@X[$j%16],$t1
+	addu	$e,@X[$i%16]
+	or	$b,$t2
+	addu	$e,$t0
+#endif
+___
+}
+
+sub BODY_20_39 {
+my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_;
+my $j=$i+1;
+$code.=<<___ if ($i<79);
+#if defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS32R2) || defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS64R2)
+	 xor	@X[$j%16],@X[($j+2)%16]
+	addu	$e,$K		# $i
+	rotr	$t1,$a,27
+	 xor	@X[$j%16],@X[($j+8)%16]
+	xor	$t0,$c,$d
+	addu	$e,$t1
+	 xor	@X[$j%16],@X[($j+13)%16]
+	xor	$t0,$b
+	addu	$e,@X[$i%16]
+	 rotr	@X[$j%16],@X[$j%16],31
+	rotr	$b,$b,2
+	addu	$e,$t0
+#else
+	 xor	@X[$j%16],@X[($j+2)%16]
+	sll	$t0,$a,5	# $i
+	addu	$e,$K
+	srl	$t1,$a,27
+	addu	$e,$t0
+	 xor	@X[$j%16],@X[($j+8)%16]
+	xor	$t0,$c,$d
+	addu	$e,$t1
+	 xor	@X[$j%16],@X[($j+13)%16]
+	sll	$t2,$b,30
+	xor	$t0,$b
+	 srl	$t1,@X[$j%16],31
+	 addu	@X[$j%16],@X[$j%16]
+	srl	$b,$b,2
+	addu	$e,@X[$i%16]
+	 or	@X[$j%16],$t1
+	or	$b,$t2
+	addu	$e,$t0
+#endif
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i==79);
+#if defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS32R2) || defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS64R2)
+	 lw	@X[0],0($ctx)
+	addu	$e,$K		# $i
+	 lw	@X[1],4($ctx)
+	rotr	$t1,$a,27
+	 lw	@X[2],8($ctx)
+	xor	$t0,$c,$d
+	addu	$e,$t1
+	 lw	@X[3],12($ctx)
+	xor	$t0,$b
+	addu	$e,@X[$i%16]
+	 lw	@X[4],16($ctx)
+	rotr	$b,$b,2
+	addu	$e,$t0
+#else
+	 lw	@X[0],0($ctx)
+	sll	$t0,$a,5	# $i
+	addu	$e,$K
+	 lw	@X[1],4($ctx)
+	srl	$t1,$a,27
+	addu	$e,$t0
+	 lw	@X[2],8($ctx)
+	xor	$t0,$c,$d
+	addu	$e,$t1
+	 lw	@X[3],12($ctx)
+	sll	$t2,$b,30
+	xor	$t0,$b
+	 lw	@X[4],16($ctx)
+	srl	$b,$b,2
+	addu	$e,@X[$i%16]
+	or	$b,$t2
+	addu	$e,$t0
+#endif
+___
+}
+
+sub BODY_40_59 {
+my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_;
+my $j=$i+1;
+$code.=<<___ if ($i<79);
+#if defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS32R2) || defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS64R2)
+	addu	$e,$K		# $i
+	and	$t0,$c,$d
+	 xor	@X[$j%16],@X[($j+2)%16]
+	rotr	$t1,$a,27
+	addu	$e,$t0
+	 xor	@X[$j%16],@X[($j+8)%16]
+	xor	$t0,$c,$d
+	addu	$e,$t1
+	 xor	@X[$j%16],@X[($j+13)%16]
+	and	$t0,$b
+	addu	$e,@X[$i%16]
+	 rotr	@X[$j%16],@X[$j%16],31
+	rotr	$b,$b,2
+	addu	$e,$t0
+#else
+	 xor	@X[$j%16],@X[($j+2)%16]
+	sll	$t0,$a,5	# $i
+	addu	$e,$K
+	srl	$t1,$a,27
+	addu	$e,$t0
+	 xor	@X[$j%16],@X[($j+8)%16]
+	and	$t0,$c,$d
+	addu	$e,$t1
+	 xor	@X[$j%16],@X[($j+13)%16]
+	sll	$t2,$b,30
+	addu	$e,$t0
+	 srl	$t1,@X[$j%16],31
+	xor	$t0,$c,$d
+	 addu	@X[$j%16],@X[$j%16]
+	and	$t0,$b
+	srl	$b,$b,2
+	 or	@X[$j%16],$t1
+	addu	$e,@X[$i%16]
+	or	$b,$t2
+	addu	$e,$t0
+#endif
+___
+}
+
+$FRAMESIZE=16;	# large enough to accommodate NUBI saved registers
+$SAVED_REGS_MASK = ($flavour =~ /nubi/i) ? "0xc0fff008" : "0xc0ff0000";
+
+$code=<<___;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPSCANISTER
+# include <openssl/fipssyms.h>
+#endif
+
+#if defined(__mips_smartmips) && !defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS32R2)
+#define _MIPS_ARCH_MIPS32R2
+#endif
+
+.text
+
+.set	noat
+.set	noreorder
+.align	5
+.globl	sha1_block_data_order
+.ent	sha1_block_data_order
+sha1_block_data_order:
+	.frame	$sp,$FRAMESIZE*$SZREG,$ra
+	.mask	$SAVED_REGS_MASK,-$SZREG
+	.set	noreorder
+	$PTR_SUB $sp,$FRAMESIZE*$SZREG
+	$REG_S	$ra,($FRAMESIZE-1)*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$fp,($FRAMESIZE-2)*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$s11,($FRAMESIZE-3)*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$s10,($FRAMESIZE-4)*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$s9,($FRAMESIZE-5)*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$s8,($FRAMESIZE-6)*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$s7,($FRAMESIZE-7)*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$s6,($FRAMESIZE-8)*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$s5,($FRAMESIZE-9)*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$s4,($FRAMESIZE-10)*$SZREG($sp)
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i);	# optimize non-nubi prologue
+	$REG_S	$s3,($FRAMESIZE-11)*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$s2,($FRAMESIZE-12)*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$s1,($FRAMESIZE-13)*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$s0,($FRAMESIZE-14)*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$gp,($FRAMESIZE-15)*$SZREG($sp)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	$PTR_SLL $num,6
+	$PTR_ADD $num,$inp
+	$REG_S	$num,0($sp)
+	lw	$A,0($ctx)
+	lw	$B,4($ctx)
+	lw	$C,8($ctx)
+	lw	$D,12($ctx)
+	b	.Loop
+	lw	$E,16($ctx)
+.align	4
+.Loop:
+	.set	reorder
+	lwl	@X[0],$MSB($inp)
+	lui	$K,0x5a82
+	lwr	@X[0],$LSB($inp)
+	ori	$K,0x7999	# K_00_19
+___
+for ($i=0;$i<15;$i++)	{ &BODY_00_14($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+for (;$i<20;$i++)	{ &BODY_15_19($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+$code.=<<___;
+	lui	$K,0x6ed9
+	ori	$K,0xeba1	# K_20_39
+___
+for (;$i<40;$i++)	{ &BODY_20_39($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+$code.=<<___;
+	lui	$K,0x8f1b
+	ori	$K,0xbcdc	# K_40_59
+___
+for (;$i<60;$i++)	{ &BODY_40_59($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+$code.=<<___;
+	lui	$K,0xca62
+	ori	$K,0xc1d6	# K_60_79
+___
+for (;$i<80;$i++)	{ &BODY_20_39($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+$code.=<<___;
+	$PTR_ADD $inp,64
+	$REG_L	$num,0($sp)
+
+	addu	$A,$X[0]
+	addu	$B,$X[1]
+	sw	$A,0($ctx)
+	addu	$C,$X[2]
+	addu	$D,$X[3]
+	sw	$B,4($ctx)
+	addu	$E,$X[4]
+	sw	$C,8($ctx)
+	sw	$D,12($ctx)
+	sw	$E,16($ctx)
+	.set	noreorder
+	bne	$inp,$num,.Loop
+	nop
+
+	.set	noreorder
+	$REG_L	$ra,($FRAMESIZE-1)*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$fp,($FRAMESIZE-2)*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$s11,($FRAMESIZE-3)*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$s10,($FRAMESIZE-4)*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$s9,($FRAMESIZE-5)*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$s8,($FRAMESIZE-6)*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$s7,($FRAMESIZE-7)*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$s6,($FRAMESIZE-8)*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$s5,($FRAMESIZE-9)*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$s4,($FRAMESIZE-10)*$SZREG($sp)
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i);
+	$REG_L	$s3,($FRAMESIZE-11)*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$s2,($FRAMESIZE-12)*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$s1,($FRAMESIZE-13)*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$s0,($FRAMESIZE-14)*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$gp,($FRAMESIZE-15)*$SZREG($sp)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	jr	$ra
+	$PTR_ADD $sp,$FRAMESIZE*$SZREG
+.end	sha1_block_data_order
+.rdata
+.asciiz	"SHA1 for MIPS, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+___
+print $code;
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-parisc.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-parisc.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a85d126
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-parisc.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,267 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2009-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+
+# SHA1 block procedure for PA-RISC.
+
+# June 2009.
+#
+# On PA-7100LC performance is >30% better than gcc 3.2 generated code
+# for aligned input and >50% better for unaligned. Compared to vendor
+# compiler on PA-8600 it's almost 60% faster in 64-bit build and just
+# few percent faster in 32-bit one (this for aligned input, data for
+# unaligned input is not available).
+#
+# Special thanks to polarhome.com for providing HP-UX account.
+
+$flavour = shift;
+$output = shift;
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+if ($flavour =~ /64/) {
+	$LEVEL		="2.0W";
+	$SIZE_T		=8;
+	$FRAME_MARKER	=80;
+	$SAVED_RP	=16;
+	$PUSH		="std";
+	$PUSHMA		="std,ma";
+	$POP		="ldd";
+	$POPMB		="ldd,mb";
+} else {
+	$LEVEL		="1.0";
+	$SIZE_T		=4;
+	$FRAME_MARKER	=48;
+	$SAVED_RP	=20;
+	$PUSH		="stw";
+	$PUSHMA		="stwm";
+	$POP		="ldw";
+	$POPMB		="ldwm";
+}
+
+$FRAME=14*$SIZE_T+$FRAME_MARKER;# 14 saved regs + frame marker
+				#                 [+ argument transfer]
+$ctx="%r26";		# arg0
+$inp="%r25";		# arg1
+$num="%r24";		# arg2
+
+$t0="%r28";
+$t1="%r29";
+$K="%r31";
+
+@X=("%r1", "%r2", "%r3", "%r4", "%r5", "%r6", "%r7", "%r8",
+    "%r9", "%r10","%r11","%r12","%r13","%r14","%r15","%r16",$t0);
+
+@V=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E)=("%r19","%r20","%r21","%r22","%r23");
+
+sub BODY_00_19 {
+my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_;
+my $j=$i+1;
+$code.=<<___ if ($i<15);
+	addl	$K,$e,$e	; $i
+	shd	$a,$a,27,$t1
+	addl	@X[$i],$e,$e
+	and	$c,$b,$t0
+	addl	$t1,$e,$e
+	andcm	$d,$b,$t1
+	shd	$b,$b,2,$b
+	or	$t1,$t0,$t0
+	addl	$t0,$e,$e
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i>=15);	# with forward Xupdate
+	addl	$K,$e,$e	; $i
+	shd	$a,$a,27,$t1
+	xor	@X[($j+2)%16],@X[$j%16],@X[$j%16]
+	addl	@X[$i%16],$e,$e
+	and	$c,$b,$t0
+	xor	@X[($j+8)%16],@X[$j%16],@X[$j%16]
+	addl	$t1,$e,$e
+	andcm	$d,$b,$t1
+	shd	$b,$b,2,$b
+	or	$t1,$t0,$t0
+	xor	@X[($j+13)%16],@X[$j%16],@X[$j%16]
+	add	$t0,$e,$e
+	shd	@X[$j%16],@X[$j%16],31,@X[$j%16]
+___
+}
+
+sub BODY_20_39 {
+my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_;
+my $j=$i+1;
+$code.=<<___ if ($i<79);
+	xor	@X[($j+2)%16],@X[$j%16],@X[$j%16]	; $i
+	addl	$K,$e,$e
+	shd	$a,$a,27,$t1
+	xor	@X[($j+8)%16],@X[$j%16],@X[$j%16]
+	addl	@X[$i%16],$e,$e
+	xor	$b,$c,$t0
+	xor	@X[($j+13)%16],@X[$j%16],@X[$j%16]
+	addl	$t1,$e,$e
+	shd	$b,$b,2,$b
+	xor	$d,$t0,$t0
+	shd	@X[$j%16],@X[$j%16],31,@X[$j%16]
+	addl	$t0,$e,$e
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i==79);	# with context load
+	ldw	0($ctx),@X[0]	; $i
+	addl	$K,$e,$e
+	shd	$a,$a,27,$t1
+	ldw	4($ctx),@X[1]
+	addl	@X[$i%16],$e,$e
+	xor	$b,$c,$t0
+	ldw	8($ctx),@X[2]
+	addl	$t1,$e,$e
+	shd	$b,$b,2,$b
+	xor	$d,$t0,$t0
+	ldw	12($ctx),@X[3]
+	addl	$t0,$e,$e
+	ldw	16($ctx),@X[4]
+___
+}
+
+sub BODY_40_59 {
+my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_;
+my $j=$i+1;
+$code.=<<___;
+	shd	$a,$a,27,$t1	; $i
+	addl	$K,$e,$e
+	xor	@X[($j+2)%16],@X[$j%16],@X[$j%16]
+	xor	$d,$c,$t0
+	addl	@X[$i%16],$e,$e
+	xor	@X[($j+8)%16],@X[$j%16],@X[$j%16]
+	and	$b,$t0,$t0
+	addl	$t1,$e,$e
+	shd	$b,$b,2,$b
+	xor	@X[($j+13)%16],@X[$j%16],@X[$j%16]
+	addl	$t0,$e,$e
+	and	$d,$c,$t1
+	shd	@X[$j%16],@X[$j%16],31,@X[$j%16]
+	addl	$t1,$e,$e
+___
+}
+
+$code=<<___;
+	.LEVEL	$LEVEL
+	.SPACE	\$TEXT\$
+	.SUBSPA	\$CODE\$,QUAD=0,ALIGN=8,ACCESS=0x2C,CODE_ONLY
+
+	.EXPORT	sha1_block_data_order,ENTRY,ARGW0=GR,ARGW1=GR,ARGW2=GR
+sha1_block_data_order
+	.PROC
+	.CALLINFO	FRAME=`$FRAME-14*$SIZE_T`,NO_CALLS,SAVE_RP,ENTRY_GR=16
+	.ENTRY
+	$PUSH	%r2,-$SAVED_RP(%sp)	; standard prologue
+	$PUSHMA	%r3,$FRAME(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r4,`-$FRAME+1*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r5,`-$FRAME+2*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r6,`-$FRAME+3*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r7,`-$FRAME+4*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r8,`-$FRAME+5*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r9,`-$FRAME+6*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r10,`-$FRAME+7*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r11,`-$FRAME+8*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r12,`-$FRAME+9*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r13,`-$FRAME+10*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r14,`-$FRAME+11*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r15,`-$FRAME+12*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r16,`-$FRAME+13*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+
+	ldw	0($ctx),$A
+	ldw	4($ctx),$B
+	ldw	8($ctx),$C
+	ldw	12($ctx),$D
+	ldw	16($ctx),$E
+
+	extru	$inp,31,2,$t0		; t0=inp&3;
+	sh3addl	$t0,%r0,$t0		; t0*=8;
+	subi	32,$t0,$t0		; t0=32-t0;
+	mtctl	$t0,%cr11		; %sar=t0;
+
+L\$oop
+	ldi	3,$t0
+	andcm	$inp,$t0,$t0		; 64-bit neutral
+___
+	for ($i=0;$i<15;$i++) {		# load input block
+	$code.="\tldw	`4*$i`($t0),@X[$i]\n";		}
+$code.=<<___;
+	cmpb,*=	$inp,$t0,L\$aligned
+	ldw	60($t0),@X[15]
+	ldw	64($t0),@X[16]
+___
+	for ($i=0;$i<16;$i++) {		# align input
+	$code.="\tvshd	@X[$i],@X[$i+1],@X[$i]\n";	}
+$code.=<<___;
+L\$aligned
+	ldil	L'0x5a827000,$K		; K_00_19
+	ldo	0x999($K),$K
+___
+for ($i=0;$i<20;$i++)   { &BODY_00_19($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+$code.=<<___;
+	ldil	L'0x6ed9e000,$K		; K_20_39
+	ldo	0xba1($K),$K
+___
+
+for (;$i<40;$i++)       { &BODY_20_39($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+$code.=<<___;
+	ldil	L'0x8f1bb000,$K		; K_40_59
+	ldo	0xcdc($K),$K
+___
+
+for (;$i<60;$i++)       { &BODY_40_59($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+$code.=<<___;
+	ldil	L'0xca62c000,$K		; K_60_79
+	ldo	0x1d6($K),$K
+___
+for (;$i<80;$i++)       { &BODY_20_39($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	addl	@X[0],$A,$A
+	addl	@X[1],$B,$B
+	addl	@X[2],$C,$C
+	addl	@X[3],$D,$D
+	addl	@X[4],$E,$E
+	stw	$A,0($ctx)
+	stw	$B,4($ctx)
+	stw	$C,8($ctx)
+	stw	$D,12($ctx)
+	stw	$E,16($ctx)
+	addib,*<> -1,$num,L\$oop
+	ldo	64($inp),$inp
+
+	$POP	`-$FRAME-$SAVED_RP`(%sp),%r2	; standard epilogue
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+1*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r4
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+2*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r5
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+3*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r6
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+4*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r7
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+5*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r8
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+6*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r9
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+7*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r10
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+8*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r11
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+9*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r12
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+10*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r13
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+11*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r14
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+12*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r15
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+13*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r16
+	bv	(%r2)
+	.EXIT
+	$POPMB	-$FRAME(%sp),%r3
+	.PROCEND
+	.STRINGZ "SHA1 block transform for PA-RISC, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+___
+
+$code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem;
+$code =~ s/,\*/,/gm		if ($SIZE_T==4);
+$code =~ s/\bbv\b/bve/gm	if ($SIZE_T==8);
+print $code;
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-ppc.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-ppc.pl
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..add5a9e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-ppc.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,351 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+
+# I let hardware handle unaligned input(*), except on page boundaries
+# (see below for details). Otherwise straightforward implementation
+# with X vector in register bank.
+#
+# (*) this means that this module is inappropriate for PPC403? Does
+#     anybody know if pre-POWER3 can sustain unaligned load?
+
+# 			-m64	-m32
+# ----------------------------------
+# PPC970,gcc-4.0.0	+76%	+59%
+# Power6,xlc-7		+68%	+33%
+
+$flavour = shift;
+
+if ($flavour =~ /64/) {
+	$SIZE_T	=8;
+	$LRSAVE	=2*$SIZE_T;
+	$UCMP	="cmpld";
+	$STU	="stdu";
+	$POP	="ld";
+	$PUSH	="std";
+} elsif ($flavour =~ /32/) {
+	$SIZE_T	=4;
+	$LRSAVE	=$SIZE_T;
+	$UCMP	="cmplw";
+	$STU	="stwu";
+	$POP	="lwz";
+	$PUSH	="stw";
+} else { die "nonsense $flavour"; }
+
+# Define endianness based on flavour
+# i.e.: linux64le
+$LITTLE_ENDIAN = ($flavour=~/le$/) ? $SIZE_T : 0;
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+( $xlate="${dir}ppc-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
+( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/ppc-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
+die "can't locate ppc-xlate.pl";
+
+open STDOUT,"| $^X $xlate $flavour ".shift || die "can't call $xlate: $!";
+
+$FRAME=24*$SIZE_T+64;
+$LOCALS=6*$SIZE_T;
+
+$K  ="r0";
+$sp ="r1";
+$toc="r2";
+$ctx="r3";
+$inp="r4";
+$num="r5";
+$t0 ="r15";
+$t1 ="r6";
+
+$A  ="r7";
+$B  ="r8";
+$C  ="r9";
+$D  ="r10";
+$E  ="r11";
+$T  ="r12";
+
+@V=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$T);
+@X=("r16","r17","r18","r19","r20","r21","r22","r23",
+    "r24","r25","r26","r27","r28","r29","r30","r31");
+
+sub loadbe {
+my ($dst, $src, $temp_reg) = @_;
+$code.=<<___ if (!$LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+	lwz	$dst,$src
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+	lwz	$temp_reg,$src
+	rotlwi	$dst,$temp_reg,8
+	rlwimi	$dst,$temp_reg,24,0,7
+	rlwimi	$dst,$temp_reg,24,16,23
+___
+}
+
+sub BODY_00_19 {
+my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f)=@_;
+my $j=$i+1;
+
+	# Since the last value of $f is discarded, we can use
+	# it as a temp reg to swap byte-order when needed.
+	loadbe("@X[$i]","`$i*4`($inp)",$f) if ($i==0);
+	loadbe("@X[$j]","`$j*4`($inp)",$f) if ($i<15);
+$code.=<<___ if ($i<15);
+	add	$f,$K,$e
+	rotlwi	$e,$a,5
+	add	$f,$f,@X[$i]
+	and	$t0,$c,$b
+	add	$f,$f,$e
+	andc	$t1,$d,$b
+	rotlwi	$b,$b,30
+	or	$t0,$t0,$t1
+	add	$f,$f,$t0
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i>=15);
+	add	$f,$K,$e
+	rotlwi	$e,$a,5
+	xor	@X[$j%16],@X[$j%16],@X[($j+2)%16]
+	add	$f,$f,@X[$i%16]
+	and	$t0,$c,$b
+	xor	@X[$j%16],@X[$j%16],@X[($j+8)%16]
+	add	$f,$f,$e
+	andc	$t1,$d,$b
+	rotlwi	$b,$b,30
+	or	$t0,$t0,$t1
+	xor	@X[$j%16],@X[$j%16],@X[($j+13)%16]
+	add	$f,$f,$t0
+	rotlwi	@X[$j%16],@X[$j%16],1
+___
+}
+
+sub BODY_20_39 {
+my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f)=@_;
+my $j=$i+1;
+$code.=<<___ if ($i<79);
+	add	$f,$K,$e
+	xor	$t0,$b,$d
+	rotlwi	$e,$a,5
+	xor	@X[$j%16],@X[$j%16],@X[($j+2)%16]
+	add	$f,$f,@X[$i%16]
+	xor	$t0,$t0,$c
+	xor	@X[$j%16],@X[$j%16],@X[($j+8)%16]
+	add	$f,$f,$t0
+	rotlwi	$b,$b,30
+	xor	@X[$j%16],@X[$j%16],@X[($j+13)%16]
+	add	$f,$f,$e
+	rotlwi	@X[$j%16],@X[$j%16],1
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i==79);
+	add	$f,$K,$e
+	xor	$t0,$b,$d
+	rotlwi	$e,$a,5
+	lwz	r16,0($ctx)
+	add	$f,$f,@X[$i%16]
+	xor	$t0,$t0,$c
+	lwz	r17,4($ctx)
+	add	$f,$f,$t0
+	rotlwi	$b,$b,30
+	lwz	r18,8($ctx)
+	lwz	r19,12($ctx)
+	add	$f,$f,$e
+	lwz	r20,16($ctx)
+___
+}
+
+sub BODY_40_59 {
+my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f)=@_;
+my $j=$i+1;
+$code.=<<___;
+	add	$f,$K,$e
+	rotlwi	$e,$a,5
+	xor	@X[$j%16],@X[$j%16],@X[($j+2)%16]
+	add	$f,$f,@X[$i%16]
+	and	$t0,$b,$c
+	xor	@X[$j%16],@X[$j%16],@X[($j+8)%16]
+	add	$f,$f,$e
+	or	$t1,$b,$c
+	rotlwi	$b,$b,30
+	xor	@X[$j%16],@X[$j%16],@X[($j+13)%16]
+	and	$t1,$t1,$d
+	or	$t0,$t0,$t1
+	rotlwi	@X[$j%16],@X[$j%16],1
+	add	$f,$f,$t0
+___
+}
+
+$code=<<___;
+.machine	"any"
+.text
+
+.globl	.sha1_block_data_order
+.align	4
+.sha1_block_data_order:
+	$STU	$sp,-$FRAME($sp)
+	mflr	r0
+	$PUSH	r15,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*17`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r16,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*16`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r17,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*15`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r18,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*14`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r19,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*13`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r20,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*12`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r21,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*11`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r22,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*10`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r23,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*9`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r24,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*8`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r25,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*7`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r26,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*6`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r27,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*5`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r28,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*4`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r29,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*3`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r30,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*2`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r31,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*1`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r0,`$FRAME+$LRSAVE`($sp)
+	lwz	$A,0($ctx)
+	lwz	$B,4($ctx)
+	lwz	$C,8($ctx)
+	lwz	$D,12($ctx)
+	lwz	$E,16($ctx)
+	andi.	r0,$inp,3
+	bne	Lunaligned
+Laligned:
+	mtctr	$num
+	bl	Lsha1_block_private
+	b	Ldone
+
+; PowerPC specification allows an implementation to be ill-behaved
+; upon unaligned access which crosses page boundary. "Better safe
+; than sorry" principle makes me treat it specially. But I don't
+; look for particular offending word, but rather for 64-byte input
+; block which crosses the boundary. Once found that block is aligned
+; and hashed separately...
+.align	4
+Lunaligned:
+	subfic	$t1,$inp,4096
+	andi.	$t1,$t1,4095	; distance to closest page boundary
+	srwi.	$t1,$t1,6	; t1/=64
+	beq	Lcross_page
+	$UCMP	$num,$t1
+	ble	Laligned	; didn't cross the page boundary
+	mtctr	$t1
+	subfc	$num,$t1,$num
+	bl	Lsha1_block_private
+Lcross_page:
+	li	$t1,16
+	mtctr	$t1
+	addi	r20,$sp,$LOCALS	; spot within the frame
+Lmemcpy:
+	lbz	r16,0($inp)
+	lbz	r17,1($inp)
+	lbz	r18,2($inp)
+	lbz	r19,3($inp)
+	addi	$inp,$inp,4
+	stb	r16,0(r20)
+	stb	r17,1(r20)
+	stb	r18,2(r20)
+	stb	r19,3(r20)
+	addi	r20,r20,4
+	bdnz	Lmemcpy
+
+	$PUSH	$inp,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*18`($sp)
+	li	$t1,1
+	addi	$inp,$sp,$LOCALS
+	mtctr	$t1
+	bl	Lsha1_block_private
+	$POP	$inp,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*18`($sp)
+	addic.	$num,$num,-1
+	bne	Lunaligned
+
+Ldone:
+	$POP	r0,`$FRAME+$LRSAVE`($sp)
+	$POP	r15,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*17`($sp)
+	$POP	r16,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*16`($sp)
+	$POP	r17,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*15`($sp)
+	$POP	r18,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*14`($sp)
+	$POP	r19,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*13`($sp)
+	$POP	r20,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*12`($sp)
+	$POP	r21,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*11`($sp)
+	$POP	r22,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*10`($sp)
+	$POP	r23,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*9`($sp)
+	$POP	r24,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*8`($sp)
+	$POP	r25,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*7`($sp)
+	$POP	r26,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*6`($sp)
+	$POP	r27,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*5`($sp)
+	$POP	r28,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*4`($sp)
+	$POP	r29,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*3`($sp)
+	$POP	r30,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*2`($sp)
+	$POP	r31,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*1`($sp)
+	mtlr	r0
+	addi	$sp,$sp,$FRAME
+	blr
+	.long	0
+	.byte	0,12,4,1,0x80,18,3,0
+	.long	0
+___
+
+# This is private block function, which uses tailored calling
+# interface, namely upon entry SHA_CTX is pre-loaded to given
+# registers and counter register contains amount of chunks to
+# digest...
+$code.=<<___;
+.align	4
+Lsha1_block_private:
+___
+$code.=<<___;	# load K_00_19
+	lis	$K,0x5a82
+	ori	$K,$K,0x7999
+___
+for($i=0;$i<20;$i++)	{ &BODY_00_19($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+$code.=<<___;	# load K_20_39
+	lis	$K,0x6ed9
+	ori	$K,$K,0xeba1
+___
+for(;$i<40;$i++)	{ &BODY_20_39($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+$code.=<<___;	# load K_40_59
+	lis	$K,0x8f1b
+	ori	$K,$K,0xbcdc
+___
+for(;$i<60;$i++)	{ &BODY_40_59($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+$code.=<<___;	# load K_60_79
+	lis	$K,0xca62
+	ori	$K,$K,0xc1d6
+___
+for(;$i<80;$i++)	{ &BODY_20_39($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+$code.=<<___;
+	add	r16,r16,$E
+	add	r17,r17,$T
+	add	r18,r18,$A
+	add	r19,r19,$B
+	add	r20,r20,$C
+	stw	r16,0($ctx)
+	mr	$A,r16
+	stw	r17,4($ctx)
+	mr	$B,r17
+	stw	r18,8($ctx)
+	mr	$C,r18
+	stw	r19,12($ctx)
+	mr	$D,r19
+	stw	r20,16($ctx)
+	mr	$E,r20
+	addi	$inp,$inp,`16*4`
+	bdnz	Lsha1_block_private
+	blr
+	.long	0
+	.byte	0,12,0x14,0,0,0,0,0
+.size	.sha1_block_data_order,.-.sha1_block_data_order
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+.asciz	"SHA1 block transform for PPC, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@fy.chalmers.se>"
+___
+
+$code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem;
+print $code;
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-s390x.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-s390x.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..79df1ff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-s390x.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,247 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2007-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+
+# SHA1 block procedure for s390x.
+
+# April 2007.
+#
+# Performance is >30% better than gcc 3.3 generated code. But the real
+# twist is that SHA1 hardware support is detected and utilized. In
+# which case performance can reach further >4.5x for larger chunks.
+
+# January 2009.
+#
+# Optimize Xupdate for amount of memory references and reschedule
+# instructions to favour dual-issue z10 pipeline. On z10 hardware is
+# "only" ~2.3x faster than software.
+
+# November 2010.
+#
+# Adapt for -m31 build. If kernel supports what's called "highgprs"
+# feature on Linux [see /proc/cpuinfo], it's possible to use 64-bit
+# instructions and achieve "64-bit" performance even in 31-bit legacy
+# application context. The feature is not specific to any particular
+# processor, as long as it's "z-CPU". Latter implies that the code
+# remains z/Architecture specific. On z990 it was measured to perform
+# 23% better than code generated by gcc 4.3.
+
+$kimdfunc=1;	# magic function code for kimd instruction
+
+$flavour = shift;
+
+if ($flavour =~ /3[12]/) {
+	$SIZE_T=4;
+	$g="";
+} else {
+	$SIZE_T=8;
+	$g="g";
+}
+
+while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {}
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+$K_00_39="%r0"; $K=$K_00_39;
+$K_40_79="%r1";
+$ctx="%r2";	$prefetch="%r2";
+$inp="%r3";
+$len="%r4";
+
+$A="%r5";
+$B="%r6";
+$C="%r7";
+$D="%r8";
+$E="%r9";	@V=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E);
+$t0="%r10";
+$t1="%r11";
+@X=("%r12","%r13","%r14");
+$sp="%r15";
+
+$stdframe=16*$SIZE_T+4*8;
+$frame=$stdframe+16*4;
+
+sub Xupdate {
+my $i=shift;
+
+$code.=<<___ if ($i==15);
+	lg	$prefetch,$stdframe($sp)	### Xupdate(16) warm-up
+	lr	$X[0],$X[2]
+___
+return if ($i&1);	# Xupdate is vectorized and executed every 2nd cycle
+$code.=<<___ if ($i<16);
+	lg	$X[0],`$i*4`($inp)	### Xload($i)
+	rllg	$X[1],$X[0],32
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i>=16);
+	xgr	$X[0],$prefetch		### Xupdate($i)
+	lg	$prefetch,`$stdframe+4*(($i+2)%16)`($sp)
+	xg	$X[0],`$stdframe+4*(($i+8)%16)`($sp)
+	xgr	$X[0],$prefetch
+	rll	$X[0],$X[0],1
+	rllg	$X[1],$X[0],32
+	rll	$X[1],$X[1],1
+	rllg	$X[0],$X[1],32
+	lr	$X[2],$X[1]		# feedback
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i<=70);
+	stg	$X[0],`$stdframe+4*($i%16)`($sp)
+___
+unshift(@X,pop(@X));
+}
+
+sub BODY_00_19 {
+my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_;
+my $xi=$X[1];
+
+	&Xupdate($i);
+$code.=<<___;
+	alr	$e,$K		### $i
+	rll	$t1,$a,5
+	lr	$t0,$d
+	xr	$t0,$c
+	alr	$e,$t1
+	nr	$t0,$b
+	alr	$e,$xi
+	xr	$t0,$d
+	rll	$b,$b,30
+	alr	$e,$t0
+___
+}
+
+sub BODY_20_39 {
+my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_;
+my $xi=$X[1];
+
+	&Xupdate($i);
+$code.=<<___;
+	alr	$e,$K		### $i
+	rll	$t1,$a,5
+	lr	$t0,$b
+	alr	$e,$t1
+	xr	$t0,$c
+	alr	$e,$xi
+	xr	$t0,$d
+	rll	$b,$b,30
+	alr	$e,$t0
+___
+}
+
+sub BODY_40_59 {
+my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_;
+my $xi=$X[1];
+
+	&Xupdate($i);
+$code.=<<___;
+	alr	$e,$K		### $i
+	rll	$t1,$a,5
+	lr	$t0,$b
+	alr	$e,$t1
+	or	$t0,$c
+	lr	$t1,$b
+	nr	$t0,$d
+	nr	$t1,$c
+	alr	$e,$xi
+	or	$t0,$t1
+	rll	$b,$b,30
+	alr	$e,$t0
+___
+}
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.text
+.align	64
+.type	Ktable,\@object
+Ktable: .long	0x5a827999,0x6ed9eba1,0x8f1bbcdc,0xca62c1d6
+	.skip	48	#.long	0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0
+.size	Ktable,.-Ktable
+.globl	sha1_block_data_order
+.type	sha1_block_data_order,\@function
+sha1_block_data_order:
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($kimdfunc);
+	larl	%r1,OPENSSL_s390xcap_P
+	lg	%r0,16(%r1)	# check kimd capabilities
+	tmhh	%r0,`0x8000>>$kimdfunc`
+	jz	.Lsoftware
+	lghi	%r0,$kimdfunc
+	lgr	%r1,$ctx
+	lgr	%r2,$inp
+	sllg	%r3,$len,6
+	.long	0xb93e0002	# kimd %r0,%r2
+	brc	1,.-4		# pay attention to "partial completion"
+	br	%r14
+.align	16
+.Lsoftware:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	lghi	%r1,-$frame
+	st${g}	$ctx,`2*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+	stm${g}	%r6,%r15,`6*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+	lgr	%r0,$sp
+	la	$sp,0(%r1,$sp)
+	st${g}	%r0,0($sp)
+
+	larl	$t0,Ktable
+	llgf	$A,0($ctx)
+	llgf	$B,4($ctx)
+	llgf	$C,8($ctx)
+	llgf	$D,12($ctx)
+	llgf	$E,16($ctx)
+
+	lg	$K_00_39,0($t0)
+	lg	$K_40_79,8($t0)
+
+.Lloop:
+	rllg	$K_00_39,$K_00_39,32
+___
+for ($i=0;$i<20;$i++)	{ &BODY_00_19($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+$code.=<<___;
+	rllg	$K_00_39,$K_00_39,32
+___
+for (;$i<40;$i++)	{ &BODY_20_39($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+$code.=<<___;	$K=$K_40_79;
+	rllg	$K_40_79,$K_40_79,32
+___
+for (;$i<60;$i++)	{ &BODY_40_59($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+$code.=<<___;
+	rllg	$K_40_79,$K_40_79,32
+___
+for (;$i<80;$i++)	{ &BODY_20_39($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+$code.=<<___;
+
+	l${g}	$ctx,`$frame+2*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+	la	$inp,64($inp)
+	al	$A,0($ctx)
+	al	$B,4($ctx)
+	al	$C,8($ctx)
+	al	$D,12($ctx)
+	al	$E,16($ctx)
+	st	$A,0($ctx)
+	st	$B,4($ctx)
+	st	$C,8($ctx)
+	st	$D,12($ctx)
+	st	$E,16($ctx)
+	brct${g} $len,.Lloop
+
+	lm${g}	%r6,%r15,`$frame+6*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+	br	%r14
+.size	sha1_block_data_order,.-sha1_block_data_order
+.string	"SHA1 block transform for s390x, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+___
+
+$code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem;
+
+print $code;
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-sparcv9.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-sparcv9.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7437ff4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-sparcv9.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,434 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2007-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+#
+# Hardware SPARC T4 support by David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>.
+# ====================================================================
+
+# Performance improvement is not really impressive on pre-T1 CPU: +8%
+# over Sun C and +25% over gcc [3.3]. While on T1, a.k.a. Niagara, it
+# turned to be 40% faster than 64-bit code generated by Sun C 5.8 and
+# >2x than 64-bit code generated by gcc 3.4. And there is a gimmick.
+# X[16] vector is packed to 8 64-bit registers and as result nothing
+# is spilled on stack. In addition input data is loaded in compact
+# instruction sequence, thus minimizing the window when the code is
+# subject to [inter-thread] cache-thrashing hazard. The goal is to
+# ensure scalability on UltraSPARC T1, or rather to avoid decay when
+# amount of active threads exceeds the number of physical cores.
+
+# SPARC T4 SHA1 hardware achieves 3.72 cycles per byte, which is 3.1x
+# faster than software. Multi-process benchmark saturates at 11x
+# single-process result on 8-core processor, or ~9GBps per 2.85GHz
+# socket.
+
+$output=pop;
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+@X=("%o0","%o1","%o2","%o3","%o4","%o5","%g1","%o7");
+$rot1m="%g2";
+$tmp64="%g3";
+$Xi="%g4";
+$A="%l0";
+$B="%l1";
+$C="%l2";
+$D="%l3";
+$E="%l4";
+@V=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E);
+$K_00_19="%l5";
+$K_20_39="%l6";
+$K_40_59="%l7";
+$K_60_79="%g5";
+@K=($K_00_19,$K_20_39,$K_40_59,$K_60_79);
+
+$ctx="%i0";
+$inp="%i1";
+$len="%i2";
+$tmp0="%i3";
+$tmp1="%i4";
+$tmp2="%i5";
+
+sub BODY_00_15 {
+my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_;
+my $xi=($i&1)?@X[($i/2)%8]:$Xi;
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	sll	$a,5,$tmp0		!! $i
+	add	@K[$i/20],$e,$e
+	srl	$a,27,$tmp1
+	add	$tmp0,$e,$e
+	and	$c,$b,$tmp0
+	add	$tmp1,$e,$e
+	sll	$b,30,$tmp2
+	andn	$d,$b,$tmp1
+	srl	$b,2,$b
+	or	$tmp1,$tmp0,$tmp1
+	or	$tmp2,$b,$b
+	add	$xi,$e,$e
+___
+if ($i&1 && $i<15) {
+	$code.=
+	"	srlx	@X[(($i+1)/2)%8],32,$Xi\n";
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	add	$tmp1,$e,$e
+___
+}
+
+sub Xupdate {
+my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_;
+my $j=$i/2;
+
+if ($i&1) {
+$code.=<<___;
+	sll	$a,5,$tmp0		!! $i
+	add	@K[$i/20],$e,$e
+	srl	$a,27,$tmp1
+___
+} else {
+$code.=<<___;
+	sllx	@X[($j+6)%8],32,$Xi	! Xupdate($i)
+	xor	@X[($j+1)%8],@X[$j%8],@X[$j%8]
+	srlx	@X[($j+7)%8],32,$tmp1
+	xor	@X[($j+4)%8],@X[$j%8],@X[$j%8]
+	sll	$a,5,$tmp0		!! $i
+	or	$tmp1,$Xi,$Xi
+	add	@K[$i/20],$e,$e		!!
+	xor	$Xi,@X[$j%8],@X[$j%8]
+	srlx	@X[$j%8],31,$Xi
+	add	@X[$j%8],@X[$j%8],@X[$j%8]
+	and	$Xi,$rot1m,$Xi
+	andn	@X[$j%8],$rot1m,@X[$j%8]
+	srl	$a,27,$tmp1		!!
+	or	$Xi,@X[$j%8],@X[$j%8]
+___
+}
+}
+
+sub BODY_16_19 {
+my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_;
+
+	&Xupdate(@_);
+    if ($i&1) {
+	$xi=@X[($i/2)%8];
+    } else {
+	$xi=$Xi;
+	$code.="\tsrlx	@X[($i/2)%8],32,$xi\n";
+    }
+$code.=<<___;
+	add	$tmp0,$e,$e		!!
+	and	$c,$b,$tmp0
+	add	$tmp1,$e,$e
+	sll	$b,30,$tmp2
+	add	$xi,$e,$e
+	andn	$d,$b,$tmp1
+	srl	$b,2,$b
+	or	$tmp1,$tmp0,$tmp1
+	or	$tmp2,$b,$b
+	add	$tmp1,$e,$e
+___
+}
+
+sub BODY_20_39 {
+my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_;
+my $xi;
+	&Xupdate(@_);
+    if ($i&1) {
+	$xi=@X[($i/2)%8];
+    } else {
+	$xi=$Xi;
+	$code.="\tsrlx	@X[($i/2)%8],32,$xi\n";
+    }
+$code.=<<___;
+	add	$tmp0,$e,$e		!!
+	xor	$c,$b,$tmp0
+	add	$tmp1,$e,$e
+	sll	$b,30,$tmp2
+	xor	$d,$tmp0,$tmp1
+	srl	$b,2,$b
+	add	$tmp1,$e,$e
+	or	$tmp2,$b,$b
+	add	$xi,$e,$e
+___
+}
+
+sub BODY_40_59 {
+my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_;
+my $xi;
+	&Xupdate(@_);
+    if ($i&1) {
+	$xi=@X[($i/2)%8];
+    } else {
+	$xi=$Xi;
+	$code.="\tsrlx	@X[($i/2)%8],32,$xi\n";
+    }
+$code.=<<___;
+	add	$tmp0,$e,$e		!!
+	and	$c,$b,$tmp0
+	add	$tmp1,$e,$e
+	sll	$b,30,$tmp2
+	or	$c,$b,$tmp1
+	srl	$b,2,$b
+	and	$d,$tmp1,$tmp1
+	add	$xi,$e,$e
+	or	$tmp1,$tmp0,$tmp1
+	or	$tmp2,$b,$b
+	add	$tmp1,$e,$e
+___
+}
+
+$code.=<<___;
+#include "sparc_arch.h"
+
+#ifdef __arch64__
+.register	%g2,#scratch
+.register	%g3,#scratch
+#endif
+
+.section	".text",#alloc,#execinstr
+
+#ifdef __PIC__
+SPARC_PIC_THUNK(%g1)
+#endif
+
+.align	32
+.globl	sha1_block_data_order
+sha1_block_data_order:
+	SPARC_LOAD_ADDRESS_LEAF(OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P,%g1,%g5)
+	ld	[%g1+4],%g1		! OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[1]
+
+	andcc	%g1, CFR_SHA1, %g0
+	be	.Lsoftware
+	nop
+
+	ld	[%o0 + 0x00], %f0	! load context
+	ld	[%o0 + 0x04], %f1
+	ld	[%o0 + 0x08], %f2
+	andcc	%o1, 0x7, %g0
+	ld	[%o0 + 0x0c], %f3
+	bne,pn	%icc, .Lhwunaligned
+	 ld	[%o0 + 0x10], %f4
+
+.Lhw_loop:
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x00], %f8
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x08], %f10
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x10], %f12
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x18], %f14
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x20], %f16
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x28], %f18
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x30], %f20
+	subcc	%o2, 1, %o2		! done yet? 
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x38], %f22
+	add	%o1, 0x40, %o1
+	prefetch [%o1 + 63], 20
+
+	.word	0x81b02820		! SHA1
+
+	bne,pt	SIZE_T_CC, .Lhw_loop
+	nop
+
+.Lhwfinish:
+	st	%f0, [%o0 + 0x00]	! store context
+	st	%f1, [%o0 + 0x04]
+	st	%f2, [%o0 + 0x08]
+	st	%f3, [%o0 + 0x0c]
+	retl
+	st	%f4, [%o0 + 0x10]
+
+.align	8
+.Lhwunaligned:
+	alignaddr %o1, %g0, %o1
+
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x00], %f10
+.Lhwunaligned_loop:
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x08], %f12
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x10], %f14
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x18], %f16
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x20], %f18
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x28], %f20
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x30], %f22
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x38], %f24
+	subcc	%o2, 1, %o2		! done yet?
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x40], %f26
+	add	%o1, 0x40, %o1
+	prefetch [%o1 + 63], 20
+
+	faligndata %f10, %f12, %f8
+	faligndata %f12, %f14, %f10
+	faligndata %f14, %f16, %f12
+	faligndata %f16, %f18, %f14
+	faligndata %f18, %f20, %f16
+	faligndata %f20, %f22, %f18
+	faligndata %f22, %f24, %f20
+	faligndata %f24, %f26, %f22
+
+	.word	0x81b02820		! SHA1
+
+	bne,pt	SIZE_T_CC, .Lhwunaligned_loop
+	for	%f26, %f26, %f10	! %f10=%f26
+
+	ba	.Lhwfinish
+	nop
+
+.align	16
+.Lsoftware:
+	save	%sp,-STACK_FRAME,%sp
+	sllx	$len,6,$len
+	add	$inp,$len,$len
+
+	or	%g0,1,$rot1m
+	sllx	$rot1m,32,$rot1m
+	or	$rot1m,1,$rot1m
+
+	ld	[$ctx+0],$A
+	ld	[$ctx+4],$B
+	ld	[$ctx+8],$C
+	ld	[$ctx+12],$D
+	ld	[$ctx+16],$E
+	andn	$inp,7,$tmp0
+
+	sethi	%hi(0x5a827999),$K_00_19
+	or	$K_00_19,%lo(0x5a827999),$K_00_19
+	sethi	%hi(0x6ed9eba1),$K_20_39
+	or	$K_20_39,%lo(0x6ed9eba1),$K_20_39
+	sethi	%hi(0x8f1bbcdc),$K_40_59
+	or	$K_40_59,%lo(0x8f1bbcdc),$K_40_59
+	sethi	%hi(0xca62c1d6),$K_60_79
+	or	$K_60_79,%lo(0xca62c1d6),$K_60_79
+
+.Lloop:
+	ldx	[$tmp0+0],@X[0]
+	ldx	[$tmp0+16],@X[2]
+	ldx	[$tmp0+32],@X[4]
+	ldx	[$tmp0+48],@X[6]
+	and	$inp,7,$tmp1
+	ldx	[$tmp0+8],@X[1]
+	sll	$tmp1,3,$tmp1
+	ldx	[$tmp0+24],@X[3]
+	subcc	%g0,$tmp1,$tmp2	! should be 64-$tmp1, but -$tmp1 works too
+	ldx	[$tmp0+40],@X[5]
+	bz,pt	%icc,.Laligned
+	ldx	[$tmp0+56],@X[7]
+
+	sllx	@X[0],$tmp1,@X[0]
+	ldx	[$tmp0+64],$tmp64
+___
+for($i=0;$i<7;$i++)
+{   $code.=<<___;
+	srlx	@X[$i+1],$tmp2,$Xi
+	sllx	@X[$i+1],$tmp1,@X[$i+1]
+	or	$Xi,@X[$i],@X[$i]
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	srlx	$tmp64,$tmp2,$tmp64
+	or	$tmp64,@X[7],@X[7]
+.Laligned:
+	srlx	@X[0],32,$Xi
+___
+for ($i=0;$i<16;$i++)	{ &BODY_00_15($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+for (;$i<20;$i++)	{ &BODY_16_19($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+for (;$i<40;$i++)	{ &BODY_20_39($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+for (;$i<60;$i++)	{ &BODY_40_59($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+for (;$i<80;$i++)	{ &BODY_20_39($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+$code.=<<___;
+
+	ld	[$ctx+0],@X[0]
+	ld	[$ctx+4],@X[1]
+	ld	[$ctx+8],@X[2]
+	ld	[$ctx+12],@X[3]
+	add	$inp,64,$inp
+	ld	[$ctx+16],@X[4]
+	cmp	$inp,$len
+
+	add	$A,@X[0],$A
+	st	$A,[$ctx+0]
+	add	$B,@X[1],$B
+	st	$B,[$ctx+4]
+	add	$C,@X[2],$C
+	st	$C,[$ctx+8]
+	add	$D,@X[3],$D
+	st	$D,[$ctx+12]
+	add	$E,@X[4],$E
+	st	$E,[$ctx+16]
+
+	bne	SIZE_T_CC,.Lloop
+	andn	$inp,7,$tmp0
+
+	ret
+	restore
+.type	sha1_block_data_order,#function
+.size	sha1_block_data_order,(.-sha1_block_data_order)
+.asciz	"SHA1 block transform for SPARCv9, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+.align	4
+___
+
+# Purpose of these subroutines is to explicitly encode VIS instructions,
+# so that one can compile the module without having to specify VIS
+# extensions on compiler command line, e.g. -xarch=v9 vs. -xarch=v9a.
+# Idea is to reserve for option to produce "universal" binary and let
+# programmer detect if current CPU is VIS capable at run-time.
+sub unvis {
+my ($mnemonic,$rs1,$rs2,$rd)=@_;
+my $ref,$opf;
+my %visopf = (	"faligndata"	=> 0x048,
+		"for"		=> 0x07c	);
+
+    $ref = "$mnemonic\t$rs1,$rs2,$rd";
+
+    if ($opf=$visopf{$mnemonic}) {
+	foreach ($rs1,$rs2,$rd) {
+	    return $ref if (!/%f([0-9]{1,2})/);
+	    $_=$1;
+	    if ($1>=32) {
+		return $ref if ($1&1);
+		# re-encode for upper double register addressing
+		$_=($1|$1>>5)&31;
+	    }
+	}
+
+	return	sprintf ".word\t0x%08x !%s",
+			0x81b00000|$rd<<25|$rs1<<14|$opf<<5|$rs2,
+			$ref;
+    } else {
+	return $ref;
+    }
+}
+sub unalignaddr {
+my ($mnemonic,$rs1,$rs2,$rd)=@_;
+my %bias = ( "g" => 0, "o" => 8, "l" => 16, "i" => 24 );
+my $ref="$mnemonic\t$rs1,$rs2,$rd";
+
+    foreach ($rs1,$rs2,$rd) {
+	if (/%([goli])([0-7])/)	{ $_=$bias{$1}+$2; }
+	else			{ return $ref; }
+    }
+    return  sprintf ".word\t0x%08x !%s",
+		    0x81b00300|$rd<<25|$rs1<<14|$rs2,
+		    $ref;
+}
+
+foreach (split("\n",$code)) {
+	s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/ge;
+
+	s/\b(f[^\s]*)\s+(%f[0-9]{1,2}),\s*(%f[0-9]{1,2}),\s*(%f[0-9]{1,2})/
+		&unvis($1,$2,$3,$4)
+	 /ge;
+	s/\b(alignaddr)\s+(%[goli][0-7]),\s*(%[goli][0-7]),\s*(%[goli][0-7])/
+		&unalignaddr($1,$2,$3,$4)
+	 /ge;
+
+	print $_,"\n";
+}
+
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-sparcv9a.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-sparcv9a.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f9ed563
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-sparcv9a.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,608 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2009-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+
+# January 2009
+#
+# Provided that UltraSPARC VIS instructions are pipe-lined(*) and
+# pairable(*) with IALU ones, offloading of Xupdate to the UltraSPARC
+# Graphic Unit would make it possible to achieve higher instruction-
+# level parallelism, ILP, and thus higher performance. It should be
+# explicitly noted that ILP is the keyword, and it means that this
+# code would be unsuitable for cores like UltraSPARC-Tx. The idea is
+# not really novel, Sun had VIS-powered implementation for a while.
+# Unlike Sun's implementation this one can process multiple unaligned
+# input blocks, and as such works as drop-in replacement for OpenSSL
+# sha1_block_data_order. Performance improvement was measured to be
+# 40% over pure IALU sha1-sparcv9.pl on UltraSPARC-IIi, but 12% on
+# UltraSPARC-III. See below for discussion...
+#
+# The module does not present direct interest for OpenSSL, because
+# it doesn't provide better performance on contemporary SPARCv9 CPUs,
+# UltraSPARC-Tx and SPARC64-V[II] to be specific. Those who feel they
+# absolutely must score on UltraSPARC-I-IV can simply replace
+# crypto/sha/asm/sha1-sparcv9.pl with this module.
+#
+# (*)	"Pipe-lined" means that even if it takes several cycles to
+#	complete, next instruction using same functional unit [but not
+#	depending on the result of the current instruction] can start
+#	execution without having to wait for the unit. "Pairable"
+#	means that two [or more] independent instructions can be
+#	issued at the very same time.
+
+$bits=32;
+for (@ARGV)	{ $bits=64 if (/\-m64/ || /\-xarch\=v9/); }
+if ($bits==64)	{ $bias=2047; $frame=192; }
+else		{ $bias=0;    $frame=112; }
+
+$output=shift;
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+$ctx="%i0";
+$inp="%i1";
+$len="%i2";
+$tmp0="%i3";
+$tmp1="%i4";
+$tmp2="%i5";
+$tmp3="%g5";
+
+$base="%g1";
+$align="%g4";
+$Xfer="%o5";
+$nXfer=$tmp3;
+$Xi="%o7";
+
+$A="%l0";
+$B="%l1";
+$C="%l2";
+$D="%l3";
+$E="%l4";
+@V=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E);
+
+$Actx="%o0";
+$Bctx="%o1";
+$Cctx="%o2";
+$Dctx="%o3";
+$Ectx="%o4";
+
+$fmul="%f32";
+$VK_00_19="%f34";
+$VK_20_39="%f36";
+$VK_40_59="%f38";
+$VK_60_79="%f40";
+@VK=($VK_00_19,$VK_20_39,$VK_40_59,$VK_60_79);
+@X=("%f0", "%f1", "%f2", "%f3", "%f4", "%f5", "%f6", "%f7",
+    "%f8", "%f9","%f10","%f11","%f12","%f13","%f14","%f15","%f16");
+
+# This is reference 2x-parallelized VIS-powered Xupdate procedure. It
+# covers even K_NN_MM addition...
+sub Xupdate {
+my ($i)=@_;
+my $K=@VK[($i+16)/20];
+my $j=($i+16)%16;
+
+#	[ provided that GSR.alignaddr_offset is 5, $mul contains
+#	  0x100ULL<<32|0x100 value and K_NN_MM are pre-loaded to
+#	  chosen registers... ]
+$code.=<<___;
+	fxors		@X[($j+13)%16],@X[$j],@X[$j]	!-1/-1/-1:X[0]^=X[13]
+	fxors		@X[($j+14)%16],@X[$j+1],@X[$j+1]! 0/ 0/ 0:X[1]^=X[14]
+	fxor		@X[($j+2)%16],@X[($j+8)%16],%f18! 1/ 1/ 1:Tmp=X[2,3]^X[8,9]
+	fxor		%f18,@X[$j],@X[$j]		! 2/ 4/ 3:X[0,1]^=X[2,3]^X[8,9]
+	faligndata	@X[$j],@X[$j],%f18		! 3/ 7/ 5:Tmp=X[0,1]>>>24
+	fpadd32		@X[$j],@X[$j],@X[$j]		! 4/ 8/ 6:X[0,1]<<=1
+	fmul8ulx16	%f18,$fmul,%f18			! 5/10/ 7:Tmp>>=7, Tmp&=1
+	![fxors		%f15,%f2,%f2]
+	for		%f18,@X[$j],@X[$j]		! 8/14/10:X[0,1]|=Tmp
+	![fxors		%f0,%f3,%f3]			!10/17/12:X[0] dependency
+	fpadd32		$K,@X[$j],%f20
+	std		%f20,[$Xfer+`4*$j`]
+___
+# The numbers delimited with slash are the earliest possible dispatch
+# cycles for given instruction assuming 1 cycle latency for simple VIS
+# instructions, such as on UltraSPARC-I&II, 3 cycles latency, such as
+# on UltraSPARC-III&IV, and 2 cycles latency(*), respectively. Being
+# 2x-parallelized the procedure is "worth" 5, 8.5 or 6 ticks per SHA1
+# round. As [long as] FPU/VIS instructions are perfectly pairable with
+# IALU ones, the round timing is defined by the maximum between VIS
+# and IALU timings. The latter varies from round to round and averages
+# out at 6.25 ticks. This means that USI&II should operate at IALU
+# rate, while USIII&IV - at VIS rate. This explains why performance
+# improvement varies among processors. Well, given that pure IALU
+# sha1-sparcv9.pl module exhibits virtually uniform performance of
+# ~9.3 cycles per SHA1 round. Timings mentioned above are theoretical
+# lower limits. Real-life performance was measured to be 6.6 cycles
+# per SHA1 round on USIIi and 8.3 on USIII. The latter is lower than
+# half-round VIS timing, because there are 16 Xupdate-free rounds,
+# which "push down" average theoretical timing to 8 cycles...
+
+# (*)	SPARC64-V[II] was originally believed to have 2 cycles VIS
+#	latency. Well, it might have, but it doesn't have dedicated
+#	VIS-unit. Instead, VIS instructions are executed by other
+#	functional units, ones used here - by IALU. This doesn't
+#	improve effective ILP...
+}
+
+# The reference Xupdate procedure is then "strained" over *pairs* of
+# BODY_NN_MM and kind of modulo-scheduled in respect to X[n]^=X[n+13]
+# and K_NN_MM addition. It's "running" 15 rounds ahead, which leaves
+# plenty of room to amortize for read-after-write hazard, as well as
+# to fetch and align input for the next spin. The VIS instructions are
+# scheduled for latency of 2 cycles, because there are not enough IALU
+# instructions to schedule for latency of 3, while scheduling for 1
+# would give no gain on USI&II anyway.
+
+sub BODY_00_19 {
+my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_;
+my $j=$i&~1;
+my $k=($j+16+2)%16;	# ahead reference
+my $l=($j+16-2)%16;	# behind reference
+my $K=@VK[($j+16-2)/20];
+
+$j=($j+16)%16;
+
+$code.=<<___ if (!($i&1));
+	sll		$a,5,$tmp0			!! $i
+	and		$c,$b,$tmp3
+	ld		[$Xfer+`4*($i%16)`],$Xi
+	 fxors		@X[($j+14)%16],@X[$j+1],@X[$j+1]! 0/ 0/ 0:X[1]^=X[14]
+	srl		$a,27,$tmp1
+	add		$tmp0,$e,$e
+	 fxor		@X[($j+2)%16],@X[($j+8)%16],%f18! 1/ 1/ 1:Tmp=X[2,3]^X[8,9]
+	sll		$b,30,$tmp2
+	add		$tmp1,$e,$e
+	andn		$d,$b,$tmp1
+	add		$Xi,$e,$e
+	 fxor		%f18,@X[$j],@X[$j]		! 2/ 4/ 3:X[0,1]^=X[2,3]^X[8,9]
+	srl		$b,2,$b
+	or		$tmp1,$tmp3,$tmp1
+	or		$tmp2,$b,$b
+	add		$tmp1,$e,$e
+	 faligndata	@X[$j],@X[$j],%f18		! 3/ 7/ 5:Tmp=X[0,1]>>>24
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i&1);
+	sll		$a,5,$tmp0			!! $i
+	and		$c,$b,$tmp3
+	ld		[$Xfer+`4*($i%16)`],$Xi
+	 fpadd32	@X[$j],@X[$j],@X[$j]		! 4/ 8/ 6:X[0,1]<<=1
+	srl		$a,27,$tmp1
+	add		$tmp0,$e,$e
+	 fmul8ulx16	%f18,$fmul,%f18			! 5/10/ 7:Tmp>>=7, Tmp&=1
+	sll		$b,30,$tmp2
+	add		$tmp1,$e,$e
+	 fpadd32	$K,@X[$l],%f20			!
+	andn		$d,$b,$tmp1
+	add		$Xi,$e,$e
+	 fxors		@X[($k+13)%16],@X[$k],@X[$k]	!-1/-1/-1:X[0]^=X[13]
+	srl		$b,2,$b
+	or		$tmp1,$tmp3,$tmp1
+	 fxor		%f18,@X[$j],@X[$j]		! 8/14/10:X[0,1]|=Tmp
+	or		$tmp2,$b,$b
+	add		$tmp1,$e,$e
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i&1 && $i>=2);
+	 std		%f20,[$Xfer+`4*$l`]		!
+___
+}
+
+sub BODY_20_39 {
+my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_;
+my $j=$i&~1;
+my $k=($j+16+2)%16;	# ahead reference
+my $l=($j+16-2)%16;	# behind reference
+my $K=@VK[($j+16-2)/20];
+
+$j=($j+16)%16;
+
+$code.=<<___ if (!($i&1) && $i<64);
+	sll		$a,5,$tmp0			!! $i
+	ld		[$Xfer+`4*($i%16)`],$Xi
+	 fxors		@X[($j+14)%16],@X[$j+1],@X[$j+1]! 0/ 0/ 0:X[1]^=X[14]
+	srl		$a,27,$tmp1
+	add		$tmp0,$e,$e
+	 fxor		@X[($j+2)%16],@X[($j+8)%16],%f18! 1/ 1/ 1:Tmp=X[2,3]^X[8,9]
+	xor		$c,$b,$tmp0
+	add		$tmp1,$e,$e
+	sll		$b,30,$tmp2
+	xor		$d,$tmp0,$tmp1
+	 fxor		%f18,@X[$j],@X[$j]		! 2/ 4/ 3:X[0,1]^=X[2,3]^X[8,9]
+	srl		$b,2,$b
+	add		$tmp1,$e,$e
+	or		$tmp2,$b,$b
+	add		$Xi,$e,$e
+	 faligndata	@X[$j],@X[$j],%f18		! 3/ 7/ 5:Tmp=X[0,1]>>>24
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i&1 && $i<64);
+	sll		$a,5,$tmp0			!! $i
+	ld		[$Xfer+`4*($i%16)`],$Xi
+	 fpadd32	@X[$j],@X[$j],@X[$j]		! 4/ 8/ 6:X[0,1]<<=1
+	srl		$a,27,$tmp1
+	add		$tmp0,$e,$e
+	 fmul8ulx16	%f18,$fmul,%f18			! 5/10/ 7:Tmp>>=7, Tmp&=1
+	xor		$c,$b,$tmp0
+	add		$tmp1,$e,$e
+	 fpadd32	$K,@X[$l],%f20			!
+	sll		$b,30,$tmp2
+	xor		$d,$tmp0,$tmp1
+	 fxors		@X[($k+13)%16],@X[$k],@X[$k]	!-1/-1/-1:X[0]^=X[13]
+	srl		$b,2,$b
+	add		$tmp1,$e,$e
+	 fxor		%f18,@X[$j],@X[$j]		! 8/14/10:X[0,1]|=Tmp
+	or		$tmp2,$b,$b
+	add		$Xi,$e,$e
+	 std		%f20,[$Xfer+`4*$l`]		!
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i==64);
+	sll		$a,5,$tmp0			!! $i
+	ld		[$Xfer+`4*($i%16)`],$Xi
+	 fpadd32	$K,@X[$l],%f20
+	srl		$a,27,$tmp1
+	add		$tmp0,$e,$e
+	xor		$c,$b,$tmp0
+	add		$tmp1,$e,$e
+	sll		$b,30,$tmp2
+	xor		$d,$tmp0,$tmp1
+	 std		%f20,[$Xfer+`4*$l`]
+	srl		$b,2,$b
+	add		$tmp1,$e,$e
+	or		$tmp2,$b,$b
+	add		$Xi,$e,$e
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i>64);
+	sll		$a,5,$tmp0			!! $i
+	ld		[$Xfer+`4*($i%16)`],$Xi
+	srl		$a,27,$tmp1
+	add		$tmp0,$e,$e
+	xor		$c,$b,$tmp0
+	add		$tmp1,$e,$e
+	sll		$b,30,$tmp2
+	xor		$d,$tmp0,$tmp1
+	srl		$b,2,$b
+	add		$tmp1,$e,$e
+	or		$tmp2,$b,$b
+	add		$Xi,$e,$e
+___
+}
+
+sub BODY_40_59 {
+my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_;
+my $j=$i&~1;
+my $k=($j+16+2)%16;	# ahead reference
+my $l=($j+16-2)%16;	# behind reference
+my $K=@VK[($j+16-2)/20];
+
+$j=($j+16)%16;
+
+$code.=<<___ if (!($i&1));
+	sll		$a,5,$tmp0			!! $i
+	ld		[$Xfer+`4*($i%16)`],$Xi
+	 fxors		@X[($j+14)%16],@X[$j+1],@X[$j+1]! 0/ 0/ 0:X[1]^=X[14]
+	srl		$a,27,$tmp1
+	add		$tmp0,$e,$e
+	 fxor		@X[($j+2)%16],@X[($j+8)%16],%f18! 1/ 1/ 1:Tmp=X[2,3]^X[8,9]
+	and		$c,$b,$tmp0
+	add		$tmp1,$e,$e
+	sll		$b,30,$tmp2
+	or		$c,$b,$tmp1
+	 fxor		%f18,@X[$j],@X[$j]		! 2/ 4/ 3:X[0,1]^=X[2,3]^X[8,9]
+	srl		$b,2,$b
+	and		$d,$tmp1,$tmp1
+	add		$Xi,$e,$e
+	or		$tmp1,$tmp0,$tmp1
+	 faligndata	@X[$j],@X[$j],%f18		! 3/ 7/ 5:Tmp=X[0,1]>>>24
+	or		$tmp2,$b,$b
+	add		$tmp1,$e,$e
+	 fpadd32	@X[$j],@X[$j],@X[$j]		! 4/ 8/ 6:X[0,1]<<=1
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i&1);
+	sll		$a,5,$tmp0			!! $i
+	ld		[$Xfer+`4*($i%16)`],$Xi
+	srl		$a,27,$tmp1
+	add		$tmp0,$e,$e
+	 fmul8ulx16	%f18,$fmul,%f18			! 5/10/ 7:Tmp>>=7, Tmp&=1
+	and		$c,$b,$tmp0
+	add		$tmp1,$e,$e
+	 fpadd32	$K,@X[$l],%f20			!
+	sll		$b,30,$tmp2
+	or		$c,$b,$tmp1
+	 fxors		@X[($k+13)%16],@X[$k],@X[$k]	!-1/-1/-1:X[0]^=X[13]
+	srl		$b,2,$b
+	and		$d,$tmp1,$tmp1
+	 fxor		%f18,@X[$j],@X[$j]		! 8/14/10:X[0,1]|=Tmp
+	add		$Xi,$e,$e
+	or		$tmp1,$tmp0,$tmp1
+	or		$tmp2,$b,$b
+	add		$tmp1,$e,$e
+	 std		%f20,[$Xfer+`4*$l`]		!
+___
+}
+
+# If there is more data to process, then we pre-fetch the data for
+# next iteration in last ten rounds...
+sub BODY_70_79 {
+my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_;
+my $j=$i&~1;
+my $m=($i%8)*2;
+
+$j=($j+16)%16;
+
+$code.=<<___ if ($i==70);
+	sll		$a,5,$tmp0			!! $i
+	ld		[$Xfer+`4*($i%16)`],$Xi
+	srl		$a,27,$tmp1
+	add		$tmp0,$e,$e
+	 ldd		[$inp+64],@X[0]
+	xor		$c,$b,$tmp0
+	add		$tmp1,$e,$e
+	sll		$b,30,$tmp2
+	xor		$d,$tmp0,$tmp1
+	srl		$b,2,$b
+	add		$tmp1,$e,$e
+	or		$tmp2,$b,$b
+	add		$Xi,$e,$e
+
+	and		$inp,-64,$nXfer
+	inc		64,$inp
+	and		$nXfer,255,$nXfer
+	alignaddr	%g0,$align,%g0
+	add		$base,$nXfer,$nXfer
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i==71);
+	sll		$a,5,$tmp0			!! $i
+	ld		[$Xfer+`4*($i%16)`],$Xi
+	srl		$a,27,$tmp1
+	add		$tmp0,$e,$e
+	xor		$c,$b,$tmp0
+	add		$tmp1,$e,$e
+	sll		$b,30,$tmp2
+	xor		$d,$tmp0,$tmp1
+	srl		$b,2,$b
+	add		$tmp1,$e,$e
+	or		$tmp2,$b,$b
+	add		$Xi,$e,$e
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i>=72);
+	 faligndata	@X[$m],@X[$m+2],@X[$m]
+	sll		$a,5,$tmp0			!! $i
+	ld		[$Xfer+`4*($i%16)`],$Xi
+	srl		$a,27,$tmp1
+	add		$tmp0,$e,$e
+	xor		$c,$b,$tmp0
+	add		$tmp1,$e,$e
+	 fpadd32	$VK_00_19,@X[$m],%f20
+	sll		$b,30,$tmp2
+	xor		$d,$tmp0,$tmp1
+	srl		$b,2,$b
+	add		$tmp1,$e,$e
+	or		$tmp2,$b,$b
+	add		$Xi,$e,$e
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i<77);
+	 ldd		[$inp+`8*($i+1-70)`],@X[2*($i+1-70)]
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i==77);	# redundant if $inp was aligned
+	 add		$align,63,$tmp0
+	 and		$tmp0,-8,$tmp0
+	 ldd		[$inp+$tmp0],@X[16]
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i>=72);
+	 std		%f20,[$nXfer+`4*$m`]
+___
+}
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.section	".text",#alloc,#execinstr
+
+.align	64
+vis_const:
+.long	0x5a827999,0x5a827999	! K_00_19
+.long	0x6ed9eba1,0x6ed9eba1	! K_20_39
+.long	0x8f1bbcdc,0x8f1bbcdc	! K_40_59
+.long	0xca62c1d6,0xca62c1d6	! K_60_79
+.long	0x00000100,0x00000100
+.align	64
+.type	vis_const,#object
+.size	vis_const,(.-vis_const)
+
+.globl	sha1_block_data_order
+sha1_block_data_order:
+	save	%sp,-$frame,%sp
+	add	%fp,$bias-256,$base
+
+1:	call	.+8
+	add	%o7,vis_const-1b,$tmp0
+
+	ldd	[$tmp0+0],$VK_00_19
+	ldd	[$tmp0+8],$VK_20_39
+	ldd	[$tmp0+16],$VK_40_59
+	ldd	[$tmp0+24],$VK_60_79
+	ldd	[$tmp0+32],$fmul
+
+	ld	[$ctx+0],$Actx
+	and	$base,-256,$base
+	ld	[$ctx+4],$Bctx
+	sub	$base,$bias+$frame,%sp
+	ld	[$ctx+8],$Cctx
+	and	$inp,7,$align
+	ld	[$ctx+12],$Dctx
+	and	$inp,-8,$inp
+	ld	[$ctx+16],$Ectx
+
+	! X[16] is maintained in FP register bank
+	alignaddr	%g0,$align,%g0
+	ldd		[$inp+0],@X[0]
+	sub		$inp,-64,$Xfer
+	ldd		[$inp+8],@X[2]
+	and		$Xfer,-64,$Xfer
+	ldd		[$inp+16],@X[4]
+	and		$Xfer,255,$Xfer
+	ldd		[$inp+24],@X[6]
+	add		$base,$Xfer,$Xfer
+	ldd		[$inp+32],@X[8]
+	ldd		[$inp+40],@X[10]
+	ldd		[$inp+48],@X[12]
+	brz,pt		$align,.Laligned
+	ldd		[$inp+56],@X[14]
+
+	ldd		[$inp+64],@X[16]
+	faligndata	@X[0],@X[2],@X[0]
+	faligndata	@X[2],@X[4],@X[2]
+	faligndata	@X[4],@X[6],@X[4]
+	faligndata	@X[6],@X[8],@X[6]
+	faligndata	@X[8],@X[10],@X[8]
+	faligndata	@X[10],@X[12],@X[10]
+	faligndata	@X[12],@X[14],@X[12]
+	faligndata	@X[14],@X[16],@X[14]
+
+.Laligned:
+	mov		5,$tmp0
+	dec		1,$len
+	alignaddr	%g0,$tmp0,%g0
+	fpadd32		$VK_00_19,@X[0],%f16
+	fpadd32		$VK_00_19,@X[2],%f18
+	fpadd32		$VK_00_19,@X[4],%f20
+	fpadd32		$VK_00_19,@X[6],%f22
+	fpadd32		$VK_00_19,@X[8],%f24
+	fpadd32		$VK_00_19,@X[10],%f26
+	fpadd32		$VK_00_19,@X[12],%f28
+	fpadd32		$VK_00_19,@X[14],%f30
+	std		%f16,[$Xfer+0]
+	mov		$Actx,$A
+	std		%f18,[$Xfer+8]
+	mov		$Bctx,$B
+	std		%f20,[$Xfer+16]
+	mov		$Cctx,$C
+	std		%f22,[$Xfer+24]
+	mov		$Dctx,$D
+	std		%f24,[$Xfer+32]
+	mov		$Ectx,$E
+	std		%f26,[$Xfer+40]
+	fxors		@X[13],@X[0],@X[0]
+	std		%f28,[$Xfer+48]
+	ba		.Loop
+	std		%f30,[$Xfer+56]
+.align	32
+.Loop:
+___
+for ($i=0;$i<20;$i++)	{ &BODY_00_19($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+for (;$i<40;$i++)	{ &BODY_20_39($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+for (;$i<60;$i++)	{ &BODY_40_59($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+for (;$i<70;$i++)	{ &BODY_20_39($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+$code.=<<___;
+	tst		$len
+	bz,pn		`$bits==32?"%icc":"%xcc"`,.Ltail
+	nop
+___
+for (;$i<80;$i++)	{ &BODY_70_79($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+$code.=<<___;
+	add		$A,$Actx,$Actx
+	add		$B,$Bctx,$Bctx
+	add		$C,$Cctx,$Cctx
+	add		$D,$Dctx,$Dctx
+	add		$E,$Ectx,$Ectx
+	mov		5,$tmp0
+	fxors		@X[13],@X[0],@X[0]
+	mov		$Actx,$A
+	mov		$Bctx,$B
+	mov		$Cctx,$C
+	mov		$Dctx,$D
+	mov		$Ectx,$E
+	alignaddr	%g0,$tmp0,%g0	
+	dec		1,$len
+	ba		.Loop
+	mov		$nXfer,$Xfer
+
+.align	32
+.Ltail:
+___
+for($i=70;$i<80;$i++)	{ &BODY_20_39($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+$code.=<<___;
+	add	$A,$Actx,$Actx
+	add	$B,$Bctx,$Bctx
+	add	$C,$Cctx,$Cctx
+	add	$D,$Dctx,$Dctx
+	add	$E,$Ectx,$Ectx
+
+	st	$Actx,[$ctx+0]
+	st	$Bctx,[$ctx+4]
+	st	$Cctx,[$ctx+8]
+	st	$Dctx,[$ctx+12]
+	st	$Ectx,[$ctx+16]
+
+	ret
+	restore
+.type	sha1_block_data_order,#function
+.size	sha1_block_data_order,(.-sha1_block_data_order)
+.asciz	"SHA1 block transform for SPARCv9a, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+.align	4
+___
+
+# Purpose of these subroutines is to explicitly encode VIS instructions,
+# so that one can compile the module without having to specify VIS
+# extensions on compiler command line, e.g. -xarch=v9 vs. -xarch=v9a.
+# Idea is to reserve for option to produce "universal" binary and let
+# programmer detect if current CPU is VIS capable at run-time.
+sub unvis {
+my ($mnemonic,$rs1,$rs2,$rd)=@_;
+my ($ref,$opf);
+my %visopf = (	"fmul8ulx16"	=> 0x037,
+		"faligndata"	=> 0x048,
+		"fpadd32"	=> 0x052,
+		"fxor"		=> 0x06c,
+		"fxors"		=> 0x06d	);
+
+    $ref = "$mnemonic\t$rs1,$rs2,$rd";
+
+    if ($opf=$visopf{$mnemonic}) {
+	foreach ($rs1,$rs2,$rd) {
+	    return $ref if (!/%f([0-9]{1,2})/);
+	    $_=$1;
+	    if ($1>=32) {
+		return $ref if ($1&1);
+		# re-encode for upper double register addressing
+		$_=($1|$1>>5)&31;
+	    }
+	}
+
+	return	sprintf ".word\t0x%08x !%s",
+			0x81b00000|$rd<<25|$rs1<<14|$opf<<5|$rs2,
+			$ref;
+    } else {
+	return $ref;
+    }
+}
+sub unalignaddr {
+my ($mnemonic,$rs1,$rs2,$rd)=@_;
+my %bias = ( "g" => 0, "o" => 8, "l" => 16, "i" => 24 );
+my $ref="$mnemonic\t$rs1,$rs2,$rd";
+
+    foreach ($rs1,$rs2,$rd) {
+	if (/%([goli])([0-7])/)	{ $_=$bias{$1}+$2; }
+	else			{ return $ref; }
+    }
+    return  sprintf ".word\t0x%08x !%s",
+		    0x81b00300|$rd<<25|$rs1<<14|$rs2,
+		    $ref;
+}
+
+$code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem;
+$code =~ s/\b(f[^\s]*)\s+(%f[0-9]{1,2}),(%f[0-9]{1,2}),(%f[0-9]{1,2})/
+		&unvis($1,$2,$3,$4)
+	  /gem;
+$code =~ s/\b(alignaddr)\s+(%[goli][0-7]),(%[goli][0-7]),(%[goli][0-7])/
+		&unalignaddr($1,$2,$3,$4)
+	  /gem;
+print $code;
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-thumb.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-thumb.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..661fd9f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-thumb.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,266 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2007-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+
+# sha1_block for Thumb.
+#
+# January 2007.
+#
+# The code does not present direct interest to OpenSSL, because of low
+# performance. Its purpose is to establish _size_ benchmark. Pretty
+# useless one I must say, because 30% or 88 bytes larger ARMv4 code
+# [avialable on demand] is almost _twice_ as fast. It should also be
+# noted that in-lining of .Lcommon and .Lrotate improves performance
+# by over 40%, while code increases by only 10% or 32 bytes. But once
+# again, the goal was to establish _size_ benchmark, not performance.
+
+$output=shift;
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+$inline=0;
+#$cheat_on_binutils=1;
+
+$t0="r0";
+$t1="r1";
+$t2="r2";
+$a="r3";
+$b="r4";
+$c="r5";
+$d="r6";
+$e="r7";
+$K="r8";	# "upper" registers can be used in add/sub and mov insns
+$ctx="r9";
+$inp="r10";
+$len="r11";
+$Xi="r12";
+
+sub common {
+<<___;
+	sub	$t0,#4
+	ldr	$t1,[$t0]
+	add	$e,$K			@ E+=K_xx_xx
+	lsl	$t2,$a,#5
+	add	$t2,$e
+	lsr	$e,$a,#27
+	add	$t2,$e			@ E+=ROR(A,27)
+	add	$t2,$t1			@ E+=X[i]
+___
+}
+sub rotate {
+<<___;
+	mov	$e,$d			@ E=D
+	mov	$d,$c			@ D=C
+	lsl	$c,$b,#30
+	lsr	$b,$b,#2
+	orr	$c,$b			@ C=ROR(B,2)
+	mov	$b,$a			@ B=A
+	add	$a,$t2,$t1		@ A=E+F_xx_xx(B,C,D)
+___
+}
+
+sub BODY_00_19 {
+$code.=$inline?&common():"\tbl	.Lcommon\n";
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	$t1,$c
+	eor	$t1,$d
+	and	$t1,$b
+	eor	$t1,$d			@ F_00_19(B,C,D)
+___
+$code.=$inline?&rotate():"\tbl	.Lrotate\n";
+}
+
+sub BODY_20_39 {
+$code.=$inline?&common():"\tbl	.Lcommon\n";
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	$t1,$b
+	eor	$t1,$c
+	eor	$t1,$d			@ F_20_39(B,C,D)
+___
+$code.=$inline?&rotate():"\tbl	.Lrotate\n";
+}
+
+sub BODY_40_59 {
+$code.=$inline?&common():"\tbl	.Lcommon\n";
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	$t1,$b
+	and	$t1,$c
+	mov	$e,$b
+	orr	$e,$c
+	and	$e,$d
+	orr	$t1,$e			@ F_40_59(B,C,D)
+___
+$code.=$inline?&rotate():"\tbl	.Lrotate\n";
+}
+
+$code=<<___;
+.text
+.code	16
+
+.global	sha1_block_data_order
+.type	sha1_block_data_order,%function
+
+.align	2
+sha1_block_data_order:
+___
+if ($cheat_on_binutils) {
+$code.=<<___;
+.code	32
+	add	r3,pc,#1
+	bx	r3			@ switch to Thumb ISA
+.code	16
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	push	{r4-r7}
+	mov	r3,r8
+	mov	r4,r9
+	mov	r5,r10
+	mov	r6,r11
+	mov	r7,r12
+	push	{r3-r7,lr}
+	lsl	r2,#6
+	mov	$ctx,r0			@ save context
+	mov	$inp,r1			@ save inp
+	mov	$len,r2			@ save len
+	add	$len,$inp		@ $len to point at inp end
+
+.Lloop:
+	mov	$Xi,sp
+	mov	$t2,sp
+	sub	$t2,#16*4		@ [3]
+.LXload:
+	ldrb	$a,[$t1,#0]		@ $t1 is r1 and holds inp
+	ldrb	$b,[$t1,#1]
+	ldrb	$c,[$t1,#2]
+	ldrb	$d,[$t1,#3]
+	lsl	$a,#24
+	lsl	$b,#16
+	lsl	$c,#8
+	orr	$a,$b
+	orr	$a,$c
+	orr	$a,$d
+	add	$t1,#4
+	push	{$a}
+	cmp	sp,$t2
+	bne	.LXload			@ [+14*16]
+
+	mov	$inp,$t1		@ update $inp
+	sub	$t2,#32*4
+	sub	$t2,#32*4
+	mov	$e,#31			@ [+4]
+.LXupdate:
+	ldr	$a,[sp,#15*4]
+	ldr	$b,[sp,#13*4]
+	ldr	$c,[sp,#7*4]
+	ldr	$d,[sp,#2*4]
+	eor	$a,$b
+	eor	$a,$c
+	eor	$a,$d
+	ror	$a,$e
+	push	{$a}
+	cmp	sp,$t2
+	bne	.LXupdate		@ [+(11+1)*64]
+
+	ldmia	$t0!,{$a,$b,$c,$d,$e}	@ $t0 is r0 and holds ctx
+	mov	$t0,$Xi
+
+	ldr	$t2,.LK_00_19
+	mov	$t1,$t0
+	sub	$t1,#20*4
+	mov	$Xi,$t1
+	mov	$K,$t2			@ [+7+4]
+.L_00_19:
+___
+	&BODY_00_19();
+$code.=<<___;
+	cmp	$Xi,$t0
+	bne	.L_00_19		@ [+(2+9+4+2+8+2)*20]
+
+	ldr	$t2,.LK_20_39
+	mov	$t1,$t0
+	sub	$t1,#20*4
+	mov	$Xi,$t1
+	mov	$K,$t2			@ [+5]
+.L_20_39_or_60_79:
+___
+	&BODY_20_39();
+$code.=<<___;
+	cmp	$Xi,$t0
+	bne	.L_20_39_or_60_79	@ [+(2+9+3+2+8+2)*20*2]
+	cmp	sp,$t0
+	beq	.Ldone			@ [+2]
+
+	ldr	$t2,.LK_40_59
+	mov	$t1,$t0
+	sub	$t1,#20*4
+	mov	$Xi,$t1
+	mov	$K,$t2			@ [+5]
+.L_40_59:
+___
+	&BODY_40_59();
+$code.=<<___;
+	cmp	$Xi,$t0
+	bne	.L_40_59		@ [+(2+9+6+2+8+2)*20]
+
+	ldr	$t2,.LK_60_79
+	mov	$Xi,sp
+	mov	$K,$t2
+	b	.L_20_39_or_60_79	@ [+4]
+.Ldone:
+	mov	$t0,$ctx
+	ldr	$t1,[$t0,#0]
+	ldr	$t2,[$t0,#4]
+	add	$a,$t1
+	ldr	$t1,[$t0,#8]
+	add	$b,$t2
+	ldr	$t2,[$t0,#12]
+	add	$c,$t1
+	ldr	$t1,[$t0,#16]
+	add	$d,$t2
+	add	$e,$t1
+	stmia	$t0!,{$a,$b,$c,$d,$e}	@ [+20]
+
+	add	sp,#80*4		@ deallocate stack frame
+	mov	$t0,$ctx		@ restore ctx
+	mov	$t1,$inp		@ restore inp
+	cmp	$t1,$len
+	beq	.Lexit
+	b	.Lloop			@ [+6] total 3212 cycles
+.Lexit:
+	pop	{r2-r7}
+	mov	r8,r2
+	mov	r9,r3
+	mov	r10,r4
+	mov	r11,r5
+	mov	r12,r6
+	mov	lr,r7
+	pop	{r4-r7}
+	bx	lr
+.align	2
+___
+$code.=".Lcommon:\n".&common()."\tmov	pc,lr\n" if (!$inline);
+$code.=".Lrotate:\n".&rotate()."\tmov	pc,lr\n" if (!$inline);
+$code.=<<___;
+.align	2
+.LK_00_19:	.word	0x5a827999
+.LK_20_39:	.word	0x6ed9eba1
+.LK_40_59:	.word	0x8f1bbcdc
+.LK_60_79:	.word	0xca62c1d6
+.size	sha1_block_data_order,.-sha1_block_data_order
+.asciz	"SHA1 block transform for Thumb, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+___
+
+print $code;
+close STDOUT; # enforce flush
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-x86_64.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-x86_64.pl
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..6a3378b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-x86_64.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,2077 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# sha1_block procedure for x86_64.
+#
+# It was brought to my attention that on EM64T compiler-generated code
+# was far behind 32-bit assembler implementation. This is unlike on
+# Opteron where compiler-generated code was only 15% behind 32-bit
+# assembler, which originally made it hard to motivate the effort.
+# There was suggestion to mechanically translate 32-bit code, but I
+# dismissed it, reasoning that x86_64 offers enough register bank
+# capacity to fully utilize SHA-1 parallelism. Therefore this fresh
+# implementation:-) However! While 64-bit code does perform better
+# on Opteron, I failed to beat 32-bit assembler on EM64T core. Well,
+# x86_64 does offer larger *addressable* bank, but out-of-order core
+# reaches for even more registers through dynamic aliasing, and EM64T
+# core must have managed to run-time optimize even 32-bit code just as
+# good as 64-bit one. Performance improvement is summarized in the
+# following table:
+#
+#		gcc 3.4		32-bit asm	cycles/byte
+# Opteron	+45%		+20%		6.8
+# Xeon P4	+65%		+0%		9.9
+# Core2		+60%		+10%		7.0
+
+# August 2009.
+#
+# The code was revised to minimize code size and to maximize
+# "distance" between instructions producing input to 'lea'
+# instruction and the 'lea' instruction itself, which is essential
+# for Intel Atom core.
+
+# October 2010.
+#
+# Add SSSE3, Supplemental[!] SSE3, implementation. The idea behind it
+# is to offload message schedule denoted by Wt in NIST specification,
+# or Xupdate in OpenSSL source, to SIMD unit. See sha1-586.pl module
+# for background and implementation details. The only difference from
+# 32-bit code is that 64-bit code doesn't have to spill @X[] elements
+# to free temporary registers.
+
+# April 2011.
+#
+# Add AVX code path. See sha1-586.pl for further information.
+
+# May 2013.
+#
+# Add AVX2+BMI code path. Initial attempt (utilizing BMI instructions
+# and loading pair of consecutive blocks to 256-bit %ymm registers)
+# did not provide impressive performance improvement till a crucial
+# hint regarding the number of Xupdate iterations to pre-compute in
+# advance was provided by Ilya Albrekht of Intel Corp.
+
+# March 2014.
+#
+# Add support for Intel SHA Extensions.
+
+######################################################################
+# Current performance is summarized in following table. Numbers are
+# CPU clock cycles spent to process single byte (less is better).
+#
+#		x86_64		SSSE3		AVX[2]
+# P4		9.05		-
+# Opteron	6.26		-
+# Core2		6.55		6.05/+8%	-
+# Westmere	6.73		5.30/+27%	-
+# Sandy Bridge	7.70		6.10/+26%	4.99/+54%
+# Ivy Bridge	6.06		4.67/+30%	4.60/+32%
+# Haswell	5.45		4.15/+31%	3.57/+53%
+# Skylake	5.18		4.06/+28%	3.54/+46%
+# Bulldozer	9.11		5.95/+53%
+# VIA Nano	9.32		7.15/+30%
+# Atom		10.3		9.17/+12%
+# Silvermont	13.1(*)		9.37/+40%
+# Goldmont	8.13		6.42/+27%	1.70/+380%(**)
+#
+# (*)	obviously suboptimal result, nothing was done about it,
+#	because SSSE3 code is compiled unconditionally;
+# (**)	SHAEXT result
+
+$flavour = shift;
+$output  = shift;
+if ($flavour =~ /\./) { $output = $flavour; undef $flavour; }
+
+$win64=0; $win64=1 if ($flavour =~ /[nm]asm|mingw64/ || $output =~ /\.asm$/);
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+( $xlate="${dir}x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
+( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
+die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl";
+
+if (`$ENV{CC} -Wa,-v -c -o /dev/null -x assembler /dev/null 2>&1`
+		=~ /GNU assembler version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
+	$avx = ($1>=2.19) + ($1>=2.22);
+}
+
+if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /nasm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /nasm/) &&
+	   `nasm -v 2>&1` =~ /NASM version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
+	$avx = ($1>=2.09) + ($1>=2.10);
+}
+
+if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
+	   `ml64 2>&1` =~ /Version ([0-9]+)\./) {
+	$avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=11);
+}
+
+if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
+	$avx = ($2>=3.0) + ($2>3.0);
+}
+
+$shaext=1;	### set to zero if compiling for 1.0.1
+$avx=1		if (!$shaext && $avx);
+
+open OUT,"| \"$^X\" \"$xlate\" $flavour \"$output\"";
+*STDOUT=*OUT;
+
+$ctx="%rdi";	# 1st arg
+$inp="%rsi";	# 2nd arg
+$num="%rdx";	# 3rd arg
+
+# reassign arguments in order to produce more compact code
+$ctx="%r8";
+$inp="%r9";
+$num="%r10";
+
+$t0="%eax";
+$t1="%ebx";
+$t2="%ecx";
+@xi=("%edx","%ebp","%r14d");
+$A="%esi";
+$B="%edi";
+$C="%r11d";
+$D="%r12d";
+$E="%r13d";
+
+@V=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E);
+
+sub BODY_00_19 {
+my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_;
+my $j=$i+1;
+$code.=<<___ if ($i==0);
+	mov	`4*$i`($inp),$xi[0]
+	bswap	$xi[0]
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i<15);
+	mov	`4*$j`($inp),$xi[1]
+	mov	$d,$t0
+	mov	$xi[0],`4*$i`(%rsp)
+	mov	$a,$t2
+	bswap	$xi[1]
+	xor	$c,$t0
+	rol	\$5,$t2
+	and	$b,$t0
+	lea	0x5a827999($xi[0],$e),$e
+	add	$t2,$e
+	xor	$d,$t0
+	rol	\$30,$b
+	add	$t0,$e
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i>=15);
+	xor	`4*($j%16)`(%rsp),$xi[1]
+	mov	$d,$t0
+	mov	$xi[0],`4*($i%16)`(%rsp)
+	mov	$a,$t2
+	xor	`4*(($j+2)%16)`(%rsp),$xi[1]
+	xor	$c,$t0
+	rol	\$5,$t2
+	xor	`4*(($j+8)%16)`(%rsp),$xi[1]
+	and	$b,$t0
+	lea	0x5a827999($xi[0],$e),$e
+	rol	\$30,$b
+	xor	$d,$t0
+	add	$t2,$e
+	rol	\$1,$xi[1]
+	add	$t0,$e
+___
+push(@xi,shift(@xi));
+}
+
+sub BODY_20_39 {
+my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_;
+my $j=$i+1;
+my $K=($i<40)?0x6ed9eba1:0xca62c1d6;
+$code.=<<___ if ($i<79);
+	xor	`4*($j%16)`(%rsp),$xi[1]
+	mov	$b,$t0
+	`"mov	$xi[0],".4*($i%16)."(%rsp)"	if ($i<72)`
+	mov	$a,$t2
+	xor	`4*(($j+2)%16)`(%rsp),$xi[1]
+	xor	$d,$t0
+	rol	\$5,$t2
+	xor	`4*(($j+8)%16)`(%rsp),$xi[1]
+	lea	$K($xi[0],$e),$e
+	xor	$c,$t0
+	add	$t2,$e
+	rol	\$30,$b
+	add	$t0,$e
+	rol	\$1,$xi[1]
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i==79);
+	mov	$b,$t0
+	mov	$a,$t2
+	xor	$d,$t0
+	lea	$K($xi[0],$e),$e
+	rol	\$5,$t2
+	xor	$c,$t0
+	add	$t2,$e
+	rol	\$30,$b
+	add	$t0,$e
+___
+push(@xi,shift(@xi));
+}
+
+sub BODY_40_59 {
+my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_;
+my $j=$i+1;
+$code.=<<___;
+	xor	`4*($j%16)`(%rsp),$xi[1]
+	mov	$d,$t0
+	mov	$xi[0],`4*($i%16)`(%rsp)
+	mov	$d,$t1
+	xor	`4*(($j+2)%16)`(%rsp),$xi[1]
+	and	$c,$t0
+	mov	$a,$t2
+	xor	`4*(($j+8)%16)`(%rsp),$xi[1]
+	lea	0x8f1bbcdc($xi[0],$e),$e
+	xor	$c,$t1
+	rol	\$5,$t2
+	add	$t0,$e
+	rol	\$1,$xi[1]
+	and	$b,$t1
+	add	$t2,$e
+	rol	\$30,$b
+	add	$t1,$e
+___
+push(@xi,shift(@xi));
+}
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.text
+.extern	OPENSSL_ia32cap_P
+
+.globl	sha1_block_data_order
+.type	sha1_block_data_order,\@function,3
+.align	16
+sha1_block_data_order:
+	mov	OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+0(%rip),%r9d
+	mov	OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+4(%rip),%r8d
+	mov	OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+8(%rip),%r10d
+	test	\$`1<<9`,%r8d		# check SSSE3 bit
+	jz	.Lialu
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($shaext);
+	test	\$`1<<29`,%r10d		# check SHA bit	
+	jnz	_shaext_shortcut
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($avx>1);
+	and	\$`1<<3|1<<5|1<<8`,%r10d	# check AVX2+BMI1+BMI2
+	cmp	\$`1<<3|1<<5|1<<8`,%r10d
+	je	_avx2_shortcut
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($avx);
+	and	\$`1<<28`,%r8d		# mask AVX bit
+	and	\$`1<<30`,%r9d		# mask "Intel CPU" bit
+	or	%r9d,%r8d
+	cmp	\$`1<<28|1<<30`,%r8d
+	je	_avx_shortcut
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	jmp	_ssse3_shortcut
+
+.align	16
+.Lialu:
+	mov	%rsp,%rax
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	mov	%rdi,$ctx	# reassigned argument
+	sub	\$`8+16*4`,%rsp
+	mov	%rsi,$inp	# reassigned argument
+	and	\$-64,%rsp
+	mov	%rdx,$num	# reassigned argument
+	mov	%rax,`16*4`(%rsp)
+.Lprologue:
+
+	mov	0($ctx),$A
+	mov	4($ctx),$B
+	mov	8($ctx),$C
+	mov	12($ctx),$D
+	mov	16($ctx),$E
+	jmp	.Lloop
+
+.align	16
+.Lloop:
+___
+for($i=0;$i<20;$i++)	{ &BODY_00_19($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+for(;$i<40;$i++)	{ &BODY_20_39($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+for(;$i<60;$i++)	{ &BODY_40_59($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+for(;$i<80;$i++)	{ &BODY_20_39($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+$code.=<<___;
+	add	0($ctx),$A
+	add	4($ctx),$B
+	add	8($ctx),$C
+	add	12($ctx),$D
+	add	16($ctx),$E
+	mov	$A,0($ctx)
+	mov	$B,4($ctx)
+	mov	$C,8($ctx)
+	mov	$D,12($ctx)
+	mov	$E,16($ctx)
+
+	sub	\$1,$num
+	lea	`16*4`($inp),$inp
+	jnz	.Lloop
+
+	mov	`16*4`(%rsp),%rsi
+	mov	-40(%rsi),%r14
+	mov	-32(%rsi),%r13
+	mov	-24(%rsi),%r12
+	mov	-16(%rsi),%rbp
+	mov	-8(%rsi),%rbx
+	lea	(%rsi),%rsp
+.Lepilogue:
+	ret
+.size	sha1_block_data_order,.-sha1_block_data_order
+___
+if ($shaext) {{{
+######################################################################
+# Intel SHA Extensions implementation of SHA1 update function.
+#
+my ($ctx,$inp,$num)=("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx");
+my ($ABCD,$E,$E_,$BSWAP,$ABCD_SAVE,$E_SAVE)=map("%xmm$_",(0..3,8,9));
+my @MSG=map("%xmm$_",(4..7));
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.type	sha1_block_data_order_shaext,\@function,3
+.align	32
+sha1_block_data_order_shaext:
+_shaext_shortcut:
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	lea	`-8-4*16`(%rsp),%rsp
+	movaps	%xmm6,-8-4*16(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm7,-8-3*16(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm8,-8-2*16(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm9,-8-1*16(%rax)
+.Lprologue_shaext:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	movdqu	($ctx),$ABCD
+	movd	16($ctx),$E
+	movdqa	K_XX_XX+0xa0(%rip),$BSWAP	# byte-n-word swap
+
+	movdqu	($inp),@MSG[0]
+	pshufd	\$0b00011011,$ABCD,$ABCD	# flip word order
+	movdqu	0x10($inp),@MSG[1]
+	pshufd	\$0b00011011,$E,$E		# flip word order
+	movdqu	0x20($inp),@MSG[2]
+	pshufb	$BSWAP,@MSG[0]
+	movdqu	0x30($inp),@MSG[3]
+	pshufb	$BSWAP,@MSG[1]
+	pshufb	$BSWAP,@MSG[2]
+	movdqa	$E,$E_SAVE			# offload $E
+	pshufb	$BSWAP,@MSG[3]
+	jmp	.Loop_shaext
+
+.align	16
+.Loop_shaext:
+	dec		$num
+	lea		0x40($inp),%r8		# next input block
+	paddd		@MSG[0],$E
+	cmovne		%r8,$inp
+	movdqa		$ABCD,$ABCD_SAVE	# offload $ABCD
+___
+for($i=0;$i<20-4;$i+=2) {
+$code.=<<___;
+	sha1msg1	@MSG[1],@MSG[0]
+	movdqa		$ABCD,$E_
+	sha1rnds4	\$`int($i/5)`,$E,$ABCD	# 0-3...
+	sha1nexte	@MSG[1],$E_
+	pxor		@MSG[2],@MSG[0]
+	sha1msg1	@MSG[2],@MSG[1]
+	sha1msg2	@MSG[3],@MSG[0]
+
+	movdqa		$ABCD,$E
+	sha1rnds4	\$`int(($i+1)/5)`,$E_,$ABCD
+	sha1nexte	@MSG[2],$E
+	pxor		@MSG[3],@MSG[1]
+	sha1msg2	@MSG[0],@MSG[1]
+___
+	push(@MSG,shift(@MSG));	push(@MSG,shift(@MSG));
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	movdqu		($inp),@MSG[0]
+	movdqa		$ABCD,$E_
+	sha1rnds4	\$3,$E,$ABCD		# 64-67
+	sha1nexte	@MSG[1],$E_
+	movdqu		0x10($inp),@MSG[1]
+	pshufb		$BSWAP,@MSG[0]
+
+	movdqa		$ABCD,$E
+	sha1rnds4	\$3,$E_,$ABCD		# 68-71
+	sha1nexte	@MSG[2],$E
+	movdqu		0x20($inp),@MSG[2]
+	pshufb		$BSWAP,@MSG[1]
+
+	movdqa		$ABCD,$E_
+	sha1rnds4	\$3,$E,$ABCD		# 72-75
+	sha1nexte	@MSG[3],$E_
+	movdqu		0x30($inp),@MSG[3]
+	pshufb		$BSWAP,@MSG[2]
+
+	movdqa		$ABCD,$E
+	sha1rnds4	\$3,$E_,$ABCD		# 76-79
+	sha1nexte	$E_SAVE,$E
+	pshufb		$BSWAP,@MSG[3]
+
+	paddd		$ABCD_SAVE,$ABCD
+	movdqa		$E,$E_SAVE		# offload $E
+
+	jnz		.Loop_shaext
+
+	pshufd	\$0b00011011,$ABCD,$ABCD
+	pshufd	\$0b00011011,$E,$E
+	movdqu	$ABCD,($ctx)
+	movd	$E,16($ctx)
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	movaps	-8-4*16(%rax),%xmm6
+	movaps	-8-3*16(%rax),%xmm7
+	movaps	-8-2*16(%rax),%xmm8
+	movaps	-8-1*16(%rax),%xmm9
+	mov	%rax,%rsp
+.Lepilogue_shaext:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	ret
+.size	sha1_block_data_order_shaext,.-sha1_block_data_order_shaext
+___
+}}}
+{{{
+my $Xi=4;
+my @X=map("%xmm$_",(4..7,0..3));
+my @Tx=map("%xmm$_",(8..10));
+my $Kx="%xmm11";
+my @V=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E)=("%eax","%ebx","%ecx","%edx","%ebp");	# size optimization
+my @T=("%esi","%edi");
+my $j=0;
+my $rx=0;
+my $K_XX_XX="%r11";
+
+my $_rol=sub { &rol(@_) };
+my $_ror=sub { &ror(@_) };
+
+{ my $sn;
+sub align32() {
+  ++$sn;
+$code.=<<___;
+	jmp	.Lalign32_$sn	# see "Decoded ICache" in manual
+.align	32
+.Lalign32_$sn:
+___
+}
+}
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.type	sha1_block_data_order_ssse3,\@function,3
+.align	16
+sha1_block_data_order_ssse3:
+_ssse3_shortcut:
+	mov	%rsp,%rax
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13		# redundant, done to share Win64 SE handler
+	push	%r14
+	lea	`-64-($win64?6*16:0)`(%rsp),%rsp
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	movaps	%xmm6,-40-6*16(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm7,-40-5*16(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm8,-40-4*16(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm9,-40-3*16(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm10,-40-2*16(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm11,-40-1*16(%rax)
+.Lprologue_ssse3:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	%rax,%r14	# original %rsp
+	and	\$-64,%rsp
+	mov	%rdi,$ctx	# reassigned argument
+	mov	%rsi,$inp	# reassigned argument
+	mov	%rdx,$num	# reassigned argument
+
+	shl	\$6,$num
+	add	$inp,$num
+	lea	K_XX_XX+64(%rip),$K_XX_XX
+
+	mov	0($ctx),$A		# load context
+	mov	4($ctx),$B
+	mov	8($ctx),$C
+	mov	12($ctx),$D
+	mov	$B,@T[0]		# magic seed
+	mov	16($ctx),$E
+	mov	$C,@T[1]
+	xor	$D,@T[1]
+	and	@T[1],@T[0]
+
+	movdqa	64($K_XX_XX),@X[2]	# pbswap mask
+	movdqa	-64($K_XX_XX),@Tx[1]	# K_00_19
+	movdqu	0($inp),@X[-4&7]	# load input to %xmm[0-3]
+	movdqu	16($inp),@X[-3&7]
+	movdqu	32($inp),@X[-2&7]
+	movdqu	48($inp),@X[-1&7]
+	pshufb	@X[2],@X[-4&7]		# byte swap
+	pshufb	@X[2],@X[-3&7]
+	pshufb	@X[2],@X[-2&7]
+	add	\$64,$inp
+	paddd	@Tx[1],@X[-4&7]		# add K_00_19
+	pshufb	@X[2],@X[-1&7]
+	paddd	@Tx[1],@X[-3&7]
+	paddd	@Tx[1],@X[-2&7]
+	movdqa	@X[-4&7],0(%rsp)	# X[]+K xfer to IALU
+	psubd	@Tx[1],@X[-4&7]		# restore X[]
+	movdqa	@X[-3&7],16(%rsp)
+	psubd	@Tx[1],@X[-3&7]
+	movdqa	@X[-2&7],32(%rsp)
+	psubd	@Tx[1],@X[-2&7]
+	jmp	.Loop_ssse3
+___
+
+sub AUTOLOAD()		# thunk [simplified] 32-bit style perlasm
+{ my $opcode = $AUTOLOAD; $opcode =~ s/.*:://;
+  my $arg = pop;
+    $arg = "\$$arg" if ($arg*1 eq $arg);
+    $code .= "\t$opcode\t".join(',',$arg,reverse @_)."\n";
+}
+
+sub Xupdate_ssse3_16_31()		# recall that $Xi starts with 4
+{ use integer;
+  my $body = shift;
+  my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body);	# 40 instructions
+  my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e);
+
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# ror
+	&pshufd	(@X[0],@X[-4&7],0xee);	# was &movdqa	(@X[0],@X[-3&7]);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&movdqa	(@Tx[0],@X[-1&7]);
+	  &paddd	(@Tx[1],@X[-1&7]);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	&punpcklqdq(@X[0],@X[-3&7]);	# compose "X[-14]" in "X[0]", was &palignr(@X[0],@X[-4&7],8);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# rol
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&psrldq	(@Tx[0],4);		# "X[-3]", 3 dwords
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	&pxor	(@X[0],@X[-4&7]);	# "X[0]"^="X[-16]"
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# ror
+	&pxor	(@Tx[0],@X[-2&7]);	# "X[-3]"^"X[-8]"
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	&pxor	(@X[0],@Tx[0]);		# "X[0]"^="X[-3]"^"X[-8]"
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# rol
+	  &movdqa	(eval(16*(($Xi-1)&3))."(%rsp)",@Tx[1]);	# X[]+K xfer to IALU
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	&movdqa	(@Tx[2],@X[0]);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# ror
+	&movdqa	(@Tx[0],@X[0]);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	&pslldq	(@Tx[2],12);		# "X[0]"<<96, extract one dword
+	&paddd	(@X[0],@X[0]);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	&psrld	(@Tx[0],31);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# rol
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&movdqa	(@Tx[1],@Tx[2]);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	&psrld	(@Tx[2],30);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# ror
+	&por	(@X[0],@Tx[0]);		# "X[0]"<<<=1
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	&pslld	(@Tx[1],2);
+	&pxor	(@X[0],@Tx[2]);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	  &movdqa	(@Tx[2],eval(2*16*(($Xi)/5)-64)."($K_XX_XX)");	# K_XX_XX
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# rol
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	&pxor	(@X[0],@Tx[1]);		# "X[0]"^=("X[0]">>96)<<<2
+	&pshufd (@Tx[1],@X[-1&7],0xee)	if ($Xi==7);	# was &movdqa	(@Tx[0],@X[-1&7]) in Xupdate_ssse3_32_79
+
+	 foreach (@insns) { eval; }	# remaining instructions [if any]
+
+  $Xi++;	push(@X,shift(@X));	# "rotate" X[]
+		push(@Tx,shift(@Tx));
+}
+
+sub Xupdate_ssse3_32_79()
+{ use integer;
+  my $body = shift;
+  my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body);	# 32 to 44 instructions
+  my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e);
+
+	 eval(shift(@insns))		if ($Xi==8);
+	&pxor	(@X[0],@X[-4&7]);	# "X[0]"="X[-32]"^"X[-16]"
+	 eval(shift(@insns))		if ($Xi==8);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# body_20_39
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns))		if (@insns[1] =~ /_ror/);
+	 eval(shift(@insns))		if (@insns[0] =~ /_ror/);
+	&punpcklqdq(@Tx[0],@X[-1&7]);	# compose "X[-6]", was &palignr(@Tx[0],@X[-2&7],8);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# rol
+
+	&pxor	(@X[0],@X[-7&7]);	# "X[0]"^="X[-28]"
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	if ($Xi%5) {
+	  &movdqa	(@Tx[2],@Tx[1]);# "perpetuate" K_XX_XX...
+	} else {			# ... or load next one
+	  &movdqa	(@Tx[2],eval(2*16*($Xi/5)-64)."($K_XX_XX)");
+	}
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# ror
+	  &paddd	(@Tx[1],@X[-1&7]);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	&pxor	(@X[0],@Tx[0]);		# "X[0]"^="X[-6]"
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# body_20_39
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# rol
+	 eval(shift(@insns))		if (@insns[0] =~ /_ror/);
+
+	&movdqa	(@Tx[0],@X[0]);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	  &movdqa	(eval(16*(($Xi-1)&3))."(%rsp)",@Tx[1]);	# X[]+K xfer to IALU
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# ror
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# body_20_39
+
+	&pslld	(@X[0],2);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&psrld	(@Tx[0],30);
+	 eval(shift(@insns))		if (@insns[0] =~ /_rol/);# rol
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# ror
+
+	&por	(@X[0],@Tx[0]);		# "X[0]"<<<=2
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# body_20_39
+	 eval(shift(@insns))		if (@insns[1] =~ /_rol/);
+	 eval(shift(@insns))		if (@insns[0] =~ /_rol/);
+	  &pshufd(@Tx[1],@X[-1&7],0xee)	if ($Xi<19);	# was &movdqa	(@Tx[1],@X[0])
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# rol
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# rol
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	 foreach (@insns) { eval; }	# remaining instructions
+
+  $Xi++;	push(@X,shift(@X));	# "rotate" X[]
+		push(@Tx,shift(@Tx));
+}
+
+sub Xuplast_ssse3_80()
+{ use integer;
+  my $body = shift;
+  my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body);	# 32 instructions
+  my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e);
+
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	  &paddd	(@Tx[1],@X[-1&7]);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	  &movdqa	(eval(16*(($Xi-1)&3))."(%rsp)",@Tx[1]);	# X[]+K xfer IALU
+
+	 foreach (@insns) { eval; }		# remaining instructions
+
+	&cmp	($inp,$num);
+	&je	(".Ldone_ssse3");
+
+	unshift(@Tx,pop(@Tx));
+
+	&movdqa	(@X[2],"64($K_XX_XX)");		# pbswap mask
+	&movdqa	(@Tx[1],"-64($K_XX_XX)");	# K_00_19
+	&movdqu	(@X[-4&7],"0($inp)");		# load input
+	&movdqu	(@X[-3&7],"16($inp)");
+	&movdqu	(@X[-2&7],"32($inp)");
+	&movdqu	(@X[-1&7],"48($inp)");
+	&pshufb	(@X[-4&7],@X[2]);		# byte swap
+	&add	($inp,64);
+
+  $Xi=0;
+}
+
+sub Xloop_ssse3()
+{ use integer;
+  my $body = shift;
+  my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body);	# 32 instructions
+  my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e);
+
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&pshufb	(@X[($Xi-3)&7],@X[2]);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&paddd	(@X[($Xi-4)&7],@Tx[1]);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&movdqa	(eval(16*$Xi)."(%rsp)",@X[($Xi-4)&7]);	# X[]+K xfer to IALU
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&psubd	(@X[($Xi-4)&7],@Tx[1]);
+
+	foreach (@insns) { eval; }
+  $Xi++;
+}
+
+sub Xtail_ssse3()
+{ use integer;
+  my $body = shift;
+  my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body);	# 32 instructions
+  my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e);
+
+	foreach (@insns) { eval; }
+}
+
+sub body_00_19 () {	# ((c^d)&b)^d
+	# on start @T[0]=(c^d)&b
+	return &body_20_39() if ($rx==19); $rx++;
+	(
+	'($a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@V;'.
+	'&$_ror	($b,$j?7:2)',	# $b>>>2
+	'&xor	(@T[0],$d)',
+	'&mov	(@T[1],$a)',	# $b for next round
+
+	'&add	($e,eval(4*($j&15))."(%rsp)")',	# X[]+K xfer
+	'&xor	($b,$c)',	# $c^$d for next round
+
+	'&$_rol	($a,5)',
+	'&add	($e,@T[0])',
+	'&and	(@T[1],$b)',	# ($b&($c^$d)) for next round
+
+	'&xor	($b,$c)',	# restore $b
+	'&add	($e,$a);'	.'$j++; unshift(@V,pop(@V)); unshift(@T,pop(@T));'
+	);
+}
+
+sub body_20_39 () {	# b^d^c
+	# on entry @T[0]=b^d
+	return &body_40_59() if ($rx==39); $rx++;
+	(
+	'($a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@V;'.
+	'&add	($e,eval(4*($j&15))."(%rsp)")',	# X[]+K xfer
+	'&xor	(@T[0],$d)	if($j==19);'.
+	'&xor	(@T[0],$c)	if($j> 19)',	# ($b^$d^$c)
+	'&mov	(@T[1],$a)',	# $b for next round
+
+	'&$_rol	($a,5)',
+	'&add	($e,@T[0])',
+	'&xor	(@T[1],$c)	if ($j< 79)',	# $b^$d for next round
+
+	'&$_ror	($b,7)',	# $b>>>2
+	'&add	($e,$a);'	.'$j++; unshift(@V,pop(@V)); unshift(@T,pop(@T));'
+	);
+}
+
+sub body_40_59 () {	# ((b^c)&(c^d))^c
+	# on entry @T[0]=(b^c), (c^=d)
+	$rx++;
+	(
+	'($a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@V;'.
+	'&add	($e,eval(4*($j&15))."(%rsp)")',	# X[]+K xfer
+	'&and	(@T[0],$c)	if ($j>=40)',	# (b^c)&(c^d)
+	'&xor	($c,$d)		if ($j>=40)',	# restore $c
+
+	'&$_ror	($b,7)',	# $b>>>2
+	'&mov	(@T[1],$a)',	# $b for next round
+	'&xor	(@T[0],$c)',
+
+	'&$_rol	($a,5)',
+	'&add	($e,@T[0])',
+	'&xor	(@T[1],$c)	if ($j==59);'.
+	'&xor	(@T[1],$b)	if ($j< 59)',	# b^c for next round
+
+	'&xor	($b,$c)		if ($j< 59)',	# c^d for next round
+	'&add	($e,$a);'	.'$j++; unshift(@V,pop(@V)); unshift(@T,pop(@T));'
+	);
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+.align	16
+.Loop_ssse3:
+___
+	&Xupdate_ssse3_16_31(\&body_00_19);
+	&Xupdate_ssse3_16_31(\&body_00_19);
+	&Xupdate_ssse3_16_31(\&body_00_19);
+	&Xupdate_ssse3_16_31(\&body_00_19);
+	&Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_00_19);
+	&Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_20_39);
+	&Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_20_39);
+	&Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_20_39);
+	&Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_20_39);
+	&Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_20_39);
+	&Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_40_59);
+	&Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_40_59);
+	&Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_40_59);
+	&Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_40_59);
+	&Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_40_59);
+	&Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_20_39);
+	&Xuplast_ssse3_80(\&body_20_39);	# can jump to "done"
+
+				$saved_j=$j; @saved_V=@V;
+
+	&Xloop_ssse3(\&body_20_39);
+	&Xloop_ssse3(\&body_20_39);
+	&Xloop_ssse3(\&body_20_39);
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	add	0($ctx),$A			# update context
+	add	4($ctx),@T[0]
+	add	8($ctx),$C
+	add	12($ctx),$D
+	mov	$A,0($ctx)
+	add	16($ctx),$E
+	mov	@T[0],4($ctx)
+	mov	@T[0],$B			# magic seed
+	mov	$C,8($ctx)
+	mov	$C,@T[1]
+	mov	$D,12($ctx)
+	xor	$D,@T[1]
+	mov	$E,16($ctx)
+	and	@T[1],@T[0]
+	jmp	.Loop_ssse3
+
+.align	16
+.Ldone_ssse3:
+___
+				$j=$saved_j; @V=@saved_V;
+
+	&Xtail_ssse3(\&body_20_39);
+	&Xtail_ssse3(\&body_20_39);
+	&Xtail_ssse3(\&body_20_39);
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	add	0($ctx),$A			# update context
+	add	4($ctx),@T[0]
+	add	8($ctx),$C
+	mov	$A,0($ctx)
+	add	12($ctx),$D
+	mov	@T[0],4($ctx)
+	add	16($ctx),$E
+	mov	$C,8($ctx)
+	mov	$D,12($ctx)
+	mov	$E,16($ctx)
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	movaps	-40-6*16(%r14),%xmm6
+	movaps	-40-5*16(%r14),%xmm7
+	movaps	-40-4*16(%r14),%xmm8
+	movaps	-40-3*16(%r14),%xmm9
+	movaps	-40-2*16(%r14),%xmm10
+	movaps	-40-1*16(%r14),%xmm11
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	lea	(%r14),%rsi
+	mov	-40(%rsi),%r14
+	mov	-32(%rsi),%r13
+	mov	-24(%rsi),%r12
+	mov	-16(%rsi),%rbp
+	mov	-8(%rsi),%rbx
+	lea	(%rsi),%rsp
+.Lepilogue_ssse3:
+	ret
+.size	sha1_block_data_order_ssse3,.-sha1_block_data_order_ssse3
+___
+
+if ($avx) {
+$Xi=4;				# reset variables
+@X=map("%xmm$_",(4..7,0..3));
+@Tx=map("%xmm$_",(8..10));
+$j=0;
+$rx=0;
+
+my $done_avx_label=".Ldone_avx";
+
+my $_rol=sub { &shld(@_[0],@_) };
+my $_ror=sub { &shrd(@_[0],@_) };
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.type	sha1_block_data_order_avx,\@function,3
+.align	16
+sha1_block_data_order_avx:
+_avx_shortcut:
+	mov	%rsp,%rax
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13		# redundant, done to share Win64 SE handler
+	push	%r14
+	lea	`-64-($win64?6*16:0)`(%rsp),%rsp
+	vzeroupper
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	vmovaps	%xmm6,-40-6*16(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm7,-40-5*16(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm8,-40-4*16(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm9,-40-3*16(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm10,-40-2*16(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm11,-40-1*16(%rax)
+.Lprologue_avx:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	%rax,%r14	# original %rsp
+	and	\$-64,%rsp
+	mov	%rdi,$ctx	# reassigned argument
+	mov	%rsi,$inp	# reassigned argument
+	mov	%rdx,$num	# reassigned argument
+
+	shl	\$6,$num
+	add	$inp,$num
+	lea	K_XX_XX+64(%rip),$K_XX_XX
+
+	mov	0($ctx),$A		# load context
+	mov	4($ctx),$B
+	mov	8($ctx),$C
+	mov	12($ctx),$D
+	mov	$B,@T[0]		# magic seed
+	mov	16($ctx),$E
+	mov	$C,@T[1]
+	xor	$D,@T[1]
+	and	@T[1],@T[0]
+
+	vmovdqa	64($K_XX_XX),@X[2]	# pbswap mask
+	vmovdqa	-64($K_XX_XX),$Kx	# K_00_19
+	vmovdqu	0($inp),@X[-4&7]	# load input to %xmm[0-3]
+	vmovdqu	16($inp),@X[-3&7]
+	vmovdqu	32($inp),@X[-2&7]
+	vmovdqu	48($inp),@X[-1&7]
+	vpshufb	@X[2],@X[-4&7],@X[-4&7]	# byte swap
+	add	\$64,$inp
+	vpshufb	@X[2],@X[-3&7],@X[-3&7]
+	vpshufb	@X[2],@X[-2&7],@X[-2&7]
+	vpshufb	@X[2],@X[-1&7],@X[-1&7]
+	vpaddd	$Kx,@X[-4&7],@X[0]	# add K_00_19
+	vpaddd	$Kx,@X[-3&7],@X[1]
+	vpaddd	$Kx,@X[-2&7],@X[2]
+	vmovdqa	@X[0],0(%rsp)		# X[]+K xfer to IALU
+	vmovdqa	@X[1],16(%rsp)
+	vmovdqa	@X[2],32(%rsp)
+	jmp	.Loop_avx
+___
+
+sub Xupdate_avx_16_31()		# recall that $Xi starts with 4
+{ use integer;
+  my $body = shift;
+  my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body);	# 40 instructions
+  my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e);
+
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&vpalignr(@X[0],@X[-3&7],@X[-4&7],8);	# compose "X[-14]" in "X[0]"
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	  &vpaddd	(@Tx[1],$Kx,@X[-1&7]);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&vpsrldq(@Tx[0],@X[-1&7],4);		# "X[-3]", 3 dwords
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&vpxor	(@X[0],@X[0],@X[-4&7]);		# "X[0]"^="X[-16]"
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	&vpxor	(@Tx[0],@Tx[0],@X[-2&7]);	# "X[-3]"^"X[-8]"
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	&vpxor	(@X[0],@X[0],@Tx[0]);		# "X[0]"^="X[-3]"^"X[-8]"
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	  &vmovdqa	(eval(16*(($Xi-1)&3))."(%rsp)",@Tx[1]);	# X[]+K xfer to IALU
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	&vpsrld	(@Tx[0],@X[0],31);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	&vpslldq(@Tx[2],@X[0],12);		# "X[0]"<<96, extract one dword
+	&vpaddd	(@X[0],@X[0],@X[0]);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	&vpsrld	(@Tx[1],@Tx[2],30);
+	&vpor	(@X[0],@X[0],@Tx[0]);		# "X[0]"<<<=1
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	&vpslld	(@Tx[2],@Tx[2],2);
+	&vpxor	(@X[0],@X[0],@Tx[1]);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	&vpxor	(@X[0],@X[0],@Tx[2]);		# "X[0]"^=("X[0]">>96)<<<2
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	  &vmovdqa	($Kx,eval(2*16*(($Xi)/5)-64)."($K_XX_XX)")	if ($Xi%5==0);	# K_XX_XX
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+
+	 foreach (@insns) { eval; }	# remaining instructions [if any]
+
+  $Xi++;	push(@X,shift(@X));	# "rotate" X[]
+}
+
+sub Xupdate_avx_32_79()
+{ use integer;
+  my $body = shift;
+  my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body);	# 32 to 44 instructions
+  my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e);
+
+	&vpalignr(@Tx[0],@X[-1&7],@X[-2&7],8);	# compose "X[-6]"
+	&vpxor	(@X[0],@X[0],@X[-4&7]);		# "X[0]"="X[-32]"^"X[-16]"
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# body_20_39
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# rol
+
+	&vpxor	(@X[0],@X[0],@X[-7&7]);		# "X[0]"^="X[-28]"
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns))	if (@insns[0] !~ /&ro[rl]/);
+	  &vpaddd	(@Tx[1],$Kx,@X[-1&7]);
+	  &vmovdqa	($Kx,eval(2*16*($Xi/5)-64)."($K_XX_XX)")	if ($Xi%5==0);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# ror
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	&vpxor	(@X[0],@X[0],@Tx[0]);		# "X[0]"^="X[-6]"
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# body_20_39
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# rol
+
+	&vpsrld	(@Tx[0],@X[0],30);
+	  &vmovdqa	(eval(16*(($Xi-1)&3))."(%rsp)",@Tx[1]);	# X[]+K xfer to IALU
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# ror
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	&vpslld	(@X[0],@X[0],2);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# body_20_39
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# rol
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# ror
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	&vpor	(@X[0],@X[0],@Tx[0]);		# "X[0]"<<<=2
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# body_20_39
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# rol
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));		# rol
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	 foreach (@insns) { eval; }	# remaining instructions
+
+  $Xi++;	push(@X,shift(@X));	# "rotate" X[]
+}
+
+sub Xuplast_avx_80()
+{ use integer;
+  my $body = shift;
+  my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body);	# 32 instructions
+  my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e);
+
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	  &vpaddd	(@Tx[1],$Kx,@X[-1&7]);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	  &vmovdqa	(eval(16*(($Xi-1)&3))."(%rsp)",@Tx[1]);	# X[]+K xfer IALU
+
+	 foreach (@insns) { eval; }		# remaining instructions
+
+	&cmp	($inp,$num);
+	&je	($done_avx_label);
+
+	&vmovdqa(@X[2],"64($K_XX_XX)");		# pbswap mask
+	&vmovdqa($Kx,"-64($K_XX_XX)");		# K_00_19
+	&vmovdqu(@X[-4&7],"0($inp)");		# load input
+	&vmovdqu(@X[-3&7],"16($inp)");
+	&vmovdqu(@X[-2&7],"32($inp)");
+	&vmovdqu(@X[-1&7],"48($inp)");
+	&vpshufb(@X[-4&7],@X[-4&7],@X[2]);	# byte swap
+	&add	($inp,64);
+
+  $Xi=0;
+}
+
+sub Xloop_avx()
+{ use integer;
+  my $body = shift;
+  my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body);	# 32 instructions
+  my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e);
+
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&vpshufb(@X[($Xi-3)&7],@X[($Xi-3)&7],@X[2]);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&vpaddd	(@X[$Xi&7],@X[($Xi-4)&7],$Kx);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&vmovdqa(eval(16*$Xi)."(%rsp)",@X[$Xi&7]);	# X[]+K xfer to IALU
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	foreach (@insns) { eval; }
+  $Xi++;
+}
+
+sub Xtail_avx()
+{ use integer;
+  my $body = shift;
+  my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body);	# 32 instructions
+  my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e);
+
+	foreach (@insns) { eval; }
+}
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.align	16
+.Loop_avx:
+___
+	&Xupdate_avx_16_31(\&body_00_19);
+	&Xupdate_avx_16_31(\&body_00_19);
+	&Xupdate_avx_16_31(\&body_00_19);
+	&Xupdate_avx_16_31(\&body_00_19);
+	&Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_00_19);
+	&Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_20_39);
+	&Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_20_39);
+	&Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_20_39);
+	&Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_20_39);
+	&Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_20_39);
+	&Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_40_59);
+	&Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_40_59);
+	&Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_40_59);
+	&Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_40_59);
+	&Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_40_59);
+	&Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_20_39);
+	&Xuplast_avx_80(\&body_20_39);	# can jump to "done"
+
+				$saved_j=$j; @saved_V=@V;
+
+	&Xloop_avx(\&body_20_39);
+	&Xloop_avx(\&body_20_39);
+	&Xloop_avx(\&body_20_39);
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	add	0($ctx),$A			# update context
+	add	4($ctx),@T[0]
+	add	8($ctx),$C
+	add	12($ctx),$D
+	mov	$A,0($ctx)
+	add	16($ctx),$E
+	mov	@T[0],4($ctx)
+	mov	@T[0],$B			# magic seed
+	mov	$C,8($ctx)
+	mov	$C,@T[1]
+	mov	$D,12($ctx)
+	xor	$D,@T[1]
+	mov	$E,16($ctx)
+	and	@T[1],@T[0]
+	jmp	.Loop_avx
+
+.align	16
+$done_avx_label:
+___
+				$j=$saved_j; @V=@saved_V;
+
+	&Xtail_avx(\&body_20_39);
+	&Xtail_avx(\&body_20_39);
+	&Xtail_avx(\&body_20_39);
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	vzeroupper
+
+	add	0($ctx),$A			# update context
+	add	4($ctx),@T[0]
+	add	8($ctx),$C
+	mov	$A,0($ctx)
+	add	12($ctx),$D
+	mov	@T[0],4($ctx)
+	add	16($ctx),$E
+	mov	$C,8($ctx)
+	mov	$D,12($ctx)
+	mov	$E,16($ctx)
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	movaps	-40-6*16(%r14),%xmm6
+	movaps	-40-5*16(%r14),%xmm7
+	movaps	-40-4*16(%r14),%xmm8
+	movaps	-40-3*16(%r14),%xmm9
+	movaps	-40-2*16(%r14),%xmm10
+	movaps	-40-1*16(%r14),%xmm11
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	lea	(%r14),%rsi
+	mov	-40(%rsi),%r14
+	mov	-32(%rsi),%r13
+	mov	-24(%rsi),%r12
+	mov	-16(%rsi),%rbp
+	mov	-8(%rsi),%rbx
+	lea	(%rsi),%rsp
+.Lepilogue_avx:
+	ret
+.size	sha1_block_data_order_avx,.-sha1_block_data_order_avx
+___
+
+if ($avx>1) {
+use integer;
+$Xi=4;					# reset variables
+@X=map("%ymm$_",(4..7,0..3));
+@Tx=map("%ymm$_",(8..10));
+$Kx="%ymm11";
+$j=0;
+
+my @ROTX=("%eax","%ebp","%ebx","%ecx","%edx","%esi");
+my ($a5,$t0)=("%r12d","%edi");
+
+my ($A,$F,$B,$C,$D,$E)=@ROTX;
+my $rx=0;
+my $frame="%r13";
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.type	sha1_block_data_order_avx2,\@function,3
+.align	16
+sha1_block_data_order_avx2:
+_avx2_shortcut:
+	mov	%rsp,%rax
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	vzeroupper
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	lea	-6*16(%rsp),%rsp
+	vmovaps	%xmm6,-40-6*16(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm7,-40-5*16(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm8,-40-4*16(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm9,-40-3*16(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm10,-40-2*16(%rax)
+	vmovaps	%xmm11,-40-1*16(%rax)
+.Lprologue_avx2:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	%rax,%r14		# original %rsp
+	mov	%rdi,$ctx		# reassigned argument
+	mov	%rsi,$inp		# reassigned argument
+	mov	%rdx,$num		# reassigned argument
+
+	lea	-640(%rsp),%rsp
+	shl	\$6,$num
+	 lea	64($inp),$frame
+	and	\$-128,%rsp
+	add	$inp,$num
+	lea	K_XX_XX+64(%rip),$K_XX_XX
+
+	mov	0($ctx),$A		# load context
+	 cmp	$num,$frame
+	 cmovae	$inp,$frame		# next or same block
+	mov	4($ctx),$F
+	mov	8($ctx),$C
+	mov	12($ctx),$D
+	mov	16($ctx),$E
+	vmovdqu	64($K_XX_XX),@X[2]	# pbswap mask
+
+	vmovdqu		($inp),%xmm0
+	vmovdqu		16($inp),%xmm1
+	vmovdqu		32($inp),%xmm2
+	vmovdqu		48($inp),%xmm3
+	lea		64($inp),$inp
+	vinserti128	\$1,($frame),@X[-4&7],@X[-4&7]
+	vinserti128	\$1,16($frame),@X[-3&7],@X[-3&7]
+	vpshufb		@X[2],@X[-4&7],@X[-4&7]
+	vinserti128	\$1,32($frame),@X[-2&7],@X[-2&7]
+	vpshufb		@X[2],@X[-3&7],@X[-3&7]
+	vinserti128	\$1,48($frame),@X[-1&7],@X[-1&7]
+	vpshufb		@X[2],@X[-2&7],@X[-2&7]
+	vmovdqu		-64($K_XX_XX),$Kx	# K_00_19
+	vpshufb		@X[2],@X[-1&7],@X[-1&7]
+
+	vpaddd	$Kx,@X[-4&7],@X[0]	# add K_00_19
+	vpaddd	$Kx,@X[-3&7],@X[1]
+	vmovdqu	@X[0],0(%rsp)		# X[]+K xfer to IALU
+	vpaddd	$Kx,@X[-2&7],@X[2]
+	vmovdqu	@X[1],32(%rsp)
+	vpaddd	$Kx,@X[-1&7],@X[3]
+	vmovdqu	@X[2],64(%rsp)
+	vmovdqu	@X[3],96(%rsp)
+___
+for (;$Xi<8;$Xi++) {	# Xupdate_avx2_16_31
+    use integer;
+
+	&vpalignr(@X[0],@X[-3&7],@X[-4&7],8);	# compose "X[-14]" in "X[0]"
+	&vpsrldq(@Tx[0],@X[-1&7],4);		# "X[-3]", 3 dwords
+	&vpxor	(@X[0],@X[0],@X[-4&7]);		# "X[0]"^="X[-16]"
+	&vpxor	(@Tx[0],@Tx[0],@X[-2&7]);	# "X[-3]"^"X[-8]"
+	&vpxor	(@X[0],@X[0],@Tx[0]);		# "X[0]"^="X[-3]"^"X[-8]"
+	&vpsrld	(@Tx[0],@X[0],31);
+	&vmovdqu($Kx,eval(2*16*(($Xi)/5)-64)."($K_XX_XX)")	if ($Xi%5==0);	# K_XX_XX
+	&vpslldq(@Tx[2],@X[0],12);		# "X[0]"<<96, extract one dword
+	&vpaddd	(@X[0],@X[0],@X[0]);
+	&vpsrld	(@Tx[1],@Tx[2],30);
+	&vpor	(@X[0],@X[0],@Tx[0]);		# "X[0]"<<<=1
+	&vpslld	(@Tx[2],@Tx[2],2);
+	&vpxor	(@X[0],@X[0],@Tx[1]);
+	&vpxor	(@X[0],@X[0],@Tx[2]);		# "X[0]"^=("X[0]">>96)<<<2
+	&vpaddd	(@Tx[1],@X[0],$Kx);
+	&vmovdqu("32*$Xi(%rsp)",@Tx[1]);	# X[]+K xfer to IALU
+
+	push(@X,shift(@X));	# "rotate" X[]
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	lea	128(%rsp),$frame
+	jmp	.Loop_avx2
+.align	32
+.Loop_avx2:
+	rorx	\$2,$F,$B
+	andn	$D,$F,$t0
+	and	$C,$F
+	xor	$t0,$F
+___
+sub bodyx_00_19 () {	# 8 instructions, 3 cycles critical path
+	# at start $f=(b&c)^(~b&d), $b>>>=2
+	return &bodyx_20_39() if ($rx==19); $rx++;
+	(
+	'($a,$f,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@ROTX;'.
+
+	'&add	($e,((32*($j/4)+4*($j%4))%256-128)."($frame)");'.	# e+=X[i]+K
+	 '&lea	($frame,"256($frame)")	if ($j%32==31);',
+	'&andn	($t0,$a,$c)',			# ~b&d for next round
+
+	'&add	($e,$f)',			# e+=(b&c)^(~b&d)
+	'&rorx	($a5,$a,27)',			# a<<<5
+	'&rorx	($f,$a,2)',			# b>>>2 for next round
+	'&and	($a,$b)',			# b&c for next round
+
+	'&add	($e,$a5)',			# e+=a<<<5
+	'&xor	($a,$t0);'.			# f=(b&c)^(~b&d) for next round
+
+	'unshift(@ROTX,pop(@ROTX)); $j++;'
+	)
+}
+
+sub bodyx_20_39 () {	# 7 instructions, 2 cycles critical path
+	# on entry $f=b^c^d, $b>>>=2
+	return &bodyx_40_59() if ($rx==39); $rx++;
+	(
+	'($a,$f,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@ROTX;'.
+
+	'&add	($e,((32*($j/4)+4*($j%4))%256-128)."($frame)");'.	# e+=X[i]+K
+	 '&lea	($frame,"256($frame)")	if ($j%32==31);',
+
+	'&lea	($e,"($e,$f)")',		# e+=b^c^d
+	'&rorx	($a5,$a,27)',			# a<<<5
+	'&rorx	($f,$a,2)	if ($j<79)',	# b>>>2 in next round
+	'&xor	($a,$b)		if ($j<79)',	# b^c for next round
+
+	'&add	($e,$a5)',			# e+=a<<<5
+	'&xor	($a,$c)		if ($j<79);'.	# f=b^c^d for next round
+
+	'unshift(@ROTX,pop(@ROTX)); $j++;'
+	)
+}
+
+sub bodyx_40_59 () {	# 10 instructions, 3 cycles critical path
+	# on entry $f=((b^c)&(c^d)), $b>>>=2
+	$rx++;
+	(
+	'($a,$f,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@ROTX;'.
+
+	'&add	($e,((32*($j/4)+4*($j%4))%256-128)."($frame)");'.	# e+=X[i]+K
+	 '&lea	($frame,"256($frame)")	if ($j%32==31);',
+	'&xor	($f,$c)		if ($j>39)',	# (b^c)&(c^d)^c
+	'&mov	($t0,$b)	if ($j<59)',	# count on zero latency
+	'&xor	($t0,$c)	if ($j<59)',	# c^d for next round
+
+	'&lea	($e,"($e,$f)")',		# e+=(b^c)&(c^d)^c
+	'&rorx	($a5,$a,27)',			# a<<<5
+	'&rorx	($f,$a,2)',			# b>>>2 in next round
+	'&xor	($a,$b)',			# b^c for next round
+
+	'&add	($e,$a5)',			# e+=a<<<5
+	'&and	($a,$t0)	if ($j< 59);'.	# f=(b^c)&(c^d) for next round
+	'&xor	($a,$c)		if ($j==59);'.	# f=b^c^d for next round
+
+	'unshift(@ROTX,pop(@ROTX)); $j++;'
+	)
+}
+
+sub Xupdate_avx2_16_31()		# recall that $Xi starts with 4
+{ use integer;
+  my $body = shift;
+  my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body);	# 35 instructions
+  my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e);
+
+	&vpalignr(@X[0],@X[-3&7],@X[-4&7],8);	# compose "X[-14]" in "X[0]"
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	&vpsrldq(@Tx[0],@X[-1&7],4);		# "X[-3]", 3 dwords
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	&vpxor	(@X[0],@X[0],@X[-4&7]);		# "X[0]"^="X[-16]"
+	&vpxor	(@Tx[0],@Tx[0],@X[-2&7]);	# "X[-3]"^"X[-8]"
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	&vpxor	(@X[0],@X[0],@Tx[0]);		# "X[0]"^="X[-3]"^"X[-8]"
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	&vpsrld	(@Tx[0],@X[0],31);
+	&vmovdqu($Kx,eval(2*16*(($Xi)/5)-64)."($K_XX_XX)")	if ($Xi%5==0);	# K_XX_XX
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	&vpslldq(@Tx[2],@X[0],12);		# "X[0]"<<96, extract one dword
+	&vpaddd	(@X[0],@X[0],@X[0]);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	&vpsrld	(@Tx[1],@Tx[2],30);
+	&vpor	(@X[0],@X[0],@Tx[0]);		# "X[0]"<<<=1
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	&vpslld	(@Tx[2],@Tx[2],2);
+	&vpxor	(@X[0],@X[0],@Tx[1]);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	&vpxor	(@X[0],@X[0],@Tx[2]);		# "X[0]"^=("X[0]">>96)<<<2
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	&vpaddd	(@Tx[1],@X[0],$Kx);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&vmovdqu(eval(32*($Xi))."(%rsp)",@Tx[1]);	# X[]+K xfer to IALU
+
+	 foreach (@insns) { eval; }	# remaining instructions [if any]
+
+	$Xi++;
+	push(@X,shift(@X));	# "rotate" X[]
+}
+
+sub Xupdate_avx2_32_79()
+{ use integer;
+  my $body = shift;
+  my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body);	# 35 to 50 instructions
+  my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e);
+
+	&vpalignr(@Tx[0],@X[-1&7],@X[-2&7],8);	# compose "X[-6]"
+	&vpxor	(@X[0],@X[0],@X[-4&7]);		# "X[0]"="X[-32]"^"X[-16]"
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	&vpxor	(@X[0],@X[0],@X[-7&7]);		# "X[0]"^="X[-28]"
+	&vmovdqu($Kx,eval(2*16*($Xi/5)-64)."($K_XX_XX)")	if ($Xi%5==0);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	&vpxor	(@X[0],@X[0],@Tx[0]);		# "X[0]"^="X[-6]"
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	&vpsrld	(@Tx[0],@X[0],30);
+	&vpslld	(@X[0],@X[0],2);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	#&vpslld	(@X[0],@X[0],2);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	&vpor	(@X[0],@X[0],@Tx[0]);		# "X[0]"<<<=2
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	&vpaddd	(@Tx[1],@X[0],$Kx);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	&vmovdqu("32*$Xi(%rsp)",@Tx[1]);	# X[]+K xfer to IALU
+
+	 foreach (@insns) { eval; }	# remaining instructions
+
+	$Xi++;
+	push(@X,shift(@X));	# "rotate" X[]
+}
+
+sub Xloop_avx2()
+{ use integer;
+  my $body = shift;
+  my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body);	# 32 instructions
+  my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e);
+
+	 foreach (@insns) { eval; }
+}
+
+	&align32();
+	&Xupdate_avx2_32_79(\&bodyx_00_19);
+	&Xupdate_avx2_32_79(\&bodyx_00_19);
+	&Xupdate_avx2_32_79(\&bodyx_00_19);
+	&Xupdate_avx2_32_79(\&bodyx_00_19);
+
+	&Xupdate_avx2_32_79(\&bodyx_20_39);
+	&Xupdate_avx2_32_79(\&bodyx_20_39);
+	&Xupdate_avx2_32_79(\&bodyx_20_39);
+	&Xupdate_avx2_32_79(\&bodyx_20_39);
+
+	&align32();
+	&Xupdate_avx2_32_79(\&bodyx_40_59);
+	&Xupdate_avx2_32_79(\&bodyx_40_59);
+	&Xupdate_avx2_32_79(\&bodyx_40_59);
+	&Xupdate_avx2_32_79(\&bodyx_40_59);
+
+	&Xloop_avx2(\&bodyx_20_39);
+	&Xloop_avx2(\&bodyx_20_39);
+	&Xloop_avx2(\&bodyx_20_39);
+	&Xloop_avx2(\&bodyx_20_39);
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	lea	128($inp),$frame
+	lea	128($inp),%rdi			# borrow $t0
+	cmp	$num,$frame
+	cmovae	$inp,$frame			# next or previous block
+
+	# output is d-e-[a]-f-b-c => A=d,F=e,C=f,D=b,E=c
+	add	0($ctx),@ROTX[0]		# update context
+	add	4($ctx),@ROTX[1]
+	add	8($ctx),@ROTX[3]
+	mov	@ROTX[0],0($ctx)
+	add	12($ctx),@ROTX[4]
+	mov	@ROTX[1],4($ctx)
+	 mov	@ROTX[0],$A			# A=d
+	add	16($ctx),@ROTX[5]
+	 mov	@ROTX[3],$a5
+	mov	@ROTX[3],8($ctx)
+	 mov	@ROTX[4],$D			# D=b
+	 #xchg	@ROTX[5],$F			# F=c, C=f
+	mov	@ROTX[4],12($ctx)
+	 mov	@ROTX[1],$F			# F=e
+	mov	@ROTX[5],16($ctx)
+	#mov	$F,16($ctx)
+	 mov	@ROTX[5],$E			# E=c
+	 mov	$a5,$C				# C=f
+	 #xchg	$F,$E				# E=c, F=e
+
+	cmp	$num,$inp
+	je	.Ldone_avx2
+___
+
+$Xi=4;				# reset variables
+@X=map("%ymm$_",(4..7,0..3));
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	vmovdqu	64($K_XX_XX),@X[2]		# pbswap mask
+	cmp	$num,%rdi			# borrowed $t0
+	ja	.Last_avx2
+
+	vmovdqu		-64(%rdi),%xmm0		# low part of @X[-4&7]
+	vmovdqu		-48(%rdi),%xmm1
+	vmovdqu		-32(%rdi),%xmm2
+	vmovdqu		-16(%rdi),%xmm3
+	vinserti128	\$1,0($frame),@X[-4&7],@X[-4&7]
+	vinserti128	\$1,16($frame),@X[-3&7],@X[-3&7]
+	vinserti128	\$1,32($frame),@X[-2&7],@X[-2&7]
+	vinserti128	\$1,48($frame),@X[-1&7],@X[-1&7]
+	jmp	.Last_avx2
+
+.align	32
+.Last_avx2:
+	lea	128+16(%rsp),$frame
+	rorx	\$2,$F,$B
+	andn	$D,$F,$t0
+	and	$C,$F
+	xor	$t0,$F
+	sub	\$-128,$inp
+___
+	$rx=$j=0;	@ROTX=($A,$F,$B,$C,$D,$E);
+
+	&Xloop_avx2	(\&bodyx_00_19);
+	&Xloop_avx2	(\&bodyx_00_19);
+	&Xloop_avx2	(\&bodyx_00_19);
+	&Xloop_avx2	(\&bodyx_00_19);
+
+	&Xloop_avx2	(\&bodyx_20_39);
+	  &vmovdqu	($Kx,"-64($K_XX_XX)");		# K_00_19
+	  &vpshufb	(@X[-4&7],@X[-4&7],@X[2]);	# byte swap
+	&Xloop_avx2	(\&bodyx_20_39);
+	  &vpshufb	(@X[-3&7],@X[-3&7],@X[2]);
+	  &vpaddd	(@Tx[0],@X[-4&7],$Kx);		# add K_00_19
+	&Xloop_avx2	(\&bodyx_20_39);
+	  &vmovdqu	("0(%rsp)",@Tx[0]);
+	  &vpshufb	(@X[-2&7],@X[-2&7],@X[2]);
+	  &vpaddd	(@Tx[1],@X[-3&7],$Kx);
+	&Xloop_avx2	(\&bodyx_20_39);
+	  &vmovdqu	("32(%rsp)",@Tx[1]);
+	  &vpshufb	(@X[-1&7],@X[-1&7],@X[2]);
+	  &vpaddd	(@X[2],@X[-2&7],$Kx);
+
+	&Xloop_avx2	(\&bodyx_40_59);
+	&align32	();
+	  &vmovdqu	("64(%rsp)",@X[2]);
+	  &vpaddd	(@X[3],@X[-1&7],$Kx);
+	&Xloop_avx2	(\&bodyx_40_59);
+	  &vmovdqu	("96(%rsp)",@X[3]);
+	&Xloop_avx2	(\&bodyx_40_59);
+	&Xupdate_avx2_16_31(\&bodyx_40_59);
+
+	&Xupdate_avx2_16_31(\&bodyx_20_39);
+	&Xupdate_avx2_16_31(\&bodyx_20_39);
+	&Xupdate_avx2_16_31(\&bodyx_20_39);
+	&Xloop_avx2	(\&bodyx_20_39);
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	lea	128(%rsp),$frame
+
+	# output is d-e-[a]-f-b-c => A=d,F=e,C=f,D=b,E=c
+	add	0($ctx),@ROTX[0]		# update context
+	add	4($ctx),@ROTX[1]
+	add	8($ctx),@ROTX[3]
+	mov	@ROTX[0],0($ctx)
+	add	12($ctx),@ROTX[4]
+	mov	@ROTX[1],4($ctx)
+	 mov	@ROTX[0],$A			# A=d
+	add	16($ctx),@ROTX[5]
+	 mov	@ROTX[3],$a5
+	mov	@ROTX[3],8($ctx)
+	 mov	@ROTX[4],$D			# D=b
+	 #xchg	@ROTX[5],$F			# F=c, C=f
+	mov	@ROTX[4],12($ctx)
+	 mov	@ROTX[1],$F			# F=e
+	mov	@ROTX[5],16($ctx)
+	#mov	$F,16($ctx)
+	 mov	@ROTX[5],$E			# E=c
+	 mov	$a5,$C				# C=f
+	 #xchg	$F,$E				# E=c, F=e
+
+	cmp	$num,$inp
+	jbe	.Loop_avx2
+
+.Ldone_avx2:
+	vzeroupper
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	movaps	-40-6*16(%r14),%xmm6
+	movaps	-40-5*16(%r14),%xmm7
+	movaps	-40-4*16(%r14),%xmm8
+	movaps	-40-3*16(%r14),%xmm9
+	movaps	-40-2*16(%r14),%xmm10
+	movaps	-40-1*16(%r14),%xmm11
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	lea	(%r14),%rsi
+	mov	-40(%rsi),%r14
+	mov	-32(%rsi),%r13
+	mov	-24(%rsi),%r12
+	mov	-16(%rsi),%rbp
+	mov	-8(%rsi),%rbx
+	lea	(%rsi),%rsp
+.Lepilogue_avx2:
+	ret
+.size	sha1_block_data_order_avx2,.-sha1_block_data_order_avx2
+___
+}
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+.align	64
+K_XX_XX:
+.long	0x5a827999,0x5a827999,0x5a827999,0x5a827999	# K_00_19
+.long	0x5a827999,0x5a827999,0x5a827999,0x5a827999	# K_00_19
+.long	0x6ed9eba1,0x6ed9eba1,0x6ed9eba1,0x6ed9eba1	# K_20_39
+.long	0x6ed9eba1,0x6ed9eba1,0x6ed9eba1,0x6ed9eba1	# K_20_39
+.long	0x8f1bbcdc,0x8f1bbcdc,0x8f1bbcdc,0x8f1bbcdc	# K_40_59
+.long	0x8f1bbcdc,0x8f1bbcdc,0x8f1bbcdc,0x8f1bbcdc	# K_40_59
+.long	0xca62c1d6,0xca62c1d6,0xca62c1d6,0xca62c1d6	# K_60_79
+.long	0xca62c1d6,0xca62c1d6,0xca62c1d6,0xca62c1d6	# K_60_79
+.long	0x00010203,0x04050607,0x08090a0b,0x0c0d0e0f	# pbswap mask
+.long	0x00010203,0x04050607,0x08090a0b,0x0c0d0e0f	# pbswap mask
+.byte	0xf,0xe,0xd,0xc,0xb,0xa,0x9,0x8,0x7,0x6,0x5,0x4,0x3,0x2,0x1,0x0
+___
+}}}
+$code.=<<___;
+.asciz	"SHA1 block transform for x86_64, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+.align	64
+___
+
+# EXCEPTION_DISPOSITION handler (EXCEPTION_RECORD *rec,ULONG64 frame,
+#		CONTEXT *context,DISPATCHER_CONTEXT *disp)
+if ($win64) {
+$rec="%rcx";
+$frame="%rdx";
+$context="%r8";
+$disp="%r9";
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.extern	__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind
+.type	se_handler,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+se_handler:
+	push	%rsi
+	push	%rdi
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+	pushfq
+	sub	\$64,%rsp
+
+	mov	120($context),%rax	# pull context->Rax
+	mov	248($context),%rbx	# pull context->Rip
+
+	lea	.Lprologue(%rip),%r10
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip<.Lprologue
+	jb	.Lcommon_seh_tail
+
+	mov	152($context),%rax	# pull context->Rsp
+
+	lea	.Lepilogue(%rip),%r10
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip>=.Lepilogue
+	jae	.Lcommon_seh_tail
+
+	mov	`16*4`(%rax),%rax	# pull saved stack pointer
+
+	mov	-8(%rax),%rbx
+	mov	-16(%rax),%rbp
+	mov	-24(%rax),%r12
+	mov	-32(%rax),%r13
+	mov	-40(%rax),%r14
+	mov	%rbx,144($context)	# restore context->Rbx
+	mov	%rbp,160($context)	# restore context->Rbp
+	mov	%r12,216($context)	# restore context->R12
+	mov	%r13,224($context)	# restore context->R13
+	mov	%r14,232($context)	# restore context->R14
+
+	jmp	.Lcommon_seh_tail
+.size	se_handler,.-se_handler
+___
+
+$code.=<<___ if ($shaext);
+.type	shaext_handler,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+shaext_handler:
+	push	%rsi
+	push	%rdi
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+	pushfq
+	sub	\$64,%rsp
+
+	mov	120($context),%rax	# pull context->Rax
+	mov	248($context),%rbx	# pull context->Rip
+
+	lea	.Lprologue_shaext(%rip),%r10
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip<.Lprologue
+	jb	.Lcommon_seh_tail
+
+	lea	.Lepilogue_shaext(%rip),%r10
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip>=.Lepilogue
+	jae	.Lcommon_seh_tail
+
+	lea	-8-4*16(%rax),%rsi
+	lea	512($context),%rdi	# &context.Xmm6
+	mov	\$8,%ecx
+	.long	0xa548f3fc		# cld; rep movsq
+
+	jmp	.Lcommon_seh_tail
+.size	shaext_handler,.-shaext_handler
+___
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.type	ssse3_handler,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+ssse3_handler:
+	push	%rsi
+	push	%rdi
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+	pushfq
+	sub	\$64,%rsp
+
+	mov	120($context),%rax	# pull context->Rax
+	mov	248($context),%rbx	# pull context->Rip
+
+	mov	8($disp),%rsi		# disp->ImageBase
+	mov	56($disp),%r11		# disp->HandlerData
+
+	mov	0(%r11),%r10d		# HandlerData[0]
+	lea	(%rsi,%r10),%r10	# prologue label
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip<prologue label
+	jb	.Lcommon_seh_tail
+
+	mov	152($context),%rax	# pull context->Rsp
+
+	mov	4(%r11),%r10d		# HandlerData[1]
+	lea	(%rsi,%r10),%r10	# epilogue label
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip>=epilogue label
+	jae	.Lcommon_seh_tail
+
+	mov	232($context),%rax	# pull context->R14
+
+	lea	-40-6*16(%rax),%rsi
+	lea	512($context),%rdi	# &context.Xmm6
+	mov	\$12,%ecx
+	.long	0xa548f3fc		# cld; rep movsq
+
+	mov	-8(%rax),%rbx
+	mov	-16(%rax),%rbp
+	mov	-24(%rax),%r12
+	mov	-32(%rax),%r13
+	mov	-40(%rax),%r14
+	mov	%rbx,144($context)	# restore context->Rbx
+	mov	%rbp,160($context)	# restore context->Rbp
+	mov	%r12,216($context)	# restore cotnext->R12
+	mov	%r13,224($context)	# restore cotnext->R13
+	mov	%r14,232($context)	# restore cotnext->R14
+
+.Lcommon_seh_tail:
+	mov	8(%rax),%rdi
+	mov	16(%rax),%rsi
+	mov	%rax,152($context)	# restore context->Rsp
+	mov	%rsi,168($context)	# restore context->Rsi
+	mov	%rdi,176($context)	# restore context->Rdi
+
+	mov	40($disp),%rdi		# disp->ContextRecord
+	mov	$context,%rsi		# context
+	mov	\$154,%ecx		# sizeof(CONTEXT)
+	.long	0xa548f3fc		# cld; rep movsq
+
+	mov	$disp,%rsi
+	xor	%rcx,%rcx		# arg1, UNW_FLAG_NHANDLER
+	mov	8(%rsi),%rdx		# arg2, disp->ImageBase
+	mov	0(%rsi),%r8		# arg3, disp->ControlPc
+	mov	16(%rsi),%r9		# arg4, disp->FunctionEntry
+	mov	40(%rsi),%r10		# disp->ContextRecord
+	lea	56(%rsi),%r11		# &disp->HandlerData
+	lea	24(%rsi),%r12		# &disp->EstablisherFrame
+	mov	%r10,32(%rsp)		# arg5
+	mov	%r11,40(%rsp)		# arg6
+	mov	%r12,48(%rsp)		# arg7
+	mov	%rcx,56(%rsp)		# arg8, (NULL)
+	call	*__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind(%rip)
+
+	mov	\$1,%eax		# ExceptionContinueSearch
+	add	\$64,%rsp
+	popfq
+	pop	%r15
+	pop	%r14
+	pop	%r13
+	pop	%r12
+	pop	%rbp
+	pop	%rbx
+	pop	%rdi
+	pop	%rsi
+	ret
+.size	ssse3_handler,.-ssse3_handler
+
+.section	.pdata
+.align	4
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_sha1_block_data_order
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_sha1_block_data_order
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_sha1_block_data_order
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($shaext);
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_sha1_block_data_order_shaext
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_sha1_block_data_order_shaext
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_sha1_block_data_order_shaext
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_sha1_block_data_order_ssse3
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_sha1_block_data_order_ssse3
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_sha1_block_data_order_ssse3
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($avx);
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_sha1_block_data_order_avx
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_sha1_block_data_order_avx
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_sha1_block_data_order_avx
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($avx>1);
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_sha1_block_data_order_avx2
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_sha1_block_data_order_avx2
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_sha1_block_data_order_avx2
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+.section	.xdata
+.align	8
+.LSEH_info_sha1_block_data_order:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	se_handler
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($shaext);
+.LSEH_info_sha1_block_data_order_shaext:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	shaext_handler
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+.LSEH_info_sha1_block_data_order_ssse3:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	ssse3_handler
+	.rva	.Lprologue_ssse3,.Lepilogue_ssse3	# HandlerData[]
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($avx);
+.LSEH_info_sha1_block_data_order_avx:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	ssse3_handler
+	.rva	.Lprologue_avx,.Lepilogue_avx		# HandlerData[]
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($avx>1);
+.LSEH_info_sha1_block_data_order_avx2:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	ssse3_handler
+	.rva	.Lprologue_avx2,.Lepilogue_avx2		# HandlerData[]
+___
+}
+
+####################################################################
+
+sub sha1rnds4 {
+    if (@_[0] =~ /\$([x0-9a-f]+),\s*%xmm([0-7]),\s*%xmm([0-7])/) {
+      my @opcode=(0x0f,0x3a,0xcc);
+	push @opcode,0xc0|($2&7)|(($3&7)<<3);		# ModR/M
+	my $c=$1;
+	push @opcode,$c=~/^0/?oct($c):$c;
+	return ".byte\t".join(',',@opcode);
+    } else {
+	return "sha1rnds4\t".@_[0];
+    }
+}
+
+sub sha1op38 {
+    my $instr = shift;
+    my %opcodelet = (
+		"sha1nexte" => 0xc8,
+  		"sha1msg1"  => 0xc9,
+		"sha1msg2"  => 0xca	);
+
+    if (defined($opcodelet{$instr}) && @_[0] =~ /%xmm([0-9]+),\s*%xmm([0-9]+)/) {
+      my @opcode=(0x0f,0x38);
+      my $rex=0;
+	$rex|=0x04			if ($2>=8);
+	$rex|=0x01			if ($1>=8);
+	unshift @opcode,0x40|$rex	if ($rex);
+	push @opcode,$opcodelet{$instr};
+	push @opcode,0xc0|($1&7)|(($2&7)<<3);		# ModR/M
+	return ".byte\t".join(',',@opcode);
+    } else {
+	return $instr."\t".@_[0];
+    }
+}
+
+foreach (split("\n",$code)) {
+	s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/geo;
+
+	s/\b(sha1rnds4)\s+(.*)/sha1rnds4($2)/geo	or
+	s/\b(sha1[^\s]*)\s+(.*)/sha1op38($1,$2)/geo;
+
+	print $_,"\n";
+}
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-586.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-586.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6af1d84
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-586.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,1293 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2007-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# SHA256 block transform for x86. September 2007.
+#
+# Performance improvement over compiler generated code varies from
+# 10% to 40% [see below]. Not very impressive on some µ-archs, but
+# it's 5 times smaller and optimizies amount of writes.
+#
+# May 2012.
+#
+# Optimization including two of Pavel Semjanov's ideas, alternative
+# Maj and full unroll, resulted in ~20-25% improvement on most CPUs,
+# ~7% on Pentium, ~40% on Atom. As fully unrolled loop body is almost
+# 15x larger, 8KB vs. 560B, it's fired only for longer inputs. But not
+# on P4, where it kills performance, nor Sandy Bridge, where folded
+# loop is approximately as fast...
+#
+# June 2012.
+#
+# Add AMD XOP-specific code path, >30% improvement on Bulldozer over
+# May version, >60% over original. Add AVX+shrd code path, >25%
+# improvement on Sandy Bridge over May version, 60% over original.
+#
+# May 2013.
+#
+# Replace AMD XOP code path with SSSE3 to cover more processors.
+# (Biggest improvement coefficient is on upcoming Atom Silvermont,
+# not shown.) Add AVX+BMI code path.
+#
+# March 2014.
+#
+# Add support for Intel SHA Extensions.
+#
+# Performance in clock cycles per processed byte (less is better):
+#
+#		gcc	icc	x86 asm(*)	SIMD	x86_64 asm(**)	
+# Pentium	46	57	40/38		-	-
+# PIII		36	33	27/24		-	-
+# P4		41	38	28		-	17.3
+# AMD K8	27	25	19/15.5		-	14.9
+# Core2		26	23	18/15.6		14.3	13.8
+# Westmere	27	-	19/15.7		13.4	12.3
+# Sandy Bridge	25	-	15.9		12.4	11.6
+# Ivy Bridge	24	-	15.0		11.4	10.3
+# Haswell	22	-	13.9		9.46	7.80
+# Bulldozer	36	-	27/22		17.0	13.6
+# VIA Nano	36	-	25/22		16.8	16.5
+# Atom		50	-	30/25		21.9	18.9
+# Silvermont	40	-	34/31		22.9	20.6
+#
+# (*)	numbers after slash are for unrolled loop, where applicable;
+# (**)	x86_64 assembly performance is presented for reference
+#	purposes, results are best-available;
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm");
+require "x86asm.pl";
+
+$output=pop;
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+&asm_init($ARGV[0],"sha512-586.pl",$ARGV[$#ARGV] eq "386");
+
+$xmm=$avx=0;
+for (@ARGV) { $xmm=1 if (/-DOPENSSL_IA32_SSE2/); }
+
+if ($xmm &&	`$ENV{CC} -Wa,-v -c -o /dev/null -x assembler /dev/null 2>&1`
+			=~ /GNU assembler version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
+	$avx = ($1>=2.19) + ($1>=2.22);
+}
+
+if ($xmm && !$avx && $ARGV[0] eq "win32n" &&
+		`nasm -v 2>&1` =~ /NASM version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
+	$avx = ($1>=2.03) + ($1>=2.10);
+}
+
+if ($xmm && !$avx && $ARGV[0] eq "win32" &&
+		`ml 2>&1` =~ /Version ([0-9]+)\./) {
+	$avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=11);
+}
+
+if ($xmm && !$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /(^clang version|based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
+	$avx = ($2>=3.0) + ($2>3.0);
+}
+
+$shaext=$xmm;	### set to zero if compiling for 1.0.1
+
+$unroll_after = 64*4;	# If pre-evicted from L1P cache first spin of
+			# fully unrolled loop was measured to run about
+			# 3-4x slower. If slowdown coefficient is N and
+			# unrolled loop is m times faster, then you break
+			# even at (N-1)/(m-1) blocks. Then it needs to be
+			# adjusted for probability of code being evicted,
+			# code size/cache size=1/4. Typical m is 1.15...
+
+$A="eax";
+$E="edx";
+$T="ebx";
+$Aoff=&DWP(4,"esp");
+$Boff=&DWP(8,"esp");
+$Coff=&DWP(12,"esp");
+$Doff=&DWP(16,"esp");
+$Eoff=&DWP(20,"esp");
+$Foff=&DWP(24,"esp");
+$Goff=&DWP(28,"esp");
+$Hoff=&DWP(32,"esp");
+$Xoff=&DWP(36,"esp");
+$K256="ebp";
+
+sub BODY_16_63() {
+	&mov	($T,"ecx");			# "ecx" is preloaded
+	 &mov	("esi",&DWP(4*(9+15+16-14),"esp"));
+	&ror	("ecx",18-7);
+	 &mov	("edi","esi");
+	&ror	("esi",19-17);
+	 &xor	("ecx",$T);
+	 &shr	($T,3);
+	&ror	("ecx",7);
+	 &xor	("esi","edi");
+	 &xor	($T,"ecx");			# T = sigma0(X[-15])
+	&ror	("esi",17);
+	 &add	($T,&DWP(4*(9+15+16),"esp"));	# T += X[-16]
+	&shr	("edi",10);
+	 &add	($T,&DWP(4*(9+15+16-9),"esp"));	# T += X[-7]
+	#&xor	("edi","esi")			# sigma1(X[-2])
+	# &add	($T,"edi");			# T += sigma1(X[-2])
+	# &mov	(&DWP(4*(9+15),"esp"),$T);	# save X[0]
+
+	&BODY_00_15(1);
+}
+sub BODY_00_15() {
+    my $in_16_63=shift;
+
+	&mov	("ecx",$E);
+	 &xor	("edi","esi")			if ($in_16_63);	# sigma1(X[-2])
+	 &mov	("esi",$Foff);
+	&ror	("ecx",25-11);
+	 &add	($T,"edi")			if ($in_16_63);	# T += sigma1(X[-2])
+	 &mov	("edi",$Goff);
+	&xor	("ecx",$E);
+	 &xor	("esi","edi");
+	 &mov	($T,&DWP(4*(9+15),"esp"))	if (!$in_16_63);
+	 &mov	(&DWP(4*(9+15),"esp"),$T)	if ($in_16_63);	# save X[0]
+	&ror	("ecx",11-6);
+	 &and	("esi",$E);
+	 &mov	($Eoff,$E);		# modulo-scheduled
+	&xor	($E,"ecx");
+	 &add	($T,$Hoff);		# T += h
+	 &xor	("esi","edi");		# Ch(e,f,g)
+	&ror	($E,6);			# Sigma1(e)
+	 &mov	("ecx",$A);
+	 &add	($T,"esi");		# T += Ch(e,f,g)
+
+	&ror	("ecx",22-13);
+	 &add	($T,$E);		# T += Sigma1(e)
+	 &mov	("edi",$Boff);
+	&xor	("ecx",$A);
+	 &mov	($Aoff,$A);		# modulo-scheduled
+	 &lea	("esp",&DWP(-4,"esp"));
+	&ror	("ecx",13-2);
+	 &mov	("esi",&DWP(0,$K256));
+	&xor	("ecx",$A);
+	 &mov	($E,$Eoff);		# e in next iteration, d in this one
+	 &xor	($A,"edi");		# a ^= b
+	&ror	("ecx",2);		# Sigma0(a)
+
+	 &add	($T,"esi");		# T+= K[i]
+	 &mov	(&DWP(0,"esp"),$A);	# (b^c) in next round
+	&add	($E,$T);		# d += T
+	 &and	($A,&DWP(4,"esp"));	# a &= (b^c)
+	&add	($T,"ecx");		# T += Sigma0(a)
+	 &xor	($A,"edi");		# h = Maj(a,b,c) = Ch(a^b,c,b)
+	 &mov	("ecx",&DWP(4*(9+15+16-1),"esp"))	if ($in_16_63);	# preload T
+	&add	($K256,4);
+	 &add	($A,$T);		# h += T
+}
+
+&external_label("OPENSSL_ia32cap_P")		if (!$i386);
+
+&function_begin("sha256_block_data_order");
+	&mov	("esi",wparam(0));	# ctx
+	&mov	("edi",wparam(1));	# inp
+	&mov	("eax",wparam(2));	# num
+	&mov	("ebx","esp");		# saved sp
+
+	&call	(&label("pic_point"));	# make it PIC!
+&set_label("pic_point");
+	&blindpop($K256);
+	&lea	($K256,&DWP(&label("K256")."-".&label("pic_point"),$K256));
+
+	&sub	("esp",16);
+	&and	("esp",-64);
+
+	&shl	("eax",6);
+	&add	("eax","edi");
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,"esp"),"esi");	# ctx
+	&mov	(&DWP(4,"esp"),"edi");	# inp
+	&mov	(&DWP(8,"esp"),"eax");	# inp+num*128
+	&mov	(&DWP(12,"esp"),"ebx");	# saved sp
+						if (!$i386 && $xmm) {
+	&picmeup("edx","OPENSSL_ia32cap_P",$K256,&label("K256"));
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(0,"edx"));
+	&mov	("ebx",&DWP(4,"edx"));
+	&test	("ecx",1<<20);		# check for P4
+	&jnz	(&label("loop"));
+	&mov	("edx",&DWP(8,"edx"))	if ($xmm);
+	&test	("ecx",1<<24);		# check for FXSR
+	&jz	($unroll_after?&label("no_xmm"):&label("loop"));
+	&and	("ecx",1<<30);		# mask "Intel CPU" bit
+	&and	("ebx",1<<28|1<<9);	# mask AVX and SSSE3 bits
+	&test	("edx",1<<29)		if ($shaext);	# check for SHA
+	&jnz	(&label("shaext"))	if ($shaext);
+	&or	("ecx","ebx");
+	&and	("ecx",1<<28|1<<30);
+	&cmp	("ecx",1<<28|1<<30);
+					if ($xmm) {
+	&je	(&label("AVX"))		if ($avx);
+	&test	("ebx",1<<9);		# check for SSSE3
+	&jnz	(&label("SSSE3"));
+					} else {
+	&je	(&label("loop_shrd"));
+					}
+						if ($unroll_after) {
+&set_label("no_xmm");
+	&sub	("eax","edi");
+	&cmp	("eax",$unroll_after);
+	&jae	(&label("unrolled"));
+						} }
+	&jmp	(&label("loop"));
+
+sub COMPACT_LOOP() {
+my $suffix=shift;
+
+&set_label("loop$suffix",$suffix?32:16);
+    # copy input block to stack reversing byte and dword order
+    for($i=0;$i<4;$i++) {
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP($i*16+0,"edi"));
+	&mov	("ebx",&DWP($i*16+4,"edi"));
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP($i*16+8,"edi"));
+	&bswap	("eax");
+	&mov	("edx",&DWP($i*16+12,"edi"));
+	&bswap	("ebx");
+	&push	("eax");
+	&bswap	("ecx");
+	&push	("ebx");
+	&bswap	("edx");
+	&push	("ecx");
+	&push	("edx");
+    }
+	&add	("edi",64);
+	&lea	("esp",&DWP(-4*9,"esp"));# place for A,B,C,D,E,F,G,H
+	&mov	(&DWP(4*(9+16)+4,"esp"),"edi");
+
+	# copy ctx->h[0-7] to A,B,C,D,E,F,G,H on stack
+	&mov	($A,&DWP(0,"esi"));
+	&mov	("ebx",&DWP(4,"esi"));
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(8,"esi"));
+	&mov	("edi",&DWP(12,"esi"));
+	# &mov	($Aoff,$A);
+	&mov	($Boff,"ebx");
+	&xor	("ebx","ecx");
+	&mov	($Coff,"ecx");
+	&mov	($Doff,"edi");
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,"esp"),"ebx");	# magic
+	&mov	($E,&DWP(16,"esi"));	
+	&mov	("ebx",&DWP(20,"esi"));
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(24,"esi"));
+	&mov	("edi",&DWP(28,"esi"));
+	# &mov	($Eoff,$E);
+	&mov	($Foff,"ebx");
+	&mov	($Goff,"ecx");
+	&mov	($Hoff,"edi");
+
+&set_label("00_15$suffix",16);
+
+	&BODY_00_15();
+
+	&cmp	("esi",0xc19bf174);
+	&jne	(&label("00_15$suffix"));
+
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(4*(9+15+16-1),"esp"));	# preloaded in BODY_00_15(1)
+	&jmp	(&label("16_63$suffix"));
+
+&set_label("16_63$suffix",16);
+
+	&BODY_16_63();
+
+	&cmp	("esi",0xc67178f2);
+	&jne	(&label("16_63$suffix"));
+
+	&mov	("esi",&DWP(4*(9+16+64)+0,"esp"));#ctx
+	# &mov	($A,$Aoff);
+	&mov	("ebx",$Boff);
+	# &mov	("edi",$Coff);
+	&mov	("ecx",$Doff);
+	&add	($A,&DWP(0,"esi"));
+	&add	("ebx",&DWP(4,"esi"));
+	&add	("edi",&DWP(8,"esi"));
+	&add	("ecx",&DWP(12,"esi"));
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,"esi"),$A);
+	&mov	(&DWP(4,"esi"),"ebx");
+	&mov	(&DWP(8,"esi"),"edi");
+	&mov	(&DWP(12,"esi"),"ecx");
+	# &mov	($E,$Eoff);
+	&mov	("eax",$Foff);
+	&mov	("ebx",$Goff);
+	&mov	("ecx",$Hoff);
+	&mov	("edi",&DWP(4*(9+16+64)+4,"esp"));#inp
+	&add	($E,&DWP(16,"esi"));
+	&add	("eax",&DWP(20,"esi"));
+	&add	("ebx",&DWP(24,"esi"));
+	&add	("ecx",&DWP(28,"esi"));
+	&mov	(&DWP(16,"esi"),$E);
+	&mov	(&DWP(20,"esi"),"eax");
+	&mov	(&DWP(24,"esi"),"ebx");
+	&mov	(&DWP(28,"esi"),"ecx");
+
+	&lea	("esp",&DWP(4*(9+16+64),"esp"));# destroy frame
+	&sub	($K256,4*64);			# rewind K
+
+	&cmp	("edi",&DWP(8,"esp"));		# are we done yet?
+	&jb	(&label("loop$suffix"));
+}
+	&COMPACT_LOOP();
+	&mov	("esp",&DWP(12,"esp"));		# restore sp
+&function_end_A();
+						if (!$i386 && !$xmm) {
+	# ~20% improvement on Sandy Bridge
+	local *ror = sub { &shrd(@_[0],@_) };
+	&COMPACT_LOOP("_shrd");
+	&mov	("esp",&DWP(12,"esp"));		# restore sp
+&function_end_A();
+						}
+
+&set_label("K256",64);	# Yes! I keep it in the code segment!
+@K256=(	0x428a2f98,0x71374491,0xb5c0fbcf,0xe9b5dba5,
+	0x3956c25b,0x59f111f1,0x923f82a4,0xab1c5ed5,
+	0xd807aa98,0x12835b01,0x243185be,0x550c7dc3,
+	0x72be5d74,0x80deb1fe,0x9bdc06a7,0xc19bf174,
+	0xe49b69c1,0xefbe4786,0x0fc19dc6,0x240ca1cc,
+	0x2de92c6f,0x4a7484aa,0x5cb0a9dc,0x76f988da,
+	0x983e5152,0xa831c66d,0xb00327c8,0xbf597fc7,
+	0xc6e00bf3,0xd5a79147,0x06ca6351,0x14292967,
+	0x27b70a85,0x2e1b2138,0x4d2c6dfc,0x53380d13,
+	0x650a7354,0x766a0abb,0x81c2c92e,0x92722c85,
+	0xa2bfe8a1,0xa81a664b,0xc24b8b70,0xc76c51a3,
+	0xd192e819,0xd6990624,0xf40e3585,0x106aa070,
+	0x19a4c116,0x1e376c08,0x2748774c,0x34b0bcb5,
+	0x391c0cb3,0x4ed8aa4a,0x5b9cca4f,0x682e6ff3,
+	0x748f82ee,0x78a5636f,0x84c87814,0x8cc70208,
+	0x90befffa,0xa4506ceb,0xbef9a3f7,0xc67178f2	);
+&data_word(@K256);
+&data_word(0x00010203,0x04050607,0x08090a0b,0x0c0d0e0f);	# byte swap mask
+&asciz("SHA256 block transform for x86, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>");
+
+($a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f,$g,$h)=(0..7);	# offsets
+sub off { &DWP(4*(((shift)-$i)&7),"esp"); }
+
+if (!$i386 && $unroll_after) {
+my @AH=($A,$K256);
+
+&set_label("unrolled",16);
+	&lea	("esp",&DWP(-96,"esp"));
+	# copy ctx->h[0-7] to A,B,C,D,E,F,G,H on stack
+	&mov	($AH[0],&DWP(0,"esi"));
+	&mov	($AH[1],&DWP(4,"esi"));
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(8,"esi"));
+	&mov	("ebx",&DWP(12,"esi"));
+	#&mov	(&DWP(0,"esp"),$AH[0]);
+	&mov	(&DWP(4,"esp"),$AH[1]);
+	&xor	($AH[1],"ecx");		# magic
+	&mov	(&DWP(8,"esp"),"ecx");
+	&mov	(&DWP(12,"esp"),"ebx");
+	&mov	($E,&DWP(16,"esi"));	
+	&mov	("ebx",&DWP(20,"esi"));
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(24,"esi"));
+	&mov	("esi",&DWP(28,"esi"));
+	#&mov	(&DWP(16,"esp"),$E);
+	&mov	(&DWP(20,"esp"),"ebx");
+	&mov	(&DWP(24,"esp"),"ecx");
+	&mov	(&DWP(28,"esp"),"esi");
+	&jmp	(&label("grand_loop"));
+
+&set_label("grand_loop",16);
+    # copy input block to stack reversing byte order
+    for($i=0;$i<5;$i++) {
+	&mov	("ebx",&DWP(12*$i+0,"edi"));
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(12*$i+4,"edi"));
+	&bswap	("ebx");
+	&mov	("esi",&DWP(12*$i+8,"edi"));
+	&bswap	("ecx");
+	&mov	(&DWP(32+12*$i+0,"esp"),"ebx");
+	&bswap	("esi");
+	&mov	(&DWP(32+12*$i+4,"esp"),"ecx");
+	&mov	(&DWP(32+12*$i+8,"esp"),"esi");
+    }
+	&mov	("ebx",&DWP($i*12,"edi"));
+	&add	("edi",64);
+	&bswap	("ebx");
+	&mov	(&DWP(96+4,"esp"),"edi");
+	&mov	(&DWP(32+12*$i,"esp"),"ebx");
+
+    my ($t1,$t2) = ("ecx","esi");
+
+    for ($i=0;$i<64;$i++) {
+
+      if ($i>=16) {
+	&mov	($T,$t1);			# $t1 is preloaded
+	# &mov	($t2,&DWP(32+4*(($i+14)&15),"esp"));
+	&ror	($t1,18-7);
+	 &mov	("edi",$t2);
+	&ror	($t2,19-17);
+	 &xor	($t1,$T);
+	 &shr	($T,3);
+	&ror	($t1,7);
+	 &xor	($t2,"edi");
+	 &xor	($T,$t1);			# T = sigma0(X[-15])
+	&ror	($t2,17);
+	 &add	($T,&DWP(32+4*($i&15),"esp"));	# T += X[-16]
+	&shr	("edi",10);
+	 &add	($T,&DWP(32+4*(($i+9)&15),"esp"));	# T += X[-7]
+	#&xor	("edi",$t2)			# sigma1(X[-2])
+	# &add	($T,"edi");			# T += sigma1(X[-2])
+	# &mov	(&DWP(4*(9+15),"esp"),$T);	# save X[0]
+      }
+	&mov	($t1,$E);
+	 &xor	("edi",$t2)			if ($i>=16);	# sigma1(X[-2])
+	 &mov	($t2,&off($f));
+	&ror	($E,25-11);
+	 &add	($T,"edi")			if ($i>=16);	# T += sigma1(X[-2])
+	 &mov	("edi",&off($g));
+	&xor	($E,$t1);
+	 &mov	($T,&DWP(32+4*($i&15),"esp"))	if ($i<16);	# X[i]
+	 &mov	(&DWP(32+4*($i&15),"esp"),$T)	if ($i>=16 && $i<62);	# save X[0]
+	 &xor	($t2,"edi");
+	&ror	($E,11-6);
+	 &and	($t2,$t1);
+	 &mov	(&off($e),$t1);		# save $E, modulo-scheduled
+	&xor	($E,$t1);
+	 &add	($T,&off($h));		# T += h
+	 &xor	("edi",$t2);		# Ch(e,f,g)
+	&ror	($E,6);			# Sigma1(e)
+	 &mov	($t1,$AH[0]);
+	 &add	($T,"edi");		# T += Ch(e,f,g)
+
+	&ror	($t1,22-13);
+	 &mov	($t2,$AH[0]);
+	 &mov	("edi",&off($b));
+	&xor	($t1,$AH[0]);
+	 &mov	(&off($a),$AH[0]);	# save $A, modulo-scheduled
+	 &xor	($AH[0],"edi");		# a ^= b, (b^c) in next round
+	&ror	($t1,13-2);
+	 &and	($AH[1],$AH[0]);	# (b^c) &= (a^b)
+	 &lea	($E,&DWP(@K256[$i],$T,$E));	# T += Sigma1(1)+K[i]
+	&xor	($t1,$t2);
+	 &xor	($AH[1],"edi");		# h = Maj(a,b,c) = Ch(a^b,c,b)
+	 &mov	($t2,&DWP(32+4*(($i+2)&15),"esp"))	if ($i>=15 && $i<63);
+	&ror	($t1,2);		# Sigma0(a)
+
+	 &add	($AH[1],$E);		# h += T
+	 &add	($E,&off($d));		# d += T
+	&add	($AH[1],$t1);		# h += Sigma0(a)
+	 &mov	($t1,&DWP(32+4*(($i+15)&15),"esp"))	if ($i>=15 && $i<63);
+
+	@AH = reverse(@AH);		# rotate(a,h)
+	($t1,$t2) = ($t2,$t1);		# rotate(t1,t2)
+    }
+	&mov	("esi",&DWP(96,"esp"));	#ctx
+					#&mov	($AH[0],&DWP(0,"esp"));
+	&xor	($AH[1],"edi");		#&mov	($AH[1],&DWP(4,"esp"));
+					#&mov	("edi", &DWP(8,"esp"));
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(12,"esp"));
+	&add	($AH[0],&DWP(0,"esi"));
+	&add	($AH[1],&DWP(4,"esi"));
+	&add	("edi",&DWP(8,"esi"));
+	&add	("ecx",&DWP(12,"esi"));
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,"esi"),$AH[0]);
+	&mov	(&DWP(4,"esi"),$AH[1]);
+	&mov	(&DWP(8,"esi"),"edi");
+	&mov	(&DWP(12,"esi"),"ecx");
+	 #&mov	(&DWP(0,"esp"),$AH[0]);
+	 &mov	(&DWP(4,"esp"),$AH[1]);
+	 &xor	($AH[1],"edi");		# magic
+	 &mov	(&DWP(8,"esp"),"edi");
+	 &mov	(&DWP(12,"esp"),"ecx");
+	#&mov	($E,&DWP(16,"esp"));
+	&mov	("edi",&DWP(20,"esp"));
+	&mov	("ebx",&DWP(24,"esp"));
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(28,"esp"));
+	&add	($E,&DWP(16,"esi"));
+	&add	("edi",&DWP(20,"esi"));
+	&add	("ebx",&DWP(24,"esi"));
+	&add	("ecx",&DWP(28,"esi"));
+	&mov	(&DWP(16,"esi"),$E);
+	&mov	(&DWP(20,"esi"),"edi");
+	&mov	(&DWP(24,"esi"),"ebx");
+	&mov	(&DWP(28,"esi"),"ecx");
+	 #&mov	(&DWP(16,"esp"),$E);
+	 &mov	(&DWP(20,"esp"),"edi");
+	&mov	("edi",&DWP(96+4,"esp"));	# inp
+	 &mov	(&DWP(24,"esp"),"ebx");
+	 &mov	(&DWP(28,"esp"),"ecx");
+
+	&cmp	("edi",&DWP(96+8,"esp"));	# are we done yet?
+	&jb	(&label("grand_loop"));
+
+	&mov	("esp",&DWP(96+12,"esp"));	# restore sp
+&function_end_A();
+}
+						if (!$i386 && $xmm) {{{
+if ($shaext) {
+######################################################################
+# Intel SHA Extensions implementation of SHA256 update function.
+#
+my ($ctx,$inp,$end)=("esi","edi","eax");
+my ($Wi,$ABEF,$CDGH,$TMP)=map("xmm$_",(0..2,7));
+my @MSG=map("xmm$_",(3..6));
+
+sub sha256op38 {
+ my ($opcodelet,$dst,$src)=@_;
+    if ("$dst:$src" =~ /xmm([0-7]):xmm([0-7])/)
+    {	&data_byte(0x0f,0x38,$opcodelet,0xc0|($1<<3)|$2);	}
+}
+sub sha256rnds2	{ sha256op38(0xcb,@_); }
+sub sha256msg1	{ sha256op38(0xcc,@_); }
+sub sha256msg2	{ sha256op38(0xcd,@_); }
+
+&set_label("shaext",32);
+	&sub		("esp",32);
+
+	&movdqu		($ABEF,&QWP(0,$ctx));		# DCBA
+	&lea		($K256,&DWP(0x80,$K256));
+	&movdqu		($CDGH,&QWP(16,$ctx));		# HGFE
+	&movdqa		($TMP,&QWP(0x100-0x80,$K256));	# byte swap mask
+
+	&pshufd		($Wi,$ABEF,0x1b);		# ABCD
+	&pshufd		($ABEF,$ABEF,0xb1);		# CDAB
+	&pshufd		($CDGH,$CDGH,0x1b);		# EFGH
+	&palignr	($ABEF,$CDGH,8);		# ABEF
+	&punpcklqdq	($CDGH,$Wi);			# CDGH
+	&jmp		(&label("loop_shaext"));
+
+&set_label("loop_shaext",16);
+	&movdqu		(@MSG[0],&QWP(0,$inp));
+	&movdqu		(@MSG[1],&QWP(0x10,$inp));
+	&movdqu		(@MSG[2],&QWP(0x20,$inp));
+	&pshufb		(@MSG[0],$TMP);
+	&movdqu		(@MSG[3],&QWP(0x30,$inp));
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16,"esp"),$CDGH);		# offload
+
+	&movdqa		($Wi,&QWP(0*16-0x80,$K256));
+	&paddd		($Wi,@MSG[0]);
+	&pshufb		(@MSG[1],$TMP);
+	&sha256rnds2	($CDGH,$ABEF);			# 0-3
+	&pshufd		($Wi,$Wi,0x0e);
+	&nop		();
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(0,"esp"),$ABEF);		# offload
+	&sha256rnds2	($ABEF,$CDGH);
+
+	&movdqa		($Wi,&QWP(1*16-0x80,$K256));
+	&paddd		($Wi,@MSG[1]);
+	&pshufb		(@MSG[2],$TMP);
+	&sha256rnds2	($CDGH,$ABEF);			# 4-7
+	&pshufd		($Wi,$Wi,0x0e);
+	&lea		($inp,&DWP(0x40,$inp));
+	&sha256msg1	(@MSG[0],@MSG[1]);
+	&sha256rnds2	($ABEF,$CDGH);
+
+	&movdqa		($Wi,&QWP(2*16-0x80,$K256));
+	&paddd		($Wi,@MSG[2]);
+	&pshufb		(@MSG[3],$TMP);
+	&sha256rnds2	($CDGH,$ABEF);			# 8-11
+	&pshufd		($Wi,$Wi,0x0e);
+	&movdqa		($TMP,@MSG[3]);
+	&palignr	($TMP,@MSG[2],4);
+	&nop		();
+	&paddd		(@MSG[0],$TMP);
+	&sha256msg1	(@MSG[1],@MSG[2]);
+	&sha256rnds2	($ABEF,$CDGH);
+
+	&movdqa		($Wi,&QWP(3*16-0x80,$K256));
+	&paddd		($Wi,@MSG[3]);
+	&sha256msg2	(@MSG[0],@MSG[3]);
+	&sha256rnds2	($CDGH,$ABEF);			# 12-15
+	&pshufd		($Wi,$Wi,0x0e);
+	&movdqa		($TMP,@MSG[0]);
+	&palignr	($TMP,@MSG[3],4);
+	&nop		();
+	&paddd		(@MSG[1],$TMP);
+	&sha256msg1	(@MSG[2],@MSG[3]);
+	&sha256rnds2	($ABEF,$CDGH);
+
+for($i=4;$i<16-3;$i++) {
+	&movdqa		($Wi,&QWP($i*16-0x80,$K256));
+	&paddd		($Wi,@MSG[0]);
+	&sha256msg2	(@MSG[1],@MSG[0]);
+	&sha256rnds2	($CDGH,$ABEF);			# 16-19...
+	&pshufd		($Wi,$Wi,0x0e);
+	&movdqa		($TMP,@MSG[1]);
+	&palignr	($TMP,@MSG[0],4);
+	&nop		();
+	&paddd		(@MSG[2],$TMP);
+	&sha256msg1	(@MSG[3],@MSG[0]);
+	&sha256rnds2	($ABEF,$CDGH);
+
+	push(@MSG,shift(@MSG));
+}
+	&movdqa		($Wi,&QWP(13*16-0x80,$K256));
+	&paddd		($Wi,@MSG[0]);
+	&sha256msg2	(@MSG[1],@MSG[0]);
+	&sha256rnds2	($CDGH,$ABEF);			# 52-55
+	&pshufd		($Wi,$Wi,0x0e);
+	&movdqa		($TMP,@MSG[1])
+	&palignr	($TMP,@MSG[0],4);
+	&sha256rnds2	($ABEF,$CDGH);
+	&paddd		(@MSG[2],$TMP);
+
+	&movdqa		($Wi,&QWP(14*16-0x80,$K256));
+	&paddd		($Wi,@MSG[1]);
+	&sha256rnds2	($CDGH,$ABEF);			# 56-59
+	&pshufd		($Wi,$Wi,0x0e);
+	&sha256msg2	(@MSG[2],@MSG[1]);
+	&movdqa		($TMP,&QWP(0x100-0x80,$K256));	# byte swap mask
+	&sha256rnds2	($ABEF,$CDGH);
+
+	&movdqa		($Wi,&QWP(15*16-0x80,$K256));
+	&paddd		($Wi,@MSG[2]);
+	&nop		();
+	&sha256rnds2	($CDGH,$ABEF);			# 60-63
+	&pshufd		($Wi,$Wi,0x0e);
+	&cmp		($end,$inp);
+	&nop		();
+	&sha256rnds2	($ABEF,$CDGH);
+
+	&paddd		($CDGH,&QWP(16,"esp"));
+	&paddd		($ABEF,&QWP(0,"esp"));
+	&jnz		(&label("loop_shaext"));
+
+	&pshufd		($CDGH,$CDGH,0xb1);		# DCHG
+	&pshufd		($TMP,$ABEF,0x1b);		# FEBA
+	&pshufd		($ABEF,$ABEF,0xb1);		# BAFE
+	&punpckhqdq	($ABEF,$CDGH);			# DCBA
+	&palignr	($CDGH,$TMP,8);			# HGFE
+
+	&mov		("esp",&DWP(32+12,"esp"));
+	&movdqu		(&QWP(0,$ctx),$ABEF);
+	&movdqu		(&QWP(16,$ctx),$CDGH);
+&function_end_A();
+}
+
+my @X = map("xmm$_",(0..3));
+my ($t0,$t1,$t2,$t3) = map("xmm$_",(4..7));
+my @AH = ($A,$T);
+
+&set_label("SSSE3",32);
+	&lea	("esp",&DWP(-96,"esp"));
+	# copy ctx->h[0-7] to A,B,C,D,E,F,G,H on stack
+	&mov	($AH[0],&DWP(0,"esi"));
+	&mov	($AH[1],&DWP(4,"esi"));
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(8,"esi"));
+	&mov	("edi",&DWP(12,"esi"));
+	#&mov	(&DWP(0,"esp"),$AH[0]);
+	&mov	(&DWP(4,"esp"),$AH[1]);
+	&xor	($AH[1],"ecx");			# magic
+	&mov	(&DWP(8,"esp"),"ecx");
+	&mov	(&DWP(12,"esp"),"edi");
+	&mov	($E,&DWP(16,"esi"));
+	&mov	("edi",&DWP(20,"esi"));
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(24,"esi"));
+	&mov	("esi",&DWP(28,"esi"));
+	#&mov	(&DWP(16,"esp"),$E);
+	&mov	(&DWP(20,"esp"),"edi");
+	&mov	("edi",&DWP(96+4,"esp"));	# inp
+	&mov	(&DWP(24,"esp"),"ecx");
+	&mov	(&DWP(28,"esp"),"esi");
+	&movdqa	($t3,&QWP(256,$K256));
+	&jmp	(&label("grand_ssse3"));
+
+&set_label("grand_ssse3",16);
+	# load input, reverse byte order, add K256[0..15], save to stack
+	&movdqu	(@X[0],&QWP(0,"edi"));
+	&movdqu	(@X[1],&QWP(16,"edi"));
+	&movdqu	(@X[2],&QWP(32,"edi"));
+	&movdqu	(@X[3],&QWP(48,"edi"));
+	&add	("edi",64);
+	&pshufb	(@X[0],$t3);
+	&mov	(&DWP(96+4,"esp"),"edi");
+	&pshufb	(@X[1],$t3);
+	&movdqa	($t0,&QWP(0,$K256));
+	&pshufb	(@X[2],$t3);
+	&movdqa	($t1,&QWP(16,$K256));
+	&paddd	($t0,@X[0]);
+	&pshufb	(@X[3],$t3);
+	&movdqa	($t2,&QWP(32,$K256));
+	&paddd	($t1,@X[1]);
+	&movdqa	($t3,&QWP(48,$K256));
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(32+0,"esp"),$t0);
+	&paddd	($t2,@X[2]);
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(32+16,"esp"),$t1);
+	&paddd	($t3,@X[3]);
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(32+32,"esp"),$t2);
+	&movdqa	(&QWP(32+48,"esp"),$t3);
+	&jmp	(&label("ssse3_00_47"));
+
+&set_label("ssse3_00_47",16);
+	&add		($K256,64);
+
+sub SSSE3_00_47 () {
+my $j = shift;
+my $body = shift;
+my @X = @_;
+my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body);	# 120 instructions
+
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	&movdqa		($t0,@X[1]);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));			# @
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	&movdqa		($t3,@X[3]);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	&palignr	($t0,@X[0],4);		# X[1..4]
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));			# @
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	 &palignr	($t3,@X[2],4);		# X[9..12]
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	&movdqa		($t1,$t0);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));			# @
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	&movdqa		($t2,$t0);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	&psrld		($t0,3);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));			# @
+	 &paddd		(@X[0],$t3);		# X[0..3] += X[9..12]
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	&psrld		($t2,7);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));			# @
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	 &pshufd	($t3,@X[3],0b11111010);	# X[14..15]
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	&pslld		($t1,32-18);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));			# @
+	&pxor		($t0,$t2);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	&psrld		($t2,18-7);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));			# @
+	&pxor		($t0,$t1);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	&pslld		($t1,18-7);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));			# @
+	&pxor		($t0,$t2);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	 &movdqa	($t2,$t3);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));			# @
+	&pxor		($t0,$t1);		# sigma0(X[1..4])
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	 &psrld		($t3,10);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));			# @
+	&paddd		(@X[0],$t0);		# X[0..3] += sigma0(X[1..4])
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	 &psrlq		($t2,17);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));			# @
+	 &pxor		($t3,$t2);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	 &psrlq		($t2,19-17);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));			# @
+	 &pxor		($t3,$t2);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	 &pshufd	($t3,$t3,0b10000000);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));			# @
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));			# @
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	 &psrldq	($t3,8);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	&paddd		(@X[0],$t3);		# X[0..1] += sigma1(X[14..15])
+	  eval(shift(@insns));			# @
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));			# @
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	 &pshufd	($t3,@X[0],0b01010000);	# X[16..17]
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	 &movdqa	($t2,$t3);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));			# @
+	 &psrld		($t3,10);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	 &psrlq		($t2,17);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));			# @
+	 &pxor		($t3,$t2);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	 &psrlq		($t2,19-17);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));			# @
+	 &pxor		($t3,$t2);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	 &pshufd	($t3,$t3,0b00001000);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));			# @
+	&movdqa		($t2,&QWP(16*$j,$K256));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	 &pslldq	($t3,8);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));			# @
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));			# @
+	&paddd		(@X[0],$t3);		# X[2..3] += sigma1(X[16..17])
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	&paddd		($t2,@X[0]);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));			# @
+
+	foreach (@insns) { eval; }		# remaining instructions
+
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(32+16*$j,"esp"),$t2);
+}
+
+sub body_00_15 () {
+	(
+	'&mov	("ecx",$E);',
+	'&ror	($E,25-11);',
+	 '&mov	("esi",&off($f));',
+	'&xor	($E,"ecx");',
+	 '&mov	("edi",&off($g));',
+	 '&xor	("esi","edi");',
+	'&ror	($E,11-6);',
+	 '&and	("esi","ecx");',
+	 '&mov	(&off($e),"ecx");',	# save $E, modulo-scheduled
+	'&xor	($E,"ecx");',
+	 '&xor	("edi","esi");',	# Ch(e,f,g)
+	'&ror	($E,6);',		# T = Sigma1(e)
+	 '&mov	("ecx",$AH[0]);',
+	 '&add	($E,"edi");',		# T += Ch(e,f,g)
+	 '&mov	("edi",&off($b));',
+	'&mov	("esi",$AH[0]);',
+
+	'&ror	("ecx",22-13);',
+	 '&mov	(&off($a),$AH[0]);',	# save $A, modulo-scheduled
+	'&xor	("ecx",$AH[0]);',
+	 '&xor	($AH[0],"edi");',	# a ^= b, (b^c) in next round
+	 '&add	($E,&off($h));',	# T += h
+	'&ror	("ecx",13-2);',
+	 '&and	($AH[1],$AH[0]);',	# (b^c) &= (a^b)
+	'&xor	("ecx","esi");',
+	 '&add	($E,&DWP(32+4*($i&15),"esp"));',	# T += K[i]+X[i]
+	 '&xor	($AH[1],"edi");',	# h = Maj(a,b,c) = Ch(a^b,c,b)
+	'&ror	("ecx",2);',		# Sigma0(a)
+
+	 '&add	($AH[1],$E);',		# h += T
+	 '&add	($E,&off($d));',	# d += T
+	'&add	($AH[1],"ecx");'.	# h += Sigma0(a)
+
+	'@AH = reverse(@AH); $i++;'	# rotate(a,h)
+	);
+}
+
+    for ($i=0,$j=0; $j<4; $j++) {
+	&SSSE3_00_47($j,\&body_00_15,@X);
+	push(@X,shift(@X));		# rotate(@X)
+    }
+	&cmp	(&DWP(16*$j,$K256),0x00010203);
+	&jne	(&label("ssse3_00_47"));
+
+    for ($i=0; $i<16; ) {
+	foreach(body_00_15()) { eval; }
+    }
+
+	&mov	("esi",&DWP(96,"esp"));	#ctx
+					#&mov	($AH[0],&DWP(0,"esp"));
+	&xor	($AH[1],"edi");		#&mov	($AH[1],&DWP(4,"esp"));
+					#&mov	("edi", &DWP(8,"esp"));
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(12,"esp"));
+	&add	($AH[0],&DWP(0,"esi"));
+	&add	($AH[1],&DWP(4,"esi"));
+	&add	("edi",&DWP(8,"esi"));
+	&add	("ecx",&DWP(12,"esi"));
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,"esi"),$AH[0]);
+	&mov	(&DWP(4,"esi"),$AH[1]);
+	&mov	(&DWP(8,"esi"),"edi");
+	&mov	(&DWP(12,"esi"),"ecx");
+	 #&mov	(&DWP(0,"esp"),$AH[0]);
+	 &mov	(&DWP(4,"esp"),$AH[1]);
+	 &xor	($AH[1],"edi");			# magic
+	 &mov	(&DWP(8,"esp"),"edi");
+	 &mov	(&DWP(12,"esp"),"ecx");
+	#&mov	($E,&DWP(16,"esp"));
+	&mov	("edi",&DWP(20,"esp"));
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(24,"esp"));
+	&add	($E,&DWP(16,"esi"));
+	&add	("edi",&DWP(20,"esi"));
+	&add	("ecx",&DWP(24,"esi"));
+	&mov	(&DWP(16,"esi"),$E);
+	&mov	(&DWP(20,"esi"),"edi");
+	 &mov	(&DWP(20,"esp"),"edi");
+	&mov	("edi",&DWP(28,"esp"));
+	&mov	(&DWP(24,"esi"),"ecx");
+	 #&mov	(&DWP(16,"esp"),$E);
+	&add	("edi",&DWP(28,"esi"));
+	 &mov	(&DWP(24,"esp"),"ecx");
+	&mov	(&DWP(28,"esi"),"edi");
+	 &mov	(&DWP(28,"esp"),"edi");
+	&mov	("edi",&DWP(96+4,"esp"));	# inp
+
+	&movdqa	($t3,&QWP(64,$K256));
+	&sub	($K256,3*64);			# rewind K
+	&cmp	("edi",&DWP(96+8,"esp"));	# are we done yet?
+	&jb	(&label("grand_ssse3"));
+
+	&mov	("esp",&DWP(96+12,"esp"));	# restore sp
+&function_end_A();
+						if ($avx) {
+&set_label("AVX",32);
+						if ($avx>1) {
+	&and	("edx",1<<8|1<<3);		# check for BMI2+BMI1
+	&cmp	("edx",1<<8|1<<3);
+	&je	(&label("AVX_BMI"));
+						}
+	&lea	("esp",&DWP(-96,"esp"));
+	&vzeroall	();
+	# copy ctx->h[0-7] to A,B,C,D,E,F,G,H on stack
+	&mov	($AH[0],&DWP(0,"esi"));
+	&mov	($AH[1],&DWP(4,"esi"));
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(8,"esi"));
+	&mov	("edi",&DWP(12,"esi"));
+	#&mov	(&DWP(0,"esp"),$AH[0]);
+	&mov	(&DWP(4,"esp"),$AH[1]);
+	&xor	($AH[1],"ecx");			# magic
+	&mov	(&DWP(8,"esp"),"ecx");
+	&mov	(&DWP(12,"esp"),"edi");
+	&mov	($E,&DWP(16,"esi"));
+	&mov	("edi",&DWP(20,"esi"));
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(24,"esi"));
+	&mov	("esi",&DWP(28,"esi"));
+	#&mov	(&DWP(16,"esp"),$E);
+	&mov	(&DWP(20,"esp"),"edi");
+	&mov	("edi",&DWP(96+4,"esp"));	# inp
+	&mov	(&DWP(24,"esp"),"ecx");
+	&mov	(&DWP(28,"esp"),"esi");
+	&vmovdqa	($t3,&QWP(256,$K256));
+	&jmp	(&label("grand_avx"));
+
+&set_label("grand_avx",32);
+	# load input, reverse byte order, add K256[0..15], save to stack
+	&vmovdqu	(@X[0],&QWP(0,"edi"));
+	&vmovdqu	(@X[1],&QWP(16,"edi"));
+	&vmovdqu	(@X[2],&QWP(32,"edi"));
+	&vmovdqu	(@X[3],&QWP(48,"edi"));
+	&add		("edi",64);
+	&vpshufb	(@X[0],@X[0],$t3);
+	&mov		(&DWP(96+4,"esp"),"edi");
+	&vpshufb	(@X[1],@X[1],$t3);
+	&vpshufb	(@X[2],@X[2],$t3);
+	&vpaddd		($t0,@X[0],&QWP(0,$K256));
+	&vpshufb	(@X[3],@X[3],$t3);
+	&vpaddd		($t1,@X[1],&QWP(16,$K256));
+	&vpaddd		($t2,@X[2],&QWP(32,$K256));
+	&vpaddd		($t3,@X[3],&QWP(48,$K256));
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(32+0,"esp"),$t0);
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(32+16,"esp"),$t1);
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(32+32,"esp"),$t2);
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(32+48,"esp"),$t3);
+	&jmp		(&label("avx_00_47"));
+
+&set_label("avx_00_47",16);
+	&add		($K256,64);
+
+sub Xupdate_AVX () {
+	(
+	'&vpalignr	($t0,@X[1],@X[0],4);',	# X[1..4]
+	 '&vpalignr	($t3,@X[3],@X[2],4);',	# X[9..12]
+	'&vpsrld	($t2,$t0,7);',
+	 '&vpaddd	(@X[0],@X[0],$t3);',	# X[0..3] += X[9..16]
+	'&vpsrld	($t3,$t0,3);',
+	'&vpslld	($t1,$t0,14);',
+	'&vpxor		($t0,$t3,$t2);',
+	 '&vpshufd	($t3,@X[3],0b11111010)',# X[14..15]
+	'&vpsrld	($t2,$t2,18-7);',
+	'&vpxor		($t0,$t0,$t1);',
+	'&vpslld	($t1,$t1,25-14);',
+	'&vpxor		($t0,$t0,$t2);',
+	 '&vpsrld	($t2,$t3,10);',
+	'&vpxor		($t0,$t0,$t1);',	# sigma0(X[1..4])
+	 '&vpsrlq	($t1,$t3,17);',
+	'&vpaddd	(@X[0],@X[0],$t0);',	# X[0..3] += sigma0(X[1..4])
+	 '&vpxor	($t2,$t2,$t1);',
+	 '&vpsrlq	($t3,$t3,19);',
+	 '&vpxor	($t2,$t2,$t3);',	# sigma1(X[14..15]
+	 '&vpshufd	($t3,$t2,0b10000100);',
+	'&vpsrldq	($t3,$t3,8);',
+	'&vpaddd	(@X[0],@X[0],$t3);',	# X[0..1] += sigma1(X[14..15])
+	 '&vpshufd	($t3,@X[0],0b01010000)',# X[16..17]
+	 '&vpsrld	($t2,$t3,10);',
+	 '&vpsrlq	($t1,$t3,17);',
+	 '&vpxor	($t2,$t2,$t1);',
+	 '&vpsrlq	($t3,$t3,19);',
+	 '&vpxor	($t2,$t2,$t3);',	# sigma1(X[16..17]
+	 '&vpshufd	($t3,$t2,0b11101000);',
+	'&vpslldq	($t3,$t3,8);',
+	'&vpaddd	(@X[0],@X[0],$t3);'	# X[2..3] += sigma1(X[16..17])
+	);
+}
+
+local *ror = sub { &shrd(@_[0],@_) };
+sub AVX_00_47 () {
+my $j = shift;
+my $body = shift;
+my @X = @_;
+my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body);	# 120 instructions
+my $insn;
+
+	foreach (Xupdate_AVX()) {		# 31 instructions
+	    eval;
+	    eval(shift(@insns));
+	    eval(shift(@insns));
+	    eval($insn = shift(@insns));
+	    eval(shift(@insns)) if ($insn =~ /rorx/ && @insns[0] =~ /rorx/);
+	}
+	&vpaddd		($t2,@X[0],&QWP(16*$j,$K256));
+	foreach (@insns) { eval; }		# remaining instructions
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(32+16*$j,"esp"),$t2);
+}
+
+    for ($i=0,$j=0; $j<4; $j++) {
+	&AVX_00_47($j,\&body_00_15,@X);
+	push(@X,shift(@X));		# rotate(@X)
+    }
+	&cmp	(&DWP(16*$j,$K256),0x00010203);
+	&jne	(&label("avx_00_47"));
+
+    for ($i=0; $i<16; ) {
+	foreach(body_00_15()) { eval; }
+    }
+
+	&mov	("esi",&DWP(96,"esp"));	#ctx
+					#&mov	($AH[0],&DWP(0,"esp"));
+	&xor	($AH[1],"edi");		#&mov	($AH[1],&DWP(4,"esp"));
+					#&mov	("edi", &DWP(8,"esp"));
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(12,"esp"));
+	&add	($AH[0],&DWP(0,"esi"));
+	&add	($AH[1],&DWP(4,"esi"));
+	&add	("edi",&DWP(8,"esi"));
+	&add	("ecx",&DWP(12,"esi"));
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,"esi"),$AH[0]);
+	&mov	(&DWP(4,"esi"),$AH[1]);
+	&mov	(&DWP(8,"esi"),"edi");
+	&mov	(&DWP(12,"esi"),"ecx");
+	 #&mov	(&DWP(0,"esp"),$AH[0]);
+	 &mov	(&DWP(4,"esp"),$AH[1]);
+	 &xor	($AH[1],"edi");			# magic
+	 &mov	(&DWP(8,"esp"),"edi");
+	 &mov	(&DWP(12,"esp"),"ecx");
+	#&mov	($E,&DWP(16,"esp"));
+	&mov	("edi",&DWP(20,"esp"));
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(24,"esp"));
+	&add	($E,&DWP(16,"esi"));
+	&add	("edi",&DWP(20,"esi"));
+	&add	("ecx",&DWP(24,"esi"));
+	&mov	(&DWP(16,"esi"),$E);
+	&mov	(&DWP(20,"esi"),"edi");
+	 &mov	(&DWP(20,"esp"),"edi");
+	&mov	("edi",&DWP(28,"esp"));
+	&mov	(&DWP(24,"esi"),"ecx");
+	 #&mov	(&DWP(16,"esp"),$E);
+	&add	("edi",&DWP(28,"esi"));
+	 &mov	(&DWP(24,"esp"),"ecx");
+	&mov	(&DWP(28,"esi"),"edi");
+	 &mov	(&DWP(28,"esp"),"edi");
+	&mov	("edi",&DWP(96+4,"esp"));	# inp
+
+	&vmovdqa	($t3,&QWP(64,$K256));
+	&sub	($K256,3*64);			# rewind K
+	&cmp	("edi",&DWP(96+8,"esp"));	# are we done yet?
+	&jb	(&label("grand_avx"));
+
+	&mov	("esp",&DWP(96+12,"esp"));	# restore sp
+	&vzeroall	();
+&function_end_A();
+						if ($avx>1) {
+sub bodyx_00_15 () {			# +10%
+	(
+	'&rorx	("ecx",$E,6)',
+	'&rorx	("esi",$E,11)',
+	 '&mov	(&off($e),$E)',		# save $E, modulo-scheduled
+	'&rorx	("edi",$E,25)',
+	'&xor	("ecx","esi")',
+	 '&andn	("esi",$E,&off($g))',
+	'&xor	("ecx","edi")',		# Sigma1(e)
+	 '&and	($E,&off($f))',
+	 '&mov	(&off($a),$AH[0]);',	# save $A, modulo-scheduled
+	 '&or	($E,"esi")',		# T = Ch(e,f,g)
+
+	'&rorx	("edi",$AH[0],2)',
+	'&rorx	("esi",$AH[0],13)',
+	 '&lea	($E,&DWP(0,$E,"ecx"))',	# T += Sigma1(e)
+	'&rorx	("ecx",$AH[0],22)',
+	'&xor	("esi","edi")',
+	 '&mov	("edi",&off($b))',
+	'&xor	("ecx","esi")',		# Sigma0(a)
+
+	 '&xor	($AH[0],"edi")',	# a ^= b, (b^c) in next round
+	 '&add	($E,&off($h))',		# T += h
+	 '&and	($AH[1],$AH[0])',	# (b^c) &= (a^b)
+	 '&add	($E,&DWP(32+4*($i&15),"esp"))',	# T += K[i]+X[i]
+	 '&xor	($AH[1],"edi")',	# h = Maj(a,b,c) = Ch(a^b,c,b)
+
+	 '&add	("ecx",$E)',		# h += T
+	 '&add	($E,&off($d))',		# d += T
+	'&lea	($AH[1],&DWP(0,$AH[1],"ecx"));'.	# h += Sigma0(a)
+
+	'@AH = reverse(@AH); $i++;'	# rotate(a,h)
+	);
+}
+
+&set_label("AVX_BMI",32);
+	&lea	("esp",&DWP(-96,"esp"));
+	&vzeroall	();
+	# copy ctx->h[0-7] to A,B,C,D,E,F,G,H on stack
+	&mov	($AH[0],&DWP(0,"esi"));
+	&mov	($AH[1],&DWP(4,"esi"));
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(8,"esi"));
+	&mov	("edi",&DWP(12,"esi"));
+	#&mov	(&DWP(0,"esp"),$AH[0]);
+	&mov	(&DWP(4,"esp"),$AH[1]);
+	&xor	($AH[1],"ecx");			# magic
+	&mov	(&DWP(8,"esp"),"ecx");
+	&mov	(&DWP(12,"esp"),"edi");
+	&mov	($E,&DWP(16,"esi"));
+	&mov	("edi",&DWP(20,"esi"));
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(24,"esi"));
+	&mov	("esi",&DWP(28,"esi"));
+	#&mov	(&DWP(16,"esp"),$E);
+	&mov	(&DWP(20,"esp"),"edi");
+	&mov	("edi",&DWP(96+4,"esp"));	# inp
+	&mov	(&DWP(24,"esp"),"ecx");
+	&mov	(&DWP(28,"esp"),"esi");
+	&vmovdqa	($t3,&QWP(256,$K256));
+	&jmp	(&label("grand_avx_bmi"));
+
+&set_label("grand_avx_bmi",32);
+	# load input, reverse byte order, add K256[0..15], save to stack
+	&vmovdqu	(@X[0],&QWP(0,"edi"));
+	&vmovdqu	(@X[1],&QWP(16,"edi"));
+	&vmovdqu	(@X[2],&QWP(32,"edi"));
+	&vmovdqu	(@X[3],&QWP(48,"edi"));
+	&add		("edi",64);
+	&vpshufb	(@X[0],@X[0],$t3);
+	&mov		(&DWP(96+4,"esp"),"edi");
+	&vpshufb	(@X[1],@X[1],$t3);
+	&vpshufb	(@X[2],@X[2],$t3);
+	&vpaddd		($t0,@X[0],&QWP(0,$K256));
+	&vpshufb	(@X[3],@X[3],$t3);
+	&vpaddd		($t1,@X[1],&QWP(16,$K256));
+	&vpaddd		($t2,@X[2],&QWP(32,$K256));
+	&vpaddd		($t3,@X[3],&QWP(48,$K256));
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(32+0,"esp"),$t0);
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(32+16,"esp"),$t1);
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(32+32,"esp"),$t2);
+	&vmovdqa	(&QWP(32+48,"esp"),$t3);
+	&jmp		(&label("avx_bmi_00_47"));
+
+&set_label("avx_bmi_00_47",16);
+	&add		($K256,64);
+
+    for ($i=0,$j=0; $j<4; $j++) {
+	&AVX_00_47($j,\&bodyx_00_15,@X);
+	push(@X,shift(@X));		# rotate(@X)
+    }
+	&cmp	(&DWP(16*$j,$K256),0x00010203);
+	&jne	(&label("avx_bmi_00_47"));
+
+    for ($i=0; $i<16; ) {
+	foreach(bodyx_00_15()) { eval; }
+    }
+
+	&mov	("esi",&DWP(96,"esp"));	#ctx
+					#&mov	($AH[0],&DWP(0,"esp"));
+	&xor	($AH[1],"edi");		#&mov	($AH[1],&DWP(4,"esp"));
+					#&mov	("edi", &DWP(8,"esp"));
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(12,"esp"));
+	&add	($AH[0],&DWP(0,"esi"));
+	&add	($AH[1],&DWP(4,"esi"));
+	&add	("edi",&DWP(8,"esi"));
+	&add	("ecx",&DWP(12,"esi"));
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,"esi"),$AH[0]);
+	&mov	(&DWP(4,"esi"),$AH[1]);
+	&mov	(&DWP(8,"esi"),"edi");
+	&mov	(&DWP(12,"esi"),"ecx");
+	 #&mov	(&DWP(0,"esp"),$AH[0]);
+	 &mov	(&DWP(4,"esp"),$AH[1]);
+	 &xor	($AH[1],"edi");			# magic
+	 &mov	(&DWP(8,"esp"),"edi");
+	 &mov	(&DWP(12,"esp"),"ecx");
+	#&mov	($E,&DWP(16,"esp"));
+	&mov	("edi",&DWP(20,"esp"));
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(24,"esp"));
+	&add	($E,&DWP(16,"esi"));
+	&add	("edi",&DWP(20,"esi"));
+	&add	("ecx",&DWP(24,"esi"));
+	&mov	(&DWP(16,"esi"),$E);
+	&mov	(&DWP(20,"esi"),"edi");
+	 &mov	(&DWP(20,"esp"),"edi");
+	&mov	("edi",&DWP(28,"esp"));
+	&mov	(&DWP(24,"esi"),"ecx");
+	 #&mov	(&DWP(16,"esp"),$E);
+	&add	("edi",&DWP(28,"esi"));
+	 &mov	(&DWP(24,"esp"),"ecx");
+	&mov	(&DWP(28,"esi"),"edi");
+	 &mov	(&DWP(28,"esp"),"edi");
+	&mov	("edi",&DWP(96+4,"esp"));	# inp
+
+	&vmovdqa	($t3,&QWP(64,$K256));
+	&sub	($K256,3*64);			# rewind K
+	&cmp	("edi",&DWP(96+8,"esp"));	# are we done yet?
+	&jb	(&label("grand_avx_bmi"));
+
+	&mov	("esp",&DWP(96+12,"esp"));	# restore sp
+	&vzeroall	();
+&function_end_A();
+						}
+						}
+						}}}
+&function_end_B("sha256_block_data_order");
+
+&asm_finish();
+
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-armv4.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-armv4.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..55d30cb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-armv4.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,732 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2007-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+#
+# Permission to use under GPL terms is granted.
+# ====================================================================
+
+# SHA256 block procedure for ARMv4. May 2007.
+
+# Performance is ~2x better than gcc 3.4 generated code and in "abso-
+# lute" terms is ~2250 cycles per 64-byte block or ~35 cycles per
+# byte [on single-issue Xscale PXA250 core].
+
+# July 2010.
+#
+# Rescheduling for dual-issue pipeline resulted in 22% improvement on
+# Cortex A8 core and ~20 cycles per processed byte.
+
+# February 2011.
+#
+# Profiler-assisted and platform-specific optimization resulted in 16%
+# improvement on Cortex A8 core and ~15.4 cycles per processed byte.
+
+# September 2013.
+#
+# Add NEON implementation. On Cortex A8 it was measured to process one
+# byte in 12.5 cycles or 23% faster than integer-only code. Snapdragon
+# S4 does it in 12.5 cycles too, but it's 50% faster than integer-only
+# code (meaning that latter performs sub-optimally, nothing was done
+# about it).
+
+# May 2014.
+#
+# Add ARMv8 code path performing at 2.0 cpb on Apple A7.
+
+$flavour = shift;
+if ($flavour=~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/) { $output=$flavour; undef $flavour; }
+else { while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {} }
+
+if ($flavour && $flavour ne "void") {
+    $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+    ( $xlate="${dir}arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
+    ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
+    die "can't locate arm-xlate.pl";
+
+    open STDOUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output";
+} else {
+    open STDOUT,">$output";
+}
+
+$ctx="r0";	$t0="r0";
+$inp="r1";	$t4="r1";
+$len="r2";	$t1="r2";
+$T1="r3";	$t3="r3";
+$A="r4";
+$B="r5";
+$C="r6";
+$D="r7";
+$E="r8";
+$F="r9";
+$G="r10";
+$H="r11";
+@V=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$F,$G,$H);
+$t2="r12";
+$Ktbl="r14";
+
+@Sigma0=( 2,13,22);
+@Sigma1=( 6,11,25);
+@sigma0=( 7,18, 3);
+@sigma1=(17,19,10);
+
+sub BODY_00_15 {
+my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f,$g,$h) = @_;
+
+$code.=<<___ if ($i<16);
+#if __ARM_ARCH__>=7
+	@ ldr	$t1,[$inp],#4			@ $i
+# if $i==15
+	str	$inp,[sp,#17*4]			@ make room for $t4
+# endif
+	eor	$t0,$e,$e,ror#`$Sigma1[1]-$Sigma1[0]`
+	add	$a,$a,$t2			@ h+=Maj(a,b,c) from the past
+	eor	$t0,$t0,$e,ror#`$Sigma1[2]-$Sigma1[0]`	@ Sigma1(e)
+# ifndef __ARMEB__
+	rev	$t1,$t1
+# endif
+#else
+	@ ldrb	$t1,[$inp,#3]			@ $i
+	add	$a,$a,$t2			@ h+=Maj(a,b,c) from the past
+	ldrb	$t2,[$inp,#2]
+	ldrb	$t0,[$inp,#1]
+	orr	$t1,$t1,$t2,lsl#8
+	ldrb	$t2,[$inp],#4
+	orr	$t1,$t1,$t0,lsl#16
+# if $i==15
+	str	$inp,[sp,#17*4]			@ make room for $t4
+# endif
+	eor	$t0,$e,$e,ror#`$Sigma1[1]-$Sigma1[0]`
+	orr	$t1,$t1,$t2,lsl#24
+	eor	$t0,$t0,$e,ror#`$Sigma1[2]-$Sigma1[0]`	@ Sigma1(e)
+#endif
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	ldr	$t2,[$Ktbl],#4			@ *K256++
+	add	$h,$h,$t1			@ h+=X[i]
+	str	$t1,[sp,#`$i%16`*4]
+	eor	$t1,$f,$g
+	add	$h,$h,$t0,ror#$Sigma1[0]	@ h+=Sigma1(e)
+	and	$t1,$t1,$e
+	add	$h,$h,$t2			@ h+=K256[i]
+	eor	$t1,$t1,$g			@ Ch(e,f,g)
+	eor	$t0,$a,$a,ror#`$Sigma0[1]-$Sigma0[0]`
+	add	$h,$h,$t1			@ h+=Ch(e,f,g)
+#if $i==31
+	and	$t2,$t2,#0xff
+	cmp	$t2,#0xf2			@ done?
+#endif
+#if $i<15
+# if __ARM_ARCH__>=7
+	ldr	$t1,[$inp],#4			@ prefetch
+# else
+	ldrb	$t1,[$inp,#3]
+# endif
+	eor	$t2,$a,$b			@ a^b, b^c in next round
+#else
+	ldr	$t1,[sp,#`($i+2)%16`*4]		@ from future BODY_16_xx
+	eor	$t2,$a,$b			@ a^b, b^c in next round
+	ldr	$t4,[sp,#`($i+15)%16`*4]	@ from future BODY_16_xx
+#endif
+	eor	$t0,$t0,$a,ror#`$Sigma0[2]-$Sigma0[0]`	@ Sigma0(a)
+	and	$t3,$t3,$t2			@ (b^c)&=(a^b)
+	add	$d,$d,$h			@ d+=h
+	eor	$t3,$t3,$b			@ Maj(a,b,c)
+	add	$h,$h,$t0,ror#$Sigma0[0]	@ h+=Sigma0(a)
+	@ add	$h,$h,$t3			@ h+=Maj(a,b,c)
+___
+	($t2,$t3)=($t3,$t2);
+}
+
+sub BODY_16_XX {
+my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f,$g,$h) = @_;
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	@ ldr	$t1,[sp,#`($i+1)%16`*4]		@ $i
+	@ ldr	$t4,[sp,#`($i+14)%16`*4]
+	mov	$t0,$t1,ror#$sigma0[0]
+	add	$a,$a,$t2			@ h+=Maj(a,b,c) from the past
+	mov	$t2,$t4,ror#$sigma1[0]
+	eor	$t0,$t0,$t1,ror#$sigma0[1]
+	eor	$t2,$t2,$t4,ror#$sigma1[1]
+	eor	$t0,$t0,$t1,lsr#$sigma0[2]	@ sigma0(X[i+1])
+	ldr	$t1,[sp,#`($i+0)%16`*4]
+	eor	$t2,$t2,$t4,lsr#$sigma1[2]	@ sigma1(X[i+14])
+	ldr	$t4,[sp,#`($i+9)%16`*4]
+
+	add	$t2,$t2,$t0
+	eor	$t0,$e,$e,ror#`$Sigma1[1]-$Sigma1[0]`	@ from BODY_00_15
+	add	$t1,$t1,$t2
+	eor	$t0,$t0,$e,ror#`$Sigma1[2]-$Sigma1[0]`	@ Sigma1(e)
+	add	$t1,$t1,$t4			@ X[i]
+___
+	&BODY_00_15(@_);
+}
+
+$code=<<___;
+#ifndef __KERNEL__
+# include "arm_arch.h"
+#else
+# define __ARM_ARCH__ __LINUX_ARM_ARCH__
+# define __ARM_MAX_ARCH__ 7
+#endif
+
+.text
+#if defined(__thumb2__)
+.syntax unified
+.thumb
+#else
+.code   32
+#endif
+
+.type	K256,%object
+.align	5
+K256:
+.word	0x428a2f98,0x71374491,0xb5c0fbcf,0xe9b5dba5
+.word	0x3956c25b,0x59f111f1,0x923f82a4,0xab1c5ed5
+.word	0xd807aa98,0x12835b01,0x243185be,0x550c7dc3
+.word	0x72be5d74,0x80deb1fe,0x9bdc06a7,0xc19bf174
+.word	0xe49b69c1,0xefbe4786,0x0fc19dc6,0x240ca1cc
+.word	0x2de92c6f,0x4a7484aa,0x5cb0a9dc,0x76f988da
+.word	0x983e5152,0xa831c66d,0xb00327c8,0xbf597fc7
+.word	0xc6e00bf3,0xd5a79147,0x06ca6351,0x14292967
+.word	0x27b70a85,0x2e1b2138,0x4d2c6dfc,0x53380d13
+.word	0x650a7354,0x766a0abb,0x81c2c92e,0x92722c85
+.word	0xa2bfe8a1,0xa81a664b,0xc24b8b70,0xc76c51a3
+.word	0xd192e819,0xd6990624,0xf40e3585,0x106aa070
+.word	0x19a4c116,0x1e376c08,0x2748774c,0x34b0bcb5
+.word	0x391c0cb3,0x4ed8aa4a,0x5b9cca4f,0x682e6ff3
+.word	0x748f82ee,0x78a5636f,0x84c87814,0x8cc70208
+.word	0x90befffa,0xa4506ceb,0xbef9a3f7,0xc67178f2
+.size	K256,.-K256
+.word	0				@ terminator
+#if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7 && !defined(__KERNEL__)
+.LOPENSSL_armcap:
+.word	OPENSSL_armcap_P-.Lsha256_block_data_order
+#endif
+.align	5
+
+.global	sha256_block_data_order
+.type	sha256_block_data_order,%function
+sha256_block_data_order:
+.Lsha256_block_data_order:
+#if __ARM_ARCH__<7 && !defined(__thumb2__)
+	sub	r3,pc,#8		@ sha256_block_data_order
+#else
+	adr	r3,.Lsha256_block_data_order
+#endif
+#if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7 && !defined(__KERNEL__)
+	ldr	r12,.LOPENSSL_armcap
+	ldr	r12,[r3,r12]		@ OPENSSL_armcap_P
+#ifdef	__APPLE__
+	ldr	r12,[r12]
+#endif
+	tst	r12,#ARMV8_SHA256
+	bne	.LARMv8
+	tst	r12,#ARMV7_NEON
+	bne	.LNEON
+#endif
+	add	$len,$inp,$len,lsl#6	@ len to point at the end of inp
+	stmdb	sp!,{$ctx,$inp,$len,r4-r11,lr}
+	ldmia	$ctx,{$A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$F,$G,$H}
+	sub	$Ktbl,r3,#256+32	@ K256
+	sub	sp,sp,#16*4		@ alloca(X[16])
+.Loop:
+# if __ARM_ARCH__>=7
+	ldr	$t1,[$inp],#4
+# else
+	ldrb	$t1,[$inp,#3]
+# endif
+	eor	$t3,$B,$C		@ magic
+	eor	$t2,$t2,$t2
+___
+for($i=0;$i<16;$i++)	{ &BODY_00_15($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+$code.=".Lrounds_16_xx:\n";
+for (;$i<32;$i++)	{ &BODY_16_XX($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+$code.=<<___;
+#if __ARM_ARCH__>=7
+	ite	eq			@ Thumb2 thing, sanity check in ARM
+#endif
+	ldreq	$t3,[sp,#16*4]		@ pull ctx
+	bne	.Lrounds_16_xx
+
+	add	$A,$A,$t2		@ h+=Maj(a,b,c) from the past
+	ldr	$t0,[$t3,#0]
+	ldr	$t1,[$t3,#4]
+	ldr	$t2,[$t3,#8]
+	add	$A,$A,$t0
+	ldr	$t0,[$t3,#12]
+	add	$B,$B,$t1
+	ldr	$t1,[$t3,#16]
+	add	$C,$C,$t2
+	ldr	$t2,[$t3,#20]
+	add	$D,$D,$t0
+	ldr	$t0,[$t3,#24]
+	add	$E,$E,$t1
+	ldr	$t1,[$t3,#28]
+	add	$F,$F,$t2
+	ldr	$inp,[sp,#17*4]		@ pull inp
+	ldr	$t2,[sp,#18*4]		@ pull inp+len
+	add	$G,$G,$t0
+	add	$H,$H,$t1
+	stmia	$t3,{$A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$F,$G,$H}
+	cmp	$inp,$t2
+	sub	$Ktbl,$Ktbl,#256	@ rewind Ktbl
+	bne	.Loop
+
+	add	sp,sp,#`16+3`*4	@ destroy frame
+#if __ARM_ARCH__>=5
+	ldmia	sp!,{r4-r11,pc}
+#else
+	ldmia	sp!,{r4-r11,lr}
+	tst	lr,#1
+	moveq	pc,lr			@ be binary compatible with V4, yet
+	bx	lr			@ interoperable with Thumb ISA:-)
+#endif
+.size	sha256_block_data_order,.-sha256_block_data_order
+___
+######################################################################
+# NEON stuff
+#
+{{{
+my @X=map("q$_",(0..3));
+my ($T0,$T1,$T2,$T3,$T4,$T5)=("q8","q9","q10","q11","d24","d25");
+my $Xfer=$t4;
+my $j=0;
+
+sub Dlo()   { shift=~m|q([1]?[0-9])|?"d".($1*2):"";     }
+sub Dhi()   { shift=~m|q([1]?[0-9])|?"d".($1*2+1):"";   }
+
+sub AUTOLOAD()          # thunk [simplified] x86-style perlasm
+{ my $opcode = $AUTOLOAD; $opcode =~ s/.*:://; $opcode =~ s/_/\./;
+  my $arg = pop;
+    $arg = "#$arg" if ($arg*1 eq $arg);
+    $code .= "\t$opcode\t".join(',',@_,$arg)."\n";
+}
+
+sub Xupdate()
+{ use integer;
+  my $body = shift;
+  my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body);
+  my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f,$g,$h);
+
+	&vext_8		($T0,@X[0],@X[1],4);	# X[1..4]
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&vext_8		($T1,@X[2],@X[3],4);	# X[9..12]
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&vshr_u32	($T2,$T0,$sigma0[0]);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&vadd_i32	(@X[0],@X[0],$T1);	# X[0..3] += X[9..12]
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&vshr_u32	($T1,$T0,$sigma0[2]);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&vsli_32	($T2,$T0,32-$sigma0[0]);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&vshr_u32	($T3,$T0,$sigma0[1]);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&veor		($T1,$T1,$T2);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&vsli_32	($T3,$T0,32-$sigma0[1]);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	  &vshr_u32	($T4,&Dhi(@X[3]),$sigma1[0]);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&veor		($T1,$T1,$T3);		# sigma0(X[1..4])
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	  &vsli_32	($T4,&Dhi(@X[3]),32-$sigma1[0]);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	  &vshr_u32	($T5,&Dhi(@X[3]),$sigma1[2]);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&vadd_i32	(@X[0],@X[0],$T1);	# X[0..3] += sigma0(X[1..4])
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	  &veor		($T5,$T5,$T4);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	  &vshr_u32	($T4,&Dhi(@X[3]),$sigma1[1]);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	  &vsli_32	($T4,&Dhi(@X[3]),32-$sigma1[1]);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	  &veor		($T5,$T5,$T4);		# sigma1(X[14..15])
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&vadd_i32	(&Dlo(@X[0]),&Dlo(@X[0]),$T5);# X[0..1] += sigma1(X[14..15])
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	  &vshr_u32	($T4,&Dlo(@X[0]),$sigma1[0]);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	  &vsli_32	($T4,&Dlo(@X[0]),32-$sigma1[0]);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	  &vshr_u32	($T5,&Dlo(@X[0]),$sigma1[2]);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	  &veor		($T5,$T5,$T4);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	  &vshr_u32	($T4,&Dlo(@X[0]),$sigma1[1]);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&vld1_32	("{$T0}","[$Ktbl,:128]!");
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	  &vsli_32	($T4,&Dlo(@X[0]),32-$sigma1[1]);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	  &veor		($T5,$T5,$T4);		# sigma1(X[16..17])
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&vadd_i32	(&Dhi(@X[0]),&Dhi(@X[0]),$T5);# X[2..3] += sigma1(X[16..17])
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&vadd_i32	($T0,$T0,@X[0]);
+	 while($#insns>=2) { eval(shift(@insns)); }
+	&vst1_32	("{$T0}","[$Xfer,:128]!");
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+
+	push(@X,shift(@X));		# "rotate" X[]
+}
+
+sub Xpreload()
+{ use integer;
+  my $body = shift;
+  my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body);
+  my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f,$g,$h);
+
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&vld1_32	("{$T0}","[$Ktbl,:128]!");
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&vrev32_8	(@X[0],@X[0]);
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&vadd_i32	($T0,$T0,@X[0]);
+	 foreach (@insns) { eval; }	# remaining instructions
+	&vst1_32	("{$T0}","[$Xfer,:128]!");
+
+	push(@X,shift(@X));		# "rotate" X[]
+}
+
+sub body_00_15 () {
+	(
+	'($a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f,$g,$h)=@V;'.
+	'&add	($h,$h,$t1)',			# h+=X[i]+K[i]
+	'&eor	($t1,$f,$g)',
+	'&eor	($t0,$e,$e,"ror#".($Sigma1[1]-$Sigma1[0]))',
+	'&add	($a,$a,$t2)',			# h+=Maj(a,b,c) from the past
+	'&and	($t1,$t1,$e)',
+	'&eor	($t2,$t0,$e,"ror#".($Sigma1[2]-$Sigma1[0]))',	# Sigma1(e)
+	'&eor	($t0,$a,$a,"ror#".($Sigma0[1]-$Sigma0[0]))',
+	'&eor	($t1,$t1,$g)',			# Ch(e,f,g)
+	'&add	($h,$h,$t2,"ror#$Sigma1[0]")',	# h+=Sigma1(e)
+	'&eor	($t2,$a,$b)',			# a^b, b^c in next round
+	'&eor	($t0,$t0,$a,"ror#".($Sigma0[2]-$Sigma0[0]))',	# Sigma0(a)
+	'&add	($h,$h,$t1)',			# h+=Ch(e,f,g)
+	'&ldr	($t1,sprintf "[sp,#%d]",4*(($j+1)&15))	if (($j&15)!=15);'.
+	'&ldr	($t1,"[$Ktbl]")				if ($j==15);'.
+	'&ldr	($t1,"[sp,#64]")			if ($j==31)',
+	'&and	($t3,$t3,$t2)',			# (b^c)&=(a^b)
+	'&add	($d,$d,$h)',			# d+=h
+	'&add	($h,$h,$t0,"ror#$Sigma0[0]");'.	# h+=Sigma0(a)
+	'&eor	($t3,$t3,$b)',			# Maj(a,b,c)
+	'$j++;	unshift(@V,pop(@V)); ($t2,$t3)=($t3,$t2);'
+	)
+}
+
+$code.=<<___;
+#if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7
+.arch	armv7-a
+.fpu	neon
+
+.global	sha256_block_data_order_neon
+.type	sha256_block_data_order_neon,%function
+.align	5
+.skip	16
+sha256_block_data_order_neon:
+.LNEON:
+	stmdb	sp!,{r4-r12,lr}
+
+	sub	$H,sp,#16*4+16
+	adr	$Ktbl,K256
+	bic	$H,$H,#15		@ align for 128-bit stores
+	mov	$t2,sp
+	mov	sp,$H			@ alloca
+	add	$len,$inp,$len,lsl#6	@ len to point at the end of inp
+
+	vld1.8		{@X[0]},[$inp]!
+	vld1.8		{@X[1]},[$inp]!
+	vld1.8		{@X[2]},[$inp]!
+	vld1.8		{@X[3]},[$inp]!
+	vld1.32		{$T0},[$Ktbl,:128]!
+	vld1.32		{$T1},[$Ktbl,:128]!
+	vld1.32		{$T2},[$Ktbl,:128]!
+	vld1.32		{$T3},[$Ktbl,:128]!
+	vrev32.8	@X[0],@X[0]		@ yes, even on
+	str		$ctx,[sp,#64]
+	vrev32.8	@X[1],@X[1]		@ big-endian
+	str		$inp,[sp,#68]
+	mov		$Xfer,sp
+	vrev32.8	@X[2],@X[2]
+	str		$len,[sp,#72]
+	vrev32.8	@X[3],@X[3]
+	str		$t2,[sp,#76]		@ save original sp
+	vadd.i32	$T0,$T0,@X[0]
+	vadd.i32	$T1,$T1,@X[1]
+	vst1.32		{$T0},[$Xfer,:128]!
+	vadd.i32	$T2,$T2,@X[2]
+	vst1.32		{$T1},[$Xfer,:128]!
+	vadd.i32	$T3,$T3,@X[3]
+	vst1.32		{$T2},[$Xfer,:128]!
+	vst1.32		{$T3},[$Xfer,:128]!
+
+	ldmia		$ctx,{$A-$H}
+	sub		$Xfer,$Xfer,#64
+	ldr		$t1,[sp,#0]
+	eor		$t2,$t2,$t2
+	eor		$t3,$B,$C
+	b		.L_00_48
+
+.align	4
+.L_00_48:
+___
+	&Xupdate(\&body_00_15);
+	&Xupdate(\&body_00_15);
+	&Xupdate(\&body_00_15);
+	&Xupdate(\&body_00_15);
+$code.=<<___;
+	teq	$t1,#0				@ check for K256 terminator
+	ldr	$t1,[sp,#0]
+	sub	$Xfer,$Xfer,#64
+	bne	.L_00_48
+
+	ldr		$inp,[sp,#68]
+	ldr		$t0,[sp,#72]
+	sub		$Ktbl,$Ktbl,#256	@ rewind $Ktbl
+	teq		$inp,$t0
+	it		eq
+	subeq		$inp,$inp,#64		@ avoid SEGV
+	vld1.8		{@X[0]},[$inp]!		@ load next input block
+	vld1.8		{@X[1]},[$inp]!
+	vld1.8		{@X[2]},[$inp]!
+	vld1.8		{@X[3]},[$inp]!
+	it		ne
+	strne		$inp,[sp,#68]
+	mov		$Xfer,sp
+___
+	&Xpreload(\&body_00_15);
+	&Xpreload(\&body_00_15);
+	&Xpreload(\&body_00_15);
+	&Xpreload(\&body_00_15);
+$code.=<<___;
+	ldr	$t0,[$t1,#0]
+	add	$A,$A,$t2			@ h+=Maj(a,b,c) from the past
+	ldr	$t2,[$t1,#4]
+	ldr	$t3,[$t1,#8]
+	ldr	$t4,[$t1,#12]
+	add	$A,$A,$t0			@ accumulate
+	ldr	$t0,[$t1,#16]
+	add	$B,$B,$t2
+	ldr	$t2,[$t1,#20]
+	add	$C,$C,$t3
+	ldr	$t3,[$t1,#24]
+	add	$D,$D,$t4
+	ldr	$t4,[$t1,#28]
+	add	$E,$E,$t0
+	str	$A,[$t1],#4
+	add	$F,$F,$t2
+	str	$B,[$t1],#4
+	add	$G,$G,$t3
+	str	$C,[$t1],#4
+	add	$H,$H,$t4
+	str	$D,[$t1],#4
+	stmia	$t1,{$E-$H}
+
+	ittte	ne
+	movne	$Xfer,sp
+	ldrne	$t1,[sp,#0]
+	eorne	$t2,$t2,$t2
+	ldreq	sp,[sp,#76]			@ restore original sp
+	itt	ne
+	eorne	$t3,$B,$C
+	bne	.L_00_48
+
+	ldmia	sp!,{r4-r12,pc}
+.size	sha256_block_data_order_neon,.-sha256_block_data_order_neon
+#endif
+___
+}}}
+######################################################################
+# ARMv8 stuff
+#
+{{{
+my ($ABCD,$EFGH,$abcd)=map("q$_",(0..2));
+my @MSG=map("q$_",(8..11));
+my ($W0,$W1,$ABCD_SAVE,$EFGH_SAVE)=map("q$_",(12..15));
+my $Ktbl="r3";
+
+$code.=<<___;
+#if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7 && !defined(__KERNEL__)
+
+# if defined(__thumb2__)
+#  define INST(a,b,c,d)	.byte	c,d|0xc,a,b
+# else
+#  define INST(a,b,c,d)	.byte	a,b,c,d
+# endif
+
+.type	sha256_block_data_order_armv8,%function
+.align	5
+sha256_block_data_order_armv8:
+.LARMv8:
+	vld1.32	{$ABCD,$EFGH},[$ctx]
+	sub	$Ktbl,$Ktbl,#256+32
+	add	$len,$inp,$len,lsl#6	@ len to point at the end of inp
+	b	.Loop_v8
+
+.align	4
+.Loop_v8:
+	vld1.8		{@MSG[0]-@MSG[1]},[$inp]!
+	vld1.8		{@MSG[2]-@MSG[3]},[$inp]!
+	vld1.32		{$W0},[$Ktbl]!
+	vrev32.8	@MSG[0],@MSG[0]
+	vrev32.8	@MSG[1],@MSG[1]
+	vrev32.8	@MSG[2],@MSG[2]
+	vrev32.8	@MSG[3],@MSG[3]
+	vmov		$ABCD_SAVE,$ABCD	@ offload
+	vmov		$EFGH_SAVE,$EFGH
+	teq		$inp,$len
+___
+for($i=0;$i<12;$i++) {
+$code.=<<___;
+	vld1.32		{$W1},[$Ktbl]!
+	vadd.i32	$W0,$W0,@MSG[0]
+	sha256su0	@MSG[0],@MSG[1]
+	vmov		$abcd,$ABCD
+	sha256h		$ABCD,$EFGH,$W0
+	sha256h2	$EFGH,$abcd,$W0
+	sha256su1	@MSG[0],@MSG[2],@MSG[3]
+___
+	($W0,$W1)=($W1,$W0);	push(@MSG,shift(@MSG));
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	vld1.32		{$W1},[$Ktbl]!
+	vadd.i32	$W0,$W0,@MSG[0]
+	vmov		$abcd,$ABCD
+	sha256h		$ABCD,$EFGH,$W0
+	sha256h2	$EFGH,$abcd,$W0
+
+	vld1.32		{$W0},[$Ktbl]!
+	vadd.i32	$W1,$W1,@MSG[1]
+	vmov		$abcd,$ABCD
+	sha256h		$ABCD,$EFGH,$W1
+	sha256h2	$EFGH,$abcd,$W1
+
+	vld1.32		{$W1},[$Ktbl]
+	vadd.i32	$W0,$W0,@MSG[2]
+	sub		$Ktbl,$Ktbl,#256-16	@ rewind
+	vmov		$abcd,$ABCD
+	sha256h		$ABCD,$EFGH,$W0
+	sha256h2	$EFGH,$abcd,$W0
+
+	vadd.i32	$W1,$W1,@MSG[3]
+	vmov		$abcd,$ABCD
+	sha256h		$ABCD,$EFGH,$W1
+	sha256h2	$EFGH,$abcd,$W1
+
+	vadd.i32	$ABCD,$ABCD,$ABCD_SAVE
+	vadd.i32	$EFGH,$EFGH,$EFGH_SAVE
+	it		ne
+	bne		.Loop_v8
+
+	vst1.32		{$ABCD,$EFGH},[$ctx]
+
+	ret		@ bx lr
+.size	sha256_block_data_order_armv8,.-sha256_block_data_order_armv8
+#endif
+___
+}}}
+$code.=<<___;
+.asciz  "SHA256 block transform for ARMv4/NEON/ARMv8, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+.align	2
+#if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7 && !defined(__KERNEL__)
+.comm   OPENSSL_armcap_P,4,4
+#endif
+___
+
+open SELF,$0;
+while(<SELF>) {
+	next if (/^#!/);
+	last if (!s/^#/@/ and !/^$/);
+	print;
+}
+close SELF;
+
+{   my  %opcode = (
+	"sha256h"	=> 0xf3000c40,	"sha256h2"	=> 0xf3100c40,
+	"sha256su0"	=> 0xf3ba03c0,	"sha256su1"	=> 0xf3200c40	);
+
+    sub unsha256 {
+	my ($mnemonic,$arg)=@_;
+
+	if ($arg =~ m/q([0-9]+)(?:,\s*q([0-9]+))?,\s*q([0-9]+)/o) {
+	    my $word = $opcode{$mnemonic}|(($1&7)<<13)|(($1&8)<<19)
+					 |(($2&7)<<17)|(($2&8)<<4)
+					 |(($3&7)<<1) |(($3&8)<<2);
+	    # since ARMv7 instructions are always encoded little-endian.
+	    # correct solution is to use .inst directive, but older
+	    # assemblers don't implement it:-(
+	    sprintf "INST(0x%02x,0x%02x,0x%02x,0x%02x)\t@ %s %s",
+			$word&0xff,($word>>8)&0xff,
+			($word>>16)&0xff,($word>>24)&0xff,
+			$mnemonic,$arg;
+	}
+    }
+}
+
+foreach (split($/,$code)) {
+
+	s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/geo;
+
+	s/\b(sha256\w+)\s+(q.*)/unsha256($1,$2)/geo;
+
+	s/\bret\b/bx	lr/go		or
+	s/\bbx\s+lr\b/.word\t0xe12fff1e/go;	# make it possible to compile with -march=armv4
+
+	print $_,"\n";
+}
+
+close STDOUT; # enforce flush
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-c64xplus.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-c64xplus.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3ab7d9b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-c64xplus.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,320 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2012-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# SHA256 for C64x+.
+#
+# January 2012
+#
+# Performance is just below 10 cycles per processed byte, which is
+# almost 40% faster than compiler-generated code. Unroll is unlikely
+# to give more than ~8% improvement...
+#
+# !!! Note that this module uses AMR, which means that all interrupt
+# service routines are expected to preserve it and for own well-being
+# zero it upon entry.
+
+while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {}
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+($CTXA,$INP,$NUM) = ("A4","B4","A6");            # arguments
+ $K256="A3";
+
+($A,$Actx,$B,$Bctx,$C,$Cctx,$D,$Dctx,$T2,$S0,$s1,$t0a,$t1a,$t2a,$X9,$X14)
+	=map("A$_",(16..31));
+($E,$Ectx,$F,$Fctx,$G,$Gctx,$H,$Hctx,$T1,$S1,$s0,$t0e,$t1e,$t2e,$X1,$X15)
+	=map("B$_",(16..31));
+
+($Xia,$Xib)=("A5","B5");			# circular/ring buffer
+ $CTXB=$t2e;
+
+($Xn,$X0,$K)=("B7","B8","B9");
+($Maj,$Ch)=($T2,"B6");
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	.text
+
+	.if	.ASSEMBLER_VERSION<7000000
+	.asg	0,__TI_EABI__
+	.endif
+	.if	__TI_EABI__
+	.nocmp
+	.asg	sha256_block_data_order,_sha256_block_data_order
+	.endif
+
+	.asg	B3,RA
+	.asg	A15,FP
+	.asg	B15,SP
+
+	.if	.BIG_ENDIAN
+	.asg	SWAP2,MV
+	.asg	SWAP4,MV
+	.endif
+
+	.global	_sha256_block_data_order
+_sha256_block_data_order:
+__sha256_block:
+	.asmfunc stack_usage(64)
+	MV	$NUM,A0				; reassign $NUM
+||	MVK	-64,B0
+  [!A0]	BNOP	RA				; if ($NUM==0) return;
+|| [A0]	STW	FP,*SP--[16]			; save frame pointer and alloca(64)
+|| [A0]	MV	SP,FP
+   [A0]	ADDKPC	__sha256_block,B2
+|| [A0]	AND	B0,SP,SP			; align stack at 64 bytes
+	.if	__TI_EABI__
+   [A0]	MVK	0x00404,B1
+|| [A0]	MVKL	\$PCR_OFFSET(K256,__sha256_block),$K256
+   [A0]	MVKH	0x50000,B1
+|| [A0]	MVKH	\$PCR_OFFSET(K256,__sha256_block),$K256
+	.else
+   [A0]	MVK	0x00404,B1
+|| [A0]	MVKL	(K256-__sha256_block),$K256
+   [A0]	MVKH	0x50000,B1
+|| [A0]	MVKH	(K256-__sha256_block),$K256
+	.endif
+   [A0]	MVC	B1,AMR				; setup circular addressing
+|| [A0]	MV	SP,$Xia
+   [A0]	MV	SP,$Xib
+|| [A0]	ADD	B2,$K256,$K256
+|| [A0]	MV	$CTXA,$CTXB
+|| [A0]	SUBAW	SP,2,SP				; reserve two words above buffer
+	LDW	*${CTXA}[0],$A			; load ctx
+||	LDW	*${CTXB}[4],$E
+	LDW	*${CTXA}[1],$B
+||	LDW	*${CTXB}[5],$F
+	LDW	*${CTXA}[2],$C
+||	LDW	*${CTXB}[6],$G
+	LDW	*${CTXA}[3],$D
+||	LDW	*${CTXB}[7],$H
+
+	LDNW	*$INP++,$Xn			; pre-fetch input
+	LDW	*$K256++,$K			; pre-fetch K256[0]
+	MVK	14,B0				; loop counters
+	MVK	47,B1
+||	ADDAW	$Xia,9,$Xia
+outerloop?:
+	SUB	A0,1,A0
+||	MV	$A,$Actx
+||	MV	$E,$Ectx
+||	MVD	$B,$Bctx
+||	MVD	$F,$Fctx
+	MV	$C,$Cctx
+||	MV	$G,$Gctx
+||	MVD	$D,$Dctx
+||	MVD	$H,$Hctx
+||	SWAP4	$Xn,$X0
+
+	SPLOOPD	8				; BODY_00_14
+||	MVC	B0,ILC
+||	SWAP2	$X0,$X0
+
+	LDNW	*$INP++,$Xn
+||	ROTL	$A,30,$S0
+||	OR	$A,$B,$Maj
+||	AND	$A,$B,$t2a
+||	ROTL	$E,26,$S1
+||	AND	$F,$E,$Ch
+||	ANDN	$G,$E,$t2e
+	ROTL	$A,19,$t0a
+||	AND	$C,$Maj,$Maj
+||	ROTL	$E,21,$t0e
+||	XOR	$t2e,$Ch,$Ch			; Ch(e,f,g) = (e&f)^(~e&g)
+	ROTL	$A,10,$t1a
+||	OR	$t2a,$Maj,$Maj			; Maj(a,b,c) = ((a|b)&c)|(a&b)
+||	ROTL	$E,7,$t1e
+||	ADD	$K,$H,$T1			; T1 = h + K256[i]
+	ADD	$X0,$T1,$T1			; T1 += X[i];
+||	STW	$X0,*$Xib++
+||	XOR	$t0a,$S0,$S0
+||	XOR	$t0e,$S1,$S1
+	XOR	$t1a,$S0,$S0			; Sigma0(a)
+||	XOR	$t1e,$S1,$S1			; Sigma1(e)
+||	LDW	*$K256++,$K			; pre-fetch K256[i+1]
+||	ADD	$Ch,$T1,$T1			; T1 += Ch(e,f,g)
+	ADD	$S1,$T1,$T1			; T1 += Sigma1(e)
+||	ADD	$S0,$Maj,$T2			; T2 = Sigma0(a) + Maj(a,b,c)
+||	ROTL	$G,0,$H				; h = g
+||	MV	$F,$G				; g = f
+||	MV	$X0,$X14
+||	SWAP4	$Xn,$X0
+	SWAP2	$X0,$X0
+||	MV	$E,$F				; f = e
+||	ADD	$D,$T1,$E			; e = d + T1
+||	MV	$C,$D				; d = c
+	MV	$B,$C				; c = b
+||	MV	$A,$B				; b = a
+||	ADD	$T1,$T2,$A			; a = T1 + T2
+	SPKERNEL
+
+	ROTL	$A,30,$S0			; BODY_15
+||	OR	$A,$B,$Maj
+||	AND	$A,$B,$t2a
+||	ROTL	$E,26,$S1
+||	AND	$F,$E,$Ch
+||	ANDN	$G,$E,$t2e
+||	LDW	*${Xib}[1],$Xn			; modulo-scheduled
+	ROTL	$A,19,$t0a
+||	AND	$C,$Maj,$Maj
+||	ROTL	$E,21,$t0e
+||	XOR	$t2e,$Ch,$Ch			; Ch(e,f,g) = (e&f)^(~e&g)
+||	LDW	*${Xib}[2],$X1			; modulo-scheduled
+	ROTL	$A,10,$t1a
+||	OR	$t2a,$Maj,$Maj			; Maj(a,b,c) = ((a|b)&c)|(a&b)
+||	ROTL	$E,7,$t1e
+||	ADD	$K,$H,$T1			; T1 = h + K256[i]
+	ADD	$X0,$T1,$T1			; T1 += X[i];
+||	STW	$X0,*$Xib++
+||	XOR	$t0a,$S0,$S0
+||	XOR	$t0e,$S1,$S1
+	XOR	$t1a,$S0,$S0			; Sigma0(a)
+||	XOR	$t1e,$S1,$S1			; Sigma1(e)
+||	LDW	*$K256++,$K			; pre-fetch K256[i+1]
+||	ADD	$Ch,$T1,$T1			; T1 += Ch(e,f,g)
+	ADD	$S1,$T1,$T1			; T1 += Sigma1(e)
+||	ADD	$S0,$Maj,$T2			; T2 = Sigma0(a) + Maj(a,b,c)
+||	ROTL	$G,0,$H				; h = g
+||	MV	$F,$G				; g = f
+||	MV	$X0,$X15
+	MV	$E,$F				; f = e
+||	ADD	$D,$T1,$E			; e = d + T1
+||	MV	$C,$D				; d = c
+||	MV	$Xn,$X0				; modulo-scheduled
+||	LDW	*$Xia,$X9			; modulo-scheduled
+||	ROTL	$X1,25,$t0e			; modulo-scheduled
+||	ROTL	$X14,15,$t0a			; modulo-scheduled
+	SHRU	$X1,3,$s0			; modulo-scheduled
+||	SHRU	$X14,10,$s1			; modulo-scheduled
+||	ROTL	$B,0,$C				; c = b
+||	MV	$A,$B				; b = a
+||	ADD	$T1,$T2,$A			; a = T1 + T2
+
+	SPLOOPD	10				; BODY_16_63
+||	MVC	B1,ILC
+||	ROTL	$X1,14,$t1e			; modulo-scheduled
+||	ROTL	$X14,13,$t1a			; modulo-scheduled
+
+	XOR	$t0e,$s0,$s0
+||	XOR	$t0a,$s1,$s1
+||	MV	$X15,$X14
+||	MV	$X1,$Xn
+	XOR	$t1e,$s0,$s0			; sigma0(X[i+1])
+||	XOR	$t1a,$s1,$s1			; sigma1(X[i+14])
+||	LDW	*${Xib}[2],$X1			; module-scheduled
+	ROTL	$A,30,$S0
+||	OR	$A,$B,$Maj
+||	AND	$A,$B,$t2a
+||	ROTL	$E,26,$S1
+||	AND	$F,$E,$Ch
+||	ANDN	$G,$E,$t2e
+||	ADD	$X9,$X0,$X0			; X[i] += X[i+9]
+	ROTL	$A,19,$t0a
+||	AND	$C,$Maj,$Maj
+||	ROTL	$E,21,$t0e
+||	XOR	$t2e,$Ch,$Ch			; Ch(e,f,g) = (e&f)^(~e&g)
+||	ADD	$s0,$X0,$X0			; X[i] += sigma1(X[i+1])
+	ROTL	$A,10,$t1a
+||	OR	$t2a,$Maj,$Maj			; Maj(a,b,c) = ((a|b)&c)|(a&b)
+||	ROTL	$E,7,$t1e
+||	ADD	$H,$K,$T1			; T1 = h + K256[i]
+||	ADD	$s1,$X0,$X0			; X[i] += sigma1(X[i+14])
+	XOR	$t0a,$S0,$S0
+||	XOR	$t0e,$S1,$S1
+||	ADD	$X0,$T1,$T1			; T1 += X[i]
+||	STW	$X0,*$Xib++
+	XOR	$t1a,$S0,$S0			; Sigma0(a)
+||	XOR	$t1e,$S1,$S1			; Sigma1(e)
+||	ADD	$Ch,$T1,$T1			; T1 += Ch(e,f,g)
+||	MV	$X0,$X15
+||	ROTL	$G,0,$H				; h = g
+||	LDW	*$K256++,$K			; pre-fetch K256[i+1]
+	ADD	$S1,$T1,$T1			; T1 += Sigma1(e)
+||	ADD	$S0,$Maj,$T2			; T2 = Sigma0(a) + Maj(a,b,c)
+||	MV	$F,$G				; g = f
+||	MV	$Xn,$X0				; modulo-scheduled
+||	LDW	*++$Xia,$X9			; modulo-scheduled
+||	ROTL	$X1,25,$t0e			; module-scheduled
+||	ROTL	$X14,15,$t0a			; modulo-scheduled
+	ROTL	$X1,14,$t1e			; modulo-scheduled
+||	ROTL	$X14,13,$t1a			; modulo-scheduled
+||	MV	$E,$F				; f = e
+||	ADD	$D,$T1,$E			; e = d + T1
+||	MV	$C,$D				; d = c
+||	MV	$B,$C				; c = b
+	MV	$A,$B				; b = a
+||	ADD	$T1,$T2,$A			; a = T1 + T2
+||	SHRU	$X1,3,$s0			; modulo-scheduled
+||	SHRU	$X14,10,$s1			; modulo-scheduled
+	SPKERNEL
+
+   [A0]	B	outerloop?
+|| [A0]	LDNW	*$INP++,$Xn			; pre-fetch input
+|| [A0]	ADDK	-260,$K256			; rewind K256
+||	ADD	$Actx,$A,$A			; accumulate ctx
+||	ADD	$Ectx,$E,$E
+||	ADD	$Bctx,$B,$B
+	ADD	$Fctx,$F,$F
+||	ADD	$Cctx,$C,$C
+||	ADD	$Gctx,$G,$G
+||	ADD	$Dctx,$D,$D
+||	ADD	$Hctx,$H,$H
+|| [A0]	LDW	*$K256++,$K			; pre-fetch K256[0]
+
+  [!A0]	BNOP	RA
+||[!A0]	MV	$CTXA,$CTXB
+  [!A0]	MV	FP,SP				; restore stack pointer
+||[!A0]	LDW	*FP[0],FP			; restore frame pointer
+  [!A0]	STW	$A,*${CTXA}[0]  		; save ctx
+||[!A0]	STW	$E,*${CTXB}[4]
+||[!A0]	MVK	0,B0
+  [!A0]	STW	$B,*${CTXA}[1]
+||[!A0]	STW	$F,*${CTXB}[5]
+||[!A0]	MVC	B0,AMR				; clear AMR
+	STW	$C,*${CTXA}[2]
+||	STW	$G,*${CTXB}[6]
+	STW	$D,*${CTXA}[3]
+||	STW	$H,*${CTXB}[7]
+	.endasmfunc
+
+	.if	__TI_EABI__
+	.sect	".text:sha_asm.const"
+	.else
+	.sect	".const:sha_asm"
+	.endif
+	.align	128
+K256:
+	.uword	0x428a2f98, 0x71374491, 0xb5c0fbcf, 0xe9b5dba5
+	.uword	0x3956c25b, 0x59f111f1, 0x923f82a4, 0xab1c5ed5
+	.uword	0xd807aa98, 0x12835b01, 0x243185be, 0x550c7dc3
+	.uword	0x72be5d74, 0x80deb1fe, 0x9bdc06a7, 0xc19bf174
+	.uword	0xe49b69c1, 0xefbe4786, 0x0fc19dc6, 0x240ca1cc
+	.uword	0x2de92c6f, 0x4a7484aa, 0x5cb0a9dc, 0x76f988da
+	.uword	0x983e5152, 0xa831c66d, 0xb00327c8, 0xbf597fc7
+	.uword	0xc6e00bf3, 0xd5a79147, 0x06ca6351, 0x14292967
+	.uword	0x27b70a85, 0x2e1b2138, 0x4d2c6dfc, 0x53380d13
+	.uword	0x650a7354, 0x766a0abb, 0x81c2c92e, 0x92722c85
+	.uword	0xa2bfe8a1, 0xa81a664b, 0xc24b8b70, 0xc76c51a3
+	.uword	0xd192e819, 0xd6990624, 0xf40e3585, 0x106aa070
+	.uword	0x19a4c116, 0x1e376c08, 0x2748774c, 0x34b0bcb5
+	.uword	0x391c0cb3, 0x4ed8aa4a, 0x5b9cca4f, 0x682e6ff3
+	.uword	0x748f82ee, 0x78a5636f, 0x84c87814, 0x8cc70208
+	.uword	0x90befffa, 0xa4506ceb, 0xbef9a3f7, 0xc67178f2
+	.cstring "SHA256 block transform for C64x+, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+	.align	4
+
+___
+
+print $code;
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-mb-x86_64.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-mb-x86_64.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fbcd29f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-mb-x86_64.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,1568 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2013-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+
+# Multi-buffer SHA256 procedure processes n buffers in parallel by
+# placing buffer data to designated lane of SIMD register. n is
+# naturally limited to 4 on pre-AVX2 processors and to 8 on
+# AVX2-capable processors such as Haswell.
+#
+#		this	+aesni(i)	sha256	aesni-sha256	gain(iv)
+# -------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Westmere(ii)	23.3/n	+1.28=7.11(n=4)	12.3	+3.75=16.1	+126%
+# Atom(ii)	38.7/n	+3.93=13.6(n=4)	20.8	+5.69=26.5	+95%
+# Sandy Bridge	(20.5	+5.15=25.7)/n	11.6	13.0		+103%
+# Ivy Bridge	(20.4	+5.14=25.5)/n	10.3	11.6		+82%
+# Haswell(iii)	(21.0	+5.00=26.0)/n	7.80	8.79		+170%
+# Skylake	(18.9	+5.00=23.9)/n	7.70	8.17		+170%
+# Bulldozer	(21.6	+5.76=27.4)/n	13.6	13.7		+100%
+#
+# (i)	multi-block CBC encrypt with 128-bit key;
+# (ii)	(HASH+AES)/n does not apply to Westmere for n>3 and Atom,
+#	because of lower AES-NI instruction throughput, nor is there
+#	AES-NI-SHA256 stitch for these processors;
+# (iii)	"this" is for n=8, when we gather twice as much data, result
+#	for n=4 is 20.3+4.44=24.7;
+# (iv)	presented improvement coefficients are asymptotic limits and
+#	in real-life application are somewhat lower, e.g. for 2KB 
+#	fragments they range from 75% to 130% (on Haswell);
+
+$flavour = shift;
+$output  = shift;
+if ($flavour =~ /\./) { $output = $flavour; undef $flavour; }
+
+$win64=0; $win64=1 if ($flavour =~ /[nm]asm|mingw64/ || $output =~ /\.asm$/);
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+( $xlate="${dir}x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
+( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
+die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl";
+
+$avx=0;
+
+if (`$ENV{CC} -Wa,-v -c -o /dev/null -x assembler /dev/null 2>&1`
+		=~ /GNU assembler version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
+	$avx = ($1>=2.19) + ($1>=2.22);
+}
+
+if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /nasm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /nasm/) &&
+	   `nasm -v 2>&1` =~ /NASM version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
+	$avx = ($1>=2.09) + ($1>=2.10);
+}
+
+if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
+	   `ml64 2>&1` =~ /Version ([0-9]+)\./) {
+	$avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=11);
+}
+
+if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
+	$avx = ($2>=3.0) + ($2>3.0);
+}
+
+open OUT,"| \"$^X\" \"$xlate\" $flavour \"$output\"";
+*STDOUT=*OUT;
+
+# void sha256_multi_block (
+#     struct {	unsigned int A[8];
+#		unsigned int B[8];
+#		unsigned int C[8];
+#		unsigned int D[8];
+#		unsigned int E[8];
+#		unsigned int F[8];
+#		unsigned int G[8];
+#		unsigned int H[8];	} *ctx,
+#     struct {	void *ptr; int blocks;	} inp[8],
+#     int num);		/* 1 or 2 */
+#
+$ctx="%rdi";	# 1st arg
+$inp="%rsi";	# 2nd arg
+$num="%edx";	# 3rd arg
+@ptr=map("%r$_",(8..11));
+$Tbl="%rbp";
+
+@V=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$F,$G,$H)=map("%xmm$_",(8..15));
+($t1,$t2,$t3,$axb,$bxc,$Xi,$Xn,$sigma)=map("%xmm$_",(0..7));
+
+$REG_SZ=16;
+
+sub Xi_off {
+my $off = shift;
+
+    $off %= 16; $off *= $REG_SZ;
+    $off<256 ? "$off-128(%rax)" : "$off-256-128(%rbx)";
+}
+
+sub ROUND_00_15 {
+my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f,$g,$h)=@_;
+
+$code.=<<___ if ($i<15);
+	movd		`4*$i`(@ptr[0]),$Xi
+	movd		`4*$i`(@ptr[1]),$t1
+	movd		`4*$i`(@ptr[2]),$t2
+	movd		`4*$i`(@ptr[3]),$t3
+	punpckldq	$t2,$Xi
+	punpckldq	$t3,$t1
+	punpckldq	$t1,$Xi
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i==15);
+	movd		`4*$i`(@ptr[0]),$Xi
+	 lea		`16*4`(@ptr[0]),@ptr[0]
+	movd		`4*$i`(@ptr[1]),$t1
+	 lea		`16*4`(@ptr[1]),@ptr[1]
+	movd		`4*$i`(@ptr[2]),$t2
+	 lea		`16*4`(@ptr[2]),@ptr[2]
+	movd		`4*$i`(@ptr[3]),$t3
+	 lea		`16*4`(@ptr[3]),@ptr[3]
+	punpckldq	$t2,$Xi
+	punpckldq	$t3,$t1
+	punpckldq	$t1,$Xi
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	movdqa	$e,$sigma
+	`"pshufb	$Xn,$Xi"		if ($i<=15 && ($i&1)==0)`
+	movdqa	$e,$t3
+	`"pshufb	$Xn,$Xi"		if ($i<=15 && ($i&1)==1)`
+	psrld	\$6,$sigma
+	movdqa	$e,$t2
+	pslld	\$7,$t3
+	movdqa	$Xi,`&Xi_off($i)`
+	 paddd	$h,$Xi				# Xi+=h
+
+	psrld	\$11,$t2
+	pxor	$t3,$sigma
+	pslld	\$21-7,$t3
+	 paddd	`32*($i%8)-128`($Tbl),$Xi	# Xi+=K[round]
+	pxor	$t2,$sigma
+
+	psrld	\$25-11,$t2
+	 movdqa	$e,$t1
+	 `"prefetcht0	63(@ptr[0])"		if ($i==15)`
+	pxor	$t3,$sigma
+	 movdqa	$e,$axb				# borrow $axb
+	pslld	\$26-21,$t3
+	 pandn	$g,$t1
+	 pand	$f,$axb
+	pxor	$t2,$sigma
+
+	 `"prefetcht0	63(@ptr[1])"		if ($i==15)`
+	movdqa	$a,$t2
+	pxor	$t3,$sigma			# Sigma1(e)
+	movdqa	$a,$t3
+	psrld	\$2,$t2
+	paddd	$sigma,$Xi			# Xi+=Sigma1(e)
+	 pxor	$axb,$t1			# Ch(e,f,g)
+	 movdqa	$b,$axb
+	movdqa	$a,$sigma
+	pslld	\$10,$t3
+	 pxor	$a,$axb				# a^b, b^c in next round
+
+	 `"prefetcht0	63(@ptr[2])"		if ($i==15)`
+	psrld	\$13,$sigma
+	pxor	$t3,$t2
+	 paddd	$t1,$Xi				# Xi+=Ch(e,f,g)
+	pslld	\$19-10,$t3
+	 pand	$axb,$bxc
+	pxor	$sigma,$t2
+
+	 `"prefetcht0	63(@ptr[3])"		if ($i==15)`
+	psrld	\$22-13,$sigma
+	pxor	$t3,$t2
+	 movdqa	$b,$h
+	pslld	\$30-19,$t3
+	pxor	$t2,$sigma
+	 pxor	$bxc,$h				# h=Maj(a,b,c)=Ch(a^b,c,b)
+	 paddd	$Xi,$d				# d+=Xi
+	pxor	$t3,$sigma			# Sigma0(a)
+
+	paddd	$Xi,$h				# h+=Xi
+	paddd	$sigma,$h			# h+=Sigma0(a)
+___
+$code.=<<___ if (($i%8)==7);
+	lea	`32*8`($Tbl),$Tbl
+___
+	($axb,$bxc)=($bxc,$axb);
+}
+
+sub ROUND_16_XX {
+my $i=shift;
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	movdqa	`&Xi_off($i+1)`,$Xn
+	paddd	`&Xi_off($i+9)`,$Xi		# Xi+=X[i+9]
+
+	movdqa	$Xn,$sigma
+	movdqa	$Xn,$t2
+	psrld	\$3,$sigma
+	movdqa	$Xn,$t3
+
+	psrld	\$7,$t2
+	movdqa	`&Xi_off($i+14)`,$t1
+	pslld	\$14,$t3
+	pxor	$t2,$sigma
+	psrld	\$18-7,$t2
+	movdqa	$t1,$axb			# borrow $axb
+	pxor	$t3,$sigma
+	pslld	\$25-14,$t3
+	pxor	$t2,$sigma
+	psrld	\$10,$t1
+	movdqa	$axb,$t2
+
+	psrld	\$17,$axb
+	pxor	$t3,$sigma			# sigma0(X[i+1])
+	pslld	\$13,$t2
+	 paddd	$sigma,$Xi			# Xi+=sigma0(e)
+	pxor	$axb,$t1
+	psrld	\$19-17,$axb
+	pxor	$t2,$t1
+	pslld	\$15-13,$t2
+	pxor	$axb,$t1
+	pxor	$t2,$t1				# sigma0(X[i+14])
+	paddd	$t1,$Xi				# Xi+=sigma1(X[i+14])
+___
+	&ROUND_00_15($i,@_);
+	($Xi,$Xn)=($Xn,$Xi);
+}
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.text
+
+.extern	OPENSSL_ia32cap_P
+
+.globl	sha256_multi_block
+.type	sha256_multi_block,\@function,3
+.align	32
+sha256_multi_block:
+	mov	OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+4(%rip),%rcx
+	bt	\$61,%rcx			# check SHA bit
+	jc	_shaext_shortcut
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($avx);
+	test	\$`1<<28`,%ecx
+	jnz	_avx_shortcut
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	%rsp,%rax
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	lea	-0xa8(%rsp),%rsp
+	movaps	%xmm6,(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm7,0x10(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm8,0x20(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm9,0x30(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm10,-0x78(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm11,-0x68(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm12,-0x58(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm13,-0x48(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm14,-0x38(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm15,-0x28(%rax)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	sub	\$`$REG_SZ*18`, %rsp
+	and	\$-256,%rsp
+	mov	%rax,`$REG_SZ*17`(%rsp)		# original %rsp
+.Lbody:
+	lea	K256+128(%rip),$Tbl
+	lea	`$REG_SZ*16`(%rsp),%rbx
+	lea	0x80($ctx),$ctx			# size optimization
+
+.Loop_grande:
+	mov	$num,`$REG_SZ*17+8`(%rsp)	# original $num
+	xor	$num,$num
+___
+for($i=0;$i<4;$i++) {
+    $code.=<<___;
+	mov	`16*$i+0`($inp),@ptr[$i]	# input pointer
+	mov	`16*$i+8`($inp),%ecx		# number of blocks
+	cmp	$num,%ecx
+	cmovg	%ecx,$num			# find maximum
+	test	%ecx,%ecx
+	mov	%ecx,`4*$i`(%rbx)		# initialize counters
+	cmovle	$Tbl,@ptr[$i]			# cancel input
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	test	$num,$num
+	jz	.Ldone
+
+	movdqu	0x00-0x80($ctx),$A		# load context
+	 lea	128(%rsp),%rax
+	movdqu	0x20-0x80($ctx),$B
+	movdqu	0x40-0x80($ctx),$C
+	movdqu	0x60-0x80($ctx),$D
+	movdqu	0x80-0x80($ctx),$E
+	movdqu	0xa0-0x80($ctx),$F
+	movdqu	0xc0-0x80($ctx),$G
+	movdqu	0xe0-0x80($ctx),$H
+	movdqu	.Lpbswap(%rip),$Xn
+	jmp	.Loop
+
+.align	32
+.Loop:
+	movdqa	$C,$bxc
+	pxor	$B,$bxc				# magic seed
+___
+for($i=0;$i<16;$i++)	{ &ROUND_00_15($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+$code.=<<___;
+	movdqu	`&Xi_off($i)`,$Xi
+	mov	\$3,%ecx
+	jmp	.Loop_16_xx
+.align	32
+.Loop_16_xx:
+___
+for(;$i<32;$i++)	{ &ROUND_16_XX($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+$code.=<<___;
+	dec	%ecx
+	jnz	.Loop_16_xx
+
+	mov	\$1,%ecx
+	lea	K256+128(%rip),$Tbl
+
+	movdqa	(%rbx),$sigma			# pull counters
+	cmp	4*0(%rbx),%ecx			# examine counters
+	pxor	$t1,$t1
+	cmovge	$Tbl,@ptr[0]			# cancel input
+	cmp	4*1(%rbx),%ecx
+	movdqa	$sigma,$Xn
+	cmovge	$Tbl,@ptr[1]
+	cmp	4*2(%rbx),%ecx
+	pcmpgtd	$t1,$Xn				# mask value
+	cmovge	$Tbl,@ptr[2]
+	cmp	4*3(%rbx),%ecx
+	paddd	$Xn,$sigma			# counters--
+	cmovge	$Tbl,@ptr[3]
+
+	movdqu	0x00-0x80($ctx),$t1
+	pand	$Xn,$A
+	movdqu	0x20-0x80($ctx),$t2
+	pand	$Xn,$B
+	movdqu	0x40-0x80($ctx),$t3
+	pand	$Xn,$C
+	movdqu	0x60-0x80($ctx),$Xi
+	pand	$Xn,$D
+	paddd	$t1,$A
+	movdqu	0x80-0x80($ctx),$t1
+	pand	$Xn,$E
+	paddd	$t2,$B
+	movdqu	0xa0-0x80($ctx),$t2
+	pand	$Xn,$F
+	paddd	$t3,$C
+	movdqu	0xc0-0x80($ctx),$t3
+	pand	$Xn,$G
+	paddd	$Xi,$D
+	movdqu	0xe0-0x80($ctx),$Xi
+	pand	$Xn,$H
+	paddd	$t1,$E
+	paddd	$t2,$F
+	movdqu	$A,0x00-0x80($ctx)
+	paddd	$t3,$G
+	movdqu	$B,0x20-0x80($ctx)
+	paddd	$Xi,$H
+	movdqu	$C,0x40-0x80($ctx)
+	movdqu	$D,0x60-0x80($ctx)
+	movdqu	$E,0x80-0x80($ctx)
+	movdqu	$F,0xa0-0x80($ctx)
+	movdqu	$G,0xc0-0x80($ctx)
+	movdqu	$H,0xe0-0x80($ctx)
+
+	movdqa	$sigma,(%rbx)			# save counters
+	movdqa	.Lpbswap(%rip),$Xn
+	dec	$num
+	jnz	.Loop
+
+	mov	`$REG_SZ*17+8`(%rsp),$num
+	lea	$REG_SZ($ctx),$ctx
+	lea	`16*$REG_SZ/4`($inp),$inp
+	dec	$num
+	jnz	.Loop_grande
+
+.Ldone:
+	mov	`$REG_SZ*17`(%rsp),%rax		# original %rsp
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	movaps	-0xb8(%rax),%xmm6
+	movaps	-0xa8(%rax),%xmm7
+	movaps	-0x98(%rax),%xmm8
+	movaps	-0x88(%rax),%xmm9
+	movaps	-0x78(%rax),%xmm10
+	movaps	-0x68(%rax),%xmm11
+	movaps	-0x58(%rax),%xmm12
+	movaps	-0x48(%rax),%xmm13
+	movaps	-0x38(%rax),%xmm14
+	movaps	-0x28(%rax),%xmm15
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	-16(%rax),%rbp
+	mov	-8(%rax),%rbx
+	lea	(%rax),%rsp
+.Lepilogue:
+	ret
+.size	sha256_multi_block,.-sha256_multi_block
+___
+						{{{
+my ($Wi,$TMP0,$TMP1,$TMPx,$ABEF0,$CDGH0,$ABEF1,$CDGH1)=map("%xmm$_",(0..3,12..15));
+my @MSG0=map("%xmm$_",(4..7));
+my @MSG1=map("%xmm$_",(8..11));
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.type	sha256_multi_block_shaext,\@function,3
+.align	32
+sha256_multi_block_shaext:
+_shaext_shortcut:
+	mov	%rsp,%rax
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	lea	-0xa8(%rsp),%rsp
+	movaps	%xmm6,(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm7,0x10(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm8,0x20(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm9,0x30(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm10,-0x78(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm11,-0x68(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm12,-0x58(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm13,-0x48(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm14,-0x38(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm15,-0x28(%rax)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	sub	\$`$REG_SZ*18`,%rsp
+	shl	\$1,$num			# we process pair at a time
+	and	\$-256,%rsp
+	lea	0x80($ctx),$ctx			# size optimization
+	mov	%rax,`$REG_SZ*17`(%rsp)		# original %rsp
+.Lbody_shaext:
+	lea	`$REG_SZ*16`(%rsp),%rbx
+	lea	K256_shaext+0x80(%rip),$Tbl
+
+.Loop_grande_shaext:
+	mov	$num,`$REG_SZ*17+8`(%rsp)	# original $num
+	xor	$num,$num
+___
+for($i=0;$i<2;$i++) {
+    $code.=<<___;
+	mov	`16*$i+0`($inp),@ptr[$i]	# input pointer
+	mov	`16*$i+8`($inp),%ecx		# number of blocks
+	cmp	$num,%ecx
+	cmovg	%ecx,$num			# find maximum
+	test	%ecx,%ecx
+	mov	%ecx,`4*$i`(%rbx)		# initialize counters
+	cmovle	%rsp,@ptr[$i]			# cancel input
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	test	$num,$num
+	jz	.Ldone_shaext
+
+	movq		0x00-0x80($ctx),$ABEF0		# A1.A0
+	movq		0x20-0x80($ctx),@MSG0[0]	# B1.B0
+	movq		0x40-0x80($ctx),$CDGH0		# C1.C0
+	movq		0x60-0x80($ctx),@MSG0[1]	# D1.D0
+	movq		0x80-0x80($ctx),@MSG1[0]	# E1.E0
+	movq		0xa0-0x80($ctx),@MSG1[1]	# F1.F0
+	movq		0xc0-0x80($ctx),@MSG1[2]	# G1.G0
+	movq		0xe0-0x80($ctx),@MSG1[3]	# H1.H0
+
+	punpckldq	@MSG0[0],$ABEF0			# B1.A1.B0.A0
+	punpckldq	@MSG0[1],$CDGH0			# D1.C1.D0.C0
+	punpckldq	@MSG1[1],@MSG1[0]		# F1.E1.F0.E0
+	punpckldq	@MSG1[3],@MSG1[2]		# H1.G1.H0.G0
+	movdqa		K256_shaext-0x10(%rip),$TMPx	# byte swap
+
+	movdqa		$ABEF0,$ABEF1
+	movdqa		$CDGH0,$CDGH1
+	punpcklqdq	@MSG1[0],$ABEF0			# F0.E0.B0.A0
+	punpcklqdq	@MSG1[2],$CDGH0			# H0.G0.D0.C0
+	punpckhqdq	@MSG1[0],$ABEF1			# F1.E1.B1.A1
+	punpckhqdq	@MSG1[2],$CDGH1			# H1.G1.D1.C1
+
+	pshufd		\$0b00011011,$ABEF0,$ABEF0
+	pshufd		\$0b00011011,$CDGH0,$CDGH0
+	pshufd		\$0b00011011,$ABEF1,$ABEF1
+	pshufd		\$0b00011011,$CDGH1,$CDGH1
+	jmp		.Loop_shaext
+
+.align	32
+.Loop_shaext:
+	movdqu		0x00(@ptr[0]),@MSG0[0]
+	 movdqu		0x00(@ptr[1]),@MSG1[0]
+	movdqu		0x10(@ptr[0]),@MSG0[1]
+	 movdqu		0x10(@ptr[1]),@MSG1[1]
+	movdqu		0x20(@ptr[0]),@MSG0[2]
+	pshufb		$TMPx,@MSG0[0]
+	 movdqu		0x20(@ptr[1]),@MSG1[2]
+	 pshufb		$TMPx,@MSG1[0]
+	movdqu		0x30(@ptr[0]),@MSG0[3]
+	lea		0x40(@ptr[0]),@ptr[0]
+	 movdqu		0x30(@ptr[1]),@MSG1[3]
+	 lea		0x40(@ptr[1]),@ptr[1]
+
+	movdqa		0*16-0x80($Tbl),$Wi
+	pshufb		$TMPx,@MSG0[1]
+	paddd		@MSG0[0],$Wi
+	pxor		$ABEF0,@MSG0[0]		# black magic
+	movdqa		$Wi,$TMP0
+	 movdqa		0*16-0x80($Tbl),$TMP1
+	 pshufb		$TMPx,@MSG1[1]
+	 paddd		@MSG1[0],$TMP1
+	movdqa		$CDGH0,0x50(%rsp)	# offload
+	sha256rnds2	$ABEF0,$CDGH0		# 0-3
+	 pxor		$ABEF1,@MSG1[0]		# black magic
+	 movdqa		$TMP1,$Wi
+	 movdqa		$CDGH1,0x70(%rsp)
+	 sha256rnds2	$ABEF1,$CDGH1		# 0-3
+	pshufd		\$0x0e,$TMP0,$Wi
+	pxor		$ABEF0,@MSG0[0]		# black magic
+	movdqa		$ABEF0,0x40(%rsp)	# offload
+	sha256rnds2	$CDGH0,$ABEF0
+	 pshufd		\$0x0e,$TMP1,$Wi
+	 pxor		$ABEF1,@MSG1[0]		# black magic
+	 movdqa		$ABEF1,0x60(%rsp)
+	movdqa		1*16-0x80($Tbl),$TMP0
+	paddd		@MSG0[1],$TMP0
+	pshufb		$TMPx,@MSG0[2]
+	 sha256rnds2	$CDGH1,$ABEF1
+
+	movdqa		$TMP0,$Wi
+	 movdqa		1*16-0x80($Tbl),$TMP1
+	 paddd		@MSG1[1],$TMP1
+	sha256rnds2	$ABEF0,$CDGH0		# 4-7
+	 movdqa		$TMP1,$Wi
+	prefetcht0	127(@ptr[0])
+	pshufb		$TMPx,@MSG0[3]
+	 pshufb		$TMPx,@MSG1[2]
+	 prefetcht0	127(@ptr[1])
+	 sha256rnds2	$ABEF1,$CDGH1		# 4-7
+	pshufd		\$0x0e,$TMP0,$Wi
+	 pshufb		$TMPx,@MSG1[3]
+	sha256msg1	@MSG0[1],@MSG0[0]
+	sha256rnds2	$CDGH0,$ABEF0
+	 pshufd		\$0x0e,$TMP1,$Wi
+	movdqa		2*16-0x80($Tbl),$TMP0
+	paddd		@MSG0[2],$TMP0
+	 sha256rnds2	$CDGH1,$ABEF1
+
+	movdqa		$TMP0,$Wi
+	 movdqa		2*16-0x80($Tbl),$TMP1
+	 paddd		@MSG1[2],$TMP1
+	sha256rnds2	$ABEF0,$CDGH0		# 8-11
+	 sha256msg1	@MSG1[1],@MSG1[0]
+	 movdqa		$TMP1,$Wi
+	movdqa		@MSG0[3],$TMPx
+	 sha256rnds2	$ABEF1,$CDGH1		# 8-11
+	pshufd		\$0x0e,$TMP0,$Wi
+	palignr		\$4,@MSG0[2],$TMPx
+	paddd		$TMPx,@MSG0[0]
+	 movdqa		@MSG1[3],$TMPx
+	 palignr	\$4,@MSG1[2],$TMPx
+	sha256msg1	@MSG0[2],@MSG0[1]
+	sha256rnds2	$CDGH0,$ABEF0
+	 pshufd		\$0x0e,$TMP1,$Wi
+	movdqa		3*16-0x80($Tbl),$TMP0
+	paddd		@MSG0[3],$TMP0
+	 sha256rnds2	$CDGH1,$ABEF1
+	 sha256msg1	@MSG1[2],@MSG1[1]
+
+	movdqa		$TMP0,$Wi
+	 movdqa		3*16-0x80($Tbl),$TMP1
+	 paddd		$TMPx,@MSG1[0]
+	 paddd		@MSG1[3],$TMP1
+	sha256msg2	@MSG0[3],@MSG0[0]
+	sha256rnds2	$ABEF0,$CDGH0		# 12-15
+	 movdqa		$TMP1,$Wi
+	movdqa		@MSG0[0],$TMPx
+	palignr		\$4,@MSG0[3],$TMPx
+	 sha256rnds2	$ABEF1,$CDGH1		# 12-15
+	 sha256msg2	@MSG1[3],@MSG1[0]
+	pshufd		\$0x0e,$TMP0,$Wi
+	paddd		$TMPx,@MSG0[1]
+	 movdqa		@MSG1[0],$TMPx
+	 palignr	\$4,@MSG1[3],$TMPx
+	sha256msg1	@MSG0[3],@MSG0[2]
+	sha256rnds2	$CDGH0,$ABEF0
+	 pshufd		\$0x0e,$TMP1,$Wi
+	movdqa		4*16-0x80($Tbl),$TMP0
+	paddd		@MSG0[0],$TMP0
+	 sha256rnds2	$CDGH1,$ABEF1
+	 sha256msg1	@MSG1[3],@MSG1[2]
+___
+for($i=4;$i<16-3;$i++) {
+$code.=<<___;
+	movdqa		$TMP0,$Wi
+	 movdqa		$i*16-0x80($Tbl),$TMP1
+	 paddd		$TMPx,@MSG1[1]
+	 paddd		@MSG1[0],$TMP1
+	sha256msg2	@MSG0[0],@MSG0[1]
+	sha256rnds2	$ABEF0,$CDGH0		# 16-19...
+	 movdqa		$TMP1,$Wi
+	movdqa		@MSG0[1],$TMPx
+	palignr		\$4,@MSG0[0],$TMPx
+	 sha256rnds2	$ABEF1,$CDGH1		# 16-19...
+	 sha256msg2	@MSG1[0],@MSG1[1]
+	pshufd		\$0x0e,$TMP0,$Wi
+	paddd		$TMPx,@MSG0[2]
+	 movdqa		@MSG1[1],$TMPx
+	 palignr	\$4,@MSG1[0],$TMPx
+	sha256msg1	@MSG0[0],@MSG0[3]
+	sha256rnds2	$CDGH0,$ABEF0
+	 pshufd		\$0x0e,$TMP1,$Wi
+	movdqa		`($i+1)*16`-0x80($Tbl),$TMP0
+	paddd		@MSG0[1],$TMP0
+	 sha256rnds2	$CDGH1,$ABEF1
+	 sha256msg1	@MSG1[0],@MSG1[3]
+___
+	push(@MSG0,shift(@MSG0));	push(@MSG1,shift(@MSG1));
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	movdqa		$TMP0,$Wi
+	 movdqa		13*16-0x80($Tbl),$TMP1
+	 paddd		$TMPx,@MSG1[1]
+	 paddd		@MSG1[0],$TMP1
+	sha256msg2	@MSG0[0],@MSG0[1]
+	sha256rnds2	$ABEF0,$CDGH0		# 52-55
+	 movdqa		$TMP1,$Wi
+	movdqa		@MSG0[1],$TMPx
+	palignr		\$4,@MSG0[0],$TMPx
+	 sha256rnds2	$ABEF1,$CDGH1		# 52-55
+	 sha256msg2	@MSG1[0],@MSG1[1]
+	pshufd		\$0x0e,$TMP0,$Wi
+	paddd		$TMPx,@MSG0[2]
+	 movdqa		@MSG1[1],$TMPx
+	 palignr	\$4,@MSG1[0],$TMPx
+	nop
+	sha256rnds2	$CDGH0,$ABEF0
+	 pshufd		\$0x0e,$TMP1,$Wi
+	movdqa		14*16-0x80($Tbl),$TMP0
+	paddd		@MSG0[1],$TMP0
+	 sha256rnds2	$CDGH1,$ABEF1
+
+	movdqa		$TMP0,$Wi
+	 movdqa		14*16-0x80($Tbl),$TMP1
+	 paddd		$TMPx,@MSG1[2]
+	 paddd		@MSG1[1],$TMP1
+	sha256msg2	@MSG0[1],@MSG0[2]
+	nop
+	sha256rnds2	$ABEF0,$CDGH0		# 56-59
+	 movdqa		$TMP1,$Wi
+	  mov		\$1,%ecx
+	  pxor		@MSG0[1],@MSG0[1]	# zero
+	 sha256rnds2	$ABEF1,$CDGH1		# 56-59
+	 sha256msg2	@MSG1[1],@MSG1[2]
+	pshufd		\$0x0e,$TMP0,$Wi
+	movdqa		15*16-0x80($Tbl),$TMP0
+	paddd		@MSG0[2],$TMP0
+	  movq		(%rbx),@MSG0[2]		# pull counters
+	  nop
+	sha256rnds2	$CDGH0,$ABEF0
+	 pshufd		\$0x0e,$TMP1,$Wi
+	 movdqa		15*16-0x80($Tbl),$TMP1
+	 paddd		@MSG1[2],$TMP1
+	 sha256rnds2	$CDGH1,$ABEF1
+
+	movdqa		$TMP0,$Wi
+	  cmp		4*0(%rbx),%ecx		# examine counters
+	  cmovge	%rsp,@ptr[0]		# cancel input
+	  cmp		4*1(%rbx),%ecx
+	  cmovge	%rsp,@ptr[1]
+	  pshufd	\$0x00,@MSG0[2],@MSG1[0]
+	sha256rnds2	$ABEF0,$CDGH0		# 60-63
+	 movdqa		$TMP1,$Wi
+	  pshufd	\$0x55,@MSG0[2],@MSG1[1]
+	  movdqa	@MSG0[2],@MSG1[2]
+	 sha256rnds2	$ABEF1,$CDGH1		# 60-63
+	pshufd		\$0x0e,$TMP0,$Wi
+	  pcmpgtd	@MSG0[1],@MSG1[0]
+	  pcmpgtd	@MSG0[1],@MSG1[1]
+	sha256rnds2	$CDGH0,$ABEF0
+	 pshufd		\$0x0e,$TMP1,$Wi
+	  pcmpgtd	@MSG0[1],@MSG1[2]	# counter mask
+	  movdqa	K256_shaext-0x10(%rip),$TMPx
+	 sha256rnds2	$CDGH1,$ABEF1
+
+	pand		@MSG1[0],$CDGH0
+	 pand		@MSG1[1],$CDGH1
+	pand		@MSG1[0],$ABEF0
+	 pand		@MSG1[1],$ABEF1
+	paddd		@MSG0[2],@MSG1[2]	# counters--
+
+	paddd		0x50(%rsp),$CDGH0
+	 paddd		0x70(%rsp),$CDGH1
+	paddd		0x40(%rsp),$ABEF0
+	 paddd		0x60(%rsp),$ABEF1
+
+	movq		@MSG1[2],(%rbx)		# save counters
+	dec		$num
+	jnz		.Loop_shaext
+
+	mov		`$REG_SZ*17+8`(%rsp),$num
+
+	pshufd		\$0b00011011,$ABEF0,$ABEF0
+	pshufd		\$0b00011011,$CDGH0,$CDGH0
+	pshufd		\$0b00011011,$ABEF1,$ABEF1
+	pshufd		\$0b00011011,$CDGH1,$CDGH1
+
+	movdqa		$ABEF0,@MSG0[0]
+	movdqa		$CDGH0,@MSG0[1]
+	punpckldq	$ABEF1,$ABEF0			# B1.B0.A1.A0
+	punpckhdq	$ABEF1,@MSG0[0]			# F1.F0.E1.E0
+	punpckldq	$CDGH1,$CDGH0			# D1.D0.C1.C0
+	punpckhdq	$CDGH1,@MSG0[1]			# H1.H0.G1.G0
+
+	movq		$ABEF0,0x00-0x80($ctx)		# A1.A0
+	psrldq		\$8,$ABEF0
+	movq		@MSG0[0],0x80-0x80($ctx)	# E1.E0
+	psrldq		\$8,@MSG0[0]
+	movq		$ABEF0,0x20-0x80($ctx)		# B1.B0
+	movq		@MSG0[0],0xa0-0x80($ctx)	# F1.F0
+
+	movq		$CDGH0,0x40-0x80($ctx)		# C1.C0
+	psrldq		\$8,$CDGH0
+	movq		@MSG0[1],0xc0-0x80($ctx)	# G1.G0
+	psrldq		\$8,@MSG0[1]
+	movq		$CDGH0,0x60-0x80($ctx)		# D1.D0
+	movq		@MSG0[1],0xe0-0x80($ctx)	# H1.H0
+
+	lea	`$REG_SZ/2`($ctx),$ctx
+	lea	`16*2`($inp),$inp
+	dec	$num
+	jnz	.Loop_grande_shaext
+
+.Ldone_shaext:
+	#mov	`$REG_SZ*17`(%rsp),%rax		# original %rsp
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	movaps	-0xb8(%rax),%xmm6
+	movaps	-0xa8(%rax),%xmm7
+	movaps	-0x98(%rax),%xmm8
+	movaps	-0x88(%rax),%xmm9
+	movaps	-0x78(%rax),%xmm10
+	movaps	-0x68(%rax),%xmm11
+	movaps	-0x58(%rax),%xmm12
+	movaps	-0x48(%rax),%xmm13
+	movaps	-0x38(%rax),%xmm14
+	movaps	-0x28(%rax),%xmm15
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	-16(%rax),%rbp
+	mov	-8(%rax),%rbx
+	lea	(%rax),%rsp
+.Lepilogue_shaext:
+	ret
+.size	sha256_multi_block_shaext,.-sha256_multi_block_shaext
+___
+						}}}
+						if ($avx) {{{
+sub ROUND_00_15_avx {
+my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f,$g,$h)=@_;
+
+$code.=<<___ if ($i<15 && $REG_SZ==16);
+	vmovd		`4*$i`(@ptr[0]),$Xi
+	vmovd		`4*$i`(@ptr[1]),$t1
+	vpinsrd		\$1,`4*$i`(@ptr[2]),$Xi,$Xi
+	vpinsrd		\$1,`4*$i`(@ptr[3]),$t1,$t1
+	vpunpckldq	$t1,$Xi,$Xi
+	vpshufb		$Xn,$Xi,$Xi
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i==15 && $REG_SZ==16);
+	vmovd		`4*$i`(@ptr[0]),$Xi
+	 lea		`16*4`(@ptr[0]),@ptr[0]
+	vmovd		`4*$i`(@ptr[1]),$t1
+	 lea		`16*4`(@ptr[1]),@ptr[1]
+	vpinsrd		\$1,`4*$i`(@ptr[2]),$Xi,$Xi
+	 lea		`16*4`(@ptr[2]),@ptr[2]
+	vpinsrd		\$1,`4*$i`(@ptr[3]),$t1,$t1
+	 lea		`16*4`(@ptr[3]),@ptr[3]
+	vpunpckldq	$t1,$Xi,$Xi
+	vpshufb		$Xn,$Xi,$Xi
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i<15 && $REG_SZ==32);
+	vmovd		`4*$i`(@ptr[0]),$Xi
+	vmovd		`4*$i`(@ptr[4]),$t1
+	vmovd		`4*$i`(@ptr[1]),$t2
+	vmovd		`4*$i`(@ptr[5]),$t3
+	vpinsrd		\$1,`4*$i`(@ptr[2]),$Xi,$Xi
+	vpinsrd		\$1,`4*$i`(@ptr[6]),$t1,$t1
+	vpinsrd		\$1,`4*$i`(@ptr[3]),$t2,$t2
+	vpunpckldq	$t2,$Xi,$Xi
+	vpinsrd		\$1,`4*$i`(@ptr[7]),$t3,$t3
+	vpunpckldq	$t3,$t1,$t1
+	vinserti128	$t1,$Xi,$Xi
+	vpshufb		$Xn,$Xi,$Xi
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i==15 && $REG_SZ==32);
+	vmovd		`4*$i`(@ptr[0]),$Xi
+	 lea		`16*4`(@ptr[0]),@ptr[0]
+	vmovd		`4*$i`(@ptr[4]),$t1
+	 lea		`16*4`(@ptr[4]),@ptr[4]
+	vmovd		`4*$i`(@ptr[1]),$t2
+	 lea		`16*4`(@ptr[1]),@ptr[1]
+	vmovd		`4*$i`(@ptr[5]),$t3
+	 lea		`16*4`(@ptr[5]),@ptr[5]
+	vpinsrd		\$1,`4*$i`(@ptr[2]),$Xi,$Xi
+	 lea		`16*4`(@ptr[2]),@ptr[2]
+	vpinsrd		\$1,`4*$i`(@ptr[6]),$t1,$t1
+	 lea		`16*4`(@ptr[6]),@ptr[6]
+	vpinsrd		\$1,`4*$i`(@ptr[3]),$t2,$t2
+	 lea		`16*4`(@ptr[3]),@ptr[3]
+	vpunpckldq	$t2,$Xi,$Xi
+	vpinsrd		\$1,`4*$i`(@ptr[7]),$t3,$t3
+	 lea		`16*4`(@ptr[7]),@ptr[7]
+	vpunpckldq	$t3,$t1,$t1
+	vinserti128	$t1,$Xi,$Xi
+	vpshufb		$Xn,$Xi,$Xi
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	vpsrld	\$6,$e,$sigma
+	vpslld	\$26,$e,$t3
+	vmovdqu	$Xi,`&Xi_off($i)`
+	 vpaddd	$h,$Xi,$Xi			# Xi+=h
+
+	vpsrld	\$11,$e,$t2
+	vpxor	$t3,$sigma,$sigma
+	vpslld	\$21,$e,$t3
+	 vpaddd	`32*($i%8)-128`($Tbl),$Xi,$Xi	# Xi+=K[round]
+	vpxor	$t2,$sigma,$sigma
+
+	vpsrld	\$25,$e,$t2
+	vpxor	$t3,$sigma,$sigma
+	 `"prefetcht0	63(@ptr[0])"		if ($i==15)`
+	vpslld	\$7,$e,$t3
+	 vpandn	$g,$e,$t1
+	 vpand	$f,$e,$axb			# borrow $axb
+	 `"prefetcht0	63(@ptr[1])"		if ($i==15)`
+	vpxor	$t2,$sigma,$sigma
+
+	vpsrld	\$2,$a,$h			# borrow $h
+	vpxor	$t3,$sigma,$sigma		# Sigma1(e)
+	 `"prefetcht0	63(@ptr[2])"		if ($i==15)`
+	vpslld	\$30,$a,$t2
+	 vpxor	$axb,$t1,$t1			# Ch(e,f,g)
+	 vpxor	$a,$b,$axb			# a^b, b^c in next round
+	 `"prefetcht0	63(@ptr[3])"		if ($i==15)`
+	vpxor	$t2,$h,$h
+	vpaddd	$sigma,$Xi,$Xi			# Xi+=Sigma1(e)
+
+	vpsrld	\$13,$a,$t2
+	 `"prefetcht0	63(@ptr[4])"		if ($i==15 && $REG_SZ==32)`
+	vpslld	\$19,$a,$t3
+	 vpaddd	$t1,$Xi,$Xi			# Xi+=Ch(e,f,g)
+	 vpand	$axb,$bxc,$bxc
+	 `"prefetcht0	63(@ptr[5])"		if ($i==15 && $REG_SZ==32)`
+	vpxor	$t2,$h,$sigma
+
+	vpsrld	\$22,$a,$t2
+	vpxor	$t3,$sigma,$sigma
+	 `"prefetcht0	63(@ptr[6])"		if ($i==15 && $REG_SZ==32)`
+	vpslld	\$10,$a,$t3
+	 vpxor	$bxc,$b,$h			# h=Maj(a,b,c)=Ch(a^b,c,b)
+	 vpaddd	$Xi,$d,$d			# d+=Xi
+	 `"prefetcht0	63(@ptr[7])"		if ($i==15 && $REG_SZ==32)`
+	vpxor	$t2,$sigma,$sigma
+	vpxor	$t3,$sigma,$sigma		# Sigma0(a)
+
+	vpaddd	$Xi,$h,$h			# h+=Xi
+	vpaddd	$sigma,$h,$h			# h+=Sigma0(a)
+___
+$code.=<<___ if (($i%8)==7);
+	add	\$`32*8`,$Tbl
+___
+	($axb,$bxc)=($bxc,$axb);
+}
+
+sub ROUND_16_XX_avx {
+my $i=shift;
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	vmovdqu	`&Xi_off($i+1)`,$Xn
+	vpaddd	`&Xi_off($i+9)`,$Xi,$Xi		# Xi+=X[i+9]
+
+	vpsrld	\$3,$Xn,$sigma
+	vpsrld	\$7,$Xn,$t2
+	vpslld	\$25,$Xn,$t3
+	vpxor	$t2,$sigma,$sigma
+	vpsrld	\$18,$Xn,$t2
+	vpxor	$t3,$sigma,$sigma
+	vpslld	\$14,$Xn,$t3
+	vmovdqu	`&Xi_off($i+14)`,$t1
+	vpsrld	\$10,$t1,$axb			# borrow $axb
+
+	vpxor	$t2,$sigma,$sigma
+	vpsrld	\$17,$t1,$t2
+	vpxor	$t3,$sigma,$sigma		# sigma0(X[i+1])
+	vpslld	\$15,$t1,$t3
+	 vpaddd	$sigma,$Xi,$Xi			# Xi+=sigma0(e)
+	vpxor	$t2,$axb,$sigma
+	vpsrld	\$19,$t1,$t2
+	vpxor	$t3,$sigma,$sigma
+	vpslld	\$13,$t1,$t3
+	vpxor	$t2,$sigma,$sigma
+	vpxor	$t3,$sigma,$sigma		# sigma0(X[i+14])
+	vpaddd	$sigma,$Xi,$Xi			# Xi+=sigma1(X[i+14])
+___
+	&ROUND_00_15_avx($i,@_);
+	($Xi,$Xn)=($Xn,$Xi);
+}
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.type	sha256_multi_block_avx,\@function,3
+.align	32
+sha256_multi_block_avx:
+_avx_shortcut:
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($avx>1);
+	shr	\$32,%rcx
+	cmp	\$2,$num
+	jb	.Lavx
+	test	\$`1<<5`,%ecx
+	jnz	_avx2_shortcut
+	jmp	.Lavx
+.align	32
+.Lavx:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	%rsp,%rax
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	lea	-0xa8(%rsp),%rsp
+	movaps	%xmm6,(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm7,0x10(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm8,0x20(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm9,0x30(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm10,-0x78(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm11,-0x68(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm12,-0x58(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm13,-0x48(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm14,-0x38(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm15,-0x28(%rax)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	sub	\$`$REG_SZ*18`, %rsp
+	and	\$-256,%rsp
+	mov	%rax,`$REG_SZ*17`(%rsp)		# original %rsp
+.Lbody_avx:
+	lea	K256+128(%rip),$Tbl
+	lea	`$REG_SZ*16`(%rsp),%rbx
+	lea	0x80($ctx),$ctx			# size optimization
+
+.Loop_grande_avx:
+	mov	$num,`$REG_SZ*17+8`(%rsp)	# original $num
+	xor	$num,$num
+___
+for($i=0;$i<4;$i++) {
+    $code.=<<___;
+	mov	`16*$i+0`($inp),@ptr[$i]	# input pointer
+	mov	`16*$i+8`($inp),%ecx		# number of blocks
+	cmp	$num,%ecx
+	cmovg	%ecx,$num			# find maximum
+	test	%ecx,%ecx
+	mov	%ecx,`4*$i`(%rbx)		# initialize counters
+	cmovle	$Tbl,@ptr[$i]			# cancel input
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	test	$num,$num
+	jz	.Ldone_avx
+
+	vmovdqu	0x00-0x80($ctx),$A		# load context
+	 lea	128(%rsp),%rax
+	vmovdqu	0x20-0x80($ctx),$B
+	vmovdqu	0x40-0x80($ctx),$C
+	vmovdqu	0x60-0x80($ctx),$D
+	vmovdqu	0x80-0x80($ctx),$E
+	vmovdqu	0xa0-0x80($ctx),$F
+	vmovdqu	0xc0-0x80($ctx),$G
+	vmovdqu	0xe0-0x80($ctx),$H
+	vmovdqu	.Lpbswap(%rip),$Xn
+	jmp	.Loop_avx
+
+.align	32
+.Loop_avx:
+	vpxor	$B,$C,$bxc			# magic seed
+___
+for($i=0;$i<16;$i++)	{ &ROUND_00_15_avx($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+$code.=<<___;
+	vmovdqu	`&Xi_off($i)`,$Xi
+	mov	\$3,%ecx
+	jmp	.Loop_16_xx_avx
+.align	32
+.Loop_16_xx_avx:
+___
+for(;$i<32;$i++)	{ &ROUND_16_XX_avx($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+$code.=<<___;
+	dec	%ecx
+	jnz	.Loop_16_xx_avx
+
+	mov	\$1,%ecx
+	lea	K256+128(%rip),$Tbl
+___
+for($i=0;$i<4;$i++) {
+    $code.=<<___;
+	cmp	`4*$i`(%rbx),%ecx		# examine counters
+	cmovge	$Tbl,@ptr[$i]			# cancel input
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	vmovdqa	(%rbx),$sigma			# pull counters
+	vpxor	$t1,$t1,$t1
+	vmovdqa	$sigma,$Xn
+	vpcmpgtd $t1,$Xn,$Xn			# mask value
+	vpaddd	$Xn,$sigma,$sigma		# counters--
+
+	vmovdqu	0x00-0x80($ctx),$t1
+	vpand	$Xn,$A,$A
+	vmovdqu	0x20-0x80($ctx),$t2
+	vpand	$Xn,$B,$B
+	vmovdqu	0x40-0x80($ctx),$t3
+	vpand	$Xn,$C,$C
+	vmovdqu	0x60-0x80($ctx),$Xi
+	vpand	$Xn,$D,$D
+	vpaddd	$t1,$A,$A
+	vmovdqu	0x80-0x80($ctx),$t1
+	vpand	$Xn,$E,$E
+	vpaddd	$t2,$B,$B
+	vmovdqu	0xa0-0x80($ctx),$t2
+	vpand	$Xn,$F,$F
+	vpaddd	$t3,$C,$C
+	vmovdqu	0xc0-0x80($ctx),$t3
+	vpand	$Xn,$G,$G
+	vpaddd	$Xi,$D,$D
+	vmovdqu	0xe0-0x80($ctx),$Xi
+	vpand	$Xn,$H,$H
+	vpaddd	$t1,$E,$E
+	vpaddd	$t2,$F,$F
+	vmovdqu	$A,0x00-0x80($ctx)
+	vpaddd	$t3,$G,$G
+	vmovdqu	$B,0x20-0x80($ctx)
+	vpaddd	$Xi,$H,$H
+	vmovdqu	$C,0x40-0x80($ctx)
+	vmovdqu	$D,0x60-0x80($ctx)
+	vmovdqu	$E,0x80-0x80($ctx)
+	vmovdqu	$F,0xa0-0x80($ctx)
+	vmovdqu	$G,0xc0-0x80($ctx)
+	vmovdqu	$H,0xe0-0x80($ctx)
+
+	vmovdqu	$sigma,(%rbx)			# save counters
+	vmovdqu	.Lpbswap(%rip),$Xn
+	dec	$num
+	jnz	.Loop_avx
+
+	mov	`$REG_SZ*17+8`(%rsp),$num
+	lea	$REG_SZ($ctx),$ctx
+	lea	`16*$REG_SZ/4`($inp),$inp
+	dec	$num
+	jnz	.Loop_grande_avx
+
+.Ldone_avx:
+	mov	`$REG_SZ*17`(%rsp),%rax		# original %rsp
+	vzeroupper
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	movaps	-0xb8(%rax),%xmm6
+	movaps	-0xa8(%rax),%xmm7
+	movaps	-0x98(%rax),%xmm8
+	movaps	-0x88(%rax),%xmm9
+	movaps	-0x78(%rax),%xmm10
+	movaps	-0x68(%rax),%xmm11
+	movaps	-0x58(%rax),%xmm12
+	movaps	-0x48(%rax),%xmm13
+	movaps	-0x38(%rax),%xmm14
+	movaps	-0x28(%rax),%xmm15
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	-16(%rax),%rbp
+	mov	-8(%rax),%rbx
+	lea	(%rax),%rsp
+.Lepilogue_avx:
+	ret
+.size	sha256_multi_block_avx,.-sha256_multi_block_avx
+___
+						if ($avx>1) {
+$code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem;
+
+$REG_SZ=32;
+@ptr=map("%r$_",(12..15,8..11));
+
+@V=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$F,$G,$H)=map("%ymm$_",(8..15));
+($t1,$t2,$t3,$axb,$bxc,$Xi,$Xn,$sigma)=map("%ymm$_",(0..7));
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.type	sha256_multi_block_avx2,\@function,3
+.align	32
+sha256_multi_block_avx2:
+_avx2_shortcut:
+	mov	%rsp,%rax
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	lea	-0xa8(%rsp),%rsp
+	movaps	%xmm6,(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm7,0x10(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm8,0x20(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm9,0x30(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm10,0x40(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm11,0x50(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm12,-0x78(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm13,-0x68(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm14,-0x58(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm15,-0x48(%rax)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	sub	\$`$REG_SZ*18`, %rsp
+	and	\$-256,%rsp
+	mov	%rax,`$REG_SZ*17`(%rsp)		# original %rsp
+.Lbody_avx2:
+	lea	K256+128(%rip),$Tbl
+	lea	0x80($ctx),$ctx			# size optimization
+
+.Loop_grande_avx2:
+	mov	$num,`$REG_SZ*17+8`(%rsp)	# original $num
+	xor	$num,$num
+	lea	`$REG_SZ*16`(%rsp),%rbx
+___
+for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) {
+    $code.=<<___;
+	mov	`16*$i+0`($inp),@ptr[$i]	# input pointer
+	mov	`16*$i+8`($inp),%ecx		# number of blocks
+	cmp	$num,%ecx
+	cmovg	%ecx,$num			# find maximum
+	test	%ecx,%ecx
+	mov	%ecx,`4*$i`(%rbx)		# initialize counters
+	cmovle	$Tbl,@ptr[$i]			# cancel input
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	vmovdqu	0x00-0x80($ctx),$A		# load context
+	 lea	128(%rsp),%rax
+	vmovdqu	0x20-0x80($ctx),$B
+	 lea	256+128(%rsp),%rbx
+	vmovdqu	0x40-0x80($ctx),$C
+	vmovdqu	0x60-0x80($ctx),$D
+	vmovdqu	0x80-0x80($ctx),$E
+	vmovdqu	0xa0-0x80($ctx),$F
+	vmovdqu	0xc0-0x80($ctx),$G
+	vmovdqu	0xe0-0x80($ctx),$H
+	vmovdqu	.Lpbswap(%rip),$Xn
+	jmp	.Loop_avx2
+
+.align	32
+.Loop_avx2:
+	vpxor	$B,$C,$bxc			# magic seed
+___
+for($i=0;$i<16;$i++)	{ &ROUND_00_15_avx($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+$code.=<<___;
+	vmovdqu	`&Xi_off($i)`,$Xi
+	mov	\$3,%ecx
+	jmp	.Loop_16_xx_avx2
+.align	32
+.Loop_16_xx_avx2:
+___
+for(;$i<32;$i++)	{ &ROUND_16_XX_avx($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+$code.=<<___;
+	dec	%ecx
+	jnz	.Loop_16_xx_avx2
+
+	mov	\$1,%ecx
+	lea	`$REG_SZ*16`(%rsp),%rbx
+	lea	K256+128(%rip),$Tbl
+___
+for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) {
+    $code.=<<___;
+	cmp	`4*$i`(%rbx),%ecx		# examine counters
+	cmovge	$Tbl,@ptr[$i]			# cancel input
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	vmovdqa	(%rbx),$sigma			# pull counters
+	vpxor	$t1,$t1,$t1
+	vmovdqa	$sigma,$Xn
+	vpcmpgtd $t1,$Xn,$Xn			# mask value
+	vpaddd	$Xn,$sigma,$sigma		# counters--
+
+	vmovdqu	0x00-0x80($ctx),$t1
+	vpand	$Xn,$A,$A
+	vmovdqu	0x20-0x80($ctx),$t2
+	vpand	$Xn,$B,$B
+	vmovdqu	0x40-0x80($ctx),$t3
+	vpand	$Xn,$C,$C
+	vmovdqu	0x60-0x80($ctx),$Xi
+	vpand	$Xn,$D,$D
+	vpaddd	$t1,$A,$A
+	vmovdqu	0x80-0x80($ctx),$t1
+	vpand	$Xn,$E,$E
+	vpaddd	$t2,$B,$B
+	vmovdqu	0xa0-0x80($ctx),$t2
+	vpand	$Xn,$F,$F
+	vpaddd	$t3,$C,$C
+	vmovdqu	0xc0-0x80($ctx),$t3
+	vpand	$Xn,$G,$G
+	vpaddd	$Xi,$D,$D
+	vmovdqu	0xe0-0x80($ctx),$Xi
+	vpand	$Xn,$H,$H
+	vpaddd	$t1,$E,$E
+	vpaddd	$t2,$F,$F
+	vmovdqu	$A,0x00-0x80($ctx)
+	vpaddd	$t3,$G,$G
+	vmovdqu	$B,0x20-0x80($ctx)
+	vpaddd	$Xi,$H,$H
+	vmovdqu	$C,0x40-0x80($ctx)
+	vmovdqu	$D,0x60-0x80($ctx)
+	vmovdqu	$E,0x80-0x80($ctx)
+	vmovdqu	$F,0xa0-0x80($ctx)
+	vmovdqu	$G,0xc0-0x80($ctx)
+	vmovdqu	$H,0xe0-0x80($ctx)
+
+	vmovdqu	$sigma,(%rbx)			# save counters
+	lea	256+128(%rsp),%rbx
+	vmovdqu	.Lpbswap(%rip),$Xn
+	dec	$num
+	jnz	.Loop_avx2
+
+	#mov	`$REG_SZ*17+8`(%rsp),$num
+	#lea	$REG_SZ($ctx),$ctx
+	#lea	`16*$REG_SZ/4`($inp),$inp
+	#dec	$num
+	#jnz	.Loop_grande_avx2
+
+.Ldone_avx2:
+	mov	`$REG_SZ*17`(%rsp),%rax		# original %rsp
+	vzeroupper
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	movaps	-0xd8(%rax),%xmm6
+	movaps	-0xc8(%rax),%xmm7
+	movaps	-0xb8(%rax),%xmm8
+	movaps	-0xa8(%rax),%xmm9
+	movaps	-0x98(%rax),%xmm10
+	movaps	-0x88(%rax),%xmm11
+	movaps	-0x78(%rax),%xmm12
+	movaps	-0x68(%rax),%xmm13
+	movaps	-0x58(%rax),%xmm14
+	movaps	-0x48(%rax),%xmm15
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	-48(%rax),%r15
+	mov	-40(%rax),%r14
+	mov	-32(%rax),%r13
+	mov	-24(%rax),%r12
+	mov	-16(%rax),%rbp
+	mov	-8(%rax),%rbx
+	lea	(%rax),%rsp
+.Lepilogue_avx2:
+	ret
+.size	sha256_multi_block_avx2,.-sha256_multi_block_avx2
+___
+					}	}}}
+$code.=<<___;
+.align	256
+K256:
+___
+sub TABLE {
+    foreach (@_) {
+	$code.=<<___;
+	.long	$_,$_,$_,$_
+	.long	$_,$_,$_,$_
+___
+    }
+}
+&TABLE(	0x428a2f98,0x71374491,0xb5c0fbcf,0xe9b5dba5,
+	0x3956c25b,0x59f111f1,0x923f82a4,0xab1c5ed5,
+	0xd807aa98,0x12835b01,0x243185be,0x550c7dc3,
+	0x72be5d74,0x80deb1fe,0x9bdc06a7,0xc19bf174,
+	0xe49b69c1,0xefbe4786,0x0fc19dc6,0x240ca1cc,
+	0x2de92c6f,0x4a7484aa,0x5cb0a9dc,0x76f988da,
+	0x983e5152,0xa831c66d,0xb00327c8,0xbf597fc7,
+	0xc6e00bf3,0xd5a79147,0x06ca6351,0x14292967,
+	0x27b70a85,0x2e1b2138,0x4d2c6dfc,0x53380d13,
+	0x650a7354,0x766a0abb,0x81c2c92e,0x92722c85,
+	0xa2bfe8a1,0xa81a664b,0xc24b8b70,0xc76c51a3,
+	0xd192e819,0xd6990624,0xf40e3585,0x106aa070,
+	0x19a4c116,0x1e376c08,0x2748774c,0x34b0bcb5,
+	0x391c0cb3,0x4ed8aa4a,0x5b9cca4f,0x682e6ff3,
+	0x748f82ee,0x78a5636f,0x84c87814,0x8cc70208,
+	0x90befffa,0xa4506ceb,0xbef9a3f7,0xc67178f2 );
+$code.=<<___;
+.Lpbswap:
+	.long	0x00010203,0x04050607,0x08090a0b,0x0c0d0e0f	# pbswap
+	.long	0x00010203,0x04050607,0x08090a0b,0x0c0d0e0f	# pbswap
+K256_shaext:
+	.long	0x428a2f98,0x71374491,0xb5c0fbcf,0xe9b5dba5
+	.long	0x3956c25b,0x59f111f1,0x923f82a4,0xab1c5ed5
+	.long	0xd807aa98,0x12835b01,0x243185be,0x550c7dc3
+	.long	0x72be5d74,0x80deb1fe,0x9bdc06a7,0xc19bf174
+	.long	0xe49b69c1,0xefbe4786,0x0fc19dc6,0x240ca1cc
+	.long	0x2de92c6f,0x4a7484aa,0x5cb0a9dc,0x76f988da
+	.long	0x983e5152,0xa831c66d,0xb00327c8,0xbf597fc7
+	.long	0xc6e00bf3,0xd5a79147,0x06ca6351,0x14292967
+	.long	0x27b70a85,0x2e1b2138,0x4d2c6dfc,0x53380d13
+	.long	0x650a7354,0x766a0abb,0x81c2c92e,0x92722c85
+	.long	0xa2bfe8a1,0xa81a664b,0xc24b8b70,0xc76c51a3
+	.long	0xd192e819,0xd6990624,0xf40e3585,0x106aa070
+	.long	0x19a4c116,0x1e376c08,0x2748774c,0x34b0bcb5
+	.long	0x391c0cb3,0x4ed8aa4a,0x5b9cca4f,0x682e6ff3
+	.long	0x748f82ee,0x78a5636f,0x84c87814,0x8cc70208
+	.long	0x90befffa,0xa4506ceb,0xbef9a3f7,0xc67178f2
+	.asciz	"SHA256 multi-block transform for x86_64, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+___
+
+if ($win64) {
+# EXCEPTION_DISPOSITION handler (EXCEPTION_RECORD *rec,ULONG64 frame,
+#		CONTEXT *context,DISPATCHER_CONTEXT *disp)
+$rec="%rcx";
+$frame="%rdx";
+$context="%r8";
+$disp="%r9";
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.extern	__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind
+.type	se_handler,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+se_handler:
+	push	%rsi
+	push	%rdi
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+	pushfq
+	sub	\$64,%rsp
+
+	mov	120($context),%rax	# pull context->Rax
+	mov	248($context),%rbx	# pull context->Rip
+
+	mov	8($disp),%rsi		# disp->ImageBase
+	mov	56($disp),%r11		# disp->HandlerData
+
+	mov	0(%r11),%r10d		# HandlerData[0]
+	lea	(%rsi,%r10),%r10	# end of prologue label
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip<.Lbody
+	jb	.Lin_prologue
+
+	mov	152($context),%rax	# pull context->Rsp
+
+	mov	4(%r11),%r10d		# HandlerData[1]
+	lea	(%rsi,%r10),%r10	# epilogue label
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip>=.Lepilogue
+	jae	.Lin_prologue
+
+	mov	`16*17`(%rax),%rax	# pull saved stack pointer
+
+	mov	-8(%rax),%rbx
+	mov	-16(%rax),%rbp
+	mov	%rbx,144($context)	# restore context->Rbx
+	mov	%rbp,160($context)	# restore context->Rbp
+
+	lea	-24-10*16(%rax),%rsi
+	lea	512($context),%rdi	# &context.Xmm6
+	mov	\$20,%ecx
+	.long	0xa548f3fc		# cld; rep movsq
+
+.Lin_prologue:
+	mov	8(%rax),%rdi
+	mov	16(%rax),%rsi
+	mov	%rax,152($context)	# restore context->Rsp
+	mov	%rsi,168($context)	# restore context->Rsi
+	mov	%rdi,176($context)	# restore context->Rdi
+
+	mov	40($disp),%rdi		# disp->ContextRecord
+	mov	$context,%rsi		# context
+	mov	\$154,%ecx		# sizeof(CONTEXT)
+	.long	0xa548f3fc		# cld; rep movsq
+
+	mov	$disp,%rsi
+	xor	%rcx,%rcx		# arg1, UNW_FLAG_NHANDLER
+	mov	8(%rsi),%rdx		# arg2, disp->ImageBase
+	mov	0(%rsi),%r8		# arg3, disp->ControlPc
+	mov	16(%rsi),%r9		# arg4, disp->FunctionEntry
+	mov	40(%rsi),%r10		# disp->ContextRecord
+	lea	56(%rsi),%r11		# &disp->HandlerData
+	lea	24(%rsi),%r12		# &disp->EstablisherFrame
+	mov	%r10,32(%rsp)		# arg5
+	mov	%r11,40(%rsp)		# arg6
+	mov	%r12,48(%rsp)		# arg7
+	mov	%rcx,56(%rsp)		# arg8, (NULL)
+	call	*__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind(%rip)
+
+	mov	\$1,%eax		# ExceptionContinueSearch
+	add	\$64,%rsp
+	popfq
+	pop	%r15
+	pop	%r14
+	pop	%r13
+	pop	%r12
+	pop	%rbp
+	pop	%rbx
+	pop	%rdi
+	pop	%rsi
+	ret
+.size	se_handler,.-se_handler
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($avx>1);
+.type	avx2_handler,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+avx2_handler:
+	push	%rsi
+	push	%rdi
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+	pushfq
+	sub	\$64,%rsp
+
+	mov	120($context),%rax	# pull context->Rax
+	mov	248($context),%rbx	# pull context->Rip
+
+	mov	8($disp),%rsi		# disp->ImageBase
+	mov	56($disp),%r11		# disp->HandlerData
+
+	mov	0(%r11),%r10d		# HandlerData[0]
+	lea	(%rsi,%r10),%r10	# end of prologue label
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip<body label
+	jb	.Lin_prologue
+
+	mov	152($context),%rax	# pull context->Rsp
+
+	mov	4(%r11),%r10d		# HandlerData[1]
+	lea	(%rsi,%r10),%r10	# epilogue label
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip>=epilogue label
+	jae	.Lin_prologue
+
+	mov	`32*17`($context),%rax	# pull saved stack pointer
+
+	mov	-8(%rax),%rbx
+	mov	-16(%rax),%rbp
+	mov	-24(%rax),%r12
+	mov	-32(%rax),%r13
+	mov	-40(%rax),%r14
+	mov	-48(%rax),%r15
+	mov	%rbx,144($context)	# restore context->Rbx
+	mov	%rbp,160($context)	# restore context->Rbp
+	mov	%r12,216($context)	# restore cotnext->R12
+	mov	%r13,224($context)	# restore cotnext->R13
+	mov	%r14,232($context)	# restore cotnext->R14
+	mov	%r15,240($context)	# restore cotnext->R15
+
+	lea	-56-10*16(%rax),%rsi
+	lea	512($context),%rdi	# &context.Xmm6
+	mov	\$20,%ecx
+	.long	0xa548f3fc		# cld; rep movsq
+
+	jmp	.Lin_prologue
+.size	avx2_handler,.-avx2_handler
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+.section	.pdata
+.align	4
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_sha256_multi_block
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_sha256_multi_block
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_sha256_multi_block
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_sha256_multi_block_shaext
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_sha256_multi_block_shaext
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_sha256_multi_block_shaext
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($avx);
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_sha256_multi_block_avx
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_sha256_multi_block_avx
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_sha256_multi_block_avx
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($avx>1);
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_sha256_multi_block_avx2
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_sha256_multi_block_avx2
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_sha256_multi_block_avx2
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+.section	.xdata
+.align	8
+.LSEH_info_sha256_multi_block:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	se_handler
+	.rva	.Lbody,.Lepilogue			# HandlerData[]
+.LSEH_info_sha256_multi_block_shaext:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	se_handler
+	.rva	.Lbody_shaext,.Lepilogue_shaext		# HandlerData[]
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($avx);
+.LSEH_info_sha256_multi_block_avx:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	se_handler
+	.rva	.Lbody_avx,.Lepilogue_avx		# HandlerData[]
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($avx>1);
+.LSEH_info_sha256_multi_block_avx2:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	avx2_handler
+	.rva	.Lbody_avx2,.Lepilogue_avx2		# HandlerData[]
+___
+}
+####################################################################
+
+sub rex {
+  local *opcode=shift;
+  my ($dst,$src)=@_;
+  my $rex=0;
+
+    $rex|=0x04			if ($dst>=8);
+    $rex|=0x01			if ($src>=8);
+    unshift @opcode,$rex|0x40	if ($rex);
+}
+
+sub sha256op38 {
+    my $instr = shift;
+    my %opcodelet = (
+		"sha256rnds2" => 0xcb,
+  		"sha256msg1"  => 0xcc,
+		"sha256msg2"  => 0xcd	);
+
+    if (defined($opcodelet{$instr}) && @_[0] =~ /%xmm([0-9]+),\s*%xmm([0-9]+)/) {
+      my @opcode=(0x0f,0x38);
+	rex(\@opcode,$2,$1);
+	push @opcode,$opcodelet{$instr};
+	push @opcode,0xc0|($1&7)|(($2&7)<<3);		# ModR/M
+	return ".byte\t".join(',',@opcode);
+    } else {
+	return $instr."\t".@_[0];
+    }
+}
+
+foreach (split("\n",$code)) {
+	s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval($1)/ge;
+
+	s/\b(sha256[^\s]*)\s+(.*)/sha256op38($1,$2)/geo		or
+
+	s/\b(vmov[dq])\b(.+)%ymm([0-9]+)/$1$2%xmm$3/go		or
+	s/\b(vmovdqu)\b(.+)%x%ymm([0-9]+)/$1$2%xmm$3/go		or
+	s/\b(vpinsr[qd])\b(.+)%ymm([0-9]+),%ymm([0-9]+)/$1$2%xmm$3,%xmm$4/go	or
+	s/\b(vpextr[qd])\b(.+)%ymm([0-9]+)/$1$2%xmm$3/go	or
+	s/\b(vinserti128)\b(\s+)%ymm/$1$2\$1,%xmm/go		or
+	s/\b(vpbroadcast[qd]\s+)%ymm([0-9]+)/$1%xmm$2/go;
+
+	print $_,"\n";
+}
+
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-586.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-586.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3873934
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-586.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,924 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2007-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# SHA512 block transform for x86. September 2007.
+#
+# May 2013.
+#
+# Add SSSE3 code path, 20-25% improvement [over original SSE2 code].
+#
+# Performance in clock cycles per processed byte (less is better):
+#
+#		gcc	icc	x86 asm	SIMD(*)	x86_64(**)
+# Pentium	100	97	61	-	-
+# PIII		75	77	56	-	-
+# P4		116	95	82	34.6	30.8
+# AMD K8	54	55	36	20.7	9.57
+# Core2		66	57	40	15.9	9.97
+# Westmere	70	-	38	12.2	9.58
+# Sandy Bridge	58	-	35	11.9	11.2
+# Ivy Bridge	50	-	33	11.5	8.17
+# Haswell	46	-	29	11.3	7.66
+# Bulldozer	121	-	50	14.0	13.5
+# VIA Nano	91	-	52	33	14.7
+# Atom		126	-	68	48(***)	14.7
+# Silvermont	97	-	58	42(***)	17.5
+# Goldmont	80	-	48	19.5	12.0
+#
+# (*)	whichever best applicable.
+# (**)	x86_64 assembler performance is presented for reference
+#	purposes, the results are for integer-only code.
+# (***)	paddq is increadibly slow on Atom.
+#
+# IALU code-path is optimized for elder Pentiums. On vanilla Pentium
+# performance improvement over compiler generated code reaches ~60%,
+# while on PIII - ~35%. On newer µ-archs improvement varies from 15%
+# to 50%, but it's less important as they are expected to execute SSE2
+# code-path, which is commonly ~2-3x faster [than compiler generated
+# code]. SSE2 code-path is as fast as original sha512-sse2.pl, even
+# though it does not use 128-bit operations. The latter means that
+# SSE2-aware kernel is no longer required to execute the code. Another
+# difference is that new code optimizes amount of writes, but at the
+# cost of increased data cache "footprint" by 1/2KB.
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm");
+require "x86asm.pl";
+
+$output=pop;
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+&asm_init($ARGV[0],"sha512-586.pl",$ARGV[$#ARGV] eq "386");
+
+$sse2=0;
+for (@ARGV) { $sse2=1 if (/-DOPENSSL_IA32_SSE2/); }
+
+&external_label("OPENSSL_ia32cap_P") if ($sse2);
+
+$Tlo=&DWP(0,"esp");	$Thi=&DWP(4,"esp");
+$Alo=&DWP(8,"esp");	$Ahi=&DWP(8+4,"esp");
+$Blo=&DWP(16,"esp");	$Bhi=&DWP(16+4,"esp");
+$Clo=&DWP(24,"esp");	$Chi=&DWP(24+4,"esp");
+$Dlo=&DWP(32,"esp");	$Dhi=&DWP(32+4,"esp");
+$Elo=&DWP(40,"esp");	$Ehi=&DWP(40+4,"esp");
+$Flo=&DWP(48,"esp");	$Fhi=&DWP(48+4,"esp");
+$Glo=&DWP(56,"esp");	$Ghi=&DWP(56+4,"esp");
+$Hlo=&DWP(64,"esp");	$Hhi=&DWP(64+4,"esp");
+$K512="ebp";
+
+$Asse2=&QWP(0,"esp");
+$Bsse2=&QWP(8,"esp");
+$Csse2=&QWP(16,"esp");
+$Dsse2=&QWP(24,"esp");
+$Esse2=&QWP(32,"esp");
+$Fsse2=&QWP(40,"esp");
+$Gsse2=&QWP(48,"esp");
+$Hsse2=&QWP(56,"esp");
+
+$A="mm0";	# B-D and
+$E="mm4";	# F-H are commonly loaded to respectively mm1-mm3 and
+		# mm5-mm7, but it's done on on-demand basis...
+$BxC="mm2";	# ... except for B^C
+
+sub BODY_00_15_sse2 {
+    my $phase=shift;
+
+	#&movq	("mm5",$Fsse2);			# load f
+	#&movq	("mm6",$Gsse2);			# load g
+
+	&movq	("mm1",$E);			# %mm1 is sliding right
+	 &pxor	("mm5","mm6");			# f^=g
+	&psrlq	("mm1",14);
+	 &movq	($Esse2,$E);			# modulo-scheduled save e
+	 &pand	("mm5",$E);			# f&=e
+	&psllq	($E,23);			# $E is sliding left
+	 &movq	($A,"mm3")			if ($phase<2);
+	 &movq	(&QWP(8*9,"esp"),"mm7")		# save X[i]
+	&movq	("mm3","mm1");			# %mm3 is T1
+	 &psrlq	("mm1",4);
+	 &pxor	("mm5","mm6");			# Ch(e,f,g)
+	&pxor	("mm3",$E);
+	 &psllq	($E,23);
+	&pxor	("mm3","mm1");
+	 &movq	($Asse2,$A);			# modulo-scheduled save a
+	 &paddq	("mm7","mm5");			# X[i]+=Ch(e,f,g)
+	&pxor	("mm3",$E);
+	 &psrlq	("mm1",23);
+	 &paddq	("mm7",$Hsse2);			# X[i]+=h
+	&pxor	("mm3","mm1");
+	 &psllq	($E,4);
+	 &paddq	("mm7",QWP(0,$K512));		# X[i]+=K512[i]
+	&pxor	("mm3",$E);			# T1=Sigma1_512(e)
+
+	 &movq	($E,$Dsse2);			# e = load d, e in next round
+	&paddq	("mm3","mm7");			# T1+=X[i]
+	 &movq	("mm5",$A);			# %mm5 is sliding right
+	 &psrlq	("mm5",28);
+	&paddq	($E,"mm3");			# d += T1
+	 &movq	("mm6",$A);			# %mm6 is sliding left
+	 &movq	("mm7","mm5");
+	 &psllq	("mm6",25);
+	&movq	("mm1",$Bsse2);			# load b
+	 &psrlq	("mm5",6);
+	 &pxor	("mm7","mm6");
+	&sub	("esp",8);
+	 &psllq	("mm6",5);
+	 &pxor	("mm7","mm5");
+	&pxor	($A,"mm1");			# a^b, b^c in next round
+	 &psrlq	("mm5",5);
+	 &pxor	("mm7","mm6");
+	&pand	($BxC,$A);			# (b^c)&(a^b)
+	 &psllq	("mm6",6);
+	 &pxor	("mm7","mm5");
+	&pxor	($BxC,"mm1");			# [h=]Maj(a,b,c)
+	 &pxor	("mm6","mm7");			# Sigma0_512(a)
+	 &movq	("mm7",&QWP(8*(9+16-1),"esp"))	if ($phase!=0);	# pre-fetch
+	 &movq	("mm5",$Fsse2)			if ($phase==0);	# load f
+
+    if ($phase>1) {
+	&paddq	($BxC,"mm6");			# h+=Sigma0(a)
+	 &add	($K512,8);
+	#&paddq	($BxC,"mm3");			# h+=T1
+
+	($A,$BxC) = ($BxC,$A);			# rotate registers
+    } else {
+	&paddq	("mm3",$BxC);			# T1+=Maj(a,b,c)
+	 &movq	($BxC,$A);
+	 &add	($K512,8);
+	&paddq	("mm3","mm6");			# T1+=Sigma0(a)
+	 &movq	("mm6",$Gsse2)			if ($phase==0);	# load g
+	#&movq	($A,"mm3");			# h=T1
+    }
+}
+
+sub BODY_00_15_x86 {
+	#define Sigma1(x)	(ROTR((x),14) ^ ROTR((x),18)  ^ ROTR((x),41))
+	#	LO		lo>>14^hi<<18 ^ lo>>18^hi<<14 ^ hi>>9^lo<<23
+	#	HI		hi>>14^lo<<18 ^ hi>>18^lo<<14 ^ lo>>9^hi<<23
+	&mov	("ecx",$Elo);
+	&mov	("edx",$Ehi);
+	&mov	("esi","ecx");
+
+	&shr	("ecx",9);	# lo>>9
+	&mov	("edi","edx");
+	&shr	("edx",9);	# hi>>9
+	&mov	("ebx","ecx");
+	&shl	("esi",14);	# lo<<14
+	&mov	("eax","edx");
+	&shl	("edi",14);	# hi<<14
+	&xor	("ebx","esi");
+
+	&shr	("ecx",14-9);	# lo>>14
+	&xor	("eax","edi");
+	&shr	("edx",14-9);	# hi>>14
+	&xor	("eax","ecx");
+	&shl	("esi",18-14);	# lo<<18
+	&xor	("ebx","edx");
+	&shl	("edi",18-14);	# hi<<18
+	&xor	("ebx","esi");
+
+	&shr	("ecx",18-14);	# lo>>18
+	&xor	("eax","edi");
+	&shr	("edx",18-14);	# hi>>18
+	&xor	("eax","ecx");
+	&shl	("esi",23-18);	# lo<<23
+	&xor	("ebx","edx");
+	&shl	("edi",23-18);	# hi<<23
+	&xor	("eax","esi");
+	&xor	("ebx","edi");			# T1 = Sigma1(e)
+
+	&mov	("ecx",$Flo);
+	&mov	("edx",$Fhi);
+	&mov	("esi",$Glo);
+	&mov	("edi",$Ghi);
+	 &add	("eax",$Hlo);
+	 &adc	("ebx",$Hhi);			# T1 += h
+	&xor	("ecx","esi");
+	&xor	("edx","edi");
+	&and	("ecx",$Elo);
+	&and	("edx",$Ehi);
+	 &add	("eax",&DWP(8*(9+15)+0,"esp"));
+	 &adc	("ebx",&DWP(8*(9+15)+4,"esp"));	# T1 += X[0]
+	&xor	("ecx","esi");
+	&xor	("edx","edi");			# Ch(e,f,g) = (f^g)&e)^g
+
+	&mov	("esi",&DWP(0,$K512));
+	&mov	("edi",&DWP(4,$K512));		# K[i]
+	&add	("eax","ecx");
+	&adc	("ebx","edx");			# T1 += Ch(e,f,g)
+	&mov	("ecx",$Dlo);
+	&mov	("edx",$Dhi);
+	&add	("eax","esi");
+	&adc	("ebx","edi");			# T1 += K[i]
+	&mov	($Tlo,"eax");
+	&mov	($Thi,"ebx");			# put T1 away
+	&add	("eax","ecx");
+	&adc	("ebx","edx");			# d += T1
+
+	#define Sigma0(x)	(ROTR((x),28) ^ ROTR((x),34) ^ ROTR((x),39))
+	#	LO		lo>>28^hi<<4  ^ hi>>2^lo<<30 ^ hi>>7^lo<<25
+	#	HI		hi>>28^lo<<4  ^ lo>>2^hi<<30 ^ lo>>7^hi<<25
+	&mov	("ecx",$Alo);
+	&mov	("edx",$Ahi);
+	&mov	($Dlo,"eax");
+	&mov	($Dhi,"ebx");
+	&mov	("esi","ecx");
+
+	&shr	("ecx",2);	# lo>>2
+	&mov	("edi","edx");
+	&shr	("edx",2);	# hi>>2
+	&mov	("ebx","ecx");
+	&shl	("esi",4);	# lo<<4
+	&mov	("eax","edx");
+	&shl	("edi",4);	# hi<<4
+	&xor	("ebx","esi");
+
+	&shr	("ecx",7-2);	# lo>>7
+	&xor	("eax","edi");
+	&shr	("edx",7-2);	# hi>>7
+	&xor	("ebx","ecx");
+	&shl	("esi",25-4);	# lo<<25
+	&xor	("eax","edx");
+	&shl	("edi",25-4);	# hi<<25
+	&xor	("eax","esi");
+
+	&shr	("ecx",28-7);	# lo>>28
+	&xor	("ebx","edi");
+	&shr	("edx",28-7);	# hi>>28
+	&xor	("eax","ecx");
+	&shl	("esi",30-25);	# lo<<30
+	&xor	("ebx","edx");
+	&shl	("edi",30-25);	# hi<<30
+	&xor	("eax","esi");
+	&xor	("ebx","edi");			# Sigma0(a)
+
+	&mov	("ecx",$Alo);
+	&mov	("edx",$Ahi);
+	&mov	("esi",$Blo);
+	&mov	("edi",$Bhi);
+	&add	("eax",$Tlo);
+	&adc	("ebx",$Thi);			# T1 = Sigma0(a)+T1
+	&or	("ecx","esi");
+	&or	("edx","edi");
+	&and	("ecx",$Clo);
+	&and	("edx",$Chi);
+	&and	("esi",$Alo);
+	&and	("edi",$Ahi);
+	&or	("ecx","esi");
+	&or	("edx","edi");			# Maj(a,b,c) = ((a|b)&c)|(a&b)
+
+	&add	("eax","ecx");
+	&adc	("ebx","edx");			# T1 += Maj(a,b,c)
+	&mov	($Tlo,"eax");
+	&mov	($Thi,"ebx");
+
+	&mov	(&LB("edx"),&BP(0,$K512));	# pre-fetch LSB of *K
+	&sub	("esp",8);
+	&lea	($K512,&DWP(8,$K512));		# K++
+}
+
+
+&function_begin("sha512_block_data_order");
+	&mov	("esi",wparam(0));	# ctx
+	&mov	("edi",wparam(1));	# inp
+	&mov	("eax",wparam(2));	# num
+	&mov	("ebx","esp");		# saved sp
+
+	&call	(&label("pic_point"));	# make it PIC!
+&set_label("pic_point");
+	&blindpop($K512);
+	&lea	($K512,&DWP(&label("K512")."-".&label("pic_point"),$K512));
+
+	&sub	("esp",16);
+	&and	("esp",-64);
+
+	&shl	("eax",7);
+	&add	("eax","edi");
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,"esp"),"esi");	# ctx
+	&mov	(&DWP(4,"esp"),"edi");	# inp
+	&mov	(&DWP(8,"esp"),"eax");	# inp+num*128
+	&mov	(&DWP(12,"esp"),"ebx");	# saved sp
+
+if ($sse2) {
+	&picmeup("edx","OPENSSL_ia32cap_P",$K512,&label("K512"));
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(0,"edx"));
+	&test	("ecx",1<<26);
+	&jz	(&label("loop_x86"));
+
+	&mov	("edx",&DWP(4,"edx"));
+
+	# load ctx->h[0-7]
+	&movq	($A,&QWP(0,"esi"));
+	 &and	("ecx",1<<24);		# XMM registers availability
+	&movq	("mm1",&QWP(8,"esi"));
+	 &and	("edx",1<<9);		# SSSE3 bit
+	&movq	($BxC,&QWP(16,"esi"));
+	 &or	("ecx","edx");
+	&movq	("mm3",&QWP(24,"esi"));
+	&movq	($E,&QWP(32,"esi"));
+	&movq	("mm5",&QWP(40,"esi"));
+	&movq	("mm6",&QWP(48,"esi"));
+	&movq	("mm7",&QWP(56,"esi"));
+	&cmp	("ecx",1<<24|1<<9);
+	&je	(&label("SSSE3"));
+	&sub	("esp",8*10);
+	&jmp	(&label("loop_sse2"));
+
+&set_label("loop_sse2",16);
+	#&movq	($Asse2,$A);
+	&movq	($Bsse2,"mm1");
+	&movq	($Csse2,$BxC);
+	&movq	($Dsse2,"mm3");
+	#&movq	($Esse2,$E);
+	&movq	($Fsse2,"mm5");
+	&movq	($Gsse2,"mm6");
+	&pxor	($BxC,"mm1");			# magic
+	&movq	($Hsse2,"mm7");
+	&movq	("mm3",$A);			# magic
+
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(0,"edi"));
+	&mov	("ebx",&DWP(4,"edi"));
+	&add	("edi",8);
+	&mov	("edx",15);			# counter
+	&bswap	("eax");
+	&bswap	("ebx");
+	&jmp	(&label("00_14_sse2"));
+
+&set_label("00_14_sse2",16);
+	&movd	("mm1","eax");
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(0,"edi"));
+	&movd	("mm7","ebx");
+	&mov	("ebx",&DWP(4,"edi"));
+	&add	("edi",8);
+	&bswap	("eax");
+	&bswap	("ebx");
+	&punpckldq("mm7","mm1");
+
+	&BODY_00_15_sse2();
+
+	&dec	("edx");
+	&jnz	(&label("00_14_sse2"));
+
+	&movd	("mm1","eax");
+	&movd	("mm7","ebx");
+	&punpckldq("mm7","mm1");
+
+	&BODY_00_15_sse2(1);
+
+	&pxor	($A,$A);			# A is in %mm3
+	&mov	("edx",32);			# counter
+	&jmp	(&label("16_79_sse2"));
+
+&set_label("16_79_sse2",16);
+    for ($j=0;$j<2;$j++) {			# 2x unroll
+	#&movq	("mm7",&QWP(8*(9+16-1),"esp"));	# prefetched in BODY_00_15 
+	&movq	("mm5",&QWP(8*(9+16-14),"esp"));
+	&movq	("mm1","mm7");
+	&psrlq	("mm7",1);
+	 &movq	("mm6","mm5");
+	 &psrlq	("mm5",6);
+	&psllq	("mm1",56);
+	 &paddq	($A,"mm3");			# from BODY_00_15
+	 &movq	("mm3","mm7");
+	&psrlq	("mm7",7-1);
+	 &pxor	("mm3","mm1");
+	 &psllq	("mm1",63-56);
+	&pxor	("mm3","mm7");
+	 &psrlq	("mm7",8-7);
+	&pxor	("mm3","mm1");
+	 &movq	("mm1","mm5");
+	 &psrlq	("mm5",19-6);
+	&pxor	("mm7","mm3");			# sigma0
+
+	 &psllq	("mm6",3);
+	 &pxor	("mm1","mm5");
+	&paddq	("mm7",&QWP(8*(9+16),"esp"));
+	 &pxor	("mm1","mm6");
+	 &psrlq	("mm5",61-19);
+	&paddq	("mm7",&QWP(8*(9+16-9),"esp"));
+	 &pxor	("mm1","mm5");
+	 &psllq	("mm6",45-3);
+	&movq	("mm5",$Fsse2);			# load f
+	 &pxor	("mm1","mm6");			# sigma1
+	&movq	("mm6",$Gsse2);			# load g
+
+	&paddq	("mm7","mm1");			# X[i]
+	#&movq	(&QWP(8*9,"esp"),"mm7");	# moved to BODY_00_15
+
+	&BODY_00_15_sse2(2);
+    }
+	&dec	("edx");
+	&jnz	(&label("16_79_sse2"));
+
+	#&movq	($A,$Asse2);
+	&paddq	($A,"mm3");			# from BODY_00_15
+	&movq	("mm1",$Bsse2);
+	#&movq	($BxC,$Csse2);
+	&movq	("mm3",$Dsse2);
+	#&movq	($E,$Esse2);
+	&movq	("mm5",$Fsse2);
+	&movq	("mm6",$Gsse2);
+	&movq	("mm7",$Hsse2);
+
+	&pxor	($BxC,"mm1");			# de-magic
+	&paddq	($A,&QWP(0,"esi"));
+	&paddq	("mm1",&QWP(8,"esi"));
+	&paddq	($BxC,&QWP(16,"esi"));
+	&paddq	("mm3",&QWP(24,"esi"));
+	&paddq	($E,&QWP(32,"esi"));
+	&paddq	("mm5",&QWP(40,"esi"));
+	&paddq	("mm6",&QWP(48,"esi"));
+	&paddq	("mm7",&QWP(56,"esi"));
+
+	&mov	("eax",8*80);
+	&movq	(&QWP(0,"esi"),$A);
+	&movq	(&QWP(8,"esi"),"mm1");
+	&movq	(&QWP(16,"esi"),$BxC);
+	&movq	(&QWP(24,"esi"),"mm3");
+	&movq	(&QWP(32,"esi"),$E);
+	&movq	(&QWP(40,"esi"),"mm5");
+	&movq	(&QWP(48,"esi"),"mm6");
+	&movq	(&QWP(56,"esi"),"mm7");
+
+	&lea	("esp",&DWP(0,"esp","eax"));	# destroy frame
+	&sub	($K512,"eax");			# rewind K
+
+	&cmp	("edi",&DWP(8*10+8,"esp"));	# are we done yet?
+	&jb	(&label("loop_sse2"));
+
+	&mov	("esp",&DWP(8*10+12,"esp"));	# restore sp
+	&emms	();
+&function_end_A();
+
+&set_label("SSSE3",32);
+{ my ($cnt,$frame)=("ecx","edx");
+  my @X=map("xmm$_",(0..7));
+  my $j;
+  my $i=0;
+
+	&lea	($frame,&DWP(-64,"esp"));
+	&sub	("esp",256);
+
+	# fixed stack frame layout
+	#
+	# +0	A B C D E F G H		# backing store
+	# +64	X[0]+K[i] .. X[15]+K[i]	# XMM->MM xfer area
+	# +192				# XMM off-load ring buffer
+	# +256				# saved parameters
+
+	&movdqa		(@X[1],&QWP(80*8,$K512));		# byte swap mask
+	&movdqu		(@X[0],&QWP(0,"edi"));
+	&pshufb		(@X[0],@X[1]);
+    for ($j=0;$j<8;$j++) {
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*(($j-1)%4),$frame),@X[3])	if ($j>4); # off-load
+	&movdqa		(@X[3],&QWP(16*($j%8),$K512));
+	&movdqa		(@X[2],@X[1])				if ($j<7); # perpetuate byte swap mask
+	&movdqu		(@X[1],&QWP(16*($j+1),"edi"))		if ($j<7); # next input
+	&movdqa		(@X[1],&QWP(16*(($j+1)%4),$frame))	if ($j==7);# restore @X[0]
+	&paddq		(@X[3],@X[0]);
+	&pshufb		(@X[1],@X[2])				if ($j<7);
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*($j%8)-128,$frame),@X[3]);	# xfer X[i]+K[i]
+
+	push(@X,shift(@X));					# rotate(@X)
+    }
+	#&jmp		(&label("loop_ssse3"));
+	&nop		();
+
+&set_label("loop_ssse3",32);
+	&movdqa		(@X[2],&QWP(16*(($j+1)%4),$frame));	# pre-restore @X[1]
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*(($j-1)%4),$frame),@X[3]);	# off-load @X[3]
+	&lea		($K512,&DWP(16*8,$K512));
+
+	#&movq	($Asse2,$A);			# off-load A-H
+	&movq	($Bsse2,"mm1");
+	 &mov	("ebx","edi");
+	&movq	($Csse2,$BxC);
+	 &lea	("edi",&DWP(128,"edi"));	# advance input
+	&movq	($Dsse2,"mm3");
+	 &cmp	("edi","eax");
+	#&movq	($Esse2,$E);
+	&movq	($Fsse2,"mm5");
+	 &cmovb	("ebx","edi");
+	&movq	($Gsse2,"mm6");
+	 &mov	("ecx",4);			# loop counter
+	&pxor	($BxC,"mm1");			# magic
+	&movq	($Hsse2,"mm7");
+	&pxor	("mm3","mm3");			# magic
+
+	&jmp		(&label("00_47_ssse3"));
+
+sub BODY_00_15_ssse3 {		# "phase-less" copy of BODY_00_15_sse2
+	(
+	'&movq	("mm1",$E)',				# %mm1 is sliding right
+	'&movq	("mm7",&QWP(((-8*$i)%128)-128,$frame))',# X[i]+K[i]
+	 '&pxor	("mm5","mm6")',				# f^=g
+	'&psrlq	("mm1",14)',
+	 '&movq	(&QWP(8*($i+4)%64,"esp"),$E)',		# modulo-scheduled save e
+	 '&pand	("mm5",$E)',				# f&=e
+	'&psllq	($E,23)',				# $E is sliding left
+	'&paddq	($A,"mm3")',				# [h+=Maj(a,b,c)]
+	'&movq	("mm3","mm1")',				# %mm3 is T1
+	 '&psrlq("mm1",4)',
+	 '&pxor	("mm5","mm6")',				# Ch(e,f,g)
+	'&pxor	("mm3",$E)',
+	 '&psllq($E,23)',
+	'&pxor	("mm3","mm1")',
+	 '&movq	(&QWP(8*$i%64,"esp"),$A)',		# modulo-scheduled save a
+	 '&paddq("mm7","mm5")',				# X[i]+=Ch(e,f,g)
+	'&pxor	("mm3",$E)',
+	 '&psrlq("mm1",23)',
+	 '&paddq("mm7",&QWP(8*($i+7)%64,"esp"))',	# X[i]+=h
+	'&pxor	("mm3","mm1")',
+	 '&psllq($E,4)',
+	'&pxor	("mm3",$E)',				# T1=Sigma1_512(e)
+
+	 '&movq	($E,&QWP(8*($i+3)%64,"esp"))',		# e = load d, e in next round
+	'&paddq	("mm3","mm7")',				# T1+=X[i]
+	 '&movq	("mm5",$A)',				# %mm5 is sliding right
+	 '&psrlq("mm5",28)',
+	'&paddq	($E,"mm3")',				# d += T1
+	 '&movq	("mm6",$A)',				# %mm6 is sliding left
+	 '&movq	("mm7","mm5")',
+	 '&psllq("mm6",25)',
+	'&movq	("mm1",&QWP(8*($i+1)%64,"esp"))',	# load b
+	 '&psrlq("mm5",6)',
+	 '&pxor	("mm7","mm6")',
+	 '&psllq("mm6",5)',
+	 '&pxor	("mm7","mm5")',
+	'&pxor	($A,"mm1")',				# a^b, b^c in next round
+	 '&psrlq("mm5",5)',
+	 '&pxor	("mm7","mm6")',
+	'&pand	($BxC,$A)',				# (b^c)&(a^b)
+	 '&psllq("mm6",6)',
+	 '&pxor	("mm7","mm5")',
+	'&pxor	($BxC,"mm1")',				# [h=]Maj(a,b,c)
+	 '&pxor	("mm6","mm7")',				# Sigma0_512(a)
+	 '&movq	("mm5",&QWP(8*($i+5-1)%64,"esp"))',	# pre-load f
+	'&paddq	($BxC,"mm6")',				# h+=Sigma0(a)
+	 '&movq	("mm6",&QWP(8*($i+6-1)%64,"esp"))',	# pre-load g
+
+	'($A,$BxC) = ($BxC,$A); $i--;'
+	);
+}
+
+&set_label("00_47_ssse3",32);
+
+    for(;$j<16;$j++) {
+	my ($t0,$t2,$t1)=@X[2..4];
+	my @insns = (&BODY_00_15_ssse3(),&BODY_00_15_ssse3());
+
+	&movdqa		($t2,@X[5]);
+	&movdqa		(@X[1],$t0);			# restore @X[1]
+	&palignr	($t0,@X[0],8);			# X[1..2]
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*($j%4),$frame),@X[4]);	# off-load @X[4]
+	 &palignr	($t2,@X[4],8);			# X[9..10]
+
+	&movdqa		($t1,$t0);
+	&psrlq		($t0,7);
+	 &paddq		(@X[0],$t2);			# X[0..1] += X[9..10]
+	&movdqa		($t2,$t1);
+	&psrlq		($t1,1);
+	&psllq		($t2,64-8);
+	&pxor		($t0,$t1);
+	&psrlq		($t1,8-1);
+	&pxor		($t0,$t2);
+	&psllq		($t2,8-1);
+	&pxor		($t0,$t1);
+	 &movdqa	($t1,@X[7]);
+	&pxor		($t0,$t2);			# sigma0(X[1..2])
+	 &movdqa	($t2,@X[7]);
+	 &psrlq		($t1,6);
+	&paddq		(@X[0],$t0);			# X[0..1] += sigma0(X[1..2])
+
+	&movdqa		($t0,@X[7]);
+	&psrlq		($t2,19);
+	&psllq		($t0,64-61);
+	&pxor		($t1,$t2);
+	&psrlq		($t2,61-19);
+	&pxor		($t1,$t0);
+	&psllq		($t0,61-19);
+	&pxor		($t1,$t2);
+	&movdqa		($t2,&QWP(16*(($j+2)%4),$frame));# pre-restore @X[1]
+	&pxor		($t1,$t0);			# sigma0(X[1..2])
+	&movdqa		($t0,&QWP(16*($j%8),$K512));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&paddq		(@X[0],$t1);			# X[0..1] += sigma0(X[14..15])
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	 eval(shift(@insns));
+	&paddq		($t0,@X[0]);
+	 foreach(@insns) { eval; }
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*($j%8)-128,$frame),$t0);# xfer X[i]+K[i]
+
+	push(@X,shift(@X));				# rotate(@X)
+    }
+	&lea		($K512,&DWP(16*8,$K512));
+	&dec		("ecx");
+	&jnz		(&label("00_47_ssse3"));
+
+	&movdqa		(@X[1],&QWP(0,$K512));		# byte swap mask
+	&lea		($K512,&DWP(-80*8,$K512));	# rewind
+	&movdqu		(@X[0],&QWP(0,"ebx"));
+	&pshufb		(@X[0],@X[1]);
+
+    for ($j=0;$j<8;$j++) {	# load next or same block
+	my @insns = (&BODY_00_15_ssse3(),&BODY_00_15_ssse3());
+
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*(($j-1)%4),$frame),@X[3])	if ($j>4); # off-load
+	&movdqa		(@X[3],&QWP(16*($j%8),$K512));
+	&movdqa		(@X[2],@X[1])				if ($j<7); # perpetuate byte swap mask
+	&movdqu		(@X[1],&QWP(16*($j+1),"ebx"))		if ($j<7); # next input
+	&movdqa		(@X[1],&QWP(16*(($j+1)%4),$frame))	if ($j==7);# restore @X[0]
+	&paddq		(@X[3],@X[0]);
+	&pshufb		(@X[1],@X[2])				if ($j<7);
+	 foreach(@insns) { eval; }
+	&movdqa		(&QWP(16*($j%8)-128,$frame),@X[3]);# xfer X[i]+K[i]
+
+	push(@X,shift(@X));				# rotate(@X)
+    }
+
+	#&movq	($A,$Asse2);			# load A-H
+	&movq	("mm1",$Bsse2);
+	&paddq	($A,"mm3");			# from BODY_00_15
+	#&movq	($BxC,$Csse2);
+	&movq	("mm3",$Dsse2);
+	#&movq	($E,$Esse2);
+	#&movq	("mm5",$Fsse2);
+	#&movq	("mm6",$Gsse2);
+	&movq	("mm7",$Hsse2);
+
+	&pxor	($BxC,"mm1");			# de-magic
+	&paddq	($A,&QWP(0,"esi"));
+	&paddq	("mm1",&QWP(8,"esi"));
+	&paddq	($BxC,&QWP(16,"esi"));
+	&paddq	("mm3",&QWP(24,"esi"));
+	&paddq	($E,&QWP(32,"esi"));
+	&paddq	("mm5",&QWP(40,"esi"));
+	&paddq	("mm6",&QWP(48,"esi"));
+	&paddq	("mm7",&QWP(56,"esi"));
+
+	&movq	(&QWP(0,"esi"),$A);
+	&movq	(&QWP(8,"esi"),"mm1");
+	&movq	(&QWP(16,"esi"),$BxC);
+	&movq	(&QWP(24,"esi"),"mm3");
+	&movq	(&QWP(32,"esi"),$E);
+	&movq	(&QWP(40,"esi"),"mm5");
+	&movq	(&QWP(48,"esi"),"mm6");
+	&movq	(&QWP(56,"esi"),"mm7");
+
+    	&cmp	("edi","eax")			# are we done yet?
+	&jb	(&label("loop_ssse3"));
+
+	&mov	("esp",&DWP(64+12,$frame));	# restore sp
+	&emms	();
+}
+&function_end_A();
+}
+&set_label("loop_x86",16);
+    # copy input block to stack reversing byte and qword order
+    for ($i=0;$i<8;$i++) {
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP($i*16+0,"edi"));
+	&mov	("ebx",&DWP($i*16+4,"edi"));
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP($i*16+8,"edi"));
+	&mov	("edx",&DWP($i*16+12,"edi"));
+	&bswap	("eax");
+	&bswap	("ebx");
+	&bswap	("ecx");
+	&bswap	("edx");
+	&push	("eax");
+	&push	("ebx");
+	&push	("ecx");
+	&push	("edx");
+    }
+	&add	("edi",128);
+	&sub	("esp",9*8);		# place for T,A,B,C,D,E,F,G,H
+	&mov	(&DWP(8*(9+16)+4,"esp"),"edi");
+
+	# copy ctx->h[0-7] to A,B,C,D,E,F,G,H on stack
+	&lea	("edi",&DWP(8,"esp"));
+	&mov	("ecx",16);
+	&data_word(0xA5F3F689);		# rep movsd
+
+&set_label("00_15_x86",16);
+	&BODY_00_15_x86();
+
+	&cmp	(&LB("edx"),0x94);
+	&jne	(&label("00_15_x86"));
+
+&set_label("16_79_x86",16);
+	#define sigma0(x)	(ROTR((x),1)  ^ ROTR((x),8)  ^ ((x)>>7))
+	#	LO		lo>>1^hi<<31  ^ lo>>8^hi<<24 ^ lo>>7^hi<<25
+	#	HI		hi>>1^lo<<31  ^ hi>>8^lo<<24 ^ hi>>7
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(8*(9+15+16-1)+0,"esp"));
+	&mov	("edx",&DWP(8*(9+15+16-1)+4,"esp"));
+	&mov	("esi","ecx");
+
+	&shr	("ecx",1);	# lo>>1
+	&mov	("edi","edx");
+	&shr	("edx",1);	# hi>>1
+	&mov	("eax","ecx");
+	&shl	("esi",24);	# lo<<24
+	&mov	("ebx","edx");
+	&shl	("edi",24);	# hi<<24
+	&xor	("ebx","esi");
+
+	&shr	("ecx",7-1);	# lo>>7
+	&xor	("eax","edi");
+	&shr	("edx",7-1);	# hi>>7
+	&xor	("eax","ecx");
+	&shl	("esi",31-24);	# lo<<31
+	&xor	("ebx","edx");
+	&shl	("edi",25-24);	# hi<<25
+	&xor	("ebx","esi");
+
+	&shr	("ecx",8-7);	# lo>>8
+	&xor	("eax","edi");
+	&shr	("edx",8-7);	# hi>>8
+	&xor	("eax","ecx");
+	&shl	("edi",31-25);	# hi<<31
+	&xor	("ebx","edx");
+	&xor	("eax","edi");			# T1 = sigma0(X[-15])
+
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,"esp"),"eax");
+	&mov	(&DWP(4,"esp"),"ebx");		# put T1 away
+
+	#define sigma1(x)	(ROTR((x),19) ^ ROTR((x),61) ^ ((x)>>6))
+	#	LO		lo>>19^hi<<13 ^ hi>>29^lo<<3 ^ lo>>6^hi<<26
+	#	HI		hi>>19^lo<<13 ^ lo>>29^hi<<3 ^ hi>>6
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(8*(9+15+16-14)+0,"esp"));
+	&mov	("edx",&DWP(8*(9+15+16-14)+4,"esp"));
+	&mov	("esi","ecx");
+
+	&shr	("ecx",6);	# lo>>6
+	&mov	("edi","edx");
+	&shr	("edx",6);	# hi>>6
+	&mov	("eax","ecx");
+	&shl	("esi",3);	# lo<<3
+	&mov	("ebx","edx");
+	&shl	("edi",3);	# hi<<3
+	&xor	("eax","esi");
+
+	&shr	("ecx",19-6);	# lo>>19
+	&xor	("ebx","edi");
+	&shr	("edx",19-6);	# hi>>19
+	&xor	("eax","ecx");
+	&shl	("esi",13-3);	# lo<<13
+	&xor	("ebx","edx");
+	&shl	("edi",13-3);	# hi<<13
+	&xor	("ebx","esi");
+
+	&shr	("ecx",29-19);	# lo>>29
+	&xor	("eax","edi");
+	&shr	("edx",29-19);	# hi>>29
+	&xor	("ebx","ecx");
+	&shl	("edi",26-13);	# hi<<26
+	&xor	("eax","edx");
+	&xor	("eax","edi");			# sigma1(X[-2])
+
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(8*(9+15+16)+0,"esp"));
+	&mov	("edx",&DWP(8*(9+15+16)+4,"esp"));
+	&add	("eax",&DWP(0,"esp"));
+	&adc	("ebx",&DWP(4,"esp"));		# T1 = sigma1(X[-2])+T1
+	&mov	("esi",&DWP(8*(9+15+16-9)+0,"esp"));
+	&mov	("edi",&DWP(8*(9+15+16-9)+4,"esp"));
+	&add	("eax","ecx");
+	&adc	("ebx","edx");			# T1 += X[-16]
+	&add	("eax","esi");
+	&adc	("ebx","edi");			# T1 += X[-7]
+	&mov	(&DWP(8*(9+15)+0,"esp"),"eax");
+	&mov	(&DWP(8*(9+15)+4,"esp"),"ebx");	# save X[0]
+
+	&BODY_00_15_x86();
+
+	&cmp	(&LB("edx"),0x17);
+	&jne	(&label("16_79_x86"));
+
+	&mov	("esi",&DWP(8*(9+16+80)+0,"esp"));# ctx
+	&mov	("edi",&DWP(8*(9+16+80)+4,"esp"));# inp
+    for($i=0;$i<4;$i++) {
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP($i*16+0,"esi"));
+	&mov	("ebx",&DWP($i*16+4,"esi"));
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP($i*16+8,"esi"));
+	&mov	("edx",&DWP($i*16+12,"esi"));
+	&add	("eax",&DWP(8+($i*16)+0,"esp"));
+	&adc	("ebx",&DWP(8+($i*16)+4,"esp"));
+	&mov	(&DWP($i*16+0,"esi"),"eax");
+	&mov	(&DWP($i*16+4,"esi"),"ebx");
+	&add	("ecx",&DWP(8+($i*16)+8,"esp"));
+	&adc	("edx",&DWP(8+($i*16)+12,"esp"));
+	&mov	(&DWP($i*16+8,"esi"),"ecx");
+	&mov	(&DWP($i*16+12,"esi"),"edx");
+    }
+	&add	("esp",8*(9+16+80));		# destroy frame
+	&sub	($K512,8*80);			# rewind K
+
+	&cmp	("edi",&DWP(8,"esp"));		# are we done yet?
+	&jb	(&label("loop_x86"));
+
+	&mov	("esp",&DWP(12,"esp"));		# restore sp
+&function_end_A();
+
+&set_label("K512",64);	# Yes! I keep it in the code segment!
+	&data_word(0xd728ae22,0x428a2f98);	# u64
+	&data_word(0x23ef65cd,0x71374491);	# u64
+	&data_word(0xec4d3b2f,0xb5c0fbcf);	# u64
+	&data_word(0x8189dbbc,0xe9b5dba5);	# u64
+	&data_word(0xf348b538,0x3956c25b);	# u64
+	&data_word(0xb605d019,0x59f111f1);	# u64
+	&data_word(0xaf194f9b,0x923f82a4);	# u64
+	&data_word(0xda6d8118,0xab1c5ed5);	# u64
+	&data_word(0xa3030242,0xd807aa98);	# u64
+	&data_word(0x45706fbe,0x12835b01);	# u64
+	&data_word(0x4ee4b28c,0x243185be);	# u64
+	&data_word(0xd5ffb4e2,0x550c7dc3);	# u64
+	&data_word(0xf27b896f,0x72be5d74);	# u64
+	&data_word(0x3b1696b1,0x80deb1fe);	# u64
+	&data_word(0x25c71235,0x9bdc06a7);	# u64
+	&data_word(0xcf692694,0xc19bf174);	# u64
+	&data_word(0x9ef14ad2,0xe49b69c1);	# u64
+	&data_word(0x384f25e3,0xefbe4786);	# u64
+	&data_word(0x8b8cd5b5,0x0fc19dc6);	# u64
+	&data_word(0x77ac9c65,0x240ca1cc);	# u64
+	&data_word(0x592b0275,0x2de92c6f);	# u64
+	&data_word(0x6ea6e483,0x4a7484aa);	# u64
+	&data_word(0xbd41fbd4,0x5cb0a9dc);	# u64
+	&data_word(0x831153b5,0x76f988da);	# u64
+	&data_word(0xee66dfab,0x983e5152);	# u64
+	&data_word(0x2db43210,0xa831c66d);	# u64
+	&data_word(0x98fb213f,0xb00327c8);	# u64
+	&data_word(0xbeef0ee4,0xbf597fc7);	# u64
+	&data_word(0x3da88fc2,0xc6e00bf3);	# u64
+	&data_word(0x930aa725,0xd5a79147);	# u64
+	&data_word(0xe003826f,0x06ca6351);	# u64
+	&data_word(0x0a0e6e70,0x14292967);	# u64
+	&data_word(0x46d22ffc,0x27b70a85);	# u64
+	&data_word(0x5c26c926,0x2e1b2138);	# u64
+	&data_word(0x5ac42aed,0x4d2c6dfc);	# u64
+	&data_word(0x9d95b3df,0x53380d13);	# u64
+	&data_word(0x8baf63de,0x650a7354);	# u64
+	&data_word(0x3c77b2a8,0x766a0abb);	# u64
+	&data_word(0x47edaee6,0x81c2c92e);	# u64
+	&data_word(0x1482353b,0x92722c85);	# u64
+	&data_word(0x4cf10364,0xa2bfe8a1);	# u64
+	&data_word(0xbc423001,0xa81a664b);	# u64
+	&data_word(0xd0f89791,0xc24b8b70);	# u64
+	&data_word(0x0654be30,0xc76c51a3);	# u64
+	&data_word(0xd6ef5218,0xd192e819);	# u64
+	&data_word(0x5565a910,0xd6990624);	# u64
+	&data_word(0x5771202a,0xf40e3585);	# u64
+	&data_word(0x32bbd1b8,0x106aa070);	# u64
+	&data_word(0xb8d2d0c8,0x19a4c116);	# u64
+	&data_word(0x5141ab53,0x1e376c08);	# u64
+	&data_word(0xdf8eeb99,0x2748774c);	# u64
+	&data_word(0xe19b48a8,0x34b0bcb5);	# u64
+	&data_word(0xc5c95a63,0x391c0cb3);	# u64
+	&data_word(0xe3418acb,0x4ed8aa4a);	# u64
+	&data_word(0x7763e373,0x5b9cca4f);	# u64
+	&data_word(0xd6b2b8a3,0x682e6ff3);	# u64
+	&data_word(0x5defb2fc,0x748f82ee);	# u64
+	&data_word(0x43172f60,0x78a5636f);	# u64
+	&data_word(0xa1f0ab72,0x84c87814);	# u64
+	&data_word(0x1a6439ec,0x8cc70208);	# u64
+	&data_word(0x23631e28,0x90befffa);	# u64
+	&data_word(0xde82bde9,0xa4506ceb);	# u64
+	&data_word(0xb2c67915,0xbef9a3f7);	# u64
+	&data_word(0xe372532b,0xc67178f2);	# u64
+	&data_word(0xea26619c,0xca273ece);	# u64
+	&data_word(0x21c0c207,0xd186b8c7);	# u64
+	&data_word(0xcde0eb1e,0xeada7dd6);	# u64
+	&data_word(0xee6ed178,0xf57d4f7f);	# u64
+	&data_word(0x72176fba,0x06f067aa);	# u64
+	&data_word(0xa2c898a6,0x0a637dc5);	# u64
+	&data_word(0xbef90dae,0x113f9804);	# u64
+	&data_word(0x131c471b,0x1b710b35);	# u64
+	&data_word(0x23047d84,0x28db77f5);	# u64
+	&data_word(0x40c72493,0x32caab7b);	# u64
+	&data_word(0x15c9bebc,0x3c9ebe0a);	# u64
+	&data_word(0x9c100d4c,0x431d67c4);	# u64
+	&data_word(0xcb3e42b6,0x4cc5d4be);	# u64
+	&data_word(0xfc657e2a,0x597f299c);	# u64
+	&data_word(0x3ad6faec,0x5fcb6fab);	# u64
+	&data_word(0x4a475817,0x6c44198c);	# u64
+
+	&data_word(0x04050607,0x00010203);	# byte swap
+	&data_word(0x0c0d0e0f,0x08090a0b);	# mask
+&function_end_B("sha512_block_data_order");
+&asciz("SHA512 block transform for x86, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>");
+
+&asm_finish();
+
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-armv4.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-armv4.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..22b5a9d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-armv4.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,668 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2007-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+#
+# Permission to use under GPL terms is granted.
+# ====================================================================
+
+# SHA512 block procedure for ARMv4. September 2007.
+
+# This code is ~4.5 (four and a half) times faster than code generated
+# by gcc 3.4 and it spends ~72 clock cycles per byte [on single-issue
+# Xscale PXA250 core].
+#
+# July 2010.
+#
+# Rescheduling for dual-issue pipeline resulted in 6% improvement on
+# Cortex A8 core and ~40 cycles per processed byte.
+
+# February 2011.
+#
+# Profiler-assisted and platform-specific optimization resulted in 7%
+# improvement on Coxtex A8 core and ~38 cycles per byte.
+
+# March 2011.
+#
+# Add NEON implementation. On Cortex A8 it was measured to process
+# one byte in 23.3 cycles or ~60% faster than integer-only code.
+
+# August 2012.
+#
+# Improve NEON performance by 12% on Snapdragon S4. In absolute
+# terms it's 22.6 cycles per byte, which is disappointing result.
+# Technical writers asserted that 3-way S4 pipeline can sustain
+# multiple NEON instructions per cycle, but dual NEON issue could
+# not be observed, see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/Snapdragon-S4.html
+# for further details. On side note Cortex-A15 processes one byte in
+# 16 cycles.
+
+# Byte order [in]dependence. =========================================
+#
+# Originally caller was expected to maintain specific *dword* order in
+# h[0-7], namely with most significant dword at *lower* address, which
+# was reflected in below two parameters as 0 and 4. Now caller is
+# expected to maintain native byte order for whole 64-bit values.
+$hi="HI";
+$lo="LO";
+# ====================================================================
+
+$flavour = shift;
+if ($flavour=~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/) { $output=$flavour; undef $flavour; }
+else { while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {} }
+
+if ($flavour && $flavour ne "void") {
+    $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+    ( $xlate="${dir}arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
+    ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
+    die "can't locate arm-xlate.pl";
+
+    open STDOUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output";
+} else {
+    open STDOUT,">$output";
+}
+
+$ctx="r0";	# parameter block
+$inp="r1";
+$len="r2";
+
+$Tlo="r3";
+$Thi="r4";
+$Alo="r5";
+$Ahi="r6";
+$Elo="r7";
+$Ehi="r8";
+$t0="r9";
+$t1="r10";
+$t2="r11";
+$t3="r12";
+############	r13 is stack pointer
+$Ktbl="r14";
+############	r15 is program counter
+
+$Aoff=8*0;
+$Boff=8*1;
+$Coff=8*2;
+$Doff=8*3;
+$Eoff=8*4;
+$Foff=8*5;
+$Goff=8*6;
+$Hoff=8*7;
+$Xoff=8*8;
+
+sub BODY_00_15() {
+my $magic = shift;
+$code.=<<___;
+	@ Sigma1(x)	(ROTR((x),14) ^ ROTR((x),18)  ^ ROTR((x),41))
+	@ LO		lo>>14^hi<<18 ^ lo>>18^hi<<14 ^ hi>>9^lo<<23
+	@ HI		hi>>14^lo<<18 ^ hi>>18^lo<<14 ^ lo>>9^hi<<23
+	mov	$t0,$Elo,lsr#14
+	str	$Tlo,[sp,#$Xoff+0]
+	mov	$t1,$Ehi,lsr#14
+	str	$Thi,[sp,#$Xoff+4]
+	eor	$t0,$t0,$Ehi,lsl#18
+	ldr	$t2,[sp,#$Hoff+0]	@ h.lo
+	eor	$t1,$t1,$Elo,lsl#18
+	ldr	$t3,[sp,#$Hoff+4]	@ h.hi
+	eor	$t0,$t0,$Elo,lsr#18
+	eor	$t1,$t1,$Ehi,lsr#18
+	eor	$t0,$t0,$Ehi,lsl#14
+	eor	$t1,$t1,$Elo,lsl#14
+	eor	$t0,$t0,$Ehi,lsr#9
+	eor	$t1,$t1,$Elo,lsr#9
+	eor	$t0,$t0,$Elo,lsl#23
+	eor	$t1,$t1,$Ehi,lsl#23	@ Sigma1(e)
+	adds	$Tlo,$Tlo,$t0
+	ldr	$t0,[sp,#$Foff+0]	@ f.lo
+	adc	$Thi,$Thi,$t1		@ T += Sigma1(e)
+	ldr	$t1,[sp,#$Foff+4]	@ f.hi
+	adds	$Tlo,$Tlo,$t2
+	ldr	$t2,[sp,#$Goff+0]	@ g.lo
+	adc	$Thi,$Thi,$t3		@ T += h
+	ldr	$t3,[sp,#$Goff+4]	@ g.hi
+
+	eor	$t0,$t0,$t2
+	str	$Elo,[sp,#$Eoff+0]
+	eor	$t1,$t1,$t3
+	str	$Ehi,[sp,#$Eoff+4]
+	and	$t0,$t0,$Elo
+	str	$Alo,[sp,#$Aoff+0]
+	and	$t1,$t1,$Ehi
+	str	$Ahi,[sp,#$Aoff+4]
+	eor	$t0,$t0,$t2
+	ldr	$t2,[$Ktbl,#$lo]	@ K[i].lo
+	eor	$t1,$t1,$t3		@ Ch(e,f,g)
+	ldr	$t3,[$Ktbl,#$hi]	@ K[i].hi
+
+	adds	$Tlo,$Tlo,$t0
+	ldr	$Elo,[sp,#$Doff+0]	@ d.lo
+	adc	$Thi,$Thi,$t1		@ T += Ch(e,f,g)
+	ldr	$Ehi,[sp,#$Doff+4]	@ d.hi
+	adds	$Tlo,$Tlo,$t2
+	and	$t0,$t2,#0xff
+	adc	$Thi,$Thi,$t3		@ T += K[i]
+	adds	$Elo,$Elo,$Tlo
+	ldr	$t2,[sp,#$Boff+0]	@ b.lo
+	adc	$Ehi,$Ehi,$Thi		@ d += T
+	teq	$t0,#$magic
+
+	ldr	$t3,[sp,#$Coff+0]	@ c.lo
+#if __ARM_ARCH__>=7
+	it	eq			@ Thumb2 thing, sanity check in ARM
+#endif
+	orreq	$Ktbl,$Ktbl,#1
+	@ Sigma0(x)	(ROTR((x),28) ^ ROTR((x),34) ^ ROTR((x),39))
+	@ LO		lo>>28^hi<<4  ^ hi>>2^lo<<30 ^ hi>>7^lo<<25
+	@ HI		hi>>28^lo<<4  ^ lo>>2^hi<<30 ^ lo>>7^hi<<25
+	mov	$t0,$Alo,lsr#28
+	mov	$t1,$Ahi,lsr#28
+	eor	$t0,$t0,$Ahi,lsl#4
+	eor	$t1,$t1,$Alo,lsl#4
+	eor	$t0,$t0,$Ahi,lsr#2
+	eor	$t1,$t1,$Alo,lsr#2
+	eor	$t0,$t0,$Alo,lsl#30
+	eor	$t1,$t1,$Ahi,lsl#30
+	eor	$t0,$t0,$Ahi,lsr#7
+	eor	$t1,$t1,$Alo,lsr#7
+	eor	$t0,$t0,$Alo,lsl#25
+	eor	$t1,$t1,$Ahi,lsl#25	@ Sigma0(a)
+	adds	$Tlo,$Tlo,$t0
+	and	$t0,$Alo,$t2
+	adc	$Thi,$Thi,$t1		@ T += Sigma0(a)
+
+	ldr	$t1,[sp,#$Boff+4]	@ b.hi
+	orr	$Alo,$Alo,$t2
+	ldr	$t2,[sp,#$Coff+4]	@ c.hi
+	and	$Alo,$Alo,$t3
+	and	$t3,$Ahi,$t1
+	orr	$Ahi,$Ahi,$t1
+	orr	$Alo,$Alo,$t0		@ Maj(a,b,c).lo
+	and	$Ahi,$Ahi,$t2
+	adds	$Alo,$Alo,$Tlo
+	orr	$Ahi,$Ahi,$t3		@ Maj(a,b,c).hi
+	sub	sp,sp,#8
+	adc	$Ahi,$Ahi,$Thi		@ h += T
+	tst	$Ktbl,#1
+	add	$Ktbl,$Ktbl,#8
+___
+}
+$code=<<___;
+#ifndef __KERNEL__
+# include "arm_arch.h"
+# define VFP_ABI_PUSH	vstmdb	sp!,{d8-d15}
+# define VFP_ABI_POP	vldmia	sp!,{d8-d15}
+#else
+# define __ARM_ARCH__ __LINUX_ARM_ARCH__
+# define __ARM_MAX_ARCH__ 7
+# define VFP_ABI_PUSH
+# define VFP_ABI_POP
+#endif
+
+#ifdef __ARMEL__
+# define LO 0
+# define HI 4
+# define WORD64(hi0,lo0,hi1,lo1)	.word	lo0,hi0, lo1,hi1
+#else
+# define HI 0
+# define LO 4
+# define WORD64(hi0,lo0,hi1,lo1)	.word	hi0,lo0, hi1,lo1
+#endif
+
+.text
+#if defined(__thumb2__)
+.syntax unified
+.thumb
+# define adrl adr
+#else
+.code	32
+#endif
+
+.type	K512,%object
+.align	5
+K512:
+WORD64(0x428a2f98,0xd728ae22, 0x71374491,0x23ef65cd)
+WORD64(0xb5c0fbcf,0xec4d3b2f, 0xe9b5dba5,0x8189dbbc)
+WORD64(0x3956c25b,0xf348b538, 0x59f111f1,0xb605d019)
+WORD64(0x923f82a4,0xaf194f9b, 0xab1c5ed5,0xda6d8118)
+WORD64(0xd807aa98,0xa3030242, 0x12835b01,0x45706fbe)
+WORD64(0x243185be,0x4ee4b28c, 0x550c7dc3,0xd5ffb4e2)
+WORD64(0x72be5d74,0xf27b896f, 0x80deb1fe,0x3b1696b1)
+WORD64(0x9bdc06a7,0x25c71235, 0xc19bf174,0xcf692694)
+WORD64(0xe49b69c1,0x9ef14ad2, 0xefbe4786,0x384f25e3)
+WORD64(0x0fc19dc6,0x8b8cd5b5, 0x240ca1cc,0x77ac9c65)
+WORD64(0x2de92c6f,0x592b0275, 0x4a7484aa,0x6ea6e483)
+WORD64(0x5cb0a9dc,0xbd41fbd4, 0x76f988da,0x831153b5)
+WORD64(0x983e5152,0xee66dfab, 0xa831c66d,0x2db43210)
+WORD64(0xb00327c8,0x98fb213f, 0xbf597fc7,0xbeef0ee4)
+WORD64(0xc6e00bf3,0x3da88fc2, 0xd5a79147,0x930aa725)
+WORD64(0x06ca6351,0xe003826f, 0x14292967,0x0a0e6e70)
+WORD64(0x27b70a85,0x46d22ffc, 0x2e1b2138,0x5c26c926)
+WORD64(0x4d2c6dfc,0x5ac42aed, 0x53380d13,0x9d95b3df)
+WORD64(0x650a7354,0x8baf63de, 0x766a0abb,0x3c77b2a8)
+WORD64(0x81c2c92e,0x47edaee6, 0x92722c85,0x1482353b)
+WORD64(0xa2bfe8a1,0x4cf10364, 0xa81a664b,0xbc423001)
+WORD64(0xc24b8b70,0xd0f89791, 0xc76c51a3,0x0654be30)
+WORD64(0xd192e819,0xd6ef5218, 0xd6990624,0x5565a910)
+WORD64(0xf40e3585,0x5771202a, 0x106aa070,0x32bbd1b8)
+WORD64(0x19a4c116,0xb8d2d0c8, 0x1e376c08,0x5141ab53)
+WORD64(0x2748774c,0xdf8eeb99, 0x34b0bcb5,0xe19b48a8)
+WORD64(0x391c0cb3,0xc5c95a63, 0x4ed8aa4a,0xe3418acb)
+WORD64(0x5b9cca4f,0x7763e373, 0x682e6ff3,0xd6b2b8a3)
+WORD64(0x748f82ee,0x5defb2fc, 0x78a5636f,0x43172f60)
+WORD64(0x84c87814,0xa1f0ab72, 0x8cc70208,0x1a6439ec)
+WORD64(0x90befffa,0x23631e28, 0xa4506ceb,0xde82bde9)
+WORD64(0xbef9a3f7,0xb2c67915, 0xc67178f2,0xe372532b)
+WORD64(0xca273ece,0xea26619c, 0xd186b8c7,0x21c0c207)
+WORD64(0xeada7dd6,0xcde0eb1e, 0xf57d4f7f,0xee6ed178)
+WORD64(0x06f067aa,0x72176fba, 0x0a637dc5,0xa2c898a6)
+WORD64(0x113f9804,0xbef90dae, 0x1b710b35,0x131c471b)
+WORD64(0x28db77f5,0x23047d84, 0x32caab7b,0x40c72493)
+WORD64(0x3c9ebe0a,0x15c9bebc, 0x431d67c4,0x9c100d4c)
+WORD64(0x4cc5d4be,0xcb3e42b6, 0x597f299c,0xfc657e2a)
+WORD64(0x5fcb6fab,0x3ad6faec, 0x6c44198c,0x4a475817)
+.size	K512,.-K512
+#if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7 && !defined(__KERNEL__)
+.LOPENSSL_armcap:
+.word	OPENSSL_armcap_P-.Lsha512_block_data_order
+.skip	32-4
+#else
+.skip	32
+#endif
+
+.global	sha512_block_data_order
+.type	sha512_block_data_order,%function
+sha512_block_data_order:
+.Lsha512_block_data_order:
+#if __ARM_ARCH__<7 && !defined(__thumb2__)
+	sub	r3,pc,#8		@ sha512_block_data_order
+#else
+	adr	r3,.Lsha512_block_data_order
+#endif
+#if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7 && !defined(__KERNEL__)
+	ldr	r12,.LOPENSSL_armcap
+	ldr	r12,[r3,r12]		@ OPENSSL_armcap_P
+#ifdef	__APPLE__
+	ldr	r12,[r12]
+#endif
+	tst	r12,#ARMV7_NEON
+	bne	.LNEON
+#endif
+	add	$len,$inp,$len,lsl#7	@ len to point at the end of inp
+	stmdb	sp!,{r4-r12,lr}
+	sub	$Ktbl,r3,#672		@ K512
+	sub	sp,sp,#9*8
+
+	ldr	$Elo,[$ctx,#$Eoff+$lo]
+	ldr	$Ehi,[$ctx,#$Eoff+$hi]
+	ldr	$t0, [$ctx,#$Goff+$lo]
+	ldr	$t1, [$ctx,#$Goff+$hi]
+	ldr	$t2, [$ctx,#$Hoff+$lo]
+	ldr	$t3, [$ctx,#$Hoff+$hi]
+.Loop:
+	str	$t0, [sp,#$Goff+0]
+	str	$t1, [sp,#$Goff+4]
+	str	$t2, [sp,#$Hoff+0]
+	str	$t3, [sp,#$Hoff+4]
+	ldr	$Alo,[$ctx,#$Aoff+$lo]
+	ldr	$Ahi,[$ctx,#$Aoff+$hi]
+	ldr	$Tlo,[$ctx,#$Boff+$lo]
+	ldr	$Thi,[$ctx,#$Boff+$hi]
+	ldr	$t0, [$ctx,#$Coff+$lo]
+	ldr	$t1, [$ctx,#$Coff+$hi]
+	ldr	$t2, [$ctx,#$Doff+$lo]
+	ldr	$t3, [$ctx,#$Doff+$hi]
+	str	$Tlo,[sp,#$Boff+0]
+	str	$Thi,[sp,#$Boff+4]
+	str	$t0, [sp,#$Coff+0]
+	str	$t1, [sp,#$Coff+4]
+	str	$t2, [sp,#$Doff+0]
+	str	$t3, [sp,#$Doff+4]
+	ldr	$Tlo,[$ctx,#$Foff+$lo]
+	ldr	$Thi,[$ctx,#$Foff+$hi]
+	str	$Tlo,[sp,#$Foff+0]
+	str	$Thi,[sp,#$Foff+4]
+
+.L00_15:
+#if __ARM_ARCH__<7
+	ldrb	$Tlo,[$inp,#7]
+	ldrb	$t0, [$inp,#6]
+	ldrb	$t1, [$inp,#5]
+	ldrb	$t2, [$inp,#4]
+	ldrb	$Thi,[$inp,#3]
+	ldrb	$t3, [$inp,#2]
+	orr	$Tlo,$Tlo,$t0,lsl#8
+	ldrb	$t0, [$inp,#1]
+	orr	$Tlo,$Tlo,$t1,lsl#16
+	ldrb	$t1, [$inp],#8
+	orr	$Tlo,$Tlo,$t2,lsl#24
+	orr	$Thi,$Thi,$t3,lsl#8
+	orr	$Thi,$Thi,$t0,lsl#16
+	orr	$Thi,$Thi,$t1,lsl#24
+#else
+	ldr	$Tlo,[$inp,#4]
+	ldr	$Thi,[$inp],#8
+#ifdef __ARMEL__
+	rev	$Tlo,$Tlo
+	rev	$Thi,$Thi
+#endif
+#endif
+___
+	&BODY_00_15(0x94);
+$code.=<<___;
+	tst	$Ktbl,#1
+	beq	.L00_15
+	ldr	$t0,[sp,#`$Xoff+8*(16-1)`+0]
+	ldr	$t1,[sp,#`$Xoff+8*(16-1)`+4]
+	bic	$Ktbl,$Ktbl,#1
+.L16_79:
+	@ sigma0(x)	(ROTR((x),1)  ^ ROTR((x),8)  ^ ((x)>>7))
+	@ LO		lo>>1^hi<<31  ^ lo>>8^hi<<24 ^ lo>>7^hi<<25
+	@ HI		hi>>1^lo<<31  ^ hi>>8^lo<<24 ^ hi>>7
+	mov	$Tlo,$t0,lsr#1
+	ldr	$t2,[sp,#`$Xoff+8*(16-14)`+0]
+	mov	$Thi,$t1,lsr#1
+	ldr	$t3,[sp,#`$Xoff+8*(16-14)`+4]
+	eor	$Tlo,$Tlo,$t1,lsl#31
+	eor	$Thi,$Thi,$t0,lsl#31
+	eor	$Tlo,$Tlo,$t0,lsr#8
+	eor	$Thi,$Thi,$t1,lsr#8
+	eor	$Tlo,$Tlo,$t1,lsl#24
+	eor	$Thi,$Thi,$t0,lsl#24
+	eor	$Tlo,$Tlo,$t0,lsr#7
+	eor	$Thi,$Thi,$t1,lsr#7
+	eor	$Tlo,$Tlo,$t1,lsl#25
+
+	@ sigma1(x)	(ROTR((x),19) ^ ROTR((x),61) ^ ((x)>>6))
+	@ LO		lo>>19^hi<<13 ^ hi>>29^lo<<3 ^ lo>>6^hi<<26
+	@ HI		hi>>19^lo<<13 ^ lo>>29^hi<<3 ^ hi>>6
+	mov	$t0,$t2,lsr#19
+	mov	$t1,$t3,lsr#19
+	eor	$t0,$t0,$t3,lsl#13
+	eor	$t1,$t1,$t2,lsl#13
+	eor	$t0,$t0,$t3,lsr#29
+	eor	$t1,$t1,$t2,lsr#29
+	eor	$t0,$t0,$t2,lsl#3
+	eor	$t1,$t1,$t3,lsl#3
+	eor	$t0,$t0,$t2,lsr#6
+	eor	$t1,$t1,$t3,lsr#6
+	ldr	$t2,[sp,#`$Xoff+8*(16-9)`+0]
+	eor	$t0,$t0,$t3,lsl#26
+
+	ldr	$t3,[sp,#`$Xoff+8*(16-9)`+4]
+	adds	$Tlo,$Tlo,$t0
+	ldr	$t0,[sp,#`$Xoff+8*16`+0]
+	adc	$Thi,$Thi,$t1
+
+	ldr	$t1,[sp,#`$Xoff+8*16`+4]
+	adds	$Tlo,$Tlo,$t2
+	adc	$Thi,$Thi,$t3
+	adds	$Tlo,$Tlo,$t0
+	adc	$Thi,$Thi,$t1
+___
+	&BODY_00_15(0x17);
+$code.=<<___;
+#if __ARM_ARCH__>=7
+	ittt	eq			@ Thumb2 thing, sanity check in ARM
+#endif
+	ldreq	$t0,[sp,#`$Xoff+8*(16-1)`+0]
+	ldreq	$t1,[sp,#`$Xoff+8*(16-1)`+4]
+	beq	.L16_79
+	bic	$Ktbl,$Ktbl,#1
+
+	ldr	$Tlo,[sp,#$Boff+0]
+	ldr	$Thi,[sp,#$Boff+4]
+	ldr	$t0, [$ctx,#$Aoff+$lo]
+	ldr	$t1, [$ctx,#$Aoff+$hi]
+	ldr	$t2, [$ctx,#$Boff+$lo]
+	ldr	$t3, [$ctx,#$Boff+$hi]
+	adds	$t0,$Alo,$t0
+	str	$t0, [$ctx,#$Aoff+$lo]
+	adc	$t1,$Ahi,$t1
+	str	$t1, [$ctx,#$Aoff+$hi]
+	adds	$t2,$Tlo,$t2
+	str	$t2, [$ctx,#$Boff+$lo]
+	adc	$t3,$Thi,$t3
+	str	$t3, [$ctx,#$Boff+$hi]
+
+	ldr	$Alo,[sp,#$Coff+0]
+	ldr	$Ahi,[sp,#$Coff+4]
+	ldr	$Tlo,[sp,#$Doff+0]
+	ldr	$Thi,[sp,#$Doff+4]
+	ldr	$t0, [$ctx,#$Coff+$lo]
+	ldr	$t1, [$ctx,#$Coff+$hi]
+	ldr	$t2, [$ctx,#$Doff+$lo]
+	ldr	$t3, [$ctx,#$Doff+$hi]
+	adds	$t0,$Alo,$t0
+	str	$t0, [$ctx,#$Coff+$lo]
+	adc	$t1,$Ahi,$t1
+	str	$t1, [$ctx,#$Coff+$hi]
+	adds	$t2,$Tlo,$t2
+	str	$t2, [$ctx,#$Doff+$lo]
+	adc	$t3,$Thi,$t3
+	str	$t3, [$ctx,#$Doff+$hi]
+
+	ldr	$Tlo,[sp,#$Foff+0]
+	ldr	$Thi,[sp,#$Foff+4]
+	ldr	$t0, [$ctx,#$Eoff+$lo]
+	ldr	$t1, [$ctx,#$Eoff+$hi]
+	ldr	$t2, [$ctx,#$Foff+$lo]
+	ldr	$t3, [$ctx,#$Foff+$hi]
+	adds	$Elo,$Elo,$t0
+	str	$Elo,[$ctx,#$Eoff+$lo]
+	adc	$Ehi,$Ehi,$t1
+	str	$Ehi,[$ctx,#$Eoff+$hi]
+	adds	$t2,$Tlo,$t2
+	str	$t2, [$ctx,#$Foff+$lo]
+	adc	$t3,$Thi,$t3
+	str	$t3, [$ctx,#$Foff+$hi]
+
+	ldr	$Alo,[sp,#$Goff+0]
+	ldr	$Ahi,[sp,#$Goff+4]
+	ldr	$Tlo,[sp,#$Hoff+0]
+	ldr	$Thi,[sp,#$Hoff+4]
+	ldr	$t0, [$ctx,#$Goff+$lo]
+	ldr	$t1, [$ctx,#$Goff+$hi]
+	ldr	$t2, [$ctx,#$Hoff+$lo]
+	ldr	$t3, [$ctx,#$Hoff+$hi]
+	adds	$t0,$Alo,$t0
+	str	$t0, [$ctx,#$Goff+$lo]
+	adc	$t1,$Ahi,$t1
+	str	$t1, [$ctx,#$Goff+$hi]
+	adds	$t2,$Tlo,$t2
+	str	$t2, [$ctx,#$Hoff+$lo]
+	adc	$t3,$Thi,$t3
+	str	$t3, [$ctx,#$Hoff+$hi]
+
+	add	sp,sp,#640
+	sub	$Ktbl,$Ktbl,#640
+
+	teq	$inp,$len
+	bne	.Loop
+
+	add	sp,sp,#8*9		@ destroy frame
+#if __ARM_ARCH__>=5
+	ldmia	sp!,{r4-r12,pc}
+#else
+	ldmia	sp!,{r4-r12,lr}
+	tst	lr,#1
+	moveq	pc,lr			@ be binary compatible with V4, yet
+	bx	lr			@ interoperable with Thumb ISA:-)
+#endif
+.size	sha512_block_data_order,.-sha512_block_data_order
+___
+
+{
+my @Sigma0=(28,34,39);
+my @Sigma1=(14,18,41);
+my @sigma0=(1, 8, 7);
+my @sigma1=(19,61,6);
+
+my $Ktbl="r3";
+my $cnt="r12";	# volatile register known as ip, intra-procedure-call scratch
+
+my @X=map("d$_",(0..15));
+my @V=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$F,$G,$H)=map("d$_",(16..23));
+
+sub NEON_00_15() {
+my $i=shift;
+my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f,$g,$h)=@_;
+my ($t0,$t1,$t2,$T1,$K,$Ch,$Maj)=map("d$_",(24..31));	# temps
+
+$code.=<<___ if ($i<16 || $i&1);
+	vshr.u64	$t0,$e,#@Sigma1[0]	@ $i
+#if $i<16
+	vld1.64		{@X[$i%16]},[$inp]!	@ handles unaligned
+#endif
+	vshr.u64	$t1,$e,#@Sigma1[1]
+#if $i>0
+	 vadd.i64	$a,$Maj			@ h+=Maj from the past
+#endif
+	vshr.u64	$t2,$e,#@Sigma1[2]
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	vld1.64		{$K},[$Ktbl,:64]!	@ K[i++]
+	vsli.64		$t0,$e,#`64-@Sigma1[0]`
+	vsli.64		$t1,$e,#`64-@Sigma1[1]`
+	vmov		$Ch,$e
+	vsli.64		$t2,$e,#`64-@Sigma1[2]`
+#if $i<16 && defined(__ARMEL__)
+	vrev64.8	@X[$i],@X[$i]
+#endif
+	veor		$t1,$t0
+	vbsl		$Ch,$f,$g		@ Ch(e,f,g)
+	vshr.u64	$t0,$a,#@Sigma0[0]
+	veor		$t2,$t1			@ Sigma1(e)
+	vadd.i64	$T1,$Ch,$h
+	vshr.u64	$t1,$a,#@Sigma0[1]
+	vsli.64		$t0,$a,#`64-@Sigma0[0]`
+	vadd.i64	$T1,$t2
+	vshr.u64	$t2,$a,#@Sigma0[2]
+	vadd.i64	$K,@X[$i%16]
+	vsli.64		$t1,$a,#`64-@Sigma0[1]`
+	veor		$Maj,$a,$b
+	vsli.64		$t2,$a,#`64-@Sigma0[2]`
+	veor		$h,$t0,$t1
+	vadd.i64	$T1,$K
+	vbsl		$Maj,$c,$b		@ Maj(a,b,c)
+	veor		$h,$t2			@ Sigma0(a)
+	vadd.i64	$d,$T1
+	vadd.i64	$Maj,$T1
+	@ vadd.i64	$h,$Maj
+___
+}
+
+sub NEON_16_79() {
+my $i=shift;
+
+if ($i&1)	{ &NEON_00_15($i,@_); return; }
+
+# 2x-vectorized, therefore runs every 2nd round
+my @X=map("q$_",(0..7));			# view @X as 128-bit vector
+my ($t0,$t1,$s0,$s1) = map("q$_",(12..15));	# temps
+my ($d0,$d1,$d2) = map("d$_",(24..26));		# temps from NEON_00_15
+my $e=@_[4];					# $e from NEON_00_15
+$i /= 2;
+$code.=<<___;
+	vshr.u64	$t0,@X[($i+7)%8],#@sigma1[0]
+	vshr.u64	$t1,@X[($i+7)%8],#@sigma1[1]
+	 vadd.i64	@_[0],d30			@ h+=Maj from the past
+	vshr.u64	$s1,@X[($i+7)%8],#@sigma1[2]
+	vsli.64		$t0,@X[($i+7)%8],#`64-@sigma1[0]`
+	vext.8		$s0,@X[$i%8],@X[($i+1)%8],#8	@ X[i+1]
+	vsli.64		$t1,@X[($i+7)%8],#`64-@sigma1[1]`
+	veor		$s1,$t0
+	vshr.u64	$t0,$s0,#@sigma0[0]
+	veor		$s1,$t1				@ sigma1(X[i+14])
+	vshr.u64	$t1,$s0,#@sigma0[1]
+	vadd.i64	@X[$i%8],$s1
+	vshr.u64	$s1,$s0,#@sigma0[2]
+	vsli.64		$t0,$s0,#`64-@sigma0[0]`
+	vsli.64		$t1,$s0,#`64-@sigma0[1]`
+	vext.8		$s0,@X[($i+4)%8],@X[($i+5)%8],#8	@ X[i+9]
+	veor		$s1,$t0
+	vshr.u64	$d0,$e,#@Sigma1[0]		@ from NEON_00_15
+	vadd.i64	@X[$i%8],$s0
+	vshr.u64	$d1,$e,#@Sigma1[1]		@ from NEON_00_15
+	veor		$s1,$t1				@ sigma0(X[i+1])
+	vshr.u64	$d2,$e,#@Sigma1[2]		@ from NEON_00_15
+	vadd.i64	@X[$i%8],$s1
+___
+	&NEON_00_15(2*$i,@_);
+}
+
+$code.=<<___;
+#if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7
+.arch	armv7-a
+.fpu	neon
+
+.global	sha512_block_data_order_neon
+.type	sha512_block_data_order_neon,%function
+.align	4
+sha512_block_data_order_neon:
+.LNEON:
+	dmb				@ errata #451034 on early Cortex A8
+	add	$len,$inp,$len,lsl#7	@ len to point at the end of inp
+	adr	$Ktbl,K512
+	VFP_ABI_PUSH
+	vldmia	$ctx,{$A-$H}		@ load context
+.Loop_neon:
+___
+for($i=0;$i<16;$i++)	{ &NEON_00_15($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov		$cnt,#4
+.L16_79_neon:
+	subs		$cnt,#1
+___
+for(;$i<32;$i++)	{ &NEON_16_79($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+$code.=<<___;
+	bne		.L16_79_neon
+
+	 vadd.i64	$A,d30		@ h+=Maj from the past
+	vldmia		$ctx,{d24-d31}	@ load context to temp
+	vadd.i64	q8,q12		@ vectorized accumulate
+	vadd.i64	q9,q13
+	vadd.i64	q10,q14
+	vadd.i64	q11,q15
+	vstmia		$ctx,{$A-$H}	@ save context
+	teq		$inp,$len
+	sub		$Ktbl,#640	@ rewind K512
+	bne		.Loop_neon
+
+	VFP_ABI_POP
+	ret				@ bx lr
+.size	sha512_block_data_order_neon,.-sha512_block_data_order_neon
+#endif
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+.asciz	"SHA512 block transform for ARMv4/NEON, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+.align	2
+#if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7 && !defined(__KERNEL__)
+.comm	OPENSSL_armcap_P,4,4
+#endif
+___
+
+$code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem;
+$code =~ s/\bbx\s+lr\b/.word\t0xe12fff1e/gm;	# make it possible to compile with -march=armv4
+$code =~ s/\bret\b/bx	lr/gm;
+
+open SELF,$0;
+while(<SELF>) {
+	next if (/^#!/);
+	last if (!s/^#/@/ and !/^$/);
+	print;
+}
+close SELF;
+
+print $code;
+close STDOUT; # enforce flush
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-armv8.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-armv8.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c1aaf77
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-armv8.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,446 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2014-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# SHA256/512 for ARMv8.
+#
+# Performance in cycles per processed byte and improvement coefficient
+# over code generated with "default" compiler:
+#
+#		SHA256-hw	SHA256(*)	SHA512
+# Apple A7	1.97		10.5 (+33%)	6.73 (-1%(**))
+# Cortex-A53	2.38		15.5 (+115%)	10.0 (+150%(***))
+# Cortex-A57	2.31		11.6 (+86%)	7.51 (+260%(***))
+# Denver	2.01		10.5 (+26%)	6.70 (+8%)
+# X-Gene			20.0 (+100%)	12.8 (+300%(***))
+# Mongoose	2.36		13.0 (+50%)	8.36 (+33%)
+# 
+# (*)	Software SHA256 results are of lesser relevance, presented
+#	mostly for informational purposes.
+# (**)	The result is a trade-off: it's possible to improve it by
+#	10% (or by 1 cycle per round), but at the cost of 20% loss
+#	on Cortex-A53 (or by 4 cycles per round).
+# (***)	Super-impressive coefficients over gcc-generated code are
+#	indication of some compiler "pathology", most notably code
+#	generated with -mgeneral-regs-only is significanty faster
+#	and the gap is only 40-90%.
+
+$flavour=shift;
+$output=shift;
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+( $xlate="${dir}arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
+( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
+die "can't locate arm-xlate.pl";
+
+open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output";
+*STDOUT=*OUT;
+
+if ($output =~ /512/) {
+	$BITS=512;
+	$SZ=8;
+	@Sigma0=(28,34,39);
+	@Sigma1=(14,18,41);
+	@sigma0=(1,  8, 7);
+	@sigma1=(19,61, 6);
+	$rounds=80;
+	$reg_t="x";
+} else {
+	$BITS=256;
+	$SZ=4;
+	@Sigma0=( 2,13,22);
+	@Sigma1=( 6,11,25);
+	@sigma0=( 7,18, 3);
+	@sigma1=(17,19,10);
+	$rounds=64;
+	$reg_t="w";
+}
+
+$func="sha${BITS}_block_data_order";
+
+($ctx,$inp,$num,$Ktbl)=map("x$_",(0..2,30));
+
+@X=map("$reg_t$_",(3..15,0..2));
+@V=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$F,$G,$H)=map("$reg_t$_",(20..27));
+($t0,$t1,$t2,$t3)=map("$reg_t$_",(16,17,19,28));
+
+sub BODY_00_xx {
+my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f,$g,$h)=@_;
+my $j=($i+1)&15;
+my ($T0,$T1,$T2)=(@X[($i-8)&15],@X[($i-9)&15],@X[($i-10)&15]);
+   $T0=@X[$i+3] if ($i<11);
+
+$code.=<<___	if ($i<16);
+#ifndef	__ARMEB__
+	rev	@X[$i],@X[$i]			// $i
+#endif
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($i<13 && ($i&1));
+	ldp	@X[$i+1],@X[$i+2],[$inp],#2*$SZ
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($i==13);
+	ldp	@X[14],@X[15],[$inp]
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($i>=14);
+	ldr	@X[($i-11)&15],[sp,#`$SZ*(($i-11)%4)`]
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($i>0 && $i<16);
+	add	$a,$a,$t1			// h+=Sigma0(a)
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($i>=11);
+	str	@X[($i-8)&15],[sp,#`$SZ*(($i-8)%4)`]
+___
+# While ARMv8 specifies merged rotate-n-logical operation such as
+# 'eor x,y,z,ror#n', it was found to negatively affect performance
+# on Apple A7. The reason seems to be that it requires even 'y' to
+# be available earlier. This means that such merged instruction is
+# not necessarily best choice on critical path... On the other hand
+# Cortex-A5x handles merged instructions much better than disjoint
+# rotate and logical... See (**) footnote above.
+$code.=<<___	if ($i<15);
+	ror	$t0,$e,#$Sigma1[0]
+	add	$h,$h,$t2			// h+=K[i]
+	eor	$T0,$e,$e,ror#`$Sigma1[2]-$Sigma1[1]`
+	and	$t1,$f,$e
+	bic	$t2,$g,$e
+	add	$h,$h,@X[$i&15]			// h+=X[i]
+	orr	$t1,$t1,$t2			// Ch(e,f,g)
+	eor	$t2,$a,$b			// a^b, b^c in next round
+	eor	$t0,$t0,$T0,ror#$Sigma1[1]	// Sigma1(e)
+	ror	$T0,$a,#$Sigma0[0]
+	add	$h,$h,$t1			// h+=Ch(e,f,g)
+	eor	$t1,$a,$a,ror#`$Sigma0[2]-$Sigma0[1]`
+	add	$h,$h,$t0			// h+=Sigma1(e)
+	and	$t3,$t3,$t2			// (b^c)&=(a^b)
+	add	$d,$d,$h			// d+=h
+	eor	$t3,$t3,$b			// Maj(a,b,c)
+	eor	$t1,$T0,$t1,ror#$Sigma0[1]	// Sigma0(a)
+	add	$h,$h,$t3			// h+=Maj(a,b,c)
+	ldr	$t3,[$Ktbl],#$SZ		// *K++, $t2 in next round
+	//add	$h,$h,$t1			// h+=Sigma0(a)
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($i>=15);
+	ror	$t0,$e,#$Sigma1[0]
+	add	$h,$h,$t2			// h+=K[i]
+	ror	$T1,@X[($j+1)&15],#$sigma0[0]
+	and	$t1,$f,$e
+	ror	$T2,@X[($j+14)&15],#$sigma1[0]
+	bic	$t2,$g,$e
+	ror	$T0,$a,#$Sigma0[0]
+	add	$h,$h,@X[$i&15]			// h+=X[i]
+	eor	$t0,$t0,$e,ror#$Sigma1[1]
+	eor	$T1,$T1,@X[($j+1)&15],ror#$sigma0[1]
+	orr	$t1,$t1,$t2			// Ch(e,f,g)
+	eor	$t2,$a,$b			// a^b, b^c in next round
+	eor	$t0,$t0,$e,ror#$Sigma1[2]	// Sigma1(e)
+	eor	$T0,$T0,$a,ror#$Sigma0[1]
+	add	$h,$h,$t1			// h+=Ch(e,f,g)
+	and	$t3,$t3,$t2			// (b^c)&=(a^b)
+	eor	$T2,$T2,@X[($j+14)&15],ror#$sigma1[1]
+	eor	$T1,$T1,@X[($j+1)&15],lsr#$sigma0[2]	// sigma0(X[i+1])
+	add	$h,$h,$t0			// h+=Sigma1(e)
+	eor	$t3,$t3,$b			// Maj(a,b,c)
+	eor	$t1,$T0,$a,ror#$Sigma0[2]	// Sigma0(a)
+	eor	$T2,$T2,@X[($j+14)&15],lsr#$sigma1[2]	// sigma1(X[i+14])
+	add	@X[$j],@X[$j],@X[($j+9)&15]
+	add	$d,$d,$h			// d+=h
+	add	$h,$h,$t3			// h+=Maj(a,b,c)
+	ldr	$t3,[$Ktbl],#$SZ		// *K++, $t2 in next round
+	add	@X[$j],@X[$j],$T1
+	add	$h,$h,$t1			// h+=Sigma0(a)
+	add	@X[$j],@X[$j],$T2
+___
+	($t2,$t3)=($t3,$t2);
+}
+
+$code.=<<___;
+#include "arm_arch.h"
+
+.text
+
+.extern	OPENSSL_armcap_P
+.globl	$func
+.type	$func,%function
+.align	6
+$func:
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($SZ==4);
+#ifdef	__ILP32__
+	ldrsw	x16,.LOPENSSL_armcap_P
+#else
+	ldr	x16,.LOPENSSL_armcap_P
+#endif
+	adr	x17,.LOPENSSL_armcap_P
+	add	x16,x16,x17
+	ldr	w16,[x16]
+	tst	w16,#ARMV8_SHA256
+	b.ne	.Lv8_entry
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	stp	x29,x30,[sp,#-128]!
+	add	x29,sp,#0
+
+	stp	x19,x20,[sp,#16]
+	stp	x21,x22,[sp,#32]
+	stp	x23,x24,[sp,#48]
+	stp	x25,x26,[sp,#64]
+	stp	x27,x28,[sp,#80]
+	sub	sp,sp,#4*$SZ
+
+	ldp	$A,$B,[$ctx]				// load context
+	ldp	$C,$D,[$ctx,#2*$SZ]
+	ldp	$E,$F,[$ctx,#4*$SZ]
+	add	$num,$inp,$num,lsl#`log(16*$SZ)/log(2)`	// end of input
+	ldp	$G,$H,[$ctx,#6*$SZ]
+	adr	$Ktbl,.LK$BITS
+	stp	$ctx,$num,[x29,#96]
+
+.Loop:
+	ldp	@X[0],@X[1],[$inp],#2*$SZ
+	ldr	$t2,[$Ktbl],#$SZ			// *K++
+	eor	$t3,$B,$C				// magic seed
+	str	$inp,[x29,#112]
+___
+for ($i=0;$i<16;$i++)	{ &BODY_00_xx($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+$code.=".Loop_16_xx:\n";
+for (;$i<32;$i++)	{ &BODY_00_xx($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+$code.=<<___;
+	cbnz	$t2,.Loop_16_xx
+
+	ldp	$ctx,$num,[x29,#96]
+	ldr	$inp,[x29,#112]
+	sub	$Ktbl,$Ktbl,#`$SZ*($rounds+1)`		// rewind
+
+	ldp	@X[0],@X[1],[$ctx]
+	ldp	@X[2],@X[3],[$ctx,#2*$SZ]
+	add	$inp,$inp,#14*$SZ			// advance input pointer
+	ldp	@X[4],@X[5],[$ctx,#4*$SZ]
+	add	$A,$A,@X[0]
+	ldp	@X[6],@X[7],[$ctx,#6*$SZ]
+	add	$B,$B,@X[1]
+	add	$C,$C,@X[2]
+	add	$D,$D,@X[3]
+	stp	$A,$B,[$ctx]
+	add	$E,$E,@X[4]
+	add	$F,$F,@X[5]
+	stp	$C,$D,[$ctx,#2*$SZ]
+	add	$G,$G,@X[6]
+	add	$H,$H,@X[7]
+	cmp	$inp,$num
+	stp	$E,$F,[$ctx,#4*$SZ]
+	stp	$G,$H,[$ctx,#6*$SZ]
+	b.ne	.Loop
+
+	ldp	x19,x20,[x29,#16]
+	add	sp,sp,#4*$SZ
+	ldp	x21,x22,[x29,#32]
+	ldp	x23,x24,[x29,#48]
+	ldp	x25,x26,[x29,#64]
+	ldp	x27,x28,[x29,#80]
+	ldp	x29,x30,[sp],#128
+	ret
+.size	$func,.-$func
+
+.align	6
+.type	.LK$BITS,%object
+.LK$BITS:
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($SZ==8);
+	.quad	0x428a2f98d728ae22,0x7137449123ef65cd
+	.quad	0xb5c0fbcfec4d3b2f,0xe9b5dba58189dbbc
+	.quad	0x3956c25bf348b538,0x59f111f1b605d019
+	.quad	0x923f82a4af194f9b,0xab1c5ed5da6d8118
+	.quad	0xd807aa98a3030242,0x12835b0145706fbe
+	.quad	0x243185be4ee4b28c,0x550c7dc3d5ffb4e2
+	.quad	0x72be5d74f27b896f,0x80deb1fe3b1696b1
+	.quad	0x9bdc06a725c71235,0xc19bf174cf692694
+	.quad	0xe49b69c19ef14ad2,0xefbe4786384f25e3
+	.quad	0x0fc19dc68b8cd5b5,0x240ca1cc77ac9c65
+	.quad	0x2de92c6f592b0275,0x4a7484aa6ea6e483
+	.quad	0x5cb0a9dcbd41fbd4,0x76f988da831153b5
+	.quad	0x983e5152ee66dfab,0xa831c66d2db43210
+	.quad	0xb00327c898fb213f,0xbf597fc7beef0ee4
+	.quad	0xc6e00bf33da88fc2,0xd5a79147930aa725
+	.quad	0x06ca6351e003826f,0x142929670a0e6e70
+	.quad	0x27b70a8546d22ffc,0x2e1b21385c26c926
+	.quad	0x4d2c6dfc5ac42aed,0x53380d139d95b3df
+	.quad	0x650a73548baf63de,0x766a0abb3c77b2a8
+	.quad	0x81c2c92e47edaee6,0x92722c851482353b
+	.quad	0xa2bfe8a14cf10364,0xa81a664bbc423001
+	.quad	0xc24b8b70d0f89791,0xc76c51a30654be30
+	.quad	0xd192e819d6ef5218,0xd69906245565a910
+	.quad	0xf40e35855771202a,0x106aa07032bbd1b8
+	.quad	0x19a4c116b8d2d0c8,0x1e376c085141ab53
+	.quad	0x2748774cdf8eeb99,0x34b0bcb5e19b48a8
+	.quad	0x391c0cb3c5c95a63,0x4ed8aa4ae3418acb
+	.quad	0x5b9cca4f7763e373,0x682e6ff3d6b2b8a3
+	.quad	0x748f82ee5defb2fc,0x78a5636f43172f60
+	.quad	0x84c87814a1f0ab72,0x8cc702081a6439ec
+	.quad	0x90befffa23631e28,0xa4506cebde82bde9
+	.quad	0xbef9a3f7b2c67915,0xc67178f2e372532b
+	.quad	0xca273eceea26619c,0xd186b8c721c0c207
+	.quad	0xeada7dd6cde0eb1e,0xf57d4f7fee6ed178
+	.quad	0x06f067aa72176fba,0x0a637dc5a2c898a6
+	.quad	0x113f9804bef90dae,0x1b710b35131c471b
+	.quad	0x28db77f523047d84,0x32caab7b40c72493
+	.quad	0x3c9ebe0a15c9bebc,0x431d67c49c100d4c
+	.quad	0x4cc5d4becb3e42b6,0x597f299cfc657e2a
+	.quad	0x5fcb6fab3ad6faec,0x6c44198c4a475817
+	.quad	0	// terminator
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($SZ==4);
+	.long	0x428a2f98,0x71374491,0xb5c0fbcf,0xe9b5dba5
+	.long	0x3956c25b,0x59f111f1,0x923f82a4,0xab1c5ed5
+	.long	0xd807aa98,0x12835b01,0x243185be,0x550c7dc3
+	.long	0x72be5d74,0x80deb1fe,0x9bdc06a7,0xc19bf174
+	.long	0xe49b69c1,0xefbe4786,0x0fc19dc6,0x240ca1cc
+	.long	0x2de92c6f,0x4a7484aa,0x5cb0a9dc,0x76f988da
+	.long	0x983e5152,0xa831c66d,0xb00327c8,0xbf597fc7
+	.long	0xc6e00bf3,0xd5a79147,0x06ca6351,0x14292967
+	.long	0x27b70a85,0x2e1b2138,0x4d2c6dfc,0x53380d13
+	.long	0x650a7354,0x766a0abb,0x81c2c92e,0x92722c85
+	.long	0xa2bfe8a1,0xa81a664b,0xc24b8b70,0xc76c51a3
+	.long	0xd192e819,0xd6990624,0xf40e3585,0x106aa070
+	.long	0x19a4c116,0x1e376c08,0x2748774c,0x34b0bcb5
+	.long	0x391c0cb3,0x4ed8aa4a,0x5b9cca4f,0x682e6ff3
+	.long	0x748f82ee,0x78a5636f,0x84c87814,0x8cc70208
+	.long	0x90befffa,0xa4506ceb,0xbef9a3f7,0xc67178f2
+	.long	0	//terminator
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+.size	.LK$BITS,.-.LK$BITS
+.align	3
+.LOPENSSL_armcap_P:
+#ifdef	__ILP32__
+	.long	OPENSSL_armcap_P-.
+#else
+	.quad	OPENSSL_armcap_P-.
+#endif
+.asciz	"SHA$BITS block transform for ARMv8, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+.align	2
+___
+
+if ($SZ==4) {
+my $Ktbl="x3";
+
+my ($ABCD,$EFGH,$abcd)=map("v$_.16b",(0..2));
+my @MSG=map("v$_.16b",(4..7));
+my ($W0,$W1)=("v16.4s","v17.4s");
+my ($ABCD_SAVE,$EFGH_SAVE)=("v18.16b","v19.16b");
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.type	sha256_block_armv8,%function
+.align	6
+sha256_block_armv8:
+.Lv8_entry:
+	stp		x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
+	add		x29,sp,#0
+
+	ld1.32		{$ABCD,$EFGH},[$ctx]
+	adr		$Ktbl,.LK256
+
+.Loop_hw:
+	ld1		{@MSG[0]-@MSG[3]},[$inp],#64
+	sub		$num,$num,#1
+	ld1.32		{$W0},[$Ktbl],#16
+	rev32		@MSG[0],@MSG[0]
+	rev32		@MSG[1],@MSG[1]
+	rev32		@MSG[2],@MSG[2]
+	rev32		@MSG[3],@MSG[3]
+	orr		$ABCD_SAVE,$ABCD,$ABCD		// offload
+	orr		$EFGH_SAVE,$EFGH,$EFGH
+___
+for($i=0;$i<12;$i++) {
+$code.=<<___;
+	ld1.32		{$W1},[$Ktbl],#16
+	add.i32		$W0,$W0,@MSG[0]
+	sha256su0	@MSG[0],@MSG[1]
+	orr		$abcd,$ABCD,$ABCD
+	sha256h		$ABCD,$EFGH,$W0
+	sha256h2	$EFGH,$abcd,$W0
+	sha256su1	@MSG[0],@MSG[2],@MSG[3]
+___
+	($W0,$W1)=($W1,$W0);	push(@MSG,shift(@MSG));
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	ld1.32		{$W1},[$Ktbl],#16
+	add.i32		$W0,$W0,@MSG[0]
+	orr		$abcd,$ABCD,$ABCD
+	sha256h		$ABCD,$EFGH,$W0
+	sha256h2	$EFGH,$abcd,$W0
+
+	ld1.32		{$W0},[$Ktbl],#16
+	add.i32		$W1,$W1,@MSG[1]
+	orr		$abcd,$ABCD,$ABCD
+	sha256h		$ABCD,$EFGH,$W1
+	sha256h2	$EFGH,$abcd,$W1
+
+	ld1.32		{$W1},[$Ktbl]
+	add.i32		$W0,$W0,@MSG[2]
+	sub		$Ktbl,$Ktbl,#$rounds*$SZ-16	// rewind
+	orr		$abcd,$ABCD,$ABCD
+	sha256h		$ABCD,$EFGH,$W0
+	sha256h2	$EFGH,$abcd,$W0
+
+	add.i32		$W1,$W1,@MSG[3]
+	orr		$abcd,$ABCD,$ABCD
+	sha256h		$ABCD,$EFGH,$W1
+	sha256h2	$EFGH,$abcd,$W1
+
+	add.i32		$ABCD,$ABCD,$ABCD_SAVE
+	add.i32		$EFGH,$EFGH,$EFGH_SAVE
+
+	cbnz		$num,.Loop_hw
+
+	st1.32		{$ABCD,$EFGH},[$ctx]
+
+	ldr		x29,[sp],#16
+	ret
+.size	sha256_block_armv8,.-sha256_block_armv8
+___
+}
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.comm	OPENSSL_armcap_P,4,4
+___
+
+{   my  %opcode = (
+	"sha256h"	=> 0x5e004000,	"sha256h2"	=> 0x5e005000,
+	"sha256su0"	=> 0x5e282800,	"sha256su1"	=> 0x5e006000	);
+
+    sub unsha256 {
+	my ($mnemonic,$arg)=@_;
+
+	$arg =~ m/[qv]([0-9]+)[^,]*,\s*[qv]([0-9]+)[^,]*(?:,\s*[qv]([0-9]+))?/o
+	&&
+	sprintf ".inst\t0x%08x\t//%s %s",
+			$opcode{$mnemonic}|$1|($2<<5)|($3<<16),
+			$mnemonic,$arg;
+    }
+}
+
+foreach(split("\n",$code)) {
+
+	s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval($1)/geo;
+
+	s/\b(sha256\w+)\s+([qv].*)/unsha256($1,$2)/geo;
+
+	s/\.\w?32\b//o		and s/\.16b/\.4s/go;
+	m/(ld|st)1[^\[]+\[0\]/o	and s/\.4s/\.s/go;
+
+	print $_,"\n";
+}
+
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-c64xplus.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-c64xplus.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9ebfc92
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-c64xplus.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,438 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2012-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# SHA512 for C64x+.
+#
+# January 2012
+#
+# Performance is 19 cycles per processed byte. Compared to block
+# transform function from sha512.c compiled with cl6x with -mv6400+
+# -o2 -DOPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT it's almost 7x faster and 2x smaller.
+# Loop unroll won't make it, this implementation, any faster, because
+# it's effectively dominated by SHRU||SHL pairs and you can't schedule
+# more of them.
+#
+# !!! Note that this module uses AMR, which means that all interrupt
+# service routines are expected to preserve it and for own well-being
+# zero it upon entry.
+
+while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {}
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+($CTXA,$INP,$NUM) = ("A4","B4","A6");            # arguments
+ $K512="A3";
+
+($Ahi,$Actxhi,$Bhi,$Bctxhi,$Chi,$Cctxhi,$Dhi,$Dctxhi,
+ $Ehi,$Ectxhi,$Fhi,$Fctxhi,$Ghi,$Gctxhi,$Hhi,$Hctxhi)=map("A$_",(16..31));
+($Alo,$Actxlo,$Blo,$Bctxlo,$Clo,$Cctxlo,$Dlo,$Dctxlo,
+ $Elo,$Ectxlo,$Flo,$Fctxlo,$Glo,$Gctxlo,$Hlo,$Hctxlo)=map("B$_",(16..31));
+
+($S1hi,$CHhi,$S0hi,$t0hi)=map("A$_",(10..13));
+($S1lo,$CHlo,$S0lo,$t0lo)=map("B$_",(10..13));
+($T1hi,         $T2hi)=         ("A6","A7");
+($T1lo,$T1carry,$T2lo,$T2carry)=("B6","B7","B8","B9");
+($Khi,$Klo)=("A9","A8");
+($MAJhi,$MAJlo)=($T2hi,$T2lo);
+($t1hi,$t1lo)=($Khi,"B2");
+ $CTXB=$t1lo;
+
+($Xihi,$Xilo)=("A5","B5");			# circular/ring buffer
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	.text
+
+	.if	.ASSEMBLER_VERSION<7000000
+	.asg	0,__TI_EABI__
+	.endif
+	.if	__TI_EABI__
+	.nocmp
+	.asg	sha512_block_data_order,_sha512_block_data_order
+	.endif
+
+	.asg	B3,RA
+	.asg	A15,FP
+	.asg	B15,SP
+
+	.if	.BIG_ENDIAN
+	.asg	$Khi,KHI
+	.asg	$Klo,KLO
+	.else
+	.asg	$Khi,KLO
+	.asg	$Klo,KHI
+	.endif
+
+	.global	_sha512_block_data_order
+_sha512_block_data_order:
+__sha512_block:
+	.asmfunc stack_usage(40+128)
+	MV	$NUM,A0				; reassign $NUM
+||	MVK	-128,B0
+  [!A0]	BNOP	RA				; if ($NUM==0) return;
+|| [A0]	STW	FP,*SP--(40)			; save frame pointer
+|| [A0]	MV	SP,FP
+   [A0]	STDW	B13:B12,*SP[4]
+|| [A0]	MVK	0x00404,B1
+   [A0]	STDW	B11:B10,*SP[3]
+|| [A0]	STDW	A13:A12,*FP[-3]
+|| [A0]	MVKH	0x60000,B1
+   [A0]	STDW	A11:A10,*SP[1]
+|| [A0]	MVC	B1,AMR				; setup circular addressing
+|| [A0]	ADD	B0,SP,SP			; alloca(128)
+	.if	__TI_EABI__
+   [A0]	AND	B0,SP,SP			; align stack at 128 bytes
+|| [A0]	ADDKPC	__sha512_block,B1
+|| [A0]	MVKL	\$PCR_OFFSET(K512,__sha512_block),$K512
+   [A0]	MVKH	\$PCR_OFFSET(K512,__sha512_block),$K512
+|| [A0]	SUBAW	SP,2,SP				; reserve two words above buffer
+	.else
+   [A0]	AND	B0,SP,SP			; align stack at 128 bytes
+|| [A0]	ADDKPC	__sha512_block,B1
+|| [A0]	MVKL	(K512-__sha512_block),$K512
+   [A0]	MVKH	(K512-__sha512_block),$K512
+|| [A0]	SUBAW	SP,2,SP				; reserve two words above buffer
+	.endif
+	ADDAW	SP,3,$Xilo
+	ADDAW	SP,2,$Xihi
+
+||	MV	$CTXA,$CTXB
+	LDW	*${CTXA}[0^.LITTLE_ENDIAN],$Ahi	; load ctx
+||	LDW	*${CTXB}[1^.LITTLE_ENDIAN],$Alo
+||	ADD	B1,$K512,$K512
+	LDW	*${CTXA}[2^.LITTLE_ENDIAN],$Bhi
+||	LDW	*${CTXB}[3^.LITTLE_ENDIAN],$Blo
+	LDW	*${CTXA}[4^.LITTLE_ENDIAN],$Chi
+||	LDW	*${CTXB}[5^.LITTLE_ENDIAN],$Clo
+	LDW	*${CTXA}[6^.LITTLE_ENDIAN],$Dhi
+||	LDW	*${CTXB}[7^.LITTLE_ENDIAN],$Dlo
+	LDW	*${CTXA}[8^.LITTLE_ENDIAN],$Ehi
+||	LDW	*${CTXB}[9^.LITTLE_ENDIAN],$Elo
+	LDW	*${CTXA}[10^.LITTLE_ENDIAN],$Fhi
+||	LDW	*${CTXB}[11^.LITTLE_ENDIAN],$Flo
+	LDW	*${CTXA}[12^.LITTLE_ENDIAN],$Ghi
+||	LDW	*${CTXB}[13^.LITTLE_ENDIAN],$Glo
+	LDW	*${CTXA}[14^.LITTLE_ENDIAN],$Hhi
+||	LDW	*${CTXB}[15^.LITTLE_ENDIAN],$Hlo
+
+	LDNDW	*$INP++,B11:B10			; pre-fetch input
+	LDDW	*$K512++,$Khi:$Klo		; pre-fetch K512[0]
+outerloop?:
+	MVK	15,B0				; loop counters
+||	MVK	64,B1
+||	SUB	A0,1,A0
+	MV	$Ahi,$Actxhi
+||	MV	$Alo,$Actxlo
+||	MV	$Bhi,$Bctxhi
+||	MV	$Blo,$Bctxlo
+||	MV	$Chi,$Cctxhi
+||	MV	$Clo,$Cctxlo
+||	MVD	$Dhi,$Dctxhi
+||	MVD	$Dlo,$Dctxlo
+	MV	$Ehi,$Ectxhi
+||	MV	$Elo,$Ectxlo
+||	MV	$Fhi,$Fctxhi
+||	MV	$Flo,$Fctxlo
+||	MV	$Ghi,$Gctxhi
+||	MV	$Glo,$Gctxlo
+||	MVD	$Hhi,$Hctxhi
+||	MVD	$Hlo,$Hctxlo
+loop0_15?:
+	.if	.BIG_ENDIAN
+	MV	B11,$T1hi
+||	MV	B10,$T1lo
+	.else
+	SWAP4	B10,$T1hi
+||	SWAP4	B11,$T1lo
+	SWAP2	$T1hi,$T1hi
+||	SWAP2	$T1lo,$T1lo
+	.endif
+loop16_79?:
+	STW	$T1hi,*$Xihi++[2]
+||	STW	$T1lo,*$Xilo++[2]			; X[i] = T1
+||	ADD	$Hhi,$T1hi,$T1hi
+||	ADDU	$Hlo,$T1lo,$T1carry:$T1lo		; T1 += h
+||	SHRU	$Ehi,14,$S1hi
+||	SHL	$Ehi,32-14,$S1lo
+	XOR	$Fhi,$Ghi,$CHhi
+||	XOR	$Flo,$Glo,$CHlo
+||	ADD	KHI,$T1hi,$T1hi
+||	ADDU	KLO,$T1carry:$T1lo,$T1carry:$T1lo	; T1 += K512[i]
+||	SHRU	$Elo,14,$t0lo
+||	SHL	$Elo,32-14,$t0hi
+	XOR	$t0hi,$S1hi,$S1hi
+||	XOR	$t0lo,$S1lo,$S1lo
+||	AND	$Ehi,$CHhi,$CHhi
+||	AND	$Elo,$CHlo,$CHlo
+||	ROTL	$Ghi,0,$Hhi
+||	ROTL	$Glo,0,$Hlo				; h = g
+||	SHRU	$Ehi,18,$t0hi
+||	SHL	$Ehi,32-18,$t0lo
+	XOR	$t0hi,$S1hi,$S1hi
+||	XOR	$t0lo,$S1lo,$S1lo
+||	XOR	$Ghi,$CHhi,$CHhi
+||	XOR	$Glo,$CHlo,$CHlo			; Ch(e,f,g) = ((f^g)&e)^g
+||	ROTL	$Fhi,0,$Ghi
+||	ROTL	$Flo,0,$Glo				; g = f
+||	SHRU	$Elo,18,$t0lo
+||	SHL	$Elo,32-18,$t0hi
+	XOR	$t0hi,$S1hi,$S1hi
+||	XOR	$t0lo,$S1lo,$S1lo
+||	OR	$Ahi,$Bhi,$MAJhi
+||	OR	$Alo,$Blo,$MAJlo
+||	ROTL	$Ehi,0,$Fhi
+||	ROTL	$Elo,0,$Flo				; f = e
+||	SHRU	$Ehi,41-32,$t0lo
+||	SHL	$Ehi,64-41,$t0hi
+	XOR	$t0hi,$S1hi,$S1hi
+||	XOR	$t0lo,$S1lo,$S1lo
+||	AND	$Chi,$MAJhi,$MAJhi
+||	AND	$Clo,$MAJlo,$MAJlo
+||	ROTL	$Dhi,0,$Ehi
+||	ROTL	$Dlo,0,$Elo				; e = d
+||	SHRU	$Elo,41-32,$t0hi
+||	SHL	$Elo,64-41,$t0lo
+	XOR	$t0hi,$S1hi,$S1hi
+||	XOR	$t0lo,$S1lo,$S1lo			; Sigma1(e)
+||	AND	$Ahi,$Bhi,$t1hi
+||	AND	$Alo,$Blo,$t1lo
+||	ROTL	$Chi,0,$Dhi
+||	ROTL	$Clo,0,$Dlo				; d = c
+||	SHRU	$Ahi,28,$S0hi
+||	SHL	$Ahi,32-28,$S0lo
+	OR	$t1hi,$MAJhi,$MAJhi
+||	OR	$t1lo,$MAJlo,$MAJlo			; Maj(a,b,c) = ((a|b)&c)|(a&b)
+||	ADD	$CHhi,$T1hi,$T1hi
+||	ADDU	$CHlo,$T1carry:$T1lo,$T1carry:$T1lo	; T1 += Ch(e,f,g)
+||	ROTL	$Bhi,0,$Chi
+||	ROTL	$Blo,0,$Clo				; c = b
+||	SHRU	$Alo,28,$t0lo
+||	SHL	$Alo,32-28,$t0hi
+	XOR	$t0hi,$S0hi,$S0hi
+||	XOR	$t0lo,$S0lo,$S0lo
+||	ADD	$S1hi,$T1hi,$T1hi
+||	ADDU	$S1lo,$T1carry:$T1lo,$T1carry:$T1lo	; T1 += Sigma1(e)
+||	ROTL	$Ahi,0,$Bhi
+||	ROTL	$Alo,0,$Blo				; b = a
+||	SHRU	$Ahi,34-32,$t0lo
+||	SHL	$Ahi,64-34,$t0hi
+	XOR	$t0hi,$S0hi,$S0hi
+||	XOR	$t0lo,$S0lo,$S0lo
+||	ADD	$MAJhi,$T1hi,$T2hi
+||	ADDU	$MAJlo,$T1carry:$T1lo,$T2carry:$T2lo	; T2 = T1+Maj(a,b,c)
+||	SHRU	$Alo,34-32,$t0hi
+||	SHL	$Alo,64-34,$t0lo
+	XOR	$t0hi,$S0hi,$S0hi
+||	XOR	$t0lo,$S0lo,$S0lo
+||	ADD	$Ehi,$T1hi,$T1hi
+||	ADDU	$Elo,$T1carry:$T1lo,$T1carry:$T1lo	; T1 += e
+|| [B0]	BNOP	loop0_15?
+||	SHRU	$Ahi,39-32,$t0lo
+||	SHL	$Ahi,64-39,$t0hi
+	XOR	$t0hi,$S0hi,$S0hi
+||	XOR	$t0lo,$S0lo,$S0lo
+|| [B0]	LDNDW	*$INP++,B11:B10				; pre-fetch input
+||[!B1]	BNOP	break?
+||	SHRU	$Alo,39-32,$t0hi
+||	SHL	$Alo,64-39,$t0lo
+	XOR	$t0hi,$S0hi,$S0hi
+||	XOR	$t0lo,$S0lo,$S0lo			; Sigma0(a)
+||	ADD	$T1carry,$T1hi,$Ehi
+||	MV	$T1lo,$Elo				; e = T1
+||[!B0]	LDW	*${Xihi}[28],$T1hi
+||[!B0]	LDW	*${Xilo}[28],$T1lo			; X[i+14]
+	ADD	$S0hi,$T2hi,$T2hi
+||	ADDU	$S0lo,$T2carry:$T2lo,$T2carry:$T2lo	; T2 += Sigma0(a)
+|| [B1]	LDDW	*$K512++,$Khi:$Klo			; pre-fetch K512[i]
+	NOP						; avoid cross-path stall
+	ADD	$T2carry,$T2hi,$Ahi
+||	MV	$T2lo,$Alo				; a = T2
+|| [B0]	SUB	B0,1,B0
+;;===== branch to loop00_15? is taken here
+	NOP
+;;===== branch to break? is taken here
+	LDW	*${Xihi}[2],$T2hi
+||	LDW	*${Xilo}[2],$T2lo			; X[i+1]
+||	SHRU	$T1hi,19,$S1hi
+||	SHL	$T1hi,32-19,$S1lo
+	SHRU	$T1lo,19,$t0lo
+||	SHL	$T1lo,32-19,$t0hi
+	XOR	$t0hi,$S1hi,$S1hi
+||	XOR	$t0lo,$S1lo,$S1lo
+||	SHRU	$T1hi,61-32,$t0lo
+||	SHL	$T1hi,64-61,$t0hi
+	XOR	$t0hi,$S1hi,$S1hi
+||	XOR	$t0lo,$S1lo,$S1lo
+||	SHRU	$T1lo,61-32,$t0hi
+||	SHL	$T1lo,64-61,$t0lo
+	XOR	$t0hi,$S1hi,$S1hi
+||	XOR	$t0lo,$S1lo,$S1lo
+||	SHRU	$T1hi,6,$t0hi
+||	SHL	$T1hi,32-6,$t0lo
+	XOR	$t0hi,$S1hi,$S1hi
+||	XOR	$t0lo,$S1lo,$S1lo
+||	SHRU	$T1lo,6,$t0lo
+||	LDW	*${Xihi}[18],$T1hi
+||	LDW	*${Xilo}[18],$T1lo			; X[i+9]
+	XOR	$t0lo,$S1lo,$S1lo			; sigma1(Xi[i+14])
+
+||	LDW	*${Xihi}[0],$CHhi
+||	LDW	*${Xilo}[0],$CHlo			; X[i]
+||	SHRU	$T2hi,1,$S0hi
+||	SHL	$T2hi,32-1,$S0lo
+	SHRU	$T2lo,1,$t0lo
+||	SHL	$T2lo,32-1,$t0hi
+	XOR	$t0hi,$S0hi,$S0hi
+||	XOR	$t0lo,$S0lo,$S0lo
+||	SHRU	$T2hi,8,$t0hi
+||	SHL	$T2hi,32-8,$t0lo
+	XOR	$t0hi,$S0hi,$S0hi
+||	XOR	$t0lo,$S0lo,$S0lo
+||	SHRU	$T2lo,8,$t0lo
+||	SHL	$T2lo,32-8,$t0hi
+	XOR	$t0hi,$S0hi,$S0hi
+||	XOR	$t0lo,$S0lo,$S0lo
+||	ADD	$S1hi,$T1hi,$T1hi
+||	ADDU	$S1lo,$T1lo,$T1carry:$T1lo		; T1 = X[i+9]+sigma1()
+|| [B1]	BNOP	loop16_79?
+||	SHRU	$T2hi,7,$t0hi
+||	SHL	$T2hi,32-7,$t0lo
+	XOR	$t0hi,$S0hi,$S0hi
+||	XOR	$t0lo,$S0lo,$S0lo
+||	ADD	$CHhi,$T1hi,$T1hi
+||	ADDU	$CHlo,$T1carry:$T1lo,$T1carry:$T1lo	; T1 += X[i]
+||	SHRU	$T2lo,7,$t0lo
+	XOR	$t0lo,$S0lo,$S0lo			; sigma0(Xi[i+1]
+
+	ADD	$S0hi,$T1hi,$T1hi
+||	ADDU	$S0lo,$T1carry:$T1lo,$T1carry:$T1lo	; T1 += sigma0()
+|| [B1]	SUB	B1,1,B1
+	NOP						; avoid cross-path stall
+	ADD	$T1carry,$T1hi,$T1hi
+;;===== branch to loop16_79? is taken here
+
+break?:
+	ADD	$Ahi,$Actxhi,$Ahi		; accumulate ctx
+||	ADDU	$Alo,$Actxlo,$Actxlo:$Alo
+|| [A0]	LDNDW	*$INP++,B11:B10			; pre-fetch input
+|| [A0]	ADDK	-640,$K512			; rewind pointer to K512
+	ADD	$Bhi,$Bctxhi,$Bhi
+||	ADDU	$Blo,$Bctxlo,$Bctxlo:$Blo
+|| [A0]	LDDW	*$K512++,$Khi:$Klo		; pre-fetch K512[0]
+	ADD	$Chi,$Cctxhi,$Chi
+||	ADDU	$Clo,$Cctxlo,$Cctxlo:$Clo
+||	ADD	$Actxlo,$Ahi,$Ahi
+||[!A0]	MV	$CTXA,$CTXB
+	ADD	$Dhi,$Dctxhi,$Dhi
+||	ADDU	$Dlo,$Dctxlo,$Dctxlo:$Dlo
+||	ADD	$Bctxlo,$Bhi,$Bhi
+||[!A0]	STW	$Ahi,*${CTXA}[0^.LITTLE_ENDIAN]	; save ctx
+||[!A0]	STW	$Alo,*${CTXB}[1^.LITTLE_ENDIAN]
+	ADD	$Ehi,$Ectxhi,$Ehi
+||	ADDU	$Elo,$Ectxlo,$Ectxlo:$Elo
+||	ADD	$Cctxlo,$Chi,$Chi
+|| [A0]	BNOP	outerloop?
+||[!A0]	STW	$Bhi,*${CTXA}[2^.LITTLE_ENDIAN]
+||[!A0]	STW	$Blo,*${CTXB}[3^.LITTLE_ENDIAN]
+	ADD	$Fhi,$Fctxhi,$Fhi
+||	ADDU	$Flo,$Fctxlo,$Fctxlo:$Flo
+||	ADD	$Dctxlo,$Dhi,$Dhi
+||[!A0]	STW	$Chi,*${CTXA}[4^.LITTLE_ENDIAN]
+||[!A0]	STW	$Clo,*${CTXB}[5^.LITTLE_ENDIAN]
+	ADD	$Ghi,$Gctxhi,$Ghi
+||	ADDU	$Glo,$Gctxlo,$Gctxlo:$Glo
+||	ADD	$Ectxlo,$Ehi,$Ehi
+||[!A0]	STW	$Dhi,*${CTXA}[6^.LITTLE_ENDIAN]
+||[!A0]	STW	$Dlo,*${CTXB}[7^.LITTLE_ENDIAN]
+	ADD	$Hhi,$Hctxhi,$Hhi
+||	ADDU	$Hlo,$Hctxlo,$Hctxlo:$Hlo
+||	ADD	$Fctxlo,$Fhi,$Fhi
+||[!A0]	STW	$Ehi,*${CTXA}[8^.LITTLE_ENDIAN]
+||[!A0]	STW	$Elo,*${CTXB}[9^.LITTLE_ENDIAN]
+	ADD	$Gctxlo,$Ghi,$Ghi
+||[!A0]	STW	$Fhi,*${CTXA}[10^.LITTLE_ENDIAN]
+||[!A0]	STW	$Flo,*${CTXB}[11^.LITTLE_ENDIAN]
+	ADD	$Hctxlo,$Hhi,$Hhi
+||[!A0]	STW	$Ghi,*${CTXA}[12^.LITTLE_ENDIAN]
+||[!A0]	STW	$Glo,*${CTXB}[13^.LITTLE_ENDIAN]
+;;===== branch to outerloop? is taken here
+
+	STW	$Hhi,*${CTXA}[14^.LITTLE_ENDIAN]
+||	STW	$Hlo,*${CTXB}[15^.LITTLE_ENDIAN]
+||	MVK	-40,B0
+	ADD	FP,B0,SP			; destroy circular buffer
+||	LDDW	*FP[-4],A11:A10
+	LDDW	*SP[2],A13:A12
+||	LDDW	*FP[-2],B11:B10
+	LDDW	*SP[4],B13:B12
+||	BNOP	RA
+	LDW	*++SP(40),FP			; restore frame pointer
+	MVK	0,B0
+	MVC	B0,AMR				; clear AMR
+	NOP	2				; wait till FP is committed
+	.endasmfunc
+
+	.if	__TI_EABI__
+	.sect	".text:sha_asm.const"
+	.else
+	.sect	".const:sha_asm"
+	.endif
+	.align	128
+K512:
+	.uword	0x428a2f98,0xd728ae22, 0x71374491,0x23ef65cd
+	.uword	0xb5c0fbcf,0xec4d3b2f, 0xe9b5dba5,0x8189dbbc
+	.uword	0x3956c25b,0xf348b538, 0x59f111f1,0xb605d019
+	.uword	0x923f82a4,0xaf194f9b, 0xab1c5ed5,0xda6d8118
+	.uword	0xd807aa98,0xa3030242, 0x12835b01,0x45706fbe
+	.uword	0x243185be,0x4ee4b28c, 0x550c7dc3,0xd5ffb4e2
+	.uword	0x72be5d74,0xf27b896f, 0x80deb1fe,0x3b1696b1
+	.uword	0x9bdc06a7,0x25c71235, 0xc19bf174,0xcf692694
+	.uword	0xe49b69c1,0x9ef14ad2, 0xefbe4786,0x384f25e3
+	.uword	0x0fc19dc6,0x8b8cd5b5, 0x240ca1cc,0x77ac9c65
+	.uword	0x2de92c6f,0x592b0275, 0x4a7484aa,0x6ea6e483
+	.uword	0x5cb0a9dc,0xbd41fbd4, 0x76f988da,0x831153b5
+	.uword	0x983e5152,0xee66dfab, 0xa831c66d,0x2db43210
+	.uword	0xb00327c8,0x98fb213f, 0xbf597fc7,0xbeef0ee4
+	.uword	0xc6e00bf3,0x3da88fc2, 0xd5a79147,0x930aa725
+	.uword	0x06ca6351,0xe003826f, 0x14292967,0x0a0e6e70
+	.uword	0x27b70a85,0x46d22ffc, 0x2e1b2138,0x5c26c926
+	.uword	0x4d2c6dfc,0x5ac42aed, 0x53380d13,0x9d95b3df
+	.uword	0x650a7354,0x8baf63de, 0x766a0abb,0x3c77b2a8
+	.uword	0x81c2c92e,0x47edaee6, 0x92722c85,0x1482353b
+	.uword	0xa2bfe8a1,0x4cf10364, 0xa81a664b,0xbc423001
+	.uword	0xc24b8b70,0xd0f89791, 0xc76c51a3,0x0654be30
+	.uword	0xd192e819,0xd6ef5218, 0xd6990624,0x5565a910
+	.uword	0xf40e3585,0x5771202a, 0x106aa070,0x32bbd1b8
+	.uword	0x19a4c116,0xb8d2d0c8, 0x1e376c08,0x5141ab53
+	.uword	0x2748774c,0xdf8eeb99, 0x34b0bcb5,0xe19b48a8
+	.uword	0x391c0cb3,0xc5c95a63, 0x4ed8aa4a,0xe3418acb
+	.uword	0x5b9cca4f,0x7763e373, 0x682e6ff3,0xd6b2b8a3
+	.uword	0x748f82ee,0x5defb2fc, 0x78a5636f,0x43172f60
+	.uword	0x84c87814,0xa1f0ab72, 0x8cc70208,0x1a6439ec
+	.uword	0x90befffa,0x23631e28, 0xa4506ceb,0xde82bde9
+	.uword	0xbef9a3f7,0xb2c67915, 0xc67178f2,0xe372532b
+	.uword	0xca273ece,0xea26619c, 0xd186b8c7,0x21c0c207
+	.uword	0xeada7dd6,0xcde0eb1e, 0xf57d4f7f,0xee6ed178
+	.uword	0x06f067aa,0x72176fba, 0x0a637dc5,0xa2c898a6
+	.uword	0x113f9804,0xbef90dae, 0x1b710b35,0x131c471b
+	.uword	0x28db77f5,0x23047d84, 0x32caab7b,0x40c72493
+	.uword	0x3c9ebe0a,0x15c9bebc, 0x431d67c4,0x9c100d4c
+	.uword	0x4cc5d4be,0xcb3e42b6, 0x597f299c,0xfc657e2a
+	.uword	0x5fcb6fab,0x3ad6faec, 0x6c44198c,0x4a475817
+	.cstring "SHA512 block transform for C64x+, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+	.align	4
+___
+
+print $code;
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-ia64.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-ia64.pl
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..356a46a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-ia64.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,692 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# SHA256/512_Transform for Itanium.
+#
+# sha512_block runs in 1003 cycles on Itanium 2, which is almost 50%
+# faster than gcc and >60%(!) faster than code generated by HP-UX
+# compiler (yes, HP-UX is generating slower code, because unlike gcc,
+# it failed to deploy "shift right pair," 'shrp' instruction, which
+# substitutes for 64-bit rotate).
+#
+# 924 cycles long sha256_block outperforms gcc by over factor of 2(!)
+# and HP-UX compiler - by >40% (yes, gcc won sha512_block, but lost
+# this one big time). Note that "formally" 924 is about 100 cycles
+# too much. I mean it's 64 32-bit rounds vs. 80 virtually identical
+# 64-bit ones and 1003*64/80 gives 802. Extra cycles, 2 per round,
+# are spent on extra work to provide for 32-bit rotations. 32-bit
+# rotations are still handled by 'shrp' instruction and for this
+# reason lower 32 bits are deposited to upper half of 64-bit register
+# prior 'shrp' issue. And in order to minimize the amount of such
+# operations, X[16] values are *maintained* with copies of lower
+# halves in upper halves, which is why you'll spot such instructions
+# as custom 'mux2', "parallel 32-bit add," 'padd4' and "parallel
+# 32-bit unsigned right shift," 'pshr4.u' instructions here.
+#
+# Rules of engagement.
+#
+# There is only one integer shifter meaning that if I have two rotate,
+# deposit or extract instructions in adjacent bundles, they shall
+# split [at run-time if they have to]. But note that variable and
+# parallel shifts are performed by multi-media ALU and *are* pairable
+# with rotates [and alike]. On the backside MMALU is rather slow: it
+# takes 2 extra cycles before the result of integer operation is
+# available *to* MMALU and 2(*) extra cycles before the result of MM
+# operation is available "back" *to* integer ALU, not to mention that
+# MMALU itself has 2 cycles latency. However! I explicitly scheduled
+# these MM instructions to avoid MM stalls, so that all these extra
+# latencies get "hidden" in instruction-level parallelism.
+#
+# (*) 2 cycles on Itanium 1 and 1 cycle on Itanium 2. But I schedule
+#     for 2 in order to provide for best *overall* performance,
+#     because on Itanium 1 stall on MM result is accompanied by
+#     pipeline flush, which takes 6 cycles:-(
+#
+# June 2012
+#
+# Improve performance by 15-20%. Note about "rules of engagement"
+# above. Contemporary cores are equipped with additional shifter,
+# so that they should perform even better than below, presumably
+# by ~10%.
+#
+######################################################################
+# Current performance in cycles per processed byte for Itanium 2
+# pre-9000 series [little-endian] system:
+#
+# SHA1(*)	5.7
+# SHA256	12.6
+# SHA512	6.7
+#
+# (*) SHA1 result is presented purely for reference purposes.
+#
+# To generate code, pass the file name with either 256 or 512 in its
+# name and compiler flags.
+
+$output=pop;
+
+if ($output =~ /512.*\.[s|asm]/) {
+	$SZ=8;
+	$BITS=8*$SZ;
+	$LDW="ld8";
+	$STW="st8";
+	$ADD="add";
+	$SHRU="shr.u";
+	$TABLE="K512";
+	$func="sha512_block_data_order";
+	@Sigma0=(28,34,39);
+	@Sigma1=(14,18,41);
+	@sigma0=(1,  8, 7);
+	@sigma1=(19,61, 6);
+	$rounds=80;
+} elsif ($output =~ /256.*\.[s|asm]/) {
+	$SZ=4;
+	$BITS=8*$SZ;
+	$LDW="ld4";
+	$STW="st4";
+	$ADD="padd4";
+	$SHRU="pshr4.u";
+	$TABLE="K256";
+	$func="sha256_block_data_order";
+	@Sigma0=( 2,13,22);
+	@Sigma1=( 6,11,25);
+	@sigma0=( 7,18, 3);
+	@sigma1=(17,19,10);
+	$rounds=64;
+} else { die "nonsense $output"; }
+
+open STDOUT,">$output" || die "can't open $output: $!";
+
+if ($^O eq "hpux") {
+    $ADDP="addp4";
+    for (@ARGV) { $ADDP="add" if (/[\+DD|\-mlp]64/); }
+} else { $ADDP="add"; }
+for (@ARGV)  {	$big_endian=1 if (/\-DB_ENDIAN/);
+		$big_endian=0 if (/\-DL_ENDIAN/);  }
+if (!defined($big_endian))
+             {	$big_endian=(unpack('L',pack('N',1))==1);  }
+
+$code=<<___;
+.ident  \"$output, version 2.0\"
+.ident  \"IA-64 ISA artwork by Andy Polyakov <appro\@openssl.org>\"
+.explicit
+.text
+
+pfssave=r2;
+lcsave=r3;
+prsave=r14;
+K=r15;
+A_=r16; B_=r17; C_=r18; D_=r19;
+E_=r20; F_=r21; G_=r22; H_=r23;
+T1=r24;	T2=r25;
+s0=r26;	s1=r27;	t0=r28;	t1=r29;
+Ktbl=r30;
+ctx=r31;	// 1st arg
+input=r56;	// 2nd arg
+num=r57;	// 3rd arg
+sgm0=r58;	sgm1=r59;	// small constants
+
+// void $func (SHA_CTX *ctx, const void *in,size_t num[,int host])
+.global	$func#
+.proc	$func#
+.align	32
+.skip	16
+$func:
+	.prologue
+	.save	ar.pfs,pfssave
+{ .mmi;	alloc	pfssave=ar.pfs,3,25,0,24
+	$ADDP	ctx=0,r32		// 1st arg
+	.save	ar.lc,lcsave
+	mov	lcsave=ar.lc	}
+{ .mmi;	$ADDP	input=0,r33		// 2nd arg
+	mov	num=r34			// 3rd arg
+	.save	pr,prsave
+	mov	prsave=pr	};;
+
+	.body
+{ .mib;	add	r8=0*$SZ,ctx
+	add	r9=1*$SZ,ctx	}
+{ .mib;	add	r10=2*$SZ,ctx
+	add	r11=3*$SZ,ctx	};;
+
+// load A-H
+.Lpic_point:
+{ .mmi;	$LDW	A_=[r8],4*$SZ
+	$LDW	B_=[r9],4*$SZ
+	mov	Ktbl=ip		}
+{ .mmi;	$LDW	C_=[r10],4*$SZ
+	$LDW	D_=[r11],4*$SZ
+	mov	sgm0=$sigma0[2]	};;
+{ .mmi;	$LDW	E_=[r8]
+	$LDW	F_=[r9]
+	add	Ktbl=($TABLE#-.Lpic_point),Ktbl		}
+{ .mmi;	$LDW	G_=[r10]
+	$LDW	H_=[r11]
+	cmp.ne	p0,p16=0,r0	};;
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($BITS==64);
+{ .mii;	and	r8=7,input
+	and	input=~7,input;;
+	cmp.eq	p9,p0=1,r8	}
+{ .mmi;	cmp.eq	p10,p0=2,r8
+	cmp.eq	p11,p0=3,r8
+	cmp.eq	p12,p0=4,r8	}
+{ .mmi;	cmp.eq	p13,p0=5,r8
+	cmp.eq	p14,p0=6,r8
+	cmp.eq	p15,p0=7,r8	};;
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+.L_outer:
+.rotr	R[8],X[16]
+A=R[0]; B=R[1]; C=R[2]; D=R[3]; E=R[4]; F=R[5]; G=R[6]; H=R[7]
+{ .mmi;	ld1	X[15]=[input],$SZ		// eliminated in sha512
+	mov	A=A_
+	mov	ar.lc=14	}
+{ .mmi;	mov	B=B_
+	mov	C=C_
+	mov	D=D_		}
+{ .mmi;	mov	E=E_
+	mov	F=F_
+	mov	ar.ec=2		};;
+{ .mmi;	mov	G=G_
+	mov	H=H_
+	mov	sgm1=$sigma1[2]	}
+{ .mib;	mov	r8=0
+	add	r9=1-$SZ,input
+	brp.loop.imp	.L_first16,.L_first16_end-16	};;
+___
+$t0="A", $t1="E", $code.=<<___ if ($BITS==64);
+// in sha512 case I load whole X[16] at once and take care of alignment...
+{ .mmi;	add	r8=1*$SZ,input
+	add	r9=2*$SZ,input
+	add	r10=3*$SZ,input		};;
+{ .mmb;	$LDW	X[15]=[input],4*$SZ
+	$LDW	X[14]=[r8],4*$SZ
+(p9)	br.cond.dpnt.many	.L1byte	};;
+{ .mmb;	$LDW	X[13]=[r9],4*$SZ
+	$LDW	X[12]=[r10],4*$SZ
+(p10)	br.cond.dpnt.many	.L2byte	};;
+{ .mmb;	$LDW	X[11]=[input],4*$SZ
+	$LDW	X[10]=[r8],4*$SZ
+(p11)	br.cond.dpnt.many	.L3byte	};;
+{ .mmb;	$LDW	X[ 9]=[r9],4*$SZ
+	$LDW	X[ 8]=[r10],4*$SZ
+(p12)	br.cond.dpnt.many	.L4byte	};;
+{ .mmb;	$LDW	X[ 7]=[input],4*$SZ
+	$LDW	X[ 6]=[r8],4*$SZ
+(p13)	br.cond.dpnt.many	.L5byte	};;
+{ .mmb;	$LDW	X[ 5]=[r9],4*$SZ
+	$LDW	X[ 4]=[r10],4*$SZ
+(p14)	br.cond.dpnt.many	.L6byte	};;
+{ .mmb;	$LDW	X[ 3]=[input],4*$SZ
+	$LDW	X[ 2]=[r8],4*$SZ
+(p15)	br.cond.dpnt.many	.L7byte	};;
+{ .mmb;	$LDW	X[ 1]=[r9],4*$SZ
+	$LDW	X[ 0]=[r10],4*$SZ	}
+{ .mib;	mov	r8=0
+	mux1	X[15]=X[15],\@rev		// eliminated on big-endian
+	br.many	.L_first16		};;
+.L1byte:
+{ .mmi;	$LDW	X[13]=[r9],4*$SZ
+	$LDW	X[12]=[r10],4*$SZ
+	shrp	X[15]=X[15],X[14],56	};;
+{ .mmi;	$LDW	X[11]=[input],4*$SZ
+	$LDW	X[10]=[r8],4*$SZ
+	shrp	X[14]=X[14],X[13],56	}
+{ .mmi;	$LDW	X[ 9]=[r9],4*$SZ
+	$LDW	X[ 8]=[r10],4*$SZ
+	shrp	X[13]=X[13],X[12],56	};;
+{ .mmi;	$LDW	X[ 7]=[input],4*$SZ
+	$LDW	X[ 6]=[r8],4*$SZ
+	shrp	X[12]=X[12],X[11],56	}
+{ .mmi;	$LDW	X[ 5]=[r9],4*$SZ
+	$LDW	X[ 4]=[r10],4*$SZ
+	shrp	X[11]=X[11],X[10],56	};;
+{ .mmi;	$LDW	X[ 3]=[input],4*$SZ
+	$LDW	X[ 2]=[r8],4*$SZ
+	shrp	X[10]=X[10],X[ 9],56	}
+{ .mmi;	$LDW	X[ 1]=[r9],4*$SZ
+	$LDW	X[ 0]=[r10],4*$SZ
+	shrp	X[ 9]=X[ 9],X[ 8],56	};;
+{ .mii;	$LDW	T1=[input]
+	shrp	X[ 8]=X[ 8],X[ 7],56
+	shrp	X[ 7]=X[ 7],X[ 6],56	}
+{ .mii;	shrp	X[ 6]=X[ 6],X[ 5],56
+	shrp	X[ 5]=X[ 5],X[ 4],56	};;
+{ .mii;	shrp	X[ 4]=X[ 4],X[ 3],56
+	shrp	X[ 3]=X[ 3],X[ 2],56	}
+{ .mii;	shrp	X[ 2]=X[ 2],X[ 1],56
+	shrp	X[ 1]=X[ 1],X[ 0],56	}
+{ .mib;	shrp	X[ 0]=X[ 0],T1,56	}
+{ .mib;	mov	r8=0
+	mux1	X[15]=X[15],\@rev		// eliminated on big-endian
+	br.many	.L_first16		};;
+.L2byte:
+{ .mmi;	$LDW	X[11]=[input],4*$SZ
+	$LDW	X[10]=[r8],4*$SZ
+	shrp	X[15]=X[15],X[14],48	}
+{ .mmi;	$LDW	X[ 9]=[r9],4*$SZ
+	$LDW	X[ 8]=[r10],4*$SZ
+	shrp	X[14]=X[14],X[13],48	};;
+{ .mmi;	$LDW	X[ 7]=[input],4*$SZ
+	$LDW	X[ 6]=[r8],4*$SZ
+	shrp	X[13]=X[13],X[12],48	}
+{ .mmi;	$LDW	X[ 5]=[r9],4*$SZ
+	$LDW	X[ 4]=[r10],4*$SZ
+	shrp	X[12]=X[12],X[11],48	};;
+{ .mmi;	$LDW	X[ 3]=[input],4*$SZ
+	$LDW	X[ 2]=[r8],4*$SZ
+	shrp	X[11]=X[11],X[10],48	}
+{ .mmi;	$LDW	X[ 1]=[r9],4*$SZ
+	$LDW	X[ 0]=[r10],4*$SZ
+	shrp	X[10]=X[10],X[ 9],48	};;
+{ .mii;	$LDW	T1=[input]
+	shrp	X[ 9]=X[ 9],X[ 8],48
+	shrp	X[ 8]=X[ 8],X[ 7],48	}
+{ .mii;	shrp	X[ 7]=X[ 7],X[ 6],48
+	shrp	X[ 6]=X[ 6],X[ 5],48	};;
+{ .mii;	shrp	X[ 5]=X[ 5],X[ 4],48
+	shrp	X[ 4]=X[ 4],X[ 3],48	}
+{ .mii;	shrp	X[ 3]=X[ 3],X[ 2],48
+	shrp	X[ 2]=X[ 2],X[ 1],48	}
+{ .mii;	shrp	X[ 1]=X[ 1],X[ 0],48
+	shrp	X[ 0]=X[ 0],T1,48	}
+{ .mib;	mov	r8=0
+	mux1	X[15]=X[15],\@rev		// eliminated on big-endian
+	br.many	.L_first16		};;
+.L3byte:
+{ .mmi;	$LDW	X[ 9]=[r9],4*$SZ
+	$LDW	X[ 8]=[r10],4*$SZ
+	shrp	X[15]=X[15],X[14],40	};;
+{ .mmi;	$LDW	X[ 7]=[input],4*$SZ
+	$LDW	X[ 6]=[r8],4*$SZ
+	shrp	X[14]=X[14],X[13],40	}
+{ .mmi;	$LDW	X[ 5]=[r9],4*$SZ
+	$LDW	X[ 4]=[r10],4*$SZ
+	shrp	X[13]=X[13],X[12],40	};;
+{ .mmi;	$LDW	X[ 3]=[input],4*$SZ
+	$LDW	X[ 2]=[r8],4*$SZ
+	shrp	X[12]=X[12],X[11],40	}
+{ .mmi;	$LDW	X[ 1]=[r9],4*$SZ
+	$LDW	X[ 0]=[r10],4*$SZ
+	shrp	X[11]=X[11],X[10],40	};;
+{ .mii;	$LDW	T1=[input]
+	shrp	X[10]=X[10],X[ 9],40
+	shrp	X[ 9]=X[ 9],X[ 8],40	}
+{ .mii;	shrp	X[ 8]=X[ 8],X[ 7],40
+	shrp	X[ 7]=X[ 7],X[ 6],40	};;
+{ .mii;	shrp	X[ 6]=X[ 6],X[ 5],40
+	shrp	X[ 5]=X[ 5],X[ 4],40	}
+{ .mii;	shrp	X[ 4]=X[ 4],X[ 3],40
+	shrp	X[ 3]=X[ 3],X[ 2],40	}
+{ .mii;	shrp	X[ 2]=X[ 2],X[ 1],40
+	shrp	X[ 1]=X[ 1],X[ 0],40	}
+{ .mib;	shrp	X[ 0]=X[ 0],T1,40	}
+{ .mib;	mov	r8=0
+	mux1	X[15]=X[15],\@rev		// eliminated on big-endian
+	br.many	.L_first16		};;
+.L4byte:
+{ .mmi;	$LDW	X[ 7]=[input],4*$SZ
+	$LDW	X[ 6]=[r8],4*$SZ
+	shrp	X[15]=X[15],X[14],32	}
+{ .mmi;	$LDW	X[ 5]=[r9],4*$SZ
+	$LDW	X[ 4]=[r10],4*$SZ
+	shrp	X[14]=X[14],X[13],32	};;
+{ .mmi;	$LDW	X[ 3]=[input],4*$SZ
+	$LDW	X[ 2]=[r8],4*$SZ
+	shrp	X[13]=X[13],X[12],32	}
+{ .mmi;	$LDW	X[ 1]=[r9],4*$SZ
+	$LDW	X[ 0]=[r10],4*$SZ
+	shrp	X[12]=X[12],X[11],32	};;
+{ .mii;	$LDW	T1=[input]
+	shrp	X[11]=X[11],X[10],32
+	shrp	X[10]=X[10],X[ 9],32	}
+{ .mii;	shrp	X[ 9]=X[ 9],X[ 8],32
+	shrp	X[ 8]=X[ 8],X[ 7],32	};;
+{ .mii;	shrp	X[ 7]=X[ 7],X[ 6],32
+	shrp	X[ 6]=X[ 6],X[ 5],32	}
+{ .mii;	shrp	X[ 5]=X[ 5],X[ 4],32
+	shrp	X[ 4]=X[ 4],X[ 3],32	}
+{ .mii;	shrp	X[ 3]=X[ 3],X[ 2],32
+	shrp	X[ 2]=X[ 2],X[ 1],32	}
+{ .mii;	shrp	X[ 1]=X[ 1],X[ 0],32
+	shrp	X[ 0]=X[ 0],T1,32	}
+{ .mib;	mov	r8=0
+	mux1	X[15]=X[15],\@rev		// eliminated on big-endian
+	br.many	.L_first16		};;
+.L5byte:
+{ .mmi;	$LDW	X[ 5]=[r9],4*$SZ
+	$LDW	X[ 4]=[r10],4*$SZ
+	shrp	X[15]=X[15],X[14],24	};;
+{ .mmi;	$LDW	X[ 3]=[input],4*$SZ
+	$LDW	X[ 2]=[r8],4*$SZ
+	shrp	X[14]=X[14],X[13],24	}
+{ .mmi;	$LDW	X[ 1]=[r9],4*$SZ
+	$LDW	X[ 0]=[r10],4*$SZ
+	shrp	X[13]=X[13],X[12],24	};;
+{ .mii;	$LDW	T1=[input]
+	shrp	X[12]=X[12],X[11],24
+	shrp	X[11]=X[11],X[10],24	}
+{ .mii;	shrp	X[10]=X[10],X[ 9],24
+	shrp	X[ 9]=X[ 9],X[ 8],24	};;
+{ .mii;	shrp	X[ 8]=X[ 8],X[ 7],24
+	shrp	X[ 7]=X[ 7],X[ 6],24	}
+{ .mii;	shrp	X[ 6]=X[ 6],X[ 5],24
+	shrp	X[ 5]=X[ 5],X[ 4],24	}
+{ .mii;	shrp	X[ 4]=X[ 4],X[ 3],24
+	shrp	X[ 3]=X[ 3],X[ 2],24	}
+{ .mii;	shrp	X[ 2]=X[ 2],X[ 1],24
+	shrp	X[ 1]=X[ 1],X[ 0],24	}
+{ .mib;	shrp	X[ 0]=X[ 0],T1,24	}
+{ .mib;	mov	r8=0
+	mux1	X[15]=X[15],\@rev		// eliminated on big-endian
+	br.many	.L_first16		};;
+.L6byte:
+{ .mmi;	$LDW	X[ 3]=[input],4*$SZ
+	$LDW	X[ 2]=[r8],4*$SZ
+	shrp	X[15]=X[15],X[14],16	}
+{ .mmi;	$LDW	X[ 1]=[r9],4*$SZ
+	$LDW	X[ 0]=[r10],4*$SZ
+	shrp	X[14]=X[14],X[13],16	};;
+{ .mii;	$LDW	T1=[input]
+	shrp	X[13]=X[13],X[12],16
+	shrp	X[12]=X[12],X[11],16	}
+{ .mii;	shrp	X[11]=X[11],X[10],16
+	shrp	X[10]=X[10],X[ 9],16	};;
+{ .mii;	shrp	X[ 9]=X[ 9],X[ 8],16
+	shrp	X[ 8]=X[ 8],X[ 7],16	}
+{ .mii;	shrp	X[ 7]=X[ 7],X[ 6],16
+	shrp	X[ 6]=X[ 6],X[ 5],16	}
+{ .mii;	shrp	X[ 5]=X[ 5],X[ 4],16
+	shrp	X[ 4]=X[ 4],X[ 3],16	}
+{ .mii;	shrp	X[ 3]=X[ 3],X[ 2],16
+	shrp	X[ 2]=X[ 2],X[ 1],16	}
+{ .mii;	shrp	X[ 1]=X[ 1],X[ 0],16
+	shrp	X[ 0]=X[ 0],T1,16	}
+{ .mib;	mov	r8=0
+	mux1	X[15]=X[15],\@rev		// eliminated on big-endian
+	br.many	.L_first16		};;
+.L7byte:
+{ .mmi;	$LDW	X[ 1]=[r9],4*$SZ
+	$LDW	X[ 0]=[r10],4*$SZ
+	shrp	X[15]=X[15],X[14],8	};;
+{ .mii;	$LDW	T1=[input]
+	shrp	X[14]=X[14],X[13],8
+	shrp	X[13]=X[13],X[12],8	}
+{ .mii;	shrp	X[12]=X[12],X[11],8
+	shrp	X[11]=X[11],X[10],8	};;
+{ .mii;	shrp	X[10]=X[10],X[ 9],8
+	shrp	X[ 9]=X[ 9],X[ 8],8	}
+{ .mii;	shrp	X[ 8]=X[ 8],X[ 7],8
+	shrp	X[ 7]=X[ 7],X[ 6],8	}
+{ .mii;	shrp	X[ 6]=X[ 6],X[ 5],8
+	shrp	X[ 5]=X[ 5],X[ 4],8	}
+{ .mii;	shrp	X[ 4]=X[ 4],X[ 3],8
+	shrp	X[ 3]=X[ 3],X[ 2],8	}
+{ .mii;	shrp	X[ 2]=X[ 2],X[ 1],8
+	shrp	X[ 1]=X[ 1],X[ 0],8	}
+{ .mib;	shrp	X[ 0]=X[ 0],T1,8	}
+{ .mib;	mov	r8=0
+	mux1	X[15]=X[15],\@rev	};;	// eliminated on big-endian
+
+.align	32
+.L_first16:
+{ .mmi;		$LDW	K=[Ktbl],$SZ
+		add	A=A,r8			// H+=Sigma(0) from the past
+		_rotr	r10=$t1,$Sigma1[0]  }	// ROTR(e,14)
+{ .mmi;		and	T1=F,E
+		andcm	r8=G,E
+	(p16)	mux1	X[14]=X[14],\@rev   };;	// eliminated on big-endian
+{ .mmi;		and	T2=A,B
+		and	r9=A,C
+		_rotr	r11=$t1,$Sigma1[1]  }	// ROTR(e,41)
+{ .mmi;		xor	T1=T1,r8		// T1=((e & f) ^ (~e & g))
+		and	r8=B,C		    };;
+___
+$t0="t0", $t1="t1", $code.=<<___ if ($BITS==32);
+.align	32
+.L_first16:
+{ .mmi;		add	A=A,r8			// H+=Sigma(0) from the past
+		add	r10=2-$SZ,input
+		add	r11=3-$SZ,input	};;
+{ .mmi;		ld1	r9=[r9]
+		ld1	r10=[r10]
+		dep.z	$t1=E,32,32	}
+{ .mmi;		ld1	r11=[r11]
+		$LDW	K=[Ktbl],$SZ
+		zxt4	E=E		};;
+{ .mii;		or	$t1=$t1,E
+		dep	X[15]=X[15],r9,8,8
+		mux2	$t0=A,0x44	};;	// copy lower half to upper
+{ .mmi;		and	T1=F,E
+		andcm	r8=G,E
+		dep	r11=r10,r11,8,8	};;
+{ .mmi;		and	T2=A,B
+		and	r9=A,C
+		dep	X[15]=X[15],r11,16,16	};;
+{ .mmi;	(p16)	ld1	X[15-1]=[input],$SZ	// prefetch
+		xor	T1=T1,r8		// T1=((e & f) ^ (~e & g))
+		_rotr	r10=$t1,$Sigma1[0] }	// ROTR(e,14)
+{ .mmi;		and	r8=B,C
+		_rotr	r11=$t1,$Sigma1[1] };;	// ROTR(e,18)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+{ .mmi;		add	T1=T1,H			// T1=Ch(e,f,g)+h
+		xor	r10=r10,r11
+		_rotr	r11=$t1,$Sigma1[2]  }	// ROTR(e,41)
+{ .mmi;		xor	T2=T2,r9
+		add	K=K,X[15]	    };;
+{ .mmi;		add	T1=T1,K			// T1+=K[i]+X[i]
+		xor	T2=T2,r8		// T2=((a & b) ^ (a & c) ^ (b & c))
+		_rotr	r8=$t0,$Sigma0[0]   }	// ROTR(a,28)
+{ .mmi;		xor	r11=r11,r10		// Sigma1(e)
+		_rotr	r9=$t0,$Sigma0[1]   };;	// ROTR(a,34)
+{ .mmi;		add	T1=T1,r11		// T+=Sigma1(e)
+		xor	r8=r8,r9
+		_rotr	r9=$t0,$Sigma0[2]   };;	// ROTR(a,39)
+{ .mmi;		xor	r8=r8,r9		// Sigma0(a)
+		add	D=D,T1
+		mux2	H=X[15],0x44	    }	// mov H=X[15] in sha512
+{ .mib;	(p16)	add	r9=1-$SZ,input		// not used in sha512
+		add	X[15]=T1,T2		// H=T1+Maj(a,b,c)
+	br.ctop.sptk	.L_first16	    };;
+.L_first16_end:
+
+{ .mib;	mov	ar.lc=$rounds-17
+	brp.loop.imp	.L_rest,.L_rest_end-16		}
+{ .mib;	mov	ar.ec=1
+	br.many	.L_rest			};;
+
+.align	32
+.L_rest:
+{ .mmi;		$LDW	K=[Ktbl],$SZ
+		add	A=A,r8			// H+=Sigma0(a) from the past
+		_rotr	r8=X[15-1],$sigma0[0] }	// ROTR(s0,1)
+{ .mmi; 	add	X[15]=X[15],X[15-9]	// X[i&0xF]+=X[(i+9)&0xF]
+		$SHRU	s0=X[15-1],sgm0	    };;	// s0=X[(i+1)&0xF]>>7
+{ .mib;		and	T1=F,E
+		_rotr	r9=X[15-1],$sigma0[1] }	// ROTR(s0,8)
+{ .mib;		andcm	r10=G,E
+		$SHRU	s1=X[15-14],sgm1    };;	// s1=X[(i+14)&0xF]>>6
+// Pair of mmi; splits on Itanium 1 and prevents pipeline flush
+// upon $SHRU output usage
+{ .mmi;		xor	T1=T1,r10		// T1=((e & f) ^ (~e & g))
+		xor	r9=r8,r9
+		_rotr	r10=X[15-14],$sigma1[0] }// ROTR(s1,19)
+{ .mmi;		and	T2=A,B
+		and	r8=A,C
+		_rotr	r11=X[15-14],$sigma1[1] };;// ROTR(s1,61)
+___
+$t0="t0", $t1="t1", $code.=<<___ if ($BITS==32);
+{ .mib;		xor	s0=s0,r9		// s0=sigma0(X[(i+1)&0xF])
+		dep.z	$t1=E,32,32	    }
+{ .mib;		xor	r10=r11,r10
+		zxt4	E=E		    };;
+{ .mii;		xor	s1=s1,r10		// s1=sigma1(X[(i+14)&0xF])
+		shrp	r9=E,$t1,32+$Sigma1[0]	// ROTR(e,14)
+		mux2	$t0=A,0x44	    };;	// copy lower half to upper
+// Pair of mmi; splits on Itanium 1 and prevents pipeline flush
+// upon mux2 output usage
+{ .mmi;		xor	T2=T2,r8
+		shrp	r8=E,$t1,32+$Sigma1[1]}	// ROTR(e,18)
+{ .mmi;		and	r10=B,C
+		add	T1=T1,H			// T1=Ch(e,f,g)+h
+		or	$t1=$t1,E   	    };;
+___
+$t0="A", $t1="E", $code.=<<___ if ($BITS==64);
+{ .mib;		xor	s0=s0,r9		// s0=sigma0(X[(i+1)&0xF])
+		_rotr	r9=$t1,$Sigma1[0]   }	// ROTR(e,14)
+{ .mib;		xor	r10=r11,r10
+		xor	T2=T2,r8	    };;
+{ .mib;		xor	s1=s1,r10		// s1=sigma1(X[(i+14)&0xF])
+		_rotr	r8=$t1,$Sigma1[1]   }	// ROTR(e,18)
+{ .mib;		and	r10=B,C
+		add	T1=T1,H		    };;	// T1+=H
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+{ .mib;		xor	r9=r9,r8
+		_rotr	r8=$t1,$Sigma1[2]   }	// ROTR(e,41)
+{ .mib;		xor	T2=T2,r10		// T2=((a & b) ^ (a & c) ^ (b & c))
+		add	X[15]=X[15],s0	    };;	// X[i]+=sigma0(X[i+1])
+{ .mmi;		xor	r9=r9,r8		// Sigma1(e)
+		add	X[15]=X[15],s1		// X[i]+=sigma0(X[i+14])
+		_rotr	r8=$t0,$Sigma0[0]   };;	// ROTR(a,28)
+{ .mmi;		add	K=K,X[15]
+		add	T1=T1,r9		// T1+=Sigma1(e)
+		_rotr	r9=$t0,$Sigma0[1]   };;	// ROTR(a,34)
+{ .mmi;		add	T1=T1,K			// T1+=K[i]+X[i]
+		xor	r8=r8,r9
+		_rotr	r9=$t0,$Sigma0[2]   };;	// ROTR(a,39)
+{ .mib;		add	D=D,T1
+		mux2	H=X[15],0x44	    }	// mov H=X[15] in sha512
+{ .mib;		xor	r8=r8,r9		// Sigma0(a)
+		add	X[15]=T1,T2		// H=T1+Maj(a,b,c)
+	br.ctop.sptk	.L_rest		    };;
+.L_rest_end:
+
+{ .mmi;	add	A=A,r8			};;	// H+=Sigma0(a) from the past
+{ .mmi;	add	A_=A_,A
+	add	B_=B_,B
+	add	C_=C_,C			}
+{ .mmi;	add	D_=D_,D
+	add	E_=E_,E
+	cmp.ltu	p16,p0=1,num		};;
+{ .mmi;	add	F_=F_,F
+	add	G_=G_,G
+	add	H_=H_,H			}
+{ .mmb;	add	Ktbl=-$SZ*$rounds,Ktbl
+(p16)	add	num=-1,num
+(p16)	br.dptk.many	.L_outer	};;
+
+{ .mib;	add	r8=0*$SZ,ctx
+	add	r9=1*$SZ,ctx		}
+{ .mib;	add	r10=2*$SZ,ctx
+	add	r11=3*$SZ,ctx		};;
+{ .mmi;	$STW	[r8]=A_,4*$SZ
+	$STW	[r9]=B_,4*$SZ
+	mov	ar.lc=lcsave		}
+{ .mmi;	$STW	[r10]=C_,4*$SZ
+	$STW	[r11]=D_,4*$SZ
+	mov	pr=prsave,0x1ffff	};;
+{ .mmb;	$STW	[r8]=E_
+	$STW	[r9]=F_			}
+{ .mmb;	$STW	[r10]=G_
+	$STW	[r11]=H_
+	br.ret.sptk.many	b0	};;
+.endp	$func#
+___
+
+foreach(split($/,$code)) {
+    s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem;
+    s/_rotr(\s+)([^=]+)=([^,]+),([0-9]+)/shrp$1$2=$3,$3,$4/gm;
+    if ($BITS==64) {
+	s/mux2(\s+)([^=]+)=([^,]+),\S+/mov$1 $2=$3/gm;
+	s/mux1(\s+)\S+/nop.i$1 0x0/gm	if ($big_endian);
+	s/(shrp\s+X\[[^=]+)=([^,]+),([^,]+),([1-9]+)/$1=$3,$2,64-$4/gm
+    						if (!$big_endian);
+	s/ld1(\s+)X\[\S+/nop.m$1 0x0/gm;
+    }
+
+    print $_,"\n";
+}
+
+print<<___ if ($BITS==32);
+.align	64
+.type	K256#,\@object
+K256:	data4	0x428a2f98,0x71374491,0xb5c0fbcf,0xe9b5dba5
+	data4	0x3956c25b,0x59f111f1,0x923f82a4,0xab1c5ed5
+	data4	0xd807aa98,0x12835b01,0x243185be,0x550c7dc3
+	data4	0x72be5d74,0x80deb1fe,0x9bdc06a7,0xc19bf174
+	data4	0xe49b69c1,0xefbe4786,0x0fc19dc6,0x240ca1cc
+	data4	0x2de92c6f,0x4a7484aa,0x5cb0a9dc,0x76f988da
+	data4	0x983e5152,0xa831c66d,0xb00327c8,0xbf597fc7
+	data4	0xc6e00bf3,0xd5a79147,0x06ca6351,0x14292967
+	data4	0x27b70a85,0x2e1b2138,0x4d2c6dfc,0x53380d13
+	data4	0x650a7354,0x766a0abb,0x81c2c92e,0x92722c85
+	data4	0xa2bfe8a1,0xa81a664b,0xc24b8b70,0xc76c51a3
+	data4	0xd192e819,0xd6990624,0xf40e3585,0x106aa070
+	data4	0x19a4c116,0x1e376c08,0x2748774c,0x34b0bcb5
+	data4	0x391c0cb3,0x4ed8aa4a,0x5b9cca4f,0x682e6ff3
+	data4	0x748f82ee,0x78a5636f,0x84c87814,0x8cc70208
+	data4	0x90befffa,0xa4506ceb,0xbef9a3f7,0xc67178f2
+.size	K256#,$SZ*$rounds
+stringz	"SHA256 block transform for IA64, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+___
+print<<___ if ($BITS==64);
+.align	64
+.type	K512#,\@object
+K512:	data8	0x428a2f98d728ae22,0x7137449123ef65cd
+	data8	0xb5c0fbcfec4d3b2f,0xe9b5dba58189dbbc
+	data8	0x3956c25bf348b538,0x59f111f1b605d019
+	data8	0x923f82a4af194f9b,0xab1c5ed5da6d8118
+	data8	0xd807aa98a3030242,0x12835b0145706fbe
+	data8	0x243185be4ee4b28c,0x550c7dc3d5ffb4e2
+	data8	0x72be5d74f27b896f,0x80deb1fe3b1696b1
+	data8	0x9bdc06a725c71235,0xc19bf174cf692694
+	data8	0xe49b69c19ef14ad2,0xefbe4786384f25e3
+	data8	0x0fc19dc68b8cd5b5,0x240ca1cc77ac9c65
+	data8	0x2de92c6f592b0275,0x4a7484aa6ea6e483
+	data8	0x5cb0a9dcbd41fbd4,0x76f988da831153b5
+	data8	0x983e5152ee66dfab,0xa831c66d2db43210
+	data8	0xb00327c898fb213f,0xbf597fc7beef0ee4
+	data8	0xc6e00bf33da88fc2,0xd5a79147930aa725
+	data8	0x06ca6351e003826f,0x142929670a0e6e70
+	data8	0x27b70a8546d22ffc,0x2e1b21385c26c926
+	data8	0x4d2c6dfc5ac42aed,0x53380d139d95b3df
+	data8	0x650a73548baf63de,0x766a0abb3c77b2a8
+	data8	0x81c2c92e47edaee6,0x92722c851482353b
+	data8	0xa2bfe8a14cf10364,0xa81a664bbc423001
+	data8	0xc24b8b70d0f89791,0xc76c51a30654be30
+	data8	0xd192e819d6ef5218,0xd69906245565a910
+	data8	0xf40e35855771202a,0x106aa07032bbd1b8
+	data8	0x19a4c116b8d2d0c8,0x1e376c085141ab53
+	data8	0x2748774cdf8eeb99,0x34b0bcb5e19b48a8
+	data8	0x391c0cb3c5c95a63,0x4ed8aa4ae3418acb
+	data8	0x5b9cca4f7763e373,0x682e6ff3d6b2b8a3
+	data8	0x748f82ee5defb2fc,0x78a5636f43172f60
+	data8	0x84c87814a1f0ab72,0x8cc702081a6439ec
+	data8	0x90befffa23631e28,0xa4506cebde82bde9
+	data8	0xbef9a3f7b2c67915,0xc67178f2e372532b
+	data8	0xca273eceea26619c,0xd186b8c721c0c207
+	data8	0xeada7dd6cde0eb1e,0xf57d4f7fee6ed178
+	data8	0x06f067aa72176fba,0x0a637dc5a2c898a6
+	data8	0x113f9804bef90dae,0x1b710b35131c471b
+	data8	0x28db77f523047d84,0x32caab7b40c72493
+	data8	0x3c9ebe0a15c9bebc,0x431d67c49c100d4c
+	data8	0x4cc5d4becb3e42b6,0x597f299cfc657e2a
+	data8	0x5fcb6fab3ad6faec,0x6c44198c4a475817
+.size	K512#,$SZ*$rounds
+stringz	"SHA512 block transform for IA64, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+___
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-mips.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-mips.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5c2d23f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-mips.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,519 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2010-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+
+# SHA2 block procedures for MIPS.
+
+# October 2010.
+#
+# SHA256 performance improvement on MIPS R5000 CPU is ~27% over gcc-
+# generated code in o32 build and ~55% in n32/64 build. SHA512 [which
+# for now can only be compiled for MIPS64 ISA] improvement is modest
+# ~17%, but it comes for free, because it's same instruction sequence.
+# Improvement coefficients are for aligned input.
+
+# September 2012.
+#
+# Add MIPS[32|64]R2 code (>25% less instructions).
+
+######################################################################
+# There is a number of MIPS ABI in use, O32 and N32/64 are most
+# widely used. Then there is a new contender: NUBI. It appears that if
+# one picks the latter, it's possible to arrange code in ABI neutral
+# manner. Therefore let's stick to NUBI register layout:
+#
+($zero,$at,$t0,$t1,$t2)=map("\$$_",(0..2,24,25));
+($a0,$a1,$a2,$a3,$a4,$a5,$a6,$a7)=map("\$$_",(4..11));
+($s0,$s1,$s2,$s3,$s4,$s5,$s6,$s7,$s8,$s9,$s10,$s11)=map("\$$_",(12..23));
+($gp,$tp,$sp,$fp,$ra)=map("\$$_",(3,28..31));
+#
+# The return value is placed in $a0. Following coding rules facilitate
+# interoperability:
+#
+# - never ever touch $tp, "thread pointer", former $gp [o32 can be
+#   excluded from the rule, because it's specified volatile];
+# - copy return value to $t0, former $v0 [or to $a0 if you're adapting
+#   old code];
+# - on O32 populate $a4-$a7 with 'lw $aN,4*N($sp)' if necessary;
+#
+# For reference here is register layout for N32/64 MIPS ABIs:
+#
+# ($zero,$at,$v0,$v1)=map("\$$_",(0..3));
+# ($a0,$a1,$a2,$a3,$a4,$a5,$a6,$a7)=map("\$$_",(4..11));
+# ($t0,$t1,$t2,$t3,$t8,$t9)=map("\$$_",(12..15,24,25));
+# ($s0,$s1,$s2,$s3,$s4,$s5,$s6,$s7)=map("\$$_",(16..23));
+# ($gp,$sp,$fp,$ra)=map("\$$_",(28..31));
+#
+$flavour = shift || "o32"; # supported flavours are o32,n32,64,nubi32,nubi64
+
+if ($flavour =~ /64|n32/i) {
+	$PTR_LA="dla";
+	$PTR_ADD="dadd";	# incidentally works even on n32
+	$PTR_SUB="dsub";	# incidentally works even on n32
+	$REG_S="sd";
+	$REG_L="ld";
+	$PTR_SLL="dsll";	# incidentally works even on n32
+	$SZREG=8;
+} else {
+	$PTR_LA="la";
+	$PTR_ADD="add";
+	$PTR_SUB="sub";
+	$REG_S="sw";
+	$REG_L="lw";
+	$PTR_SLL="sll";
+	$SZREG=4;
+}
+$pf = ($flavour =~ /nubi/i) ? $t0 : $t2;
+#
+# <appro@openssl.org>
+#
+######################################################################
+
+$big_endian=(`echo MIPSEL | $ENV{CC} -E -`=~/MIPSEL/)?1:0 if ($ENV{CC});
+
+for (@ARGV) {	$output=$_ if (/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/);	}
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+if (!defined($big_endian)) { $big_endian=(unpack('L',pack('N',1))==1); }
+
+if ($output =~ /512/) {
+	$label="512";
+	$SZ=8;
+	$LD="ld";		# load from memory
+	$ST="sd";		# store to memory
+	$SLL="dsll";		# shift left logical
+	$SRL="dsrl";		# shift right logical
+	$ADDU="daddu";
+	$ROTR="drotr";
+	@Sigma0=(28,34,39);
+	@Sigma1=(14,18,41);
+	@sigma0=( 7, 1, 8);	# right shift first
+	@sigma1=( 6,19,61);	# right shift first
+	$lastK=0x817;
+	$rounds=80;
+} else {
+	$label="256";
+	$SZ=4;
+	$LD="lw";		# load from memory
+	$ST="sw";		# store to memory
+	$SLL="sll";		# shift left logical
+	$SRL="srl";		# shift right logical
+	$ADDU="addu";
+	$ROTR="rotr";
+	@Sigma0=( 2,13,22);
+	@Sigma1=( 6,11,25);
+	@sigma0=( 3, 7,18);	# right shift first
+	@sigma1=(10,17,19);	# right shift first
+	$lastK=0x8f2;
+	$rounds=64;
+}
+
+$MSB = $big_endian ? 0 : ($SZ-1);
+$LSB = ($SZ-1)&~$MSB;
+
+@V=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$F,$G,$H)=map("\$$_",(1,2,3,7,24,25,30,31));
+@X=map("\$$_",(8..23));
+
+$ctx=$a0;
+$inp=$a1;
+$len=$a2;	$Ktbl=$len;
+
+sub BODY_00_15 {
+my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f,$g,$h)=@_;
+my ($T1,$tmp0,$tmp1,$tmp2)=(@X[4],@X[5],@X[6],@X[7]);
+
+$code.=<<___ if ($i<15);
+	${LD}l	@X[1],`($i+1)*$SZ+$MSB`($inp)
+	${LD}r	@X[1],`($i+1)*$SZ+$LSB`($inp)
+___
+$code.=<<___	if (!$big_endian && $i<16 && $SZ==4);
+#if defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS32R2) || defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS64R2)
+	wsbh	@X[0],@X[0]		# byte swap($i)
+	rotr	@X[0],@X[0],16
+#else
+	srl	$tmp0,@X[0],24		# byte swap($i)
+	srl	$tmp1,@X[0],8
+	andi	$tmp2,@X[0],0xFF00
+	sll	@X[0],@X[0],24
+	andi	$tmp1,0xFF00
+	sll	$tmp2,$tmp2,8
+	or	@X[0],$tmp0
+	or	$tmp1,$tmp2
+	or	@X[0],$tmp1
+#endif
+___
+$code.=<<___	if (!$big_endian && $i<16 && $SZ==8);
+#if defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS64R2)
+	dsbh	@X[0],@X[0]		# byte swap($i)
+	dshd	@X[0],@X[0]
+#else
+	ori	$tmp0,$zero,0xFF
+	dsll	$tmp2,$tmp0,32
+	or	$tmp0,$tmp2		# 0x000000FF000000FF
+	and	$tmp1,@X[0],$tmp0	# byte swap($i)
+	dsrl	$tmp2,@X[0],24
+	dsll	$tmp1,24
+	and	$tmp2,$tmp0
+	dsll	$tmp0,8			# 0x0000FF000000FF00
+	or	$tmp1,$tmp2
+	and	$tmp2,@X[0],$tmp0
+	dsrl	@X[0],8
+	dsll	$tmp2,8
+	and	@X[0],$tmp0
+	or	$tmp1,$tmp2
+	or	@X[0],$tmp1
+	dsrl	$tmp1,@X[0],32
+	dsll	@X[0],32
+	or	@X[0],$tmp1
+#endif
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+#if defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS32R2) || defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS64R2)
+	xor	$tmp2,$f,$g			# $i
+	$ROTR	$tmp0,$e,@Sigma1[0]
+	$ADDU	$T1,$X[0],$h
+	$ROTR	$tmp1,$e,@Sigma1[1]
+	and	$tmp2,$e
+	$ROTR	$h,$e,@Sigma1[2]
+	xor	$tmp0,$tmp1
+	$ROTR	$tmp1,$a,@Sigma0[0]
+	xor	$tmp2,$g			# Ch(e,f,g)
+	xor	$tmp0,$h			# Sigma1(e)
+
+	$ROTR	$h,$a,@Sigma0[1]
+	$ADDU	$T1,$tmp2
+	$LD	$tmp2,`$i*$SZ`($Ktbl)		# K[$i]
+	xor	$h,$tmp1
+	$ROTR	$tmp1,$a,@Sigma0[2]
+	$ADDU	$T1,$tmp0
+	and	$tmp0,$b,$c
+	xor	$h,$tmp1			# Sigma0(a)
+	xor	$tmp1,$b,$c
+#else
+	$ADDU	$T1,$X[0],$h			# $i
+	$SRL	$h,$e,@Sigma1[0]
+	xor	$tmp2,$f,$g
+	$SLL	$tmp1,$e,`$SZ*8-@Sigma1[2]`
+	and	$tmp2,$e
+	$SRL	$tmp0,$e,@Sigma1[1]
+	xor	$h,$tmp1
+	$SLL	$tmp1,$e,`$SZ*8-@Sigma1[1]`
+	xor	$h,$tmp0
+	$SRL	$tmp0,$e,@Sigma1[2]
+	xor	$h,$tmp1
+	$SLL	$tmp1,$e,`$SZ*8-@Sigma1[0]`
+	xor	$h,$tmp0
+	xor	$tmp2,$g			# Ch(e,f,g)
+	xor	$tmp0,$tmp1,$h			# Sigma1(e)
+
+	$SRL	$h,$a,@Sigma0[0]
+	$ADDU	$T1,$tmp2
+	$LD	$tmp2,`$i*$SZ`($Ktbl)		# K[$i]
+	$SLL	$tmp1,$a,`$SZ*8-@Sigma0[2]`
+	$ADDU	$T1,$tmp0
+	$SRL	$tmp0,$a,@Sigma0[1]
+	xor	$h,$tmp1
+	$SLL	$tmp1,$a,`$SZ*8-@Sigma0[1]`
+	xor	$h,$tmp0
+	$SRL	$tmp0,$a,@Sigma0[2]
+	xor	$h,$tmp1
+	$SLL	$tmp1,$a,`$SZ*8-@Sigma0[0]`
+	xor	$h,$tmp0
+	and	$tmp0,$b,$c
+	xor	$h,$tmp1			# Sigma0(a)
+	xor	$tmp1,$b,$c
+#endif
+	$ST	@X[0],`($i%16)*$SZ`($sp)	# offload to ring buffer
+	$ADDU	$h,$tmp0
+	and	$tmp1,$a
+	$ADDU	$T1,$tmp2			# +=K[$i]
+	$ADDU	$h,$tmp1			# +=Maj(a,b,c)
+	$ADDU	$d,$T1
+	$ADDU	$h,$T1
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i>=13);
+	$LD	@X[3],`(($i+3)%16)*$SZ`($sp)	# prefetch from ring buffer
+___
+}
+
+sub BODY_16_XX {
+my $i=@_[0];
+my ($tmp0,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3)=(@X[4],@X[5],@X[6],@X[7]);
+
+$code.=<<___;
+#if defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS32R2) || defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS64R2)
+	$SRL	$tmp2,@X[1],@sigma0[0]		# Xupdate($i)
+	$ROTR	$tmp0,@X[1],@sigma0[1]
+	$ADDU	@X[0],@X[9]			# +=X[i+9]
+	xor	$tmp2,$tmp0
+	$ROTR	$tmp0,@X[1],@sigma0[2]
+
+	$SRL	$tmp3,@X[14],@sigma1[0]
+	$ROTR	$tmp1,@X[14],@sigma1[1]
+	xor	$tmp2,$tmp0			# sigma0(X[i+1])
+	$ROTR	$tmp0,@X[14],@sigma1[2]
+	xor	$tmp3,$tmp1
+	$ADDU	@X[0],$tmp2
+#else
+	$SRL	$tmp2,@X[1],@sigma0[0]		# Xupdate($i)
+	$ADDU	@X[0],@X[9]			# +=X[i+9]
+	$SLL	$tmp1,@X[1],`$SZ*8-@sigma0[2]`
+	$SRL	$tmp0,@X[1],@sigma0[1]
+	xor	$tmp2,$tmp1
+	$SLL	$tmp1,`@sigma0[2]-@sigma0[1]`
+	xor	$tmp2,$tmp0
+	$SRL	$tmp0,@X[1],@sigma0[2]
+	xor	$tmp2,$tmp1
+
+	$SRL	$tmp3,@X[14],@sigma1[0]
+	xor	$tmp2,$tmp0			# sigma0(X[i+1])
+	$SLL	$tmp1,@X[14],`$SZ*8-@sigma1[2]`
+	$ADDU	@X[0],$tmp2
+	$SRL	$tmp0,@X[14],@sigma1[1]
+	xor	$tmp3,$tmp1
+	$SLL	$tmp1,`@sigma1[2]-@sigma1[1]`
+	xor	$tmp3,$tmp0
+	$SRL	$tmp0,@X[14],@sigma1[2]
+	xor	$tmp3,$tmp1
+#endif
+	xor	$tmp3,$tmp0			# sigma1(X[i+14])
+	$ADDU	@X[0],$tmp3
+___
+	&BODY_00_15(@_);
+}
+
+$FRAMESIZE=16*$SZ+16*$SZREG;
+$SAVED_REGS_MASK = ($flavour =~ /nubi/i) ? "0xc0fff008" : "0xc0ff0000";
+
+$code.=<<___;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPSCANISTER
+# include <openssl/fipssyms.h>
+#endif
+
+#if defined(__mips_smartmips) && !defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS32R2)
+#define _MIPS_ARCH_MIPS32R2
+#endif
+
+.text
+.set	noat
+#if !defined(__mips_eabi) && (!defined(__vxworks) || defined(__pic__))
+.option	pic2
+#endif
+
+.align	5
+.globl	sha${label}_block_data_order
+.ent	sha${label}_block_data_order
+sha${label}_block_data_order:
+	.frame	$sp,$FRAMESIZE,$ra
+	.mask	$SAVED_REGS_MASK,-$SZREG
+	.set	noreorder
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /o32/i);	# o32 PIC-ification
+	.cpload	$pf
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	$PTR_SUB $sp,$FRAMESIZE
+	$REG_S	$ra,$FRAMESIZE-1*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$fp,$FRAMESIZE-2*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$s11,$FRAMESIZE-3*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$s10,$FRAMESIZE-4*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$s9,$FRAMESIZE-5*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$s8,$FRAMESIZE-6*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$s7,$FRAMESIZE-7*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$s6,$FRAMESIZE-8*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$s5,$FRAMESIZE-9*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$s4,$FRAMESIZE-10*$SZREG($sp)
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i);	# optimize non-nubi prologue
+	$REG_S	$s3,$FRAMESIZE-11*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$s2,$FRAMESIZE-12*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$s1,$FRAMESIZE-13*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$s0,$FRAMESIZE-14*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_S	$gp,$FRAMESIZE-15*$SZREG($sp)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	$PTR_SLL @X[15],$len,`log(16*$SZ)/log(2)`
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($flavour !~ /o32/i);	# non-o32 PIC-ification
+	.cplocal	$Ktbl
+	.cpsetup	$pf,$zero,sha${label}_block_data_order
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	.set	reorder
+	$PTR_LA	$Ktbl,K${label}		# PIC-ified 'load address'
+
+	$LD	$A,0*$SZ($ctx)		# load context
+	$LD	$B,1*$SZ($ctx)
+	$LD	$C,2*$SZ($ctx)
+	$LD	$D,3*$SZ($ctx)
+	$LD	$E,4*$SZ($ctx)
+	$LD	$F,5*$SZ($ctx)
+	$LD	$G,6*$SZ($ctx)
+	$LD	$H,7*$SZ($ctx)
+
+	$PTR_ADD @X[15],$inp		# pointer to the end of input
+	$REG_S	@X[15],16*$SZ($sp)
+	b	.Loop
+
+.align	5
+.Loop:
+	${LD}l	@X[0],$MSB($inp)
+	${LD}r	@X[0],$LSB($inp)
+___
+for ($i=0;$i<16;$i++)
+{ &BODY_00_15($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); push(@X,shift(@X)); }
+$code.=<<___;
+	b	.L16_xx
+.align	4
+.L16_xx:
+___
+for (;$i<32;$i++)
+{ &BODY_16_XX($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); push(@X,shift(@X)); }
+$code.=<<___;
+	and	@X[6],0xfff
+	li	@X[7],$lastK
+	.set	noreorder
+	bne	@X[6],@X[7],.L16_xx
+	$PTR_ADD $Ktbl,16*$SZ		# Ktbl+=16
+
+	$REG_L	@X[15],16*$SZ($sp)	# restore pointer to the end of input
+	$LD	@X[0],0*$SZ($ctx)
+	$LD	@X[1],1*$SZ($ctx)
+	$LD	@X[2],2*$SZ($ctx)
+	$PTR_ADD $inp,16*$SZ
+	$LD	@X[3],3*$SZ($ctx)
+	$ADDU	$A,@X[0]
+	$LD	@X[4],4*$SZ($ctx)
+	$ADDU	$B,@X[1]
+	$LD	@X[5],5*$SZ($ctx)
+	$ADDU	$C,@X[2]
+	$LD	@X[6],6*$SZ($ctx)
+	$ADDU	$D,@X[3]
+	$LD	@X[7],7*$SZ($ctx)
+	$ADDU	$E,@X[4]
+	$ST	$A,0*$SZ($ctx)
+	$ADDU	$F,@X[5]
+	$ST	$B,1*$SZ($ctx)
+	$ADDU	$G,@X[6]
+	$ST	$C,2*$SZ($ctx)
+	$ADDU	$H,@X[7]
+	$ST	$D,3*$SZ($ctx)
+	$ST	$E,4*$SZ($ctx)
+	$ST	$F,5*$SZ($ctx)
+	$ST	$G,6*$SZ($ctx)
+	$ST	$H,7*$SZ($ctx)
+
+	bne	$inp,@X[15],.Loop
+	$PTR_SUB $Ktbl,`($rounds-16)*$SZ`	# rewind $Ktbl
+
+	$REG_L	$ra,$FRAMESIZE-1*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$fp,$FRAMESIZE-2*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$s11,$FRAMESIZE-3*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$s10,$FRAMESIZE-4*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$s9,$FRAMESIZE-5*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$s8,$FRAMESIZE-6*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$s7,$FRAMESIZE-7*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$s6,$FRAMESIZE-8*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$s5,$FRAMESIZE-9*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$s4,$FRAMESIZE-10*$SZREG($sp)
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i);
+	$REG_L	$s3,$FRAMESIZE-11*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$s2,$FRAMESIZE-12*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$s1,$FRAMESIZE-13*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$s0,$FRAMESIZE-14*$SZREG($sp)
+	$REG_L	$gp,$FRAMESIZE-15*$SZREG($sp)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	jr	$ra
+	$PTR_ADD $sp,$FRAMESIZE
+.end	sha${label}_block_data_order
+
+.rdata
+.align	5
+K${label}:
+___
+if ($SZ==4) {
+$code.=<<___;
+	.word	0x428a2f98, 0x71374491, 0xb5c0fbcf, 0xe9b5dba5
+	.word	0x3956c25b, 0x59f111f1, 0x923f82a4, 0xab1c5ed5
+	.word	0xd807aa98, 0x12835b01, 0x243185be, 0x550c7dc3
+	.word	0x72be5d74, 0x80deb1fe, 0x9bdc06a7, 0xc19bf174
+	.word	0xe49b69c1, 0xefbe4786, 0x0fc19dc6, 0x240ca1cc
+	.word	0x2de92c6f, 0x4a7484aa, 0x5cb0a9dc, 0x76f988da
+	.word	0x983e5152, 0xa831c66d, 0xb00327c8, 0xbf597fc7
+	.word	0xc6e00bf3, 0xd5a79147, 0x06ca6351, 0x14292967
+	.word	0x27b70a85, 0x2e1b2138, 0x4d2c6dfc, 0x53380d13
+	.word	0x650a7354, 0x766a0abb, 0x81c2c92e, 0x92722c85
+	.word	0xa2bfe8a1, 0xa81a664b, 0xc24b8b70, 0xc76c51a3
+	.word	0xd192e819, 0xd6990624, 0xf40e3585, 0x106aa070
+	.word	0x19a4c116, 0x1e376c08, 0x2748774c, 0x34b0bcb5
+	.word	0x391c0cb3, 0x4ed8aa4a, 0x5b9cca4f, 0x682e6ff3
+	.word	0x748f82ee, 0x78a5636f, 0x84c87814, 0x8cc70208
+	.word	0x90befffa, 0xa4506ceb, 0xbef9a3f7, 0xc67178f2
+___
+} else {
+$code.=<<___;
+	.dword	0x428a2f98d728ae22, 0x7137449123ef65cd
+	.dword	0xb5c0fbcfec4d3b2f, 0xe9b5dba58189dbbc
+	.dword	0x3956c25bf348b538, 0x59f111f1b605d019
+	.dword	0x923f82a4af194f9b, 0xab1c5ed5da6d8118
+	.dword	0xd807aa98a3030242, 0x12835b0145706fbe
+	.dword	0x243185be4ee4b28c, 0x550c7dc3d5ffb4e2
+	.dword	0x72be5d74f27b896f, 0x80deb1fe3b1696b1
+	.dword	0x9bdc06a725c71235, 0xc19bf174cf692694
+	.dword	0xe49b69c19ef14ad2, 0xefbe4786384f25e3
+	.dword	0x0fc19dc68b8cd5b5, 0x240ca1cc77ac9c65
+	.dword	0x2de92c6f592b0275, 0x4a7484aa6ea6e483
+	.dword	0x5cb0a9dcbd41fbd4, 0x76f988da831153b5
+	.dword	0x983e5152ee66dfab, 0xa831c66d2db43210
+	.dword	0xb00327c898fb213f, 0xbf597fc7beef0ee4
+	.dword	0xc6e00bf33da88fc2, 0xd5a79147930aa725
+	.dword	0x06ca6351e003826f, 0x142929670a0e6e70
+	.dword	0x27b70a8546d22ffc, 0x2e1b21385c26c926
+	.dword	0x4d2c6dfc5ac42aed, 0x53380d139d95b3df
+	.dword	0x650a73548baf63de, 0x766a0abb3c77b2a8
+	.dword	0x81c2c92e47edaee6, 0x92722c851482353b
+	.dword	0xa2bfe8a14cf10364, 0xa81a664bbc423001
+	.dword	0xc24b8b70d0f89791, 0xc76c51a30654be30
+	.dword	0xd192e819d6ef5218, 0xd69906245565a910
+	.dword	0xf40e35855771202a, 0x106aa07032bbd1b8
+	.dword	0x19a4c116b8d2d0c8, 0x1e376c085141ab53
+	.dword	0x2748774cdf8eeb99, 0x34b0bcb5e19b48a8
+	.dword	0x391c0cb3c5c95a63, 0x4ed8aa4ae3418acb
+	.dword	0x5b9cca4f7763e373, 0x682e6ff3d6b2b8a3
+	.dword	0x748f82ee5defb2fc, 0x78a5636f43172f60
+	.dword	0x84c87814a1f0ab72, 0x8cc702081a6439ec
+	.dword	0x90befffa23631e28, 0xa4506cebde82bde9
+	.dword	0xbef9a3f7b2c67915, 0xc67178f2e372532b
+	.dword	0xca273eceea26619c, 0xd186b8c721c0c207
+	.dword	0xeada7dd6cde0eb1e, 0xf57d4f7fee6ed178
+	.dword	0x06f067aa72176fba, 0x0a637dc5a2c898a6
+	.dword	0x113f9804bef90dae, 0x1b710b35131c471b
+	.dword	0x28db77f523047d84, 0x32caab7b40c72493
+	.dword	0x3c9ebe0a15c9bebc, 0x431d67c49c100d4c
+	.dword	0x4cc5d4becb3e42b6, 0x597f299cfc657e2a
+	.dword	0x5fcb6fab3ad6faec, 0x6c44198c4a475817
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+.asciiz	"SHA${label} for MIPS, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+.align	5
+
+___
+
+$code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem;
+print $code;
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-parisc.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-parisc.pl
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..fcb6157
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-parisc.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,800 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2009-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+
+# SHA256/512 block procedure for PA-RISC.
+
+# June 2009.
+#
+# SHA256 performance is >75% better than gcc 3.2 generated code on
+# PA-7100LC. Compared to code generated by vendor compiler this
+# implementation is almost 70% faster in 64-bit build, but delivers
+# virtually same performance in 32-bit build on PA-8600.
+#
+# SHA512 performance is >2.9x better than gcc 3.2 generated code on
+# PA-7100LC, PA-RISC 1.1 processor. Then implementation detects if the
+# code is executed on PA-RISC 2.0 processor and switches to 64-bit
+# code path delivering adequate performance even in "blended" 32-bit
+# build. Though 64-bit code is not any faster than code generated by
+# vendor compiler on PA-8600...
+#
+# Special thanks to polarhome.com for providing HP-UX account.
+
+$flavour = shift;
+$output = shift;
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+if ($flavour =~ /64/) {
+	$LEVEL		="2.0W";
+	$SIZE_T		=8;
+	$FRAME_MARKER	=80;
+	$SAVED_RP	=16;
+	$PUSH		="std";
+	$PUSHMA		="std,ma";
+	$POP		="ldd";
+	$POPMB		="ldd,mb";
+} else {
+	$LEVEL		="1.0";
+	$SIZE_T		=4;
+	$FRAME_MARKER	=48;
+	$SAVED_RP	=20;
+	$PUSH		="stw";
+	$PUSHMA		="stwm";
+	$POP		="ldw";
+	$POPMB		="ldwm";
+}
+
+if ($output =~ /512/) {
+	$func="sha512_block_data_order";
+	$SZ=8;
+	@Sigma0=(28,34,39);
+	@Sigma1=(14,18,41);
+	@sigma0=(1,  8, 7);
+	@sigma1=(19,61, 6);
+	$rounds=80;
+	$LAST10BITS=0x017;
+	$LD="ldd";
+	$LDM="ldd,ma";
+	$ST="std";
+} else {
+	$func="sha256_block_data_order";
+	$SZ=4;
+	@Sigma0=( 2,13,22);
+	@Sigma1=( 6,11,25);
+	@sigma0=( 7,18, 3);
+	@sigma1=(17,19,10);
+	$rounds=64;
+	$LAST10BITS=0x0f2;
+	$LD="ldw";
+	$LDM="ldwm";
+	$ST="stw";
+}
+
+$FRAME=16*$SIZE_T+$FRAME_MARKER;# 16 saved regs + frame marker
+				#                 [+ argument transfer]
+$XOFF=16*$SZ+32;		# local variables
+$FRAME+=$XOFF;
+$XOFF+=$FRAME_MARKER;		# distance between %sp and local variables
+
+$ctx="%r26";	# zapped by $a0
+$inp="%r25";	# zapped by $a1
+$num="%r24";	# zapped by $t0
+
+$a0 ="%r26";
+$a1 ="%r25";
+$t0 ="%r24";
+$t1 ="%r29";
+$Tbl="%r31";
+
+@V=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$F,$G,$H)=("%r17","%r18","%r19","%r20","%r21","%r22","%r23","%r28");
+
+@X=("%r1", "%r2", "%r3", "%r4", "%r5", "%r6", "%r7", "%r8",
+    "%r9", "%r10","%r11","%r12","%r13","%r14","%r15","%r16",$inp);
+
+sub ROUND_00_15 {
+my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f,$g,$h)=@_;
+$code.=<<___;
+	_ror	$e,$Sigma1[0],$a0
+	and	$f,$e,$t0
+	_ror	$e,$Sigma1[1],$a1
+	addl	$t1,$h,$h
+	andcm	$g,$e,$t1
+	xor	$a1,$a0,$a0
+	_ror	$a1,`$Sigma1[2]-$Sigma1[1]`,$a1
+	or	$t0,$t1,$t1		; Ch(e,f,g)
+	addl	@X[$i%16],$h,$h
+	xor	$a0,$a1,$a1		; Sigma1(e)
+	addl	$t1,$h,$h
+	_ror	$a,$Sigma0[0],$a0
+	addl	$a1,$h,$h
+
+	_ror	$a,$Sigma0[1],$a1
+	and	$a,$b,$t0
+	and	$a,$c,$t1
+	xor	$a1,$a0,$a0
+	_ror	$a1,`$Sigma0[2]-$Sigma0[1]`,$a1
+	xor	$t1,$t0,$t0
+	and	$b,$c,$t1
+	xor	$a0,$a1,$a1		; Sigma0(a)
+	addl	$h,$d,$d
+	xor	$t1,$t0,$t0		; Maj(a,b,c)
+	`"$LDM	$SZ($Tbl),$t1" if ($i<15)`
+	addl	$a1,$h,$h
+	addl	$t0,$h,$h
+
+___
+}
+
+sub ROUND_16_xx {
+my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f,$g,$h)=@_;
+$i-=16;
+$code.=<<___;
+	_ror	@X[($i+1)%16],$sigma0[0],$a0
+	_ror	@X[($i+1)%16],$sigma0[1],$a1
+	addl	@X[($i+9)%16],@X[$i],@X[$i]
+	_ror	@X[($i+14)%16],$sigma1[0],$t0
+	_ror	@X[($i+14)%16],$sigma1[1],$t1
+	xor	$a1,$a0,$a0
+	_shr	@X[($i+1)%16],$sigma0[2],$a1
+	xor	$t1,$t0,$t0
+	_shr	@X[($i+14)%16],$sigma1[2],$t1
+	xor	$a1,$a0,$a0		; sigma0(X[(i+1)&0x0f])
+	xor	$t1,$t0,$t0		; sigma1(X[(i+14)&0x0f])
+	$LDM	$SZ($Tbl),$t1
+	addl	$a0,@X[$i],@X[$i]
+	addl	$t0,@X[$i],@X[$i]
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i==15);
+	extru	$t1,31,10,$a1
+	comiclr,<> $LAST10BITS,$a1,%r0
+	ldo	1($Tbl),$Tbl		; signal end of $Tbl
+___
+&ROUND_00_15($i+16,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f,$g,$h);
+}
+
+$code=<<___;
+	.LEVEL	$LEVEL
+	.SPACE	\$TEXT\$
+	.SUBSPA	\$CODE\$,QUAD=0,ALIGN=8,ACCESS=0x2C,CODE_ONLY
+
+	.ALIGN	64
+L\$table
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($SZ==8);
+	.WORD	0x428a2f98,0xd728ae22,0x71374491,0x23ef65cd
+	.WORD	0xb5c0fbcf,0xec4d3b2f,0xe9b5dba5,0x8189dbbc
+	.WORD	0x3956c25b,0xf348b538,0x59f111f1,0xb605d019
+	.WORD	0x923f82a4,0xaf194f9b,0xab1c5ed5,0xda6d8118
+	.WORD	0xd807aa98,0xa3030242,0x12835b01,0x45706fbe
+	.WORD	0x243185be,0x4ee4b28c,0x550c7dc3,0xd5ffb4e2
+	.WORD	0x72be5d74,0xf27b896f,0x80deb1fe,0x3b1696b1
+	.WORD	0x9bdc06a7,0x25c71235,0xc19bf174,0xcf692694
+	.WORD	0xe49b69c1,0x9ef14ad2,0xefbe4786,0x384f25e3
+	.WORD	0x0fc19dc6,0x8b8cd5b5,0x240ca1cc,0x77ac9c65
+	.WORD	0x2de92c6f,0x592b0275,0x4a7484aa,0x6ea6e483
+	.WORD	0x5cb0a9dc,0xbd41fbd4,0x76f988da,0x831153b5
+	.WORD	0x983e5152,0xee66dfab,0xa831c66d,0x2db43210
+	.WORD	0xb00327c8,0x98fb213f,0xbf597fc7,0xbeef0ee4
+	.WORD	0xc6e00bf3,0x3da88fc2,0xd5a79147,0x930aa725
+	.WORD	0x06ca6351,0xe003826f,0x14292967,0x0a0e6e70
+	.WORD	0x27b70a85,0x46d22ffc,0x2e1b2138,0x5c26c926
+	.WORD	0x4d2c6dfc,0x5ac42aed,0x53380d13,0x9d95b3df
+	.WORD	0x650a7354,0x8baf63de,0x766a0abb,0x3c77b2a8
+	.WORD	0x81c2c92e,0x47edaee6,0x92722c85,0x1482353b
+	.WORD	0xa2bfe8a1,0x4cf10364,0xa81a664b,0xbc423001
+	.WORD	0xc24b8b70,0xd0f89791,0xc76c51a3,0x0654be30
+	.WORD	0xd192e819,0xd6ef5218,0xd6990624,0x5565a910
+	.WORD	0xf40e3585,0x5771202a,0x106aa070,0x32bbd1b8
+	.WORD	0x19a4c116,0xb8d2d0c8,0x1e376c08,0x5141ab53
+	.WORD	0x2748774c,0xdf8eeb99,0x34b0bcb5,0xe19b48a8
+	.WORD	0x391c0cb3,0xc5c95a63,0x4ed8aa4a,0xe3418acb
+	.WORD	0x5b9cca4f,0x7763e373,0x682e6ff3,0xd6b2b8a3
+	.WORD	0x748f82ee,0x5defb2fc,0x78a5636f,0x43172f60
+	.WORD	0x84c87814,0xa1f0ab72,0x8cc70208,0x1a6439ec
+	.WORD	0x90befffa,0x23631e28,0xa4506ceb,0xde82bde9
+	.WORD	0xbef9a3f7,0xb2c67915,0xc67178f2,0xe372532b
+	.WORD	0xca273ece,0xea26619c,0xd186b8c7,0x21c0c207
+	.WORD	0xeada7dd6,0xcde0eb1e,0xf57d4f7f,0xee6ed178
+	.WORD	0x06f067aa,0x72176fba,0x0a637dc5,0xa2c898a6
+	.WORD	0x113f9804,0xbef90dae,0x1b710b35,0x131c471b
+	.WORD	0x28db77f5,0x23047d84,0x32caab7b,0x40c72493
+	.WORD	0x3c9ebe0a,0x15c9bebc,0x431d67c4,0x9c100d4c
+	.WORD	0x4cc5d4be,0xcb3e42b6,0x597f299c,0xfc657e2a
+	.WORD	0x5fcb6fab,0x3ad6faec,0x6c44198c,0x4a475817
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($SZ==4);
+	.WORD	0x428a2f98,0x71374491,0xb5c0fbcf,0xe9b5dba5
+	.WORD	0x3956c25b,0x59f111f1,0x923f82a4,0xab1c5ed5
+	.WORD	0xd807aa98,0x12835b01,0x243185be,0x550c7dc3
+	.WORD	0x72be5d74,0x80deb1fe,0x9bdc06a7,0xc19bf174
+	.WORD	0xe49b69c1,0xefbe4786,0x0fc19dc6,0x240ca1cc
+	.WORD	0x2de92c6f,0x4a7484aa,0x5cb0a9dc,0x76f988da
+	.WORD	0x983e5152,0xa831c66d,0xb00327c8,0xbf597fc7
+	.WORD	0xc6e00bf3,0xd5a79147,0x06ca6351,0x14292967
+	.WORD	0x27b70a85,0x2e1b2138,0x4d2c6dfc,0x53380d13
+	.WORD	0x650a7354,0x766a0abb,0x81c2c92e,0x92722c85
+	.WORD	0xa2bfe8a1,0xa81a664b,0xc24b8b70,0xc76c51a3
+	.WORD	0xd192e819,0xd6990624,0xf40e3585,0x106aa070
+	.WORD	0x19a4c116,0x1e376c08,0x2748774c,0x34b0bcb5
+	.WORD	0x391c0cb3,0x4ed8aa4a,0x5b9cca4f,0x682e6ff3
+	.WORD	0x748f82ee,0x78a5636f,0x84c87814,0x8cc70208
+	.WORD	0x90befffa,0xa4506ceb,0xbef9a3f7,0xc67178f2
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+
+	.EXPORT	$func,ENTRY,ARGW0=GR,ARGW1=GR,ARGW2=GR
+	.ALIGN	64
+$func
+	.PROC
+	.CALLINFO	FRAME=`$FRAME-16*$SIZE_T`,NO_CALLS,SAVE_RP,ENTRY_GR=18
+	.ENTRY
+	$PUSH	%r2,-$SAVED_RP(%sp)	; standard prologue
+	$PUSHMA	%r3,$FRAME(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r4,`-$FRAME+1*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r5,`-$FRAME+2*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r6,`-$FRAME+3*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r7,`-$FRAME+4*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r8,`-$FRAME+5*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r9,`-$FRAME+6*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r10,`-$FRAME+7*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r11,`-$FRAME+8*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r12,`-$FRAME+9*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r13,`-$FRAME+10*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r14,`-$FRAME+11*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r15,`-$FRAME+12*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r16,`-$FRAME+13*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r17,`-$FRAME+14*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+	$PUSH	%r18,`-$FRAME+15*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+
+	_shl	$num,`log(16*$SZ)/log(2)`,$num
+	addl	$inp,$num,$num		; $num to point at the end of $inp
+
+	$PUSH	$num,`-$FRAME_MARKER-4*$SIZE_T`(%sp)	; save arguments
+	$PUSH	$inp,`-$FRAME_MARKER-3*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+	$PUSH	$ctx,`-$FRAME_MARKER-2*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+
+	blr	%r0,$Tbl
+	ldi	3,$t1
+L\$pic
+	andcm	$Tbl,$t1,$Tbl		; wipe privilege level
+	ldo	L\$table-L\$pic($Tbl),$Tbl
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($SZ==8 && $SIZE_T==4);
+	ldi	31,$t1
+	mtctl	$t1,%cr11
+	extrd,u,*= $t1,%sar,1,$t1	; executes on PA-RISC 1.0
+	b	L\$parisc1
+	nop
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	$LD	`0*$SZ`($ctx),$A	; load context
+	$LD	`1*$SZ`($ctx),$B
+	$LD	`2*$SZ`($ctx),$C
+	$LD	`3*$SZ`($ctx),$D
+	$LD	`4*$SZ`($ctx),$E
+	$LD	`5*$SZ`($ctx),$F
+	$LD	`6*$SZ`($ctx),$G
+	$LD	`7*$SZ`($ctx),$H
+
+	extru	$inp,31,`log($SZ)/log(2)`,$t0
+	sh3addl	$t0,%r0,$t0
+	subi	`8*$SZ`,$t0,$t0
+	mtctl	$t0,%cr11		; load %sar with align factor
+
+L\$oop
+	ldi	`$SZ-1`,$t0
+	$LDM	$SZ($Tbl),$t1
+	andcm	$inp,$t0,$t0		; align $inp
+___
+	for ($i=0;$i<15;$i++) {		# load input block
+	$code.="\t$LD	`$SZ*$i`($t0),@X[$i]\n";		}
+$code.=<<___;
+	cmpb,*=	$inp,$t0,L\$aligned
+	$LD	`$SZ*15`($t0),@X[15]
+	$LD	`$SZ*16`($t0),@X[16]
+___
+	for ($i=0;$i<16;$i++) {		# align data
+	$code.="\t_align	@X[$i],@X[$i+1],@X[$i]\n";	}
+$code.=<<___;
+L\$aligned
+	nop	; otherwise /usr/ccs/bin/as is confused by below .WORD
+___
+
+for($i=0;$i<16;$i++)	{ &ROUND_00_15($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+$code.=<<___;
+L\$rounds
+	nop	; otherwise /usr/ccs/bin/as is confused by below .WORD
+___
+for(;$i<32;$i++)	{ &ROUND_16_xx($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+$code.=<<___;
+	bb,>=	$Tbl,31,L\$rounds	; end of $Tbl signalled?
+	nop
+
+	$POP	`-$FRAME_MARKER-2*$SIZE_T`(%sp),$ctx	; restore arguments
+	$POP	`-$FRAME_MARKER-3*$SIZE_T`(%sp),$inp
+	$POP	`-$FRAME_MARKER-4*$SIZE_T`(%sp),$num
+	ldo	`-$rounds*$SZ-1`($Tbl),$Tbl		; rewind $Tbl
+
+	$LD	`0*$SZ`($ctx),@X[0]	; load context
+	$LD	`1*$SZ`($ctx),@X[1]
+	$LD	`2*$SZ`($ctx),@X[2]
+	$LD	`3*$SZ`($ctx),@X[3]
+	$LD	`4*$SZ`($ctx),@X[4]
+	$LD	`5*$SZ`($ctx),@X[5]
+	addl	@X[0],$A,$A
+	$LD	`6*$SZ`($ctx),@X[6]
+	addl	@X[1],$B,$B
+	$LD	`7*$SZ`($ctx),@X[7]
+	ldo	`16*$SZ`($inp),$inp	; advance $inp
+
+	$ST	$A,`0*$SZ`($ctx)	; save context
+	addl	@X[2],$C,$C
+	$ST	$B,`1*$SZ`($ctx)
+	addl	@X[3],$D,$D
+	$ST	$C,`2*$SZ`($ctx)
+	addl	@X[4],$E,$E
+	$ST	$D,`3*$SZ`($ctx)
+	addl	@X[5],$F,$F
+	$ST	$E,`4*$SZ`($ctx)
+	addl	@X[6],$G,$G
+	$ST	$F,`5*$SZ`($ctx)
+	addl	@X[7],$H,$H
+	$ST	$G,`6*$SZ`($ctx)
+	$ST	$H,`7*$SZ`($ctx)
+
+	cmpb,*<>,n $inp,$num,L\$oop
+	$PUSH	$inp,`-$FRAME_MARKER-3*$SIZE_T`(%sp)	; save $inp
+___
+if ($SZ==8 && $SIZE_T==4)	# SHA512 for 32-bit PA-RISC 1.0
+{{
+$code.=<<___;
+	b	L\$done
+	nop
+
+	.ALIGN	64
+L\$parisc1
+___
+
+@V=(  $Ahi,  $Alo,  $Bhi,  $Blo,  $Chi,  $Clo,  $Dhi,  $Dlo,
+      $Ehi,  $Elo,  $Fhi,  $Flo,  $Ghi,  $Glo,  $Hhi,  $Hlo) = 
+   ( "%r1", "%r2", "%r3", "%r4", "%r5", "%r6", "%r7", "%r8",
+     "%r9","%r10","%r11","%r12","%r13","%r14","%r15","%r16");
+$a0 ="%r17";
+$a1 ="%r18";
+$a2 ="%r19";
+$a3 ="%r20";
+$t0 ="%r21";
+$t1 ="%r22";
+$t2 ="%r28";
+$t3 ="%r29";
+$Tbl="%r31";
+
+@X=("%r23","%r24","%r25","%r26");	# zaps $num,$inp,$ctx
+
+sub ROUND_00_15_pa1 {
+my ($i,$ahi,$alo,$bhi,$blo,$chi,$clo,$dhi,$dlo,
+       $ehi,$elo,$fhi,$flo,$ghi,$glo,$hhi,$hlo,$flag)=@_;
+my ($Xhi,$Xlo,$Xnhi,$Xnlo) = @X;
+
+$code.=<<___ if (!$flag);
+	ldw	`-$XOFF+8*(($i+1)%16)`(%sp),$Xnhi
+	ldw	`-$XOFF+8*(($i+1)%16)+4`(%sp),$Xnlo	; load X[i+1]
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	shd	$ehi,$elo,$Sigma1[0],$t0
+	 add	$Xlo,$hlo,$hlo
+	shd	$elo,$ehi,$Sigma1[0],$t1
+	 addc	$Xhi,$hhi,$hhi		; h += X[i]
+	shd	$ehi,$elo,$Sigma1[1],$t2
+	 ldwm	8($Tbl),$Xhi
+	shd	$elo,$ehi,$Sigma1[1],$t3
+	 ldw	-4($Tbl),$Xlo		; load K[i]
+	xor	$t2,$t0,$t0
+	xor	$t3,$t1,$t1
+	 and	$flo,$elo,$a0
+	 and	$fhi,$ehi,$a1
+	shd	$ehi,$elo,$Sigma1[2],$t2
+	 andcm	$glo,$elo,$a2
+	shd	$elo,$ehi,$Sigma1[2],$t3
+	 andcm	$ghi,$ehi,$a3
+	xor	$t2,$t0,$t0
+	xor	$t3,$t1,$t1		; Sigma1(e)
+	add	$Xlo,$hlo,$hlo
+	 xor	$a2,$a0,$a0
+	addc	$Xhi,$hhi,$hhi		; h += K[i]
+	 xor	$a3,$a1,$a1		; Ch(e,f,g)
+
+	 add	$t0,$hlo,$hlo
+	shd	$ahi,$alo,$Sigma0[0],$t0
+	 addc	$t1,$hhi,$hhi		; h += Sigma1(e)
+	shd	$alo,$ahi,$Sigma0[0],$t1	
+	 add	$a0,$hlo,$hlo
+	shd	$ahi,$alo,$Sigma0[1],$t2
+	 addc	$a1,$hhi,$hhi		; h += Ch(e,f,g)
+	shd	$alo,$ahi,$Sigma0[1],$t3
+
+	xor	$t2,$t0,$t0
+	xor	$t3,$t1,$t1
+	shd	$ahi,$alo,$Sigma0[2],$t2
+	and	$alo,$blo,$a0
+	shd	$alo,$ahi,$Sigma0[2],$t3
+	and	$ahi,$bhi,$a1
+	xor	$t2,$t0,$t0
+	xor	$t3,$t1,$t1		; Sigma0(a)
+
+	and	$alo,$clo,$a2
+	and	$ahi,$chi,$a3
+	xor	$a2,$a0,$a0
+	 add	$hlo,$dlo,$dlo
+	xor	$a3,$a1,$a1
+	 addc	$hhi,$dhi,$dhi		; d += h
+	and	$blo,$clo,$a2
+	 add	$t0,$hlo,$hlo
+	and	$bhi,$chi,$a3
+	 addc	$t1,$hhi,$hhi		; h += Sigma0(a)
+	xor	$a2,$a0,$a0
+	 add	$a0,$hlo,$hlo
+	xor	$a3,$a1,$a1		; Maj(a,b,c)
+	 addc	$a1,$hhi,$hhi		; h += Maj(a,b,c)
+
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i==15 && $flag);
+	extru	$Xlo,31,10,$Xlo
+	comiclr,= $LAST10BITS,$Xlo,%r0
+	b	L\$rounds_pa1
+	nop
+___
+push(@X,shift(@X)); push(@X,shift(@X));
+}
+
+sub ROUND_16_xx_pa1 {
+my ($Xhi,$Xlo,$Xnhi,$Xnlo) = @X;
+my ($i)=shift;
+$i-=16;
+$code.=<<___;
+	ldw	`-$XOFF+8*(($i+1)%16)`(%sp),$Xnhi
+	ldw	`-$XOFF+8*(($i+1)%16)+4`(%sp),$Xnlo	; load X[i+1]
+	ldw	`-$XOFF+8*(($i+9)%16)`(%sp),$a1
+	ldw	`-$XOFF+8*(($i+9)%16)+4`(%sp),$a0	; load X[i+9]
+	ldw	`-$XOFF+8*(($i+14)%16)`(%sp),$a3
+	ldw	`-$XOFF+8*(($i+14)%16)+4`(%sp),$a2	; load X[i+14]
+	shd	$Xnhi,$Xnlo,$sigma0[0],$t0
+	shd	$Xnlo,$Xnhi,$sigma0[0],$t1
+	 add	$a0,$Xlo,$Xlo
+	shd	$Xnhi,$Xnlo,$sigma0[1],$t2
+	 addc	$a1,$Xhi,$Xhi
+	shd	$Xnlo,$Xnhi,$sigma0[1],$t3
+	xor	$t2,$t0,$t0
+	shd	$Xnhi,$Xnlo,$sigma0[2],$t2
+	xor	$t3,$t1,$t1
+	extru	$Xnhi,`31-$sigma0[2]`,`32-$sigma0[2]`,$t3
+	xor	$t2,$t0,$t0
+	 shd	$a3,$a2,$sigma1[0],$a0
+	xor	$t3,$t1,$t1		; sigma0(X[i+1)&0x0f])
+	 shd	$a2,$a3,$sigma1[0],$a1
+	add	$t0,$Xlo,$Xlo
+	 shd	$a3,$a2,$sigma1[1],$t2
+	addc	$t1,$Xhi,$Xhi
+	 shd	$a2,$a3,$sigma1[1],$t3
+	xor	$t2,$a0,$a0
+	shd	$a3,$a2,$sigma1[2],$t2
+	xor	$t3,$a1,$a1
+	extru	$a3,`31-$sigma1[2]`,`32-$sigma1[2]`,$t3
+	xor	$t2,$a0,$a0
+	xor	$t3,$a1,$a1		; sigma0(X[i+14)&0x0f])
+	add	$a0,$Xlo,$Xlo
+	addc	$a1,$Xhi,$Xhi
+
+	stw	$Xhi,`-$XOFF+8*($i%16)`(%sp)
+	stw	$Xlo,`-$XOFF+8*($i%16)+4`(%sp)
+___
+&ROUND_00_15_pa1($i,@_,1);
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	ldw	`0*4`($ctx),$Ahi		; load context
+	ldw	`1*4`($ctx),$Alo
+	ldw	`2*4`($ctx),$Bhi
+	ldw	`3*4`($ctx),$Blo
+	ldw	`4*4`($ctx),$Chi
+	ldw	`5*4`($ctx),$Clo
+	ldw	`6*4`($ctx),$Dhi
+	ldw	`7*4`($ctx),$Dlo
+	ldw	`8*4`($ctx),$Ehi
+	ldw	`9*4`($ctx),$Elo
+	ldw	`10*4`($ctx),$Fhi
+	ldw	`11*4`($ctx),$Flo
+	ldw	`12*4`($ctx),$Ghi
+	ldw	`13*4`($ctx),$Glo
+	ldw	`14*4`($ctx),$Hhi
+	ldw	`15*4`($ctx),$Hlo
+
+	extru	$inp,31,2,$t0
+	sh3addl	$t0,%r0,$t0
+	subi	32,$t0,$t0
+	mtctl	$t0,%cr11		; load %sar with align factor
+
+L\$oop_pa1
+	extru	$inp,31,2,$a3
+	comib,=	0,$a3,L\$aligned_pa1
+	sub	$inp,$a3,$inp
+
+	ldw	`0*4`($inp),$X[0]
+	ldw	`1*4`($inp),$X[1]
+	ldw	`2*4`($inp),$t2
+	ldw	`3*4`($inp),$t3
+	ldw	`4*4`($inp),$a0
+	ldw	`5*4`($inp),$a1
+	ldw	`6*4`($inp),$a2
+	ldw	`7*4`($inp),$a3
+	vshd	$X[0],$X[1],$X[0]
+	vshd	$X[1],$t2,$X[1]
+	stw	$X[0],`-$XOFF+0*4`(%sp)
+	ldw	`8*4`($inp),$t0
+	vshd	$t2,$t3,$t2
+	stw	$X[1],`-$XOFF+1*4`(%sp)
+	ldw	`9*4`($inp),$t1
+	vshd	$t3,$a0,$t3
+___
+{
+my @t=($t2,$t3,$a0,$a1,$a2,$a3,$t0,$t1);
+for ($i=2;$i<=(128/4-8);$i++) {
+$code.=<<___;
+	stw	$t[0],`-$XOFF+$i*4`(%sp)
+	ldw	`(8+$i)*4`($inp),$t[0]
+	vshd	$t[1],$t[2],$t[1]
+___
+push(@t,shift(@t));
+}
+for (;$i<(128/4-1);$i++) {
+$code.=<<___;
+	stw	$t[0],`-$XOFF+$i*4`(%sp)
+	vshd	$t[1],$t[2],$t[1]
+___
+push(@t,shift(@t));
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	b	L\$collected_pa1
+	stw	$t[0],`-$XOFF+$i*4`(%sp)
+
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+L\$aligned_pa1
+	ldw	`0*4`($inp),$X[0]
+	ldw	`1*4`($inp),$X[1]
+	ldw	`2*4`($inp),$t2
+	ldw	`3*4`($inp),$t3
+	ldw	`4*4`($inp),$a0
+	ldw	`5*4`($inp),$a1
+	ldw	`6*4`($inp),$a2
+	ldw	`7*4`($inp),$a3
+	stw	$X[0],`-$XOFF+0*4`(%sp)
+	ldw	`8*4`($inp),$t0
+	stw	$X[1],`-$XOFF+1*4`(%sp)
+	ldw	`9*4`($inp),$t1
+___
+{
+my @t=($t2,$t3,$a0,$a1,$a2,$a3,$t0,$t1);
+for ($i=2;$i<(128/4-8);$i++) {
+$code.=<<___;
+	stw	$t[0],`-$XOFF+$i*4`(%sp)
+	ldw	`(8+$i)*4`($inp),$t[0]
+___
+push(@t,shift(@t));
+}
+for (;$i<128/4;$i++) {
+$code.=<<___;
+	stw	$t[0],`-$XOFF+$i*4`(%sp)
+___
+push(@t,shift(@t));
+}
+$code.="L\$collected_pa1\n";
+}
+
+for($i=0;$i<16;$i++)	{ &ROUND_00_15_pa1($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+$code.="L\$rounds_pa1\n";
+for(;$i<32;$i++)	{ &ROUND_16_xx_pa1($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	$POP	`-$FRAME_MARKER-2*$SIZE_T`(%sp),$ctx	; restore arguments
+	$POP	`-$FRAME_MARKER-3*$SIZE_T`(%sp),$inp
+	$POP	`-$FRAME_MARKER-4*$SIZE_T`(%sp),$num
+	ldo	`-$rounds*$SZ`($Tbl),$Tbl		; rewind $Tbl
+
+	ldw	`0*4`($ctx),$t1		; update context
+	ldw	`1*4`($ctx),$t0
+	ldw	`2*4`($ctx),$t3
+	ldw	`3*4`($ctx),$t2
+	ldw	`4*4`($ctx),$a1
+	ldw	`5*4`($ctx),$a0
+	ldw	`6*4`($ctx),$a3
+	add	$t0,$Alo,$Alo
+	ldw	`7*4`($ctx),$a2
+	addc	$t1,$Ahi,$Ahi
+	ldw	`8*4`($ctx),$t1
+	add	$t2,$Blo,$Blo
+	ldw	`9*4`($ctx),$t0
+	addc	$t3,$Bhi,$Bhi
+	ldw	`10*4`($ctx),$t3
+	add	$a0,$Clo,$Clo
+	ldw	`11*4`($ctx),$t2
+	addc	$a1,$Chi,$Chi
+	ldw	`12*4`($ctx),$a1
+	add	$a2,$Dlo,$Dlo
+	ldw	`13*4`($ctx),$a0
+	addc	$a3,$Dhi,$Dhi
+	ldw	`14*4`($ctx),$a3
+	add	$t0,$Elo,$Elo
+	ldw	`15*4`($ctx),$a2
+	addc	$t1,$Ehi,$Ehi
+	stw	$Ahi,`0*4`($ctx)
+	add	$t2,$Flo,$Flo
+	stw	$Alo,`1*4`($ctx)
+	addc	$t3,$Fhi,$Fhi
+	stw	$Bhi,`2*4`($ctx)
+	add	$a0,$Glo,$Glo
+	stw	$Blo,`3*4`($ctx)
+	addc	$a1,$Ghi,$Ghi
+	stw	$Chi,`4*4`($ctx)
+	add	$a2,$Hlo,$Hlo
+	stw	$Clo,`5*4`($ctx)
+	addc	$a3,$Hhi,$Hhi
+	stw	$Dhi,`6*4`($ctx)
+	ldo	`16*$SZ`($inp),$inp	; advance $inp
+	stw	$Dlo,`7*4`($ctx)
+	stw	$Ehi,`8*4`($ctx)
+	stw	$Elo,`9*4`($ctx)
+	stw	$Fhi,`10*4`($ctx)
+	stw	$Flo,`11*4`($ctx)
+	stw	$Ghi,`12*4`($ctx)
+	stw	$Glo,`13*4`($ctx)
+	stw	$Hhi,`14*4`($ctx)
+	comb,=	$inp,$num,L\$done
+	stw	$Hlo,`15*4`($ctx)
+	b	L\$oop_pa1
+	$PUSH	$inp,`-$FRAME_MARKER-3*$SIZE_T`(%sp)	; save $inp
+L\$done
+___
+}}
+$code.=<<___;
+	$POP	`-$FRAME-$SAVED_RP`(%sp),%r2		; standard epilogue
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+1*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r4
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+2*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r5
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+3*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r6
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+4*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r7
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+5*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r8
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+6*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r9
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+7*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r10
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+8*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r11
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+9*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r12
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+10*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r13
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+11*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r14
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+12*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r15
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+13*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r16
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+14*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r17
+	$POP	`-$FRAME+15*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r18
+	bv	(%r2)
+	.EXIT
+	$POPMB	-$FRAME(%sp),%r3
+	.PROCEND
+	.STRINGZ "SHA`64*$SZ` block transform for PA-RISC, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+___
+
+# Explicitly encode PA-RISC 2.0 instructions used in this module, so
+# that it can be compiled with .LEVEL 1.0. It should be noted that I
+# wouldn't have to do this, if GNU assembler understood .ALLOW 2.0
+# directive...
+
+my $ldd = sub {
+  my ($mod,$args) = @_;
+  my $orig = "ldd$mod\t$args";
+
+    if ($args =~ /(\-?[0-9]+)\(%r([0-9]+)\),%r([0-9]+)/) # format 3 suffices
+    {	my $opcode=(0x14<<26)|($2<<21)|($3<<16)|(($1&0x1FF8)<<1)|(($1>>13)&1);
+	$opcode|=(1<<3) if ($mod =~ /^,m/);
+	$opcode|=(1<<2) if ($mod =~ /^,mb/);
+	sprintf "\t.WORD\t0x%08x\t; %s",$opcode,$orig;
+    }
+    else { "\t".$orig; }
+};
+
+my $std = sub {
+  my ($mod,$args) = @_;
+  my $orig = "std$mod\t$args";
+
+    if ($args =~ /%r([0-9]+),(\-?[0-9]+)\(%r([0-9]+)\)/) # format 3 suffices
+    {	my $opcode=(0x1c<<26)|($3<<21)|($1<<16)|(($2&0x1FF8)<<1)|(($2>>13)&1);
+	sprintf "\t.WORD\t0x%08x\t; %s",$opcode,$orig;
+    }
+    else { "\t".$orig; }
+};
+
+my $extrd = sub {
+  my ($mod,$args) = @_;
+  my $orig = "extrd$mod\t$args";
+
+    # I only have ",u" completer, it's implicitly encoded...
+    if ($args =~ /%r([0-9]+),([0-9]+),([0-9]+),%r([0-9]+)/)	# format 15
+    {	my $opcode=(0x36<<26)|($1<<21)|($4<<16);
+	my $len=32-$3;
+	$opcode |= (($2&0x20)<<6)|(($2&0x1f)<<5);		# encode pos
+	$opcode |= (($len&0x20)<<7)|($len&0x1f);		# encode len
+	sprintf "\t.WORD\t0x%08x\t; %s",$opcode,$orig;
+    }
+    elsif ($args =~ /%r([0-9]+),%sar,([0-9]+),%r([0-9]+)/)	# format 12
+    {	my $opcode=(0x34<<26)|($1<<21)|($3<<16)|(2<<11)|(1<<9);
+	my $len=32-$2;
+	$opcode |= (($len&0x20)<<3)|($len&0x1f);		# encode len
+	$opcode |= (1<<13) if ($mod =~ /,\**=/);
+	sprintf "\t.WORD\t0x%08x\t; %s",$opcode,$orig;
+    }
+    else { "\t".$orig; }
+};
+
+my $shrpd = sub {
+  my ($mod,$args) = @_;
+  my $orig = "shrpd$mod\t$args";
+
+    if ($args =~ /%r([0-9]+),%r([0-9]+),([0-9]+),%r([0-9]+)/)	# format 14
+    {	my $opcode=(0x34<<26)|($2<<21)|($1<<16)|(1<<10)|$4;
+	my $cpos=63-$3;
+	$opcode |= (($cpos&0x20)<<6)|(($cpos&0x1f)<<5);		# encode sa
+	sprintf "\t.WORD\t0x%08x\t; %s",$opcode,$orig;
+    }
+    elsif ($args =~ /%r([0-9]+),%r([0-9]+),%sar,%r([0-9]+)/)	# format 11
+    {	sprintf "\t.WORD\t0x%08x\t; %s",
+		(0x34<<26)|($2<<21)|($1<<16)|(1<<9)|$3,$orig;
+    }
+    else { "\t".$orig; }
+};
+
+sub assemble {
+  my ($mnemonic,$mod,$args)=@_;
+  my $opcode = eval("\$$mnemonic");
+
+    ref($opcode) eq 'CODE' ? &$opcode($mod,$args) : "\t$mnemonic$mod\t$args";
+}
+
+foreach (split("\n",$code)) {
+	s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/ge;
+
+	s/shd\s+(%r[0-9]+),(%r[0-9]+),([0-9]+)/
+		$3>31 ? sprintf("shd\t%$2,%$1,%d",$3-32)	# rotation for >=32
+		:       sprintf("shd\t%$1,%$2,%d",$3)/e			or
+	# translate made up instructons: _ror, _shr, _align, _shl
+	s/_ror(\s+)(%r[0-9]+),/
+		($SZ==4 ? "shd" : "shrpd")."$1$2,$2,"/e			or
+
+	s/_shr(\s+%r[0-9]+),([0-9]+),/
+		$SZ==4 ? sprintf("extru%s,%d,%d,",$1,31-$2,32-$2)
+		:        sprintf("extrd,u%s,%d,%d,",$1,63-$2,64-$2)/e	or
+
+	s/_align(\s+%r[0-9]+,%r[0-9]+),/
+		($SZ==4 ? "vshd$1," : "shrpd$1,%sar,")/e		or
+
+	s/_shl(\s+%r[0-9]+),([0-9]+),/
+		$SIZE_T==4 ? sprintf("zdep%s,%d,%d,",$1,31-$2,32-$2)
+		:            sprintf("depd,z%s,%d,%d,",$1,63-$2,64-$2)/e;
+
+	s/^\s+([a-z]+)([\S]*)\s+([\S]*)/&assemble($1,$2,$3)/e if ($SIZE_T==4);
+
+	s/cmpb,\*/comb,/ if ($SIZE_T==4);
+
+	s/\bbv\b/bve/    if ($SIZE_T==8);
+
+	print $_,"\n";
+}
+
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-ppc.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-ppc.pl
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..fe95b01
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-ppc.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,799 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+
+# I let hardware handle unaligned input, except on page boundaries
+# (see below for details). Otherwise straightforward implementation
+# with X vector in register bank.
+
+#			sha256		|	sha512
+# 			-m64	-m32	|	-m64	-m32
+# --------------------------------------+-----------------------
+# PPC970,gcc-4.0.0	+50%	+38%	|	+40%	+410%(*)
+# Power6,xlc-7		+150%	+90%	|	+100%	+430%(*)
+#
+# (*)	64-bit code in 32-bit application context, which actually is
+#	on TODO list. It should be noted that for safe deployment in
+#	32-bit *mutli-threaded* context asyncronous signals should be
+#	blocked upon entry to SHA512 block routine. This is because
+#	32-bit signaling procedure invalidates upper halves of GPRs.
+#	Context switch procedure preserves them, but not signaling:-(
+
+# Second version is true multi-thread safe. Trouble with the original
+# version was that it was using thread local storage pointer register.
+# Well, it scrupulously preserved it, but the problem would arise the
+# moment asynchronous signal was delivered and signal handler would
+# dereference the TLS pointer. While it's never the case in openssl
+# application or test suite, we have to respect this scenario and not
+# use TLS pointer register. Alternative would be to require caller to
+# block signals prior calling this routine. For the record, in 32-bit
+# context R2 serves as TLS pointer, while in 64-bit context - R13.
+
+$flavour=shift;
+$output =shift;
+
+if ($flavour =~ /64/) {
+	$SIZE_T=8;
+	$LRSAVE=2*$SIZE_T;
+	$STU="stdu";
+	$UCMP="cmpld";
+	$SHL="sldi";
+	$POP="ld";
+	$PUSH="std";
+} elsif ($flavour =~ /32/) {
+	$SIZE_T=4;
+	$LRSAVE=$SIZE_T;
+	$STU="stwu";
+	$UCMP="cmplw";
+	$SHL="slwi";
+	$POP="lwz";
+	$PUSH="stw";
+} else { die "nonsense $flavour"; }
+
+$LITTLE_ENDIAN = ($flavour=~/le$/) ? $SIZE_T : 0;
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+( $xlate="${dir}ppc-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
+( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/ppc-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
+die "can't locate ppc-xlate.pl";
+
+open STDOUT,"| $^X $xlate $flavour $output" || die "can't call $xlate: $!";
+
+if ($output =~ /512/) {
+	$func="sha512_block_ppc";
+	$SZ=8;
+	@Sigma0=(28,34,39);
+	@Sigma1=(14,18,41);
+	@sigma0=(1,  8, 7);
+	@sigma1=(19,61, 6);
+	$rounds=80;
+	$LD="ld";
+	$ST="std";
+	$ROR="rotrdi";
+	$SHR="srdi";
+} else {
+	$func="sha256_block_ppc";
+	$SZ=4;
+	@Sigma0=( 2,13,22);
+	@Sigma1=( 6,11,25);
+	@sigma0=( 7,18, 3);
+	@sigma1=(17,19,10);
+	$rounds=64;
+	$LD="lwz";
+	$ST="stw";
+	$ROR="rotrwi";
+	$SHR="srwi";
+}
+
+$FRAME=32*$SIZE_T+16*$SZ;
+$LOCALS=6*$SIZE_T;
+
+$sp ="r1";
+$toc="r2";
+$ctx="r3";	# zapped by $a0
+$inp="r4";	# zapped by $a1
+$num="r5";	# zapped by $t0
+
+$T  ="r0";
+$a0 ="r3";
+$a1 ="r4";
+$t0 ="r5";
+$t1 ="r6";
+$Tbl="r7";
+
+$A  ="r8";
+$B  ="r9";
+$C  ="r10";
+$D  ="r11";
+$E  ="r12";
+$F  =$t1;	$t1 = "r0";	# stay away from "r13";
+$G  ="r14";
+$H  ="r15";
+
+@V=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$F,$G,$H);
+@X=("r16","r17","r18","r19","r20","r21","r22","r23",
+    "r24","r25","r26","r27","r28","r29","r30","r31");
+
+$inp="r31" if($SZ==4 || $SIZE_T==8);	# reassigned $inp! aliases with @X[15]
+
+sub ROUND_00_15 {
+my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f,$g,$h)=@_;
+$code.=<<___;
+	$ROR	$a0,$e,$Sigma1[0]
+	$ROR	$a1,$e,$Sigma1[1]
+	and	$t0,$f,$e
+	xor	$a0,$a0,$a1
+	add	$h,$h,$t1
+	andc	$t1,$g,$e
+	$ROR	$a1,$a1,`$Sigma1[2]-$Sigma1[1]`
+	or	$t0,$t0,$t1		; Ch(e,f,g)
+	add	$h,$h,@X[$i%16]
+	xor	$a0,$a0,$a1		; Sigma1(e)
+	add	$h,$h,$t0
+	add	$h,$h,$a0
+
+	$ROR	$a0,$a,$Sigma0[0]
+	$ROR	$a1,$a,$Sigma0[1]
+	and	$t0,$a,$b
+	and	$t1,$a,$c
+	xor	$a0,$a0,$a1
+	$ROR	$a1,$a1,`$Sigma0[2]-$Sigma0[1]`
+	xor	$t0,$t0,$t1
+	and	$t1,$b,$c
+	xor	$a0,$a0,$a1		; Sigma0(a)
+	add	$d,$d,$h
+	xor	$t0,$t0,$t1		; Maj(a,b,c)
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i<15);
+	$LD	$t1,`($i+1)*$SZ`($Tbl)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	add	$h,$h,$a0
+	add	$h,$h,$t0
+
+___
+}
+
+sub ROUND_16_xx {
+my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f,$g,$h)=@_;
+$i-=16;
+$code.=<<___;
+	$ROR	$a0,@X[($i+1)%16],$sigma0[0]
+	$ROR	$a1,@X[($i+1)%16],$sigma0[1]
+	$ROR	$t0,@X[($i+14)%16],$sigma1[0]
+	$ROR	$t1,@X[($i+14)%16],$sigma1[1]
+	xor	$a0,$a0,$a1
+	$SHR	$a1,@X[($i+1)%16],$sigma0[2]
+	xor	$t0,$t0,$t1
+	$SHR	$t1,@X[($i+14)%16],$sigma1[2]
+	add	@X[$i],@X[$i],@X[($i+9)%16]
+	xor	$a0,$a0,$a1		; sigma0(X[(i+1)&0x0f])
+	xor	$t0,$t0,$t1		; sigma1(X[(i+14)&0x0f])
+	$LD	$t1,`$i*$SZ`($Tbl)
+	add	@X[$i],@X[$i],$a0
+	add	@X[$i],@X[$i],$t0
+___
+&ROUND_00_15($i+16,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f,$g,$h);
+}
+
+$code=<<___;
+.machine	"any"
+.text
+
+.globl	$func
+.align	6
+$func:
+	$STU	$sp,-$FRAME($sp)
+	mflr	r0
+	$SHL	$num,$num,`log(16*$SZ)/log(2)`
+
+	$PUSH	$ctx,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*22`($sp)
+
+	$PUSH	r14,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*18`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r15,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*17`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r16,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*16`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r17,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*15`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r18,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*14`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r19,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*13`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r20,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*12`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r21,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*11`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r22,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*10`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r23,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*9`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r24,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*8`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r25,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*7`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r26,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*6`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r27,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*5`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r28,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*4`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r29,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*3`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r30,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*2`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r31,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*1`($sp)
+	$PUSH	r0,`$FRAME+$LRSAVE`($sp)
+___
+
+if ($SZ==4 || $SIZE_T==8) {
+$code.=<<___;
+	$LD	$A,`0*$SZ`($ctx)
+	mr	$inp,r4				; incarnate $inp
+	$LD	$B,`1*$SZ`($ctx)
+	$LD	$C,`2*$SZ`($ctx)
+	$LD	$D,`3*$SZ`($ctx)
+	$LD	$E,`4*$SZ`($ctx)
+	$LD	$F,`5*$SZ`($ctx)
+	$LD	$G,`6*$SZ`($ctx)
+	$LD	$H,`7*$SZ`($ctx)
+___
+} else {
+  for ($i=16;$i<32;$i++) {
+    $code.=<<___;
+	lwz	r$i,`$LITTLE_ENDIAN^(4*($i-16))`($ctx)
+___
+  }
+}
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	bl	LPICmeup
+LPICedup:
+	andi.	r0,$inp,3
+	bne	Lunaligned
+Laligned:
+	add	$num,$inp,$num
+	$PUSH	$num,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*24`($sp)	; end pointer
+	$PUSH	$inp,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*23`($sp)	; inp pointer
+	bl	Lsha2_block_private
+	b	Ldone
+
+; PowerPC specification allows an implementation to be ill-behaved
+; upon unaligned access which crosses page boundary. "Better safe
+; than sorry" principle makes me treat it specially. But I don't
+; look for particular offending word, but rather for the input
+; block which crosses the boundary. Once found that block is aligned
+; and hashed separately...
+.align	4
+Lunaligned:
+	subfic	$t1,$inp,4096
+	andi.	$t1,$t1,`4096-16*$SZ`	; distance to closest page boundary
+	beq	Lcross_page
+	$UCMP	$num,$t1
+	ble	Laligned		; didn't cross the page boundary
+	subfc	$num,$t1,$num
+	add	$t1,$inp,$t1
+	$PUSH	$num,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*25`($sp)	; save real remaining num
+	$PUSH	$t1,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*24`($sp)	; intermediate end pointer
+	$PUSH	$inp,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*23`($sp)	; inp pointer
+	bl	Lsha2_block_private
+	; $inp equals to the intermediate end pointer here
+	$POP	$num,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*25`($sp)	; restore real remaining num
+Lcross_page:
+	li	$t1,`16*$SZ/4`
+	mtctr	$t1
+___
+if ($SZ==4 || $SIZE_T==8) {
+$code.=<<___;
+	addi	r20,$sp,$LOCALS			; aligned spot below the frame
+Lmemcpy:
+	lbz	r16,0($inp)
+	lbz	r17,1($inp)
+	lbz	r18,2($inp)
+	lbz	r19,3($inp)
+	addi	$inp,$inp,4
+	stb	r16,0(r20)
+	stb	r17,1(r20)
+	stb	r18,2(r20)
+	stb	r19,3(r20)
+	addi	r20,r20,4
+	bdnz	Lmemcpy
+___
+} else {
+$code.=<<___;
+	addi	r12,$sp,$LOCALS			; aligned spot below the frame
+Lmemcpy:
+	lbz	r8,0($inp)
+	lbz	r9,1($inp)
+	lbz	r10,2($inp)
+	lbz	r11,3($inp)
+	addi	$inp,$inp,4
+	stb	r8,0(r12)
+	stb	r9,1(r12)
+	stb	r10,2(r12)
+	stb	r11,3(r12)
+	addi	r12,r12,4
+	bdnz	Lmemcpy
+___
+}
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	$PUSH	$inp,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*26`($sp)	; save real inp
+	addi	$t1,$sp,`$LOCALS+16*$SZ`	; fictitious end pointer
+	addi	$inp,$sp,$LOCALS		; fictitious inp pointer
+	$PUSH	$num,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*25`($sp)	; save real num
+	$PUSH	$t1,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*24`($sp)	; end pointer
+	$PUSH	$inp,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*23`($sp)	; inp pointer
+	bl	Lsha2_block_private
+	$POP	$inp,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*26`($sp)	; restore real inp
+	$POP	$num,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*25`($sp)	; restore real num
+	addic.	$num,$num,`-16*$SZ`		; num--
+	bne	Lunaligned
+
+Ldone:
+	$POP	r0,`$FRAME+$LRSAVE`($sp)
+	$POP	r14,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*18`($sp)
+	$POP	r15,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*17`($sp)
+	$POP	r16,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*16`($sp)
+	$POP	r17,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*15`($sp)
+	$POP	r18,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*14`($sp)
+	$POP	r19,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*13`($sp)
+	$POP	r20,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*12`($sp)
+	$POP	r21,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*11`($sp)
+	$POP	r22,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*10`($sp)
+	$POP	r23,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*9`($sp)
+	$POP	r24,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*8`($sp)
+	$POP	r25,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*7`($sp)
+	$POP	r26,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*6`($sp)
+	$POP	r27,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*5`($sp)
+	$POP	r28,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*4`($sp)
+	$POP	r29,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*3`($sp)
+	$POP	r30,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*2`($sp)
+	$POP	r31,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*1`($sp)
+	mtlr	r0
+	addi	$sp,$sp,$FRAME
+	blr
+	.long	0
+	.byte	0,12,4,1,0x80,18,3,0
+	.long	0
+___
+
+if ($SZ==4 || $SIZE_T==8) {
+$code.=<<___;
+.align	4
+Lsha2_block_private:
+	$LD	$t1,0($Tbl)
+___
+for($i=0;$i<16;$i++) {
+$code.=<<___ if ($SZ==4 && !$LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+	lwz	@X[$i],`$i*$SZ`($inp)
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($SZ==4 && $LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+	lwz	$a0,`$i*$SZ`($inp)
+	rotlwi	@X[$i],$a0,8
+	rlwimi	@X[$i],$a0,24,0,7
+	rlwimi	@X[$i],$a0,24,16,23
+___
+# 64-bit loads are split to 2x32-bit ones, as CPU can't handle
+# unaligned 64-bit loads, only 32-bit ones...
+$code.=<<___ if ($SZ==8 && !$LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+	lwz	$t0,`$i*$SZ`($inp)
+	lwz	@X[$i],`$i*$SZ+4`($inp)
+	insrdi	@X[$i],$t0,32,0
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($SZ==8 && $LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+	lwz	$a0,`$i*$SZ`($inp)
+	 lwz	$a1,`$i*$SZ+4`($inp)
+	rotlwi	$t0,$a0,8
+	 rotlwi	@X[$i],$a1,8
+	rlwimi	$t0,$a0,24,0,7
+	 rlwimi	@X[$i],$a1,24,0,7
+	rlwimi	$t0,$a0,24,16,23
+	 rlwimi	@X[$i],$a1,24,16,23
+	insrdi	@X[$i],$t0,32,0
+___
+	&ROUND_00_15($i,@V);
+	unshift(@V,pop(@V));
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	li	$t0,`$rounds/16-1`
+	mtctr	$t0
+.align	4
+Lrounds:
+	addi	$Tbl,$Tbl,`16*$SZ`
+___
+for(;$i<32;$i++) {
+	&ROUND_16_xx($i,@V);
+	unshift(@V,pop(@V));
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	bdnz	Lrounds
+
+	$POP	$ctx,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*22`($sp)
+	$POP	$inp,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*23`($sp)	; inp pointer
+	$POP	$num,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*24`($sp)	; end pointer
+	subi	$Tbl,$Tbl,`($rounds-16)*$SZ`	; rewind Tbl
+
+	$LD	r16,`0*$SZ`($ctx)
+	$LD	r17,`1*$SZ`($ctx)
+	$LD	r18,`2*$SZ`($ctx)
+	$LD	r19,`3*$SZ`($ctx)
+	$LD	r20,`4*$SZ`($ctx)
+	$LD	r21,`5*$SZ`($ctx)
+	$LD	r22,`6*$SZ`($ctx)
+	addi	$inp,$inp,`16*$SZ`		; advance inp
+	$LD	r23,`7*$SZ`($ctx)
+	add	$A,$A,r16
+	add	$B,$B,r17
+	$PUSH	$inp,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*23`($sp)
+	add	$C,$C,r18
+	$ST	$A,`0*$SZ`($ctx)
+	add	$D,$D,r19
+	$ST	$B,`1*$SZ`($ctx)
+	add	$E,$E,r20
+	$ST	$C,`2*$SZ`($ctx)
+	add	$F,$F,r21
+	$ST	$D,`3*$SZ`($ctx)
+	add	$G,$G,r22
+	$ST	$E,`4*$SZ`($ctx)
+	add	$H,$H,r23
+	$ST	$F,`5*$SZ`($ctx)
+	$ST	$G,`6*$SZ`($ctx)
+	$UCMP	$inp,$num
+	$ST	$H,`7*$SZ`($ctx)
+	bne	Lsha2_block_private
+	blr
+	.long	0
+	.byte	0,12,0x14,0,0,0,0,0
+.size	$func,.-$func
+___
+} else {
+########################################################################
+# SHA512 for PPC32, X vector is off-loaded to stack...
+#
+#			|	sha512
+#			|	-m32
+# ----------------------+-----------------------
+# PPC74x0,gcc-4.0.1	|	+48%
+# POWER6,gcc-4.4.6	|	+124%(*)
+# POWER7,gcc-4.4.6	|	+79%(*)
+# e300,gcc-4.1.0	|	+167%
+#
+# (*)	~1/3 of -m64 result [and ~20% better than -m32 code generated
+#	by xlc-12.1]
+
+my $XOFF=$LOCALS;
+
+my @V=map("r$_",(16..31));	# A..H
+
+my ($s0,$s1,$t0,$t1,$t2,$t3,$a0,$a1,$a2,$a3)=map("r$_",(0,5,6,8..12,14,15));
+my ($x0,$x1)=("r3","r4");	# zaps $ctx and $inp
+
+sub ROUND_00_15_ppc32 {
+my ($i,	$ahi,$alo,$bhi,$blo,$chi,$clo,$dhi,$dlo,
+	$ehi,$elo,$fhi,$flo,$ghi,$glo,$hhi,$hlo)=@_;
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	lwz	$t2,`$SZ*($i%16)+($LITTLE_ENDIAN^4)`($Tbl)
+	 xor	$a0,$flo,$glo
+	lwz	$t3,`$SZ*($i%16)+($LITTLE_ENDIAN^0)`($Tbl)
+	 xor	$a1,$fhi,$ghi
+	addc	$hlo,$hlo,$t0			; h+=x[i]
+	stw	$t0,`$XOFF+0+$SZ*($i%16)`($sp)	; save x[i]
+
+	srwi	$s0,$elo,$Sigma1[0]
+	srwi	$s1,$ehi,$Sigma1[0]
+	 and	$a0,$a0,$elo
+	adde	$hhi,$hhi,$t1
+	 and	$a1,$a1,$ehi
+	stw	$t1,`$XOFF+4+$SZ*($i%16)`($sp)
+	srwi	$t0,$elo,$Sigma1[1]
+	srwi	$t1,$ehi,$Sigma1[1]
+	 addc	$hlo,$hlo,$t2			; h+=K512[i]
+	insrwi	$s0,$ehi,$Sigma1[0],0
+	insrwi	$s1,$elo,$Sigma1[0],0
+	 xor	$a0,$a0,$glo			; Ch(e,f,g)
+	 adde	$hhi,$hhi,$t3
+	 xor	$a1,$a1,$ghi
+	insrwi	$t0,$ehi,$Sigma1[1],0
+	insrwi	$t1,$elo,$Sigma1[1],0
+	 addc	$hlo,$hlo,$a0			; h+=Ch(e,f,g)
+	srwi	$t2,$ehi,$Sigma1[2]-32
+	srwi	$t3,$elo,$Sigma1[2]-32
+	xor	$s0,$s0,$t0
+	xor	$s1,$s1,$t1
+	insrwi	$t2,$elo,$Sigma1[2]-32,0
+	insrwi	$t3,$ehi,$Sigma1[2]-32,0
+	 xor	$a0,$alo,$blo			; a^b, b^c in next round
+	 adde	$hhi,$hhi,$a1
+	 xor	$a1,$ahi,$bhi
+	xor	$s0,$s0,$t2			; Sigma1(e)
+	xor	$s1,$s1,$t3
+
+	srwi	$t0,$alo,$Sigma0[0]
+	 and	$a2,$a2,$a0
+	 addc	$hlo,$hlo,$s0			; h+=Sigma1(e)
+	 and	$a3,$a3,$a1
+	srwi	$t1,$ahi,$Sigma0[0]
+	srwi	$s0,$ahi,$Sigma0[1]-32
+	 adde	$hhi,$hhi,$s1
+	srwi	$s1,$alo,$Sigma0[1]-32
+	insrwi	$t0,$ahi,$Sigma0[0],0
+	insrwi	$t1,$alo,$Sigma0[0],0
+	 xor	$a2,$a2,$blo			; Maj(a,b,c)
+	 addc	$dlo,$dlo,$hlo			; d+=h
+	 xor	$a3,$a3,$bhi
+	insrwi	$s0,$alo,$Sigma0[1]-32,0
+	insrwi	$s1,$ahi,$Sigma0[1]-32,0
+	 adde	$dhi,$dhi,$hhi
+	srwi	$t2,$ahi,$Sigma0[2]-32
+	srwi	$t3,$alo,$Sigma0[2]-32
+	xor	$s0,$s0,$t0
+	 addc	$hlo,$hlo,$a2			; h+=Maj(a,b,c)
+	xor	$s1,$s1,$t1
+	insrwi	$t2,$alo,$Sigma0[2]-32,0
+	insrwi	$t3,$ahi,$Sigma0[2]-32,0
+	 adde	$hhi,$hhi,$a3
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i>=15);
+	lwz	$t0,`$XOFF+0+$SZ*(($i+2)%16)`($sp)
+	lwz	$t1,`$XOFF+4+$SZ*(($i+2)%16)`($sp)
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i<15 && !$LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+	lwz	$t1,`$SZ*($i+1)+0`($inp)
+	lwz	$t0,`$SZ*($i+1)+4`($inp)
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i<15 && $LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+	lwz	$a2,`$SZ*($i+1)+0`($inp)
+	 lwz	$a3,`$SZ*($i+1)+4`($inp)
+	rotlwi	$t1,$a2,8
+	 rotlwi	$t0,$a3,8
+	rlwimi	$t1,$a2,24,0,7
+	 rlwimi	$t0,$a3,24,0,7
+	rlwimi	$t1,$a2,24,16,23
+	 rlwimi	$t0,$a3,24,16,23
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	xor	$s0,$s0,$t2			; Sigma0(a)
+	xor	$s1,$s1,$t3
+	addc	$hlo,$hlo,$s0			; h+=Sigma0(a)
+	adde	$hhi,$hhi,$s1
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i==15);
+	lwz	$x0,`$XOFF+0+$SZ*(($i+1)%16)`($sp)
+	lwz	$x1,`$XOFF+4+$SZ*(($i+1)%16)`($sp)
+___
+}
+sub ROUND_16_xx_ppc32 {
+my ($i,	$ahi,$alo,$bhi,$blo,$chi,$clo,$dhi,$dlo,
+	$ehi,$elo,$fhi,$flo,$ghi,$glo,$hhi,$hlo)=@_;
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	srwi	$s0,$t0,$sigma0[0]
+	srwi	$s1,$t1,$sigma0[0]
+	srwi	$t2,$t0,$sigma0[1]
+	srwi	$t3,$t1,$sigma0[1]
+	insrwi	$s0,$t1,$sigma0[0],0
+	insrwi	$s1,$t0,$sigma0[0],0
+	srwi	$a0,$t0,$sigma0[2]
+	insrwi	$t2,$t1,$sigma0[1],0
+	insrwi	$t3,$t0,$sigma0[1],0
+	insrwi	$a0,$t1,$sigma0[2],0
+	xor	$s0,$s0,$t2
+	 lwz	$t2,`$XOFF+0+$SZ*(($i+14)%16)`($sp)
+	srwi	$a1,$t1,$sigma0[2]
+	xor	$s1,$s1,$t3
+	 lwz	$t3,`$XOFF+4+$SZ*(($i+14)%16)`($sp)
+	xor	$a0,$a0,$s0
+	 srwi	$s0,$t2,$sigma1[0]
+	xor	$a1,$a1,$s1
+	 srwi	$s1,$t3,$sigma1[0]
+	addc	$x0,$x0,$a0			; x[i]+=sigma0(x[i+1])
+	 srwi	$a0,$t3,$sigma1[1]-32
+	insrwi	$s0,$t3,$sigma1[0],0
+	insrwi	$s1,$t2,$sigma1[0],0
+	adde	$x1,$x1,$a1
+	 srwi	$a1,$t2,$sigma1[1]-32
+
+	insrwi	$a0,$t2,$sigma1[1]-32,0
+	srwi	$t2,$t2,$sigma1[2]
+	insrwi	$a1,$t3,$sigma1[1]-32,0
+	insrwi	$t2,$t3,$sigma1[2],0
+	xor	$s0,$s0,$a0
+	 lwz	$a0,`$XOFF+0+$SZ*(($i+9)%16)`($sp)
+	srwi	$t3,$t3,$sigma1[2]
+	xor	$s1,$s1,$a1
+	 lwz	$a1,`$XOFF+4+$SZ*(($i+9)%16)`($sp)
+	xor	$s0,$s0,$t2
+	 addc	$x0,$x0,$a0			; x[i]+=x[i+9]
+	xor	$s1,$s1,$t3
+	 adde	$x1,$x1,$a1
+	addc	$x0,$x0,$s0			; x[i]+=sigma1(x[i+14])
+	adde	$x1,$x1,$s1
+___
+	($t0,$t1,$x0,$x1) = ($x0,$x1,$t0,$t1);
+	&ROUND_00_15_ppc32(@_);
+}
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.align	4
+Lsha2_block_private:
+___
+$code.=<<___ if (!$LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+	lwz	$t1,0($inp)
+	xor	$a2,@V[3],@V[5]		; B^C, magic seed
+	lwz	$t0,4($inp)
+	xor	$a3,@V[2],@V[4]
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+	lwz	$a1,0($inp)
+	xor	$a2,@V[3],@V[5]		; B^C, magic seed
+	lwz	$a0,4($inp)
+	xor	$a3,@V[2],@V[4]
+	rotlwi	$t1,$a1,8
+	 rotlwi	$t0,$a0,8
+	rlwimi	$t1,$a1,24,0,7
+	 rlwimi	$t0,$a0,24,0,7
+	rlwimi	$t1,$a1,24,16,23
+	 rlwimi	$t0,$a0,24,16,23
+___
+for($i=0;$i<16;$i++) {
+	&ROUND_00_15_ppc32($i,@V);
+	unshift(@V,pop(@V));	unshift(@V,pop(@V));
+	($a0,$a1,$a2,$a3) = ($a2,$a3,$a0,$a1);
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	li	$a0,`$rounds/16-1`
+	mtctr	$a0
+.align	4
+Lrounds:
+	addi	$Tbl,$Tbl,`16*$SZ`
+___
+for(;$i<32;$i++) {
+	&ROUND_16_xx_ppc32($i,@V);
+	unshift(@V,pop(@V));	unshift(@V,pop(@V));
+	($a0,$a1,$a2,$a3) = ($a2,$a3,$a0,$a1);
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	bdnz	Lrounds
+
+	$POP	$ctx,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*22`($sp)
+	$POP	$inp,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*23`($sp)	; inp pointer
+	$POP	$num,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*24`($sp)	; end pointer
+	subi	$Tbl,$Tbl,`($rounds-16)*$SZ`	; rewind Tbl
+
+	lwz	$t0,`$LITTLE_ENDIAN^0`($ctx)
+	lwz	$t1,`$LITTLE_ENDIAN^4`($ctx)
+	lwz	$t2,`$LITTLE_ENDIAN^8`($ctx)
+	lwz	$t3,`$LITTLE_ENDIAN^12`($ctx)
+	lwz	$a0,`$LITTLE_ENDIAN^16`($ctx)
+	lwz	$a1,`$LITTLE_ENDIAN^20`($ctx)
+	lwz	$a2,`$LITTLE_ENDIAN^24`($ctx)
+	addc	@V[1],@V[1],$t1
+	lwz	$a3,`$LITTLE_ENDIAN^28`($ctx)
+	adde	@V[0],@V[0],$t0
+	lwz	$t0,`$LITTLE_ENDIAN^32`($ctx)
+	addc	@V[3],@V[3],$t3
+	lwz	$t1,`$LITTLE_ENDIAN^36`($ctx)
+	adde	@V[2],@V[2],$t2
+	lwz	$t2,`$LITTLE_ENDIAN^40`($ctx)
+	addc	@V[5],@V[5],$a1
+	lwz	$t3,`$LITTLE_ENDIAN^44`($ctx)
+	adde	@V[4],@V[4],$a0
+	lwz	$a0,`$LITTLE_ENDIAN^48`($ctx)
+	addc	@V[7],@V[7],$a3
+	lwz	$a1,`$LITTLE_ENDIAN^52`($ctx)
+	adde	@V[6],@V[6],$a2
+	lwz	$a2,`$LITTLE_ENDIAN^56`($ctx)
+	addc	@V[9],@V[9],$t1
+	lwz	$a3,`$LITTLE_ENDIAN^60`($ctx)
+	adde	@V[8],@V[8],$t0
+	stw	@V[0],`$LITTLE_ENDIAN^0`($ctx)
+	stw	@V[1],`$LITTLE_ENDIAN^4`($ctx)
+	addc	@V[11],@V[11],$t3
+	stw	@V[2],`$LITTLE_ENDIAN^8`($ctx)
+	stw	@V[3],`$LITTLE_ENDIAN^12`($ctx)
+	adde	@V[10],@V[10],$t2
+	stw	@V[4],`$LITTLE_ENDIAN^16`($ctx)
+	stw	@V[5],`$LITTLE_ENDIAN^20`($ctx)
+	addc	@V[13],@V[13],$a1
+	stw	@V[6],`$LITTLE_ENDIAN^24`($ctx)
+	stw	@V[7],`$LITTLE_ENDIAN^28`($ctx)
+	adde	@V[12],@V[12],$a0
+	stw	@V[8],`$LITTLE_ENDIAN^32`($ctx)
+	stw	@V[9],`$LITTLE_ENDIAN^36`($ctx)
+	addc	@V[15],@V[15],$a3
+	stw	@V[10],`$LITTLE_ENDIAN^40`($ctx)
+	stw	@V[11],`$LITTLE_ENDIAN^44`($ctx)
+	adde	@V[14],@V[14],$a2
+	stw	@V[12],`$LITTLE_ENDIAN^48`($ctx)
+	stw	@V[13],`$LITTLE_ENDIAN^52`($ctx)
+	stw	@V[14],`$LITTLE_ENDIAN^56`($ctx)
+	stw	@V[15],`$LITTLE_ENDIAN^60`($ctx)
+
+	addi	$inp,$inp,`16*$SZ`		; advance inp
+	$PUSH	$inp,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*23`($sp)
+	$UCMP	$inp,$num
+	bne	Lsha2_block_private
+	blr
+	.long	0
+	.byte	0,12,0x14,0,0,0,0,0
+.size	$func,.-$func
+___
+}
+
+# Ugly hack here, because PPC assembler syntax seem to vary too
+# much from platforms to platform...
+$code.=<<___;
+.align	6
+LPICmeup:
+	mflr	r0
+	bcl	20,31,\$+4
+	mflr	$Tbl	; vvvvvv "distance" between . and 1st data entry
+	addi	$Tbl,$Tbl,`64-8`
+	mtlr	r0
+	blr
+	.long	0
+	.byte	0,12,0x14,0,0,0,0,0
+	.space	`64-9*4`
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($SZ==8);
+	.quad	0x428a2f98d728ae22,0x7137449123ef65cd
+	.quad	0xb5c0fbcfec4d3b2f,0xe9b5dba58189dbbc
+	.quad	0x3956c25bf348b538,0x59f111f1b605d019
+	.quad	0x923f82a4af194f9b,0xab1c5ed5da6d8118
+	.quad	0xd807aa98a3030242,0x12835b0145706fbe
+	.quad	0x243185be4ee4b28c,0x550c7dc3d5ffb4e2
+	.quad	0x72be5d74f27b896f,0x80deb1fe3b1696b1
+	.quad	0x9bdc06a725c71235,0xc19bf174cf692694
+	.quad	0xe49b69c19ef14ad2,0xefbe4786384f25e3
+	.quad	0x0fc19dc68b8cd5b5,0x240ca1cc77ac9c65
+	.quad	0x2de92c6f592b0275,0x4a7484aa6ea6e483
+	.quad	0x5cb0a9dcbd41fbd4,0x76f988da831153b5
+	.quad	0x983e5152ee66dfab,0xa831c66d2db43210
+	.quad	0xb00327c898fb213f,0xbf597fc7beef0ee4
+	.quad	0xc6e00bf33da88fc2,0xd5a79147930aa725
+	.quad	0x06ca6351e003826f,0x142929670a0e6e70
+	.quad	0x27b70a8546d22ffc,0x2e1b21385c26c926
+	.quad	0x4d2c6dfc5ac42aed,0x53380d139d95b3df
+	.quad	0x650a73548baf63de,0x766a0abb3c77b2a8
+	.quad	0x81c2c92e47edaee6,0x92722c851482353b
+	.quad	0xa2bfe8a14cf10364,0xa81a664bbc423001
+	.quad	0xc24b8b70d0f89791,0xc76c51a30654be30
+	.quad	0xd192e819d6ef5218,0xd69906245565a910
+	.quad	0xf40e35855771202a,0x106aa07032bbd1b8
+	.quad	0x19a4c116b8d2d0c8,0x1e376c085141ab53
+	.quad	0x2748774cdf8eeb99,0x34b0bcb5e19b48a8
+	.quad	0x391c0cb3c5c95a63,0x4ed8aa4ae3418acb
+	.quad	0x5b9cca4f7763e373,0x682e6ff3d6b2b8a3
+	.quad	0x748f82ee5defb2fc,0x78a5636f43172f60
+	.quad	0x84c87814a1f0ab72,0x8cc702081a6439ec
+	.quad	0x90befffa23631e28,0xa4506cebde82bde9
+	.quad	0xbef9a3f7b2c67915,0xc67178f2e372532b
+	.quad	0xca273eceea26619c,0xd186b8c721c0c207
+	.quad	0xeada7dd6cde0eb1e,0xf57d4f7fee6ed178
+	.quad	0x06f067aa72176fba,0x0a637dc5a2c898a6
+	.quad	0x113f9804bef90dae,0x1b710b35131c471b
+	.quad	0x28db77f523047d84,0x32caab7b40c72493
+	.quad	0x3c9ebe0a15c9bebc,0x431d67c49c100d4c
+	.quad	0x4cc5d4becb3e42b6,0x597f299cfc657e2a
+	.quad	0x5fcb6fab3ad6faec,0x6c44198c4a475817
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($SZ==4);
+	.long	0x428a2f98,0x71374491,0xb5c0fbcf,0xe9b5dba5
+	.long	0x3956c25b,0x59f111f1,0x923f82a4,0xab1c5ed5
+	.long	0xd807aa98,0x12835b01,0x243185be,0x550c7dc3
+	.long	0x72be5d74,0x80deb1fe,0x9bdc06a7,0xc19bf174
+	.long	0xe49b69c1,0xefbe4786,0x0fc19dc6,0x240ca1cc
+	.long	0x2de92c6f,0x4a7484aa,0x5cb0a9dc,0x76f988da
+	.long	0x983e5152,0xa831c66d,0xb00327c8,0xbf597fc7
+	.long	0xc6e00bf3,0xd5a79147,0x06ca6351,0x14292967
+	.long	0x27b70a85,0x2e1b2138,0x4d2c6dfc,0x53380d13
+	.long	0x650a7354,0x766a0abb,0x81c2c92e,0x92722c85
+	.long	0xa2bfe8a1,0xa81a664b,0xc24b8b70,0xc76c51a3
+	.long	0xd192e819,0xd6990624,0xf40e3585,0x106aa070
+	.long	0x19a4c116,0x1e376c08,0x2748774c,0x34b0bcb5
+	.long	0x391c0cb3,0x4ed8aa4a,0x5b9cca4f,0x682e6ff3
+	.long	0x748f82ee,0x78a5636f,0x84c87814,0x8cc70208
+	.long	0x90befffa,0xa4506ceb,0xbef9a3f7,0xc67178f2
+___
+
+$code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem;
+print $code;
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-s390x.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-s390x.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..427d6f8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-s390x.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,322 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2007-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+
+# SHA256/512 block procedures for s390x.
+
+# April 2007.
+#
+# sha256_block_data_order is reportedly >3 times faster than gcc 3.3
+# generated code (must be a bug in compiler, as improvement is
+# "pathologically" high, in particular in comparison to other SHA
+# modules). But the real twist is that it detects if hardware support
+# for SHA256 is available and in such case utilizes it. Then the
+# performance can reach >6.5x of assembler one for larger chunks.
+#
+# sha512_block_data_order is ~70% faster than gcc 3.3 generated code.
+
+# January 2009.
+#
+# Add support for hardware SHA512 and reschedule instructions to
+# favour dual-issue z10 pipeline. Hardware SHA256/512 is ~4.7x faster
+# than software.
+
+# November 2010.
+#
+# Adapt for -m31 build. If kernel supports what's called "highgprs"
+# feature on Linux [see /proc/cpuinfo], it's possible to use 64-bit
+# instructions and achieve "64-bit" performance even in 31-bit legacy
+# application context. The feature is not specific to any particular
+# processor, as long as it's "z-CPU". Latter implies that the code
+# remains z/Architecture specific. On z990 SHA256 was measured to
+# perform 2.4x and SHA512 - 13x better than code generated by gcc 4.3.
+
+$flavour = shift;
+
+if ($flavour =~ /3[12]/) {
+	$SIZE_T=4;
+	$g="";
+} else {
+	$SIZE_T=8;
+	$g="g";
+}
+
+$t0="%r0";
+$t1="%r1";
+$ctx="%r2";	$t2="%r2";
+$inp="%r3";
+$len="%r4";	# used as index in inner loop
+
+$A="%r5";
+$B="%r6";
+$C="%r7";
+$D="%r8";
+$E="%r9";
+$F="%r10";
+$G="%r11";
+$H="%r12";	@V=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$F,$G,$H);
+$tbl="%r13";
+$T1="%r14";
+$sp="%r15";
+
+while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {}
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+if ($output =~ /512/) {
+	$label="512";
+	$SZ=8;
+	$LD="lg";	# load from memory
+	$ST="stg";	# store to memory
+	$ADD="alg";	# add with memory operand
+	$ROT="rllg";	# rotate left
+	$SHR="srlg";	# logical right shift [see even at the end]
+	@Sigma0=(25,30,36);
+	@Sigma1=(23,46,50);
+	@sigma0=(56,63, 7);
+	@sigma1=( 3,45, 6);
+	$rounds=80;
+	$kimdfunc=3;	# 0 means unknown/unsupported/unimplemented/disabled
+} else {
+	$label="256";
+	$SZ=4;
+	$LD="llgf";	# load from memory
+	$ST="st";	# store to memory
+	$ADD="al";	# add with memory operand
+	$ROT="rll";	# rotate left
+	$SHR="srl";	# logical right shift
+	@Sigma0=(10,19,30);
+	@Sigma1=( 7,21,26);
+	@sigma0=(14,25, 3);
+	@sigma1=(13,15,10);
+	$rounds=64;
+	$kimdfunc=2;	# magic function code for kimd instruction
+}
+$Func="sha${label}_block_data_order";
+$Table="K${label}";
+$stdframe=16*$SIZE_T+4*8;
+$frame=$stdframe+16*$SZ;
+
+sub BODY_00_15 {
+my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f,$g,$h) = @_;
+
+$code.=<<___ if ($i<16);
+	$LD	$T1,`$i*$SZ`($inp)	### $i
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	$ROT	$t0,$e,$Sigma1[0]
+	$ROT	$t1,$e,$Sigma1[1]
+	 lgr	$t2,$f
+	xgr	$t0,$t1
+	$ROT	$t1,$t1,`$Sigma1[2]-$Sigma1[1]`
+	 xgr	$t2,$g
+	$ST	$T1,`$stdframe+$SZ*($i%16)`($sp)
+	xgr	$t0,$t1			# Sigma1(e)
+	algr	$T1,$h			# T1+=h
+	 ngr	$t2,$e
+	 lgr	$t1,$a
+	algr	$T1,$t0			# T1+=Sigma1(e)
+	$ROT	$h,$a,$Sigma0[0]
+	 xgr	$t2,$g			# Ch(e,f,g)
+	$ADD	$T1,`$i*$SZ`($len,$tbl)	# T1+=K[i]
+	$ROT	$t0,$a,$Sigma0[1]
+	algr	$T1,$t2			# T1+=Ch(e,f,g)
+	 ogr	$t1,$b
+	xgr	$h,$t0
+	 lgr	$t2,$a
+	 ngr	$t1,$c
+	$ROT	$t0,$t0,`$Sigma0[2]-$Sigma0[1]`
+	xgr	$h,$t0			# h=Sigma0(a)
+	 ngr	$t2,$b
+	algr	$h,$T1			# h+=T1
+	 ogr	$t2,$t1			# Maj(a,b,c)
+	algr	$d,$T1			# d+=T1
+	algr	$h,$t2			# h+=Maj(a,b,c)
+___
+}
+
+sub BODY_16_XX {
+my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f,$g,$h) = @_;
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	$LD	$T1,`$stdframe+$SZ*(($i+1)%16)`($sp)	### $i
+	$LD	$t1,`$stdframe+$SZ*(($i+14)%16)`($sp)
+	$ROT	$t0,$T1,$sigma0[0]
+	$SHR	$T1,$sigma0[2]
+	$ROT	$t2,$t0,`$sigma0[1]-$sigma0[0]`
+	xgr	$T1,$t0
+	$ROT	$t0,$t1,$sigma1[0]
+	xgr	$T1,$t2					# sigma0(X[i+1])
+	$SHR	$t1,$sigma1[2]
+	$ADD	$T1,`$stdframe+$SZ*($i%16)`($sp)	# +=X[i]
+	xgr	$t1,$t0
+	$ROT	$t0,$t0,`$sigma1[1]-$sigma1[0]`
+	$ADD	$T1,`$stdframe+$SZ*(($i+9)%16)`($sp)	# +=X[i+9]
+	xgr	$t1,$t0				# sigma1(X[i+14])
+	algr	$T1,$t1				# +=sigma1(X[i+14])
+___
+	&BODY_00_15(@_);
+}
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.text
+.align	64
+.type	$Table,\@object
+$Table:
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($SZ==4);
+	.long	0x428a2f98,0x71374491,0xb5c0fbcf,0xe9b5dba5
+	.long	0x3956c25b,0x59f111f1,0x923f82a4,0xab1c5ed5
+	.long	0xd807aa98,0x12835b01,0x243185be,0x550c7dc3
+	.long	0x72be5d74,0x80deb1fe,0x9bdc06a7,0xc19bf174
+	.long	0xe49b69c1,0xefbe4786,0x0fc19dc6,0x240ca1cc
+	.long	0x2de92c6f,0x4a7484aa,0x5cb0a9dc,0x76f988da
+	.long	0x983e5152,0xa831c66d,0xb00327c8,0xbf597fc7
+	.long	0xc6e00bf3,0xd5a79147,0x06ca6351,0x14292967
+	.long	0x27b70a85,0x2e1b2138,0x4d2c6dfc,0x53380d13
+	.long	0x650a7354,0x766a0abb,0x81c2c92e,0x92722c85
+	.long	0xa2bfe8a1,0xa81a664b,0xc24b8b70,0xc76c51a3
+	.long	0xd192e819,0xd6990624,0xf40e3585,0x106aa070
+	.long	0x19a4c116,0x1e376c08,0x2748774c,0x34b0bcb5
+	.long	0x391c0cb3,0x4ed8aa4a,0x5b9cca4f,0x682e6ff3
+	.long	0x748f82ee,0x78a5636f,0x84c87814,0x8cc70208
+	.long	0x90befffa,0xa4506ceb,0xbef9a3f7,0xc67178f2
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($SZ==8);
+	.quad	0x428a2f98d728ae22,0x7137449123ef65cd
+	.quad	0xb5c0fbcfec4d3b2f,0xe9b5dba58189dbbc
+	.quad	0x3956c25bf348b538,0x59f111f1b605d019
+	.quad	0x923f82a4af194f9b,0xab1c5ed5da6d8118
+	.quad	0xd807aa98a3030242,0x12835b0145706fbe
+	.quad	0x243185be4ee4b28c,0x550c7dc3d5ffb4e2
+	.quad	0x72be5d74f27b896f,0x80deb1fe3b1696b1
+	.quad	0x9bdc06a725c71235,0xc19bf174cf692694
+	.quad	0xe49b69c19ef14ad2,0xefbe4786384f25e3
+	.quad	0x0fc19dc68b8cd5b5,0x240ca1cc77ac9c65
+	.quad	0x2de92c6f592b0275,0x4a7484aa6ea6e483
+	.quad	0x5cb0a9dcbd41fbd4,0x76f988da831153b5
+	.quad	0x983e5152ee66dfab,0xa831c66d2db43210
+	.quad	0xb00327c898fb213f,0xbf597fc7beef0ee4
+	.quad	0xc6e00bf33da88fc2,0xd5a79147930aa725
+	.quad	0x06ca6351e003826f,0x142929670a0e6e70
+	.quad	0x27b70a8546d22ffc,0x2e1b21385c26c926
+	.quad	0x4d2c6dfc5ac42aed,0x53380d139d95b3df
+	.quad	0x650a73548baf63de,0x766a0abb3c77b2a8
+	.quad	0x81c2c92e47edaee6,0x92722c851482353b
+	.quad	0xa2bfe8a14cf10364,0xa81a664bbc423001
+	.quad	0xc24b8b70d0f89791,0xc76c51a30654be30
+	.quad	0xd192e819d6ef5218,0xd69906245565a910
+	.quad	0xf40e35855771202a,0x106aa07032bbd1b8
+	.quad	0x19a4c116b8d2d0c8,0x1e376c085141ab53
+	.quad	0x2748774cdf8eeb99,0x34b0bcb5e19b48a8
+	.quad	0x391c0cb3c5c95a63,0x4ed8aa4ae3418acb
+	.quad	0x5b9cca4f7763e373,0x682e6ff3d6b2b8a3
+	.quad	0x748f82ee5defb2fc,0x78a5636f43172f60
+	.quad	0x84c87814a1f0ab72,0x8cc702081a6439ec
+	.quad	0x90befffa23631e28,0xa4506cebde82bde9
+	.quad	0xbef9a3f7b2c67915,0xc67178f2e372532b
+	.quad	0xca273eceea26619c,0xd186b8c721c0c207
+	.quad	0xeada7dd6cde0eb1e,0xf57d4f7fee6ed178
+	.quad	0x06f067aa72176fba,0x0a637dc5a2c898a6
+	.quad	0x113f9804bef90dae,0x1b710b35131c471b
+	.quad	0x28db77f523047d84,0x32caab7b40c72493
+	.quad	0x3c9ebe0a15c9bebc,0x431d67c49c100d4c
+	.quad	0x4cc5d4becb3e42b6,0x597f299cfc657e2a
+	.quad	0x5fcb6fab3ad6faec,0x6c44198c4a475817
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+.size	$Table,.-$Table
+.globl	$Func
+.type	$Func,\@function
+$Func:
+	sllg	$len,$len,`log(16*$SZ)/log(2)`
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($kimdfunc);
+	larl	%r1,OPENSSL_s390xcap_P
+	lg	%r0,16(%r1)	# check kimd capabilities
+	tmhh	%r0,`0x8000>>$kimdfunc`
+	jz	.Lsoftware
+	lghi	%r0,$kimdfunc
+	lgr	%r1,$ctx
+	lgr	%r2,$inp
+	lgr	%r3,$len
+	.long	0xb93e0002	# kimd %r0,%r2
+	brc	1,.-4		# pay attention to "partial completion"
+	br	%r14
+.align	16
+.Lsoftware:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	lghi	%r1,-$frame
+	la	$len,0($len,$inp)
+	stm${g}	$ctx,%r15,`2*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+	lgr	%r0,$sp
+	la	$sp,0(%r1,$sp)
+	st${g}	%r0,0($sp)
+
+	larl	$tbl,$Table
+	$LD	$A,`0*$SZ`($ctx)
+	$LD	$B,`1*$SZ`($ctx)
+	$LD	$C,`2*$SZ`($ctx)
+	$LD	$D,`3*$SZ`($ctx)
+	$LD	$E,`4*$SZ`($ctx)
+	$LD	$F,`5*$SZ`($ctx)
+	$LD	$G,`6*$SZ`($ctx)
+	$LD	$H,`7*$SZ`($ctx)
+
+.Lloop:
+	lghi	$len,0
+___
+for ($i=0;$i<16;$i++)	{ &BODY_00_15($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+$code.=".Lrounds_16_xx:\n";
+for (;$i<32;$i++)	{ &BODY_16_XX($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+$code.=<<___;
+	aghi	$len,`16*$SZ`
+	lghi	$t0,`($rounds-16)*$SZ`
+	clgr	$len,$t0
+	jne	.Lrounds_16_xx
+
+	l${g}	$ctx,`$frame+2*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+	la	$inp,`16*$SZ`($inp)
+	$ADD	$A,`0*$SZ`($ctx)
+	$ADD	$B,`1*$SZ`($ctx)
+	$ADD	$C,`2*$SZ`($ctx)
+	$ADD	$D,`3*$SZ`($ctx)
+	$ADD	$E,`4*$SZ`($ctx)
+	$ADD	$F,`5*$SZ`($ctx)
+	$ADD	$G,`6*$SZ`($ctx)
+	$ADD	$H,`7*$SZ`($ctx)
+	$ST	$A,`0*$SZ`($ctx)
+	$ST	$B,`1*$SZ`($ctx)
+	$ST	$C,`2*$SZ`($ctx)
+	$ST	$D,`3*$SZ`($ctx)
+	$ST	$E,`4*$SZ`($ctx)
+	$ST	$F,`5*$SZ`($ctx)
+	$ST	$G,`6*$SZ`($ctx)
+	$ST	$H,`7*$SZ`($ctx)
+	cl${g}	$inp,`$frame+4*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+	jne	.Lloop
+
+	lm${g}	%r6,%r15,`$frame+6*$SIZE_T`($sp)	
+	br	%r14
+.size	$Func,.-$Func
+.string	"SHA${label} block transform for s390x, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+___
+
+$code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem;
+# unlike 32-bit shift 64-bit one takes three arguments
+$code =~ s/(srlg\s+)(%r[0-9]+),/$1$2,$2,/gm;
+
+print $code;
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-sparcv9.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-sparcv9.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4a1ce5f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-sparcv9.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,857 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2007-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+#
+# Hardware SPARC T4 support by David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>.
+# ====================================================================
+
+# SHA256 performance improvement over compiler generated code varies
+# from 40% for Sun C [32-bit build] to 70% for gcc [3.3, 64-bit
+# build]. Just like in SHA1 module I aim to ensure scalability on
+# UltraSPARC T1 by packing X[16] to 8 64-bit registers.
+
+# SHA512 on pre-T1 UltraSPARC.
+#
+# Performance is >75% better than 64-bit code generated by Sun C and
+# over 2x than 32-bit code. X[16] resides on stack, but access to it
+# is scheduled for L2 latency and staged through 32 least significant
+# bits of %l0-%l7. The latter is done to achieve 32-/64-bit ABI
+# duality. Nevetheless it's ~40% faster than SHA256, which is pretty
+# good [optimal coefficient is 50%].
+#
+# SHA512 on UltraSPARC T1.
+#
+# It's not any faster than 64-bit code generated by Sun C 5.8. This is
+# because 64-bit code generator has the advantage of using 64-bit
+# loads(*) to access X[16], which I consciously traded for 32-/64-bit
+# ABI duality [as per above]. But it surpasses 32-bit Sun C generated
+# code by 60%, not to mention that it doesn't suffer from severe decay
+# when running 4 times physical cores threads and that it leaves gcc
+# [3.4] behind by over 4x factor! If compared to SHA256, single thread
+# performance is only 10% better, but overall throughput for maximum
+# amount of threads for given CPU exceeds corresponding one of SHA256
+# by 30% [again, optimal coefficient is 50%].
+#
+# (*)	Unlike pre-T1 UltraSPARC loads on T1 are executed strictly
+#	in-order, i.e. load instruction has to complete prior next
+#	instruction in given thread is executed, even if the latter is
+#	not dependent on load result! This means that on T1 two 32-bit
+#	loads are always slower than one 64-bit load. Once again this
+#	is unlike pre-T1 UltraSPARC, where, if scheduled appropriately,
+#	2x32-bit loads can be as fast as 1x64-bit ones.
+#
+# SPARC T4 SHA256/512 hardware achieves 3.17/2.01 cycles per byte,
+# which is 9.3x/11.1x faster than software. Multi-process benchmark
+# saturates at 11.5x single-process result on 8-core processor, or
+# ~11/16GBps per 2.85GHz socket.
+
+$output=pop;
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+if ($output =~ /512/) {
+	$label="512";
+	$SZ=8;
+	$LD="ldx";		# load from memory
+	$ST="stx";		# store to memory
+	$SLL="sllx";		# shift left logical
+	$SRL="srlx";		# shift right logical
+	@Sigma0=(28,34,39);
+	@Sigma1=(14,18,41);
+	@sigma0=( 7, 1, 8);	# right shift first
+	@sigma1=( 6,19,61);	# right shift first
+	$lastK=0x817;
+	$rounds=80;
+	$align=4;
+
+	$locals=16*$SZ;		# X[16]
+
+	$A="%o0";
+	$B="%o1";
+	$C="%o2";
+	$D="%o3";
+	$E="%o4";
+	$F="%o5";
+	$G="%g1";
+	$H="%o7";
+	@V=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$F,$G,$H);
+} else {
+	$label="256";
+	$SZ=4;
+	$LD="ld";		# load from memory
+	$ST="st";		# store to memory
+	$SLL="sll";		# shift left logical
+	$SRL="srl";		# shift right logical
+	@Sigma0=( 2,13,22);
+	@Sigma1=( 6,11,25);
+	@sigma0=( 3, 7,18);	# right shift first
+	@sigma1=(10,17,19);	# right shift first
+	$lastK=0x8f2;
+	$rounds=64;
+	$align=8;
+
+	$locals=0;		# X[16] is register resident
+	@X=("%o0","%o1","%o2","%o3","%o4","%o5","%g1","%o7");
+	
+	$A="%l0";
+	$B="%l1";
+	$C="%l2";
+	$D="%l3";
+	$E="%l4";
+	$F="%l5";
+	$G="%l6";
+	$H="%l7";
+	@V=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$F,$G,$H);
+}
+$T1="%g2";
+$tmp0="%g3";
+$tmp1="%g4";
+$tmp2="%g5";
+
+$ctx="%i0";
+$inp="%i1";
+$len="%i2";
+$Ktbl="%i3";
+$tmp31="%i4";
+$tmp32="%i5";
+
+########### SHA256
+$Xload = sub {
+my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f,$g,$h)=@_;
+
+    if ($i==0) {
+$code.=<<___;
+	ldx	[$inp+0],@X[0]
+	ldx	[$inp+16],@X[2]
+	ldx	[$inp+32],@X[4]
+	ldx	[$inp+48],@X[6]
+	ldx	[$inp+8],@X[1]
+	ldx	[$inp+24],@X[3]
+	subcc	%g0,$tmp31,$tmp32 ! should be 64-$tmp31, but -$tmp31 works too
+	ldx	[$inp+40],@X[5]
+	bz,pt	%icc,.Laligned
+	ldx	[$inp+56],@X[7]
+
+	sllx	@X[0],$tmp31,@X[0]
+	ldx	[$inp+64],$T1
+___
+for($j=0;$j<7;$j++)
+{   $code.=<<___;
+	srlx	@X[$j+1],$tmp32,$tmp1
+	sllx	@X[$j+1],$tmp31,@X[$j+1]
+	or	$tmp1,@X[$j],@X[$j]
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	srlx	$T1,$tmp32,$T1
+	or	$T1,@X[7],@X[7]
+.Laligned:
+___
+    }
+
+    if ($i&1) {
+	$code.="\tadd	@X[$i/2],$h,$T1\n";
+    } else {
+	$code.="\tsrlx	@X[$i/2],32,$T1\n\tadd	$h,$T1,$T1\n";
+    }
+} if ($SZ==4);
+
+########### SHA512
+$Xload = sub {
+my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f,$g,$h)=@_;
+my @pair=("%l".eval(($i*2)%8),"%l".eval(($i*2)%8+1),"%l".eval((($i+1)*2)%8));
+
+$code.=<<___ if ($i==0);
+	ld	[$inp+0],%l0
+	ld	[$inp+4],%l1
+	ld	[$inp+8],%l2
+	ld	[$inp+12],%l3
+	ld	[$inp+16],%l4
+	ld	[$inp+20],%l5
+	ld	[$inp+24],%l6
+	cmp	$tmp31,0
+	ld	[$inp+28],%l7
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i<15);
+	sllx	@pair[1],$tmp31,$tmp2	! Xload($i)
+	add	$tmp31,32,$tmp0
+	sllx	@pair[0],$tmp0,$tmp1
+	`"ld	[$inp+".eval(32+0+$i*8)."],@pair[0]"	if ($i<12)`
+	srlx	@pair[2],$tmp32,@pair[1]
+	or	$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp2
+	or	@pair[1],$tmp2,$tmp2
+	`"ld	[$inp+".eval(32+4+$i*8)."],@pair[1]"	if ($i<12)`
+	add	$h,$tmp2,$T1
+	$ST	$tmp2,[%sp+STACK_BIAS+STACK_FRAME+`$i*$SZ`]
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i==12);
+	bnz,a,pn	%icc,.+8
+	ld	[$inp+128],%l0
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i==15);
+	ld	[%sp+STACK_BIAS+STACK_FRAME+`(($i+1+1)%16)*$SZ+0`],%l2
+	sllx	@pair[1],$tmp31,$tmp2	! Xload($i)
+	add	$tmp31,32,$tmp0
+	ld	[%sp+STACK_BIAS+STACK_FRAME+`(($i+1+1)%16)*$SZ+4`],%l3
+	sllx	@pair[0],$tmp0,$tmp1
+	ld	[%sp+STACK_BIAS+STACK_FRAME+`(($i+1+9)%16)*$SZ+0`],%l4
+	srlx	@pair[2],$tmp32,@pair[1]
+	or	$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp2
+	ld	[%sp+STACK_BIAS+STACK_FRAME+`(($i+1+9)%16)*$SZ+4`],%l5
+	or	@pair[1],$tmp2,$tmp2
+	ld	[%sp+STACK_BIAS+STACK_FRAME+`(($i+1+14)%16)*$SZ+0`],%l6
+	add	$h,$tmp2,$T1
+	$ST	$tmp2,[%sp+STACK_BIAS+STACK_FRAME+`$i*$SZ`]
+	ld	[%sp+STACK_BIAS+STACK_FRAME+`(($i+1+14)%16)*$SZ+4`],%l7
+	ld	[%sp+STACK_BIAS+STACK_FRAME+`(($i+1+0)%16)*$SZ+0`],%l0
+	ld	[%sp+STACK_BIAS+STACK_FRAME+`(($i+1+0)%16)*$SZ+4`],%l1
+___
+} if ($SZ==8);
+
+########### common
+sub BODY_00_15 {
+my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f,$g,$h)=@_;
+
+    if ($i<16) {
+	&$Xload(@_);
+    } else {
+	$code.="\tadd	$h,$T1,$T1\n";
+    }
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	$SRL	$e,@Sigma1[0],$h	!! $i
+	xor	$f,$g,$tmp2
+	$SLL	$e,`$SZ*8-@Sigma1[2]`,$tmp1
+	and	$e,$tmp2,$tmp2
+	$SRL	$e,@Sigma1[1],$tmp0
+	xor	$tmp1,$h,$h
+	$SLL	$e,`$SZ*8-@Sigma1[1]`,$tmp1
+	xor	$tmp0,$h,$h
+	$SRL	$e,@Sigma1[2],$tmp0
+	xor	$tmp1,$h,$h
+	$SLL	$e,`$SZ*8-@Sigma1[0]`,$tmp1
+	xor	$tmp0,$h,$h
+	xor	$g,$tmp2,$tmp2		! Ch(e,f,g)
+	xor	$tmp1,$h,$tmp0		! Sigma1(e)
+
+	$SRL	$a,@Sigma0[0],$h
+	add	$tmp2,$T1,$T1
+	$LD	[$Ktbl+`$i*$SZ`],$tmp2	! K[$i]
+	$SLL	$a,`$SZ*8-@Sigma0[2]`,$tmp1
+	add	$tmp0,$T1,$T1
+	$SRL	$a,@Sigma0[1],$tmp0
+	xor	$tmp1,$h,$h
+	$SLL	$a,`$SZ*8-@Sigma0[1]`,$tmp1
+	xor	$tmp0,$h,$h
+	$SRL	$a,@Sigma0[2],$tmp0
+	xor	$tmp1,$h,$h	
+	$SLL	$a,`$SZ*8-@Sigma0[0]`,$tmp1
+	xor	$tmp0,$h,$h
+	xor	$tmp1,$h,$h		! Sigma0(a)
+
+	or	$a,$b,$tmp0
+	and	$a,$b,$tmp1
+	and	$c,$tmp0,$tmp0
+	or	$tmp0,$tmp1,$tmp1	! Maj(a,b,c)
+	add	$tmp2,$T1,$T1		! +=K[$i]
+	add	$tmp1,$h,$h
+
+	add	$T1,$d,$d
+	add	$T1,$h,$h
+___
+}
+
+########### SHA256
+$BODY_16_XX = sub {
+my $i=@_[0];
+my $xi;
+
+    if ($i&1) {
+	$xi=$tmp32;
+	$code.="\tsrlx	@X[(($i+1)/2)%8],32,$xi\n";
+    } else {
+	$xi=@X[(($i+1)/2)%8];
+    }
+$code.=<<___;
+	srl	$xi,@sigma0[0],$T1		!! Xupdate($i)
+	sll	$xi,`32-@sigma0[2]`,$tmp1
+	srl	$xi,@sigma0[1],$tmp0
+	xor	$tmp1,$T1,$T1
+	sll	$tmp1,`@sigma0[2]-@sigma0[1]`,$tmp1
+	xor	$tmp0,$T1,$T1
+	srl	$xi,@sigma0[2],$tmp0
+	xor	$tmp1,$T1,$T1
+___
+    if ($i&1) {
+	$xi=@X[(($i+14)/2)%8];
+    } else {
+	$xi=$tmp32;
+	$code.="\tsrlx	@X[(($i+14)/2)%8],32,$xi\n";
+    }
+$code.=<<___;
+	srl	$xi,@sigma1[0],$tmp2
+	xor	$tmp0,$T1,$T1			! T1=sigma0(X[i+1])
+	sll	$xi,`32-@sigma1[2]`,$tmp1
+	srl	$xi,@sigma1[1],$tmp0
+	xor	$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp2
+	sll	$tmp1,`@sigma1[2]-@sigma1[1]`,$tmp1
+	xor	$tmp0,$tmp2,$tmp2
+	srl	$xi,@sigma1[2],$tmp0
+	xor	$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp2
+___
+    if ($i&1) {
+	$xi=@X[($i/2)%8];
+$code.=<<___;
+	srlx	@X[(($i+9)/2)%8],32,$tmp1	! X[i+9]
+	xor	$tmp0,$tmp2,$tmp2		! sigma1(X[i+14])
+	srl	@X[($i/2)%8],0,$tmp0
+	add	$tmp2,$tmp1,$tmp1
+	add	$xi,$T1,$T1			! +=X[i]
+	xor	$tmp0,@X[($i/2)%8],@X[($i/2)%8]
+	add	$tmp1,$T1,$T1
+
+	srl	$T1,0,$T1
+	or	$T1,@X[($i/2)%8],@X[($i/2)%8]
+___
+    } else {
+	$xi=@X[(($i+9)/2)%8];
+$code.=<<___;
+	srlx	@X[($i/2)%8],32,$tmp1		! X[i]
+	xor	$tmp0,$tmp2,$tmp2		! sigma1(X[i+14])
+	add	$xi,$T1,$T1			! +=X[i+9]
+	add	$tmp2,$tmp1,$tmp1
+	srl	@X[($i/2)%8],0,@X[($i/2)%8]
+	add	$tmp1,$T1,$T1
+
+	sllx	$T1,32,$tmp0
+	or	$tmp0,@X[($i/2)%8],@X[($i/2)%8]
+___
+    }
+    &BODY_00_15(@_);
+} if ($SZ==4);
+
+########### SHA512
+$BODY_16_XX = sub {
+my $i=@_[0];
+my @pair=("%l".eval(($i*2)%8),"%l".eval(($i*2)%8+1));
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	sllx	%l2,32,$tmp0		!! Xupdate($i)
+	or	%l3,$tmp0,$tmp0
+
+	srlx	$tmp0,@sigma0[0],$T1
+	ld	[%sp+STACK_BIAS+STACK_FRAME+`(($i+1+1)%16)*$SZ+0`],%l2
+	sllx	$tmp0,`64-@sigma0[2]`,$tmp1
+	ld	[%sp+STACK_BIAS+STACK_FRAME+`(($i+1+1)%16)*$SZ+4`],%l3
+	srlx	$tmp0,@sigma0[1],$tmp0
+	xor	$tmp1,$T1,$T1
+	sllx	$tmp1,`@sigma0[2]-@sigma0[1]`,$tmp1
+	xor	$tmp0,$T1,$T1
+	srlx	$tmp0,`@sigma0[2]-@sigma0[1]`,$tmp0
+	xor	$tmp1,$T1,$T1
+	sllx	%l6,32,$tmp2
+	xor	$tmp0,$T1,$T1		! sigma0(X[$i+1])
+	or	%l7,$tmp2,$tmp2
+
+	srlx	$tmp2,@sigma1[0],$tmp1
+	ld	[%sp+STACK_BIAS+STACK_FRAME+`(($i+1+14)%16)*$SZ+0`],%l6
+	sllx	$tmp2,`64-@sigma1[2]`,$tmp0
+	ld	[%sp+STACK_BIAS+STACK_FRAME+`(($i+1+14)%16)*$SZ+4`],%l7
+	srlx	$tmp2,@sigma1[1],$tmp2
+	xor	$tmp0,$tmp1,$tmp1
+	sllx	$tmp0,`@sigma1[2]-@sigma1[1]`,$tmp0
+	xor	$tmp2,$tmp1,$tmp1
+	srlx	$tmp2,`@sigma1[2]-@sigma1[1]`,$tmp2
+	xor	$tmp0,$tmp1,$tmp1
+	sllx	%l4,32,$tmp0
+	xor	$tmp2,$tmp1,$tmp1	! sigma1(X[$i+14])
+	ld	[%sp+STACK_BIAS+STACK_FRAME+`(($i+1+9)%16)*$SZ+0`],%l4
+	or	%l5,$tmp0,$tmp0
+	ld	[%sp+STACK_BIAS+STACK_FRAME+`(($i+1+9)%16)*$SZ+4`],%l5
+
+	sllx	%l0,32,$tmp2
+	add	$tmp1,$T1,$T1
+	ld	[%sp+STACK_BIAS+STACK_FRAME+`(($i+1+0)%16)*$SZ+0`],%l0
+	or	%l1,$tmp2,$tmp2
+	add	$tmp0,$T1,$T1		! +=X[$i+9]
+	ld	[%sp+STACK_BIAS+STACK_FRAME+`(($i+1+0)%16)*$SZ+4`],%l1
+	add	$tmp2,$T1,$T1		! +=X[$i]
+	$ST	$T1,[%sp+STACK_BIAS+STACK_FRAME+`($i%16)*$SZ`]
+___
+    &BODY_00_15(@_);
+} if ($SZ==8);
+
+$code.=<<___;
+#include "sparc_arch.h"
+
+#ifdef __arch64__
+.register	%g2,#scratch
+.register	%g3,#scratch
+#endif
+
+.section	".text",#alloc,#execinstr
+
+.align	64
+K${label}:
+.type	K${label},#object
+___
+if ($SZ==4) {
+$code.=<<___;
+	.long	0x428a2f98, 0x71374491, 0xb5c0fbcf, 0xe9b5dba5
+	.long	0x3956c25b, 0x59f111f1, 0x923f82a4, 0xab1c5ed5
+	.long	0xd807aa98, 0x12835b01, 0x243185be, 0x550c7dc3
+	.long	0x72be5d74, 0x80deb1fe, 0x9bdc06a7, 0xc19bf174
+	.long	0xe49b69c1, 0xefbe4786, 0x0fc19dc6, 0x240ca1cc
+	.long	0x2de92c6f, 0x4a7484aa, 0x5cb0a9dc, 0x76f988da
+	.long	0x983e5152, 0xa831c66d, 0xb00327c8, 0xbf597fc7
+	.long	0xc6e00bf3, 0xd5a79147, 0x06ca6351, 0x14292967
+	.long	0x27b70a85, 0x2e1b2138, 0x4d2c6dfc, 0x53380d13
+	.long	0x650a7354, 0x766a0abb, 0x81c2c92e, 0x92722c85
+	.long	0xa2bfe8a1, 0xa81a664b, 0xc24b8b70, 0xc76c51a3
+	.long	0xd192e819, 0xd6990624, 0xf40e3585, 0x106aa070
+	.long	0x19a4c116, 0x1e376c08, 0x2748774c, 0x34b0bcb5
+	.long	0x391c0cb3, 0x4ed8aa4a, 0x5b9cca4f, 0x682e6ff3
+	.long	0x748f82ee, 0x78a5636f, 0x84c87814, 0x8cc70208
+	.long	0x90befffa, 0xa4506ceb, 0xbef9a3f7, 0xc67178f2
+___
+} else {
+$code.=<<___;
+	.long	0x428a2f98,0xd728ae22, 0x71374491,0x23ef65cd
+	.long	0xb5c0fbcf,0xec4d3b2f, 0xe9b5dba5,0x8189dbbc
+	.long	0x3956c25b,0xf348b538, 0x59f111f1,0xb605d019
+	.long	0x923f82a4,0xaf194f9b, 0xab1c5ed5,0xda6d8118
+	.long	0xd807aa98,0xa3030242, 0x12835b01,0x45706fbe
+	.long	0x243185be,0x4ee4b28c, 0x550c7dc3,0xd5ffb4e2
+	.long	0x72be5d74,0xf27b896f, 0x80deb1fe,0x3b1696b1
+	.long	0x9bdc06a7,0x25c71235, 0xc19bf174,0xcf692694
+	.long	0xe49b69c1,0x9ef14ad2, 0xefbe4786,0x384f25e3
+	.long	0x0fc19dc6,0x8b8cd5b5, 0x240ca1cc,0x77ac9c65
+	.long	0x2de92c6f,0x592b0275, 0x4a7484aa,0x6ea6e483
+	.long	0x5cb0a9dc,0xbd41fbd4, 0x76f988da,0x831153b5
+	.long	0x983e5152,0xee66dfab, 0xa831c66d,0x2db43210
+	.long	0xb00327c8,0x98fb213f, 0xbf597fc7,0xbeef0ee4
+	.long	0xc6e00bf3,0x3da88fc2, 0xd5a79147,0x930aa725
+	.long	0x06ca6351,0xe003826f, 0x14292967,0x0a0e6e70
+	.long	0x27b70a85,0x46d22ffc, 0x2e1b2138,0x5c26c926
+	.long	0x4d2c6dfc,0x5ac42aed, 0x53380d13,0x9d95b3df
+	.long	0x650a7354,0x8baf63de, 0x766a0abb,0x3c77b2a8
+	.long	0x81c2c92e,0x47edaee6, 0x92722c85,0x1482353b
+	.long	0xa2bfe8a1,0x4cf10364, 0xa81a664b,0xbc423001
+	.long	0xc24b8b70,0xd0f89791, 0xc76c51a3,0x0654be30
+	.long	0xd192e819,0xd6ef5218, 0xd6990624,0x5565a910
+	.long	0xf40e3585,0x5771202a, 0x106aa070,0x32bbd1b8
+	.long	0x19a4c116,0xb8d2d0c8, 0x1e376c08,0x5141ab53
+	.long	0x2748774c,0xdf8eeb99, 0x34b0bcb5,0xe19b48a8
+	.long	0x391c0cb3,0xc5c95a63, 0x4ed8aa4a,0xe3418acb
+	.long	0x5b9cca4f,0x7763e373, 0x682e6ff3,0xd6b2b8a3
+	.long	0x748f82ee,0x5defb2fc, 0x78a5636f,0x43172f60
+	.long	0x84c87814,0xa1f0ab72, 0x8cc70208,0x1a6439ec
+	.long	0x90befffa,0x23631e28, 0xa4506ceb,0xde82bde9
+	.long	0xbef9a3f7,0xb2c67915, 0xc67178f2,0xe372532b
+	.long	0xca273ece,0xea26619c, 0xd186b8c7,0x21c0c207
+	.long	0xeada7dd6,0xcde0eb1e, 0xf57d4f7f,0xee6ed178
+	.long	0x06f067aa,0x72176fba, 0x0a637dc5,0xa2c898a6
+	.long	0x113f9804,0xbef90dae, 0x1b710b35,0x131c471b
+	.long	0x28db77f5,0x23047d84, 0x32caab7b,0x40c72493
+	.long	0x3c9ebe0a,0x15c9bebc, 0x431d67c4,0x9c100d4c
+	.long	0x4cc5d4be,0xcb3e42b6, 0x597f299c,0xfc657e2a
+	.long	0x5fcb6fab,0x3ad6faec, 0x6c44198c,0x4a475817
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+.size	K${label},.-K${label}
+
+#ifdef __PIC__
+SPARC_PIC_THUNK(%g1)
+#endif
+
+.globl	sha${label}_block_data_order
+.align	32
+sha${label}_block_data_order:
+	SPARC_LOAD_ADDRESS_LEAF(OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P,%g1,%g5)
+	ld	[%g1+4],%g1		! OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[1]
+
+	andcc	%g1, CFR_SHA${label}, %g0
+	be	.Lsoftware
+	nop
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($SZ==8); 		# SHA512
+	ldd	[%o0 + 0x00], %f0	! load context
+	ldd	[%o0 + 0x08], %f2
+	ldd	[%o0 + 0x10], %f4
+	ldd	[%o0 + 0x18], %f6
+	ldd	[%o0 + 0x20], %f8
+	ldd	[%o0 + 0x28], %f10
+	andcc	%o1, 0x7, %g0
+	ldd	[%o0 + 0x30], %f12
+	bne,pn	%icc, .Lhwunaligned
+	 ldd	[%o0 + 0x38], %f14
+
+.Lhwaligned_loop:
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x00], %f16
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x08], %f18
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x10], %f20
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x18], %f22
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x20], %f24
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x28], %f26
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x30], %f28
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x38], %f30
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x40], %f32
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x48], %f34
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x50], %f36
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x58], %f38
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x60], %f40
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x68], %f42
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x70], %f44
+	subcc	%o2, 1, %o2		! done yet?
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x78], %f46
+	add	%o1, 0x80, %o1
+	prefetch [%o1 + 63], 20
+	prefetch [%o1 + 64+63], 20
+
+	.word	0x81b02860		! SHA512
+
+	bne,pt	SIZE_T_CC, .Lhwaligned_loop
+	nop
+
+.Lhwfinish:
+	std	%f0, [%o0 + 0x00]	! store context
+	std	%f2, [%o0 + 0x08]
+	std	%f4, [%o0 + 0x10]
+	std	%f6, [%o0 + 0x18]
+	std	%f8, [%o0 + 0x20]
+	std	%f10, [%o0 + 0x28]
+	std	%f12, [%o0 + 0x30]
+	retl
+	 std	%f14, [%o0 + 0x38]
+
+.align	16
+.Lhwunaligned:
+	alignaddr %o1, %g0, %o1
+
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x00], %f18
+.Lhwunaligned_loop:
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x08], %f20
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x10], %f22
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x18], %f24
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x20], %f26
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x28], %f28
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x30], %f30
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x38], %f32
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x40], %f34
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x48], %f36
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x50], %f38
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x58], %f40
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x60], %f42
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x68], %f44
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x70], %f46
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x78], %f48
+	subcc	%o2, 1, %o2		! done yet?
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x80], %f50
+	add	%o1, 0x80, %o1
+	prefetch [%o1 + 63], 20
+	prefetch [%o1 + 64+63], 20
+
+	faligndata %f18, %f20, %f16
+	faligndata %f20, %f22, %f18
+	faligndata %f22, %f24, %f20
+	faligndata %f24, %f26, %f22
+	faligndata %f26, %f28, %f24
+	faligndata %f28, %f30, %f26
+	faligndata %f30, %f32, %f28
+	faligndata %f32, %f34, %f30
+	faligndata %f34, %f36, %f32
+	faligndata %f36, %f38, %f34
+	faligndata %f38, %f40, %f36
+	faligndata %f40, %f42, %f38
+	faligndata %f42, %f44, %f40
+	faligndata %f44, %f46, %f42
+	faligndata %f46, %f48, %f44
+	faligndata %f48, %f50, %f46
+
+	.word	0x81b02860		! SHA512
+
+	bne,pt	SIZE_T_CC, .Lhwunaligned_loop
+	for	%f50, %f50, %f18	! %f18=%f50
+
+	ba	.Lhwfinish
+	nop
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($SZ==4); 		# SHA256
+	ld	[%o0 + 0x00], %f0
+	ld	[%o0 + 0x04], %f1
+	ld	[%o0 + 0x08], %f2
+	ld	[%o0 + 0x0c], %f3
+	ld	[%o0 + 0x10], %f4
+	ld	[%o0 + 0x14], %f5
+	andcc	%o1, 0x7, %g0
+	ld	[%o0 + 0x18], %f6
+	bne,pn	%icc, .Lhwunaligned
+	 ld	[%o0 + 0x1c], %f7
+
+.Lhwloop:
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x00], %f8
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x08], %f10
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x10], %f12
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x18], %f14
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x20], %f16
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x28], %f18
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x30], %f20
+	subcc	%o2, 1, %o2		! done yet?
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x38], %f22
+	add	%o1, 0x40, %o1
+	prefetch [%o1 + 63], 20
+
+	.word	0x81b02840		! SHA256
+
+	bne,pt	SIZE_T_CC, .Lhwloop
+	nop
+
+.Lhwfinish:
+	st	%f0, [%o0 + 0x00]	! store context
+	st	%f1, [%o0 + 0x04]
+	st	%f2, [%o0 + 0x08]
+	st	%f3, [%o0 + 0x0c]
+	st	%f4, [%o0 + 0x10]
+	st	%f5, [%o0 + 0x14]
+	st	%f6, [%o0 + 0x18]
+	retl
+	 st	%f7, [%o0 + 0x1c]
+
+.align	8
+.Lhwunaligned:
+	alignaddr %o1, %g0, %o1
+
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x00], %f10
+.Lhwunaligned_loop:
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x08], %f12
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x10], %f14
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x18], %f16
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x20], %f18
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x28], %f20
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x30], %f22
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x38], %f24
+	subcc	%o2, 1, %o2		! done yet?
+	ldd	[%o1 + 0x40], %f26
+	add	%o1, 0x40, %o1
+	prefetch [%o1 + 63], 20
+
+	faligndata %f10, %f12, %f8
+	faligndata %f12, %f14, %f10
+	faligndata %f14, %f16, %f12
+	faligndata %f16, %f18, %f14
+	faligndata %f18, %f20, %f16
+	faligndata %f20, %f22, %f18
+	faligndata %f22, %f24, %f20
+	faligndata %f24, %f26, %f22
+
+	.word	0x81b02840		! SHA256
+
+	bne,pt	SIZE_T_CC, .Lhwunaligned_loop
+	for	%f26, %f26, %f10	! %f10=%f26
+
+	ba	.Lhwfinish
+	nop
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+.align	16
+.Lsoftware:
+	save	%sp,-STACK_FRAME-$locals,%sp
+	and	$inp,`$align-1`,$tmp31
+	sllx	$len,`log(16*$SZ)/log(2)`,$len
+	andn	$inp,`$align-1`,$inp
+	sll	$tmp31,3,$tmp31
+	add	$inp,$len,$len
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($SZ==8); # SHA512
+	mov	32,$tmp32
+	sub	$tmp32,$tmp31,$tmp32
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+.Lpic:	call	.+8
+	add	%o7,K${label}-.Lpic,$Ktbl
+
+	$LD	[$ctx+`0*$SZ`],$A
+	$LD	[$ctx+`1*$SZ`],$B
+	$LD	[$ctx+`2*$SZ`],$C
+	$LD	[$ctx+`3*$SZ`],$D
+	$LD	[$ctx+`4*$SZ`],$E
+	$LD	[$ctx+`5*$SZ`],$F
+	$LD	[$ctx+`6*$SZ`],$G
+	$LD	[$ctx+`7*$SZ`],$H
+
+.Lloop:
+___
+for ($i=0;$i<16;$i++)	{ &BODY_00_15($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+$code.=".L16_xx:\n";
+for (;$i<32;$i++)	{ &$BODY_16_XX($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+$code.=<<___;
+	and	$tmp2,0xfff,$tmp2
+	cmp	$tmp2,$lastK
+	bne	.L16_xx
+	add	$Ktbl,`16*$SZ`,$Ktbl	! Ktbl+=16
+
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($SZ==4); # SHA256
+	$LD	[$ctx+`0*$SZ`],@X[0]
+	$LD	[$ctx+`1*$SZ`],@X[1]
+	$LD	[$ctx+`2*$SZ`],@X[2]
+	$LD	[$ctx+`3*$SZ`],@X[3]
+	$LD	[$ctx+`4*$SZ`],@X[4]
+	$LD	[$ctx+`5*$SZ`],@X[5]
+	$LD	[$ctx+`6*$SZ`],@X[6]
+	$LD	[$ctx+`7*$SZ`],@X[7]
+
+	add	$A,@X[0],$A
+	$ST	$A,[$ctx+`0*$SZ`]
+	add	$B,@X[1],$B
+	$ST	$B,[$ctx+`1*$SZ`]
+	add	$C,@X[2],$C
+	$ST	$C,[$ctx+`2*$SZ`]
+	add	$D,@X[3],$D
+	$ST	$D,[$ctx+`3*$SZ`]
+	add	$E,@X[4],$E
+	$ST	$E,[$ctx+`4*$SZ`]
+	add	$F,@X[5],$F
+	$ST	$F,[$ctx+`5*$SZ`]
+	add	$G,@X[6],$G
+	$ST	$G,[$ctx+`6*$SZ`]
+	add	$H,@X[7],$H
+	$ST	$H,[$ctx+`7*$SZ`]
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($SZ==8); # SHA512
+	ld	[$ctx+`0*$SZ+0`],%l0
+	ld	[$ctx+`0*$SZ+4`],%l1
+	ld	[$ctx+`1*$SZ+0`],%l2
+	ld	[$ctx+`1*$SZ+4`],%l3
+	ld	[$ctx+`2*$SZ+0`],%l4
+	ld	[$ctx+`2*$SZ+4`],%l5
+	ld	[$ctx+`3*$SZ+0`],%l6
+
+	sllx	%l0,32,$tmp0
+	ld	[$ctx+`3*$SZ+4`],%l7
+	sllx	%l2,32,$tmp1
+	or	%l1,$tmp0,$tmp0
+	or	%l3,$tmp1,$tmp1
+	add	$tmp0,$A,$A
+	add	$tmp1,$B,$B
+	$ST	$A,[$ctx+`0*$SZ`]
+	sllx	%l4,32,$tmp2
+	$ST	$B,[$ctx+`1*$SZ`]
+	sllx	%l6,32,$T1
+	or	%l5,$tmp2,$tmp2
+	or	%l7,$T1,$T1
+	add	$tmp2,$C,$C
+	$ST	$C,[$ctx+`2*$SZ`]
+	add	$T1,$D,$D
+	$ST	$D,[$ctx+`3*$SZ`]
+
+	ld	[$ctx+`4*$SZ+0`],%l0
+	ld	[$ctx+`4*$SZ+4`],%l1
+	ld	[$ctx+`5*$SZ+0`],%l2
+	ld	[$ctx+`5*$SZ+4`],%l3
+	ld	[$ctx+`6*$SZ+0`],%l4
+	ld	[$ctx+`6*$SZ+4`],%l5
+	ld	[$ctx+`7*$SZ+0`],%l6
+
+	sllx	%l0,32,$tmp0
+	ld	[$ctx+`7*$SZ+4`],%l7
+	sllx	%l2,32,$tmp1
+	or	%l1,$tmp0,$tmp0
+	or	%l3,$tmp1,$tmp1
+	add	$tmp0,$E,$E
+	add	$tmp1,$F,$F
+	$ST	$E,[$ctx+`4*$SZ`]
+	sllx	%l4,32,$tmp2
+	$ST	$F,[$ctx+`5*$SZ`]
+	sllx	%l6,32,$T1
+	or	%l5,$tmp2,$tmp2
+	or	%l7,$T1,$T1
+	add	$tmp2,$G,$G
+	$ST	$G,[$ctx+`6*$SZ`]
+	add	$T1,$H,$H
+	$ST	$H,[$ctx+`7*$SZ`]
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	add	$inp,`16*$SZ`,$inp		! advance inp
+	cmp	$inp,$len
+	bne	SIZE_T_CC,.Lloop
+	sub	$Ktbl,`($rounds-16)*$SZ`,$Ktbl	! rewind Ktbl
+
+	ret
+	restore
+.type	sha${label}_block_data_order,#function
+.size	sha${label}_block_data_order,(.-sha${label}_block_data_order)
+.asciz	"SHA${label} block transform for SPARCv9, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+.align	4
+___
+
+# Purpose of these subroutines is to explicitly encode VIS instructions,
+# so that one can compile the module without having to specify VIS
+# extensions on compiler command line, e.g. -xarch=v9 vs. -xarch=v9a.
+# Idea is to reserve for option to produce "universal" binary and let
+# programmer detect if current CPU is VIS capable at run-time.
+sub unvis {
+my ($mnemonic,$rs1,$rs2,$rd)=@_;
+my $ref,$opf;
+my %visopf = (	"faligndata"	=> 0x048,
+		"for"		=> 0x07c	);
+
+    $ref = "$mnemonic\t$rs1,$rs2,$rd";
+
+    if ($opf=$visopf{$mnemonic}) {
+	foreach ($rs1,$rs2,$rd) {
+	    return $ref if (!/%f([0-9]{1,2})/);
+	    $_=$1;
+	    if ($1>=32) {
+		return $ref if ($1&1);
+		# re-encode for upper double register addressing
+		$_=($1|$1>>5)&31;
+	    }
+	}
+
+	return	sprintf ".word\t0x%08x !%s",
+			0x81b00000|$rd<<25|$rs1<<14|$opf<<5|$rs2,
+			$ref;
+    } else {
+	return $ref;
+    }
+}
+sub unalignaddr {
+my ($mnemonic,$rs1,$rs2,$rd)=@_;
+my %bias = ( "g" => 0, "o" => 8, "l" => 16, "i" => 24 );
+my $ref="$mnemonic\t$rs1,$rs2,$rd";
+
+    foreach ($rs1,$rs2,$rd) {
+	if (/%([goli])([0-7])/)	{ $_=$bias{$1}+$2; }
+	else			{ return $ref; }
+    }
+    return  sprintf ".word\t0x%08x !%s",
+		    0x81b00300|$rd<<25|$rs1<<14|$rs2,
+		    $ref;
+}
+
+foreach (split("\n",$code)) {
+	s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/ge;
+
+	s/\b(f[^\s]*)\s+(%f[0-9]{1,2}),\s*(%f[0-9]{1,2}),\s*(%f[0-9]{1,2})/
+		&unvis($1,$2,$3,$4)
+	 /ge;
+	s/\b(alignaddr)\s+(%[goli][0-7]),\s*(%[goli][0-7]),\s*(%[goli][0-7])/
+		&unalignaddr($1,$2,$3,$4)
+	 /ge;
+
+	print $_,"\n";
+}
+
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-x86_64.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-x86_64.pl
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..c9b7b28
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-x86_64.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,2407 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. Rights for redistribution and usage in source and binary
+# forms are granted according to the OpenSSL license.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# sha256/512_block procedure for x86_64.
+#
+# 40% improvement over compiler-generated code on Opteron. On EM64T
+# sha256 was observed to run >80% faster and sha512 - >40%. No magical
+# tricks, just straight implementation... I really wonder why gcc
+# [being armed with inline assembler] fails to generate as fast code.
+# The only thing which is cool about this module is that it's very
+# same instruction sequence used for both SHA-256 and SHA-512. In
+# former case the instructions operate on 32-bit operands, while in
+# latter - on 64-bit ones. All I had to do is to get one flavor right,
+# the other one passed the test right away:-)
+#
+# sha256_block runs in ~1005 cycles on Opteron, which gives you
+# asymptotic performance of 64*1000/1005=63.7MBps times CPU clock
+# frequency in GHz. sha512_block runs in ~1275 cycles, which results
+# in 128*1000/1275=100MBps per GHz. Is there room for improvement?
+# Well, if you compare it to IA-64 implementation, which maintains
+# X[16] in register bank[!], tends to 4 instructions per CPU clock
+# cycle and runs in 1003 cycles, 1275 is very good result for 3-way
+# issue Opteron pipeline and X[16] maintained in memory. So that *if*
+# there is a way to improve it, *then* the only way would be to try to
+# offload X[16] updates to SSE unit, but that would require "deeper"
+# loop unroll, which in turn would naturally cause size blow-up, not
+# to mention increased complexity! And once again, only *if* it's
+# actually possible to noticeably improve overall ILP, instruction
+# level parallelism, on a given CPU implementation in this case.
+#
+# Special note on Intel EM64T. While Opteron CPU exhibits perfect
+# performance ratio of 1.5 between 64- and 32-bit flavors [see above],
+# [currently available] EM64T CPUs apparently are far from it. On the
+# contrary, 64-bit version, sha512_block, is ~30% *slower* than 32-bit
+# sha256_block:-( This is presumably because 64-bit shifts/rotates
+# apparently are not atomic instructions, but implemented in microcode.
+#
+# May 2012.
+#
+# Optimization including one of Pavel Semjanov's ideas, alternative
+# Maj, resulted in >=5% improvement on most CPUs, +20% SHA256 and
+# unfortunately -2% SHA512 on P4 [which nobody should care about
+# that much].
+#
+# June 2012.
+#
+# Add SIMD code paths, see below for improvement coefficients. SSSE3
+# code path was not attempted for SHA512, because improvement is not
+# estimated to be high enough, noticeably less than 9%, to justify
+# the effort, not on pre-AVX processors. [Obviously with exclusion
+# for VIA Nano, but it has SHA512 instruction that is faster and
+# should be used instead.] For reference, corresponding estimated
+# upper limit for improvement for SSSE3 SHA256 is 28%. The fact that
+# higher coefficients are observed on VIA Nano and Bulldozer has more
+# to do with specifics of their architecture [which is topic for
+# separate discussion].
+#
+# November 2012.
+#
+# Add AVX2 code path. Two consecutive input blocks are loaded to
+# 256-bit %ymm registers, with data from first block to least
+# significant 128-bit halves and data from second to most significant.
+# The data is then processed with same SIMD instruction sequence as
+# for AVX, but with %ymm as operands. Side effect is increased stack
+# frame, 448 additional bytes in SHA256 and 1152 in SHA512, and 1.2KB
+# code size increase.
+#
+# March 2014.
+#
+# Add support for Intel SHA Extensions.
+
+######################################################################
+# Current performance in cycles per processed byte (less is better):
+#
+#		SHA256	SSSE3       AVX/XOP(*)	    SHA512  AVX/XOP(*)
+#
+# AMD K8	14.9	-	    -		    9.57    -
+# P4		17.3	-	    -		    30.8    -
+# Core 2	15.6	13.8(+13%)  -		    9.97    -
+# Westmere	14.8	12.3(+19%)  -		    9.58    -
+# Sandy Bridge	17.4	14.2(+23%)  11.6(+50%(**))  11.2    8.10(+38%(**))
+# Ivy Bridge	12.6	10.5(+20%)  10.3(+22%)	    8.17    7.22(+13%)
+# Haswell	12.2	9.28(+31%)  7.80(+56%)	    7.66    5.40(+42%)
+# Skylake	11.4	9.03(+26%)  7.70(+48%)      7.25    5.20(+40%)
+# Bulldozer	21.1	13.6(+54%)  13.6(+54%(***)) 13.5    8.58(+57%)
+# VIA Nano	23.0	16.5(+39%)  -		    14.7    -
+# Atom		23.0	18.9(+22%)  -		    14.7    -
+# Silvermont	27.4	20.6(+33%)  -               17.5    -
+# Goldmont	18.9	14.3(+32%)  4.16(+350%)     12.0    -
+#
+# (*)	whichever best applicable, including SHAEXT;
+# (**)	switch from ror to shrd stands for fair share of improvement;
+# (***)	execution time is fully determined by remaining integer-only
+#	part, body_00_15; reducing the amount of SIMD instructions
+#	below certain limit makes no difference/sense; to conserve
+#	space SHA256 XOP code path is therefore omitted;
+
+$flavour = shift;
+$output  = shift;
+if ($flavour =~ /\./) { $output = $flavour; undef $flavour; }
+
+$win64=0; $win64=1 if ($flavour =~ /[nm]asm|mingw64/ || $output =~ /\.asm$/);
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+( $xlate="${dir}x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
+( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
+die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl";
+
+if (`$ENV{CC} -Wa,-v -c -o /dev/null -x assembler /dev/null 2>&1`
+		=~ /GNU assembler version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
+	$avx = ($1>=2.19) + ($1>=2.22);
+}
+
+if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /nasm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /nasm/) &&
+	   `nasm -v 2>&1` =~ /NASM version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
+	$avx = ($1>=2.09) + ($1>=2.10);
+}
+
+if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
+	   `ml64 2>&1` =~ /Version ([0-9]+)\./) {
+	$avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=11);
+}
+
+if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
+	$avx = ($2>=3.0) + ($2>3.0);
+}
+
+$shaext=1;	### set to zero if compiling for 1.0.1
+$avx=1		if (!$shaext && $avx);
+
+open OUT,"| \"$^X\" \"$xlate\" $flavour \"$output\"";
+*STDOUT=*OUT;
+
+if ($output =~ /512/) {
+	$func="sha512_block_data_order";
+	$TABLE="K512";
+	$SZ=8;
+	@ROT=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$F,$G,$H)=("%rax","%rbx","%rcx","%rdx",
+					"%r8", "%r9", "%r10","%r11");
+	($T1,$a0,$a1,$a2,$a3)=("%r12","%r13","%r14","%r15","%rdi");
+	@Sigma0=(28,34,39);
+	@Sigma1=(14,18,41);
+	@sigma0=(1,  8, 7);
+	@sigma1=(19,61, 6);
+	$rounds=80;
+} else {
+	$func="sha256_block_data_order";
+	$TABLE="K256";
+	$SZ=4;
+	@ROT=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$F,$G,$H)=("%eax","%ebx","%ecx","%edx",
+					"%r8d","%r9d","%r10d","%r11d");
+	($T1,$a0,$a1,$a2,$a3)=("%r12d","%r13d","%r14d","%r15d","%edi");
+	@Sigma0=( 2,13,22);
+	@Sigma1=( 6,11,25);
+	@sigma0=( 7,18, 3);
+	@sigma1=(17,19,10);
+	$rounds=64;
+}
+
+$ctx="%rdi";	# 1st arg, zapped by $a3
+$inp="%rsi";	# 2nd arg
+$Tbl="%rbp";
+
+$_ctx="16*$SZ+0*8(%rsp)";
+$_inp="16*$SZ+1*8(%rsp)";
+$_end="16*$SZ+2*8(%rsp)";
+$_rsp="16*$SZ+3*8(%rsp)";
+$framesz="16*$SZ+4*8";
+
+
+sub ROUND_00_15()
+{ my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f,$g,$h) = @_;
+  my $STRIDE=$SZ;
+     $STRIDE += 16 if ($i%(16/$SZ)==(16/$SZ-1));
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	ror	\$`$Sigma1[2]-$Sigma1[1]`,$a0
+	mov	$f,$a2
+
+	xor	$e,$a0
+	ror	\$`$Sigma0[2]-$Sigma0[1]`,$a1
+	xor	$g,$a2			# f^g
+
+	mov	$T1,`$SZ*($i&0xf)`(%rsp)
+	xor	$a,$a1
+	and	$e,$a2			# (f^g)&e
+
+	ror	\$`$Sigma1[1]-$Sigma1[0]`,$a0
+	add	$h,$T1			# T1+=h
+	xor	$g,$a2			# Ch(e,f,g)=((f^g)&e)^g
+
+	ror	\$`$Sigma0[1]-$Sigma0[0]`,$a1
+	xor	$e,$a0
+	add	$a2,$T1			# T1+=Ch(e,f,g)
+
+	mov	$a,$a2
+	add	($Tbl),$T1		# T1+=K[round]
+	xor	$a,$a1
+
+	xor	$b,$a2			# a^b, b^c in next round
+	ror	\$$Sigma1[0],$a0	# Sigma1(e)
+	mov	$b,$h
+
+	and	$a2,$a3
+	ror	\$$Sigma0[0],$a1	# Sigma0(a)
+	add	$a0,$T1			# T1+=Sigma1(e)
+
+	xor	$a3,$h			# h=Maj(a,b,c)=Ch(a^b,c,b)
+	add	$T1,$d			# d+=T1
+	add	$T1,$h			# h+=T1
+
+	lea	$STRIDE($Tbl),$Tbl	# round++
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i<15);
+	add	$a1,$h			# h+=Sigma0(a)
+___
+	($a2,$a3) = ($a3,$a2);
+}
+
+sub ROUND_16_XX()
+{ my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f,$g,$h) = @_;
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	`$SZ*(($i+1)&0xf)`(%rsp),$a0
+	mov	`$SZ*(($i+14)&0xf)`(%rsp),$a2
+
+	mov	$a0,$T1
+	ror	\$`$sigma0[1]-$sigma0[0]`,$a0
+	add	$a1,$a			# modulo-scheduled h+=Sigma0(a)
+	mov	$a2,$a1
+	ror	\$`$sigma1[1]-$sigma1[0]`,$a2
+
+	xor	$T1,$a0
+	shr	\$$sigma0[2],$T1
+	ror	\$$sigma0[0],$a0
+	xor	$a1,$a2
+	shr	\$$sigma1[2],$a1
+
+	ror	\$$sigma1[0],$a2
+	xor	$a0,$T1			# sigma0(X[(i+1)&0xf])
+	xor	$a1,$a2			# sigma1(X[(i+14)&0xf])
+	add	`$SZ*(($i+9)&0xf)`(%rsp),$T1
+
+	add	`$SZ*($i&0xf)`(%rsp),$T1
+	mov	$e,$a0
+	add	$a2,$T1
+	mov	$a,$a1
+___
+	&ROUND_00_15(@_);
+}
+
+$code=<<___;
+.text
+
+.extern	OPENSSL_ia32cap_P
+.globl	$func
+.type	$func,\@function,3
+.align	16
+$func:
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($SZ==4 || $avx);
+	lea	OPENSSL_ia32cap_P(%rip),%r11
+	mov	0(%r11),%r9d
+	mov	4(%r11),%r10d
+	mov	8(%r11),%r11d
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($SZ==4 && $shaext);
+	test	\$`1<<29`,%r11d		# check for SHA
+	jnz	_shaext_shortcut
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($avx && $SZ==8);
+	test	\$`1<<11`,%r10d		# check for XOP
+	jnz	.Lxop_shortcut
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($avx>1);
+	and	\$`1<<8|1<<5|1<<3`,%r11d	# check for BMI2+AVX2+BMI1
+	cmp	\$`1<<8|1<<5|1<<3`,%r11d
+	je	.Lavx2_shortcut
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($avx);
+	and	\$`1<<30`,%r9d		# mask "Intel CPU" bit
+	and	\$`1<<28|1<<9`,%r10d	# mask AVX and SSSE3 bits
+	or	%r9d,%r10d
+	cmp	\$`1<<28|1<<9|1<<30`,%r10d
+	je	.Lavx_shortcut
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($SZ==4);
+	test	\$`1<<9`,%r10d
+	jnz	.Lssse3_shortcut
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+	mov	%rsp,%r11		# copy %rsp
+	shl	\$4,%rdx		# num*16
+	sub	\$$framesz,%rsp
+	lea	($inp,%rdx,$SZ),%rdx	# inp+num*16*$SZ
+	and	\$-64,%rsp		# align stack frame
+	mov	$ctx,$_ctx		# save ctx, 1st arg
+	mov	$inp,$_inp		# save inp, 2nd arh
+	mov	%rdx,$_end		# save end pointer, "3rd" arg
+	mov	%r11,$_rsp		# save copy of %rsp
+.Lprologue:
+
+	mov	$SZ*0($ctx),$A
+	mov	$SZ*1($ctx),$B
+	mov	$SZ*2($ctx),$C
+	mov	$SZ*3($ctx),$D
+	mov	$SZ*4($ctx),$E
+	mov	$SZ*5($ctx),$F
+	mov	$SZ*6($ctx),$G
+	mov	$SZ*7($ctx),$H
+	jmp	.Lloop
+
+.align	16
+.Lloop:
+	mov	$B,$a3
+	lea	$TABLE(%rip),$Tbl
+	xor	$C,$a3			# magic
+___
+	for($i=0;$i<16;$i++) {
+		$code.="	mov	$SZ*$i($inp),$T1\n";
+		$code.="	mov	@ROT[4],$a0\n";
+		$code.="	mov	@ROT[0],$a1\n";
+		$code.="	bswap	$T1\n";
+		&ROUND_00_15($i,@ROT);
+		unshift(@ROT,pop(@ROT));
+	}
+$code.=<<___;
+	jmp	.Lrounds_16_xx
+.align	16
+.Lrounds_16_xx:
+___
+	for(;$i<32;$i++) {
+		&ROUND_16_XX($i,@ROT);
+		unshift(@ROT,pop(@ROT));
+	}
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	cmpb	\$0,`$SZ-1`($Tbl)
+	jnz	.Lrounds_16_xx
+
+	mov	$_ctx,$ctx
+	add	$a1,$A			# modulo-scheduled h+=Sigma0(a)
+	lea	16*$SZ($inp),$inp
+
+	add	$SZ*0($ctx),$A
+	add	$SZ*1($ctx),$B
+	add	$SZ*2($ctx),$C
+	add	$SZ*3($ctx),$D
+	add	$SZ*4($ctx),$E
+	add	$SZ*5($ctx),$F
+	add	$SZ*6($ctx),$G
+	add	$SZ*7($ctx),$H
+
+	cmp	$_end,$inp
+
+	mov	$A,$SZ*0($ctx)
+	mov	$B,$SZ*1($ctx)
+	mov	$C,$SZ*2($ctx)
+	mov	$D,$SZ*3($ctx)
+	mov	$E,$SZ*4($ctx)
+	mov	$F,$SZ*5($ctx)
+	mov	$G,$SZ*6($ctx)
+	mov	$H,$SZ*7($ctx)
+	jb	.Lloop
+
+	mov	$_rsp,%rsi
+	mov	(%rsi),%r15
+	mov	8(%rsi),%r14
+	mov	16(%rsi),%r13
+	mov	24(%rsi),%r12
+	mov	32(%rsi),%rbp
+	mov	40(%rsi),%rbx
+	lea	48(%rsi),%rsp
+.Lepilogue:
+	ret
+.size	$func,.-$func
+___
+
+if ($SZ==4) {
+$code.=<<___;
+.align	64
+.type	$TABLE,\@object
+$TABLE:
+	.long	0x428a2f98,0x71374491,0xb5c0fbcf,0xe9b5dba5
+	.long	0x428a2f98,0x71374491,0xb5c0fbcf,0xe9b5dba5
+	.long	0x3956c25b,0x59f111f1,0x923f82a4,0xab1c5ed5
+	.long	0x3956c25b,0x59f111f1,0x923f82a4,0xab1c5ed5
+	.long	0xd807aa98,0x12835b01,0x243185be,0x550c7dc3
+	.long	0xd807aa98,0x12835b01,0x243185be,0x550c7dc3
+	.long	0x72be5d74,0x80deb1fe,0x9bdc06a7,0xc19bf174
+	.long	0x72be5d74,0x80deb1fe,0x9bdc06a7,0xc19bf174
+	.long	0xe49b69c1,0xefbe4786,0x0fc19dc6,0x240ca1cc
+	.long	0xe49b69c1,0xefbe4786,0x0fc19dc6,0x240ca1cc
+	.long	0x2de92c6f,0x4a7484aa,0x5cb0a9dc,0x76f988da
+	.long	0x2de92c6f,0x4a7484aa,0x5cb0a9dc,0x76f988da
+	.long	0x983e5152,0xa831c66d,0xb00327c8,0xbf597fc7
+	.long	0x983e5152,0xa831c66d,0xb00327c8,0xbf597fc7
+	.long	0xc6e00bf3,0xd5a79147,0x06ca6351,0x14292967
+	.long	0xc6e00bf3,0xd5a79147,0x06ca6351,0x14292967
+	.long	0x27b70a85,0x2e1b2138,0x4d2c6dfc,0x53380d13
+	.long	0x27b70a85,0x2e1b2138,0x4d2c6dfc,0x53380d13
+	.long	0x650a7354,0x766a0abb,0x81c2c92e,0x92722c85
+	.long	0x650a7354,0x766a0abb,0x81c2c92e,0x92722c85
+	.long	0xa2bfe8a1,0xa81a664b,0xc24b8b70,0xc76c51a3
+	.long	0xa2bfe8a1,0xa81a664b,0xc24b8b70,0xc76c51a3
+	.long	0xd192e819,0xd6990624,0xf40e3585,0x106aa070
+	.long	0xd192e819,0xd6990624,0xf40e3585,0x106aa070
+	.long	0x19a4c116,0x1e376c08,0x2748774c,0x34b0bcb5
+	.long	0x19a4c116,0x1e376c08,0x2748774c,0x34b0bcb5
+	.long	0x391c0cb3,0x4ed8aa4a,0x5b9cca4f,0x682e6ff3
+	.long	0x391c0cb3,0x4ed8aa4a,0x5b9cca4f,0x682e6ff3
+	.long	0x748f82ee,0x78a5636f,0x84c87814,0x8cc70208
+	.long	0x748f82ee,0x78a5636f,0x84c87814,0x8cc70208
+	.long	0x90befffa,0xa4506ceb,0xbef9a3f7,0xc67178f2
+	.long	0x90befffa,0xa4506ceb,0xbef9a3f7,0xc67178f2
+
+	.long	0x00010203,0x04050607,0x08090a0b,0x0c0d0e0f
+	.long	0x00010203,0x04050607,0x08090a0b,0x0c0d0e0f
+	.long	0x03020100,0x0b0a0908,0xffffffff,0xffffffff
+	.long	0x03020100,0x0b0a0908,0xffffffff,0xffffffff
+	.long	0xffffffff,0xffffffff,0x03020100,0x0b0a0908
+	.long	0xffffffff,0xffffffff,0x03020100,0x0b0a0908
+	.asciz	"SHA256 block transform for x86_64, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+___
+} else {
+$code.=<<___;
+.align	64
+.type	$TABLE,\@object
+$TABLE:
+	.quad	0x428a2f98d728ae22,0x7137449123ef65cd
+	.quad	0x428a2f98d728ae22,0x7137449123ef65cd
+	.quad	0xb5c0fbcfec4d3b2f,0xe9b5dba58189dbbc
+	.quad	0xb5c0fbcfec4d3b2f,0xe9b5dba58189dbbc
+	.quad	0x3956c25bf348b538,0x59f111f1b605d019
+	.quad	0x3956c25bf348b538,0x59f111f1b605d019
+	.quad	0x923f82a4af194f9b,0xab1c5ed5da6d8118
+	.quad	0x923f82a4af194f9b,0xab1c5ed5da6d8118
+	.quad	0xd807aa98a3030242,0x12835b0145706fbe
+	.quad	0xd807aa98a3030242,0x12835b0145706fbe
+	.quad	0x243185be4ee4b28c,0x550c7dc3d5ffb4e2
+	.quad	0x243185be4ee4b28c,0x550c7dc3d5ffb4e2
+	.quad	0x72be5d74f27b896f,0x80deb1fe3b1696b1
+	.quad	0x72be5d74f27b896f,0x80deb1fe3b1696b1
+	.quad	0x9bdc06a725c71235,0xc19bf174cf692694
+	.quad	0x9bdc06a725c71235,0xc19bf174cf692694
+	.quad	0xe49b69c19ef14ad2,0xefbe4786384f25e3
+	.quad	0xe49b69c19ef14ad2,0xefbe4786384f25e3
+	.quad	0x0fc19dc68b8cd5b5,0x240ca1cc77ac9c65
+	.quad	0x0fc19dc68b8cd5b5,0x240ca1cc77ac9c65
+	.quad	0x2de92c6f592b0275,0x4a7484aa6ea6e483
+	.quad	0x2de92c6f592b0275,0x4a7484aa6ea6e483
+	.quad	0x5cb0a9dcbd41fbd4,0x76f988da831153b5
+	.quad	0x5cb0a9dcbd41fbd4,0x76f988da831153b5
+	.quad	0x983e5152ee66dfab,0xa831c66d2db43210
+	.quad	0x983e5152ee66dfab,0xa831c66d2db43210
+	.quad	0xb00327c898fb213f,0xbf597fc7beef0ee4
+	.quad	0xb00327c898fb213f,0xbf597fc7beef0ee4
+	.quad	0xc6e00bf33da88fc2,0xd5a79147930aa725
+	.quad	0xc6e00bf33da88fc2,0xd5a79147930aa725
+	.quad	0x06ca6351e003826f,0x142929670a0e6e70
+	.quad	0x06ca6351e003826f,0x142929670a0e6e70
+	.quad	0x27b70a8546d22ffc,0x2e1b21385c26c926
+	.quad	0x27b70a8546d22ffc,0x2e1b21385c26c926
+	.quad	0x4d2c6dfc5ac42aed,0x53380d139d95b3df
+	.quad	0x4d2c6dfc5ac42aed,0x53380d139d95b3df
+	.quad	0x650a73548baf63de,0x766a0abb3c77b2a8
+	.quad	0x650a73548baf63de,0x766a0abb3c77b2a8
+	.quad	0x81c2c92e47edaee6,0x92722c851482353b
+	.quad	0x81c2c92e47edaee6,0x92722c851482353b
+	.quad	0xa2bfe8a14cf10364,0xa81a664bbc423001
+	.quad	0xa2bfe8a14cf10364,0xa81a664bbc423001
+	.quad	0xc24b8b70d0f89791,0xc76c51a30654be30
+	.quad	0xc24b8b70d0f89791,0xc76c51a30654be30
+	.quad	0xd192e819d6ef5218,0xd69906245565a910
+	.quad	0xd192e819d6ef5218,0xd69906245565a910
+	.quad	0xf40e35855771202a,0x106aa07032bbd1b8
+	.quad	0xf40e35855771202a,0x106aa07032bbd1b8
+	.quad	0x19a4c116b8d2d0c8,0x1e376c085141ab53
+	.quad	0x19a4c116b8d2d0c8,0x1e376c085141ab53
+	.quad	0x2748774cdf8eeb99,0x34b0bcb5e19b48a8
+	.quad	0x2748774cdf8eeb99,0x34b0bcb5e19b48a8
+	.quad	0x391c0cb3c5c95a63,0x4ed8aa4ae3418acb
+	.quad	0x391c0cb3c5c95a63,0x4ed8aa4ae3418acb
+	.quad	0x5b9cca4f7763e373,0x682e6ff3d6b2b8a3
+	.quad	0x5b9cca4f7763e373,0x682e6ff3d6b2b8a3
+	.quad	0x748f82ee5defb2fc,0x78a5636f43172f60
+	.quad	0x748f82ee5defb2fc,0x78a5636f43172f60
+	.quad	0x84c87814a1f0ab72,0x8cc702081a6439ec
+	.quad	0x84c87814a1f0ab72,0x8cc702081a6439ec
+	.quad	0x90befffa23631e28,0xa4506cebde82bde9
+	.quad	0x90befffa23631e28,0xa4506cebde82bde9
+	.quad	0xbef9a3f7b2c67915,0xc67178f2e372532b
+	.quad	0xbef9a3f7b2c67915,0xc67178f2e372532b
+	.quad	0xca273eceea26619c,0xd186b8c721c0c207
+	.quad	0xca273eceea26619c,0xd186b8c721c0c207
+	.quad	0xeada7dd6cde0eb1e,0xf57d4f7fee6ed178
+	.quad	0xeada7dd6cde0eb1e,0xf57d4f7fee6ed178
+	.quad	0x06f067aa72176fba,0x0a637dc5a2c898a6
+	.quad	0x06f067aa72176fba,0x0a637dc5a2c898a6
+	.quad	0x113f9804bef90dae,0x1b710b35131c471b
+	.quad	0x113f9804bef90dae,0x1b710b35131c471b
+	.quad	0x28db77f523047d84,0x32caab7b40c72493
+	.quad	0x28db77f523047d84,0x32caab7b40c72493
+	.quad	0x3c9ebe0a15c9bebc,0x431d67c49c100d4c
+	.quad	0x3c9ebe0a15c9bebc,0x431d67c49c100d4c
+	.quad	0x4cc5d4becb3e42b6,0x597f299cfc657e2a
+	.quad	0x4cc5d4becb3e42b6,0x597f299cfc657e2a
+	.quad	0x5fcb6fab3ad6faec,0x6c44198c4a475817
+	.quad	0x5fcb6fab3ad6faec,0x6c44198c4a475817
+
+	.quad	0x0001020304050607,0x08090a0b0c0d0e0f
+	.quad	0x0001020304050607,0x08090a0b0c0d0e0f
+	.asciz	"SHA512 block transform for x86_64, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+___
+}
+
+######################################################################
+# SIMD code paths
+#
+if ($SZ==4 && $shaext) {{{
+######################################################################
+# Intel SHA Extensions implementation of SHA256 update function.
+#
+my ($ctx,$inp,$num,$Tbl)=("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx","%rcx");
+
+my ($Wi,$ABEF,$CDGH,$TMP,$BSWAP,$ABEF_SAVE,$CDGH_SAVE)=map("%xmm$_",(0..2,7..10));
+my @MSG=map("%xmm$_",(3..6));
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.type	sha256_block_data_order_shaext,\@function,3
+.align	64
+sha256_block_data_order_shaext:
+_shaext_shortcut:
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	lea	`-8-5*16`(%rsp),%rsp
+	movaps	%xmm6,-8-5*16(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm7,-8-4*16(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm8,-8-3*16(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm9,-8-2*16(%rax)
+	movaps	%xmm10,-8-1*16(%rax)
+.Lprologue_shaext:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	lea		K256+0x80(%rip),$Tbl
+	movdqu		($ctx),$ABEF		# DCBA
+	movdqu		16($ctx),$CDGH		# HGFE
+	movdqa		0x200-0x80($Tbl),$TMP	# byte swap mask
+
+	pshufd		\$0x1b,$ABEF,$Wi	# ABCD
+	pshufd		\$0xb1,$ABEF,$ABEF	# CDAB
+	pshufd		\$0x1b,$CDGH,$CDGH	# EFGH
+	movdqa		$TMP,$BSWAP		# offload
+	palignr		\$8,$CDGH,$ABEF		# ABEF
+	punpcklqdq	$Wi,$CDGH		# CDGH
+	jmp		.Loop_shaext
+
+.align	16
+.Loop_shaext:
+	movdqu		($inp),@MSG[0]
+	movdqu		0x10($inp),@MSG[1]
+	movdqu		0x20($inp),@MSG[2]
+	pshufb		$TMP,@MSG[0]
+	movdqu		0x30($inp),@MSG[3]
+
+	movdqa		0*32-0x80($Tbl),$Wi
+	paddd		@MSG[0],$Wi
+	pshufb		$TMP,@MSG[1]
+	movdqa		$CDGH,$CDGH_SAVE	# offload
+	sha256rnds2	$ABEF,$CDGH		# 0-3
+	pshufd		\$0x0e,$Wi,$Wi
+	nop
+	movdqa		$ABEF,$ABEF_SAVE	# offload
+	sha256rnds2	$CDGH,$ABEF
+
+	movdqa		1*32-0x80($Tbl),$Wi
+	paddd		@MSG[1],$Wi
+	pshufb		$TMP,@MSG[2]
+	sha256rnds2	$ABEF,$CDGH		# 4-7
+	pshufd		\$0x0e,$Wi,$Wi
+	lea		0x40($inp),$inp
+	sha256msg1	@MSG[1],@MSG[0]
+	sha256rnds2	$CDGH,$ABEF
+
+	movdqa		2*32-0x80($Tbl),$Wi
+	paddd		@MSG[2],$Wi
+	pshufb		$TMP,@MSG[3]
+	sha256rnds2	$ABEF,$CDGH		# 8-11
+	pshufd		\$0x0e,$Wi,$Wi
+	movdqa		@MSG[3],$TMP
+	palignr		\$4,@MSG[2],$TMP
+	nop
+	paddd		$TMP,@MSG[0]
+	sha256msg1	@MSG[2],@MSG[1]
+	sha256rnds2	$CDGH,$ABEF
+
+	movdqa		3*32-0x80($Tbl),$Wi
+	paddd		@MSG[3],$Wi
+	sha256msg2	@MSG[3],@MSG[0]
+	sha256rnds2	$ABEF,$CDGH		# 12-15
+	pshufd		\$0x0e,$Wi,$Wi
+	movdqa		@MSG[0],$TMP
+	palignr		\$4,@MSG[3],$TMP
+	nop
+	paddd		$TMP,@MSG[1]
+	sha256msg1	@MSG[3],@MSG[2]
+	sha256rnds2	$CDGH,$ABEF
+___
+for($i=4;$i<16-3;$i++) {
+$code.=<<___;
+	movdqa		$i*32-0x80($Tbl),$Wi
+	paddd		@MSG[0],$Wi
+	sha256msg2	@MSG[0],@MSG[1]
+	sha256rnds2	$ABEF,$CDGH		# 16-19...
+	pshufd		\$0x0e,$Wi,$Wi
+	movdqa		@MSG[1],$TMP
+	palignr		\$4,@MSG[0],$TMP
+	nop
+	paddd		$TMP,@MSG[2]
+	sha256msg1	@MSG[0],@MSG[3]
+	sha256rnds2	$CDGH,$ABEF
+___
+	push(@MSG,shift(@MSG));
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	movdqa		13*32-0x80($Tbl),$Wi
+	paddd		@MSG[0],$Wi
+	sha256msg2	@MSG[0],@MSG[1]
+	sha256rnds2	$ABEF,$CDGH		# 52-55
+	pshufd		\$0x0e,$Wi,$Wi
+	movdqa		@MSG[1],$TMP
+	palignr		\$4,@MSG[0],$TMP
+	sha256rnds2	$CDGH,$ABEF
+	paddd		$TMP,@MSG[2]
+
+	movdqa		14*32-0x80($Tbl),$Wi
+	paddd		@MSG[1],$Wi
+	sha256rnds2	$ABEF,$CDGH		# 56-59
+	pshufd		\$0x0e,$Wi,$Wi
+	sha256msg2	@MSG[1],@MSG[2]
+	movdqa		$BSWAP,$TMP
+	sha256rnds2	$CDGH,$ABEF
+
+	movdqa		15*32-0x80($Tbl),$Wi
+	paddd		@MSG[2],$Wi
+	nop
+	sha256rnds2	$ABEF,$CDGH		# 60-63
+	pshufd		\$0x0e,$Wi,$Wi
+	dec		$num
+	nop
+	sha256rnds2	$CDGH,$ABEF
+
+	paddd		$CDGH_SAVE,$CDGH
+	paddd		$ABEF_SAVE,$ABEF
+	jnz		.Loop_shaext
+
+	pshufd		\$0xb1,$CDGH,$CDGH	# DCHG
+	pshufd		\$0x1b,$ABEF,$TMP	# FEBA
+	pshufd		\$0xb1,$ABEF,$ABEF	# BAFE
+	punpckhqdq	$CDGH,$ABEF		# DCBA
+	palignr		\$8,$TMP,$CDGH		# HGFE
+
+	movdqu	$ABEF,($ctx)
+	movdqu	$CDGH,16($ctx)
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	movaps	-8-5*16(%rax),%xmm6
+	movaps	-8-4*16(%rax),%xmm7
+	movaps	-8-3*16(%rax),%xmm8
+	movaps	-8-2*16(%rax),%xmm9
+	movaps	-8-1*16(%rax),%xmm10
+	mov	%rax,%rsp
+.Lepilogue_shaext:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	ret
+.size	sha256_block_data_order_shaext,.-sha256_block_data_order_shaext
+___
+}}}
+{{{
+
+my $a4=$T1;
+my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f,$g,$h);
+
+sub AUTOLOAD()		# thunk [simplified] 32-bit style perlasm
+{ my $opcode = $AUTOLOAD; $opcode =~ s/.*:://;
+  my $arg = pop;
+    $arg = "\$$arg" if ($arg*1 eq $arg);
+    $code .= "\t$opcode\t".join(',',$arg,reverse @_)."\n";
+}
+
+sub body_00_15 () {
+	(
+	'($a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f,$g,$h)=@ROT;'.
+
+	'&ror	($a0,$Sigma1[2]-$Sigma1[1])',
+	'&mov	($a,$a1)',
+	'&mov	($a4,$f)',
+
+	'&ror	($a1,$Sigma0[2]-$Sigma0[1])',
+	'&xor	($a0,$e)',
+	'&xor	($a4,$g)',			# f^g
+
+	'&ror	($a0,$Sigma1[1]-$Sigma1[0])',
+	'&xor	($a1,$a)',
+	'&and	($a4,$e)',			# (f^g)&e
+
+	'&xor	($a0,$e)',
+	'&add	($h,$SZ*($i&15)."(%rsp)")',	# h+=X[i]+K[i]
+	'&mov	($a2,$a)',
+
+	'&xor	($a4,$g)',			# Ch(e,f,g)=((f^g)&e)^g
+	'&ror	($a1,$Sigma0[1]-$Sigma0[0])',
+	'&xor	($a2,$b)',			# a^b, b^c in next round
+
+	'&add	($h,$a4)',			# h+=Ch(e,f,g)
+	'&ror	($a0,$Sigma1[0])',		# Sigma1(e)
+	'&and	($a3,$a2)',			# (b^c)&(a^b)
+
+	'&xor	($a1,$a)',
+	'&add	($h,$a0)',			# h+=Sigma1(e)
+	'&xor	($a3,$b)',			# Maj(a,b,c)=Ch(a^b,c,b)
+
+	'&ror	($a1,$Sigma0[0])',		# Sigma0(a)
+	'&add	($d,$h)',			# d+=h
+	'&add	($h,$a3)',			# h+=Maj(a,b,c)
+
+	'&mov	($a0,$d)',
+	'&add	($a1,$h);'.			# h+=Sigma0(a)
+	'($a2,$a3) = ($a3,$a2); unshift(@ROT,pop(@ROT)); $i++;'
+	);
+}
+
+######################################################################
+# SSSE3 code path
+#
+if ($SZ==4) {	# SHA256 only
+my @X = map("%xmm$_",(0..3));
+my ($t0,$t1,$t2,$t3, $t4,$t5) = map("%xmm$_",(4..9));
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.type	${func}_ssse3,\@function,3
+.align	64
+${func}_ssse3:
+.Lssse3_shortcut:
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+	mov	%rsp,%r11		# copy %rsp
+	shl	\$4,%rdx		# num*16
+	sub	\$`$framesz+$win64*16*4`,%rsp
+	lea	($inp,%rdx,$SZ),%rdx	# inp+num*16*$SZ
+	and	\$-64,%rsp		# align stack frame
+	mov	$ctx,$_ctx		# save ctx, 1st arg
+	mov	$inp,$_inp		# save inp, 2nd arh
+	mov	%rdx,$_end		# save end pointer, "3rd" arg
+	mov	%r11,$_rsp		# save copy of %rsp
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	movaps	%xmm6,16*$SZ+32(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm7,16*$SZ+48(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm8,16*$SZ+64(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm9,16*$SZ+80(%rsp)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+.Lprologue_ssse3:
+
+	mov	$SZ*0($ctx),$A
+	mov	$SZ*1($ctx),$B
+	mov	$SZ*2($ctx),$C
+	mov	$SZ*3($ctx),$D
+	mov	$SZ*4($ctx),$E
+	mov	$SZ*5($ctx),$F
+	mov	$SZ*6($ctx),$G
+	mov	$SZ*7($ctx),$H
+___
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	#movdqa	$TABLE+`$SZ*2*$rounds`+32(%rip),$t4
+	#movdqa	$TABLE+`$SZ*2*$rounds`+64(%rip),$t5
+	jmp	.Lloop_ssse3
+.align	16
+.Lloop_ssse3:
+	movdqa	$TABLE+`$SZ*2*$rounds`(%rip),$t3
+	movdqu	0x00($inp),@X[0]
+	movdqu	0x10($inp),@X[1]
+	movdqu	0x20($inp),@X[2]
+	pshufb	$t3,@X[0]
+	movdqu	0x30($inp),@X[3]
+	lea	$TABLE(%rip),$Tbl
+	pshufb	$t3,@X[1]
+	movdqa	0x00($Tbl),$t0
+	movdqa	0x20($Tbl),$t1
+	pshufb	$t3,@X[2]
+	paddd	@X[0],$t0
+	movdqa	0x40($Tbl),$t2
+	pshufb	$t3,@X[3]
+	movdqa	0x60($Tbl),$t3
+	paddd	@X[1],$t1
+	paddd	@X[2],$t2
+	paddd	@X[3],$t3
+	movdqa	$t0,0x00(%rsp)
+	mov	$A,$a1
+	movdqa	$t1,0x10(%rsp)
+	mov	$B,$a3
+	movdqa	$t2,0x20(%rsp)
+	xor	$C,$a3			# magic
+	movdqa	$t3,0x30(%rsp)
+	mov	$E,$a0
+	jmp	.Lssse3_00_47
+
+.align	16
+.Lssse3_00_47:
+	sub	\$`-16*2*$SZ`,$Tbl	# size optimization
+___
+sub Xupdate_256_SSSE3 () {
+	(
+	'&movdqa	($t0,@X[1]);',
+	'&movdqa	($t3,@X[3])',
+	'&palignr	($t0,@X[0],$SZ)',	# X[1..4]
+	 '&palignr	($t3,@X[2],$SZ);',	# X[9..12]
+	'&movdqa	($t1,$t0)',
+	'&movdqa	($t2,$t0);',
+	'&psrld		($t0,$sigma0[2])',
+	 '&paddd	(@X[0],$t3);',		# X[0..3] += X[9..12]
+	'&psrld		($t2,$sigma0[0])',
+	 '&pshufd	($t3,@X[3],0b11111010)',# X[14..15]
+	'&pslld		($t1,8*$SZ-$sigma0[1]);'.
+	'&pxor		($t0,$t2)',
+	'&psrld		($t2,$sigma0[1]-$sigma0[0]);'.
+	'&pxor		($t0,$t1)',
+	'&pslld		($t1,$sigma0[1]-$sigma0[0]);'.
+	'&pxor		($t0,$t2);',
+	 '&movdqa	($t2,$t3)',
+	'&pxor		($t0,$t1);',		# sigma0(X[1..4])
+	 '&psrld	($t3,$sigma1[2])',
+	'&paddd		(@X[0],$t0);',		# X[0..3] += sigma0(X[1..4])
+	 '&psrlq	($t2,$sigma1[0])',
+	 '&pxor		($t3,$t2);',
+	 '&psrlq	($t2,$sigma1[1]-$sigma1[0])',
+	 '&pxor		($t3,$t2)',
+	 '&pshufb	($t3,$t4)',		# sigma1(X[14..15])
+	'&paddd		(@X[0],$t3)',		# X[0..1] += sigma1(X[14..15])
+	 '&pshufd	($t3,@X[0],0b01010000)',# X[16..17]
+	 '&movdqa	($t2,$t3);',
+	 '&psrld	($t3,$sigma1[2])',
+	 '&psrlq	($t2,$sigma1[0])',
+	 '&pxor		($t3,$t2);',
+	 '&psrlq	($t2,$sigma1[1]-$sigma1[0])',
+	 '&pxor		($t3,$t2);',
+	'&movdqa	($t2,16*2*$j."($Tbl)")',
+	 '&pshufb	($t3,$t5)',
+	'&paddd		(@X[0],$t3)'		# X[2..3] += sigma1(X[16..17])
+	);
+}
+
+sub SSSE3_256_00_47 () {
+my $j = shift;
+my $body = shift;
+my @X = @_;
+my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body);	# 104 instructions
+
+    if (0) {
+	foreach (Xupdate_256_SSSE3()) {		# 36 instructions
+	    eval;
+	    eval(shift(@insns));
+	    eval(shift(@insns));
+	    eval(shift(@insns));
+	}
+    } else {			# squeeze extra 4% on Westmere and 19% on Atom
+	  eval(shift(@insns));	#@
+	&movdqa		($t0,@X[1]);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	&movdqa		($t3,@X[3]);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));	#@
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));	#@
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	&palignr	($t0,@X[0],$SZ);	# X[1..4]
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	 &palignr	($t3,@X[2],$SZ);	# X[9..12]
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));	#@
+	&movdqa		($t1,$t0);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	&movdqa		($t2,$t0);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));	#@
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	&psrld		($t0,$sigma0[2]);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	 &paddd		(@X[0],$t3);		# X[0..3] += X[9..12]
+	  eval(shift(@insns));	#@
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	&psrld		($t2,$sigma0[0]);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	 &pshufd	($t3,@X[3],0b11111010);	# X[4..15]
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));	#@
+	&pslld		($t1,8*$SZ-$sigma0[1]);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	&pxor		($t0,$t2);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));	#@
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));	#@
+	&psrld		($t2,$sigma0[1]-$sigma0[0]);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	&pxor		($t0,$t1);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	&pslld		($t1,$sigma0[1]-$sigma0[0]);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	&pxor		($t0,$t2);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));	#@
+	 &movdqa	($t2,$t3);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	&pxor		($t0,$t1);		# sigma0(X[1..4])
+	  eval(shift(@insns));	#@
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	 &psrld		($t3,$sigma1[2]);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	&paddd		(@X[0],$t0);		# X[0..3] += sigma0(X[1..4])
+	  eval(shift(@insns));	#@
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	 &psrlq		($t2,$sigma1[0]);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	 &pxor		($t3,$t2);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));	#@
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));	#@
+	 &psrlq		($t2,$sigma1[1]-$sigma1[0]);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	 &pxor		($t3,$t2);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));	#@
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	 #&pshufb	($t3,$t4);		# sigma1(X[14..15])
+	 &pshufd	($t3,$t3,0b10000000);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	 &psrldq	($t3,8);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));	#@
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));	#@
+	&paddd		(@X[0],$t3);		# X[0..1] += sigma1(X[14..15])
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	 &pshufd	($t3,@X[0],0b01010000);	# X[16..17]
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));	#@
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	 &movdqa	($t2,$t3);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	 &psrld		($t3,$sigma1[2]);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));	#@
+	 &psrlq		($t2,$sigma1[0]);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	 &pxor		($t3,$t2);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));	#@
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));	#@
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	 &psrlq		($t2,$sigma1[1]-$sigma1[0]);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	 &pxor		($t3,$t2);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));	#@
+	 #&pshufb	($t3,$t5);
+	 &pshufd	($t3,$t3,0b00001000);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	&movdqa		($t2,16*2*$j."($Tbl)");
+	  eval(shift(@insns));	#@
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	 &pslldq	($t3,8);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	&paddd		(@X[0],$t3);		# X[2..3] += sigma1(X[16..17])
+	  eval(shift(@insns));	#@
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+    }
+	&paddd		($t2,@X[0]);
+	  foreach (@insns) { eval; }		# remaining instructions
+	&movdqa		(16*$j."(%rsp)",$t2);
+}
+
+    for ($i=0,$j=0; $j<4; $j++) {
+	&SSSE3_256_00_47($j,\&body_00_15,@X);
+	push(@X,shift(@X));			# rotate(@X)
+    }
+	&cmpb	($SZ-1+16*2*$SZ."($Tbl)",0);
+	&jne	(".Lssse3_00_47");
+
+    for ($i=0; $i<16; ) {
+	foreach(body_00_15()) { eval; }
+    }
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	$_ctx,$ctx
+	mov	$a1,$A
+
+	add	$SZ*0($ctx),$A
+	lea	16*$SZ($inp),$inp
+	add	$SZ*1($ctx),$B
+	add	$SZ*2($ctx),$C
+	add	$SZ*3($ctx),$D
+	add	$SZ*4($ctx),$E
+	add	$SZ*5($ctx),$F
+	add	$SZ*6($ctx),$G
+	add	$SZ*7($ctx),$H
+
+	cmp	$_end,$inp
+
+	mov	$A,$SZ*0($ctx)
+	mov	$B,$SZ*1($ctx)
+	mov	$C,$SZ*2($ctx)
+	mov	$D,$SZ*3($ctx)
+	mov	$E,$SZ*4($ctx)
+	mov	$F,$SZ*5($ctx)
+	mov	$G,$SZ*6($ctx)
+	mov	$H,$SZ*7($ctx)
+	jb	.Lloop_ssse3
+
+	mov	$_rsp,%rsi
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	movaps	16*$SZ+32(%rsp),%xmm6
+	movaps	16*$SZ+48(%rsp),%xmm7
+	movaps	16*$SZ+64(%rsp),%xmm8
+	movaps	16*$SZ+80(%rsp),%xmm9
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	(%rsi),%r15
+	mov	8(%rsi),%r14
+	mov	16(%rsi),%r13
+	mov	24(%rsi),%r12
+	mov	32(%rsi),%rbp
+	mov	40(%rsi),%rbx
+	lea	48(%rsi),%rsp
+.Lepilogue_ssse3:
+	ret
+.size	${func}_ssse3,.-${func}_ssse3
+___
+}
+
+if ($avx) {{
+######################################################################
+# XOP code path
+#
+if ($SZ==8) {	# SHA512 only
+$code.=<<___;
+.type	${func}_xop,\@function,3
+.align	64
+${func}_xop:
+.Lxop_shortcut:
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+	mov	%rsp,%r11		# copy %rsp
+	shl	\$4,%rdx		# num*16
+	sub	\$`$framesz+$win64*16*($SZ==4?4:6)`,%rsp
+	lea	($inp,%rdx,$SZ),%rdx	# inp+num*16*$SZ
+	and	\$-64,%rsp		# align stack frame
+	mov	$ctx,$_ctx		# save ctx, 1st arg
+	mov	$inp,$_inp		# save inp, 2nd arh
+	mov	%rdx,$_end		# save end pointer, "3rd" arg
+	mov	%r11,$_rsp		# save copy of %rsp
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	movaps	%xmm6,16*$SZ+32(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm7,16*$SZ+48(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm8,16*$SZ+64(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm9,16*$SZ+80(%rsp)
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64 && $SZ>4);
+	movaps	%xmm10,16*$SZ+96(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm11,16*$SZ+112(%rsp)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+.Lprologue_xop:
+
+	vzeroupper
+	mov	$SZ*0($ctx),$A
+	mov	$SZ*1($ctx),$B
+	mov	$SZ*2($ctx),$C
+	mov	$SZ*3($ctx),$D
+	mov	$SZ*4($ctx),$E
+	mov	$SZ*5($ctx),$F
+	mov	$SZ*6($ctx),$G
+	mov	$SZ*7($ctx),$H
+	jmp	.Lloop_xop
+___
+					if ($SZ==4) {	# SHA256
+    my @X = map("%xmm$_",(0..3));
+    my ($t0,$t1,$t2,$t3) = map("%xmm$_",(4..7));
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.align	16
+.Lloop_xop:
+	vmovdqa	$TABLE+`$SZ*2*$rounds`(%rip),$t3
+	vmovdqu	0x00($inp),@X[0]
+	vmovdqu	0x10($inp),@X[1]
+	vmovdqu	0x20($inp),@X[2]
+	vmovdqu	0x30($inp),@X[3]
+	vpshufb	$t3,@X[0],@X[0]
+	lea	$TABLE(%rip),$Tbl
+	vpshufb	$t3,@X[1],@X[1]
+	vpshufb	$t3,@X[2],@X[2]
+	vpaddd	0x00($Tbl),@X[0],$t0
+	vpshufb	$t3,@X[3],@X[3]
+	vpaddd	0x20($Tbl),@X[1],$t1
+	vpaddd	0x40($Tbl),@X[2],$t2
+	vpaddd	0x60($Tbl),@X[3],$t3
+	vmovdqa	$t0,0x00(%rsp)
+	mov	$A,$a1
+	vmovdqa	$t1,0x10(%rsp)
+	mov	$B,$a3
+	vmovdqa	$t2,0x20(%rsp)
+	xor	$C,$a3			# magic
+	vmovdqa	$t3,0x30(%rsp)
+	mov	$E,$a0
+	jmp	.Lxop_00_47
+
+.align	16
+.Lxop_00_47:
+	sub	\$`-16*2*$SZ`,$Tbl	# size optimization
+___
+sub XOP_256_00_47 () {
+my $j = shift;
+my $body = shift;
+my @X = @_;
+my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body);	# 104 instructions
+
+	&vpalignr	($t0,@X[1],@X[0],$SZ);	# X[1..4]
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	 &vpalignr	($t3,@X[3],@X[2],$SZ);	# X[9..12]
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	&vprotd		($t1,$t0,8*$SZ-$sigma0[1]);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	&vpsrld		($t0,$t0,$sigma0[2]);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	 &vpaddd	(@X[0],@X[0],$t3);	# X[0..3] += X[9..12]
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	&vprotd		($t2,$t1,$sigma0[1]-$sigma0[0]);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	&vpxor		($t0,$t0,$t1);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	 &vprotd	($t3,@X[3],8*$SZ-$sigma1[1]);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	&vpxor		($t0,$t0,$t2);		# sigma0(X[1..4])
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	 &vpsrld	($t2,@X[3],$sigma1[2]);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	&vpaddd		(@X[0],@X[0],$t0);	# X[0..3] += sigma0(X[1..4])
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	 &vprotd	($t1,$t3,$sigma1[1]-$sigma1[0]);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	 &vpxor		($t3,$t3,$t2);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	 &vpxor		($t3,$t3,$t1);		# sigma1(X[14..15])
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	&vpsrldq	($t3,$t3,8);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	&vpaddd		(@X[0],@X[0],$t3);	# X[0..1] += sigma1(X[14..15])
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	 &vprotd	($t3,@X[0],8*$SZ-$sigma1[1]);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	 &vpsrld	($t2,@X[0],$sigma1[2]);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	 &vprotd	($t1,$t3,$sigma1[1]-$sigma1[0]);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	 &vpxor		($t3,$t3,$t2);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	 &vpxor		($t3,$t3,$t1);		# sigma1(X[16..17])
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	&vpslldq	($t3,$t3,8);		# 22 instructions
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	&vpaddd		(@X[0],@X[0],$t3);	# X[2..3] += sigma1(X[16..17])
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	&vpaddd		($t2,@X[0],16*2*$j."($Tbl)");
+	  foreach (@insns) { eval; }		# remaining instructions
+	&vmovdqa	(16*$j."(%rsp)",$t2);
+}
+
+    for ($i=0,$j=0; $j<4; $j++) {
+	&XOP_256_00_47($j,\&body_00_15,@X);
+	push(@X,shift(@X));			# rotate(@X)
+    }
+	&cmpb	($SZ-1+16*2*$SZ."($Tbl)",0);
+	&jne	(".Lxop_00_47");
+
+    for ($i=0; $i<16; ) {
+	foreach(body_00_15()) { eval; }
+    }
+
+					} else {	# SHA512
+    my @X = map("%xmm$_",(0..7));
+    my ($t0,$t1,$t2,$t3) = map("%xmm$_",(8..11));
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.align	16
+.Lloop_xop:
+	vmovdqa	$TABLE+`$SZ*2*$rounds`(%rip),$t3
+	vmovdqu	0x00($inp),@X[0]
+	lea	$TABLE+0x80(%rip),$Tbl	# size optimization
+	vmovdqu	0x10($inp),@X[1]
+	vmovdqu	0x20($inp),@X[2]
+	vpshufb	$t3,@X[0],@X[0]
+	vmovdqu	0x30($inp),@X[3]
+	vpshufb	$t3,@X[1],@X[1]
+	vmovdqu	0x40($inp),@X[4]
+	vpshufb	$t3,@X[2],@X[2]
+	vmovdqu	0x50($inp),@X[5]
+	vpshufb	$t3,@X[3],@X[3]
+	vmovdqu	0x60($inp),@X[6]
+	vpshufb	$t3,@X[4],@X[4]
+	vmovdqu	0x70($inp),@X[7]
+	vpshufb	$t3,@X[5],@X[5]
+	vpaddq	-0x80($Tbl),@X[0],$t0
+	vpshufb	$t3,@X[6],@X[6]
+	vpaddq	-0x60($Tbl),@X[1],$t1
+	vpshufb	$t3,@X[7],@X[7]
+	vpaddq	-0x40($Tbl),@X[2],$t2
+	vpaddq	-0x20($Tbl),@X[3],$t3
+	vmovdqa	$t0,0x00(%rsp)
+	vpaddq	0x00($Tbl),@X[4],$t0
+	vmovdqa	$t1,0x10(%rsp)
+	vpaddq	0x20($Tbl),@X[5],$t1
+	vmovdqa	$t2,0x20(%rsp)
+	vpaddq	0x40($Tbl),@X[6],$t2
+	vmovdqa	$t3,0x30(%rsp)
+	vpaddq	0x60($Tbl),@X[7],$t3
+	vmovdqa	$t0,0x40(%rsp)
+	mov	$A,$a1
+	vmovdqa	$t1,0x50(%rsp)
+	mov	$B,$a3
+	vmovdqa	$t2,0x60(%rsp)
+	xor	$C,$a3			# magic
+	vmovdqa	$t3,0x70(%rsp)
+	mov	$E,$a0
+	jmp	.Lxop_00_47
+
+.align	16
+.Lxop_00_47:
+	add	\$`16*2*$SZ`,$Tbl
+___
+sub XOP_512_00_47 () {
+my $j = shift;
+my $body = shift;
+my @X = @_;
+my @insns = (&$body,&$body);			# 52 instructions
+
+	&vpalignr	($t0,@X[1],@X[0],$SZ);	# X[1..2]
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	 &vpalignr	($t3,@X[5],@X[4],$SZ);	# X[9..10]
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	&vprotq		($t1,$t0,8*$SZ-$sigma0[1]);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	&vpsrlq		($t0,$t0,$sigma0[2]);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	 &vpaddq	(@X[0],@X[0],$t3);	# X[0..1] += X[9..10]
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	&vprotq		($t2,$t1,$sigma0[1]-$sigma0[0]);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	&vpxor		($t0,$t0,$t1);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	 &vprotq	($t3,@X[7],8*$SZ-$sigma1[1]);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	&vpxor		($t0,$t0,$t2);		# sigma0(X[1..2])
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	 &vpsrlq	($t2,@X[7],$sigma1[2]);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	&vpaddq		(@X[0],@X[0],$t0);	# X[0..1] += sigma0(X[1..2])
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	 &vprotq	($t1,$t3,$sigma1[1]-$sigma1[0]);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	 &vpxor		($t3,$t3,$t2);
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	 &vpxor		($t3,$t3,$t1);		# sigma1(X[14..15])
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	&vpaddq		(@X[0],@X[0],$t3);	# X[0..1] += sigma1(X[14..15])
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	  eval(shift(@insns));
+	&vpaddq		($t2,@X[0],16*2*$j-0x80."($Tbl)");
+	  foreach (@insns) { eval; }		# remaining instructions
+	&vmovdqa	(16*$j."(%rsp)",$t2);
+}
+
+    for ($i=0,$j=0; $j<8; $j++) {
+	&XOP_512_00_47($j,\&body_00_15,@X);
+	push(@X,shift(@X));			# rotate(@X)
+    }
+	&cmpb	($SZ-1+16*2*$SZ-0x80."($Tbl)",0);
+	&jne	(".Lxop_00_47");
+
+    for ($i=0; $i<16; ) {
+	foreach(body_00_15()) { eval; }
+    }
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	$_ctx,$ctx
+	mov	$a1,$A
+
+	add	$SZ*0($ctx),$A
+	lea	16*$SZ($inp),$inp
+	add	$SZ*1($ctx),$B
+	add	$SZ*2($ctx),$C
+	add	$SZ*3($ctx),$D
+	add	$SZ*4($ctx),$E
+	add	$SZ*5($ctx),$F
+	add	$SZ*6($ctx),$G
+	add	$SZ*7($ctx),$H
+
+	cmp	$_end,$inp
+
+	mov	$A,$SZ*0($ctx)
+	mov	$B,$SZ*1($ctx)
+	mov	$C,$SZ*2($ctx)
+	mov	$D,$SZ*3($ctx)
+	mov	$E,$SZ*4($ctx)
+	mov	$F,$SZ*5($ctx)
+	mov	$G,$SZ*6($ctx)
+	mov	$H,$SZ*7($ctx)
+	jb	.Lloop_xop
+
+	mov	$_rsp,%rsi
+	vzeroupper
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	movaps	16*$SZ+32(%rsp),%xmm6
+	movaps	16*$SZ+48(%rsp),%xmm7
+	movaps	16*$SZ+64(%rsp),%xmm8
+	movaps	16*$SZ+80(%rsp),%xmm9
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64 && $SZ>4);
+	movaps	16*$SZ+96(%rsp),%xmm10
+	movaps	16*$SZ+112(%rsp),%xmm11
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	(%rsi),%r15
+	mov	8(%rsi),%r14
+	mov	16(%rsi),%r13
+	mov	24(%rsi),%r12
+	mov	32(%rsi),%rbp
+	mov	40(%rsi),%rbx
+	lea	48(%rsi),%rsp
+.Lepilogue_xop:
+	ret
+.size	${func}_xop,.-${func}_xop
+___
+}
+######################################################################
+# AVX+shrd code path
+#
+local *ror = sub { &shrd(@_[0],@_) };
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.type	${func}_avx,\@function,3
+.align	64
+${func}_avx:
+.Lavx_shortcut:
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+	mov	%rsp,%r11		# copy %rsp
+	shl	\$4,%rdx		# num*16
+	sub	\$`$framesz+$win64*16*($SZ==4?4:6)`,%rsp
+	lea	($inp,%rdx,$SZ),%rdx	# inp+num*16*$SZ
+	and	\$-64,%rsp		# align stack frame
+	mov	$ctx,$_ctx		# save ctx, 1st arg
+	mov	$inp,$_inp		# save inp, 2nd arh
+	mov	%rdx,$_end		# save end pointer, "3rd" arg
+	mov	%r11,$_rsp		# save copy of %rsp
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	movaps	%xmm6,16*$SZ+32(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm7,16*$SZ+48(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm8,16*$SZ+64(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm9,16*$SZ+80(%rsp)
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64 && $SZ>4);
+	movaps	%xmm10,16*$SZ+96(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm11,16*$SZ+112(%rsp)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+.Lprologue_avx:
+
+	vzeroupper
+	mov	$SZ*0($ctx),$A
+	mov	$SZ*1($ctx),$B
+	mov	$SZ*2($ctx),$C
+	mov	$SZ*3($ctx),$D
+	mov	$SZ*4($ctx),$E
+	mov	$SZ*5($ctx),$F
+	mov	$SZ*6($ctx),$G
+	mov	$SZ*7($ctx),$H
+___
+					if ($SZ==4) {	# SHA256
+    my @X = map("%xmm$_",(0..3));
+    my ($t0,$t1,$t2,$t3, $t4,$t5) = map("%xmm$_",(4..9));
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	vmovdqa	$TABLE+`$SZ*2*$rounds`+32(%rip),$t4
+	vmovdqa	$TABLE+`$SZ*2*$rounds`+64(%rip),$t5
+	jmp	.Lloop_avx
+.align	16
+.Lloop_avx:
+	vmovdqa	$TABLE+`$SZ*2*$rounds`(%rip),$t3
+	vmovdqu	0x00($inp),@X[0]
+	vmovdqu	0x10($inp),@X[1]
+	vmovdqu	0x20($inp),@X[2]
+	vmovdqu	0x30($inp),@X[3]
+	vpshufb	$t3,@X[0],@X[0]
+	lea	$TABLE(%rip),$Tbl
+	vpshufb	$t3,@X[1],@X[1]
+	vpshufb	$t3,@X[2],@X[2]
+	vpaddd	0x00($Tbl),@X[0],$t0
+	vpshufb	$t3,@X[3],@X[3]
+	vpaddd	0x20($Tbl),@X[1],$t1
+	vpaddd	0x40($Tbl),@X[2],$t2
+	vpaddd	0x60($Tbl),@X[3],$t3
+	vmovdqa	$t0,0x00(%rsp)
+	mov	$A,$a1
+	vmovdqa	$t1,0x10(%rsp)
+	mov	$B,$a3
+	vmovdqa	$t2,0x20(%rsp)
+	xor	$C,$a3			# magic
+	vmovdqa	$t3,0x30(%rsp)
+	mov	$E,$a0
+	jmp	.Lavx_00_47
+
+.align	16
+.Lavx_00_47:
+	sub	\$`-16*2*$SZ`,$Tbl	# size optimization
+___
+sub Xupdate_256_AVX () {
+	(
+	'&vpalignr	($t0,@X[1],@X[0],$SZ)',	# X[1..4]
+	 '&vpalignr	($t3,@X[3],@X[2],$SZ)',	# X[9..12]
+	'&vpsrld	($t2,$t0,$sigma0[0]);',
+	 '&vpaddd	(@X[0],@X[0],$t3)',	# X[0..3] += X[9..12]
+	'&vpsrld	($t3,$t0,$sigma0[2])',
+	'&vpslld	($t1,$t0,8*$SZ-$sigma0[1]);',
+	'&vpxor		($t0,$t3,$t2)',
+	 '&vpshufd	($t3,@X[3],0b11111010)',# X[14..15]
+	'&vpsrld	($t2,$t2,$sigma0[1]-$sigma0[0]);',
+	'&vpxor		($t0,$t0,$t1)',
+	'&vpslld	($t1,$t1,$sigma0[1]-$sigma0[0]);',
+	'&vpxor		($t0,$t0,$t2)',
+	 '&vpsrld	($t2,$t3,$sigma1[2]);',
+	'&vpxor		($t0,$t0,$t1)',		# sigma0(X[1..4])
+	 '&vpsrlq	($t3,$t3,$sigma1[0]);',
+	'&vpaddd	(@X[0],@X[0],$t0)',	# X[0..3] += sigma0(X[1..4])
+	 '&vpxor	($t2,$t2,$t3);',
+	 '&vpsrlq	($t3,$t3,$sigma1[1]-$sigma1[0])',
+	 '&vpxor	($t2,$t2,$t3)',
+	 '&vpshufb	($t2,$t2,$t4)',		# sigma1(X[14..15])
+	'&vpaddd	(@X[0],@X[0],$t2)',	# X[0..1] += sigma1(X[14..15])
+	 '&vpshufd	($t3,@X[0],0b01010000)',# X[16..17]
+	 '&vpsrld	($t2,$t3,$sigma1[2])',
+	 '&vpsrlq	($t3,$t3,$sigma1[0])',
+	 '&vpxor	($t2,$t2,$t3);',
+	 '&vpsrlq	($t3,$t3,$sigma1[1]-$sigma1[0])',
+	 '&vpxor	($t2,$t2,$t3)',
+	 '&vpshufb	($t2,$t2,$t5)',
+	'&vpaddd	(@X[0],@X[0],$t2)'	# X[2..3] += sigma1(X[16..17])
+	);
+}
+
+sub AVX_256_00_47 () {
+my $j = shift;
+my $body = shift;
+my @X = @_;
+my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body);	# 104 instructions
+
+	foreach (Xupdate_256_AVX()) {		# 29 instructions
+	    eval;
+	    eval(shift(@insns));
+	    eval(shift(@insns));
+	    eval(shift(@insns));
+	}
+	&vpaddd		($t2,@X[0],16*2*$j."($Tbl)");
+	  foreach (@insns) { eval; }		# remaining instructions
+	&vmovdqa	(16*$j."(%rsp)",$t2);
+}
+
+    for ($i=0,$j=0; $j<4; $j++) {
+	&AVX_256_00_47($j,\&body_00_15,@X);
+	push(@X,shift(@X));			# rotate(@X)
+    }
+	&cmpb	($SZ-1+16*2*$SZ."($Tbl)",0);
+	&jne	(".Lavx_00_47");
+
+    for ($i=0; $i<16; ) {
+	foreach(body_00_15()) { eval; }
+    }
+
+					} else {	# SHA512
+    my @X = map("%xmm$_",(0..7));
+    my ($t0,$t1,$t2,$t3) = map("%xmm$_",(8..11));
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	jmp	.Lloop_avx
+.align	16
+.Lloop_avx:
+	vmovdqa	$TABLE+`$SZ*2*$rounds`(%rip),$t3
+	vmovdqu	0x00($inp),@X[0]
+	lea	$TABLE+0x80(%rip),$Tbl	# size optimization
+	vmovdqu	0x10($inp),@X[1]
+	vmovdqu	0x20($inp),@X[2]
+	vpshufb	$t3,@X[0],@X[0]
+	vmovdqu	0x30($inp),@X[3]
+	vpshufb	$t3,@X[1],@X[1]
+	vmovdqu	0x40($inp),@X[4]
+	vpshufb	$t3,@X[2],@X[2]
+	vmovdqu	0x50($inp),@X[5]
+	vpshufb	$t3,@X[3],@X[3]
+	vmovdqu	0x60($inp),@X[6]
+	vpshufb	$t3,@X[4],@X[4]
+	vmovdqu	0x70($inp),@X[7]
+	vpshufb	$t3,@X[5],@X[5]
+	vpaddq	-0x80($Tbl),@X[0],$t0
+	vpshufb	$t3,@X[6],@X[6]
+	vpaddq	-0x60($Tbl),@X[1],$t1
+	vpshufb	$t3,@X[7],@X[7]
+	vpaddq	-0x40($Tbl),@X[2],$t2
+	vpaddq	-0x20($Tbl),@X[3],$t3
+	vmovdqa	$t0,0x00(%rsp)
+	vpaddq	0x00($Tbl),@X[4],$t0
+	vmovdqa	$t1,0x10(%rsp)
+	vpaddq	0x20($Tbl),@X[5],$t1
+	vmovdqa	$t2,0x20(%rsp)
+	vpaddq	0x40($Tbl),@X[6],$t2
+	vmovdqa	$t3,0x30(%rsp)
+	vpaddq	0x60($Tbl),@X[7],$t3
+	vmovdqa	$t0,0x40(%rsp)
+	mov	$A,$a1
+	vmovdqa	$t1,0x50(%rsp)
+	mov	$B,$a3
+	vmovdqa	$t2,0x60(%rsp)
+	xor	$C,$a3			# magic
+	vmovdqa	$t3,0x70(%rsp)
+	mov	$E,$a0
+	jmp	.Lavx_00_47
+
+.align	16
+.Lavx_00_47:
+	add	\$`16*2*$SZ`,$Tbl
+___
+sub Xupdate_512_AVX () {
+	(
+	'&vpalignr	($t0,@X[1],@X[0],$SZ)',	# X[1..2]
+	 '&vpalignr	($t3,@X[5],@X[4],$SZ)',	# X[9..10]
+	'&vpsrlq	($t2,$t0,$sigma0[0])',
+	 '&vpaddq	(@X[0],@X[0],$t3);',	# X[0..1] += X[9..10]
+	'&vpsrlq	($t3,$t0,$sigma0[2])',
+	'&vpsllq	($t1,$t0,8*$SZ-$sigma0[1]);',
+	 '&vpxor	($t0,$t3,$t2)',
+	'&vpsrlq	($t2,$t2,$sigma0[1]-$sigma0[0]);',
+	 '&vpxor	($t0,$t0,$t1)',
+	'&vpsllq	($t1,$t1,$sigma0[1]-$sigma0[0]);',
+	 '&vpxor	($t0,$t0,$t2)',
+	 '&vpsrlq	($t3,@X[7],$sigma1[2]);',
+	'&vpxor		($t0,$t0,$t1)',		# sigma0(X[1..2])
+	 '&vpsllq	($t2,@X[7],8*$SZ-$sigma1[1]);',
+	'&vpaddq	(@X[0],@X[0],$t0)',	# X[0..1] += sigma0(X[1..2])
+	 '&vpsrlq	($t1,@X[7],$sigma1[0]);',
+	 '&vpxor	($t3,$t3,$t2)',
+	 '&vpsllq	($t2,$t2,$sigma1[1]-$sigma1[0]);',
+	 '&vpxor	($t3,$t3,$t1)',
+	 '&vpsrlq	($t1,$t1,$sigma1[1]-$sigma1[0]);',
+	 '&vpxor	($t3,$t3,$t2)',
+	 '&vpxor	($t3,$t3,$t1)',		# sigma1(X[14..15])
+	'&vpaddq	(@X[0],@X[0],$t3)',	# X[0..1] += sigma1(X[14..15])
+	);
+}
+
+sub AVX_512_00_47 () {
+my $j = shift;
+my $body = shift;
+my @X = @_;
+my @insns = (&$body,&$body);			# 52 instructions
+
+	foreach (Xupdate_512_AVX()) {		# 23 instructions
+	    eval;
+	    eval(shift(@insns));
+	    eval(shift(@insns));
+	}
+	&vpaddq		($t2,@X[0],16*2*$j-0x80."($Tbl)");
+	  foreach (@insns) { eval; }		# remaining instructions
+	&vmovdqa	(16*$j."(%rsp)",$t2);
+}
+
+    for ($i=0,$j=0; $j<8; $j++) {
+	&AVX_512_00_47($j,\&body_00_15,@X);
+	push(@X,shift(@X));			# rotate(@X)
+    }
+	&cmpb	($SZ-1+16*2*$SZ-0x80."($Tbl)",0);
+	&jne	(".Lavx_00_47");
+
+    for ($i=0; $i<16; ) {
+	foreach(body_00_15()) { eval; }
+    }
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	$_ctx,$ctx
+	mov	$a1,$A
+
+	add	$SZ*0($ctx),$A
+	lea	16*$SZ($inp),$inp
+	add	$SZ*1($ctx),$B
+	add	$SZ*2($ctx),$C
+	add	$SZ*3($ctx),$D
+	add	$SZ*4($ctx),$E
+	add	$SZ*5($ctx),$F
+	add	$SZ*6($ctx),$G
+	add	$SZ*7($ctx),$H
+
+	cmp	$_end,$inp
+
+	mov	$A,$SZ*0($ctx)
+	mov	$B,$SZ*1($ctx)
+	mov	$C,$SZ*2($ctx)
+	mov	$D,$SZ*3($ctx)
+	mov	$E,$SZ*4($ctx)
+	mov	$F,$SZ*5($ctx)
+	mov	$G,$SZ*6($ctx)
+	mov	$H,$SZ*7($ctx)
+	jb	.Lloop_avx
+
+	mov	$_rsp,%rsi
+	vzeroupper
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	movaps	16*$SZ+32(%rsp),%xmm6
+	movaps	16*$SZ+48(%rsp),%xmm7
+	movaps	16*$SZ+64(%rsp),%xmm8
+	movaps	16*$SZ+80(%rsp),%xmm9
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64 && $SZ>4);
+	movaps	16*$SZ+96(%rsp),%xmm10
+	movaps	16*$SZ+112(%rsp),%xmm11
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	(%rsi),%r15
+	mov	8(%rsi),%r14
+	mov	16(%rsi),%r13
+	mov	24(%rsi),%r12
+	mov	32(%rsi),%rbp
+	mov	40(%rsi),%rbx
+	lea	48(%rsi),%rsp
+.Lepilogue_avx:
+	ret
+.size	${func}_avx,.-${func}_avx
+___
+
+if ($avx>1) {{
+######################################################################
+# AVX2+BMI code path
+#
+my $a5=$SZ==4?"%esi":"%rsi";	# zap $inp 
+my $PUSH8=8*2*$SZ;
+use integer;
+
+sub bodyx_00_15 () {
+	# at start $a1 should be zero, $a3 - $b^$c and $a4 copy of $f
+	(
+	'($a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f,$g,$h)=@ROT;'.
+
+	'&add	($h,(32*($i/(16/$SZ))+$SZ*($i%(16/$SZ)))%$PUSH8.$base)',    # h+=X[i]+K[i]
+	'&and	($a4,$e)',		# f&e
+	'&rorx	($a0,$e,$Sigma1[2])',
+	'&rorx	($a2,$e,$Sigma1[1])',
+
+	'&lea	($a,"($a,$a1)")',	# h+=Sigma0(a) from the past
+	'&lea	($h,"($h,$a4)")',
+	'&andn	($a4,$e,$g)',		# ~e&g
+	'&xor	($a0,$a2)',
+
+	'&rorx	($a1,$e,$Sigma1[0])',
+	'&lea	($h,"($h,$a4)")',	# h+=Ch(e,f,g)=(e&f)+(~e&g)
+	'&xor	($a0,$a1)',		# Sigma1(e)
+	'&mov	($a2,$a)',
+
+	'&rorx	($a4,$a,$Sigma0[2])',
+	'&lea	($h,"($h,$a0)")',	# h+=Sigma1(e)
+	'&xor	($a2,$b)',		# a^b, b^c in next round
+	'&rorx	($a1,$a,$Sigma0[1])',
+
+	'&rorx	($a0,$a,$Sigma0[0])',
+	'&lea	($d,"($d,$h)")',	# d+=h
+	'&and	($a3,$a2)',		# (b^c)&(a^b)
+	'&xor	($a1,$a4)',
+
+	'&xor	($a3,$b)',		# Maj(a,b,c)=Ch(a^b,c,b)
+	'&xor	($a1,$a0)',		# Sigma0(a)
+	'&lea	($h,"($h,$a3)");'.	# h+=Maj(a,b,c)
+	'&mov	($a4,$e)',		# copy of f in future
+
+	'($a2,$a3) = ($a3,$a2); unshift(@ROT,pop(@ROT)); $i++;'
+	);
+	# and at the finish one has to $a+=$a1
+}
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.type	${func}_avx2,\@function,3
+.align	64
+${func}_avx2:
+.Lavx2_shortcut:
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+	mov	%rsp,%r11		# copy %rsp
+	sub	\$`2*$SZ*$rounds+4*8+$win64*16*($SZ==4?4:6)`,%rsp
+	shl	\$4,%rdx		# num*16
+	and	\$-256*$SZ,%rsp		# align stack frame
+	lea	($inp,%rdx,$SZ),%rdx	# inp+num*16*$SZ
+	add	\$`2*$SZ*($rounds-8)`,%rsp
+	mov	$ctx,$_ctx		# save ctx, 1st arg
+	mov	$inp,$_inp		# save inp, 2nd arh
+	mov	%rdx,$_end		# save end pointer, "3rd" arg
+	mov	%r11,$_rsp		# save copy of %rsp
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	movaps	%xmm6,16*$SZ+32(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm7,16*$SZ+48(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm8,16*$SZ+64(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm9,16*$SZ+80(%rsp)
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64 && $SZ>4);
+	movaps	%xmm10,16*$SZ+96(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm11,16*$SZ+112(%rsp)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+.Lprologue_avx2:
+
+	vzeroupper
+	sub	\$-16*$SZ,$inp		# inp++, size optimization
+	mov	$SZ*0($ctx),$A
+	mov	$inp,%r12		# borrow $T1
+	mov	$SZ*1($ctx),$B
+	cmp	%rdx,$inp		# $_end
+	mov	$SZ*2($ctx),$C
+	cmove	%rsp,%r12		# next block or random data
+	mov	$SZ*3($ctx),$D
+	mov	$SZ*4($ctx),$E
+	mov	$SZ*5($ctx),$F
+	mov	$SZ*6($ctx),$G
+	mov	$SZ*7($ctx),$H
+___
+					if ($SZ==4) {	# SHA256
+    my @X = map("%ymm$_",(0..3));
+    my ($t0,$t1,$t2,$t3, $t4,$t5) = map("%ymm$_",(4..9));
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	vmovdqa	$TABLE+`$SZ*2*$rounds`+32(%rip),$t4
+	vmovdqa	$TABLE+`$SZ*2*$rounds`+64(%rip),$t5
+	jmp	.Loop_avx2
+.align	16
+.Loop_avx2:
+	vmovdqa	$TABLE+`$SZ*2*$rounds`(%rip),$t3
+	vmovdqu	-16*$SZ+0($inp),%xmm0
+	vmovdqu	-16*$SZ+16($inp),%xmm1
+	vmovdqu	-16*$SZ+32($inp),%xmm2
+	vmovdqu	-16*$SZ+48($inp),%xmm3
+	#mov		$inp,$_inp	# offload $inp
+	vinserti128	\$1,(%r12),@X[0],@X[0]
+	vinserti128	\$1,16(%r12),@X[1],@X[1]
+	vpshufb		$t3,@X[0],@X[0]
+	vinserti128	\$1,32(%r12),@X[2],@X[2]
+	vpshufb		$t3,@X[1],@X[1]
+	vinserti128	\$1,48(%r12),@X[3],@X[3]
+
+	lea	$TABLE(%rip),$Tbl
+	vpshufb	$t3,@X[2],@X[2]
+	vpaddd	0x00($Tbl),@X[0],$t0
+	vpshufb	$t3,@X[3],@X[3]
+	vpaddd	0x20($Tbl),@X[1],$t1
+	vpaddd	0x40($Tbl),@X[2],$t2
+	vpaddd	0x60($Tbl),@X[3],$t3
+	vmovdqa	$t0,0x00(%rsp)
+	xor	$a1,$a1
+	vmovdqa	$t1,0x20(%rsp)
+	lea	-$PUSH8(%rsp),%rsp
+	mov	$B,$a3
+	vmovdqa	$t2,0x00(%rsp)
+	xor	$C,$a3			# magic
+	vmovdqa	$t3,0x20(%rsp)
+	mov	$F,$a4
+	sub	\$-16*2*$SZ,$Tbl	# size optimization
+	jmp	.Lavx2_00_47
+
+.align	16
+.Lavx2_00_47:
+___
+
+sub AVX2_256_00_47 () {
+my $j = shift;
+my $body = shift;
+my @X = @_;
+my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body);	# 96 instructions
+my $base = "+2*$PUSH8(%rsp)";
+
+	&lea	("%rsp","-$PUSH8(%rsp)")	if (($j%2)==0);
+	foreach (Xupdate_256_AVX()) {		# 29 instructions
+	    eval;
+	    eval(shift(@insns));
+	    eval(shift(@insns));
+	    eval(shift(@insns));
+	}
+	&vpaddd		($t2,@X[0],16*2*$j."($Tbl)");
+	  foreach (@insns) { eval; }		# remaining instructions
+	&vmovdqa	((32*$j)%$PUSH8."(%rsp)",$t2);
+}
+
+    for ($i=0,$j=0; $j<4; $j++) {
+	&AVX2_256_00_47($j,\&bodyx_00_15,@X);
+	push(@X,shift(@X));			# rotate(@X)
+    }
+	&lea	($Tbl,16*2*$SZ."($Tbl)");
+	&cmpb	(($SZ-1)."($Tbl)",0);
+	&jne	(".Lavx2_00_47");
+
+    for ($i=0; $i<16; ) {
+	my $base=$i<8?"+$PUSH8(%rsp)":"(%rsp)";
+	foreach(bodyx_00_15()) { eval; }
+    }
+					} else {	# SHA512
+    my @X = map("%ymm$_",(0..7));
+    my ($t0,$t1,$t2,$t3) = map("%ymm$_",(8..11));
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	jmp	.Loop_avx2
+.align	16
+.Loop_avx2:
+	vmovdqu	-16*$SZ($inp),%xmm0
+	vmovdqu	-16*$SZ+16($inp),%xmm1
+	vmovdqu	-16*$SZ+32($inp),%xmm2
+	lea	$TABLE+0x80(%rip),$Tbl	# size optimization
+	vmovdqu	-16*$SZ+48($inp),%xmm3
+	vmovdqu	-16*$SZ+64($inp),%xmm4
+	vmovdqu	-16*$SZ+80($inp),%xmm5
+	vmovdqu	-16*$SZ+96($inp),%xmm6
+	vmovdqu	-16*$SZ+112($inp),%xmm7
+	#mov	$inp,$_inp	# offload $inp
+	vmovdqa	`$SZ*2*$rounds-0x80`($Tbl),$t2
+	vinserti128	\$1,(%r12),@X[0],@X[0]
+	vinserti128	\$1,16(%r12),@X[1],@X[1]
+	 vpshufb	$t2,@X[0],@X[0]
+	vinserti128	\$1,32(%r12),@X[2],@X[2]
+	 vpshufb	$t2,@X[1],@X[1]
+	vinserti128	\$1,48(%r12),@X[3],@X[3]
+	 vpshufb	$t2,@X[2],@X[2]
+	vinserti128	\$1,64(%r12),@X[4],@X[4]
+	 vpshufb	$t2,@X[3],@X[3]
+	vinserti128	\$1,80(%r12),@X[5],@X[5]
+	 vpshufb	$t2,@X[4],@X[4]
+	vinserti128	\$1,96(%r12),@X[6],@X[6]
+	 vpshufb	$t2,@X[5],@X[5]
+	vinserti128	\$1,112(%r12),@X[7],@X[7]
+
+	vpaddq	-0x80($Tbl),@X[0],$t0
+	vpshufb	$t2,@X[6],@X[6]
+	vpaddq	-0x60($Tbl),@X[1],$t1
+	vpshufb	$t2,@X[7],@X[7]
+	vpaddq	-0x40($Tbl),@X[2],$t2
+	vpaddq	-0x20($Tbl),@X[3],$t3
+	vmovdqa	$t0,0x00(%rsp)
+	vpaddq	0x00($Tbl),@X[4],$t0
+	vmovdqa	$t1,0x20(%rsp)
+	vpaddq	0x20($Tbl),@X[5],$t1
+	vmovdqa	$t2,0x40(%rsp)
+	vpaddq	0x40($Tbl),@X[6],$t2
+	vmovdqa	$t3,0x60(%rsp)
+	lea	-$PUSH8(%rsp),%rsp
+	vpaddq	0x60($Tbl),@X[7],$t3
+	vmovdqa	$t0,0x00(%rsp)
+	xor	$a1,$a1
+	vmovdqa	$t1,0x20(%rsp)
+	mov	$B,$a3
+	vmovdqa	$t2,0x40(%rsp)
+	xor	$C,$a3			# magic
+	vmovdqa	$t3,0x60(%rsp)
+	mov	$F,$a4
+	add	\$16*2*$SZ,$Tbl
+	jmp	.Lavx2_00_47
+
+.align	16
+.Lavx2_00_47:
+___
+
+sub AVX2_512_00_47 () {
+my $j = shift;
+my $body = shift;
+my @X = @_;
+my @insns = (&$body,&$body);			# 48 instructions
+my $base = "+2*$PUSH8(%rsp)";
+
+	&lea	("%rsp","-$PUSH8(%rsp)")	if (($j%4)==0);
+	foreach (Xupdate_512_AVX()) {		# 23 instructions
+	    eval;
+	    if ($_ !~ /\;$/) {
+		eval(shift(@insns));
+		eval(shift(@insns));
+		eval(shift(@insns));
+	    }
+	}
+	&vpaddq		($t2,@X[0],16*2*$j-0x80."($Tbl)");
+	  foreach (@insns) { eval; }		# remaining instructions
+	&vmovdqa	((32*$j)%$PUSH8."(%rsp)",$t2);
+}
+
+    for ($i=0,$j=0; $j<8; $j++) {
+	&AVX2_512_00_47($j,\&bodyx_00_15,@X);
+	push(@X,shift(@X));			# rotate(@X)
+    }
+	&lea	($Tbl,16*2*$SZ."($Tbl)");
+	&cmpb	(($SZ-1-0x80)."($Tbl)",0);
+	&jne	(".Lavx2_00_47");
+
+    for ($i=0; $i<16; ) {
+	my $base=$i<8?"+$PUSH8(%rsp)":"(%rsp)";
+	foreach(bodyx_00_15()) { eval; }
+    }
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	`2*$SZ*$rounds`(%rsp),$ctx	# $_ctx
+	add	$a1,$A
+	#mov	`2*$SZ*$rounds+8`(%rsp),$inp	# $_inp
+	lea	`2*$SZ*($rounds-8)`(%rsp),$Tbl
+
+	add	$SZ*0($ctx),$A
+	add	$SZ*1($ctx),$B
+	add	$SZ*2($ctx),$C
+	add	$SZ*3($ctx),$D
+	add	$SZ*4($ctx),$E
+	add	$SZ*5($ctx),$F
+	add	$SZ*6($ctx),$G
+	add	$SZ*7($ctx),$H
+
+	mov	$A,$SZ*0($ctx)
+	mov	$B,$SZ*1($ctx)
+	mov	$C,$SZ*2($ctx)
+	mov	$D,$SZ*3($ctx)
+	mov	$E,$SZ*4($ctx)
+	mov	$F,$SZ*5($ctx)
+	mov	$G,$SZ*6($ctx)
+	mov	$H,$SZ*7($ctx)
+
+	cmp	`$PUSH8+2*8`($Tbl),$inp	# $_end
+	je	.Ldone_avx2
+
+	xor	$a1,$a1
+	mov	$B,$a3
+	xor	$C,$a3			# magic
+	mov	$F,$a4
+	jmp	.Lower_avx2
+.align	16
+.Lower_avx2:
+___
+    for ($i=0; $i<8; ) {
+	my $base="+16($Tbl)";
+	foreach(bodyx_00_15()) { eval; }
+    }
+$code.=<<___;
+	lea	-$PUSH8($Tbl),$Tbl
+	cmp	%rsp,$Tbl
+	jae	.Lower_avx2
+
+	mov	`2*$SZ*$rounds`(%rsp),$ctx	# $_ctx
+	add	$a1,$A
+	#mov	`2*$SZ*$rounds+8`(%rsp),$inp	# $_inp
+	lea	`2*$SZ*($rounds-8)`(%rsp),%rsp
+
+	add	$SZ*0($ctx),$A
+	add	$SZ*1($ctx),$B
+	add	$SZ*2($ctx),$C
+	add	$SZ*3($ctx),$D
+	add	$SZ*4($ctx),$E
+	add	$SZ*5($ctx),$F
+	lea	`2*16*$SZ`($inp),$inp	# inp+=2
+	add	$SZ*6($ctx),$G
+	mov	$inp,%r12
+	add	$SZ*7($ctx),$H
+	cmp	$_end,$inp
+
+	mov	$A,$SZ*0($ctx)
+	cmove	%rsp,%r12		# next block or stale data
+	mov	$B,$SZ*1($ctx)
+	mov	$C,$SZ*2($ctx)
+	mov	$D,$SZ*3($ctx)
+	mov	$E,$SZ*4($ctx)
+	mov	$F,$SZ*5($ctx)
+	mov	$G,$SZ*6($ctx)
+	mov	$H,$SZ*7($ctx)
+
+	jbe	.Loop_avx2
+	lea	(%rsp),$Tbl
+
+.Ldone_avx2:
+	lea	($Tbl),%rsp
+	mov	$_rsp,%rsi
+	vzeroupper
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	movaps	16*$SZ+32(%rsp),%xmm6
+	movaps	16*$SZ+48(%rsp),%xmm7
+	movaps	16*$SZ+64(%rsp),%xmm8
+	movaps	16*$SZ+80(%rsp),%xmm9
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64 && $SZ>4);
+	movaps	16*$SZ+96(%rsp),%xmm10
+	movaps	16*$SZ+112(%rsp),%xmm11
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	(%rsi),%r15
+	mov	8(%rsi),%r14
+	mov	16(%rsi),%r13
+	mov	24(%rsi),%r12
+	mov	32(%rsi),%rbp
+	mov	40(%rsi),%rbx
+	lea	48(%rsi),%rsp
+.Lepilogue_avx2:
+	ret
+.size	${func}_avx2,.-${func}_avx2
+___
+}}
+}}}}}
+
+# EXCEPTION_DISPOSITION handler (EXCEPTION_RECORD *rec,ULONG64 frame,
+#		CONTEXT *context,DISPATCHER_CONTEXT *disp)
+if ($win64) {
+$rec="%rcx";
+$frame="%rdx";
+$context="%r8";
+$disp="%r9";
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.extern	__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind
+.type	se_handler,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+se_handler:
+	push	%rsi
+	push	%rdi
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+	pushfq
+	sub	\$64,%rsp
+
+	mov	120($context),%rax	# pull context->Rax
+	mov	248($context),%rbx	# pull context->Rip
+
+	mov	8($disp),%rsi		# disp->ImageBase
+	mov	56($disp),%r11		# disp->HanderlData
+
+	mov	0(%r11),%r10d		# HandlerData[0]
+	lea	(%rsi,%r10),%r10	# prologue label
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip<prologue label
+	jb	.Lin_prologue
+
+	mov	152($context),%rax	# pull context->Rsp
+
+	mov	4(%r11),%r10d		# HandlerData[1]
+	lea	(%rsi,%r10),%r10	# epilogue label
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip>=epilogue label
+	jae	.Lin_prologue
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($avx>1);
+	lea	.Lavx2_shortcut(%rip),%r10
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip<avx2_shortcut
+	jb	.Lnot_in_avx2
+
+	and	\$-256*$SZ,%rax
+	add	\$`2*$SZ*($rounds-8)`,%rax
+.Lnot_in_avx2:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	%rax,%rsi		# put aside Rsp
+	mov	16*$SZ+3*8(%rax),%rax	# pull $_rsp
+	lea	48(%rax),%rax
+
+	mov	-8(%rax),%rbx
+	mov	-16(%rax),%rbp
+	mov	-24(%rax),%r12
+	mov	-32(%rax),%r13
+	mov	-40(%rax),%r14
+	mov	-48(%rax),%r15
+	mov	%rbx,144($context)	# restore context->Rbx
+	mov	%rbp,160($context)	# restore context->Rbp
+	mov	%r12,216($context)	# restore context->R12
+	mov	%r13,224($context)	# restore context->R13
+	mov	%r14,232($context)	# restore context->R14
+	mov	%r15,240($context)	# restore context->R15
+
+	lea	.Lepilogue(%rip),%r10
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx
+	jb	.Lin_prologue		# non-AVX code
+
+	lea	16*$SZ+4*8(%rsi),%rsi	# Xmm6- save area
+	lea	512($context),%rdi	# &context.Xmm6
+	mov	\$`$SZ==4?8:12`,%ecx
+	.long	0xa548f3fc		# cld; rep movsq
+
+.Lin_prologue:
+	mov	8(%rax),%rdi
+	mov	16(%rax),%rsi
+	mov	%rax,152($context)	# restore context->Rsp
+	mov	%rsi,168($context)	# restore context->Rsi
+	mov	%rdi,176($context)	# restore context->Rdi
+
+	mov	40($disp),%rdi		# disp->ContextRecord
+	mov	$context,%rsi		# context
+	mov	\$154,%ecx		# sizeof(CONTEXT)
+	.long	0xa548f3fc		# cld; rep movsq
+
+	mov	$disp,%rsi
+	xor	%rcx,%rcx		# arg1, UNW_FLAG_NHANDLER
+	mov	8(%rsi),%rdx		# arg2, disp->ImageBase
+	mov	0(%rsi),%r8		# arg3, disp->ControlPc
+	mov	16(%rsi),%r9		# arg4, disp->FunctionEntry
+	mov	40(%rsi),%r10		# disp->ContextRecord
+	lea	56(%rsi),%r11		# &disp->HandlerData
+	lea	24(%rsi),%r12		# &disp->EstablisherFrame
+	mov	%r10,32(%rsp)		# arg5
+	mov	%r11,40(%rsp)		# arg6
+	mov	%r12,48(%rsp)		# arg7
+	mov	%rcx,56(%rsp)		# arg8, (NULL)
+	call	*__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind(%rip)
+
+	mov	\$1,%eax		# ExceptionContinueSearch
+	add	\$64,%rsp
+	popfq
+	pop	%r15
+	pop	%r14
+	pop	%r13
+	pop	%r12
+	pop	%rbp
+	pop	%rbx
+	pop	%rdi
+	pop	%rsi
+	ret
+.size	se_handler,.-se_handler
+___
+
+$code.=<<___ if ($SZ==4 && $shaext);
+.type	shaext_handler,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+shaext_handler:
+	push	%rsi
+	push	%rdi
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+	pushfq
+	sub	\$64,%rsp
+
+	mov	120($context),%rax	# pull context->Rax
+	mov	248($context),%rbx	# pull context->Rip
+
+	lea	.Lprologue_shaext(%rip),%r10
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip<.Lprologue
+	jb	.Lin_prologue
+
+	lea	.Lepilogue_shaext(%rip),%r10
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip>=.Lepilogue
+	jae	.Lin_prologue
+
+	lea	-8-5*16(%rax),%rsi
+	lea	512($context),%rdi	# &context.Xmm6
+	mov	\$10,%ecx
+	.long	0xa548f3fc		# cld; rep movsq
+
+	jmp	.Lin_prologue
+.size	shaext_handler,.-shaext_handler
+___
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.section	.pdata
+.align	4
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_$func
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_$func
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_$func
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($SZ==4 && $shaext);
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_${func}_shaext
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_${func}_shaext
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_${func}_shaext
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($SZ==4);
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_${func}_ssse3
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_${func}_ssse3
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_${func}_ssse3
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($avx && $SZ==8);
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_${func}_xop
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_${func}_xop
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_${func}_xop
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($avx);
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_${func}_avx
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_${func}_avx
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_${func}_avx
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($avx>1);
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_${func}_avx2
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_${func}_avx2
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_${func}_avx2
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+.section	.xdata
+.align	8
+.LSEH_info_$func:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	se_handler
+	.rva	.Lprologue,.Lepilogue			# HandlerData[]
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($SZ==4 && $shaext);
+.LSEH_info_${func}_shaext:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	shaext_handler
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($SZ==4);
+.LSEH_info_${func}_ssse3:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	se_handler
+	.rva	.Lprologue_ssse3,.Lepilogue_ssse3	# HandlerData[]
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($avx && $SZ==8);
+.LSEH_info_${func}_xop:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	se_handler
+	.rva	.Lprologue_xop,.Lepilogue_xop		# HandlerData[]
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($avx);
+.LSEH_info_${func}_avx:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	se_handler
+	.rva	.Lprologue_avx,.Lepilogue_avx		# HandlerData[]
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($avx>1);
+.LSEH_info_${func}_avx2:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	se_handler
+	.rva	.Lprologue_avx2,.Lepilogue_avx2		# HandlerData[]
+___
+}
+
+sub sha256op38 {
+    my $instr = shift;
+    my %opcodelet = (
+		"sha256rnds2" => 0xcb,
+  		"sha256msg1"  => 0xcc,
+		"sha256msg2"  => 0xcd	);
+
+    if (defined($opcodelet{$instr}) && @_[0] =~ /%xmm([0-7]),\s*%xmm([0-7])/) {
+      my @opcode=(0x0f,0x38);
+	push @opcode,$opcodelet{$instr};
+	push @opcode,0xc0|($1&7)|(($2&7)<<3);		# ModR/M
+	return ".byte\t".join(',',@opcode);
+    } else {
+	return $instr."\t".@_[0];
+    }
+}
+
+foreach (split("\n",$code)) {
+	s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/geo;
+
+	s/\b(sha256[^\s]*)\s+(.*)/sha256op38($1,$2)/geo;
+
+	print $_,"\n";
+}
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha512p8-ppc.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha512p8-ppc.pl
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..4d3d3b2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/asm/sha512p8-ppc.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,431 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2014-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+
+# SHA256/512 for PowerISA v2.07.
+#
+# Accurate performance measurements are problematic, because it's
+# always virtualized setup with possibly throttled processor.
+# Relative comparison is therefore more informative. This module is
+# ~60% faster than integer-only sha512-ppc.pl. To anchor to something
+# else, SHA256 is 24% slower than sha1-ppc.pl and 2.5x slower than
+# hardware-assisted aes-128-cbc encrypt. SHA512 is 20% faster than
+# sha1-ppc.pl and 1.6x slower than aes-128-cbc. Another interesting
+# result is degree of computational resources' utilization. POWER8 is
+# "massively multi-threaded chip" and difference between single- and
+# maximum multi-process benchmark results tells that utlization is
+# whooping 94%. For sha512-ppc.pl we get [not unimpressive] 84% and
+# for sha1-ppc.pl - 73%. 100% means that multi-process result equals
+# to single-process one, given that all threads end up on the same
+# physical core.
+
+$flavour=shift;
+$output =shift;
+
+if ($flavour =~ /64/) {
+	$SIZE_T=8;
+	$LRSAVE=2*$SIZE_T;
+	$STU="stdu";
+	$POP="ld";
+	$PUSH="std";
+} elsif ($flavour =~ /32/) {
+	$SIZE_T=4;
+	$LRSAVE=$SIZE_T;
+	$STU="stwu";
+	$POP="lwz";
+	$PUSH="stw";
+} else { die "nonsense $flavour"; }
+
+$LENDIAN=($flavour=~/le/);
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+( $xlate="${dir}ppc-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
+( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/ppc-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
+die "can't locate ppc-xlate.pl";
+
+open STDOUT,"| $^X $xlate $flavour $output" || die "can't call $xlate: $!";
+
+if ($output =~ /512/) {
+	$bits=512;
+	$SZ=8;
+	$sz="d";
+	$rounds=80;
+} else {
+	$bits=256;
+	$SZ=4;
+	$sz="w";
+	$rounds=64;
+}
+
+$func="sha${bits}_block_p8";
+$FRAME=8*$SIZE_T;
+
+$sp ="r1";
+$toc="r2";
+$ctx="r3";
+$inp="r4";
+$num="r5";
+$Tbl="r6";
+$idx="r7";
+$lrsave="r8";
+$offload="r11";
+$vrsave="r12";
+($x00,$x10,$x20,$x30,$x40,$x50,$x60,$x70)=map("r$_",(0,10,26..31));
+ $x00=0 if ($flavour =~ /osx/);
+
+@V=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$F,$G,$H)=map("v$_",(0..7));
+@X=map("v$_",(8..23));
+($Ki,$Func,$S0,$S1,$s0,$s1,$lemask)=map("v$_",(24..31));
+
+sub ROUND {
+my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f,$g,$h)=@_;
+my $j=($i+1)%16;
+
+$code.=<<___		if ($i<15 && ($i%(16/$SZ))==(16/$SZ-1));
+	lvx_u		@X[$i+1],0,$inp		; load X[i] in advance
+	addi		$inp,$inp,16
+___
+$code.=<<___		if ($i<16 && ($i%(16/$SZ)));
+	vsldoi		@X[$i],@X[$i-1],@X[$i-1],$SZ
+___
+$code.=<<___		if ($LENDIAN && $i<16 && ($i%(16/$SZ))==0);
+	vperm		@X[$i],@X[$i],@X[$i],$lemask
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	`"vshasigma${sz}	$s0,@X[($j+1)%16],0,0"		if ($i>=15)`
+	vsel		$Func,$g,$f,$e		; Ch(e,f,g)
+	vshasigma${sz}	$S1,$e,1,15		; Sigma1(e)
+	vaddu${sz}m	$h,$h,@X[$i%16]		; h+=X[i]
+	vshasigma${sz}	$S0,$a,1,0		; Sigma0(a)
+	`"vshasigma${sz}	$s1,@X[($j+14)%16],0,15"	if ($i>=15)`
+	vaddu${sz}m	$h,$h,$Func		; h+=Ch(e,f,g)
+	vxor		$Func,$a,$b
+	`"vaddu${sz}m		@X[$j],@X[$j],@X[($j+9)%16]"	if ($i>=15)`
+	vaddu${sz}m	$h,$h,$S1		; h+=Sigma1(e)
+	vsel		$Func,$b,$c,$Func	; Maj(a,b,c)
+	vaddu${sz}m	$g,$g,$Ki		; future h+=K[i]
+	vaddu${sz}m	$d,$d,$h		; d+=h
+	vaddu${sz}m	$S0,$S0,$Func		; Sigma0(a)+Maj(a,b,c)
+	`"vaddu${sz}m		@X[$j],@X[$j],$s0"		if ($i>=15)`
+	lvx		$Ki,$idx,$Tbl		; load next K[i]
+	addi		$idx,$idx,16
+	vaddu${sz}m	$h,$h,$S0		; h+=Sigma0(a)+Maj(a,b,c)
+	`"vaddu${sz}m		@X[$j],@X[$j],$s1"		if ($i>=15)`
+___
+}
+
+$code=<<___;
+.machine	"any"
+.text
+
+.globl	$func
+.align	6
+$func:
+	$STU		$sp,-`($FRAME+21*16+6*$SIZE_T)`($sp)
+	mflr		$lrsave
+	li		r10,`$FRAME+8*16+15`
+	li		r11,`$FRAME+8*16+31`
+	stvx		v20,r10,$sp		# ABI says so
+	addi		r10,r10,32
+	mfspr		$vrsave,256
+	stvx		v21,r11,$sp
+	addi		r11,r11,32
+	stvx		v22,r10,$sp
+	addi		r10,r10,32
+	stvx		v23,r11,$sp
+	addi		r11,r11,32
+	stvx		v24,r10,$sp
+	addi		r10,r10,32
+	stvx		v25,r11,$sp
+	addi		r11,r11,32
+	stvx		v26,r10,$sp
+	addi		r10,r10,32
+	stvx		v27,r11,$sp
+	addi		r11,r11,32
+	stvx		v28,r10,$sp
+	addi		r10,r10,32
+	stvx		v29,r11,$sp
+	addi		r11,r11,32
+	stvx		v30,r10,$sp
+	stvx		v31,r11,$sp
+	li		r11,-1
+	stw		$vrsave,`$FRAME+21*16-4`($sp)	# save vrsave
+	li		$x10,0x10
+	$PUSH		r26,`$FRAME+21*16+0*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+	li		$x20,0x20
+	$PUSH		r27,`$FRAME+21*16+1*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+	li		$x30,0x30
+	$PUSH		r28,`$FRAME+21*16+2*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+	li		$x40,0x40
+	$PUSH		r29,`$FRAME+21*16+3*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+	li		$x50,0x50
+	$PUSH		r30,`$FRAME+21*16+4*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+	li		$x60,0x60
+	$PUSH		r31,`$FRAME+21*16+5*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+	li		$x70,0x70
+	$PUSH		$lrsave,`$FRAME+21*16+6*$SIZE_T+$LRSAVE`($sp)
+	mtspr		256,r11
+
+	bl		LPICmeup
+	addi		$offload,$sp,$FRAME+15
+___
+$code.=<<___		if ($LENDIAN);
+	li		$idx,8
+	lvsl		$lemask,0,$idx
+	vspltisb	$Ki,0x0f
+	vxor		$lemask,$lemask,$Ki
+___
+$code.=<<___		if ($SZ==4);
+	lvx_4w		$A,$x00,$ctx
+	lvx_4w		$E,$x10,$ctx
+	vsldoi		$B,$A,$A,4		# unpack
+	vsldoi		$C,$A,$A,8
+	vsldoi		$D,$A,$A,12
+	vsldoi		$F,$E,$E,4
+	vsldoi		$G,$E,$E,8
+	vsldoi		$H,$E,$E,12
+___
+$code.=<<___		if ($SZ==8);
+	lvx_u		$A,$x00,$ctx
+	lvx_u		$C,$x10,$ctx
+	lvx_u		$E,$x20,$ctx
+	vsldoi		$B,$A,$A,8		# unpack
+	lvx_u		$G,$x30,$ctx
+	vsldoi		$D,$C,$C,8
+	vsldoi		$F,$E,$E,8
+	vsldoi		$H,$G,$G,8
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	li		r0,`($rounds-16)/16`	# inner loop counter
+	b		Loop
+.align	5
+Loop:
+	lvx		$Ki,$x00,$Tbl
+	li		$idx,16
+	lvx_u		@X[0],0,$inp
+	addi		$inp,$inp,16
+	stvx		$A,$x00,$offload	# offload $A-$H
+	stvx		$B,$x10,$offload
+	stvx		$C,$x20,$offload
+	stvx		$D,$x30,$offload
+	stvx		$E,$x40,$offload
+	stvx		$F,$x50,$offload
+	stvx		$G,$x60,$offload
+	stvx		$H,$x70,$offload
+	vaddu${sz}m	$H,$H,$Ki		# h+K[i]
+	lvx		$Ki,$idx,$Tbl
+	addi		$idx,$idx,16
+___
+for ($i=0;$i<16;$i++)	{ &ROUND($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+$code.=<<___;
+	mtctr		r0
+	b		L16_xx
+.align	5
+L16_xx:
+___
+for (;$i<32;$i++)	{ &ROUND($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+$code.=<<___;
+	bdnz		L16_xx
+
+	lvx		@X[2],$x00,$offload
+	subic.		$num,$num,1
+	lvx		@X[3],$x10,$offload
+	vaddu${sz}m	$A,$A,@X[2]
+	lvx		@X[4],$x20,$offload
+	vaddu${sz}m	$B,$B,@X[3]
+	lvx		@X[5],$x30,$offload
+	vaddu${sz}m	$C,$C,@X[4]
+	lvx		@X[6],$x40,$offload
+	vaddu${sz}m	$D,$D,@X[5]
+	lvx		@X[7],$x50,$offload
+	vaddu${sz}m	$E,$E,@X[6]
+	lvx		@X[8],$x60,$offload
+	vaddu${sz}m	$F,$F,@X[7]
+	lvx		@X[9],$x70,$offload
+	vaddu${sz}m	$G,$G,@X[8]
+	vaddu${sz}m	$H,$H,@X[9]
+	bne		Loop
+___
+$code.=<<___		if ($SZ==4);
+	lvx		@X[0],$idx,$Tbl
+	addi		$idx,$idx,16
+	vperm		$A,$A,$B,$Ki		# pack the answer
+	lvx		@X[1],$idx,$Tbl
+	vperm		$E,$E,$F,$Ki
+	vperm		$A,$A,$C,@X[0]
+	vperm		$E,$E,$G,@X[0]
+	vperm		$A,$A,$D,@X[1]
+	vperm		$E,$E,$H,@X[1]
+	stvx_4w		$A,$x00,$ctx
+	stvx_4w		$E,$x10,$ctx
+___
+$code.=<<___		if ($SZ==8);
+	vperm		$A,$A,$B,$Ki		# pack the answer
+	vperm		$C,$C,$D,$Ki
+	vperm		$E,$E,$F,$Ki
+	vperm		$G,$G,$H,$Ki
+	stvx_u		$A,$x00,$ctx
+	stvx_u		$C,$x10,$ctx
+	stvx_u		$E,$x20,$ctx
+	stvx_u		$G,$x30,$ctx
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	li		r10,`$FRAME+8*16+15`
+	mtlr		$lrsave
+	li		r11,`$FRAME+8*16+31`
+	mtspr		256,$vrsave
+	lvx		v20,r10,$sp		# ABI says so
+	addi		r10,r10,32
+	lvx		v21,r11,$sp
+	addi		r11,r11,32
+	lvx		v22,r10,$sp
+	addi		r10,r10,32
+	lvx		v23,r11,$sp
+	addi		r11,r11,32
+	lvx		v24,r10,$sp
+	addi		r10,r10,32
+	lvx		v25,r11,$sp
+	addi		r11,r11,32
+	lvx		v26,r10,$sp
+	addi		r10,r10,32
+	lvx		v27,r11,$sp
+	addi		r11,r11,32
+	lvx		v28,r10,$sp
+	addi		r10,r10,32
+	lvx		v29,r11,$sp
+	addi		r11,r11,32
+	lvx		v30,r10,$sp
+	lvx		v31,r11,$sp
+	$POP		r26,`$FRAME+21*16+0*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+	$POP		r27,`$FRAME+21*16+1*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+	$POP		r28,`$FRAME+21*16+2*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+	$POP		r29,`$FRAME+21*16+3*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+	$POP		r30,`$FRAME+21*16+4*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+	$POP		r31,`$FRAME+21*16+5*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+	addi		$sp,$sp,`$FRAME+21*16+6*$SIZE_T`
+	blr
+	.long		0
+	.byte		0,12,4,1,0x80,6,3,0
+	.long		0
+.size	$func,.-$func
+___
+
+# Ugly hack here, because PPC assembler syntax seem to vary too
+# much from platforms to platform...
+$code.=<<___;
+.align	6
+LPICmeup:
+	mflr	r0
+	bcl	20,31,\$+4
+	mflr	$Tbl	; vvvvvv "distance" between . and 1st data entry
+	addi	$Tbl,$Tbl,`64-8`
+	mtlr	r0
+	blr
+	.long	0
+	.byte	0,12,0x14,0,0,0,0,0
+	.space	`64-9*4`
+___
+
+if ($SZ==8) {
+    local *table = sub {
+	foreach(@_) { $code.=".quad	$_,$_\n"; }
+    };
+    table(
+	"0x428a2f98d728ae22","0x7137449123ef65cd",
+	"0xb5c0fbcfec4d3b2f","0xe9b5dba58189dbbc",
+	"0x3956c25bf348b538","0x59f111f1b605d019",
+	"0x923f82a4af194f9b","0xab1c5ed5da6d8118",
+	"0xd807aa98a3030242","0x12835b0145706fbe",
+	"0x243185be4ee4b28c","0x550c7dc3d5ffb4e2",
+	"0x72be5d74f27b896f","0x80deb1fe3b1696b1",
+	"0x9bdc06a725c71235","0xc19bf174cf692694",
+	"0xe49b69c19ef14ad2","0xefbe4786384f25e3",
+	"0x0fc19dc68b8cd5b5","0x240ca1cc77ac9c65",
+	"0x2de92c6f592b0275","0x4a7484aa6ea6e483",
+	"0x5cb0a9dcbd41fbd4","0x76f988da831153b5",
+	"0x983e5152ee66dfab","0xa831c66d2db43210",
+	"0xb00327c898fb213f","0xbf597fc7beef0ee4",
+	"0xc6e00bf33da88fc2","0xd5a79147930aa725",
+	"0x06ca6351e003826f","0x142929670a0e6e70",
+	"0x27b70a8546d22ffc","0x2e1b21385c26c926",
+	"0x4d2c6dfc5ac42aed","0x53380d139d95b3df",
+	"0x650a73548baf63de","0x766a0abb3c77b2a8",
+	"0x81c2c92e47edaee6","0x92722c851482353b",
+	"0xa2bfe8a14cf10364","0xa81a664bbc423001",
+	"0xc24b8b70d0f89791","0xc76c51a30654be30",
+	"0xd192e819d6ef5218","0xd69906245565a910",
+	"0xf40e35855771202a","0x106aa07032bbd1b8",
+	"0x19a4c116b8d2d0c8","0x1e376c085141ab53",
+	"0x2748774cdf8eeb99","0x34b0bcb5e19b48a8",
+	"0x391c0cb3c5c95a63","0x4ed8aa4ae3418acb",
+	"0x5b9cca4f7763e373","0x682e6ff3d6b2b8a3",
+	"0x748f82ee5defb2fc","0x78a5636f43172f60",
+	"0x84c87814a1f0ab72","0x8cc702081a6439ec",
+	"0x90befffa23631e28","0xa4506cebde82bde9",
+	"0xbef9a3f7b2c67915","0xc67178f2e372532b",
+	"0xca273eceea26619c","0xd186b8c721c0c207",
+	"0xeada7dd6cde0eb1e","0xf57d4f7fee6ed178",
+	"0x06f067aa72176fba","0x0a637dc5a2c898a6",
+	"0x113f9804bef90dae","0x1b710b35131c471b",
+	"0x28db77f523047d84","0x32caab7b40c72493",
+	"0x3c9ebe0a15c9bebc","0x431d67c49c100d4c",
+	"0x4cc5d4becb3e42b6","0x597f299cfc657e2a",
+	"0x5fcb6fab3ad6faec","0x6c44198c4a475817","0");
+$code.=<<___	if (!$LENDIAN);
+.quad	0x0001020304050607,0x1011121314151617
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($LENDIAN);	# quad-swapped
+.quad	0x1011121314151617,0x0001020304050607
+___
+} else {
+    local *table = sub {
+	foreach(@_) { $code.=".long	$_,$_,$_,$_\n"; }
+    };
+    table(
+	"0x428a2f98","0x71374491","0xb5c0fbcf","0xe9b5dba5",
+	"0x3956c25b","0x59f111f1","0x923f82a4","0xab1c5ed5",
+	"0xd807aa98","0x12835b01","0x243185be","0x550c7dc3",
+	"0x72be5d74","0x80deb1fe","0x9bdc06a7","0xc19bf174",
+	"0xe49b69c1","0xefbe4786","0x0fc19dc6","0x240ca1cc",
+	"0x2de92c6f","0x4a7484aa","0x5cb0a9dc","0x76f988da",
+	"0x983e5152","0xa831c66d","0xb00327c8","0xbf597fc7",
+	"0xc6e00bf3","0xd5a79147","0x06ca6351","0x14292967",
+	"0x27b70a85","0x2e1b2138","0x4d2c6dfc","0x53380d13",
+	"0x650a7354","0x766a0abb","0x81c2c92e","0x92722c85",
+	"0xa2bfe8a1","0xa81a664b","0xc24b8b70","0xc76c51a3",
+	"0xd192e819","0xd6990624","0xf40e3585","0x106aa070",
+	"0x19a4c116","0x1e376c08","0x2748774c","0x34b0bcb5",
+	"0x391c0cb3","0x4ed8aa4a","0x5b9cca4f","0x682e6ff3",
+	"0x748f82ee","0x78a5636f","0x84c87814","0x8cc70208",
+	"0x90befffa","0xa4506ceb","0xbef9a3f7","0xc67178f2","0");
+$code.=<<___	if (!$LENDIAN);
+.long	0x00010203,0x10111213,0x10111213,0x10111213
+.long	0x00010203,0x04050607,0x10111213,0x10111213
+.long	0x00010203,0x04050607,0x08090a0b,0x10111213
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($LENDIAN);	# word-swapped
+.long	0x10111213,0x10111213,0x10111213,0x00010203
+.long	0x10111213,0x10111213,0x04050607,0x00010203
+.long	0x10111213,0x08090a0b,0x04050607,0x00010203
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+.asciz	"SHA${bits} for PowerISA 2.07, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+.align	2
+___
+
+$code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem;
+print $code;
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/build.info b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/build.info
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5843e50
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/build.info
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+LIBS=../../libcrypto
+SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
+        sha1dgst.c sha1_one.c sha256.c sha512.c {- $target{sha1_asm_src} -}
+
+GENERATE[sha1-586.s]=asm/sha1-586.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $(CFLAGS) $(LIB_CFLAGS) $(PROCESSOR)
+DEPEND[sha1-586.s]=../perlasm/x86asm.pl
+GENERATE[sha256-586.s]=asm/sha256-586.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $(CFLAGS) $(LIB_CFLAGS) $(PROCESSOR)
+DEPEND[sha256-586.s]=../perlasm/x86asm.pl
+GENERATE[sha512-586.s]=asm/sha512-586.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $(CFLAGS) $(LIB_CFLAGS) $(PROCESSOR)
+DEPEND[sha512-586.s]=../perlasm/x86asm.pl
+
+GENERATE[sha1-ia64.s]=asm/sha1-ia64.pl $(CFLAGS) $(LIB_CFLAGS)
+GENERATE[sha256-ia64.s]=asm/sha512-ia64.pl $(CFLAGS) $(LIB_CFLAGS)
+GENERATE[sha512-ia64.s]=asm/sha512-ia64.pl $(CFLAGS) $(LIB_CFLAGS)
+
+GENERATE[sha1-alpha.S]=asm/sha1-alpha.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+
+GENERATE[sha1-x86_64.s]=asm/sha1-x86_64.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+GENERATE[sha1-mb-x86_64.s]=asm/sha1-mb-x86_64.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+GENERATE[sha256-x86_64.s]=asm/sha512-x86_64.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+GENERATE[sha256-mb-x86_64.s]=asm/sha256-mb-x86_64.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+GENERATE[sha512-x86_64.s]=asm/sha512-x86_64.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+
+GENERATE[sha1-sparcv9.S]=asm/sha1-sparcv9.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+INCLUDE[sha1-sparcv9.o]=..
+GENERATE[sha256-sparcv9.S]=asm/sha512-sparcv9.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+INCLUDE[sha256-sparcv9.o]=..
+GENERATE[sha512-sparcv9.S]=asm/sha512-sparcv9.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+INCLUDE[sha512-sparcv9.o]=..
+
+GENERATE[sha1-ppc.s]=asm/sha1-ppc.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+GENERATE[sha256-ppc.s]=asm/sha512-ppc.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+GENERATE[sha512-ppc.s]=asm/sha512-ppc.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+GENERATE[sha256p8-ppc.s]=asm/sha512p8-ppc.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+GENERATE[sha512p8-ppc.s]=asm/sha512p8-ppc.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+
+GENERATE[sha1-parisc.s]=asm/sha1-parisc.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+GENERATE[sha256-parisc.s]=asm/sha512-parisc.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+GENERATE[sha512-parisc.s]=asm/sha512-parisc.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+
+GENERATE[sha1-mips.S]=asm/sha1-mips.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+GENERATE[sha256-mips.S]=asm/sha512-mips.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+GENERATE[sha512-mips.S]=asm/sha512-mips.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+
+GENERATE[sha1-armv4-large.S]=asm/sha1-armv4-large.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+INCLUDE[sha1-armv4-large.o]=..
+GENERATE[sha256-armv4.S]=asm/sha256-armv4.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+INCLUDE[sha256-armv4.o]=..
+GENERATE[sha512-armv4.S]=asm/sha512-armv4.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+INCLUDE[sha512-armv4.o]=..
+
+GENERATE[sha1-armv8.S]=asm/sha1-armv8.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+INCLUDE[sha1-armv8.o]=..
+GENERATE[sha256-armv8.S]=asm/sha512-armv8.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+INCLUDE[sha256-armv8.o]=..
+GENERATE[sha512-armv8.S]=asm/sha512-armv8.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+INCLUDE[sha512-armv8.o]=..
+
+BEGINRAW[Makefile(unix)]
+##### SHA assembler implementations
+
+# GNU make "catch all"
+{- $builddir -}/sha1-%.S:	{- $sourcedir -}/asm/sha1-%.pl
+	CC="$(CC)" $(PERL) $< $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $@
+{- $builddir -}/sha256-%.S:	{- $sourcedir -}/asm/sha512-%.pl
+	CC="$(CC)" $(PERL) $< $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $@
+{- $builddir -}/sha512-%.S:	{- $sourcedir -}/asm/sha512-%.pl
+	CC="$(CC)" $(PERL) $< $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $@
+ENDRAW[Makefile(unix)]
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/sha1_one.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/sha1_one.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..273ab08
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/sha1_one.c
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
+
+unsigned char *SHA1(const unsigned char *d, size_t n, unsigned char *md)
+{
+    SHA_CTX c;
+    static unsigned char m[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+
+    if (md == NULL)
+        md = m;
+    if (!SHA1_Init(&c))
+        return NULL;
+    SHA1_Update(&c, d, n);
+    SHA1_Final(md, &c);
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(&c, sizeof(c));
+    return (md);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/sha1dgst.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/sha1dgst.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..819370e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/sha1dgst.c
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+
+# include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+
+/* The implementation is in ../md32_common.h */
+
+# include "sha_locl.h"
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/sha256.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/sha256.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5e7ba43
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/sha256.c
@@ -0,0 +1,386 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
+#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+
+int SHA224_Init(SHA256_CTX *c)
+{
+    memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c));
+    c->h[0] = 0xc1059ed8UL;
+    c->h[1] = 0x367cd507UL;
+    c->h[2] = 0x3070dd17UL;
+    c->h[3] = 0xf70e5939UL;
+    c->h[4] = 0xffc00b31UL;
+    c->h[5] = 0x68581511UL;
+    c->h[6] = 0x64f98fa7UL;
+    c->h[7] = 0xbefa4fa4UL;
+    c->md_len = SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int SHA256_Init(SHA256_CTX *c)
+{
+    memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c));
+    c->h[0] = 0x6a09e667UL;
+    c->h[1] = 0xbb67ae85UL;
+    c->h[2] = 0x3c6ef372UL;
+    c->h[3] = 0xa54ff53aUL;
+    c->h[4] = 0x510e527fUL;
+    c->h[5] = 0x9b05688cUL;
+    c->h[6] = 0x1f83d9abUL;
+    c->h[7] = 0x5be0cd19UL;
+    c->md_len = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+unsigned char *SHA224(const unsigned char *d, size_t n, unsigned char *md)
+{
+    SHA256_CTX c;
+    static unsigned char m[SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+
+    if (md == NULL)
+        md = m;
+    SHA224_Init(&c);
+    SHA256_Update(&c, d, n);
+    SHA256_Final(md, &c);
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(&c, sizeof(c));
+    return (md);
+}
+
+unsigned char *SHA256(const unsigned char *d, size_t n, unsigned char *md)
+{
+    SHA256_CTX c;
+    static unsigned char m[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+
+    if (md == NULL)
+        md = m;
+    SHA256_Init(&c);
+    SHA256_Update(&c, d, n);
+    SHA256_Final(md, &c);
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(&c, sizeof(c));
+    return (md);
+}
+
+int SHA224_Update(SHA256_CTX *c, const void *data, size_t len)
+{
+    return SHA256_Update(c, data, len);
+}
+
+int SHA224_Final(unsigned char *md, SHA256_CTX *c)
+{
+    return SHA256_Final(md, c);
+}
+
+#define DATA_ORDER_IS_BIG_ENDIAN
+
+#define HASH_LONG               SHA_LONG
+#define HASH_CTX                SHA256_CTX
+#define HASH_CBLOCK             SHA_CBLOCK
+
+/*
+ * Note that FIPS180-2 discusses "Truncation of the Hash Function Output."
+ * default: case below covers for it. It's not clear however if it's
+ * permitted to truncate to amount of bytes not divisible by 4. I bet not,
+ * but if it is, then default: case shall be extended. For reference.
+ * Idea behind separate cases for pre-defined lengths is to let the
+ * compiler decide if it's appropriate to unroll small loops.
+ */
+#define HASH_MAKE_STRING(c,s)   do {    \
+        unsigned long ll;               \
+        unsigned int  nn;               \
+        switch ((c)->md_len)            \
+        {   case SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH:  \
+                for (nn=0;nn<SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH/4;nn++)       \
+                {   ll=(c)->h[nn]; (void)HOST_l2c(ll,(s));   }  \
+                break;                  \
+            case SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH:  \
+                for (nn=0;nn<SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH/4;nn++)       \
+                {   ll=(c)->h[nn]; (void)HOST_l2c(ll,(s));   }  \
+                break;                  \
+            default:                    \
+                if ((c)->md_len > SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) \
+                    return 0;                           \
+                for (nn=0;nn<(c)->md_len/4;nn++)                \
+                {   ll=(c)->h[nn]; (void)HOST_l2c(ll,(s));   }  \
+                break;                  \
+        }                               \
+        } while (0)
+
+#define HASH_UPDATE             SHA256_Update
+#define HASH_TRANSFORM          SHA256_Transform
+#define HASH_FINAL              SHA256_Final
+#define HASH_BLOCK_DATA_ORDER   sha256_block_data_order
+#ifndef SHA256_ASM
+static
+#endif
+void sha256_block_data_order(SHA256_CTX *ctx, const void *in, size_t num);
+
+#include "internal/md32_common.h"
+
+#ifndef SHA256_ASM
+static const SHA_LONG K256[64] = {
+    0x428a2f98UL, 0x71374491UL, 0xb5c0fbcfUL, 0xe9b5dba5UL,
+    0x3956c25bUL, 0x59f111f1UL, 0x923f82a4UL, 0xab1c5ed5UL,
+    0xd807aa98UL, 0x12835b01UL, 0x243185beUL, 0x550c7dc3UL,
+    0x72be5d74UL, 0x80deb1feUL, 0x9bdc06a7UL, 0xc19bf174UL,
+    0xe49b69c1UL, 0xefbe4786UL, 0x0fc19dc6UL, 0x240ca1ccUL,
+    0x2de92c6fUL, 0x4a7484aaUL, 0x5cb0a9dcUL, 0x76f988daUL,
+    0x983e5152UL, 0xa831c66dUL, 0xb00327c8UL, 0xbf597fc7UL,
+    0xc6e00bf3UL, 0xd5a79147UL, 0x06ca6351UL, 0x14292967UL,
+    0x27b70a85UL, 0x2e1b2138UL, 0x4d2c6dfcUL, 0x53380d13UL,
+    0x650a7354UL, 0x766a0abbUL, 0x81c2c92eUL, 0x92722c85UL,
+    0xa2bfe8a1UL, 0xa81a664bUL, 0xc24b8b70UL, 0xc76c51a3UL,
+    0xd192e819UL, 0xd6990624UL, 0xf40e3585UL, 0x106aa070UL,
+    0x19a4c116UL, 0x1e376c08UL, 0x2748774cUL, 0x34b0bcb5UL,
+    0x391c0cb3UL, 0x4ed8aa4aUL, 0x5b9cca4fUL, 0x682e6ff3UL,
+    0x748f82eeUL, 0x78a5636fUL, 0x84c87814UL, 0x8cc70208UL,
+    0x90befffaUL, 0xa4506cebUL, 0xbef9a3f7UL, 0xc67178f2UL
+};
+
+/*
+ * FIPS specification refers to right rotations, while our ROTATE macro
+ * is left one. This is why you might notice that rotation coefficients
+ * differ from those observed in FIPS document by 32-N...
+ */
+# define Sigma0(x)       (ROTATE((x),30) ^ ROTATE((x),19) ^ ROTATE((x),10))
+# define Sigma1(x)       (ROTATE((x),26) ^ ROTATE((x),21) ^ ROTATE((x),7))
+# define sigma0(x)       (ROTATE((x),25) ^ ROTATE((x),14) ^ ((x)>>3))
+# define sigma1(x)       (ROTATE((x),15) ^ ROTATE((x),13) ^ ((x)>>10))
+
+# define Ch(x,y,z)       (((x) & (y)) ^ ((~(x)) & (z)))
+# define Maj(x,y,z)      (((x) & (y)) ^ ((x) & (z)) ^ ((y) & (z)))
+
+# ifdef OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT
+
+static void sha256_block_data_order(SHA256_CTX *ctx, const void *in,
+                                    size_t num)
+{
+    unsigned MD32_REG_T a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, s0, s1, T1, T2;
+    SHA_LONG X[16], l;
+    int i;
+    const unsigned char *data = in;
+
+    while (num--) {
+
+        a = ctx->h[0];
+        b = ctx->h[1];
+        c = ctx->h[2];
+        d = ctx->h[3];
+        e = ctx->h[4];
+        f = ctx->h[5];
+        g = ctx->h[6];
+        h = ctx->h[7];
+
+        for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
+            (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+            T1 = X[i] = l;
+            T1 += h + Sigma1(e) + Ch(e, f, g) + K256[i];
+            T2 = Sigma0(a) + Maj(a, b, c);
+            h = g;
+            g = f;
+            f = e;
+            e = d + T1;
+            d = c;
+            c = b;
+            b = a;
+            a = T1 + T2;
+        }
+
+        for (; i < 64; i++) {
+            s0 = X[(i + 1) & 0x0f];
+            s0 = sigma0(s0);
+            s1 = X[(i + 14) & 0x0f];
+            s1 = sigma1(s1);
+
+            T1 = X[i & 0xf] += s0 + s1 + X[(i + 9) & 0xf];
+            T1 += h + Sigma1(e) + Ch(e, f, g) + K256[i];
+            T2 = Sigma0(a) + Maj(a, b, c);
+            h = g;
+            g = f;
+            f = e;
+            e = d + T1;
+            d = c;
+            c = b;
+            b = a;
+            a = T1 + T2;
+        }
+
+        ctx->h[0] += a;
+        ctx->h[1] += b;
+        ctx->h[2] += c;
+        ctx->h[3] += d;
+        ctx->h[4] += e;
+        ctx->h[5] += f;
+        ctx->h[6] += g;
+        ctx->h[7] += h;
+
+    }
+}
+
+# else
+
+#  define ROUND_00_15(i,a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h)          do {    \
+        T1 += h + Sigma1(e) + Ch(e,f,g) + K256[i];      \
+        h = Sigma0(a) + Maj(a,b,c);                     \
+        d += T1;        h += T1;                } while (0)
+
+#  define ROUND_16_63(i,a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h,X)        do {    \
+        s0 = X[(i+1)&0x0f];     s0 = sigma0(s0);        \
+        s1 = X[(i+14)&0x0f];    s1 = sigma1(s1);        \
+        T1 = X[(i)&0x0f] += s0 + s1 + X[(i+9)&0x0f];    \
+        ROUND_00_15(i,a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h);         } while (0)
+
+static void sha256_block_data_order(SHA256_CTX *ctx, const void *in,
+                                    size_t num)
+{
+    unsigned MD32_REG_T a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, s0, s1, T1;
+    SHA_LONG X[16];
+    int i;
+    const unsigned char *data = in;
+    const union {
+        long one;
+        char little;
+    } is_endian = {
+        1
+    };
+
+    while (num--) {
+
+        a = ctx->h[0];
+        b = ctx->h[1];
+        c = ctx->h[2];
+        d = ctx->h[3];
+        e = ctx->h[4];
+        f = ctx->h[5];
+        g = ctx->h[6];
+        h = ctx->h[7];
+
+        if (!is_endian.little && sizeof(SHA_LONG) == 4
+            && ((size_t)in % 4) == 0) {
+            const SHA_LONG *W = (const SHA_LONG *)data;
+
+            T1 = X[0] = W[0];
+            ROUND_00_15(0, a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h);
+            T1 = X[1] = W[1];
+            ROUND_00_15(1, h, a, b, c, d, e, f, g);
+            T1 = X[2] = W[2];
+            ROUND_00_15(2, g, h, a, b, c, d, e, f);
+            T1 = X[3] = W[3];
+            ROUND_00_15(3, f, g, h, a, b, c, d, e);
+            T1 = X[4] = W[4];
+            ROUND_00_15(4, e, f, g, h, a, b, c, d);
+            T1 = X[5] = W[5];
+            ROUND_00_15(5, d, e, f, g, h, a, b, c);
+            T1 = X[6] = W[6];
+            ROUND_00_15(6, c, d, e, f, g, h, a, b);
+            T1 = X[7] = W[7];
+            ROUND_00_15(7, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, a);
+            T1 = X[8] = W[8];
+            ROUND_00_15(8, a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h);
+            T1 = X[9] = W[9];
+            ROUND_00_15(9, h, a, b, c, d, e, f, g);
+            T1 = X[10] = W[10];
+            ROUND_00_15(10, g, h, a, b, c, d, e, f);
+            T1 = X[11] = W[11];
+            ROUND_00_15(11, f, g, h, a, b, c, d, e);
+            T1 = X[12] = W[12];
+            ROUND_00_15(12, e, f, g, h, a, b, c, d);
+            T1 = X[13] = W[13];
+            ROUND_00_15(13, d, e, f, g, h, a, b, c);
+            T1 = X[14] = W[14];
+            ROUND_00_15(14, c, d, e, f, g, h, a, b);
+            T1 = X[15] = W[15];
+            ROUND_00_15(15, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, a);
+
+            data += SHA256_CBLOCK;
+        } else {
+            SHA_LONG l;
+
+            (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+            T1 = X[0] = l;
+            ROUND_00_15(0, a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h);
+            (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+            T1 = X[1] = l;
+            ROUND_00_15(1, h, a, b, c, d, e, f, g);
+            (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+            T1 = X[2] = l;
+            ROUND_00_15(2, g, h, a, b, c, d, e, f);
+            (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+            T1 = X[3] = l;
+            ROUND_00_15(3, f, g, h, a, b, c, d, e);
+            (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+            T1 = X[4] = l;
+            ROUND_00_15(4, e, f, g, h, a, b, c, d);
+            (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+            T1 = X[5] = l;
+            ROUND_00_15(5, d, e, f, g, h, a, b, c);
+            (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+            T1 = X[6] = l;
+            ROUND_00_15(6, c, d, e, f, g, h, a, b);
+            (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+            T1 = X[7] = l;
+            ROUND_00_15(7, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, a);
+            (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+            T1 = X[8] = l;
+            ROUND_00_15(8, a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h);
+            (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+            T1 = X[9] = l;
+            ROUND_00_15(9, h, a, b, c, d, e, f, g);
+            (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+            T1 = X[10] = l;
+            ROUND_00_15(10, g, h, a, b, c, d, e, f);
+            (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+            T1 = X[11] = l;
+            ROUND_00_15(11, f, g, h, a, b, c, d, e);
+            (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+            T1 = X[12] = l;
+            ROUND_00_15(12, e, f, g, h, a, b, c, d);
+            (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+            T1 = X[13] = l;
+            ROUND_00_15(13, d, e, f, g, h, a, b, c);
+            (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+            T1 = X[14] = l;
+            ROUND_00_15(14, c, d, e, f, g, h, a, b);
+            (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+            T1 = X[15] = l;
+            ROUND_00_15(15, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, a);
+        }
+
+        for (i = 16; i < 64; i += 8) {
+            ROUND_16_63(i + 0, a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, X);
+            ROUND_16_63(i + 1, h, a, b, c, d, e, f, g, X);
+            ROUND_16_63(i + 2, g, h, a, b, c, d, e, f, X);
+            ROUND_16_63(i + 3, f, g, h, a, b, c, d, e, X);
+            ROUND_16_63(i + 4, e, f, g, h, a, b, c, d, X);
+            ROUND_16_63(i + 5, d, e, f, g, h, a, b, c, X);
+            ROUND_16_63(i + 6, c, d, e, f, g, h, a, b, X);
+            ROUND_16_63(i + 7, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, a, X);
+        }
+
+        ctx->h[0] += a;
+        ctx->h[1] += b;
+        ctx->h[2] += c;
+        ctx->h[3] += d;
+        ctx->h[4] += e;
+        ctx->h[5] += f;
+        ctx->h[6] += g;
+        ctx->h[7] += h;
+
+    }
+}
+
+# endif
+#endif                         /* SHA256_ASM */
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/sha512.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/sha512.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e94de43
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/sha512.c
@@ -0,0 +1,692 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+/*-
+ * IMPLEMENTATION NOTES.
+ *
+ * As you might have noticed 32-bit hash algorithms:
+ *
+ * - permit SHA_LONG to be wider than 32-bit
+ * - optimized versions implement two transform functions: one operating
+ *   on [aligned] data in host byte order and one - on data in input
+ *   stream byte order;
+ * - share common byte-order neutral collector and padding function
+ *   implementations, ../md32_common.h;
+ *
+ * Neither of the above applies to this SHA-512 implementations. Reasons
+ * [in reverse order] are:
+ *
+ * - it's the only 64-bit hash algorithm for the moment of this writing,
+ *   there is no need for common collector/padding implementation [yet];
+ * - by supporting only one transform function [which operates on
+ *   *aligned* data in input stream byte order, big-endian in this case]
+ *   we minimize burden of maintenance in two ways: a) collector/padding
+ *   function is simpler; b) only one transform function to stare at;
+ * - SHA_LONG64 is required to be exactly 64-bit in order to be able to
+ *   apply a number of optimizations to mitigate potential performance
+ *   penalties caused by previous design decision;
+ *
+ * Caveat lector.
+ *
+ * Implementation relies on the fact that "long long" is 64-bit on
+ * both 32- and 64-bit platforms. If some compiler vendor comes up
+ * with 128-bit long long, adjustment to sha.h would be required.
+ * As this implementation relies on 64-bit integer type, it's totally
+ * inappropriate for platforms which don't support it, most notably
+ * 16-bit platforms.
+ *                                      <appro@fy.chalmers.se>
+ */
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
+#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+
+#if defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__) || defined(_M_IX86) || \
+    defined(__x86_64) || defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) || \
+    defined(__s390__) || defined(__s390x__) || \
+    defined(__aarch64__) || \
+    defined(SHA512_ASM)
+# define SHA512_BLOCK_CAN_MANAGE_UNALIGNED_DATA
+#endif
+
+int SHA384_Init(SHA512_CTX *c)
+{
+    c->h[0] = U64(0xcbbb9d5dc1059ed8);
+    c->h[1] = U64(0x629a292a367cd507);
+    c->h[2] = U64(0x9159015a3070dd17);
+    c->h[3] = U64(0x152fecd8f70e5939);
+    c->h[4] = U64(0x67332667ffc00b31);
+    c->h[5] = U64(0x8eb44a8768581511);
+    c->h[6] = U64(0xdb0c2e0d64f98fa7);
+    c->h[7] = U64(0x47b5481dbefa4fa4);
+
+    c->Nl = 0;
+    c->Nh = 0;
+    c->num = 0;
+    c->md_len = SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int SHA512_Init(SHA512_CTX *c)
+{
+    c->h[0] = U64(0x6a09e667f3bcc908);
+    c->h[1] = U64(0xbb67ae8584caa73b);
+    c->h[2] = U64(0x3c6ef372fe94f82b);
+    c->h[3] = U64(0xa54ff53a5f1d36f1);
+    c->h[4] = U64(0x510e527fade682d1);
+    c->h[5] = U64(0x9b05688c2b3e6c1f);
+    c->h[6] = U64(0x1f83d9abfb41bd6b);
+    c->h[7] = U64(0x5be0cd19137e2179);
+
+    c->Nl = 0;
+    c->Nh = 0;
+    c->num = 0;
+    c->md_len = SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+#ifndef SHA512_ASM
+static
+#endif
+void sha512_block_data_order(SHA512_CTX *ctx, const void *in, size_t num);
+
+int SHA512_Final(unsigned char *md, SHA512_CTX *c)
+{
+    unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)c->u.p;
+    size_t n = c->num;
+
+    p[n] = 0x80;                /* There always is a room for one */
+    n++;
+    if (n > (sizeof(c->u) - 16)) {
+        memset(p + n, 0, sizeof(c->u) - n);
+        n = 0;
+        sha512_block_data_order(c, p, 1);
+    }
+
+    memset(p + n, 0, sizeof(c->u) - 16 - n);
+#ifdef  B_ENDIAN
+    c->u.d[SHA_LBLOCK - 2] = c->Nh;
+    c->u.d[SHA_LBLOCK - 1] = c->Nl;
+#else
+    p[sizeof(c->u) - 1] = (unsigned char)(c->Nl);
+    p[sizeof(c->u) - 2] = (unsigned char)(c->Nl >> 8);
+    p[sizeof(c->u) - 3] = (unsigned char)(c->Nl >> 16);
+    p[sizeof(c->u) - 4] = (unsigned char)(c->Nl >> 24);
+    p[sizeof(c->u) - 5] = (unsigned char)(c->Nl >> 32);
+    p[sizeof(c->u) - 6] = (unsigned char)(c->Nl >> 40);
+    p[sizeof(c->u) - 7] = (unsigned char)(c->Nl >> 48);
+    p[sizeof(c->u) - 8] = (unsigned char)(c->Nl >> 56);
+    p[sizeof(c->u) - 9] = (unsigned char)(c->Nh);
+    p[sizeof(c->u) - 10] = (unsigned char)(c->Nh >> 8);
+    p[sizeof(c->u) - 11] = (unsigned char)(c->Nh >> 16);
+    p[sizeof(c->u) - 12] = (unsigned char)(c->Nh >> 24);
+    p[sizeof(c->u) - 13] = (unsigned char)(c->Nh >> 32);
+    p[sizeof(c->u) - 14] = (unsigned char)(c->Nh >> 40);
+    p[sizeof(c->u) - 15] = (unsigned char)(c->Nh >> 48);
+    p[sizeof(c->u) - 16] = (unsigned char)(c->Nh >> 56);
+#endif
+
+    sha512_block_data_order(c, p, 1);
+
+    if (md == 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    switch (c->md_len) {
+    /* Let compiler decide if it's appropriate to unroll... */
+    case SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH:
+        for (n = 0; n < SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH / 8; n++) {
+            SHA_LONG64 t = c->h[n];
+
+            *(md++) = (unsigned char)(t >> 56);
+            *(md++) = (unsigned char)(t >> 48);
+            *(md++) = (unsigned char)(t >> 40);
+            *(md++) = (unsigned char)(t >> 32);
+            *(md++) = (unsigned char)(t >> 24);
+            *(md++) = (unsigned char)(t >> 16);
+            *(md++) = (unsigned char)(t >> 8);
+            *(md++) = (unsigned char)(t);
+        }
+        break;
+    case SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH:
+        for (n = 0; n < SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH / 8; n++) {
+            SHA_LONG64 t = c->h[n];
+
+            *(md++) = (unsigned char)(t >> 56);
+            *(md++) = (unsigned char)(t >> 48);
+            *(md++) = (unsigned char)(t >> 40);
+            *(md++) = (unsigned char)(t >> 32);
+            *(md++) = (unsigned char)(t >> 24);
+            *(md++) = (unsigned char)(t >> 16);
+            *(md++) = (unsigned char)(t >> 8);
+            *(md++) = (unsigned char)(t);
+        }
+        break;
+    /* ... as well as make sure md_len is not abused. */
+    default:
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int SHA384_Final(unsigned char *md, SHA512_CTX *c)
+{
+    return SHA512_Final(md, c);
+}
+
+int SHA512_Update(SHA512_CTX *c, const void *_data, size_t len)
+{
+    SHA_LONG64 l;
+    unsigned char *p = c->u.p;
+    const unsigned char *data = (const unsigned char *)_data;
+
+    if (len == 0)
+        return 1;
+
+    l = (c->Nl + (((SHA_LONG64) len) << 3)) & U64(0xffffffffffffffff);
+    if (l < c->Nl)
+        c->Nh++;
+    if (sizeof(len) >= 8)
+        c->Nh += (((SHA_LONG64) len) >> 61);
+    c->Nl = l;
+
+    if (c->num != 0) {
+        size_t n = sizeof(c->u) - c->num;
+
+        if (len < n) {
+            memcpy(p + c->num, data, len), c->num += (unsigned int)len;
+            return 1;
+        } else {
+            memcpy(p + c->num, data, n), c->num = 0;
+            len -= n, data += n;
+            sha512_block_data_order(c, p, 1);
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (len >= sizeof(c->u)) {
+#ifndef SHA512_BLOCK_CAN_MANAGE_UNALIGNED_DATA
+        if ((size_t)data % sizeof(c->u.d[0]) != 0)
+            while (len >= sizeof(c->u))
+                memcpy(p, data, sizeof(c->u)),
+                sha512_block_data_order(c, p, 1),
+                len -= sizeof(c->u), data += sizeof(c->u);
+        else
+#endif
+            sha512_block_data_order(c, data, len / sizeof(c->u)),
+            data += len, len %= sizeof(c->u), data -= len;
+    }
+
+    if (len != 0)
+        memcpy(p, data, len), c->num = (int)len;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int SHA384_Update(SHA512_CTX *c, const void *data, size_t len)
+{
+    return SHA512_Update(c, data, len);
+}
+
+void SHA512_Transform(SHA512_CTX *c, const unsigned char *data)
+{
+#ifndef SHA512_BLOCK_CAN_MANAGE_UNALIGNED_DATA
+    if ((size_t)data % sizeof(c->u.d[0]) != 0)
+        memcpy(c->u.p, data, sizeof(c->u.p)), data = c->u.p;
+#endif
+    sha512_block_data_order(c, data, 1);
+}
+
+unsigned char *SHA384(const unsigned char *d, size_t n, unsigned char *md)
+{
+    SHA512_CTX c;
+    static unsigned char m[SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+
+    if (md == NULL)
+        md = m;
+    SHA384_Init(&c);
+    SHA512_Update(&c, d, n);
+    SHA512_Final(md, &c);
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(&c, sizeof(c));
+    return (md);
+}
+
+unsigned char *SHA512(const unsigned char *d, size_t n, unsigned char *md)
+{
+    SHA512_CTX c;
+    static unsigned char m[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+
+    if (md == NULL)
+        md = m;
+    SHA512_Init(&c);
+    SHA512_Update(&c, d, n);
+    SHA512_Final(md, &c);
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(&c, sizeof(c));
+    return (md);
+}
+
+#ifndef SHA512_ASM
+static const SHA_LONG64 K512[80] = {
+    U64(0x428a2f98d728ae22), U64(0x7137449123ef65cd),
+    U64(0xb5c0fbcfec4d3b2f), U64(0xe9b5dba58189dbbc),
+    U64(0x3956c25bf348b538), U64(0x59f111f1b605d019),
+    U64(0x923f82a4af194f9b), U64(0xab1c5ed5da6d8118),
+    U64(0xd807aa98a3030242), U64(0x12835b0145706fbe),
+    U64(0x243185be4ee4b28c), U64(0x550c7dc3d5ffb4e2),
+    U64(0x72be5d74f27b896f), U64(0x80deb1fe3b1696b1),
+    U64(0x9bdc06a725c71235), U64(0xc19bf174cf692694),
+    U64(0xe49b69c19ef14ad2), U64(0xefbe4786384f25e3),
+    U64(0x0fc19dc68b8cd5b5), U64(0x240ca1cc77ac9c65),
+    U64(0x2de92c6f592b0275), U64(0x4a7484aa6ea6e483),
+    U64(0x5cb0a9dcbd41fbd4), U64(0x76f988da831153b5),
+    U64(0x983e5152ee66dfab), U64(0xa831c66d2db43210),
+    U64(0xb00327c898fb213f), U64(0xbf597fc7beef0ee4),
+    U64(0xc6e00bf33da88fc2), U64(0xd5a79147930aa725),
+    U64(0x06ca6351e003826f), U64(0x142929670a0e6e70),
+    U64(0x27b70a8546d22ffc), U64(0x2e1b21385c26c926),
+    U64(0x4d2c6dfc5ac42aed), U64(0x53380d139d95b3df),
+    U64(0x650a73548baf63de), U64(0x766a0abb3c77b2a8),
+    U64(0x81c2c92e47edaee6), U64(0x92722c851482353b),
+    U64(0xa2bfe8a14cf10364), U64(0xa81a664bbc423001),
+    U64(0xc24b8b70d0f89791), U64(0xc76c51a30654be30),
+    U64(0xd192e819d6ef5218), U64(0xd69906245565a910),
+    U64(0xf40e35855771202a), U64(0x106aa07032bbd1b8),
+    U64(0x19a4c116b8d2d0c8), U64(0x1e376c085141ab53),
+    U64(0x2748774cdf8eeb99), U64(0x34b0bcb5e19b48a8),
+    U64(0x391c0cb3c5c95a63), U64(0x4ed8aa4ae3418acb),
+    U64(0x5b9cca4f7763e373), U64(0x682e6ff3d6b2b8a3),
+    U64(0x748f82ee5defb2fc), U64(0x78a5636f43172f60),
+    U64(0x84c87814a1f0ab72), U64(0x8cc702081a6439ec),
+    U64(0x90befffa23631e28), U64(0xa4506cebde82bde9),
+    U64(0xbef9a3f7b2c67915), U64(0xc67178f2e372532b),
+    U64(0xca273eceea26619c), U64(0xd186b8c721c0c207),
+    U64(0xeada7dd6cde0eb1e), U64(0xf57d4f7fee6ed178),
+    U64(0x06f067aa72176fba), U64(0x0a637dc5a2c898a6),
+    U64(0x113f9804bef90dae), U64(0x1b710b35131c471b),
+    U64(0x28db77f523047d84), U64(0x32caab7b40c72493),
+    U64(0x3c9ebe0a15c9bebc), U64(0x431d67c49c100d4c),
+    U64(0x4cc5d4becb3e42b6), U64(0x597f299cfc657e2a),
+    U64(0x5fcb6fab3ad6faec), U64(0x6c44198c4a475817)
+};
+
+# ifndef PEDANTIC
+#  if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 && \
+      !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_INLINE_ASM)
+#   if defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__)
+#    define ROTR(a,n)    ({ SHA_LONG64 ret;             \
+                                asm ("rorq %1,%0"       \
+                                : "=r"(ret)             \
+                                : "J"(n),"0"(a)         \
+                                : "cc"); ret;           })
+#    if !defined(B_ENDIAN)
+#     define PULL64(x) ({ SHA_LONG64 ret=*((const SHA_LONG64 *)(&(x)));  \
+                                asm ("bswapq    %0"             \
+                                : "=r"(ret)                     \
+                                : "0"(ret)); ret;               })
+#    endif
+#   elif (defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__)) && !defined(B_ENDIAN)
+#    if defined(I386_ONLY)
+#     define PULL64(x) ({ const unsigned int *p=(const unsigned int *)(&(x));\
+                          unsigned int hi=p[0],lo=p[1];          \
+                                asm("xchgb %%ah,%%al;xchgb %%dh,%%dl;"\
+                                    "roll $16,%%eax; roll $16,%%edx; "\
+                                    "xchgb %%ah,%%al;xchgb %%dh,%%dl;"\
+                                : "=a"(lo),"=d"(hi)             \
+                                : "0"(lo),"1"(hi) : "cc");      \
+                                ((SHA_LONG64)hi)<<32|lo;        })
+#    else
+#     define PULL64(x) ({ const unsigned int *p=(const unsigned int *)(&(x));\
+                          unsigned int hi=p[0],lo=p[1];         \
+                                asm ("bswapl %0; bswapl %1;"    \
+                                : "=r"(lo),"=r"(hi)             \
+                                : "0"(lo),"1"(hi));             \
+                                ((SHA_LONG64)hi)<<32|lo;        })
+#    endif
+#   elif (defined(_ARCH_PPC) && defined(__64BIT__)) || defined(_ARCH_PPC64)
+#    define ROTR(a,n)    ({ SHA_LONG64 ret;             \
+                                asm ("rotrdi %0,%1,%2"  \
+                                : "=r"(ret)             \
+                                : "r"(a),"K"(n)); ret;  })
+#   elif defined(__aarch64__)
+#    define ROTR(a,n)    ({ SHA_LONG64 ret;             \
+                                asm ("ror %0,%1,%2"     \
+                                : "=r"(ret)             \
+                                : "r"(a),"I"(n)); ret;  })
+#    if  defined(__BYTE_ORDER__) && defined(__ORDER_LITTLE_ENDIAN__) && \
+        __BYTE_ORDER__==__ORDER_LITTLE_ENDIAN__
+#     define PULL64(x)   ({ SHA_LONG64 ret;                     \
+                                asm ("rev       %0,%1"          \
+                                : "=r"(ret)                     \
+                                : "r"(*((const SHA_LONG64 *)(&(x))))); ret; })
+#    endif
+#   endif
+#  elif defined(_MSC_VER)
+#   if defined(_WIN64)         /* applies to both IA-64 and AMD64 */
+#    pragma intrinsic(_rotr64)
+#    define ROTR(a,n)    _rotr64((a),n)
+#   endif
+#   if defined(_M_IX86) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && \
+       !defined(OPENSSL_NO_INLINE_ASM)
+#    if defined(I386_ONLY)
+static SHA_LONG64 __fastcall __pull64be(const void *x)
+{
+    _asm mov  edx,[ecx + 0]
+    _asm mov  eax,[ecx + 4]
+    _asm xchg dh, dl
+    _asm xchg ah, al
+    _asm rol  edx, 16
+    _asm rol  eax, 16
+    _asm xchg dh, dl
+    _asm xchg ah, al
+}
+#    else
+static SHA_LONG64 __fastcall __pull64be(const void *x)
+{
+    _asm mov   edx,[ecx + 0]
+    _asm mov   eax,[ecx + 4]
+    _asm bswap edx
+    _asm bswap eax
+}
+#    endif
+#    define PULL64(x) __pull64be(&(x))
+#    if _MSC_VER<=1200
+#     pragma inline_depth(0)
+#    endif
+#   endif
+#  endif
+# endif
+# ifndef PULL64
+#  define B(x,j)    (((SHA_LONG64)(*(((const unsigned char *)(&x))+j)))<<((7-j)*8))
+#  define PULL64(x) (B(x,0)|B(x,1)|B(x,2)|B(x,3)|B(x,4)|B(x,5)|B(x,6)|B(x,7))
+# endif
+# ifndef ROTR
+#  define ROTR(x,s)       (((x)>>s) | (x)<<(64-s))
+# endif
+# define Sigma0(x)       (ROTR((x),28) ^ ROTR((x),34) ^ ROTR((x),39))
+# define Sigma1(x)       (ROTR((x),14) ^ ROTR((x),18) ^ ROTR((x),41))
+# define sigma0(x)       (ROTR((x),1)  ^ ROTR((x),8)  ^ ((x)>>7))
+# define sigma1(x)       (ROTR((x),19) ^ ROTR((x),61) ^ ((x)>>6))
+# define Ch(x,y,z)       (((x) & (y)) ^ ((~(x)) & (z)))
+# define Maj(x,y,z)      (((x) & (y)) ^ ((x) & (z)) ^ ((y) & (z)))
+
+# if defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__) || defined(_M_IX86)
+/*
+ * This code should give better results on 32-bit CPU with less than
+ * ~24 registers, both size and performance wise...
+ */
+
+static void sha512_block_data_order(SHA512_CTX *ctx, const void *in,
+                                    size_t num)
+{
+    const SHA_LONG64 *W = in;
+    SHA_LONG64 A, E, T;
+    SHA_LONG64 X[9 + 80], *F;
+    int i;
+
+    while (num--) {
+
+        F = X + 80;
+        A = ctx->h[0];
+        F[1] = ctx->h[1];
+        F[2] = ctx->h[2];
+        F[3] = ctx->h[3];
+        E = ctx->h[4];
+        F[5] = ctx->h[5];
+        F[6] = ctx->h[6];
+        F[7] = ctx->h[7];
+
+        for (i = 0; i < 16; i++, F--) {
+#  ifdef B_ENDIAN
+            T = W[i];
+#  else
+            T = PULL64(W[i]);
+#  endif
+            F[0] = A;
+            F[4] = E;
+            F[8] = T;
+            T += F[7] + Sigma1(E) + Ch(E, F[5], F[6]) + K512[i];
+            E = F[3] + T;
+            A = T + Sigma0(A) + Maj(A, F[1], F[2]);
+        }
+
+        for (; i < 80; i++, F--) {
+            T = sigma0(F[8 + 16 - 1]);
+            T += sigma1(F[8 + 16 - 14]);
+            T += F[8 + 16] + F[8 + 16 - 9];
+
+            F[0] = A;
+            F[4] = E;
+            F[8] = T;
+            T += F[7] + Sigma1(E) + Ch(E, F[5], F[6]) + K512[i];
+            E = F[3] + T;
+            A = T + Sigma0(A) + Maj(A, F[1], F[2]);
+        }
+
+        ctx->h[0] += A;
+        ctx->h[1] += F[1];
+        ctx->h[2] += F[2];
+        ctx->h[3] += F[3];
+        ctx->h[4] += E;
+        ctx->h[5] += F[5];
+        ctx->h[6] += F[6];
+        ctx->h[7] += F[7];
+
+        W += SHA_LBLOCK;
+    }
+}
+
+# elif defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT)
+
+static void sha512_block_data_order(SHA512_CTX *ctx, const void *in,
+                                    size_t num)
+{
+    const SHA_LONG64 *W = in;
+    SHA_LONG64 a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, s0, s1, T1, T2;
+    SHA_LONG64 X[16];
+    int i;
+
+    while (num--) {
+
+        a = ctx->h[0];
+        b = ctx->h[1];
+        c = ctx->h[2];
+        d = ctx->h[3];
+        e = ctx->h[4];
+        f = ctx->h[5];
+        g = ctx->h[6];
+        h = ctx->h[7];
+
+        for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
+#  ifdef B_ENDIAN
+            T1 = X[i] = W[i];
+#  else
+            T1 = X[i] = PULL64(W[i]);
+#  endif
+            T1 += h + Sigma1(e) + Ch(e, f, g) + K512[i];
+            T2 = Sigma0(a) + Maj(a, b, c);
+            h = g;
+            g = f;
+            f = e;
+            e = d + T1;
+            d = c;
+            c = b;
+            b = a;
+            a = T1 + T2;
+        }
+
+        for (; i < 80; i++) {
+            s0 = X[(i + 1) & 0x0f];
+            s0 = sigma0(s0);
+            s1 = X[(i + 14) & 0x0f];
+            s1 = sigma1(s1);
+
+            T1 = X[i & 0xf] += s0 + s1 + X[(i + 9) & 0xf];
+            T1 += h + Sigma1(e) + Ch(e, f, g) + K512[i];
+            T2 = Sigma0(a) + Maj(a, b, c);
+            h = g;
+            g = f;
+            f = e;
+            e = d + T1;
+            d = c;
+            c = b;
+            b = a;
+            a = T1 + T2;
+        }
+
+        ctx->h[0] += a;
+        ctx->h[1] += b;
+        ctx->h[2] += c;
+        ctx->h[3] += d;
+        ctx->h[4] += e;
+        ctx->h[5] += f;
+        ctx->h[6] += g;
+        ctx->h[7] += h;
+
+        W += SHA_LBLOCK;
+    }
+}
+
+# else
+#  define ROUND_00_15(i,a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h)        do {    \
+        T1 += h + Sigma1(e) + Ch(e,f,g) + K512[i];      \
+        h = Sigma0(a) + Maj(a,b,c);                     \
+        d += T1;        h += T1;                        } while (0)
+
+#  define ROUND_16_80(i,j,a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h,X)    do {    \
+        s0 = X[(j+1)&0x0f];     s0 = sigma0(s0);        \
+        s1 = X[(j+14)&0x0f];    s1 = sigma1(s1);        \
+        T1 = X[(j)&0x0f] += s0 + s1 + X[(j+9)&0x0f];    \
+        ROUND_00_15(i+j,a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h);               } while (0)
+
+static void sha512_block_data_order(SHA512_CTX *ctx, const void *in,
+                                    size_t num)
+{
+    const SHA_LONG64 *W = in;
+    SHA_LONG64 a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, s0, s1, T1;
+    SHA_LONG64 X[16];
+    int i;
+
+    while (num--) {
+
+        a = ctx->h[0];
+        b = ctx->h[1];
+        c = ctx->h[2];
+        d = ctx->h[3];
+        e = ctx->h[4];
+        f = ctx->h[5];
+        g = ctx->h[6];
+        h = ctx->h[7];
+
+#  ifdef B_ENDIAN
+        T1 = X[0] = W[0];
+        ROUND_00_15(0, a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h);
+        T1 = X[1] = W[1];
+        ROUND_00_15(1, h, a, b, c, d, e, f, g);
+        T1 = X[2] = W[2];
+        ROUND_00_15(2, g, h, a, b, c, d, e, f);
+        T1 = X[3] = W[3];
+        ROUND_00_15(3, f, g, h, a, b, c, d, e);
+        T1 = X[4] = W[4];
+        ROUND_00_15(4, e, f, g, h, a, b, c, d);
+        T1 = X[5] = W[5];
+        ROUND_00_15(5, d, e, f, g, h, a, b, c);
+        T1 = X[6] = W[6];
+        ROUND_00_15(6, c, d, e, f, g, h, a, b);
+        T1 = X[7] = W[7];
+        ROUND_00_15(7, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, a);
+        T1 = X[8] = W[8];
+        ROUND_00_15(8, a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h);
+        T1 = X[9] = W[9];
+        ROUND_00_15(9, h, a, b, c, d, e, f, g);
+        T1 = X[10] = W[10];
+        ROUND_00_15(10, g, h, a, b, c, d, e, f);
+        T1 = X[11] = W[11];
+        ROUND_00_15(11, f, g, h, a, b, c, d, e);
+        T1 = X[12] = W[12];
+        ROUND_00_15(12, e, f, g, h, a, b, c, d);
+        T1 = X[13] = W[13];
+        ROUND_00_15(13, d, e, f, g, h, a, b, c);
+        T1 = X[14] = W[14];
+        ROUND_00_15(14, c, d, e, f, g, h, a, b);
+        T1 = X[15] = W[15];
+        ROUND_00_15(15, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, a);
+#  else
+        T1 = X[0] = PULL64(W[0]);
+        ROUND_00_15(0, a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h);
+        T1 = X[1] = PULL64(W[1]);
+        ROUND_00_15(1, h, a, b, c, d, e, f, g);
+        T1 = X[2] = PULL64(W[2]);
+        ROUND_00_15(2, g, h, a, b, c, d, e, f);
+        T1 = X[3] = PULL64(W[3]);
+        ROUND_00_15(3, f, g, h, a, b, c, d, e);
+        T1 = X[4] = PULL64(W[4]);
+        ROUND_00_15(4, e, f, g, h, a, b, c, d);
+        T1 = X[5] = PULL64(W[5]);
+        ROUND_00_15(5, d, e, f, g, h, a, b, c);
+        T1 = X[6] = PULL64(W[6]);
+        ROUND_00_15(6, c, d, e, f, g, h, a, b);
+        T1 = X[7] = PULL64(W[7]);
+        ROUND_00_15(7, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, a);
+        T1 = X[8] = PULL64(W[8]);
+        ROUND_00_15(8, a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h);
+        T1 = X[9] = PULL64(W[9]);
+        ROUND_00_15(9, h, a, b, c, d, e, f, g);
+        T1 = X[10] = PULL64(W[10]);
+        ROUND_00_15(10, g, h, a, b, c, d, e, f);
+        T1 = X[11] = PULL64(W[11]);
+        ROUND_00_15(11, f, g, h, a, b, c, d, e);
+        T1 = X[12] = PULL64(W[12]);
+        ROUND_00_15(12, e, f, g, h, a, b, c, d);
+        T1 = X[13] = PULL64(W[13]);
+        ROUND_00_15(13, d, e, f, g, h, a, b, c);
+        T1 = X[14] = PULL64(W[14]);
+        ROUND_00_15(14, c, d, e, f, g, h, a, b);
+        T1 = X[15] = PULL64(W[15]);
+        ROUND_00_15(15, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, a);
+#  endif
+
+        for (i = 16; i < 80; i += 16) {
+            ROUND_16_80(i, 0, a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, X);
+            ROUND_16_80(i, 1, h, a, b, c, d, e, f, g, X);
+            ROUND_16_80(i, 2, g, h, a, b, c, d, e, f, X);
+            ROUND_16_80(i, 3, f, g, h, a, b, c, d, e, X);
+            ROUND_16_80(i, 4, e, f, g, h, a, b, c, d, X);
+            ROUND_16_80(i, 5, d, e, f, g, h, a, b, c, X);
+            ROUND_16_80(i, 6, c, d, e, f, g, h, a, b, X);
+            ROUND_16_80(i, 7, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, a, X);
+            ROUND_16_80(i, 8, a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, X);
+            ROUND_16_80(i, 9, h, a, b, c, d, e, f, g, X);
+            ROUND_16_80(i, 10, g, h, a, b, c, d, e, f, X);
+            ROUND_16_80(i, 11, f, g, h, a, b, c, d, e, X);
+            ROUND_16_80(i, 12, e, f, g, h, a, b, c, d, X);
+            ROUND_16_80(i, 13, d, e, f, g, h, a, b, c, X);
+            ROUND_16_80(i, 14, c, d, e, f, g, h, a, b, X);
+            ROUND_16_80(i, 15, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, a, X);
+        }
+
+        ctx->h[0] += a;
+        ctx->h[1] += b;
+        ctx->h[2] += c;
+        ctx->h[3] += d;
+        ctx->h[4] += e;
+        ctx->h[5] += f;
+        ctx->h[6] += g;
+        ctx->h[7] += h;
+
+        W += SHA_LBLOCK;
+    }
+}
+
+# endif
+
+#endif                         /* SHA512_ASM */
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/sha_locl.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/sha_locl.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..918278a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sha/sha_locl.h
@@ -0,0 +1,424 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
+
+#define DATA_ORDER_IS_BIG_ENDIAN
+
+#define HASH_LONG               SHA_LONG
+#define HASH_CTX                SHA_CTX
+#define HASH_CBLOCK             SHA_CBLOCK
+#define HASH_MAKE_STRING(c,s)   do {    \
+        unsigned long ll;               \
+        ll=(c)->h0; (void)HOST_l2c(ll,(s));     \
+        ll=(c)->h1; (void)HOST_l2c(ll,(s));     \
+        ll=(c)->h2; (void)HOST_l2c(ll,(s));     \
+        ll=(c)->h3; (void)HOST_l2c(ll,(s));     \
+        ll=(c)->h4; (void)HOST_l2c(ll,(s));     \
+        } while (0)
+
+#define HASH_UPDATE                     SHA1_Update
+#define HASH_TRANSFORM                  SHA1_Transform
+#define HASH_FINAL                      SHA1_Final
+#define HASH_INIT                       SHA1_Init
+#define HASH_BLOCK_DATA_ORDER           sha1_block_data_order
+#define Xupdate(a,ix,ia,ib,ic,id)       ( (a)=(ia^ib^ic^id),    \
+                                          ix=(a)=ROTATE((a),1)  \
+                                        )
+
+#ifndef SHA1_ASM
+static void sha1_block_data_order(SHA_CTX *c, const void *p, size_t num);
+#else
+void sha1_block_data_order(SHA_CTX *c, const void *p, size_t num);
+#endif
+
+#include "internal/md32_common.h"
+
+#define INIT_DATA_h0 0x67452301UL
+#define INIT_DATA_h1 0xefcdab89UL
+#define INIT_DATA_h2 0x98badcfeUL
+#define INIT_DATA_h3 0x10325476UL
+#define INIT_DATA_h4 0xc3d2e1f0UL
+
+int HASH_INIT(SHA_CTX *c)
+{
+    memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c));
+    c->h0 = INIT_DATA_h0;
+    c->h1 = INIT_DATA_h1;
+    c->h2 = INIT_DATA_h2;
+    c->h3 = INIT_DATA_h3;
+    c->h4 = INIT_DATA_h4;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+#define K_00_19 0x5a827999UL
+#define K_20_39 0x6ed9eba1UL
+#define K_40_59 0x8f1bbcdcUL
+#define K_60_79 0xca62c1d6UL
+
+/*
+ * As pointed out by Wei Dai <weidai@eskimo.com>, F() below can be simplified
+ * to the code in F_00_19.  Wei attributes these optimisations to Peter
+ * Gutmann's SHS code, and he attributes it to Rich Schroeppel. #define
+ * F(x,y,z) (((x) & (y)) | ((~(x)) & (z))) I've just become aware of another
+ * tweak to be made, again from Wei Dai, in F_40_59, (x&a)|(y&a) -> (x|y)&a
+ */
+#define F_00_19(b,c,d)  ((((c) ^ (d)) & (b)) ^ (d))
+#define F_20_39(b,c,d)  ((b) ^ (c) ^ (d))
+#define F_40_59(b,c,d)  (((b) & (c)) | (((b)|(c)) & (d)))
+#define F_60_79(b,c,d)  F_20_39(b,c,d)
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT
+
+# define BODY_00_15(i,a,b,c,d,e,f,xi) \
+        (f)=xi+(e)+K_00_19+ROTATE((a),5)+F_00_19((b),(c),(d)); \
+        (b)=ROTATE((b),30);
+
+# define BODY_16_19(i,a,b,c,d,e,f,xi,xa,xb,xc,xd) \
+        Xupdate(f,xi,xa,xb,xc,xd); \
+        (f)+=(e)+K_00_19+ROTATE((a),5)+F_00_19((b),(c),(d)); \
+        (b)=ROTATE((b),30);
+
+# define BODY_20_31(i,a,b,c,d,e,f,xi,xa,xb,xc,xd) \
+        Xupdate(f,xi,xa,xb,xc,xd); \
+        (f)+=(e)+K_20_39+ROTATE((a),5)+F_20_39((b),(c),(d)); \
+        (b)=ROTATE((b),30);
+
+# define BODY_32_39(i,a,b,c,d,e,f,xa,xb,xc,xd) \
+        Xupdate(f,xa,xa,xb,xc,xd); \
+        (f)+=(e)+K_20_39+ROTATE((a),5)+F_20_39((b),(c),(d)); \
+        (b)=ROTATE((b),30);
+
+# define BODY_40_59(i,a,b,c,d,e,f,xa,xb,xc,xd) \
+        Xupdate(f,xa,xa,xb,xc,xd); \
+        (f)+=(e)+K_40_59+ROTATE((a),5)+F_40_59((b),(c),(d)); \
+        (b)=ROTATE((b),30);
+
+# define BODY_60_79(i,a,b,c,d,e,f,xa,xb,xc,xd) \
+        Xupdate(f,xa,xa,xb,xc,xd); \
+        (f)=xa+(e)+K_60_79+ROTATE((a),5)+F_60_79((b),(c),(d)); \
+        (b)=ROTATE((b),30);
+
+# ifdef X
+#  undef X
+# endif
+# ifndef MD32_XARRAY
+  /*
+   * Originally X was an array. As it's automatic it's natural
+   * to expect RISC compiler to accommodate at least part of it in
+   * the register bank, isn't it? Unfortunately not all compilers
+   * "find" this expectation reasonable:-( On order to make such
+   * compilers generate better code I replace X[] with a bunch of
+   * X0, X1, etc. See the function body below...
+   *                                    <appro@fy.chalmers.se>
+   */
+#  define X(i)   XX##i
+# else
+  /*
+   * However! Some compilers (most notably HP C) get overwhelmed by
+   * that many local variables so that we have to have the way to
+   * fall down to the original behavior.
+   */
+#  define X(i)   XX[i]
+# endif
+
+# if !defined(SHA1_ASM)
+static void HASH_BLOCK_DATA_ORDER(SHA_CTX *c, const void *p, size_t num)
+{
+    const unsigned char *data = p;
+    register unsigned MD32_REG_T A, B, C, D, E, T, l;
+#  ifndef MD32_XARRAY
+    unsigned MD32_REG_T XX0, XX1, XX2, XX3, XX4, XX5, XX6, XX7,
+        XX8, XX9, XX10, XX11, XX12, XX13, XX14, XX15;
+#  else
+    SHA_LONG XX[16];
+#  endif
+
+    A = c->h0;
+    B = c->h1;
+    C = c->h2;
+    D = c->h3;
+    E = c->h4;
+
+    for (;;) {
+        const union {
+            long one;
+            char little;
+        } is_endian = {
+            1
+        };
+
+        if (!is_endian.little && sizeof(SHA_LONG) == 4
+            && ((size_t)p % 4) == 0) {
+            const SHA_LONG *W = (const SHA_LONG *)data;
+
+            X(0) = W[0];
+            X(1) = W[1];
+            BODY_00_15(0, A, B, C, D, E, T, X(0));
+            X(2) = W[2];
+            BODY_00_15(1, T, A, B, C, D, E, X(1));
+            X(3) = W[3];
+            BODY_00_15(2, E, T, A, B, C, D, X(2));
+            X(4) = W[4];
+            BODY_00_15(3, D, E, T, A, B, C, X(3));
+            X(5) = W[5];
+            BODY_00_15(4, C, D, E, T, A, B, X(4));
+            X(6) = W[6];
+            BODY_00_15(5, B, C, D, E, T, A, X(5));
+            X(7) = W[7];
+            BODY_00_15(6, A, B, C, D, E, T, X(6));
+            X(8) = W[8];
+            BODY_00_15(7, T, A, B, C, D, E, X(7));
+            X(9) = W[9];
+            BODY_00_15(8, E, T, A, B, C, D, X(8));
+            X(10) = W[10];
+            BODY_00_15(9, D, E, T, A, B, C, X(9));
+            X(11) = W[11];
+            BODY_00_15(10, C, D, E, T, A, B, X(10));
+            X(12) = W[12];
+            BODY_00_15(11, B, C, D, E, T, A, X(11));
+            X(13) = W[13];
+            BODY_00_15(12, A, B, C, D, E, T, X(12));
+            X(14) = W[14];
+            BODY_00_15(13, T, A, B, C, D, E, X(13));
+            X(15) = W[15];
+            BODY_00_15(14, E, T, A, B, C, D, X(14));
+            BODY_00_15(15, D, E, T, A, B, C, X(15));
+
+            data += SHA_CBLOCK;
+        } else {
+            (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+            X(0) = l;
+            (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+            X(1) = l;
+            BODY_00_15(0, A, B, C, D, E, T, X(0));
+            (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+            X(2) = l;
+            BODY_00_15(1, T, A, B, C, D, E, X(1));
+            (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+            X(3) = l;
+            BODY_00_15(2, E, T, A, B, C, D, X(2));
+            (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+            X(4) = l;
+            BODY_00_15(3, D, E, T, A, B, C, X(3));
+            (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+            X(5) = l;
+            BODY_00_15(4, C, D, E, T, A, B, X(4));
+            (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+            X(6) = l;
+            BODY_00_15(5, B, C, D, E, T, A, X(5));
+            (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+            X(7) = l;
+            BODY_00_15(6, A, B, C, D, E, T, X(6));
+            (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+            X(8) = l;
+            BODY_00_15(7, T, A, B, C, D, E, X(7));
+            (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+            X(9) = l;
+            BODY_00_15(8, E, T, A, B, C, D, X(8));
+            (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+            X(10) = l;
+            BODY_00_15(9, D, E, T, A, B, C, X(9));
+            (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+            X(11) = l;
+            BODY_00_15(10, C, D, E, T, A, B, X(10));
+            (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+            X(12) = l;
+            BODY_00_15(11, B, C, D, E, T, A, X(11));
+            (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+            X(13) = l;
+            BODY_00_15(12, A, B, C, D, E, T, X(12));
+            (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+            X(14) = l;
+            BODY_00_15(13, T, A, B, C, D, E, X(13));
+            (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+            X(15) = l;
+            BODY_00_15(14, E, T, A, B, C, D, X(14));
+            BODY_00_15(15, D, E, T, A, B, C, X(15));
+        }
+
+        BODY_16_19(16, C, D, E, T, A, B, X(0), X(0), X(2), X(8), X(13));
+        BODY_16_19(17, B, C, D, E, T, A, X(1), X(1), X(3), X(9), X(14));
+        BODY_16_19(18, A, B, C, D, E, T, X(2), X(2), X(4), X(10), X(15));
+        BODY_16_19(19, T, A, B, C, D, E, X(3), X(3), X(5), X(11), X(0));
+
+        BODY_20_31(20, E, T, A, B, C, D, X(4), X(4), X(6), X(12), X(1));
+        BODY_20_31(21, D, E, T, A, B, C, X(5), X(5), X(7), X(13), X(2));
+        BODY_20_31(22, C, D, E, T, A, B, X(6), X(6), X(8), X(14), X(3));
+        BODY_20_31(23, B, C, D, E, T, A, X(7), X(7), X(9), X(15), X(4));
+        BODY_20_31(24, A, B, C, D, E, T, X(8), X(8), X(10), X(0), X(5));
+        BODY_20_31(25, T, A, B, C, D, E, X(9), X(9), X(11), X(1), X(6));
+        BODY_20_31(26, E, T, A, B, C, D, X(10), X(10), X(12), X(2), X(7));
+        BODY_20_31(27, D, E, T, A, B, C, X(11), X(11), X(13), X(3), X(8));
+        BODY_20_31(28, C, D, E, T, A, B, X(12), X(12), X(14), X(4), X(9));
+        BODY_20_31(29, B, C, D, E, T, A, X(13), X(13), X(15), X(5), X(10));
+        BODY_20_31(30, A, B, C, D, E, T, X(14), X(14), X(0), X(6), X(11));
+        BODY_20_31(31, T, A, B, C, D, E, X(15), X(15), X(1), X(7), X(12));
+
+        BODY_32_39(32, E, T, A, B, C, D, X(0), X(2), X(8), X(13));
+        BODY_32_39(33, D, E, T, A, B, C, X(1), X(3), X(9), X(14));
+        BODY_32_39(34, C, D, E, T, A, B, X(2), X(4), X(10), X(15));
+        BODY_32_39(35, B, C, D, E, T, A, X(3), X(5), X(11), X(0));
+        BODY_32_39(36, A, B, C, D, E, T, X(4), X(6), X(12), X(1));
+        BODY_32_39(37, T, A, B, C, D, E, X(5), X(7), X(13), X(2));
+        BODY_32_39(38, E, T, A, B, C, D, X(6), X(8), X(14), X(3));
+        BODY_32_39(39, D, E, T, A, B, C, X(7), X(9), X(15), X(4));
+
+        BODY_40_59(40, C, D, E, T, A, B, X(8), X(10), X(0), X(5));
+        BODY_40_59(41, B, C, D, E, T, A, X(9), X(11), X(1), X(6));
+        BODY_40_59(42, A, B, C, D, E, T, X(10), X(12), X(2), X(7));
+        BODY_40_59(43, T, A, B, C, D, E, X(11), X(13), X(3), X(8));
+        BODY_40_59(44, E, T, A, B, C, D, X(12), X(14), X(4), X(9));
+        BODY_40_59(45, D, E, T, A, B, C, X(13), X(15), X(5), X(10));
+        BODY_40_59(46, C, D, E, T, A, B, X(14), X(0), X(6), X(11));
+        BODY_40_59(47, B, C, D, E, T, A, X(15), X(1), X(7), X(12));
+        BODY_40_59(48, A, B, C, D, E, T, X(0), X(2), X(8), X(13));
+        BODY_40_59(49, T, A, B, C, D, E, X(1), X(3), X(9), X(14));
+        BODY_40_59(50, E, T, A, B, C, D, X(2), X(4), X(10), X(15));
+        BODY_40_59(51, D, E, T, A, B, C, X(3), X(5), X(11), X(0));
+        BODY_40_59(52, C, D, E, T, A, B, X(4), X(6), X(12), X(1));
+        BODY_40_59(53, B, C, D, E, T, A, X(5), X(7), X(13), X(2));
+        BODY_40_59(54, A, B, C, D, E, T, X(6), X(8), X(14), X(3));
+        BODY_40_59(55, T, A, B, C, D, E, X(7), X(9), X(15), X(4));
+        BODY_40_59(56, E, T, A, B, C, D, X(8), X(10), X(0), X(5));
+        BODY_40_59(57, D, E, T, A, B, C, X(9), X(11), X(1), X(6));
+        BODY_40_59(58, C, D, E, T, A, B, X(10), X(12), X(2), X(7));
+        BODY_40_59(59, B, C, D, E, T, A, X(11), X(13), X(3), X(8));
+
+        BODY_60_79(60, A, B, C, D, E, T, X(12), X(14), X(4), X(9));
+        BODY_60_79(61, T, A, B, C, D, E, X(13), X(15), X(5), X(10));
+        BODY_60_79(62, E, T, A, B, C, D, X(14), X(0), X(6), X(11));
+        BODY_60_79(63, D, E, T, A, B, C, X(15), X(1), X(7), X(12));
+        BODY_60_79(64, C, D, E, T, A, B, X(0), X(2), X(8), X(13));
+        BODY_60_79(65, B, C, D, E, T, A, X(1), X(3), X(9), X(14));
+        BODY_60_79(66, A, B, C, D, E, T, X(2), X(4), X(10), X(15));
+        BODY_60_79(67, T, A, B, C, D, E, X(3), X(5), X(11), X(0));
+        BODY_60_79(68, E, T, A, B, C, D, X(4), X(6), X(12), X(1));
+        BODY_60_79(69, D, E, T, A, B, C, X(5), X(7), X(13), X(2));
+        BODY_60_79(70, C, D, E, T, A, B, X(6), X(8), X(14), X(3));
+        BODY_60_79(71, B, C, D, E, T, A, X(7), X(9), X(15), X(4));
+        BODY_60_79(72, A, B, C, D, E, T, X(8), X(10), X(0), X(5));
+        BODY_60_79(73, T, A, B, C, D, E, X(9), X(11), X(1), X(6));
+        BODY_60_79(74, E, T, A, B, C, D, X(10), X(12), X(2), X(7));
+        BODY_60_79(75, D, E, T, A, B, C, X(11), X(13), X(3), X(8));
+        BODY_60_79(76, C, D, E, T, A, B, X(12), X(14), X(4), X(9));
+        BODY_60_79(77, B, C, D, E, T, A, X(13), X(15), X(5), X(10));
+        BODY_60_79(78, A, B, C, D, E, T, X(14), X(0), X(6), X(11));
+        BODY_60_79(79, T, A, B, C, D, E, X(15), X(1), X(7), X(12));
+
+        c->h0 = (c->h0 + E) & 0xffffffffL;
+        c->h1 = (c->h1 + T) & 0xffffffffL;
+        c->h2 = (c->h2 + A) & 0xffffffffL;
+        c->h3 = (c->h3 + B) & 0xffffffffL;
+        c->h4 = (c->h4 + C) & 0xffffffffL;
+
+        if (--num == 0)
+            break;
+
+        A = c->h0;
+        B = c->h1;
+        C = c->h2;
+        D = c->h3;
+        E = c->h4;
+
+    }
+}
+# endif
+
+#else                           /* OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT */
+
+# define BODY_00_15(xi)           do {   \
+        T=E+K_00_19+F_00_19(B,C,D);     \
+        E=D, D=C, C=ROTATE(B,30), B=A;  \
+        A=ROTATE(A,5)+T+xi;         } while(0)
+
+# define BODY_16_19(xa,xb,xc,xd)  do {   \
+        Xupdate(T,xa,xa,xb,xc,xd);      \
+        T+=E+K_00_19+F_00_19(B,C,D);    \
+        E=D, D=C, C=ROTATE(B,30), B=A;  \
+        A=ROTATE(A,5)+T;            } while(0)
+
+# define BODY_20_39(xa,xb,xc,xd)  do {   \
+        Xupdate(T,xa,xa,xb,xc,xd);      \
+        T+=E+K_20_39+F_20_39(B,C,D);    \
+        E=D, D=C, C=ROTATE(B,30), B=A;  \
+        A=ROTATE(A,5)+T;            } while(0)
+
+# define BODY_40_59(xa,xb,xc,xd)  do {   \
+        Xupdate(T,xa,xa,xb,xc,xd);      \
+        T+=E+K_40_59+F_40_59(B,C,D);    \
+        E=D, D=C, C=ROTATE(B,30), B=A;  \
+        A=ROTATE(A,5)+T;            } while(0)
+
+# define BODY_60_79(xa,xb,xc,xd)  do {   \
+        Xupdate(T,xa,xa,xb,xc,xd);      \
+        T=E+K_60_79+F_60_79(B,C,D);     \
+        E=D, D=C, C=ROTATE(B,30), B=A;  \
+        A=ROTATE(A,5)+T+xa;         } while(0)
+
+# if !defined(SHA1_ASM)
+static void HASH_BLOCK_DATA_ORDER(SHA_CTX *c, const void *p, size_t num)
+{
+    const unsigned char *data = p;
+    register unsigned MD32_REG_T A, B, C, D, E, T, l;
+    int i;
+    SHA_LONG X[16];
+
+    A = c->h0;
+    B = c->h1;
+    C = c->h2;
+    D = c->h3;
+    E = c->h4;
+
+    for (;;) {
+        for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
+            (void)HOST_c2l(data, l);
+            X[i] = l;
+            BODY_00_15(X[i]);
+        }
+        for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
+            BODY_16_19(X[i], X[i + 2], X[i + 8], X[(i + 13) & 15]);
+        }
+        for (; i < 24; i++) {
+            BODY_20_39(X[i & 15], X[(i + 2) & 15], X[(i + 8) & 15],
+                       X[(i + 13) & 15]);
+        }
+        for (i = 0; i < 20; i++) {
+            BODY_40_59(X[(i + 8) & 15], X[(i + 10) & 15], X[i & 15],
+                       X[(i + 5) & 15]);
+        }
+        for (i = 4; i < 24; i++) {
+            BODY_60_79(X[(i + 8) & 15], X[(i + 10) & 15], X[i & 15],
+                       X[(i + 5) & 15]);
+        }
+
+        c->h0 = (c->h0 + A) & 0xffffffffL;
+        c->h1 = (c->h1 + B) & 0xffffffffL;
+        c->h2 = (c->h2 + C) & 0xffffffffL;
+        c->h3 = (c->h3 + D) & 0xffffffffL;
+        c->h4 = (c->h4 + E) & 0xffffffffL;
+
+        if (--num == 0)
+            break;
+
+        A = c->h0;
+        B = c->h1;
+        C = c->h2;
+        D = c->h3;
+        E = c->h4;
+
+    }
+}
+# endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sparc_arch.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sparc_arch.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..99eafb3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sparc_arch.h
@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2012-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef __SPARC_ARCH_H__
+# define __SPARC_ARCH_H__
+
+# define SPARCV9_TICK_PRIVILEGED (1<<0)
+# define SPARCV9_PREFER_FPU      (1<<1)
+# define SPARCV9_VIS1            (1<<2)
+# define SPARCV9_VIS2            (1<<3)/* reserved */
+# define SPARCV9_FMADD           (1<<4)
+# define SPARCV9_BLK             (1<<5)/* VIS1 block copy */
+# define SPARCV9_VIS3            (1<<6)
+# define SPARCV9_RANDOM          (1<<7)
+# define SPARCV9_64BIT_STACK     (1<<8)
+# define SPARCV9_FJAESX          (1<<9)/* Fujitsu SPARC64 X AES */
+# define SPARCV9_FJDESX          (1<<10)/* Fujitsu SPARC64 X DES, reserved */
+# define SPARCV9_FJHPCACE        (1<<11)/* Fujitsu HPC-ACE, reserved */
+# define SPARCV9_IMA             (1<<13)/* reserved */
+# define SPARCV9_VIS4            (1<<14)/* reserved */
+
+/*
+ * OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[1] is copy of Compatibility Feature Register,
+ * %asr26, SPARC-T4 and later. There is no SPARCV9_CFR bit in
+ * OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0], as %cfr copy is sufficient...
+ */
+# define CFR_AES         0x00000001/* Supports AES opcodes */
+# define CFR_DES         0x00000002/* Supports DES opcodes */
+# define CFR_KASUMI      0x00000004/* Supports KASUMI opcodes */
+# define CFR_CAMELLIA    0x00000008/* Supports CAMELLIA opcodes */
+# define CFR_MD5         0x00000010/* Supports MD5 opcodes */
+# define CFR_SHA1        0x00000020/* Supports SHA1 opcodes */
+# define CFR_SHA256      0x00000040/* Supports SHA256 opcodes */
+# define CFR_SHA512      0x00000080/* Supports SHA512 opcodes */
+# define CFR_MPMUL       0x00000100/* Supports MPMUL opcodes */
+# define CFR_MONTMUL     0x00000200/* Supports MONTMUL opcodes */
+# define CFR_MONTSQR     0x00000400/* Supports MONTSQR opcodes */
+# define CFR_CRC32C      0x00000800/* Supports CRC32C opcodes */
+# define CFR_XMPMUL      0x00001000/* Supports XMPMUL opcodes */
+# define CFR_XMONTMUL    0x00002000/* Supports XMONTMUL opcodes */
+# define CFR_XMONTSQR    0x00004000/* Supports XMONTSQR opcodes */
+
+# if defined(OPENSSL_PIC) && !defined(__PIC__)
+#  define __PIC__
+# endif
+
+# if defined(__SUNPRO_C) && defined(__sparcv9) && !defined(__arch64__)
+#  define __arch64__
+# endif
+
+# define SPARC_PIC_THUNK(reg)    \
+        .align  32;             \
+.Lpic_thunk:                    \
+        jmp     %o7 + 8;        \
+         add    %o7, reg, reg;
+
+# define SPARC_PIC_THUNK_CALL(reg)                       \
+        sethi   %hi(_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_-4), reg;      \
+        call    .Lpic_thunk;                            \
+         or     reg, %lo(_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_+4), reg;
+
+# if 1
+#  define SPARC_SETUP_GOT_REG(reg)       SPARC_PIC_THUNK_CALL(reg)
+# else
+#  define SPARC_SETUP_GOT_REG(reg)       \
+        sethi   %hi(_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_-4), reg;      \
+        call    .+8;                                    \
+        or      reg,%lo(_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_+4), reg;  \
+        add     %o7, reg, reg
+# endif
+
+# if defined(__arch64__)
+
+#  define SPARC_LOAD_ADDRESS(SYM, reg)   \
+        setx    SYM, %o7, reg;
+#  define LDPTR          ldx
+#  define SIZE_T_CC      %xcc
+#  define STACK_FRAME    192
+#  define STACK_BIAS     2047
+#  define STACK_7thARG   (STACK_BIAS+176)
+
+# else
+
+#  define SPARC_LOAD_ADDRESS(SYM, reg)   \
+        set     SYM, reg;
+#  define LDPTR          ld
+#  define SIZE_T_CC      %icc
+#  define STACK_FRAME    112
+#  define STACK_BIAS     0
+#  define STACK_7thARG   92
+#  define SPARC_LOAD_ADDRESS_LEAF(SYM,reg,tmp) SPARC_LOAD_ADDRESS(SYM,reg)
+
+# endif
+
+# ifdef __PIC__
+#  undef SPARC_LOAD_ADDRESS
+#  undef SPARC_LOAD_ADDRESS_LEAF
+#  define SPARC_LOAD_ADDRESS(SYM, reg)   \
+        SPARC_SETUP_GOT_REG(reg);       \
+        sethi   %hi(SYM), %o7;          \
+        or      %o7, %lo(SYM), %o7;     \
+        LDPTR   [reg + %o7], reg;
+# endif
+
+# ifndef SPARC_LOAD_ADDRESS_LEAF
+#  define SPARC_LOAD_ADDRESS_LEAF(SYM, reg, tmp) \
+        mov     %o7, tmp;                       \
+        SPARC_LOAD_ADDRESS(SYM, reg)            \
+        mov     tmp, %o7;
+# endif
+
+#endif                          /* __SPARC_ARCH_H__ */
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sparccpuid.S b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sparccpuid.S
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c6ca224
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sparccpuid.S
@@ -0,0 +1,582 @@
+! Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+!
+! Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+! this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+! in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+! https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPSCANISTER
+#include <openssl/fipssyms.h>
+#endif
+
+#if defined(__SUNPRO_C) && defined(__sparcv9)
+# define ABI64  /* They've said -xarch=v9 at command line */
+#elif defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__arch64__)
+# define ABI64  /* They've said -m64 at command line */
+#endif
+
+#ifdef ABI64
+  .register	%g2,#scratch
+  .register	%g3,#scratch
+# define	FRAME	-192
+# define	BIAS	2047
+#else
+# define	FRAME	-96
+# define	BIAS	0
+#endif
+
+.text
+.align	32
+.global	OPENSSL_wipe_cpu
+.type	OPENSSL_wipe_cpu,#function
+! Keep in mind that this does not excuse us from wiping the stack!
+! This routine wipes registers, but not the backing store [which
+! resides on the stack, toward lower addresses]. To facilitate for
+! stack wiping I return pointer to the top of stack of the *caller*.
+OPENSSL_wipe_cpu:
+	save	%sp,FRAME,%sp
+	nop
+#ifdef __sun
+#include <sys/trap.h>
+	ta	ST_CLEAN_WINDOWS
+#else
+	call	.walk.reg.wins
+#endif
+	nop
+	call	.PIC.zero.up
+	mov	.zero-(.-4),%o0
+	ld	[%o0],%f0
+	ld	[%o0],%f1
+
+	subcc	%g0,1,%o0
+	! Following is V9 "rd %ccr,%o0" instruction. However! V8
+	! specification says that it ("rd %asr2,%o0" in V8 terms) does
+	! not cause illegal_instruction trap. It therefore can be used
+	! to determine if the CPU the code is executing on is V8- or
+	! V9-compliant, as V9 returns a distinct value of 0x99,
+	! "negative" and "borrow" bits set in both %icc and %xcc.
+	.word	0x91408000	!rd	%ccr,%o0
+	cmp	%o0,0x99
+	bne	.v8
+	nop
+			! Even though we do not use %fp register bank,
+			! we wipe it as memcpy might have used it...
+			.word	0xbfa00040	!fmovd	%f0,%f62
+			.word	0xbba00040	!...
+			.word	0xb7a00040
+			.word	0xb3a00040
+			.word	0xafa00040
+			.word	0xaba00040
+			.word	0xa7a00040
+			.word	0xa3a00040
+			.word	0x9fa00040
+			.word	0x9ba00040
+			.word	0x97a00040
+			.word	0x93a00040
+			.word	0x8fa00040
+			.word	0x8ba00040
+			.word	0x87a00040
+			.word	0x83a00040	!fmovd	%f0,%f32
+.v8:			fmovs	%f1,%f31
+	clr	%o0
+			fmovs	%f0,%f30
+	clr	%o1
+			fmovs	%f1,%f29
+	clr	%o2
+			fmovs	%f0,%f28
+	clr	%o3
+			fmovs	%f1,%f27
+	clr	%o4
+			fmovs	%f0,%f26
+	clr	%o5
+			fmovs	%f1,%f25
+	clr	%o7
+			fmovs	%f0,%f24
+	clr	%l0
+			fmovs	%f1,%f23
+	clr	%l1
+			fmovs	%f0,%f22
+	clr	%l2
+			fmovs	%f1,%f21
+	clr	%l3
+			fmovs	%f0,%f20
+	clr	%l4
+			fmovs	%f1,%f19
+	clr	%l5
+			fmovs	%f0,%f18
+	clr	%l6
+			fmovs	%f1,%f17
+	clr	%l7
+			fmovs	%f0,%f16
+	clr	%i0
+			fmovs	%f1,%f15
+	clr	%i1
+			fmovs	%f0,%f14
+	clr	%i2
+			fmovs	%f1,%f13
+	clr	%i3
+			fmovs	%f0,%f12
+	clr	%i4
+			fmovs	%f1,%f11
+	clr	%i5
+			fmovs	%f0,%f10
+	clr	%g1
+			fmovs	%f1,%f9
+	clr	%g2
+			fmovs	%f0,%f8
+	clr	%g3
+			fmovs	%f1,%f7
+	clr	%g4
+			fmovs	%f0,%f6
+	clr	%g5
+			fmovs	%f1,%f5
+			fmovs	%f0,%f4
+			fmovs	%f1,%f3
+			fmovs	%f0,%f2
+
+	add	%fp,BIAS,%i0	! return pointer to caller´s top of stack
+
+	ret
+	restore
+
+.zero:	.long	0x0,0x0
+.PIC.zero.up:
+	retl
+	add	%o0,%o7,%o0
+#ifdef DEBUG
+.global	walk_reg_wins
+.type	walk_reg_wins,#function
+walk_reg_wins:
+#endif
+.walk.reg.wins:
+	save	%sp,FRAME,%sp
+	cmp	%i7,%o7
+	be	2f
+	clr	%o0
+	cmp	%o7,0	! compiler never cleans %o7...
+	be	1f	! could have been a leaf function...
+	clr	%o1
+	call	.walk.reg.wins
+	nop
+1:	clr	%o2
+	clr	%o3
+	clr	%o4
+	clr	%o5
+	clr	%o7
+	clr	%l0
+	clr	%l1
+	clr	%l2
+	clr	%l3
+	clr	%l4
+	clr	%l5
+	clr	%l6
+	clr	%l7
+	add	%o0,1,%i0	! used for debugging
+2:	ret
+	restore
+.size	OPENSSL_wipe_cpu,.-OPENSSL_wipe_cpu
+
+.global	OPENSSL_atomic_add
+.type	OPENSSL_atomic_add,#function
+.align	32
+OPENSSL_atomic_add:
+#ifndef ABI64
+	subcc	%g0,1,%o2
+	.word	0x95408000	!rd	%ccr,%o2, see comment above
+	cmp	%o2,0x99
+	be	.v9
+	nop
+	save	%sp,FRAME,%sp
+	ba	.enter
+	nop
+#ifdef __sun
+! Note that you do not have to link with libthread to call thr_yield,
+! as libc provides a stub, which is overloaded the moment you link
+! with *either* libpthread or libthread...
+#define	YIELD_CPU	thr_yield
+#else
+! applies at least to Linux and FreeBSD... Feedback expected...
+#define	YIELD_CPU	sched_yield
+#endif
+.spin:	call	YIELD_CPU
+	nop
+.enter:	ld	[%i0],%i2
+	cmp	%i2,-4096
+	be	.spin
+	mov	-1,%i2
+	swap	[%i0],%i2
+	cmp	%i2,-1
+	be	.spin
+	add	%i2,%i1,%i2
+	stbar
+	st	%i2,[%i0]
+	sra	%i2,%g0,%i0
+	ret
+	restore
+.v9:
+#endif
+	ld	[%o0],%o2
+1:	add	%o1,%o2,%o3
+	.word	0xd7e2100a	!cas [%o0],%o2,%o3, compare [%o0] with %o2 and swap %o3
+	cmp	%o2,%o3
+	bne	1b
+	mov	%o3,%o2		! cas is always fetching to dest. register
+	add	%o1,%o2,%o0	! OpenSSL expects the new value
+	retl
+	sra	%o0,%g0,%o0	! we return signed int, remember?
+.size	OPENSSL_atomic_add,.-OPENSSL_atomic_add
+
+.global	_sparcv9_rdtick
+.align	32
+_sparcv9_rdtick:
+	subcc	%g0,1,%o0
+	.word	0x91408000	!rd	%ccr,%o0
+	cmp	%o0,0x99
+	bne	.notick
+	xor	%o0,%o0,%o0
+	.word	0x91410000	!rd	%tick,%o0
+	retl
+	.word	0x93323020	!srlx	%o0,32,%o1
+.notick:
+	retl
+	xor	%o1,%o1,%o1
+.type	_sparcv9_rdtick,#function
+.size	_sparcv9_rdtick,.-_sparcv9_rdtick
+
+.global	_sparcv9_vis1_probe
+.align	8
+_sparcv9_vis1_probe:
+	add	%sp,BIAS+2,%o1
+	.word	0xc19a5a40	!ldda	[%o1]ASI_FP16_P,%f0
+	retl
+	.word	0x81b00d80	!fxor	%f0,%f0,%f0
+.type	_sparcv9_vis1_probe,#function
+.size	_sparcv9_vis1_probe,.-_sparcv9_vis1_probe
+
+! Probe and instrument VIS1 instruction. Output is number of cycles it
+! takes to execute rdtick and pair of VIS1 instructions. US-Tx VIS unit
+! is slow (documented to be 6 cycles on T2) and the core is in-order
+! single-issue, it should be possible to distinguish Tx reliably...
+! Observed return values are:
+!
+!	UltraSPARC IIe		7
+!	UltraSPARC III		7
+!	UltraSPARC T1		24
+!	SPARC T4		65(*)
+!
+! (*)	result has lesser to do with VIS instruction latencies, rdtick
+!	appears that slow, but it does the trick in sense that FP and
+!	VIS code paths are still slower than integer-only ones.
+!
+! Numbers for T2 and SPARC64 V-VII are more than welcomed.
+!
+! It would be possible to detect specifically US-T1 by instrumenting
+! fmul8ulx16, which is emulated on T1 and as such accounts for quite
+! a lot of %tick-s, couple of thousand on Linux...
+.global	_sparcv9_vis1_instrument
+.align	8
+_sparcv9_vis1_instrument:
+	.word	0x81b00d80	!fxor	%f0,%f0,%f0
+	.word	0x85b08d82	!fxor	%f2,%f2,%f2
+	.word	0x91410000	!rd	%tick,%o0
+	.word	0x81b00d80	!fxor	%f0,%f0,%f0
+	.word	0x85b08d82	!fxor	%f2,%f2,%f2
+	.word	0x93410000	!rd	%tick,%o1
+	.word	0x81b00d80	!fxor	%f0,%f0,%f0
+	.word	0x85b08d82	!fxor	%f2,%f2,%f2
+	.word	0x95410000	!rd	%tick,%o2
+	.word	0x81b00d80	!fxor	%f0,%f0,%f0
+	.word	0x85b08d82	!fxor	%f2,%f2,%f2
+	.word	0x97410000	!rd	%tick,%o3
+	.word	0x81b00d80	!fxor	%f0,%f0,%f0
+	.word	0x85b08d82	!fxor	%f2,%f2,%f2
+	.word	0x99410000	!rd	%tick,%o4
+
+	! calculate intervals
+	sub	%o1,%o0,%o0
+	sub	%o2,%o1,%o1
+	sub	%o3,%o2,%o2
+	sub	%o4,%o3,%o3
+
+	! find minimum value
+	cmp	%o0,%o1
+	.word	0x38680002	!bgu,a	%xcc,.+8
+	mov	%o1,%o0
+	cmp	%o0,%o2
+	.word	0x38680002	!bgu,a	%xcc,.+8
+	mov	%o2,%o0
+	cmp	%o0,%o3
+	.word	0x38680002	!bgu,a	%xcc,.+8
+	mov	%o3,%o0
+
+	retl
+	nop
+.type	_sparcv9_vis1_instrument,#function
+.size	_sparcv9_vis1_instrument,.-_sparcv9_vis1_instrument
+
+.global	_sparcv9_vis2_probe
+.align	8
+_sparcv9_vis2_probe:
+	retl
+	.word	0x81b00980	!bshuffle	%f0,%f0,%f0
+.type	_sparcv9_vis2_probe,#function
+.size	_sparcv9_vis2_probe,.-_sparcv9_vis2_probe
+
+.global	_sparcv9_fmadd_probe
+.align	8
+_sparcv9_fmadd_probe:
+	.word	0x81b00d80	!fxor	%f0,%f0,%f0
+	.word	0x85b08d82	!fxor	%f2,%f2,%f2
+	retl
+	.word	0x81b80440	!fmaddd	%f0,%f0,%f2,%f0
+.type	_sparcv9_fmadd_probe,#function
+.size	_sparcv9_fmadd_probe,.-_sparcv9_fmadd_probe
+
+.global	_sparcv9_rdcfr
+.align	8
+_sparcv9_rdcfr:
+	retl
+	.word	0x91468000	!rd	%asr26,%o0
+.type	_sparcv9_rdcfr,#function
+.size	_sparcv9_rdcfr,.-_sparcv9_rdcfr
+
+.global	_sparcv9_vis3_probe
+.align	8
+_sparcv9_vis3_probe:
+	retl
+	.word	0x81b022a0	!xmulx	%g0,%g0,%g0
+.type	_sparcv9_vis3_probe,#function
+.size	_sparcv9_vis3_probe,.-_sparcv9_vis3_probe
+
+.global	_sparcv9_random
+.align	8
+_sparcv9_random:
+	retl
+	.word	0x91b002a0	!random	%o0
+.type	_sparcv9_random,#function
+.size	_sparcv9_random,.-_sparcv9_vis3_probe
+
+.global	_sparcv9_fjaesx_probe
+.align	8
+_sparcv9_fjaesx_probe:
+	.word	0x81b09206	!faesencx %f2,%f6,%f0
+	retl
+	nop
+.size	_sparcv9_fjaesx_probe,.-_sparcv9_fjaesx_probe
+
+.global	OPENSSL_cleanse
+.align	32
+OPENSSL_cleanse:
+	cmp	%o1,14
+	nop
+#ifdef ABI64
+	bgu	%xcc,.Lot
+#else
+	bgu	.Lot
+#endif
+	cmp	%o1,0
+	bne	.Little
+	nop
+	retl
+	nop
+
+.Little:
+	stb	%g0,[%o0]
+	subcc	%o1,1,%o1
+	bnz	.Little
+	add	%o0,1,%o0
+	retl
+	nop
+.align	32
+.Lot:
+#ifndef ABI64
+	subcc	%g0,1,%g1
+	! see above for explanation
+	.word	0x83408000	!rd	%ccr,%g1
+	cmp	%g1,0x99
+	bne	.v8lot
+	nop
+#endif
+
+.v9lot:	andcc	%o0,7,%g0
+	bz	.v9aligned
+	nop
+	stb	%g0,[%o0]
+	sub	%o1,1,%o1
+	ba	.v9lot
+	add	%o0,1,%o0
+.align	16,0x01000000
+.v9aligned:
+	.word	0xc0720000	!stx	%g0,[%o0]
+	sub	%o1,8,%o1
+	andcc	%o1,-8,%g0
+#ifdef ABI64
+	.word	0x126ffffd	!bnz	%xcc,.v9aligned
+#else
+	.word	0x124ffffd	!bnz	%icc,.v9aligned
+#endif
+	add	%o0,8,%o0
+
+	cmp	%o1,0
+	bne	.Little
+	nop
+	retl
+	nop
+#ifndef ABI64
+.v8lot:	andcc	%o0,3,%g0
+	bz	.v8aligned
+	nop
+	stb	%g0,[%o0]
+	sub	%o1,1,%o1
+	ba	.v8lot
+	add	%o0,1,%o0
+	nop
+.v8aligned:
+	st	%g0,[%o0]
+	sub	%o1,4,%o1
+	andcc	%o1,-4,%g0
+	bnz	.v8aligned
+	add	%o0,4,%o0
+
+	cmp	%o1,0
+	bne	.Little
+	nop
+	retl
+	nop
+#endif
+.type	OPENSSL_cleanse,#function
+.size	OPENSSL_cleanse,.-OPENSSL_cleanse
+
+.global	CRYPTO_memcmp
+.align	16
+CRYPTO_memcmp:
+	cmp	%o2,0
+#ifdef ABI64
+	beq,pn	%xcc,.Lno_data
+#else
+	beq	.Lno_data
+#endif
+	xor	%g1,%g1,%g1
+	nop
+
+.Loop_cmp:
+	ldub	[%o0],%o3
+	add	%o0,1,%o0
+	ldub	[%o1],%o4
+	add	%o1,1,%o1
+	subcc	%o2,1,%o2
+	xor	%o3,%o4,%o4
+#ifdef ABI64
+	bnz	%xcc,.Loop_cmp
+#else
+	bnz	.Loop_cmp
+#endif
+	or	%o4,%g1,%g1
+
+	sub	%g0,%g1,%g1
+	srl	%g1,31,%g1
+.Lno_data:
+	retl
+	mov	%g1,%o0
+.type	CRYPTO_memcmp,#function
+.size	CRYPTO_memcmp,.-CRYPTO_memcmp
+
+.global	_sparcv9_vis1_instrument_bus
+.align	8
+_sparcv9_vis1_instrument_bus:
+	mov	%o1,%o3					! save cnt
+	.word	0x99410000	!rd	%tick,%o4	! tick
+	mov	%o4,%o5					! lasttick = tick
+	set	0,%g4					! diff
+
+	andn	%o0,63,%g1
+	.word	0xc1985e00	!ldda	[%g1]0xf0,%f0	! block load
+	.word	0x8143e040	!membar	#Sync
+	.word	0xc1b85c00	!stda	%f0,[%g1]0xe0	! block store and commit
+	.word	0x8143e040	!membar	#Sync
+	ld	[%o0],%o4
+	add	%o4,%g4,%g4
+	.word	0xc9e2100c	!cas	[%o0],%o4,%g4
+
+.Loop:	.word	0x99410000	!rd	%tick,%o4
+	sub	%o4,%o5,%g4				! diff=tick-lasttick
+	mov	%o4,%o5					! lasttick=tick
+
+	andn	%o0,63,%g1
+	.word	0xc1985e00	!ldda	[%g1]0xf0,%f0	! block load
+	.word	0x8143e040	!membar	#Sync
+	.word	0xc1b85c00	!stda	%f0,[%g1]0xe0	! block store and commit
+	.word	0x8143e040	!membar	#Sync
+	ld	[%o0],%o4
+	add	%o4,%g4,%g4
+	.word	0xc9e2100c	!cas	[%o0],%o4,%g4
+	subcc	%o1,1,%o1				! --$cnt
+	bnz	.Loop
+	add	%o0,4,%o0				! ++$out
+
+	retl
+	mov	%o3,%o0
+.type	_sparcv9_vis1_instrument_bus,#function
+.size	_sparcv9_vis1_instrument_bus,.-_sparcv9_vis1_instrument_bus
+
+.global	_sparcv9_vis1_instrument_bus2
+.align	8
+_sparcv9_vis1_instrument_bus2:
+	mov	%o1,%o3					! save cnt
+	sll	%o1,2,%o1				! cnt*=4
+
+	.word	0x99410000	!rd	%tick,%o4	! tick
+	mov	%o4,%o5					! lasttick = tick
+	set	0,%g4					! diff
+
+	andn	%o0,63,%g1
+	.word	0xc1985e00	!ldda	[%g1]0xf0,%f0	! block load
+	.word	0x8143e040	!membar	#Sync
+	.word	0xc1b85c00	!stda	%f0,[%g1]0xe0	! block store and commit
+	.word	0x8143e040	!membar	#Sync
+	ld	[%o0],%o4
+	add	%o4,%g4,%g4
+	.word	0xc9e2100c	!cas	[%o0],%o4,%g4
+
+	.word	0x99410000	!rd	%tick,%o4	! tick
+	sub	%o4,%o5,%g4				! diff=tick-lasttick
+	mov	%o4,%o5					! lasttick=tick
+	mov	%g4,%g5					! lastdiff=diff
+.Loop2:
+	andn	%o0,63,%g1
+	.word	0xc1985e00	!ldda	[%g1]0xf0,%f0	! block load
+	.word	0x8143e040	!membar	#Sync
+	.word	0xc1b85c00	!stda	%f0,[%g1]0xe0	! block store and commit
+	.word	0x8143e040	!membar	#Sync
+	ld	[%o0],%o4
+	add	%o4,%g4,%g4
+	.word	0xc9e2100c	!cas	[%o0],%o4,%g4
+
+	subcc	%o2,1,%o2				! --max
+	bz	.Ldone2
+	nop
+
+	.word	0x99410000	!rd	%tick,%o4	! tick
+	sub	%o4,%o5,%g4				! diff=tick-lasttick
+	mov	%o4,%o5					! lasttick=tick
+	cmp	%g4,%g5
+	mov	%g4,%g5					! lastdiff=diff
+
+	.word	0x83408000	!rd	%ccr,%g1
+	and	%g1,4,%g1				! isolate zero flag
+	xor	%g1,4,%g1				! flip zero flag
+
+	subcc	%o1,%g1,%o1				! conditional --$cnt
+	bnz	.Loop2
+	add	%o0,%g1,%o0				! conditional ++$out
+
+.Ldone2:
+	srl	%o1,2,%o1
+	retl
+	sub	%o3,%o1,%o0
+.type	_sparcv9_vis1_instrument_bus2,#function
+.size	_sparcv9_vis1_instrument_bus2,.-_sparcv9_vis1_instrument_bus2
+
+.section	".init",#alloc,#execinstr
+	call	OPENSSL_cpuid_setup
+	nop
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sparcv9cap.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sparcv9cap.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..61d0334
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/sparcv9cap.c
@@ -0,0 +1,294 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <setjmp.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+#include "sparc_arch.h"
+
+#if defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__linux)
+__attribute__ ((visibility("hidden")))
+#endif
+unsigned int OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[2] = { SPARCV9_TICK_PRIVILEGED, 0 };
+
+int bn_mul_mont(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp,
+                const BN_ULONG *np, const BN_ULONG *n0, int num)
+{
+    int bn_mul_mont_vis3(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp,
+                         const BN_ULONG *np, const BN_ULONG *n0, int num);
+    int bn_mul_mont_fpu(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp,
+                        const BN_ULONG *np, const BN_ULONG *n0, int num);
+    int bn_mul_mont_int(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp,
+                        const BN_ULONG *np, const BN_ULONG *n0, int num);
+
+    if (!(num & 1) && num >= 6) {
+        if ((num & 15) == 0 && num <= 64 &&
+            (OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[1] & (CFR_MONTMUL | CFR_MONTSQR)) ==
+            (CFR_MONTMUL | CFR_MONTSQR)) {
+            typedef int (*bn_mul_mont_f) (BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap,
+                                          const BN_ULONG *bp,
+                                          const BN_ULONG *np,
+                                          const BN_ULONG *n0);
+            int bn_mul_mont_t4_8(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap,
+                                 const BN_ULONG *bp, const BN_ULONG *np,
+                                 const BN_ULONG *n0);
+            int bn_mul_mont_t4_16(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap,
+                                  const BN_ULONG *bp, const BN_ULONG *np,
+                                  const BN_ULONG *n0);
+            int bn_mul_mont_t4_24(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap,
+                                  const BN_ULONG *bp, const BN_ULONG *np,
+                                  const BN_ULONG *n0);
+            int bn_mul_mont_t4_32(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap,
+                                  const BN_ULONG *bp, const BN_ULONG *np,
+                                  const BN_ULONG *n0);
+            static const bn_mul_mont_f funcs[4] = {
+                bn_mul_mont_t4_8, bn_mul_mont_t4_16,
+                bn_mul_mont_t4_24, bn_mul_mont_t4_32
+            };
+            bn_mul_mont_f worker = funcs[num / 16 - 1];
+
+            if ((*worker) (rp, ap, bp, np, n0))
+                return 1;
+            /* retry once and fall back */
+            if ((*worker) (rp, ap, bp, np, n0))
+                return 1;
+            return bn_mul_mont_vis3(rp, ap, bp, np, n0, num);
+        }
+        if ((OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] & SPARCV9_VIS3))
+            return bn_mul_mont_vis3(rp, ap, bp, np, n0, num);
+        else if (num >= 8 &&
+                 /*
+                  * bn_mul_mont_fpu doesn't use FMADD, we just use the
+                  * flag to detect when FPU path is preferable in cases
+                  * when current heuristics is unreliable. [it works
+                  * out because FMADD-capable processors where FPU
+                  * code path is undesirable are also VIS3-capable and
+                  * VIS3 code path takes precedence.]
+                  */
+                 ( (OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] & SPARCV9_FMADD) ||
+                   (OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] &
+                    (SPARCV9_PREFER_FPU | SPARCV9_VIS1)) ==
+                   (SPARCV9_PREFER_FPU | SPARCV9_VIS1) ))
+            return bn_mul_mont_fpu(rp, ap, bp, np, n0, num);
+    }
+    return bn_mul_mont_int(rp, ap, bp, np, n0, num);
+}
+
+unsigned long _sparcv9_rdtick(void);
+void _sparcv9_vis1_probe(void);
+unsigned long _sparcv9_vis1_instrument(void);
+void _sparcv9_vis2_probe(void);
+void _sparcv9_fmadd_probe(void);
+unsigned long _sparcv9_rdcfr(void);
+void _sparcv9_vis3_probe(void);
+void _sparcv9_fjaesx_probe(void);
+unsigned long _sparcv9_random(void);
+size_t _sparcv9_vis1_instrument_bus(unsigned int *, size_t);
+size_t _sparcv9_vis1_instrument_bus2(unsigned int *, size_t, size_t);
+
+unsigned long OPENSSL_rdtsc(void)
+{
+    if (OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] & SPARCV9_TICK_PRIVILEGED)
+#if defined(__sun) && defined(__SVR4)
+        return gethrtime();
+#else
+        return 0;
+#endif
+    else
+        return _sparcv9_rdtick();
+}
+
+size_t OPENSSL_instrument_bus(unsigned int *out, size_t cnt)
+{
+    if ((OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] & (SPARCV9_TICK_PRIVILEGED | SPARCV9_BLK)) ==
+        SPARCV9_BLK)
+        return _sparcv9_vis1_instrument_bus(out, cnt);
+    else
+        return 0;
+}
+
+size_t OPENSSL_instrument_bus2(unsigned int *out, size_t cnt, size_t max)
+{
+    if ((OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] & (SPARCV9_TICK_PRIVILEGED | SPARCV9_BLK)) ==
+        SPARCV9_BLK)
+        return _sparcv9_vis1_instrument_bus2(out, cnt, max);
+    else
+        return 0;
+}
+
+static sigjmp_buf common_jmp;
+static void common_handler(int sig)
+{
+    siglongjmp(common_jmp, sig);
+}
+
+#if defined(__sun) && defined(__SVR4)
+# if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2
+extern unsigned int getisax(unsigned int vec[], unsigned int sz) __attribute__ ((weak));
+# elif defined(__SUNPRO_C)
+#pragma weak getisax
+extern unsigned int getisax(unsigned int vec[], unsigned int sz);
+# else
+static unsigned int (*getisax) (unsigned int vec[], unsigned int sz) = NULL;
+# endif
+#endif
+
+void OPENSSL_cpuid_setup(void)
+{
+    char *e;
+    struct sigaction common_act, ill_oact, bus_oact;
+    sigset_t all_masked, oset;
+    static int trigger = 0;
+
+    if (trigger)
+        return;
+    trigger = 1;
+
+    if ((e = getenv("OPENSSL_sparcv9cap"))) {
+        OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] = strtoul(e, NULL, 0);
+        if ((e = strchr(e, ':')))
+            OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[1] = strtoul(e + 1, NULL, 0);
+        return;
+    }
+
+#if defined(__sun) && defined(__SVR4)
+    if (getisax != NULL) {
+        unsigned int vec[2] = { 0, 0 };
+
+        if (getisax (vec,2)) {
+            if (vec[0]&0x00020) OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] |= SPARCV9_VIS1;
+            if (vec[0]&0x00040) OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] |= SPARCV9_VIS2;
+            if (vec[0]&0x00080) OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] |= SPARCV9_BLK;
+            if (vec[0]&0x00100) OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] |= SPARCV9_FMADD;
+            if (vec[0]&0x00400) OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] |= SPARCV9_VIS3;
+            if (vec[0]&0x01000) OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] |= SPARCV9_FJHPCACE;
+            if (vec[0]&0x02000) OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] |= SPARCV9_FJDESX;
+            if (vec[0]&0x08000) OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] |= SPARCV9_IMA;
+            if (vec[0]&0x10000) OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] |= SPARCV9_FJAESX;
+            if (vec[1]&0x00008) OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] |= SPARCV9_VIS4;
+
+            /* reconstruct %cfr copy */
+            OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[1] = (vec[0]>>17)&0x3ff;
+            OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[1] |= (OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[1]&CFR_MONTMUL)<<1;
+            if (vec[0]&0x20000000) OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[1] |= CFR_CRC32C;
+            if (vec[1]&0x00000020) OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[1] |= CFR_XMPMUL;
+            if (vec[1]&0x00000040)
+                OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[1] |= CFR_XMONTMUL|CFR_XMONTSQR;
+
+            /* Some heuristics */
+            /* all known VIS2-capable CPUs have unprivileged tick counter */
+            if (OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0]&SPARCV9_VIS2)
+                OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] &= ~SPARCV9_TICK_PRIVILEGED;
+
+            OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] |= SPARCV9_PREFER_FPU;
+
+            /* detect UltraSPARC-Tx, see sparccpud.S for details... */
+            if ((OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0]&SPARCV9_VIS1) &&
+                _sparcv9_vis1_instrument() >= 12)
+                OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] &= ~(SPARCV9_VIS1 | SPARCV9_PREFER_FPU);
+        }
+
+        if (sizeof(size_t) == 8)
+            OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] |= SPARCV9_64BIT_STACK;
+
+        return;
+    }
+#endif
+
+    /* Initial value, fits UltraSPARC-I&II... */
+    OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] = SPARCV9_PREFER_FPU | SPARCV9_TICK_PRIVILEGED;
+
+    sigfillset(&all_masked);
+    sigdelset(&all_masked, SIGILL);
+    sigdelset(&all_masked, SIGTRAP);
+# ifdef SIGEMT
+    sigdelset(&all_masked, SIGEMT);
+# endif
+    sigdelset(&all_masked, SIGFPE);
+    sigdelset(&all_masked, SIGBUS);
+    sigdelset(&all_masked, SIGSEGV);
+    sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &all_masked, &oset);
+
+    memset(&common_act, 0, sizeof(common_act));
+    common_act.sa_handler = common_handler;
+    common_act.sa_mask = all_masked;
+
+    sigaction(SIGILL, &common_act, &ill_oact);
+    sigaction(SIGBUS, &common_act, &bus_oact); /* T1 fails 16-bit ldda [on
+                                                * Linux] */
+
+    if (sigsetjmp(common_jmp, 1) == 0) {
+        _sparcv9_rdtick();
+        OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] &= ~SPARCV9_TICK_PRIVILEGED;
+    }
+
+    if (sigsetjmp(common_jmp, 1) == 0) {
+        _sparcv9_vis1_probe();
+        OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] |= SPARCV9_VIS1 | SPARCV9_BLK;
+        /* detect UltraSPARC-Tx, see sparccpud.S for details... */
+        if (_sparcv9_vis1_instrument() >= 12)
+            OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] &= ~(SPARCV9_VIS1 | SPARCV9_PREFER_FPU);
+        else {
+            _sparcv9_vis2_probe();
+            OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] |= SPARCV9_VIS2;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (sigsetjmp(common_jmp, 1) == 0) {
+        _sparcv9_fmadd_probe();
+        OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] |= SPARCV9_FMADD;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * VIS3 flag is tested independently from VIS1, unlike VIS2 that is,
+     * because VIS3 defines even integer instructions.
+     */
+    if (sigsetjmp(common_jmp, 1) == 0) {
+        _sparcv9_vis3_probe();
+        OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] |= SPARCV9_VIS3;
+    }
+
+    if (sigsetjmp(common_jmp, 1) == 0) {
+        _sparcv9_fjaesx_probe();
+        OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] |= SPARCV9_FJAESX;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * In wait for better solution _sparcv9_rdcfr is masked by
+     * VIS3 flag, because it goes to uninterruptable endless
+     * loop on UltraSPARC II running Solaris. Things might be
+     * different on Linux...
+     */
+    if ((OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] & SPARCV9_VIS3) &&
+        sigsetjmp(common_jmp, 1) == 0) {
+        OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[1] = (unsigned int)_sparcv9_rdcfr();
+    }
+
+    sigaction(SIGBUS, &bus_oact, NULL);
+    sigaction(SIGILL, &ill_oact, NULL);
+
+    sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &oset, NULL);
+
+    if (sizeof(size_t) == 8)
+        OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] |= SPARCV9_64BIT_STACK;
+# ifdef __linux
+    else {
+        int ret = syscall(340);
+
+        if (ret >= 0 && ret & 1)
+            OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] |= SPARCV9_64BIT_STACK;
+    }
+# endif
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/srp/build.info b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/srp/build.info
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b6c7fe7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/srp/build.info
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+LIBS=../../libcrypto
+SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=srp_lib.c srp_vfy.c
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/srp/srp_lib.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/srp/srp_lib.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e79352c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/srp/srp_lib.c
@@ -0,0 +1,280 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+# include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+# include <openssl/sha.h>
+# include <openssl/srp.h>
+# include <openssl/evp.h>
+# include "internal/bn_srp.h"
+
+/* calculate = SHA1(PAD(x) || PAD(y)) */
+
+static BIGNUM *srp_Calc_xy(const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y, const BIGNUM *N)
+{
+    unsigned char digest[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+    unsigned char *tmp = NULL;
+    int numN = BN_num_bytes(N);
+    BIGNUM *res = NULL;
+    if (x != N && BN_ucmp(x, N) >= 0)
+        return NULL;
+    if (y != N && BN_ucmp(y, N) >= 0)
+        return NULL;
+    if ((tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(numN * 2)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (BN_bn2binpad(x, tmp, numN) < 0
+        || BN_bn2binpad(y, tmp + numN, numN) < 0
+        || !EVP_Digest(tmp, numN * 2, digest, NULL, EVP_sha1(), NULL))
+        goto err;
+    res = BN_bin2bn(digest, sizeof(digest), NULL);
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_free(tmp);
+    return res;
+}
+
+static BIGNUM *srp_Calc_k(const BIGNUM *N, const BIGNUM *g)
+{
+    /* k = SHA1(N | PAD(g)) -- tls-srp draft 8 */
+    return srp_Calc_xy(N, g, N);
+}
+
+BIGNUM *SRP_Calc_u(const BIGNUM *A, const BIGNUM *B, const BIGNUM *N)
+{
+    /* k = SHA1(PAD(A) || PAD(B) ) -- tls-srp draft 8 */
+    return srp_Calc_xy(A, B, N);
+}
+
+BIGNUM *SRP_Calc_server_key(const BIGNUM *A, const BIGNUM *v, const BIGNUM *u,
+                            const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *N)
+{
+    BIGNUM *tmp = NULL, *S = NULL;
+    BN_CTX *bn_ctx;
+
+    if (u == NULL || A == NULL || v == NULL || b == NULL || N == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+
+    if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL || (tmp = BN_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* S = (A*v**u) ** b */
+
+    if (!BN_mod_exp(tmp, v, u, N, bn_ctx))
+        goto err;
+    if (!BN_mod_mul(tmp, A, tmp, N, bn_ctx))
+        goto err;
+
+    S = BN_new();
+    if (S != NULL && !BN_mod_exp(S, tmp, b, N, bn_ctx)) {
+        BN_free(S);
+        S = NULL;
+    }
+ err:
+    BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+    BN_clear_free(tmp);
+    return S;
+}
+
+BIGNUM *SRP_Calc_B(const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *N, const BIGNUM *g,
+                   const BIGNUM *v)
+{
+    BIGNUM *kv = NULL, *gb = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *B = NULL, *k = NULL;
+    BN_CTX *bn_ctx;
+
+    if (b == NULL || N == NULL || g == NULL || v == NULL ||
+        (bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+
+    if ((kv = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+        (gb = BN_new()) == NULL || (B = BN_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* B = g**b + k*v */
+
+    if (!BN_mod_exp(gb, g, b, N, bn_ctx)
+        || (k = srp_Calc_k(N, g)) == NULL
+        || !BN_mod_mul(kv, v, k, N, bn_ctx)
+        || !BN_mod_add(B, gb, kv, N, bn_ctx)) {
+        BN_free(B);
+        B = NULL;
+    }
+ err:
+    BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+    BN_clear_free(kv);
+    BN_clear_free(gb);
+    BN_free(k);
+    return B;
+}
+
+BIGNUM *SRP_Calc_x(const BIGNUM *s, const char *user, const char *pass)
+{
+    unsigned char dig[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+    EVP_MD_CTX *ctxt;
+    unsigned char *cs = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *res = NULL;
+
+    if ((s == NULL) || (user == NULL) || (pass == NULL))
+        return NULL;
+
+    ctxt = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+    if (ctxt == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    if ((cs = OPENSSL_malloc(BN_num_bytes(s))) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctxt, EVP_sha1(), NULL)
+        || !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctxt, user, strlen(user))
+        || !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctxt, ":", 1)
+        || !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctxt, pass, strlen(pass))
+        || !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctxt, dig, NULL)
+        || !EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctxt, EVP_sha1(), NULL))
+        goto err;
+    BN_bn2bin(s, cs);
+    if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctxt, cs, BN_num_bytes(s)))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctxt, dig, sizeof(dig))
+        || !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctxt, dig, NULL))
+        goto err;
+
+    res = BN_bin2bn(dig, sizeof(dig), NULL);
+
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_free(cs);
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctxt);
+    return res;
+}
+
+BIGNUM *SRP_Calc_A(const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *N, const BIGNUM *g)
+{
+    BN_CTX *bn_ctx;
+    BIGNUM *A = NULL;
+
+    if (a == NULL || N == NULL || g == NULL || (bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+
+    if ((A = BN_new()) != NULL && !BN_mod_exp(A, g, a, N, bn_ctx)) {
+        BN_free(A);
+        A = NULL;
+    }
+    BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+    return A;
+}
+
+BIGNUM *SRP_Calc_client_key(const BIGNUM *N, const BIGNUM *B, const BIGNUM *g,
+                            const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *u)
+{
+    BIGNUM *tmp = NULL, *tmp2 = NULL, *tmp3 = NULL, *k = NULL, *K = NULL;
+    BN_CTX *bn_ctx;
+
+    if (u == NULL || B == NULL || N == NULL || g == NULL || x == NULL
+        || a == NULL || (bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+
+    if ((tmp = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+        (tmp2 = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+        (tmp3 = BN_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!BN_mod_exp(tmp, g, x, N, bn_ctx))
+        goto err;
+    if ((k = srp_Calc_k(N, g)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (!BN_mod_mul(tmp2, tmp, k, N, bn_ctx))
+        goto err;
+    if (!BN_mod_sub(tmp, B, tmp2, N, bn_ctx))
+        goto err;
+    if (!BN_mul(tmp3, u, x, bn_ctx))
+        goto err;
+    if (!BN_add(tmp2, a, tmp3))
+        goto err;
+    K = BN_new();
+    if (K != NULL && !BN_mod_exp(K, tmp, tmp2, N, bn_ctx)) {
+        BN_free(K);
+        K = NULL;
+    }
+
+ err:
+    BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+    BN_clear_free(tmp);
+    BN_clear_free(tmp2);
+    BN_clear_free(tmp3);
+    BN_free(k);
+    return K;
+}
+
+int SRP_Verify_B_mod_N(const BIGNUM *B, const BIGNUM *N)
+{
+    BIGNUM *r;
+    BN_CTX *bn_ctx;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    if (B == NULL || N == NULL || (bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    if ((r = BN_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    /* Checks if B % N == 0 */
+    if (!BN_nnmod(r, B, N, bn_ctx))
+        goto err;
+    ret = !BN_is_zero(r);
+ err:
+    BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+    BN_free(r);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int SRP_Verify_A_mod_N(const BIGNUM *A, const BIGNUM *N)
+{
+    /* Checks if A % N == 0 */
+    return SRP_Verify_B_mod_N(A, N);
+}
+
+static SRP_gN knowngN[] = {
+    {"8192", &bn_generator_19, &bn_group_8192},
+    {"6144", &bn_generator_5, &bn_group_6144},
+    {"4096", &bn_generator_5, &bn_group_4096},
+    {"3072", &bn_generator_5, &bn_group_3072},
+    {"2048", &bn_generator_2, &bn_group_2048},
+    {"1536", &bn_generator_2, &bn_group_1536},
+    {"1024", &bn_generator_2, &bn_group_1024},
+};
+
+# define KNOWN_GN_NUMBER sizeof(knowngN) / sizeof(SRP_gN)
+
+/*
+ * Check if G and N are known parameters. The values have been generated
+ * from the ietf-tls-srp draft version 8
+ */
+char *SRP_check_known_gN_param(const BIGNUM *g, const BIGNUM *N)
+{
+    size_t i;
+    if ((g == NULL) || (N == NULL))
+        return 0;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < KNOWN_GN_NUMBER; i++) {
+        if (BN_cmp(knowngN[i].g, g) == 0 && BN_cmp(knowngN[i].N, N) == 0)
+            return knowngN[i].id;
+    }
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+SRP_gN *SRP_get_default_gN(const char *id)
+{
+    size_t i;
+
+    if (id == NULL)
+        return knowngN;
+    for (i = 0; i < KNOWN_GN_NUMBER; i++) {
+        if (strcmp(knowngN[i].id, id) == 0)
+            return knowngN + i;
+    }
+    return NULL;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..29b7afc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c
@@ -0,0 +1,680 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+# include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+# include <openssl/sha.h>
+# include <openssl/srp.h>
+# include <openssl/evp.h>
+# include <openssl/buffer.h>
+# include <openssl/rand.h>
+# include <openssl/txt_db.h>
+
+# define SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN 20
+# define MAX_LEN 2500
+
+static char b64table[] =
+    "0123456789ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz./";
+
+/*
+ * the following two conversion routines have been inspired by code from
+ * Stanford
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Convert a base64 string into raw byte array representation.
+ */
+static int t_fromb64(unsigned char *a, size_t alen, const char *src)
+{
+    char *loc;
+    int i, j;
+    int size;
+
+    if (alen == 0 || alen > INT_MAX)
+        return -1;
+
+    while (*src && (*src == ' ' || *src == '\t' || *src == '\n'))
+        ++src;
+    size = strlen(src);
+    if (size < 0 || size >= (int)alen)
+        return -1;
+
+    i = 0;
+    while (i < size) {
+        loc = strchr(b64table, src[i]);
+        if (loc == (char *)0)
+            break;
+        else
+            a[i] = loc - b64table;
+        ++i;
+    }
+    /* if nothing valid to process we have a zero length response */
+    if (i == 0)
+        return 0;
+    size = i;
+    i = size - 1;
+    j = size;
+    while (1) {
+        a[j] = a[i];
+        if (--i < 0)
+            break;
+        a[j] |= (a[i] & 3) << 6;
+        --j;
+        a[j] = (unsigned char)((a[i] & 0x3c) >> 2);
+        if (--i < 0)
+            break;
+        a[j] |= (a[i] & 0xf) << 4;
+        --j;
+        a[j] = (unsigned char)((a[i] & 0x30) >> 4);
+        if (--i < 0)
+            break;
+        a[j] |= (a[i] << 2);
+
+        a[--j] = 0;
+        if (--i < 0)
+            break;
+    }
+    while (j <= size && a[j] == 0)
+        ++j;
+    i = 0;
+    while (j <= size)
+        a[i++] = a[j++];
+    return i;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convert a raw byte string into a null-terminated base64 ASCII string.
+ */
+static char *t_tob64(char *dst, const unsigned char *src, int size)
+{
+    int c, pos = size % 3;
+    unsigned char b0 = 0, b1 = 0, b2 = 0, notleading = 0;
+    char *olddst = dst;
+
+    switch (pos) {
+    case 1:
+        b2 = src[0];
+        break;
+    case 2:
+        b1 = src[0];
+        b2 = src[1];
+        break;
+    }
+
+    while (1) {
+        c = (b0 & 0xfc) >> 2;
+        if (notleading || c != 0) {
+            *dst++ = b64table[c];
+            notleading = 1;
+        }
+        c = ((b0 & 3) << 4) | ((b1 & 0xf0) >> 4);
+        if (notleading || c != 0) {
+            *dst++ = b64table[c];
+            notleading = 1;
+        }
+        c = ((b1 & 0xf) << 2) | ((b2 & 0xc0) >> 6);
+        if (notleading || c != 0) {
+            *dst++ = b64table[c];
+            notleading = 1;
+        }
+        c = b2 & 0x3f;
+        if (notleading || c != 0) {
+            *dst++ = b64table[c];
+            notleading = 1;
+        }
+        if (pos >= size)
+            break;
+        else {
+            b0 = src[pos++];
+            b1 = src[pos++];
+            b2 = src[pos++];
+        }
+    }
+
+    *dst++ = '\0';
+    return olddst;
+}
+
+void SRP_user_pwd_free(SRP_user_pwd *user_pwd)
+{
+    if (user_pwd == NULL)
+        return;
+    BN_free(user_pwd->s);
+    BN_clear_free(user_pwd->v);
+    OPENSSL_free(user_pwd->id);
+    OPENSSL_free(user_pwd->info);
+    OPENSSL_free(user_pwd);
+}
+
+static SRP_user_pwd *SRP_user_pwd_new(void)
+{
+    SRP_user_pwd *ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ret));
+    if (ret == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    ret->N = NULL;
+    ret->g = NULL;
+    ret->s = NULL;
+    ret->v = NULL;
+    ret->id = NULL;
+    ret->info = NULL;
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static void SRP_user_pwd_set_gN(SRP_user_pwd *vinfo, const BIGNUM *g,
+                                const BIGNUM *N)
+{
+    vinfo->N = N;
+    vinfo->g = g;
+}
+
+static int SRP_user_pwd_set_ids(SRP_user_pwd *vinfo, const char *id,
+                                const char *info)
+{
+    if (id != NULL && NULL == (vinfo->id = OPENSSL_strdup(id)))
+        return 0;
+    return (info == NULL || NULL != (vinfo->info = OPENSSL_strdup(info)));
+}
+
+static int SRP_user_pwd_set_sv(SRP_user_pwd *vinfo, const char *s,
+                               const char *v)
+{
+    unsigned char tmp[MAX_LEN];
+    int len;
+
+    vinfo->v = NULL;
+    vinfo->s = NULL;
+
+    len = t_fromb64(tmp, sizeof(tmp), v);
+    if (len < 0)
+        return 0;
+    if (NULL == (vinfo->v = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL)))
+        return 0;
+    len = t_fromb64(tmp, sizeof(tmp), s);
+    if (len < 0)
+        goto err;
+    vinfo->s = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL);
+    if (vinfo->s == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    return 1;
+ err:
+    BN_free(vinfo->v);
+    vinfo->v = NULL;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int SRP_user_pwd_set_sv_BN(SRP_user_pwd *vinfo, BIGNUM *s, BIGNUM *v)
+{
+    vinfo->v = v;
+    vinfo->s = s;
+    return (vinfo->s != NULL && vinfo->v != NULL);
+}
+
+static SRP_user_pwd *srp_user_pwd_dup(SRP_user_pwd *src)
+{
+    SRP_user_pwd *ret;
+
+    if (src == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    if ((ret = SRP_user_pwd_new()) == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+
+    SRP_user_pwd_set_gN(ret, src->g, src->N);
+    if (!SRP_user_pwd_set_ids(ret, src->id, src->info)
+        || !SRP_user_pwd_set_sv_BN(ret, BN_dup(src->s), BN_dup(src->v))) {
+            SRP_user_pwd_free(ret);
+            return NULL;
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+SRP_VBASE *SRP_VBASE_new(char *seed_key)
+{
+    SRP_VBASE *vb = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*vb));
+
+    if (vb == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    if ((vb->users_pwd = sk_SRP_user_pwd_new_null()) == NULL
+        || (vb->gN_cache = sk_SRP_gN_cache_new_null()) == NULL) {
+        OPENSSL_free(vb);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    vb->default_g = NULL;
+    vb->default_N = NULL;
+    vb->seed_key = NULL;
+    if ((seed_key != NULL) && (vb->seed_key = OPENSSL_strdup(seed_key)) == NULL) {
+        sk_SRP_user_pwd_free(vb->users_pwd);
+        sk_SRP_gN_cache_free(vb->gN_cache);
+        OPENSSL_free(vb);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    return vb;
+}
+
+void SRP_VBASE_free(SRP_VBASE *vb)
+{
+    if (!vb)
+        return;
+    sk_SRP_user_pwd_pop_free(vb->users_pwd, SRP_user_pwd_free);
+    sk_SRP_gN_cache_free(vb->gN_cache);
+    OPENSSL_free(vb->seed_key);
+    OPENSSL_free(vb);
+}
+
+static SRP_gN_cache *SRP_gN_new_init(const char *ch)
+{
+    unsigned char tmp[MAX_LEN];
+    int len;
+    SRP_gN_cache *newgN = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*newgN));
+
+    if (newgN == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+
+    len = t_fromb64(tmp, sizeof(tmp), ch);
+    if (len < 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    if ((newgN->b64_bn = OPENSSL_strdup(ch)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if ((newgN->bn = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL)))
+        return newgN;
+
+    OPENSSL_free(newgN->b64_bn);
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_free(newgN);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+static void SRP_gN_free(SRP_gN_cache *gN_cache)
+{
+    if (gN_cache == NULL)
+        return;
+    OPENSSL_free(gN_cache->b64_bn);
+    BN_free(gN_cache->bn);
+    OPENSSL_free(gN_cache);
+}
+
+static SRP_gN *SRP_get_gN_by_id(const char *id, STACK_OF(SRP_gN) *gN_tab)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    SRP_gN *gN;
+    if (gN_tab != NULL)
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_SRP_gN_num(gN_tab); i++) {
+            gN = sk_SRP_gN_value(gN_tab, i);
+            if (gN && (id == NULL || strcmp(gN->id, id) == 0))
+                return gN;
+        }
+
+    return SRP_get_default_gN(id);
+}
+
+static BIGNUM *SRP_gN_place_bn(STACK_OF(SRP_gN_cache) *gN_cache, char *ch)
+{
+    int i;
+    if (gN_cache == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+
+    /* search if we have already one... */
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_SRP_gN_cache_num(gN_cache); i++) {
+        SRP_gN_cache *cache = sk_SRP_gN_cache_value(gN_cache, i);
+        if (strcmp(cache->b64_bn, ch) == 0)
+            return cache->bn;
+    }
+    {                           /* it is the first time that we find it */
+        SRP_gN_cache *newgN = SRP_gN_new_init(ch);
+        if (newgN) {
+            if (sk_SRP_gN_cache_insert(gN_cache, newgN, 0) > 0)
+                return newgN->bn;
+            SRP_gN_free(newgN);
+        }
+    }
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * this function parses verifier file. Format is:
+ * string(index):base64(N):base64(g):0
+ * string(username):base64(v):base64(salt):int(index)
+ */
+
+int SRP_VBASE_init(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *verifier_file)
+{
+    int error_code;
+    STACK_OF(SRP_gN) *SRP_gN_tab = sk_SRP_gN_new_null();
+    char *last_index = NULL;
+    int i;
+    char **pp;
+
+    SRP_gN *gN = NULL;
+    SRP_user_pwd *user_pwd = NULL;
+
+    TXT_DB *tmpdb = NULL;
+    BIO *in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
+
+    error_code = SRP_ERR_OPEN_FILE;
+
+    if (in == NULL || BIO_read_filename(in, verifier_file) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    error_code = SRP_ERR_VBASE_INCOMPLETE_FILE;
+
+    if ((tmpdb = TXT_DB_read(in, DB_NUMBER)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    error_code = SRP_ERR_MEMORY;
+
+    if (vb->seed_key) {
+        last_index = SRP_get_default_gN(NULL)->id;
+    }
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_num(tmpdb->data); i++) {
+        pp = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(tmpdb->data, i);
+        if (pp[DB_srptype][0] == DB_SRP_INDEX) {
+            /*
+             * we add this couple in the internal Stack
+             */
+
+            if ((gN = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*gN))) == NULL)
+                goto err;
+
+            if ((gN->id = OPENSSL_strdup(pp[DB_srpid])) == NULL
+                || (gN->N = SRP_gN_place_bn(vb->gN_cache, pp[DB_srpverifier]))
+                        == NULL
+                || (gN->g = SRP_gN_place_bn(vb->gN_cache, pp[DB_srpsalt]))
+                        == NULL
+                || sk_SRP_gN_insert(SRP_gN_tab, gN, 0) == 0)
+                goto err;
+
+            gN = NULL;
+
+            if (vb->seed_key != NULL) {
+                last_index = pp[DB_srpid];
+            }
+        } else if (pp[DB_srptype][0] == DB_SRP_VALID) {
+            /* it is a user .... */
+            const SRP_gN *lgN;
+
+            if ((lgN = SRP_get_gN_by_id(pp[DB_srpgN], SRP_gN_tab)) != NULL) {
+                error_code = SRP_ERR_MEMORY;
+                if ((user_pwd = SRP_user_pwd_new()) == NULL)
+                    goto err;
+
+                SRP_user_pwd_set_gN(user_pwd, lgN->g, lgN->N);
+                if (!SRP_user_pwd_set_ids
+                    (user_pwd, pp[DB_srpid], pp[DB_srpinfo]))
+                    goto err;
+
+                error_code = SRP_ERR_VBASE_BN_LIB;
+                if (!SRP_user_pwd_set_sv
+                    (user_pwd, pp[DB_srpsalt], pp[DB_srpverifier]))
+                    goto err;
+
+                if (sk_SRP_user_pwd_insert(vb->users_pwd, user_pwd, 0) == 0)
+                    goto err;
+                user_pwd = NULL; /* abandon responsibility */
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (last_index != NULL) {
+        /* this means that we want to simulate a default user */
+
+        if (((gN = SRP_get_gN_by_id(last_index, SRP_gN_tab)) == NULL)) {
+            error_code = SRP_ERR_VBASE_BN_LIB;
+            goto err;
+        }
+        vb->default_g = gN->g;
+        vb->default_N = gN->N;
+        gN = NULL;
+    }
+    error_code = SRP_NO_ERROR;
+
+ err:
+    /*
+     * there may be still some leaks to fix, if this fails, the application
+     * terminates most likely
+     */
+
+    if (gN != NULL) {
+        OPENSSL_free(gN->id);
+        OPENSSL_free(gN);
+    }
+
+    SRP_user_pwd_free(user_pwd);
+
+    TXT_DB_free(tmpdb);
+    BIO_free_all(in);
+
+    sk_SRP_gN_free(SRP_gN_tab);
+
+    return error_code;
+
+}
+
+static SRP_user_pwd *find_user(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *username)
+{
+    int i;
+    SRP_user_pwd *user;
+
+    if (vb == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_SRP_user_pwd_num(vb->users_pwd); i++) {
+        user = sk_SRP_user_pwd_value(vb->users_pwd, i);
+        if (strcmp(user->id, username) == 0)
+            return user;
+    }
+
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+ #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+/*
+ * DEPRECATED: use SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user instead.
+ * This method ignores the configured seed and fails for an unknown user.
+ * Ownership of the returned pointer is not released to the caller.
+ * In other words, caller must not free the result.
+ */
+SRP_user_pwd *SRP_VBASE_get_by_user(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *username)
+{
+    return find_user(vb, username);
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Ownership of the returned pointer is released to the caller.
+ * In other words, caller must free the result once done.
+ */
+SRP_user_pwd *SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *username)
+{
+    SRP_user_pwd *user;
+    unsigned char digv[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+    unsigned char digs[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+    EVP_MD_CTX *ctxt = NULL;
+
+    if (vb == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+
+    if ((user = find_user(vb, username)) != NULL)
+        return srp_user_pwd_dup(user);
+
+    if ((vb->seed_key == NULL) ||
+        (vb->default_g == NULL) || (vb->default_N == NULL))
+        return NULL;
+
+/* if the user is unknown we set parameters as well if we have a seed_key */
+
+    if ((user = SRP_user_pwd_new()) == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+
+    SRP_user_pwd_set_gN(user, vb->default_g, vb->default_N);
+
+    if (!SRP_user_pwd_set_ids(user, username, NULL))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (RAND_bytes(digv, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    ctxt = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+    if (ctxt == NULL
+        || !EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctxt, EVP_sha1(), NULL)
+        || !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctxt, vb->seed_key, strlen(vb->seed_key))
+        || !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctxt, username, strlen(username))
+        || !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctxt, digs, NULL))
+        goto err;
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctxt);
+    ctxt = NULL;
+    if (SRP_user_pwd_set_sv_BN(user,
+                               BN_bin2bn(digs, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, NULL),
+                               BN_bin2bn(digv, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, NULL)))
+        return user;
+
+ err:
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctxt);
+    SRP_user_pwd_free(user);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * create a verifier (*salt,*verifier,g and N are in base64)
+ */
+char *SRP_create_verifier(const char *user, const char *pass, char **salt,
+                          char **verifier, const char *N, const char *g)
+{
+    int len;
+    char *result = NULL, *vf = NULL;
+    const BIGNUM *N_bn = NULL, *g_bn = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *N_bn_alloc = NULL, *g_bn_alloc = NULL, *s = NULL, *v = NULL;
+    unsigned char tmp[MAX_LEN];
+    unsigned char tmp2[MAX_LEN];
+    char *defgNid = NULL;
+    int vfsize = 0;
+
+    if ((user == NULL) ||
+        (pass == NULL) || (salt == NULL) || (verifier == NULL))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (N) {
+        if ((len = t_fromb64(tmp, sizeof(tmp), N)) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+        N_bn_alloc = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL);
+        N_bn = N_bn_alloc;
+        if ((len = t_fromb64(tmp, sizeof(tmp) ,g)) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+        g_bn_alloc = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL);
+        g_bn = g_bn_alloc;
+        defgNid = "*";
+    } else {
+        SRP_gN *gN = SRP_get_gN_by_id(g, NULL);
+        if (gN == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        N_bn = gN->N;
+        g_bn = gN->g;
+        defgNid = gN->id;
+    }
+
+    if (*salt == NULL) {
+        if (RAND_bytes(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+
+        s = BN_bin2bn(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN, NULL);
+    } else {
+        if ((len = t_fromb64(tmp2, sizeof(tmp2), *salt)) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+        s = BN_bin2bn(tmp2, len, NULL);
+    }
+
+    if (!SRP_create_verifier_BN(user, pass, &s, &v, N_bn, g_bn))
+        goto err;
+
+    BN_bn2bin(v, tmp);
+    vfsize = BN_num_bytes(v) * 2;
+    if (((vf = OPENSSL_malloc(vfsize)) == NULL))
+        goto err;
+    t_tob64(vf, tmp, BN_num_bytes(v));
+
+    if (*salt == NULL) {
+        char *tmp_salt;
+
+        if ((tmp_salt = OPENSSL_malloc(SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN * 2)) == NULL) {
+            goto err;
+        }
+        t_tob64(tmp_salt, tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN);
+        *salt = tmp_salt;
+    }
+
+    *verifier = vf;
+    vf = NULL;
+    result = defgNid;
+
+ err:
+    BN_free(N_bn_alloc);
+    BN_free(g_bn_alloc);
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(vf, vfsize);
+    BN_clear_free(s);
+    BN_clear_free(v);
+    return result;
+}
+
+/*
+ * create a verifier (*salt,*verifier,g and N are BIGNUMs). If *salt != NULL
+ * then the provided salt will be used. On successful exit *verifier will point
+ * to a newly allocated BIGNUM containing the verifier and (if a salt was not
+ * provided) *salt will be populated with a newly allocated BIGNUM containing a
+ * random salt.
+ * The caller is responsible for freeing the allocated *salt and *verifier
+ * BIGNUMS.
+ */
+int SRP_create_verifier_BN(const char *user, const char *pass, BIGNUM **salt,
+                           BIGNUM **verifier, const BIGNUM *N,
+                           const BIGNUM *g)
+{
+    int result = 0;
+    BIGNUM *x = NULL;
+    BN_CTX *bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+    unsigned char tmp2[MAX_LEN];
+    BIGNUM *salttmp = NULL;
+
+    if ((user == NULL) ||
+        (pass == NULL) ||
+        (salt == NULL) ||
+        (verifier == NULL) || (N == NULL) || (g == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (*salt == NULL) {
+        if (RAND_bytes(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+
+        salttmp = BN_bin2bn(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN, NULL);
+    } else {
+        salttmp = *salt;
+    }
+
+    x = SRP_Calc_x(salttmp, user, pass);
+
+    *verifier = BN_new();
+    if (*verifier == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!BN_mod_exp(*verifier, g, x, N, bn_ctx)) {
+        BN_clear_free(*verifier);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    result = 1;
+    *salt = salttmp;
+
+ err:
+    if (salt != NULL && *salt != salttmp)
+        BN_clear_free(salttmp);
+    BN_clear_free(x);
+    BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+    return result;
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/stack/build.info b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/stack/build.info
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e587021
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/stack/build.info
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+LIBS=../../libcrypto
+SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=stack.c
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/stack/stack.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/stack/stack.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..43ddf30
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/stack/stack.c
@@ -0,0 +1,312 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "internal/numbers.h"
+#include <openssl/stack.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+
+struct stack_st {
+    int num;
+    const char **data;
+    int sorted;
+    size_t num_alloc;
+    OPENSSL_sk_compfunc comp;
+};
+
+#undef MIN_NODES
+#define MIN_NODES       4
+
+#include <errno.h>
+
+OPENSSL_sk_compfunc OPENSSL_sk_set_cmp_func(OPENSSL_STACK *sk, OPENSSL_sk_compfunc c)
+{
+    OPENSSL_sk_compfunc old = sk->comp;
+
+    if (sk->comp != c)
+        sk->sorted = 0;
+    sk->comp = c;
+
+    return old;
+}
+
+OPENSSL_STACK *OPENSSL_sk_dup(const OPENSSL_STACK *sk)
+{
+    OPENSSL_STACK *ret;
+
+    if (sk->num < 0)
+        return NULL;
+
+    if ((ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ret))) == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+
+    /* direct structure assignment */
+    *ret = *sk;
+
+    if ((ret->data = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ret->data) * sk->num_alloc)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    memcpy(ret->data, sk->data, sizeof(char *) * sk->num);
+    return ret;
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_sk_free(ret);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+OPENSSL_STACK *OPENSSL_sk_deep_copy(const OPENSSL_STACK *sk,
+                             OPENSSL_sk_copyfunc copy_func,
+                             OPENSSL_sk_freefunc free_func)
+{
+    OPENSSL_STACK *ret;
+    int i;
+
+    if (sk->num < 0)
+        return NULL;
+
+    if ((ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ret))) == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+
+    /* direct structure assignment */
+    *ret = *sk;
+
+    ret->num_alloc = sk->num > MIN_NODES ? (size_t)sk->num : MIN_NODES;
+    ret->data = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret->data) * ret->num_alloc);
+    if (ret->data == NULL) {
+        OPENSSL_free(ret);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0; i < ret->num; ++i) {
+        if (sk->data[i] == NULL)
+            continue;
+        if ((ret->data[i] = copy_func(sk->data[i])) == NULL) {
+            while (--i >= 0)
+                if (ret->data[i] != NULL)
+                    free_func((void *)ret->data[i]);
+            OPENSSL_sk_free(ret);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+OPENSSL_STACK *OPENSSL_sk_new_null(void)
+{
+    return OPENSSL_sk_new((OPENSSL_sk_compfunc)NULL);
+}
+
+OPENSSL_STACK *OPENSSL_sk_new(OPENSSL_sk_compfunc c)
+{
+    OPENSSL_STACK *ret;
+
+    if ((ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret))) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if ((ret->data = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret->data) * MIN_NODES)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    ret->comp = c;
+    ret->num_alloc = MIN_NODES;
+    return (ret);
+
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_free(ret);
+    return (NULL);
+}
+
+int OPENSSL_sk_insert(OPENSSL_STACK *st, const void *data, int loc)
+{
+    if (st == NULL || st->num < 0 || st->num == INT_MAX) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (st->num_alloc <= (size_t)(st->num + 1)) {
+        size_t doub_num_alloc = st->num_alloc * 2;
+        const char **tmpdata;
+
+        /* Overflow checks */
+        if (doub_num_alloc < st->num_alloc)
+            return 0;
+
+        /* Avoid overflow due to multiplication by sizeof(char *) */
+        if (doub_num_alloc > SIZE_MAX / sizeof(char *))
+            return 0;
+
+        tmpdata = OPENSSL_realloc((char *)st->data,
+                                  sizeof(char *) * doub_num_alloc);
+        if (tmpdata == NULL)
+            return 0;
+
+        st->data = tmpdata;
+        st->num_alloc = doub_num_alloc;
+    }
+    if ((loc >= st->num) || (loc < 0)) {
+        st->data[st->num] = data;
+    } else {
+        memmove(&st->data[loc + 1], &st->data[loc],
+                sizeof(st->data[0]) * (st->num - loc));
+        st->data[loc] = data;
+    }
+    st->num++;
+    st->sorted = 0;
+    return st->num;
+}
+
+void *OPENSSL_sk_delete_ptr(OPENSSL_STACK *st, const void *p)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < st->num; i++)
+        if (st->data[i] == p)
+            return OPENSSL_sk_delete(st, i);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+void *OPENSSL_sk_delete(OPENSSL_STACK *st, int loc)
+{
+    const char *ret;
+
+    if (st == NULL || loc < 0 || loc >= st->num)
+        return NULL;
+
+    ret = st->data[loc];
+    if (loc != st->num - 1)
+         memmove(&st->data[loc], &st->data[loc + 1],
+                 sizeof(st->data[0]) * (st->num - loc - 1));
+    st->num--;
+    return (void *)ret;
+}
+
+static int internal_find(OPENSSL_STACK *st, const void *data,
+                         int ret_val_options)
+{
+    const void *r;
+    int i;
+
+    if (st == NULL)
+        return -1;
+
+    if (st->comp == NULL) {
+        for (i = 0; i < st->num; i++)
+            if (st->data[i] == data)
+                return (i);
+        return (-1);
+    }
+    OPENSSL_sk_sort(st);
+    if (data == NULL)
+        return (-1);
+    r = OBJ_bsearch_ex_(&data, st->data, st->num, sizeof(void *), st->comp,
+                        ret_val_options);
+    if (r == NULL)
+        return (-1);
+    return (int)((const char **)r - st->data);
+}
+
+int OPENSSL_sk_find(OPENSSL_STACK *st, const void *data)
+{
+    return internal_find(st, data, OBJ_BSEARCH_FIRST_VALUE_ON_MATCH);
+}
+
+int OPENSSL_sk_find_ex(OPENSSL_STACK *st, const void *data)
+{
+    return internal_find(st, data, OBJ_BSEARCH_VALUE_ON_NOMATCH);
+}
+
+int OPENSSL_sk_push(OPENSSL_STACK *st, const void *data)
+{
+    return (OPENSSL_sk_insert(st, data, st->num));
+}
+
+int OPENSSL_sk_unshift(OPENSSL_STACK *st, const void *data)
+{
+    return (OPENSSL_sk_insert(st, data, 0));
+}
+
+void *OPENSSL_sk_shift(OPENSSL_STACK *st)
+{
+    if (st == NULL)
+        return (NULL);
+    if (st->num <= 0)
+        return (NULL);
+    return (OPENSSL_sk_delete(st, 0));
+}
+
+void *OPENSSL_sk_pop(OPENSSL_STACK *st)
+{
+    if (st == NULL)
+        return (NULL);
+    if (st->num <= 0)
+        return (NULL);
+    return (OPENSSL_sk_delete(st, st->num - 1));
+}
+
+void OPENSSL_sk_zero(OPENSSL_STACK *st)
+{
+    if (st == NULL)
+        return;
+    if (st->num <= 0)
+        return;
+    memset(st->data, 0, sizeof(*st->data) * st->num);
+    st->num = 0;
+}
+
+void OPENSSL_sk_pop_free(OPENSSL_STACK *st, OPENSSL_sk_freefunc func)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    if (st == NULL)
+        return;
+    for (i = 0; i < st->num; i++)
+        if (st->data[i] != NULL)
+            func((char *)st->data[i]);
+    OPENSSL_sk_free(st);
+}
+
+void OPENSSL_sk_free(OPENSSL_STACK *st)
+{
+    if (st == NULL)
+        return;
+    OPENSSL_free(st->data);
+    OPENSSL_free(st);
+}
+
+int OPENSSL_sk_num(const OPENSSL_STACK *st)
+{
+    if (st == NULL)
+        return -1;
+    return st->num;
+}
+
+void *OPENSSL_sk_value(const OPENSSL_STACK *st, int i)
+{
+    if (st == NULL || i < 0 || i >= st->num)
+        return NULL;
+    return (void *)st->data[i];
+}
+
+void *OPENSSL_sk_set(OPENSSL_STACK *st, int i, const void *data)
+{
+    if (st == NULL || i < 0 || i >= st->num)
+        return NULL;
+    st->data[i] = data;
+    return (void *)st->data[i];
+}
+
+void OPENSSL_sk_sort(OPENSSL_STACK *st)
+{
+    if (st && !st->sorted && st->comp != NULL) {
+        qsort(st->data, st->num, sizeof(char *), st->comp);
+        st->sorted = 1;
+    }
+}
+
+int OPENSSL_sk_is_sorted(const OPENSSL_STACK *st)
+{
+    if (st == NULL)
+        return 1;
+    return st->sorted;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/threads_none.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/threads_none.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..72bf25b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/threads_none.c
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_THREADS) || defined(CRYPTO_TDEBUG)
+
+CRYPTO_RWLOCK *CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(void)
+{
+    CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(unsigned int));
+    if (lock == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+
+    *(unsigned int *)lock = 1;
+
+    return lock;
+}
+
+int CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock)
+{
+    OPENSSL_assert(*(unsigned int *)lock == 1);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock)
+{
+    OPENSSL_assert(*(unsigned int *)lock == 1);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock)
+{
+    OPENSSL_assert(*(unsigned int *)lock == 1);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+void CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock) {
+    if (lock == NULL)
+        return;
+
+    *(unsigned int *)lock = 0;
+    OPENSSL_free(lock);
+
+    return;
+}
+
+int CRYPTO_THREAD_run_once(CRYPTO_ONCE *once, void (*init)(void))
+{
+    if (*once != 0)
+        return 1;
+
+    init();
+    *once = 1;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+#define OPENSSL_CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL_KEY_MAX 256
+
+static void *thread_local_storage[OPENSSL_CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL_KEY_MAX];
+
+int CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local(CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL *key, void (*cleanup)(void *))
+{
+    static unsigned int thread_local_key = 0;
+
+    if (thread_local_key >= OPENSSL_CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL_KEY_MAX)
+        return 0;
+
+    *key = thread_local_key++;
+
+    thread_local_storage[*key] = NULL;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+void *CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL *key)
+{
+    if (*key >= OPENSSL_CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL_KEY_MAX)
+        return NULL;
+
+    return thread_local_storage[*key];
+}
+
+int CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL *key, void *val)
+{
+    if (*key >= OPENSSL_CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL_KEY_MAX)
+        return 0;
+
+    thread_local_storage[*key] = val;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL *key)
+{
+    *key = OPENSSL_CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL_KEY_MAX + 1;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+CRYPTO_THREAD_ID CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id(void)
+{
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int CRYPTO_THREAD_compare_id(CRYPTO_THREAD_ID a, CRYPTO_THREAD_ID b)
+{
+    return (a == b);
+}
+
+int CRYPTO_atomic_add(int *val, int amount, int *ret, CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock)
+{
+    *val += amount;
+    *ret  = *val;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/threads_pthread.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/threads_pthread.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..151013e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/threads_pthread.c
@@ -0,0 +1,171 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_THREADS) && !defined(CRYPTO_TDEBUG) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS)
+
+# ifdef PTHREAD_RWLOCK_INITIALIZER
+#  define USE_RWLOCK
+# endif
+
+CRYPTO_RWLOCK *CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(void)
+{
+# ifdef USE_RWLOCK
+    CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(pthread_rwlock_t));
+    if (lock == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+
+    if (pthread_rwlock_init(lock, NULL) != 0) {
+        OPENSSL_free(lock);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+# else
+    pthread_mutexattr_t attr;
+    CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(pthread_mutex_t));
+    if (lock == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+
+    pthread_mutexattr_init(&attr);
+    pthread_mutexattr_settype(&attr, PTHREAD_MUTEX_RECURSIVE);
+
+    if (pthread_mutex_init(lock, &attr) != 0) {
+        pthread_mutexattr_destroy(&attr);
+        OPENSSL_free(lock);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    pthread_mutexattr_destroy(&attr);
+# endif
+
+    return lock;
+}
+
+int CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock)
+{
+# ifdef USE_RWLOCK
+    if (pthread_rwlock_rdlock(lock) != 0)
+        return 0;
+# else
+    if (pthread_mutex_lock(lock) != 0)
+        return 0;
+# endif
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock)
+{
+# ifdef USE_RWLOCK
+    if (pthread_rwlock_wrlock(lock) != 0)
+        return 0;
+# else
+    if (pthread_mutex_lock(lock) != 0)
+        return 0;
+# endif
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock)
+{
+# ifdef USE_RWLOCK
+    if (pthread_rwlock_unlock(lock) != 0)
+        return 0;
+# else
+    if (pthread_mutex_unlock(lock) != 0)
+        return 0;
+# endif
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+void CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock)
+{
+    if (lock == NULL)
+        return;
+
+# ifdef USE_RWLOCK
+    pthread_rwlock_destroy(lock);
+# else
+    pthread_mutex_destroy(lock);
+# endif
+    OPENSSL_free(lock);
+
+    return;
+}
+
+int CRYPTO_THREAD_run_once(CRYPTO_ONCE *once, void (*init)(void))
+{
+    if (pthread_once(once, init) != 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local(CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL *key, void (*cleanup)(void *))
+{
+    if (pthread_key_create(key, cleanup) != 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+void *CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL *key)
+{
+    return pthread_getspecific(*key);
+}
+
+int CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL *key, void *val)
+{
+    if (pthread_setspecific(*key, val) != 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL *key)
+{
+    if (pthread_key_delete(*key) != 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+CRYPTO_THREAD_ID CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id(void)
+{
+    return pthread_self();
+}
+
+int CRYPTO_THREAD_compare_id(CRYPTO_THREAD_ID a, CRYPTO_THREAD_ID b)
+{
+    return pthread_equal(a, b);
+}
+
+int CRYPTO_atomic_add(int *val, int amount, int *ret, CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock)
+{
+# if defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__ATOMIC_ACQ_REL)
+    if (__atomic_is_lock_free(sizeof(*val), val)) {
+        *ret = __atomic_add_fetch(val, amount, __ATOMIC_ACQ_REL);
+        return 1;
+    }
+# endif
+    if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(lock))
+        return 0;
+
+    *val += amount;
+    *ret  = *val;
+
+    if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(lock))
+        return 0;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/threads_win.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/threads_win.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4e0de90
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/threads_win.c
@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#if defined(_WIN32)
+# include <windows.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_THREADS) && !defined(CRYPTO_TDEBUG) && defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS)
+
+CRYPTO_RWLOCK *CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(void)
+{
+    CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(CRITICAL_SECTION));
+    if (lock == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+
+    /* 0x400 is the spin count value suggested in the documentation */
+    if (!InitializeCriticalSectionAndSpinCount(lock, 0x400)) {
+        OPENSSL_free(lock);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    return lock;
+}
+
+int CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock)
+{
+    EnterCriticalSection(lock);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock)
+{
+    EnterCriticalSection(lock);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock)
+{
+    LeaveCriticalSection(lock);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+void CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock)
+{
+    if (lock == NULL)
+        return;
+
+    DeleteCriticalSection(lock);
+    OPENSSL_free(lock);
+
+    return;
+}
+
+#  define ONCE_UNINITED     0
+#  define ONCE_ININIT       1
+#  define ONCE_DONE         2
+
+/*
+ * We don't use InitOnceExecuteOnce because that isn't available in WinXP which
+ * we still have to support.
+ */
+int CRYPTO_THREAD_run_once(CRYPTO_ONCE *once, void (*init)(void))
+{
+    LONG volatile *lock = (LONG *)once;
+    LONG result;
+
+    if (*lock == ONCE_DONE)
+        return 1;
+
+    do {
+        result = InterlockedCompareExchange(lock, ONCE_ININIT, ONCE_UNINITED);
+        if (result == ONCE_UNINITED) {
+            init();
+            *lock = ONCE_DONE;
+            return 1;
+        }
+    } while (result == ONCE_ININIT);
+
+    return (*lock == ONCE_DONE);
+}
+
+int CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local(CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL *key, void (*cleanup)(void *))
+{
+    *key = TlsAlloc();
+    if (*key == TLS_OUT_OF_INDEXES)
+        return 0;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+void *CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL *key)
+{
+    return TlsGetValue(*key);
+}
+
+int CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL *key, void *val)
+{
+    if (TlsSetValue(*key, val) == 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL *key)
+{
+    if (TlsFree(*key) == 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+CRYPTO_THREAD_ID CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id(void)
+{
+    return GetCurrentThreadId();
+}
+
+int CRYPTO_THREAD_compare_id(CRYPTO_THREAD_ID a, CRYPTO_THREAD_ID b)
+{
+    return (a == b);
+}
+
+int CRYPTO_atomic_add(int *val, int amount, int *ret, CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock)
+{
+    *ret = InterlockedExchangeAdd(val, amount) + amount;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ts/build.info b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ts/build.info
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..98e633d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ts/build.info
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+LIBS=../../libcrypto
+SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
+        ts_err.c ts_req_utils.c ts_req_print.c ts_rsp_utils.c ts_rsp_print.c \
+        ts_rsp_sign.c ts_rsp_verify.c ts_verify_ctx.c ts_lib.c ts_conf.c \
+        ts_asn1.c
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ts/ts_asn1.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ts/ts_asn1.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e60675a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ts/ts_asn1.c
@@ -0,0 +1,259 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/ts.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include "ts_lcl.h"
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(TS_MSG_IMPRINT) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(TS_MSG_IMPRINT, hash_algo, X509_ALGOR),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(TS_MSG_IMPRINT, hashed_msg, ASN1_OCTET_STRING)
+} static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(TS_MSG_IMPRINT)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const(TS_MSG_IMPRINT)
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(TS_MSG_IMPRINT)
+TS_MSG_IMPRINT *d2i_TS_MSG_IMPRINT_bio(BIO *bp, TS_MSG_IMPRINT **a)
+{
+    return ASN1_d2i_bio_of(TS_MSG_IMPRINT, TS_MSG_IMPRINT_new,
+                           d2i_TS_MSG_IMPRINT, bp, a);
+}
+
+int i2d_TS_MSG_IMPRINT_bio(BIO *bp, TS_MSG_IMPRINT *a)
+{
+    return ASN1_i2d_bio_of_const(TS_MSG_IMPRINT, i2d_TS_MSG_IMPRINT, bp, a);
+}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+TS_MSG_IMPRINT *d2i_TS_MSG_IMPRINT_fp(FILE *fp, TS_MSG_IMPRINT **a)
+{
+    return ASN1_d2i_fp_of(TS_MSG_IMPRINT, TS_MSG_IMPRINT_new,
+                          d2i_TS_MSG_IMPRINT, fp, a);
+}
+
+int i2d_TS_MSG_IMPRINT_fp(FILE *fp, TS_MSG_IMPRINT *a)
+{
+    return ASN1_i2d_fp_of_const(TS_MSG_IMPRINT, i2d_TS_MSG_IMPRINT, fp, a);
+}
+#endif
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(TS_REQ) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(TS_REQ, version, ASN1_INTEGER),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(TS_REQ, msg_imprint, TS_MSG_IMPRINT),
+        ASN1_OPT(TS_REQ, policy_id, ASN1_OBJECT),
+        ASN1_OPT(TS_REQ, nonce, ASN1_INTEGER),
+        ASN1_OPT(TS_REQ, cert_req, ASN1_FBOOLEAN),
+        ASN1_IMP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(TS_REQ, extensions, X509_EXTENSION, 0)
+} static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(TS_REQ)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const(TS_REQ)
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(TS_REQ)
+TS_REQ *d2i_TS_REQ_bio(BIO *bp, TS_REQ **a)
+{
+    return ASN1_d2i_bio_of(TS_REQ, TS_REQ_new, d2i_TS_REQ, bp, a);
+}
+
+int i2d_TS_REQ_bio(BIO *bp, TS_REQ *a)
+{
+    return ASN1_i2d_bio_of_const(TS_REQ, i2d_TS_REQ, bp, a);
+}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+TS_REQ *d2i_TS_REQ_fp(FILE *fp, TS_REQ **a)
+{
+    return ASN1_d2i_fp_of(TS_REQ, TS_REQ_new, d2i_TS_REQ, fp, a);
+}
+
+int i2d_TS_REQ_fp(FILE *fp, TS_REQ *a)
+{
+    return ASN1_i2d_fp_of_const(TS_REQ, i2d_TS_REQ, fp, a);
+}
+#endif
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(TS_ACCURACY) = {
+        ASN1_OPT(TS_ACCURACY, seconds, ASN1_INTEGER),
+        ASN1_IMP_OPT(TS_ACCURACY, millis, ASN1_INTEGER, 0),
+        ASN1_IMP_OPT(TS_ACCURACY, micros, ASN1_INTEGER, 1)
+} static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(TS_ACCURACY)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const(TS_ACCURACY)
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(TS_ACCURACY)
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(TS_TST_INFO) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(TS_TST_INFO, version, ASN1_INTEGER),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(TS_TST_INFO, policy_id, ASN1_OBJECT),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(TS_TST_INFO, msg_imprint, TS_MSG_IMPRINT),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(TS_TST_INFO, serial, ASN1_INTEGER),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(TS_TST_INFO, time, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME),
+        ASN1_OPT(TS_TST_INFO, accuracy, TS_ACCURACY),
+        ASN1_OPT(TS_TST_INFO, ordering, ASN1_FBOOLEAN),
+        ASN1_OPT(TS_TST_INFO, nonce, ASN1_INTEGER),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(TS_TST_INFO, tsa, GENERAL_NAME, 0),
+        ASN1_IMP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(TS_TST_INFO, extensions, X509_EXTENSION, 1)
+} static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(TS_TST_INFO)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const(TS_TST_INFO)
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(TS_TST_INFO)
+TS_TST_INFO *d2i_TS_TST_INFO_bio(BIO *bp, TS_TST_INFO **a)
+{
+    return ASN1_d2i_bio_of(TS_TST_INFO, TS_TST_INFO_new, d2i_TS_TST_INFO, bp,
+                           a);
+}
+
+int i2d_TS_TST_INFO_bio(BIO *bp, TS_TST_INFO *a)
+{
+    return ASN1_i2d_bio_of_const(TS_TST_INFO, i2d_TS_TST_INFO, bp, a);
+}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+TS_TST_INFO *d2i_TS_TST_INFO_fp(FILE *fp, TS_TST_INFO **a)
+{
+    return ASN1_d2i_fp_of(TS_TST_INFO, TS_TST_INFO_new, d2i_TS_TST_INFO, fp,
+                          a);
+}
+
+int i2d_TS_TST_INFO_fp(FILE *fp, TS_TST_INFO *a)
+{
+    return ASN1_i2d_fp_of_const(TS_TST_INFO, i2d_TS_TST_INFO, fp, a);
+}
+#endif
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(TS_STATUS_INFO) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(TS_STATUS_INFO, status, ASN1_INTEGER),
+        ASN1_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(TS_STATUS_INFO, text, ASN1_UTF8STRING),
+        ASN1_OPT(TS_STATUS_INFO, failure_info, ASN1_BIT_STRING)
+} static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(TS_STATUS_INFO)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const(TS_STATUS_INFO)
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(TS_STATUS_INFO)
+
+static int ts_resp_set_tst_info(TS_RESP *a)
+{
+    long status;
+
+    status = ASN1_INTEGER_get(a->status_info->status);
+
+    if (a->token) {
+        if (status != 0 && status != 1) {
+            TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_SET_TST_INFO, TS_R_TOKEN_PRESENT);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        TS_TST_INFO_free(a->tst_info);
+        a->tst_info = PKCS7_to_TS_TST_INFO(a->token);
+        if (!a->tst_info) {
+            TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_SET_TST_INFO,
+                  TS_R_PKCS7_TO_TS_TST_INFO_FAILED);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    } else if (status == 0 || status == 1) {
+        TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_SET_TST_INFO, TS_R_TOKEN_NOT_PRESENT);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int ts_resp_cb(int op, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+                      void *exarg)
+{
+    TS_RESP *ts_resp = (TS_RESP *)*pval;
+    if (op == ASN1_OP_NEW_POST) {
+        ts_resp->tst_info = NULL;
+    } else if (op == ASN1_OP_FREE_POST) {
+        TS_TST_INFO_free(ts_resp->tst_info);
+    } else if (op == ASN1_OP_D2I_POST) {
+        if (ts_resp_set_tst_info(ts_resp) == 0)
+            return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE_cb(TS_RESP, ts_resp_cb) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(TS_RESP, status_info, TS_STATUS_INFO),
+        ASN1_OPT(TS_RESP, token, PKCS7),
+} static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_cb(TS_RESP, TS_RESP)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const(TS_RESP)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(TS_RESP)
+
+TS_RESP *d2i_TS_RESP_bio(BIO *bp, TS_RESP **a)
+{
+    return ASN1_d2i_bio_of(TS_RESP, TS_RESP_new, d2i_TS_RESP, bp, a);
+}
+
+int i2d_TS_RESP_bio(BIO *bp, TS_RESP *a)
+{
+    return ASN1_i2d_bio_of_const(TS_RESP, i2d_TS_RESP, bp, a);
+}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+TS_RESP *d2i_TS_RESP_fp(FILE *fp, TS_RESP **a)
+{
+    return ASN1_d2i_fp_of(TS_RESP, TS_RESP_new, d2i_TS_RESP, fp, a);
+}
+
+int i2d_TS_RESP_fp(FILE *fp, TS_RESP *a)
+{
+    return ASN1_i2d_fp_of_const(TS_RESP, i2d_TS_RESP, fp, a);
+}
+#endif
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL) = {
+        ASN1_SEQUENCE_OF(ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL, issuer, GENERAL_NAME),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL, serial, ASN1_INTEGER)
+} static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const(ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL)
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL)
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(ESS_CERT_ID) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(ESS_CERT_ID, hash, ASN1_OCTET_STRING),
+        ASN1_OPT(ESS_CERT_ID, issuer_serial, ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL)
+} static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(ESS_CERT_ID)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const(ESS_CERT_ID)
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(ESS_CERT_ID)
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(ESS_SIGNING_CERT) = {
+        ASN1_SEQUENCE_OF(ESS_SIGNING_CERT, cert_ids, ESS_CERT_ID),
+        ASN1_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(ESS_SIGNING_CERT, policy_info, POLICYINFO)
+} static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(ESS_SIGNING_CERT)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const(ESS_SIGNING_CERT)
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(ESS_SIGNING_CERT)
+
+/* Getting encapsulated TS_TST_INFO object from PKCS7. */
+TS_TST_INFO *PKCS7_to_TS_TST_INFO(PKCS7 *token)
+{
+    PKCS7_SIGNED *pkcs7_signed;
+    PKCS7 *enveloped;
+    ASN1_TYPE *tst_info_wrapper;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *tst_info_der;
+    const unsigned char *p;
+
+    if (!PKCS7_type_is_signed(token)) {
+        TSerr(TS_F_PKCS7_TO_TS_TST_INFO, TS_R_BAD_PKCS7_TYPE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    if (PKCS7_get_detached(token)) {
+        TSerr(TS_F_PKCS7_TO_TS_TST_INFO, TS_R_DETACHED_CONTENT);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    pkcs7_signed = token->d.sign;
+    enveloped = pkcs7_signed->contents;
+    if (OBJ_obj2nid(enveloped->type) != NID_id_smime_ct_TSTInfo) {
+        TSerr(TS_F_PKCS7_TO_TS_TST_INFO, TS_R_BAD_PKCS7_TYPE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    tst_info_wrapper = enveloped->d.other;
+    if (tst_info_wrapper->type != V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING) {
+        TSerr(TS_F_PKCS7_TO_TS_TST_INFO, TS_R_BAD_TYPE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    tst_info_der = tst_info_wrapper->value.octet_string;
+    p = tst_info_der->data;
+    return d2i_TS_TST_INFO(NULL, &p, tst_info_der->length);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ts/ts_conf.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ts/ts_conf.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f5f3934
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ts/ts_conf.c
@@ -0,0 +1,468 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#include <openssl/ts.h>
+
+/* Macro definitions for the configuration file. */
+#define BASE_SECTION                    "tsa"
+#define ENV_DEFAULT_TSA                 "default_tsa"
+#define ENV_SERIAL                      "serial"
+#define ENV_CRYPTO_DEVICE               "crypto_device"
+#define ENV_SIGNER_CERT                 "signer_cert"
+#define ENV_CERTS                       "certs"
+#define ENV_SIGNER_KEY                  "signer_key"
+#define ENV_SIGNER_DIGEST               "signer_digest"
+#define ENV_DEFAULT_POLICY              "default_policy"
+#define ENV_OTHER_POLICIES              "other_policies"
+#define ENV_DIGESTS                     "digests"
+#define ENV_ACCURACY                    "accuracy"
+#define ENV_ORDERING                    "ordering"
+#define ENV_TSA_NAME                    "tsa_name"
+#define ENV_ESS_CERT_ID_CHAIN           "ess_cert_id_chain"
+#define ENV_VALUE_SECS                  "secs"
+#define ENV_VALUE_MILLISECS             "millisecs"
+#define ENV_VALUE_MICROSECS             "microsecs"
+#define ENV_CLOCK_PRECISION_DIGITS      "clock_precision_digits"
+#define ENV_VALUE_YES                   "yes"
+#define ENV_VALUE_NO                    "no"
+
+/* Function definitions for certificate and key loading. */
+
+X509 *TS_CONF_load_cert(const char *file)
+{
+    BIO *cert = NULL;
+    X509 *x = NULL;
+
+    if ((cert = BIO_new_file(file, "r")) == NULL)
+        goto end;
+    x = PEM_read_bio_X509_AUX(cert, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ end:
+    if (x == NULL)
+        TSerr(TS_F_TS_CONF_LOAD_CERT, TS_R_CANNOT_LOAD_CERT);
+    BIO_free(cert);
+    return x;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509) *TS_CONF_load_certs(const char *file)
+{
+    BIO *certs = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(X509) *othercerts = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *allcerts = NULL;
+    int i;
+
+    if ((certs = BIO_new_file(file, "r")) == NULL)
+        goto end;
+    if ((othercerts = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
+        goto end;
+
+    allcerts = PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(certs, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_INFO_num(allcerts); i++) {
+        X509_INFO *xi = sk_X509_INFO_value(allcerts, i);
+        if (xi->x509) {
+            sk_X509_push(othercerts, xi->x509);
+            xi->x509 = NULL;
+        }
+    }
+ end:
+    if (othercerts == NULL)
+        TSerr(TS_F_TS_CONF_LOAD_CERTS, TS_R_CANNOT_LOAD_CERT);
+    sk_X509_INFO_pop_free(allcerts, X509_INFO_free);
+    BIO_free(certs);
+    return othercerts;
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY *TS_CONF_load_key(const char *file, const char *pass)
+{
+    BIO *key = NULL;
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+
+    if ((key = BIO_new_file(file, "r")) == NULL)
+        goto end;
+    pkey = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(key, NULL, NULL, (char *)pass);
+ end:
+    if (pkey == NULL)
+        TSerr(TS_F_TS_CONF_LOAD_KEY, TS_R_CANNOT_LOAD_KEY);
+    BIO_free(key);
+    return pkey;
+}
+
+/* Function definitions for handling configuration options. */
+
+static void ts_CONF_lookup_fail(const char *name, const char *tag)
+{
+    TSerr(TS_F_TS_CONF_LOOKUP_FAIL, TS_R_VAR_LOOKUP_FAILURE);
+    ERR_add_error_data(3, name, "::", tag);
+}
+
+static void ts_CONF_invalid(const char *name, const char *tag)
+{
+    TSerr(TS_F_TS_CONF_INVALID, TS_R_VAR_BAD_VALUE);
+    ERR_add_error_data(3, name, "::", tag);
+}
+
+const char *TS_CONF_get_tsa_section(CONF *conf, const char *section)
+{
+    if (!section) {
+        section = NCONF_get_string(conf, BASE_SECTION, ENV_DEFAULT_TSA);
+        if (!section)
+            ts_CONF_lookup_fail(BASE_SECTION, ENV_DEFAULT_TSA);
+    }
+    return section;
+}
+
+int TS_CONF_set_serial(CONF *conf, const char *section, TS_serial_cb cb,
+                       TS_RESP_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    char *serial = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_SERIAL);
+    if (!serial) {
+        ts_CONF_lookup_fail(section, ENV_SERIAL);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    TS_RESP_CTX_set_serial_cb(ctx, cb, serial);
+
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    return ret;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+
+int TS_CONF_set_crypto_device(CONF *conf, const char *section,
+                              const char *device)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    if (device == NULL)
+        device = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_CRYPTO_DEVICE);
+
+    if (device && !TS_CONF_set_default_engine(device)) {
+        ts_CONF_invalid(section, ENV_CRYPTO_DEVICE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int TS_CONF_set_default_engine(const char *name)
+{
+    ENGINE *e = NULL;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    if (strcmp(name, "builtin") == 0)
+        return 1;
+
+    if ((e = ENGINE_by_id(name)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (strcmp(name, "chil") == 0)
+        ENGINE_ctrl(e, ENGINE_CTRL_CHIL_SET_FORKCHECK, 1, 0, 0);
+    if (!ENGINE_set_default(e, ENGINE_METHOD_ALL))
+        goto err;
+    ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+    if (!ret) {
+        TSerr(TS_F_TS_CONF_SET_DEFAULT_ENGINE, TS_R_COULD_NOT_SET_ENGINE);
+        ERR_add_error_data(2, "engine:", name);
+    }
+    ENGINE_free(e);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+#endif
+
+int TS_CONF_set_signer_cert(CONF *conf, const char *section,
+                            const char *cert, TS_RESP_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    X509 *cert_obj = NULL;
+
+    if (cert == NULL) {
+        cert = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_SIGNER_CERT);
+        if (cert == NULL) {
+            ts_CONF_lookup_fail(section, ENV_SIGNER_CERT);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+    if ((cert_obj = TS_CONF_load_cert(cert)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (!TS_RESP_CTX_set_signer_cert(ctx, cert_obj))
+        goto err;
+
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    X509_free(cert_obj);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int TS_CONF_set_certs(CONF *conf, const char *section, const char *certs,
+                      TS_RESP_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    STACK_OF(X509) *certs_obj = NULL;
+
+    if (certs == NULL) {
+        /* Certificate chain is optional. */
+        if ((certs = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_CERTS)) == NULL)
+            goto end;
+    }
+    if ((certs_obj = TS_CONF_load_certs(certs)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (!TS_RESP_CTX_set_certs(ctx, certs_obj))
+        goto err;
+ end:
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    sk_X509_pop_free(certs_obj, X509_free);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int TS_CONF_set_signer_key(CONF *conf, const char *section,
+                           const char *key, const char *pass,
+                           TS_RESP_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    EVP_PKEY *key_obj = NULL;
+    if (!key)
+        key = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_SIGNER_KEY);
+    if (!key) {
+        ts_CONF_lookup_fail(section, ENV_SIGNER_KEY);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if ((key_obj = TS_CONF_load_key(key, pass)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (!TS_RESP_CTX_set_signer_key(ctx, key_obj))
+        goto err;
+
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    EVP_PKEY_free(key_obj);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int TS_CONF_set_signer_digest(CONF *conf, const char *section,
+                              const char *md, TS_RESP_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    const EVP_MD *sign_md = NULL;
+    if (md == NULL)
+        md = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_SIGNER_DIGEST);
+    if (md == NULL) {
+        ts_CONF_lookup_fail(section, ENV_SIGNER_DIGEST);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    sign_md = EVP_get_digestbyname(md);
+    if (sign_md == NULL) {
+        ts_CONF_invalid(section, ENV_SIGNER_DIGEST);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (!TS_RESP_CTX_set_signer_digest(ctx, sign_md))
+        goto err;
+
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int TS_CONF_set_def_policy(CONF *conf, const char *section,
+                           const char *policy, TS_RESP_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    ASN1_OBJECT *policy_obj = NULL;
+    if (!policy)
+        policy = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_DEFAULT_POLICY);
+    if (!policy) {
+        ts_CONF_lookup_fail(section, ENV_DEFAULT_POLICY);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if ((policy_obj = OBJ_txt2obj(policy, 0)) == NULL) {
+        ts_CONF_invalid(section, ENV_DEFAULT_POLICY);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (!TS_RESP_CTX_set_def_policy(ctx, policy_obj))
+        goto err;
+
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    ASN1_OBJECT_free(policy_obj);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int TS_CONF_set_policies(CONF *conf, const char *section, TS_RESP_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    int i;
+    STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *list = NULL;
+    char *policies = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_OTHER_POLICIES);
+
+    /* If no other policy is specified, that's fine. */
+    if (policies && (list = X509V3_parse_list(policies)) == NULL) {
+        ts_CONF_invalid(section, ENV_OTHER_POLICIES);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(list); ++i) {
+        CONF_VALUE *val = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(list, i);
+        const char *extval = val->value ? val->value : val->name;
+        ASN1_OBJECT *objtmp;
+
+        if ((objtmp = OBJ_txt2obj(extval, 0)) == NULL) {
+            ts_CONF_invalid(section, ENV_OTHER_POLICIES);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (!TS_RESP_CTX_add_policy(ctx, objtmp))
+            goto err;
+        ASN1_OBJECT_free(objtmp);
+    }
+
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    sk_CONF_VALUE_pop_free(list, X509V3_conf_free);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int TS_CONF_set_digests(CONF *conf, const char *section, TS_RESP_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    int i;
+    STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *list = NULL;
+    char *digests = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_DIGESTS);
+
+    if (digests == NULL) {
+        ts_CONF_lookup_fail(section, ENV_DIGESTS);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if ((list = X509V3_parse_list(digests)) == NULL) {
+        ts_CONF_invalid(section, ENV_DIGESTS);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (sk_CONF_VALUE_num(list) == 0) {
+        ts_CONF_invalid(section, ENV_DIGESTS);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(list); ++i) {
+        CONF_VALUE *val = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(list, i);
+        const char *extval = val->value ? val->value : val->name;
+        const EVP_MD *md;
+
+        if ((md = EVP_get_digestbyname(extval)) == NULL) {
+            ts_CONF_invalid(section, ENV_DIGESTS);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (!TS_RESP_CTX_add_md(ctx, md))
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    sk_CONF_VALUE_pop_free(list, X509V3_conf_free);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int TS_CONF_set_accuracy(CONF *conf, const char *section, TS_RESP_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    int i;
+    int secs = 0, millis = 0, micros = 0;
+    STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *list = NULL;
+    char *accuracy = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_ACCURACY);
+
+    if (accuracy && (list = X509V3_parse_list(accuracy)) == NULL) {
+        ts_CONF_invalid(section, ENV_ACCURACY);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(list); ++i) {
+        CONF_VALUE *val = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(list, i);
+        if (strcmp(val->name, ENV_VALUE_SECS) == 0) {
+            if (val->value)
+                secs = atoi(val->value);
+        } else if (strcmp(val->name, ENV_VALUE_MILLISECS) == 0) {
+            if (val->value)
+                millis = atoi(val->value);
+        } else if (strcmp(val->name, ENV_VALUE_MICROSECS) == 0) {
+            if (val->value)
+                micros = atoi(val->value);
+        } else {
+            ts_CONF_invalid(section, ENV_ACCURACY);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+    if (!TS_RESP_CTX_set_accuracy(ctx, secs, millis, micros))
+        goto err;
+
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    sk_CONF_VALUE_pop_free(list, X509V3_conf_free);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int TS_CONF_set_clock_precision_digits(CONF *conf, const char *section,
+                                       TS_RESP_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    long digits = 0;
+
+    /*
+     * If not specified, set the default value to 0, i.e. sec precision
+     */
+    if (!NCONF_get_number_e(conf, section, ENV_CLOCK_PRECISION_DIGITS,
+                            &digits))
+        digits = 0;
+    if (digits < 0 || digits > TS_MAX_CLOCK_PRECISION_DIGITS) {
+        ts_CONF_invalid(section, ENV_CLOCK_PRECISION_DIGITS);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!TS_RESP_CTX_set_clock_precision_digits(ctx, digits))
+        goto err;
+
+    return 1;
+ err:
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int ts_CONF_add_flag(CONF *conf, const char *section,
+                            const char *field, int flag, TS_RESP_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    const char *value = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, field);
+
+    if (value) {
+        if (strcmp(value, ENV_VALUE_YES) == 0)
+            TS_RESP_CTX_add_flags(ctx, flag);
+        else if (strcmp(value, ENV_VALUE_NO) != 0) {
+            ts_CONF_invalid(section, field);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int TS_CONF_set_ordering(CONF *conf, const char *section, TS_RESP_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ts_CONF_add_flag(conf, section, ENV_ORDERING, TS_ORDERING, ctx);
+}
+
+int TS_CONF_set_tsa_name(CONF *conf, const char *section, TS_RESP_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ts_CONF_add_flag(conf, section, ENV_TSA_NAME, TS_TSA_NAME, ctx);
+}
+
+int TS_CONF_set_ess_cert_id_chain(CONF *conf, const char *section,
+                                  TS_RESP_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ts_CONF_add_flag(conf, section, ENV_ESS_CERT_ID_CHAIN,
+                            TS_ESS_CERT_ID_CHAIN, ctx);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ts/ts_err.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ts/ts_err.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a6d73a1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ts/ts_err.c
@@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
+/*
+ * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/ts.h>
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+
+# define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_TS,func,0)
+# define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_TS,0,reason)
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA TS_str_functs[] = {
+    {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_DEF_SERIAL_CB), "def_serial_cb"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_DEF_TIME_CB), "def_time_cb"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_ESS_ADD_SIGNING_CERT), "ESS_add_signing_cert"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_ESS_CERT_ID_NEW_INIT), "ess_CERT_ID_new_init"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_ESS_SIGNING_CERT_NEW_INIT), "ess_SIGNING_CERT_new_init"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_INT_TS_RESP_VERIFY_TOKEN), "int_ts_RESP_verify_token"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_PKCS7_TO_TS_TST_INFO), "PKCS7_to_TS_TST_INFO"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_ACCURACY_SET_MICROS), "TS_ACCURACY_set_micros"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_ACCURACY_SET_MILLIS), "TS_ACCURACY_set_millis"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_ACCURACY_SET_SECONDS), "TS_ACCURACY_set_seconds"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_CHECK_IMPRINTS), "ts_check_imprints"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_CHECK_NONCES), "ts_check_nonces"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_CHECK_POLICY), "ts_check_policy"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_CHECK_SIGNING_CERTS), "ts_check_signing_certs"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_CHECK_STATUS_INFO), "ts_check_status_info"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_COMPUTE_IMPRINT), "ts_compute_imprint"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_CONF_INVALID), "ts_CONF_invalid"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_CONF_LOAD_CERT), "TS_CONF_load_cert"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_CONF_LOAD_CERTS), "TS_CONF_load_certs"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_CONF_LOAD_KEY), "TS_CONF_load_key"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_CONF_LOOKUP_FAIL), "ts_CONF_lookup_fail"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_CONF_SET_DEFAULT_ENGINE), "TS_CONF_set_default_engine"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_GET_STATUS_TEXT), "ts_get_status_text"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_MSG_IMPRINT_SET_ALGO), "TS_MSG_IMPRINT_set_algo"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_REQ_SET_MSG_IMPRINT), "TS_REQ_set_msg_imprint"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_REQ_SET_NONCE), "TS_REQ_set_nonce"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_REQ_SET_POLICY_ID), "TS_REQ_set_policy_id"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_RESP_CREATE_RESPONSE), "TS_RESP_create_response"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_RESP_CREATE_TST_INFO), "ts_RESP_create_tst_info"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_RESP_CTX_ADD_FAILURE_INFO),
+     "TS_RESP_CTX_add_failure_info"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_RESP_CTX_ADD_MD), "TS_RESP_CTX_add_md"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_RESP_CTX_ADD_POLICY), "TS_RESP_CTX_add_policy"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_RESP_CTX_NEW), "TS_RESP_CTX_new"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_RESP_CTX_SET_ACCURACY), "TS_RESP_CTX_set_accuracy"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_RESP_CTX_SET_CERTS), "TS_RESP_CTX_set_certs"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_RESP_CTX_SET_DEF_POLICY), "TS_RESP_CTX_set_def_policy"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_RESP_CTX_SET_SIGNER_CERT),
+     "TS_RESP_CTX_set_signer_cert"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_RESP_CTX_SET_STATUS_INFO),
+     "TS_RESP_CTX_set_status_info"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_RESP_GET_POLICY), "ts_RESP_get_policy"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_RESP_SET_GENTIME_WITH_PRECISION),
+     "TS_RESP_set_genTime_with_precision"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_RESP_SET_STATUS_INFO), "TS_RESP_set_status_info"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_RESP_SET_TST_INFO), "TS_RESP_set_tst_info"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_RESP_SIGN), "ts_RESP_sign"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_RESP_VERIFY_SIGNATURE), "TS_RESP_verify_signature"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_TST_INFO_SET_ACCURACY), "TS_TST_INFO_set_accuracy"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_TST_INFO_SET_MSG_IMPRINT),
+     "TS_TST_INFO_set_msg_imprint"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_TST_INFO_SET_NONCE), "TS_TST_INFO_set_nonce"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_TST_INFO_SET_POLICY_ID), "TS_TST_INFO_set_policy_id"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_TST_INFO_SET_SERIAL), "TS_TST_INFO_set_serial"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_TST_INFO_SET_TIME), "TS_TST_INFO_set_time"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_TST_INFO_SET_TSA), "TS_TST_INFO_set_tsa"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_VERIFY), "TS_VERIFY"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_VERIFY_CERT), "ts_verify_cert"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_VERIFY_CTX_NEW), "TS_VERIFY_CTX_new"},
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA TS_str_reasons[] = {
+    {ERR_REASON(TS_R_BAD_PKCS7_TYPE), "bad pkcs7 type"},
+    {ERR_REASON(TS_R_BAD_TYPE), "bad type"},
+    {ERR_REASON(TS_R_CANNOT_LOAD_CERT), "cannot load certificate"},
+    {ERR_REASON(TS_R_CANNOT_LOAD_KEY), "cannot load private key"},
+    {ERR_REASON(TS_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR), "certificate verify error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(TS_R_COULD_NOT_SET_ENGINE), "could not set engine"},
+    {ERR_REASON(TS_R_COULD_NOT_SET_TIME), "could not set time"},
+    {ERR_REASON(TS_R_DETACHED_CONTENT), "detached content"},
+    {ERR_REASON(TS_R_ESS_ADD_SIGNING_CERT_ERROR),
+     "ess add signing cert error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(TS_R_ESS_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE_ERROR),
+     "ess signing certificate error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(TS_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER), "invalid null pointer"},
+    {ERR_REASON(TS_R_INVALID_SIGNER_CERTIFICATE_PURPOSE),
+     "invalid signer certificate purpose"},
+    {ERR_REASON(TS_R_MESSAGE_IMPRINT_MISMATCH), "message imprint mismatch"},
+    {ERR_REASON(TS_R_NONCE_MISMATCH), "nonce mismatch"},
+    {ERR_REASON(TS_R_NONCE_NOT_RETURNED), "nonce not returned"},
+    {ERR_REASON(TS_R_NO_CONTENT), "no content"},
+    {ERR_REASON(TS_R_NO_TIME_STAMP_TOKEN), "no time stamp token"},
+    {ERR_REASON(TS_R_PKCS7_ADD_SIGNATURE_ERROR), "pkcs7 add signature error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(TS_R_PKCS7_ADD_SIGNED_ATTR_ERROR),
+     "pkcs7 add signed attr error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(TS_R_PKCS7_TO_TS_TST_INFO_FAILED),
+     "pkcs7 to ts tst info failed"},
+    {ERR_REASON(TS_R_POLICY_MISMATCH), "policy mismatch"},
+    {ERR_REASON(TS_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DOES_NOT_MATCH_CERTIFICATE),
+     "private key does not match certificate"},
+    {ERR_REASON(TS_R_RESPONSE_SETUP_ERROR), "response setup error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(TS_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE), "signature failure"},
+    {ERR_REASON(TS_R_THERE_MUST_BE_ONE_SIGNER), "there must be one signer"},
+    {ERR_REASON(TS_R_TIME_SYSCALL_ERROR), "time syscall error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(TS_R_TOKEN_NOT_PRESENT), "token not present"},
+    {ERR_REASON(TS_R_TOKEN_PRESENT), "token present"},
+    {ERR_REASON(TS_R_TSA_NAME_MISMATCH), "tsa name mismatch"},
+    {ERR_REASON(TS_R_TSA_UNTRUSTED), "tsa untrusted"},
+    {ERR_REASON(TS_R_TST_INFO_SETUP_ERROR), "tst info setup error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(TS_R_TS_DATASIGN), "ts datasign"},
+    {ERR_REASON(TS_R_UNACCEPTABLE_POLICY), "unacceptable policy"},
+    {ERR_REASON(TS_R_UNSUPPORTED_MD_ALGORITHM), "unsupported md algorithm"},
+    {ERR_REASON(TS_R_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION), "unsupported version"},
+    {ERR_REASON(TS_R_VAR_BAD_VALUE), "var bad value"},
+    {ERR_REASON(TS_R_VAR_LOOKUP_FAILURE), "cannot find config variable"},
+    {ERR_REASON(TS_R_WRONG_CONTENT_TYPE), "wrong content type"},
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+
+#endif
+
+int ERR_load_TS_strings(void)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+
+    if (ERR_func_error_string(TS_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) {
+        ERR_load_strings(0, TS_str_functs);
+        ERR_load_strings(0, TS_str_reasons);
+    }
+#endif
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ts/ts_lcl.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ts/ts_lcl.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d0c3cf8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ts/ts_lcl.h
@@ -0,0 +1,183 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*-
+ * MessageImprint ::= SEQUENCE  {
+ *      hashAlgorithm                AlgorithmIdentifier,
+ *      hashedMessage                OCTET STRING  }
+ */
+struct TS_msg_imprint_st {
+    X509_ALGOR *hash_algo;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *hashed_msg;
+};
+
+/*-
+ * TimeStampResp ::= SEQUENCE  {
+ *     status                  PKIStatusInfo,
+ *     timeStampToken          TimeStampToken     OPTIONAL }
+ */
+struct TS_resp_st {
+    TS_STATUS_INFO *status_info;
+    PKCS7 *token;
+    TS_TST_INFO *tst_info;
+};
+
+/*-
+ * TimeStampReq ::= SEQUENCE  {
+ *    version                  INTEGER  { v1(1) },
+ *    messageImprint           MessageImprint,
+ *      --a hash algorithm OID and the hash value of the data to be
+ *      --time-stamped
+ *    reqPolicy                TSAPolicyId                OPTIONAL,
+ *    nonce                    INTEGER                    OPTIONAL,
+ *    certReq                  BOOLEAN                    DEFAULT FALSE,
+ *    extensions               [0] IMPLICIT Extensions    OPTIONAL  }
+ */
+struct TS_req_st {
+    ASN1_INTEGER *version;
+    TS_MSG_IMPRINT *msg_imprint;
+    ASN1_OBJECT *policy_id;
+    ASN1_INTEGER *nonce;
+    ASN1_BOOLEAN cert_req;
+    STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *extensions;
+};
+
+/*-
+ * Accuracy ::= SEQUENCE {
+ *                 seconds        INTEGER           OPTIONAL,
+ *                 millis     [0] INTEGER  (1..999) OPTIONAL,
+ *                 micros     [1] INTEGER  (1..999) OPTIONAL  }
+ */
+struct TS_accuracy_st {
+    ASN1_INTEGER *seconds;
+    ASN1_INTEGER *millis;
+    ASN1_INTEGER *micros;
+};
+
+/*-
+ * TSTInfo ::= SEQUENCE  {
+ *     version                      INTEGER  { v1(1) },
+ *     policy                       TSAPolicyId,
+ *     messageImprint               MessageImprint,
+ *       -- MUST have the same value as the similar field in
+ *       -- TimeStampReq
+ *     serialNumber                 INTEGER,
+ *      -- Time-Stamping users MUST be ready to accommodate integers
+ *      -- up to 160 bits.
+ *     genTime                      GeneralizedTime,
+ *     accuracy                     Accuracy                 OPTIONAL,
+ *     ordering                     BOOLEAN             DEFAULT FALSE,
+ *     nonce                        INTEGER                  OPTIONAL,
+ *       -- MUST be present if the similar field was present
+ *       -- in TimeStampReq.  In that case it MUST have the same value.
+ *     tsa                          [0] GeneralName          OPTIONAL,
+ *     extensions                   [1] IMPLICIT Extensions  OPTIONAL   }
+ */
+struct TS_tst_info_st {
+    ASN1_INTEGER *version;
+    ASN1_OBJECT *policy_id;
+    TS_MSG_IMPRINT *msg_imprint;
+    ASN1_INTEGER *serial;
+    ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *time;
+    TS_ACCURACY *accuracy;
+    ASN1_BOOLEAN ordering;
+    ASN1_INTEGER *nonce;
+    GENERAL_NAME *tsa;
+    STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *extensions;
+};
+
+struct TS_status_info_st {
+    ASN1_INTEGER *status;
+    STACK_OF(ASN1_UTF8STRING) *text;
+    ASN1_BIT_STRING *failure_info;
+};
+
+/*-
+ * IssuerSerial ::= SEQUENCE {
+ *         issuer                   GeneralNames,
+ *         serialNumber             CertificateSerialNumber
+ *         }
+ */
+struct ESS_issuer_serial {
+    STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *issuer;
+    ASN1_INTEGER *serial;
+};
+
+/*-
+ * ESSCertID ::=  SEQUENCE {
+ *         certHash                 Hash,
+ *         issuerSerial             IssuerSerial OPTIONAL
+ * }
+ */
+struct ESS_cert_id {
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *hash;    /* Always SHA-1 digest. */
+    ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL *issuer_serial;
+};
+
+/*-
+ * SigningCertificate ::=  SEQUENCE {
+ *        certs        SEQUENCE OF ESSCertID,
+ *        policies     SEQUENCE OF PolicyInformation OPTIONAL
+ * }
+ */
+struct ESS_signing_cert {
+    STACK_OF(ESS_CERT_ID) *cert_ids;
+    STACK_OF(POLICYINFO) *policy_info;
+};
+
+
+struct TS_resp_ctx {
+    X509 *signer_cert;
+    EVP_PKEY *signer_key;
+    const EVP_MD *signer_md;
+    STACK_OF(X509) *certs;      /* Certs to include in signed data. */
+    STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *policies; /* Acceptable policies. */
+    ASN1_OBJECT *default_policy; /* It may appear in policies, too. */
+    STACK_OF(EVP_MD) *mds;      /* Acceptable message digests. */
+    ASN1_INTEGER *seconds;      /* accuracy, 0 means not specified. */
+    ASN1_INTEGER *millis;       /* accuracy, 0 means not specified. */
+    ASN1_INTEGER *micros;       /* accuracy, 0 means not specified. */
+    unsigned clock_precision_digits; /* fraction of seconds in time stamp
+                                      * token. */
+    unsigned flags;             /* Optional info, see values above. */
+    /* Callback functions. */
+    TS_serial_cb serial_cb;
+    void *serial_cb_data;       /* User data for serial_cb. */
+    TS_time_cb time_cb;
+    void *time_cb_data;         /* User data for time_cb. */
+    TS_extension_cb extension_cb;
+    void *extension_cb_data;    /* User data for extension_cb. */
+    /* These members are used only while creating the response. */
+    TS_REQ *request;
+    TS_RESP *response;
+    TS_TST_INFO *tst_info;
+};
+
+struct TS_verify_ctx {
+    /* Set this to the union of TS_VFY_... flags you want to carry out. */
+    unsigned flags;
+    /* Must be set only with TS_VFY_SIGNATURE. certs is optional. */
+    X509_STORE *store;
+    STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
+    /* Must be set only with TS_VFY_POLICY. */
+    ASN1_OBJECT *policy;
+    /*
+     * Must be set only with TS_VFY_IMPRINT. If md_alg is NULL, the
+     * algorithm from the response is used.
+     */
+    X509_ALGOR *md_alg;
+    unsigned char *imprint;
+    unsigned imprint_len;
+    /* Must be set only with TS_VFY_DATA. */
+    BIO *data;
+    /* Must be set only with TS_VFY_TSA_NAME. */
+    ASN1_INTEGER *nonce;
+    /* Must be set only with TS_VFY_TSA_NAME. */
+    GENERAL_NAME *tsa_name;
+};
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ts/ts_lib.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ts/ts_lib.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..de36e0e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ts/ts_lib.c
@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/ts.h>
+#include "ts_lcl.h"
+
+int TS_ASN1_INTEGER_print_bio(BIO *bio, const ASN1_INTEGER *num)
+{
+    BIGNUM *num_bn;
+    int result = 0;
+    char *hex;
+
+    num_bn = BN_new();
+    if (num_bn == NULL)
+        return -1;
+    ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(num, num_bn);
+    if ((hex = BN_bn2hex(num_bn))) {
+        result = BIO_write(bio, "0x", 2) > 0;
+        result = result && BIO_write(bio, hex, strlen(hex)) > 0;
+        OPENSSL_free(hex);
+    }
+    BN_free(num_bn);
+
+    return result;
+}
+
+int TS_OBJ_print_bio(BIO *bio, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj)
+{
+    char obj_txt[128];
+
+    OBJ_obj2txt(obj_txt, sizeof(obj_txt), obj, 0);
+    BIO_printf(bio, "%s\n", obj_txt);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int TS_ext_print_bio(BIO *bio, const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *extensions)
+{
+    int i, critical, n;
+    X509_EXTENSION *ex;
+    ASN1_OBJECT *obj;
+
+    BIO_printf(bio, "Extensions:\n");
+    n = X509v3_get_ext_count(extensions);
+    for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+        ex = X509v3_get_ext(extensions, i);
+        obj = X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex);
+        if (i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bio, obj) < 0)
+            return 0;
+        critical = X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ex);
+        BIO_printf(bio, ":%s\n", critical ? " critical" : "");
+        if (!X509V3_EXT_print(bio, ex, 0, 4)) {
+            BIO_printf(bio, "%4s", "");
+            ASN1_STRING_print(bio, X509_EXTENSION_get_data(ex));
+        }
+        BIO_write(bio, "\n", 1);
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int TS_X509_ALGOR_print_bio(BIO *bio, const X509_ALGOR *alg)
+{
+    int i = OBJ_obj2nid(alg->algorithm);
+    return BIO_printf(bio, "Hash Algorithm: %s\n",
+                      (i == NID_undef) ? "UNKNOWN" : OBJ_nid2ln(i));
+}
+
+int TS_MSG_IMPRINT_print_bio(BIO *bio, TS_MSG_IMPRINT *a)
+{
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *msg;
+
+    TS_X509_ALGOR_print_bio(bio, a->hash_algo);
+
+    BIO_printf(bio, "Message data:\n");
+    msg = a->hashed_msg;
+    BIO_dump_indent(bio, (const char *)ASN1_STRING_get0_data(msg),
+                    ASN1_STRING_length(msg), 4);
+
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ts/ts_req_print.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ts/ts_req_print.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0dedf47
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ts/ts_req_print.c
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/ts.h>
+#include "ts_lcl.h"
+
+int TS_REQ_print_bio(BIO *bio, TS_REQ *a)
+{
+    int v;
+    ASN1_OBJECT *policy_id;
+
+    if (a == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    v = TS_REQ_get_version(a);
+    BIO_printf(bio, "Version: %d\n", v);
+
+    TS_MSG_IMPRINT_print_bio(bio, a->msg_imprint);
+
+    BIO_printf(bio, "Policy OID: ");
+    policy_id = TS_REQ_get_policy_id(a);
+    if (policy_id == NULL)
+        BIO_printf(bio, "unspecified\n");
+    else
+        TS_OBJ_print_bio(bio, policy_id);
+
+    BIO_printf(bio, "Nonce: ");
+    if (a->nonce == NULL)
+        BIO_printf(bio, "unspecified");
+    else
+        TS_ASN1_INTEGER_print_bio(bio, a->nonce);
+    BIO_write(bio, "\n", 1);
+
+    BIO_printf(bio, "Certificate required: %s\n",
+               a->cert_req ? "yes" : "no");
+
+    TS_ext_print_bio(bio, a->extensions);
+
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ts/ts_req_utils.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ts/ts_req_utils.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2073d33
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ts/ts_req_utils.c
@@ -0,0 +1,183 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/ts.h>
+#include "ts_lcl.h"
+
+int TS_REQ_set_version(TS_REQ *a, long version)
+{
+    return ASN1_INTEGER_set(a->version, version);
+}
+
+long TS_REQ_get_version(const TS_REQ *a)
+{
+    return ASN1_INTEGER_get(a->version);
+}
+
+int TS_REQ_set_msg_imprint(TS_REQ *a, TS_MSG_IMPRINT *msg_imprint)
+{
+    TS_MSG_IMPRINT *new_msg_imprint;
+
+    if (a->msg_imprint == msg_imprint)
+        return 1;
+    new_msg_imprint = TS_MSG_IMPRINT_dup(msg_imprint);
+    if (new_msg_imprint == NULL) {
+        TSerr(TS_F_TS_REQ_SET_MSG_IMPRINT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    TS_MSG_IMPRINT_free(a->msg_imprint);
+    a->msg_imprint = new_msg_imprint;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+TS_MSG_IMPRINT *TS_REQ_get_msg_imprint(TS_REQ *a)
+{
+    return a->msg_imprint;
+}
+
+int TS_MSG_IMPRINT_set_algo(TS_MSG_IMPRINT *a, X509_ALGOR *alg)
+{
+    X509_ALGOR *new_alg;
+
+    if (a->hash_algo == alg)
+        return 1;
+    new_alg = X509_ALGOR_dup(alg);
+    if (new_alg == NULL) {
+        TSerr(TS_F_TS_MSG_IMPRINT_SET_ALGO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    X509_ALGOR_free(a->hash_algo);
+    a->hash_algo = new_alg;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+X509_ALGOR *TS_MSG_IMPRINT_get_algo(TS_MSG_IMPRINT *a)
+{
+    return a->hash_algo;
+}
+
+int TS_MSG_IMPRINT_set_msg(TS_MSG_IMPRINT *a, unsigned char *d, int len)
+{
+    return ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(a->hashed_msg, d, len);
+}
+
+ASN1_OCTET_STRING *TS_MSG_IMPRINT_get_msg(TS_MSG_IMPRINT *a)
+{
+    return a->hashed_msg;
+}
+
+int TS_REQ_set_policy_id(TS_REQ *a, const ASN1_OBJECT *policy)
+{
+    ASN1_OBJECT *new_policy;
+
+    if (a->policy_id == policy)
+        return 1;
+    new_policy = OBJ_dup(policy);
+    if (new_policy == NULL) {
+        TSerr(TS_F_TS_REQ_SET_POLICY_ID, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    ASN1_OBJECT_free(a->policy_id);
+    a->policy_id = new_policy;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+ASN1_OBJECT *TS_REQ_get_policy_id(TS_REQ *a)
+{
+    return a->policy_id;
+}
+
+int TS_REQ_set_nonce(TS_REQ *a, const ASN1_INTEGER *nonce)
+{
+    ASN1_INTEGER *new_nonce;
+
+    if (a->nonce == nonce)
+        return 1;
+    new_nonce = ASN1_INTEGER_dup(nonce);
+    if (new_nonce == NULL) {
+        TSerr(TS_F_TS_REQ_SET_NONCE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    ASN1_INTEGER_free(a->nonce);
+    a->nonce = new_nonce;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+const ASN1_INTEGER *TS_REQ_get_nonce(const TS_REQ *a)
+{
+    return a->nonce;
+}
+
+int TS_REQ_set_cert_req(TS_REQ *a, int cert_req)
+{
+    a->cert_req = cert_req ? 0xFF : 0x00;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int TS_REQ_get_cert_req(const TS_REQ *a)
+{
+    return a->cert_req ? 1 : 0;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *TS_REQ_get_exts(TS_REQ *a)
+{
+    return a->extensions;
+}
+
+void TS_REQ_ext_free(TS_REQ *a)
+{
+    if (!a)
+        return;
+    sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(a->extensions, X509_EXTENSION_free);
+    a->extensions = NULL;
+}
+
+int TS_REQ_get_ext_count(TS_REQ *a)
+{
+    return X509v3_get_ext_count(a->extensions);
+}
+
+int TS_REQ_get_ext_by_NID(TS_REQ *a, int nid, int lastpos)
+{
+    return X509v3_get_ext_by_NID(a->extensions, nid, lastpos);
+}
+
+int TS_REQ_get_ext_by_OBJ(TS_REQ *a, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int lastpos)
+{
+    return X509v3_get_ext_by_OBJ(a->extensions, obj, lastpos);
+}
+
+int TS_REQ_get_ext_by_critical(TS_REQ *a, int crit, int lastpos)
+{
+    return X509v3_get_ext_by_critical(a->extensions, crit, lastpos);
+}
+
+X509_EXTENSION *TS_REQ_get_ext(TS_REQ *a, int loc)
+{
+    return X509v3_get_ext(a->extensions, loc);
+}
+
+X509_EXTENSION *TS_REQ_delete_ext(TS_REQ *a, int loc)
+{
+    return X509v3_delete_ext(a->extensions, loc);
+}
+
+int TS_REQ_add_ext(TS_REQ *a, X509_EXTENSION *ex, int loc)
+{
+    return X509v3_add_ext(&a->extensions, ex, loc) != NULL;
+}
+
+void *TS_REQ_get_ext_d2i(TS_REQ *a, int nid, int *crit, int *idx)
+{
+    return X509V3_get_d2i(a->extensions, nid, crit, idx);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_print.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_print.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6eb0ec8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_print.c
@@ -0,0 +1,195 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/ts.h>
+#include "ts_lcl.h"
+
+struct status_map_st {
+    int bit;
+    const char *text;
+};
+
+static int ts_status_map_print(BIO *bio, const struct status_map_st *a,
+                               const ASN1_BIT_STRING *v);
+static int ts_ACCURACY_print_bio(BIO *bio, const TS_ACCURACY *accuracy);
+
+
+int TS_RESP_print_bio(BIO *bio, TS_RESP *a)
+{
+    BIO_printf(bio, "Status info:\n");
+    TS_STATUS_INFO_print_bio(bio, a->status_info);
+
+    BIO_printf(bio, "\nTST info:\n");
+    if (a->tst_info != NULL)
+        TS_TST_INFO_print_bio(bio, a->tst_info);
+    else
+        BIO_printf(bio, "Not included.\n");
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int TS_STATUS_INFO_print_bio(BIO *bio, TS_STATUS_INFO *a)
+{
+    static const char *status_map[] = {
+        "Granted.",
+        "Granted with modifications.",
+        "Rejected.",
+        "Waiting.",
+        "Revocation warning.",
+        "Revoked."
+    };
+    static const struct status_map_st failure_map[] = {
+        {TS_INFO_BAD_ALG,
+         "unrecognized or unsupported algorithm identifier"},
+        {TS_INFO_BAD_REQUEST,
+         "transaction not permitted or supported"},
+        {TS_INFO_BAD_DATA_FORMAT,
+         "the data submitted has the wrong format"},
+        {TS_INFO_TIME_NOT_AVAILABLE,
+         "the TSA's time source is not available"},
+        {TS_INFO_UNACCEPTED_POLICY,
+         "the requested TSA policy is not supported by the TSA"},
+        {TS_INFO_UNACCEPTED_EXTENSION,
+         "the requested extension is not supported by the TSA"},
+        {TS_INFO_ADD_INFO_NOT_AVAILABLE,
+         "the additional information requested could not be understood "
+         "or is not available"},
+        {TS_INFO_SYSTEM_FAILURE,
+         "the request cannot be handled due to system failure"},
+        {-1, NULL}
+    };
+    long status;
+    int i, lines = 0;
+
+    BIO_printf(bio, "Status: ");
+    status = ASN1_INTEGER_get(a->status);
+    if (0 <= status && status < (long)OSSL_NELEM(status_map))
+        BIO_printf(bio, "%s\n", status_map[status]);
+    else
+        BIO_printf(bio, "out of bounds\n");
+
+    BIO_printf(bio, "Status description: ");
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_UTF8STRING_num(a->text); ++i) {
+        if (i > 0)
+            BIO_puts(bio, "\t");
+        ASN1_STRING_print_ex(bio, sk_ASN1_UTF8STRING_value(a->text, i), 0);
+        BIO_puts(bio, "\n");
+    }
+    if (i == 0)
+        BIO_printf(bio, "unspecified\n");
+
+    BIO_printf(bio, "Failure info: ");
+    if (a->failure_info != NULL)
+        lines = ts_status_map_print(bio, failure_map, a->failure_info);
+    if (lines == 0)
+        BIO_printf(bio, "unspecified");
+    BIO_printf(bio, "\n");
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int ts_status_map_print(BIO *bio, const struct status_map_st *a,
+                               const ASN1_BIT_STRING *v)
+{
+    int lines = 0;
+
+    for (; a->bit >= 0; ++a) {
+        if (ASN1_BIT_STRING_get_bit(v, a->bit)) {
+            if (++lines > 1)
+                BIO_printf(bio, ", ");
+            BIO_printf(bio, "%s", a->text);
+        }
+    }
+
+    return lines;
+}
+
+int TS_TST_INFO_print_bio(BIO *bio, TS_TST_INFO *a)
+{
+    int v;
+
+    if (a == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    v = ASN1_INTEGER_get(a->version);
+    BIO_printf(bio, "Version: %d\n", v);
+
+    BIO_printf(bio, "Policy OID: ");
+    TS_OBJ_print_bio(bio, a->policy_id);
+
+    TS_MSG_IMPRINT_print_bio(bio, a->msg_imprint);
+
+    BIO_printf(bio, "Serial number: ");
+    if (a->serial == NULL)
+        BIO_printf(bio, "unspecified");
+    else
+        TS_ASN1_INTEGER_print_bio(bio, a->serial);
+    BIO_write(bio, "\n", 1);
+
+    BIO_printf(bio, "Time stamp: ");
+    ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(bio, a->time);
+    BIO_write(bio, "\n", 1);
+
+    BIO_printf(bio, "Accuracy: ");
+    if (a->accuracy == NULL)
+        BIO_printf(bio, "unspecified");
+    else
+        ts_ACCURACY_print_bio(bio, a->accuracy);
+    BIO_write(bio, "\n", 1);
+
+    BIO_printf(bio, "Ordering: %s\n", a->ordering ? "yes" : "no");
+
+    BIO_printf(bio, "Nonce: ");
+    if (a->nonce == NULL)
+        BIO_printf(bio, "unspecified");
+    else
+        TS_ASN1_INTEGER_print_bio(bio, a->nonce);
+    BIO_write(bio, "\n", 1);
+
+    BIO_printf(bio, "TSA: ");
+    if (a->tsa == NULL)
+        BIO_printf(bio, "unspecified");
+    else {
+        STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nval;
+        if ((nval = i2v_GENERAL_NAME(NULL, a->tsa, NULL)))
+            X509V3_EXT_val_prn(bio, nval, 0, 0);
+        sk_CONF_VALUE_pop_free(nval, X509V3_conf_free);
+    }
+    BIO_write(bio, "\n", 1);
+
+    TS_ext_print_bio(bio, a->extensions);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int ts_ACCURACY_print_bio(BIO *bio, const TS_ACCURACY *a)
+{
+    if (a->seconds != NULL)
+        TS_ASN1_INTEGER_print_bio(bio, a->seconds);
+    else
+        BIO_printf(bio, "unspecified");
+    BIO_printf(bio, " seconds, ");
+    if (a->millis != NULL)
+        TS_ASN1_INTEGER_print_bio(bio, a->millis);
+    else
+        BIO_printf(bio, "unspecified");
+    BIO_printf(bio, " millis, ");
+    if (a->micros != NULL)
+        TS_ASN1_INTEGER_print_bio(bio, a->micros);
+    else
+        BIO_printf(bio, "unspecified");
+    BIO_printf(bio, " micros");
+
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_sign.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_sign.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..aea7b92
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_sign.c
@@ -0,0 +1,904 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX)
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/ts.h>
+#include <openssl/pkcs7.h>
+#include "ts_lcl.h"
+
+static ASN1_INTEGER *def_serial_cb(struct TS_resp_ctx *, void *);
+static int def_time_cb(struct TS_resp_ctx *, void *, long *sec, long *usec);
+static int def_extension_cb(struct TS_resp_ctx *, X509_EXTENSION *, void *);
+
+static void ts_RESP_CTX_init(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx);
+static void ts_RESP_CTX_cleanup(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx);
+static int ts_RESP_check_request(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx);
+static ASN1_OBJECT *ts_RESP_get_policy(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx);
+static TS_TST_INFO *ts_RESP_create_tst_info(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx,
+                                            ASN1_OBJECT *policy);
+static int ts_RESP_process_extensions(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx);
+static int ts_RESP_sign(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx);
+
+static ESS_SIGNING_CERT *ess_SIGNING_CERT_new_init(X509 *signcert,
+                                                   STACK_OF(X509) *certs);
+static ESS_CERT_ID *ess_CERT_ID_new_init(X509 *cert, int issuer_needed);
+static int ts_TST_INFO_content_new(PKCS7 *p7);
+static int ESS_add_signing_cert(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si, ESS_SIGNING_CERT *sc);
+
+static ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME
+*TS_RESP_set_genTime_with_precision(ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *, long, long,
+                                    unsigned);
+
+/* Default callback for response generation. */
+static ASN1_INTEGER *def_serial_cb(struct TS_resp_ctx *ctx, void *data)
+{
+    ASN1_INTEGER *serial = ASN1_INTEGER_new();
+
+    if (serial == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(serial, 1))
+        goto err;
+    return serial;
+
+ err:
+    TSerr(TS_F_DEF_SERIAL_CB, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    TS_RESP_CTX_set_status_info(ctx, TS_STATUS_REJECTION,
+                                "Error during serial number generation.");
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX)
+
+static int def_time_cb(struct TS_resp_ctx *ctx, void *data,
+                       long *sec, long *usec)
+{
+    struct timeval tv;
+    if (gettimeofday(&tv, NULL) != 0) {
+        TSerr(TS_F_DEF_TIME_CB, TS_R_TIME_SYSCALL_ERROR);
+        TS_RESP_CTX_set_status_info(ctx, TS_STATUS_REJECTION,
+                                    "Time is not available.");
+        TS_RESP_CTX_add_failure_info(ctx, TS_INFO_TIME_NOT_AVAILABLE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    *sec = tv.tv_sec;
+    *usec = tv.tv_usec;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+#else
+
+static int def_time_cb(struct TS_resp_ctx *ctx, void *data,
+                       long *sec, long *usec)
+{
+    time_t t;
+    if (time(&t) == (time_t)-1) {
+        TSerr(TS_F_DEF_TIME_CB, TS_R_TIME_SYSCALL_ERROR);
+        TS_RESP_CTX_set_status_info(ctx, TS_STATUS_REJECTION,
+                                    "Time is not available.");
+        TS_RESP_CTX_add_failure_info(ctx, TS_INFO_TIME_NOT_AVAILABLE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    *sec = (long)t;
+    *usec = 0;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+#endif
+
+static int def_extension_cb(struct TS_resp_ctx *ctx, X509_EXTENSION *ext,
+                            void *data)
+{
+    TS_RESP_CTX_set_status_info(ctx, TS_STATUS_REJECTION,
+                                "Unsupported extension.");
+    TS_RESP_CTX_add_failure_info(ctx, TS_INFO_UNACCEPTED_EXTENSION);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/* TS_RESP_CTX management functions. */
+
+TS_RESP_CTX *TS_RESP_CTX_new()
+{
+    TS_RESP_CTX *ctx;
+
+    if ((ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx))) == NULL) {
+        TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    ctx->signer_md = EVP_sha256();
+
+    ctx->serial_cb = def_serial_cb;
+    ctx->time_cb = def_time_cb;
+    ctx->extension_cb = def_extension_cb;
+
+    return ctx;
+}
+
+void TS_RESP_CTX_free(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    if (!ctx)
+        return;
+
+    X509_free(ctx->signer_cert);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(ctx->signer_key);
+    sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->certs, X509_free);
+    sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(ctx->policies, ASN1_OBJECT_free);
+    ASN1_OBJECT_free(ctx->default_policy);
+    sk_EVP_MD_free(ctx->mds);   /* No EVP_MD_free method exists. */
+    ASN1_INTEGER_free(ctx->seconds);
+    ASN1_INTEGER_free(ctx->millis);
+    ASN1_INTEGER_free(ctx->micros);
+    OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+}
+
+int TS_RESP_CTX_set_signer_cert(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx, X509 *signer)
+{
+    if (X509_check_purpose(signer, X509_PURPOSE_TIMESTAMP_SIGN, 0) != 1) {
+        TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_CTX_SET_SIGNER_CERT,
+              TS_R_INVALID_SIGNER_CERTIFICATE_PURPOSE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    X509_free(ctx->signer_cert);
+    ctx->signer_cert = signer;
+    X509_up_ref(ctx->signer_cert);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int TS_RESP_CTX_set_signer_key(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *key)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY_free(ctx->signer_key);
+    ctx->signer_key = key;
+    EVP_PKEY_up_ref(ctx->signer_key);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int TS_RESP_CTX_set_signer_digest(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md)
+{
+    ctx->signer_md = md;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int TS_RESP_CTX_set_def_policy(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx, const ASN1_OBJECT *def_policy)
+{
+    ASN1_OBJECT_free(ctx->default_policy);
+    if ((ctx->default_policy = OBJ_dup(def_policy)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    return 1;
+ err:
+    TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_CTX_SET_DEF_POLICY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int TS_RESP_CTX_set_certs(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *certs)
+{
+
+    sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->certs, X509_free);
+    ctx->certs = NULL;
+    if (!certs)
+        return 1;
+    if ((ctx->certs = X509_chain_up_ref(certs)) == NULL) {
+        TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_CTX_SET_CERTS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int TS_RESP_CTX_add_policy(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx, const ASN1_OBJECT *policy)
+{
+    ASN1_OBJECT *copy = NULL;
+
+    if (ctx->policies == NULL
+        && (ctx->policies = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_new_null()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if ((copy = OBJ_dup(policy)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (!sk_ASN1_OBJECT_push(ctx->policies, copy))
+        goto err;
+
+    return 1;
+ err:
+    TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_CTX_ADD_POLICY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    ASN1_OBJECT_free(copy);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int TS_RESP_CTX_add_md(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md)
+{
+    if (ctx->mds == NULL
+        && (ctx->mds = sk_EVP_MD_new_null()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (!sk_EVP_MD_push(ctx->mds, md))
+        goto err;
+
+    return 1;
+ err:
+    TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_CTX_ADD_MD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+#define TS_RESP_CTX_accuracy_free(ctx)          \
+        ASN1_INTEGER_free(ctx->seconds);        \
+        ctx->seconds = NULL;                    \
+        ASN1_INTEGER_free(ctx->millis);         \
+        ctx->millis = NULL;                     \
+        ASN1_INTEGER_free(ctx->micros);         \
+        ctx->micros = NULL;
+
+int TS_RESP_CTX_set_accuracy(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx,
+                             int secs, int millis, int micros)
+{
+
+    TS_RESP_CTX_accuracy_free(ctx);
+    if (secs
+        && ((ctx->seconds = ASN1_INTEGER_new()) == NULL
+            || !ASN1_INTEGER_set(ctx->seconds, secs)))
+        goto err;
+    if (millis
+        && ((ctx->millis = ASN1_INTEGER_new()) == NULL
+            || !ASN1_INTEGER_set(ctx->millis, millis)))
+        goto err;
+    if (micros
+        && ((ctx->micros = ASN1_INTEGER_new()) == NULL
+            || !ASN1_INTEGER_set(ctx->micros, micros)))
+        goto err;
+
+    return 1;
+ err:
+    TS_RESP_CTX_accuracy_free(ctx);
+    TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_CTX_SET_ACCURACY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+void TS_RESP_CTX_add_flags(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx, int flags)
+{
+    ctx->flags |= flags;
+}
+
+void TS_RESP_CTX_set_serial_cb(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx, TS_serial_cb cb, void *data)
+{
+    ctx->serial_cb = cb;
+    ctx->serial_cb_data = data;
+}
+
+void TS_RESP_CTX_set_time_cb(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx, TS_time_cb cb, void *data)
+{
+    ctx->time_cb = cb;
+    ctx->time_cb_data = data;
+}
+
+void TS_RESP_CTX_set_extension_cb(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx,
+                                  TS_extension_cb cb, void *data)
+{
+    ctx->extension_cb = cb;
+    ctx->extension_cb_data = data;
+}
+
+int TS_RESP_CTX_set_status_info(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx,
+                                int status, const char *text)
+{
+    TS_STATUS_INFO *si = NULL;
+    ASN1_UTF8STRING *utf8_text = NULL;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    if ((si = TS_STATUS_INFO_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(si->status, status))
+        goto err;
+    if (text) {
+        if ((utf8_text = ASN1_UTF8STRING_new()) == NULL
+            || !ASN1_STRING_set(utf8_text, text, strlen(text)))
+            goto err;
+        if (si->text == NULL
+            && (si->text = sk_ASN1_UTF8STRING_new_null()) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        if (!sk_ASN1_UTF8STRING_push(si->text, utf8_text))
+            goto err;
+        utf8_text = NULL;       /* Ownership is lost. */
+    }
+    if (!TS_RESP_set_status_info(ctx->response, si))
+        goto err;
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    if (!ret)
+        TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_CTX_SET_STATUS_INFO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    TS_STATUS_INFO_free(si);
+    ASN1_UTF8STRING_free(utf8_text);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int TS_RESP_CTX_set_status_info_cond(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx,
+                                     int status, const char *text)
+{
+    int ret = 1;
+    TS_STATUS_INFO *si = ctx->response->status_info;
+
+    if (ASN1_INTEGER_get(si->status) == TS_STATUS_GRANTED) {
+        ret = TS_RESP_CTX_set_status_info(ctx, status, text);
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int TS_RESP_CTX_add_failure_info(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx, int failure)
+{
+    TS_STATUS_INFO *si = ctx->response->status_info;
+    if (si->failure_info == NULL
+        && (si->failure_info = ASN1_BIT_STRING_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (!ASN1_BIT_STRING_set_bit(si->failure_info, failure, 1))
+        goto err;
+    return 1;
+ err:
+    TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_CTX_ADD_FAILURE_INFO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+TS_REQ *TS_RESP_CTX_get_request(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->request;
+}
+
+TS_TST_INFO *TS_RESP_CTX_get_tst_info(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->tst_info;
+}
+
+int TS_RESP_CTX_set_clock_precision_digits(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx,
+                                           unsigned precision)
+{
+    if (precision > TS_MAX_CLOCK_PRECISION_DIGITS)
+        return 0;
+    ctx->clock_precision_digits = precision;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Main entry method of the response generation. */
+TS_RESP *TS_RESP_create_response(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx, BIO *req_bio)
+{
+    ASN1_OBJECT *policy;
+    TS_RESP *response;
+    int result = 0;
+
+    ts_RESP_CTX_init(ctx);
+
+    if ((ctx->response = TS_RESP_new()) == NULL) {
+        TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_CREATE_RESPONSE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto end;
+    }
+    if ((ctx->request = d2i_TS_REQ_bio(req_bio, NULL)) == NULL) {
+        TS_RESP_CTX_set_status_info(ctx, TS_STATUS_REJECTION,
+                                    "Bad request format or system error.");
+        TS_RESP_CTX_add_failure_info(ctx, TS_INFO_BAD_DATA_FORMAT);
+        goto end;
+    }
+    if (!TS_RESP_CTX_set_status_info(ctx, TS_STATUS_GRANTED, NULL))
+        goto end;
+    if (!ts_RESP_check_request(ctx))
+        goto end;
+    if ((policy = ts_RESP_get_policy(ctx)) == NULL)
+        goto end;
+    if ((ctx->tst_info = ts_RESP_create_tst_info(ctx, policy)) == NULL)
+        goto end;
+    if (!ts_RESP_process_extensions(ctx))
+        goto end;
+    if (!ts_RESP_sign(ctx))
+        goto end;
+    result = 1;
+
+ end:
+    if (!result) {
+        TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_CREATE_RESPONSE, TS_R_RESPONSE_SETUP_ERROR);
+        if (ctx->response != NULL) {
+            if (TS_RESP_CTX_set_status_info_cond(ctx,
+                                                 TS_STATUS_REJECTION,
+                                                 "Error during response "
+                                                 "generation.") == 0) {
+                TS_RESP_free(ctx->response);
+                ctx->response = NULL;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    response = ctx->response;
+    ctx->response = NULL;       /* Ownership will be returned to caller. */
+    ts_RESP_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
+    return response;
+}
+
+/* Initializes the variable part of the context. */
+static void ts_RESP_CTX_init(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    ctx->request = NULL;
+    ctx->response = NULL;
+    ctx->tst_info = NULL;
+}
+
+/* Cleans up the variable part of the context. */
+static void ts_RESP_CTX_cleanup(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    TS_REQ_free(ctx->request);
+    ctx->request = NULL;
+    TS_RESP_free(ctx->response);
+    ctx->response = NULL;
+    TS_TST_INFO_free(ctx->tst_info);
+    ctx->tst_info = NULL;
+}
+
+/* Checks the format and content of the request. */
+static int ts_RESP_check_request(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    TS_REQ *request = ctx->request;
+    TS_MSG_IMPRINT *msg_imprint;
+    X509_ALGOR *md_alg;
+    int md_alg_id;
+    const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *digest;
+    const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
+    int i;
+
+    if (TS_REQ_get_version(request) != 1) {
+        TS_RESP_CTX_set_status_info(ctx, TS_STATUS_REJECTION,
+                                    "Bad request version.");
+        TS_RESP_CTX_add_failure_info(ctx, TS_INFO_BAD_REQUEST);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    msg_imprint = request->msg_imprint;
+    md_alg = msg_imprint->hash_algo;
+    md_alg_id = OBJ_obj2nid(md_alg->algorithm);
+    for (i = 0; !md && i < sk_EVP_MD_num(ctx->mds); ++i) {
+        const EVP_MD *current_md = sk_EVP_MD_value(ctx->mds, i);
+        if (md_alg_id == EVP_MD_type(current_md))
+            md = current_md;
+    }
+    if (!md) {
+        TS_RESP_CTX_set_status_info(ctx, TS_STATUS_REJECTION,
+                                    "Message digest algorithm is "
+                                    "not supported.");
+        TS_RESP_CTX_add_failure_info(ctx, TS_INFO_BAD_ALG);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (md_alg->parameter && ASN1_TYPE_get(md_alg->parameter) != V_ASN1_NULL) {
+        TS_RESP_CTX_set_status_info(ctx, TS_STATUS_REJECTION,
+                                    "Superfluous message digest "
+                                    "parameter.");
+        TS_RESP_CTX_add_failure_info(ctx, TS_INFO_BAD_ALG);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    digest = msg_imprint->hashed_msg;
+    if (digest->length != EVP_MD_size(md)) {
+        TS_RESP_CTX_set_status_info(ctx, TS_STATUS_REJECTION,
+                                    "Bad message digest.");
+        TS_RESP_CTX_add_failure_info(ctx, TS_INFO_BAD_DATA_FORMAT);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Returns the TSA policy based on the requested and acceptable policies. */
+static ASN1_OBJECT *ts_RESP_get_policy(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    ASN1_OBJECT *requested = ctx->request->policy_id;
+    ASN1_OBJECT *policy = NULL;
+    int i;
+
+    if (ctx->default_policy == NULL) {
+        TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_GET_POLICY, TS_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    if (!requested || !OBJ_cmp(requested, ctx->default_policy))
+        policy = ctx->default_policy;
+
+    /* Check if the policy is acceptable. */
+    for (i = 0; !policy && i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(ctx->policies); ++i) {
+        ASN1_OBJECT *current = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(ctx->policies, i);
+        if (!OBJ_cmp(requested, current))
+            policy = current;
+    }
+    if (!policy) {
+        TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_GET_POLICY, TS_R_UNACCEPTABLE_POLICY);
+        TS_RESP_CTX_set_status_info(ctx, TS_STATUS_REJECTION,
+                                    "Requested policy is not " "supported.");
+        TS_RESP_CTX_add_failure_info(ctx, TS_INFO_UNACCEPTED_POLICY);
+    }
+    return policy;
+}
+
+/* Creates the TS_TST_INFO object based on the settings of the context. */
+static TS_TST_INFO *ts_RESP_create_tst_info(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx,
+                                            ASN1_OBJECT *policy)
+{
+    int result = 0;
+    TS_TST_INFO *tst_info = NULL;
+    ASN1_INTEGER *serial = NULL;
+    ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *asn1_time = NULL;
+    long sec, usec;
+    TS_ACCURACY *accuracy = NULL;
+    const ASN1_INTEGER *nonce;
+    GENERAL_NAME *tsa_name = NULL;
+
+    if ((tst_info = TS_TST_INFO_new()) == NULL)
+        goto end;
+    if (!TS_TST_INFO_set_version(tst_info, 1))
+        goto end;
+    if (!TS_TST_INFO_set_policy_id(tst_info, policy))
+        goto end;
+    if (!TS_TST_INFO_set_msg_imprint(tst_info, ctx->request->msg_imprint))
+        goto end;
+    if ((serial = ctx->serial_cb(ctx, ctx->serial_cb_data)) == NULL
+        || !TS_TST_INFO_set_serial(tst_info, serial))
+        goto end;
+    if (!ctx->time_cb(ctx, ctx->time_cb_data, &sec, &usec)
+        || (asn1_time =
+            TS_RESP_set_genTime_with_precision(NULL, sec, usec,
+                                        ctx->clock_precision_digits)) == NULL
+        || !TS_TST_INFO_set_time(tst_info, asn1_time))
+        goto end;
+
+    if ((ctx->seconds || ctx->millis || ctx->micros)
+        && (accuracy = TS_ACCURACY_new()) == NULL)
+        goto end;
+    if (ctx->seconds && !TS_ACCURACY_set_seconds(accuracy, ctx->seconds))
+        goto end;
+    if (ctx->millis && !TS_ACCURACY_set_millis(accuracy, ctx->millis))
+        goto end;
+    if (ctx->micros && !TS_ACCURACY_set_micros(accuracy, ctx->micros))
+        goto end;
+    if (accuracy && !TS_TST_INFO_set_accuracy(tst_info, accuracy))
+        goto end;
+
+    if ((ctx->flags & TS_ORDERING)
+        && !TS_TST_INFO_set_ordering(tst_info, 1))
+        goto end;
+
+    if ((nonce = ctx->request->nonce) != NULL
+        && !TS_TST_INFO_set_nonce(tst_info, nonce))
+        goto end;
+
+    if (ctx->flags & TS_TSA_NAME) {
+        if ((tsa_name = GENERAL_NAME_new()) == NULL)
+            goto end;
+        tsa_name->type = GEN_DIRNAME;
+        tsa_name->d.dirn =
+            X509_NAME_dup(X509_get_subject_name(ctx->signer_cert));
+        if (!tsa_name->d.dirn)
+            goto end;
+        if (!TS_TST_INFO_set_tsa(tst_info, tsa_name))
+            goto end;
+    }
+
+    result = 1;
+ end:
+    if (!result) {
+        TS_TST_INFO_free(tst_info);
+        tst_info = NULL;
+        TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_CREATE_TST_INFO, TS_R_TST_INFO_SETUP_ERROR);
+        TS_RESP_CTX_set_status_info_cond(ctx, TS_STATUS_REJECTION,
+                                         "Error during TSTInfo "
+                                         "generation.");
+    }
+    GENERAL_NAME_free(tsa_name);
+    TS_ACCURACY_free(accuracy);
+    ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_free(asn1_time);
+    ASN1_INTEGER_free(serial);
+
+    return tst_info;
+}
+
+/* Processing the extensions of the request. */
+static int ts_RESP_process_extensions(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts = ctx->request->extensions;
+    int i;
+    int ok = 1;
+
+    for (i = 0; ok && i < sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts); ++i) {
+        X509_EXTENSION *ext = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(exts, i);
+        /*
+         * The last argument was previously (void *)ctx->extension_cb,
+         * but ISO C doesn't permit converting a function pointer to void *.
+         * For lack of better information, I'm placing a NULL there instead.
+         * The callback can pick its own address out from the ctx anyway...
+         */
+        ok = (*ctx->extension_cb) (ctx, ext, NULL);
+    }
+
+    return ok;
+}
+
+/* Functions for signing the TS_TST_INFO structure of the context. */
+static int ts_RESP_sign(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    PKCS7 *p7 = NULL;
+    PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si;
+    STACK_OF(X509) *certs;      /* Certificates to include in sc. */
+    ESS_SIGNING_CERT *sc = NULL;
+    ASN1_OBJECT *oid;
+    BIO *p7bio = NULL;
+    int i;
+
+    if (!X509_check_private_key(ctx->signer_cert, ctx->signer_key)) {
+        TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_SIGN, TS_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DOES_NOT_MATCH_CERTIFICATE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if ((p7 = PKCS7_new()) == NULL) {
+        TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (!PKCS7_set_type(p7, NID_pkcs7_signed))
+        goto err;
+    if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(p7->d.sign->version, 3))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (ctx->request->cert_req) {
+        PKCS7_add_certificate(p7, ctx->signer_cert);
+        if (ctx->certs) {
+            for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->certs); ++i) {
+                X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->certs, i);
+                PKCS7_add_certificate(p7, cert);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    if ((si = PKCS7_add_signature(p7, ctx->signer_cert,
+                                  ctx->signer_key, ctx->signer_md)) == NULL) {
+        TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_SIGN, TS_R_PKCS7_ADD_SIGNATURE_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    oid = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_id_smime_ct_TSTInfo);
+    if (!PKCS7_add_signed_attribute(si, NID_pkcs9_contentType,
+                                    V_ASN1_OBJECT, oid)) {
+        TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_SIGN, TS_R_PKCS7_ADD_SIGNED_ATTR_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    certs = ctx->flags & TS_ESS_CERT_ID_CHAIN ? ctx->certs : NULL;
+    if ((sc = ess_SIGNING_CERT_new_init(ctx->signer_cert, certs)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (!ESS_add_signing_cert(si, sc)) {
+        TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_SIGN, TS_R_ESS_ADD_SIGNING_CERT_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!ts_TST_INFO_content_new(p7))
+        goto err;
+    if ((p7bio = PKCS7_dataInit(p7, NULL)) == NULL) {
+        TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (!i2d_TS_TST_INFO_bio(p7bio, ctx->tst_info)) {
+        TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_SIGN, TS_R_TS_DATASIGN);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (!PKCS7_dataFinal(p7, p7bio)) {
+        TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_SIGN, TS_R_TS_DATASIGN);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    TS_RESP_set_tst_info(ctx->response, p7, ctx->tst_info);
+    p7 = NULL;                  /* Ownership is lost. */
+    ctx->tst_info = NULL;       /* Ownership is lost. */
+
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    if (!ret)
+        TS_RESP_CTX_set_status_info_cond(ctx, TS_STATUS_REJECTION,
+                                         "Error during signature "
+                                         "generation.");
+    BIO_free_all(p7bio);
+    ESS_SIGNING_CERT_free(sc);
+    PKCS7_free(p7);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static ESS_SIGNING_CERT *ess_SIGNING_CERT_new_init(X509 *signcert,
+                                                   STACK_OF(X509) *certs)
+{
+    ESS_CERT_ID *cid;
+    ESS_SIGNING_CERT *sc = NULL;
+    int i;
+
+    if ((sc = ESS_SIGNING_CERT_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (sc->cert_ids == NULL
+        && (sc->cert_ids = sk_ESS_CERT_ID_new_null()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if ((cid = ess_CERT_ID_new_init(signcert, 0)) == NULL
+        || !sk_ESS_CERT_ID_push(sc->cert_ids, cid))
+        goto err;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); ++i) {
+        X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
+        if ((cid = ess_CERT_ID_new_init(cert, 1)) == NULL
+            || !sk_ESS_CERT_ID_push(sc->cert_ids, cid))
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    return sc;
+ err:
+    ESS_SIGNING_CERT_free(sc);
+    TSerr(TS_F_ESS_SIGNING_CERT_NEW_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+static ESS_CERT_ID *ess_CERT_ID_new_init(X509 *cert, int issuer_needed)
+{
+    ESS_CERT_ID *cid = NULL;
+    GENERAL_NAME *name = NULL;
+    unsigned char cert_sha1[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+
+    /* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */
+    X509_check_purpose(cert, -1, 0);
+    if ((cid = ESS_CERT_ID_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    X509_digest(cert, EVP_sha1(), cert_sha1, NULL);
+    if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(cid->hash, cert_sha1, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH))
+        goto err;
+
+    /* Setting the issuer/serial if requested. */
+    if (issuer_needed) {
+        if (cid->issuer_serial == NULL
+            && (cid->issuer_serial = ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL_new()) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        if ((name = GENERAL_NAME_new()) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        name->type = GEN_DIRNAME;
+        if ((name->d.dirn = X509_NAME_dup(X509_get_issuer_name(cert))) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        if (!sk_GENERAL_NAME_push(cid->issuer_serial->issuer, name))
+            goto err;
+        name = NULL;            /* Ownership is lost. */
+        ASN1_INTEGER_free(cid->issuer_serial->serial);
+        if (!(cid->issuer_serial->serial =
+              ASN1_INTEGER_dup(X509_get_serialNumber(cert))))
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    return cid;
+ err:
+    GENERAL_NAME_free(name);
+    ESS_CERT_ID_free(cid);
+    TSerr(TS_F_ESS_CERT_ID_NEW_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+static int ts_TST_INFO_content_new(PKCS7 *p7)
+{
+    PKCS7 *ret = NULL;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *octet_string = NULL;
+
+    /* Create new encapsulated NID_id_smime_ct_TSTInfo content. */
+    if ((ret = PKCS7_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if ((ret->d.other = ASN1_TYPE_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    ret->type = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_id_smime_ct_TSTInfo);
+    if ((octet_string = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    ASN1_TYPE_set(ret->d.other, V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, octet_string);
+    octet_string = NULL;
+
+    /* Add encapsulated content to signed PKCS7 structure. */
+    if (!PKCS7_set_content(p7, ret))
+        goto err;
+
+    return 1;
+ err:
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(octet_string);
+    PKCS7_free(ret);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int ESS_add_signing_cert(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si, ESS_SIGNING_CERT *sc)
+{
+    ASN1_STRING *seq = NULL;
+    unsigned char *p, *pp = NULL;
+    int len;
+
+    len = i2d_ESS_SIGNING_CERT(sc, NULL);
+    if ((pp = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) {
+        TSerr(TS_F_ESS_ADD_SIGNING_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    p = pp;
+    i2d_ESS_SIGNING_CERT(sc, &p);
+    if ((seq = ASN1_STRING_new()) == NULL || !ASN1_STRING_set(seq, pp, len)) {
+        TSerr(TS_F_ESS_ADD_SIGNING_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    OPENSSL_free(pp);
+    pp = NULL;
+    return PKCS7_add_signed_attribute(si,
+                                      NID_id_smime_aa_signingCertificate,
+                                      V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, seq);
+ err:
+    ASN1_STRING_free(seq);
+    OPENSSL_free(pp);
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME
+*TS_RESP_set_genTime_with_precision(ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *asn1_time,
+                                    long sec, long usec, unsigned precision)
+{
+    time_t time_sec = (time_t)sec;
+    struct tm *tm = NULL;
+    char genTime_str[17 + TS_MAX_CLOCK_PRECISION_DIGITS];
+    char *p = genTime_str;
+    char *p_end = genTime_str + sizeof(genTime_str);
+
+    if (precision > TS_MAX_CLOCK_PRECISION_DIGITS)
+        goto err;
+
+    if ((tm = gmtime(&time_sec)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    /*
+     * Put "genTime_str" in GeneralizedTime format.  We work around the
+     * restrictions imposed by rfc3280 (i.e. "GeneralizedTime values MUST
+     * NOT include fractional seconds") and OpenSSL related functions to
+     * meet the rfc3161 requirement: "GeneralizedTime syntax can include
+     * fraction-of-second details".
+     */
+    p += BIO_snprintf(p, p_end - p,
+                      "%04d%02d%02d%02d%02d%02d",
+                      tm->tm_year + 1900, tm->tm_mon + 1, tm->tm_mday,
+                      tm->tm_hour, tm->tm_min, tm->tm_sec);
+    if (precision > 0) {
+        BIO_snprintf(p, 2 + precision, ".%06ld", usec);
+        p += strlen(p);
+
+        /*
+         * To make things a bit harder, X.690 | ISO/IEC 8825-1 provides the
+         * following restrictions for a DER-encoding, which OpenSSL
+         * (specifically ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_check() function) doesn't
+         * support: "The encoding MUST terminate with a "Z" (which means
+         * "Zulu" time). The decimal point element, if present, MUST be the
+         * point option ".". The fractional-seconds elements, if present,
+         * MUST omit all trailing 0's; if the elements correspond to 0, they
+         * MUST be wholly omitted, and the decimal point element also MUST be
+         * omitted."
+         */
+        /*
+         * Remove trailing zeros. The dot guarantees the exit condition of
+         * this loop even if all the digits are zero.
+         */
+        while (*--p == '0')
+             continue;
+        if (*p != '.')
+            ++p;
+    }
+    *p++ = 'Z';
+    *p++ = '\0';
+
+    if (asn1_time == NULL
+        && (asn1_time = ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (!ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set_string(asn1_time, genTime_str)) {
+        ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_free(asn1_time);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    return asn1_time;
+
+ err:
+    TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_SET_GENTIME_WITH_PRECISION, TS_R_COULD_NOT_SET_TIME);
+    return NULL;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_utils.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_utils.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3ecee39
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_utils.c
@@ -0,0 +1,365 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/ts.h>
+#include <openssl/pkcs7.h>
+#include "ts_lcl.h"
+
+int TS_RESP_set_status_info(TS_RESP *a, TS_STATUS_INFO *status_info)
+{
+    TS_STATUS_INFO *new_status_info;
+
+    if (a->status_info == status_info)
+        return 1;
+    new_status_info = TS_STATUS_INFO_dup(status_info);
+    if (new_status_info == NULL) {
+        TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_SET_STATUS_INFO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    TS_STATUS_INFO_free(a->status_info);
+    a->status_info = new_status_info;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+TS_STATUS_INFO *TS_RESP_get_status_info(TS_RESP *a)
+{
+    return a->status_info;
+}
+
+/* Caller loses ownership of PKCS7 and TS_TST_INFO objects. */
+void TS_RESP_set_tst_info(TS_RESP *a, PKCS7 *p7, TS_TST_INFO *tst_info)
+{
+    PKCS7_free(a->token);
+    a->token = p7;
+    TS_TST_INFO_free(a->tst_info);
+    a->tst_info = tst_info;
+}
+
+PKCS7 *TS_RESP_get_token(TS_RESP *a)
+{
+    return a->token;
+}
+
+TS_TST_INFO *TS_RESP_get_tst_info(TS_RESP *a)
+{
+    return a->tst_info;
+}
+
+int TS_TST_INFO_set_version(TS_TST_INFO *a, long version)
+{
+    return ASN1_INTEGER_set(a->version, version);
+}
+
+long TS_TST_INFO_get_version(const TS_TST_INFO *a)
+{
+    return ASN1_INTEGER_get(a->version);
+}
+
+int TS_TST_INFO_set_policy_id(TS_TST_INFO *a, ASN1_OBJECT *policy)
+{
+    ASN1_OBJECT *new_policy;
+
+    if (a->policy_id == policy)
+        return 1;
+    new_policy = OBJ_dup(policy);
+    if (new_policy == NULL) {
+        TSerr(TS_F_TS_TST_INFO_SET_POLICY_ID, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    ASN1_OBJECT_free(a->policy_id);
+    a->policy_id = new_policy;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+ASN1_OBJECT *TS_TST_INFO_get_policy_id(TS_TST_INFO *a)
+{
+    return a->policy_id;
+}
+
+int TS_TST_INFO_set_msg_imprint(TS_TST_INFO *a, TS_MSG_IMPRINT *msg_imprint)
+{
+    TS_MSG_IMPRINT *new_msg_imprint;
+
+    if (a->msg_imprint == msg_imprint)
+        return 1;
+    new_msg_imprint = TS_MSG_IMPRINT_dup(msg_imprint);
+    if (new_msg_imprint == NULL) {
+        TSerr(TS_F_TS_TST_INFO_SET_MSG_IMPRINT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    TS_MSG_IMPRINT_free(a->msg_imprint);
+    a->msg_imprint = new_msg_imprint;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+TS_MSG_IMPRINT *TS_TST_INFO_get_msg_imprint(TS_TST_INFO *a)
+{
+    return a->msg_imprint;
+}
+
+int TS_TST_INFO_set_serial(TS_TST_INFO *a, const ASN1_INTEGER *serial)
+{
+    ASN1_INTEGER *new_serial;
+
+    if (a->serial == serial)
+        return 1;
+    new_serial = ASN1_INTEGER_dup(serial);
+    if (new_serial == NULL) {
+        TSerr(TS_F_TS_TST_INFO_SET_SERIAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    ASN1_INTEGER_free(a->serial);
+    a->serial = new_serial;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+const ASN1_INTEGER *TS_TST_INFO_get_serial(const TS_TST_INFO *a)
+{
+    return a->serial;
+}
+
+int TS_TST_INFO_set_time(TS_TST_INFO *a, const ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *gtime)
+{
+    ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *new_time;
+
+    if (a->time == gtime)
+        return 1;
+    new_time = ASN1_STRING_dup(gtime);
+    if (new_time == NULL) {
+        TSerr(TS_F_TS_TST_INFO_SET_TIME, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_free(a->time);
+    a->time = new_time;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+const ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *TS_TST_INFO_get_time(const TS_TST_INFO *a)
+{
+    return a->time;
+}
+
+int TS_TST_INFO_set_accuracy(TS_TST_INFO *a, TS_ACCURACY *accuracy)
+{
+    TS_ACCURACY *new_accuracy;
+
+    if (a->accuracy == accuracy)
+        return 1;
+    new_accuracy = TS_ACCURACY_dup(accuracy);
+    if (new_accuracy == NULL) {
+        TSerr(TS_F_TS_TST_INFO_SET_ACCURACY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    TS_ACCURACY_free(a->accuracy);
+    a->accuracy = new_accuracy;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+TS_ACCURACY *TS_TST_INFO_get_accuracy(TS_TST_INFO *a)
+{
+    return a->accuracy;
+}
+
+int TS_ACCURACY_set_seconds(TS_ACCURACY *a, const ASN1_INTEGER *seconds)
+{
+    ASN1_INTEGER *new_seconds;
+
+    if (a->seconds == seconds)
+        return 1;
+    new_seconds = ASN1_INTEGER_dup(seconds);
+    if (new_seconds == NULL) {
+        TSerr(TS_F_TS_ACCURACY_SET_SECONDS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    ASN1_INTEGER_free(a->seconds);
+    a->seconds = new_seconds;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+const ASN1_INTEGER *TS_ACCURACY_get_seconds(const TS_ACCURACY *a)
+{
+    return a->seconds;
+}
+
+int TS_ACCURACY_set_millis(TS_ACCURACY *a, const ASN1_INTEGER *millis)
+{
+    ASN1_INTEGER *new_millis = NULL;
+
+    if (a->millis == millis)
+        return 1;
+    if (millis != NULL) {
+        new_millis = ASN1_INTEGER_dup(millis);
+        if (new_millis == NULL) {
+            TSerr(TS_F_TS_ACCURACY_SET_MILLIS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+    ASN1_INTEGER_free(a->millis);
+    a->millis = new_millis;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+const ASN1_INTEGER *TS_ACCURACY_get_millis(const TS_ACCURACY *a)
+{
+    return a->millis;
+}
+
+int TS_ACCURACY_set_micros(TS_ACCURACY *a, const ASN1_INTEGER *micros)
+{
+    ASN1_INTEGER *new_micros = NULL;
+
+    if (a->micros == micros)
+        return 1;
+    if (micros != NULL) {
+        new_micros = ASN1_INTEGER_dup(micros);
+        if (new_micros == NULL) {
+            TSerr(TS_F_TS_ACCURACY_SET_MICROS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+    ASN1_INTEGER_free(a->micros);
+    a->micros = new_micros;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+const ASN1_INTEGER *TS_ACCURACY_get_micros(const TS_ACCURACY *a)
+{
+    return a->micros;
+}
+
+int TS_TST_INFO_set_ordering(TS_TST_INFO *a, int ordering)
+{
+    a->ordering = ordering ? 0xFF : 0x00;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int TS_TST_INFO_get_ordering(const TS_TST_INFO *a)
+{
+    return a->ordering ? 1 : 0;
+}
+
+int TS_TST_INFO_set_nonce(TS_TST_INFO *a, const ASN1_INTEGER *nonce)
+{
+    ASN1_INTEGER *new_nonce;
+
+    if (a->nonce == nonce)
+        return 1;
+    new_nonce = ASN1_INTEGER_dup(nonce);
+    if (new_nonce == NULL) {
+        TSerr(TS_F_TS_TST_INFO_SET_NONCE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    ASN1_INTEGER_free(a->nonce);
+    a->nonce = new_nonce;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+const ASN1_INTEGER *TS_TST_INFO_get_nonce(const TS_TST_INFO *a)
+{
+    return a->nonce;
+}
+
+int TS_TST_INFO_set_tsa(TS_TST_INFO *a, GENERAL_NAME *tsa)
+{
+    GENERAL_NAME *new_tsa;
+
+    if (a->tsa == tsa)
+        return 1;
+    new_tsa = GENERAL_NAME_dup(tsa);
+    if (new_tsa == NULL) {
+        TSerr(TS_F_TS_TST_INFO_SET_TSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    GENERAL_NAME_free(a->tsa);
+    a->tsa = new_tsa;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+GENERAL_NAME *TS_TST_INFO_get_tsa(TS_TST_INFO *a)
+{
+    return a->tsa;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *TS_TST_INFO_get_exts(TS_TST_INFO *a)
+{
+    return a->extensions;
+}
+
+void TS_TST_INFO_ext_free(TS_TST_INFO *a)
+{
+    if (!a)
+        return;
+    sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(a->extensions, X509_EXTENSION_free);
+    a->extensions = NULL;
+}
+
+int TS_TST_INFO_get_ext_count(TS_TST_INFO *a)
+{
+    return X509v3_get_ext_count(a->extensions);
+}
+
+int TS_TST_INFO_get_ext_by_NID(TS_TST_INFO *a, int nid, int lastpos)
+{
+    return X509v3_get_ext_by_NID(a->extensions, nid, lastpos);
+}
+
+int TS_TST_INFO_get_ext_by_OBJ(TS_TST_INFO *a, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int lastpos)
+{
+    return X509v3_get_ext_by_OBJ(a->extensions, obj, lastpos);
+}
+
+int TS_TST_INFO_get_ext_by_critical(TS_TST_INFO *a, int crit, int lastpos)
+{
+    return X509v3_get_ext_by_critical(a->extensions, crit, lastpos);
+}
+
+X509_EXTENSION *TS_TST_INFO_get_ext(TS_TST_INFO *a, int loc)
+{
+    return X509v3_get_ext(a->extensions, loc);
+}
+
+X509_EXTENSION *TS_TST_INFO_delete_ext(TS_TST_INFO *a, int loc)
+{
+    return X509v3_delete_ext(a->extensions, loc);
+}
+
+int TS_TST_INFO_add_ext(TS_TST_INFO *a, X509_EXTENSION *ex, int loc)
+{
+    return X509v3_add_ext(&a->extensions, ex, loc) != NULL;
+}
+
+void *TS_TST_INFO_get_ext_d2i(TS_TST_INFO *a, int nid, int *crit, int *idx)
+{
+    return X509V3_get_d2i(a->extensions, nid, crit, idx);
+}
+
+int TS_STATUS_INFO_set_status(TS_STATUS_INFO *a, int i)
+{
+    return ASN1_INTEGER_set(a->status, i);
+}
+
+const ASN1_INTEGER *TS_STATUS_INFO_get0_status(const TS_STATUS_INFO *a)
+{
+    return a->status;
+}
+
+const STACK_OF(ASN1_UTF8STRING) *
+TS_STATUS_INFO_get0_text(const TS_STATUS_INFO *a)
+{
+    return a->text;
+}
+
+const ASN1_BIT_STRING *TS_STATUS_INFO_get0_failure_info(const TS_STATUS_INFO *a)
+{
+    return a->failure_info;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2755dd0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c
@@ -0,0 +1,635 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/ts.h>
+#include <openssl/pkcs7.h>
+#include "ts_lcl.h"
+
+static int ts_verify_cert(X509_STORE *store, STACK_OF(X509) *untrusted,
+                          X509 *signer, STACK_OF(X509) **chain);
+static int ts_check_signing_certs(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si,
+                                  STACK_OF(X509) *chain);
+static ESS_SIGNING_CERT *ess_get_signing_cert(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si);
+static int ts_find_cert(STACK_OF(ESS_CERT_ID) *cert_ids, X509 *cert);
+static int ts_issuer_serial_cmp(ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL *is, X509 *cert);
+static int int_ts_RESP_verify_token(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx,
+                                    PKCS7 *token, TS_TST_INFO *tst_info);
+static int ts_check_status_info(TS_RESP *response);
+static char *ts_get_status_text(STACK_OF(ASN1_UTF8STRING) *text);
+static int ts_check_policy(const ASN1_OBJECT *req_oid,
+                           const TS_TST_INFO *tst_info);
+static int ts_compute_imprint(BIO *data, TS_TST_INFO *tst_info,
+                              X509_ALGOR **md_alg,
+                              unsigned char **imprint, unsigned *imprint_len);
+static int ts_check_imprints(X509_ALGOR *algor_a,
+                             const unsigned char *imprint_a, unsigned len_a,
+                             TS_TST_INFO *tst_info);
+static int ts_check_nonces(const ASN1_INTEGER *a, TS_TST_INFO *tst_info);
+static int ts_check_signer_name(GENERAL_NAME *tsa_name, X509 *signer);
+static int ts_find_name(STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *gen_names,
+                        GENERAL_NAME *name);
+
+/*
+ * This must be large enough to hold all values in ts_status_text (with
+ * comma separator) or all text fields in ts_failure_info (also with comma).
+ */
+#define TS_STATUS_BUF_SIZE      256
+
+/*
+ * Local mapping between response codes and descriptions.
+ */
+static const char *ts_status_text[] = {
+    "granted",
+    "grantedWithMods",
+    "rejection",
+    "waiting",
+    "revocationWarning",
+    "revocationNotification"
+};
+
+#define TS_STATUS_TEXT_SIZE     OSSL_NELEM(ts_status_text)
+
+static struct {
+    int code;
+    const char *text;
+} ts_failure_info[] = {
+    {TS_INFO_BAD_ALG, "badAlg"},
+    {TS_INFO_BAD_REQUEST, "badRequest"},
+    {TS_INFO_BAD_DATA_FORMAT, "badDataFormat"},
+    {TS_INFO_TIME_NOT_AVAILABLE, "timeNotAvailable"},
+    {TS_INFO_UNACCEPTED_POLICY, "unacceptedPolicy"},
+    {TS_INFO_UNACCEPTED_EXTENSION, "unacceptedExtension"},
+    {TS_INFO_ADD_INFO_NOT_AVAILABLE, "addInfoNotAvailable"},
+    {TS_INFO_SYSTEM_FAILURE, "systemFailure"}
+};
+
+
+/*-
+ * This function carries out the following tasks:
+ *      - Checks if there is one and only one signer.
+ *      - Search for the signing certificate in 'certs' and in the response.
+ *      - Check the extended key usage and key usage fields of the signer
+ *      certificate (done by the path validation).
+ *      - Build and validate the certificate path.
+ *      - Check if the certificate path meets the requirements of the
+ *      SigningCertificate ESS signed attribute.
+ *      - Verify the signature value.
+ *      - Returns the signer certificate in 'signer', if 'signer' is not NULL.
+ */
+int TS_RESP_verify_signature(PKCS7 *token, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
+                             X509_STORE *store, X509 **signer_out)
+{
+    STACK_OF(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO) *sinfos = NULL;
+    PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si;
+    STACK_OF(X509) *signers = NULL;
+    X509 *signer;
+    STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
+    char buf[4096];
+    int i, j = 0, ret = 0;
+    BIO *p7bio = NULL;
+
+    /* Some sanity checks first. */
+    if (!token) {
+        TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_VERIFY_SIGNATURE, TS_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (!PKCS7_type_is_signed(token)) {
+        TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_VERIFY_SIGNATURE, TS_R_WRONG_CONTENT_TYPE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    sinfos = PKCS7_get_signer_info(token);
+    if (!sinfos || sk_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_num(sinfos) != 1) {
+        TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_VERIFY_SIGNATURE, TS_R_THERE_MUST_BE_ONE_SIGNER);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    si = sk_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_value(sinfos, 0);
+    if (PKCS7_get_detached(token)) {
+        TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_VERIFY_SIGNATURE, TS_R_NO_CONTENT);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Get hold of the signer certificate, search only internal certificates
+     * if it was requested.
+     */
+    signers = PKCS7_get0_signers(token, certs, 0);
+    if (!signers || sk_X509_num(signers) != 1)
+        goto err;
+    signer = sk_X509_value(signers, 0);
+
+    if (!ts_verify_cert(store, certs, signer, &chain))
+        goto err;
+    if (!ts_check_signing_certs(si, chain))
+        goto err;
+    p7bio = PKCS7_dataInit(token, NULL);
+
+    /* We now have to 'read' from p7bio to calculate digests etc. */
+    while ((i = BIO_read(p7bio, buf, sizeof(buf))) > 0)
+        continue;
+
+    j = PKCS7_signatureVerify(p7bio, token, si, signer);
+    if (j <= 0) {
+        TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_VERIFY_SIGNATURE, TS_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (signer_out) {
+        *signer_out = signer;
+        X509_up_ref(signer);
+    }
+    ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+    BIO_free_all(p7bio);
+    sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free);
+    sk_X509_free(signers);
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The certificate chain is returned in chain. Caller is responsible for
+ * freeing the vector.
+ */
+static int ts_verify_cert(X509_STORE *store, STACK_OF(X509) *untrusted,
+                          X509 *signer, STACK_OF(X509) **chain)
+{
+    X509_STORE_CTX *cert_ctx = NULL;
+    int i;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    *chain = NULL;
+    cert_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
+    if (cert_ctx == NULL) {
+        TSerr(TS_F_TS_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(cert_ctx, store, signer, untrusted))
+        goto end;
+    X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(cert_ctx, X509_PURPOSE_TIMESTAMP_SIGN);
+    i = X509_verify_cert(cert_ctx);
+    if (i <= 0) {
+        int j = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(cert_ctx);
+        TSerr(TS_F_TS_VERIFY_CERT, TS_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR);
+        ERR_add_error_data(2, "Verify error:",
+                           X509_verify_cert_error_string(j));
+        goto err;
+    }
+    *chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(cert_ctx);
+    ret = 1;
+    goto end;
+
+err:
+    ret = 0;
+
+end:
+    X509_STORE_CTX_free(cert_ctx);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int ts_check_signing_certs(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si,
+                                  STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
+{
+    ESS_SIGNING_CERT *ss = ess_get_signing_cert(si);
+    STACK_OF(ESS_CERT_ID) *cert_ids = NULL;
+    X509 *cert;
+    int i = 0;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    if (!ss)
+        goto err;
+    cert_ids = ss->cert_ids;
+    cert = sk_X509_value(chain, 0);
+    if (ts_find_cert(cert_ids, cert) != 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    /*
+     * Check the other certificates of the chain if there are more than one
+     * certificate ids in cert_ids.
+     */
+    if (sk_ESS_CERT_ID_num(cert_ids) > 1) {
+        for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(chain); ++i) {
+            cert = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
+            if (ts_find_cert(cert_ids, cert) < 0)
+                goto err;
+        }
+    }
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    if (!ret)
+        TSerr(TS_F_TS_CHECK_SIGNING_CERTS,
+              TS_R_ESS_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE_ERROR);
+    ESS_SIGNING_CERT_free(ss);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static ESS_SIGNING_CERT *ess_get_signing_cert(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si)
+{
+    ASN1_TYPE *attr;
+    const unsigned char *p;
+    attr = PKCS7_get_signed_attribute(si, NID_id_smime_aa_signingCertificate);
+    if (!attr)
+        return NULL;
+    p = attr->value.sequence->data;
+    return d2i_ESS_SIGNING_CERT(NULL, &p, attr->value.sequence->length);
+}
+
+/* Returns < 0 if certificate is not found, certificate index otherwise. */
+static int ts_find_cert(STACK_OF(ESS_CERT_ID) *cert_ids, X509 *cert)
+{
+    int i;
+    unsigned char cert_sha1[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+
+    if (!cert_ids || !cert)
+        return -1;
+
+    X509_digest(cert, EVP_sha1(), cert_sha1, NULL);
+
+    /* Recompute SHA1 hash of certificate if necessary (side effect). */
+    X509_check_purpose(cert, -1, 0);
+
+    /* Look for cert in the cert_ids vector. */
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_ESS_CERT_ID_num(cert_ids); ++i) {
+        ESS_CERT_ID *cid = sk_ESS_CERT_ID_value(cert_ids, i);
+
+        if (cid->hash->length == SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
+            && memcmp(cid->hash->data, cert_sha1, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) == 0) {
+            ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL *is = cid->issuer_serial;
+            if (!is || !ts_issuer_serial_cmp(is, cert))
+                return i;
+        }
+    }
+
+    return -1;
+}
+
+static int ts_issuer_serial_cmp(ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL *is, X509 *cert)
+{
+    GENERAL_NAME *issuer;
+
+    if (!is || !cert || sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(is->issuer) != 1)
+        return -1;
+
+    issuer = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(is->issuer, 0);
+    if (issuer->type != GEN_DIRNAME
+        || X509_NAME_cmp(issuer->d.dirn, X509_get_issuer_name(cert)))
+        return -1;
+
+    if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(is->serial, X509_get_serialNumber(cert)))
+        return -1;
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Verifies whether 'response' contains a valid response with regards
+ * to the settings of the context:
+ *      - Gives an error message if the TS_TST_INFO is not present.
+ *      - Calls _TS_RESP_verify_token to verify the token content.
+ */
+int TS_RESP_verify_response(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx, TS_RESP *response)
+{
+    PKCS7 *token = response->token;
+    TS_TST_INFO *tst_info = response->tst_info;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    if (!ts_check_status_info(response))
+        goto err;
+    if (!int_ts_RESP_verify_token(ctx, token, tst_info))
+        goto err;
+    ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Tries to extract a TS_TST_INFO structure from the PKCS7 token and
+ * calls the internal int_TS_RESP_verify_token function for verifying it.
+ */
+int TS_RESP_verify_token(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx, PKCS7 *token)
+{
+    TS_TST_INFO *tst_info = PKCS7_to_TS_TST_INFO(token);
+    int ret = 0;
+    if (tst_info) {
+        ret = int_ts_RESP_verify_token(ctx, token, tst_info);
+        TS_TST_INFO_free(tst_info);
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Verifies whether the 'token' contains a valid time stamp token
+ * with regards to the settings of the context. Only those checks are
+ * carried out that are specified in the context:
+ *      - Verifies the signature of the TS_TST_INFO.
+ *      - Checks the version number of the response.
+ *      - Check if the requested and returned policies math.
+ *      - Check if the message imprints are the same.
+ *      - Check if the nonces are the same.
+ *      - Check if the TSA name matches the signer.
+ *      - Check if the TSA name is the expected TSA.
+ */
+static int int_ts_RESP_verify_token(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx,
+                                    PKCS7 *token, TS_TST_INFO *tst_info)
+{
+    X509 *signer = NULL;
+    GENERAL_NAME *tsa_name = tst_info->tsa;
+    X509_ALGOR *md_alg = NULL;
+    unsigned char *imprint = NULL;
+    unsigned imprint_len = 0;
+    int ret = 0;
+    int flags = ctx->flags;
+
+    /* Some options require us to also check the signature */
+    if (((flags & TS_VFY_SIGNER) && tsa_name != NULL)
+            || (flags & TS_VFY_TSA_NAME)) {
+        flags |= TS_VFY_SIGNATURE;
+    }
+
+    if ((flags & TS_VFY_SIGNATURE)
+        && !TS_RESP_verify_signature(token, ctx->certs, ctx->store, &signer))
+        goto err;
+    if ((flags & TS_VFY_VERSION)
+        && TS_TST_INFO_get_version(tst_info) != 1) {
+        TSerr(TS_F_INT_TS_RESP_VERIFY_TOKEN, TS_R_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if ((flags & TS_VFY_POLICY)
+        && !ts_check_policy(ctx->policy, tst_info))
+        goto err;
+    if ((flags & TS_VFY_IMPRINT)
+        && !ts_check_imprints(ctx->md_alg, ctx->imprint, ctx->imprint_len,
+                              tst_info))
+        goto err;
+    if ((flags & TS_VFY_DATA)
+        && (!ts_compute_imprint(ctx->data, tst_info,
+                                &md_alg, &imprint, &imprint_len)
+            || !ts_check_imprints(md_alg, imprint, imprint_len, tst_info)))
+        goto err;
+    if ((flags & TS_VFY_NONCE)
+        && !ts_check_nonces(ctx->nonce, tst_info))
+        goto err;
+    if ((flags & TS_VFY_SIGNER)
+        && tsa_name && !ts_check_signer_name(tsa_name, signer)) {
+        TSerr(TS_F_INT_TS_RESP_VERIFY_TOKEN, TS_R_TSA_NAME_MISMATCH);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if ((flags & TS_VFY_TSA_NAME)
+        && !ts_check_signer_name(ctx->tsa_name, signer)) {
+        TSerr(TS_F_INT_TS_RESP_VERIFY_TOKEN, TS_R_TSA_UNTRUSTED);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+    X509_free(signer);
+    X509_ALGOR_free(md_alg);
+    OPENSSL_free(imprint);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int ts_check_status_info(TS_RESP *response)
+{
+    TS_STATUS_INFO *info = response->status_info;
+    long status = ASN1_INTEGER_get(info->status);
+    const char *status_text = NULL;
+    char *embedded_status_text = NULL;
+    char failure_text[TS_STATUS_BUF_SIZE] = "";
+
+    if (status == 0 || status == 1)
+        return 1;
+
+    /* There was an error, get the description in status_text. */
+    if (0 <= status && status < (long) OSSL_NELEM(ts_status_text))
+        status_text = ts_status_text[status];
+    else
+        status_text = "unknown code";
+
+    if (sk_ASN1_UTF8STRING_num(info->text) > 0
+        && (embedded_status_text = ts_get_status_text(info->text)) == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    /* Fill in failure_text with the failure information. */
+    if (info->failure_info) {
+        int i;
+        int first = 1;
+        for (i = 0; i < (int)OSSL_NELEM(ts_failure_info); ++i) {
+            if (ASN1_BIT_STRING_get_bit(info->failure_info,
+                                        ts_failure_info[i].code)) {
+                if (!first)
+                    strcat(failure_text, ",");
+                else
+                    first = 0;
+                strcat(failure_text, ts_failure_info[i].text);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    if (failure_text[0] == '\0')
+        strcpy(failure_text, "unspecified");
+
+    TSerr(TS_F_TS_CHECK_STATUS_INFO, TS_R_NO_TIME_STAMP_TOKEN);
+    ERR_add_error_data(6,
+                       "status code: ", status_text,
+                       ", status text: ", embedded_status_text ?
+                       embedded_status_text : "unspecified",
+                       ", failure codes: ", failure_text);
+    OPENSSL_free(embedded_status_text);
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static char *ts_get_status_text(STACK_OF(ASN1_UTF8STRING) *text)
+{
+    int i;
+    int length = 0;
+    char *result = NULL;
+    char *p;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_UTF8STRING_num(text); ++i) {
+        ASN1_UTF8STRING *current = sk_ASN1_UTF8STRING_value(text, i);
+        if (ASN1_STRING_length(current) > TS_MAX_STATUS_LENGTH - length - 1)
+            return NULL;
+        length += ASN1_STRING_length(current);
+        length += 1;            /* separator character */
+    }
+    if ((result = OPENSSL_malloc(length)) == NULL) {
+        TSerr(TS_F_TS_GET_STATUS_TEXT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0, p = result; i < sk_ASN1_UTF8STRING_num(text); ++i) {
+        ASN1_UTF8STRING *current = sk_ASN1_UTF8STRING_value(text, i);
+        length = ASN1_STRING_length(current);
+        if (i > 0)
+            *p++ = '/';
+        strncpy(p, (const char *)ASN1_STRING_get0_data(current), length);
+        p += length;
+    }
+    *p = '\0';
+
+    return result;
+}
+
+static int ts_check_policy(const ASN1_OBJECT *req_oid, 
+                           const TS_TST_INFO *tst_info)
+{
+    const ASN1_OBJECT *resp_oid = tst_info->policy_id;
+
+    if (OBJ_cmp(req_oid, resp_oid) != 0) {
+        TSerr(TS_F_TS_CHECK_POLICY, TS_R_POLICY_MISMATCH);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int ts_compute_imprint(BIO *data, TS_TST_INFO *tst_info,
+                              X509_ALGOR **md_alg,
+                              unsigned char **imprint, unsigned *imprint_len)
+{
+    TS_MSG_IMPRINT *msg_imprint = tst_info->msg_imprint;
+    X509_ALGOR *md_alg_resp = msg_imprint->hash_algo;
+    const EVP_MD *md;
+    EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL;
+    unsigned char buffer[4096];
+    int length;
+
+    *md_alg = NULL;
+    *imprint = NULL;
+
+    if ((*md_alg = X509_ALGOR_dup(md_alg_resp)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if ((md = EVP_get_digestbyobj((*md_alg)->algorithm)) == NULL) {
+        TSerr(TS_F_TS_COMPUTE_IMPRINT, TS_R_UNSUPPORTED_MD_ALGORITHM);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    length = EVP_MD_size(md);
+    if (length < 0)
+        goto err;
+    *imprint_len = length;
+    if ((*imprint = OPENSSL_malloc(*imprint_len)) == NULL) {
+        TSerr(TS_F_TS_COMPUTE_IMPRINT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+    if (md_ctx == NULL) {
+        TSerr(TS_F_TS_COMPUTE_IMPRINT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (!EVP_DigestInit(md_ctx, md))
+        goto err;
+    while ((length = BIO_read(data, buffer, sizeof(buffer))) > 0) {
+        if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, buffer, length))
+            goto err;
+    }
+    if (!EVP_DigestFinal(md_ctx, *imprint, NULL))
+        goto err;
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
+
+    return 1;
+ err:
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
+    X509_ALGOR_free(*md_alg);
+    OPENSSL_free(*imprint);
+    *imprint_len = 0;
+    *imprint = 0;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int ts_check_imprints(X509_ALGOR *algor_a,
+                             const unsigned char *imprint_a, unsigned len_a,
+                             TS_TST_INFO *tst_info)
+{
+    TS_MSG_IMPRINT *b = tst_info->msg_imprint;
+    X509_ALGOR *algor_b = b->hash_algo;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    if (algor_a) {
+        if (OBJ_cmp(algor_a->algorithm, algor_b->algorithm))
+            goto err;
+
+        /* The parameter must be NULL in both. */
+        if ((algor_a->parameter
+             && ASN1_TYPE_get(algor_a->parameter) != V_ASN1_NULL)
+            || (algor_b->parameter
+                && ASN1_TYPE_get(algor_b->parameter) != V_ASN1_NULL))
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    ret = len_a == (unsigned)ASN1_STRING_length(b->hashed_msg) &&
+        memcmp(imprint_a, ASN1_STRING_get0_data(b->hashed_msg), len_a) == 0;
+ err:
+    if (!ret)
+        TSerr(TS_F_TS_CHECK_IMPRINTS, TS_R_MESSAGE_IMPRINT_MISMATCH);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int ts_check_nonces(const ASN1_INTEGER *a, TS_TST_INFO *tst_info)
+{
+    const ASN1_INTEGER *b = tst_info->nonce;
+
+    if (!b) {
+        TSerr(TS_F_TS_CHECK_NONCES, TS_R_NONCE_NOT_RETURNED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* No error if a nonce is returned without being requested. */
+    if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(a, b) != 0) {
+        TSerr(TS_F_TS_CHECK_NONCES, TS_R_NONCE_MISMATCH);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check if the specified TSA name matches either the subject or one of the
+ * subject alternative names of the TSA certificate.
+ */
+static int ts_check_signer_name(GENERAL_NAME *tsa_name, X509 *signer)
+{
+    STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *gen_names = NULL;
+    int idx = -1;
+    int found = 0;
+
+    if (tsa_name->type == GEN_DIRNAME
+        && X509_name_cmp(tsa_name->d.dirn, X509_get_subject_name(signer)) == 0)
+        return 1;
+    gen_names = X509_get_ext_d2i(signer, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, &idx);
+    while (gen_names != NULL) {
+        found = ts_find_name(gen_names, tsa_name) >= 0;
+        if (found)
+            break;
+        /*
+         * Get the next subject alternative name, although there should be no
+         * more than one.
+         */
+        GENERAL_NAMES_free(gen_names);
+        gen_names = X509_get_ext_d2i(signer, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, &idx);
+    }
+    GENERAL_NAMES_free(gen_names);
+
+    return found;
+}
+
+/* Returns 1 if name is in gen_names, 0 otherwise. */
+static int ts_find_name(STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *gen_names, GENERAL_NAME *name)
+{
+    int i, found;
+    for (i = 0, found = 0; !found && i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gen_names); ++i) {
+        GENERAL_NAME *current = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gen_names, i);
+        found = GENERAL_NAME_cmp(current, name) == 0;
+    }
+    return found ? i - 1 : -1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ts/ts_verify_ctx.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ts/ts_verify_ctx.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d4792ee
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ts/ts_verify_ctx.c
@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/ts.h>
+#include "ts_lcl.h"
+
+TS_VERIFY_CTX *TS_VERIFY_CTX_new(void)
+{
+    TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx));
+
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        TSerr(TS_F_TS_VERIFY_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return ctx;
+}
+
+void TS_VERIFY_CTX_init(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    OPENSSL_assert(ctx != NULL);
+    memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
+}
+
+void TS_VERIFY_CTX_free(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    if (!ctx)
+        return;
+
+    TS_VERIFY_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
+    OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+}
+
+int TS_VERIFY_CTX_add_flags(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx, int f)
+{
+    ctx->flags |= f;
+    return ctx->flags;
+}
+
+int TS_VERIFY_CTX_set_flags(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx, int f)
+{
+    ctx->flags = f;
+    return ctx->flags;
+}
+
+BIO *TS_VERIFY_CTX_set_data(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx, BIO *b)
+{
+    ctx->data = b;
+    return ctx->data;
+}
+
+X509_STORE *TS_VERIFY_CTX_set_store(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *s)
+{
+    ctx->store = s;
+    return ctx->store;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509) *TS_VERIFY_CTS_set_certs(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx,
+                                        STACK_OF(X509) *certs)
+{
+    ctx->certs = certs;
+    return ctx->certs;
+}
+
+unsigned char *TS_VERIFY_CTX_set_imprint(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx,
+                                         unsigned char *hexstr, long len)
+{
+    ctx->imprint = hexstr;
+    ctx->imprint_len = len;
+    return ctx->imprint;
+}
+
+void TS_VERIFY_CTX_cleanup(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    if (!ctx)
+        return;
+
+    X509_STORE_free(ctx->store);
+    sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->certs, X509_free);
+
+    ASN1_OBJECT_free(ctx->policy);
+
+    X509_ALGOR_free(ctx->md_alg);
+    OPENSSL_free(ctx->imprint);
+
+    BIO_free_all(ctx->data);
+
+    ASN1_INTEGER_free(ctx->nonce);
+
+    GENERAL_NAME_free(ctx->tsa_name);
+
+    TS_VERIFY_CTX_init(ctx);
+}
+
+TS_VERIFY_CTX *TS_REQ_to_TS_VERIFY_CTX(TS_REQ *req, TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    TS_VERIFY_CTX *ret = ctx;
+    ASN1_OBJECT *policy;
+    TS_MSG_IMPRINT *imprint;
+    X509_ALGOR *md_alg;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *msg;
+    const ASN1_INTEGER *nonce;
+
+    OPENSSL_assert(req != NULL);
+    if (ret)
+        TS_VERIFY_CTX_cleanup(ret);
+    else if ((ret = TS_VERIFY_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+
+    ret->flags = TS_VFY_ALL_IMPRINT & ~(TS_VFY_TSA_NAME | TS_VFY_SIGNATURE);
+
+    if ((policy = req->policy_id) != NULL) {
+        if ((ret->policy = OBJ_dup(policy)) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+    } else
+        ret->flags &= ~TS_VFY_POLICY;
+
+    imprint = req->msg_imprint;
+    md_alg = imprint->hash_algo;
+    if ((ret->md_alg = X509_ALGOR_dup(md_alg)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    msg = imprint->hashed_msg;
+    ret->imprint_len = ASN1_STRING_length(msg);
+    if ((ret->imprint = OPENSSL_malloc(ret->imprint_len)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    memcpy(ret->imprint, ASN1_STRING_get0_data(msg), ret->imprint_len);
+
+    if ((nonce = req->nonce) != NULL) {
+        if ((ret->nonce = ASN1_INTEGER_dup(nonce)) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+    } else
+        ret->flags &= ~TS_VFY_NONCE;
+
+    return ret;
+ err:
+    if (ctx)
+        TS_VERIFY_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
+    else
+        TS_VERIFY_CTX_free(ret);
+    return NULL;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/txt_db/build.info b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/txt_db/build.info
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4379d5f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/txt_db/build.info
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+LIBS=../../libcrypto
+SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=txt_db.c
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/txt_db/txt_db.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/txt_db/txt_db.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cf932a5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/txt_db/txt_db.c
@@ -0,0 +1,318 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/txt_db.h>
+
+#undef BUFSIZE
+#define BUFSIZE 512
+
+TXT_DB *TXT_DB_read(BIO *in, int num)
+{
+    TXT_DB *ret = NULL;
+    int esc = 0;
+    long ln = 0;
+    int i, add, n;
+    int size = BUFSIZE;
+    int offset = 0;
+    char *p, *f;
+    OPENSSL_STRING *pp;
+    BUF_MEM *buf = NULL;
+
+    if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, size))
+        goto err;
+
+    if ((ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ret))) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    ret->num_fields = num;
+    ret->index = NULL;
+    ret->qual = NULL;
+    if ((ret->data = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_new_null()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if ((ret->index = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ret->index) * num)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if ((ret->qual = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*(ret->qual)) * num)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
+        ret->index[i] = NULL;
+        ret->qual[i] = NULL;
+    }
+
+    add = (num + 1) * sizeof(char *);
+    buf->data[size - 1] = '\0';
+    offset = 0;
+    for (;;) {
+        if (offset != 0) {
+            size += BUFSIZE;
+            if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, size))
+                goto err;
+        }
+        buf->data[offset] = '\0';
+        BIO_gets(in, &(buf->data[offset]), size - offset);
+        ln++;
+        if (buf->data[offset] == '\0')
+            break;
+        if ((offset == 0) && (buf->data[0] == '#'))
+            continue;
+        i = strlen(&(buf->data[offset]));
+        offset += i;
+        if (buf->data[offset - 1] != '\n')
+            continue;
+        else {
+            buf->data[offset - 1] = '\0'; /* blat the '\n' */
+            if ((p = OPENSSL_malloc(add + offset)) == NULL)
+                goto err;
+            offset = 0;
+        }
+        pp = (char **)p;
+        p += add;
+        n = 0;
+        pp[n++] = p;
+        i = 0;
+        f = buf->data;
+
+        esc = 0;
+        for (;;) {
+            if (*f == '\0')
+                break;
+            if (*f == '\t') {
+                if (esc)
+                    p--;
+                else {
+                    *(p++) = '\0';
+                    f++;
+                    if (n >= num)
+                        break;
+                    pp[n++] = p;
+                    continue;
+                }
+            }
+            esc = (*f == '\\');
+            *(p++) = *(f++);
+        }
+        *(p++) = '\0';
+        if ((n != num) || (*f != '\0')) {
+            OPENSSL_free(pp);
+            ret->error = DB_ERROR_WRONG_NUM_FIELDS;
+            goto err;
+        }
+        pp[n] = p;
+        if (!sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_push(ret->data, pp)) {
+            OPENSSL_free(pp);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+    BUF_MEM_free(buf);
+    return ret;
+ err:
+    BUF_MEM_free(buf);
+    if (ret != NULL) {
+        sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_free(ret->data);
+        OPENSSL_free(ret->index);
+        OPENSSL_free(ret->qual);
+        OPENSSL_free(ret);
+    }
+    return (NULL);
+}
+
+OPENSSL_STRING *TXT_DB_get_by_index(TXT_DB *db, int idx,
+                                    OPENSSL_STRING *value)
+{
+    OPENSSL_STRING *ret;
+    LHASH_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *lh;
+
+    if (idx >= db->num_fields) {
+        db->error = DB_ERROR_INDEX_OUT_OF_RANGE;
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+    lh = db->index[idx];
+    if (lh == NULL) {
+        db->error = DB_ERROR_NO_INDEX;
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+    ret = lh_OPENSSL_STRING_retrieve(lh, value);
+    db->error = DB_ERROR_OK;
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+int TXT_DB_create_index(TXT_DB *db, int field, int (*qual) (OPENSSL_STRING *),
+                        OPENSSL_LH_HASHFUNC hash, OPENSSL_LH_COMPFUNC cmp)
+{
+    LHASH_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *idx;
+    OPENSSL_STRING *r, *k;
+    int i, n;
+
+    if (field >= db->num_fields) {
+        db->error = DB_ERROR_INDEX_OUT_OF_RANGE;
+        return (0);
+    }
+    /* FIXME: we lose type checking at this point */
+    if ((idx = (LHASH_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *)OPENSSL_LH_new(hash, cmp)) == NULL) {
+        db->error = DB_ERROR_MALLOC;
+        return (0);
+    }
+    n = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_num(db->data);
+    for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+        r = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->data, i);
+        if ((qual != NULL) && (qual(r) == 0))
+            continue;
+        if ((k = lh_OPENSSL_STRING_insert(idx, r)) != NULL) {
+            db->error = DB_ERROR_INDEX_CLASH;
+            db->arg1 = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_find(db->data, k);
+            db->arg2 = i;
+            lh_OPENSSL_STRING_free(idx);
+            return (0);
+        }
+        if (lh_OPENSSL_STRING_retrieve(idx, r) == NULL) {
+            db->error = DB_ERROR_MALLOC;
+            lh_OPENSSL_STRING_free(idx);
+            return (0);
+        }
+    }
+    lh_OPENSSL_STRING_free(db->index[field]);
+    db->index[field] = idx;
+    db->qual[field] = qual;
+    return (1);
+}
+
+long TXT_DB_write(BIO *out, TXT_DB *db)
+{
+    long i, j, n, nn, l, tot = 0;
+    char *p, **pp, *f;
+    BUF_MEM *buf = NULL;
+    long ret = -1;
+
+    if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    n = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_num(db->data);
+    nn = db->num_fields;
+    for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+        pp = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->data, i);
+
+        l = 0;
+        for (j = 0; j < nn; j++) {
+            if (pp[j] != NULL)
+                l += strlen(pp[j]);
+        }
+        if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, (int)(l * 2 + nn)))
+            goto err;
+
+        p = buf->data;
+        for (j = 0; j < nn; j++) {
+            f = pp[j];
+            if (f != NULL)
+                for (;;) {
+                    if (*f == '\0')
+                        break;
+                    if (*f == '\t')
+                        *(p++) = '\\';
+                    *(p++) = *(f++);
+                }
+            *(p++) = '\t';
+        }
+        p[-1] = '\n';
+        j = p - buf->data;
+        if (BIO_write(out, buf->data, (int)j) != j)
+            goto err;
+        tot += j;
+    }
+    ret = tot;
+ err:
+    BUF_MEM_free(buf);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+int TXT_DB_insert(TXT_DB *db, OPENSSL_STRING *row)
+{
+    int i;
+    OPENSSL_STRING *r;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < db->num_fields; i++) {
+        if (db->index[i] != NULL) {
+            if ((db->qual[i] != NULL) && (db->qual[i] (row) == 0))
+                continue;
+            r = lh_OPENSSL_STRING_retrieve(db->index[i], row);
+            if (r != NULL) {
+                db->error = DB_ERROR_INDEX_CLASH;
+                db->arg1 = i;
+                db->arg_row = r;
+                goto err;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0; i < db->num_fields; i++) {
+        if (db->index[i] != NULL) {
+            if ((db->qual[i] != NULL) && (db->qual[i] (row) == 0))
+                continue;
+            (void)lh_OPENSSL_STRING_insert(db->index[i], row);
+            if (lh_OPENSSL_STRING_retrieve(db->index[i], row) == NULL)
+                goto err1;
+        }
+    }
+    if (!sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_push(db->data, row))
+        goto err1;
+    return (1);
+
+ err1:
+    db->error = DB_ERROR_MALLOC;
+    while (i-- > 0) {
+        if (db->index[i] != NULL) {
+            if ((db->qual[i] != NULL) && (db->qual[i] (row) == 0))
+                continue;
+            (void)lh_OPENSSL_STRING_delete(db->index[i], row);
+        }
+    }
+ err:
+    return (0);
+}
+
+void TXT_DB_free(TXT_DB *db)
+{
+    int i, n;
+    char **p, *max;
+
+    if (db == NULL)
+        return;
+
+    if (db->index != NULL) {
+        for (i = db->num_fields - 1; i >= 0; i--)
+            lh_OPENSSL_STRING_free(db->index[i]);
+        OPENSSL_free(db->index);
+    }
+    OPENSSL_free(db->qual);
+    if (db->data != NULL) {
+        for (i = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_num(db->data) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+            /*
+             * check if any 'fields' have been allocated from outside of the
+             * initial block
+             */
+            p = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->data, i);
+            max = p[db->num_fields]; /* last address */
+            if (max == NULL) {  /* new row */
+                for (n = 0; n < db->num_fields; n++)
+                    OPENSSL_free(p[n]);
+            } else {
+                for (n = 0; n < db->num_fields; n++) {
+                    if (((p[n] < (char *)p) || (p[n] > max)))
+                        OPENSSL_free(p[n]);
+                }
+            }
+            OPENSSL_free(sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->data, i));
+        }
+        sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_free(db->data);
+    }
+    OPENSSL_free(db);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ui/build.info b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ui/build.info
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fcb45af
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ui/build.info
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+LIBS=../../libcrypto
+SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
+        ui_err.c ui_lib.c ui_openssl.c ui_util.c
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ui/ui_err.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ui/ui_err.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c8640fe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ui/ui_err.c
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+/*
+ * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/ui.h>
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+
+# define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_UI,func,0)
+# define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_UI,0,reason)
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA UI_str_functs[] = {
+    {ERR_FUNC(UI_F_CLOSE_CONSOLE), "close_console"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(UI_F_ECHO_CONSOLE), "echo_console"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(UI_F_GENERAL_ALLOCATE_BOOLEAN), "general_allocate_boolean"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(UI_F_GENERAL_ALLOCATE_PROMPT), "general_allocate_prompt"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(UI_F_NOECHO_CONSOLE), "noecho_console"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(UI_F_OPEN_CONSOLE), "open_console"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(UI_F_UI_CREATE_METHOD), "UI_create_method"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(UI_F_UI_CTRL), "UI_ctrl"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(UI_F_UI_DUP_ERROR_STRING), "UI_dup_error_string"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(UI_F_UI_DUP_INFO_STRING), "UI_dup_info_string"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(UI_F_UI_DUP_INPUT_BOOLEAN), "UI_dup_input_boolean"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(UI_F_UI_DUP_INPUT_STRING), "UI_dup_input_string"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(UI_F_UI_DUP_VERIFY_STRING), "UI_dup_verify_string"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(UI_F_UI_GET0_RESULT), "UI_get0_result"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(UI_F_UI_NEW_METHOD), "UI_new_method"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(UI_F_UI_PROCESS), "UI_process"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(UI_F_UI_SET_RESULT), "UI_set_result"},
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA UI_str_reasons[] = {
+    {ERR_REASON(UI_R_COMMON_OK_AND_CANCEL_CHARACTERS),
+     "common ok and cancel characters"},
+    {ERR_REASON(UI_R_INDEX_TOO_LARGE), "index too large"},
+    {ERR_REASON(UI_R_INDEX_TOO_SMALL), "index too small"},
+    {ERR_REASON(UI_R_NO_RESULT_BUFFER), "no result buffer"},
+    {ERR_REASON(UI_R_PROCESSING_ERROR), "processing error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(UI_R_RESULT_TOO_LARGE), "result too large"},
+    {ERR_REASON(UI_R_RESULT_TOO_SMALL), "result too small"},
+    {ERR_REASON(UI_R_SYSASSIGN_ERROR), "sys$assign error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(UI_R_SYSDASSGN_ERROR), "sys$dassgn error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(UI_R_SYSQIOW_ERROR), "sys$qiow error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(UI_R_UNKNOWN_CONTROL_COMMAND), "unknown control command"},
+    {ERR_REASON(UI_R_UNKNOWN_TTYGET_ERRNO_VALUE),
+     "unknown ttyget errno value"},
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+
+#endif
+
+int ERR_load_UI_strings(void)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+
+    if (ERR_func_error_string(UI_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) {
+        ERR_load_strings(0, UI_str_functs);
+        ERR_load_strings(0, UI_str_reasons);
+    }
+#endif
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ui/ui_lib.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ui/ui_lib.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..464dac4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ui/ui_lib.c
@@ -0,0 +1,812 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/e_os2.h>
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/ui.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include "ui_locl.h"
+
+UI *UI_new(void)
+{
+    return (UI_new_method(NULL));
+}
+
+UI *UI_new_method(const UI_METHOD *method)
+{
+    UI *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
+
+    if (ret == NULL) {
+        UIerr(UI_F_UI_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
+    if (ret->lock == NULL) {
+        UIerr(UI_F_UI_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        OPENSSL_free(ret);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    if (method == NULL)
+        ret->meth = UI_get_default_method();
+    else
+        ret->meth = method;
+
+    if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_UI, ret, &ret->ex_data)) {
+        OPENSSL_free(ret);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static void free_string(UI_STRING *uis)
+{
+    if (uis->flags & OUT_STRING_FREEABLE) {
+        OPENSSL_free((char *)uis->out_string);
+        switch (uis->type) {
+        case UIT_BOOLEAN:
+            OPENSSL_free((char *)uis->_.boolean_data.action_desc);
+            OPENSSL_free((char *)uis->_.boolean_data.ok_chars);
+            OPENSSL_free((char *)uis->_.boolean_data.cancel_chars);
+            break;
+        default:
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    OPENSSL_free(uis);
+}
+
+void UI_free(UI *ui)
+{
+    if (ui == NULL)
+        return;
+    sk_UI_STRING_pop_free(ui->strings, free_string);
+    CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_UI, ui, &ui->ex_data);
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(ui->lock);
+    OPENSSL_free(ui);
+}
+
+static int allocate_string_stack(UI *ui)
+{
+    if (ui->strings == NULL) {
+        ui->strings = sk_UI_STRING_new_null();
+        if (ui->strings == NULL) {
+            return -1;
+        }
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static UI_STRING *general_allocate_prompt(UI *ui, const char *prompt,
+                                          int prompt_freeable,
+                                          enum UI_string_types type,
+                                          int input_flags, char *result_buf)
+{
+    UI_STRING *ret = NULL;
+
+    if (prompt == NULL) {
+        UIerr(UI_F_GENERAL_ALLOCATE_PROMPT, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+    } else if ((type == UIT_PROMPT || type == UIT_VERIFY
+                || type == UIT_BOOLEAN) && result_buf == NULL) {
+        UIerr(UI_F_GENERAL_ALLOCATE_PROMPT, UI_R_NO_RESULT_BUFFER);
+    } else if ((ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ret))) != NULL) {
+        ret->out_string = prompt;
+        ret->flags = prompt_freeable ? OUT_STRING_FREEABLE : 0;
+        ret->input_flags = input_flags;
+        ret->type = type;
+        ret->result_buf = result_buf;
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int general_allocate_string(UI *ui, const char *prompt,
+                                   int prompt_freeable,
+                                   enum UI_string_types type, int input_flags,
+                                   char *result_buf, int minsize, int maxsize,
+                                   const char *test_buf)
+{
+    int ret = -1;
+    UI_STRING *s = general_allocate_prompt(ui, prompt, prompt_freeable,
+                                           type, input_flags, result_buf);
+
+    if (s != NULL) {
+        if (allocate_string_stack(ui) >= 0) {
+            s->_.string_data.result_minsize = minsize;
+            s->_.string_data.result_maxsize = maxsize;
+            s->_.string_data.test_buf = test_buf;
+            ret = sk_UI_STRING_push(ui->strings, s);
+            /* sk_push() returns 0 on error.  Let's adapt that */
+            if (ret <= 0) {
+                ret--;
+                free_string(s);
+            }
+        } else
+            free_string(s);
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int general_allocate_boolean(UI *ui,
+                                    const char *prompt,
+                                    const char *action_desc,
+                                    const char *ok_chars,
+                                    const char *cancel_chars,
+                                    int prompt_freeable,
+                                    enum UI_string_types type,
+                                    int input_flags, char *result_buf)
+{
+    int ret = -1;
+    UI_STRING *s;
+    const char *p;
+
+    if (ok_chars == NULL) {
+        UIerr(UI_F_GENERAL_ALLOCATE_BOOLEAN, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+    } else if (cancel_chars == NULL) {
+        UIerr(UI_F_GENERAL_ALLOCATE_BOOLEAN, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+    } else {
+        for (p = ok_chars; *p != '\0'; p++) {
+            if (strchr(cancel_chars, *p) != NULL) {
+                UIerr(UI_F_GENERAL_ALLOCATE_BOOLEAN,
+                      UI_R_COMMON_OK_AND_CANCEL_CHARACTERS);
+            }
+        }
+
+        s = general_allocate_prompt(ui, prompt, prompt_freeable,
+                                    type, input_flags, result_buf);
+
+        if (s != NULL) {
+            if (allocate_string_stack(ui) >= 0) {
+                s->_.boolean_data.action_desc = action_desc;
+                s->_.boolean_data.ok_chars = ok_chars;
+                s->_.boolean_data.cancel_chars = cancel_chars;
+                ret = sk_UI_STRING_push(ui->strings, s);
+                /*
+                 * sk_push() returns 0 on error. Let's adapt that
+                 */
+                if (ret <= 0) {
+                    ret--;
+                    free_string(s);
+                }
+            } else
+                free_string(s);
+        }
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the index to the place in the stack or -1 for error.  Uses a
+ * direct reference to the prompt.
+ */
+int UI_add_input_string(UI *ui, const char *prompt, int flags,
+                        char *result_buf, int minsize, int maxsize)
+{
+    return general_allocate_string(ui, prompt, 0,
+                                   UIT_PROMPT, flags, result_buf, minsize,
+                                   maxsize, NULL);
+}
+
+/* Same as UI_add_input_string(), excepts it takes a copy of the prompt */
+int UI_dup_input_string(UI *ui, const char *prompt, int flags,
+                        char *result_buf, int minsize, int maxsize)
+{
+    char *prompt_copy = NULL;
+
+    if (prompt != NULL) {
+        prompt_copy = OPENSSL_strdup(prompt);
+        if (prompt_copy == NULL) {
+            UIerr(UI_F_UI_DUP_INPUT_STRING, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    return general_allocate_string(ui, prompt_copy, 1,
+                                   UIT_PROMPT, flags, result_buf, minsize,
+                                   maxsize, NULL);
+}
+
+int UI_add_verify_string(UI *ui, const char *prompt, int flags,
+                         char *result_buf, int minsize, int maxsize,
+                         const char *test_buf)
+{
+    return general_allocate_string(ui, prompt, 0,
+                                   UIT_VERIFY, flags, result_buf, minsize,
+                                   maxsize, test_buf);
+}
+
+int UI_dup_verify_string(UI *ui, const char *prompt, int flags,
+                         char *result_buf, int minsize, int maxsize,
+                         const char *test_buf)
+{
+    char *prompt_copy = NULL;
+
+    if (prompt != NULL) {
+        prompt_copy = OPENSSL_strdup(prompt);
+        if (prompt_copy == NULL) {
+            UIerr(UI_F_UI_DUP_VERIFY_STRING, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            return -1;
+        }
+    }
+
+    return general_allocate_string(ui, prompt_copy, 1,
+                                   UIT_VERIFY, flags, result_buf, minsize,
+                                   maxsize, test_buf);
+}
+
+int UI_add_input_boolean(UI *ui, const char *prompt, const char *action_desc,
+                         const char *ok_chars, const char *cancel_chars,
+                         int flags, char *result_buf)
+{
+    return general_allocate_boolean(ui, prompt, action_desc,
+                                    ok_chars, cancel_chars, 0, UIT_BOOLEAN,
+                                    flags, result_buf);
+}
+
+int UI_dup_input_boolean(UI *ui, const char *prompt, const char *action_desc,
+                         const char *ok_chars, const char *cancel_chars,
+                         int flags, char *result_buf)
+{
+    char *prompt_copy = NULL;
+    char *action_desc_copy = NULL;
+    char *ok_chars_copy = NULL;
+    char *cancel_chars_copy = NULL;
+
+    if (prompt != NULL) {
+        prompt_copy = OPENSSL_strdup(prompt);
+        if (prompt_copy == NULL) {
+            UIerr(UI_F_UI_DUP_INPUT_BOOLEAN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (action_desc != NULL) {
+        action_desc_copy = OPENSSL_strdup(action_desc);
+        if (action_desc_copy == NULL) {
+            UIerr(UI_F_UI_DUP_INPUT_BOOLEAN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (ok_chars != NULL) {
+        ok_chars_copy = OPENSSL_strdup(ok_chars);
+        if (ok_chars_copy == NULL) {
+            UIerr(UI_F_UI_DUP_INPUT_BOOLEAN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (cancel_chars != NULL) {
+        cancel_chars_copy = OPENSSL_strdup(cancel_chars);
+        if (cancel_chars_copy == NULL) {
+            UIerr(UI_F_UI_DUP_INPUT_BOOLEAN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    return general_allocate_boolean(ui, prompt_copy, action_desc_copy,
+                                    ok_chars_copy, cancel_chars_copy, 1,
+                                    UIT_BOOLEAN, flags, result_buf);
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_free(prompt_copy);
+    OPENSSL_free(action_desc_copy);
+    OPENSSL_free(ok_chars_copy);
+    OPENSSL_free(cancel_chars_copy);
+    return -1;
+}
+
+int UI_add_info_string(UI *ui, const char *text)
+{
+    return general_allocate_string(ui, text, 0, UIT_INFO, 0, NULL, 0, 0,
+                                   NULL);
+}
+
+int UI_dup_info_string(UI *ui, const char *text)
+{
+    char *text_copy = NULL;
+
+    if (text != NULL) {
+        text_copy = OPENSSL_strdup(text);
+        if (text_copy == NULL) {
+            UIerr(UI_F_UI_DUP_INFO_STRING, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            return -1;
+        }
+    }
+
+    return general_allocate_string(ui, text_copy, 1, UIT_INFO, 0, NULL,
+                                   0, 0, NULL);
+}
+
+int UI_add_error_string(UI *ui, const char *text)
+{
+    return general_allocate_string(ui, text, 0, UIT_ERROR, 0, NULL, 0, 0,
+                                   NULL);
+}
+
+int UI_dup_error_string(UI *ui, const char *text)
+{
+    char *text_copy = NULL;
+
+    if (text != NULL) {
+        text_copy = OPENSSL_strdup(text);
+        if (text_copy == NULL) {
+            UIerr(UI_F_UI_DUP_ERROR_STRING, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            return -1;
+        }
+    }
+    return general_allocate_string(ui, text_copy, 1, UIT_ERROR, 0, NULL,
+                                   0, 0, NULL);
+}
+
+char *UI_construct_prompt(UI *ui, const char *object_desc,
+                          const char *object_name)
+{
+    char *prompt = NULL;
+
+    if (ui->meth->ui_construct_prompt != NULL)
+        prompt = ui->meth->ui_construct_prompt(ui, object_desc, object_name);
+    else {
+        char prompt1[] = "Enter ";
+        char prompt2[] = " for ";
+        char prompt3[] = ":";
+        int len = 0;
+
+        if (object_desc == NULL)
+            return NULL;
+        len = sizeof(prompt1) - 1 + strlen(object_desc);
+        if (object_name != NULL)
+            len += sizeof(prompt2) - 1 + strlen(object_name);
+        len += sizeof(prompt3) - 1;
+
+        prompt = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1);
+        if (prompt == NULL)
+            return NULL;
+        OPENSSL_strlcpy(prompt, prompt1, len + 1);
+        OPENSSL_strlcat(prompt, object_desc, len + 1);
+        if (object_name != NULL) {
+            OPENSSL_strlcat(prompt, prompt2, len + 1);
+            OPENSSL_strlcat(prompt, object_name, len + 1);
+        }
+        OPENSSL_strlcat(prompt, prompt3, len + 1);
+    }
+    return prompt;
+}
+
+void *UI_add_user_data(UI *ui, void *user_data)
+{
+    void *old_data = ui->user_data;
+    ui->user_data = user_data;
+    return old_data;
+}
+
+void *UI_get0_user_data(UI *ui)
+{
+    return ui->user_data;
+}
+
+const char *UI_get0_result(UI *ui, int i)
+{
+    if (i < 0) {
+        UIerr(UI_F_UI_GET0_RESULT, UI_R_INDEX_TOO_SMALL);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    if (i >= sk_UI_STRING_num(ui->strings)) {
+        UIerr(UI_F_UI_GET0_RESULT, UI_R_INDEX_TOO_LARGE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    return UI_get0_result_string(sk_UI_STRING_value(ui->strings, i));
+}
+
+static int print_error(const char *str, size_t len, UI *ui)
+{
+    UI_STRING uis;
+
+    memset(&uis, 0, sizeof(uis));
+    uis.type = UIT_ERROR;
+    uis.out_string = str;
+
+    if (ui->meth->ui_write_string != NULL
+        && ui->meth->ui_write_string(ui, &uis) <= 0)
+        return -1;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int UI_process(UI *ui)
+{
+    int i, ok = 0;
+    const char *state = "processing";
+
+    if (ui->meth->ui_open_session != NULL
+        && ui->meth->ui_open_session(ui) <= 0) {
+        state = "opening session";
+        ok = -1;
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (ui->flags & UI_FLAG_PRINT_ERRORS)
+        ERR_print_errors_cb((int (*)(const char *, size_t, void *))
+                            print_error, (void *)ui);
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_UI_STRING_num(ui->strings); i++) {
+        if (ui->meth->ui_write_string != NULL
+            && (ui->meth->ui_write_string(ui,
+                                          sk_UI_STRING_value(ui->strings, i))
+                <= 0))
+        {
+            state = "writing strings";
+            ok = -1;
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (ui->meth->ui_flush != NULL)
+        switch (ui->meth->ui_flush(ui)) {
+        case -1:               /* Interrupt/Cancel/something... */
+            ok = -2;
+            goto err;
+        case 0:                /* Errors */
+            state = "flushing";
+            ok = -1;
+            goto err;
+        default:               /* Success */
+            ok = 0;
+            break;
+        }
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_UI_STRING_num(ui->strings); i++) {
+        if (ui->meth->ui_read_string != NULL) {
+            switch (ui->meth->ui_read_string(ui,
+                                             sk_UI_STRING_value(ui->strings,
+                                                                i))) {
+            case -1:           /* Interrupt/Cancel/something... */
+                ok = -2;
+                goto err;
+            case 0:            /* Errors */
+                state = "reading strings";
+                ok = -1;
+                goto err;
+            default:           /* Success */
+                ok = 0;
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    state = NULL;
+ err:
+    if (ui->meth->ui_close_session != NULL
+        && ui->meth->ui_close_session(ui) <= 0) {
+        if (state == NULL)
+            state = "closing session";
+        ok = -1;
+    }
+
+    if (ok == -1) {
+        UIerr(UI_F_UI_PROCESS, UI_R_PROCESSING_ERROR);
+        ERR_add_error_data(2, "while ", state);
+    }
+    return ok;
+}
+
+int UI_ctrl(UI *ui, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f) (void))
+{
+    if (ui == NULL) {
+        UIerr(UI_F_UI_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+        return -1;
+    }
+    switch (cmd) {
+    case UI_CTRL_PRINT_ERRORS:
+        {
+            int save_flag = ! !(ui->flags & UI_FLAG_PRINT_ERRORS);
+            if (i)
+                ui->flags |= UI_FLAG_PRINT_ERRORS;
+            else
+                ui->flags &= ~UI_FLAG_PRINT_ERRORS;
+            return save_flag;
+        }
+    case UI_CTRL_IS_REDOABLE:
+        return ! !(ui->flags & UI_FLAG_REDOABLE);
+    default:
+        break;
+    }
+    UIerr(UI_F_UI_CTRL, UI_R_UNKNOWN_CONTROL_COMMAND);
+    return -1;
+}
+
+int UI_set_ex_data(UI *r, int idx, void *arg)
+{
+    return (CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&r->ex_data, idx, arg));
+}
+
+void *UI_get_ex_data(UI *r, int idx)
+{
+    return (CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&r->ex_data, idx));
+}
+
+const UI_METHOD *UI_get_method(UI *ui)
+{
+    return ui->meth;
+}
+
+const UI_METHOD *UI_set_method(UI *ui, const UI_METHOD *meth)
+{
+    ui->meth = meth;
+    return ui->meth;
+}
+
+UI_METHOD *UI_create_method(const char *name)
+{
+    UI_METHOD *ui_method = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ui_method));
+
+    if (ui_method != NULL) {
+        ui_method->name = OPENSSL_strdup(name);
+        if (ui_method->name == NULL) {
+            OPENSSL_free(ui_method);
+            UIerr(UI_F_UI_CREATE_METHOD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+    }
+    return ui_method;
+}
+
+/*
+ * BIG FSCKING WARNING!!!! If you use this on a statically allocated method
+ * (that is, it hasn't been allocated using UI_create_method(), you deserve
+ * anything Murphy can throw at you and more! You have been warned.
+ */
+void UI_destroy_method(UI_METHOD *ui_method)
+{
+    OPENSSL_free(ui_method->name);
+    ui_method->name = NULL;
+    OPENSSL_free(ui_method);
+}
+
+int UI_method_set_opener(UI_METHOD *method, int (*opener) (UI *ui))
+{
+    if (method != NULL) {
+        method->ui_open_session = opener;
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return -1;
+}
+
+int UI_method_set_writer(UI_METHOD *method,
+                         int (*writer) (UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis))
+{
+    if (method != NULL) {
+        method->ui_write_string = writer;
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return -1;
+}
+
+int UI_method_set_flusher(UI_METHOD *method, int (*flusher) (UI *ui))
+{
+    if (method != NULL) {
+        method->ui_flush = flusher;
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return -1;
+}
+
+int UI_method_set_reader(UI_METHOD *method,
+                         int (*reader) (UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis))
+{
+    if (method != NULL) {
+        method->ui_read_string = reader;
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return -1;
+}
+
+int UI_method_set_closer(UI_METHOD *method, int (*closer) (UI *ui))
+{
+    if (method != NULL) {
+        method->ui_close_session = closer;
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return -1;
+}
+
+int UI_method_set_prompt_constructor(UI_METHOD *method,
+                                     char *(*prompt_constructor) (UI *ui,
+                                                                  const char
+                                                                  *object_desc,
+                                                                  const char
+                                                                  *object_name))
+{
+    if (method != NULL) {
+        method->ui_construct_prompt = prompt_constructor;
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return -1;
+}
+
+int (*UI_method_get_opener(UI_METHOD *method)) (UI *)
+{
+    if (method != NULL)
+        return method->ui_open_session;
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+int (*UI_method_get_writer(UI_METHOD *method)) (UI *, UI_STRING *)
+{
+    if (method != NULL)
+        return method->ui_write_string;
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+int (*UI_method_get_flusher(UI_METHOD *method)) (UI *)
+{
+    if (method != NULL)
+        return method->ui_flush;
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+int (*UI_method_get_reader(UI_METHOD *method)) (UI *, UI_STRING *)
+{
+    if (method != NULL)
+        return method->ui_read_string;
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+int (*UI_method_get_closer(UI_METHOD *method)) (UI *)
+{
+    if (method != NULL)
+        return method->ui_close_session;
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+char *(*UI_method_get_prompt_constructor(UI_METHOD *method)) (UI *,
+                                                              const char *,
+                                                              const char *)
+{
+    if (method != NULL)
+        return method->ui_construct_prompt;
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+enum UI_string_types UI_get_string_type(UI_STRING *uis)
+{
+    return uis->type;
+}
+
+int UI_get_input_flags(UI_STRING *uis)
+{
+    return uis->input_flags;
+}
+
+const char *UI_get0_output_string(UI_STRING *uis)
+{
+    return uis->out_string;
+}
+
+const char *UI_get0_action_string(UI_STRING *uis)
+{
+    switch (uis->type) {
+    case UIT_BOOLEAN:
+        return uis->_.boolean_data.action_desc;
+    default:
+        return NULL;
+    }
+}
+
+const char *UI_get0_result_string(UI_STRING *uis)
+{
+    switch (uis->type) {
+    case UIT_PROMPT:
+    case UIT_VERIFY:
+        return uis->result_buf;
+    default:
+        return NULL;
+    }
+}
+
+const char *UI_get0_test_string(UI_STRING *uis)
+{
+    switch (uis->type) {
+    case UIT_VERIFY:
+        return uis->_.string_data.test_buf;
+    default:
+        return NULL;
+    }
+}
+
+int UI_get_result_minsize(UI_STRING *uis)
+{
+    switch (uis->type) {
+    case UIT_PROMPT:
+    case UIT_VERIFY:
+        return uis->_.string_data.result_minsize;
+    default:
+        return -1;
+    }
+}
+
+int UI_get_result_maxsize(UI_STRING *uis)
+{
+    switch (uis->type) {
+    case UIT_PROMPT:
+    case UIT_VERIFY:
+        return uis->_.string_data.result_maxsize;
+    default:
+        return -1;
+    }
+}
+
+int UI_set_result(UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis, const char *result)
+{
+    int l = strlen(result);
+
+    ui->flags &= ~UI_FLAG_REDOABLE;
+
+    switch (uis->type) {
+    case UIT_PROMPT:
+    case UIT_VERIFY:
+        {
+            char number1[DECIMAL_SIZE(uis->_.string_data.result_minsize) + 1];
+            char number2[DECIMAL_SIZE(uis->_.string_data.result_maxsize) + 1];
+
+            BIO_snprintf(number1, sizeof(number1), "%d",
+                         uis->_.string_data.result_minsize);
+            BIO_snprintf(number2, sizeof(number2), "%d",
+                         uis->_.string_data.result_maxsize);
+
+            if (l < uis->_.string_data.result_minsize) {
+                ui->flags |= UI_FLAG_REDOABLE;
+                UIerr(UI_F_UI_SET_RESULT, UI_R_RESULT_TOO_SMALL);
+                ERR_add_error_data(5, "You must type in ",
+                                   number1, " to ", number2, " characters");
+                return -1;
+            }
+            if (l > uis->_.string_data.result_maxsize) {
+                ui->flags |= UI_FLAG_REDOABLE;
+                UIerr(UI_F_UI_SET_RESULT, UI_R_RESULT_TOO_LARGE);
+                ERR_add_error_data(5, "You must type in ",
+                                   number1, " to ", number2, " characters");
+                return -1;
+            }
+        }
+
+        if (uis->result_buf == NULL) {
+            UIerr(UI_F_UI_SET_RESULT, UI_R_NO_RESULT_BUFFER);
+            return -1;
+        }
+
+        OPENSSL_strlcpy(uis->result_buf, result,
+                    uis->_.string_data.result_maxsize + 1);
+        break;
+    case UIT_BOOLEAN:
+        {
+            const char *p;
+
+            if (uis->result_buf == NULL) {
+                UIerr(UI_F_UI_SET_RESULT, UI_R_NO_RESULT_BUFFER);
+                return -1;
+            }
+
+            uis->result_buf[0] = '\0';
+            for (p = result; *p; p++) {
+                if (strchr(uis->_.boolean_data.ok_chars, *p)) {
+                    uis->result_buf[0] = uis->_.boolean_data.ok_chars[0];
+                    break;
+                }
+                if (strchr(uis->_.boolean_data.cancel_chars, *p)) {
+                    uis->result_buf[0] = uis->_.boolean_data.cancel_chars[0];
+                    break;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    default:
+        break;
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ui/ui_locl.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ui/ui_locl.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2953739
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ui/ui_locl.h
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_UI_LOCL_H
+# define HEADER_UI_LOCL_H
+
+# include <openssl/ui.h>
+# include <openssl/crypto.h>
+
+# ifdef _
+#  undef _
+# endif
+
+struct ui_method_st {
+    char *name;
+    /*
+     * All the functions return 1 or non-NULL for success and 0 or NULL for
+     * failure
+     */
+    /*
+     * Open whatever channel for this, be it the console, an X window or
+     * whatever. This function should use the ex_data structure to save
+     * intermediate data.
+     */
+    int (*ui_open_session) (UI *ui);
+    int (*ui_write_string) (UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis);
+    /*
+     * Flush the output.  If a GUI dialog box is used, this function can be
+     * used to actually display it.
+     */
+    int (*ui_flush) (UI *ui);
+    int (*ui_read_string) (UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis);
+    int (*ui_close_session) (UI *ui);
+    /*
+     * Construct a prompt in a user-defined manner.  object_desc is a textual
+     * short description of the object, for example "pass phrase", and
+     * object_name is the name of the object (might be a card name or a file
+     * name. The returned string shall always be allocated on the heap with
+     * OPENSSL_malloc(), and need to be free'd with OPENSSL_free().
+     */
+    char *(*ui_construct_prompt) (UI *ui, const char *object_desc,
+                                  const char *object_name);
+};
+
+struct ui_string_st {
+    enum UI_string_types type;  /* Input */
+    const char *out_string;     /* Input */
+    int input_flags;            /* Flags from the user */
+    /*
+     * The following parameters are completely irrelevant for UIT_INFO, and
+     * can therefore be set to 0 or NULL
+     */
+    char *result_buf;           /* Input and Output: If not NULL,
+                                 * user-defined with size in result_maxsize.
+                                 * Otherwise, it may be allocated by the UI
+                                 * routine, meaning result_minsize is going
+                                 * to be overwritten. */
+    union {
+        struct {
+            int result_minsize; /* Input: minimum required size of the
+                                 * result. */
+            int result_maxsize; /* Input: maximum permitted size of the
+                                 * result */
+            const char *test_buf; /* Input: test string to verify against */
+        } string_data;
+        struct {
+            const char *action_desc; /* Input */
+            const char *ok_chars; /* Input */
+            const char *cancel_chars; /* Input */
+        } boolean_data;
+    } _;
+
+# define OUT_STRING_FREEABLE 0x01
+    int flags;                  /* flags for internal use */
+};
+
+struct ui_st {
+    const UI_METHOD *meth;
+    STACK_OF(UI_STRING) *strings; /* We might want to prompt for more than
+                                   * one thing at a time, and with different
+                                   * echoing status.  */
+    void *user_data;
+    CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data;
+# define UI_FLAG_REDOABLE        0x0001
+# define UI_FLAG_PRINT_ERRORS    0x0100
+    int flags;
+
+    CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock;
+};
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8fa8dec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,712 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/e_os2.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+/*
+ * need for #define _POSIX_C_SOURCE arises whenever you pass -ansi to gcc
+ * [maybe others?], because it masks interfaces not discussed in standard,
+ * sigaction and fileno included. -pedantic would be more appropriate for the
+ * intended purposes, but we can't prevent users from adding -ansi.
+ */
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS)
+# include <sys/types.h>
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(_POSIX_C_SOURCE) && defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
+# ifndef _POSIX_C_SOURCE
+#  define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 2
+# endif
+#endif
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
+# ifdef OPENSSL_UNISTD
+#  include OPENSSL_UNISTD
+# else
+#  include <unistd.h>
+# endif
+/*
+ * If unistd.h defines _POSIX_VERSION, we conclude that we are on a POSIX
+ * system and have sigaction and termios.
+ */
+# if defined(_POSIX_VERSION)
+
+#  define SIGACTION
+#  if !defined(TERMIOS) && !defined(TERMIO) && !defined(SGTTY)
+#   define TERMIOS
+#  endif
+
+# endif
+#endif
+
+/* 06-Apr-92 Luke Brennan    Support for VMS */
+#include "ui_locl.h"
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS          /* prototypes for sys$whatever */
+# include <starlet.h>
+# ifdef __DECC
+#  pragma message disable DOLLARID
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#ifdef WIN_CONSOLE_BUG
+# include <windows.h>
+# ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE
+#  include <wincon.h>
+# endif
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * There are 6 types of terminal interface supported, TERMIO, TERMIOS, VMS,
+ * MSDOS, WIN32 Console and SGTTY.
+ *
+ * If someone defines one of the macros TERMIO, TERMIOS or SGTTY, it will
+ * remain respected.  Otherwise, we default to TERMIOS except for a few
+ * systems that require something different.
+ *
+ * Note: we do not use SGTTY unless it's defined by the configuration.  We
+ * may eventually opt to remove it's use entirely.
+ */
+
+#if !defined(TERMIOS) && !defined(TERMIO) && !defined(SGTTY)
+
+# if defined(_LIBC)
+#  undef  TERMIOS
+#  define TERMIO
+#  undef  SGTTY
+/*
+ * We know that VMS, MSDOS, VXWORKS, use entirely other mechanisms.
+ */
+# elif !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) \
+	&& !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) \
+	&& !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS)
+#  define TERMIOS
+#  undef  TERMIO
+#  undef  SGTTY
+# endif
+
+#endif
+
+#ifdef TERMIOS
+# include <termios.h>
+# define TTY_STRUCT             struct termios
+# define TTY_FLAGS              c_lflag
+# define TTY_get(tty,data)      tcgetattr(tty,data)
+# define TTY_set(tty,data)      tcsetattr(tty,TCSANOW,data)
+#endif
+
+#ifdef TERMIO
+# include <termio.h>
+# define TTY_STRUCT             struct termio
+# define TTY_FLAGS              c_lflag
+# define TTY_get(tty,data)      ioctl(tty,TCGETA,data)
+# define TTY_set(tty,data)      ioctl(tty,TCSETA,data)
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SGTTY
+# include <sgtty.h>
+# define TTY_STRUCT             struct sgttyb
+# define TTY_FLAGS              sg_flags
+# define TTY_get(tty,data)      ioctl(tty,TIOCGETP,data)
+# define TTY_set(tty,data)      ioctl(tty,TIOCSETP,data)
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(_LIBC) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
+# include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS
+# include <conio.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+# include <ssdef.h>
+# include <iodef.h>
+# include <ttdef.h>
+# include <descrip.h>
+struct IOSB {
+    short iosb$w_value;
+    short iosb$w_count;
+    long iosb$l_info;
+};
+#endif
+
+#ifndef NX509_SIG
+# define NX509_SIG 32
+#endif
+
+/* Define globals.  They are protected by a lock */
+#ifdef SIGACTION
+static struct sigaction savsig[NX509_SIG];
+#else
+static void (*savsig[NX509_SIG]) (int);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+static struct IOSB iosb;
+static $DESCRIPTOR(terminal, "TT");
+static long tty_orig[3], tty_new[3]; /* XXX Is there any guarantee that this
+                                      * will always suffice for the actual
+                                      * structures? */
+static long status;
+static unsigned short channel = 0;
+#elif defined(_WIN32) && !defined(_WIN32_WCE)
+static DWORD tty_orig, tty_new;
+#else
+# if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) || defined(__DJGPP__)
+static TTY_STRUCT tty_orig, tty_new;
+# endif
+#endif
+static FILE *tty_in, *tty_out;
+static int is_a_tty;
+
+/* Declare static functions */
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE)
+static int read_till_nl(FILE *);
+static void recsig(int);
+static void pushsig(void);
+static void popsig(void);
+#endif
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) && !defined(_WIN32)
+static int noecho_fgets(char *buf, int size, FILE *tty);
+#endif
+static int read_string_inner(UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis, int echo, int strip_nl);
+
+static int read_string(UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis);
+static int write_string(UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis);
+
+static int open_console(UI *ui);
+static int echo_console(UI *ui);
+static int noecho_console(UI *ui);
+static int close_console(UI *ui);
+
+static UI_METHOD ui_openssl = {
+    "OpenSSL default user interface",
+    open_console,
+    write_string,
+    NULL,                       /* No flusher is needed for command lines */
+    read_string,
+    close_console,
+    NULL
+};
+
+static const UI_METHOD *default_UI_meth = &ui_openssl;
+
+void UI_set_default_method(const UI_METHOD *meth)
+{
+    default_UI_meth = meth;
+}
+
+const UI_METHOD *UI_get_default_method(void)
+{
+    return default_UI_meth;
+}
+
+/* The method with all the built-in thingies */
+UI_METHOD *UI_OpenSSL(void)
+{
+    return &ui_openssl;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The following function makes sure that info and error strings are printed
+ * before any prompt.
+ */
+static int write_string(UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis)
+{
+    switch (UI_get_string_type(uis)) {
+    case UIT_ERROR:
+    case UIT_INFO:
+        fputs(UI_get0_output_string(uis), tty_out);
+        fflush(tty_out);
+        break;
+    default:
+        break;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int read_string(UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis)
+{
+    int ok = 0;
+
+    switch (UI_get_string_type(uis)) {
+    case UIT_BOOLEAN:
+        fputs(UI_get0_output_string(uis), tty_out);
+        fputs(UI_get0_action_string(uis), tty_out);
+        fflush(tty_out);
+        return read_string_inner(ui, uis,
+                                 UI_get_input_flags(uis) & UI_INPUT_FLAG_ECHO,
+                                 0);
+    case UIT_PROMPT:
+        fputs(UI_get0_output_string(uis), tty_out);
+        fflush(tty_out);
+        return read_string_inner(ui, uis,
+                                 UI_get_input_flags(uis) & UI_INPUT_FLAG_ECHO,
+                                 1);
+    case UIT_VERIFY:
+        fprintf(tty_out, "Verifying - %s", UI_get0_output_string(uis));
+        fflush(tty_out);
+        if ((ok = read_string_inner(ui, uis,
+                                    UI_get_input_flags(uis) &
+                                    UI_INPUT_FLAG_ECHO, 1)) <= 0)
+            return ok;
+        if (strcmp(UI_get0_result_string(uis), UI_get0_test_string(uis)) != 0) {
+            fprintf(tty_out, "Verify failure\n");
+            fflush(tty_out);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        break;
+    default:
+        break;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE)
+/* Internal functions to read a string without echoing */
+static int read_till_nl(FILE *in)
+{
+# define SIZE 4
+    char buf[SIZE + 1];
+
+    do {
+        if (!fgets(buf, SIZE, in))
+            return 0;
+    } while (strchr(buf, '\n') == NULL);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static volatile sig_atomic_t intr_signal;
+#endif
+
+static int read_string_inner(UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis, int echo, int strip_nl)
+{
+    static int ps;
+    int ok;
+    char result[BUFSIZ];
+    int maxsize = BUFSIZ - 1;
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE)
+    char *p = NULL;
+    int echo_eol = !echo;
+
+    intr_signal = 0;
+    ok = 0;
+    ps = 0;
+
+    pushsig();
+    ps = 1;
+
+    if (!echo && !noecho_console(ui))
+        goto error;
+    ps = 2;
+
+    result[0] = '\0';
+# if defined(_WIN32)
+    if (is_a_tty) {
+        DWORD numread;
+#  if defined(CP_UTF8)
+        if (GetEnvironmentVariableW(L"OPENSSL_WIN32_UTF8", NULL, 0) != 0) {
+            WCHAR wresult[BUFSIZ];
+
+            if (ReadConsoleW(GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE),
+                         wresult, maxsize, &numread, NULL)) {
+                if (numread >= 2 &&
+                    wresult[numread-2] == L'\r' &&
+                    wresult[numread-1] == L'\n') {
+                    wresult[numread-2] = L'\n';
+                    numread--;
+                }
+                wresult[numread] = '\0';
+                if (WideCharToMultiByte(CP_UTF8, 0, wresult, -1,
+                                        result, sizeof(result), NULL, 0) > 0)
+                    p = result;
+
+                OPENSSL_cleanse(wresult, sizeof(wresult));
+            }
+        } else
+#  endif
+        if (ReadConsoleA(GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE),
+                         result, maxsize, &numread, NULL)) {
+            if (numread >= 2 &&
+                result[numread-2] == '\r' && result[numread-1] == '\n') {
+                result[numread-2] = '\n';
+                numread--;
+            }
+            result[numread] = '\0';
+            p = result;
+        }
+    } else
+# elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS)
+    if (!echo) {
+        noecho_fgets(result, maxsize, tty_in);
+        p = result;             /* FIXME: noecho_fgets doesn't return errors */
+    } else
+# endif
+    p = fgets(result, maxsize, tty_in);
+    if (p == NULL)
+        goto error;
+    if (feof(tty_in))
+        goto error;
+    if (ferror(tty_in))
+        goto error;
+    if ((p = (char *)strchr(result, '\n')) != NULL) {
+        if (strip_nl)
+            *p = '\0';
+    } else if (!read_till_nl(tty_in))
+        goto error;
+    if (UI_set_result(ui, uis, result) >= 0)
+        ok = 1;
+
+ error:
+    if (intr_signal == SIGINT)
+        ok = -1;
+    if (echo_eol)
+        fprintf(tty_out, "\n");
+    if (ps >= 2 && !echo && !echo_console(ui))
+        ok = 0;
+
+    if (ps >= 1)
+        popsig();
+#else
+    ok = 1;
+#endif
+
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(result, BUFSIZ);
+    return ok;
+}
+
+/* Internal functions to open, handle and close a channel to the console.  */
+static int open_console(UI *ui)
+{
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(ui->lock);
+    is_a_tty = 1;
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS)
+    tty_in = stdin;
+    tty_out = stderr;
+#elif defined(_WIN32) && !defined(_WIN32_WCE)
+    if ((tty_out = fopen("conout$", "w")) == NULL)
+        tty_out = stderr;
+
+    if (GetConsoleMode(GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE), &tty_orig)) {
+        tty_in = stdin;
+    } else {
+        is_a_tty = 0;
+        if ((tty_in = fopen("conin$", "r")) == NULL)
+            tty_in = stdin;
+    }
+#else
+# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS
+#  define DEV_TTY "con"
+# else
+#  define DEV_TTY "/dev/tty"
+# endif
+    if ((tty_in = fopen(DEV_TTY, "r")) == NULL)
+        tty_in = stdin;
+    if ((tty_out = fopen(DEV_TTY, "w")) == NULL)
+        tty_out = stderr;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(TTY_get) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
+    if (TTY_get(fileno(tty_in), &tty_orig) == -1) {
+# ifdef ENOTTY
+        if (errno == ENOTTY)
+            is_a_tty = 0;
+        else
+# endif
+# ifdef EINVAL
+            /*
+             * Ariel Glenn ariel@columbia.edu reports that solaris can return
+             * EINVAL instead.  This should be ok
+             */
+        if (errno == EINVAL)
+            is_a_tty = 0;
+        else
+# endif
+# ifdef ENODEV
+            /*
+             * MacOS X returns ENODEV (Operation not supported by device),
+             * which seems appropriate.
+             */
+        if (errno == ENODEV)
+            is_a_tty = 0;
+        else
+# endif
+            {
+                char tmp_num[10];
+                BIO_snprintf(tmp_num, sizeof(tmp_num) - 1, "%d", errno);
+                UIerr(UI_F_OPEN_CONSOLE, UI_R_UNKNOWN_TTYGET_ERRNO_VALUE);
+                ERR_add_error_data(2, "errno=", tmp_num);
+
+                return 0;
+            }
+    }
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+    status = sys$assign(&terminal, &channel, 0, 0);
+
+    /* if there isn't a TT device, something is very wrong */
+    if (status != SS$_NORMAL) {
+        char tmp_num[12];
+
+        BIO_snprintf(tmp_num, sizeof(tmp_num) - 1, "%%X%08X", status);
+        UIerr(UI_F_OPEN_CONSOLE, UI_R_SYSASSIGN_ERROR);
+        ERR_add_error_data(2, "status=", tmp_num);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    status = sys$qiow(0, channel, IO$_SENSEMODE, &iosb, 0, 0, tty_orig, 12,
+                      0, 0, 0, 0);
+
+    /* If IO$_SENSEMODE doesn't work, this is not a terminal device */
+    if ((status != SS$_NORMAL) || (iosb.iosb$w_value != SS$_NORMAL))
+        is_a_tty = 0;
+#endif
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int noecho_console(UI *ui)
+{
+#ifdef TTY_FLAGS
+    memcpy(&(tty_new), &(tty_orig), sizeof(tty_orig));
+    tty_new.TTY_FLAGS &= ~ECHO;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(TTY_set) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
+    if (is_a_tty && (TTY_set(fileno(tty_in), &tty_new) == -1))
+        return 0;
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+    if (is_a_tty) {
+        tty_new[0] = tty_orig[0];
+        tty_new[1] = tty_orig[1] | TT$M_NOECHO;
+        tty_new[2] = tty_orig[2];
+        status = sys$qiow(0, channel, IO$_SETMODE, &iosb, 0, 0, tty_new, 12,
+                          0, 0, 0, 0);
+        if ((status != SS$_NORMAL) || (iosb.iosb$w_value != SS$_NORMAL)) {
+            char tmp_num[2][12];
+
+            BIO_snprintf(tmp_num[0], sizeof(tmp_num[0]) - 1, "%%X%08X",
+                         status);
+            BIO_snprintf(tmp_num[1], sizeof(tmp_num[1]) - 1, "%%X%08X",
+                         iosb.iosb$w_value);
+            UIerr(UI_F_NOECHO_CONSOLE, UI_R_SYSQIOW_ERROR);
+            ERR_add_error_data(5, "status=", tmp_num[0],
+                               ",", "iosb.iosb$w_value=", tmp_num[1]);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+#endif
+#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(_WIN32_WCE)
+    if (is_a_tty) {
+        tty_new = tty_orig;
+        tty_new &= ~ENABLE_ECHO_INPUT;
+        SetConsoleMode(GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE), tty_new);
+    }
+#endif
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int echo_console(UI *ui)
+{
+#if defined(TTY_set) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
+    memcpy(&(tty_new), &(tty_orig), sizeof(tty_orig));
+    tty_new.TTY_FLAGS |= ECHO;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(TTY_set) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
+    if (is_a_tty && (TTY_set(fileno(tty_in), &tty_new) == -1))
+        return 0;
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+    if (is_a_tty) {
+        tty_new[0] = tty_orig[0];
+        tty_new[1] = tty_orig[1] & ~TT$M_NOECHO;
+        tty_new[2] = tty_orig[2];
+        status = sys$qiow(0, channel, IO$_SETMODE, &iosb, 0, 0, tty_new, 12,
+                          0, 0, 0, 0);
+        if ((status != SS$_NORMAL) || (iosb.iosb$w_value != SS$_NORMAL)) {
+            char tmp_num[2][12];
+
+            BIO_snprintf(tmp_num[0], sizeof(tmp_num[0]) - 1, "%%X%08X",
+                         status);
+            BIO_snprintf(tmp_num[1], sizeof(tmp_num[1]) - 1, "%%X%08X",
+                         iosb.iosb$w_value);
+            UIerr(UI_F_ECHO_CONSOLE, UI_R_SYSQIOW_ERROR);
+            ERR_add_error_data(5, "status=", tmp_num[0],
+                               ",", "iosb.iosb$w_value=", tmp_num[1]);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+#endif
+#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(_WIN32_WCE)
+    if (is_a_tty) {
+        tty_new = tty_orig;
+        tty_new |= ENABLE_ECHO_INPUT;
+        SetConsoleMode(GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE), tty_new);
+    }
+#endif
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int close_console(UI *ui)
+{
+    if (tty_in != stdin)
+        fclose(tty_in);
+    if (tty_out != stderr)
+        fclose(tty_out);
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+    status = sys$dassgn(channel);
+    if (status != SS$_NORMAL) {
+        char tmp_num[12];
+
+        BIO_snprintf(tmp_num, sizeof(tmp_num) - 1, "%%X%08X", status);
+        UIerr(UI_F_CLOSE_CONSOLE, UI_R_SYSDASSGN_ERROR);
+        ERR_add_error_data(2, "status=", tmp_num);
+        return 0;
+    }
+#endif
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ui->lock);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE)
+/* Internal functions to handle signals and act on them */
+static void pushsig(void)
+{
+# ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
+    int i;
+# endif
+# ifdef SIGACTION
+    struct sigaction sa;
+
+    memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
+    sa.sa_handler = recsig;
+# endif
+
+# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
+    savsig[SIGABRT] = signal(SIGABRT, recsig);
+    savsig[SIGFPE] = signal(SIGFPE, recsig);
+    savsig[SIGILL] = signal(SIGILL, recsig);
+    savsig[SIGINT] = signal(SIGINT, recsig);
+    savsig[SIGSEGV] = signal(SIGSEGV, recsig);
+    savsig[SIGTERM] = signal(SIGTERM, recsig);
+# else
+    for (i = 1; i < NX509_SIG; i++) {
+#  ifdef SIGUSR1
+        if (i == SIGUSR1)
+            continue;
+#  endif
+#  ifdef SIGUSR2
+        if (i == SIGUSR2)
+            continue;
+#  endif
+#  ifdef SIGKILL
+        if (i == SIGKILL)       /* We can't make any action on that. */
+            continue;
+#  endif
+#  ifdef SIGACTION
+        sigaction(i, &sa, &savsig[i]);
+#  else
+        savsig[i] = signal(i, recsig);
+#  endif
+    }
+# endif
+
+# ifdef SIGWINCH
+    signal(SIGWINCH, SIG_DFL);
+# endif
+}
+
+static void popsig(void)
+{
+# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
+    signal(SIGABRT, savsig[SIGABRT]);
+    signal(SIGFPE, savsig[SIGFPE]);
+    signal(SIGILL, savsig[SIGILL]);
+    signal(SIGINT, savsig[SIGINT]);
+    signal(SIGSEGV, savsig[SIGSEGV]);
+    signal(SIGTERM, savsig[SIGTERM]);
+# else
+    int i;
+    for (i = 1; i < NX509_SIG; i++) {
+#  ifdef SIGUSR1
+        if (i == SIGUSR1)
+            continue;
+#  endif
+#  ifdef SIGUSR2
+        if (i == SIGUSR2)
+            continue;
+#  endif
+#  ifdef SIGACTION
+        sigaction(i, &savsig[i], NULL);
+#  else
+        signal(i, savsig[i]);
+#  endif
+    }
+# endif
+}
+
+static void recsig(int i)
+{
+    intr_signal = i;
+}
+#endif
+
+/* Internal functions specific for Windows */
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) && !defined(_WIN32)
+static int noecho_fgets(char *buf, int size, FILE *tty)
+{
+    int i;
+    char *p;
+
+    p = buf;
+    for (;;) {
+        if (size == 0) {
+            *p = '\0';
+            break;
+        }
+        size--;
+# if defined(_WIN32)
+        i = _getch();
+# else
+        i = getch();
+# endif
+        if (i == '\r')
+            i = '\n';
+        *(p++) = i;
+        if (i == '\n') {
+            *p = '\0';
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+# ifdef WIN_CONSOLE_BUG
+    /*
+     * Win95 has several evil console bugs: one of these is that the last
+     * character read using getch() is passed to the next read: this is
+     * usually a CR so this can be trouble. No STDIO fix seems to work but
+     * flushing the console appears to do the trick.
+     */
+    {
+        HANDLE inh;
+        inh = GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE);
+        FlushConsoleInputBuffer(inh);
+    }
+# endif
+    return (strlen(buf));
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ui/ui_util.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ui/ui_util.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3b51db9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ui/ui_util.c
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include "ui_locl.h"
+
+#ifndef BUFSIZ
+#define BUFSIZ 256
+#endif
+
+int UI_UTIL_read_pw_string(char *buf, int length, const char *prompt,
+                           int verify)
+{
+    char buff[BUFSIZ];
+    int ret;
+
+    ret =
+        UI_UTIL_read_pw(buf, buff, (length > BUFSIZ) ? BUFSIZ : length,
+                        prompt, verify);
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(buff, BUFSIZ);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+int UI_UTIL_read_pw(char *buf, char *buff, int size, const char *prompt,
+                    int verify)
+{
+    int ok = 0;
+    UI *ui;
+
+    if (size < 1)
+        return -1;
+
+    ui = UI_new();
+    if (ui != NULL) {
+        ok = UI_add_input_string(ui, prompt, 0, buf, 0, size - 1);
+        if (ok >= 0 && verify)
+            ok = UI_add_verify_string(ui, prompt, 0, buff, 0, size - 1, buf);
+        if (ok >= 0)
+            ok = UI_process(ui);
+        UI_free(ui);
+    }
+    if (ok > 0)
+        ok = 0;
+    return (ok);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/uid.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/uid.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..12df8a4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/uid.c
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+
+#if defined(__OpenBSD__) || (defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD__ > 2)
+
+# include OPENSSL_UNISTD
+
+int OPENSSL_issetugid(void)
+{
+    return issetugid();
+}
+
+#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS)
+
+int OPENSSL_issetugid(void)
+{
+    return 0;
+}
+
+#else
+
+# include OPENSSL_UNISTD
+# include <sys/types.h>
+
+int OPENSSL_issetugid(void)
+{
+    if (getuid() != geteuid())
+        return 1;
+    if (getgid() != getegid())
+        return 1;
+    return 0;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/vms_rms.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/vms_rms.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3b994a0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/vms_rms.h
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifdef NAML$C_MAXRSS
+
+# define CC_RMS_NAMX cc$rms_naml
+# define FAB_NAMX fab$l_naml
+# define FAB_OR_NAML( fab, naml) naml
+# define FAB_OR_NAML_DNA naml$l_long_defname
+# define FAB_OR_NAML_DNS naml$l_long_defname_size
+# define FAB_OR_NAML_FNA naml$l_long_filename
+# define FAB_OR_NAML_FNS naml$l_long_filename_size
+# define NAMX_ESA naml$l_long_expand
+# define NAMX_ESL naml$l_long_expand_size
+# define NAMX_ESS naml$l_long_expand_alloc
+# define NAMX_NOP naml$b_nop
+# define SET_NAMX_NO_SHORT_UPCASE( nam) nam.naml$v_no_short_upcase = 1
+
+# if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64
+#  define NAMX_DNA_FNA_SET(fab) fab.fab$l_dna = (__char_ptr32) -1; \
+   fab.fab$l_fna = (__char_ptr32) -1;
+# else                          /* __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 */
+#  define NAMX_DNA_FNA_SET(fab) fab.fab$l_dna = (char *) -1; \
+   fab.fab$l_fna = (char *) -1;
+# endif                         /* __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 [else] */
+
+# define NAMX_MAXRSS NAML$C_MAXRSS
+# define NAMX_STRUCT NAML
+
+#else                           /* def NAML$C_MAXRSS */
+
+# define CC_RMS_NAMX cc$rms_nam
+# define FAB_NAMX fab$l_nam
+# define FAB_OR_NAML( fab, naml) fab
+# define FAB_OR_NAML_DNA fab$l_dna
+# define FAB_OR_NAML_DNS fab$b_dns
+# define FAB_OR_NAML_FNA fab$l_fna
+# define FAB_OR_NAML_FNS fab$b_fns
+# define NAMX_ESA nam$l_esa
+# define NAMX_ESL nam$b_esl
+# define NAMX_ESS nam$b_ess
+# define NAMX_NOP nam$b_nop
+# define NAMX_DNA_FNA_SET(fab)
+# define NAMX_MAXRSS NAM$C_MAXRSS
+# define NAMX_STRUCT NAM
+# ifdef NAM$M_NO_SHORT_UPCASE
+#  define SET_NAMX_NO_SHORT_UPCASE( nam) naml.naml$v_no_short_upcase = 1
+# else                          /* def NAM$M_NO_SHORT_UPCASE */
+#  define SET_NAMX_NO_SHORT_UPCASE( nam)
+# endif                         /* def NAM$M_NO_SHORT_UPCASE [else] */
+
+#endif                          /* def NAML$C_MAXRSS [else] */
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/whrlpool/asm/wp-mmx.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/whrlpool/asm/wp-mmx.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f63945c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/whrlpool/asm/wp-mmx.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,507 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se> for the OpenSSL
+# project. Rights for redistribution and usage in source and binary
+# forms are granted according to the OpenSSL license.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# whirlpool_block_mmx implementation.
+#
+*SCALE=\(2); # 2 or 8, that is the question:-) Value of 8 results
+# in 16KB large table, which is tough on L1 cache, but eliminates
+# unaligned references to it. Value of 2 results in 4KB table, but
+# 7/8 of references to it are unaligned. AMD cores seem to be
+# allergic to the latter, while Intel ones - to former [see the
+# table]. I stick to value of 2 for two reasons: 1. smaller table
+# minimizes cache trashing and thus mitigates the hazard of side-
+# channel leakage similar to AES cache-timing one; 2. performance
+# gap among different µ-archs is smaller.
+#
+# Performance table lists rounded amounts of CPU cycles spent by
+# whirlpool_block_mmx routine on single 64 byte input block, i.e.
+# smaller is better and asymptotic throughput can be estimated by
+# multiplying 64 by CPU clock frequency and dividing by relevant
+# value from the given table:
+#
+#		$SCALE=2/8	icc8	gcc3	
+# Intel P4	3200/4600	4600(*)	6400
+# Intel PIII	2900/3000	4900	5400
+# AMD K[78]	2500/1800	9900	8200(**)
+#
+# (*)	I've sketched even non-MMX assembler, but for the record
+#	I've failed to beat the Intel compiler on P4, without using
+#	MMX that is...
+# (**)	... on AMD on the other hand non-MMX assembler was observed
+#	to perform significantly better, but I figured this MMX
+#	implementation is even faster anyway, so why bother? As for
+#	pre-MMX AMD core[s], the improvement coefficient is more
+#	than likely to vary anyway and I don't know how. But the
+#	least I know is that gcc-generated code compiled with
+#	-DL_ENDIAN and -DOPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT [see C module for
+#	details] and optimized for Pentium was observed to perform
+#	*better* on Pentium 100 than unrolled non-MMX assembler
+#	loop... So we just say that I don't know if maintaining
+#	non-MMX implementation would actually pay off, but till
+#	opposite is proved "unlikely" is assumed.
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm");
+require "x86asm.pl";
+
+$output=pop;
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+&asm_init($ARGV[0],"wp-mmx.pl");
+
+sub L()  { &data_byte(@_); }
+sub LL()
+{	if	($SCALE==2)	{ &data_byte(@_); &data_byte(@_); }
+	elsif	($SCALE==8)	{ for ($i=0;$i<8;$i++) {
+					&data_byte(@_);
+					unshift(@_,pop(@_));
+				  }
+				}
+	else			{ die "unvalid SCALE value"; }
+}
+
+sub scale()
+{	if	($SCALE==2)	{ &lea(@_[0],&DWP(0,@_[1],@_[1])); }
+	elsif	($SCALE==8)	{ &lea(@_[0],&DWP(0,"",@_[1],8));  }
+	else			{ die "unvalid SCALE value";       }
+}
+
+sub row()
+{	if	($SCALE==2)	{ ((8-shift)&7); }
+	elsif	($SCALE==8)	{ (8*shift);     }
+	else			{ die "unvalid SCALE value"; }
+}
+
+$tbl="ebp";
+@mm=("mm0","mm1","mm2","mm3","mm4","mm5","mm6","mm7");
+
+&function_begin_B("whirlpool_block_mmx");
+	&push	("ebp");
+	&push	("ebx");
+	&push	("esi");
+	&push	("edi");
+
+	&mov	("esi",&wparam(0));		# hash value
+	&mov	("edi",&wparam(1));		# input data stream
+	&mov	("ebp",&wparam(2));		# number of chunks in input
+
+	&mov	("eax","esp");			# copy stack pointer
+	&sub	("esp",128+20);			# allocate frame
+	&and	("esp",-64);			# align for cache-line
+
+	&lea	("ebx",&DWP(128,"esp"));
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,"ebx"),"esi");		# save parameter block
+	&mov	(&DWP(4,"ebx"),"edi");
+	&mov	(&DWP(8,"ebx"),"ebp");
+	&mov	(&DWP(16,"ebx"),"eax");		# saved stack pointer
+
+	&call	(&label("pic_point"));
+&set_label("pic_point");
+	&blindpop($tbl);
+	&lea	($tbl,&DWP(&label("table")."-".&label("pic_point"),$tbl));
+
+	&xor	("ecx","ecx");
+	&xor	("edx","edx");
+
+	for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) { &movq(@mm[$i],&QWP($i*8,"esi")); }    # L=H
+&set_label("outerloop");
+	for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) { &movq(&QWP($i*8,"esp"),@mm[$i]); }    # K=L
+	for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) { &pxor(@mm[$i],&QWP($i*8,"edi")); }    # L^=inp
+	for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) { &movq(&QWP(64+$i*8,"esp"),@mm[$i]); } # S=L
+
+	&xor	("esi","esi");
+	&mov	(&DWP(12,"ebx"),"esi");		# zero round counter
+
+&set_label("round",16);
+	&movq	(@mm[0],&QWP(2048*$SCALE,$tbl,"esi",8));	# rc[r]
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(0,"esp"));
+	&mov	("ebx",&DWP(4,"esp"));
+	&movz	("ecx",&LB("eax"));
+	&movz	("edx",&HB("eax"));
+for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) {
+    my $func = ($i==0)? \&movq : \&pxor;
+	&shr	("eax",16);
+	&scale	("esi","ecx");
+	&movz	("ecx",&LB("eax"));
+	&scale	("edi","edx");
+	&movz	("edx",&HB("eax"));
+	&pxor	(@mm[0],&QWP(&row(0),$tbl,"esi",8));
+	&$func	(@mm[1],&QWP(&row(1),$tbl,"edi",8));
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(($i+1)*8,"esp"));
+	&scale	("esi","ecx");
+	&movz	("ecx",&LB("ebx"));
+	&scale	("edi","edx");
+	&movz	("edx",&HB("ebx"));
+	&$func	(@mm[2],&QWP(&row(2),$tbl,"esi",8));
+	&$func	(@mm[3],&QWP(&row(3),$tbl,"edi",8));
+	&shr	("ebx",16);
+	&scale	("esi","ecx");
+	&movz	("ecx",&LB("ebx"));
+	&scale	("edi","edx");
+	&movz	("edx",&HB("ebx"));
+	&$func	(@mm[4],&QWP(&row(4),$tbl,"esi",8));
+	&$func	(@mm[5],&QWP(&row(5),$tbl,"edi",8));
+	&mov	("ebx",&DWP(($i+1)*8+4,"esp"));
+	&scale	("esi","ecx");
+	&movz	("ecx",&LB("eax"));
+	&scale	("edi","edx");
+	&movz	("edx",&HB("eax"));
+	&$func	(@mm[6],&QWP(&row(6),$tbl,"esi",8));
+	&$func	(@mm[7],&QWP(&row(7),$tbl,"edi",8));
+    push(@mm,shift(@mm));
+}
+
+	for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) { &movq(&QWP($i*8,"esp"),@mm[$i]); }    # K=L
+
+for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) {
+	&shr	("eax",16);
+	&scale	("esi","ecx");
+	&movz	("ecx",&LB("eax"));
+	&scale	("edi","edx");
+	&movz	("edx",&HB("eax"));
+	&pxor	(@mm[0],&QWP(&row(0),$tbl,"esi",8));
+	&pxor	(@mm[1],&QWP(&row(1),$tbl,"edi",8));
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(64+($i+1)*8,"esp"))		if ($i<7);
+	&scale	("esi","ecx");
+	&movz	("ecx",&LB("ebx"));
+	&scale	("edi","edx");
+	&movz	("edx",&HB("ebx"));
+	&pxor	(@mm[2],&QWP(&row(2),$tbl,"esi",8));
+	&pxor	(@mm[3],&QWP(&row(3),$tbl,"edi",8));
+	&shr	("ebx",16);
+	&scale	("esi","ecx");
+	&movz	("ecx",&LB("ebx"));
+	&scale	("edi","edx");
+	&movz	("edx",&HB("ebx"));
+	&pxor	(@mm[4],&QWP(&row(4),$tbl,"esi",8));
+	&pxor	(@mm[5],&QWP(&row(5),$tbl,"edi",8));
+	&mov	("ebx",&DWP(64+($i+1)*8+4,"esp"))	if ($i<7);
+	&scale	("esi","ecx");
+	&movz	("ecx",&LB("eax"));
+	&scale	("edi","edx");
+	&movz	("edx",&HB("eax"));
+	&pxor	(@mm[6],&QWP(&row(6),$tbl,"esi",8));
+	&pxor	(@mm[7],&QWP(&row(7),$tbl,"edi",8));
+    push(@mm,shift(@mm));
+}
+	&lea	("ebx",&DWP(128,"esp"));
+	&mov	("esi",&DWP(12,"ebx"));		# pull round counter
+	&add	("esi",1);
+	&cmp	("esi",10);
+	&je	(&label("roundsdone"));
+
+	&mov	(&DWP(12,"ebx"),"esi");		# update round counter
+	for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) { &movq(&QWP(64+$i*8,"esp"),@mm[$i]); } # S=L
+	&jmp	(&label("round"));
+
+&set_label("roundsdone",16);
+	&mov	("esi",&DWP(0,"ebx"));		# reload argument block
+	&mov	("edi",&DWP(4,"ebx"));
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(8,"ebx"));
+
+	for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) { &pxor(@mm[$i],&QWP($i*8,"edi")); }    # L^=inp
+	for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) { &pxor(@mm[$i],&QWP($i*8,"esi")); }    # L^=H
+	for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) { &movq(&QWP($i*8,"esi"),@mm[$i]); }    # H=L
+
+	&lea	("edi",&DWP(64,"edi"));		# inp+=64
+	&sub	("eax",1);			# num--
+	&jz	(&label("alldone"));
+	&mov	(&DWP(4,"ebx"),"edi");		# update argument block
+	&mov	(&DWP(8,"ebx"),"eax");
+	&jmp	(&label("outerloop"));
+
+&set_label("alldone");
+	&emms	();
+	&mov	("esp",&DWP(16,"ebx"));		# restore saved stack pointer
+	&pop	("edi");
+	&pop	("esi");
+	&pop	("ebx");
+	&pop	("ebp");
+	&ret	();
+
+&align(64);
+&set_label("table");
+	&LL(0x18,0x18,0x60,0x18,0xc0,0x78,0x30,0xd8);
+	&LL(0x23,0x23,0x8c,0x23,0x05,0xaf,0x46,0x26);
+	&LL(0xc6,0xc6,0x3f,0xc6,0x7e,0xf9,0x91,0xb8);
+	&LL(0xe8,0xe8,0x87,0xe8,0x13,0x6f,0xcd,0xfb);
+	&LL(0x87,0x87,0x26,0x87,0x4c,0xa1,0x13,0xcb);
+	&LL(0xb8,0xb8,0xda,0xb8,0xa9,0x62,0x6d,0x11);
+	&LL(0x01,0x01,0x04,0x01,0x08,0x05,0x02,0x09);
+	&LL(0x4f,0x4f,0x21,0x4f,0x42,0x6e,0x9e,0x0d);
+	&LL(0x36,0x36,0xd8,0x36,0xad,0xee,0x6c,0x9b);
+	&LL(0xa6,0xa6,0xa2,0xa6,0x59,0x04,0x51,0xff);
+	&LL(0xd2,0xd2,0x6f,0xd2,0xde,0xbd,0xb9,0x0c);
+	&LL(0xf5,0xf5,0xf3,0xf5,0xfb,0x06,0xf7,0x0e);
+	&LL(0x79,0x79,0xf9,0x79,0xef,0x80,0xf2,0x96);
+	&LL(0x6f,0x6f,0xa1,0x6f,0x5f,0xce,0xde,0x30);
+	&LL(0x91,0x91,0x7e,0x91,0xfc,0xef,0x3f,0x6d);
+	&LL(0x52,0x52,0x55,0x52,0xaa,0x07,0xa4,0xf8);
+	&LL(0x60,0x60,0x9d,0x60,0x27,0xfd,0xc0,0x47);
+	&LL(0xbc,0xbc,0xca,0xbc,0x89,0x76,0x65,0x35);
+	&LL(0x9b,0x9b,0x56,0x9b,0xac,0xcd,0x2b,0x37);
+	&LL(0x8e,0x8e,0x02,0x8e,0x04,0x8c,0x01,0x8a);
+	&LL(0xa3,0xa3,0xb6,0xa3,0x71,0x15,0x5b,0xd2);
+	&LL(0x0c,0x0c,0x30,0x0c,0x60,0x3c,0x18,0x6c);
+	&LL(0x7b,0x7b,0xf1,0x7b,0xff,0x8a,0xf6,0x84);
+	&LL(0x35,0x35,0xd4,0x35,0xb5,0xe1,0x6a,0x80);
+	&LL(0x1d,0x1d,0x74,0x1d,0xe8,0x69,0x3a,0xf5);
+	&LL(0xe0,0xe0,0xa7,0xe0,0x53,0x47,0xdd,0xb3);
+	&LL(0xd7,0xd7,0x7b,0xd7,0xf6,0xac,0xb3,0x21);
+	&LL(0xc2,0xc2,0x2f,0xc2,0x5e,0xed,0x99,0x9c);
+	&LL(0x2e,0x2e,0xb8,0x2e,0x6d,0x96,0x5c,0x43);
+	&LL(0x4b,0x4b,0x31,0x4b,0x62,0x7a,0x96,0x29);
+	&LL(0xfe,0xfe,0xdf,0xfe,0xa3,0x21,0xe1,0x5d);
+	&LL(0x57,0x57,0x41,0x57,0x82,0x16,0xae,0xd5);
+	&LL(0x15,0x15,0x54,0x15,0xa8,0x41,0x2a,0xbd);
+	&LL(0x77,0x77,0xc1,0x77,0x9f,0xb6,0xee,0xe8);
+	&LL(0x37,0x37,0xdc,0x37,0xa5,0xeb,0x6e,0x92);
+	&LL(0xe5,0xe5,0xb3,0xe5,0x7b,0x56,0xd7,0x9e);
+	&LL(0x9f,0x9f,0x46,0x9f,0x8c,0xd9,0x23,0x13);
+	&LL(0xf0,0xf0,0xe7,0xf0,0xd3,0x17,0xfd,0x23);
+	&LL(0x4a,0x4a,0x35,0x4a,0x6a,0x7f,0x94,0x20);
+	&LL(0xda,0xda,0x4f,0xda,0x9e,0x95,0xa9,0x44);
+	&LL(0x58,0x58,0x7d,0x58,0xfa,0x25,0xb0,0xa2);
+	&LL(0xc9,0xc9,0x03,0xc9,0x06,0xca,0x8f,0xcf);
+	&LL(0x29,0x29,0xa4,0x29,0x55,0x8d,0x52,0x7c);
+	&LL(0x0a,0x0a,0x28,0x0a,0x50,0x22,0x14,0x5a);
+	&LL(0xb1,0xb1,0xfe,0xb1,0xe1,0x4f,0x7f,0x50);
+	&LL(0xa0,0xa0,0xba,0xa0,0x69,0x1a,0x5d,0xc9);
+	&LL(0x6b,0x6b,0xb1,0x6b,0x7f,0xda,0xd6,0x14);
+	&LL(0x85,0x85,0x2e,0x85,0x5c,0xab,0x17,0xd9);
+	&LL(0xbd,0xbd,0xce,0xbd,0x81,0x73,0x67,0x3c);
+	&LL(0x5d,0x5d,0x69,0x5d,0xd2,0x34,0xba,0x8f);
+	&LL(0x10,0x10,0x40,0x10,0x80,0x50,0x20,0x90);
+	&LL(0xf4,0xf4,0xf7,0xf4,0xf3,0x03,0xf5,0x07);
+	&LL(0xcb,0xcb,0x0b,0xcb,0x16,0xc0,0x8b,0xdd);
+	&LL(0x3e,0x3e,0xf8,0x3e,0xed,0xc6,0x7c,0xd3);
+	&LL(0x05,0x05,0x14,0x05,0x28,0x11,0x0a,0x2d);
+	&LL(0x67,0x67,0x81,0x67,0x1f,0xe6,0xce,0x78);
+	&LL(0xe4,0xe4,0xb7,0xe4,0x73,0x53,0xd5,0x97);
+	&LL(0x27,0x27,0x9c,0x27,0x25,0xbb,0x4e,0x02);
+	&LL(0x41,0x41,0x19,0x41,0x32,0x58,0x82,0x73);
+	&LL(0x8b,0x8b,0x16,0x8b,0x2c,0x9d,0x0b,0xa7);
+	&LL(0xa7,0xa7,0xa6,0xa7,0x51,0x01,0x53,0xf6);
+	&LL(0x7d,0x7d,0xe9,0x7d,0xcf,0x94,0xfa,0xb2);
+	&LL(0x95,0x95,0x6e,0x95,0xdc,0xfb,0x37,0x49);
+	&LL(0xd8,0xd8,0x47,0xd8,0x8e,0x9f,0xad,0x56);
+	&LL(0xfb,0xfb,0xcb,0xfb,0x8b,0x30,0xeb,0x70);
+	&LL(0xee,0xee,0x9f,0xee,0x23,0x71,0xc1,0xcd);
+	&LL(0x7c,0x7c,0xed,0x7c,0xc7,0x91,0xf8,0xbb);
+	&LL(0x66,0x66,0x85,0x66,0x17,0xe3,0xcc,0x71);
+	&LL(0xdd,0xdd,0x53,0xdd,0xa6,0x8e,0xa7,0x7b);
+	&LL(0x17,0x17,0x5c,0x17,0xb8,0x4b,0x2e,0xaf);
+	&LL(0x47,0x47,0x01,0x47,0x02,0x46,0x8e,0x45);
+	&LL(0x9e,0x9e,0x42,0x9e,0x84,0xdc,0x21,0x1a);
+	&LL(0xca,0xca,0x0f,0xca,0x1e,0xc5,0x89,0xd4);
+	&LL(0x2d,0x2d,0xb4,0x2d,0x75,0x99,0x5a,0x58);
+	&LL(0xbf,0xbf,0xc6,0xbf,0x91,0x79,0x63,0x2e);
+	&LL(0x07,0x07,0x1c,0x07,0x38,0x1b,0x0e,0x3f);
+	&LL(0xad,0xad,0x8e,0xad,0x01,0x23,0x47,0xac);
+	&LL(0x5a,0x5a,0x75,0x5a,0xea,0x2f,0xb4,0xb0);
+	&LL(0x83,0x83,0x36,0x83,0x6c,0xb5,0x1b,0xef);
+	&LL(0x33,0x33,0xcc,0x33,0x85,0xff,0x66,0xb6);
+	&LL(0x63,0x63,0x91,0x63,0x3f,0xf2,0xc6,0x5c);
+	&LL(0x02,0x02,0x08,0x02,0x10,0x0a,0x04,0x12);
+	&LL(0xaa,0xaa,0x92,0xaa,0x39,0x38,0x49,0x93);
+	&LL(0x71,0x71,0xd9,0x71,0xaf,0xa8,0xe2,0xde);
+	&LL(0xc8,0xc8,0x07,0xc8,0x0e,0xcf,0x8d,0xc6);
+	&LL(0x19,0x19,0x64,0x19,0xc8,0x7d,0x32,0xd1);
+	&LL(0x49,0x49,0x39,0x49,0x72,0x70,0x92,0x3b);
+	&LL(0xd9,0xd9,0x43,0xd9,0x86,0x9a,0xaf,0x5f);
+	&LL(0xf2,0xf2,0xef,0xf2,0xc3,0x1d,0xf9,0x31);
+	&LL(0xe3,0xe3,0xab,0xe3,0x4b,0x48,0xdb,0xa8);
+	&LL(0x5b,0x5b,0x71,0x5b,0xe2,0x2a,0xb6,0xb9);
+	&LL(0x88,0x88,0x1a,0x88,0x34,0x92,0x0d,0xbc);
+	&LL(0x9a,0x9a,0x52,0x9a,0xa4,0xc8,0x29,0x3e);
+	&LL(0x26,0x26,0x98,0x26,0x2d,0xbe,0x4c,0x0b);
+	&LL(0x32,0x32,0xc8,0x32,0x8d,0xfa,0x64,0xbf);
+	&LL(0xb0,0xb0,0xfa,0xb0,0xe9,0x4a,0x7d,0x59);
+	&LL(0xe9,0xe9,0x83,0xe9,0x1b,0x6a,0xcf,0xf2);
+	&LL(0x0f,0x0f,0x3c,0x0f,0x78,0x33,0x1e,0x77);
+	&LL(0xd5,0xd5,0x73,0xd5,0xe6,0xa6,0xb7,0x33);
+	&LL(0x80,0x80,0x3a,0x80,0x74,0xba,0x1d,0xf4);
+	&LL(0xbe,0xbe,0xc2,0xbe,0x99,0x7c,0x61,0x27);
+	&LL(0xcd,0xcd,0x13,0xcd,0x26,0xde,0x87,0xeb);
+	&LL(0x34,0x34,0xd0,0x34,0xbd,0xe4,0x68,0x89);
+	&LL(0x48,0x48,0x3d,0x48,0x7a,0x75,0x90,0x32);
+	&LL(0xff,0xff,0xdb,0xff,0xab,0x24,0xe3,0x54);
+	&LL(0x7a,0x7a,0xf5,0x7a,0xf7,0x8f,0xf4,0x8d);
+	&LL(0x90,0x90,0x7a,0x90,0xf4,0xea,0x3d,0x64);
+	&LL(0x5f,0x5f,0x61,0x5f,0xc2,0x3e,0xbe,0x9d);
+	&LL(0x20,0x20,0x80,0x20,0x1d,0xa0,0x40,0x3d);
+	&LL(0x68,0x68,0xbd,0x68,0x67,0xd5,0xd0,0x0f);
+	&LL(0x1a,0x1a,0x68,0x1a,0xd0,0x72,0x34,0xca);
+	&LL(0xae,0xae,0x82,0xae,0x19,0x2c,0x41,0xb7);
+	&LL(0xb4,0xb4,0xea,0xb4,0xc9,0x5e,0x75,0x7d);
+	&LL(0x54,0x54,0x4d,0x54,0x9a,0x19,0xa8,0xce);
+	&LL(0x93,0x93,0x76,0x93,0xec,0xe5,0x3b,0x7f);
+	&LL(0x22,0x22,0x88,0x22,0x0d,0xaa,0x44,0x2f);
+	&LL(0x64,0x64,0x8d,0x64,0x07,0xe9,0xc8,0x63);
+	&LL(0xf1,0xf1,0xe3,0xf1,0xdb,0x12,0xff,0x2a);
+	&LL(0x73,0x73,0xd1,0x73,0xbf,0xa2,0xe6,0xcc);
+	&LL(0x12,0x12,0x48,0x12,0x90,0x5a,0x24,0x82);
+	&LL(0x40,0x40,0x1d,0x40,0x3a,0x5d,0x80,0x7a);
+	&LL(0x08,0x08,0x20,0x08,0x40,0x28,0x10,0x48);
+	&LL(0xc3,0xc3,0x2b,0xc3,0x56,0xe8,0x9b,0x95);
+	&LL(0xec,0xec,0x97,0xec,0x33,0x7b,0xc5,0xdf);
+	&LL(0xdb,0xdb,0x4b,0xdb,0x96,0x90,0xab,0x4d);
+	&LL(0xa1,0xa1,0xbe,0xa1,0x61,0x1f,0x5f,0xc0);
+	&LL(0x8d,0x8d,0x0e,0x8d,0x1c,0x83,0x07,0x91);
+	&LL(0x3d,0x3d,0xf4,0x3d,0xf5,0xc9,0x7a,0xc8);
+	&LL(0x97,0x97,0x66,0x97,0xcc,0xf1,0x33,0x5b);
+	&LL(0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00);
+	&LL(0xcf,0xcf,0x1b,0xcf,0x36,0xd4,0x83,0xf9);
+	&LL(0x2b,0x2b,0xac,0x2b,0x45,0x87,0x56,0x6e);
+	&LL(0x76,0x76,0xc5,0x76,0x97,0xb3,0xec,0xe1);
+	&LL(0x82,0x82,0x32,0x82,0x64,0xb0,0x19,0xe6);
+	&LL(0xd6,0xd6,0x7f,0xd6,0xfe,0xa9,0xb1,0x28);
+	&LL(0x1b,0x1b,0x6c,0x1b,0xd8,0x77,0x36,0xc3);
+	&LL(0xb5,0xb5,0xee,0xb5,0xc1,0x5b,0x77,0x74);
+	&LL(0xaf,0xaf,0x86,0xaf,0x11,0x29,0x43,0xbe);
+	&LL(0x6a,0x6a,0xb5,0x6a,0x77,0xdf,0xd4,0x1d);
+	&LL(0x50,0x50,0x5d,0x50,0xba,0x0d,0xa0,0xea);
+	&LL(0x45,0x45,0x09,0x45,0x12,0x4c,0x8a,0x57);
+	&LL(0xf3,0xf3,0xeb,0xf3,0xcb,0x18,0xfb,0x38);
+	&LL(0x30,0x30,0xc0,0x30,0x9d,0xf0,0x60,0xad);
+	&LL(0xef,0xef,0x9b,0xef,0x2b,0x74,0xc3,0xc4);
+	&LL(0x3f,0x3f,0xfc,0x3f,0xe5,0xc3,0x7e,0xda);
+	&LL(0x55,0x55,0x49,0x55,0x92,0x1c,0xaa,0xc7);
+	&LL(0xa2,0xa2,0xb2,0xa2,0x79,0x10,0x59,0xdb);
+	&LL(0xea,0xea,0x8f,0xea,0x03,0x65,0xc9,0xe9);
+	&LL(0x65,0x65,0x89,0x65,0x0f,0xec,0xca,0x6a);
+	&LL(0xba,0xba,0xd2,0xba,0xb9,0x68,0x69,0x03);
+	&LL(0x2f,0x2f,0xbc,0x2f,0x65,0x93,0x5e,0x4a);
+	&LL(0xc0,0xc0,0x27,0xc0,0x4e,0xe7,0x9d,0x8e);
+	&LL(0xde,0xde,0x5f,0xde,0xbe,0x81,0xa1,0x60);
+	&LL(0x1c,0x1c,0x70,0x1c,0xe0,0x6c,0x38,0xfc);
+	&LL(0xfd,0xfd,0xd3,0xfd,0xbb,0x2e,0xe7,0x46);
+	&LL(0x4d,0x4d,0x29,0x4d,0x52,0x64,0x9a,0x1f);
+	&LL(0x92,0x92,0x72,0x92,0xe4,0xe0,0x39,0x76);
+	&LL(0x75,0x75,0xc9,0x75,0x8f,0xbc,0xea,0xfa);
+	&LL(0x06,0x06,0x18,0x06,0x30,0x1e,0x0c,0x36);
+	&LL(0x8a,0x8a,0x12,0x8a,0x24,0x98,0x09,0xae);
+	&LL(0xb2,0xb2,0xf2,0xb2,0xf9,0x40,0x79,0x4b);
+	&LL(0xe6,0xe6,0xbf,0xe6,0x63,0x59,0xd1,0x85);
+	&LL(0x0e,0x0e,0x38,0x0e,0x70,0x36,0x1c,0x7e);
+	&LL(0x1f,0x1f,0x7c,0x1f,0xf8,0x63,0x3e,0xe7);
+	&LL(0x62,0x62,0x95,0x62,0x37,0xf7,0xc4,0x55);
+	&LL(0xd4,0xd4,0x77,0xd4,0xee,0xa3,0xb5,0x3a);
+	&LL(0xa8,0xa8,0x9a,0xa8,0x29,0x32,0x4d,0x81);
+	&LL(0x96,0x96,0x62,0x96,0xc4,0xf4,0x31,0x52);
+	&LL(0xf9,0xf9,0xc3,0xf9,0x9b,0x3a,0xef,0x62);
+	&LL(0xc5,0xc5,0x33,0xc5,0x66,0xf6,0x97,0xa3);
+	&LL(0x25,0x25,0x94,0x25,0x35,0xb1,0x4a,0x10);
+	&LL(0x59,0x59,0x79,0x59,0xf2,0x20,0xb2,0xab);
+	&LL(0x84,0x84,0x2a,0x84,0x54,0xae,0x15,0xd0);
+	&LL(0x72,0x72,0xd5,0x72,0xb7,0xa7,0xe4,0xc5);
+	&LL(0x39,0x39,0xe4,0x39,0xd5,0xdd,0x72,0xec);
+	&LL(0x4c,0x4c,0x2d,0x4c,0x5a,0x61,0x98,0x16);
+	&LL(0x5e,0x5e,0x65,0x5e,0xca,0x3b,0xbc,0x94);
+	&LL(0x78,0x78,0xfd,0x78,0xe7,0x85,0xf0,0x9f);
+	&LL(0x38,0x38,0xe0,0x38,0xdd,0xd8,0x70,0xe5);
+	&LL(0x8c,0x8c,0x0a,0x8c,0x14,0x86,0x05,0x98);
+	&LL(0xd1,0xd1,0x63,0xd1,0xc6,0xb2,0xbf,0x17);
+	&LL(0xa5,0xa5,0xae,0xa5,0x41,0x0b,0x57,0xe4);
+	&LL(0xe2,0xe2,0xaf,0xe2,0x43,0x4d,0xd9,0xa1);
+	&LL(0x61,0x61,0x99,0x61,0x2f,0xf8,0xc2,0x4e);
+	&LL(0xb3,0xb3,0xf6,0xb3,0xf1,0x45,0x7b,0x42);
+	&LL(0x21,0x21,0x84,0x21,0x15,0xa5,0x42,0x34);
+	&LL(0x9c,0x9c,0x4a,0x9c,0x94,0xd6,0x25,0x08);
+	&LL(0x1e,0x1e,0x78,0x1e,0xf0,0x66,0x3c,0xee);
+	&LL(0x43,0x43,0x11,0x43,0x22,0x52,0x86,0x61);
+	&LL(0xc7,0xc7,0x3b,0xc7,0x76,0xfc,0x93,0xb1);
+	&LL(0xfc,0xfc,0xd7,0xfc,0xb3,0x2b,0xe5,0x4f);
+	&LL(0x04,0x04,0x10,0x04,0x20,0x14,0x08,0x24);
+	&LL(0x51,0x51,0x59,0x51,0xb2,0x08,0xa2,0xe3);
+	&LL(0x99,0x99,0x5e,0x99,0xbc,0xc7,0x2f,0x25);
+	&LL(0x6d,0x6d,0xa9,0x6d,0x4f,0xc4,0xda,0x22);
+	&LL(0x0d,0x0d,0x34,0x0d,0x68,0x39,0x1a,0x65);
+	&LL(0xfa,0xfa,0xcf,0xfa,0x83,0x35,0xe9,0x79);
+	&LL(0xdf,0xdf,0x5b,0xdf,0xb6,0x84,0xa3,0x69);
+	&LL(0x7e,0x7e,0xe5,0x7e,0xd7,0x9b,0xfc,0xa9);
+	&LL(0x24,0x24,0x90,0x24,0x3d,0xb4,0x48,0x19);
+	&LL(0x3b,0x3b,0xec,0x3b,0xc5,0xd7,0x76,0xfe);
+	&LL(0xab,0xab,0x96,0xab,0x31,0x3d,0x4b,0x9a);
+	&LL(0xce,0xce,0x1f,0xce,0x3e,0xd1,0x81,0xf0);
+	&LL(0x11,0x11,0x44,0x11,0x88,0x55,0x22,0x99);
+	&LL(0x8f,0x8f,0x06,0x8f,0x0c,0x89,0x03,0x83);
+	&LL(0x4e,0x4e,0x25,0x4e,0x4a,0x6b,0x9c,0x04);
+	&LL(0xb7,0xb7,0xe6,0xb7,0xd1,0x51,0x73,0x66);
+	&LL(0xeb,0xeb,0x8b,0xeb,0x0b,0x60,0xcb,0xe0);
+	&LL(0x3c,0x3c,0xf0,0x3c,0xfd,0xcc,0x78,0xc1);
+	&LL(0x81,0x81,0x3e,0x81,0x7c,0xbf,0x1f,0xfd);
+	&LL(0x94,0x94,0x6a,0x94,0xd4,0xfe,0x35,0x40);
+	&LL(0xf7,0xf7,0xfb,0xf7,0xeb,0x0c,0xf3,0x1c);
+	&LL(0xb9,0xb9,0xde,0xb9,0xa1,0x67,0x6f,0x18);
+	&LL(0x13,0x13,0x4c,0x13,0x98,0x5f,0x26,0x8b);
+	&LL(0x2c,0x2c,0xb0,0x2c,0x7d,0x9c,0x58,0x51);
+	&LL(0xd3,0xd3,0x6b,0xd3,0xd6,0xb8,0xbb,0x05);
+	&LL(0xe7,0xe7,0xbb,0xe7,0x6b,0x5c,0xd3,0x8c);
+	&LL(0x6e,0x6e,0xa5,0x6e,0x57,0xcb,0xdc,0x39);
+	&LL(0xc4,0xc4,0x37,0xc4,0x6e,0xf3,0x95,0xaa);
+	&LL(0x03,0x03,0x0c,0x03,0x18,0x0f,0x06,0x1b);
+	&LL(0x56,0x56,0x45,0x56,0x8a,0x13,0xac,0xdc);
+	&LL(0x44,0x44,0x0d,0x44,0x1a,0x49,0x88,0x5e);
+	&LL(0x7f,0x7f,0xe1,0x7f,0xdf,0x9e,0xfe,0xa0);
+	&LL(0xa9,0xa9,0x9e,0xa9,0x21,0x37,0x4f,0x88);
+	&LL(0x2a,0x2a,0xa8,0x2a,0x4d,0x82,0x54,0x67);
+	&LL(0xbb,0xbb,0xd6,0xbb,0xb1,0x6d,0x6b,0x0a);
+	&LL(0xc1,0xc1,0x23,0xc1,0x46,0xe2,0x9f,0x87);
+	&LL(0x53,0x53,0x51,0x53,0xa2,0x02,0xa6,0xf1);
+	&LL(0xdc,0xdc,0x57,0xdc,0xae,0x8b,0xa5,0x72);
+	&LL(0x0b,0x0b,0x2c,0x0b,0x58,0x27,0x16,0x53);
+	&LL(0x9d,0x9d,0x4e,0x9d,0x9c,0xd3,0x27,0x01);
+	&LL(0x6c,0x6c,0xad,0x6c,0x47,0xc1,0xd8,0x2b);
+	&LL(0x31,0x31,0xc4,0x31,0x95,0xf5,0x62,0xa4);
+	&LL(0x74,0x74,0xcd,0x74,0x87,0xb9,0xe8,0xf3);
+	&LL(0xf6,0xf6,0xff,0xf6,0xe3,0x09,0xf1,0x15);
+	&LL(0x46,0x46,0x05,0x46,0x0a,0x43,0x8c,0x4c);
+	&LL(0xac,0xac,0x8a,0xac,0x09,0x26,0x45,0xa5);
+	&LL(0x89,0x89,0x1e,0x89,0x3c,0x97,0x0f,0xb5);
+	&LL(0x14,0x14,0x50,0x14,0xa0,0x44,0x28,0xb4);
+	&LL(0xe1,0xe1,0xa3,0xe1,0x5b,0x42,0xdf,0xba);
+	&LL(0x16,0x16,0x58,0x16,0xb0,0x4e,0x2c,0xa6);
+	&LL(0x3a,0x3a,0xe8,0x3a,0xcd,0xd2,0x74,0xf7);
+	&LL(0x69,0x69,0xb9,0x69,0x6f,0xd0,0xd2,0x06);
+	&LL(0x09,0x09,0x24,0x09,0x48,0x2d,0x12,0x41);
+	&LL(0x70,0x70,0xdd,0x70,0xa7,0xad,0xe0,0xd7);
+	&LL(0xb6,0xb6,0xe2,0xb6,0xd9,0x54,0x71,0x6f);
+	&LL(0xd0,0xd0,0x67,0xd0,0xce,0xb7,0xbd,0x1e);
+	&LL(0xed,0xed,0x93,0xed,0x3b,0x7e,0xc7,0xd6);
+	&LL(0xcc,0xcc,0x17,0xcc,0x2e,0xdb,0x85,0xe2);
+	&LL(0x42,0x42,0x15,0x42,0x2a,0x57,0x84,0x68);
+	&LL(0x98,0x98,0x5a,0x98,0xb4,0xc2,0x2d,0x2c);
+	&LL(0xa4,0xa4,0xaa,0xa4,0x49,0x0e,0x55,0xed);
+	&LL(0x28,0x28,0xa0,0x28,0x5d,0x88,0x50,0x75);
+	&LL(0x5c,0x5c,0x6d,0x5c,0xda,0x31,0xb8,0x86);
+	&LL(0xf8,0xf8,0xc7,0xf8,0x93,0x3f,0xed,0x6b);
+	&LL(0x86,0x86,0x22,0x86,0x44,0xa4,0x11,0xc2);
+
+	&L(0x18,0x23,0xc6,0xe8,0x87,0xb8,0x01,0x4f);	# rc[ROUNDS]
+	&L(0x36,0xa6,0xd2,0xf5,0x79,0x6f,0x91,0x52);
+	&L(0x60,0xbc,0x9b,0x8e,0xa3,0x0c,0x7b,0x35);
+	&L(0x1d,0xe0,0xd7,0xc2,0x2e,0x4b,0xfe,0x57);
+	&L(0x15,0x77,0x37,0xe5,0x9f,0xf0,0x4a,0xda);
+	&L(0x58,0xc9,0x29,0x0a,0xb1,0xa0,0x6b,0x85);
+	&L(0xbd,0x5d,0x10,0xf4,0xcb,0x3e,0x05,0x67);
+	&L(0xe4,0x27,0x41,0x8b,0xa7,0x7d,0x95,0xd8);
+	&L(0xfb,0xee,0x7c,0x66,0xdd,0x17,0x47,0x9e);
+	&L(0xca,0x2d,0xbf,0x07,0xad,0x5a,0x83,0x33);
+
+&function_end_B("whirlpool_block_mmx");
+&asm_finish(); 
+
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/whrlpool/asm/wp-x86_64.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/whrlpool/asm/wp-x86_64.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c0b21d1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/whrlpool/asm/wp-x86_64.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,600 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se> for the OpenSSL
+# project. Rights for redistribution and usage in source and binary
+# forms are granted according to the OpenSSL license.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# whirlpool_block for x86_64.
+#
+# 2500 cycles per 64-byte input block on AMD64, which is *identical*
+# to 32-bit MMX version executed on same CPU. So why did I bother?
+# Well, it's faster than gcc 3.3.2 generated code by over 50%, and
+# over 80% faster than PathScale 1.4, an "ambitious" commercial
+# compiler. Furthermore it surpasses gcc 3.4.3 by 170% and Sun Studio
+# 10 - by 360%[!]... What is it with x86_64 compilers? It's not the
+# first example when they fail to generate more optimal code, when
+# I believe they had *all* chances to...
+#
+# Note that register and stack frame layout are virtually identical
+# to 32-bit MMX version, except that %r8-15 are used instead of
+# %mm0-8. You can even notice that K[i] and S[i] are loaded to
+# %eax:%ebx as pair of 32-bit values and not as single 64-bit one.
+# This is done in order to avoid 64-bit shift penalties on Intel
+# EM64T core. Speaking of which! I bet it's possible to improve
+# Opteron performance by compressing the table to 2KB and replacing
+# unaligned references with complementary rotations [which would
+# incidentally replace lea instructions], but it would definitely
+# just "kill" EM64T, because it has only 1 shifter/rotator [against
+# 3 on Opteron] and which is *unacceptably* slow with 64-bit
+# operand.
+
+$flavour = shift;
+$output  = shift;
+if ($flavour =~ /\./) { $output = $flavour; undef $flavour; }
+
+$win64=0; $win64=1 if ($flavour =~ /[nm]asm|mingw64/ || $output =~ /\.asm$/);
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; my $dir=$1; my $xlate;
+( $xlate="${dir}x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
+( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
+die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl";
+
+open OUT,"| \"$^X\" \"$xlate\" $flavour \"$output\"";
+*STDOUT=*OUT;
+
+sub L() { $code.=".byte	".join(',',@_)."\n"; }
+sub LL(){ $code.=".byte	".join(',',@_).",".join(',',@_)."\n"; }
+
+@mm=("%r8","%r9","%r10","%r11","%r12","%r13","%r14","%r15");
+
+$func="whirlpool_block";
+$table=".Ltable";
+
+$code=<<___;
+.text
+
+.globl	$func
+.type	$func,\@function,3
+.align	16
+$func:
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+
+	mov	%rsp,%r11
+	sub	\$128+40,%rsp
+	and	\$-64,%rsp
+
+	lea	128(%rsp),%r10
+	mov	%rdi,0(%r10)		# save parameter block
+	mov	%rsi,8(%r10)
+	mov	%rdx,16(%r10)
+	mov	%r11,32(%r10)		# saved stack pointer
+.Lprologue:
+
+	mov	%r10,%rbx
+	lea	$table(%rip),%rbp
+
+	xor	%rcx,%rcx
+	xor	%rdx,%rdx
+___
+for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) { $code.="mov $i*8(%rdi),@mm[$i]\n"; }	# L=H
+$code.=".Louterloop:\n";
+for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) { $code.="mov @mm[$i],$i*8(%rsp)\n"; }	# K=L
+for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) { $code.="xor $i*8(%rsi),@mm[$i]\n"; }	# L^=inp
+for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) { $code.="mov @mm[$i],64+$i*8(%rsp)\n"; }	# S=L
+$code.=<<___;
+	xor	%rsi,%rsi
+	mov	%rsi,24(%rbx)		# zero round counter
+	jmp	.Lround
+.align	16
+.Lround:
+	mov	4096(%rbp,%rsi,8),@mm[0]	# rc[r]
+	mov	0(%rsp),%eax
+	mov	4(%rsp),%ebx
+	movz	%al,%ecx
+	movz	%ah,%edx
+___
+for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) {
+    my $func = ($i==0)? "mov" : "xor";
+    $code.=<<___;
+	shr	\$16,%eax
+	lea	(%rcx,%rcx),%rsi
+	movz	%al,%ecx
+	lea	(%rdx,%rdx),%rdi
+	movz	%ah,%edx
+	xor	0(%rbp,%rsi,8),@mm[0]
+	$func	7(%rbp,%rdi,8),@mm[1]
+	mov	$i*8+8(%rsp),%eax		# ($i+1)*8
+	lea	(%rcx,%rcx),%rsi
+	movz	%bl,%ecx
+	lea	(%rdx,%rdx),%rdi
+	movz	%bh,%edx
+	$func	6(%rbp,%rsi,8),@mm[2]
+	$func	5(%rbp,%rdi,8),@mm[3]
+	shr	\$16,%ebx
+	lea	(%rcx,%rcx),%rsi
+	movz	%bl,%ecx
+	lea	(%rdx,%rdx),%rdi
+	movz	%bh,%edx
+	$func	4(%rbp,%rsi,8),@mm[4]
+	$func	3(%rbp,%rdi,8),@mm[5]
+	mov	$i*8+8+4(%rsp),%ebx		# ($i+1)*8+4
+	lea	(%rcx,%rcx),%rsi
+	movz	%al,%ecx
+	lea	(%rdx,%rdx),%rdi
+	movz	%ah,%edx
+	$func	2(%rbp,%rsi,8),@mm[6]
+	$func	1(%rbp,%rdi,8),@mm[7]
+___
+    push(@mm,shift(@mm));
+}
+for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) { $code.="mov @mm[$i],$i*8(%rsp)\n"; }	# K=L
+for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) {
+    $code.=<<___;
+	shr	\$16,%eax
+	lea	(%rcx,%rcx),%rsi
+	movz	%al,%ecx
+	lea	(%rdx,%rdx),%rdi
+	movz	%ah,%edx
+	xor	0(%rbp,%rsi,8),@mm[0]
+	xor	7(%rbp,%rdi,8),@mm[1]
+	`"mov	64+$i*8+8(%rsp),%eax"	if($i<7);`	# 64+($i+1)*8
+	lea	(%rcx,%rcx),%rsi
+	movz	%bl,%ecx
+	lea	(%rdx,%rdx),%rdi
+	movz	%bh,%edx
+	xor	6(%rbp,%rsi,8),@mm[2]
+	xor	5(%rbp,%rdi,8),@mm[3]
+	shr	\$16,%ebx
+	lea	(%rcx,%rcx),%rsi
+	movz	%bl,%ecx
+	lea	(%rdx,%rdx),%rdi
+	movz	%bh,%edx
+	xor	4(%rbp,%rsi,8),@mm[4]
+	xor	3(%rbp,%rdi,8),@mm[5]
+	`"mov	64+$i*8+8+4(%rsp),%ebx"	if($i<7);`	# 64+($i+1)*8+4
+	lea	(%rcx,%rcx),%rsi
+	movz	%al,%ecx
+	lea	(%rdx,%rdx),%rdi
+	movz	%ah,%edx
+	xor	2(%rbp,%rsi,8),@mm[6]
+	xor	1(%rbp,%rdi,8),@mm[7]
+___
+    push(@mm,shift(@mm));
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+	lea	128(%rsp),%rbx
+	mov	24(%rbx),%rsi		# pull round counter
+	add	\$1,%rsi
+	cmp	\$10,%rsi
+	je	.Lroundsdone
+
+	mov	%rsi,24(%rbx)		# update round counter
+___
+for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) { $code.="mov @mm[$i],64+$i*8(%rsp)\n"; }	# S=L
+$code.=<<___;
+	jmp	.Lround
+.align	16
+.Lroundsdone:
+	mov	0(%rbx),%rdi		# reload argument block
+	mov	8(%rbx),%rsi
+	mov	16(%rbx),%rax
+___
+for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) { $code.="xor $i*8(%rsi),@mm[$i]\n"; }	# L^=inp
+for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) { $code.="xor $i*8(%rdi),@mm[$i]\n"; }	# L^=H
+for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) { $code.="mov @mm[$i],$i*8(%rdi)\n"; }	# H=L
+$code.=<<___;
+	lea	64(%rsi),%rsi		# inp+=64
+	sub	\$1,%rax		# num--
+	jz	.Lalldone
+	mov	%rsi,8(%rbx)		# update parameter block
+	mov	%rax,16(%rbx)
+	jmp	.Louterloop
+.Lalldone:
+	mov	32(%rbx),%rsi		# restore saved pointer
+	mov	(%rsi),%r15
+	mov	8(%rsi),%r14
+	mov	16(%rsi),%r13
+	mov	24(%rsi),%r12
+	mov	32(%rsi),%rbp
+	mov	40(%rsi),%rbx
+	lea	48(%rsi),%rsp
+.Lepilogue:
+	ret
+.size	$func,.-$func
+
+.align	64
+.type	$table,\@object
+$table:
+___
+	&LL(0x18,0x18,0x60,0x18,0xc0,0x78,0x30,0xd8);
+	&LL(0x23,0x23,0x8c,0x23,0x05,0xaf,0x46,0x26);
+	&LL(0xc6,0xc6,0x3f,0xc6,0x7e,0xf9,0x91,0xb8);
+	&LL(0xe8,0xe8,0x87,0xe8,0x13,0x6f,0xcd,0xfb);
+	&LL(0x87,0x87,0x26,0x87,0x4c,0xa1,0x13,0xcb);
+	&LL(0xb8,0xb8,0xda,0xb8,0xa9,0x62,0x6d,0x11);
+	&LL(0x01,0x01,0x04,0x01,0x08,0x05,0x02,0x09);
+	&LL(0x4f,0x4f,0x21,0x4f,0x42,0x6e,0x9e,0x0d);
+	&LL(0x36,0x36,0xd8,0x36,0xad,0xee,0x6c,0x9b);
+	&LL(0xa6,0xa6,0xa2,0xa6,0x59,0x04,0x51,0xff);
+	&LL(0xd2,0xd2,0x6f,0xd2,0xde,0xbd,0xb9,0x0c);
+	&LL(0xf5,0xf5,0xf3,0xf5,0xfb,0x06,0xf7,0x0e);
+	&LL(0x79,0x79,0xf9,0x79,0xef,0x80,0xf2,0x96);
+	&LL(0x6f,0x6f,0xa1,0x6f,0x5f,0xce,0xde,0x30);
+	&LL(0x91,0x91,0x7e,0x91,0xfc,0xef,0x3f,0x6d);
+	&LL(0x52,0x52,0x55,0x52,0xaa,0x07,0xa4,0xf8);
+	&LL(0x60,0x60,0x9d,0x60,0x27,0xfd,0xc0,0x47);
+	&LL(0xbc,0xbc,0xca,0xbc,0x89,0x76,0x65,0x35);
+	&LL(0x9b,0x9b,0x56,0x9b,0xac,0xcd,0x2b,0x37);
+	&LL(0x8e,0x8e,0x02,0x8e,0x04,0x8c,0x01,0x8a);
+	&LL(0xa3,0xa3,0xb6,0xa3,0x71,0x15,0x5b,0xd2);
+	&LL(0x0c,0x0c,0x30,0x0c,0x60,0x3c,0x18,0x6c);
+	&LL(0x7b,0x7b,0xf1,0x7b,0xff,0x8a,0xf6,0x84);
+	&LL(0x35,0x35,0xd4,0x35,0xb5,0xe1,0x6a,0x80);
+	&LL(0x1d,0x1d,0x74,0x1d,0xe8,0x69,0x3a,0xf5);
+	&LL(0xe0,0xe0,0xa7,0xe0,0x53,0x47,0xdd,0xb3);
+	&LL(0xd7,0xd7,0x7b,0xd7,0xf6,0xac,0xb3,0x21);
+	&LL(0xc2,0xc2,0x2f,0xc2,0x5e,0xed,0x99,0x9c);
+	&LL(0x2e,0x2e,0xb8,0x2e,0x6d,0x96,0x5c,0x43);
+	&LL(0x4b,0x4b,0x31,0x4b,0x62,0x7a,0x96,0x29);
+	&LL(0xfe,0xfe,0xdf,0xfe,0xa3,0x21,0xe1,0x5d);
+	&LL(0x57,0x57,0x41,0x57,0x82,0x16,0xae,0xd5);
+	&LL(0x15,0x15,0x54,0x15,0xa8,0x41,0x2a,0xbd);
+	&LL(0x77,0x77,0xc1,0x77,0x9f,0xb6,0xee,0xe8);
+	&LL(0x37,0x37,0xdc,0x37,0xa5,0xeb,0x6e,0x92);
+	&LL(0xe5,0xe5,0xb3,0xe5,0x7b,0x56,0xd7,0x9e);
+	&LL(0x9f,0x9f,0x46,0x9f,0x8c,0xd9,0x23,0x13);
+	&LL(0xf0,0xf0,0xe7,0xf0,0xd3,0x17,0xfd,0x23);
+	&LL(0x4a,0x4a,0x35,0x4a,0x6a,0x7f,0x94,0x20);
+	&LL(0xda,0xda,0x4f,0xda,0x9e,0x95,0xa9,0x44);
+	&LL(0x58,0x58,0x7d,0x58,0xfa,0x25,0xb0,0xa2);
+	&LL(0xc9,0xc9,0x03,0xc9,0x06,0xca,0x8f,0xcf);
+	&LL(0x29,0x29,0xa4,0x29,0x55,0x8d,0x52,0x7c);
+	&LL(0x0a,0x0a,0x28,0x0a,0x50,0x22,0x14,0x5a);
+	&LL(0xb1,0xb1,0xfe,0xb1,0xe1,0x4f,0x7f,0x50);
+	&LL(0xa0,0xa0,0xba,0xa0,0x69,0x1a,0x5d,0xc9);
+	&LL(0x6b,0x6b,0xb1,0x6b,0x7f,0xda,0xd6,0x14);
+	&LL(0x85,0x85,0x2e,0x85,0x5c,0xab,0x17,0xd9);
+	&LL(0xbd,0xbd,0xce,0xbd,0x81,0x73,0x67,0x3c);
+	&LL(0x5d,0x5d,0x69,0x5d,0xd2,0x34,0xba,0x8f);
+	&LL(0x10,0x10,0x40,0x10,0x80,0x50,0x20,0x90);
+	&LL(0xf4,0xf4,0xf7,0xf4,0xf3,0x03,0xf5,0x07);
+	&LL(0xcb,0xcb,0x0b,0xcb,0x16,0xc0,0x8b,0xdd);
+	&LL(0x3e,0x3e,0xf8,0x3e,0xed,0xc6,0x7c,0xd3);
+	&LL(0x05,0x05,0x14,0x05,0x28,0x11,0x0a,0x2d);
+	&LL(0x67,0x67,0x81,0x67,0x1f,0xe6,0xce,0x78);
+	&LL(0xe4,0xe4,0xb7,0xe4,0x73,0x53,0xd5,0x97);
+	&LL(0x27,0x27,0x9c,0x27,0x25,0xbb,0x4e,0x02);
+	&LL(0x41,0x41,0x19,0x41,0x32,0x58,0x82,0x73);
+	&LL(0x8b,0x8b,0x16,0x8b,0x2c,0x9d,0x0b,0xa7);
+	&LL(0xa7,0xa7,0xa6,0xa7,0x51,0x01,0x53,0xf6);
+	&LL(0x7d,0x7d,0xe9,0x7d,0xcf,0x94,0xfa,0xb2);
+	&LL(0x95,0x95,0x6e,0x95,0xdc,0xfb,0x37,0x49);
+	&LL(0xd8,0xd8,0x47,0xd8,0x8e,0x9f,0xad,0x56);
+	&LL(0xfb,0xfb,0xcb,0xfb,0x8b,0x30,0xeb,0x70);
+	&LL(0xee,0xee,0x9f,0xee,0x23,0x71,0xc1,0xcd);
+	&LL(0x7c,0x7c,0xed,0x7c,0xc7,0x91,0xf8,0xbb);
+	&LL(0x66,0x66,0x85,0x66,0x17,0xe3,0xcc,0x71);
+	&LL(0xdd,0xdd,0x53,0xdd,0xa6,0x8e,0xa7,0x7b);
+	&LL(0x17,0x17,0x5c,0x17,0xb8,0x4b,0x2e,0xaf);
+	&LL(0x47,0x47,0x01,0x47,0x02,0x46,0x8e,0x45);
+	&LL(0x9e,0x9e,0x42,0x9e,0x84,0xdc,0x21,0x1a);
+	&LL(0xca,0xca,0x0f,0xca,0x1e,0xc5,0x89,0xd4);
+	&LL(0x2d,0x2d,0xb4,0x2d,0x75,0x99,0x5a,0x58);
+	&LL(0xbf,0xbf,0xc6,0xbf,0x91,0x79,0x63,0x2e);
+	&LL(0x07,0x07,0x1c,0x07,0x38,0x1b,0x0e,0x3f);
+	&LL(0xad,0xad,0x8e,0xad,0x01,0x23,0x47,0xac);
+	&LL(0x5a,0x5a,0x75,0x5a,0xea,0x2f,0xb4,0xb0);
+	&LL(0x83,0x83,0x36,0x83,0x6c,0xb5,0x1b,0xef);
+	&LL(0x33,0x33,0xcc,0x33,0x85,0xff,0x66,0xb6);
+	&LL(0x63,0x63,0x91,0x63,0x3f,0xf2,0xc6,0x5c);
+	&LL(0x02,0x02,0x08,0x02,0x10,0x0a,0x04,0x12);
+	&LL(0xaa,0xaa,0x92,0xaa,0x39,0x38,0x49,0x93);
+	&LL(0x71,0x71,0xd9,0x71,0xaf,0xa8,0xe2,0xde);
+	&LL(0xc8,0xc8,0x07,0xc8,0x0e,0xcf,0x8d,0xc6);
+	&LL(0x19,0x19,0x64,0x19,0xc8,0x7d,0x32,0xd1);
+	&LL(0x49,0x49,0x39,0x49,0x72,0x70,0x92,0x3b);
+	&LL(0xd9,0xd9,0x43,0xd9,0x86,0x9a,0xaf,0x5f);
+	&LL(0xf2,0xf2,0xef,0xf2,0xc3,0x1d,0xf9,0x31);
+	&LL(0xe3,0xe3,0xab,0xe3,0x4b,0x48,0xdb,0xa8);
+	&LL(0x5b,0x5b,0x71,0x5b,0xe2,0x2a,0xb6,0xb9);
+	&LL(0x88,0x88,0x1a,0x88,0x34,0x92,0x0d,0xbc);
+	&LL(0x9a,0x9a,0x52,0x9a,0xa4,0xc8,0x29,0x3e);
+	&LL(0x26,0x26,0x98,0x26,0x2d,0xbe,0x4c,0x0b);
+	&LL(0x32,0x32,0xc8,0x32,0x8d,0xfa,0x64,0xbf);
+	&LL(0xb0,0xb0,0xfa,0xb0,0xe9,0x4a,0x7d,0x59);
+	&LL(0xe9,0xe9,0x83,0xe9,0x1b,0x6a,0xcf,0xf2);
+	&LL(0x0f,0x0f,0x3c,0x0f,0x78,0x33,0x1e,0x77);
+	&LL(0xd5,0xd5,0x73,0xd5,0xe6,0xa6,0xb7,0x33);
+	&LL(0x80,0x80,0x3a,0x80,0x74,0xba,0x1d,0xf4);
+	&LL(0xbe,0xbe,0xc2,0xbe,0x99,0x7c,0x61,0x27);
+	&LL(0xcd,0xcd,0x13,0xcd,0x26,0xde,0x87,0xeb);
+	&LL(0x34,0x34,0xd0,0x34,0xbd,0xe4,0x68,0x89);
+	&LL(0x48,0x48,0x3d,0x48,0x7a,0x75,0x90,0x32);
+	&LL(0xff,0xff,0xdb,0xff,0xab,0x24,0xe3,0x54);
+	&LL(0x7a,0x7a,0xf5,0x7a,0xf7,0x8f,0xf4,0x8d);
+	&LL(0x90,0x90,0x7a,0x90,0xf4,0xea,0x3d,0x64);
+	&LL(0x5f,0x5f,0x61,0x5f,0xc2,0x3e,0xbe,0x9d);
+	&LL(0x20,0x20,0x80,0x20,0x1d,0xa0,0x40,0x3d);
+	&LL(0x68,0x68,0xbd,0x68,0x67,0xd5,0xd0,0x0f);
+	&LL(0x1a,0x1a,0x68,0x1a,0xd0,0x72,0x34,0xca);
+	&LL(0xae,0xae,0x82,0xae,0x19,0x2c,0x41,0xb7);
+	&LL(0xb4,0xb4,0xea,0xb4,0xc9,0x5e,0x75,0x7d);
+	&LL(0x54,0x54,0x4d,0x54,0x9a,0x19,0xa8,0xce);
+	&LL(0x93,0x93,0x76,0x93,0xec,0xe5,0x3b,0x7f);
+	&LL(0x22,0x22,0x88,0x22,0x0d,0xaa,0x44,0x2f);
+	&LL(0x64,0x64,0x8d,0x64,0x07,0xe9,0xc8,0x63);
+	&LL(0xf1,0xf1,0xe3,0xf1,0xdb,0x12,0xff,0x2a);
+	&LL(0x73,0x73,0xd1,0x73,0xbf,0xa2,0xe6,0xcc);
+	&LL(0x12,0x12,0x48,0x12,0x90,0x5a,0x24,0x82);
+	&LL(0x40,0x40,0x1d,0x40,0x3a,0x5d,0x80,0x7a);
+	&LL(0x08,0x08,0x20,0x08,0x40,0x28,0x10,0x48);
+	&LL(0xc3,0xc3,0x2b,0xc3,0x56,0xe8,0x9b,0x95);
+	&LL(0xec,0xec,0x97,0xec,0x33,0x7b,0xc5,0xdf);
+	&LL(0xdb,0xdb,0x4b,0xdb,0x96,0x90,0xab,0x4d);
+	&LL(0xa1,0xa1,0xbe,0xa1,0x61,0x1f,0x5f,0xc0);
+	&LL(0x8d,0x8d,0x0e,0x8d,0x1c,0x83,0x07,0x91);
+	&LL(0x3d,0x3d,0xf4,0x3d,0xf5,0xc9,0x7a,0xc8);
+	&LL(0x97,0x97,0x66,0x97,0xcc,0xf1,0x33,0x5b);
+	&LL(0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00);
+	&LL(0xcf,0xcf,0x1b,0xcf,0x36,0xd4,0x83,0xf9);
+	&LL(0x2b,0x2b,0xac,0x2b,0x45,0x87,0x56,0x6e);
+	&LL(0x76,0x76,0xc5,0x76,0x97,0xb3,0xec,0xe1);
+	&LL(0x82,0x82,0x32,0x82,0x64,0xb0,0x19,0xe6);
+	&LL(0xd6,0xd6,0x7f,0xd6,0xfe,0xa9,0xb1,0x28);
+	&LL(0x1b,0x1b,0x6c,0x1b,0xd8,0x77,0x36,0xc3);
+	&LL(0xb5,0xb5,0xee,0xb5,0xc1,0x5b,0x77,0x74);
+	&LL(0xaf,0xaf,0x86,0xaf,0x11,0x29,0x43,0xbe);
+	&LL(0x6a,0x6a,0xb5,0x6a,0x77,0xdf,0xd4,0x1d);
+	&LL(0x50,0x50,0x5d,0x50,0xba,0x0d,0xa0,0xea);
+	&LL(0x45,0x45,0x09,0x45,0x12,0x4c,0x8a,0x57);
+	&LL(0xf3,0xf3,0xeb,0xf3,0xcb,0x18,0xfb,0x38);
+	&LL(0x30,0x30,0xc0,0x30,0x9d,0xf0,0x60,0xad);
+	&LL(0xef,0xef,0x9b,0xef,0x2b,0x74,0xc3,0xc4);
+	&LL(0x3f,0x3f,0xfc,0x3f,0xe5,0xc3,0x7e,0xda);
+	&LL(0x55,0x55,0x49,0x55,0x92,0x1c,0xaa,0xc7);
+	&LL(0xa2,0xa2,0xb2,0xa2,0x79,0x10,0x59,0xdb);
+	&LL(0xea,0xea,0x8f,0xea,0x03,0x65,0xc9,0xe9);
+	&LL(0x65,0x65,0x89,0x65,0x0f,0xec,0xca,0x6a);
+	&LL(0xba,0xba,0xd2,0xba,0xb9,0x68,0x69,0x03);
+	&LL(0x2f,0x2f,0xbc,0x2f,0x65,0x93,0x5e,0x4a);
+	&LL(0xc0,0xc0,0x27,0xc0,0x4e,0xe7,0x9d,0x8e);
+	&LL(0xde,0xde,0x5f,0xde,0xbe,0x81,0xa1,0x60);
+	&LL(0x1c,0x1c,0x70,0x1c,0xe0,0x6c,0x38,0xfc);
+	&LL(0xfd,0xfd,0xd3,0xfd,0xbb,0x2e,0xe7,0x46);
+	&LL(0x4d,0x4d,0x29,0x4d,0x52,0x64,0x9a,0x1f);
+	&LL(0x92,0x92,0x72,0x92,0xe4,0xe0,0x39,0x76);
+	&LL(0x75,0x75,0xc9,0x75,0x8f,0xbc,0xea,0xfa);
+	&LL(0x06,0x06,0x18,0x06,0x30,0x1e,0x0c,0x36);
+	&LL(0x8a,0x8a,0x12,0x8a,0x24,0x98,0x09,0xae);
+	&LL(0xb2,0xb2,0xf2,0xb2,0xf9,0x40,0x79,0x4b);
+	&LL(0xe6,0xe6,0xbf,0xe6,0x63,0x59,0xd1,0x85);
+	&LL(0x0e,0x0e,0x38,0x0e,0x70,0x36,0x1c,0x7e);
+	&LL(0x1f,0x1f,0x7c,0x1f,0xf8,0x63,0x3e,0xe7);
+	&LL(0x62,0x62,0x95,0x62,0x37,0xf7,0xc4,0x55);
+	&LL(0xd4,0xd4,0x77,0xd4,0xee,0xa3,0xb5,0x3a);
+	&LL(0xa8,0xa8,0x9a,0xa8,0x29,0x32,0x4d,0x81);
+	&LL(0x96,0x96,0x62,0x96,0xc4,0xf4,0x31,0x52);
+	&LL(0xf9,0xf9,0xc3,0xf9,0x9b,0x3a,0xef,0x62);
+	&LL(0xc5,0xc5,0x33,0xc5,0x66,0xf6,0x97,0xa3);
+	&LL(0x25,0x25,0x94,0x25,0x35,0xb1,0x4a,0x10);
+	&LL(0x59,0x59,0x79,0x59,0xf2,0x20,0xb2,0xab);
+	&LL(0x84,0x84,0x2a,0x84,0x54,0xae,0x15,0xd0);
+	&LL(0x72,0x72,0xd5,0x72,0xb7,0xa7,0xe4,0xc5);
+	&LL(0x39,0x39,0xe4,0x39,0xd5,0xdd,0x72,0xec);
+	&LL(0x4c,0x4c,0x2d,0x4c,0x5a,0x61,0x98,0x16);
+	&LL(0x5e,0x5e,0x65,0x5e,0xca,0x3b,0xbc,0x94);
+	&LL(0x78,0x78,0xfd,0x78,0xe7,0x85,0xf0,0x9f);
+	&LL(0x38,0x38,0xe0,0x38,0xdd,0xd8,0x70,0xe5);
+	&LL(0x8c,0x8c,0x0a,0x8c,0x14,0x86,0x05,0x98);
+	&LL(0xd1,0xd1,0x63,0xd1,0xc6,0xb2,0xbf,0x17);
+	&LL(0xa5,0xa5,0xae,0xa5,0x41,0x0b,0x57,0xe4);
+	&LL(0xe2,0xe2,0xaf,0xe2,0x43,0x4d,0xd9,0xa1);
+	&LL(0x61,0x61,0x99,0x61,0x2f,0xf8,0xc2,0x4e);
+	&LL(0xb3,0xb3,0xf6,0xb3,0xf1,0x45,0x7b,0x42);
+	&LL(0x21,0x21,0x84,0x21,0x15,0xa5,0x42,0x34);
+	&LL(0x9c,0x9c,0x4a,0x9c,0x94,0xd6,0x25,0x08);
+	&LL(0x1e,0x1e,0x78,0x1e,0xf0,0x66,0x3c,0xee);
+	&LL(0x43,0x43,0x11,0x43,0x22,0x52,0x86,0x61);
+	&LL(0xc7,0xc7,0x3b,0xc7,0x76,0xfc,0x93,0xb1);
+	&LL(0xfc,0xfc,0xd7,0xfc,0xb3,0x2b,0xe5,0x4f);
+	&LL(0x04,0x04,0x10,0x04,0x20,0x14,0x08,0x24);
+	&LL(0x51,0x51,0x59,0x51,0xb2,0x08,0xa2,0xe3);
+	&LL(0x99,0x99,0x5e,0x99,0xbc,0xc7,0x2f,0x25);
+	&LL(0x6d,0x6d,0xa9,0x6d,0x4f,0xc4,0xda,0x22);
+	&LL(0x0d,0x0d,0x34,0x0d,0x68,0x39,0x1a,0x65);
+	&LL(0xfa,0xfa,0xcf,0xfa,0x83,0x35,0xe9,0x79);
+	&LL(0xdf,0xdf,0x5b,0xdf,0xb6,0x84,0xa3,0x69);
+	&LL(0x7e,0x7e,0xe5,0x7e,0xd7,0x9b,0xfc,0xa9);
+	&LL(0x24,0x24,0x90,0x24,0x3d,0xb4,0x48,0x19);
+	&LL(0x3b,0x3b,0xec,0x3b,0xc5,0xd7,0x76,0xfe);
+	&LL(0xab,0xab,0x96,0xab,0x31,0x3d,0x4b,0x9a);
+	&LL(0xce,0xce,0x1f,0xce,0x3e,0xd1,0x81,0xf0);
+	&LL(0x11,0x11,0x44,0x11,0x88,0x55,0x22,0x99);
+	&LL(0x8f,0x8f,0x06,0x8f,0x0c,0x89,0x03,0x83);
+	&LL(0x4e,0x4e,0x25,0x4e,0x4a,0x6b,0x9c,0x04);
+	&LL(0xb7,0xb7,0xe6,0xb7,0xd1,0x51,0x73,0x66);
+	&LL(0xeb,0xeb,0x8b,0xeb,0x0b,0x60,0xcb,0xe0);
+	&LL(0x3c,0x3c,0xf0,0x3c,0xfd,0xcc,0x78,0xc1);
+	&LL(0x81,0x81,0x3e,0x81,0x7c,0xbf,0x1f,0xfd);
+	&LL(0x94,0x94,0x6a,0x94,0xd4,0xfe,0x35,0x40);
+	&LL(0xf7,0xf7,0xfb,0xf7,0xeb,0x0c,0xf3,0x1c);
+	&LL(0xb9,0xb9,0xde,0xb9,0xa1,0x67,0x6f,0x18);
+	&LL(0x13,0x13,0x4c,0x13,0x98,0x5f,0x26,0x8b);
+	&LL(0x2c,0x2c,0xb0,0x2c,0x7d,0x9c,0x58,0x51);
+	&LL(0xd3,0xd3,0x6b,0xd3,0xd6,0xb8,0xbb,0x05);
+	&LL(0xe7,0xe7,0xbb,0xe7,0x6b,0x5c,0xd3,0x8c);
+	&LL(0x6e,0x6e,0xa5,0x6e,0x57,0xcb,0xdc,0x39);
+	&LL(0xc4,0xc4,0x37,0xc4,0x6e,0xf3,0x95,0xaa);
+	&LL(0x03,0x03,0x0c,0x03,0x18,0x0f,0x06,0x1b);
+	&LL(0x56,0x56,0x45,0x56,0x8a,0x13,0xac,0xdc);
+	&LL(0x44,0x44,0x0d,0x44,0x1a,0x49,0x88,0x5e);
+	&LL(0x7f,0x7f,0xe1,0x7f,0xdf,0x9e,0xfe,0xa0);
+	&LL(0xa9,0xa9,0x9e,0xa9,0x21,0x37,0x4f,0x88);
+	&LL(0x2a,0x2a,0xa8,0x2a,0x4d,0x82,0x54,0x67);
+	&LL(0xbb,0xbb,0xd6,0xbb,0xb1,0x6d,0x6b,0x0a);
+	&LL(0xc1,0xc1,0x23,0xc1,0x46,0xe2,0x9f,0x87);
+	&LL(0x53,0x53,0x51,0x53,0xa2,0x02,0xa6,0xf1);
+	&LL(0xdc,0xdc,0x57,0xdc,0xae,0x8b,0xa5,0x72);
+	&LL(0x0b,0x0b,0x2c,0x0b,0x58,0x27,0x16,0x53);
+	&LL(0x9d,0x9d,0x4e,0x9d,0x9c,0xd3,0x27,0x01);
+	&LL(0x6c,0x6c,0xad,0x6c,0x47,0xc1,0xd8,0x2b);
+	&LL(0x31,0x31,0xc4,0x31,0x95,0xf5,0x62,0xa4);
+	&LL(0x74,0x74,0xcd,0x74,0x87,0xb9,0xe8,0xf3);
+	&LL(0xf6,0xf6,0xff,0xf6,0xe3,0x09,0xf1,0x15);
+	&LL(0x46,0x46,0x05,0x46,0x0a,0x43,0x8c,0x4c);
+	&LL(0xac,0xac,0x8a,0xac,0x09,0x26,0x45,0xa5);
+	&LL(0x89,0x89,0x1e,0x89,0x3c,0x97,0x0f,0xb5);
+	&LL(0x14,0x14,0x50,0x14,0xa0,0x44,0x28,0xb4);
+	&LL(0xe1,0xe1,0xa3,0xe1,0x5b,0x42,0xdf,0xba);
+	&LL(0x16,0x16,0x58,0x16,0xb0,0x4e,0x2c,0xa6);
+	&LL(0x3a,0x3a,0xe8,0x3a,0xcd,0xd2,0x74,0xf7);
+	&LL(0x69,0x69,0xb9,0x69,0x6f,0xd0,0xd2,0x06);
+	&LL(0x09,0x09,0x24,0x09,0x48,0x2d,0x12,0x41);
+	&LL(0x70,0x70,0xdd,0x70,0xa7,0xad,0xe0,0xd7);
+	&LL(0xb6,0xb6,0xe2,0xb6,0xd9,0x54,0x71,0x6f);
+	&LL(0xd0,0xd0,0x67,0xd0,0xce,0xb7,0xbd,0x1e);
+	&LL(0xed,0xed,0x93,0xed,0x3b,0x7e,0xc7,0xd6);
+	&LL(0xcc,0xcc,0x17,0xcc,0x2e,0xdb,0x85,0xe2);
+	&LL(0x42,0x42,0x15,0x42,0x2a,0x57,0x84,0x68);
+	&LL(0x98,0x98,0x5a,0x98,0xb4,0xc2,0x2d,0x2c);
+	&LL(0xa4,0xa4,0xaa,0xa4,0x49,0x0e,0x55,0xed);
+	&LL(0x28,0x28,0xa0,0x28,0x5d,0x88,0x50,0x75);
+	&LL(0x5c,0x5c,0x6d,0x5c,0xda,0x31,0xb8,0x86);
+	&LL(0xf8,0xf8,0xc7,0xf8,0x93,0x3f,0xed,0x6b);
+	&LL(0x86,0x86,0x22,0x86,0x44,0xa4,0x11,0xc2);
+
+	&L(0x18,0x23,0xc6,0xe8,0x87,0xb8,0x01,0x4f);	# rc[ROUNDS]
+	&L(0x36,0xa6,0xd2,0xf5,0x79,0x6f,0x91,0x52);
+	&L(0x60,0xbc,0x9b,0x8e,0xa3,0x0c,0x7b,0x35);
+	&L(0x1d,0xe0,0xd7,0xc2,0x2e,0x4b,0xfe,0x57);
+	&L(0x15,0x77,0x37,0xe5,0x9f,0xf0,0x4a,0xda);
+	&L(0x58,0xc9,0x29,0x0a,0xb1,0xa0,0x6b,0x85);
+	&L(0xbd,0x5d,0x10,0xf4,0xcb,0x3e,0x05,0x67);
+	&L(0xe4,0x27,0x41,0x8b,0xa7,0x7d,0x95,0xd8);
+	&L(0xfb,0xee,0x7c,0x66,0xdd,0x17,0x47,0x9e);
+	&L(0xca,0x2d,0xbf,0x07,0xad,0x5a,0x83,0x33);
+
+# EXCEPTION_DISPOSITION handler (EXCEPTION_RECORD *rec,ULONG64 frame,
+#		CONTEXT *context,DISPATCHER_CONTEXT *disp)
+if ($win64) {
+$rec="%rcx";
+$frame="%rdx";
+$context="%r8";
+$disp="%r9";
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.extern	__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind
+.type	se_handler,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+se_handler:
+	push	%rsi
+	push	%rdi
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+	pushfq
+	sub	\$64,%rsp
+
+	mov	120($context),%rax	# pull context->Rax
+	mov	248($context),%rbx	# pull context->Rip
+
+	lea	.Lprologue(%rip),%r10
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip<.Lprologue
+	jb	.Lin_prologue
+
+	mov	152($context),%rax	# pull context->Rsp
+
+	lea	.Lepilogue(%rip),%r10
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip>=.Lepilogue
+	jae	.Lin_prologue
+
+	mov	128+32(%rax),%rax	# pull saved stack pointer
+	lea	48(%rax),%rax
+
+	mov	-8(%rax),%rbx
+	mov	-16(%rax),%rbp
+	mov	-24(%rax),%r12
+	mov	-32(%rax),%r13
+	mov	-40(%rax),%r14
+	mov	-48(%rax),%r15
+	mov	%rbx,144($context)	# restore context->Rbx
+	mov	%rbp,160($context)	# restore context->Rbp
+	mov	%r12,216($context)	# restore context->R12
+	mov	%r13,224($context)	# restore context->R13
+	mov	%r14,232($context)	# restore context->R14
+	mov	%r15,240($context)	# restore context->R15
+
+.Lin_prologue:
+	mov	8(%rax),%rdi
+	mov	16(%rax),%rsi
+	mov	%rax,152($context)	# restore context->Rsp
+	mov	%rsi,168($context)	# restore context->Rsi
+	mov	%rdi,176($context)	# restore context->Rdi
+
+	mov	40($disp),%rdi		# disp->ContextRecord
+	mov	$context,%rsi		# context
+	mov	\$154,%ecx		# sizeof(CONTEXT)
+	.long	0xa548f3fc		# cld; rep movsq
+
+	mov	$disp,%rsi
+	xor	%rcx,%rcx		# arg1, UNW_FLAG_NHANDLER
+	mov	8(%rsi),%rdx		# arg2, disp->ImageBase
+	mov	0(%rsi),%r8		# arg3, disp->ControlPc
+	mov	16(%rsi),%r9		# arg4, disp->FunctionEntry
+	mov	40(%rsi),%r10		# disp->ContextRecord
+	lea	56(%rsi),%r11		# &disp->HandlerData
+	lea	24(%rsi),%r12		# &disp->EstablisherFrame
+	mov	%r10,32(%rsp)		# arg5
+	mov	%r11,40(%rsp)		# arg6
+	mov	%r12,48(%rsp)		# arg7
+	mov	%rcx,56(%rsp)		# arg8, (NULL)
+	call	*__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind(%rip)
+
+	mov	\$1,%eax		# ExceptionContinueSearch
+	add	\$64,%rsp
+	popfq
+	pop	%r15
+	pop	%r14
+	pop	%r13
+	pop	%r12
+	pop	%rbp
+	pop	%rbx
+	pop	%rdi
+	pop	%rsi
+	ret
+.size	se_handler,.-se_handler
+
+.section	.pdata
+.align	4
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_$func
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_$func
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_$func
+
+.section	.xdata
+.align	8
+.LSEH_info_$func:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	se_handler
+___
+}
+
+$code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem;
+print $code;
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/whrlpool/build.info b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/whrlpool/build.info
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7f3a19e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/whrlpool/build.info
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+LIBS=../../libcrypto
+SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=wp_dgst.c {- $target{wp_asm_src} -}
+
+GENERATE[wp-mmx.s]=asm/wp-mmx.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $(CFLAGS) $(LIB_CFLAGS) $(PROCESSOR)
+DEPEND[wp-mmx.s]=../perlasm/x86asm.pl
+
+GENERATE[wp-x86_64.s]=asm/wp-x86_64.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/whrlpool/wp_block.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/whrlpool/wp_block.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b29f037
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/whrlpool/wp_block.c
@@ -0,0 +1,792 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/**
+ * The Whirlpool hashing function.
+ *
+ * <P>
+ * <b>References</b>
+ *
+ * <P>
+ * The Whirlpool algorithm was developed by
+ * <a href="mailto:pbarreto@scopus.com.br">Paulo S. L. M. Barreto</a> and
+ * <a href="mailto:vincent.rijmen@cryptomathic.com">Vincent Rijmen</a>.
+ *
+ * See
+ *      P.S.L.M. Barreto, V. Rijmen,
+ *      ``The Whirlpool hashing function,''
+ *      NESSIE submission, 2000 (tweaked version, 2001),
+ *      <https://www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.ac.be/nessie/workshop/submissions/whirlpool.zip>
+ *
+ * Based on "@version 3.0 (2003.03.12)" by Paulo S.L.M. Barreto and
+ * Vincent Rijmen. Lookup "reference implementations" on
+ * <http://planeta.terra.com.br/informatica/paulobarreto/>
+ *
+ * =============================================================================
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHORS ''AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS
+ * OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE
+ * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
+ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
+ * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR
+ * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY,
+ * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE
+ * OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE,
+ * EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include "wp_locl.h"
+#include <string.h>
+
+typedef unsigned char u8;
+#if (defined(_WIN32) || defined(_WIN64)) && !defined(__MINGW32)
+typedef unsigned __int64 u64;
+#elif defined(__arch64__)
+typedef unsigned long u64;
+#else
+typedef unsigned long long u64;
+#endif
+
+#define ROUNDS  10
+
+#define STRICT_ALIGNMENT
+#if !defined(PEDANTIC) && (defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__) || \
+                           defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
+                           defined(_M_IX86) || defined(_M_AMD64) || \
+                           defined(_M_X64))
+/*
+ * Well, formally there're couple of other architectures, which permit
+ * unaligned loads, specifically those not crossing cache lines, IA-64 and
+ * PowerPC...
+ */
+# undef STRICT_ALIGNMENT
+#endif
+
+#undef SMALL_REGISTER_BANK
+#if defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__) || defined(_M_IX86)
+# define SMALL_REGISTER_BANK
+# if defined(WHIRLPOOL_ASM)
+#  ifndef OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT
+/*
+ * it appears that for elder non-MMX
+ * CPUs this is actually faster!
+ */
+#   define OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT
+#  endif
+#  define GO_FOR_MMX(ctx,inp,num)     do {                    \
+        extern unsigned long OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[];               \
+        void whirlpool_block_mmx(void *,const void *,size_t);   \
+        if (!(OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[0] & (1<<23)))  break;          \
+        whirlpool_block_mmx(ctx->H.c,inp,num);  return;         \
+                                        } while (0)
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#undef ROTATE
+#ifndef PEDANTIC
+# if defined(_MSC_VER)
+#  if defined(_WIN64)            /* applies to both IA-64 and AMD64 */
+#   pragma intrinsic(_rotl64)
+#   define ROTATE(a,n) _rotl64((a),n)
+#  endif
+# elif defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2
+#  if defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__)
+#   if defined(L_ENDIAN)
+#    define ROTATE(a,n)       ({ u64 ret; asm ("rolq %1,%0"   \
+                                   : "=r"(ret) : "J"(n),"0"(a) : "cc"); ret; })
+#   elif defined(B_ENDIAN)
+       /*
+        * Most will argue that x86_64 is always little-endian. Well, yes, but
+        * then we have stratus.com who has modified gcc to "emulate"
+        * big-endian on x86. Is there evidence that they [or somebody else]
+        * won't do same for x86_64? Naturally no. And this line is waiting
+        * ready for that brave soul:-)
+        */
+#    define ROTATE(a,n)       ({ u64 ret; asm ("rorq %1,%0"   \
+                                   : "=r"(ret) : "J"(n),"0"(a) : "cc"); ret; })
+#   endif
+#  elif defined(__ia64) || defined(__ia64__)
+#   if defined(L_ENDIAN)
+#    define ROTATE(a,n)       ({ u64 ret; asm ("shrp %0=%1,%1,%2"     \
+                                   : "=r"(ret) : "r"(a),"M"(64-(n))); ret; })
+#   elif defined(B_ENDIAN)
+#    define ROTATE(a,n)       ({ u64 ret; asm ("shrp %0=%1,%1,%2"     \
+                                   : "=r"(ret) : "r"(a),"M"(n)); ret; })
+#   endif
+#  endif
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT)
+# if !defined(ROTATE)
+#  if defined(L_ENDIAN)         /* little-endians have to rotate left */
+#   define ROTATE(i,n)       ((i)<<(n) ^ (i)>>(64-n))
+#  elif defined(B_ENDIAN)       /* big-endians have to rotate right */
+#   define ROTATE(i,n)       ((i)>>(n) ^ (i)<<(64-n))
+#  endif
+# endif
+# if defined(ROTATE) && !defined(STRICT_ALIGNMENT)
+#  define STRICT_ALIGNMENT      /* ensure smallest table size */
+# endif
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Table size depends on STRICT_ALIGNMENT and whether or not endian-
+ * specific ROTATE macro is defined. If STRICT_ALIGNMENT is not
+ * defined, which is normally the case on x86[_64] CPUs, the table is
+ * 4KB large unconditionally. Otherwise if ROTATE is defined, the
+ * table is 2KB large, and otherwise - 16KB. 2KB table requires a
+ * whole bunch of additional rotations, but I'm willing to "trade,"
+ * because 16KB table certainly trashes L1 cache. I wish all CPUs
+ * could handle unaligned load as 4KB table doesn't trash the cache,
+ * nor does it require additional rotations.
+ */
+/*
+ * Note that every Cn macro expands as two loads: one byte load and
+ * one quadword load. One can argue that that many single-byte loads
+ * is too excessive, as one could load a quadword and "milk" it for
+ * eight 8-bit values instead. Well, yes, but in order to do so *and*
+ * avoid excessive loads you have to accommodate a handful of 64-bit
+ * values in the register bank and issue a bunch of shifts and mask.
+ * It's a tradeoff: loads vs. shift and mask in big register bank[!].
+ * On most CPUs eight single-byte loads are faster and I let other
+ * ones to depend on smart compiler to fold byte loads if beneficial.
+ * Hand-coded assembler would be another alternative:-)
+ */
+#ifdef STRICT_ALIGNMENT
+# if defined(ROTATE)
+#  define N   1
+#  define LL(c0,c1,c2,c3,c4,c5,c6,c7) c0,c1,c2,c3,c4,c5,c6,c7
+#  define C0(K,i)     (Cx.q[K.c[(i)*8+0]])
+#  define C1(K,i)     ROTATE(Cx.q[K.c[(i)*8+1]],8)
+#  define C2(K,i)     ROTATE(Cx.q[K.c[(i)*8+2]],16)
+#  define C3(K,i)     ROTATE(Cx.q[K.c[(i)*8+3]],24)
+#  define C4(K,i)     ROTATE(Cx.q[K.c[(i)*8+4]],32)
+#  define C5(K,i)     ROTATE(Cx.q[K.c[(i)*8+5]],40)
+#  define C6(K,i)     ROTATE(Cx.q[K.c[(i)*8+6]],48)
+#  define C7(K,i)     ROTATE(Cx.q[K.c[(i)*8+7]],56)
+# else
+#  define N   8
+#  define LL(c0,c1,c2,c3,c4,c5,c6,c7) c0,c1,c2,c3,c4,c5,c6,c7, \
+                                        c7,c0,c1,c2,c3,c4,c5,c6, \
+                                        c6,c7,c0,c1,c2,c3,c4,c5, \
+                                        c5,c6,c7,c0,c1,c2,c3,c4, \
+                                        c4,c5,c6,c7,c0,c1,c2,c3, \
+                                        c3,c4,c5,c6,c7,c0,c1,c2, \
+                                        c2,c3,c4,c5,c6,c7,c0,c1, \
+                                        c1,c2,c3,c4,c5,c6,c7,c0
+#  define C0(K,i)     (Cx.q[0+8*K.c[(i)*8+0]])
+#  define C1(K,i)     (Cx.q[1+8*K.c[(i)*8+1]])
+#  define C2(K,i)     (Cx.q[2+8*K.c[(i)*8+2]])
+#  define C3(K,i)     (Cx.q[3+8*K.c[(i)*8+3]])
+#  define C4(K,i)     (Cx.q[4+8*K.c[(i)*8+4]])
+#  define C5(K,i)     (Cx.q[5+8*K.c[(i)*8+5]])
+#  define C6(K,i)     (Cx.q[6+8*K.c[(i)*8+6]])
+#  define C7(K,i)     (Cx.q[7+8*K.c[(i)*8+7]])
+# endif
+#else
+# define N     2
+# define LL(c0,c1,c2,c3,c4,c5,c6,c7)   c0,c1,c2,c3,c4,c5,c6,c7, \
+                                        c0,c1,c2,c3,c4,c5,c6,c7
+# define C0(K,i)       (((u64*)(Cx.c+0))[2*K.c[(i)*8+0]])
+# define C1(K,i)       (((u64*)(Cx.c+7))[2*K.c[(i)*8+1]])
+# define C2(K,i)       (((u64*)(Cx.c+6))[2*K.c[(i)*8+2]])
+# define C3(K,i)       (((u64*)(Cx.c+5))[2*K.c[(i)*8+3]])
+# define C4(K,i)       (((u64*)(Cx.c+4))[2*K.c[(i)*8+4]])
+# define C5(K,i)       (((u64*)(Cx.c+3))[2*K.c[(i)*8+5]])
+# define C6(K,i)       (((u64*)(Cx.c+2))[2*K.c[(i)*8+6]])
+# define C7(K,i)       (((u64*)(Cx.c+1))[2*K.c[(i)*8+7]])
+#endif
+
+static const
+    union {
+    u8 c[(256 * N + ROUNDS) * sizeof(u64)];
+    u64 q[(256 * N + ROUNDS)];
+} Cx = {
+        {
+            /* Note endian-neutral representation:-) */
+            LL(0x18, 0x18, 0x60, 0x18, 0xc0, 0x78, 0x30, 0xd8),
+            LL(0x23, 0x23, 0x8c, 0x23, 0x05, 0xaf, 0x46, 0x26),
+            LL(0xc6, 0xc6, 0x3f, 0xc6, 0x7e, 0xf9, 0x91, 0xb8),
+            LL(0xe8, 0xe8, 0x87, 0xe8, 0x13, 0x6f, 0xcd, 0xfb),
+            LL(0x87, 0x87, 0x26, 0x87, 0x4c, 0xa1, 0x13, 0xcb),
+            LL(0xb8, 0xb8, 0xda, 0xb8, 0xa9, 0x62, 0x6d, 0x11),
+            LL(0x01, 0x01, 0x04, 0x01, 0x08, 0x05, 0x02, 0x09),
+            LL(0x4f, 0x4f, 0x21, 0x4f, 0x42, 0x6e, 0x9e, 0x0d),
+            LL(0x36, 0x36, 0xd8, 0x36, 0xad, 0xee, 0x6c, 0x9b),
+            LL(0xa6, 0xa6, 0xa2, 0xa6, 0x59, 0x04, 0x51, 0xff),
+            LL(0xd2, 0xd2, 0x6f, 0xd2, 0xde, 0xbd, 0xb9, 0x0c),
+            LL(0xf5, 0xf5, 0xf3, 0xf5, 0xfb, 0x06, 0xf7, 0x0e),
+            LL(0x79, 0x79, 0xf9, 0x79, 0xef, 0x80, 0xf2, 0x96),
+            LL(0x6f, 0x6f, 0xa1, 0x6f, 0x5f, 0xce, 0xde, 0x30),
+            LL(0x91, 0x91, 0x7e, 0x91, 0xfc, 0xef, 0x3f, 0x6d),
+            LL(0x52, 0x52, 0x55, 0x52, 0xaa, 0x07, 0xa4, 0xf8),
+            LL(0x60, 0x60, 0x9d, 0x60, 0x27, 0xfd, 0xc0, 0x47),
+            LL(0xbc, 0xbc, 0xca, 0xbc, 0x89, 0x76, 0x65, 0x35),
+            LL(0x9b, 0x9b, 0x56, 0x9b, 0xac, 0xcd, 0x2b, 0x37),
+            LL(0x8e, 0x8e, 0x02, 0x8e, 0x04, 0x8c, 0x01, 0x8a),
+            LL(0xa3, 0xa3, 0xb6, 0xa3, 0x71, 0x15, 0x5b, 0xd2),
+            LL(0x0c, 0x0c, 0x30, 0x0c, 0x60, 0x3c, 0x18, 0x6c),
+            LL(0x7b, 0x7b, 0xf1, 0x7b, 0xff, 0x8a, 0xf6, 0x84),
+            LL(0x35, 0x35, 0xd4, 0x35, 0xb5, 0xe1, 0x6a, 0x80),
+            LL(0x1d, 0x1d, 0x74, 0x1d, 0xe8, 0x69, 0x3a, 0xf5),
+            LL(0xe0, 0xe0, 0xa7, 0xe0, 0x53, 0x47, 0xdd, 0xb3),
+            LL(0xd7, 0xd7, 0x7b, 0xd7, 0xf6, 0xac, 0xb3, 0x21),
+            LL(0xc2, 0xc2, 0x2f, 0xc2, 0x5e, 0xed, 0x99, 0x9c),
+            LL(0x2e, 0x2e, 0xb8, 0x2e, 0x6d, 0x96, 0x5c, 0x43),
+            LL(0x4b, 0x4b, 0x31, 0x4b, 0x62, 0x7a, 0x96, 0x29),
+            LL(0xfe, 0xfe, 0xdf, 0xfe, 0xa3, 0x21, 0xe1, 0x5d),
+            LL(0x57, 0x57, 0x41, 0x57, 0x82, 0x16, 0xae, 0xd5),
+            LL(0x15, 0x15, 0x54, 0x15, 0xa8, 0x41, 0x2a, 0xbd),
+            LL(0x77, 0x77, 0xc1, 0x77, 0x9f, 0xb6, 0xee, 0xe8),
+            LL(0x37, 0x37, 0xdc, 0x37, 0xa5, 0xeb, 0x6e, 0x92),
+            LL(0xe5, 0xe5, 0xb3, 0xe5, 0x7b, 0x56, 0xd7, 0x9e),
+            LL(0x9f, 0x9f, 0x46, 0x9f, 0x8c, 0xd9, 0x23, 0x13),
+            LL(0xf0, 0xf0, 0xe7, 0xf0, 0xd3, 0x17, 0xfd, 0x23),
+            LL(0x4a, 0x4a, 0x35, 0x4a, 0x6a, 0x7f, 0x94, 0x20),
+            LL(0xda, 0xda, 0x4f, 0xda, 0x9e, 0x95, 0xa9, 0x44),
+            LL(0x58, 0x58, 0x7d, 0x58, 0xfa, 0x25, 0xb0, 0xa2),
+            LL(0xc9, 0xc9, 0x03, 0xc9, 0x06, 0xca, 0x8f, 0xcf),
+            LL(0x29, 0x29, 0xa4, 0x29, 0x55, 0x8d, 0x52, 0x7c),
+            LL(0x0a, 0x0a, 0x28, 0x0a, 0x50, 0x22, 0x14, 0x5a),
+            LL(0xb1, 0xb1, 0xfe, 0xb1, 0xe1, 0x4f, 0x7f, 0x50),
+            LL(0xa0, 0xa0, 0xba, 0xa0, 0x69, 0x1a, 0x5d, 0xc9),
+            LL(0x6b, 0x6b, 0xb1, 0x6b, 0x7f, 0xda, 0xd6, 0x14),
+            LL(0x85, 0x85, 0x2e, 0x85, 0x5c, 0xab, 0x17, 0xd9),
+            LL(0xbd, 0xbd, 0xce, 0xbd, 0x81, 0x73, 0x67, 0x3c),
+            LL(0x5d, 0x5d, 0x69, 0x5d, 0xd2, 0x34, 0xba, 0x8f),
+            LL(0x10, 0x10, 0x40, 0x10, 0x80, 0x50, 0x20, 0x90),
+            LL(0xf4, 0xf4, 0xf7, 0xf4, 0xf3, 0x03, 0xf5, 0x07),
+            LL(0xcb, 0xcb, 0x0b, 0xcb, 0x16, 0xc0, 0x8b, 0xdd),
+            LL(0x3e, 0x3e, 0xf8, 0x3e, 0xed, 0xc6, 0x7c, 0xd3),
+            LL(0x05, 0x05, 0x14, 0x05, 0x28, 0x11, 0x0a, 0x2d),
+            LL(0x67, 0x67, 0x81, 0x67, 0x1f, 0xe6, 0xce, 0x78),
+            LL(0xe4, 0xe4, 0xb7, 0xe4, 0x73, 0x53, 0xd5, 0x97),
+            LL(0x27, 0x27, 0x9c, 0x27, 0x25, 0xbb, 0x4e, 0x02),
+            LL(0x41, 0x41, 0x19, 0x41, 0x32, 0x58, 0x82, 0x73),
+            LL(0x8b, 0x8b, 0x16, 0x8b, 0x2c, 0x9d, 0x0b, 0xa7),
+            LL(0xa7, 0xa7, 0xa6, 0xa7, 0x51, 0x01, 0x53, 0xf6),
+            LL(0x7d, 0x7d, 0xe9, 0x7d, 0xcf, 0x94, 0xfa, 0xb2),
+            LL(0x95, 0x95, 0x6e, 0x95, 0xdc, 0xfb, 0x37, 0x49),
+            LL(0xd8, 0xd8, 0x47, 0xd8, 0x8e, 0x9f, 0xad, 0x56),
+            LL(0xfb, 0xfb, 0xcb, 0xfb, 0x8b, 0x30, 0xeb, 0x70),
+            LL(0xee, 0xee, 0x9f, 0xee, 0x23, 0x71, 0xc1, 0xcd),
+            LL(0x7c, 0x7c, 0xed, 0x7c, 0xc7, 0x91, 0xf8, 0xbb),
+            LL(0x66, 0x66, 0x85, 0x66, 0x17, 0xe3, 0xcc, 0x71),
+            LL(0xdd, 0xdd, 0x53, 0xdd, 0xa6, 0x8e, 0xa7, 0x7b),
+            LL(0x17, 0x17, 0x5c, 0x17, 0xb8, 0x4b, 0x2e, 0xaf),
+            LL(0x47, 0x47, 0x01, 0x47, 0x02, 0x46, 0x8e, 0x45),
+            LL(0x9e, 0x9e, 0x42, 0x9e, 0x84, 0xdc, 0x21, 0x1a),
+            LL(0xca, 0xca, 0x0f, 0xca, 0x1e, 0xc5, 0x89, 0xd4),
+            LL(0x2d, 0x2d, 0xb4, 0x2d, 0x75, 0x99, 0x5a, 0x58),
+            LL(0xbf, 0xbf, 0xc6, 0xbf, 0x91, 0x79, 0x63, 0x2e),
+            LL(0x07, 0x07, 0x1c, 0x07, 0x38, 0x1b, 0x0e, 0x3f),
+            LL(0xad, 0xad, 0x8e, 0xad, 0x01, 0x23, 0x47, 0xac),
+            LL(0x5a, 0x5a, 0x75, 0x5a, 0xea, 0x2f, 0xb4, 0xb0),
+            LL(0x83, 0x83, 0x36, 0x83, 0x6c, 0xb5, 0x1b, 0xef),
+            LL(0x33, 0x33, 0xcc, 0x33, 0x85, 0xff, 0x66, 0xb6),
+            LL(0x63, 0x63, 0x91, 0x63, 0x3f, 0xf2, 0xc6, 0x5c),
+            LL(0x02, 0x02, 0x08, 0x02, 0x10, 0x0a, 0x04, 0x12),
+            LL(0xaa, 0xaa, 0x92, 0xaa, 0x39, 0x38, 0x49, 0x93),
+            LL(0x71, 0x71, 0xd9, 0x71, 0xaf, 0xa8, 0xe2, 0xde),
+            LL(0xc8, 0xc8, 0x07, 0xc8, 0x0e, 0xcf, 0x8d, 0xc6),
+            LL(0x19, 0x19, 0x64, 0x19, 0xc8, 0x7d, 0x32, 0xd1),
+            LL(0x49, 0x49, 0x39, 0x49, 0x72, 0x70, 0x92, 0x3b),
+            LL(0xd9, 0xd9, 0x43, 0xd9, 0x86, 0x9a, 0xaf, 0x5f),
+            LL(0xf2, 0xf2, 0xef, 0xf2, 0xc3, 0x1d, 0xf9, 0x31),
+            LL(0xe3, 0xe3, 0xab, 0xe3, 0x4b, 0x48, 0xdb, 0xa8),
+            LL(0x5b, 0x5b, 0x71, 0x5b, 0xe2, 0x2a, 0xb6, 0xb9),
+            LL(0x88, 0x88, 0x1a, 0x88, 0x34, 0x92, 0x0d, 0xbc),
+            LL(0x9a, 0x9a, 0x52, 0x9a, 0xa4, 0xc8, 0x29, 0x3e),
+            LL(0x26, 0x26, 0x98, 0x26, 0x2d, 0xbe, 0x4c, 0x0b),
+            LL(0x32, 0x32, 0xc8, 0x32, 0x8d, 0xfa, 0x64, 0xbf),
+            LL(0xb0, 0xb0, 0xfa, 0xb0, 0xe9, 0x4a, 0x7d, 0x59),
+            LL(0xe9, 0xe9, 0x83, 0xe9, 0x1b, 0x6a, 0xcf, 0xf2),
+            LL(0x0f, 0x0f, 0x3c, 0x0f, 0x78, 0x33, 0x1e, 0x77),
+            LL(0xd5, 0xd5, 0x73, 0xd5, 0xe6, 0xa6, 0xb7, 0x33),
+            LL(0x80, 0x80, 0x3a, 0x80, 0x74, 0xba, 0x1d, 0xf4),
+            LL(0xbe, 0xbe, 0xc2, 0xbe, 0x99, 0x7c, 0x61, 0x27),
+            LL(0xcd, 0xcd, 0x13, 0xcd, 0x26, 0xde, 0x87, 0xeb),
+            LL(0x34, 0x34, 0xd0, 0x34, 0xbd, 0xe4, 0x68, 0x89),
+            LL(0x48, 0x48, 0x3d, 0x48, 0x7a, 0x75, 0x90, 0x32),
+            LL(0xff, 0xff, 0xdb, 0xff, 0xab, 0x24, 0xe3, 0x54),
+            LL(0x7a, 0x7a, 0xf5, 0x7a, 0xf7, 0x8f, 0xf4, 0x8d),
+            LL(0x90, 0x90, 0x7a, 0x90, 0xf4, 0xea, 0x3d, 0x64),
+            LL(0x5f, 0x5f, 0x61, 0x5f, 0xc2, 0x3e, 0xbe, 0x9d),
+            LL(0x20, 0x20, 0x80, 0x20, 0x1d, 0xa0, 0x40, 0x3d),
+            LL(0x68, 0x68, 0xbd, 0x68, 0x67, 0xd5, 0xd0, 0x0f),
+            LL(0x1a, 0x1a, 0x68, 0x1a, 0xd0, 0x72, 0x34, 0xca),
+            LL(0xae, 0xae, 0x82, 0xae, 0x19, 0x2c, 0x41, 0xb7),
+            LL(0xb4, 0xb4, 0xea, 0xb4, 0xc9, 0x5e, 0x75, 0x7d),
+            LL(0x54, 0x54, 0x4d, 0x54, 0x9a, 0x19, 0xa8, 0xce),
+            LL(0x93, 0x93, 0x76, 0x93, 0xec, 0xe5, 0x3b, 0x7f),
+            LL(0x22, 0x22, 0x88, 0x22, 0x0d, 0xaa, 0x44, 0x2f),
+            LL(0x64, 0x64, 0x8d, 0x64, 0x07, 0xe9, 0xc8, 0x63),
+            LL(0xf1, 0xf1, 0xe3, 0xf1, 0xdb, 0x12, 0xff, 0x2a),
+            LL(0x73, 0x73, 0xd1, 0x73, 0xbf, 0xa2, 0xe6, 0xcc),
+            LL(0x12, 0x12, 0x48, 0x12, 0x90, 0x5a, 0x24, 0x82),
+            LL(0x40, 0x40, 0x1d, 0x40, 0x3a, 0x5d, 0x80, 0x7a),
+            LL(0x08, 0x08, 0x20, 0x08, 0x40, 0x28, 0x10, 0x48),
+            LL(0xc3, 0xc3, 0x2b, 0xc3, 0x56, 0xe8, 0x9b, 0x95),
+            LL(0xec, 0xec, 0x97, 0xec, 0x33, 0x7b, 0xc5, 0xdf),
+            LL(0xdb, 0xdb, 0x4b, 0xdb, 0x96, 0x90, 0xab, 0x4d),
+            LL(0xa1, 0xa1, 0xbe, 0xa1, 0x61, 0x1f, 0x5f, 0xc0),
+            LL(0x8d, 0x8d, 0x0e, 0x8d, 0x1c, 0x83, 0x07, 0x91),
+            LL(0x3d, 0x3d, 0xf4, 0x3d, 0xf5, 0xc9, 0x7a, 0xc8),
+            LL(0x97, 0x97, 0x66, 0x97, 0xcc, 0xf1, 0x33, 0x5b),
+            LL(0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+            LL(0xcf, 0xcf, 0x1b, 0xcf, 0x36, 0xd4, 0x83, 0xf9),
+            LL(0x2b, 0x2b, 0xac, 0x2b, 0x45, 0x87, 0x56, 0x6e),
+            LL(0x76, 0x76, 0xc5, 0x76, 0x97, 0xb3, 0xec, 0xe1),
+            LL(0x82, 0x82, 0x32, 0x82, 0x64, 0xb0, 0x19, 0xe6),
+            LL(0xd6, 0xd6, 0x7f, 0xd6, 0xfe, 0xa9, 0xb1, 0x28),
+            LL(0x1b, 0x1b, 0x6c, 0x1b, 0xd8, 0x77, 0x36, 0xc3),
+            LL(0xb5, 0xb5, 0xee, 0xb5, 0xc1, 0x5b, 0x77, 0x74),
+            LL(0xaf, 0xaf, 0x86, 0xaf, 0x11, 0x29, 0x43, 0xbe),
+            LL(0x6a, 0x6a, 0xb5, 0x6a, 0x77, 0xdf, 0xd4, 0x1d),
+            LL(0x50, 0x50, 0x5d, 0x50, 0xba, 0x0d, 0xa0, 0xea),
+            LL(0x45, 0x45, 0x09, 0x45, 0x12, 0x4c, 0x8a, 0x57),
+            LL(0xf3, 0xf3, 0xeb, 0xf3, 0xcb, 0x18, 0xfb, 0x38),
+            LL(0x30, 0x30, 0xc0, 0x30, 0x9d, 0xf0, 0x60, 0xad),
+            LL(0xef, 0xef, 0x9b, 0xef, 0x2b, 0x74, 0xc3, 0xc4),
+            LL(0x3f, 0x3f, 0xfc, 0x3f, 0xe5, 0xc3, 0x7e, 0xda),
+            LL(0x55, 0x55, 0x49, 0x55, 0x92, 0x1c, 0xaa, 0xc7),
+            LL(0xa2, 0xa2, 0xb2, 0xa2, 0x79, 0x10, 0x59, 0xdb),
+            LL(0xea, 0xea, 0x8f, 0xea, 0x03, 0x65, 0xc9, 0xe9),
+            LL(0x65, 0x65, 0x89, 0x65, 0x0f, 0xec, 0xca, 0x6a),
+            LL(0xba, 0xba, 0xd2, 0xba, 0xb9, 0x68, 0x69, 0x03),
+            LL(0x2f, 0x2f, 0xbc, 0x2f, 0x65, 0x93, 0x5e, 0x4a),
+            LL(0xc0, 0xc0, 0x27, 0xc0, 0x4e, 0xe7, 0x9d, 0x8e),
+            LL(0xde, 0xde, 0x5f, 0xde, 0xbe, 0x81, 0xa1, 0x60),
+            LL(0x1c, 0x1c, 0x70, 0x1c, 0xe0, 0x6c, 0x38, 0xfc),
+            LL(0xfd, 0xfd, 0xd3, 0xfd, 0xbb, 0x2e, 0xe7, 0x46),
+            LL(0x4d, 0x4d, 0x29, 0x4d, 0x52, 0x64, 0x9a, 0x1f),
+            LL(0x92, 0x92, 0x72, 0x92, 0xe4, 0xe0, 0x39, 0x76),
+            LL(0x75, 0x75, 0xc9, 0x75, 0x8f, 0xbc, 0xea, 0xfa),
+            LL(0x06, 0x06, 0x18, 0x06, 0x30, 0x1e, 0x0c, 0x36),
+            LL(0x8a, 0x8a, 0x12, 0x8a, 0x24, 0x98, 0x09, 0xae),
+            LL(0xb2, 0xb2, 0xf2, 0xb2, 0xf9, 0x40, 0x79, 0x4b),
+            LL(0xe6, 0xe6, 0xbf, 0xe6, 0x63, 0x59, 0xd1, 0x85),
+            LL(0x0e, 0x0e, 0x38, 0x0e, 0x70, 0x36, 0x1c, 0x7e),
+            LL(0x1f, 0x1f, 0x7c, 0x1f, 0xf8, 0x63, 0x3e, 0xe7),
+            LL(0x62, 0x62, 0x95, 0x62, 0x37, 0xf7, 0xc4, 0x55),
+            LL(0xd4, 0xd4, 0x77, 0xd4, 0xee, 0xa3, 0xb5, 0x3a),
+            LL(0xa8, 0xa8, 0x9a, 0xa8, 0x29, 0x32, 0x4d, 0x81),
+            LL(0x96, 0x96, 0x62, 0x96, 0xc4, 0xf4, 0x31, 0x52),
+            LL(0xf9, 0xf9, 0xc3, 0xf9, 0x9b, 0x3a, 0xef, 0x62),
+            LL(0xc5, 0xc5, 0x33, 0xc5, 0x66, 0xf6, 0x97, 0xa3),
+            LL(0x25, 0x25, 0x94, 0x25, 0x35, 0xb1, 0x4a, 0x10),
+            LL(0x59, 0x59, 0x79, 0x59, 0xf2, 0x20, 0xb2, 0xab),
+            LL(0x84, 0x84, 0x2a, 0x84, 0x54, 0xae, 0x15, 0xd0),
+            LL(0x72, 0x72, 0xd5, 0x72, 0xb7, 0xa7, 0xe4, 0xc5),
+            LL(0x39, 0x39, 0xe4, 0x39, 0xd5, 0xdd, 0x72, 0xec),
+            LL(0x4c, 0x4c, 0x2d, 0x4c, 0x5a, 0x61, 0x98, 0x16),
+            LL(0x5e, 0x5e, 0x65, 0x5e, 0xca, 0x3b, 0xbc, 0x94),
+            LL(0x78, 0x78, 0xfd, 0x78, 0xe7, 0x85, 0xf0, 0x9f),
+            LL(0x38, 0x38, 0xe0, 0x38, 0xdd, 0xd8, 0x70, 0xe5),
+            LL(0x8c, 0x8c, 0x0a, 0x8c, 0x14, 0x86, 0x05, 0x98),
+            LL(0xd1, 0xd1, 0x63, 0xd1, 0xc6, 0xb2, 0xbf, 0x17),
+            LL(0xa5, 0xa5, 0xae, 0xa5, 0x41, 0x0b, 0x57, 0xe4),
+            LL(0xe2, 0xe2, 0xaf, 0xe2, 0x43, 0x4d, 0xd9, 0xa1),
+            LL(0x61, 0x61, 0x99, 0x61, 0x2f, 0xf8, 0xc2, 0x4e),
+            LL(0xb3, 0xb3, 0xf6, 0xb3, 0xf1, 0x45, 0x7b, 0x42),
+            LL(0x21, 0x21, 0x84, 0x21, 0x15, 0xa5, 0x42, 0x34),
+            LL(0x9c, 0x9c, 0x4a, 0x9c, 0x94, 0xd6, 0x25, 0x08),
+            LL(0x1e, 0x1e, 0x78, 0x1e, 0xf0, 0x66, 0x3c, 0xee),
+            LL(0x43, 0x43, 0x11, 0x43, 0x22, 0x52, 0x86, 0x61),
+            LL(0xc7, 0xc7, 0x3b, 0xc7, 0x76, 0xfc, 0x93, 0xb1),
+            LL(0xfc, 0xfc, 0xd7, 0xfc, 0xb3, 0x2b, 0xe5, 0x4f),
+            LL(0x04, 0x04, 0x10, 0x04, 0x20, 0x14, 0x08, 0x24),
+            LL(0x51, 0x51, 0x59, 0x51, 0xb2, 0x08, 0xa2, 0xe3),
+            LL(0x99, 0x99, 0x5e, 0x99, 0xbc, 0xc7, 0x2f, 0x25),
+            LL(0x6d, 0x6d, 0xa9, 0x6d, 0x4f, 0xc4, 0xda, 0x22),
+            LL(0x0d, 0x0d, 0x34, 0x0d, 0x68, 0x39, 0x1a, 0x65),
+            LL(0xfa, 0xfa, 0xcf, 0xfa, 0x83, 0x35, 0xe9, 0x79),
+            LL(0xdf, 0xdf, 0x5b, 0xdf, 0xb6, 0x84, 0xa3, 0x69),
+            LL(0x7e, 0x7e, 0xe5, 0x7e, 0xd7, 0x9b, 0xfc, 0xa9),
+            LL(0x24, 0x24, 0x90, 0x24, 0x3d, 0xb4, 0x48, 0x19),
+            LL(0x3b, 0x3b, 0xec, 0x3b, 0xc5, 0xd7, 0x76, 0xfe),
+            LL(0xab, 0xab, 0x96, 0xab, 0x31, 0x3d, 0x4b, 0x9a),
+            LL(0xce, 0xce, 0x1f, 0xce, 0x3e, 0xd1, 0x81, 0xf0),
+            LL(0x11, 0x11, 0x44, 0x11, 0x88, 0x55, 0x22, 0x99),
+            LL(0x8f, 0x8f, 0x06, 0x8f, 0x0c, 0x89, 0x03, 0x83),
+            LL(0x4e, 0x4e, 0x25, 0x4e, 0x4a, 0x6b, 0x9c, 0x04),
+            LL(0xb7, 0xb7, 0xe6, 0xb7, 0xd1, 0x51, 0x73, 0x66),
+            LL(0xeb, 0xeb, 0x8b, 0xeb, 0x0b, 0x60, 0xcb, 0xe0),
+            LL(0x3c, 0x3c, 0xf0, 0x3c, 0xfd, 0xcc, 0x78, 0xc1),
+            LL(0x81, 0x81, 0x3e, 0x81, 0x7c, 0xbf, 0x1f, 0xfd),
+            LL(0x94, 0x94, 0x6a, 0x94, 0xd4, 0xfe, 0x35, 0x40),
+            LL(0xf7, 0xf7, 0xfb, 0xf7, 0xeb, 0x0c, 0xf3, 0x1c),
+            LL(0xb9, 0xb9, 0xde, 0xb9, 0xa1, 0x67, 0x6f, 0x18),
+            LL(0x13, 0x13, 0x4c, 0x13, 0x98, 0x5f, 0x26, 0x8b),
+            LL(0x2c, 0x2c, 0xb0, 0x2c, 0x7d, 0x9c, 0x58, 0x51),
+            LL(0xd3, 0xd3, 0x6b, 0xd3, 0xd6, 0xb8, 0xbb, 0x05),
+            LL(0xe7, 0xe7, 0xbb, 0xe7, 0x6b, 0x5c, 0xd3, 0x8c),
+            LL(0x6e, 0x6e, 0xa5, 0x6e, 0x57, 0xcb, 0xdc, 0x39),
+            LL(0xc4, 0xc4, 0x37, 0xc4, 0x6e, 0xf3, 0x95, 0xaa),
+            LL(0x03, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x03, 0x18, 0x0f, 0x06, 0x1b),
+            LL(0x56, 0x56, 0x45, 0x56, 0x8a, 0x13, 0xac, 0xdc),
+            LL(0x44, 0x44, 0x0d, 0x44, 0x1a, 0x49, 0x88, 0x5e),
+            LL(0x7f, 0x7f, 0xe1, 0x7f, 0xdf, 0x9e, 0xfe, 0xa0),
+            LL(0xa9, 0xa9, 0x9e, 0xa9, 0x21, 0x37, 0x4f, 0x88),
+            LL(0x2a, 0x2a, 0xa8, 0x2a, 0x4d, 0x82, 0x54, 0x67),
+            LL(0xbb, 0xbb, 0xd6, 0xbb, 0xb1, 0x6d, 0x6b, 0x0a),
+            LL(0xc1, 0xc1, 0x23, 0xc1, 0x46, 0xe2, 0x9f, 0x87),
+            LL(0x53, 0x53, 0x51, 0x53, 0xa2, 0x02, 0xa6, 0xf1),
+            LL(0xdc, 0xdc, 0x57, 0xdc, 0xae, 0x8b, 0xa5, 0x72),
+            LL(0x0b, 0x0b, 0x2c, 0x0b, 0x58, 0x27, 0x16, 0x53),
+            LL(0x9d, 0x9d, 0x4e, 0x9d, 0x9c, 0xd3, 0x27, 0x01),
+            LL(0x6c, 0x6c, 0xad, 0x6c, 0x47, 0xc1, 0xd8, 0x2b),
+            LL(0x31, 0x31, 0xc4, 0x31, 0x95, 0xf5, 0x62, 0xa4),
+            LL(0x74, 0x74, 0xcd, 0x74, 0x87, 0xb9, 0xe8, 0xf3),
+            LL(0xf6, 0xf6, 0xff, 0xf6, 0xe3, 0x09, 0xf1, 0x15),
+            LL(0x46, 0x46, 0x05, 0x46, 0x0a, 0x43, 0x8c, 0x4c),
+            LL(0xac, 0xac, 0x8a, 0xac, 0x09, 0x26, 0x45, 0xa5),
+            LL(0x89, 0x89, 0x1e, 0x89, 0x3c, 0x97, 0x0f, 0xb5),
+            LL(0x14, 0x14, 0x50, 0x14, 0xa0, 0x44, 0x28, 0xb4),
+            LL(0xe1, 0xe1, 0xa3, 0xe1, 0x5b, 0x42, 0xdf, 0xba),
+            LL(0x16, 0x16, 0x58, 0x16, 0xb0, 0x4e, 0x2c, 0xa6),
+            LL(0x3a, 0x3a, 0xe8, 0x3a, 0xcd, 0xd2, 0x74, 0xf7),
+            LL(0x69, 0x69, 0xb9, 0x69, 0x6f, 0xd0, 0xd2, 0x06),
+            LL(0x09, 0x09, 0x24, 0x09, 0x48, 0x2d, 0x12, 0x41),
+            LL(0x70, 0x70, 0xdd, 0x70, 0xa7, 0xad, 0xe0, 0xd7),
+            LL(0xb6, 0xb6, 0xe2, 0xb6, 0xd9, 0x54, 0x71, 0x6f),
+            LL(0xd0, 0xd0, 0x67, 0xd0, 0xce, 0xb7, 0xbd, 0x1e),
+            LL(0xed, 0xed, 0x93, 0xed, 0x3b, 0x7e, 0xc7, 0xd6),
+            LL(0xcc, 0xcc, 0x17, 0xcc, 0x2e, 0xdb, 0x85, 0xe2),
+            LL(0x42, 0x42, 0x15, 0x42, 0x2a, 0x57, 0x84, 0x68),
+            LL(0x98, 0x98, 0x5a, 0x98, 0xb4, 0xc2, 0x2d, 0x2c),
+            LL(0xa4, 0xa4, 0xaa, 0xa4, 0x49, 0x0e, 0x55, 0xed),
+            LL(0x28, 0x28, 0xa0, 0x28, 0x5d, 0x88, 0x50, 0x75),
+            LL(0x5c, 0x5c, 0x6d, 0x5c, 0xda, 0x31, 0xb8, 0x86),
+            LL(0xf8, 0xf8, 0xc7, 0xf8, 0x93, 0x3f, 0xed, 0x6b),
+            LL(0x86, 0x86, 0x22, 0x86, 0x44, 0xa4, 0x11, 0xc2),
+#define RC      (&(Cx.q[256*N]))
+            0x18, 0x23, 0xc6, 0xe8, 0x87, 0xb8, 0x01, 0x4f,
+            /* rc[ROUNDS] */
+            0x36, 0xa6, 0xd2, 0xf5, 0x79, 0x6f, 0x91, 0x52, 0x60, 0xbc, 0x9b,
+            0x8e, 0xa3, 0x0c, 0x7b, 0x35, 0x1d, 0xe0, 0xd7, 0xc2, 0x2e, 0x4b,
+            0xfe, 0x57, 0x15, 0x77, 0x37, 0xe5, 0x9f, 0xf0, 0x4a, 0xda, 0x58,
+            0xc9, 0x29, 0x0a, 0xb1, 0xa0, 0x6b, 0x85, 0xbd, 0x5d, 0x10, 0xf4,
+            0xcb, 0x3e, 0x05, 0x67, 0xe4, 0x27, 0x41, 0x8b, 0xa7, 0x7d, 0x95,
+            0xd8, 0xfb, 0xee, 0x7c, 0x66, 0xdd, 0x17, 0x47, 0x9e, 0xca, 0x2d,
+            0xbf, 0x07, 0xad, 0x5a, 0x83, 0x33
+        }
+    };
+
+void whirlpool_block(WHIRLPOOL_CTX *ctx, const void *inp, size_t n)
+{
+    int r;
+    const u8 *p = inp;
+    union {
+        u64 q[8];
+        u8 c[64];
+    } S, K, *H = (void *)ctx->H.q;
+
+#ifdef GO_FOR_MMX
+    GO_FOR_MMX(ctx, inp, n);
+#endif
+    do {
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT
+        u64 L[8];
+        int i;
+
+        for (i = 0; i < 64; i++)
+            S.c[i] = (K.c[i] = H->c[i]) ^ p[i];
+        for (r = 0; r < ROUNDS; r++) {
+            for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+                L[i] = i ? 0 : RC[r];
+                L[i] ^= C0(K, i) ^ C1(K, (i - 1) & 7) ^
+                    C2(K, (i - 2) & 7) ^ C3(K, (i - 3) & 7) ^
+                    C4(K, (i - 4) & 7) ^ C5(K, (i - 5) & 7) ^
+                    C6(K, (i - 6) & 7) ^ C7(K, (i - 7) & 7);
+            }
+            memcpy(K.q, L, 64);
+            for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+                L[i] ^= C0(S, i) ^ C1(S, (i - 1) & 7) ^
+                    C2(S, (i - 2) & 7) ^ C3(S, (i - 3) & 7) ^
+                    C4(S, (i - 4) & 7) ^ C5(S, (i - 5) & 7) ^
+                    C6(S, (i - 6) & 7) ^ C7(S, (i - 7) & 7);
+            }
+            memcpy(S.q, L, 64);
+        }
+        for (i = 0; i < 64; i++)
+            H->c[i] ^= S.c[i] ^ p[i];
+#else
+        u64 L0, L1, L2, L3, L4, L5, L6, L7;
+
+# ifdef STRICT_ALIGNMENT
+        if ((size_t)p & 7) {
+            memcpy(S.c, p, 64);
+            S.q[0] ^= (K.q[0] = H->q[0]);
+            S.q[1] ^= (K.q[1] = H->q[1]);
+            S.q[2] ^= (K.q[2] = H->q[2]);
+            S.q[3] ^= (K.q[3] = H->q[3]);
+            S.q[4] ^= (K.q[4] = H->q[4]);
+            S.q[5] ^= (K.q[5] = H->q[5]);
+            S.q[6] ^= (K.q[6] = H->q[6]);
+            S.q[7] ^= (K.q[7] = H->q[7]);
+        } else
+# endif
+        {
+            const u64 *pa = (const u64 *)p;
+            S.q[0] = (K.q[0] = H->q[0]) ^ pa[0];
+            S.q[1] = (K.q[1] = H->q[1]) ^ pa[1];
+            S.q[2] = (K.q[2] = H->q[2]) ^ pa[2];
+            S.q[3] = (K.q[3] = H->q[3]) ^ pa[3];
+            S.q[4] = (K.q[4] = H->q[4]) ^ pa[4];
+            S.q[5] = (K.q[5] = H->q[5]) ^ pa[5];
+            S.q[6] = (K.q[6] = H->q[6]) ^ pa[6];
+            S.q[7] = (K.q[7] = H->q[7]) ^ pa[7];
+        }
+
+        for (r = 0; r < ROUNDS; r++) {
+# ifdef SMALL_REGISTER_BANK
+            L0 = C0(K, 0) ^ C1(K, 7) ^ C2(K, 6) ^ C3(K, 5) ^
+                C4(K, 4) ^ C5(K, 3) ^ C6(K, 2) ^ C7(K, 1) ^ RC[r];
+            L1 = C0(K, 1) ^ C1(K, 0) ^ C2(K, 7) ^ C3(K, 6) ^
+                C4(K, 5) ^ C5(K, 4) ^ C6(K, 3) ^ C7(K, 2);
+            L2 = C0(K, 2) ^ C1(K, 1) ^ C2(K, 0) ^ C3(K, 7) ^
+                C4(K, 6) ^ C5(K, 5) ^ C6(K, 4) ^ C7(K, 3);
+            L3 = C0(K, 3) ^ C1(K, 2) ^ C2(K, 1) ^ C3(K, 0) ^
+                C4(K, 7) ^ C5(K, 6) ^ C6(K, 5) ^ C7(K, 4);
+            L4 = C0(K, 4) ^ C1(K, 3) ^ C2(K, 2) ^ C3(K, 1) ^
+                C4(K, 0) ^ C5(K, 7) ^ C6(K, 6) ^ C7(K, 5);
+            L5 = C0(K, 5) ^ C1(K, 4) ^ C2(K, 3) ^ C3(K, 2) ^
+                C4(K, 1) ^ C5(K, 0) ^ C6(K, 7) ^ C7(K, 6);
+            L6 = C0(K, 6) ^ C1(K, 5) ^ C2(K, 4) ^ C3(K, 3) ^
+                C4(K, 2) ^ C5(K, 1) ^ C6(K, 0) ^ C7(K, 7);
+            L7 = C0(K, 7) ^ C1(K, 6) ^ C2(K, 5) ^ C3(K, 4) ^
+                C4(K, 3) ^ C5(K, 2) ^ C6(K, 1) ^ C7(K, 0);
+
+            K.q[0] = L0;
+            K.q[1] = L1;
+            K.q[2] = L2;
+            K.q[3] = L3;
+            K.q[4] = L4;
+            K.q[5] = L5;
+            K.q[6] = L6;
+            K.q[7] = L7;
+
+            L0 ^= C0(S, 0) ^ C1(S, 7) ^ C2(S, 6) ^ C3(S, 5) ^
+                C4(S, 4) ^ C5(S, 3) ^ C6(S, 2) ^ C7(S, 1);
+            L1 ^= C0(S, 1) ^ C1(S, 0) ^ C2(S, 7) ^ C3(S, 6) ^
+                C4(S, 5) ^ C5(S, 4) ^ C6(S, 3) ^ C7(S, 2);
+            L2 ^= C0(S, 2) ^ C1(S, 1) ^ C2(S, 0) ^ C3(S, 7) ^
+                C4(S, 6) ^ C5(S, 5) ^ C6(S, 4) ^ C7(S, 3);
+            L3 ^= C0(S, 3) ^ C1(S, 2) ^ C2(S, 1) ^ C3(S, 0) ^
+                C4(S, 7) ^ C5(S, 6) ^ C6(S, 5) ^ C7(S, 4);
+            L4 ^= C0(S, 4) ^ C1(S, 3) ^ C2(S, 2) ^ C3(S, 1) ^
+                C4(S, 0) ^ C5(S, 7) ^ C6(S, 6) ^ C7(S, 5);
+            L5 ^= C0(S, 5) ^ C1(S, 4) ^ C2(S, 3) ^ C3(S, 2) ^
+                C4(S, 1) ^ C5(S, 0) ^ C6(S, 7) ^ C7(S, 6);
+            L6 ^= C0(S, 6) ^ C1(S, 5) ^ C2(S, 4) ^ C3(S, 3) ^
+                C4(S, 2) ^ C5(S, 1) ^ C6(S, 0) ^ C7(S, 7);
+            L7 ^= C0(S, 7) ^ C1(S, 6) ^ C2(S, 5) ^ C3(S, 4) ^
+                C4(S, 3) ^ C5(S, 2) ^ C6(S, 1) ^ C7(S, 0);
+
+            S.q[0] = L0;
+            S.q[1] = L1;
+            S.q[2] = L2;
+            S.q[3] = L3;
+            S.q[4] = L4;
+            S.q[5] = L5;
+            S.q[6] = L6;
+            S.q[7] = L7;
+# else
+            L0 = C0(K, 0);
+            L1 = C1(K, 0);
+            L2 = C2(K, 0);
+            L3 = C3(K, 0);
+            L4 = C4(K, 0);
+            L5 = C5(K, 0);
+            L6 = C6(K, 0);
+            L7 = C7(K, 0);
+            L0 ^= RC[r];
+
+            L1 ^= C0(K, 1);
+            L2 ^= C1(K, 1);
+            L3 ^= C2(K, 1);
+            L4 ^= C3(K, 1);
+            L5 ^= C4(K, 1);
+            L6 ^= C5(K, 1);
+            L7 ^= C6(K, 1);
+            L0 ^= C7(K, 1);
+
+            L2 ^= C0(K, 2);
+            L3 ^= C1(K, 2);
+            L4 ^= C2(K, 2);
+            L5 ^= C3(K, 2);
+            L6 ^= C4(K, 2);
+            L7 ^= C5(K, 2);
+            L0 ^= C6(K, 2);
+            L1 ^= C7(K, 2);
+
+            L3 ^= C0(K, 3);
+            L4 ^= C1(K, 3);
+            L5 ^= C2(K, 3);
+            L6 ^= C3(K, 3);
+            L7 ^= C4(K, 3);
+            L0 ^= C5(K, 3);
+            L1 ^= C6(K, 3);
+            L2 ^= C7(K, 3);
+
+            L4 ^= C0(K, 4);
+            L5 ^= C1(K, 4);
+            L6 ^= C2(K, 4);
+            L7 ^= C3(K, 4);
+            L0 ^= C4(K, 4);
+            L1 ^= C5(K, 4);
+            L2 ^= C6(K, 4);
+            L3 ^= C7(K, 4);
+
+            L5 ^= C0(K, 5);
+            L6 ^= C1(K, 5);
+            L7 ^= C2(K, 5);
+            L0 ^= C3(K, 5);
+            L1 ^= C4(K, 5);
+            L2 ^= C5(K, 5);
+            L3 ^= C6(K, 5);
+            L4 ^= C7(K, 5);
+
+            L6 ^= C0(K, 6);
+            L7 ^= C1(K, 6);
+            L0 ^= C2(K, 6);
+            L1 ^= C3(K, 6);
+            L2 ^= C4(K, 6);
+            L3 ^= C5(K, 6);
+            L4 ^= C6(K, 6);
+            L5 ^= C7(K, 6);
+
+            L7 ^= C0(K, 7);
+            L0 ^= C1(K, 7);
+            L1 ^= C2(K, 7);
+            L2 ^= C3(K, 7);
+            L3 ^= C4(K, 7);
+            L4 ^= C5(K, 7);
+            L5 ^= C6(K, 7);
+            L6 ^= C7(K, 7);
+
+            K.q[0] = L0;
+            K.q[1] = L1;
+            K.q[2] = L2;
+            K.q[3] = L3;
+            K.q[4] = L4;
+            K.q[5] = L5;
+            K.q[6] = L6;
+            K.q[7] = L7;
+
+            L0 ^= C0(S, 0);
+            L1 ^= C1(S, 0);
+            L2 ^= C2(S, 0);
+            L3 ^= C3(S, 0);
+            L4 ^= C4(S, 0);
+            L5 ^= C5(S, 0);
+            L6 ^= C6(S, 0);
+            L7 ^= C7(S, 0);
+
+            L1 ^= C0(S, 1);
+            L2 ^= C1(S, 1);
+            L3 ^= C2(S, 1);
+            L4 ^= C3(S, 1);
+            L5 ^= C4(S, 1);
+            L6 ^= C5(S, 1);
+            L7 ^= C6(S, 1);
+            L0 ^= C7(S, 1);
+
+            L2 ^= C0(S, 2);
+            L3 ^= C1(S, 2);
+            L4 ^= C2(S, 2);
+            L5 ^= C3(S, 2);
+            L6 ^= C4(S, 2);
+            L7 ^= C5(S, 2);
+            L0 ^= C6(S, 2);
+            L1 ^= C7(S, 2);
+
+            L3 ^= C0(S, 3);
+            L4 ^= C1(S, 3);
+            L5 ^= C2(S, 3);
+            L6 ^= C3(S, 3);
+            L7 ^= C4(S, 3);
+            L0 ^= C5(S, 3);
+            L1 ^= C6(S, 3);
+            L2 ^= C7(S, 3);
+
+            L4 ^= C0(S, 4);
+            L5 ^= C1(S, 4);
+            L6 ^= C2(S, 4);
+            L7 ^= C3(S, 4);
+            L0 ^= C4(S, 4);
+            L1 ^= C5(S, 4);
+            L2 ^= C6(S, 4);
+            L3 ^= C7(S, 4);
+
+            L5 ^= C0(S, 5);
+            L6 ^= C1(S, 5);
+            L7 ^= C2(S, 5);
+            L0 ^= C3(S, 5);
+            L1 ^= C4(S, 5);
+            L2 ^= C5(S, 5);
+            L3 ^= C6(S, 5);
+            L4 ^= C7(S, 5);
+
+            L6 ^= C0(S, 6);
+            L7 ^= C1(S, 6);
+            L0 ^= C2(S, 6);
+            L1 ^= C3(S, 6);
+            L2 ^= C4(S, 6);
+            L3 ^= C5(S, 6);
+            L4 ^= C6(S, 6);
+            L5 ^= C7(S, 6);
+
+            L7 ^= C0(S, 7);
+            L0 ^= C1(S, 7);
+            L1 ^= C2(S, 7);
+            L2 ^= C3(S, 7);
+            L3 ^= C4(S, 7);
+            L4 ^= C5(S, 7);
+            L5 ^= C6(S, 7);
+            L6 ^= C7(S, 7);
+
+            S.q[0] = L0;
+            S.q[1] = L1;
+            S.q[2] = L2;
+            S.q[3] = L3;
+            S.q[4] = L4;
+            S.q[5] = L5;
+            S.q[6] = L6;
+            S.q[7] = L7;
+# endif
+        }
+
+# ifdef STRICT_ALIGNMENT
+        if ((size_t)p & 7) {
+            int i;
+            for (i = 0; i < 64; i++)
+                H->c[i] ^= S.c[i] ^ p[i];
+        } else
+# endif
+        {
+            const u64 *pa = (const u64 *)p;
+            H->q[0] ^= S.q[0] ^ pa[0];
+            H->q[1] ^= S.q[1] ^ pa[1];
+            H->q[2] ^= S.q[2] ^ pa[2];
+            H->q[3] ^= S.q[3] ^ pa[3];
+            H->q[4] ^= S.q[4] ^ pa[4];
+            H->q[5] ^= S.q[5] ^ pa[5];
+            H->q[6] ^= S.q[6] ^ pa[6];
+            H->q[7] ^= S.q[7] ^ pa[7];
+        }
+#endif
+        p += 64;
+    } while (--n);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/whrlpool/wp_dgst.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/whrlpool/wp_dgst.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6d92551
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/whrlpool/wp_dgst.c
@@ -0,0 +1,266 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/**
+ * The Whirlpool hashing function.
+ *
+ * <P>
+ * <b>References</b>
+ *
+ * <P>
+ * The Whirlpool algorithm was developed by
+ * <a href="mailto:pbarreto@scopus.com.br">Paulo S. L. M. Barreto</a> and
+ * <a href="mailto:vincent.rijmen@cryptomathic.com">Vincent Rijmen</a>.
+ *
+ * See
+ *      P.S.L.M. Barreto, V. Rijmen,
+ *      ``The Whirlpool hashing function,''
+ *      NESSIE submission, 2000 (tweaked version, 2001),
+ *      <https://www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.ac.be/nessie/workshop/submissions/whirlpool.zip>
+ *
+ * Based on "@version 3.0 (2003.03.12)" by Paulo S.L.M. Barreto and
+ * Vincent Rijmen. Lookup "reference implementations" on
+ * <http://planeta.terra.com.br/informatica/paulobarreto/>
+ *
+ * =============================================================================
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHORS ''AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS
+ * OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE
+ * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
+ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
+ * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR
+ * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY,
+ * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE
+ * OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE,
+ * EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ */
+
+/*
+ * OpenSSL-specific implementation notes.
+ *
+ * WHIRLPOOL_Update as well as one-stroke WHIRLPOOL both expect
+ * number of *bytes* as input length argument. Bit-oriented routine
+ * as specified by authors is called WHIRLPOOL_BitUpdate[!] and
+ * does not have one-stroke counterpart.
+ *
+ * WHIRLPOOL_BitUpdate implements byte-oriented loop, essentially
+ * to serve WHIRLPOOL_Update. This is done for performance.
+ *
+ * Unlike authors' reference implementation, block processing
+ * routine whirlpool_block is designed to operate on multi-block
+ * input. This is done for performance.
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include "wp_locl.h"
+#include <string.h>
+
+int WHIRLPOOL_Init(WHIRLPOOL_CTX *c)
+{
+    memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c));
+    return (1);
+}
+
+int WHIRLPOOL_Update(WHIRLPOOL_CTX *c, const void *_inp, size_t bytes)
+{
+    /*
+     * Well, largest suitable chunk size actually is
+     * (1<<(sizeof(size_t)*8-3))-64, but below number is large enough for not
+     * to care about excessive calls to WHIRLPOOL_BitUpdate...
+     */
+    size_t chunk = ((size_t)1) << (sizeof(size_t) * 8 - 4);
+    const unsigned char *inp = _inp;
+
+    while (bytes >= chunk) {
+        WHIRLPOOL_BitUpdate(c, inp, chunk * 8);
+        bytes -= chunk;
+        inp += chunk;
+    }
+    if (bytes)
+        WHIRLPOOL_BitUpdate(c, inp, bytes * 8);
+
+    return (1);
+}
+
+void WHIRLPOOL_BitUpdate(WHIRLPOOL_CTX *c, const void *_inp, size_t bits)
+{
+    size_t n;
+    unsigned int bitoff = c->bitoff,
+        bitrem = bitoff % 8, inpgap = (8 - (unsigned int)bits % 8) & 7;
+    const unsigned char *inp = _inp;
+
+    /*
+     * This 256-bit increment procedure relies on the size_t being natural
+     * size of CPU register, so that we don't have to mask the value in order
+     * to detect overflows.
+     */
+    c->bitlen[0] += bits;
+    if (c->bitlen[0] < bits) {  /* overflow */
+        n = 1;
+        do {
+            c->bitlen[n]++;
+        } while (c->bitlen[n] == 0
+                 && ++n < (WHIRLPOOL_COUNTER / sizeof(size_t)));
+    }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT
+ reconsider:
+    if (inpgap == 0 && bitrem == 0) { /* byte-oriented loop */
+        while (bits) {
+            if (bitoff == 0 && (n = bits / WHIRLPOOL_BBLOCK)) {
+                whirlpool_block(c, inp, n);
+                inp += n * WHIRLPOOL_BBLOCK / 8;
+                bits %= WHIRLPOOL_BBLOCK;
+            } else {
+                unsigned int byteoff = bitoff / 8;
+
+                bitrem = WHIRLPOOL_BBLOCK - bitoff; /* re-use bitrem */
+                if (bits >= bitrem) {
+                    bits -= bitrem;
+                    bitrem /= 8;
+                    memcpy(c->data + byteoff, inp, bitrem);
+                    inp += bitrem;
+                    whirlpool_block(c, c->data, 1);
+                    bitoff = 0;
+                } else {
+                    memcpy(c->data + byteoff, inp, bits / 8);
+                    bitoff += (unsigned int)bits;
+                    bits = 0;
+                }
+                c->bitoff = bitoff;
+            }
+        }
+    } else                      /* bit-oriented loop */
+#endif
+    {
+        /*-
+                   inp
+                   |
+                   +-------+-------+-------
+                      |||||||||||||||||||||
+                   +-------+-------+-------
+        +-------+-------+-------+-------+-------
+        ||||||||||||||                          c->data
+        +-------+-------+-------+-------+-------
+                |
+                c->bitoff/8
+        */
+        while (bits) {
+            unsigned int byteoff = bitoff / 8;
+            unsigned char b;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT
+            if (bitrem == inpgap) {
+                c->data[byteoff++] |= inp[0] & (0xff >> inpgap);
+                inpgap = 8 - inpgap;
+                bitoff += inpgap;
+                bitrem = 0;     /* bitoff%8 */
+                bits -= inpgap;
+                inpgap = 0;     /* bits%8 */
+                inp++;
+                if (bitoff == WHIRLPOOL_BBLOCK) {
+                    whirlpool_block(c, c->data, 1);
+                    bitoff = 0;
+                }
+                c->bitoff = bitoff;
+                goto reconsider;
+            } else
+#endif
+            if (bits > 8) {
+                b = ((inp[0] << inpgap) | (inp[1] >> (8 - inpgap)));
+                b &= 0xff;
+                if (bitrem)
+                    c->data[byteoff++] |= b >> bitrem;
+                else
+                    c->data[byteoff++] = b;
+                bitoff += 8;
+                bits -= 8;
+                inp++;
+                if (bitoff >= WHIRLPOOL_BBLOCK) {
+                    whirlpool_block(c, c->data, 1);
+                    byteoff = 0;
+                    bitoff %= WHIRLPOOL_BBLOCK;
+                }
+                if (bitrem)
+                    c->data[byteoff] = b << (8 - bitrem);
+            } else {            /* remaining less than or equal to 8 bits */
+
+                b = (inp[0] << inpgap) & 0xff;
+                if (bitrem)
+                    c->data[byteoff++] |= b >> bitrem;
+                else
+                    c->data[byteoff++] = b;
+                bitoff += (unsigned int)bits;
+                if (bitoff == WHIRLPOOL_BBLOCK) {
+                    whirlpool_block(c, c->data, 1);
+                    byteoff = 0;
+                    bitoff %= WHIRLPOOL_BBLOCK;
+                }
+                if (bitrem)
+                    c->data[byteoff] = b << (8 - bitrem);
+                bits = 0;
+            }
+            c->bitoff = bitoff;
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+int WHIRLPOOL_Final(unsigned char *md, WHIRLPOOL_CTX *c)
+{
+    unsigned int bitoff = c->bitoff, byteoff = bitoff / 8;
+    size_t i, j, v;
+    unsigned char *p;
+
+    bitoff %= 8;
+    if (bitoff)
+        c->data[byteoff] |= 0x80 >> bitoff;
+    else
+        c->data[byteoff] = 0x80;
+    byteoff++;
+
+    /* pad with zeros */
+    if (byteoff > (WHIRLPOOL_BBLOCK / 8 - WHIRLPOOL_COUNTER)) {
+        if (byteoff < WHIRLPOOL_BBLOCK / 8)
+            memset(&c->data[byteoff], 0, WHIRLPOOL_BBLOCK / 8 - byteoff);
+        whirlpool_block(c, c->data, 1);
+        byteoff = 0;
+    }
+    if (byteoff < (WHIRLPOOL_BBLOCK / 8 - WHIRLPOOL_COUNTER))
+        memset(&c->data[byteoff], 0,
+               (WHIRLPOOL_BBLOCK / 8 - WHIRLPOOL_COUNTER) - byteoff);
+    /* smash 256-bit c->bitlen in big-endian order */
+    p = &c->data[WHIRLPOOL_BBLOCK / 8 - 1]; /* last byte in c->data */
+    for (i = 0; i < WHIRLPOOL_COUNTER / sizeof(size_t); i++)
+        for (v = c->bitlen[i], j = 0; j < sizeof(size_t); j++, v >>= 8)
+            *p-- = (unsigned char)(v & 0xff);
+
+    whirlpool_block(c, c->data, 1);
+
+    if (md) {
+        memcpy(md, c->H.c, WHIRLPOOL_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+        OPENSSL_cleanse(c, sizeof(*c));
+        return (1);
+    }
+    return (0);
+}
+
+unsigned char *WHIRLPOOL(const void *inp, size_t bytes, unsigned char *md)
+{
+    WHIRLPOOL_CTX ctx;
+    static unsigned char m[WHIRLPOOL_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+
+    if (md == NULL)
+        md = m;
+    WHIRLPOOL_Init(&ctx);
+    WHIRLPOOL_Update(&ctx, inp, bytes);
+    WHIRLPOOL_Final(md, &ctx);
+    return (md);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/whrlpool/wp_locl.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/whrlpool/wp_locl.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3a81cfd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/whrlpool/wp_locl.h
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/whrlpool.h>
+
+void whirlpool_block(WHIRLPOOL_CTX *, const void *, size_t);
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/build.info b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/build.info
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7fc4b45
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/build.info
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+LIBS=../../libcrypto
+SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
+        x509_def.c x509_d2.c x509_r2x.c x509_cmp.c \
+        x509_obj.c x509_req.c x509spki.c x509_vfy.c \
+        x509_set.c x509cset.c x509rset.c x509_err.c \
+        x509name.c x509_v3.c x509_ext.c x509_att.c \
+        x509type.c x509_lu.c x_all.c x509_txt.c \
+        x509_trs.c by_file.c by_dir.c x509_vpm.c \
+        x_crl.c t_crl.c x_req.c t_req.c x_x509.c t_x509.c \
+        x_pubkey.c x_x509a.c x_attrib.c x_exten.c x_name.c
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/by_dir.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/by_dir.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..21672a7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/by_dir.c
@@ -0,0 +1,386 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+#endif
+
+
+#include <openssl/lhash.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include "internal/x509_int.h"
+#include "x509_lcl.h"
+
+struct lookup_dir_hashes_st {
+    unsigned long hash;
+    int suffix;
+};
+
+struct lookup_dir_entry_st {
+    char *dir;
+    int dir_type;
+    STACK_OF(BY_DIR_HASH) *hashes;
+};
+
+typedef struct lookup_dir_st {
+    BUF_MEM *buffer;
+    STACK_OF(BY_DIR_ENTRY) *dirs;
+    CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock;
+} BY_DIR;
+
+static int dir_ctrl(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, int cmd, const char *argp, long argl,
+                    char **ret);
+static int new_dir(X509_LOOKUP *lu);
+static void free_dir(X509_LOOKUP *lu);
+static int add_cert_dir(BY_DIR *ctx, const char *dir, int type);
+static int get_cert_by_subject(X509_LOOKUP *xl, X509_LOOKUP_TYPE type,
+                               X509_NAME *name, X509_OBJECT *ret);
+static X509_LOOKUP_METHOD x509_dir_lookup = {
+    "Load certs from files in a directory",
+    new_dir,                    /* new */
+    free_dir,                   /* free */
+    NULL,                       /* init */
+    NULL,                       /* shutdown */
+    dir_ctrl,                   /* ctrl */
+    get_cert_by_subject,        /* get_by_subject */
+    NULL,                       /* get_by_issuer_serial */
+    NULL,                       /* get_by_fingerprint */
+    NULL,                       /* get_by_alias */
+};
+
+X509_LOOKUP_METHOD *X509_LOOKUP_hash_dir(void)
+{
+    return (&x509_dir_lookup);
+}
+
+static int dir_ctrl(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, int cmd, const char *argp, long argl,
+                    char **retp)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    BY_DIR *ld;
+    char *dir = NULL;
+
+    ld = (BY_DIR *)ctx->method_data;
+
+    switch (cmd) {
+    case X509_L_ADD_DIR:
+        if (argl == X509_FILETYPE_DEFAULT) {
+            dir = (char *)getenv(X509_get_default_cert_dir_env());
+            if (dir)
+                ret = add_cert_dir(ld, dir, X509_FILETYPE_PEM);
+            else
+                ret = add_cert_dir(ld, X509_get_default_cert_dir(),
+                                   X509_FILETYPE_PEM);
+            if (!ret) {
+                X509err(X509_F_DIR_CTRL, X509_R_LOADING_CERT_DIR);
+            }
+        } else
+            ret = add_cert_dir(ld, argp, (int)argl);
+        break;
+    }
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static int new_dir(X509_LOOKUP *lu)
+{
+    BY_DIR *a;
+
+    if ((a = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*a))) == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    if ((a->buffer = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
+        OPENSSL_free(a);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    a->dirs = NULL;
+    a->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
+    if (a->lock == NULL) {
+        BUF_MEM_free(a->buffer);
+        OPENSSL_free(a);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    lu->method_data = (char *)a;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static void by_dir_hash_free(BY_DIR_HASH *hash)
+{
+    OPENSSL_free(hash);
+}
+
+static int by_dir_hash_cmp(const BY_DIR_HASH *const *a,
+                           const BY_DIR_HASH *const *b)
+{
+    if ((*a)->hash > (*b)->hash)
+        return 1;
+    if ((*a)->hash < (*b)->hash)
+        return -1;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static void by_dir_entry_free(BY_DIR_ENTRY *ent)
+{
+    OPENSSL_free(ent->dir);
+    sk_BY_DIR_HASH_pop_free(ent->hashes, by_dir_hash_free);
+    OPENSSL_free(ent);
+}
+
+static void free_dir(X509_LOOKUP *lu)
+{
+    BY_DIR *a;
+
+    a = (BY_DIR *)lu->method_data;
+    sk_BY_DIR_ENTRY_pop_free(a->dirs, by_dir_entry_free);
+    BUF_MEM_free(a->buffer);
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(a->lock);
+    OPENSSL_free(a);
+}
+
+static int add_cert_dir(BY_DIR *ctx, const char *dir, int type)
+{
+    const char *s, *p;
+
+    if (dir == NULL || !*dir) {
+        X509err(X509_F_ADD_CERT_DIR, X509_R_INVALID_DIRECTORY);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    s = dir;
+    p = s;
+    do {
+        if ((*p == LIST_SEPARATOR_CHAR) || (*p == '\0')) {
+            BY_DIR_ENTRY *ent;
+            int j;
+            size_t len;
+            const char *ss = s;
+            s = p + 1;
+            len = p - ss;
+            if (len == 0)
+                continue;
+            for (j = 0; j < sk_BY_DIR_ENTRY_num(ctx->dirs); j++) {
+                ent = sk_BY_DIR_ENTRY_value(ctx->dirs, j);
+                if (strlen(ent->dir) == len &&
+                    strncmp(ent->dir, ss, len) == 0)
+                    break;
+            }
+            if (j < sk_BY_DIR_ENTRY_num(ctx->dirs))
+                continue;
+            if (ctx->dirs == NULL) {
+                ctx->dirs = sk_BY_DIR_ENTRY_new_null();
+                if (!ctx->dirs) {
+                    X509err(X509_F_ADD_CERT_DIR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                    return 0;
+                }
+            }
+            ent = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ent));
+            if (ent == NULL)
+                return 0;
+            ent->dir_type = type;
+            ent->hashes = sk_BY_DIR_HASH_new(by_dir_hash_cmp);
+            ent->dir = OPENSSL_strndup(ss, len);
+            if (ent->dir == NULL || ent->hashes == NULL) {
+                by_dir_entry_free(ent);
+                return 0;
+            }
+            if (!sk_BY_DIR_ENTRY_push(ctx->dirs, ent)) {
+                by_dir_entry_free(ent);
+                return 0;
+            }
+        }
+    } while (*p++ != '\0');
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int get_cert_by_subject(X509_LOOKUP *xl, X509_LOOKUP_TYPE type,
+                               X509_NAME *name, X509_OBJECT *ret)
+{
+    BY_DIR *ctx;
+    union {
+        X509 st_x509;
+        X509_CRL crl;
+    } data;
+    int ok = 0;
+    int i, j, k;
+    unsigned long h;
+    BUF_MEM *b = NULL;
+    X509_OBJECT stmp, *tmp;
+    const char *postfix = "";
+
+    if (name == NULL)
+        return (0);
+
+    stmp.type = type;
+    if (type == X509_LU_X509) {
+        data.st_x509.cert_info.subject = name;
+        stmp.data.x509 = &data.st_x509;
+        postfix = "";
+    } else if (type == X509_LU_CRL) {
+        data.crl.crl.issuer = name;
+        stmp.data.crl = &data.crl;
+        postfix = "r";
+    } else {
+        X509err(X509_F_GET_CERT_BY_SUBJECT, X509_R_WRONG_LOOKUP_TYPE);
+        goto finish;
+    }
+
+    if ((b = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
+        X509err(X509_F_GET_CERT_BY_SUBJECT, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+        goto finish;
+    }
+
+    ctx = (BY_DIR *)xl->method_data;
+
+    h = X509_NAME_hash(name);
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_BY_DIR_ENTRY_num(ctx->dirs); i++) {
+        BY_DIR_ENTRY *ent;
+        int idx;
+        BY_DIR_HASH htmp, *hent;
+        ent = sk_BY_DIR_ENTRY_value(ctx->dirs, i);
+        j = strlen(ent->dir) + 1 + 8 + 6 + 1 + 1;
+        if (!BUF_MEM_grow(b, j)) {
+            X509err(X509_F_GET_CERT_BY_SUBJECT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto finish;
+        }
+        if (type == X509_LU_CRL && ent->hashes) {
+            htmp.hash = h;
+            CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(ctx->lock);
+            idx = sk_BY_DIR_HASH_find(ent->hashes, &htmp);
+            if (idx >= 0) {
+                hent = sk_BY_DIR_HASH_value(ent->hashes, idx);
+                k = hent->suffix;
+            } else {
+                hent = NULL;
+                k = 0;
+            }
+            CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ctx->lock);
+        } else {
+            k = 0;
+            hent = NULL;
+        }
+        for (;;) {
+            char c = '/';
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+            c = ent->dir[strlen(ent->dir) - 1];
+            if (c != ':' && c != '>' && c != ']') {
+                /*
+                 * If no separator is present, we assume the directory
+                 * specifier is a logical name, and add a colon.  We really
+                 * should use better VMS routines for merging things like
+                 * this, but this will do for now... -- Richard Levitte
+                 */
+                c = ':';
+            } else {
+                c = '\0';
+            }
+#endif
+            if (c == '\0') {
+                /*
+                 * This is special.  When c == '\0', no directory separator
+                 * should be added.
+                 */
+                BIO_snprintf(b->data, b->max,
+                             "%s%08lx.%s%d", ent->dir, h, postfix, k);
+            } else {
+                BIO_snprintf(b->data, b->max,
+                             "%s%c%08lx.%s%d", ent->dir, c, h, postfix, k);
+            }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO
+# ifdef _WIN32
+#  define stat _stat
+# endif
+            {
+                struct stat st;
+                if (stat(b->data, &st) < 0)
+                    break;
+            }
+#endif
+            /* found one. */
+            if (type == X509_LU_X509) {
+                if ((X509_load_cert_file(xl, b->data, ent->dir_type)) == 0)
+                    break;
+            } else if (type == X509_LU_CRL) {
+                if ((X509_load_crl_file(xl, b->data, ent->dir_type)) == 0)
+                    break;
+            }
+            /* else case will caught higher up */
+            k++;
+        }
+
+        /*
+         * we have added it to the cache so now pull it out again
+         */
+        CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(ctx->lock);
+        j = sk_X509_OBJECT_find(xl->store_ctx->objs, &stmp);
+        if (j != -1)
+            tmp = sk_X509_OBJECT_value(xl->store_ctx->objs, j);
+        else
+            tmp = NULL;
+        CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ctx->lock);
+
+        /* If a CRL, update the last file suffix added for this */
+
+        if (type == X509_LU_CRL) {
+            CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(ctx->lock);
+            /*
+             * Look for entry again in case another thread added an entry
+             * first.
+             */
+            if (!hent) {
+                htmp.hash = h;
+                idx = sk_BY_DIR_HASH_find(ent->hashes, &htmp);
+                if (idx >= 0)
+                    hent = sk_BY_DIR_HASH_value(ent->hashes, idx);
+            }
+            if (!hent) {
+                hent = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*hent));
+                if (hent == NULL) {
+                    CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ctx->lock);
+                    X509err(X509_F_GET_CERT_BY_SUBJECT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                    ok = 0;
+                    goto finish;
+                }
+                hent->hash = h;
+                hent->suffix = k;
+                if (!sk_BY_DIR_HASH_push(ent->hashes, hent)) {
+                    CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ctx->lock);
+                    OPENSSL_free(hent);
+                    ok = 0;
+                    goto finish;
+                }
+            } else if (hent->suffix < k) {
+                hent->suffix = k;
+            }
+
+            CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ctx->lock);
+
+        }
+
+        if (tmp != NULL) {
+            ok = 1;
+            ret->type = tmp->type;
+            memcpy(&ret->data, &tmp->data, sizeof(ret->data));
+            /*
+             * If we were going to up the reference count, we would need to
+             * do it on a perl 'type' basis
+             */
+        /*- CRYPTO_add(&tmp->data.x509->references,1,
+                    CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);*/
+            goto finish;
+        }
+    }
+ finish:
+    BUF_MEM_free(b);
+    return (ok);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/by_file.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/by_file.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0bcc6af
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/by_file.c
@@ -0,0 +1,221 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/lhash.h>
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include "x509_lcl.h"
+
+static int by_file_ctrl(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, int cmd, const char *argc,
+                        long argl, char **ret);
+static X509_LOOKUP_METHOD x509_file_lookup = {
+    "Load file into cache",
+    NULL,                       /* new */
+    NULL,                       /* free */
+    NULL,                       /* init */
+    NULL,                       /* shutdown */
+    by_file_ctrl,               /* ctrl */
+    NULL,                       /* get_by_subject */
+    NULL,                       /* get_by_issuer_serial */
+    NULL,                       /* get_by_fingerprint */
+    NULL,                       /* get_by_alias */
+};
+
+X509_LOOKUP_METHOD *X509_LOOKUP_file(void)
+{
+    return (&x509_file_lookup);
+}
+
+static int by_file_ctrl(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, int cmd, const char *argp,
+                        long argl, char **ret)
+{
+    int ok = 0;
+    const char *file;
+
+    switch (cmd) {
+    case X509_L_FILE_LOAD:
+        if (argl == X509_FILETYPE_DEFAULT) {
+            file = getenv(X509_get_default_cert_file_env());
+            if (file)
+                ok = (X509_load_cert_crl_file(ctx, file,
+                                              X509_FILETYPE_PEM) != 0);
+
+            else
+                ok = (X509_load_cert_crl_file
+                      (ctx, X509_get_default_cert_file(),
+                       X509_FILETYPE_PEM) != 0);
+
+            if (!ok) {
+                X509err(X509_F_BY_FILE_CTRL, X509_R_LOADING_DEFAULTS);
+            }
+        } else {
+            if (argl == X509_FILETYPE_PEM)
+                ok = (X509_load_cert_crl_file(ctx, argp,
+                                              X509_FILETYPE_PEM) != 0);
+            else
+                ok = (X509_load_cert_file(ctx, argp, (int)argl) != 0);
+        }
+        break;
+    }
+    return (ok);
+}
+
+int X509_load_cert_file(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, const char *file, int type)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    BIO *in = NULL;
+    int i, count = 0;
+    X509 *x = NULL;
+
+    if (file == NULL)
+        return (1);
+    in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
+
+    if ((in == NULL) || (BIO_read_filename(in, file) <= 0)) {
+        X509err(X509_F_X509_LOAD_CERT_FILE, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (type == X509_FILETYPE_PEM) {
+        for (;;) {
+            x = PEM_read_bio_X509_AUX(in, NULL, NULL, "");
+            if (x == NULL) {
+                if ((ERR_GET_REASON(ERR_peek_last_error()) ==
+                     PEM_R_NO_START_LINE) && (count > 0)) {
+                    ERR_clear_error();
+                    break;
+                } else {
+                    X509err(X509_F_X509_LOAD_CERT_FILE, ERR_R_PEM_LIB);
+                    goto err;
+                }
+            }
+            i = X509_STORE_add_cert(ctx->store_ctx, x);
+            if (!i)
+                goto err;
+            count++;
+            X509_free(x);
+            x = NULL;
+        }
+        ret = count;
+    } else if (type == X509_FILETYPE_ASN1) {
+        x = d2i_X509_bio(in, NULL);
+        if (x == NULL) {
+            X509err(X509_F_X509_LOAD_CERT_FILE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        i = X509_STORE_add_cert(ctx->store_ctx, x);
+        if (!i)
+            goto err;
+        ret = i;
+    } else {
+        X509err(X509_F_X509_LOAD_CERT_FILE, X509_R_BAD_X509_FILETYPE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+ err:
+    X509_free(x);
+    BIO_free(in);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+int X509_load_crl_file(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, const char *file, int type)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    BIO *in = NULL;
+    int i, count = 0;
+    X509_CRL *x = NULL;
+
+    if (file == NULL)
+        return (1);
+    in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
+
+    if ((in == NULL) || (BIO_read_filename(in, file) <= 0)) {
+        X509err(X509_F_X509_LOAD_CRL_FILE, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (type == X509_FILETYPE_PEM) {
+        for (;;) {
+            x = PEM_read_bio_X509_CRL(in, NULL, NULL, "");
+            if (x == NULL) {
+                if ((ERR_GET_REASON(ERR_peek_last_error()) ==
+                     PEM_R_NO_START_LINE) && (count > 0)) {
+                    ERR_clear_error();
+                    break;
+                } else {
+                    X509err(X509_F_X509_LOAD_CRL_FILE, ERR_R_PEM_LIB);
+                    goto err;
+                }
+            }
+            i = X509_STORE_add_crl(ctx->store_ctx, x);
+            if (!i)
+                goto err;
+            count++;
+            X509_CRL_free(x);
+            x = NULL;
+        }
+        ret = count;
+    } else if (type == X509_FILETYPE_ASN1) {
+        x = d2i_X509_CRL_bio(in, NULL);
+        if (x == NULL) {
+            X509err(X509_F_X509_LOAD_CRL_FILE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        i = X509_STORE_add_crl(ctx->store_ctx, x);
+        if (!i)
+            goto err;
+        ret = i;
+    } else {
+        X509err(X509_F_X509_LOAD_CRL_FILE, X509_R_BAD_X509_FILETYPE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+ err:
+    X509_CRL_free(x);
+    BIO_free(in);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+int X509_load_cert_crl_file(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, const char *file, int type)
+{
+    STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *inf;
+    X509_INFO *itmp;
+    BIO *in;
+    int i, count = 0;
+    if (type != X509_FILETYPE_PEM)
+        return X509_load_cert_file(ctx, file, type);
+    in = BIO_new_file(file, "r");
+    if (!in) {
+        X509err(X509_F_X509_LOAD_CERT_CRL_FILE, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    inf = PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(in, NULL, NULL, "");
+    BIO_free(in);
+    if (!inf) {
+        X509err(X509_F_X509_LOAD_CERT_CRL_FILE, ERR_R_PEM_LIB);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_INFO_num(inf); i++) {
+        itmp = sk_X509_INFO_value(inf, i);
+        if (itmp->x509) {
+            X509_STORE_add_cert(ctx->store_ctx, itmp->x509);
+            count++;
+        }
+        if (itmp->crl) {
+            X509_STORE_add_crl(ctx->store_ctx, itmp->crl);
+            count++;
+        }
+    }
+    sk_X509_INFO_pop_free(inf, X509_INFO_free);
+    return count;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/t_crl.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/t_crl.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f3ca6db
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/t_crl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+int X509_CRL_print_fp(FILE *fp, X509_CRL *x)
+{
+    BIO *b;
+    int ret;
+
+    if ((b = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL) {
+        X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_PRINT_FP, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+        return (0);
+    }
+    BIO_set_fp(b, fp, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+    ret = X509_CRL_print(b, x);
+    BIO_free(b);
+    return (ret);
+}
+#endif
+
+int X509_CRL_print(BIO *out, X509_CRL *x)
+{
+    STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *rev;
+    X509_REVOKED *r;
+    const X509_ALGOR *sig_alg;
+    const ASN1_BIT_STRING *sig;
+    long l;
+    int i;
+    char *p;
+
+    BIO_printf(out, "Certificate Revocation List (CRL):\n");
+    l = X509_CRL_get_version(x);
+    if (l >= 0 && l <= 1)
+        BIO_printf(out, "%8sVersion %ld (0x%lx)\n", "", l + 1, (unsigned long)l);
+    else
+        BIO_printf(out, "%8sVersion unknown (%ld)\n", "", l);
+    X509_CRL_get0_signature(x, &sig, &sig_alg);
+    X509_signature_print(out, sig_alg, NULL);
+    p = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_CRL_get_issuer(x), NULL, 0);
+    BIO_printf(out, "%8sIssuer: %s\n", "", p);
+    OPENSSL_free(p);
+    BIO_printf(out, "%8sLast Update: ", "");
+    ASN1_TIME_print(out, X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(x));
+    BIO_printf(out, "\n%8sNext Update: ", "");
+    if (X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(x))
+        ASN1_TIME_print(out, X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(x));
+    else
+        BIO_printf(out, "NONE");
+    BIO_printf(out, "\n");
+
+    X509V3_extensions_print(out, "CRL extensions",
+                            X509_CRL_get0_extensions(x), 0, 8);
+
+    rev = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(x);
+
+    if (sk_X509_REVOKED_num(rev) > 0)
+        BIO_printf(out, "Revoked Certificates:\n");
+    else
+        BIO_printf(out, "No Revoked Certificates.\n");
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(rev); i++) {
+        r = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(rev, i);
+        BIO_printf(out, "    Serial Number: ");
+        i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(out, X509_REVOKED_get0_serialNumber(r));
+        BIO_printf(out, "\n        Revocation Date: ");
+        ASN1_TIME_print(out, X509_REVOKED_get0_revocationDate(r));
+        BIO_printf(out, "\n");
+        X509V3_extensions_print(out, "CRL entry extensions",
+                                X509_REVOKED_get0_extensions(r), 0, 8);
+    }
+    X509_signature_print(out, sig_alg, sig);
+
+    return 1;
+
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/t_req.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/t_req.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..77ce810
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/t_req.c
@@ -0,0 +1,198 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+int X509_REQ_print_fp(FILE *fp, X509_REQ *x)
+{
+    BIO *b;
+    int ret;
+
+    if ((b = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL) {
+        X509err(X509_F_X509_REQ_PRINT_FP, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+        return (0);
+    }
+    BIO_set_fp(b, fp, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+    ret = X509_REQ_print(b, x);
+    BIO_free(b);
+    return (ret);
+}
+#endif
+
+int X509_REQ_print_ex(BIO *bp, X509_REQ *x, unsigned long nmflags,
+                      unsigned long cflag)
+{
+    long l;
+    int i;
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+    STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts;
+    char mlch = ' ';
+    int nmindent = 0;
+
+    if ((nmflags & XN_FLAG_SEP_MASK) == XN_FLAG_SEP_MULTILINE) {
+        mlch = '\n';
+        nmindent = 12;
+    }
+
+    if (nmflags == X509_FLAG_COMPAT)
+        nmindent = 16;
+
+    if (!(cflag & X509_FLAG_NO_HEADER)) {
+        if (BIO_write(bp, "Certificate Request:\n", 21) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+        if (BIO_write(bp, "    Data:\n", 10) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+    }
+    if (!(cflag & X509_FLAG_NO_VERSION)) {
+        l = X509_REQ_get_version(x);
+        if (l >= 0 && l <= 2) {
+            if (BIO_printf(bp, "%8sVersion: %ld (0x%lx)\n", "", l + 1, (unsigned long)l) <= 0)
+                goto err;
+        } else {
+            if (BIO_printf(bp, "%8sVersion: Unknown (%ld)\n", "", l) <= 0)
+                goto err;
+        }
+    }
+    if (!(cflag & X509_FLAG_NO_SUBJECT)) {
+        if (BIO_printf(bp, "        Subject:%c", mlch) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+        if (X509_NAME_print_ex(bp, X509_REQ_get_subject_name(x),
+            nmindent, nmflags) < 0)
+            goto err;
+        if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+    }
+    if (!(cflag & X509_FLAG_NO_PUBKEY)) {
+        X509_PUBKEY *xpkey;
+        ASN1_OBJECT *koid;
+        if (BIO_write(bp, "        Subject Public Key Info:\n", 33) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+        if (BIO_printf(bp, "%12sPublic Key Algorithm: ", "") <= 0)
+            goto err;
+        xpkey = X509_REQ_get_X509_PUBKEY(x);
+        X509_PUBKEY_get0_param(&koid, NULL, NULL, NULL, xpkey);
+        if (i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, koid) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+        if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n") <= 0)
+            goto err;
+
+        pkey = X509_REQ_get0_pubkey(x);
+        if (pkey == NULL) {
+            BIO_printf(bp, "%12sUnable to load Public Key\n", "");
+            ERR_print_errors(bp);
+        } else {
+            EVP_PKEY_print_public(bp, pkey, 16, NULL);
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (!(cflag & X509_FLAG_NO_ATTRIBUTES)) {
+        /* may not be */
+        if (BIO_printf(bp, "%8sAttributes:\n", "") <= 0)
+            goto err;
+
+        if (X509_REQ_get_attr_count(x) == 0) {
+            if (BIO_printf(bp, "%12sa0:00\n", "") <= 0)
+                goto err;
+        } else {
+            for (i = 0; i < X509_REQ_get_attr_count(x); i++) {
+                ASN1_TYPE *at;
+                X509_ATTRIBUTE *a;
+                ASN1_BIT_STRING *bs = NULL;
+                ASN1_OBJECT *aobj;
+                int j, type = 0, count = 1, ii = 0;
+
+                a = X509_REQ_get_attr(x, i);
+                aobj = X509_ATTRIBUTE_get0_object(a);
+                if (X509_REQ_extension_nid(OBJ_obj2nid(aobj)))
+                    continue;
+                if (BIO_printf(bp, "%12s", "") <= 0)
+                    goto err;
+                if ((j = i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, aobj)) > 0) {
+                    ii = 0;
+                    count = X509_ATTRIBUTE_count(a);
+ get_next:
+                    at = X509_ATTRIBUTE_get0_type(a, ii);
+                    type = at->type;
+                    bs = at->value.asn1_string;
+                }
+                for (j = 25 - j; j > 0; j--)
+                    if (BIO_write(bp, " ", 1) != 1)
+                        goto err;
+                if (BIO_puts(bp, ":") <= 0)
+                    goto err;
+                if ((type == V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING) ||
+                    (type == V_ASN1_T61STRING) ||
+                    (type == V_ASN1_UTF8STRING) ||
+                    (type == V_ASN1_IA5STRING)) {
+                    if (BIO_write(bp, (char *)bs->data, bs->length)
+                        != bs->length)
+                        goto err;
+                    BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
+                } else {
+                    BIO_puts(bp, "unable to print attribute\n");
+                }
+                if (++ii < count)
+                    goto get_next;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    if (!(cflag & X509_FLAG_NO_EXTENSIONS)) {
+        exts = X509_REQ_get_extensions(x);
+        if (exts) {
+            BIO_printf(bp, "%8sRequested Extensions:\n", "");
+            for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts); i++) {
+                ASN1_OBJECT *obj;
+                X509_EXTENSION *ex;
+                int critical;
+                ex = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(exts, i);
+                if (BIO_printf(bp, "%12s", "") <= 0)
+                    goto err;
+                obj = X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex);
+                i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, obj);
+                critical = X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ex);
+                if (BIO_printf(bp, ": %s\n", critical ? "critical" : "") <= 0)
+                    goto err;
+                if (!X509V3_EXT_print(bp, ex, cflag, 16)) {
+                    BIO_printf(bp, "%16s", "");
+                    ASN1_STRING_print(bp, X509_EXTENSION_get_data(ex));
+                }
+                if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) <= 0)
+                    goto err;
+            }
+            sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(exts, X509_EXTENSION_free);
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (!(cflag & X509_FLAG_NO_SIGDUMP)) {
+        const X509_ALGOR *sig_alg;
+        const ASN1_BIT_STRING *sig;
+        X509_REQ_get0_signature(x, &sig, &sig_alg);
+        if (!X509_signature_print(bp, sig_alg, sig))
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    return (1);
+ err:
+    X509err(X509_F_X509_REQ_PRINT_EX, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+    return (0);
+}
+
+int X509_REQ_print(BIO *bp, X509_REQ *x)
+{
+    return X509_REQ_print_ex(bp, x, XN_FLAG_COMPAT, X509_FLAG_COMPAT);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/t_x509.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/t_x509.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c7ced67
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/t_x509.c
@@ -0,0 +1,376 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include "internal/asn1_int.h"
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+int X509_print_fp(FILE *fp, X509 *x)
+{
+    return X509_print_ex_fp(fp, x, XN_FLAG_COMPAT, X509_FLAG_COMPAT);
+}
+
+int X509_print_ex_fp(FILE *fp, X509 *x, unsigned long nmflag,
+                     unsigned long cflag)
+{
+    BIO *b;
+    int ret;
+
+    if ((b = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL) {
+        X509err(X509_F_X509_PRINT_EX_FP, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+        return (0);
+    }
+    BIO_set_fp(b, fp, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+    ret = X509_print_ex(b, x, nmflag, cflag);
+    BIO_free(b);
+    return (ret);
+}
+#endif
+
+int X509_print(BIO *bp, X509 *x)
+{
+    return X509_print_ex(bp, x, XN_FLAG_COMPAT, X509_FLAG_COMPAT);
+}
+
+int X509_print_ex(BIO *bp, X509 *x, unsigned long nmflags,
+                  unsigned long cflag)
+{
+    long l;
+    int ret = 0, i;
+    char *m = NULL, mlch = ' ';
+    int nmindent = 0;
+    ASN1_INTEGER *bs;
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+    const char *neg;
+
+    if ((nmflags & XN_FLAG_SEP_MASK) == XN_FLAG_SEP_MULTILINE) {
+        mlch = '\n';
+        nmindent = 12;
+    }
+
+    if (nmflags == X509_FLAG_COMPAT)
+        nmindent = 16;
+
+    if (!(cflag & X509_FLAG_NO_HEADER)) {
+        if (BIO_write(bp, "Certificate:\n", 13) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+        if (BIO_write(bp, "    Data:\n", 10) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+    }
+    if (!(cflag & X509_FLAG_NO_VERSION)) {
+        l = X509_get_version(x);
+        if (l >= 0 && l <= 2) {
+            if (BIO_printf(bp, "%8sVersion: %ld (0x%lx)\n", "", l + 1, (unsigned long)l) <= 0)
+                goto err;
+        } else {
+            if (BIO_printf(bp, "%8sVersion: Unknown (%ld)\n", "", l) <= 0)
+                goto err;
+        }
+    }
+    if (!(cflag & X509_FLAG_NO_SERIAL)) {
+
+        if (BIO_write(bp, "        Serial Number:", 22) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+
+        bs = X509_get_serialNumber(x);
+        if (bs->length <= (int)sizeof(long)) {
+                ERR_set_mark();
+                l = ASN1_INTEGER_get(bs);
+                ERR_pop_to_mark();
+        } else {
+            l = -1;
+        }
+        if (l != -1) {
+            unsigned long ul;
+            if (bs->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER) {
+                ul = 0 - (unsigned long)l;
+                neg = "-";
+            } else {
+                ul = l;
+                neg = "";
+            }
+            if (BIO_printf(bp, " %s%lu (%s0x%lx)\n", neg, ul, neg, ul) <= 0)
+                goto err;
+        } else {
+            neg = (bs->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER) ? " (Negative)" : "";
+            if (BIO_printf(bp, "\n%12s%s", "", neg) <= 0)
+                goto err;
+
+            for (i = 0; i < bs->length; i++) {
+                if (BIO_printf(bp, "%02x%c", bs->data[i],
+                               ((i + 1 == bs->length) ? '\n' : ':')) <= 0)
+                    goto err;
+            }
+        }
+
+    }
+
+    if (!(cflag & X509_FLAG_NO_SIGNAME)) {
+        const X509_ALGOR *tsig_alg = X509_get0_tbs_sigalg(x);
+        if (X509_signature_print(bp, tsig_alg, NULL) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!(cflag & X509_FLAG_NO_ISSUER)) {
+        if (BIO_printf(bp, "        Issuer:%c", mlch) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+        if (X509_NAME_print_ex(bp, X509_get_issuer_name(x), nmindent, nmflags)
+            < 0)
+            goto err;
+        if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+    }
+    if (!(cflag & X509_FLAG_NO_VALIDITY)) {
+        if (BIO_write(bp, "        Validity\n", 17) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+        if (BIO_write(bp, "            Not Before: ", 24) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+        if (!ASN1_TIME_print(bp, X509_get0_notBefore(x)))
+            goto err;
+        if (BIO_write(bp, "\n            Not After : ", 25) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+        if (!ASN1_TIME_print(bp, X509_get0_notAfter(x)))
+            goto err;
+        if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+    }
+    if (!(cflag & X509_FLAG_NO_SUBJECT)) {
+        if (BIO_printf(bp, "        Subject:%c", mlch) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+        if (X509_NAME_print_ex
+            (bp, X509_get_subject_name(x), nmindent, nmflags) < 0)
+            goto err;
+        if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+    }
+    if (!(cflag & X509_FLAG_NO_PUBKEY)) {
+        X509_PUBKEY *xpkey = X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(x);
+        ASN1_OBJECT *xpoid;
+        X509_PUBKEY_get0_param(&xpoid, NULL, NULL, NULL, xpkey);
+        if (BIO_write(bp, "        Subject Public Key Info:\n", 33) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+        if (BIO_printf(bp, "%12sPublic Key Algorithm: ", "") <= 0)
+            goto err;
+        if (i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, xpoid) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+        if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n") <= 0)
+            goto err;
+
+        pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
+        if (pkey == NULL) {
+            BIO_printf(bp, "%12sUnable to load Public Key\n", "");
+            ERR_print_errors(bp);
+        } else {
+            EVP_PKEY_print_public(bp, pkey, 16, NULL);
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (!(cflag & X509_FLAG_NO_IDS)) {
+        const ASN1_BIT_STRING *iuid, *suid;
+        X509_get0_uids(x, &iuid, &suid);
+        if (iuid != NULL) {
+            if (BIO_printf(bp, "%8sIssuer Unique ID: ", "") <= 0)
+                goto err;
+            if (!X509_signature_dump(bp, iuid, 12))
+                goto err;
+        }
+        if (suid != NULL) {
+            if (BIO_printf(bp, "%8sSubject Unique ID: ", "") <= 0)
+                goto err;
+            if (!X509_signature_dump(bp, suid, 12))
+                goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (!(cflag & X509_FLAG_NO_EXTENSIONS))
+        X509V3_extensions_print(bp, "X509v3 extensions",
+                                X509_get0_extensions(x), cflag, 8);
+
+    if (!(cflag & X509_FLAG_NO_SIGDUMP)) {
+        const X509_ALGOR *sig_alg;
+        const ASN1_BIT_STRING *sig;
+        X509_get0_signature(&sig, &sig_alg, x);
+        if (X509_signature_print(bp, sig_alg, sig) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+    }
+    if (!(cflag & X509_FLAG_NO_AUX)) {
+        if (!X509_aux_print(bp, x, 0))
+            goto err;
+    }
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_free(m);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+int X509_ocspid_print(BIO *bp, X509 *x)
+{
+    unsigned char *der = NULL;
+    unsigned char *dertmp;
+    int derlen;
+    int i;
+    unsigned char SHA1md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+    ASN1_BIT_STRING *keybstr;
+    X509_NAME *subj;
+
+    /*
+     * display the hash of the subject as it would appear in OCSP requests
+     */
+    if (BIO_printf(bp, "        Subject OCSP hash: ") <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    subj = X509_get_subject_name(x);
+    derlen = i2d_X509_NAME(subj, NULL);
+    if ((der = dertmp = OPENSSL_malloc(derlen)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    i2d_X509_NAME(subj, &dertmp);
+
+    if (!EVP_Digest(der, derlen, SHA1md, NULL, EVP_sha1(), NULL))
+        goto err;
+    for (i = 0; i < SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++) {
+        if (BIO_printf(bp, "%02X", SHA1md[i]) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+    }
+    OPENSSL_free(der);
+    der = NULL;
+
+    /*
+     * display the hash of the public key as it would appear in OCSP requests
+     */
+    if (BIO_printf(bp, "\n        Public key OCSP hash: ") <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    keybstr = X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(x);
+
+    if (keybstr == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!EVP_Digest(ASN1_STRING_get0_data(keybstr),
+                    ASN1_STRING_length(keybstr), SHA1md, NULL, EVP_sha1(),
+                    NULL))
+        goto err;
+    for (i = 0; i < SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++) {
+        if (BIO_printf(bp, "%02X", SHA1md[i]) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+    }
+    BIO_printf(bp, "\n");
+
+    return (1);
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_free(der);
+    return (0);
+}
+
+int X509_signature_dump(BIO *bp, const ASN1_STRING *sig, int indent)
+{
+    const unsigned char *s;
+    int i, n;
+
+    n = sig->length;
+    s = sig->data;
+    for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+        if ((i % 18) == 0) {
+            if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) <= 0)
+                return 0;
+            if (BIO_indent(bp, indent, indent) <= 0)
+                return 0;
+        }
+        if (BIO_printf(bp, "%02x%s", s[i], ((i + 1) == n) ? "" : ":") <= 0)
+            return 0;
+    }
+    if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) != 1)
+        return 0;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int X509_signature_print(BIO *bp, const X509_ALGOR *sigalg,
+                         const ASN1_STRING *sig)
+{
+    int sig_nid;
+    if (BIO_puts(bp, "    Signature Algorithm: ") <= 0)
+        return 0;
+    if (i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, sigalg->algorithm) <= 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    sig_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(sigalg->algorithm);
+    if (sig_nid != NID_undef) {
+        int pkey_nid, dig_nid;
+        const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth;
+        if (OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &dig_nid, &pkey_nid)) {
+            ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find(NULL, pkey_nid);
+            if (ameth && ameth->sig_print)
+                return ameth->sig_print(bp, sigalg, sig, 9, 0);
+        }
+    }
+    if (sig)
+        return X509_signature_dump(bp, sig, 9);
+    else if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n") <= 0)
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int X509_aux_print(BIO *out, X509 *x, int indent)
+{
+    char oidstr[80], first;
+    STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *trust, *reject;
+    const unsigned char *alias, *keyid;
+    int keyidlen;
+    int i;
+    if (X509_trusted(x) == 0)
+        return 1;
+    trust = X509_get0_trust_objects(x);
+    reject = X509_get0_reject_objects(x);
+    if (trust) {
+        first = 1;
+        BIO_printf(out, "%*sTrusted Uses:\n%*s", indent, "", indent + 2, "");
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(trust); i++) {
+            if (!first)
+                BIO_puts(out, ", ");
+            else
+                first = 0;
+            OBJ_obj2txt(oidstr, sizeof(oidstr),
+                        sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(trust, i), 0);
+            BIO_puts(out, oidstr);
+        }
+        BIO_puts(out, "\n");
+    } else
+        BIO_printf(out, "%*sNo Trusted Uses.\n", indent, "");
+    if (reject) {
+        first = 1;
+        BIO_printf(out, "%*sRejected Uses:\n%*s", indent, "", indent + 2, "");
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(reject); i++) {
+            if (!first)
+                BIO_puts(out, ", ");
+            else
+                first = 0;
+            OBJ_obj2txt(oidstr, sizeof(oidstr),
+                        sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(reject, i), 0);
+            BIO_puts(out, oidstr);
+        }
+        BIO_puts(out, "\n");
+    } else
+        BIO_printf(out, "%*sNo Rejected Uses.\n", indent, "");
+    alias = X509_alias_get0(x, NULL);
+    if (alias)
+        BIO_printf(out, "%*sAlias: %s\n", indent, "", alias);
+    keyid = X509_keyid_get0(x, &keyidlen);
+    if (keyid) {
+        BIO_printf(out, "%*sKey Id: ", indent, "");
+        for (i = 0; i < keyidlen; i++)
+            BIO_printf(out, "%s%02X", i ? ":" : "", keyid[i]);
+        BIO_write(out, "\n", 1);
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x509_att.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x509_att.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..836bca5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x509_att.c
@@ -0,0 +1,329 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/stack.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include "x509_lcl.h"
+
+int X509at_get_attr_count(const STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *x)
+{
+    return sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_num(x);
+}
+
+int X509at_get_attr_by_NID(const STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *x, int nid,
+                           int lastpos)
+{
+    const ASN1_OBJECT *obj = OBJ_nid2obj(nid);
+
+    if (obj == NULL)
+        return (-2);
+    return (X509at_get_attr_by_OBJ(x, obj, lastpos));
+}
+
+int X509at_get_attr_by_OBJ(const STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *sk,
+                           const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int lastpos)
+{
+    int n;
+    X509_ATTRIBUTE *ex;
+
+    if (sk == NULL)
+        return (-1);
+    lastpos++;
+    if (lastpos < 0)
+        lastpos = 0;
+    n = sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_num(sk);
+    for (; lastpos < n; lastpos++) {
+        ex = sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_value(sk, lastpos);
+        if (OBJ_cmp(ex->object, obj) == 0)
+            return (lastpos);
+    }
+    return (-1);
+}
+
+X509_ATTRIBUTE *X509at_get_attr(const STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *x, int loc)
+{
+    if (x == NULL || sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_num(x) <= loc || loc < 0)
+        return NULL;
+    else
+        return sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_value(x, loc);
+}
+
+X509_ATTRIBUTE *X509at_delete_attr(STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *x, int loc)
+{
+    X509_ATTRIBUTE *ret;
+
+    if (x == NULL || sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_num(x) <= loc || loc < 0)
+        return (NULL);
+    ret = sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_delete(x, loc);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *X509at_add1_attr(STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) **x,
+                                           X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr)
+{
+    X509_ATTRIBUTE *new_attr = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *sk = NULL;
+
+    if (x == NULL) {
+        X509err(X509_F_X509AT_ADD1_ATTR, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+        goto err2;
+    }
+
+    if (*x == NULL) {
+        if ((sk = sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_new_null()) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+    } else
+        sk = *x;
+
+    if ((new_attr = X509_ATTRIBUTE_dup(attr)) == NULL)
+        goto err2;
+    if (!sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_push(sk, new_attr))
+        goto err;
+    if (*x == NULL)
+        *x = sk;
+    return (sk);
+ err:
+    X509err(X509_F_X509AT_ADD1_ATTR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ err2:
+    X509_ATTRIBUTE_free(new_attr);
+    sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_free(sk);
+    return (NULL);
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *X509at_add1_attr_by_OBJ(STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
+                                                  **x, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj,
+                                                  int type,
+                                                  const unsigned char *bytes,
+                                                  int len)
+{
+    X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr;
+    STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *ret;
+    attr = X509_ATTRIBUTE_create_by_OBJ(NULL, obj, type, bytes, len);
+    if (!attr)
+        return 0;
+    ret = X509at_add1_attr(x, attr);
+    X509_ATTRIBUTE_free(attr);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *X509at_add1_attr_by_NID(STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
+                                                  **x, int nid, int type,
+                                                  const unsigned char *bytes,
+                                                  int len)
+{
+    X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr;
+    STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *ret;
+    attr = X509_ATTRIBUTE_create_by_NID(NULL, nid, type, bytes, len);
+    if (!attr)
+        return 0;
+    ret = X509at_add1_attr(x, attr);
+    X509_ATTRIBUTE_free(attr);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *X509at_add1_attr_by_txt(STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
+                                                  **x, const char *attrname,
+                                                  int type,
+                                                  const unsigned char *bytes,
+                                                  int len)
+{
+    X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr;
+    STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *ret;
+    attr = X509_ATTRIBUTE_create_by_txt(NULL, attrname, type, bytes, len);
+    if (!attr)
+        return 0;
+    ret = X509at_add1_attr(x, attr);
+    X509_ATTRIBUTE_free(attr);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+void *X509at_get0_data_by_OBJ(STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *x,
+                              const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int lastpos, int type)
+{
+    int i;
+    X509_ATTRIBUTE *at;
+    i = X509at_get_attr_by_OBJ(x, obj, lastpos);
+    if (i == -1)
+        return NULL;
+    if ((lastpos <= -2) && (X509at_get_attr_by_OBJ(x, obj, i) != -1))
+        return NULL;
+    at = X509at_get_attr(x, i);
+    if (lastpos <= -3 && (X509_ATTRIBUTE_count(at) != 1))
+        return NULL;
+    return X509_ATTRIBUTE_get0_data(at, 0, type, NULL);
+}
+
+X509_ATTRIBUTE *X509_ATTRIBUTE_create_by_NID(X509_ATTRIBUTE **attr, int nid,
+                                             int atrtype, const void *data,
+                                             int len)
+{
+    ASN1_OBJECT *obj;
+    X509_ATTRIBUTE *ret;
+
+    obj = OBJ_nid2obj(nid);
+    if (obj == NULL) {
+        X509err(X509_F_X509_ATTRIBUTE_CREATE_BY_NID, X509_R_UNKNOWN_NID);
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+    ret = X509_ATTRIBUTE_create_by_OBJ(attr, obj, atrtype, data, len);
+    if (ret == NULL)
+        ASN1_OBJECT_free(obj);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+X509_ATTRIBUTE *X509_ATTRIBUTE_create_by_OBJ(X509_ATTRIBUTE **attr,
+                                             const ASN1_OBJECT *obj,
+                                             int atrtype, const void *data,
+                                             int len)
+{
+    X509_ATTRIBUTE *ret;
+
+    if ((attr == NULL) || (*attr == NULL)) {
+        if ((ret = X509_ATTRIBUTE_new()) == NULL) {
+            X509err(X509_F_X509_ATTRIBUTE_CREATE_BY_OBJ,
+                    ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            return (NULL);
+        }
+    } else
+        ret = *attr;
+
+    if (!X509_ATTRIBUTE_set1_object(ret, obj))
+        goto err;
+    if (!X509_ATTRIBUTE_set1_data(ret, atrtype, data, len))
+        goto err;
+
+    if ((attr != NULL) && (*attr == NULL))
+        *attr = ret;
+    return (ret);
+ err:
+    if ((attr == NULL) || (ret != *attr))
+        X509_ATTRIBUTE_free(ret);
+    return (NULL);
+}
+
+X509_ATTRIBUTE *X509_ATTRIBUTE_create_by_txt(X509_ATTRIBUTE **attr,
+                                             const char *atrname, int type,
+                                             const unsigned char *bytes,
+                                             int len)
+{
+    ASN1_OBJECT *obj;
+    X509_ATTRIBUTE *nattr;
+
+    obj = OBJ_txt2obj(atrname, 0);
+    if (obj == NULL) {
+        X509err(X509_F_X509_ATTRIBUTE_CREATE_BY_TXT,
+                X509_R_INVALID_FIELD_NAME);
+        ERR_add_error_data(2, "name=", atrname);
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+    nattr = X509_ATTRIBUTE_create_by_OBJ(attr, obj, type, bytes, len);
+    ASN1_OBJECT_free(obj);
+    return nattr;
+}
+
+int X509_ATTRIBUTE_set1_object(X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj)
+{
+    if ((attr == NULL) || (obj == NULL))
+        return (0);
+    ASN1_OBJECT_free(attr->object);
+    attr->object = OBJ_dup(obj);
+    return attr->object != NULL;
+}
+
+int X509_ATTRIBUTE_set1_data(X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr, int attrtype,
+                             const void *data, int len)
+{
+    ASN1_TYPE *ttmp = NULL;
+    ASN1_STRING *stmp = NULL;
+    int atype = 0;
+    if (!attr)
+        return 0;
+    if (attrtype & MBSTRING_FLAG) {
+        stmp = ASN1_STRING_set_by_NID(NULL, data, len, attrtype,
+                                      OBJ_obj2nid(attr->object));
+        if (!stmp) {
+            X509err(X509_F_X509_ATTRIBUTE_SET1_DATA, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        atype = stmp->type;
+    } else if (len != -1) {
+        if ((stmp = ASN1_STRING_type_new(attrtype)) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        if (!ASN1_STRING_set(stmp, data, len))
+            goto err;
+        atype = attrtype;
+    }
+    /*
+     * This is a bit naughty because the attribute should really have at
+     * least one value but some types use and zero length SET and require
+     * this.
+     */
+    if (attrtype == 0) {
+        ASN1_STRING_free(stmp);
+        return 1;
+    }
+    if ((ttmp = ASN1_TYPE_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if ((len == -1) && !(attrtype & MBSTRING_FLAG)) {
+        if (!ASN1_TYPE_set1(ttmp, attrtype, data))
+            goto err;
+    } else {
+        ASN1_TYPE_set(ttmp, atype, stmp);
+        stmp = NULL;
+    }
+    if (!sk_ASN1_TYPE_push(attr->set, ttmp))
+        goto err;
+    return 1;
+ err:
+    X509err(X509_F_X509_ATTRIBUTE_SET1_DATA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    ASN1_TYPE_free(ttmp);
+    ASN1_STRING_free(stmp);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int X509_ATTRIBUTE_count(const X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr)
+{
+    if (attr == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    return sk_ASN1_TYPE_num(attr->set);
+}
+
+ASN1_OBJECT *X509_ATTRIBUTE_get0_object(X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr)
+{
+    if (attr == NULL)
+        return (NULL);
+    return (attr->object);
+}
+
+void *X509_ATTRIBUTE_get0_data(X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr, int idx,
+                               int atrtype, void *data)
+{
+    ASN1_TYPE *ttmp;
+    ttmp = X509_ATTRIBUTE_get0_type(attr, idx);
+    if (!ttmp)
+        return NULL;
+    if (atrtype != ASN1_TYPE_get(ttmp)) {
+        X509err(X509_F_X509_ATTRIBUTE_GET0_DATA, X509_R_WRONG_TYPE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    return ttmp->value.ptr;
+}
+
+ASN1_TYPE *X509_ATTRIBUTE_get0_type(X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr, int idx)
+{
+    if (attr == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    return sk_ASN1_TYPE_value(attr->set, idx);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0105635
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c
@@ -0,0 +1,459 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include "internal/x509_int.h"
+
+int X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
+{
+    int i;
+    const X509_CINF *ai, *bi;
+
+    ai = &a->cert_info;
+    bi = &b->cert_info;
+    i = ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(&ai->serialNumber, &bi->serialNumber);
+    if (i)
+        return (i);
+    return (X509_NAME_cmp(ai->issuer, bi->issuer));
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a)
+{
+    unsigned long ret = 0;
+    EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+    unsigned char md[16];
+    char *f;
+
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    f = X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info.issuer, NULL, 0);
+    if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL))
+        goto err;
+    if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, (unsigned char *)f, strlen(f)))
+        goto err;
+    OPENSSL_free(f);
+    if (!EVP_DigestUpdate
+        (ctx, (unsigned char *)a->cert_info.serialNumber.data,
+         (unsigned long)a->cert_info.serialNumber.length))
+        goto err;
+    if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, &(md[0]), NULL))
+        goto err;
+    ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
+           ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
+        ) & 0xffffffffL;
+ err:
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
+    return (ret);
+}
+#endif
+
+int X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
+{
+    return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info.issuer, b->cert_info.issuer));
+}
+
+int X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
+{
+    return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info.subject, b->cert_info.subject));
+}
+
+int X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
+{
+    return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl.issuer, b->crl.issuer));
+}
+
+int X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
+{
+    return memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, 20);
+}
+
+X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(const X509 *a)
+{
+    return (a->cert_info.issuer);
+}
+
+unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *x)
+{
+    return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info.issuer));
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
+{
+    return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info.issuer));
+}
+#endif
+
+X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(const X509 *a)
+{
+    return (a->cert_info.subject);
+}
+
+ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *a)
+{
+    return &a->cert_info.serialNumber;
+}
+
+const ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get0_serialNumber(const X509 *a)
+{
+    return &a->cert_info.serialNumber;
+}
+
+unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x)
+{
+    return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info.subject));
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
+{
+    return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info.subject));
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Compare two certificates: they must be identical for this to work. NB:
+ * Although "cmp" operations are generally prototyped to take "const"
+ * arguments (eg. for use in STACKs), the way X509 handling is - these
+ * operations may involve ensuring the hashes are up-to-date and ensuring
+ * certain cert information is cached. So this is the point where the
+ * "depth-first" constification tree has to halt with an evil cast.
+ */
+int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
+{
+    int rv;
+    /* ensure hash is valid */
+    X509_check_purpose((X509 *)a, -1, 0);
+    X509_check_purpose((X509 *)b, -1, 0);
+
+    rv = memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+    if (rv)
+        return rv;
+    /* Check for match against stored encoding too */
+    if (!a->cert_info.enc.modified && !b->cert_info.enc.modified) {
+        if (a->cert_info.enc.len < b->cert_info.enc.len)
+            return -1;
+        if (a->cert_info.enc.len > b->cert_info.enc.len)
+            return 1;
+        return memcmp(a->cert_info.enc.enc, b->cert_info.enc.enc,
+                      a->cert_info.enc.len);
+    }
+    return rv;
+}
+
+int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b)
+{
+    int ret;
+
+    /* Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date */
+
+    if (!a->canon_enc || a->modified) {
+        ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)a, NULL);
+        if (ret < 0)
+            return -2;
+    }
+
+    if (!b->canon_enc || b->modified) {
+        ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)b, NULL);
+        if (ret < 0)
+            return -2;
+    }
+
+    ret = a->canon_enclen - b->canon_enclen;
+
+    if (ret)
+        return ret;
+
+    return memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen);
+
+}
+
+unsigned long X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x)
+{
+    unsigned long ret = 0;
+    unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+
+    /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
+    i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL);
+    if (!EVP_Digest(x->canon_enc, x->canon_enclen, md, NULL, EVP_sha1(),
+                    NULL))
+        return 0;
+
+    ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
+           ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
+        ) & 0xffffffffL;
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+/*
+ * I now DER encode the name and hash it.  Since I cache the DER encoding,
+ * this is reasonably efficient.
+ */
+
+unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME *x)
+{
+    EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+    unsigned long ret = 0;
+    unsigned char md[16];
+
+    if (md_ctx == NULL)
+        return ret;
+
+    /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
+    i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL);
+    EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
+    if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(md_ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL)
+        && EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length)
+        && EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL))
+        ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
+               ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
+            ) & 0xffffffffL;
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
+
+    return (ret);
+}
+#endif
+
+/* Search a stack of X509 for a match */
+X509 *X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name,
+                                     ASN1_INTEGER *serial)
+{
+    int i;
+    X509 x, *x509 = NULL;
+
+    if (!sk)
+        return NULL;
+
+    x.cert_info.serialNumber = *serial;
+    x.cert_info.issuer = name;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
+        x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
+        if (X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(x509, &x) == 0)
+            return (x509);
+    }
+    return (NULL);
+}
+
+X509 *X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name)
+{
+    X509 *x509;
+    int i;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
+        x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
+        if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x509), name) == 0)
+            return (x509);
+    }
+    return (NULL);
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY *X509_get0_pubkey(const X509 *x)
+{
+    if (x == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    return X509_PUBKEY_get0(x->cert_info.key);
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x)
+{
+    if (x == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    return X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info.key);
+}
+
+int X509_check_private_key(const X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *k)
+{
+    const EVP_PKEY *xk;
+    int ret;
+
+    xk = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
+
+    if (xk)
+        ret = EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk, k);
+    else
+        ret = -2;
+
+    switch (ret) {
+    case 1:
+        break;
+    case 0:
+        X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH);
+        break;
+    case -1:
+        X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH);
+        break;
+    case -2:
+        X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE);
+    }
+    if (ret > 0)
+        return 1;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check a suite B algorithm is permitted: pass in a public key and the NID
+ * of its signature (or 0 if no signature). The pflags is a pointer to a
+ * flags field which must contain the suite B verification flags.
+ */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+
+static int check_suite_b(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int sign_nid, unsigned long *pflags)
+{
+    const EC_GROUP *grp = NULL;
+    int curve_nid;
+    if (pkey && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC)
+        grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
+    if (!grp)
+        return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM;
+    curve_nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
+    /* Check curve is consistent with LOS */
+    if (curve_nid == NID_secp384r1) { /* P-384 */
+        /*
+         * Check signature algorithm is consistent with curve.
+         */
+        if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384)
+            return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
+        if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS))
+            return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED;
+        /* If we encounter P-384 we cannot use P-256 later */
+        *pflags &= ~X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY;
+    } else if (curve_nid == NID_X9_62_prime256v1) { /* P-256 */
+        if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
+            return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
+        if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY))
+            return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED;
+    } else
+        return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE;
+
+    return X509_V_OK;
+}
+
+int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
+                            unsigned long flags)
+{
+    int rv, i, sign_nid;
+    EVP_PKEY *pk;
+    unsigned long tflags = flags;
+
+    if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS))
+        return X509_V_OK;
+
+    /* If no EE certificate passed in must be first in chain */
+    if (x == NULL) {
+        x = sk_X509_value(chain, 0);
+        i = 1;
+    } else
+        i = 0;
+
+    pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
+
+    /*
+     * With DANE-EE(3) success, or DANE-EE(3)/PKIX-EE(1) failure we don't build
+     * a chain all, just report trust success or failure, but must also report
+     * Suite-B errors if applicable.  This is indicated via a NULL chain
+     * pointer.  All we need to do is check the leaf key algorithm.
+     */
+    if (chain == NULL)
+        return check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags);
+
+    if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) {
+        rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION;
+        /* Correct error depth */
+        i = 0;
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    /* Check EE key only */
+    rv = check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags);
+    if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
+        /* Correct error depth */
+        i = 0;
+        goto end;
+    }
+    for (; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
+        sign_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
+        x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
+        if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) {
+            rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION;
+            goto end;
+        }
+        pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
+        rv = check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &tflags);
+        if (rv != X509_V_OK)
+            goto end;
+    }
+
+    /* Final check: root CA signature */
+    rv = check_suite_b(pk, X509_get_signature_nid(x), &tflags);
+ end:
+    if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
+        /* Invalid signature or LOS errors are for previous cert */
+        if ((rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
+             || rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED) && i)
+            i--;
+        /*
+         * If we have LOS error and flags changed then we are signing P-384
+         * with P-256. Use more meaningful error.
+         */
+        if (rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED && flags != tflags)
+            rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256;
+        if (perror_depth)
+            *perror_depth = i;
+    }
+    return rv;
+}
+
+int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags)
+{
+    int sign_nid;
+    if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS))
+        return X509_V_OK;
+    sign_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(crl->crl.sig_alg.algorithm);
+    return check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &flags);
+}
+
+#else
+int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
+                            unsigned long flags)
+{
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags)
+{
+    return 0;
+}
+
+#endif
+/*
+ * Not strictly speaking an "up_ref" as a STACK doesn't have a reference
+ * count but it has the same effect by duping the STACK and upping the ref of
+ * each X509 structure.
+ */
+STACK_OF(X509) *X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
+{
+    STACK_OF(X509) *ret;
+    int i;
+    ret = sk_X509_dup(chain);
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ret); i++) {
+        X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ret, i);
+        X509_up_ref(x);
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x509_d2.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x509_d2.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cb03dbf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x509_d2.c
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+int X509_STORE_set_default_paths(X509_STORE *ctx)
+{
+    X509_LOOKUP *lookup;
+
+    lookup = X509_STORE_add_lookup(ctx, X509_LOOKUP_file());
+    if (lookup == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    X509_LOOKUP_load_file(lookup, NULL, X509_FILETYPE_DEFAULT);
+
+    lookup = X509_STORE_add_lookup(ctx, X509_LOOKUP_hash_dir());
+    if (lookup == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    X509_LOOKUP_add_dir(lookup, NULL, X509_FILETYPE_DEFAULT);
+
+    /* clear any errors */
+    ERR_clear_error();
+
+    return (1);
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_load_locations(X509_STORE *ctx, const char *file,
+                              const char *path)
+{
+    X509_LOOKUP *lookup;
+
+    if (file != NULL) {
+        lookup = X509_STORE_add_lookup(ctx, X509_LOOKUP_file());
+        if (lookup == NULL)
+            return (0);
+        if (X509_LOOKUP_load_file(lookup, file, X509_FILETYPE_PEM) != 1)
+            return (0);
+    }
+    if (path != NULL) {
+        lookup = X509_STORE_add_lookup(ctx, X509_LOOKUP_hash_dir());
+        if (lookup == NULL)
+            return (0);
+        if (X509_LOOKUP_add_dir(lookup, path, X509_FILETYPE_PEM) != 1)
+            return (0);
+    }
+    if ((path == NULL) && (file == NULL))
+        return (0);
+    return (1);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x509_def.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x509_def.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d11358e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x509_def.c
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+const char *X509_get_default_private_dir(void)
+{
+    return (X509_PRIVATE_DIR);
+}
+
+const char *X509_get_default_cert_area(void)
+{
+    return (X509_CERT_AREA);
+}
+
+const char *X509_get_default_cert_dir(void)
+{
+    return (X509_CERT_DIR);
+}
+
+const char *X509_get_default_cert_file(void)
+{
+    return (X509_CERT_FILE);
+}
+
+const char *X509_get_default_cert_dir_env(void)
+{
+    return (X509_CERT_DIR_EVP);
+}
+
+const char *X509_get_default_cert_file_env(void)
+{
+    return (X509_CERT_FILE_EVP);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x509_err.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x509_err.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3f4b8ef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x509_err.c
@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+/*
+ * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+
+# define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509,func,0)
+# define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509,0,reason)
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA X509_str_functs[] = {
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_ADD_CERT_DIR), "add_cert_dir"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN), "build_chain"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_BY_FILE_CTRL), "by_file_ctrl"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_CHECK_NAME_CONSTRAINTS), "check_name_constraints"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY), "check_policy"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_DANE_I2D), "dane_i2d"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_DIR_CTRL), "dir_ctrl"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_GET_CERT_BY_SUBJECT), "get_cert_by_subject"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_NETSCAPE_SPKI_B64_DECODE), "NETSCAPE_SPKI_b64_decode"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_NETSCAPE_SPKI_B64_ENCODE), "NETSCAPE_SPKI_b64_encode"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509AT_ADD1_ATTR), "X509at_add1_attr"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509V3_ADD_EXT), "X509v3_add_ext"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_ATTRIBUTE_CREATE_BY_NID),
+     "X509_ATTRIBUTE_create_by_NID"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_ATTRIBUTE_CREATE_BY_OBJ),
+     "X509_ATTRIBUTE_create_by_OBJ"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_ATTRIBUTE_CREATE_BY_TXT),
+     "X509_ATTRIBUTE_create_by_txt"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_ATTRIBUTE_GET0_DATA), "X509_ATTRIBUTE_get0_data"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_ATTRIBUTE_SET1_DATA), "X509_ATTRIBUTE_set1_data"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY), "X509_check_private_key"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF), "X509_CRL_diff"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_CRL_PRINT_FP), "X509_CRL_print_fp"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_EXTENSION_CREATE_BY_NID),
+     "X509_EXTENSION_create_by_NID"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_EXTENSION_CREATE_BY_OBJ),
+     "X509_EXTENSION_create_by_OBJ"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS),
+     "X509_get_pubkey_parameters"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_LOAD_CERT_CRL_FILE), "X509_load_cert_crl_file"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_LOAD_CERT_FILE), "X509_load_cert_file"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_LOAD_CRL_FILE), "X509_load_crl_file"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_NAME_ADD_ENTRY), "X509_NAME_add_entry"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_NAME_ENTRY_CREATE_BY_NID),
+     "X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_NID"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_NAME_ENTRY_CREATE_BY_TXT),
+     "X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_txt"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_NAME_ENTRY_SET_OBJECT),
+     "X509_NAME_ENTRY_set_object"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_NAME_ONELINE), "X509_NAME_oneline"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_NAME_PRINT), "X509_NAME_print"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_OBJECT_NEW), "X509_OBJECT_new"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_PRINT_EX_FP), "X509_print_ex_fp"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_PUBKEY_DECODE), "x509_pubkey_decode"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_PUBKEY_GET0), "X509_PUBKEY_get0"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_PUBKEY_SET), "X509_PUBKEY_set"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_REQ_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY),
+     "X509_REQ_check_private_key"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_REQ_PRINT_EX), "X509_REQ_print_ex"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_REQ_PRINT_FP), "X509_REQ_print_fp"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_REQ_TO_X509), "X509_REQ_to_X509"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_STORE_ADD_CERT), "X509_STORE_add_cert"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_STORE_ADD_CRL), "X509_STORE_add_crl"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_GET1_ISSUER),
+     "X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT), "X509_STORE_CTX_init"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW), "X509_STORE_CTX_new"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT),
+     "X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_TO_X509_REQ), "X509_to_X509_REQ"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_TRUST_ADD), "X509_TRUST_add"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_TRUST_SET), "X509_TRUST_set"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT), "X509_verify_cert"},
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA X509_str_reasons[] = {
+    {ERR_REASON(X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH), "akid mismatch"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509_R_BAD_SELECTOR), "bad selector"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509_R_BAD_X509_FILETYPE), "bad x509 filetype"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509_R_BASE64_DECODE_ERROR), "base64 decode error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509_R_CANT_CHECK_DH_KEY), "cant check dh key"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509_R_CERT_ALREADY_IN_HASH_TABLE),
+     "cert already in hash table"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA), "crl already delta"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE), "crl verify failure"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH), "idp mismatch"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509_R_INVALID_DIRECTORY), "invalid directory"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509_R_INVALID_FIELD_NAME), "invalid field name"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509_R_INVALID_TRUST), "invalid trust"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH), "issuer mismatch"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH), "key type mismatch"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH), "key values mismatch"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509_R_LOADING_CERT_DIR), "loading cert dir"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509_R_LOADING_DEFAULTS), "loading defaults"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509_R_METHOD_NOT_SUPPORTED), "method not supported"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509_R_NAME_TOO_LONG), "name too long"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER), "newer crl not newer"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY),
+     "no cert set for us to verify"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER), "no crl number"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509_R_PUBLIC_KEY_DECODE_ERROR), "public key decode error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509_R_PUBLIC_KEY_ENCODE_ERROR), "public key encode error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509_R_SHOULD_RETRY), "should retry"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN),
+     "unable to find parameters in chain"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY),
+     "unable to get certs public key"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE), "unknown key type"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509_R_UNKNOWN_NID), "unknown nid"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID), "unknown purpose id"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID), "unknown trust id"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM), "unsupported algorithm"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509_R_WRONG_LOOKUP_TYPE), "wrong lookup type"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509_R_WRONG_TYPE), "wrong type"},
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+
+#endif
+
+int ERR_load_X509_strings(void)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+
+    if (ERR_func_error_string(X509_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) {
+        ERR_load_strings(0, X509_str_functs);
+        ERR_load_strings(0, X509_str_reasons);
+    }
+#endif
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x509_ext.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x509_ext.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3c59079
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x509_ext.c
@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/stack.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include "internal/x509_int.h"
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+
+int X509_CRL_get_ext_count(const X509_CRL *x)
+{
+    return (X509v3_get_ext_count(x->crl.extensions));
+}
+
+int X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(const X509_CRL *x, int nid, int lastpos)
+{
+    return (X509v3_get_ext_by_NID(x->crl.extensions, nid, lastpos));
+}
+
+int X509_CRL_get_ext_by_OBJ(const X509_CRL *x, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj,
+                            int lastpos)
+{
+    return (X509v3_get_ext_by_OBJ(x->crl.extensions, obj, lastpos));
+}
+
+int X509_CRL_get_ext_by_critical(const X509_CRL *x, int crit, int lastpos)
+{
+    return (X509v3_get_ext_by_critical(x->crl.extensions, crit, lastpos));
+}
+
+X509_EXTENSION *X509_CRL_get_ext(const X509_CRL *x, int loc)
+{
+    return (X509v3_get_ext(x->crl.extensions, loc));
+}
+
+X509_EXTENSION *X509_CRL_delete_ext(X509_CRL *x, int loc)
+{
+    return (X509v3_delete_ext(x->crl.extensions, loc));
+}
+
+void *X509_CRL_get_ext_d2i(const X509_CRL *x, int nid, int *crit, int *idx)
+{
+    return X509V3_get_d2i(x->crl.extensions, nid, crit, idx);
+}
+
+int X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(X509_CRL *x, int nid, void *value, int crit,
+                          unsigned long flags)
+{
+    return X509V3_add1_i2d(&x->crl.extensions, nid, value, crit, flags);
+}
+
+int X509_CRL_add_ext(X509_CRL *x, X509_EXTENSION *ex, int loc)
+{
+    return (X509v3_add_ext(&(x->crl.extensions), ex, loc) != NULL);
+}
+
+int X509_get_ext_count(const X509 *x)
+{
+    return (X509v3_get_ext_count(x->cert_info.extensions));
+}
+
+int X509_get_ext_by_NID(const X509 *x, int nid, int lastpos)
+{
+    return (X509v3_get_ext_by_NID(x->cert_info.extensions, nid, lastpos));
+}
+
+int X509_get_ext_by_OBJ(const X509 *x, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int lastpos)
+{
+    return (X509v3_get_ext_by_OBJ(x->cert_info.extensions, obj, lastpos));
+}
+
+int X509_get_ext_by_critical(const X509 *x, int crit, int lastpos)
+{
+    return (X509v3_get_ext_by_critical
+            (x->cert_info.extensions, crit, lastpos));
+}
+
+X509_EXTENSION *X509_get_ext(const X509 *x, int loc)
+{
+    return (X509v3_get_ext(x->cert_info.extensions, loc));
+}
+
+X509_EXTENSION *X509_delete_ext(X509 *x, int loc)
+{
+    return (X509v3_delete_ext(x->cert_info.extensions, loc));
+}
+
+int X509_add_ext(X509 *x, X509_EXTENSION *ex, int loc)
+{
+    return (X509v3_add_ext(&(x->cert_info.extensions), ex, loc) != NULL);
+}
+
+void *X509_get_ext_d2i(const X509 *x, int nid, int *crit, int *idx)
+{
+    return X509V3_get_d2i(x->cert_info.extensions, nid, crit, idx);
+}
+
+int X509_add1_ext_i2d(X509 *x, int nid, void *value, int crit,
+                      unsigned long flags)
+{
+    return X509V3_add1_i2d(&x->cert_info.extensions, nid, value, crit,
+                           flags);
+}
+
+int X509_REVOKED_get_ext_count(const X509_REVOKED *x)
+{
+    return (X509v3_get_ext_count(x->extensions));
+}
+
+int X509_REVOKED_get_ext_by_NID(const X509_REVOKED *x, int nid, int lastpos)
+{
+    return (X509v3_get_ext_by_NID(x->extensions, nid, lastpos));
+}
+
+int X509_REVOKED_get_ext_by_OBJ(const X509_REVOKED *x, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj,
+                                int lastpos)
+{
+    return (X509v3_get_ext_by_OBJ(x->extensions, obj, lastpos));
+}
+
+int X509_REVOKED_get_ext_by_critical(const X509_REVOKED *x, int crit, int lastpos)
+{
+    return (X509v3_get_ext_by_critical(x->extensions, crit, lastpos));
+}
+
+X509_EXTENSION *X509_REVOKED_get_ext(const X509_REVOKED *x, int loc)
+{
+    return (X509v3_get_ext(x->extensions, loc));
+}
+
+X509_EXTENSION *X509_REVOKED_delete_ext(X509_REVOKED *x, int loc)
+{
+    return (X509v3_delete_ext(x->extensions, loc));
+}
+
+int X509_REVOKED_add_ext(X509_REVOKED *x, X509_EXTENSION *ex, int loc)
+{
+    return (X509v3_add_ext(&(x->extensions), ex, loc) != NULL);
+}
+
+void *X509_REVOKED_get_ext_d2i(const X509_REVOKED *x, int nid, int *crit, int *idx)
+{
+    return X509V3_get_d2i(x->extensions, nid, crit, idx);
+}
+
+int X509_REVOKED_add1_ext_i2d(X509_REVOKED *x, int nid, void *value, int crit,
+                              unsigned long flags)
+{
+    return X509V3_add1_i2d(&x->extensions, nid, value, crit, flags);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x509_lcl.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x509_lcl.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..40bd102
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x509_lcl.h
@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2014-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * This structure holds all parameters associated with a verify operation by
+ * including an X509_VERIFY_PARAM structure in related structures the
+ * parameters used can be customized
+ */
+
+struct X509_VERIFY_PARAM_st {
+    char *name;
+    time_t check_time;          /* Time to use */
+    uint32_t inh_flags;         /* Inheritance flags */
+    unsigned long flags;        /* Various verify flags */
+    int purpose;                /* purpose to check untrusted certificates */
+    int trust;                  /* trust setting to check */
+    int depth;                  /* Verify depth */
+    int auth_level;             /* Security level for chain verification */
+    STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *policies; /* Permissible policies */
+    /* Peer identity details */
+    STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *hosts; /* Set of acceptable names */
+    unsigned int hostflags;     /* Flags to control matching features */
+    char *peername;             /* Matching hostname in peer certificate */
+    char *email;                /* If not NULL email address to match */
+    size_t emaillen;
+    unsigned char *ip;          /* If not NULL IP address to match */
+    size_t iplen;               /* Length of IP address */
+};
+
+/* No error callback if depth < 0 */
+int x509_check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int depth);
+
+/* a sequence of these are used */
+struct x509_attributes_st {
+    ASN1_OBJECT *object;
+    STACK_OF(ASN1_TYPE) *set;
+};
+
+struct X509_extension_st {
+    ASN1_OBJECT *object;
+    ASN1_BOOLEAN critical;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING value;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Method to handle CRL access. In general a CRL could be very large (several
+ * Mb) and can consume large amounts of resources if stored in memory by
+ * multiple processes. This method allows general CRL operations to be
+ * redirected to more efficient callbacks: for example a CRL entry database.
+ */
+
+#define X509_CRL_METHOD_DYNAMIC         1
+
+struct x509_crl_method_st {
+    int flags;
+    int (*crl_init) (X509_CRL *crl);
+    int (*crl_free) (X509_CRL *crl);
+    int (*crl_lookup) (X509_CRL *crl, X509_REVOKED **ret,
+                       ASN1_INTEGER *ser, X509_NAME *issuer);
+    int (*crl_verify) (X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk);
+};
+
+struct x509_lookup_method_st {
+    const char *name;
+    int (*new_item) (X509_LOOKUP *ctx);
+    void (*free) (X509_LOOKUP *ctx);
+    int (*init) (X509_LOOKUP *ctx);
+    int (*shutdown) (X509_LOOKUP *ctx);
+    int (*ctrl) (X509_LOOKUP *ctx, int cmd, const char *argc, long argl,
+                 char **ret);
+    int (*get_by_subject) (X509_LOOKUP *ctx, X509_LOOKUP_TYPE type,
+                           X509_NAME *name, X509_OBJECT *ret);
+    int (*get_by_issuer_serial) (X509_LOOKUP *ctx, X509_LOOKUP_TYPE type,
+                                 X509_NAME *name, ASN1_INTEGER *serial,
+                                 X509_OBJECT *ret);
+    int (*get_by_fingerprint) (X509_LOOKUP *ctx, X509_LOOKUP_TYPE type,
+                               const unsigned char *bytes, int len,
+                               X509_OBJECT *ret);
+    int (*get_by_alias) (X509_LOOKUP *ctx, X509_LOOKUP_TYPE type,
+                         const char *str, int len, X509_OBJECT *ret);
+};
+
+/* This is the functions plus an instance of the local variables. */
+struct x509_lookup_st {
+    int init;                   /* have we been started */
+    int skip;                   /* don't use us. */
+    X509_LOOKUP_METHOD *method; /* the functions */
+    char *method_data;          /* method data */
+    X509_STORE *store_ctx;      /* who owns us */
+};
+
+/*
+ * This is used to hold everything.  It is used for all certificate
+ * validation.  Once we have a certificate chain, the 'verify' function is
+ * then called to actually check the cert chain.
+ */
+struct x509_store_st {
+    /* The following is a cache of trusted certs */
+    int cache;                  /* if true, stash any hits */
+    STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT) *objs; /* Cache of all objects */
+    /* These are external lookup methods */
+    STACK_OF(X509_LOOKUP) *get_cert_methods;
+    X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
+    /* Callbacks for various operations */
+    /* called to verify a certificate */
+    int (*verify) (X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+    /* error callback */
+    int (*verify_cb) (int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+    /* get issuers cert from ctx */
+    int (*get_issuer) (X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
+    /* check issued */
+    int (*check_issued) (X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
+    /* Check revocation status of chain */
+    int (*check_revocation) (X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+    /* retrieve CRL */
+    int (*get_crl) (X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **crl, X509 *x);
+    /* Check CRL validity */
+    int (*check_crl) (X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl);
+    /* Check certificate against CRL */
+    int (*cert_crl) (X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
+    /* Check policy status of the chain */
+    int (*check_policy) (X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+    STACK_OF(X509) *(*lookup_certs) (X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_NAME *nm);
+    STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *(*lookup_crls) (X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_NAME *nm);
+    int (*cleanup) (X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+    CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data;
+    int references;
+    CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock;
+};
+
+typedef struct lookup_dir_hashes_st BY_DIR_HASH;
+typedef struct lookup_dir_entry_st BY_DIR_ENTRY;
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(BY_DIR_HASH)
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(BY_DIR_ENTRY)
+typedef STACK_OF(X509_NAME_ENTRY) STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY;
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY)
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x509_lu.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x509_lu.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..90f2352
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x509_lu.c
@@ -0,0 +1,846 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/lhash.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include "internal/x509_int.h"
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include "x509_lcl.h"
+
+X509_LOOKUP *X509_LOOKUP_new(X509_LOOKUP_METHOD *method)
+{
+    X509_LOOKUP *ret;
+
+    ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
+    if (ret == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+
+    ret->method = method;
+    if ((method->new_item != NULL) && !method->new_item(ret)) {
+        OPENSSL_free(ret);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+void X509_LOOKUP_free(X509_LOOKUP *ctx)
+{
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        return;
+    if ((ctx->method != NULL) && (ctx->method->free != NULL))
+        (*ctx->method->free) (ctx);
+    OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_lock(X509_STORE *s)
+{
+    return CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(s->lock);
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_unlock(X509_STORE *s)
+{
+    return CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(s->lock);
+}
+
+int X509_LOOKUP_init(X509_LOOKUP *ctx)
+{
+    if (ctx->method == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    if (ctx->method->init != NULL)
+        return ctx->method->init(ctx);
+    else
+        return 1;
+}
+
+int X509_LOOKUP_shutdown(X509_LOOKUP *ctx)
+{
+    if (ctx->method == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    if (ctx->method->shutdown != NULL)
+        return ctx->method->shutdown(ctx);
+    else
+        return 1;
+}
+
+int X509_LOOKUP_ctrl(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, int cmd, const char *argc, long argl,
+                     char **ret)
+{
+    if (ctx->method == NULL)
+        return -1;
+    if (ctx->method->ctrl != NULL)
+        return ctx->method->ctrl(ctx, cmd, argc, argl, ret);
+    else
+        return 1;
+}
+
+int X509_LOOKUP_by_subject(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, X509_LOOKUP_TYPE type,
+                           X509_NAME *name, X509_OBJECT *ret)
+{
+    if ((ctx->method == NULL) || (ctx->method->get_by_subject == NULL))
+        return 0;
+    if (ctx->skip)
+        return 0;
+    return ctx->method->get_by_subject(ctx, type, name, ret);
+}
+
+int X509_LOOKUP_by_issuer_serial(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, X509_LOOKUP_TYPE type,
+                                 X509_NAME *name, ASN1_INTEGER *serial,
+                                 X509_OBJECT *ret)
+{
+    if ((ctx->method == NULL) || (ctx->method->get_by_issuer_serial == NULL))
+        return 0;
+    return ctx->method->get_by_issuer_serial(ctx, type, name, serial, ret);
+}
+
+int X509_LOOKUP_by_fingerprint(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, X509_LOOKUP_TYPE type,
+                               const unsigned char *bytes, int len,
+                               X509_OBJECT *ret)
+{
+    if ((ctx->method == NULL) || (ctx->method->get_by_fingerprint == NULL))
+        return 0;
+    return ctx->method->get_by_fingerprint(ctx, type, bytes, len, ret);
+}
+
+int X509_LOOKUP_by_alias(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, X509_LOOKUP_TYPE type,
+                         const char *str, int len, X509_OBJECT *ret)
+{
+    if ((ctx->method == NULL) || (ctx->method->get_by_alias == NULL))
+        return 0;
+    return ctx->method->get_by_alias(ctx, type, str, len, ret);
+}
+
+static int x509_object_cmp(const X509_OBJECT *const *a,
+                           const X509_OBJECT *const *b)
+{
+    int ret;
+
+    ret = ((*a)->type - (*b)->type);
+    if (ret)
+        return ret;
+    switch ((*a)->type) {
+    case X509_LU_X509:
+        ret = X509_subject_name_cmp((*a)->data.x509, (*b)->data.x509);
+        break;
+    case X509_LU_CRL:
+        ret = X509_CRL_cmp((*a)->data.crl, (*b)->data.crl);
+        break;
+    default:
+        /* abort(); */
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+X509_STORE *X509_STORE_new(void)
+{
+    X509_STORE *ret;
+
+    if ((ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret))) == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    if ((ret->objs = sk_X509_OBJECT_new(x509_object_cmp)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    ret->cache = 1;
+    if ((ret->get_cert_methods = sk_X509_LOOKUP_new_null()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if ((ret->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE, ret, &ret->ex_data))
+        goto err;
+
+    ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
+    if (ret->lock == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    ret->references = 1;
+    return ret;
+
+err:
+    X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ret->param);
+    sk_X509_OBJECT_free(ret->objs);
+    sk_X509_LOOKUP_free(ret->get_cert_methods);
+    OPENSSL_free(ret);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_free(X509_STORE *vfy)
+{
+    int i;
+    STACK_OF(X509_LOOKUP) *sk;
+    X509_LOOKUP *lu;
+
+    if (vfy == NULL)
+        return;
+
+    CRYPTO_atomic_add(&vfy->references, -1, &i, vfy->lock);
+    REF_PRINT_COUNT("X509_STORE", vfy);
+    if (i > 0)
+        return;
+    REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0);
+
+    sk = vfy->get_cert_methods;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_LOOKUP_num(sk); i++) {
+        lu = sk_X509_LOOKUP_value(sk, i);
+        X509_LOOKUP_shutdown(lu);
+        X509_LOOKUP_free(lu);
+    }
+    sk_X509_LOOKUP_free(sk);
+    sk_X509_OBJECT_pop_free(vfy->objs, X509_OBJECT_free);
+
+    CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE, vfy, &vfy->ex_data);
+    X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(vfy->param);
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(vfy->lock);
+    OPENSSL_free(vfy);
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_up_ref(X509_STORE *vfy)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    if (CRYPTO_atomic_add(&vfy->references, 1, &i, vfy->lock) <= 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    REF_PRINT_COUNT("X509_STORE", a);
+    REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 2);
+    return ((i > 1) ? 1 : 0);
+}
+
+X509_LOOKUP *X509_STORE_add_lookup(X509_STORE *v, X509_LOOKUP_METHOD *m)
+{
+    int i;
+    STACK_OF(X509_LOOKUP) *sk;
+    X509_LOOKUP *lu;
+
+    sk = v->get_cert_methods;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_LOOKUP_num(sk); i++) {
+        lu = sk_X509_LOOKUP_value(sk, i);
+        if (m == lu->method) {
+            return lu;
+        }
+    }
+    /* a new one */
+    lu = X509_LOOKUP_new(m);
+    if (lu == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    else {
+        lu->store_ctx = v;
+        if (sk_X509_LOOKUP_push(v->get_cert_methods, lu))
+            return lu;
+        else {
+            X509_LOOKUP_free(lu);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+X509_OBJECT *X509_STORE_CTX_get_obj_by_subject(X509_STORE_CTX *vs,
+                                               X509_LOOKUP_TYPE type,
+                                               X509_NAME *name)
+{
+    X509_OBJECT *ret = X509_OBJECT_new();
+
+    if (ret == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    if (!X509_STORE_CTX_get_by_subject(vs, type, name, ret)) {
+        X509_OBJECT_free(ret);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_CTX_get_by_subject(X509_STORE_CTX *vs, X509_LOOKUP_TYPE type,
+                                  X509_NAME *name, X509_OBJECT *ret)
+{
+    X509_STORE *ctx = vs->ctx;
+    X509_LOOKUP *lu;
+    X509_OBJECT stmp, *tmp;
+    int i, j;
+
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(ctx->lock);
+    tmp = X509_OBJECT_retrieve_by_subject(ctx->objs, type, name);
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ctx->lock);
+
+    if (tmp == NULL || type == X509_LU_CRL) {
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_LOOKUP_num(ctx->get_cert_methods); i++) {
+            lu = sk_X509_LOOKUP_value(ctx->get_cert_methods, i);
+            j = X509_LOOKUP_by_subject(lu, type, name, &stmp);
+            if (j) {
+                tmp = &stmp;
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+        if (tmp == NULL)
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    ret->type = tmp->type;
+    ret->data.ptr = tmp->data.ptr;
+
+    X509_OBJECT_up_ref_count(ret);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_add_cert(X509_STORE *ctx, X509 *x)
+{
+    X509_OBJECT *obj;
+    int ret = 1, added = 1;
+
+    if (x == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    obj = X509_OBJECT_new();
+    if (obj == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    obj->type = X509_LU_X509;
+    obj->data.x509 = x;
+    X509_OBJECT_up_ref_count(obj);
+
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(ctx->lock);
+
+    if (X509_OBJECT_retrieve_match(ctx->objs, obj)) {
+        X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_ADD_CERT,
+                X509_R_CERT_ALREADY_IN_HASH_TABLE);
+        ret = 0;
+    } else {
+        added = sk_X509_OBJECT_push(ctx->objs, obj);
+        ret = added != 0;
+    }
+
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ctx->lock);
+
+    if (!ret)                   /* obj not pushed */
+        X509_OBJECT_free(obj);
+    if (!added)                 /* on push failure */
+        X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_ADD_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_add_crl(X509_STORE *ctx, X509_CRL *x)
+{
+    X509_OBJECT *obj;
+    int ret = 1, added = 1;
+
+    if (x == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    obj = X509_OBJECT_new();
+    if (obj == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    obj->type = X509_LU_CRL;
+    obj->data.crl = x;
+    X509_OBJECT_up_ref_count(obj);
+
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(ctx->lock);
+
+    if (X509_OBJECT_retrieve_match(ctx->objs, obj)) {
+        X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_ADD_CRL, X509_R_CERT_ALREADY_IN_HASH_TABLE);
+        ret = 0;
+    } else {
+        added = sk_X509_OBJECT_push(ctx->objs, obj);
+        ret = added != 0;
+    }
+
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ctx->lock);
+
+    if (!ret)                   /* obj not pushed */
+        X509_OBJECT_free(obj);
+    if (!added)                 /* on push failure */
+        X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_ADD_CRL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int X509_OBJECT_up_ref_count(X509_OBJECT *a)
+{
+    switch (a->type) {
+    default:
+        break;
+    case X509_LU_X509:
+        return X509_up_ref(a->data.x509);
+    case X509_LU_CRL:
+        return X509_CRL_up_ref(a->data.crl);
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+X509 *X509_OBJECT_get0_X509(const X509_OBJECT *a)
+{
+    if (a == NULL || a->type != X509_LU_X509)
+        return NULL;
+    return a->data.x509;
+}
+
+X509_CRL *X509_OBJECT_get0_X509_CRL(X509_OBJECT *a)
+{
+    if (a == NULL || a->type != X509_LU_CRL)
+        return NULL;
+    return a->data.crl;
+}
+
+X509_LOOKUP_TYPE X509_OBJECT_get_type(const X509_OBJECT *a)
+{
+    return a->type;
+}
+
+X509_OBJECT *X509_OBJECT_new()
+{
+    X509_OBJECT *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
+
+    if (ret == NULL) {
+        X509err(X509_F_X509_OBJECT_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    ret->type = X509_LU_NONE;
+    return ret;
+}
+
+
+void X509_OBJECT_free(X509_OBJECT *a)
+{
+    if (a == NULL)
+        return;
+    switch (a->type) {
+    default:
+        break;
+    case X509_LU_X509:
+        X509_free(a->data.x509);
+        break;
+    case X509_LU_CRL:
+        X509_CRL_free(a->data.crl);
+        break;
+    }
+    OPENSSL_free(a);
+}
+
+static int x509_object_idx_cnt(STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT) *h, X509_LOOKUP_TYPE type,
+                               X509_NAME *name, int *pnmatch)
+{
+    X509_OBJECT stmp;
+    X509 x509_s;
+    X509_CRL crl_s;
+    int idx;
+
+    stmp.type = type;
+    switch (type) {
+    case X509_LU_X509:
+        stmp.data.x509 = &x509_s;
+        x509_s.cert_info.subject = name;
+        break;
+    case X509_LU_CRL:
+        stmp.data.crl = &crl_s;
+        crl_s.crl.issuer = name;
+        break;
+    default:
+        /* abort(); */
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    idx = sk_X509_OBJECT_find(h, &stmp);
+    if (idx >= 0 && pnmatch) {
+        int tidx;
+        const X509_OBJECT *tobj, *pstmp;
+        *pnmatch = 1;
+        pstmp = &stmp;
+        for (tidx = idx + 1; tidx < sk_X509_OBJECT_num(h); tidx++) {
+            tobj = sk_X509_OBJECT_value(h, tidx);
+            if (x509_object_cmp(&tobj, &pstmp))
+                break;
+            (*pnmatch)++;
+        }
+    }
+    return idx;
+}
+
+int X509_OBJECT_idx_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT) *h, X509_LOOKUP_TYPE type,
+                               X509_NAME *name)
+{
+    return x509_object_idx_cnt(h, type, name, NULL);
+}
+
+X509_OBJECT *X509_OBJECT_retrieve_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT) *h,
+                                             X509_LOOKUP_TYPE type,
+                                             X509_NAME *name)
+{
+    int idx;
+    idx = X509_OBJECT_idx_by_subject(h, type, name);
+    if (idx == -1)
+        return NULL;
+    return sk_X509_OBJECT_value(h, idx);
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT) *X509_STORE_get0_objects(X509_STORE *v)
+{
+    return v->objs;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_certs(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_NAME *nm)
+{
+    int i, idx, cnt;
+    STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
+    X509 *x;
+    X509_OBJECT *obj;
+
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(ctx->ctx->lock);
+    idx = x509_object_idx_cnt(ctx->ctx->objs, X509_LU_X509, nm, &cnt);
+    if (idx < 0) {
+        /*
+         * Nothing found in cache: do lookup to possibly add new objects to
+         * cache
+         */
+        X509_OBJECT *xobj = X509_OBJECT_new();
+
+        CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ctx->ctx->lock);
+        if (xobj == NULL)
+            return NULL;
+        if (!X509_STORE_CTX_get_by_subject(ctx, X509_LU_X509, nm, xobj)) {
+            X509_OBJECT_free(xobj);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+        X509_OBJECT_free(xobj);
+        CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(ctx->ctx->lock);
+        idx = x509_object_idx_cnt(ctx->ctx->objs, X509_LU_X509, nm, &cnt);
+        if (idx < 0) {
+            CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ctx->ctx->lock);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+    }
+
+    sk = sk_X509_new_null();
+    for (i = 0; i < cnt; i++, idx++) {
+        obj = sk_X509_OBJECT_value(ctx->ctx->objs, idx);
+        x = obj->data.x509;
+        X509_up_ref(x);
+        if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
+            CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ctx->ctx->lock);
+            X509_free(x);
+            sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+    }
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ctx->ctx->lock);
+    return sk;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_NAME *nm)
+{
+    int i, idx, cnt;
+    STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk = sk_X509_CRL_new_null();
+    X509_CRL *x;
+    X509_OBJECT *obj, *xobj = X509_OBJECT_new();
+
+    /* Always do lookup to possibly add new CRLs to cache */
+    if (sk == NULL || xobj == NULL ||
+            !X509_STORE_CTX_get_by_subject(ctx, X509_LU_CRL, nm, xobj)) {
+        X509_OBJECT_free(xobj);
+        sk_X509_CRL_free(sk);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    X509_OBJECT_free(xobj);
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(ctx->ctx->lock);
+    idx = x509_object_idx_cnt(ctx->ctx->objs, X509_LU_CRL, nm, &cnt);
+    if (idx < 0) {
+        CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ctx->ctx->lock);
+        sk_X509_CRL_free(sk);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0; i < cnt; i++, idx++) {
+        obj = sk_X509_OBJECT_value(ctx->ctx->objs, idx);
+        x = obj->data.crl;
+        X509_CRL_up_ref(x);
+        if (!sk_X509_CRL_push(sk, x)) {
+            CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ctx->ctx->lock);
+            X509_CRL_free(x);
+            sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(sk, X509_CRL_free);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+    }
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ctx->ctx->lock);
+    return sk;
+}
+
+X509_OBJECT *X509_OBJECT_retrieve_match(STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT) *h,
+                                        X509_OBJECT *x)
+{
+    int idx, i;
+    X509_OBJECT *obj;
+    idx = sk_X509_OBJECT_find(h, x);
+    if (idx == -1)
+        return NULL;
+    if ((x->type != X509_LU_X509) && (x->type != X509_LU_CRL))
+        return sk_X509_OBJECT_value(h, idx);
+    for (i = idx; i < sk_X509_OBJECT_num(h); i++) {
+        obj = sk_X509_OBJECT_value(h, i);
+        if (x509_object_cmp
+            ((const X509_OBJECT **)&obj, (const X509_OBJECT **)&x))
+            return NULL;
+        if (x->type == X509_LU_X509) {
+            if (!X509_cmp(obj->data.x509, x->data.x509))
+                return obj;
+        } else if (x->type == X509_LU_CRL) {
+            if (!X509_CRL_match(obj->data.crl, x->data.crl))
+                return obj;
+        } else
+            return obj;
+    }
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Try to get issuer certificate from store. Due to limitations
+ * of the API this can only retrieve a single certificate matching
+ * a given subject name. However it will fill the cache with all
+ * matching certificates, so we can examine the cache for all
+ * matches.
+ *
+ * Return values are:
+ *  1 lookup successful.
+ *  0 certificate not found.
+ * -1 some other error.
+ */
+int X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
+{
+    X509_NAME *xn;
+    X509_OBJECT *obj = X509_OBJECT_new(), *pobj = NULL;
+    int i, ok, idx, ret;
+
+    if (obj == NULL)
+        return -1;
+    *issuer = NULL;
+    xn = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
+    ok = X509_STORE_CTX_get_by_subject(ctx, X509_LU_X509, xn, obj);
+    if (ok != 1) {
+        X509_OBJECT_free(obj);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    /* If certificate matches all OK */
+    if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, obj->data.x509)) {
+        if (x509_check_cert_time(ctx, obj->data.x509, -1)) {
+            *issuer = obj->data.x509;
+            X509_up_ref(*issuer);
+            X509_OBJECT_free(obj);
+            return 1;
+        }
+    }
+    X509_OBJECT_free(obj);
+
+    /* Else find index of first cert accepted by 'check_issued' */
+    ret = 0;
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(ctx->ctx->lock);
+    idx = X509_OBJECT_idx_by_subject(ctx->ctx->objs, X509_LU_X509, xn);
+    if (idx != -1) {            /* should be true as we've had at least one
+                                 * match */
+        /* Look through all matching certs for suitable issuer */
+        for (i = idx; i < sk_X509_OBJECT_num(ctx->ctx->objs); i++) {
+            pobj = sk_X509_OBJECT_value(ctx->ctx->objs, i);
+            /* See if we've run past the matches */
+            if (pobj->type != X509_LU_X509)
+                break;
+            if (X509_NAME_cmp(xn, X509_get_subject_name(pobj->data.x509)))
+                break;
+            if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, pobj->data.x509)) {
+                *issuer = pobj->data.x509;
+                ret = 1;
+                /*
+                 * If times check, exit with match,
+                 * otherwise keep looking. Leave last
+                 * match in issuer so we return nearest
+                 * match if no certificate time is OK.
+                 */
+
+                if (x509_check_cert_time(ctx, *issuer, -1))
+                    break;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ctx->ctx->lock);
+    if (*issuer)
+        X509_up_ref(*issuer);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_set_flags(X509_STORE *ctx, unsigned long flags)
+{
+    return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_set_depth(X509_STORE *ctx, int depth)
+{
+    X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_set_purpose(X509_STORE *ctx, int purpose)
+{
+    return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(ctx->param, purpose);
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_set_trust(X509_STORE *ctx, int trust)
+{
+    return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(ctx->param, trust);
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_set1_param(X509_STORE *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
+{
+    return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ctx->param, param);
+}
+
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_get0_param(X509_STORE *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->param;
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_set_verify(X509_STORE *ctx, X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn verify)
+{
+    ctx->verify = verify;
+}
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn X509_STORE_get_verify(X509_STORE *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->verify;
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE *ctx,
+                              X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb verify_cb)
+{
+    ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb;
+}
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb X509_STORE_get_verify_cb(X509_STORE *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->verify_cb;
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_set_get_issuer(X509_STORE *ctx,
+                               X509_STORE_CTX_get_issuer_fn get_issuer)
+{
+    ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer;
+}
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_issuer_fn X509_STORE_get_get_issuer(X509_STORE *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->get_issuer;
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_set_check_issued(X509_STORE *ctx,
+                                 X509_STORE_CTX_check_issued_fn check_issued)
+{
+    ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
+}
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_check_issued_fn X509_STORE_get_check_issued(X509_STORE *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->check_issued;
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_set_check_revocation(X509_STORE *ctx,
+                                     X509_STORE_CTX_check_revocation_fn check_revocation)
+{
+    ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
+}
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_check_revocation_fn X509_STORE_get_check_revocation(X509_STORE *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->check_revocation;
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_set_get_crl(X509_STORE *ctx,
+                            X509_STORE_CTX_get_crl_fn get_crl)
+{
+    ctx->get_crl = get_crl;
+}
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_crl_fn X509_STORE_get_get_crl(X509_STORE *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->get_crl;
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_set_check_crl(X509_STORE *ctx,
+                              X509_STORE_CTX_check_crl_fn check_crl)
+{
+    ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
+}
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_check_crl_fn X509_STORE_get_check_crl(X509_STORE *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->check_crl;
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_set_cert_crl(X509_STORE *ctx,
+                             X509_STORE_CTX_cert_crl_fn cert_crl)
+{
+    ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
+}
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_cert_crl_fn X509_STORE_get_cert_crl(X509_STORE *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->cert_crl;
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_set_check_policy(X509_STORE *ctx,
+                                 X509_STORE_CTX_check_policy_fn check_policy)
+{
+    ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
+}
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_check_policy_fn X509_STORE_get_check_policy(X509_STORE *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->check_policy;
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_set_lookup_certs(X509_STORE *ctx,
+                                 X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_certs_fn lookup_certs)
+{
+    ctx->lookup_certs = lookup_certs;
+}
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_certs_fn X509_STORE_get_lookup_certs(X509_STORE *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->lookup_certs;
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_set_lookup_crls(X509_STORE *ctx,
+                                X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_crls_fn lookup_crls)
+{
+    ctx->lookup_crls = lookup_crls;
+}
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_crls_fn X509_STORE_get_lookup_crls(X509_STORE *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->lookup_crls;
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_set_cleanup(X509_STORE *ctx,
+                            X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup_fn ctx_cleanup)
+{
+    ctx->cleanup = ctx_cleanup;
+}
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup_fn X509_STORE_get_cleanup(X509_STORE *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->cleanup;
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_set_ex_data(X509_STORE *ctx, int idx, void *data)
+{
+    return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, data);
+}
+
+void *X509_STORE_get_ex_data(X509_STORE *ctx, int idx)
+{
+    return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx);
+}
+
+X509_STORE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_store(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->ctx;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x509_obj.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x509_obj.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..55dc778
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x509_obj.c
@@ -0,0 +1,182 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/lhash.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include "internal/x509_int.h"
+
+/*
+ * Limit to ensure we don't overflow: much greater than
+ * anything encountered in practice.
+ */
+
+#define NAME_ONELINE_MAX    (1024 * 1024)
+
+char *X509_NAME_oneline(const X509_NAME *a, char *buf, int len)
+{
+    const X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne;
+    int i;
+    int n, lold, l, l1, l2, num, j, type;
+    const char *s;
+    char *p;
+    unsigned char *q;
+    BUF_MEM *b = NULL;
+    static const char hex[17] = "0123456789ABCDEF";
+    int gs_doit[4];
+    char tmp_buf[80];
+#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+    unsigned char ebcdic_buf[1024];
+#endif
+
+    if (buf == NULL) {
+        if ((b = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        if (!BUF_MEM_grow(b, 200))
+            goto err;
+        b->data[0] = '\0';
+        len = 200;
+    } else if (len == 0) {
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    if (a == NULL) {
+        if (b) {
+            buf = b->data;
+            OPENSSL_free(b);
+        }
+        strncpy(buf, "NO X509_NAME", len);
+        buf[len - 1] = '\0';
+        return buf;
+    }
+
+    len--;                      /* space for '\0' */
+    l = 0;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_num(a->entries); i++) {
+        ne = sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_value(a->entries, i);
+        n = OBJ_obj2nid(ne->object);
+        if ((n == NID_undef) || ((s = OBJ_nid2sn(n)) == NULL)) {
+            i2t_ASN1_OBJECT(tmp_buf, sizeof(tmp_buf), ne->object);
+            s = tmp_buf;
+        }
+        l1 = strlen(s);
+
+        type = ne->value->type;
+        num = ne->value->length;
+        if (num > NAME_ONELINE_MAX) {
+            X509err(X509_F_X509_NAME_ONELINE, X509_R_NAME_TOO_LONG);
+            goto end;
+        }
+        q = ne->value->data;
+#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+        if (type == V_ASN1_GENERALSTRING ||
+            type == V_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING ||
+            type == V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING ||
+            type == V_ASN1_TELETEXSTRING ||
+            type == V_ASN1_IA5STRING) {
+            if (num > (int)sizeof(ebcdic_buf))
+                num = sizeof(ebcdic_buf);
+            ascii2ebcdic(ebcdic_buf, q, num);
+            q = ebcdic_buf;
+        }
+#endif
+
+        if ((type == V_ASN1_GENERALSTRING) && ((num % 4) == 0)) {
+            gs_doit[0] = gs_doit[1] = gs_doit[2] = gs_doit[3] = 0;
+            for (j = 0; j < num; j++)
+                if (q[j] != 0)
+                    gs_doit[j & 3] = 1;
+
+            if (gs_doit[0] | gs_doit[1] | gs_doit[2])
+                gs_doit[0] = gs_doit[1] = gs_doit[2] = gs_doit[3] = 1;
+            else {
+                gs_doit[0] = gs_doit[1] = gs_doit[2] = 0;
+                gs_doit[3] = 1;
+            }
+        } else
+            gs_doit[0] = gs_doit[1] = gs_doit[2] = gs_doit[3] = 1;
+
+        for (l2 = j = 0; j < num; j++) {
+            if (!gs_doit[j & 3])
+                continue;
+            l2++;
+#ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+            if ((q[j] < ' ') || (q[j] > '~'))
+                l2 += 3;
+#else
+            if ((os_toascii[q[j]] < os_toascii[' ']) ||
+                (os_toascii[q[j]] > os_toascii['~']))
+                l2 += 3;
+#endif
+        }
+
+        lold = l;
+        l += 1 + l1 + 1 + l2;
+        if (l > NAME_ONELINE_MAX) {
+            X509err(X509_F_X509_NAME_ONELINE, X509_R_NAME_TOO_LONG);
+            goto end;
+        }
+        if (b != NULL) {
+            if (!BUF_MEM_grow(b, l + 1))
+                goto err;
+            p = &(b->data[lold]);
+        } else if (l > len) {
+            break;
+        } else
+            p = &(buf[lold]);
+        *(p++) = '/';
+        memcpy(p, s, (unsigned int)l1);
+        p += l1;
+        *(p++) = '=';
+
+#ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC          /* q was assigned above already. */
+        q = ne->value->data;
+#endif
+
+        for (j = 0; j < num; j++) {
+            if (!gs_doit[j & 3])
+                continue;
+#ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+            n = q[j];
+            if ((n < ' ') || (n > '~')) {
+                *(p++) = '\\';
+                *(p++) = 'x';
+                *(p++) = hex[(n >> 4) & 0x0f];
+                *(p++) = hex[n & 0x0f];
+            } else
+                *(p++) = n;
+#else
+            n = os_toascii[q[j]];
+            if ((n < os_toascii[' ']) || (n > os_toascii['~'])) {
+                *(p++) = '\\';
+                *(p++) = 'x';
+                *(p++) = hex[(n >> 4) & 0x0f];
+                *(p++) = hex[n & 0x0f];
+            } else
+                *(p++) = q[j];
+#endif
+        }
+        *p = '\0';
+    }
+    if (b != NULL) {
+        p = b->data;
+        OPENSSL_free(b);
+    } else
+        p = buf;
+    if (i == 0)
+        *p = '\0';
+    return (p);
+ err:
+    X509err(X509_F_X509_NAME_ONELINE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ end:
+    BUF_MEM_free(b);
+    return (NULL);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x509_r2x.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x509_r2x.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3d72787
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x509_r2x.c
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include "internal/x509_int.h"
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+
+X509 *X509_REQ_to_X509(X509_REQ *r, int days, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    X509 *ret = NULL;
+    X509_CINF *xi = NULL;
+    X509_NAME *xn;
+    EVP_PKEY *pubkey = NULL;
+
+    if ((ret = X509_new()) == NULL) {
+        X509err(X509_F_X509_REQ_TO_X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    /* duplicate the request */
+    xi = &ret->cert_info;
+
+    if (sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_num(r->req_info.attributes) != 0) {
+        if ((xi->version = ASN1_INTEGER_new()) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(xi->version, 2))
+            goto err;
+/*-     xi->extensions=ri->attributes; <- bad, should not ever be done
+        ri->attributes=NULL; */
+    }
+
+    xn = X509_REQ_get_subject_name(r);
+    if (X509_set_subject_name(ret, xn) == 0)
+        goto err;
+    if (X509_set_issuer_name(ret, xn) == 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (X509_gmtime_adj(xi->validity.notBefore, 0) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (X509_gmtime_adj(xi->validity.notAfter, (long)60 * 60 * 24 * days) ==
+        NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    pubkey = X509_REQ_get0_pubkey(r);
+    if (pubkey == NULL || !X509_set_pubkey(ret, pubkey))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!X509_sign(ret, pkey, EVP_md5()))
+        goto err;
+    return ret;
+
+ err:
+    X509_free(ret);
+    return NULL;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x509_req.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x509_req.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7b88dbc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x509_req.c
@@ -0,0 +1,298 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include "internal/x509_int.h"
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+
+X509_REQ *X509_to_X509_REQ(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *md)
+{
+    X509_REQ *ret;
+    X509_REQ_INFO *ri;
+    int i;
+    EVP_PKEY *pktmp;
+
+    ret = X509_REQ_new();
+    if (ret == NULL) {
+        X509err(X509_F_X509_TO_X509_REQ, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    ri = &ret->req_info;
+
+    ri->version->length = 1;
+    ri->version->data = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
+    if (ri->version->data == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    ri->version->data[0] = 0;   /* version == 0 */
+
+    if (!X509_REQ_set_subject_name(ret, X509_get_subject_name(x)))
+        goto err;
+
+    pktmp = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
+    if (pktmp == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    i = X509_REQ_set_pubkey(ret, pktmp);
+    if (!i)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (pkey != NULL) {
+        if (!X509_REQ_sign(ret, pkey, md))
+            goto err;
+    }
+    return (ret);
+ err:
+    X509_REQ_free(ret);
+    return (NULL);
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY *X509_REQ_get_pubkey(X509_REQ *req)
+{
+    if (req == NULL)
+        return (NULL);
+    return (X509_PUBKEY_get(req->req_info.pubkey));
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY *X509_REQ_get0_pubkey(X509_REQ *req)
+{
+    if (req == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    return (X509_PUBKEY_get0(req->req_info.pubkey));
+}
+
+X509_PUBKEY *X509_REQ_get_X509_PUBKEY(X509_REQ *req)
+{
+    return req->req_info.pubkey;
+}
+
+int X509_REQ_check_private_key(X509_REQ *x, EVP_PKEY *k)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY *xk = NULL;
+    int ok = 0;
+
+    xk = X509_REQ_get_pubkey(x);
+    switch (EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk, k)) {
+    case 1:
+        ok = 1;
+        break;
+    case 0:
+        X509err(X509_F_X509_REQ_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,
+                X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH);
+        break;
+    case -1:
+        X509err(X509_F_X509_REQ_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH);
+        break;
+    case -2:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+        if (EVP_PKEY_id(k) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
+            X509err(X509_F_X509_REQ_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+            break;
+        }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+        if (EVP_PKEY_id(k) == EVP_PKEY_DH) {
+            /* No idea */
+            X509err(X509_F_X509_REQ_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,
+                    X509_R_CANT_CHECK_DH_KEY);
+            break;
+        }
+#endif
+        X509err(X509_F_X509_REQ_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE);
+    }
+
+    EVP_PKEY_free(xk);
+    return (ok);
+}
+
+/*
+ * It seems several organisations had the same idea of including a list of
+ * extensions in a certificate request. There are at least two OIDs that are
+ * used and there may be more: so the list is configurable.
+ */
+
+static int ext_nid_list[] = { NID_ext_req, NID_ms_ext_req, NID_undef };
+
+static int *ext_nids = ext_nid_list;
+
+int X509_REQ_extension_nid(int req_nid)
+{
+    int i, nid;
+    for (i = 0;; i++) {
+        nid = ext_nids[i];
+        if (nid == NID_undef)
+            return 0;
+        else if (req_nid == nid)
+            return 1;
+    }
+}
+
+int *X509_REQ_get_extension_nids(void)
+{
+    return ext_nids;
+}
+
+void X509_REQ_set_extension_nids(int *nids)
+{
+    ext_nids = nids;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *X509_REQ_get_extensions(X509_REQ *req)
+{
+    X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr;
+    ASN1_TYPE *ext = NULL;
+    int idx, *pnid;
+    const unsigned char *p;
+
+    if ((req == NULL) || !ext_nids)
+        return (NULL);
+    for (pnid = ext_nids; *pnid != NID_undef; pnid++) {
+        idx = X509_REQ_get_attr_by_NID(req, *pnid, -1);
+        if (idx == -1)
+            continue;
+        attr = X509_REQ_get_attr(req, idx);
+        ext = X509_ATTRIBUTE_get0_type(attr, 0);
+        break;
+    }
+    if (!ext || (ext->type != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE))
+        return NULL;
+    p = ext->value.sequence->data;
+    return (STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *)
+        ASN1_item_d2i(NULL, &p, ext->value.sequence->length,
+                      ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_EXTENSIONS));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Add a STACK_OF extensions to a certificate request: allow alternative OIDs
+ * in case we want to create a non standard one.
+ */
+
+int X509_REQ_add_extensions_nid(X509_REQ *req, STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts,
+                                int nid)
+{
+    int extlen;
+    int rv = 0;
+    unsigned char *ext = NULL;
+    /* Generate encoding of extensions */
+    extlen = ASN1_item_i2d((ASN1_VALUE *)exts, &ext,
+                           ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_EXTENSIONS));
+    if (extlen <= 0)
+        return 0;
+    rv = X509_REQ_add1_attr_by_NID(req, nid, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, ext, extlen);
+    OPENSSL_free(ext);
+    return rv;
+}
+
+/* This is the normal usage: use the "official" OID */
+int X509_REQ_add_extensions(X509_REQ *req, STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts)
+{
+    return X509_REQ_add_extensions_nid(req, exts, NID_ext_req);
+}
+
+/* Request attribute functions */
+
+int X509_REQ_get_attr_count(const X509_REQ *req)
+{
+    return X509at_get_attr_count(req->req_info.attributes);
+}
+
+int X509_REQ_get_attr_by_NID(const X509_REQ *req, int nid, int lastpos)
+{
+    return X509at_get_attr_by_NID(req->req_info.attributes, nid, lastpos);
+}
+
+int X509_REQ_get_attr_by_OBJ(const X509_REQ *req, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj,
+                             int lastpos)
+{
+    return X509at_get_attr_by_OBJ(req->req_info.attributes, obj, lastpos);
+}
+
+X509_ATTRIBUTE *X509_REQ_get_attr(const X509_REQ *req, int loc)
+{
+    return X509at_get_attr(req->req_info.attributes, loc);
+}
+
+X509_ATTRIBUTE *X509_REQ_delete_attr(X509_REQ *req, int loc)
+{
+    return X509at_delete_attr(req->req_info.attributes, loc);
+}
+
+int X509_REQ_add1_attr(X509_REQ *req, X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr)
+{
+    if (X509at_add1_attr(&req->req_info.attributes, attr))
+        return 1;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int X509_REQ_add1_attr_by_OBJ(X509_REQ *req,
+                              const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int type,
+                              const unsigned char *bytes, int len)
+{
+    if (X509at_add1_attr_by_OBJ(&req->req_info.attributes, obj,
+                                type, bytes, len))
+        return 1;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int X509_REQ_add1_attr_by_NID(X509_REQ *req,
+                              int nid, int type,
+                              const unsigned char *bytes, int len)
+{
+    if (X509at_add1_attr_by_NID(&req->req_info.attributes, nid,
+                                type, bytes, len))
+        return 1;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int X509_REQ_add1_attr_by_txt(X509_REQ *req,
+                              const char *attrname, int type,
+                              const unsigned char *bytes, int len)
+{
+    if (X509at_add1_attr_by_txt(&req->req_info.attributes, attrname,
+                                type, bytes, len))
+        return 1;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+long X509_REQ_get_version(const X509_REQ *req)
+{
+    return ASN1_INTEGER_get(req->req_info.version);
+}
+
+X509_NAME *X509_REQ_get_subject_name(const X509_REQ *req)
+{
+    return req->req_info.subject;
+}
+
+void X509_REQ_get0_signature(const X509_REQ *req, const ASN1_BIT_STRING **psig,
+                             const X509_ALGOR **palg)
+{
+    if (psig != NULL)
+        *psig = req->signature;
+    if (palg != NULL)
+        *palg = &req->sig_alg;
+}
+
+int X509_REQ_get_signature_nid(const X509_REQ *req)
+{
+    return OBJ_obj2nid(req->sig_alg.algorithm);
+}
+
+int i2d_re_X509_REQ_tbs(X509_REQ *req, unsigned char **pp)
+{
+    req->req_info.enc.modified = 1;
+    return i2d_X509_REQ_INFO(&req->req_info, pp);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x509_set.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x509_set.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c0ea418
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x509_set.c
@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include "internal/x509_int.h"
+
+int X509_set_version(X509 *x, long version)
+{
+    if (x == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    if (version == 0) {
+        ASN1_INTEGER_free(x->cert_info.version);
+        x->cert_info.version = NULL;
+        return (1);
+    }
+    if (x->cert_info.version == NULL) {
+        if ((x->cert_info.version = ASN1_INTEGER_new()) == NULL)
+            return (0);
+    }
+    return (ASN1_INTEGER_set(x->cert_info.version, version));
+}
+
+int X509_set_serialNumber(X509 *x, ASN1_INTEGER *serial)
+{
+    ASN1_INTEGER *in;
+
+    if (x == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    in = &x->cert_info.serialNumber;
+    if (in != serial)
+        return ASN1_STRING_copy(in, serial);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int X509_set_issuer_name(X509 *x, X509_NAME *name)
+{
+    if (x == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    return (X509_NAME_set(&x->cert_info.issuer, name));
+}
+
+int X509_set_subject_name(X509 *x, X509_NAME *name)
+{
+    if (x == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    return (X509_NAME_set(&x->cert_info.subject, name));
+}
+
+int x509_set1_time(ASN1_TIME **ptm, const ASN1_TIME *tm)
+{
+    ASN1_TIME *in;
+    in = *ptm;
+    if (in != tm) {
+        in = ASN1_STRING_dup(tm);
+        if (in != NULL) {
+            ASN1_TIME_free(*ptm);
+            *ptm = in;
+        }
+    }
+    return (in != NULL);
+}
+
+int X509_set1_notBefore(X509 *x, const ASN1_TIME *tm)
+{
+    if (x == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    return x509_set1_time(&x->cert_info.validity.notBefore, tm);
+}
+
+int X509_set1_notAfter(X509 *x, const ASN1_TIME *tm)
+{
+    if (x == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    return x509_set1_time(&x->cert_info.validity.notAfter, tm);
+}
+
+int X509_set_pubkey(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    if (x == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    return (X509_PUBKEY_set(&(x->cert_info.key), pkey));
+}
+
+int X509_up_ref(X509 *x)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    if (CRYPTO_atomic_add(&x->references, 1, &i, x->lock) <= 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    REF_PRINT_COUNT("X509", x);
+    REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 2);
+    return ((i > 1) ? 1 : 0);
+}
+
+long X509_get_version(const X509 *x)
+{
+    return ASN1_INTEGER_get(x->cert_info.version);
+}
+
+const ASN1_TIME *X509_get0_notBefore(const X509 *x)
+{
+    return x->cert_info.validity.notBefore;
+}
+
+const ASN1_TIME *X509_get0_notAfter(const X509 *x)
+{
+    return x->cert_info.validity.notAfter;
+}
+
+ASN1_TIME *X509_getm_notBefore(const X509 *x)
+{
+    return x->cert_info.validity.notBefore;
+}
+
+ASN1_TIME *X509_getm_notAfter(const X509 *x)
+{
+    return x->cert_info.validity.notAfter;
+}
+
+int X509_get_signature_type(const X509 *x)
+{
+    return EVP_PKEY_type(OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg.algorithm));
+}
+
+X509_PUBKEY *X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(const X509 *x)
+{
+    return x->cert_info.key;
+}
+
+const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *X509_get0_extensions(const X509 *x)
+{
+    return x->cert_info.extensions;
+}
+
+void X509_get0_uids(const X509 *x, const ASN1_BIT_STRING **piuid,
+                    const ASN1_BIT_STRING **psuid)
+{
+    if (piuid != NULL)
+        *piuid = x->cert_info.issuerUID;
+    if (psuid != NULL)
+        *psuid = x->cert_info.subjectUID;
+}
+
+const X509_ALGOR *X509_get0_tbs_sigalg(const X509 *x)
+{
+    return &x->cert_info.signature;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x509_trs.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x509_trs.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a9bb88d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x509_trs.c
@@ -0,0 +1,298 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include "internal/x509_int.h"
+
+static int tr_cmp(const X509_TRUST *const *a, const X509_TRUST *const *b);
+static void trtable_free(X509_TRUST *p);
+
+static int trust_1oidany(X509_TRUST *trust, X509 *x, int flags);
+static int trust_1oid(X509_TRUST *trust, X509 *x, int flags);
+static int trust_compat(X509_TRUST *trust, X509 *x, int flags);
+
+static int obj_trust(int id, X509 *x, int flags);
+static int (*default_trust) (int id, X509 *x, int flags) = obj_trust;
+
+/*
+ * WARNING: the following table should be kept in order of trust and without
+ * any gaps so we can just subtract the minimum trust value to get an index
+ * into the table
+ */
+
+static X509_TRUST trstandard[] = {
+    {X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, trust_compat, "compatible", 0, NULL},
+    {X509_TRUST_SSL_CLIENT, 0, trust_1oidany, "SSL Client", NID_client_auth,
+     NULL},
+    {X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, 0, trust_1oidany, "SSL Server", NID_server_auth,
+     NULL},
+    {X509_TRUST_EMAIL, 0, trust_1oidany, "S/MIME email", NID_email_protect,
+     NULL},
+    {X509_TRUST_OBJECT_SIGN, 0, trust_1oidany, "Object Signer", NID_code_sign,
+     NULL},
+    {X509_TRUST_OCSP_SIGN, 0, trust_1oid, "OCSP responder", NID_OCSP_sign,
+     NULL},
+    {X509_TRUST_OCSP_REQUEST, 0, trust_1oid, "OCSP request", NID_ad_OCSP,
+     NULL},
+    {X509_TRUST_TSA, 0, trust_1oidany, "TSA server", NID_time_stamp, NULL}
+};
+
+#define X509_TRUST_COUNT        OSSL_NELEM(trstandard)
+
+static STACK_OF(X509_TRUST) *trtable = NULL;
+
+static int tr_cmp(const X509_TRUST *const *a, const X509_TRUST *const *b)
+{
+    return (*a)->trust - (*b)->trust;
+}
+
+int (*X509_TRUST_set_default(int (*trust) (int, X509 *, int))) (int, X509 *,
+                                                                int) {
+    int (*oldtrust) (int, X509 *, int);
+    oldtrust = default_trust;
+    default_trust = trust;
+    return oldtrust;
+}
+
+int X509_check_trust(X509 *x, int id, int flags)
+{
+    X509_TRUST *pt;
+    int idx;
+
+    /* We get this as a default value */
+    if (id == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT)
+        return obj_trust(NID_anyExtendedKeyUsage, x,
+                         flags | X509_TRUST_DO_SS_COMPAT);
+    idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(id);
+    if (idx == -1)
+        return default_trust(id, x, flags);
+    pt = X509_TRUST_get0(idx);
+    return pt->check_trust(pt, x, flags);
+}
+
+int X509_TRUST_get_count(void)
+{
+    if (!trtable)
+        return X509_TRUST_COUNT;
+    return sk_X509_TRUST_num(trtable) + X509_TRUST_COUNT;
+}
+
+X509_TRUST *X509_TRUST_get0(int idx)
+{
+    if (idx < 0)
+        return NULL;
+    if (idx < (int)X509_TRUST_COUNT)
+        return trstandard + idx;
+    return sk_X509_TRUST_value(trtable, idx - X509_TRUST_COUNT);
+}
+
+int X509_TRUST_get_by_id(int id)
+{
+    X509_TRUST tmp;
+    int idx;
+    if ((id >= X509_TRUST_MIN) && (id <= X509_TRUST_MAX))
+        return id - X509_TRUST_MIN;
+    tmp.trust = id;
+    if (!trtable)
+        return -1;
+    idx = sk_X509_TRUST_find(trtable, &tmp);
+    if (idx == -1)
+        return -1;
+    return idx + X509_TRUST_COUNT;
+}
+
+int X509_TRUST_set(int *t, int trust)
+{
+    if (X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust) == -1) {
+        X509err(X509_F_X509_TRUST_SET, X509_R_INVALID_TRUST);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    *t = trust;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int X509_TRUST_add(int id, int flags, int (*ck) (X509_TRUST *, X509 *, int),
+                   const char *name, int arg1, void *arg2)
+{
+    int idx;
+    X509_TRUST *trtmp;
+    /*
+     * This is set according to what we change: application can't set it
+     */
+    flags &= ~X509_TRUST_DYNAMIC;
+    /* This will always be set for application modified trust entries */
+    flags |= X509_TRUST_DYNAMIC_NAME;
+    /* Get existing entry if any */
+    idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(id);
+    /* Need a new entry */
+    if (idx == -1) {
+        if ((trtmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*trtmp))) == NULL) {
+            X509err(X509_F_X509_TRUST_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        trtmp->flags = X509_TRUST_DYNAMIC;
+    } else
+        trtmp = X509_TRUST_get0(idx);
+
+    /* OPENSSL_free existing name if dynamic */
+    if (trtmp->flags & X509_TRUST_DYNAMIC_NAME)
+        OPENSSL_free(trtmp->name);
+    /* dup supplied name */
+    if ((trtmp->name = OPENSSL_strdup(name)) == NULL) {
+        X509err(X509_F_X509_TRUST_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    /* Keep the dynamic flag of existing entry */
+    trtmp->flags &= X509_TRUST_DYNAMIC;
+    /* Set all other flags */
+    trtmp->flags |= flags;
+
+    trtmp->trust = id;
+    trtmp->check_trust = ck;
+    trtmp->arg1 = arg1;
+    trtmp->arg2 = arg2;
+
+    /* If its a new entry manage the dynamic table */
+    if (idx == -1) {
+        if (trtable == NULL
+            && (trtable = sk_X509_TRUST_new(tr_cmp)) == NULL) {
+            X509err(X509_F_X509_TRUST_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;;
+        }
+        if (!sk_X509_TRUST_push(trtable, trtmp)) {
+            X509err(X509_F_X509_TRUST_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+    return 1;
+ err:
+    if (idx == -1) {
+        OPENSSL_free(trtmp->name);
+        OPENSSL_free(trtmp);
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static void trtable_free(X509_TRUST *p)
+{
+    if (!p)
+        return;
+    if (p->flags & X509_TRUST_DYNAMIC) {
+        if (p->flags & X509_TRUST_DYNAMIC_NAME)
+            OPENSSL_free(p->name);
+        OPENSSL_free(p);
+    }
+}
+
+void X509_TRUST_cleanup(void)
+{
+    sk_X509_TRUST_pop_free(trtable, trtable_free);
+    trtable = NULL;
+}
+
+int X509_TRUST_get_flags(const X509_TRUST *xp)
+{
+    return xp->flags;
+}
+
+char *X509_TRUST_get0_name(const X509_TRUST *xp)
+{
+    return xp->name;
+}
+
+int X509_TRUST_get_trust(const X509_TRUST *xp)
+{
+    return xp->trust;
+}
+
+static int trust_1oidany(X509_TRUST *trust, X509 *x, int flags)
+{
+    /*
+     * Declare the chain verified if the desired trust OID is not rejected in
+     * any auxiliary trust info for this certificate, and the OID is either
+     * expressly trusted, or else either "anyEKU" is trusted, or the
+     * certificate is self-signed.
+     */
+    flags |= X509_TRUST_DO_SS_COMPAT | X509_TRUST_OK_ANY_EKU;
+    return obj_trust(trust->arg1, x, flags);
+}
+
+static int trust_1oid(X509_TRUST *trust, X509 *x, int flags)
+{
+    /*
+     * Declare the chain verified only if the desired trust OID is not
+     * rejected and is expressly trusted.  Neither "anyEKU" nor "compat"
+     * trust in self-signed certificates apply.
+     */
+    flags &= ~(X509_TRUST_DO_SS_COMPAT | X509_TRUST_OK_ANY_EKU);
+    return obj_trust(trust->arg1, x, flags);
+}
+
+static int trust_compat(X509_TRUST *trust, X509 *x, int flags)
+{
+    /* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */
+    X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
+    if ((flags & X509_TRUST_NO_SS_COMPAT) == 0 && x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS)
+        return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
+    else
+        return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
+}
+
+static int obj_trust(int id, X509 *x, int flags)
+{
+    X509_CERT_AUX *ax = x->aux;
+    int i;
+
+    if (ax && ax->reject) {
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(ax->reject); i++) {
+            ASN1_OBJECT *obj = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(ax->reject, i);
+            int nid = OBJ_obj2nid(obj);
+
+            if (nid == id || (nid == NID_anyExtendedKeyUsage &&
+                (flags & X509_TRUST_OK_ANY_EKU)))
+                return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (ax && ax->trust) {
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(ax->trust); i++) {
+            ASN1_OBJECT *obj = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(ax->trust, i);
+            int nid = OBJ_obj2nid(obj);
+
+            if (nid == id || (nid == NID_anyExtendedKeyUsage &&
+                (flags & X509_TRUST_OK_ANY_EKU)))
+                return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
+        }
+        /*
+         * Reject when explicit trust EKU are set and none match.
+         *
+         * Returning untrusted is enough for for full chains that end in
+         * self-signed roots, because when explicit trust is specified it
+         * suppresses the default blanket trust of self-signed objects.
+         *
+         * But for partial chains, this is not enough, because absent a similar
+         * trust-self-signed policy, non matching EKUs are indistinguishable
+         * from lack of EKU constraints.
+         *
+         * Therefore, failure to match any trusted purpose must trigger an
+         * explicit reject.
+         */
+        return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
+    }
+
+    if ((flags & X509_TRUST_DO_SS_COMPAT) == 0)
+        return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
+
+    /*
+     * Not rejected, and there is no list of accepted uses, try compat.
+     */
+    return trust_compat(NULL, x, flags);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x509_txt.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x509_txt.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..66e5fcd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x509_txt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,177 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/lhash.h>
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+
+const char *X509_verify_cert_error_string(long n)
+{
+    switch ((int)n) {
+    case X509_V_OK:
+        return ("ok");
+    case X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED:
+        return ("unspecified certificate verification error");
+    case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
+        return ("unable to get issuer certificate");
+    case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL:
+        return ("unable to get certificate CRL");
+    case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE:
+        return ("unable to decrypt certificate's signature");
+    case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE:
+        return ("unable to decrypt CRL's signature");
+    case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY:
+        return ("unable to decode issuer public key");
+    case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
+        return ("certificate signature failure");
+    case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
+        return ("CRL signature failure");
+    case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID:
+        return ("certificate is not yet valid");
+    case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
+        return ("certificate has expired");
+    case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID:
+        return ("CRL is not yet valid");
+    case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED:
+        return ("CRL has expired");
+    case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD:
+        return ("format error in certificate's notBefore field");
+    case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD:
+        return ("format error in certificate's notAfter field");
+    case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD:
+        return ("format error in CRL's lastUpdate field");
+    case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD:
+        return ("format error in CRL's nextUpdate field");
+    case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
+        return ("out of memory");
+    case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT:
+        return ("self signed certificate");
+    case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN:
+        return ("self signed certificate in certificate chain");
+    case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY:
+        return ("unable to get local issuer certificate");
+    case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE:
+        return ("unable to verify the first certificate");
+    case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG:
+        return ("certificate chain too long");
+    case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED:
+        return ("certificate revoked");
+    case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA:
+        return ("invalid CA certificate");
+    case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED:
+        return ("path length constraint exceeded");
+    case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE:
+        return ("unsupported certificate purpose");
+    case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED:
+        return ("certificate not trusted");
+    case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED:
+        return ("certificate rejected");
+    case X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH:
+        return ("subject issuer mismatch");
+    case X509_V_ERR_AKID_SKID_MISMATCH:
+        return ("authority and subject key identifier mismatch");
+    case X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH:
+        return ("authority and issuer serial number mismatch");
+    case X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CERTSIGN:
+        return ("key usage does not include certificate signing");
+    case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER:
+        return ("unable to get CRL issuer certificate");
+    case X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION:
+        return ("unhandled critical extension");
+    case X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN:
+        return ("key usage does not include CRL signing");
+    case X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION:
+        return ("unhandled critical CRL extension");
+    case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA:
+        return ("invalid non-CA certificate (has CA markings)");
+    case X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED:
+        return ("proxy path length constraint exceeded");
+    case X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE:
+        return ("key usage does not include digital signature");
+    case X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED:
+        return
+            ("proxy certificates not allowed, please set the appropriate flag");
+    case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION:
+        return ("invalid or inconsistent certificate extension");
+    case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION:
+        return ("invalid or inconsistent certificate policy extension");
+    case X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY:
+        return ("no explicit policy");
+    case X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE:
+        return ("Different CRL scope");
+    case X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION_FEATURE:
+        return ("Unsupported extension feature");
+    case X509_V_ERR_UNNESTED_RESOURCE:
+        return ("RFC 3779 resource not subset of parent's resources");
+    case X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION:
+        return ("permitted subtree violation");
+    case X509_V_ERR_EXCLUDED_VIOLATION:
+        return ("excluded subtree violation");
+    case X509_V_ERR_SUBTREE_MINMAX:
+        return ("name constraints minimum and maximum not supported");
+    case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION:
+        return ("application verification failure");
+    case X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CONSTRAINT_TYPE:
+        return ("unsupported name constraint type");
+    case X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CONSTRAINT_SYNTAX:
+        return ("unsupported or invalid name constraint syntax");
+    case X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX:
+        return ("unsupported or invalid name syntax");
+    case X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR:
+        return ("CRL path validation error");
+    case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LOOP:
+        return ("Path Loop");
+    case X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION:
+        return ("Suite B: certificate version invalid");
+    case X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM:
+        return ("Suite B: invalid public key algorithm");
+    case X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE:
+        return ("Suite B: invalid ECC curve");
+    case X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM:
+        return ("Suite B: invalid signature algorithm");
+    case X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED:
+        return ("Suite B: curve not allowed for this LOS");
+    case X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256:
+        return ("Suite B: cannot sign P-384 with P-256");
+    case X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH:
+        return ("Hostname mismatch");
+    case X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH:
+        return ("Email address mismatch");
+    case X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH:
+        return ("IP address mismatch");
+    case X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH:
+        return ("No matching DANE TLSA records");
+    case X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL:
+        return ("EE certificate key too weak");
+    case X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL:
+        return ("CA certificate key too weak");
+    case X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK:
+        return ("CA signature digest algorithm too weak");
+    case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL:
+        return ("Invalid certificate verification context");
+    case X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP:
+        return ("Issuer certificate lookup error");
+    case X509_V_ERR_NO_VALID_SCTS:
+        return ("Certificate Transparency required, but no valid SCTs found");
+    case X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION:
+        return ("proxy subject name violation");
+
+    default:
+        /* Printing an error number into a static buffer is not thread-safe */
+        return ("unknown certificate verification error");
+    }
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x509_v3.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x509_v3.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..19016bb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x509_v3.c
@@ -0,0 +1,235 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/stack.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include "x509_lcl.h"
+
+int X509v3_get_ext_count(const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *x)
+{
+    if (x == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    return (sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(x));
+}
+
+int X509v3_get_ext_by_NID(const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *x, int nid,
+                          int lastpos)
+{
+    ASN1_OBJECT *obj;
+
+    obj = OBJ_nid2obj(nid);
+    if (obj == NULL)
+        return (-2);
+    return (X509v3_get_ext_by_OBJ(x, obj, lastpos));
+}
+
+int X509v3_get_ext_by_OBJ(const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *sk,
+                          const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int lastpos)
+{
+    int n;
+    X509_EXTENSION *ex;
+
+    if (sk == NULL)
+        return (-1);
+    lastpos++;
+    if (lastpos < 0)
+        lastpos = 0;
+    n = sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(sk);
+    for (; lastpos < n; lastpos++) {
+        ex = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(sk, lastpos);
+        if (OBJ_cmp(ex->object, obj) == 0)
+            return (lastpos);
+    }
+    return (-1);
+}
+
+int X509v3_get_ext_by_critical(const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *sk, int crit,
+                               int lastpos)
+{
+    int n;
+    X509_EXTENSION *ex;
+
+    if (sk == NULL)
+        return (-1);
+    lastpos++;
+    if (lastpos < 0)
+        lastpos = 0;
+    n = sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(sk);
+    for (; lastpos < n; lastpos++) {
+        ex = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(sk, lastpos);
+        if (((ex->critical > 0) && crit) || ((ex->critical <= 0) && !crit))
+            return (lastpos);
+    }
+    return (-1);
+}
+
+X509_EXTENSION *X509v3_get_ext(const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *x, int loc)
+{
+    if (x == NULL || sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(x) <= loc || loc < 0)
+        return NULL;
+    else
+        return sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(x, loc);
+}
+
+X509_EXTENSION *X509v3_delete_ext(STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *x, int loc)
+{
+    X509_EXTENSION *ret;
+
+    if (x == NULL || sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(x) <= loc || loc < 0)
+        return (NULL);
+    ret = sk_X509_EXTENSION_delete(x, loc);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *X509v3_add_ext(STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) **x,
+                                         X509_EXTENSION *ex, int loc)
+{
+    X509_EXTENSION *new_ex = NULL;
+    int n;
+    STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *sk = NULL;
+
+    if (x == NULL) {
+        X509err(X509_F_X509V3_ADD_EXT, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+        goto err2;
+    }
+
+    if (*x == NULL) {
+        if ((sk = sk_X509_EXTENSION_new_null()) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+    } else
+        sk = *x;
+
+    n = sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(sk);
+    if (loc > n)
+        loc = n;
+    else if (loc < 0)
+        loc = n;
+
+    if ((new_ex = X509_EXTENSION_dup(ex)) == NULL)
+        goto err2;
+    if (!sk_X509_EXTENSION_insert(sk, new_ex, loc))
+        goto err;
+    if (*x == NULL)
+        *x = sk;
+    return (sk);
+ err:
+    X509err(X509_F_X509V3_ADD_EXT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ err2:
+    X509_EXTENSION_free(new_ex);
+    if (x != NULL && *x == NULL)
+        sk_X509_EXTENSION_free(sk);
+    return (NULL);
+}
+
+X509_EXTENSION *X509_EXTENSION_create_by_NID(X509_EXTENSION **ex, int nid,
+                                             int crit,
+                                             ASN1_OCTET_STRING *data)
+{
+    ASN1_OBJECT *obj;
+    X509_EXTENSION *ret;
+
+    obj = OBJ_nid2obj(nid);
+    if (obj == NULL) {
+        X509err(X509_F_X509_EXTENSION_CREATE_BY_NID, X509_R_UNKNOWN_NID);
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+    ret = X509_EXTENSION_create_by_OBJ(ex, obj, crit, data);
+    if (ret == NULL)
+        ASN1_OBJECT_free(obj);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+X509_EXTENSION *X509_EXTENSION_create_by_OBJ(X509_EXTENSION **ex,
+                                             const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int crit,
+                                             ASN1_OCTET_STRING *data)
+{
+    X509_EXTENSION *ret;
+
+    if ((ex == NULL) || (*ex == NULL)) {
+        if ((ret = X509_EXTENSION_new()) == NULL) {
+            X509err(X509_F_X509_EXTENSION_CREATE_BY_OBJ,
+                    ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            return (NULL);
+        }
+    } else
+        ret = *ex;
+
+    if (!X509_EXTENSION_set_object(ret, obj))
+        goto err;
+    if (!X509_EXTENSION_set_critical(ret, crit))
+        goto err;
+    if (!X509_EXTENSION_set_data(ret, data))
+        goto err;
+
+    if ((ex != NULL) && (*ex == NULL))
+        *ex = ret;
+    return (ret);
+ err:
+    if ((ex == NULL) || (ret != *ex))
+        X509_EXTENSION_free(ret);
+    return (NULL);
+}
+
+int X509_EXTENSION_set_object(X509_EXTENSION *ex, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj)
+{
+    if ((ex == NULL) || (obj == NULL))
+        return (0);
+    ASN1_OBJECT_free(ex->object);
+    ex->object = OBJ_dup(obj);
+    return ex->object != NULL;
+}
+
+int X509_EXTENSION_set_critical(X509_EXTENSION *ex, int crit)
+{
+    if (ex == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    ex->critical = (crit) ? 0xFF : -1;
+    return (1);
+}
+
+int X509_EXTENSION_set_data(X509_EXTENSION *ex, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *data)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    if (ex == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    i = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(&ex->value, data->data, data->length);
+    if (!i)
+        return (0);
+    return (1);
+}
+
+ASN1_OBJECT *X509_EXTENSION_get_object(X509_EXTENSION *ex)
+{
+    if (ex == NULL)
+        return (NULL);
+    return (ex->object);
+}
+
+ASN1_OCTET_STRING *X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_EXTENSION *ex)
+{
+    if (ex == NULL)
+        return (NULL);
+    return &ex->value;
+}
+
+int X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(const X509_EXTENSION *ex)
+{
+    if (ex == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    if (ex->critical > 0)
+        return 1;
+    return 0;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3018c69
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
@@ -0,0 +1,3277 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/lhash.h>
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <internal/dane.h>
+#include <internal/x509_int.h>
+#include "x509_lcl.h"
+
+/* CRL score values */
+
+/* No unhandled critical extensions */
+
+#define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL    0x100
+
+/* certificate is within CRL scope */
+
+#define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE         0x080
+
+/* CRL times valid */
+
+#define CRL_SCORE_TIME          0x040
+
+/* Issuer name matches certificate */
+
+#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME   0x020
+
+/* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
+
+#define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
+
+/* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
+
+#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT   0x018
+
+/* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
+
+#define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH     0x008
+
+/* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
+
+#define CRL_SCORE_AKID          0x004
+
+/* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
+
+#define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA    0x002
+
+static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e);
+static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
+static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
+static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int num_untrusted);
+static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
+static int check_dane_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth);
+static int check_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert);
+static int check_sig_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert);
+
+static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
+                         unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
+static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
+                         X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x);
+static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl,
+                         int *pcrl_score, X509_CRL *base,
+                         STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls);
+static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer,
+                           int *pcrl_score);
+static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
+                           unsigned int *preasons);
+static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
+static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
+                           STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
+                           STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path);
+
+static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+
+static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
+{
+    return ok;
+}
+
+/* Return 1 is a certificate is self signed */
+static int cert_self_signed(X509 *x)
+{
+    /*
+     * FIXME: x509v3_cache_extensions() needs to detect more failures and not
+     * set EXFLAG_SET when that happens.  Especially, if the failures are
+     * parse errors, rather than memory pressure!
+     */
+    X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
+    if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS)
+        return 1;
+    else
+        return 0;
+}
+
+/* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */
+
+static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
+{
+    STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
+    X509 *xtmp = NULL;
+    int i;
+    /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */
+    certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x));
+    if (certs == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    /* Look for exact match */
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
+        xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
+        if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x))
+            break;
+    }
+    if (i < sk_X509_num(certs))
+        X509_up_ref(xtmp);
+    else
+        xtmp = NULL;
+    sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
+    return xtmp;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Inform the verify callback of an error.
+ * If B<x> is not NULL it is the error cert, otherwise use the chain cert at
+ * B<depth>.
+ * If B<err> is not X509_V_OK, that's the error value, otherwise leave
+ * unchanged (presumably set by the caller).
+ *
+ * Returns 0 to abort verification with an error, non-zero to continue.
+ */
+static int verify_cb_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int depth, int err)
+{
+    ctx->error_depth = depth;
+    ctx->current_cert = (x != NULL) ? x : sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, depth);
+    if (err != X509_V_OK)
+        ctx->error = err;
+    return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Inform the verify callback of an error, CRL-specific variant.  Here, the
+ * error depth and certificate are already set, we just specify the error
+ * number.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 to abort verification with an error, non-zero to continue.
+ */
+static int verify_cb_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
+{
+    ctx->error = err;
+    return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+}
+
+static int check_auth_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int i;
+    int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
+
+    if (ctx->param->auth_level <= 0)
+        return 1;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) {
+        X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
+
+        /*
+         * We've already checked the security of the leaf key, so here we only
+         * check the security of issuer keys.
+         */
+        if (i > 0 && !check_key_level(ctx, cert) &&
+            verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, i, X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL) == 0)
+            return 0;
+        /*
+         * We also check the signature algorithm security of all certificates
+         * except those of the trust anchor at index num-1.
+         */
+        if (i < num - 1 && !check_sig_level(ctx, cert) &&
+            verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, i, X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK) == 0)
+            return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int err;
+    int ok;
+
+    /*
+     * Before either returning with an error, or continuing with CRL checks,
+     * instantiate chain public key parameters.
+     */
+    if ((ok = build_chain(ctx)) == 0 ||
+        (ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx)) == 0 ||
+        (ok = check_auth_level(ctx)) == 0 ||
+        (ok = check_id(ctx)) == 0 || 1)
+        X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain);
+    if (ok == 0 || (ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx)) == 0)
+        return ok;
+
+    err = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain,
+                                  ctx->param->flags);
+    if (err != X509_V_OK) {
+        if ((ok = verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, ctx->error_depth, err)) == 0)
+            return ok;
+    }
+
+    /* Verify chain signatures and expiration times */
+    ok = (ctx->verify != NULL) ? ctx->verify(ctx) : internal_verify(ctx);
+    if (!ok)
+        return ok;
+
+    if ((ok = check_name_constraints(ctx)) == 0)
+        return ok;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
+    /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
+    if ((ok = X509v3_asid_validate_path(ctx)) == 0)
+        return ok;
+    if ((ok = X509v3_addr_validate_path(ctx)) == 0)
+        return ok;
+#endif
+
+    /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
+    if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK)
+        ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
+    return ok;
+}
+
+int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
+    int ret;
+
+    if (ctx->cert == NULL) {
+        X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
+        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
+        /*
+         * This X509_STORE_CTX has already been used to verify a cert. We
+         * cannot do another one.
+         */
+        X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that
+     * the first entry is in place
+     */
+    if (((ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
+        (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert))) {
+        X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
+        return -1;
+    }
+    X509_up_ref(ctx->cert);
+    ctx->num_untrusted = 1;
+
+    /* If the peer's public key is too weak, we can stop early. */
+    if (!check_key_level(ctx, ctx->cert) &&
+        !verify_cb_cert(ctx, ctx->cert, 0, X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane))
+        ret = dane_verify(ctx);
+    else
+        ret = verify_chain(ctx);
+
+    /*
+     * Safety-net.  If we are returning an error, we must also set ctx->error,
+     * so that the chain is not considered verified should the error be ignored
+     * (e.g. TLS with SSL_VERIFY_NONE).
+     */
+    if (ret <= 0 && ctx->error == X509_V_OK)
+        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
+ */
+static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
+{
+    int i;
+    X509 *issuer, *rv = NULL;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
+        issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
+        if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer)) {
+            rv = issuer;
+            if (x509_check_cert_time(ctx, rv, -1))
+                break;
+        }
+    }
+    return rv;
+}
+
+/* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
+
+static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
+{
+    int ret;
+    if (x == issuer)
+        return cert_self_signed(x);
+    ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
+    if (ret == X509_V_OK) {
+        int i;
+        X509 *ch;
+        /* Special case: single self signed certificate */
+        if (cert_self_signed(x) && sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
+            return 1;
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
+            ch = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
+            if (ch == issuer || !X509_cmp(ch, issuer)) {
+                ret = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LOOP;
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    return (ret == X509_V_OK);
+}
+
+/* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
+
+static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
+{
+    *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
+    if (*issuer) {
+        X509_up_ref(*issuer);
+        return 1;
+    } else
+        return 0;
+}
+
+static STACK_OF(X509) *lookup_certs_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_NAME *nm)
+{
+    STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
+    X509 *x;
+    int i;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->other_ctx); i++) {
+        x = sk_X509_value(ctx->other_ctx, i);
+        if (X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_get_subject_name(x)) == 0) {
+            if (sk == NULL)
+                sk = sk_X509_new_null();
+            if (sk == NULL || sk_X509_push(sk, x) == 0) {
+                sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
+                return NULL;
+            }
+            X509_up_ref(x);
+        }
+    }
+    return sk;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check EE or CA certificate purpose.  For trusted certificates explicit local
+ * auxiliary trust can be used to override EKU-restrictions.
+ */
+static int check_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int purpose, int depth,
+                         int must_be_ca)
+{
+    int tr_ok = X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
+
+    /*
+     * For trusted certificates we want to see whether any auxiliary trust
+     * settings trump the purpose constraints.
+     *
+     * This is complicated by the fact that the trust ordinals in
+     * ctx->param->trust are entirely independent of the purpose ordinals in
+     * ctx->param->purpose!
+     *
+     * What connects them is their mutual initialization via calls from
+     * X509_STORE_CTX_set_default() into X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup() which sets
+     * related values of both param->trust and param->purpose.  It is however
+     * typically possible to infer associated trust values from a purpose value
+     * via the X509_PURPOSE API.
+     *
+     * Therefore, we can only check for trust overrides when the purpose we're
+     * checking is the same as ctx->param->purpose and ctx->param->trust is
+     * also set.
+     */
+    if (depth >= ctx->num_untrusted && purpose == ctx->param->purpose)
+        tr_ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, X509_TRUST_NO_SS_COMPAT);
+
+    switch (tr_ok) {
+    case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED:
+        return 1;
+    case X509_TRUST_REJECTED:
+        break;
+    default:
+        switch (X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0)) {
+        case 1:
+            return 1;
+        case 0:
+            break;
+        default:
+            if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) == 0)
+                return 1;
+        }
+        break;
+    }
+
+    return verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency with the supplied
+ * purpose
+ */
+
+static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int i, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
+    X509 *x;
+    int proxy_path_length = 0;
+    int purpose;
+    int allow_proxy_certs;
+    int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
+
+    /*-
+     *  must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
+     * -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
+     *     use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
+     * 0:  we only accept non-CA certificates.  This is currently not
+     *     used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
+     * 1:  we only accept CA certificates.  This is currently used for
+     *     all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
+     */
+    must_be_ca = -1;
+
+    /* CRL path validation */
+    if (ctx->parent) {
+        allow_proxy_certs = 0;
+        purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
+    } else {
+        allow_proxy_certs =
+            ! !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
+        purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
+        int ret;
+        x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
+        if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
+            && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
+            if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i,
+                                X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION))
+                return 0;
+        }
+        if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)) {
+            if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i,
+                                X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED))
+                return 0;
+        }
+        ret = X509_check_ca(x);
+        switch (must_be_ca) {
+        case -1:
+            if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
+                && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0)) {
+                ret = 0;
+                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
+            } else
+                ret = 1;
+            break;
+        case 0:
+            if (ret != 0) {
+                ret = 0;
+                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
+            } else
+                ret = 1;
+            break;
+        default:
+            /* X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT is implicit for intermediate CAs */
+            if ((ret == 0)
+                || ((i + 1 < num || ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
+                    && (ret != 1))) {
+                ret = 0;
+                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
+            } else
+                ret = 1;
+            break;
+        }
+        if (ret == 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, X509_V_OK))
+            return 0;
+        /* check_purpose() makes the callback as needed */
+        if (purpose > 0 && !check_purpose(ctx, x, purpose, i, must_be_ca))
+            return 0;
+        /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
+        if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)
+            && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
+            && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1))) {
+            if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED))
+                return 0;
+        }
+        /* Increment path length if not self issued */
+        if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
+            plen++;
+        /*
+         * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate
+         * must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate.  If not,
+         * the next certificate must be a CA certificate.
+         */
+        if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
+            /*
+             * RFC3820, 4.1.3 (b)(1) stipulates that if pCPathLengthConstraint
+             * is less than max_path_length, the former should be copied to
+             * the latter, and 4.1.4 (a) stipulates that max_path_length
+             * should be verified to be larger than zero and decrement it.
+             *
+             * Because we're checking the certs in the reverse order, we start
+             * with verifying that proxy_path_length isn't larger than pcPLC,
+             * and copy the latter to the former if it is, and finally,
+             * increment proxy_path_length.
+             */
+            if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1) {
+                if (proxy_path_length > x->ex_pcpathlen) {
+                    if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i,
+                                        X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED))
+                        return 0;
+                }
+                proxy_path_length = x->ex_pcpathlen;
+            }
+            proxy_path_length++;
+            must_be_ca = 0;
+        } else
+            must_be_ca = 1;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
+    for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+        X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
+        int j;
+
+        /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
+        if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
+            continue;
+
+        /*
+         * Proxy certificates policy has an extra constraint, where the
+         * certificate subject MUST be the issuer with a single CN entry
+         * added.
+         * (RFC 3820: 3.4, 4.1.3 (a)(4))
+         */
+        if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
+            X509_NAME *tmpsubject = X509_get_subject_name(x);
+            X509_NAME *tmpissuer = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
+            X509_NAME_ENTRY *tmpentry = NULL;
+            int last_object_nid = 0;
+            int err = X509_V_OK;
+            int last_object_loc = X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject) - 1;
+
+            /* Check that there are at least two RDNs */
+            if (last_object_loc < 1) {
+                err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
+                goto proxy_name_done;
+            }
+
+            /*
+             * Check that there is exactly one more RDN in subject as
+             * there is in issuer.
+             */
+            if (X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject)
+                != X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpissuer) + 1) {
+                err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
+                goto proxy_name_done;
+            }
+
+            /*
+             * Check that the last subject component isn't part of a
+             * multivalued RDN
+             */
+            if (X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject,
+                                                        last_object_loc))
+                == X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject,
+                                                           last_object_loc - 1))) {
+                err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
+                goto proxy_name_done;
+            }
+
+            /*
+             * Check that the last subject RDN is a commonName, and that
+             * all the previous RDNs match the issuer exactly
+             */
+            tmpsubject = X509_NAME_dup(tmpsubject);
+            if (tmpsubject == NULL) {
+                X509err(X509_F_CHECK_NAME_CONSTRAINTS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
+                return 0;
+            }
+
+            tmpentry =
+                X509_NAME_delete_entry(tmpsubject, last_object_loc);
+            last_object_nid =
+                OBJ_obj2nid(X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(tmpentry));
+
+            if (last_object_nid != NID_commonName
+                || X509_NAME_cmp(tmpsubject, tmpissuer) != 0) {
+                err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
+            }
+
+            X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(tmpentry);
+            X509_NAME_free(tmpsubject);
+
+         proxy_name_done:
+            if (err != X509_V_OK
+                && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, err))
+                return 0;
+        }
+
+        /*
+         * Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain
+         * including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed
+         * but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them
+         * to be obeyed.
+         */
+        for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--) {
+            NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
+
+            if (nc) {
+                int rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
+
+                /* If EE certificate check commonName too */
+                if (rv == X509_V_OK && i == 0)
+                    rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check_CN(x, nc);
+
+                switch (rv) {
+                case X509_V_OK:
+                    break;
+                case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
+                    return 0;
+                default:
+                    if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, rv))
+                        return 0;
+                    break;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode)
+{
+    return verify_cb_cert(ctx, ctx->cert, 0, errcode);
+}
+
+static int check_hosts(X509 *x, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm)
+{
+    int i;
+    int n = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(vpm->hosts);
+    char *name;
+
+    if (vpm->peername != NULL) {
+        OPENSSL_free(vpm->peername);
+        vpm->peername = NULL;
+    }
+    for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
+        name = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(vpm->hosts, i);
+        if (X509_check_host(x, name, 0, vpm->hostflags, &vpm->peername) > 0)
+            return 1;
+    }
+    return n == 0;
+}
+
+static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param;
+    X509 *x = ctx->cert;
+    if (vpm->hosts && check_hosts(x, vpm) <= 0) {
+        if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH))
+            return 0;
+    }
+    if (vpm->email && X509_check_email(x, vpm->email, vpm->emaillen, 0) <= 0) {
+        if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH))
+            return 0;
+    }
+    if (vpm->ip && X509_check_ip(x, vpm->ip, vpm->iplen, 0) <= 0) {
+        if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH))
+            return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int num_untrusted)
+{
+    int i;
+    X509 *x = NULL;
+    X509 *mx;
+    SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
+    int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
+    int trust;
+
+    /*
+     * Check for a DANE issuer at depth 1 or greater, if it is a DANE-TA(2)
+     * match, we're done, otherwise we'll merely record the match depth.
+     */
+    if (DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane) && num_untrusted > 0 && num_untrusted < num) {
+        switch (trust = check_dane_issuer(ctx, num_untrusted)) {
+        case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED:
+        case X509_TRUST_REJECTED:
+            return trust;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Check trusted certificates in chain at depth num_untrusted and up.
+     * Note, that depths 0..num_untrusted-1 may also contain trusted
+     * certificates, but the caller is expected to have already checked those,
+     * and wants to incrementally check just any added since.
+     */
+    for (i = num_untrusted; i < num; i++) {
+        x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
+        trust = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
+        /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */
+        if (trust == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
+            goto trusted;
+        if (trust == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
+            goto rejected;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * If we are looking at a trusted certificate, and accept partial chains,
+     * the chain is PKIX trusted.
+     */
+    if (num_untrusted < num) {
+        if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN)
+            goto trusted;
+        return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
+    }
+
+    if (num_untrusted == num && ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
+        /*
+         * Last-resort call with no new trusted certificates, check the leaf
+         * for a direct trust store match.
+         */
+        i = 0;
+        x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
+        mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x);
+        if (!mx)
+            return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
+
+        /*
+         * Check explicit auxiliary trust/reject settings.  If none are set,
+         * we'll accept X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED when not self-signed.
+         */
+        trust = X509_check_trust(mx, ctx->param->trust, 0);
+        if (trust == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) {
+            X509_free(mx);
+            goto rejected;
+        }
+
+        /* Replace leaf with trusted match */
+        (void) sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx);
+        X509_free(x);
+        ctx->num_untrusted = 0;
+        goto trusted;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and allow
+     * standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
+     */
+    return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
+
+ rejected:
+    if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED))
+        return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
+    return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
+
+ trusted:
+    if (!DANETLS_ENABLED(dane))
+        return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
+    if (dane->pdpth < 0)
+        dane->pdpth = num_untrusted;
+    /* With DANE, PKIX alone is not trusted until we have both */
+    if (dane->mdpth >= 0)
+        return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
+    return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
+}
+
+static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int i = 0, last = 0, ok = 0;
+    if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
+        return 1;
+    if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
+        last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
+    else {
+        /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
+        if (ctx->parent)
+            return 1;
+        last = 0;
+    }
+    for (i = 0; i <= last; i++) {
+        ctx->error_depth = i;
+        ok = check_cert(ctx);
+        if (!ok)
+            return ok;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
+    int ok = 0;
+    int cnum = ctx->error_depth;
+    X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
+
+    ctx->current_cert = x;
+    ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
+    ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
+    ctx->current_reasons = 0;
+
+    if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)
+        return 1;
+
+    while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) {
+        unsigned int last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
+
+        /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
+        if (ctx->get_crl)
+            ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
+        else
+            ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
+        /*
+         * If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback
+         */
+        if (!ok) {
+            ok = verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL);
+            goto done;
+        }
+        ctx->current_crl = crl;
+        ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
+        if (!ok)
+            goto done;
+
+        if (dcrl) {
+            ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
+            if (!ok)
+                goto done;
+            ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
+            if (!ok)
+                goto done;
+        } else
+            ok = 1;
+
+        /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
+        if (ok != 2) {
+            ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
+            if (!ok)
+                goto done;
+        }
+
+        X509_CRL_free(crl);
+        X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
+        crl = NULL;
+        dcrl = NULL;
+        /*
+         * If reasons not updated we won't get anywhere by another iteration,
+         * so exit loop.
+         */
+        if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons) {
+            ok = verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL);
+            goto done;
+        }
+    }
+ done:
+    X509_CRL_free(crl);
+    X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
+
+    ctx->current_crl = NULL;
+    return ok;
+}
+
+/* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
+
+static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
+{
+    time_t *ptime;
+    int i;
+
+    if (notify)
+        ctx->current_crl = crl;
+    if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
+        ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
+    else if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME)
+        return 1;
+    else
+        ptime = NULL;
+
+    i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
+    if (i == 0) {
+        if (!notify)
+            return 0;
+        if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD))
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (i > 0) {
+        if (!notify)
+            return 0;
+        if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID))
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(crl)) {
+        i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
+
+        if (i == 0) {
+            if (!notify)
+                return 0;
+            if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD))
+                return 0;
+        }
+        /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
+        if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA)) {
+            if (!notify)
+                return 0;
+            if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED))
+                return 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (notify)
+        ctx->current_crl = NULL;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
+                      X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
+                      STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
+{
+    int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
+    unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
+    X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
+    X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
+    X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
+        crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
+        reasons = *preasons;
+        crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
+        if (crl_score < best_score || crl_score == 0)
+            continue;
+        /* If current CRL is equivalent use it if it is newer */
+        if (crl_score == best_score && best_crl != NULL) {
+            int day, sec;
+            if (ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(best_crl),
+                               X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(crl)) == 0)
+                continue;
+            /*
+             * ASN1_TIME_diff never returns inconsistent signs for |day|
+             * and |sec|.
+             */
+            if (day <= 0 && sec <= 0)
+                continue;
+        }
+        best_crl = crl;
+        best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
+        best_score = crl_score;
+        best_reasons = reasons;
+    }
+
+    if (best_crl) {
+        X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
+        *pcrl = best_crl;
+        *pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
+        *pscore = best_score;
+        *preasons = best_reasons;
+        X509_CRL_up_ref(best_crl);
+        X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
+        *pdcrl = NULL;
+        get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
+    }
+
+    if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
+        return 1;
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
+ * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
+ */
+
+static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
+{
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
+    int i;
+    i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1);
+    if (i >= 0) {
+        /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
+        if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1)
+            return 0;
+        exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i));
+    } else
+        exta = NULL;
+
+    i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1);
+
+    if (i >= 0) {
+
+        if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1)
+            return 0;
+        extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i));
+    } else
+        extb = NULL;
+
+    if (!exta && !extb)
+        return 1;
+
+    if (!exta || !extb)
+        return 0;
+
+    if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb))
+        return 0;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* See if a base and delta are compatible */
+
+static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base)
+{
+    /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
+    if (!delta->base_crl_number)
+        return 0;
+    /* Base must have a CRL number */
+    if (!base->crl_number)
+        return 0;
+    /* Issuer names must match */
+    if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)))
+        return 0;
+    /* AKID and IDP must match */
+    if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier))
+        return 0;
+    if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
+        return 0;
+    /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
+    if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
+        return 0;
+    /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
+    if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
+        return 1;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or
+ * retrieve a chain of deltas...
+ */
+
+static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore,
+                         X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
+{
+    X509_CRL *delta;
+    int i;
+    if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS))
+        return;
+    if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST))
+        return;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
+        delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
+        if (check_delta_base(delta, base)) {
+            if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0))
+                *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA;
+            X509_CRL_up_ref(delta);
+            *dcrl = delta;
+            return;
+        }
+    }
+    *dcrl = NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate
+ * 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not
+ * the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is
+ * also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL
+ * is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
+ */
+
+static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
+                         unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
+{
+
+    int crl_score = 0;
+    unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;
+
+    /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
+
+    /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
+    if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
+        return 0;
+    /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
+    if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) {
+        if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS))
+            return 0;
+    } else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) {
+        /* If no new reasons reject */
+        if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
+            return 0;
+    }
+    /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
+    else if (crl->base_crl_number)
+        return 0;
+    /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
+    if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) {
+        if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT))
+            return 0;
+    } else
+        crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
+
+    if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
+        crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
+
+    /* Check expiry */
+    if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
+        crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
+
+    /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
+    crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
+
+    /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
+
+    if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID))
+        return 0;
+
+    /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
+
+    if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) {
+        /* If no new reasons reject */
+        if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
+            return 0;
+        tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
+        crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
+    }
+
+    *preasons = tmp_reasons;
+
+    return crl_score;
+
+}
+
+static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
+                           X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score)
+{
+    X509 *crl_issuer = NULL;
+    X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
+    int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
+    int i;
+
+    if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
+        cidx++;
+
+    crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
+
+    if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
+        if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) {
+            *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT;
+            *pissuer = crl_issuer;
+            return;
+        }
+    }
+
+    for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) {
+        crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
+        if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
+            continue;
+        if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
+            *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH;
+            *pissuer = crl_issuer;
+            return;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
+
+    if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
+        return;
+
+    /*
+     * Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of
+     * untrusted certificates.
+     */
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++) {
+        crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i);
+        if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
+            continue;
+        if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
+            *pissuer = crl_issuer;
+            *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
+            return;
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
+ * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
+ * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will
+ * be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice.
+ */
+
+static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
+{
+    X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
+    int ret;
+
+    /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
+    if (ctx->parent)
+        return 0;
+    if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted))
+        return -1;
+
+    crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls;
+    /* Copy verify params across */
+    X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param);
+
+    crl_ctx.parent = ctx;
+    crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb;
+
+    /* Verify CRL issuer */
+    ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
+    if (ret <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* Check chain is acceptable */
+    ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
+ err:
+    X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and
+ * certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could
+ * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised to do so. RFC5280 is more
+ * strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor,
+ * though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the
+ * RFC5280 version
+ */
+
+static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
+                           STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
+                           STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
+{
+    X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta;
+    cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
+    crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
+    if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta))
+        return 1;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
+ * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
+ * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
+ * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
+ * 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
+ */
+
+static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
+{
+    X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
+    GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
+    GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
+    int i, j;
+    if (!a || !b)
+        return 1;
+    if (a->type == 1) {
+        if (!a->dpname)
+            return 0;
+        /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
+        if (b->type == 1) {
+            if (!b->dpname)
+                return 0;
+            if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname))
+                return 1;
+            else
+                return 0;
+        }
+        /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
+        nm = a->dpname;
+        gens = b->name.fullname;
+    } else if (b->type == 1) {
+        if (!b->dpname)
+            return 0;
+        /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
+        gens = a->name.fullname;
+        nm = b->dpname;
+    }
+
+    /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
+    if (nm) {
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) {
+            gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
+            if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
+                continue;
+            if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName))
+                return 1;
+        }
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) {
+        gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
+        for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) {
+            genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
+            if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb))
+                return 1;
+        }
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+
+}
+
+static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score)
+{
+    int i;
+    X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
+    /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
+    if (!dp->CRLissuer)
+        return ! !(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME);
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) {
+        GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
+        if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
+            continue;
+        if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm))
+            return 1;
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/* Check CRLDP and IDP */
+
+static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
+                           unsigned int *preasons)
+{
+    int i;
+    if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
+        return 0;
+    if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) {
+        if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
+            return 0;
+    } else {
+        if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
+            return 0;
+    }
+    *preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) {
+        DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
+        if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) {
+            if (!crl->idp || idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) {
+                *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
+                return 1;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint)
+        && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME))
+        return 1;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try
+ * to find a delta CRL too
+ */
+
+static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
+                         X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x)
+{
+    int ok;
+    X509 *issuer = NULL;
+    int crl_score = 0;
+    unsigned int reasons;
+    X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
+    X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
+
+    reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
+    ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl,
+                    &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls);
+    if (ok)
+        goto done;
+
+    /* Lookup CRLs from store */
+
+    skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
+
+    /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
+    if (!skcrl && crl)
+        goto done;
+
+    get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
+
+    sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
+
+ done:
+    /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
+    if (crl) {
+        ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
+        ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
+        ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
+        *pcrl = crl;
+        *pdcrl = dcrl;
+        return 1;
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/* Check CRL validity */
+static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
+{
+    X509 *issuer = NULL;
+    EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
+    int cnum = ctx->error_depth;
+    int chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
+
+    /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
+    if (ctx->current_issuer)
+        issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
+    /*
+     * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next
+     * certificate in chain.
+     */
+    else if (cnum < chnum)
+        issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
+    else {
+        issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
+        /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
+        if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer) &&
+            !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER))
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (issuer == NULL)
+        return 1;
+
+    /*
+     * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done
+     */
+    if (!crl->base_crl_number) {
+        /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
+        if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
+            !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN) &&
+            !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN))
+            return 0;
+
+        if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE) &&
+            !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE))
+            return 0;
+
+        if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH) &&
+            check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0 &&
+            !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR))
+            return 0;
+
+        if ((crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) &&
+            !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION))
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME) &&
+        !check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1))
+        return 0;
+
+    /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
+    ikey = X509_get0_pubkey(issuer);
+
+    if (!ikey &&
+        !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (ikey) {
+        int rv = X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags);
+
+        if (rv != X509_V_OK && !verify_cb_crl(ctx, rv))
+            return 0;
+        /* Verify CRL signature */
+        if (X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0 &&
+            !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE))
+            return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Check certificate against CRL */
+static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
+{
+    X509_REVOKED *rev;
+
+    /*
+     * The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled
+     * critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate
+     * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extensions can
+     * change the meaning of CRL entries.
+     */
+    if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
+        && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL) &&
+        !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION))
+        return 0;
+    /*
+     * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL.  If found, make sure
+     * reason is not removeFromCRL.
+     */
+    if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x)) {
+        if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
+            return 2;
+        if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED))
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int ret;
+
+    if (ctx->parent)
+        return 1;
+    /*
+     * With DANE, the trust anchor might be a bare public key, not a
+     * certificate!  In that case our chain does not have the trust anchor
+     * certificate as a top-most element.  This comports well with RFC5280
+     * chain verification, since there too, the trust anchor is not part of the
+     * chain to be verified.  In particular, X509_policy_check() does not look
+     * at the TA cert, but assumes that it is present as the top-most chain
+     * element.  We therefore temporarily push a NULL cert onto the chain if it
+     * was verified via a bare public key, and pop it off right after the
+     * X509_policy_check() call.
+     */
+    if (ctx->bare_ta_signed && !sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, NULL)) {
+        X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
+        return 0;
+    }
+    ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
+                            ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
+    if (ctx->bare_ta_signed)
+        sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
+
+    if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL) {
+        X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
+        return 0;
+    }
+    /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
+    if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_INVALID) {
+        int i;
+
+        /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback. */
+        for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
+            X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
+
+            if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
+                continue;
+            if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i,
+                                X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION))
+                return 0;
+        }
+        return 1;
+    }
+    if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE) {
+        ctx->current_cert = NULL;
+        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
+        return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+    }
+    if (ret != X509_PCY_TREE_VALID) {
+        X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) {
+        ctx->current_cert = NULL;
+        /*
+         * Verification errors need to be "sticky", a callback may have allowed
+         * an SSL handshake to continue despite an error, and we must then
+         * remain in an error state.  Therefore, we MUST NOT clear earlier
+         * verification errors by setting the error to X509_V_OK.
+         */
+        if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Check certificate validity times.
+ * If depth >= 0, invoke verification callbacks on error, otherwise just return
+ * the validation status.
+ *
+ * Return 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+int x509_check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int depth)
+{
+    time_t *ptime;
+    int i;
+
+    if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
+        ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
+    else if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME)
+        return 1;
+    else
+        ptime = NULL;
+
+    i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get0_notBefore(x), ptime);
+    if (i >= 0 && depth < 0)
+        return 0;
+    if (i == 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth,
+                                  X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD))
+        return 0;
+    if (i > 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID))
+        return 0;
+
+    i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get0_notAfter(x), ptime);
+    if (i <= 0 && depth < 0)
+        return 0;
+    if (i == 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth,
+                                  X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD))
+        return 0;
+    if (i < 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED))
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int n = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
+    X509 *xi = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
+    X509 *xs;
+
+    /*
+     * With DANE-verified bare public key TA signatures, it remains only to
+     * check the timestamps of the top certificate.  We report the issuer as
+     * NULL, since all we have is a bare key.
+     */
+    if (ctx->bare_ta_signed) {
+        xs = xi;
+        xi = NULL;
+        goto check_cert;
+    }
+
+    if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
+        xs = xi;
+    else {
+        if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
+            xs = xi;
+            goto check_cert;
+        }
+        if (n <= 0)
+            return verify_cb_cert(ctx, xi, 0,
+                                  X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE);
+        n--;
+        ctx->error_depth = n;
+        xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Do not clear ctx->error=0, it must be "sticky", only the user's callback
+     * is allowed to reset errors (at its own peril).
+     */
+    while (n >= 0) {
+        EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+
+        /*
+         * Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless explicitly
+         * asked for.  It doesn't add any security and just wastes time.  If
+         * the issuer's public key is unusable, report the issuer certificate
+         * and its depth (rather than the depth of the subject).
+         */
+        if (xs != xi || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE)) {
+            if ((pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) {
+                if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, xi, xi != xs ? n+1 : n,
+                        X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY))
+                    return 0;
+            } else if (X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0) {
+                if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, xs, n,
+                                    X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE))
+                    return 0;
+            }
+        }
+
+ check_cert:
+        /* Calls verify callback as needed */
+        if (!x509_check_cert_time(ctx, xs, n))
+            return 0;
+
+        /*
+         * Signal success at this depth.  However, the previous error (if any)
+         * is retained.
+         */
+        ctx->current_issuer = xi;
+        ctx->current_cert = xs;
+        ctx->error_depth = n;
+        if (!ctx->verify_cb(1, ctx))
+            return 0;
+
+        if (--n >= 0) {
+            xi = xs;
+            xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
+        }
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
+{
+    return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
+}
+
+int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
+{
+    char *str;
+    ASN1_TIME atm;
+    long offset;
+    char buff1[24], buff2[24], *p;
+    int i, j, remaining;
+
+    p = buff1;
+    remaining = ctm->length;
+    str = (char *)ctm->data;
+    /*
+     * Note that the following (historical) code allows much more slack in the
+     * time format than RFC5280. In RFC5280, the representation is fixed:
+     * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ
+     * GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ
+     */
+    if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) {
+        /* YYMMDDHHMM[SS]Z or YYMMDDHHMM[SS](+-)hhmm */
+        int min_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1;
+        int max_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSS+hhmm") - 1;
+        if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length)
+            return 0;
+        memcpy(p, str, 10);
+        p += 10;
+        str += 10;
+        remaining -= 10;
+    } else {
+        /* YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.fff]]Z or YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.f[f[f]]]](+-)hhmm */
+        int min_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1;
+        int max_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSS.fff+hhmm") - 1;
+        if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length)
+            return 0;
+        memcpy(p, str, 12);
+        p += 12;
+        str += 12;
+        remaining -= 12;
+    }
+
+    if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+')) {
+        *(p++) = '0';
+        *(p++) = '0';
+    } else {
+        /* SS (seconds) */
+        if (remaining < 2)
+            return 0;
+        *(p++) = *(str++);
+        *(p++) = *(str++);
+        remaining -= 2;
+        /*
+         * Skip any (up to three) fractional seconds...
+         * TODO(emilia): in RFC5280, fractional seconds are forbidden.
+         * Can we just kill them altogether?
+         */
+        if (remaining && *str == '.') {
+            str++;
+            remaining--;
+            for (i = 0; i < 3 && remaining; i++, str++, remaining--) {
+                if (*str < '0' || *str > '9')
+                    break;
+            }
+        }
+
+    }
+    *(p++) = 'Z';
+    *(p++) = '\0';
+
+    /* We now need either a terminating 'Z' or an offset. */
+    if (!remaining)
+        return 0;
+    if (*str == 'Z') {
+        if (remaining != 1)
+            return 0;
+        offset = 0;
+    } else {
+        /* (+-)HHMM */
+        if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
+            return 0;
+        /* Historical behaviour: the (+-)hhmm offset is forbidden in RFC5280. */
+        if (remaining != 5)
+            return 0;
+        if (str[1] < '0' || str[1] > '9' || str[2] < '0' || str[2] > '9' ||
+            str[3] < '0' || str[3] > '9' || str[4] < '0' || str[4] > '9')
+            return 0;
+        offset = ((str[1] - '0') * 10 + (str[2] - '0')) * 60;
+        offset += (str[3] - '0') * 10 + (str[4] - '0');
+        if (*str == '-')
+            offset = -offset;
+    }
+    atm.type = ctm->type;
+    atm.flags = 0;
+    atm.length = sizeof(buff2);
+    atm.data = (unsigned char *)buff2;
+
+    if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset * 60, cmp_time) == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) {
+        i = (buff1[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff1[1] - '0');
+        if (i < 50)
+            i += 100;           /* cf. RFC 2459 */
+        j = (buff2[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff2[1] - '0');
+        if (j < 50)
+            j += 100;
+
+        if (i < j)
+            return -1;
+        if (i > j)
+            return 1;
+    }
+    i = strcmp(buff1, buff2);
+    if (i == 0)                 /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
+        return -1;
+    else
+        return i;
+}
+
+ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
+{
+    return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
+}
+
+ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
+{
+    return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm);
+}
+
+ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s,
+                            int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
+{
+    time_t t;
+
+    if (in_tm)
+        t = *in_tm;
+    else
+        time(&t);
+
+    if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING)) {
+        if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
+            return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
+        if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
+            return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
+    }
+    return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
+}
+
+int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY *ktmp = NULL, *ktmp2;
+    int i, j;
+
+    if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey))
+        return 1;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
+        ktmp = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, i));
+        if (ktmp == NULL) {
+            X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,
+                    X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
+            break;
+    }
+    if (ktmp == NULL) {
+        X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,
+                X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* first, populate the other certs */
+    for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--) {
+        ktmp2 = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, j));
+        EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2, ktmp);
+    }
+
+    if (pkey != NULL)
+        EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, ktmp);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */
+
+X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer,
+                        EVP_PKEY *skey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags)
+{
+    X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
+    int i;
+    STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revs = NULL;
+    /* CRLs can't be delta already */
+    if (base->base_crl_number || newer->base_crl_number) {
+        X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */
+    if (!base->crl_number || !newer->crl_number) {
+        X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    /* Issuer names must match */
+    if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer))) {
+        X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    /* AKID and IDP must match */
+    if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_authority_key_identifier)) {
+        X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) {
+        X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
+    if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer->crl_number, base->crl_number) <= 0) {
+        X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    /* CRLs must verify */
+    if (skey && (X509_CRL_verify(base, skey) <= 0 ||
+                 X509_CRL_verify(newer, skey) <= 0)) {
+        X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    /* Create new CRL */
+    crl = X509_CRL_new();
+    if (crl == NULL || !X509_CRL_set_version(crl, 1))
+        goto memerr;
+    /* Set issuer name */
+    if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer)))
+        goto memerr;
+
+    if (!X509_CRL_set1_lastUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(newer)))
+        goto memerr;
+    if (!X509_CRL_set1_nextUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(newer)))
+        goto memerr;
+
+    /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */
+
+    if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_delta_crl, base->crl_number, 1, 0))
+        goto memerr;
+
+    /*
+     * Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set CRL
+     * number to correct value too.
+     */
+
+    for (i = 0; i < X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer); i++) {
+        X509_EXTENSION *ext;
+        ext = X509_CRL_get_ext(newer, i);
+        if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl, ext, -1))
+            goto memerr;
+    }
+
+    /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */
+
+    revs = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer);
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs); i++) {
+        X509_REVOKED *rvn, *rvtmp;
+        rvn = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs, i);
+        /*
+         * Add only if not also in base. TODO: need something cleverer here
+         * for some more complex CRLs covering multiple CAs.
+         */
+        if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base, &rvtmp, &rvn->serialNumber)) {
+            rvtmp = X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn);
+            if (!rvtmp)
+                goto memerr;
+            if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, rvtmp)) {
+                X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp);
+                goto memerr;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */
+
+    if (skey && md && !X509_CRL_sign(crl, skey, md))
+        goto memerr;
+
+    return crl;
+
+ memerr:
+    X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    X509_CRL_free(crl);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
+{
+    return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, data);
+}
+
+void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
+{
+    return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx);
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->error;
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
+{
+    ctx->error = err;
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->error_depth;
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
+{
+    ctx->error_depth = depth;
+}
+
+X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->current_cert;
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
+{
+    ctx->current_cert = x;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->chain;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    if (!ctx->chain)
+        return NULL;
+    return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx->chain);
+}
+
+X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->current_issuer;
+}
+
+X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->current_crl;
+}
+
+X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->parent;
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
+{
+    ctx->cert = x;
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
+{
+    ctx->crls = sk;
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
+{
+    /*
+     * XXX: Why isn't this function always used to set the associated trust?
+     * Should there even be a VPM->trust field at all?  Or should the trust
+     * always be inferred from the purpose by X509_STORE_CTX_init().
+     */
+    return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
+{
+    /*
+     * XXX: See above, this function would only be needed when the default
+     * trust for the purpose needs an override in a corner case.
+     */
+    return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values.
+ * This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and
+ * purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't
+ * set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then
+ * be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL
+ * structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the
+ * application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL
+ * client/server.
+ */
+
+int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
+                                   int purpose, int trust)
+{
+    int idx;
+    /* If purpose not set use default */
+    if (!purpose)
+        purpose = def_purpose;
+    /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
+    if (purpose) {
+        X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
+        idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
+        if (idx == -1) {
+            X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
+                    X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
+        if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) {
+            idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
+            /*
+             * XXX: In the two callers above def_purpose is always 0, which is
+             * not a known value, so idx will always be -1.  How is the
+             * X509_TRUST_DEFAULT case actually supposed to be handled?
+             */
+            if (idx == -1) {
+                X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
+                        X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
+                return 0;
+            }
+            ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
+        }
+        /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
+        if (!trust)
+            trust = ptmp->trust;
+    }
+    if (trust) {
+        idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
+        if (idx == -1) {
+            X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
+                    X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose)
+        ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
+    if (trust && !ctx->param->trust)
+        ctx->param->trust = trust;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
+{
+    X509_STORE_CTX *ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx));
+
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+        X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    return ctx;
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        return;
+
+    X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
+    OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
+                        STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
+{
+    int ret = 1;
+
+    ctx->ctx = store;
+    ctx->cert = x509;
+    ctx->untrusted = chain;
+    ctx->crls = NULL;
+    ctx->num_untrusted = 0;
+    ctx->other_ctx = NULL;
+    ctx->valid = 0;
+    ctx->chain = NULL;
+    ctx->error = 0;
+    ctx->explicit_policy = 0;
+    ctx->error_depth = 0;
+    ctx->current_cert = NULL;
+    ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
+    ctx->current_crl = NULL;
+    ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
+    ctx->current_reasons = 0;
+    ctx->tree = NULL;
+    ctx->parent = NULL;
+    ctx->dane = NULL;
+    ctx->bare_ta_signed = 0;
+    /* Zero ex_data to make sure we're cleanup-safe */
+    memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(ctx->ex_data));
+
+    /* store->cleanup is always 0 in OpenSSL, if set must be idempotent */
+    if (store)
+        ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
+    else
+        ctx->cleanup = 0;
+
+    if (store && store->check_issued)
+        ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
+    else
+        ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
+
+    if (store && store->get_issuer)
+        ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
+    else
+        ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
+
+    if (store && store->verify_cb)
+        ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
+    else
+        ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
+
+    if (store && store->verify)
+        ctx->verify = store->verify;
+    else
+        ctx->verify = internal_verify;
+
+    if (store && store->check_revocation)
+        ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
+    else
+        ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
+
+    if (store && store->get_crl)
+        ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
+    else
+        ctx->get_crl = NULL;
+
+    if (store && store->check_crl)
+        ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
+    else
+        ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
+
+    if (store && store->cert_crl)
+        ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
+    else
+        ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
+
+    if (store && store->check_policy)
+        ctx->check_policy = store->check_policy;
+    else
+        ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
+
+    if (store && store->lookup_certs)
+        ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
+    else
+        ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_certs;
+
+    if (store && store->lookup_crls)
+        ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
+    else
+        ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_crls;
+
+    ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
+    if (ctx->param == NULL) {
+        X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults.
+     */
+    if (store)
+        ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
+    else
+        ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT | X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
+
+    if (ret)
+        ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
+                                        X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
+
+    if (ret == 0) {
+        X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * XXX: For now, continue to inherit trust from VPM, but infer from the
+     * purpose if this still yields the default value.
+     */
+    if (ctx->param->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) {
+        int idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(ctx->param->purpose);
+        X509_PURPOSE *xp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
+
+        if (xp != NULL)
+            ctx->param->trust = X509_PURPOSE_get_trust(xp);
+    }
+
+    if (CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
+                           &ctx->ex_data))
+        return 1;
+    X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+
+ err:
+    /*
+     * On error clean up allocated storage, if the store context was not
+     * allocated with X509_STORE_CTX_new() this is our last chance to do so.
+     */
+    X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This
+ * avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
+ */
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
+{
+    ctx->other_ctx = sk;
+    ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
+    ctx->lookup_certs = lookup_certs_sk;
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    /*
+     * We need to be idempotent because, unfortunately, free() also calls
+     * cleanup(), so the natural call sequence new(), init(), cleanup(), free()
+     * calls cleanup() for the same object twice!  Thus we must zero the
+     * pointers below after they're freed!
+     */
+    /* Seems to always be 0 in OpenSSL, do this at most once. */
+    if (ctx->cleanup != NULL) {
+        ctx->cleanup(ctx);
+        ctx->cleanup = NULL;
+    }
+    if (ctx->param != NULL) {
+        if (ctx->parent == NULL)
+            X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
+        ctx->param = NULL;
+    }
+    X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
+    ctx->tree = NULL;
+    sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free);
+    ctx->chain = NULL;
+    CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
+    memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(ctx->ex_data));
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
+{
+    X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
+{
+    X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags,
+                             time_t t)
+{
+    X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
+}
+
+X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->cert;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->untrusted;
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
+{
+    ctx->untrusted = sk;
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_verified_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
+{
+    sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free);
+    ctx->chain = sk;
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
+                                  X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb verify_cb)
+{
+    ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb;
+}
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->verify_cb;
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
+                               X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn verify)
+{
+    ctx->verify = verify;
+}
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->verify;
+}
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_issuer_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_get_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->get_issuer;
+}
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_check_issued_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->check_issued;
+}
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_check_revocation_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->check_revocation;
+}
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_crl_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_get_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->get_crl;
+}
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_check_crl_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->check_crl;
+}
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_cert_crl_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->cert_crl;
+}
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_check_policy_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->check_policy;
+}
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_certs_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_certs(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->lookup_certs;
+}
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_crls_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->lookup_crls;
+}
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->cleanup;
+}
+
+X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->tree;
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->explicit_policy;
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->num_untrusted;
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
+{
+    const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
+    param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
+    if (!param)
+        return 0;
+    return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
+}
+
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->param;
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
+{
+    X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
+    ctx->param = param;
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_dane(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, SSL_DANE *dane)
+{
+    ctx->dane = dane;
+}
+
+static unsigned char *dane_i2d(
+    X509 *cert,
+    uint8_t selector,
+    unsigned int *i2dlen)
+{
+    unsigned char *buf = NULL;
+    int len;
+
+    /*
+     * Extract ASN.1 DER form of certificate or public key.
+     */
+    switch (selector) {
+    case DANETLS_SELECTOR_CERT:
+        len = i2d_X509(cert, &buf);
+        break;
+    case DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI:
+        len = i2d_X509_PUBKEY(X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(cert), &buf);
+        break;
+    default:
+        X509err(X509_F_DANE_I2D, X509_R_BAD_SELECTOR);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    if (len < 0 || buf == NULL) {
+        X509err(X509_F_DANE_I2D, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    *i2dlen = (unsigned int)len;
+    return buf;
+}
+
+#define DANETLS_NONE 256        /* impossible uint8_t */
+
+static int dane_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert, int depth)
+{
+    SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
+    unsigned usage = DANETLS_NONE;
+    unsigned selector = DANETLS_NONE;
+    unsigned ordinal = DANETLS_NONE;
+    unsigned mtype = DANETLS_NONE;
+    unsigned char *i2dbuf = NULL;
+    unsigned int i2dlen = 0;
+    unsigned char mdbuf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+    unsigned char *cmpbuf = NULL;
+    unsigned int cmplen = 0;
+    int i;
+    int recnum;
+    int matched = 0;
+    danetls_record *t = NULL;
+    uint32_t mask;
+
+    mask = (depth == 0) ? DANETLS_EE_MASK : DANETLS_TA_MASK;
+
+    /*
+     * The trust store is not applicable with DANE-TA(2)
+     */
+    if (depth >= ctx->num_untrusted)
+        mask &= DANETLS_PKIX_MASK;
+
+    /*
+     * If we've previously matched a PKIX-?? record, no need to test any
+     * further PKIX-?? records, it remains to just build the PKIX chain.
+     * Had the match been a DANE-?? record, we'd be done already.
+     */
+    if (dane->mdpth >= 0)
+        mask &= ~DANETLS_PKIX_MASK;
+
+    /*-
+     * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.1
+     * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.2
+     * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.3
+     * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.4
+     *
+     * We handle DANE-EE(3) records first as they require no chain building
+     * and no expiration or hostname checks.  We also process digests with
+     * higher ordinals first and ignore lower priorities except Full(0) which
+     * is always processed (last).  If none match, we then process PKIX-EE(1).
+     *
+     * NOTE: This relies on DANE usages sorting before the corresponding PKIX
+     * usages in SSL_dane_tlsa_add(), and also on descending sorting of digest
+     * priorities.  See twin comment in ssl/ssl_lib.c.
+     *
+     * We expect that most TLSA RRsets will have just a single usage, so we
+     * don't go out of our way to cache multiple selector-specific i2d buffers
+     * across usages, but if the selector happens to remain the same as switch
+     * usages, that's OK.  Thus, a set of "3 1 1", "3 0 1", "1 1 1", "1 0 1",
+     * records would result in us generating each of the certificate and public
+     * key DER forms twice, but more typically we'd just see multiple "3 1 1"
+     * or multiple "3 0 1" records.
+     *
+     * As soon as we find a match at any given depth, we stop, because either
+     * we've matched a DANE-?? record and the peer is authenticated, or, after
+     * exhausting all DANE-?? records, we've matched a PKIX-?? record, which is
+     * sufficient for DANE, and what remains to do is ordinary PKIX validation.
+     */
+    recnum = (dane->umask & mask) ? sk_danetls_record_num(dane->trecs) : 0;
+    for (i = 0; matched == 0 && i < recnum; ++i) {
+        t = sk_danetls_record_value(dane->trecs, i);
+        if ((DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(t->usage) & mask) == 0)
+            continue;
+        if (t->usage != usage) {
+            usage = t->usage;
+
+            /* Reset digest agility for each usage/selector pair */
+            mtype = DANETLS_NONE;
+            ordinal = dane->dctx->mdord[t->mtype];
+        }
+        if (t->selector != selector) {
+            selector = t->selector;
+
+            /* Update per-selector state */
+            OPENSSL_free(i2dbuf);
+            i2dbuf = dane_i2d(cert, selector, &i2dlen);
+            if (i2dbuf == NULL)
+                return -1;
+
+            /* Reset digest agility for each usage/selector pair */
+            mtype = DANETLS_NONE;
+            ordinal = dane->dctx->mdord[t->mtype];
+        } else if (t->mtype != DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL) {
+            /*-
+             * Digest agility:
+             *
+             *     <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-9>
+             *
+             * For a fixed selector, after processing all records with the
+             * highest mtype ordinal, ignore all mtypes with lower ordinals
+             * other than "Full".
+             */
+            if (dane->dctx->mdord[t->mtype] < ordinal)
+                continue;
+        }
+
+        /*
+         * Each time we hit a (new selector or) mtype, re-compute the relevant
+         * digest, more complex caching is not worth the code space.
+         */
+        if (t->mtype != mtype) {
+            const EVP_MD *md = dane->dctx->mdevp[mtype = t->mtype];
+            cmpbuf = i2dbuf;
+            cmplen = i2dlen;
+
+            if (md != NULL) {
+                cmpbuf = mdbuf;
+                if (!EVP_Digest(i2dbuf, i2dlen, cmpbuf, &cmplen, md, 0)) {
+                    matched = -1;
+                    break;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
+        /*
+         * Squirrel away the certificate and depth if we have a match.  Any
+         * DANE match is dispositive, but with PKIX we still need to build a
+         * full chain.
+         */
+        if (cmplen == t->dlen &&
+            memcmp(cmpbuf, t->data, cmplen) == 0) {
+            if (DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(usage) & DANETLS_DANE_MASK)
+                matched = 1;
+            if (matched || dane->mdpth < 0) {
+                dane->mdpth = depth;
+                dane->mtlsa = t;
+                OPENSSL_free(dane->mcert);
+                dane->mcert = cert;
+                X509_up_ref(cert);
+            }
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* Clear the one-element DER cache */
+    OPENSSL_free(i2dbuf);
+    return matched;
+}
+
+static int check_dane_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
+{
+    SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
+    int matched = 0;
+    X509 *cert;
+
+    if (!DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane) || depth == 0)
+        return  X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
+
+    /*
+     * Record any DANE trust-anchor matches, for the first depth to test, if
+     * there's one at that depth. (This'll be false for length 1 chains looking
+     * for an exact match for the leaf certificate).
+     */
+    cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, depth);
+    if (cert != NULL && (matched = dane_match(ctx, cert, depth)) < 0)
+        return  X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
+    if (matched > 0) {
+        ctx->num_untrusted = depth - 1;
+        return  X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
+    }
+
+    return  X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
+}
+
+static int check_dane_pkeys(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
+    danetls_record *t;
+    int num = ctx->num_untrusted;
+    X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
+    int recnum = sk_danetls_record_num(dane->trecs);
+    int i;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < recnum; ++i) {
+        t = sk_danetls_record_value(dane->trecs, i);
+        if (t->usage != DANETLS_USAGE_DANE_TA ||
+            t->selector != DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI ||
+            t->mtype != DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL ||
+            X509_verify(cert, t->spki) <= 0)
+            continue;
+
+        /* Clear any PKIX-?? matches that failed to extend to a full chain */
+        X509_free(dane->mcert);
+        dane->mcert = NULL;
+
+        /* Record match via a bare TA public key */
+        ctx->bare_ta_signed = 1;
+        dane->mdpth = num - 1;
+        dane->mtlsa = t;
+
+        /* Prune any excess chain certificates */
+        num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
+        for (; num > ctx->num_untrusted; --num)
+            X509_free(sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain));
+
+        return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
+    }
+
+    return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
+}
+
+static void dane_reset(SSL_DANE *dane)
+{
+    /*
+     * Reset state to verify another chain, or clear after failure.
+     */
+    X509_free(dane->mcert);
+    dane->mcert = NULL;
+    dane->mtlsa = NULL;
+    dane->mdpth = -1;
+    dane->pdpth = -1;
+}
+
+static int check_leaf_suiteb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
+{
+    int err = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, cert, NULL, ctx->param->flags);
+
+    if (err == X509_V_OK)
+        return 1;
+    return verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, 0, err);
+}
+
+static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    X509 *cert = ctx->cert;
+    SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
+    int matched;
+    int done;
+
+    dane_reset(dane);
+
+    /*-
+     * When testing the leaf certificate, if we match a DANE-EE(3) record,
+     * dane_match() returns 1 and we're done.  If however we match a PKIX-EE(1)
+     * record, the match depth and matching TLSA record are recorded, but the
+     * return value is 0, because we still need to find a PKIX trust-anchor.
+     * Therefore, when DANE authentication is enabled (required), we're done
+     * if:
+     *   + matched < 0, internal error.
+     *   + matched == 1, we matched a DANE-EE(3) record
+     *   + matched == 0, mdepth < 0 (no PKIX-EE match) and there are no
+     *     DANE-TA(2) or PKIX-TA(0) to test.
+     */
+    matched = dane_match(ctx, ctx->cert, 0);
+    done = matched != 0 || (!DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane) && dane->mdpth < 0);
+
+    if (done)
+        X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain);
+
+    if (matched > 0) {
+        /* Callback invoked as needed */
+        if (!check_leaf_suiteb(ctx, cert))
+            return 0;
+        /* Callback invoked as needed */
+        if ((dane->flags & DANE_FLAG_NO_DANE_EE_NAMECHECKS) == 0 &&
+            !check_id(ctx))
+            return 0;
+        /* Bypass internal_verify(), issue depth 0 success callback */
+        ctx->error_depth = 0;
+        ctx->current_cert = cert;
+        return ctx->verify_cb(1, ctx);
+    }
+
+    if (matched < 0) {
+        ctx->error_depth = 0;
+        ctx->current_cert = cert;
+        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (done) {
+        /* Fail early, TA-based success is not possible */
+        if (!check_leaf_suiteb(ctx, cert))
+            return 0;
+        return verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, 0, X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Chain verification for usages 0/1/2.  TLSA record matching of depth > 0
+     * certificates happens in-line with building the rest of the chain.
+     */
+    return verify_chain(ctx);
+}
+
+/* Get issuer, without duplicate suppression */
+static int get_issuer(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
+{
+    STACK_OF(X509) *saved_chain = ctx->chain;
+    int ok;
+
+    ctx->chain = NULL;
+    ok = ctx->get_issuer(issuer, ctx, cert);
+    ctx->chain = saved_chain;
+
+    return ok;
+}
+
+static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
+    int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
+    X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
+    int ss = cert_self_signed(cert);
+    STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp = NULL;
+    unsigned int search;
+    int may_trusted = 0;
+    int may_alternate = 0;
+    int trust = X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
+    int alt_untrusted = 0;
+    int depth;
+    int ok = 0;
+    int i;
+
+    /* Our chain starts with a single untrusted element. */
+    OPENSSL_assert(num == 1 && ctx->num_untrusted == num);
+
+#define S_DOUNTRUSTED      (1 << 0)     /* Search untrusted chain */
+#define S_DOTRUSTED        (1 << 1)     /* Search trusted store */
+#define S_DOALTERNATE      (1 << 2)     /* Retry with pruned alternate chain */
+    /*
+     * Set up search policy, untrusted if possible, trusted-first if enabled.
+     * If we're doing DANE and not doing PKIX-TA/PKIX-EE, we never look in the
+     * trust_store, otherwise we might look there first.  If not trusted-first,
+     * and alternate chains are not disabled, try building an alternate chain
+     * if no luck with untrusted first.
+     */
+    search = (ctx->untrusted != NULL) ? S_DOUNTRUSTED : 0;
+    if (DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane) || !DANETLS_HAS_DANE(dane)) {
+        if (search == 0 || ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST)
+            search |= S_DOTRUSTED;
+        else if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS))
+            may_alternate = 1;
+        may_trusted = 1;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Shallow-copy the stack of untrusted certificates (with TLS, this is
+     * typically the content of the peer's certificate message) so can make
+     * multiple passes over it, while free to remove elements as we go.
+     */
+    if (ctx->untrusted && (sktmp = sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) {
+        X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * If we got any "DANE-TA(2) Cert(0) Full(0)" trust-anchors from DNS, add
+     * them to our working copy of the untrusted certificate stack.  Since the
+     * caller of X509_STORE_CTX_init() may have provided only a leaf cert with
+     * no corresponding stack of untrusted certificates, we may need to create
+     * an empty stack first.  [ At present only the ssl library provides DANE
+     * support, and ssl_verify_cert_chain() always provides a non-null stack
+     * containing at least the leaf certificate, but we must be prepared for
+     * this to change. ]
+     */
+    if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) && dane->certs != NULL) {
+        if (sktmp == NULL && (sktmp = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
+            X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
+            return 0;
+        }
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(dane->certs); ++i) {
+            if (!sk_X509_push(sktmp, sk_X509_value(dane->certs, i))) {
+                sk_X509_free(sktmp);
+                X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
+                return 0;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Still absurdly large, but arithmetically safe, a lower hard upper bound
+     * might be reasonable.
+     */
+    if (ctx->param->depth > INT_MAX/2)
+        ctx->param->depth = INT_MAX/2;
+
+    /*
+     * Try to Extend the chain until we reach an ultimately trusted issuer.
+     * Build chains up to one longer the limit, later fail if we hit the limit,
+     * with an X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code.
+     */
+    depth = ctx->param->depth + 1;
+
+    while (search != 0) {
+        X509 *x;
+        X509 *xtmp = NULL;
+
+        /*
+         * Look in the trust store if enabled for first lookup, or we've run
+         * out of untrusted issuers and search here is not disabled.  When we
+         * reach the depth limit, we stop extending the chain, if by that point
+         * we've not found a trust-anchor, any trusted chain would be too long.
+         *
+         * The error reported to the application verify callback is at the
+         * maximal valid depth with the current certificate equal to the last
+         * not ultimately-trusted issuer.  For example, with verify_depth = 0,
+         * the callback will report errors at depth=1 when the immediate issuer
+         * of the leaf certificate is not a trust anchor.  No attempt will be
+         * made to locate an issuer for that certificate, since such a chain
+         * would be a-priori too long.
+         */
+        if ((search & S_DOTRUSTED) != 0) {
+            i = num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
+            if ((search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0) {
+                /*
+                 * As high up the chain as we can, look for an alternative
+                 * trusted issuer of an untrusted certificate that currently
+                 * has an untrusted issuer.  We use the alt_untrusted variable
+                 * to track how far up the chain we find the first match.  It
+                 * is only if and when we find a match, that we prune the chain
+                 * and reset ctx->num_untrusted to the reduced count of
+                 * untrusted certificates.  While we're searching for such a
+                 * match (which may never be found), it is neither safe nor
+                 * wise to preemptively modify either the chain or
+                 * ctx->num_untrusted.
+                 *
+                 * Note, like ctx->num_untrusted, alt_untrusted is a count of
+                 * untrusted certificates, not a "depth".
+                 */
+                i = alt_untrusted;
+            }
+            x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i-1);
+
+            ok = (depth < num) ? 0 : get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
+
+            if (ok < 0) {
+                trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
+                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP;
+                search = 0;
+                continue;
+            }
+
+            if (ok > 0) {
+                /*
+                 * Alternative trusted issuer for a mid-chain untrusted cert?
+                 * Pop the untrusted cert's successors and retry.  We might now
+                 * be able to complete a valid chain via the trust store.  Note
+                 * that despite the current trust-store match we might still
+                 * fail complete the chain to a suitable trust-anchor, in which
+                 * case we may prune some more untrusted certificates and try
+                 * again.  Thus the S_DOALTERNATE bit may yet be turned on
+                 * again with an even shorter untrusted chain!
+                 *
+                 * If in the process we threw away our matching PKIX-TA trust
+                 * anchor, reset DANE trust.  We might find a suitable trusted
+                 * certificate among the ones from the trust store.
+                 */
+                if ((search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0) {
+                    OPENSSL_assert(num > i && i > 0 && ss == 0);
+                    search &= ~S_DOALTERNATE;
+                    for (; num > i; --num)
+                        X509_free(sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain));
+                    ctx->num_untrusted = num;
+
+                    if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) &&
+                        dane->mdpth >= ctx->num_untrusted) {
+                        dane->mdpth = -1;
+                        X509_free(dane->mcert);
+                        dane->mcert = NULL;
+                    }
+                    if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) &&
+                        dane->pdpth >= ctx->num_untrusted)
+                        dane->pdpth = -1;
+                }
+
+                /*
+                 * Self-signed untrusted certificates get replaced by their
+                 * trusted matching issuer.  Otherwise, grow the chain.
+                 */
+                if (ss == 0) {
+                    if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x = xtmp)) {
+                        X509_free(xtmp);
+                        X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                        trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
+                        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
+                        search = 0;
+                        continue;
+                    }
+                    ss = cert_self_signed(x);
+                } else if (num == ctx->num_untrusted) {
+                    /*
+                     * We have a self-signed certificate that has the same
+                     * subject name (and perhaps keyid and/or serial number) as
+                     * a trust-anchor.  We must have an exact match to avoid
+                     * possible impersonation via key substitution etc.
+                     */
+                    if (X509_cmp(x, xtmp) != 0) {
+                        /* Self-signed untrusted mimic. */
+                        X509_free(xtmp);
+                        ok = 0;
+                    } else {
+                        X509_free(x);
+                        ctx->num_untrusted = --num;
+                        (void) sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, num, x = xtmp);
+                    }
+                }
+
+                /*
+                 * We've added a new trusted certificate to the chain, recheck
+                 * trust.  If not done, and not self-signed look deeper.
+                 * Whether or not we're doing "trusted first", we no longer
+                 * look for untrusted certificates from the peer's chain.
+                 *
+                 * At this point ctx->num_trusted and num must reflect the
+                 * correct number of untrusted certificates, since the DANE
+                 * logic in check_trust() depends on distinguishing CAs from
+                 * "the wire" from CAs from the trust store.  In particular, the
+                 * certificate at depth "num" should be the new trusted
+                 * certificate with ctx->num_untrusted <= num.
+                 */
+                if (ok) {
+                    OPENSSL_assert(ctx->num_untrusted <= num);
+                    search &= ~S_DOUNTRUSTED;
+                    switch (trust = check_trust(ctx, num)) {
+                    case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED:
+                    case X509_TRUST_REJECTED:
+                        search = 0;
+                        continue;
+                    }
+                    if (ss == 0)
+                        continue;
+                }
+            }
+
+            /*
+             * No dispositive decision, and either self-signed or no match, if
+             * we were doing untrusted-first, and alt-chains are not disabled,
+             * do that, by repeatedly losing one untrusted element at a time,
+             * and trying to extend the shorted chain.
+             */
+            if ((search & S_DOUNTRUSTED) == 0) {
+                /* Continue search for a trusted issuer of a shorter chain? */
+                if ((search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0 && --alt_untrusted > 0)
+                    continue;
+                /* Still no luck and no fallbacks left? */
+                if (!may_alternate || (search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0 ||
+                    ctx->num_untrusted < 2)
+                    break;
+                /* Search for a trusted issuer of a shorter chain */
+                search |= S_DOALTERNATE;
+                alt_untrusted = ctx->num_untrusted - 1;
+                ss = 0;
+            }
+        }
+
+        /*
+         * Extend chain with peer-provided certificates
+         */
+        if ((search & S_DOUNTRUSTED) != 0) {
+            num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
+            OPENSSL_assert(num == ctx->num_untrusted);
+            x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num-1);
+
+            /*
+             * Once we run out of untrusted issuers, we stop looking for more
+             * and start looking only in the trust store if enabled.
+             */
+            xtmp = (ss || depth < num) ? NULL : find_issuer(ctx, sktmp, x);
+            if (xtmp == NULL) {
+                search &= ~S_DOUNTRUSTED;
+                if (may_trusted)
+                    search |= S_DOTRUSTED;
+                continue;
+            }
+
+            /* Drop this issuer from future consideration */
+            (void) sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp, xtmp);
+
+            if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, xtmp)) {
+                X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
+                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
+                search = 0;
+                continue;
+            }
+
+            X509_up_ref(x = xtmp);
+            ++ctx->num_untrusted;
+            ss = cert_self_signed(xtmp);
+
+            /*
+             * Check for DANE-TA trust of the topmost untrusted certificate.
+             */
+            switch (trust = check_dane_issuer(ctx, ctx->num_untrusted - 1)) {
+            case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED:
+            case X509_TRUST_REJECTED:
+                search = 0;
+                continue;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    sk_X509_free(sktmp);
+
+    /*
+     * Last chance to make a trusted chain, either bare DANE-TA public-key
+     * signers, or else direct leaf PKIX trust.
+     */
+    num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
+    if (num <= depth) {
+        if (trust == X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED && DANETLS_HAS_DANE_TA(dane))
+            trust = check_dane_pkeys(ctx);
+        if (trust == X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED && num == ctx->num_untrusted)
+            trust = check_trust(ctx, num);
+    }
+
+    switch (trust) {
+    case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED:
+        return 1;
+    case X509_TRUST_REJECTED:
+        /* Callback already issued */
+        return 0;
+    case X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED:
+    default:
+        num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
+        if (num > depth)
+            return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1,
+                                  X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG);
+        if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) &&
+            (!DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane) || dane->pdpth >= 0))
+            return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1, X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH);
+        if (ss && sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
+            return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1,
+                                  X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT);
+        if (ss)
+            return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1,
+                                  X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN);
+        if (ctx->num_untrusted < num)
+            return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1,
+                                  X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT);
+        return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1,
+                              X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY);
+    }
+}
+
+static const int minbits_table[] = { 80, 112, 128, 192, 256 };
+static const int NUM_AUTH_LEVELS = OSSL_NELEM(minbits_table);
+
+/*
+ * Check whether the public key of ``cert`` meets the security level of
+ * ``ctx``.
+ *
+ * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+static int check_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(cert);
+    int level = ctx->param->auth_level;
+
+    /* Unsupported or malformed keys are not secure */
+    if (pkey == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    if (level <= 0)
+        return 1;
+    if (level > NUM_AUTH_LEVELS)
+        level = NUM_AUTH_LEVELS;
+
+    return EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey) >= minbits_table[level - 1];
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check whether the signature digest algorithm of ``cert`` meets the security
+ * level of ``ctx``.  Should not be checked for trust anchors (whether
+ * self-signed or otherwise).
+ *
+ * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+static int check_sig_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
+{
+    int nid = X509_get_signature_nid(cert);
+    int mdnid = NID_undef;
+    int secbits = -1;
+    int level = ctx->param->auth_level;
+
+    if (level <= 0)
+        return 1;
+    if (level > NUM_AUTH_LEVELS)
+        level = NUM_AUTH_LEVELS;
+
+    /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
+    if (nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(nid, &mdnid, NULL)) {
+        const EVP_MD *md;
+
+        /* Assume 4 bits of collision resistance for each hash octet */
+        if (mdnid != NID_undef && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(mdnid)) != NULL)
+            secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
+    }
+
+    return secbits >= minbits_table[level - 1];
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x509_vpm.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x509_vpm.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b506722
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x509_vpm.c
@@ -0,0 +1,617 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/lhash.h>
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include "internal/x509_int.h"
+
+#include "x509_lcl.h"
+
+/* X509_VERIFY_PARAM functions */
+
+#define SET_HOST 0
+#define ADD_HOST 1
+
+static char *str_copy(const char *s)
+{
+    return OPENSSL_strdup(s);
+}
+
+static void str_free(char *s)
+{
+    OPENSSL_free(s);
+}
+
+static int int_x509_param_set_hosts(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm, int mode,
+                                    const char *name, size_t namelen)
+{
+    char *copy;
+
+    /*
+     * Refuse names with embedded NUL bytes, except perhaps as final byte.
+     * XXX: Do we need to push an error onto the error stack?
+     */
+    if (namelen == 0 || name == NULL)
+        namelen = name ? strlen(name) : 0;
+    else if (name && memchr(name, '\0', namelen > 1 ? namelen - 1 : namelen))
+        return 0;
+    if (namelen > 0 && name[namelen - 1] == '\0')
+        --namelen;
+
+    if (mode == SET_HOST) {
+        sk_OPENSSL_STRING_pop_free(vpm->hosts, str_free);
+        vpm->hosts = NULL;
+    }
+    if (name == NULL || namelen == 0)
+        return 1;
+
+    copy = OPENSSL_strndup(name, namelen);
+    if (copy == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    if (vpm->hosts == NULL &&
+        (vpm->hosts = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null()) == NULL) {
+        OPENSSL_free(copy);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (!sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(vpm->hosts, copy)) {
+        OPENSSL_free(copy);
+        if (sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(vpm->hosts) == 0) {
+            sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(vpm->hosts);
+            vpm->hosts = NULL;
+        }
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static void x509_verify_param_zero(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
+{
+    if (!param)
+        return;
+    param->name = NULL;
+    param->purpose = 0;
+    param->trust = X509_TRUST_DEFAULT;
+    /*
+     * param->inh_flags = X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT;
+     */
+    param->inh_flags = 0;
+    param->flags = 0;
+    param->depth = -1;
+    param->auth_level = -1; /* -1 means unset, 0 is explicit */
+    sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(param->policies, ASN1_OBJECT_free);
+    param->policies = NULL;
+    sk_OPENSSL_STRING_pop_free(param->hosts, str_free);
+    param->hosts = NULL;
+    OPENSSL_free(param->peername);
+    param->peername = NULL;
+    OPENSSL_free(param->email);
+    param->email = NULL;
+    param->emaillen = 0;
+    OPENSSL_free(param->ip);
+    param->ip = NULL;
+    param->iplen = 0;
+}
+
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(void)
+{
+    X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
+
+    param = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*param));
+    if (param == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    x509_verify_param_zero(param);
+    return param;
+}
+
+void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
+{
+    if (!param)
+        return;
+    x509_verify_param_zero(param);
+    OPENSSL_free(param);
+}
+
+/*-
+ * This function determines how parameters are "inherited" from one structure
+ * to another. There are several different ways this can happen.
+ *
+ * 1. If a child structure needs to have its values initialized from a parent
+ *    they are simply copied across. For example SSL_CTX copied to SSL.
+ * 2. If the structure should take on values only if they are currently unset.
+ *    For example the values in an SSL structure will take appropriate value
+ *    for SSL servers or clients but only if the application has not set new
+ *    ones.
+ *
+ * The "inh_flags" field determines how this function behaves.
+ *
+ * Normally any values which are set in the default are not copied from the
+ * destination and verify flags are ORed together.
+ *
+ * If X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT is set then anything set in the source is copied
+ * to the destination. Effectively the values in "to" become default values
+ * which will be used only if nothing new is set in "from".
+ *
+ * If X509_VP_FLAG_OVERWRITE is set then all value are copied across whether
+ * they are set or not. Flags is still Ored though.
+ *
+ * If X509_VP_FLAG_RESET_FLAGS is set then the flags value is copied instead
+ * of ORed.
+ *
+ * If X509_VP_FLAG_LOCKED is set then no values are copied.
+ *
+ * If X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE is set then the current inh_flags setting is zeroed
+ * after the next call.
+ */
+
+/* Macro to test if a field should be copied from src to dest */
+
+#define test_x509_verify_param_copy(field, def) \
+        (to_overwrite || \
+                ((src->field != def) && (to_default || (dest->field == def))))
+
+/* Macro to test and copy a field if necessary */
+
+#define x509_verify_param_copy(field, def) \
+        if (test_x509_verify_param_copy(field, def)) \
+                dest->field = src->field
+
+int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *dest,
+                              const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *src)
+{
+    unsigned long inh_flags;
+    int to_default, to_overwrite;
+    if (!src)
+        return 1;
+    inh_flags = dest->inh_flags | src->inh_flags;
+
+    if (inh_flags & X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE)
+        dest->inh_flags = 0;
+
+    if (inh_flags & X509_VP_FLAG_LOCKED)
+        return 1;
+
+    if (inh_flags & X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT)
+        to_default = 1;
+    else
+        to_default = 0;
+
+    if (inh_flags & X509_VP_FLAG_OVERWRITE)
+        to_overwrite = 1;
+    else
+        to_overwrite = 0;
+
+    x509_verify_param_copy(purpose, 0);
+    x509_verify_param_copy(trust, X509_TRUST_DEFAULT);
+    x509_verify_param_copy(depth, -1);
+    x509_verify_param_copy(auth_level, -1);
+
+    /* If overwrite or check time not set, copy across */
+
+    if (to_overwrite || !(dest->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)) {
+        dest->check_time = src->check_time;
+        dest->flags &= ~X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME;
+        /* Don't need to copy flag: that is done below */
+    }
+
+    if (inh_flags & X509_VP_FLAG_RESET_FLAGS)
+        dest->flags = 0;
+
+    dest->flags |= src->flags;
+
+    if (test_x509_verify_param_copy(policies, NULL)) {
+        if (!X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_policies(dest, src->policies))
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* Copy the host flags if and only if we're copying the host list */
+    if (test_x509_verify_param_copy(hosts, NULL)) {
+        sk_OPENSSL_STRING_pop_free(dest->hosts, str_free);
+        dest->hosts = NULL;
+        if (src->hosts) {
+            dest->hosts =
+                sk_OPENSSL_STRING_deep_copy(src->hosts, str_copy, str_free);
+            if (dest->hosts == NULL)
+                return 0;
+            dest->hostflags = src->hostflags;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (test_x509_verify_param_copy(email, NULL)) {
+        if (!X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_email(dest, src->email, src->emaillen))
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (test_x509_verify_param_copy(ip, NULL)) {
+        if (!X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip(dest, src->ip, src->iplen))
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *to,
+                           const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *from)
+{
+    unsigned long save_flags = to->inh_flags;
+    int ret;
+    to->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT;
+    ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(to, from);
+    to->inh_flags = save_flags;
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int int_x509_param_set1(char **pdest, size_t *pdestlen,
+                               const char *src, size_t srclen)
+{
+    void *tmp;
+    if (src) {
+        if (srclen == 0)
+            srclen = strlen(src);
+
+        tmp = OPENSSL_memdup(src, srclen);
+        if (tmp == NULL)
+            return 0;
+    } else {
+        tmp = NULL;
+        srclen = 0;
+    }
+    OPENSSL_free(*pdest);
+    *pdest = tmp;
+    if (pdestlen != NULL)
+        *pdestlen = srclen;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_name(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, const char *name)
+{
+    OPENSSL_free(param->name);
+    param->name = OPENSSL_strdup(name);
+    if (param->name)
+        return 1;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, unsigned long flags)
+{
+    param->flags |= flags;
+    if (flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_MASK)
+        param->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_clear_flags(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
+                                  unsigned long flags)
+{
+    param->flags &= ~flags;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+unsigned long X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_flags(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
+{
+    return param->flags;
+}
+
+uint32_t X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_inh_flags(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
+{
+    return param->inh_flags;
+}
+
+int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_inh_flags(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, uint32_t flags)
+{
+    param->inh_flags = flags;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, int purpose)
+{
+    return X509_PURPOSE_set(&param->purpose, purpose);
+}
+
+int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, int trust)
+{
+    return X509_TRUST_set(&param->trust, trust);
+}
+
+void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, int depth)
+{
+    param->depth = depth;
+}
+
+void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_auth_level(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, int auth_level)
+{
+    param->auth_level = auth_level;
+}
+
+time_t X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_time(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
+{
+    return param->check_time;
+}
+
+void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, time_t t)
+{
+    param->check_time = t;
+    param->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME;
+}
+
+int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
+                                  ASN1_OBJECT *policy)
+{
+    if (!param->policies) {
+        param->policies = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_new_null();
+        if (!param->policies)
+            return 0;
+    }
+    if (!sk_ASN1_OBJECT_push(param->policies, policy))
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_policies(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
+                                    STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *policies)
+{
+    int i;
+    ASN1_OBJECT *oid, *doid;
+
+    if (!param)
+        return 0;
+    sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(param->policies, ASN1_OBJECT_free);
+
+    if (!policies) {
+        param->policies = NULL;
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    param->policies = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_new_null();
+    if (!param->policies)
+        return 0;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(policies); i++) {
+        oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(policies, i);
+        doid = OBJ_dup(oid);
+        if (!doid)
+            return 0;
+        if (!sk_ASN1_OBJECT_push(param->policies, doid)) {
+            ASN1_OBJECT_free(doid);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+    param->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
+                                const char *name, size_t namelen)
+{
+    return int_x509_param_set_hosts(param, SET_HOST, name, namelen);
+}
+
+int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add1_host(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
+                                const char *name, size_t namelen)
+{
+    return int_x509_param_set_hosts(param, ADD_HOST, name, namelen);
+}
+
+void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_hostflags(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
+                                     unsigned int flags)
+{
+    param->hostflags = flags;
+}
+
+char *X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_peername(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
+{
+    return param->peername;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Move peername from one param structure to another, freeing any name present
+ * at the target.  If the source is a NULL parameter structure, free and zero
+ * the target peername.
+ */
+void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_move_peername(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *to,
+                                     X509_VERIFY_PARAM *from)
+{
+    char *peername = (from != NULL) ? from->peername : NULL;
+
+    if (to->peername != peername) {
+        OPENSSL_free(to->peername);
+        to->peername = peername;
+    }
+    if (from)
+        from->peername = NULL;
+}
+
+int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_email(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
+                                 const char *email, size_t emaillen)
+{
+    return int_x509_param_set1(&param->email, &param->emaillen,
+                               email, emaillen);
+}
+
+int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
+                              const unsigned char *ip, size_t iplen)
+{
+    if (iplen != 0 && iplen != 4 && iplen != 16)
+        return 0;
+    return int_x509_param_set1((char **)&param->ip, &param->iplen,
+                               (char *)ip, iplen);
+}
+
+int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip_asc(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, const char *ipasc)
+{
+    unsigned char ipout[16];
+    size_t iplen;
+
+    iplen = (size_t)a2i_ipadd(ipout, ipasc);
+    if (iplen == 0)
+        return 0;
+    return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip(param, ipout, iplen);
+}
+
+int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
+{
+    return param->depth;
+}
+
+int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_auth_level(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
+{
+    return param->auth_level;
+}
+
+const char *X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_name(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
+{
+    return param->name;
+}
+
+#define vpm_empty_id NULL, 0U, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, 0
+
+/*
+ * Default verify parameters: these are used for various applications and can
+ * be overridden by the user specified table. NB: the 'name' field *must* be
+ * in alphabetical order because it will be searched using OBJ_search.
+ */
+
+static const X509_VERIFY_PARAM default_table[] = {
+    {
+     "default",                 /* X509 default parameters */
+     0,                         /* Check time */
+     0,                         /* internal flags */
+     X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST, /* flags */
+     0,                         /* purpose */
+     0,                         /* trust */
+     100,                       /* depth */
+     -1,                        /* auth_level */
+     NULL,                      /* policies */
+     vpm_empty_id},
+    {
+     "pkcs7",                   /* S/MIME sign parameters */
+     0,                         /* Check time */
+     0,                         /* internal flags */
+     0,                         /* flags */
+     X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_SIGN,   /* purpose */
+     X509_TRUST_EMAIL,          /* trust */
+     -1,                        /* depth */
+     -1,                        /* auth_level */
+     NULL,                      /* policies */
+     vpm_empty_id},
+    {
+     "smime_sign",              /* S/MIME sign parameters */
+     0,                         /* Check time */
+     0,                         /* internal flags */
+     0,                         /* flags */
+     X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_SIGN,   /* purpose */
+     X509_TRUST_EMAIL,          /* trust */
+     -1,                        /* depth */
+     -1,                        /* auth_level */
+     NULL,                      /* policies */
+     vpm_empty_id},
+    {
+     "ssl_client",              /* SSL/TLS client parameters */
+     0,                         /* Check time */
+     0,                         /* internal flags */
+     0,                         /* flags */
+     X509_PURPOSE_SSL_CLIENT,   /* purpose */
+     X509_TRUST_SSL_CLIENT,     /* trust */
+     -1,                        /* depth */
+     -1,                        /* auth_level */
+     NULL,                      /* policies */
+     vpm_empty_id},
+    {
+     "ssl_server",              /* SSL/TLS server parameters */
+     0,                         /* Check time */
+     0,                         /* internal flags */
+     0,                         /* flags */
+     X509_PURPOSE_SSL_SERVER,   /* purpose */
+     X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER,     /* trust */
+     -1,                        /* depth */
+     -1,                        /* auth_level */
+     NULL,                      /* policies */
+     vpm_empty_id}
+};
+
+static STACK_OF(X509_VERIFY_PARAM) *param_table = NULL;
+
+static int table_cmp(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *a, const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *b)
+{
+    return strcmp(a->name, b->name);
+}
+
+DECLARE_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(X509_VERIFY_PARAM, X509_VERIFY_PARAM, table);
+IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(X509_VERIFY_PARAM, X509_VERIFY_PARAM, table);
+
+static int param_cmp(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *const *a,
+                     const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *const *b)
+{
+    return strcmp((*a)->name, (*b)->name);
+}
+
+int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_table(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
+{
+    int idx;
+    X509_VERIFY_PARAM *ptmp;
+    if (param_table == NULL) {
+        param_table = sk_X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(param_cmp);
+        if (param_table == NULL)
+            return 0;
+    } else {
+        idx = sk_X509_VERIFY_PARAM_find(param_table, param);
+        if (idx != -1) {
+            ptmp = sk_X509_VERIFY_PARAM_value(param_table, idx);
+            X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ptmp);
+            (void)sk_X509_VERIFY_PARAM_delete(param_table, idx);
+        }
+    }
+    if (!sk_X509_VERIFY_PARAM_push(param_table, param))
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_count(void)
+{
+    int num = OSSL_NELEM(default_table);
+    if (param_table)
+        num += sk_X509_VERIFY_PARAM_num(param_table);
+    return num;
+}
+
+const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0(int id)
+{
+    int num = OSSL_NELEM(default_table);
+    if (id < num)
+        return default_table + id;
+    return sk_X509_VERIFY_PARAM_value(param_table, id - num);
+}
+
+const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(const char *name)
+{
+    int idx;
+    X509_VERIFY_PARAM pm;
+
+    pm.name = (char *)name;
+    if (param_table) {
+        idx = sk_X509_VERIFY_PARAM_find(param_table, &pm);
+        if (idx != -1)
+            return sk_X509_VERIFY_PARAM_value(param_table, idx);
+    }
+    return OBJ_bsearch_table(&pm, default_table, OSSL_NELEM(default_table));
+}
+
+void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_table_cleanup(void)
+{
+    sk_X509_VERIFY_PARAM_pop_free(param_table, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free);
+    param_table = NULL;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x509cset.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x509cset.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2057859
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x509cset.c
@@ -0,0 +1,182 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include "internal/x509_int.h"
+
+int X509_CRL_set_version(X509_CRL *x, long version)
+{
+    if (x == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    if (x->crl.version == NULL) {
+        if ((x->crl.version = ASN1_INTEGER_new()) == NULL)
+            return (0);
+    }
+    return (ASN1_INTEGER_set(x->crl.version, version));
+}
+
+int X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(X509_CRL *x, X509_NAME *name)
+{
+    if (x == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    return (X509_NAME_set(&x->crl.issuer, name));
+}
+
+int X509_CRL_set1_lastUpdate(X509_CRL *x, const ASN1_TIME *tm)
+{
+    if (x == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    return x509_set1_time(&x->crl.lastUpdate, tm);
+}
+
+int X509_CRL_set1_nextUpdate(X509_CRL *x, const ASN1_TIME *tm)
+{
+    if (x == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    return x509_set1_time(&x->crl.nextUpdate, tm);
+}
+
+int X509_CRL_sort(X509_CRL *c)
+{
+    int i;
+    X509_REVOKED *r;
+    /*
+     * sort the data so it will be written in serial number order
+     */
+    sk_X509_REVOKED_sort(c->crl.revoked);
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(c->crl.revoked); i++) {
+        r = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(c->crl.revoked, i);
+        r->sequence = i;
+    }
+    c->crl.enc.modified = 1;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int X509_CRL_up_ref(X509_CRL *crl)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    if (CRYPTO_atomic_add(&crl->references, 1, &i, crl->lock) <= 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    REF_PRINT_COUNT("X509_CRL", crl);
+    REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 2);
+    return ((i > 1) ? 1 : 0);
+}
+
+long X509_CRL_get_version(const X509_CRL *crl)
+{
+    return ASN1_INTEGER_get(crl->crl.version);
+}
+
+const ASN1_TIME *X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(const X509_CRL *crl)
+{
+    return crl->crl.lastUpdate;
+}
+
+const ASN1_TIME *X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(const X509_CRL *crl)
+{
+    return crl->crl.nextUpdate;
+}
+
+#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+ASN1_TIME *X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(X509_CRL *crl)
+{
+    return crl->crl.lastUpdate;
+}
+
+ASN1_TIME *X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(X509_CRL *crl)
+{
+    return crl->crl.nextUpdate;
+}
+#endif
+
+X509_NAME *X509_CRL_get_issuer(const X509_CRL *crl)
+{
+    return crl->crl.issuer;
+}
+
+const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *X509_CRL_get0_extensions(const X509_CRL *crl)
+{
+    return crl->crl.extensions;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(X509_CRL *crl)
+{
+    return crl->crl.revoked;
+}
+
+void X509_CRL_get0_signature(const X509_CRL *crl, const ASN1_BIT_STRING **psig,
+                             const X509_ALGOR **palg)
+{
+    if (psig != NULL)
+        *psig = &crl->signature;
+    if (palg != NULL)
+        *palg = &crl->sig_alg;
+}
+
+int X509_CRL_get_signature_nid(const X509_CRL *crl)
+{
+    return OBJ_obj2nid(crl->sig_alg.algorithm);
+}
+
+const ASN1_TIME *X509_REVOKED_get0_revocationDate(const X509_REVOKED *x)
+{
+    return x->revocationDate;
+}
+
+int X509_REVOKED_set_revocationDate(X509_REVOKED *x, ASN1_TIME *tm)
+{
+    ASN1_TIME *in;
+
+    if (x == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    in = x->revocationDate;
+    if (in != tm) {
+        in = ASN1_STRING_dup(tm);
+        if (in != NULL) {
+            ASN1_TIME_free(x->revocationDate);
+            x->revocationDate = in;
+        }
+    }
+    return (in != NULL);
+}
+
+const ASN1_INTEGER *X509_REVOKED_get0_serialNumber(const X509_REVOKED *x)
+{
+    return &x->serialNumber;
+}
+
+int X509_REVOKED_set_serialNumber(X509_REVOKED *x, ASN1_INTEGER *serial)
+{
+    ASN1_INTEGER *in;
+
+    if (x == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    in = &x->serialNumber;
+    if (in != serial)
+        return ASN1_STRING_copy(in, serial);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *X509_REVOKED_get0_extensions(const X509_REVOKED *r)
+{
+    return r->extensions;
+}
+
+int i2d_re_X509_CRL_tbs(X509_CRL *crl, unsigned char **pp)
+{
+    crl->crl.enc.modified = 1;
+    return i2d_X509_CRL_INFO(&crl->crl, pp);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x509name.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x509name.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f87dc7d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x509name.c
@@ -0,0 +1,358 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/stack.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include "internal/x509_int.h"
+
+int X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(X509_NAME *name, int nid, char *buf, int len)
+{
+    ASN1_OBJECT *obj;
+
+    obj = OBJ_nid2obj(nid);
+    if (obj == NULL)
+        return (-1);
+    return (X509_NAME_get_text_by_OBJ(name, obj, buf, len));
+}
+
+int X509_NAME_get_text_by_OBJ(X509_NAME *name, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, char *buf,
+                              int len)
+{
+    int i;
+    const ASN1_STRING *data;
+
+    i = X509_NAME_get_index_by_OBJ(name, obj, -1);
+    if (i < 0)
+        return (-1);
+    data = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(X509_NAME_get_entry(name, i));
+    i = (data->length > (len - 1)) ? (len - 1) : data->length;
+    if (buf == NULL)
+        return (data->length);
+    memcpy(buf, data->data, i);
+    buf[i] = '\0';
+    return (i);
+}
+
+int X509_NAME_entry_count(const X509_NAME *name)
+{
+    if (name == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    return (sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_num(name->entries));
+}
+
+int X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(X509_NAME *name, int nid, int lastpos)
+{
+    ASN1_OBJECT *obj;
+
+    obj = OBJ_nid2obj(nid);
+    if (obj == NULL)
+        return (-2);
+    return (X509_NAME_get_index_by_OBJ(name, obj, lastpos));
+}
+
+/* NOTE: you should be passing -1, not 0 as lastpos */
+int X509_NAME_get_index_by_OBJ(X509_NAME *name, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int lastpos)
+{
+    int n;
+    X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne;
+    STACK_OF(X509_NAME_ENTRY) *sk;
+
+    if (name == NULL)
+        return (-1);
+    if (lastpos < 0)
+        lastpos = -1;
+    sk = name->entries;
+    n = sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_num(sk);
+    for (lastpos++; lastpos < n; lastpos++) {
+        ne = sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_value(sk, lastpos);
+        if (OBJ_cmp(ne->object, obj) == 0)
+            return (lastpos);
+    }
+    return (-1);
+}
+
+X509_NAME_ENTRY *X509_NAME_get_entry(const X509_NAME *name, int loc)
+{
+    if (name == NULL || sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_num(name->entries) <= loc
+        || loc < 0)
+        return (NULL);
+    else
+        return (sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_value(name->entries, loc));
+}
+
+X509_NAME_ENTRY *X509_NAME_delete_entry(X509_NAME *name, int loc)
+{
+    X509_NAME_ENTRY *ret;
+    int i, n, set_prev, set_next;
+    STACK_OF(X509_NAME_ENTRY) *sk;
+
+    if (name == NULL || sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_num(name->entries) <= loc
+        || loc < 0)
+        return (NULL);
+    sk = name->entries;
+    ret = sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_delete(sk, loc);
+    n = sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_num(sk);
+    name->modified = 1;
+    if (loc == n)
+        return (ret);
+
+    /* else we need to fixup the set field */
+    if (loc != 0)
+        set_prev = (sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_value(sk, loc - 1))->set;
+    else
+        set_prev = ret->set - 1;
+    set_next = sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_value(sk, loc)->set;
+
+    /*-
+     * set_prev is the previous set
+     * set is the current set
+     * set_next is the following
+     * prev  1 1    1 1     1 1     1 1
+     * set   1      1       2       2
+     * next  1 1    2 2     2 2     3 2
+     * so basically only if prev and next differ by 2, then
+     * re-number down by 1
+     */
+    if (set_prev + 1 < set_next)
+        for (i = loc; i < n; i++)
+            sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_value(sk, i)->set--;
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+int X509_NAME_add_entry_by_OBJ(X509_NAME *name, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int type,
+                               const unsigned char *bytes, int len, int loc,
+                               int set)
+{
+    X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne;
+    int ret;
+    ne = X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_OBJ(NULL, obj, type, bytes, len);
+    if (!ne)
+        return 0;
+    ret = X509_NAME_add_entry(name, ne, loc, set);
+    X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(ne);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID(X509_NAME *name, int nid, int type,
+                               const unsigned char *bytes, int len, int loc,
+                               int set)
+{
+    X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne;
+    int ret;
+    ne = X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_NID(NULL, nid, type, bytes, len);
+    if (!ne)
+        return 0;
+    ret = X509_NAME_add_entry(name, ne, loc, set);
+    X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(ne);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(X509_NAME *name, const char *field, int type,
+                               const unsigned char *bytes, int len, int loc,
+                               int set)
+{
+    X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne;
+    int ret;
+    ne = X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_txt(NULL, field, type, bytes, len);
+    if (!ne)
+        return 0;
+    ret = X509_NAME_add_entry(name, ne, loc, set);
+    X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(ne);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * if set is -1, append to previous set, 0 'a new one', and 1, prepend to the
+ * guy we are about to stomp on.
+ */
+int X509_NAME_add_entry(X509_NAME *name, const X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne, int loc,
+                        int set)
+{
+    X509_NAME_ENTRY *new_name = NULL;
+    int n, i, inc;
+    STACK_OF(X509_NAME_ENTRY) *sk;
+
+    if (name == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    sk = name->entries;
+    n = sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_num(sk);
+    if (loc > n)
+        loc = n;
+    else if (loc < 0)
+        loc = n;
+
+    name->modified = 1;
+
+    if (set == -1) {
+        if (loc == 0) {
+            set = 0;
+            inc = 1;
+        } else {
+            set = sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_value(sk, loc - 1)->set;
+            inc = 0;
+        }
+    } else {                    /* if (set >= 0) */
+
+        if (loc >= n) {
+            if (loc != 0)
+                set = sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_value(sk, loc - 1)->set + 1;
+            else
+                set = 0;
+        } else
+            set = sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_value(sk, loc)->set;
+        inc = (set == 0) ? 1 : 0;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * X509_NAME_ENTRY_dup is ASN1 generated code, that can't be easily
+     * const'ified; harmless cast as dup() don't modify its input.
+     */
+    if ((new_name = X509_NAME_ENTRY_dup((X509_NAME_ENTRY *)ne)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    new_name->set = set;
+    if (!sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_insert(sk, new_name, loc)) {
+        X509err(X509_F_X509_NAME_ADD_ENTRY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (inc) {
+        n = sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_num(sk);
+        for (i = loc + 1; i < n; i++)
+            sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_value(sk, i - 1)->set += 1;
+    }
+    return (1);
+ err:
+    X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(new_name);
+    return (0);
+}
+
+X509_NAME_ENTRY *X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_txt(X509_NAME_ENTRY **ne,
+                                               const char *field, int type,
+                                               const unsigned char *bytes,
+                                               int len)
+{
+    ASN1_OBJECT *obj;
+    X509_NAME_ENTRY *nentry;
+
+    obj = OBJ_txt2obj(field, 0);
+    if (obj == NULL) {
+        X509err(X509_F_X509_NAME_ENTRY_CREATE_BY_TXT,
+                X509_R_INVALID_FIELD_NAME);
+        ERR_add_error_data(2, "name=", field);
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+    nentry = X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_OBJ(ne, obj, type, bytes, len);
+    ASN1_OBJECT_free(obj);
+    return nentry;
+}
+
+X509_NAME_ENTRY *X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_NID(X509_NAME_ENTRY **ne, int nid,
+                                               int type,
+                                               const unsigned char *bytes,
+                                               int len)
+{
+    ASN1_OBJECT *obj;
+    X509_NAME_ENTRY *nentry;
+
+    obj = OBJ_nid2obj(nid);
+    if (obj == NULL) {
+        X509err(X509_F_X509_NAME_ENTRY_CREATE_BY_NID, X509_R_UNKNOWN_NID);
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+    nentry = X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_OBJ(ne, obj, type, bytes, len);
+    ASN1_OBJECT_free(obj);
+    return nentry;
+}
+
+X509_NAME_ENTRY *X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_OBJ(X509_NAME_ENTRY **ne,
+                                               const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int type,
+                                               const unsigned char *bytes,
+                                               int len)
+{
+    X509_NAME_ENTRY *ret;
+
+    if ((ne == NULL) || (*ne == NULL)) {
+        if ((ret = X509_NAME_ENTRY_new()) == NULL)
+            return (NULL);
+    } else
+        ret = *ne;
+
+    if (!X509_NAME_ENTRY_set_object(ret, obj))
+        goto err;
+    if (!X509_NAME_ENTRY_set_data(ret, type, bytes, len))
+        goto err;
+
+    if ((ne != NULL) && (*ne == NULL))
+        *ne = ret;
+    return (ret);
+ err:
+    if ((ne == NULL) || (ret != *ne))
+        X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(ret);
+    return (NULL);
+}
+
+int X509_NAME_ENTRY_set_object(X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj)
+{
+    if ((ne == NULL) || (obj == NULL)) {
+        X509err(X509_F_X509_NAME_ENTRY_SET_OBJECT,
+                ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+        return (0);
+    }
+    ASN1_OBJECT_free(ne->object);
+    ne->object = OBJ_dup(obj);
+    return ((ne->object == NULL) ? 0 : 1);
+}
+
+int X509_NAME_ENTRY_set_data(X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne, int type,
+                             const unsigned char *bytes, int len)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    if ((ne == NULL) || ((bytes == NULL) && (len != 0)))
+        return (0);
+    if ((type > 0) && (type & MBSTRING_FLAG))
+        return ASN1_STRING_set_by_NID(&ne->value, bytes,
+                                      len, type,
+                                      OBJ_obj2nid(ne->object)) ? 1 : 0;
+    if (len < 0)
+        len = strlen((const char *)bytes);
+    i = ASN1_STRING_set(ne->value, bytes, len);
+    if (!i)
+        return (0);
+    if (type != V_ASN1_UNDEF) {
+        if (type == V_ASN1_APP_CHOOSE)
+            ne->value->type = ASN1_PRINTABLE_type(bytes, len);
+        else
+            ne->value->type = type;
+    }
+    return (1);
+}
+
+ASN1_OBJECT *X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(const X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne)
+{
+    if (ne == NULL)
+        return (NULL);
+    return (ne->object);
+}
+
+ASN1_STRING *X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(const X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne)
+{
+    if (ne == NULL)
+        return (NULL);
+    return (ne->value);
+}
+
+int X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(const X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne)
+{
+    return ne->set;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x509rset.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x509rset.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6dee297
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x509rset.c
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include "internal/x509_int.h"
+
+int X509_REQ_set_version(X509_REQ *x, long version)
+{
+    if (x == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    x->req_info.enc.modified = 1;
+    return (ASN1_INTEGER_set(x->req_info.version, version));
+}
+
+int X509_REQ_set_subject_name(X509_REQ *x, X509_NAME *name)
+{
+    if (x == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    x->req_info.enc.modified = 1;
+    return (X509_NAME_set(&x->req_info.subject, name));
+}
+
+int X509_REQ_set_pubkey(X509_REQ *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    if (x == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    x->req_info.enc.modified = 1;
+    return (X509_PUBKEY_set(&x->req_info.pubkey, pkey));
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x509spki.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x509spki.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b142485
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x509spki.c
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+int NETSCAPE_SPKI_set_pubkey(NETSCAPE_SPKI *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    if ((x == NULL) || (x->spkac == NULL))
+        return (0);
+    return (X509_PUBKEY_set(&(x->spkac->pubkey), pkey));
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY *NETSCAPE_SPKI_get_pubkey(NETSCAPE_SPKI *x)
+{
+    if ((x == NULL) || (x->spkac == NULL))
+        return (NULL);
+    return (X509_PUBKEY_get(x->spkac->pubkey));
+}
+
+/* Load a Netscape SPKI from a base64 encoded string */
+
+NETSCAPE_SPKI *NETSCAPE_SPKI_b64_decode(const char *str, int len)
+{
+    unsigned char *spki_der;
+    const unsigned char *p;
+    int spki_len;
+    NETSCAPE_SPKI *spki;
+    if (len <= 0)
+        len = strlen(str);
+    if ((spki_der = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) {
+        X509err(X509_F_NETSCAPE_SPKI_B64_DECODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    spki_len = EVP_DecodeBlock(spki_der, (const unsigned char *)str, len);
+    if (spki_len < 0) {
+        X509err(X509_F_NETSCAPE_SPKI_B64_DECODE, X509_R_BASE64_DECODE_ERROR);
+        OPENSSL_free(spki_der);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    p = spki_der;
+    spki = d2i_NETSCAPE_SPKI(NULL, &p, spki_len);
+    OPENSSL_free(spki_der);
+    return spki;
+}
+
+/* Generate a base64 encoded string from an SPKI */
+
+char *NETSCAPE_SPKI_b64_encode(NETSCAPE_SPKI *spki)
+{
+    unsigned char *der_spki, *p;
+    char *b64_str;
+    int der_len;
+    der_len = i2d_NETSCAPE_SPKI(spki, NULL);
+    der_spki = OPENSSL_malloc(der_len);
+    b64_str = OPENSSL_malloc(der_len * 2);
+    if (der_spki == NULL || b64_str == NULL) {
+        X509err(X509_F_NETSCAPE_SPKI_B64_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        OPENSSL_free(der_spki);
+        OPENSSL_free(b64_str);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    p = der_spki;
+    i2d_NETSCAPE_SPKI(spki, &p);
+    EVP_EncodeBlock((unsigned char *)b64_str, der_spki, der_len);
+    OPENSSL_free(der_spki);
+    return b64_str;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x509type.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x509type.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..aca8355
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x509type.c
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+int X509_certificate_type(const X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    const EVP_PKEY *pk;
+    int ret = 0, i;
+
+    if (x == NULL)
+        return (0);
+
+    if (pkey == NULL)
+        pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
+    else
+        pk = pkey;
+
+    if (pk == NULL)
+        return (0);
+
+    switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
+    case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
+        ret = EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN;
+/*              if (!sign only extension) */
+        ret |= EVP_PKT_ENC;
+        break;
+    case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
+        ret = EVP_PK_DSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN;
+        break;
+    case EVP_PKEY_EC:
+        ret = EVP_PK_EC | EVP_PKT_SIGN | EVP_PKT_EXCH;
+        break;
+    case EVP_PKEY_DH:
+        ret = EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKT_EXCH;
+        break;
+    case NID_id_GostR3410_2001:
+    case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256:
+    case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512:
+        ret = EVP_PKT_EXCH | EVP_PKT_SIGN;
+        break;
+    default:
+        break;
+    }
+
+    i = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
+    if (i && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(i, NULL, &i)) {
+
+        switch (i) {
+        case NID_rsaEncryption:
+        case NID_rsa:
+            ret |= EVP_PKS_RSA;
+            break;
+        case NID_dsa:
+        case NID_dsa_2:
+            ret |= EVP_PKS_DSA;
+            break;
+        case NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey:
+            ret |= EVP_PKS_EC;
+            break;
+        default:
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+
+    return (ret);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x_all.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x_all.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..42bd161
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x_all.c
@@ -0,0 +1,526 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/stack.h>
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include "internal/x509_int.h"
+#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+
+int X509_verify(X509 *a, EVP_PKEY *r)
+{
+    if (X509_ALGOR_cmp(&a->sig_alg, &a->cert_info.signature))
+        return 0;
+    return (ASN1_item_verify(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CINF), &a->sig_alg,
+                             &a->signature, &a->cert_info, r));
+}
+
+int X509_REQ_verify(X509_REQ *a, EVP_PKEY *r)
+{
+    return (ASN1_item_verify(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_REQ_INFO),
+                             &a->sig_alg, a->signature, &a->req_info, r));
+}
+
+int NETSCAPE_SPKI_verify(NETSCAPE_SPKI *a, EVP_PKEY *r)
+{
+    return (ASN1_item_verify(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(NETSCAPE_SPKAC),
+                             &a->sig_algor, a->signature, a->spkac, r));
+}
+
+int X509_sign(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *md)
+{
+    x->cert_info.enc.modified = 1;
+    return (ASN1_item_sign(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CINF), &x->cert_info.signature,
+                           &x->sig_alg, &x->signature, &x->cert_info, pkey,
+                           md));
+}
+
+int X509_sign_ctx(X509 *x, EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    x->cert_info.enc.modified = 1;
+    return ASN1_item_sign_ctx(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CINF),
+                              &x->cert_info.signature,
+                              &x->sig_alg, &x->signature, &x->cert_info, ctx);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+int X509_http_nbio(OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx, X509 **pcert)
+{
+    return OCSP_REQ_CTX_nbio_d2i(rctx,
+                                 (ASN1_VALUE **)pcert, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509));
+}
+#endif
+
+int X509_REQ_sign(X509_REQ *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *md)
+{
+    return (ASN1_item_sign(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_REQ_INFO), &x->sig_alg, NULL,
+                           x->signature, &x->req_info, pkey, md));
+}
+
+int X509_REQ_sign_ctx(X509_REQ *x, EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ASN1_item_sign_ctx(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_REQ_INFO),
+                              &x->sig_alg, NULL, x->signature, &x->req_info,
+                              ctx);
+}
+
+int X509_CRL_sign(X509_CRL *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *md)
+{
+    x->crl.enc.modified = 1;
+    return (ASN1_item_sign(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CRL_INFO), &x->crl.sig_alg,
+                           &x->sig_alg, &x->signature, &x->crl, pkey, md));
+}
+
+int X509_CRL_sign_ctx(X509_CRL *x, EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    x->crl.enc.modified = 1;
+    return ASN1_item_sign_ctx(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CRL_INFO),
+                              &x->crl.sig_alg, &x->sig_alg, &x->signature,
+                              &x->crl, ctx);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+int X509_CRL_http_nbio(OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx, X509_CRL **pcrl)
+{
+    return OCSP_REQ_CTX_nbio_d2i(rctx,
+                                 (ASN1_VALUE **)pcrl,
+                                 ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CRL));
+}
+#endif
+
+int NETSCAPE_SPKI_sign(NETSCAPE_SPKI *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *md)
+{
+    return (ASN1_item_sign(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(NETSCAPE_SPKAC), &x->sig_algor, NULL,
+                           x->signature, x->spkac, pkey, md));
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+X509 *d2i_X509_fp(FILE *fp, X509 **x509)
+{
+    return ASN1_item_d2i_fp(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509), fp, x509);
+}
+
+int i2d_X509_fp(FILE *fp, X509 *x509)
+{
+    return ASN1_item_i2d_fp(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509), fp, x509);
+}
+#endif
+
+X509 *d2i_X509_bio(BIO *bp, X509 **x509)
+{
+    return ASN1_item_d2i_bio(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509), bp, x509);
+}
+
+int i2d_X509_bio(BIO *bp, X509 *x509)
+{
+    return ASN1_item_i2d_bio(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509), bp, x509);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+X509_CRL *d2i_X509_CRL_fp(FILE *fp, X509_CRL **crl)
+{
+    return ASN1_item_d2i_fp(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CRL), fp, crl);
+}
+
+int i2d_X509_CRL_fp(FILE *fp, X509_CRL *crl)
+{
+    return ASN1_item_i2d_fp(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CRL), fp, crl);
+}
+#endif
+
+X509_CRL *d2i_X509_CRL_bio(BIO *bp, X509_CRL **crl)
+{
+    return ASN1_item_d2i_bio(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CRL), bp, crl);
+}
+
+int i2d_X509_CRL_bio(BIO *bp, X509_CRL *crl)
+{
+    return ASN1_item_i2d_bio(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CRL), bp, crl);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+PKCS7 *d2i_PKCS7_fp(FILE *fp, PKCS7 **p7)
+{
+    return ASN1_item_d2i_fp(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS7), fp, p7);
+}
+
+int i2d_PKCS7_fp(FILE *fp, PKCS7 *p7)
+{
+    return ASN1_item_i2d_fp(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS7), fp, p7);
+}
+#endif
+
+PKCS7 *d2i_PKCS7_bio(BIO *bp, PKCS7 **p7)
+{
+    return ASN1_item_d2i_bio(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS7), bp, p7);
+}
+
+int i2d_PKCS7_bio(BIO *bp, PKCS7 *p7)
+{
+    return ASN1_item_i2d_bio(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS7), bp, p7);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+X509_REQ *d2i_X509_REQ_fp(FILE *fp, X509_REQ **req)
+{
+    return ASN1_item_d2i_fp(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_REQ), fp, req);
+}
+
+int i2d_X509_REQ_fp(FILE *fp, X509_REQ *req)
+{
+    return ASN1_item_i2d_fp(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_REQ), fp, req);
+}
+#endif
+
+X509_REQ *d2i_X509_REQ_bio(BIO *bp, X509_REQ **req)
+{
+    return ASN1_item_d2i_bio(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_REQ), bp, req);
+}
+
+int i2d_X509_REQ_bio(BIO *bp, X509_REQ *req)
+{
+    return ASN1_item_i2d_bio(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_REQ), bp, req);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+RSA *d2i_RSAPrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp, RSA **rsa)
+{
+    return ASN1_item_d2i_fp(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSAPrivateKey), fp, rsa);
+}
+
+int i2d_RSAPrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp, RSA *rsa)
+{
+    return ASN1_item_i2d_fp(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSAPrivateKey), fp, rsa);
+}
+
+RSA *d2i_RSAPublicKey_fp(FILE *fp, RSA **rsa)
+{
+    return ASN1_item_d2i_fp(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSAPublicKey), fp, rsa);
+}
+
+RSA *d2i_RSA_PUBKEY_fp(FILE *fp, RSA **rsa)
+{
+    return ASN1_d2i_fp((void *(*)(void))
+                       RSA_new, (D2I_OF(void)) d2i_RSA_PUBKEY, fp,
+                       (void **)rsa);
+}
+
+int i2d_RSAPublicKey_fp(FILE *fp, RSA *rsa)
+{
+    return ASN1_item_i2d_fp(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSAPublicKey), fp, rsa);
+}
+
+int i2d_RSA_PUBKEY_fp(FILE *fp, RSA *rsa)
+{
+    return ASN1_i2d_fp((I2D_OF(void))i2d_RSA_PUBKEY, fp, rsa);
+}
+# endif
+
+RSA *d2i_RSAPrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, RSA **rsa)
+{
+    return ASN1_item_d2i_bio(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSAPrivateKey), bp, rsa);
+}
+
+int i2d_RSAPrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, RSA *rsa)
+{
+    return ASN1_item_i2d_bio(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSAPrivateKey), bp, rsa);
+}
+
+RSA *d2i_RSAPublicKey_bio(BIO *bp, RSA **rsa)
+{
+    return ASN1_item_d2i_bio(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSAPublicKey), bp, rsa);
+}
+
+RSA *d2i_RSA_PUBKEY_bio(BIO *bp, RSA **rsa)
+{
+    return ASN1_d2i_bio_of(RSA, RSA_new, d2i_RSA_PUBKEY, bp, rsa);
+}
+
+int i2d_RSAPublicKey_bio(BIO *bp, RSA *rsa)
+{
+    return ASN1_item_i2d_bio(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSAPublicKey), bp, rsa);
+}
+
+int i2d_RSA_PUBKEY_bio(BIO *bp, RSA *rsa)
+{
+    return ASN1_i2d_bio_of(RSA, i2d_RSA_PUBKEY, bp, rsa);
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+DSA *d2i_DSAPrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp, DSA **dsa)
+{
+    return ASN1_d2i_fp_of(DSA, DSA_new, d2i_DSAPrivateKey, fp, dsa);
+}
+
+int i2d_DSAPrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp, DSA *dsa)
+{
+    return ASN1_i2d_fp_of_const(DSA, i2d_DSAPrivateKey, fp, dsa);
+}
+
+DSA *d2i_DSA_PUBKEY_fp(FILE *fp, DSA **dsa)
+{
+    return ASN1_d2i_fp_of(DSA, DSA_new, d2i_DSA_PUBKEY, fp, dsa);
+}
+
+int i2d_DSA_PUBKEY_fp(FILE *fp, DSA *dsa)
+{
+    return ASN1_i2d_fp_of(DSA, i2d_DSA_PUBKEY, fp, dsa);
+}
+# endif
+
+DSA *d2i_DSAPrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, DSA **dsa)
+{
+    return ASN1_d2i_bio_of(DSA, DSA_new, d2i_DSAPrivateKey, bp, dsa);
+}
+
+int i2d_DSAPrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, DSA *dsa)
+{
+    return ASN1_i2d_bio_of_const(DSA, i2d_DSAPrivateKey, bp, dsa);
+}
+
+DSA *d2i_DSA_PUBKEY_bio(BIO *bp, DSA **dsa)
+{
+    return ASN1_d2i_bio_of(DSA, DSA_new, d2i_DSA_PUBKEY, bp, dsa);
+}
+
+int i2d_DSA_PUBKEY_bio(BIO *bp, DSA *dsa)
+{
+    return ASN1_i2d_bio_of(DSA, i2d_DSA_PUBKEY, bp, dsa);
+}
+
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+EC_KEY *d2i_EC_PUBKEY_fp(FILE *fp, EC_KEY **eckey)
+{
+    return ASN1_d2i_fp_of(EC_KEY, EC_KEY_new, d2i_EC_PUBKEY, fp, eckey);
+}
+
+int i2d_EC_PUBKEY_fp(FILE *fp, EC_KEY *eckey)
+{
+    return ASN1_i2d_fp_of(EC_KEY, i2d_EC_PUBKEY, fp, eckey);
+}
+
+EC_KEY *d2i_ECPrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp, EC_KEY **eckey)
+{
+    return ASN1_d2i_fp_of(EC_KEY, EC_KEY_new, d2i_ECPrivateKey, fp, eckey);
+}
+
+int i2d_ECPrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp, EC_KEY *eckey)
+{
+    return ASN1_i2d_fp_of(EC_KEY, i2d_ECPrivateKey, fp, eckey);
+}
+# endif
+EC_KEY *d2i_EC_PUBKEY_bio(BIO *bp, EC_KEY **eckey)
+{
+    return ASN1_d2i_bio_of(EC_KEY, EC_KEY_new, d2i_EC_PUBKEY, bp, eckey);
+}
+
+int i2d_EC_PUBKEY_bio(BIO *bp, EC_KEY *ecdsa)
+{
+    return ASN1_i2d_bio_of(EC_KEY, i2d_EC_PUBKEY, bp, ecdsa);
+}
+
+EC_KEY *d2i_ECPrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, EC_KEY **eckey)
+{
+    return ASN1_d2i_bio_of(EC_KEY, EC_KEY_new, d2i_ECPrivateKey, bp, eckey);
+}
+
+int i2d_ECPrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, EC_KEY *eckey)
+{
+    return ASN1_i2d_bio_of(EC_KEY, i2d_ECPrivateKey, bp, eckey);
+}
+#endif
+
+int X509_pubkey_digest(const X509 *data, const EVP_MD *type,
+                       unsigned char *md, unsigned int *len)
+{
+    ASN1_BIT_STRING *key;
+    key = X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(data);
+    if (!key)
+        return 0;
+    return EVP_Digest(key->data, key->length, md, len, type, NULL);
+}
+
+int X509_digest(const X509 *data, const EVP_MD *type, unsigned char *md,
+                unsigned int *len)
+{
+    if (type == EVP_sha1() && (data->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET) != 0) {
+        /* Asking for SHA1 and we already computed it. */
+        if (len != NULL)
+            *len = sizeof(data->sha1_hash);
+        memcpy(md, data->sha1_hash, sizeof(data->sha1_hash));
+        return 1;
+    }
+    return (ASN1_item_digest
+            (ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509), type, (char *)data, md, len));
+}
+
+int X509_CRL_digest(const X509_CRL *data, const EVP_MD *type,
+                    unsigned char *md, unsigned int *len)
+{
+    if (type == EVP_sha1() && (data->flags & EXFLAG_SET) != 0) {
+        /* Asking for SHA1; always computed in CRL d2i. */
+        if (len != NULL)
+            *len = sizeof(data->sha1_hash);
+        memcpy(md, data->sha1_hash, sizeof(data->sha1_hash));
+        return 1;
+    }
+    return (ASN1_item_digest
+            (ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CRL), type, (char *)data, md, len));
+}
+
+int X509_REQ_digest(const X509_REQ *data, const EVP_MD *type,
+                    unsigned char *md, unsigned int *len)
+{
+    return (ASN1_item_digest
+            (ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_REQ), type, (char *)data, md, len));
+}
+
+int X509_NAME_digest(const X509_NAME *data, const EVP_MD *type,
+                     unsigned char *md, unsigned int *len)
+{
+    return (ASN1_item_digest
+            (ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_NAME), type, (char *)data, md, len));
+}
+
+int PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL_digest(PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL *data,
+                                   const EVP_MD *type, unsigned char *md,
+                                   unsigned int *len)
+{
+    return (ASN1_item_digest(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL), type,
+                             (char *)data, md, len));
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+X509_SIG *d2i_PKCS8_fp(FILE *fp, X509_SIG **p8)
+{
+    return ASN1_d2i_fp_of(X509_SIG, X509_SIG_new, d2i_X509_SIG, fp, p8);
+}
+
+int i2d_PKCS8_fp(FILE *fp, X509_SIG *p8)
+{
+    return ASN1_i2d_fp_of(X509_SIG, i2d_X509_SIG, fp, p8);
+}
+#endif
+
+X509_SIG *d2i_PKCS8_bio(BIO *bp, X509_SIG **p8)
+{
+    return ASN1_d2i_bio_of(X509_SIG, X509_SIG_new, d2i_X509_SIG, bp, p8);
+}
+
+int i2d_PKCS8_bio(BIO *bp, X509_SIG *p8)
+{
+    return ASN1_i2d_bio_of(X509_SIG, i2d_X509_SIG, bp, p8);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_fp(FILE *fp,
+                                                PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO **p8inf)
+{
+    return ASN1_d2i_fp_of(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_new,
+                          d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, fp, p8inf);
+}
+
+int i2d_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_fp(FILE *fp, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf)
+{
+    return ASN1_i2d_fp_of(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, i2d_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, fp,
+                          p8inf);
+}
+
+int i2d_PKCS8PrivateKeyInfo_fp(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY *key)
+{
+    PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf;
+    int ret;
+    p8inf = EVP_PKEY2PKCS8(key);
+    if (!p8inf)
+        return 0;
+    ret = i2d_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_fp(fp, p8inf);
+    PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8inf);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int i2d_PrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    return ASN1_i2d_fp_of(EVP_PKEY, i2d_PrivateKey, fp, pkey);
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY *d2i_PrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY **a)
+{
+    return ASN1_d2i_fp_of(EVP_PKEY, EVP_PKEY_new, d2i_AutoPrivateKey, fp, a);
+}
+
+int i2d_PUBKEY_fp(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    return ASN1_i2d_fp_of(EVP_PKEY, i2d_PUBKEY, fp, pkey);
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY *d2i_PUBKEY_fp(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY **a)
+{
+    return ASN1_d2i_fp_of(EVP_PKEY, EVP_PKEY_new, d2i_PUBKEY, fp, a);
+}
+
+#endif
+
+PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_bio(BIO *bp,
+                                                 PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO **p8inf)
+{
+    return ASN1_d2i_bio_of(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_new,
+                           d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, bp, p8inf);
+}
+
+int i2d_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_bio(BIO *bp, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf)
+{
+    return ASN1_i2d_bio_of(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, i2d_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, bp,
+                           p8inf);
+}
+
+int i2d_PKCS8PrivateKeyInfo_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *key)
+{
+    PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf;
+    int ret;
+    p8inf = EVP_PKEY2PKCS8(key);
+    if (!p8inf)
+        return 0;
+    ret = i2d_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_bio(bp, p8inf);
+    PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8inf);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int i2d_PrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    return ASN1_i2d_bio_of(EVP_PKEY, i2d_PrivateKey, bp, pkey);
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY *d2i_PrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY **a)
+{
+    return ASN1_d2i_bio_of(EVP_PKEY, EVP_PKEY_new, d2i_AutoPrivateKey, bp, a);
+}
+
+int i2d_PUBKEY_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    return ASN1_i2d_bio_of(EVP_PKEY, i2d_PUBKEY, bp, pkey);
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY *d2i_PUBKEY_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY **a)
+{
+    return ASN1_d2i_bio_of(EVP_PKEY, EVP_PKEY_new, d2i_PUBKEY, bp, a);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x_attrib.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x_attrib.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..35f4aee
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x_attrib.c
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include "x509_lcl.h"
+
+/*-
+ * X509_ATTRIBUTE: this has the following form:
+ *
+ * typedef struct x509_attributes_st
+ *      {
+ *      ASN1_OBJECT *object;
+ *      STACK_OF(ASN1_TYPE) *set;
+ *      } X509_ATTRIBUTE;
+ *
+ */
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(X509_ATTRIBUTE) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_ATTRIBUTE, object, ASN1_OBJECT),
+        ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE, set, ASN1_ANY)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
+
+X509_ATTRIBUTE *X509_ATTRIBUTE_create(int nid, int atrtype, void *value)
+{
+    X509_ATTRIBUTE *ret = NULL;
+    ASN1_TYPE *val = NULL;
+
+    if ((ret = X509_ATTRIBUTE_new()) == NULL)
+        return (NULL);
+    ret->object = OBJ_nid2obj(nid);
+    if ((val = ASN1_TYPE_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (!sk_ASN1_TYPE_push(ret->set, val))
+        goto err;
+
+    ASN1_TYPE_set(val, atrtype, value);
+    return (ret);
+ err:
+    X509_ATTRIBUTE_free(ret);
+    ASN1_TYPE_free(val);
+    return (NULL);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x_crl.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x_crl.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dbed850
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x_crl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,459 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include "internal/x509_int.h"
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include "x509_lcl.h"
+
+static int X509_REVOKED_cmp(const X509_REVOKED *const *a,
+                            const X509_REVOKED *const *b);
+static void setup_idp(X509_CRL *crl, ISSUING_DIST_POINT *idp);
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(X509_REVOKED) = {
+        ASN1_EMBED(X509_REVOKED,serialNumber, ASN1_INTEGER),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_REVOKED,revocationDate, ASN1_TIME),
+        ASN1_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(X509_REVOKED,extensions, X509_EXTENSION)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(X509_REVOKED)
+
+static int def_crl_verify(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *r);
+static int def_crl_lookup(X509_CRL *crl,
+                          X509_REVOKED **ret, ASN1_INTEGER *serial,
+                          X509_NAME *issuer);
+
+static X509_CRL_METHOD int_crl_meth = {
+    0,
+    0, 0,
+    def_crl_lookup,
+    def_crl_verify
+};
+
+static const X509_CRL_METHOD *default_crl_method = &int_crl_meth;
+
+/*
+ * The X509_CRL_INFO structure needs a bit of customisation. Since we cache
+ * the original encoding the signature won't be affected by reordering of the
+ * revoked field.
+ */
+static int crl_inf_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+                      void *exarg)
+{
+    X509_CRL_INFO *a = (X509_CRL_INFO *)*pval;
+
+    if (!a || !a->revoked)
+        return 1;
+    switch (operation) {
+        /*
+         * Just set cmp function here. We don't sort because that would
+         * affect the output of X509_CRL_print().
+         */
+    case ASN1_OP_D2I_POST:
+        (void)sk_X509_REVOKED_set_cmp_func(a->revoked, X509_REVOKED_cmp);
+        break;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE_enc(X509_CRL_INFO, enc, crl_inf_cb) = {
+        ASN1_OPT(X509_CRL_INFO, version, ASN1_INTEGER),
+        ASN1_EMBED(X509_CRL_INFO, sig_alg, X509_ALGOR),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CRL_INFO, issuer, X509_NAME),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CRL_INFO, lastUpdate, ASN1_TIME),
+        ASN1_OPT(X509_CRL_INFO, nextUpdate, ASN1_TIME),
+        ASN1_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(X509_CRL_INFO, revoked, X509_REVOKED),
+        ASN1_EXP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(X509_CRL_INFO, extensions, X509_EXTENSION, 0)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_enc(X509_CRL_INFO, X509_CRL_INFO)
+
+/*
+ * Set CRL entry issuer according to CRL certificate issuer extension. Check
+ * for unhandled critical CRL entry extensions.
+ */
+
+static int crl_set_issuers(X509_CRL *crl)
+{
+
+    int i, j;
+    GENERAL_NAMES *gens, *gtmp;
+    STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revoked;
+
+    revoked = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(crl);
+
+    gens = NULL;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revoked); i++) {
+        X509_REVOKED *rev = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revoked, i);
+        STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts;
+        ASN1_ENUMERATED *reason;
+        X509_EXTENSION *ext;
+        gtmp = X509_REVOKED_get_ext_d2i(rev,
+                                        NID_certificate_issuer, &j, NULL);
+        if (!gtmp && (j != -1)) {
+            crl->flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
+            return 1;
+        }
+
+        if (gtmp) {
+            gens = gtmp;
+            if (!crl->issuers) {
+                crl->issuers = sk_GENERAL_NAMES_new_null();
+                if (!crl->issuers)
+                    return 0;
+            }
+            if (!sk_GENERAL_NAMES_push(crl->issuers, gtmp))
+                return 0;
+        }
+        rev->issuer = gens;
+
+        reason = X509_REVOKED_get_ext_d2i(rev, NID_crl_reason, &j, NULL);
+        if (!reason && (j != -1)) {
+            crl->flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
+            return 1;
+        }
+
+        if (reason) {
+            rev->reason = ASN1_ENUMERATED_get(reason);
+            ASN1_ENUMERATED_free(reason);
+        } else
+            rev->reason = CRL_REASON_NONE;
+
+        /* Check for critical CRL entry extensions */
+
+        exts = rev->extensions;
+
+        for (j = 0; j < sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts); j++) {
+            ext = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(exts, j);
+            if (X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ext)) {
+                if (OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ext)) == NID_certificate_issuer)
+                    continue;
+                crl->flags |= EXFLAG_CRITICAL;
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+
+}
+
+/*
+ * The X509_CRL structure needs a bit of customisation. Cache some extensions
+ * and hash of the whole CRL.
+ */
+static int crl_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+                  void *exarg)
+{
+    X509_CRL *crl = (X509_CRL *)*pval;
+    STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts;
+    X509_EXTENSION *ext;
+    int idx;
+
+    switch (operation) {
+    case ASN1_OP_NEW_POST:
+        crl->idp = NULL;
+        crl->akid = NULL;
+        crl->flags = 0;
+        crl->idp_flags = 0;
+        crl->idp_reasons = CRLDP_ALL_REASONS;
+        crl->meth = default_crl_method;
+        crl->meth_data = NULL;
+        crl->issuers = NULL;
+        crl->crl_number = NULL;
+        crl->base_crl_number = NULL;
+        break;
+
+    case ASN1_OP_D2I_POST:
+        X509_CRL_digest(crl, EVP_sha1(), crl->sha1_hash, NULL);
+        crl->idp = X509_CRL_get_ext_d2i(crl,
+                                        NID_issuing_distribution_point, NULL,
+                                        NULL);
+        if (crl->idp)
+            setup_idp(crl, crl->idp);
+
+        crl->akid = X509_CRL_get_ext_d2i(crl,
+                                         NID_authority_key_identifier, NULL,
+                                         NULL);
+
+        crl->crl_number = X509_CRL_get_ext_d2i(crl,
+                                               NID_crl_number, NULL, NULL);
+
+        crl->base_crl_number = X509_CRL_get_ext_d2i(crl,
+                                                    NID_delta_crl, NULL,
+                                                    NULL);
+        /* Delta CRLs must have CRL number */
+        if (crl->base_crl_number && !crl->crl_number)
+            crl->flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
+
+        /*
+         * See if we have any unhandled critical CRL extensions and indicate
+         * this in a flag. We only currently handle IDP so anything else
+         * critical sets the flag. This code accesses the X509_CRL structure
+         * directly: applications shouldn't do this.
+         */
+
+        exts = crl->crl.extensions;
+
+        for (idx = 0; idx < sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts); idx++) {
+            int nid;
+            ext = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(exts, idx);
+            nid = OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ext));
+            if (nid == NID_freshest_crl)
+                crl->flags |= EXFLAG_FRESHEST;
+            if (X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ext)) {
+                /* We handle IDP and deltas */
+                if ((nid == NID_issuing_distribution_point)
+                    || (nid == NID_authority_key_identifier)
+                    || (nid == NID_delta_crl))
+                    continue;
+                crl->flags |= EXFLAG_CRITICAL;
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+
+        if (!crl_set_issuers(crl))
+            return 0;
+
+        if (crl->meth->crl_init) {
+            if (crl->meth->crl_init(crl) == 0)
+                return 0;
+        }
+
+        crl->flags |= EXFLAG_SET;
+        break;
+
+    case ASN1_OP_FREE_POST:
+        if (crl->meth->crl_free) {
+            if (!crl->meth->crl_free(crl))
+                return 0;
+        }
+        AUTHORITY_KEYID_free(crl->akid);
+        ISSUING_DIST_POINT_free(crl->idp);
+        ASN1_INTEGER_free(crl->crl_number);
+        ASN1_INTEGER_free(crl->base_crl_number);
+        sk_GENERAL_NAMES_pop_free(crl->issuers, GENERAL_NAMES_free);
+        break;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Convert IDP into a more convenient form */
+
+static void setup_idp(X509_CRL *crl, ISSUING_DIST_POINT *idp)
+{
+    int idp_only = 0;
+    /* Set various flags according to IDP */
+    crl->idp_flags |= IDP_PRESENT;
+    if (idp->onlyuser > 0) {
+        idp_only++;
+        crl->idp_flags |= IDP_ONLYUSER;
+    }
+    if (idp->onlyCA > 0) {
+        idp_only++;
+        crl->idp_flags |= IDP_ONLYCA;
+    }
+    if (idp->onlyattr > 0) {
+        idp_only++;
+        crl->idp_flags |= IDP_ONLYATTR;
+    }
+
+    if (idp_only > 1)
+        crl->idp_flags |= IDP_INVALID;
+
+    if (idp->indirectCRL > 0)
+        crl->idp_flags |= IDP_INDIRECT;
+
+    if (idp->onlysomereasons) {
+        crl->idp_flags |= IDP_REASONS;
+        if (idp->onlysomereasons->length > 0)
+            crl->idp_reasons = idp->onlysomereasons->data[0];
+        if (idp->onlysomereasons->length > 1)
+            crl->idp_reasons |= (idp->onlysomereasons->data[1] << 8);
+        crl->idp_reasons &= CRLDP_ALL_REASONS;
+    }
+
+    DIST_POINT_set_dpname(idp->distpoint, X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl));
+}
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE_ref(X509_CRL, crl_cb) = {
+        ASN1_EMBED(X509_CRL, crl, X509_CRL_INFO),
+        ASN1_EMBED(X509_CRL, sig_alg, X509_ALGOR),
+        ASN1_EMBED(X509_CRL, signature, ASN1_BIT_STRING)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_ref(X509_CRL, X509_CRL)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_REVOKED)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(X509_REVOKED)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_CRL_INFO)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_CRL)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(X509_CRL)
+
+static int X509_REVOKED_cmp(const X509_REVOKED *const *a,
+                            const X509_REVOKED *const *b)
+{
+    return (ASN1_STRING_cmp((ASN1_STRING *)&(*a)->serialNumber,
+                            (ASN1_STRING *)&(*b)->serialNumber));
+}
+
+int X509_CRL_add0_revoked(X509_CRL *crl, X509_REVOKED *rev)
+{
+    X509_CRL_INFO *inf;
+    inf = &crl->crl;
+    if (inf->revoked == NULL)
+        inf->revoked = sk_X509_REVOKED_new(X509_REVOKED_cmp);
+    if (inf->revoked == NULL || !sk_X509_REVOKED_push(inf->revoked, rev)) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_X509_CRL_ADD0_REVOKED, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    inf->enc.modified = 1;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int X509_CRL_verify(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *r)
+{
+    if (crl->meth->crl_verify)
+        return crl->meth->crl_verify(crl, r);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(X509_CRL *crl,
+                            X509_REVOKED **ret, ASN1_INTEGER *serial)
+{
+    if (crl->meth->crl_lookup)
+        return crl->meth->crl_lookup(crl, ret, serial, NULL);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(X509_CRL *crl, X509_REVOKED **ret, X509 *x)
+{
+    if (crl->meth->crl_lookup)
+        return crl->meth->crl_lookup(crl, ret,
+                                     X509_get_serialNumber(x),
+                                     X509_get_issuer_name(x));
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int def_crl_verify(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *r)
+{
+    return (ASN1_item_verify(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CRL_INFO),
+                             &crl->sig_alg, &crl->signature, &crl->crl, r));
+}
+
+static int crl_revoked_issuer_match(X509_CRL *crl, X509_NAME *nm,
+                                    X509_REVOKED *rev)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    if (!rev->issuer) {
+        if (!nm)
+            return 1;
+        if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl)))
+            return 1;
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (!nm)
+        nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(rev->issuer); i++) {
+        GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(rev->issuer, i);
+        if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
+            continue;
+        if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gen->d.directoryName))
+            return 1;
+    }
+    return 0;
+
+}
+
+static int def_crl_lookup(X509_CRL *crl,
+                          X509_REVOKED **ret, ASN1_INTEGER *serial,
+                          X509_NAME *issuer)
+{
+    X509_REVOKED rtmp, *rev;
+    int idx;
+    rtmp.serialNumber = *serial;
+    /*
+     * Sort revoked into serial number order if not already sorted. Do this
+     * under a lock to avoid race condition.
+     */
+    if (!sk_X509_REVOKED_is_sorted(crl->crl.revoked)) {
+        CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(crl->lock);
+        sk_X509_REVOKED_sort(crl->crl.revoked);
+        CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(crl->lock);
+    }
+    idx = sk_X509_REVOKED_find(crl->crl.revoked, &rtmp);
+    if (idx < 0)
+        return 0;
+    /* Need to look for matching name */
+    for (; idx < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(crl->crl.revoked); idx++) {
+        rev = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(crl->crl.revoked, idx);
+        if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(&rev->serialNumber, serial))
+            return 0;
+        if (crl_revoked_issuer_match(crl, issuer, rev)) {
+            if (ret)
+                *ret = rev;
+            if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
+                return 2;
+            return 1;
+        }
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+void X509_CRL_set_default_method(const X509_CRL_METHOD *meth)
+{
+    if (meth == NULL)
+        default_crl_method = &int_crl_meth;
+    else
+        default_crl_method = meth;
+}
+
+X509_CRL_METHOD *X509_CRL_METHOD_new(int (*crl_init) (X509_CRL *crl),
+                                     int (*crl_free) (X509_CRL *crl),
+                                     int (*crl_lookup) (X509_CRL *crl,
+                                                        X509_REVOKED **ret,
+                                                        ASN1_INTEGER *ser,
+                                                        X509_NAME *issuer),
+                                     int (*crl_verify) (X509_CRL *crl,
+                                                        EVP_PKEY *pk))
+{
+    X509_CRL_METHOD *m;
+    m = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*m));
+    if (m == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    m->crl_init = crl_init;
+    m->crl_free = crl_free;
+    m->crl_lookup = crl_lookup;
+    m->crl_verify = crl_verify;
+    m->flags = X509_CRL_METHOD_DYNAMIC;
+    return m;
+}
+
+void X509_CRL_METHOD_free(X509_CRL_METHOD *m)
+{
+    if (m == NULL || !(m->flags & X509_CRL_METHOD_DYNAMIC))
+        return;
+    OPENSSL_free(m);
+}
+
+void X509_CRL_set_meth_data(X509_CRL *crl, void *dat)
+{
+    crl->meth_data = dat;
+}
+
+void *X509_CRL_get_meth_data(X509_CRL *crl)
+{
+    return crl->meth_data;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x_exten.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x_exten.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f10f4a4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x_exten.c
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include "x509_lcl.h"
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(X509_EXTENSION) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_EXTENSION, object, ASN1_OBJECT),
+        ASN1_OPT(X509_EXTENSION, critical, ASN1_BOOLEAN),
+        ASN1_EMBED(X509_EXTENSION, value, ASN1_OCTET_STRING)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(X509_EXTENSION)
+
+ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE(X509_EXTENSIONS) =
+        ASN1_EX_TEMPLATE_TYPE(ASN1_TFLG_SEQUENCE_OF, 0, Extension, X509_EXTENSION)
+ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE_END(X509_EXTENSIONS)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_EXTENSION)
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_fname(X509_EXTENSIONS, X509_EXTENSIONS, X509_EXTENSIONS)
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(X509_EXTENSION)
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x_name.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x_name.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0af5df5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x_name.c
@@ -0,0 +1,549 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include "internal/x509_int.h"
+#include "internal/asn1_int.h"
+#include "x509_lcl.h"
+
+/*
+ * Maximum length of X509_NAME: much larger than anything we should
+ * ever see in practice.
+ */
+
+#define X509_NAME_MAX (1024 * 1024)
+
+static int x509_name_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **val,
+                            const unsigned char **in, long len,
+                            const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+                            int tag, int aclass, char opt, ASN1_TLC *ctx);
+
+static int x509_name_ex_i2d(ASN1_VALUE **val, unsigned char **out,
+                            const ASN1_ITEM *it, int tag, int aclass);
+static int x509_name_ex_new(ASN1_VALUE **val, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
+static void x509_name_ex_free(ASN1_VALUE **val, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
+
+static int x509_name_encode(X509_NAME *a);
+static int x509_name_canon(X509_NAME *a);
+static int asn1_string_canon(ASN1_STRING *out, const ASN1_STRING *in);
+static int i2d_name_canon(STACK_OF(STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY) * intname,
+                          unsigned char **in);
+
+static int x509_name_ex_print(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE **pval,
+                              int indent,
+                              const char *fname, const ASN1_PCTX *pctx);
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(X509_NAME_ENTRY) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_NAME_ENTRY, object, ASN1_OBJECT),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_NAME_ENTRY, value, ASN1_PRINTABLE)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(X509_NAME_ENTRY)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_NAME_ENTRY)
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(X509_NAME_ENTRY)
+
+/*
+ * For the "Name" type we need a SEQUENCE OF { SET OF X509_NAME_ENTRY } so
+ * declare two template wrappers for this
+ */
+
+ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE(X509_NAME_ENTRIES) =
+        ASN1_EX_TEMPLATE_TYPE(ASN1_TFLG_SET_OF, 0, RDNS, X509_NAME_ENTRY)
+static_ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE_END(X509_NAME_ENTRIES)
+
+ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE(X509_NAME_INTERNAL) =
+        ASN1_EX_TEMPLATE_TYPE(ASN1_TFLG_SEQUENCE_OF, 0, Name, X509_NAME_ENTRIES)
+static_ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE_END(X509_NAME_INTERNAL)
+
+/*
+ * Normally that's where it would end: we'd have two nested STACK structures
+ * representing the ASN1. Unfortunately X509_NAME uses a completely different
+ * form and caches encodings so we have to process the internal form and
+ * convert to the external form.
+ */
+
+static const ASN1_EXTERN_FUNCS x509_name_ff = {
+    NULL,
+    x509_name_ex_new,
+    x509_name_ex_free,
+    0,                          /* Default clear behaviour is OK */
+    x509_name_ex_d2i,
+    x509_name_ex_i2d,
+    x509_name_ex_print
+};
+
+IMPLEMENT_EXTERN_ASN1(X509_NAME, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, x509_name_ff)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_NAME)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(X509_NAME)
+
+static int x509_name_ex_new(ASN1_VALUE **val, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
+{
+    X509_NAME *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
+
+    if (ret == NULL)
+        goto memerr;
+    if ((ret->entries = sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_new_null()) == NULL)
+        goto memerr;
+    if ((ret->bytes = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
+        goto memerr;
+    ret->modified = 1;
+    *val = (ASN1_VALUE *)ret;
+    return 1;
+
+ memerr:
+    ASN1err(ASN1_F_X509_NAME_EX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    if (ret) {
+        sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(ret->entries);
+        OPENSSL_free(ret);
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static void x509_name_ex_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
+{
+    X509_NAME *a;
+
+    if (!pval || !*pval)
+        return;
+    a = (X509_NAME *)*pval;
+
+    BUF_MEM_free(a->bytes);
+    sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_pop_free(a->entries, X509_NAME_ENTRY_free);
+    OPENSSL_free(a->canon_enc);
+    OPENSSL_free(a);
+    *pval = NULL;
+}
+
+static void local_sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(STACK_OF(X509_NAME_ENTRY) *ne)
+{
+    sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(ne);
+}
+
+static void local_sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_pop_free(STACK_OF(X509_NAME_ENTRY) *ne)
+{
+    sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_pop_free(ne, X509_NAME_ENTRY_free);
+}
+
+static int x509_name_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **val,
+                            const unsigned char **in, long len,
+                            const ASN1_ITEM *it, int tag, int aclass,
+                            char opt, ASN1_TLC *ctx)
+{
+    const unsigned char *p = *in, *q;
+    union {
+        STACK_OF(STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY) *s;
+        ASN1_VALUE *a;
+    } intname = {
+        NULL
+    };
+    union {
+        X509_NAME *x;
+        ASN1_VALUE *a;
+    } nm = {
+        NULL
+    };
+    int i, j, ret;
+    STACK_OF(X509_NAME_ENTRY) *entries;
+    X509_NAME_ENTRY *entry;
+    if (len > X509_NAME_MAX)
+        len = X509_NAME_MAX;
+    q = p;
+
+    /* Get internal representation of Name */
+    ret = ASN1_item_ex_d2i(&intname.a,
+                           &p, len, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_NAME_INTERNAL),
+                           tag, aclass, opt, ctx);
+
+    if (ret <= 0)
+        return ret;
+
+    if (*val)
+        x509_name_ex_free(val, NULL);
+    if (!x509_name_ex_new(&nm.a, NULL))
+        goto err;
+    /* We've decoded it: now cache encoding */
+    if (!BUF_MEM_grow(nm.x->bytes, p - q))
+        goto err;
+    memcpy(nm.x->bytes->data, q, p - q);
+
+    /* Convert internal representation to X509_NAME structure */
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY_num(intname.s); i++) {
+        entries = sk_STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY_value(intname.s, i);
+        for (j = 0; j < sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_num(entries); j++) {
+            entry = sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_value(entries, j);
+            entry->set = i;
+            if (!sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_push(nm.x->entries, entry))
+                goto err;
+            sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(entries, j, NULL);
+        }
+    }
+    ret = x509_name_canon(nm.x);
+    if (!ret)
+        goto err;
+    sk_STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY_pop_free(intname.s,
+                                         local_sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_free);
+    nm.x->modified = 0;
+    *val = nm.a;
+    *in = p;
+    return ret;
+
+ err:
+    if (nm.x != NULL)
+        X509_NAME_free(nm.x);
+    sk_STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY_pop_free(intname.s,
+                                         local_sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_pop_free);
+    ASN1err(ASN1_F_X509_NAME_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int x509_name_ex_i2d(ASN1_VALUE **val, unsigned char **out,
+                            const ASN1_ITEM *it, int tag, int aclass)
+{
+    int ret;
+    X509_NAME *a = (X509_NAME *)*val;
+    if (a->modified) {
+        ret = x509_name_encode(a);
+        if (ret < 0)
+            return ret;
+        ret = x509_name_canon(a);
+        if (ret < 0)
+            return ret;
+    }
+    ret = a->bytes->length;
+    if (out != NULL) {
+        memcpy(*out, a->bytes->data, ret);
+        *out += ret;
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int x509_name_encode(X509_NAME *a)
+{
+    union {
+        STACK_OF(STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY) *s;
+        ASN1_VALUE *a;
+    } intname = {
+        NULL
+    };
+    int len;
+    unsigned char *p;
+    STACK_OF(X509_NAME_ENTRY) *entries = NULL;
+    X509_NAME_ENTRY *entry;
+    int i, set = -1;
+    intname.s = sk_STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY_new_null();
+    if (!intname.s)
+        goto memerr;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_num(a->entries); i++) {
+        entry = sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_value(a->entries, i);
+        if (entry->set != set) {
+            entries = sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_new_null();
+            if (!entries)
+                goto memerr;
+            if (!sk_STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY_push(intname.s, entries)) {
+                sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(entries);
+                goto memerr;
+            }
+            set = entry->set;
+        }
+        if (!sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_push(entries, entry))
+            goto memerr;
+    }
+    len = ASN1_item_ex_i2d(&intname.a, NULL,
+                           ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_NAME_INTERNAL), -1, -1);
+    if (!BUF_MEM_grow(a->bytes, len))
+        goto memerr;
+    p = (unsigned char *)a->bytes->data;
+    ASN1_item_ex_i2d(&intname.a,
+                     &p, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_NAME_INTERNAL), -1, -1);
+    sk_STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY_pop_free(intname.s,
+                                         local_sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_free);
+    a->modified = 0;
+    return len;
+ memerr:
+    sk_STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY_pop_free(intname.s,
+                                         local_sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_free);
+    ASN1err(ASN1_F_X509_NAME_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return -1;
+}
+
+static int x509_name_ex_print(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE **pval,
+                              int indent,
+                              const char *fname, const ASN1_PCTX *pctx)
+{
+    if (X509_NAME_print_ex(out, (const X509_NAME *)*pval,
+                           indent, pctx->nm_flags) <= 0)
+        return 0;
+    return 2;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function generates the canonical encoding of the Name structure. In
+ * it all strings are converted to UTF8, leading, trailing and multiple
+ * spaces collapsed, converted to lower case and the leading SEQUENCE header
+ * removed. In future we could also normalize the UTF8 too. By doing this
+ * comparison of Name structures can be rapidly performed by just using
+ * memcmp() of the canonical encoding. By omitting the leading SEQUENCE name
+ * constraints of type dirName can also be checked with a simple memcmp().
+ */
+
+static int x509_name_canon(X509_NAME *a)
+{
+    unsigned char *p;
+    STACK_OF(STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY) *intname = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(X509_NAME_ENTRY) *entries = NULL;
+    X509_NAME_ENTRY *entry, *tmpentry = NULL;
+    int i, set = -1, ret = 0, len;
+
+    OPENSSL_free(a->canon_enc);
+    a->canon_enc = NULL;
+    /* Special case: empty X509_NAME => null encoding */
+    if (sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_num(a->entries) == 0) {
+        a->canon_enclen = 0;
+        return 1;
+    }
+    intname = sk_STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY_new_null();
+    if (!intname)
+        goto err;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_num(a->entries); i++) {
+        entry = sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_value(a->entries, i);
+        if (entry->set != set) {
+            entries = sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_new_null();
+            if (!entries)
+                goto err;
+            if (!sk_STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY_push(intname, entries)) {
+                sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(entries);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            set = entry->set;
+        }
+        tmpentry = X509_NAME_ENTRY_new();
+        if (tmpentry == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        tmpentry->object = OBJ_dup(entry->object);
+        if (tmpentry->object == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        if (!asn1_string_canon(tmpentry->value, entry->value))
+            goto err;
+        if (!sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_push(entries, tmpentry))
+            goto err;
+        tmpentry = NULL;
+    }
+
+    /* Finally generate encoding */
+
+    len = i2d_name_canon(intname, NULL);
+    if (len < 0)
+        goto err;
+    a->canon_enclen = len;
+
+    p = OPENSSL_malloc(a->canon_enclen);
+
+    if (p == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    a->canon_enc = p;
+
+    i2d_name_canon(intname, &p);
+
+    ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+
+    X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(tmpentry);
+    sk_STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY_pop_free(intname,
+                                         local_sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_pop_free);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/* Bitmap of all the types of string that will be canonicalized. */
+
+#define ASN1_MASK_CANON \
+        (B_ASN1_UTF8STRING | B_ASN1_BMPSTRING | B_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING \
+        | B_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING | B_ASN1_T61STRING | B_ASN1_IA5STRING \
+        | B_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING)
+
+static int asn1_string_canon(ASN1_STRING *out, const ASN1_STRING *in)
+{
+    unsigned char *to, *from;
+    int len, i;
+
+    /* If type not in bitmask just copy string across */
+    if (!(ASN1_tag2bit(in->type) & ASN1_MASK_CANON)) {
+        if (!ASN1_STRING_copy(out, in))
+            return 0;
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    out->type = V_ASN1_UTF8STRING;
+    out->length = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&out->data, in);
+    if (out->length == -1)
+        return 0;
+
+    to = out->data;
+    from = to;
+
+    len = out->length;
+
+    /*
+     * Convert string in place to canonical form. Ultimately we may need to
+     * handle a wider range of characters but for now ignore anything with
+     * MSB set and rely on the isspace() and tolower() functions.
+     */
+
+    /* Ignore leading spaces */
+    while ((len > 0) && !(*from & 0x80) && isspace(*from)) {
+        from++;
+        len--;
+    }
+
+    to = from + len;
+
+    /* Ignore trailing spaces */
+    while ((len > 0) && !(to[-1] & 0x80) && isspace(to[-1])) {
+        to--;
+        len--;
+    }
+
+    to = out->data;
+
+    i = 0;
+    while (i < len) {
+        /* If MSB set just copy across */
+        if (*from & 0x80) {
+            *to++ = *from++;
+            i++;
+        }
+        /* Collapse multiple spaces */
+        else if (isspace(*from)) {
+            /* Copy one space across */
+            *to++ = ' ';
+            /*
+             * Ignore subsequent spaces. Note: don't need to check len here
+             * because we know the last character is a non-space so we can't
+             * overflow.
+             */
+            do {
+                from++;
+                i++;
+            }
+            while (!(*from & 0x80) && isspace(*from));
+        } else {
+            *to++ = tolower(*from);
+            from++;
+            i++;
+        }
+    }
+
+    out->length = to - out->data;
+
+    return 1;
+
+}
+
+static int i2d_name_canon(STACK_OF(STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY) * _intname,
+                          unsigned char **in)
+{
+    int i, len, ltmp;
+    ASN1_VALUE *v;
+    STACK_OF(ASN1_VALUE) *intname = (STACK_OF(ASN1_VALUE) *)_intname;
+
+    len = 0;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_VALUE_num(intname); i++) {
+        v = sk_ASN1_VALUE_value(intname, i);
+        ltmp = ASN1_item_ex_i2d(&v, in,
+                                ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_NAME_ENTRIES), -1, -1);
+        if (ltmp < 0)
+            return ltmp;
+        len += ltmp;
+    }
+    return len;
+}
+
+int X509_NAME_set(X509_NAME **xn, X509_NAME *name)
+{
+    if ((name = X509_NAME_dup(name)) == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    X509_NAME_free(*xn);
+    *xn = name;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int X509_NAME_print(BIO *bp, const X509_NAME *name, int obase)
+{
+    char *s, *c, *b;
+    int l, i;
+
+    l = 80 - 2 - obase;
+
+    b = X509_NAME_oneline(name, NULL, 0);
+    if (!b)
+        return 0;
+    if (!*b) {
+        OPENSSL_free(b);
+        return 1;
+    }
+    s = b + 1;                  /* skip the first slash */
+
+    c = s;
+    for (;;) {
+#ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+        if (((*s == '/') &&
+             ((s[1] >= 'A') && (s[1] <= 'Z') && ((s[2] == '=') ||
+                                                 ((s[2] >= 'A')
+                                                  && (s[2] <= 'Z')
+                                                  && (s[3] == '='))
+              ))) || (*s == '\0'))
+#else
+        if (((*s == '/') &&
+             (isupper(s[1]) && ((s[2] == '=') ||
+                                (isupper(s[2]) && (s[3] == '='))
+              ))) || (*s == '\0'))
+#endif
+        {
+            i = s - c;
+            if (BIO_write(bp, c, i) != i)
+                goto err;
+            c = s + 1;          /* skip following slash */
+            if (*s != '\0') {
+                if (BIO_write(bp, ", ", 2) != 2)
+                    goto err;
+            }
+            l--;
+        }
+        if (*s == '\0')
+            break;
+        s++;
+        l--;
+    }
+
+    OPENSSL_free(b);
+    return 1;
+ err:
+    X509err(X509_F_X509_NAME_PRINT, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+    OPENSSL_free(b);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int X509_NAME_get0_der(X509_NAME *nm, const unsigned char **pder,
+                       size_t *pderlen)
+{
+    /* Make sure encoding is valid */
+    if (i2d_X509_NAME(nm, NULL) <= 0)
+        return 0;
+    if (pder != NULL)
+        *pder = (unsigned char *)nm->bytes->data;
+    if (pderlen != NULL)
+        *pderlen = nm->bytes->length;
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x_pubkey.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x_pubkey.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cc69283
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x_pubkey.c
@@ -0,0 +1,374 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include "internal/asn1_int.h"
+#include "internal/evp_int.h"
+#include "internal/x509_int.h"
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
+
+struct X509_pubkey_st {
+    X509_ALGOR *algor;
+    ASN1_BIT_STRING *public_key;
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+};
+
+static int x509_pubkey_decode(EVP_PKEY **pk, X509_PUBKEY *key);
+
+/* Minor tweak to operation: free up EVP_PKEY */
+static int pubkey_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+                     void *exarg)
+{
+    if (operation == ASN1_OP_FREE_POST) {
+        X509_PUBKEY *pubkey = (X509_PUBKEY *)*pval;
+        EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey->pkey);
+    } else if (operation == ASN1_OP_D2I_POST) {
+        /* Attempt to decode public key and cache in pubkey structure. */
+        X509_PUBKEY *pubkey = (X509_PUBKEY *)*pval;
+        EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey->pkey);
+        /*
+         * Opportunistically decode the key but remove any non fatal errors
+         * from the queue. Subsequent explicit attempts to decode/use the key
+         * will return an appropriate error.
+         */
+        ERR_set_mark();
+        if (x509_pubkey_decode(&pubkey->pkey, pubkey) == -1)
+            return 0;
+        ERR_pop_to_mark();
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE_cb(X509_PUBKEY, pubkey_cb) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_PUBKEY, algor, X509_ALGOR),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_PUBKEY, public_key, ASN1_BIT_STRING)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_cb(X509_PUBKEY, X509_PUBKEY)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_PUBKEY)
+
+int X509_PUBKEY_set(X509_PUBKEY **x, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    X509_PUBKEY *pk = NULL;
+
+    if (x == NULL)
+        return (0);
+
+    if ((pk = X509_PUBKEY_new()) == NULL)
+        goto error;
+
+    if (pkey->ameth) {
+        if (pkey->ameth->pub_encode) {
+            if (!pkey->ameth->pub_encode(pk, pkey)) {
+                X509err(X509_F_X509_PUBKEY_SET,
+                        X509_R_PUBLIC_KEY_ENCODE_ERROR);
+                goto error;
+            }
+        } else {
+            X509err(X509_F_X509_PUBKEY_SET, X509_R_METHOD_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+            goto error;
+        }
+    } else {
+        X509err(X509_F_X509_PUBKEY_SET, X509_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM);
+        goto error;
+    }
+
+    X509_PUBKEY_free(*x);
+    *x = pk;
+    pk->pkey = pkey;
+    EVP_PKEY_up_ref(pkey);
+    return 1;
+
+ error:
+    X509_PUBKEY_free(pk);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Attempt to decode a public key.
+ * Returns 1 on success, 0 for a decode failure and -1 for a fatal
+ * error e.g. malloc failure.
+ */
+
+
+static int x509_pubkey_decode(EVP_PKEY **ppkey, X509_PUBKEY *key)
+    {
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
+
+    if (pkey == NULL) {
+        X509err(X509_F_X509_PUBKEY_DECODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (!EVP_PKEY_set_type(pkey, OBJ_obj2nid(key->algor->algorithm))) {
+        X509err(X509_F_X509_PUBKEY_DECODE, X509_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM);
+        goto error;
+    }
+
+    if (pkey->ameth->pub_decode) {
+        /*
+         * Treat any failure of pub_decode as a decode error. In
+         * future we could have different return codes for decode
+         * errors and fatal errors such as malloc failure.
+         */
+        if (!pkey->ameth->pub_decode(pkey, key)) {
+            X509err(X509_F_X509_PUBKEY_DECODE, X509_R_PUBLIC_KEY_DECODE_ERROR);
+            goto error;
+        }
+    } else {
+        X509err(X509_F_X509_PUBKEY_DECODE, X509_R_METHOD_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+        goto error;
+    }
+
+    *ppkey = pkey;
+    return 1;
+
+ error:
+    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY *X509_PUBKEY_get0(X509_PUBKEY *key)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY *ret = NULL;
+
+    if (key == NULL || key->public_key == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+
+    if (key->pkey != NULL)
+        return key->pkey;
+
+    /*
+     * When the key ASN.1 is initially parsed an attempt is made to
+     * decode the public key and cache the EVP_PKEY structure. If this
+     * operation fails the cached value will be NULL. Parsing continues
+     * to allow parsing of unknown key types or unsupported forms.
+     * We repeat the decode operation so the appropriate errors are left
+     * in the queue.
+     */
+    x509_pubkey_decode(&ret, key);
+    /* If decode doesn't fail something bad happened */
+    if (ret != NULL) {
+        X509err(X509_F_X509_PUBKEY_GET0, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        EVP_PKEY_free(ret);
+    }
+
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY *X509_PUBKEY_get(X509_PUBKEY *key)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY *ret = X509_PUBKEY_get0(key);
+    if (ret != NULL)
+        EVP_PKEY_up_ref(ret);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Now two pseudo ASN1 routines that take an EVP_PKEY structure and encode or
+ * decode as X509_PUBKEY
+ */
+
+EVP_PKEY *d2i_PUBKEY(EVP_PKEY **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length)
+{
+    X509_PUBKEY *xpk;
+    EVP_PKEY *pktmp;
+    const unsigned char *q;
+    q = *pp;
+    xpk = d2i_X509_PUBKEY(NULL, &q, length);
+    if (!xpk)
+        return NULL;
+    pktmp = X509_PUBKEY_get(xpk);
+    X509_PUBKEY_free(xpk);
+    if (!pktmp)
+        return NULL;
+    *pp = q;
+    if (a) {
+        EVP_PKEY_free(*a);
+        *a = pktmp;
+    }
+    return pktmp;
+}
+
+int i2d_PUBKEY(EVP_PKEY *a, unsigned char **pp)
+{
+    X509_PUBKEY *xpk = NULL;
+    int ret;
+    if (!a)
+        return 0;
+    if (!X509_PUBKEY_set(&xpk, a))
+        return 0;
+    ret = i2d_X509_PUBKEY(xpk, pp);
+    X509_PUBKEY_free(xpk);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The following are equivalents but which return RSA and DSA keys
+ */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+RSA *d2i_RSA_PUBKEY(RSA **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+    RSA *key;
+    const unsigned char *q;
+    q = *pp;
+    pkey = d2i_PUBKEY(NULL, &q, length);
+    if (!pkey)
+        return NULL;
+    key = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+    if (!key)
+        return NULL;
+    *pp = q;
+    if (a) {
+        RSA_free(*a);
+        *a = key;
+    }
+    return key;
+}
+
+int i2d_RSA_PUBKEY(RSA *a, unsigned char **pp)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY *pktmp;
+    int ret;
+    if (!a)
+        return 0;
+    pktmp = EVP_PKEY_new();
+    if (pktmp == NULL) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_I2D_RSA_PUBKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pktmp, a);
+    ret = i2d_PUBKEY(pktmp, pp);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(pktmp);
+    return ret;
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+DSA *d2i_DSA_PUBKEY(DSA **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+    DSA *key;
+    const unsigned char *q;
+    q = *pp;
+    pkey = d2i_PUBKEY(NULL, &q, length);
+    if (!pkey)
+        return NULL;
+    key = EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA(pkey);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+    if (!key)
+        return NULL;
+    *pp = q;
+    if (a) {
+        DSA_free(*a);
+        *a = key;
+    }
+    return key;
+}
+
+int i2d_DSA_PUBKEY(DSA *a, unsigned char **pp)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY *pktmp;
+    int ret;
+    if (!a)
+        return 0;
+    pktmp = EVP_PKEY_new();
+    if (pktmp == NULL) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_I2D_DSA_PUBKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(pktmp, a);
+    ret = i2d_PUBKEY(pktmp, pp);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(pktmp);
+    return ret;
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+EC_KEY *d2i_EC_PUBKEY(EC_KEY **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+    EC_KEY *key;
+    const unsigned char *q;
+    q = *pp;
+    pkey = d2i_PUBKEY(NULL, &q, length);
+    if (!pkey)
+        return (NULL);
+    key = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pkey);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+    if (!key)
+        return (NULL);
+    *pp = q;
+    if (a) {
+        EC_KEY_free(*a);
+        *a = key;
+    }
+    return (key);
+}
+
+int i2d_EC_PUBKEY(EC_KEY *a, unsigned char **pp)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY *pktmp;
+    int ret;
+    if (!a)
+        return (0);
+    if ((pktmp = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_I2D_EC_PUBKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return (0);
+    }
+    EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(pktmp, a);
+    ret = i2d_PUBKEY(pktmp, pp);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(pktmp);
+    return (ret);
+}
+#endif
+
+int X509_PUBKEY_set0_param(X509_PUBKEY *pub, ASN1_OBJECT *aobj,
+                           int ptype, void *pval,
+                           unsigned char *penc, int penclen)
+{
+    if (!X509_ALGOR_set0(pub->algor, aobj, ptype, pval))
+        return 0;
+    if (penc) {
+        OPENSSL_free(pub->public_key->data);
+        pub->public_key->data = penc;
+        pub->public_key->length = penclen;
+        /* Set number of unused bits to zero */
+        pub->public_key->flags &= ~(ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT | 0x07);
+        pub->public_key->flags |= ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int X509_PUBKEY_get0_param(ASN1_OBJECT **ppkalg,
+                           const unsigned char **pk, int *ppklen,
+                           X509_ALGOR **pa, X509_PUBKEY *pub)
+{
+    if (ppkalg)
+        *ppkalg = pub->algor->algorithm;
+    if (pk) {
+        *pk = pub->public_key->data;
+        *ppklen = pub->public_key->length;
+    }
+    if (pa)
+        *pa = pub->algor;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+ASN1_BIT_STRING *X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(const X509 *x)
+{
+    if (x == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    return x->cert_info.key->public_key;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x_req.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x_req.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c2da95a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x_req.c
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include "internal/x509_int.h"
+
+/*-
+ * X509_REQ_INFO is handled in an unusual way to get round
+ * invalid encodings. Some broken certificate requests don't
+ * encode the attributes field if it is empty. This is in
+ * violation of PKCS#10 but we need to tolerate it. We do
+ * this by making the attributes field OPTIONAL then using
+ * the callback to initialise it to an empty STACK.
+ *
+ * This means that the field will be correctly encoded unless
+ * we NULL out the field.
+ *
+ * As a result we no longer need the req_kludge field because
+ * the information is now contained in the attributes field:
+ * 1. If it is NULL then it's the invalid omission.
+ * 2. If it is empty it is the correct encoding.
+ * 3. If it is not empty then some attributes are present.
+ *
+ */
+
+static int rinf_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+                   void *exarg)
+{
+    X509_REQ_INFO *rinf = (X509_REQ_INFO *)*pval;
+
+    if (operation == ASN1_OP_NEW_POST) {
+        rinf->attributes = sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_new_null();
+        if (!rinf->attributes)
+            return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE_enc(X509_REQ_INFO, enc, rinf_cb) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_REQ_INFO, version, ASN1_INTEGER),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_REQ_INFO, subject, X509_NAME),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_REQ_INFO, pubkey, X509_PUBKEY),
+        /* This isn't really OPTIONAL but it gets round invalid
+         * encodings
+         */
+        ASN1_IMP_SET_OF_OPT(X509_REQ_INFO, attributes, X509_ATTRIBUTE, 0)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_enc(X509_REQ_INFO, X509_REQ_INFO)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_REQ_INFO)
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE_ref(X509_REQ, 0) = {
+        ASN1_EMBED(X509_REQ, req_info, X509_REQ_INFO),
+        ASN1_EMBED(X509_REQ, sig_alg, X509_ALGOR),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_REQ, signature, ASN1_BIT_STRING)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_ref(X509_REQ, X509_REQ)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_REQ)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(X509_REQ)
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x_x509.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x_x509.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6783fd8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x_x509.c
@@ -0,0 +1,224 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include "internal/x509_int.h"
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE_enc(X509_CINF, enc, 0) = {
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(X509_CINF, version, ASN1_INTEGER, 0),
+        ASN1_EMBED(X509_CINF, serialNumber, ASN1_INTEGER),
+        ASN1_EMBED(X509_CINF, signature, X509_ALGOR),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CINF, issuer, X509_NAME),
+        ASN1_EMBED(X509_CINF, validity, X509_VAL),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CINF, subject, X509_NAME),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CINF, key, X509_PUBKEY),
+        ASN1_IMP_OPT(X509_CINF, issuerUID, ASN1_BIT_STRING, 1),
+        ASN1_IMP_OPT(X509_CINF, subjectUID, ASN1_BIT_STRING, 2),
+        ASN1_EXP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(X509_CINF, extensions, X509_EXTENSION, 3)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_enc(X509_CINF, X509_CINF)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_CINF)
+/* X509 top level structure needs a bit of customisation */
+
+extern void policy_cache_free(X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache);
+
+static int x509_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+                   void *exarg)
+{
+    X509 *ret = (X509 *)*pval;
+
+    switch (operation) {
+
+    case ASN1_OP_NEW_POST:
+        ret->ex_flags = 0;
+        ret->ex_pathlen = -1;
+        ret->ex_pcpathlen = -1;
+        ret->skid = NULL;
+        ret->akid = NULL;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
+        ret->rfc3779_addr = NULL;
+        ret->rfc3779_asid = NULL;
+#endif
+        ret->aux = NULL;
+        ret->crldp = NULL;
+        if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509, ret, &ret->ex_data))
+            return 0;
+        break;
+
+    case ASN1_OP_FREE_POST:
+        CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509, ret, &ret->ex_data);
+        X509_CERT_AUX_free(ret->aux);
+        ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(ret->skid);
+        AUTHORITY_KEYID_free(ret->akid);
+        CRL_DIST_POINTS_free(ret->crldp);
+        policy_cache_free(ret->policy_cache);
+        GENERAL_NAMES_free(ret->altname);
+        NAME_CONSTRAINTS_free(ret->nc);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
+        sk_IPAddressFamily_pop_free(ret->rfc3779_addr, IPAddressFamily_free);
+        ASIdentifiers_free(ret->rfc3779_asid);
+#endif
+        break;
+
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+
+}
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE_ref(X509, x509_cb) = {
+        ASN1_EMBED(X509, cert_info, X509_CINF),
+        ASN1_EMBED(X509, sig_alg, X509_ALGOR),
+        ASN1_EMBED(X509, signature, ASN1_BIT_STRING)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_ref(X509, X509)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(X509)
+
+int X509_set_ex_data(X509 *r, int idx, void *arg)
+{
+    return (CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&r->ex_data, idx, arg));
+}
+
+void *X509_get_ex_data(X509 *r, int idx)
+{
+    return (CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&r->ex_data, idx));
+}
+
+/*
+ * X509_AUX ASN1 routines. X509_AUX is the name given to a certificate with
+ * extra info tagged on the end. Since these functions set how a certificate
+ * is trusted they should only be used when the certificate comes from a
+ * reliable source such as local storage.
+ */
+
+X509 *d2i_X509_AUX(X509 **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length)
+{
+    const unsigned char *q;
+    X509 *ret;
+    int freeret = 0;
+
+    /* Save start position */
+    q = *pp;
+
+    if (a == NULL || *a == NULL)
+        freeret = 1;
+    ret = d2i_X509(a, &q, length);
+    /* If certificate unreadable then forget it */
+    if (ret == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    /* update length */
+    length -= q - *pp;
+    if (length > 0 && !d2i_X509_CERT_AUX(&ret->aux, &q, length))
+        goto err;
+    *pp = q;
+    return ret;
+ err:
+    if (freeret) {
+        X509_free(ret);
+        if (a)
+            *a = NULL;
+    }
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Serialize trusted certificate to *pp or just return the required buffer
+ * length if pp == NULL.  We ultimately want to avoid modifying *pp in the
+ * error path, but that depends on similar hygiene in lower-level functions.
+ * Here we avoid compounding the problem.
+ */
+static int i2d_x509_aux_internal(X509 *a, unsigned char **pp)
+{
+    int length, tmplen;
+    unsigned char *start = pp != NULL ? *pp : NULL;
+
+    OPENSSL_assert(pp == NULL || *pp != NULL);
+
+    /*
+     * This might perturb *pp on error, but fixing that belongs in i2d_X509()
+     * not here.  It should be that if a == NULL length is zero, but we check
+     * both just in case.
+     */
+    length = i2d_X509(a, pp);
+    if (length <= 0 || a == NULL)
+        return length;
+
+    tmplen = i2d_X509_CERT_AUX(a->aux, pp);
+    if (tmplen < 0) {
+        if (start != NULL)
+            *pp = start;
+        return tmplen;
+    }
+    length += tmplen;
+
+    return length;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Serialize trusted certificate to *pp, or just return the required buffer
+ * length if pp == NULL.
+ *
+ * When pp is not NULL, but *pp == NULL, we allocate the buffer, but since
+ * we're writing two ASN.1 objects back to back, we can't have i2d_X509() do
+ * the allocation, nor can we allow i2d_X509_CERT_AUX() to increment the
+ * allocated buffer.
+ */
+int i2d_X509_AUX(X509 *a, unsigned char **pp)
+{
+    int length;
+    unsigned char *tmp;
+
+    /* Buffer provided by caller */
+    if (pp == NULL || *pp != NULL)
+        return i2d_x509_aux_internal(a, pp);
+
+    /* Obtain the combined length */
+    if ((length = i2d_x509_aux_internal(a, NULL)) <= 0)
+        return length;
+
+    /* Allocate requisite combined storage */
+    *pp = tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(length);
+    if (tmp == NULL)
+        return -1; /* Push error onto error stack? */
+
+    /* Encode, but keep *pp at the originally malloced pointer */
+    length = i2d_x509_aux_internal(a, &tmp);
+    if (length <= 0) {
+        OPENSSL_free(*pp);
+        *pp = NULL;
+    }
+    return length;
+}
+
+int i2d_re_X509_tbs(X509 *x, unsigned char **pp)
+{
+    x->cert_info.enc.modified = 1;
+    return i2d_X509_CINF(&x->cert_info, pp);
+}
+
+void X509_get0_signature(const ASN1_BIT_STRING **psig,
+                         const X509_ALGOR **palg, const X509 *x)
+{
+    if (psig)
+        *psig = &x->signature;
+    if (palg)
+        *palg = &x->sig_alg;
+}
+
+int X509_get_signature_nid(const X509 *x)
+{
+    return OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg.algorithm);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x_x509a.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x_x509a.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8c9ad71
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x_x509a.c
@@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include "internal/x509_int.h"
+
+/*
+ * X509_CERT_AUX routines. These are used to encode additional user
+ * modifiable data about a certificate. This data is appended to the X509
+ * encoding when the *_X509_AUX routines are used. This means that the
+ * "traditional" X509 routines will simply ignore the extra data.
+ */
+
+static X509_CERT_AUX *aux_get(X509 *x);
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(X509_CERT_AUX) = {
+        ASN1_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(X509_CERT_AUX, trust, ASN1_OBJECT),
+        ASN1_IMP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(X509_CERT_AUX, reject, ASN1_OBJECT, 0),
+        ASN1_OPT(X509_CERT_AUX, alias, ASN1_UTF8STRING),
+        ASN1_OPT(X509_CERT_AUX, keyid, ASN1_OCTET_STRING),
+        ASN1_IMP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(X509_CERT_AUX, other, X509_ALGOR, 1)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(X509_CERT_AUX)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_CERT_AUX)
+
+int X509_trusted(const X509 *x)
+{
+    return x->aux ? 1 : 0;
+}
+
+static X509_CERT_AUX *aux_get(X509 *x)
+{
+    if (x == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    if (x->aux == NULL && (x->aux = X509_CERT_AUX_new()) == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    return x->aux;
+}
+
+int X509_alias_set1(X509 *x, const unsigned char *name, int len)
+{
+    X509_CERT_AUX *aux;
+    if (!name) {
+        if (!x || !x->aux || !x->aux->alias)
+            return 1;
+        ASN1_UTF8STRING_free(x->aux->alias);
+        x->aux->alias = NULL;
+        return 1;
+    }
+    if ((aux = aux_get(x)) == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    if (aux->alias == NULL && (aux->alias = ASN1_UTF8STRING_new()) == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    return ASN1_STRING_set(aux->alias, name, len);
+}
+
+int X509_keyid_set1(X509 *x, const unsigned char *id, int len)
+{
+    X509_CERT_AUX *aux;
+    if (!id) {
+        if (!x || !x->aux || !x->aux->keyid)
+            return 1;
+        ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(x->aux->keyid);
+        x->aux->keyid = NULL;
+        return 1;
+    }
+    if ((aux = aux_get(x)) == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    if (aux->keyid == NULL
+        && (aux->keyid = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new()) == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    return ASN1_STRING_set(aux->keyid, id, len);
+}
+
+unsigned char *X509_alias_get0(X509 *x, int *len)
+{
+    if (!x->aux || !x->aux->alias)
+        return NULL;
+    if (len)
+        *len = x->aux->alias->length;
+    return x->aux->alias->data;
+}
+
+unsigned char *X509_keyid_get0(X509 *x, int *len)
+{
+    if (!x->aux || !x->aux->keyid)
+        return NULL;
+    if (len)
+        *len = x->aux->keyid->length;
+    return x->aux->keyid->data;
+}
+
+int X509_add1_trust_object(X509 *x, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj)
+{
+    X509_CERT_AUX *aux;
+    ASN1_OBJECT *objtmp = NULL;
+    if (obj) {
+        objtmp = OBJ_dup(obj);
+        if (!objtmp)
+            return 0;
+    }
+    if ((aux = aux_get(x)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (aux->trust == NULL
+        && (aux->trust = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_new_null()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (!objtmp || sk_ASN1_OBJECT_push(aux->trust, objtmp))
+        return 1;
+ err:
+    ASN1_OBJECT_free(objtmp);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int X509_add1_reject_object(X509 *x, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj)
+{
+    X509_CERT_AUX *aux;
+    ASN1_OBJECT *objtmp;
+    if ((objtmp = OBJ_dup(obj)) == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    if ((aux = aux_get(x)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (aux->reject == NULL
+        && (aux->reject = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_new_null()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    return sk_ASN1_OBJECT_push(aux->reject, objtmp);
+ err:
+    ASN1_OBJECT_free(objtmp);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+void X509_trust_clear(X509 *x)
+{
+    if (x->aux) {
+        sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(x->aux->trust, ASN1_OBJECT_free);
+        x->aux->trust = NULL;
+    }
+}
+
+void X509_reject_clear(X509 *x)
+{
+    if (x->aux) {
+        sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(x->aux->reject, ASN1_OBJECT_free);
+        x->aux->reject = NULL;
+    }
+}
+
+STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *X509_get0_trust_objects(X509 *x)
+{
+    if (x->aux != NULL)
+        return x->aux->trust;
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *X509_get0_reject_objects(X509 *x)
+{
+    if (x->aux != NULL)
+        return x->aux->reject;
+    return NULL;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/build.info b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/build.info
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..452a8b0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/build.info
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+LIBS=../../libcrypto
+SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
+  v3_bcons.c v3_bitst.c v3_conf.c v3_extku.c v3_ia5.c v3_lib.c \
+  v3_prn.c v3_utl.c v3err.c v3_genn.c v3_alt.c v3_skey.c v3_akey.c v3_pku.c \
+  v3_int.c v3_enum.c v3_sxnet.c v3_cpols.c v3_crld.c v3_purp.c v3_info.c \
+  v3_akeya.c v3_pmaps.c v3_pcons.c v3_ncons.c v3_pcia.c v3_pci.c \
+  pcy_cache.c pcy_node.c pcy_data.c pcy_map.c pcy_tree.c pcy_lib.c \
+  v3_asid.c v3_addr.c v3_tlsf.c
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/ext_dat.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/ext_dat.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c9ede96
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/ext_dat.h
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+int name_cmp(const char *name, const char *cmp);
+
+extern const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_bcons, v3_nscert, v3_key_usage, v3_ext_ku;
+extern const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_pkey_usage_period, v3_sxnet, v3_info, v3_sinfo;
+extern const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_ns_ia5_list[8], v3_alt[3], v3_skey_id, v3_akey_id;
+extern const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_crl_num, v3_crl_reason, v3_crl_invdate;
+extern const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_delta_crl, v3_cpols, v3_crld, v3_freshest_crl;
+extern const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_ocsp_nonce, v3_ocsp_accresp, v3_ocsp_acutoff;
+extern const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_ocsp_crlid, v3_ocsp_nocheck, v3_ocsp_serviceloc;
+extern const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_crl_hold, v3_pci;
+extern const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_policy_mappings, v3_policy_constraints;
+extern const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_name_constraints, v3_inhibit_anyp, v3_idp;
+extern const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_addr, v3_asid;
+extern const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_ct_scts[3];
+extern const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_tls_feature;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/pcy_cache.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/pcy_cache.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a9ee30a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/pcy_cache.c
@@ -0,0 +1,216 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include "internal/x509_int.h"
+
+#include "pcy_int.h"
+
+static int policy_data_cmp(const X509_POLICY_DATA *const *a,
+                           const X509_POLICY_DATA *const *b);
+static int policy_cache_set_int(long *out, ASN1_INTEGER *value);
+
+/*
+ * Set cache entry according to CertificatePolicies extension. Note: this
+ * destroys the passed CERTIFICATEPOLICIES structure.
+ */
+
+static int policy_cache_create(X509 *x,
+                               CERTIFICATEPOLICIES *policies, int crit)
+{
+    int i;
+    int ret = 0;
+    X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache = x->policy_cache;
+    X509_POLICY_DATA *data = NULL;
+    POLICYINFO *policy;
+    if (sk_POLICYINFO_num(policies) == 0)
+        goto bad_policy;
+    cache->data = sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_new(policy_data_cmp);
+    if (cache->data == NULL)
+        goto bad_policy;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_POLICYINFO_num(policies); i++) {
+        policy = sk_POLICYINFO_value(policies, i);
+        data = policy_data_new(policy, NULL, crit);
+        if (data == NULL)
+            goto bad_policy;
+        /*
+         * Duplicate policy OIDs are illegal: reject if matches found.
+         */
+        if (OBJ_obj2nid(data->valid_policy) == NID_any_policy) {
+            if (cache->anyPolicy) {
+                ret = -1;
+                goto bad_policy;
+            }
+            cache->anyPolicy = data;
+        } else if (sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_find(cache->data, data) != -1) {
+            ret = -1;
+            goto bad_policy;
+        } else if (!sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_push(cache->data, data))
+            goto bad_policy;
+        data = NULL;
+    }
+    ret = 1;
+ bad_policy:
+    if (ret == -1)
+        x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY;
+    policy_data_free(data);
+    sk_POLICYINFO_pop_free(policies, POLICYINFO_free);
+    if (ret <= 0) {
+        sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_pop_free(cache->data, policy_data_free);
+        cache->data = NULL;
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int policy_cache_new(X509 *x)
+{
+    X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache;
+    ASN1_INTEGER *ext_any = NULL;
+    POLICY_CONSTRAINTS *ext_pcons = NULL;
+    CERTIFICATEPOLICIES *ext_cpols = NULL;
+    POLICY_MAPPINGS *ext_pmaps = NULL;
+    int i;
+
+    if (x->policy_cache != NULL)
+        return 1;
+    cache = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*cache));
+    if (cache == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    cache->anyPolicy = NULL;
+    cache->data = NULL;
+    cache->any_skip = -1;
+    cache->explicit_skip = -1;
+    cache->map_skip = -1;
+
+    x->policy_cache = cache;
+
+    /*
+     * Handle requireExplicitPolicy *first*. Need to process this even if we
+     * don't have any policies.
+     */
+    ext_pcons = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_policy_constraints, &i, NULL);
+
+    if (!ext_pcons) {
+        if (i != -1)
+            goto bad_cache;
+    } else {
+        if (!ext_pcons->requireExplicitPolicy
+            && !ext_pcons->inhibitPolicyMapping)
+            goto bad_cache;
+        if (!policy_cache_set_int(&cache->explicit_skip,
+                                  ext_pcons->requireExplicitPolicy))
+            goto bad_cache;
+        if (!policy_cache_set_int(&cache->map_skip,
+                                  ext_pcons->inhibitPolicyMapping))
+            goto bad_cache;
+    }
+
+    /* Process CertificatePolicies */
+
+    ext_cpols = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_certificate_policies, &i, NULL);
+    /*
+     * If no CertificatePolicies extension or problem decoding then there is
+     * no point continuing because the valid policies will be NULL.
+     */
+    if (!ext_cpols) {
+        /* If not absent some problem with extension */
+        if (i != -1)
+            goto bad_cache;
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    i = policy_cache_create(x, ext_cpols, i);
+
+    /* NB: ext_cpols freed by policy_cache_set_policies */
+
+    if (i <= 0)
+        return i;
+
+    ext_pmaps = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_policy_mappings, &i, NULL);
+
+    if (!ext_pmaps) {
+        /* If not absent some problem with extension */
+        if (i != -1)
+            goto bad_cache;
+    } else {
+        i = policy_cache_set_mapping(x, ext_pmaps);
+        if (i <= 0)
+            goto bad_cache;
+    }
+
+    ext_any = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_inhibit_any_policy, &i, NULL);
+
+    if (!ext_any) {
+        if (i != -1)
+            goto bad_cache;
+    } else if (!policy_cache_set_int(&cache->any_skip, ext_any))
+        goto bad_cache;
+    goto just_cleanup;
+
+ bad_cache:
+    x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY;
+
+ just_cleanup:
+    POLICY_CONSTRAINTS_free(ext_pcons);
+    ASN1_INTEGER_free(ext_any);
+    return 1;
+
+}
+
+void policy_cache_free(X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache)
+{
+    if (!cache)
+        return;
+    policy_data_free(cache->anyPolicy);
+    sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_pop_free(cache->data, policy_data_free);
+    OPENSSL_free(cache);
+}
+
+const X509_POLICY_CACHE *policy_cache_set(X509 *x)
+{
+
+    if (x->policy_cache == NULL) {
+        CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(x->lock);
+        policy_cache_new(x);
+        CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(x->lock);
+    }
+
+    return x->policy_cache;
+
+}
+
+X509_POLICY_DATA *policy_cache_find_data(const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache,
+                                         const ASN1_OBJECT *id)
+{
+    int idx;
+    X509_POLICY_DATA tmp;
+    tmp.valid_policy = (ASN1_OBJECT *)id;
+    idx = sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_find(cache->data, &tmp);
+    if (idx == -1)
+        return NULL;
+    return sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_value(cache->data, idx);
+}
+
+static int policy_data_cmp(const X509_POLICY_DATA *const *a,
+                           const X509_POLICY_DATA *const *b)
+{
+    return OBJ_cmp((*a)->valid_policy, (*b)->valid_policy);
+}
+
+static int policy_cache_set_int(long *out, ASN1_INTEGER *value)
+{
+    if (value == NULL)
+        return 1;
+    if (value->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER)
+        return 0;
+    *out = ASN1_INTEGER_get(value);
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/pcy_data.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/pcy_data.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cf1d635
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/pcy_data.c
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+
+#include "pcy_int.h"
+
+/* Policy Node routines */
+
+void policy_data_free(X509_POLICY_DATA *data)
+{
+    if (!data)
+        return;
+    ASN1_OBJECT_free(data->valid_policy);
+    /* Don't free qualifiers if shared */
+    if (!(data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS))
+        sk_POLICYQUALINFO_pop_free(data->qualifier_set, POLICYQUALINFO_free);
+    sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(data->expected_policy_set, ASN1_OBJECT_free);
+    OPENSSL_free(data);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Create a data based on an existing policy. If 'id' is NULL use the OID in
+ * the policy, otherwise use 'id'. This behaviour covers the two types of
+ * data in RFC3280: data with from a CertificatePolicies extension and
+ * additional data with just the qualifiers of anyPolicy and ID from another
+ * source.
+ */
+
+X509_POLICY_DATA *policy_data_new(POLICYINFO *policy,
+                                  const ASN1_OBJECT *cid, int crit)
+{
+    X509_POLICY_DATA *ret;
+    ASN1_OBJECT *id;
+    if (!policy && !cid)
+        return NULL;
+    if (cid) {
+        id = OBJ_dup(cid);
+        if (!id)
+            return NULL;
+    } else
+        id = NULL;
+    ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
+    if (ret == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    ret->expected_policy_set = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_new_null();
+    if (ret->expected_policy_set == NULL) {
+        OPENSSL_free(ret);
+        ASN1_OBJECT_free(id);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    if (crit)
+        ret->flags = POLICY_DATA_FLAG_CRITICAL;
+
+    if (id)
+        ret->valid_policy = id;
+    else {
+        ret->valid_policy = policy->policyid;
+        policy->policyid = NULL;
+    }
+
+    if (policy) {
+        ret->qualifier_set = policy->qualifiers;
+        policy->qualifiers = NULL;
+    }
+
+    return ret;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/pcy_int.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/pcy_int.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5daf78d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/pcy_int.h
@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+typedef struct X509_POLICY_DATA_st X509_POLICY_DATA;
+
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_DATA)
+
+/* Internal structures */
+
+/*
+ * This structure and the field names correspond to the Policy 'node' of
+ * RFC3280. NB this structure contains no pointers to parent or child data:
+ * X509_POLICY_NODE contains that. This means that the main policy data can
+ * be kept static and cached with the certificate.
+ */
+
+struct X509_POLICY_DATA_st {
+    unsigned int flags;
+    /* Policy OID and qualifiers for this data */
+    ASN1_OBJECT *valid_policy;
+    STACK_OF(POLICYQUALINFO) *qualifier_set;
+    STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *expected_policy_set;
+};
+
+/* X509_POLICY_DATA flags values */
+
+/*
+ * This flag indicates the structure has been mapped using a policy mapping
+ * extension. If policy mapping is not active its references get deleted.
+ */
+
+#define POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAPPED                 0x1
+
+/*
+ * This flag indicates the data doesn't correspond to a policy in Certificate
+ * Policies: it has been mapped to any policy.
+ */
+
+#define POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAPPED_ANY             0x2
+
+/* AND with flags to see if any mapping has occurred */
+
+#define POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAP_MASK               0x3
+
+/* qualifiers are shared and shouldn't be freed */
+
+#define POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS      0x4
+
+/* Parent node is an extra node and should be freed */
+
+#define POLICY_DATA_FLAG_EXTRA_NODE             0x8
+
+/* Corresponding CertificatePolicies is critical */
+
+#define POLICY_DATA_FLAG_CRITICAL               0x10
+
+/* This structure is cached with a certificate */
+
+struct X509_POLICY_CACHE_st {
+    /* anyPolicy data or NULL if no anyPolicy */
+    X509_POLICY_DATA *anyPolicy;
+    /* other policy data */
+    STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_DATA) *data;
+    /* If InhibitAnyPolicy present this is its value or -1 if absent. */
+    long any_skip;
+    /*
+     * If policyConstraints and requireExplicitPolicy present this is its
+     * value or -1 if absent.
+     */
+    long explicit_skip;
+    /*
+     * If policyConstraints and policyMapping present this is its value or -1
+     * if absent.
+     */
+    long map_skip;
+};
+
+/*
+ * #define POLICY_CACHE_FLAG_CRITICAL POLICY_DATA_FLAG_CRITICAL
+ */
+
+/* This structure represents the relationship between nodes */
+
+struct X509_POLICY_NODE_st {
+    /* node data this refers to */
+    const X509_POLICY_DATA *data;
+    /* Parent node */
+    X509_POLICY_NODE *parent;
+    /* Number of child nodes */
+    int nchild;
+};
+
+struct X509_POLICY_LEVEL_st {
+    /* Cert for this level */
+    X509 *cert;
+    /* nodes at this level */
+    STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *nodes;
+    /* anyPolicy node */
+    X509_POLICY_NODE *anyPolicy;
+    /* Extra data */
+    /*
+     * STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_DATA) *extra_data;
+     */
+    unsigned int flags;
+};
+
+struct X509_POLICY_TREE_st {
+    /* This is the tree 'level' data */
+    X509_POLICY_LEVEL *levels;
+    int nlevel;
+    /*
+     * Extra policy data when additional nodes (not from the certificate) are
+     * required.
+     */
+    STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_DATA) *extra_data;
+    /* This is the authority constrained policy set */
+    STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *auth_policies;
+    STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *user_policies;
+    unsigned int flags;
+};
+
+/* Set if anyPolicy present in user policies */
+#define POLICY_FLAG_ANY_POLICY          0x2
+
+/* Useful macros */
+
+#define node_data_critical(data) (data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_CRITICAL)
+#define node_critical(node) node_data_critical(node->data)
+
+/* Internal functions */
+
+X509_POLICY_DATA *policy_data_new(POLICYINFO *policy, const ASN1_OBJECT *id,
+                                  int crit);
+void policy_data_free(X509_POLICY_DATA *data);
+
+X509_POLICY_DATA *policy_cache_find_data(const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache,
+                                         const ASN1_OBJECT *id);
+int policy_cache_set_mapping(X509 *x, POLICY_MAPPINGS *maps);
+
+STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *policy_node_cmp_new(void);
+
+void policy_cache_init(void);
+
+void policy_cache_free(X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache);
+
+X509_POLICY_NODE *level_find_node(const X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
+                                  const X509_POLICY_NODE *parent,
+                                  const ASN1_OBJECT *id);
+
+X509_POLICY_NODE *tree_find_sk(STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *sk,
+                               const ASN1_OBJECT *id);
+
+X509_POLICY_NODE *level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
+                                 X509_POLICY_DATA *data,
+                                 X509_POLICY_NODE *parent,
+                                 X509_POLICY_TREE *tree);
+void policy_node_free(X509_POLICY_NODE *node);
+int policy_node_match(const X509_POLICY_LEVEL *lvl,
+                      const X509_POLICY_NODE *node, const ASN1_OBJECT *oid);
+
+const X509_POLICY_CACHE *policy_cache_set(X509 *x);
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/pcy_lib.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/pcy_lib.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..67f7eaf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/pcy_lib.c
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+
+#include "pcy_int.h"
+
+/* accessor functions */
+
+/* X509_POLICY_TREE stuff */
+
+int X509_policy_tree_level_count(const X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
+{
+    if (!tree)
+        return 0;
+    return tree->nlevel;
+}
+
+X509_POLICY_LEVEL *X509_policy_tree_get0_level(const X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
+                                               int i)
+{
+    if (!tree || (i < 0) || (i >= tree->nlevel))
+        return NULL;
+    return tree->levels + i;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *X509_policy_tree_get0_policies(const
+                                                           X509_POLICY_TREE
+                                                           *tree)
+{
+    if (!tree)
+        return NULL;
+    return tree->auth_policies;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *X509_policy_tree_get0_user_policies(const
+                                                                X509_POLICY_TREE
+                                                                *tree)
+{
+    if (!tree)
+        return NULL;
+    if (tree->flags & POLICY_FLAG_ANY_POLICY)
+        return tree->auth_policies;
+    else
+        return tree->user_policies;
+}
+
+/* X509_POLICY_LEVEL stuff */
+
+int X509_policy_level_node_count(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level)
+{
+    int n;
+    if (!level)
+        return 0;
+    if (level->anyPolicy)
+        n = 1;
+    else
+        n = 0;
+    if (level->nodes)
+        n += sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(level->nodes);
+    return n;
+}
+
+X509_POLICY_NODE *X509_policy_level_get0_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level, int i)
+{
+    if (!level)
+        return NULL;
+    if (level->anyPolicy) {
+        if (i == 0)
+            return level->anyPolicy;
+        i--;
+    }
+    return sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(level->nodes, i);
+}
+
+/* X509_POLICY_NODE stuff */
+
+const ASN1_OBJECT *X509_policy_node_get0_policy(const X509_POLICY_NODE *node)
+{
+    if (!node)
+        return NULL;
+    return node->data->valid_policy;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(POLICYQUALINFO) *X509_policy_node_get0_qualifiers(const
+                                                           X509_POLICY_NODE
+                                                           *node)
+{
+    if (!node)
+        return NULL;
+    return node->data->qualifier_set;
+}
+
+const X509_POLICY_NODE *X509_policy_node_get0_parent(const X509_POLICY_NODE
+                                                     *node)
+{
+    if (!node)
+        return NULL;
+    return node->parent;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/pcy_map.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/pcy_map.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ab9dd21
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/pcy_map.c
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include "internal/x509_int.h"
+
+#include "pcy_int.h"
+
+/*
+ * Set policy mapping entries in cache. Note: this modifies the passed
+ * POLICY_MAPPINGS structure
+ */
+
+int policy_cache_set_mapping(X509 *x, POLICY_MAPPINGS *maps)
+{
+    POLICY_MAPPING *map;
+    X509_POLICY_DATA *data;
+    X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache = x->policy_cache;
+    int i;
+    int ret = 0;
+    if (sk_POLICY_MAPPING_num(maps) == 0) {
+        ret = -1;
+        goto bad_mapping;
+    }
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_POLICY_MAPPING_num(maps); i++) {
+        map = sk_POLICY_MAPPING_value(maps, i);
+        /* Reject if map to or from anyPolicy */
+        if ((OBJ_obj2nid(map->subjectDomainPolicy) == NID_any_policy)
+            || (OBJ_obj2nid(map->issuerDomainPolicy) == NID_any_policy)) {
+            ret = -1;
+            goto bad_mapping;
+        }
+
+        /* Attempt to find matching policy data */
+        data = policy_cache_find_data(cache, map->issuerDomainPolicy);
+        /* If we don't have anyPolicy can't map */
+        if (data == NULL && !cache->anyPolicy)
+            continue;
+
+        /* Create a NODE from anyPolicy */
+        if (data == NULL) {
+            data = policy_data_new(NULL, map->issuerDomainPolicy,
+                                   cache->anyPolicy->flags
+                                   & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_CRITICAL);
+            if (data == NULL)
+                goto bad_mapping;
+            data->qualifier_set = cache->anyPolicy->qualifier_set;
+            /*
+             * map->issuerDomainPolicy = NULL;
+             */
+            data->flags |= POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAPPED_ANY;
+            data->flags |= POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS;
+            if (!sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_push(cache->data, data)) {
+                policy_data_free(data);
+                goto bad_mapping;
+            }
+        } else
+            data->flags |= POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAPPED;
+        if (!sk_ASN1_OBJECT_push(data->expected_policy_set,
+                                 map->subjectDomainPolicy))
+            goto bad_mapping;
+        map->subjectDomainPolicy = NULL;
+
+    }
+
+    ret = 1;
+ bad_mapping:
+    if (ret == -1)
+        x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY;
+    sk_POLICY_MAPPING_pop_free(maps, POLICY_MAPPING_free);
+    return ret;
+
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/pcy_node.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/pcy_node.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..80443bf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/pcy_node.c
@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+
+#include "pcy_int.h"
+
+static int node_cmp(const X509_POLICY_NODE *const *a,
+                    const X509_POLICY_NODE *const *b)
+{
+    return OBJ_cmp((*a)->data->valid_policy, (*b)->data->valid_policy);
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *policy_node_cmp_new(void)
+{
+    return sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_new(node_cmp);
+}
+
+X509_POLICY_NODE *tree_find_sk(STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *nodes,
+                               const ASN1_OBJECT *id)
+{
+    X509_POLICY_DATA n;
+    X509_POLICY_NODE l;
+    int idx;
+
+    n.valid_policy = (ASN1_OBJECT *)id;
+    l.data = &n;
+
+    idx = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_find(nodes, &l);
+    if (idx == -1)
+        return NULL;
+
+    return sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(nodes, idx);
+
+}
+
+X509_POLICY_NODE *level_find_node(const X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
+                                  const X509_POLICY_NODE *parent,
+                                  const ASN1_OBJECT *id)
+{
+    X509_POLICY_NODE *node;
+    int i;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(level->nodes); i++) {
+        node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(level->nodes, i);
+        if (node->parent == parent) {
+            if (!OBJ_cmp(node->data->valid_policy, id))
+                return node;
+        }
+    }
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+X509_POLICY_NODE *level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
+                                 X509_POLICY_DATA *data,
+                                 X509_POLICY_NODE *parent,
+                                 X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
+{
+    X509_POLICY_NODE *node;
+
+    node = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*node));
+    if (node == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    node->data = data;
+    node->parent = parent;
+    if (level) {
+        if (OBJ_obj2nid(data->valid_policy) == NID_any_policy) {
+            if (level->anyPolicy)
+                goto node_error;
+            level->anyPolicy = node;
+        } else {
+
+            if (level->nodes == NULL)
+                level->nodes = policy_node_cmp_new();
+            if (level->nodes == NULL)
+                goto node_error;
+            if (!sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_push(level->nodes, node))
+                goto node_error;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (tree) {
+        if (tree->extra_data == NULL)
+            tree->extra_data = sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_new_null();
+        if (tree->extra_data == NULL)
+            goto node_error;
+        if (!sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_push(tree->extra_data, data))
+            goto node_error;
+    }
+
+    if (parent)
+        parent->nchild++;
+
+    return node;
+
+ node_error:
+    policy_node_free(node);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+void policy_node_free(X509_POLICY_NODE *node)
+{
+    OPENSSL_free(node);
+}
+
+/*
+ * See if a policy node matches a policy OID. If mapping enabled look through
+ * expected policy set otherwise just valid policy.
+ */
+
+int policy_node_match(const X509_POLICY_LEVEL *lvl,
+                      const X509_POLICY_NODE *node, const ASN1_OBJECT *oid)
+{
+    int i;
+    ASN1_OBJECT *policy_oid;
+    const X509_POLICY_DATA *x = node->data;
+
+    if ((lvl->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP)
+        || !(x->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAP_MASK)) {
+        if (!OBJ_cmp(x->valid_policy, oid))
+            return 1;
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(x->expected_policy_set); i++) {
+        policy_oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(x->expected_policy_set, i);
+        if (!OBJ_cmp(policy_oid, oid))
+            return 1;
+    }
+    return 0;
+
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b3d1983
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c
@@ -0,0 +1,700 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+
+#include "pcy_int.h"
+
+/*
+ * Enable this to print out the complete policy tree at various point during
+ * evaluation.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * #define OPENSSL_POLICY_DEBUG
+ */
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_POLICY_DEBUG
+
+static void expected_print(BIO *err, X509_POLICY_LEVEL *lev,
+                           X509_POLICY_NODE *node, int indent)
+{
+    if ((lev->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP)
+        || !(node->data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAP_MASK))
+        BIO_puts(err, "  Not Mapped\n");
+    else {
+        int i;
+        STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *pset = node->data->expected_policy_set;
+        ASN1_OBJECT *oid;
+        BIO_puts(err, "  Expected: ");
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(pset); i++) {
+            oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(pset, i);
+            if (i)
+                BIO_puts(err, ", ");
+            i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(err, oid);
+        }
+        BIO_puts(err, "\n");
+    }
+}
+
+static void tree_print(char *str, X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
+                       X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr)
+{
+    BIO *err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+    X509_POLICY_LEVEL *plev;
+
+    if (err == NULL)
+        return;
+    if (!curr)
+        curr = tree->levels + tree->nlevel;
+    else
+        curr++;
+
+    BIO_printf(err, "Level print after %s\n", str);
+    BIO_printf(err, "Printing Up to Level %ld\n", curr - tree->levels);
+    for (plev = tree->levels; plev != curr; plev++) {
+        int i;
+
+        BIO_printf(err, "Level %ld, flags = %x\n",
+                   (long)(plev - tree->levels), plev->flags);
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(plev->nodes); i++) {
+            X509_POLICY_NODE *node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(plev->nodes, i);
+
+            X509_POLICY_NODE_print(err, node, 2);
+            expected_print(err, plev, node, 2);
+            BIO_printf(err, "  Flags: %x\n", node->data->flags);
+        }
+        if (plev->anyPolicy)
+            X509_POLICY_NODE_print(err, plev->anyPolicy, 2);
+    }
+    BIO_free(err);
+}
+#endif
+
+/*-
+ * Return value: <= 0 on error, or positive bit mask:
+ *
+ * X509_PCY_TREE_VALID: valid tree
+ * X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY: empty tree (including bare TA case)
+ * X509_PCY_TREE_EXPLICIT: explicit policy required
+ */
+static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
+                     unsigned int flags)
+{
+    X509_POLICY_TREE *tree;
+    X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level;
+    const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache;
+    X509_POLICY_DATA *data = NULL;
+    int ret = X509_PCY_TREE_VALID;
+    int n = sk_X509_num(certs) - 1; /* RFC5280 paths omit the TA */
+    int explicit_policy = (flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY) ? 0 : n+1;
+    int any_skip = (flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY) ? 0 : n+1;
+    int map_skip = (flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP) ? 0 : n+1;
+    int i;
+
+    *ptree = NULL;
+
+    /* Can't do anything with just a trust anchor */
+    if (n == 0)
+        return X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY;
+
+    /*
+     * First setup the policy cache in all n non-TA certificates, this will be
+     * used in X509_verify_cert() which will invoke the verify callback for all
+     * certificates with invalid policy extensions.
+     */
+    for (i = n - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+        X509 *x = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
+
+        /* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */
+        X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
+
+        /* If cache is NULL, likely ENOMEM: return immediately */
+        if (policy_cache_set(x) == NULL)
+            return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * At this point check for invalid policies and required explicit policy.
+     * Note that the explicit_policy counter is a count-down to zero, with the
+     * requirement kicking in if and once it does that.  The counter is
+     * decremented for every non-self-issued certificate in the path, but may
+     * be further reduced by policy constraints in a non-leaf certificate.
+     *
+     * The ultimate policy set is the intersection of all the policies along
+     * the path, if we hit a certificate with an empty policy set, and explicit
+     * policy is required we're done.
+     */
+    for (i = n - 1;
+         i >= 0 && (explicit_policy > 0 || (ret & X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY) == 0);
+         i--) {
+        X509 *x = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
+        uint32_t ex_flags = X509_get_extension_flags(x);
+
+        /* All the policies are already cached, we can return early */
+        if (ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY)
+            return X509_PCY_TREE_INVALID;
+
+        /* Access the cache which we now know exists */
+        cache = policy_cache_set(x);
+
+        if ((ret & X509_PCY_TREE_VALID) && cache->data == NULL)
+            ret = X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY;
+        if (explicit_policy > 0) {
+            if (!(ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
+                explicit_policy--;
+            if ((cache->explicit_skip >= 0)
+                && (cache->explicit_skip < explicit_policy))
+                explicit_policy = cache->explicit_skip;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (explicit_policy == 0)
+        ret |= X509_PCY_TREE_EXPLICIT;
+    if ((ret & X509_PCY_TREE_VALID) == 0)
+        return ret;
+
+    /* If we get this far initialize the tree */
+    if ((tree = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*tree))) == NULL)
+        return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL;
+
+    /*
+     * http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-6.1.2, figure 3.
+     *
+     * The top level is implicitly for the trust anchor with valid expected
+     * policies of anyPolicy.  (RFC 5280 has the TA at depth 0 and the leaf at
+     * depth n, we have the leaf at depth 0 and the TA at depth n).
+     */
+    if ((tree->levels = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*tree->levels)*(n+1))) == NULL) {
+        OPENSSL_free(tree);
+        return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL;
+    }
+    tree->nlevel = n+1;
+    level = tree->levels;
+    if ((data = policy_data_new(NULL, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_any_policy), 0)) == NULL)
+        goto bad_tree;
+    if (level_add_node(level, data, NULL, tree) == NULL) {
+        policy_data_free(data);
+        goto bad_tree;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * In this pass initialize all the tree levels and whether anyPolicy and
+     * policy mapping are inhibited at each level.
+     */
+    for (i = n - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+        X509 *x = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
+        uint32_t ex_flags = X509_get_extension_flags(x);
+
+        /* Access the cache which we now know exists */
+        cache = policy_cache_set(x);
+
+        X509_up_ref(x);
+        (++level)->cert = x;
+
+        if (!cache->anyPolicy)
+            level->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY;
+
+        /* Determine inhibit any and inhibit map flags */
+        if (any_skip == 0) {
+            /*
+             * Any matching allowed only if certificate is self issued and not
+             * the last in the chain.
+             */
+            if (!(ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) || (i == 0))
+                level->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY;
+        } else {
+            if (!(ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
+                any_skip--;
+            if ((cache->any_skip >= 0) && (cache->any_skip < any_skip))
+                any_skip = cache->any_skip;
+        }
+
+        if (map_skip == 0)
+            level->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP;
+        else {
+            if (!(ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
+                map_skip--;
+            if ((cache->map_skip >= 0) && (cache->map_skip < map_skip))
+                map_skip = cache->map_skip;
+        }
+    }
+
+    *ptree = tree;
+    return ret;
+
+ bad_tree:
+    X509_policy_tree_free(tree);
+    return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise
+ */
+static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
+                                    X509_POLICY_DATA *data)
+{
+    X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last = curr - 1;
+    int i, matched = 0;
+
+    /* Iterate through all in nodes linking matches */
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(last->nodes); i++) {
+        X509_POLICY_NODE *node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(last->nodes, i);
+
+        if (policy_node_match(last, node, data->valid_policy)) {
+            if (level_add_node(curr, data, node, NULL) == NULL)
+                return 0;
+            matched = 1;
+        }
+    }
+    if (!matched && last->anyPolicy) {
+        if (level_add_node(curr, data, last->anyPolicy, NULL) == NULL)
+            return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This corresponds to RFC3280 6.1.3(d)(1): link any data from
+ * CertificatePolicies onto matching parent or anyPolicy if no match.
+ *
+ * Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+static int tree_link_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
+                           const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_num(cache->data); i++) {
+        X509_POLICY_DATA *data = sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_value(cache->data, i);
+
+        /* Look for matching nodes in previous level */
+        if (!tree_link_matching_nodes(curr, data))
+            return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This corresponds to RFC3280 6.1.3(d)(2): Create new data for any unmatched
+ * policies in the parent and link to anyPolicy.
+ *
+ * Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+static int tree_add_unmatched(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
+                              const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache,
+                              const ASN1_OBJECT *id,
+                              X509_POLICY_NODE *node, X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
+{
+    X509_POLICY_DATA *data;
+
+    if (id == NULL)
+        id = node->data->valid_policy;
+    /*
+     * Create a new node with qualifiers from anyPolicy and id from unmatched
+     * node.
+     */
+    if ((data = policy_data_new(NULL, id, node_critical(node))) == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    /* Curr may not have anyPolicy */
+    data->qualifier_set = cache->anyPolicy->qualifier_set;
+    data->flags |= POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS;
+    if (level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree) == NULL) {
+        policy_data_free(data);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+static int tree_link_unmatched(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
+                               const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache,
+                               X509_POLICY_NODE *node, X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
+{
+    const X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last = curr - 1;
+    int i;
+
+    if ((last->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP)
+        || !(node->data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAPPED)) {
+        /* If no policy mapping: matched if one child present */
+        if (node->nchild)
+            return 1;
+        if (!tree_add_unmatched(curr, cache, NULL, node, tree))
+            return 0;
+        /* Add it */
+    } else {
+        /* If mapping: matched if one child per expected policy set */
+        STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *expset = node->data->expected_policy_set;
+        if (node->nchild == sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(expset))
+            return 1;
+        /* Locate unmatched nodes */
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(expset); i++) {
+            ASN1_OBJECT *oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(expset, i);
+            if (level_find_node(curr, node, oid))
+                continue;
+            if (!tree_add_unmatched(curr, cache, oid, node, tree))
+                return 0;
+        }
+
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise
+ */
+static int tree_link_any(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
+                         const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache,
+                         X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
+{
+    int i;
+    X509_POLICY_NODE *node;
+    X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last = curr - 1;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(last->nodes); i++) {
+        node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(last->nodes, i);
+
+        if (!tree_link_unmatched(curr, cache, node, tree))
+            return 0;
+    }
+    /* Finally add link to anyPolicy */
+    if (last->anyPolicy &&
+        level_add_node(curr, cache->anyPolicy, last->anyPolicy, NULL) == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Prune the tree: delete any child mapped child data on the current level then
+ * proceed up the tree deleting any data with no children. If we ever have no
+ * data on a level we can halt because the tree will be empty.
+ *
+ * Return value: <= 0 error, otherwise one of:
+ *
+ * X509_PCY_TREE_VALID: valid tree
+ * X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY: empty tree
+ */
+static int tree_prune(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree, X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr)
+{
+    STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *nodes;
+    X509_POLICY_NODE *node;
+    int i;
+    nodes = curr->nodes;
+    if (curr->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP) {
+        for (i = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(nodes) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+            node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(nodes, i);
+            /* Delete any mapped data: see RFC3280 XXXX */
+            if (node->data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAP_MASK) {
+                node->parent->nchild--;
+                OPENSSL_free(node);
+                (void)sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_delete(nodes, i);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    for (;;) {
+        --curr;
+        nodes = curr->nodes;
+        for (i = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(nodes) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+            node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(nodes, i);
+            if (node->nchild == 0) {
+                node->parent->nchild--;
+                OPENSSL_free(node);
+                (void)sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_delete(nodes, i);
+            }
+        }
+        if (curr->anyPolicy && !curr->anyPolicy->nchild) {
+            if (curr->anyPolicy->parent)
+                curr->anyPolicy->parent->nchild--;
+            OPENSSL_free(curr->anyPolicy);
+            curr->anyPolicy = NULL;
+        }
+        if (curr == tree->levels) {
+            /* If we zapped anyPolicy at top then tree is empty */
+            if (!curr->anyPolicy)
+                return X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY;
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    return X509_PCY_TREE_VALID;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+static int tree_add_auth_node(STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) **pnodes,
+                              X509_POLICY_NODE *pcy)
+{
+    if (*pnodes == NULL &&
+        (*pnodes = policy_node_cmp_new()) == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    if (sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_find(*pnodes, pcy) != -1)
+        return 1;
+    return sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_push(*pnodes, pcy) != 0;
+}
+
+#define TREE_CALC_FAILURE 0
+#define TREE_CALC_OK_NOFREE 1
+#define TREE_CALC_OK_DOFREE 2
+
+/*-
+ * Calculate the authority set based on policy tree. The 'pnodes' parameter is
+ * used as a store for the set of policy nodes used to calculate the user set.
+ * If the authority set is not anyPolicy then pnodes will just point to the
+ * authority set. If however the authority set is anyPolicy then the set of
+ * valid policies (other than anyPolicy) is store in pnodes.
+ *
+ * Return value:
+ *  TREE_CALC_FAILURE on failure,
+ *  TREE_CALC_OK_NOFREE on success and pnodes need not be freed,
+ *  TREE_CALC_OK_DOFREE on success and pnodes needs to be freed
+ */
+static int tree_calculate_authority_set(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
+                                        STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) **pnodes)
+{
+    X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr;
+    X509_POLICY_NODE *node, *anyptr;
+    STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) **addnodes;
+    int i, j;
+    curr = tree->levels + tree->nlevel - 1;
+
+    /* If last level contains anyPolicy set is anyPolicy */
+    if (curr->anyPolicy) {
+        if (!tree_add_auth_node(&tree->auth_policies, curr->anyPolicy))
+            return TREE_CALC_FAILURE;
+        addnodes = pnodes;
+    } else
+        /* Add policies to authority set */
+        addnodes = &tree->auth_policies;
+
+    curr = tree->levels;
+    for (i = 1; i < tree->nlevel; i++) {
+        /*
+         * If no anyPolicy node on this this level it can't appear on lower
+         * levels so end search.
+         */
+        if ((anyptr = curr->anyPolicy) == NULL)
+            break;
+        curr++;
+        for (j = 0; j < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(curr->nodes); j++) {
+            node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(curr->nodes, j);
+            if ((node->parent == anyptr)
+                && !tree_add_auth_node(addnodes, node)) {
+                if (addnodes == pnodes) {
+                    sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_free(*pnodes);
+                    *pnodes = NULL;
+                }
+                return TREE_CALC_FAILURE;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    if (addnodes == pnodes)
+        return TREE_CALC_OK_DOFREE;
+
+    *pnodes = tree->auth_policies;
+    return TREE_CALC_OK_NOFREE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+static int tree_calculate_user_set(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
+                                   STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *policy_oids,
+                                   STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *auth_nodes)
+{
+    int i;
+    X509_POLICY_NODE *node;
+    ASN1_OBJECT *oid;
+    X509_POLICY_NODE *anyPolicy;
+    X509_POLICY_DATA *extra;
+
+    /*
+     * Check if anyPolicy present in authority constrained policy set: this
+     * will happen if it is a leaf node.
+     */
+    if (sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(policy_oids) <= 0)
+        return 1;
+
+    anyPolicy = tree->levels[tree->nlevel - 1].anyPolicy;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(policy_oids); i++) {
+        oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(policy_oids, i);
+        if (OBJ_obj2nid(oid) == NID_any_policy) {
+            tree->flags |= POLICY_FLAG_ANY_POLICY;
+            return 1;
+        }
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(policy_oids); i++) {
+        oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(policy_oids, i);
+        node = tree_find_sk(auth_nodes, oid);
+        if (!node) {
+            if (!anyPolicy)
+                continue;
+            /*
+             * Create a new node with policy ID from user set and qualifiers
+             * from anyPolicy.
+             */
+            extra = policy_data_new(NULL, oid, node_critical(anyPolicy));
+            if (extra == NULL)
+                return 0;
+            extra->qualifier_set = anyPolicy->data->qualifier_set;
+            extra->flags = POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS
+                | POLICY_DATA_FLAG_EXTRA_NODE;
+            node = level_add_node(NULL, extra, anyPolicy->parent, tree);
+        }
+        if (!tree->user_policies) {
+            tree->user_policies = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_new_null();
+            if (!tree->user_policies)
+                return 1;
+        }
+        if (!sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_push(tree->user_policies, node))
+            return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Return value: <= 0 error, otherwise one of:
+ *  X509_PCY_TREE_VALID: valid tree
+ *  X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY: empty tree
+ * (see tree_prune()).
+ */
+static int tree_evaluate(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
+{
+    int ret, i;
+    X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr = tree->levels + 1;
+    const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache;
+
+    for (i = 1; i < tree->nlevel; i++, curr++) {
+        cache = policy_cache_set(curr->cert);
+        if (!tree_link_nodes(curr, cache))
+            return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL;
+
+        if (!(curr->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY)
+            && !tree_link_any(curr, cache, tree))
+            return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_POLICY_DEBUG
+        tree_print("before tree_prune()", tree, curr);
+#endif
+        ret = tree_prune(tree, curr);
+        if (ret != X509_PCY_TREE_VALID)
+            return ret;
+    }
+    return X509_PCY_TREE_VALID;
+}
+
+static void exnode_free(X509_POLICY_NODE *node)
+{
+    if (node->data && (node->data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_EXTRA_NODE))
+        OPENSSL_free(node);
+}
+
+void X509_policy_tree_free(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
+{
+    X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr;
+    int i;
+
+    if (!tree)
+        return;
+
+    sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_free(tree->auth_policies);
+    sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_pop_free(tree->user_policies, exnode_free);
+
+    for (i = 0, curr = tree->levels; i < tree->nlevel; i++, curr++) {
+        X509_free(curr->cert);
+        sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_pop_free(curr->nodes, policy_node_free);
+        policy_node_free(curr->anyPolicy);
+    }
+
+    sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_pop_free(tree->extra_data, policy_data_free);
+    OPENSSL_free(tree->levels);
+    OPENSSL_free(tree);
+
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Application policy checking function.
+ * Return codes:
+ *  X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE:  Failure to satisfy explicit policy
+ *  X509_PCY_TREE_INVALID:  Inconsistent or invalid extensions
+ *  X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL: Internal error, most likely malloc
+ *  X509_PCY_TREE_VALID:    Success (null tree if empty or bare TA)
+ */
+int X509_policy_check(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, int *pexplicit_policy,
+                      STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
+                      STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *policy_oids, unsigned int flags)
+{
+    int init_ret;
+    int ret;
+    int calc_ret;
+    X509_POLICY_TREE *tree = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *nodes, *auth_nodes = NULL;
+
+    *ptree = NULL;
+    *pexplicit_policy = 0;
+    init_ret = tree_init(&tree, certs, flags);
+
+    if (init_ret <= 0)
+        return init_ret;
+
+    if ((init_ret & X509_PCY_TREE_EXPLICIT) == 0) {
+        if (init_ret & X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY) {
+            X509_policy_tree_free(tree);
+            return X509_PCY_TREE_VALID;
+        }
+    } else {
+        *pexplicit_policy = 1;
+        /* Tree empty and requireExplicit True: Error */
+        if (init_ret & X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY)
+            return X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE;
+    }
+
+    ret = tree_evaluate(tree);
+#ifdef OPENSSL_POLICY_DEBUG
+    tree_print("tree_evaluate()", tree, NULL);
+#endif
+    if (ret <= 0)
+        goto error;
+
+    if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY) {
+        X509_policy_tree_free(tree);
+        if (init_ret & X509_PCY_TREE_EXPLICIT)
+            return X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE;
+        return X509_PCY_TREE_VALID;
+    }
+
+    /* Tree is not empty: continue */
+
+    if ((calc_ret = tree_calculate_authority_set(tree, &auth_nodes)) == 0)
+        goto error;
+    ret = tree_calculate_user_set(tree, policy_oids, auth_nodes);
+    if (calc_ret == TREE_CALC_OK_DOFREE)
+        sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_free(auth_nodes);
+    if (!ret)
+        goto error;
+
+    *ptree = tree;
+
+    if (init_ret & X509_PCY_TREE_EXPLICIT) {
+        nodes = X509_policy_tree_get0_user_policies(tree);
+        if (sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(nodes) <= 0)
+            return X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE;
+    }
+    return X509_PCY_TREE_VALID;
+
+ error:
+    X509_policy_tree_free(tree);
+    return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/tabtest.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/tabtest.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a33a63a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/tabtest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Simple program to check the ext_dat.h is correct and print out problems if
+ * it is not.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+
+#include "ext_dat.h"
+
+main()
+{
+    int i, prev = -1, bad = 0;
+    X509V3_EXT_METHOD **tmp;
+    i = OSSL_NELEM(standard_exts);
+    if (i != STANDARD_EXTENSION_COUNT)
+        fprintf(stderr, "Extension number invalid expecting %d\n", i);
+    tmp = standard_exts;
+    for (i = 0; i < STANDARD_EXTENSION_COUNT; i++, tmp++) {
+        if ((*tmp)->ext_nid < prev)
+            bad = 1;
+        prev = (*tmp)->ext_nid;
+
+    }
+    if (bad) {
+        tmp = standard_exts;
+        fprintf(stderr, "Extensions out of order!\n");
+        for (i = 0; i < STANDARD_EXTENSION_COUNT; i++, tmp++)
+            printf("%d : %s\n", (*tmp)->ext_nid, OBJ_nid2sn((*tmp)->ext_nid));
+    } else
+        fprintf(stderr, "Order OK\n");
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_addr.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_addr.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c5183a1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_addr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1307 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Implementation of RFC 3779 section 2.2.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/conf.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include "internal/x509_int.h"
+#include "ext_dat.h"
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
+
+/*
+ * OpenSSL ASN.1 template translation of RFC 3779 2.2.3.
+ */
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(IPAddressRange) = {
+  ASN1_SIMPLE(IPAddressRange, min, ASN1_BIT_STRING),
+  ASN1_SIMPLE(IPAddressRange, max, ASN1_BIT_STRING)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(IPAddressRange)
+
+ASN1_CHOICE(IPAddressOrRange) = {
+  ASN1_SIMPLE(IPAddressOrRange, u.addressPrefix, ASN1_BIT_STRING),
+  ASN1_SIMPLE(IPAddressOrRange, u.addressRange,  IPAddressRange)
+} ASN1_CHOICE_END(IPAddressOrRange)
+
+ASN1_CHOICE(IPAddressChoice) = {
+  ASN1_SIMPLE(IPAddressChoice,      u.inherit,           ASN1_NULL),
+  ASN1_SEQUENCE_OF(IPAddressChoice, u.addressesOrRanges, IPAddressOrRange)
+} ASN1_CHOICE_END(IPAddressChoice)
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(IPAddressFamily) = {
+  ASN1_SIMPLE(IPAddressFamily, addressFamily,   ASN1_OCTET_STRING),
+  ASN1_SIMPLE(IPAddressFamily, ipAddressChoice, IPAddressChoice)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(IPAddressFamily)
+
+ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE(IPAddrBlocks) =
+  ASN1_EX_TEMPLATE_TYPE(ASN1_TFLG_SEQUENCE_OF, 0,
+                        IPAddrBlocks, IPAddressFamily)
+static_ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE_END(IPAddrBlocks)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(IPAddressRange)
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(IPAddressOrRange)
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(IPAddressChoice)
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(IPAddressFamily)
+
+/*
+ * How much buffer space do we need for a raw address?
+ */
+#define ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN        16
+
+/*
+ * What's the address length associated with this AFI?
+ */
+static int length_from_afi(const unsigned afi)
+{
+    switch (afi) {
+    case IANA_AFI_IPV4:
+        return 4;
+    case IANA_AFI_IPV6:
+        return 16;
+    default:
+        return 0;
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Extract the AFI from an IPAddressFamily.
+ */
+unsigned int X509v3_addr_get_afi(const IPAddressFamily *f)
+{
+    if (f == NULL
+            || f->addressFamily == NULL
+            || f->addressFamily->data == NULL
+            || f->addressFamily->length < 2)
+        return 0;
+    return (f->addressFamily->data[0] << 8) | f->addressFamily->data[1];
+}
+
+/*
+ * Expand the bitstring form of an address into a raw byte array.
+ * At the moment this is coded for simplicity, not speed.
+ */
+static int addr_expand(unsigned char *addr,
+                       const ASN1_BIT_STRING *bs,
+                       const int length, const unsigned char fill)
+{
+    if (bs->length < 0 || bs->length > length)
+        return 0;
+    if (bs->length > 0) {
+        memcpy(addr, bs->data, bs->length);
+        if ((bs->flags & 7) != 0) {
+            unsigned char mask = 0xFF >> (8 - (bs->flags & 7));
+            if (fill == 0)
+                addr[bs->length - 1] &= ~mask;
+            else
+                addr[bs->length - 1] |= mask;
+        }
+    }
+    memset(addr + bs->length, fill, length - bs->length);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Extract the prefix length from a bitstring.
+ */
+#define addr_prefixlen(bs) ((int) ((bs)->length * 8 - ((bs)->flags & 7)))
+
+/*
+ * i2r handler for one address bitstring.
+ */
+static int i2r_address(BIO *out,
+                       const unsigned afi,
+                       const unsigned char fill, const ASN1_BIT_STRING *bs)
+{
+    unsigned char addr[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN];
+    int i, n;
+
+    if (bs->length < 0)
+        return 0;
+    switch (afi) {
+    case IANA_AFI_IPV4:
+        if (!addr_expand(addr, bs, 4, fill))
+            return 0;
+        BIO_printf(out, "%d.%d.%d.%d", addr[0], addr[1], addr[2], addr[3]);
+        break;
+    case IANA_AFI_IPV6:
+        if (!addr_expand(addr, bs, 16, fill))
+            return 0;
+        for (n = 16; n > 1 && addr[n - 1] == 0x00 && addr[n - 2] == 0x00;
+             n -= 2) ;
+        for (i = 0; i < n; i += 2)
+            BIO_printf(out, "%x%s", (addr[i] << 8) | addr[i + 1],
+                       (i < 14 ? ":" : ""));
+        if (i < 16)
+            BIO_puts(out, ":");
+        if (i == 0)
+            BIO_puts(out, ":");
+        break;
+    default:
+        for (i = 0; i < bs->length; i++)
+            BIO_printf(out, "%s%02x", (i > 0 ? ":" : ""), bs->data[i]);
+        BIO_printf(out, "[%d]", (int)(bs->flags & 7));
+        break;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * i2r handler for a sequence of addresses and ranges.
+ */
+static int i2r_IPAddressOrRanges(BIO *out,
+                                 const int indent,
+                                 const IPAddressOrRanges *aors,
+                                 const unsigned afi)
+{
+    int i;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_IPAddressOrRange_num(aors); i++) {
+        const IPAddressOrRange *aor = sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(aors, i);
+        BIO_printf(out, "%*s", indent, "");
+        switch (aor->type) {
+        case IPAddressOrRange_addressPrefix:
+            if (!i2r_address(out, afi, 0x00, aor->u.addressPrefix))
+                return 0;
+            BIO_printf(out, "/%d\n", addr_prefixlen(aor->u.addressPrefix));
+            continue;
+        case IPAddressOrRange_addressRange:
+            if (!i2r_address(out, afi, 0x00, aor->u.addressRange->min))
+                return 0;
+            BIO_puts(out, "-");
+            if (!i2r_address(out, afi, 0xFF, aor->u.addressRange->max))
+                return 0;
+            BIO_puts(out, "\n");
+            continue;
+        }
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * i2r handler for an IPAddrBlocks extension.
+ */
+static int i2r_IPAddrBlocks(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
+                            void *ext, BIO *out, int indent)
+{
+    const IPAddrBlocks *addr = ext;
+    int i;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_IPAddressFamily_num(addr); i++) {
+        IPAddressFamily *f = sk_IPAddressFamily_value(addr, i);
+        const unsigned int afi = X509v3_addr_get_afi(f);
+        switch (afi) {
+        case IANA_AFI_IPV4:
+            BIO_printf(out, "%*sIPv4", indent, "");
+            break;
+        case IANA_AFI_IPV6:
+            BIO_printf(out, "%*sIPv6", indent, "");
+            break;
+        default:
+            BIO_printf(out, "%*sUnknown AFI %u", indent, "", afi);
+            break;
+        }
+        if (f->addressFamily->length > 2) {
+            switch (f->addressFamily->data[2]) {
+            case 1:
+                BIO_puts(out, " (Unicast)");
+                break;
+            case 2:
+                BIO_puts(out, " (Multicast)");
+                break;
+            case 3:
+                BIO_puts(out, " (Unicast/Multicast)");
+                break;
+            case 4:
+                BIO_puts(out, " (MPLS)");
+                break;
+            case 64:
+                BIO_puts(out, " (Tunnel)");
+                break;
+            case 65:
+                BIO_puts(out, " (VPLS)");
+                break;
+            case 66:
+                BIO_puts(out, " (BGP MDT)");
+                break;
+            case 128:
+                BIO_puts(out, " (MPLS-labeled VPN)");
+                break;
+            default:
+                BIO_printf(out, " (Unknown SAFI %u)",
+                           (unsigned)f->addressFamily->data[2]);
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+        switch (f->ipAddressChoice->type) {
+        case IPAddressChoice_inherit:
+            BIO_puts(out, ": inherit\n");
+            break;
+        case IPAddressChoice_addressesOrRanges:
+            BIO_puts(out, ":\n");
+            if (!i2r_IPAddressOrRanges(out,
+                                       indent + 2,
+                                       f->ipAddressChoice->
+                                       u.addressesOrRanges, afi))
+                return 0;
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Sort comparison function for a sequence of IPAddressOrRange
+ * elements.
+ *
+ * There's no sane answer we can give if addr_expand() fails, and an
+ * assertion failure on externally supplied data is seriously uncool,
+ * so we just arbitrarily declare that if given invalid inputs this
+ * function returns -1.  If this messes up your preferred sort order
+ * for garbage input, tough noogies.
+ */
+static int IPAddressOrRange_cmp(const IPAddressOrRange *a,
+                                const IPAddressOrRange *b, const int length)
+{
+    unsigned char addr_a[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN], addr_b[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN];
+    int prefixlen_a = 0, prefixlen_b = 0;
+    int r;
+
+    switch (a->type) {
+    case IPAddressOrRange_addressPrefix:
+        if (!addr_expand(addr_a, a->u.addressPrefix, length, 0x00))
+            return -1;
+        prefixlen_a = addr_prefixlen(a->u.addressPrefix);
+        break;
+    case IPAddressOrRange_addressRange:
+        if (!addr_expand(addr_a, a->u.addressRange->min, length, 0x00))
+            return -1;
+        prefixlen_a = length * 8;
+        break;
+    }
+
+    switch (b->type) {
+    case IPAddressOrRange_addressPrefix:
+        if (!addr_expand(addr_b, b->u.addressPrefix, length, 0x00))
+            return -1;
+        prefixlen_b = addr_prefixlen(b->u.addressPrefix);
+        break;
+    case IPAddressOrRange_addressRange:
+        if (!addr_expand(addr_b, b->u.addressRange->min, length, 0x00))
+            return -1;
+        prefixlen_b = length * 8;
+        break;
+    }
+
+    if ((r = memcmp(addr_a, addr_b, length)) != 0)
+        return r;
+    else
+        return prefixlen_a - prefixlen_b;
+}
+
+/*
+ * IPv4-specific closure over IPAddressOrRange_cmp, since sk_sort()
+ * comparison routines are only allowed two arguments.
+ */
+static int v4IPAddressOrRange_cmp(const IPAddressOrRange *const *a,
+                                  const IPAddressOrRange *const *b)
+{
+    return IPAddressOrRange_cmp(*a, *b, 4);
+}
+
+/*
+ * IPv6-specific closure over IPAddressOrRange_cmp, since sk_sort()
+ * comparison routines are only allowed two arguments.
+ */
+static int v6IPAddressOrRange_cmp(const IPAddressOrRange *const *a,
+                                  const IPAddressOrRange *const *b)
+{
+    return IPAddressOrRange_cmp(*a, *b, 16);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Calculate whether a range collapses to a prefix.
+ * See last paragraph of RFC 3779 2.2.3.7.
+ */
+static int range_should_be_prefix(const unsigned char *min,
+                                  const unsigned char *max, const int length)
+{
+    unsigned char mask;
+    int i, j;
+
+    OPENSSL_assert(memcmp(min, max, length) <= 0);
+    for (i = 0; i < length && min[i] == max[i]; i++) ;
+    for (j = length - 1; j >= 0 && min[j] == 0x00 && max[j] == 0xFF; j--) ;
+    if (i < j)
+        return -1;
+    if (i > j)
+        return i * 8;
+    mask = min[i] ^ max[i];
+    switch (mask) {
+    case 0x01:
+        j = 7;
+        break;
+    case 0x03:
+        j = 6;
+        break;
+    case 0x07:
+        j = 5;
+        break;
+    case 0x0F:
+        j = 4;
+        break;
+    case 0x1F:
+        j = 3;
+        break;
+    case 0x3F:
+        j = 2;
+        break;
+    case 0x7F:
+        j = 1;
+        break;
+    default:
+        return -1;
+    }
+    if ((min[i] & mask) != 0 || (max[i] & mask) != mask)
+        return -1;
+    else
+        return i * 8 + j;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Construct a prefix.
+ */
+static int make_addressPrefix(IPAddressOrRange **result,
+                              unsigned char *addr, const int prefixlen)
+{
+    int bytelen = (prefixlen + 7) / 8, bitlen = prefixlen % 8;
+    IPAddressOrRange *aor = IPAddressOrRange_new();
+
+    if (aor == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    aor->type = IPAddressOrRange_addressPrefix;
+    if (aor->u.addressPrefix == NULL &&
+        (aor->u.addressPrefix = ASN1_BIT_STRING_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (!ASN1_BIT_STRING_set(aor->u.addressPrefix, addr, bytelen))
+        goto err;
+    aor->u.addressPrefix->flags &= ~7;
+    aor->u.addressPrefix->flags |= ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT;
+    if (bitlen > 0) {
+        aor->u.addressPrefix->data[bytelen - 1] &= ~(0xFF >> bitlen);
+        aor->u.addressPrefix->flags |= 8 - bitlen;
+    }
+
+    *result = aor;
+    return 1;
+
+ err:
+    IPAddressOrRange_free(aor);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Construct a range.  If it can be expressed as a prefix,
+ * return a prefix instead.  Doing this here simplifies
+ * the rest of the code considerably.
+ */
+static int make_addressRange(IPAddressOrRange **result,
+                             unsigned char *min,
+                             unsigned char *max, const int length)
+{
+    IPAddressOrRange *aor;
+    int i, prefixlen;
+
+    if ((prefixlen = range_should_be_prefix(min, max, length)) >= 0)
+        return make_addressPrefix(result, min, prefixlen);
+
+    if ((aor = IPAddressOrRange_new()) == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    aor->type = IPAddressOrRange_addressRange;
+    OPENSSL_assert(aor->u.addressRange == NULL);
+    if ((aor->u.addressRange = IPAddressRange_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (aor->u.addressRange->min == NULL &&
+        (aor->u.addressRange->min = ASN1_BIT_STRING_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (aor->u.addressRange->max == NULL &&
+        (aor->u.addressRange->max = ASN1_BIT_STRING_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    for (i = length; i > 0 && min[i - 1] == 0x00; --i) ;
+    if (!ASN1_BIT_STRING_set(aor->u.addressRange->min, min, i))
+        goto err;
+    aor->u.addressRange->min->flags &= ~7;
+    aor->u.addressRange->min->flags |= ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT;
+    if (i > 0) {
+        unsigned char b = min[i - 1];
+        int j = 1;
+        while ((b & (0xFFU >> j)) != 0)
+            ++j;
+        aor->u.addressRange->min->flags |= 8 - j;
+    }
+
+    for (i = length; i > 0 && max[i - 1] == 0xFF; --i) ;
+    if (!ASN1_BIT_STRING_set(aor->u.addressRange->max, max, i))
+        goto err;
+    aor->u.addressRange->max->flags &= ~7;
+    aor->u.addressRange->max->flags |= ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT;
+    if (i > 0) {
+        unsigned char b = max[i - 1];
+        int j = 1;
+        while ((b & (0xFFU >> j)) != (0xFFU >> j))
+            ++j;
+        aor->u.addressRange->max->flags |= 8 - j;
+    }
+
+    *result = aor;
+    return 1;
+
+ err:
+    IPAddressOrRange_free(aor);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Construct a new address family or find an existing one.
+ */
+static IPAddressFamily *make_IPAddressFamily(IPAddrBlocks *addr,
+                                             const unsigned afi,
+                                             const unsigned *safi)
+{
+    IPAddressFamily *f;
+    unsigned char key[3];
+    int keylen;
+    int i;
+
+    key[0] = (afi >> 8) & 0xFF;
+    key[1] = afi & 0xFF;
+    if (safi != NULL) {
+        key[2] = *safi & 0xFF;
+        keylen = 3;
+    } else {
+        keylen = 2;
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_IPAddressFamily_num(addr); i++) {
+        f = sk_IPAddressFamily_value(addr, i);
+        OPENSSL_assert(f->addressFamily->data != NULL);
+        if (f->addressFamily->length == keylen &&
+            !memcmp(f->addressFamily->data, key, keylen))
+            return f;
+    }
+
+    if ((f = IPAddressFamily_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (f->ipAddressChoice == NULL &&
+        (f->ipAddressChoice = IPAddressChoice_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (f->addressFamily == NULL &&
+        (f->addressFamily = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(f->addressFamily, key, keylen))
+        goto err;
+    if (!sk_IPAddressFamily_push(addr, f))
+        goto err;
+
+    return f;
+
+ err:
+    IPAddressFamily_free(f);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Add an inheritance element.
+ */
+int X509v3_addr_add_inherit(IPAddrBlocks *addr,
+                            const unsigned afi, const unsigned *safi)
+{
+    IPAddressFamily *f = make_IPAddressFamily(addr, afi, safi);
+    if (f == NULL ||
+        f->ipAddressChoice == NULL ||
+        (f->ipAddressChoice->type == IPAddressChoice_addressesOrRanges &&
+         f->ipAddressChoice->u.addressesOrRanges != NULL))
+        return 0;
+    if (f->ipAddressChoice->type == IPAddressChoice_inherit &&
+        f->ipAddressChoice->u.inherit != NULL)
+        return 1;
+    if (f->ipAddressChoice->u.inherit == NULL &&
+        (f->ipAddressChoice->u.inherit = ASN1_NULL_new()) == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    f->ipAddressChoice->type = IPAddressChoice_inherit;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Construct an IPAddressOrRange sequence, or return an existing one.
+ */
+static IPAddressOrRanges *make_prefix_or_range(IPAddrBlocks *addr,
+                                               const unsigned afi,
+                                               const unsigned *safi)
+{
+    IPAddressFamily *f = make_IPAddressFamily(addr, afi, safi);
+    IPAddressOrRanges *aors = NULL;
+
+    if (f == NULL ||
+        f->ipAddressChoice == NULL ||
+        (f->ipAddressChoice->type == IPAddressChoice_inherit &&
+         f->ipAddressChoice->u.inherit != NULL))
+        return NULL;
+    if (f->ipAddressChoice->type == IPAddressChoice_addressesOrRanges)
+        aors = f->ipAddressChoice->u.addressesOrRanges;
+    if (aors != NULL)
+        return aors;
+    if ((aors = sk_IPAddressOrRange_new_null()) == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    switch (afi) {
+    case IANA_AFI_IPV4:
+        (void)sk_IPAddressOrRange_set_cmp_func(aors, v4IPAddressOrRange_cmp);
+        break;
+    case IANA_AFI_IPV6:
+        (void)sk_IPAddressOrRange_set_cmp_func(aors, v6IPAddressOrRange_cmp);
+        break;
+    }
+    f->ipAddressChoice->type = IPAddressChoice_addressesOrRanges;
+    f->ipAddressChoice->u.addressesOrRanges = aors;
+    return aors;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Add a prefix.
+ */
+int X509v3_addr_add_prefix(IPAddrBlocks *addr,
+                           const unsigned afi,
+                           const unsigned *safi,
+                           unsigned char *a, const int prefixlen)
+{
+    IPAddressOrRanges *aors = make_prefix_or_range(addr, afi, safi);
+    IPAddressOrRange *aor;
+    if (aors == NULL || !make_addressPrefix(&aor, a, prefixlen))
+        return 0;
+    if (sk_IPAddressOrRange_push(aors, aor))
+        return 1;
+    IPAddressOrRange_free(aor);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Add a range.
+ */
+int X509v3_addr_add_range(IPAddrBlocks *addr,
+                          const unsigned afi,
+                          const unsigned *safi,
+                          unsigned char *min, unsigned char *max)
+{
+    IPAddressOrRanges *aors = make_prefix_or_range(addr, afi, safi);
+    IPAddressOrRange *aor;
+    int length = length_from_afi(afi);
+    if (aors == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    if (!make_addressRange(&aor, min, max, length))
+        return 0;
+    if (sk_IPAddressOrRange_push(aors, aor))
+        return 1;
+    IPAddressOrRange_free(aor);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Extract min and max values from an IPAddressOrRange.
+ */
+static int extract_min_max(IPAddressOrRange *aor,
+                           unsigned char *min, unsigned char *max, int length)
+{
+    if (aor == NULL || min == NULL || max == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    switch (aor->type) {
+    case IPAddressOrRange_addressPrefix:
+        return (addr_expand(min, aor->u.addressPrefix, length, 0x00) &&
+                addr_expand(max, aor->u.addressPrefix, length, 0xFF));
+    case IPAddressOrRange_addressRange:
+        return (addr_expand(min, aor->u.addressRange->min, length, 0x00) &&
+                addr_expand(max, aor->u.addressRange->max, length, 0xFF));
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Public wrapper for extract_min_max().
+ */
+int X509v3_addr_get_range(IPAddressOrRange *aor,
+                          const unsigned afi,
+                          unsigned char *min,
+                          unsigned char *max, const int length)
+{
+    int afi_length = length_from_afi(afi);
+    if (aor == NULL || min == NULL || max == NULL ||
+        afi_length == 0 || length < afi_length ||
+        (aor->type != IPAddressOrRange_addressPrefix &&
+         aor->type != IPAddressOrRange_addressRange) ||
+        !extract_min_max(aor, min, max, afi_length))
+        return 0;
+
+    return afi_length;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Sort comparison function for a sequence of IPAddressFamily.
+ *
+ * The last paragraph of RFC 3779 2.2.3.3 is slightly ambiguous about
+ * the ordering: I can read it as meaning that IPv6 without a SAFI
+ * comes before IPv4 with a SAFI, which seems pretty weird.  The
+ * examples in appendix B suggest that the author intended the
+ * null-SAFI rule to apply only within a single AFI, which is what I
+ * would have expected and is what the following code implements.
+ */
+static int IPAddressFamily_cmp(const IPAddressFamily *const *a_,
+                               const IPAddressFamily *const *b_)
+{
+    const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *a = (*a_)->addressFamily;
+    const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *b = (*b_)->addressFamily;
+    int len = ((a->length <= b->length) ? a->length : b->length);
+    int cmp = memcmp(a->data, b->data, len);
+    return cmp ? cmp : a->length - b->length;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check whether an IPAddrBLocks is in canonical form.
+ */
+int X509v3_addr_is_canonical(IPAddrBlocks *addr)
+{
+    unsigned char a_min[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN], a_max[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN];
+    unsigned char b_min[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN], b_max[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN];
+    IPAddressOrRanges *aors;
+    int i, j, k;
+
+    /*
+     * Empty extension is canonical.
+     */
+    if (addr == NULL)
+        return 1;
+
+    /*
+     * Check whether the top-level list is in order.
+     */
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_IPAddressFamily_num(addr) - 1; i++) {
+        const IPAddressFamily *a = sk_IPAddressFamily_value(addr, i);
+        const IPAddressFamily *b = sk_IPAddressFamily_value(addr, i + 1);
+        if (IPAddressFamily_cmp(&a, &b) >= 0)
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Top level's ok, now check each address family.
+     */
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_IPAddressFamily_num(addr); i++) {
+        IPAddressFamily *f = sk_IPAddressFamily_value(addr, i);
+        int length = length_from_afi(X509v3_addr_get_afi(f));
+
+        /*
+         * Inheritance is canonical.  Anything other than inheritance or
+         * a SEQUENCE OF IPAddressOrRange is an ASN.1 error or something.
+         */
+        if (f == NULL || f->ipAddressChoice == NULL)
+            return 0;
+        switch (f->ipAddressChoice->type) {
+        case IPAddressChoice_inherit:
+            continue;
+        case IPAddressChoice_addressesOrRanges:
+            break;
+        default:
+            return 0;
+        }
+
+        /*
+         * It's an IPAddressOrRanges sequence, check it.
+         */
+        aors = f->ipAddressChoice->u.addressesOrRanges;
+        if (sk_IPAddressOrRange_num(aors) == 0)
+            return 0;
+        for (j = 0; j < sk_IPAddressOrRange_num(aors) - 1; j++) {
+            IPAddressOrRange *a = sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(aors, j);
+            IPAddressOrRange *b = sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(aors, j + 1);
+
+            if (!extract_min_max(a, a_min, a_max, length) ||
+                !extract_min_max(b, b_min, b_max, length))
+                return 0;
+
+            /*
+             * Punt misordered list, overlapping start, or inverted range.
+             */
+            if (memcmp(a_min, b_min, length) >= 0 ||
+                memcmp(a_min, a_max, length) > 0 ||
+                memcmp(b_min, b_max, length) > 0)
+                return 0;
+
+            /*
+             * Punt if adjacent or overlapping.  Check for adjacency by
+             * subtracting one from b_min first.
+             */
+            for (k = length - 1; k >= 0 && b_min[k]-- == 0x00; k--) ;
+            if (memcmp(a_max, b_min, length) >= 0)
+                return 0;
+
+            /*
+             * Check for range that should be expressed as a prefix.
+             */
+            if (a->type == IPAddressOrRange_addressRange &&
+                range_should_be_prefix(a_min, a_max, length) >= 0)
+                return 0;
+        }
+
+        /*
+         * Check range to see if it's inverted or should be a
+         * prefix.
+         */
+        j = sk_IPAddressOrRange_num(aors) - 1;
+        {
+            IPAddressOrRange *a = sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(aors, j);
+            if (a != NULL && a->type == IPAddressOrRange_addressRange) {
+                if (!extract_min_max(a, a_min, a_max, length))
+                    return 0;
+                if (memcmp(a_min, a_max, length) > 0 ||
+                    range_should_be_prefix(a_min, a_max, length) >= 0)
+                    return 0;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * If we made it through all that, we're happy.
+     */
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Whack an IPAddressOrRanges into canonical form.
+ */
+static int IPAddressOrRanges_canonize(IPAddressOrRanges *aors,
+                                      const unsigned afi)
+{
+    int i, j, length = length_from_afi(afi);
+
+    /*
+     * Sort the IPAddressOrRanges sequence.
+     */
+    sk_IPAddressOrRange_sort(aors);
+
+    /*
+     * Clean up representation issues, punt on duplicates or overlaps.
+     */
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_IPAddressOrRange_num(aors) - 1; i++) {
+        IPAddressOrRange *a = sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(aors, i);
+        IPAddressOrRange *b = sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(aors, i + 1);
+        unsigned char a_min[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN], a_max[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN];
+        unsigned char b_min[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN], b_max[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN];
+
+        if (!extract_min_max(a, a_min, a_max, length) ||
+            !extract_min_max(b, b_min, b_max, length))
+            return 0;
+
+        /*
+         * Punt inverted ranges.
+         */
+        if (memcmp(a_min, a_max, length) > 0 ||
+            memcmp(b_min, b_max, length) > 0)
+            return 0;
+
+        /*
+         * Punt overlaps.
+         */
+        if (memcmp(a_max, b_min, length) >= 0)
+            return 0;
+
+        /*
+         * Merge if a and b are adjacent.  We check for
+         * adjacency by subtracting one from b_min first.
+         */
+        for (j = length - 1; j >= 0 && b_min[j]-- == 0x00; j--) ;
+        if (memcmp(a_max, b_min, length) == 0) {
+            IPAddressOrRange *merged;
+            if (!make_addressRange(&merged, a_min, b_max, length))
+                return 0;
+            (void)sk_IPAddressOrRange_set(aors, i, merged);
+            (void)sk_IPAddressOrRange_delete(aors, i + 1);
+            IPAddressOrRange_free(a);
+            IPAddressOrRange_free(b);
+            --i;
+            continue;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Check for inverted final range.
+     */
+    j = sk_IPAddressOrRange_num(aors) - 1;
+    {
+        IPAddressOrRange *a = sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(aors, j);
+        if (a != NULL && a->type == IPAddressOrRange_addressRange) {
+            unsigned char a_min[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN], a_max[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN];
+            if (!extract_min_max(a, a_min, a_max, length))
+                return 0;
+            if (memcmp(a_min, a_max, length) > 0)
+                return 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Whack an IPAddrBlocks extension into canonical form.
+ */
+int X509v3_addr_canonize(IPAddrBlocks *addr)
+{
+    int i;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_IPAddressFamily_num(addr); i++) {
+        IPAddressFamily *f = sk_IPAddressFamily_value(addr, i);
+        if (f->ipAddressChoice->type == IPAddressChoice_addressesOrRanges &&
+            !IPAddressOrRanges_canonize(f->ipAddressChoice->
+                                        u.addressesOrRanges,
+                                        X509v3_addr_get_afi(f)))
+            return 0;
+    }
+    (void)sk_IPAddressFamily_set_cmp_func(addr, IPAddressFamily_cmp);
+    sk_IPAddressFamily_sort(addr);
+    OPENSSL_assert(X509v3_addr_is_canonical(addr));
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * v2i handler for the IPAddrBlocks extension.
+ */
+static void *v2i_IPAddrBlocks(const struct v3_ext_method *method,
+                              struct v3_ext_ctx *ctx,
+                              STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *values)
+{
+    static const char v4addr_chars[] = "0123456789.";
+    static const char v6addr_chars[] = "0123456789.:abcdefABCDEF";
+    IPAddrBlocks *addr = NULL;
+    char *s = NULL, *t;
+    int i;
+
+    if ((addr = sk_IPAddressFamily_new(IPAddressFamily_cmp)) == NULL) {
+        X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_IPADDRBLOCKS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(values); i++) {
+        CONF_VALUE *val = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(values, i);
+        unsigned char min[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN], max[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN];
+        unsigned afi, *safi = NULL, safi_;
+        const char *addr_chars = NULL;
+        int prefixlen, i1, i2, delim, length;
+
+        if (!name_cmp(val->name, "IPv4")) {
+            afi = IANA_AFI_IPV4;
+        } else if (!name_cmp(val->name, "IPv6")) {
+            afi = IANA_AFI_IPV6;
+        } else if (!name_cmp(val->name, "IPv4-SAFI")) {
+            afi = IANA_AFI_IPV4;
+            safi = &safi_;
+        } else if (!name_cmp(val->name, "IPv6-SAFI")) {
+            afi = IANA_AFI_IPV6;
+            safi = &safi_;
+        } else {
+            X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_IPADDRBLOCKS,
+                      X509V3_R_EXTENSION_NAME_ERROR);
+            X509V3_conf_err(val);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        switch (afi) {
+        case IANA_AFI_IPV4:
+            addr_chars = v4addr_chars;
+            break;
+        case IANA_AFI_IPV6:
+            addr_chars = v6addr_chars;
+            break;
+        }
+
+        length = length_from_afi(afi);
+
+        /*
+         * Handle SAFI, if any, and OPENSSL_strdup() so we can null-terminate
+         * the other input values.
+         */
+        if (safi != NULL) {
+            *safi = strtoul(val->value, &t, 0);
+            t += strspn(t, " \t");
+            if (*safi > 0xFF || *t++ != ':') {
+                X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_IPADDRBLOCKS, X509V3_R_INVALID_SAFI);
+                X509V3_conf_err(val);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            t += strspn(t, " \t");
+            s = OPENSSL_strdup(t);
+        } else {
+            s = OPENSSL_strdup(val->value);
+        }
+        if (s == NULL) {
+            X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_IPADDRBLOCKS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        /*
+         * Check for inheritance.  Not worth additional complexity to
+         * optimize this (seldom-used) case.
+         */
+        if (strcmp(s, "inherit") == 0) {
+            if (!X509v3_addr_add_inherit(addr, afi, safi)) {
+                X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_IPADDRBLOCKS,
+                          X509V3_R_INVALID_INHERITANCE);
+                X509V3_conf_err(val);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            OPENSSL_free(s);
+            s = NULL;
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        i1 = strspn(s, addr_chars);
+        i2 = i1 + strspn(s + i1, " \t");
+        delim = s[i2++];
+        s[i1] = '\0';
+
+        if (a2i_ipadd(min, s) != length) {
+            X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_IPADDRBLOCKS, X509V3_R_INVALID_IPADDRESS);
+            X509V3_conf_err(val);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        switch (delim) {
+        case '/':
+            prefixlen = (int)strtoul(s + i2, &t, 10);
+            if (t == s + i2 || *t != '\0') {
+                X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_IPADDRBLOCKS,
+                          X509V3_R_EXTENSION_VALUE_ERROR);
+                X509V3_conf_err(val);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            if (!X509v3_addr_add_prefix(addr, afi, safi, min, prefixlen)) {
+                X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_IPADDRBLOCKS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            break;
+        case '-':
+            i1 = i2 + strspn(s + i2, " \t");
+            i2 = i1 + strspn(s + i1, addr_chars);
+            if (i1 == i2 || s[i2] != '\0') {
+                X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_IPADDRBLOCKS,
+                          X509V3_R_EXTENSION_VALUE_ERROR);
+                X509V3_conf_err(val);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            if (a2i_ipadd(max, s + i1) != length) {
+                X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_IPADDRBLOCKS,
+                          X509V3_R_INVALID_IPADDRESS);
+                X509V3_conf_err(val);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            if (memcmp(min, max, length_from_afi(afi)) > 0) {
+                X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_IPADDRBLOCKS,
+                          X509V3_R_EXTENSION_VALUE_ERROR);
+                X509V3_conf_err(val);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            if (!X509v3_addr_add_range(addr, afi, safi, min, max)) {
+                X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_IPADDRBLOCKS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            break;
+        case '\0':
+            if (!X509v3_addr_add_prefix(addr, afi, safi, min, length * 8)) {
+                X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_IPADDRBLOCKS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            break;
+        default:
+            X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_IPADDRBLOCKS,
+                      X509V3_R_EXTENSION_VALUE_ERROR);
+            X509V3_conf_err(val);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        OPENSSL_free(s);
+        s = NULL;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Canonize the result, then we're done.
+     */
+    if (!X509v3_addr_canonize(addr))
+        goto err;
+    return addr;
+
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_free(s);
+    sk_IPAddressFamily_pop_free(addr, IPAddressFamily_free);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * OpenSSL dispatch
+ */
+const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_addr = {
+    NID_sbgp_ipAddrBlock,       /* nid */
+    0,                          /* flags */
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(IPAddrBlocks), /* template */
+    0, 0, 0, 0,                 /* old functions, ignored */
+    0,                          /* i2s */
+    0,                          /* s2i */
+    0,                          /* i2v */
+    v2i_IPAddrBlocks,           /* v2i */
+    i2r_IPAddrBlocks,           /* i2r */
+    0,                          /* r2i */
+    NULL                        /* extension-specific data */
+};
+
+/*
+ * Figure out whether extension sues inheritance.
+ */
+int X509v3_addr_inherits(IPAddrBlocks *addr)
+{
+    int i;
+    if (addr == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_IPAddressFamily_num(addr); i++) {
+        IPAddressFamily *f = sk_IPAddressFamily_value(addr, i);
+        if (f->ipAddressChoice->type == IPAddressChoice_inherit)
+            return 1;
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Figure out whether parent contains child.
+ */
+static int addr_contains(IPAddressOrRanges *parent,
+                         IPAddressOrRanges *child, int length)
+{
+    unsigned char p_min[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN], p_max[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN];
+    unsigned char c_min[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN], c_max[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN];
+    int p, c;
+
+    if (child == NULL || parent == child)
+        return 1;
+    if (parent == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    p = 0;
+    for (c = 0; c < sk_IPAddressOrRange_num(child); c++) {
+        if (!extract_min_max(sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(child, c),
+                             c_min, c_max, length))
+            return -1;
+        for (;; p++) {
+            if (p >= sk_IPAddressOrRange_num(parent))
+                return 0;
+            if (!extract_min_max(sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(parent, p),
+                                 p_min, p_max, length))
+                return 0;
+            if (memcmp(p_max, c_max, length) < 0)
+                continue;
+            if (memcmp(p_min, c_min, length) > 0)
+                return 0;
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Test whether a is a subset of b.
+ */
+int X509v3_addr_subset(IPAddrBlocks *a, IPAddrBlocks *b)
+{
+    int i;
+    if (a == NULL || a == b)
+        return 1;
+    if (b == NULL || X509v3_addr_inherits(a) || X509v3_addr_inherits(b))
+        return 0;
+    (void)sk_IPAddressFamily_set_cmp_func(b, IPAddressFamily_cmp);
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_IPAddressFamily_num(a); i++) {
+        IPAddressFamily *fa = sk_IPAddressFamily_value(a, i);
+        int j = sk_IPAddressFamily_find(b, fa);
+        IPAddressFamily *fb;
+        fb = sk_IPAddressFamily_value(b, j);
+        if (fb == NULL)
+            return 0;
+        if (!addr_contains(fb->ipAddressChoice->u.addressesOrRanges,
+                           fa->ipAddressChoice->u.addressesOrRanges,
+                           length_from_afi(X509v3_addr_get_afi(fb))))
+            return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Validation error handling via callback.
+ */
+#define validation_err(_err_)           \
+  do {                                  \
+    if (ctx != NULL) {                  \
+      ctx->error = _err_;               \
+      ctx->error_depth = i;             \
+      ctx->current_cert = x;            \
+      ret = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);     \
+    } else {                            \
+      ret = 0;                          \
+    }                                   \
+    if (!ret)                           \
+      goto done;                        \
+  } while (0)
+
+/*
+ * Core code for RFC 3779 2.3 path validation.
+ *
+ * Returns 1 for success, 0 on error.
+ *
+ * When returning 0, ctx->error MUST be set to an appropriate value other than
+ * X509_V_OK.
+ */
+static int addr_validate_path_internal(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
+                                       STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
+                                       IPAddrBlocks *ext)
+{
+    IPAddrBlocks *child = NULL;
+    int i, j, ret = 1;
+    X509 *x;
+
+    OPENSSL_assert(chain != NULL && sk_X509_num(chain) > 0);
+    OPENSSL_assert(ctx != NULL || ext != NULL);
+    OPENSSL_assert(ctx == NULL || ctx->verify_cb != NULL);
+
+    /*
+     * Figure out where to start.  If we don't have an extension to
+     * check, we're done.  Otherwise, check canonical form and
+     * set up for walking up the chain.
+     */
+    if (ext != NULL) {
+        i = -1;
+        x = NULL;
+    } else {
+        i = 0;
+        x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
+        OPENSSL_assert(x != NULL);
+        if ((ext = x->rfc3779_addr) == NULL)
+            goto done;
+    }
+    if (!X509v3_addr_is_canonical(ext))
+        validation_err(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION);
+    (void)sk_IPAddressFamily_set_cmp_func(ext, IPAddressFamily_cmp);
+    if ((child = sk_IPAddressFamily_dup(ext)) == NULL) {
+        X509V3err(X509V3_F_ADDR_VALIDATE_PATH_INTERNAL,
+                  ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
+        ret = 0;
+        goto done;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Now walk up the chain.  No cert may list resources that its
+     * parent doesn't list.
+     */
+    for (i++; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
+        x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
+        OPENSSL_assert(x != NULL);
+        if (!X509v3_addr_is_canonical(x->rfc3779_addr))
+            validation_err(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION);
+        if (x->rfc3779_addr == NULL) {
+            for (j = 0; j < sk_IPAddressFamily_num(child); j++) {
+                IPAddressFamily *fc = sk_IPAddressFamily_value(child, j);
+                if (fc->ipAddressChoice->type != IPAddressChoice_inherit) {
+                    validation_err(X509_V_ERR_UNNESTED_RESOURCE);
+                    break;
+                }
+            }
+            continue;
+        }
+        (void)sk_IPAddressFamily_set_cmp_func(x->rfc3779_addr,
+                                              IPAddressFamily_cmp);
+        for (j = 0; j < sk_IPAddressFamily_num(child); j++) {
+            IPAddressFamily *fc = sk_IPAddressFamily_value(child, j);
+            int k = sk_IPAddressFamily_find(x->rfc3779_addr, fc);
+            IPAddressFamily *fp =
+                sk_IPAddressFamily_value(x->rfc3779_addr, k);
+            if (fp == NULL) {
+                if (fc->ipAddressChoice->type ==
+                    IPAddressChoice_addressesOrRanges) {
+                    validation_err(X509_V_ERR_UNNESTED_RESOURCE);
+                    break;
+                }
+                continue;
+            }
+            if (fp->ipAddressChoice->type ==
+                IPAddressChoice_addressesOrRanges) {
+                if (fc->ipAddressChoice->type == IPAddressChoice_inherit
+                    || addr_contains(fp->ipAddressChoice->u.addressesOrRanges,
+                                     fc->ipAddressChoice->u.addressesOrRanges,
+                                     length_from_afi(X509v3_addr_get_afi(fc))))
+                    sk_IPAddressFamily_set(child, j, fp);
+                else
+                    validation_err(X509_V_ERR_UNNESTED_RESOURCE);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Trust anchor can't inherit.
+     */
+    OPENSSL_assert(x != NULL);
+    if (x->rfc3779_addr != NULL) {
+        for (j = 0; j < sk_IPAddressFamily_num(x->rfc3779_addr); j++) {
+            IPAddressFamily *fp =
+                sk_IPAddressFamily_value(x->rfc3779_addr, j);
+            if (fp->ipAddressChoice->type == IPAddressChoice_inherit
+                && sk_IPAddressFamily_find(child, fp) >= 0)
+                validation_err(X509_V_ERR_UNNESTED_RESOURCE);
+        }
+    }
+
+ done:
+    sk_IPAddressFamily_free(child);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+#undef validation_err
+
+/*
+ * RFC 3779 2.3 path validation -- called from X509_verify_cert().
+ */
+int X509v3_addr_validate_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return addr_validate_path_internal(ctx, ctx->chain, NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * RFC 3779 2.3 path validation of an extension.
+ * Test whether chain covers extension.
+ */
+int X509v3_addr_validate_resource_set(STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
+                                  IPAddrBlocks *ext, int allow_inheritance)
+{
+    if (ext == NULL)
+        return 1;
+    if (chain == NULL || sk_X509_num(chain) == 0)
+        return 0;
+    if (!allow_inheritance && X509v3_addr_inherits(ext))
+        return 0;
+    return addr_validate_path_internal(NULL, chain, ext);
+}
+
+#endif                          /* OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 */
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_akey.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_akey.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d9f7704
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_akey.c
@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/conf.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include "ext_dat.h"
+
+static STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *i2v_AUTHORITY_KEYID(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
+                                                 AUTHORITY_KEYID *akeyid,
+                                                 STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE)
+                                                 *extlist);
+static AUTHORITY_KEYID *v2i_AUTHORITY_KEYID(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
+                                            X509V3_CTX *ctx,
+                                            STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *values);
+
+const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_akey_id = {
+    NID_authority_key_identifier,
+    X509V3_EXT_MULTILINE, ASN1_ITEM_ref(AUTHORITY_KEYID),
+    0, 0, 0, 0,
+    0, 0,
+    (X509V3_EXT_I2V) i2v_AUTHORITY_KEYID,
+    (X509V3_EXT_V2I)v2i_AUTHORITY_KEYID,
+    0, 0,
+    NULL
+};
+
+static STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *i2v_AUTHORITY_KEYID(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
+                                                 AUTHORITY_KEYID *akeyid,
+                                                 STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE)
+                                                 *extlist)
+{
+    char *tmp;
+    if (akeyid->keyid) {
+        tmp = OPENSSL_buf2hexstr(akeyid->keyid->data, akeyid->keyid->length);
+        X509V3_add_value("keyid", tmp, &extlist);
+        OPENSSL_free(tmp);
+    }
+    if (akeyid->issuer)
+        extlist = i2v_GENERAL_NAMES(NULL, akeyid->issuer, extlist);
+    if (akeyid->serial) {
+        tmp = OPENSSL_buf2hexstr(akeyid->serial->data, akeyid->serial->length);
+        X509V3_add_value("serial", tmp, &extlist);
+        OPENSSL_free(tmp);
+    }
+    return extlist;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Currently two options:
+ * keyid: use the issuers subject keyid, the value 'always' means its is
+ * an error if the issuer certificate doesn't have a key id.
+ * issuer: use the issuers cert issuer and serial number. The default is
+ * to only use this if keyid is not present. With the option 'always'
+ * this is always included.
+ */
+
+static AUTHORITY_KEYID *v2i_AUTHORITY_KEYID(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
+                                            X509V3_CTX *ctx,
+                                            STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *values)
+{
+    char keyid = 0, issuer = 0;
+    int i;
+    CONF_VALUE *cnf;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ikeyid = NULL;
+    X509_NAME *isname = NULL;
+    GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
+    GENERAL_NAME *gen = NULL;
+    ASN1_INTEGER *serial = NULL;
+    X509_EXTENSION *ext;
+    X509 *cert;
+    AUTHORITY_KEYID *akeyid;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(values); i++) {
+        cnf = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(values, i);
+        if (strcmp(cnf->name, "keyid") == 0) {
+            keyid = 1;
+            if (cnf->value && strcmp(cnf->value, "always") == 0)
+                keyid = 2;
+        } else if (strcmp(cnf->name, "issuer") == 0) {
+            issuer = 1;
+            if (cnf->value && strcmp(cnf->value, "always") == 0)
+                issuer = 2;
+        } else {
+            X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_AUTHORITY_KEYID, X509V3_R_UNKNOWN_OPTION);
+            ERR_add_error_data(2, "name=", cnf->name);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (!ctx || !ctx->issuer_cert) {
+        if (ctx && (ctx->flags == CTX_TEST))
+            return AUTHORITY_KEYID_new();
+        X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_AUTHORITY_KEYID,
+                  X509V3_R_NO_ISSUER_CERTIFICATE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    cert = ctx->issuer_cert;
+
+    if (keyid) {
+        i = X509_get_ext_by_NID(cert, NID_subject_key_identifier, -1);
+        if ((i >= 0) && (ext = X509_get_ext(cert, i)))
+            ikeyid = X509V3_EXT_d2i(ext);
+        if (keyid == 2 && !ikeyid) {
+            X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_AUTHORITY_KEYID,
+                      X509V3_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_KEYID);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if ((issuer && !ikeyid) || (issuer == 2)) {
+        isname = X509_NAME_dup(X509_get_issuer_name(cert));
+        serial = ASN1_INTEGER_dup(X509_get_serialNumber(cert));
+        if (!isname || !serial) {
+            X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_AUTHORITY_KEYID,
+                      X509V3_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_DETAILS);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if ((akeyid = AUTHORITY_KEYID_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (isname) {
+        if ((gens = sk_GENERAL_NAME_new_null()) == NULL
+            || (gen = GENERAL_NAME_new()) == NULL
+            || !sk_GENERAL_NAME_push(gens, gen)) {
+            X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_AUTHORITY_KEYID, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        gen->type = GEN_DIRNAME;
+        gen->d.dirn = isname;
+    }
+
+    akeyid->issuer = gens;
+    gen = NULL;
+    gens = NULL;
+    akeyid->serial = serial;
+    akeyid->keyid = ikeyid;
+
+    return akeyid;
+
+ err:
+    sk_GENERAL_NAME_free(gens);
+    GENERAL_NAME_free(gen);
+    X509_NAME_free(isname);
+    ASN1_INTEGER_free(serial);
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(ikeyid);
+    return NULL;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_akeya.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_akeya.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d6dd6bc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_akeya.c
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/conf.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(AUTHORITY_KEYID) = {
+        ASN1_IMP_OPT(AUTHORITY_KEYID, keyid, ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 0),
+        ASN1_IMP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(AUTHORITY_KEYID, issuer, GENERAL_NAME, 1),
+        ASN1_IMP_OPT(AUTHORITY_KEYID, serial, ASN1_INTEGER, 2)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(AUTHORITY_KEYID)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(AUTHORITY_KEYID)
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_alt.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_alt.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a35d337
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_alt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,576 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/conf.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include "ext_dat.h"
+
+static GENERAL_NAMES *v2i_subject_alt(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
+                                      X509V3_CTX *ctx,
+                                      STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nval);
+static GENERAL_NAMES *v2i_issuer_alt(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
+                                     X509V3_CTX *ctx,
+                                     STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nval);
+static int copy_email(X509V3_CTX *ctx, GENERAL_NAMES *gens, int move_p);
+static int copy_issuer(X509V3_CTX *ctx, GENERAL_NAMES *gens);
+static int do_othername(GENERAL_NAME *gen, const char *value, X509V3_CTX *ctx);
+static int do_dirname(GENERAL_NAME *gen, const char *value, X509V3_CTX *ctx);
+
+const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_alt[3] = {
+    {NID_subject_alt_name, 0, ASN1_ITEM_ref(GENERAL_NAMES),
+     0, 0, 0, 0,
+     0, 0,
+     (X509V3_EXT_I2V) i2v_GENERAL_NAMES,
+     (X509V3_EXT_V2I)v2i_subject_alt,
+     NULL, NULL, NULL},
+
+    {NID_issuer_alt_name, 0, ASN1_ITEM_ref(GENERAL_NAMES),
+     0, 0, 0, 0,
+     0, 0,
+     (X509V3_EXT_I2V) i2v_GENERAL_NAMES,
+     (X509V3_EXT_V2I)v2i_issuer_alt,
+     NULL, NULL, NULL},
+
+    {NID_certificate_issuer, 0, ASN1_ITEM_ref(GENERAL_NAMES),
+     0, 0, 0, 0,
+     0, 0,
+     (X509V3_EXT_I2V) i2v_GENERAL_NAMES,
+     NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL},
+};
+
+STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *i2v_GENERAL_NAMES(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
+                                        GENERAL_NAMES *gens,
+                                        STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *ret)
+{
+    int i;
+    GENERAL_NAME *gen;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) {
+        gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
+        ret = i2v_GENERAL_NAME(method, gen, ret);
+    }
+    if (!ret)
+        return sk_CONF_VALUE_new_null();
+    return ret;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *i2v_GENERAL_NAME(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
+                                       GENERAL_NAME *gen,
+                                       STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *ret)
+{
+    unsigned char *p;
+    char oline[256], htmp[5];
+    int i;
+    switch (gen->type) {
+    case GEN_OTHERNAME:
+        if (!X509V3_add_value("othername", "<unsupported>", &ret))
+            return NULL;
+        break;
+
+    case GEN_X400:
+        if (!X509V3_add_value("X400Name", "<unsupported>", &ret))
+            return NULL;
+        break;
+
+    case GEN_EDIPARTY:
+        if (!X509V3_add_value("EdiPartyName", "<unsupported>", &ret))
+            return NULL;
+        break;
+
+    case GEN_EMAIL:
+        if (!X509V3_add_value_uchar("email", gen->d.ia5->data, &ret))
+            return NULL;
+        break;
+
+    case GEN_DNS:
+        if (!X509V3_add_value_uchar("DNS", gen->d.ia5->data, &ret))
+            return NULL;
+        break;
+
+    case GEN_URI:
+        if (!X509V3_add_value_uchar("URI", gen->d.ia5->data, &ret))
+            return NULL;
+        break;
+
+    case GEN_DIRNAME:
+        if (X509_NAME_oneline(gen->d.dirn, oline, 256) == NULL
+                || !X509V3_add_value("DirName", oline, &ret))
+            return NULL;
+        break;
+
+    case GEN_IPADD:
+        p = gen->d.ip->data;
+        if (gen->d.ip->length == 4)
+            BIO_snprintf(oline, sizeof(oline),
+                         "%d.%d.%d.%d", p[0], p[1], p[2], p[3]);
+        else if (gen->d.ip->length == 16) {
+            oline[0] = 0;
+            for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+                BIO_snprintf(htmp, sizeof(htmp), "%X", p[0] << 8 | p[1]);
+                p += 2;
+                strcat(oline, htmp);
+                if (i != 7)
+                    strcat(oline, ":");
+            }
+        } else {
+            if (!X509V3_add_value("IP Address", "<invalid>", &ret))
+                return NULL;
+            break;
+        }
+        if (!X509V3_add_value("IP Address", oline, &ret))
+            return NULL;
+        break;
+
+    case GEN_RID:
+        i2t_ASN1_OBJECT(oline, 256, gen->d.rid);
+        if (!X509V3_add_value("Registered ID", oline, &ret))
+            return NULL;
+        break;
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int GENERAL_NAME_print(BIO *out, GENERAL_NAME *gen)
+{
+    unsigned char *p;
+    int i;
+    switch (gen->type) {
+    case GEN_OTHERNAME:
+        BIO_printf(out, "othername:<unsupported>");
+        break;
+
+    case GEN_X400:
+        BIO_printf(out, "X400Name:<unsupported>");
+        break;
+
+    case GEN_EDIPARTY:
+        /* Maybe fix this: it is supported now */
+        BIO_printf(out, "EdiPartyName:<unsupported>");
+        break;
+
+    case GEN_EMAIL:
+        BIO_printf(out, "email:%s", gen->d.ia5->data);
+        break;
+
+    case GEN_DNS:
+        BIO_printf(out, "DNS:%s", gen->d.ia5->data);
+        break;
+
+    case GEN_URI:
+        BIO_printf(out, "URI:%s", gen->d.ia5->data);
+        break;
+
+    case GEN_DIRNAME:
+        BIO_printf(out, "DirName:");
+        X509_NAME_print_ex(out, gen->d.dirn, 0, XN_FLAG_ONELINE);
+        break;
+
+    case GEN_IPADD:
+        p = gen->d.ip->data;
+        if (gen->d.ip->length == 4)
+            BIO_printf(out, "IP Address:%d.%d.%d.%d", p[0], p[1], p[2], p[3]);
+        else if (gen->d.ip->length == 16) {
+            BIO_printf(out, "IP Address");
+            for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+                BIO_printf(out, ":%X", p[0] << 8 | p[1]);
+                p += 2;
+            }
+            BIO_puts(out, "\n");
+        } else {
+            BIO_printf(out, "IP Address:<invalid>");
+            break;
+        }
+        break;
+
+    case GEN_RID:
+        BIO_printf(out, "Registered ID:");
+        i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(out, gen->d.rid);
+        break;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static GENERAL_NAMES *v2i_issuer_alt(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
+                                     X509V3_CTX *ctx,
+                                     STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nval)
+{
+    GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
+    CONF_VALUE *cnf;
+    int i;
+
+    if ((gens = sk_GENERAL_NAME_new_null()) == NULL) {
+        X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_ISSUER_ALT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(nval); i++) {
+        cnf = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(nval, i);
+        if (!name_cmp(cnf->name, "issuer")
+            && cnf->value && strcmp(cnf->value, "copy") == 0) {
+            if (!copy_issuer(ctx, gens))
+                goto err;
+        } else {
+            GENERAL_NAME *gen;
+            if ((gen = v2i_GENERAL_NAME(method, ctx, cnf)) == NULL)
+                goto err;
+            sk_GENERAL_NAME_push(gens, gen);
+        }
+    }
+    return gens;
+ err:
+    sk_GENERAL_NAME_pop_free(gens, GENERAL_NAME_free);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+/* Append subject altname of issuer to issuer alt name of subject */
+
+static int copy_issuer(X509V3_CTX *ctx, GENERAL_NAMES *gens)
+{
+    GENERAL_NAMES *ialt;
+    GENERAL_NAME *gen;
+    X509_EXTENSION *ext;
+    int i;
+
+    if (ctx && (ctx->flags == CTX_TEST))
+        return 1;
+    if (!ctx || !ctx->issuer_cert) {
+        X509V3err(X509V3_F_COPY_ISSUER, X509V3_R_NO_ISSUER_DETAILS);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    i = X509_get_ext_by_NID(ctx->issuer_cert, NID_subject_alt_name, -1);
+    if (i < 0)
+        return 1;
+    if ((ext = X509_get_ext(ctx->issuer_cert, i)) == NULL
+        || (ialt = X509V3_EXT_d2i(ext)) == NULL) {
+        X509V3err(X509V3_F_COPY_ISSUER, X509V3_R_ISSUER_DECODE_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(ialt); i++) {
+        gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(ialt, i);
+        if (!sk_GENERAL_NAME_push(gens, gen)) {
+            X509V3err(X509V3_F_COPY_ISSUER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+    sk_GENERAL_NAME_free(ialt);
+
+    return 1;
+
+ err:
+    return 0;
+
+}
+
+static GENERAL_NAMES *v2i_subject_alt(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
+                                      X509V3_CTX *ctx,
+                                      STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nval)
+{
+    GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
+    CONF_VALUE *cnf;
+    int i;
+
+    if ((gens = sk_GENERAL_NAME_new_null()) == NULL) {
+        X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_SUBJECT_ALT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(nval); i++) {
+        cnf = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(nval, i);
+        if (!name_cmp(cnf->name, "email")
+            && cnf->value && strcmp(cnf->value, "copy") == 0) {
+            if (!copy_email(ctx, gens, 0))
+                goto err;
+        } else if (!name_cmp(cnf->name, "email")
+                   && cnf->value && strcmp(cnf->value, "move") == 0) {
+            if (!copy_email(ctx, gens, 1))
+                goto err;
+        } else {
+            GENERAL_NAME *gen;
+            if ((gen = v2i_GENERAL_NAME(method, ctx, cnf)) == NULL)
+                goto err;
+            sk_GENERAL_NAME_push(gens, gen);
+        }
+    }
+    return gens;
+ err:
+    sk_GENERAL_NAME_pop_free(gens, GENERAL_NAME_free);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Copy any email addresses in a certificate or request to GENERAL_NAMES
+ */
+
+static int copy_email(X509V3_CTX *ctx, GENERAL_NAMES *gens, int move_p)
+{
+    X509_NAME *nm;
+    ASN1_IA5STRING *email = NULL;
+    X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne;
+    GENERAL_NAME *gen = NULL;
+    int i;
+    if (ctx != NULL && ctx->flags == CTX_TEST)
+        return 1;
+    if (!ctx || (!ctx->subject_cert && !ctx->subject_req)) {
+        X509V3err(X509V3_F_COPY_EMAIL, X509V3_R_NO_SUBJECT_DETAILS);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    /* Find the subject name */
+    if (ctx->subject_cert)
+        nm = X509_get_subject_name(ctx->subject_cert);
+    else
+        nm = X509_REQ_get_subject_name(ctx->subject_req);
+
+    /* Now add any email address(es) to STACK */
+    i = -1;
+    while ((i = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(nm,
+                                           NID_pkcs9_emailAddress, i)) >= 0) {
+        ne = X509_NAME_get_entry(nm, i);
+        email = ASN1_STRING_dup(X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(ne));
+        if (move_p) {
+            X509_NAME_delete_entry(nm, i);
+            X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(ne);
+            i--;
+        }
+        if (email == NULL || (gen = GENERAL_NAME_new()) == NULL) {
+            X509V3err(X509V3_F_COPY_EMAIL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        gen->d.ia5 = email;
+        email = NULL;
+        gen->type = GEN_EMAIL;
+        if (!sk_GENERAL_NAME_push(gens, gen)) {
+            X509V3err(X509V3_F_COPY_EMAIL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        gen = NULL;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+
+ err:
+    GENERAL_NAME_free(gen);
+    ASN1_IA5STRING_free(email);
+    return 0;
+
+}
+
+GENERAL_NAMES *v2i_GENERAL_NAMES(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
+                                 X509V3_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nval)
+{
+    GENERAL_NAME *gen;
+    GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
+    CONF_VALUE *cnf;
+    int i;
+
+    if ((gens = sk_GENERAL_NAME_new_null()) == NULL) {
+        X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_GENERAL_NAMES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(nval); i++) {
+        cnf = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(nval, i);
+        if ((gen = v2i_GENERAL_NAME(method, ctx, cnf)) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        sk_GENERAL_NAME_push(gens, gen);
+    }
+    return gens;
+ err:
+    sk_GENERAL_NAME_pop_free(gens, GENERAL_NAME_free);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+GENERAL_NAME *v2i_GENERAL_NAME(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
+                               X509V3_CTX *ctx, CONF_VALUE *cnf)
+{
+    return v2i_GENERAL_NAME_ex(NULL, method, ctx, cnf, 0);
+}
+
+GENERAL_NAME *a2i_GENERAL_NAME(GENERAL_NAME *out,
+                               const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
+                               X509V3_CTX *ctx, int gen_type, const char *value,
+                               int is_nc)
+{
+    char is_string = 0;
+    GENERAL_NAME *gen = NULL;
+
+    if (!value) {
+        X509V3err(X509V3_F_A2I_GENERAL_NAME, X509V3_R_MISSING_VALUE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    if (out)
+        gen = out;
+    else {
+        gen = GENERAL_NAME_new();
+        if (gen == NULL) {
+            X509V3err(X509V3_F_A2I_GENERAL_NAME, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+    }
+
+    switch (gen_type) {
+    case GEN_URI:
+    case GEN_EMAIL:
+    case GEN_DNS:
+        is_string = 1;
+        break;
+
+    case GEN_RID:
+        {
+            ASN1_OBJECT *obj;
+            if ((obj = OBJ_txt2obj(value, 0)) == NULL) {
+                X509V3err(X509V3_F_A2I_GENERAL_NAME, X509V3_R_BAD_OBJECT);
+                ERR_add_error_data(2, "value=", value);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            gen->d.rid = obj;
+        }
+        break;
+
+    case GEN_IPADD:
+        if (is_nc)
+            gen->d.ip = a2i_IPADDRESS_NC(value);
+        else
+            gen->d.ip = a2i_IPADDRESS(value);
+        if (gen->d.ip == NULL) {
+            X509V3err(X509V3_F_A2I_GENERAL_NAME, X509V3_R_BAD_IP_ADDRESS);
+            ERR_add_error_data(2, "value=", value);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        break;
+
+    case GEN_DIRNAME:
+        if (!do_dirname(gen, value, ctx)) {
+            X509V3err(X509V3_F_A2I_GENERAL_NAME, X509V3_R_DIRNAME_ERROR);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        break;
+
+    case GEN_OTHERNAME:
+        if (!do_othername(gen, value, ctx)) {
+            X509V3err(X509V3_F_A2I_GENERAL_NAME, X509V3_R_OTHERNAME_ERROR);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        break;
+    default:
+        X509V3err(X509V3_F_A2I_GENERAL_NAME, X509V3_R_UNSUPPORTED_TYPE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (is_string) {
+        if ((gen->d.ia5 = ASN1_IA5STRING_new()) == NULL ||
+            !ASN1_STRING_set(gen->d.ia5, (unsigned char *)value,
+                             strlen(value))) {
+            X509V3err(X509V3_F_A2I_GENERAL_NAME, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    gen->type = gen_type;
+
+    return gen;
+
+ err:
+    if (!out)
+        GENERAL_NAME_free(gen);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+GENERAL_NAME *v2i_GENERAL_NAME_ex(GENERAL_NAME *out,
+                                  const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
+                                  X509V3_CTX *ctx, CONF_VALUE *cnf, int is_nc)
+{
+    int type;
+
+    char *name, *value;
+
+    name = cnf->name;
+    value = cnf->value;
+
+    if (!value) {
+        X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_GENERAL_NAME_EX, X509V3_R_MISSING_VALUE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    if (!name_cmp(name, "email"))
+        type = GEN_EMAIL;
+    else if (!name_cmp(name, "URI"))
+        type = GEN_URI;
+    else if (!name_cmp(name, "DNS"))
+        type = GEN_DNS;
+    else if (!name_cmp(name, "RID"))
+        type = GEN_RID;
+    else if (!name_cmp(name, "IP"))
+        type = GEN_IPADD;
+    else if (!name_cmp(name, "dirName"))
+        type = GEN_DIRNAME;
+    else if (!name_cmp(name, "otherName"))
+        type = GEN_OTHERNAME;
+    else {
+        X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_GENERAL_NAME_EX, X509V3_R_UNSUPPORTED_OPTION);
+        ERR_add_error_data(2, "name=", name);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    return a2i_GENERAL_NAME(out, method, ctx, type, value, is_nc);
+
+}
+
+static int do_othername(GENERAL_NAME *gen, const char *value, X509V3_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    char *objtmp = NULL, *p;
+    int objlen;
+
+    if ((p = strchr(value, ';')) == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    if ((gen->d.otherName = OTHERNAME_new()) == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    /*
+     * Free this up because we will overwrite it. no need to free type_id
+     * because it is static
+     */
+    ASN1_TYPE_free(gen->d.otherName->value);
+    if ((gen->d.otherName->value = ASN1_generate_v3(p + 1, ctx)) == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    objlen = p - value;
+    objtmp = OPENSSL_strndup(value, objlen);
+    if (objtmp == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    gen->d.otherName->type_id = OBJ_txt2obj(objtmp, 0);
+    OPENSSL_free(objtmp);
+    if (!gen->d.otherName->type_id)
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int do_dirname(GENERAL_NAME *gen, const char *value, X509V3_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *sk = NULL;
+    X509_NAME *nm;
+
+    if ((nm = X509_NAME_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    sk = X509V3_get_section(ctx, value);
+    if (!sk) {
+        X509V3err(X509V3_F_DO_DIRNAME, X509V3_R_SECTION_NOT_FOUND);
+        ERR_add_error_data(2, "section=", value);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    /* FIXME: should allow other character types... */
+    ret = X509V3_NAME_from_section(nm, sk, MBSTRING_ASC);
+    if (!ret)
+        goto err;
+    gen->d.dirn = nm;
+
+err:
+    if (ret == 0)
+        X509_NAME_free(nm);
+    X509V3_section_free(ctx, sk);
+    return ret;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_asid.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_asid.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..af4fcf4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_asid.c
@@ -0,0 +1,852 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Implementation of RFC 3779 section 3.2.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/conf.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include "internal/x509_int.h"
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include "ext_dat.h"
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
+
+/*
+ * OpenSSL ASN.1 template translation of RFC 3779 3.2.3.
+ */
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(ASRange) = {
+  ASN1_SIMPLE(ASRange, min, ASN1_INTEGER),
+  ASN1_SIMPLE(ASRange, max, ASN1_INTEGER)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(ASRange)
+
+ASN1_CHOICE(ASIdOrRange) = {
+  ASN1_SIMPLE(ASIdOrRange, u.id,    ASN1_INTEGER),
+  ASN1_SIMPLE(ASIdOrRange, u.range, ASRange)
+} ASN1_CHOICE_END(ASIdOrRange)
+
+ASN1_CHOICE(ASIdentifierChoice) = {
+  ASN1_SIMPLE(ASIdentifierChoice,      u.inherit,       ASN1_NULL),
+  ASN1_SEQUENCE_OF(ASIdentifierChoice, u.asIdsOrRanges, ASIdOrRange)
+} ASN1_CHOICE_END(ASIdentifierChoice)
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(ASIdentifiers) = {
+  ASN1_EXP_OPT(ASIdentifiers, asnum, ASIdentifierChoice, 0),
+  ASN1_EXP_OPT(ASIdentifiers, rdi,   ASIdentifierChoice, 1)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(ASIdentifiers)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASRange)
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASIdOrRange)
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASIdentifierChoice)
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASIdentifiers)
+
+/*
+ * i2r method for an ASIdentifierChoice.
+ */
+static int i2r_ASIdentifierChoice(BIO *out,
+                                  ASIdentifierChoice *choice,
+                                  int indent, const char *msg)
+{
+    int i;
+    char *s;
+    if (choice == NULL)
+        return 1;
+    BIO_printf(out, "%*s%s:\n", indent, "", msg);
+    switch (choice->type) {
+    case ASIdentifierChoice_inherit:
+        BIO_printf(out, "%*sinherit\n", indent + 2, "");
+        break;
+    case ASIdentifierChoice_asIdsOrRanges:
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_ASIdOrRange_num(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges); i++) {
+            ASIdOrRange *aor =
+                sk_ASIdOrRange_value(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges, i);
+            switch (aor->type) {
+            case ASIdOrRange_id:
+                if ((s = i2s_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, aor->u.id)) == NULL)
+                    return 0;
+                BIO_printf(out, "%*s%s\n", indent + 2, "", s);
+                OPENSSL_free(s);
+                break;
+            case ASIdOrRange_range:
+                if ((s = i2s_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, aor->u.range->min)) == NULL)
+                    return 0;
+                BIO_printf(out, "%*s%s-", indent + 2, "", s);
+                OPENSSL_free(s);
+                if ((s = i2s_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, aor->u.range->max)) == NULL)
+                    return 0;
+                BIO_printf(out, "%s\n", s);
+                OPENSSL_free(s);
+                break;
+            default:
+                return 0;
+            }
+        }
+        break;
+    default:
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * i2r method for an ASIdentifier extension.
+ */
+static int i2r_ASIdentifiers(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
+                             void *ext, BIO *out, int indent)
+{
+    ASIdentifiers *asid = ext;
+    return (i2r_ASIdentifierChoice(out, asid->asnum, indent,
+                                   "Autonomous System Numbers") &&
+            i2r_ASIdentifierChoice(out, asid->rdi, indent,
+                                   "Routing Domain Identifiers"));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Sort comparison function for a sequence of ASIdOrRange elements.
+ */
+static int ASIdOrRange_cmp(const ASIdOrRange *const *a_,
+                           const ASIdOrRange *const *b_)
+{
+    const ASIdOrRange *a = *a_, *b = *b_;
+
+    OPENSSL_assert((a->type == ASIdOrRange_id && a->u.id != NULL) ||
+                   (a->type == ASIdOrRange_range && a->u.range != NULL &&
+                    a->u.range->min != NULL && a->u.range->max != NULL));
+
+    OPENSSL_assert((b->type == ASIdOrRange_id && b->u.id != NULL) ||
+                   (b->type == ASIdOrRange_range && b->u.range != NULL &&
+                    b->u.range->min != NULL && b->u.range->max != NULL));
+
+    if (a->type == ASIdOrRange_id && b->type == ASIdOrRange_id)
+        return ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(a->u.id, b->u.id);
+
+    if (a->type == ASIdOrRange_range && b->type == ASIdOrRange_range) {
+        int r = ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(a->u.range->min, b->u.range->min);
+        return r != 0 ? r : ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(a->u.range->max,
+                                             b->u.range->max);
+    }
+
+    if (a->type == ASIdOrRange_id)
+        return ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(a->u.id, b->u.range->min);
+    else
+        return ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(a->u.range->min, b->u.id);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Add an inherit element.
+ */
+int X509v3_asid_add_inherit(ASIdentifiers *asid, int which)
+{
+    ASIdentifierChoice **choice;
+    if (asid == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    switch (which) {
+    case V3_ASID_ASNUM:
+        choice = &asid->asnum;
+        break;
+    case V3_ASID_RDI:
+        choice = &asid->rdi;
+        break;
+    default:
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (*choice == NULL) {
+        if ((*choice = ASIdentifierChoice_new()) == NULL)
+            return 0;
+        OPENSSL_assert((*choice)->u.inherit == NULL);
+        if (((*choice)->u.inherit = ASN1_NULL_new()) == NULL)
+            return 0;
+        (*choice)->type = ASIdentifierChoice_inherit;
+    }
+    return (*choice)->type == ASIdentifierChoice_inherit;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Add an ID or range to an ASIdentifierChoice.
+ */
+int X509v3_asid_add_id_or_range(ASIdentifiers *asid,
+                                int which, ASN1_INTEGER *min, ASN1_INTEGER *max)
+{
+    ASIdentifierChoice **choice;
+    ASIdOrRange *aor;
+    if (asid == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    switch (which) {
+    case V3_ASID_ASNUM:
+        choice = &asid->asnum;
+        break;
+    case V3_ASID_RDI:
+        choice = &asid->rdi;
+        break;
+    default:
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (*choice != NULL && (*choice)->type == ASIdentifierChoice_inherit)
+        return 0;
+    if (*choice == NULL) {
+        if ((*choice = ASIdentifierChoice_new()) == NULL)
+            return 0;
+        OPENSSL_assert((*choice)->u.asIdsOrRanges == NULL);
+        (*choice)->u.asIdsOrRanges = sk_ASIdOrRange_new(ASIdOrRange_cmp);
+        if ((*choice)->u.asIdsOrRanges == NULL)
+            return 0;
+        (*choice)->type = ASIdentifierChoice_asIdsOrRanges;
+    }
+    if ((aor = ASIdOrRange_new()) == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    if (max == NULL) {
+        aor->type = ASIdOrRange_id;
+        aor->u.id = min;
+    } else {
+        aor->type = ASIdOrRange_range;
+        if ((aor->u.range = ASRange_new()) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        ASN1_INTEGER_free(aor->u.range->min);
+        aor->u.range->min = min;
+        ASN1_INTEGER_free(aor->u.range->max);
+        aor->u.range->max = max;
+    }
+    if (!(sk_ASIdOrRange_push((*choice)->u.asIdsOrRanges, aor)))
+        goto err;
+    return 1;
+
+ err:
+    ASIdOrRange_free(aor);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Extract min and max values from an ASIdOrRange.
+ */
+static void extract_min_max(ASIdOrRange *aor,
+                            ASN1_INTEGER **min, ASN1_INTEGER **max)
+{
+    OPENSSL_assert(aor != NULL && min != NULL && max != NULL);
+    switch (aor->type) {
+    case ASIdOrRange_id:
+        *min = aor->u.id;
+        *max = aor->u.id;
+        return;
+    case ASIdOrRange_range:
+        *min = aor->u.range->min;
+        *max = aor->u.range->max;
+        return;
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check whether an ASIdentifierChoice is in canonical form.
+ */
+static int ASIdentifierChoice_is_canonical(ASIdentifierChoice *choice)
+{
+    ASN1_INTEGER *a_max_plus_one = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *bn = NULL;
+    int i, ret = 0;
+
+    /*
+     * Empty element or inheritance is canonical.
+     */
+    if (choice == NULL || choice->type == ASIdentifierChoice_inherit)
+        return 1;
+
+    /*
+     * If not a list, or if empty list, it's broken.
+     */
+    if (choice->type != ASIdentifierChoice_asIdsOrRanges ||
+        sk_ASIdOrRange_num(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges) == 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    /*
+     * It's a list, check it.
+     */
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_ASIdOrRange_num(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges) - 1; i++) {
+        ASIdOrRange *a = sk_ASIdOrRange_value(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges, i);
+        ASIdOrRange *b = sk_ASIdOrRange_value(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges, i + 1);
+        ASN1_INTEGER *a_min = NULL, *a_max = NULL, *b_min = NULL, *b_max =
+            NULL;
+
+        extract_min_max(a, &a_min, &a_max);
+        extract_min_max(b, &b_min, &b_max);
+
+        /*
+         * Punt misordered list, overlapping start, or inverted range.
+         */
+        if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(a_min, b_min) >= 0 ||
+            ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(a_min, a_max) > 0 ||
+            ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(b_min, b_max) > 0)
+            goto done;
+
+        /*
+         * Calculate a_max + 1 to check for adjacency.
+         */
+        if ((bn == NULL && (bn = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
+            ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(a_max, bn) == NULL ||
+            !BN_add_word(bn, 1) ||
+            (a_max_plus_one =
+             BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(bn, a_max_plus_one)) == NULL) {
+            X509V3err(X509V3_F_ASIDENTIFIERCHOICE_IS_CANONICAL,
+                      ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto done;
+        }
+
+        /*
+         * Punt if adjacent or overlapping.
+         */
+        if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(a_max_plus_one, b_min) >= 0)
+            goto done;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Check for inverted range.
+     */
+    i = sk_ASIdOrRange_num(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges) - 1;
+    {
+        ASIdOrRange *a = sk_ASIdOrRange_value(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges, i);
+        ASN1_INTEGER *a_min, *a_max;
+        if (a != NULL && a->type == ASIdOrRange_range) {
+            extract_min_max(a, &a_min, &a_max);
+            if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(a_min, a_max) > 0)
+                goto done;
+        }
+    }
+
+    ret = 1;
+
+ done:
+    ASN1_INTEGER_free(a_max_plus_one);
+    BN_free(bn);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check whether an ASIdentifier extension is in canonical form.
+ */
+int X509v3_asid_is_canonical(ASIdentifiers *asid)
+{
+    return (asid == NULL ||
+            (ASIdentifierChoice_is_canonical(asid->asnum) &&
+             ASIdentifierChoice_is_canonical(asid->rdi)));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Whack an ASIdentifierChoice into canonical form.
+ */
+static int ASIdentifierChoice_canonize(ASIdentifierChoice *choice)
+{
+    ASN1_INTEGER *a_max_plus_one = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *bn = NULL;
+    int i, ret = 0;
+
+    /*
+     * Nothing to do for empty element or inheritance.
+     */
+    if (choice == NULL || choice->type == ASIdentifierChoice_inherit)
+        return 1;
+
+    /*
+     * If not a list, or if empty list, it's broken.
+     */
+    if (choice->type != ASIdentifierChoice_asIdsOrRanges ||
+        sk_ASIdOrRange_num(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges) == 0) {
+        X509V3err(X509V3_F_ASIDENTIFIERCHOICE_CANONIZE,
+                  X509V3_R_EXTENSION_VALUE_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * We have a non-empty list.  Sort it.
+     */
+    sk_ASIdOrRange_sort(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges);
+
+    /*
+     * Now check for errors and suboptimal encoding, rejecting the
+     * former and fixing the latter.
+     */
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_ASIdOrRange_num(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges) - 1; i++) {
+        ASIdOrRange *a = sk_ASIdOrRange_value(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges, i);
+        ASIdOrRange *b = sk_ASIdOrRange_value(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges, i + 1);
+        ASN1_INTEGER *a_min = NULL, *a_max = NULL, *b_min = NULL, *b_max =
+            NULL;
+
+        extract_min_max(a, &a_min, &a_max);
+        extract_min_max(b, &b_min, &b_max);
+
+        /*
+         * Make sure we're properly sorted (paranoia).
+         */
+        OPENSSL_assert(ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(a_min, b_min) <= 0);
+
+        /*
+         * Punt inverted ranges.
+         */
+        if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(a_min, a_max) > 0 ||
+            ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(b_min, b_max) > 0)
+            goto done;
+
+        /*
+         * Check for overlaps.
+         */
+        if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(a_max, b_min) >= 0) {
+            X509V3err(X509V3_F_ASIDENTIFIERCHOICE_CANONIZE,
+                      X509V3_R_EXTENSION_VALUE_ERROR);
+            goto done;
+        }
+
+        /*
+         * Calculate a_max + 1 to check for adjacency.
+         */
+        if ((bn == NULL && (bn = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
+            ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(a_max, bn) == NULL ||
+            !BN_add_word(bn, 1) ||
+            (a_max_plus_one =
+             BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(bn, a_max_plus_one)) == NULL) {
+            X509V3err(X509V3_F_ASIDENTIFIERCHOICE_CANONIZE,
+                      ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto done;
+        }
+
+        /*
+         * If a and b are adjacent, merge them.
+         */
+        if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(a_max_plus_one, b_min) == 0) {
+            ASRange *r;
+            switch (a->type) {
+            case ASIdOrRange_id:
+                if ((r = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*r))) == NULL) {
+                    X509V3err(X509V3_F_ASIDENTIFIERCHOICE_CANONIZE,
+                              ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                    goto done;
+                }
+                r->min = a_min;
+                r->max = b_max;
+                a->type = ASIdOrRange_range;
+                a->u.range = r;
+                break;
+            case ASIdOrRange_range:
+                ASN1_INTEGER_free(a->u.range->max);
+                a->u.range->max = b_max;
+                break;
+            }
+            switch (b->type) {
+            case ASIdOrRange_id:
+                b->u.id = NULL;
+                break;
+            case ASIdOrRange_range:
+                b->u.range->max = NULL;
+                break;
+            }
+            ASIdOrRange_free(b);
+            (void)sk_ASIdOrRange_delete(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges, i + 1);
+            i--;
+            continue;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Check for final inverted range.
+     */
+    i = sk_ASIdOrRange_num(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges) - 1;
+    {
+        ASIdOrRange *a = sk_ASIdOrRange_value(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges, i);
+        ASN1_INTEGER *a_min, *a_max;
+        if (a != NULL && a->type == ASIdOrRange_range) {
+            extract_min_max(a, &a_min, &a_max);
+            if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(a_min, a_max) > 0)
+                goto done;
+        }
+    }
+
+    OPENSSL_assert(ASIdentifierChoice_is_canonical(choice)); /* Paranoia */
+
+    ret = 1;
+
+ done:
+    ASN1_INTEGER_free(a_max_plus_one);
+    BN_free(bn);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Whack an ASIdentifier extension into canonical form.
+ */
+int X509v3_asid_canonize(ASIdentifiers *asid)
+{
+    return (asid == NULL ||
+            (ASIdentifierChoice_canonize(asid->asnum) &&
+             ASIdentifierChoice_canonize(asid->rdi)));
+}
+
+/*
+ * v2i method for an ASIdentifier extension.
+ */
+static void *v2i_ASIdentifiers(const struct v3_ext_method *method,
+                               struct v3_ext_ctx *ctx,
+                               STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *values)
+{
+    ASN1_INTEGER *min = NULL, *max = NULL;
+    ASIdentifiers *asid = NULL;
+    int i;
+
+    if ((asid = ASIdentifiers_new()) == NULL) {
+        X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_ASIDENTIFIERS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(values); i++) {
+        CONF_VALUE *val = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(values, i);
+        int i1 = 0, i2 = 0, i3 = 0, is_range = 0, which = 0;
+
+        /*
+         * Figure out whether this is an AS or an RDI.
+         */
+        if (!name_cmp(val->name, "AS")) {
+            which = V3_ASID_ASNUM;
+        } else if (!name_cmp(val->name, "RDI")) {
+            which = V3_ASID_RDI;
+        } else {
+            X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_ASIDENTIFIERS,
+                      X509V3_R_EXTENSION_NAME_ERROR);
+            X509V3_conf_err(val);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        /*
+         * Handle inheritance.
+         */
+        if (strcmp(val->value, "inherit") == 0) {
+            if (X509v3_asid_add_inherit(asid, which))
+                continue;
+            X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_ASIDENTIFIERS,
+                      X509V3_R_INVALID_INHERITANCE);
+            X509V3_conf_err(val);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        /*
+         * Number, range, or mistake, pick it apart and figure out which.
+         */
+        i1 = strspn(val->value, "0123456789");
+        if (val->value[i1] == '\0') {
+            is_range = 0;
+        } else {
+            is_range = 1;
+            i2 = i1 + strspn(val->value + i1, " \t");
+            if (val->value[i2] != '-') {
+                X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_ASIDENTIFIERS,
+                          X509V3_R_INVALID_ASNUMBER);
+                X509V3_conf_err(val);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            i2++;
+            i2 = i2 + strspn(val->value + i2, " \t");
+            i3 = i2 + strspn(val->value + i2, "0123456789");
+            if (val->value[i3] != '\0') {
+                X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_ASIDENTIFIERS,
+                          X509V3_R_INVALID_ASRANGE);
+                X509V3_conf_err(val);
+                goto err;
+            }
+        }
+
+        /*
+         * Syntax is ok, read and add it.
+         */
+        if (!is_range) {
+            if (!X509V3_get_value_int(val, &min)) {
+                X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_ASIDENTIFIERS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                goto err;
+            }
+        } else {
+            char *s = OPENSSL_strdup(val->value);
+            if (s == NULL) {
+                X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_ASIDENTIFIERS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            s[i1] = '\0';
+            min = s2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, s);
+            max = s2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, s + i2);
+            OPENSSL_free(s);
+            if (min == NULL || max == NULL) {
+                X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_ASIDENTIFIERS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(min, max) > 0) {
+                X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_ASIDENTIFIERS,
+                          X509V3_R_EXTENSION_VALUE_ERROR);
+                goto err;
+            }
+        }
+        if (!X509v3_asid_add_id_or_range(asid, which, min, max)) {
+            X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_ASIDENTIFIERS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        min = max = NULL;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Canonize the result, then we're done.
+     */
+    if (!X509v3_asid_canonize(asid))
+        goto err;
+    return asid;
+
+ err:
+    ASIdentifiers_free(asid);
+    ASN1_INTEGER_free(min);
+    ASN1_INTEGER_free(max);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * OpenSSL dispatch.
+ */
+const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_asid = {
+    NID_sbgp_autonomousSysNum,  /* nid */
+    0,                          /* flags */
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASIdentifiers), /* template */
+    0, 0, 0, 0,                 /* old functions, ignored */
+    0,                          /* i2s */
+    0,                          /* s2i */
+    0,                          /* i2v */
+    v2i_ASIdentifiers,          /* v2i */
+    i2r_ASIdentifiers,          /* i2r */
+    0,                          /* r2i */
+    NULL                        /* extension-specific data */
+};
+
+/*
+ * Figure out whether extension uses inheritance.
+ */
+int X509v3_asid_inherits(ASIdentifiers *asid)
+{
+    return (asid != NULL &&
+            ((asid->asnum != NULL &&
+              asid->asnum->type == ASIdentifierChoice_inherit) ||
+             (asid->rdi != NULL &&
+              asid->rdi->type == ASIdentifierChoice_inherit)));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Figure out whether parent contains child.
+ */
+static int asid_contains(ASIdOrRanges *parent, ASIdOrRanges *child)
+{
+    ASN1_INTEGER *p_min = NULL, *p_max = NULL, *c_min = NULL, *c_max = NULL;
+    int p, c;
+
+    if (child == NULL || parent == child)
+        return 1;
+    if (parent == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    p = 0;
+    for (c = 0; c < sk_ASIdOrRange_num(child); c++) {
+        extract_min_max(sk_ASIdOrRange_value(child, c), &c_min, &c_max);
+        for (;; p++) {
+            if (p >= sk_ASIdOrRange_num(parent))
+                return 0;
+            extract_min_max(sk_ASIdOrRange_value(parent, p), &p_min, &p_max);
+            if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(p_max, c_max) < 0)
+                continue;
+            if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(p_min, c_min) > 0)
+                return 0;
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Test whether a is a subset of b.
+ */
+int X509v3_asid_subset(ASIdentifiers *a, ASIdentifiers *b)
+{
+    return (a == NULL ||
+            a == b ||
+            (b != NULL &&
+             !X509v3_asid_inherits(a) &&
+             !X509v3_asid_inherits(b) &&
+             asid_contains(b->asnum->u.asIdsOrRanges,
+                           a->asnum->u.asIdsOrRanges) &&
+             asid_contains(b->rdi->u.asIdsOrRanges,
+                           a->rdi->u.asIdsOrRanges)));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Validation error handling via callback.
+ */
+#define validation_err(_err_)           \
+  do {                                  \
+    if (ctx != NULL) {                  \
+      ctx->error = _err_;               \
+      ctx->error_depth = i;             \
+      ctx->current_cert = x;            \
+      ret = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);     \
+    } else {                            \
+      ret = 0;                          \
+    }                                   \
+    if (!ret)                           \
+      goto done;                        \
+  } while (0)
+
+/*
+ * Core code for RFC 3779 3.3 path validation.
+ */
+static int asid_validate_path_internal(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
+                                       STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
+                                       ASIdentifiers *ext)
+{
+    ASIdOrRanges *child_as = NULL, *child_rdi = NULL;
+    int i, ret = 1, inherit_as = 0, inherit_rdi = 0;
+    X509 *x;
+
+    OPENSSL_assert(chain != NULL && sk_X509_num(chain) > 0);
+    OPENSSL_assert(ctx != NULL || ext != NULL);
+    OPENSSL_assert(ctx == NULL || ctx->verify_cb != NULL);
+
+    /*
+     * Figure out where to start.  If we don't have an extension to
+     * check, we're done.  Otherwise, check canonical form and
+     * set up for walking up the chain.
+     */
+    if (ext != NULL) {
+        i = -1;
+        x = NULL;
+    } else {
+        i = 0;
+        x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
+        OPENSSL_assert(x != NULL);
+        if ((ext = x->rfc3779_asid) == NULL)
+            goto done;
+    }
+    if (!X509v3_asid_is_canonical(ext))
+        validation_err(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION);
+    if (ext->asnum != NULL) {
+        switch (ext->asnum->type) {
+        case ASIdentifierChoice_inherit:
+            inherit_as = 1;
+            break;
+        case ASIdentifierChoice_asIdsOrRanges:
+            child_as = ext->asnum->u.asIdsOrRanges;
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    if (ext->rdi != NULL) {
+        switch (ext->rdi->type) {
+        case ASIdentifierChoice_inherit:
+            inherit_rdi = 1;
+            break;
+        case ASIdentifierChoice_asIdsOrRanges:
+            child_rdi = ext->rdi->u.asIdsOrRanges;
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Now walk up the chain.  Extensions must be in canonical form, no
+     * cert may list resources that its parent doesn't list.
+     */
+    for (i++; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
+        x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
+        OPENSSL_assert(x != NULL);
+        if (x->rfc3779_asid == NULL) {
+            if (child_as != NULL || child_rdi != NULL)
+                validation_err(X509_V_ERR_UNNESTED_RESOURCE);
+            continue;
+        }
+        if (!X509v3_asid_is_canonical(x->rfc3779_asid))
+            validation_err(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION);
+        if (x->rfc3779_asid->asnum == NULL && child_as != NULL) {
+            validation_err(X509_V_ERR_UNNESTED_RESOURCE);
+            child_as = NULL;
+            inherit_as = 0;
+        }
+        if (x->rfc3779_asid->asnum != NULL &&
+            x->rfc3779_asid->asnum->type ==
+            ASIdentifierChoice_asIdsOrRanges) {
+            if (inherit_as
+                || asid_contains(x->rfc3779_asid->asnum->u.asIdsOrRanges,
+                                 child_as)) {
+                child_as = x->rfc3779_asid->asnum->u.asIdsOrRanges;
+                inherit_as = 0;
+            } else {
+                validation_err(X509_V_ERR_UNNESTED_RESOURCE);
+            }
+        }
+        if (x->rfc3779_asid->rdi == NULL && child_rdi != NULL) {
+            validation_err(X509_V_ERR_UNNESTED_RESOURCE);
+            child_rdi = NULL;
+            inherit_rdi = 0;
+        }
+        if (x->rfc3779_asid->rdi != NULL &&
+            x->rfc3779_asid->rdi->type == ASIdentifierChoice_asIdsOrRanges) {
+            if (inherit_rdi ||
+                asid_contains(x->rfc3779_asid->rdi->u.asIdsOrRanges,
+                              child_rdi)) {
+                child_rdi = x->rfc3779_asid->rdi->u.asIdsOrRanges;
+                inherit_rdi = 0;
+            } else {
+                validation_err(X509_V_ERR_UNNESTED_RESOURCE);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Trust anchor can't inherit.
+     */
+    OPENSSL_assert(x != NULL);
+    if (x->rfc3779_asid != NULL) {
+        if (x->rfc3779_asid->asnum != NULL &&
+            x->rfc3779_asid->asnum->type == ASIdentifierChoice_inherit)
+            validation_err(X509_V_ERR_UNNESTED_RESOURCE);
+        if (x->rfc3779_asid->rdi != NULL &&
+            x->rfc3779_asid->rdi->type == ASIdentifierChoice_inherit)
+            validation_err(X509_V_ERR_UNNESTED_RESOURCE);
+    }
+
+ done:
+    return ret;
+}
+
+#undef validation_err
+
+/*
+ * RFC 3779 3.3 path validation -- called from X509_verify_cert().
+ */
+int X509v3_asid_validate_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return asid_validate_path_internal(ctx, ctx->chain, NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * RFC 3779 3.3 path validation of an extension.
+ * Test whether chain covers extension.
+ */
+int X509v3_asid_validate_resource_set(STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
+                                      ASIdentifiers *ext, int allow_inheritance)
+{
+    if (ext == NULL)
+        return 1;
+    if (chain == NULL || sk_X509_num(chain) == 0)
+        return 0;
+    if (!allow_inheritance && X509v3_asid_inherits(ext))
+        return 0;
+    return asid_validate_path_internal(NULL, chain, ext);
+}
+
+#endif                          /* OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 */
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_bcons.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_bcons.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3bbf155
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_bcons.c
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/conf.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include "ext_dat.h"
+
+static STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *i2v_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
+                                                   BASIC_CONSTRAINTS *bcons,
+                                                   STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE)
+                                                   *extlist);
+static BASIC_CONSTRAINTS *v2i_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
+                                                X509V3_CTX *ctx,
+                                                STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *values);
+
+const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_bcons = {
+    NID_basic_constraints, 0,
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(BASIC_CONSTRAINTS),
+    0, 0, 0, 0,
+    0, 0,
+    (X509V3_EXT_I2V) i2v_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS,
+    (X509V3_EXT_V2I)v2i_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS,
+    NULL, NULL,
+    NULL
+};
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(BASIC_CONSTRAINTS) = {
+        ASN1_OPT(BASIC_CONSTRAINTS, ca, ASN1_FBOOLEAN),
+        ASN1_OPT(BASIC_CONSTRAINTS, pathlen, ASN1_INTEGER)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(BASIC_CONSTRAINTS)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(BASIC_CONSTRAINTS)
+
+static STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *i2v_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
+                                                   BASIC_CONSTRAINTS *bcons,
+                                                   STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE)
+                                                   *extlist)
+{
+    X509V3_add_value_bool("CA", bcons->ca, &extlist);
+    X509V3_add_value_int("pathlen", bcons->pathlen, &extlist);
+    return extlist;
+}
+
+static BASIC_CONSTRAINTS *v2i_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
+                                                X509V3_CTX *ctx,
+                                                STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *values)
+{
+    BASIC_CONSTRAINTS *bcons = NULL;
+    CONF_VALUE *val;
+    int i;
+
+    if ((bcons = BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_new()) == NULL) {
+        X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(values); i++) {
+        val = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(values, i);
+        if (strcmp(val->name, "CA") == 0) {
+            if (!X509V3_get_value_bool(val, &bcons->ca))
+                goto err;
+        } else if (strcmp(val->name, "pathlen") == 0) {
+            if (!X509V3_get_value_int(val, &bcons->pathlen))
+                goto err;
+        } else {
+            X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS, X509V3_R_INVALID_NAME);
+            X509V3_conf_err(val);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+    return bcons;
+ err:
+    BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_free(bcons);
+    return NULL;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_bitst.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_bitst.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4802116
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_bitst.c
@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/conf.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include "ext_dat.h"
+
+static BIT_STRING_BITNAME ns_cert_type_table[] = {
+    {0, "SSL Client", "client"},
+    {1, "SSL Server", "server"},
+    {2, "S/MIME", "email"},
+    {3, "Object Signing", "objsign"},
+    {4, "Unused", "reserved"},
+    {5, "SSL CA", "sslCA"},
+    {6, "S/MIME CA", "emailCA"},
+    {7, "Object Signing CA", "objCA"},
+    {-1, NULL, NULL}
+};
+
+static BIT_STRING_BITNAME key_usage_type_table[] = {
+    {0, "Digital Signature", "digitalSignature"},
+    {1, "Non Repudiation", "nonRepudiation"},
+    {2, "Key Encipherment", "keyEncipherment"},
+    {3, "Data Encipherment", "dataEncipherment"},
+    {4, "Key Agreement", "keyAgreement"},
+    {5, "Certificate Sign", "keyCertSign"},
+    {6, "CRL Sign", "cRLSign"},
+    {7, "Encipher Only", "encipherOnly"},
+    {8, "Decipher Only", "decipherOnly"},
+    {-1, NULL, NULL}
+};
+
+const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_nscert =
+EXT_BITSTRING(NID_netscape_cert_type, ns_cert_type_table);
+const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_key_usage =
+EXT_BITSTRING(NID_key_usage, key_usage_type_table);
+
+STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *i2v_ASN1_BIT_STRING(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
+                                          ASN1_BIT_STRING *bits,
+                                          STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *ret)
+{
+    BIT_STRING_BITNAME *bnam;
+    for (bnam = method->usr_data; bnam->lname; bnam++) {
+        if (ASN1_BIT_STRING_get_bit(bits, bnam->bitnum))
+            X509V3_add_value(bnam->lname, NULL, &ret);
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+ASN1_BIT_STRING *v2i_ASN1_BIT_STRING(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
+                                     X509V3_CTX *ctx,
+                                     STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nval)
+{
+    CONF_VALUE *val;
+    ASN1_BIT_STRING *bs;
+    int i;
+    BIT_STRING_BITNAME *bnam;
+    if ((bs = ASN1_BIT_STRING_new()) == NULL) {
+        X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_ASN1_BIT_STRING, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(nval); i++) {
+        val = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(nval, i);
+        for (bnam = method->usr_data; bnam->lname; bnam++) {
+            if (strcmp(bnam->sname, val->name) == 0
+                || strcmp(bnam->lname, val->name) == 0) {
+                if (!ASN1_BIT_STRING_set_bit(bs, bnam->bitnum, 1)) {
+                    X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_ASN1_BIT_STRING,
+                              ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                    ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(bs);
+                    return NULL;
+                }
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+        if (!bnam->lname) {
+            X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_ASN1_BIT_STRING,
+                      X509V3_R_UNKNOWN_BIT_STRING_ARGUMENT);
+            X509V3_conf_err(val);
+            ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(bs);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+    }
+    return bs;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_conf.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_conf.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3cc5b14
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_conf.c
@@ -0,0 +1,511 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* extension creation utilities */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/conf.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include "internal/x509_int.h"
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+
+static int v3_check_critical(const char **value);
+static int v3_check_generic(const char **value);
+static X509_EXTENSION *do_ext_nconf(CONF *conf, X509V3_CTX *ctx, int ext_nid,
+                                    int crit, const char *value);
+static X509_EXTENSION *v3_generic_extension(const char *ext, const char *value,
+                                            int crit, int type,
+                                            X509V3_CTX *ctx);
+static char *conf_lhash_get_string(void *db, const char *section, const char *value);
+static STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *conf_lhash_get_section(void *db, const char *section);
+static X509_EXTENSION *do_ext_i2d(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
+                                  int ext_nid, int crit, void *ext_struc);
+static unsigned char *generic_asn1(const char *value, X509V3_CTX *ctx,
+                                   long *ext_len);
+/* CONF *conf:  Config file    */
+/* char *name:  Name    */
+/* char *value:  Value    */
+X509_EXTENSION *X509V3_EXT_nconf(CONF *conf, X509V3_CTX *ctx, const char *name,
+                                 const char *value)
+{
+    int crit;
+    int ext_type;
+    X509_EXTENSION *ret;
+    crit = v3_check_critical(&value);
+    if ((ext_type = v3_check_generic(&value)))
+        return v3_generic_extension(name, value, crit, ext_type, ctx);
+    ret = do_ext_nconf(conf, ctx, OBJ_sn2nid(name), crit, value);
+    if (!ret) {
+        X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509V3_EXT_NCONF, X509V3_R_ERROR_IN_EXTENSION);
+        ERR_add_error_data(4, "name=", name, ", value=", value);
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/* CONF *conf:  Config file    */
+/* char *value:  Value    */
+X509_EXTENSION *X509V3_EXT_nconf_nid(CONF *conf, X509V3_CTX *ctx, int ext_nid,
+                                     const char *value)
+{
+    int crit;
+    int ext_type;
+    crit = v3_check_critical(&value);
+    if ((ext_type = v3_check_generic(&value)))
+        return v3_generic_extension(OBJ_nid2sn(ext_nid),
+                                    value, crit, ext_type, ctx);
+    return do_ext_nconf(conf, ctx, ext_nid, crit, value);
+}
+
+/* CONF *conf:  Config file    */
+/* char *value:  Value    */
+static X509_EXTENSION *do_ext_nconf(CONF *conf, X509V3_CTX *ctx, int ext_nid,
+                                    int crit, const char *value)
+{
+    const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method;
+    X509_EXTENSION *ext;
+    STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nval;
+    void *ext_struc;
+
+    if (ext_nid == NID_undef) {
+        X509V3err(X509V3_F_DO_EXT_NCONF, X509V3_R_UNKNOWN_EXTENSION_NAME);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    if ((method = X509V3_EXT_get_nid(ext_nid)) == NULL) {
+        X509V3err(X509V3_F_DO_EXT_NCONF, X509V3_R_UNKNOWN_EXTENSION);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    /* Now get internal extension representation based on type */
+    if (method->v2i) {
+        if (*value == '@')
+            nval = NCONF_get_section(conf, value + 1);
+        else
+            nval = X509V3_parse_list(value);
+        if (nval == NULL || sk_CONF_VALUE_num(nval) <= 0) {
+            X509V3err(X509V3_F_DO_EXT_NCONF,
+                      X509V3_R_INVALID_EXTENSION_STRING);
+            ERR_add_error_data(4, "name=", OBJ_nid2sn(ext_nid), ",section=",
+                               value);
+            if (*value != '@')
+                sk_CONF_VALUE_pop_free(nval, X509V3_conf_free);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+        ext_struc = method->v2i(method, ctx, nval);
+        if (*value != '@')
+            sk_CONF_VALUE_pop_free(nval, X509V3_conf_free);
+        if (!ext_struc)
+            return NULL;
+    } else if (method->s2i) {
+        if ((ext_struc = method->s2i(method, ctx, value)) == NULL)
+            return NULL;
+    } else if (method->r2i) {
+        if (!ctx->db || !ctx->db_meth) {
+            X509V3err(X509V3_F_DO_EXT_NCONF, X509V3_R_NO_CONFIG_DATABASE);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+        if ((ext_struc = method->r2i(method, ctx, value)) == NULL)
+            return NULL;
+    } else {
+        X509V3err(X509V3_F_DO_EXT_NCONF,
+                  X509V3_R_EXTENSION_SETTING_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+        ERR_add_error_data(2, "name=", OBJ_nid2sn(ext_nid));
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    ext = do_ext_i2d(method, ext_nid, crit, ext_struc);
+    if (method->it)
+        ASN1_item_free(ext_struc, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(method->it));
+    else
+        method->ext_free(ext_struc);
+    return ext;
+
+}
+
+static X509_EXTENSION *do_ext_i2d(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
+                                  int ext_nid, int crit, void *ext_struc)
+{
+    unsigned char *ext_der = NULL;
+    int ext_len;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ext_oct = NULL;
+    X509_EXTENSION *ext;
+    /* Convert internal representation to DER */
+    if (method->it) {
+        ext_der = NULL;
+        ext_len =
+            ASN1_item_i2d(ext_struc, &ext_der, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(method->it));
+        if (ext_len < 0)
+            goto merr;
+    } else {
+        unsigned char *p;
+
+        ext_len = method->i2d(ext_struc, NULL);
+        if ((ext_der = OPENSSL_malloc(ext_len)) == NULL)
+            goto merr;
+        p = ext_der;
+        method->i2d(ext_struc, &p);
+    }
+    if ((ext_oct = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new()) == NULL)
+        goto merr;
+    ext_oct->data = ext_der;
+    ext_der = NULL;
+    ext_oct->length = ext_len;
+
+    ext = X509_EXTENSION_create_by_NID(NULL, ext_nid, crit, ext_oct);
+    if (!ext)
+        goto merr;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(ext_oct);
+
+    return ext;
+
+ merr:
+    X509V3err(X509V3_F_DO_EXT_I2D, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    OPENSSL_free(ext_der);
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(ext_oct);
+    return NULL;
+
+}
+
+/* Given an internal structure, nid and critical flag create an extension */
+
+X509_EXTENSION *X509V3_EXT_i2d(int ext_nid, int crit, void *ext_struc)
+{
+    const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method;
+
+    if ((method = X509V3_EXT_get_nid(ext_nid)) == NULL) {
+        X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509V3_EXT_I2D, X509V3_R_UNKNOWN_EXTENSION);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    return do_ext_i2d(method, ext_nid, crit, ext_struc);
+}
+
+/* Check the extension string for critical flag */
+static int v3_check_critical(const char **value)
+{
+    const char *p = *value;
+    if ((strlen(p) < 9) || strncmp(p, "critical,", 9))
+        return 0;
+    p += 9;
+    while (isspace((unsigned char)*p))
+        p++;
+    *value = p;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Check extension string for generic extension and return the type */
+static int v3_check_generic(const char **value)
+{
+    int gen_type = 0;
+    const char *p = *value;
+    if ((strlen(p) >= 4) && strncmp(p, "DER:", 4) == 0) {
+        p += 4;
+        gen_type = 1;
+    } else if ((strlen(p) >= 5) && strncmp(p, "ASN1:", 5) == 0) {
+        p += 5;
+        gen_type = 2;
+    } else
+        return 0;
+
+    while (isspace((unsigned char)*p))
+        p++;
+    *value = p;
+    return gen_type;
+}
+
+/* Create a generic extension: for now just handle DER type */
+static X509_EXTENSION *v3_generic_extension(const char *ext, const char *value,
+                                            int crit, int gen_type,
+                                            X509V3_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    unsigned char *ext_der = NULL;
+    long ext_len = 0;
+    ASN1_OBJECT *obj = NULL;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *oct = NULL;
+    X509_EXTENSION *extension = NULL;
+
+    if ((obj = OBJ_txt2obj(ext, 0)) == NULL) {
+        X509V3err(X509V3_F_V3_GENERIC_EXTENSION,
+                  X509V3_R_EXTENSION_NAME_ERROR);
+        ERR_add_error_data(2, "name=", ext);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (gen_type == 1)
+        ext_der = OPENSSL_hexstr2buf(value, &ext_len);
+    else if (gen_type == 2)
+        ext_der = generic_asn1(value, ctx, &ext_len);
+
+    if (ext_der == NULL) {
+        X509V3err(X509V3_F_V3_GENERIC_EXTENSION,
+                  X509V3_R_EXTENSION_VALUE_ERROR);
+        ERR_add_error_data(2, "value=", value);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if ((oct = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new()) == NULL) {
+        X509V3err(X509V3_F_V3_GENERIC_EXTENSION, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    oct->data = ext_der;
+    oct->length = ext_len;
+    ext_der = NULL;
+
+    extension = X509_EXTENSION_create_by_OBJ(NULL, obj, crit, oct);
+
+ err:
+    ASN1_OBJECT_free(obj);
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(oct);
+    OPENSSL_free(ext_der);
+    return extension;
+
+}
+
+static unsigned char *generic_asn1(const char *value, X509V3_CTX *ctx,
+                                   long *ext_len)
+{
+    ASN1_TYPE *typ;
+    unsigned char *ext_der = NULL;
+    typ = ASN1_generate_v3(value, ctx);
+    if (typ == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    *ext_len = i2d_ASN1_TYPE(typ, &ext_der);
+    ASN1_TYPE_free(typ);
+    return ext_der;
+}
+
+static void delete_ext(STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *sk, X509_EXTENSION *dext)
+{
+    int idx;
+    ASN1_OBJECT *obj;
+    obj = X509_EXTENSION_get_object(dext);
+    while ((idx = X509v3_get_ext_by_OBJ(sk, obj, -1)) >= 0) {
+        X509_EXTENSION *tmpext = X509v3_get_ext(sk, idx);
+        X509v3_delete_ext(sk, idx);
+        X509_EXTENSION_free(tmpext);
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is the main function: add a bunch of extensions based on a config
+ * file section to an extension STACK.
+ */
+
+int X509V3_EXT_add_nconf_sk(CONF *conf, X509V3_CTX *ctx, const char *section,
+                            STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) **sk)
+{
+    X509_EXTENSION *ext;
+    STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nval;
+    CONF_VALUE *val;
+    int i;
+
+    if ((nval = NCONF_get_section(conf, section)) == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(nval); i++) {
+        val = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(nval, i);
+        if ((ext = X509V3_EXT_nconf(conf, ctx, val->name, val->value)) == NULL)
+            return 0;
+        if (ctx->flags == X509V3_CTX_REPLACE)
+            delete_ext(*sk, ext);
+        if (sk != NULL) {
+            if (X509v3_add_ext(sk, ext, -1) == NULL) {
+                X509_EXTENSION_free(ext);
+                return 0;
+            }
+        }
+        X509_EXTENSION_free(ext);
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convenience functions to add extensions to a certificate, CRL and request
+ */
+
+int X509V3_EXT_add_nconf(CONF *conf, X509V3_CTX *ctx, const char *section,
+                         X509 *cert)
+{
+    STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) **sk = NULL;
+    if (cert)
+        sk = &cert->cert_info.extensions;
+    return X509V3_EXT_add_nconf_sk(conf, ctx, section, sk);
+}
+
+/* Same as above but for a CRL */
+
+int X509V3_EXT_CRL_add_nconf(CONF *conf, X509V3_CTX *ctx, const char *section,
+                             X509_CRL *crl)
+{
+    STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) **sk = NULL;
+    if (crl)
+        sk = &crl->crl.extensions;
+    return X509V3_EXT_add_nconf_sk(conf, ctx, section, sk);
+}
+
+/* Add extensions to certificate request */
+
+int X509V3_EXT_REQ_add_nconf(CONF *conf, X509V3_CTX *ctx, const char *section,
+                             X509_REQ *req)
+{
+    STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *extlist = NULL, **sk = NULL;
+    int i;
+    if (req)
+        sk = &extlist;
+    i = X509V3_EXT_add_nconf_sk(conf, ctx, section, sk);
+    if (!i || !sk)
+        return i;
+    i = X509_REQ_add_extensions(req, extlist);
+    sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(extlist, X509_EXTENSION_free);
+    return i;
+}
+
+/* Config database functions */
+
+char *X509V3_get_string(X509V3_CTX *ctx, const char *name, const char *section)
+{
+    if (!ctx->db || !ctx->db_meth || !ctx->db_meth->get_string) {
+        X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509V3_GET_STRING, X509V3_R_OPERATION_NOT_DEFINED);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    if (ctx->db_meth->get_string)
+        return ctx->db_meth->get_string(ctx->db, name, section);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *X509V3_get_section(X509V3_CTX *ctx, const char *section)
+{
+    if (!ctx->db || !ctx->db_meth || !ctx->db_meth->get_section) {
+        X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509V3_GET_SECTION,
+                  X509V3_R_OPERATION_NOT_DEFINED);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    if (ctx->db_meth->get_section)
+        return ctx->db_meth->get_section(ctx->db, section);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+void X509V3_string_free(X509V3_CTX *ctx, char *str)
+{
+    if (!str)
+        return;
+    if (ctx->db_meth->free_string)
+        ctx->db_meth->free_string(ctx->db, str);
+}
+
+void X509V3_section_free(X509V3_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *section)
+{
+    if (!section)
+        return;
+    if (ctx->db_meth->free_section)
+        ctx->db_meth->free_section(ctx->db, section);
+}
+
+static char *nconf_get_string(void *db, const char *section, const char *value)
+{
+    return NCONF_get_string(db, section, value);
+}
+
+static STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nconf_get_section(void *db, const char *section)
+{
+    return NCONF_get_section(db, section);
+}
+
+static X509V3_CONF_METHOD nconf_method = {
+    nconf_get_string,
+    nconf_get_section,
+    NULL,
+    NULL
+};
+
+void X509V3_set_nconf(X509V3_CTX *ctx, CONF *conf)
+{
+    ctx->db_meth = &nconf_method;
+    ctx->db = conf;
+}
+
+void X509V3_set_ctx(X509V3_CTX *ctx, X509 *issuer, X509 *subj, X509_REQ *req,
+                    X509_CRL *crl, int flags)
+{
+    ctx->issuer_cert = issuer;
+    ctx->subject_cert = subj;
+    ctx->crl = crl;
+    ctx->subject_req = req;
+    ctx->flags = flags;
+}
+
+/* Old conf compatibility functions */
+
+X509_EXTENSION *X509V3_EXT_conf(LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *conf, X509V3_CTX *ctx,
+                                const char *name, const char *value)
+{
+    CONF ctmp;
+    CONF_set_nconf(&ctmp, conf);
+    return X509V3_EXT_nconf(&ctmp, ctx, name, value);
+}
+
+/* LHASH *conf:  Config file    */
+/* char *value:  Value    */
+X509_EXTENSION *X509V3_EXT_conf_nid(LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *conf,
+                                    X509V3_CTX *ctx, int ext_nid, const char *value)
+{
+    CONF ctmp;
+    CONF_set_nconf(&ctmp, conf);
+    return X509V3_EXT_nconf_nid(&ctmp, ctx, ext_nid, value);
+}
+
+static char *conf_lhash_get_string(void *db, const char *section, const char *value)
+{
+    return CONF_get_string(db, section, value);
+}
+
+static STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *conf_lhash_get_section(void *db, const char *section)
+{
+    return CONF_get_section(db, section);
+}
+
+static X509V3_CONF_METHOD conf_lhash_method = {
+    conf_lhash_get_string,
+    conf_lhash_get_section,
+    NULL,
+    NULL
+};
+
+void X509V3_set_conf_lhash(X509V3_CTX *ctx, LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *lhash)
+{
+    ctx->db_meth = &conf_lhash_method;
+    ctx->db = lhash;
+}
+
+int X509V3_EXT_add_conf(LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *conf, X509V3_CTX *ctx,
+                        const char *section, X509 *cert)
+{
+    CONF ctmp;
+    CONF_set_nconf(&ctmp, conf);
+    return X509V3_EXT_add_nconf(&ctmp, ctx, section, cert);
+}
+
+/* Same as above but for a CRL */
+
+int X509V3_EXT_CRL_add_conf(LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *conf, X509V3_CTX *ctx,
+                            const char *section, X509_CRL *crl)
+{
+    CONF ctmp;
+    CONF_set_nconf(&ctmp, conf);
+    return X509V3_EXT_CRL_add_nconf(&ctmp, ctx, section, crl);
+}
+
+/* Add extensions to certificate request */
+
+int X509V3_EXT_REQ_add_conf(LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *conf, X509V3_CTX *ctx,
+                            const char *section, X509_REQ *req)
+{
+    CONF ctmp;
+    CONF_set_nconf(&ctmp, conf);
+    return X509V3_EXT_REQ_add_nconf(&ctmp, ctx, section, req);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_cpols.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_cpols.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..22c56ba
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_cpols.c
@@ -0,0 +1,447 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/conf.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+
+#include "pcy_int.h"
+#include "ext_dat.h"
+
+/* Certificate policies extension support: this one is a bit complex... */
+
+static int i2r_certpol(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, STACK_OF(POLICYINFO) *pol,
+                       BIO *out, int indent);
+static STACK_OF(POLICYINFO) *r2i_certpol(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
+                                         X509V3_CTX *ctx, const char *value);
+static void print_qualifiers(BIO *out, STACK_OF(POLICYQUALINFO) *quals,
+                             int indent);
+static void print_notice(BIO *out, USERNOTICE *notice, int indent);
+static POLICYINFO *policy_section(X509V3_CTX *ctx,
+                                  STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *polstrs, int ia5org);
+static POLICYQUALINFO *notice_section(X509V3_CTX *ctx,
+                                      STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *unot, int ia5org);
+static int nref_nos(STACK_OF(ASN1_INTEGER) *nnums, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nos);
+
+const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_cpols = {
+    NID_certificate_policies, 0, ASN1_ITEM_ref(CERTIFICATEPOLICIES),
+    0, 0, 0, 0,
+    0, 0,
+    0, 0,
+    (X509V3_EXT_I2R)i2r_certpol,
+    (X509V3_EXT_R2I)r2i_certpol,
+    NULL
+};
+
+ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE(CERTIFICATEPOLICIES) =
+        ASN1_EX_TEMPLATE_TYPE(ASN1_TFLG_SEQUENCE_OF, 0, CERTIFICATEPOLICIES, POLICYINFO)
+ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE_END(CERTIFICATEPOLICIES)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(CERTIFICATEPOLICIES)
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(POLICYINFO) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(POLICYINFO, policyid, ASN1_OBJECT),
+        ASN1_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(POLICYINFO, qualifiers, POLICYQUALINFO)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(POLICYINFO)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(POLICYINFO)
+
+ASN1_ADB_TEMPLATE(policydefault) = ASN1_SIMPLE(POLICYQUALINFO, d.other, ASN1_ANY);
+
+ASN1_ADB(POLICYQUALINFO) = {
+        ADB_ENTRY(NID_id_qt_cps, ASN1_SIMPLE(POLICYQUALINFO, d.cpsuri, ASN1_IA5STRING)),
+        ADB_ENTRY(NID_id_qt_unotice, ASN1_SIMPLE(POLICYQUALINFO, d.usernotice, USERNOTICE))
+} ASN1_ADB_END(POLICYQUALINFO, 0, pqualid, 0, &policydefault_tt, NULL);
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(POLICYQUALINFO) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(POLICYQUALINFO, pqualid, ASN1_OBJECT),
+        ASN1_ADB_OBJECT(POLICYQUALINFO)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(POLICYQUALINFO)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(POLICYQUALINFO)
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(USERNOTICE) = {
+        ASN1_OPT(USERNOTICE, noticeref, NOTICEREF),
+        ASN1_OPT(USERNOTICE, exptext, DISPLAYTEXT)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(USERNOTICE)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(USERNOTICE)
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(NOTICEREF) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(NOTICEREF, organization, DISPLAYTEXT),
+        ASN1_SEQUENCE_OF(NOTICEREF, noticenos, ASN1_INTEGER)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(NOTICEREF)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(NOTICEREF)
+
+static STACK_OF(POLICYINFO) *r2i_certpol(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
+                                         X509V3_CTX *ctx, const char *value)
+{
+    STACK_OF(POLICYINFO) *pols = NULL;
+    char *pstr;
+    POLICYINFO *pol;
+    ASN1_OBJECT *pobj;
+    STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *vals;
+    CONF_VALUE *cnf;
+    int i, ia5org;
+    pols = sk_POLICYINFO_new_null();
+    if (pols == NULL) {
+        X509V3err(X509V3_F_R2I_CERTPOL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    vals = X509V3_parse_list(value);
+    if (vals == NULL) {
+        X509V3err(X509V3_F_R2I_CERTPOL, ERR_R_X509V3_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    ia5org = 0;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(vals); i++) {
+        cnf = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(vals, i);
+        if (cnf->value || !cnf->name) {
+            X509V3err(X509V3_F_R2I_CERTPOL,
+                      X509V3_R_INVALID_POLICY_IDENTIFIER);
+            X509V3_conf_err(cnf);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        pstr = cnf->name;
+        if (strcmp(pstr, "ia5org") == 0) {
+            ia5org = 1;
+            continue;
+        } else if (*pstr == '@') {
+            STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *polsect;
+            polsect = X509V3_get_section(ctx, pstr + 1);
+            if (!polsect) {
+                X509V3err(X509V3_F_R2I_CERTPOL, X509V3_R_INVALID_SECTION);
+
+                X509V3_conf_err(cnf);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            pol = policy_section(ctx, polsect, ia5org);
+            X509V3_section_free(ctx, polsect);
+            if (pol == NULL)
+                goto err;
+        } else {
+            if ((pobj = OBJ_txt2obj(cnf->name, 0)) == NULL) {
+                X509V3err(X509V3_F_R2I_CERTPOL,
+                          X509V3_R_INVALID_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER);
+                X509V3_conf_err(cnf);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            pol = POLICYINFO_new();
+            if (pol == NULL) {
+                X509V3err(X509V3_F_R2I_CERTPOL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                ASN1_OBJECT_free(pobj);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            pol->policyid = pobj;
+        }
+        if (!sk_POLICYINFO_push(pols, pol)) {
+            POLICYINFO_free(pol);
+            X509V3err(X509V3_F_R2I_CERTPOL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+    sk_CONF_VALUE_pop_free(vals, X509V3_conf_free);
+    return pols;
+ err:
+    sk_CONF_VALUE_pop_free(vals, X509V3_conf_free);
+    sk_POLICYINFO_pop_free(pols, POLICYINFO_free);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+static POLICYINFO *policy_section(X509V3_CTX *ctx,
+                                  STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *polstrs, int ia5org)
+{
+    int i;
+    CONF_VALUE *cnf;
+    POLICYINFO *pol;
+    POLICYQUALINFO *qual;
+
+    if ((pol = POLICYINFO_new()) == NULL)
+        goto merr;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(polstrs); i++) {
+        cnf = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(polstrs, i);
+        if (strcmp(cnf->name, "policyIdentifier") == 0) {
+            ASN1_OBJECT *pobj;
+            if ((pobj = OBJ_txt2obj(cnf->value, 0)) == NULL) {
+                X509V3err(X509V3_F_POLICY_SECTION,
+                          X509V3_R_INVALID_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER);
+                X509V3_conf_err(cnf);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            pol->policyid = pobj;
+
+        } else if (!name_cmp(cnf->name, "CPS")) {
+            if (pol->qualifiers == NULL)
+                pol->qualifiers = sk_POLICYQUALINFO_new_null();
+            if ((qual = POLICYQUALINFO_new()) == NULL)
+                goto merr;
+            if (!sk_POLICYQUALINFO_push(pol->qualifiers, qual))
+                goto merr;
+            if ((qual->pqualid = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_id_qt_cps)) == NULL) {
+                X509V3err(X509V3_F_POLICY_SECTION, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            if ((qual->d.cpsuri = ASN1_IA5STRING_new()) == NULL)
+                goto merr;
+            if (!ASN1_STRING_set(qual->d.cpsuri, cnf->value,
+                                 strlen(cnf->value)))
+                goto merr;
+        } else if (!name_cmp(cnf->name, "userNotice")) {
+            STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *unot;
+            if (*cnf->value != '@') {
+                X509V3err(X509V3_F_POLICY_SECTION,
+                          X509V3_R_EXPECTED_A_SECTION_NAME);
+                X509V3_conf_err(cnf);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            unot = X509V3_get_section(ctx, cnf->value + 1);
+            if (!unot) {
+                X509V3err(X509V3_F_POLICY_SECTION, X509V3_R_INVALID_SECTION);
+
+                X509V3_conf_err(cnf);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            qual = notice_section(ctx, unot, ia5org);
+            X509V3_section_free(ctx, unot);
+            if (!qual)
+                goto err;
+            if (!pol->qualifiers)
+                pol->qualifiers = sk_POLICYQUALINFO_new_null();
+            if (!sk_POLICYQUALINFO_push(pol->qualifiers, qual))
+                goto merr;
+        } else {
+            X509V3err(X509V3_F_POLICY_SECTION, X509V3_R_INVALID_OPTION);
+
+            X509V3_conf_err(cnf);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+    if (!pol->policyid) {
+        X509V3err(X509V3_F_POLICY_SECTION, X509V3_R_NO_POLICY_IDENTIFIER);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    return pol;
+
+ merr:
+    X509V3err(X509V3_F_POLICY_SECTION, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+
+ err:
+    POLICYINFO_free(pol);
+    return NULL;
+
+}
+
+static POLICYQUALINFO *notice_section(X509V3_CTX *ctx,
+                                      STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *unot, int ia5org)
+{
+    int i, ret;
+    CONF_VALUE *cnf;
+    USERNOTICE *not;
+    POLICYQUALINFO *qual;
+
+    if ((qual = POLICYQUALINFO_new()) == NULL)
+        goto merr;
+    if ((qual->pqualid = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_id_qt_unotice)) == NULL) {
+        X509V3err(X509V3_F_NOTICE_SECTION, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if ((not = USERNOTICE_new()) == NULL)
+        goto merr;
+    qual->d.usernotice = not;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(unot); i++) {
+        cnf = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(unot, i);
+        if (strcmp(cnf->name, "explicitText") == 0) {
+            if ((not->exptext = ASN1_VISIBLESTRING_new()) == NULL)
+                goto merr;
+            if (!ASN1_STRING_set(not->exptext, cnf->value,
+                                 strlen(cnf->value)))
+                goto merr;
+        } else if (strcmp(cnf->name, "organization") == 0) {
+            NOTICEREF *nref;
+            if (!not->noticeref) {
+                if ((nref = NOTICEREF_new()) == NULL)
+                    goto merr;
+                not->noticeref = nref;
+            } else
+                nref = not->noticeref;
+            if (ia5org)
+                nref->organization->type = V_ASN1_IA5STRING;
+            else
+                nref->organization->type = V_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING;
+            if (!ASN1_STRING_set(nref->organization, cnf->value,
+                                 strlen(cnf->value)))
+                goto merr;
+        } else if (strcmp(cnf->name, "noticeNumbers") == 0) {
+            NOTICEREF *nref;
+            STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nos;
+            if (!not->noticeref) {
+                if ((nref = NOTICEREF_new()) == NULL)
+                    goto merr;
+                not->noticeref = nref;
+            } else
+                nref = not->noticeref;
+            nos = X509V3_parse_list(cnf->value);
+            if (!nos || !sk_CONF_VALUE_num(nos)) {
+                X509V3err(X509V3_F_NOTICE_SECTION, X509V3_R_INVALID_NUMBERS);
+                X509V3_conf_err(cnf);
+                sk_CONF_VALUE_pop_free(nos, X509V3_conf_free);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            ret = nref_nos(nref->noticenos, nos);
+            sk_CONF_VALUE_pop_free(nos, X509V3_conf_free);
+            if (!ret)
+                goto err;
+        } else {
+            X509V3err(X509V3_F_NOTICE_SECTION, X509V3_R_INVALID_OPTION);
+            X509V3_conf_err(cnf);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (not->noticeref &&
+        (!not->noticeref->noticenos || !not->noticeref->organization)) {
+        X509V3err(X509V3_F_NOTICE_SECTION,
+                  X509V3_R_NEED_ORGANIZATION_AND_NUMBERS);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    return qual;
+
+ merr:
+    X509V3err(X509V3_F_NOTICE_SECTION, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+
+ err:
+    POLICYQUALINFO_free(qual);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+static int nref_nos(STACK_OF(ASN1_INTEGER) *nnums, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nos)
+{
+    CONF_VALUE *cnf;
+    ASN1_INTEGER *aint;
+
+    int i;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(nos); i++) {
+        cnf = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(nos, i);
+        if ((aint = s2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, cnf->name)) == NULL) {
+            X509V3err(X509V3_F_NREF_NOS, X509V3_R_INVALID_NUMBER);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (!sk_ASN1_INTEGER_push(nnums, aint))
+            goto merr;
+    }
+    return 1;
+
+ merr:
+    ASN1_INTEGER_free(aint);
+    X509V3err(X509V3_F_NREF_NOS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+
+ err:
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int i2r_certpol(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, STACK_OF(POLICYINFO) *pol,
+                       BIO *out, int indent)
+{
+    int i;
+    POLICYINFO *pinfo;
+    /* First print out the policy OIDs */
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_POLICYINFO_num(pol); i++) {
+        pinfo = sk_POLICYINFO_value(pol, i);
+        BIO_printf(out, "%*sPolicy: ", indent, "");
+        i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(out, pinfo->policyid);
+        BIO_puts(out, "\n");
+        if (pinfo->qualifiers)
+            print_qualifiers(out, pinfo->qualifiers, indent + 2);
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static void print_qualifiers(BIO *out, STACK_OF(POLICYQUALINFO) *quals,
+                             int indent)
+{
+    POLICYQUALINFO *qualinfo;
+    int i;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_POLICYQUALINFO_num(quals); i++) {
+        qualinfo = sk_POLICYQUALINFO_value(quals, i);
+        switch (OBJ_obj2nid(qualinfo->pqualid)) {
+        case NID_id_qt_cps:
+            BIO_printf(out, "%*sCPS: %s\n", indent, "",
+                       qualinfo->d.cpsuri->data);
+            break;
+
+        case NID_id_qt_unotice:
+            BIO_printf(out, "%*sUser Notice:\n", indent, "");
+            print_notice(out, qualinfo->d.usernotice, indent + 2);
+            break;
+
+        default:
+            BIO_printf(out, "%*sUnknown Qualifier: ", indent + 2, "");
+
+            i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(out, qualinfo->pqualid);
+            BIO_puts(out, "\n");
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+static void print_notice(BIO *out, USERNOTICE *notice, int indent)
+{
+    int i;
+    if (notice->noticeref) {
+        NOTICEREF *ref;
+        ref = notice->noticeref;
+        BIO_printf(out, "%*sOrganization: %s\n", indent, "",
+                   ref->organization->data);
+        BIO_printf(out, "%*sNumber%s: ", indent, "",
+                   sk_ASN1_INTEGER_num(ref->noticenos) > 1 ? "s" : "");
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_INTEGER_num(ref->noticenos); i++) {
+            ASN1_INTEGER *num;
+            char *tmp;
+            num = sk_ASN1_INTEGER_value(ref->noticenos, i);
+            if (i)
+                BIO_puts(out, ", ");
+            if (num == NULL)
+                BIO_puts(out, "(null)");
+            else {
+                tmp = i2s_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, num);
+                if (tmp == NULL)
+                    return;
+                BIO_puts(out, tmp);
+                OPENSSL_free(tmp);
+            }
+        }
+        BIO_puts(out, "\n");
+    }
+    if (notice->exptext)
+        BIO_printf(out, "%*sExplicit Text: %s\n", indent, "",
+                   notice->exptext->data);
+}
+
+void X509_POLICY_NODE_print(BIO *out, X509_POLICY_NODE *node, int indent)
+{
+    const X509_POLICY_DATA *dat = node->data;
+
+    BIO_printf(out, "%*sPolicy: ", indent, "");
+
+    i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(out, dat->valid_policy);
+    BIO_puts(out, "\n");
+    BIO_printf(out, "%*s%s\n", indent + 2, "",
+               node_data_critical(dat) ? "Critical" : "Non Critical");
+    if (dat->qualifier_set)
+        print_qualifiers(out, dat->qualifier_set, indent + 2);
+    else
+        BIO_printf(out, "%*sNo Qualifiers\n", indent + 2, "");
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_crld.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_crld.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c4c77f1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_crld.c
@@ -0,0 +1,509 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/conf.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+
+#include "internal/x509_int.h"
+#include "ext_dat.h"
+
+static void *v2i_crld(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
+                      X509V3_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nval);
+static int i2r_crldp(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, void *pcrldp, BIO *out,
+                     int indent);
+
+const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_crld = {
+    NID_crl_distribution_points, 0, ASN1_ITEM_ref(CRL_DIST_POINTS),
+    0, 0, 0, 0,
+    0, 0,
+    0,
+    v2i_crld,
+    i2r_crldp, 0,
+    NULL
+};
+
+const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_freshest_crl = {
+    NID_freshest_crl, 0, ASN1_ITEM_ref(CRL_DIST_POINTS),
+    0, 0, 0, 0,
+    0, 0,
+    0,
+    v2i_crld,
+    i2r_crldp, 0,
+    NULL
+};
+
+static STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *gnames_from_sectname(X509V3_CTX *ctx,
+                                                    char *sect)
+{
+    STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *gnsect;
+    STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *gens;
+    if (*sect == '@')
+        gnsect = X509V3_get_section(ctx, sect + 1);
+    else
+        gnsect = X509V3_parse_list(sect);
+    if (!gnsect) {
+        X509V3err(X509V3_F_GNAMES_FROM_SECTNAME, X509V3_R_SECTION_NOT_FOUND);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    gens = v2i_GENERAL_NAMES(NULL, ctx, gnsect);
+    if (*sect == '@')
+        X509V3_section_free(ctx, gnsect);
+    else
+        sk_CONF_VALUE_pop_free(gnsect, X509V3_conf_free);
+    return gens;
+}
+
+static int set_dist_point_name(DIST_POINT_NAME **pdp, X509V3_CTX *ctx,
+                               CONF_VALUE *cnf)
+{
+    STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *fnm = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(X509_NAME_ENTRY) *rnm = NULL;
+
+    if (strncmp(cnf->name, "fullname", 9) == 0) {
+        fnm = gnames_from_sectname(ctx, cnf->value);
+        if (!fnm)
+            goto err;
+    } else if (strcmp(cnf->name, "relativename") == 0) {
+        int ret;
+        STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *dnsect;
+        X509_NAME *nm;
+        nm = X509_NAME_new();
+        if (nm == NULL)
+            return -1;
+        dnsect = X509V3_get_section(ctx, cnf->value);
+        if (!dnsect) {
+            X509V3err(X509V3_F_SET_DIST_POINT_NAME,
+                      X509V3_R_SECTION_NOT_FOUND);
+            return -1;
+        }
+        ret = X509V3_NAME_from_section(nm, dnsect, MBSTRING_ASC);
+        X509V3_section_free(ctx, dnsect);
+        rnm = nm->entries;
+        nm->entries = NULL;
+        X509_NAME_free(nm);
+        if (!ret || sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_num(rnm) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+        /*
+         * Since its a name fragment can't have more than one RDNSequence
+         */
+        if (sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_value(rnm,
+                                     sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_num(rnm) - 1)->set) {
+            X509V3err(X509V3_F_SET_DIST_POINT_NAME,
+                      X509V3_R_INVALID_MULTIPLE_RDNS);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    } else
+        return 0;
+
+    if (*pdp) {
+        X509V3err(X509V3_F_SET_DIST_POINT_NAME,
+                  X509V3_R_DISTPOINT_ALREADY_SET);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    *pdp = DIST_POINT_NAME_new();
+    if (*pdp == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (fnm) {
+        (*pdp)->type = 0;
+        (*pdp)->name.fullname = fnm;
+    } else {
+        (*pdp)->type = 1;
+        (*pdp)->name.relativename = rnm;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+
+ err:
+    sk_GENERAL_NAME_pop_free(fnm, GENERAL_NAME_free);
+    sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_pop_free(rnm, X509_NAME_ENTRY_free);
+    return -1;
+}
+
+static const BIT_STRING_BITNAME reason_flags[] = {
+    {0, "Unused", "unused"},
+    {1, "Key Compromise", "keyCompromise"},
+    {2, "CA Compromise", "CACompromise"},
+    {3, "Affiliation Changed", "affiliationChanged"},
+    {4, "Superseded", "superseded"},
+    {5, "Cessation Of Operation", "cessationOfOperation"},
+    {6, "Certificate Hold", "certificateHold"},
+    {7, "Privilege Withdrawn", "privilegeWithdrawn"},
+    {8, "AA Compromise", "AACompromise"},
+    {-1, NULL, NULL}
+};
+
+static int set_reasons(ASN1_BIT_STRING **preas, char *value)
+{
+    STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *rsk = NULL;
+    const BIT_STRING_BITNAME *pbn;
+    const char *bnam;
+    int i, ret = 0;
+    rsk = X509V3_parse_list(value);
+    if (rsk == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    if (*preas != NULL)
+        goto err;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(rsk); i++) {
+        bnam = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(rsk, i)->name;
+        if (*preas == NULL) {
+            *preas = ASN1_BIT_STRING_new();
+            if (*preas == NULL)
+                goto err;
+        }
+        for (pbn = reason_flags; pbn->lname; pbn++) {
+            if (strcmp(pbn->sname, bnam) == 0) {
+                if (!ASN1_BIT_STRING_set_bit(*preas, pbn->bitnum, 1))
+                    goto err;
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+        if (!pbn->lname)
+            goto err;
+    }
+    ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+    sk_CONF_VALUE_pop_free(rsk, X509V3_conf_free);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int print_reasons(BIO *out, const char *rname,
+                         ASN1_BIT_STRING *rflags, int indent)
+{
+    int first = 1;
+    const BIT_STRING_BITNAME *pbn;
+    BIO_printf(out, "%*s%s:\n%*s", indent, "", rname, indent + 2, "");
+    for (pbn = reason_flags; pbn->lname; pbn++) {
+        if (ASN1_BIT_STRING_get_bit(rflags, pbn->bitnum)) {
+            if (first)
+                first = 0;
+            else
+                BIO_puts(out, ", ");
+            BIO_puts(out, pbn->lname);
+        }
+    }
+    if (first)
+        BIO_puts(out, "<EMPTY>\n");
+    else
+        BIO_puts(out, "\n");
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static DIST_POINT *crldp_from_section(X509V3_CTX *ctx,
+                                      STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nval)
+{
+    int i;
+    CONF_VALUE *cnf;
+    DIST_POINT *point = NULL;
+    point = DIST_POINT_new();
+    if (point == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(nval); i++) {
+        int ret;
+        cnf = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(nval, i);
+        ret = set_dist_point_name(&point->distpoint, ctx, cnf);
+        if (ret > 0)
+            continue;
+        if (ret < 0)
+            goto err;
+        if (strcmp(cnf->name, "reasons") == 0) {
+            if (!set_reasons(&point->reasons, cnf->value))
+                goto err;
+        } else if (strcmp(cnf->name, "CRLissuer") == 0) {
+            point->CRLissuer = gnames_from_sectname(ctx, cnf->value);
+            if (!point->CRLissuer)
+                goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    return point;
+
+ err:
+    DIST_POINT_free(point);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+static void *v2i_crld(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
+                      X509V3_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nval)
+{
+    STACK_OF(DIST_POINT) *crld = NULL;
+    GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
+    GENERAL_NAME *gen = NULL;
+    CONF_VALUE *cnf;
+    int i;
+
+    if ((crld = sk_DIST_POINT_new_null()) == NULL)
+        goto merr;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(nval); i++) {
+        DIST_POINT *point;
+        cnf = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(nval, i);
+        if (!cnf->value) {
+            STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *dpsect;
+            dpsect = X509V3_get_section(ctx, cnf->name);
+            if (!dpsect)
+                goto err;
+            point = crldp_from_section(ctx, dpsect);
+            X509V3_section_free(ctx, dpsect);
+            if (!point)
+                goto err;
+            if (!sk_DIST_POINT_push(crld, point)) {
+                DIST_POINT_free(point);
+                goto merr;
+            }
+        } else {
+            if ((gen = v2i_GENERAL_NAME(method, ctx, cnf)) == NULL)
+                goto err;
+            if ((gens = GENERAL_NAMES_new()) == NULL)
+                goto merr;
+            if (!sk_GENERAL_NAME_push(gens, gen))
+                goto merr;
+            gen = NULL;
+            if ((point = DIST_POINT_new()) == NULL)
+                goto merr;
+            if (!sk_DIST_POINT_push(crld, point)) {
+                DIST_POINT_free(point);
+                goto merr;
+            }
+            if ((point->distpoint = DIST_POINT_NAME_new()) == NULL)
+                goto merr;
+            point->distpoint->name.fullname = gens;
+            point->distpoint->type = 0;
+            gens = NULL;
+        }
+    }
+    return crld;
+
+ merr:
+    X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_CRLD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ err:
+    GENERAL_NAME_free(gen);
+    GENERAL_NAMES_free(gens);
+    sk_DIST_POINT_pop_free(crld, DIST_POINT_free);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+static int dpn_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+                  void *exarg)
+{
+    DIST_POINT_NAME *dpn = (DIST_POINT_NAME *)*pval;
+
+    switch (operation) {
+    case ASN1_OP_NEW_POST:
+        dpn->dpname = NULL;
+        break;
+
+    case ASN1_OP_FREE_POST:
+        X509_NAME_free(dpn->dpname);
+        break;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+
+ASN1_CHOICE_cb(DIST_POINT_NAME, dpn_cb) = {
+        ASN1_IMP_SEQUENCE_OF(DIST_POINT_NAME, name.fullname, GENERAL_NAME, 0),
+        ASN1_IMP_SET_OF(DIST_POINT_NAME, name.relativename, X509_NAME_ENTRY, 1)
+} ASN1_CHOICE_END_cb(DIST_POINT_NAME, DIST_POINT_NAME, type)
+
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(DIST_POINT_NAME)
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(DIST_POINT) = {
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(DIST_POINT, distpoint, DIST_POINT_NAME, 0),
+        ASN1_IMP_OPT(DIST_POINT, reasons, ASN1_BIT_STRING, 1),
+        ASN1_IMP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(DIST_POINT, CRLissuer, GENERAL_NAME, 2)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(DIST_POINT)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(DIST_POINT)
+
+ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE(CRL_DIST_POINTS) =
+        ASN1_EX_TEMPLATE_TYPE(ASN1_TFLG_SEQUENCE_OF, 0, CRLDistributionPoints, DIST_POINT)
+ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE_END(CRL_DIST_POINTS)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(CRL_DIST_POINTS)
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(ISSUING_DIST_POINT) = {
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(ISSUING_DIST_POINT, distpoint, DIST_POINT_NAME, 0),
+        ASN1_IMP_OPT(ISSUING_DIST_POINT, onlyuser, ASN1_FBOOLEAN, 1),
+        ASN1_IMP_OPT(ISSUING_DIST_POINT, onlyCA, ASN1_FBOOLEAN, 2),
+        ASN1_IMP_OPT(ISSUING_DIST_POINT, onlysomereasons, ASN1_BIT_STRING, 3),
+        ASN1_IMP_OPT(ISSUING_DIST_POINT, indirectCRL, ASN1_FBOOLEAN, 4),
+        ASN1_IMP_OPT(ISSUING_DIST_POINT, onlyattr, ASN1_FBOOLEAN, 5)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(ISSUING_DIST_POINT)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ISSUING_DIST_POINT)
+
+static int i2r_idp(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, void *pidp, BIO *out,
+                   int indent);
+static void *v2i_idp(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, X509V3_CTX *ctx,
+                     STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nval);
+
+const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_idp = {
+    NID_issuing_distribution_point, X509V3_EXT_MULTILINE,
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(ISSUING_DIST_POINT),
+    0, 0, 0, 0,
+    0, 0,
+    0,
+    v2i_idp,
+    i2r_idp, 0,
+    NULL
+};
+
+static void *v2i_idp(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, X509V3_CTX *ctx,
+                     STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nval)
+{
+    ISSUING_DIST_POINT *idp = NULL;
+    CONF_VALUE *cnf;
+    char *name, *val;
+    int i, ret;
+    idp = ISSUING_DIST_POINT_new();
+    if (idp == NULL)
+        goto merr;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(nval); i++) {
+        cnf = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(nval, i);
+        name = cnf->name;
+        val = cnf->value;
+        ret = set_dist_point_name(&idp->distpoint, ctx, cnf);
+        if (ret > 0)
+            continue;
+        if (ret < 0)
+            goto err;
+        if (strcmp(name, "onlyuser") == 0) {
+            if (!X509V3_get_value_bool(cnf, &idp->onlyuser))
+                goto err;
+        } else if (strcmp(name, "onlyCA") == 0) {
+            if (!X509V3_get_value_bool(cnf, &idp->onlyCA))
+                goto err;
+        } else if (strcmp(name, "onlyAA") == 0) {
+            if (!X509V3_get_value_bool(cnf, &idp->onlyattr))
+                goto err;
+        } else if (strcmp(name, "indirectCRL") == 0) {
+            if (!X509V3_get_value_bool(cnf, &idp->indirectCRL))
+                goto err;
+        } else if (strcmp(name, "onlysomereasons") == 0) {
+            if (!set_reasons(&idp->onlysomereasons, val))
+                goto err;
+        } else {
+            X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_IDP, X509V3_R_INVALID_NAME);
+            X509V3_conf_err(cnf);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+    return idp;
+
+ merr:
+    X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_IDP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ err:
+    ISSUING_DIST_POINT_free(idp);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+static int print_gens(BIO *out, STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *gens, int indent)
+{
+    int i;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) {
+        BIO_printf(out, "%*s", indent + 2, "");
+        GENERAL_NAME_print(out, sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i));
+        BIO_puts(out, "\n");
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int print_distpoint(BIO *out, DIST_POINT_NAME *dpn, int indent)
+{
+    if (dpn->type == 0) {
+        BIO_printf(out, "%*sFull Name:\n", indent, "");
+        print_gens(out, dpn->name.fullname, indent);
+    } else {
+        X509_NAME ntmp;
+        ntmp.entries = dpn->name.relativename;
+        BIO_printf(out, "%*sRelative Name:\n%*s", indent, "", indent + 2, "");
+        X509_NAME_print_ex(out, &ntmp, 0, XN_FLAG_ONELINE);
+        BIO_puts(out, "\n");
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int i2r_idp(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, void *pidp, BIO *out,
+                   int indent)
+{
+    ISSUING_DIST_POINT *idp = pidp;
+    if (idp->distpoint)
+        print_distpoint(out, idp->distpoint, indent);
+    if (idp->onlyuser > 0)
+        BIO_printf(out, "%*sOnly User Certificates\n", indent, "");
+    if (idp->onlyCA > 0)
+        BIO_printf(out, "%*sOnly CA Certificates\n", indent, "");
+    if (idp->indirectCRL > 0)
+        BIO_printf(out, "%*sIndirect CRL\n", indent, "");
+    if (idp->onlysomereasons)
+        print_reasons(out, "Only Some Reasons", idp->onlysomereasons, indent);
+    if (idp->onlyattr > 0)
+        BIO_printf(out, "%*sOnly Attribute Certificates\n", indent, "");
+    if (!idp->distpoint && (idp->onlyuser <= 0) && (idp->onlyCA <= 0)
+        && (idp->indirectCRL <= 0) && !idp->onlysomereasons
+        && (idp->onlyattr <= 0))
+        BIO_printf(out, "%*s<EMPTY>\n", indent, "");
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int i2r_crldp(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, void *pcrldp, BIO *out,
+                     int indent)
+{
+    STACK_OF(DIST_POINT) *crld = pcrldp;
+    DIST_POINT *point;
+    int i;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(crld); i++) {
+        BIO_puts(out, "\n");
+        point = sk_DIST_POINT_value(crld, i);
+        if (point->distpoint)
+            print_distpoint(out, point->distpoint, indent);
+        if (point->reasons)
+            print_reasons(out, "Reasons", point->reasons, indent);
+        if (point->CRLissuer) {
+            BIO_printf(out, "%*sCRL Issuer:\n", indent, "");
+            print_gens(out, point->CRLissuer, indent);
+        }
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int DIST_POINT_set_dpname(DIST_POINT_NAME *dpn, X509_NAME *iname)
+{
+    int i;
+    STACK_OF(X509_NAME_ENTRY) *frag;
+    X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne;
+    if (!dpn || (dpn->type != 1))
+        return 1;
+    frag = dpn->name.relativename;
+    dpn->dpname = X509_NAME_dup(iname);
+    if (!dpn->dpname)
+        return 0;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_num(frag); i++) {
+        ne = sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_value(frag, i);
+        if (!X509_NAME_add_entry(dpn->dpname, ne, -1, i ? 0 : 1)) {
+            X509_NAME_free(dpn->dpname);
+            dpn->dpname = NULL;
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+    /* generate cached encoding of name */
+    if (i2d_X509_NAME(dpn->dpname, NULL) < 0) {
+        X509_NAME_free(dpn->dpname);
+        dpn->dpname = NULL;
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_enum.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_enum.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f39cb5a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_enum.c
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include "ext_dat.h"
+
+static ENUMERATED_NAMES crl_reasons[] = {
+    {CRL_REASON_UNSPECIFIED, "Unspecified", "unspecified"},
+    {CRL_REASON_KEY_COMPROMISE, "Key Compromise", "keyCompromise"},
+    {CRL_REASON_CA_COMPROMISE, "CA Compromise", "CACompromise"},
+    {CRL_REASON_AFFILIATION_CHANGED, "Affiliation Changed",
+     "affiliationChanged"},
+    {CRL_REASON_SUPERSEDED, "Superseded", "superseded"},
+    {CRL_REASON_CESSATION_OF_OPERATION,
+     "Cessation Of Operation", "cessationOfOperation"},
+    {CRL_REASON_CERTIFICATE_HOLD, "Certificate Hold", "certificateHold"},
+    {CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL, "Remove From CRL", "removeFromCRL"},
+    {CRL_REASON_PRIVILEGE_WITHDRAWN, "Privilege Withdrawn",
+     "privilegeWithdrawn"},
+    {CRL_REASON_AA_COMPROMISE, "AA Compromise", "AACompromise"},
+    {-1, NULL, NULL}
+};
+
+const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_crl_reason = {
+    NID_crl_reason, 0, ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_ENUMERATED),
+    0, 0, 0, 0,
+    (X509V3_EXT_I2S)i2s_ASN1_ENUMERATED_TABLE,
+    0,
+    0, 0, 0, 0,
+    crl_reasons
+};
+
+char *i2s_ASN1_ENUMERATED_TABLE(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, 
+                                const ASN1_ENUMERATED *e)
+{
+    ENUMERATED_NAMES *enam;
+    long strval;
+
+    strval = ASN1_ENUMERATED_get(e);
+    for (enam = method->usr_data; enam->lname; enam++) {
+        if (strval == enam->bitnum)
+            return OPENSSL_strdup(enam->lname);
+    }
+    return i2s_ASN1_ENUMERATED(method, e);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_extku.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_extku.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bae755e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_extku.c
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/conf.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include "ext_dat.h"
+
+static void *v2i_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
+                                    X509V3_CTX *ctx,
+                                    STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nval);
+static STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *i2v_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD
+                                                    *method, void *eku, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE)
+                                                    *extlist);
+
+const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_ext_ku = {
+    NID_ext_key_usage, 0,
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE),
+    0, 0, 0, 0,
+    0, 0,
+    i2v_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE,
+    v2i_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE,
+    0, 0,
+    NULL
+};
+
+/* NB OCSP acceptable responses also is a SEQUENCE OF OBJECT */
+const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_ocsp_accresp = {
+    NID_id_pkix_OCSP_acceptableResponses, 0,
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE),
+    0, 0, 0, 0,
+    0, 0,
+    i2v_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE,
+    v2i_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE,
+    0, 0,
+    NULL
+};
+
+ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE(EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE) =
+        ASN1_EX_TEMPLATE_TYPE(ASN1_TFLG_SEQUENCE_OF, 0, EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE, ASN1_OBJECT)
+ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE_END(EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE)
+
+static STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *i2v_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD
+                                                    *method, void *a, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE)
+                                                    *ext_list)
+{
+    EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE *eku = a;
+    int i;
+    ASN1_OBJECT *obj;
+    char obj_tmp[80];
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(eku); i++) {
+        obj = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(eku, i);
+        i2t_ASN1_OBJECT(obj_tmp, 80, obj);
+        X509V3_add_value(NULL, obj_tmp, &ext_list);
+    }
+    return ext_list;
+}
+
+static void *v2i_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
+                                    X509V3_CTX *ctx,
+                                    STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nval)
+{
+    EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE *extku;
+    char *extval;
+    ASN1_OBJECT *objtmp;
+    CONF_VALUE *val;
+    int i;
+
+    if ((extku = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_new_null()) == NULL) {
+        X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(nval); i++) {
+        val = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(nval, i);
+        if (val->value)
+            extval = val->value;
+        else
+            extval = val->name;
+        if ((objtmp = OBJ_txt2obj(extval, 0)) == NULL) {
+            sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(extku, ASN1_OBJECT_free);
+            X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE,
+                      X509V3_R_INVALID_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER);
+            X509V3_conf_err(val);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+        sk_ASN1_OBJECT_push(extku, objtmp);
+    }
+    return extku;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_genn.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_genn.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..85fc3fc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_genn.c
@@ -0,0 +1,201 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/conf.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(OTHERNAME) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(OTHERNAME, type_id, ASN1_OBJECT),
+        /* Maybe have a true ANY DEFINED BY later */
+        ASN1_EXP(OTHERNAME, value, ASN1_ANY, 0)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(OTHERNAME)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OTHERNAME)
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(EDIPARTYNAME) = {
+        ASN1_IMP_OPT(EDIPARTYNAME, nameAssigner, DIRECTORYSTRING, 0),
+        ASN1_IMP_OPT(EDIPARTYNAME, partyName, DIRECTORYSTRING, 1)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(EDIPARTYNAME)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(EDIPARTYNAME)
+
+ASN1_CHOICE(GENERAL_NAME) = {
+        ASN1_IMP(GENERAL_NAME, d.otherName, OTHERNAME, GEN_OTHERNAME),
+        ASN1_IMP(GENERAL_NAME, d.rfc822Name, ASN1_IA5STRING, GEN_EMAIL),
+        ASN1_IMP(GENERAL_NAME, d.dNSName, ASN1_IA5STRING, GEN_DNS),
+        /* Don't decode this */
+        ASN1_IMP(GENERAL_NAME, d.x400Address, ASN1_SEQUENCE, GEN_X400),
+        /* X509_NAME is a CHOICE type so use EXPLICIT */
+        ASN1_EXP(GENERAL_NAME, d.directoryName, X509_NAME, GEN_DIRNAME),
+        ASN1_IMP(GENERAL_NAME, d.ediPartyName, EDIPARTYNAME, GEN_EDIPARTY),
+        ASN1_IMP(GENERAL_NAME, d.uniformResourceIdentifier, ASN1_IA5STRING, GEN_URI),
+        ASN1_IMP(GENERAL_NAME, d.iPAddress, ASN1_OCTET_STRING, GEN_IPADD),
+        ASN1_IMP(GENERAL_NAME, d.registeredID, ASN1_OBJECT, GEN_RID)
+} ASN1_CHOICE_END(GENERAL_NAME)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(GENERAL_NAME)
+
+ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE(GENERAL_NAMES) =
+        ASN1_EX_TEMPLATE_TYPE(ASN1_TFLG_SEQUENCE_OF, 0, GeneralNames, GENERAL_NAME)
+ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE_END(GENERAL_NAMES)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(GENERAL_NAMES)
+
+GENERAL_NAME *GENERAL_NAME_dup(GENERAL_NAME *a)
+{
+    return (GENERAL_NAME *)ASN1_dup((i2d_of_void *)i2d_GENERAL_NAME,
+                                    (d2i_of_void *)d2i_GENERAL_NAME,
+                                    (char *)a);
+}
+
+/* Returns 0 if they are equal, != 0 otherwise. */
+int GENERAL_NAME_cmp(GENERAL_NAME *a, GENERAL_NAME *b)
+{
+    int result = -1;
+
+    if (!a || !b || a->type != b->type)
+        return -1;
+    switch (a->type) {
+    case GEN_X400:
+    case GEN_EDIPARTY:
+        result = ASN1_TYPE_cmp(a->d.other, b->d.other);
+        break;
+
+    case GEN_OTHERNAME:
+        result = OTHERNAME_cmp(a->d.otherName, b->d.otherName);
+        break;
+
+    case GEN_EMAIL:
+    case GEN_DNS:
+    case GEN_URI:
+        result = ASN1_STRING_cmp(a->d.ia5, b->d.ia5);
+        break;
+
+    case GEN_DIRNAME:
+        result = X509_NAME_cmp(a->d.dirn, b->d.dirn);
+        break;
+
+    case GEN_IPADD:
+        result = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(a->d.ip, b->d.ip);
+        break;
+
+    case GEN_RID:
+        result = OBJ_cmp(a->d.rid, b->d.rid);
+        break;
+    }
+    return result;
+}
+
+/* Returns 0 if they are equal, != 0 otherwise. */
+int OTHERNAME_cmp(OTHERNAME *a, OTHERNAME *b)
+{
+    int result = -1;
+
+    if (!a || !b)
+        return -1;
+    /* Check their type first. */
+    if ((result = OBJ_cmp(a->type_id, b->type_id)) != 0)
+        return result;
+    /* Check the value. */
+    result = ASN1_TYPE_cmp(a->value, b->value);
+    return result;
+}
+
+void GENERAL_NAME_set0_value(GENERAL_NAME *a, int type, void *value)
+{
+    switch (type) {
+    case GEN_X400:
+    case GEN_EDIPARTY:
+        a->d.other = value;
+        break;
+
+    case GEN_OTHERNAME:
+        a->d.otherName = value;
+        break;
+
+    case GEN_EMAIL:
+    case GEN_DNS:
+    case GEN_URI:
+        a->d.ia5 = value;
+        break;
+
+    case GEN_DIRNAME:
+        a->d.dirn = value;
+        break;
+
+    case GEN_IPADD:
+        a->d.ip = value;
+        break;
+
+    case GEN_RID:
+        a->d.rid = value;
+        break;
+    }
+    a->type = type;
+}
+
+void *GENERAL_NAME_get0_value(GENERAL_NAME *a, int *ptype)
+{
+    if (ptype)
+        *ptype = a->type;
+    switch (a->type) {
+    case GEN_X400:
+    case GEN_EDIPARTY:
+        return a->d.other;
+
+    case GEN_OTHERNAME:
+        return a->d.otherName;
+
+    case GEN_EMAIL:
+    case GEN_DNS:
+    case GEN_URI:
+        return a->d.ia5;
+
+    case GEN_DIRNAME:
+        return a->d.dirn;
+
+    case GEN_IPADD:
+        return a->d.ip;
+
+    case GEN_RID:
+        return a->d.rid;
+
+    default:
+        return NULL;
+    }
+}
+
+int GENERAL_NAME_set0_othername(GENERAL_NAME *gen,
+                                ASN1_OBJECT *oid, ASN1_TYPE *value)
+{
+    OTHERNAME *oth;
+    oth = OTHERNAME_new();
+    if (oth == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    ASN1_TYPE_free(oth->value);
+    oth->type_id = oid;
+    oth->value = value;
+    GENERAL_NAME_set0_value(gen, GEN_OTHERNAME, oth);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int GENERAL_NAME_get0_otherName(GENERAL_NAME *gen,
+                                ASN1_OBJECT **poid, ASN1_TYPE **pvalue)
+{
+    if (gen->type != GEN_OTHERNAME)
+        return 0;
+    if (poid)
+        *poid = gen->d.otherName->type_id;
+    if (pvalue)
+        *pvalue = gen->d.otherName->value;
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_ia5.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_ia5.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c1170d4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_ia5.c
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/conf.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include "ext_dat.h"
+
+const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_ns_ia5_list[8] = {
+    EXT_IA5STRING(NID_netscape_base_url),
+    EXT_IA5STRING(NID_netscape_revocation_url),
+    EXT_IA5STRING(NID_netscape_ca_revocation_url),
+    EXT_IA5STRING(NID_netscape_renewal_url),
+    EXT_IA5STRING(NID_netscape_ca_policy_url),
+    EXT_IA5STRING(NID_netscape_ssl_server_name),
+    EXT_IA5STRING(NID_netscape_comment),
+    EXT_END
+};
+
+char *i2s_ASN1_IA5STRING(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, ASN1_IA5STRING *ia5)
+{
+    char *tmp;
+
+    if (!ia5 || !ia5->length)
+        return NULL;
+    if ((tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(ia5->length + 1)) == NULL) {
+        X509V3err(X509V3_F_I2S_ASN1_IA5STRING, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    memcpy(tmp, ia5->data, ia5->length);
+    tmp[ia5->length] = 0;
+    return tmp;
+}
+
+ASN1_IA5STRING *s2i_ASN1_IA5STRING(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
+                                   X509V3_CTX *ctx, const char *str)
+{
+    ASN1_IA5STRING *ia5;
+    if (!str) {
+        X509V3err(X509V3_F_S2I_ASN1_IA5STRING,
+                  X509V3_R_INVALID_NULL_ARGUMENT);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    if ((ia5 = ASN1_IA5STRING_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (!ASN1_STRING_set((ASN1_STRING *)ia5, str, strlen(str))) {
+        ASN1_IA5STRING_free(ia5);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+    ebcdic2ascii(ia5->data, ia5->data, ia5->length);
+#endif                          /* CHARSET_EBCDIC */
+    return ia5;
+ err:
+    X509V3err(X509V3_F_S2I_ASN1_IA5STRING, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return NULL;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_info.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_info.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a0bca5f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_info.c
@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/conf.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include "ext_dat.h"
+
+static STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *i2v_AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS(X509V3_EXT_METHOD
+                                                       *method, AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS
+                                                       *ainfo, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE)
+                                                       *ret);
+static AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS *v2i_AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS(X509V3_EXT_METHOD
+                                                        *method,
+                                                        X509V3_CTX *ctx,
+                                                        STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE)
+                                                        *nval);
+
+const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_info = { NID_info_access, X509V3_EXT_MULTILINE,
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS),
+    0, 0, 0, 0,
+    0, 0,
+    (X509V3_EXT_I2V) i2v_AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS,
+    (X509V3_EXT_V2I)v2i_AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS,
+    0, 0,
+    NULL
+};
+
+const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_sinfo = { NID_sinfo_access, X509V3_EXT_MULTILINE,
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS),
+    0, 0, 0, 0,
+    0, 0,
+    (X509V3_EXT_I2V) i2v_AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS,
+    (X509V3_EXT_V2I)v2i_AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS,
+    0, 0,
+    NULL
+};
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(ACCESS_DESCRIPTION) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(ACCESS_DESCRIPTION, method, ASN1_OBJECT),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(ACCESS_DESCRIPTION, location, GENERAL_NAME)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(ACCESS_DESCRIPTION)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ACCESS_DESCRIPTION)
+
+ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE(AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS) =
+        ASN1_EX_TEMPLATE_TYPE(ASN1_TFLG_SEQUENCE_OF, 0, GeneralNames, ACCESS_DESCRIPTION)
+ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE_END(AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS)
+
+static STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *i2v_AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS(
+    X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS *ainfo,
+    STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *ret)
+{
+    ACCESS_DESCRIPTION *desc;
+    int i, nlen;
+    char objtmp[80], *ntmp;
+    CONF_VALUE *vtmp;
+    STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *tret = ret;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_num(ainfo); i++) {
+        STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *tmp;
+
+        desc = sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_value(ainfo, i);
+        tmp = i2v_GENERAL_NAME(method, desc->location, tret);
+        if (tmp == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        tret = tmp;
+        vtmp = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(tret, i);
+        i2t_ASN1_OBJECT(objtmp, sizeof(objtmp), desc->method);
+        nlen = strlen(objtmp) + strlen(vtmp->name) + 5;
+        ntmp = OPENSSL_malloc(nlen);
+        if (ntmp == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        OPENSSL_strlcpy(ntmp, objtmp, nlen);
+        OPENSSL_strlcat(ntmp, " - ", nlen);
+        OPENSSL_strlcat(ntmp, vtmp->name, nlen);
+        OPENSSL_free(vtmp->name);
+        vtmp->name = ntmp;
+
+    }
+    if (ret == NULL && tret == NULL)
+        return sk_CONF_VALUE_new_null();
+
+    return tret;
+ err:
+    X509V3err(X509V3_F_I2V_AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    if (ret == NULL && tret != NULL)
+        sk_CONF_VALUE_pop_free(tret, X509V3_conf_free);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+static AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS *v2i_AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS(X509V3_EXT_METHOD
+                                                        *method,
+                                                        X509V3_CTX *ctx,
+                                                        STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE)
+                                                        *nval)
+{
+    AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS *ainfo = NULL;
+    CONF_VALUE *cnf, ctmp;
+    ACCESS_DESCRIPTION *acc;
+    int i, objlen;
+    char *objtmp, *ptmp;
+
+    if ((ainfo = sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_new_null()) == NULL) {
+        X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(nval); i++) {
+        cnf = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(nval, i);
+        if ((acc = ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_new()) == NULL
+            || !sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_push(ainfo, acc)) {
+            X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS,
+                      ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        ptmp = strchr(cnf->name, ';');
+        if (!ptmp) {
+            X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS,
+                      X509V3_R_INVALID_SYNTAX);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        objlen = ptmp - cnf->name;
+        ctmp.name = ptmp + 1;
+        ctmp.value = cnf->value;
+        if (!v2i_GENERAL_NAME_ex(acc->location, method, ctx, &ctmp, 0))
+            goto err;
+        if ((objtmp = OPENSSL_strndup(cnf->name, objlen)) == NULL) {
+            X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS,
+                      ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        acc->method = OBJ_txt2obj(objtmp, 0);
+        if (!acc->method) {
+            X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS,
+                      X509V3_R_BAD_OBJECT);
+            ERR_add_error_data(2, "value=", objtmp);
+            OPENSSL_free(objtmp);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        OPENSSL_free(objtmp);
+
+    }
+    return ainfo;
+ err:
+    sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_pop_free(ainfo, ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_free);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+int i2a_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION(BIO *bp, const ACCESS_DESCRIPTION *a)
+{
+    i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, a->method);
+    return 2;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_int.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_int.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..690c90e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_int.c
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include "ext_dat.h"
+
+const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_crl_num = {
+    NID_crl_number, 0, ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_INTEGER),
+    0, 0, 0, 0,
+    (X509V3_EXT_I2S)i2s_ASN1_INTEGER,
+    0,
+    0, 0, 0, 0, NULL
+};
+
+const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_delta_crl = {
+    NID_delta_crl, 0, ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_INTEGER),
+    0, 0, 0, 0,
+    (X509V3_EXT_I2S)i2s_ASN1_INTEGER,
+    0,
+    0, 0, 0, 0, NULL
+};
+
+static void *s2i_asn1_int(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *meth, X509V3_CTX *ctx,
+                          const char *value)
+{
+    return s2i_ASN1_INTEGER(meth, value);
+}
+
+const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_inhibit_anyp = {
+    NID_inhibit_any_policy, 0, ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_INTEGER),
+    0, 0, 0, 0,
+    (X509V3_EXT_I2S)i2s_ASN1_INTEGER,
+    (X509V3_EXT_S2I)s2i_asn1_int,
+    0, 0, 0, 0, NULL
+};
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_lib.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_lib.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d714308
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_lib.c
@@ -0,0 +1,371 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* X509 v3 extension utilities */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/conf.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+
+#include "ext_dat.h"
+
+static STACK_OF(X509V3_EXT_METHOD) *ext_list = NULL;
+
+static int ext_cmp(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *const *a,
+                   const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *const *b);
+static void ext_list_free(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *ext);
+
+int X509V3_EXT_add(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *ext)
+{
+    if (ext_list == NULL
+        && (ext_list = sk_X509V3_EXT_METHOD_new(ext_cmp)) == NULL) {
+        X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509V3_EXT_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (!sk_X509V3_EXT_METHOD_push(ext_list, ext)) {
+        X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509V3_EXT_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int ext_cmp(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *const *a,
+                   const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *const *b)
+{
+    return ((*a)->ext_nid - (*b)->ext_nid);
+}
+
+DECLARE_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *,
+                           const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *, ext);
+IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *,
+                             const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *, ext);
+
+/*
+ * This table will be searched using OBJ_bsearch so it *must* kept in order
+ * of the ext_nid values.
+ */
+
+static const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *standard_exts[] = {
+    &v3_nscert,
+    &v3_ns_ia5_list[0],
+    &v3_ns_ia5_list[1],
+    &v3_ns_ia5_list[2],
+    &v3_ns_ia5_list[3],
+    &v3_ns_ia5_list[4],
+    &v3_ns_ia5_list[5],
+    &v3_ns_ia5_list[6],
+    &v3_skey_id,
+    &v3_key_usage,
+    &v3_pkey_usage_period,
+    &v3_alt[0],
+    &v3_alt[1],
+    &v3_bcons,
+    &v3_crl_num,
+    &v3_cpols,
+    &v3_akey_id,
+    &v3_crld,
+    &v3_ext_ku,
+    &v3_delta_crl,
+    &v3_crl_reason,
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+    &v3_crl_invdate,
+#endif
+    &v3_sxnet,
+    &v3_info,
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
+    &v3_addr,
+    &v3_asid,
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+    &v3_ocsp_nonce,
+    &v3_ocsp_crlid,
+    &v3_ocsp_accresp,
+    &v3_ocsp_nocheck,
+    &v3_ocsp_acutoff,
+    &v3_ocsp_serviceloc,
+#endif
+    &v3_sinfo,
+    &v3_policy_constraints,
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+    &v3_crl_hold,
+#endif
+    &v3_pci,
+    &v3_name_constraints,
+    &v3_policy_mappings,
+    &v3_inhibit_anyp,
+    &v3_idp,
+    &v3_alt[2],
+    &v3_freshest_crl,
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
+    &v3_ct_scts[0],
+    &v3_ct_scts[1],
+    &v3_ct_scts[2],
+#endif
+    &v3_tls_feature,
+};
+
+/* Number of standard extensions */
+
+#define STANDARD_EXTENSION_COUNT OSSL_NELEM(standard_exts)
+
+const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *X509V3_EXT_get_nid(int nid)
+{
+    X509V3_EXT_METHOD tmp;
+    const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *t = &tmp, *const *ret;
+    int idx;
+
+    if (nid < 0)
+        return NULL;
+    tmp.ext_nid = nid;
+    ret = OBJ_bsearch_ext(&t, standard_exts, STANDARD_EXTENSION_COUNT);
+    if (ret)
+        return *ret;
+    if (!ext_list)
+        return NULL;
+    idx = sk_X509V3_EXT_METHOD_find(ext_list, &tmp);
+    if (idx == -1)
+        return NULL;
+    return sk_X509V3_EXT_METHOD_value(ext_list, idx);
+}
+
+const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *X509V3_EXT_get(X509_EXTENSION *ext)
+{
+    int nid;
+    if ((nid = OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ext))) == NID_undef)
+        return NULL;
+    return X509V3_EXT_get_nid(nid);
+}
+
+int X509V3_EXT_add_list(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *extlist)
+{
+    for (; extlist->ext_nid != -1; extlist++)
+        if (!X509V3_EXT_add(extlist))
+            return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int X509V3_EXT_add_alias(int nid_to, int nid_from)
+{
+    const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *ext;
+    X509V3_EXT_METHOD *tmpext;
+
+    if ((ext = X509V3_EXT_get_nid(nid_from)) == NULL) {
+        X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509V3_EXT_ADD_ALIAS, X509V3_R_EXTENSION_NOT_FOUND);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if ((tmpext = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*tmpext))) == NULL) {
+        X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509V3_EXT_ADD_ALIAS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    *tmpext = *ext;
+    tmpext->ext_nid = nid_to;
+    tmpext->ext_flags |= X509V3_EXT_DYNAMIC;
+    return X509V3_EXT_add(tmpext);
+}
+
+void X509V3_EXT_cleanup(void)
+{
+    sk_X509V3_EXT_METHOD_pop_free(ext_list, ext_list_free);
+    ext_list = NULL;
+}
+
+static void ext_list_free(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *ext)
+{
+    if (ext->ext_flags & X509V3_EXT_DYNAMIC)
+        OPENSSL_free(ext);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Legacy function: we don't need to add standard extensions any more because
+ * they are now kept in ext_dat.h.
+ */
+
+int X509V3_add_standard_extensions(void)
+{
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Return an extension internal structure */
+
+void *X509V3_EXT_d2i(X509_EXTENSION *ext)
+{
+    const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method;
+    const unsigned char *p;
+    ASN1_STRING *extvalue;
+    int extlen;
+
+    if ((method = X509V3_EXT_get(ext)) == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    extvalue = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(ext);
+    p = ASN1_STRING_get0_data(extvalue);
+    extlen = ASN1_STRING_length(extvalue);
+    if (method->it)
+        return ASN1_item_d2i(NULL, &p, extlen, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(method->it));
+    return method->d2i(NULL, &p, extlen);
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Get critical flag and decoded version of extension from a NID.
+ * The "idx" variable returns the last found extension and can
+ * be used to retrieve multiple extensions of the same NID.
+ * However multiple extensions with the same NID is usually
+ * due to a badly encoded certificate so if idx is NULL we
+ * choke if multiple extensions exist.
+ * The "crit" variable is set to the critical value.
+ * The return value is the decoded extension or NULL on
+ * error. The actual error can have several different causes,
+ * the value of *crit reflects the cause:
+ * >= 0, extension found but not decoded (reflects critical value).
+ * -1 extension not found.
+ * -2 extension occurs more than once.
+ */
+
+void *X509V3_get_d2i(const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *x, int nid, int *crit,
+                     int *idx)
+{
+    int lastpos, i;
+    X509_EXTENSION *ex, *found_ex = NULL;
+
+    if (!x) {
+        if (idx)
+            *idx = -1;
+        if (crit)
+            *crit = -1;
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    if (idx)
+        lastpos = *idx + 1;
+    else
+        lastpos = 0;
+    if (lastpos < 0)
+        lastpos = 0;
+    for (i = lastpos; i < sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(x); i++) {
+        ex = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(x, i);
+        if (OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex)) == nid) {
+            if (idx) {
+                *idx = i;
+                found_ex = ex;
+                break;
+            } else if (found_ex) {
+                /* Found more than one */
+                if (crit)
+                    *crit = -2;
+                return NULL;
+            }
+            found_ex = ex;
+        }
+    }
+    if (found_ex) {
+        /* Found it */
+        if (crit)
+            *crit = X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(found_ex);
+        return X509V3_EXT_d2i(found_ex);
+    }
+
+    /* Extension not found */
+    if (idx)
+        *idx = -1;
+    if (crit)
+        *crit = -1;
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function is a general extension append, replace and delete utility.
+ * The precise operation is governed by the 'flags' value. The 'crit' and
+ * 'value' arguments (if relevant) are the extensions internal structure.
+ */
+
+int X509V3_add1_i2d(STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) **x, int nid, void *value,
+                    int crit, unsigned long flags)
+{
+    int errcode, extidx = -1;
+    X509_EXTENSION *ext = NULL, *extmp;
+    STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *ret = NULL;
+    unsigned long ext_op = flags & X509V3_ADD_OP_MASK;
+
+    /*
+     * If appending we don't care if it exists, otherwise look for existing
+     * extension.
+     */
+    if (ext_op != X509V3_ADD_APPEND)
+        extidx = X509v3_get_ext_by_NID(*x, nid, -1);
+
+    /* See if extension exists */
+    if (extidx >= 0) {
+        /* If keep existing, nothing to do */
+        if (ext_op == X509V3_ADD_KEEP_EXISTING)
+            return 1;
+        /* If default then its an error */
+        if (ext_op == X509V3_ADD_DEFAULT) {
+            errcode = X509V3_R_EXTENSION_EXISTS;
+            goto err;
+        }
+        /* If delete, just delete it */
+        if (ext_op == X509V3_ADD_DELETE) {
+            if (!sk_X509_EXTENSION_delete(*x, extidx))
+                return -1;
+            return 1;
+        }
+    } else {
+        /*
+         * If replace existing or delete, error since extension must exist
+         */
+        if ((ext_op == X509V3_ADD_REPLACE_EXISTING) ||
+            (ext_op == X509V3_ADD_DELETE)) {
+            errcode = X509V3_R_EXTENSION_NOT_FOUND;
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * If we get this far then we have to create an extension: could have
+     * some flags for alternative encoding schemes...
+     */
+
+    ext = X509V3_EXT_i2d(nid, crit, value);
+
+    if (!ext) {
+        X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509V3_ADD1_I2D,
+                  X509V3_R_ERROR_CREATING_EXTENSION);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* If extension exists replace it.. */
+    if (extidx >= 0) {
+        extmp = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(*x, extidx);
+        X509_EXTENSION_free(extmp);
+        if (!sk_X509_EXTENSION_set(*x, extidx, ext))
+            return -1;
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    ret = *x;
+    if (*x == NULL
+        && (ret = sk_X509_EXTENSION_new_null()) == NULL)
+        goto m_fail;
+    if (!sk_X509_EXTENSION_push(ret, ext))
+        goto m_fail;
+
+    *x = ret;
+    return 1;
+
+ m_fail:
+    /* X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509V3_ADD1_I2D, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); */
+    if (ret != *x)
+        sk_X509_EXTENSION_free(ret);
+    X509_EXTENSION_free(ext);
+    return -1;
+
+ err:
+    if (!(flags & X509V3_ADD_SILENT))
+        X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509V3_ADD1_I2D, errcode);
+    return 0;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_ncons.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_ncons.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2eec405
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_ncons.c
@@ -0,0 +1,582 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2003-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "internal/numbers.h"
+#include "internal/asn1_int.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/conf.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+
+#include "internal/x509_int.h"
+#include "ext_dat.h"
+
+static void *v2i_NAME_CONSTRAINTS(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
+                                  X509V3_CTX *ctx,
+                                  STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nval);
+static int i2r_NAME_CONSTRAINTS(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, void *a,
+                                BIO *bp, int ind);
+static int do_i2r_name_constraints(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
+                                   STACK_OF(GENERAL_SUBTREE) *trees, BIO *bp,
+                                   int ind, const char *name);
+static int print_nc_ipadd(BIO *bp, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ip);
+
+static int nc_match(GENERAL_NAME *gen, NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc);
+static int nc_match_single(GENERAL_NAME *sub, GENERAL_NAME *gen);
+static int nc_dn(X509_NAME *sub, X509_NAME *nm);
+static int nc_dns(ASN1_IA5STRING *sub, ASN1_IA5STRING *dns);
+static int nc_email(ASN1_IA5STRING *sub, ASN1_IA5STRING *eml);
+static int nc_uri(ASN1_IA5STRING *uri, ASN1_IA5STRING *base);
+static int nc_ip(ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ip, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *base);
+
+const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_name_constraints = {
+    NID_name_constraints, 0,
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(NAME_CONSTRAINTS),
+    0, 0, 0, 0,
+    0, 0,
+    0, v2i_NAME_CONSTRAINTS,
+    i2r_NAME_CONSTRAINTS, 0,
+    NULL
+};
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(GENERAL_SUBTREE) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(GENERAL_SUBTREE, base, GENERAL_NAME),
+        ASN1_IMP_OPT(GENERAL_SUBTREE, minimum, ASN1_INTEGER, 0),
+        ASN1_IMP_OPT(GENERAL_SUBTREE, maximum, ASN1_INTEGER, 1)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(GENERAL_SUBTREE)
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(NAME_CONSTRAINTS) = {
+        ASN1_IMP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(NAME_CONSTRAINTS, permittedSubtrees,
+                                                        GENERAL_SUBTREE, 0),
+        ASN1_IMP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(NAME_CONSTRAINTS, excludedSubtrees,
+                                                        GENERAL_SUBTREE, 1),
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(NAME_CONSTRAINTS)
+
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(GENERAL_SUBTREE)
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(NAME_CONSTRAINTS)
+
+/*
+ * We cannot use strncasecmp here because that applies locale specific rules.
+ * For example in Turkish 'I' is not the uppercase character for 'i'. We need to
+ * do a simple ASCII case comparison ignoring the locale (that is why we use
+ * numeric constants below).
+ */
+static int ia5ncasecmp(const char *s1, const char *s2, size_t n)
+{
+    for (; n > 0; n--, s1++, s2++) {
+        if (*s1 != *s2) {
+            unsigned char c1 = (unsigned char)*s1, c2 = (unsigned char)*s2;
+
+            /* Convert to lower case */
+            if (c1 >= 0x41 /* A */ && c1 <= 0x5A /* Z */)
+                c1 += 0x20;
+            if (c2 >= 0x41 /* A */ && c2 <= 0x5A /* Z */)
+                c2 += 0x20;
+
+            if (c1 == c2)
+                continue;
+
+            if (c1 < c2)
+                return -1;
+
+            /* c1 > c2 */
+            return 1;
+        } else if (*s1 == 0) {
+            /* If we get here we know that *s2 == 0 too */
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int ia5casecmp(const char *s1, const char *s2)
+{
+    return ia5ncasecmp(s1, s2, SIZE_MAX);
+}
+
+static void *v2i_NAME_CONSTRAINTS(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
+                                  X509V3_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nval)
+{
+    int i;
+    CONF_VALUE tval, *val;
+    STACK_OF(GENERAL_SUBTREE) **ptree = NULL;
+    NAME_CONSTRAINTS *ncons = NULL;
+    GENERAL_SUBTREE *sub = NULL;
+
+    ncons = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_new();
+    if (ncons == NULL)
+        goto memerr;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(nval); i++) {
+        val = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(nval, i);
+        if (strncmp(val->name, "permitted", 9) == 0 && val->name[9]) {
+            ptree = &ncons->permittedSubtrees;
+            tval.name = val->name + 10;
+        } else if (strncmp(val->name, "excluded", 8) == 0 && val->name[8]) {
+            ptree = &ncons->excludedSubtrees;
+            tval.name = val->name + 9;
+        } else {
+            X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_NAME_CONSTRAINTS, X509V3_R_INVALID_SYNTAX);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        tval.value = val->value;
+        sub = GENERAL_SUBTREE_new();
+        if (sub == NULL)
+            goto memerr;
+        if (!v2i_GENERAL_NAME_ex(sub->base, method, ctx, &tval, 1))
+            goto err;
+        if (*ptree == NULL)
+            *ptree = sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_new_null();
+        if (*ptree == NULL || !sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_push(*ptree, sub))
+            goto memerr;
+        sub = NULL;
+    }
+
+    return ncons;
+
+ memerr:
+    X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_NAME_CONSTRAINTS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ err:
+    NAME_CONSTRAINTS_free(ncons);
+    GENERAL_SUBTREE_free(sub);
+
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+static int i2r_NAME_CONSTRAINTS(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, void *a,
+                                BIO *bp, int ind)
+{
+    NAME_CONSTRAINTS *ncons = a;
+    do_i2r_name_constraints(method, ncons->permittedSubtrees,
+                            bp, ind, "Permitted");
+    do_i2r_name_constraints(method, ncons->excludedSubtrees,
+                            bp, ind, "Excluded");
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int do_i2r_name_constraints(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
+                                   STACK_OF(GENERAL_SUBTREE) *trees,
+                                   BIO *bp, int ind, const char *name)
+{
+    GENERAL_SUBTREE *tree;
+    int i;
+    if (sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_num(trees) > 0)
+        BIO_printf(bp, "%*s%s:\n", ind, "", name);
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_num(trees); i++) {
+        tree = sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_value(trees, i);
+        BIO_printf(bp, "%*s", ind + 2, "");
+        if (tree->base->type == GEN_IPADD)
+            print_nc_ipadd(bp, tree->base->d.ip);
+        else
+            GENERAL_NAME_print(bp, tree->base);
+        BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int print_nc_ipadd(BIO *bp, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ip)
+{
+    int i, len;
+    unsigned char *p;
+    p = ip->data;
+    len = ip->length;
+    BIO_puts(bp, "IP:");
+    if (len == 8) {
+        BIO_printf(bp, "%d.%d.%d.%d/%d.%d.%d.%d",
+                   p[0], p[1], p[2], p[3], p[4], p[5], p[6], p[7]);
+    } else if (len == 32) {
+        for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
+            BIO_printf(bp, "%X", p[0] << 8 | p[1]);
+            p += 2;
+            if (i == 7)
+                BIO_puts(bp, "/");
+            else if (i != 15)
+                BIO_puts(bp, ":");
+        }
+    } else
+        BIO_printf(bp, "IP Address:<invalid>");
+    return 1;
+}
+
+#define NAME_CHECK_MAX (1 << 20)
+
+static int add_lengths(int *out, int a, int b)
+{
+    /* sk_FOO_num(NULL) returns -1 but is effectively 0 when iterating. */
+    if (a < 0)
+        a = 0;
+    if (b < 0)
+        b = 0;
+
+    if (a > INT_MAX - b)
+        return 0;
+    *out = a + b;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Check a certificate conforms to a specified set of constraints.
+ * Return values:
+ *  X509_V_OK: All constraints obeyed.
+ *  X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION: Permitted subtree violation.
+ *  X509_V_ERR_EXCLUDED_VIOLATION: Excluded subtree violation.
+ *  X509_V_ERR_SUBTREE_MINMAX: Min or max values present and matching type.
+ *  X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CONSTRAINT_TYPE:  Unsupported constraint type.
+ *  X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CONSTRAINT_SYNTAX: bad unsupported constraint syntax.
+ *  X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX: bad or unsupported syntax of name
+ */
+
+int NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(X509 *x, NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc)
+{
+    int r, i, name_count, constraint_count;
+    X509_NAME *nm;
+
+    nm = X509_get_subject_name(x);
+
+    /*
+     * Guard against certificates with an excessive number of names or
+     * constraints causing a computationally expensive name constraints check.
+     */
+    if (!add_lengths(&name_count, X509_NAME_entry_count(nm),
+                     sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(x->altname))
+        || !add_lengths(&constraint_count,
+                        sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_num(nc->permittedSubtrees),
+                        sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_num(nc->excludedSubtrees))
+        || (name_count > 0 && constraint_count > NAME_CHECK_MAX / name_count))
+        return X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+    if (X509_NAME_entry_count(nm) > 0) {
+        GENERAL_NAME gntmp;
+        gntmp.type = GEN_DIRNAME;
+        gntmp.d.directoryName = nm;
+
+        r = nc_match(&gntmp, nc);
+
+        if (r != X509_V_OK)
+            return r;
+
+        gntmp.type = GEN_EMAIL;
+
+        /* Process any email address attributes in subject name */
+
+        for (i = -1;;) {
+            const X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne;
+
+            i = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(nm, NID_pkcs9_emailAddress, i);
+            if (i == -1)
+                break;
+            ne = X509_NAME_get_entry(nm, i);
+            gntmp.d.rfc822Name = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(ne);
+            if (gntmp.d.rfc822Name->type != V_ASN1_IA5STRING)
+                return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX;
+
+            r = nc_match(&gntmp, nc);
+
+            if (r != X509_V_OK)
+                return r;
+        }
+
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(x->altname); i++) {
+        GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(x->altname, i);
+        r = nc_match(gen, nc);
+        if (r != X509_V_OK)
+            return r;
+    }
+
+    return X509_V_OK;
+
+}
+
+int NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check_CN(X509 *x, NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc)
+{
+    int r, i;
+    X509_NAME *nm;
+
+    ASN1_STRING stmp;
+    GENERAL_NAME gntmp;
+    stmp.flags = 0;
+    stmp.type = V_ASN1_IA5STRING;
+    gntmp.type = GEN_DNS;
+    gntmp.d.dNSName = &stmp;
+
+    nm = X509_get_subject_name(x);
+
+    /* Process any commonName attributes in subject name */
+
+    for (i = -1;;) {
+        X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne;
+        ASN1_STRING *hn;
+        i = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(nm, NID_commonName, i);
+        if (i == -1)
+            break;
+        ne = X509_NAME_get_entry(nm, i);
+        hn = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(ne);
+        /* Only process attributes that look like host names */
+        if (asn1_valid_host(hn)) {
+            unsigned char *h;
+            int hlen = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&h, hn);
+            if (hlen <= 0)
+                return X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
+
+            stmp.length = hlen;
+            stmp.data = h;
+
+            r = nc_match(&gntmp, nc);
+
+            OPENSSL_free(h);
+
+            if (r != X509_V_OK)
+                    return r;
+        }
+    }
+    return X509_V_OK;
+}
+
+static int nc_match(GENERAL_NAME *gen, NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc)
+{
+    GENERAL_SUBTREE *sub;
+    int i, r, match = 0;
+
+    /*
+     * Permitted subtrees: if any subtrees exist of matching the type at
+     * least one subtree must match.
+     */
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_num(nc->permittedSubtrees); i++) {
+        sub = sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_value(nc->permittedSubtrees, i);
+        if (gen->type != sub->base->type)
+            continue;
+        if (sub->minimum || sub->maximum)
+            return X509_V_ERR_SUBTREE_MINMAX;
+        /* If we already have a match don't bother trying any more */
+        if (match == 2)
+            continue;
+        if (match == 0)
+            match = 1;
+        r = nc_match_single(gen, sub->base);
+        if (r == X509_V_OK)
+            match = 2;
+        else if (r != X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION)
+            return r;
+    }
+
+    if (match == 1)
+        return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
+
+    /* Excluded subtrees: must not match any of these */
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_num(nc->excludedSubtrees); i++) {
+        sub = sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_value(nc->excludedSubtrees, i);
+        if (gen->type != sub->base->type)
+            continue;
+        if (sub->minimum || sub->maximum)
+            return X509_V_ERR_SUBTREE_MINMAX;
+
+        r = nc_match_single(gen, sub->base);
+        if (r == X509_V_OK)
+            return X509_V_ERR_EXCLUDED_VIOLATION;
+        else if (r != X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION)
+            return r;
+
+    }
+
+    return X509_V_OK;
+
+}
+
+static int nc_match_single(GENERAL_NAME *gen, GENERAL_NAME *base)
+{
+    switch (base->type) {
+    case GEN_DIRNAME:
+        return nc_dn(gen->d.directoryName, base->d.directoryName);
+
+    case GEN_DNS:
+        return nc_dns(gen->d.dNSName, base->d.dNSName);
+
+    case GEN_EMAIL:
+        return nc_email(gen->d.rfc822Name, base->d.rfc822Name);
+
+    case GEN_URI:
+        return nc_uri(gen->d.uniformResourceIdentifier,
+                      base->d.uniformResourceIdentifier);
+
+    case GEN_IPADD:
+        return nc_ip(gen->d.iPAddress, base->d.iPAddress);
+
+    default:
+        return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CONSTRAINT_TYPE;
+    }
+
+}
+
+/*
+ * directoryName name constraint matching. The canonical encoding of
+ * X509_NAME makes this comparison easy. It is matched if the subtree is a
+ * subset of the name.
+ */
+
+static int nc_dn(X509_NAME *nm, X509_NAME *base)
+{
+    /* Ensure canonical encodings are up to date.  */
+    if (nm->modified && i2d_X509_NAME(nm, NULL) < 0)
+        return X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
+    if (base->modified && i2d_X509_NAME(base, NULL) < 0)
+        return X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
+    if (base->canon_enclen > nm->canon_enclen)
+        return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
+    if (memcmp(base->canon_enc, nm->canon_enc, base->canon_enclen))
+        return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
+    return X509_V_OK;
+}
+
+static int nc_dns(ASN1_IA5STRING *dns, ASN1_IA5STRING *base)
+{
+    char *baseptr = (char *)base->data;
+    char *dnsptr = (char *)dns->data;
+    /* Empty matches everything */
+    if (!*baseptr)
+        return X509_V_OK;
+    /*
+     * Otherwise can add zero or more components on the left so compare RHS
+     * and if dns is longer and expect '.' as preceding character.
+     */
+    if (dns->length > base->length) {
+        dnsptr += dns->length - base->length;
+        if (*baseptr != '.' && dnsptr[-1] != '.')
+            return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
+    }
+
+    if (ia5casecmp(baseptr, dnsptr))
+        return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
+
+    return X509_V_OK;
+
+}
+
+static int nc_email(ASN1_IA5STRING *eml, ASN1_IA5STRING *base)
+{
+    const char *baseptr = (char *)base->data;
+    const char *emlptr = (char *)eml->data;
+
+    const char *baseat = strchr(baseptr, '@');
+    const char *emlat = strchr(emlptr, '@');
+    if (!emlat)
+        return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX;
+    /* Special case: initial '.' is RHS match */
+    if (!baseat && (*baseptr == '.')) {
+        if (eml->length > base->length) {
+            emlptr += eml->length - base->length;
+            if (ia5casecmp(baseptr, emlptr) == 0)
+                return X509_V_OK;
+        }
+        return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
+    }
+
+    /* If we have anything before '@' match local part */
+
+    if (baseat) {
+        if (baseat != baseptr) {
+            if ((baseat - baseptr) != (emlat - emlptr))
+                return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
+            /* Case sensitive match of local part */
+            if (strncmp(baseptr, emlptr, emlat - emlptr))
+                return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
+        }
+        /* Position base after '@' */
+        baseptr = baseat + 1;
+    }
+    emlptr = emlat + 1;
+    /* Just have hostname left to match: case insensitive */
+    if (ia5casecmp(baseptr, emlptr))
+        return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
+
+    return X509_V_OK;
+
+}
+
+static int nc_uri(ASN1_IA5STRING *uri, ASN1_IA5STRING *base)
+{
+    const char *baseptr = (char *)base->data;
+    const char *hostptr = (char *)uri->data;
+    const char *p = strchr(hostptr, ':');
+    int hostlen;
+    /* Check for foo:// and skip past it */
+    if (!p || (p[1] != '/') || (p[2] != '/'))
+        return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX;
+    hostptr = p + 3;
+
+    /* Determine length of hostname part of URI */
+
+    /* Look for a port indicator as end of hostname first */
+
+    p = strchr(hostptr, ':');
+    /* Otherwise look for trailing slash */
+    if (!p)
+        p = strchr(hostptr, '/');
+
+    if (!p)
+        hostlen = strlen(hostptr);
+    else
+        hostlen = p - hostptr;
+
+    if (hostlen == 0)
+        return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX;
+
+    /* Special case: initial '.' is RHS match */
+    if (*baseptr == '.') {
+        if (hostlen > base->length) {
+            p = hostptr + hostlen - base->length;
+            if (ia5ncasecmp(p, baseptr, base->length) == 0)
+                return X509_V_OK;
+        }
+        return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
+    }
+
+    if ((base->length != (int)hostlen)
+        || ia5ncasecmp(hostptr, baseptr, hostlen))
+        return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
+
+    return X509_V_OK;
+
+}
+
+static int nc_ip(ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ip, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *base)
+{
+    int hostlen, baselen, i;
+    unsigned char *hostptr, *baseptr, *maskptr;
+    hostptr = ip->data;
+    hostlen = ip->length;
+    baseptr = base->data;
+    baselen = base->length;
+
+    /* Invalid if not IPv4 or IPv6 */
+    if (!((hostlen == 4) || (hostlen == 16)))
+        return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX;
+    if (!((baselen == 8) || (baselen == 32)))
+        return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX;
+
+    /* Do not match IPv4 with IPv6 */
+    if (hostlen * 2 != baselen)
+        return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
+
+    maskptr = base->data + hostlen;
+
+    /* Considering possible not aligned base ipAddress */
+    /* Not checking for wrong mask definition: i.e.: 255.0.255.0 */
+    for (i = 0; i < hostlen; i++)
+        if ((hostptr[i] & maskptr[i]) != (baseptr[i] & maskptr[i]))
+            return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
+
+    return X509_V_OK;
+
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_pci.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_pci.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2c05edb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_pci.c
@@ -0,0 +1,321 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* Copyright (c) 2004 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan
+ * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden).
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/conf.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include "ext_dat.h"
+
+static int i2r_pci(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION *ext,
+                   BIO *out, int indent);
+static PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION *r2i_pci(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
+                                          X509V3_CTX *ctx, char *str);
+
+const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_pci =
+    { NID_proxyCertInfo, 0, ASN1_ITEM_ref(PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION),
+    0, 0, 0, 0,
+    0, 0,
+    NULL, NULL,
+    (X509V3_EXT_I2R)i2r_pci,
+    (X509V3_EXT_R2I)r2i_pci,
+    NULL,
+};
+
+static int i2r_pci(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION *pci,
+                   BIO *out, int indent)
+{
+    BIO_printf(out, "%*sPath Length Constraint: ", indent, "");
+    if (pci->pcPathLengthConstraint)
+        i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(out, pci->pcPathLengthConstraint);
+    else
+        BIO_printf(out, "infinite");
+    BIO_puts(out, "\n");
+    BIO_printf(out, "%*sPolicy Language: ", indent, "");
+    i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(out, pci->proxyPolicy->policyLanguage);
+    BIO_puts(out, "\n");
+    if (pci->proxyPolicy->policy && pci->proxyPolicy->policy->data)
+        BIO_printf(out, "%*sPolicy Text: %s\n", indent, "",
+                   pci->proxyPolicy->policy->data);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int process_pci_value(CONF_VALUE *val,
+                             ASN1_OBJECT **language, ASN1_INTEGER **pathlen,
+                             ASN1_OCTET_STRING **policy)
+{
+    int free_policy = 0;
+
+    if (strcmp(val->name, "language") == 0) {
+        if (*language) {
+            X509V3err(X509V3_F_PROCESS_PCI_VALUE,
+                      X509V3_R_POLICY_LANGUAGE_ALREADY_DEFINED);
+            X509V3_conf_err(val);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        if ((*language = OBJ_txt2obj(val->value, 0)) == NULL) {
+            X509V3err(X509V3_F_PROCESS_PCI_VALUE,
+                      X509V3_R_INVALID_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER);
+            X509V3_conf_err(val);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    } else if (strcmp(val->name, "pathlen") == 0) {
+        if (*pathlen) {
+            X509V3err(X509V3_F_PROCESS_PCI_VALUE,
+                      X509V3_R_POLICY_PATH_LENGTH_ALREADY_DEFINED);
+            X509V3_conf_err(val);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        if (!X509V3_get_value_int(val, pathlen)) {
+            X509V3err(X509V3_F_PROCESS_PCI_VALUE,
+                      X509V3_R_POLICY_PATH_LENGTH);
+            X509V3_conf_err(val);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    } else if (strcmp(val->name, "policy") == 0) {
+        unsigned char *tmp_data = NULL;
+        long val_len;
+        if (!*policy) {
+            *policy = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
+            if (*policy == NULL) {
+                X509V3err(X509V3_F_PROCESS_PCI_VALUE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                X509V3_conf_err(val);
+                return 0;
+            }
+            free_policy = 1;
+        }
+        if (strncmp(val->value, "hex:", 4) == 0) {
+            unsigned char *tmp_data2 =
+                OPENSSL_hexstr2buf(val->value + 4, &val_len);
+
+            if (!tmp_data2) {
+                X509V3_conf_err(val);
+                goto err;
+            }
+
+            tmp_data = OPENSSL_realloc((*policy)->data,
+                                       (*policy)->length + val_len + 1);
+            if (tmp_data) {
+                (*policy)->data = tmp_data;
+                memcpy(&(*policy)->data[(*policy)->length],
+                       tmp_data2, val_len);
+                (*policy)->length += val_len;
+                (*policy)->data[(*policy)->length] = '\0';
+            } else {
+                OPENSSL_free(tmp_data2);
+                /*
+                 * realloc failure implies the original data space is b0rked
+                 * too!
+                 */
+                OPENSSL_free((*policy)->data);
+                (*policy)->data = NULL;
+                (*policy)->length = 0;
+                X509V3err(X509V3_F_PROCESS_PCI_VALUE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                X509V3_conf_err(val);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            OPENSSL_free(tmp_data2);
+        } else if (strncmp(val->value, "file:", 5) == 0) {
+            unsigned char buf[2048];
+            int n;
+            BIO *b = BIO_new_file(val->value + 5, "r");
+            if (!b) {
+                X509V3err(X509V3_F_PROCESS_PCI_VALUE, ERR_R_BIO_LIB);
+                X509V3_conf_err(val);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            while ((n = BIO_read(b, buf, sizeof(buf))) > 0
+                   || (n == 0 && BIO_should_retry(b))) {
+                if (!n)
+                    continue;
+
+                tmp_data = OPENSSL_realloc((*policy)->data,
+                                           (*policy)->length + n + 1);
+
+                if (!tmp_data) {
+                    OPENSSL_free((*policy)->data);
+                    (*policy)->data = NULL;
+                    (*policy)->length = 0;
+                    X509V3err(X509V3_F_PROCESS_PCI_VALUE,
+                              ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                    X509V3_conf_err(val);
+                    BIO_free_all(b);
+                    goto err;
+                }
+
+                (*policy)->data = tmp_data;
+                memcpy(&(*policy)->data[(*policy)->length], buf, n);
+                (*policy)->length += n;
+                (*policy)->data[(*policy)->length] = '\0';
+            }
+            BIO_free_all(b);
+
+            if (n < 0) {
+                X509V3err(X509V3_F_PROCESS_PCI_VALUE, ERR_R_BIO_LIB);
+                X509V3_conf_err(val);
+                goto err;
+            }
+        } else if (strncmp(val->value, "text:", 5) == 0) {
+            val_len = strlen(val->value + 5);
+            tmp_data = OPENSSL_realloc((*policy)->data,
+                                       (*policy)->length + val_len + 1);
+            if (tmp_data) {
+                (*policy)->data = tmp_data;
+                memcpy(&(*policy)->data[(*policy)->length],
+                       val->value + 5, val_len);
+                (*policy)->length += val_len;
+                (*policy)->data[(*policy)->length] = '\0';
+            } else {
+                /*
+                 * realloc failure implies the original data space is b0rked
+                 * too!
+                 */
+                OPENSSL_free((*policy)->data);
+                (*policy)->data = NULL;
+                (*policy)->length = 0;
+                X509V3err(X509V3_F_PROCESS_PCI_VALUE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                X509V3_conf_err(val);
+                goto err;
+            }
+        } else {
+            X509V3err(X509V3_F_PROCESS_PCI_VALUE,
+                      X509V3_R_INCORRECT_POLICY_SYNTAX_TAG);
+            X509V3_conf_err(val);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (!tmp_data) {
+            X509V3err(X509V3_F_PROCESS_PCI_VALUE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            X509V3_conf_err(val);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+    return 1;
+ err:
+    if (free_policy) {
+        ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(*policy);
+        *policy = NULL;
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION *r2i_pci(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
+                                          X509V3_CTX *ctx, char *value)
+{
+    PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION *pci = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *vals;
+    ASN1_OBJECT *language = NULL;
+    ASN1_INTEGER *pathlen = NULL;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *policy = NULL;
+    int i, j;
+
+    vals = X509V3_parse_list(value);
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(vals); i++) {
+        CONF_VALUE *cnf = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(vals, i);
+        if (!cnf->name || (*cnf->name != '@' && !cnf->value)) {
+            X509V3err(X509V3_F_R2I_PCI,
+                      X509V3_R_INVALID_PROXY_POLICY_SETTING);
+            X509V3_conf_err(cnf);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (*cnf->name == '@') {
+            STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *sect;
+            int success_p = 1;
+
+            sect = X509V3_get_section(ctx, cnf->name + 1);
+            if (!sect) {
+                X509V3err(X509V3_F_R2I_PCI, X509V3_R_INVALID_SECTION);
+                X509V3_conf_err(cnf);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            for (j = 0; success_p && j < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(sect); j++) {
+                success_p =
+                    process_pci_value(sk_CONF_VALUE_value(sect, j),
+                                      &language, &pathlen, &policy);
+            }
+            X509V3_section_free(ctx, sect);
+            if (!success_p)
+                goto err;
+        } else {
+            if (!process_pci_value(cnf, &language, &pathlen, &policy)) {
+                X509V3_conf_err(cnf);
+                goto err;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* Language is mandatory */
+    if (!language) {
+        X509V3err(X509V3_F_R2I_PCI,
+                  X509V3_R_NO_PROXY_CERT_POLICY_LANGUAGE_DEFINED);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    i = OBJ_obj2nid(language);
+    if ((i == NID_Independent || i == NID_id_ppl_inheritAll) && policy) {
+        X509V3err(X509V3_F_R2I_PCI,
+                  X509V3_R_POLICY_WHEN_PROXY_LANGUAGE_REQUIRES_NO_POLICY);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    pci = PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION_new();
+    if (pci == NULL) {
+        X509V3err(X509V3_F_R2I_PCI, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    pci->proxyPolicy->policyLanguage = language;
+    language = NULL;
+    pci->proxyPolicy->policy = policy;
+    policy = NULL;
+    pci->pcPathLengthConstraint = pathlen;
+    pathlen = NULL;
+    goto end;
+ err:
+    ASN1_OBJECT_free(language);
+    ASN1_INTEGER_free(pathlen);
+    pathlen = NULL;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(policy);
+    policy = NULL;
+    PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION_free(pci);
+    pci = NULL;
+ end:
+    sk_CONF_VALUE_pop_free(vals, X509V3_conf_free);
+    return pci;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_pcia.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_pcia.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e6f7a91
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_pcia.c
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* Copyright (c) 2004 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan
+ * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden).
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(PROXY_POLICY) =
+        {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(PROXY_POLICY,policyLanguage,ASN1_OBJECT),
+        ASN1_OPT(PROXY_POLICY,policy,ASN1_OCTET_STRING)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(PROXY_POLICY)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PROXY_POLICY)
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION) =
+        {
+        ASN1_OPT(PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION,pcPathLengthConstraint,ASN1_INTEGER),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION,proxyPolicy,PROXY_POLICY)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION)
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_pcons.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_pcons.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..24f7ff4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_pcons.c
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2003-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/conf.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include "ext_dat.h"
+
+static STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *i2v_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD
+                                                    *method, void *bcons, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE)
+                                                    *extlist);
+static void *v2i_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
+                                    X509V3_CTX *ctx,
+                                    STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *values);
+
+const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_policy_constraints = {
+    NID_policy_constraints, 0,
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(POLICY_CONSTRAINTS),
+    0, 0, 0, 0,
+    0, 0,
+    i2v_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS,
+    v2i_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS,
+    NULL, NULL,
+    NULL
+};
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(POLICY_CONSTRAINTS) = {
+        ASN1_IMP_OPT(POLICY_CONSTRAINTS, requireExplicitPolicy, ASN1_INTEGER,0),
+        ASN1_IMP_OPT(POLICY_CONSTRAINTS, inhibitPolicyMapping, ASN1_INTEGER,1)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(POLICY_CONSTRAINTS)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(POLICY_CONSTRAINTS)
+
+static STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *i2v_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD
+                                                    *method, void *a, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE)
+                                                    *extlist)
+{
+    POLICY_CONSTRAINTS *pcons = a;
+    X509V3_add_value_int("Require Explicit Policy",
+                         pcons->requireExplicitPolicy, &extlist);
+    X509V3_add_value_int("Inhibit Policy Mapping",
+                         pcons->inhibitPolicyMapping, &extlist);
+    return extlist;
+}
+
+static void *v2i_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
+                                    X509V3_CTX *ctx,
+                                    STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *values)
+{
+    POLICY_CONSTRAINTS *pcons = NULL;
+    CONF_VALUE *val;
+    int i;
+
+    if ((pcons = POLICY_CONSTRAINTS_new()) == NULL) {
+        X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(values); i++) {
+        val = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(values, i);
+        if (strcmp(val->name, "requireExplicitPolicy") == 0) {
+            if (!X509V3_get_value_int(val, &pcons->requireExplicitPolicy))
+                goto err;
+        } else if (strcmp(val->name, "inhibitPolicyMapping") == 0) {
+            if (!X509V3_get_value_int(val, &pcons->inhibitPolicyMapping))
+                goto err;
+        } else {
+            X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS, X509V3_R_INVALID_NAME);
+            X509V3_conf_err(val);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+    if (!pcons->inhibitPolicyMapping && !pcons->requireExplicitPolicy) {
+        X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS,
+                  X509V3_R_ILLEGAL_EMPTY_EXTENSION);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    return pcons;
+ err:
+    POLICY_CONSTRAINTS_free(pcons);
+    return NULL;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_pku.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_pku.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ed82bca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_pku.c
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include "ext_dat.h"
+
+static int i2r_PKEY_USAGE_PERIOD(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
+                                 PKEY_USAGE_PERIOD *usage, BIO *out,
+                                 int indent);
+/*
+ * static PKEY_USAGE_PERIOD *v2i_PKEY_USAGE_PERIOD(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
+ * X509V3_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *values);
+ */
+const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_pkey_usage_period = {
+    NID_private_key_usage_period, 0, ASN1_ITEM_ref(PKEY_USAGE_PERIOD),
+    0, 0, 0, 0,
+    0, 0, 0, 0,
+    (X509V3_EXT_I2R)i2r_PKEY_USAGE_PERIOD, NULL,
+    NULL
+};
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(PKEY_USAGE_PERIOD) = {
+        ASN1_IMP_OPT(PKEY_USAGE_PERIOD, notBefore, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME, 0),
+        ASN1_IMP_OPT(PKEY_USAGE_PERIOD, notAfter, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME, 1)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(PKEY_USAGE_PERIOD)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PKEY_USAGE_PERIOD)
+
+static int i2r_PKEY_USAGE_PERIOD(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
+                                 PKEY_USAGE_PERIOD *usage, BIO *out,
+                                 int indent)
+{
+    BIO_printf(out, "%*s", indent, "");
+    if (usage->notBefore) {
+        BIO_write(out, "Not Before: ", 12);
+        ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(out, usage->notBefore);
+        if (usage->notAfter)
+            BIO_write(out, ", ", 2);
+    }
+    if (usage->notAfter) {
+        BIO_write(out, "Not After: ", 11);
+        ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(out, usage->notAfter);
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*-
+static PKEY_USAGE_PERIOD *v2i_PKEY_USAGE_PERIOD(method, ctx, values)
+X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method;
+X509V3_CTX *ctx;
+STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *values;
+{
+return NULL;
+}
+*/
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_pmaps.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_pmaps.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..73f4ec2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_pmaps.c
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2003-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/conf.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include "ext_dat.h"
+
+static void *v2i_POLICY_MAPPINGS(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
+                                 X509V3_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nval);
+static STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *i2v_POLICY_MAPPINGS(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD
+                                                 *method, void *pmps, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE)
+                                                 *extlist);
+
+const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_policy_mappings = {
+    NID_policy_mappings, 0,
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(POLICY_MAPPINGS),
+    0, 0, 0, 0,
+    0, 0,
+    i2v_POLICY_MAPPINGS,
+    v2i_POLICY_MAPPINGS,
+    0, 0,
+    NULL
+};
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(POLICY_MAPPING) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(POLICY_MAPPING, issuerDomainPolicy, ASN1_OBJECT),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(POLICY_MAPPING, subjectDomainPolicy, ASN1_OBJECT)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(POLICY_MAPPING)
+
+ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE(POLICY_MAPPINGS) =
+        ASN1_EX_TEMPLATE_TYPE(ASN1_TFLG_SEQUENCE_OF, 0, POLICY_MAPPINGS,
+                                                                POLICY_MAPPING)
+ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE_END(POLICY_MAPPINGS)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(POLICY_MAPPING)
+
+static STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *i2v_POLICY_MAPPINGS(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD
+                                                 *method, void *a, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE)
+                                                 *ext_list)
+{
+    POLICY_MAPPINGS *pmaps = a;
+    POLICY_MAPPING *pmap;
+    int i;
+    char obj_tmp1[80];
+    char obj_tmp2[80];
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_POLICY_MAPPING_num(pmaps); i++) {
+        pmap = sk_POLICY_MAPPING_value(pmaps, i);
+        i2t_ASN1_OBJECT(obj_tmp1, 80, pmap->issuerDomainPolicy);
+        i2t_ASN1_OBJECT(obj_tmp2, 80, pmap->subjectDomainPolicy);
+        X509V3_add_value(obj_tmp1, obj_tmp2, &ext_list);
+    }
+    return ext_list;
+}
+
+static void *v2i_POLICY_MAPPINGS(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
+                                 X509V3_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nval)
+{
+    POLICY_MAPPINGS *pmaps = NULL;
+    POLICY_MAPPING *pmap = NULL;
+    ASN1_OBJECT *obj1 = NULL, *obj2 = NULL;
+    CONF_VALUE *val;
+    int i;
+
+    if ((pmaps = sk_POLICY_MAPPING_new_null()) == NULL) {
+        X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_POLICY_MAPPINGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(nval); i++) {
+        val = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(nval, i);
+        if (!val->value || !val->name) {
+            X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_POLICY_MAPPINGS,
+                      X509V3_R_INVALID_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER);
+            X509V3_conf_err(val);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        obj1 = OBJ_txt2obj(val->name, 0);
+        obj2 = OBJ_txt2obj(val->value, 0);
+        if (!obj1 || !obj2) {
+            X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_POLICY_MAPPINGS,
+                      X509V3_R_INVALID_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER);
+            X509V3_conf_err(val);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        pmap = POLICY_MAPPING_new();
+        if (pmap == NULL) {
+            X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_POLICY_MAPPINGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        pmap->issuerDomainPolicy = obj1;
+        pmap->subjectDomainPolicy = obj2;
+        obj1 = obj2 = NULL;
+        sk_POLICY_MAPPING_push(pmaps, pmap);
+    }
+    return pmaps;
+ err:
+    ASN1_OBJECT_free(obj1);
+    ASN1_OBJECT_free(obj2);
+    sk_POLICY_MAPPING_pop_free(pmaps, POLICY_MAPPING_free);
+    return NULL;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_prn.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_prn.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f384c34
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_prn.c
@@ -0,0 +1,210 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* X509 v3 extension utilities */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/conf.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+
+/* Extension printing routines */
+
+static int unknown_ext_print(BIO *out, const unsigned char *ext, int extlen,
+                             unsigned long flag, int indent, int supported);
+
+/* Print out a name+value stack */
+
+void X509V3_EXT_val_prn(BIO *out, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *val, int indent,
+                        int ml)
+{
+    int i;
+    CONF_VALUE *nval;
+    if (!val)
+        return;
+    if (!ml || !sk_CONF_VALUE_num(val)) {
+        BIO_printf(out, "%*s", indent, "");
+        if (!sk_CONF_VALUE_num(val))
+            BIO_puts(out, "<EMPTY>\n");
+    }
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(val); i++) {
+        if (ml)
+            BIO_printf(out, "%*s", indent, "");
+        else if (i > 0)
+            BIO_printf(out, ", ");
+        nval = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(val, i);
+        if (!nval->name)
+            BIO_puts(out, nval->value);
+        else if (!nval->value)
+            BIO_puts(out, nval->name);
+#ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+        else
+            BIO_printf(out, "%s:%s", nval->name, nval->value);
+#else
+        else {
+            int len;
+            char *tmp;
+            len = strlen(nval->value) + 1;
+            tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
+            if (tmp != NULL) {
+                ascii2ebcdic(tmp, nval->value, len);
+                BIO_printf(out, "%s:%s", nval->name, tmp);
+                OPENSSL_free(tmp);
+            }
+        }
+#endif
+        if (ml)
+            BIO_puts(out, "\n");
+    }
+}
+
+/* Main routine: print out a general extension */
+
+int X509V3_EXT_print(BIO *out, X509_EXTENSION *ext, unsigned long flag,
+                     int indent)
+{
+    void *ext_str = NULL;
+    char *value = NULL;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *extoct;
+    const unsigned char *p;
+    int extlen;
+    const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method;
+    STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nval = NULL;
+    int ok = 1;
+
+    extoct = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(ext);
+    p = ASN1_STRING_get0_data(extoct);
+    extlen = ASN1_STRING_length(extoct);
+
+    if ((method = X509V3_EXT_get(ext)) == NULL)
+        return unknown_ext_print(out, p, extlen, flag, indent, 0);
+    if (method->it)
+        ext_str = ASN1_item_d2i(NULL, &p, extlen, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(method->it));
+    else
+        ext_str = method->d2i(NULL, &p, extlen);
+
+    if (!ext_str)
+        return unknown_ext_print(out, p, extlen, flag, indent, 1);
+
+    if (method->i2s) {
+        if ((value = method->i2s(method, ext_str)) == NULL) {
+            ok = 0;
+            goto err;
+        }
+#ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+        BIO_printf(out, "%*s%s", indent, "", value);
+#else
+        {
+            int len;
+            char *tmp;
+            len = strlen(value) + 1;
+            tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
+            if (tmp != NULL) {
+                ascii2ebcdic(tmp, value, len);
+                BIO_printf(out, "%*s%s", indent, "", tmp);
+                OPENSSL_free(tmp);
+            }
+        }
+#endif
+    } else if (method->i2v) {
+        if ((nval = method->i2v(method, ext_str, NULL)) == NULL) {
+            ok = 0;
+            goto err;
+        }
+        X509V3_EXT_val_prn(out, nval, indent,
+                           method->ext_flags & X509V3_EXT_MULTILINE);
+    } else if (method->i2r) {
+        if (!method->i2r(method, ext_str, out, indent))
+            ok = 0;
+    } else
+        ok = 0;
+
+ err:
+    sk_CONF_VALUE_pop_free(nval, X509V3_conf_free);
+    OPENSSL_free(value);
+    if (method->it)
+        ASN1_item_free(ext_str, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(method->it));
+    else
+        method->ext_free(ext_str);
+    return ok;
+}
+
+int X509V3_extensions_print(BIO *bp, const char *title,
+                            const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts,
+                            unsigned long flag, int indent)
+{
+    int i, j;
+
+    if (sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts) <= 0)
+        return 1;
+
+    if (title) {
+        BIO_printf(bp, "%*s%s:\n", indent, "", title);
+        indent += 4;
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts); i++) {
+        ASN1_OBJECT *obj;
+        X509_EXTENSION *ex;
+        ex = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(exts, i);
+        if (indent && BIO_printf(bp, "%*s", indent, "") <= 0)
+            return 0;
+        obj = X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex);
+        i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, obj);
+        j = X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ex);
+        if (BIO_printf(bp, ": %s\n", j ? "critical" : "") <= 0)
+            return 0;
+        if (!X509V3_EXT_print(bp, ex, flag, indent + 4)) {
+            BIO_printf(bp, "%*s", indent + 4, "");
+            ASN1_STRING_print(bp, X509_EXTENSION_get_data(ex));
+        }
+        if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) <= 0)
+            return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int unknown_ext_print(BIO *out, const unsigned char *ext, int extlen,
+                             unsigned long flag, int indent, int supported)
+{
+    switch (flag & X509V3_EXT_UNKNOWN_MASK) {
+
+    case X509V3_EXT_DEFAULT:
+        return 0;
+
+    case X509V3_EXT_ERROR_UNKNOWN:
+        if (supported)
+            BIO_printf(out, "%*s<Parse Error>", indent, "");
+        else
+            BIO_printf(out, "%*s<Not Supported>", indent, "");
+        return 1;
+
+    case X509V3_EXT_PARSE_UNKNOWN:
+        return ASN1_parse_dump(out, ext, extlen, indent, -1);
+    case X509V3_EXT_DUMP_UNKNOWN:
+        return BIO_dump_indent(out, (const char *)ext, extlen, indent);
+
+    default:
+        return 1;
+    }
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+int X509V3_EXT_print_fp(FILE *fp, X509_EXTENSION *ext, int flag, int indent)
+{
+    BIO *bio_tmp;
+    int ret;
+
+    if ((bio_tmp = BIO_new_fp(fp, BIO_NOCLOSE)) == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    ret = X509V3_EXT_print(bio_tmp, ext, flag, indent);
+    BIO_free(bio_tmp);
+    return ret;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6d2f354
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c
@@ -0,0 +1,873 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "internal/numbers.h"
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/x509_vfy.h>
+#include "internal/x509_int.h"
+
+static void x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x);
+
+static int check_ssl_ca(const X509 *x);
+static int check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
+                                    int ca);
+static int check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
+                                    int ca);
+static int check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
+                                       int ca);
+static int purpose_smime(const X509 *x, int ca);
+static int check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
+                                    int ca);
+static int check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
+                                       int ca);
+static int check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
+                                  int ca);
+static int check_purpose_timestamp_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
+                                        int ca);
+static int no_check(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
+static int ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
+
+static int xp_cmp(const X509_PURPOSE *const *a, const X509_PURPOSE *const *b);
+static void xptable_free(X509_PURPOSE *p);
+
+static X509_PURPOSE xstandard[] = {
+    {X509_PURPOSE_SSL_CLIENT, X509_TRUST_SSL_CLIENT, 0,
+     check_purpose_ssl_client, "SSL client", "sslclient", NULL},
+    {X509_PURPOSE_SSL_SERVER, X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, 0,
+     check_purpose_ssl_server, "SSL server", "sslserver", NULL},
+    {X509_PURPOSE_NS_SSL_SERVER, X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, 0,
+     check_purpose_ns_ssl_server, "Netscape SSL server", "nssslserver", NULL},
+    {X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_SIGN, X509_TRUST_EMAIL, 0, check_purpose_smime_sign,
+     "S/MIME signing", "smimesign", NULL},
+    {X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_ENCRYPT, X509_TRUST_EMAIL, 0,
+     check_purpose_smime_encrypt, "S/MIME encryption", "smimeencrypt", NULL},
+    {X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN, X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, check_purpose_crl_sign,
+     "CRL signing", "crlsign", NULL},
+    {X509_PURPOSE_ANY, X509_TRUST_DEFAULT, 0, no_check, "Any Purpose", "any",
+     NULL},
+    {X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER, X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, ocsp_helper,
+     "OCSP helper", "ocsphelper", NULL},
+    {X509_PURPOSE_TIMESTAMP_SIGN, X509_TRUST_TSA, 0,
+     check_purpose_timestamp_sign, "Time Stamp signing", "timestampsign",
+     NULL},
+};
+
+#define X509_PURPOSE_COUNT OSSL_NELEM(xstandard)
+
+static STACK_OF(X509_PURPOSE) *xptable = NULL;
+
+static int xp_cmp(const X509_PURPOSE *const *a, const X509_PURPOSE *const *b)
+{
+    return (*a)->purpose - (*b)->purpose;
+}
+
+/*
+ * As much as I'd like to make X509_check_purpose use a "const" X509* I
+ * really can't because it does recalculate hashes and do other non-const
+ * things.
+ */
+int X509_check_purpose(X509 *x, int id, int ca)
+{
+    int idx;
+    const X509_PURPOSE *pt;
+    if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET)) {
+        CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(x->lock);
+        x509v3_cache_extensions(x);
+        CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(x->lock);
+    }
+    /* Return if side-effect only call */
+    if (id == -1)
+        return 1;
+    idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(id);
+    if (idx == -1)
+        return -1;
+    pt = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
+    return pt->check_purpose(pt, x, ca);
+}
+
+int X509_PURPOSE_set(int *p, int purpose)
+{
+    if (X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose) == -1) {
+        X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_SET, X509V3_R_INVALID_PURPOSE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    *p = purpose;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int X509_PURPOSE_get_count(void)
+{
+    if (!xptable)
+        return X509_PURPOSE_COUNT;
+    return sk_X509_PURPOSE_num(xptable) + X509_PURPOSE_COUNT;
+}
+
+X509_PURPOSE *X509_PURPOSE_get0(int idx)
+{
+    if (idx < 0)
+        return NULL;
+    if (idx < (int)X509_PURPOSE_COUNT)
+        return xstandard + idx;
+    return sk_X509_PURPOSE_value(xptable, idx - X509_PURPOSE_COUNT);
+}
+
+int X509_PURPOSE_get_by_sname(const char *sname)
+{
+    int i;
+    X509_PURPOSE *xptmp;
+    for (i = 0; i < X509_PURPOSE_get_count(); i++) {
+        xptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(i);
+        if (strcmp(xptmp->sname, sname) == 0)
+            return i;
+    }
+    return -1;
+}
+
+int X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(int purpose)
+{
+    X509_PURPOSE tmp;
+    int idx;
+    if ((purpose >= X509_PURPOSE_MIN) && (purpose <= X509_PURPOSE_MAX))
+        return purpose - X509_PURPOSE_MIN;
+    tmp.purpose = purpose;
+    if (!xptable)
+        return -1;
+    idx = sk_X509_PURPOSE_find(xptable, &tmp);
+    if (idx == -1)
+        return -1;
+    return idx + X509_PURPOSE_COUNT;
+}
+
+int X509_PURPOSE_add(int id, int trust, int flags,
+                     int (*ck) (const X509_PURPOSE *, const X509 *, int),
+                     const char *name, const char *sname, void *arg)
+{
+    int idx;
+    X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
+    /*
+     * This is set according to what we change: application can't set it
+     */
+    flags &= ~X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC;
+    /* This will always be set for application modified trust entries */
+    flags |= X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME;
+    /* Get existing entry if any */
+    idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(id);
+    /* Need a new entry */
+    if (idx == -1) {
+        if ((ptmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ptmp))) == NULL) {
+            X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        ptmp->flags = X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC;
+    } else
+        ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
+
+    /* OPENSSL_free existing name if dynamic */
+    if (ptmp->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME) {
+        OPENSSL_free(ptmp->name);
+        OPENSSL_free(ptmp->sname);
+    }
+    /* dup supplied name */
+    ptmp->name = OPENSSL_strdup(name);
+    ptmp->sname = OPENSSL_strdup(sname);
+    if (!ptmp->name || !ptmp->sname) {
+        X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    /* Keep the dynamic flag of existing entry */
+    ptmp->flags &= X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC;
+    /* Set all other flags */
+    ptmp->flags |= flags;
+
+    ptmp->purpose = id;
+    ptmp->trust = trust;
+    ptmp->check_purpose = ck;
+    ptmp->usr_data = arg;
+
+    /* If its a new entry manage the dynamic table */
+    if (idx == -1) {
+        if (xptable == NULL
+            && (xptable = sk_X509_PURPOSE_new(xp_cmp)) == NULL) {
+            X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (!sk_X509_PURPOSE_push(xptable, ptmp)) {
+            X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+    return 1;
+ err:
+    if (idx == -1) {
+        OPENSSL_free(ptmp->name);
+        OPENSSL_free(ptmp->sname);
+        OPENSSL_free(ptmp);
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static void xptable_free(X509_PURPOSE *p)
+{
+    if (!p)
+        return;
+    if (p->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC) {
+        if (p->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME) {
+            OPENSSL_free(p->name);
+            OPENSSL_free(p->sname);
+        }
+        OPENSSL_free(p);
+    }
+}
+
+void X509_PURPOSE_cleanup(void)
+{
+    sk_X509_PURPOSE_pop_free(xptable, xptable_free);
+    xptable = NULL;
+}
+
+int X509_PURPOSE_get_id(const X509_PURPOSE *xp)
+{
+    return xp->purpose;
+}
+
+char *X509_PURPOSE_get0_name(const X509_PURPOSE *xp)
+{
+    return xp->name;
+}
+
+char *X509_PURPOSE_get0_sname(const X509_PURPOSE *xp)
+{
+    return xp->sname;
+}
+
+int X509_PURPOSE_get_trust(const X509_PURPOSE *xp)
+{
+    return xp->trust;
+}
+
+static int nid_cmp(const int *a, const int *b)
+{
+    return *a - *b;
+}
+
+DECLARE_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(int, int, nid);
+IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(int, int, nid);
+
+int X509_supported_extension(X509_EXTENSION *ex)
+{
+    /*
+     * This table is a list of the NIDs of supported extensions: that is
+     * those which are used by the verify process. If an extension is
+     * critical and doesn't appear in this list then the verify process will
+     * normally reject the certificate. The list must be kept in numerical
+     * order because it will be searched using bsearch.
+     */
+
+    static const int supported_nids[] = {
+        NID_netscape_cert_type, /* 71 */
+        NID_key_usage,          /* 83 */
+        NID_subject_alt_name,   /* 85 */
+        NID_basic_constraints,  /* 87 */
+        NID_certificate_policies, /* 89 */
+        NID_crl_distribution_points, /* 103 */
+        NID_ext_key_usage,      /* 126 */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
+        NID_sbgp_ipAddrBlock,   /* 290 */
+        NID_sbgp_autonomousSysNum, /* 291 */
+#endif
+        NID_policy_constraints, /* 401 */
+        NID_proxyCertInfo,      /* 663 */
+        NID_name_constraints,   /* 666 */
+        NID_policy_mappings,    /* 747 */
+        NID_inhibit_any_policy  /* 748 */
+    };
+
+    int ex_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex));
+
+    if (ex_nid == NID_undef)
+        return 0;
+
+    if (OBJ_bsearch_nid(&ex_nid, supported_nids, OSSL_NELEM(supported_nids)))
+        return 1;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static void setup_dp(X509 *x, DIST_POINT *dp)
+{
+    X509_NAME *iname = NULL;
+    int i;
+    if (dp->reasons) {
+        if (dp->reasons->length > 0)
+            dp->dp_reasons = dp->reasons->data[0];
+        if (dp->reasons->length > 1)
+            dp->dp_reasons |= (dp->reasons->data[1] << 8);
+        dp->dp_reasons &= CRLDP_ALL_REASONS;
+    } else
+        dp->dp_reasons = CRLDP_ALL_REASONS;
+    if (!dp->distpoint || (dp->distpoint->type != 1))
+        return;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) {
+        GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
+        if (gen->type == GEN_DIRNAME) {
+            iname = gen->d.directoryName;
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    if (!iname)
+        iname = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
+
+    DIST_POINT_set_dpname(dp->distpoint, iname);
+
+}
+
+static void setup_crldp(X509 *x)
+{
+    int i;
+    x->crldp = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_crl_distribution_points, NULL, NULL);
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++)
+        setup_dp(x, sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i));
+}
+
+#define V1_ROOT (EXFLAG_V1|EXFLAG_SS)
+#define ku_reject(x, usage) \
+        (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_kusage & (usage)))
+#define xku_reject(x, usage) \
+        (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_xkusage & (usage)))
+#define ns_reject(x, usage) \
+        (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) && !((x)->ex_nscert & (usage)))
+
+static void x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x)
+{
+    BASIC_CONSTRAINTS *bs;
+    PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION *pci;
+    ASN1_BIT_STRING *usage;
+    ASN1_BIT_STRING *ns;
+    EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE *extusage;
+    X509_EXTENSION *ex;
+
+    int i;
+    if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET)
+        return;
+    X509_digest(x, EVP_sha1(), x->sha1_hash, NULL);
+    /* V1 should mean no extensions ... */
+    if (!X509_get_version(x))
+        x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_V1;
+    /* Handle basic constraints */
+    if ((bs = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_basic_constraints, NULL, NULL))) {
+        if (bs->ca)
+            x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CA;
+        if (bs->pathlen) {
+            if ((bs->pathlen->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER)
+                || !bs->ca) {
+                x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
+                x->ex_pathlen = 0;
+            } else
+                x->ex_pathlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(bs->pathlen);
+        } else
+            x->ex_pathlen = -1;
+        BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_free(bs);
+        x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_BCONS;
+    }
+    /* Handle proxy certificates */
+    if ((pci = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_proxyCertInfo, NULL, NULL))) {
+        if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA
+            || X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_subject_alt_name, -1) >= 0
+            || X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_issuer_alt_name, -1) >= 0) {
+            x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
+        }
+        if (pci->pcPathLengthConstraint) {
+            x->ex_pcpathlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(pci->pcPathLengthConstraint);
+        } else
+            x->ex_pcpathlen = -1;
+        PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION_free(pci);
+        x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_PROXY;
+    }
+    /* Handle key usage */
+    if ((usage = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_key_usage, NULL, NULL))) {
+        if (usage->length > 0) {
+            x->ex_kusage = usage->data[0];
+            if (usage->length > 1)
+                x->ex_kusage |= usage->data[1] << 8;
+        } else
+            x->ex_kusage = 0;
+        x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_KUSAGE;
+        ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(usage);
+    }
+    x->ex_xkusage = 0;
+    if ((extusage = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_ext_key_usage, NULL, NULL))) {
+        x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_XKUSAGE;
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(extusage); i++) {
+            switch (OBJ_obj2nid(sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(extusage, i))) {
+            case NID_server_auth:
+                x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SSL_SERVER;
+                break;
+
+            case NID_client_auth:
+                x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SSL_CLIENT;
+                break;
+
+            case NID_email_protect:
+                x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SMIME;
+                break;
+
+            case NID_code_sign:
+                x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_CODE_SIGN;
+                break;
+
+            case NID_ms_sgc:
+            case NID_ns_sgc:
+                x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SGC;
+                break;
+
+            case NID_OCSP_sign:
+                x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_OCSP_SIGN;
+                break;
+
+            case NID_time_stamp:
+                x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_TIMESTAMP;
+                break;
+
+            case NID_dvcs:
+                x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_DVCS;
+                break;
+
+            case NID_anyExtendedKeyUsage:
+                x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_ANYEKU;
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+        sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(extusage, ASN1_OBJECT_free);
+    }
+
+    if ((ns = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_netscape_cert_type, NULL, NULL))) {
+        if (ns->length > 0)
+            x->ex_nscert = ns->data[0];
+        else
+            x->ex_nscert = 0;
+        x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_NSCERT;
+        ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(ns);
+    }
+    x->skid = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_key_identifier, NULL, NULL);
+    x->akid = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_authority_key_identifier, NULL, NULL);
+    /* Does subject name match issuer ? */
+    if (!X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x), X509_get_issuer_name(x))) {
+        x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SI;
+        /* If SKID matches AKID also indicate self signed */
+        if (X509_check_akid(x, x->akid) == X509_V_OK &&
+            !ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN))
+            x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SS;
+    }
+    x->altname = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL);
+    x->nc = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_name_constraints, &i, NULL);
+    if (!x->nc && (i != -1))
+        x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
+    setup_crldp(x);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
+    x->rfc3779_addr = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_sbgp_ipAddrBlock, NULL, NULL);
+    x->rfc3779_asid = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_sbgp_autonomousSysNum,
+                                       NULL, NULL);
+#endif
+    for (i = 0; i < X509_get_ext_count(x); i++) {
+        ex = X509_get_ext(x, i);
+        if (OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex))
+            == NID_freshest_crl)
+            x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_FRESHEST;
+        if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ex))
+            continue;
+        if (!X509_supported_extension(ex)) {
+            x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CRITICAL;
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SET;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * CA checks common to all purposes
+ * return codes:
+ * 0 not a CA
+ * 1 is a CA
+ * 2 basicConstraints absent so "maybe" a CA
+ * 3 basicConstraints absent but self signed V1.
+ * 4 basicConstraints absent but keyUsage present and keyCertSign asserted.
+ */
+
+static int check_ca(const X509 *x)
+{
+    /* keyUsage if present should allow cert signing */
+    if (ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN))
+        return 0;
+    if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_BCONS) {
+        if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA)
+            return 1;
+        /* If basicConstraints says not a CA then say so */
+        else
+            return 0;
+    } else {
+        /* we support V1 roots for...  uh, I don't really know why. */
+        if ((x->ex_flags & V1_ROOT) == V1_ROOT)
+            return 3;
+        /*
+         * If key usage present it must have certSign so tolerate it
+         */
+        else if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE)
+            return 4;
+        /* Older certificates could have Netscape-specific CA types */
+        else if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT && x->ex_nscert & NS_ANY_CA)
+            return 5;
+        /* can this still be regarded a CA certificate?  I doubt it */
+        return 0;
+    }
+}
+
+void X509_set_proxy_flag(X509 *x)
+{
+    x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_PROXY;
+}
+
+void X509_set_proxy_pathlen(X509 *x, long l)
+{
+    x->ex_pcpathlen = l;
+}
+
+int X509_check_ca(X509 *x)
+{
+    if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET)) {
+        CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(x->lock);
+        x509v3_cache_extensions(x);
+        CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(x->lock);
+    }
+
+    return check_ca(x);
+}
+
+/* Check SSL CA: common checks for SSL client and server */
+static int check_ssl_ca(const X509 *x)
+{
+    int ca_ret;
+    ca_ret = check_ca(x);
+    if (!ca_ret)
+        return 0;
+    /* check nsCertType if present */
+    if (ca_ret != 5 || x->ex_nscert & NS_SSL_CA)
+        return ca_ret;
+    else
+        return 0;
+}
+
+static int check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
+                                    int ca)
+{
+    if (xku_reject(x, XKU_SSL_CLIENT))
+        return 0;
+    if (ca)
+        return check_ssl_ca(x);
+    /* We need to do digital signatures or key agreement */
+    if (ku_reject(x, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | KU_KEY_AGREEMENT))
+        return 0;
+    /* nsCertType if present should allow SSL client use */
+    if (ns_reject(x, NS_SSL_CLIENT))
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Key usage needed for TLS/SSL server: digital signature, encipherment or
+ * key agreement. The ssl code can check this more thoroughly for individual
+ * key types.
+ */
+#define KU_TLS \
+        KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE|KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT|KU_KEY_AGREEMENT
+
+static int check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
+                                    int ca)
+{
+    if (xku_reject(x, XKU_SSL_SERVER | XKU_SGC))
+        return 0;
+    if (ca)
+        return check_ssl_ca(x);
+
+    if (ns_reject(x, NS_SSL_SERVER))
+        return 0;
+    if (ku_reject(x, KU_TLS))
+        return 0;
+
+    return 1;
+
+}
+
+static int check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
+                                       int ca)
+{
+    int ret;
+    ret = check_purpose_ssl_server(xp, x, ca);
+    if (!ret || ca)
+        return ret;
+    /* We need to encipher or Netscape complains */
+    if (ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT))
+        return 0;
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/* common S/MIME checks */
+static int purpose_smime(const X509 *x, int ca)
+{
+    if (xku_reject(x, XKU_SMIME))
+        return 0;
+    if (ca) {
+        int ca_ret;
+        ca_ret = check_ca(x);
+        if (!ca_ret)
+            return 0;
+        /* check nsCertType if present */
+        if (ca_ret != 5 || x->ex_nscert & NS_SMIME_CA)
+            return ca_ret;
+        else
+            return 0;
+    }
+    if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) {
+        if (x->ex_nscert & NS_SMIME)
+            return 1;
+        /* Workaround for some buggy certificates */
+        if (x->ex_nscert & NS_SSL_CLIENT)
+            return 2;
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
+                                    int ca)
+{
+    int ret;
+    ret = purpose_smime(x, ca);
+    if (!ret || ca)
+        return ret;
+    if (ku_reject(x, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | KU_NON_REPUDIATION))
+        return 0;
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
+                                       int ca)
+{
+    int ret;
+    ret = purpose_smime(x, ca);
+    if (!ret || ca)
+        return ret;
+    if (ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT))
+        return 0;
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
+                                  int ca)
+{
+    if (ca) {
+        int ca_ret;
+        if ((ca_ret = check_ca(x)) != 2)
+            return ca_ret;
+        else
+            return 0;
+    }
+    if (ku_reject(x, KU_CRL_SIGN))
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * OCSP helper: this is *not* a full OCSP check. It just checks that each CA
+ * is valid. Additional checks must be made on the chain.
+ */
+
+static int ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
+{
+    /*
+     * Must be a valid CA.  Should we really support the "I don't know" value
+     * (2)?
+     */
+    if (ca)
+        return check_ca(x);
+    /* leaf certificate is checked in OCSP_verify() */
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int check_purpose_timestamp_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
+                                        int ca)
+{
+    int i_ext;
+
+    /* If ca is true we must return if this is a valid CA certificate. */
+    if (ca)
+        return check_ca(x);
+
+    /*
+     * Check the optional key usage field:
+     * if Key Usage is present, it must be one of digitalSignature
+     * and/or nonRepudiation (other values are not consistent and shall
+     * be rejected).
+     */
+    if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE)
+        && ((x->ex_kusage & ~(KU_NON_REPUDIATION | KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) ||
+            !(x->ex_kusage & (KU_NON_REPUDIATION | KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE))))
+        return 0;
+
+    /* Only time stamp key usage is permitted and it's required. */
+    if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) || x->ex_xkusage != XKU_TIMESTAMP)
+        return 0;
+
+    /* Extended Key Usage MUST be critical */
+    i_ext = X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_ext_key_usage, -1);
+    if (i_ext >= 0) {
+        X509_EXTENSION *ext = X509_get_ext((X509 *)x, i_ext);
+        if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ext))
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int no_check(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
+{
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Various checks to see if one certificate issued the second.
+ * This can be used to prune a set of possible issuer certificates
+ * which have been looked up using some simple method such as by
+ * subject name.
+ * These are:
+ * 1. Check issuer_name(subject) == subject_name(issuer)
+ * 2. If akid(subject) exists check it matches issuer
+ * 3. If key_usage(issuer) exists check it supports certificate signing
+ * returns 0 for OK, positive for reason for mismatch, reasons match
+ * codes for X509_verify_cert()
+ */
+
+int X509_check_issued(X509 *issuer, X509 *subject)
+{
+    if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(issuer),
+                      X509_get_issuer_name(subject)))
+        return X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH;
+    x509v3_cache_extensions(issuer);
+    x509v3_cache_extensions(subject);
+
+    if (subject->akid) {
+        int ret = X509_check_akid(issuer, subject->akid);
+        if (ret != X509_V_OK)
+            return ret;
+    }
+
+    if (subject->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
+        if (ku_reject(issuer, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE))
+            return X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE;
+    } else if (ku_reject(issuer, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN))
+        return X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CERTSIGN;
+    return X509_V_OK;
+}
+
+int X509_check_akid(X509 *issuer, AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid)
+{
+
+    if (!akid)
+        return X509_V_OK;
+
+    /* Check key ids (if present) */
+    if (akid->keyid && issuer->skid &&
+        ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(akid->keyid, issuer->skid))
+        return X509_V_ERR_AKID_SKID_MISMATCH;
+    /* Check serial number */
+    if (akid->serial &&
+        ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(X509_get_serialNumber(issuer), akid->serial))
+        return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH;
+    /* Check issuer name */
+    if (akid->issuer) {
+        /*
+         * Ugh, for some peculiar reason AKID includes SEQUENCE OF
+         * GeneralName. So look for a DirName. There may be more than one but
+         * we only take any notice of the first.
+         */
+        GENERAL_NAMES *gens;
+        GENERAL_NAME *gen;
+        X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
+        int i;
+        gens = akid->issuer;
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) {
+            gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
+            if (gen->type == GEN_DIRNAME) {
+                nm = gen->d.dirn;
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+        if (nm && X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_get_issuer_name(issuer)))
+            return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH;
+    }
+    return X509_V_OK;
+}
+
+uint32_t X509_get_extension_flags(X509 *x)
+{
+    /* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */
+    X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1);
+    return x->ex_flags;
+}
+
+uint32_t X509_get_key_usage(X509 *x)
+{
+    /* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */
+    X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1);
+    if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE)
+        return x->ex_kusage;
+    return UINT32_MAX;
+}
+
+uint32_t X509_get_extended_key_usage(X509 *x)
+{
+    /* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */
+    X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1);
+    if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE)
+        return x->ex_xkusage;
+    return UINT32_MAX;
+}
+
+const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *X509_get0_subject_key_id(X509 *x)
+{
+    /* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */
+    X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1);
+    return x->skid;
+}
+
+const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *X509_get0_authority_key_id(X509 *x)
+{
+    /* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */
+    X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1);
+    return (x->akid != NULL ? x->akid->keyid : NULL);
+}
+
+long X509_get_pathlen(X509 *x)
+{
+    /* Called for side effect of caching extensions */
+    if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1) != 1
+            || (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_BCONS) == 0)
+        return -1;
+    return x->ex_pathlen;
+}
+
+long X509_get_proxy_pathlen(X509 *x)
+{
+    /* Called for side effect of caching extensions */
+    if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1) != 1
+            || (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) == 0)
+        return -1;
+    return x->ex_pcpathlen;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_skey.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_skey.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..39597dc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_skey.c
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include "internal/x509_int.h"
+#include "ext_dat.h"
+
+static ASN1_OCTET_STRING *s2i_skey_id(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
+                                      X509V3_CTX *ctx, char *str);
+const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_skey_id = {
+    NID_subject_key_identifier, 0, ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_OCTET_STRING),
+    0, 0, 0, 0,
+    (X509V3_EXT_I2S)i2s_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+    (X509V3_EXT_S2I)s2i_skey_id,
+    0, 0, 0, 0,
+    NULL
+};
+
+char *i2s_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, 
+                            const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *oct)
+{
+    return OPENSSL_buf2hexstr(oct->data, oct->length);
+}
+
+ASN1_OCTET_STRING *s2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
+                                         X509V3_CTX *ctx, const char *str)
+{
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *oct;
+    long length;
+
+    if ((oct = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new()) == NULL) {
+        X509V3err(X509V3_F_S2I_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    if ((oct->data = OPENSSL_hexstr2buf(str, &length)) == NULL) {
+        ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(oct);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    oct->length = length;
+
+    return oct;
+
+}
+
+static ASN1_OCTET_STRING *s2i_skey_id(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
+                                      X509V3_CTX *ctx, char *str)
+{
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *oct;
+    X509_PUBKEY *pubkey;
+    const unsigned char *pk;
+    int pklen;
+    unsigned char pkey_dig[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+    unsigned int diglen;
+
+    if (strcmp(str, "hash"))
+        return s2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(method, ctx, str);
+
+    if ((oct = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new()) == NULL) {
+        X509V3err(X509V3_F_S2I_SKEY_ID, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    if (ctx && (ctx->flags == CTX_TEST))
+        return oct;
+
+    if (!ctx || (!ctx->subject_req && !ctx->subject_cert)) {
+        X509V3err(X509V3_F_S2I_SKEY_ID, X509V3_R_NO_PUBLIC_KEY);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (ctx->subject_req)
+        pubkey = ctx->subject_req->req_info.pubkey;
+    else
+        pubkey = ctx->subject_cert->cert_info.key;
+
+    if (pubkey == NULL) {
+        X509V3err(X509V3_F_S2I_SKEY_ID, X509V3_R_NO_PUBLIC_KEY);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    X509_PUBKEY_get0_param(NULL, &pk, &pklen, NULL, pubkey);
+
+    if (!EVP_Digest(pk, pklen, pkey_dig, &diglen, EVP_sha1(), NULL))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(oct, pkey_dig, diglen)) {
+        X509V3err(X509V3_F_S2I_SKEY_ID, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    return oct;
+
+ err:
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(oct);
+    return NULL;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_sxnet.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_sxnet.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..89cda01
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_sxnet.c
@@ -0,0 +1,226 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/conf.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include "ext_dat.h"
+
+/* Support for Thawte strong extranet extension */
+
+#define SXNET_TEST
+
+static int sxnet_i2r(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, SXNET *sx, BIO *out,
+                     int indent);
+#ifdef SXNET_TEST
+static SXNET *sxnet_v2i(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, X509V3_CTX *ctx,
+                        STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nval);
+#endif
+const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_sxnet = {
+    NID_sxnet, X509V3_EXT_MULTILINE, ASN1_ITEM_ref(SXNET),
+    0, 0, 0, 0,
+    0, 0,
+    0,
+#ifdef SXNET_TEST
+    (X509V3_EXT_V2I)sxnet_v2i,
+#else
+    0,
+#endif
+    (X509V3_EXT_I2R)sxnet_i2r,
+    0,
+    NULL
+};
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(SXNETID) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(SXNETID, zone, ASN1_INTEGER),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(SXNETID, user, ASN1_OCTET_STRING)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(SXNETID)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(SXNETID)
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(SXNET) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(SXNET, version, ASN1_INTEGER),
+        ASN1_SEQUENCE_OF(SXNET, ids, SXNETID)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(SXNET)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(SXNET)
+
+static int sxnet_i2r(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, SXNET *sx, BIO *out,
+                     int indent)
+{
+    long v;
+    char *tmp;
+    SXNETID *id;
+    int i;
+    v = ASN1_INTEGER_get(sx->version);
+    BIO_printf(out, "%*sVersion: %ld (0x%lX)", indent, "", v + 1, v);
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_SXNETID_num(sx->ids); i++) {
+        id = sk_SXNETID_value(sx->ids, i);
+        tmp = i2s_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, id->zone);
+        BIO_printf(out, "\n%*sZone: %s, User: ", indent, "", tmp);
+        OPENSSL_free(tmp);
+        ASN1_STRING_print(out, id->user);
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+#ifdef SXNET_TEST
+
+/*
+ * NBB: this is used for testing only. It should *not* be used for anything
+ * else because it will just take static IDs from the configuration file and
+ * they should really be separate values for each user.
+ */
+
+static SXNET *sxnet_v2i(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, X509V3_CTX *ctx,
+                        STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nval)
+{
+    CONF_VALUE *cnf;
+    SXNET *sx = NULL;
+    int i;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(nval); i++) {
+        cnf = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(nval, i);
+        if (!SXNET_add_id_asc(&sx, cnf->name, cnf->value, -1))
+            return NULL;
+    }
+    return sx;
+}
+
+#endif
+
+/* Strong Extranet utility functions */
+
+/* Add an id given the zone as an ASCII number */
+
+int SXNET_add_id_asc(SXNET **psx, const char *zone, const char *user, int userlen)
+{
+    ASN1_INTEGER *izone;
+
+    if ((izone = s2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, zone)) == NULL) {
+        X509V3err(X509V3_F_SXNET_ADD_ID_ASC, X509V3_R_ERROR_CONVERTING_ZONE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return SXNET_add_id_INTEGER(psx, izone, user, userlen);
+}
+
+/* Add an id given the zone as an unsigned long */
+
+int SXNET_add_id_ulong(SXNET **psx, unsigned long lzone, const char *user,
+                       int userlen)
+{
+    ASN1_INTEGER *izone;
+
+    if ((izone = ASN1_INTEGER_new()) == NULL
+        || !ASN1_INTEGER_set(izone, lzone)) {
+        X509V3err(X509V3_F_SXNET_ADD_ID_ULONG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        ASN1_INTEGER_free(izone);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return SXNET_add_id_INTEGER(psx, izone, user, userlen);
+
+}
+
+/*
+ * Add an id given the zone as an ASN1_INTEGER. Note this version uses the
+ * passed integer and doesn't make a copy so don't free it up afterwards.
+ */
+
+int SXNET_add_id_INTEGER(SXNET **psx, ASN1_INTEGER *zone, const char *user,
+                         int userlen)
+{
+    SXNET *sx = NULL;
+    SXNETID *id = NULL;
+    if (!psx || !zone || !user) {
+        X509V3err(X509V3_F_SXNET_ADD_ID_INTEGER,
+                  X509V3_R_INVALID_NULL_ARGUMENT);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (userlen == -1)
+        userlen = strlen(user);
+    if (userlen > 64) {
+        X509V3err(X509V3_F_SXNET_ADD_ID_INTEGER, X509V3_R_USER_TOO_LONG);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (*psx == NULL) {
+        if ((sx = SXNET_new()) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(sx->version, 0))
+            goto err;
+        *psx = sx;
+    } else
+        sx = *psx;
+    if (SXNET_get_id_INTEGER(sx, zone)) {
+        X509V3err(X509V3_F_SXNET_ADD_ID_INTEGER, X509V3_R_DUPLICATE_ZONE_ID);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if ((id = SXNETID_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (userlen == -1)
+        userlen = strlen(user);
+
+    if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(id->user, (const unsigned char *)user, userlen))
+        goto err;
+    if (!sk_SXNETID_push(sx->ids, id))
+        goto err;
+    id->zone = zone;
+    return 1;
+
+ err:
+    X509V3err(X509V3_F_SXNET_ADD_ID_INTEGER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    SXNETID_free(id);
+    SXNET_free(sx);
+    *psx = NULL;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+ASN1_OCTET_STRING *SXNET_get_id_asc(SXNET *sx, const char *zone)
+{
+    ASN1_INTEGER *izone;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *oct;
+
+    if ((izone = s2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, zone)) == NULL) {
+        X509V3err(X509V3_F_SXNET_GET_ID_ASC, X509V3_R_ERROR_CONVERTING_ZONE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    oct = SXNET_get_id_INTEGER(sx, izone);
+    ASN1_INTEGER_free(izone);
+    return oct;
+}
+
+ASN1_OCTET_STRING *SXNET_get_id_ulong(SXNET *sx, unsigned long lzone)
+{
+    ASN1_INTEGER *izone;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *oct;
+
+    if ((izone = ASN1_INTEGER_new()) == NULL
+        || !ASN1_INTEGER_set(izone, lzone)) {
+        X509V3err(X509V3_F_SXNET_GET_ID_ULONG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        ASN1_INTEGER_free(izone);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    oct = SXNET_get_id_INTEGER(sx, izone);
+    ASN1_INTEGER_free(izone);
+    return oct;
+}
+
+ASN1_OCTET_STRING *SXNET_get_id_INTEGER(SXNET *sx, ASN1_INTEGER *zone)
+{
+    SXNETID *id;
+    int i;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_SXNETID_num(sx->ids); i++) {
+        id = sk_SXNETID_value(sx->ids, i);
+        if (!ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(id->zone, zone))
+            return id->user;
+    }
+    return NULL;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_tlsf.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_tlsf.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fec6724
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_tlsf.c
@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "internal/o_str.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/conf.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include "ext_dat.h"
+
+static STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *i2v_TLS_FEATURE(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
+                                             TLS_FEATURE *tls_feature,
+                                             STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *ext_list);
+static TLS_FEATURE *v2i_TLS_FEATURE(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
+                                    X509V3_CTX *ctx,
+                                    STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nval);
+
+ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE(TLS_FEATURE) =
+        ASN1_EX_TEMPLATE_TYPE(ASN1_TFLG_SEQUENCE_OF, 0, TLS_FEATURE, ASN1_INTEGER)
+static_ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE_END(TLS_FEATURE)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(TLS_FEATURE)
+
+const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_tls_feature = {
+    NID_tlsfeature, 0,
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(TLS_FEATURE),
+    0, 0, 0, 0,
+    0, 0,
+    (X509V3_EXT_I2V)i2v_TLS_FEATURE,
+    (X509V3_EXT_V2I)v2i_TLS_FEATURE,
+    0, 0,
+    NULL
+};
+
+
+typedef struct {
+    long num;
+    const char *name;
+} TLS_FEATURE_NAME;
+
+static TLS_FEATURE_NAME tls_feature_tbl[] = {
+    { 5, "status_request" },
+    { 17, "status_request_v2" }
+};
+
+/*
+ * i2v_TLS_FEATURE converts the TLS_FEATURE structure tls_feature into the
+ * STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) structure ext_list. STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) is the format
+ * used by the CONF library to represent a multi-valued extension.  ext_list is
+ * returned.
+ */
+static STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *i2v_TLS_FEATURE(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
+                                             TLS_FEATURE *tls_feature,
+                                             STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *ext_list)
+{
+    int i;
+    size_t j;
+    ASN1_INTEGER *ai;
+    long tlsextid;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_INTEGER_num(tls_feature); i++) {
+        ai = sk_ASN1_INTEGER_value(tls_feature, i);
+        tlsextid = ASN1_INTEGER_get(ai);
+        for (j = 0; j < OSSL_NELEM(tls_feature_tbl); j++)
+            if (tlsextid == tls_feature_tbl[j].num)
+                break;
+        if (j < OSSL_NELEM(tls_feature_tbl))
+            X509V3_add_value(NULL, tls_feature_tbl[j].name, &ext_list);
+        else
+            X509V3_add_value_int(NULL, ai, &ext_list);
+    }
+    return ext_list;
+}
+
+/*
+ * v2i_TLS_FEATURE converts the multi-valued extension nval into a TLS_FEATURE
+ * structure, which is returned if the conversion is successful.  In case of
+ * error, NULL is returned.
+ */
+static TLS_FEATURE *v2i_TLS_FEATURE(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
+                                    X509V3_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nval)
+{
+    TLS_FEATURE *tlsf;
+    char *extval, *endptr;
+    ASN1_INTEGER *ai;
+    CONF_VALUE *val;
+    int i;
+    size_t j;
+    long tlsextid;
+
+    if ((tlsf = sk_ASN1_INTEGER_new_null()) == NULL) {
+        X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_TLS_FEATURE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(nval); i++) {
+        val = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(nval, i);
+        if (val->value)
+            extval = val->value;
+        else
+            extval = val->name;
+
+        for (j = 0; j < OSSL_NELEM(tls_feature_tbl); j++)
+            if (strcasecmp(extval, tls_feature_tbl[j].name) == 0)
+                break;
+        if (j < OSSL_NELEM(tls_feature_tbl))
+            tlsextid = tls_feature_tbl[j].num;
+        else {
+            tlsextid = strtol(extval, &endptr, 10);
+            if (((*endptr) != '\0') || (extval == endptr) || (tlsextid < 0) ||
+                (tlsextid > 65535)) {
+                X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_TLS_FEATURE, X509V3_R_INVALID_SYNTAX);
+                X509V3_conf_err(val);
+                goto err;
+            }
+        }
+
+        ai = ASN1_INTEGER_new();
+        if (ai == NULL) {
+            X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_TLS_FEATURE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        ASN1_INTEGER_set(ai, tlsextid);
+        sk_ASN1_INTEGER_push(tlsf, ai);
+    }
+    return tlsf;
+
+ err:
+    sk_ASN1_INTEGER_pop_free(tlsf, ASN1_INTEGER_free);
+    return NULL;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_utl.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_utl.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..418ef06
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3_utl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1238 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* X509 v3 extension utilities */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/conf.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include "internal/x509_int.h"
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include "ext_dat.h"
+
+static char *strip_spaces(char *name);
+static int sk_strcmp(const char *const *a, const char *const *b);
+static STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *get_email(X509_NAME *name,
+                                           GENERAL_NAMES *gens);
+static void str_free(OPENSSL_STRING str);
+static int append_ia5(STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) **sk, const ASN1_IA5STRING *email);
+
+static int ipv4_from_asc(unsigned char *v4, const char *in);
+static int ipv6_from_asc(unsigned char *v6, const char *in);
+static int ipv6_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *usr);
+static int ipv6_hex(unsigned char *out, const char *in, int inlen);
+
+/* Add a CONF_VALUE name value pair to stack */
+
+int X509V3_add_value(const char *name, const char *value,
+                     STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) **extlist)
+{
+    CONF_VALUE *vtmp = NULL;
+    char *tname = NULL, *tvalue = NULL;
+    int sk_allocated = (*extlist == NULL);
+
+    if (name && (tname = OPENSSL_strdup(name)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (value && (tvalue = OPENSSL_strdup(value)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if ((vtmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*vtmp))) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (sk_allocated && (*extlist = sk_CONF_VALUE_new_null()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    vtmp->section = NULL;
+    vtmp->name = tname;
+    vtmp->value = tvalue;
+    if (!sk_CONF_VALUE_push(*extlist, vtmp))
+        goto err;
+    return 1;
+ err:
+    X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509V3_ADD_VALUE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    if (sk_allocated) {
+        sk_CONF_VALUE_free(*extlist);
+        *extlist = NULL;
+    }
+    OPENSSL_free(vtmp);
+    OPENSSL_free(tname);
+    OPENSSL_free(tvalue);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int X509V3_add_value_uchar(const char *name, const unsigned char *value,
+                           STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) **extlist)
+{
+    return X509V3_add_value(name, (const char *)value, extlist);
+}
+
+/* Free function for STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) */
+
+void X509V3_conf_free(CONF_VALUE *conf)
+{
+    if (!conf)
+        return;
+    OPENSSL_free(conf->name);
+    OPENSSL_free(conf->value);
+    OPENSSL_free(conf->section);
+    OPENSSL_free(conf);
+}
+
+int X509V3_add_value_bool(const char *name, int asn1_bool,
+                          STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) **extlist)
+{
+    if (asn1_bool)
+        return X509V3_add_value(name, "TRUE", extlist);
+    return X509V3_add_value(name, "FALSE", extlist);
+}
+
+int X509V3_add_value_bool_nf(const char *name, int asn1_bool,
+                             STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) **extlist)
+{
+    if (asn1_bool)
+        return X509V3_add_value(name, "TRUE", extlist);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static char *bignum_to_string(const BIGNUM *bn)
+{
+    char *tmp, *ret;
+    size_t len;
+
+    /*
+     * Display large numbers in hex and small numbers in decimal. Converting to
+     * decimal takes quadratic time and is no more useful than hex for large
+     * numbers.
+     */
+    if (BN_num_bits(bn) < 128)
+        return BN_bn2dec(bn);
+
+    tmp = BN_bn2hex(bn);
+    if (tmp == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+
+    len = strlen(tmp) + 3;
+    ret = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
+    if (ret == NULL) {
+        X509V3err(X509V3_F_BIGNUM_TO_STRING, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        OPENSSL_free(tmp);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    /* Prepend "0x", but place it after the "-" if negative. */
+    if (tmp[0] == '-') {
+        OPENSSL_strlcpy(ret, "-0x", len);
+        OPENSSL_strlcat(ret, tmp + 1, len);
+    } else {
+        OPENSSL_strlcpy(ret, "0x", len);
+        OPENSSL_strlcat(ret, tmp, len);
+    }
+    OPENSSL_free(tmp);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+char *i2s_ASN1_ENUMERATED(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, const ASN1_ENUMERATED *a)
+{
+    BIGNUM *bntmp = NULL;
+    char *strtmp = NULL;
+
+    if (!a)
+        return NULL;
+    if ((bntmp = ASN1_ENUMERATED_to_BN(a, NULL)) == NULL
+        || (strtmp = bignum_to_string(bntmp)) == NULL)
+        X509V3err(X509V3_F_I2S_ASN1_ENUMERATED, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    BN_free(bntmp);
+    return strtmp;
+}
+
+char *i2s_ASN1_INTEGER(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, const ASN1_INTEGER *a)
+{
+    BIGNUM *bntmp = NULL;
+    char *strtmp = NULL;
+
+    if (!a)
+        return NULL;
+    if ((bntmp = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(a, NULL)) == NULL
+        || (strtmp = bignum_to_string(bntmp)) == NULL)
+        X509V3err(X509V3_F_I2S_ASN1_INTEGER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    BN_free(bntmp);
+    return strtmp;
+}
+
+ASN1_INTEGER *s2i_ASN1_INTEGER(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, const char *value)
+{
+    BIGNUM *bn = NULL;
+    ASN1_INTEGER *aint;
+    int isneg, ishex;
+    int ret;
+    if (value == NULL) {
+        X509V3err(X509V3_F_S2I_ASN1_INTEGER, X509V3_R_INVALID_NULL_VALUE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    bn = BN_new();
+    if (bn == NULL) {
+        X509V3err(X509V3_F_S2I_ASN1_INTEGER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    if (value[0] == '-') {
+        value++;
+        isneg = 1;
+    } else
+        isneg = 0;
+
+    if (value[0] == '0' && ((value[1] == 'x') || (value[1] == 'X'))) {
+        value += 2;
+        ishex = 1;
+    } else
+        ishex = 0;
+
+    if (ishex)
+        ret = BN_hex2bn(&bn, value);
+    else
+        ret = BN_dec2bn(&bn, value);
+
+    if (!ret || value[ret]) {
+        BN_free(bn);
+        X509V3err(X509V3_F_S2I_ASN1_INTEGER, X509V3_R_BN_DEC2BN_ERROR);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    if (isneg && BN_is_zero(bn))
+        isneg = 0;
+
+    aint = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(bn, NULL);
+    BN_free(bn);
+    if (!aint) {
+        X509V3err(X509V3_F_S2I_ASN1_INTEGER,
+                  X509V3_R_BN_TO_ASN1_INTEGER_ERROR);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    if (isneg)
+        aint->type |= V_ASN1_NEG;
+    return aint;
+}
+
+int X509V3_add_value_int(const char *name, const ASN1_INTEGER *aint,
+                         STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) **extlist)
+{
+    char *strtmp;
+    int ret;
+
+    if (!aint)
+        return 1;
+    if ((strtmp = i2s_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, aint)) == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    ret = X509V3_add_value(name, strtmp, extlist);
+    OPENSSL_free(strtmp);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int X509V3_get_value_bool(const CONF_VALUE *value, int *asn1_bool)
+{
+    const char *btmp;
+
+    if ((btmp = value->value) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (strcmp(btmp, "TRUE") == 0
+        || strcmp(btmp, "true") == 0
+        || strcmp(btmp, "Y") == 0
+        || strcmp(btmp, "y") == 0
+        || strcmp(btmp, "YES") == 0
+        || strcmp(btmp, "yes") == 0) {
+        *asn1_bool = 0xff;
+        return 1;
+    }
+    if (strcmp(btmp, "FALSE") == 0
+        || strcmp(btmp, "false") == 0
+        || strcmp(btmp, "N") == 0
+        || strcmp(btmp, "n") == 0
+        || strcmp(btmp, "NO") == 0
+        || strcmp(btmp, "no") == 0) {
+        *asn1_bool = 0;
+        return 1;
+    }
+ err:
+    X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509V3_GET_VALUE_BOOL,
+              X509V3_R_INVALID_BOOLEAN_STRING);
+    X509V3_conf_err(value);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int X509V3_get_value_int(const CONF_VALUE *value, ASN1_INTEGER **aint)
+{
+    ASN1_INTEGER *itmp;
+
+    if ((itmp = s2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, value->value)) == NULL) {
+        X509V3_conf_err(value);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    *aint = itmp;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+#define HDR_NAME        1
+#define HDR_VALUE       2
+
+/*
+ * #define DEBUG
+ */
+
+STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *X509V3_parse_list(const char *line)
+{
+    char *p, *q, c;
+    char *ntmp, *vtmp;
+    STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *values = NULL;
+    char *linebuf;
+    int state;
+    /* We are going to modify the line so copy it first */
+    linebuf = OPENSSL_strdup(line);
+    if (linebuf == NULL) {
+        X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509V3_PARSE_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    state = HDR_NAME;
+    ntmp = NULL;
+    /* Go through all characters */
+    for (p = linebuf, q = linebuf; (c = *p) && (c != '\r') && (c != '\n');
+         p++) {
+
+        switch (state) {
+        case HDR_NAME:
+            if (c == ':') {
+                state = HDR_VALUE;
+                *p = 0;
+                ntmp = strip_spaces(q);
+                if (!ntmp) {
+                    X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509V3_PARSE_LIST,
+                              X509V3_R_INVALID_NULL_NAME);
+                    goto err;
+                }
+                q = p + 1;
+            } else if (c == ',') {
+                *p = 0;
+                ntmp = strip_spaces(q);
+                q = p + 1;
+                if (!ntmp) {
+                    X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509V3_PARSE_LIST,
+                              X509V3_R_INVALID_NULL_NAME);
+                    goto err;
+                }
+                X509V3_add_value(ntmp, NULL, &values);
+            }
+            break;
+
+        case HDR_VALUE:
+            if (c == ',') {
+                state = HDR_NAME;
+                *p = 0;
+                vtmp = strip_spaces(q);
+                if (!vtmp) {
+                    X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509V3_PARSE_LIST,
+                              X509V3_R_INVALID_NULL_VALUE);
+                    goto err;
+                }
+                X509V3_add_value(ntmp, vtmp, &values);
+                ntmp = NULL;
+                q = p + 1;
+            }
+
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (state == HDR_VALUE) {
+        vtmp = strip_spaces(q);
+        if (!vtmp) {
+            X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509V3_PARSE_LIST,
+                      X509V3_R_INVALID_NULL_VALUE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        X509V3_add_value(ntmp, vtmp, &values);
+    } else {
+        ntmp = strip_spaces(q);
+        if (!ntmp) {
+            X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509V3_PARSE_LIST, X509V3_R_INVALID_NULL_NAME);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        X509V3_add_value(ntmp, NULL, &values);
+    }
+    OPENSSL_free(linebuf);
+    return values;
+
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_free(linebuf);
+    sk_CONF_VALUE_pop_free(values, X509V3_conf_free);
+    return NULL;
+
+}
+
+/* Delete leading and trailing spaces from a string */
+static char *strip_spaces(char *name)
+{
+    char *p, *q;
+    /* Skip over leading spaces */
+    p = name;
+    while (*p && isspace((unsigned char)*p))
+        p++;
+    if (!*p)
+        return NULL;
+    q = p + strlen(p) - 1;
+    while ((q != p) && isspace((unsigned char)*q))
+        q--;
+    if (p != q)
+        q[1] = 0;
+    if (!*p)
+        return NULL;
+    return p;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * V2I name comparison function: returns zero if 'name' matches cmp or cmp.*
+ */
+
+int name_cmp(const char *name, const char *cmp)
+{
+    int len, ret;
+    char c;
+    len = strlen(cmp);
+    if ((ret = strncmp(name, cmp, len)))
+        return ret;
+    c = name[len];
+    if (!c || (c == '.'))
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int sk_strcmp(const char *const *a, const char *const *b)
+{
+    return strcmp(*a, *b);
+}
+
+STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *X509_get1_email(X509 *x)
+{
+    GENERAL_NAMES *gens;
+    STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *ret;
+
+    gens = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL);
+    ret = get_email(X509_get_subject_name(x), gens);
+    sk_GENERAL_NAME_pop_free(gens, GENERAL_NAME_free);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *X509_get1_ocsp(X509 *x)
+{
+    AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS *info;
+    STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *ret = NULL;
+    int i;
+
+    info = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_info_access, NULL, NULL);
+    if (!info)
+        return NULL;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_num(info); i++) {
+        ACCESS_DESCRIPTION *ad = sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_value(info, i);
+        if (OBJ_obj2nid(ad->method) == NID_ad_OCSP) {
+            if (ad->location->type == GEN_URI) {
+                if (!append_ia5
+                    (&ret, ad->location->d.uniformResourceIdentifier))
+                    break;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS_free(info);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *X509_REQ_get1_email(X509_REQ *x)
+{
+    GENERAL_NAMES *gens;
+    STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts;
+    STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *ret;
+
+    exts = X509_REQ_get_extensions(x);
+    gens = X509V3_get_d2i(exts, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL);
+    ret = get_email(X509_REQ_get_subject_name(x), gens);
+    sk_GENERAL_NAME_pop_free(gens, GENERAL_NAME_free);
+    sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(exts, X509_EXTENSION_free);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *get_email(X509_NAME *name,
+                                           GENERAL_NAMES *gens)
+{
+    STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *ret = NULL;
+    X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne;
+    ASN1_IA5STRING *email;
+    GENERAL_NAME *gen;
+    int i;
+    /* Now add any email address(es) to STACK */
+    i = -1;
+    /* First supplied X509_NAME */
+    while ((i = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(name,
+                                           NID_pkcs9_emailAddress, i)) >= 0) {
+        ne = X509_NAME_get_entry(name, i);
+        email = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(ne);
+        if (!append_ia5(&ret, email))
+            return NULL;
+    }
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) {
+        gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
+        if (gen->type != GEN_EMAIL)
+            continue;
+        if (!append_ia5(&ret, gen->d.ia5))
+            return NULL;
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static void str_free(OPENSSL_STRING str)
+{
+    OPENSSL_free(str);
+}
+
+static int append_ia5(STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) **sk, const ASN1_IA5STRING *email)
+{
+    char *emtmp;
+    /* First some sanity checks */
+    if (email->type != V_ASN1_IA5STRING)
+        return 1;
+    if (!email->data || !email->length)
+        return 1;
+    if (*sk == NULL)
+        *sk = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new(sk_strcmp);
+    if (*sk == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    /* Don't add duplicates */
+    if (sk_OPENSSL_STRING_find(*sk, (char *)email->data) != -1)
+        return 1;
+    emtmp = OPENSSL_strdup((char *)email->data);
+    if (emtmp == NULL || !sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(*sk, emtmp)) {
+        OPENSSL_free(emtmp);    /* free on push failure */
+        X509_email_free(*sk);
+        *sk = NULL;
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+void X509_email_free(STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sk)
+{
+    sk_OPENSSL_STRING_pop_free(sk, str_free);
+}
+
+typedef int (*equal_fn) (const unsigned char *pattern, size_t pattern_len,
+                         const unsigned char *subject, size_t subject_len,
+                         unsigned int flags);
+
+/* Skip pattern prefix to match "wildcard" subject */
+static void skip_prefix(const unsigned char **p, size_t *plen,
+                        size_t subject_len,
+                        unsigned int flags)
+{
+    const unsigned char *pattern = *p;
+    size_t pattern_len = *plen;
+
+    /*
+     * If subject starts with a leading '.' followed by more octets, and
+     * pattern is longer, compare just an equal-length suffix with the
+     * full subject (starting at the '.'), provided the prefix contains
+     * no NULs.
+     */
+    if ((flags & _X509_CHECK_FLAG_DOT_SUBDOMAINS) == 0)
+        return;
+
+    while (pattern_len > subject_len && *pattern) {
+        if ((flags & X509_CHECK_FLAG_SINGLE_LABEL_SUBDOMAINS) &&
+            *pattern == '.')
+            break;
+        ++pattern;
+        --pattern_len;
+    }
+
+    /* Skip if entire prefix acceptable */
+    if (pattern_len == subject_len) {
+        *p = pattern;
+        *plen = pattern_len;
+    }
+}
+
+/* Compare while ASCII ignoring case. */
+static int equal_nocase(const unsigned char *pattern, size_t pattern_len,
+                        const unsigned char *subject, size_t subject_len,
+                        unsigned int flags)
+{
+    skip_prefix(&pattern, &pattern_len, subject_len, flags);
+    if (pattern_len != subject_len)
+        return 0;
+    while (pattern_len) {
+        unsigned char l = *pattern;
+        unsigned char r = *subject;
+        /* The pattern must not contain NUL characters. */
+        if (l == 0)
+            return 0;
+        if (l != r) {
+            if ('A' <= l && l <= 'Z')
+                l = (l - 'A') + 'a';
+            if ('A' <= r && r <= 'Z')
+                r = (r - 'A') + 'a';
+            if (l != r)
+                return 0;
+        }
+        ++pattern;
+        ++subject;
+        --pattern_len;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Compare using memcmp. */
+static int equal_case(const unsigned char *pattern, size_t pattern_len,
+                      const unsigned char *subject, size_t subject_len,
+                      unsigned int flags)
+{
+    skip_prefix(&pattern, &pattern_len, subject_len, flags);
+    if (pattern_len != subject_len)
+        return 0;
+    return !memcmp(pattern, subject, pattern_len);
+}
+
+/*
+ * RFC 5280, section 7.5, requires that only the domain is compared in a
+ * case-insensitive manner.
+ */
+static int equal_email(const unsigned char *a, size_t a_len,
+                       const unsigned char *b, size_t b_len,
+                       unsigned int unused_flags)
+{
+    size_t i = a_len;
+    if (a_len != b_len)
+        return 0;
+    /*
+     * We search backwards for the '@' character, so that we do not have to
+     * deal with quoted local-parts.  The domain part is compared in a
+     * case-insensitive manner.
+     */
+    while (i > 0) {
+        --i;
+        if (a[i] == '@' || b[i] == '@') {
+            if (!equal_nocase(a + i, a_len - i, b + i, a_len - i, 0))
+                return 0;
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    if (i == 0)
+        i = a_len;
+    return equal_case(a, i, b, i, 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compare the prefix and suffix with the subject, and check that the
+ * characters in-between are valid.
+ */
+static int wildcard_match(const unsigned char *prefix, size_t prefix_len,
+                          const unsigned char *suffix, size_t suffix_len,
+                          const unsigned char *subject, size_t subject_len,
+                          unsigned int flags)
+{
+    const unsigned char *wildcard_start;
+    const unsigned char *wildcard_end;
+    const unsigned char *p;
+    int allow_multi = 0;
+    int allow_idna = 0;
+
+    if (subject_len < prefix_len + suffix_len)
+        return 0;
+    if (!equal_nocase(prefix, prefix_len, subject, prefix_len, flags))
+        return 0;
+    wildcard_start = subject + prefix_len;
+    wildcard_end = subject + (subject_len - suffix_len);
+    if (!equal_nocase(wildcard_end, suffix_len, suffix, suffix_len, flags))
+        return 0;
+    /*
+     * If the wildcard makes up the entire first label, it must match at
+     * least one character.
+     */
+    if (prefix_len == 0 && *suffix == '.') {
+        if (wildcard_start == wildcard_end)
+            return 0;
+        allow_idna = 1;
+        if (flags & X509_CHECK_FLAG_MULTI_LABEL_WILDCARDS)
+            allow_multi = 1;
+    }
+    /* IDNA labels cannot match partial wildcards */
+    if (!allow_idna &&
+        subject_len >= 4 && strncasecmp((char *)subject, "xn--", 4) == 0)
+        return 0;
+    /* The wildcard may match a literal '*' */
+    if (wildcard_end == wildcard_start + 1 && *wildcard_start == '*')
+        return 1;
+    /*
+     * Check that the part matched by the wildcard contains only
+     * permitted characters and only matches a single label unless
+     * allow_multi is set.
+     */
+    for (p = wildcard_start; p != wildcard_end; ++p)
+        if (!(('0' <= *p && *p <= '9') ||
+              ('A' <= *p && *p <= 'Z') ||
+              ('a' <= *p && *p <= 'z') ||
+              *p == '-' || (allow_multi && *p == '.')))
+            return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+#define LABEL_START     (1 << 0)
+#define LABEL_END       (1 << 1)
+#define LABEL_HYPHEN    (1 << 2)
+#define LABEL_IDNA      (1 << 3)
+
+static const unsigned char *valid_star(const unsigned char *p, size_t len,
+                                       unsigned int flags)
+{
+    const unsigned char *star = 0;
+    size_t i;
+    int state = LABEL_START;
+    int dots = 0;
+    for (i = 0; i < len; ++i) {
+        /*
+         * Locate first and only legal wildcard, either at the start
+         * or end of a non-IDNA first and not final label.
+         */
+        if (p[i] == '*') {
+            int atstart = (state & LABEL_START);
+            int atend = (i == len - 1 || p[i + 1] == '.');
+            /*-
+             * At most one wildcard per pattern.
+             * No wildcards in IDNA labels.
+             * No wildcards after the first label.
+             */
+            if (star != NULL || (state & LABEL_IDNA) != 0 || dots)
+                return NULL;
+            /* Only full-label '*.example.com' wildcards? */
+            if ((flags & X509_CHECK_FLAG_NO_PARTIAL_WILDCARDS)
+                && (!atstart || !atend))
+                return NULL;
+            /* No 'foo*bar' wildcards */
+            if (!atstart && !atend)
+                return NULL;
+            star = &p[i];
+            state &= ~LABEL_START;
+        } else if (('a' <= p[i] && p[i] <= 'z')
+                   || ('A' <= p[i] && p[i] <= 'Z')
+                   || ('0' <= p[i] && p[i] <= '9')) {
+            if ((state & LABEL_START) != 0
+                && len - i >= 4 && strncasecmp((char *)&p[i], "xn--", 4) == 0)
+                state |= LABEL_IDNA;
+            state &= ~(LABEL_HYPHEN | LABEL_START);
+        } else if (p[i] == '.') {
+            if ((state & (LABEL_HYPHEN | LABEL_START)) != 0)
+                return NULL;
+            state = LABEL_START;
+            ++dots;
+        } else if (p[i] == '-') {
+            /* no domain/subdomain starts with '-' */
+            if ((state & LABEL_START) != 0)
+                return NULL;
+            state |= LABEL_HYPHEN;
+        } else
+            return NULL;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * The final label must not end in a hyphen or ".", and
+     * there must be at least two dots after the star.
+     */
+    if ((state & (LABEL_START | LABEL_HYPHEN)) != 0 || dots < 2)
+        return NULL;
+    return star;
+}
+
+/* Compare using wildcards. */
+static int equal_wildcard(const unsigned char *pattern, size_t pattern_len,
+                          const unsigned char *subject, size_t subject_len,
+                          unsigned int flags)
+{
+    const unsigned char *star = NULL;
+
+    /*
+     * Subject names starting with '.' can only match a wildcard pattern
+     * via a subject sub-domain pattern suffix match.
+     */
+    if (!(subject_len > 1 && subject[0] == '.'))
+        star = valid_star(pattern, pattern_len, flags);
+    if (star == NULL)
+        return equal_nocase(pattern, pattern_len,
+                            subject, subject_len, flags);
+    return wildcard_match(pattern, star - pattern,
+                          star + 1, (pattern + pattern_len) - star - 1,
+                          subject, subject_len, flags);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compare an ASN1_STRING to a supplied string. If they match return 1. If
+ * cmp_type > 0 only compare if string matches the type, otherwise convert it
+ * to UTF8.
+ */
+
+static int do_check_string(const ASN1_STRING *a, int cmp_type, equal_fn equal,
+                           unsigned int flags, const char *b, size_t blen,
+                           char **peername)
+{
+    int rv = 0;
+
+    if (!a->data || !a->length)
+        return 0;
+    if (cmp_type > 0) {
+        if (cmp_type != a->type)
+            return 0;
+        if (cmp_type == V_ASN1_IA5STRING)
+            rv = equal(a->data, a->length, (unsigned char *)b, blen, flags);
+        else if (a->length == (int)blen && !memcmp(a->data, b, blen))
+            rv = 1;
+        if (rv > 0 && peername)
+            *peername = OPENSSL_strndup((char *)a->data, a->length);
+    } else {
+        int astrlen;
+        unsigned char *astr;
+        astrlen = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&astr, a);
+        if (astrlen < 0) {
+            /*
+             * -1 could be an internal malloc failure or a decoding error from
+             * malformed input; we can't distinguish.
+             */
+            return -1;
+        }
+        rv = equal(astr, astrlen, (unsigned char *)b, blen, flags);
+        if (rv > 0 && peername)
+            *peername = OPENSSL_strndup((char *)astr, astrlen);
+        OPENSSL_free(astr);
+    }
+    return rv;
+}
+
+static int do_x509_check(X509 *x, const char *chk, size_t chklen,
+                         unsigned int flags, int check_type, char **peername)
+{
+    GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
+    X509_NAME *name = NULL;
+    int i;
+    int cnid = NID_undef;
+    int alt_type;
+    int san_present = 0;
+    int rv = 0;
+    equal_fn equal;
+
+    /* See below, this flag is internal-only */
+    flags &= ~_X509_CHECK_FLAG_DOT_SUBDOMAINS;
+    if (check_type == GEN_EMAIL) {
+        cnid = NID_pkcs9_emailAddress;
+        alt_type = V_ASN1_IA5STRING;
+        equal = equal_email;
+    } else if (check_type == GEN_DNS) {
+        cnid = NID_commonName;
+        /* Implicit client-side DNS sub-domain pattern */
+        if (chklen > 1 && chk[0] == '.')
+            flags |= _X509_CHECK_FLAG_DOT_SUBDOMAINS;
+        alt_type = V_ASN1_IA5STRING;
+        if (flags & X509_CHECK_FLAG_NO_WILDCARDS)
+            equal = equal_nocase;
+        else
+            equal = equal_wildcard;
+    } else {
+        alt_type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
+        equal = equal_case;
+    }
+
+    if (chklen == 0)
+        chklen = strlen(chk);
+
+    gens = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL);
+    if (gens) {
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) {
+            GENERAL_NAME *gen;
+            ASN1_STRING *cstr;
+            gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
+            if (gen->type != check_type)
+                continue;
+            san_present = 1;
+            if (check_type == GEN_EMAIL)
+                cstr = gen->d.rfc822Name;
+            else if (check_type == GEN_DNS)
+                cstr = gen->d.dNSName;
+            else
+                cstr = gen->d.iPAddress;
+            /* Positive on success, negative on error! */
+            if ((rv = do_check_string(cstr, alt_type, equal, flags,
+                                      chk, chklen, peername)) != 0)
+                break;
+        }
+        GENERAL_NAMES_free(gens);
+        if (rv != 0)
+            return rv;
+        if (san_present && !(flags & X509_CHECK_FLAG_ALWAYS_CHECK_SUBJECT))
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* We're done if CN-ID is not pertinent */
+    if (cnid == NID_undef || (flags & X509_CHECK_FLAG_NEVER_CHECK_SUBJECT))
+        return 0;
+
+    i = -1;
+    name = X509_get_subject_name(x);
+    while ((i = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(name, cnid, i)) >= 0) {
+        const X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne = X509_NAME_get_entry(name, i);
+        const ASN1_STRING *str = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(ne);
+
+        /* Positive on success, negative on error! */
+        if ((rv = do_check_string(str, -1, equal, flags,
+                                  chk, chklen, peername)) != 0)
+            return rv;
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int X509_check_host(X509 *x, const char *chk, size_t chklen,
+                    unsigned int flags, char **peername)
+{
+    if (chk == NULL)
+        return -2;
+    /*
+     * Embedded NULs are disallowed, except as the last character of a
+     * string of length 2 or more (tolerate caller including terminating
+     * NUL in string length).
+     */
+    if (chklen == 0)
+        chklen = strlen(chk);
+    else if (memchr(chk, '\0', chklen > 1 ? chklen - 1 : chklen))
+        return -2;
+    if (chklen > 1 && chk[chklen - 1] == '\0')
+        --chklen;
+    return do_x509_check(x, chk, chklen, flags, GEN_DNS, peername);
+}
+
+int X509_check_email(X509 *x, const char *chk, size_t chklen,
+                     unsigned int flags)
+{
+    if (chk == NULL)
+        return -2;
+    /*
+     * Embedded NULs are disallowed, except as the last character of a
+     * string of length 2 or more (tolerate caller including terminating
+     * NUL in string length).
+     */
+    if (chklen == 0)
+        chklen = strlen((char *)chk);
+    else if (memchr(chk, '\0', chklen > 1 ? chklen - 1 : chklen))
+        return -2;
+    if (chklen > 1 && chk[chklen - 1] == '\0')
+        --chklen;
+    return do_x509_check(x, chk, chklen, flags, GEN_EMAIL, NULL);
+}
+
+int X509_check_ip(X509 *x, const unsigned char *chk, size_t chklen,
+                  unsigned int flags)
+{
+    if (chk == NULL)
+        return -2;
+    return do_x509_check(x, (char *)chk, chklen, flags, GEN_IPADD, NULL);
+}
+
+int X509_check_ip_asc(X509 *x, const char *ipasc, unsigned int flags)
+{
+    unsigned char ipout[16];
+    size_t iplen;
+
+    if (ipasc == NULL)
+        return -2;
+    iplen = (size_t)a2i_ipadd(ipout, ipasc);
+    if (iplen == 0)
+        return -2;
+    return do_x509_check(x, (char *)ipout, iplen, flags, GEN_IPADD, NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convert IP addresses both IPv4 and IPv6 into an OCTET STRING compatible
+ * with RFC3280.
+ */
+
+ASN1_OCTET_STRING *a2i_IPADDRESS(const char *ipasc)
+{
+    unsigned char ipout[16];
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ret;
+    int iplen;
+
+    /* If string contains a ':' assume IPv6 */
+
+    iplen = a2i_ipadd(ipout, ipasc);
+
+    if (!iplen)
+        return NULL;
+
+    ret = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
+    if (ret == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(ret, ipout, iplen)) {
+        ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(ret);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+ASN1_OCTET_STRING *a2i_IPADDRESS_NC(const char *ipasc)
+{
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ret = NULL;
+    unsigned char ipout[32];
+    char *iptmp = NULL, *p;
+    int iplen1, iplen2;
+    p = strchr(ipasc, '/');
+    if (!p)
+        return NULL;
+    iptmp = OPENSSL_strdup(ipasc);
+    if (!iptmp)
+        return NULL;
+    p = iptmp + (p - ipasc);
+    *p++ = 0;
+
+    iplen1 = a2i_ipadd(ipout, iptmp);
+
+    if (!iplen1)
+        goto err;
+
+    iplen2 = a2i_ipadd(ipout + iplen1, p);
+
+    OPENSSL_free(iptmp);
+    iptmp = NULL;
+
+    if (!iplen2 || (iplen1 != iplen2))
+        goto err;
+
+    ret = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
+    if (ret == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(ret, ipout, iplen1 + iplen2))
+        goto err;
+
+    return ret;
+
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_free(iptmp);
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(ret);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+int a2i_ipadd(unsigned char *ipout, const char *ipasc)
+{
+    /* If string contains a ':' assume IPv6 */
+
+    if (strchr(ipasc, ':')) {
+        if (!ipv6_from_asc(ipout, ipasc))
+            return 0;
+        return 16;
+    } else {
+        if (!ipv4_from_asc(ipout, ipasc))
+            return 0;
+        return 4;
+    }
+}
+
+static int ipv4_from_asc(unsigned char *v4, const char *in)
+{
+    int a0, a1, a2, a3;
+    if (sscanf(in, "%d.%d.%d.%d", &a0, &a1, &a2, &a3) != 4)
+        return 0;
+    if ((a0 < 0) || (a0 > 255) || (a1 < 0) || (a1 > 255)
+        || (a2 < 0) || (a2 > 255) || (a3 < 0) || (a3 > 255))
+        return 0;
+    v4[0] = a0;
+    v4[1] = a1;
+    v4[2] = a2;
+    v4[3] = a3;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+typedef struct {
+    /* Temporary store for IPV6 output */
+    unsigned char tmp[16];
+    /* Total number of bytes in tmp */
+    int total;
+    /* The position of a zero (corresponding to '::') */
+    int zero_pos;
+    /* Number of zeroes */
+    int zero_cnt;
+} IPV6_STAT;
+
+static int ipv6_from_asc(unsigned char *v6, const char *in)
+{
+    IPV6_STAT v6stat;
+    v6stat.total = 0;
+    v6stat.zero_pos = -1;
+    v6stat.zero_cnt = 0;
+    /*
+     * Treat the IPv6 representation as a list of values separated by ':'.
+     * The presence of a '::' will parse as one, two or three zero length
+     * elements.
+     */
+    if (!CONF_parse_list(in, ':', 0, ipv6_cb, &v6stat))
+        return 0;
+
+    /* Now for some sanity checks */
+
+    if (v6stat.zero_pos == -1) {
+        /* If no '::' must have exactly 16 bytes */
+        if (v6stat.total != 16)
+            return 0;
+    } else {
+        /* If '::' must have less than 16 bytes */
+        if (v6stat.total == 16)
+            return 0;
+        /* More than three zeroes is an error */
+        if (v6stat.zero_cnt > 3)
+            return 0;
+        /* Can only have three zeroes if nothing else present */
+        else if (v6stat.zero_cnt == 3) {
+            if (v6stat.total > 0)
+                return 0;
+        }
+        /* Can only have two zeroes if at start or end */
+        else if (v6stat.zero_cnt == 2) {
+            if ((v6stat.zero_pos != 0)
+                && (v6stat.zero_pos != v6stat.total))
+                return 0;
+        } else
+            /* Can only have one zero if *not* start or end */
+        {
+            if ((v6stat.zero_pos == 0)
+                || (v6stat.zero_pos == v6stat.total))
+                return 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* Format result */
+
+    if (v6stat.zero_pos >= 0) {
+        /* Copy initial part */
+        memcpy(v6, v6stat.tmp, v6stat.zero_pos);
+        /* Zero middle */
+        memset(v6 + v6stat.zero_pos, 0, 16 - v6stat.total);
+        /* Copy final part */
+        if (v6stat.total != v6stat.zero_pos)
+            memcpy(v6 + v6stat.zero_pos + 16 - v6stat.total,
+                   v6stat.tmp + v6stat.zero_pos,
+                   v6stat.total - v6stat.zero_pos);
+    } else
+        memcpy(v6, v6stat.tmp, 16);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int ipv6_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *usr)
+{
+    IPV6_STAT *s = usr;
+    /* Error if 16 bytes written */
+    if (s->total == 16)
+        return 0;
+    if (len == 0) {
+        /* Zero length element, corresponds to '::' */
+        if (s->zero_pos == -1)
+            s->zero_pos = s->total;
+        /* If we've already got a :: its an error */
+        else if (s->zero_pos != s->total)
+            return 0;
+        s->zero_cnt++;
+    } else {
+        /* If more than 4 characters could be final a.b.c.d form */
+        if (len > 4) {
+            /* Need at least 4 bytes left */
+            if (s->total > 12)
+                return 0;
+            /* Must be end of string */
+            if (elem[len])
+                return 0;
+            if (!ipv4_from_asc(s->tmp + s->total, elem))
+                return 0;
+            s->total += 4;
+        } else {
+            if (!ipv6_hex(s->tmp + s->total, elem, len))
+                return 0;
+            s->total += 2;
+        }
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convert a string of up to 4 hex digits into the corresponding IPv6 form.
+ */
+
+static int ipv6_hex(unsigned char *out, const char *in, int inlen)
+{
+    unsigned char c;
+    unsigned int num = 0;
+    int x;
+
+    if (inlen > 4)
+        return 0;
+    while (inlen--) {
+        c = *in++;
+        num <<= 4;
+        x = OPENSSL_hexchar2int(c);
+        if (x < 0)
+            return 0;
+        num |= (char)x;
+    }
+    out[0] = num >> 8;
+    out[1] = num & 0xff;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int X509V3_NAME_from_section(X509_NAME *nm, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *dn_sk,
+                             unsigned long chtype)
+{
+    CONF_VALUE *v;
+    int i, mval, spec_char, plus_char;
+    char *p, *type;
+    if (!nm)
+        return 0;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(dn_sk); i++) {
+        v = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(dn_sk, i);
+        type = v->name;
+        /*
+         * Skip past any leading X. X: X, etc to allow for multiple instances
+         */
+        for (p = type; *p; p++) {
+#ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+            spec_char = ((*p == ':') || (*p == ',') || (*p == '.'));
+#else
+            spec_char = ((*p == os_toascii[':']) || (*p == os_toascii[','])
+                    || (*p == os_toascii['.']));
+#endif
+            if (spec_char) {
+                p++;
+                if (*p)
+                    type = p;
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+#ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+        plus_char = (*type == '+');
+#else
+        plus_char = (*type == os_toascii['+']);
+#endif
+        if (plus_char) {
+            mval = -1;
+            type++;
+        } else
+            mval = 0;
+        if (!X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(nm, type, chtype,
+                                        (unsigned char *)v->value, -1, -1,
+                                        mval))
+            return 0;
+
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3conf.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3conf.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..966ab90
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3conf.c
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/conf.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+
+/* Test application to add extensions from a config file */
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    LHASH *conf;
+    X509 *cert;
+    FILE *inf;
+    char *conf_file;
+    int i;
+    int count;
+    X509_EXTENSION *ext;
+    X509V3_add_standard_extensions();
+    ERR_load_crypto_strings();
+    if (!argv[1]) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Usage: v3conf cert.pem [file.cnf]\n");
+        exit(1);
+    }
+    conf_file = argv[2];
+    if (!conf_file)
+        conf_file = "test.cnf";
+    conf = CONF_load(NULL, "test.cnf", NULL);
+    if (!conf) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Error opening Config file %s\n", conf_file);
+        ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+        exit(1);
+    }
+
+    inf = fopen(argv[1], "r");
+    if (!inf) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Can't open certificate file %s\n", argv[1]);
+        exit(1);
+    }
+    cert = PEM_read_X509(inf, NULL, NULL);
+    if (!cert) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Error reading certificate file %s\n", argv[1]);
+        exit(1);
+    }
+    fclose(inf);
+
+    sk_pop_free(cert->cert_info->extensions, X509_EXTENSION_free);
+    cert->cert_info->extensions = NULL;
+
+    if (!X509V3_EXT_add_conf(conf, NULL, "test_section", cert)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Error adding extensions\n");
+        ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+        exit(1);
+    }
+
+    count = X509_get_ext_count(cert);
+    printf("%d extensions\n", count);
+    for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+        ext = X509_get_ext(cert, i);
+        printf("%s", OBJ_nid2ln(OBJ_obj2nid(ext->object)));
+        if (ext->critical)
+            printf(",critical:\n");
+        else
+            printf(":\n");
+        X509V3_EXT_print_fp(stdout, ext, 0, 0);
+        printf("\n");
+
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3err.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3err.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d598791
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3err.c
@@ -0,0 +1,188 @@
+/*
+ * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
+ * Copyright 1995-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+
+# define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509V3,func,0)
+# define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509V3,0,reason)
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA X509V3_str_functs[] = {
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_A2I_GENERAL_NAME), "a2i_GENERAL_NAME"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_ADDR_VALIDATE_PATH_INTERNAL),
+     "addr_validate_path_internal"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_ASIDENTIFIERCHOICE_CANONIZE),
+     "ASIdentifierChoice_canonize"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_ASIDENTIFIERCHOICE_IS_CANONICAL),
+     "ASIdentifierChoice_is_canonical"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_BIGNUM_TO_STRING), "bignum_to_string"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_COPY_EMAIL), "copy_email"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_COPY_ISSUER), "copy_issuer"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_DO_DIRNAME), "do_dirname"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_DO_EXT_I2D), "do_ext_i2d"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_DO_EXT_NCONF), "do_ext_nconf"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_GNAMES_FROM_SECTNAME), "gnames_from_sectname"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_I2S_ASN1_ENUMERATED), "i2s_ASN1_ENUMERATED"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_I2S_ASN1_IA5STRING), "i2s_ASN1_IA5STRING"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_I2S_ASN1_INTEGER), "i2s_ASN1_INTEGER"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_I2V_AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS),
+     "i2v_AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_NOTICE_SECTION), "notice_section"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_NREF_NOS), "nref_nos"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_POLICY_SECTION), "policy_section"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_PROCESS_PCI_VALUE), "process_pci_value"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_R2I_CERTPOL), "r2i_certpol"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_R2I_PCI), "r2i_pci"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_S2I_ASN1_IA5STRING), "s2i_ASN1_IA5STRING"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_S2I_ASN1_INTEGER), "s2i_ASN1_INTEGER"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_S2I_ASN1_OCTET_STRING), "s2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_S2I_SKEY_ID), "s2i_skey_id"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_SET_DIST_POINT_NAME), "set_dist_point_name"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_SXNET_ADD_ID_ASC), "SXNET_add_id_asc"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_SXNET_ADD_ID_INTEGER), "SXNET_add_id_INTEGER"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_SXNET_ADD_ID_ULONG), "SXNET_add_id_ulong"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_SXNET_GET_ID_ASC), "SXNET_get_id_asc"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_SXNET_GET_ID_ULONG), "SXNET_get_id_ulong"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_V2I_ASIDENTIFIERS), "v2i_ASIdentifiers"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_V2I_ASN1_BIT_STRING), "v2i_ASN1_BIT_STRING"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_V2I_AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS),
+     "v2i_AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_V2I_AUTHORITY_KEYID), "v2i_AUTHORITY_KEYID"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_V2I_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS), "v2i_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_V2I_CRLD), "v2i_crld"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_V2I_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE), "v2i_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_V2I_GENERAL_NAMES), "v2i_GENERAL_NAMES"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_V2I_GENERAL_NAME_EX), "v2i_GENERAL_NAME_ex"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_V2I_IDP), "v2i_idp"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_V2I_IPADDRBLOCKS), "v2i_IPAddrBlocks"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_V2I_ISSUER_ALT), "v2i_issuer_alt"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_V2I_NAME_CONSTRAINTS), "v2i_NAME_CONSTRAINTS"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_V2I_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS), "v2i_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_V2I_POLICY_MAPPINGS), "v2i_POLICY_MAPPINGS"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_V2I_SUBJECT_ALT), "v2i_subject_alt"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_V2I_TLS_FEATURE), "v2i_TLS_FEATURE"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_V3_GENERIC_EXTENSION), "v3_generic_extension"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_X509V3_ADD1_I2D), "X509V3_add1_i2d"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_X509V3_ADD_VALUE), "X509V3_add_value"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_X509V3_EXT_ADD), "X509V3_EXT_add"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_X509V3_EXT_ADD_ALIAS), "X509V3_EXT_add_alias"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_X509V3_EXT_I2D), "X509V3_EXT_i2d"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_X509V3_EXT_NCONF), "X509V3_EXT_nconf"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_X509V3_GET_SECTION), "X509V3_get_section"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_X509V3_GET_STRING), "X509V3_get_string"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_X509V3_GET_VALUE_BOOL), "X509V3_get_value_bool"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_X509V3_PARSE_LIST), "X509V3_parse_list"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD), "X509_PURPOSE_add"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_SET), "X509_PURPOSE_set"},
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA X509V3_str_reasons[] = {
+    {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_BAD_IP_ADDRESS), "bad ip address"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_BAD_OBJECT), "bad object"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_BN_DEC2BN_ERROR), "bn dec2bn error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_BN_TO_ASN1_INTEGER_ERROR),
+     "bn to asn1 integer error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_DIRNAME_ERROR), "dirname error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_DISTPOINT_ALREADY_SET), "distpoint already set"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_DUPLICATE_ZONE_ID), "duplicate zone id"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_ERROR_CONVERTING_ZONE), "error converting zone"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_ERROR_CREATING_EXTENSION),
+     "error creating extension"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_ERROR_IN_EXTENSION), "error in extension"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_EXPECTED_A_SECTION_NAME), "expected a section name"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_EXTENSION_EXISTS), "extension exists"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_EXTENSION_NAME_ERROR), "extension name error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_EXTENSION_NOT_FOUND), "extension not found"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_EXTENSION_SETTING_NOT_SUPPORTED),
+     "extension setting not supported"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_EXTENSION_VALUE_ERROR), "extension value error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_ILLEGAL_EMPTY_EXTENSION), "illegal empty extension"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_INCORRECT_POLICY_SYNTAX_TAG),
+     "incorrect policy syntax tag"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_INVALID_ASNUMBER), "invalid asnumber"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_INVALID_ASRANGE), "invalid asrange"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_INVALID_BOOLEAN_STRING), "invalid boolean string"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_INVALID_EXTENSION_STRING),
+     "invalid extension string"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_INVALID_INHERITANCE), "invalid inheritance"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_INVALID_IPADDRESS), "invalid ipaddress"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_INVALID_MULTIPLE_RDNS), "invalid multiple rdns"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_INVALID_NAME), "invalid name"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_INVALID_NULL_ARGUMENT), "invalid null argument"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_INVALID_NULL_NAME), "invalid null name"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_INVALID_NULL_VALUE), "invalid null value"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_INVALID_NUMBER), "invalid number"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_INVALID_NUMBERS), "invalid numbers"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_INVALID_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER),
+     "invalid object identifier"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_INVALID_OPTION), "invalid option"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_INVALID_POLICY_IDENTIFIER),
+     "invalid policy identifier"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_INVALID_PROXY_POLICY_SETTING),
+     "invalid proxy policy setting"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_INVALID_PURPOSE), "invalid purpose"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_INVALID_SAFI), "invalid safi"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_INVALID_SECTION), "invalid section"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_INVALID_SYNTAX), "invalid syntax"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_ISSUER_DECODE_ERROR), "issuer decode error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_MISSING_VALUE), "missing value"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_NEED_ORGANIZATION_AND_NUMBERS),
+     "need organization and numbers"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_NO_CONFIG_DATABASE), "no config database"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_NO_ISSUER_CERTIFICATE), "no issuer certificate"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_NO_ISSUER_DETAILS), "no issuer details"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_NO_POLICY_IDENTIFIER), "no policy identifier"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_NO_PROXY_CERT_POLICY_LANGUAGE_DEFINED),
+     "no proxy cert policy language defined"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_NO_PUBLIC_KEY), "no public key"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_NO_SUBJECT_DETAILS), "no subject details"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_OPERATION_NOT_DEFINED), "operation not defined"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_OTHERNAME_ERROR), "othername error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_POLICY_LANGUAGE_ALREADY_DEFINED),
+     "policy language already defined"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_POLICY_PATH_LENGTH), "policy path length"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_POLICY_PATH_LENGTH_ALREADY_DEFINED),
+     "policy path length already defined"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_POLICY_WHEN_PROXY_LANGUAGE_REQUIRES_NO_POLICY),
+     "policy when proxy language requires no policy"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_SECTION_NOT_FOUND), "section not found"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_DETAILS),
+     "unable to get issuer details"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_KEYID),
+     "unable to get issuer keyid"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_UNKNOWN_BIT_STRING_ARGUMENT),
+     "unknown bit string argument"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_UNKNOWN_EXTENSION), "unknown extension"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_UNKNOWN_EXTENSION_NAME), "unknown extension name"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_UNKNOWN_OPTION), "unknown option"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_UNSUPPORTED_OPTION), "unsupported option"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_UNSUPPORTED_TYPE), "unsupported type"},
+    {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_USER_TOO_LONG), "user too long"},
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+
+#endif
+
+int ERR_load_X509V3_strings(void)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+
+    if (ERR_func_error_string(X509V3_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) {
+        ERR_load_strings(0, X509V3_str_functs);
+        ERR_load_strings(0, X509V3_str_reasons);
+    }
+#endif
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3prin.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3prin.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7431a4e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509v3/v3prin.c
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/conf.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    X509 *cert;
+    FILE *inf;
+    int i, count;
+    X509_EXTENSION *ext;
+
+    X509V3_add_standard_extensions();
+    ERR_load_crypto_strings();
+    if (!argv[1]) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Usage v3prin cert.pem\n");
+        exit(1);
+    }
+    if ((inf = fopen(argv[1], "r")) == NULL) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Can't open %s\n", argv[1]);
+        exit(1);
+    }
+    if ((cert = PEM_read_X509(inf, NULL, NULL)) == NULL) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Can't read certificate %s\n", argv[1]);
+        ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+        exit(1);
+    }
+    fclose(inf);
+    count = X509_get_ext_count(cert);
+    printf("%d extensions\n", count);
+    for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+        ext = X509_get_ext(cert, i);
+        printf("%s\n", OBJ_nid2ln(OBJ_obj2nid(ext->object)));
+        if (!X509V3_EXT_print_fp(stdout, ext, 0, 0))
+            ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+        printf("\n");
+
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x86_64cpuid.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x86_64cpuid.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1a6f728
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x86_64cpuid.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,475 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+$flavour = shift;
+$output  = shift;
+if ($flavour =~ /\./) { $output = $flavour; undef $flavour; }
+
+$win64=0; $win64=1 if ($flavour =~ /[nm]asm|mingw64/ || $output =~ /\.asm$/);
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+( $xlate="${dir}x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
+( $xlate="${dir}perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
+die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl";
+
+open OUT,"| \"$^X\" \"$xlate\" $flavour \"$output\"";
+*STDOUT=*OUT;
+
+($arg1,$arg2,$arg3,$arg4)=$win64?("%rcx","%rdx","%r8", "%r9") :	# Win64 order
+				 ("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx","%rcx");	# Unix order
+
+print<<___;
+.extern		OPENSSL_cpuid_setup
+.hidden		OPENSSL_cpuid_setup
+.section	.init
+	call	OPENSSL_cpuid_setup
+
+.hidden	OPENSSL_ia32cap_P
+.comm	OPENSSL_ia32cap_P,16,4
+
+.text
+
+.globl	OPENSSL_atomic_add
+.type	OPENSSL_atomic_add,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+OPENSSL_atomic_add:
+	movl	($arg1),%eax
+.Lspin:	leaq	($arg2,%rax),%r8
+	.byte	0xf0		# lock
+	cmpxchgl	%r8d,($arg1)
+	jne	.Lspin
+	movl	%r8d,%eax
+	.byte	0x48,0x98	# cltq/cdqe
+	ret
+.size	OPENSSL_atomic_add,.-OPENSSL_atomic_add
+
+.globl	OPENSSL_rdtsc
+.type	OPENSSL_rdtsc,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+OPENSSL_rdtsc:
+	rdtsc
+	shl	\$32,%rdx
+	or	%rdx,%rax
+	ret
+.size	OPENSSL_rdtsc,.-OPENSSL_rdtsc
+
+.globl	OPENSSL_ia32_cpuid
+.type	OPENSSL_ia32_cpuid,\@function,1
+.align	16
+OPENSSL_ia32_cpuid:
+	mov	%rbx,%r8		# save %rbx
+
+	xor	%eax,%eax
+	mov	%eax,8(%rdi)		# clear extended feature flags
+	cpuid
+	mov	%eax,%r11d		# max value for standard query level
+
+	xor	%eax,%eax
+	cmp	\$0x756e6547,%ebx	# "Genu"
+	setne	%al
+	mov	%eax,%r9d
+	cmp	\$0x49656e69,%edx	# "ineI"
+	setne	%al
+	or	%eax,%r9d
+	cmp	\$0x6c65746e,%ecx	# "ntel"
+	setne	%al
+	or	%eax,%r9d		# 0 indicates Intel CPU
+	jz	.Lintel
+
+	cmp	\$0x68747541,%ebx	# "Auth"
+	setne	%al
+	mov	%eax,%r10d
+	cmp	\$0x69746E65,%edx	# "enti"
+	setne	%al
+	or	%eax,%r10d
+	cmp	\$0x444D4163,%ecx	# "cAMD"
+	setne	%al
+	or	%eax,%r10d		# 0 indicates AMD CPU
+	jnz	.Lintel
+
+	# AMD specific
+	mov	\$0x80000000,%eax
+	cpuid
+	cmp	\$0x80000001,%eax
+	jb	.Lintel
+	mov	%eax,%r10d
+	mov	\$0x80000001,%eax
+	cpuid
+	or	%ecx,%r9d
+	and	\$0x00000801,%r9d	# isolate AMD XOP bit, 1<<11
+
+	cmp	\$0x80000008,%r10d
+	jb	.Lintel
+
+	mov	\$0x80000008,%eax
+	cpuid
+	movzb	%cl,%r10		# number of cores - 1
+	inc	%r10			# number of cores
+
+	mov	\$1,%eax
+	cpuid
+	bt	\$28,%edx		# test hyper-threading bit
+	jnc	.Lgeneric
+	shr	\$16,%ebx		# number of logical processors
+	cmp	%r10b,%bl
+	ja	.Lgeneric
+	and	\$0xefffffff,%edx	# ~(1<<28)
+	jmp	.Lgeneric
+
+.Lintel:
+	cmp	\$4,%r11d
+	mov	\$-1,%r10d
+	jb	.Lnocacheinfo
+
+	mov	\$4,%eax
+	mov	\$0,%ecx		# query L1D
+	cpuid
+	mov	%eax,%r10d
+	shr	\$14,%r10d
+	and	\$0xfff,%r10d		# number of cores -1 per L1D
+
+.Lnocacheinfo:
+	mov	\$1,%eax
+	cpuid
+	and	\$0xbfefffff,%edx	# force reserved bits to 0
+	cmp	\$0,%r9d
+	jne	.Lnotintel
+	or	\$0x40000000,%edx	# set reserved bit#30 on Intel CPUs
+	and	\$15,%ah
+	cmp	\$15,%ah		# examine Family ID
+	jne	.LnotP4
+	or	\$0x00100000,%edx	# set reserved bit#20 to engage RC4_CHAR
+.LnotP4:
+	cmp	\$6,%ah
+	jne	.Lnotintel
+	and	\$0x0fff0ff0,%eax
+	cmp	\$0x00050670,%eax	# Knights Landing
+	je	.Lknights
+	cmp	\$0x00080650,%eax	# Knights Mill (according to sde)
+	jne	.Lnotintel
+.Lknights:
+	and	\$0xfbffffff,%ecx	# clear XSAVE flag to mimic Silvermont
+
+.Lnotintel:
+	bt	\$28,%edx		# test hyper-threading bit
+	jnc	.Lgeneric
+	and	\$0xefffffff,%edx	# ~(1<<28)
+	cmp	\$0,%r10d
+	je	.Lgeneric
+
+	or	\$0x10000000,%edx	# 1<<28
+	shr	\$16,%ebx
+	cmp	\$1,%bl			# see if cache is shared
+	ja	.Lgeneric
+	and	\$0xefffffff,%edx	# ~(1<<28)
+.Lgeneric:
+	and	\$0x00000800,%r9d	# isolate AMD XOP flag
+	and	\$0xfffff7ff,%ecx
+	or	%ecx,%r9d		# merge AMD XOP flag
+
+	mov	%edx,%r10d		# %r9d:%r10d is copy of %ecx:%edx
+
+	cmp	\$7,%r11d
+	jb	.Lno_extended_info
+	mov	\$7,%eax
+	xor	%ecx,%ecx
+	cpuid
+	bt	\$26,%r9d		# check XSAVE bit, cleared on Knights
+	jc	.Lnotknights
+	and	\$0xfff7ffff,%ebx	# clear ADCX/ADOX flag
+.Lnotknights:
+	mov	%ebx,8(%rdi)		# save extended feature flags
+.Lno_extended_info:
+
+	bt	\$27,%r9d		# check OSXSAVE bit
+	jnc	.Lclear_avx
+	xor	%ecx,%ecx		# XCR0
+	.byte	0x0f,0x01,0xd0		# xgetbv
+	and	\$6,%eax		# isolate XMM and YMM state support
+	cmp	\$6,%eax
+	je	.Ldone
+.Lclear_avx:
+	mov	\$0xefffe7ff,%eax	# ~(1<<28|1<<12|1<<11)
+	and	%eax,%r9d		# clear AVX, FMA and AMD XOP bits
+	andl	\$0xffffffdf,8(%rdi)	# clear AVX2, ~(1<<5)
+.Ldone:
+	shl	\$32,%r9
+	mov	%r10d,%eax
+	mov	%r8,%rbx		# restore %rbx
+	or	%r9,%rax
+	ret
+.size	OPENSSL_ia32_cpuid,.-OPENSSL_ia32_cpuid
+
+.globl  OPENSSL_cleanse
+.type   OPENSSL_cleanse,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align  16
+OPENSSL_cleanse:
+	xor	%rax,%rax
+	cmp	\$15,$arg2
+	jae	.Lot
+	cmp	\$0,$arg2
+	je	.Lret
+.Little:
+	mov	%al,($arg1)
+	sub	\$1,$arg2
+	lea	1($arg1),$arg1
+	jnz	.Little
+.Lret:
+	ret
+.align	16
+.Lot:
+	test	\$7,$arg1
+	jz	.Laligned
+	mov	%al,($arg1)
+	lea	-1($arg2),$arg2
+	lea	1($arg1),$arg1
+	jmp	.Lot
+.Laligned:
+	mov	%rax,($arg1)
+	lea	-8($arg2),$arg2
+	test	\$-8,$arg2
+	lea	8($arg1),$arg1
+	jnz	.Laligned
+	cmp	\$0,$arg2
+	jne	.Little
+	ret
+.size	OPENSSL_cleanse,.-OPENSSL_cleanse
+
+.globl  CRYPTO_memcmp
+.type   CRYPTO_memcmp,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align  16
+CRYPTO_memcmp:
+	xor	%rax,%rax
+	xor	%r10,%r10
+	cmp	\$0,$arg3
+	je	.Lno_data
+.Loop_cmp:
+	mov	($arg1),%r10b
+	lea	1($arg1),$arg1
+	xor	($arg2),%r10b
+	lea	1($arg2),$arg2
+	or	%r10b,%al
+	dec	$arg3
+	jnz	.Loop_cmp
+	neg	%rax
+	shr	\$63,%rax
+.Lno_data:
+	ret
+.size	CRYPTO_memcmp,.-CRYPTO_memcmp
+___
+
+print<<___ if (!$win64);
+.globl	OPENSSL_wipe_cpu
+.type	OPENSSL_wipe_cpu,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+OPENSSL_wipe_cpu:
+	pxor	%xmm0,%xmm0
+	pxor	%xmm1,%xmm1
+	pxor	%xmm2,%xmm2
+	pxor	%xmm3,%xmm3
+	pxor	%xmm4,%xmm4
+	pxor	%xmm5,%xmm5
+	pxor	%xmm6,%xmm6
+	pxor	%xmm7,%xmm7
+	pxor	%xmm8,%xmm8
+	pxor	%xmm9,%xmm9
+	pxor	%xmm10,%xmm10
+	pxor	%xmm11,%xmm11
+	pxor	%xmm12,%xmm12
+	pxor	%xmm13,%xmm13
+	pxor	%xmm14,%xmm14
+	pxor	%xmm15,%xmm15
+	xorq	%rcx,%rcx
+	xorq	%rdx,%rdx
+	xorq	%rsi,%rsi
+	xorq	%rdi,%rdi
+	xorq	%r8,%r8
+	xorq	%r9,%r9
+	xorq	%r10,%r10
+	xorq	%r11,%r11
+	leaq	8(%rsp),%rax
+	ret
+.size	OPENSSL_wipe_cpu,.-OPENSSL_wipe_cpu
+___
+print<<___ if ($win64);
+.globl	OPENSSL_wipe_cpu
+.type	OPENSSL_wipe_cpu,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+OPENSSL_wipe_cpu:
+	pxor	%xmm0,%xmm0
+	pxor	%xmm1,%xmm1
+	pxor	%xmm2,%xmm2
+	pxor	%xmm3,%xmm3
+	pxor	%xmm4,%xmm4
+	pxor	%xmm5,%xmm5
+	xorq	%rcx,%rcx
+	xorq	%rdx,%rdx
+	xorq	%r8,%r8
+	xorq	%r9,%r9
+	xorq	%r10,%r10
+	xorq	%r11,%r11
+	leaq	8(%rsp),%rax
+	ret
+.size	OPENSSL_wipe_cpu,.-OPENSSL_wipe_cpu
+___
+{
+my $out="%r10";
+my $cnt="%rcx";
+my $max="%r11";
+my $lasttick="%r8d";
+my $lastdiff="%r9d";
+my $redzone=win64?8:-8;
+
+print<<___;
+.globl	OPENSSL_instrument_bus
+.type	OPENSSL_instrument_bus,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+OPENSSL_instrument_bus:
+	mov	$arg1,$out	# tribute to Win64
+	mov	$arg2,$cnt
+	mov	$arg2,$max
+
+	rdtsc			# collect 1st tick
+	mov	%eax,$lasttick	# lasttick = tick
+	mov	\$0,$lastdiff	# lastdiff = 0
+	clflush	($out)
+	.byte	0xf0		# lock
+	add	$lastdiff,($out)
+	jmp	.Loop
+.align	16
+.Loop:	rdtsc
+	mov	%eax,%edx
+	sub	$lasttick,%eax
+	mov	%edx,$lasttick
+	mov	%eax,$lastdiff
+	clflush	($out)
+	.byte	0xf0		# lock
+	add	%eax,($out)
+	lea	4($out),$out
+	sub	\$1,$cnt
+	jnz	.Loop
+
+	mov	$max,%rax
+	ret
+.size	OPENSSL_instrument_bus,.-OPENSSL_instrument_bus
+
+.globl	OPENSSL_instrument_bus2
+.type	OPENSSL_instrument_bus2,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+OPENSSL_instrument_bus2:
+	mov	$arg1,$out	# tribute to Win64
+	mov	$arg2,$cnt
+	mov	$arg3,$max
+	mov	$cnt,$redzone(%rsp)
+
+	rdtsc			# collect 1st tick
+	mov	%eax,$lasttick	# lasttick = tick
+	mov	\$0,$lastdiff	# lastdiff = 0
+
+	clflush	($out)
+	.byte	0xf0		# lock
+	add	$lastdiff,($out)
+
+	rdtsc			# collect 1st diff
+	mov	%eax,%edx
+	sub	$lasttick,%eax	# diff
+	mov	%edx,$lasttick	# lasttick = tick
+	mov	%eax,$lastdiff	# lastdiff = diff
+.Loop2:
+	clflush	($out)
+	.byte	0xf0		# lock
+	add	%eax,($out)	# accumulate diff
+
+	sub	\$1,$max
+	jz	.Ldone2
+
+	rdtsc
+	mov	%eax,%edx
+	sub	$lasttick,%eax	# diff
+	mov	%edx,$lasttick	# lasttick = tick
+	cmp	$lastdiff,%eax
+	mov	%eax,$lastdiff	# lastdiff = diff
+	mov	\$0,%edx
+	setne	%dl
+	sub	%rdx,$cnt	# conditional --$cnt
+	lea	($out,%rdx,4),$out	# conditional ++$out
+	jnz	.Loop2
+
+.Ldone2:
+	mov	$redzone(%rsp),%rax
+	sub	$cnt,%rax
+	ret
+.size	OPENSSL_instrument_bus2,.-OPENSSL_instrument_bus2
+___
+}
+
+sub gen_random {
+my $rdop = shift;
+print<<___;
+.globl	OPENSSL_ia32_${rdop}
+.type	OPENSSL_ia32_${rdop},\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+OPENSSL_ia32_${rdop}:
+	mov	\$8,%ecx
+.Loop_${rdop}:
+	${rdop}	%rax
+	jc	.Lbreak_${rdop}
+	loop	.Loop_${rdop}
+.Lbreak_${rdop}:
+	cmp	\$0,%rax
+	cmove	%rcx,%rax
+	ret
+.size	OPENSSL_ia32_${rdop},.-OPENSSL_ia32_${rdop}
+
+.globl	OPENSSL_ia32_${rdop}_bytes
+.type	OPENSSL_ia32_${rdop}_bytes,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+OPENSSL_ia32_${rdop}_bytes:
+	xor	%rax, %rax	# return value
+	cmp	\$0,$arg2
+	je	.Ldone_${rdop}_bytes
+
+	mov	\$8,%r11
+.Loop_${rdop}_bytes:
+	${rdop}	%r10
+	jc	.Lbreak_${rdop}_bytes
+	dec	%r11
+	jnz	.Loop_${rdop}_bytes
+	jmp	.Ldone_${rdop}_bytes
+
+.align	16
+.Lbreak_${rdop}_bytes:
+	cmp	\$8,$arg2
+	jb	.Ltail_${rdop}_bytes
+	mov	%r10,($arg1)
+	lea	8($arg1),$arg1
+	add	\$8,%rax
+	sub	\$8,$arg2
+	jz	.Ldone_${rdop}_bytes
+	mov	\$8,%r11
+	jmp	.Loop_${rdop}_bytes
+
+.align	16
+.Ltail_${rdop}_bytes:
+	mov	%r10b,($arg1)
+	lea	1($arg1),$arg1
+	inc	%rax
+	shr	\$8,%r8
+	dec	$arg2
+	jnz	.Ltail_${rdop}_bytes
+
+.Ldone_${rdop}_bytes:
+	ret
+.size	OPENSSL_ia32_${rdop}_bytes,.-OPENSSL_ia32_${rdop}_bytes
+___
+}
+gen_random("rdrand");
+gen_random("rdseed");
+
+close STDOUT;	# flush
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x86cpuid.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x86cpuid.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4622a9f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x86cpuid.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,559 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+push(@INC, "${dir}perlasm", "perlasm");
+require "x86asm.pl";
+
+$output = pop;
+open OUT,">$output";
+*STDOUT=*OUT;
+
+&asm_init($ARGV[0],"x86cpuid");
+
+for (@ARGV) { $sse2=1 if (/-DOPENSSL_IA32_SSE2/); }
+
+&function_begin("OPENSSL_ia32_cpuid");
+	&xor	("edx","edx");
+	&pushf	();
+	&pop	("eax");
+	&mov	("ecx","eax");
+	&xor	("eax",1<<21);
+	&push	("eax");
+	&popf	();
+	&pushf	();
+	&pop	("eax");
+	&xor	("ecx","eax");
+	&xor	("eax","eax");
+	&mov	("esi",&wparam(0));
+	&mov	(&DWP(8,"esi"),"eax");	# clear extended feature flags
+	&bt	("ecx",21);
+	&jnc	(&label("nocpuid"));
+	&cpuid	();
+	&mov	("edi","eax");		# max value for standard query level
+
+	&xor	("eax","eax");
+	&cmp	("ebx",0x756e6547);	# "Genu"
+	&setne	(&LB("eax"));
+	&mov	("ebp","eax");
+	&cmp	("edx",0x49656e69);	# "ineI"
+	&setne	(&LB("eax"));
+	&or	("ebp","eax");
+	&cmp	("ecx",0x6c65746e);	# "ntel"
+	&setne	(&LB("eax"));
+	&or	("ebp","eax");		# 0 indicates Intel CPU
+	&jz	(&label("intel"));
+
+	&cmp	("ebx",0x68747541);	# "Auth"
+	&setne	(&LB("eax"));
+	&mov	("esi","eax");
+	&cmp	("edx",0x69746E65);	# "enti"
+	&setne	(&LB("eax"));
+	&or	("esi","eax");
+	&cmp	("ecx",0x444D4163);	# "cAMD"
+	&setne	(&LB("eax"));
+	&or	("esi","eax");		# 0 indicates AMD CPU
+	&jnz	(&label("intel"));
+
+	# AMD specific
+	&mov	("eax",0x80000000);
+	&cpuid	();
+	&cmp	("eax",0x80000001);
+	&jb	(&label("intel"));
+	&mov	("esi","eax");
+	&mov	("eax",0x80000001);
+	&cpuid	();
+	&or	("ebp","ecx");
+	&and	("ebp",1<<11|1);	# isolate XOP bit
+	&cmp	("esi",0x80000008);
+	&jb	(&label("intel"));
+
+	&mov	("eax",0x80000008);
+	&cpuid	();
+	&movz	("esi",&LB("ecx"));	# number of cores - 1
+	&inc	("esi");		# number of cores
+
+	&mov	("eax",1);
+	&xor	("ecx","ecx");
+	&cpuid	();
+	&bt	("edx",28);
+	&jnc	(&label("generic"));
+	&shr	("ebx",16);
+	&and	("ebx",0xff);
+	&cmp	("ebx","esi");
+	&ja	(&label("generic"));
+	&and	("edx",0xefffffff);	# clear hyper-threading bit
+	&jmp	(&label("generic"));
+	
+&set_label("intel");
+	&cmp	("edi",4);
+	&mov	("esi",-1);
+	&jb	(&label("nocacheinfo"));
+
+	&mov	("eax",4);
+	&mov	("ecx",0);		# query L1D
+	&cpuid	();
+	&mov	("esi","eax");
+	&shr	("esi",14);
+	&and	("esi",0xfff);		# number of cores -1 per L1D
+
+&set_label("nocacheinfo");
+	&mov	("eax",1);
+	&xor	("ecx","ecx");
+	&cpuid	();
+	&and	("edx",0xbfefffff);	# force reserved bits #20, #30 to 0
+	&cmp	("ebp",0);
+	&jne	(&label("notintel"));
+	&or	("edx",1<<30);		# set reserved bit#30 on Intel CPUs
+	&and	(&HB("eax"),15);	# familiy ID
+	&cmp	(&HB("eax"),15);	# P4?
+	&jne	(&label("notintel"));
+	&or	("edx",1<<20);		# set reserved bit#20 to engage RC4_CHAR
+&set_label("notintel");
+	&bt	("edx",28);		# test hyper-threading bit
+	&jnc	(&label("generic"));
+	&and	("edx",0xefffffff);
+	&cmp	("esi",0);
+	&je	(&label("generic"));
+
+	&or	("edx",0x10000000);
+	&shr	("ebx",16);
+	&cmp	(&LB("ebx"),1);
+	&ja	(&label("generic"));
+	&and	("edx",0xefffffff);	# clear hyper-threading bit if not
+
+&set_label("generic");
+	&and	("ebp",1<<11);		# isolate AMD XOP flag
+	&and	("ecx",0xfffff7ff);	# force 11th bit to 0
+	&mov	("esi","edx");		# %ebp:%esi is copy of %ecx:%edx
+	&or	("ebp","ecx");		# merge AMD XOP flag
+
+	&cmp	("edi",7);
+	&mov	("edi",&wparam(0));
+	&jb	(&label("no_extended_info"));
+	&mov	("eax",7);
+	&xor	("ecx","ecx");
+	&cpuid	();
+	&mov	(&DWP(8,"edi"),"ebx");	# save extended feature flag
+&set_label("no_extended_info");
+
+	&bt	("ebp",27);		# check OSXSAVE bit
+	&jnc	(&label("clear_avx"));
+	&xor	("ecx","ecx");
+	&data_byte(0x0f,0x01,0xd0);	# xgetbv
+	&and	("eax",6);
+	&cmp	("eax",6);
+	&je	(&label("done"));
+	&cmp	("eax",2);
+	&je	(&label("clear_avx"));
+&set_label("clear_xmm");
+	&and	("ebp",0xfdfffffd);	# clear AESNI and PCLMULQDQ bits
+	&and	("esi",0xfeffffff);	# clear FXSR
+&set_label("clear_avx");
+	&and	("ebp",0xefffe7ff);	# clear AVX, FMA and AMD XOP bits
+	&and	(&DWP(8,"edi"),0xffffffdf);	# clear AVX2
+&set_label("done");
+	&mov	("eax","esi");
+	&mov	("edx","ebp");
+&set_label("nocpuid");
+&function_end("OPENSSL_ia32_cpuid");
+
+&external_label("OPENSSL_ia32cap_P");
+
+&function_begin_B("OPENSSL_rdtsc","EXTRN\t_OPENSSL_ia32cap_P:DWORD");
+	&xor	("eax","eax");
+	&xor	("edx","edx");
+	&picmeup("ecx","OPENSSL_ia32cap_P");
+	&bt	(&DWP(0,"ecx"),4);
+	&jnc	(&label("notsc"));
+	&rdtsc	();
+&set_label("notsc");
+	&ret	();
+&function_end_B("OPENSSL_rdtsc");
+
+# This works in Ring 0 only [read DJGPP+MS-DOS+privileged DPMI host],
+# but it's safe to call it on any [supported] 32-bit platform...
+# Just check for [non-]zero return value...
+&function_begin_B("OPENSSL_instrument_halt","EXTRN\t_OPENSSL_ia32cap_P:DWORD");
+	&picmeup("ecx","OPENSSL_ia32cap_P");
+	&bt	(&DWP(0,"ecx"),4);
+	&jnc	(&label("nohalt"));	# no TSC
+
+	&data_word(0x9058900e);		# push %cs; pop %eax
+	&and	("eax",3);
+	&jnz	(&label("nohalt"));	# not enough privileges
+
+	&pushf	();
+	&pop	("eax");
+	&bt	("eax",9);
+	&jnc	(&label("nohalt"));	# interrupts are disabled
+
+	&rdtsc	();
+	&push	("edx");
+	&push	("eax");
+	&halt	();
+	&rdtsc	();
+
+	&sub	("eax",&DWP(0,"esp"));
+	&sbb	("edx",&DWP(4,"esp"));
+	&add	("esp",8);
+	&ret	();
+
+&set_label("nohalt");
+	&xor	("eax","eax");
+	&xor	("edx","edx");
+	&ret	();
+&function_end_B("OPENSSL_instrument_halt");
+
+# Essentially there is only one use for this function. Under DJGPP:
+#
+#	#include <go32.h>
+#	...
+#	i=OPENSSL_far_spin(_dos_ds,0x46c);
+#	...
+# to obtain the number of spins till closest timer interrupt.
+
+&function_begin_B("OPENSSL_far_spin");
+	&pushf	();
+	&pop	("eax");
+	&bt	("eax",9);
+	&jnc	(&label("nospin"));	# interrupts are disabled
+
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(4,"esp"));
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(8,"esp"));
+	&data_word (0x90d88e1e);	# push %ds, mov %eax,%ds
+	&xor	("eax","eax");
+	&mov	("edx",&DWP(0,"ecx"));
+	&jmp	(&label("spin"));
+
+	&align	(16);
+&set_label("spin");
+	&inc	("eax");
+	&cmp	("edx",&DWP(0,"ecx"));
+	&je	(&label("spin"));
+
+	&data_word (0x1f909090);	# pop	%ds
+	&ret	();
+
+&set_label("nospin");
+	&xor	("eax","eax");
+	&xor	("edx","edx");
+	&ret	();
+&function_end_B("OPENSSL_far_spin");
+
+&function_begin_B("OPENSSL_wipe_cpu","EXTRN\t_OPENSSL_ia32cap_P:DWORD");
+	&xor	("eax","eax");
+	&xor	("edx","edx");
+	&picmeup("ecx","OPENSSL_ia32cap_P");
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(0,"ecx"));
+	&bt	(&DWP(0,"ecx"),1);
+	&jnc	(&label("no_x87"));
+	if ($sse2) {
+		&and	("ecx",1<<26|1<<24);	# check SSE2 and FXSR bits
+		&cmp	("ecx",1<<26|1<<24);
+		&jne	(&label("no_sse2"));
+		&pxor	("xmm0","xmm0");
+		&pxor	("xmm1","xmm1");
+		&pxor	("xmm2","xmm2");
+		&pxor	("xmm3","xmm3");
+		&pxor	("xmm4","xmm4");
+		&pxor	("xmm5","xmm5");
+		&pxor	("xmm6","xmm6");
+		&pxor	("xmm7","xmm7");
+	&set_label("no_sse2");
+	}
+	# just a bunch of fldz to zap the fp/mm bank followed by finit...
+	&data_word(0xeed9eed9,0xeed9eed9,0xeed9eed9,0xeed9eed9,0x90e3db9b);
+&set_label("no_x87");
+	&lea	("eax",&DWP(4,"esp"));
+	&ret	();
+&function_end_B("OPENSSL_wipe_cpu");
+
+&function_begin_B("OPENSSL_atomic_add");
+	&mov	("edx",&DWP(4,"esp"));	# fetch the pointer, 1st arg
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(8,"esp"));	# fetch the increment, 2nd arg
+	&push	("ebx");
+	&nop	();
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(0,"edx"));
+&set_label("spin");
+	&lea	("ebx",&DWP(0,"eax","ecx"));
+	&nop	();
+	&data_word(0x1ab10ff0);	# lock;	cmpxchg	%ebx,(%edx)	# %eax is involved and is always reloaded
+	&jne	(&label("spin"));
+	&mov	("eax","ebx");	# OpenSSL expects the new value
+	&pop	("ebx");
+	&ret	();
+&function_end_B("OPENSSL_atomic_add");
+
+# This function can become handy under Win32 in situations when
+# we don't know which calling convention, __stdcall or __cdecl(*),
+# indirect callee is using. In C it can be deployed as
+#
+#ifdef OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ
+#	type OPENSSL_indirect_call(void *f,...);
+#	...
+#	OPENSSL_indirect_call(func,[up to $max arguments]);
+#endif
+#
+# (*)	it's designed to work even for __fastcall if number of
+#	arguments is 1 or 2!
+&function_begin_B("OPENSSL_indirect_call");
+	{
+	my ($max,$i)=(7,);	# $max has to be chosen as 4*n-1
+				# in order to preserve eventual
+				# stack alignment
+	&push	("ebp");
+	&mov	("ebp","esp");
+	&sub	("esp",$max*4);
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(12,"ebp"));
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,"esp"),"ecx");
+	&mov	("edx",&DWP(16,"ebp"));
+	&mov	(&DWP(4,"esp"),"edx");
+	for($i=2;$i<$max;$i++)
+		{
+		# Some copies will be redundant/bogus...
+		&mov	("eax",&DWP(12+$i*4,"ebp"));
+		&mov	(&DWP(0+$i*4,"esp"),"eax");
+		}
+	&call_ptr	(&DWP(8,"ebp"));# make the call...
+	&mov	("esp","ebp");	# ... and just restore the stack pointer
+				# without paying attention to what we called,
+				# (__cdecl *func) or (__stdcall *one).
+	&pop	("ebp");
+	&ret	();
+	}
+&function_end_B("OPENSSL_indirect_call");
+
+&function_begin_B("OPENSSL_cleanse");
+	&mov	("edx",&wparam(0));
+	&mov	("ecx",&wparam(1));
+	&xor	("eax","eax");
+	&cmp	("ecx",7);
+	&jae	(&label("lot"));
+	&cmp	("ecx",0);
+	&je	(&label("ret"));
+&set_label("little");
+	&mov	(&BP(0,"edx"),"al");
+	&sub	("ecx",1);
+	&lea	("edx",&DWP(1,"edx"));
+	&jnz	(&label("little"));
+&set_label("ret");
+	&ret	();
+
+&set_label("lot",16);
+	&test	("edx",3);
+	&jz	(&label("aligned"));
+	&mov	(&BP(0,"edx"),"al");
+	&lea	("ecx",&DWP(-1,"ecx"));
+	&lea	("edx",&DWP(1,"edx"));
+	&jmp	(&label("lot"));
+&set_label("aligned");
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,"edx"),"eax");
+	&lea	("ecx",&DWP(-4,"ecx"));
+	&test	("ecx",-4);
+	&lea	("edx",&DWP(4,"edx"));
+	&jnz	(&label("aligned"));
+	&cmp	("ecx",0);
+	&jne	(&label("little"));
+	&ret	();
+&function_end_B("OPENSSL_cleanse");
+
+&function_begin_B("CRYPTO_memcmp");
+	&push	("esi");
+	&push	("edi");
+	&mov	("esi",&wparam(0));
+	&mov	("edi",&wparam(1));
+	&mov	("ecx",&wparam(2));
+	&xor	("eax","eax");
+	&xor	("edx","edx");
+	&cmp	("ecx",0);
+	&je	(&label("no_data"));
+&set_label("loop");
+	&mov	("dl",&BP(0,"esi"));
+	&lea	("esi",&DWP(1,"esi"));
+	&xor	("dl",&BP(0,"edi"));
+	&lea	("edi",&DWP(1,"edi"));
+	&or	("al","dl");
+	&dec	("ecx");
+	&jnz	(&label("loop"));
+	&neg	("eax");
+	&shr	("eax",31);
+&set_label("no_data");
+	&pop	("edi");
+	&pop	("esi");
+	&ret	();
+&function_end_B("CRYPTO_memcmp");
+{
+my $lasttick = "esi";
+my $lastdiff = "ebx";
+my $out = "edi";
+my $cnt = "ecx";
+my $max = "ebp";
+
+&function_begin("OPENSSL_instrument_bus");
+    &mov	("eax",0);
+    if ($sse2) {
+	&picmeup("edx","OPENSSL_ia32cap_P");
+	&bt	(&DWP(0,"edx"),4);
+	&jnc	(&label("nogo"));	# no TSC
+	&bt	(&DWP(0,"edx"),19);
+	&jnc	(&label("nogo"));	# no CLFLUSH
+
+	&mov	($out,&wparam(0));	# load arguments
+	&mov	($cnt,&wparam(1));
+
+	# collect 1st tick
+	&rdtsc	();
+	&mov	($lasttick,"eax");	# lasttick = tick
+	&mov	($lastdiff,0);		# lastdiff = 0
+	&clflush(&DWP(0,$out));
+	&data_byte(0xf0);		# lock
+	&add	(&DWP(0,$out),$lastdiff);
+	&jmp	(&label("loop"));
+
+&set_label("loop",16);
+	&rdtsc	();
+	&mov	("edx","eax");		# put aside tick (yes, I neglect edx)
+	&sub	("eax",$lasttick);	# diff
+	&mov	($lasttick,"edx");	# lasttick = tick
+	&mov	($lastdiff,"eax");	# lastdiff = diff
+	&clflush(&DWP(0,$out));
+	&data_byte(0xf0);		# lock
+	&add	(&DWP(0,$out),"eax");	# accumulate diff
+	&lea	($out,&DWP(4,$out));	# ++$out
+	&sub	($cnt,1);		# --$cnt
+	&jnz	(&label("loop"));
+
+	&mov	("eax",&wparam(1));
+&set_label("nogo");
+    }
+&function_end("OPENSSL_instrument_bus");
+
+&function_begin("OPENSSL_instrument_bus2");
+    &mov	("eax",0);
+    if ($sse2) {
+	&picmeup("edx","OPENSSL_ia32cap_P");
+	&bt	(&DWP(0,"edx"),4);
+	&jnc	(&label("nogo"));	# no TSC
+	&bt	(&DWP(0,"edx"),19);
+	&jnc	(&label("nogo"));	# no CLFLUSH
+
+	&mov	($out,&wparam(0));	# load arguments
+	&mov	($cnt,&wparam(1));
+	&mov	($max,&wparam(2));
+
+	&rdtsc	();			# collect 1st tick
+	&mov	($lasttick,"eax");	# lasttick = tick
+	&mov	($lastdiff,0);		# lastdiff = 0
+
+	&clflush(&DWP(0,$out));
+	&data_byte(0xf0);		# lock
+	&add	(&DWP(0,$out),$lastdiff);
+
+	&rdtsc	();			# collect 1st diff
+	&mov	("edx","eax");		# put aside tick (yes, I neglect edx)
+	&sub	("eax",$lasttick);	# diff
+	&mov	($lasttick,"edx");	# lasttick = tick
+	&mov	($lastdiff,"eax");	# lastdiff = diff
+	&jmp	(&label("loop2"));
+
+&set_label("loop2",16);
+	&clflush(&DWP(0,$out));
+	&data_byte(0xf0);		# lock
+	&add	(&DWP(0,$out),"eax");	# accumulate diff
+
+	&sub	($max,1);
+	&jz	(&label("done2"));
+
+	&rdtsc	();
+	&mov	("edx","eax");		# put aside tick (yes, I neglect edx)
+	&sub	("eax",$lasttick);	# diff
+	&mov	($lasttick,"edx");	# lasttick = tick
+	&cmp	("eax",$lastdiff);
+	&mov	($lastdiff,"eax");	# lastdiff = diff
+	&mov	("edx",0);
+	&setne	("dl");
+	&sub	($cnt,"edx");		# conditional --$cnt
+	&lea	($out,&DWP(0,$out,"edx",4));	# conditional ++$out
+	&jnz	(&label("loop2"));
+
+&set_label("done2");
+	&mov	("eax",&wparam(1));
+	&sub	("eax",$cnt);
+&set_label("nogo");
+    }
+&function_end("OPENSSL_instrument_bus2");
+}
+
+sub gen_random {
+my $rdop = shift;
+&function_begin_B("OPENSSL_ia32_${rdop}");
+	&mov	("ecx",8);
+&set_label("loop");
+	&${rdop}("eax");
+	&jc	(&label("break"));
+	&loop	(&label("loop"));
+&set_label("break");
+	&cmp	("eax",0);
+	&cmove	("eax","ecx");
+	&ret	();
+&function_end_B("OPENSSL_ia32_${rdop}");
+
+&function_begin_B("OPENSSL_ia32_${rdop}_bytes");
+	&push	("edi");
+	&push	("ebx");
+	&xor	("eax","eax");		# return value
+	&mov	("edi",&wparam(0));
+	&mov	("ebx",&wparam(1));
+
+	&cmp	("ebx",0);
+	&je	(&label("done"));
+
+	&mov	("ecx",8);
+&set_label("loop");
+	&${rdop}("edx");
+	&jc	(&label("break"));
+	&loop	(&label("loop"));
+	&jmp	(&label("done"));
+
+&set_label("break",16);
+	&cmp	("ebx",4);
+	&jb	(&label("tail"));
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,"edi"),"edx");
+	&lea	("edi",&DWP(4,"edi"));
+	&add	("eax",4);
+	&sub	("ebx",4);
+	&jz	(&label("done"));
+	&mov	("ecx",8);
+	&jmp	(&label("loop"));
+
+&set_label("tail",16);
+	&mov	(&BP(0,"edi"),"dl");
+	&lea	("edi",&DWP(1,"edi"));
+	&inc	("eax");
+	&shr	("edx",8);
+	&dec	("ebx");
+	&jnz	(&label("tail"));
+
+&set_label("done");
+	&pop	("ebx");
+	&pop	("edi");
+	&ret	();
+&function_end_B("OPENSSL_ia32_${rdop}_bytes");
+}
+&gen_random("rdrand");
+&gen_random("rdseed");
+
+&initseg("OPENSSL_cpuid_setup");
+
+&hidden("OPENSSL_cpuid_setup");
+&hidden("OPENSSL_ia32cap_P");
+
+&asm_finish();
+
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/README b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/README
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d2155ef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/README
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+NOTE: Don't expect any of these programs to work with current
+OpenSSL releases, or even with later SSLeay releases.
+
+Original README:
+=============================================================================
+
+Some demo programs sent to me by various people
+
+eric
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/bio/Makefile b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/bio/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..493e8a5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/bio/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+# Quick instruction:
+# To build against an OpenSSL built in the source tree, do this:
+#
+#    make OPENSSL_INCS_LOCATION=-I../../include OPENSSL_LIBS_LOCATION=-L../..
+#
+# To run the demos when linked with a shared library (default):
+#
+#    LD_LIBRARY_PATH=../.. ./server-arg
+#    LD_LIBRARY_PATH=../.. ./server-cmod
+#    LD_LIBRARY_PATH=../.. ./server-conf
+#    LD_LIBRARY_PATH=../.. ./client-arg
+#    LD_LIBRARY_PATH=../.. ./client-conf
+#    LD_LIBRARY_PATH=../.. ./saccept
+#    LD_LIBRARY_PATH=../.. ./sconnect
+
+CFLAGS = $(OPENSSL_INCS_LOCATION)
+LDFLAGS = $(OPENSSL_LIBS_LOCATION) -lssl -lcrypto $(EX_LIBS)
+
+all: client-arg client-conf saccept sconnect server-arg server-cmod server-conf
+
+client-arg: client-arg.o
+client-conf: client-conf.o
+saccept: saccept.o
+sconnect: sconnect.o
+server-arg: server-arg.o
+server-cmod: server-cmod.o
+server-conf: server-conf.o
+
+client-arg client-conf saccept sconnect server-arg server-cmod server-conf:
+	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ $<
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/bio/README b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/bio/README
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a36bb48
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/bio/README
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+This directory contains some simple examples of the use of BIO's
+to simplify socket programming.
+
+The client-conf, server-conf, client-arg and client-conf include examples
+of how to use the SSL_CONF API for configuration file or command line
+processing.
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/bio/accept.cnf b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/bio/accept.cnf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..eb69658
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/bio/accept.cnf
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+# Example configuration file
+# Port to listen on
+Port = 4433
+# Disable TLS v1.2 for test.
+# Protocol = ALL, -TLSv1.2
+# Only support 3 curves
+Curves = P-521:P-384:P-256
+# Restricted signature algorithms
+SignatureAlgorithms = RSA+SHA512:ECDSA+SHA512 
+Certificate=server.pem
+PrivateKey=server.pem
+ChainCAFile=root.pem
+VerifyCAFile=root.pem
+
+# Request certificate
+VerifyMode=Request
+ClientCAFile=root.pem
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/bio/client-arg.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/bio/client-arg.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e8d5e46
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/bio/client-arg.c
@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2013-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    BIO *sbio = NULL, *out = NULL;
+    int len;
+    char tmpbuf[1024];
+    SSL_CTX *ctx;
+    SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx;
+    SSL *ssl;
+    char **args = argv + 1;
+    const char *connect_str = "localhost:4433";
+    int nargs = argc - 1;
+
+    ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_client_method());
+    cctx = SSL_CONF_CTX_new();
+    SSL_CONF_CTX_set_flags(cctx, SSL_CONF_FLAG_CLIENT);
+    SSL_CONF_CTX_set_ssl_ctx(cctx, ctx);
+    while (*args && **args == '-') {
+        int rv;
+        /* Parse standard arguments */
+        rv = SSL_CONF_cmd_argv(cctx, &nargs, &args);
+        if (rv == -3) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "Missing argument for %s\n", *args);
+            goto end;
+        }
+        if (rv < 0) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "Error in command %s\n", *args);
+            ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+            goto end;
+        }
+        /* If rv > 0 we processed something so proceed to next arg */
+        if (rv > 0)
+            continue;
+        /* Otherwise application specific argument processing */
+        if (strcmp(*args, "-connect") == 0) {
+            connect_str = args[1];
+            if (connect_str == NULL) {
+                fprintf(stderr, "Missing -connect argument\n");
+                goto end;
+            }
+            args += 2;
+            nargs -= 2;
+            continue;
+        } else {
+            fprintf(stderr, "Unknown argument %s\n", *args);
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (!SSL_CONF_CTX_finish(cctx)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Finish error\n");
+        ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * We'd normally set some stuff like the verify paths and * mode here
+     * because as things stand this will connect to * any server whose
+     * certificate is signed by any CA.
+     */
+
+    sbio = BIO_new_ssl_connect(ctx);
+
+    BIO_get_ssl(sbio, &ssl);
+
+    if (!ssl) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Can't locate SSL pointer\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    /* Don't want any retries */
+    SSL_set_mode(ssl, SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY);
+
+    /* We might want to do other things with ssl here */
+
+    BIO_set_conn_hostname(sbio, connect_str);
+
+    out = BIO_new_fp(stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+    if (BIO_do_connect(sbio) <= 0) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Error connecting to server\n");
+        ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (BIO_do_handshake(sbio) <= 0) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Error establishing SSL connection\n");
+        ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    /* Could examine ssl here to get connection info */
+
+    BIO_puts(sbio, "GET / HTTP/1.0\n\n");
+    for (;;) {
+        len = BIO_read(sbio, tmpbuf, 1024);
+        if (len <= 0)
+            break;
+        BIO_write(out, tmpbuf, len);
+    }
+ end:
+    SSL_CONF_CTX_free(cctx);
+    BIO_free_all(sbio);
+    BIO_free(out);
+    return 0;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/bio/client-conf.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/bio/client-conf.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e819030
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/bio/client-conf.c
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2013-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+#include <openssl/conf.h>
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    BIO *sbio = NULL, *out = NULL;
+    int i, len, rv;
+    char tmpbuf[1024];
+    SSL_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+    SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx = NULL;
+    SSL *ssl = NULL;
+    CONF *conf = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *sect = NULL;
+    CONF_VALUE *cnf;
+    const char *connect_str = "localhost:4433";
+    long errline = -1;
+
+    conf = NCONF_new(NULL);
+
+    if (NCONF_load(conf, "connect.cnf", &errline) <= 0) {
+        if (errline <= 0)
+            fprintf(stderr, "Error processing config file\n");
+        else
+            fprintf(stderr, "Error on line %ld\n", errline);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    sect = NCONF_get_section(conf, "default");
+
+    if (sect == NULL) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Error retrieving default section\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_client_method());
+    cctx = SSL_CONF_CTX_new();
+    SSL_CONF_CTX_set_flags(cctx, SSL_CONF_FLAG_CLIENT);
+    SSL_CONF_CTX_set_flags(cctx, SSL_CONF_FLAG_FILE);
+    SSL_CONF_CTX_set_ssl_ctx(cctx, ctx);
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(sect); i++) {
+        cnf = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(sect, i);
+        rv = SSL_CONF_cmd(cctx, cnf->name, cnf->value);
+        if (rv > 0)
+            continue;
+        if (rv != -2) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "Error processing %s = %s\n",
+                    cnf->name, cnf->value);
+            ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+            goto end;
+        }
+        if (strcmp(cnf->name, "Connect") == 0) {
+            connect_str = cnf->value;
+        } else {
+            fprintf(stderr, "Unknown configuration option %s\n", cnf->name);
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (!SSL_CONF_CTX_finish(cctx)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Finish error\n");
+        ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * We'd normally set some stuff like the verify paths and * mode here
+     * because as things stand this will connect to * any server whose
+     * certificate is signed by any CA.
+     */
+
+    sbio = BIO_new_ssl_connect(ctx);
+
+    BIO_get_ssl(sbio, &ssl);
+
+    if (!ssl) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Can't locate SSL pointer\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    /* Don't want any retries */
+    SSL_set_mode(ssl, SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY);
+
+    /* We might want to do other things with ssl here */
+
+    BIO_set_conn_hostname(sbio, connect_str);
+
+    out = BIO_new_fp(stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+    if (BIO_do_connect(sbio) <= 0) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Error connecting to server\n");
+        ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (BIO_do_handshake(sbio) <= 0) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Error establishing SSL connection\n");
+        ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    /* Could examine ssl here to get connection info */
+
+    BIO_puts(sbio, "GET / HTTP/1.0\n\n");
+    for (;;) {
+        len = BIO_read(sbio, tmpbuf, 1024);
+        if (len <= 0)
+            break;
+        BIO_write(out, tmpbuf, len);
+    }
+ end:
+    SSL_CONF_CTX_free(cctx);
+    BIO_free_all(sbio);
+    BIO_free(out);
+    NCONF_free(conf);
+    return 0;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/bio/cmod.cnf b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/bio/cmod.cnf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..39ac54e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/bio/cmod.cnf
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+# Example config module configuration
+
+# Name supplied by application to CONF_modules_load_file
+# and section containing configuration
+testapp = test_sect
+
+[test_sect]
+# list of configuration modules
+
+# SSL configuration module
+ssl_conf = ssl_sect
+
+[ssl_sect]
+# list of SSL configurations
+server = server_sect
+
+[server_sect]
+# Only support 3 curves
+Curves = P-521:P-384:P-256
+# Restricted signature algorithms
+SignatureAlgorithms = RSA+SHA512:ECDSA+SHA512
+# Certificates and keys
+RSA.Certificate=server.pem
+ECDSA.Certificate=server-ec.pem
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/bio/connect.cnf b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/bio/connect.cnf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4dee03c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/bio/connect.cnf
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+# Example configuration file
+# Connects to the default port of s_server
+Connect = localhost:4433
+# Disable TLS v1.2 for test.
+# Protocol = ALL, -TLSv1.2
+# Only support 3 curves
+Curves = P-521:P-384:P-256
+# Restricted signature algorithms
+SignatureAlgorithms = RSA+SHA512:ECDSA+SHA512 
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/bio/descrip.mms b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/bio/descrip.mms
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8e127b0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/bio/descrip.mms
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+# This build description trusts that the following logical names are defined:
+#
+# For compilation: OPENSSL
+# For linking with shared libraries: OSSL$LIBCRYPTO_SHR and OSSL$LIBSSL_SHR
+# For linking with static libraries: OSSL$LIBCRYPTO and OSSL$LIBSSL
+#
+# These are normally defined with the OpenSSL startup procedure
+
+# By default, we link with the shared libraries
+SHARED = TRUE
+
+# Alternative, for linking with static libraries
+#SHARED = FALSE
+
+.FIRST :
+	IF "$(SHARED)" .EQS. "TRUE" THEN DEFINE OPT []shared.opt
+	IF "$(SHARED)" .NES. "TRUE" THEN DEFINE OPT []static.opt
+
+.LAST :
+	DEASSIGN OPT
+
+.DEFAULT :
+	@ !
+
+# Because we use an option file, we need to redefine this
+.obj.exe : 
+	$(LINK) $(LINKFLAGS) $<,OPT:/OPT
+
+all : client-arg.exe client-conf.exe saccept.exe sconnect.exe -
+      server-arg.exe server-cmod.exe server-conf.exe
+
+client-arg.exe : client-arg.obj
+client-conf.exe : client-conf.obj
+saccept.exe : saccept.obj
+sconnect.exe : sconnect.obj
+server-arg.exe : server-arg.obj
+server-cmod.exe : server-cmod.obj
+server-conf.exe : server-conf.obj
+
+# Stoopid MMS doesn't infer this automatically...
+client-arg.obj : client-arg.c
+client-conf.obj : client-conf.c
+saccept.obj : saccept.c
+sconnect.obj : sconnect.c
+server-arg.obj : server-arg.c
+server-cmod.obj : server-cmod.c
+server-conf.obj : server-conf.c
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/bio/intca.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/bio/intca.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3551ea9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/bio/intca.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/bio/root.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/bio/root.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3bd0e9b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/bio/root.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/bio/saccept.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/bio/saccept.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..66c5c61
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/bio/saccept.c
@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1998-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*-
+ * A minimal program to serve an SSL connection.
+ * It uses blocking.
+ * saccept host:port
+ * host is the interface IP to use.  If any interface, use *:port
+ * The default it *:4433
+ *
+ * cc -I../../include saccept.c -L../.. -lssl -lcrypto -ldl
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+#define CERT_FILE       "server.pem"
+
+static int done = 0;
+
+void interrupt(int sig)
+{
+    done = 1;
+}
+
+void sigsetup(void)
+{
+    struct sigaction sa;
+
+    /*
+     * Catch at most once, and don't restart the accept system call.
+     */
+    sa.sa_flags = SA_RESETHAND;
+    sa.sa_handler = interrupt;
+    sigemptyset(&sa.sa_mask);
+    sigaction(SIGINT, &sa, NULL);
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+    char *port = NULL;
+    BIO *in = NULL;
+    BIO *ssl_bio, *tmp;
+    SSL_CTX *ctx;
+    char buf[512];
+    int ret = 1, i;
+
+    if (argc <= 1)
+        port = "*:4433";
+    else
+        port = argv[1];
+
+    ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_server_method());
+    if (!SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(ctx, CERT_FILE))
+        goto err;
+    if (!SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(ctx, CERT_FILE, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM))
+        goto err;
+    if (!SSL_CTX_check_private_key(ctx))
+        goto err;
+
+    /* Setup server side SSL bio */
+    ssl_bio = BIO_new_ssl(ctx, 0);
+
+    if ((in = BIO_new_accept(port)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    /*
+     * This means that when a new connection is accepted on 'in', The ssl_bio
+     * will be 'duplicated' and have the new socket BIO push into it.
+     * Basically it means the SSL BIO will be automatically setup
+     */
+    BIO_set_accept_bios(in, ssl_bio);
+
+    /* Arrange to leave server loop on interrupt */
+    sigsetup();
+
+ again:
+    /*
+     * The first call will setup the accept socket, and the second will get a
+     * socket.  In this loop, the first actual accept will occur in the
+     * BIO_read() function.
+     */
+
+    if (BIO_do_accept(in) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    while (!done) {
+        i = BIO_read(in, buf, 512);
+        if (i == 0) {
+            /*
+             * If we have finished, remove the underlying BIO stack so the
+             * next time we call any function for this BIO, it will attempt
+             * to do an accept
+             */
+            printf("Done\n");
+            tmp = BIO_pop(in);
+            BIO_free_all(tmp);
+            goto again;
+        }
+        if (i < 0)
+            goto err;
+        fwrite(buf, 1, i, stdout);
+        fflush(stdout);
+    }
+
+    ret = 0;
+ err:
+    if (ret) {
+        ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+    }
+    BIO_free(in);
+    exit(ret);
+    return (!ret);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/bio/sconnect.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/bio/sconnect.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..664a1e0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/bio/sconnect.c
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1998-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*-
+ * A minimal program to do SSL to a passed host and port.
+ * It is actually using non-blocking IO but in a very simple manner
+ * sconnect host:port - it does a 'GET / HTTP/1.0'
+ *
+ * cc -I../../include sconnect.c -L../.. -lssl -lcrypto
+ */
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+#define HOSTPORT "localhost:4433"
+#define CAFILE "root.pem"
+
+extern int errno;
+
+int main(argc, argv)
+int argc;
+char *argv[];
+{
+    const char *hostport = HOSTPORT;
+    const char *CAfile = CAFILE;
+    char *hostname;
+    char *cp;
+    BIO *out = NULL;
+    char buf[1024 * 10], *p;
+    SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx = NULL;
+    SSL *ssl;
+    BIO *ssl_bio;
+    int i, len, off, ret = 1;
+
+    if (argc > 1)
+        hostport = argv[1];
+    if (argc > 2)
+        CAfile = argv[2];
+
+    hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(hostport);
+    if ((cp = strchr(hostname, ':')) != NULL)
+        *cp = 0;
+
+#ifdef WATT32
+    dbug_init();
+    sock_init();
+#endif
+
+    ssl_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_client_method());
+
+    /* Enable trust chain verification */
+    SSL_CTX_set_verify(ssl_ctx, SSL_VERIFY_PEER, NULL);
+    SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(ssl_ctx, CAfile, NULL);
+
+    /* Lets make a SSL structure */
+    ssl = SSL_new(ssl_ctx);
+    SSL_set_connect_state(ssl);
+
+    /* Enable peername verification */
+    if (SSL_set1_host(ssl, hostname) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* Use it inside an SSL BIO */
+    ssl_bio = BIO_new(BIO_f_ssl());
+    BIO_set_ssl(ssl_bio, ssl, BIO_CLOSE);
+
+    /* Lets use a connect BIO under the SSL BIO */
+    out = BIO_new(BIO_s_connect());
+    BIO_set_conn_hostname(out, hostport);
+    BIO_set_nbio(out, 1);
+    out = BIO_push(ssl_bio, out);
+
+    p = "GET / HTTP/1.0\r\n\r\n";
+    len = strlen(p);
+
+    off = 0;
+    for (;;) {
+        i = BIO_write(out, &(p[off]), len);
+        if (i <= 0) {
+            if (BIO_should_retry(out)) {
+                fprintf(stderr, "write DELAY\n");
+                sleep(1);
+                continue;
+            } else {
+                goto err;
+            }
+        }
+        off += i;
+        len -= i;
+        if (len <= 0)
+            break;
+    }
+
+    for (;;) {
+        i = BIO_read(out, buf, sizeof(buf));
+        if (i == 0)
+            break;
+        if (i < 0) {
+            if (BIO_should_retry(out)) {
+                fprintf(stderr, "read DELAY\n");
+                sleep(1);
+                continue;
+            }
+            goto err;
+        }
+        fwrite(buf, 1, i, stdout);
+    }
+
+    ret = 1;
+    goto done;
+
+ err:
+    if (ERR_peek_error() == 0) { /* system call error */
+        fprintf(stderr, "errno=%d ", errno);
+        perror("error");
+    } else
+        ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+ done:
+    BIO_free_all(out);
+    SSL_CTX_free(ssl_ctx);
+    return (ret == 1);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/bio/server-arg.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/bio/server-arg.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6056969
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/bio/server-arg.c
@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2013-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * A minimal program to serve an SSL connection. It uses blocking. It use the
+ * SSL_CONF API with the command line. cc -I../../include server-arg.c
+ * -L../.. -lssl -lcrypto -ldl
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+    char *port = "*:4433";
+    BIO *ssl_bio, *tmp;
+    SSL_CTX *ctx;
+    SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx;
+    char buf[512];
+    BIO *in = NULL;
+    int ret = 1, i;
+    char **args = argv + 1;
+    int nargs = argc - 1;
+
+    ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_server_method());
+
+    cctx = SSL_CONF_CTX_new();
+    SSL_CONF_CTX_set_flags(cctx, SSL_CONF_FLAG_SERVER);
+    SSL_CONF_CTX_set_flags(cctx, SSL_CONF_FLAG_CERTIFICATE);
+    SSL_CONF_CTX_set_ssl_ctx(cctx, ctx);
+    while (*args && **args == '-') {
+        int rv;
+        /* Parse standard arguments */
+        rv = SSL_CONF_cmd_argv(cctx, &nargs, &args);
+        if (rv == -3) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "Missing argument for %s\n", *args);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (rv < 0) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "Error in command %s\n", *args);
+            ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        /* If rv > 0 we processed something so proceed to next arg */
+        if (rv > 0)
+            continue;
+        /* Otherwise application specific argument processing */
+        if (strcmp(*args, "-port") == 0) {
+            port = args[1];
+            if (port == NULL) {
+                fprintf(stderr, "Missing -port argument\n");
+                goto err;
+            }
+            args += 2;
+            nargs -= 2;
+            continue;
+        } else {
+            fprintf(stderr, "Unknown argument %s\n", *args);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (!SSL_CONF_CTX_finish(cctx)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Finish error\n");
+        ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+        goto err;
+    }
+#ifdef ITERATE_CERTS
+    /*
+     * Demo of how to iterate over all certificates in an SSL_CTX structure.
+     */
+    {
+        X509 *x;
+        int rv;
+        rv = SSL_CTX_set_current_cert(ctx, SSL_CERT_SET_FIRST);
+        while (rv) {
+            X509 *x = SSL_CTX_get0_certificate(ctx);
+            X509_NAME_print_ex_fp(stdout, X509_get_subject_name(x), 0,
+                                  XN_FLAG_ONELINE);
+            printf("\n");
+            rv = SSL_CTX_set_current_cert(ctx, SSL_CERT_SET_NEXT);
+        }
+        fflush(stdout);
+    }
+#endif
+    /* Setup server side SSL bio */
+    ssl_bio = BIO_new_ssl(ctx, 0);
+
+    if ((in = BIO_new_accept(port)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    /*
+     * This means that when a new connection is accepted on 'in', The ssl_bio
+     * will be 'duplicated' and have the new socket BIO push into it.
+     * Basically it means the SSL BIO will be automatically setup
+     */
+    BIO_set_accept_bios(in, ssl_bio);
+
+ again:
+    /*
+     * The first call will setup the accept socket, and the second will get a
+     * socket.  In this loop, the first actual accept will occur in the
+     * BIO_read() function.
+     */
+
+    if (BIO_do_accept(in) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    for (;;) {
+        i = BIO_read(in, buf, 512);
+        if (i == 0) {
+            /*
+             * If we have finished, remove the underlying BIO stack so the
+             * next time we call any function for this BIO, it will attempt
+             * to do an accept
+             */
+            printf("Done\n");
+            tmp = BIO_pop(in);
+            BIO_free_all(tmp);
+            goto again;
+        }
+        if (i < 0)
+            goto err;
+        fwrite(buf, 1, i, stdout);
+        fflush(stdout);
+    }
+
+    ret = 0;
+ err:
+    if (ret) {
+        ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+    }
+    BIO_free(in);
+    exit(ret);
+    return (!ret);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/bio/server-cmod.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/bio/server-cmod.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9cb2463
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/bio/server-cmod.c
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * A minimal TLS server it ses SSL_CTX_config and a configuration file to
+ * set most server parameters.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+#include <openssl/conf.h>
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+    unsigned char buf[512];
+    char *port = "*:4433";
+    BIO *in = NULL;
+    BIO *ssl_bio, *tmp;
+    SSL_CTX *ctx;
+    int ret = 1, i;
+
+    ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_server_method());
+
+    if (CONF_modules_load_file("cmod.cnf", "testapp", 0) <= 0) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Error processing config file\n");
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (SSL_CTX_config(ctx, "server") == 0) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Error configuring server.\n");
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* Setup server side SSL bio */
+    ssl_bio = BIO_new_ssl(ctx, 0);
+
+    if ((in = BIO_new_accept(port)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    /*
+     * This means that when a new connection is accepted on 'in', The ssl_bio
+     * will be 'duplicated' and have the new socket BIO push into it.
+     * Basically it means the SSL BIO will be automatically setup
+     */
+    BIO_set_accept_bios(in, ssl_bio);
+
+ again:
+    /*
+     * The first call will setup the accept socket, and the second will get a
+     * socket.  In this loop, the first actual accept will occur in the
+     * BIO_read() function.
+     */
+
+    if (BIO_do_accept(in) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    for (;;) {
+        i = BIO_read(in, buf, sizeof(buf));
+        if (i == 0) {
+            /*
+             * If we have finished, remove the underlying BIO stack so the
+             * next time we call any function for this BIO, it will attempt
+             * to do an accept
+             */
+            printf("Done\n");
+            tmp = BIO_pop(in);
+            BIO_free_all(tmp);
+            goto again;
+        }
+        if (i < 0) {
+            if (BIO_should_retry(in))
+                continue;
+            goto err;
+        }
+        fwrite(buf, 1, i, stdout);
+        fflush(stdout);
+    }
+
+    ret = 0;
+ err:
+    if (ret) {
+        ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+    }
+    BIO_free(in);
+    exit(ret);
+    return (!ret);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/bio/server-conf.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/bio/server-conf.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..41b1308
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/bio/server-conf.c
@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2013-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * A minimal program to serve an SSL connection. It uses blocking. It uses
+ * the SSL_CONF API with a configuration file. cc -I../../include saccept.c
+ * -L../.. -lssl -lcrypto -ldl
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+#include <openssl/conf.h>
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+    char *port = "*:4433";
+    BIO *in = NULL;
+    BIO *ssl_bio, *tmp;
+    SSL_CTX *ctx;
+    SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx = NULL;
+    CONF *conf = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *sect = NULL;
+    CONF_VALUE *cnf;
+    long errline = -1;
+    char buf[512];
+    int ret = 1, i;
+
+    ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_server_method());
+
+    conf = NCONF_new(NULL);
+
+    if (NCONF_load(conf, "accept.cnf", &errline) <= 0) {
+        if (errline <= 0)
+            fprintf(stderr, "Error processing config file\n");
+        else
+            fprintf(stderr, "Error on line %ld\n", errline);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    sect = NCONF_get_section(conf, "default");
+
+    if (sect == NULL) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Error retrieving default section\n");
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    cctx = SSL_CONF_CTX_new();
+    SSL_CONF_CTX_set_flags(cctx, SSL_CONF_FLAG_SERVER);
+    SSL_CONF_CTX_set_flags(cctx, SSL_CONF_FLAG_CERTIFICATE);
+    SSL_CONF_CTX_set_flags(cctx, SSL_CONF_FLAG_FILE);
+    SSL_CONF_CTX_set_ssl_ctx(cctx, ctx);
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(sect); i++) {
+        int rv;
+        cnf = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(sect, i);
+        rv = SSL_CONF_cmd(cctx, cnf->name, cnf->value);
+        if (rv > 0)
+            continue;
+        if (rv != -2) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "Error processing %s = %s\n",
+                    cnf->name, cnf->value);
+            ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (strcmp(cnf->name, "Port") == 0) {
+            port = cnf->value;
+        } else {
+            fprintf(stderr, "Unknown configuration option %s\n", cnf->name);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (!SSL_CONF_CTX_finish(cctx)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Finish error\n");
+        ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* Setup server side SSL bio */
+    ssl_bio = BIO_new_ssl(ctx, 0);
+
+    if ((in = BIO_new_accept(port)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    /*
+     * This means that when a new connection is accepted on 'in', The ssl_bio
+     * will be 'duplicated' and have the new socket BIO push into it.
+     * Basically it means the SSL BIO will be automatically setup
+     */
+    BIO_set_accept_bios(in, ssl_bio);
+
+ again:
+    /*
+     * The first call will setup the accept socket, and the second will get a
+     * socket.  In this loop, the first actual accept will occur in the
+     * BIO_read() function.
+     */
+
+    if (BIO_do_accept(in) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    for (;;) {
+        i = BIO_read(in, buf, 512);
+        if (i == 0) {
+            /*
+             * If we have finished, remove the underlying BIO stack so the
+             * next time we call any function for this BIO, it will attempt
+             * to do an accept
+             */
+            printf("Done\n");
+            tmp = BIO_pop(in);
+            BIO_free_all(tmp);
+            goto again;
+        }
+        if (i < 0) {
+            if (BIO_should_retry(in))
+                continue;
+            goto err;
+        }
+        fwrite(buf, 1, i, stdout);
+        fflush(stdout);
+    }
+
+    ret = 0;
+ err:
+    if (ret) {
+        ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+    }
+    BIO_free(in);
+    exit(ret);
+    return (!ret);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/bio/server-ec.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/bio/server-ec.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a13fdc7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/bio/server-ec.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIGHAgEAMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHBG0wawIBAQQg/5kYU3PUlHwfdjEN
+lC1xTZEx3o55RgtSOuOCTryDfomhRANCAARW/qUFg+qZzjcFWrST4bmkRCFu8/rn
+KTHjW2vpBXYGXKDn4AbAfYXYhM9J7v1HkkrZBPPGx53eVzs61/Pgr6Rc
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/bio/server.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/bio/server.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8a4a51f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/bio/server.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+subject= C = UK, O = OpenSSL Group, OU = FOR TESTING PURPOSES ONLY, CN = Test Server Cert
+issuer= C = UK, O = OpenSSL Group, OU = FOR TESTING PURPOSES ONLY, CN = OpenSSL Test Intermediate CA
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIDyTCCArGgAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADBwMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVSzEW
+MBQGA1UECgwNT3BlblNTTCBHcm91cDEiMCAGA1UECwwZRk9SIFRFU1RJTkcgUFVS
+UE9TRVMgT05MWTElMCMGA1UEAwwcT3BlblNTTCBUZXN0IEludGVybWVkaWF0ZSBD
+QTAgFw0xNjAxMDQwODU0NDZaGA8yMTE2MDEwNTA4NTQ0NlowZDELMAkGA1UEBhMC
+VUsxFjAUBgNVBAoMDU9wZW5TU0wgR3JvdXAxIjAgBgNVBAsMGUZPUiBURVNUSU5H
+IFBVUlBPU0VTIE9OTFkxGTAXBgNVBAMMEFRlc3QgU2VydmVyIENlcnQwggEiMA0G
+CSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQDzhPOSNtyyRspmeuUpxfNJKCLTuf7g
+3uQ4zu4iHOmRO5TQci+HhVlLZrHF9XqFXcIP0y4pWDbMSGuiorUmzmfiR7bfSdI/
++qIQt8KXRH6HNG1t8ou0VSvWId5TS5Dq/er5ODUr9OaaDva7EquHIcMvvPQGuI+O
+EAcnleVCy9HVEIySrO4P3CNIicnGkwwiAud05yUAq/gPXBC1hTtmlPD7TVcGVSEi
+Jdvzqqlgv02qedGrkki6GY4S7GjZxrrf7Foc2EP+51LJzwLQx3/JfrCU41NEWAsu
+/Sl0tQabXESN+zJ1pDqoZ3uHMgpQjeGiE0olr+YcsSW/tJmiU9OiAr8RAgMBAAGj
+eDB2MB0GA1UdDgQWBBSCvM8AABPR9zklmifnr9LvIBturDAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBQ2
+w2yI55X+sL3szj49hqshgYfa2jAJBgNVHRMEAjAAMBMGA1UdJQQMMAoGCCsGAQUF
+BwMBMBQGA1UdEQQNMAuCCWxvY2FsaG9zdDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAC78R
+sAr4uvkYOu/pSwQ3MYOFqZ0BnPuP0/AZW2zF7TLNy8g36GyH9rKxz2ffQEHRmPQN
+Z11Ohg3z03jw/sVzkgt2U5Ipv923sSeCZcu0nuNex3v9/x72ldYikZNhQOsw+2kr
+hx3OvE9R7xl9eyjz7BknsbY7PC3kiUY8SDdc5Fr/XMkHm3ge65oWYOHBjC5tAr5K
+FGCEjM3syxS+Li5X6yfDGiVSjOU4gJuZDCYbl7cEQexU2deds8EmpJJrrI7s4JcQ
+rraHI8+Hu8X9VLpZE1jl/fKJw3D0i53PoN2WhukIOg1Zv+ajMKQ4ubVfISH2ebox
++ybAZO8hxL6/I08/GQ==
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+subject= C = UK, O = OpenSSL Group, OU = FOR TESTING PURPOSES ONLY, CN = OpenSSL Test Intermediate CA
+issuer= C = UK, O = OpenSSL Group, OU = FOR TESTING PURPOSES ONLY, CN = OpenSSL Test Root CA
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/bio/shared.opt b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/bio/shared.opt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4141b93
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/bio/shared.opt
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+OSSL$LIBSSL_SHR/SHARE
+OSSL$LIBCRYPTO_SHR/SHARE
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/bio/static.opt b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/bio/static.opt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9ca1588
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/bio/static.opt
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+OSSL$LIBSSL/LIB
+OSSL$LIBCRYPTO/LIB
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/certs/README b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/certs/README
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..126663a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/certs/README
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+There is often a need to generate test certificates automatically using
+a script. This is often a cause for confusion which can result in incorrect
+CA certificates, obsolete V1 certificates or duplicate serial numbers.
+The range of command line options can be daunting for a beginner.
+
+The mkcerts.sh script is an example of how to generate certificates
+automatically using scripts. Example creates a root CA, an intermediate CA
+signed by the root and several certificates signed by the intermediate CA.
+
+The script then creates an empty index.txt file and adds entries for the
+certificates and generates a CRL. Then one certificate is revoked and a 
+second CRL generated.
+
+The script ocsprun.sh runs the test responder on port 8888 covering the
+client certificates.
+
+The script ocspquery.sh queries the status of the certificates using the
+test responder.
+
+
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/certs/apps/apps.cnf b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/certs/apps/apps.cnf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..531afe6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/certs/apps/apps.cnf
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+#
+# OpenSSL configuration file to create apps directory certificates
+#
+
+# This definition stops the following lines choking if HOME or CN
+# is undefined.
+HOME			= .
+RANDFILE		= $ENV::HOME/.rnd
+CN			= "Not Defined"
+
+####################################################################
+[ req ]
+default_bits		= 2048
+default_keyfile 	= privkey.pem
+# Don't prompt for fields: use those in section directly
+prompt			= no
+distinguished_name	= req_distinguished_name
+x509_extensions	= v3_ca	# The extensions to add to the self signed cert
+string_mask = utf8only
+
+# req_extensions = v3_req # The extensions to add to a certificate request
+
+[ req_distinguished_name ]
+countryName			= UK
+
+organizationName		= OpenSSL Group
+organizationalUnitName		= FOR TESTING PURPOSES ONLY
+# Take CN from environment so it can come from a script.
+commonName			= $ENV::CN
+
+[ usr_cert ]
+
+# These extensions are added when 'ca' signs a request for an end entity
+# certificate
+
+basicConstraints=critical, CA:FALSE
+keyUsage=critical, nonRepudiation, digitalSignature, keyEncipherment
+
+# This will be displayed in Netscape's comment listbox.
+nsComment			= "OpenSSL Generated Certificate"
+
+[ ec_cert ]
+
+# These extensions are added when 'ca' signs a request for an end entity
+# certificate
+
+basicConstraints=critical, CA:FALSE
+keyUsage=critical, nonRepudiation, digitalSignature, keyAgreement
+
+# This will be displayed in Netscape's comment listbox.
+nsComment			= "OpenSSL Generated Certificate"
+
+# PKIX recommendations harmless if included in all certificates.
+subjectKeyIdentifier=hash
+authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid
+
+[ v3_ca ]
+
+
+# Extensions for a typical CA
+
+# PKIX recommendation.
+
+subjectKeyIdentifier=hash
+authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid:always
+basicConstraints = critical,CA:true
+keyUsage = critical, cRLSign, keyCertSign
+
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/certs/apps/ckey.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/certs/apps/ckey.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8e9054d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/certs/apps/ckey.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/certs/apps/intkey.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/certs/apps/intkey.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d586cb7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/certs/apps/intkey.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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+9kkL+/Y0Xg9bOM6xXPm+81UNpDvOLbUahSSQsfB+LNVEkthJIL4XIk083LsHjFaJ
+9SiCFRbf2OgWrEhe/c1drySwz9u/0f4Q7B6VGqxMnTDjzS5JacZ1pE8CgYEAxzMn
+/n/Dpdn+c4rf14BRNKCv1qBXngPNylKJCmiRpKRJAn+B+Msdwtggk/1Ihju21wSo
+IGy0Gw7WQd1Iq7V85cB2G5PAFY6ybpSV6G3QrzmzuvjHmKvXgUAuuaN+7Pp1YkMY
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+2dnMcAzIfTSa7lgf/bxDetPBHKWJs8vYxA9S9BZM3Gvgjr6IxuAjsI0+9O6TzdvG
+UckrNc+h5Mq241ZDbmRK6MZXzOPUxlKDyJBw8Hb7dU82BeJpjJRDMG6hsHS5vh77
+l6sodZ4ARCZFcEq1+N8ICQKBgDeBHJLAXO6YmFrvhkGQ4o+senJuSRuhabUHXGIH
+ExXyJNnKV5fQWOGSwTkbKRsmBmNRS9uFDoY/kxnVI8ucjUmjYAV9HNek5DkFs+OI
+vc4lYNwnN85li23bSWm2kcZMX2ra0URGYn8HdtHg4Q4XTq3ANhp21oi9FsmVrhP9
+T+JdAoGBAK2ebwZ7CXFavDFo4mzLKkGitBjrSi/udFhZECXZWEbNzWlVc3Y3q0cU
+drDqUtbVm+/Xb5CMU044Gqq6SKdObAb3JElKmFylFL9fp2rfL/foUr2sdb87Vqdp
+2j5jZyvt1DKnNaJ7JaFbUdRxlvHQRiqKlZpafN/SMQ0jCs1bSgCg
+-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/certs/apps/mkacerts.sh b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/certs/apps/mkacerts.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7098496
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/certs/apps/mkacerts.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+# Recreate the demo certificates in the apps directory.
+
+OPENSSL=openssl
+
+# Root CA: create certificate directly
+CN="OpenSSL Test Root CA" $OPENSSL req -config apps.cnf -x509 -nodes \
+	-keyout root.pem -out root.pem -key rootkey.pem -new -days 3650
+# Intermediate CA: request first
+CN="OpenSSL Test Intermediate CA" $OPENSSL req -config apps.cnf -nodes \
+	-key intkey.pem -out intreq.pem -new
+# Sign request: CA extensions
+$OPENSSL x509 -req -in intreq.pem -CA root.pem -CAkey rootkey.pem -days 3630 \
+	-extfile apps.cnf -extensions v3_ca -CAcreateserial -out intca.pem
+# Client certificate: request first
+CN="Test Client Cert" $OPENSSL req -config apps.cnf -nodes \
+	-key ckey.pem -out creq.pem -new
+# Sign using intermediate CA
+$OPENSSL x509 -req -in creq.pem -CA intca.pem -CAkey intkey.pem -days 3600 \
+	-extfile apps.cnf -extensions usr_cert -CAcreateserial | \
+	$OPENSSL x509 -nameopt oneline -subject -issuer >client.pem
+# Server certificate: request first
+CN="Test Server Cert" $OPENSSL req -config apps.cnf -nodes \
+	-key skey.pem -out sreq.pem -new
+# Sign using intermediate CA
+$OPENSSL x509 -req -in sreq.pem -CA intca.pem -CAkey intkey.pem -days 3600 \
+	-extfile apps.cnf -extensions usr_cert -CAcreateserial | \
+	$OPENSSL x509 -nameopt oneline -subject -issuer >server.pem
+# Server certificate #2: request first
+CN="Test Server Cert #2" $OPENSSL req -config apps.cnf -nodes \
+	-key skey2.pem -out sreq2.pem -new
+# Sign using intermediate CA
+$OPENSSL x509 -req -in sreq2.pem -CA intca.pem -CAkey intkey.pem -days 3600 \
+	-extfile apps.cnf -extensions usr_cert -CAcreateserial | \
+	$OPENSSL x509 -nameopt oneline -subject -issuer >server2.pem
+
+# Append keys to file.
+
+cat skey.pem >>server.pem
+cat skey2.pem >>server2.pem
+cat ckey.pem >>client.pem
+
+$OPENSSL verify -CAfile root.pem -untrusted intca.pem \
+				server2.pem server.pem client.pem
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/certs/apps/mkxcerts.sh b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/certs/apps/mkxcerts.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0f88a48
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/certs/apps/mkxcerts.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+
+# Create certificates using various algorithms to test multi-certificate
+# functionality.
+
+OPENSSL=../../../apps/openssl
+CN="OpenSSL Test RSA SHA-1 cert" $OPENSSL req \
+	-config apps.cnf -extensions usr_cert -x509 -nodes \
+	-keyout tsha1.pem -out tsha1.pem -new -days 3650 -sha1
+CN="OpenSSL Test RSA SHA-256 cert" $OPENSSL req \
+	-config apps.cnf -extensions usr_cert -x509 -nodes \
+	-keyout tsha256.pem -out tsha256.pem -new -days 3650 -sha256
+CN="OpenSSL Test RSA SHA-512 cert" $OPENSSL req \
+	-config apps.cnf -extensions usr_cert -x509 -nodes \
+	-keyout tsha512.pem -out tsha512.pem -new -days 3650 -sha512
+
+# Create EC parameters 
+
+$OPENSSL ecparam -name P-256 -out ecp256.pem
+$OPENSSL ecparam -name P-384 -out ecp384.pem
+
+CN="OpenSSL Test P-256 SHA-256 cert" $OPENSSL req \
+	-config apps.cnf -extensions ec_cert -x509 -nodes \
+	-nodes -keyout tecp256.pem -out tecp256.pem -newkey ec:ecp256.pem \
+	-days 3650 -sha256
+
+CN="OpenSSL Test P-384 SHA-384 cert" $OPENSSL req \
+	-config apps.cnf -extensions ec_cert -x509 -nodes \
+	-nodes -keyout tecp384.pem -out tecp384.pem -newkey ec:ecp384.pem \
+	-days 3650 -sha384
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/certs/apps/rootkey.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/certs/apps/rootkey.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2600aab
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/certs/apps/rootkey.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIIEpgIBAAKCAQEA0xpquKAoY6trkxz8uuE6RyYfMOy+Rgvt19pqG3x8sEpFNjDN
+IG873HniShNaOrseRtrGRgCDcecNOQ0LLOQYo10zz0er8+0YgUWVx5Ag5q3cqN3T
+kjDc+0sRZMONPoUwD0ySOT9dumbJypEjA0q2AgKgWwaO4ilzg/fWTEruLeuL4meX
+K9WZFmMnGuF4kHSocZeKWs5UM86WIOf/+NdtzLNd6a5HwqAB5Azggiz2Ngck6Aet
+Mi0inBr3A1MSn0oIaQ7rGvbQ2QrIOnpdHJ36GadQHuvvtZOm28o8UVONMMWoS1yJ
+/1TaRWQJ+faZJE7yegJtUf75+5HwsxaUP32C3wIDAQABAoIBAQCEybEnwVamm0Vn
+nGw9AT+vUYN9Ou3VEdviUzk7YOrt2Un/9GKTbGSzItf80H+JQfqhhywBDIGiPDxN
+Dq9g5Xm6CP51/BdlsFYhuqukhDyt3d9XOXHEG4hlaarfP0KxeQXqGbhA2mMSxWVZ
+TkI/59blHNHRcCagjIJlGJhsFRYNO1/ApfA5zN7fWCFvH1XWZhuvsPDgUXKm4BS0
+p3ol67MVJHRfYcLb/txBO5rBhSXinK0jEBiljRcE0rWzRycSedmDgG3SNV17wvA0
+UWgMNpPcJ1b7Satr0nM7A8+siV8FRcfvPqCuGPKCYTrNn71hGJEhKXKwlURj9+95
+O5yzRxjBAoGBAPtTRYN40/piRB0XLpi+zNh+4Ba4TGfXSymbaozgC/pI5wfgGXrz
+IpT9ujjV42r8TABHvXa6uiGm0cbxcUgq2n6Y8rf6iHxmn23ezCEBUs7rd6jtt11b
+m58T8o0XWyOgAovaH0UgzMtrlsZYR2fli5254oRkTWwaUTuO38z6CVddAoGBANcH
+nvdu3RniIYStsr5/deu7l81ZQ9rSiR1m3H6Wy8ryMIfkYfa0WqXhwNHrLrhvhLIQ
+7mGnJ+jAkJyVQULE6UdbmVW8tC58Dfrgz/1s7RMeUYPnOmRpx79c/LqZ2IunfFWx
+IvBvFu7vidEHA+1tU2N+oXNsU+B9XpfsJ+/d2QtrAoGBAJTuP58tFtClMp/agO5b
+AqC4bqqIBB704cGCK53XlsF2OhHcprzJH5ES2iub8+wOHit8V7Xn6SzP4jf2E58k
+Zd3nXM3RVNgDKC6/fE+CrUOZHYupcqOMCag29eDOGl/+DgQ5+ZXJXhKdaveWkJns
+2NNat/SkS4zn+4NDozOgZ7CxAoGBAIuXjfJRTUXNUDci0APtGO9U1AJiLbOzs4Gb
+0g539IqmWS0O7S3L/YDsolFkXOsssjcq2KYabsUhpX+RQVGIJWzGoS9QlqQKssSo
+Bz4c5Xbg2shHZtfi9+JaClNVJofazdOPcAAoDfpFFPHWnQ0YSOcxQLx+maEFok/7
+5h1IputLAoGBAKGBWDPwskgRRfCAIFpCJLOu/9D30M/akMtO0kJYQpBjOaKuigUy
+ic7pthFVse/pMUljXHAd1hs2CTjMW1ukEusU3x1Ei6wvnHHqn0Hs+6D5NQFQkcMn
+7rejJ+bpJPRAn40AAV5hGBYI12XycB8ZgyPC4hTUK6unGVK06DC4qvdv
+-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/certs/apps/skey.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/certs/apps/skey.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dbd403d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/certs/apps/skey.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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+bp+6iBfUPJUbcqNqFmi/08Yt7vrDnMnyMw2A/sECgYEAiiuRMxnuzVm34hQcsbhH
+6ymVqf7j0PW2qK0F4H1ocT9qhzWFd+RB3kHWrCjnqODQoI6GbGr/4JepHUpre1ex
+4UEN5oSS3G0ru0rC3U4C59dZ5KwDHFm7ffZ1pr52ljfQDUsrjjIMRtuiwNK2OoRa
+WSsqiaL+SDzSB+nBmpnAizECgYBdt/y6rerWUx4MhDwwtTnel7JwHyo2MDFS6/5g
+n8qC2Lj6/fMDRE22w+CA2esp7EJNQJGv+b27iFpbJEDh+/Lf5YzIT4MwVskQ5bYB
+JFcmRxUVmf4e09D7o705U/DjCgMH09iCsbLmqQ38ONIRSHZaJtMDtNTHD1yi+jF+
+OT43gQKBgQC/2OHZoko6iRlNOAQ/tMVFNq7fL81GivoQ9F1U0Qr+DH3ZfaH8eIkX
+xT0ToMPJUzWAn8pZv0snA0um6SIgvkCuxO84OkANCVbttzXImIsL7pFzfcwV/ERK
+UM6j0ZuSMFOCr/lGPAoOQU0fskidGEHi1/kW+suSr28TqsyYZpwBDQ==
+-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/certs/apps/skey2.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/certs/apps/skey2.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7853822
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/certs/apps/skey2.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/certs/ca.cnf b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/certs/ca.cnf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5a8a5f2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/certs/ca.cnf
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+#
+# OpenSSL example configuration file for automated certificate creation.
+#
+
+# This definition stops the following lines choking if HOME or CN
+# is undefined.
+HOME			= .
+RANDFILE		= $ENV::HOME/.rnd
+CN			= "Not Defined"
+default_ca		= ca
+
+####################################################################
+[ req ]
+default_bits		= 1024
+default_keyfile 	= privkey.pem
+# Don't prompt for fields: use those in section directly
+prompt			= no
+distinguished_name	= req_distinguished_name
+x509_extensions	= v3_ca	# The extensions to add to the self signed cert
+string_mask = utf8only
+
+# req_extensions = v3_req # The extensions to add to a certificate request
+
+[ req_distinguished_name ]
+countryName			= UK
+
+organizationName		= OpenSSL Group
+# Take CN from environment so it can come from a script.
+commonName			= $ENV::CN
+
+[ usr_cert ]
+
+# These extensions are added when 'ca' signs a request for an end entity
+# certificate
+
+basicConstraints=critical, CA:FALSE
+keyUsage=critical, nonRepudiation, digitalSignature, keyEncipherment
+
+# This will be displayed in Netscape's comment listbox.
+nsComment			= "OpenSSL Generated Certificate"
+
+# PKIX recommendations harmless if included in all certificates.
+subjectKeyIdentifier=hash
+authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid
+# OCSP responder certificate
+[ ocsp_cert ]
+
+basicConstraints=critical, CA:FALSE
+keyUsage=critical, nonRepudiation, digitalSignature, keyEncipherment
+
+# This will be displayed in Netscape's comment listbox.
+nsComment			= "OpenSSL Generated Certificate"
+
+# PKIX recommendations harmless if included in all certificates.
+subjectKeyIdentifier=hash
+authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid
+extendedKeyUsage=OCSPSigning
+
+[ dh_cert ]
+
+# These extensions are added when 'ca' signs a request for an end entity
+# DH certificate
+
+basicConstraints=critical, CA:FALSE
+keyUsage=critical, keyAgreement
+
+# PKIX recommendations harmless if included in all certificates.
+subjectKeyIdentifier=hash
+authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid
+
+[ v3_ca ]
+
+
+# Extensions for a typical CA
+
+# PKIX recommendation.
+
+subjectKeyIdentifier=hash
+authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid:always
+basicConstraints = critical,CA:true
+keyUsage = critical, cRLSign, keyCertSign
+
+# Minimal CA entry to allow generation of CRLs.
+[ca]
+database=index.txt
+crlnumber=crlnum.txt
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/certs/mkcerts.sh b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/certs/mkcerts.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..18daa6b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/certs/mkcerts.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+OPENSSL=../../apps/openssl
+OPENSSL_CONF=../../apps/openssl.cnf
+export OPENSSL_CONF
+
+# Root CA: create certificate directly
+CN="Test Root CA" $OPENSSL req -config ca.cnf -x509 -nodes \
+	-keyout root.pem -out root.pem -newkey rsa:2048 -days 3650
+# Intermediate CA: request first
+CN="Test Intermediate CA" $OPENSSL req -config ca.cnf -nodes \
+	-keyout intkey.pem -out intreq.pem -newkey rsa:2048
+# Sign request: CA extensions
+$OPENSSL x509 -req -in intreq.pem -CA root.pem -days 3600 \
+	-extfile ca.cnf -extensions v3_ca -CAcreateserial -out intca.pem
+
+# Server certificate: create request first
+CN="Test Server Cert" $OPENSSL req -config ca.cnf -nodes \
+	-keyout skey.pem -out req.pem -newkey rsa:1024
+# Sign request: end entity extensions
+$OPENSSL x509 -req -in req.pem -CA intca.pem -CAkey intkey.pem -days 3600 \
+	-extfile ca.cnf -extensions usr_cert -CAcreateserial -out server.pem
+
+# Client certificate: request first
+CN="Test Client Cert" $OPENSSL req -config ca.cnf -nodes \
+	-keyout ckey.pem -out creq.pem -newkey rsa:1024
+# Sign using intermediate CA
+$OPENSSL x509 -req -in creq.pem -CA intca.pem -CAkey intkey.pem -days 3600 \
+	-extfile ca.cnf -extensions usr_cert -CAcreateserial -out client.pem
+
+# Revoked certificate: request first
+CN="Test Revoked Cert" $OPENSSL req -config ca.cnf -nodes \
+	-keyout revkey.pem -out rreq.pem -newkey rsa:1024
+# Sign using intermediate CA
+$OPENSSL x509 -req -in rreq.pem -CA intca.pem -CAkey intkey.pem -days 3600 \
+	-extfile ca.cnf -extensions usr_cert -CAcreateserial -out rev.pem
+
+# OCSP responder certificate: request first
+CN="Test OCSP Responder Cert" $OPENSSL req -config ca.cnf -nodes \
+	-keyout respkey.pem -out respreq.pem -newkey rsa:1024
+# Sign using intermediate CA and responder extensions
+$OPENSSL x509 -req -in respreq.pem -CA intca.pem -CAkey intkey.pem -days 3600 \
+	-extfile ca.cnf -extensions ocsp_cert -CAcreateserial -out resp.pem
+
+# Example creating a PKCS#3 DH certificate. 
+
+# First DH parameters
+
+[ -f dhp.pem ] || $OPENSSL genpkey -genparam -algorithm DH -pkeyopt dh_paramgen_prime_len:1024 -out dhp.pem
+
+# Now a DH private key
+$OPENSSL genpkey -paramfile dhp.pem -out dhskey.pem
+# Create DH public key file
+$OPENSSL pkey -in dhskey.pem -pubout -out dhspub.pem
+# Certificate request, key just reuses old one as it is ignored when the
+# request is signed.
+CN="Test Server DH Cert" $OPENSSL req -config ca.cnf -new \
+	-key skey.pem -out dhsreq.pem
+# Sign request: end entity DH extensions
+$OPENSSL x509 -req -in dhsreq.pem -CA root.pem -days 3600 \
+	-force_pubkey dhspub.pem \
+	-extfile ca.cnf -extensions dh_cert -CAcreateserial -out dhserver.pem
+
+# DH client certificate
+
+$OPENSSL genpkey -paramfile dhp.pem -out dhckey.pem
+$OPENSSL pkey -in dhckey.pem -pubout -out dhcpub.pem
+CN="Test Client DH Cert" $OPENSSL req -config ca.cnf -new \
+	-key skey.pem -out dhcreq.pem
+$OPENSSL x509 -req -in dhcreq.pem -CA root.pem -days 3600 \
+	-force_pubkey dhcpub.pem \
+	-extfile ca.cnf -extensions dh_cert -CAcreateserial -out dhclient.pem
+
+# Examples of CRL generation without the need to use 'ca' to issue
+# certificates.
+# Create zero length index file
+>index.txt
+# Create initial crl number file
+echo 01 >crlnum.txt
+# Add entries for server and client certs
+$OPENSSL ca -valid server.pem -keyfile root.pem -cert root.pem \
+		-config ca.cnf -md sha1
+$OPENSSL ca -valid client.pem -keyfile root.pem -cert root.pem \
+		-config ca.cnf -md sha1
+$OPENSSL ca -valid rev.pem -keyfile root.pem -cert root.pem \
+		-config ca.cnf -md sha1
+# Generate a CRL.
+$OPENSSL ca -gencrl -keyfile root.pem -cert root.pem -config ca.cnf \
+		-md sha1 -crldays 1 -out crl1.pem
+# Revoke a certificate
+openssl ca -revoke rev.pem -crl_reason superseded \
+		-keyfile root.pem -cert root.pem -config ca.cnf -md sha1
+# Generate another CRL
+$OPENSSL ca -gencrl -keyfile root.pem -cert root.pem -config ca.cnf \
+		-md sha1 -crldays 1 -out crl2.pem
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/certs/ocspquery.sh b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/certs/ocspquery.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f664113
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/certs/ocspquery.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+# Example querying OpenSSL test responder. Assumes ocsprun.sh has been
+# called.
+
+OPENSSL=../../apps/openssl
+OPENSSL_CONF=../../apps/openssl.cnf
+export OPENSSL_CONF
+
+# Send responder queries for each certificate.
+
+echo "Requesting OCSP status for each certificate"
+$OPENSSL ocsp -issuer intca.pem -cert client.pem -CAfile root.pem \
+			-url http://127.0.0.1:8888/
+$OPENSSL ocsp -issuer intca.pem -cert server.pem -CAfile root.pem \
+			-url http://127.0.0.1:8888/
+$OPENSSL ocsp -issuer intca.pem -cert rev.pem -CAfile root.pem \
+			-url http://127.0.0.1:8888/
+# One query for all three certificates.
+echo "Requesting OCSP status for three certificates in one request"
+$OPENSSL ocsp -issuer intca.pem \
+	-cert client.pem -cert server.pem -cert rev.pem \
+	-CAfile root.pem -url http://127.0.0.1:8888/
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/certs/ocsprun.sh b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/certs/ocsprun.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a65e5f2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/certs/ocsprun.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+# Example of running an querying OpenSSL test OCSP responder.
+# This assumes "mkcerts.sh" or similar has been run to set up the
+# necessary file structure.
+
+OPENSSL=../../apps/openssl
+OPENSSL_CONF=../../apps/openssl.cnf
+export OPENSSL_CONF
+
+# Run OCSP responder.
+
+PORT=8888
+
+$OPENSSL ocsp -port $PORT -index index.txt -CA intca.pem \
+	-rsigner resp.pem -rkey respkey.pem -rother intca.pem $*
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/cms/cacert.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/cms/cacert.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..75cbb34
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/cms/cacert.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/cms/cakey.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/cms/cakey.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3b53c5e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/cms/cakey.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/cms/cms_comp.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/cms/cms_comp.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0d548f9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/cms/cms_comp.c
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* Simple S/MIME compress example */
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/cms.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL;
+    CMS_ContentInfo *cms = NULL;
+    int ret = 1;
+
+    /*
+     * On OpenSSL 1.0.0+ only:
+     * for streaming set CMS_STREAM
+     */
+    int flags = CMS_STREAM;
+
+    OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
+    ERR_load_crypto_strings();
+
+    /* Open content being compressed */
+
+    in = BIO_new_file("comp.txt", "r");
+
+    if (!in)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* compress content */
+    cms = CMS_compress(in, NID_zlib_compression, flags);
+
+    if (!cms)
+        goto err;
+
+    out = BIO_new_file("smcomp.txt", "w");
+    if (!out)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* Write out S/MIME message */
+    if (!SMIME_write_CMS(out, cms, in, flags))
+        goto err;
+
+    ret = 0;
+
+ err:
+
+    if (ret) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Error Compressing Data\n");
+        ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+    }
+
+    CMS_ContentInfo_free(cms);
+    BIO_free(in);
+    BIO_free(out);
+    return ret;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/cms/cms_ddec.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/cms/cms_ddec.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8f2e9ae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/cms/cms_ddec.c
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * S/MIME detached data decrypt example: rarely done but should the need
+ * arise this is an example....
+ */
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/cms.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL, *tbio = NULL, *dcont = NULL;
+    X509 *rcert = NULL;
+    EVP_PKEY *rkey = NULL;
+    CMS_ContentInfo *cms = NULL;
+    int ret = 1;
+
+    OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
+    ERR_load_crypto_strings();
+
+    /* Read in recipient certificate and private key */
+    tbio = BIO_new_file("signer.pem", "r");
+
+    if (!tbio)
+        goto err;
+
+    rcert = PEM_read_bio_X509(tbio, NULL, 0, NULL);
+
+    BIO_reset(tbio);
+
+    rkey = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(tbio, NULL, 0, NULL);
+
+    if (!rcert || !rkey)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* Open PEM file containing enveloped data */
+
+    in = BIO_new_file("smencr.pem", "r");
+
+    if (!in)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* Parse PEM content */
+    cms = PEM_read_bio_CMS(in, NULL, 0, NULL);
+
+    if (!cms)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* Open file containing detached content */
+    dcont = BIO_new_file("smencr.out", "rb");
+
+    if (!in)
+        goto err;
+
+    out = BIO_new_file("encrout.txt", "w");
+    if (!out)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* Decrypt S/MIME message */
+    if (!CMS_decrypt(cms, rkey, rcert, dcont, out, 0))
+        goto err;
+
+    ret = 0;
+
+ err:
+
+    if (ret) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Error Decrypting Data\n");
+        ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+    }
+
+    CMS_ContentInfo_free(cms);
+    X509_free(rcert);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(rkey);
+    BIO_free(in);
+    BIO_free(out);
+    BIO_free(tbio);
+    BIO_free(dcont);
+    return ret;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/cms/cms_dec.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/cms/cms_dec.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4f9428b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/cms/cms_dec.c
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* Simple S/MIME decryption example */
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/cms.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL, *tbio = NULL;
+    X509 *rcert = NULL;
+    EVP_PKEY *rkey = NULL;
+    CMS_ContentInfo *cms = NULL;
+    int ret = 1;
+
+    OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
+    ERR_load_crypto_strings();
+
+    /* Read in recipient certificate and private key */
+    tbio = BIO_new_file("signer.pem", "r");
+
+    if (!tbio)
+        goto err;
+
+    rcert = PEM_read_bio_X509(tbio, NULL, 0, NULL);
+
+    BIO_reset(tbio);
+
+    rkey = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(tbio, NULL, 0, NULL);
+
+    if (!rcert || !rkey)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* Open S/MIME message to decrypt */
+
+    in = BIO_new_file("smencr.txt", "r");
+
+    if (!in)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* Parse message */
+    cms = SMIME_read_CMS(in, NULL);
+
+    if (!cms)
+        goto err;
+
+    out = BIO_new_file("decout.txt", "w");
+    if (!out)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* Decrypt S/MIME message */
+    if (!CMS_decrypt(cms, rkey, rcert, NULL, out, 0))
+        goto err;
+
+    ret = 0;
+
+ err:
+
+    if (ret) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Error Decrypting Data\n");
+        ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+    }
+
+    CMS_ContentInfo_free(cms);
+    X509_free(rcert);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(rkey);
+    BIO_free(in);
+    BIO_free(out);
+    BIO_free(tbio);
+    return ret;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/cms/cms_denc.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/cms/cms_denc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..adba69b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/cms/cms_denc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * S/MIME detached data encrypt example: rarely done but should the need
+ * arise this is an example....
+ */
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/cms.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL, *tbio = NULL, *dout = NULL;
+    X509 *rcert = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(X509) *recips = NULL;
+    CMS_ContentInfo *cms = NULL;
+    int ret = 1;
+
+    int flags = CMS_STREAM | CMS_DETACHED;
+
+    OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
+    ERR_load_crypto_strings();
+
+    /* Read in recipient certificate */
+    tbio = BIO_new_file("signer.pem", "r");
+
+    if (!tbio)
+        goto err;
+
+    rcert = PEM_read_bio_X509(tbio, NULL, 0, NULL);
+
+    if (!rcert)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* Create recipient STACK and add recipient cert to it */
+    recips = sk_X509_new_null();
+
+    if (!recips || !sk_X509_push(recips, rcert))
+        goto err;
+
+    /*
+     * sk_X509_pop_free will free up recipient STACK and its contents so set
+     * rcert to NULL so it isn't freed up twice.
+     */
+    rcert = NULL;
+
+    /* Open content being encrypted */
+
+    in = BIO_new_file("encr.txt", "r");
+
+    dout = BIO_new_file("smencr.out", "wb");
+
+    if (!in)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* encrypt content */
+    cms = CMS_encrypt(recips, in, EVP_des_ede3_cbc(), flags);
+
+    if (!cms)
+        goto err;
+
+    out = BIO_new_file("smencr.pem", "w");
+    if (!out)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!CMS_final(cms, in, dout, flags))
+        goto err;
+
+    /* Write out CMS structure without content */
+    if (!PEM_write_bio_CMS(out, cms))
+        goto err;
+
+    ret = 0;
+
+ err:
+
+    if (ret) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Error Encrypting Data\n");
+        ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+    }
+
+    CMS_ContentInfo_free(cms);
+    X509_free(rcert);
+    sk_X509_pop_free(recips, X509_free);
+    BIO_free(in);
+    BIO_free(out);
+    BIO_free(dout);
+    BIO_free(tbio);
+    return ret;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/cms/cms_enc.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/cms/cms_enc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4d17d72
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/cms/cms_enc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* Simple S/MIME encrypt example */
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/cms.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL, *tbio = NULL;
+    X509 *rcert = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(X509) *recips = NULL;
+    CMS_ContentInfo *cms = NULL;
+    int ret = 1;
+
+    /*
+     * On OpenSSL 1.0.0 and later only:
+     * for streaming set CMS_STREAM
+     */
+    int flags = CMS_STREAM;
+
+    OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
+    ERR_load_crypto_strings();
+
+    /* Read in recipient certificate */
+    tbio = BIO_new_file("signer.pem", "r");
+
+    if (!tbio)
+        goto err;
+
+    rcert = PEM_read_bio_X509(tbio, NULL, 0, NULL);
+
+    if (!rcert)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* Create recipient STACK and add recipient cert to it */
+    recips = sk_X509_new_null();
+
+    if (!recips || !sk_X509_push(recips, rcert))
+        goto err;
+
+    /*
+     * sk_X509_pop_free will free up recipient STACK and its contents so set
+     * rcert to NULL so it isn't freed up twice.
+     */
+    rcert = NULL;
+
+    /* Open content being encrypted */
+
+    in = BIO_new_file("encr.txt", "r");
+
+    if (!in)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* encrypt content */
+    cms = CMS_encrypt(recips, in, EVP_des_ede3_cbc(), flags);
+
+    if (!cms)
+        goto err;
+
+    out = BIO_new_file("smencr.txt", "w");
+    if (!out)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* Write out S/MIME message */
+    if (!SMIME_write_CMS(out, cms, in, flags))
+        goto err;
+
+    ret = 0;
+
+ err:
+
+    if (ret) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Error Encrypting Data\n");
+        ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+    }
+
+    CMS_ContentInfo_free(cms);
+    X509_free(rcert);
+    sk_X509_pop_free(recips, X509_free);
+    BIO_free(in);
+    BIO_free(out);
+    BIO_free(tbio);
+    return ret;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/cms/cms_sign.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/cms/cms_sign.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..15bd5b8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/cms/cms_sign.c
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* Simple S/MIME signing example */
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/cms.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL, *tbio = NULL;
+    X509 *scert = NULL;
+    EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
+    CMS_ContentInfo *cms = NULL;
+    int ret = 1;
+
+    /*
+     * For simple S/MIME signing use CMS_DETACHED. On OpenSSL 1.0.0 only: for
+     * streaming detached set CMS_DETACHED|CMS_STREAM for streaming
+     * non-detached set CMS_STREAM
+     */
+    int flags = CMS_DETACHED | CMS_STREAM;
+
+    OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
+    ERR_load_crypto_strings();
+
+    /* Read in signer certificate and private key */
+    tbio = BIO_new_file("signer.pem", "r");
+
+    if (!tbio)
+        goto err;
+
+    scert = PEM_read_bio_X509(tbio, NULL, 0, NULL);
+
+    BIO_reset(tbio);
+
+    skey = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(tbio, NULL, 0, NULL);
+
+    if (!scert || !skey)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* Open content being signed */
+
+    in = BIO_new_file("sign.txt", "r");
+
+    if (!in)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* Sign content */
+    cms = CMS_sign(scert, skey, NULL, in, flags);
+
+    if (!cms)
+        goto err;
+
+    out = BIO_new_file("smout.txt", "w");
+    if (!out)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!(flags & CMS_STREAM))
+        BIO_reset(in);
+
+    /* Write out S/MIME message */
+    if (!SMIME_write_CMS(out, cms, in, flags))
+        goto err;
+
+    ret = 0;
+
+ err:
+
+    if (ret) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Error Signing Data\n");
+        ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+    }
+
+    CMS_ContentInfo_free(cms);
+    X509_free(scert);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
+    BIO_free(in);
+    BIO_free(out);
+    BIO_free(tbio);
+    return ret;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/cms/cms_sign2.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/cms/cms_sign2.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..14ebf27
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/cms/cms_sign2.c
@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* S/MIME signing example: 2 signers */
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/cms.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL, *tbio = NULL;
+    X509 *scert = NULL, *scert2 = NULL;
+    EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL, *skey2 = NULL;
+    CMS_ContentInfo *cms = NULL;
+    int ret = 1;
+
+    OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
+    ERR_load_crypto_strings();
+
+    tbio = BIO_new_file("signer.pem", "r");
+
+    if (!tbio)
+        goto err;
+
+    scert = PEM_read_bio_X509(tbio, NULL, 0, NULL);
+
+    BIO_reset(tbio);
+
+    skey = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(tbio, NULL, 0, NULL);
+
+    BIO_free(tbio);
+
+    tbio = BIO_new_file("signer2.pem", "r");
+
+    if (!tbio)
+        goto err;
+
+    scert2 = PEM_read_bio_X509(tbio, NULL, 0, NULL);
+
+    BIO_reset(tbio);
+
+    skey2 = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(tbio, NULL, 0, NULL);
+
+    if (!scert2 || !skey2)
+        goto err;
+
+    in = BIO_new_file("sign.txt", "r");
+
+    if (!in)
+        goto err;
+
+    cms = CMS_sign(NULL, NULL, NULL, in, CMS_STREAM | CMS_PARTIAL);
+
+    if (!cms)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* Add each signer in turn */
+
+    if (!CMS_add1_signer(cms, scert, skey, NULL, 0))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!CMS_add1_signer(cms, scert2, skey2, NULL, 0))
+        goto err;
+
+    out = BIO_new_file("smout.txt", "w");
+    if (!out)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* NB: content included and finalized by SMIME_write_CMS */
+
+    if (!SMIME_write_CMS(out, cms, in, CMS_STREAM))
+        goto err;
+
+    ret = 0;
+
+ err:
+
+    if (ret) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Error Signing Data\n");
+        ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+    }
+
+    CMS_ContentInfo_free(cms);
+    X509_free(scert);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
+    X509_free(scert2);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(skey2);
+    BIO_free(in);
+    BIO_free(out);
+    BIO_free(tbio);
+    return ret;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/cms/cms_uncomp.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/cms/cms_uncomp.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3e3b4c4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/cms/cms_uncomp.c
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* Simple S/MIME uncompression example */
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/cms.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL;
+    CMS_ContentInfo *cms = NULL;
+    int ret = 1;
+
+    OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
+    ERR_load_crypto_strings();
+
+    /* Open compressed content */
+
+    in = BIO_new_file("smcomp.txt", "r");
+
+    if (!in)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* Sign content */
+    cms = SMIME_read_CMS(in, NULL);
+
+    if (!cms)
+        goto err;
+
+    out = BIO_new_file("smuncomp.txt", "w");
+    if (!out)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* Uncompress S/MIME message */
+    if (!CMS_uncompress(cms, out, NULL, 0))
+        goto err;
+
+    ret = 0;
+
+ err:
+
+    if (ret) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Error Uncompressing Data\n");
+        ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+    }
+
+    CMS_ContentInfo_free(cms);
+    BIO_free(in);
+    BIO_free(out);
+    return ret;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/cms/cms_ver.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/cms/cms_ver.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..43c10e2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/cms/cms_ver.c
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* Simple S/MIME verification example */
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/cms.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL, *tbio = NULL, *cont = NULL;
+    X509_STORE *st = NULL;
+    X509 *cacert = NULL;
+    CMS_ContentInfo *cms = NULL;
+
+    int ret = 1;
+
+    OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
+    ERR_load_crypto_strings();
+
+    /* Set up trusted CA certificate store */
+
+    st = X509_STORE_new();
+
+    /* Read in CA certificate */
+    tbio = BIO_new_file("cacert.pem", "r");
+
+    if (!tbio)
+        goto err;
+
+    cacert = PEM_read_bio_X509(tbio, NULL, 0, NULL);
+
+    if (!cacert)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!X509_STORE_add_cert(st, cacert))
+        goto err;
+
+    /* Open message being verified */
+
+    in = BIO_new_file("smout.txt", "r");
+
+    if (!in)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* parse message */
+    cms = SMIME_read_CMS(in, &cont);
+
+    if (!cms)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* File to output verified content to */
+    out = BIO_new_file("smver.txt", "w");
+    if (!out)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!CMS_verify(cms, NULL, st, cont, out, 0)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Verification Failure\n");
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    fprintf(stderr, "Verification Successful\n");
+
+    ret = 0;
+
+ err:
+
+    if (ret) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Error Verifying Data\n");
+        ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+    }
+
+    CMS_ContentInfo_free(cms);
+    X509_free(cacert);
+    BIO_free(in);
+    BIO_free(out);
+    BIO_free(tbio);
+    return ret;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/cms/comp.txt b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/cms/comp.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1672328
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/cms/comp.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+Content-type: text/plain
+
+Some Text To be Compressed
+Some Text To be Compressed
+Some Text To be Compressed
+Some Text To be Compressed
+Some Text To be Compressed
+Some Text To be Compressed
+Some Text To be Compressed
+Some Text To be Compressed
+Some Text To be Compressed
+Some Text To be Compressed
+Some Text To be Compressed
+Some Text To be Compressed
+Some Text To be Compressed
+Some Text To be Compressed
+Some Text To be Compressed
+Some Text To be Compressed
+Some Text To be Compressed
+Some Text To be Compressed
+Some Text To be Compressed
+Some Text To be Compressed
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/cms/encr.txt b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/cms/encr.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0eceb40
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/cms/encr.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Content-type: text/plain
+
+Sample OpenSSL Data for CMS encryption
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/cms/sign.txt b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/cms/sign.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c3f9d73
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/cms/sign.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Content-type: text/plain
+
+Test OpenSSL CMS Signed Content
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/cms/signer.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/cms/signer.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bac16ba
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/cms/signer.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIICXAIBAAKBgQC9aHAEOzjdqSFF848Cj86TwfaMwejxRuhepAETvotA4k+kJ/Gm
+1I8KRz1PpRsrPN0JaW5EFVA+hb/+C8rYoZOjfT6/33hAlXEmdtHSON1l432GpNeH
+Ula2ZBjTDF6ipp56rZAHQ9KCTewO8oHH/EblYldJL5Pf9+ngjMDB6yJn4QIDAQAB
+AoGACCuYIWaYll80UzslYRvo8lC8nOfEb5v6bBKxBTQD98GLY+5hKywiG3RlPalG
+mb/fXQeSPReaRYgpdwD1OBEIOEMW9kLyqpzokC0xjpZ+MwsuJTlxCesk5GEsMa3o
+wC3QMmiRA7qrZ/SzTtwrs++9mZ/pxp8JZ6pKYUj8SE7/vV0CQQDz8Ix2t40E16hx
+04+XhClnGqydZJyLLSxcTU3ZVhYxL+efo/5hZ8tKpkcDi8wq6T03BOKrKxrlIW55
+qDRNM24rAkEAxsWzu/rJhIouQyNoYygEIEYzFRlTQyZSg59u6dNiewMn27dOAbyc
+YT7B6da7e74QttTXo0lIllsX2S38+XsIIwJBANSRuIU3G66tkr5l4gnhhAaxqtuY
+sgVhvvdL8dvC9aG1Ifzt9hzBSthpHxbK+oYmK07HdhI8hLpIMLHYzoK7n3MCQEy4
+4rccBcxyyYiAkjozp+QNNIpgTBMPJ6pGT7lRLiHtBeV4y1NASdv/LTnk+Fi69Bid
+7t3H24ytfHcHmS1yn6ECQF6Jmh4C7dlvp59zXp+t+VsXxa/8sq41vKNIj0Rx9vh5
+xp9XL0C5ZpgmBnsTydP9pmkiL4ltLbMX0wJU6N2cmFw=
+-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/cms/signer2.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/cms/signer2.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..25e23d1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/cms/signer2.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIICXAIBAAKBgQDXKO1T4F/b3BsJmY2Ko6tSYkezN/HbDDYbici0VYyef3KRZbkM
+nULhtT4czifM32FRYnDlyr22Lirl1qM2SMM6hKlrDX9+ih0y0usjjBvCNd3ESJ4f
+nwCCqvWfBIeuSOxSc1bDbHxEKxnxFhjAPLrNuCGkrz90JG3xyZ/+EWis5wIDAQAB
+AoGAUTB2bcIrKfGimjrBOGGOUmYXnD8uGnQ/LqENhU8K4vxApTD3ZRUqmbUknQYF
+6r8YH/e/llasw8QkF9qod+F5GTgsnyh/aMidFHKrXXbf1662scz9+S6crSXq9Eb2
+CL57f6Kw61k6edrz8zHdA+rnTK00hzgzKCP4ZL5k8/55ueECQQD+BK+nsKi6CcKf
+m3Mh61Sf2Icm5JlMCKaihlbnh78lBN1imYUAfHJEnQ1ujxXB94R+6o9S+XrWTnTX
+2m/JNIfpAkEA2NaidX7Sv5jnRPkwJ02Srl0urxINLmg4bU0zmM3VoMklYBHWnMyr
+upPZGPh5TzCa+g6FTBmU8XK61wvnEKNcTwJBAM24VdnlBIDGbsx8RJ3vzLU30xz4
+ff5J80okqjUQhwkgC3tTAZgHMTPITZyAXQqdvrxakoCMc6MkHxTBX08AMCECQHHL
+SdyxXrYv7waSY0PtANJCkpJLveEhzqMFxdMmCjtj9BpTojYNbv3uQxtIopj9YAdk
+gW2ray++zvC2DV/86x8CQH4UJwgO6JqU4bSgi6HiRNjDg26tJ0Beu8jjl1vrkIVX
+pHFwSUeLZUsT2/iTUSgYH4uYiZPgYNcKTCT9W6se30A=
+-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/evp/Makefile b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/evp/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..72c6e81
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/evp/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+# Quick instruction:
+# To build against an OpenSSL built in the source tree, do this:
+#
+#    make OPENSSL_INCS_LOCATION=-I../../include OPENSSL_LIBS_LOCATION=-L../..
+#
+# To run the demos when linked with a shared library (default):
+#
+#    LD_LIBRARY_PATH=../.. ./aesccm
+#    LD_LIBRARY_PATH=../.. ./aesgcm
+
+CFLAGS = $(OPENSSL_INCS_LOCATION)
+LDFLAGS = $(OPENSSL_LIBS_LOCATION) -lssl -lcrypto
+
+all: aesccm aesgcm 
+
+aesccm: aesccm.o
+aesgcm: aesgcm.o
+
+aesccm aesgcm:
+	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ $<
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/evp/aesccm.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/evp/aesccm.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cc4d0b5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/evp/aesccm.c
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2013-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Simple AES CCM test program, uses the same NIST data used for the FIPS
+ * self test but uses the application level EVP APIs.
+ */
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+/* AES-CCM test data from NIST public test vectors */
+
+static const unsigned char ccm_key[] = {
+    0xce, 0xb0, 0x09, 0xae, 0xa4, 0x45, 0x44, 0x51, 0xfe, 0xad, 0xf0, 0xe6,
+    0xb3, 0x6f, 0x45, 0x55, 0x5d, 0xd0, 0x47, 0x23, 0xba, 0xa4, 0x48, 0xe8
+};
+
+static const unsigned char ccm_nonce[] = {
+    0x76, 0x40, 0x43, 0xc4, 0x94, 0x60, 0xb7
+};
+
+static const unsigned char ccm_adata[] = {
+    0x6e, 0x80, 0xdd, 0x7f, 0x1b, 0xad, 0xf3, 0xa1, 0xc9, 0xab, 0x25, 0xc7,
+    0x5f, 0x10, 0xbd, 0xe7, 0x8c, 0x23, 0xfa, 0x0e, 0xb8, 0xf9, 0xaa, 0xa5,
+    0x3a, 0xde, 0xfb, 0xf4, 0xcb, 0xf7, 0x8f, 0xe4
+};
+
+static const unsigned char ccm_pt[] = {
+    0xc8, 0xd2, 0x75, 0xf9, 0x19, 0xe1, 0x7d, 0x7f, 0xe6, 0x9c, 0x2a, 0x1f,
+    0x58, 0x93, 0x9d, 0xfe, 0x4d, 0x40, 0x37, 0x91, 0xb5, 0xdf, 0x13, 0x10
+};
+
+static const unsigned char ccm_ct[] = {
+    0x8a, 0x0f, 0x3d, 0x82, 0x29, 0xe4, 0x8e, 0x74, 0x87, 0xfd, 0x95, 0xa2,
+    0x8a, 0xd3, 0x92, 0xc8, 0x0b, 0x36, 0x81, 0xd4, 0xfb, 0xc7, 0xbb, 0xfd
+};
+
+static const unsigned char ccm_tag[] = {
+    0x2d, 0xd6, 0xef, 0x1c, 0x45, 0xd4, 0xcc, 0xb7, 0x23, 0xdc, 0x07, 0x44,
+    0x14, 0xdb, 0x50, 0x6d
+};
+
+void aes_ccm_encrypt(void)
+{
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
+    int outlen, tmplen;
+    unsigned char outbuf[1024];
+    printf("AES CCM Encrypt:\n");
+    printf("Plaintext:\n");
+    BIO_dump_fp(stdout, ccm_pt, sizeof(ccm_pt));
+    ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+    /* Set cipher type and mode */
+    EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_192_ccm(), NULL, NULL, NULL);
+    /* Set nonce length if default 96 bits is not appropriate */
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN, sizeof(ccm_nonce),
+                        NULL);
+    /* Set tag length */
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG, sizeof(ccm_tag), NULL);
+    /* Initialise key and IV */
+    EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, ccm_key, ccm_nonce);
+    /* Set plaintext length: only needed if AAD is used */
+    EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, NULL, &outlen, NULL, sizeof(ccm_pt));
+    /* Zero or one call to specify any AAD */
+    EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, NULL, &outlen, ccm_adata, sizeof(ccm_adata));
+    /* Encrypt plaintext: can only be called once */
+    EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, outbuf, &outlen, ccm_pt, sizeof(ccm_pt));
+    /* Output encrypted block */
+    printf("Ciphertext:\n");
+    BIO_dump_fp(stdout, outbuf, outlen);
+    /* Finalise: note get no output for CCM */
+    EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, outbuf, &outlen);
+    /* Get tag */
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG, 16, outbuf);
+    /* Output tag */
+    printf("Tag:\n");
+    BIO_dump_fp(stdout, outbuf, 16);
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
+}
+
+void aes_ccm_decrypt(void)
+{
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
+    int outlen, tmplen, rv;
+    unsigned char outbuf[1024];
+    printf("AES CCM Derypt:\n");
+    printf("Ciphertext:\n");
+    BIO_dump_fp(stdout, ccm_ct, sizeof(ccm_ct));
+    ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+    /* Select cipher */
+    EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_192_ccm(), NULL, NULL, NULL);
+    /* Set nonce length, omit for 96 bits */
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN, sizeof(ccm_nonce),
+                        NULL);
+    /* Set expected tag value */
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG,
+                        sizeof(ccm_tag), (void *)ccm_tag);
+    /* Specify key and IV */
+    EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, ccm_key, ccm_nonce);
+    /* Set ciphertext length: only needed if we have AAD */
+    EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, NULL, &outlen, NULL, sizeof(ccm_ct));
+    /* Zero or one call to specify any AAD */
+    EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, NULL, &outlen, ccm_adata, sizeof(ccm_adata));
+    /* Decrypt plaintext, verify tag: can only be called once */
+    rv = EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, outbuf, &outlen, ccm_ct, sizeof(ccm_ct));
+    /* Output decrypted block: if tag verify failed we get nothing */
+    if (rv > 0) {
+        printf("Plaintext:\n");
+        BIO_dump_fp(stdout, outbuf, outlen);
+    } else
+        printf("Plaintext not available: tag verify failed.\n");
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    aes_ccm_encrypt();
+    aes_ccm_decrypt();
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/evp/aesgcm.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/evp/aesgcm.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..df59f46
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/evp/aesgcm.c
@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2012-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Simple AES GCM test program, uses the same NIST data used for the FIPS
+ * self test but uses the application level EVP APIs.
+ */
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+/* AES-GCM test data from NIST public test vectors */
+
+static const unsigned char gcm_key[] = {
+    0xee, 0xbc, 0x1f, 0x57, 0x48, 0x7f, 0x51, 0x92, 0x1c, 0x04, 0x65, 0x66,
+    0x5f, 0x8a, 0xe6, 0xd1, 0x65, 0x8b, 0xb2, 0x6d, 0xe6, 0xf8, 0xa0, 0x69,
+    0xa3, 0x52, 0x02, 0x93, 0xa5, 0x72, 0x07, 0x8f
+};
+
+static const unsigned char gcm_iv[] = {
+    0x99, 0xaa, 0x3e, 0x68, 0xed, 0x81, 0x73, 0xa0, 0xee, 0xd0, 0x66, 0x84
+};
+
+static const unsigned char gcm_pt[] = {
+    0xf5, 0x6e, 0x87, 0x05, 0x5b, 0xc3, 0x2d, 0x0e, 0xeb, 0x31, 0xb2, 0xea,
+    0xcc, 0x2b, 0xf2, 0xa5
+};
+
+static const unsigned char gcm_aad[] = {
+    0x4d, 0x23, 0xc3, 0xce, 0xc3, 0x34, 0xb4, 0x9b, 0xdb, 0x37, 0x0c, 0x43,
+    0x7f, 0xec, 0x78, 0xde
+};
+
+static const unsigned char gcm_ct[] = {
+    0xf7, 0x26, 0x44, 0x13, 0xa8, 0x4c, 0x0e, 0x7c, 0xd5, 0x36, 0x86, 0x7e,
+    0xb9, 0xf2, 0x17, 0x36
+};
+
+static const unsigned char gcm_tag[] = {
+    0x67, 0xba, 0x05, 0x10, 0x26, 0x2a, 0xe4, 0x87, 0xd7, 0x37, 0xee, 0x62,
+    0x98, 0xf7, 0x7e, 0x0c
+};
+
+void aes_gcm_encrypt(void)
+{
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
+    int outlen, tmplen;
+    unsigned char outbuf[1024];
+    printf("AES GCM Encrypt:\n");
+    printf("Plaintext:\n");
+    BIO_dump_fp(stdout, gcm_pt, sizeof(gcm_pt));
+    ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+    /* Set cipher type and mode */
+    EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_gcm(), NULL, NULL, NULL);
+    /* Set IV length if default 96 bits is not appropriate */
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN, sizeof(gcm_iv), NULL);
+    /* Initialise key and IV */
+    EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, gcm_key, gcm_iv);
+    /* Zero or more calls to specify any AAD */
+    EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, NULL, &outlen, gcm_aad, sizeof(gcm_aad));
+    /* Encrypt plaintext */
+    EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, outbuf, &outlen, gcm_pt, sizeof(gcm_pt));
+    /* Output encrypted block */
+    printf("Ciphertext:\n");
+    BIO_dump_fp(stdout, outbuf, outlen);
+    /* Finalise: note get no output for GCM */
+    EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, outbuf, &outlen);
+    /* Get tag */
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG, 16, outbuf);
+    /* Output tag */
+    printf("Tag:\n");
+    BIO_dump_fp(stdout, outbuf, 16);
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
+}
+
+void aes_gcm_decrypt(void)
+{
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
+    int outlen, tmplen, rv;
+    unsigned char outbuf[1024];
+    printf("AES GCM Derypt:\n");
+    printf("Ciphertext:\n");
+    BIO_dump_fp(stdout, gcm_ct, sizeof(gcm_ct));
+    ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+    /* Select cipher */
+    EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_gcm(), NULL, NULL, NULL);
+    /* Set IV length, omit for 96 bits */
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN, sizeof(gcm_iv), NULL);
+    /* Specify key and IV */
+    EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, gcm_key, gcm_iv);
+    /* Zero or more calls to specify any AAD */
+    EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, NULL, &outlen, gcm_aad, sizeof(gcm_aad));
+    /* Decrypt plaintext */
+    EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, outbuf, &outlen, gcm_ct, sizeof(gcm_ct));
+    /* Output decrypted block */
+    printf("Plaintext:\n");
+    BIO_dump_fp(stdout, outbuf, outlen);
+    /* Set expected tag value. */
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG, sizeof(gcm_tag), 
+                        (void *)gcm_tag);
+    /* Finalise: note get no output for GCM */
+    rv = EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, outbuf, &outlen);
+    /*
+     * Print out return value. If this is not successful authentication
+     * failed and plaintext is not trustworthy.
+     */
+    printf("Tag Verify %s\n", rv > 0 ? "Successful!" : "Failed!");
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    aes_gcm_encrypt();
+    aes_gcm_decrypt();
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/pkcs12/README b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/pkcs12/README
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c87434b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/pkcs12/README
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+PKCS#12 demo applications
+
+Written by Steve Henson.
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/pkcs12/pkread.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/pkcs12/pkread.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3b87d7a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/pkcs12/pkread.c
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
+
+/* Simple PKCS#12 file reader */
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    FILE *fp;
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+    X509 *cert;
+    STACK_OF(X509) *ca = NULL;
+    PKCS12 *p12;
+    int i;
+    if (argc != 4) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Usage: pkread p12file password opfile\n");
+        exit(1);
+    }
+    OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
+    ERR_load_crypto_strings();
+    if ((fp = fopen(argv[1], "rb")) == NULL) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Error opening file %s\n", argv[1]);
+        exit(1);
+    }
+    p12 = d2i_PKCS12_fp(fp, NULL);
+    fclose(fp);
+    if (!p12) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Error reading PKCS#12 file\n");
+        ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+        exit(1);
+    }
+    if (!PKCS12_parse(p12, argv[2], &pkey, &cert, &ca)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Error parsing PKCS#12 file\n");
+        ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+        exit(1);
+    }
+    PKCS12_free(p12);
+    if ((fp = fopen(argv[3], "w")) == NULL) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Error opening file %s\n", argv[1]);
+        exit(1);
+    }
+    if (pkey) {
+        fprintf(fp, "***Private Key***\n");
+        PEM_write_PrivateKey(fp, pkey, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
+    }
+    if (cert) {
+        fprintf(fp, "***User Certificate***\n");
+        PEM_write_X509_AUX(fp, cert);
+    }
+    if (ca && sk_X509_num(ca)) {
+        fprintf(fp, "***Other Certificates***\n");
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ca); i++)
+            PEM_write_X509_AUX(fp, sk_X509_value(ca, i));
+    }
+    fclose(fp);
+    return 0;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/pkcs12/pkwrite.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/pkcs12/pkwrite.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e14cf83
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/pkcs12/pkwrite.c
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
+
+/* Simple PKCS#12 file creator */
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    FILE *fp;
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+    X509 *cert;
+    PKCS12 *p12;
+    if (argc != 5) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Usage: pkwrite infile password name p12file\n");
+        exit(1);
+    }
+    OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
+    ERR_load_crypto_strings();
+    if ((fp = fopen(argv[1], "r")) == NULL) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Error opening file %s\n", argv[1]);
+        exit(1);
+    }
+    cert = PEM_read_X509(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+    rewind(fp);
+    pkey = PEM_read_PrivateKey(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+    fclose(fp);
+    p12 = PKCS12_create(argv[2], argv[3], pkey, cert, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
+    if (!p12) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Error creating PKCS#12 structure\n");
+        ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+        exit(1);
+    }
+    if ((fp = fopen(argv[4], "wb")) == NULL) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Error opening file %s\n", argv[1]);
+        ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+        exit(1);
+    }
+    i2d_PKCS12_fp(fp, p12);
+    PKCS12_free(p12);
+    fclose(fp);
+    return 0;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/smime/cacert.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/smime/cacert.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..75cbb34
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/smime/cacert.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/smime/cakey.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/smime/cakey.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3b53c5e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/smime/cakey.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/smime/encr.txt b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/smime/encr.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f163a32
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/smime/encr.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Content-type: text/plain
+
+Sample OpenSSL Data for PKCS#7 encryption
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/smime/sign.txt b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/smime/sign.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..af1341d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/smime/sign.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Content-type: text/plain
+
+Test OpenSSL Signed Content
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/smime/signer.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/smime/signer.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bac16ba
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/smime/signer.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/smime/signer2.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/smime/signer2.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..25e23d1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/smime/signer2.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/smime/smdec.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/smime/smdec.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c4d1b09
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/smime/smdec.c
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2007-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* Simple S/MIME signing example */
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/pkcs7.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL, *tbio = NULL;
+    X509 *rcert = NULL;
+    EVP_PKEY *rkey = NULL;
+    PKCS7 *p7 = NULL;
+    int ret = 1;
+
+    OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
+    ERR_load_crypto_strings();
+
+    /* Read in recipient certificate and private key */
+    tbio = BIO_new_file("signer.pem", "r");
+
+    if (!tbio)
+        goto err;
+
+    rcert = PEM_read_bio_X509(tbio, NULL, 0, NULL);
+
+    BIO_reset(tbio);
+
+    rkey = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(tbio, NULL, 0, NULL);
+
+    if (!rcert || !rkey)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* Open content being signed */
+
+    in = BIO_new_file("smencr.txt", "r");
+
+    if (!in)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* Sign content */
+    p7 = SMIME_read_PKCS7(in, NULL);
+
+    if (!p7)
+        goto err;
+
+    out = BIO_new_file("encrout.txt", "w");
+    if (!out)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* Decrypt S/MIME message */
+    if (!PKCS7_decrypt(p7, rkey, rcert, out, 0))
+        goto err;
+
+    ret = 0;
+
+ err:
+    if (ret) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Error Signing Data\n");
+        ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+    }
+    PKCS7_free(p7);
+    X509_free(rcert);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(rkey);
+    BIO_free(in);
+    BIO_free(out);
+    BIO_free(tbio);
+
+    return ret;
+
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/smime/smenc.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/smime/smenc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5d36e9a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/smime/smenc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2007-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* Simple S/MIME encrypt example */
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/pkcs7.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL, *tbio = NULL;
+    X509 *rcert = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(X509) *recips = NULL;
+    PKCS7 *p7 = NULL;
+    int ret = 1;
+
+    /*
+     * On OpenSSL 0.9.9 only:
+     * for streaming set PKCS7_STREAM
+     */
+    int flags = PKCS7_STREAM;
+
+    OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
+    ERR_load_crypto_strings();
+
+    /* Read in recipient certificate */
+    tbio = BIO_new_file("signer.pem", "r");
+
+    if (!tbio)
+        goto err;
+
+    rcert = PEM_read_bio_X509(tbio, NULL, 0, NULL);
+
+    if (!rcert)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* Create recipient STACK and add recipient cert to it */
+    recips = sk_X509_new_null();
+
+    if (!recips || !sk_X509_push(recips, rcert))
+        goto err;
+
+    /*
+     * sk_X509_pop_free will free up recipient STACK and its contents so set
+     * rcert to NULL so it isn't freed up twice.
+     */
+    rcert = NULL;
+
+    /* Open content being encrypted */
+
+    in = BIO_new_file("encr.txt", "r");
+
+    if (!in)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* encrypt content */
+    p7 = PKCS7_encrypt(recips, in, EVP_des_ede3_cbc(), flags);
+
+    if (!p7)
+        goto err;
+
+    out = BIO_new_file("smencr.txt", "w");
+    if (!out)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* Write out S/MIME message */
+    if (!SMIME_write_PKCS7(out, p7, in, flags))
+        goto err;
+
+    ret = 0;
+
+ err:
+    if (ret) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Error Encrypting Data\n");
+        ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+    }
+    PKCS7_free(p7);
+    X509_free(rcert);
+    sk_X509_pop_free(recips, X509_free);
+    BIO_free(in);
+    BIO_free(out);
+    BIO_free(tbio);
+    return ret;
+
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/smime/smsign.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/smime/smsign.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ba0adb3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/smime/smsign.c
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2007-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* Simple S/MIME signing example */
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/pkcs7.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL, *tbio = NULL;
+    X509 *scert = NULL;
+    EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
+    PKCS7 *p7 = NULL;
+    int ret = 1;
+
+    /*
+     * For simple S/MIME signing use PKCS7_DETACHED. On OpenSSL 0.9.9 only:
+     * for streaming detached set PKCS7_DETACHED|PKCS7_STREAM for streaming
+     * non-detached set PKCS7_STREAM
+     */
+    int flags = PKCS7_DETACHED | PKCS7_STREAM;
+
+    OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
+    ERR_load_crypto_strings();
+
+    /* Read in signer certificate and private key */
+    tbio = BIO_new_file("signer.pem", "r");
+
+    if (!tbio)
+        goto err;
+
+    scert = PEM_read_bio_X509(tbio, NULL, 0, NULL);
+
+    BIO_reset(tbio);
+
+    skey = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(tbio, NULL, 0, NULL);
+
+    if (!scert || !skey)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* Open content being signed */
+
+    in = BIO_new_file("sign.txt", "r");
+
+    if (!in)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* Sign content */
+    p7 = PKCS7_sign(scert, skey, NULL, in, flags);
+
+    if (!p7)
+        goto err;
+
+    out = BIO_new_file("smout.txt", "w");
+    if (!out)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!(flags & PKCS7_STREAM))
+        BIO_reset(in);
+
+    /* Write out S/MIME message */
+    if (!SMIME_write_PKCS7(out, p7, in, flags))
+        goto err;
+
+    ret = 0;
+
+ err:
+    if (ret) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Error Signing Data\n");
+        ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+    }
+    PKCS7_free(p7);
+    X509_free(scert);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
+    BIO_free(in);
+    BIO_free(out);
+    BIO_free(tbio);
+
+    return ret;
+
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/smime/smsign2.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/smime/smsign2.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2b7f45b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/smime/smsign2.c
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2007-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* S/MIME signing example: 2 signers. OpenSSL 0.9.9 only */
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/pkcs7.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL, *tbio = NULL;
+    X509 *scert = NULL, *scert2 = NULL;
+    EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL, *skey2 = NULL;
+    PKCS7 *p7 = NULL;
+    int ret = 1;
+
+    OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
+    ERR_load_crypto_strings();
+
+    tbio = BIO_new_file("signer.pem", "r");
+
+    if (!tbio)
+        goto err;
+
+    scert = PEM_read_bio_X509(tbio, NULL, 0, NULL);
+
+    BIO_reset(tbio);
+
+    skey = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(tbio, NULL, 0, NULL);
+
+    BIO_free(tbio);
+
+    tbio = BIO_new_file("signer2.pem", "r");
+
+    if (!tbio)
+        goto err;
+
+    scert2 = PEM_read_bio_X509(tbio, NULL, 0, NULL);
+
+    BIO_reset(tbio);
+
+    skey2 = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(tbio, NULL, 0, NULL);
+
+    if (!scert2 || !skey2)
+        goto err;
+
+    in = BIO_new_file("sign.txt", "r");
+
+    if (!in)
+        goto err;
+
+    p7 = PKCS7_sign(NULL, NULL, NULL, in, PKCS7_STREAM | PKCS7_PARTIAL);
+
+    if (!p7)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* Add each signer in turn */
+
+    if (!PKCS7_sign_add_signer(p7, scert, skey, NULL, 0))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!PKCS7_sign_add_signer(p7, scert2, skey2, NULL, 0))
+        goto err;
+
+    out = BIO_new_file("smout.txt", "w");
+    if (!out)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* NB: content included and finalized by SMIME_write_PKCS7 */
+
+    if (!SMIME_write_PKCS7(out, p7, in, PKCS7_STREAM))
+        goto err;
+
+    ret = 0;
+
+ err:
+    if (ret) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Error Signing Data\n");
+        ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+    }
+    PKCS7_free(p7);
+    X509_free(scert);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
+    X509_free(scert2);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(skey2);
+    BIO_free(in);
+    BIO_free(out);
+    BIO_free(tbio);
+    return ret;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/smime/smver.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/smime/smver.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..75411c4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/demos/smime/smver.c
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2007-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* Simple S/MIME verification example */
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/pkcs7.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL, *tbio = NULL, *cont = NULL;
+    X509_STORE *st = NULL;
+    X509 *cacert = NULL;
+    PKCS7 *p7 = NULL;
+
+    int ret = 1;
+
+    OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
+    ERR_load_crypto_strings();
+
+    /* Set up trusted CA certificate store */
+
+    st = X509_STORE_new();
+
+    /* Read in signer certificate and private key */
+    tbio = BIO_new_file("cacert.pem", "r");
+
+    if (!tbio)
+        goto err;
+
+    cacert = PEM_read_bio_X509(tbio, NULL, 0, NULL);
+
+    if (!cacert)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!X509_STORE_add_cert(st, cacert))
+        goto err;
+
+    /* Open content being signed */
+
+    in = BIO_new_file("smout.txt", "r");
+
+    if (!in)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* Sign content */
+    p7 = SMIME_read_PKCS7(in, &cont);
+
+    if (!p7)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* File to output verified content to */
+    out = BIO_new_file("smver.txt", "w");
+    if (!out)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!PKCS7_verify(p7, NULL, st, cont, out, 0)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Verification Failure\n");
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    fprintf(stderr, "Verification Successful\n");
+
+    ret = 0;
+
+ err:
+    if (ret) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Error Verifying Data\n");
+        ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+    }
+    PKCS7_free(p7);
+    X509_free(cacert);
+    BIO_free(in);
+    BIO_free(out);
+    BIO_free(tbio);
+    return ret;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/HOWTO/certificates.txt b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/HOWTO/certificates.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..65f8fc8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/HOWTO/certificates.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+<DRAFT!>
+			HOWTO certificates
+
+1. Introduction
+
+How you handle certificates depends a great deal on what your role is.
+Your role can be one or several of:
+
+  - User of some client application
+  - User of some server application
+  - Certificate authority
+
+This file is for users who wish to get a certificate of their own.
+Certificate authorities should read https://www.openssl.org/docs/apps/ca.html.
+
+In all the cases shown below, the standard configuration file, as
+compiled into openssl, will be used.  You may find it in /etc/,
+/usr/local/ssl/ or somewhere else.  By default the file is named
+openssl.cnf and is described at https://www.openssl.org/docs/apps/config.html.
+You can specify a different configuration file using the
+'-config {file}' argument with the commands shown below.
+
+
+2. Relationship with keys
+
+Certificates are related to public key cryptography by containing a
+public key.  To be useful, there must be a corresponding private key
+somewhere.  With OpenSSL, public keys are easily derived from private
+keys, so before you create a certificate or a certificate request, you
+need to create a private key.
+
+Private keys are generated with 'openssl genrsa -out privkey.pem' if
+you want a RSA private key, or if you want a DSA private key:
+'openssl dsaparam -out dsaparam.pem 2048; openssl gendsa -out privkey.pem dsaparam.pem'.
+
+The private keys created by these commands are not passphrase protected;
+it might or might not be the desirable thing.  Further information on how to
+create private keys can be found at https://www.openssl.org/docs/HOWTO/keys.txt.
+The rest of this text assumes you have a private key in the file privkey.pem.
+
+
+3. Creating a certificate request
+
+To create a certificate, you need to start with a certificate request
+(or, as some certificate authorities like to put it, "certificate
+signing request", since that's exactly what they do, they sign it and
+give you the result back, thus making it authentic according to their
+policies).  A certificate request is sent to a certificate authority
+to get it signed into a certificate. You can also sign the certificate
+yourself if you have your own certificate authority or create a
+self-signed certificate (typically for testing purpose).
+
+The certificate request is created like this:
+
+  openssl req -new -key privkey.pem -out cert.csr
+
+Now, cert.csr can be sent to the certificate authority, if they can
+handle files in PEM format.  If not, use the extra argument '-outform'
+followed by the keyword for the format to use (see another HOWTO
+<formats.txt?>).  In some cases, -outform does not let you output the
+certificate request in the right format and you will have to use one
+of the various other commands that are exposed by openssl (or get
+creative and use a combination of tools).
+
+The certificate authority performs various checks (according to their
+policies) and usually waits for payment from you. Once that is
+complete, they send you your new certificate.
+
+Section 5 will tell you more on how to handle the certificate you
+received.
+
+
+4. Creating a self-signed test certificate
+
+You can create a self-signed certificate if you don't want to deal
+with a certificate authority, or if you just want to create a test
+certificate for yourself.  This is similar to creating a certificate
+request, but creates a certificate instead of a certificate request.
+This is NOT the recommended way to create a CA certificate, see
+https://www.openssl.org/docs/apps/ca.html.
+
+  openssl req -new -x509 -key privkey.pem -out cacert.pem -days 1095
+
+
+5. What to do with the certificate
+
+If you created everything yourself, or if the certificate authority
+was kind enough, your certificate is a raw DER thing in PEM format.
+Your key most definitely is if you have followed the examples above.
+However, some (most?) certificate authorities will encode them with
+things like PKCS7 or PKCS12, or something else.  Depending on your
+applications, this may be perfectly OK, it all depends on what they
+know how to decode.  If not, There are a number of OpenSSL tools to
+convert between some (most?) formats.
+
+So, depending on your application, you may have to convert your
+certificate and your key to various formats, most often also putting
+them together into one file.  The ways to do this is described in
+another HOWTO <formats.txt?>, I will just mention the simplest case.
+In the case of a raw DER thing in PEM format, and assuming that's all
+right for your applications, simply concatenating the certificate and
+the key into a new file and using that one should be enough.  With
+some applications, you don't even have to do that.
+
+
+By now, you have your certificate and your private key and can start
+using applications that depend on it.
+
+-- 
+Richard Levitte
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/HOWTO/keys.txt b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/HOWTO/keys.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1662c17
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/HOWTO/keys.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+<DRAFT!>
+			HOWTO keys
+
+1. Introduction
+
+Keys are the basis of public key algorithms and PKI.  Keys usually
+come in pairs, with one half being the public key and the other half
+being the private key.  With OpenSSL, the private key contains the
+public key information as well, so a public key doesn't need to be
+generated separately.
+
+Public keys come in several flavors, using different cryptographic
+algorithms.  The most popular ones associated with certificates are
+RSA and DSA, and this HOWTO will show how to generate each of them.
+
+
+2. To generate a RSA key
+
+A RSA key can be used both for encryption and for signing.
+
+Generating a key for the RSA algorithm is quite easy, all you have to
+do is the following:
+
+  openssl genrsa -des3 -out privkey.pem 2048
+
+With this variant, you will be prompted for a protecting password.  If
+you don't want your key to be protected by a password, remove the flag
+'-des3' from the command line above.
+
+The number 2048 is the size of the key, in bits.  Today, 2048 or
+higher is recommended for RSA keys, as fewer amount of bits is
+consider insecure or to be insecure pretty soon.
+
+
+3. To generate a DSA key
+
+A DSA key can be used for signing only.  It is important to
+know what a certificate request with a DSA key can really be used for.
+
+Generating a key for the DSA algorithm is a two-step process.  First,
+you have to generate parameters from which to generate the key:
+
+  openssl dsaparam -out dsaparam.pem 2048
+
+The number 2048 is the size of the key, in bits.  Today, 2048 or
+higher is recommended for DSA keys, as fewer amount of bits is
+consider insecure or to be insecure pretty soon.
+
+When that is done, you can generate a key using the parameters in
+question (actually, several keys can be generated from the same
+parameters):
+
+  openssl gendsa -des3 -out privkey.pem dsaparam.pem
+
+With this variant, you will be prompted for a protecting password.  If
+you don't want your key to be protected by a password, remove the flag
+'-des3' from the command line above.
+
+
+4. To generate an EC key
+
+An EC key can be used both for key agreement (ECDH) and signing (ECDSA).
+
+Generating a key for ECC is similar to generating a DSA key. These are
+two-step processes. First, you have to get the EC parameters from which
+the key will be generated:
+
+  openssl ecparam -name prime256v1 -out prime256v1.pem
+
+The prime256v1, or NIST P-256, which stands for 'X9.62/SECG curve over
+a 256-bit prime field', is the name of an elliptic curve which generates the
+parameters. You can use the following command to list all supported curves:
+
+  openssl ecparam -list_curves
+
+When that is done, you can generate a key using the created parameters (several
+keys can be produced from the same parameters):
+
+  openssl genpkey -des3 -paramfile prime256v1.pem -out private.key
+
+With this variant, you will be prompted for a password to protect your key.
+If you don't want your key to be protected by a password, remove the flag
+'-des3' from the command line above.
+
+You can also directly generate the key in one step:
+
+  openssl ecparam -genkey -name prime256v1 -out private.key
+
+or
+
+  openssl genpkey -algorithm EC -pkeyopt ec_paramgen_curve:P-256
+
+
+5. NOTE
+
+If you intend to use the key together with a server certificate,
+it may be reasonable to avoid protecting it with a password, since
+otherwise someone would have to type in the password every time the
+server needs to access the key.
+
+For X25519, it's treated as a distinct algorithm but not as one of
+the curves listed with 'ecparam -list_curves' option. You can use
+the following command to generate an X25519 key:
+
+  openssl genpkey -algorithm X25519 -out xkey.pem
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/HOWTO/proxy_certificates.txt b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/HOWTO/proxy_certificates.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..642bec9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/HOWTO/proxy_certificates.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,319 @@
+			HOWTO proxy certificates
+
+0. WARNING
+
+NONE OF THE CODE PRESENTED HERE HAS BEEN CHECKED!  The code is just examples to
+show you how things could be done.  There might be typos or type conflicts, and
+you will have to resolve them.
+
+1. Introduction
+
+Proxy certificates are defined in RFC 3820.  They are really usual certificates
+with the mandatory extension proxyCertInfo.
+
+Proxy certificates are issued by an End Entity (typically a user), either
+directly with the EE certificate as issuing certificate, or by extension through
+an already issued proxy certificate.  Proxy certificates are used to extend
+rights to some other entity (a computer process, typically, or sometimes to the
+user itself).  This allows the entity to perform operations on behalf of the
+owner of the EE certificate.
+
+See http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3820.txt for more information.
+
+
+2. A warning about proxy certificates
+
+No one seems to have tested proxy certificates with security in mind.  To this
+date, it seems that proxy certificates have only been used in a context highly
+aware of them.
+
+Existing applications might misbehave when trying to validate a chain of
+certificates which use a proxy certificate.  They might incorrectly consider the
+leaf to be the certificate to check for authorisation data, which is controlled
+by the EE certificate owner.
+
+subjectAltName and issuerAltName are forbidden in proxy certificates, and this
+is enforced in OpenSSL.  The subject must be the same as the issuer, with one
+commonName added on.
+
+Possible threats we can think of at this time include:
+
+ - impersonation through commonName (think server certificates).
+ - use of additional extensions, possibly non-standard ones used in certain
+   environments, that would grant extra or different authorisation rights.
+
+For these reasons, OpenSSL requires that the use of proxy certificates be
+explicitly allowed.  Currently, this can be done using the following methods:
+
+ - if the application directly calls X509_verify_cert(), it can first call:
+
+   X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(ctx, X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
+
+   Where ctx is the pointer which then gets passed to X509_verify_cert().
+
+ - proxy certificate validation can be enabled before starting the application
+   by setting the environment variable OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS.
+
+In the future, it might be possible to enable proxy certificates by editing
+openssl.cnf.
+
+
+3. How to create proxy certificates
+
+Creating proxy certificates is quite easy, by taking advantage of a lack of
+checks in the 'openssl x509' application (*ahem*).  You must first create a
+configuration section that contains a definition of the proxyCertInfo extension,
+for example:
+
+  [ v3_proxy ]
+  # A proxy certificate MUST NEVER be a CA certificate.
+  basicConstraints=CA:FALSE
+
+  # Usual authority key ID
+  authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid,issuer:always
+
+  # The extension which marks this certificate as a proxy
+  proxyCertInfo=critical,language:id-ppl-anyLanguage,pathlen:1,policy:text:AB
+
+It's also possible to specify the proxy extension in a separate section:
+
+  proxyCertInfo=critical,@proxy_ext
+
+  [ proxy_ext ]
+  language=id-ppl-anyLanguage
+  pathlen=0
+  policy=text:BC
+
+The policy value has a specific syntax, {syntag}:{string}, where the syntag
+determines what will be done with the string.  The following syntags are
+recognised:
+
+  text  indicates that the string is simply bytes, without any encoding:
+
+          policy=text:räksmörgås
+
+        Previous versions of this design had a specific tag for UTF-8 text.
+        However, since the bytes are copied as-is anyway, there is no need for
+        such a specific tag.
+
+  hex   indicates the string is encoded in hex, with colons between each byte
+        (every second hex digit):
+
+          policy=hex:72:E4:6B:73:6D:F6:72:67:E5:73
+
+        Previous versions of this design had a tag to insert a complete DER
+        blob.  However, the only legal use for this would be to surround the
+        bytes that would go with the hex: tag with whatever is needed to
+        construct a correct OCTET STRING.  The DER tag therefore felt
+        superfluous, and was removed.
+
+  file  indicates that the text of the policy should really be taken from a
+        file.  The string is then really a file name.  This is useful for
+        policies that are large (more than a few lines, e.g. XML documents).
+
+The 'policy' setting can be split up in multiple lines like this:
+
+  0.policy=This is
+  1.policy= a multi-
+  2.policy=line policy.
+
+NOTE: the proxy policy value is the part which determines the rights granted to
+the process using the proxy certificate.  The value is completely dependent on
+the application reading and interpreting it!
+
+Now that you have created an extension section for your proxy certificate, you
+can easily create a proxy certificate by doing:
+
+  openssl req -new -config openssl.cnf -out proxy.req -keyout proxy.key
+  openssl x509 -req -CAcreateserial -in proxy.req -days 7 -out proxy.crt \
+    -CA user.crt -CAkey user.key -extfile openssl.cnf -extensions v3_proxy
+
+You can also create a proxy certificate using another proxy certificate as
+issuer (note: I'm using a different configuration section for it):
+
+  openssl req -new -config openssl.cnf -out proxy2.req -keyout proxy2.key
+  openssl x509 -req -CAcreateserial -in proxy2.req -days 7 -out proxy2.crt \
+    -CA proxy.crt -CAkey proxy.key -extfile openssl.cnf -extensions v3_proxy2
+
+
+4. How to have your application interpret the policy?
+
+The basic way to interpret proxy policies is to start with some default rights,
+then compute the resulting rights by checking the proxy certificate against
+the chain of proxy certificates, user certificate and CA certificates. You then
+use the final computed rights.  Sounds easy, huh?  It almost is.
+
+The slightly complicated part is figuring out how to pass data between your
+application and the certificate validation procedure.
+
+You need the following ingredients:
+
+ - a callback function that will be called for every certificate being
+   validated.  The callback be called several times for each certificate,
+   so you must be careful to do the proxy policy interpretation at the right
+   time.  You also need to fill in the defaults when the EE certificate is
+   checked.
+
+ - a data structure that is shared between your application code and the
+   callback.
+
+ - a wrapper function that sets it all up.
+
+ - an ex_data index function that creates an index into the generic ex_data
+   store that is attached to an X509 validation context.
+
+Here is some skeleton code you can fill in:
+
+  #include <string.h>
+  #include <netdb.h>
+  #include <openssl/x509.h>
+  #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+
+  #define total_rights 25
+
+  /*
+   * In this example, I will use a view of granted rights as a bit
+   * array, one bit for each possible right.
+   */
+  typedef struct your_rights {
+      unsigned char rights[(total_rights + 7) / 8];
+  } YOUR_RIGHTS;
+
+  /*
+   * The following procedure will create an index for the ex_data
+   * store in the X509 validation context the first time it's called.
+   * Subsequent calls will return the same index.  */
+  static int get_proxy_auth_ex_data_idx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+  {
+      static volatile int idx = -1;
+      if (idx < 0) {
+          X509_STORE_lock(X509_STORE_CTX_get0_store(ctx));
+          if (idx < 0) {
+              idx = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(0,
+                                                    "for verify callback",
+                                                    NULL,NULL,NULL);
+          }
+          X509_STORE_unlock(X509_STORE_CTX_get0_store(ctx));
+      }
+      return idx;
+  }
+
+  /* Callback to be given to the X509 validation procedure.  */
+  static int verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+  {
+      if (ok == 1) {
+          /*
+           * It's REALLY important you keep the proxy policy
+           * check within this section.  It's important to know
+           * that when ok is 1, the certificates are checked
+           * from top to bottom.  You get the CA root first,
+           * followed by the possible chain of intermediate
+           * CAs, followed by the EE certificate, followed by
+           * the possible proxy certificates.
+           */
+          X509 *xs = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx);
+
+          if (X509_get_extension_flags(xs) & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
+              YOUR_RIGHTS *rights =
+                  (YOUR_RIGHTS *)X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx,
+                      get_proxy_auth_ex_data_idx(ctx));
+              PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION *pci =
+                  X509_get_ext_d2i(xs, NID_proxyCertInfo, NULL, NULL);
+
+              switch (OBJ_obj2nid(pci->proxyPolicy->policyLanguage)) {
+              case NID_Independent:
+                  /*
+                   * Do whatever you need to grant explicit rights to
+                   * this particular proxy certificate, usually by
+                   * pulling them from some database.  If there are none
+                   * to be found, clear all rights (making this and any
+                   * subsequent proxy certificate void of any rights).
+                   */
+                  memset(rights->rights, 0, sizeof(rights->rights));
+                  break;
+              case NID_id_ppl_inheritAll:
+                  /*
+                   * This is basically a NOP, we simply let the current
+                   * rights stand as they are.
+                   */
+                  break;
+              default:
+                  /* This is usually the most complex section of code.
+                   * You really do whatever you want as long as you
+                   * follow RFC 3820.  In the example we use here, the
+                   * simplest thing to do is to build another, temporary
+                   * bit array and fill it with the rights granted by
+                   * the current proxy certificate, then use it as a
+                   * mask on the accumulated rights bit array, and
+                   * voilà, you now have a new accumulated rights bit
+                   * array.
+                   */
+                  {
+                      int i;
+                      YOUR_RIGHTS tmp_rights;
+                      memset(tmp_rights.rights, 0, sizeof(tmp_rights.rights));
+
+                      /*
+                       * process_rights() is supposed to be a procedure
+                       * that takes a string and it's length, interprets
+                       * it and sets the bits in the YOUR_RIGHTS pointed
+                       * at by the third argument.
+                       */
+                      process_rights((char *) pci->proxyPolicy->policy->data,
+                                     pci->proxyPolicy->policy->length,
+                                     &tmp_rights);
+
+                      for(i = 0; i < total_rights / 8; i++)
+                          rights->rights[i] &= tmp_rights.rights[i];
+                  }
+                  break;
+              }
+              PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION_free(pci);
+          } else if (!(X509_get_extension_flags(xs) & EXFLAG_CA)) {
+              /* We have an EE certificate, let's use it to set default! */
+              YOUR_RIGHTS *rights =
+                  (YOUR_RIGHTS *)X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx,
+                      get_proxy_auth_ex_data_idx(ctx));
+
+              /* The following procedure finds out what rights the owner
+               * of the current certificate has, and sets them in the
+               * YOUR_RIGHTS structure pointed at by the second
+               * argument.
+               */
+              set_default_rights(xs, rights);
+          }
+      }
+      return ok;
+  }
+
+  static int my_X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
+                                 YOUR_RIGHTS *needed_rights)
+  {
+      int ok;
+      int (*save_verify_cb)(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) =
+          X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify_cb(ctx);
+      YOUR_RIGHTS rights;
+
+      X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(ctx, verify_callback);
+      X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(ctx, get_proxy_auth_ex_data_idx(ctx), &rights);
+      X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(ctx, X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
+      ok = X509_verify_cert(ctx);
+
+      if (ok == 1) {
+          ok = check_needed_rights(rights, needed_rights);
+      }
+
+      X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(ctx, save_verify_cb);
+
+      return ok;
+  }
+
+
+If you use SSL or TLS, you can easily set up a callback to have the
+certificates checked properly, using the code above:
+
+  SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(s_ctx, my_X509_verify_cert, &needed_rights);
+
+
+-- 
+Richard Levitte
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/README b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/README
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cac4115
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/README
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+
+README  This file
+
+fingerprints.txt
+        PGP fingerprints of authorised release signers
+
+standards.txt
+        Moved to the web, https://www.openssl.org/docs/standards.html
+
+HOWTO/
+        A few how-to documents; not necessarily up-to-date
+apps/
+        The openssl command-line tools; start with openssl.pod
+ssl/
+        The SSL library; start with ssl.pod
+crypto/
+        The cryptographic library; start with crypto.pod
+
+Formatted versions of the manpages (apps,ssl,crypto) can be found at
+        https://www.openssl.org/docs/manpages.html
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/CA.pl.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/CA.pl.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a7f3970
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/CA.pl.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,214 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+CA.pl - friendlier interface for OpenSSL certificate programs
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+B<CA.pl>
+B<-?> |
+B<-h> |
+B<-help>
+
+B<CA.pl>
+B<-newcert> |
+B<-newreq> |
+B<-newreq-nodes> |
+B<-xsign> |
+B<-sign> |
+B<-signCA> |
+B<-signcert> |
+B<-crl> |
+B<-newca>
+[B<-extra-cmd> extra-params]
+
+B<CA.pl> B<-pkcs12> [B<-extra-pkcs12> extra-params] [B<certname>]
+
+B<CA.pl> B<-verify> [B<-extra-verify> extra-params] B<certfile>...
+
+B<CA.pl> B<-revoke> [B<-extra-ca> extra-params] B<certfile> [B<reason>]
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The B<CA.pl> script is a perl script that supplies the relevant command line
+arguments to the B<openssl> command for some common certificate operations.
+It is intended to simplify the process of certificate creation and management
+by the use of some simple options.
+
+=head1 OPTIONS
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<?>, B<-h>, B<-help>
+
+prints a usage message.
+
+=item B<-newcert>
+
+creates a new self signed certificate. The private key is written to the file
+"newkey.pem" and the request written to the file "newreq.pem".
+This argument invokes B<openssl req> command.
+
+=item B<-newreq>
+
+creates a new certificate request. The private key is written to the file
+"newkey.pem" and the request written to the file "newreq.pem".
+Executes B<openssl req> command below the hood.
+
+=item B<-newreq-nodes>
+
+is like B<-newreq> except that the private key will not be encrypted.
+Uses B<openssl req> command.
+
+=item B<-newca>
+
+creates a new CA hierarchy for use with the B<ca> program (or the B<-signcert>
+and B<-xsign> options). The user is prompted to enter the filename of the CA
+certificates (which should also contain the private key) or by hitting ENTER
+details of the CA will be prompted for. The relevant files and directories
+are created in a directory called "demoCA" in the current directory.
+B<openssl req> and B<openssl ca> commands are get invoked.
+
+=item B<-pkcs12>
+
+create a PKCS#12 file containing the user certificate, private key and CA
+certificate. It expects the user certificate and private key to be in the
+file "newcert.pem" and the CA certificate to be in the file demoCA/cacert.pem,
+it creates a file "newcert.p12". This command can thus be called after the
+B<-sign> option. The PKCS#12 file can be imported directly into a browser.
+If there is an additional argument on the command line it will be used as the
+"friendly name" for the certificate (which is typically displayed in the browser
+list box), otherwise the name "My Certificate" is used.
+Delegates work to B<openssl pkcs12> command.
+
+=item B<-sign>, B<-signcert>, B<-xsign>
+
+calls the B<ca> program to sign a certificate request. It expects the request
+to be in the file "newreq.pem". The new certificate is written to the file
+"newcert.pem" except in the case of the B<-xsign> option when it is written
+to standard output. Leverages B<openssl ca> command.
+
+=item B<-signCA>
+
+this option is the same as the B<-signreq> option except it uses the configuration
+file section B<v3_ca> and so makes the signed request a valid CA certificate. This
+is useful when creating intermediate CA from a root CA.
+Extra params are passed on to B<openssl ca> command.
+
+=item B<-signcert>
+
+this option is the same as B<-sign> except it expects a self signed certificate
+to be present in the file "newreq.pem".
+Extra params are passed on to B<openssl x509> and B<openssl ca> commands.
+
+=item B<-crl>
+
+generate a CRL. Executes B<openssl ca> command.
+
+=item B<-revoke certfile [reason]>
+
+revoke the certificate contained in the specified B<certfile>. An optional
+reason may be specified, and must be one of: B<unspecified>,
+B<keyCompromise>, B<CACompromise>, B<affiliationChanged>, B<superseded>,
+B<cessationOfOperation>, B<certificateHold>, or B<removeFromCRL>.
+Leverages B<openssl ca> command.
+
+=item B<-verify>
+
+verifies certificates against the CA certificate for "demoCA". If no certificates
+are specified on the command line it tries to verify the file "newcert.pem".
+Invokes B<openssl verify> command.
+
+=item B<-extra-req> | B<-extra-ca> | B<-extra-pkcs12> | B<-extra-x509> | B<-extra-verify> <extra-params>
+
+The purpose of these parameters is to allow optional parameters to be supplied
+to B<openssl> that this command executes. The B<-extra-cmd> are specific to the
+option being used and the B<openssl> command getting invoked. For example
+when this command invokes B<openssl req> extra parameters can be passed on
+with the B<-extra-req> parameter. The
+B<openssl> commands being invoked per option are documented below.
+Users should consult B<openssl> command documentation for more information.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 EXAMPLES
+
+Create a CA hierarchy:
+
+ CA.pl -newca
+
+Complete certificate creation example: create a CA, create a request, sign
+the request and finally create a PKCS#12 file containing it.
+
+ CA.pl -newca
+ CA.pl -newreq
+ CA.pl -signreq
+ CA.pl -pkcs12 "My Test Certificate"
+
+=head1 DSA CERTIFICATES
+
+Although the B<CA.pl> creates RSA CAs and requests it is still possible to
+use it with DSA certificates and requests using the L<req(1)> command
+directly. The following example shows the steps that would typically be taken.
+
+Create some DSA parameters:
+
+ openssl dsaparam -out dsap.pem 1024
+
+Create a DSA CA certificate and private key:
+
+ openssl req -x509 -newkey dsa:dsap.pem -keyout cacert.pem -out cacert.pem
+
+Create the CA directories and files:
+
+ CA.pl -newca
+
+enter cacert.pem when prompted for the CA file name.
+
+Create a DSA certificate request and private key (a different set of parameters
+can optionally be created first):
+
+ openssl req -out newreq.pem -newkey dsa:dsap.pem
+
+Sign the request:
+
+ CA.pl -signreq
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+Most of the filenames mentioned can be modified by editing the B<CA.pl> script.
+
+If the demoCA directory already exists then the B<-newca> command will not
+overwrite it and will do nothing. This can happen if a previous call using
+the B<-newca> option terminated abnormally. To get the correct behaviour
+delete the demoCA directory if it already exists.
+
+Under some environments it may not be possible to run the B<CA.pl> script
+directly (for example Win32) and the default configuration file location may
+be wrong. In this case the command:
+
+ perl -S CA.pl
+
+can be used and the B<OPENSSL_CONF> environment variable changed to point to
+the correct path of the configuration file.
+
+The script is intended as a simple front end for the B<openssl> program for use
+by a beginner. Its behaviour isn't always what is wanted. For more control over the
+behaviour of the certificate commands call the B<openssl> command directly.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<x509(1)>, L<ca(1)>, L<req(1)>, L<pkcs12(1)>,
+L<config(5)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/asn1parse.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/asn1parse.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3c607e8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/asn1parse.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,209 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+openssl-asn1parse,
+asn1parse - ASN.1 parsing tool
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+B<openssl> B<asn1parse>
+[B<-help>]
+[B<-inform PEM|DER>]
+[B<-in filename>]
+[B<-out filename>]
+[B<-noout>]
+[B<-offset number>]
+[B<-length number>]
+[B<-i>]
+[B<-oid filename>]
+[B<-dump>]
+[B<-dlimit num>]
+[B<-strparse offset>]
+[B<-genstr string>]
+[B<-genconf file>]
+[B<-strictpem>]
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The B<asn1parse> command is a diagnostic utility that can parse ASN.1
+structures. It can also be used to extract data from ASN.1 formatted data.
+
+=head1 OPTIONS
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<-help>
+
+Print out a usage message.
+
+=item B<-inform> B<DER|PEM>
+
+the input format. B<DER> is binary format and B<PEM> (the default) is base64
+encoded.
+
+=item B<-in filename>
+
+the input file, default is standard input
+
+=item B<-out filename>
+
+output file to place the DER encoded data into. If this
+option is not present then no data will be output. This is most useful when
+combined with the B<-strparse> option.
+
+=item B<-noout>
+
+don't output the parsed version of the input file.
+
+=item B<-offset number>
+
+starting offset to begin parsing, default is start of file.
+
+=item B<-length number>
+
+number of bytes to parse, default is until end of file.
+
+=item B<-i>
+
+indents the output according to the "depth" of the structures.
+
+=item B<-oid filename>
+
+a file containing additional OBJECT IDENTIFIERs (OIDs). The format of this
+file is described in the NOTES section below.
+
+=item B<-dump>
+
+dump unknown data in hex format.
+
+=item B<-dlimit num>
+
+like B<-dump>, but only the first B<num> bytes are output.
+
+=item B<-strparse offset>
+
+parse the contents octets of the ASN.1 object starting at B<offset>. This
+option can be used multiple times to "drill down" into a nested structure.
+
+=item B<-genstr string>, B<-genconf file>
+
+generate encoded data based on B<string>, B<file> or both using
+L<ASN1_generate_nconf(3)> format. If B<file> only is
+present then the string is obtained from the default section using the name
+B<asn1>. The encoded data is passed through the ASN1 parser and printed out as
+though it came from a file, the contents can thus be examined and written to a
+file using the B<out> option.
+
+=item B<-strictpem>
+
+If this option is used then B<-inform> will be ignored. Without this option any
+data in a PEM format input file will be treated as being base64 encoded and
+processed whether it has the normal PEM BEGIN and END markers or not. This
+option will ignore any data prior to the start of the BEGIN marker, or after an
+END marker in a PEM file.
+
+=back
+
+=head2 Output
+
+The output will typically contain lines like this:
+
+  0:d=0  hl=4 l= 681 cons: SEQUENCE
+
+.....
+
+  229:d=3  hl=3 l= 141 prim: BIT STRING
+  373:d=2  hl=3 l= 162 cons: cont [ 3 ]
+  376:d=3  hl=3 l= 159 cons: SEQUENCE
+  379:d=4  hl=2 l=  29 cons: SEQUENCE
+  381:d=5  hl=2 l=   3 prim: OBJECT            :X509v3 Subject Key Identifier
+  386:d=5  hl=2 l=  22 prim: OCTET STRING
+  410:d=4  hl=2 l= 112 cons: SEQUENCE
+  412:d=5  hl=2 l=   3 prim: OBJECT            :X509v3 Authority Key Identifier
+  417:d=5  hl=2 l= 105 prim: OCTET STRING
+  524:d=4  hl=2 l=  12 cons: SEQUENCE
+
+.....
+
+This example is part of a self-signed certificate. Each line starts with the
+offset in decimal. B<d=XX> specifies the current depth. The depth is increased
+within the scope of any SET or SEQUENCE. B<hl=XX> gives the header length
+(tag and length octets) of the current type. B<l=XX> gives the length of
+the contents octets.
+
+The B<-i> option can be used to make the output more readable.
+
+Some knowledge of the ASN.1 structure is needed to interpret the output.
+
+In this example the BIT STRING at offset 229 is the certificate public key.
+The contents octets of this will contain the public key information. This can
+be examined using the option B<-strparse 229> to yield:
+
+    0:d=0  hl=3 l= 137 cons: SEQUENCE
+    3:d=1  hl=3 l= 129 prim: INTEGER           :E5D21E1F5C8D208EA7A2166C7FAF9F6BDF2059669C60876DDB70840F1A5AAFA59699FE471F379F1DD6A487E7D5409AB6A88D4A9746E24B91D8CF55DB3521015460C8EDE44EE8A4189F7A7BE77D6CD3A9AF2696F486855CF58BF0EDF2B4068058C7A947F52548DDF7E15E96B385F86422BEA9064A3EE9E1158A56E4A6F47E5897
+  135:d=1  hl=2 l=   3 prim: INTEGER           :010001
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+If an OID is not part of OpenSSL's internal table it will be represented in
+numerical form (for example 1.2.3.4). The file passed to the B<-oid> option
+allows additional OIDs to be included. Each line consists of three columns,
+the first column is the OID in numerical format and should be followed by white
+space. The second column is the "short name" which is a single word followed
+by white space. The final column is the rest of the line and is the
+"long name". B<asn1parse> displays the long name. Example:
+
+C<1.2.3.4       shortName       A long name>
+
+=head1 EXAMPLES
+
+Parse a file:
+
+ openssl asn1parse -in file.pem
+
+Parse a DER file:
+
+ openssl asn1parse -inform DER -in file.der
+
+Generate a simple UTF8String:
+
+ openssl asn1parse -genstr 'UTF8:Hello World'
+
+Generate and write out a UTF8String, don't print parsed output:
+
+ openssl asn1parse -genstr 'UTF8:Hello World' -noout -out utf8.der
+
+Generate using a config file:
+
+ openssl asn1parse -genconf asn1.cnf -noout -out asn1.der
+
+Example config file:
+
+ asn1=SEQUENCE:seq_sect
+
+ [seq_sect]
+
+ field1=BOOL:TRUE
+ field2=EXP:0, UTF8:some random string
+
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+There should be options to change the format of output lines. The output of some
+ASN.1 types is not well handled (if at all).
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ASN1_generate_nconf(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/ca.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/ca.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9918a13
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/ca.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,724 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+openssl-ca,
+ca - sample minimal CA application
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+B<openssl> B<ca>
+[B<-help>]
+[B<-verbose>]
+[B<-config filename>]
+[B<-name section>]
+[B<-gencrl>]
+[B<-revoke file>]
+[B<-valid file>]
+[B<-status serial>]
+[B<-updatedb>]
+[B<-crl_reason reason>]
+[B<-crl_hold instruction>]
+[B<-crl_compromise time>]
+[B<-crl_CA_compromise time>]
+[B<-crldays days>]
+[B<-crlhours hours>]
+[B<-crlexts section>]
+[B<-startdate date>]
+[B<-enddate date>]
+[B<-days arg>]
+[B<-md arg>]
+[B<-policy arg>]
+[B<-keyfile arg>]
+[B<-keyform PEM|DER>]
+[B<-key arg>]
+[B<-passin arg>]
+[B<-cert file>]
+[B<-selfsign>]
+[B<-in file>]
+[B<-out file>]
+[B<-notext>]
+[B<-outdir dir>]
+[B<-infiles>]
+[B<-spkac file>]
+[B<-ss_cert file>]
+[B<-preserveDN>]
+[B<-noemailDN>]
+[B<-batch>]
+[B<-msie_hack>]
+[B<-extensions section>]
+[B<-extfile section>]
+[B<-engine id>]
+[B<-subj arg>]
+[B<-utf8>]
+[B<-create_serial>]
+[B<-multivalue-rdn>]
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The B<ca> command is a minimal CA application. It can be used
+to sign certificate requests in a variety of forms and generate
+CRLs it also maintains a text database of issued certificates
+and their status.
+
+The options descriptions will be divided into each purpose.
+
+=head1 OPTIONS
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<-help>
+
+Print out a usage message.
+
+=item B<-verbose>
+
+this prints extra details about the operations being performed.
+
+=item B<-config filename>
+
+specifies the configuration file to use.
+Optional; for a description of the default value,
+see L<openssl(1)/COMMAND SUMMARY>.
+
+=item B<-name section>
+
+specifies the configuration file section to use (overrides
+B<default_ca> in the B<ca> section).
+
+=item B<-in filename>
+
+an input filename containing a single certificate request to be
+signed by the CA.
+
+=item B<-ss_cert filename>
+
+a single self-signed certificate to be signed by the CA.
+
+=item B<-spkac filename>
+
+a file containing a single Netscape signed public key and challenge
+and additional field values to be signed by the CA. See the B<SPKAC FORMAT>
+section for information on the required input and output format.
+
+=item B<-infiles>
+
+if present this should be the last option, all subsequent arguments
+are taken as the names of files containing certificate requests.
+
+=item B<-out filename>
+
+the output file to output certificates to. The default is standard
+output. The certificate details will also be printed out to this
+file in PEM format (except that B<-spkac> outputs DER format).
+
+=item B<-outdir directory>
+
+the directory to output certificates to. The certificate will be
+written to a filename consisting of the serial number in hex with
+".pem" appended.
+
+=item B<-cert>
+
+the CA certificate file.
+
+=item B<-keyfile filename>
+
+the private key to sign requests with.
+
+=item B<-keyform PEM|DER>
+
+the format of the data in the private key file.
+The default is PEM.
+
+=item B<-key password>
+
+the password used to encrypt the private key. Since on some
+systems the command line arguments are visible (e.g. Unix with
+the 'ps' utility) this option should be used with caution.
+
+=item B<-selfsign>
+
+indicates the issued certificates are to be signed with the key
+the certificate requests were signed with (given with B<-keyfile>).
+Certificate requests signed with a different key are ignored.  If
+B<-spkac>, B<-ss_cert> or B<-gencrl> are given, B<-selfsign> is
+ignored.
+
+A consequence of using B<-selfsign> is that the self-signed
+certificate appears among the entries in the certificate database
+(see the configuration option B<database>), and uses the same
+serial number counter as all other certificates sign with the
+self-signed certificate.
+
+=item B<-passin arg>
+
+the key password source. For more information about the format of B<arg>
+see the B<PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS> section in L<openssl(1)>.
+
+=item B<-notext>
+
+don't output the text form of a certificate to the output file.
+
+=item B<-startdate date>
+
+this allows the start date to be explicitly set. The format of the
+date is YYMMDDHHMMSSZ (the same as an ASN1 UTCTime structure).
+
+=item B<-enddate date>
+
+this allows the expiry date to be explicitly set. The format of the
+date is YYMMDDHHMMSSZ (the same as an ASN1 UTCTime structure).
+
+=item B<-days arg>
+
+the number of days to certify the certificate for.
+
+=item B<-md alg>
+
+the message digest to use.
+Any digest supported by the OpenSSL B<dgst> command can be used.
+This option also applies to CRLs.
+
+=item B<-policy arg>
+
+this option defines the CA "policy" to use. This is a section in
+the configuration file which decides which fields should be mandatory
+or match the CA certificate. Check out the B<POLICY FORMAT> section
+for more information.
+
+=item B<-msie_hack>
+
+this is a legacy option to make B<ca> work with very old versions of
+the IE certificate enrollment control "certenr3". It used UniversalStrings
+for almost everything. Since the old control has various security bugs
+its use is strongly discouraged. The newer control "Xenroll" does not
+need this option.
+
+=item B<-preserveDN>
+
+Normally the DN order of a certificate is the same as the order of the
+fields in the relevant policy section. When this option is set the order
+is the same as the request. This is largely for compatibility with the
+older IE enrollment control which would only accept certificates if their
+DNs match the order of the request. This is not needed for Xenroll.
+
+=item B<-noemailDN>
+
+The DN of a certificate can contain the EMAIL field if present in the
+request DN, however it is good policy just having the e-mail set into
+the altName extension of the certificate. When this option is set the
+EMAIL field is removed from the certificate' subject and set only in
+the, eventually present, extensions. The B<email_in_dn> keyword can be
+used in the configuration file to enable this behaviour.
+
+=item B<-batch>
+
+this sets the batch mode. In this mode no questions will be asked
+and all certificates will be certified automatically.
+
+=item B<-extensions section>
+
+the section of the configuration file containing certificate extensions
+to be added when a certificate is issued (defaults to B<x509_extensions>
+unless the B<-extfile> option is used). If no extension section is
+present then, a V1 certificate is created. If the extension section
+is present (even if it is empty), then a V3 certificate is created. See the:w
+L<x509v3_config(5)> manual page for details of the
+extension section format.
+
+=item B<-extfile file>
+
+an additional configuration file to read certificate extensions from
+(using the default section unless the B<-extensions> option is also
+used).
+
+=item B<-engine id>
+
+specifying an engine (by its unique B<id> string) will cause B<ca>
+to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine,
+thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default
+for all available algorithms.
+
+=item B<-subj arg>
+
+supersedes subject name given in the request.
+The arg must be formatted as I</type0=value0/type1=value1/type2=...>,
+characters may be escaped by \ (backslash), no spaces are skipped.
+
+=item B<-utf8>
+
+this option causes field values to be interpreted as UTF8 strings, by
+default they are interpreted as ASCII. This means that the field
+values, whether prompted from a terminal or obtained from a
+configuration file, must be valid UTF8 strings.
+
+=item B<-create_serial>
+
+if reading serial from the text file as specified in the configuration
+fails, specifying this option creates a new random serial to be used as next
+serial number.
+
+=item B<-multivalue-rdn>
+
+This option causes the -subj argument to be interpreted with full
+support for multivalued RDNs. Example:
+
+I</DC=org/DC=OpenSSL/DC=users/UID=123456+CN=John Doe>
+
+If -multi-rdn is not used then the UID value is I<123456+CN=John Doe>.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 CRL OPTIONS
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<-gencrl>
+
+this option generates a CRL based on information in the index file.
+
+=item B<-crldays num>
+
+the number of days before the next CRL is due. That is the days from
+now to place in the CRL nextUpdate field.
+
+=item B<-crlhours num>
+
+the number of hours before the next CRL is due.
+
+=item B<-revoke filename>
+
+a filename containing a certificate to revoke.
+
+=item B<-valid filename>
+
+a filename containing a certificate to add a Valid certificate entry.
+
+=item B<-status serial>
+
+displays the revocation status of the certificate with the specified
+serial number and exits.
+
+=item B<-updatedb>
+
+Updates the database index to purge expired certificates.
+
+=item B<-crl_reason reason>
+
+revocation reason, where B<reason> is one of: B<unspecified>, B<keyCompromise>,
+B<CACompromise>, B<affiliationChanged>, B<superseded>, B<cessationOfOperation>,
+B<certificateHold> or B<removeFromCRL>. The matching of B<reason> is case
+insensitive. Setting any revocation reason will make the CRL v2.
+
+In practice B<removeFromCRL> is not particularly useful because it is only used
+in delta CRLs which are not currently implemented.
+
+=item B<-crl_hold instruction>
+
+This sets the CRL revocation reason code to B<certificateHold> and the hold
+instruction to B<instruction> which must be an OID. Although any OID can be
+used only B<holdInstructionNone> (the use of which is discouraged by RFC2459)
+B<holdInstructionCallIssuer> or B<holdInstructionReject> will normally be used.
+
+=item B<-crl_compromise time>
+
+This sets the revocation reason to B<keyCompromise> and the compromise time to
+B<time>. B<time> should be in GeneralizedTime format that is B<YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ>.
+
+=item B<-crl_CA_compromise time>
+
+This is the same as B<crl_compromise> except the revocation reason is set to
+B<CACompromise>.
+
+=item B<-crlexts section>
+
+the section of the configuration file containing CRL extensions to
+include. If no CRL extension section is present then a V1 CRL is
+created, if the CRL extension section is present (even if it is
+empty) then a V2 CRL is created. The CRL extensions specified are
+CRL extensions and B<not> CRL entry extensions.  It should be noted
+that some software (for example Netscape) can't handle V2 CRLs. See
+L<x509v3_config(5)> manual page for details of the
+extension section format.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 CONFIGURATION FILE OPTIONS
+
+The section of the configuration file containing options for B<ca>
+is found as follows: If the B<-name> command line option is used,
+then it names the section to be used. Otherwise the section to
+be used must be named in the B<default_ca> option of the B<ca> section
+of the configuration file (or in the default section of the
+configuration file). Besides B<default_ca>, the following options are
+read directly from the B<ca> section:
+ RANDFILE
+ preserve
+ msie_hack
+With the exception of B<RANDFILE>, this is probably a bug and may
+change in future releases.
+
+Many of the configuration file options are identical to command line
+options. Where the option is present in the configuration file
+and the command line the command line value is used. Where an
+option is described as mandatory then it must be present in
+the configuration file or the command line equivalent (if
+any) used.
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<oid_file>
+
+This specifies a file containing additional B<OBJECT IDENTIFIERS>.
+Each line of the file should consist of the numerical form of the
+object identifier followed by white space then the short name followed
+by white space and finally the long name.
+
+=item B<oid_section>
+
+This specifies a section in the configuration file containing extra
+object identifiers. Each line should consist of the short name of the
+object identifier followed by B<=> and the numerical form. The short
+and long names are the same when this option is used.
+
+=item B<new_certs_dir>
+
+the same as the B<-outdir> command line option. It specifies
+the directory where new certificates will be placed. Mandatory.
+
+=item B<certificate>
+
+the same as B<-cert>. It gives the file containing the CA
+certificate. Mandatory.
+
+=item B<private_key>
+
+same as the B<-keyfile> option. The file containing the
+CA private key. Mandatory.
+
+=item B<RANDFILE>
+
+a file used to read and write random number seed information, or
+an EGD socket (see L<RAND_egd(3)>).
+
+=item B<default_days>
+
+the same as the B<-days> option. The number of days to certify
+a certificate for.
+
+=item B<default_startdate>
+
+the same as the B<-startdate> option. The start date to certify
+a certificate for. If not set the current time is used.
+
+=item B<default_enddate>
+
+the same as the B<-enddate> option. Either this option or
+B<default_days> (or the command line equivalents) must be
+present.
+
+=item B<default_crl_hours default_crl_days>
+
+the same as the B<-crlhours> and the B<-crldays> options. These
+will only be used if neither command line option is present. At
+least one of these must be present to generate a CRL.
+
+=item B<default_md>
+
+the same as the B<-md> option. Mandatory.
+
+=item B<database>
+
+the text database file to use. Mandatory. This file must be present
+though initially it will be empty.
+
+=item B<unique_subject>
+
+if the value B<yes> is given, the valid certificate entries in the
+database must have unique subjects.  if the value B<no> is given,
+several valid certificate entries may have the exact same subject.
+The default value is B<yes>, to be compatible with older (pre 0.9.8)
+versions of OpenSSL.  However, to make CA certificate roll-over easier,
+it's recommended to use the value B<no>, especially if combined with
+the B<-selfsign> command line option.
+
+Note that it is valid in some circumstances for certificates to be created
+without any subject. In the case where there are multiple certificates without
+subjects this does not count as a duplicate.
+
+=item B<serial>
+
+a text file containing the next serial number to use in hex. Mandatory.
+This file must be present and contain a valid serial number.
+
+=item B<crlnumber>
+
+a text file containing the next CRL number to use in hex. The crl number
+will be inserted in the CRLs only if this file exists. If this file is
+present, it must contain a valid CRL number.
+
+=item B<x509_extensions>
+
+the same as B<-extensions>.
+
+=item B<crl_extensions>
+
+the same as B<-crlexts>.
+
+=item B<preserve>
+
+the same as B<-preserveDN>
+
+=item B<email_in_dn>
+
+the same as B<-noemailDN>. If you want the EMAIL field to be removed
+from the DN of the certificate simply set this to 'no'. If not present
+the default is to allow for the EMAIL filed in the certificate's DN.
+
+=item B<msie_hack>
+
+the same as B<-msie_hack>
+
+=item B<policy>
+
+the same as B<-policy>. Mandatory. See the B<POLICY FORMAT> section
+for more information.
+
+=item B<name_opt>, B<cert_opt>
+
+these options allow the format used to display the certificate details
+when asking the user to confirm signing. All the options supported by
+the B<x509> utilities B<-nameopt> and B<-certopt> switches can be used
+here, except the B<no_signame> and B<no_sigdump> are permanently set
+and cannot be disabled (this is because the certificate signature cannot
+be displayed because the certificate has not been signed at this point).
+
+For convenience the values B<ca_default> are accepted by both to produce
+a reasonable output.
+
+If neither option is present the format used in earlier versions of
+OpenSSL is used. Use of the old format is B<strongly> discouraged because
+it only displays fields mentioned in the B<policy> section, mishandles
+multicharacter string types and does not display extensions.
+
+=item B<copy_extensions>
+
+determines how extensions in certificate requests should be handled.
+If set to B<none> or this option is not present then extensions are
+ignored and not copied to the certificate. If set to B<copy> then any
+extensions present in the request that are not already present are copied
+to the certificate. If set to B<copyall> then all extensions in the
+request are copied to the certificate: if the extension is already present
+in the certificate it is deleted first. See the B<WARNINGS> section before
+using this option.
+
+The main use of this option is to allow a certificate request to supply
+values for certain extensions such as subjectAltName.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 POLICY FORMAT
+
+The policy section consists of a set of variables corresponding to
+certificate DN fields. If the value is "match" then the field value
+must match the same field in the CA certificate. If the value is
+"supplied" then it must be present. If the value is "optional" then
+it may be present. Any fields not mentioned in the policy section
+are silently deleted, unless the B<-preserveDN> option is set but
+this can be regarded more of a quirk than intended behaviour.
+
+=head1 SPKAC FORMAT
+
+The input to the B<-spkac> command line option is a Netscape
+signed public key and challenge. This will usually come from
+the B<KEYGEN> tag in an HTML form to create a new private key.
+It is however possible to create SPKACs using the B<spkac> utility.
+
+The file should contain the variable SPKAC set to the value of
+the SPKAC and also the required DN components as name value pairs.
+If you need to include the same component twice then it can be
+preceded by a number and a '.'.
+
+When processing SPKAC format, the output is DER if the B<-out>
+flag is used, but PEM format if sending to stdout or the B<-outdir>
+flag is used.
+
+=head1 EXAMPLES
+
+Note: these examples assume that the B<ca> directory structure is
+already set up and the relevant files already exist. This usually
+involves creating a CA certificate and private key with B<req>, a
+serial number file and an empty index file and placing them in
+the relevant directories.
+
+To use the sample configuration file below the directories demoCA,
+demoCA/private and demoCA/newcerts would be created. The CA
+certificate would be copied to demoCA/cacert.pem and its private
+key to demoCA/private/cakey.pem. A file demoCA/serial would be
+created containing for example "01" and the empty index file
+demoCA/index.txt.
+
+
+Sign a certificate request:
+
+ openssl ca -in req.pem -out newcert.pem
+
+Sign a certificate request, using CA extensions:
+
+ openssl ca -in req.pem -extensions v3_ca -out newcert.pem
+
+Generate a CRL
+
+ openssl ca -gencrl -out crl.pem
+
+Sign several requests:
+
+ openssl ca -infiles req1.pem req2.pem req3.pem
+
+Certify a Netscape SPKAC:
+
+ openssl ca -spkac spkac.txt
+
+A sample SPKAC file (the SPKAC line has been truncated for clarity):
+
+ SPKAC=MIG0MGAwXDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAANLADBIAkEAn7PDhCeV/xIxUg8V70YRxK2A5
+ CN=Steve Test
+ emailAddress=steve@openssl.org
+ 0.OU=OpenSSL Group
+ 1.OU=Another Group
+
+A sample configuration file with the relevant sections for B<ca>:
+
+ [ ca ]
+ default_ca      = CA_default            # The default ca section
+
+ [ CA_default ]
+
+ dir            = ./demoCA              # top dir
+ database       = $dir/index.txt        # index file.
+ new_certs_dir  = $dir/newcerts         # new certs dir
+
+ certificate    = $dir/cacert.pem       # The CA cert
+ serial         = $dir/serial           # serial no file
+ private_key    = $dir/private/cakey.pem# CA private key
+ RANDFILE       = $dir/private/.rand    # random number file
+
+ default_days   = 365                   # how long to certify for
+ default_crl_days= 30                   # how long before next CRL
+ default_md     = md5                   # md to use
+
+ policy         = policy_any            # default policy
+ email_in_dn    = no                    # Don't add the email into cert DN
+
+ name_opt       = ca_default            # Subject name display option
+ cert_opt       = ca_default            # Certificate display option
+ copy_extensions = none                 # Don't copy extensions from request
+
+ [ policy_any ]
+ countryName            = supplied
+ stateOrProvinceName    = optional
+ organizationName       = optional
+ organizationalUnitName = optional
+ commonName             = supplied
+ emailAddress           = optional
+
+=head1 FILES
+
+Note: the location of all files can change either by compile time options,
+configuration file entries, environment variables or command line options.
+The values below reflect the default values.
+
+ /usr/local/ssl/lib/openssl.cnf - master configuration file
+ ./demoCA                       - main CA directory
+ ./demoCA/cacert.pem            - CA certificate
+ ./demoCA/private/cakey.pem     - CA private key
+ ./demoCA/serial                - CA serial number file
+ ./demoCA/serial.old            - CA serial number backup file
+ ./demoCA/index.txt             - CA text database file
+ ./demoCA/index.txt.old         - CA text database backup file
+ ./demoCA/certs                 - certificate output file
+ ./demoCA/.rnd                  - CA random seed information
+
+=head1 RESTRICTIONS
+
+The text database index file is a critical part of the process and
+if corrupted it can be difficult to fix. It is theoretically possible
+to rebuild the index file from all the issued certificates and a current
+CRL: however there is no option to do this.
+
+V2 CRL features like delta CRLs are not currently supported.
+
+Although several requests can be input and handled at once it is only
+possible to include one SPKAC or self-signed certificate.
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+The use of an in-memory text database can cause problems when large
+numbers of certificates are present because, as the name implies
+the database has to be kept in memory.
+
+The B<ca> command really needs rewriting or the required functionality
+exposed at either a command or interface level so a more friendly utility
+(perl script or GUI) can handle things properly. The script
+B<CA.pl> helps a little but not very much.
+
+Any fields in a request that are not present in a policy are silently
+deleted. This does not happen if the B<-preserveDN> option is used. To
+enforce the absence of the EMAIL field within the DN, as suggested by
+RFCs, regardless the contents of the request' subject the B<-noemailDN>
+option can be used. The behaviour should be more friendly and
+configurable.
+
+Canceling some commands by refusing to certify a certificate can
+create an empty file.
+
+=head1 WARNINGS
+
+The B<ca> command is quirky and at times downright unfriendly.
+
+The B<ca> utility was originally meant as an example of how to do things
+in a CA. It was not supposed to be used as a full blown CA itself:
+nevertheless some people are using it for this purpose.
+
+The B<ca> command is effectively a single user command: no locking is
+done on the various files and attempts to run more than one B<ca> command
+on the same database can have unpredictable results.
+
+The B<copy_extensions> option should be used with caution. If care is
+not taken then it can be a security risk. For example if a certificate
+request contains a basicConstraints extension with CA:TRUE and the
+B<copy_extensions> value is set to B<copyall> and the user does not spot
+this when the certificate is displayed then this will hand the requester
+a valid CA certificate.
+
+This situation can be avoided by setting B<copy_extensions> to B<copy>
+and including basicConstraints with CA:FALSE in the configuration file.
+Then if the request contains a basicConstraints extension it will be
+ignored.
+
+It is advisable to also include values for other extensions such
+as B<keyUsage> to prevent a request supplying its own values.
+
+Additional restrictions can be placed on the CA certificate itself.
+For example if the CA certificate has:
+
+ basicConstraints = CA:TRUE, pathlen:0
+
+then even if a certificate is issued with CA:TRUE it will not be valid.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<req(1)>, L<spkac(1)>, L<x509(1)>, L<CA.pl(1)>,
+L<config(5)>, L<x509v3_config(5)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/ciphers.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/ciphers.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..def3bdc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/ciphers.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,731 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+openssl-ciphers,
+ciphers - SSL cipher display and cipher list tool
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+B<openssl> B<ciphers>
+[B<-help>]
+[B<-s>]
+[B<-v>]
+[B<-V>]
+[B<-ssl3>]
+[B<-tls1>]
+[B<-tls1_1>]
+[B<-tls1_2>]
+[B<-s>]
+[B<-psk>]
+[B<-srp>]
+[B<-stdname>]
+[B<cipherlist>]
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The B<ciphers> command converts textual OpenSSL cipher lists into ordered
+SSL cipher preference lists. It can be used as a test tool to determine
+the appropriate cipherlist.
+
+=head1 OPTIONS
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<-help>
+
+Print a usage message.
+
+=item B<-s>
+
+Only list supported ciphers: those consistent with the security level, and
+minimum and maximum protocol version.  This is closer to the actual cipher list
+an application will support.
+
+PSK and SRP ciphers are not enabled by default: they require B<-psk> or B<-srp>
+to enable them.
+
+It also does not change the default list of supported signature algorithms.
+
+On a server the list of supported ciphers might also exclude other ciphers
+depending on the configured certificates and presence of DH parameters.
+
+If this option is not used then all ciphers that match the cipherlist will be
+listed.
+
+=item B<-psk>
+
+When combined with B<-s> includes cipher suites which require PSK.
+
+=item B<-srp>
+
+When combined with B<-s> includes cipher suites which require SRP.
+
+=item B<-v>
+
+Verbose output: For each ciphersuite, list details as provided by
+L<SSL_CIPHER_description(3)>.
+
+=item B<-V>
+
+Like B<-v>, but include the official cipher suite values in hex.
+
+=item B<-tls1_2>
+
+In combination with the B<-s> option, list the ciphers which would be used if
+TLSv1.2 were negotiated.
+
+=item B<-ssl3>
+
+In combination with the B<-s> option, list the ciphers which would be used if
+SSLv3 were negotiated.
+
+=item B<-tls1>
+
+In combination with the B<-s> option, list the ciphers which would be used if
+TLSv1 were negotiated.
+
+=item B<-tls1_1>
+
+In combination with the B<-s> option, list the ciphers which would be used if
+TLSv1.1 were negotiated.
+
+=item B<-stdname>
+
+precede each ciphersuite by its standard name: only available is OpenSSL
+is built with tracing enabled (B<enable-ssl-trace> argument to Configure).
+
+=item B<cipherlist>
+
+a cipher list to convert to a cipher preference list. If it is not included
+then the default cipher list will be used. The format is described below.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 CIPHER LIST FORMAT
+
+The cipher list consists of one or more I<cipher strings> separated by colons.
+Commas or spaces are also acceptable separators but colons are normally used.
+
+The actual cipher string can take several different forms.
+
+It can consist of a single cipher suite such as B<RC4-SHA>.
+
+It can represent a list of cipher suites containing a certain algorithm, or
+cipher suites of a certain type. For example B<SHA1> represents all ciphers
+suites using the digest algorithm SHA1 and B<SSLv3> represents all SSL v3
+algorithms.
+
+Lists of cipher suites can be combined in a single cipher string using the
+B<+> character. This is used as a logical B<and> operation. For example
+B<SHA1+DES> represents all cipher suites containing the SHA1 B<and> the DES
+algorithms.
+
+Each cipher string can be optionally preceded by the characters B<!>,
+B<-> or B<+>.
+
+If B<!> is used then the ciphers are permanently deleted from the list.
+The ciphers deleted can never reappear in the list even if they are
+explicitly stated.
+
+If B<-> is used then the ciphers are deleted from the list, but some or
+all of the ciphers can be added again by later options.
+
+If B<+> is used then the ciphers are moved to the end of the list. This
+option doesn't add any new ciphers it just moves matching existing ones.
+
+If none of these characters is present then the string is just interpreted
+as a list of ciphers to be appended to the current preference list. If the
+list includes any ciphers already present they will be ignored: that is they
+will not moved to the end of the list.
+
+The cipher string B<@STRENGTH> can be used at any point to sort the current
+cipher list in order of encryption algorithm key length.
+
+The cipher string B<@SECLEVEL=n> can be used at any point to set the security
+level to B<n>.
+
+=head1 CIPHER STRINGS
+
+The following is a list of all permitted cipher strings and their meanings.
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<DEFAULT>
+
+The default cipher list.
+This is determined at compile time and is normally
+B<ALL:!COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT:!eNULL>.
+When used, this must be the first cipherstring specified.
+
+=item B<COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT>
+
+The ciphers included in B<ALL>, but not enabled by default. Currently
+this includes all RC4 and anonymous ciphers. Note that this rule does
+not cover B<eNULL>, which is not included by B<ALL> (use B<COMPLEMENTOFALL> if
+necessary). Note that RC4 based ciphersuites are not built into OpenSSL by
+default (see the enable-weak-ssl-ciphers option to Configure).
+
+=item B<ALL>
+
+All cipher suites except the B<eNULL> ciphers (which must be explicitly enabled
+if needed).
+As of OpenSSL 1.0.0, the B<ALL> cipher suites are sensibly ordered by default.
+
+=item B<COMPLEMENTOFALL>
+
+The cipher suites not enabled by B<ALL>, currently B<eNULL>.
+
+=item B<HIGH>
+
+"high" encryption cipher suites. This currently means those with key lengths
+larger than 128 bits, and some cipher suites with 128-bit keys.
+
+=item B<MEDIUM>
+
+"medium" encryption cipher suites, currently some of those using 128 bit
+encryption.
+
+=item B<LOW>
+
+"low" encryption cipher suites, currently those using 64 or 56 bit
+encryption algorithms but excluding export cipher suites.  All these
+ciphersuites have been removed as of OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+=item B<eNULL>, B<NULL>
+
+The "NULL" ciphers that is those offering no encryption. Because these offer no
+encryption at all and are a security risk they are not enabled via either the
+B<DEFAULT> or B<ALL> cipher strings.
+Be careful when building cipherlists out of lower-level primitives such as
+B<kRSA> or B<aECDSA> as these do overlap with the B<eNULL> ciphers.  When in
+doubt, include B<!eNULL> in your cipherlist.
+
+=item B<aNULL>
+
+The cipher suites offering no authentication. This is currently the anonymous
+DH algorithms and anonymous ECDH algorithms. These cipher suites are vulnerable
+to "man in the middle" attacks and so their use is discouraged.
+These are excluded from the B<DEFAULT> ciphers, but included in the B<ALL>
+ciphers.
+Be careful when building cipherlists out of lower-level primitives such as
+B<kDHE> or B<AES> as these do overlap with the B<aNULL> ciphers.
+When in doubt, include B<!aNULL> in your cipherlist.
+
+=item B<kRSA>, B<aRSA>, B<RSA>
+
+Cipher suites using RSA key exchange or authentication. B<RSA> is an alias for
+B<kRSA>.
+
+=item B<kDHr>, B<kDHd>, B<kDH>
+
+Cipher suites using static DH key agreement and DH certificates signed by CAs
+with RSA and DSS keys or either respectively.
+All these cipher suites have been removed in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+=item B<kDHE>, B<kEDH>, B<DH>
+
+Cipher suites using ephemeral DH key agreement, including anonymous cipher
+suites.
+
+=item B<DHE>, B<EDH>
+
+Cipher suites using authenticated ephemeral DH key agreement.
+
+=item B<ADH>
+
+Anonymous DH cipher suites, note that this does not include anonymous Elliptic
+Curve DH (ECDH) cipher suites.
+
+=item B<kEECDH>, B<kECDHE>, B<ECDH>
+
+Cipher suites using ephemeral ECDH key agreement, including anonymous
+cipher suites.
+
+=item B<ECDHE>, B<EECDH>
+
+Cipher suites using authenticated ephemeral ECDH key agreement.
+
+=item B<AECDH>
+
+Anonymous Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman cipher suites.
+
+=item B<aDSS>, B<DSS>
+
+Cipher suites using DSS authentication, i.e. the certificates carry DSS keys.
+
+=item B<aDH>
+
+Cipher suites effectively using DH authentication, i.e. the certificates carry
+DH keys.
+All these cipher suites have been removed in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+=item B<aECDSA>, B<ECDSA>
+
+Cipher suites using ECDSA authentication, i.e. the certificates carry ECDSA
+keys.
+
+=item B<TLSv1.2>, B<TLSv1.0>, B<SSLv3>
+
+Lists ciphersuites which are only supported in at least TLS v1.2, TLS v1.0 or
+SSL v3.0 respectively.
+Note: there are no ciphersuites specific to TLS v1.1.
+Since this is only the minimum version, if, for example, TLSv1.0 is negotiated
+then both TLSv1.0 and SSLv3.0 ciphersuites are available.
+
+Note: these cipher strings B<do not> change the negotiated version of SSL or
+TLS, they only affect the list of available cipher suites.
+
+=item B<AES128>, B<AES256>, B<AES>
+
+cipher suites using 128 bit AES, 256 bit AES or either 128 or 256 bit AES.
+
+=item B<AESGCM>
+
+AES in Galois Counter Mode (GCM): these ciphersuites are only supported
+in TLS v1.2.
+
+=item B<AESCCM>, B<AESCCM8>
+
+AES in Cipher Block Chaining - Message Authentication Mode (CCM): these
+ciphersuites are only supported in TLS v1.2. B<AESCCM> references CCM
+cipher suites using both 16 and 8 octet Integrity Check Value (ICV)
+while B<AESCCM8> only references 8 octet ICV.
+
+=item B<CAMELLIA128>, B<CAMELLIA256>, B<CAMELLIA>
+
+cipher suites using 128 bit CAMELLIA, 256 bit CAMELLIA or either 128 or 256 bit
+CAMELLIA.
+
+=item B<CHACHA20>
+
+cipher suites using ChaCha20.
+
+=item B<3DES>
+
+cipher suites using triple DES.
+
+=item B<DES>
+
+Cipher suites using DES (not triple DES).
+All these cipher suites have been removed in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+=item B<RC4>
+
+Cipher suites using RC4.
+
+=item B<RC2>
+
+Cipher suites using RC2.
+
+=item B<IDEA>
+
+Cipher suites using IDEA.
+
+=item B<SEED>
+
+Cipher suites using SEED.
+
+=item B<MD5>
+
+Cipher suites using MD5.
+
+=item B<SHA1>, B<SHA>
+
+Cipher suites using SHA1.
+
+=item B<SHA256>, B<SHA384>
+
+Ciphersuites using SHA256 or SHA384.
+
+=item B<aGOST>
+
+Cipher suites using GOST R 34.10 (either 2001 or 94) for authentication
+(needs an engine supporting GOST algorithms).
+
+=item B<aGOST01>
+
+Cipher suites using GOST R 34.10-2001 authentication.
+
+=item B<kGOST>
+
+Cipher suites, using VKO 34.10 key exchange, specified in the RFC 4357.
+
+=item B<GOST94>
+
+Cipher suites, using HMAC based on GOST R 34.11-94.
+
+=item B<GOST89MAC>
+
+Cipher suites using GOST 28147-89 MAC B<instead of> HMAC.
+
+=item B<PSK>
+
+All cipher suites using pre-shared keys (PSK).
+
+=item B<kPSK>, B<kECDHEPSK>, B<kDHEPSK>, B<kRSAPSK>
+
+Cipher suites using PSK key exchange, ECDHE_PSK, DHE_PSK or RSA_PSK.
+
+=item B<aPSK>
+
+Cipher suites using PSK authentication (currently all PSK modes apart from
+RSA_PSK).
+
+=item B<SUITEB128>, B<SUITEB128ONLY>, B<SUITEB192>
+
+Enables suite B mode of operation using 128 (permitting 192 bit mode by peer)
+128 bit (not permitting 192 bit by peer) or 192 bit level of security
+respectively.
+If used these cipherstrings should appear first in the cipher
+list and anything after them is ignored.
+Setting Suite B mode has additional consequences required to comply with
+RFC6460.
+In particular the supported signature algorithms is reduced to support only
+ECDSA and SHA256 or SHA384, only the elliptic curves P-256 and P-384 can be
+used and only the two suite B compliant ciphersuites
+(ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 and ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384) are
+permissible.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 CIPHER SUITE NAMES
+
+The following lists give the SSL or TLS cipher suites names from the
+relevant specification and their OpenSSL equivalents. It should be noted,
+that several cipher suite names do not include the authentication used,
+e.g. DES-CBC3-SHA. In these cases, RSA authentication is used.
+
+=head2 SSL v3.0 cipher suites
+
+ SSL_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5                   NULL-MD5
+ SSL_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA                   NULL-SHA
+ SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5                RC4-MD5
+ SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA                RC4-SHA
+ SSL_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA               IDEA-CBC-SHA
+ SSL_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA           DES-CBC3-SHA
+
+ SSL_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA        DH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA
+ SSL_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA        DH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA
+ SSL_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA       DHE-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA
+ SSL_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA       DHE-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA
+
+ SSL_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5            ADH-RC4-MD5
+ SSL_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA       ADH-DES-CBC3-SHA
+
+ SSL_FORTEZZA_KEA_WITH_NULL_SHA          Not implemented.
+ SSL_FORTEZZA_KEA_WITH_FORTEZZA_CBC_SHA  Not implemented.
+ SSL_FORTEZZA_KEA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA       Not implemented.
+
+=head2 TLS v1.0 cipher suites
+
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5                   NULL-MD5
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA                   NULL-SHA
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5                RC4-MD5
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA                RC4-SHA
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA               IDEA-CBC-SHA
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA           DES-CBC3-SHA
+
+ TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA        Not implemented.
+ TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA        Not implemented.
+ TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA       DHE-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA
+ TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA       DHE-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA
+
+ TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5            ADH-RC4-MD5
+ TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA       ADH-DES-CBC3-SHA
+
+=head2 AES ciphersuites from RFC3268, extending TLS v1.0
+
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA            AES128-SHA
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA            AES256-SHA
+
+ TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA         DH-DSS-AES128-SHA
+ TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA         DH-DSS-AES256-SHA
+ TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA         DH-RSA-AES128-SHA
+ TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA         DH-RSA-AES256-SHA
+
+ TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA        DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA
+ TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA        DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA
+ TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA        DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA
+ TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA        DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA
+
+ TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA        ADH-AES128-SHA
+ TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA        ADH-AES256-SHA
+
+=head2 Camellia ciphersuites from RFC4132, extending TLS v1.0
+
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA      CAMELLIA128-SHA
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA      CAMELLIA256-SHA
+
+ TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA   DH-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA
+ TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA   DH-DSS-CAMELLIA256-SHA
+ TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA   DH-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA
+ TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA   DH-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA
+
+ TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA  DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA
+ TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA  DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA256-SHA
+ TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA  DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA
+ TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA  DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA
+
+ TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA  ADH-CAMELLIA128-SHA
+ TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA  ADH-CAMELLIA256-SHA
+
+=head2 SEED ciphersuites from RFC4162, extending TLS v1.0
+
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA              SEED-SHA
+
+ TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA           DH-DSS-SEED-SHA
+ TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA           DH-RSA-SEED-SHA
+
+ TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA          DHE-DSS-SEED-SHA
+ TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA          DHE-RSA-SEED-SHA
+
+ TLS_DH_anon_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA          ADH-SEED-SHA
+
+=head2 GOST ciphersuites from draft-chudov-cryptopro-cptls, extending TLS v1.0
+
+Note: these ciphers require an engine which including GOST cryptographic
+algorithms, such as the B<ccgost> engine, included in the OpenSSL distribution.
+
+ TLS_GOSTR341094_WITH_28147_CNT_IMIT GOST94-GOST89-GOST89
+ TLS_GOSTR341001_WITH_28147_CNT_IMIT GOST2001-GOST89-GOST89
+ TLS_GOSTR341094_WITH_NULL_GOSTR3411 GOST94-NULL-GOST94
+ TLS_GOSTR341001_WITH_NULL_GOSTR3411 GOST2001-NULL-GOST94
+
+=head2 Additional Export 1024 and other cipher suites
+
+Note: these ciphers can also be used in SSL v3.
+
+ TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA            DHE-DSS-RC4-SHA
+
+=head2 Elliptic curve cipher suites.
+
+ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA             ECDHE-RSA-NULL-SHA
+ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA          ECDHE-RSA-RC4-SHA
+ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA     ECDHE-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA
+ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA      ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA
+ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA      ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA
+
+ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA           ECDHE-ECDSA-NULL-SHA
+ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA        ECDHE-ECDSA-RC4-SHA
+ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA   ECDHE-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA
+ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA    ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA
+ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA    ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA
+
+ TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA             AECDH-NULL-SHA
+ TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA          AECDH-RC4-SHA
+ TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA     AECDH-DES-CBC3-SHA
+ TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA      AECDH-AES128-SHA
+ TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA      AECDH-AES256-SHA
+
+=head2 TLS v1.2 cipher suites
+
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256                  NULL-SHA256
+
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256           AES128-SHA256
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256           AES256-SHA256
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256           AES128-GCM-SHA256
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384           AES256-GCM-SHA384
+
+ TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256        DH-RSA-AES128-SHA256
+ TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256        DH-RSA-AES256-SHA256
+ TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256        DH-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256
+ TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384        DH-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384
+
+ TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256        DH-DSS-AES128-SHA256
+ TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256        DH-DSS-AES256-SHA256
+ TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256        DH-DSS-AES128-GCM-SHA256
+ TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384        DH-DSS-AES256-GCM-SHA384
+
+ TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256       DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256
+ TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256       DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256
+ TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256       DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256
+ TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384       DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384
+
+ TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256       DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA256
+ TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256       DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA256
+ TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256       DHE-DSS-AES128-GCM-SHA256
+ TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384       DHE-DSS-AES256-GCM-SHA384
+
+ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256     ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256
+ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384     ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384
+ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256     ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256
+ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384     ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384
+
+ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256   ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256
+ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384   ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384
+ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256   ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256
+ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384   ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384
+
+ TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256       ADH-AES128-SHA256
+ TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256       ADH-AES256-SHA256
+ TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256       ADH-AES128-GCM-SHA256
+ TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384       ADH-AES256-GCM-SHA384
+
+ RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM                      AES128-CCM
+ RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM                      AES256-CCM
+ DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM                  DHE-RSA-AES128-CCM
+ DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM                  DHE-RSA-AES256-CCM
+ RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8                    AES128-CCM8
+ RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8                    AES256-CCM8
+ DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8                DHE-RSA-AES128-CCM8
+ DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8                DHE-RSA-AES256-CCM8
+ ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM              ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-CCM
+ ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM              ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-CCM
+ ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8            ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-CCM8
+ ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8            ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-CCM8
+
+=head2 Camellia HMAC-Based ciphersuites from RFC6367, extending TLS v1.2
+
+ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 ECDHE-ECDSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA256
+ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 ECDHE-ECDSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA384
+ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256   ECDHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA256
+ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384   ECDHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA384
+
+=head2 Pre-shared keying (PSK) ciphersuites
+
+ PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA                         PSK-NULL-SHA
+ DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA                     DHE-PSK-NULL-SHA
+ RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA                     RSA-PSK-NULL-SHA
+
+ PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA                      PSK-RC4-SHA
+ PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA                 PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA
+ PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA                  PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA
+ PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA                  PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA
+
+ DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA                  DHE-PSK-RC4-SHA
+ DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA             DHE-PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA
+ DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA              DHE-PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA
+ DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA              DHE-PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA
+
+ RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA                  RSA-PSK-RC4-SHA
+ RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA             RSA-PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA
+ RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA              RSA-PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA
+ RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA              RSA-PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA
+
+ PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256               PSK-AES128-GCM-SHA256
+ PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384               PSK-AES256-GCM-SHA384
+ DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256           DHE-PSK-AES128-GCM-SHA256
+ DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384           DHE-PSK-AES256-GCM-SHA384
+ RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256           RSA-PSK-AES128-GCM-SHA256
+ RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384           RSA-PSK-AES256-GCM-SHA384
+
+ PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256               PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA256
+ PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384               PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA384
+ PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256                      PSK-NULL-SHA256
+ PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384                      PSK-NULL-SHA384
+ DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256           DHE-PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA256
+ DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384           DHE-PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA384
+ DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256                  DHE-PSK-NULL-SHA256
+ DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384                  DHE-PSK-NULL-SHA384
+ RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256           RSA-PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA256
+ RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384           RSA-PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA384
+ RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256                  RSA-PSK-NULL-SHA256
+ RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384                  RSA-PSK-NULL-SHA384
+ PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256               PSK-AES128-GCM-SHA256
+ PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384               PSK-AES256-GCM-SHA384
+
+ ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA                ECDHE-PSK-RC4-SHA
+ ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA           ECDHE-PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA
+ ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA            ECDHE-PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA
+ ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA            ECDHE-PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA
+ ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256         ECDHE-PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA256
+ ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384         ECDHE-PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA384
+ ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA                   ECDHE-PSK-NULL-SHA
+ ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256                ECDHE-PSK-NULL-SHA256
+ ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384                ECDHE-PSK-NULL-SHA384
+
+ PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256          PSK-CAMELLIA128-SHA256
+ PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384          PSK-CAMELLIA256-SHA384
+
+ DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256      DHE-PSK-CAMELLIA128-SHA256
+ DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384      DHE-PSK-CAMELLIA256-SHA384
+
+ RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256      RSA-PSK-CAMELLIA128-SHA256
+ RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384      RSA-PSK-CAMELLIA256-SHA384
+
+ ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256    ECDHE-PSK-CAMELLIA128-SHA256
+ ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384    ECDHE-PSK-CAMELLIA256-SHA384
+
+ PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM                      PSK-AES128-CCM
+ PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM                      PSK-AES256-CCM
+ DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM                  DHE-PSK-AES128-CCM
+ DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM                  DHE-PSK-AES256-CCM
+ PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8                    PSK-AES128-CCM8
+ PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8                    PSK-AES256-CCM8
+ DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8                DHE-PSK-AES128-CCM8
+ DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8                DHE-PSK-AES256-CCM8
+
+=head2 ChaCha20-Poly1305 cipher suites, extending TLS v1.2
+
+ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256      ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305
+ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256    ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305
+ TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256        DHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305
+ TLS_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256            PSK-CHACHA20-POLY1305
+ TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256      ECDHE-PSK-CHACHA20-POLY1305
+ TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256        DHE-PSK-CHACHA20-POLY1305
+ TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256        RSA-PSK-CHACHA20-POLY1305
+
+=head2 Older names used by OpenSSL
+
+The following names are accepted by older releases:
+
+ SSL_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA    EDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA (DHE-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA)
+ SSL_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA    EDH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA (DHE-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA)
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+Some compiled versions of OpenSSL may not include all the ciphers
+listed here because some ciphers were excluded at compile time.
+
+=head1 EXAMPLES
+
+Verbose listing of all OpenSSL ciphers including NULL ciphers:
+
+ openssl ciphers -v 'ALL:eNULL'
+
+Include all ciphers except NULL and anonymous DH then sort by
+strength:
+
+ openssl ciphers -v 'ALL:!ADH:@STRENGTH'
+
+Include all ciphers except ones with no encryption (eNULL) or no
+authentication (aNULL):
+
+ openssl ciphers -v 'ALL:!aNULL'
+
+Include only 3DES ciphers and then place RSA ciphers last:
+
+ openssl ciphers -v '3DES:+RSA'
+
+Include all RC4 ciphers but leave out those without authentication:
+
+ openssl ciphers -v 'RC4:!COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT'
+
+Include all ciphers with RSA authentication but leave out ciphers without
+encryption.
+
+ openssl ciphers -v 'RSA:!COMPLEMENTOFALL'
+
+Set security level to 2 and display all ciphers consistent with level 2:
+
+ openssl ciphers -s -v 'ALL:@SECLEVEL=2'
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<s_client(1)>, L<s_server(1)>, L<ssl(7)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+The B<-V> option for the B<ciphers> command was added in OpenSSL 1.0.0.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/cms.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/cms.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..96acd31
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/cms.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,738 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+openssl-cms,
+cms - CMS utility
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+B<openssl> B<cms>
+[B<-help>]
+[B<-encrypt>]
+[B<-decrypt>]
+[B<-sign>]
+[B<-verify>]
+[B<-cmsout>]
+[B<-resign>]
+[B<-data_create>]
+[B<-data_out>]
+[B<-digest_create>]
+[B<-digest_verify>]
+[B<-compress>]
+[B<-uncompress>]
+[B<-EncryptedData_encrypt>]
+[B<-sign_receipt>]
+[B<-verify_receipt receipt>]
+[B<-in filename>]
+[B<-inform SMIME|PEM|DER>]
+[B<-rctform SMIME|PEM|DER>]
+[B<-out filename>]
+[B<-outform SMIME|PEM|DER>]
+[B<-stream -indef -noindef>]
+[B<-noindef>]
+[B<-content filename>]
+[B<-text>]
+[B<-noout>]
+[B<-print>]
+[B<-CAfile file>]
+[B<-CApath dir>]
+[B<-no-CAfile>]
+[B<-no-CApath>]
+[B<-attime timestamp>]
+[B<-check_ss_sig>]
+[B<-crl_check>]
+[B<-crl_check_all>]
+[B<-explicit_policy>]
+[B<-extended_crl>]
+[B<-ignore_critical>]
+[B<-inhibit_any>]
+[B<-inhibit_map>]
+[B<-no_check_time>]
+[B<-partial_chain>]
+[B<-policy arg>]
+[B<-policy_check>]
+[B<-policy_print>]
+[B<-purpose purpose>]
+[B<-suiteB_128>]
+[B<-suiteB_128_only>]
+[B<-suiteB_192>]
+[B<-trusted_first>]
+[B<-no_alt_chains>]
+[B<-use_deltas>]
+[B<-auth_level num>]
+[B<-verify_depth num>]
+[B<-verify_email email>]
+[B<-verify_hostname hostname>]
+[B<-verify_ip ip>]
+[B<-verify_name name>]
+[B<-x509_strict>]
+[B<-md digest>]
+[B<-[cipher]>]
+[B<-nointern>]
+[B<-no_signer_cert_verify>]
+[B<-nocerts>]
+[B<-noattr>]
+[B<-nosmimecap>]
+[B<-binary>]
+[B<-crlfeol>]
+[B<-asciicrlf>]
+[B<-nodetach>]
+[B<-certfile file>]
+[B<-certsout file>]
+[B<-signer file>]
+[B<-recip file>]
+[B<-keyid>]
+[B<-receipt_request_all -receipt_request_first>]
+[B<-receipt_request_from emailaddress>]
+[B<-receipt_request_to emailaddress>]
+[B<-receipt_request_print>]
+[B<-secretkey key>]
+[B<-secretkeyid id>]
+[B<-econtent_type type>]
+[B<-inkey file>]
+[B<-keyopt name:parameter>]
+[B<-passin arg>]
+[B<-rand file(s)>]
+[B<cert.pem...>]
+[B<-to addr>]
+[B<-from addr>]
+[B<-subject subj>]
+[cert.pem]...
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The B<cms> command handles S/MIME v3.1 mail. It can encrypt, decrypt, sign and
+verify, compress and uncompress S/MIME messages.
+
+=head1 OPTIONS
+
+There are fourteen operation options that set the type of operation to be
+performed. The meaning of the other options varies according to the operation
+type.
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<-help>
+
+Print out a usage message.
+
+=item B<-encrypt>
+
+encrypt mail for the given recipient certificates. Input file is the message
+to be encrypted. The output file is the encrypted mail in MIME format. The
+actual CMS type is <B>EnvelopedData<B>.
+
+Note that no revocation check is done for the recipient cert, so if that
+key has been compromised, others may be able to decrypt the text.
+
+=item B<-decrypt>
+
+decrypt mail using the supplied certificate and private key. Expects an
+encrypted mail message in MIME format for the input file. The decrypted mail
+is written to the output file.
+
+=item B<-debug_decrypt>
+
+this option sets the B<CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT> flag. This option should be used
+with caution: see the notes section below.
+
+=item B<-sign>
+
+sign mail using the supplied certificate and private key. Input file is
+the message to be signed. The signed message in MIME format is written
+to the output file.
+
+=item B<-verify>
+
+verify signed mail. Expects a signed mail message on input and outputs
+the signed data. Both clear text and opaque signing is supported.
+
+=item B<-cmsout>
+
+takes an input message and writes out a PEM encoded CMS structure.
+
+=item B<-resign>
+
+resign a message: take an existing message and one or more new signers.
+
+=item B<-data_create>
+
+Create a CMS B<Data> type.
+
+=item B<-data_out>
+
+B<Data> type and output the content.
+
+=item B<-digest_create>
+
+Create a CMS B<DigestedData> type.
+
+=item B<-digest_verify>
+
+Verify a CMS B<DigestedData> type and output the content.
+
+=item B<-compress>
+
+Create a CMS B<CompressedData> type. OpenSSL must be compiled with B<zlib>
+support for this option to work, otherwise it will output an error.
+
+=item B<-uncompress>
+
+Uncompress a CMS B<CompressedData> type and output the content. OpenSSL must be
+compiled with B<zlib> support for this option to work, otherwise it will
+output an error.
+
+=item B<-EncryptedData_encrypt>
+
+Encrypt content using supplied symmetric key and algorithm using a CMS
+B<EncryptedData> type and output the content.
+
+=item B<-sign_receipt>
+
+Generate and output a signed receipt for the supplied message. The input
+message B<must> contain a signed receipt request. Functionality is otherwise
+similar to the B<-sign> operation.
+
+=item B<-verify_receipt receipt>
+
+Verify a signed receipt in filename B<receipt>. The input message B<must>
+contain the original receipt request. Functionality is otherwise similar
+to the B<-verify> operation.
+
+=item B<-in filename>
+
+the input message to be encrypted or signed or the message to be decrypted
+or verified.
+
+=item B<-inform SMIME|PEM|DER>
+
+this specifies the input format for the CMS structure. The default
+is B<SMIME> which reads an S/MIME format message. B<PEM> and B<DER>
+format change this to expect PEM and DER format CMS structures
+instead. This currently only affects the input format of the CMS
+structure, if no CMS structure is being input (for example with
+B<-encrypt> or B<-sign>) this option has no effect.
+
+=item B<-rctform SMIME|PEM|DER>
+
+specify the format for a signed receipt for use with the B<-receipt_verify>
+operation.
+
+=item B<-out filename>
+
+the message text that has been decrypted or verified or the output MIME
+format message that has been signed or verified.
+
+=item B<-outform SMIME|PEM|DER>
+
+this specifies the output format for the CMS structure. The default
+is B<SMIME> which writes an S/MIME format message. B<PEM> and B<DER>
+format change this to write PEM and DER format CMS structures
+instead. This currently only affects the output format of the CMS
+structure, if no CMS structure is being output (for example with
+B<-verify> or B<-decrypt>) this option has no effect.
+
+=item B<-stream -indef -noindef>
+
+the B<-stream> and B<-indef> options are equivalent and enable streaming I/O
+for encoding operations. This permits single pass processing of data without
+the need to hold the entire contents in memory, potentially supporting very
+large files. Streaming is automatically set for S/MIME signing with detached
+data if the output format is B<SMIME> it is currently off by default for all
+other operations.
+
+=item B<-noindef>
+
+disable streaming I/O where it would produce and indefinite length constructed
+encoding. This option currently has no effect. In future streaming will be
+enabled by default on all relevant operations and this option will disable it.
+
+=item B<-content filename>
+
+This specifies a file containing the detached content, this is only
+useful with the B<-verify> command. This is only usable if the CMS
+structure is using the detached signature form where the content is
+not included. This option will override any content if the input format
+is S/MIME and it uses the multipart/signed MIME content type.
+
+=item B<-text>
+
+this option adds plain text (text/plain) MIME headers to the supplied
+message if encrypting or signing. If decrypting or verifying it strips
+off text headers: if the decrypted or verified message is not of MIME
+type text/plain then an error occurs.
+
+=item B<-noout>
+
+for the B<-cmsout> operation do not output the parsed CMS structure. This
+is useful when combined with the B<-print> option or if the syntax of the CMS
+structure is being checked.
+
+=item B<-print>
+
+for the B<-cmsout> operation print out all fields of the CMS structure. This
+is mainly useful for testing purposes.
+
+=item B<-CAfile file>
+
+a file containing trusted CA certificates, only used with B<-verify>.
+
+=item B<-CApath dir>
+
+a directory containing trusted CA certificates, only used with
+B<-verify>. This directory must be a standard certificate directory: that
+is a hash of each subject name (using B<x509 -hash>) should be linked
+to each certificate.
+
+=item B<-no-CAfile>
+
+Do not load the trusted CA certificates from the default file location
+
+=item B<-no-CApath>
+
+Do not load the trusted CA certificates from the default directory location
+
+=item B<-md digest>
+
+digest algorithm to use when signing or resigning. If not present then the
+default digest algorithm for the signing key will be used (usually SHA1).
+
+=item B<-[cipher]>
+
+the encryption algorithm to use. For example triple DES (168 bits) - B<-des3>
+or 256 bit AES - B<-aes256>. Any standard algorithm name (as used by the
+EVP_get_cipherbyname() function) can also be used preceded by a dash, for
+example B<-aes-128-cbc>. See L<B<enc>|enc(1)> for a list of ciphers
+supported by your version of OpenSSL.
+
+If not specified triple DES is used. Only used with B<-encrypt> and
+B<-EncryptedData_create> commands.
+
+=item B<-nointern>
+
+when verifying a message normally certificates (if any) included in
+the message are searched for the signing certificate. With this option
+only the certificates specified in the B<-certfile> option are used.
+The supplied certificates can still be used as untrusted CAs however.
+
+=item B<-no_signer_cert_verify>
+
+do not verify the signers certificate of a signed message.
+
+=item B<-nocerts>
+
+when signing a message the signer's certificate is normally included
+with this option it is excluded. This will reduce the size of the
+signed message but the verifier must have a copy of the signers certificate
+available locally (passed using the B<-certfile> option for example).
+
+=item B<-noattr>
+
+normally when a message is signed a set of attributes are included which
+include the signing time and supported symmetric algorithms. With this
+option they are not included.
+
+=item B<-nosmimecap>
+
+exclude the list of supported algorithms from signed attributes, other options
+such as signing time and content type are still included.
+
+=item B<-binary>
+
+normally the input message is converted to "canonical" format which is
+effectively using CR and LF as end of line: as required by the S/MIME
+specification. When this option is present no translation occurs. This
+is useful when handling binary data which may not be in MIME format.
+
+=item B<-crlfeol>
+
+normally the output file uses a single B<LF> as end of line. When this
+option is present B<CRLF> is used instead.
+
+=item B<-asciicrlf>
+
+when signing use ASCII CRLF format canonicalisation. This strips trailing
+whitespace from all lines, deletes trailing blank lines at EOF and sets
+the encapsulated content type. This option is normally used with detached
+content and an output signature format of DER. This option is not normally
+needed when verifying as it is enabled automatically if the encapsulated
+content format is detected.
+
+=item B<-nodetach>
+
+when signing a message use opaque signing: this form is more resistant
+to translation by mail relays but it cannot be read by mail agents that
+do not support S/MIME.  Without this option cleartext signing with
+the MIME type multipart/signed is used.
+
+=item B<-certfile file>
+
+allows additional certificates to be specified. When signing these will
+be included with the message. When verifying these will be searched for
+the signers certificates. The certificates should be in PEM format.
+
+=item B<-certsout file>
+
+any certificates contained in the message are written to B<file>.
+
+=item B<-signer file>
+
+a signing certificate when signing or resigning a message, this option can be
+used multiple times if more than one signer is required. If a message is being
+verified then the signers certificates will be written to this file if the
+verification was successful.
+
+=item B<-recip file>
+
+when decrypting a message this specifies the recipients certificate. The
+certificate must match one of the recipients of the message or an error
+occurs.
+
+When encrypting a message this option may be used multiple times to specify
+each recipient. This form B<must> be used if customised parameters are
+required (for example to specify RSA-OAEP).
+
+=item B<-keyid>
+
+use subject key identifier to identify certificates instead of issuer name and
+serial number. The supplied certificate B<must> include a subject key
+identifier extension. Supported by B<-sign> and B<-encrypt> options.
+
+=item B<-receipt_request_all -receipt_request_first>
+
+for B<-sign> option include a signed receipt request. Indicate requests should
+be provided by all recipient or first tier recipients (those mailed directly
+and not from a mailing list). Ignored it B<-receipt_request_from> is included.
+
+=item B<-receipt_request_from emailaddress>
+
+for B<-sign> option include a signed receipt request. Add an explicit email
+address where receipts should be supplied.
+
+=item B<-receipt_request_to emailaddress>
+
+Add an explicit email address where signed receipts should be sent to. This
+option B<must> but supplied if a signed receipt it requested.
+
+=item B<-receipt_request_print>
+
+For the B<-verify> operation print out the contents of any signed receipt
+requests.
+
+=item B<-secretkey key>
+
+specify symmetric key to use. The key must be supplied in hex format and be
+consistent with the algorithm used. Supported by the B<-EncryptedData_encrypt>
+B<-EncryptedData_decrypt>, B<-encrypt> and B<-decrypt> options. When used
+with B<-encrypt> or B<-decrypt> the supplied key is used to wrap or unwrap the
+content encryption key using an AES key in the B<KEKRecipientInfo> type.
+
+=item B<-secretkeyid id>
+
+the key identifier for the supplied symmetric key for B<KEKRecipientInfo> type.
+This option B<must> be present if the B<-secretkey> option is used with
+B<-encrypt>. With B<-decrypt> operations the B<id> is used to locate the
+relevant key if it is not supplied then an attempt is used to decrypt any
+B<KEKRecipientInfo> structures.
+
+=item B<-econtent_type type>
+
+set the encapsulated content type to B<type> if not supplied the B<Data> type
+is used. The B<type> argument can be any valid OID name in either text or
+numerical format.
+
+=item B<-inkey file>
+
+the private key to use when signing or decrypting. This must match the
+corresponding certificate. If this option is not specified then the
+private key must be included in the certificate file specified with
+the B<-recip> or B<-signer> file. When signing this option can be used
+multiple times to specify successive keys.
+
+=item B<-keyopt name:opt>
+
+for signing and encryption this option can be used multiple times to
+set customised parameters for the preceding key or certificate. It can
+currently be used to set RSA-PSS for signing, RSA-OAEP for encryption
+or to modify default parameters for ECDH.
+
+=item B<-passin arg>
+
+the private key password source. For more information about the format of B<arg>
+see the B<PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS> section in L<openssl(1)>.
+
+=item B<-rand file(s)>
+
+a file or files containing random data used to seed the random number
+generator, or an EGD socket (see L<RAND_egd(3)>).
+Multiple files can be specified separated by an OS-dependent character.
+The separator is B<;> for MS-Windows, B<,> for OpenVMS, and B<:> for
+all others.
+
+=item B<cert.pem...>
+
+one or more certificates of message recipients: used when encrypting
+a message.
+
+=item B<-to, -from, -subject>
+
+the relevant mail headers. These are included outside the signed
+portion of a message so they may be included manually. If signing
+then many S/MIME mail clients check the signers certificate's email
+address matches that specified in the From: address.
+
+=item B<-attime>, B<-check_ss_sig>, B<-crl_check>, B<-crl_check_all>,
+B<-explicit_policy>, B<-extended_crl>, B<-ignore_critical>, B<-inhibit_any>,
+B<-inhibit_map>, B<-no_alt_chains>, B<-no_check_time>, B<-partial_chain>, B<-policy>,
+B<-policy_check>, B<-policy_print>, B<-purpose>, B<-suiteB_128>,
+B<-suiteB_128_only>, B<-suiteB_192>, B<-trusted_first>, B<-use_deltas>,
+B<-auth_level>, B<-verify_depth>, B<-verify_email>, B<-verify_hostname>,
+B<-verify_ip>, B<-verify_name>, B<-x509_strict>
+
+Set various certificate chain validation options. See the
+L<verify(1)> manual page for details.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The MIME message must be sent without any blank lines between the
+headers and the output. Some mail programs will automatically add
+a blank line. Piping the mail directly to sendmail is one way to
+achieve the correct format.
+
+The supplied message to be signed or encrypted must include the
+necessary MIME headers or many S/MIME clients won't display it
+properly (if at all). You can use the B<-text> option to automatically
+add plain text headers.
+
+A "signed and encrypted" message is one where a signed message is
+then encrypted. This can be produced by encrypting an already signed
+message: see the examples section.
+
+This version of the program only allows one signer per message but it
+will verify multiple signers on received messages. Some S/MIME clients
+choke if a message contains multiple signers. It is possible to sign
+messages "in parallel" by signing an already signed message.
+
+The options B<-encrypt> and B<-decrypt> reflect common usage in S/MIME
+clients. Strictly speaking these process CMS enveloped data: CMS
+encrypted data is used for other purposes.
+
+The B<-resign> option uses an existing message digest when adding a new
+signer. This means that attributes must be present in at least one existing
+signer using the same message digest or this operation will fail.
+
+The B<-stream> and B<-indef> options enable streaming I/O support.
+As a result the encoding is BER using indefinite length constructed encoding
+and no longer DER. Streaming is supported for the B<-encrypt> operation and the
+B<-sign> operation if the content is not detached.
+
+Streaming is always used for the B<-sign> operation with detached data but
+since the content is no longer part of the CMS structure the encoding
+remains DER.
+
+If the B<-decrypt> option is used without a recipient certificate then an
+attempt is made to locate the recipient by trying each potential recipient
+in turn using the supplied private key. To thwart the MMA attack
+(Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding) all recipients are
+tried whether they succeed or not and if no recipients match the message
+is "decrypted" using a random key which will typically output garbage.
+The B<-debug_decrypt> option can be used to disable the MMA attack protection
+and return an error if no recipient can be found: this option should be used
+with caution. For a fuller description see L<CMS_decrypt(3)>).
+
+=head1 EXIT CODES
+
+=over 4
+
+=item Z<>0
+
+the operation was completely successfully.
+
+=item Z<>1
+
+an error occurred parsing the command options.
+
+=item Z<>2
+
+one of the input files could not be read.
+
+=item Z<>3
+
+an error occurred creating the CMS file or when reading the MIME
+message.
+
+=item Z<>4
+
+an error occurred decrypting or verifying the message.
+
+=item Z<>5
+
+the message was verified correctly but an error occurred writing out
+the signers certificates.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 COMPATIBILITY WITH PKCS#7 format.
+
+The B<smime> utility can only process the older B<PKCS#7> format. The B<cms>
+utility supports Cryptographic Message Syntax format. Use of some features
+will result in messages which cannot be processed by applications which only
+support the older format. These are detailed below.
+
+The use of the B<-keyid> option with B<-sign> or B<-encrypt>.
+
+The B<-outform PEM> option uses different headers.
+
+The B<-compress> option.
+
+The B<-secretkey> option when used with B<-encrypt>.
+
+The use of PSS with B<-sign>.
+
+The use of OAEP or non-RSA keys with B<-encrypt>.
+
+Additionally the B<-EncryptedData_create> and B<-data_create> type cannot
+be processed by the older B<smime> command.
+
+=head1 EXAMPLES
+
+Create a cleartext signed message:
+
+ openssl cms -sign -in message.txt -text -out mail.msg \
+        -signer mycert.pem
+
+Create an opaque signed message
+
+ openssl cms -sign -in message.txt -text -out mail.msg -nodetach \
+        -signer mycert.pem
+
+Create a signed message, include some additional certificates and
+read the private key from another file:
+
+ openssl cms -sign -in in.txt -text -out mail.msg \
+        -signer mycert.pem -inkey mykey.pem -certfile mycerts.pem
+
+Create a signed message with two signers, use key identifier:
+
+ openssl cms -sign -in message.txt -text -out mail.msg \
+        -signer mycert.pem -signer othercert.pem -keyid
+
+Send a signed message under Unix directly to sendmail, including headers:
+
+ openssl cms -sign -in in.txt -text -signer mycert.pem \
+        -from steve@openssl.org -to someone@somewhere \
+        -subject "Signed message" | sendmail someone@somewhere
+
+Verify a message and extract the signer's certificate if successful:
+
+ openssl cms -verify -in mail.msg -signer user.pem -out signedtext.txt
+
+Send encrypted mail using triple DES:
+
+ openssl cms -encrypt -in in.txt -from steve@openssl.org \
+        -to someone@somewhere -subject "Encrypted message" \
+        -des3 user.pem -out mail.msg
+
+Sign and encrypt mail:
+
+ openssl cms -sign -in ml.txt -signer my.pem -text \
+        | openssl cms -encrypt -out mail.msg \
+        -from steve@openssl.org -to someone@somewhere \
+        -subject "Signed and Encrypted message" -des3 user.pem
+
+Note: the encryption command does not include the B<-text> option because the
+message being encrypted already has MIME headers.
+
+Decrypt mail:
+
+ openssl cms -decrypt -in mail.msg -recip mycert.pem -inkey key.pem
+
+The output from Netscape form signing is a PKCS#7 structure with the
+detached signature format. You can use this program to verify the
+signature by line wrapping the base64 encoded structure and surrounding
+it with:
+
+ -----BEGIN PKCS7-----
+ -----END PKCS7-----
+
+and using the command,
+
+ openssl cms -verify -inform PEM -in signature.pem -content content.txt
+
+alternatively you can base64 decode the signature and use
+
+ openssl cms -verify -inform DER -in signature.der -content content.txt
+
+Create an encrypted message using 128 bit Camellia:
+
+ openssl cms -encrypt -in plain.txt -camellia128 -out mail.msg cert.pem
+
+Add a signer to an existing message:
+
+ openssl cms -resign -in mail.msg -signer newsign.pem -out mail2.msg
+
+Sign mail using RSA-PSS:
+
+ openssl cms -sign -in message.txt -text -out mail.msg \
+        -signer mycert.pem -keyopt rsa_padding_mode:pss
+
+Create encrypted mail using RSA-OAEP:
+
+ openssl cms -encrypt -in plain.txt -out mail.msg \
+        -recip cert.pem -keyopt rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+
+Use SHA256 KDF with an ECDH certificate:
+
+ openssl cms -encrypt -in plain.txt -out mail.msg \
+        -recip ecdhcert.pem -keyopt ecdh_kdf_md:sha256
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+The MIME parser isn't very clever: it seems to handle most messages that I've
+thrown at it but it may choke on others.
+
+The code currently will only write out the signer's certificate to a file: if
+the signer has a separate encryption certificate this must be manually
+extracted. There should be some heuristic that determines the correct
+encryption certificate.
+
+Ideally a database should be maintained of a certificates for each email
+address.
+
+The code doesn't currently take note of the permitted symmetric encryption
+algorithms as supplied in the SMIMECapabilities signed attribute. this means the
+user has to manually include the correct encryption algorithm. It should store
+the list of permitted ciphers in a database and only use those.
+
+No revocation checking is done on the signer's certificate.
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+The use of multiple B<-signer> options and the B<-resign> command were first
+added in OpenSSL 1.0.0
+
+The B<keyopt> option was first added in OpenSSL 1.1.0
+
+The use of B<-recip> to specify the recipient when encrypting mail was first
+added to OpenSSL 1.1.0
+
+Support for RSA-OAEP and RSA-PSS was first added to OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+The use of non-RSA keys with B<-encrypt> and B<-decrypt> was first added
+to OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+The -no_alt_chains options was first added to OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/config.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/config.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..76f282f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/config.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,387 @@
+=pod
+
+=for comment openssl_manual_section:5
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+config - OpenSSL CONF library configuration files
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The OpenSSL CONF library can be used to read configuration files.
+It is used for the OpenSSL master configuration file B<openssl.cnf>
+and in a few other places like B<SPKAC> files and certificate extension
+files for the B<x509> utility. OpenSSL applications can also use the
+CONF library for their own purposes.
+
+A configuration file is divided into a number of sections. Each section
+starts with a line B<[ section_name ]> and ends when a new section is
+started or end of file is reached. A section name can consist of
+alphanumeric characters and underscores.
+
+The first section of a configuration file is special and is referred
+to as the B<default> section this is usually unnamed and is from the
+start of file until the first named section. When a name is being looked up
+it is first looked up in a named section (if any) and then the
+default section.
+
+The environment is mapped onto a section called B<ENV>.
+
+Comments can be included by preceding them with the B<#> character
+
+Each section in a configuration file consists of a number of name and
+value pairs of the form B<name=value>
+
+The B<name> string can contain any alphanumeric characters as well as
+a few punctuation symbols such as B<.> B<,> B<;> and B<_>.
+
+The B<value> string consists of the string following the B<=> character
+until end of line with any leading and trailing white space removed.
+
+The value string undergoes variable expansion. This can be done by
+including the form B<$var> or B<${var}>: this will substitute the value
+of the named variable in the current section. It is also possible to
+substitute a value from another section using the syntax B<$section::name>
+or B<${section::name}>. By using the form B<$ENV::name> environment
+variables can be substituted. It is also possible to assign values to
+environment variables by using the name B<ENV::name>, this will work
+if the program looks up environment variables using the B<CONF> library
+instead of calling getenv() directly. The value string must not exceed 64k in
+length after variable expansion. Otherwise an error will occur.
+
+It is possible to escape certain characters by using any kind of quote
+or the B<\> character. By making the last character of a line a B<\>
+a B<value> string can be spread across multiple lines. In addition
+the sequences B<\n>, B<\r>, B<\b> and B<\t> are recognized.
+
+=head1 OPENSSL LIBRARY CONFIGURATION
+
+Applications can automatically configure certain
+aspects of OpenSSL using the master OpenSSL configuration file, or optionally
+an alternative configuration file. The B<openssl> utility includes this
+functionality: any sub command uses the master OpenSSL configuration file
+unless an option is used in the sub command to use an alternative configuration
+file.
+
+To enable library configuration the default section needs to contain an
+appropriate line which points to the main configuration section. The default
+name is B<openssl_conf> which is used by the B<openssl> utility. Other
+applications may use an alternative name such as B<myapplicaton_conf>.
+
+The configuration section should consist of a set of name value pairs which
+contain specific module configuration information. The B<name> represents
+the name of the I<configuration module> the meaning of the B<value> is
+module specific: it may, for example, represent a further configuration
+section containing configuration module specific information. E.g.
+
+ openssl_conf = openssl_init
+
+ [openssl_init]
+
+ oid_section = new_oids
+ engines = engine_section
+
+ [new_oids]
+
+ ... new oids here ...
+
+ [engine_section]
+
+ ... engine stuff here ...
+
+The features of each configuration module are described below.
+
+=head2 ASN1 Object Configuration Module
+
+This module has the name B<oid_section>. The value of this variable points
+to a section containing name value pairs of OIDs: the name is the OID short
+and long name, the value is the numerical form of the OID. Although some of
+the B<openssl> utility sub commands already have their own ASN1 OBJECT section
+functionality not all do. By using the ASN1 OBJECT configuration module
+B<all> the B<openssl> utility sub commands can see the new objects as well
+as any compliant applications. For example:
+
+ [new_oids]
+
+ some_new_oid = 1.2.3.4
+ some_other_oid = 1.2.3.5
+
+It is also possible to set the value to the long name followed
+by a comma and the numerical OID form. For example:
+
+ shortName = some object long name, 1.2.3.4
+
+=head2 Engine Configuration Module
+
+This ENGINE configuration module has the name B<engines>. The value of this
+variable points to a section containing further ENGINE configuration
+information.
+
+The section pointed to by B<engines> is a table of engine names (though see
+B<engine_id> below) and further sections containing configuration information
+specific to each ENGINE.
+
+Each ENGINE specific section is used to set default algorithms, load
+dynamic, perform initialization and send ctrls. The actual operation performed
+depends on the I<command> name which is the name of the name value pair. The
+currently supported commands are listed below.
+
+For example:
+
+ [engine_section]
+
+ # Configure ENGINE named "foo"
+ foo = foo_section
+ # Configure ENGINE named "bar"
+ bar = bar_section
+
+ [foo_section]
+ ... foo ENGINE specific commands ...
+
+ [bar_section]
+ ... "bar" ENGINE specific commands ...
+
+The command B<engine_id> is used to give the ENGINE name. If used this
+command must be first. For example:
+
+ [engine_section]
+ # This would normally handle an ENGINE named "foo"
+ foo = foo_section
+
+ [foo_section]
+ # Override default name and use "myfoo" instead.
+ engine_id = myfoo
+
+The command B<dynamic_path> loads and adds an ENGINE from the given path. It
+is equivalent to sending the ctrls B<SO_PATH> with the path argument followed
+by B<LIST_ADD> with value 2 and B<LOAD> to the dynamic ENGINE. If this is
+not the required behaviour then alternative ctrls can be sent directly
+to the dynamic ENGINE using ctrl commands.
+
+The command B<init> determines whether to initialize the ENGINE. If the value
+is B<0> the ENGINE will not be initialized, if B<1> and attempt it made to
+initialized the ENGINE immediately. If the B<init> command is not present
+then an attempt will be made to initialize the ENGINE after all commands in
+its section have been processed.
+
+The command B<default_algorithms> sets the default algorithms an ENGINE will
+supply using the functions ENGINE_set_default_string().
+
+If the name matches none of the above command names it is assumed to be a
+ctrl command which is sent to the ENGINE. The value of the command is the
+argument to the ctrl command. If the value is the string B<EMPTY> then no
+value is sent to the command.
+
+For example:
+
+
+ [engine_section]
+
+ # Configure ENGINE named "foo"
+ foo = foo_section
+
+ [foo_section]
+ # Load engine from DSO
+ dynamic_path = /some/path/fooengine.so
+ # A foo specific ctrl.
+ some_ctrl = some_value
+ # Another ctrl that doesn't take a value.
+ other_ctrl = EMPTY
+ # Supply all default algorithms
+ default_algorithms = ALL
+
+=head2 EVP Configuration Module
+
+This modules has the name B<alg_section> which points to a section containing
+algorithm commands.
+
+Currently the only algorithm command supported is B<fips_mode> whose
+value should be a boolean string such as B<on> or B<off>. If the value is
+B<on> this attempt to enter FIPS mode. If the call fails or the library is
+not FIPS capable then an error occurs.
+
+For example:
+
+ alg_section = evp_settings
+
+ [evp_settings]
+
+ fips_mode = on
+
+=head2 SSL Configuration Module
+
+This module has the name B<ssl_conf> which points to a section containing
+SSL configurations.
+
+Each line in the SSL configuration section contains the name of the
+configuration and the section containing it.
+
+Each configuration section consists of command value pairs for B<SSL_CONF>.
+Each pair will be passed to a B<SSL_CTX> or B<SSL> structure if it calls
+SSL_CTX_config() or SSL_config() with the appropriate configuration name.
+
+Note: any characters before an initial dot in the configuration section are
+ignored so the same command can be used multiple times.
+
+For example:
+
+ ssl_conf = ssl_sect
+
+ [ssl_sect]
+
+ server = server_section
+
+ [server_section]
+
+ RSA.Certificate = server-rsa.pem
+ ECDSA.Certificate = server-ecdsa.pem
+ Ciphers = ALL:!RC4
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+If a configuration file attempts to expand a variable that doesn't exist
+then an error is flagged and the file will not load. This can happen
+if an attempt is made to expand an environment variable that doesn't
+exist. For example in a previous version of OpenSSL the default OpenSSL
+master configuration file used the value of B<HOME> which may not be
+defined on non Unix systems and would cause an error.
+
+This can be worked around by including a B<default> section to provide
+a default value: then if the environment lookup fails the default value
+will be used instead. For this to work properly the default value must
+be defined earlier in the configuration file than the expansion. See
+the B<EXAMPLES> section for an example of how to do this.
+
+If the same variable exists in the same section then all but the last
+value will be silently ignored. In certain circumstances such as with
+DNs the same field may occur multiple times. This is usually worked
+around by ignoring any characters before an initial B<.> e.g.
+
+ 1.OU="My first OU"
+ 2.OU="My Second OU"
+
+=head1 EXAMPLES
+
+Here is a sample configuration file using some of the features
+mentioned above.
+
+ # This is the default section.
+
+ HOME=/temp
+ RANDFILE= ${ENV::HOME}/.rnd
+ configdir=$ENV::HOME/config
+
+ [ section_one ]
+
+ # We are now in section one.
+
+ # Quotes permit leading and trailing whitespace
+ any = " any variable name "
+
+ other = A string that can \
+ cover several lines \
+ by including \\ characters
+
+ message = Hello World\n
+
+ [ section_two ]
+
+ greeting = $section_one::message
+
+This next example shows how to expand environment variables safely.
+
+Suppose you want a variable called B<tmpfile> to refer to a
+temporary filename. The directory it is placed in can determined by
+the B<TEMP> or B<TMP> environment variables but they may not be
+set to any value at all. If you just include the environment variable
+names and the variable doesn't exist then this will cause an error when
+an attempt is made to load the configuration file. By making use of the
+default section both values can be looked up with B<TEMP> taking
+priority and B</tmp> used if neither is defined:
+
+ TMP=/tmp
+ # The above value is used if TMP isn't in the environment
+ TEMP=$ENV::TMP
+ # The above value is used if TEMP isn't in the environment
+ tmpfile=${ENV::TEMP}/tmp.filename
+
+Simple OpenSSL library configuration example to enter FIPS mode:
+
+ # Default appname: should match "appname" parameter (if any)
+ # supplied to CONF_modules_load_file et al.
+ openssl_conf = openssl_conf_section
+
+ [openssl_conf_section]
+ # Configuration module list
+ alg_section = evp_sect
+
+ [evp_sect]
+ # Set to "yes" to enter FIPS mode if supported
+ fips_mode = yes
+
+Note: in the above example you will get an error in non FIPS capable versions
+of OpenSSL.
+
+More complex OpenSSL library configuration. Add OID and don't enter FIPS mode:
+
+ # Default appname: should match "appname" parameter (if any)
+ # supplied to CONF_modules_load_file et al.
+ openssl_conf = openssl_conf_section
+
+ [openssl_conf_section]
+ # Configuration module list
+ alg_section = evp_sect
+ oid_section = new_oids
+
+ [evp_sect]
+ # This will have no effect as FIPS mode is off by default.
+ # Set to "yes" to enter FIPS mode, if supported
+ fips_mode = no
+
+ [new_oids]
+ # New OID, just short name
+ newoid1 = 1.2.3.4.1
+ # New OID shortname and long name
+ newoid2 = New OID 2 long name, 1.2.3.4.2
+
+The above examples can be used with any application supporting library
+configuration if "openssl_conf" is modified to match the appropriate "appname".
+
+For example if the second sample file above is saved to "example.cnf" then
+the command line:
+
+ OPENSSL_CONF=example.cnf openssl asn1parse -genstr OID:1.2.3.4.1
+
+will output:
+
+    0:d=0  hl=2 l=   4 prim: OBJECT            :newoid1
+
+showing that the OID "newoid1" has been added as "1.2.3.4.1".
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+Currently there is no way to include characters using the octal B<\nnn>
+form. Strings are all null terminated so nulls cannot form part of
+the value.
+
+The escaping isn't quite right: if you want to use sequences like B<\n>
+you can't use any quote escaping on the same line.
+
+Files are loaded in a single pass. This means that an variable expansion
+will only work if the variables referenced are defined earlier in the
+file.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<x509(1)>, L<req(1)>, L<ca(1)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/crl.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/crl.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fded397
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/crl.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+openssl-crl,
+crl - CRL utility
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+B<openssl> B<crl>
+[B<-help>]
+[B<-inform PEM|DER>]
+[B<-outform PEM|DER>]
+[B<-text>]
+[B<-in filename>]
+[B<-out filename>]
+[B<-nameopt option>]
+[B<-noout>]
+[B<-hash>]
+[B<-issuer>]
+[B<-lastupdate>]
+[B<-nextupdate>]
+[B<-CAfile file>]
+[B<-CApath dir>]
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The B<crl> command processes CRL files in DER or PEM format.
+
+=head1 OPTIONS
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<-help>
+
+Print out a usage message.
+
+=item B<-inform DER|PEM>
+
+This specifies the input format. B<DER> format is DER encoded CRL
+structure. B<PEM> (the default) is a base64 encoded version of
+the DER form with header and footer lines.
+
+=item B<-outform DER|PEM>
+
+This specifies the output format, the options have the same meaning as the
+B<-inform> option.
+
+=item B<-in filename>
+
+This specifies the input filename to read from or standard input if this
+option is not specified.
+
+=item B<-out filename>
+
+specifies the output filename to write to or standard output by
+default.
+
+=item B<-text>
+
+print out the CRL in text form.
+
+=item B<-nameopt option>
+
+option which determines how the subject or issuer names are displayed. See
+the description of B<-nameopt> in L<x509(1)>.
+
+=item B<-noout>
+
+don't output the encoded version of the CRL.
+
+=item B<-hash>
+
+output a hash of the issuer name. This can be use to lookup CRLs in
+a directory by issuer name.
+
+=item B<-hash_old>
+
+outputs the "hash" of the CRL issuer name using the older algorithm
+as used by OpenSSL versions before 1.0.0.
+
+=item B<-issuer>
+
+output the issuer name.
+
+=item B<-lastupdate>
+
+output the lastUpdate field.
+
+=item B<-nextupdate>
+
+output the nextUpdate field.
+
+=item B<-CAfile file>
+
+verify the signature on a CRL by looking up the issuing certificate in
+B<file>
+
+=item B<-CApath dir>
+
+verify the signature on a CRL by looking up the issuing certificate in
+B<dir>. This directory must be a standard certificate directory: that
+is a hash of each subject name (using B<x509 -hash>) should be linked
+to each certificate.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The PEM CRL format uses the header and footer lines:
+
+ -----BEGIN X509 CRL-----
+ -----END X509 CRL-----
+
+=head1 EXAMPLES
+
+Convert a CRL file from PEM to DER:
+
+ openssl crl -in crl.pem -outform DER -out crl.der
+
+Output the text form of a DER encoded certificate:
+
+ openssl crl -in crl.der -text -noout
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+Ideally it should be possible to create a CRL using appropriate options
+and files too.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<crl2pkcs7(1)>, L<ca(1)>, L<x509(1)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/crl2pkcs7.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/crl2pkcs7.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..933750a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/crl2pkcs7.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+openssl-crl2pkcs7,
+crl2pkcs7 - Create a PKCS#7 structure from a CRL and certificates
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+B<openssl> B<crl2pkcs7>
+[B<-help>]
+[B<-inform PEM|DER>]
+[B<-outform PEM|DER>]
+[B<-in filename>]
+[B<-out filename>]
+[B<-certfile filename>]
+[B<-nocrl>]
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The B<crl2pkcs7> command takes an optional CRL and one or more
+certificates and converts them into a PKCS#7 degenerate "certificates
+only" structure.
+
+=head1 OPTIONS
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<-help>
+
+Print out a usage message.
+
+=item B<-inform DER|PEM>
+
+This specifies the CRL input format. B<DER> format is DER encoded CRL
+structure.B<PEM> (the default) is a base64 encoded version of
+the DER form with header and footer lines.
+
+=item B<-outform DER|PEM>
+
+This specifies the PKCS#7 structure output format. B<DER> format is DER
+encoded PKCS#7 structure.B<PEM> (the default) is a base64 encoded version of
+the DER form with header and footer lines.
+
+=item B<-in filename>
+
+This specifies the input filename to read a CRL from or standard input if this
+option is not specified.
+
+=item B<-out filename>
+
+specifies the output filename to write the PKCS#7 structure to or standard
+output by default.
+
+=item B<-certfile filename>
+
+specifies a filename containing one or more certificates in B<PEM> format.
+All certificates in the file will be added to the PKCS#7 structure. This
+option can be used more than once to read certificates form multiple
+files.
+
+=item B<-nocrl>
+
+normally a CRL is included in the output file. With this option no CRL is
+included in the output file and a CRL is not read from the input file.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 EXAMPLES
+
+Create a PKCS#7 structure from a certificate and CRL:
+
+ openssl crl2pkcs7 -in crl.pem -certfile cert.pem -out p7.pem
+
+Creates a PKCS#7 structure in DER format with no CRL from several
+different certificates:
+
+ openssl crl2pkcs7 -nocrl -certfile newcert.pem
+        -certfile demoCA/cacert.pem -outform DER -out p7.der
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The output file is a PKCS#7 signed data structure containing no signers and
+just certificates and an optional CRL.
+
+This utility can be used to send certificates and CAs to Netscape as part of
+the certificate enrollment process. This involves sending the DER encoded output
+as MIME type application/x-x509-user-cert.
+
+The B<PEM> encoded form with the header and footer lines removed can be used to
+install user certificates and CAs in MSIE using the Xenroll control.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<pkcs7(1)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/dgst.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/dgst.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..59919c3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/dgst.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,239 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+openssl-dgst,
+dgst, sha, sha1, mdc2, ripemd160, sha224, sha256, sha384, sha512, md4, md5, blake2b, blake2s - message digests
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+B<openssl> B<dgst>
+[B<-help>]
+[B<-I<digest>>]
+[B<-c>]
+[B<-d>]
+[B<-hex>]
+[B<-binary>]
+[B<-r>]
+[B<-out filename>]
+[B<-sign filename>]
+[B<-keyform arg>]
+[B<-passin arg>]
+[B<-verify filename>]
+[B<-prverify filename>]
+[B<-signature filename>]
+[B<-hmac key>]
+[B<-fips-fingerprint>]
+[B<-engine id>]
+[B<-engine_impl>]
+[B<file...>]
+
+B<openssl>
+[I<digest>]
+[B<...>]
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The digest functions output the message digest of a supplied file or files
+in hexadecimal.  The digest functions also generate and verify digital
+signatures using message digests.
+
+The generic name, B<dgst>, may be used with an option specifying the
+algorithm to be used.
+The default digest is I<sha256>.
+A supported I<digest> name may also be used as the command name.
+To see the list of supported algorithms, use the I<list --digest-commands>
+command.
+
+=head1 OPTIONS
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<-help>
+
+Print out a usage message.
+
+=item B<-I<digest>>
+
+Specifies name of a supported digest to be used. To see the list of
+supported digests, use the command I<list --digest-commands>.
+
+=item B<-c>
+
+Print out the digest in two digit groups separated by colons, only relevant if
+B<hex> format output is used.
+
+=item B<-d>
+
+Print out BIO debugging information.
+
+=item B<-hex>
+
+Digest is to be output as a hex dump. This is the default case for a "normal"
+digest as opposed to a digital signature.  See NOTES below for digital
+signatures using B<-hex>.
+
+=item B<-binary>
+
+Output the digest or signature in binary form.
+
+=item B<-r>
+
+Output the digest in the "coreutils" format used by programs like B<sha1sum>.
+
+=item B<-out filename>
+
+Filename to output to, or standard output by default.
+
+=item B<-sign filename>
+
+Digitally sign the digest using the private key in "filename".
+
+=item B<-keyform arg>
+
+Specifies the key format to sign digest with. The DER, PEM, P12,
+and ENGINE formats are supported.
+
+=item B<-sigopt nm:v>
+
+Pass options to the signature algorithm during sign or verify operations.
+Names and values of these options are algorithm-specific.
+
+=item B<-passin arg>
+
+The private key password source. For more information about the format of B<arg>
+see the B<PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS> section in L<openssl(1)>.
+
+=item B<-verify filename>
+
+Verify the signature using the public key in "filename".
+The output is either "Verification OK" or "Verification Failure".
+
+=item B<-prverify filename>
+
+Verify the signature using the private key in "filename".
+
+=item B<-signature filename>
+
+The actual signature to verify.
+
+=item B<-hmac key>
+
+Create a hashed MAC using "key".
+
+=item B<-mac alg>
+
+Create MAC (keyed Message Authentication Code). The most popular MAC
+algorithm is HMAC (hash-based MAC), but there are other MAC algorithms
+which are not based on hash, for instance B<gost-mac> algorithm,
+supported by B<ccgost> engine. MAC keys and other options should be set
+via B<-macopt> parameter.
+
+=item B<-macopt nm:v>
+
+Passes options to MAC algorithm, specified by B<-mac> key.
+Following options are supported by both by B<HMAC> and B<gost-mac>:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<key:string>
+
+Specifies MAC key as alphanumeric string (use if key contain printable
+characters only). String length must conform to any restrictions of
+the MAC algorithm for example exactly 32 chars for gost-mac.
+
+=item B<hexkey:string>
+
+Specifies MAC key in hexadecimal form (two hex digits per byte).
+Key length must conform to any restrictions of the MAC algorithm
+for example exactly 32 chars for gost-mac.
+
+=back
+
+=item B<-rand file(s)>
+
+A file or files containing random data used to seed the random number
+generator, or an EGD socket (see L<RAND_egd(3)>).
+Multiple files can be specified separated by an OS-dependent character.
+The separator is B<;> for MS-Windows, B<,> for OpenVMS, and B<:> for
+all others.
+
+=item B<-fips-fingerprint>
+
+Compute HMAC using a specific key for certain OpenSSL-FIPS operations.
+
+=item B<-engine id>
+
+Use engine B<id> for operations (including private key storage).
+This engine is not used as source for digest algorithms, unless it is
+also specified in the configuration file or B<-engine_impl> is also
+specified.
+
+=item B<-engine_impl>
+
+When used with the B<-engine> option, it specifies to also use
+engine B<id> for digest operations.
+
+=item B<file...>
+
+File or files to digest. If no files are specified then standard input is
+used.
+
+=back
+
+
+=head1 EXAMPLES
+
+To create a hex-encoded message digest of a file:
+ openssl dgst -md5 -hex file.txt
+
+To sign a file using SHA-256 with binary file output:
+ openssl dgst -sha256 -sign privatekey.pem -out signature.sign file.txt
+
+To verify a signature:
+ openssl dgst -sha256 -verify publickey.pem \
+ -signature signature.sign \
+ file.txt
+
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The digest mechanisms that are available will depend on the options
+used when building OpenSSL.
+The B<list digest-commands> command can be used to list them.
+
+New or agile applications should use probably use SHA-256. Other digests,
+particularly SHA-1 and MD5, are still widely used for interoperating
+with existing formats and protocols.
+
+When signing a file, B<dgst> will automatically determine the algorithm
+(RSA, ECC, etc) to use for signing based on the private key's ASN.1 info.
+When verifying signatures, it only handles the RSA, DSA, or ECDSA signature
+itself, not the related data to identify the signer and algorithm used in
+formats such as x.509, CMS, and S/MIME.
+
+A source of random numbers is required for certain signing algorithms, in
+particular ECDSA and DSA.
+
+The signing and verify options should only be used if a single file is
+being signed or verified.
+
+Hex signatures cannot be verified using B<openssl>.  Instead, use "xxd -r"
+or similar program to transform the hex signature into a binary signature
+prior to verification.
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+The default digest was changed from MD5 to SHA256 in OpenSSL 1.1.0
+The FIPS-related options were removed in OpenSSL 1.1.0
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/dhparam.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/dhparam.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..52fc0df
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/dhparam.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+openssl-dhparam,
+dhparam - DH parameter manipulation and generation
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+B<openssl dhparam>
+[B<-help>]
+[B<-inform DER|PEM>]
+[B<-outform DER|PEM>]
+[B<-in> I<filename>]
+[B<-out> I<filename>]
+[B<-dsaparam>]
+[B<-check>]
+[B<-noout>]
+[B<-text>]
+[B<-C>]
+[B<-2>]
+[B<-5>]
+[B<-rand> I<file(s)>]
+[B<-engine id>]
+[I<numbits>]
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+This command is used to manipulate DH parameter files.
+
+=head1 OPTIONS
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<-help>
+
+Print out a usage message.
+
+=item B<-inform DER|PEM>
+
+This specifies the input format. The B<DER> option uses an ASN1 DER encoded
+form compatible with the PKCS#3 DHparameter structure. The PEM form is the
+default format: it consists of the B<DER> format base64 encoded with
+additional header and footer lines.
+
+=item B<-outform DER|PEM>
+
+This specifies the output format, the options have the same meaning as the
+B<-inform> option.
+
+=item B<-in> I<filename>
+
+This specifies the input filename to read parameters from or standard input if
+this option is not specified.
+
+=item B<-out> I<filename>
+
+This specifies the output filename parameters to. Standard output is used
+if this option is not present. The output filename should B<not> be the same
+as the input filename.
+
+=item B<-dsaparam>
+
+If this option is used, DSA rather than DH parameters are read or created;
+they are converted to DH format.  Otherwise, "strong" primes (such
+that (p-1)/2 is also prime) will be used for DH parameter generation.
+
+DH parameter generation with the B<-dsaparam> option is much faster,
+and the recommended exponent length is shorter, which makes DH key
+exchange more efficient.  Beware that with such DSA-style DH
+parameters, a fresh DH key should be created for each use to
+avoid small-subgroup attacks that may be possible otherwise.
+
+=item B<-check>
+
+Performs numerous checks to see if the supplied parameters are valid and
+displays a warning if not.
+
+=item B<-2>, B<-5>
+
+The generator to use, either 2 or 5. If present then the
+input file is ignored and parameters are generated instead. If not
+present but B<numbits> is present, parameters are generated with the
+default generator 2.
+
+=item B<-rand> I<file(s)>
+
+a file or files containing random data used to seed the random number
+generator, or an EGD socket (see L<RAND_egd(3)>).
+Multiple files can be specified separated by an OS-dependent character.
+The separator is B<;> for MS-Windows, B<,> for OpenVMS, and B<:> for
+all others.
+
+=item I<numbits>
+
+this option specifies that a parameter set should be generated of size
+I<numbits>. It must be the last option. If this option is present then
+the input file is ignored and parameters are generated instead. If
+this option is not present but a generator (B<-2> or B<-5>) is
+present, parameters are generated with a default length of 2048 bits.
+
+=item B<-noout>
+
+this option inhibits the output of the encoded version of the parameters.
+
+=item B<-text>
+
+this option prints out the DH parameters in human readable form.
+
+=item B<-C>
+
+this option converts the parameters into C code. The parameters can then
+be loaded by calling the get_dhNNNN() function.
+
+=item B<-engine id>
+
+specifying an engine (by its unique B<id> string) will cause B<dhparam>
+to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine,
+thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default
+for all available algorithms.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 WARNINGS
+
+The program B<dhparam> combines the functionality of the programs B<dh> and
+B<gendh> in previous versions of OpenSSL. The B<dh> and B<gendh>
+programs are retained for now but may have different purposes in future
+versions of OpenSSL.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+PEM format DH parameters use the header and footer lines:
+
+ -----BEGIN DH PARAMETERS-----
+ -----END DH PARAMETERS-----
+
+OpenSSL currently only supports the older PKCS#3 DH, not the newer X9.42
+DH.
+
+This program manipulates DH parameters not keys.
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+There should be a way to generate and manipulate DH keys.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<dsaparam(1)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/dsa.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/dsa.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3735804
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/dsa.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,179 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+openssl-dsa,
+dsa - DSA key processing
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+B<openssl> B<dsa>
+[B<-help>]
+[B<-inform PEM|DER>]
+[B<-outform PEM|DER>]
+[B<-in filename>]
+[B<-passin arg>]
+[B<-out filename>]
+[B<-passout arg>]
+[B<-aes128>]
+[B<-aes192>]
+[B<-aes256>]
+[B<-camellia128>]
+[B<-camellia192>]
+[B<-camellia256>]
+[B<-des>]
+[B<-des3>]
+[B<-idea>]
+[B<-text>]
+[B<-noout>]
+[B<-modulus>]
+[B<-pubin>]
+[B<-pubout>]
+[B<-engine id>]
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The B<dsa> command processes DSA keys. They can be converted between various
+forms and their components printed out. B<Note> This command uses the
+traditional SSLeay compatible format for private key encryption: newer
+applications should use the more secure PKCS#8 format using the B<pkcs8>
+
+=head1 OPTIONS
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<-help>
+
+Print out a usage message.
+
+=item B<-inform DER|PEM>
+
+This specifies the input format. The B<DER> option with a private key uses
+an ASN1 DER encoded form of an ASN.1 SEQUENCE consisting of the values of
+version (currently zero), p, q, g, the public and private key components
+respectively as ASN.1 INTEGERs. When used with a public key it uses a
+SubjectPublicKeyInfo structure: it is an error if the key is not DSA.
+
+The B<PEM> form is the default format: it consists of the B<DER> format base64
+encoded with additional header and footer lines. In the case of a private key
+PKCS#8 format is also accepted.
+
+=item B<-outform DER|PEM>
+
+This specifies the output format, the options have the same meaning as the
+B<-inform> option.
+
+=item B<-in filename>
+
+This specifies the input filename to read a key from or standard input if this
+option is not specified. If the key is encrypted a pass phrase will be
+prompted for.
+
+=item B<-passin arg>
+
+the input file password source. For more information about the format of B<arg>
+see the B<PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS> section in L<openssl(1)>.
+
+=item B<-out filename>
+
+This specifies the output filename to write a key to or standard output by
+is not specified. If any encryption options are set then a pass phrase will be
+prompted for. The output filename should B<not> be the same as the input
+filename.
+
+=item B<-passout arg>
+
+the output file password source. For more information about the format of B<arg>
+see the B<PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS> section in L<openssl(1)>.
+
+=item B<-aes128|-aes192|-aes256|-camellia128|-camellia192|-camellia256|-des|-des3|-idea>
+
+These options encrypt the private key with the specified
+cipher before outputting it. A pass phrase is prompted for.
+If none of these options is specified the key is written in plain text. This
+means that using the B<dsa> utility to read in an encrypted key with no
+encryption option can be used to remove the pass phrase from a key, or by
+setting the encryption options it can be use to add or change the pass phrase.
+These options can only be used with PEM format output files.
+
+=item B<-text>
+
+prints out the public, private key components and parameters.
+
+=item B<-noout>
+
+this option prevents output of the encoded version of the key.
+
+=item B<-modulus>
+
+this option prints out the value of the public key component of the key.
+
+=item B<-pubin>
+
+by default a private key is read from the input file: with this option a
+public key is read instead.
+
+=item B<-pubout>
+
+by default a private key is output. With this option a public
+key will be output instead. This option is automatically set if the input is
+a public key.
+
+=item B<-engine id>
+
+specifying an engine (by its unique B<id> string) will cause B<dsa>
+to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine,
+thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default
+for all available algorithms.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The PEM private key format uses the header and footer lines:
+
+ -----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+ -----END DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+The PEM public key format uses the header and footer lines:
+
+ -----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+ -----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+=head1 EXAMPLES
+
+To remove the pass phrase on a DSA private key:
+
+ openssl dsa -in key.pem -out keyout.pem
+
+To encrypt a private key using triple DES:
+
+ openssl dsa -in key.pem -des3 -out keyout.pem
+
+To convert a private key from PEM to DER format:
+
+ openssl dsa -in key.pem -outform DER -out keyout.der
+
+To print out the components of a private key to standard output:
+
+ openssl dsa -in key.pem -text -noout
+
+To just output the public part of a private key:
+
+ openssl dsa -in key.pem -pubout -out pubkey.pem
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<dsaparam(1)>, L<gendsa(1)>, L<rsa(1)>,
+L<genrsa(1)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/dsaparam.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/dsaparam.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0dfda66
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/dsaparam.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+openssl-dsaparam,
+dsaparam - DSA parameter manipulation and generation
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+B<openssl dsaparam>
+[B<-help>]
+[B<-inform DER|PEM>]
+[B<-outform DER|PEM>]
+[B<-in filename>]
+[B<-out filename>]
+[B<-noout>]
+[B<-text>]
+[B<-C>]
+[B<-rand file(s)>]
+[B<-genkey>]
+[B<-engine id>]
+[B<numbits>]
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+This command is used to manipulate or generate DSA parameter files.
+
+=head1 OPTIONS
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<-help>
+
+Print out a usage message.
+
+=item B<-inform DER|PEM>
+
+This specifies the input format. The B<DER> option uses an ASN1 DER encoded
+form compatible with RFC2459 (PKIX) DSS-Parms that is a SEQUENCE consisting
+of p, q and g respectively. The PEM form is the default format: it consists
+of the B<DER> format base64 encoded with additional header and footer lines.
+
+=item B<-outform DER|PEM>
+
+This specifies the output format, the options have the same meaning as the
+B<-inform> option.
+
+=item B<-in filename>
+
+This specifies the input filename to read parameters from or standard input if
+this option is not specified. If the B<numbits> parameter is included then
+this option will be ignored.
+
+=item B<-out filename>
+
+This specifies the output filename parameters to. Standard output is used
+if this option is not present. The output filename should B<not> be the same
+as the input filename.
+
+=item B<-noout>
+
+this option inhibits the output of the encoded version of the parameters.
+
+=item B<-text>
+
+this option prints out the DSA parameters in human readable form.
+
+=item B<-C>
+
+this option converts the parameters into C code. The parameters can then
+be loaded by calling the get_dsaXXX() function.
+
+=item B<-genkey>
+
+this option will generate a DSA either using the specified or generated
+parameters.
+
+=item B<-rand file(s)>
+
+a file or files containing random data used to seed the random number
+generator, or an EGD socket (see L<RAND_egd(3)>).
+Multiple files can be specified separated by an OS-dependent character.
+The separator is B<;> for MS-Windows, B<,> for OpenVMS, and B<:> for
+all others.
+
+=item B<numbits>
+
+this option specifies that a parameter set should be generated of size
+B<numbits>. It must be the last option. If this option is included then
+the input file (if any) is ignored.
+
+=item B<-engine id>
+
+specifying an engine (by its unique B<id> string) will cause B<dsaparam>
+to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine,
+thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default
+for all available algorithms.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+PEM format DSA parameters use the header and footer lines:
+
+ -----BEGIN DSA PARAMETERS-----
+ -----END DSA PARAMETERS-----
+
+DSA parameter generation is a slow process and as a result the same set of
+DSA parameters is often used to generate several distinct keys.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<gendsa(1)>, L<dsa(1)>, L<genrsa(1)>,
+L<rsa(1)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/ec.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/ec.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c06005d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/ec.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,207 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+openssl-ec,
+ec - EC key processing
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+B<openssl> B<ec>
+[B<-help>]
+[B<-inform PEM|DER>]
+[B<-outform PEM|DER>]
+[B<-in filename>]
+[B<-passin arg>]
+[B<-out filename>]
+[B<-passout arg>]
+[B<-des>]
+[B<-des3>]
+[B<-idea>]
+[B<-text>]
+[B<-noout>]
+[B<-param_out>]
+[B<-pubin>]
+[B<-pubout>]
+[B<-conv_form arg>]
+[B<-param_enc arg>]
+[B<-no_public>]
+[B<-check>]
+[B<-engine id>]
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The B<ec> command processes EC keys. They can be converted between various
+forms and their components printed out. B<Note> OpenSSL uses the
+private key format specified in 'SEC 1: Elliptic Curve Cryptography'
+(http://www.secg.org/). To convert an OpenSSL EC private key into the
+PKCS#8 private key format use the B<pkcs8> command.
+
+=head1 OPTIONS
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<-help>
+
+Print out a usage message.
+
+=item B<-inform DER|PEM>
+
+This specifies the input format. The B<DER> option with a private key uses
+an ASN.1 DER encoded SEC1 private key. When used with a public key it
+uses the SubjectPublicKeyInfo structure as specified in RFC 3280.
+The B<PEM> form is the default format: it consists of the B<DER> format base64
+encoded with additional header and footer lines. In the case of a private key
+PKCS#8 format is also accepted.
+
+=item B<-outform DER|PEM>
+
+This specifies the output format, the options have the same meaning as the
+B<-inform> option.
+
+=item B<-in filename>
+
+This specifies the input filename to read a key from or standard input if this
+option is not specified. If the key is encrypted a pass phrase will be
+prompted for.
+
+=item B<-passin arg>
+
+the input file password source. For more information about the format of B<arg>
+see the B<PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS> section in L<openssl(1)>.
+
+=item B<-out filename>
+
+This specifies the output filename to write a key to or standard output by
+is not specified. If any encryption options are set then a pass phrase will be
+prompted for. The output filename should B<not> be the same as the input
+filename.
+
+=item B<-passout arg>
+
+the output file password source. For more information about the format of B<arg>
+see the B<PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS> section in L<openssl(1)>.
+
+=item B<-des|-des3|-idea>
+
+These options encrypt the private key with the DES, triple DES, IDEA or
+any other cipher supported by OpenSSL before outputting it. A pass phrase is
+prompted for.
+If none of these options is specified the key is written in plain text. This
+means that using the B<ec> utility to read in an encrypted key with no
+encryption option can be used to remove the pass phrase from a key, or by
+setting the encryption options it can be use to add or change the pass phrase.
+These options can only be used with PEM format output files.
+
+=item B<-text>
+
+prints out the public, private key components and parameters.
+
+=item B<-noout>
+
+this option prevents output of the encoded version of the key.
+
+=item B<-modulus>
+
+this option prints out the value of the public key component of the key.
+
+=item B<-pubin>
+
+by default a private key is read from the input file: with this option a
+public key is read instead.
+
+=item B<-pubout>
+
+by default a private key is output. With this option a public
+key will be output instead. This option is automatically set if the input is
+a public key.
+
+=item B<-conv_form>
+
+This specifies how the points on the elliptic curve are converted
+into octet strings. Possible values are: B<compressed> (the default
+value), B<uncompressed> and B<hybrid>. For more information regarding
+the point conversion forms please read the X9.62 standard.
+B<Note> Due to patent issues the B<compressed> option is disabled
+by default for binary curves and can be enabled by defining
+the preprocessor macro B<OPENSSL_EC_BIN_PT_COMP> at compile time.
+
+=item B<-param_enc arg>
+
+This specifies how the elliptic curve parameters are encoded.
+Possible value are: B<named_curve>, i.e. the ec parameters are
+specified by an OID, or B<explicit> where the ec parameters are
+explicitly given (see RFC 3279 for the definition of the
+EC parameters structures). The default value is B<named_curve>.
+B<Note> the B<implicitlyCA> alternative, as specified in RFC 3279,
+is currently not implemented in OpenSSL.
+
+=item B<-no_public>
+
+This option omits the public key components from the private key output.
+
+=item B<-check>
+
+this option checks the consistency of an EC private or public key.
+
+=item B<-engine id>
+
+specifying an engine (by its unique B<id> string) will cause B<ec>
+to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine,
+thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default
+for all available algorithms.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The PEM private key format uses the header and footer lines:
+
+ -----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----
+ -----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+The PEM public key format uses the header and footer lines:
+
+ -----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+ -----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+=head1 EXAMPLES
+
+To encrypt a private key using triple DES:
+
+ openssl ec -in key.pem -des3 -out keyout.pem
+
+To convert a private key from PEM to DER format:
+
+ openssl ec -in key.pem -outform DER -out keyout.der
+
+To print out the components of a private key to standard output:
+
+ openssl ec -in key.pem -text -noout
+
+To just output the public part of a private key:
+
+ openssl ec -in key.pem -pubout -out pubkey.pem
+
+To change the parameters encoding to B<explicit>:
+
+ openssl ec -in key.pem -param_enc explicit -out keyout.pem
+
+To change the point conversion form to B<compressed>:
+
+ openssl ec -in key.pem -conv_form compressed -out keyout.pem
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ecparam(1)>, L<dsa(1)>, L<rsa(1)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2003-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/ecparam.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/ecparam.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..69a2631
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/ecparam.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,186 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+openssl-ecparam,
+ecparam - EC parameter manipulation and generation
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+B<openssl ecparam>
+[B<-help>]
+[B<-inform DER|PEM>]
+[B<-outform DER|PEM>]
+[B<-in filename>]
+[B<-out filename>]
+[B<-noout>]
+[B<-text>]
+[B<-C>]
+[B<-check>]
+[B<-name arg>]
+[B<-list_curves>]
+[B<-conv_form arg>]
+[B<-param_enc arg>]
+[B<-no_seed>]
+[B<-rand file(s)>]
+[B<-genkey>]
+[B<-engine id>]
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+This command is used to manipulate or generate EC parameter files.
+
+=head1 OPTIONS
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<-help>
+
+Print out a usage message.
+
+=item B<-inform DER|PEM>
+
+This specifies the input format. The B<DER> option uses an ASN.1 DER encoded
+form compatible with RFC 3279 EcpkParameters. The PEM form is the default
+format: it consists of the B<DER> format base64 encoded with additional
+header and footer lines.
+
+=item B<-outform DER|PEM>
+
+This specifies the output format, the options have the same meaning as the
+B<-inform> option.
+
+=item B<-in filename>
+
+This specifies the input filename to read parameters from or standard input if
+this option is not specified.
+
+=item B<-out filename>
+
+This specifies the output filename parameters to. Standard output is used
+if this option is not present. The output filename should B<not> be the same
+as the input filename.
+
+=item B<-noout>
+
+This option inhibits the output of the encoded version of the parameters.
+
+=item B<-text>
+
+This option prints out the EC parameters in human readable form.
+
+=item B<-C>
+
+This option converts the EC parameters into C code. The parameters can then
+be loaded by calling the get_ec_group_XXX() function.
+
+=item B<-check>
+
+Validate the elliptic curve parameters.
+
+=item B<-name arg>
+
+Use the EC parameters with the specified 'short' name. Use B<-list_curves>
+to get a list of all currently implemented EC parameters.
+
+=item B<-list_curves>
+
+If this options is specified B<ecparam> will print out a list of all
+currently implemented EC parameters names and exit.
+
+=item B<-conv_form>
+
+This specifies how the points on the elliptic curve are converted
+into octet strings. Possible values are: B<compressed>, B<uncompressed> (the
+default value) and B<hybrid>. For more information regarding
+the point conversion forms please read the X9.62 standard.
+B<Note> Due to patent issues the B<compressed> option is disabled
+by default for binary curves and can be enabled by defining
+the preprocessor macro B<OPENSSL_EC_BIN_PT_COMP> at compile time.
+
+=item B<-param_enc arg>
+
+This specifies how the elliptic curve parameters are encoded.
+Possible value are: B<named_curve>, i.e. the ec parameters are
+specified by an OID, or B<explicit> where the ec parameters are
+explicitly given (see RFC 3279 for the definition of the
+EC parameters structures). The default value is B<named_curve>.
+B<Note> the B<implicitlyCA> alternative, as specified in RFC 3279,
+is currently not implemented in OpenSSL.
+
+=item B<-no_seed>
+
+This option inhibits that the 'seed' for the parameter generation
+is included in the ECParameters structure (see RFC 3279).
+
+=item B<-genkey>
+
+This option will generate an EC private key using the specified parameters.
+
+=item B<-rand file(s)>
+
+a file or files containing random data used to seed the random number
+generator, or an EGD socket (see L<RAND_egd(3)>).
+Multiple files can be specified separated by an OS-dependent character.
+The separator is B<;> for MS-Windows, B<,> for OpenVMS, and B<:> for
+all others.
+
+=item B<-engine id>
+
+specifying an engine (by its unique B<id> string) will cause B<ecparam>
+to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine,
+thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default
+for all available algorithms.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+PEM format EC parameters use the header and footer lines:
+
+ -----BEGIN EC PARAMETERS-----
+ -----END EC PARAMETERS-----
+
+OpenSSL is currently not able to generate new groups and therefore
+B<ecparam> can only create EC parameters from known (named) curves.
+
+=head1 EXAMPLES
+
+To create EC parameters with the group 'prime192v1':
+
+  openssl ecparam -out ec_param.pem -name prime192v1
+
+To create EC parameters with explicit parameters:
+
+  openssl ecparam -out ec_param.pem -name prime192v1 -param_enc explicit
+
+To validate given EC parameters:
+
+  openssl ecparam -in ec_param.pem -check
+
+To create EC parameters and a private key:
+
+  openssl ecparam -out ec_key.pem -name prime192v1 -genkey
+
+To change the point encoding to 'compressed':
+
+  openssl ecparam -in ec_in.pem -out ec_out.pem -conv_form compressed
+
+To print out the EC parameters to standard output:
+
+  openssl ecparam -in ec_param.pem -noout -text
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ec(1)>, L<dsaparam(1)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2003-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/enc.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/enc.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6338d6c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/enc.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,354 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+openssl-enc,
+enc - symmetric cipher routines
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+B<openssl enc -ciphername>
+[B<-help>]
+[B<-ciphers>]
+[B<-in filename>]
+[B<-out filename>]
+[B<-pass arg>]
+[B<-e>]
+[B<-d>]
+[B<-a/-base64>]
+[B<-A>]
+[B<-k password>]
+[B<-kfile filename>]
+[B<-K key>]
+[B<-iv IV>]
+[B<-S salt>]
+[B<-salt>]
+[B<-nosalt>]
+[B<-z>]
+[B<-md digest>]
+[B<-p>]
+[B<-P>]
+[B<-bufsize number>]
+[B<-nopad>]
+[B<-debug>]
+[B<-none>]
+[B<-engine id>]
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The symmetric cipher commands allow data to be encrypted or decrypted
+using various block and stream ciphers using keys based on passwords
+or explicitly provided. Base64 encoding or decoding can also be performed
+either by itself or in addition to the encryption or decryption.
+
+=head1 OPTIONS
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<-help>
+
+Print out a usage message.
+
+=item B<-ciphers>
+
+List all supported ciphers.
+
+=item B<-in filename>
+
+the input filename, standard input by default.
+
+=item B<-out filename>
+
+the output filename, standard output by default.
+
+=item B<-pass arg>
+
+the password source. For more information about the format of B<arg>
+see the B<PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS> section in L<openssl(1)>.
+
+=item B<-e>
+
+encrypt the input data: this is the default.
+
+=item B<-d>
+
+decrypt the input data.
+
+=item B<-a>
+
+base64 process the data. This means that if encryption is taking place
+the data is base64 encoded after encryption. If decryption is set then
+the input data is base64 decoded before being decrypted.
+
+=item B<-base64>
+
+same as B<-a>
+
+=item B<-A>
+
+if the B<-a> option is set then base64 process the data on one line.
+
+=item B<-k password>
+
+the password to derive the key from. This is for compatibility with previous
+versions of OpenSSL. Superseded by the B<-pass> argument.
+
+=item B<-kfile filename>
+
+read the password to derive the key from the first line of B<filename>.
+This is for compatibility with previous versions of OpenSSL. Superseded by
+the B<-pass> argument.
+
+=item B<-md digest>
+
+Use the specified digest to create the key from the passphrase.
+The default algorithm is sha-256.
+
+=item B<-nosalt>
+
+don't use a salt in the key derivation routines. This option B<SHOULD NOT> be
+used except for test purposes or compatibility with ancient versions of
+OpenSSL.
+
+=item B<-salt>
+
+use salt (randomly generated or provide with B<-S> option) when
+encrypting (this is the default).
+
+=item B<-S salt>
+
+the actual salt to use: this must be represented as a string of hex digits.
+
+=item B<-K key>
+
+the actual key to use: this must be represented as a string comprised only
+of hex digits. If only the key is specified, the IV must additionally specified
+using the B<-iv> option. When both a key and a password are specified, the
+key given with the B<-K> option will be used and the IV generated from the
+password will be taken. It probably does not make much sense to specify
+both key and password.
+
+=item B<-iv IV>
+
+the actual IV to use: this must be represented as a string comprised only
+of hex digits. When only the key is specified using the B<-K> option, the
+IV must explicitly be defined. When a password is being specified using
+one of the other options, the IV is generated from this password.
+
+=item B<-p>
+
+print out the key and IV used.
+
+=item B<-P>
+
+print out the key and IV used then immediately exit: don't do any encryption
+or decryption.
+
+=item B<-bufsize number>
+
+set the buffer size for I/O
+
+=item B<-nopad>
+
+disable standard block padding
+
+=item B<-debug>
+
+debug the BIOs used for I/O.
+
+=item B<-z>
+
+Compress or decompress clear text using zlib before encryption or after
+decryption. This option exists only if OpenSSL with compiled with zlib
+or zlib-dynamic option.
+
+=item B<-none>
+
+Use NULL cipher (no encryption or decryption of input).
+
+=back
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The program can be called either as B<openssl ciphername> or
+B<openssl enc -ciphername>. But the first form doesn't work with
+engine-provided ciphers, because this form is processed before the
+configuration file is read and any ENGINEs loaded.
+
+Engines which provide entirely new encryption algorithms (such as ccgost
+engine which provides gost89 algorithm) should be configured in the
+configuration file. Engines, specified in the command line using -engine
+options can only be used for hardware-assisted implementations of
+ciphers, which are supported by OpenSSL core or other engine, specified
+in the configuration file.
+
+When enc command lists supported ciphers, ciphers provided by engines,
+specified in the configuration files are listed too.
+
+A password will be prompted for to derive the key and IV if necessary.
+
+The B<-salt> option should B<ALWAYS> be used if the key is being derived
+from a password unless you want compatibility with previous versions of
+OpenSSL.
+
+Without the B<-salt> option it is possible to perform efficient dictionary
+attacks on the password and to attack stream cipher encrypted data. The reason
+for this is that without the salt the same password always generates the same
+encryption key. When the salt is being used the first eight bytes of the
+encrypted data are reserved for the salt: it is generated at random when
+encrypting a file and read from the encrypted file when it is decrypted.
+
+Some of the ciphers do not have large keys and others have security
+implications if not used correctly. A beginner is advised to just use
+a strong block cipher in CBC mode such as bf or des3.
+
+All the block ciphers normally use PKCS#5 padding also known as standard block
+padding: this allows a rudimentary integrity or password check to be
+performed. However since the chance of random data passing the test is
+better than 1 in 256 it isn't a very good test.
+
+If padding is disabled then the input data must be a multiple of the cipher
+block length.
+
+All RC2 ciphers have the same key and effective key length.
+
+Blowfish and RC5 algorithms use a 128 bit key.
+
+=head1 SUPPORTED CIPHERS
+
+Note that some of these ciphers can be disabled at compile time
+and some are available only if an appropriate engine is configured
+in the configuration file. The output of the B<enc> command run with
+unsupported options (for example B<openssl enc -help>) includes a
+list of ciphers, supported by your version of OpenSSL, including
+ones provided by configured engines.
+
+The B<enc> program does not support authenticated encryption modes
+like CCM and GCM. The utility does not store or retrieve the
+authentication tag.
+
+
+ base64             Base 64
+
+ bf-cbc             Blowfish in CBC mode
+ bf                 Alias for bf-cbc
+ bf-cfb             Blowfish in CFB mode
+ bf-ecb             Blowfish in ECB mode
+ bf-ofb             Blowfish in OFB mode
+
+ cast-cbc           CAST in CBC mode
+ cast               Alias for cast-cbc
+ cast5-cbc          CAST5 in CBC mode
+ cast5-cfb          CAST5 in CFB mode
+ cast5-ecb          CAST5 in ECB mode
+ cast5-ofb          CAST5 in OFB mode
+
+ des-cbc            DES in CBC mode
+ des                Alias for des-cbc
+ des-cfb            DES in CBC mode
+ des-ofb            DES in OFB mode
+ des-ecb            DES in ECB mode
+
+ des-ede-cbc        Two key triple DES EDE in CBC mode
+ des-ede            Two key triple DES EDE in ECB mode
+ des-ede-cfb        Two key triple DES EDE in CFB mode
+ des-ede-ofb        Two key triple DES EDE in OFB mode
+
+ des-ede3-cbc       Three key triple DES EDE in CBC mode
+ des-ede3           Three key triple DES EDE in ECB mode
+ des3               Alias for des-ede3-cbc
+ des-ede3-cfb       Three key triple DES EDE CFB mode
+ des-ede3-ofb       Three key triple DES EDE in OFB mode
+
+ desx               DESX algorithm.
+
+ gost89             GOST 28147-89 in CFB mode (provided by ccgost engine)
+ gost89-cnt        `GOST 28147-89 in CNT mode (provided by ccgost engine)
+
+ idea-cbc           IDEA algorithm in CBC mode
+ idea               same as idea-cbc
+ idea-cfb           IDEA in CFB mode
+ idea-ecb           IDEA in ECB mode
+ idea-ofb           IDEA in OFB mode
+
+ rc2-cbc            128 bit RC2 in CBC mode
+ rc2                Alias for rc2-cbc
+ rc2-cfb            128 bit RC2 in CFB mode
+ rc2-ecb            128 bit RC2 in ECB mode
+ rc2-ofb            128 bit RC2 in OFB mode
+ rc2-64-cbc         64 bit RC2 in CBC mode
+ rc2-40-cbc         40 bit RC2 in CBC mode
+
+ rc4                128 bit RC4
+ rc4-64             64 bit RC4
+ rc4-40             40 bit RC4
+
+ rc5-cbc            RC5 cipher in CBC mode
+ rc5                Alias for rc5-cbc
+ rc5-cfb            RC5 cipher in CFB mode
+ rc5-ecb            RC5 cipher in ECB mode
+ rc5-ofb            RC5 cipher in OFB mode
+
+ aes-[128|192|256]-cbc  128/192/256 bit AES in CBC mode
+ aes[128|192|256]       Alias for aes-[128|192|256]-cbc
+ aes-[128|192|256]-cfb  128/192/256 bit AES in 128 bit CFB mode
+ aes-[128|192|256]-cfb1 128/192/256 bit AES in 1 bit CFB mode
+ aes-[128|192|256]-cfb8 128/192/256 bit AES in 8 bit CFB mode
+ aes-[128|192|256]-ecb  128/192/256 bit AES in ECB mode
+ aes-[128|192|256]-ofb  128/192/256 bit AES in OFB mode
+
+=head1 EXAMPLES
+
+Just base64 encode a binary file:
+
+ openssl base64 -in file.bin -out file.b64
+
+Decode the same file
+
+ openssl base64 -d -in file.b64 -out file.bin
+
+Encrypt a file using triple DES in CBC mode using a prompted password:
+
+ openssl des3 -salt -in file.txt -out file.des3
+
+Decrypt a file using a supplied password:
+
+ openssl des3 -d -salt -in file.des3 -out file.txt -k mypassword
+
+Encrypt a file then base64 encode it (so it can be sent via mail for example)
+using Blowfish in CBC mode:
+
+ openssl bf -a -salt -in file.txt -out file.bf
+
+Base64 decode a file then decrypt it:
+
+ openssl bf -d -salt -a -in file.bf -out file.txt
+
+Decrypt some data using a supplied 40 bit RC4 key:
+
+ openssl rc4-40 -in file.rc4 -out file.txt -K 0102030405
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+The B<-A> option when used with large files doesn't work properly.
+
+There should be an option to allow an iteration count to be included.
+
+The B<enc> program only supports a fixed number of algorithms with
+certain parameters. So if, for example, you want to use RC2 with a
+76 bit key or RC4 with an 84 bit key you can't use this program.
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+The default digest was changed from MD5 to SHA256 in Openssl 1.1.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/engine.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/engine.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..155cc62
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/engine.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+openssl-engine,
+engine - load and query engines
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+B<openssl engine>
+[ I<engine...> ]
+[B<-v>]
+[B<-vv>]
+[B<-vvv>]
+[B<-vvv>]
+[B<-vvv>]
+[B<-c>]
+[B<-t>]
+[B<-tt>]
+[B<-pre> I<command>]
+[B<-post> I<command>]
+[ I<engine...> ]
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The B<engine> command is used to query the status and capabilities
+of the specified B<engine>'s.
+Engines may be specified before and after all other command-line flags.
+Only those specified are queried.
+
+=head1 OPTIONS
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<-v> B<-vv> B<-vvv> B<-vvvv>
+
+Provides information about each specified engine. The first flag lists
+all the possible run-time control commands; the second adds a
+description of each command; the third adds the input flags, and the
+final option adds the internal input flags.
+
+=item B<-c>
+
+Lists the capabilities of each engine.
+
+=item B<-t>
+
+Tests if each specified engine is available, and displays the answer.
+
+=item B<-tt>
+
+Displays an error trace for any unavailable engine.
+
+=item B<-pre> I<command>
+
+=item B<-post> I<command>
+
+Command-line configuration of engines.
+The B<-pre> command is given to the engine before it is loaded and
+the B<-post> command is given after the engine is loaded.
+The I<command> is of the form I<cmd:val> where I<cmd> is the command,
+and I<val> is the value for the command.
+See the example below.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 EXAMPLE
+
+To list all the commands available to a dynamic engine:
+
+ % openssl engine -t -tt -vvvv dynamic
+ (dynamic) Dynamic engine loading support
+      [ unavailable ]
+      SO_PATH: Specifies the path to the new ENGINE shared library
+           (input flags): STRING
+      NO_VCHECK: Specifies to continue even if version checking fails (boolean)
+           (input flags): NUMERIC
+      ID: Specifies an ENGINE id name for loading
+           (input flags): STRING
+      LIST_ADD: Whether to add a loaded ENGINE to the internal list (0=no,1=yes,2=mandatory)
+           (input flags): NUMERIC
+      DIR_LOAD: Specifies whether to load from 'DIR_ADD' directories (0=no,1=yes,2=mandatory)
+           (input flags): NUMERIC
+      DIR_ADD: Adds a directory from which ENGINEs can be loaded
+           (input flags): STRING
+      LOAD: Load up the ENGINE specified by other settings
+           (input flags): NO_INPUT
+
+To list the capabilities of the I<rsax> engine:
+
+ % openssl engine -c
+ (rsax) RSAX engine support
+  [RSA]
+ (dynamic) Dynamic engine loading support
+
+=head1 ENVIRONMENT
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<OPENSSL_ENGINES>
+
+The path to the engines directory.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/errstr.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/errstr.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3c89b8f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/errstr.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+openssl-errstr,
+errstr - lookup error codes
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+B<openssl errstr error_code>
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+Sometimes an application will not load error message and only
+numerical forms will be available. The B<errstr> utility can be used to
+display the meaning of the hex code. The hex code is the hex digits after the
+second colon.
+
+=head1 OPTIONS
+
+None.
+
+=head1 EXAMPLE
+
+The error code:
+
+ 27594:error:2006D080:lib(32):func(109):reason(128):bss_file.c:107:
+
+can be displayed with:
+
+ openssl errstr 2006D080
+
+to produce the error message:
+
+ error:2006D080:BIO routines:BIO_new_file:no such file
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/gendsa.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/gendsa.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..36c810a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/gendsa.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+openssl-gendsa,
+gendsa - generate a DSA private key from a set of parameters
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+B<openssl> B<gendsa>
+[B<-help>]
+[B<-out filename>]
+[B<-aes128>]
+[B<-aes192>]
+[B<-aes256>]
+[B<-camellia128>]
+[B<-camellia192>]
+[B<-camellia256>]
+[B<-des>]
+[B<-des3>]
+[B<-idea>]
+[B<-rand file(s)>]
+[B<-engine id>]
+[B<paramfile>]
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The B<gendsa> command generates a DSA private key from a DSA parameter file
+(which will be typically generated by the B<openssl dsaparam> command).
+
+=head1 OPTIONS
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<-help>
+
+Print out a usage message.
+
+=item B<-out filename>
+
+Output the key to the specified file. If this argument is not specified then
+standard output is used.
+
+=item B<-aes128|-aes192|-aes256|-camellia128|-camellia192|-camellia256|-des|-des3|-idea>
+
+These options encrypt the private key with specified
+cipher before outputting it. A pass phrase is prompted for.
+If none of these options is specified no encryption is used.
+
+=item B<-rand file(s)>
+
+a file or files containing random data used to seed the random number
+generator, or an EGD socket (see L<RAND_egd(3)>).
+Multiple files can be specified separated by an OS-dependent character.
+The separator is B<;> for MS-Windows, B<,> for OpenVMS, and B<:> for
+all others.
+
+=item B<-engine id>
+
+specifying an engine (by its unique B<id> string) will cause B<gendsa>
+to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine,
+thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default
+for all available algorithms.
+
+=item B<paramfile>
+
+This option specifies the DSA parameter file to use. The parameters in this
+file determine the size of the private key. DSA parameters can be generated
+and examined using the B<openssl dsaparam> command.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+DSA key generation is little more than random number generation so it is
+much quicker that RSA key generation for example.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<dsaparam(1)>, L<dsa(1)>, L<genrsa(1)>,
+L<rsa(1)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/genpkey.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/genpkey.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d486952
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/genpkey.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,278 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+openssl-genpkey,
+genpkey - generate a private key
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+B<openssl> B<genpkey>
+[B<-help>]
+[B<-out filename>]
+[B<-outform PEM|DER>]
+[B<-pass arg>]
+[B<-cipher>]
+[B<-engine id>]
+[B<-paramfile file>]
+[B<-algorithm alg>]
+[B<-pkeyopt opt:value>]
+[B<-genparam>]
+[B<-text>]
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The B<genpkey> command generates a private key.
+
+=head1 OPTIONS
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<-help>
+
+Print out a usage message.
+
+=item B<-out filename>
+
+Output the key to the specified file. If this argument is not specified then
+standard output is used.
+
+=item B<-outform DER|PEM>
+
+This specifies the output format DER or PEM.
+
+=item B<-pass arg>
+
+the output file password source. For more information about the format of B<arg>
+see the B<PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS> section in L<openssl(1)>.
+
+=item B<-cipher>
+
+This option encrypts the private key with the supplied cipher. Any algorithm
+name accepted by EVP_get_cipherbyname() is acceptable such as B<des3>.
+
+=item B<-engine id>
+
+specifying an engine (by its unique B<id> string) will cause B<genpkey>
+to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine,
+thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default
+for all available algorithms. If used this option should precede all other
+options.
+
+=item B<-algorithm alg>
+
+public key algorithm to use such as RSA, DSA or DH. If used this option must
+precede any B<-pkeyopt> options. The options B<-paramfile> and B<-algorithm>
+are mutually exclusive.
+
+=item B<-pkeyopt opt:value>
+
+set the public key algorithm option B<opt> to B<value>. The precise set of
+options supported depends on the public key algorithm used and its
+implementation. See B<KEY GENERATION OPTIONS> below for more details.
+
+=item B<-genparam>
+
+generate a set of parameters instead of a private key. If used this option must
+precede any B<-algorithm>, B<-paramfile> or B<-pkeyopt> options.
+
+=item B<-paramfile filename>
+
+Some public key algorithms generate a private key based on a set of parameters.
+They can be supplied using this option. If this option is used the public key
+algorithm used is determined by the parameters. If used this option must
+precede any B<-pkeyopt> options. The options B<-paramfile> and B<-algorithm>
+are mutually exclusive.
+
+=item B<-text>
+
+Print an (unencrypted) text representation of private and public keys and
+parameters along with the PEM or DER structure.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 KEY GENERATION OPTIONS
+
+The options supported by each algorithm and indeed each implementation of an
+algorithm can vary. The options for the OpenSSL implementations are detailed
+below.
+
+=head1 RSA KEY GENERATION OPTIONS
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<rsa_keygen_bits:numbits>
+
+The number of bits in the generated key. If not specified 1024 is used.
+
+=item B<rsa_keygen_pubexp:value>
+
+The RSA public exponent value. This can be a large decimal or
+hexadecimal value if preceded by B<0x>. Default value is 65537.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 DSA PARAMETER GENERATION OPTIONS
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<dsa_paramgen_bits:numbits>
+
+The number of bits in the generated parameters. If not specified 1024 is used.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 DH PARAMETER GENERATION OPTIONS
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<dh_paramgen_prime_len:numbits>
+
+The number of bits in the prime parameter B<p>.
+
+=item B<dh_paramgen_generator:value>
+
+The value to use for the generator B<g>.
+
+=item B<dh_rfc5114:num>
+
+If this option is set then the appropriate RFC5114 parameters are used
+instead of generating new parameters. The value B<num> can take the
+values 1, 2 or 3 corresponding to RFC5114 DH parameters consisting of
+1024 bit group with 160 bit subgroup, 2048 bit group with 224 bit subgroup
+and 2048 bit group with 256 bit subgroup as mentioned in RFC5114 sections
+2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 respectively.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 EC PARAMETER GENERATION OPTIONS
+
+The EC parameter generation options below can also
+be supplied as EC key generation options. This can (for example) generate a
+key from a named curve without the need to use an explicit parameter file.
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<ec_paramgen_curve:curve>
+
+the EC curve to use. OpenSSL supports NIST curve names such as "P-256".
+
+=item B<ec_param_enc:encoding>
+
+the encoding to use for parameters. The "encoding" parameter must be either
+"named_curve" or "explicit".
+
+=back
+
+=head1 GOST2001 KEY GENERATION AND PARAMETER OPTIONS
+
+Gost 2001 support is not enabled by default. To enable this algorithm,
+one should load the ccgost engine in the OpenSSL configuration file.
+See README.gost file in the engines/ccgost directory of the source
+distribution for more details.
+
+Use of a parameter file for the GOST R 34.10 algorithm is optional.
+Parameters can be specified during key generation directly as well as
+during generation of parameter file.
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<paramset:name>
+
+Specifies GOST R 34.10-2001 parameter set according to RFC 4357.
+Parameter set can be specified using abbreviated name, object short name or
+numeric OID. Following parameter sets are supported:
+
+  paramset   OID               Usage
+  A          1.2.643.2.2.35.1  Signature
+  B          1.2.643.2.2.35.2  Signature
+  C          1.2.643.2.2.35.3  Signature
+  XA         1.2.643.2.2.36.0  Key exchange
+  XB         1.2.643.2.2.36.1  Key exchange
+  test       1.2.643.2.2.35.0  Test purposes
+
+=back
+
+=head1 X25519 KEY GENERATION OPTIONS
+
+The X25519 algorithm does not currently support any key generation options.
+
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The use of the genpkey program is encouraged over the algorithm specific
+utilities because additional algorithm options and ENGINE provided algorithms
+can be used.
+
+=head1 EXAMPLES
+
+Generate an RSA private key using default parameters:
+
+ openssl genpkey -algorithm RSA -out key.pem
+
+Encrypt output private key using 128 bit AES and the passphrase "hello":
+
+ openssl genpkey -algorithm RSA -out key.pem -aes-128-cbc -pass pass:hello
+
+Generate a 2048 bit RSA key using 3 as the public exponent:
+
+ openssl genpkey -algorithm RSA -out key.pem -pkeyopt rsa_keygen_bits:2048 \
+                                                -pkeyopt rsa_keygen_pubexp:3
+
+Generate 1024 bit DSA parameters:
+
+ openssl genpkey -genparam -algorithm DSA -out dsap.pem \
+                                                -pkeyopt dsa_paramgen_bits:1024
+
+Generate DSA key from parameters:
+
+ openssl genpkey -paramfile dsap.pem -out dsakey.pem
+
+Generate 1024 bit DH parameters:
+
+ openssl genpkey -genparam -algorithm DH -out dhp.pem \
+                                        -pkeyopt dh_paramgen_prime_len:1024
+
+Output RFC5114 2048 bit DH parameters with 224 bit subgroup:
+
+ openssl genpkey -genparam -algorithm DH -out dhp.pem -pkeyopt dh_rfc5114:2
+
+Generate DH key from parameters:
+
+ openssl genpkey -paramfile dhp.pem -out dhkey.pem
+
+Generate EC parameters:
+
+ openssl genpkey -genparam -algorithm EC -out ecp.pem \
+        -pkeyopt ec_paramgen_curve:secp384r1 \
+        -pkeyopt ec_param_enc:named_curve
+
+Generate EC key from parameters:
+
+ openssl genpkey -paramfile ecp.pem -out eckey.pem
+
+Generate EC key directly:
+
+ openssl genpkey -algorithm EC -out eckey.pem \
+        -pkeyopt ec_paramgen_curve:P-384 \
+        -pkeyopt ec_param_enc:named_curve
+
+Generate an X25519 private key:
+
+ openssl genpkey -algorithm X25519 -out xkey.pem
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+The ability to use NIST curve names, and to generate an EC key directly,
+were added in OpenSSL 1.0.2.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/genrsa.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/genrsa.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8be0683
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/genrsa.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+openssl-genrsa,
+genrsa - generate an RSA private key
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+B<openssl> B<genrsa>
+[B<-help>]
+[B<-out filename>]
+[B<-passout arg>]
+[B<-aes128>]
+[B<-aes192>]
+[B<-aes256>]
+[B<-aria128>]
+[B<-aria192>]
+[B<-aria256>]
+[B<-camellia128>]
+[B<-camellia192>]
+[B<-camellia256>]
+[B<-des>]
+[B<-des3>]
+[B<-idea>]
+[B<-f4>]
+[B<-3>]
+[B<-rand file(s)>]
+[B<-engine id>]
+[B<numbits>]
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The B<genrsa> command generates an RSA private key.
+
+=head1 OPTIONS
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<-help>
+
+Print out a usage message.
+
+=item B<-out filename>
+
+Output the key to the specified file. If this argument is not specified then
+standard output is used.
+
+=item B<-passout arg>
+
+the output file password source. For more information about the format of B<arg>
+see the B<PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS> section in L<openssl(1)>.
+
+=item B<-aes128|-aes192|-aes256|-aria128|-aria192|-aria256|-camellia128|-camellia192|-camellia256|-des|-des3|-idea>
+
+These options encrypt the private key with specified
+cipher before outputting it. If none of these options is
+specified no encryption is used. If encryption is used a pass phrase is prompted
+for if it is not supplied via the B<-passout> argument.
+
+=item B<-F4|-3>
+
+the public exponent to use, either 65537 or 3. The default is 65537.
+
+=item B<-rand file(s)>
+
+a file or files containing random data used to seed the random number
+generator, or an EGD socket (see L<RAND_egd(3)>).
+Multiple files can be specified separated by an OS-dependent character.
+The separator is B<;> for MS-Windows, B<,> for OpenVMS, and B<:> for
+all others.
+
+=item B<-engine id>
+
+specifying an engine (by its unique B<id> string) will cause B<genrsa>
+to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine,
+thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default
+for all available algorithms.
+
+=item B<numbits>
+
+the size of the private key to generate in bits. This must be the last option
+specified. The default is 2048.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+RSA private key generation essentially involves the generation of two prime
+numbers. When generating a private key various symbols will be output to
+indicate the progress of the generation. A B<.> represents each number which
+has passed an initial sieve test, B<+> means a number has passed a single
+round of the Miller-Rabin primality test. A newline means that the number has
+passed all the prime tests (the actual number depends on the key size).
+
+Because key generation is a random process the time taken to generate a key
+may vary somewhat.
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+A quirk of the prime generation algorithm is that it cannot generate small
+primes. Therefore the number of bits should not be less that 64. For typical
+private keys this will not matter because for security reasons they will
+be much larger (typically 1024 bits).
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<gendsa(1)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/list.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/list.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1088762
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/list.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+openssl-list,
+list - list algorithms and features
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+B<openssl list>
+[B<-help>]
+[B<-commands>]
+[B<-digest-commands>]
+[B<-digest-algorithms>]
+[B<-cipher-commands>]
+[B<-cipher-algorithms>]
+[B<-public-key-algorithms>]
+[B<-disabled>]
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+This command is used to generate list of algorithms or disabled
+features.
+
+=head1 OPTIONS
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<-help>
+
+Display out a usage message.
+
+=item B<-commands>
+
+Display a list of standard commands.
+
+=item B<-digest-commands>
+
+Display a list of message digest commands, which are typically used
+as input to the L<dgst(1)> or L<speed(1)> commands.
+
+=item B<-digest-algorithms>
+
+Display a list of message digest algorithms.
+If a line is of the form
+  foo => bar
+then B<foo> is an alias for the official algorithm name, B<bar>.
+
+=item B<-cipher-commands>
+
+Display a list of cipher commands, which are typically used as input
+to the L<dgst(1)> or L<speed(1)> commands.
+
+=item B<-cipher-algorithms>
+
+Display a list of cipher algorithms.
+If a line is of the form
+  foo => bar
+then B<foo> is an alias for the official algorithm name, B<bar>.
+
+=item B<-public-key-algorithms>
+
+Display a list of public key algorithms, with each algorithm as
+a block of multiple lines, all but the first are indented.
+
+=item B<-disabled>
+
+Display a list of disabled features, those that were compiled out
+of the installation.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/nseq.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/nseq.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6b25e22
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/nseq.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+openssl-nseq,
+nseq - create or examine a Netscape certificate sequence
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+B<openssl> B<nseq>
+[B<-help>]
+[B<-in filename>]
+[B<-out filename>]
+[B<-toseq>]
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The B<nseq> command takes a file containing a Netscape certificate
+sequence and prints out the certificates contained in it or takes a
+file of certificates and converts it into a Netscape certificate
+sequence.
+
+=head1 OPTIONS
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<-help>
+
+Print out a usage message.
+
+=item B<-in filename>
+
+This specifies the input filename to read or standard input if this
+option is not specified.
+
+=item B<-out filename>
+
+specifies the output filename or standard output by default.
+
+=item B<-toseq>
+
+normally a Netscape certificate sequence will be input and the output
+is the certificates contained in it. With the B<-toseq> option the
+situation is reversed: a Netscape certificate sequence is created from
+a file of certificates.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 EXAMPLES
+
+Output the certificates in a Netscape certificate sequence
+
+ openssl nseq -in nseq.pem -out certs.pem
+
+Create a Netscape certificate sequence
+
+ openssl nseq -in certs.pem -toseq -out nseq.pem
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The B<PEM> encoded form uses the same headers and footers as a certificate:
+
+ -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+ -----END CERTIFICATE-----
+
+A Netscape certificate sequence is a Netscape specific form that can be sent
+to browsers as an alternative to the standard PKCS#7 format when several
+certificates are sent to the browser: for example during certificate enrollment.
+It is used by Netscape certificate server for example.
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+This program needs a few more options: like allowing DER or PEM input and
+output files and allowing multiple certificate files to be used.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/ocsp.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/ocsp.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5e273cf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/ocsp.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,467 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+openssl-ocsp,
+ocsp - Online Certificate Status Protocol utility
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+B<openssl> B<ocsp>
+[B<-help>]
+[B<-out file>]
+[B<-issuer file>]
+[B<-cert file>]
+[B<-serial n>]
+[B<-signer file>]
+[B<-signkey file>]
+[B<-sign_other file>]
+[B<-no_certs>]
+[B<-req_text>]
+[B<-resp_text>]
+[B<-text>]
+[B<-reqout file>]
+[B<-respout file>]
+[B<-reqin file>]
+[B<-respin file>]
+[B<-nonce>]
+[B<-no_nonce>]
+[B<-url URL>]
+[B<-host host:port>]
+[B<-header>]
+[B<-path>]
+[B<-CApath dir>]
+[B<-CAfile file>]
+[B<-no-CAfile>]
+[B<-no-CApath>]
+[B<-attime timestamp>]
+[B<-check_ss_sig>]
+[B<-crl_check>]
+[B<-crl_check_all>]
+[B<-explicit_policy>]
+[B<-extended_crl>]
+[B<-ignore_critical>]
+[B<-inhibit_any>]
+[B<-inhibit_map>]
+[B<-no_check_time>]
+[B<-partial_chain>]
+[B<-policy arg>]
+[B<-policy_check>]
+[B<-policy_print>]
+[B<-purpose purpose>]
+[B<-suiteB_128>]
+[B<-suiteB_128_only>]
+[B<-suiteB_192>]
+[B<-trusted_first>]
+[B<-no_alt_chains>]
+[B<-use_deltas>]
+[B<-auth_level num>]
+[B<-verify_depth num>]
+[B<-verify_email email>]
+[B<-verify_hostname hostname>]
+[B<-verify_ip ip>]
+[B<-verify_name name>]
+[B<-x509_strict>]
+[B<-VAfile file>]
+[B<-validity_period n>]
+[B<-status_age n>]
+[B<-noverify>]
+[B<-verify_other file>]
+[B<-trust_other>]
+[B<-no_intern>]
+[B<-no_signature_verify>]
+[B<-no_cert_verify>]
+[B<-no_chain>]
+[B<-no_cert_checks>]
+[B<-no_explicit>]
+[B<-port num>]
+[B<-index file>]
+[B<-CA file>]
+[B<-rsigner file>]
+[B<-rkey file>]
+[B<-rother file>]
+[B<-resp_no_certs>]
+[B<-nmin n>]
+[B<-ndays n>]
+[B<-resp_key_id>]
+[B<-nrequest n>]
+[B<-md5|-sha1|...>]
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) enables applications to
+determine the (revocation) state of an identified certificate (RFC 2560).
+
+The B<ocsp> command performs many common OCSP tasks. It can be used
+to print out requests and responses, create requests and send queries
+to an OCSP responder and behave like a mini OCSP server itself.
+
+=head1 OPTIONS
+
+This command operates as either a client or a server.
+The options are described below, divided into those two modes.
+
+=head2 OCSP Client Options
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<-help>
+
+Print out a usage message.
+
+=item B<-out filename>
+
+specify output filename, default is standard output.
+
+=item B<-issuer filename>
+
+This specifies the current issuer certificate. This option can be used
+multiple times. The certificate specified in B<filename> must be in
+PEM format. This option B<MUST> come before any B<-cert> options.
+
+=item B<-cert filename>
+
+Add the certificate B<filename> to the request. The issuer certificate
+is taken from the previous B<issuer> option, or an error occurs if no
+issuer certificate is specified.
+
+=item B<-serial num>
+
+Same as the B<cert> option except the certificate with serial number
+B<num> is added to the request. The serial number is interpreted as a
+decimal integer unless preceded by B<0x>. Negative integers can also
+be specified by preceding the value by a B<-> sign.
+
+=item B<-signer filename>, B<-signkey filename>
+
+Sign the OCSP request using the certificate specified in the B<signer>
+option and the private key specified by the B<signkey> option. If
+the B<signkey> option is not present then the private key is read
+from the same file as the certificate. If neither option is specified then
+the OCSP request is not signed.
+
+=item B<-sign_other filename>
+
+Additional certificates to include in the signed request.
+
+=item B<-nonce>, B<-no_nonce>
+
+Add an OCSP nonce extension to a request or disable OCSP nonce addition.
+Normally if an OCSP request is input using the B<reqin> option no
+nonce is added: using the B<nonce> option will force addition of a nonce.
+If an OCSP request is being created (using B<cert> and B<serial> options)
+a nonce is automatically added specifying B<no_nonce> overrides this.
+
+=item B<-req_text>, B<-resp_text>, B<-text>
+
+print out the text form of the OCSP request, response or both respectively.
+
+=item B<-reqout file>, B<-respout file>
+
+write out the DER encoded certificate request or response to B<file>.
+
+=item B<-reqin file>, B<-respin file>
+
+read OCSP request or response file from B<file>. These option are ignored
+if OCSP request or response creation is implied by other options (for example
+with B<serial>, B<cert> and B<host> options).
+
+=item B<-url responder_url>
+
+specify the responder URL. Both HTTP and HTTPS (SSL/TLS) URLs can be specified.
+
+=item B<-host hostname:port>, B<-path pathname>
+
+if the B<host> option is present then the OCSP request is sent to the host
+B<hostname> on port B<port>. B<path> specifies the HTTP path name to use
+or "/" by default.  This is equivalent to specifying B<-url> with scheme
+http:// and the given hostname, port, and pathname.
+
+=item B<-header name=value>
+
+Adds the header B<name> with the specified B<value> to the OCSP request
+that is sent to the responder.
+This may be repeated.
+
+=item B<-timeout seconds>
+
+connection timeout to the OCSP responder in seconds
+
+=item B<-CAfile file>, B<-CApath pathname>
+
+file or pathname containing trusted CA certificates. These are used to verify
+the signature on the OCSP response.
+
+=item B<-no-CAfile>
+
+Do not load the trusted CA certificates from the default file location
+
+=item B<-no-CApath>
+
+Do not load the trusted CA certificates from the default directory location
+
+=item B<-attime>, B<-check_ss_sig>, B<-crl_check>, B<-crl_check_all>,
+B<-explicit_policy>, B<-extended_crl>, B<-ignore_critical>, B<-inhibit_any>,
+B<-inhibit_map>, B<-no_alt_chains>, B<-no_check_time>, B<-partial_chain>, B<-policy>,
+B<-policy_check>, B<-policy_print>, B<-purpose>, B<-suiteB_128>,
+B<-suiteB_128_only>, B<-suiteB_192>, B<-trusted_first>, B<-use_deltas>,
+B<-auth_level>, B<-verify_depth>, B<-verify_email>, B<-verify_hostname>,
+B<-verify_ip>, B<-verify_name>, B<-x509_strict>
+
+Set different certificate verification options.
+See L<verify(1)> manual page for details.
+
+=item B<-verify_other file>
+
+file containing additional certificates to search when attempting to locate
+the OCSP response signing certificate. Some responders omit the actual signer's
+certificate from the response: this option can be used to supply the necessary
+certificate in such cases.
+
+=item B<-trust_other>
+
+the certificates specified by the B<-verify_other> option should be explicitly
+trusted and no additional checks will be performed on them. This is useful
+when the complete responder certificate chain is not available or trusting a
+root CA is not appropriate.
+
+=item B<-VAfile file>
+
+file containing explicitly trusted responder certificates. Equivalent to the
+B<-verify_other> and B<-trust_other> options.
+
+=item B<-noverify>
+
+don't attempt to verify the OCSP response signature or the nonce values. This
+option will normally only be used for debugging since it disables all verification
+of the responders certificate.
+
+=item B<-no_intern>
+
+ignore certificates contained in the OCSP response when searching for the
+signers certificate. With this option the signers certificate must be specified
+with either the B<-verify_other> or B<-VAfile> options.
+
+=item B<-no_signature_verify>
+
+don't check the signature on the OCSP response. Since this option tolerates invalid
+signatures on OCSP responses it will normally only be used for testing purposes.
+
+=item B<-no_cert_verify>
+
+don't verify the OCSP response signers certificate at all. Since this option allows
+the OCSP response to be signed by any certificate it should only be used for
+testing purposes.
+
+=item B<-no_chain>
+
+do not use certificates in the response as additional untrusted CA
+certificates.
+
+=item B<-no_explicit>
+
+do not explicitly trust the root CA if it is set to be trusted for OCSP signing.
+
+=item B<-no_cert_checks>
+
+don't perform any additional checks on the OCSP response signers certificate.
+That is do not make any checks to see if the signers certificate is authorised
+to provide the necessary status information: as a result this option should
+only be used for testing purposes.
+
+=item B<-validity_period nsec>, B<-status_age age>
+
+these options specify the range of times, in seconds, which will be tolerated
+in an OCSP response. Each certificate status response includes a B<notBefore>
+time and an optional B<notAfter> time. The current time should fall between
+these two values, but the interval between the two times may be only a few
+seconds. In practice the OCSP responder and clients clocks may not be precisely
+synchronised and so such a check may fail. To avoid this the
+B<-validity_period> option can be used to specify an acceptable error range in
+seconds, the default value is 5 minutes.
+
+If the B<notAfter> time is omitted from a response then this means that new
+status information is immediately available. In this case the age of the
+B<notBefore> field is checked to see it is not older than B<age> seconds old.
+By default this additional check is not performed.
+
+=item B<-[digest]>
+
+this option sets digest algorithm to use for certificate identification in the
+OCSP request. Any digest supported by the OpenSSL B<dgst> command can be used.
+The default is SHA-1. This option may be used multiple times to specify the
+digest used by subsequent certificate identifiers.
+
+=back
+
+=head2 OCSP Server Options
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<-index indexfile>
+
+B<indexfile> is a text index file in B<ca> format containing certificate revocation
+information.
+
+If the B<index> option is specified the B<ocsp> utility is in responder mode, otherwise
+it is in client mode. The request(s) the responder processes can be either specified on
+the command line (using B<issuer> and B<serial> options), supplied in a file (using the
+B<reqin> option) or via external OCSP clients (if B<port> or B<url> is specified).
+
+If the B<index> option is present then the B<CA> and B<rsigner> options must also be
+present.
+
+=item B<-CA file>
+
+CA certificate corresponding to the revocation information in B<indexfile>.
+
+=item B<-rsigner file>
+
+The certificate to sign OCSP responses with.
+
+=item B<-rother file>
+
+Additional certificates to include in the OCSP response.
+
+=item B<-resp_no_certs>
+
+Don't include any certificates in the OCSP response.
+
+=item B<-resp_key_id>
+
+Identify the signer certificate using the key ID, default is to use the subject name.
+
+=item B<-rkey file>
+
+The private key to sign OCSP responses with: if not present the file specified in the
+B<rsigner> option is used.
+
+=item B<-port portnum>
+
+Port to listen for OCSP requests on. The port may also be specified using the B<url>
+option.
+
+=item B<-nrequest number>
+
+The OCSP server will exit after receiving B<number> requests, default unlimited.
+
+=item B<-nmin minutes>, B<-ndays days>
+
+Number of minutes or days when fresh revocation information is available: used in the
+B<nextUpdate> field. If neither option is present then the B<nextUpdate> field
+is omitted meaning fresh revocation information is immediately available.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 OCSP Response verification.
+
+OCSP Response follows the rules specified in RFC2560.
+
+Initially the OCSP responder certificate is located and the signature on
+the OCSP request checked using the responder certificate's public key.
+
+Then a normal certificate verify is performed on the OCSP responder certificate
+building up a certificate chain in the process. The locations of the trusted
+certificates used to build the chain can be specified by the B<CAfile>
+and B<CApath> options or they will be looked for in the standard OpenSSL
+certificates directory.
+
+If the initial verify fails then the OCSP verify process halts with an
+error.
+
+Otherwise the issuing CA certificate in the request is compared to the OCSP
+responder certificate: if there is a match then the OCSP verify succeeds.
+
+Otherwise the OCSP responder certificate's CA is checked against the issuing
+CA certificate in the request. If there is a match and the OCSPSigning
+extended key usage is present in the OCSP responder certificate then the
+OCSP verify succeeds.
+
+Otherwise, if B<-no_explicit> is B<not> set the root CA of the OCSP responders
+CA is checked to see if it is trusted for OCSP signing. If it is the OCSP
+verify succeeds.
+
+If none of these checks is successful then the OCSP verify fails.
+
+What this effectively means if that if the OCSP responder certificate is
+authorised directly by the CA it is issuing revocation information about
+(and it is correctly configured) then verification will succeed.
+
+If the OCSP responder is a "global responder" which can give details about
+multiple CAs and has its own separate certificate chain then its root
+CA can be trusted for OCSP signing. For example:
+
+ openssl x509 -in ocspCA.pem -addtrust OCSPSigning -out trustedCA.pem
+
+Alternatively the responder certificate itself can be explicitly trusted
+with the B<-VAfile> option.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+As noted, most of the verify options are for testing or debugging purposes.
+Normally only the B<-CApath>, B<-CAfile> and (if the responder is a 'global
+VA') B<-VAfile> options need to be used.
+
+The OCSP server is only useful for test and demonstration purposes: it is
+not really usable as a full OCSP responder. It contains only a very
+simple HTTP request handling and can only handle the POST form of OCSP
+queries. It also handles requests serially meaning it cannot respond to
+new requests until it has processed the current one. The text index file
+format of revocation is also inefficient for large quantities of revocation
+data.
+
+It is possible to run the B<ocsp> application in responder mode via a CGI
+script using the B<reqin> and B<respout> options.
+
+=head1 EXAMPLES
+
+Create an OCSP request and write it to a file:
+
+ openssl ocsp -issuer issuer.pem -cert c1.pem -cert c2.pem -reqout req.der
+
+Send a query to an OCSP responder with URL http://ocsp.myhost.com/ save the
+response to a file, print it out in text form, and verify the response:
+
+ openssl ocsp -issuer issuer.pem -cert c1.pem -cert c2.pem \
+     -url http://ocsp.myhost.com/ -resp_text -respout resp.der
+
+Read in an OCSP response and print out text form:
+
+ openssl ocsp -respin resp.der -text -noverify
+
+OCSP server on port 8888 using a standard B<ca> configuration, and a separate
+responder certificate. All requests and responses are printed to a file.
+
+ openssl ocsp -index demoCA/index.txt -port 8888 -rsigner rcert.pem -CA demoCA/cacert.pem
+        -text -out log.txt
+
+As above but exit after processing one request:
+
+ openssl ocsp -index demoCA/index.txt -port 8888 -rsigner rcert.pem -CA demoCA/cacert.pem
+     -nrequest 1
+
+Query status information using an internally generated request:
+
+ openssl ocsp -index demoCA/index.txt -rsigner rcert.pem -CA demoCA/cacert.pem
+     -issuer demoCA/cacert.pem -serial 1
+
+Query status information using request read from a file, and write the response
+to a second file.
+
+ openssl ocsp -index demoCA/index.txt -rsigner rcert.pem -CA demoCA/cacert.pem
+     -reqin req.der -respout resp.der
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+The -no_alt_chains options was first added to OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/openssl.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/openssl.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6e822a6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/openssl.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,461 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+openssl - OpenSSL command line tool
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+B<openssl>
+I<command>
+[ I<command_opts> ]
+[ I<command_args> ]
+
+B<openssl> B<list> [ B<standard-commands> | B<digest-commands> | B<cipher-commands> | B<cipher-algorithms> | B<digest-algorithms> | B<public-key-algorithms>]
+
+B<openssl> B<no->I<XXX> [ I<arbitrary options> ]
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+OpenSSL is a cryptography toolkit implementing the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL
+v2/v3) and Transport Layer Security (TLS v1) network protocols and related
+cryptography standards required by them.
+
+The B<openssl> program is a command line tool for using the various
+cryptography functions of OpenSSL's B<crypto> library from the shell.
+It can be used for
+
+ o  Creation and management of private keys, public keys and parameters
+ o  Public key cryptographic operations
+ o  Creation of X.509 certificates, CSRs and CRLs
+ o  Calculation of Message Digests
+ o  Encryption and Decryption with Ciphers
+ o  SSL/TLS Client and Server Tests
+ o  Handling of S/MIME signed or encrypted mail
+ o  Time Stamp requests, generation and verification
+
+=head1 COMMAND SUMMARY
+
+The B<openssl> program provides a rich variety of commands (I<command> in the
+SYNOPSIS above), each of which often has a wealth of options and arguments
+(I<command_opts> and I<command_args> in the SYNOPSIS).
+
+Many commands use an external configuration file for some or all of their
+arguments and have a B<-config> option to specify that file.
+The environment variable B<OPENSSL_CONF> can be used to specify
+the location of the file.
+If the environment variable is not specified, then the file is named
+B<openssl.cnf> in the default certificate storage area, whose value
+depends on the configuration flags specified when the OpenSSL
+was built.
+
+The list parameters B<standard-commands>, B<digest-commands>,
+and B<cipher-commands> output a list (one entry per line) of the names
+of all standard commands, message digest commands, or cipher commands,
+respectively, that are available in the present B<openssl> utility.
+
+The list parameters B<cipher-algorithms> and
+B<digest-algorithms> list all cipher and message digest names, one entry per line. Aliases are listed as:
+
+ from => to
+
+The list parameter B<public-key-algorithms> lists all supported public
+key algorithms.
+
+The command B<no->I<XXX> tests whether a command of the
+specified name is available.  If no command named I<XXX> exists, it
+returns 0 (success) and prints B<no->I<XXX>; otherwise it returns 1
+and prints I<XXX>.  In both cases, the output goes to B<stdout> and
+nothing is printed to B<stderr>.  Additional command line arguments
+are always ignored.  Since for each cipher there is a command of the
+same name, this provides an easy way for shell scripts to test for the
+availability of ciphers in the B<openssl> program.  (B<no->I<XXX> is
+not able to detect pseudo-commands such as B<quit>,
+B<list>, or B<no->I<XXX> itself.)
+
+=head2 Standard Commands
+
+=over 4
+
+=item L<B<asn1parse>|asn1parse(1)>
+
+Parse an ASN.1 sequence.
+
+=item L<B<ca>|ca(1)>
+
+Certificate Authority (CA) Management.
+
+=item L<B<ciphers>|ciphers(1)>
+
+Cipher Suite Description Determination.
+
+=item L<B<cms>|cms(1)>
+
+CMS (Cryptographic Message Syntax) utility.
+
+=item L<B<crl>|crl(1)>
+
+Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Management.
+
+=item L<B<crl2pkcs7>|crl2pkcs7(1)>
+
+CRL to PKCS#7 Conversion.
+
+=item L<B<dgst>|dgst(1)>
+
+Message Digest Calculation.
+
+=item B<dh>
+
+Diffie-Hellman Parameter Management.
+Obsoleted by L<B<dhparam>|dhparam(1)>.
+
+=item L<B<dhparam>|dhparam(1)>
+
+Generation and Management of Diffie-Hellman Parameters. Superseded by
+L<B<genpkey>|genpkey(1)> and L<B<pkeyparam>|pkeyparam(1)>.
+
+=item L<B<dsa>|dsa(1)>
+
+DSA Data Management.
+
+=item L<B<dsaparam>|dsaparam(1)>
+
+DSA Parameter Generation and Management. Superseded by
+L<B<genpkey>|genpkey(1)> and L<B<pkeyparam>|pkeyparam(1)>.
+
+=item L<B<ec>|ec(1)>
+
+EC (Elliptic curve) key processing.
+
+=item L<B<ecparam>|ecparam(1)>
+
+EC parameter manipulation and generation.
+
+=item L<B<enc>|enc(1)>
+
+Encoding with Ciphers.
+
+=item L<B<engine>|engine(1)>
+
+Engine (loadable module) information and manipulation.
+
+=item L<B<errstr>|errstr(1)>
+
+Error Number to Error String Conversion.
+
+=item B<gendh>
+
+Generation of Diffie-Hellman Parameters.
+Obsoleted by L<B<dhparam>|dhparam(1)>.
+
+=item L<B<gendsa>|gendsa(1)>
+
+Generation of DSA Private Key from Parameters. Superseded by
+L<B<genpkey>|genpkey(1)> and L<B<pkey>|pkey(1)>.
+
+=item L<B<genpkey>|genpkey(1)>
+
+Generation of Private Key or Parameters.
+
+=item L<B<genrsa>|genrsa(1)>
+
+Generation of RSA Private Key. Superseded by L<B<genpkey>|genpkey(1)>.
+
+=item L<B<nseq>|nseq(1)>
+
+Create or examine a Netscape certificate sequence.
+
+=item L<B<ocsp>|ocsp(1)>
+
+Online Certificate Status Protocol utility.
+
+=item L<B<passwd>|passwd(1)>
+
+Generation of hashed passwords.
+
+=item L<B<pkcs12>|pkcs12(1)>
+
+PKCS#12 Data Management.
+
+=item L<B<pkcs7>|pkcs7(1)>
+
+PKCS#7 Data Management.
+
+=item L<B<pkcs8>|pkcs8(1)>
+
+PKCS#8 format private key conversion tool.
+
+=item L<B<pkey>|pkey(1)>
+
+Public and private key management.
+
+=item L<B<pkeyparam>|pkeyparam(1)>
+
+Public key algorithm parameter management.
+
+=item L<B<pkeyutl>|pkeyutl(1)>
+
+Public key algorithm cryptographic operation utility.
+
+=item L<B<rand>|rand(1)>
+
+Generate pseudo-random bytes.
+
+=item L<B<rehash>|rehash(1)>
+
+Create symbolic links to certificate and CRL files named by the hash values.
+
+=item L<B<req>|req(1)>
+
+PKCS#10 X.509 Certificate Signing Request (CSR) Management.
+
+=item L<B<rsa>|rsa(1)>
+
+RSA key management.
+
+
+=item L<B<rsautl>|rsautl(1)>
+
+RSA utility for signing, verification, encryption, and decryption. Superseded
+by  L<B<pkeyutl>|pkeyutl(1)>.
+
+=item L<B<s_client>|s_client(1)>
+
+This implements a generic SSL/TLS client which can establish a transparent
+connection to a remote server speaking SSL/TLS. It's intended for testing
+purposes only and provides only rudimentary interface functionality but
+internally uses mostly all functionality of the OpenSSL B<ssl> library.
+
+=item L<B<s_server>|s_server(1)>
+
+This implements a generic SSL/TLS server which accepts connections from remote
+clients speaking SSL/TLS. It's intended for testing purposes only and provides
+only rudimentary interface functionality but internally uses mostly all
+functionality of the OpenSSL B<ssl> library.  It provides both an own command
+line oriented protocol for testing SSL functions and a simple HTTP response
+facility to emulate an SSL/TLS-aware webserver.
+
+=item L<B<s_time>|s_time(1)>
+
+SSL Connection Timer.
+
+=item L<B<sess_id>|sess_id(1)>
+
+SSL Session Data Management.
+
+=item L<B<smime>|smime(1)>
+
+S/MIME mail processing.
+
+=item L<B<speed>|speed(1)>
+
+Algorithm Speed Measurement.
+
+=item L<B<spkac>|spkac(1)>
+
+SPKAC printing and generating utility.
+
+=item L<B<ts>|ts(1)>
+
+Time Stamping Authority tool (client/server).
+
+=item L<B<verify>|verify(1)>
+
+X.509 Certificate Verification.
+
+=item L<B<version>|version(1)>
+
+OpenSSL Version Information.
+
+=item L<B<x509>|x509(1)>
+
+X.509 Certificate Data Management.
+
+=back
+
+=head2 Message Digest Commands
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<md2>
+
+MD2 Digest
+
+=item B<md5>
+
+MD5 Digest
+
+=item B<mdc2>
+
+MDC2 Digest
+
+=item B<rmd160>
+
+RMD-160 Digest
+
+=item B<sha>
+
+SHA Digest
+
+=item B<sha1>
+
+SHA-1 Digest
+
+=item B<sha224>
+
+SHA-224 Digest
+
+=item B<sha256>
+
+SHA-256 Digest
+
+=item B<sha384>
+
+SHA-384 Digest
+
+=item B<sha512>
+
+SHA-512 Digest
+
+=back
+
+=head2 Encoding and Cipher Commands
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<base64>
+
+Base64 Encoding
+
+=item B<bf bf-cbc bf-cfb bf-ecb bf-ofb>
+
+Blowfish Cipher
+
+=item B<cast cast-cbc>
+
+CAST Cipher
+
+=item B<cast5-cbc cast5-cfb cast5-ecb cast5-ofb>
+
+CAST5 Cipher
+
+=item B<des des-cbc des-cfb des-ecb des-ede des-ede-cbc des-ede-cfb des-ede-ofb des-ofb>
+
+DES Cipher
+
+=item B<des3 desx des-ede3 des-ede3-cbc des-ede3-cfb des-ede3-ofb>
+
+Triple-DES Cipher
+
+=item B<idea idea-cbc idea-cfb idea-ecb idea-ofb>
+
+IDEA Cipher
+
+=item B<rc2 rc2-cbc rc2-cfb rc2-ecb rc2-ofb>
+
+RC2 Cipher
+
+=item B<rc4>
+
+RC4 Cipher
+
+=item B<rc5 rc5-cbc rc5-cfb rc5-ecb rc5-ofb>
+
+RC5 Cipher
+
+=back
+
+=head1 OPTIONS
+
+Details of which options are available depend on the specific command.
+This section describes some common options with common behavior.
+
+=head2 Common Options
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<-help>
+
+Provides a terse summary of all options.
+
+=back
+
+=head2 Pass Phrase Options
+
+Several commands accept password arguments, typically using B<-passin>
+and B<-passout> for input and output passwords respectively. These allow
+the password to be obtained from a variety of sources. Both of these
+options take a single argument whose format is described below. If no
+password argument is given and a password is required then the user is
+prompted to enter one: this will typically be read from the current
+terminal with echoing turned off.
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<pass:password>
+
+The actual password is B<password>. Since the password is visible
+to utilities (like 'ps' under Unix) this form should only be used
+where security is not important.
+
+=item B<env:var>
+
+Obtain the password from the environment variable B<var>. Since
+the environment of other processes is visible on certain platforms
+(e.g. ps under certain Unix OSes) this option should be used with caution.
+
+=item B<file:pathname>
+
+The first line of B<pathname> is the password. If the same B<pathname>
+argument is supplied to B<-passin> and B<-passout> arguments then the first
+line will be used for the input password and the next line for the output
+password. B<pathname> need not refer to a regular file: it could for example
+refer to a device or named pipe.
+
+=item B<fd:number>
+
+Read the password from the file descriptor B<number>. This can be used to
+send the data via a pipe for example.
+
+=item B<stdin>
+
+Read the password from standard input.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<asn1parse(1)>, L<ca(1)>, L<ciphers(1)>, L<cms(1)>, L<config(5)>,
+L<crl(1)>, L<crl2pkcs7(1)>, L<dgst(1)>,
+L<dhparam(1)>, L<dsa(1)>, L<dsaparam(1)>,
+L<ec(1)>, L<ecparam(1)>,
+L<enc(1)>, L<engine(1)>, L<errstr(1)>, L<gendsa(1)>, L<genpkey(1)>,
+L<genrsa(1)>, L<nseq(1)>, L<ocsp(1)>,
+L<passwd(1)>,
+L<pkcs12(1)>, L<pkcs7(1)>, L<pkcs8(1)>,
+L<pkey(1)>, L<pkeyparam(1)>, L<pkeyutl(1)>,
+L<rand(1)>, L<rehash(1)>, L<req(1)>, L<rsa(1)>,
+L<rsautl(1)>, L<s_client(1)>,
+L<s_server(1)>, L<s_time(1)>, L<sess_id(1)>,
+L<smime(1)>, L<speed(1)>, L<spkac(1)>,
+L<ts(1)>,
+L<verify(1)>, L<version(1)>, L<x509(1)>,
+L<crypto(7)>, L<ssl(7)>, L<x509v3_config(5)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+The B<list->I<XXX>B<-algorithms> pseudo-commands were added in OpenSSL 1.0.0;
+For notes on the availability of other commands, see their individual
+manual pages.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/passwd.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/passwd.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4663201
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/passwd.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+openssl-passwd,
+passwd - compute password hashes
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+B<openssl passwd>
+[B<-help>]
+[B<-crypt>]
+[B<-1>]
+[B<-apr1>]
+[B<-salt> I<string>]
+[B<-in> I<file>]
+[B<-stdin>]
+[B<-noverify>]
+[B<-quiet>]
+[B<-table>]
+{I<password>}
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The B<passwd> command computes the hash of a password typed at
+run-time or the hash of each password in a list.  The password list is
+taken from the named file for option B<-in file>, from stdin for
+option B<-stdin>, or from the command line, or from the terminal otherwise.
+The Unix standard algorithm B<crypt> and the MD5-based BSD password
+algorithm B<1> and its Apache variant B<apr1> are available.
+
+=head1 OPTIONS
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<-help>
+
+Print out a usage message.
+
+=item B<-crypt>
+
+Use the B<crypt> algorithm (default).
+
+=item B<-1>
+
+Use the MD5 based BSD password algorithm B<1>.
+
+=item B<-apr1>
+
+Use the B<apr1> algorithm (Apache variant of the BSD algorithm).
+
+=item B<-salt> I<string>
+
+Use the specified salt.
+When reading a password from the terminal, this implies B<-noverify>.
+
+=item B<-in> I<file>
+
+Read passwords from I<file>.
+
+=item B<-stdin>
+
+Read passwords from B<stdin>.
+
+=item B<-noverify>
+
+Don't verify when reading a password from the terminal.
+
+=item B<-quiet>
+
+Don't output warnings when passwords given at the command line are truncated.
+
+=item B<-table>
+
+In the output list, prepend the cleartext password and a TAB character
+to each password hash.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 EXAMPLES
+
+B<openssl passwd -crypt -salt xx password> prints B<xxj31ZMTZzkVA>.
+
+B<openssl passwd -1 -salt xxxxxxxx password> prints B<$1$xxxxxxxx$UYCIxa628.9qXjpQCjM4a.>.
+
+B<openssl passwd -apr1 -salt xxxxxxxx password> prints B<$apr1$xxxxxxxx$dxHfLAsjHkDRmG83UXe8K0>.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/pkcs12.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/pkcs12.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..44ee3d4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/pkcs12.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,381 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+openssl-pkcs12,
+pkcs12 - PKCS#12 file utility
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+B<openssl> B<pkcs12>
+[B<-help>]
+[B<-export>]
+[B<-chain>]
+[B<-inkey file_or_id>]
+[B<-certfile filename>]
+[B<-name name>]
+[B<-caname name>]
+[B<-in filename>]
+[B<-out filename>]
+[B<-noout>]
+[B<-nomacver>]
+[B<-nocerts>]
+[B<-clcerts>]
+[B<-cacerts>]
+[B<-nokeys>]
+[B<-info>]
+[B<-des | -des3 | -idea | -aes128 | -aes192 | -aes256 | -camellia128 | -camellia192 | -camellia256 | -nodes>]
+[B<-noiter>]
+[B<-maciter | -nomaciter | -nomac>]
+[B<-twopass>]
+[B<-descert>]
+[B<-certpbe cipher>]
+[B<-keypbe cipher>]
+[B<-macalg digest>]
+[B<-keyex>]
+[B<-keysig>]
+[B<-password arg>]
+[B<-passin arg>]
+[B<-passout arg>]
+[B<-rand file(s)>]
+[B<-CAfile file>]
+[B<-CApath dir>]
+[B<-no-CAfile>]
+[B<-no-CApath>]
+[B<-CSP name>]
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The B<pkcs12> command allows PKCS#12 files (sometimes referred to as
+PFX files) to be created and parsed. PKCS#12 files are used by several
+programs including Netscape, MSIE and MS Outlook.
+
+=head1 OPTIONS
+
+There are a lot of options the meaning of some depends of whether a PKCS#12 file
+is being created or parsed. By default a PKCS#12 file is parsed. A PKCS#12
+file can be created by using the B<-export> option (see below).
+
+=head1 PARSING OPTIONS
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<-help>
+
+Print out a usage message.
+
+=item B<-in filename>
+
+This specifies filename of the PKCS#12 file to be parsed. Standard input is used
+by default.
+
+=item B<-out filename>
+
+The filename to write certificates and private keys to, standard output by
+default.  They are all written in PEM format.
+
+=item B<-passin arg>
+
+the PKCS#12 file (i.e. input file) password source. For more information about
+the format of B<arg> see the B<PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS> section in
+L<openssl(1)>.
+
+=item B<-passout arg>
+
+pass phrase source to encrypt any outputted private keys with. For more
+information about the format of B<arg> see the B<PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS> section
+in L<openssl(1)>.
+
+=item B<-password arg>
+
+With -export, -password is equivalent to -passout.
+Otherwise, -password is equivalent to -passin.
+
+=item B<-noout>
+
+this option inhibits output of the keys and certificates to the output file
+version of the PKCS#12 file.
+
+=item B<-clcerts>
+
+only output client certificates (not CA certificates).
+
+=item B<-cacerts>
+
+only output CA certificates (not client certificates).
+
+=item B<-nocerts>
+
+no certificates at all will be output.
+
+=item B<-nokeys>
+
+no private keys will be output.
+
+=item B<-info>
+
+output additional information about the PKCS#12 file structure, algorithms used and
+iteration counts.
+
+=item B<-des>
+
+use DES to encrypt private keys before outputting.
+
+=item B<-des3>
+
+use triple DES to encrypt private keys before outputting, this is the default.
+
+=item B<-idea>
+
+use IDEA to encrypt private keys before outputting.
+
+=item B<-aes128>, B<-aes192>, B<-aes256>
+
+use AES to encrypt private keys before outputting.
+
+=item B<-camellia128>, B<-camellia192>, B<-camellia256>
+
+use Camellia to encrypt private keys before outputting.
+
+=item B<-nodes>
+
+don't encrypt the private keys at all.
+
+=item B<-nomacver>
+
+don't attempt to verify the integrity MAC before reading the file.
+
+=item B<-twopass>
+
+prompt for separate integrity and encryption passwords: most software
+always assumes these are the same so this option will render such
+PKCS#12 files unreadable.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 FILE CREATION OPTIONS
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<-export>
+
+This option specifies that a PKCS#12 file will be created rather than
+parsed.
+
+=item B<-out filename>
+
+This specifies filename to write the PKCS#12 file to. Standard output is used
+by default.
+
+=item B<-in filename>
+
+The filename to read certificates and private keys from, standard input by
+default.  They must all be in PEM format. The order doesn't matter but one
+private key and its corresponding certificate should be present. If additional
+certificates are present they will also be included in the PKCS#12 file.
+
+=item B<-inkey file_or_id>
+
+file to read private key from. If not present then a private key must be present
+in the input file.
+If no engine is used, the argument is taken as a file; if an engine is
+specified, the argument is given to the engine as a key identifier.
+
+=item B<-name friendlyname>
+
+This specifies the "friendly name" for the certificate and private key. This
+name is typically displayed in list boxes by software importing the file.
+
+=item B<-certfile filename>
+
+A filename to read additional certificates from.
+
+=item B<-caname friendlyname>
+
+This specifies the "friendly name" for other certificates. This option may be
+used multiple times to specify names for all certificates in the order they
+appear. Netscape ignores friendly names on other certificates whereas MSIE
+displays them.
+
+=item B<-pass arg>, B<-passout arg>
+
+the PKCS#12 file (i.e. output file) password source. For more information about
+the format of B<arg> see the B<PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS> section in
+L<openssl(1)>.
+
+=item B<-passin password>
+
+pass phrase source to decrypt any input private keys with. For more information
+about the format of B<arg> see the B<PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS> section in
+L<openssl(1)>.
+
+=item B<-chain>
+
+if this option is present then an attempt is made to include the entire
+certificate chain of the user certificate. The standard CA store is used
+for this search. If the search fails it is considered a fatal error.
+
+=item B<-descert>
+
+encrypt the certificate using triple DES, this may render the PKCS#12
+file unreadable by some "export grade" software. By default the private
+key is encrypted using triple DES and the certificate using 40 bit RC2.
+
+=item B<-keypbe alg>, B<-certpbe alg>
+
+these options allow the algorithm used to encrypt the private key and
+certificates to be selected. Any PKCS#5 v1.5 or PKCS#12 PBE algorithm name
+can be used (see B<NOTES> section for more information). If a cipher name
+(as output by the B<list-cipher-algorithms> command is specified then it
+is used with PKCS#5 v2.0. For interoperability reasons it is advisable to only
+use PKCS#12 algorithms.
+
+=item B<-keyex|-keysig>
+
+specifies that the private key is to be used for key exchange or just signing.
+This option is only interpreted by MSIE and similar MS software. Normally
+"export grade" software will only allow 512 bit RSA keys to be used for
+encryption purposes but arbitrary length keys for signing. The B<-keysig>
+option marks the key for signing only. Signing only keys can be used for
+S/MIME signing, authenticode (ActiveX control signing)  and SSL client
+authentication, however due to a bug only MSIE 5.0 and later support
+the use of signing only keys for SSL client authentication.
+
+=item B<-macalg digest>
+
+specify the MAC digest algorithm. If not included them SHA1 will be used.
+
+=item B<-nomaciter>, B<-noiter>
+
+these options affect the iteration counts on the MAC and key algorithms.
+Unless you wish to produce files compatible with MSIE 4.0 you should leave
+these options alone.
+
+To discourage attacks by using large dictionaries of common passwords the
+algorithm that derives keys from passwords can have an iteration count applied
+to it: this causes a certain part of the algorithm to be repeated and slows it
+down. The MAC is used to check the file integrity but since it will normally
+have the same password as the keys and certificates it could also be attacked.
+By default both MAC and encryption iteration counts are set to 2048, using
+these options the MAC and encryption iteration counts can be set to 1, since
+this reduces the file security you should not use these options unless you
+really have to. Most software supports both MAC and key iteration counts.
+MSIE 4.0 doesn't support MAC iteration counts so it needs the B<-nomaciter>
+option.
+
+=item B<-maciter>
+
+This option is included for compatibility with previous versions, it used
+to be needed to use MAC iterations counts but they are now used by default.
+
+=item B<-nomac>
+
+don't attempt to provide the MAC integrity.
+
+=item B<-rand file(s)>
+
+a file or files containing random data used to seed the random number
+generator, or an EGD socket (see L<RAND_egd(3)>).
+Multiple files can be specified separated by an OS-dependent character.
+The separator is B<;> for MS-Windows, B<,> for OpenVMS, and B<:> for
+all others.
+
+=item B<-CAfile file>
+
+CA storage as a file.
+
+=item B<-CApath dir>
+
+CA storage as a directory. This directory must be a standard certificate
+directory: that is a hash of each subject name (using B<x509 -hash>) should be
+linked to each certificate.
+
+=item B<-no-CAfile>
+
+Do not load the trusted CA certificates from the default file location
+
+=item B<-no-CApath>
+
+Do not load the trusted CA certificates from the default directory location
+
+=item B<-CSP name>
+
+write B<name> as a Microsoft CSP name.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+Although there are a large number of options most of them are very rarely
+used. For PKCS#12 file parsing only B<-in> and B<-out> need to be used
+for PKCS#12 file creation B<-export> and B<-name> are also used.
+
+If none of the B<-clcerts>, B<-cacerts> or B<-nocerts> options are present
+then all certificates will be output in the order they appear in the input
+PKCS#12 files. There is no guarantee that the first certificate present is
+the one corresponding to the private key. Certain software which requires
+a private key and certificate and assumes the first certificate in the
+file is the one corresponding to the private key: this may not always
+be the case. Using the B<-clcerts> option will solve this problem by only
+outputting the certificate corresponding to the private key. If the CA
+certificates are required then they can be output to a separate file using
+the B<-nokeys -cacerts> options to just output CA certificates.
+
+The B<-keypbe> and B<-certpbe> algorithms allow the precise encryption
+algorithms for private keys and certificates to be specified. Normally
+the defaults are fine but occasionally software can't handle triple DES
+encrypted private keys, then the option B<-keypbe PBE-SHA1-RC2-40> can
+be used to reduce the private key encryption to 40 bit RC2. A complete
+description of all algorithms is contained in the B<pkcs8> manual page.
+
+Prior 1.1 release passwords containing non-ASCII characters were encoded
+in non-compliant manner, which limited interoperability, in first hand
+with Windows. But switching to standard-compliant password encoding
+poses problem accessing old data protected with broken encoding. For
+this reason even legacy encodings is attempted when reading the
+data. If you use PKCS#12 files in production application you are advised
+to convert the data, because implemented heuristic approach is not
+MT-safe, its sole goal is to facilitate the data upgrade with this
+utility.
+
+=head1 EXAMPLES
+
+Parse a PKCS#12 file and output it to a file:
+
+ openssl pkcs12 -in file.p12 -out file.pem
+
+Output only client certificates to a file:
+
+ openssl pkcs12 -in file.p12 -clcerts -out file.pem
+
+Don't encrypt the private key:
+
+ openssl pkcs12 -in file.p12 -out file.pem -nodes
+
+Print some info about a PKCS#12 file:
+
+ openssl pkcs12 -in file.p12 -info -noout
+
+Create a PKCS#12 file:
+
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -in file.pem -out file.p12 -name "My Certificate"
+
+Include some extra certificates:
+
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -in file.pem -out file.p12 -name "My Certificate" \
+  -certfile othercerts.pem
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<pkcs8(1)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/pkcs7.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/pkcs7.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..340b72d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/pkcs7.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+openssl-pkcs7,
+pkcs7 - PKCS#7 utility
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+B<openssl> B<pkcs7>
+[B<-help>]
+[B<-inform PEM|DER>]
+[B<-outform PEM|DER>]
+[B<-in filename>]
+[B<-out filename>]
+[B<-print_certs>]
+[B<-text>]
+[B<-noout>]
+[B<-engine id>]
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The B<pkcs7> command processes PKCS#7 files in DER or PEM format.
+
+=head1 OPTIONS
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<-help>
+
+Print out a usage message.
+
+=item B<-inform DER|PEM>
+
+This specifies the input format. B<DER> format is DER encoded PKCS#7
+v1.5 structure.B<PEM> (the default) is a base64 encoded version of
+the DER form with header and footer lines.
+
+=item B<-outform DER|PEM>
+
+This specifies the output format, the options have the same meaning as the
+B<-inform> option.
+
+=item B<-in filename>
+
+This specifies the input filename to read from or standard input if this
+option is not specified.
+
+=item B<-out filename>
+
+specifies the output filename to write to or standard output by
+default.
+
+=item B<-print_certs>
+
+prints out any certificates or CRLs contained in the file. They are
+preceded by their subject and issuer names in one line format.
+
+=item B<-text>
+
+prints out certificates details in full rather than just subject and
+issuer names.
+
+=item B<-noout>
+
+don't output the encoded version of the PKCS#7 structure (or certificates
+is B<-print_certs> is set).
+
+=item B<-engine id>
+
+specifying an engine (by its unique B<id> string) will cause B<pkcs7>
+to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine,
+thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default
+for all available algorithms.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 EXAMPLES
+
+Convert a PKCS#7 file from PEM to DER:
+
+ openssl pkcs7 -in file.pem -outform DER -out file.der
+
+Output all certificates in a file:
+
+ openssl pkcs7 -in file.pem -print_certs -out certs.pem
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The PEM PKCS#7 format uses the header and footer lines:
+
+ -----BEGIN PKCS7-----
+ -----END PKCS7-----
+
+For compatibility with some CAs it will also accept:
+
+ -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+ -----END CERTIFICATE-----
+
+=head1 RESTRICTIONS
+
+There is no option to print out all the fields of a PKCS#7 file.
+
+This PKCS#7 routines only understand PKCS#7 v 1.5 as specified in RFC2315 they
+cannot currently parse, for example, the new CMS as described in RFC2630.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<crl2pkcs7(1)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/pkcs8.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/pkcs8.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..402e7b2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/pkcs8.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,302 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+openssl-pkcs8,
+pkcs8 - PKCS#8 format private key conversion tool
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+B<openssl> B<pkcs8>
+[B<-help>]
+[B<-topk8>]
+[B<-inform PEM|DER>]
+[B<-outform PEM|DER>]
+[B<-in filename>]
+[B<-passin arg>]
+[B<-out filename>]
+[B<-passout arg>]
+[B<-iter count>]
+[B<-noiter>]
+[B<-nocrypt>]
+[B<-traditional>]
+[B<-v2 alg>]
+[B<-v2prf alg>]
+[B<-v1 alg>]
+[B<-engine id>]
+[B<-scrypt>]
+[B<-scrypt_N N>]
+[B<-scrypt_r r>]
+[B<-scrypt_p p>]
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The B<pkcs8> command processes private keys in PKCS#8 format. It can handle
+both unencrypted PKCS#8 PrivateKeyInfo format and EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo
+format with a variety of PKCS#5 (v1.5 and v2.0) and PKCS#12 algorithms.
+
+=head1 OPTIONS
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<-help>
+
+Print out a usage message.
+
+=item B<-topk8>
+
+Normally a PKCS#8 private key is expected on input and a private key will be
+written to the output file. With the B<-topk8> option the situation is
+reversed: it reads a private key and writes a PKCS#8 format key.
+
+=item B<-inform DER|PEM>
+
+This specifies the input format: see L<KEY FORMATS> for more details.
+
+=item B<-outform DER|PEM>
+
+This specifies the output format: see L<KEY FORMATS> for more details.
+
+=item B<-traditional>
+
+When this option is present and B<-topk8> is not a traditional format private
+key is written.
+
+=item B<-in filename>
+
+This specifies the input filename to read a key from or standard input if this
+option is not specified. If the key is encrypted a pass phrase will be
+prompted for.
+
+=item B<-passin arg>
+
+the input file password source. For more information about the format of B<arg>
+see the B<PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS> section in L<openssl(1)>.
+
+=item B<-out filename>
+
+This specifies the output filename to write a key to or standard output by
+default. If any encryption options are set then a pass phrase will be
+prompted for. The output filename should B<not> be the same as the input
+filename.
+
+=item B<-passout arg>
+
+the output file password source. For more information about the format of B<arg>
+see the B<PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS> section in L<openssl(1)>.
+
+=item B<-iter count>
+
+When creating new PKCS#8 containers, use a given number of iterations on
+the password in deriving the encryption key for the PKCS#8 output.
+High values increase the time required to brute-force a PKCS#8 container.
+
+=item B<-nocrypt>
+
+PKCS#8 keys generated or input are normally PKCS#8 EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo
+structures using an appropriate password based encryption algorithm. With
+this option an unencrypted PrivateKeyInfo structure is expected or output.
+This option does not encrypt private keys at all and should only be used
+when absolutely necessary. Certain software such as some versions of Java
+code signing software used unencrypted private keys.
+
+=item B<-v2 alg>
+
+This option sets the PKCS#5 v2.0 algorithm.
+
+The B<alg> argument is the encryption algorithm to use, valid values include
+B<aes128>, B<aes256> and B<des3>. If this option isn't specified then B<aes256>
+is used.
+
+=item B<-v2prf alg>
+
+This option sets the PRF algorithm to use with PKCS#5 v2.0. A typical value
+value would be B<hmacWithSHA256>. If this option isn't set then the default
+for the cipher is used or B<hmacWithSHA256> if there is no default.
+
+Some implementations may not support custom PRF algorithms and may require
+the B<hmacWithSHA1> option to work.
+
+=item B<-v1 alg>
+
+This option indicates a PKCS#5 v1.5 or PKCS#12 algorithm should be used.  Some
+older implementations may not support PKCS#5 v2.0 and may require this option.
+If not specified PKCS#5 v2.0 form is used.
+
+=item B<-engine id>
+
+specifying an engine (by its unique B<id> string) will cause B<pkcs8>
+to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine,
+thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default
+for all available algorithms.
+
+=item B<-scrypt>
+
+uses the B<scrypt> algorithm for private key encryption using default
+parameters: currently N=16384, r=8 and p=1 and AES in CBC mode with a 256 bit
+key. These parameters can be modified using the B<-scrypt_N>, B<-scrypt_r>,
+B<-scrypt_p> and B<-v2> options.
+
+B<-scrypt_N N> B<-scrypt_r r> B<-scrypt_p p>
+
+sets the scrypt B<N>, B<r> or B<p> parameters.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 KEY FORMATS
+
+Various different formats are used by the pkcs8 utility. These are detailed
+below.
+
+If a key is being converted from PKCS#8 form (i.e. the B<-topk8> option is
+not used) then the input file must be in PKCS#8 format. An encrypted
+key is expected unless B<-nocrypt> is included.
+
+If B<-topk8> is not used and B<PEM> mode is set the output file will be an
+unencrypted private key in PKCS#8 format. If the B<-traditional> option is
+used then a traditional format private key is written instead.
+
+If B<-topk8> is not used and B<DER> mode is set the output file will be an
+unencrypted private key in traditional DER format.
+
+If B<-topk8> is used then any supported private key can be used for the input
+file in a format specified by B<-inform>. The output file will be encrypted
+PKCS#8 format using the specified encryption parameters unless B<-nocrypt>
+is included.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+By default, when converting a key to PKCS#8 format, PKCS#5 v2.0 using 256 bit
+AES with HMAC and SHA256 is used.
+
+Some older implementations do not support PKCS#5 v2.0 format and require
+the older PKCS#5 v1.5 form instead, possibly also requiring insecure weak
+encryption algorithms such as 56 bit DES.
+
+The encrypted form of a PEM encode PKCS#8 files uses the following
+headers and footers:
+
+ -----BEGIN ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY-----
+ -----END ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+The unencrypted form uses:
+
+ -----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+ -----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+Private keys encrypted using PKCS#5 v2.0 algorithms and high iteration
+counts are more secure that those encrypted using the traditional
+SSLeay compatible formats. So if additional security is considered
+important the keys should be converted.
+
+It is possible to write out DER encoded encrypted private keys in
+PKCS#8 format because the encryption details are included at an ASN1
+level whereas the traditional format includes them at a PEM level.
+
+=head1 PKCS#5 v1.5 and PKCS#12 algorithms.
+
+Various algorithms can be used with the B<-v1> command line option,
+including PKCS#5 v1.5 and PKCS#12. These are described in more detail
+below.
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<PBE-MD2-DES PBE-MD5-DES>
+
+These algorithms were included in the original PKCS#5 v1.5 specification.
+They only offer 56 bits of protection since they both use DES.
+
+=item B<PBE-SHA1-RC2-64 PBE-MD2-RC2-64 PBE-MD5-RC2-64 PBE-SHA1-DES>
+
+These algorithms are not mentioned in the original PKCS#5 v1.5 specification
+but they use the same key derivation algorithm and are supported by some
+software. They are mentioned in PKCS#5 v2.0. They use either 64 bit RC2 or
+56 bit DES.
+
+=item B<PBE-SHA1-RC4-128 PBE-SHA1-RC4-40 PBE-SHA1-3DES PBE-SHA1-2DES PBE-SHA1-RC2-128 PBE-SHA1-RC2-40>
+
+These algorithms use the PKCS#12 password based encryption algorithm and
+allow strong encryption algorithms like triple DES or 128 bit RC2 to be used.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 EXAMPLES
+
+Convert a private key to PKCS#8 format using default parameters (AES with
+256 bit key and B<hmacWithSHA256>):
+
+ openssl pkcs8 -in key.pem -topk8 -out enckey.pem
+
+Convert a private key to PKCS#8 unencrypted format:
+
+ openssl pkcs8 -in key.pem -topk8 -nocrypt -out enckey.pem
+
+Convert a private key to PKCS#5 v2.0 format using triple DES:
+
+ openssl pkcs8 -in key.pem -topk8 -v2 des3 -out enckey.pem
+
+Convert a private key to PKCS#5 v2.0 format using AES with 256 bits in CBC
+mode and B<hmacWithSHA512> PRF:
+
+ openssl pkcs8 -in key.pem -topk8 -v2 aes-256-cbc -v2prf hmacWithSHA512 -out enckey.pem
+
+Convert a private key to PKCS#8 using a PKCS#5 1.5 compatible algorithm
+(DES):
+
+ openssl pkcs8 -in key.pem -topk8 -v1 PBE-MD5-DES -out enckey.pem
+
+Convert a private key to PKCS#8 using a PKCS#12 compatible algorithm
+(3DES):
+
+ openssl pkcs8 -in key.pem -topk8 -out enckey.pem -v1 PBE-SHA1-3DES
+
+Read a DER unencrypted PKCS#8 format private key:
+
+ openssl pkcs8 -inform DER -nocrypt -in key.der -out key.pem
+
+Convert a private key from any PKCS#8 encrypted format to traditional format:
+
+ openssl pkcs8 -in pk8.pem -traditional -out key.pem
+
+Convert a private key to PKCS#8 format, encrypting with AES-256 and with
+one million iterations of the password:
+
+ openssl pkcs8 -in key.pem -topk8 -v2 aes-256-cbc -iter 1000000 -out pk8.pem
+
+=head1 STANDARDS
+
+Test vectors from this PKCS#5 v2.0 implementation were posted to the
+pkcs-tng mailing list using triple DES, DES and RC2 with high iteration
+counts, several people confirmed that they could decrypt the private
+keys produced and Therefore it can be assumed that the PKCS#5 v2.0
+implementation is reasonably accurate at least as far as these
+algorithms are concerned.
+
+The format of PKCS#8 DSA (and other) private keys is not well documented:
+it is hidden away in PKCS#11 v2.01, section 11.9. OpenSSL's default DSA
+PKCS#8 private key format complies with this standard.
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+There should be an option that prints out the encryption algorithm
+in use and other details such as the iteration count.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<dsa(1)>, L<rsa(1)>, L<genrsa(1)>,
+L<gendsa(1)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+The B<-iter> option was added to OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/pkey.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/pkey.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ef2e463
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/pkey.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+openssl-pkey,
+pkey - public or private key processing tool
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+B<openssl> B<pkey>
+[B<-help>]
+[B<-inform PEM|DER>]
+[B<-outform PEM|DER>]
+[B<-in filename>]
+[B<-passin arg>]
+[B<-out filename>]
+[B<-passout arg>]
+[B<-traditional>]
+[B<-cipher>]
+[B<-text>]
+[B<-text_pub>]
+[B<-noout>]
+[B<-pubin>]
+[B<-pubout>]
+[B<-engine id>]
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The B<pkey> command processes public or private keys. They can be converted
+between various forms and their components printed out.
+
+=head1 OPTIONS
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<-help>
+
+Print out a usage message.
+
+=item B<-inform DER|PEM>
+
+This specifies the input format DER or PEM.
+
+=item B<-outform DER|PEM>
+
+This specifies the output format, the options have the same meaning as the
+B<-inform> option.
+
+=item B<-in filename>
+
+This specifies the input filename to read a key from or standard input if this
+option is not specified. If the key is encrypted a pass phrase will be
+prompted for.
+
+=item B<-passin arg>
+
+the input file password source. For more information about the format of B<arg>
+see the B<PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS> section in L<openssl(1)>.
+
+=item B<-out filename>
+
+This specifies the output filename to write a key to or standard output if this
+option is not specified. If any encryption options are set then a pass phrase
+will be prompted for. The output filename should B<not> be the same as the input
+filename.
+
+=item B<-passout password>
+
+the output file password source. For more information about the format of B<arg>
+see the B<PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS> section in L<openssl(1)>.
+
+=item B<-traditional>
+
+normally a private key is written using standard format: this is PKCS#8 form
+with the appropriate encryption algorithm (if any). If the B<-traditional>
+option is specified then the older "traditional" format is used instead.
+
+=item B<-cipher>
+
+These options encrypt the private key with the supplied cipher. Any algorithm
+name accepted by EVP_get_cipherbyname() is acceptable such as B<des3>.
+
+=item B<-text>
+
+prints out the various public or private key components in
+plain text in addition to the encoded version.
+
+=item B<-text_pub>
+
+print out only public key components even if a private key is being processed.
+
+=item B<-noout>
+
+do not output the encoded version of the key.
+
+=item B<-pubin>
+
+by default a private key is read from the input file: with this
+option a public key is read instead.
+
+=item B<-pubout>
+
+by default a private key is output: with this option a public
+key will be output instead. This option is automatically set if
+the input is a public key.
+
+=item B<-engine id>
+
+specifying an engine (by its unique B<id> string) will cause B<pkey>
+to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine,
+thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default
+for all available algorithms.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 EXAMPLES
+
+To remove the pass phrase on an RSA private key:
+
+ openssl pkey -in key.pem -out keyout.pem
+
+To encrypt a private key using triple DES:
+
+ openssl pkey -in key.pem -des3 -out keyout.pem
+
+To convert a private key from PEM to DER format:
+
+ openssl pkey -in key.pem -outform DER -out keyout.der
+
+To print out the components of a private key to standard output:
+
+ openssl pkey -in key.pem -text -noout
+
+To print out the public components of a private key to standard output:
+
+ openssl pkey -in key.pem -text_pub -noout
+
+To just output the public part of a private key:
+
+ openssl pkey -in key.pem -pubout -out pubkey.pem
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<genpkey(1)>, L<rsa(1)>, L<pkcs8(1)>,
+L<dsa(1)>, L<genrsa(1)>, L<gendsa(1)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/pkeyparam.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/pkeyparam.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..309e249
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/pkeyparam.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+openssl-pkeyparam,
+pkeyparam - public key algorithm parameter processing tool
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+B<openssl> B<pkeyparam>
+[B<-help>]
+[B<-in filename>]
+[B<-out filename>]
+[B<-text>]
+[B<-noout>]
+[B<-engine id>]
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The B<pkey> command processes public or private keys. They can be converted
+between various forms and their components printed out.
+
+=head1 OPTIONS
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<-help>
+
+Print out a usage message.
+
+=item B<-in filename>
+
+This specifies the input filename to read parameters from or standard input if
+this option is not specified.
+
+=item B<-out filename>
+
+This specifies the output filename to write parameters to or standard output if
+this option is not specified.
+
+=item B<-text>
+
+prints out the parameters in plain text in addition to the encoded version.
+
+=item B<-noout>
+
+do not output the encoded version of the parameters.
+
+=item B<-engine id>
+
+specifying an engine (by its unique B<id> string) will cause B<pkeyparam>
+to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine,
+thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default
+for all available algorithms.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 EXAMPLE
+
+Print out text version of parameters:
+
+ openssl pkeyparam -in param.pem -text
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+There are no B<-inform> or B<-outform> options for this command because only
+PEM format is supported because the key type is determined by the PEM headers.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<genpkey(1)>, L<rsa(1)>, L<pkcs8(1)>,
+L<dsa(1)>, L<genrsa(1)>, L<gendsa(1)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/pkeyutl.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/pkeyutl.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e72486d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/pkeyutl.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,293 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+openssl-pkeyutl,
+pkeyutl - public key algorithm utility
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+B<openssl> B<pkeyutl>
+[B<-help>]
+[B<-in file>]
+[B<-out file>]
+[B<-sigfile file>]
+[B<-inkey file>]
+[B<-keyform PEM|DER|ENGINE>]
+[B<-passin arg>]
+[B<-peerkey file>]
+[B<-peerform PEM|DER|ENGINE>]
+[B<-pubin>]
+[B<-certin>]
+[B<-rev>]
+[B<-sign>]
+[B<-verify>]
+[B<-verifyrecover>]
+[B<-encrypt>]
+[B<-decrypt>]
+[B<-derive>]
+[B<-kdf algorithm>]
+[B<-kdflen length>]
+[B<-pkeyopt opt:value>]
+[B<-hexdump>]
+[B<-asn1parse>]
+[B<-engine id>]
+[B<-engine_impl>]
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The B<pkeyutl> command can be used to perform public key operations using
+any supported algorithm.
+
+=head1 OPTIONS
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<-help>
+
+Print out a usage message.
+
+=item B<-in filename>
+
+This specifies the input filename to read data from or standard input
+if this option is not specified.
+
+=item B<-out filename>
+
+specifies the output filename to write to or standard output by
+default.
+
+=item B<-sigfile file>
+
+Signature file, required for B<verify> operations only
+
+=item B<-inkey file>
+
+the input key file, by default it should be a private key.
+
+=item B<-keyform PEM|DER|ENGINE>
+
+the key format PEM, DER or ENGINE. Default is PEM.
+
+=item B<-passin arg>
+
+the input key password source. For more information about the format of B<arg>
+see the B<PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS> section in L<openssl(1)>.
+
+
+=item B<-peerkey file>
+
+the peer key file, used by key derivation (agreement) operations.
+
+=item B<-peerform PEM|DER|ENGINE>
+
+the peer key format PEM, DER or ENGINE. Default is PEM.
+
+=item B<-pubin>
+
+the input file is a public key.
+
+=item B<-certin>
+
+the input is a certificate containing a public key.
+
+=item B<-rev>
+
+reverse the order of the input buffer. This is useful for some libraries
+(such as CryptoAPI) which represent the buffer in little endian format.
+
+=item B<-sign>
+
+sign the input data and output the signed result. This requires
+a private key.
+
+=item B<-verify>
+
+verify the input data against the signature file and indicate if the
+verification succeeded or failed.
+
+=item B<-verifyrecover>
+
+verify the input data and output the recovered data.
+
+=item B<-encrypt>
+
+encrypt the input data using a public key.
+
+=item B<-decrypt>
+
+decrypt the input data using a private key.
+
+=item B<-derive>
+
+derive a shared secret using the peer key.
+
+=item B<-kdf algorithm>
+
+Use key derivation function B<algorithm>.  The supported algorithms are
+at present B<TLS1-PRF> and B<HKDF>.
+Note: additional parameters and the KDF output length will normally have to be
+set for this to work.
+See L<EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_hkdf_md(3)> and L<EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_tls1_prf_md(3)>
+for the supported string parameters of each algorithm.
+
+=item B<-kdflen length>
+
+Set the output length for KDF.
+
+=item B<-pkeyopt opt:value>
+
+Public key options specified as opt:value. See NOTES below for more details.
+
+=item B<-hexdump>
+
+hex dump the output data.
+
+=item B<-asn1parse>
+
+asn1parse the output data, this is useful when combined with the
+B<-verifyrecover> option when an ASN1 structure is signed.
+
+=item B<-engine id>
+
+specifying an engine (by its unique B<id> string) will cause B<pkeyutl>
+to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine,
+thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default
+for all available algorithms.
+
+=item B<-engine_impl>
+
+When used with the B<-engine> option, it specifies to also use
+engine B<id> for crypto operations.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The operations and options supported vary according to the key algorithm
+and its implementation. The OpenSSL operations and options are indicated below.
+
+Unless otherwise mentioned all algorithms support the B<digest:alg> option
+which specifies the digest in use for sign, verify and verifyrecover operations.
+The value B<alg> should represent a digest name as used in the
+EVP_get_digestbyname() function for example B<sha1>.
+This value is used only for sanity-checking the lengths of data passed in to
+the B<pkeyutl> and for creating the structures that make up the signature
+(e.g. B<DigestInfo> in RSASSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signatures).
+In case of RSA, ECDSA and DSA signatures, this utility
+will not perform hashing on input data but rather use the data directly as
+input of signature algorithm. Depending on key type, signature type and mode
+of padding, the maximum acceptable lengths of input data differ. In general,
+with RSA the signed data can't be longer than the key modulus, in case of ECDSA
+and DSA the data shouldn't be longer than field size, otherwise it will be
+silently truncated to field size.
+
+In other words, if the value of digest is B<sha1> the input should be 20 bytes
+long binary encoding of SHA-1 hash function output.
+
+=head1 RSA ALGORITHM
+
+The RSA algorithm generally supports the encrypt, decrypt, sign,
+verify and verifyrecover operations. However, some padding modes
+support only a subset of these operations. The following additional
+B<pkeyopt> values are supported:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<rsa_padding_mode:mode>
+
+This sets the RSA padding mode. Acceptable values for B<mode> are B<pkcs1> for
+PKCS#1 padding, B<sslv23> for SSLv23 padding, B<none> for no padding, B<oaep>
+for B<OAEP> mode, B<x931> for X9.31 mode and B<pss> for PSS.
+
+In PKCS#1 padding if the message digest is not set then the supplied data is
+signed or verified directly instead of using a B<DigestInfo> structure. If a
+digest is set then the a B<DigestInfo> structure is used and its the length
+must correspond to the digest type.
+
+For B<oaep> mode only encryption and decryption is supported.
+
+For B<x931> if the digest type is set it is used to format the block data
+otherwise the first byte is used to specify the X9.31 digest ID. Sign,
+verify and verifyrecover are can be performed in this mode.
+
+For B<pss> mode only sign and verify are supported and the digest type must be
+specified.
+
+=item B<rsa_pss_saltlen:len>
+
+For B<pss> mode only this option specifies the salt length. Two special values
+are supported: -1 sets the salt length to the digest length. When signing -2
+sets the salt length to the maximum permissible value. When verifying -2 causes
+the salt length to be automatically determined based on the B<PSS> block
+structure.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 DSA ALGORITHM
+
+The DSA algorithm supports signing and verification operations only. Currently
+there are no additional options other than B<digest>. Only the SHA1
+digest can be used and this digest is assumed by default.
+
+=head1 DH ALGORITHM
+
+The DH algorithm only supports the derivation operation and no additional
+options.
+
+=head1 EC ALGORITHM
+
+The EC algorithm supports sign, verify and derive operations. The sign and
+verify operations use ECDSA and derive uses ECDH. Currently there are no
+additional options other than B<digest>. Only the SHA1 digest can be used and
+this digest is assumed by default.
+
+=head1 X25519 ALGORITHM
+
+The X25519 algorithm supports key derivation only. Currently there are no
+additional options.
+
+=head1 EXAMPLES
+
+Sign some data using a private key:
+
+ openssl pkeyutl -sign -in file -inkey key.pem -out sig
+
+Recover the signed data (e.g. if an RSA key is used):
+
+ openssl pkeyutl -verifyrecover -in sig -inkey key.pem
+
+Verify the signature (e.g. a DSA key):
+
+ openssl pkeyutl -verify -in file -sigfile sig -inkey key.pem
+
+Sign data using a message digest value (this is currently only valid for RSA):
+
+ openssl pkeyutl -sign -in file -inkey key.pem -out sig -pkeyopt digest:sha256
+
+Derive a shared secret value:
+
+ openssl pkeyutl -derive -inkey key.pem -peerkey pubkey.pem -out secret
+
+Hexdump 48 bytes of TLS1 PRF using digest B<SHA256> and shared secret and
+seed consisting of the single byte 0xFF:
+
+ openssl pkeyutl -kdf TLS1-PRF -kdflen 48 -pkeyopt md:SHA256 \
+    -pkeyopt hexsecret:ff -pkeyopt hexseed:ff -hexdump
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<genpkey(1)>, L<pkey(1)>, L<rsautl(1)>
+L<dgst(1)>, L<rsa(1)>, L<genrsa(1)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_hkdf_md(3)>, L<EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_tls1_prf_md(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/rand.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/rand.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4cdb370
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/rand.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+openssl-rand,
+rand - generate pseudo-random bytes
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+B<openssl rand>
+[B<-help>]
+[B<-out> I<file>]
+[B<-rand> I<file(s)>]
+[B<-base64>]
+[B<-hex>]
+I<num>
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The B<rand> command outputs I<num> pseudo-random bytes after seeding
+the random number generator once.  As in other B<openssl> command
+line tools, PRNG seeding uses the file I<$HOME/>B<.rnd> or B<.rnd>
+in addition to the files given in the B<-rand> option.  A new
+I<$HOME>/B<.rnd> or B<.rnd> file will be written back if enough
+seeding was obtained from these sources.
+
+=head1 OPTIONS
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<-help>
+
+Print out a usage message.
+
+=item B<-out> I<file>
+
+Write to I<file> instead of standard output.
+
+=item B<-rand> I<file(s)>
+
+Use specified file or files or EGD socket (see L<RAND_egd(3)>)
+for seeding the random number generator.
+Multiple files can be specified separated by an OS-dependent character.
+The separator is B<;> for MS-Windows, B<,> for OpenVMS, and B<:> for
+all others.
+
+=item B<-base64>
+
+Perform base64 encoding on the output.
+
+=item B<-hex>
+
+Show the output as a hex string.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<RAND_bytes(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/rehash.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/rehash.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..79268d4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/rehash.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
+=pod
+
+=for comment
+Original text by James Westby, contributed under the OpenSSL license.
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+openssl-c_rehash, openssl-rehash,
+c_rehash, rehash - Create symbolic links to files named by the hash values
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+B<openssl>
+B<rehash>
+B<[-h]>
+B<[-help]>
+B<[-old]>
+B<[-n]>
+B<[-v]>
+[ I<directory>...]
+
+B<c_rehash>
+I<flags...>
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+On some platforms, the OpenSSL B<rehash> command is available as
+an external script called B<c_rehash>.  They are functionally equivalent,
+except for minor differences noted below.
+
+B<rehash> scans directories and calculates a hash value of each
+C<.pem>, C<.crt>, C<.cer>, or C<.crl>
+file in the specified directory list and creates symbolic links
+for each file, where the name of the link is the hash value.
+(If the platform does not support symbolic links, a copy is made.)
+This utility is useful as many programs that use OpenSSL require
+directories to be set up like this in order to find certificates.
+
+If any directories are named on the command line, then those are
+processed in turn. If not, then the B<SSL_CERT_DIR> environment variable
+is consulted; this should be a colon-separated list of directories,
+like the Unix B<PATH> variable.
+If that is not set then the default directory (installation-specific
+but often B</usr/local/ssl/certs>) is processed.
+
+In order for a directory to be processed, the user must have write
+permissions on that directory, otherwise an error will be generated.
+
+The links created are of the form C<HHHHHHHH.D>, where each B<H>
+is a hexadecimal character and B<D> is a single decimal digit.
+When processing a directory, B<rehash> will first remove all links
+that have a name in that syntax, even if they are being used for some
+other purpose.
+To skip the removal step, use the B<-n> flag.
+Hashes for CRL's look similar except the letter B<r> appears after
+the period, like this: C<HHHHHHHH.rD>.
+
+Multiple objects may have the same hash; they will be indicated by
+incrementing the B<D> value. Duplicates are found by comparing the
+full SHA-1 fingerprint. A warning will be displayed if a duplicate
+is found.
+
+A warning will also be displayed if there are files that
+cannot be parsed as either a certificate or a CRL or if
+more than one such object appears in the file.
+
+=head2 Script Configuration
+
+The B<c_rehash> script
+uses the B<openssl> program to compute the hashes and
+fingerprints. If not found in the user's B<PATH>, then set the
+B<OPENSSL> environment variable to the full pathname.
+Any program can be used, it will be invoked as follows for either
+a certificate or CRL:
+
+  $OPENSSL x509 -hash -fingerprint -noout -in FILENAME
+  $OPENSSL crl -hash -fingerprint -noout -in FILENAME
+
+where B<FILENAME> is the filename. It must output the hash of the
+file on the first line, and the fingerprint on the second,
+optionally prefixed with some text and an equals sign.
+
+=head1 OPTIONS
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<-help> B<-h>
+
+Display a brief usage message.
+
+=item B<-old>
+
+Use old-style hashing (MD5, as opposed to SHA-1) for generating
+links to be used for releases before 1.0.0.
+Note that current versions will not use the old style.
+
+=item B<-n>
+
+Do not remove existing links.
+This is needed when keeping new and old-style links in the same directory.
+
+=item B<-v>
+
+Print messages about old links removed and new links created.
+By default, B<rehash> only lists each directory as it is processed.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 ENVIRONMENT
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<OPENSSL>
+
+The path to an executable to use to generate hashes and
+fingerprints (see above).
+
+=item B<SSL_CERT_DIR>
+
+Colon separated list of directories to operate on.
+Ignored if directories are listed on the command line.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<openssl(1)>,
+L<crl(1)>.
+L<x509(1)>.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/req.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/req.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c5b5260
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/req.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,662 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+openssl-req,
+req - PKCS#10 certificate request and certificate generating utility
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+B<openssl> B<req>
+[B<-help>]
+[B<-inform PEM|DER>]
+[B<-outform PEM|DER>]
+[B<-in filename>]
+[B<-passin arg>]
+[B<-out filename>]
+[B<-passout arg>]
+[B<-text>]
+[B<-pubkey>]
+[B<-noout>]
+[B<-verify>]
+[B<-modulus>]
+[B<-new>]
+[B<-rand file(s)>]
+[B<-newkey rsa:bits>]
+[B<-newkey alg:file>]
+[B<-nodes>]
+[B<-key filename>]
+[B<-keyform PEM|DER>]
+[B<-keyout filename>]
+[B<-keygen_engine id>]
+[B<-[digest]>]
+[B<-config filename>]
+[B<-multivalue-rdn>]
+[B<-x509>]
+[B<-days n>]
+[B<-set_serial n>]
+[B<-newhdr>]
+[B<-extensions section>]
+[B<-reqexts section>]
+[B<-utf8>]
+[B<-nameopt>]
+[B<-reqopt>]
+[B<-subject>]
+[B<-subj arg>]
+[B<-batch>]
+[B<-verbose>]
+[B<-engine id>]
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The B<req> command primarily creates and processes certificate requests
+in PKCS#10 format. It can additionally create self signed certificates
+for use as root CAs for example.
+
+=head1 OPTIONS
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<-help>
+
+Print out a usage message.
+
+=item B<-inform DER|PEM>
+
+This specifies the input format. The B<DER> option uses an ASN1 DER encoded
+form compatible with the PKCS#10. The B<PEM> form is the default format: it
+consists of the B<DER> format base64 encoded with additional header and
+footer lines.
+
+=item B<-outform DER|PEM>
+
+This specifies the output format, the options have the same meaning as the
+B<-inform> option.
+
+=item B<-in filename>
+
+This specifies the input filename to read a request from or standard input
+if this option is not specified. A request is only read if the creation
+options (B<-new> and B<-newkey>) are not specified.
+
+=item B<-passin arg>
+
+the input file password source. For more information about the format of B<arg>
+see the B<PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS> section in L<openssl(1)>.
+
+=item B<-out filename>
+
+This specifies the output filename to write to or standard output by
+default.
+
+=item B<-passout arg>
+
+the output file password source. For more information about the format of B<arg>
+see the B<PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS> section in L<openssl(1)>.
+
+=item B<-text>
+
+prints out the certificate request in text form.
+
+=item B<-subject>
+
+prints out the request subject (or certificate subject if B<-x509> is
+specified)
+
+=item B<-pubkey>
+
+outputs the public key.
+
+=item B<-noout>
+
+this option prevents output of the encoded version of the request.
+
+=item B<-modulus>
+
+this option prints out the value of the modulus of the public key
+contained in the request.
+
+=item B<-verify>
+
+verifies the signature on the request.
+
+=item B<-new>
+
+this option generates a new certificate request. It will prompt
+the user for the relevant field values. The actual fields
+prompted for and their maximum and minimum sizes are specified
+in the configuration file and any requested extensions.
+
+If the B<-key> option is not used it will generate a new RSA private
+key using information specified in the configuration file.
+
+=item B<-rand file(s)>
+
+a file or files containing random data used to seed the random number
+generator, or an EGD socket (see L<RAND_egd(3)>).
+Multiple files can be specified separated by an OS-dependent character.
+The separator is B<;> for MS-Windows, B<,> for OpenVMS, and B<:> for
+all others.
+
+=item B<-newkey arg>
+
+this option creates a new certificate request and a new private
+key. The argument takes one of several forms. B<rsa:nbits>, where
+B<nbits> is the number of bits, generates an RSA key B<nbits>
+in size. If B<nbits> is omitted, i.e. B<-newkey rsa> specified,
+the default key size, specified in the configuration file is used.
+
+All other algorithms support the B<-newkey alg:file> form, where file may be
+an algorithm parameter file, created by the B<genpkey -genparam> command
+or and X.509 certificate for a key with appropriate algorithm.
+
+B<param:file> generates a key using the parameter file or certificate B<file>,
+the algorithm is determined by the parameters. B<algname:file> use algorithm
+B<algname> and parameter file B<file>: the two algorithms must match or an
+error occurs. B<algname> just uses algorithm B<algname>, and parameters,
+if necessary should be specified via B<-pkeyopt> parameter.
+
+B<dsa:filename> generates a DSA key using the parameters
+in the file B<filename>. B<ec:filename> generates EC key (usable both with
+ECDSA or ECDH algorithms), B<gost2001:filename> generates GOST R
+34.10-2001 key (requires B<ccgost> engine configured in the configuration
+file). If just B<gost2001> is specified a parameter set should be
+specified by B<-pkeyopt paramset:X>
+
+
+=item B<-pkeyopt opt:value>
+
+set the public key algorithm option B<opt> to B<value>. The precise set of
+options supported depends on the public key algorithm used and its
+implementation. See B<KEY GENERATION OPTIONS> in the B<genpkey> manual page
+for more details.
+
+=item B<-key filename>
+
+This specifies the file to read the private key from. It also
+accepts PKCS#8 format private keys for PEM format files.
+
+=item B<-keyform PEM|DER>
+
+the format of the private key file specified in the B<-key>
+argument. PEM is the default.
+
+=item B<-keyout filename>
+
+this gives the filename to write the newly created private key to.
+If this option is not specified then the filename present in the
+configuration file is used.
+
+=item B<-nodes>
+
+if this option is specified then if a private key is created it
+will not be encrypted.
+
+=item B<-[digest]>
+
+this specifies the message digest to sign the request.
+Any digest supported by the OpenSSL B<dgst> command can be used.
+This overrides the digest algorithm specified in
+the configuration file.
+
+Some public key algorithms may override this choice. For instance, DSA
+signatures always use SHA1, GOST R 34.10 signatures always use
+GOST R 34.11-94 (B<-md_gost94>).
+
+=item B<-config filename>
+
+this allows an alternative configuration file to be specified.
+Optional; for a description of the default value,
+see L<openssl(1)/COMMAND SUMMARY>.
+
+=item B<-subj arg>
+
+sets subject name for new request or supersedes the subject name
+when processing a request.
+The arg must be formatted as I</type0=value0/type1=value1/type2=...>,
+characters may be escaped by \ (backslash), no spaces are skipped.
+
+=item B<-multivalue-rdn>
+
+this option causes the -subj argument to be interpreted with full
+support for multivalued RDNs. Example:
+
+I</DC=org/DC=OpenSSL/DC=users/UID=123456+CN=John Doe>
+
+If -multi-rdn is not used then the UID value is I<123456+CN=John Doe>.
+
+=item B<-x509>
+
+this option outputs a self signed certificate instead of a certificate
+request. This is typically used to generate a test certificate or
+a self signed root CA. The extensions added to the certificate
+(if any) are specified in the configuration file. Unless specified
+using the B<set_serial> option, a large random number will be used for
+the serial number.
+
+If existing request is specified with the B<-in> option, it is converted
+to the self signed certificate otherwise new request is created.
+
+=item B<-days n>
+
+when the B<-x509> option is being used this specifies the number of
+days to certify the certificate for. The default is 30 days.
+
+=item B<-set_serial n>
+
+serial number to use when outputting a self signed certificate. This
+may be specified as a decimal value or a hex value if preceded by B<0x>.
+
+=item B<-extensions section>
+
+=item B<-reqexts section>
+
+these options specify alternative sections to include certificate
+extensions (if the B<-x509> option is present) or certificate
+request extensions. This allows several different sections to
+be used in the same configuration file to specify requests for
+a variety of purposes.
+
+=item B<-utf8>
+
+this option causes field values to be interpreted as UTF8 strings, by
+default they are interpreted as ASCII. This means that the field
+values, whether prompted from a terminal or obtained from a
+configuration file, must be valid UTF8 strings.
+
+=item B<-nameopt option>
+
+option which determines how the subject or issuer names are displayed. The
+B<option> argument can be a single option or multiple options separated by
+commas.  Alternatively the B<-nameopt> switch may be used more than once to
+set multiple options. See the L<x509(1)> manual page for details.
+
+=item B<-reqopt>
+
+customise the output format used with B<-text>. The B<option> argument can be
+a single option or multiple options separated by commas.
+
+See discussion of the  B<-certopt> parameter in the L<x509(1)>
+command.
+
+=item B<-newhdr>
+
+Adds the word B<NEW> to the PEM file header and footer lines on the outputted
+request. Some software (Netscape certificate server) and some CAs need this.
+
+=item B<-batch>
+
+non-interactive mode.
+
+=item B<-verbose>
+
+print extra details about the operations being performed.
+
+=item B<-engine id>
+
+specifying an engine (by its unique B<id> string) will cause B<req>
+to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine,
+thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default
+for all available algorithms.
+
+=item B<-keygen_engine id>
+
+specifies an engine (by its unique B<id> string) which would be used
+for key generation operations.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 CONFIGURATION FILE FORMAT
+
+The configuration options are specified in the B<req> section of
+the configuration file. As with all configuration files if no
+value is specified in the specific section (i.e. B<req>) then
+the initial unnamed or B<default> section is searched too.
+
+The options available are described in detail below.
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<input_password output_password>
+
+The passwords for the input private key file (if present) and
+the output private key file (if one will be created). The
+command line options B<passin> and B<passout> override the
+configuration file values.
+
+=item B<default_bits>
+
+Specifies the default key size in bits.
+
+This option is used in conjunction with the B<-new> option to generate
+a new key. It can be overridden by specifying an explicit key size in
+the B<-newkey> option. The smallest accepted key size is 512 bits. If
+no key size is specified then 2048 bits is used.
+
+=item B<default_keyfile>
+
+This is the default filename to write a private key to. If not
+specified the key is written to standard output. This can be
+overridden by the B<-keyout> option.
+
+=item B<oid_file>
+
+This specifies a file containing additional B<OBJECT IDENTIFIERS>.
+Each line of the file should consist of the numerical form of the
+object identifier followed by white space then the short name followed
+by white space and finally the long name.
+
+=item B<oid_section>
+
+This specifies a section in the configuration file containing extra
+object identifiers. Each line should consist of the short name of the
+object identifier followed by B<=> and the numerical form. The short
+and long names are the same when this option is used.
+
+=item B<RANDFILE>
+
+This specifies a filename in which random number seed information is
+placed and read from, or an EGD socket (see L<RAND_egd(3)>).
+It is used for private key generation.
+
+=item B<encrypt_key>
+
+If this is set to B<no> then if a private key is generated it is
+B<not> encrypted. This is equivalent to the B<-nodes> command line
+option. For compatibility B<encrypt_rsa_key> is an equivalent option.
+
+=item B<default_md>
+
+This option specifies the digest algorithm to use.
+Any digest supported by the OpenSSL B<dgst> command can be used.
+If not present then MD5 is used.
+This option can be overridden on the command line.
+
+=item B<string_mask>
+
+This option masks out the use of certain string types in certain
+fields. Most users will not need to change this option.
+
+It can be set to several values B<default> which is also the default
+option uses PrintableStrings, T61Strings and BMPStrings if the
+B<pkix> value is used then only PrintableStrings and BMPStrings will
+be used. This follows the PKIX recommendation in RFC2459. If the
+B<utf8only> option is used then only UTF8Strings will be used: this
+is the PKIX recommendation in RFC2459 after 2003. Finally the B<nombstr>
+option just uses PrintableStrings and T61Strings: certain software has
+problems with BMPStrings and UTF8Strings: in particular Netscape.
+
+=item B<req_extensions>
+
+this specifies the configuration file section containing a list of
+extensions to add to the certificate request. It can be overridden
+by the B<-reqexts> command line switch. See the
+L<x509v3_config(5)> manual page for details of the
+extension section format.
+
+=item B<x509_extensions>
+
+this specifies the configuration file section containing a list of
+extensions to add to certificate generated when the B<-x509> switch
+is used. It can be overridden by the B<-extensions> command line switch.
+
+=item B<prompt>
+
+if set to the value B<no> this disables prompting of certificate fields
+and just takes values from the config file directly. It also changes the
+expected format of the B<distinguished_name> and B<attributes> sections.
+
+=item B<utf8>
+
+if set to the value B<yes> then field values to be interpreted as UTF8
+strings, by default they are interpreted as ASCII. This means that
+the field values, whether prompted from a terminal or obtained from a
+configuration file, must be valid UTF8 strings.
+
+=item B<attributes>
+
+this specifies the section containing any request attributes: its format
+is the same as B<distinguished_name>. Typically these may contain the
+challengePassword or unstructuredName types. They are currently ignored
+by OpenSSL's request signing utilities but some CAs might want them.
+
+=item B<distinguished_name>
+
+This specifies the section containing the distinguished name fields to
+prompt for when generating a certificate or certificate request. The format
+is described in the next section.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 DISTINGUISHED NAME AND ATTRIBUTE SECTION FORMAT
+
+There are two separate formats for the distinguished name and attribute
+sections. If the B<prompt> option is set to B<no> then these sections
+just consist of field names and values: for example,
+
+ CN=My Name
+ OU=My Organization
+ emailAddress=someone@somewhere.org
+
+This allows external programs (e.g. GUI based) to generate a template file
+with all the field names and values and just pass it to B<req>. An example
+of this kind of configuration file is contained in the B<EXAMPLES> section.
+
+Alternatively if the B<prompt> option is absent or not set to B<no> then the
+file contains field prompting information. It consists of lines of the form:
+
+ fieldName="prompt"
+ fieldName_default="default field value"
+ fieldName_min= 2
+ fieldName_max= 4
+
+"fieldName" is the field name being used, for example commonName (or CN).
+The "prompt" string is used to ask the user to enter the relevant
+details. If the user enters nothing then the default value is used if no
+default value is present then the field is omitted. A field can
+still be omitted if a default value is present if the user just
+enters the '.' character.
+
+The number of characters entered must be between the fieldName_min and
+fieldName_max limits: there may be additional restrictions based
+on the field being used (for example countryName can only ever be
+two characters long and must fit in a PrintableString).
+
+Some fields (such as organizationName) can be used more than once
+in a DN. This presents a problem because configuration files will
+not recognize the same name occurring twice. To avoid this problem
+if the fieldName contains some characters followed by a full stop
+they will be ignored. So for example a second organizationName can
+be input by calling it "1.organizationName".
+
+The actual permitted field names are any object identifier short or
+long names. These are compiled into OpenSSL and include the usual
+values such as commonName, countryName, localityName, organizationName,
+organizationalUnitName, stateOrProvinceName. Additionally emailAddress
+is include as well as name, surname, givenName initials and dnQualifier.
+
+Additional object identifiers can be defined with the B<oid_file> or
+B<oid_section> options in the configuration file. Any additional fields
+will be treated as though they were a DirectoryString.
+
+
+=head1 EXAMPLES
+
+Examine and verify certificate request:
+
+ openssl req -in req.pem -text -verify -noout
+
+Create a private key and then generate a certificate request from it:
+
+ openssl genrsa -out key.pem 2048
+ openssl req -new -key key.pem -out req.pem
+
+The same but just using req:
+
+ openssl req -newkey rsa:2048 -keyout key.pem -out req.pem
+
+Generate a self signed root certificate:
+
+ openssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:2048 -keyout key.pem -out req.pem
+
+Example of a file pointed to by the B<oid_file> option:
+
+ 1.2.3.4        shortName       A longer Name
+ 1.2.3.6        otherName       Other longer Name
+
+Example of a section pointed to by B<oid_section> making use of variable
+expansion:
+
+ testoid1=1.2.3.5
+ testoid2=${testoid1}.6
+
+Sample configuration file prompting for field values:
+
+ [ req ]
+ default_bits           = 2048
+ default_keyfile        = privkey.pem
+ distinguished_name     = req_distinguished_name
+ attributes             = req_attributes
+ req_extensions         = v3_ca
+
+ dirstring_type = nobmp
+
+ [ req_distinguished_name ]
+ countryName                    = Country Name (2 letter code)
+ countryName_default            = AU
+ countryName_min                = 2
+ countryName_max                = 2
+
+ localityName                   = Locality Name (eg, city)
+
+ organizationalUnitName         = Organizational Unit Name (eg, section)
+
+ commonName                     = Common Name (eg, YOUR name)
+ commonName_max                 = 64
+
+ emailAddress                   = Email Address
+ emailAddress_max               = 40
+
+ [ req_attributes ]
+ challengePassword              = A challenge password
+ challengePassword_min          = 4
+ challengePassword_max          = 20
+
+ [ v3_ca ]
+
+ subjectKeyIdentifier=hash
+ authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid:always,issuer:always
+ basicConstraints = critical, CA:true
+
+Sample configuration containing all field values:
+
+
+ RANDFILE               = $ENV::HOME/.rnd
+
+ [ req ]
+ default_bits           = 2048
+ default_keyfile        = keyfile.pem
+ distinguished_name     = req_distinguished_name
+ attributes             = req_attributes
+ prompt                 = no
+ output_password        = mypass
+
+ [ req_distinguished_name ]
+ C                      = GB
+ ST                     = Test State or Province
+ L                      = Test Locality
+ O                      = Organization Name
+ OU                     = Organizational Unit Name
+ CN                     = Common Name
+ emailAddress           = test@email.address
+
+ [ req_attributes ]
+ challengePassword              = A challenge password
+
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The header and footer lines in the B<PEM> format are normally:
+
+ -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----
+ -----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----
+
+some software (some versions of Netscape certificate server) instead needs:
+
+ -----BEGIN NEW CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----
+ -----END NEW CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----
+
+which is produced with the B<-newhdr> option but is otherwise compatible.
+Either form is accepted transparently on input.
+
+The certificate requests generated by B<Xenroll> with MSIE have extensions
+added. It includes the B<keyUsage> extension which determines the type of
+key (signature only or general purpose) and any additional OIDs entered
+by the script in an extendedKeyUsage extension.
+
+=head1 DIAGNOSTICS
+
+The following messages are frequently asked about:
+
+        Using configuration from /some/path/openssl.cnf
+        Unable to load config info
+
+This is followed some time later by...
+
+        unable to find 'distinguished_name' in config
+        problems making Certificate Request
+
+The first error message is the clue: it can't find the configuration
+file! Certain operations (like examining a certificate request) don't
+need a configuration file so its use isn't enforced. Generation of
+certificates or requests however does need a configuration file. This
+could be regarded as a bug.
+
+Another puzzling message is this:
+
+        Attributes:
+            a0:00
+
+this is displayed when no attributes are present and the request includes
+the correct empty B<SET OF> structure (the DER encoding of which is 0xa0
+0x00). If you just see:
+
+        Attributes:
+
+then the B<SET OF> is missing and the encoding is technically invalid (but
+it is tolerated). See the description of the command line option B<-asn1-kludge>
+for more information.
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+OpenSSL's handling of T61Strings (aka TeletexStrings) is broken: it effectively
+treats them as ISO-8859-1 (Latin 1), Netscape and MSIE have similar behaviour.
+This can cause problems if you need characters that aren't available in
+PrintableStrings and you don't want to or can't use BMPStrings.
+
+As a consequence of the T61String handling the only correct way to represent
+accented characters in OpenSSL is to use a BMPString: unfortunately Netscape
+currently chokes on these. If you have to use accented characters with Netscape
+and MSIE then you currently need to use the invalid T61String form.
+
+The current prompting is not very friendly. It doesn't allow you to confirm what
+you've just entered. Other things like extensions in certificate requests are
+statically defined in the configuration file. Some of these: like an email
+address in subjectAltName should be input by the user.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<x509(1)>, L<ca(1)>, L<genrsa(1)>,
+L<gendsa(1)>, L<config(5)>,
+L<x509v3_config(5)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/rsa.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/rsa.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dcbf514
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/rsa.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,217 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+openssl-rsa,
+rsa - RSA key processing tool
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+B<openssl> B<rsa>
+[B<-help>]
+[B<-inform PEM|NET|DER>]
+[B<-outform PEM|NET|DER>]
+[B<-in filename>]
+[B<-passin arg>]
+[B<-out filename>]
+[B<-passout arg>]
+[B<-aes128>]
+[B<-aes192>]
+[B<-aes256>]
+[B<-camellia128>]
+[B<-camellia192>]
+[B<-camellia256>]
+[B<-des>]
+[B<-des3>]
+[B<-idea>]
+[B<-text>]
+[B<-noout>]
+[B<-modulus>]
+[B<-check>]
+[B<-pubin>]
+[B<-pubout>]
+[B<-RSAPublicKey_in>]
+[B<-RSAPublicKey_out>]
+[B<-engine id>]
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The B<rsa> command processes RSA keys. They can be converted between various
+forms and their components printed out. B<Note> this command uses the
+traditional SSLeay compatible format for private key encryption: newer
+applications should use the more secure PKCS#8 format using the B<pkcs8>
+utility.
+
+=head1 OPTIONS
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<-help>
+
+Print out a usage message.
+
+=item B<-inform DER|NET|PEM>
+
+This specifies the input format. The B<DER> option uses an ASN1 DER encoded
+form compatible with the PKCS#1 RSAPrivateKey or SubjectPublicKeyInfo format.
+The B<PEM> form is the default format: it consists of the B<DER> format base64
+encoded with additional header and footer lines. On input PKCS#8 format private
+keys are also accepted. The B<NET> form is a format is described in the B<NOTES>
+section.
+
+=item B<-outform DER|NET|PEM>
+
+This specifies the output format, the options have the same meaning as the
+B<-inform> option.
+
+=item B<-in filename>
+
+This specifies the input filename to read a key from or standard input if this
+option is not specified. If the key is encrypted a pass phrase will be
+prompted for.
+
+=item B<-passin arg>
+
+the input file password source. For more information about the format of B<arg>
+see the B<PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS> section in L<openssl(1)>.
+
+=item B<-out filename>
+
+This specifies the output filename to write a key to or standard output if this
+option is not specified. If any encryption options are set then a pass phrase
+will be prompted for. The output filename should B<not> be the same as the input
+filename.
+
+=item B<-passout password>
+
+the output file password source. For more information about the format of B<arg>
+see the B<PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS> section in L<openssl(1)>.
+
+=item B<-aes128|-aes192|-aes256|-camellia128|-camellia192|-camellia256|-des|-des3|-idea>
+
+These options encrypt the private key with the specified
+cipher before outputting it. A pass phrase is prompted for.
+If none of these options is specified the key is written in plain text. This
+means that using the B<rsa> utility to read in an encrypted key with no
+encryption option can be used to remove the pass phrase from a key, or by
+setting the encryption options it can be use to add or change the pass phrase.
+These options can only be used with PEM format output files.
+
+=item B<-text>
+
+prints out the various public or private key components in
+plain text in addition to the encoded version.
+
+=item B<-noout>
+
+this option prevents output of the encoded version of the key.
+
+=item B<-modulus>
+
+this option prints out the value of the modulus of the key.
+
+=item B<-check>
+
+this option checks the consistency of an RSA private key.
+
+=item B<-pubin>
+
+by default a private key is read from the input file: with this
+option a public key is read instead.
+
+=item B<-pubout>
+
+by default a private key is output: with this option a public
+key will be output instead. This option is automatically set if
+the input is a public key.
+
+=item B<-RSAPublicKey_in>, B<-RSAPublicKey_out>
+
+like B<-pubin> and B<-pubout> except B<RSAPublicKey> format is used instead.
+
+=item B<-engine id>
+
+specifying an engine (by its unique B<id> string) will cause B<rsa>
+to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine,
+thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default
+for all available algorithms.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The PEM private key format uses the header and footer lines:
+
+ -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+ -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+The PEM public key format uses the header and footer lines:
+
+ -----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+ -----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+The PEM B<RSAPublicKey> format uses the header and footer lines:
+
+ -----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----
+ -----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+The B<NET> form is a format compatible with older Netscape servers
+and Microsoft IIS .key files, this uses unsalted RC4 for its encryption.
+It is not very secure and so should only be used when necessary.
+
+Some newer version of IIS have additional data in the exported .key
+files. To use these with the utility, view the file with a binary editor
+and look for the string "private-key", then trace back to the byte
+sequence 0x30, 0x82 (this is an ASN1 SEQUENCE). Copy all the data
+from this point onwards to another file and use that as the input
+to the B<rsa> utility with the B<-inform NET> option.
+
+=head1 EXAMPLES
+
+To remove the pass phrase on an RSA private key:
+
+ openssl rsa -in key.pem -out keyout.pem
+
+To encrypt a private key using triple DES:
+
+ openssl rsa -in key.pem -des3 -out keyout.pem
+
+To convert a private key from PEM to DER format:
+
+ openssl rsa -in key.pem -outform DER -out keyout.der
+
+To print out the components of a private key to standard output:
+
+ openssl rsa -in key.pem -text -noout
+
+To just output the public part of a private key:
+
+ openssl rsa -in key.pem -pubout -out pubkey.pem
+
+Output the public part of a private key in B<RSAPublicKey> format:
+
+ openssl rsa -in key.pem -RSAPublicKey_out -out pubkey.pem
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+The command line password arguments don't currently work with
+B<NET> format.
+
+There should be an option that automatically handles .key files,
+without having to manually edit them.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<pkcs8(1)>, L<dsa(1)>, L<genrsa(1)>,
+L<gendsa(1)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/rsautl.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/rsautl.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c07d60a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/rsautl.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,205 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+openssl-rsautl,
+rsautl - RSA utility
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+B<openssl> B<rsautl>
+[B<-help>]
+[B<-in file>]
+[B<-out file>]
+[B<-inkey file>]
+[B<-keyform PEM|DER|ENGINE>]
+[B<-pubin>]
+[B<-certin>]
+[B<-sign>]
+[B<-verify>]
+[B<-encrypt>]
+[B<-decrypt>]
+[B<-pkcs>]
+[B<-ssl>]
+[B<-raw>]
+[B<-hexdump>]
+[B<-asn1parse>]
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The B<rsautl> command can be used to sign, verify, encrypt and decrypt
+data using the RSA algorithm.
+
+=head1 OPTIONS
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<-help>
+
+Print out a usage message.
+
+=item B<-in filename>
+
+This specifies the input filename to read data from or standard input
+if this option is not specified.
+
+=item B<-out filename>
+
+specifies the output filename to write to or standard output by
+default.
+
+=item B<-inkey file>
+
+the input key file, by default it should be an RSA private key.
+
+=item B<-keyform PEM|DER|ENGINE>
+
+the key format PEM, DER or ENGINE.
+
+=item B<-pubin>
+
+the input file is an RSA public key.
+
+=item B<-certin>
+
+the input is a certificate containing an RSA public key.
+
+=item B<-sign>
+
+sign the input data and output the signed result. This requires
+an RSA private key.
+
+=item B<-verify>
+
+verify the input data and output the recovered data.
+
+=item B<-encrypt>
+
+encrypt the input data using an RSA public key.
+
+=item B<-decrypt>
+
+decrypt the input data using an RSA private key.
+
+=item B<-pkcs, -oaep, -ssl, -raw>
+
+the padding to use: PKCS#1 v1.5 (the default), PKCS#1 OAEP,
+special padding used in SSL v2 backwards compatible handshakes,
+or no padding, respectively.
+For signatures, only B<-pkcs> and B<-raw> can be used.
+
+=item B<-hexdump>
+
+hex dump the output data.
+
+=item B<-asn1parse>
+
+asn1parse the output data, this is useful when combined with the
+B<-verify> option.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+B<rsautl> because it uses the RSA algorithm directly can only be
+used to sign or verify small pieces of data.
+
+=head1 EXAMPLES
+
+Sign some data using a private key:
+
+ openssl rsautl -sign -in file -inkey key.pem -out sig
+
+Recover the signed data
+
+ openssl rsautl -verify -in sig -inkey key.pem
+
+Examine the raw signed data:
+
+ openssl rsautl -verify -in sig -inkey key.pem -raw -hexdump
+
+ 0000 - 00 01 ff ff ff ff ff ff-ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff   ................
+ 0010 - ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff-ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff   ................
+ 0020 - ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff-ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff   ................
+ 0030 - ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff-ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff   ................
+ 0040 - ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff-ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff   ................
+ 0050 - ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff-ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff   ................
+ 0060 - ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff-ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff   ................
+ 0070 - ff ff ff ff 00 68 65 6c-6c 6f 20 77 6f 72 6c 64   .....hello world
+
+The PKCS#1 block formatting is evident from this. If this was done using
+encrypt and decrypt the block would have been of type 2 (the second byte)
+and random padding data visible instead of the 0xff bytes.
+
+It is possible to analyse the signature of certificates using this
+utility in conjunction with B<asn1parse>. Consider the self signed
+example in certs/pca-cert.pem . Running B<asn1parse> as follows yields:
+
+ openssl asn1parse -in pca-cert.pem
+
+    0:d=0  hl=4 l= 742 cons: SEQUENCE
+    4:d=1  hl=4 l= 591 cons:  SEQUENCE
+    8:d=2  hl=2 l=   3 cons:   cont [ 0 ]
+   10:d=3  hl=2 l=   1 prim:    INTEGER           :02
+   13:d=2  hl=2 l=   1 prim:   INTEGER           :00
+   16:d=2  hl=2 l=  13 cons:   SEQUENCE
+   18:d=3  hl=2 l=   9 prim:    OBJECT            :md5WithRSAEncryption
+   29:d=3  hl=2 l=   0 prim:    NULL
+   31:d=2  hl=2 l=  92 cons:   SEQUENCE
+   33:d=3  hl=2 l=  11 cons:    SET
+   35:d=4  hl=2 l=   9 cons:     SEQUENCE
+   37:d=5  hl=2 l=   3 prim:      OBJECT            :countryName
+   42:d=5  hl=2 l=   2 prim:      PRINTABLESTRING   :AU
+  ....
+  599:d=1  hl=2 l=  13 cons:  SEQUENCE
+  601:d=2  hl=2 l=   9 prim:   OBJECT            :md5WithRSAEncryption
+  612:d=2  hl=2 l=   0 prim:   NULL
+  614:d=1  hl=3 l= 129 prim:  BIT STRING
+
+
+The final BIT STRING contains the actual signature. It can be extracted with:
+
+ openssl asn1parse -in pca-cert.pem -out sig -noout -strparse 614
+
+The certificate public key can be extracted with:
+
+ openssl x509 -in test/testx509.pem -pubkey -noout >pubkey.pem
+
+The signature can be analysed with:
+
+ openssl rsautl -in sig -verify -asn1parse -inkey pubkey.pem -pubin
+
+    0:d=0  hl=2 l=  32 cons: SEQUENCE
+    2:d=1  hl=2 l=  12 cons:  SEQUENCE
+    4:d=2  hl=2 l=   8 prim:   OBJECT            :md5
+   14:d=2  hl=2 l=   0 prim:   NULL
+   16:d=1  hl=2 l=  16 prim:  OCTET STRING
+      0000 - f3 46 9e aa 1a 4a 73 c9-37 ea 93 00 48 25 08 b5   .F...Js.7...H%..
+
+This is the parsed version of an ASN1 DigestInfo structure. It can be seen that
+the digest used was md5. The actual part of the certificate that was signed can
+be extracted with:
+
+ openssl asn1parse -in pca-cert.pem -out tbs -noout -strparse 4
+
+and its digest computed with:
+
+ openssl md5 -c tbs
+ MD5(tbs)= f3:46:9e:aa:1a:4a:73:c9:37:ea:93:00:48:25:08:b5
+
+which it can be seen agrees with the recovered value above.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<dgst(1)>, L<rsa(1)>, L<genrsa(1)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/s_client.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/s_client.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..01a6c5f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/s_client.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,619 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+openssl-s_client,
+s_client - SSL/TLS client program
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+B<openssl> B<s_client>
+[B<-help>]
+[B<-connect host:port>]
+[B<-proxy host:port>]
+[B<-unix path>]
+[B<-4>]
+[B<-6>]
+[B<-servername name>]
+[B<-verify depth>]
+[B<-verify_return_error>]
+[B<-cert filename>]
+[B<-certform DER|PEM>]
+[B<-key filename>]
+[B<-keyform DER|PEM>]
+[B<-pass arg>]
+[B<-CApath directory>]
+[B<-CAfile filename>]
+[B<-no-CAfile>]
+[B<-no-CApath>]
+[B<-dane_tlsa_domain domain>]
+[B<-dane_tlsa_rrdata rrdata>]
+[B<-dane_ee_no_namechecks>]
+[B<-attime timestamp>]
+[B<-check_ss_sig>]
+[B<-crl_check>]
+[B<-crl_check_all>]
+[B<-explicit_policy>]
+[B<-extended_crl>]
+[B<-ignore_critical>]
+[B<-inhibit_any>]
+[B<-inhibit_map>]
+[B<-no_check_time>]
+[B<-partial_chain>]
+[B<-policy arg>]
+[B<-policy_check>]
+[B<-policy_print>]
+[B<-purpose purpose>]
+[B<-suiteB_128>]
+[B<-suiteB_128_only>]
+[B<-suiteB_192>]
+[B<-trusted_first>]
+[B<-no_alt_chains>]
+[B<-use_deltas>]
+[B<-auth_level num>]
+[B<-verify_depth num>]
+[B<-verify_email email>]
+[B<-verify_hostname hostname>]
+[B<-verify_ip ip>]
+[B<-verify_name name>]
+[B<-x509_strict>]
+[B<-reconnect>]
+[B<-showcerts>]
+[B<-debug>]
+[B<-msg>]
+[B<-nbio_test>]
+[B<-state>]
+[B<-nbio>]
+[B<-crlf>]
+[B<-ign_eof>]
+[B<-no_ign_eof>]
+[B<-quiet>]
+[B<-ssl3>]
+[B<-tls1>]
+[B<-tls1_1>]
+[B<-tls1_2>]
+[B<-no_ssl3>]
+[B<-no_tls1>]
+[B<-no_tls1_1>]
+[B<-no_tls1_2>]
+[B<-dtls>]
+[B<-dtls1>]
+[B<-dtls1_2>]
+[B<-fallback_scsv>]
+[B<-async>]
+[B<-split_send_frag>]
+[B<-max_pipelines>]
+[B<-read_buf>]
+[B<-bugs>]
+[B<-comp>]
+[B<-no_comp>]
+[B<-sigalgs sigalglist>]
+[B<-curves curvelist>]
+[B<-cipher cipherlist>]
+[B<-serverpref>]
+[B<-starttls protocol>]
+[B<-xmpphost hostname>]
+[B<-engine id>]
+[B<-tlsextdebug>]
+[B<-no_ticket>]
+[B<-sess_out filename>]
+[B<-sess_in filename>]
+[B<-rand file(s)>]
+[B<-serverinfo types>]
+[B<-status>]
+[B<-alpn protocols>]
+[B<-nextprotoneg protocols>]
+[B<-ct|noct>]
+[B<-ctlogfile>]
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The B<s_client> command implements a generic SSL/TLS client which connects
+to a remote host using SSL/TLS. It is a I<very> useful diagnostic tool for
+SSL servers.
+
+=head1 OPTIONS
+
+In addition to the options below the B<s_client> utility also supports the
+common and client only options documented in the
+in the "Supported Command Line Commands" section of the L<SSL_CONF_cmd(3)>
+manual page.
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<-help>
+
+Print out a usage message.
+
+=item B<-connect host:port>
+
+This specifies the host and optional port to connect to. If not specified
+then an attempt is made to connect to the local host on port 4433.
+
+=item B<-proxy host:port>
+
+When used with the B<-connect> flag, the program uses the host and port
+specified with this flag and issues an HTTP CONNECT command to connect
+to the desired server.
+
+=item B<-unix path>
+
+Connect over the specified Unix-domain socket.
+
+=item B<-4>
+
+Use IPv4 only.
+
+=item B<-6>
+
+Use IPv6 only.
+
+=item B<-servername name>
+
+Set the TLS SNI (Server Name Indication) extension in the ClientHello message.
+
+=item B<-cert certname>
+
+The certificate to use, if one is requested by the server. The default is
+not to use a certificate.
+
+=item B<-certform format>
+
+The certificate format to use: DER or PEM. PEM is the default.
+
+=item B<-key keyfile>
+
+The private key to use. If not specified then the certificate file will
+be used.
+
+=item B<-keyform format>
+
+The private format to use: DER or PEM. PEM is the default.
+
+=item B<-pass arg>
+
+the private key password source. For more information about the format of B<arg>
+see the B<PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS> section in L<openssl(1)>.
+
+=item B<-verify depth>
+
+The verify depth to use. This specifies the maximum length of the
+server certificate chain and turns on server certificate verification.
+Currently the verify operation continues after errors so all the problems
+with a certificate chain can be seen. As a side effect the connection
+will never fail due to a server certificate verify failure.
+
+=item B<-verify_return_error>
+
+Return verification errors instead of continuing. This will typically
+abort the handshake with a fatal error.
+
+=item B<-CApath directory>
+
+The directory to use for server certificate verification. This directory
+must be in "hash format", see B<verify> for more information. These are
+also used when building the client certificate chain.
+
+=item B<-CAfile file>
+
+A file containing trusted certificates to use during server authentication
+and to use when attempting to build the client certificate chain.
+
+=item B<-no-CAfile>
+
+Do not load the trusted CA certificates from the default file location
+
+=item B<-no-CApath>
+
+Do not load the trusted CA certificates from the default directory location
+
+=item B<-dane_tlsa_domain domain>
+
+Enable RFC6698/RFC7671 DANE TLSA authentication and specify the
+TLSA base domain which becomes the default SNI hint and the primary
+reference identifier for hostname checks.  This must be used in
+combination with at least one instance of the B<-dane_tlsa_rrdata>
+option below.
+
+When DANE authentication succeeds, the diagnostic output will include
+the lowest (closest to 0) depth at which a TLSA record authenticated
+a chain certificate.  When that TLSA record is a "2 1 0" trust
+anchor public key that signed (rather than matched) the top-most
+certificate of the chain, the result is reported as "TA public key
+verified".  Otherwise, either the TLSA record "matched TA certificate"
+at a positive depth or else "matched EE certificate" at depth 0.
+
+=item B<-dane_tlsa_rrdata rrdata>
+
+Use one or more times to specify the RRDATA fields of the DANE TLSA
+RRset associated with the target service.  The B<rrdata> value is
+specied in "presentation form", that is four whitespace separated
+fields that specify the usage, selector, matching type and associated
+data, with the last of these encoded in hexadecimal.  Optional
+whitespace is ignored in the associated data field.  For example:
+
+  $ openssl s_client -brief -starttls smtp \
+    -connect smtp.example.com:25 \
+    -dane_tlsa_domain smtp.example.com \
+    -dane_tlsa_rrdata "2 1 1
+      B111DD8A1C2091A89BD4FD60C57F0716CCE50FEEFF8137CDBEE0326E 02CF362B" \
+    -dane_tlsa_rrdata "2 1 1
+      60B87575447DCBA2A36B7D11AC09FB24A9DB406FEE12D2CC90180517 616E8A18"
+  ...
+  Verification: OK
+  Verified peername: smtp.example.com
+  DANE TLSA 2 1 1 ...ee12d2cc90180517616e8a18 matched TA certificate at depth 1
+  ...
+
+=item B<-dane_ee_no_namechecks>
+
+This disables server name checks when authenticating via DANE-EE(3) TLSA
+records.
+For some applications, primarily web browsers, it is not safe to disable name
+checks due to "unknown key share" attacks, in which a malicious server can
+convince a client that a connection to a victim server is instead a secure
+connection to the malicious server.
+The malicious server may then be able to violate cross-origin scripting
+restrictions.
+Thus, despite the text of RFC7671, name checks are by default enabled for
+DANE-EE(3) TLSA records, and can be disabled in applications where it is safe
+to do so.
+In particular, SMTP and XMPP clients should set this option as SRV and MX
+records already make it possible for a remote domain to redirect client
+connections to any server of its choice, and in any case SMTP and XMPP clients
+do not execute scripts downloaded from remote servers.
+
+=item B<-attime>, B<-check_ss_sig>, B<-crl_check>, B<-crl_check_all>,
+B<-explicit_policy>, B<-extended_crl>, B<-ignore_critical>, B<-inhibit_any>,
+B<-inhibit_map>, B<-no_alt_chains>, B<-no_check_time>, B<-partial_chain>, B<-policy>,
+B<-policy_check>, B<-policy_print>, B<-purpose>, B<-suiteB_128>,
+B<-suiteB_128_only>, B<-suiteB_192>, B<-trusted_first>, B<-use_deltas>,
+B<-auth_level>, B<-verify_depth>, B<-verify_email>, B<-verify_hostname>,
+B<-verify_ip>, B<-verify_name>, B<-x509_strict>
+
+Set various certificate chain validation options. See the
+L<verify(1)> manual page for details.
+
+=item B<-reconnect>
+
+reconnects to the same server 5 times using the same session ID, this can
+be used as a test that session caching is working.
+
+=item B<-showcerts>
+
+display the whole server certificate chain: normally only the server
+certificate itself is displayed.
+
+=item B<-prexit>
+
+print session information when the program exits. This will always attempt
+to print out information even if the connection fails. Normally information
+will only be printed out once if the connection succeeds. This option is useful
+because the cipher in use may be renegotiated or the connection may fail
+because a client certificate is required or is requested only after an
+attempt is made to access a certain URL. Note: the output produced by this
+option is not always accurate because a connection might never have been
+established.
+
+=item B<-state>
+
+prints out the SSL session states.
+
+=item B<-debug>
+
+print extensive debugging information including a hex dump of all traffic.
+
+=item B<-msg>
+
+show all protocol messages with hex dump.
+
+=item B<-trace>
+
+show verbose trace output of protocol messages. OpenSSL needs to be compiled
+with B<enable-ssl-trace> for this option to work.
+
+=item B<-msgfile>
+
+file to send output of B<-msg> or B<-trace> to, default standard output.
+
+=item B<-nbio_test>
+
+tests non-blocking I/O
+
+=item B<-nbio>
+
+turns on non-blocking I/O
+
+=item B<-crlf>
+
+this option translated a line feed from the terminal into CR+LF as required
+by some servers.
+
+=item B<-ign_eof>
+
+inhibit shutting down the connection when end of file is reached in the
+input.
+
+=item B<-quiet>
+
+inhibit printing of session and certificate information.  This implicitly
+turns on B<-ign_eof> as well.
+
+=item B<-no_ign_eof>
+
+shut down the connection when end of file is reached in the input.
+Can be used to override the implicit B<-ign_eof> after B<-quiet>.
+
+=item B<-psk_identity identity>
+
+Use the PSK identity B<identity> when using a PSK cipher suite.
+The default value is "Client_identity" (without the quotes).
+
+=item B<-psk key>
+
+Use the PSK key B<key> when using a PSK cipher suite. The key is
+given as a hexadecimal number without leading 0x, for example -psk
+1a2b3c4d.
+This option must be provided in order to use a PSK cipher.
+
+=item B<-ssl3>, B<-tls1>, B<-tls1_1>, B<-tls1_2>, B<-no_ssl3>, B<-no_tls1>, B<-no_tls1_1>, B<-no_tls1_2>
+
+These options require or disable the use of the specified SSL or TLS protocols.
+By default B<s_client> will negotiate the highest mutually supported protocol
+version.
+When a specific TLS version is required, only that version will be offered to
+and accepted from the server.
+
+=item B<-dtls>, B<-dtls1>, B<-dtls1_2>
+
+These options make B<s_client> use DTLS protocols instead of TLS.
+With B<-dtls>, B<s_client> will negotiate any supported DTLS protocol version,
+whilst B<-dtls1> and B<-dtls1_2> will only support DTLS1.0 and DTLS1.2
+respectively.
+
+=item B<-fallback_scsv>
+
+Send TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV in the ClientHello.
+
+=item B<-async>
+
+switch on asynchronous mode. Cryptographic operations will be performed
+asynchronously. This will only have an effect if an asynchronous capable engine
+is also used via the B<-engine> option. For test purposes the dummy async engine
+(dasync) can be used (if available).
+
+=item B<-split_send_frag int>
+
+The size used to split data for encrypt pipelines. If more data is written in
+one go than this value then it will be split into multiple pipelines, up to the
+maximum number of pipelines defined by max_pipelines. This only has an effect if
+a suitable ciphersuite has been negotiated, an engine that supports pipelining
+has been loaded, and max_pipelines is greater than 1. See
+L<SSL_CTX_set_split_send_fragment(3)> for further information.
+
+=item B<-max_pipelines int>
+
+The maximum number of encrypt/decrypt pipelines to be used. This will only have
+an effect if an engine has been loaded that supports pipelining (e.g. the dasync
+engine) and a suitable ciphersuite has been negotiated. The default value is 1.
+See L<SSL_CTX_set_max_pipelines(3)> for further information.
+
+=item B<-read_buf int>
+
+The default read buffer size to be used for connections. This will only have an
+effect if the buffer size is larger than the size that would otherwise be used
+and pipelining is in use (see L<SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(3)> for
+further information).
+
+=item B<-bugs>
+
+there are several known bug in SSL and TLS implementations. Adding this
+option enables various workarounds.
+
+=item B<-comp>
+
+Enables support for SSL/TLS compression.
+This option was introduced in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+TLS compression is not recommended and is off by default as of
+OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+=item B<-no_comp>
+
+Disables support for SSL/TLS compression.
+TLS compression is not recommended and is off by default as of
+OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+=item B<-brief>
+
+only provide a brief summary of connection parameters instead of the
+normal verbose output.
+
+=item B<-sigalgs sigalglist>
+
+Specifies the list of signature algorithms that are sent by the client.
+The server selects one entry in the list based on its preferences.
+For example strings, see L<SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs(3)>
+
+=item B<-curves curvelist>
+
+Specifies the list of supported curves to be sent by the client. The curve is
+is ultimately selected by the server. For a list of all curves, use:
+
+    $ openssl ecparam -list_curves
+
+=item B<-cipher cipherlist>
+
+this allows the cipher list sent by the client to be modified. Although
+the server determines which cipher suite is used it should take the first
+supported cipher in the list sent by the client. See the B<ciphers>
+command for more information.
+
+=item B<-starttls protocol>
+
+send the protocol-specific message(s) to switch to TLS for communication.
+B<protocol> is a keyword for the intended protocol.  Currently, the only
+supported keywords are "smtp", "pop3", "imap", "ftp", "xmpp", "xmpp-server",
+and "irc."
+
+=item B<-xmpphost hostname>
+
+This option, when used with "-starttls xmpp" or "-starttls xmpp-server",
+specifies the host for the "to" attribute of the stream element.
+If this option is not specified, then the host specified with "-connect"
+will be used.
+
+=item B<-tlsextdebug>
+
+print out a hex dump of any TLS extensions received from the server.
+
+=item B<-no_ticket>
+
+disable RFC4507bis session ticket support.
+
+=item B<-sess_out filename>
+
+output SSL session to B<filename>
+
+=item B<-sess_in sess.pem>
+
+load SSL session from B<filename>. The client will attempt to resume a
+connection from this session.
+
+=item B<-engine id>
+
+specifying an engine (by its unique B<id> string) will cause B<s_client>
+to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine,
+thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default
+for all available algorithms.
+
+=item B<-rand file(s)>
+
+a file or files containing random data used to seed the random number
+generator, or an EGD socket (see L<RAND_egd(3)>).
+Multiple files can be specified separated by an OS-dependent character.
+The separator is B<;> for MS-Windows, B<,> for OpenVMS, and B<:> for
+all others.
+
+=item B<-serverinfo types>
+
+a list of comma-separated TLS Extension Types (numbers between 0 and
+65535).  Each type will be sent as an empty ClientHello TLS Extension.
+The server's response (if any) will be encoded and displayed as a PEM
+file.
+
+=item B<-status>
+
+sends a certificate status request to the server (OCSP stapling). The server
+response (if any) is printed out.
+
+=item B<-alpn protocols>, B<-nextprotoneg protocols>
+
+these flags enable the 
+Enable the Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation or Next Protocol
+Negotiation extension, respectively. ALPN is the IETF standard and
+replaces NPN.
+The B<protocols> list is a
+comma-separated protocol names that the client should advertise
+support for. The list should contain most wanted protocols first.
+Protocol names are printable ASCII strings, for example "http/1.1" or
+"spdy/3".
+Empty list of protocols is treated specially and will cause the client to
+advertise support for the TLS extension but disconnect just after
+receiving ServerHello with a list of server supported protocols.
+
+=item B<-ct|noct>
+
+Use one of these two options to control whether Certificate Transparency (CT)
+is enabled (B<-ct>) or disabled (B<-noct>).
+If CT is enabled, signed certificate timestamps (SCTs) will be requested from
+the server and reported at handshake completion.
+
+Enabling CT also enables OCSP stapling, as this is one possible delivery method
+for SCTs.
+
+=item B<-ctlogfile>
+
+A file containing a list of known Certificate Transparency logs. See
+L<SSL_CTX_set_ctlog_list_file(3)> for the expected file format.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 CONNECTED COMMANDS
+
+If a connection is established with an SSL server then any data received
+from the server is displayed and any key presses will be sent to the
+server. When used interactively (which means neither B<-quiet> nor B<-ign_eof>
+have been given), the session will be renegotiated if the line begins with an
+B<R>, and if the line begins with a B<Q> or if end of file is reached, the
+connection will be closed down.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+B<s_client> can be used to debug SSL servers. To connect to an SSL HTTP
+server the command:
+
+ openssl s_client -connect servername:443
+
+would typically be used (https uses port 443). If the connection succeeds
+then an HTTP command can be given such as "GET /" to retrieve a web page.
+
+If the handshake fails then there are several possible causes, if it is
+nothing obvious like no client certificate then the B<-bugs>,
+B<-ssl3>, B<-tls1>, B<-no_ssl3>, B<-no_tls1> options can be tried
+in case it is a buggy server. In particular you should play with these
+options B<before> submitting a bug report to an OpenSSL mailing list.
+
+A frequent problem when attempting to get client certificates working
+is that a web client complains it has no certificates or gives an empty
+list to choose from. This is normally because the server is not sending
+the clients certificate authority in its "acceptable CA list" when it
+requests a certificate. By using B<s_client> the CA list can be viewed
+and checked. However some servers only request client authentication
+after a specific URL is requested. To obtain the list in this case it
+is necessary to use the B<-prexit> option and send an HTTP request
+for an appropriate page.
+
+If a certificate is specified on the command line using the B<-cert>
+option it will not be used unless the server specifically requests
+a client certificate. Therefor merely including a client certificate
+on the command line is no guarantee that the certificate works.
+
+If there are problems verifying a server certificate then the
+B<-showcerts> option can be used to show the whole chain.
+
+The B<s_client> utility is a test tool and is designed to continue the
+handshake after any certificate verification errors. As a result it will
+accept any certificate chain (trusted or not) sent by the peer. None test
+applications should B<not> do this as it makes them vulnerable to a MITM
+attack. This behaviour can be changed by with the B<-verify_return_error>
+option: any verify errors are then returned aborting the handshake.
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+Because this program has a lot of options and also because some of the
+techniques used are rather old, the C source of B<s_client> is rather hard to
+read and not a model of how things should be done.
+A typical SSL client program would be much simpler.
+
+The B<-prexit> option is a bit of a hack. We should really report
+information whenever a session is renegotiated.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<SSL_CONF_cmd(3)>,
+L<sess_id(1)>, L<s_server(1)>, L<ciphers(1)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+The -no_alt_chains options was first added to OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/s_server.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/s_server.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e8ec91b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/s_server.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,616 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+openssl-s_server,
+s_server - SSL/TLS server program
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+B<openssl> B<s_server>
+[B<-help>]
+[B<-port port>]
+[B<-accept val>]
+[B<-naccept count>]
+[B<-unix val>]
+[B<-unlink>]
+[B<-4>]
+[B<-6>]
+[B<-context id>]
+[B<-verify depth>]
+[B<-Verify depth>]
+[B<-crl_check>]
+[B<-crl_check_all>]
+[B<-cert filename>]
+[B<-certform DER|PEM>]
+[B<-key keyfile>]
+[B<-keyform DER|PEM>]
+[B<-pass arg>]
+[B<-dcert filename>]
+[B<-dcertform DER|PEM>]
+[B<-dkey keyfile>]
+[B<-dkeyform DER|PEM>]
+[B<-dpass arg>]
+[B<-dhparam filename>]
+[B<-nbio>]
+[B<-nbio_test>]
+[B<-crlf>]
+[B<-debug>]
+[B<-msg>]
+[B<-state>]
+[B<-CApath directory>]
+[B<-CAfile filename>]
+[B<-no-CAfile>]
+[B<-no-CApath>]
+[B<-attime timestamp>]
+[B<-check_ss_sig>]
+[B<-explicit_policy>]
+[B<-extended_crl>]
+[B<-ignore_critical>]
+[B<-inhibit_any>]
+[B<-inhibit_map>]
+[B<-no_check_time>]
+[B<-partial_chain>]
+[B<-policy arg>]
+[B<-policy_check>]
+[B<-policy_print>]
+[B<-purpose purpose>]
+[B<-suiteB_128>]
+[B<-suiteB_128_only>]
+[B<-suiteB_192>]
+[B<-trusted_first>]
+[B<-no_alt_chains>]
+[B<-use_deltas>]
+[B<-auth_level num>]
+[B<-verify_depth num>]
+[B<-verify_return_error>]
+[B<-verify_email email>]
+[B<-verify_hostname hostname>]
+[B<-verify_ip ip>]
+[B<-verify_name name>]
+[B<-x509_strict>]
+[B<-nocert>]
+[B<-client_sigalgs sigalglist>]
+[B<-named_curve curve>]
+[B<-cipher cipherlist>]
+[B<-serverpref>]
+[B<-quiet>]
+[B<-ssl3>]
+[B<-tls1>]
+[B<-tls1_1>]
+[B<-tls1_2>]
+[B<-dtls>]
+[B<-dtls1>]
+[B<-dtls1_2>]
+[B<-listen>]
+[B<-async>]
+[B<-split_send_frag>]
+[B<-max_pipelines>]
+[B<-read_buf>]
+[B<-no_ssl3>]
+[B<-no_tls1>]
+[B<-no_tls1_1>]
+[B<-no_tls1_2>]
+[B<-no_dhe>]
+[B<-bugs>]
+[B<-comp>]
+[B<-no_comp>]
+[B<-brief>]
+[B<-www>]
+[B<-WWW>]
+[B<-HTTP>]
+[B<-engine id>]
+[B<-tlsextdebug>]
+[B<-no_ticket>]
+[B<-id_prefix arg>]
+[B<-rand file(s)>]
+[B<-serverinfo file>]
+[B<-no_resumption_on_reneg>]
+[B<-status>]
+[B<-status_verbose>]
+[B<-status_timeout nsec>]
+[B<-status_url url>]
+[B<-alpn protocols>]
+[B<-nextprotoneg protocols>]
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The B<s_server> command implements a generic SSL/TLS server which listens
+for connections on a given port using SSL/TLS.
+
+=head1 OPTIONS
+
+In addition to the options below the B<s_server> utility also supports the
+common and server only options documented in the
+in the "Supported Command Line Commands" section of the L<SSL_CONF_cmd(3)>
+manual page.
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<-help>
+
+Print out a usage message.
+
+=item B<-port port>
+
+The TCP port to listen on for connections. If not specified 4433 is used.
+
+=item B<-accept val>
+
+The optional TCP host and port to listen on for connections. If not specified, *:4433 is used.
+
+=item B<-naccept count>
+
+The server will exit after receiving B<number> connections, default unlimited.
+
+=item B<-unix val>
+
+Unix domain socket to accept on.
+
+=item B<-unlink>
+
+For -unix, unlink existing socket first.
+
+=item B<-4>
+
+Use IPv4 only.
+
+=item B<-6>
+
+Use IPv6 only.
+
+=item B<-context id>
+
+Sets the SSL context id. It can be given any string value. If this option
+is not present a default value will be used.
+
+=item B<-cert certname>
+
+The certificate to use, most servers cipher suites require the use of a
+certificate and some require a certificate with a certain public key type:
+for example the DSS cipher suites require a certificate containing a DSS
+(DSA) key. If not specified then the filename "server.pem" will be used.
+
+=item B<-certform format>
+
+The certificate format to use: DER or PEM. PEM is the default.
+
+=item B<-key keyfile>
+
+The private key to use. If not specified then the certificate file will
+be used.
+
+=item B<-keyform format>
+
+The private format to use: DER or PEM. PEM is the default.
+
+=item B<-pass arg>
+
+The private key password source. For more information about the format of B<arg>
+see the B<PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS> section in L<openssl(1)>.
+
+=item B<-dcert filename>, B<-dkey keyname>
+
+Specify an additional certificate and private key, these behave in the
+same manner as the B<-cert> and B<-key> options except there is no default
+if they are not specified (no additional certificate and key is used). As
+noted above some cipher suites require a certificate containing a key of
+a certain type. Some cipher suites need a certificate carrying an RSA key
+and some a DSS (DSA) key. By using RSA and DSS certificates and keys
+a server can support clients which only support RSA or DSS cipher suites
+by using an appropriate certificate.
+
+=item B<-dcertform format>, B<-dkeyform format>, B<-dpass arg>
+
+Additional certificate and private key format and passphrase respectively.
+
+=item B<-nocert>
+
+If this option is set then no certificate is used. This restricts the
+cipher suites available to the anonymous ones (currently just anonymous
+DH).
+
+=item B<-dhparam filename>
+
+The DH parameter file to use. The ephemeral DH cipher suites generate keys
+using a set of DH parameters. If not specified then an attempt is made to
+load the parameters from the server certificate file.
+If this fails then a static set of parameters hard coded into the B<s_server>
+program will be used.
+
+=item B<-no_dhe>
+
+If this option is set then no DH parameters will be loaded effectively
+disabling the ephemeral DH cipher suites.
+
+=item B<-crl_check>, B<-crl_check_all>
+
+Check the peer certificate has not been revoked by its CA.
+The CRL(s) are appended to the certificate file. With the B<-crl_check_all>
+option all CRLs of all CAs in the chain are checked.
+
+=item B<-CApath directory>
+
+The directory to use for client certificate verification. This directory
+must be in "hash format", see B<verify> for more information. These are
+also used when building the server certificate chain.
+
+=item B<-CAfile file>
+
+A file containing trusted certificates to use during client authentication
+and to use when attempting to build the server certificate chain. The list
+is also used in the list of acceptable client CAs passed to the client when
+a certificate is requested.
+
+=item B<-no-CAfile>
+
+Do not load the trusted CA certificates from the default file location
+
+=item B<-no-CApath>
+
+Do not load the trusted CA certificates from the default directory location
+
+=item B<-verify depth>, B<-Verify depth>
+
+The verify depth to use. This specifies the maximum length of the
+client certificate chain and makes the server request a certificate from
+the client. With the B<-verify> option a certificate is requested but the
+client does not have to send one, with the B<-Verify> option the client
+must supply a certificate or an error occurs.
+
+If the ciphersuite cannot request a client certificate (for example an
+anonymous ciphersuite or PSK) this option has no effect.
+
+=item B<-attime>, B<-check_ss_sig>, B<-crl_check>, B<-crl_check_all>,
+B<-explicit_policy>, B<-extended_crl>, B<-ignore_critical>, B<-inhibit_any>,
+B<-inhibit_map>, B<-no_alt_chains>, B<-no_check_time>, B<-partial_chain>, B<-policy>,
+B<-policy_check>, B<-policy_print>, B<-purpose>, B<-suiteB_128>,
+B<-suiteB_128_only>, B<-suiteB_192>, B<-trusted_first>, B<-use_deltas>,
+B<-auth_level>, B<-verify_depth>, B<-verify_email>, B<-verify_hostname>,
+B<-verify_ip>, B<-verify_name>, B<-x509_strict>
+
+Set different peer certificate verification options.
+See the L<verify(1)> manual page for details.
+
+=item B<-verify_return_error>
+
+Verification errors normally just print a message but allow the
+connection to continue, for debugging purposes.
+If this option is used, then verification errors close the connection.
+
+=item B<-state>
+
+Prints the SSL session states.
+
+=item B<-debug>
+
+Print extensive debugging information including a hex dump of all traffic.
+
+=item B<-msg>
+
+Show all protocol messages with hex dump.
+
+=item B<-trace>
+
+Show verbose trace output of protocol messages. OpenSSL needs to be compiled
+with B<enable-ssl-trace> for this option to work.
+
+=item B<-msgfile>
+
+File to send output of B<-msg> or B<-trace> to, default standard output.
+
+=item B<-nbio_test>
+
+Tests non blocking I/O
+
+=item B<-nbio>
+
+Turns on non blocking I/O
+
+=item B<-crlf>
+
+This option translated a line feed from the terminal into CR+LF.
+
+=item B<-quiet>
+
+Inhibit printing of session and certificate information.
+
+=item B<-psk_hint hint>
+
+Use the PSK identity hint B<hint> when using a PSK cipher suite.
+
+=item B<-psk key>
+
+Use the PSK key B<key> when using a PSK cipher suite. The key is
+given as a hexadecimal number without leading 0x, for example -psk
+1a2b3c4d.
+This option must be provided in order to use a PSK cipher.
+
+=item B<-ssl2>, B<-ssl3>, B<-tls1>, B<-tls1_1>, B<-tls1_2>, B<-no_ssl2>, B<-no_ssl3>, B<-no_tls1>, B<-no_tls1_1>, B<-no_tls1_2>
+
+These options require or disable the use of the specified SSL or TLS protocols.
+By default B<s_server> will negotiate the highest mutually supported protocol
+version.
+When a specific TLS version is required, only that version will be accepted
+from the client.
+
+=item B<-dtls>, B<-dtls1>, B<-dtls1_2>
+
+These options make B<s_server> use DTLS protocols instead of TLS.
+With B<-dtls>, B<s_server> will negotiate any supported DTLS protocol version,
+whilst B<-dtls1> and B<-dtls1_2> will only support DTLSv1.0 and DTLSv1.2
+respectively.
+
+=item B<-listen>
+
+This option can only be used in conjunction with one of the DTLS options above.
+With this option B<s_server> will listen on a UDP port for incoming connections.
+Any ClientHellos that arrive will be checked to see if they have a cookie in
+them or not.
+Any without a cookie will be responded to with a HelloVerifyRequest.
+If a ClientHello with a cookie is received then B<s_server> will connect to
+that peer and complete the handshake.
+
+=item B<-async>
+
+Switch on asynchronous mode. Cryptographic operations will be performed
+asynchronously. This will only have an effect if an asynchronous capable engine
+is also used via the B<-engine> option. For test purposes the dummy async engine
+(dasync) can be used (if available).
+
+=item B<-split_send_frag int>
+
+The size used to split data for encrypt pipelines. If more data is written in
+one go than this value then it will be split into multiple pipelines, up to the
+maximum number of pipelines defined by max_pipelines. This only has an effect if
+a suitable ciphersuite has been negotiated, an engine that supports pipelining
+has been loaded, and max_pipelines is greater than 1. See
+L<SSL_CTX_set_split_send_fragment(3)> for further information.
+
+=item B<-max_pipelines int>
+
+The maximum number of encrypt/decrypt pipelines to be used. This will only have
+an effect if an engine has been loaded that supports pipelining (e.g. the dasync
+engine) and a suitable ciphersuite has been negotiated. The default value is 1.
+See L<SSL_CTX_set_max_pipelines(3)> for further information.
+
+=item B<-read_buf int>
+
+The default read buffer size to be used for connections. This will only have an
+effect if the buffer size is larger than the size that would otherwise be used
+and pipelining is in use (see L<SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(3)> for
+further information).
+
+=item B<-bugs>
+
+There are several known bug in SSL and TLS implementations. Adding this
+option enables various workarounds.
+
+=item B<-comp>
+
+Enable negotiation of TLS compression.
+This option was introduced in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+TLS compression is not recommended and is off by default as of
+OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+=item B<-no_comp>
+
+Disable negotiation of TLS compression.
+TLS compression is not recommended and is off by default as of
+OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+=item B<-brief>
+
+Provide a brief summary of connection parameters instead of the normal verbose
+output.
+
+=item B<-client_sigalgs sigalglist>
+
+Signature algorithms to support for client certificate authentication
+(colon-separated list)
+
+=item B<-named_curve curve>
+
+Specifies the elliptic curve to use. NOTE: this is single curve, not a list.
+For a list of all possible curves, use:
+
+    $ openssl ecparam -list_curves
+
+=item B<-cipher cipherlist>
+
+This allows the cipher list used by the server to be modified.  When
+the client sends a list of supported ciphers the first client cipher
+also included in the server list is used. Because the client specifies
+the preference order, the order of the server cipherlist irrelevant. See
+the B<ciphers> command for more information.
+
+=item B<-serverpref>
+
+Use the server's cipher preferences, rather than the client's preferences.
+
+=item B<-tlsextdebug>
+
+Print a hex dump of any TLS extensions received from the server.
+
+=item B<-no_ticket>
+
+Disable RFC4507bis session ticket support.
+
+=item B<-www>
+
+Sends a status message back to the client when it connects. This includes
+information about the ciphers used and various session parameters.
+The output is in HTML format so this option will normally be used with a
+web browser.
+
+=item B<-WWW>
+
+Emulates a simple web server. Pages will be resolved relative to the
+current directory, for example if the URL https://myhost/page.html is
+requested the file ./page.html will be loaded.
+
+=item B<-HTTP>
+
+Emulates a simple web server. Pages will be resolved relative to the
+current directory, for example if the URL https://myhost/page.html is
+requested the file ./page.html will be loaded. The files loaded are
+assumed to contain a complete and correct HTTP response (lines that
+are part of the HTTP response line and headers must end with CRLF).
+
+=item B<-rev>
+
+Simple test server which just reverses the text received from the client
+and sends it back to the server. Also sets B<-brief>.
+
+=item B<-engine id>
+
+Specifying an engine (by its unique B<id> string) will cause B<s_server>
+to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine,
+thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default
+for all available algorithms.
+
+=item B<-id_prefix arg>
+
+Generate SSL/TLS session IDs prefixed by B<arg>. This is mostly useful
+for testing any SSL/TLS code (eg. proxies) that wish to deal with multiple
+servers, when each of which might be generating a unique range of session
+IDs (eg. with a certain prefix).
+
+=item B<-rand file(s)>
+
+A file or files containing random data used to seed the random number
+generator, or an EGD socket (see L<RAND_egd(3)>).
+Multiple files can be specified separated by an OS-dependent character.
+The separator is B<;> for MS-Windows, B<,> for OpenVMS, and B<:> for
+all others.
+
+=item B<-serverinfo file>
+
+A file containing one or more blocks of PEM data.  Each PEM block
+must encode a TLS ServerHello extension (2 bytes type, 2 bytes length,
+followed by "length" bytes of extension data).  If the client sends
+an empty TLS ClientHello extension matching the type, the corresponding
+ServerHello extension will be returned.
+
+=item B<-no_resumption_on_reneg>
+
+Set the B<SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION> option.
+
+=item B<-status>
+
+Enables certificate status request support (aka OCSP stapling).
+
+=item B<-status_verbose>
+
+Enables certificate status request support (aka OCSP stapling) and gives
+a verbose printout of the OCSP response.
+
+=item B<-status_timeout nsec>
+
+Sets the timeout for OCSP response to B<nsec> seconds.
+
+=item B<-status_url url>
+
+Sets a fallback responder URL to use if no responder URL is present in the
+server certificate. Without this option an error is returned if the server
+certificate does not contain a responder address.
+
+=item B<-alpn protocols>, B<-nextprotoneg protocols>
+
+these flags enable the 
+Enable the Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation or Next Protocol
+Negotiation extension, respectively. ALPN is the IETF standard and
+replaces NPN.
+The B<protocols> list is a
+comma-separated list of supported protocol names.
+The list should contain most wanted protocols first.
+Protocol names are printable ASCII strings, for example "http/1.1" or
+"spdy/3".
+
+=back
+
+=head1 CONNECTED COMMANDS
+
+If a connection request is established with an SSL client and neither the
+B<-www> nor the B<-WWW> option has been used then normally any data received
+from the client is displayed and any key presses will be sent to the client.
+
+Certain single letter commands are also recognized which perform special
+operations: these are listed below.
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<q>
+
+end the current SSL connection but still accept new connections.
+
+=item B<Q>
+
+end the current SSL connection and exit.
+
+=item B<r>
+
+renegotiate the SSL session.
+
+=item B<R>
+
+renegotiate the SSL session and request a client certificate.
+
+=item B<P>
+
+send some plain text down the underlying TCP connection: this should
+cause the client to disconnect due to a protocol violation.
+
+=item B<S>
+
+print out some session cache status information.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+B<s_server> can be used to debug SSL clients. To accept connections from
+a web browser the command:
+
+ openssl s_server -accept 443 -www
+
+can be used for example.
+
+Although specifying an empty list of CAs when requesting a client certificate
+is strictly speaking a protocol violation, some SSL clients interpret this to
+mean any CA is acceptable. This is useful for debugging purposes.
+
+The session parameters can printed out using the B<sess_id> program.
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+Because this program has a lot of options and also because some of the
+techniques used are rather old, the C source of B<s_server> is rather hard to
+read and not a model of how things should be done.
+A typical SSL server program would be much simpler.
+
+The output of common ciphers is wrong: it just gives the list of ciphers that
+OpenSSL recognizes and the client supports.
+
+There should be a way for the B<s_server> program to print out details of any
+unknown cipher suites a client says it supports.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<SSL_CONF_cmd(3)>,
+L<sess_id(1)>, L<s_client(1)>, L<ciphers(1)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+The -no_alt_chains options was first added to OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/s_time.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/s_time.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d44dd93
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/s_time.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,195 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+openssl-s_time,
+s_time - SSL/TLS performance timing program
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+B<openssl> B<s_time>
+[B<-help>]
+[B<-connect host:port>]
+[B<-www page>]
+[B<-cert filename>]
+[B<-key filename>]
+[B<-CApath directory>]
+[B<-CAfile filename>]
+[B<-no-CAfile>]
+[B<-no-CApath>]
+[B<-reuse>]
+[B<-new>]
+[B<-verify depth>]
+[B<-nbio>]
+[B<-time seconds>]
+[B<-ssl3>]
+[B<-bugs>]
+[B<-cipher cipherlist>]
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The B<s_time> command implements a generic SSL/TLS client which connects to a
+remote host using SSL/TLS. It can request a page from the server and includes
+the time to transfer the payload data in its timing measurements. It measures
+the number of connections within a given timeframe, the amount of data
+transferred (if any), and calculates the average time spent for one connection.
+
+=head1 OPTIONS
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<-help>
+
+Print out a usage message.
+
+=item B<-connect host:port>
+
+This specifies the host and optional port to connect to.
+
+=item B<-www page>
+
+This specifies the page to GET from the server. A value of '/' gets the
+index.htm[l] page. If this parameter is not specified, then B<s_time> will only
+perform the handshake to establish SSL connections but not transfer any
+payload data.
+
+=item B<-cert certname>
+
+The certificate to use, if one is requested by the server. The default is
+not to use a certificate. The file is in PEM format.
+
+=item B<-key keyfile>
+
+The private key to use. If not specified then the certificate file will
+be used. The file is in PEM format.
+
+=item B<-verify depth>
+
+The verify depth to use. This specifies the maximum length of the
+server certificate chain and turns on server certificate verification.
+Currently the verify operation continues after errors so all the problems
+with a certificate chain can be seen. As a side effect the connection
+will never fail due to a server certificate verify failure.
+
+=item B<-CApath directory>
+
+The directory to use for server certificate verification. This directory
+must be in "hash format", see B<verify> for more information. These are
+also used when building the client certificate chain.
+
+=item B<-CAfile file>
+
+A file containing trusted certificates to use during server authentication
+and to use when attempting to build the client certificate chain.
+
+=item B<-no-CAfile>
+
+Do not load the trusted CA certificates from the default file location
+
+=item B<-no-CApath>
+
+Do not load the trusted CA certificates from the default directory location
+
+=item B<-new>
+
+performs the timing test using a new session ID for each connection.
+If neither B<-new> nor B<-reuse> are specified, they are both on by default
+and executed in sequence.
+
+=item B<-reuse>
+
+performs the timing test using the same session ID; this can be used as a test
+that session caching is working. If neither B<-new> nor B<-reuse> are
+specified, they are both on by default and executed in sequence.
+
+=item B<-nbio>
+
+turns on non-blocking I/O.
+
+=item B<-ssl3>
+
+these options disable the use of certain SSL or TLS protocols. By default
+the initial handshake uses a method which should be compatible with all
+servers and permit them to use SSL v3 or TLS as appropriate.
+The timing program is not as rich in options to turn protocols on and off as
+the L<s_client(1)> program and may not connect to all servers.
+
+Unfortunately there are a lot of ancient and broken servers in use which
+cannot handle this technique and will fail to connect. Some servers only
+work if TLS is turned off with the B<-ssl3> option.
+
+=item B<-bugs>
+
+there are several known bug in SSL and TLS implementations. Adding this
+option enables various workarounds.
+
+=item B<-cipher cipherlist>
+
+this allows the cipher list sent by the client to be modified. Although
+the server determines which cipher suite is used it should take the first
+supported cipher in the list sent by the client.
+See the L<ciphers(1)> command for more information.
+
+=item B<-time length>
+
+specifies how long (in seconds) B<s_time> should establish connections and
+optionally transfer payload data from a server. Server and client performance
+and the link speed determine how many connections B<s_time> can establish.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+B<s_time> can be used to measure the performance of an SSL connection.
+To connect to an SSL HTTP server and get the default page the command
+
+ openssl s_time -connect servername:443 -www / -CApath yourdir -CAfile yourfile.pem -cipher commoncipher [-ssl3]
+
+would typically be used (https uses port 443). 'commoncipher' is a cipher to
+which both client and server can agree, see the L<ciphers(1)> command
+for details.
+
+If the handshake fails then there are several possible causes, if it is
+nothing obvious like no client certificate then the B<-bugs> and
+B<-ssl3> options can be tried
+in case it is a buggy server. In particular you should play with these
+options B<before> submitting a bug report to an OpenSSL mailing list.
+
+A frequent problem when attempting to get client certificates working
+is that a web client complains it has no certificates or gives an empty
+list to choose from. This is normally because the server is not sending
+the clients certificate authority in its "acceptable CA list" when it
+requests a certificate. By using L<s_client(1)> the CA list can be
+viewed and checked. However some servers only request client authentication
+after a specific URL is requested. To obtain the list in this case it
+is necessary to use the B<-prexit> option of L<s_client(1)> and
+send an HTTP request for an appropriate page.
+
+If a certificate is specified on the command line using the B<-cert>
+option it will not be used unless the server specifically requests
+a client certificate. Therefor merely including a client certificate
+on the command line is no guarantee that the certificate works.
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+Because this program does not have all the options of the
+L<s_client(1)> program to turn protocols on and off, you may not be
+able to measure the performance of all protocols with all servers.
+
+The B<-verify> option should really exit if the server verification
+fails.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<s_client(1)>, L<s_server(1)>, L<ciphers(1)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/sess_id.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/sess_id.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7766c71
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/sess_id.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+openssl-sess_id,
+sess_id - SSL/TLS session handling utility
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+B<openssl> B<sess_id>
+[B<-help>]
+[B<-inform PEM|DER>]
+[B<-outform PEM|DER|NSS>]
+[B<-in filename>]
+[B<-out filename>]
+[B<-text>]
+[B<-noout>]
+[B<-context ID>]
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The B<sess_id> process the encoded version of the SSL session structure
+and optionally prints out SSL session details (for example the SSL session
+master key) in human readable format. Since this is a diagnostic tool that
+needs some knowledge of the SSL protocol to use properly, most users will
+not need to use it.
+
+=head1 OPTIONS
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<-help>
+
+Print out a usage message.
+
+=item B<-inform DER|PEM>
+
+This specifies the input format. The B<DER> option uses an ASN1 DER encoded
+format containing session details. The precise format can vary from one version
+to the next.  The B<PEM> form is the default format: it consists of the B<DER>
+format base64 encoded with additional header and footer lines.
+
+=item B<-outform DER|PEM|NSS>
+
+This specifies the output format. The B<PEM> and B<DER> options have the same meaning
+as the B<-inform> option. The B<NSS> option outputs the session id and the master key
+in NSS keylog format.
+
+=item B<-in filename>
+
+This specifies the input filename to read session information from or standard
+input by default.
+
+=item B<-out filename>
+
+This specifies the output filename to write session information to or standard
+output if this option is not specified.
+
+=item B<-text>
+
+prints out the various public or private key components in
+plain text in addition to the encoded version.
+
+=item B<-cert>
+
+if a certificate is present in the session it will be output using this option,
+if the B<-text> option is also present then it will be printed out in text form.
+
+=item B<-noout>
+
+this option prevents output of the encoded version of the session.
+
+=item B<-context ID>
+
+this option can set the session id so the output session information uses the
+supplied ID. The ID can be any string of characters. This option won't normally
+be used.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 OUTPUT
+
+Typical output:
+
+ SSL-Session:
+     Protocol  : TLSv1
+     Cipher    : 0016
+     Session-ID: 871E62626C554CE95488823752CBD5F3673A3EF3DCE9C67BD916C809914B40ED
+     Session-ID-ctx: 01000000
+     Master-Key: A7CEFC571974BE02CAC305269DC59F76EA9F0B180CB6642697A68251F2D2BB57E51DBBB4C7885573192AE9AEE220FACD
+     Key-Arg   : None
+     Start Time: 948459261
+     Timeout   : 300 (sec)
+     Verify return code 0 (ok)
+
+Theses are described below in more detail.
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<Protocol>
+
+this is the protocol in use TLSv1.2, TLSv1.1, TLSv1 or SSLv3.
+
+=item B<Cipher>
+
+the cipher used this is the actual raw SSL or TLS cipher code, see the SSL
+or TLS specifications for more information.
+
+=item B<Session-ID>
+
+the SSL session ID in hex format.
+
+=item B<Session-ID-ctx>
+
+the session ID context in hex format.
+
+=item B<Master-Key>
+
+this is the SSL session master key.
+
+=item B<Start Time>
+
+this is the session start time represented as an integer in standard Unix format.
+
+=item B<Timeout>
+
+the timeout in seconds.
+
+=item B<Verify return code>
+
+this is the return code when an SSL client certificate is verified.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The PEM encoded session format uses the header and footer lines:
+
+ -----BEGIN SSL SESSION PARAMETERS-----
+ -----END SSL SESSION PARAMETERS-----
+
+Since the SSL session output contains the master key it is possible to read the contents
+of an encrypted session using this information. Therefore appropriate security precautions
+should be taken if the information is being output by a "real" application. This is
+however strongly discouraged and should only be used for debugging purposes.
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+The cipher and start time should be printed out in human readable form.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ciphers(1)>, L<s_server(1)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/smime.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/smime.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..753e275
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/smime.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,518 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+openssl-smime,
+smime - S/MIME utility
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+B<openssl> B<smime>
+[B<-help>]
+[B<-encrypt>]
+[B<-decrypt>]
+[B<-sign>]
+[B<-resign>]
+[B<-verify>]
+[B<-pk7out>]
+[B<-binary>]
+[B<-crlfeol>]
+[B<-[cipher]>]
+[B<-in file>]
+[B<-CAfile file>]
+[B<-CApath dir>]
+[B<-no-CAfile>]
+[B<-no-CApath>]
+[B<-attime timestamp>]
+[B<-check_ss_sig>]
+[B<-crl_check>]
+[B<-crl_check_all>]
+[B<-explicit_policy>]
+[B<-extended_crl>]
+[B<-ignore_critical>]
+[B<-inhibit_any>]
+[B<-inhibit_map>]
+[B<-partial_chain>]
+[B<-policy arg>]
+[B<-policy_check>]
+[B<-policy_print>]
+[B<-purpose purpose>]
+[B<-suiteB_128>]
+[B<-suiteB_128_only>]
+[B<-suiteB_192>]
+[B<-trusted_first>]
+[B<-no_alt_chains>]
+[B<-use_deltas>]
+[B<-auth_level num>]
+[B<-verify_depth num>]
+[B<-verify_email email>]
+[B<-verify_hostname hostname>]
+[B<-verify_ip ip>]
+[B<-verify_name name>]
+[B<-x509_strict>]
+[B<-certfile file>]
+[B<-signer file>]
+[B<-recip  file>]
+[B<-inform SMIME|PEM|DER>]
+[B<-passin arg>]
+[B<-inkey file_or_id>]
+[B<-out file>]
+[B<-outform SMIME|PEM|DER>]
+[B<-content file>]
+[B<-to addr>]
+[B<-from ad>]
+[B<-subject s>]
+[B<-text>]
+[B<-indef>]
+[B<-noindef>]
+[B<-stream>]
+[B<-rand file(s)>]
+[B<-md digest>]
+[cert.pem]...
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The B<smime> command handles S/MIME mail. It can encrypt, decrypt, sign and
+verify S/MIME messages.
+
+=head1 OPTIONS
+
+There are six operation options that set the type of operation to be performed.
+The meaning of the other options varies according to the operation type.
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<-help>
+
+Print out a usage message.
+
+=item B<-encrypt>
+
+encrypt mail for the given recipient certificates. Input file is the message
+to be encrypted. The output file is the encrypted mail in MIME format.
+
+Note that no revocation check is done for the recipient cert, so if that
+key has been compromised, others may be able to decrypt the text.
+
+=item B<-decrypt>
+
+decrypt mail using the supplied certificate and private key. Expects an
+encrypted mail message in MIME format for the input file. The decrypted mail
+is written to the output file.
+
+=item B<-sign>
+
+sign mail using the supplied certificate and private key. Input file is
+the message to be signed. The signed message in MIME format is written
+to the output file.
+
+=item B<-verify>
+
+verify signed mail. Expects a signed mail message on input and outputs
+the signed data. Both clear text and opaque signing is supported.
+
+=item B<-pk7out>
+
+takes an input message and writes out a PEM encoded PKCS#7 structure.
+
+=item B<-resign>
+
+resign a message: take an existing message and one or more new signers.
+
+=item B<-in filename>
+
+the input message to be encrypted or signed or the MIME message to
+be decrypted or verified.
+
+=item B<-inform SMIME|PEM|DER>
+
+this specifies the input format for the PKCS#7 structure. The default
+is B<SMIME> which reads an S/MIME format message. B<PEM> and B<DER>
+format change this to expect PEM and DER format PKCS#7 structures
+instead. This currently only affects the input format of the PKCS#7
+structure, if no PKCS#7 structure is being input (for example with
+B<-encrypt> or B<-sign>) this option has no effect.
+
+=item B<-out filename>
+
+the message text that has been decrypted or verified or the output MIME
+format message that has been signed or verified.
+
+=item B<-outform SMIME|PEM|DER>
+
+this specifies the output format for the PKCS#7 structure. The default
+is B<SMIME> which write an S/MIME format message. B<PEM> and B<DER>
+format change this to write PEM and DER format PKCS#7 structures
+instead. This currently only affects the output format of the PKCS#7
+structure, if no PKCS#7 structure is being output (for example with
+B<-verify> or B<-decrypt>) this option has no effect.
+
+=item B<-stream -indef -noindef>
+
+the B<-stream> and B<-indef> options are equivalent and enable streaming I/O
+for encoding operations. This permits single pass processing of data without
+the need to hold the entire contents in memory, potentially supporting very
+large files. Streaming is automatically set for S/MIME signing with detached
+data if the output format is B<SMIME> it is currently off by default for all
+other operations.
+
+=item B<-noindef>
+
+disable streaming I/O where it would produce and indefinite length constructed
+encoding. This option currently has no effect. In future streaming will be
+enabled by default on all relevant operations and this option will disable it.
+
+=item B<-content filename>
+
+This specifies a file containing the detached content, this is only
+useful with the B<-verify> command. This is only usable if the PKCS#7
+structure is using the detached signature form where the content is
+not included. This option will override any content if the input format
+is S/MIME and it uses the multipart/signed MIME content type.
+
+=item B<-text>
+
+this option adds plain text (text/plain) MIME headers to the supplied
+message if encrypting or signing. If decrypting or verifying it strips
+off text headers: if the decrypted or verified message is not of MIME
+type text/plain then an error occurs.
+
+=item B<-CAfile file>
+
+a file containing trusted CA certificates, only used with B<-verify>.
+
+=item B<-CApath dir>
+
+a directory containing trusted CA certificates, only used with
+B<-verify>. This directory must be a standard certificate directory: that
+is a hash of each subject name (using B<x509 -hash>) should be linked
+to each certificate.
+
+=item B<-no-CAfile>
+
+Do not load the trusted CA certificates from the default file location
+
+=item B<-no-CApath>
+
+Do not load the trusted CA certificates from the default directory location
+
+=item B<-md digest>
+
+digest algorithm to use when signing or resigning. If not present then the
+default digest algorithm for the signing key will be used (usually SHA1).
+
+=item B<-[cipher]>
+
+the encryption algorithm to use. For example DES  (56 bits) - B<-des>,
+triple DES (168 bits) - B<-des3>,
+EVP_get_cipherbyname() function) can also be used preceded by a dash, for
+example B<-aes-128-cbc>. See L<B<enc>|enc(1)> for list of ciphers
+supported by your version of OpenSSL.
+
+If not specified triple DES is used. Only used with B<-encrypt>.
+
+=item B<-nointern>
+
+when verifying a message normally certificates (if any) included in
+the message are searched for the signing certificate. With this option
+only the certificates specified in the B<-certfile> option are used.
+The supplied certificates can still be used as untrusted CAs however.
+
+=item B<-noverify>
+
+do not verify the signers certificate of a signed message.
+
+=item B<-nochain>
+
+do not do chain verification of signers certificates: that is don't
+use the certificates in the signed message as untrusted CAs.
+
+=item B<-nosigs>
+
+don't try to verify the signatures on the message.
+
+=item B<-nocerts>
+
+when signing a message the signer's certificate is normally included
+with this option it is excluded. This will reduce the size of the
+signed message but the verifier must have a copy of the signers certificate
+available locally (passed using the B<-certfile> option for example).
+
+=item B<-noattr>
+
+normally when a message is signed a set of attributes are included which
+include the signing time and supported symmetric algorithms. With this
+option they are not included.
+
+=item B<-binary>
+
+normally the input message is converted to "canonical" format which is
+effectively using CR and LF as end of line: as required by the S/MIME
+specification. When this option is present no translation occurs. This
+is useful when handling binary data which may not be in MIME format.
+
+=item B<-crlfeol>
+
+normally the output file uses a single B<LF> as end of line. When this
+option is present B<CRLF> is used instead.
+
+=item B<-nodetach>
+
+when signing a message use opaque signing: this form is more resistant
+to translation by mail relays but it cannot be read by mail agents that
+do not support S/MIME.  Without this option cleartext signing with
+the MIME type multipart/signed is used.
+
+=item B<-certfile file>
+
+allows additional certificates to be specified. When signing these will
+be included with the message. When verifying these will be searched for
+the signers certificates. The certificates should be in PEM format.
+
+=item B<-signer file>
+
+a signing certificate when signing or resigning a message, this option can be
+used multiple times if more than one signer is required. If a message is being
+verified then the signers certificates will be written to this file if the
+verification was successful.
+
+=item B<-recip file>
+
+the recipients certificate when decrypting a message. This certificate
+must match one of the recipients of the message or an error occurs.
+
+=item B<-inkey file_or_id>
+
+the private key to use when signing or decrypting. This must match the
+corresponding certificate. If this option is not specified then the
+private key must be included in the certificate file specified with
+the B<-recip> or B<-signer> file. When signing this option can be used
+multiple times to specify successive keys.
+If no engine is used, the argument is taken as a file; if an engine is
+specified, the argument is given to the engine as a key identifier.
+
+=item B<-passin arg>
+
+the private key password source. For more information about the format of B<arg>
+see the B<PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS> section in L<openssl(1)>.
+
+=item B<-rand file(s)>
+
+a file or files containing random data used to seed the random number
+generator, or an EGD socket (see L<RAND_egd(3)>).
+Multiple files can be specified separated by an OS-dependent character.
+The separator is B<;> for MS-Windows, B<,> for OpenVMS, and B<:> for
+all others.
+
+=item B<cert.pem...>
+
+one or more certificates of message recipients: used when encrypting
+a message.
+
+=item B<-to, -from, -subject>
+
+the relevant mail headers. These are included outside the signed
+portion of a message so they may be included manually. If signing
+then many S/MIME mail clients check the signers certificate's email
+address matches that specified in the From: address.
+
+=item B<-attime>, B<-check_ss_sig>, B<-crl_check>, B<-crl_check_all>,
+B<-explicit_policy>, B<-extended_crl>, B<-ignore_critical>, B<-inhibit_any>,
+B<-inhibit_map>, B<-no_alt_chains>, B<-partial_chain>, B<-policy>,
+B<-policy_check>, B<-policy_print>, B<-purpose>, B<-suiteB_128>,
+B<-suiteB_128_only>, B<-suiteB_192>, B<-trusted_first>, B<-use_deltas>,
+B<-auth_level>, B<-verify_depth>, B<-verify_email>, B<-verify_hostname>,
+B<-verify_ip>, B<-verify_name>, B<-x509_strict>
+
+Set various options of certificate chain verification. See
+L<verify(1)> manual page for details.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The MIME message must be sent without any blank lines between the
+headers and the output. Some mail programs will automatically add
+a blank line. Piping the mail directly to sendmail is one way to
+achieve the correct format.
+
+The supplied message to be signed or encrypted must include the
+necessary MIME headers or many S/MIME clients won't display it
+properly (if at all). You can use the B<-text> option to automatically
+add plain text headers.
+
+A "signed and encrypted" message is one where a signed message is
+then encrypted. This can be produced by encrypting an already signed
+message: see the examples section.
+
+This version of the program only allows one signer per message but it
+will verify multiple signers on received messages. Some S/MIME clients
+choke if a message contains multiple signers. It is possible to sign
+messages "in parallel" by signing an already signed message.
+
+The options B<-encrypt> and B<-decrypt> reflect common usage in S/MIME
+clients. Strictly speaking these process PKCS#7 enveloped data: PKCS#7
+encrypted data is used for other purposes.
+
+The B<-resign> option uses an existing message digest when adding a new
+signer. This means that attributes must be present in at least one existing
+signer using the same message digest or this operation will fail.
+
+The B<-stream> and B<-indef> options enable streaming I/O support.
+As a result the encoding is BER using indefinite length constructed encoding
+and no longer DER. Streaming is supported for the B<-encrypt> operation and the
+B<-sign> operation if the content is not detached.
+
+Streaming is always used for the B<-sign> operation with detached data but
+since the content is no longer part of the PKCS#7 structure the encoding
+remains DER.
+
+=head1 EXIT CODES
+
+=over 4
+
+=item Z<>0
+
+the operation was completely successfully.
+
+=item Z<>1
+
+an error occurred parsing the command options.
+
+=item Z<>2
+
+one of the input files could not be read.
+
+=item Z<>3
+
+an error occurred creating the PKCS#7 file or when reading the MIME
+message.
+
+=item Z<>4
+
+an error occurred decrypting or verifying the message.
+
+=item Z<>5
+
+the message was verified correctly but an error occurred writing out
+the signers certificates.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 EXAMPLES
+
+Create a cleartext signed message:
+
+ openssl smime -sign -in message.txt -text -out mail.msg \
+        -signer mycert.pem
+
+Create an opaque signed message:
+
+ openssl smime -sign -in message.txt -text -out mail.msg -nodetach \
+        -signer mycert.pem
+
+Create a signed message, include some additional certificates and
+read the private key from another file:
+
+ openssl smime -sign -in in.txt -text -out mail.msg \
+        -signer mycert.pem -inkey mykey.pem -certfile mycerts.pem
+
+Create a signed message with two signers:
+
+ openssl smime -sign -in message.txt -text -out mail.msg \
+        -signer mycert.pem -signer othercert.pem
+
+Send a signed message under Unix directly to sendmail, including headers:
+
+ openssl smime -sign -in in.txt -text -signer mycert.pem \
+        -from steve@openssl.org -to someone@somewhere \
+        -subject "Signed message" | sendmail someone@somewhere
+
+Verify a message and extract the signer's certificate if successful:
+
+ openssl smime -verify -in mail.msg -signer user.pem -out signedtext.txt
+
+Send encrypted mail using triple DES:
+
+ openssl smime -encrypt -in in.txt -from steve@openssl.org \
+        -to someone@somewhere -subject "Encrypted message" \
+        -des3 user.pem -out mail.msg
+
+Sign and encrypt mail:
+
+ openssl smime -sign -in ml.txt -signer my.pem -text \
+        | openssl smime -encrypt -out mail.msg \
+        -from steve@openssl.org -to someone@somewhere \
+        -subject "Signed and Encrypted message" -des3 user.pem
+
+Note: the encryption command does not include the B<-text> option because the
+message being encrypted already has MIME headers.
+
+Decrypt mail:
+
+ openssl smime -decrypt -in mail.msg -recip mycert.pem -inkey key.pem
+
+The output from Netscape form signing is a PKCS#7 structure with the
+detached signature format. You can use this program to verify the
+signature by line wrapping the base64 encoded structure and surrounding
+it with:
+
+ -----BEGIN PKCS7-----
+ -----END PKCS7-----
+
+and using the command:
+
+ openssl smime -verify -inform PEM -in signature.pem -content content.txt
+
+Alternatively you can base64 decode the signature and use:
+
+ openssl smime -verify -inform DER -in signature.der -content content.txt
+
+Create an encrypted message using 128 bit Camellia:
+
+ openssl smime -encrypt -in plain.txt -camellia128 -out mail.msg cert.pem
+
+Add a signer to an existing message:
+
+ openssl smime -resign -in mail.msg -signer newsign.pem -out mail2.msg
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+The MIME parser isn't very clever: it seems to handle most messages that I've
+thrown at it but it may choke on others.
+
+The code currently will only write out the signer's certificate to a file: if
+the signer has a separate encryption certificate this must be manually
+extracted. There should be some heuristic that determines the correct
+encryption certificate.
+
+Ideally a database should be maintained of a certificates for each email
+address.
+
+The code doesn't currently take note of the permitted symmetric encryption
+algorithms as supplied in the SMIMECapabilities signed attribute. This means the
+user has to manually include the correct encryption algorithm. It should store
+the list of permitted ciphers in a database and only use those.
+
+No revocation checking is done on the signer's certificate.
+
+The current code can only handle S/MIME v2 messages, the more complex S/MIME v3
+structures may cause parsing errors.
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+The use of multiple B<-signer> options and the B<-resign> command were first
+added in OpenSSL 1.0.0
+
+The -no_alt_chains options was first added to OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/speed.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/speed.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4379319
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/speed.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+openssl-speed,
+speed - test library performance
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+B<openssl speed>
+[B<-help>]
+[B<-engine id>]
+[B<-elapsed>]
+[B<-evp algo>]
+[B<-decrypt>]
+[B<algorithm...>]
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+This command is used to test the performance of cryptographic algorithms.
+To see the list of supported algorithms, use the I<list --digest-commands>
+or I<list --cipher-commands> command.
+
+=head1 OPTIONS
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<-help>
+
+Print out a usage message.
+
+=item B<-engine id>
+
+specifying an engine (by its unique B<id> string) will cause B<speed>
+to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine,
+thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default
+for all available algorithms.
+
+=item B<-elapsed>
+
+Measure time in real time instead of CPU time. It can be useful when testing
+speed of hardware engines.
+
+=item B<-evp algo>
+
+Use the specified cipher or message digest algorithm via the EVP interface.
+
+=item B<-decrypt>
+
+Time the decryption instead of encryption. Affects only the EVP testing.
+
+=item B<[zero or more test algorithms]>
+
+If any options are given, B<speed> tests those algorithms, otherwise all of
+the above are tested.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/spkac.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/spkac.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e337e4e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/spkac.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+openssl-spkac,
+spkac - SPKAC printing and generating utility
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+B<openssl> B<spkac>
+[B<-help>]
+[B<-in filename>]
+[B<-out filename>]
+[B<-key keyfile>]
+[B<-passin arg>]
+[B<-challenge string>]
+[B<-pubkey>]
+[B<-spkac spkacname>]
+[B<-spksect section>]
+[B<-noout>]
+[B<-verify>]
+[B<-engine id>]
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The B<spkac> command processes Netscape signed public key and challenge
+(SPKAC) files. It can print out their contents, verify the signature and
+produce its own SPKACs from a supplied private key.
+
+=head1 OPTIONS
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<-help>
+
+Print out a usage message.
+
+=item B<-in filename>
+
+This specifies the input filename to read from or standard input if this
+option is not specified. Ignored if the B<-key> option is used.
+
+=item B<-out filename>
+
+specifies the output filename to write to or standard output by
+default.
+
+=item B<-key keyfile>
+
+create an SPKAC file using the private key in B<keyfile>. The
+B<-in>, B<-noout>, B<-spksect> and B<-verify> options are ignored if
+present.
+
+=item B<-passin password>
+
+the input file password source. For more information about the format of B<arg>
+see the B<PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS> section in L<openssl(1)>.
+
+=item B<-challenge string>
+
+specifies the challenge string if an SPKAC is being created.
+
+=item B<-spkac spkacname>
+
+allows an alternative name form the variable containing the
+SPKAC. The default is "SPKAC". This option affects both
+generated and input SPKAC files.
+
+=item B<-spksect section>
+
+allows an alternative name form the section containing the
+SPKAC. The default is the default section.
+
+=item B<-noout>
+
+don't output the text version of the SPKAC (not used if an
+SPKAC is being created).
+
+=item B<-pubkey>
+
+output the public key of an SPKAC (not used if an SPKAC is
+being created).
+
+=item B<-verify>
+
+verifies the digital signature on the supplied SPKAC.
+
+=item B<-engine id>
+
+specifying an engine (by its unique B<id> string) will cause B<spkac>
+to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine,
+thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default
+for all available algorithms.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 EXAMPLES
+
+Print out the contents of an SPKAC:
+
+ openssl spkac -in spkac.cnf
+
+Verify the signature of an SPKAC:
+
+ openssl spkac -in spkac.cnf -noout -verify
+
+Create an SPKAC using the challenge string "hello":
+
+ openssl spkac -key key.pem -challenge hello -out spkac.cnf
+
+Example of an SPKAC, (long lines split up for clarity):
+
+ SPKAC=MIG5MGUwXDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAANLADBIAkEA1cCoq2Wa3Ixs47uI7F\
+ PVwHVIPDx5yso105Y6zpozam135a8R0CpoRvkkigIyXfcCjiVi5oWk+6FfPaD03u\
+ PFoQIDAQABFgVoZWxsbzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQQFAANBAFpQtY/FojdwkJh1bEIYuc\
+ 2EeM2KHTWPEepWYeawvHD0gQ3DngSC75YCWnnDdq+NQ3F+X4deMx9AaEglZtULwV\
+ 4=
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+A created SPKAC with suitable DN components appended can be fed into
+the B<ca> utility.
+
+SPKACs are typically generated by Netscape when a form is submitted
+containing the B<KEYGEN> tag as part of the certificate enrollment
+process.
+
+The challenge string permits a primitive form of proof of possession
+of private key. By checking the SPKAC signature and a random challenge
+string some guarantee is given that the user knows the private key
+corresponding to the public key being certified. This is important in
+some applications. Without this it is possible for a previous SPKAC
+to be used in a "replay attack".
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ca(1)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/ts.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/ts.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0c949bf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/ts.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,662 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+openssl-ts,
+ts - Time Stamping Authority tool (client/server)
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+B<openssl> B<ts>
+B<-query>
+[B<-rand> file:file...]
+[B<-config> configfile]
+[B<-data> file_to_hash]
+[B<-digest> digest_bytes]
+[B<-[digest]>]
+[B<-tspolicy> object_id]
+[B<-no_nonce>]
+[B<-cert>]
+[B<-in> request.tsq]
+[B<-out> request.tsq]
+[B<-text>]
+
+B<openssl> B<ts>
+B<-reply>
+[B<-config> configfile]
+[B<-section> tsa_section]
+[B<-queryfile> request.tsq]
+[B<-passin> password_src]
+[B<-signer> tsa_cert.pem]
+[B<-inkey> file_or_id]
+[B<-sha1|-sha224|-sha256|-sha384|-sha512>]
+[B<-chain> certs_file.pem]
+[B<-tspolicy> object_id]
+[B<-in> response.tsr]
+[B<-token_in>]
+[B<-out> response.tsr]
+[B<-token_out>]
+[B<-text>]
+[B<-engine> id]
+
+B<openssl> B<ts>
+B<-verify>
+[B<-data> file_to_hash]
+[B<-digest> digest_bytes]
+[B<-queryfile> request.tsq]
+[B<-in> response.tsr]
+[B<-token_in>]
+[B<-CApath> trusted_cert_path]
+[B<-CAfile> trusted_certs.pem]
+[B<-untrusted> cert_file.pem]
+[I<verify options>]
+
+I<verify options:>
+[-attime timestamp]
+[-check_ss_sig]
+[-crl_check]
+[-crl_check_all]
+[-explicit_policy]
+[-extended_crl]
+[-ignore_critical]
+[-inhibit_any]
+[-inhibit_map]
+[-issuer_checks]
+[-no_alt_chains]
+[-no_check_time]
+[-partial_chain]
+[-policy arg]
+[-policy_check]
+[-policy_print]
+[-purpose purpose]
+[-suiteB_128]
+[-suiteB_128_only]
+[-suiteB_192]
+[-trusted_first]
+[-use_deltas]
+[-auth_level num]
+[-verify_depth num]
+[-verify_email email]
+[-verify_hostname hostname]
+[-verify_ip ip]
+[-verify_name name]
+[-x509_strict]
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The B<ts> command is a basic Time Stamping Authority (TSA) client and server
+application as specified in RFC 3161 (Time-Stamp Protocol, TSP). A
+TSA can be part of a PKI deployment and its role is to provide long
+term proof of the existence of a certain datum before a particular
+time. Here is a brief description of the protocol:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item 1.
+
+The TSA client computes a one-way hash value for a data file and sends
+the hash to the TSA.
+
+=item 2.
+
+The TSA attaches the current date and time to the received hash value,
+signs them and sends the time stamp token back to the client. By
+creating this token the TSA certifies the existence of the original
+data file at the time of response generation.
+
+=item 3.
+
+The TSA client receives the time stamp token and verifies the
+signature on it. It also checks if the token contains the same hash
+value that it had sent to the TSA.
+
+=back
+
+There is one DER encoded protocol data unit defined for transporting a time
+stamp request to the TSA and one for sending the time stamp response
+back to the client. The B<ts> command has three main functions:
+creating a time stamp request based on a data file,
+creating a time stamp response based on a request, verifying if a
+response corresponds to a particular request or a data file.
+
+There is no support for sending the requests/responses automatically
+over HTTP or TCP yet as suggested in RFC 3161. The users must send the
+requests either by ftp or e-mail.
+
+=head1 OPTIONS
+
+=head2 Time Stamp Request generation
+
+The B<-query> switch can be used for creating and printing a time stamp
+request with the following options:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<-rand> file:file...
+
+The files containing random data for seeding the random number
+generator. Multiple files can be specified, the separator is B<;> for
+MS-Windows, B<,> for VMS and B<:> for all other platforms. (Optional)
+
+=item B<-config> configfile
+
+The configuration file to use.
+Optional; for a description of the default value,
+see L<openssl(1)/COMMAND SUMMARY>.
+
+=item B<-data> file_to_hash
+
+The data file for which the time stamp request needs to be
+created. stdin is the default if neither the B<-data> nor the B<-digest>
+parameter is specified. (Optional)
+
+=item B<-digest> digest_bytes
+
+It is possible to specify the message imprint explicitly without the data
+file. The imprint must be specified in a hexadecimal format, two characters
+per byte, the bytes optionally separated by colons (e.g. 1A:F6:01:... or
+1AF601...). The number of bytes must match the message digest algorithm
+in use. (Optional)
+
+=item B<-[digest]>
+
+The message digest to apply to the data file.
+Any digest supported by the OpenSSL B<dgst> command can be used.
+The default is SHA-1. (Optional)
+
+=item B<-tspolicy> object_id
+
+The policy that the client expects the TSA to use for creating the
+time stamp token. Either the dotted OID notation or OID names defined
+in the config file can be used. If no policy is requested the TSA will
+use its own default policy. (Optional)
+
+=item B<-no_nonce>
+
+No nonce is specified in the request if this option is
+given. Otherwise a 64 bit long pseudo-random none is
+included in the request. It is recommended to use nonce to
+protect against replay-attacks. (Optional)
+
+=item B<-cert>
+
+The TSA is expected to include its signing certificate in the
+response. (Optional)
+
+=item B<-in> request.tsq
+
+This option specifies a previously created time stamp request in DER
+format that will be printed into the output file. Useful when you need
+to examine the content of a request in human-readable
+format. (Optional)
+
+=item B<-out> request.tsq
+
+Name of the output file to which the request will be written. Default
+is stdout. (Optional)
+
+=item B<-text>
+
+If this option is specified the output is human-readable text format
+instead of DER. (Optional)
+
+=back
+
+=head2 Time Stamp Response generation
+
+A time stamp response (TimeStampResp) consists of a response status
+and the time stamp token itself (ContentInfo), if the token generation was
+successful. The B<-reply> command is for creating a time stamp
+response or time stamp token based on a request and printing the
+response/token in human-readable format. If B<-token_out> is not
+specified the output is always a time stamp response (TimeStampResp),
+otherwise it is a time stamp token (ContentInfo).
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<-config> configfile
+
+The configuration file to use.
+Optional; for a description of the default value,
+see L<openssl(1)/COMMAND SUMMARY>.
+See B<CONFIGURATION FILE OPTIONS> for configurable variables.
+
+=item B<-section> tsa_section
+
+The name of the config file section containing the settings for the
+response generation. If not specified the default TSA section is
+used, see B<CONFIGURATION FILE OPTIONS> for details. (Optional)
+
+=item B<-queryfile> request.tsq
+
+The name of the file containing a DER encoded time stamp request. (Optional)
+
+=item B<-passin> password_src
+
+Specifies the password source for the private key of the TSA. See
+B<PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS> in L<openssl(1)>. (Optional)
+
+=item B<-signer> tsa_cert.pem
+
+The signer certificate of the TSA in PEM format. The TSA signing
+certificate must have exactly one extended key usage assigned to it:
+timeStamping. The extended key usage must also be critical, otherwise
+the certificate is going to be refused. Overrides the B<signer_cert>
+variable of the config file. (Optional)
+
+=item B<-inkey> file_or_id
+
+The signer private key of the TSA in PEM format. Overrides the
+B<signer_key> config file option. (Optional)
+If no engine is used, the argument is taken as a file; if an engine is
+specified, the argument is given to the engine as a key identifier.
+
+=item B<-sha1|-sha224|-sha256|-sha384|-sha512>
+
+Signing digest to use. Overrides the B<signer_digest> config file
+option. (Optional)
+
+=item B<-chain> certs_file.pem
+
+The collection of certificates in PEM format that will all
+be included in the response in addition to the signer certificate if
+the B<-cert> option was used for the request. This file is supposed to
+contain the certificate chain for the signer certificate from its
+issuer upwards. The B<-reply> command does not build a certificate
+chain automatically. (Optional)
+
+=item B<-tspolicy> object_id
+
+The default policy to use for the response unless the client
+explicitly requires a particular TSA policy. The OID can be specified
+either in dotted notation or with its name. Overrides the
+B<default_policy> config file option. (Optional)
+
+=item B<-in> response.tsr
+
+Specifies a previously created time stamp response or time stamp token
+(if B<-token_in> is also specified) in DER format that will be written
+to the output file. This option does not require a request, it is
+useful e.g. when you need to examine the content of a response or
+token or you want to extract the time stamp token from a response. If
+the input is a token and the output is a time stamp response a default
+'granted' status info is added to the token. (Optional)
+
+=item B<-token_in>
+
+This flag can be used together with the B<-in> option and indicates
+that the input is a DER encoded time stamp token (ContentInfo) instead
+of a time stamp response (TimeStampResp). (Optional)
+
+=item B<-out> response.tsr
+
+The response is written to this file. The format and content of the
+file depends on other options (see B<-text>, B<-token_out>). The default is
+stdout. (Optional)
+
+=item B<-token_out>
+
+The output is a time stamp token (ContentInfo) instead of time stamp
+response (TimeStampResp). (Optional)
+
+=item B<-text>
+
+If this option is specified the output is human-readable text format
+instead of DER. (Optional)
+
+=item B<-engine> id
+
+Specifying an engine (by its unique B<id> string) will cause B<ts>
+to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine,
+thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default
+for all available algorithms. Default is builtin. (Optional)
+
+=back
+
+=head2 Time Stamp Response verification
+
+The B<-verify> command is for verifying if a time stamp response or time
+stamp token is valid and matches a particular time stamp request or
+data file. The B<-verify> command does not use the configuration file.
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<-data> file_to_hash
+
+The response or token must be verified against file_to_hash. The file
+is hashed with the message digest algorithm specified in the token.
+The B<-digest> and B<-queryfile> options must not be specified with this one.
+(Optional)
+
+=item B<-digest> digest_bytes
+
+The response or token must be verified against the message digest specified
+with this option. The number of bytes must match the message digest algorithm
+specified in the token. The B<-data> and B<-queryfile> options must not be
+specified with this one. (Optional)
+
+=item B<-queryfile> request.tsq
+
+The original time stamp request in DER format. The B<-data> and B<-digest>
+options must not be specified with this one. (Optional)
+
+=item B<-in> response.tsr
+
+The time stamp response that needs to be verified in DER format. (Mandatory)
+
+=item B<-token_in>
+
+This flag can be used together with the B<-in> option and indicates
+that the input is a DER encoded time stamp token (ContentInfo) instead
+of a time stamp response (TimeStampResp). (Optional)
+
+=item B<-CApath> trusted_cert_path
+
+The name of the directory containing the trusted CA certificates of the
+client. See the similar option of L<verify(1)> for additional
+details. Either this option or B<-CAfile> must be specified. (Optional)
+
+
+=item B<-CAfile> trusted_certs.pem
+
+The name of the file containing a set of trusted self-signed CA
+certificates in PEM format. See the similar option of
+L<verify(1)> for additional details. Either this option
+or B<-CApath> must be specified.
+(Optional)
+
+=item B<-untrusted> cert_file.pem
+
+Set of additional untrusted certificates in PEM format which may be
+needed when building the certificate chain for the TSA's signing
+certificate. This file must contain the TSA signing certificate and
+all intermediate CA certificates unless the response includes them.
+(Optional)
+
+=item I<verify options>
+
+The options B<-attime timestamp>, B<-check_ss_sig>, B<-crl_check>,
+B<-crl_check_all>, B<-explicit_policy>, B<-extended_crl>, B<-ignore_critical>,
+B<-inhibit_any>, B<-inhibit_map>, B<-issuer_checks>, B<-no_alt_chains>,
+B<-no_check_time>, B<-partial_chain>, B<-policy>, B<-policy_check>,
+B<-policy_print>, B<-purpose>, B<-suiteB_128>, B<-suiteB_128_only>,
+B<-suiteB_192>, B<-trusted_first>, B<-use_deltas>, B<-auth_level>,
+B<-verify_depth>, B<-verify_email>, B<-verify_hostname>, B<-verify_ip>,
+B<-verify_name>, and B<-x509_strict> can be used to control timestamp
+verification.  See L<verify(1)>.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 CONFIGURATION FILE OPTIONS
+
+The B<-query> and B<-reply> commands make use of a configuration file.
+See L<config(5)>
+for a general description of the syntax of the config file. The
+B<-query> command uses only the symbolic OID names section
+and it can work without it. However, the B<-reply> command needs the
+config file for its operation.
+
+When there is a command line switch equivalent of a variable the
+switch always overrides the settings in the config file.
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<tsa> section, B<default_tsa>
+
+This is the main section and it specifies the name of another section
+that contains all the options for the B<-reply> command. This default
+section can be overridden with the B<-section> command line switch. (Optional)
+
+=item B<oid_file>
+
+See L<ca(1)> for description. (Optional)
+
+=item B<oid_section>
+
+See L<ca(1)> for description. (Optional)
+
+=item B<RANDFILE>
+
+See L<ca(1)> for description. (Optional)
+
+=item B<serial>
+
+The name of the file containing the hexadecimal serial number of the
+last time stamp response created. This number is incremented by 1 for
+each response. If the file does not exist at the time of response
+generation a new file is created with serial number 1. (Mandatory)
+
+=item B<crypto_device>
+
+Specifies the OpenSSL engine that will be set as the default for
+all available algorithms. The default value is builtin, you can specify
+any other engines supported by OpenSSL (e.g. use chil for the NCipher HSM).
+(Optional)
+
+=item B<signer_cert>
+
+TSA signing certificate in PEM format. The same as the B<-signer>
+command line option. (Optional)
+
+=item B<certs>
+
+A file containing a set of PEM encoded certificates that need to be
+included in the response. The same as the B<-chain> command line
+option. (Optional)
+
+=item B<signer_key>
+
+The private key of the TSA in PEM format. The same as the B<-inkey>
+command line option. (Optional)
+
+=item B<signer_digest>
+
+Signing digest to use. The same as the
+B<-sha1|-sha224|-sha256|-sha384|-sha512> command line option. (Optional)
+
+=item B<default_policy>
+
+The default policy to use when the request does not mandate any
+policy. The same as the B<-tspolicy> command line option. (Optional)
+
+=item B<other_policies>
+
+Comma separated list of policies that are also acceptable by the TSA
+and used only if the request explicitly specifies one of them. (Optional)
+
+=item B<digests>
+
+The list of message digest algorithms that the TSA accepts. At least
+one algorithm must be specified. (Mandatory)
+
+=item B<accuracy>
+
+The accuracy of the time source of the TSA in seconds, milliseconds
+and microseconds. E.g. secs:1, millisecs:500, microsecs:100. If any of
+the components is missing zero is assumed for that field. (Optional)
+
+=item B<clock_precision_digits>
+
+Specifies the maximum number of digits, which represent the fraction of
+seconds, that  need to be included in the time field. The trailing zeroes
+must be removed from the time, so there might actually be fewer digits,
+or no fraction of seconds at all. Supported only on UNIX platforms.
+The maximum value is 6, default is 0.
+(Optional)
+
+=item B<ordering>
+
+If this option is yes the responses generated by this TSA can always
+be ordered, even if the time difference between two responses is less
+than the sum of their accuracies. Default is no. (Optional)
+
+=item B<tsa_name>
+
+Set this option to yes if the subject name of the TSA must be included in
+the TSA name field of the response. Default is no. (Optional)
+
+=item B<ess_cert_id_chain>
+
+The SignedData objects created by the TSA always contain the
+certificate identifier of the signing certificate in a signed
+attribute (see RFC 2634, Enhanced Security Services). If this option
+is set to yes and either the B<certs> variable or the B<-chain> option
+is specified then the certificate identifiers of the chain will also
+be included in the SigningCertificate signed attribute. If this
+variable is set to no, only the signing certificate identifier is
+included. Default is no. (Optional)
+
+=back
+
+=head1 EXAMPLES
+
+All the examples below presume that B<OPENSSL_CONF> is set to a proper
+configuration file, e.g. the example configuration file
+openssl/apps/openssl.cnf will do.
+
+=head2 Time Stamp Request
+
+To create a time stamp request for design1.txt with SHA-1
+without nonce and policy and no certificate is required in the response:
+
+  openssl ts -query -data design1.txt -no_nonce \
+        -out design1.tsq
+
+To create a similar time stamp request with specifying the message imprint
+explicitly:
+
+  openssl ts -query -digest b7e5d3f93198b38379852f2c04e78d73abdd0f4b \
+         -no_nonce -out design1.tsq
+
+To print the content of the previous request in human readable format:
+
+  openssl ts -query -in design1.tsq -text
+
+To create a time stamp request which includes the MD-5 digest
+of design2.txt, requests the signer certificate and nonce,
+specifies a policy id (assuming the tsa_policy1 name is defined in the
+OID section of the config file):
+
+  openssl ts -query -data design2.txt -md5 \
+        -tspolicy tsa_policy1 -cert -out design2.tsq
+
+=head2 Time Stamp Response
+
+Before generating a response a signing certificate must be created for
+the TSA that contains the B<timeStamping> critical extended key usage extension
+without any other key usage extensions. You can add the
+'extendedKeyUsage = critical,timeStamping' line to the user certificate section
+of the config file to generate a proper certificate. See L<req(1)>,
+L<ca(1)>, L<x509(1)> for instructions. The examples
+below assume that cacert.pem contains the certificate of the CA,
+tsacert.pem is the signing certificate issued by cacert.pem and
+tsakey.pem is the private key of the TSA.
+
+To create a time stamp response for a request:
+
+  openssl ts -reply -queryfile design1.tsq -inkey tsakey.pem \
+        -signer tsacert.pem -out design1.tsr
+
+If you want to use the settings in the config file you could just write:
+
+  openssl ts -reply -queryfile design1.tsq -out design1.tsr
+
+To print a time stamp reply to stdout in human readable format:
+
+  openssl ts -reply -in design1.tsr -text
+
+To create a time stamp token instead of time stamp response:
+
+  openssl ts -reply -queryfile design1.tsq -out design1_token.der -token_out
+
+To print a time stamp token to stdout in human readable format:
+
+  openssl ts -reply -in design1_token.der -token_in -text -token_out
+
+To extract the time stamp token from a response:
+
+  openssl ts -reply -in design1.tsr -out design1_token.der -token_out
+
+To add 'granted' status info to a time stamp token thereby creating a
+valid response:
+
+  openssl ts -reply -in design1_token.der -token_in -out design1.tsr
+
+=head2 Time Stamp Verification
+
+To verify a time stamp reply against a request:
+
+  openssl ts -verify -queryfile design1.tsq -in design1.tsr \
+        -CAfile cacert.pem -untrusted tsacert.pem
+
+To verify a time stamp reply that includes the certificate chain:
+
+  openssl ts -verify -queryfile design2.tsq -in design2.tsr \
+        -CAfile cacert.pem
+
+To verify a time stamp token against the original data file:
+  openssl ts -verify -data design2.txt -in design2.tsr \
+        -CAfile cacert.pem
+
+To verify a time stamp token against a message imprint:
+  openssl ts -verify -digest b7e5d3f93198b38379852f2c04e78d73abdd0f4b \
+         -in design2.tsr -CAfile cacert.pem
+
+You could also look at the 'test' directory for more examples.
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+=for comment foreign manuals: procmail(1), perl(1)
+
+If you find any bugs or you have suggestions please write to
+Zoltan Glozik <zglozik@opentsa.org>. Known issues:
+
+=over 2
+
+=item *
+
+No support for time stamps over SMTP, though it is quite easy
+to implement an automatic e-mail based TSA with L<procmail(1)>
+and L<perl(1)>. HTTP server support is provided in the form of
+a separate apache module. HTTP client support is provided by
+L<tsget(1)>. Pure TCP/IP protocol is not supported.
+
+=item *
+
+The file containing the last serial number of the TSA is not
+locked when being read or written. This is a problem if more than one
+instance of L<openssl(1)> is trying to create a time stamp
+response at the same time. This is not an issue when using the apache
+server module, it does proper locking.
+
+=item *
+
+Look for the FIXME word in the source files.
+
+=item *
+
+The source code should really be reviewed by somebody else, too.
+
+=item *
+
+More testing is needed, I have done only some basic tests (see
+test/testtsa).
+
+=back
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<tsget(1)>, L<openssl(1)>, L<req(1)>,
+L<x509(1)>, L<ca(1)>, L<genrsa(1)>,
+L<config(5)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2006-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/tsget.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/tsget.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f566f3a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/tsget.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,200 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+openssl-tsget,
+tsget - Time Stamping HTTP/HTTPS client
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+B<tsget>
+B<-h> server_url
+[B<-e> extension]
+[B<-o> output]
+[B<-v>]
+[B<-d>]
+[B<-k> private_key.pem]
+[B<-p> key_password]
+[B<-c> client_cert.pem]
+[B<-C> CA_certs.pem]
+[B<-P> CA_path]
+[B<-r> file:file...]
+[B<-g> EGD_socket]
+[request]...
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The B<tsget> command can be used for sending a time stamp request, as
+specified in B<RFC 3161>, to a time stamp server over HTTP or HTTPS and storing
+the time stamp response in a file. This tool cannot be used for creating the
+requests and verifying responses, you can use the OpenSSL B<ts(1)> command to
+do that. B<tsget> can send several requests to the server without closing
+the TCP connection if more than one requests are specified on the command
+line.
+
+The tool sends the following HTTP request for each time stamp request:
+
+        POST url HTTP/1.1
+        User-Agent: OpenTSA tsget.pl/<version>
+        Host: <host>:<port>
+        Pragma: no-cache
+        Content-Type: application/timestamp-query
+        Accept: application/timestamp-reply
+        Content-Length: length of body
+
+        ...binary request specified by the user...
+
+B<tsget> expects a response of type application/timestamp-reply, which is
+written to a file without any interpretation.
+
+=head1 OPTIONS
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<-h> server_url
+
+The URL of the HTTP/HTTPS server listening for time stamp requests.
+
+=item B<-e> extension
+
+If the B<-o> option is not given this argument specifies the extension of the
+output files. The base name of the output file will be the same as those of
+the input files. Default extension is '.tsr'. (Optional)
+
+=item B<-o> output
+
+This option can be specified only when just one request is sent to the
+server. The time stamp response will be written to the given output file. '-'
+means standard output. In case of multiple time stamp requests or the absence
+of this argument the names of the output files will be derived from the names
+of the input files and the default or specified extension argument. (Optional)
+
+=item B<-v>
+
+The name of the currently processed request is printed on standard
+error. (Optional)
+
+=item B<-d>
+
+Switches on verbose mode for the underlying B<curl> library. You can see
+detailed debug messages for the connection. (Optional)
+
+=item B<-k> private_key.pem
+
+(HTTPS) In case of certificate-based client authentication over HTTPS
+<private_key.pem> must contain the private key of the user. The private key
+file can optionally be protected by a passphrase. The B<-c> option must also
+be specified. (Optional)
+
+=item B<-p> key_password
+
+(HTTPS) Specifies the passphrase for the private key specified by the B<-k>
+argument. If this option is omitted and the key is passphrase protected B<tsget>
+will ask for it. (Optional)
+
+=item B<-c> client_cert.pem
+
+(HTTPS) In case of certificate-based client authentication over HTTPS
+<client_cert.pem> must contain the X.509 certificate of the user.  The B<-k>
+option must also be specified. If this option is not specified no
+certificate-based client authentication will take place. (Optional)
+
+=item B<-C> CA_certs.pem
+
+(HTTPS) The trusted CA certificate store. The certificate chain of the peer's
+certificate must include one of the CA certificates specified in this file.
+Either option B<-C> or option B<-P> must be given in case of HTTPS. (Optional)
+
+=item B<-P> CA_path
+
+(HTTPS) The path containing the trusted CA certificates to verify the peer's
+certificate. The directory must be prepared with the B<c_rehash>
+OpenSSL utility. Either option B<-C> or option B<-P> must be given in case of
+HTTPS. (Optional)
+
+=item B<-rand> file:file...
+
+The files containing random data for seeding the random number
+generator. Multiple files can be specified, the separator is B<;> for
+MS-Windows, B<,> for VMS and B<:> for all other platforms. (Optional)
+
+=item B<-g> EGD_socket
+
+The name of an EGD socket to get random data from. (Optional)
+
+=item [request]...
+
+List of files containing B<RFC 3161> DER-encoded time stamp requests. If no
+requests are specified only one request will be sent to the server and it will be
+read from the standard input. (Optional)
+
+=back
+
+=head1 ENVIRONMENT VARIABLES
+
+The B<TSGET> environment variable can optionally contain default
+arguments. The content of this variable is added to the list of command line
+arguments.
+
+=head1 EXAMPLES
+
+The examples below presume that B<file1.tsq> and B<file2.tsq> contain valid
+time stamp requests, tsa.opentsa.org listens at port 8080 for HTTP requests
+and at port 8443 for HTTPS requests, the TSA service is available at the /tsa
+absolute path.
+
+Get a time stamp response for file1.tsq over HTTP, output is written to
+file1.tsr:
+
+  tsget -h http://tsa.opentsa.org:8080/tsa file1.tsq
+
+Get a time stamp response for file1.tsq and file2.tsq over HTTP showing
+progress, output is written to file1.reply and file2.reply respectively:
+
+  tsget -h http://tsa.opentsa.org:8080/tsa -v -e .reply \
+        file1.tsq file2.tsq
+
+Create a time stamp request, write it to file3.tsq, send it to the server and
+write the response to file3.tsr:
+
+  openssl ts -query -data file3.txt -cert | tee file3.tsq \
+        | tsget -h http://tsa.opentsa.org:8080/tsa \
+        -o file3.tsr
+
+Get a time stamp response for file1.tsq over HTTPS without client
+authentication:
+
+  tsget -h https://tsa.opentsa.org:8443/tsa \
+        -C cacerts.pem file1.tsq
+
+Get a time stamp response for file1.tsq over HTTPS with certificate-based
+client authentication (it will ask for the passphrase if client_key.pem is
+protected):
+
+  tsget -h https://tsa.opentsa.org:8443/tsa -C cacerts.pem \
+        -k client_key.pem -c client_cert.pem file1.tsq
+
+You can shorten the previous command line if you make use of the B<TSGET>
+environment variable. The following commands do the same as the previous
+example:
+
+  TSGET='-h https://tsa.opentsa.org:8443/tsa -C cacerts.pem \
+        -k client_key.pem -c client_cert.pem'
+  export TSGET
+  tsget file1.tsq
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<openssl(1)>, L<ts(1)>, L<curl(1)>,
+B<RFC 3161>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/verify.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/verify.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..38fa346
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/verify.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,725 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+openssl-verify,
+verify - Utility to verify certificates
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+B<openssl> B<verify>
+[B<-help>]
+[B<-CAfile file>]
+[B<-CApath directory>]
+[B<-no-CAfile>]
+[B<-no-CApath>]
+[B<-allow_proxy_certs>]
+[B<-attime timestamp>]
+[B<-check_ss_sig>]
+[B<-CRLfile file>]
+[B<-crl_download>]
+[B<-crl_check>]
+[B<-crl_check_all>]
+[B<-engine id>]
+[B<-explicit_policy>]
+[B<-extended_crl>]
+[B<-ignore_critical>]
+[B<-inhibit_any>]
+[B<-inhibit_map>]
+[B<-no_check_time>]
+[B<-partial_chain>]
+[B<-policy arg>]
+[B<-policy_check>]
+[B<-policy_print>]
+[B<-purpose purpose>]
+[B<-suiteB_128>]
+[B<-suiteB_128_only>]
+[B<-suiteB_192>]
+[B<-trusted_first>]
+[B<-no_alt_chains>]
+[B<-untrusted file>]
+[B<-trusted file>]
+[B<-use_deltas>]
+[B<-verbose>]
+[B<-auth_level level>]
+[B<-verify_depth num>]
+[B<-verify_email email>]
+[B<-verify_hostname hostname>]
+[B<-verify_ip ip>]
+[B<-verify_name name>]
+[B<-x509_strict>]
+[B<-show_chain>]
+[B<->]
+[certificates]
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The B<verify> command verifies certificate chains.
+
+=head1 OPTIONS
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<-help>
+
+Print out a usage message.
+
+=item B<-CAfile file>
+
+A B<file> of trusted certificates.
+The file should contain one or more certificates in PEM format.
+
+=item B<-CApath directory>
+
+A directory of trusted certificates. The certificates should have names
+of the form: hash.0 or have symbolic links to them of this
+form ("hash" is the hashed certificate subject name: see the B<-hash> option
+of the B<x509> utility). Under Unix the B<c_rehash> script will automatically
+create symbolic links to a directory of certificates.
+
+=item B<-no-CAfile>
+
+Do not load the trusted CA certificates from the default file location
+
+=item B<-no-CApath>
+
+Do not load the trusted CA certificates from the default directory location
+
+=item B<-allow_proxy_certs>
+
+Allow the verification of proxy certificates
+
+=item B<-attime timestamp>
+
+Perform validation checks using time specified by B<timestamp> and not
+current system time. B<timestamp> is the number of seconds since
+01.01.1970 (UNIX time).
+
+=item B<-check_ss_sig>
+
+Verify the signature on the self-signed root CA. This is disabled by default
+because it doesn't add any security.
+
+=item B<-CRLfile file>
+
+The B<file> should contain one or more CRLs in PEM format.
+This option can be specified more than once to include CRLs from multiple
+B<files>.
+
+=item B<-crl_download>
+
+Attempt to download CRL information for this certificate.
+
+=item B<-crl_check>
+
+Checks end entity certificate validity by attempting to look up a valid CRL.
+If a valid CRL cannot be found an error occurs.
+
+=item B<-crl_check_all>
+
+Checks the validity of B<all> certificates in the chain by attempting
+to look up valid CRLs.
+
+=item B<-engine id>
+
+Specifying an engine B<id> will cause L<verify(1)> to attempt to load the
+specified engine.
+The engine will then be set as the default for all its supported algorithms.
+If you want to load certificates or CRLs that require engine support via any of
+the B<-trusted>, B<-untrusted> or B<-CRLfile> options, the B<-engine> option
+must be specified before those options.
+
+=item B<-explicit_policy>
+
+Set policy variable require-explicit-policy (see RFC5280).
+
+=item B<-extended_crl>
+
+Enable extended CRL features such as indirect CRLs and alternate CRL
+signing keys.
+
+=item B<-ignore_critical>
+
+Normally if an unhandled critical extension is present which is not
+supported by OpenSSL the certificate is rejected (as required by RFC5280).
+If this option is set critical extensions are ignored.
+
+=item B<-inhibit_any>
+
+Set policy variable inhibit-any-policy (see RFC5280).
+
+=item B<-inhibit_map>
+
+Set policy variable inhibit-policy-mapping (see RFC5280).
+
+=item B<-no_check_time>
+
+This option suppresses checking the validity period of certificates and CRLs
+against the current time. If option B<-attime timestamp> is used to specify
+a verification time, the check is not suppressed.
+
+=item B<-partial_chain>
+
+Allow verification to succeed even if a I<complete> chain cannot be built to a
+self-signed trust-anchor, provided it is possible to construct a chain to a
+trusted certificate that might not be self-signed.
+
+=item B<-policy arg>
+
+Enable policy processing and add B<arg> to the user-initial-policy-set (see
+RFC5280). The policy B<arg> can be an object name an OID in numeric form.
+This argument can appear more than once.
+
+=item B<-policy_check>
+
+Enables certificate policy processing.
+
+=item B<-policy_print>
+
+Print out diagnostics related to policy processing.
+
+=item B<-purpose purpose>
+
+The intended use for the certificate. If this option is not specified,
+B<verify> will not consider certificate purpose during chain verification.
+Currently accepted uses are B<sslclient>, B<sslserver>, B<nssslserver>,
+B<smimesign>, B<smimeencrypt>. See the B<VERIFY OPERATION> section for more
+information.
+
+=item B<-suiteB_128_only>, B<-suiteB_128>, B<-suiteB_192>
+
+enable the Suite B mode operation at 128 bit Level of Security, 128 bit or
+192 bit, or only 192 bit Level of Security respectively.
+See RFC6460 for details. In particular the supported signature algorithms are
+reduced to support only ECDSA and SHA256 or SHA384 and only the elliptic curves
+P-256 and P-384.
+
+=item B<-trusted_first>
+
+When constructing the certificate chain, use the trusted certificates specified
+via B<-CAfile>, B<-CApath> or B<-trusted> before any certificates specified via
+B<-untrusted>.
+This can be useful in environments with Bridge or Cross-Certified CAs.
+As of OpenSSL 1.1.0 this option is on by default and cannot be disabled.
+
+=item B<-no_alt_chains>
+
+By default, unless B<-trusted_first> is specified, when building a certificate
+chain, if the first certificate chain found is not trusted, then OpenSSL will
+attempt to replace untrusted issuer certificates with certificates from the
+trust store to see if an alternative chain can be found that is trusted.
+As of OpenSSL 1.1.0, with B<-trusted_first> always on, this option has no
+effect.
+
+=item B<-untrusted file>
+
+A B<file> of additional untrusted certificates (intermediate issuer CAs) used
+to construct a certificate chain from the subject certificate to a trust-anchor.
+The B<file> should contain one or more certificates in PEM format.
+This option can be specified more than once to include untrusted certificates
+from multiple B<files>.
+
+=item B<-trusted file>
+
+A B<file> of trusted certificates, which must be self-signed, unless the
+B<-partial_chain> option is specified.
+The B<file> contains one or more certificates in PEM format.
+With this option, no additional (e.g., default) certificate lists are
+consulted.
+That is, the only trust-anchors are those listed in B<file>.
+This option can be specified more than once to include trusted certificates
+from multiple B<files>.
+This option implies the B<-no-CAfile> and B<-no-CApath> options.
+This option cannot be used in combination with either of the B<-CAfile> or
+B<-CApath> options.
+
+=item B<-use_deltas>
+
+Enable support for delta CRLs.
+
+=item B<-verbose>
+
+Print extra information about the operations being performed.
+
+=item B<-auth_level level>
+
+Set the certificate chain authentication security level to B<level>.
+The authentication security level determines the acceptable signature and
+public key strength when verifying certificate chains.
+For a certificate chain to validate, the public keys of all the certificates
+must meet the specified security B<level>.
+The signature algorithm security level is enforced for all the certificates in
+the chain except for the chain's I<trust anchor>, which is either directly
+trusted or validated by means other than its signature.
+See L<SSL_CTX_set_security_level(3)> for the definitions of the available
+levels.
+The default security level is -1, or "not set".
+At security level 0 or lower all algorithms are acceptable.
+Security level 1 requires at least 80-bit-equivalent security and is broadly
+interoperable, though it will, for example, reject MD5 signatures or RSA keys
+shorter than 1024 bits.
+
+=item B<-verify_depth num>
+
+Limit the certificate chain to B<num> intermediate CA certificates.
+A maximal depth chain can have up to B<num+2> certificates, since neither the
+end-entity certificate nor the trust-anchor certificate count against the
+B<-verify_depth> limit.
+
+=item B<-verify_email email>
+
+Verify if the B<email> matches the email address in Subject Alternative Name or
+the email in the subject Distinguished Name.
+
+=item B<-verify_hostname hostname>
+
+Verify if the B<hostname> matches DNS name in Subject Alternative Name or
+Common Name in the subject certificate.
+
+=item B<-verify_ip ip>
+
+Verify if the B<ip> matches the IP address in Subject Alternative Name of
+the subject certificate.
+
+=item B<-verify_name name>
+
+Use default verification policies like trust model and required certificate
+policies identified by B<name>.
+The trust model determines which auxiliary trust or reject OIDs are applicable
+to verifying the given certificate chain.
+See the B<-addtrust> and B<-addreject> options of the L<x509(1)> command-line
+utility.
+Supported policy names include: B<default>, B<pkcs7>, B<smime_sign>,
+B<ssl_client>, B<ssl_server>.
+These mimics the combinations of purpose and trust settings used in SSL, CMS
+and S/MIME.
+As of OpenSSL 1.1.0, the trust model is inferred from the purpose when not
+specified, so the B<-verify_name> options are functionally equivalent to the
+corresponding B<-purpose> settings.
+
+=item B<-x509_strict>
+
+For strict X.509 compliance, disable non-compliant workarounds for broken
+certificates.
+
+=item B<-show_chain>
+
+Display information about the certificate chain that has been built (if
+successful). Certificates in the chain that came from the untrusted list will be
+flagged as "untrusted".
+
+=item B<->
+
+Indicates the last option. All arguments following this are assumed to be
+certificate files. This is useful if the first certificate filename begins
+with a B<->.
+
+=item B<certificates>
+
+One or more certificates to verify. If no certificates are given, B<verify>
+will attempt to read a certificate from standard input. Certificates must be
+in PEM format.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 VERIFY OPERATION
+
+The B<verify> program uses the same functions as the internal SSL and S/MIME
+verification, therefore this description applies to these verify operations
+too.
+
+There is one crucial difference between the verify operations performed
+by the B<verify> program: wherever possible an attempt is made to continue
+after an error whereas normally the verify operation would halt on the
+first error. This allows all the problems with a certificate chain to be
+determined.
+
+The verify operation consists of a number of separate steps.
+
+Firstly a certificate chain is built up starting from the supplied certificate
+and ending in the root CA.
+It is an error if the whole chain cannot be built up.
+The chain is built up by looking up the issuers certificate of the current
+certificate.
+If a certificate is found which is its own issuer it is assumed to be the root
+CA.
+
+The process of 'looking up the issuers certificate' itself involves a number of
+steps.
+After all certificates whose subject name matches the issuer name of the current
+certificate are subject to further tests.
+The relevant authority key identifier components of the current certificate (if
+present) must match the subject key identifier (if present) and issuer and
+serial number of the candidate issuer, in addition the keyUsage extension of
+the candidate issuer (if present) must permit certificate signing.
+
+The lookup first looks in the list of untrusted certificates and if no match
+is found the remaining lookups are from the trusted certificates. The root CA
+is always looked up in the trusted certificate list: if the certificate to
+verify is a root certificate then an exact match must be found in the trusted
+list.
+
+The second operation is to check every untrusted certificate's extensions for
+consistency with the supplied purpose. If the B<-purpose> option is not included
+then no checks are done. The supplied or "leaf" certificate must have extensions
+compatible with the supplied purpose and all other certificates must also be valid
+CA certificates. The precise extensions required are described in more detail in
+the B<CERTIFICATE EXTENSIONS> section of the B<x509> utility.
+
+The third operation is to check the trust settings on the root CA. The root CA
+should be trusted for the supplied purpose.
+For compatibility with previous versions of OpenSSL, a certificate with no
+trust settings is considered to be valid for all purposes.
+
+The final operation is to check the validity of the certificate chain. The validity
+period is checked against the current system time and the notBefore and notAfter
+dates in the certificate. The certificate signatures are also checked at this
+point.
+
+If all operations complete successfully then certificate is considered valid. If
+any operation fails then the certificate is not valid.
+
+=head1 DIAGNOSTICS
+
+When a verify operation fails the output messages can be somewhat cryptic. The
+general form of the error message is:
+
+ server.pem: /C=AU/ST=Queensland/O=CryptSoft Pty Ltd/CN=Test CA (1024 bit)
+ error 24 at 1 depth lookup:invalid CA certificate
+
+The first line contains the name of the certificate being verified followed by
+the subject name of the certificate. The second line contains the error number
+and the depth. The depth is number of the certificate being verified when a
+problem was detected starting with zero for the certificate being verified itself
+then 1 for the CA that signed the certificate and so on. Finally a text version
+of the error number is presented.
+
+A partial list of the error codes and messages is shown below, this also
+includes the name of the error code as defined in the header file x509_vfy.h
+Some of the error codes are defined but never returned: these are described
+as "unused".
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<X509_V_OK>
+
+The operation was successful.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED>
+
+Unspecified error; should not happen.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT>
+
+The issuer certificate of a looked up certificate could not be found. This
+normally means the list of trusted certificates is not complete.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL>
+
+The CRL of a certificate could not be found.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE>
+
+The certificate signature could not be decrypted. This means that the actual signature value
+could not be determined rather than it not matching the expected value, this is only
+meaningful for RSA keys.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE>
+
+The CRL signature could not be decrypted: this means that the actual signature value
+could not be determined rather than it not matching the expected value. Unused.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY>
+
+The public key in the certificate SubjectPublicKeyInfo could not be read.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE>
+
+The signature of the certificate is invalid.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE>
+
+The signature of the certificate is invalid.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID>
+
+The certificate is not yet valid: the notBefore date is after the current time.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED>
+
+The certificate has expired: that is the notAfter date is before the current time.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID>
+
+The CRL is not yet valid.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED>
+
+The CRL has expired.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD>
+
+The certificate notBefore field contains an invalid time.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD>
+
+The certificate notAfter field contains an invalid time.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD>
+
+The CRL lastUpdate field contains an invalid time.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD>
+
+The CRL nextUpdate field contains an invalid time.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM>
+
+An error occurred trying to allocate memory. This should never happen.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT>
+
+The passed certificate is self-signed and the same certificate cannot be found in the list of
+trusted certificates.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN>
+
+The certificate chain could be built up using the untrusted certificates but the root could not
+be found locally.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY>
+
+The issuer certificate could not be found: this occurs if the issuer
+certificate of an untrusted certificate cannot be found.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE>
+
+No signatures could be verified because the chain contains only one certificate and it is not
+self signed.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG>
+
+The certificate chain length is greater than the supplied maximum depth. Unused.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED>
+
+The certificate has been revoked.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA>
+
+A CA certificate is invalid. Either it is not a CA or its extensions are not consistent
+with the supplied purpose.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED>
+
+The basicConstraints pathlength parameter has been exceeded.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE>
+
+The supplied certificate cannot be used for the specified purpose.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED>
+
+the root CA is not marked as trusted for the specified purpose.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED>
+
+The root CA is marked to reject the specified purpose.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH>
+
+not used as of OpenSSL 1.1.0 as a result of the deprecation of the
+B<-issuer_checks> option.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_AKID_SKID_MISMATCH>
+
+Not used as of OpenSSL 1.1.0 as a result of the deprecation of the
+B<-issuer_checks> option.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH>
+
+Not used as of OpenSSL 1.1.0 as a result of the deprecation of the
+B<-issuer_checks> option.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CERTSIGN>
+
+Not used as of OpenSSL 1.1.0 as a result of the deprecation of the
+B<-issuer_checks> option.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER>
+
+Unable to get CRL issuer certificate.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION>
+
+Unhandled critical extension.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN>
+
+Key usage does not include CRL signing.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION>
+
+Unhandled critical CRL extension.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA>
+
+Invalid non-CA certificate has CA markings.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED>
+
+Proxy path length constraint exceeded.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_INVALID>
+
+Proxy certificate subject is invalid.  It MUST be the same as the issuer
+with a single CN component added.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE>
+
+Key usage does not include digital signature.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED>
+
+Proxy certificates not allowed, please use B<-allow_proxy_certs>.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION>
+
+Invalid or inconsistent certificate extension.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION>
+
+Invalid or inconsistent certificate policy extension.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY>
+
+No explicit policy.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE>
+
+Different CRL scope.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION_FEATURE>
+
+Unsupported extension feature.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNNESTED_RESOURCE>
+
+RFC 3779 resource not subset of parent's resources.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION>
+
+Permitted subtree violation.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_EXCLUDED_VIOLATION>
+
+Excluded subtree violation.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_SUBTREE_MINMAX>
+
+Name constraints minimum and maximum not supported.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION>
+
+Application verification failure. Unused.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CONSTRAINT_TYPE>
+
+Unsupported name constraint type.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CONSTRAINT_SYNTAX>
+
+Unsupported or invalid name constraint syntax.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX>
+
+Unsupported or invalid name syntax.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR>
+
+CRL path validation error.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_PATH_LOOP>
+
+Path loop.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION>
+
+Suite B: certificate version invalid.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM>
+
+Suite B: invalid public key algorithm.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE>
+
+Suite B: invalid ECC curve.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM>
+
+Suite B: invalid signature algorithm.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED>
+
+Suite B: curve not allowed for this LOS.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256>
+
+Suite B: cannot sign P-384 with P-256.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH>
+
+Hostname mismatch.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH>
+
+Email address mismatch.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH>
+
+IP address mismatch.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH>
+
+DANE TLSA authentication is enabled, but no TLSA records matched the
+certificate chain.
+This error is only possible in L<s_client(1)>.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+Although the issuer checks are a considerable improvement over the old technique they still
+suffer from limitations in the underlying X509_LOOKUP API. One consequence of this is that
+trusted certificates with matching subject name must either appear in a file (as specified by the
+B<-CAfile> option) or a directory (as specified by B<-CApath>). If they occur in both then only
+the certificates in the file will be recognised.
+
+Previous versions of OpenSSL assume certificates with matching subject name are identical and
+mishandled them.
+
+Previous versions of this documentation swapped the meaning of the
+B<X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT> and
+B<X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY> error codes.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<x509(1)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+The B<-show_chain> option was first added to OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+The B<-issuer_checks> option is deprecated as of OpenSSL 1.1.0 and
+is silently ignored.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/version.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/version.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..305a1b7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/version.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+openssl-version,
+version - print OpenSSL version information
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+B<openssl version>
+[B<-help>]
+[B<-a>]
+[B<-v>]
+[B<-b>]
+[B<-o>]
+[B<-f>]
+[B<-p>]
+[B<-d>]
+[B<-e>]
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+This command is used to print out version information about OpenSSL.
+
+=head1 OPTIONS
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<-help>
+
+Print out a usage message.
+
+=item B<-a>
+
+all information, this is the same as setting all the other flags.
+
+=item B<-v>
+
+the current OpenSSL version.
+
+=item B<-b>
+
+the date the current version of OpenSSL was built.
+
+=item B<-o>
+
+option information: various options set when the library was built.
+
+=item B<-f>
+
+compilation flags.
+
+=item B<-p>
+
+platform setting.
+
+=item B<-d>
+
+OPENSSLDIR setting.
+
+=item B<-e>
+
+ENGINESDIR setting.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The output of B<openssl version -a> would typically be used when sending
+in a bug report.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/x509.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/x509.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f2dcef2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/x509.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,898 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+openssl-x509,
+x509 - Certificate display and signing utility
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+B<openssl> B<x509>
+[B<-help>]
+[B<-inform DER|PEM|NET>]
+[B<-outform DER|PEM|NET>]
+[B<-keyform DER|PEM>]
+[B<-CAform DER|PEM>]
+[B<-CAkeyform DER|PEM>]
+[B<-in filename>]
+[B<-out filename>]
+[B<-serial>]
+[B<-hash>]
+[B<-subject_hash>]
+[B<-issuer_hash>]
+[B<-ocspid>]
+[B<-subject>]
+[B<-issuer>]
+[B<-nameopt option>]
+[B<-email>]
+[B<-ocsp_uri>]
+[B<-startdate>]
+[B<-enddate>]
+[B<-purpose>]
+[B<-dates>]
+[B<-checkend num>]
+[B<-modulus>]
+[B<-pubkey>]
+[B<-fingerprint>]
+[B<-alias>]
+[B<-noout>]
+[B<-trustout>]
+[B<-clrtrust>]
+[B<-clrreject>]
+[B<-addtrust arg>]
+[B<-addreject arg>]
+[B<-setalias arg>]
+[B<-days arg>]
+[B<-set_serial n>]
+[B<-signkey filename>]
+[B<-passin arg>]
+[B<-x509toreq>]
+[B<-req>]
+[B<-CA filename>]
+[B<-CAkey filename>]
+[B<-CAcreateserial>]
+[B<-CAserial filename>]
+[B<-force_pubkey key>]
+[B<-text>]
+[B<-certopt option>]
+[B<-C>]
+[B<-[digest]>]
+[B<-clrext>]
+[B<-extfile filename>]
+[B<-extensions section>]
+[B<-engine id>]
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The B<x509> command is a multi purpose certificate utility. It can be
+used to display certificate information, convert certificates to
+various forms, sign certificate requests like a "mini CA" or edit
+certificate trust settings.
+
+Since there are a large number of options they will split up into
+various sections.
+
+=head1 OPTIONS
+
+=head2 Input, Output, and General Purpose Options
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<-help>
+
+Print out a usage message.
+
+=item B<-inform DER|PEM|NET>
+
+This specifies the input format normally the command will expect an X509
+certificate but this can change if other options such as B<-req> are
+present. The DER format is the DER encoding of the certificate and PEM
+is the base64 encoding of the DER encoding with header and footer lines
+added. The NET option is an obscure Netscape server format that is now
+obsolete.
+
+=item B<-outform DER|PEM|NET>
+
+This specifies the output format, the options have the same meaning as the
+B<-inform> option.
+
+=item B<-in filename>
+
+This specifies the input filename to read a certificate from or standard input
+if this option is not specified.
+
+=item B<-out filename>
+
+This specifies the output filename to write to or standard output by
+default.
+
+=item B<-[digest]>
+
+the digest to use.
+This affects any signing or display option that uses a message
+digest, such as the B<-fingerprint>, B<-signkey> and B<-CA> options.
+Any digest supported by the OpenSSL B<dgst> command can be used.
+If not specified then SHA1 is used with B<-fingerprint> or
+the default digest for the signing algorithm is used, typically SHA256.
+
+=item B<-engine id>
+
+specifying an engine (by its unique B<id> string) will cause B<x509>
+to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine,
+thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default
+for all available algorithms.
+
+=back
+
+=head2 Display Options
+
+Note: the B<-alias> and B<-purpose> options are also display options
+but are described in the B<TRUST SETTINGS> section.
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<-text>
+
+prints out the certificate in text form. Full details are output including the
+public key, signature algorithms, issuer and subject names, serial number
+any extensions present and any trust settings.
+
+=item B<-certopt option>
+
+customise the output format used with B<-text>. The B<option> argument can be
+a single option or multiple options separated by commas. The B<-certopt> switch
+may be also be used more than once to set multiple options. See the B<TEXT OPTIONS>
+section for more information.
+
+=item B<-noout>
+
+this option prevents output of the encoded version of the request.
+
+=item B<-pubkey>
+
+outputs the certificate's SubjectPublicKeyInfo block in PEM format.
+
+=item B<-modulus>
+
+this option prints out the value of the modulus of the public key
+contained in the certificate.
+
+=item B<-serial>
+
+outputs the certificate serial number.
+
+=item B<-subject_hash>
+
+outputs the "hash" of the certificate subject name. This is used in OpenSSL to
+form an index to allow certificates in a directory to be looked up by subject
+name.
+
+=item B<-issuer_hash>
+
+outputs the "hash" of the certificate issuer name.
+
+=item B<-ocspid>
+
+outputs the OCSP hash values for the subject name and public key.
+
+=item B<-hash>
+
+synonym for "-subject_hash" for backward compatibility reasons.
+
+=item B<-subject_hash_old>
+
+outputs the "hash" of the certificate subject name using the older algorithm
+as used by OpenSSL versions before 1.0.0.
+
+=item B<-issuer_hash_old>
+
+outputs the "hash" of the certificate issuer name using the older algorithm
+as used by OpenSSL versions before 1.0.0.
+
+=item B<-subject>
+
+outputs the subject name.
+
+=item B<-issuer>
+
+outputs the issuer name.
+
+=item B<-nameopt option>
+
+option which determines how the subject or issuer names are displayed. The
+B<option> argument can be a single option or multiple options separated by
+commas.  Alternatively the B<-nameopt> switch may be used more than once to
+set multiple options. See the B<NAME OPTIONS> section for more information.
+
+=item B<-email>
+
+outputs the email address(es) if any.
+
+=item B<-ocsp_uri>
+
+outputs the OCSP responder address(es) if any.
+
+=item B<-startdate>
+
+prints out the start date of the certificate, that is the notBefore date.
+
+=item B<-enddate>
+
+prints out the expiry date of the certificate, that is the notAfter date.
+
+=item B<-dates>
+
+prints out the start and expiry dates of a certificate.
+
+=item B<-checkend arg>
+
+checks if the certificate expires within the next B<arg> seconds and exits
+non-zero if yes it will expire or zero if not.
+
+=item B<-fingerprint>
+
+Calculates and outputs the digest of the DER encoded version of the entire
+certificate (see digest options).
+This is commonly called a "fingerprint". Because of the nature of message
+digests, the fingerprint of a certificate is unique to that certificate and
+two certificates with the same fingerprint can be considered to be the same.
+
+=item B<-C>
+
+this outputs the certificate in the form of a C source file.
+
+=back
+
+=head2 Trust Settings
+
+A B<trusted certificate> is an ordinary certificate which has several
+additional pieces of information attached to it such as the permitted
+and prohibited uses of the certificate and an "alias".
+
+Normally when a certificate is being verified at least one certificate
+must be "trusted". By default a trusted certificate must be stored
+locally and must be a root CA: any certificate chain ending in this CA
+is then usable for any purpose.
+
+Trust settings currently are only used with a root CA. They allow a finer
+control over the purposes the root CA can be used for. For example a CA
+may be trusted for SSL client but not SSL server use.
+
+See the description of the B<verify> utility for more information on the
+meaning of trust settings.
+
+Future versions of OpenSSL will recognize trust settings on any
+certificate: not just root CAs.
+
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<-trustout>
+
+this causes B<x509> to output a B<trusted> certificate. An ordinary
+or trusted certificate can be input but by default an ordinary
+certificate is output and any trust settings are discarded. With the
+B<-trustout> option a trusted certificate is output. A trusted
+certificate is automatically output if any trust settings are modified.
+
+=item B<-setalias arg>
+
+sets the alias of the certificate. This will allow the certificate
+to be referred to using a nickname for example "Steve's Certificate".
+
+=item B<-alias>
+
+outputs the certificate alias, if any.
+
+=item B<-clrtrust>
+
+clears all the permitted or trusted uses of the certificate.
+
+=item B<-clrreject>
+
+clears all the prohibited or rejected uses of the certificate.
+
+=item B<-addtrust arg>
+
+adds a trusted certificate use.
+Any object name can be used here but currently only B<clientAuth> (SSL client
+use), B<serverAuth> (SSL server use), B<emailProtection> (S/MIME email) and
+B<anyExtendedKeyUsage> are used.
+As of OpenSSL 1.1.0, the last of these blocks all purposes when rejected or
+enables all purposes when trusted.
+Other OpenSSL applications may define additional uses.
+
+=item B<-addreject arg>
+
+adds a prohibited use. It accepts the same values as the B<-addtrust>
+option.
+
+=item B<-purpose>
+
+this option performs tests on the certificate extensions and outputs
+the results. For a more complete description see the B<CERTIFICATE
+EXTENSIONS> section.
+
+=back
+
+=head2 Signing Options
+
+The B<x509> utility can be used to sign certificates and requests: it
+can thus behave like a "mini CA".
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<-signkey filename>
+
+this option causes the input file to be self signed using the supplied
+private key.
+
+If the input file is a certificate it sets the issuer name to the
+subject name (i.e.  makes it self signed) changes the public key to the
+supplied value and changes the start and end dates. The start date is
+set to the current time and the end date is set to a value determined
+by the B<-days> option. Any certificate extensions are retained unless
+the B<-clrext> option is supplied; this includes, for example, any existing
+key identifier extensions.
+
+If the input is a certificate request then a self signed certificate
+is created using the supplied private key using the subject name in
+the request.
+
+=item B<-passin arg>
+
+the key password source. For more information about the format of B<arg>
+see the B<PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS> section in L<openssl(1)>.
+
+=item B<-clrext>
+
+delete any extensions from a certificate. This option is used when a
+certificate is being created from another certificate (for example with
+the B<-signkey> or the B<-CA> options). Normally all extensions are
+retained.
+
+=item B<-keyform PEM|DER>
+
+specifies the format (DER or PEM) of the private key file used in the
+B<-signkey> option.
+
+=item B<-days arg>
+
+specifies the number of days to make a certificate valid for. The default
+is 30 days.
+
+=item B<-x509toreq>
+
+converts a certificate into a certificate request. The B<-signkey> option
+is used to pass the required private key.
+
+=item B<-req>
+
+by default a certificate is expected on input. With this option a
+certificate request is expected instead.
+
+=item B<-set_serial n>
+
+specifies the serial number to use. This option can be used with either
+the B<-signkey> or B<-CA> options. If used in conjunction with the B<-CA>
+option the serial number file (as specified by the B<-CAserial> or
+B<-CAcreateserial> options) is not used.
+
+The serial number can be decimal or hex (if preceded by B<0x>).
+
+=item B<-CA filename>
+
+specifies the CA certificate to be used for signing. When this option is
+present B<x509> behaves like a "mini CA". The input file is signed by this
+CA using this option: that is its issuer name is set to the subject name
+of the CA and it is digitally signed using the CAs private key.
+
+This option is normally combined with the B<-req> option. Without the
+B<-req> option the input is a certificate which must be self signed.
+
+=item B<-CAkey filename>
+
+sets the CA private key to sign a certificate with. If this option is
+not specified then it is assumed that the CA private key is present in
+the CA certificate file.
+
+=item B<-CAserial filename>
+
+sets the CA serial number file to use.
+
+When the B<-CA> option is used to sign a certificate it uses a serial
+number specified in a file. This file consist of one line containing
+an even number of hex digits with the serial number to use. After each
+use the serial number is incremented and written out to the file again.
+
+The default filename consists of the CA certificate file base name with
+".srl" appended. For example if the CA certificate file is called
+"mycacert.pem" it expects to find a serial number file called "mycacert.srl".
+
+=item B<-CAcreateserial>
+
+with this option the CA serial number file is created if it does not exist:
+it will contain the serial number "02" and the certificate being signed will
+have the 1 as its serial number. If the B<-CA> option is specified
+and the serial number file does not exist a random number is generated;
+this is the recommended practice.
+
+=item B<-extfile filename>
+
+file containing certificate extensions to use. If not specified then
+no extensions are added to the certificate.
+
+=item B<-extensions section>
+
+the section to add certificate extensions from. If this option is not
+specified then the extensions should either be contained in the unnamed
+(default) section or the default section should contain a variable called
+"extensions" which contains the section to use. See the
+L<x509v3_config(5)> manual page for details of the
+extension section format.
+
+=item B<-force_pubkey key>
+
+when a certificate is created set its public key to B<key> instead of the
+key in the certificate or certificate request. This option is useful for
+creating certificates where the algorithm can't normally sign requests, for
+example DH.
+
+The format or B<key> can be specified using the B<-keyform> option.
+
+=back
+
+=head2 Name Options
+
+The B<nameopt> command line switch determines how the subject and issuer
+names are displayed. If no B<nameopt> switch is present the default "oneline"
+format is used which is compatible with previous versions of OpenSSL.
+Each option is described in detail below, all options can be preceded by
+a B<-> to turn the option off. Only the first four will normally be used.
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<compat>
+
+use the old format.
+
+=item B<RFC2253>
+
+displays names compatible with RFC2253 equivalent to B<esc_2253>, B<esc_ctrl>,
+B<esc_msb>, B<utf8>, B<dump_nostr>, B<dump_unknown>, B<dump_der>,
+B<sep_comma_plus>, B<dn_rev> and B<sname>.
+
+=item B<oneline>
+
+a oneline format which is more readable than RFC2253. It is equivalent to
+specifying the  B<esc_2253>, B<esc_ctrl>, B<esc_msb>, B<utf8>, B<dump_nostr>,
+B<dump_der>, B<use_quote>, B<sep_comma_plus_space>, B<space_eq> and B<sname>
+options.  This is the I<default> of no name options are given explicitly.
+
+=item B<multiline>
+
+a multiline format. It is equivalent B<esc_ctrl>, B<esc_msb>, B<sep_multiline>,
+B<space_eq>, B<lname> and B<align>.
+
+=item B<esc_2253>
+
+escape the "special" characters required by RFC2253 in a field. That is
+B<,+"E<lt>E<gt>;>. Additionally B<#> is escaped at the beginning of a string
+and a space character at the beginning or end of a string.
+
+=item B<esc_2254>
+
+escape the "special" characters required by RFC2254 in a field. That is
+the B<NUL> character as well as and B<()*>.
+
+=item B<esc_ctrl>
+
+escape control characters. That is those with ASCII values less than
+0x20 (space) and the delete (0x7f) character. They are escaped using the
+RFC2253 \XX notation (where XX are two hex digits representing the
+character value).
+
+=item B<esc_msb>
+
+escape characters with the MSB set, that is with ASCII values larger than
+127.
+
+=item B<use_quote>
+
+escapes some characters by surrounding the whole string with B<"> characters,
+without the option all escaping is done with the B<\> character.
+
+=item B<utf8>
+
+convert all strings to UTF8 format first. This is required by RFC2253. If
+you are lucky enough to have a UTF8 compatible terminal then the use
+of this option (and B<not> setting B<esc_msb>) may result in the correct
+display of multibyte (international) characters. Is this option is not
+present then multibyte characters larger than 0xff will be represented
+using the format \UXXXX for 16 bits and \WXXXXXXXX for 32 bits.
+Also if this option is off any UTF8Strings will be converted to their
+character form first.
+
+=item B<ignore_type>
+
+this option does not attempt to interpret multibyte characters in any
+way. That is their content octets are merely dumped as though one octet
+represents each character. This is useful for diagnostic purposes but
+will result in rather odd looking output.
+
+=item B<show_type>
+
+show the type of the ASN1 character string. The type precedes the
+field contents. For example "BMPSTRING: Hello World".
+
+=item B<dump_der>
+
+when this option is set any fields that need to be hexdumped will
+be dumped using the DER encoding of the field. Otherwise just the
+content octets will be displayed. Both options use the RFC2253
+B<#XXXX...> format.
+
+=item B<dump_nostr>
+
+dump non character string types (for example OCTET STRING) if this
+option is not set then non character string types will be displayed
+as though each content octet represents a single character.
+
+=item B<dump_all>
+
+dump all fields. This option when used with B<dump_der> allows the
+DER encoding of the structure to be unambiguously determined.
+
+=item B<dump_unknown>
+
+dump any field whose OID is not recognised by OpenSSL.
+
+=item B<sep_comma_plus>, B<sep_comma_plus_space>, B<sep_semi_plus_space>,
+B<sep_multiline>
+
+these options determine the field separators. The first character is
+between RDNs and the second between multiple AVAs (multiple AVAs are
+very rare and their use is discouraged). The options ending in
+"space" additionally place a space after the separator to make it
+more readable. The B<sep_multiline> uses a linefeed character for
+the RDN separator and a spaced B<+> for the AVA separator. It also
+indents the fields by four characters. If no field separator is specified
+then B<sep_comma_plus_space> is used by default.
+
+=item B<dn_rev>
+
+reverse the fields of the DN. This is required by RFC2253. As a side
+effect this also reverses the order of multiple AVAs but this is
+permissible.
+
+=item B<nofname>, B<sname>, B<lname>, B<oid>
+
+these options alter how the field name is displayed. B<nofname> does
+not display the field at all. B<sname> uses the "short name" form
+(CN for commonName for example). B<lname> uses the long form.
+B<oid> represents the OID in numerical form and is useful for
+diagnostic purpose.
+
+=item B<align>
+
+align field values for a more readable output. Only usable with
+B<sep_multiline>.
+
+=item B<space_eq>
+
+places spaces round the B<=> character which follows the field
+name.
+
+=back
+
+=head2 Text Options
+
+As well as customising the name output format, it is also possible to
+customise the actual fields printed using the B<certopt> options when
+the B<text> option is present. The default behaviour is to print all fields.
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<compatible>
+
+use the old format. This is equivalent to specifying no output options at all.
+
+=item B<no_header>
+
+don't print header information: that is the lines saying "Certificate" and "Data".
+
+=item B<no_version>
+
+don't print out the version number.
+
+=item B<no_serial>
+
+don't print out the serial number.
+
+=item B<no_signame>
+
+don't print out the signature algorithm used.
+
+=item B<no_validity>
+
+don't print the validity, that is the B<notBefore> and B<notAfter> fields.
+
+=item B<no_subject>
+
+don't print out the subject name.
+
+=item B<no_issuer>
+
+don't print out the issuer name.
+
+=item B<no_pubkey>
+
+don't print out the public key.
+
+=item B<no_sigdump>
+
+don't give a hexadecimal dump of the certificate signature.
+
+=item B<no_aux>
+
+don't print out certificate trust information.
+
+=item B<no_extensions>
+
+don't print out any X509V3 extensions.
+
+=item B<ext_default>
+
+retain default extension behaviour: attempt to print out unsupported certificate extensions.
+
+=item B<ext_error>
+
+print an error message for unsupported certificate extensions.
+
+=item B<ext_parse>
+
+ASN1 parse unsupported extensions.
+
+=item B<ext_dump>
+
+hex dump unsupported extensions.
+
+=item B<ca_default>
+
+the value used by the B<ca> utility, equivalent to B<no_issuer>, B<no_pubkey>,
+B<no_header>, and B<no_version>.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 EXAMPLES
+
+Note: in these examples the '\' means the example should be all on one
+line.
+
+Display the contents of a certificate:
+
+ openssl x509 -in cert.pem -noout -text
+
+Display the certificate serial number:
+
+ openssl x509 -in cert.pem -noout -serial
+
+Display the certificate subject name:
+
+ openssl x509 -in cert.pem -noout -subject
+
+Display the certificate subject name in RFC2253 form:
+
+ openssl x509 -in cert.pem -noout -subject -nameopt RFC2253
+
+Display the certificate subject name in oneline form on a terminal
+supporting UTF8:
+
+ openssl x509 -in cert.pem -noout -subject -nameopt oneline,-esc_msb
+
+Display the certificate SHA1 fingerprint:
+
+ openssl x509 -sha1 -in cert.pem -noout -fingerprint
+
+Convert a certificate from PEM to DER format:
+
+ openssl x509 -in cert.pem -inform PEM -out cert.der -outform DER
+
+Convert a certificate to a certificate request:
+
+ openssl x509 -x509toreq -in cert.pem -out req.pem -signkey key.pem
+
+Convert a certificate request into a self signed certificate using
+extensions for a CA:
+
+ openssl x509 -req -in careq.pem -extfile openssl.cnf -extensions v3_ca \
+        -signkey key.pem -out cacert.pem
+
+Sign a certificate request using the CA certificate above and add user
+certificate extensions:
+
+ openssl x509 -req -in req.pem -extfile openssl.cnf -extensions v3_usr \
+        -CA cacert.pem -CAkey key.pem -CAcreateserial
+
+
+Set a certificate to be trusted for SSL client use and change set its alias to
+"Steve's Class 1 CA"
+
+ openssl x509 -in cert.pem -addtrust clientAuth \
+        -setalias "Steve's Class 1 CA" -out trust.pem
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The PEM format uses the header and footer lines:
+
+ -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+ -----END CERTIFICATE-----
+
+it will also handle files containing:
+
+ -----BEGIN X509 CERTIFICATE-----
+ -----END X509 CERTIFICATE-----
+
+Trusted certificates have the lines
+
+ -----BEGIN TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
+ -----END TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
+
+The conversion to UTF8 format used with the name options assumes that
+T61Strings use the ISO8859-1 character set. This is wrong but Netscape
+and MSIE do this as do many certificates. So although this is incorrect
+it is more likely to display the majority of certificates correctly.
+
+The B<-email> option searches the subject name and the subject alternative
+name extension. Only unique email addresses will be printed out: it will
+not print the same address more than once.
+
+=head1 CERTIFICATE EXTENSIONS
+
+The B<-purpose> option checks the certificate extensions and determines
+what the certificate can be used for. The actual checks done are rather
+complex and include various hacks and workarounds to handle broken
+certificates and software.
+
+The same code is used when verifying untrusted certificates in chains
+so this section is useful if a chain is rejected by the verify code.
+
+The basicConstraints extension CA flag is used to determine whether the
+certificate can be used as a CA. If the CA flag is true then it is a CA,
+if the CA flag is false then it is not a CA. B<All> CAs should have the
+CA flag set to true.
+
+If the basicConstraints extension is absent then the certificate is
+considered to be a "possible CA" other extensions are checked according
+to the intended use of the certificate. A warning is given in this case
+because the certificate should really not be regarded as a CA: however
+it is allowed to be a CA to work around some broken software.
+
+If the certificate is a V1 certificate (and thus has no extensions) and
+it is self signed it is also assumed to be a CA but a warning is again
+given: this is to work around the problem of Verisign roots which are V1
+self signed certificates.
+
+If the keyUsage extension is present then additional restraints are
+made on the uses of the certificate. A CA certificate B<must> have the
+keyCertSign bit set if the keyUsage extension is present.
+
+The extended key usage extension places additional restrictions on the
+certificate uses. If this extension is present (whether critical or not)
+the key can only be used for the purposes specified.
+
+A complete description of each test is given below. The comments about
+basicConstraints and keyUsage and V1 certificates above apply to B<all>
+CA certificates.
+
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<SSL Client>
+
+The extended key usage extension must be absent or include the "web client
+authentication" OID.  keyUsage must be absent or it must have the
+digitalSignature bit set. Netscape certificate type must be absent or it must
+have the SSL client bit set.
+
+=item B<SSL Client CA>
+
+The extended key usage extension must be absent or include the "web client
+authentication" OID. Netscape certificate type must be absent or it must have
+the SSL CA bit set: this is used as a work around if the basicConstraints
+extension is absent.
+
+=item B<SSL Server>
+
+The extended key usage extension must be absent or include the "web server
+authentication" and/or one of the SGC OIDs.  keyUsage must be absent or it
+must have the digitalSignature, the keyEncipherment set or both bits set.
+Netscape certificate type must be absent or have the SSL server bit set.
+
+=item B<SSL Server CA>
+
+The extended key usage extension must be absent or include the "web server
+authentication" and/or one of the SGC OIDs.  Netscape certificate type must
+be absent or the SSL CA bit must be set: this is used as a work around if the
+basicConstraints extension is absent.
+
+=item B<Netscape SSL Server>
+
+For Netscape SSL clients to connect to an SSL server it must have the
+keyEncipherment bit set if the keyUsage extension is present. This isn't
+always valid because some cipher suites use the key for digital signing.
+Otherwise it is the same as a normal SSL server.
+
+=item B<Common S/MIME Client Tests>
+
+The extended key usage extension must be absent or include the "email
+protection" OID. Netscape certificate type must be absent or should have the
+S/MIME bit set. If the S/MIME bit is not set in Netscape certificate type
+then the SSL client bit is tolerated as an alternative but a warning is shown:
+this is because some Verisign certificates don't set the S/MIME bit.
+
+=item B<S/MIME Signing>
+
+In addition to the common S/MIME client tests the digitalSignature bit must
+be set if the keyUsage extension is present.
+
+=item B<S/MIME Encryption>
+
+In addition to the common S/MIME tests the keyEncipherment bit must be set
+if the keyUsage extension is present.
+
+=item B<S/MIME CA>
+
+The extended key usage extension must be absent or include the "email
+protection" OID. Netscape certificate type must be absent or must have the
+S/MIME CA bit set: this is used as a work around if the basicConstraints
+extension is absent.
+
+=item B<CRL Signing>
+
+The keyUsage extension must be absent or it must have the CRL signing bit
+set.
+
+=item B<CRL Signing CA>
+
+The normal CA tests apply. Except in this case the basicConstraints extension
+must be present.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+Extensions in certificates are not transferred to certificate requests and
+vice versa.
+
+It is possible to produce invalid certificates or requests by specifying the
+wrong private key or using inconsistent options in some cases: these should
+be checked.
+
+There should be options to explicitly set such things as start and end
+dates rather than an offset from the current time.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<req(1)>, L<ca(1)>, L<genrsa(1)>,
+L<gendsa(1)>, L<verify(1)>,
+L<x509v3_config(5)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+The hash algorithm used in the B<-subject_hash> and B<-issuer_hash> options
+before OpenSSL 1.0.0 was based on the deprecated MD5 algorithm and the encoding
+of the distinguished name. In OpenSSL 1.0.0 and later it is based on a
+canonical version of the DN using SHA1. This means that any directories using
+the old form must have their links rebuilt using B<c_rehash> or similar.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/x509v3_config.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/x509v3_config.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c0742c8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/apps/x509v3_config.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,541 @@
+=pod
+
+=for comment openssl_manual_section:5
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+x509v3_config - X509 V3 certificate extension configuration format
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+Several of the OpenSSL utilities can add extensions to a certificate or
+certificate request based on the contents of a configuration file.
+
+Typically the application will contain an option to point to an extension
+section. Each line of the extension section takes the form:
+
+ extension_name=[critical,] extension_options
+
+If B<critical> is present then the extension will be critical.
+
+The format of B<extension_options> depends on the value of B<extension_name>.
+
+There are four main types of extension: I<string> extensions, I<multi-valued>
+extensions, I<raw> and I<arbitrary> extensions.
+
+String extensions simply have a string which contains either the value itself
+or how it is obtained.
+
+For example:
+
+ nsComment="This is a Comment"
+
+Multi-valued extensions have a short form and a long form. The short form
+is a list of names and values:
+
+ basicConstraints=critical,CA:true,pathlen:1
+
+The long form allows the values to be placed in a separate section:
+
+ basicConstraints=critical,@bs_section
+
+ [bs_section]
+
+ CA=true
+ pathlen=1
+
+Both forms are equivalent.
+
+The syntax of raw extensions is governed by the extension code: it can
+for example contain data in multiple sections. The correct syntax to
+use is defined by the extension code itself: check out the certificate
+policies extension for an example.
+
+If an extension type is unsupported then the I<arbitrary> extension syntax
+must be used, see the L<ARBITRARY EXTENSIONS|/"ARBITRARY EXTENSIONS"> section for more details.
+
+=head1 STANDARD EXTENSIONS
+
+The following sections describe each supported extension in detail.
+
+=head2 Basic Constraints.
+
+This is a multi valued extension which indicates whether a certificate is
+a CA certificate. The first (mandatory) name is B<CA> followed by B<TRUE> or
+B<FALSE>. If B<CA> is B<TRUE> then an optional B<pathlen> name followed by an
+non-negative value can be included.
+
+For example:
+
+ basicConstraints=CA:TRUE
+
+ basicConstraints=CA:FALSE
+
+ basicConstraints=critical,CA:TRUE, pathlen:0
+
+A CA certificate B<must> include the basicConstraints value with the CA field
+set to TRUE. An end user certificate must either set CA to FALSE or exclude the
+extension entirely. Some software may require the inclusion of basicConstraints
+with CA set to FALSE for end entity certificates.
+
+The pathlen parameter indicates the maximum number of CAs that can appear
+below this one in a chain. So if you have a CA with a pathlen of zero it can
+only be used to sign end user certificates and not further CAs.
+
+
+=head2 Key Usage.
+
+Key usage is a multi valued extension consisting of a list of names of the
+permitted key usages.
+
+The supported names are: digitalSignature, nonRepudiation, keyEncipherment,
+dataEncipherment, keyAgreement, keyCertSign, cRLSign, encipherOnly
+and decipherOnly.
+
+Examples:
+
+ keyUsage=digitalSignature, nonRepudiation
+
+ keyUsage=critical, keyCertSign
+
+
+=head2 Extended Key Usage.
+
+This extensions consists of a list of usages indicating purposes for which
+the certificate public key can be used for,
+
+These can either be object short names or the dotted numerical form of OIDs.
+While any OID can be used only certain values make sense. In particular the
+following PKIX, NS and MS values are meaningful:
+
+ Value                  Meaning
+ -----                  -------
+ serverAuth             SSL/TLS Web Server Authentication.
+ clientAuth             SSL/TLS Web Client Authentication.
+ codeSigning            Code signing.
+ emailProtection        E-mail Protection (S/MIME).
+ timeStamping           Trusted Timestamping
+ OCSPSigning            OCSP Signing
+ ipsecIKE               ipsec Internet Key Exchange
+ msCodeInd              Microsoft Individual Code Signing (authenticode)
+ msCodeCom              Microsoft Commercial Code Signing (authenticode)
+ msCTLSign              Microsoft Trust List Signing
+ msEFS                  Microsoft Encrypted File System
+
+Examples:
+
+ extendedKeyUsage=critical,codeSigning,1.2.3.4
+ extendedKeyUsage=serverAuth,clientAuth
+
+
+=head2 Subject Key Identifier.
+
+This is really a string extension and can take two possible values. Either
+the word B<hash> which will automatically follow the guidelines in RFC3280
+or a hex string giving the extension value to include. The use of the hex
+string is strongly discouraged.
+
+Example:
+
+ subjectKeyIdentifier=hash
+
+
+=head2 Authority Key Identifier.
+
+The authority key identifier extension permits two options. keyid and issuer:
+both can take the optional value "always".
+
+If the keyid option is present an attempt is made to copy the subject key
+identifier from the parent certificate. If the value "always" is present
+then an error is returned if the option fails.
+
+The issuer option copies the issuer and serial number from the issuer
+certificate. This will only be done if the keyid option fails or
+is not included unless the "always" flag will always include the value.
+
+Example:
+
+ authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid,issuer
+
+
+=head2 Subject Alternative Name.
+
+The subject alternative name extension allows various literal values to be
+included in the configuration file. These include B<email> (an email address)
+B<URI> a uniform resource indicator, B<DNS> (a DNS domain name), B<RID> (a
+registered ID: OBJECT IDENTIFIER), B<IP> (an IP address), B<dirName>
+(a distinguished name) and otherName.
+
+The email option include a special 'copy' value. This will automatically
+include any email addresses contained in the certificate subject name in
+the extension.
+
+The IP address used in the B<IP> options can be in either IPv4 or IPv6 format.
+
+The value of B<dirName> should point to a section containing the distinguished
+name to use as a set of name value pairs. Multi values AVAs can be formed by
+prefacing the name with a B<+> character.
+
+otherName can include arbitrary data associated with an OID: the value
+should be the OID followed by a semicolon and the content in standard
+L<ASN1_generate_nconf(3)> format.
+
+Examples:
+
+ subjectAltName=email:copy,email:my@other.address,URI:http://my.url.here/
+ subjectAltName=IP:192.168.7.1
+ subjectAltName=IP:13::17
+ subjectAltName=email:my@other.address,RID:1.2.3.4
+ subjectAltName=otherName:1.2.3.4;UTF8:some other identifier
+
+ subjectAltName=dirName:dir_sect
+
+ [dir_sect]
+ C=UK
+ O=My Organization
+ OU=My Unit
+ CN=My Name
+
+
+=head2 Issuer Alternative Name.
+
+The issuer alternative name option supports all the literal options of
+subject alternative name. It does B<not> support the email:copy option because
+that would not make sense. It does support an additional issuer:copy option
+that will copy all the subject alternative name values from the issuer
+certificate (if possible).
+
+Example:
+
+ issuserAltName = issuer:copy
+
+
+=head2 Authority Info Access.
+
+The authority information access extension gives details about how to access
+certain information relating to the CA. Its syntax is accessOID;location
+where I<location> has the same syntax as subject alternative name (except
+that email:copy is not supported). accessOID can be any valid OID but only
+certain values are meaningful, for example OCSP and caIssuers.
+
+Example:
+
+ authorityInfoAccess = OCSP;URI:http://ocsp.my.host/
+ authorityInfoAccess = caIssuers;URI:http://my.ca/ca.html
+
+
+=head2 CRL distribution points
+
+This is a multi-valued extension whose options can be either in name:value pair
+using the same form as subject alternative name or a single value representing
+a section name containing all the distribution point fields.
+
+For a name:value pair a new DistributionPoint with the fullName field set to
+the given value both the cRLissuer and reasons fields are omitted in this case.
+
+In the single option case the section indicated contains values for each
+field. In this section:
+
+If the name is "fullname" the value field should contain the full name
+of the distribution point in the same format as subject alternative name.
+
+If the name is "relativename" then the value field should contain a section
+name whose contents represent a DN fragment to be placed in this field.
+
+The name "CRLIssuer" if present should contain a value for this field in
+subject alternative name format.
+
+If the name is "reasons" the value field should consist of a comma
+separated field containing the reasons. Valid reasons are: "keyCompromise",
+"CACompromise", "affiliationChanged", "superseded", "cessationOfOperation",
+"certificateHold", "privilegeWithdrawn" and "AACompromise".
+
+
+Simple examples:
+
+ crlDistributionPoints=URI:http://myhost.com/myca.crl
+ crlDistributionPoints=URI:http://my.com/my.crl,URI:http://oth.com/my.crl
+
+Full distribution point example:
+
+ crlDistributionPoints=crldp1_section
+
+ [crldp1_section]
+
+ fullname=URI:http://myhost.com/myca.crl
+ CRLissuer=dirName:issuer_sect
+ reasons=keyCompromise, CACompromise
+
+ [issuer_sect]
+ C=UK
+ O=Organisation
+ CN=Some Name
+
+=head2 Issuing Distribution Point
+
+This extension should only appear in CRLs. It is a multi valued extension
+whose syntax is similar to the "section" pointed to by the CRL distribution
+points extension with a few differences.
+
+The names "reasons" and "CRLissuer" are not recognized.
+
+The name "onlysomereasons" is accepted which sets this field. The value is
+in the same format as the CRL distribution point "reasons" field.
+
+The names "onlyuser", "onlyCA", "onlyAA" and "indirectCRL" are also accepted
+the values should be a boolean value (TRUE or FALSE) to indicate the value of
+the corresponding field.
+
+Example:
+
+ issuingDistributionPoint=critical, @idp_section
+
+ [idp_section]
+
+ fullname=URI:http://myhost.com/myca.crl
+ indirectCRL=TRUE
+ onlysomereasons=keyCompromise, CACompromise
+
+ [issuer_sect]
+ C=UK
+ O=Organisation
+ CN=Some Name
+
+
+=head2 Certificate Policies.
+
+This is a I<raw> extension. All the fields of this extension can be set by
+using the appropriate syntax.
+
+If you follow the PKIX recommendations and just using one OID then you just
+include the value of that OID. Multiple OIDs can be set separated by commas,
+for example:
+
+ certificatePolicies= 1.2.4.5, 1.1.3.4
+
+If you wish to include qualifiers then the policy OID and qualifiers need to
+be specified in a separate section: this is done by using the @section syntax
+instead of a literal OID value.
+
+The section referred to must include the policy OID using the name
+policyIdentifier, cPSuri qualifiers can be included using the syntax:
+
+ CPS.nnn=value
+
+userNotice qualifiers can be set using the syntax:
+
+ userNotice.nnn=@notice
+
+The value of the userNotice qualifier is specified in the relevant section.
+This section can include explicitText, organization and noticeNumbers
+options. explicitText and organization are text strings, noticeNumbers is a
+comma separated list of numbers. The organization and noticeNumbers options
+(if included) must BOTH be present. If you use the userNotice option with IE5
+then you need the 'ia5org' option at the top level to modify the encoding:
+otherwise it will not be interpreted properly.
+
+Example:
+
+ certificatePolicies=ia5org,1.2.3.4,1.5.6.7.8,@polsect
+
+ [polsect]
+
+ policyIdentifier = 1.3.5.8
+ CPS.1="http://my.host.name/"
+ CPS.2="http://my.your.name/"
+ userNotice.1=@notice
+
+ [notice]
+
+ explicitText="Explicit Text Here"
+ organization="Organisation Name"
+ noticeNumbers=1,2,3,4
+
+The B<ia5org> option changes the type of the I<organization> field. In RFC2459
+it can only be of type DisplayText. In RFC3280 IA5String is also permissible.
+Some software (for example some versions of MSIE) may require ia5org.
+
+=head2 Policy Constraints
+
+This is a multi-valued extension which consisting of the names
+B<requireExplicitPolicy> or B<inhibitPolicyMapping> and a non negative integer
+value. At least one component must be present.
+
+Example:
+
+ policyConstraints = requireExplicitPolicy:3
+
+
+=head2 Inhibit Any Policy
+
+This is a string extension whose value must be a non negative integer.
+
+Example:
+
+ inhibitAnyPolicy = 2
+
+
+=head2 Name Constraints
+
+The name constraints extension is a multi-valued extension. The name should
+begin with the word B<permitted> or B<excluded> followed by a B<;>. The rest of
+the name and the value follows the syntax of subjectAltName except email:copy
+is not supported and the B<IP> form should consist of an IP addresses and
+subnet mask separated by a B</>.
+
+Examples:
+
+ nameConstraints=permitted;IP:192.168.0.0/255.255.0.0
+
+ nameConstraints=permitted;email:.somedomain.com
+
+ nameConstraints=excluded;email:.com
+
+
+=head2 OCSP No Check
+
+The OCSP No Check extension is a string extension but its value is ignored.
+
+Example:
+
+ noCheck = ignored
+
+
+=head2 TLS Feature (aka Must Staple)
+
+This is a multi-valued extension consisting of a list of TLS extension
+identifiers. Each identifier may be a number (0..65535) or a supported name.
+When a TLS client sends a listed extension, the TLS server is expected to
+include that extension in its reply.
+
+The supported names are: B<status_request> and B<status_request_v2>.
+
+Example:
+
+ tlsfeature = status_request
+
+
+=head1 DEPRECATED EXTENSIONS
+
+The following extensions are non standard, Netscape specific and largely
+obsolete. Their use in new applications is discouraged.
+
+=head2 Netscape String extensions.
+
+Netscape Comment (B<nsComment>) is a string extension containing a comment
+which will be displayed when the certificate is viewed in some browsers.
+
+Example:
+
+ nsComment = "Some Random Comment"
+
+Other supported extensions in this category are: B<nsBaseUrl>,
+B<nsRevocationUrl>, B<nsCaRevocationUrl>, B<nsRenewalUrl>, B<nsCaPolicyUrl>
+and B<nsSslServerName>.
+
+
+=head2 Netscape Certificate Type
+
+This is a multi-valued extensions which consists of a list of flags to be
+included. It was used to indicate the purposes for which a certificate could
+be used. The basicConstraints, keyUsage and extended key usage extensions are
+now used instead.
+
+Acceptable values for nsCertType are: B<client>, B<server>, B<email>,
+B<objsign>, B<reserved>, B<sslCA>, B<emailCA>, B<objCA>.
+
+
+=head1 ARBITRARY EXTENSIONS
+
+If an extension is not supported by the OpenSSL code then it must be encoded
+using the arbitrary extension format. It is also possible to use the arbitrary
+format for supported extensions. Extreme care should be taken to ensure that
+the data is formatted correctly for the given extension type.
+
+There are two ways to encode arbitrary extensions.
+
+The first way is to use the word ASN1 followed by the extension content
+using the same syntax as L<ASN1_generate_nconf(3)>.
+For example:
+
+ 1.2.3.4=critical,ASN1:UTF8String:Some random data
+
+ 1.2.3.4=ASN1:SEQUENCE:seq_sect
+
+ [seq_sect]
+
+ field1 = UTF8:field1
+ field2 = UTF8:field2
+
+It is also possible to use the word DER to include the raw encoded data in any
+extension.
+
+ 1.2.3.4=critical,DER:01:02:03:04
+ 1.2.3.4=DER:01020304
+
+The value following DER is a hex dump of the DER encoding of the extension
+Any extension can be placed in this form to override the default behaviour.
+For example:
+
+ basicConstraints=critical,DER:00:01:02:03
+
+=head1 WARNING
+
+There is no guarantee that a specific implementation will process a given
+extension. It may therefore be sometimes possible to use certificates for
+purposes prohibited by their extensions because a specific application does
+not recognize or honour the values of the relevant extensions.
+
+The DER and ASN1 options should be used with caution. It is possible to create
+totally invalid extensions if they are not used carefully.
+
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+If an extension is multi-value and a field value must contain a comma the long
+form must be used otherwise the comma would be misinterpreted as a field
+separator. For example:
+
+ subjectAltName=URI:ldap://somehost.com/CN=foo,OU=bar
+
+will produce an error but the equivalent form:
+
+ subjectAltName=@subject_alt_section
+
+ [subject_alt_section]
+ subjectAltName=URI:ldap://somehost.com/CN=foo,OU=bar
+
+is valid.
+
+Due to the behaviour of the OpenSSL B<conf> library the same field name
+can only occur once in a section. This means that:
+
+ subjectAltName=@alt_section
+
+ [alt_section]
+
+ email=steve@here
+ email=steve@there
+
+will only recognize the last value. This can be worked around by using the form:
+
+ [alt_section]
+
+ email.1=steve@here
+ email.2=steve@there
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<req(1)>, L<ca(1)>, L<x509(1)>,
+L<ASN1_generate_nconf(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/ASN1_INTEGER_get_int64.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/ASN1_INTEGER_get_int64.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f61268d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/ASN1_INTEGER_get_int64.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+ASN1_INTEGER_get_uint64, ASN1_INTEGER_set_uint64,
+ASN1_INTEGER_get_int64, ASN1_INTEGER_get, ASN1_INTEGER_set_int64, ASN1_INTEGER_set, BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER, ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN, ASN1_ENUMERATED_get_int64, ASN1_ENUMERATED_get, ASN1_ENUMERATED_set_int64, ASN1_ENUMERATED_set, BN_to_ASN1_ENUMERATED, ASN1_ENUMERATED_to_BN
+- ASN.1 INTEGER and ENUMERATED utilities
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/asn1.h>
+
+ int ASN1_INTEGER_get_int64(int64_t *pr, const ASN1_INTEGER *a);
+ int ASN1_INTEGER_get(const ASN1_INTEGER *a, long v);
+
+ int ASN1_INTEGER_set_int64(ASN1_INTEGER *a, int64_t r);
+ long ASN1_INTEGER_set(const ASN1_INTEGER *a);
+
+ int ASN1_INTEGER_get_uint64(uint64_t *pr, const ASN1_INTEGER *a);
+ int ASN1_INTEGER_set_uint64(ASN1_INTEGER *a, uint64_t r);
+
+ ASN1_INTEGER *BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(const BIGNUM *bn, ASN1_INTEGER *ai);
+ BIGNUM *ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(const ASN1_INTEGER *ai, BIGNUM *bn);
+
+ int ASN1_ENUMERATED_get_int64(int64_t *pr, const ASN1_INTEGER *a);
+ long ASN1_ENUMERATED_get(const ASN1_ENUMERATED *a);
+
+ int ASN1_ENUMERATED_set_int64(ASN1_INTEGER *a, int64_t r);
+ int ASN1_ENUMERATED_set(ASN1_ENUMERATED *a, long v);
+
+ ASN1_ENUMERATED *BN_to_ASN1_ENUMERATED(BIGNUM *bn, ASN1_ENUMERATED *ai);
+ BIGNUM *ASN1_ENUMERATED_to_BN(ASN1_ENUMERATED *ai, BIGNUM *bn);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+These functions convert to and from B<ASN1_INTEGER> and B<ASN1_ENUMERATED>
+structures.
+
+ASN1_INTEGER_get_int64() converts an B<ASN1_INTEGER> into an B<int64_t> type
+If successful it returns 1 and sets B<*pr> to the value of B<a>. If it fails
+(due to invalid type or the value being too big to fit into an B<int64_t> type)
+it returns 0.
+
+ASN1_INTEGER_get_uint64() is similar to ASN1_INTEGER_get_int64_t() except it
+converts to a B<uint64_t> type and an error is returned if the passed integer
+is negative.
+
+ASN1_INTEGER_get() also returns the value of B<a> but it returns 0 if B<a> is
+NULL and -1 on error (which is ambiguous because -1 is a legitimate value for
+an B<ASN1_INTEGER>). New applications should use ASN1_INTEGER_get_int64()
+instead.
+
+ASN1_INTEGER_set_int64() sets the value of B<ASN1_INTEGER> B<a> to the
+B<int64_t> value B<r>.
+
+ASN1_INTEGER_set_uint64() sets the value of B<ASN1_INTEGER> B<a> to the
+B<uint64_t> value B<r>.
+
+ASN1_INTEGER_set() sets the value of B<ASN1_INTEGER> B<a> to the B<long> value
+B<v>.
+
+BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER() converts B<BIGNUM> B<bn> to an B<ASN1_INTEGER>. If B<ai>
+is NULL a new B<ASN1_INTEGER> structure is returned. If B<ai> is not NULL then
+the existing structure will be used instead.
+
+ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN() converts ASN1_INTEGER B<ai> into a B<BIGNUM>. If B<bn> is
+NULL a new B<BIGNUM> structure is returned. If B<bn> is not NULL then the
+existing structure will be used instead.
+
+ASN1_ENUMERATED_get_int64(), ASN1_ENUMERATED_set_int64(),
+ASN1_ENUMERATED_set(), BN_to_ASN1_ENUMERATED() and ASN1_ENUMERATED_to_BN()
+behave in an identical way to their ASN1_INTEGER counterparts except they
+operate on an B<ASN1_ENUMERATED> value.
+
+ASN1_ENUMERATED_get() returns the value of B<a> in a similar way to
+ASN1_INTEGER_get() but it returns B<0xffffffffL> if the value of B<a> will not
+fit in a long type. New applications should use ASN1_ENUMERATED_get_int64()
+instead.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+In general an B<ASN1_INTEGER> or B<ASN1_ENUMERATED> type can contain an
+integer of almost arbitrary size and so cannot always be represented by a C
+B<int64_t> type. However in many cases (for example version numbers) they
+represent small integers which can be more easily manipulated if converted to
+an appropriate C integer type.
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+The ambiguous return values of ASN1_INTEGER_get() and ASN1_ENUMERATED_get()
+mean these functions should be avoided if possible. They are retained for
+compatibility. Normally the ambiguous return values are not legitimate
+values for the fields they represent.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+ASN1_INTEGER_set_int64(), ASN1_INTEGER_set(), ASN1_ENUMERATED_set_int64() and
+ASN1_ENUMERATED_set() return 1 for success and 0 for failure. They will only
+fail if a memory allocation error occurs.
+
+ASN1_INTEGER_get_int64() and ASN1_ENUMERATED_get_int64() return 1 for success
+and 0 for failure. They will fail if the passed type is incorrect (this will
+only happen if there is a programming error) or if the value exceeds the range
+of an B<int64_t> type.
+
+BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER() and BN_to_ASN1_ENUMERATED() return an B<ASN1_INTEGER> or
+B<ASN1_ENUMERATED> structure respectively or NULL if an error occurs. They will
+only fail due to a memory allocation error.
+
+ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN() and ASN1_ENUMERATED_to_BN() return a B<BIGNUM> structure
+of NULL if an error occurs. They can fail if the passed type is incorrect
+(due to programming error) or due to a memory allocation failure.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+ASN1_INTEGER_set_int64(), ASN1_INTEGER_get_int64(),
+ASN1_ENUMERATED_set_int64() and ASN1_ENUMERATED_get_int64()
+were added to OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/ASN1_OBJECT_new.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/ASN1_OBJECT_new.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4c018ef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/ASN1_OBJECT_new.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+ASN1_OBJECT_new, ASN1_OBJECT_free - object allocation functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/asn1.h>
+
+ ASN1_OBJECT *ASN1_OBJECT_new(void);
+ void ASN1_OBJECT_free(ASN1_OBJECT *a);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The ASN1_OBJECT allocation routines, allocate and free an
+ASN1_OBJECT structure, which represents an ASN1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER.
+
+ASN1_OBJECT_new() allocates and initializes an ASN1_OBJECT structure.
+
+ASN1_OBJECT_free() frees up the B<ASN1_OBJECT> structure B<a>.
+If B<a> is NULL, nothing is done.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+Although ASN1_OBJECT_new() allocates a new ASN1_OBJECT structure it
+is almost never used in applications. The ASN1 object utility functions
+such as OBJ_nid2obj() are used instead.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+If the allocation fails, ASN1_OBJECT_new() returns B<NULL> and sets an error
+code that can be obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)>.
+Otherwise it returns a pointer to the newly allocated structure.
+
+ASN1_OBJECT_free() returns no value.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>, L<d2i_ASN1_OBJECT(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/ASN1_STRING_length.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/ASN1_STRING_length.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..20a372d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/ASN1_STRING_length.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+ASN1_STRING_dup, ASN1_STRING_cmp, ASN1_STRING_set, ASN1_STRING_length,
+ASN1_STRING_type, ASN1_STRING_get0_data, ASN1_STRING_data,
+ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8 - ASN1_STRING utility functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/asn1.h>
+
+ int ASN1_STRING_length(ASN1_STRING *x);
+ const unsigned char * ASN1_STRING_get0_data(const ASN1_STRING *x);
+ unsigned char * ASN1_STRING_data(ASN1_STRING *x);
+
+ ASN1_STRING * ASN1_STRING_dup(ASN1_STRING *a);
+
+ int ASN1_STRING_cmp(ASN1_STRING *a, ASN1_STRING *b);
+
+ int ASN1_STRING_set(ASN1_STRING *str, const void *data, int len);
+
+ int ASN1_STRING_type(const ASN1_STRING *x);
+
+ int ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(unsigned char **out, const ASN1_STRING *in);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+These functions allow an B<ASN1_STRING> structure to be manipulated.
+
+ASN1_STRING_length() returns the length of the content of B<x>.
+
+ASN1_STRING_get0_data() returns an internal pointer to the data of B<x>.
+Since this is an internal pointer it should B<not> be freed or
+modified in any way.
+
+ASN1_STRING_data() is similar to ASN1_STRING_get0_data() except the
+returned value is not constant. This function is deprecated:
+applications should use ASN1_STRING_get0_data() instead.
+
+ASN1_STRING_dup() returns a copy of the structure B<a>.
+
+ASN1_STRING_cmp() compares B<a> and B<b> returning 0 if the two
+are identical. The string types and content are compared.
+
+ASN1_STRING_set() sets the data of string B<str> to the buffer
+B<data> or length B<len>. The supplied data is copied. If B<len>
+is -1 then the length is determined by strlen(data).
+
+ASN1_STRING_type() returns the type of B<x>, using standard constants
+such as B<V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING>.
+
+ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8() converts the string B<in> to UTF8 format, the
+converted data is allocated in a buffer in B<*out>. The length of
+B<out> is returned or a negative error code. The buffer B<*out>
+should be freed using OPENSSL_free().
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+Almost all ASN1 types in OpenSSL are represented as an B<ASN1_STRING>
+structure. Other types such as B<ASN1_OCTET_STRING> are simply typedef'ed
+to B<ASN1_STRING> and the functions call the B<ASN1_STRING> equivalents.
+B<ASN1_STRING> is also used for some B<CHOICE> types which consist
+entirely of primitive string types such as B<DirectoryString> and
+B<Time>.
+
+These functions should B<not> be used to examine or modify B<ASN1_INTEGER>
+or B<ASN1_ENUMERATED> types: the relevant B<INTEGER> or B<ENUMERATED>
+utility functions should be used instead.
+
+In general it cannot be assumed that the data returned by ASN1_STRING_data()
+is null terminated or does not contain embedded nulls. The actual format
+of the data will depend on the actual string type itself: for example
+for an IA5String the data will be ASCII, for a BMPString two bytes per
+character in big endian format, and for an UTF8String it will be in UTF8 format.
+
+Similar care should be take to ensure the data is in the correct format
+when calling ASN1_STRING_set().
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2002-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/ASN1_STRING_new.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/ASN1_STRING_new.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7bd2fc1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/ASN1_STRING_new.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+ASN1_STRING_new, ASN1_STRING_type_new, ASN1_STRING_free -
+ASN1_STRING allocation functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/asn1.h>
+
+ ASN1_STRING * ASN1_STRING_new(void);
+ ASN1_STRING * ASN1_STRING_type_new(int type);
+ void ASN1_STRING_free(ASN1_STRING *a);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+ASN1_STRING_new() returns an allocated B<ASN1_STRING> structure. Its type
+is undefined.
+
+ASN1_STRING_type_new() returns an allocated B<ASN1_STRING> structure of
+type B<type>.
+
+ASN1_STRING_free() frees up B<a>.
+If B<a> is NULL nothing is done.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+Other string types call the B<ASN1_STRING> functions. For example
+ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new() calls ASN1_STRING_type(V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING).
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+ASN1_STRING_new() and ASN1_STRING_type_new() return a valid
+ASN1_STRING structure or B<NULL> if an error occurred.
+
+ASN1_STRING_free() does not return a value.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/ASN1_STRING_print_ex.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/ASN1_STRING_print_ex.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a521f78
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/ASN1_STRING_print_ex.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+ASN1_tag2str, ASN1_STRING_print_ex, ASN1_STRING_print_ex_fp, ASN1_STRING_print
+- ASN1_STRING output routines
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/asn1.h>
+
+ int ASN1_STRING_print_ex(BIO *out, const ASN1_STRING *str, unsigned long flags);
+ int ASN1_STRING_print_ex_fp(FILE *fp, const ASN1_STRING *str, unsigned long flags);
+ int ASN1_STRING_print(BIO *out, const ASN1_STRING *str);
+
+ const char *ASN1_tag2str(int tag);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+These functions output an B<ASN1_STRING> structure. B<ASN1_STRING> is used to
+represent all the ASN1 string types.
+
+ASN1_STRING_print_ex() outputs B<str> to B<out>, the format is determined by
+the options B<flags>. ASN1_STRING_print_ex_fp() is identical except it outputs
+to B<fp> instead.
+
+ASN1_STRING_print() prints B<str> to B<out> but using a different format to
+ASN1_STRING_print_ex(). It replaces unprintable characters (other than CR, LF)
+with '.'.
+
+ASN1_tag2str() returns a human-readable name of the specified ASN.1 B<tag>.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+ASN1_STRING_print() is a legacy function which should be avoided in new applications.
+
+Although there are a large number of options frequently B<ASN1_STRFLGS_RFC2253> is
+suitable, or on UTF8 terminals B<ASN1_STRFLGS_RFC2253 & ~ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_MSB>.
+
+The complete set of supported options for B<flags> is listed below.
+
+Various characters can be escaped. If B<ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_2253> is set the characters
+determined by RFC2253 are escaped. If B<ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_CTRL> is set control
+characters are escaped. If B<ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_MSB> is set characters with the
+MSB set are escaped: this option should B<not> be used if the terminal correctly
+interprets UTF8 sequences.
+
+Escaping takes several forms.
+
+If the character being escaped is a 16 bit character then the form "\UXXXX" is used
+using exactly four characters for the hex representation. If it is 32 bits then
+"\WXXXXXXXX" is used using eight characters of its hex representation. These forms
+will only be used if UTF8 conversion is not set (see below).
+
+Printable characters are normally escaped using the backslash '\' character. If
+B<ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_QUOTE> is set then the whole string is instead surrounded by
+double quote characters: this is arguably more readable than the backslash
+notation. Other characters use the "\XX" using exactly two characters of the hex
+representation.
+
+If B<ASN1_STRFLGS_UTF8_CONVERT> is set then characters are converted to UTF8
+format first. If the terminal supports the display of UTF8 sequences then this
+option will correctly display multi byte characters.
+
+If B<ASN1_STRFLGS_IGNORE_TYPE> is set then the string type is not interpreted at
+all: everything is assumed to be one byte per character. This is primarily for
+debugging purposes and can result in confusing output in multi character strings.
+
+If B<ASN1_STRFLGS_SHOW_TYPE> is set then the string type itself is printed out
+before its value (for example "BMPSTRING"), this actually uses ASN1_tag2str().
+
+The content of a string instead of being interpreted can be "dumped": this just
+outputs the value of the string using the form #XXXX using hex format for each
+octet.
+
+If B<ASN1_STRFLGS_DUMP_ALL> is set then any type is dumped.
+
+Normally non character string types (such as OCTET STRING) are assumed to be
+one byte per character, if B<ASN1_STRFLGS_DUMP_UNKNOWN> is set then they will
+be dumped instead.
+
+When a type is dumped normally just the content octets are printed, if
+B<ASN1_STRFLGS_DUMP_DER> is set then the complete encoding is dumped
+instead (including tag and length octets).
+
+B<ASN1_STRFLGS_RFC2253> includes all the flags required by RFC2253. It is
+equivalent to:
+ ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_2253 | ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_CTRL | ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_MSB |
+ ASN1_STRFLGS_UTF8_CONVERT | ASN1_STRFLGS_DUMP_UNKNOWN ASN1_STRFLGS_DUMP_DER
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<X509_NAME_print_ex(3)>,
+L<ASN1_tag2str(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2002-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/ASN1_TIME_set.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/ASN1_TIME_set.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..457b721
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/ASN1_TIME_set.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+ASN1_TIME_set, ASN1_TIME_adj, ASN1_TIME_check, ASN1_TIME_set_string,
+ASN1_TIME_print, ASN1_TIME_diff - ASN.1 Time functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ ASN1_TIME *ASN1_TIME_set(ASN1_TIME *s, time_t t);
+ ASN1_TIME *ASN1_TIME_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, time_t t,
+                          int offset_day, long offset_sec);
+ int ASN1_TIME_set_string(ASN1_TIME *s, const char *str);
+ int ASN1_TIME_check(const ASN1_TIME *t);
+ int ASN1_TIME_print(BIO *b, const ASN1_TIME *s);
+
+ int ASN1_TIME_diff(int *pday, int *psec,
+                    const ASN1_TIME *from, const ASN1_TIME *to);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The function ASN1_TIME_set() sets the ASN1_TIME structure B<s> to the
+time represented by the time_t value B<t>. If B<s> is NULL a new ASN1_TIME
+structure is allocated and returned.
+
+ASN1_TIME_adj() sets the ASN1_TIME structure B<s> to the time represented
+by the time B<offset_day> and B<offset_sec> after the time_t value B<t>.
+The values of B<offset_day> or B<offset_sec> can be negative to set a
+time before B<t>. The B<offset_sec> value can also exceed the number of
+seconds in a day. If B<s> is NULL a new ASN1_TIME structure is allocated
+and returned.
+
+ASN1_TIME_set_string() sets ASN1_TIME structure B<s> to the time
+represented by string B<str> which must be in appropriate ASN.1 time
+format (for example YYMMDDHHMMSSZ or YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ).
+
+ASN1_TIME_check() checks the syntax of ASN1_TIME structure B<s>.
+
+ASN1_TIME_print() prints out the time B<s> to BIO B<b> in human readable
+format. It will be of the format MMM DD HH:MM:SS YYYY [GMT], for example
+"Feb  3 00:55:52 2015 GMT" it does not include a newline. If the time
+structure has invalid format it prints out "Bad time value" and returns
+an error.
+
+ASN1_TIME_diff() sets B<*pday> and B<*psec> to the time difference between
+B<from> and B<to>. If B<to> represents a time later than B<from> then
+one or both (depending on the time difference) of B<*pday> and B<*psec>
+will be positive. If B<to> represents a time earlier than B<from> then
+one or both of B<*pday> and B<*psec> will be negative. If B<to> and B<from>
+represent the same time then B<*pday> and B<*psec> will both be zero.
+If both B<*pday> and B<*psec> are non-zero they will always have the same
+sign. The value of B<*psec> will always be less than the number of seconds
+in a day. If B<from> or B<to> is NULL the current time is used.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The ASN1_TIME structure corresponds to the ASN.1 structure B<Time>
+defined in RFC5280 et al. The time setting functions obey the rules outlined
+in RFC5280: if the date can be represented by UTCTime it is used, else
+GeneralizedTime is used.
+
+The ASN1_TIME structure is represented as an ASN1_STRING internally and can
+be freed up using ASN1_STRING_free().
+
+The ASN1_TIME structure can represent years from 0000 to 9999 but no attempt
+is made to correct ancient calendar changes (for example from Julian to
+Gregorian calendars).
+
+Some applications add offset times directly to a time_t value and pass the
+results to ASN1_TIME_set() (or equivalent). This can cause problems as the
+time_t value can overflow on some systems resulting in unexpected results.
+New applications should use ASN1_TIME_adj() instead and pass the offset value
+in the B<offset_sec> and B<offset_day> parameters instead of directly
+manipulating a time_t value.
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+ASN1_TIME_print() currently does not print out the time zone: it either prints
+out "GMT" or nothing. But all certificates complying with RFC5280 et al use GMT
+anyway.
+
+=head1 EXAMPLES
+
+Set a time structure to one hour after the current time and print it out:
+
+ #include <time.h>
+ #include <openssl/asn1.h>
+ ASN1_TIME *tm;
+ time_t t;
+ BIO *b;
+ t = time(NULL);
+ tm = ASN1_TIME_adj(NULL, t, 0, 60 * 60);
+ b = BIO_new_fp(stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+ ASN1_TIME_print(b, tm);
+ ASN1_STRING_free(tm);
+ BIO_free(b);
+
+Determine if one time is later or sooner than the current time:
+
+ int day, sec;
+
+ if (!ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, NULL, to))
+        /* Invalid time format */
+
+ if (day > 0 || sec > 0)
+   printf("Later\n");
+ else if (day < 0 || sec < 0)
+   printf("Sooner\n");
+ else
+   printf("Same\n");
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+ASN1_TIME_set() and ASN1_TIME_adj() return a pointer to an ASN1_TIME structure
+or NULL if an error occurred.
+
+ASN1_TIME_set_string() returns 1 if the time value is successfully set and
+0 otherwise.
+
+ASN1_TIME_check() returns 1 if the structure is syntactically correct and 0
+otherwise.
+
+ASN1_TIME_print() returns 1 if the time is successfully printed out and 0 if
+an error occurred (I/O error or invalid time format).
+
+ASN1_TIME_diff() returns 1 for success and 0 for failure. It can fail if the
+pass ASN1_TIME structure has invalid syntax for example.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/ASN1_TYPE_get.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/ASN1_TYPE_get.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..70c5687
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/ASN1_TYPE_get.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+ASN1_TYPE_get, ASN1_TYPE_set, ASN1_TYPE_set1, ASN1_TYPE_cmp, ASN1_TYPE_unpack_sequence, ASN1_TYPE_pack_sequence - ASN1_TYPE utility
+functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/asn1.h>
+
+ int ASN1_TYPE_get(const ASN1_TYPE *a);
+ void ASN1_TYPE_set(ASN1_TYPE *a, int type, void *value);
+ int ASN1_TYPE_set1(ASN1_TYPE *a, int type, const void *value);
+ int ASN1_TYPE_cmp(const ASN1_TYPE *a, const ASN1_TYPE *b);
+
+ void *ASN1_TYPE_unpack_sequence(const ASN1_ITEM *it, const ASN1_TYPE *t);
+ ASN1_TYPE *ASN1_TYPE_pack_sequence(const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *s,
+                                    ASN1_TYPE **t);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+These functions allow an ASN1_TYPE structure to be manipulated. The
+ASN1_TYPE structure can contain any ASN.1 type or constructed type
+such as a SEQUENCE: it is effectively equivalent to the ASN.1 ANY type.
+
+ASN1_TYPE_get() returns the type of B<a>.
+
+ASN1_TYPE_set() sets the value of B<a> to B<type> and B<value>. This
+function uses the pointer B<value> internally so it must B<not> be freed
+up after the call.
+
+ASN1_TYPE_set1() sets the value of B<a> to B<type> a copy of B<value>.
+
+ASN1_TYPE_cmp() compares ASN.1 types B<a> and B<b> and returns 0 if
+they are identical and non-zero otherwise.
+
+ASN1_TYPE_unpack_sequence() attempts to parse the SEQUENCE present in
+B<t> using the ASN.1 structure B<it>. If successful it returns a pointer
+to the ASN.1 structure corresponding to B<it> which must be freed by the
+caller. If it fails it return NULL.
+
+ASN1_TYPE_pack_sequence() attempts to encode the ASN.1 structure B<s>
+corresponding to B<it> into an ASN1_TYPE. If successful the encoded
+ASN1_TYPE is returned. If B<t> and B<*t> are not NULL the encoded type
+is written to B<t> overwriting any existing data. If B<t> is not NULL
+but B<*t> is NULL the returned ASN1_TYPE is written to B<*t>.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The type and meaning of the B<value> parameter for ASN1_TYPE_set() and
+ASN1_TYPE_set1() is determined by the B<type> parameter.
+If B<type> is V_ASN1_NULL B<value> is ignored. If B<type> is V_ASN1_BOOLEAN
+then the boolean is set to TRUE if B<value> is not NULL. If B<type> is
+V_ASN1_OBJECT then value is an ASN1_OBJECT structure. Otherwise B<type>
+is and ASN1_STRING structure. If B<type> corresponds to a primitive type
+(or a string type) then the contents of the ASN1_STRING contain the content
+octets of the type. If B<type> corresponds to a constructed type or
+a tagged type (V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, V_ASN1_SET or V_ASN1_OTHER) then the
+ASN1_STRING contains the entire ASN.1 encoding verbatim (including tag and
+length octets).
+
+ASN1_TYPE_cmp() may not return zero if two types are equivalent but have
+different encodings. For example the single content octet of the boolean TRUE
+value under BER can have any non-zero encoding but ASN1_TYPE_cmp() will
+only return zero if the values are the same.
+
+If either or both of the parameters passed to ASN1_TYPE_cmp() is NULL the
+return value is non-zero. Technically if both parameters are NULL the two
+types could be absent OPTIONAL fields and so should match, however passing
+NULL values could also indicate a programming error (for example an
+unparseable type which returns NULL) for types which do B<not> match. So
+applications should handle the case of two absent values separately.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+ASN1_TYPE_get() returns the type of the ASN1_TYPE argument.
+
+ASN1_TYPE_set() does not return a value.
+
+ASN1_TYPE_set1() returns 1 for success and 0 for failure.
+
+ASN1_TYPE_cmp() returns 0 if the types are identical and non-zero otherwise.
+
+ASN1_TYPE_unpack_sequence() returns a pointer to an ASN.1 structure or
+NULL on failure.
+
+ASN1_TYPE_pack_sequence() return an ASN1_TYPE structure if it succeeds or
+NULL on failure.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/ASN1_generate_nconf.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/ASN1_generate_nconf.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bf29af6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/ASN1_generate_nconf.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,270 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+ASN1_generate_nconf, ASN1_generate_v3 - ASN1 generation functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/asn1.h>
+
+ ASN1_TYPE *ASN1_generate_nconf(const char *str, CONF *nconf);
+ ASN1_TYPE *ASN1_generate_v3(const char *str, X509V3_CTX *cnf);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+These functions generate the ASN1 encoding of a string
+in an B<ASN1_TYPE> structure.
+
+B<str> contains the string to encode B<nconf> or B<cnf> contains
+the optional configuration information where additional strings
+will be read from. B<nconf> will typically come from a config
+file whereas B<cnf> is obtained from an B<X509V3_CTX> structure
+which will typically be used by X509 v3 certificate extension
+functions. B<cnf> or B<nconf> can be set to B<NULL> if no additional
+configuration will be used.
+
+=head1 GENERATION STRING FORMAT
+
+The actual data encoded is determined by the string B<str> and
+the configuration information. The general format of the string
+is:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<[modifier,]type[:value]>
+
+=back
+
+That is zero or more comma separated modifiers followed by a type
+followed by an optional colon and a value. The formats of B<type>,
+B<value> and B<modifier> are explained below.
+
+=head2 Supported Types
+
+The supported types are listed below. Unless otherwise specified
+only the B<ASCII> format is permissible.
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<BOOLEAN>, B<BOOL>
+
+This encodes a boolean type. The B<value> string is mandatory and
+should be B<TRUE> or B<FALSE>. Additionally B<TRUE>, B<true>, B<Y>,
+B<y>, B<YES>, B<yes>, B<FALSE>, B<false>, B<N>, B<n>, B<NO> and B<no>
+are acceptable.
+
+=item B<NULL>
+
+Encode the B<NULL> type, the B<value> string must not be present.
+
+=item B<INTEGER>, B<INT>
+
+Encodes an ASN1 B<INTEGER> type. The B<value> string represents
+the value of the integer, it can be prefaced by a minus sign and
+is normally interpreted as a decimal value unless the prefix B<0x>
+is included.
+
+=item B<ENUMERATED>, B<ENUM>
+
+Encodes the ASN1 B<ENUMERATED> type, it is otherwise identical to
+B<INTEGER>.
+
+=item B<OBJECT>, B<OID>
+
+Encodes an ASN1 B<OBJECT IDENTIFIER>, the B<value> string can be
+a short name, a long name or numerical format.
+
+=item B<UTCTIME>, B<UTC>
+
+Encodes an ASN1 B<UTCTime> structure, the value should be in
+the format B<YYMMDDHHMMSSZ>.
+
+=item B<GENERALIZEDTIME>, B<GENTIME>
+
+Encodes an ASN1 B<GeneralizedTime> structure, the value should be in
+the format B<YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ>.
+
+=item B<OCTETSTRING>, B<OCT>
+
+Encodes an ASN1 B<OCTET STRING>. B<value> represents the contents
+of this structure, the format strings B<ASCII> and B<HEX> can be
+used to specify the format of B<value>.
+
+=item B<BITSTRING>, B<BITSTR>
+
+Encodes an ASN1 B<BIT STRING>. B<value> represents the contents
+of this structure, the format strings B<ASCII>, B<HEX> and B<BITLIST>
+can be used to specify the format of B<value>.
+
+If the format is anything other than B<BITLIST> the number of unused
+bits is set to zero.
+
+=item B<UNIVERSALSTRING>, B<UNIV>, B<IA5>, B<IA5STRING>, B<UTF8>,
+B<UTF8String>, B<BMP>, B<BMPSTRING>, B<VISIBLESTRING>,
+B<VISIBLE>, B<PRINTABLESTRING>, B<PRINTABLE>, B<T61>,
+B<T61STRING>, B<TELETEXSTRING>, B<GeneralString>, B<NUMERICSTRING>,
+B<NUMERIC>
+
+These encode the corresponding string types. B<value> represents the
+contents of this structure. The format can be B<ASCII> or B<UTF8>.
+
+=item B<SEQUENCE>, B<SEQ>, B<SET>
+
+Formats the result as an ASN1 B<SEQUENCE> or B<SET> type. B<value>
+should be a section name which will contain the contents. The
+field names in the section are ignored and the values are in the
+generated string format. If B<value> is absent then an empty SEQUENCE
+will be encoded.
+
+=back
+
+=head2 Modifiers
+
+Modifiers affect the following structure, they can be used to
+add EXPLICIT or IMPLICIT tagging, add wrappers or to change
+the string format of the final type and value. The supported
+formats are documented below.
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<EXPLICIT>, B<EXP>
+
+Add an explicit tag to the following structure. This string
+should be followed by a colon and the tag value to use as a
+decimal value.
+
+By following the number with B<U>, B<A>, B<P> or B<C> UNIVERSAL,
+APPLICATION, PRIVATE or CONTEXT SPECIFIC tagging can be used,
+the default is CONTEXT SPECIFIC.
+
+=item B<IMPLICIT>, B<IMP>
+
+This is the same as B<EXPLICIT> except IMPLICIT tagging is used
+instead.
+
+=item B<OCTWRAP>, B<SEQWRAP>, B<SETWRAP>, B<BITWRAP>
+
+The following structure is surrounded by an OCTET STRING, a SEQUENCE,
+a SET or a BIT STRING respectively. For a BIT STRING the number of unused
+bits is set to zero.
+
+=item B<FORMAT>
+
+This specifies the format of the ultimate value. It should be followed
+by a colon and one of the strings B<ASCII>, B<UTF8>, B<HEX> or B<BITLIST>.
+
+If no format specifier is included then B<ASCII> is used. If B<UTF8> is
+specified then the value string must be a valid B<UTF8> string. For B<HEX> the
+output must be a set of hex digits. B<BITLIST> (which is only valid for a BIT
+STRING) is a comma separated list of the indices of the set bits, all other
+bits are zero.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 EXAMPLES
+
+A simple IA5String:
+
+ IA5STRING:Hello World
+
+An IA5String explicitly tagged:
+
+ EXPLICIT:0,IA5STRING:Hello World
+
+An IA5String explicitly tagged using APPLICATION tagging:
+
+ EXPLICIT:0A,IA5STRING:Hello World
+
+A BITSTRING with bits 1 and 5 set and all others zero:
+
+ FORMAT:BITLIST,BITSTRING:1,5
+
+A more complex example using a config file to produce a
+SEQUENCE consisting of a BOOL an OID and a UTF8String:
+
+ asn1 = SEQUENCE:seq_section
+
+ [seq_section]
+
+ field1 = BOOLEAN:TRUE
+ field2 = OID:commonName
+ field3 = UTF8:Third field
+
+This example produces an RSAPrivateKey structure, this is the
+key contained in the file client.pem in all OpenSSL distributions
+(note: the field names such as 'coeff' are ignored and are present just
+for clarity):
+
+ asn1=SEQUENCE:private_key
+ [private_key]
+ version=INTEGER:0
+
+ n=INTEGER:0xBB6FE79432CC6EA2D8F970675A5A87BFBE1AFF0BE63E879F2AFFB93644\
+ D4D2C6D000430DEC66ABF47829E74B8C5108623A1C0EE8BE217B3AD8D36D5EB4FCA1D9
+
+ e=INTEGER:0x010001
+
+ d=INTEGER:0x6F05EAD2F27FFAEC84BEC360C4B928FD5F3A9865D0FCAAD291E2A52F4A\
+ F810DC6373278C006A0ABBA27DC8C63BF97F7E666E27C5284D7D3B1FFFE16B7A87B51D
+
+ p=INTEGER:0xF3929B9435608F8A22C208D86795271D54EBDFB09DDEF539AB083DA912\
+ D4BD57
+
+ q=INTEGER:0xC50016F89DFF2561347ED1186A46E150E28BF2D0F539A1594BBD7FE467\
+ 46EC4F
+
+ exp1=INTEGER:0x9E7D4326C924AFC1DEA40B45650134966D6F9DFA3A7F9D698CD4ABEA\
+ 9C0A39B9
+
+ exp2=INTEGER:0xBA84003BB95355AFB7C50DF140C60513D0BA51D637272E355E397779\
+ E7B2458F
+
+ coeff=INTEGER:0x30B9E4F2AFA5AC679F920FC83F1F2DF1BAF1779CF989447FABC2F5\
+ 628657053A
+
+This example is the corresponding public key in a SubjectPublicKeyInfo
+structure:
+
+ # Start with a SEQUENCE
+ asn1=SEQUENCE:pubkeyinfo
+
+ # pubkeyinfo contains an algorithm identifier and the public key wrapped
+ # in a BIT STRING
+ [pubkeyinfo]
+ algorithm=SEQUENCE:rsa_alg
+ pubkey=BITWRAP,SEQUENCE:rsapubkey
+
+ # algorithm ID for RSA is just an OID and a NULL
+ [rsa_alg]
+ algorithm=OID:rsaEncryption
+ parameter=NULL
+
+ # Actual public key: modulus and exponent
+ [rsapubkey]
+ n=INTEGER:0xBB6FE79432CC6EA2D8F970675A5A87BFBE1AFF0BE63E879F2AFFB93644\
+ D4D2C6D000430DEC66ABF47829E74B8C5108623A1C0EE8BE217B3AD8D36D5EB4FCA1D9
+
+ e=INTEGER:0x010001
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+ASN1_generate_nconf() and ASN1_generate_v3() return the encoded
+data as an B<ASN1_TYPE> structure or B<NULL> if an error occurred.
+
+The error codes that can be obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)>.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_new.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_new.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2fb00a3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_new.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_new, ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_free, ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_set_wait_fd,
+ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_fd, ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_all_fds,
+ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_changed_fds, ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_clear_fd - functions to manage
+waiting for asynchronous jobs to complete
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/async.h>
+
+ ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_new(void);
+ void ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_free(ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *ctx);
+ int ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_set_wait_fd(ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *ctx, const void *key,
+                                OSSL_ASYNC_FD fd,
+                                void *custom_data,
+                                void (*cleanup)(ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *, const void *,
+                                               OSSL_ASYNC_FD, void *));
+ int ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_fd(ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *ctx, const void *key,
+                           OSSL_ASYNC_FD *fd, void **custom_data);
+ int ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_all_fds(ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *ctx, OSSL_ASYNC_FD *fd,
+                                size_t *numfds);
+ int ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_changed_fds(ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *ctx, OSSL_ASYNC_FD *addfd,
+                                    size_t *numaddfds, OSSL_ASYNC_FD *delfd,
+                                    size_t *numdelfds);
+ int ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_clear_fd(ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *ctx, const void *key);
+
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+For an overview of how asynchronous operations are implemented in OpenSSL see
+L<ASYNC_start_job(3)>. An ASYNC_WAIT_CTX object represents an asynchronous
+"session", i.e. a related set of crypto operations. For example in SSL terms
+this would have a one-to-one correspondence with an SSL connection.
+
+Application code must create an ASYNC_WAIT_CTX using the ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_new()
+function prior to calling ASYNC_start_job() (see L<ASYNC_start_job(3)>). When
+the job is started it is associated with the ASYNC_WAIT_CTX for the duration of
+that job. An ASYNC_WAIT_CTX should only be used for one ASYNC_JOB at any one
+time, but can be reused after an ASYNC_JOB has finished for a subsequent
+ASYNC_JOB. When the session is complete (e.g. the SSL connection is closed),
+application code cleans up with ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_free().
+
+ASYNC_WAIT_CTXs can have "wait" file descriptors associated with them. Calling
+ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_all_fds() and passing in a pointer to an ASYNC_WAIT_CTX in
+the B<ctx> parameter will return the wait file descriptors associated with that
+job in B<*fd>. The number of file descriptors returned will be stored in
+B<*numfds>. It is the caller's responsibility to ensure that sufficient memory
+has been allocated in B<*fd> to receive all the file descriptors. Calling
+ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_all_fds() with a NULL B<fd> value will return no file
+descriptors but will still populate B<*numfds>. Therefore application code is
+typically expected to call this function twice: once to get the number of fds,
+and then again when sufficient memory has been allocated. If only one
+asynchronous engine is being used then normally this call will only ever return
+one fd. If multiple asynchronous engines are being used then more could be
+returned.
+
+The function ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_changed_fds() can be used to detect if any fds
+have changed since the last call time ASYNC_start_job() returned an ASYNC_PAUSE
+result (or since the ASYNC_WAIT_CTX was created if no ASYNC_PAUSE result has
+been received). The B<numaddfds> and B<numdelfds> parameters will be populated
+with the number of fds added or deleted respectively. B<*addfd> and B<*delfd>
+will be populated with the list of added and deleted fds respectively. Similarly
+to ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_all_fds() either of these can be NULL, but if they are not
+NULL then the caller is responsible for ensuring sufficient memory is allocated.
+
+Implementors of async aware code (e.g. engines) are encouraged to return a
+stable fd for the lifetime of the ASYNC_WAIT_CTX in order to reduce the "churn"
+of regularly changing fds - although no guarantees of this are provided to
+applications.
+
+Applications can wait for the file descriptor to be ready for "read" using a
+system function call such as select or poll (being ready for "read" indicates
+that the job should be resumed). If no file descriptor is made available then an
+application will have to periodically "poll" the job by attempting to restart it
+to see if it is ready to continue.
+
+Async aware code (e.g. engines) can get the current ASYNC_WAIT_CTX from the job
+via L<ASYNC_get_wait_ctx(3)> and provide a file descriptor to use for waiting
+on by calling ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_set_wait_fd(). Typically this would be done by an
+engine immediately prior to calling ASYNC_pause_job() and not by end user code.
+An existing association with a file descriptor can be obtained using
+ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_fd() and cleared using ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_clear_fd(). Both of
+these functions requires a B<key> value which is unique to the async aware
+code.  This could be any unique value but a good candidate might be the
+B<ENGINE *> for the engine. The B<custom_data> parameter can be any value, and
+will be returned in a subsequent call to ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_fd(). The
+ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_set_wait_fd() function also expects a pointer to a "cleanup"
+routine. This can be NULL but if provided will automatically get called when
+the ASYNC_WAIT_CTX is freed, and gives the engine the opportunity to close the
+fd or any other resources. Note: The "cleanup" routine does not get called if
+the fd is cleared directly via a call to ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_clear_fd().
+
+An example of typical usage might be an async capable engine. User code would
+initiate cryptographic operations. The engine would initiate those operations
+asynchronously and then call ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_set_wait_fd() followed by
+ASYNC_pause_job() to return control to the user code. The user code can then
+perform other tasks or wait for the job to be ready by calling "select" or other
+similar function on the wait file descriptor. The engine can signal to the user
+code that the job should be resumed by making the wait file descriptor
+"readable". Once resumed the engine should clear the wake signal on the wait
+file descriptor.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_new() returns a pointer to the newly allocated ASYNC_WAIT_CTX or
+NULL on error.
+
+ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_set_wait_fd, ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_fd, ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_all_fds,
+ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_changed_fds and ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_clear_fd all return 1 on
+success or 0 on error.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+On Windows platforms the openssl/async.h header is dependent on some
+of the types customarily made available by including windows.h. The
+application developer is likely to require control over when the latter
+is included, commonly as one of the first included headers. Therefore
+it is defined as an application developer's responsibility to include
+windows.h prior to async.h.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<crypto(3)>, L<ASYNC_start_job(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_new, ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_free, ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_set_wait_fd,
+ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_fd, ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_all_fds,
+ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_changed_fds, ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_clear_fd were first added to
+OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/ASYNC_start_job.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/ASYNC_start_job.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c10a66f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/ASYNC_start_job.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,330 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+ASYNC_get_wait_ctx,
+ASYNC_init_thread, ASYNC_cleanup_thread, ASYNC_start_job, ASYNC_pause_job,
+ASYNC_get_current_job, ASYNC_block_pause, ASYNC_unblock_pause, ASYNC_is_capable
+- asynchronous job management functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/async.h>
+
+ int ASYNC_init_thread(size_t max_size, size_t init_size);
+ void ASYNC_cleanup_thread(void);
+
+ int ASYNC_start_job(ASYNC_JOB **job, ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *ctx, int *ret,
+                     int (*func)(void *), void *args, size_t size);
+ int ASYNC_pause_job(void);
+
+ ASYNC_JOB *ASYNC_get_current_job(void);
+ ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *ASYNC_get_wait_ctx(ASYNC_JOB *job);
+ void ASYNC_block_pause(void);
+ void ASYNC_unblock_pause(void);
+
+ int ASYNC_is_capable(void);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+OpenSSL implements asynchronous capabilities through an ASYNC_JOB. This
+represents code that can be started and executes until some event occurs. At
+that point the code can be paused and control returns to user code until some
+subsequent event indicates that the job can be resumed.
+
+The creation of an ASYNC_JOB is a relatively expensive operation. Therefore, for
+efficiency reasons, jobs can be created up front and reused many times. They are
+held in a pool until they are needed, at which point they are removed from the
+pool, used, and then returned to the pool when the job completes. If the user
+application is multi-threaded, then ASYNC_init_thread() may be called for each
+thread that will initiate asynchronous jobs. Before
+user code exits per-thread resources need to be cleaned up. This will normally
+occur automatically (see L<OPENSSL_init_crypto(3)>) but may be explicitly
+initiated by using ASYNC_cleanup_thread(). No asynchronous jobs must be
+outstanding for the thread when ASYNC_cleanup_thread() is called. Failing to
+ensure this will result in memory leaks.
+
+The B<max_size> argument limits the number of ASYNC_JOBs that will be held in
+the pool. If B<max_size> is set to 0 then no upper limit is set. When an
+ASYNC_JOB is needed but there are none available in the pool already then one
+will be automatically created, as long as the total of ASYNC_JOBs managed by the
+pool does not exceed B<max_size>. When the pool is first initialised
+B<init_size> ASYNC_JOBs will be created immediately. If ASYNC_init_thread() is
+not called before the pool is first used then it will be called automatically
+with a B<max_size> of 0 (no upper limit) and an B<init_size> of 0 (no ASYNC_JOBs
+created up front).
+
+An asynchronous job is started by calling the ASYNC_start_job() function.
+Initially B<*job> should be NULL. B<ctx> should point to an ASYNC_WAIT_CTX
+object created through the L<ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_new(3)> function. B<ret> should
+point to a location where the return value of the asynchronous function should
+be stored on completion of the job. B<func> represents the function that should
+be started asynchronously. The data pointed to by B<args> and of size B<size>
+will be copied and then passed as an argument to B<func> when the job starts.
+ASYNC_start_job will return one of the following values:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<ASYNC_ERR>
+
+An error occurred trying to start the job. Check the OpenSSL error queue (e.g.
+see L<ERR_print_errors(3)>) for more details.
+
+=item B<ASYNC_NO_JOBS>
+
+There are no jobs currently available in the pool. This call can be retried
+again at a later time.
+
+=item B<ASYNC_PAUSE>
+
+The job was successfully started but was "paused" before it completed (see
+ASYNC_pause_job() below). A handle to the job is placed in B<*job>. Other work
+can be performed (if desired) and the job restarted at a later time. To restart
+a job call ASYNC_start_job() again passing the job handle in B<*job>. The
+B<func>, B<args> and B<size> parameters will be ignored when restarting a job.
+When restarting a job ASYNC_start_job() B<must> be called from the same thread
+that the job was originally started from.
+
+=item B<ASYNC_FINISH>
+
+The job completed. B<*job> will be NULL and the return value from B<func> will
+be placed in B<*ret>.
+
+=back
+
+At any one time there can be a maximum of one job actively running per thread
+(you can have many that are paused). ASYNC_get_current_job() can be used to get
+a pointer to the currently executing ASYNC_JOB. If no job is currently executing
+then this will return NULL.
+
+If executing within the context of a job (i.e. having been called directly or
+indirectly by the function "func" passed as an argument to ASYNC_start_job())
+then ASYNC_pause_job() will immediately return control to the calling
+application with ASYNC_PAUSE returned from the ASYNC_start_job() call. A
+subsequent call to ASYNC_start_job passing in the relevant ASYNC_JOB in the
+B<*job> parameter will resume execution from the ASYNC_pause_job() call. If
+ASYNC_pause_job() is called whilst not within the context of a job then no
+action is taken and ASYNC_pause_job() returns immediately.
+
+ASYNC_get_wait_ctx() can be used to get a pointer to the ASYNC_WAIT_CTX
+for the B<job>. ASYNC_WAIT_CTXs can have a "wait" file descriptor associated
+with them. Applications can wait for the file descriptor to be ready for "read"
+using a system function call such as select or poll (being ready for "read"
+indicates that the job should be resumed). If no file descriptor is made
+available then an application will have to periodically "poll" the job by
+attempting to restart it to see if it is ready to continue.
+
+An example of typical usage might be an async capable engine. User code would
+initiate cryptographic operations. The engine would initiate those operations
+asynchronously and then call L<ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_set_wait_fd(3)> followed by
+ASYNC_pause_job() to return control to the user code. The user code can then
+perform other tasks or wait for the job to be ready by calling "select" or other
+similar function on the wait file descriptor. The engine can signal to the user
+code that the job should be resumed by making the wait file descriptor
+"readable". Once resumed the engine should clear the wake signal on the wait
+file descriptor.
+
+The ASYNC_block_pause() function will prevent the currently active job from
+pausing. The block will remain in place until a subsequent call to
+ASYNC_unblock_pause(). These functions can be nested, e.g. if you call
+ASYNC_block_pause() twice then you must call ASYNC_unblock_pause() twice in
+order to re-enable pausing. If these functions are called while there is no
+currently active job then they have no effect. This functionality can be useful
+to avoid deadlock scenarios. For example during the execution of an ASYNC_JOB an
+application acquires a lock. It then calls some cryptographic function which
+invokes ASYNC_pause_job(). This returns control back to the code that created
+the ASYNC_JOB. If that code then attempts to acquire the same lock before
+resuming the original job then a deadlock can occur. By calling
+ASYNC_block_pause() immediately after acquiring the lock and
+ASYNC_unblock_pause() immediately before releasing it then this situation cannot
+occur.
+
+Some platforms cannot support async operations. The ASYNC_is_capable() function
+can be used to detect whether the current platform is async capable or not.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+ASYNC_init_thread returns 1 on success or 0 otherwise.
+
+ASYNC_start_job returns one of ASYNC_ERR, ASYNC_NO_JOBS, ASYNC_PAUSE or
+ASYNC_FINISH as described above.
+
+ASYNC_pause_job returns 0 if an error occurred or 1 on success. If called when
+not within the context of an ASYNC_JOB then this is counted as success so 1 is
+returned.
+
+ASYNC_get_current_job returns a pointer to the currently executing ASYNC_JOB or
+NULL if not within the context of a job.
+
+ASYNC_get_wait_ctx() returns a pointer to the ASYNC_WAIT_CTX for the job.
+
+ASYNC_is_capable() returns 1 if the current platform is async capable or 0
+otherwise.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+On Windows platforms the openssl/async.h header is dependent on some
+of the types customarily made available by including windows.h. The
+application developer is likely to require control over when the latter
+is included, commonly as one of the first included headers. Therefore
+it is defined as an application developer's responsibility to include
+windows.h prior to async.h.
+
+=head1 EXAMPLE
+
+The following example demonstrates how to use most of the core async APIs:
+
+ #ifdef _WIN32
+ # include <windows.h>
+ #endif
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <unistd.h>
+ #include <openssl/async.h>
+ #include <openssl/crypto.h>
+
+ int unique = 0;
+
+ void cleanup(ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *ctx, const void *key, OSSL_ASYNC_FD r, void *vw)
+ {
+     OSSL_ASYNC_FD *w = (OSSL_ASYNC_FD *)vw;
+     close(r);
+     close(*w);
+     OPENSSL_free(w);
+ }
+
+ int jobfunc(void *arg)
+ {
+     ASYNC_JOB *currjob;
+     unsigned char *msg;
+     int pipefds[2] = {0, 0};
+     OSSL_ASYNC_FD *wptr;
+     char buf = 'X';
+
+     currjob = ASYNC_get_current_job();
+     if (currjob != NULL) {
+         printf("Executing within a job\n");
+     } else {
+         printf("Not executing within a job - should not happen\n");
+         return 0;
+     }
+
+     msg = (unsigned char *)arg;
+     printf("Passed in message is: %s\n", msg);
+
+     if (pipe(pipefds) != 0) {
+         printf("Failed to create pipe\n");
+         return 0;
+     }
+     wptr = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(OSSL_ASYNC_FD));
+     if (wptr == NULL) {
+         printf("Failed to malloc\n");
+         return 0;
+     }
+     *wptr = pipefds[1];
+     ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_set_wait_fd(ASYNC_get_wait_ctx(currjob), &unique,
+                                pipefds[0], wptr, cleanup);
+
+     /*
+      * Normally some external event would cause this to happen at some
+      * later point - but we do it here for demo purposes, i.e.
+      * immediately signalling that the job is ready to be woken up after
+      * we return to main via ASYNC_pause_job().
+      */
+     write(pipefds[1], &buf, 1);
+
+     /* Return control back to main */
+     ASYNC_pause_job();
+
+     /* Clear the wake signal */
+     read(pipefds[0], &buf, 1);
+
+     printf ("Resumed the job after a pause\n");
+
+     return 1;
+ }
+
+ int main(void)
+ {
+     ASYNC_JOB *job = NULL;
+     ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+     int ret;
+     OSSL_ASYNC_FD waitfd;
+     fd_set waitfdset;
+     size_t numfds;
+     unsigned char msg[13] = "Hello world!";
+
+     printf("Starting...\n");
+
+     ctx = ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_new();
+     if (ctx == NULL) {
+         printf("Failed to create ASYNC_WAIT_CTX\n");
+         abort();
+     }
+
+     for (;;) {
+         switch(ASYNC_start_job(&job, ctx, &ret, jobfunc, msg, sizeof(msg))) {
+         case ASYNC_ERR:
+         case ASYNC_NO_JOBS:
+                 printf("An error occurred\n");
+                 goto end;
+         case ASYNC_PAUSE:
+                 printf("Job was paused\n");
+                 break;
+         case ASYNC_FINISH:
+                 printf("Job finished with return value %d\n", ret);
+                 goto end;
+         }
+
+         /* Wait for the job to be woken */
+         printf("Waiting for the job to be woken up\n");
+
+         if (!ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_all_fds(ctx, NULL, &numfds)
+                 || numfds > 1) {
+             printf("Unexpected number of fds\n");
+             abort();
+         }
+         ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_all_fds(ctx, &waitfd, &numfds);
+         FD_ZERO(&waitfdset);
+         FD_SET(waitfd, &waitfdset);
+         select(waitfd + 1, &waitfdset, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+     }
+
+ end:
+     ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_free(ctx);
+     printf("Finishing\n");
+
+     return 0;
+ }
+
+The expected output from executing the above example program is:
+
+ Starting...
+ Executing within a job
+ Passed in message is: Hello world!
+ Job was paused
+ Waiting for the job to be woken up
+ Resumed the job after a pause
+ Job finished with return value 1
+ Finishing
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<crypto(3)>, L<ERR_print_errors(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+ASYNC_init_thread, ASYNC_cleanup_thread,
+ASYNC_start_job, ASYNC_pause_job, ASYNC_get_current_job, ASYNC_get_wait_ctx(),
+ASYNC_block_pause(), ASYNC_unblock_pause() and ASYNC_is_capable() were first
+added to OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BF_encrypt.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BF_encrypt.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0401e90
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BF_encrypt.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+BF_set_key, BF_encrypt, BF_decrypt, BF_ecb_encrypt, BF_cbc_encrypt,
+BF_cfb64_encrypt, BF_ofb64_encrypt, BF_options - Blowfish encryption
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/blowfish.h>
+
+ void BF_set_key(BF_KEY *key, int len, const unsigned char *data);
+
+ void BF_ecb_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+         BF_KEY *key, int enc);
+ void BF_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+         long length, BF_KEY *schedule, unsigned char *ivec, int enc);
+ void BF_cfb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+         long length, BF_KEY *schedule, unsigned char *ivec, int *num,
+         int enc);
+ void BF_ofb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+         long length, BF_KEY *schedule, unsigned char *ivec, int *num);
+ const char *BF_options(void);
+
+ void BF_encrypt(BF_LONG *data, const BF_KEY *key);
+ void BF_decrypt(BF_LONG *data, const BF_KEY *key);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+This library implements the Blowfish cipher, which was invented and described
+by Counterpane (see http://www.counterpane.com/blowfish.html ).
+
+Blowfish is a block cipher that operates on 64 bit (8 byte) blocks of data.
+It uses a variable size key, but typically, 128 bit (16 byte) keys are
+considered good for strong encryption.  Blowfish can be used in the same
+modes as DES (see L<des_modes(7)>).  Blowfish is currently one
+of the faster block ciphers.  It is quite a bit faster than DES, and much
+faster than IDEA or RC2.
+
+Blowfish consists of a key setup phase and the actual encryption or decryption
+phase.
+
+BF_set_key() sets up the B<BF_KEY> B<key> using the B<len> bytes long key
+at B<data>.
+
+BF_ecb_encrypt() is the basic Blowfish encryption and decryption function.
+It encrypts or decrypts the first 64 bits of B<in> using the key B<key>,
+putting the result in B<out>.  B<enc> decides if encryption (B<BF_ENCRYPT>)
+or decryption (B<BF_DECRYPT>) shall be performed.  The vector pointed at by
+B<in> and B<out> must be 64 bits in length, no less.  If they are larger,
+everything after the first 64 bits is ignored.
+
+The mode functions BF_cbc_encrypt(), BF_cfb64_encrypt() and BF_ofb64_encrypt()
+all operate on variable length data.  They all take an initialization vector
+B<ivec> which needs to be passed along into the next call of the same function
+for the same message.  B<ivec> may be initialized with anything, but the
+recipient needs to know what it was initialized with, or it won't be able
+to decrypt.  Some programs and protocols simplify this, like SSH, where
+B<ivec> is simply initialized to zero.
+BF_cbc_encrypt() operates on data that is a multiple of 8 bytes long, while
+BF_cfb64_encrypt() and BF_ofb64_encrypt() are used to encrypt an variable
+number of bytes (the amount does not have to be an exact multiple of 8).  The
+purpose of the latter two is to simulate stream ciphers, and therefore, they
+need the parameter B<num>, which is a pointer to an integer where the current
+offset in B<ivec> is stored between calls.  This integer must be initialized
+to zero when B<ivec> is initialized.
+
+BF_cbc_encrypt() is the Cipher Block Chaining function for Blowfish.  It
+encrypts or decrypts the 64 bits chunks of B<in> using the key B<schedule>,
+putting the result in B<out>.  B<enc> decides if encryption (BF_ENCRYPT) or
+decryption (BF_DECRYPT) shall be performed.  B<ivec> must point at an 8 byte
+long initialization vector.
+
+BF_cfb64_encrypt() is the CFB mode for Blowfish with 64 bit feedback.
+It encrypts or decrypts the bytes in B<in> using the key B<schedule>,
+putting the result in B<out>.  B<enc> decides if encryption (B<BF_ENCRYPT>)
+or decryption (B<BF_DECRYPT>) shall be performed.  B<ivec> must point at an
+8 byte long initialization vector. B<num> must point at an integer which must
+be initially zero.
+
+BF_ofb64_encrypt() is the OFB mode for Blowfish with 64 bit feedback.
+It uses the same parameters as BF_cfb64_encrypt(), which must be initialized
+the same way.
+
+BF_encrypt() and BF_decrypt() are the lowest level functions for Blowfish
+encryption.  They encrypt/decrypt the first 64 bits of the vector pointed by
+B<data>, using the key B<key>.  These functions should not be used unless you
+implement 'modes' of Blowfish.  The alternative is to use BF_ecb_encrypt().
+If you still want to use these functions, you should be aware that they take
+each 32-bit chunk in host-byte order, which is little-endian on little-endian
+platforms and big-endian on big-endian ones.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+None of the functions presented here return any value.
+
+=head1 NOTE
+
+Applications should use the higher level functions
+L<EVP_EncryptInit(3)> etc. instead of calling these
+functions directly.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<EVP_EncryptInit(3)>,
+L<des_modes(7)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_ADDR.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_ADDR.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4b169e8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_ADDR.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+BIO_ADDR, BIO_ADDR_new, BIO_ADDR_clear, BIO_ADDR_free, BIO_ADDR_rawmake,
+BIO_ADDR_family, BIO_ADDR_rawaddress, BIO_ADDR_rawport,
+BIO_ADDR_hostname_string, BIO_ADDR_service_string,
+BIO_ADDR_path_string - BIO_ADDR routines
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+ #include <openssl/bio.h>
+
+ typedef union bio_addr_st BIO_ADDR;
+
+ BIO_ADDR *BIO_ADDR_new(void);
+ void BIO_ADDR_free(BIO_ADDR *);
+ void BIO_ADDR_clear(BIO_ADDR *ap);
+ int BIO_ADDR_rawmake(BIO_ADDR *ap, int family,
+                      const void *where, size_t wherelen, unsigned short port);
+ int BIO_ADDR_family(const BIO_ADDR *ap);
+ int BIO_ADDR_rawaddress(const BIO_ADDR *ap, void *p, size_t *l);
+ unsigned short BIO_ADDR_rawport(const BIO_ADDR *ap);
+ char *BIO_ADDR_hostname_string(const BIO_ADDR *ap, int numeric);
+ char *BIO_ADDR_service_string(const BIO_ADDR *ap, int numeric);
+ char *BIO_ADDR_path_string(const BIO_ADDR *ap);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The B<BIO_ADDR> type is a wrapper around all types of socket
+addresses that OpenSSL deals with, currently transparently
+supporting AF_INET, AF_INET6 and AF_UNIX according to what's
+available on the platform at hand.
+
+BIO_ADDR_new() creates a new unfilled B<BIO_ADDR>, to be used
+with routines that will fill it with information, such as
+BIO_accept_ex().
+
+BIO_ADDR_free() frees a B<BIO_ADDR> created with BIO_ADDR_new().
+
+BIO_ADDR_clear() clears any data held within the provided B<BIO_ADDR> and sets
+it back to an uninitialised state.
+
+BIO_ADDR_rawmake() takes a protocol B<family>, an byte array of
+size B<wherelen> with an address in network byte order pointed at
+by B<where> and a port number in network byte order in B<port> (except
+for the B<AF_UNIX> protocol family, where B<port> is meaningless and
+therefore ignored) and populates the given B<BIO_ADDR> with them.
+In case this creates a B<AF_UNIX> B<BIO_ADDR>, B<wherelen> is expected
+to be the length of the path string (not including the terminating
+NUL, such as the result of a call to strlen()).
+I<Read on about the addresses in L</RAW ADDRESSES> below>.
+
+BIO_ADDR_family() returns the protocol family of the given
+B<BIO_ADDR>.  The possible non-error results are one of the
+constants AF_INET, AF_INET6 and AF_UNIX. It will also return AF_UNSPEC if the
+BIO_ADDR has not been initialised.
+
+BIO_ADDR_rawaddress() will write the raw address of the given
+B<BIO_ADDR> in the area pointed at by B<p> if B<p> is non-NULL,
+and will set B<*l> to be the amount of bytes the raw address
+takes up if B<l> is non-NULL.
+A technique to only find out the size of the address is a call
+with B<p> set to B<NULL>.  The raw address will be in network byte
+order, most significant byte first.
+In case this is a B<AF_UNIX> B<BIO_ADDR>, B<l> gets the length of the
+path string (not including the terminating NUL, such as the result of
+a call to strlen()).
+I<Read on about the addresses in L</RAW ADDRESSES> below>.
+
+BIO_ADDR_rawport() returns the raw port of the given B<BIO_ADDR>.
+The raw port will be in network byte order.
+
+BIO_ADDR_hostname_string() returns a character string with the
+hostname of the given B<BIO_ADDR>.  If B<numeric> is 1, the string
+will contain the numerical form of the address.  This only works for
+B<BIO_ADDR> of the protocol families AF_INET and AF_INET6.  The
+returned string has been allocated on the heap and must be freed
+with OPENSSL_free().
+
+BIO_ADDR_service_string() returns a character string with the
+service name of the port of the given B<BIO_ADDR>.  If B<numeric>
+is 1, the string will contain the port number.  This only works
+for B<BIO_ADDR> of the protocol families AF_INET and AF_INET6.  The
+returned string has been allocated on the heap and must be freed
+with OPENSSL_free().
+
+BIO_ADDR_path_string() returns a character string with the path
+of the given B<BIO_ADDR>.  This only works for B<BIO_ADDR> of the
+protocol family AF_UNIX.  The returned string has been allocated
+on the heap and must be freed with OPENSSL_free().
+
+=head1 RAW ADDRESSES
+
+Both BIO_ADDR_rawmake() and BIO_ADDR_rawaddress() take a pointer to a
+network byte order address of a specific site.  Internally, those are
+treated as a pointer to B<struct in_addr> (for B<AF_INET>), B<struct
+in6_addr> (for B<AF_INET6>) or B<char *> (for B<AF_UNIX>), all
+depending on the protocol family the address is for.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+The string producing functions BIO_ADDR_hostname_string(),
+BIO_ADDR_service_string() and BIO_ADDR_path_string() will
+return B<NULL> on error and leave an error indication on the
+OpenSSL error stack.
+
+All other functions described here return 0 or B<NULL> when the
+information they should return isn't available.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<BIO_connect(3)>, L<BIO_s_connect(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_ADDRINFO.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_ADDRINFO.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7811da4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_ADDRINFO.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+BIO_lookup_type,
+BIO_ADDRINFO, BIO_ADDRINFO_next, BIO_ADDRINFO_free,
+BIO_ADDRINFO_family, BIO_ADDRINFO_socktype, BIO_ADDRINFO_protocol,
+BIO_ADDRINFO_address,
+BIO_lookup
+- BIO_ADDRINFO type and routines
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+ #include <openssl/bio.h>
+
+ typedef union bio_addrinfo_st BIO_ADDRINFO;
+
+ enum BIO_lookup_type {
+     BIO_LOOKUP_CLIENT, BIO_LOOKUP_SERVER
+ };
+ int BIO_lookup(const char *node, const char *service,
+                enum BIO_lookup_type lookup_type,
+                int family, int socktype, BIO_ADDRINFO **res);
+
+ const BIO_ADDRINFO *BIO_ADDRINFO_next(const BIO_ADDRINFO *bai);
+ int BIO_ADDRINFO_family(const BIO_ADDRINFO *bai);
+ int BIO_ADDRINFO_socktype(const BIO_ADDRINFO *bai);
+ int BIO_ADDRINFO_protocol(const BIO_ADDRINFO *bai);
+ const BIO_ADDR *BIO_ADDRINFO_address(const BIO_ADDRINFO *bai);
+ void BIO_ADDRINFO_free(BIO_ADDRINFO *bai);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The B<BIO_ADDRINFO> type is a wrapper for address information
+types provided on your platform.
+
+B<BIO_ADDRINFO> normally forms a chain of several that can be
+picked at one by one.
+
+BIO_lookup() looks up a specified B<host> and B<service>, and
+uses B<lookup_type> to determine what the default address should
+be if B<host> is B<NULL>.  B<family>, B<socktype> are used to
+determine what protocol family and protocol should be used for
+the lookup.  B<family> can be any of AF_INET, AF_INET6, AF_UNIX and
+AF_UNSPEC, and B<socktype> can be SOCK_STREAM or SOCK_DGRAM.
+B<res> points at a pointer to hold the start of a B<BIO_ADDRINFO>
+chain.
+For the family B<AF_UNIX>, BIO_lookup() will ignore the B<service>
+parameter and expects the B<node> parameter to hold the path to the
+socket file.
+
+BIO_ADDRINFO_family() returns the family of the given
+B<BIO_ADDRINFO>.  The result will be one of the constants
+AF_INET, AF_INET6 and AF_UNIX.
+
+BIO_ADDRINFO_socktype() returns the socket type of the given
+B<BIO_ADDRINFO>.  The result will be one of the constants
+SOCK_STREAM and SOCK_DGRAM.
+
+BIO_ADDRINFO_protocol() returns the protocol id of the given
+B<BIO_ADDRINFO>.  The result will be one of the constants
+IPPROTO_TCP and IPPROTO_UDP.
+
+BIO_ADDRINFO_address() returns the underlying B<BIO_ADDR>
+of the given B<BIO_ADDRINFO>.
+
+BIO_ADDRINFO_next() returns the next B<BIO_ADDRINFO> in the chain
+from the given one.
+
+BIO_ADDRINFO_free() frees the chain of B<BIO_ADDRINFO> starting
+with the given one.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+BIO_lookup() returns 1 on success and 0 when an error occurred, and
+will leave an error indication on the OpenSSL error stack in that case.
+
+All other functions described here return 0 or B<NULL> when the
+information they should return isn't available.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_connect.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_connect.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5194033
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_connect.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+BIO_socket, BIO_connect, BIO_listen, BIO_accept_ex, BIO_closesocket - BIO
+socket communication setup routines
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/bio.h>
+
+ int BIO_socket(int domain, int socktype, int protocol, int options);
+ int BIO_connect(int sock, const BIO_ADDR *addr, int options);
+ int BIO_listen(int sock, const BIO_ADDR *addr, int options);
+ int BIO_accept_ex(int accept_sock, BIO_ADDR *peer, int options);
+ int BIO_closesocket(int sock);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+BIO_socket() creates a socket in the domain B<domain>, of type
+B<socktype> and B<protocol>.  Socket B<options> are currently unused,
+but is present for future use.
+
+BIO_connect() connects B<sock> to the address and service given by
+B<addr>.  Connection B<options> may be zero or any combination of
+B<BIO_SOCK_KEEPALIVE>, B<BIO_SOCK_NONBLOCK> and B<BIO_SOCK_NODELAY>.
+The flags are described in L</FLAGS> below.
+
+BIO_listen() has B<sock> start listening on the address and service
+given by B<addr>.  Connection B<options> may be zero or any
+combination of B<BIO_SOCK_KEEPALIVE>, B<BIO_SOCK_NONBLOCK>,
+B<BIO_SOCK_NODELAY>, B<BIO_SOCK_REUSEADDR> and B<BIO_SOCK_V6_ONLY>.
+The flags are described in L</FLAGS> below.
+
+BIO_accept_ex() waits for an incoming connections on the given
+socket B<accept_sock>.  When it gets a connection, the address and
+port of the peer gets stored in B<peer> if that one is non-NULL.
+Accept B<options> may be zero or B<BIO_SOCK_NONBLOCK>, and is applied
+on the accepted socket.  The flags are described in L</FLAGS> below.
+
+BIO_closesocket() closes B<sock>.
+
+=head1 FLAGS
+
+=over 4
+
+=item BIO_SOCK_KEEPALIVE
+
+Enables regular sending of keep-alive messages.
+
+=item BIO_SOCK_NONBLOCK
+
+Sets the socket to non-blocking mode.
+
+=item BIO_SOCK_NODELAY
+
+Corresponds to B<TCP_NODELAY>, and disables the Nagle algorithm.  With
+this set, any data will be sent as soon as possible instead of being
+buffered until there's enough for the socket to send out in one go.
+
+=item BIO_SOCK_REUSEADDR
+
+Try to reuse the address and port combination for a recently closed
+port.
+
+=item BIO_SOCK_V6_ONLY
+
+When creating an IPv6 socket, make it only listen for IPv6 addresses
+and not IPv4 addresses mapped to IPv6.
+
+=back
+
+These flags are bit flags, so they are to be combined with the
+C<|> operator, for example:
+
+  BIO_connect(sock, addr, BIO_SOCK_KEEPALIVE | BIO_SOCK_NONBLOCK);
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+BIO_socket() returns the socket number on success or B<INVALID_SOCKET>
+(-1) on error.  When an error has occurred, the OpenSSL error stack
+will hold the error data and errno has the system error.
+
+BIO_connect() and BIO_listen() return 1 on success or 0 on error.
+When an error has occurred, the OpenSSL error stack will hold the error
+data and errno has the system error.
+
+BIO_accept_ex() returns the accepted socket on success or
+B<INVALID_SOCKET> (-1) on error.  When an error has occurred, the
+OpenSSL error stack will hold the error data and errno has the system
+error.
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+BIO_gethostname(), BIO_get_port(), BIO_get_host_ip(),
+BIO_get_accept_socket() and BIO_accept() are deprecated since OpenSSL
+1.1.  Use the functions described above instead.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<BIO_ADDR(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_ctrl.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_ctrl.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..60cd108
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_ctrl.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+BIO_ctrl, BIO_callback_ctrl, BIO_ptr_ctrl, BIO_int_ctrl, BIO_reset,
+BIO_seek, BIO_tell, BIO_flush, BIO_eof, BIO_set_close, BIO_get_close,
+BIO_pending, BIO_wpending, BIO_ctrl_pending, BIO_ctrl_wpending,
+BIO_get_info_callback, BIO_set_info_callback, BIO_info_cb
+- BIO control operations
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/bio.h>
+
+ typedef int BIO_info_cb(BIO *b, int state, int res);
+
+ long BIO_ctrl(BIO *bp, int cmd, long larg, void *parg);
+ long BIO_callback_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, BIO_info_cb *cb);
+ char *BIO_ptr_ctrl(BIO *bp, int cmd, long larg);
+ long BIO_int_ctrl(BIO *bp, int cmd, long larg, int iarg);
+
+ int BIO_reset(BIO *b);
+ int BIO_seek(BIO *b, int ofs);
+ int BIO_tell(BIO *b);
+ int BIO_flush(BIO *b);
+ int BIO_eof(BIO *b);
+ int BIO_set_close(BIO *b, long flag);
+ int BIO_get_close(BIO *b);
+ int BIO_pending(BIO *b);
+ int BIO_wpending(BIO *b);
+ size_t BIO_ctrl_pending(BIO *b);
+ size_t BIO_ctrl_wpending(BIO *b);
+
+ int BIO_get_info_callback(BIO *b, BIO_info_cb **cbp);
+ int BIO_set_info_callback(BIO *b, BIO_info_cb *cb);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+BIO_ctrl(), BIO_callback_ctrl(), BIO_ptr_ctrl() and BIO_int_ctrl()
+are BIO "control" operations taking arguments of various types.
+These functions are not normally called directly, various macros
+are used instead. The standard macros are described below, macros
+specific to a particular type of BIO are described in the specific
+BIOs manual page as well as any special features of the standard
+calls.
+
+BIO_reset() typically resets a BIO to some initial state, in the case
+of file related BIOs for example it rewinds the file pointer to the
+start of the file.
+
+BIO_seek() resets a file related BIO's (that is file descriptor and
+FILE BIOs) file position pointer to B<ofs> bytes from start of file.
+
+BIO_tell() returns the current file position of a file related BIO.
+
+BIO_flush() normally writes out any internally buffered data, in some
+cases it is used to signal EOF and that no more data will be written.
+
+BIO_eof() returns 1 if the BIO has read EOF, the precise meaning of
+"EOF" varies according to the BIO type.
+
+BIO_set_close() sets the BIO B<b> close flag to B<flag>. B<flag> can
+take the value BIO_CLOSE or BIO_NOCLOSE. Typically BIO_CLOSE is used
+in a source/sink BIO to indicate that the underlying I/O stream should
+be closed when the BIO is freed.
+
+BIO_get_close() returns the BIOs close flag.
+
+BIO_pending(), BIO_ctrl_pending(), BIO_wpending() and BIO_ctrl_wpending()
+return the number of pending characters in the BIOs read and write buffers.
+Not all BIOs support these calls. BIO_ctrl_pending() and BIO_ctrl_wpending()
+return a size_t type and are functions, BIO_pending() and BIO_wpending() are
+macros which call BIO_ctrl().
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+BIO_reset() normally returns 1 for success and 0 or -1 for failure. File
+BIOs are an exception, they return 0 for success and -1 for failure.
+
+BIO_seek() and BIO_tell() both return the current file position on success
+and -1 for failure, except file BIOs which for BIO_seek() always return 0
+for success and -1 for failure.
+
+BIO_flush() returns 1 for success and 0 or -1 for failure.
+
+BIO_eof() returns 1 if EOF has been reached 0 otherwise.
+
+BIO_set_close() always returns 1.
+
+BIO_get_close() returns the close flag value: BIO_CLOSE or BIO_NOCLOSE.
+
+BIO_pending(), BIO_ctrl_pending(), BIO_wpending() and BIO_ctrl_wpending()
+return the amount of pending data.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+BIO_flush(), because it can write data may return 0 or -1 indicating
+that the call should be retried later in a similar manner to BIO_write_ex().
+The BIO_should_retry() call should be used and appropriate action taken
+is the call fails.
+
+The return values of BIO_pending() and BIO_wpending() may not reliably
+determine the amount of pending data in all cases. For example in the
+case of a file BIO some data may be available in the FILE structures
+internal buffers but it is not possible to determine this in a
+portably way. For other types of BIO they may not be supported.
+
+Filter BIOs if they do not internally handle a particular BIO_ctrl()
+operation usually pass the operation to the next BIO in the chain.
+This often means there is no need to locate the required BIO for
+a particular operation, it can be called on a chain and it will
+be automatically passed to the relevant BIO. However this can cause
+unexpected results: for example no current filter BIOs implement
+BIO_seek(), but this may still succeed if the chain ends in a FILE
+or file descriptor BIO.
+
+Source/sink BIOs return an 0 if they do not recognize the BIO_ctrl()
+operation.
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+Some of the return values are ambiguous and care should be taken. In
+particular a return value of 0 can be returned if an operation is not
+supported, if an error occurred, if EOF has not been reached and in
+the case of BIO_seek() on a file BIO for a successful operation.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_f_base64.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_f_base64.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..19df1dd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_f_base64.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+BIO_f_base64 - base64 BIO filter
+
+=for comment multiple includes
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/bio.h>
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+ const BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_base64(void);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+BIO_f_base64() returns the base64 BIO method. This is a filter
+BIO that base64 encodes any data written through it and decodes
+any data read through it.
+
+Base64 BIOs do not support BIO_gets() or BIO_puts().
+
+BIO_flush() on a base64 BIO that is being written through is
+used to signal that no more data is to be encoded: this is used
+to flush the final block through the BIO.
+
+The flag BIO_FLAGS_BASE64_NO_NL can be set with BIO_set_flags()
+to encode the data all on one line or expect the data to be all
+on one line.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+Because of the format of base64 encoding the end of the encoded
+block cannot always be reliably determined.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+BIO_f_base64() returns the base64 BIO method.
+
+=head1 EXAMPLES
+
+Base64 encode the string "Hello World\n" and write the result
+to standard output:
+
+ BIO *bio, *b64;
+ char message[] = "Hello World \n";
+
+ b64 = BIO_new(BIO_f_base64());
+ bio = BIO_new_fp(stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+ BIO_push(b64, bio);
+ BIO_write(b64, message, strlen(message));
+ BIO_flush(b64);
+
+ BIO_free_all(b64);
+
+Read Base64 encoded data from standard input and write the decoded
+data to standard output:
+
+ BIO *bio, *b64, *bio_out;
+ char inbuf[512];
+ int inlen;
+
+ b64 = BIO_new(BIO_f_base64());
+ bio = BIO_new_fp(stdin, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+ bio_out = BIO_new_fp(stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+ BIO_push(b64, bio);
+ while((inlen = BIO_read(b64, inbuf, 512)) > 0)
+        BIO_write(bio_out, inbuf, inlen);
+
+ BIO_flush(bio_out);
+ BIO_free_all(b64);
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+The ambiguity of EOF in base64 encoded data can cause additional
+data following the base64 encoded block to be misinterpreted.
+
+There should be some way of specifying a test that the BIO can perform
+to reliably determine EOF (for example a MIME boundary).
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_f_buffer.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_f_buffer.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3224710
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_f_buffer.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+BIO_get_buffer_num_lines,
+BIO_set_read_buffer_size,
+BIO_set_write_buffer_size,
+BIO_set_buffer_size,
+BIO_set_buffer_read_data,
+BIO_f_buffer
+- buffering BIO
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/bio.h>
+
+ const BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_buffer(void);
+
+ long BIO_get_buffer_num_lines(BIO *b);
+ long BIO_set_read_buffer_size(BIO *b, long size);
+ long BIO_set_write_buffer_size(BIO *b, long size);
+ long BIO_set_buffer_size(BIO *b, long size);
+ long BIO_set_buffer_read_data(BIO *b, void *buf, long num);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+BIO_f_buffer() returns the buffering BIO method.
+
+Data written to a buffering BIO is buffered and periodically written
+to the next BIO in the chain. Data read from a buffering BIO comes from
+an internal buffer which is filled from the next BIO in the chain.
+Both BIO_gets() and BIO_puts() are supported.
+
+Calling BIO_reset() on a buffering BIO clears any buffered data.
+
+BIO_get_buffer_num_lines() returns the number of lines currently buffered.
+
+BIO_set_read_buffer_size(), BIO_set_write_buffer_size() and BIO_set_buffer_size()
+set the read, write or both read and write buffer sizes to B<size>. The initial
+buffer size is DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE, currently 4096. Any attempt to reduce the
+buffer size below DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE is ignored. Any buffered data is cleared
+when the buffer is resized.
+
+BIO_set_buffer_read_data() clears the read buffer and fills it with B<num>
+bytes of B<buf>. If B<num> is larger than the current buffer size the buffer
+is expanded.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+These functions, other than BIO_f_buffer(), are implemented as macros.
+
+Buffering BIOs implement BIO_gets() by using BIO_read() operations on the
+next BIO in the chain. By prepending a buffering BIO to a chain it is therefore
+possible to provide BIO_gets() functionality if the following BIOs do not
+support it (for example SSL BIOs).
+
+Data is only written to the next BIO in the chain when the write buffer fills
+or when BIO_flush() is called. It is therefore important to call BIO_flush()
+whenever any pending data should be written such as when removing a buffering
+BIO using BIO_pop(). BIO_flush() may need to be retried if the ultimate
+source/sink BIO is non blocking.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+BIO_f_buffer() returns the buffering BIO method.
+
+BIO_get_buffer_num_lines() returns the number of lines buffered (may be 0).
+
+BIO_set_read_buffer_size(), BIO_set_write_buffer_size() and BIO_set_buffer_size()
+return 1 if the buffer was successfully resized or 0 for failure.
+
+BIO_set_buffer_read_data() returns 1 if the data was set correctly or 0 if
+there was an error.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<BIO(3)>,
+L<BIO_reset(3)>,
+L<BIO_flush(3)>,
+L<BIO_pop(3)>,
+L<BIO_ctrl(3)>.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_f_cipher.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_f_cipher.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..87ab3cc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_f_cipher.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+BIO_f_cipher, BIO_set_cipher, BIO_get_cipher_status, BIO_get_cipher_ctx - cipher BIO filter
+
+=for comment multiple includes
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/bio.h>
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+ const BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_cipher(void);
+ void BIO_set_cipher(BIO *b, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
+                unsigned char *key, unsigned char *iv, int enc);
+ int BIO_get_cipher_status(BIO *b)
+ int BIO_get_cipher_ctx(BIO *b, EVP_CIPHER_CTX **pctx)
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+BIO_f_cipher() returns the cipher BIO method. This is a filter
+BIO that encrypts any data written through it, and decrypts any data
+read from it. It is a BIO wrapper for the cipher routines
+EVP_CipherInit(), EVP_CipherUpdate() and EVP_CipherFinal().
+
+Cipher BIOs do not support BIO_gets() or BIO_puts().
+
+BIO_flush() on an encryption BIO that is being written through is
+used to signal that no more data is to be encrypted: this is used
+to flush and possibly pad the final block through the BIO.
+
+BIO_set_cipher() sets the cipher of BIO B<b> to B<cipher> using key B<key>
+and IV B<iv>. B<enc> should be set to 1 for encryption and zero for
+decryption.
+
+When reading from an encryption BIO the final block is automatically
+decrypted and checked when EOF is detected. BIO_get_cipher_status()
+is a BIO_ctrl() macro which can be called to determine whether the
+decryption operation was successful.
+
+BIO_get_cipher_ctx() is a BIO_ctrl() macro which retrieves the internal
+BIO cipher context. The retrieved context can be used in conjunction
+with the standard cipher routines to set it up. This is useful when
+BIO_set_cipher() is not flexible enough for the applications needs.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+When encrypting BIO_flush() B<must> be called to flush the final block
+through the BIO. If it is not then the final block will fail a subsequent
+decrypt.
+
+When decrypting an error on the final block is signaled by a zero
+return value from the read operation. A successful decrypt followed
+by EOF will also return zero for the final read. BIO_get_cipher_status()
+should be called to determine if the decrypt was successful.
+
+As always, if BIO_gets() or BIO_puts() support is needed then it can
+be achieved by preceding the cipher BIO with a buffering BIO.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+BIO_f_cipher() returns the cipher BIO method.
+
+BIO_set_cipher() does not return a value.
+
+BIO_get_cipher_status() returns 1 for a successful decrypt and 0
+for failure.
+
+BIO_get_cipher_ctx() currently always returns 1.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_f_md.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_f_md.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..32f0046
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_f_md.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+BIO_f_md, BIO_set_md, BIO_get_md, BIO_get_md_ctx - message digest BIO filter
+
+=for comment multiple includes
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/bio.h>
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+ const BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_md(void);
+ int BIO_set_md(BIO *b, EVP_MD *md);
+ int BIO_get_md(BIO *b, EVP_MD **mdp);
+ int BIO_get_md_ctx(BIO *b, EVP_MD_CTX **mdcp);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+BIO_f_md() returns the message digest BIO method. This is a filter
+BIO that digests any data passed through it, it is a BIO wrapper
+for the digest routines EVP_DigestInit(), EVP_DigestUpdate()
+and EVP_DigestFinal().
+
+Any data written or read through a digest BIO using BIO_read() and
+BIO_write() is digested.
+
+BIO_gets(), if its B<size> parameter is large enough finishes the
+digest calculation and returns the digest value. BIO_puts() is
+not supported.
+
+BIO_reset() reinitialises a digest BIO.
+
+BIO_set_md() sets the message digest of BIO B<b> to B<md>: this
+must be called to initialize a digest BIO before any data is
+passed through it. It is a BIO_ctrl() macro.
+
+BIO_get_md() places the a pointer to the digest BIOs digest method
+in B<mdp>, it is a BIO_ctrl() macro.
+
+BIO_get_md_ctx() returns the digest BIOs context into B<mdcp>.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The context returned by BIO_get_md_ctx() can be used in calls
+to EVP_DigestFinal() and also the signature routines EVP_SignFinal()
+and EVP_VerifyFinal().
+
+The context returned by BIO_get_md_ctx() is an internal context
+structure. Changes made to this context will affect the digest
+BIO itself and the context pointer will become invalid when the digest
+BIO is freed.
+
+After the digest has been retrieved from a digest BIO it must be
+reinitialized by calling BIO_reset(), or BIO_set_md() before any more
+data is passed through it.
+
+If an application needs to call BIO_gets() or BIO_puts() through
+a chain containing digest BIOs then this can be done by prepending
+a buffering BIO.
+
+Calling BIO_get_md_ctx() will return the context and initialize the BIO
+state. This allows applications to initialize the context externally
+if the standard calls such as BIO_set_md() are not sufficiently flexible.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+BIO_f_md() returns the digest BIO method.
+
+BIO_set_md(), BIO_get_md() and BIO_md_ctx() return 1 for success and
+0 for failure.
+
+=head1 EXAMPLES
+
+The following example creates a BIO chain containing an SHA1 and MD5
+digest BIO and passes the string "Hello World" through it. Error
+checking has been omitted for clarity.
+
+ BIO *bio, *mdtmp;
+ char message[] = "Hello World";
+ bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_null());
+ mdtmp = BIO_new(BIO_f_md());
+ BIO_set_md(mdtmp, EVP_sha1());
+ /* For BIO_push() we want to append the sink BIO and keep a note of
+  * the start of the chain.
+  */
+ bio = BIO_push(mdtmp, bio);
+ mdtmp = BIO_new(BIO_f_md());
+ BIO_set_md(mdtmp, EVP_md5());
+ bio = BIO_push(mdtmp, bio);
+ /* Note: mdtmp can now be discarded */
+ BIO_write(bio, message, strlen(message));
+
+The next example digests data by reading through a chain instead:
+
+ BIO *bio, *mdtmp;
+ char buf[1024];
+ int rdlen;
+ bio = BIO_new_file(file, "rb");
+ mdtmp = BIO_new(BIO_f_md());
+ BIO_set_md(mdtmp, EVP_sha1());
+ bio = BIO_push(mdtmp, bio);
+ mdtmp = BIO_new(BIO_f_md());
+ BIO_set_md(mdtmp, EVP_md5());
+ bio = BIO_push(mdtmp, bio);
+ do {
+        rdlen = BIO_read(bio, buf, sizeof(buf));
+        /* Might want to do something with the data here */
+ } while (rdlen > 0);
+
+This next example retrieves the message digests from a BIO chain and
+outputs them. This could be used with the examples above.
+
+ BIO *mdtmp;
+ unsigned char mdbuf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ int mdlen;
+ int i;
+ mdtmp = bio;   /* Assume bio has previously been set up */
+ do {
+        EVP_MD *md;
+        mdtmp = BIO_find_type(mdtmp, BIO_TYPE_MD);
+        if (!mdtmp) break;
+        BIO_get_md(mdtmp, &md);
+        printf("%s digest", OBJ_nid2sn(EVP_MD_type(md)));
+        mdlen = BIO_gets(mdtmp, mdbuf, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+        for (i = 0; i < mdlen; i++) printf(":%02X", mdbuf[i]);
+        printf("\n");
+        mdtmp = BIO_next(mdtmp);
+ } while (mdtmp);
+
+ BIO_free_all(bio);
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+The lack of support for BIO_puts() and the non standard behaviour of
+BIO_gets() could be regarded as anomalous. It could be argued that BIO_gets()
+and BIO_puts() should be passed to the next BIO in the chain and digest
+the data passed through and that digests should be retrieved using a
+separate BIO_ctrl() call.
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+Before OpenSSL 1.0.0., the call to BIO_get_md_ctx() would only work if the
+BIO was initialized first.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_f_null.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_f_null.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c4e4c66
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_f_null.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+BIO_f_null - null filter
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/bio.h>
+
+ const BIO_METHOD *     BIO_f_null(void);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+BIO_f_null() returns the null filter BIO method. This is a filter BIO
+that does nothing.
+
+All requests to a null filter BIO are passed through to the next BIO in
+the chain: this means that a BIO chain containing a null filter BIO
+behaves just as though the BIO was not there.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+As may be apparent a null filter BIO is not particularly useful.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+BIO_f_null() returns the null filter BIO method.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_f_ssl.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_f_ssl.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3f9635e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_f_ssl.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,298 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+BIO_do_handshake,
+BIO_f_ssl, BIO_set_ssl, BIO_get_ssl, BIO_set_ssl_mode,
+BIO_set_ssl_renegotiate_bytes,
+BIO_get_num_renegotiates, BIO_set_ssl_renegotiate_timeout, BIO_new_ssl,
+BIO_new_ssl_connect, BIO_new_buffer_ssl_connect, BIO_ssl_copy_session_id,
+BIO_ssl_shutdown - SSL BIO
+
+=for comment multiple includes
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/bio.h>
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ const BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_ssl(void);
+
+ long BIO_set_ssl(BIO *b, SSL *ssl, long c);
+ long BIO_get_ssl(BIO *b, SSL **sslp);
+ long BIO_set_ssl_mode(BIO *b, long client);
+ long BIO_set_ssl_renegotiate_bytes(BIO *b, long num);
+ long BIO_set_ssl_renegotiate_timeout(BIO *b, long seconds);
+ long BIO_get_num_renegotiates(BIO *b);
+
+ BIO *BIO_new_ssl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int client);
+ BIO *BIO_new_ssl_connect(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+ BIO *BIO_new_buffer_ssl_connect(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+ int BIO_ssl_copy_session_id(BIO *to, BIO *from);
+ void BIO_ssl_shutdown(BIO *bio);
+
+ long BIO_do_handshake(BIO *b);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+BIO_f_ssl() returns the SSL BIO method. This is a filter BIO which
+is a wrapper round the OpenSSL SSL routines adding a BIO "flavour" to
+SSL I/O.
+
+I/O performed on an SSL BIO communicates using the SSL protocol with
+the SSLs read and write BIOs. If an SSL connection is not established
+then an attempt is made to establish one on the first I/O call.
+
+If a BIO is appended to an SSL BIO using BIO_push() it is automatically
+used as the SSL BIOs read and write BIOs.
+
+Calling BIO_reset() on an SSL BIO closes down any current SSL connection
+by calling SSL_shutdown(). BIO_reset() is then sent to the next BIO in
+the chain: this will typically disconnect the underlying transport.
+The SSL BIO is then reset to the initial accept or connect state.
+
+If the close flag is set when an SSL BIO is freed then the internal
+SSL structure is also freed using SSL_free().
+
+BIO_set_ssl() sets the internal SSL pointer of BIO B<b> to B<ssl> using
+the close flag B<c>.
+
+BIO_get_ssl() retrieves the SSL pointer of BIO B<b>, it can then be
+manipulated using the standard SSL library functions.
+
+BIO_set_ssl_mode() sets the SSL BIO mode to B<client>. If B<client>
+is 1 client mode is set. If B<client> is 0 server mode is set.
+
+BIO_set_ssl_renegotiate_bytes() sets the renegotiate byte count
+to B<num>. When set after every B<num> bytes of I/O (read and write)
+the SSL session is automatically renegotiated. B<num> must be at
+least 512 bytes.
+
+BIO_set_ssl_renegotiate_timeout() sets the renegotiate timeout to
+B<seconds>. When the renegotiate timeout elapses the session is
+automatically renegotiated.
+
+BIO_get_num_renegotiates() returns the total number of session
+renegotiations due to I/O or timeout.
+
+BIO_new_ssl() allocates an SSL BIO using SSL_CTX B<ctx> and using
+client mode if B<client> is non zero.
+
+BIO_new_ssl_connect() creates a new BIO chain consisting of an
+SSL BIO (using B<ctx>) followed by a connect BIO.
+
+BIO_new_buffer_ssl_connect() creates a new BIO chain consisting
+of a buffering BIO, an SSL BIO (using B<ctx>) and a connect
+BIO.
+
+BIO_ssl_copy_session_id() copies an SSL session id between
+BIO chains B<from> and B<to>. It does this by locating the
+SSL BIOs in each chain and calling SSL_copy_session_id() on
+the internal SSL pointer.
+
+BIO_ssl_shutdown() closes down an SSL connection on BIO
+chain B<bio>. It does this by locating the SSL BIO in the
+chain and calling SSL_shutdown() on its internal SSL
+pointer.
+
+BIO_do_handshake() attempts to complete an SSL handshake on the
+supplied BIO and establish the SSL connection. It returns 1
+if the connection was established successfully. A zero or negative
+value is returned if the connection could not be established, the
+call BIO_should_retry() should be used for non blocking connect BIOs
+to determine if the call should be retried. If an SSL connection has
+already been established this call has no effect.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+SSL BIOs are exceptional in that if the underlying transport
+is non blocking they can still request a retry in exceptional
+circumstances. Specifically this will happen if a session
+renegotiation takes place during a BIO_read() operation, one
+case where this happens is when step up occurs.
+
+The SSL flag SSL_AUTO_RETRY can be
+set to disable this behaviour. That is when this flag is set
+an SSL BIO using a blocking transport will never request a
+retry.
+
+Since unknown BIO_ctrl() operations are sent through filter
+BIOs the servers name and port can be set using BIO_set_host()
+on the BIO returned by BIO_new_ssl_connect() without having
+to locate the connect BIO first.
+
+Applications do not have to call BIO_do_handshake() but may wish
+to do so to separate the handshake process from other I/O
+processing.
+
+BIO_set_ssl(), BIO_get_ssl(), BIO_set_ssl_mode(),
+BIO_set_ssl_renegotiate_bytes(), BIO_set_ssl_renegotiate_timeout(),
+BIO_get_num_renegotiates(), and BIO_do_handshake() are implemented as macros.
+
+=head1 EXAMPLE
+
+This SSL/TLS client example, attempts to retrieve a page from an
+SSL/TLS web server. The I/O routines are identical to those of the
+unencrypted example in L<BIO_s_connect(3)>.
+
+ BIO *sbio, *out;
+ int len;
+ char tmpbuf[1024];
+ SSL_CTX *ctx;
+ SSL *ssl;
+
+ /* XXX Seed the PRNG if needed. */
+
+ ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_client_method());
+
+ /* XXX Set verify paths and mode here. */
+
+ sbio = BIO_new_ssl_connect(ctx);
+ BIO_get_ssl(sbio, &ssl);
+ if (ssl == NULL) {
+     fprintf(stderr, "Can't locate SSL pointer\n");
+     ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+     exit(1);
+ }
+
+ /* Don't want any retries */
+ SSL_set_mode(ssl, SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY);
+
+ /* XXX We might want to do other things with ssl here */
+
+ /* An empty host part means the loopback address */
+ BIO_set_conn_hostname(sbio, ":https");
+
+ out = BIO_new_fp(stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+ if (BIO_do_connect(sbio) <= 0) {
+     fprintf(stderr, "Error connecting to server\n");
+     ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+     exit(1);
+ }
+ if (BIO_do_handshake(sbio) <= 0) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Error establishing SSL connection\n");
+        ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+        exit(1);
+ }
+
+ /* XXX Could examine ssl here to get connection info */
+
+ BIO_puts(sbio, "GET / HTTP/1.0\n\n");
+ for ( ; ; ) {
+     len = BIO_read(sbio, tmpbuf, 1024);
+     if (len <= 0)
+         break;
+     BIO_write(out, tmpbuf, len);
+ }
+ BIO_free_all(sbio);
+ BIO_free(out);
+
+Here is a simple server example. It makes use of a buffering
+BIO to allow lines to be read from the SSL BIO using BIO_gets.
+It creates a pseudo web page containing the actual request from
+a client and also echoes the request to standard output.
+
+ BIO *sbio, *bbio, *acpt, *out;
+ int len;
+ char tmpbuf[1024];
+ SSL_CTX *ctx;
+ SSL *ssl;
+
+ /* XXX Seed the PRNG if needed. */
+
+ ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_server_method());
+ if (!SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(ctx, "server.pem", SSL_FILETYPE_PEM)
+         || !SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(ctx, "server.pem", SSL_FILETYPE_PEM)
+         || !SSL_CTX_check_private_key(ctx)) {
+     fprintf(stderr, "Error setting up SSL_CTX\n");
+     ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+     exit(1);
+ }
+
+ /* XXX Other things like set verify locations, EDH temp callbacks. */
+
+ /* New SSL BIO setup as server */
+ sbio = BIO_new_ssl(ctx, 0);
+ BIO_get_ssl(sbio, &ssl);
+ if (ssl == NULL) {
+     fprintf(stderr, "Can't locate SSL pointer\n");
+     ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+     exit(1);
+ }
+
+ SSL_set_mode(ssl, SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY);
+ bbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer());
+ sbio = BIO_push(bbio, sbio);
+ acpt = BIO_new_accept("4433");
+
+ /*
+  * By doing this when a new connection is established
+  * we automatically have sbio inserted into it. The
+  * BIO chain is now 'swallowed' by the accept BIO and
+  * will be freed when the accept BIO is freed.
+  */
+ BIO_set_accept_bios(acpt, sbio);
+ out = BIO_new_fp(stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+
+ /* Setup accept BIO */
+ if (BIO_do_accept(acpt) <= 0) {
+     fprintf(stderr, "Error setting up accept BIO\n");
+     ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+     exit(1);
+ }
+
+ if (BIO_do_accept(acpt) <= 0) {
+     fprintf(stderr, "Error in connection\n");
+     ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+     exit(1);
+ }
+
+ /* We only want one connection so remove and free accept BIO */
+ sbio = BIO_pop(acpt);
+ BIO_free_all(acpt);
+
+ if (BIO_do_handshake(sbio) <= 0) {
+     fprintf(stderr, "Error in SSL handshake\n");
+     ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+     exit(1);
+ }
+
+ BIO_puts(sbio, "HTTP/1.0 200 OK\r\nContent-type: text/plain\r\n\r\n");
+ BIO_puts(sbio, "\r\nConnection Established\r\nRequest headers:\r\n");
+ BIO_puts(sbio, "--------------------------------------------------\r\n");
+
+ for ( ; ; ) {
+     len = BIO_gets(sbio, tmpbuf, 1024);
+     if (len <= 0)
+         break;
+     BIO_write(sbio, tmpbuf, len);
+     BIO_write(out, tmpbuf, len);
+     /* Look for blank line signifying end of headers*/
+     if (tmpbuf[0] == '\r' || tmpbuf[0] == '\n')
+         break;
+ }
+
+ BIO_puts(sbio, "--------------------------------------------------\r\n");
+ BIO_puts(sbio, "\r\n");
+ BIO_flush(sbio);
+ BIO_free_all(sbio);
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+In OpenSSL versions before 1.0.0 the BIO_pop() call was handled incorrectly,
+the I/O BIO reference count was incorrectly incremented (instead of
+decremented) and dissociated with the SSL BIO even if the SSL BIO was not
+explicitly being popped (e.g. a pop higher up the chain). Applications which
+included workarounds for this bug (e.g. freeing BIOs more than once) should
+be modified to handle this fix or they may free up an already freed BIO.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_find_type.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_find_type.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ff7b488
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_find_type.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+BIO_find_type, BIO_next, BIO_method_type - BIO chain traversal
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/bio.h>
+
+ BIO *BIO_find_type(BIO *b, int bio_type);
+ BIO *BIO_next(BIO *b);
+ int BIO_method_type(const BIO *b);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The BIO_find_type() searches for a BIO of a given type in a chain, starting
+at BIO B<b>. If B<type> is a specific type (such as B<BIO_TYPE_MEM>) then a search
+is made for a BIO of that type. If B<type> is a general type (such as
+B<BIO_TYPE_SOURCE_SINK>) then the next matching BIO of the given general type is
+searched for. BIO_find_type() returns the next matching BIO or NULL if none is
+found.
+
+The following general types are defined:
+B<BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR>, B<BIO_TYPE_FILTER>, and B<BIO_TYPE_SOURCE_SINK>.
+
+For a list of the specific types, see the B<openssl/bio.h> header file.
+
+BIO_next() returns the next BIO in a chain. It can be used to traverse all BIOs
+in a chain or used in conjunction with BIO_find_type() to find all BIOs of a
+certain type.
+
+BIO_method_type() returns the type of a BIO.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+BIO_find_type() returns a matching BIO or NULL for no match.
+
+BIO_next() returns the next BIO in a chain.
+
+BIO_method_type() returns the type of the BIO B<b>.
+
+=head1 EXAMPLE
+
+Traverse a chain looking for digest BIOs:
+
+ BIO *btmp;
+ btmp = in_bio; /* in_bio is chain to search through */
+
+ do {
+        btmp = BIO_find_type(btmp, BIO_TYPE_MD);
+        if (btmp == NULL) break; /* Not found */
+        /* btmp is a digest BIO, do something with it ...*/
+        ...
+
+        btmp = BIO_next(btmp);
+ } while (btmp);
+
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_get_data.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_get_data.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c3137c4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_get_data.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+BIO_set_data, BIO_get_data, BIO_set_init, BIO_get_init, BIO_set_shutdown,
+BIO_get_shutdown - functions for managing BIO state information
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/bio.h>
+
+ void BIO_set_data(BIO *a, void *ptr);
+ void *BIO_get_data(BIO *a);
+ void BIO_set_init(BIO *a, int init);
+ int BIO_get_init(BIO *a);
+ void BIO_set_shutdown(BIO *a, int shut);
+ int BIO_get_shutdown(BIO *a);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+These functions are mainly useful when implementing a custom BIO.
+
+The BIO_set_data() function associates the custom data pointed to by B<ptr> with
+the BIO. This data can subsequently be retrieved via a call to BIO_get_data().
+This can be used by custom BIOs for storing implementation specific information.
+
+The BIO_set_init() function sets the value of the BIO's "init" flag to indicate
+whether initialisation has been completed for this BIO or not. A non-zero value
+indicates that initialisation is complete, whilst zero indicates that it is not.
+Often initialisation will complete during initial construction of the BIO. For
+some BIOs however, initialisation may not complete until after additional steps
+have occurred (for example through calling custom ctrls). The BIO_get_init()
+function returns the value of the "init" flag.
+
+The BIO_set_shutdown() and BIO_get_shutdown() functions set and get the state of
+this BIO's shutdown (i.e. BIO_CLOSE) flag. If set then the underlying resource
+is also closed when the BIO is freed.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+BIO_get_data() returns a pointer to the implementation specific custom data
+associated with this BIO, or NULL if none has been set.
+
+BIO_get_init() returns the state of the BIO's init flag.
+
+BIO_get_shutdown() returns the stat of the BIO's shutdown (i.e. BIO_CLOSE) flag.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<bio>, L<BIO_meth_new>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+The functions described here were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_get_ex_new_index.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_get_ex_new_index.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9cf20c2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_get_ex_new_index.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+BIO_get_ex_new_index, BIO_set_ex_data, BIO_get_ex_data,
+ENGINE_get_ex_new_index, ENGINE_set_ex_data, ENGINE_get_ex_data,
+UI_get_ex_new_index, UI_set_ex_data, UI_get_ex_data,
+X509_get_ex_new_index, X509_set_ex_data, X509_get_ex_data,
+X509_STORE_get_ex_new_index, X509_STORE_set_ex_data, X509_STORE_get_ex_data,
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index, X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data, X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data,
+DH_get_ex_new_index, DH_set_ex_data, DH_get_ex_data,
+DSA_get_ex_new_index, DSA_set_ex_data, DSA_get_ex_data,
+ECDH_get_ex_new_index, ECDH_set_ex_data, ECDH_get_ex_data,
+EC_KEY_get_ex_new_index, EC_KEY_set_ex_data, EC_KEY_get_ex_data,
+RSA_get_ex_new_index, RSA_set_ex_data, RSA_get_ex_data
+- application-specific data
+
+=for comment generic
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+ int TYPE_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp,
+                CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
+                CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,
+                CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func);
+
+ int TYPE_set_ex_data(TYPE *d, int idx, void *arg);
+
+ void *TYPE_get_ex_data(TYPE *d, int idx);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+In the description here, I<TYPE> is used a placeholder
+for any of the OpenSSL datatypes listed in
+L<CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(3)>.
+
+These functions handle application-specific data for OpenSSL data
+structures.
+
+TYPE_get_new_ex_index() is a macro that calls CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index()
+with the correct B<index> value.
+
+TYPE_set_ex_data() is a function that calls CRYPTO_set_ex_data() with
+an offset into the opaque exdata part of the TYPE object.
+
+TYPE_get_ex_data() is a function that calls CRYPTO_get_ex_data() with an
+an offset into the opaque exdata part of the TYPE object.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(3)>.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_meth_new.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_meth_new.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f682c37
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_meth_new.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+BIO_get_new_index,
+BIO_meth_new, BIO_meth_free, BIO_meth_get_write, BIO_meth_set_write,
+BIO_meth_get_read, BIO_meth_set_read, BIO_meth_get_puts, BIO_meth_set_puts,
+BIO_meth_get_gets, BIO_meth_set_gets, BIO_meth_get_ctrl, BIO_meth_set_ctrl,
+BIO_meth_get_create, BIO_meth_set_create, BIO_meth_get_destroy,
+BIO_meth_set_destroy, BIO_meth_get_callback_ctrl,
+BIO_meth_set_callback_ctrl - Routines to build up BIO methods
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/bio.h>
+
+ int BIO_get_new_index(void);
+ BIO_METHOD *BIO_meth_new(int type, const char *name);
+ void BIO_meth_free(BIO_METHOD *biom);
+ int (*BIO_meth_get_write(BIO_METHOD *biom)) (BIO *, const char *, int);
+ int BIO_meth_set_write(BIO_METHOD *biom,
+                        int (*write) (BIO *, const char *, int));
+ int (*BIO_meth_get_read(BIO_METHOD *biom)) (BIO *, char *, int);
+ int BIO_meth_set_read(BIO_METHOD *biom,
+                       int (*read) (BIO *, char *, int));
+ int (*BIO_meth_get_puts(BIO_METHOD *biom)) (BIO *, const char *);
+ int BIO_meth_set_puts(BIO_METHOD *biom,
+                       int (*puts) (BIO *, const char *));
+ int (*BIO_meth_get_gets(BIO_METHOD *biom)) (BIO *, char *, int);
+ int BIO_meth_set_gets(BIO_METHOD *biom,
+                       int (*gets) (BIO *, char *, int));
+ long (*BIO_meth_get_ctrl(BIO_METHOD *biom)) (BIO *, int, long, void *);
+ int BIO_meth_set_ctrl(BIO_METHOD *biom,
+                       long (*ctrl) (BIO *, int, long, void *));
+ int (*BIO_meth_get_create(BIO_METHOD *bion)) (BIO *);
+ int BIO_meth_set_create(BIO_METHOD *biom, int (*create) (BIO *));
+ int (*BIO_meth_get_destroy(BIO_METHOD *biom)) (BIO *);
+ int BIO_meth_set_destroy(BIO_METHOD *biom, int (*destroy) (BIO *));
+ long (*BIO_meth_get_callback_ctrl(BIO_METHOD *biom))
+                                  (BIO *, int, BIO_info_cb *);
+ int BIO_meth_set_callback_ctrl(BIO_METHOD *biom,
+                                long (*callback_ctrl) (BIO *, int,
+                                                      BIO_info_cb *));
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The B<BIO_METHOD> type is a structure used for the implementation of new BIO
+types. It provides a set of of functions used by OpenSSL for the implementation
+of the various BIO capabilities. See the L<bio> page for more information.
+
+BIO_meth_new() creates a new B<BIO_METHOD> structure. It should be given a
+unique integer B<type> and a string that represents its B<name>.
+Use BIO_get_new_index() to get the value for B<type>.
+
+The set of
+standard OpenSSL provided BIO types is provided in B<bio.h>. Some examples
+include B<BIO_TYPE_BUFFER> and B<BIO_TYPE_CIPHER>. Filter BIOs should have a
+type which have the "filter" bit set (B<BIO_TYPE_FILTER>). Source/sink BIOs
+should have the "source/sink" bit set (B<BIO_TYPE_SOURCE_SINK>). File descriptor
+based BIOs (e.g. socket, fd, connect, accept etc) should additionally have the
+"descriptor" bit set (B<BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR>). See the L<BIO_find_type> page for
+more information.
+
+BIO_meth_free() destroys a B<BIO_METHOD> structure and frees up any memory
+associated with it.
+
+BIO_meth_get_write() and BIO_meth_set_write() get and set the function used for
+writing arbitrary length data to the BIO respectively. This function will be
+called in response to the application calling BIO_write(). The parameters for
+the function have the same meaning as for BIO_write().
+
+BIO_meth_get_read() and BIO_meth_set_read() get and set the function used for
+reading arbitrary length data from the BIO respectively. This function will be
+called in response to the application calling BIO_read(). The parameters for the
+function have the same meaning as for BIO_read().
+
+BIO_meth_get_puts() and BIO_meth_set_puts() get and set the function used for
+writing a NULL terminated string to the BIO respectively. This function will be
+called in response to the application calling BIO_puts(). The parameters for
+the function have the same meaning as for BIO_puts().
+
+BIO_meth_get_gets() and BIO_meth_set_gets() get and set the function typically
+used for reading a line of data from the BIO respectively (see the L<BIO_gets(3)>
+page for more information). This function will be called in response to the
+application calling BIO_gets(). The parameters for the function have the same
+meaning as for BIO_gets().
+
+BIO_meth_get_ctrl() and BIO_meth_set_ctrl() get and set the function used for
+processing ctrl messages in the BIO respectively. See the L<BIO_ctrl> page for
+more information. This function will be called in response to the application
+calling BIO_ctrl(). The parameters for the function have the same meaning as for
+BIO_ctrl().
+
+BIO_meth_get_create() and BIO_meth_set_create() get and set the function used
+for creating a new instance of the BIO respectively. This function will be
+called in response to the application calling BIO_new() and passing
+in a pointer to the current BIO_METHOD. The BIO_new() function will allocate the
+memory for the new BIO, and a pointer to this newly allocated structure will
+be passed as a parameter to the function.
+
+BIO_meth_get_destroy() and BIO_meth_set_destroy() get and set the function used
+for destroying an instance of a BIO respectively. This function will be
+called in response to the application calling BIO_free(). A pointer to the BIO
+to be destroyed is passed as a parameter. The destroy function should be used
+for BIO specific clean up. The memory for the BIO itself should not be freed by
+this function.
+
+BIO_meth_get_callback_ctrl() and BIO_meth_set_callback_ctrl() get and set the
+function used for processing callback ctrl messages in the BIO respectively. See
+the L<BIO_callback_ctrl(3)> page for more information. This function will be called
+in response to the application calling BIO_callback_ctrl(). The parameters for
+the function have the same meaning as for BIO_callback_ctrl().
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<bio>, L<BIO_find_type>, L<BIO_ctrl>, L<BIO_read>, L<BIO_new>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+The functions described here were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_new.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_new.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..006cf59
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_new.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+BIO_new, BIO_up_ref, BIO_free, BIO_vfree, BIO_free_all,
+BIO_set - BIO allocation and freeing functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/bio.h>
+
+ BIO *  BIO_new(const BIO_METHOD *type);
+ int    BIO_set(BIO *a, const BIO_METHOD *type);
+ int    BIO_up_ref(BIO *a);
+ int    BIO_free(BIO *a);
+ void   BIO_vfree(BIO *a);
+ void   BIO_free_all(BIO *a);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The BIO_new() function returns a new BIO using method B<type>.
+
+BIO_up_ref() increments the reference count associated with the BIO object.
+
+BIO_free() frees up a single BIO, BIO_vfree() also frees up a single BIO
+but it does not return a value.
+If B<a> is NULL nothing is done.
+Calling BIO_free() may also have some effect
+on the underlying I/O structure, for example it may close the file being
+referred to under certain circumstances. For more details see the individual
+BIO_METHOD descriptions.
+
+BIO_free_all() frees up an entire BIO chain, it does not halt if an error
+occurs freeing up an individual BIO in the chain.
+If B<a> is NULL nothing is done.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+BIO_new() returns a newly created BIO or NULL if the call fails.
+
+BIO_set(), BIO_up_ref() and BIO_free() return 1 for success and 0 for failure.
+
+BIO_free_all() and BIO_vfree() do not return values.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+If BIO_free() is called on a BIO chain it will only free one BIO resulting
+in a memory leak.
+
+Calling BIO_free_all() on a single BIO has the same effect as calling BIO_free()
+on it other than the discarded return value.
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+BIO_set() was removed in OpenSSL 1.1.0 as BIO type is now opaque.
+
+=head1 EXAMPLE
+
+Create a memory BIO:
+
+ BIO *mem = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_new_CMS.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_new_CMS.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b06c224
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_new_CMS.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+BIO_new_CMS - CMS streaming filter BIO
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/cms.h>
+
+ BIO *BIO_new_CMS(BIO *out, CMS_ContentInfo *cms);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+BIO_new_CMS() returns a streaming filter BIO chain based on B<cms>. The output
+of the filter is written to B<out>. Any data written to the chain is
+automatically translated to a BER format CMS structure of the appropriate type.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The chain returned by this function behaves like a standard filter BIO. It
+supports non blocking I/O. Content is processed and streamed on the fly and not
+all held in memory at once: so it is possible to encode very large structures.
+After all content has been written through the chain BIO_flush() must be called
+to finalise the structure.
+
+The B<CMS_STREAM> flag must be included in the corresponding B<flags>
+parameter of the B<cms> creation function.
+
+If an application wishes to write additional data to B<out> BIOs should be
+removed from the chain using BIO_pop() and freed with BIO_free() until B<out>
+is reached. If no additional data needs to be written BIO_free_all() can be
+called to free up the whole chain.
+
+Any content written through the filter is used verbatim: no canonical
+translation is performed.
+
+It is possible to chain multiple BIOs to, for example, create a triple wrapped
+signed, enveloped, signed structure. In this case it is the applications
+responsibility to set the inner content type of any outer CMS_ContentInfo
+structures.
+
+Large numbers of small writes through the chain should be avoided as this will
+produce an output consisting of lots of OCTET STRING structures. Prepending
+a BIO_f_buffer() buffering BIO will prevent this.
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+There is currently no corresponding inverse BIO: i.e. one which can decode
+a CMS structure on the fly.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+BIO_new_CMS() returns a BIO chain when successful or NULL if an error
+occurred. The error can be obtained from ERR_get_error(3).
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>, L<CMS_sign(3)>,
+L<CMS_encrypt(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+BIO_new_CMS() was added to OpenSSL 1.0.0
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_parse_hostserv.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_parse_hostserv.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..426e4de
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_parse_hostserv.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+BIO_hostserv_priorities,
+BIO_parse_hostserv
+- utility routines to parse a standard host and service string
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/bio.h>
+
+ enum BIO_hostserv_priorities {
+     BIO_PARSE_PRIO_HOST, BIO_PARSE_PRIO_SERV
+ };
+ int BIO_parse_hostserv(const char *hostserv, char **host, char **service,
+                        enum BIO_hostserv_priorities hostserv_prio);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+BIO_parse_hostserv() will parse the information given in B<hostserv>,
+create strings with the host name and service name and give those
+back via B<host> and B<service>.  Those will need to be freed after
+they are used.  B<hostserv_prio> helps determine if B<hostserv> shall
+be interpreted primarily as a host name or a service name in ambiguous
+cases.
+
+The syntax the BIO_parse_hostserv() recognises is:
+
+ host + ':' + service
+ host + ':' + '*'
+ host + ':'
+        ':' + service
+ '*'  + ':' + service
+ host
+ service
+
+The host part can be a name or an IP address.  If it's a IPv6
+address, it MUST be enclosed in brackets, such as '[::1]'.
+
+The service part can  be a service name or its port number.
+
+The returned values will depend on the given B<hostserv> string
+and B<hostserv_prio>, as follows:
+
+ host + ':' + service  => *host = "host", *service = "service"
+ host + ':' + '*'      => *host = "host", *service = NULL
+ host + ':'            => *host = "host", *service = NULL
+        ':' + service  => *host = NULL, *service = "service"
+  '*' + ':' + service  => *host = NULL, *service = "service"
+
+ in case no ':' is present in the string, the result depends on
+ hostserv_prio, as follows:
+
+ when hostserv_prio == BIO_PARSE_PRIO_HOST
+ host                 => *host = "host", *service untouched
+
+ when hostserv_prio == BIO_PARSE_PRIO_SERV
+ service              => *host untouched, *service = "service"
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<BIO_ADDRINFO(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_printf.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_printf.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8045b64
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_printf.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+BIO_printf, BIO_vprintf, BIO_snprintf, BIO_vsnprintf
+- formatted output to a BIO
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/bio.h>
+
+ int BIO_printf(BIO *bio, const char *format, ...)
+ int BIO_vprintf(BIO *bio, const char *format, va_list args)
+
+ int BIO_snprintf(char *buf, size_t n, const char *format, ...)
+ int BIO_vsnprintf(char *buf, size_t n, const char *format, va_list args)
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+BIO_printf() is similar to the standard C printf() function, except that
+the output is sent to the specified BIO, B<bio>, rather than standard
+output.  All common format specifiers are supported.
+
+BIO_vprintf() is similar to the vprintf() function found on many platforms,
+the output is sent to the specified BIO, B<bio>, rather than standard
+output.  All common format specifiers are supported. The argument
+list B<args> is a stdarg argument list.
+
+BIO_snprintf() is for platforms that do not have the common snprintf()
+function. It is like sprintf() except that the size parameter, B<n>,
+specifies the size of the output buffer.
+
+BIO_vsnprintf() is to BIO_snprintf() as BIO_vprintf() is to BIO_printf().
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+All functions return the number of bytes written, or -1 on error.
+For BIO_snprintf() and BIO_vsnprintf() this includes when the output
+buffer is too small.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_push.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_push.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ce56db9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_push.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+BIO_push, BIO_pop, BIO_set_next - add and remove BIOs from a chain
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/bio.h>
+
+ BIO *BIO_push(BIO *b, BIO *append);
+ BIO *BIO_pop(BIO *b);
+ void BIO_set_next(BIO *b, BIO *next);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The BIO_push() function appends the BIO B<append> to B<b>, it returns
+B<b>.
+
+BIO_pop() removes the BIO B<b> from a chain and returns the next BIO
+in the chain, or NULL if there is no next BIO. The removed BIO then
+becomes a single BIO with no association with the original chain,
+it can thus be freed or attached to a different chain.
+
+BIO_set_next() replaces the existing next BIO in a chain with the BIO pointed to
+by B<next>. The new chain may include some of the same BIOs from the old chain
+or it may be completely different.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The names of these functions are perhaps a little misleading. BIO_push()
+joins two BIO chains whereas BIO_pop() deletes a single BIO from a chain,
+the deleted BIO does not need to be at the end of a chain.
+
+The process of calling BIO_push() and BIO_pop() on a BIO may have additional
+consequences (a control call is made to the affected BIOs) any effects will
+be noted in the descriptions of individual BIOs.
+
+=head1 EXAMPLES
+
+For these examples suppose B<md1> and B<md2> are digest BIOs, B<b64> is
+a base64 BIO and B<f> is a file BIO.
+
+If the call:
+
+ BIO_push(b64, f);
+
+is made then the new chain will be B<b64-f>. After making the calls
+
+ BIO_push(md2, b64);
+ BIO_push(md1, md2);
+
+the new chain is B<md1-md2-b64-f>. Data written to B<md1> will be digested
+by B<md1> and B<md2>, B<base64> encoded and written to B<f>.
+
+It should be noted that reading causes data to pass in the reverse
+direction, that is data is read from B<f>, base64 B<decoded> and digested
+by B<md1> and B<md2>. If the call:
+
+ BIO_pop(md2);
+
+The call will return B<b64> and the new chain will be B<md1-b64-f> data can
+be written to B<md1> as before.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+BIO_push() returns the end of the chain, B<b>.
+
+BIO_pop() returns the next BIO in the chain, or NULL if there is no next
+BIO.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<bio>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+The BIO_set_next() function was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_read.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_read.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..45871c1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_read.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+BIO_read, BIO_write, BIO_gets, BIO_puts - BIO I/O functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/bio.h>
+
+ int    BIO_read(BIO *b, void *buf, int len);
+ int    BIO_gets(BIO *b, char *buf, int size);
+ int    BIO_write(BIO *b, const void *buf, int len);
+ int    BIO_puts(BIO *b, const char *buf);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+BIO_read() attempts to read B<len> bytes from BIO B<b> and places
+the data in B<buf>.
+
+BIO_gets() performs the BIOs "gets" operation and places the data
+in B<buf>. Usually this operation will attempt to read a line of data
+from the BIO of maximum length B<len-1>. There are exceptions to this,
+however; for example, BIO_gets() on a digest BIO will calculate and
+return the digest and other BIOs may not support BIO_gets() at all.
+The returned string is always NUL-terminated.
+
+BIO_write() attempts to write B<len> bytes from B<buf> to BIO B<b>.
+
+BIO_puts() attempts to write a NUL-terminated string B<buf> to BIO B<b>.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+All these functions return either the amount of data successfully read or
+written (if the return value is positive) or that no data was successfully
+read or written if the result is 0 or -1. If the return value is -2 then
+the operation is not implemented in the specific BIO type.  The trailing
+NUL is not included in the length returned by BIO_gets().
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+A 0 or -1 return is not necessarily an indication of an error. In
+particular when the source/sink is non-blocking or of a certain type
+it may merely be an indication that no data is currently available and that
+the application should retry the operation later.
+
+One technique sometimes used with blocking sockets is to use a system call
+(such as select(), poll() or equivalent) to determine when data is available
+and then call read() to read the data. The equivalent with BIOs (that is call
+select() on the underlying I/O structure and then call BIO_read() to
+read the data) should B<not> be used because a single call to BIO_read()
+can cause several reads (and writes in the case of SSL BIOs) on the underlying
+I/O structure and may block as a result. Instead select() (or equivalent)
+should be combined with non blocking I/O so successive reads will request
+a retry instead of blocking.
+
+See L<BIO_should_retry(3)> for details of how to
+determine the cause of a retry and other I/O issues.
+
+If the BIO_gets() function is not supported by a BIO then it possible to
+work around this by adding a buffering BIO L<BIO_f_buffer(3)>
+to the chain.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<BIO_should_retry(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_s_accept.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_s_accept.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ce9995d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_s_accept.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,222 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+BIO_s_accept, BIO_set_accept_name, BIO_set_accept_port, BIO_get_accept_name,
+BIO_get_accept_port, BIO_new_accept, BIO_set_nbio_accept, BIO_set_accept_bios,
+BIO_set_bind_mode, BIO_get_bind_mode, BIO_do_accept - accept BIO
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/bio.h>
+
+ const BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_accept(void);
+
+ long BIO_set_accept_name(BIO *b, char *name);
+ char *BIO_get_accept_name(BIO *b);
+
+ long BIO_set_accept_port(BIO *b, char *port);
+ char *BIO_get_accept_port(BIO *b);
+
+ BIO *BIO_new_accept(char *host_port);
+
+ long BIO_set_nbio_accept(BIO *b, int n);
+ long BIO_set_accept_bios(BIO *b, char *bio);
+
+ long BIO_set_bind_mode(BIO *b, long mode);
+ long BIO_get_bind_mode(BIO *b);
+
+ int BIO_do_accept(BIO *b);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+BIO_s_accept() returns the accept BIO method. This is a wrapper
+round the platform's TCP/IP socket accept routines.
+
+Using accept BIOs, TCP/IP connections can be accepted and data
+transferred using only BIO routines. In this way any platform
+specific operations are hidden by the BIO abstraction.
+
+Read and write operations on an accept BIO will perform I/O
+on the underlying connection. If no connection is established
+and the port (see below) is set up properly then the BIO
+waits for an incoming connection.
+
+Accept BIOs support BIO_puts() but not BIO_gets().
+
+If the close flag is set on an accept BIO then any active
+connection on that chain is shutdown and the socket closed when
+the BIO is freed.
+
+Calling BIO_reset() on an accept BIO will close any active
+connection and reset the BIO into a state where it awaits another
+incoming connection.
+
+BIO_get_fd() and BIO_set_fd() can be called to retrieve or set
+the accept socket. See L<BIO_s_fd(3)>
+
+BIO_set_accept_name() uses the string B<name> to set the accept
+name. The name is represented as a string of the form "host:port",
+where "host" is the interface to use and "port" is the port.
+The host can be "*" or empty which is interpreted as meaning
+any interface.  If the host is an IPv6 address, it has to be
+enclosed in brackets, for example "[::1]:https".  "port" has the
+same syntax as the port specified in BIO_set_conn_port() for
+connect BIOs, that is it can be a numerical port string or a
+string to lookup using getservbyname() and a string table.
+
+BIO_set_accept_port() uses the string B<port> to set the accept
+port.  "port" has the same syntax as the port specified in
+BIO_set_conn_port() for connect BIOs, that is it can be a numerical
+port string or a string to lookup using getservbyname() and a string
+table.
+
+BIO_new_accept() combines BIO_new() and BIO_set_accept_name() into
+a single call: that is it creates a new accept BIO with port
+B<host_port>.
+
+BIO_set_nbio_accept() sets the accept socket to blocking mode
+(the default) if B<n> is 0 or non blocking mode if B<n> is 1.
+
+BIO_set_accept_bios() can be used to set a chain of BIOs which
+will be duplicated and prepended to the chain when an incoming
+connection is received. This is useful if, for example, a
+buffering or SSL BIO is required for each connection. The
+chain of BIOs must not be freed after this call, they will
+be automatically freed when the accept BIO is freed.
+
+BIO_set_bind_mode() and BIO_get_bind_mode() set and retrieve
+the current bind mode. If B<BIO_BIND_NORMAL> (the default) is set
+then another socket cannot be bound to the same port. If
+B<BIO_BIND_REUSEADDR> is set then other sockets can bind to the
+same port. If B<BIO_BIND_REUSEADDR_IF_UNUSED> is set then and
+attempt is first made to use BIO_BIN_NORMAL, if this fails
+and the port is not in use then a second attempt is made
+using B<BIO_BIND_REUSEADDR>.
+
+BIO_do_accept() serves two functions. When it is first
+called, after the accept BIO has been setup, it will attempt
+to create the accept socket and bind an address to it. Second
+and subsequent calls to BIO_do_accept() will await an incoming
+connection, or request a retry in non blocking mode.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+When an accept BIO is at the end of a chain it will await an
+incoming connection before processing I/O calls. When an accept
+BIO is not at then end of a chain it passes I/O calls to the next
+BIO in the chain.
+
+When a connection is established a new socket BIO is created for
+the connection and appended to the chain. That is the chain is now
+accept->socket. This effectively means that attempting I/O on
+an initial accept socket will await an incoming connection then
+perform I/O on it.
+
+If any additional BIOs have been set using BIO_set_accept_bios()
+then they are placed between the socket and the accept BIO,
+that is the chain will be accept->otherbios->socket.
+
+If a server wishes to process multiple connections (as is normally
+the case) then the accept BIO must be made available for further
+incoming connections. This can be done by waiting for a connection and
+then calling:
+
+ connection = BIO_pop(accept);
+
+After this call B<connection> will contain a BIO for the recently
+established connection and B<accept> will now be a single BIO
+again which can be used to await further incoming connections.
+If no further connections will be accepted the B<accept> can
+be freed using BIO_free().
+
+If only a single connection will be processed it is possible to
+perform I/O using the accept BIO itself. This is often undesirable
+however because the accept BIO will still accept additional incoming
+connections. This can be resolved by using BIO_pop() (see above)
+and freeing up the accept BIO after the initial connection.
+
+If the underlying accept socket is non-blocking and BIO_do_accept() is
+called to await an incoming connection it is possible for
+BIO_should_io_special() with the reason BIO_RR_ACCEPT. If this happens
+then it is an indication that an accept attempt would block: the application
+should take appropriate action to wait until the underlying socket has
+accepted a connection and retry the call.
+
+BIO_set_accept_name(), BIO_get_accept_name(), BIO_set_accept_port(),
+BIO_get_accept_port(), BIO_set_nbio_accept(), BIO_set_accept_bios(),
+BIO_set_bind_mode(), BIO_get_bind_mode() and BIO_do_accept() are macros.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+BIO_do_accept(),
+BIO_set_accept_name(), BIO_set_accept_port(), BIO_set_nbio_accept(),
+BIO_set_accept_bios(), and BIO_set_bind_mode(), return 1 for success and 0 or
+-1 for failure.
+
+BIO_get_accept_name() returns the accept name or NULL on error.
+
+BIO_get_accept_port() returns the port as a string or NULL on error.
+
+BIO_get_bind_mode() returns the set of B<BIO_BIND> flags, or -1 on failure.
+
+BIO_new_accept() returns a BIO or NULL on error.
+
+=head1 EXAMPLE
+
+This example accepts two connections on port 4444, sends messages
+down each and finally closes both down.
+
+ BIO *abio, *cbio, *cbio2;
+
+ /* First call to BIO_accept() sets up accept BIO */
+ abio = BIO_new_accept("4444");
+ if (BIO_do_accept(abio) <= 0) {
+     fprintf(stderr, "Error setting up accept\n");
+     ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+     exit(1);
+ }
+
+ /* Wait for incoming connection */
+ if (BIO_do_accept(abio) <= 0) {
+     fprintf(stderr, "Error accepting connection\n");
+     ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+     exit(1);
+ }
+ fprintf(stderr, "Connection 1 established\n");
+
+ /* Retrieve BIO for connection */
+ cbio = BIO_pop(abio);
+ BIO_puts(cbio, "Connection 1: Sending out Data on initial connection\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, "Sent out data on connection 1\n");
+
+ /* Wait for another connection */
+ if (BIO_do_accept(abio) <= 0) {
+     fprintf(stderr, "Error accepting connection\n");
+     ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+     exit(1);
+ }
+ fprintf(stderr, "Connection 2 established\n");
+
+ /* Close accept BIO to refuse further connections */
+ cbio2 = BIO_pop(abio);
+ BIO_free(abio);
+ BIO_puts(cbio2, "Connection 2: Sending out Data on second\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, "Sent out data on connection 2\n");
+
+ BIO_puts(cbio, "Connection 1: Second connection established\n");
+
+ /* Close the two established connections */
+ BIO_free(cbio);
+ BIO_free(cbio2);
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_s_bio.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_s_bio.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cb46546
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_s_bio.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,201 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+BIO_s_bio, BIO_make_bio_pair, BIO_destroy_bio_pair, BIO_shutdown_wr,
+BIO_set_write_buf_size, BIO_get_write_buf_size, BIO_new_bio_pair,
+BIO_get_write_guarantee, BIO_ctrl_get_write_guarantee, BIO_get_read_request,
+BIO_ctrl_get_read_request, BIO_ctrl_reset_read_request - BIO pair BIO
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/bio.h>
+
+ const BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_bio(void);
+
+ int BIO_make_bio_pair(BIO *b1, BIO *b2);
+ int BIO_destroy_bio_pair(BIO *b);
+ int BIO_shutdown_wr(BIO *b);
+
+
+ int BIO_set_write_buf_size(BIO *b, long size);
+ size_t BIO_get_write_buf_size(BIO *b, long size);
+
+ int BIO_new_bio_pair(BIO **bio1, size_t writebuf1, BIO **bio2, size_t writebuf2);
+
+ int BIO_get_write_guarantee(BIO *b);
+ size_t BIO_ctrl_get_write_guarantee(BIO *b);
+ int BIO_get_read_request(BIO *b);
+ size_t BIO_ctrl_get_read_request(BIO *b);
+ int BIO_ctrl_reset_read_request(BIO *b);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+BIO_s_bio() returns the method for a BIO pair. A BIO pair is a pair of source/sink
+BIOs where data written to either half of the pair is buffered and can be read from
+the other half. Both halves must usually by handled by the same application thread
+since no locking is done on the internal data structures.
+
+Since BIO chains typically end in a source/sink BIO it is possible to make this
+one half of a BIO pair and have all the data processed by the chain under application
+control.
+
+One typical use of BIO pairs is to place TLS/SSL I/O under application control, this
+can be used when the application wishes to use a non standard transport for
+TLS/SSL or the normal socket routines are inappropriate.
+
+Calls to BIO_read() will read data from the buffer or request a retry if no
+data is available.
+
+Calls to BIO_write() will place data in the buffer or request a retry if the
+buffer is full.
+
+The standard calls BIO_ctrl_pending() and BIO_ctrl_wpending() can be used to
+determine the amount of pending data in the read or write buffer.
+
+BIO_reset() clears any data in the write buffer.
+
+BIO_make_bio_pair() joins two separate BIOs into a connected pair.
+
+BIO_destroy_pair() destroys the association between two connected BIOs. Freeing
+up any half of the pair will automatically destroy the association.
+
+BIO_shutdown_wr() is used to close down a BIO B<b>. After this call no further
+writes on BIO B<b> are allowed (they will return an error). Reads on the other
+half of the pair will return any pending data or EOF when all pending data has
+been read.
+
+BIO_set_write_buf_size() sets the write buffer size of BIO B<b> to B<size>.
+If the size is not initialized a default value is used. This is currently
+17K, sufficient for a maximum size TLS record.
+
+BIO_get_write_buf_size() returns the size of the write buffer.
+
+BIO_new_bio_pair() combines the calls to BIO_new(), BIO_make_bio_pair() and
+BIO_set_write_buf_size() to create a connected pair of BIOs B<bio1>, B<bio2>
+with write buffer sizes B<writebuf1> and B<writebuf2>. If either size is
+zero then the default size is used.  BIO_new_bio_pair() does not check whether
+B<bio1> or B<bio2> do point to some other BIO, the values are overwritten,
+BIO_free() is not called.
+
+BIO_get_write_guarantee() and BIO_ctrl_get_write_guarantee() return the maximum
+length of data that can be currently written to the BIO. Writes larger than this
+value will return a value from BIO_write() less than the amount requested or if the
+buffer is full request a retry. BIO_ctrl_get_write_guarantee() is a function
+whereas BIO_get_write_guarantee() is a macro.
+
+BIO_get_read_request() and BIO_ctrl_get_read_request() return the
+amount of data requested, or the buffer size if it is less, if the
+last read attempt at the other half of the BIO pair failed due to an
+empty buffer.  This can be used to determine how much data should be
+written to the BIO so the next read will succeed: this is most useful
+in TLS/SSL applications where the amount of data read is usually
+meaningful rather than just a buffer size. After a successful read
+this call will return zero.  It also will return zero once new data
+has been written satisfying the read request or part of it.
+Note that BIO_get_read_request() never returns an amount larger
+than that returned by BIO_get_write_guarantee().
+
+BIO_ctrl_reset_read_request() can also be used to reset the value returned by
+BIO_get_read_request() to zero.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+Both halves of a BIO pair should be freed. That is even if one half is implicit
+freed due to a BIO_free_all() or SSL_free() call the other half needs to be freed.
+
+When used in bidirectional applications (such as TLS/SSL) care should be taken to
+flush any data in the write buffer. This can be done by calling BIO_pending()
+on the other half of the pair and, if any data is pending, reading it and sending
+it to the underlying transport. This must be done before any normal processing
+(such as calling select() ) due to a request and BIO_should_read() being true.
+
+To see why this is important consider a case where a request is sent using
+BIO_write() and a response read with BIO_read(), this can occur during an
+TLS/SSL handshake for example. BIO_write() will succeed and place data in the write
+buffer. BIO_read() will initially fail and BIO_should_read() will be true. If
+the application then waits for data to be available on the underlying transport
+before flushing the write buffer it will never succeed because the request was
+never sent!
+
+BIO_eof() is true if no data is in the peer BIO and the peer BIO has been
+shutdown.
+
+BIO_make_bio_pair(), BIO_destroy_bio_pair(), BIO_shutdown_wr(),
+BIO_set_write_buf_size(), BIO_get_write_buf_size(),
+BIO_get_write_guarantee(), and BIO_get_read_request() are implemented
+as macros.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+BIO_new_bio_pair() returns 1 on success, with the new BIOs available in
+B<bio1> and B<bio2>, or 0 on failure, with NULL pointers stored into the
+locations for B<bio1> and B<bio2>. Check the error stack for more information.
+
+[XXXXX: More return values need to be added here]
+
+=head1 EXAMPLE
+
+The BIO pair can be used to have full control over the network access of an
+application. The application can call select() on the socket as required
+without having to go through the SSL-interface.
+
+ BIO *internal_bio, *network_bio;
+ ...
+ BIO_new_bio_pair(&internal_bio, 0, &network_bio, 0);
+ SSL_set_bio(ssl, internal_bio, internal_bio);
+ SSL_operations(); //e.g SSL_read and SSL_write
+ ...
+
+ application |   TLS-engine
+    |        |
+    +----------> SSL_operations()
+             |     /\    ||
+             |     ||    \/
+             |   BIO-pair (internal_bio)
+             |   BIO-pair (network_bio)
+             |     ||     /\
+             |     \/     ||
+    +-----------< BIO_operations()
+    |        |
+    |        |
+   socket
+
+  ...
+  SSL_free(ssl);                /* implicitly frees internal_bio */
+  BIO_free(network_bio);
+  ...
+
+As the BIO pair will only buffer the data and never directly access the
+connection, it behaves non-blocking and will return as soon as the write
+buffer is full or the read buffer is drained. Then the application has to
+flush the write buffer and/or fill the read buffer.
+
+Use the BIO_ctrl_pending(), to find out whether data is buffered in the BIO
+and must be transferred to the network. Use BIO_ctrl_get_read_request() to
+find out, how many bytes must be written into the buffer before the
+SSL_operation() can successfully be continued.
+
+=head1 WARNING
+
+As the data is buffered, SSL_operation() may return with an ERROR_SSL_WANT_READ
+condition, but there is still data in the write buffer. An application must
+not rely on the error value of SSL_operation() but must assure that the
+write buffer is always flushed first. Otherwise a deadlock may occur as
+the peer might be waiting for the data before being able to continue.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<SSL_set_bio(3)>, L<ssl(3)>, L<bio(3)>,
+L<BIO_should_retry(3)>, L<BIO_read(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_s_connect.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_s_connect.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2143acd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_s_connect.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,200 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+BIO_set_conn_address, BIO_get_conn_address,
+BIO_s_connect, BIO_new_connect, BIO_set_conn_hostname, BIO_set_conn_port,
+BIO_get_conn_hostname,
+BIO_get_conn_port,
+BIO_set_nbio, BIO_do_connect - connect BIO
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/bio.h>
+
+ const BIO_METHOD * BIO_s_connect(void);
+
+ BIO *BIO_new_connect(char *name);
+
+ long BIO_set_conn_hostname(BIO *b, char *name);
+ long BIO_set_conn_port(BIO *b, char *port);
+ long BIO_set_conn_address(BIO *b, BIO_ADDR *addr);
+ const char *BIO_get_conn_hostname(BIO *b);
+ const char *BIO_get_conn_port(BIO *b);
+ const BIO_ADDR *BIO_get_conn_address(BIO *b);
+
+ long BIO_set_nbio(BIO *b, long n);
+
+ int BIO_do_connect(BIO *b);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+BIO_s_connect() returns the connect BIO method. This is a wrapper
+round the platform's TCP/IP socket connection routines.
+
+Using connect BIOs, TCP/IP connections can be made and data
+transferred using only BIO routines. In this way any platform
+specific operations are hidden by the BIO abstraction.
+
+Read and write operations on a connect BIO will perform I/O
+on the underlying connection. If no connection is established
+and the port and hostname (see below) is set up properly then
+a connection is established first.
+
+Connect BIOs support BIO_puts() but not BIO_gets().
+
+If the close flag is set on a connect BIO then any active
+connection is shutdown and the socket closed when the BIO
+is freed.
+
+Calling BIO_reset() on a connect BIO will close any active
+connection and reset the BIO into a state where it can connect
+to the same host again.
+
+BIO_get_fd() places the underlying socket in B<c> if it is not NULL,
+it also returns the socket . If B<c> is not NULL it should be of
+type (int *).
+
+BIO_set_conn_hostname() uses the string B<name> to set the hostname.
+The hostname can be an IP address; if the address is an IPv6 one, it
+must be enclosed with brackets. The hostname can also include the
+port in the form hostname:port.
+
+BIO_set_conn_port() sets the port to B<port>. B<port> can be the
+numerical form or a string such as "http". A string will be looked
+up first using getservbyname() on the host platform but if that
+fails a standard table of port names will be used. This internal
+list is http, telnet, socks, https, ssl, ftp, and gopher.
+
+BIO_set_conn_address() sets the address and port information using
+a BIO_ADDR(3ssl).
+
+BIO_get_conn_hostname() returns the hostname of the connect BIO or
+NULL if the BIO is initialized but no hostname is set.
+This return value is an internal pointer which should not be modified.
+
+BIO_get_conn_port() returns the port as a string.
+This return value is an internal pointer which should not be modified.
+
+BIO_get_conn_address() returns the address information as a BIO_ADDR.
+This return value is an internal pointer which should not be modified.
+
+BIO_set_nbio() sets the non blocking I/O flag to B<n>. If B<n> is
+zero then blocking I/O is set. If B<n> is 1 then non blocking I/O
+is set. Blocking I/O is the default. The call to BIO_set_nbio()
+should be made before the connection is established because
+non blocking I/O is set during the connect process.
+
+BIO_new_connect() combines BIO_new() and BIO_set_conn_hostname() into
+a single call: that is it creates a new connect BIO with B<name>.
+
+BIO_do_connect() attempts to connect the supplied BIO. It returns 1
+if the connection was established successfully. A zero or negative
+value is returned if the connection could not be established, the
+call BIO_should_retry() should be used for non blocking connect BIOs
+to determine if the call should be retried.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+If blocking I/O is set then a non positive return value from any
+I/O call is caused by an error condition, although a zero return
+will normally mean that the connection was closed.
+
+If the port name is supplied as part of the host name then this will
+override any value set with BIO_set_conn_port(). This may be undesirable
+if the application does not wish to allow connection to arbitrary
+ports. This can be avoided by checking for the presence of the ':'
+character in the passed hostname and either indicating an error or
+truncating the string at that point.
+
+The values returned by BIO_get_conn_hostname(), BIO_get_conn_port(),
+BIO_get_conn_ip() and BIO_get_conn_int_port() are updated when a
+connection attempt is made. Before any connection attempt the values
+returned are those set by the application itself.
+
+Applications do not have to call BIO_do_connect() but may wish to do
+so to separate the connection process from other I/O processing.
+
+If non blocking I/O is set then retries will be requested as appropriate.
+
+It addition to BIO_should_read() and BIO_should_write() it is also
+possible for BIO_should_io_special() to be true during the initial
+connection process with the reason BIO_RR_CONNECT. If this is returned
+then this is an indication that a connection attempt would block,
+the application should then take appropriate action to wait until
+the underlying socket has connected and retry the call.
+
+BIO_set_conn_hostname(), BIO_set_conn_port(), BIO_set_conn_ip(),
+BIO_set_conn_int_port(), BIO_get_conn_hostname(), BIO_get_conn_port(),
+BIO_get_conn_ip(), BIO_get_conn_int_port(), BIO_set_nbio() and
+BIO_do_connect() are macros.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+BIO_s_connect() returns the connect BIO method.
+
+BIO_get_fd() returns the socket or -1 if the BIO has not
+been initialized.
+
+BIO_set_conn_hostname(), BIO_set_conn_port(), BIO_set_conn_ip() and
+BIO_set_conn_int_port() always return 1.
+
+BIO_get_conn_hostname() returns the connected hostname or NULL is
+none was set.
+
+BIO_get_conn_port() returns a string representing the connected
+port or NULL if not set.
+
+BIO_get_conn_ip() returns a pointer to the connected IP address in
+binary form or all zeros if not set.
+
+BIO_get_conn_int_port() returns the connected port or 0 if none was
+set.
+
+BIO_set_nbio() always returns 1.
+
+BIO_do_connect() returns 1 if the connection was successfully
+established and 0 or -1 if the connection failed.
+
+=head1 EXAMPLE
+
+This is example connects to a webserver on the local host and attempts
+to retrieve a page and copy the result to standard output.
+
+
+ BIO *cbio, *out;
+ int len;
+ char tmpbuf[1024];
+
+ cbio = BIO_new_connect("localhost:http");
+ out = BIO_new_fp(stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+ if (BIO_do_connect(cbio) <= 0) {
+     fprintf(stderr, "Error connecting to server\n");
+     ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+     exit(1);
+ }
+ BIO_puts(cbio, "GET / HTTP/1.0\n\n");
+ for ( ; ; ) {
+     len = BIO_read(cbio, tmpbuf, 1024);
+     if (len <= 0)
+         break;
+     BIO_write(out, tmpbuf, len);
+ }
+ BIO_free(cbio);
+ BIO_free(out);
+
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<BIO_ADDR(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_s_fd.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_s_fd.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..79c4a59
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_s_fd.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+BIO_s_fd, BIO_set_fd, BIO_get_fd, BIO_new_fd - file descriptor BIO
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/bio.h>
+
+ const BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_fd(void);
+
+ int BIO_set_fd(BIO *b, int fd, int c);
+ int BIO_get_fd(BIO *b, int *c);
+
+ BIO *BIO_new_fd(int fd, int close_flag);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+BIO_s_fd() returns the file descriptor BIO method. This is a wrapper
+round the platforms file descriptor routines such as read() and write().
+
+BIO_read() and BIO_write() read or write the underlying descriptor.
+BIO_puts() is supported but BIO_gets() is not.
+
+If the close flag is set then close() is called on the underlying
+file descriptor when the BIO is freed.
+
+BIO_reset() attempts to change the file pointer to the start of file
+such as by using B<lseek(fd, 0, 0)>.
+
+BIO_seek() sets the file pointer to position B<ofs> from start of file
+such as by using B<lseek(fd, ofs, 0)>.
+
+BIO_tell() returns the current file position such as by calling
+B<lseek(fd, 0, 1)>.
+
+BIO_set_fd() sets the file descriptor of BIO B<b> to B<fd> and the close
+flag to B<c>.
+
+BIO_get_fd() places the file descriptor in B<c> if it is not NULL, it also
+returns the file descriptor.
+
+BIO_new_fd() returns a file descriptor BIO using B<fd> and B<close_flag>.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The behaviour of BIO_read() and BIO_write() depends on the behavior of the
+platforms read() and write() calls on the descriptor. If the underlying
+file descriptor is in a non blocking mode then the BIO will behave in the
+manner described in the L<BIO_read(3)> and L<BIO_should_retry(3)>
+manual pages.
+
+File descriptor BIOs should not be used for socket I/O. Use socket BIOs
+instead.
+
+BIO_set_fd() and BIO_get_fd() are implemented as macros.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+BIO_s_fd() returns the file descriptor BIO method.
+
+BIO_set_fd() always returns 1.
+
+BIO_get_fd() returns the file descriptor or -1 if the BIO has not
+been initialized.
+
+BIO_new_fd() returns the newly allocated BIO or NULL is an error
+occurred.
+
+=head1 EXAMPLE
+
+This is a file descriptor BIO version of "Hello World":
+
+ BIO *out;
+
+ out = BIO_new_fd(fileno(stdout), BIO_NOCLOSE);
+ BIO_printf(out, "Hello World\n");
+ BIO_free(out);
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<BIO_seek(3)>, L<BIO_tell(3)>,
+L<BIO_reset(3)>, L<BIO_read(3)>,
+L<BIO_write(3)>, L<BIO_puts(3)>,
+L<BIO_gets(3)>, L<BIO_printf(3)>,
+L<BIO_set_close(3)>, L<BIO_get_close(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_s_file.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_s_file.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e19d824
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_s_file.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+BIO_s_file, BIO_new_file, BIO_new_fp, BIO_set_fp, BIO_get_fp,
+BIO_read_filename, BIO_write_filename, BIO_append_filename,
+BIO_rw_filename - FILE bio
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/bio.h>
+
+ const BIO_METHOD *     BIO_s_file(void);
+ BIO *BIO_new_file(const char *filename, const char *mode);
+ BIO *BIO_new_fp(FILE *stream, int flags);
+
+ BIO_set_fp(BIO *b, FILE *fp, int flags);
+ BIO_get_fp(BIO *b, FILE **fpp);
+
+ int BIO_read_filename(BIO *b, char *name)
+ int BIO_write_filename(BIO *b, char *name)
+ int BIO_append_filename(BIO *b, char *name)
+ int BIO_rw_filename(BIO *b, char *name)
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+BIO_s_file() returns the BIO file method. As its name implies it
+is a wrapper round the stdio FILE structure and it is a
+source/sink BIO.
+
+Calls to BIO_read() and BIO_write() read and write data to the
+underlying stream. BIO_gets() and BIO_puts() are supported on file BIOs.
+
+BIO_flush() on a file BIO calls the fflush() function on the wrapped
+stream.
+
+BIO_reset() attempts to change the file pointer to the start of file
+using fseek(stream, 0, 0).
+
+BIO_seek() sets the file pointer to position B<ofs> from start of file
+using fseek(stream, ofs, 0).
+
+BIO_eof() calls feof().
+
+Setting the BIO_CLOSE flag calls fclose() on the stream when the BIO
+is freed.
+
+BIO_new_file() creates a new file BIO with mode B<mode> the meaning
+of B<mode> is the same as the stdio function fopen(). The BIO_CLOSE
+flag is set on the returned BIO.
+
+BIO_new_fp() creates a file BIO wrapping B<stream>. Flags can be:
+BIO_CLOSE, BIO_NOCLOSE (the close flag) BIO_FP_TEXT (sets the underlying
+stream to text mode, default is binary: this only has any effect under
+Win32).
+
+BIO_set_fp() set the fp of a file BIO to B<fp>. B<flags> has the same
+meaning as in BIO_new_fp(), it is a macro.
+
+BIO_get_fp() retrieves the fp of a file BIO, it is a macro.
+
+BIO_seek() is a macro that sets the position pointer to B<offset> bytes
+from the start of file.
+
+BIO_tell() returns the value of the position pointer.
+
+BIO_read_filename(), BIO_write_filename(), BIO_append_filename() and
+BIO_rw_filename() set the file BIO B<b> to use file B<name> for
+reading, writing, append or read write respectively.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+When wrapping stdout, stdin or stderr the underlying stream should not
+normally be closed so the BIO_NOCLOSE flag should be set.
+
+Because the file BIO calls the underlying stdio functions any quirks
+in stdio behaviour will be mirrored by the corresponding BIO.
+
+On Windows BIO_new_files reserves for the filename argument to be
+UTF-8 encoded. In other words if you have to make it work in multi-
+lingual environment, encode file names in UTF-8.
+
+=head1 EXAMPLES
+
+File BIO "hello world":
+
+ BIO *bio_out;
+ bio_out = BIO_new_fp(stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+ BIO_printf(bio_out, "Hello World\n");
+
+Alternative technique:
+
+ BIO *bio_out;
+ bio_out = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
+ if (bio_out == NULL) /* Error ... */
+ if (!BIO_set_fp(bio_out, stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE)) /* Error ... */
+ BIO_printf(bio_out, "Hello World\n");
+
+Write to a file:
+
+ BIO *out;
+ out = BIO_new_file("filename.txt", "w");
+ if (!out) /* Error occurred */
+ BIO_printf(out, "Hello World\n");
+ BIO_free(out);
+
+Alternative technique:
+
+ BIO *out;
+ out = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
+ if (out == NULL) /* Error ... */
+ if (!BIO_write_filename(out, "filename.txt")) /* Error ... */
+ BIO_printf(out, "Hello World\n");
+ BIO_free(out);
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+BIO_s_file() returns the file BIO method.
+
+BIO_new_file() and BIO_new_fp() return a file BIO or NULL if an error
+occurred.
+
+BIO_set_fp() and BIO_get_fp() return 1 for success or 0 for failure
+(although the current implementation never return 0).
+
+BIO_seek() returns the same value as the underlying fseek() function:
+0 for success or -1 for failure.
+
+BIO_tell() returns the current file position.
+
+BIO_read_filename(), BIO_write_filename(), BIO_append_filename() and
+BIO_rw_filename() return 1 for success or 0 for failure.
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+BIO_reset() and BIO_seek() are implemented using fseek() on the underlying
+stream. The return value for fseek() is 0 for success or -1 if an error
+occurred this differs from other types of BIO which will typically return
+1 for success and a non positive value if an error occurred.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<BIO_seek(3)>, L<BIO_tell(3)>,
+L<BIO_reset(3)>, L<BIO_flush(3)>,
+L<BIO_read(3)>,
+L<BIO_write(3)>, L<BIO_puts(3)>,
+L<BIO_gets(3)>, L<BIO_printf(3)>,
+L<BIO_set_close(3)>, L<BIO_get_close(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_s_mem.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_s_mem.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..eb67cbe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_s_mem.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+BIO_s_secmem,
+BIO_s_mem, BIO_set_mem_eof_return, BIO_get_mem_data, BIO_set_mem_buf,
+BIO_get_mem_ptr, BIO_new_mem_buf - memory BIO
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/bio.h>
+
+ const BIO_METHOD *     BIO_s_mem(void);
+ const BIO_METHOD *     BIO_s_secmem(void);
+
+ BIO_set_mem_eof_return(BIO *b, int v)
+ long BIO_get_mem_data(BIO *b, char **pp)
+ BIO_set_mem_buf(BIO *b, BUF_MEM *bm, int c)
+ BIO_get_mem_ptr(BIO *b, BUF_MEM **pp)
+
+ BIO *BIO_new_mem_buf(const void *buf, int len);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+BIO_s_mem() return the memory BIO method function.
+
+A memory BIO is a source/sink BIO which uses memory for its I/O. Data
+written to a memory BIO is stored in a BUF_MEM structure which is extended
+as appropriate to accommodate the stored data.
+
+BIO_s_secmem() is like BIO_s_mem() except that the secure heap is used
+for buffer storage.
+
+Any data written to a memory BIO can be recalled by reading from it.
+Unless the memory BIO is read only any data read from it is deleted from
+the BIO.
+
+Memory BIOs support BIO_gets() and BIO_puts().
+
+If the BIO_CLOSE flag is set when a memory BIO is freed then the underlying
+BUF_MEM structure is also freed.
+
+Calling BIO_reset() on a read write memory BIO clears any data in it if the
+flag BIO_FLAGS_NONCLEAR_RST is not set. On a read only BIO or if the flag
+BIO_FLAGS_NONCLEAR_RST is set it restores the BIO to its original state and
+the data can be read again.
+
+BIO_eof() is true if no data is in the BIO.
+
+BIO_ctrl_pending() returns the number of bytes currently stored.
+
+BIO_set_mem_eof_return() sets the behaviour of memory BIO B<b> when it is
+empty. If the B<v> is zero then an empty memory BIO will return EOF (that is
+it will return zero and BIO_should_retry(b) will be false. If B<v> is non
+zero then it will return B<v> when it is empty and it will set the read retry
+flag (that is BIO_read_retry(b) is true). To avoid ambiguity with a normal
+positive return value B<v> should be set to a negative value, typically -1.
+
+BIO_get_mem_data() sets *B<pp> to a pointer to the start of the memory BIOs data
+and returns the total amount of data available. It is implemented as a macro.
+
+BIO_set_mem_buf() sets the internal BUF_MEM structure to B<bm> and sets the
+close flag to B<c>, that is B<c> should be either BIO_CLOSE or BIO_NOCLOSE.
+It is a macro.
+
+BIO_get_mem_ptr() places the underlying BUF_MEM structure in *B<pp>. It is
+a macro.
+
+BIO_new_mem_buf() creates a memory BIO using B<len> bytes of data at B<buf>,
+if B<len> is -1 then the B<buf> is assumed to be nul terminated and its
+length is determined by B<strlen>. The BIO is set to a read only state and
+as a result cannot be written to. This is useful when some data needs to be
+made available from a static area of memory in the form of a BIO. The
+supplied data is read directly from the supplied buffer: it is B<not> copied
+first, so the supplied area of memory must be unchanged until the BIO is freed.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+Writes to memory BIOs will always succeed if memory is available: that is
+their size can grow indefinitely.
+
+Every read from a read write memory BIO will remove the data just read with
+an internal copy operation, if a BIO contains a lot of data and it is
+read in small chunks the operation can be very slow. The use of a read only
+memory BIO avoids this problem. If the BIO must be read write then adding
+a buffering BIO to the chain will speed up the process.
+
+Calling BIO_set_mem_buf() on a BIO created with BIO_new_secmem() will
+give undefined results, including perhaps a program crash.
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+There should be an option to set the maximum size of a memory BIO.
+
+=head1 EXAMPLE
+
+Create a memory BIO and write some data to it:
+
+ BIO *mem = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+ BIO_puts(mem, "Hello World\n");
+
+Create a read only memory BIO:
+
+ char data[] = "Hello World";
+ BIO *mem;
+ mem = BIO_new_mem_buf(data, -1);
+
+Extract the BUF_MEM structure from a memory BIO and then free up the BIO:
+
+ BUF_MEM *bptr;
+ BIO_get_mem_ptr(mem, &bptr);
+ BIO_set_close(mem, BIO_NOCLOSE); /* So BIO_free() leaves BUF_MEM alone */
+ BIO_free(mem);
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_s_null.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_s_null.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5a1d84d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_s_null.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+BIO_s_null - null data sink
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/bio.h>
+
+ const BIO_METHOD *     BIO_s_null(void);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+BIO_s_null() returns the null sink BIO method. Data written to
+the null sink is discarded, reads return EOF.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+A null sink BIO behaves in a similar manner to the Unix /dev/null
+device.
+
+A null bio can be placed on the end of a chain to discard any data
+passed through it.
+
+A null sink is useful if, for example, an application wishes to digest some
+data by writing through a digest bio but not send the digested data anywhere.
+Since a BIO chain must normally include a source/sink BIO this can be achieved
+by adding a null sink BIO to the end of the chain
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+BIO_s_null() returns the null sink BIO method.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_s_socket.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_s_socket.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ad0574a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_s_socket.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+BIO_s_socket, BIO_new_socket - socket BIO
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/bio.h>
+
+ const BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_socket(void);
+
+ BIO *BIO_new_socket(int sock, int close_flag);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+BIO_s_socket() returns the socket BIO method. This is a wrapper
+round the platform's socket routines.
+
+BIO_read() and BIO_write() read or write the underlying socket.
+BIO_puts() is supported but BIO_gets() is not.
+
+If the close flag is set then the socket is shut down and closed
+when the BIO is freed.
+
+BIO_new_socket() returns a socket BIO using B<sock> and B<close_flag>.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+Socket BIOs also support any relevant functionality of file descriptor
+BIOs.
+
+The reason for having separate file descriptor and socket BIOs is that on some
+platforms sockets are not file descriptors and use distinct I/O routines,
+Windows is one such platform. Any code mixing the two will not work on
+all platforms.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+BIO_s_socket() returns the socket BIO method.
+
+BIO_new_socket() returns the newly allocated BIO or NULL is an error
+occurred.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_set_callback.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_set_callback.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..27aa4f4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_set_callback.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,221 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+BIO_set_callback_ex, BIO_get_callback_ex, BIO_set_callback, BIO_get_callback,
+BIO_set_callback_arg, BIO_get_callback_arg, BIO_debug_callback,
+BIO_callback_fn_ex, BIO_callback_fn
+- BIO callback functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/bio.h>
+
+ typedef long (*BIO_callback_fn_ex)(BIO *b, int oper, const char *argp,
+                                    size_t len, int argi,
+                                    long argl, int ret, size_t *processed);
+ typedef long (*BIO_callback_fn)(BIO *b, int oper, const char *argp, int argi,
+                                 long argl, long ret);
+
+ void BIO_set_callback_ex(BIO *b, BIO_callback_fn_ex callback);
+ BIO_callback_fn_ex BIO_get_callback_ex(const BIO *b);
+
+ void BIO_set_callback(BIO *b, BIO_callback_fn cb);
+ BIO_callback_fn BIO_get_callback(BIO *b);
+ void BIO_set_callback_arg(BIO *b, char *arg);
+ char *BIO_get_callback_arg(const BIO *b);
+
+ long BIO_debug_callback(BIO *bio, int cmd, const char *argp, int argi,
+                         long argl, long ret);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+BIO_set_callback_ex() and BIO_get_callback_ex() set and retrieve the BIO
+callback. The callback is called during most high level BIO operations. It can
+be used for debugging purposes to trace operations on a BIO or to modify its
+operation.
+
+BIO_set_callback() and BIO_get_callback() set and retrieve the old format BIO
+callback. New code should not use these functions, but they are retained for
+backwards compatibility. Any callback set via BIO_set_callback_ex() will get
+called in preference to any set by BIO_set_callback().
+
+BIO_set_callback_arg() and BIO_get_callback_arg() are macros which can be
+used to set and retrieve an argument for use in the callback.
+
+BIO_debug_callback() is a standard debugging callback which prints
+out information relating to each BIO operation. If the callback
+argument is set it is interpreted as a BIO to send the information
+to, otherwise stderr is used.
+
+BIO_callback_fn_ex() is the type of the callback function and BIO_callback_fn()
+is the type of the old format callback function. The meaning of each argument
+is described below:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<b>
+
+The BIO the callback is attached to is passed in B<b>.
+
+=item B<oper>
+
+B<oper> is set to the operation being performed. For some operations
+the callback is called twice, once before and once after the actual
+operation, the latter case has B<oper> or'ed with BIO_CB_RETURN.
+
+=item B<len>
+
+The length of the data requested to be read or written. This is only useful if
+B<oper> is BIO_CB_READ, BIO_CB_WRITE or BIO_CB_GETS.
+
+=item B<argp> B<argi> B<argl>
+
+The meaning of the arguments B<argp>, B<argi> and B<argl> depends on
+the value of B<oper>, that is the operation being performed.
+
+=item B<processed>
+
+B<processed> is a pointer to a location which will be updated with the amount of
+data that was actually read or written. Only used for BIO_CB_READ, BIO_CB_WRITE,
+BIO_CB_GETS and BIO_CB_PUTS.
+
+=item B<ret>
+
+B<ret> is the return value that would be returned to the
+application if no callback were present. The actual value returned
+is the return value of the callback itself. In the case of callbacks
+called before the actual BIO operation 1 is placed in B<ret>, if
+the return value is not positive it will be immediately returned to
+the application and the BIO operation will not be performed.
+
+=back
+
+The callback should normally simply return B<ret> when it has
+finished processing, unless it specifically wishes to modify the
+value returned to the application.
+
+=head1 CALLBACK OPERATIONS
+
+In the notes below, B<callback> defers to the actual callback
+function that is called.
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<BIO_free(b)>
+
+ callback_ex(b, BIO_CB_FREE, NULL, 0, 0, 0L, 1L, NULL)
+
+or
+
+ callback(b, BIO_CB_FREE, NULL, 0L, 0L, 1L)
+
+is called before the free operation.
+
+=item B<BIO_read_ex(b, data, dlen, readbytes)>
+
+ callback_ex(b, BIO_CB_READ, data, dlen, 0, 0L, 1L, readbytes)
+
+or
+
+ callback(b, BIO_CB_READ, data, dlen, 0L, 1L)
+
+is called before the read and
+
+ callback_ex(b, BIO_CB_READ | BIO_CB_RETURN, data, dlen, 0, 0L, retvalue, readbytes)
+
+or
+
+ callback(b, BIO_CB_READ|BIO_CB_RETURN, data, dlen, 0L, retvalue)
+
+after.
+
+=item B<BIO_write(b, data, dlen, written)>
+
+ callback_ex(b, BIO_CB_WRITE, data, dlen, 0, 0L, 1L, written)
+
+or
+
+ callback(b, BIO_CB_WRITE, datat, dlen, 0L, 1L)
+
+is called before the write and
+
+ callback_ex(b, BIO_CB_WRITE | BIO_CB_RETURN, data, dlen, 0, 0L, retvalue, written)
+
+or
+
+ callback(b, BIO_CB_WRITE|BIO_CB_RETURN, data, dlen, 0L, retvalue)
+
+after.
+
+=item B<BIO_gets(b, buf, size)>
+
+ callback_ex(b, BIO_CB_GETS, buf, size, 0, 0L, 1, NULL, NULL)
+
+or
+
+ callback(b, BIO_CB_GETS, buf, size, 0L, 1L)
+
+is called before the operation and
+
+ callback_ex(b, BIO_CB_GETS | BIO_CB_RETURN, buf, size, 0, 0L, retvalue, readbytes)
+
+or
+
+ callback(b, BIO_CB_GETS|BIO_CB_RETURN, buf, size, 0L, retvalue)
+
+after.
+
+=item B<BIO_puts(b, buf)>
+
+ callback_ex(b, BIO_CB_PUTS, buf, 0, 0, 0L, 1L, NULL);
+
+or
+
+ callback(b, BIO_CB_PUTS, buf, 0, 0L, 1L)
+
+is called before the operation and
+
+ callback_ex(b, BIO_CB_PUTS | BIO_CB_RETURN, buf, 0, 0, 0L, retvalue, written)
+
+or
+
+ callback(b, BIO_CB_WRITE|BIO_CB_RETURN, buf, 0, 0L, retvalue)
+
+after.
+
+=item B<BIO_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)>
+
+ callback_ex(b, BIO_CB_CTRL, parg, 0, cmd, larg, 1L, NULL)
+
+or
+
+ callback(b, BIO_CB_CTRL, parg, cmd, larg, 1L)
+
+is called before the call and
+
+ callback_ex(b, BIO_CB_CTRL | BIO_CB_RETURN, parg, 0, cmd, larg, ret, NULL)
+
+or
+
+ callback(b, BIO_CB_CTRL|BIO_CB_RETURN, parg, cmd, larg, ret)
+
+after.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 EXAMPLE
+
+The BIO_debug_callback() function is a good example, its source is
+in crypto/bio/bio_cb.c
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_should_retry.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_should_retry.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d01d5bb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BIO_should_retry.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+BIO_should_read, BIO_should_write,
+BIO_should_io_special, BIO_retry_type, BIO_should_retry,
+BIO_get_retry_BIO, BIO_get_retry_reason, BIO_set_retry_reason - BIO retry
+functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/bio.h>
+
+ int BIO_should_read(BIO *b);
+ int BIO_should_write(BIO *b);
+ int BIO_should_io_special(iBIO *b);
+ int BIO_retry_type(BIO *b);
+ int BIO_should_retry(BIO *b);
+
+ BIO *BIO_get_retry_BIO(BIO *bio, int *reason);
+ int BIO_get_retry_reason(BIO *bio);
+ void BIO_set_retry_reason(BIO *bio, int reason);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+These functions determine why a BIO is not able to read or write data.
+They will typically be called after a failed BIO_read() or BIO_write()
+call.
+
+BIO_should_retry() is true if the call that produced this condition
+should then be retried at a later time.
+
+If BIO_should_retry() is false then the cause is an error condition.
+
+BIO_should_read() is true if the cause of the condition is that a BIO
+needs to read data.
+
+BIO_should_write() is true if the cause of the condition is that a BIO
+needs to read data.
+
+BIO_should_io_special() is true if some "special" condition, that is a
+reason other than reading or writing is the cause of the condition.
+
+BIO_retry_type() returns a mask of the cause of a retry condition
+consisting of the values B<BIO_FLAGS_READ>, B<BIO_FLAGS_WRITE>,
+B<BIO_FLAGS_IO_SPECIAL> though current BIO types will only set one of
+these.
+
+BIO_get_retry_BIO() determines the precise reason for the special
+condition, it returns the BIO that caused this condition and if
+B<reason> is not NULL it contains the reason code. The meaning of
+the reason code and the action that should be taken depends on
+the type of BIO that resulted in this condition.
+
+BIO_get_retry_reason() returns the reason for a special condition if
+passed the relevant BIO, for example as returned by BIO_get_retry_BIO().
+
+BIO_set_retry_reason() sets the retry reason for a special condition for a given
+BIO. This would usually only be called by BIO implementations.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+BIO_should_read(), BIO_should_write(), BIO_should_io_special(),
+BIO_retry_type(), and BIO_should_retry(), are implemented as macros.
+
+If BIO_should_retry() returns false then the precise "error condition"
+depends on the BIO type that caused it and the return code of the BIO
+operation. For example if a call to BIO_read() on a socket BIO returns
+0 and BIO_should_retry() is false then the cause will be that the
+connection closed. A similar condition on a file BIO will mean that it
+has reached EOF. Some BIO types may place additional information on
+the error queue. For more details see the individual BIO type manual
+pages.
+
+If the underlying I/O structure is in a blocking mode almost all current
+BIO types will not request a retry, because the underlying I/O
+calls will not. If the application knows that the BIO type will never
+signal a retry then it need not call BIO_should_retry() after a failed
+BIO I/O call. This is typically done with file BIOs.
+
+SSL BIOs are the only current exception to this rule: they can request a
+retry even if the underlying I/O structure is blocking, if a handshake
+occurs during a call to BIO_read(). An application can retry the failed
+call immediately or avoid this situation by setting SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY
+on the underlying SSL structure.
+
+While an application may retry a failed non blocking call immediately
+this is likely to be very inefficient because the call will fail
+repeatedly until data can be processed or is available. An application
+will normally wait until the necessary condition is satisfied. How
+this is done depends on the underlying I/O structure.
+
+For example if the cause is ultimately a socket and BIO_should_read()
+is true then a call to select() may be made to wait until data is
+available and then retry the BIO operation. By combining the retry
+conditions of several non blocking BIOs in a single select() call
+it is possible to service several BIOs in a single thread, though
+the performance may be poor if SSL BIOs are present because long delays
+can occur during the initial handshake process.
+
+It is possible for a BIO to block indefinitely if the underlying I/O
+structure cannot process or return any data. This depends on the behaviour of
+the platforms I/O functions. This is often not desirable: one solution
+is to use non blocking I/O and use a timeout on the select() (or
+equivalent) call.
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+The OpenSSL ASN1 functions cannot gracefully deal with non blocking I/O:
+that is they cannot retry after a partial read or write. This is usually
+worked around by only passing the relevant data to ASN1 functions when
+the entire structure can be read or written.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<bio>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+The BIO_get_retry_reason() and BIO_set_retry_reason() functions were added in
+OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BN_BLINDING_new.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BN_BLINDING_new.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4229e75
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BN_BLINDING_new.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+BN_BLINDING_new, BN_BLINDING_free, BN_BLINDING_update, BN_BLINDING_convert,
+BN_BLINDING_invert, BN_BLINDING_convert_ex, BN_BLINDING_invert_ex,
+BN_BLINDING_is_current_thread, BN_BLINDING_set_current_thread,
+BN_BLINDING_lock, BN_BLINDING_unlock, BN_BLINDING_get_flags,
+BN_BLINDING_set_flags, BN_BLINDING_create_param - blinding related BIGNUM functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+ BN_BLINDING *BN_BLINDING_new(const BIGNUM *A, const BIGNUM *Ai,
+        BIGNUM *mod);
+ void BN_BLINDING_free(BN_BLINDING *b);
+ int BN_BLINDING_update(BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *ctx);
+ int BN_BLINDING_convert(BIGNUM *n, BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *ctx);
+ int BN_BLINDING_invert(BIGNUM *n, BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *ctx);
+ int BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *r, BN_BLINDING *b,
+        BN_CTX *ctx);
+ int BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(BIGNUM *n, const BIGNUM *r, BN_BLINDING *b,
+        BN_CTX *ctx);
+ int BN_BLINDING_is_current_thread(BN_BLINDING *b);
+ void BN_BLINDING_set_current_thread(BN_BLINDING *b);
+ int BN_BLINDING_lock(BN_BLINDING *b);
+ int BN_BLINDING_unlock(BN_BLINDING *b);
+ unsigned long BN_BLINDING_get_flags(const BN_BLINDING *);
+ void BN_BLINDING_set_flags(BN_BLINDING *, unsigned long);
+ BN_BLINDING *BN_BLINDING_create_param(BN_BLINDING *b,
+        const BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx,
+        int (*bn_mod_exp)(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
+                          const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx),
+        BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+BN_BLINDING_new() allocates a new B<BN_BLINDING> structure and copies
+the B<A> and B<Ai> values into the newly created B<BN_BLINDING> object.
+
+BN_BLINDING_free() frees the B<BN_BLINDING> structure.
+If B<b> is NULL, nothing is done.
+
+BN_BLINDING_update() updates the B<BN_BLINDING> parameters by squaring
+the B<A> and B<Ai> or, after specific number of uses and if the
+necessary parameters are set, by re-creating the blinding parameters.
+
+BN_BLINDING_convert_ex() multiplies B<n> with the blinding factor B<A>.
+If B<r> is not NULL a copy the inverse blinding factor B<Ai> will be
+returned in B<r> (this is useful if a B<RSA> object is shared among
+several threads). BN_BLINDING_invert_ex() multiplies B<n> with the
+inverse blinding factor B<Ai>. If B<r> is not NULL it will be used as
+the inverse blinding.
+
+BN_BLINDING_convert() and BN_BLINDING_invert() are wrapper
+functions for BN_BLINDING_convert_ex() and BN_BLINDING_invert_ex()
+with B<r> set to NULL.
+
+BN_BLINDING_is_current_thread() returns whether the B<BN_BLINDING>
+structure is owned by the current thread. This is to help users
+provide proper locking if needed for multi-threaded use.
+
+BN_BLINDING_set_current_thread() sets the current thread as the
+owner of the B<BN_BLINDING> structure.
+
+BN_BLINDING_lock() locks the B<BN_BLINDING> structure.
+
+BN_BLINDING_unlock() unlocks the B<BN_BLINDING> structure.
+
+BN_BLINDING_get_flags() returns the BN_BLINDING flags. Currently
+there are two supported flags: B<BN_BLINDING_NO_UPDATE> and
+B<BN_BLINDING_NO_RECREATE>. B<BN_BLINDING_NO_UPDATE> inhibits the
+automatic update of the B<BN_BLINDING> parameters after each use
+and B<BN_BLINDING_NO_RECREATE> inhibits the automatic re-creation
+of the B<BN_BLINDING> parameters after a fixed number of uses (currently
+32). In newly allocated B<BN_BLINDING> objects no flags are set.
+BN_BLINDING_set_flags() sets the B<BN_BLINDING> parameters flags.
+
+BN_BLINDING_create_param() creates new B<BN_BLINDING> parameters
+using the exponent B<e> and the modulus B<m>. B<bn_mod_exp> and
+B<m_ctx> can be used to pass special functions for exponentiation
+(normally BN_mod_exp_mont() and B<BN_MONT_CTX>).
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+BN_BLINDING_new() returns the newly allocated B<BN_BLINDING> structure
+or NULL in case of an error.
+
+BN_BLINDING_update(), BN_BLINDING_convert(), BN_BLINDING_invert(),
+BN_BLINDING_convert_ex() and BN_BLINDING_invert_ex() return 1 on
+success and 0 if an error occurred.
+
+BN_BLINDING_is_current_thread() returns 1 if the current thread owns
+the B<BN_BLINDING> object, 0 otherwise.
+
+BN_BLINDING_set_current_thread() doesn't return anything.
+
+BN_BLINDING_lock(), BN_BLINDING_unlock() return 1 if the operation
+succeeded or 0 on error.
+
+BN_BLINDING_get_flags() returns the currently set B<BN_BLINDING> flags
+(a B<unsigned long> value).
+
+BN_BLINDING_create_param() returns the newly created B<BN_BLINDING>
+parameters or NULL on error.
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+BN_BLINDING_thread_id() was first introduced in OpenSSL 1.0.0, and it
+deprecates BN_BLINDING_set_thread_id() and BN_BLINDING_get_thread_id().
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2005-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BN_CTX_new.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BN_CTX_new.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..623fcd5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BN_CTX_new.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+BN_CTX_new, BN_CTX_secure_new, BN_CTX_free - allocate and free BN_CTX structures
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+ BN_CTX *BN_CTX_new(void);
+
+ BN_CTX *BN_CTX_secure_new(void);
+
+ void BN_CTX_free(BN_CTX *c);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+A B<BN_CTX> is a structure that holds B<BIGNUM> temporary variables used by
+library functions. Since dynamic memory allocation to create B<BIGNUM>s
+is rather expensive when used in conjunction with repeated subroutine
+calls, the B<BN_CTX> structure is used.
+
+BN_CTX_new() allocates and initializes a B<BN_CTX> structure.
+BN_CTX_secure_new() allocates and initializes a B<BN_CTX> structure
+but uses the secure heap (see L<CRYPTO_secure_malloc(3)>) to hold the
+B<BIGNUM>s.
+
+BN_CTX_free() frees the components of the B<BN_CTX>, and if it was
+created by BN_CTX_new(), also the structure itself.
+If L<BN_CTX_start(3)> has been used on the B<BN_CTX>,
+L<BN_CTX_end(3)> must be called before the B<BN_CTX>
+may be freed by BN_CTX_free().
+If B<c> is NULL, nothing is done.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+BN_CTX_new() and BN_CTX_secure_new() return a pointer to the B<BN_CTX>.
+If the allocation fails,
+they return B<NULL> and sets an error code that can be obtained by
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>.
+
+BN_CTX_free() has no return values.
+
+=head1 REMOVED FUNCTIONALITY
+
+ void BN_CTX_init(BN_CTX *c);
+
+BN_CTX_init() is no longer available as of OpenSSL 1.1.0. Applications should
+replace use of BN_CTX_init with BN_CTX_new instead:
+
+ BN_CTX *ctx;
+ ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+ if(!ctx) /* Handle error */
+ ...
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>, L<BN_add(3)>,
+L<BN_CTX_start(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+BN_CTX_init() was removed in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BN_CTX_start.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BN_CTX_start.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..372da50
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BN_CTX_start.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+BN_CTX_start, BN_CTX_get, BN_CTX_end - use temporary BIGNUM variables
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+ void BN_CTX_start(BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+ BIGNUM *BN_CTX_get(BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+ void BN_CTX_end(BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+These functions are used to obtain temporary B<BIGNUM> variables from
+a B<BN_CTX> (which can been created by using L<BN_CTX_new(3)>)
+in order to save the overhead of repeatedly creating and
+freeing B<BIGNUM>s in functions that are called from inside a loop.
+
+A function must call BN_CTX_start() first. Then, BN_CTX_get() may be
+called repeatedly to obtain temporary B<BIGNUM>s. All BN_CTX_get()
+calls must be made before calling any other functions that use the
+B<ctx> as an argument.
+
+Finally, BN_CTX_end() must be called before returning from the function.
+When BN_CTX_end() is called, the B<BIGNUM> pointers obtained from
+BN_CTX_get() become invalid.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+BN_CTX_start() and BN_CTX_end() return no values.
+
+BN_CTX_get() returns a pointer to the B<BIGNUM>, or B<NULL> on error.
+Once BN_CTX_get() has failed, the subsequent calls will return B<NULL>
+as well, so it is sufficient to check the return value of the last
+BN_CTX_get() call. In case of an error, an error code is set, which
+can be obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)>.
+
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<BN_CTX_new(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BN_add.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BN_add.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..db3b0d4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BN_add.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+BN_add, BN_sub, BN_mul, BN_sqr, BN_div, BN_mod, BN_nnmod, BN_mod_add,
+BN_mod_sub, BN_mod_mul, BN_mod_sqr, BN_exp, BN_mod_exp, BN_gcd -
+arithmetic operations on BIGNUMs
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+ int BN_add(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b);
+
+ int BN_sub(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b);
+
+ int BN_mul(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+ int BN_sqr(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+ int BN_div(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *d,
+         BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+ int BN_mod(BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+ int BN_nnmod(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+ int BN_mod_add(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *m,
+         BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+ int BN_mod_sub(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *m,
+         BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+ int BN_mod_mul(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *m,
+         BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+ int BN_mod_sqr(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+ int BN_exp(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+ int BN_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
+         const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+ int BN_gcd(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+BN_add() adds I<a> and I<b> and places the result in I<r> (C<r=a+b>).
+I<r> may be the same B<BIGNUM> as I<a> or I<b>.
+
+BN_sub() subtracts I<b> from I<a> and places the result in I<r> (C<r=a-b>).
+I<r> may be the same B<BIGNUM> as I<a> or I<b>.
+
+BN_mul() multiplies I<a> and I<b> and places the result in I<r> (C<r=a*b>).
+I<r> may be the same B<BIGNUM> as I<a> or I<b>.
+For multiplication by powers of 2, use L<BN_lshift(3)>.
+
+BN_sqr() takes the square of I<a> and places the result in I<r>
+(C<r=a^2>). I<r> and I<a> may be the same B<BIGNUM>.
+This function is faster than BN_mul(r,a,a).
+
+BN_div() divides I<a> by I<d> and places the result in I<dv> and the
+remainder in I<rem> (C<dv=a/d, rem=a%d>). Either of I<dv> and I<rem> may
+be B<NULL>, in which case the respective value is not returned.
+The result is rounded towards zero; thus if I<a> is negative, the
+remainder will be zero or negative.
+For division by powers of 2, use BN_rshift(3).
+
+BN_mod() corresponds to BN_div() with I<dv> set to B<NULL>.
+
+BN_nnmod() reduces I<a> modulo I<m> and places the non-negative
+remainder in I<r>.
+
+BN_mod_add() adds I<a> to I<b> modulo I<m> and places the non-negative
+result in I<r>.
+
+BN_mod_sub() subtracts I<b> from I<a> modulo I<m> and places the
+non-negative result in I<r>.
+
+BN_mod_mul() multiplies I<a> by I<b> and finds the non-negative
+remainder respective to modulus I<m> (C<r=(a*b) mod m>). I<r> may be
+the same B<BIGNUM> as I<a> or I<b>. For more efficient algorithms for
+repeated computations using the same modulus, see
+L<BN_mod_mul_montgomery(3)> and
+L<BN_mod_mul_reciprocal(3)>.
+
+BN_mod_sqr() takes the square of I<a> modulo B<m> and places the
+result in I<r>.
+
+BN_exp() raises I<a> to the I<p>-th power and places the result in I<r>
+(C<r=a^p>). This function is faster than repeated applications of
+BN_mul().
+
+BN_mod_exp() computes I<a> to the I<p>-th power modulo I<m> (C<r=a^p %
+m>). This function uses less time and space than BN_exp().
+
+BN_gcd() computes the greatest common divisor of I<a> and I<b> and
+places the result in I<r>. I<r> may be the same B<BIGNUM> as I<a> or
+I<b>.
+
+For all functions, I<ctx> is a previously allocated B<BN_CTX> used for
+temporary variables; see L<BN_CTX_new(3)>.
+
+Unless noted otherwise, the result B<BIGNUM> must be different from
+the arguments.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+For all functions, 1 is returned for success, 0 on error. The return
+value should always be checked (e.g., C<if (!BN_add(r,a,b)) goto err;>).
+The error codes can be obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)>.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>, L<BN_CTX_new(3)>,
+L<BN_add_word(3)>, L<BN_set_bit(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BN_add_word.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BN_add_word.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6c69bc4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BN_add_word.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+BN_add_word, BN_sub_word, BN_mul_word, BN_div_word, BN_mod_word - arithmetic
+functions on BIGNUMs with integers
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+ int BN_add_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w);
+
+ int BN_sub_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w);
+
+ int BN_mul_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w);
+
+ BN_ULONG BN_div_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w);
+
+ BN_ULONG BN_mod_word(const BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+These functions perform arithmetic operations on BIGNUMs with unsigned
+integers. They are much more efficient than the normal BIGNUM
+arithmetic operations.
+
+BN_add_word() adds B<w> to B<a> (C<a+=w>).
+
+BN_sub_word() subtracts B<w> from B<a> (C<a-=w>).
+
+BN_mul_word() multiplies B<a> and B<w> (C<a*=w>).
+
+BN_div_word() divides B<a> by B<w> (C<a/=w>) and returns the remainder.
+
+BN_mod_word() returns the remainder of B<a> divided by B<w> (C<a%w>).
+
+For BN_div_word() and BN_mod_word(), B<w> must not be 0.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+BN_add_word(), BN_sub_word() and BN_mul_word() return 1 for success, 0
+on error. The error codes can be obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)>.
+
+BN_mod_word() and BN_div_word() return B<a>%B<w> on success and
+B<(BN_ULONG)-1> if an error occurred.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>, L<BN_add(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BN_bn2bin.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BN_bn2bin.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ac46948
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BN_bn2bin.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+BN_bn2binpad,
+BN_bn2bin, BN_bin2bn, BN_bn2lebinpad, BN_lebin2bn, BN_bn2hex, BN_bn2dec,
+BN_hex2bn, BN_dec2bn, BN_print, BN_print_fp, BN_bn2mpi,
+BN_mpi2bn - format conversions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+ int BN_bn2bin(const BIGNUM *a, unsigned char *to);
+ int BN_bn2binpad(const BIGNUM *a, unsigned char *to, int tolen);
+ BIGNUM *BN_bin2bn(const unsigned char *s, int len, BIGNUM *ret);
+
+ int BN_bn2lebinpad(const BIGNUM *a, unsigned char *to, int tolen);
+ BIGNUM *BN_lebin2bn(const unsigned char *s, int len, BIGNUM *ret);
+
+ char *BN_bn2hex(const BIGNUM *a);
+ char *BN_bn2dec(const BIGNUM *a);
+ int BN_hex2bn(BIGNUM **a, const char *str);
+ int BN_dec2bn(BIGNUM **a, const char *str);
+
+ int BN_print(BIO *fp, const BIGNUM *a);
+ int BN_print_fp(FILE *fp, const BIGNUM *a);
+
+ int BN_bn2mpi(const BIGNUM *a, unsigned char *to);
+ BIGNUM *BN_mpi2bn(unsigned char *s, int len, BIGNUM *ret);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+BN_bn2bin() converts the absolute value of B<a> into big-endian form
+and stores it at B<to>. B<to> must point to BN_num_bytes(B<a>) bytes of
+memory.
+
+BN_bn2binpad() also converts the absolute value of B<a> into big-endian form
+and stores it at B<to>. B<tolen> indicates the length of the output buffer
+B<to>. The result is padded with zeroes if necessary. If B<tolen> is less than
+BN_num_bytes(B<a>) an error is returned.
+
+BN_bin2bn() converts the positive integer in big-endian form of length
+B<len> at B<s> into a B<BIGNUM> and places it in B<ret>. If B<ret> is
+NULL, a new B<BIGNUM> is created.
+
+BN_bn2lebinpad() and BN_bin2lbn() are identical to BN_bn2binpad() and
+BN_bin2bn() except the buffer is in little-endian format.
+
+BN_bn2hex() and BN_bn2dec() return printable strings containing the
+hexadecimal and decimal encoding of B<a> respectively. For negative
+numbers, the string is prefaced with a leading '-'. The string must be
+freed later using OPENSSL_free().
+
+BN_hex2bn() takes as many characters as possible from the string B<str>,
+including the leading character '-' which means negative, to form a valid
+hexadecimal number representation and converts them to a B<BIGNUM> and
+stores it in **B<bn>. If *B<bn> is NULL, a new B<BIGNUM> is created. If
+B<bn> is NULL, it only computes the length of valid representation.
+A "negative zero" is converted to zero.
+BN_dec2bn() is the same using the decimal system.
+
+BN_print() and BN_print_fp() write the hexadecimal encoding of B<a>,
+with a leading '-' for negative numbers, to the B<BIO> or B<FILE>
+B<fp>.
+
+BN_bn2mpi() and BN_mpi2bn() convert B<BIGNUM>s from and to a format
+that consists of the number's length in bytes represented as a 4-byte
+big-endian number, and the number itself in big-endian format, where
+the most significant bit signals a negative number (the representation
+of numbers with the MSB set is prefixed with null byte).
+
+BN_bn2mpi() stores the representation of B<a> at B<to>, where B<to>
+must be large enough to hold the result. The size can be determined by
+calling BN_bn2mpi(B<a>, NULL).
+
+BN_mpi2bn() converts the B<len> bytes long representation at B<s> to
+a B<BIGNUM> and stores it at B<ret>, or in a newly allocated B<BIGNUM>
+if B<ret> is NULL.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+BN_bn2bin() returns the length of the big-endian number placed at B<to>.
+BN_bin2bn() returns the B<BIGNUM>, NULL on error.
+
+BN_bn2binpad() returns the number of bytes written or -1 if the supplied
+buffer is too small.
+
+BN_bn2hex() and BN_bn2dec() return a null-terminated string, or NULL
+on error. BN_hex2bn() and BN_dec2bn() return the number of characters
+used in parsing, or 0 on error, in which
+case no new B<BIGNUM> will be created.
+
+BN_print_fp() and BN_print() return 1 on success, 0 on write errors.
+
+BN_bn2mpi() returns the length of the representation. BN_mpi2bn()
+returns the B<BIGNUM>, and NULL on error.
+
+The error codes can be obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)>.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>, L<BN_zero(3)>,
+L<ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(3)>,
+L<BN_num_bytes(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BN_cmp.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BN_cmp.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..95d162f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BN_cmp.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+BN_cmp, BN_ucmp, BN_is_zero, BN_is_one, BN_is_word, BN_is_odd - BIGNUM comparison and test functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+ int BN_cmp(BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b);
+ int BN_ucmp(BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b);
+
+ int BN_is_zero(BIGNUM *a);
+ int BN_is_one(BIGNUM *a);
+ int BN_is_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w);
+ int BN_is_odd(BIGNUM *a);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+BN_cmp() compares the numbers B<a> and B<b>. BN_ucmp() compares their
+absolute values.
+
+BN_is_zero(), BN_is_one() and BN_is_word() test if B<a> equals 0, 1,
+or B<w> respectively. BN_is_odd() tests if a is odd.
+
+BN_is_zero(), BN_is_one(), BN_is_word() and BN_is_odd() are macros.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+BN_cmp() returns -1 if B<a> E<lt> B<b>, 0 if B<a> == B<b> and 1 if
+B<a> E<gt> B<b>. BN_ucmp() is the same using the absolute values
+of B<a> and B<b>.
+
+BN_is_zero(), BN_is_one() BN_is_word() and BN_is_odd() return 1 if
+the condition is true, 0 otherwise.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BN_copy.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BN_copy.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..46de544
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BN_copy.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+BN_copy, BN_dup, BN_with_flags - copy BIGNUMs
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+ BIGNUM *BN_copy(BIGNUM *to, const BIGNUM *from);
+
+ BIGNUM *BN_dup(const BIGNUM *from);
+
+ void BN_with_flags(BIGNUM *dest, const BIGNUM *b, int flags);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+BN_copy() copies B<from> to B<to>. BN_dup() creates a new B<BIGNUM>
+containing the value B<from>.
+
+BN_with_flags creates a B<temporary> shallow copy of B<b> in B<dest>. It places
+significant restrictions on the copied data. Applications that do no adhere to
+these restrictions may encounter unexpected side effects or crashes. For that
+reason use of this function is discouraged. Any flags provided in B<flags> will
+be set in B<dest> in addition to any flags already set in B<b>. For example this
+might commonly be used to create a temporary copy of a BIGNUM with the
+B<BN_FLG_CONSTTIME> flag set for constant time operations. The temporary copy in
+B<dest> will share some internal state with B<b>. For this reason the following
+restrictions apply to the use of B<dest>:
+
+=over 2
+
+=item *
+
+B<dest> should be a newly allocated BIGNUM obtained via a call to BN_new(). It
+should not have been used for other purposes or initialised in any way.
+
+=item *
+
+B<dest> must only be used in "read-only" operations, i.e. typically those
+functions where the relevant parameter is declared "const".
+
+=item *
+
+B<dest> must be used and freed before any further subsequent use of B<b>
+
+=back
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+BN_copy() returns B<to> on success, NULL on error. BN_dup() returns
+the new B<BIGNUM>, and NULL on error. The error codes can be obtained
+by L<ERR_get_error(3)>.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BN_generate_prime.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BN_generate_prime.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c97536b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BN_generate_prime.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+BN_generate_prime_ex, BN_is_prime_ex, BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex, BN_GENCB_call,
+BN_GENCB_new, BN_GENCB_free, BN_GENCB_set_old, BN_GENCB_set, BN_GENCB_get_arg,
+BN_generate_prime, BN_is_prime, BN_is_prime_fasttest - generate primes and test
+for primality
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+ int BN_generate_prime_ex(BIGNUM *ret, int bits, int safe, const BIGNUM *add,
+     const BIGNUM *rem, BN_GENCB *cb);
+
+ int BN_is_prime_ex(const BIGNUM *p, int nchecks, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_GENCB *cb);
+
+ int BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(const BIGNUM *p, int nchecks, BN_CTX *ctx,
+     int do_trial_division, BN_GENCB *cb);
+
+ int BN_GENCB_call(BN_GENCB *cb, int a, int b);
+
+ BN_GENCB *BN_GENCB_new(void);
+
+ void BN_GENCB_free(BN_GENCB *cb);
+
+ void BN_GENCB_set_old(BN_GENCB *gencb,
+     void (*callback)(int, int, void *), void *cb_arg);
+
+ void BN_GENCB_set(BN_GENCB *gencb,
+     int (*callback)(int, int, BN_GENCB *), void *cb_arg);
+
+ void *BN_GENCB_get_arg(BN_GENCB *cb);
+
+Deprecated:
+
+ #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x00908000L
+ BIGNUM *BN_generate_prime(BIGNUM *ret, int num, int safe, BIGNUM *add,
+     BIGNUM *rem, void (*callback)(int, int, void *), void *cb_arg);
+
+ int BN_is_prime(const BIGNUM *a, int checks, void (*callback)(int, int,
+     void *), BN_CTX *ctx, void *cb_arg);
+
+ int BN_is_prime_fasttest(const BIGNUM *a, int checks,
+     void (*callback)(int, int, void *), BN_CTX *ctx, void *cb_arg,
+     int do_trial_division);
+ #endif
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+BN_generate_prime_ex() generates a pseudo-random prime number of
+at least bit length B<bits>.
+If B<ret> is not B<NULL>, it will be used to store the number.
+
+If B<cb> is not B<NULL>, it is used as follows:
+
+=over 2
+
+=item *
+
+B<BN_GENCB_call(cb, 0, i)> is called after generating the i-th
+potential prime number.
+
+=item *
+
+While the number is being tested for primality,
+B<BN_GENCB_call(cb, 1, j)> is called as described below.
+
+=item *
+
+When a prime has been found, B<BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, i)> is called.
+
+=back
+
+The prime may have to fulfill additional requirements for use in
+Diffie-Hellman key exchange:
+
+If B<add> is not B<NULL>, the prime will fulfill the condition p % B<add>
+== B<rem> (p % B<add> == 1 if B<rem> == B<NULL>) in order to suit a given
+generator.
+
+If B<safe> is true, it will be a safe prime (i.e. a prime p so
+that (p-1)/2 is also prime).
+
+The PRNG must be seeded prior to calling BN_generate_prime_ex().
+The prime number generation has a negligible error probability.
+
+BN_is_prime_ex() and BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex() test if the number B<p> is
+prime.  The following tests are performed until one of them shows that
+B<p> is composite; if B<p> passes all these tests, it is considered
+prime.
+
+BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(), when called with B<do_trial_division == 1>,
+first attempts trial division by a number of small primes;
+if no divisors are found by this test and B<cb> is not B<NULL>,
+B<BN_GENCB_call(cb, 1, -1)> is called.
+If B<do_trial_division == 0>, this test is skipped.
+
+Both BN_is_prime_ex() and BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex() perform a Miller-Rabin
+probabilistic primality test with B<nchecks> iterations. If
+B<nchecks == BN_prime_checks>, a number of iterations is used that
+yields a false positive rate of at most 2^-80 for random input.
+
+If B<cb> is not B<NULL>, B<BN_GENCB_call(cb, 1, j)> is called
+after the j-th iteration (j = 0, 1, ...). B<ctx> is a
+pre-allocated B<BN_CTX> (to save the overhead of allocating and
+freeing the structure in a loop), or B<NULL>.
+
+BN_GENCB_call calls the callback function held in the B<BN_GENCB> structure
+and passes the ints B<a> and B<b> as arguments. There are two types of
+B<BN_GENCB> structure that are supported: "new" style and "old" style. New
+programs should prefer the "new" style, whilst the "old" style is provided
+for backwards compatibility purposes.
+
+A BN_GENCB structure should be created through a call to BN_GENCB_new(),
+and freed through a call to BN_GENCB_free().
+
+For "new" style callbacks a BN_GENCB structure should be initialised with a
+call to BN_GENCB_set(), where B<gencb> is a B<BN_GENCB *>, B<callback> is of
+type B<int (*callback)(int, int, BN_GENCB *)> and B<cb_arg> is a B<void *>.
+"Old" style callbacks are the same except they are initialised with a call
+to BN_GENCB_set_old() and B<callback> is of type
+B<void (*callback)(int, int, void *)>.
+
+A callback is invoked through a call to B<BN_GENCB_call>. This will check
+the type of the callback and will invoke B<callback(a, b, gencb)> for new
+style callbacks or B<callback(a, b, cb_arg)> for old style.
+
+It is possible to obtained the argument associated with a BN_GENCB structure
+(set via a call to BN_GENCB_set or BN_GENCB_set_old) using BN_GENCB_get_arg.
+
+BN_generate_prime (deprecated) works in the same way as
+BN_generate_prime_ex but expects an old style callback function
+directly in the B<callback> parameter, and an argument to pass to it in
+the B<cb_arg>. Similarly BN_is_prime and BN_is_prime_fasttest are
+deprecated and can be compared to BN_is_prime_ex and
+BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex respectively.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+BN_generate_prime_ex() return 1 on success or 0 on error.
+
+BN_is_prime_ex(), BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(), BN_is_prime() and
+BN_is_prime_fasttest() return 0 if the number is composite, 1 if it is
+prime with an error probability of less than 0.25^B<nchecks>, and
+-1 on error.
+
+BN_generate_prime() returns the prime number on success, B<NULL> otherwise.
+
+BN_GENCB_new returns a pointer to a BN_GENCB structure on success, or B<NULL>
+otherwise.
+
+BN_GENCB_get_arg returns the argument previously associated with a BN_GENCB
+structure.
+
+Callback functions should return 1 on success or 0 on error.
+
+The error codes can be obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)>.
+
+=head1 REMOVED FUNCTIONALITY
+
+As of OpenSSL 1.1.0 it is no longer possible to create a BN_GENCB structure
+directly, as in:
+
+ BN_GENCB callback;
+
+Instead applications should create a BN_GENCB structure using BN_GENCB_new:
+
+ BN_GENCB *callback;
+ callback = BN_GENCB_new();
+ if(!callback) /* handle error */
+ ...
+ BN_GENCB_free(callback);
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>, L<RAND_bytes(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+BN_GENCB_new(), BN_GENCB_free(),
+and BN_GENCB_get_arg() were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BN_mod_inverse.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BN_mod_inverse.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cb84a14
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BN_mod_inverse.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+BN_mod_inverse - compute inverse modulo n
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+ BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n,
+           BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+BN_mod_inverse() computes the inverse of B<a> modulo B<n>
+places the result in B<r> (C<(a*r)%n==1>). If B<r> is NULL,
+a new B<BIGNUM> is created.
+
+B<ctx> is a previously allocated B<BN_CTX> used for temporary
+variables. B<r> may be the same B<BIGNUM> as B<a> or B<n>.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+BN_mod_inverse() returns the B<BIGNUM> containing the inverse, and
+NULL on error. The error codes can be obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)>.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>, L<BN_add(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BN_mod_mul_montgomery.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BN_mod_mul_montgomery.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..81056c7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BN_mod_mul_montgomery.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+BN_mod_mul_montgomery, BN_MONT_CTX_new,
+BN_MONT_CTX_free, BN_MONT_CTX_set, BN_MONT_CTX_copy,
+BN_from_montgomery, BN_to_montgomery - Montgomery multiplication
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+ BN_MONT_CTX *BN_MONT_CTX_new(void);
+ void BN_MONT_CTX_free(BN_MONT_CTX *mont);
+
+ int BN_MONT_CTX_set(BN_MONT_CTX *mont, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx);
+ BN_MONT_CTX *BN_MONT_CTX_copy(BN_MONT_CTX *to, BN_MONT_CTX *from);
+
+ int BN_mod_mul_montgomery(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b,
+         BN_MONT_CTX *mont, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+ int BN_from_montgomery(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BN_MONT_CTX *mont,
+         BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+ int BN_to_montgomery(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BN_MONT_CTX *mont,
+         BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+These functions implement Montgomery multiplication. They are used
+automatically when L<BN_mod_exp(3)> is called with suitable input,
+but they may be useful when several operations are to be performed
+using the same modulus.
+
+BN_MONT_CTX_new() allocates and initializes a B<BN_MONT_CTX> structure.
+
+BN_MONT_CTX_set() sets up the I<mont> structure from the modulus I<m>
+by precomputing its inverse and a value R.
+
+BN_MONT_CTX_copy() copies the B<BN_MONT_CTX> I<from> to I<to>.
+
+BN_MONT_CTX_free() frees the components of the B<BN_MONT_CTX>, and, if
+it was created by BN_MONT_CTX_new(), also the structure itself.
+If B<mont> is NULL, nothing is done.
+
+BN_mod_mul_montgomery() computes Mont(I<a>,I<b>):=I<a>*I<b>*R^-1 and places
+the result in I<r>.
+
+BN_from_montgomery() performs the Montgomery reduction I<r> = I<a>*R^-1.
+
+BN_to_montgomery() computes Mont(I<a>,R^2), i.e. I<a>*R.
+Note that I<a> must be non-negative and smaller than the modulus.
+
+For all functions, I<ctx> is a previously allocated B<BN_CTX> used for
+temporary variables.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+BN_MONT_CTX_new() returns the newly allocated B<BN_MONT_CTX>, and NULL
+on error.
+
+BN_MONT_CTX_free() has no return value.
+
+For the other functions, 1 is returned for success, 0 on error.
+The error codes can be obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)>.
+
+=head1 WARNING
+
+The inputs must be reduced modulo B<m>, otherwise the result will be
+outside the expected range.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>, L<BN_add(3)>,
+L<BN_CTX_new(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+BN_MONT_CTX_init() was removed in OpenSSL 1.1.0
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BN_mod_mul_reciprocal.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BN_mod_mul_reciprocal.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d480fed
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BN_mod_mul_reciprocal.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+BN_mod_mul_reciprocal, BN_div_recp, BN_RECP_CTX_new,
+BN_RECP_CTX_free, BN_RECP_CTX_set - modular multiplication using
+reciprocal
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+ BN_RECP_CTX *BN_RECP_CTX_new(void);
+ void BN_RECP_CTX_free(BN_RECP_CTX *recp);
+
+ int BN_RECP_CTX_set(BN_RECP_CTX *recp, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+ int BN_div_recp(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rem, BIGNUM *a, BN_RECP_CTX *recp,
+        BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+ int BN_mod_mul_reciprocal(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b,
+        BN_RECP_CTX *recp, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+BN_mod_mul_reciprocal() can be used to perform an efficient
+L<BN_mod_mul(3)> operation when the operation will be performed
+repeatedly with the same modulus. It computes B<r>=(B<a>*B<b>)%B<m>
+using B<recp>=1/B<m>, which is set as described below.  B<ctx> is a
+previously allocated B<BN_CTX> used for temporary variables.
+
+BN_RECP_CTX_new() allocates and initializes a B<BN_RECP> structure.
+
+BN_RECP_CTX_free() frees the components of the B<BN_RECP>, and, if it
+was created by BN_RECP_CTX_new(), also the structure itself.
+If B<recp> is NULL, nothing is done.
+
+BN_RECP_CTX_set() stores B<m> in B<recp> and sets it up for computing
+1/B<m> and shifting it left by BN_num_bits(B<m>)+1 to make it an
+integer. The result and the number of bits it was shifted left will
+later be stored in B<recp>.
+
+BN_div_recp() divides B<a> by B<m> using B<recp>. It places the quotient
+in B<dv> and the remainder in B<rem>.
+
+The B<BN_RECP_CTX> structure cannot be shared between threads.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+BN_RECP_CTX_new() returns the newly allocated B<BN_RECP_CTX>, and NULL
+on error.
+
+BN_RECP_CTX_free() has no return value.
+
+For the other functions, 1 is returned for success, 0 on error.
+The error codes can be obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)>.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>, L<BN_add(3)>,
+L<BN_CTX_new(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+BN_RECP_CTX_init() was removed in OpenSSL 1.1.0
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BN_new.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BN_new.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..08aae5e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BN_new.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+BN_new, BN_secure_new, BN_clear, BN_free, BN_clear_free - allocate and free BIGNUMs
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+ BIGNUM *BN_new(void);
+
+ BIGNUM *BN_secure_new(void);
+
+ void BN_clear(BIGNUM *a);
+
+ void BN_free(BIGNUM *a);
+
+ void BN_clear_free(BIGNUM *a);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+BN_new() allocates and initializes a B<BIGNUM> structure.
+BN_secure_new() does the same except that the secure heap
+OPENSSL_secure_malloc(3) is used to store the value.
+
+BN_clear() is used to destroy sensitive data such as keys when they
+are no longer needed. It erases the memory used by B<a> and sets it
+to the value 0.
+
+BN_free() frees the components of the B<BIGNUM>, and if it was created
+by BN_new(), also the structure itself. BN_clear_free() additionally
+overwrites the data before the memory is returned to the system.
+If B<a> is NULL, nothing is done.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+BN_new() and BN_secure_new()
+return a pointer to the B<BIGNUM> initialised to the value 0.
+If the allocation fails,
+they return B<NULL> and set an error code that can be obtained
+by L<ERR_get_error(3)>.
+
+BN_clear(), BN_free() and BN_clear_free() have no return values.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+BN_init() was removed in OpenSSL 1.1.0; use BN_new() instead.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BN_num_bytes.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BN_num_bytes.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9e0465d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BN_num_bytes.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+BN_num_bits, BN_num_bytes, BN_num_bits_word - get BIGNUM size
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+ int BN_num_bytes(const BIGNUM *a);
+
+ int BN_num_bits(const BIGNUM *a);
+
+ int BN_num_bits_word(BN_ULONG w);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+BN_num_bytes() returns the size of a B<BIGNUM> in bytes.
+
+BN_num_bits_word() returns the number of significant bits in a word.
+If we take 0x00000432 as an example, it returns 11, not 16, not 32.
+Basically, except for a zero, it returns I<floor(log2(w))+1>.
+
+BN_num_bits() returns the number of significant bits in a B<BIGNUM>,
+following the same principle as BN_num_bits_word().
+
+BN_num_bytes() is a macro.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+The size.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+Some have tried using BN_num_bits() on individual numbers in RSA keys,
+DH keys and DSA keys, and found that they don't always come up with
+the number of bits they expected (something like 512, 1024, 2048,
+...).  This is because generating a number with some specific number
+of bits doesn't always set the highest bits, thereby making the number
+of I<significant> bits a little lower.  If you want to know the "key
+size" of such a key, either use functions like RSA_size(), DH_size()
+and DSA_size(), or use BN_num_bytes() and multiply with 8 (although
+there's no real guarantee that will match the "key size", just a lot
+more probability).
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<DH_size(3)>, L<DSA_size(3)>,
+L<RSA_size(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BN_rand.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BN_rand.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..08d14de
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BN_rand.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+BN_rand, BN_pseudo_rand, BN_rand_range, BN_pseudo_rand_range - generate pseudo-random number
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+ int BN_rand(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom);
+
+ int BN_pseudo_rand(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom);
+
+ int BN_rand_range(BIGNUM *rnd, BIGNUM *range);
+
+ int BN_pseudo_rand_range(BIGNUM *rnd, BIGNUM *range);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+BN_rand() generates a cryptographically strong pseudo-random number of
+B<bits> in length and stores it in B<rnd>.
+If B<bits> is less than zero, or too small to
+accommodate the requirements specified by the B<top> and B<bottom>
+parameters, an error is returned.
+The B<top> parameters specifies
+requirements on the most significant bit of the generated number.
+If it is B<BN_RAND_TOP_ANY>, there is no constraint.
+If it is B<BN_RAND_TOP_ONE>, the top bit must be one.
+If it is B<BN_RAND_TOP_TWO>, the two most significant bits of
+the number will be set to 1, so that the product of two such random
+numbers will always have 2*B<bits> length.
+If B<bottom> is B<BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ODD>, the number will be odd; if it
+is B<BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ANY> it can be odd or even.
+If B<bits> is 1 then B<top> cannot also be B<BN_RAND_FLG_TOPTWO>.
+
+BN_pseudo_rand() does the same, but pseudo-random numbers generated by
+this function are not necessarily unpredictable. They can be used for
+non-cryptographic purposes and for certain purposes in cryptographic
+protocols, but usually not for key generation etc.
+
+BN_rand_range() generates a cryptographically strong pseudo-random
+number B<rnd> in the range 0 E<lt>= B<rnd> E<lt> B<range>.
+BN_pseudo_rand_range() does the same, but is based on BN_pseudo_rand(),
+and hence numbers generated by it are not necessarily unpredictable.
+
+The PRNG must be seeded prior to calling BN_rand() or BN_rand_range().
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+The functions return 1 on success, 0 on error.
+The error codes can be obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)>.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>, L<RAND_add(3)>, L<RAND_bytes(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BN_set_bit.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BN_set_bit.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..af02983
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BN_set_bit.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+BN_set_bit, BN_clear_bit, BN_is_bit_set, BN_mask_bits, BN_lshift,
+BN_lshift1, BN_rshift, BN_rshift1 - bit operations on BIGNUMs
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+ int BN_set_bit(BIGNUM *a, int n);
+ int BN_clear_bit(BIGNUM *a, int n);
+
+ int BN_is_bit_set(const BIGNUM *a, int n);
+
+ int BN_mask_bits(BIGNUM *a, int n);
+
+ int BN_lshift(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, int n);
+ int BN_lshift1(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a);
+
+ int BN_rshift(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, int n);
+ int BN_rshift1(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+BN_set_bit() sets bit B<n> in B<a> to 1 (C<a|=(1E<lt>E<lt>n)>). The
+number is expanded if necessary.
+
+BN_clear_bit() sets bit B<n> in B<a> to 0 (C<a&=~(1E<lt>E<lt>n)>). An
+error occurs if B<a> is shorter than B<n> bits.
+
+BN_is_bit_set() tests if bit B<n> in B<a> is set.
+
+BN_mask_bits() truncates B<a> to an B<n> bit number
+(C<a&=~((~0)E<gt>E<gt>n)>).  An error occurs if B<a> already is
+shorter than B<n> bits.
+
+BN_lshift() shifts B<a> left by B<n> bits and places the result in
+B<r> (C<r=a*2^n>). Note that B<n> must be non-negative. BN_lshift1() shifts
+B<a> left by one and places the result in B<r> (C<r=2*a>).
+
+BN_rshift() shifts B<a> right by B<n> bits and places the result in
+B<r> (C<r=a/2^n>). Note that B<n> must be non-negative. BN_rshift1() shifts
+B<a> right by one and places the result in B<r> (C<r=a/2>).
+
+For the shift functions, B<r> and B<a> may be the same variable.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+BN_is_bit_set() returns 1 if the bit is set, 0 otherwise.
+
+All other functions return 1 for success, 0 on error. The error codes
+can be obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)>.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<BN_num_bytes(3)>, L<BN_add(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BN_swap.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BN_swap.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9f77f22
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BN_swap.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+BN_swap - exchange BIGNUMs
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+ void BN_swap(BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+BN_swap() exchanges the values of I<a> and I<b>.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BN_zero.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BN_zero.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2ca8850
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BN_zero.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+BN_zero, BN_one, BN_value_one, BN_set_word, BN_get_word - BIGNUM assignment
+operations
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+ void BN_zero(BIGNUM *a);
+ int BN_one(BIGNUM *a);
+
+ const BIGNUM *BN_value_one(void);
+
+ int BN_set_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w);
+ BN_ULONG BN_get_word(BIGNUM *a);
+
+Deprecated:
+
+ #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x00908000L
+ int BN_zero(BIGNUM *a);
+ #endif
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+B<BN_ULONG> is a macro that will be an unsigned integral type optimied
+for the most efficient implementation on the local platform.
+
+BN_zero(), BN_one() and BN_set_word() set B<a> to the values 0, 1 and
+B<w> respectively.  BN_zero() and BN_one() are macros.
+
+BN_value_one() returns a B<BIGNUM> constant of value 1. This constant
+is useful for use in comparisons and assignment.
+
+BN_get_word() returns B<a>, if it can be represented as a B<BN_ULONG>.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+BN_get_word() returns the value B<a>, or all-bits-set if B<a> cannot
+be represented as a B<BN_ULONG>.
+
+BN_one(), BN_set_word() and the deprecated version of BN_zero()
+return 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
+BN_value_one() returns the constant.
+The preferred version of BN_zero() never fails and returns no value.
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+If a B<BIGNUM> is equal to the value of all-bits-set, it will collide
+with the error condition returned by BN_get_word() which uses that
+as an error value.
+
+B<BN_ULONG> should probably be a typedef.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<BN_bn2bin(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BUF_MEM_new.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BUF_MEM_new.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1d89159
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/BUF_MEM_new.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+BUF_MEM_new, BUF_MEM_new_ex, BUF_MEM_free, BUF_MEM_grow,
+BUF_MEM_grow_clean, BUF_reverse
+- simple character array structure
+
+standard C library equivalents
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/buffer.h>
+
+ BUF_MEM *BUF_MEM_new(void);
+
+ BUF_MEM *BUF_MEM_new_ex(unsigned long flags);
+
+ void BUF_MEM_free(BUF_MEM *a);
+
+ int BUF_MEM_grow(BUF_MEM *str, int len);
+ size_t BUF_MEM_grow_clean(BUF_MEM *str, size_t len);
+
+ void BUF_reverse(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t size);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The buffer library handles simple character arrays. Buffers are used for
+various purposes in the library, most notably memory BIOs.
+
+BUF_MEM_new() allocates a new buffer of zero size.
+
+BUF_MEM_new_ex() allocates a buffer with the specified flags.
+The flag B<BUF_MEM_FLAG_SECURE> specifies that the B<data> pointer
+should be allocated on the secure heap; see L<CRYPTO_secure_malloc(3)>.
+
+BUF_MEM_free() frees up an already existing buffer. The data is zeroed
+before freeing up in case the buffer contains sensitive data.
+
+BUF_MEM_grow() changes the size of an already existing buffer to
+B<len>. Any data already in the buffer is preserved if it increases in
+size.
+
+BUF_MEM_grow_clean() is similar to BUF_MEM_grow() but it sets any free'd
+or additionally-allocated memory to zero.
+
+BUF_reverse() reverses B<size> bytes at B<in> into B<out>.  If B<in>
+is NULL, the array is reversed in-place.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+BUF_MEM_new() returns the buffer or NULL on error.
+
+BUF_MEM_free() has no return value.
+
+BUF_MEM_grow() and BUF_MEM_grow_clean() return
+zero on error or the new size (i.e., B<len>).
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<bio(7)>,
+L<CRYPTO_secure_malloc(3)>.
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+BUF_MEM_new_ex() was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/CMS_add0_cert.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/CMS_add0_cert.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a5be002
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/CMS_add0_cert.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+CMS_add0_cert, CMS_add1_cert, CMS_get1_certs, CMS_add0_crl, CMS_add1_crl, CMS_get1_crls
+- CMS certificate and CRL utility functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/cms.h>
+
+ int CMS_add0_cert(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, X509 *cert);
+ int CMS_add1_cert(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, X509 *cert);
+ STACK_OF(X509) *CMS_get1_certs(CMS_ContentInfo *cms);
+
+ int CMS_add0_crl(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, X509_CRL *crl);
+ int CMS_add1_crl(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, X509_CRL *crl);
+ STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *CMS_get1_crls(CMS_ContentInfo *cms);
+
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+CMS_add0_cert() and CMS_add1_cert() add certificate B<cert> to B<cms>.
+must be of type signed data or enveloped data.
+
+CMS_get1_certs() returns all certificates in B<cms>.
+
+CMS_add0_crl() and CMS_add1_crl() add CRL B<crl> to B<cms>. CMS_get1_crls()
+returns any CRLs in B<cms>.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The CMS_ContentInfo structure B<cms> must be of type signed data or enveloped
+data or an error will be returned.
+
+For signed data certificates and CRLs are added to the B<certificates> and
+B<crls> fields of SignedData structure. For enveloped data they are added to
+B<OriginatorInfo>.
+
+As the B<0> implies CMS_add0_cert() adds B<cert> internally to B<cms> and it
+must not be freed up after the call as opposed to CMS_add1_cert() where B<cert>
+must be freed up.
+
+The same certificate or CRL must not be added to the same cms structure more
+than once.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+CMS_add0_cert(), CMS_add1_cert() and CMS_add0_crl() and CMS_add1_crl() return
+1 for success and 0 for failure.
+
+CMS_get1_certs() and CMS_get1_crls() return the STACK of certificates or CRLs
+or NULL if there are none or an error occurs. The only error which will occur
+in practice is if the B<cms> type is invalid.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>,
+L<CMS_sign(3)>,
+L<CMS_encrypt(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/CMS_add1_recipient_cert.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/CMS_add1_recipient_cert.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0dae5cf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/CMS_add1_recipient_cert.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+CMS_add1_recipient_cert, CMS_add0_recipient_key - add recipients to a CMS enveloped data structure
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/cms.h>
+
+ CMS_RecipientInfo *CMS_add1_recipient_cert(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, X509 *recip, unsigned int flags);
+
+ CMS_RecipientInfo *CMS_add0_recipient_key(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, int nid, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, unsigned char *id, size_t idlen, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *date, ASN1_OBJECT *otherTypeId, ASN1_TYPE *otherType);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+CMS_add1_recipient_cert() adds recipient B<recip> to CMS_ContentInfo enveloped
+data structure B<cms> as a KeyTransRecipientInfo structure.
+
+CMS_add0_recipient_key() adds symmetric key B<key> of length B<keylen> using
+wrapping algorithm B<nid>, identifier B<id> of length B<idlen> and optional
+values B<date>, B<otherTypeId> and B<otherType> to CMS_ContentInfo enveloped
+data structure B<cms> as a KEKRecipientInfo structure.
+
+The CMS_ContentInfo structure should be obtained from an initial call to
+CMS_encrypt() with the flag B<CMS_PARTIAL> set.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The main purpose of this function is to provide finer control over a CMS
+enveloped data structure where the simpler CMS_encrypt() function defaults are
+not appropriate. For example if one or more KEKRecipientInfo structures
+need to be added. New attributes can also be added using the returned
+CMS_RecipientInfo structure and the CMS attribute utility functions.
+
+OpenSSL will by default identify recipient certificates using issuer name
+and serial number. If B<CMS_USE_KEYID> is set it will use the subject key
+identifier value instead. An error occurs if all recipient certificates do not
+have a subject key identifier extension.
+
+Currently only AES based key wrapping algorithms are supported for B<nid>,
+specifically: NID_id_aes128_wrap, NID_id_aes192_wrap and NID_id_aes256_wrap.
+If B<nid> is set to B<NID_undef> then an AES wrap algorithm will be used
+consistent with B<keylen>.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+CMS_add1_recipient_cert() and CMS_add0_recipient_key() return an internal
+pointer to the CMS_RecipientInfo structure just added or NULL if an error
+occurs.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>, L<CMS_decrypt(3)>,
+L<CMS_final(3)>,
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/CMS_add1_signer.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/CMS_add1_signer.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f4738e0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/CMS_add1_signer.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+CMS_add1_signer, CMS_SignerInfo_sign - add a signer to a CMS_ContentInfo signed data structure
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/cms.h>
+
+ CMS_SignerInfo *CMS_add1_signer(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, X509 *signcert, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags);
+
+ int CMS_SignerInfo_sign(CMS_SignerInfo *si);
+
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+CMS_add1_signer() adds a signer with certificate B<signcert> and private
+key B<pkey> using message digest B<md> to CMS_ContentInfo SignedData
+structure B<cms>.
+
+The CMS_ContentInfo structure should be obtained from an initial call to
+CMS_sign() with the flag B<CMS_PARTIAL> set or in the case or re-signing a
+valid CMS_ContentInfo SignedData structure.
+
+If the B<md> parameter is B<NULL> then the default digest for the public
+key algorithm will be used.
+
+Unless the B<CMS_REUSE_DIGEST> flag is set the returned CMS_ContentInfo
+structure is not complete and must be finalized either by streaming (if
+applicable) or a call to CMS_final().
+
+The CMS_SignerInfo_sign() function will explicitly sign a CMS_SignerInfo
+structure, its main use is when B<CMS_REUSE_DIGEST> and B<CMS_PARTIAL> flags
+are both set.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The main purpose of CMS_add1_signer() is to provide finer control
+over a CMS signed data structure where the simpler CMS_sign() function defaults
+are not appropriate. For example if multiple signers or non default digest
+algorithms are needed. New attributes can also be added using the returned
+CMS_SignerInfo structure and the CMS attribute utility functions or the
+CMS signed receipt request functions.
+
+Any of the following flags (ored together) can be passed in the B<flags>
+parameter.
+
+If B<CMS_REUSE_DIGEST> is set then an attempt is made to copy the content
+digest value from the CMS_ContentInfo structure: to add a signer to an existing
+structure.  An error occurs if a matching digest value cannot be found to copy.
+The returned CMS_ContentInfo structure will be valid and finalized when this
+flag is set.
+
+If B<CMS_PARTIAL> is set in addition to B<CMS_REUSE_DIGEST> then the
+CMS_SignerInfo structure will not be finalized so additional attributes
+can be added. In this case an explicit call to CMS_SignerInfo_sign() is
+needed to finalize it.
+
+If B<CMS_NOCERTS> is set the signer's certificate will not be included in the
+CMS_ContentInfo structure, the signer's certificate must still be supplied in
+the B<signcert> parameter though. This can reduce the size of the signature if
+the signers certificate can be obtained by other means: for example a
+previously signed message.
+
+The SignedData structure includes several CMS signedAttributes including the
+signing time, the CMS content type and the supported list of ciphers in an
+SMIMECapabilities attribute. If B<CMS_NOATTR> is set then no signedAttributes
+will be used. If B<CMS_NOSMIMECAP> is set then just the SMIMECapabilities are
+omitted.
+
+OpenSSL will by default identify signing certificates using issuer name
+and serial number. If B<CMS_USE_KEYID> is set it will use the subject key
+identifier value instead. An error occurs if the signing certificate does not
+have a subject key identifier extension.
+
+If present the SMIMECapabilities attribute indicates support for the following
+algorithms in preference order: 256 bit AES, Gost R3411-94, Gost 28147-89, 192
+bit AES, 128 bit AES, triple DES, 128 bit RC2, 64 bit RC2, DES and 40 bit RC2.
+If any of these algorithms is not available then it will not be included: for example the GOST algorithms will not be included if the GOST ENGINE is
+not loaded.
+
+CMS_add1_signer() returns an internal pointer to the CMS_SignerInfo
+structure just added, this can be used to set additional attributes
+before it is finalized.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+CMS_add1_signer() returns an internal pointer to the CMS_SignerInfo
+structure just added or NULL if an error occurs.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>, L<CMS_sign(3)>,
+L<CMS_final(3)>,
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2014-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/CMS_compress.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/CMS_compress.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e405108
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/CMS_compress.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+CMS_compress - create a CMS CompressedData structure
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/cms.h>
+
+ CMS_ContentInfo *CMS_compress(BIO *in, int comp_nid, unsigned int flags);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+CMS_compress() creates and returns a CMS CompressedData structure. B<comp_nid>
+is the compression algorithm to use or B<NID_undef> to use the default
+algorithm (zlib compression). B<in> is the content to be compressed.
+B<flags> is an optional set of flags.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The only currently supported compression algorithm is zlib using the NID
+NID_zlib_compression.
+
+If zlib support is not compiled into OpenSSL then CMS_compress() will return
+an error.
+
+If the B<CMS_TEXT> flag is set MIME headers for type B<text/plain> are
+prepended to the data.
+
+Normally the supplied content is translated into MIME canonical format (as
+required by the S/MIME specifications) if B<CMS_BINARY> is set no translation
+occurs. This option should be used if the supplied data is in binary format
+otherwise the translation will corrupt it. If B<CMS_BINARY> is set then
+B<CMS_TEXT> is ignored.
+
+If the B<CMS_STREAM> flag is set a partial B<CMS_ContentInfo> structure is
+returned suitable for streaming I/O: no data is read from the BIO B<in>.
+
+The compressed data is included in the CMS_ContentInfo structure, unless
+B<CMS_DETACHED> is set in which case it is omitted. This is rarely used in
+practice and is not supported by SMIME_write_CMS().
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+If the flag B<CMS_STREAM> is set the returned B<CMS_ContentInfo> structure is
+B<not> complete and outputting its contents via a function that does not
+properly finalize the B<CMS_ContentInfo> structure will give unpredictable
+results.
+
+Several functions including SMIME_write_CMS(), i2d_CMS_bio_stream(),
+PEM_write_bio_CMS_stream() finalize the structure. Alternatively finalization
+can be performed by obtaining the streaming ASN1 B<BIO> directly using
+BIO_new_CMS().
+
+Additional compression parameters such as the zlib compression level cannot
+currently be set.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+CMS_compress() returns either a CMS_ContentInfo structure or NULL if an error
+occurred. The error can be obtained from ERR_get_error(3).
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>, L<CMS_uncompress(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+The B<CMS_STREAM> flag was added in OpenSSL 1.0.0.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/CMS_decrypt.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/CMS_decrypt.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b3b196c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/CMS_decrypt.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+CMS_decrypt - decrypt content from a CMS envelopedData structure
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/cms.h>
+
+ int CMS_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *cert, BIO *dcont, BIO *out, unsigned int flags);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+CMS_decrypt() extracts and decrypts the content from a CMS EnvelopedData
+structure. B<pkey> is the private key of the recipient, B<cert> is the
+recipient's certificate, B<out> is a BIO to write the content to and
+B<flags> is an optional set of flags.
+
+The B<dcont> parameter is used in the rare case where the encrypted content
+is detached. It will normally be set to NULL.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+Although the recipients certificate is not needed to decrypt the data it is
+needed to locate the appropriate (of possible several) recipients in the CMS
+structure.
+
+If B<cert> is set to NULL all possible recipients are tried. This case however
+is problematic. To thwart the MMA attack (Bleichenbacher's attack on
+PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding) all recipients are tried whether they succeed or
+not. If no recipient succeeds then a random symmetric key is used to decrypt
+the content: this will typically output garbage and may (but is not guaranteed
+to) ultimately return a padding error only. If CMS_decrypt() just returned an
+error when all recipient encrypted keys failed to decrypt an attacker could
+use this in a timing attack. If the special flag B<CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT> is set
+then the above behaviour is modified and an error B<is> returned if no
+recipient encrypted key can be decrypted B<without> generating a random
+content encryption key. Applications should use this flag with
+B<extreme caution> especially in automated gateways as it can leave them
+open to attack.
+
+It is possible to determine the correct recipient key by other means (for
+example looking them up in a database) and setting them in the CMS structure
+in advance using the CMS utility functions such as CMS_set1_pkey(). In this
+case both B<cert> and B<pkey> should be set to NULL.
+
+To process KEKRecipientInfo types CMS_set1_key() or CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_key()
+and CMS_ReceipientInfo_decrypt() should be called before CMS_decrypt() and
+B<cert> and B<pkey> set to NULL.
+
+The following flags can be passed in the B<flags> parameter.
+
+If the B<CMS_TEXT> flag is set MIME headers for type B<text/plain> are deleted
+from the content. If the content is not of type B<text/plain> then an error is
+returned.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+CMS_decrypt() returns either 1 for success or 0 for failure.
+The error can be obtained from ERR_get_error(3)
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+The lack of single pass processing and the need to hold all data in memory as
+mentioned in CMS_verify() also applies to CMS_decrypt().
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>, L<CMS_encrypt(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/CMS_encrypt.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/CMS_encrypt.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0ed4262
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/CMS_encrypt.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+CMS_encrypt - create a CMS envelopedData structure
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/cms.h>
+
+ CMS_ContentInfo *CMS_encrypt(STACK_OF(X509) *certs, BIO *in, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, unsigned int flags);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+CMS_encrypt() creates and returns a CMS EnvelopedData structure. B<certs>
+is a list of recipient certificates. B<in> is the content to be encrypted.
+B<cipher> is the symmetric cipher to use. B<flags> is an optional set of flags.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+Only certificates carrying RSA keys are supported so the recipient certificates
+supplied to this function must all contain RSA public keys, though they do not
+have to be signed using the RSA algorithm.
+
+EVP_des_ede3_cbc() (triple DES) is the algorithm of choice for S/MIME use
+because most clients will support it.
+
+The algorithm passed in the B<cipher> parameter must support ASN1 encoding of
+its parameters.
+
+Many browsers implement a "sign and encrypt" option which is simply an S/MIME
+envelopedData containing an S/MIME signed message. This can be readily produced
+by storing the S/MIME signed message in a memory BIO and passing it to
+CMS_encrypt().
+
+The following flags can be passed in the B<flags> parameter.
+
+If the B<CMS_TEXT> flag is set MIME headers for type B<text/plain> are
+prepended to the data.
+
+Normally the supplied content is translated into MIME canonical format (as
+required by the S/MIME specifications) if B<CMS_BINARY> is set no translation
+occurs. This option should be used if the supplied data is in binary format
+otherwise the translation will corrupt it. If B<CMS_BINARY> is set then
+B<CMS_TEXT> is ignored.
+
+OpenSSL will by default identify recipient certificates using issuer name
+and serial number. If B<CMS_USE_KEYID> is set it will use the subject key
+identifier value instead. An error occurs if all recipient certificates do not
+have a subject key identifier extension.
+
+If the B<CMS_STREAM> flag is set a partial B<CMS_ContentInfo> structure is
+returned suitable for streaming I/O: no data is read from the BIO B<in>.
+
+If the B<CMS_PARTIAL> flag is set a partial B<CMS_ContentInfo> structure is
+returned to which additional recipients and attributes can be added before
+finalization.
+
+The data being encrypted is included in the CMS_ContentInfo structure, unless
+B<CMS_DETACHED> is set in which case it is omitted. This is rarely used in
+practice and is not supported by SMIME_write_CMS().
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+If the flag B<CMS_STREAM> is set the returned B<CMS_ContentInfo> structure is
+B<not> complete and outputting its contents via a function that does not
+properly finalize the B<CMS_ContentInfo> structure will give unpredictable
+results.
+
+Several functions including SMIME_write_CMS(), i2d_CMS_bio_stream(),
+PEM_write_bio_CMS_stream() finalize the structure. Alternatively finalization
+can be performed by obtaining the streaming ASN1 B<BIO> directly using
+BIO_new_CMS().
+
+The recipients specified in B<certs> use a CMS KeyTransRecipientInfo info
+structure. KEKRecipientInfo is also supported using the flag B<CMS_PARTIAL>
+and CMS_add0_recipient_key().
+
+The parameter B<certs> may be NULL if B<CMS_PARTIAL> is set and recipients
+added later using CMS_add1_recipient_cert() or CMS_add0_recipient_key().
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+CMS_encrypt() returns either a CMS_ContentInfo structure or NULL if an error
+occurred. The error can be obtained from ERR_get_error(3).
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>, L<CMS_decrypt(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+The B<CMS_STREAM> flag was first supported in OpenSSL 1.0.0.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/CMS_final.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/CMS_final.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..264fe7b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/CMS_final.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+CMS_final - finalise a CMS_ContentInfo structure
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/cms.h>
+
+ int CMS_final(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, BIO *data, BIO *dcont, unsigned int flags);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+CMS_final() finalises the structure B<cms>. It's purpose is to perform any
+operations necessary on B<cms> (digest computation for example) and set the
+appropriate fields. The parameter B<data> contains the content to be
+processed. The B<dcont> parameter contains a BIO to write content to after
+processing: this is only used with detached data and will usually be set to
+NULL.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+This function will normally be called when the B<CMS_PARTIAL> flag is used. It
+should only be used when streaming is not performed because the streaming
+I/O functions perform finalisation operations internally.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+CMS_final() returns 1 for success or 0 for failure.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>, L<CMS_sign(3)>,
+L<CMS_encrypt(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/CMS_get0_RecipientInfos.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/CMS_get0_RecipientInfos.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6c33c22
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/CMS_get0_RecipientInfos.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+CMS_get0_RecipientInfos, CMS_RecipientInfo_type,
+CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_get0_signer_id, CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_cert_cmp,
+CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_pkey, CMS_RecipientInfo_kekri_get0_id,
+CMS_RecipientInfo_kekri_id_cmp, CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_key,
+CMS_RecipientInfo_decrypt, CMS_RecipientInfo_encrypt
+- CMS envelopedData RecipientInfo routines
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/cms.h>
+
+ STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientInfo) *CMS_get0_RecipientInfos(CMS_ContentInfo *cms);
+ int CMS_RecipientInfo_type(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri);
+
+ int CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_get0_signer_id(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid, X509_NAME **issuer, ASN1_INTEGER **sno);
+ int CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_cert_cmp(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509 *cert);
+ int CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_pkey(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+
+ int CMS_RecipientInfo_kekri_get0_id(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509_ALGOR **palg, ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pid, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **pdate, ASN1_OBJECT **potherid, ASN1_TYPE **pothertype);
+ int CMS_RecipientInfo_kekri_id_cmp(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, const unsigned char *id, size_t idlen);
+ int CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_key(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen);
+
+ int CMS_RecipientInfo_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, CMS_RecipientInfo *ri);
+ int CMS_RecipientInfo_encrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, CMS_RecipientInfo *ri);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The function CMS_get0_RecipientInfos() returns all the CMS_RecipientInfo
+structures associated with a CMS EnvelopedData structure.
+
+CMS_RecipientInfo_type() returns the type of CMS_RecipientInfo structure B<ri>.
+It will currently return CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS, CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE,
+CMS_RECIPINFO_KEK, CMS_RECIPINFO_PASS, or CMS_RECIPINFO_OTHER.
+
+CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_get0_signer_id() retrieves the certificate recipient
+identifier associated with a specific CMS_RecipientInfo structure B<ri>, which
+must be of type CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS. Either the keyidentifier will be set in
+B<keyid> or B<both> issuer name and serial number in B<issuer> and B<sno>.
+
+CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_cert_cmp() compares the certificate B<cert> against the
+CMS_RecipientInfo structure B<ri>, which must be of type CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS.
+It returns zero if the comparison is successful and non zero if not.
+
+CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_pkey() associates the private key B<pkey> with
+the CMS_RecipientInfo structure B<ri>, which must be of type
+CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS.
+
+CMS_RecipientInfo_kekri_get0_id() retrieves the key information from the
+CMS_RecipientInfo structure B<ri> which must be of type CMS_RECIPINFO_KEK.  Any
+of the remaining parameters can be NULL if the application is not interested in
+the value of a field. Where a field is optional and absent NULL will be written
+to the corresponding parameter. The keyEncryptionAlgorithm field is written to
+B<palg>, the B<keyIdentifier> field is written to B<pid>, the B<date> field if
+present is written to B<pdate>, if the B<other> field is present the components
+B<keyAttrId> and B<keyAttr> are written to parameters B<potherid> and
+B<pothertype>.
+
+CMS_RecipientInfo_kekri_id_cmp() compares the ID in the B<id> and B<idlen>
+parameters against the B<keyIdentifier> CMS_RecipientInfo structure B<ri>,
+which must be of type CMS_RECIPINFO_KEK.  It returns zero if the comparison is
+successful and non zero if not.
+
+CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_key() associates the symmetric key B<key> of length
+B<keylen> with the CMS_RecipientInfo structure B<ri>, which must be of type
+CMS_RECIPINFO_KEK.
+
+CMS_RecipientInfo_decrypt() attempts to decrypt CMS_RecipientInfo structure
+B<ri> in structure B<cms>. A key must have been associated with the structure
+first.
+
+CMS_RecipientInfo_encrypt() attempts to encrypt CMS_RecipientInfo structure
+B<ri> in structure B<cms>. A key must have been associated with the structure
+first and the content encryption key must be available: for example by a
+previous call to CMS_RecipientInfo_decrypt().
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The main purpose of these functions is to enable an application to lookup
+recipient keys using any appropriate technique when the simpler method
+of CMS_decrypt() is not appropriate.
+
+In typical usage and application will retrieve all CMS_RecipientInfo structures
+using CMS_get0_RecipientInfos() and check the type of each using
+CMS_RecpientInfo_type(). Depending on the type the CMS_RecipientInfo structure
+can be ignored or its key identifier data retrieved using an appropriate
+function. Then if the corresponding secret or private key can be obtained by
+any appropriate means it can then associated with the structure and
+CMS_RecpientInfo_decrypt() called. If successful CMS_decrypt() can be called
+with a NULL key to decrypt the enveloped content.
+
+The CMS_RecipientInfo_encrypt() can be used to add a new recipient to an
+existing enveloped data structure. Typically an application will first decrypt
+an appropriate CMS_RecipientInfo structure to make the content encrypt key
+available, it will then add a new recipient using a function such as
+CMS_add1_recipient_cert() and finally encrypt the content encryption key
+using CMS_RecipientInfo_encrypt().
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+CMS_get0_RecipientInfos() returns all CMS_RecipientInfo structures, or NULL if
+an error occurs.
+
+CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_get0_signer_id(), CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_pkey(),
+CMS_RecipientInfo_kekri_get0_id(), CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_key() and
+CMS_RecipientInfo_decrypt() return 1 for success or 0 if an error occurs.
+CMS_RecipientInfo_encrypt() return 1 for success or 0 if an error occurs.
+
+CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_cert_cmp() and CMS_RecipientInfo_kekri_cmp() return 0
+for a successful comparison and non zero otherwise.
+
+Any error can be obtained from L<ERR_get_error(3)>.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>, L<CMS_decrypt(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/CMS_get0_SignerInfos.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/CMS_get0_SignerInfos.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e5532c9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/CMS_get0_SignerInfos.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+CMS_SignerInfo_set1_signer_cert,
+CMS_get0_SignerInfos, CMS_SignerInfo_get0_signer_id,
+CMS_SignerInfo_get0_signature, CMS_SignerInfo_cert_cmp
+- CMS signedData signer functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/cms.h>
+
+ STACK_OF(CMS_SignerInfo) *CMS_get0_SignerInfos(CMS_ContentInfo *cms);
+
+ int CMS_SignerInfo_get0_signer_id(CMS_SignerInfo *si, ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid, X509_NAME **issuer, ASN1_INTEGER **sno);
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING *CMS_SignerInfo_get0_signature(CMS_SignerInfo *si);
+ int CMS_SignerInfo_cert_cmp(CMS_SignerInfo *si, X509 *cert);
+ void CMS_SignerInfo_set1_signer_cert(CMS_SignerInfo *si, X509 *signer);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The function CMS_get0_SignerInfos() returns all the CMS_SignerInfo structures
+associated with a CMS signedData structure.
+
+CMS_SignerInfo_get0_signer_id() retrieves the certificate signer identifier
+associated with a specific CMS_SignerInfo structure B<si>. Either the
+keyidentifier will be set in B<keyid> or B<both> issuer name and serial number
+in B<issuer> and B<sno>.
+
+CMS_SignerInfo_get0_signature() retrieves the signature associated with
+B<si> in a pointer to an ASN1_OCTET_STRING structure. This pointer returned
+corresponds to the internal signature value if B<si> so it may be read or
+modified.
+
+CMS_SignerInfo_cert_cmp() compares the certificate B<cert> against the signer
+identifier B<si>. It returns zero if the comparison is successful and non zero
+if not.
+
+CMS_SignerInfo_set1_signer_cert() sets the signers certificate of B<si> to
+B<signer>.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The main purpose of these functions is to enable an application to lookup
+signers certificates using any appropriate technique when the simpler method
+of CMS_verify() is not appropriate.
+
+In typical usage and application will retrieve all CMS_SignerInfo structures
+using CMS_get0_SignerInfo() and retrieve the identifier information using
+CMS. It will then obtain the signer certificate by some unspecified means
+(or return and error if it cannot be found) and set it using
+CMS_SignerInfo_set1_signer_cert().
+
+Once all signer certificates have been set CMS_verify() can be used.
+
+Although CMS_get0_SignerInfos() can return NULL is an error occur B<or> if
+there are no signers this is not a problem in practice because the only
+error which can occur is if the B<cms> structure is not of type signedData
+due to application error.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+CMS_get0_SignerInfos() returns all CMS_SignerInfo structures, or NULL there
+are no signers or an error occurs.
+
+CMS_SignerInfo_get0_signer_id() returns 1 for success and 0 for failure.
+
+CMS_SignerInfo_cert_cmp() returns 0 for a successful comparison and non
+zero otherwise.
+
+CMS_SignerInfo_set1_signer_cert() does not return a value.
+
+Any error can be obtained from L<ERR_get_error(3)>
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>, L<CMS_verify(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/CMS_get0_type.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/CMS_get0_type.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cad8d3f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/CMS_get0_type.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+CMS_get0_type, CMS_set1_eContentType, CMS_get0_eContentType, CMS_get0_content - get and set CMS content types and content
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/cms.h>
+
+ const ASN1_OBJECT *CMS_get0_type(const CMS_ContentInfo *cms);
+ int CMS_set1_eContentType(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, const ASN1_OBJECT *oid);
+ const ASN1_OBJECT *CMS_get0_eContentType(CMS_ContentInfo *cms);
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING **CMS_get0_content(CMS_ContentInfo *cms);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+CMS_get0_type() returns the content type of a CMS_ContentInfo structure as
+and ASN1_OBJECT pointer. An application can then decide how to process the
+CMS_ContentInfo structure based on this value.
+
+CMS_set1_eContentType() sets the embedded content type of a CMS_ContentInfo
+structure. It should be called with CMS functions with the B<CMS_PARTIAL>
+flag and B<before> the structure is finalised, otherwise the results are
+undefined.
+
+ASN1_OBJECT *CMS_get0_eContentType() returns a pointer to the embedded
+content type.
+
+CMS_get0_content() returns a pointer to the B<ASN1_OCTET_STRING> pointer
+containing the embedded content.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+As the B<0> implies CMS_get0_type(), CMS_get0_eContentType() and
+CMS_get0_content() return internal pointers which should B<not> be freed up.
+CMS_set1_eContentType() copies the supplied OID and it B<should> be freed up
+after use.
+
+The B<ASN1_OBJECT> values returned can be converted to an integer B<NID> value
+using OBJ_obj2nid(). For the currently supported content types the following
+values are returned:
+
+ NID_pkcs7_data
+ NID_pkcs7_signed
+ NID_pkcs7_digest
+ NID_id_smime_ct_compressedData:
+ NID_pkcs7_encrypted
+ NID_pkcs7_enveloped
+
+The return value of CMS_get0_content() is a pointer to the B<ASN1_OCTET_STRING>
+content pointer. That means that for example:
+
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pconf = CMS_get0_content(cms);
+
+B<*pconf> could be NULL if there is no embedded content. Applications can
+access, modify or create the embedded content in a B<CMS_ContentInfo> structure
+using this function. Applications usually will not need to modify the
+embedded content as it is normally set by higher level functions.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+CMS_get0_type() and CMS_get0_eContentType() return and ASN1_OBJECT structure.
+
+CMS_set1_eContentType() returns 1 for success or 0 if an error occurred.  The
+error can be obtained from ERR_get_error(3).
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/CMS_get1_ReceiptRequest.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/CMS_get1_ReceiptRequest.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..79f5f42
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/CMS_get1_ReceiptRequest.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+CMS_ReceiptRequest_create0, CMS_add1_ReceiptRequest, CMS_get1_ReceiptRequest, CMS_ReceiptRequest_get0_values - CMS signed receipt request functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/cms.h>
+
+ CMS_ReceiptRequest *CMS_ReceiptRequest_create0(unsigned char *id, int idlen, int allorfirst, STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAMES) *receiptList, STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAMES) *receiptsTo);
+ int CMS_add1_ReceiptRequest(CMS_SignerInfo *si, CMS_ReceiptRequest *rr);
+ int CMS_get1_ReceiptRequest(CMS_SignerInfo *si, CMS_ReceiptRequest **prr);
+ void CMS_ReceiptRequest_get0_values(CMS_ReceiptRequest *rr, ASN1_STRING **pcid, int *pallorfirst, STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAMES) **plist, STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAMES) **prto);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+CMS_ReceiptRequest_create0() creates a signed receipt request structure. The
+B<signedContentIdentifier> field is set using B<id> and B<idlen>, or it is set
+to 32 bytes of pseudo random data if B<id> is NULL. If B<receiptList> is NULL
+the allOrFirstTier option in B<receiptsFrom> is used and set to the value of
+the B<allorfirst> parameter. If B<receiptList> is not NULL the B<receiptList>
+option in B<receiptsFrom> is used. The B<receiptsTo> parameter specifies the
+B<receiptsTo> field value.
+
+The CMS_add1_ReceiptRequest() function adds a signed receipt request B<rr>
+to SignerInfo structure B<si>.
+
+int CMS_get1_ReceiptRequest() looks for a signed receipt request in B<si>, if
+any is found it is decoded and written to B<prr>.
+
+CMS_ReceiptRequest_get0_values() retrieves the values of a receipt request.
+The signedContentIdentifier is copied to B<pcid>. If the B<allOrFirstTier>
+option of B<receiptsFrom> is used its value is copied to B<pallorfirst>
+otherwise the B<receiptList> field is copied to B<plist>. The B<receiptsTo>
+parameter is copied to B<prto>.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+For more details of the meaning of the fields see RFC2634.
+
+The contents of a signed receipt should only be considered meaningful if the
+corresponding CMS_ContentInfo structure can be successfully verified using
+CMS_verify().
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+CMS_ReceiptRequest_create0() returns a signed receipt request structure or
+NULL if an error occurred.
+
+CMS_add1_ReceiptRequest() returns 1 for success or 0 is an error occurred.
+
+CMS_get1_ReceiptRequest() returns 1 is a signed receipt request is found and
+decoded. It returns 0 if a signed receipt request is not present and -1 if
+it is present but malformed.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>, L<CMS_sign(3)>,
+L<CMS_sign_receipt(3)>, L<CMS_verify(3)>
+L<CMS_verify_receipt(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/CMS_sign.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/CMS_sign.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..396deef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/CMS_sign.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+CMS_sign - create a CMS SignedData structure
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/cms.h>
+
+ CMS_ContentInfo *CMS_sign(X509 *signcert, EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, BIO *data, unsigned int flags);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+CMS_sign() creates and returns a CMS SignedData structure. B<signcert> is
+the certificate to sign with, B<pkey> is the corresponding private key.
+B<certs> is an optional additional set of certificates to include in the CMS
+structure (for example any intermediate CAs in the chain). Any or all of
+these parameters can be B<NULL>, see B<NOTES> below.
+
+The data to be signed is read from BIO B<data>.
+
+B<flags> is an optional set of flags.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+Any of the following flags (ored together) can be passed in the B<flags>
+parameter.
+
+Many S/MIME clients expect the signed content to include valid MIME headers. If
+the B<CMS_TEXT> flag is set MIME headers for type B<text/plain> are prepended
+to the data.
+
+If B<CMS_NOCERTS> is set the signer's certificate will not be included in the
+CMS_ContentInfo structure, the signer's certificate must still be supplied in
+the B<signcert> parameter though. This can reduce the size of the signature if
+the signers certificate can be obtained by other means: for example a
+previously signed message.
+
+The data being signed is included in the CMS_ContentInfo structure, unless
+B<CMS_DETACHED> is set in which case it is omitted. This is used for
+CMS_ContentInfo detached signatures which are used in S/MIME plaintext signed
+messages for example.
+
+Normally the supplied content is translated into MIME canonical format (as
+required by the S/MIME specifications) if B<CMS_BINARY> is set no translation
+occurs. This option should be used if the supplied data is in binary format
+otherwise the translation will corrupt it.
+
+The SignedData structure includes several CMS signedAttributes including the
+signing time, the CMS content type and the supported list of ciphers in an
+SMIMECapabilities attribute. If B<CMS_NOATTR> is set then no signedAttributes
+will be used. If B<CMS_NOSMIMECAP> is set then just the SMIMECapabilities are
+omitted.
+
+If present the SMIMECapabilities attribute indicates support for the following
+algorithms in preference order: 256 bit AES, Gost R3411-94, Gost 28147-89, 192
+bit AES, 128 bit AES, triple DES, 128 bit RC2, 64 bit RC2, DES and 40 bit RC2.
+If any of these algorithms is not available then it will not be included: for example the GOST algorithms will not be included if the GOST ENGINE is
+not loaded.
+
+OpenSSL will by default identify signing certificates using issuer name
+and serial number. If B<CMS_USE_KEYID> is set it will use the subject key
+identifier value instead. An error occurs if the signing certificate does not
+have a subject key identifier extension.
+
+If the flags B<CMS_STREAM> is set then the returned B<CMS_ContentInfo>
+structure is just initialized ready to perform the signing operation. The
+signing is however B<not> performed and the data to be signed is not read from
+the B<data> parameter. Signing is deferred until after the data has been
+written. In this way data can be signed in a single pass.
+
+If the B<CMS_PARTIAL> flag is set a partial B<CMS_ContentInfo> structure is
+output to which additional signers and capabilities can be added before
+finalization.
+
+If the flag B<CMS_STREAM> is set the returned B<CMS_ContentInfo> structure is
+B<not> complete and outputting its contents via a function that does not
+properly finalize the B<CMS_ContentInfo> structure will give unpredictable
+results.
+
+Several functions including SMIME_write_CMS(), i2d_CMS_bio_stream(),
+PEM_write_bio_CMS_stream() finalize the structure. Alternatively finalization
+can be performed by obtaining the streaming ASN1 B<BIO> directly using
+BIO_new_CMS().
+
+If a signer is specified it will use the default digest for the signing
+algorithm. This is B<SHA1> for both RSA and DSA keys.
+
+If B<signcert> and B<pkey> are NULL then a certificates only CMS structure is
+output.
+
+The function CMS_sign() is a basic CMS signing function whose output will be
+suitable for many purposes. For finer control of the output format the
+B<certs>, B<signcert> and B<pkey> parameters can all be B<NULL> and the
+B<CMS_PARTIAL> flag set. Then one or more signers can be added using the
+function CMS_sign_add1_signer(), non default digests can be used and custom
+attributes added. CMS_final() must then be called to finalize the
+structure if streaming is not enabled.
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+Some attributes such as counter signatures are not supported.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+CMS_sign() returns either a valid CMS_ContentInfo structure or NULL if an error
+occurred. The error can be obtained from ERR_get_error(3).
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>, L<CMS_verify(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+The B<CMS_STREAM> flag is only supported for detached data in OpenSSL 0.9.8,
+it is supported for embedded data in OpenSSL 1.0.0 and later.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/CMS_sign_receipt.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/CMS_sign_receipt.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8ea6df1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/CMS_sign_receipt.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+CMS_sign_receipt - create a CMS signed receipt
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/cms.h>
+
+ CMS_ContentInfo *CMS_sign_receipt(CMS_SignerInfo *si, X509 *signcert, EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, unsigned int flags);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+CMS_sign_receipt() creates and returns a CMS signed receipt structure. B<si> is
+the B<CMS_SignerInfo> structure containing the signed receipt request.
+B<signcert> is the certificate to sign with, B<pkey> is the corresponding
+private key.  B<certs> is an optional additional set of certificates to include
+in the CMS structure (for example any intermediate CAs in the chain).
+
+B<flags> is an optional set of flags.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+This functions behaves in a similar way to CMS_sign() except the flag values
+B<CMS_DETACHED>, B<CMS_BINARY>, B<CMS_NOATTR>, B<CMS_TEXT> and B<CMS_STREAM>
+are not supported since they do not make sense in the context of signed
+receipts.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+CMS_sign_receipt() returns either a valid CMS_ContentInfo structure or NULL if
+an error occurred.  The error can be obtained from ERR_get_error(3).
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>,
+L<CMS_verify_receipt(3)>,
+L<CMS_sign(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/CMS_uncompress.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/CMS_uncompress.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..80f9c0d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/CMS_uncompress.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+CMS_uncompress - uncompress a CMS CompressedData structure
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/cms.h>
+
+ int CMS_uncompress(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, BIO *dcont, BIO *out, unsigned int flags);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+CMS_uncompress() extracts and uncompresses the content from a CMS
+CompressedData structure B<cms>. B<data> is a BIO to write the content to and
+B<flags> is an optional set of flags.
+
+The B<dcont> parameter is used in the rare case where the compressed content
+is detached. It will normally be set to NULL.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The only currently supported compression algorithm is zlib: if the structure
+indicates the use of any other algorithm an error is returned.
+
+If zlib support is not compiled into OpenSSL then CMS_uncompress() will always
+return an error.
+
+The following flags can be passed in the B<flags> parameter.
+
+If the B<CMS_TEXT> flag is set MIME headers for type B<text/plain> are deleted
+from the content. If the content is not of type B<text/plain> then an error is
+returned.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+CMS_uncompress() returns either 1 for success or 0 for failure. The error can
+be obtained from ERR_get_error(3)
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+The lack of single pass processing and the need to hold all data in memory as
+mentioned in CMS_verify() also applies to CMS_decompress().
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>, L<CMS_compress(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/CMS_verify.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/CMS_verify.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c2ff57b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/CMS_verify.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+CMS_verify, CMS_get0_signers - verify a CMS SignedData structure
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/cms.h>
+
+ int CMS_verify(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, X509_STORE *store, BIO *indata, BIO *out, unsigned int flags);
+
+ STACK_OF(X509) *CMS_get0_signers(CMS_ContentInfo *cms);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+CMS_verify() verifies a CMS SignedData structure. B<cms> is the CMS_ContentInfo
+structure to verify. B<certs> is a set of certificates in which to search for
+the signing certificate(s). B<store> is a trusted certificate store used for
+chain verification. B<indata> is the detached content if the content is not
+present in B<cms>. The content is written to B<out> if it is not NULL.
+
+B<flags> is an optional set of flags, which can be used to modify the verify
+operation.
+
+CMS_get0_signers() retrieves the signing certificate(s) from B<cms>, it must
+be called after a successful CMS_verify() operation.
+
+=head1 VERIFY PROCESS
+
+Normally the verify process proceeds as follows.
+
+Initially some sanity checks are performed on B<cms>. The type of B<cms> must
+be SignedData. There must be at least one signature on the data and if
+the content is detached B<indata> cannot be B<NULL>.
+
+An attempt is made to locate all the signing certificate(s), first looking in
+the B<certs> parameter (if it is not NULL) and then looking in any
+certificates contained in the B<cms> structure itself. If any signing
+certificate cannot be located the operation fails.
+
+Each signing certificate is chain verified using the B<smimesign> purpose and
+the supplied trusted certificate store. Any internal certificates in the message
+are used as untrusted CAs. If CRL checking is enabled in B<store> any internal
+CRLs are used in addition to attempting to look them up in B<store>. If any
+chain verify fails an error code is returned.
+
+Finally the signed content is read (and written to B<out> is it is not NULL)
+and the signature's checked.
+
+If all signature's verify correctly then the function is successful.
+
+Any of the following flags (ored together) can be passed in the B<flags>
+parameter to change the default verify behaviour.
+
+If B<CMS_NOINTERN> is set the certificates in the message itself are not
+searched when locating the signing certificate(s). This means that all the
+signing certificates must be in the B<certs> parameter.
+
+If B<CMS_NOCRL> is set and CRL checking is enabled in B<store> then any
+CRLs in the message itself are ignored.
+
+If the B<CMS_TEXT> flag is set MIME headers for type B<text/plain> are deleted
+from the content. If the content is not of type B<text/plain> then an error is
+returned.
+
+If B<CMS_NO_SIGNER_CERT_VERIFY> is set the signing certificates are not
+verified.
+
+If B<CMS_NO_ATTR_VERIFY> is set the signed attributes signature is not
+verified.
+
+If B<CMS_NO_CONTENT_VERIFY> is set then the content digest is not checked.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+One application of B<CMS_NOINTERN> is to only accept messages signed by
+a small number of certificates. The acceptable certificates would be passed
+in the B<certs> parameter. In this case if the signer is not one of the
+certificates supplied in B<certs> then the verify will fail because the
+signer cannot be found.
+
+In some cases the standard techniques for looking up and validating
+certificates are not appropriate: for example an application may wish to
+lookup certificates in a database or perform customised verification. This
+can be achieved by setting and verifying the signers certificates manually
+using the signed data utility functions.
+
+Care should be taken when modifying the default verify behaviour, for example
+setting B<CMS_NO_CONTENT_VERIFY> will totally disable all content verification
+and any modified content will be considered valid. This combination is however
+useful if one merely wishes to write the content to B<out> and its validity
+is not considered important.
+
+Chain verification should arguably be performed using the signing time rather
+than the current time. However since the signing time is supplied by the
+signer it cannot be trusted without additional evidence (such as a trusted
+timestamp).
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+CMS_verify() returns 1 for a successful verification and zero if an error
+occurred.
+
+CMS_get0_signers() returns all signers or NULL if an error occurred.
+
+The error can be obtained from L<ERR_get_error(3)>
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+The trusted certificate store is not searched for the signing certificate,
+this is primarily due to the inadequacies of the current B<X509_STORE>
+functionality.
+
+The lack of single pass processing means that the signed content must all
+be held in memory if it is not detached.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>, L<CMS_sign(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/CMS_verify_receipt.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/CMS_verify_receipt.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..193241c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/CMS_verify_receipt.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+CMS_verify_receipt - verify a CMS signed receipt
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/cms.h>
+
+ int CMS_verify_receipt(CMS_ContentInfo *rcms, CMS_ContentInfo *ocms, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, X509_STORE *store, unsigned int flags);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+CMS_verify_receipt() verifies a CMS signed receipt. B<rcms> is the signed
+receipt to verify. B<ocms> is the original SignedData structure containing the
+receipt request. B<certs> is a set of certificates in which to search for the
+signing certificate. B<store> is a trusted certificate store (used for chain
+verification).
+
+B<flags> is an optional set of flags, which can be used to modify the verify
+operation.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+This functions behaves in a similar way to CMS_verify() except the flag values
+B<CMS_DETACHED>, B<CMS_BINARY>, B<CMS_TEXT> and B<CMS_STREAM> are not
+supported since they do not make sense in the context of signed receipts.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+CMS_verify_receipt() returns 1 for a successful verification and zero if an
+error occurred.
+
+The error can be obtained from L<ERR_get_error(3)>
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>,
+L<CMS_sign_receipt(3)>,
+L<CMS_verify(3)>,
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/CONF_modules_free.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/CONF_modules_free.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ac59f37
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/CONF_modules_free.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+CONF_modules_free, CONF_modules_finish, CONF_modules_unload -
+OpenSSL configuration cleanup functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/conf.h>
+
+ void CONF_modules_finish(void);
+ void CONF_modules_unload(int all);
+
+Deprecated:
+
+ #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+ void CONF_modules_free(void)
+ #endif
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+CONF_modules_free() closes down and frees up all memory allocated by all
+configuration modules.
+
+CONF_modules_finish() calls each configuration modules B<finish> handler
+to free up any configuration that module may have performed.
+
+CONF_modules_unload() finishes and unloads configuration modules. If
+B<all> is set to B<0> only modules loaded from DSOs will be unloads. If
+B<all> is B<1> all modules, including builtin modules will be unloaded.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+Normally in versions of OpenSSL prior to 1.1.0 applications will only call
+CONF_modules_free() at application exit to tidy up any configuration performed.
+From 1.1.0 CONF_modules_free() is deprecated and no explicit CONF cleanup is
+required at all. For more information see L<OPENSSL_init_crypto(3)>.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUE
+
+None of the functions return a value.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<conf(5)>, L<OPENSSL_config(3)>,
+L<CONF_modules_load_file(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+CONF_modules_free() was deprecated in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/CONF_modules_load_file.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/CONF_modules_load_file.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4f02f52
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/CONF_modules_load_file.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+CONF_modules_load_file, CONF_modules_load - OpenSSL configuration functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/conf.h>
+
+ int CONF_modules_load_file(const char *filename, const char *appname,
+                                        unsigned long flags);
+ int CONF_modules_load(const CONF *cnf, const char *appname,
+                               unsigned long flags);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The function CONF_modules_load_file() configures OpenSSL using file
+B<filename> and application name B<appname>. If B<filename> is NULL
+the standard OpenSSL configuration file is used. If B<appname> is
+NULL the standard OpenSSL application name B<openssl_conf> is used.
+The behaviour can be customized using B<flags>.
+
+CONF_modules_load() is identical to CONF_modules_load_file() except it
+reads configuration information from B<cnf>.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The following B<flags> are currently recognized:
+
+B<CONF_MFLAGS_IGNORE_ERRORS> if set errors returned by individual
+configuration modules are ignored. If not set the first module error is
+considered fatal and no further modules are loaded.
+
+Normally any modules errors will add error information to the error queue. If
+B<CONF_MFLAGS_SILENT> is set no error information is added.
+
+If B<CONF_MFLAGS_NO_DSO> is set configuration module loading from DSOs is
+disabled.
+
+B<CONF_MFLAGS_IGNORE_MISSING_FILE> if set will make CONF_load_modules_file()
+ignore missing configuration files. Normally a missing configuration file
+return an error.
+
+B<CONF_MFLAGS_DEFAULT_SECTION> if set and B<appname> is not NULL will use the
+default section pointed to by B<openssl_conf> if B<appname> does not exist.
+
+By using CONF_modules_load_file() with appropriate flags an application can
+customise application configuration to best suit its needs. In some cases the
+use of a configuration file is optional and its absence is not an error: in
+this case B<CONF_MFLAGS_IGNORE_MISSING_FILE> would be set.
+
+Errors during configuration may also be handled differently by different
+applications. For example in some cases an error may simply print out a warning
+message and the application continue. In other cases an application might
+consider a configuration file error as fatal and exit immediately.
+
+Applications can use the CONF_modules_load() function if they wish to load a
+configuration file themselves and have finer control over how errors are
+treated.
+
+=head1 EXAMPLES
+
+Load a configuration file and print out any errors and exit (missing file
+considered fatal):
+
+ if (CONF_modules_load_file(NULL, NULL, 0) <= 0) {
+    fprintf(stderr, "FATAL: error loading configuration file\n");
+    ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+    exit(1);
+ }
+
+Load default configuration file using the section indicated by "myapp",
+tolerate missing files, but exit on other errors:
+
+ if (CONF_modules_load_file(NULL, "myapp",
+                            CONF_MFLAGS_IGNORE_MISSING_FILE) <= 0) {
+    fprintf(stderr, "FATAL: error loading configuration file\n");
+    ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+    exit(1);
+ }
+
+Load custom configuration file and section, only print warnings on error,
+missing configuration file ignored:
+
+ if (CONF_modules_load_file("/something/app.cnf", "myapp",
+                            CONF_MFLAGS_IGNORE_MISSING_FILE) <= 0) {
+    fprintf(stderr, "WARNING: error loading configuration file\n");
+    ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+ }
+
+Load and parse configuration file manually, custom error handling:
+
+ FILE *fp;
+ CONF *cnf = NULL;
+ long eline;
+ fp = fopen("/somepath/app.cnf", "r");
+ if (fp == NULL) {
+    fprintf(stderr, "Error opening configuration file\n");
+    /* Other missing configuration file behaviour */
+ } else {
+    cnf = NCONF_new(NULL);
+    if (NCONF_load_fp(cnf, fp, &eline) == 0) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Error on line %ld of configuration file\n", eline);
+        ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+        /* Other malformed configuration file behaviour */
+    } else if (CONF_modules_load(cnf, "appname", 0) <= 0) {
+      fprintf(stderr, "Error configuring application\n");
+      ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+      /* Other configuration error behaviour */
+    }
+    fclose(fp);
+    NCONF_free(cnf);
+  }
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+These functions return 1 for success and a zero or negative value for
+failure. If module errors are not ignored the return code will reflect the
+return value of the failing module (this will always be zero or negative).
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<config(5)>, L<OPENSSL_config(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2004-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/CRYPTO_THREAD_run_once.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/CRYPTO_THREAD_run_once.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b256a18
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/CRYPTO_THREAD_run_once.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+CRYPTO_THREAD_run_once,
+CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new, CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock, CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock,
+CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock, CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free, CRYPTO_atomic_add - OpenSSL thread support
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/crypto.h>
+
+ CRYPTO_ONCE CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
+ int CRYPTO_THREAD_run_once(CRYPTO_ONCE *once, void (*init)(void));
+
+ CRYPTO_RWLOCK *CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(void);
+ int CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock);
+ int CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock);
+ int CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock);
+ void CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock);
+
+ int CRYPTO_atomic_add(int *val, int amount, int *ret, CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+OpenSSL can be safely used in multi-threaded applications provided that
+support for the underlying OS threading API is built-in. Currently, OpenSSL
+supports the pthread and Windows APIs. OpenSSL can also be built without
+any multi-threading support, for example on platforms that don't provide
+any threading support or that provide a threading API that is not yet
+supported by OpenSSL.
+
+The following multi-threading function are provided:
+
+=over 2
+
+=item *
+
+CRYPTO_THREAD_run_once() can be used to perform one-time initialization.
+The B<once> argument must be a pointer to a static object of type
+B<CRYPTO_ONCE> that was statically initialized to the value
+B<CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT>.
+The B<init> argument is a pointer to a function that performs the desired
+exactly once initialization.
+In particular, this can be used to allocate locks in a thread-safe manner,
+which can then be used with the locking functions below.
+
+=item *
+
+CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new() allocates, initializes and returns a new read/write
+lock.
+
+=item *
+
+CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock() locks the provided B<lock> for reading.
+
+=item *
+
+CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock() locks the provided B<lock> for writing.
+
+=item *
+
+CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock() unlocks the previously locked B<lock>.
+
+=item *
+
+CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_frees() frees the provided B<lock>.
+
+=item *
+
+CRYPTO_atomic_add() atomically adds B<amount> to B<val> and returns the
+result of the operation in B<ret>. B<lock> will be locked, unless atomic
+operations are supported on the specific platform. Because of this, if a
+variable is modified by CRYPTO_atomic_add() then CRYPTO_atomic_add() must
+be the only way that the variable is modified.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+CRYPTO_THREAD_run_once() returns 1 on success, or 0 on error.
+
+CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new() returns the allocated lock, or NULL on error.
+
+CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_frees() returns no value.
+
+The other functions return 1 on success or 0 on error.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+On Windows platforms the CRYPTO_THREAD_* types and functions in the
+openssl/crypto.h header are dependent on some of the types customarily
+made available by including windows.h. The application developer is
+likely to require control over when the latter is included, commonly as
+one of the first included headers. Therefore it is defined as an
+application developer's responsibility to include windows.h prior to
+crypto.h where use of CRYPTO_THREAD_* types and functions is required.
+
+=head1 EXAMPLE
+
+This example safely initializes and uses a lock.
+
+  #ifdef _WIN32
+  # include <windows.h>
+  #endif
+  #include <openssl/crypto.h>
+
+  static CRYPTO_ONCE once = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
+  static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock;
+
+  static void myinit(void)
+  {
+      lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
+  }
+
+  static int mylock(void)
+  {
+      if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_run_once(&once, void init) || lock == NULL)
+          return 0;
+      return CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(lock);
+  }
+
+  static int myunlock(void)
+  {
+      return CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(lock);
+  }
+
+  int serialized(void)
+  {
+      int ret = 0;
+
+      if (mylock()) {
+          /* Your code here, do not return without releasing the lock! */
+          ret = ... ;
+      }
+      myunlock();
+      return ret;
+  }
+
+Finalization of locks is an advanced topic, not covered in this example.
+This can only be done at process exit or when a dynamically loaded library is
+no longer in use and is unloaded.
+The simplest solution is to just "leak" the lock in applications and not
+repeatedly load/unload shared libraries that allocate locks.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+You can find out if OpenSSL was configured with thread support:
+
+ #include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+ #if defined(OPENSSL_THREADS)
+   // thread support enabled
+ #else
+   // no thread support
+ #endif
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<crypto(7)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a5bf620
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+CRYPTO_EX_new, CRYPTO_EX_free, CRYPTO_EX_dup,
+CRYPTO_free_ex_index, CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index, CRYPTO_set_ex_data,
+CRYPTO_get_ex_data, CRYPTO_free_ex_data, CRYPTO_new_ex_data
+- functions supporting application-specific data
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/crypto.h>
+
+ int CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(int class_index,
+                long argl, void *argp,
+                CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
+                CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,
+                CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func);
+
+ typedef void CRYPTO_EX_new(void *parent, void *ptr, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad,
+                            int idx, long argl, void *argp);
+ typedef void CRYPTO_EX_free(void *parent, void *ptr, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad,
+                             int idx, long argl, void *argp);
+ typedef int CRYPTO_EX_dup(CRYPTO_EX_DATA *to, const CRYPTO_EX_DATA *from,
+                           void *from_d, int idx, long argl, void *argp);
+
+ int CRYPTO_new_ex_data(int class_index, void *obj, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad)
+
+ int CRYPTO_set_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_DATA *r, int idx, void *arg);
+
+ void *CRYPTO_get_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_DATA *r, int idx);
+
+ void CRYPTO_free_ex_data(int class_index, void *obj, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *r);
+
+ int CRYPTO_free_ex_index(int class_index, int idx);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+Several OpenSSL structures can have application-specific data attached to them,
+known as "exdata."
+The specific structures are:
+
+    SSL
+    SSL_CTX
+    SSL_SESSION
+    X509
+    X509_STORE
+    X509_STORE_CTX
+    DH
+    DSA
+    EC_KEY
+    RSA
+    ENGINE
+    UI
+    UI_METHOD
+    BIO
+
+Each is identified by an B<CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_xxx> define in the B<crypto.h>
+header file.  In addition, B<CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_APP> is reserved for
+applications to use this facility for their own structures.
+
+The API described here is used by OpenSSL to manipulate exdata for specific
+structures.  Since the application data can be anything at all it is passed
+and retrieved as a B<void *> type.
+
+The B<CRYPTO_EX_DATA> type is opaque.  To initialize the exdata part of
+a structure, call CRYPTO_new_ex_data(). This is only necessary for
+B<CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_APP> objects.
+
+Exdata types are identified by an B<index>, an integer guaranteed to be
+unique within structures for the lifetime of the program.  Applications
+using exdata typically call B<CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index> at startup, and
+store the result in a global variable, or write a wrapper function to
+provide lazy evaluation.  The B<class_index> should be one of the
+B<CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_xxx> values. The B<argl> and B<argp> parameters are saved
+to be passed to the callbacks but are otherwise not used.  In order to
+transparently manipulate exdata, three callbacks must be provided. The
+semantics of those callbacks are described below.
+
+When copying or releasing objects with exdata, the callback functions
+are called in increasing order of their B<index> value.
+
+If a dynamic library can be unloaded, it should call CRYPTO_free_ex_index()
+when this is done.
+This will replace the callbacks with no-ops
+so that applications don't crash.  Any existing exdata will be leaked.
+
+To set or get the exdata on an object, the appropriate type-specific
+routine must be used.  This is because the containing structure is opaque
+and the B<CRYPTO_EX_DATA> field is not accessible.  In both API's, the
+B<idx> parameter should be an already-created index value.
+
+When setting exdata, the pointer specified with a particular index is saved,
+and returned on a subsequent "get" call.  If the application is going to
+release the data, it must make sure to set a B<NULL> value at the index,
+to avoid likely double-free crashes.
+
+The function B<CRYPTO_free_ex_data> is used to free all exdata attached
+to a structure. The appropriate type-specific routine must be used.
+The B<class_index> identifies the structure type, the B<obj> is
+be the pointer to the actual structure, and B<r> is a pointer to the
+structure's exdata field.
+
+=head2 Callback Functions
+
+This section describes how the callback functions are used. Applications
+that are defining their own exdata using B<CYPRTO_EX_INDEX_APP> must
+call them as described here.
+
+When a structure is initially allocated (such as RSA_new()) then the
+new_func() is called for every defined index. There is no requirement
+that the entire parent, or containing, structure has been set up.
+The new_func() is typically used only to allocate memory to store the
+exdata, and perhaps an "initialized" flag within that memory.
+The exdata value should be set by calling CRYPTO_set_ex_data().
+
+When a structure is free'd (such as SSL_CTX_free()) then the
+free_func() is called for every defined index.  Again, the state of the
+parent structure is not guaranteed.  The free_func() may be called with a
+NULL pointer.
+
+Both new_func() and free_func() take the same parameters.
+The B<parent> is the pointer to the structure that contains the exdata.
+The B<ptr> is the current exdata item; for new_func() this will typically
+be NULL.  The B<r> parameter is a pointer to the exdata field of the object.
+The B<idx> is the index and is the value returned when the callbacks were
+initially registered via CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index() and can be used if
+the same callback handles different types of exdata.
+
+dup_func() is called when a structure is being copied.  This is only done
+for B<SSL>, B<SSL_SESSION>, B<EC_KEY> objects and B<BIO> chains via
+BIO_dup_chain().  The B<to> and B<from> parameters
+are pointers to the destination and source B<CRYPTO_EX_DATA> structures,
+respectively.  The B<from_d> parameter needs to be cast to a B<void **pptr>
+as the API has currently the wrong signature; that will be changed in a
+future version.  The B<*pptr> is a pointer to the source exdata.
+When the dup_func() returns, the value in B<*pptr> is copied to the
+destination ex_data.  If the pointer contained in B<*pptr> is not modified
+by the dup_func(), then both B<to> and B<from> will point to the same data.
+The B<idx>, B<argl> and B<argp> parameters are as described for the other
+two callbacks.  If the dup_func() returns B<0> the whole CRYPTO_dup_ex_data()
+will fail.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index() returns a new index or -1 on failure; the
+value B<0> is reserved for the legacy "app_data" API's.
+
+CRYPTO_free_ex_index() and
+CRYPTO_set_ex_data() return 1 on success or 0 on failure.
+
+CRYPTO_get_ex_data() returns the application data or NULL on failure;
+note that NULL may be a valid value.
+
+dup_func() should return 0 for failure and 1 for success.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2015-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/CTLOG_STORE_get0_log_by_id.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/CTLOG_STORE_get0_log_by_id.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c517e95
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/CTLOG_STORE_get0_log_by_id.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+CTLOG_STORE_get0_log_by_id -
+Get a Certificate Transparency log from a CTLOG_STORE
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ct.h>
+
+ const CTLOG *CTLOG_STORE_get0_log_by_id(const CTLOG_STORE *store,
+                                         const uint8_t *log_id,
+                                         size_t log_id_len);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+A Signed Certificate Timestamp (SCT) identifies the Certificate Transparency
+(CT) log that issued it using the log's LogID (see RFC 6962, Section 3.2).
+Therefore, it is useful to be able to look up more information about a log
+(e.g. its public key) using this LogID.
+
+CTLOG_STORE_get0_log_by_id() provides a way to do this. It will find a CTLOG
+in a CTLOG_STORE that has a given LogID.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+B<CTLOG_STORE_get0_log_by_id> returns a CTLOG with the given LogID, if it
+exists in the given CTLOG_STORE, otherwise it returns NULL.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ct(3)>,
+L<CTLOG_STORE_new(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+This function was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/CTLOG_STORE_new.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/CTLOG_STORE_new.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2a38f26
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/CTLOG_STORE_new.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+CTLOG_STORE_new, CTLOG_STORE_free,
+CTLOG_STORE_load_default_file, CTLOG_STORE_load_file -
+Create and populate a Certificate Transparency log list
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ct.h>
+
+ CTLOG_STORE *CTLOG_STORE_new(void);
+ void CTLOG_STORE_free(CTLOG_STORE *store);
+
+ int CTLOG_STORE_load_default_file(CTLOG_STORE *store);
+ int CTLOG_STORE_load_file(CTLOG_STORE *store, const char *file);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+A CTLOG_STORE is a container for a list of CTLOGs (Certificate Transparency
+logs). The list can be loaded from one or more files and then searched by LogID
+(see RFC 6962, Section 3.2, for the definition of a LogID).
+
+CTLOG_STORE_new() creates an empty list of CT logs. This is then populated
+by CTLOG_STORE_load_default_file() or CTLOG_STORE_load_file().
+CTLOG_STORE_load_default_file() loads from the default file, which is named
+"ct_log_list.cnf" in OPENSSLDIR (see the output of L<version>). This can be
+overridden using an environment variable named "CTLOG_FILE".
+CTLOG_STORE_load_file() loads from a caller-specified file path instead.
+Both of these functions append any loaded CT logs to the CTLOG_STORE.
+
+The expected format of the file is:
+
+ enabled_logs=foo,bar
+
+ [foo]
+ description = Log 1
+ key = <base64-encoded DER SubjectPublicKeyInfo here>
+
+ [bar]
+ description = Log 2
+ key = <base64-encoded DER SubjectPublicKeyInfo here>
+
+Once a CTLOG_STORE is no longer required, it should be passed to
+CTLOG_STORE_free(). This will delete all of the CTLOGs stored within, along
+with the CTLOG_STORE itself.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+If there are any invalid CT logs in a file, they are skipped and the remaining
+valid logs will still be added to the CTLOG_STORE. A CT log will be considered
+invalid if it is missing a "key" or "description" field.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+Both B<CTLOG_STORE_load_default_file> and B<CTLOG_STORE_load_file> return 1 if
+all CT logs in the file are successfully parsed and loaded, 0 otherwise.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ct(3)>,
+L<CTLOG_STORE_get0_log_by_id(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_ctlog_list_file(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+These functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/CTLOG_new.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/CTLOG_new.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ccda6b9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/CTLOG_new.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+CTLOG_new, CTLOG_new_from_base64, CTLOG_free,
+CTLOG_get0_name, CTLOG_get0_log_id, CTLOG_get0_public_key -
+encapsulates information about a Certificate Transparency log
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ct.h>
+
+ CTLOG *CTLOG_new(EVP_PKEY *public_key, const char *name);
+ int CTLOG_new_from_base64(CTLOG ** ct_log,
+                           const char *pkey_base64, const char *name);
+ void CTLOG_free(CTLOG *log);
+ const char *CTLOG_get0_name(const CTLOG *log);
+ void CTLOG_get0_log_id(const CTLOG *log, const uint8_t **log_id,
+                        size_t *log_id_len);
+ EVP_PKEY *CTLOG_get0_public_key(const CTLOG *log);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+CTLOG_new() returns a new CTLOG that represents the Certificate Transparency
+(CT) log with the given public key. A name must also be provided that can be
+used to help users identify this log. Ownership of the public key is
+transferred.
+
+CTLOG_new_from_base64() also creates a new CTLOG, but takes the public key in
+base64-encoded DER form and sets the ct_log pointer to point to the new CTLOG.
+The base64 will be decoded and the public key parsed.
+
+Regardless of whether CTLOG_new() or CTLOG_new_from_base64() is used, it is the
+caller's responsibility to pass the CTLOG to CTLOG_free() once it is no longer
+needed. This will delete it and, if created by CTLOG_new(), the EVP_PKEY that
+was passed to it.
+
+CTLOG_get0_name() returns the name of the log, as provided when the CTLOG was
+created. Ownership of the string remains with the CTLOG.
+
+CTLOG_get0_log_id() sets *log_id to point to a string containing that log's
+LogID (see RFC 6962). It sets *log_id_len to the length of that LogID. For a
+v1 CT log, the LogID will be a SHA-256 hash (i.e. 32 bytes long). Ownership of
+the string remains with the CTLOG.
+
+CTLOG_get0_public_key() returns the public key of the CT log. Ownership of the
+EVP_PKEY remains with the CTLOG.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+CTLOG_new() will return NULL if an error occurs.
+
+CTLOG_new_from_base64() will return 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ct(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+These functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_new.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_new.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7839fd3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_new.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_new, CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_free,
+CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_get0_cert, CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set1_cert,
+CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_get0_issuer, CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set1_issuer,
+CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_get0_log_store, CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set_shared_CTLOG_STORE,
+CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_get_time, CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set_time -
+Encapsulates the data required to evaluate whether SCTs meet a Certificate Transparency policy
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ct.h>
+
+ CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_new(void);
+ void CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_free(CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx);
+ X509* CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_get0_cert(const CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx);
+ int CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set1_cert(CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert);
+ X509* CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_get0_issuer(const CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx);
+ int CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set1_issuer(CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx, X509 *issuer);
+ const CTLOG_STORE *CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_get0_log_store(const CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx);
+ void CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set_shared_CTLOG_STORE(CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx, CTLOG_STORE *log_store);
+ uint64_t CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_get_time(const CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx);
+ void CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set_time(CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx, uint64_t time_in_ms);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+A B<CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX> is used by functions that evaluate whether Signed
+Certificate Timestamps (SCTs) fulfil a Certificate Transparency (CT) policy.
+This policy may be, for example, that at least one valid SCT is available. To
+determine this, an SCT's timestamp and signature must be verified.
+This requires:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item * the public key of the log that issued the SCT
+
+=item * the certificate that the SCT was issued for
+
+=item * the issuer certificate (if the SCT was issued for a pre-certificate)
+
+=item * the current time
+
+=back
+
+The above requirements are met using the setters described below.
+
+CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_new() creates an empty policy evaluation context. This
+should then be populated using:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item * CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set1_cert() to provide the certificate the SCTs were issued for
+
+Increments the reference count of the certificate.
+
+=item * CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set1_issuer() to provide the issuer certificate
+
+Increments the reference count of the certificate.
+
+=item * CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set_shared_CTLOG_STORE() to provide a list of logs that are trusted as sources of SCTs
+
+Holds a pointer to the CTLOG_STORE, so the CTLOG_STORE must outlive the
+CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX.
+
+=item * CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set_time() to set the time SCTs should be compared with to determine if they are valid
+
+The SCT timestamp will be compared to this time to check whether the SCT was
+issued in the future. RFC6962 states that "TLS clients MUST reject SCTs whose
+timestamp is in the future". By default, this will be set to 5 minutes in the
+future (e.g. (time() + 300) * 1000), to allow for clock drift.
+
+The time should be in milliseconds since the Unix epoch.
+
+=back
+
+Each setter has a matching getter for accessing the current value.
+
+When no longer required, the B<CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX> should be passed to
+CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_free() to delete it.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The issuer certificate only needs to be provided if at least one of the SCTs
+was issued for a pre-certificate. This will be the case for SCTs embedded in a
+certificate (i.e. those in an X.509 extension), but may not be the case for SCTs
+found in the TLS SCT extension or OCSP response.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_new() will return NULL if malloc fails.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ct(7)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+These functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/DEFINE_STACK_OF.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/DEFINE_STACK_OF.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f655f84
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/DEFINE_STACK_OF.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,241 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+DEFINE_STACK_OF, DEFINE_STACK_OF_CONST, DEFINE_SPECIAL_STACK_OF,
+DEFINE_SPECIAL_STACK_OF_CONST,
+OPENSSL_sk_deep_copy, OPENSSL_sk_delete, OPENSSL_sk_delete_ptr,
+OPENSSL_sk_dup, OPENSSL_sk_find, OPENSSL_sk_find_ex, OPENSSL_sk_free,
+OPENSSL_sk_insert, OPENSSL_sk_is_sorted, OPENSSL_sk_new, OPENSSL_sk_new_null,
+OPENSSL_sk_num, OPENSSL_sk_pop, OPENSSL_sk_pop_free, OPENSSL_sk_push,
+OPENSSL_sk_set, OPENSSL_sk_set_cmp_func, OPENSSL_sk_shift, OPENSSL_sk_sort,
+OPENSSL_sk_unshift, OPENSSL_sk_value, OPENSSL_sk_zero,
+sk_TYPE_num, sk_TYPE_value, sk_TYPE_new, sk_TYPE_new_null, sk_TYPE_free,
+sk_TYPE_zero, sk_TYPE_delete, sk_TYPE_delete_ptr, sk_TYPE_push,
+sk_TYPE_unshift, sk_TYPE_pop, sk_TYPE_shift, sk_TYPE_pop_free,
+sk_TYPE_insert, sk_TYPE_set, sk_TYPE_find, sk_TYPE_find_ex, sk_TYPE_sort,
+sk_TYPE_is_sorted, sk_TYPE_dup, sk_TYPE_deep_copy, sk_TYPE_set_cmp_func -
+stack container
+
+=for comment generic
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/safestack.h>
+
+ STACK_OF(TYPE)
+ DEFINE_STACK_OF(TYPE)
+ DEFINE_STACK_OF_CONST(TYPE)
+ DEFINE_SPECIAL_STACK_OF(FUNCTYPE, TYPE)
+ DEFINE_SPECIAL_STACK_OF_CONST(FUNCTYPE, TYPE)
+
+ typedef int (*sk_TYPE_compfunc)(const TYPE *const *a, const TYPE *const *b);
+ typedef TYPE * (*sk_TYPE_copyfunc)(const TYPE *a);
+ typedef void (*sk_TYPE_freefunc)(TYPE *a);
+
+ int sk_TYPE_num(const STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk);
+ TYPE *sk_TYPE_value(const STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk, int idx);
+ STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk_TYPE_new(sk_TYPE_compfunc compare);
+ STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk_TYPE_new_null(void);
+ void sk_TYPE_free(const STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk);
+ void sk_TYPE_zero(const STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk);
+ TYPE *sk_TYPE_delete(STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk, int i);
+ TYPE *sk_TYPE_delete_ptr(STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk, TYPE *ptr);
+ int sk_TYPE_push(STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk, const TYPE *ptr);
+ int sk_TYPE_unshift(STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk, const TYPE *ptr);
+ TYPE *sk_TYPE_pop(STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk);
+ TYPE *sk_TYPE_shift(STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk);
+ void sk_TYPE_pop_free(STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk, sk_TYPE_freefunc freefunc);
+ int sk_TYPE_insert(STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk, TYPE *ptr, int idx);
+ TYPE *sk_TYPE_set(STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk, int idx, const TYPE *ptr);
+ int sk_TYPE_find(STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk, TYPE *ptr);
+ int sk_TYPE_find_ex(STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk, TYPE *ptr);
+ void sk_TYPE_sort(const STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk);
+ int sk_TYPE_is_sorted(const STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk);
+ STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk_TYPE_dup(const STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk);
+ STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk_TYPE_deep_copy(const STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk,
+                                   sk_TYPE_copyfunc copyfunc,
+                                   sk_TYPE_freefunc freefunc);
+ sk_TYPE_compfunc (*sk_TYPE_set_cmp_func(STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk, sk_TYPE_compfunc compare);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+Applications can create and use their own stacks by placing any of the macros
+described below in a header file. These macros define typesafe inline
+functions that wrap around the utility B<OPENSSL_sk_> API.
+In the description here, I<TYPE> is used
+as a placeholder for any of the OpenSSL datatypes, such as I<X509>.
+
+STACK_OF() returns the name for a stack of the specified B<TYPE>.
+DEFINE_STACK_OF() creates set of functions for a stack of B<TYPE>. This
+will mean that type B<TYPE> is stored in each stack, the type is referenced by
+STACK_OF(TYPE) and each function name begins with I<sk_TYPE_>. For example:
+
+ TYPE *sk_TYPE_value(STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk, int idx);
+
+DEFINE_STACK_OF_CONST() is identical to DEFINE_STACK_OF() except
+each element is constant. For example:
+
+ const TYPE *sk_TYPE_value(STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk, int idx);
+
+DEFINE_SPECIAL_STACK_OF() defines a stack of B<TYPE> but
+each function uses B<FUNCNAME> in the function name. For example:
+
+ TYPE *sk_FUNCNAME_value(STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk, int idx);
+
+DEFINE_SPECIAL_STACK_OF_CONST() is similar except that each element is
+constant:
+
+ const TYPE *sk_FUNCNAME_value(STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk, int idx);
+
+sk_TYPE_num() returns the number of elements in B<sk> or -1 if B<sk> is
+B<NULL>.
+
+sk_TYPE_value() returns element B<idx> in B<sk>, where B<idx> starts at
+zero. If B<idx> is out of range then B<NULL> is returned.
+
+sk_TYPE_new() allocates a new empty stack using comparison function B<compare>.
+If B<compare> is B<NULL> then no comparison function is used.
+
+sk_TYPE_new_null() allocates a new empty stack with no comparison function.
+
+sk_TYPE_set_cmp_func() sets the comparison function of B<sk> to B<compare>.
+The previous comparison function is returned or B<NULL> if there was
+no previous comparison function.
+
+sk_TYPE_free() frees up the B<sk> structure. It does B<not> free up any
+elements of B<sk>. After this call B<sk> is no longer valid.
+
+sk_TYPE_zero() sets the number of elements in B<sk> to zero. It does not free
+B<sk> so after this call B<sk> is still valid.
+
+sk_TYPE_pop_free() frees up all elements of B<sk> and B<sk> itself. The
+free function freefunc() is called on each element to free it.
+
+sk_TYPE_delete() deletes element B<i> from B<sk>. It returns the deleted
+element or B<NULL> if B<i> is out of range.
+
+sk_TYPE_delete_ptr() deletes element matching B<ptr> from B<sk>. It returns
+the deleted element or B<NULL> if no element matching B<ptr> was found.
+
+sk_TYPE_insert() inserts B<ptr> into B<sk> at position B<idx>. Any existing
+elements at or after B<idx> are moved downwards. If B<idx> is out of range
+the new element is appended to B<sk>. sk_TYPE_insert() either returns the
+number of elements in B<sk> after the new element is inserted or zero if
+an error (such as memory allocation failure) occurred.
+
+sk_TYPE_push() appends B<ptr> to B<sk> it is equivalent to:
+
+ sk_TYPE_insert(sk, ptr, -1);
+
+sk_TYPE_unshift() inserts B<ptr> at the start of B<sk> it is equivalent to:
+
+ sk_TYPE_insert(sk, ptr, 0);
+
+sk_TYPE_pop() returns and removes the last element from B<sk>.
+
+sk_TYPE_shift() returns and removes the first element from B<sk>.
+
+sk_TYPE_set() sets element B<idx> of B<sk> to B<ptr> replacing the current
+element. The new element value is returned or B<NULL> if an error occurred:
+this will only happen if B<sk> is B<NULL> or B<idx> is out of range.
+
+sk_TYPE_find() searches B<sk> for the element B<ptr>.  In the case
+where no comparison function has been specified, the function performs
+a linear search for a pointer equal to B<ptr>. The index of the first
+matching element is returned or B<-1> if there is no match. In the case
+where a comparison function has been specified, B<sk> is sorted then
+sk_TYPE_find() returns the index of a matching element or B<-1> if there
+is no match. Note that, in this case, the matching element returned is
+not guaranteed to be the first; the comparison function will usually
+compare the values pointed to rather than the pointers themselves and
+the order of elements in B<sk> could change.
+
+sk_TYPE_find_ex() operates like sk_TYPE_find() except when a comparison
+function has been specified and no matching element is found. Instead
+of returning B<-1>, sk_TYPE_find_ex() returns the index of the element
+either before or after the location where B<ptr> would be if it were
+present in B<sk>.
+
+sk_TYPE_sort() sorts B<sk> using the supplied comparison function.
+
+sk_TYPE_is_sorted() returns B<1> if B<sk> is sorted and B<0> otherwise.
+
+sk_TYPE_dup() returns a copy of B<sk>. Note the pointers in the copy
+are identical to the original.
+
+sk_TYPE_deep_copy() returns a new stack where each element has been copied.
+Copying is performed by the supplied copyfunc() and freeing by freefunc(). The
+function freefunc() is only called if an error occurs.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+Care should be taken when accessing stacks in multi-threaded environments.
+Any operation which increases the size of a stack such as sk_TYPE_insert() or
+sk_push() can "grow" the size of an internal array and cause race conditions
+if the same stack is accessed in a different thread. Operations such as
+sk_find() and sk_sort() can also reorder the stack.
+
+Any comparison function supplied should use a metric suitable
+for use in a binary search operation. That is it should return zero, a
+positive or negative value if B<a> is equal to, greater than
+or less than B<b> respectively.
+
+Care should be taken when checking the return values of the functions
+sk_TYPE_find() and sk_TYPE_find_ex(). They return an index to the
+matching element. In particular B<0> indicates a matching first element.
+A failed search is indicated by a B<-1> return value.
+
+STACK_OF(), DEFINE_STACK_OF(), DEFINE_STACK_OF_CONST(), and
+DEFINE_SPECIAL_STACK_OF() are implemented as macros.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+sk_TYPE_num() returns the number of elements in the stack or B<-1> if the
+passed stack is B<NULL>.
+
+sk_TYPE_value() returns a pointer to a stack element or B<NULL> if the
+index is out of range.
+
+sk_TYPE_new() and sk_TYPE_new_null() return an empty stack or B<NULL> if
+an error occurs.
+
+sk_TYPE_set_cmp_func() returns the old comparison function or B<NULL> if
+there was no old comparison function.
+
+sk_TYPE_free(), sk_TYPE_zero(), sk_TYPE_pop_free() and sk_TYPE_sort() do
+not return values.
+
+sk_TYPE_pop(), sk_TYPE_shift(), sk_TYPE_delete() and sk_TYPE_delete_ptr()
+return a pointer to the deleted element or B<NULL> on error.
+
+sk_TYPE_insert(), sk_TYPE_push() and sk_TYPE_unshift() return the total
+number of elements in the stack and 0 if an error occurred.
+
+sk_TYPE_set() returns a pointer to the replacement element or B<NULL> on
+error.
+
+sk_TYPE_find() and sk_TYPE_find_ex() return an index to the found element
+or B<-1> on error.
+
+sk_TYPE_is_sorted() returns B<1> if the stack is sorted and B<0> if it is
+not.
+
+sk_TYPE_dup() and sk_TYPE_deep_copy() return a pointer to the copy of the
+stack.
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+Before OpenSSL 1.1.0, this was implemented via macros and not inline functions
+and was not a public API.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/DES_random_key.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/DES_random_key.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..77cfdda
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/DES_random_key.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,310 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+DES_random_key, DES_set_key, DES_key_sched, DES_set_key_checked,
+DES_set_key_unchecked, DES_set_odd_parity, DES_is_weak_key,
+DES_ecb_encrypt, DES_ecb2_encrypt, DES_ecb3_encrypt, DES_ncbc_encrypt,
+DES_cfb_encrypt, DES_ofb_encrypt, DES_pcbc_encrypt, DES_cfb64_encrypt,
+DES_ofb64_encrypt, DES_xcbc_encrypt, DES_ede2_cbc_encrypt,
+DES_ede2_cfb64_encrypt, DES_ede2_ofb64_encrypt, DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt,
+DES_ede3_cfb64_encrypt, DES_ede3_ofb64_encrypt,
+DES_cbc_cksum, DES_quad_cksum, DES_string_to_key, DES_string_to_2keys,
+DES_fcrypt, DES_crypt - DES encryption
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/des.h>
+
+ void DES_random_key(DES_cblock *ret);
+
+ int DES_set_key(const_DES_cblock *key, DES_key_schedule *schedule);
+ int DES_key_sched(const_DES_cblock *key, DES_key_schedule *schedule);
+ int DES_set_key_checked(const_DES_cblock *key,
+        DES_key_schedule *schedule);
+ void DES_set_key_unchecked(const_DES_cblock *key,
+        DES_key_schedule *schedule);
+
+ void DES_set_odd_parity(DES_cblock *key);
+ int DES_is_weak_key(const_DES_cblock *key);
+
+ void DES_ecb_encrypt(const_DES_cblock *input, DES_cblock *output,
+        DES_key_schedule *ks, int enc);
+ void DES_ecb2_encrypt(const_DES_cblock *input, DES_cblock *output,
+        DES_key_schedule *ks1, DES_key_schedule *ks2, int enc);
+ void DES_ecb3_encrypt(const_DES_cblock *input, DES_cblock *output,
+        DES_key_schedule *ks1, DES_key_schedule *ks2,
+        DES_key_schedule *ks3, int enc);
+
+ void DES_ncbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output,
+        long length, DES_key_schedule *schedule, DES_cblock *ivec,
+        int enc);
+ void DES_cfb_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+        int numbits, long length, DES_key_schedule *schedule,
+        DES_cblock *ivec, int enc);
+ void DES_ofb_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+        int numbits, long length, DES_key_schedule *schedule,
+        DES_cblock *ivec);
+ void DES_pcbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output,
+        long length, DES_key_schedule *schedule, DES_cblock *ivec,
+        int enc);
+ void DES_cfb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+        long length, DES_key_schedule *schedule, DES_cblock *ivec,
+        int *num, int enc);
+ void DES_ofb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+        long length, DES_key_schedule *schedule, DES_cblock *ivec,
+        int *num);
+
+ void DES_xcbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output,
+        long length, DES_key_schedule *schedule, DES_cblock *ivec,
+        const_DES_cblock *inw, const_DES_cblock *outw, int enc);
+
+ void DES_ede2_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *input,
+        unsigned char *output, long length, DES_key_schedule *ks1,
+        DES_key_schedule *ks2, DES_cblock *ivec, int enc);
+ void DES_ede2_cfb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in,
+        unsigned char *out, long length, DES_key_schedule *ks1,
+        DES_key_schedule *ks2, DES_cblock *ivec, int *num, int enc);
+ void DES_ede2_ofb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in,
+        unsigned char *out, long length, DES_key_schedule *ks1,
+        DES_key_schedule *ks2, DES_cblock *ivec, int *num);
+
+ void DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *input,
+        unsigned char *output, long length, DES_key_schedule *ks1,
+        DES_key_schedule *ks2, DES_key_schedule *ks3, DES_cblock *ivec,
+        int enc);
+ void DES_ede3_cfb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+        long length, DES_key_schedule *ks1, DES_key_schedule *ks2,
+        DES_key_schedule *ks3, DES_cblock *ivec, int *num, int enc);
+ void DES_ede3_ofb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+        long length, DES_key_schedule *ks1,
+        DES_key_schedule *ks2, DES_key_schedule *ks3,
+        DES_cblock *ivec, int *num);
+
+ DES_LONG DES_cbc_cksum(const unsigned char *input, DES_cblock *output,
+        long length, DES_key_schedule *schedule,
+        const_DES_cblock *ivec);
+ DES_LONG DES_quad_cksum(const unsigned char *input, DES_cblock output[],
+        long length, int out_count, DES_cblock *seed);
+ void DES_string_to_key(const char *str, DES_cblock *key);
+ void DES_string_to_2keys(const char *str, DES_cblock *key1,
+        DES_cblock *key2);
+
+ char *DES_fcrypt(const char *buf, const char *salt, char *ret);
+ char *DES_crypt(const char *buf, const char *salt);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+This library contains a fast implementation of the DES encryption
+algorithm.
+
+There are two phases to the use of DES encryption.  The first is the
+generation of a I<DES_key_schedule> from a key, the second is the
+actual encryption.  A DES key is of type I<DES_cblock>. This type is
+consists of 8 bytes with odd parity.  The least significant bit in
+each byte is the parity bit.  The key schedule is an expanded form of
+the key; it is used to speed the encryption process.
+
+DES_random_key() generates a random key.  The PRNG must be seeded
+prior to using this function (see L<rand(3)>).  If the PRNG
+could not generate a secure key, 0 is returned.
+
+Before a DES key can be used, it must be converted into the
+architecture dependent I<DES_key_schedule> via the
+DES_set_key_checked() or DES_set_key_unchecked() function.
+
+DES_set_key_checked() will check that the key passed is of odd parity
+and is not a weak or semi-weak key.  If the parity is wrong, then -1
+is returned.  If the key is a weak key, then -2 is returned.  If an
+error is returned, the key schedule is not generated.
+
+DES_set_key() works like
+DES_set_key_checked() if the I<DES_check_key> flag is non-zero,
+otherwise like DES_set_key_unchecked().  These functions are available
+for compatibility; it is recommended to use a function that does not
+depend on a global variable.
+
+DES_set_odd_parity() sets the parity of the passed I<key> to odd.
+
+DES_is_weak_key() returns 1 if the passed key is a weak key, 0 if it
+is ok.
+
+The following routines mostly operate on an input and output stream of
+I<DES_cblock>s.
+
+DES_ecb_encrypt() is the basic DES encryption routine that encrypts or
+decrypts a single 8-byte I<DES_cblock> in I<electronic code book>
+(ECB) mode.  It always transforms the input data, pointed to by
+I<input>, into the output data, pointed to by the I<output> argument.
+If the I<encrypt> argument is non-zero (DES_ENCRYPT), the I<input>
+(cleartext) is encrypted in to the I<output> (ciphertext) using the
+key_schedule specified by the I<schedule> argument, previously set via
+I<DES_set_key>. If I<encrypt> is zero (DES_DECRYPT), the I<input> (now
+ciphertext) is decrypted into the I<output> (now cleartext).  Input
+and output may overlap.  DES_ecb_encrypt() does not return a value.
+
+DES_ecb3_encrypt() encrypts/decrypts the I<input> block by using
+three-key Triple-DES encryption in ECB mode.  This involves encrypting
+the input with I<ks1>, decrypting with the key schedule I<ks2>, and
+then encrypting with I<ks3>.  This routine greatly reduces the chances
+of brute force breaking of DES and has the advantage of if I<ks1>,
+I<ks2> and I<ks3> are the same, it is equivalent to just encryption
+using ECB mode and I<ks1> as the key.
+
+The macro DES_ecb2_encrypt() is provided to perform two-key Triple-DES
+encryption by using I<ks1> for the final encryption.
+
+DES_ncbc_encrypt() encrypts/decrypts using the I<cipher-block-chaining>
+(CBC) mode of DES.  If the I<encrypt> argument is non-zero, the
+routine cipher-block-chain encrypts the cleartext data pointed to by
+the I<input> argument into the ciphertext pointed to by the I<output>
+argument, using the key schedule provided by the I<schedule> argument,
+and initialization vector provided by the I<ivec> argument.  If the
+I<length> argument is not an integral multiple of eight bytes, the
+last block is copied to a temporary area and zero filled.  The output
+is always an integral multiple of eight bytes.
+
+DES_xcbc_encrypt() is RSA's DESX mode of DES.  It uses I<inw> and
+I<outw> to 'whiten' the encryption.  I<inw> and I<outw> are secret
+(unlike the iv) and are as such, part of the key.  So the key is sort
+of 24 bytes.  This is much better than CBC DES.
+
+DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt() implements outer triple CBC DES encryption with
+three keys. This means that each DES operation inside the CBC mode is
+an C<C=E(ks3,D(ks2,E(ks1,M)))>.  This mode is used by SSL.
+
+The DES_ede2_cbc_encrypt() macro implements two-key Triple-DES by
+reusing I<ks1> for the final encryption.  C<C=E(ks1,D(ks2,E(ks1,M)))>.
+This form of Triple-DES is used by the RSAREF library.
+
+DES_pcbc_encrypt() encrypt/decrypts using the propagating cipher block
+chaining mode used by Kerberos v4. Its parameters are the same as
+DES_ncbc_encrypt().
+
+DES_cfb_encrypt() encrypt/decrypts using cipher feedback mode.  This
+method takes an array of characters as input and outputs and array of
+characters.  It does not require any padding to 8 character groups.
+Note: the I<ivec> variable is changed and the new changed value needs to
+be passed to the next call to this function.  Since this function runs
+a complete DES ECB encryption per I<numbits>, this function is only
+suggested for use when sending small numbers of characters.
+
+DES_cfb64_encrypt()
+implements CFB mode of DES with 64bit feedback.  Why is this
+useful you ask?  Because this routine will allow you to encrypt an
+arbitrary number of bytes, no 8 byte padding.  Each call to this
+routine will encrypt the input bytes to output and then update ivec
+and num.  num contains 'how far' we are though ivec.  If this does
+not make much sense, read more about cfb mode of DES :-).
+
+DES_ede3_cfb64_encrypt() and DES_ede2_cfb64_encrypt() is the same as
+DES_cfb64_encrypt() except that Triple-DES is used.
+
+DES_ofb_encrypt() encrypts using output feedback mode.  This method
+takes an array of characters as input and outputs and array of
+characters.  It does not require any padding to 8 character groups.
+Note: the I<ivec> variable is changed and the new changed value needs to
+be passed to the next call to this function.  Since this function runs
+a complete DES ECB encryption per numbits, this function is only
+suggested for use when sending small numbers of characters.
+
+DES_ofb64_encrypt() is the same as DES_cfb64_encrypt() using Output
+Feed Back mode.
+
+DES_ede3_ofb64_encrypt() and DES_ede2_ofb64_encrypt() is the same as
+DES_ofb64_encrypt(), using Triple-DES.
+
+The following functions are included in the DES library for
+compatibility with the MIT Kerberos library.
+
+DES_cbc_cksum() produces an 8 byte checksum based on the input stream
+(via CBC encryption).  The last 4 bytes of the checksum are returned
+and the complete 8 bytes are placed in I<output>. This function is
+used by Kerberos v4.  Other applications should use
+L<EVP_DigestInit(3)> etc. instead.
+
+DES_quad_cksum() is a Kerberos v4 function.  It returns a 4 byte
+checksum from the input bytes.  The algorithm can be iterated over the
+input, depending on I<out_count>, 1, 2, 3 or 4 times.  If I<output> is
+non-NULL, the 8 bytes generated by each pass are written into
+I<output>.
+
+The following are DES-based transformations:
+
+DES_fcrypt() is a fast version of the Unix crypt(3) function.  This
+version takes only a small amount of space relative to other fast
+crypt() implementations.  This is different to the normal crypt in
+that the third parameter is the buffer that the return value is
+written into.  It needs to be at least 14 bytes long.  This function
+is thread safe, unlike the normal crypt.
+
+DES_crypt() is a faster replacement for the normal system crypt().
+This function calls DES_fcrypt() with a static array passed as the
+third parameter.  This mostly emulates the normal non-thread-safe semantics
+of crypt(3).
+The B<salt> must be two ASCII characters.
+
+DES_enc_write() writes I<len> bytes to file descriptor I<fd> from
+buffer I<buf>. The data is encrypted via I<pcbc_encrypt> (default)
+using I<sched> for the key and I<iv> as a starting vector.  The actual
+data send down I<fd> consists of 4 bytes (in network byte order)
+containing the length of the following encrypted data.  The encrypted
+data then follows, padded with random data out to a multiple of 8
+bytes.
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+DES_3cbc_encrypt() is flawed and must not be used in applications.
+
+DES_cbc_encrypt() does not modify B<ivec>; use DES_ncbc_encrypt()
+instead.
+
+DES_cfb_encrypt() and DES_ofb_encrypt() operates on input of 8 bits.
+What this means is that if you set numbits to 12, and length to 2, the
+first 12 bits will come from the 1st input byte and the low half of
+the second input byte.  The second 12 bits will have the low 8 bits
+taken from the 3rd input byte and the top 4 bits taken from the 4th
+input byte.  The same holds for output.  This function has been
+implemented this way because most people will be using a multiple of 8
+and because once you get into pulling bytes input bytes apart things
+get ugly!
+
+DES_string_to_key() is available for backward compatibility with the
+MIT library.  New applications should use a cryptographic hash function.
+The same applies for DES_string_to_2key().
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The B<des> library was written to be source code compatible with
+the MIT Kerberos library.
+
+Applications should use the higher level functions
+L<EVP_EncryptInit(3)> etc. instead of calling these
+functions directly.
+
+Single-key DES is insecure due to its short key size.  ECB mode is
+not suitable for most applications; see L<des_modes(7)>.
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+The requirement that the B<salt> parameter to DES_crypt() and DES_fcrypt()
+be two ASCII characters was first enforced in
+OpenSSL 1.1.0.  Previous versions tried to use the letter uppercase B<A>
+if both character were not present, and could crash when given non-ASCII
+on some platforms.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<des_modes(7)>,
+L<EVP_EncryptInit(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/DH_generate_key.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/DH_generate_key.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..de0847a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/DH_generate_key.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+DH_generate_key, DH_compute_key - perform Diffie-Hellman key exchange
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/dh.h>
+
+ int DH_generate_key(DH *dh);
+
+ int DH_compute_key(unsigned char *key, BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+DH_generate_key() performs the first step of a Diffie-Hellman key
+exchange by generating private and public DH values. By calling
+DH_compute_key(), these are combined with the other party's public
+value to compute the shared key.
+
+DH_generate_key() expects B<dh> to contain the shared parameters
+B<dh-E<gt>p> and B<dh-E<gt>g>. It generates a random private DH value
+unless B<dh-E<gt>priv_key> is already set, and computes the
+corresponding public value B<dh-E<gt>pub_key>, which can then be
+published.
+
+DH_compute_key() computes the shared secret from the private DH value
+in B<dh> and the other party's public value in B<pub_key> and stores
+it in B<key>. B<key> must point to B<DH_size(dh)> bytes of memory.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+DH_generate_key() returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
+
+DH_compute_key() returns the size of the shared secret on success, -1
+on error.
+
+The error codes can be obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)>.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<dh(3)>, L<ERR_get_error(3)>, L<rand(3)>, L<DH_size(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/DH_generate_parameters.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/DH_generate_parameters.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ce178af
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/DH_generate_parameters.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+DH_generate_parameters_ex, DH_generate_parameters,
+DH_check, DH_check_params - generate and check Diffie-Hellman
+parameters
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/dh.h>
+
+ int DH_generate_parameters_ex(DH *dh, int prime_len, int generator, BN_GENCB *cb);
+
+ int DH_check(DH *dh, int *codes);
+ int DH_check_params(DH *dh, int *codes);
+
+Deprecated:
+
+ #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x00908000L
+ DH *DH_generate_parameters(int prime_len, int generator,
+     void (*callback)(int, int, void *), void *cb_arg);
+ #endif
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+DH_generate_parameters_ex() generates Diffie-Hellman parameters that can
+be shared among a group of users, and stores them in the provided B<DH>
+structure. The pseudo-random number generator must be
+seeded prior to calling DH_generate_parameters().
+
+B<prime_len> is the length in bits of the safe prime to be generated.
+B<generator> is a small number E<gt> 1, typically 2 or 5.
+
+A callback function may be used to provide feedback about the progress
+of the key generation. If B<cb> is not B<NULL>, it will be
+called as described in L<BN_generate_prime(3)> while a random prime
+number is generated, and when a prime has been found, B<BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 0)>
+is called. See L<BN_generate_prime(3)> for information on
+the BN_GENCB_call() function.
+
+DH_check_params() confirms that the B<p> and B<g> are likely enough to
+be valid.
+This is a lightweight check, if a more thorough check is needed, use
+DH_check().
+The value of B<*codes> is updated with any problems found.
+If B<*codes> is zero then no problems were found, otherwise the
+following bits may be set:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME
+
+The parameter B<p> has been determined to not being an odd prime.
+Note that the lack of this bit doesn't guarantee that B<p> is a
+prime.
+
+=item DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR
+
+The generator B<g> is not suitable.
+Note that the lack of this bit doesn't guarantee that B<g> is
+suitable, unless B<p> is known to be a strong prime.
+
+=back
+
+DH_check() confirms that the Diffie-Hellman parameters B<dh> are valid. The
+value of B<*codes> is updated with any problems found. If B<*codes> is zero then
+no problems were found, otherwise the following bits may be set:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME
+
+The parameter B<p> is not prime.
+
+=item DH_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME
+
+The parameter B<p> is not a safe prime and no B<q> value is present.
+
+=item DH_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR
+
+The generator B<g> cannot be checked for suitability.
+
+=item DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR
+
+The generator B<g> is not suitable.
+
+=item DH_CHECK_Q_NOT_PRIME
+
+The parameter B<q> is not prime.
+
+=item DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE
+
+The parameter B<q> is invalid.
+
+=item DH_CHECK_INVALID_J_VALUE
+
+The parameter B<j> is invalid.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+DH_generate_parameters_ex(), DH_check() and DH_check_params() return 1
+if the check could be performed, 0 otherwise.
+
+DH_generate_parameters() (deprecated) returns a pointer to the DH structure, or
+NULL if the parameter generation fails.
+
+The error codes can be obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)>.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+DH_generate_parameters_ex() and DH_generate_parameters() may run for several
+hours before finding a suitable prime.
+
+The parameters generated by DH_generate_parameters_ex() and DH_generate_parameters()
+are not to be used in signature schemes.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<DH_new(3)>, L<ERR_get_error(3)>, L<RAND_bytes(3)>,
+L<DH_free(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/DH_get0_pqg.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/DH_get0_pqg.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3809813
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/DH_get0_pqg.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+DH_get0_pqg, DH_set0_pqg, DH_get0_key, DH_set0_key, DH_clear_flags,
+DH_test_flags, DH_set_flags, DH_get0_engine, DH_get_length,
+DH_set_length - Routines for getting and setting data in a DH object
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/dh.h>
+
+ void DH_get0_pqg(const DH *dh,
+                  const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q, const BIGNUM **g);
+ int DH_set0_pqg(DH *dh, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g);
+ void DH_get0_key(const DH *dh,
+                  const BIGNUM **pub_key, const BIGNUM **priv_key);
+ int DH_set0_key(DH *dh, BIGNUM *pub_key, BIGNUM *priv_key);
+ void DH_clear_flags(DH *dh, int flags);
+ int DH_test_flags(const DH *dh, int flags);
+ void DH_set_flags(DH *dh, int flags);
+ ENGINE *DH_get0_engine(DH *d);
+ long DH_get_length(const DH *dh);
+ int DH_set_length(DH *dh, long length);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+A DH object contains the parameters B<p>, B<q> and B<g>. Note that the B<q>
+parameter is optional. It also contains a public key (B<pub_key>) and
+(optionally) a private key (B<priv_key>).
+
+The B<p>, B<q> and B<g> parameters can be obtained by calling DH_get0_pqg().
+If the parameters have not yet been set then B<*p>, B<*q> and B<*g> will be set
+to NULL. Otherwise they are set to pointers to their respective values. These
+point directly to the internal representations of the values and therefore
+should not be freed directly.
+
+The B<p>, B<q> and B<g> values can be set by calling DH_set0_pqg() and passing
+the new values for B<p>, B<q> and B<g> as parameters to the function. Calling
+this function transfers the memory management of the values to the DH object,
+and therefore the values that have been passed in should not be freed directly
+after this function has been called. The B<q> parameter may be NULL.
+
+To get the public and private key values use the DH_get0_key() function. A
+pointer to the public key will be stored in B<*pub_key>, and a pointer to the
+private key will be stored in B<*priv_key>. Either may be NULL if they have not
+been set yet, although if the private key has been set then the public key must
+be. The values point to the internal representation of the public key and
+private key values. This memory should not be freed directly.
+
+The public and private key values can be set using DH_set0_key(). Either
+parameter may be NULL, which means the corresponding DH field is left
+untouched. As with DH_set0_pqg() this function transfers the memory management
+of the key values to the DH object, and therefore they should not be freed
+directly after this function has been called.
+
+DH_set_flags() sets the flags in the B<flags> parameter on the DH object.
+Multiple flags can be passed in one go (bitwise ORed together). Any flags that
+are already set are left set. DH_test_flags() tests to see whether the flags
+passed in the B<flags> parameter are currently set in the DH object. Multiple
+flags can be tested in one go. All flags that are currently set are returned, or
+zero if none of the flags are set. DH_clear_flags() clears the specified flags
+within the DH object.
+
+DH_get0_engine() returns a handle to the ENGINE that has been set for this DH
+object, or NULL if no such ENGINE has been set.
+
+The DH_get_length() and DH_set_length() functions get and set the optional
+length parameter associated with this DH object. If the length is non-zero then
+it is used, otherwise it is ignored. The B<length> parameter indicates the
+length of the secret exponent (private key) in bits.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+Values retrieved with DH_get0_key() are owned by the DH object used
+in the call and may therefore I<not> be passed to DH_set0_key().  If
+needed, duplicate the received value using BN_dup() and pass the
+duplicate.  The same applies to DH_get0_pqg() and DH_set0_pqg().
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+DH_set0_pqg() and DH_set0_key() return 1 on success or 0 on failure.
+
+DH_test_flags() returns the current state of the flags in the DH object.
+
+DH_get0_engine() returns the ENGINE set for the DH object or NULL if no ENGINE
+has been set.
+
+DH_get_length() returns the length of the secret exponent (private key) in bits,
+or zero if no such length has been explicitly set.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<dh(3)>, L<DH_new(3)>, L<DH_generate_parameters(3)>, L<DH_generate_key(3)>,
+L<DH_set_method(3)>, L<DH_size(3)>, L<DH_meth_new(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+The functions described here were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/DH_get_1024_160.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/DH_get_1024_160.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4044f10
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/DH_get_1024_160.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+DH_get_1024_160,
+DH_get_2048_224,
+DH_get_2048_256,
+BN_get0_nist_prime_192,
+BN_get0_nist_prime_224,
+BN_get0_nist_prime_256,
+BN_get0_nist_prime_384,
+BN_get0_nist_prime_521,
+BN_get_rfc2409_prime_768,
+BN_get_rfc2409_prime_1024,
+BN_get_rfc3526_prime_1536,
+BN_get_rfc3526_prime_2048,
+BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072,
+BN_get_rfc3526_prime_4096,
+BN_get_rfc3526_prime_6144,
+BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192
+- Create standardized public primes or DH pairs
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/dh.h>
+ DH *DH_get_1024_160(void)
+ DH *DH_get_2048_224(void)
+ DH *DH_get_2048_256(void)
+
+ const BIGNUM *BN_get0_nist_prime_192(void)
+ const BIGNUM *BN_get0_nist_prime_224(void)
+ const BIGNUM *BN_get0_nist_prime_256(void)
+ const BIGNUM *BN_get0_nist_prime_384(void)
+ const BIGNUM *BN_get0_nist_prime_521(void)
+
+ BIGNUM *BN_get_rfc2409_prime_768(BIGNUM *bn)
+ BIGNUM *BN_get_rfc2409_prime_1024(BIGNUM *bn)
+ BIGNUM *BN_get_rfc3526_prime_1536(BIGNUM *bn)
+ BIGNUM *BN_get_rfc3526_prime_2048(BIGNUM *bn)
+ BIGNUM *BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(BIGNUM *bn)
+ BIGNUM *BN_get_rfc3526_prime_4096(BIGNUM *bn)
+ BIGNUM *BN_get_rfc3526_prime_6144(BIGNUM *bn)
+ BIGNUM *BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(BIGNUM *bn)
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+DH_get_1024_160(), DH_get_2048_224(), and DH_get_2048_256() each return
+a DH object for the IETF RFC 5114 value.
+
+BN_get0_nist_prime_192(), BN_get0_nist_prime_224(), BN_get0_nist_prime_256(),
+BN_get0_nist_prime_384(), and BN_get0_nist_prime_521() functions return
+a BIGNUM for the specific NIST prime curve (e.g., P-256).
+
+BN_get_rfc2409_prime_768(), BN_get_rfc2409_prime_1024(),
+BN_get_rfc3526_prime_1536(), BN_get_rfc3526_prime_2048(),
+BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(), BN_get_rfc3526_prime_4096(),
+BN_get_rfc3526_prime_6144(), and BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192() functions
+return a BIGNUM for the specified size from IETF RFC 2409.  If B<bn>
+is not NULL, the BIGNUM will be set into that location as well.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+Defined above.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/DH_meth_new.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/DH_meth_new.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d768da8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/DH_meth_new.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+DH_meth_new, DH_meth_free, DH_meth_dup, DH_meth_get0_name, DH_meth_set1_name,
+DH_meth_get_flags, DH_meth_set_flags, DH_meth_get0_app_data,
+DH_meth_set0_app_data, DH_meth_get_generate_key, DH_meth_set_generate_key,
+DH_meth_get_compute_key, DH_meth_set_compute_key, DH_meth_get_bn_mod_exp,
+DH_meth_set_bn_mod_exp, DH_meth_get_init, DH_meth_set_init, DH_meth_get_finish,
+DH_meth_set_finish, DH_meth_get_generate_params,
+DH_meth_set_generate_params - Routines to build up DH methods
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/dh.h>
+
+ DH_METHOD *DH_meth_new(const char *name, int flags);
+ void DH_meth_free(DH_METHOD *dhm);
+ DH_METHOD *DH_meth_dup(const DH_METHOD *dhm);
+ const char *DH_meth_get0_name(const DH_METHOD *dhm);
+ int DH_meth_set1_name(DH_METHOD *dhm, const char *name);
+ int DH_meth_get_flags(DH_METHOD *dhm);
+ int DH_meth_set_flags(DH_METHOD *dhm, int flags);
+ void *DH_meth_get0_app_data(const DH_METHOD *dhm);
+ int DH_meth_set0_app_data(DH_METHOD *dhm, void *app_data);
+ int (*DH_meth_get_generate_key(const DH_METHOD *dhm)) (DH *);
+ int DH_meth_set_generate_key(DH_METHOD *dhm, int (*generate_key) (DH *));
+ int (*DH_meth_get_compute_key(const DH_METHOD *dhm))
+         (unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh);
+ int DH_meth_set_compute_key(DH_METHOD *dhm,
+         int (*compute_key) (unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh));
+ int (*DH_meth_get_bn_mod_exp(const DH_METHOD *dhm))
+     (const DH *dh, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
+      const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx);
+ int DH_meth_set_bn_mod_exp(DH_METHOD *dhm,
+     int (*bn_mod_exp) (const DH *dh, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
+                        const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx,
+                        BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx));
+ int (*DH_meth_get_init(const DH_METHOD *dhm))(DH *);
+ int DH_meth_set_init(DH_METHOD *dhm, int (*init)(DH *));
+ int (*DH_meth_get_finish(const DH_METHOD *dhm)) (DH *);
+ int DH_meth_set_finish(DH_METHOD *dhm, int (*finish) (DH *));
+ int (*DH_meth_get_generate_params(const DH_METHOD *dhm))
+         (DH *, int, int, BN_GENCB *);
+ int DH_meth_set_generate_params(DH_METHOD *dhm,
+         int (*generate_params) (DH *, int, int, BN_GENCB *));
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The B<DH_METHOD> type is a structure used for the provision of custom DH
+implementations. It provides a set of of functions used by OpenSSL for the
+implementation of the various DH capabilities.
+
+DH_meth_new() creates a new B<DH_METHOD> structure. It should be given a
+unique B<name> and a set of B<flags>. The B<name> should be a NULL terminated
+string, which will be duplicated and stored in the B<DH_METHOD> object. It is
+the callers responsibility to free the original string. The flags will be used
+during the construction of a new B<DH> object based on this B<DH_METHOD>. Any
+new B<DH> object will have those flags set by default.
+
+DH_meth_dup() creates a duplicate copy of the B<DH_METHOD> object passed as a
+parameter. This might be useful for creating a new B<DH_METHOD> based on an
+existing one, but with some differences.
+
+DH_meth_free() destroys a B<DH_METHOD> structure and frees up any memory
+associated with it.
+
+DH_meth_get0_name() will return a pointer to the name of this DH_METHOD. This
+is a pointer to the internal name string and so should not be freed by the
+caller. DH_meth_set1_name() sets the name of the DH_METHOD to B<name>. The
+string is duplicated and the copy is stored in the DH_METHOD structure, so the
+caller remains responsible for freeing the memory associated with the name.
+
+DH_meth_get_flags() returns the current value of the flags associated with this
+DH_METHOD. DH_meth_set_flags() provides the ability to set these flags.
+
+The functions DH_meth_get0_app_data() and DH_meth_set0_app_data() provide the
+ability to associate implementation specific data with the DH_METHOD. It is
+the application's responsibility to free this data before the DH_METHOD is
+freed via a call to DH_meth_free().
+
+DH_meth_get_generate_key() and DH_meth_set_generate_key() get and set the
+function used for generating a new DH key pair respectively. This function will
+be called in response to the application calling DH_generate_key(). The
+parameter for the function has the same meaning as for DH_generate_key().
+
+DH_meth_get_compute_key() and DH_meth_set_compute_key() get and set the
+function used for computing a new DH shared secret respectively. This function
+will be called in response to the application calling DH_compute_key(). The
+parameters for the function have the same meaning as for DH_compute_key().
+
+DH_meth_get_bn_mod_exp() and DH_meth_set_bn_mod_exp() get and set the function
+used for computing the following value:
+
+ r = a ^ p mod m
+
+This function will be called by the default OpenSSL function for
+DH_generate_key(). The result is stored in the B<r> parameter. This function
+may be NULL unless using the default generate key function, in which case it
+must be present.
+
+DH_meth_get_init() and DH_meth_set_init() get and set the function used
+for creating a new DH instance respectively. This function will be
+called in response to the application calling DH_new() (if the current default
+DH_METHOD is this one) or DH_new_method(). The DH_new() and DH_new_method()
+functions will allocate the memory for the new DH object, and a pointer to this
+newly allocated structure will be passed as a parameter to the function. This
+function may be NULL.
+
+DH_meth_get_finish() and DH_meth_set_finish() get and set the function used
+for destroying an instance of a DH object respectively. This function will be
+called in response to the application calling DH_free(). A pointer to the DH
+to be destroyed is passed as a parameter. The destroy function should be used
+for DH implementation specific clean up. The memory for the DH itself should
+not be freed by this function. This function may be NULL.
+
+DH_meth_get_generate_params() and DH_meth_set_generate_params() get and set the
+function used for generating DH parameters respectively. This function will be
+called in response to the application calling DH_generate_parameters_ex() (or
+DH_generate_parameters()). The parameters for the function have the same
+meaning as for DH_generate_parameters_ex(). This function may be NULL.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+DH_meth_new() and DH_meth_dup() return the newly allocated DH_METHOD object
+or NULL on failure.
+
+DH_meth_get0_name() and DH_meth_get_flags() return the name and flags
+associated with the DH_METHOD respectively.
+
+All other DH_meth_get_*() functions return the appropriate function pointer
+that has been set in the DH_METHOD, or NULL if no such pointer has yet been
+set.
+
+DH_meth_set1_name() and all DH_meth_set_*() functions return 1 on success or
+0 on failure.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<dh(3)>, L<DH_new(3)>, L<DH_generate_parameters(3)>, L<DH_generate_key(3)>,
+L<DH_set_method(3)>, L<DH_size(3)>, L<DH_get0_pqg(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+The functions described here were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/DH_new.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/DH_new.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..959a470
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/DH_new.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+DH_new, DH_free - allocate and free DH objects
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/dh.h>
+
+ DH* DH_new(void);
+
+ void DH_free(DH *dh);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+DH_new() allocates and initializes a B<DH> structure.
+
+DH_free() frees the B<DH> structure and its components. The values are
+erased before the memory is returned to the system.
+If B<dh> is NULL nothing is done.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+If the allocation fails, DH_new() returns B<NULL> and sets an error
+code that can be obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)>. Otherwise it returns
+a pointer to the newly allocated structure.
+
+DH_free() returns no value.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<dh(3)>, L<ERR_get_error(3)>,
+L<DH_generate_parameters(3)>,
+L<DH_generate_key(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/DH_set_method.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/DH_set_method.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2100608
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/DH_set_method.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+DH_set_default_method, DH_get_default_method,
+DH_set_method, DH_new_method, DH_OpenSSL - select DH method
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/dh.h>
+
+ void DH_set_default_method(const DH_METHOD *meth);
+
+ const DH_METHOD *DH_get_default_method(void);
+
+ int DH_set_method(DH *dh, const DH_METHOD *meth);
+
+ DH *DH_new_method(ENGINE *engine);
+
+ const DH_METHOD *DH_OpenSSL(void);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+A B<DH_METHOD> specifies the functions that OpenSSL uses for Diffie-Hellman
+operations. By modifying the method, alternative implementations
+such as hardware accelerators may be used. IMPORTANT: See the NOTES section for
+important information about how these DH API functions are affected by the use
+of B<ENGINE> API calls.
+
+Initially, the default DH_METHOD is the OpenSSL internal implementation, as
+returned by DH_OpenSSL().
+
+DH_set_default_method() makes B<meth> the default method for all DH
+structures created later.
+B<NB>: This is true only whilst no ENGINE has been set
+as a default for DH, so this function is no longer recommended.
+This function is not thread-safe and should not be called at the same time
+as other OpenSSL functions.
+
+DH_get_default_method() returns a pointer to the current default DH_METHOD.
+However, the meaningfulness of this result is dependent on whether the ENGINE
+API is being used, so this function is no longer recommended.
+
+DH_set_method() selects B<meth> to perform all operations using the key B<dh>.
+This will replace the DH_METHOD used by the DH key and if the previous method
+was supplied by an ENGINE, the handle to that ENGINE will be released during the
+change. It is possible to have DH keys that only work with certain DH_METHOD
+implementations (eg. from an ENGINE module that supports embedded
+hardware-protected keys), and in such cases attempting to change the DH_METHOD
+for the key can have unexpected results.
+
+DH_new_method() allocates and initializes a DH structure so that B<engine> will
+be used for the DH operations. If B<engine> is NULL, the default ENGINE for DH
+operations is used, and if no default ENGINE is set, the DH_METHOD controlled by
+DH_set_default_method() is used.
+
+A new DH_METHOD object may be constructed using DH_meth_new() (see
+L<DH_meth_new(3)>).
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+DH_OpenSSL() and DH_get_default_method() return pointers to the respective
+B<DH_METHOD>s.
+
+DH_set_default_method() returns no value.
+
+DH_set_method() returns non-zero if the provided B<meth> was successfully set as
+the method for B<dh> (including unloading the ENGINE handle if the previous
+method was supplied by an ENGINE).
+
+DH_new_method() returns NULL and sets an error code that can be obtained by
+L<ERR_get_error(3)> if the allocation fails. Otherwise it
+returns a pointer to the newly allocated structure.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<dh(3)>, L<DH_new(3)>, L<DH_meth_new(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/DH_size.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/DH_size.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8c1d151
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/DH_size.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+DH_size, DH_bits - get Diffie-Hellman prime size
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+
+int DH_size(const DH *dh);
+
+int DH_bits(const DH *dh);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+DH_size() returns the Diffie-Hellman prime size in bytes. It can be used
+to determine how much memory must be allocated for the shared secret
+computed by DH_compute_key().
+
+DH_bits() returns the number of significant bits.
+
+B<dh> and B<dh-E<gt>p> must not be B<NULL>.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUE
+
+The size.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<dh(3)>, L<DH_generate_key(3)>,
+L<BN_num_bits(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+DH_bits() was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/DSA_SIG_new.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/DSA_SIG_new.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7503460
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/DSA_SIG_new.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+DSA_SIG_get0, DSA_SIG_set0,
+DSA_SIG_new, DSA_SIG_free - allocate and free DSA signature objects
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/dsa.h>
+
+ DSA_SIG *DSA_SIG_new(void);
+ void DSA_SIG_free(DSA_SIG *a);
+ void DSA_SIG_get0(const DSA_SIG *sig, const BIGNUM **pr, const BIGNUM **ps);
+ int DSA_SIG_set0(DSA_SIG *sig, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *s);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+DSA_SIG_new() allocates an empty B<DSA_SIG> structure.
+
+DSA_SIG_free() frees the B<DSA_SIG> structure and its components. The
+values are erased before the memory is returned to the system.
+
+DSA_SIG_get0() returns internal pointers to the B<r> and B<s> values contained
+in B<sig>.
+
+The B<r> and B<s> values can be set by calling DSA_SIG_set0() and passing the
+new values for B<r> and B<s> as parameters to the function. Calling this
+function transfers the memory management of the values to the DSA_SIG object,
+and therefore the values that have been passed in should not be freed directly
+after this function has been called.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+If the allocation fails, DSA_SIG_new() returns B<NULL> and sets an
+error code that can be obtained by
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>. Otherwise it returns a pointer
+to the newly allocated structure.
+
+DSA_SIG_free() returns no value.
+
+DSA_SIG_set0() returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<dsa(3)>, L<ERR_get_error(3)>,
+L<DSA_do_sign(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/DSA_do_sign.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/DSA_do_sign.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5e56d20
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/DSA_do_sign.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+DSA_do_sign, DSA_do_verify - raw DSA signature operations
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/dsa.h>
+
+ DSA_SIG *DSA_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa);
+
+ int DSA_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
+             DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+DSA_do_sign() computes a digital signature on the B<len> byte message
+digest B<dgst> using the private key B<dsa> and returns it in a
+newly allocated B<DSA_SIG> structure.
+
+L<DSA_sign_setup(3)> may be used to precompute part
+of the signing operation in case signature generation is
+time-critical.
+
+DSA_do_verify() verifies that the signature B<sig> matches a given
+message digest B<dgst> of size B<len>.  B<dsa> is the signer's public
+key.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+DSA_do_sign() returns the signature, NULL on error.  DSA_do_verify()
+returns 1 for a valid signature, 0 for an incorrect signature and -1
+on error. The error codes can be obtained by
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<dsa(3)>, L<ERR_get_error(3)>, L<rand(3)>,
+L<DSA_SIG_new(3)>,
+L<DSA_sign(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/DSA_dup_DH.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/DSA_dup_DH.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6967ef3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/DSA_dup_DH.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+DSA_dup_DH - create a DH structure out of DSA structure
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/dsa.h>
+
+ DH * DSA_dup_DH(const DSA *r);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+DSA_dup_DH() duplicates DSA parameters/keys as DH parameters/keys. q
+is lost during that conversion, but the resulting DH parameters
+contain its length.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUE
+
+DSA_dup_DH() returns the new B<DH> structure, and NULL on error. The
+error codes can be obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)>.
+
+=head1 NOTE
+
+Be careful to avoid small subgroup attacks when using this.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<dh(3)>, L<dsa(3)>, L<ERR_get_error(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/DSA_generate_key.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/DSA_generate_key.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4781abe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/DSA_generate_key.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+DSA_generate_key - generate DSA key pair
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/dsa.h>
+
+ int DSA_generate_key(DSA *a);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+DSA_generate_key() expects B<a> to contain DSA parameters. It generates
+a new key pair and stores it in B<a-E<gt>pub_key> and B<a-E<gt>priv_key>.
+
+The PRNG must be seeded prior to calling DSA_generate_key().
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUE
+
+DSA_generate_key() returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
+The error codes can be obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)>.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<dsa(3)>, L<ERR_get_error(3)>, L<rand(3)>,
+L<DSA_generate_parameters(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/DSA_generate_parameters.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/DSA_generate_parameters.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fc05149
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/DSA_generate_parameters.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+DSA_generate_parameters_ex, DSA_generate_parameters - generate DSA parameters
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/dsa.h>
+
+ int DSA_generate_parameters_ex(DSA *dsa, int bits,
+                const unsigned char *seed, int seed_len,
+                int *counter_ret, unsigned long *h_ret, BN_GENCB *cb);
+
+Deprecated:
+
+ #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x00908000L
+ DSA *DSA_generate_parameters(int bits, unsigned char *seed,
+                int seed_len, int *counter_ret, unsigned long *h_ret,
+                void (*callback)(int, int, void *), void *cb_arg);
+ #endif
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+DSA_generate_parameters_ex() generates primes p and q and a generator g
+for use in the DSA and stores the result in B<dsa>.
+
+B<bits> is the length of the prime p to be generated.
+For lengths under 2048 bits, the length of q is 160 bits; for lengths
+greater than or equal to 2048 bits, the length of q is set to 256 bits.
+
+If B<seed> is NULL, the primes will be generated at random.
+If B<seed_len> is less than the length of q, an error is returned.
+
+DSA_generate_parameters_ex() places the iteration count in
+*B<counter_ret> and a counter used for finding a generator in
+*B<h_ret>, unless these are B<NULL>.
+
+A callback function may be used to provide feedback about the progress
+of the key generation. If B<cb> is not B<NULL>, it will be
+called as shown below. For information on the BN_GENCB structure and the
+BN_GENCB_call function discussed below, refer to
+L<BN_generate_prime(3)>.
+
+=over 2
+
+=item *
+
+When a candidate for q is generated, B<BN_GENCB_call(cb, 0, m++)> is called
+(m is 0 for the first candidate).
+
+=item *
+
+When a candidate for q has passed a test by trial division,
+B<BN_GENCB_call(cb, 1, -1)> is called.
+While a candidate for q is tested by Miller-Rabin primality tests,
+B<BN_GENCB_call(cb, 1, i)> is called in the outer loop
+(once for each witness that confirms that the candidate may be prime);
+i is the loop counter (starting at 0).
+
+=item *
+
+When a prime q has been found, B<BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, 0)> and
+B<BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 0)> are called.
+
+=item *
+
+Before a candidate for p (other than the first) is generated and tested,
+B<BN_GENCB_call(cb, 0, counter)> is called.
+
+=item *
+
+When a candidate for p has passed the test by trial division,
+B<BN_GENCB_call(cb, 1, -1)> is called.
+While it is tested by the Miller-Rabin primality test,
+B<BN_GENCB_call(cb, 1, i)> is called in the outer loop
+(once for each witness that confirms that the candidate may be prime).
+i is the loop counter (starting at 0).
+
+=item *
+
+When p has been found, B<BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, 1)> is called.
+
+=item *
+
+When the generator has been found, B<BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 1)> is called.
+
+=back
+
+DSA_generate_parameters() (deprecated) works in much the same way as for DSA_generate_parameters_ex, except that no B<dsa> parameter is passed and
+instead a newly allocated B<DSA> structure is returned. Additionally "old
+style" callbacks are used instead of the newer BN_GENCB based approach.
+Refer to L<BN_generate_prime(3)> for further information.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUE
+
+DSA_generate_parameters_ex() returns a 1 on success, or 0 otherwise.
+
+DSA_generate_parameters() returns a pointer to the DSA structure, or
+B<NULL> if the parameter generation fails.
+
+The error codes can be obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)>.
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+Seed lengths E<gt> 20 are not supported.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<DSA_new(3)>, L<ERR_get_error(3)>, L<RAND_bytes(3)>,
+L<DSA_free(3)>, L<BN_generate_prime(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/DSA_get0_pqg.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/DSA_get0_pqg.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6c1c09a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/DSA_get0_pqg.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+DSA_get0_pqg, DSA_set0_pqg, DSA_get0_key, DSA_set0_key, DSA_clear_flags,
+DSA_test_flags, DSA_set_flags, DSA_get0_engine - Routines for getting and
+setting data in a DSA object
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/dsa.h>
+
+ void DSA_get0_pqg(const DSA *d,
+                   const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q, const BIGNUM **g);
+ int DSA_set0_pqg(DSA *d, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g);
+ void DSA_get0_key(const DSA *d,
+                   const BIGNUM **pub_key, const BIGNUM **priv_key);
+ int DSA_set0_key(DSA *d, BIGNUM *pub_key, BIGNUM *priv_key);
+ void DSA_clear_flags(DSA *d, int flags);
+ int DSA_test_flags(const DSA *d, int flags);
+ void DSA_set_flags(DSA *d, int flags);
+ ENGINE *DSA_get0_engine(DSA *d);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+A DSA object contains the parameters B<p>, B<q> and B<g>. It also contains a
+public key (B<pub_key>) and (optionally) a private key (B<priv_key>).
+
+The B<p>, B<q> and B<g> parameters can be obtained by calling DSA_get0_pqg().
+If the parameters have not yet been set then B<*p>, B<*q> and B<*g> will be set
+to NULL. Otherwise they are set to pointers to their respective values. These
+point directly to the internal representations of the values and therefore
+should not be freed directly.
+
+The B<p>, B<q> and B<g> values can be set by calling DSA_set0_pqg() and passing
+the new values for B<p>, B<q> and B<g> as parameters to the function. Calling
+this function transfers the memory management of the values to the DSA object,
+and therefore the values that have been passed in should not be freed directly
+after this function has been called.
+
+To get the public and private key values use the DSA_get0_key() function. A
+pointer to the public key will be stored in B<*pub_key>, and a pointer to the
+private key will be stored in B<*priv_key>. Either may be NULL if they have not
+been set yet, although if the private key has been set then the public key must
+be. The values point to the internal representation of the public key and
+private key values. This memory should not be freed directly.
+
+The public and private key values can be set using DSA_set0_key(). The public
+key must be non-NULL the first time this function is called on a given DSA
+object. The private key may be NULL.  On subsequent calls, either may be NULL,
+which means the corresponding DSA field is left untouched. As for DSA_set0_pqg()
+this function transfers the memory management of the key values to the DSA
+object, and therefore they should not be freed directly after this function has
+been called.
+
+DSA_set_flags() sets the flags in the B<flags> parameter on the DSA object.
+Multiple flags can be passed in one go (bitwise ORed together). Any flags that
+are already set are left set. DSA_test_flags() tests to see whether the flags
+passed in the B<flags> parameter are currently set in the DSA object. Multiple
+flags can be tested in one go. All flags that are currently set are returned, or
+zero if none of the flags are set. DSA_clear_flags() clears the specified flags
+within the DSA object.
+
+DSA_get0_engine() returns a handle to the ENGINE that has been set for this DSA
+object, or NULL if no such ENGINE has been set.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+Values retrieved with DSA_get0_key() are owned by the DSA object used
+in the call and may therefore I<not> be passed to DSA_set0_key().  If
+needed, duplicate the received value using BN_dup() and pass the
+duplicate.  The same applies to DSA_get0_pqg() and DSA_set0_pqg().
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+DSA_set0_pqg() and DSA_set0_key() return 1 on success or 0 on failure.
+
+DSA_test_flags() returns the current state of the flags in the DSA object.
+
+DSA_get0_engine() returns the ENGINE set for the DSA object or NULL if no ENGINE
+has been set.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<dsa(3)>, L<DSA_new(3)>, L<DSA_generate_parameters(3)>, L<DSA_generate_key(3)>,
+L<DSA_dup_DH(3)>, L<DSA_do_sign(3)>, L<DSA_set_method(3)>, L<DSA_SIG_new(3)>,
+L<DSA_sign(3)>, L<DSA_size(3)>, L<DSA_meth_new(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+The functions described here were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/DSA_meth_new.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/DSA_meth_new.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..948ab29
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/DSA_meth_new.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+DSA_meth_new, DSA_meth_free, DSA_meth_dup, DSA_meth_get0_name,
+DSA_meth_set1_name, DSA_meth_get_flags, DSA_meth_set_flags,
+DSA_meth_get0_app_data, DSA_meth_set0_app_data, DSA_meth_get_sign,
+DSA_meth_set_sign, DSA_meth_get_sign_setup, DSA_meth_set_sign_setup,
+DSA_meth_get_verify, DSA_meth_set_verify, DSA_meth_get_mod_exp,
+DSA_meth_set_mod_exp, DSA_meth_get_bn_mod_exp, DSA_meth_set_bn_mod_exp,
+DSA_meth_get_init, DSA_meth_set_init, DSA_meth_get_finish, DSA_meth_set_finish,
+DSA_meth_get_paramgen, DSA_meth_set_paramgen, DSA_meth_get_keygen,
+DSA_meth_set_keygen - Routines to build up DSA methods
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/dsa.h>
+
+ DSA_METHOD *DSA_meth_new(const char *name, int flags);
+ void DSA_meth_free(DSA_METHOD *dsam);
+ DSA_METHOD *DSA_meth_dup(const DSA_METHOD *meth);
+ const char *DSA_meth_get0_name(const DSA_METHOD *dsam);
+ int DSA_meth_set1_name(DSA_METHOD *dsam, const char *name);
+ int DSA_meth_get_flags(DSA_METHOD *dsam);
+ int DSA_meth_set_flags(DSA_METHOD *dsam, int flags);
+ void *DSA_meth_get0_app_data(const DSA_METHOD *dsam);
+ int DSA_meth_set0_app_data(DSA_METHOD *dsam, void *app_data);
+ DSA_SIG *(*DSA_meth_get_sign(const DSA_METHOD *dsam))
+         (const unsigned char *, int, DSA *);
+ int DSA_meth_set_sign(DSA_METHOD *dsam,
+                       DSA_SIG *(*sign) (const unsigned char *, int, DSA *));
+ int (*DSA_meth_get_sign_setup(const DSA_METHOD *dsam))
+         (DSA *, BN_CTX *, BIGNUM **, BIGNUM **);
+ int DSA_meth_set_sign_setup(DSA_METHOD *dsam,
+         int (*sign_setup) (DSA *, BN_CTX *, BIGNUM **, BIGNUM **));
+ int (*DSA_meth_get_verify(const DSA_METHOD *dsam))
+         (const unsigned char *, int , DSA_SIG *, DSA *);
+ int DSA_meth_set_verify(DSA_METHOD *dsam,
+     int (*verify) (const unsigned char *, int, DSA_SIG *, DSA *));
+ int (*DSA_meth_get_mod_exp(const DSA_METHOD *dsam))
+        (DSA *dsa, BIGNUM *rr, BIGNUM *a1, BIGNUM *p1, BIGNUM *a2, BIGNUM *p2,
+         BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont);
+ int DSA_meth_set_mod_exp(DSA_METHOD *dsam,
+     int (*mod_exp) (DSA *dsa, BIGNUM *rr, BIGNUM *a1, BIGNUM *p1, BIGNUM *a2,
+                     BIGNUM *p2, BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *mont));
+ int (*DSA_meth_get_bn_mod_exp(const DSA_METHOD *dsam))
+     (DSA *dsa, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m,
+      BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *mont);
+ int DSA_meth_set_bn_mod_exp(DSA_METHOD *dsam,
+     int (*bn_mod_exp) (DSA *dsa, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
+                        const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *mont));
+ int (*DSA_meth_get_init(const DSA_METHOD *dsam))(DSA *);
+ int DSA_meth_set_init(DSA_METHOD *dsam, int (*init)(DSA *));
+ int (*DSA_meth_get_finish(const DSA_METHOD *dsam)) (DSA *);
+ int DSA_meth_set_finish(DSA_METHOD *dsam, int (*finish) (DSA *));
+ int (*DSA_meth_get_paramgen(const DSA_METHOD *dsam))
+         (DSA *, int, const unsigned char *, int, int *, unsigned long *,
+          BN_GENCB *);
+ int DSA_meth_set_paramgen(DSA_METHOD *dsam,
+         int (*paramgen) (DSA *, int, const unsigned char *, int, int *,
+                          unsigned long *, BN_GENCB *));
+ int (*DSA_meth_get_keygen(const DSA_METHOD *dsam)) (DSA *);
+ int DSA_meth_set_keygen(DSA_METHOD *dsam, int (*keygen) (DSA *));
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The B<DSA_METHOD> type is a structure used for the provision of custom DSA
+implementations. It provides a set of of functions used by OpenSSL for the
+implementation of the various DSA capabilities. See the L<dsa> page for more
+information.
+
+DSA_meth_new() creates a new B<DSA_METHOD> structure. It should be given a
+unique B<name> and a set of B<flags>. The B<name> should be a NULL terminated
+string, which will be duplicated and stored in the B<DSA_METHOD> object. It is
+the callers responsibility to free the original string. The flags will be used
+during the construction of a new B<DSA> object based on this B<DSA_METHOD>. Any
+new B<DSA> object will have those flags set by default.
+
+DSA_meth_dup() creates a duplicate copy of the B<DSA_METHOD> object passed as a
+parameter. This might be useful for creating a new B<DSA_METHOD> based on an
+existing one, but with some differences.
+
+DSA_meth_free() destroys a B<DSA_METHOD> structure and frees up any memory
+associated with it.
+
+DSA_meth_get0_name() will return a pointer to the name of this DSA_METHOD. This
+is a pointer to the internal name string and so should not be freed by the
+caller. DSA_meth_set1_name() sets the name of the DSA_METHOD to B<name>. The
+string is duplicated and the copy is stored in the DSA_METHOD structure, so the
+caller remains responsible for freeing the memory associated with the name.
+
+DSA_meth_get_flags() returns the current value of the flags associated with this
+DSA_METHOD. DSA_meth_set_flags() provides the ability to set these flags.
+
+The functions DSA_meth_get0_app_data() and DSA_meth_set0_app_data() provide the
+ability to associate implementation specific data with the DSA_METHOD. It is
+the application's responsibility to free this data before the DSA_METHOD is
+freed via a call to DSA_meth_free().
+
+DSA_meth_get_sign() and DSA_meth_set_sign() get and set the function used for
+creating a DSA signature respectively. This function will be
+called in response to the application calling DSA_do_sign() (or DSA_sign()). The
+parameters for the function have the same meaning as for DSA_do_sign().
+
+DSA_meth_get_sign_setup() and DSA_meth_set_sign_setup() get and set the function
+used for precalculating the DSA signature values B<k^-1> and B<r>. This function
+will be called in response to the application calling DSA_sign_setup(). The
+parameters for the function have the same meaning as for DSA_sign_setup().
+
+DSA_meth_get_verify() and DSA_meth_set_verify() get and set the function used
+for verifying a DSA signature respectively. This function will be called in
+response to the application calling DSA_do_verify() (or DSA_verify()). The
+parameters for the function have the same meaning as for DSA_do_verify().
+
+DSA_meth_get_mod_exp() and DSA_meth_set_mod_exp() get and set the function used
+for computing the following value:
+
+ rr = a1^p1 * a2^p2 mod m
+
+This function will be called by the default OpenSSL method during verification
+of a DSA signature. The result is stored in the B<rr> parameter. This function
+may be NULL.
+
+DSA_meth_get_bn_mod_exp() and DSA_meth_set_bn_mod_exp() get and set the function
+used for computing the following value:
+
+ r = a ^ p mod m
+
+This function will be called by the default OpenSSL function for
+DSA_sign_setup(). The result is stored in the B<r> parameter. This function
+may be NULL.
+
+DSA_meth_get_init() and DSA_meth_set_init() get and set the function used
+for creating a new DSA instance respectively. This function will be
+called in response to the application calling DSA_new() (if the current default
+DSA_METHOD is this one) or DSA_new_method(). The DSA_new() and DSA_new_method()
+functions will allocate the memory for the new DSA object, and a pointer to this
+newly allocated structure will be passed as a parameter to the function. This
+function may be NULL.
+
+DSA_meth_get_finish() and DSA_meth_set_finish() get and set the function used
+for destroying an instance of a DSA object respectively. This function will be
+called in response to the application calling DSA_free(). A pointer to the DSA
+to be destroyed is passed as a parameter. The destroy function should be used
+for DSA implementation specific clean up. The memory for the DSA itself should
+not be freed by this function. This function may be NULL.
+
+DSA_meth_get_paramgen() and DSA_meth_set_paramgen() get and set the function
+used for generating DSA parameters respectively. This function will be called in
+response to the application calling DSA_generate_parameters_ex() (or
+DSA_generate_parameters()). The parameters for the function have the same
+meaning as for DSA_generate_parameters_ex().
+
+DSA_meth_get_keygen() and DSA_meth_set_keygen() get and set the function
+used for generating a new DSA key pair respectively. This function will be
+called in response to the application calling DSA_generate_key(). The parameter
+for the function has the same meaning as for DSA_generate_key().
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+DSA_meth_new() and DSA_meth_dup() return the newly allocated DSA_METHOD object
+or NULL on failure.
+
+DSA_meth_get0_name() and DSA_meth_get_flags() return the name and flags
+associated with the DSA_METHOD respectively.
+
+All other DSA_meth_get_*() functions return the appropriate function pointer
+that has been set in the DSA_METHOD, or NULL if no such pointer has yet been
+set.
+
+DSA_meth_set1_name() and all DSA_meth_set_*() functions return 1 on success or
+0 on failure.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<dsa(3)>, L<DSA_new(3)>, L<DSA_generate_parameters(3)>, L<DSA_generate_key(3)>,
+L<DSA_dup_DH(3)>, L<DSA_do_sign(3)>, L<DSA_set_method(3)>, L<DSA_SIG_new(3)>,
+L<DSA_sign(3)>, L<DSA_size(3)>, L<DSA_get0_pqg(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+The functions described here were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/DSA_new.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/DSA_new.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a967ab5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/DSA_new.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+DSA_new, DSA_free - allocate and free DSA objects
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/dsa.h>
+
+ DSA* DSA_new(void);
+
+ void DSA_free(DSA *dsa);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+DSA_new() allocates and initializes a B<DSA> structure. It is equivalent to
+calling DSA_new_method(NULL).
+
+DSA_free() frees the B<DSA> structure and its components. The values are
+erased before the memory is returned to the system.
+If B<dsa> is NULL nothing is done.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+If the allocation fails, DSA_new() returns B<NULL> and sets an error
+code that can be obtained by
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>. Otherwise it returns a pointer
+to the newly allocated structure.
+
+DSA_free() returns no value.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<dsa(3)>, L<ERR_get_error(3)>,
+L<DSA_generate_parameters(3)>,
+L<DSA_generate_key(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/DSA_set_method.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/DSA_set_method.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d870f56
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/DSA_set_method.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+DSA_set_default_method, DSA_get_default_method,
+DSA_set_method, DSA_new_method, DSA_OpenSSL - select DSA method
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/dsa.h>
+
+ void DSA_set_default_method(const DSA_METHOD *meth);
+
+ const DSA_METHOD *DSA_get_default_method(void);
+
+ int DSA_set_method(DSA *dsa, const DSA_METHOD *meth);
+
+ DSA *DSA_new_method(ENGINE *engine);
+
+ DSA_METHOD *DSA_OpenSSL(void);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+A B<DSA_METHOD> specifies the functions that OpenSSL uses for DSA
+operations. By modifying the method, alternative implementations
+such as hardware accelerators may be used. IMPORTANT: See the NOTES section for
+important information about how these DSA API functions are affected by the use
+of B<ENGINE> API calls.
+
+Initially, the default DSA_METHOD is the OpenSSL internal implementation,
+as returned by DSA_OpenSSL().
+
+DSA_set_default_method() makes B<meth> the default method for all DSA
+structures created later.
+B<NB>: This is true only whilst no ENGINE has
+been set as a default for DSA, so this function is no longer recommended.
+This function is not thread-safe and should not be called at the same time
+as other OpenSSL functions.
+
+DSA_get_default_method() returns a pointer to the current default
+DSA_METHOD. However, the meaningfulness of this result is dependent on
+whether the ENGINE API is being used, so this function is no longer
+recommended.
+
+DSA_set_method() selects B<meth> to perform all operations using the key
+B<rsa>. This will replace the DSA_METHOD used by the DSA key and if the
+previous method was supplied by an ENGINE, the handle to that ENGINE will
+be released during the change. It is possible to have DSA keys that only
+work with certain DSA_METHOD implementations (eg. from an ENGINE module
+that supports embedded hardware-protected keys), and in such cases
+attempting to change the DSA_METHOD for the key can have unexpected
+results. See L<DSA_meth_new> for information on constructing custom DSA_METHOD
+objects;
+
+DSA_new_method() allocates and initializes a DSA structure so that B<engine>
+will be used for the DSA operations. If B<engine> is NULL, the default engine
+for DSA operations is used, and if no default ENGINE is set, the DSA_METHOD
+controlled by DSA_set_default_method() is used.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+DSA_OpenSSL() and DSA_get_default_method() return pointers to the respective
+B<DSA_METHOD>s.
+
+DSA_set_default_method() returns no value.
+
+DSA_set_method() returns non-zero if the provided B<meth> was successfully set as
+the method for B<dsa> (including unloading the ENGINE handle if the previous
+method was supplied by an ENGINE).
+
+DSA_new_method() returns NULL and sets an error code that can be
+obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)> if the allocation
+fails. Otherwise it returns a pointer to the newly allocated structure.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<dsa(3)>, L<DSA_new(3)>, L<DSA_meth_new(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/DSA_sign.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/DSA_sign.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ba0f6b8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/DSA_sign.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+DSA_sign, DSA_sign_setup, DSA_verify - DSA signatures
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/dsa.h>
+
+ int    DSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int len,
+                unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, DSA *dsa);
+
+ int    DSA_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx, BIGNUM **kinvp,
+                BIGNUM **rp);
+
+ int    DSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int len,
+                unsigned char *sigbuf, int siglen, DSA *dsa);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+DSA_sign() computes a digital signature on the B<len> byte message
+digest B<dgst> using the private key B<dsa> and places its ASN.1 DER
+encoding at B<sigret>. The length of the signature is places in
+*B<siglen>. B<sigret> must point to DSA_size(B<dsa>) bytes of memory.
+
+DSA_sign_setup() may be used to precompute part of the signing
+operation in case signature generation is time-critical. It expects
+B<dsa> to contain DSA parameters. It places the precomputed values
+in newly allocated B<BIGNUM>s at *B<kinvp> and *B<rp>, after freeing
+the old ones unless *B<kinvp> and *B<rp> are NULL. These values may
+be passed to DSA_sign() in B<dsa-E<gt>kinv> and B<dsa-E<gt>r>.
+B<ctx> is a pre-allocated B<BN_CTX> or NULL.
+
+DSA_verify() verifies that the signature B<sigbuf> of size B<siglen>
+matches a given message digest B<dgst> of size B<len>.
+B<dsa> is the signer's public key.
+
+The B<type> parameter is ignored.
+
+The PRNG must be seeded before DSA_sign() (or DSA_sign_setup())
+is called.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+DSA_sign() and DSA_sign_setup() return 1 on success, 0 on error.
+DSA_verify() returns 1 for a valid signature, 0 for an incorrect
+signature and -1 on error. The error codes can be obtained by
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>.
+
+=head1 CONFORMING TO
+
+US Federal Information Processing Standard FIPS 186 (Digital Signature
+Standard, DSS), ANSI X9.30
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<dsa(3)>, L<ERR_get_error(3)>, L<rand(3)>,
+L<DSA_do_sign(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/DSA_size.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/DSA_size.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..16e6f3a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/DSA_size.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+DSA_size, DSA_bits - get DSA signature size or key bits
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/dsa.h>
+
+ int DSA_size(const DSA *dsa);
+ int DSA_bits(const DSA *dsa);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+DSA_size() returns the maximum size of an ASN.1 encoded DSA signature
+for key B<dsa> in bytes. It can be used to determine how much memory must
+be allocated for a DSA signature.
+
+B<dsa-E<gt>q> must not be B<NULL>.
+
+DSA_bits() returns the number of bits in key B<dsa>: this is the number
+of bits in the B<p> parameter.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUE
+
+DSA_size() returns the size in bytes.
+
+DSA_bits() returns the number of bits in the key.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<dsa(3)>, L<DSA_sign(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/ECDSA_SIG_new.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/ECDSA_SIG_new.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9e1f662
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/ECDSA_SIG_new.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,207 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+ECDSA_SIG_get0, ECDSA_SIG_set0,
+ECDSA_SIG_new, ECDSA_SIG_free, i2d_ECDSA_SIG, d2i_ECDSA_SIG, ECDSA_size,
+ECDSA_sign, ECDSA_do_sign, ECDSA_verify, ECDSA_do_verify, ECDSA_sign_setup,
+ECDSA_sign_ex, ECDSA_do_sign_ex - low level elliptic curve digital signature
+algorithm (ECDSA) functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
+
+ ECDSA_SIG *ECDSA_SIG_new(void);
+ void ECDSA_SIG_free(ECDSA_SIG *sig);
+ void ECDSA_SIG_get0(const ECDSA_SIG *sig, const BIGNUM **pr, const BIGNUM **ps);
+ int ECDSA_SIG_set0(ECDSA_SIG *sig, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *s);
+ int i2d_ECDSA_SIG(const ECDSA_SIG *sig, unsigned char **pp);
+ ECDSA_SIG *d2i_ECDSA_SIG(ECDSA_SIG **sig, const unsigned char **pp, long len);
+ int ECDSA_size(const EC_KEY *eckey);
+
+ int ECDSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dgstlen,
+                unsigned char *sig, unsigned int *siglen, EC_KEY *eckey);
+ ECDSA_SIG *ECDSA_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
+                          EC_KEY *eckey);
+
+ int ECDSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dgstlen,
+                  const unsigned char *sig, int siglen, EC_KEY *eckey);
+ int ECDSA_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
+                     const ECDSA_SIG *sig, EC_KEY* eckey);
+
+ ECDSA_SIG *ECDSA_do_sign_ex(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgstlen,
+                             const BIGNUM *kinv, const BIGNUM *rp,
+                             EC_KEY *eckey);
+ int ECDSA_sign_setup(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx, BIGNUM **kinv, BIGNUM **rp);
+ int ECDSA_sign_ex(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dgstlen,
+                   unsigned char *sig, unsigned int *siglen,
+                   const BIGNUM *kinv, const BIGNUM *rp, EC_KEY *eckey);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+Note: these functions provide a low level interface to ECDSA. Most
+applications should use the higher level B<EVP> interface such as
+L<EVP_DigestSignInit(3)> or L<EVP_DigestVerifyInit(3)> instead.
+
+B<ECDSA_SIG> is an opaque structure consisting of two BIGNUMs for the
+B<r> and B<s> value of an ECDSA signature (see X9.62 or FIPS 186-2).
+
+ECDSA_SIG_new() allocates an empty B<ECDSA_SIG> structure. Note: before
+OpenSSL 1.1.0 the: the B<r> and B<s> components were initialised.
+
+ECDSA_SIG_free() frees the B<ECDSA_SIG> structure B<sig>.
+
+ECDSA_SIG_get0() returns internal pointers the B<r> and B<s> values contained
+in B<sig>.
+
+The B<r> and B<s> values can be set by calling ECDSA_SIG_set0() and passing the
+new values for B<r> and B<s> as parameters to the function. Calling this
+function transfers the memory management of the values to the ECDSA_SIG object,
+and therefore the values that have been passed in should not be freed directly
+after this function has been called.
+
+i2d_ECDSA_SIG() creates the DER encoding of the ECDSA signature B<sig> and
+writes the encoded signature to B<*pp> (note: if B<pp> is NULL i2d_ECDSA_SIG()
+returns the expected length in bytes of the DER encoded signature).
+i2d_ECDSA_SIG() returns the length of the DER encoded signature (or 0 on
+error).
+
+d2i_ECDSA_SIG() decodes a DER encoded ECDSA signature and returns the decoded
+signature in a newly allocated B<ECDSA_SIG> structure. B<*sig> points to the
+buffer containing the DER encoded signature of size B<len>.
+
+ECDSA_size() returns the maximum length of a DER encoded ECDSA signature
+created with the private EC key B<eckey>.
+
+ECDSA_sign() computes a digital signature of the B<dgstlen> bytes hash value
+B<dgst> using the private EC key B<eckey>. The DER encoded signatures is
+stored in B<sig> and its length is returned in B<sig_len>. Note: B<sig> must
+point to ECDSA_size(eckey) bytes of memory. The parameter B<type> is currently
+ignored. ECDSA_sign() is wrapper function for ECDSA_sign_ex() with B<kinv>
+and B<rp> set to NULL.
+
+ECDSA_do_sign() is similar to ECDSA_sign() except the signature is returned
+as a newly allocated B<ECDSA_SIG> structure (or NULL on error). ECDSA_do_sign()
+is a wrapper function for ECDSA_do_sign_ex() with B<kinv> and B<rp> set to
+NULL.
+
+ECDSA_verify() verifies that the signature in B<sig> of size B<siglen> is a
+valid ECDSA signature of the hash value B<dgst> of size B<dgstlen> using the
+public key B<eckey>.  The parameter B<type> is ignored.
+
+ECDSA_do_verify() is similar to ECDSA_verify() except the signature is
+presented in the form of a pointer to an B<ECDSA_SIG> structure.
+
+The remaining functions utilise the internal B<kinv> and B<r> values used
+during signature computation. Most applications will never need to call these
+and some external ECDSA ENGINE implementations may not support them at all if
+either B<kinv> or B<r> is not B<NULL>.
+
+ECDSA_sign_setup() may be used to precompute parts of the signing operation.
+B<eckey> is the private EC key and B<ctx> is a pointer to B<BN_CTX> structure
+(or NULL). The precomputed values or returned in B<kinv> and B<rp> and can be
+used in a later call to ECDSA_sign_ex() or ECDSA_do_sign_ex().
+
+ECDSA_sign_ex() computes a digital signature of the B<dgstlen> bytes hash value
+B<dgst> using the private EC key B<eckey> and the optional pre-computed values
+B<kinv> and B<rp>. The DER encoded signature is stored in B<sig> and its
+length is returned in B<sig_len>. Note: B<sig> must point to ECDSA_size(eckey)
+bytes of memory. The parameter B<type> is ignored.
+
+ECDSA_do_sign_ex() is similar to ECDSA_sign_ex() except the signature is
+returned as a newly allocated B<ECDSA_SIG> structure (or NULL on error).
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+ECDSA_SIG_set0() returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
+
+ECDSA_size() returns the maximum length signature or 0 on error.
+
+ECDSA_sign(), ECDSA_sign_ex() and ECDSA_sign_setup() return 1 if successful
+or 0 on error.
+
+ECDSA_do_sign() and ECDSA_do_sign_ex() return a pointer to an allocated
+B<ECDSA_SIG> structure or NULL on error.
+
+ECDSA_verify() and ECDSA_do_verify() return 1 for a valid
+signature, 0 for an invalid signature and -1 on error.
+The error codes can be obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)>.
+
+=head1 EXAMPLES
+
+Creating an ECDSA signature of a given SHA-256 hash value using the
+named curve prime256v1 (aka P-256).
+
+First step: create an EC_KEY object (note: this part is B<not> ECDSA
+specific)
+
+ int        ret;
+ ECDSA_SIG *sig;
+ EC_KEY    *eckey;
+ eckey = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1);
+ if (eckey == NULL) {
+    /* error */
+ }
+ if (EC_KEY_generate_key(eckey) == 0) {
+    /* error */
+ }
+
+Second step: compute the ECDSA signature of a SHA-256 hash value
+using ECDSA_do_sign():
+
+ sig = ECDSA_do_sign(digest, 32, eckey);
+ if (sig == NULL) {
+    /* error */
+ }
+
+or using ECDSA_sign():
+
+ unsigned char *buffer, *pp;
+ int            buf_len;
+ buf_len = ECDSA_size(eckey);
+ buffer  = OPENSSL_malloc(buf_len);
+ pp = buffer;
+ if (ECDSA_sign(0, dgst, dgstlen, pp, &buf_len, eckey) == 0) {
+    /* error */
+ }
+
+Third step: verify the created ECDSA signature using ECDSA_do_verify():
+
+ ret = ECDSA_do_verify(digest, 32, sig, eckey);
+
+or using ECDSA_verify():
+
+ ret = ECDSA_verify(0, digest, 32, buffer, buf_len, eckey);
+
+and finally evaluate the return value:
+
+ if (ret == 1) {
+    /* signature ok */
+ } else if (ret == 0) {
+    /* incorrect signature */
+ } else {
+    /* error */
+ }
+
+=head1 CONFORMING TO
+
+ANSI X9.62, US Federal Information Processing Standard FIPS 186-2
+(Digital Signature Standard, DSS)
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<DSA_new(3)>,
+L<EVP_DigestSignInit(3)>,
+L<EVP_DigestVerifyInit(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/ECPKParameters_print.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/ECPKParameters_print.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..24b6bb9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/ECPKParameters_print.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+ECPKParameters_print, ECPKParameters_print_fp - Functions for decoding and
+encoding ASN1 representations of elliptic curve entities
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ec.h>
+
+ int ECPKParameters_print(BIO *bp, const EC_GROUP *x, int off);
+ int ECPKParameters_print_fp(FILE *fp, const EC_GROUP *x, int off);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The ECPKParameters represent the public parameters for an
+B<EC_GROUP> structure, which represents a curve.
+
+The ECPKParameters_print() and ECPKParameters_print_fp() functions print
+a human-readable output of the public parameters of the EC_GROUP to B<bp>
+or B<fp>. The output lines are indented by B<off> spaces.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+ECPKParameters_print() and ECPKParameters_print_fp()
+return 1 for success and 0 if an error occurs.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<crypto(7)>, L<EC_GROUP_new(3)>, L<EC_GROUP_copy(3)>,
+L<EC_POINT_new(3)>, L<EC_POINT_add(3)>, L<EC_KEY_new(3)>,
+L<EC_GFp_simple_method(3)>,
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2013-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EC_GFp_simple_method.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EC_GFp_simple_method.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f283d8e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EC_GFp_simple_method.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+EC_GFp_simple_method, EC_GFp_mont_method, EC_GFp_nist_method, EC_GFp_nistp224_method, EC_GFp_nistp256_method, EC_GFp_nistp521_method, EC_GF2m_simple_method, EC_METHOD_get_field_type - Functions for obtaining EC_METHOD objects
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ec.h>
+
+ const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_simple_method(void);
+ const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_mont_method(void);
+ const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_nist_method(void);
+ const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_nistp224_method(void);
+ const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_nistp256_method(void);
+ const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_nistp521_method(void);
+
+ const EC_METHOD *EC_GF2m_simple_method(void);
+
+ int EC_METHOD_get_field_type(const EC_METHOD *meth);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The Elliptic Curve library provides a number of different implementations through a single common interface.
+When constructing a curve using EC_GROUP_new (see L<EC_GROUP_new(3)>) an
+implementation method must be provided. The functions described here all return a const pointer to an
+B<EC_METHOD> structure that can be passed to EC_GROUP_NEW. It is important that the correct implementation
+type for the form of curve selected is used.
+
+For F2^m curves there is only one implementation choice, i.e. EC_GF2_simple_method.
+
+For Fp curves the lowest common denominator implementation is the EC_GFp_simple_method implementation. All
+other implementations are based on this one. EC_GFp_mont_method builds on EC_GFp_simple_method but adds the
+use of montgomery multiplication (see L<BN_mod_mul_montgomery(3)>). EC_GFp_nist_method
+offers an implementation optimised for use with NIST recommended curves (NIST curves are available through
+EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name as described in L<EC_GROUP_new(3)>).
+
+The functions EC_GFp_nistp224_method, EC_GFp_nistp256_method and EC_GFp_nistp521_method offer 64 bit
+optimised implementations for the NIST P224, P256 and P521 curves respectively. Note, however, that these
+implementations are not available on all platforms.
+
+EC_METHOD_get_field_type identifies what type of field the EC_METHOD structure supports, which will be either
+F2^m or Fp. If the field type is Fp then the value B<NID_X9_62_prime_field> is returned. If the field type is
+F2^m then the value B<NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field> is returned. These values are defined in the
+obj_mac.h header file.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+All EC_GFp* functions and EC_GF2m_simple_method always return a const pointer to an EC_METHOD structure.
+
+EC_METHOD_get_field_type returns an integer that identifies the type of field the EC_METHOD structure supports.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<crypto(7)>, L<EC_GROUP_new(3)>, L<EC_GROUP_copy(3)>,
+L<EC_POINT_new(3)>, L<EC_POINT_add(3)>, L<EC_KEY_new(3)>,
+L<d2i_ECPKParameters(3)>,
+L<BN_mod_mul_montgomery(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2013-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EC_GROUP_copy.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EC_GROUP_copy.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fd5f58c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EC_GROUP_copy.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,206 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+EC_GROUP_get0_order, EC_GROUP_order_bits, EC_GROUP_get0_cofactor,
+EC_GROUP_copy, EC_GROUP_dup, EC_GROUP_method_of, EC_GROUP_set_generator,
+EC_GROUP_get0_generator, EC_GROUP_get_order, EC_GROUP_get_cofactor,
+EC_GROUP_set_curve_name, EC_GROUP_get_curve_name, EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag,
+EC_GROUP_get_asn1_flag, EC_GROUP_set_point_conversion_form,
+EC_GROUP_get_point_conversion_form, EC_GROUP_get0_seed,
+EC_GROUP_get_seed_len, EC_GROUP_set_seed, EC_GROUP_get_degree,
+EC_GROUP_check, EC_GROUP_check_discriminant, EC_GROUP_cmp,
+EC_GROUP_get_basis_type, EC_GROUP_get_trinomial_basis,
+EC_GROUP_get_pentanomial_basis
+- Functions for manipulating EC_GROUP objects
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ec.h>
+
+ int EC_GROUP_copy(EC_GROUP *dst, const EC_GROUP *src);
+ EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_dup(const EC_GROUP *src);
+
+ const EC_METHOD *EC_GROUP_method_of(const EC_GROUP *group);
+
+ int EC_GROUP_set_generator(EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *generator, const BIGNUM *order, const BIGNUM *cofactor);
+ const EC_POINT *EC_GROUP_get0_generator(const EC_GROUP *group);
+
+ int EC_GROUP_get_order(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *order, BN_CTX *ctx);
+ const BIGNUM *EC_GROUP_get0_order(const EC_GROUP *group);
+ int EC_GROUP_order_bits(const EC_GROUP *group);
+ int EC_GROUP_get_cofactor(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *cofactor, BN_CTX *ctx);
+ const BIGNUM *EC_GROUP_get0_cofactor(const EC_GROUP *group);
+
+ void EC_GROUP_set_curve_name(EC_GROUP *group, int nid);
+ int EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(const EC_GROUP *group);
+
+ void EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(EC_GROUP *group, int flag);
+ int EC_GROUP_get_asn1_flag(const EC_GROUP *group);
+
+ void EC_GROUP_set_point_conversion_form(EC_GROUP *group, point_conversion_form_t form);
+ point_conversion_form_t EC_GROUP_get_point_conversion_form(const EC_GROUP *);
+
+ unsigned char *EC_GROUP_get0_seed(const EC_GROUP *x);
+ size_t EC_GROUP_get_seed_len(const EC_GROUP *);
+ size_t EC_GROUP_set_seed(EC_GROUP *, const unsigned char *, size_t len);
+
+ int EC_GROUP_get_degree(const EC_GROUP *group);
+
+ int EC_GROUP_check(const EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+ int EC_GROUP_check_discriminant(const EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+ int EC_GROUP_cmp(const EC_GROUP *a, const EC_GROUP *b, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+ int EC_GROUP_get_basis_type(const EC_GROUP *);
+ int EC_GROUP_get_trinomial_basis(const EC_GROUP *, unsigned int *k);
+ int EC_GROUP_get_pentanomial_basis(const EC_GROUP *, unsigned int *k1,
+        unsigned int *k2, unsigned int *k3);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+EC_GROUP_copy copies the curve B<src> into B<dst>. Both B<src> and B<dst> must use the same EC_METHOD.
+
+EC_GROUP_dup creates a new EC_GROUP object and copies the content from B<src> to the newly created
+EC_GROUP object.
+
+EC_GROUP_method_of obtains the EC_METHOD of B<group>.
+
+EC_GROUP_set_generator sets curve parameters that must be agreed by all participants using the curve. These
+parameters include the B<generator>, the B<order> and the B<cofactor>. The B<generator> is a well defined point on the
+curve chosen for cryptographic operations. Integers used for point multiplications will be between 0 and
+n-1 where n is the B<order>. The B<order> multiplied by the B<cofactor> gives the number of points on the curve.
+
+EC_GROUP_get0_generator returns the generator for the identified B<group>.
+
+The functions EC_GROUP_get_order and EC_GROUP_get_cofactor populate the provided B<order> and B<cofactor> parameters
+with the respective order and cofactors for the B<group>.
+
+The functions EC_GROUP_set_curve_name and EC_GROUP_get_curve_name, set and get the NID for the curve respectively
+(see L<EC_GROUP_new(3)>). If a curve does not have a NID associated with it, then EC_GROUP_get_curve_name
+will return 0.
+
+The asn1_flag value is used to determine whether the curve encoding uses
+explicit parameters or a named curve using an ASN1 OID: many applications only
+support the latter form. If asn1_flag is B<OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE> then the
+named curve form is used and the parameters must have a corresponding
+named curve NID set. If asn1_flags is B<OPENSSL_EC_EXPLICIT_CURVE> the
+parameters are explicitly encoded. The functions EC_GROUP_get_asn1_flag and
+EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag get and set the status of the asn1_flag for the curve.
+Note: B<OPENSSL_EC_EXPLICIT_CURVE> was first added to OpenSSL 1.1.0, for
+previous versions of OpenSSL the value 0 must be used instead. Before OpenSSL
+1.1.0 the default form was to use explicit parameters (meaning that
+applications would have to explicitly set the named curve form) in OpenSSL
+1.1.0 and later the named curve form is the default.
+
+The point_conversion_form for a curve controls how EC_POINT data is encoded as ASN1 as defined in X9.62 (ECDSA).
+point_conversion_form_t is an enum defined as follows:
+
+ typedef enum {
+        /** the point is encoded as z||x, where the octet z specifies
+         *   which solution of the quadratic equation y is  */
+        POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED = 2,
+        /** the point is encoded as z||x||y, where z is the octet 0x04  */
+        POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED = 4,
+        /** the point is encoded as z||x||y, where the octet z specifies
+         *  which solution of the quadratic equation y is  */
+        POINT_CONVERSION_HYBRID = 6
+ } point_conversion_form_t;
+
+For POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED the point is encoded as an octet signifying the UNCOMPRESSED form has been used followed by
+the octets for x, followed by the octets for y.
+
+For any given x co-ordinate for a point on a curve it is possible to derive two possible y values. For
+POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED the point is encoded as an octet signifying that the COMPRESSED form has been used AND which of
+the two possible solutions for y has been used, followed by the octets for x.
+
+For POINT_CONVERSION_HYBRID the point is encoded as an octet signifying the HYBRID form has been used AND which of the two
+possible solutions for y has been used, followed by the octets for x, followed by the octets for y.
+
+The functions EC_GROUP_set_point_conversion_form and EC_GROUP_get_point_conversion_form set and get the point_conversion_form
+for the curve respectively.
+
+ANSI X9.62 (ECDSA standard) defines a method of generating the curve parameter b from a random number. This provides advantages
+in that a parameter obtained in this way is highly unlikely to be susceptible to special purpose attacks, or have any trapdoors in it.
+If the seed is present for a curve then the b parameter was generated in a verifiable fashion using that seed. The OpenSSL EC library
+does not use this seed value but does enable you to inspect it using EC_GROUP_get0_seed. This returns a pointer to a memory block
+containing the seed that was used. The length of the memory block can be obtained using EC_GROUP_get_seed_len. A number of the
+builtin curves within the library provide seed values that can be obtained. It is also possible to set a custom seed using
+EC_GROUP_set_seed and passing a pointer to a memory block, along with the length of the seed. Again, the EC library will not use
+this seed value, although it will be preserved in any ASN1 based communications.
+
+EC_GROUP_get_degree gets the degree of the field. For Fp fields this will be the number of bits in p.  For F2^m fields this will be
+the value m.
+
+The function EC_GROUP_check_discriminant calculates the discriminant for the curve and verifies that it is valid.
+For a curve defined over Fp the discriminant is given by the formula 4*a^3 + 27*b^2 whilst for F2^m curves the discriminant is
+simply b. In either case for the curve to be valid the discriminant must be non zero.
+
+The function EC_GROUP_check performs a number of checks on a curve to verify that it is valid. Checks performed include
+verifying that the discriminant is non zero; that a generator has been defined; that the generator is on the curve and has
+the correct order.
+
+EC_GROUP_cmp compares B<a> and B<b> to determine whether they represent the same curve or not.
+
+The functions EC_GROUP_get_basis_type, EC_GROUP_get_trinomial_basis and EC_GROUP_get_pentanomial_basis should only be called for curves
+defined over an F2^m field. Addition and multiplication operations within an F2^m field are performed using an irreducible polynomial
+function f(x). This function is either a trinomial of the form:
+
+f(x) = x^m + x^k + 1 with m > k >= 1
+
+or a pentanomial of the form:
+
+f(x) = x^m + x^k3 + x^k2 + x^k1 + 1 with m > k3 > k2 > k1 >= 1
+
+The function EC_GROUP_get_basis_type returns a NID identifying whether a trinomial or pentanomial is in use for the field. The
+function EC_GROUP_get_trinomial_basis must only be called where f(x) is of the trinomial form, and returns the value of B<k>. Similarly
+the function EC_GROUP_get_pentanomial_basis must only be called where f(x) is of the pentanomial form, and returns the values of B<k1>,
+B<k2> and B<k3> respectively.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+The following functions return 1 on success or 0 on error: EC_GROUP_copy, EC_GROUP_set_generator, EC_GROUP_check,
+EC_GROUP_check_discriminant, EC_GROUP_get_trinomial_basis and EC_GROUP_get_pentanomial_basis.
+
+EC_GROUP_dup returns a pointer to the duplicated curve, or NULL on error.
+
+EC_GROUP_method_of returns the EC_METHOD implementation in use for the given curve or NULL on error.
+
+EC_GROUP_get0_generator returns the generator for the given curve or NULL on error.
+
+EC_GROUP_get_order, EC_GROUP_get_cofactor, EC_GROUP_get_curve_name, EC_GROUP_get_asn1_flag, EC_GROUP_get_point_conversion_form
+and EC_GROUP_get_degree return the order, cofactor, curve name (NID), ASN1 flag, point_conversion_form and degree for the
+specified curve respectively. If there is no curve name associated with a curve then EC_GROUP_get_curve_name will return 0.
+
+EC_GROUP_get0_order() returns an internal pointer to the group order.
+EC_GROUP_get_order_bits() returns the number of bits in the group order.
+EC_GROUP_get0_cofactor() returns an internal pointer to the group cofactor.
+
+EC_GROUP_get0_seed returns a pointer to the seed that was used to generate the parameter b, or NULL if the seed is not
+specified. EC_GROUP_get_seed_len returns the length of the seed or 0 if the seed is not specified.
+
+EC_GROUP_set_seed returns the length of the seed that has been set. If the supplied seed is NULL, or the supplied seed length is
+0, the return value will be 1. On error 0 is returned.
+
+EC_GROUP_cmp returns 0 if the curves are equal, 1 if they are not equal, or -1 on error.
+
+EC_GROUP_get_basis_type returns the values NID_X9_62_tpBasis or NID_X9_62_ppBasis (as defined in <openssl/obj_mac.h>) for a
+trinomial or pentanomial respectively. Alternatively in the event of an error a 0 is returned.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<crypto(7)>, L<EC_GROUP_new(3)>,
+L<EC_POINT_new(3)>, L<EC_POINT_add(3)>, L<EC_KEY_new(3)>,
+L<EC_GFp_simple_method(3)>, L<d2i_ECPKParameters(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2013-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EC_GROUP_new.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EC_GROUP_new.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2f658dc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EC_GROUP_new.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+EC_GROUP_get_ecparameters, EC_GROUP_get_ecpkparameters,
+EC_GROUP_new, EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters,
+EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters,
+EC_GROUP_free, EC_GROUP_clear_free, EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp,
+EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m, EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name, EC_GROUP_set_curve_GFp,
+EC_GROUP_get_curve_GFp, EC_GROUP_set_curve_GF2m, EC_GROUP_get_curve_GF2m,
+EC_get_builtin_curves - Functions for creating and destroying EC_GROUP
+objects
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ec.h>
+
+ EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new(const EC_METHOD *meth);
+ EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters(const ECPARAMETERS *params)
+ EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters(const ECPKPARAMETERS *params)
+ void EC_GROUP_free(EC_GROUP *group);
+ void EC_GROUP_clear_free(EC_GROUP *group);
+
+ EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp(const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx);
+ EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m(const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx);
+ EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(int nid);
+
+ int EC_GROUP_set_curve_GFp(EC_GROUP *group, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx);
+ int EC_GROUP_get_curve_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx);
+ int EC_GROUP_set_curve_GF2m(EC_GROUP *group, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx);
+ int EC_GROUP_get_curve_GF2m(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+ ECPARAMETERS *EC_GROUP_get_ecparameters(const EC_GROUP *group, ECPARAMETERS *params)
+ ECPKPARAMETERS *EC_GROUP_get_ecpkparameters(const EC_GROUP *group, ECPKPARAMETERS *params)
+
+ size_t EC_get_builtin_curves(EC_builtin_curve *r, size_t nitems);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+Within the library there are two forms of elliptic curve that are of interest. The first form is those defined over the
+prime field Fp. The elements of Fp are the integers 0 to p-1, where p is a prime number. This gives us a revised
+elliptic curve equation as follows:
+
+y^2 mod p = x^3 +ax + b mod p
+
+The second form is those defined over a binary field F2^m where the elements of the field are integers of length at
+most m bits. For this form the elliptic curve equation is modified to:
+
+y^2 + xy = x^3 + ax^2 + b (where b != 0)
+
+Operations in a binary field are performed relative to an B<irreducible polynomial>. All such curves with OpenSSL
+use a trinomial or a pentanomial for this parameter.
+
+A new curve can be constructed by calling EC_GROUP_new, using the implementation provided by B<meth> (see
+L<EC_GFp_simple_method(3)>). It is then necessary to call either EC_GROUP_set_curve_GFp or
+EC_GROUP_set_curve_GF2m as appropriate to create a curve defined over Fp or over F2^m respectively.
+EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters() will create a group from the
+specified B<params> and
+EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters() will create a group from the specific PK B<params>.
+
+EC_GROUP_set_curve_GFp sets the curve parameters B<p>, B<a> and B<b> for a curve over Fp stored in B<group>.
+EC_group_get_curve_GFp obtains the previously set curve parameters.
+
+EC_GROUP_set_curve_GF2m sets the equivalent curve parameters for a curve over F2^m. In this case B<p> represents
+the irreducible polynomial - each bit represents a term in the polynomial. Therefore there will either be three
+or five bits set dependent on whether the polynomial is a trinomial or a pentanomial.
+EC_group_get_curve_GF2m obtains the previously set curve parameters.
+
+The functions EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp and EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m are shortcuts for calling EC_GROUP_new and the
+appropriate EC_group_set_curve function. An appropriate default implementation method will be used.
+
+Whilst the library can be used to create any curve using the functions described above, there are also a number of
+predefined curves that are available. In order to obtain a list of all of the predefined curves, call the function
+EC_get_builtin_curves. The parameter B<r> should be an array of EC_builtin_curve structures of size B<nitems>. The function
+will populate the B<r> array with information about the builtin curves. If B<nitems> is less than the total number of
+curves available, then the first B<nitems> curves will be returned. Otherwise the total number of curves will be
+provided. The return value is the total number of curves available (whether that number has been populated in B<r> or
+not). Passing a NULL B<r>, or setting B<nitems> to 0 will do nothing other than return the total number of curves available.
+The EC_builtin_curve structure is defined as follows:
+
+ typedef struct {
+        int nid;
+        const char *comment;
+        } EC_builtin_curve;
+
+Each EC_builtin_curve item has a unique integer id (B<nid>), and a human readable comment string describing the curve.
+
+In order to construct a builtin curve use the function EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name and provide the B<nid> of the curve to
+be constructed.
+
+EC_GROUP_free frees the memory associated with the EC_GROUP.
+If B<group> is NULL nothing is done.
+
+EC_GROUP_clear_free destroys any sensitive data held within the EC_GROUP and then frees its memory.
+If B<group> is NULL nothing is done.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+All EC_GROUP_new* functions return a pointer to the newly constructed group, or NULL on error.
+
+EC_get_builtin_curves returns the number of builtin curves that are available.
+
+EC_GROUP_set_curve_GFp, EC_GROUP_get_curve_GFp, EC_GROUP_set_curve_GF2m, EC_GROUP_get_curve_GF2m return 1 on success or 0 on error.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<crypto(7)>, L<EC_GROUP_copy(3)>,
+L<EC_POINT_new(3)>, L<EC_POINT_add(3)>, L<EC_KEY_new(3)>,
+L<EC_GFp_simple_method(3)>, L<d2i_ECPKParameters(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2013-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EC_KEY_get_enc_flags.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EC_KEY_get_enc_flags.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4f73a1d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EC_KEY_get_enc_flags.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+EC_KEY_get_enc_flags, EC_KEY_set_enc_flags
+- Get and set flags for encoding EC_KEY structures
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ec.h>
+
+ unsigned int EC_KEY_get_enc_flags(const EC_KEY *key);
+ void EC_KEY_set_enc_flags(EC_KEY *eckey, unsigned int flags);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The format of the external representation of the public key written by
+i2d_ECPrivateKey() (such as whether it is stored in a compressed form or not) is
+described by the point_conversion_form. See L<EC_GROUP_copy(3)>
+for a description of point_conversion_form.
+
+When reading a private key encoded without an associated public key (e.g. if
+EC_PKEY_NO_PUBKEY has been used - see below), then d2i_ECPrivateKey() generates
+the missing public key automatically. Private keys encoded without parameters
+(e.g. if EC_PKEY_NO_PARAMETERS has been used - see below) cannot be loaded using
+d2i_ECPrivateKey().
+
+The functions EC_KEY_get_enc_flags() and EC_KEY_set_enc_flags() get and set the
+value of the encoding flags for the B<key>. There are two encoding flags
+currently defined - EC_PKEY_NO_PARAMETERS and EC_PKEY_NO_PUBKEY.  These flags
+define the behaviour of how the  B<key> is converted into ASN1 in a call to
+i2d_ECPrivateKey(). If EC_PKEY_NO_PARAMETERS is set then the public parameters for
+the curve are not encoded along with the private key. If EC_PKEY_NO_PUBKEY is
+set then the public key is not encoded along with the private key.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+EC_KEY_get_enc_flags() returns the value of the current encoding flags for the
+EC_KEY.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<crypto(7)>, L<EC_GROUP_new(3)>,
+L<EC_GROUP_copy(3)>, L<EC_POINT_new(3)>,
+L<EC_POINT_add(3)>,
+L<EC_GFp_simple_method(3)>,
+L<d2i_ECPKParameters(3)>,
+L<d2i_ECPrivateKey(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2015-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EC_KEY_new.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EC_KEY_new.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..591529f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EC_KEY_new.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,183 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+EC_KEY_get_method, EC_KEY_set_method,
+EC_KEY_new, EC_KEY_get_flags, EC_KEY_set_flags, EC_KEY_clear_flags,
+EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name, EC_KEY_free, EC_KEY_copy, EC_KEY_dup, EC_KEY_up_ref,
+EC_KEY_get0_group, EC_KEY_set_group, EC_KEY_get0_private_key,
+EC_KEY_set_private_key, EC_KEY_get0_public_key, EC_KEY_set_public_key,
+EC_KEY_get_conv_form,
+EC_KEY_set_conv_form, EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag, EC_KEY_precompute_mult,
+EC_KEY_generate_key, EC_KEY_check_key, EC_KEY_set_public_key_affine_coordinates,
+EC_KEY_oct2key, EC_KEY_key2buf, EC_KEY_oct2priv, EC_KEY_priv2oct,
+EC_KEY_priv2buf - Functions for creating, destroying and manipulating
+EC_KEY objects
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ec.h>
+
+ EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new(void);
+ int EC_KEY_get_flags(const EC_KEY *key);
+ void EC_KEY_set_flags(EC_KEY *key, int flags);
+ void EC_KEY_clear_flags(EC_KEY *key, int flags);
+ EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(int nid);
+ void EC_KEY_free(EC_KEY *key);
+ EC_KEY *EC_KEY_copy(EC_KEY *dst, const EC_KEY *src);
+ EC_KEY *EC_KEY_dup(const EC_KEY *src);
+ int EC_KEY_up_ref(EC_KEY *key);
+ const EC_GROUP *EC_KEY_get0_group(const EC_KEY *key);
+ int EC_KEY_set_group(EC_KEY *key, const EC_GROUP *group);
+ const BIGNUM *EC_KEY_get0_private_key(const EC_KEY *key);
+ int EC_KEY_set_private_key(EC_KEY *key, const BIGNUM *prv);
+ const EC_POINT *EC_KEY_get0_public_key(const EC_KEY *key);
+ int EC_KEY_set_public_key(EC_KEY *key, const EC_POINT *pub);
+ point_conversion_form_t EC_KEY_get_conv_form(const EC_KEY *key);
+ void EC_KEY_set_conv_form(EC_KEY *eckey, point_conversion_form_t cform);
+ void EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag(EC_KEY *eckey, int asn1_flag);
+ int EC_KEY_precompute_mult(EC_KEY *key, BN_CTX *ctx);
+ int EC_KEY_generate_key(EC_KEY *key);
+ int EC_KEY_check_key(const EC_KEY *key);
+ int EC_KEY_set_public_key_affine_coordinates(EC_KEY *key,
+                                              BIGNUM *x, BIGNUM *y);
+ const EC_KEY_METHOD *EC_KEY_get_method(const EC_KEY *key);
+ int EC_KEY_set_method(EC_KEY *key, const EC_KEY_METHOD *meth);
+
+ int EC_KEY_oct2key(EC_KEY *eckey, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len,
+                    BN_CTX *ctx);
+ size_t EC_KEY_key2buf(const EC_KEY *eckey, point_conversion_form_t form,
+                       unsigned char **pbuf, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+ int EC_KEY_oct2priv(EC_KEY *eckey, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len);
+ size_t EC_KEY_priv2oct(const EC_KEY *eckey, unsigned char *buf, size_t len);
+
+ size_t EC_KEY_priv2buf(const EC_KEY *eckey, unsigned char **pbuf);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+An EC_KEY represents a public key and, optionally, the associated private
+key. A new EC_KEY with no associated curve can be constructed by calling
+EC_KEY_new(). The reference count for the newly created EC_KEY is initially
+set to 1. A curve can be associated with the EC_KEY by calling
+EC_KEY_set_group().
+
+Alternatively a new EC_KEY can be constructed by calling
+EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name() and supplying the nid of the associated curve. See
+L<EC_GROUP_new(3)> for a description of curve names. This function simply
+wraps calls to EC_KEY_new() and EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name().
+
+Calling EC_KEY_free() decrements the reference count for the EC_KEY object,
+and if it has dropped to zero then frees the memory associated with it.  If
+B<key> is NULL nothing is done.
+
+EC_KEY_copy() copies the contents of the EC_KEY in B<src> into B<dest>.
+
+EC_KEY_dup() creates a new EC_KEY object and copies B<ec_key> into it.
+
+EC_KEY_up_ref() increments the reference count associated with the EC_KEY
+object.
+
+EC_KEY_generate_key() generates a new public and private key for the supplied
+B<eckey> object. B<eckey> must have an EC_GROUP object associated with it
+before calling this function. The private key is a random integer (0 < priv_key
+< order, where I<order> is the order of the EC_GROUP object). The public key is
+an EC_POINT on the curve calculated by multiplying the generator for the
+curve by the private key.
+
+EC_KEY_check_key() performs various sanity checks on the EC_KEY object to
+confirm that it is valid.
+
+EC_KEY_set_public_key_affine_coordinates() sets the public key for B<key> based
+on its affine co-ordinates; i.e., it constructs an EC_POINT object based on
+the supplied B<x> and B<y> values and sets the public key to be this
+EC_POINT. It also performs certain sanity checks on the key to confirm
+that it is valid.
+
+The functions EC_KEY_get0_group(), EC_KEY_set_group(),
+EC_KEY_get0_private_key(), EC_KEY_set_private_key(), EC_KEY_get0_public_key(),
+and EC_KEY_set_public_key() get and set the EC_GROUP object, the private key,
+and the EC_POINT public key for the B<key> respectively.
+
+The functions EC_KEY_get_conv_form() and EC_KEY_set_conv_form() get and set the
+point_conversion_form for the B<key>. For a description of
+point_conversion_forms please see L<EC_POINT_new(3)>.
+
+EC_KEY_set_flags() sets the flags in the B<flags> parameter on the EC_KEY
+object. Any flags that are already set are left set. The flags currently
+defined are EC_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW and EC_FLAG_FIPS_CHECKED. In
+addition there is the flag EC_FLAG_COFACTOR_ECDH which is specific to ECDH.
+EC_KEY_get_flags() returns the current flags that are set for this EC_KEY.
+EC_KEY_clear_flags() clears the flags indicated by the B<flags> parameter; all
+other flags are left in their existing state.
+
+EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag() sets the asn1_flag on the underlying EC_GROUP object
+(if set). Refer to L<EC_GROUP_copy(3)> for further information on the
+asn1_flag.
+
+EC_KEY_precompute_mult() stores multiples of the underlying EC_GROUP generator
+for faster point multiplication. See also L<EC_POINT_add(3)>.
+
+EC_KEY_oct2key() and EC_KEY_key2buf() are identical to the functions
+EC_POINT_oct2point() and EC_KEY_point2buf() except they use the public key
+EC_POINT in B<eckey>.
+
+EC_KEY_oct2priv() and EC_KEY_priv2oct() convert between the private key
+component of B<eckey> and octet form. The octet form consists of the content
+octets of the B<privateKey> OCTET STRING in an B<ECPrivateKey> ASN.1 structure.
+
+The function EC_KEY_priv2oct() must be supplied with a buffer long enough to
+store the octet form. The return value provides the number of octets stored.
+Calling the function with a NULL buffer will not perform the conversion but
+will just return the required buffer length.
+
+The function EC_KEY_priv2buf() allocates a buffer of suitable length and writes
+an EC_KEY to it in octet format. The allocated buffer is written to B<*pbuf>
+and its length is returned. The caller must free up the allocated buffer with a
+call to OPENSSL_free(). Since the allocated buffer value is written to B<*pbuf>
+the B<pbuf> parameter B<MUST NOT> be B<NULL>.
+
+EC_KEY_priv2buf() converts an EC_KEY private key into an allocated buffer.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+EC_KEY_new(), EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name() and EC_KEY_dup() return a pointer to
+the newly created EC_KEY object, or NULL on error.
+
+EC_KEY_get_flags() returns the flags associated with the EC_KEY object as an
+integer.
+
+EC_KEY_copy() returns a pointer to the destination key, or NULL on error.
+
+EC_KEY_up_ref(), EC_KEY_set_group(), EC_KEY_set_private_key(),
+EC_KEY_set_public_key(), EC_KEY_precompute_mult(), EC_KEY_generate_key(),
+EC_KEY_check_key(), EC_KEY_set_public_key_affine_coordinates(),
+EC_KEY_oct2key() and EC_KEY_oct2priv() return 1 on success or 0 on error.
+
+EC_KEY_get0_group() returns the EC_GROUP associated with the EC_KEY.
+
+EC_KEY_get0_private_key() returns the private key associated with the EC_KEY.
+
+EC_KEY_get_conv_form() return the point_conversion_form for the EC_KEY.
+
+EC_KEY_key2buf(), EC_KEY_priv2oct() and EC_KEY_priv2buf() return the length
+of the buffer or 0 on error.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<crypto(7)>, L<EC_GROUP_new(3)>,
+L<EC_GROUP_copy(3)>, L<EC_POINT_new(3)>,
+L<EC_POINT_add(3)>,
+L<EC_GFp_simple_method(3)>,
+L<d2i_ECPKParameters(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2013-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EC_POINT_add.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EC_POINT_add.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6f3e230
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EC_POINT_add.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+EC_POINT_add, EC_POINT_dbl, EC_POINT_invert, EC_POINT_is_at_infinity, EC_POINT_is_on_curve, EC_POINT_cmp, EC_POINT_make_affine, EC_POINTs_make_affine, EC_POINTs_mul, EC_POINT_mul, EC_GROUP_precompute_mult, EC_GROUP_have_precompute_mult - Functions for performing mathematical operations and tests on EC_POINT objects
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ec.h>
+
+ int EC_POINT_add(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const EC_POINT *a, const EC_POINT *b, BN_CTX *ctx);
+ int EC_POINT_dbl(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const EC_POINT *a, BN_CTX *ctx);
+ int EC_POINT_invert(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *a, BN_CTX *ctx);
+ int EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *p);
+ int EC_POINT_is_on_curve(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point, BN_CTX *ctx);
+ int EC_POINT_cmp(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *a, const EC_POINT *b, BN_CTX *ctx);
+ int EC_POINT_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point, BN_CTX *ctx);
+ int EC_POINTs_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *group, size_t num, EC_POINT *points[], BN_CTX *ctx);
+ int EC_POINTs_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *n, size_t num, const EC_POINT *p[], const BIGNUM *m[], BN_CTX *ctx);
+ int EC_POINT_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *n, const EC_POINT *q, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx);
+ int EC_GROUP_precompute_mult(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx);
+ int EC_GROUP_have_precompute_mult(const EC_GROUP *group);
+
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+EC_POINT_add adds the two points B<a> and B<b> and places the result in B<r>. Similarly EC_POINT_dbl doubles the point B<a> and places the
+result in B<r>. In both cases it is valid for B<r> to be one of B<a> or B<b>.
+
+EC_POINT_invert calculates the inverse of the supplied point B<a>. The result is placed back in B<a>.
+
+The function EC_POINT_is_at_infinity tests whether the supplied point is at infinity or not.
+
+EC_POINT_is_on_curve tests whether the supplied point is on the curve or not.
+
+EC_POINT_cmp compares the two supplied points and tests whether or not they are equal.
+
+The functions EC_POINT_make_affine and EC_POINTs_make_affine force the internal representation of the EC_POINT(s) into the affine
+co-ordinate system. In the case of EC_POINTs_make_affine the value B<num> provides the number of points in the array B<points> to be
+forced.
+
+EC_POINT_mul calculates the value generator * B<n> + B<q> * B<m> and stores the result in B<r>. The value B<n> may be NULL in which case the result is just B<q> * B<m>.
+
+EC_POINTs_mul calculates the value generator * B<n> + B<q[0]> * B<m[0]> + ... + B<q[num-1]> * B<m[num-1]>. As for EC_POINT_mul the value
+B<n> may be NULL.
+
+The function EC_GROUP_precompute_mult stores multiples of the generator for faster point multiplication, whilst
+EC_GROUP_have_precompute_mult tests whether precomputation has already been done. See L<EC_GROUP_copy(3)> for information
+about the generator.
+
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+The following functions return 1 on success or 0 on error: EC_POINT_add, EC_POINT_dbl, EC_POINT_invert, EC_POINT_make_affine,
+EC_POINTs_make_affine, EC_POINTs_make_affine, EC_POINT_mul, EC_POINTs_mul and EC_GROUP_precompute_mult.
+
+EC_POINT_is_at_infinity returns 1 if the point is at infinity, or 0 otherwise.
+
+EC_POINT_is_on_curve returns 1 if the point is on the curve, 0 if not, or -1 on error.
+
+EC_POINT_cmp returns 1 if the points are not equal, 0 if they are, or -1 on error.
+
+EC_GROUP_have_precompute_mult return 1 if a precomputation has been done, or 0 if not.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<crypto(7)>, L<EC_GROUP_new(3)>, L<EC_GROUP_copy(3)>,
+L<EC_POINT_new(3)>, L<EC_KEY_new(3)>,
+L<EC_GFp_simple_method(3)>, L<d2i_ECPKParameters(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2013-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EC_POINT_new.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EC_POINT_new.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5ac41b3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EC_POINT_new.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,196 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+EC_POINT_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp, EC_POINT_point2buf,
+EC_POINT_new, EC_POINT_free, EC_POINT_clear_free,
+EC_POINT_copy, EC_POINT_dup, EC_POINT_method_of,
+EC_POINT_set_to_infinity,
+EC_POINT_get_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp,
+EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp,
+EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp, EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp,
+EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m, EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m,
+EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GF2m, EC_POINT_point2oct,
+EC_POINT_oct2point, EC_POINT_point2bn, EC_POINT_bn2point, EC_POINT_point2hex,
+EC_POINT_hex2point
+- Functions for creating, destroying and manipulating EC_POINT objects
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ec.h>
+
+ EC_POINT *EC_POINT_new(const EC_GROUP *group);
+ void EC_POINT_free(EC_POINT *point);
+ void EC_POINT_clear_free(EC_POINT *point);
+ int EC_POINT_copy(EC_POINT *dst, const EC_POINT *src);
+ EC_POINT *EC_POINT_dup(const EC_POINT *src, const EC_GROUP *group);
+ const EC_METHOD *EC_POINT_method_of(const EC_POINT *point);
+ int EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point);
+ int EC_POINT_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group,
+                                              EC_POINT *p,
+                                              const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y,
+                                              const BIGNUM *z, BN_CTX *ctx);
+ int EC_POINT_get_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group,
+                                              const EC_POINT *p,
+                                              BIGNUM *x, BIGNUM *y, BIGNUM *z,
+                                              BN_CTX *ctx);
+ int EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *p,
+                                         const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y,
+                                         BN_CTX *ctx);
+ int EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group,
+                                         const EC_POINT *p,
+                                         BIGNUM *x, BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *ctx);
+ int EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group,
+                                             EC_POINT *p,
+                                             const BIGNUM *x, int y_bit,
+                                             BN_CTX *ctx);
+ int EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *p,
+                                          const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y,
+                                          BN_CTX *ctx);
+ int EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m(const EC_GROUP *group,
+                                          const EC_POINT *p,
+                                          BIGNUM *x, BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *ctx);
+ int EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GF2m(const EC_GROUP *group,
+                                              EC_POINT *p,
+                                              const BIGNUM *x, int y_bit,
+                                              BN_CTX *ctx);
+ size_t EC_POINT_point2oct(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *p,
+                           point_conversion_form_t form,
+                           unsigned char *buf, size_t len, BN_CTX *ctx);
+ size_t EC_POINT_point2buf(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point,
+                           point_conversion_form_t form,
+                           unsigned char **pbuf, BN_CTX *ctx);
+ int EC_POINT_oct2point(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *p,
+                        const unsigned char *buf, size_t len, BN_CTX *ctx);
+ BIGNUM *EC_POINT_point2bn(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *p,
+                           point_conversion_form_t form, BIGNUM *bn,
+                           BN_CTX *ctx);
+ EC_POINT *EC_POINT_bn2point(const EC_GROUP *group, const BIGNUM *bn,
+                             EC_POINT *p, BN_CTX *ctx);
+ char *EC_POINT_point2hex(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *p,
+                          point_conversion_form_t form, BN_CTX *ctx);
+ EC_POINT *EC_POINT_hex2point(const EC_GROUP *group, const char *hex,
+                              EC_POINT *p, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+An B<EC_POINT> structure represents a point on a curve. A new point is
+constructed by calling the function EC_POINT_new() and providing the
+B<group> object that the point relates to.
+
+EC_POINT_free() frees the memory associated with the B<EC_POINT>.
+if B<point> is NULL nothing is done.
+
+EC_POINT_clear_free() destroys any sensitive data held within the EC_POINT and
+then frees its memory. If B<point> is NULL nothing is done.
+
+EC_POINT_copy() copies the point B<src> into B<dst>. Both B<src> and B<dst>
+must use the same B<EC_METHOD>.
+
+EC_POINT_dup() creates a new B<EC_POINT> object and copies the content from
+B<src> to the newly created B<EC_POINT> object.
+
+EC_POINT_method_of() obtains the B<EC_METHOD> associated with B<point>.
+
+A valid point on a curve is the special point at infinity. A point is set to
+be at infinity by calling EC_POINT_set_to_infinity().
+
+The affine co-ordinates for a point describe a point in terms of its x and y
+position. The functions EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp() and
+EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m() set the B<x> and B<y> co-ordinates for
+the point B<p> defined over the curve given in B<group>.
+
+As well as the affine co-ordinates, a point can alternatively be described in
+terms of its Jacobian projective co-ordinates (for Fp curves only). Jacobian
+projective co-ordinates are expressed as three values x, y and z. Working in
+this co-ordinate system provides more efficient point multiplication
+operations.  A mapping exists between Jacobian projective co-ordinates and
+affine co-ordinates. A Jacobian projective co-ordinate (x, y, z) can be written
+as an affine co-ordinate as (x/(z^2), y/(z^3)). Conversion to Jacobian
+projective from affine co-ordinates is simple. The co-ordinate (x, y) is mapped
+to (x, y, 1). To set or get the projective co-ordinates use
+EC_POINT_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp() and
+EC_POINT_get_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp() respectively.
+
+Points can also be described in terms of their compressed co-ordinates. For a
+point (x, y), for any given value for x such that the point is on the curve
+there will only ever be two possible values for y. Therefore a point can be set
+using the EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp() and
+EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GF2m() functions where B<x> is the x
+co-ordinate and B<y_bit> is a value 0 or 1 to identify which of the two
+possible values for y should be used.
+
+In addition B<EC_POINT> can be converted to and from various external
+representations. The octet form is the binary encoding of the B<ECPoint>
+structure (as defined in RFC5480 and used in certificates and TLS records):
+only the content octets are present, the B<OCTET STRING> tag and length are
+not included. B<BIGNUM> form is the octet form interpreted as a big endian
+integer converted to a B<BIGNUM> structure. Hexadecimal form is the octet
+form converted to a NULL terminated character string where each character
+is one of the printable values 0-9 or A-F (or a-f).
+
+The functions EC_POINT_point2oct(), EC_POINT_oct2point(), EC_POINT_point2bn(),
+EC_POINT_bn2point(), EC_POINT_point2hex() and EC_POINT_hex2point() convert from
+and to EC_POINTs for the formats: octet, BIGNUM and hexadecimal respectively.
+
+The function EC_POINT_point2oct() must be supplied with a buffer long enough to
+store the octet form. The return value provides the number of octets stored.
+Calling the function with a NULL buffer will not perform the conversion but
+will still return the required buffer length.
+
+The function EC_POINT_point2buf() allocates a buffer of suitable length and
+writes an EC_POINT to it in octet format. The allocated buffer is written to
+B<*pbuf> and its length is returned. The caller must free up the allocated
+buffer with a call to OPENSSL_free(). Since the allocated buffer value is
+written to B<*pbuf> the B<pbuf> parameter B<MUST NOT> be B<NULL>.
+
+The function EC_POINT_point2hex() will allocate sufficient memory to store the
+hexadecimal string. It is the caller's responsibility to free this memory with
+a subsequent call to OPENSSL_free().
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+EC_POINT_new() and EC_POINT_dup() return the newly allocated EC_POINT or NULL
+on error.
+
+The following functions return 1 on success or 0 on error: EC_POINT_copy(),
+EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(), EC_POINT_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(),
+EC_POINT_get_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(),
+EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(), EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(),
+EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp(),
+EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m(), EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m(),
+EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GF2m() and EC_POINT_oct2point().
+
+EC_POINT_method_of returns the EC_METHOD associated with the supplied EC_POINT.
+
+EC_POINT_point2oct() and EC_POINT_point2buf() return the length of the required
+buffer or 0 on error.
+
+EC_POINT_point2bn() returns the pointer to the BIGNUM supplied, or NULL on
+error.
+
+EC_POINT_bn2point() returns the pointer to the EC_POINT supplied, or NULL on
+error.
+
+EC_POINT_point2hex() returns a pointer to the hex string, or NULL on error.
+
+EC_POINT_hex2point() returns the pointer to the EC_POINT supplied, or NULL on
+error.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<crypto(7)>, L<EC_GROUP_new(3)>, L<EC_GROUP_copy(3)>,
+L<EC_POINT_add(3)>, L<EC_KEY_new(3)>,
+L<EC_GFp_simple_method(3)>, L<d2i_ECPKParameters(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2013-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/ENGINE_add.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/ENGINE_add.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d5a7d72
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/ENGINE_add.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,621 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+ENGINE_get_DH, ENGINE_get_DSA, ENGINE_get_ECDH, ENGINE_get_ECDSA,
+ENGINE_by_id, ENGINE_get_cipher_engine, ENGINE_get_default_DH,
+ENGINE_get_default_DSA, ENGINE_get_default_ECDH,
+ENGINE_get_default_ECDSA, ENGINE_get_default_RAND,
+ENGINE_get_default_RSA, ENGINE_get_digest_engine, ENGINE_get_first,
+ENGINE_get_last, ENGINE_get_next, ENGINE_get_prev, ENGINE_new,
+ENGINE_get_ciphers, ENGINE_get_ctrl_function, ENGINE_get_digests,
+ENGINE_get_destroy_function, ENGINE_get_finish_function,
+ENGINE_get_init_function, ENGINE_get_load_privkey_function,
+ENGINE_get_load_pubkey_function, ENGINE_load_private_key,
+ENGINE_load_public_key, ENGINE_get_RAND, ENGINE_get_RSA, ENGINE_get_id,
+ENGINE_get_name, ENGINE_get_cmd_defns, ENGINE_get_cipher,
+ENGINE_get_digest, ENGINE_add, ENGINE_cmd_is_executable,
+ENGINE_ctrl, ENGINE_ctrl_cmd, ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string,
+ENGINE_finish, ENGINE_free, ENGINE_get_flags, ENGINE_init,
+ENGINE_register_DH, ENGINE_register_DSA, ENGINE_register_ECDH,
+ENGINE_register_ECDSA, ENGINE_register_RAND, ENGINE_register_RSA,
+ENGINE_register_all_complete, ENGINE_register_ciphers,
+ENGINE_register_complete, ENGINE_register_digests, ENGINE_remove,
+ENGINE_set_DH, ENGINE_set_DSA, ENGINE_set_ECDH, ENGINE_set_ECDSA,
+ENGINE_set_RAND, ENGINE_set_RSA, ENGINE_set_ciphers,
+ENGINE_set_cmd_defns, ENGINE_set_ctrl_function, ENGINE_set_default,
+ENGINE_set_default_DH, ENGINE_set_default_DSA, ENGINE_set_default_ECDH,
+ENGINE_set_default_ECDSA, ENGINE_set_default_RAND, ENGINE_set_default_RSA,
+ENGINE_set_default_ciphers, ENGINE_set_default_digests,
+ENGINE_set_default_string, ENGINE_set_destroy_function,
+ENGINE_set_digests, ENGINE_set_finish_function, ENGINE_set_flags,
+ENGINE_set_id, ENGINE_set_init_function, ENGINE_set_load_privkey_function,
+ENGINE_set_load_pubkey_function, ENGINE_set_name, ENGINE_up_ref,
+ENGINE_get_table_flags, ENGINE_cleanup,
+ENGINE_load_builtin_engines, ENGINE_register_all_DH,
+ENGINE_register_all_DSA, ENGINE_register_all_ECDH,
+ENGINE_register_all_ECDSA, ENGINE_register_all_RAND,
+ENGINE_register_all_RSA, ENGINE_register_all_ciphers,
+ENGINE_register_all_digests, ENGINE_set_table_flags, ENGINE_unregister_DH,
+ENGINE_unregister_DSA, ENGINE_unregister_ECDH, ENGINE_unregister_ECDSA,
+ENGINE_unregister_RAND, ENGINE_unregister_RSA, ENGINE_unregister_ciphers,
+ENGINE_unregister_digests
+- ENGINE cryptographic module support
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/engine.h>
+
+ ENGINE *ENGINE_get_first(void);
+ ENGINE *ENGINE_get_last(void);
+ ENGINE *ENGINE_get_next(ENGINE *e);
+ ENGINE *ENGINE_get_prev(ENGINE *e);
+
+ int ENGINE_add(ENGINE *e);
+ int ENGINE_remove(ENGINE *e);
+
+ ENGINE *ENGINE_by_id(const char *id);
+
+ int ENGINE_init(ENGINE *e);
+ int ENGINE_finish(ENGINE *e);
+
+ void ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(void);
+
+ ENGINE *ENGINE_get_default_RSA(void);
+ ENGINE *ENGINE_get_default_DSA(void);
+ ENGINE *ENGINE_get_default_ECDH(void);
+ ENGINE *ENGINE_get_default_ECDSA(void);
+ ENGINE *ENGINE_get_default_DH(void);
+ ENGINE *ENGINE_get_default_RAND(void);
+ ENGINE *ENGINE_get_cipher_engine(int nid);
+ ENGINE *ENGINE_get_digest_engine(int nid);
+
+ int ENGINE_set_default_RSA(ENGINE *e);
+ int ENGINE_set_default_DSA(ENGINE *e);
+ int ENGINE_set_default_ECDH(ENGINE *e);
+ int ENGINE_set_default_ECDSA(ENGINE *e);
+ int ENGINE_set_default_DH(ENGINE *e);
+ int ENGINE_set_default_RAND(ENGINE *e);
+ int ENGINE_set_default_ciphers(ENGINE *e);
+ int ENGINE_set_default_digests(ENGINE *e);
+ int ENGINE_set_default_string(ENGINE *e, const char *list);
+
+ int ENGINE_set_default(ENGINE *e, unsigned int flags);
+
+ unsigned int ENGINE_get_table_flags(void);
+ void ENGINE_set_table_flags(unsigned int flags);
+
+ int ENGINE_register_RSA(ENGINE *e);
+ void ENGINE_unregister_RSA(ENGINE *e);
+ void ENGINE_register_all_RSA(void);
+ int ENGINE_register_DSA(ENGINE *e);
+ void ENGINE_unregister_DSA(ENGINE *e);
+ void ENGINE_register_all_DSA(void);
+ int ENGINE_register_ECDH(ENGINE *e);
+ void ENGINE_unregister_ECDH(ENGINE *e);
+ void ENGINE_register_all_ECDH(void);
+ int ENGINE_register_ECDSA(ENGINE *e);
+ void ENGINE_unregister_ECDSA(ENGINE *e);
+ void ENGINE_register_all_ECDSA(void);
+ int ENGINE_register_DH(ENGINE *e);
+ void ENGINE_unregister_DH(ENGINE *e);
+ void ENGINE_register_all_DH(void);
+ int ENGINE_register_RAND(ENGINE *e);
+ void ENGINE_unregister_RAND(ENGINE *e);
+ void ENGINE_register_all_RAND(void);
+ int ENGINE_register_ciphers(ENGINE *e);
+ void ENGINE_unregister_ciphers(ENGINE *e);
+ void ENGINE_register_all_ciphers(void);
+ int ENGINE_register_digests(ENGINE *e);
+ void ENGINE_unregister_digests(ENGINE *e);
+ void ENGINE_register_all_digests(void);
+ int ENGINE_register_complete(ENGINE *e);
+ int ENGINE_register_all_complete(void);
+
+ int ENGINE_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)(void));
+ int ENGINE_cmd_is_executable(ENGINE *e, int cmd);
+ int ENGINE_ctrl_cmd(ENGINE *e, const char *cmd_name,
+         long i, void *p, void (*f)(void), int cmd_optional);
+ int ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(ENGINE *e, const char *cmd_name, const char *arg,
+         int cmd_optional);
+
+ ENGINE *ENGINE_new(void);
+ int ENGINE_free(ENGINE *e);
+ int ENGINE_up_ref(ENGINE *e);
+
+ int ENGINE_set_id(ENGINE *e, const char *id);
+ int ENGINE_set_name(ENGINE *e, const char *name);
+ int ENGINE_set_RSA(ENGINE *e, const RSA_METHOD *rsa_meth);
+ int ENGINE_set_DSA(ENGINE *e, const DSA_METHOD *dsa_meth);
+ int ENGINE_set_ECDH(ENGINE *e, const ECDH_METHOD *dh_meth);
+ int ENGINE_set_ECDSA(ENGINE *e, const ECDSA_METHOD *dh_meth);
+ int ENGINE_set_DH(ENGINE *e, const DH_METHOD *dh_meth);
+ int ENGINE_set_RAND(ENGINE *e, const RAND_METHOD *rand_meth);
+ int ENGINE_set_destroy_function(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR destroy_f);
+ int ENGINE_set_init_function(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR init_f);
+ int ENGINE_set_finish_function(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR finish_f);
+ int ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_CTRL_FUNC_PTR ctrl_f);
+ int ENGINE_set_load_privkey_function(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_LOAD_KEY_PTR loadpriv_f);
+ int ENGINE_set_load_pubkey_function(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_LOAD_KEY_PTR loadpub_f);
+ int ENGINE_set_ciphers(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_CIPHERS_PTR f);
+ int ENGINE_set_digests(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_DIGESTS_PTR f);
+ int ENGINE_set_flags(ENGINE *e, int flags);
+ int ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(ENGINE *e, const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN *defns);
+
+ const char *ENGINE_get_id(const ENGINE *e);
+ const char *ENGINE_get_name(const ENGINE *e);
+ const RSA_METHOD *ENGINE_get_RSA(const ENGINE *e);
+ const DSA_METHOD *ENGINE_get_DSA(const ENGINE *e);
+ const ECDH_METHOD *ENGINE_get_ECDH(const ENGINE *e);
+ const ECDSA_METHOD *ENGINE_get_ECDSA(const ENGINE *e);
+ const DH_METHOD *ENGINE_get_DH(const ENGINE *e);
+ const RAND_METHOD *ENGINE_get_RAND(const ENGINE *e);
+ ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR ENGINE_get_destroy_function(const ENGINE *e);
+ ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR ENGINE_get_init_function(const ENGINE *e);
+ ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR ENGINE_get_finish_function(const ENGINE *e);
+ ENGINE_CTRL_FUNC_PTR ENGINE_get_ctrl_function(const ENGINE *e);
+ ENGINE_LOAD_KEY_PTR ENGINE_get_load_privkey_function(const ENGINE *e);
+ ENGINE_LOAD_KEY_PTR ENGINE_get_load_pubkey_function(const ENGINE *e);
+ ENGINE_CIPHERS_PTR ENGINE_get_ciphers(const ENGINE *e);
+ ENGINE_DIGESTS_PTR ENGINE_get_digests(const ENGINE *e);
+ const EVP_CIPHER *ENGINE_get_cipher(ENGINE *e, int nid);
+ const EVP_MD *ENGINE_get_digest(ENGINE *e, int nid);
+ int ENGINE_get_flags(const ENGINE *e);
+ const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN *ENGINE_get_cmd_defns(const ENGINE *e);
+
+ EVP_PKEY *ENGINE_load_private_key(ENGINE *e, const char *key_id,
+     UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
+ EVP_PKEY *ENGINE_load_public_key(ENGINE *e, const char *key_id,
+     UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
+
+Deprecated:
+
+ #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+ void ENGINE_cleanup(void)
+ #endif
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+These functions create, manipulate, and use cryptographic modules in the
+form of B<ENGINE> objects. These objects act as containers for
+implementations of cryptographic algorithms, and support a
+reference-counted mechanism to allow them to be dynamically loaded in and
+out of the running application.
+
+The cryptographic functionality that can be provided by an B<ENGINE>
+implementation includes the following abstractions;
+
+ RSA_METHOD - for providing alternative RSA implementations
+ DSA_METHOD, DH_METHOD, RAND_METHOD, ECDH_METHOD, ECDSA_METHOD,
+       - similarly for other OpenSSL APIs
+ EVP_CIPHER - potentially multiple cipher algorithms (indexed by 'nid')
+ EVP_DIGEST - potentially multiple hash algorithms (indexed by 'nid')
+ key-loading - loading public and/or private EVP_PKEY keys
+
+=head2 Reference counting and handles
+
+Due to the modular nature of the ENGINE API, pointers to ENGINEs need to be
+treated as handles - ie. not only as pointers, but also as references to
+the underlying ENGINE object. Ie. one should obtain a new reference when
+making copies of an ENGINE pointer if the copies will be used (and
+released) independently.
+
+ENGINE objects have two levels of reference-counting to match the way in
+which the objects are used. At the most basic level, each ENGINE pointer is
+inherently a B<structural> reference - a structural reference is required
+to use the pointer value at all, as this kind of reference is a guarantee
+that the structure can not be deallocated until the reference is released.
+
+However, a structural reference provides no guarantee that the ENGINE is
+initialised and able to use any of its cryptographic
+implementations. Indeed it's quite possible that most ENGINEs will not
+initialise at all in typical environments, as ENGINEs are typically used to
+support specialised hardware. To use an ENGINE's functionality, you need a
+B<functional> reference. This kind of reference can be considered a
+specialised form of structural reference, because each functional reference
+implicitly contains a structural reference as well - however to avoid
+difficult-to-find programming bugs, it is recommended to treat the two
+kinds of reference independently. If you have a functional reference to an
+ENGINE, you have a guarantee that the ENGINE has been initialised and
+is ready to perform cryptographic operations, and will remain initialised
+until after you have released your reference.
+
+I<Structural references>
+
+This basic type of reference is used for instantiating new ENGINEs,
+iterating across OpenSSL's internal linked-list of loaded
+ENGINEs, reading information about an ENGINE, etc. Essentially a structural
+reference is sufficient if you only need to query or manipulate the data of
+an ENGINE implementation rather than use its functionality.
+
+The ENGINE_new() function returns a structural reference to a new (empty)
+ENGINE object. There are other ENGINE API functions that return structural
+references such as; ENGINE_by_id(), ENGINE_get_first(), ENGINE_get_last(),
+ENGINE_get_next(), ENGINE_get_prev(). All structural references should be
+released by a corresponding to call to the ENGINE_free() function - the
+ENGINE object itself will only actually be cleaned up and deallocated when
+the last structural reference is released.
+
+It should also be noted that many ENGINE API function calls that accept a
+structural reference will internally obtain another reference - typically
+this happens whenever the supplied ENGINE will be needed by OpenSSL after
+the function has returned. Eg. the function to add a new ENGINE to
+OpenSSL's internal list is ENGINE_add() - if this function returns success,
+then OpenSSL will have stored a new structural reference internally so the
+caller is still responsible for freeing their own reference with
+ENGINE_free() when they are finished with it. In a similar way, some
+functions will automatically release the structural reference passed to it
+if part of the function's job is to do so. Eg. the ENGINE_get_next() and
+ENGINE_get_prev() functions are used for iterating across the internal
+ENGINE list - they will return a new structural reference to the next (or
+previous) ENGINE in the list or NULL if at the end (or beginning) of the
+list, but in either case the structural reference passed to the function is
+released on behalf of the caller.
+
+To clarify a particular function's handling of references, one should
+always consult that function's documentation "man" page, or failing that
+the openssl/engine.h header file includes some hints.
+
+I<Functional references>
+
+As mentioned, functional references exist when the cryptographic
+functionality of an ENGINE is required to be available. A functional
+reference can be obtained in one of two ways; from an existing structural
+reference to the required ENGINE, or by asking OpenSSL for the default
+operational ENGINE for a given cryptographic purpose.
+
+To obtain a functional reference from an existing structural reference,
+call the ENGINE_init() function. This returns zero if the ENGINE was not
+already operational and couldn't be successfully initialised (eg. lack of
+system drivers, no special hardware attached, etc), otherwise it will
+return non-zero to indicate that the ENGINE is now operational and will
+have allocated a new B<functional> reference to the ENGINE. All functional
+references are released by calling ENGINE_finish() (which removes the
+implicit structural reference as well).
+
+The second way to get a functional reference is by asking OpenSSL for a
+default implementation for a given task, eg. by ENGINE_get_default_RSA(),
+ENGINE_get_default_cipher_engine(), etc. These are discussed in the next
+section, though they are not usually required by application programmers as
+they are used automatically when creating and using the relevant
+algorithm-specific types in OpenSSL, such as RSA, DSA, EVP_CIPHER_CTX, etc.
+
+=head2 Default implementations
+
+For each supported abstraction, the ENGINE code maintains an internal table
+of state to control which implementations are available for a given
+abstraction and which should be used by default. These implementations are
+registered in the tables and indexed by an 'nid' value, because
+abstractions like EVP_CIPHER and EVP_DIGEST support many distinct
+algorithms and modes, and ENGINEs can support arbitrarily many of them.
+In the case of other abstractions like RSA, DSA, etc, there is only one
+"algorithm" so all implementations implicitly register using the same 'nid'
+index.
+
+When a default ENGINE is requested for a given abstraction/algorithm/mode, (eg.
+when calling RSA_new_method(NULL)), a "get_default" call will be made to the
+ENGINE subsystem to process the corresponding state table and return a
+functional reference to an initialised ENGINE whose implementation should be
+used. If no ENGINE should (or can) be used, it will return NULL and the caller
+will operate with a NULL ENGINE handle - this usually equates to using the
+conventional software implementation. In the latter case, OpenSSL will from
+then on behave the way it used to before the ENGINE API existed.
+
+Each state table has a flag to note whether it has processed this
+"get_default" query since the table was last modified, because to process
+this question it must iterate across all the registered ENGINEs in the
+table trying to initialise each of them in turn, in case one of them is
+operational. If it returns a functional reference to an ENGINE, it will
+also cache another reference to speed up processing future queries (without
+needing to iterate across the table). Likewise, it will cache a NULL
+response if no ENGINE was available so that future queries won't repeat the
+same iteration unless the state table changes. This behaviour can also be
+changed; if the ENGINE_TABLE_FLAG_NOINIT flag is set (using
+ENGINE_set_table_flags()), no attempted initialisations will take place,
+instead the only way for the state table to return a non-NULL ENGINE to the
+"get_default" query will be if one is expressly set in the table. Eg.
+ENGINE_set_default_RSA() does the same job as ENGINE_register_RSA() except
+that it also sets the state table's cached response for the "get_default"
+query. In the case of abstractions like EVP_CIPHER, where implementations are
+indexed by 'nid', these flags and cached-responses are distinct for each 'nid'
+value.
+
+=head2 Application requirements
+
+This section will explain the basic things an application programmer should
+support to make the most useful elements of the ENGINE functionality
+available to the user. The first thing to consider is whether the
+programmer wishes to make alternative ENGINE modules available to the
+application and user. OpenSSL maintains an internal linked list of
+"visible" ENGINEs from which it has to operate - at start-up, this list is
+empty and in fact if an application does not call any ENGINE API calls and
+it uses static linking against openssl, then the resulting application
+binary will not contain any alternative ENGINE code at all. So the first
+consideration is whether any/all available ENGINE implementations should be
+made visible to OpenSSL - this is controlled by calling the various "load"
+functions.
+
+Having called any of these functions, ENGINE objects would have been
+dynamically allocated and populated with these implementations and linked
+into OpenSSL's internal linked list. At this point it is important to
+mention an important API function;
+
+ void ENGINE_cleanup(void)
+
+If no ENGINE API functions are called at all in an application, then there
+are no inherent memory leaks to worry about from the ENGINE functionality.
+However, prior to OpenSSL 1.1.0 if any ENGINEs are loaded, even if they are
+never registered or used, it was necessary to use the ENGINE_cleanup() function
+to correspondingly cleanup before program exit, if the caller wishes to avoid
+memory leaks. This mechanism used an internal callback registration table
+so that any ENGINE API functionality that knows it requires cleanup can
+register its cleanup details to be called during ENGINE_cleanup(). This
+approach allowed ENGINE_cleanup() to clean up after any ENGINE functionality
+at all that your program uses, yet doesn't automatically create linker
+dependencies to all possible ENGINE functionality - only the cleanup
+callbacks required by the functionality you do use will be required by the
+linker. From OpenSSL 1.1.0 it is no longer necessary to explicitly call
+ENGINE_cleanup and this function is deprecated. Cleanup automatically takes
+place at program exit.
+
+The fact that ENGINEs are made visible to OpenSSL (and thus are linked into
+the program and loaded into memory at run-time) does not mean they are
+"registered" or called into use by OpenSSL automatically - that behaviour
+is something for the application to control. Some applications
+will want to allow the user to specify exactly which ENGINE they want used
+if any is to be used at all. Others may prefer to load all support and have
+OpenSSL automatically use at run-time any ENGINE that is able to
+successfully initialise - ie. to assume that this corresponds to
+acceleration hardware attached to the machine or some such thing. There are
+probably numerous other ways in which applications may prefer to handle
+things, so we will simply illustrate the consequences as they apply to a
+couple of simple cases and leave developers to consider these and the
+source code to openssl's builtin utilities as guides.
+
+I<Using a specific ENGINE implementation>
+
+Here we'll assume an application has been configured by its user or admin
+to want to use the "ACME" ENGINE if it is available in the version of
+OpenSSL the application was compiled with. If it is available, it should be
+used by default for all RSA, DSA, and symmetric cipher operations, otherwise
+OpenSSL should use its builtin software as per usual. The following code
+illustrates how to approach this;
+
+ ENGINE *e;
+ const char *engine_id = "ACME";
+ ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
+ e = ENGINE_by_id(engine_id);
+ if(!e)
+     /* the engine isn't available */
+     return;
+ if(!ENGINE_init(e)) {
+     /* the engine couldn't initialise, release 'e' */
+     ENGINE_free(e);
+     return;
+ }
+ if(!ENGINE_set_default_RSA(e))
+     /* This should only happen when 'e' can't initialise, but the previous
+      * statement suggests it did. */
+     abort();
+ ENGINE_set_default_DSA(e);
+ ENGINE_set_default_ciphers(e);
+ /* Release the functional reference from ENGINE_init() */
+ ENGINE_finish(e);
+ /* Release the structural reference from ENGINE_by_id() */
+ ENGINE_free(e);
+
+I<Automatically using builtin ENGINE implementations>
+
+Here we'll assume we want to load and register all ENGINE implementations
+bundled with OpenSSL, such that for any cryptographic algorithm required by
+OpenSSL - if there is an ENGINE that implements it and can be initialised,
+it should be used. The following code illustrates how this can work;
+
+ /* Load all bundled ENGINEs into memory and make them visible */
+ ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
+ /* Register all of them for every algorithm they collectively implement */
+ ENGINE_register_all_complete();
+
+That's all that's required. Eg. the next time OpenSSL tries to set up an
+RSA key, any bundled ENGINEs that implement RSA_METHOD will be passed to
+ENGINE_init() and if any of those succeed, that ENGINE will be set as the
+default for RSA use from then on.
+
+=head2 Advanced configuration support
+
+There is a mechanism supported by the ENGINE framework that allows each
+ENGINE implementation to define an arbitrary set of configuration
+"commands" and expose them to OpenSSL and any applications based on
+OpenSSL. This mechanism is entirely based on the use of name-value pairs
+and assumes ASCII input (no unicode or UTF for now!), so it is ideal if
+applications want to provide a transparent way for users to provide
+arbitrary configuration "directives" directly to such ENGINEs. It is also
+possible for the application to dynamically interrogate the loaded ENGINE
+implementations for the names, descriptions, and input flags of their
+available "control commands", providing a more flexible configuration
+scheme. However, if the user is expected to know which ENGINE device he/she
+is using (in the case of specialised hardware, this goes without saying)
+then applications may not need to concern themselves with discovering the
+supported control commands and simply prefer to pass settings into ENGINEs
+exactly as they are provided by the user.
+
+Before illustrating how control commands work, it is worth mentioning what
+they are typically used for. Broadly speaking there are two uses for
+control commands; the first is to provide the necessary details to the
+implementation (which may know nothing at all specific to the host system)
+so that it can be initialised for use. This could include the path to any
+driver or config files it needs to load, required network addresses,
+smart-card identifiers, passwords to initialise protected devices,
+logging information, etc etc. This class of commands typically needs to be
+passed to an ENGINE B<before> attempting to initialise it, ie. before
+calling ENGINE_init(). The other class of commands consist of settings or
+operations that tweak certain behaviour or cause certain operations to take
+place, and these commands may work either before or after ENGINE_init(), or
+in some cases both. ENGINE implementations should provide indications of
+this in the descriptions attached to builtin control commands and/or in
+external product documentation.
+
+I<Issuing control commands to an ENGINE>
+
+Let's illustrate by example; a function for which the caller supplies the
+name of the ENGINE it wishes to use, a table of string-pairs for use before
+initialisation, and another table for use after initialisation. Note that
+the string-pairs used for control commands consist of a command "name"
+followed by the command "parameter" - the parameter could be NULL in some
+cases but the name can not. This function should initialise the ENGINE
+(issuing the "pre" commands beforehand and the "post" commands afterwards)
+and set it as the default for everything except RAND and then return a
+boolean success or failure.
+
+ int generic_load_engine_fn(const char *engine_id,
+                            const char **pre_cmds, int pre_num,
+                            const char **post_cmds, int post_num)
+ {
+     ENGINE *e = ENGINE_by_id(engine_id);
+     if (!e) return 0;
+     while (pre_num--) {
+         if(!ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(e, pre_cmds[0], pre_cmds[1], 0)) {
+             fprintf(stderr, "Failed command (%s - %s:%s)\n", engine_id,
+                 pre_cmds[0], pre_cmds[1] ? pre_cmds[1] : "(NULL)");
+             ENGINE_free(e);
+             return 0;
+         }
+         pre_cmds += 2;
+     }
+     if (!ENGINE_init(e)) {
+         fprintf(stderr, "Failed initialisation\n");
+         ENGINE_free(e);
+         return 0;
+     }
+     /* ENGINE_init() returned a functional reference, so free the structural
+      * reference from ENGINE_by_id(). */
+     ENGINE_free(e);
+     while(post_num--) {
+         if(!ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(e, post_cmds[0], post_cmds[1], 0)) {
+             fprintf(stderr, "Failed command (%s - %s:%s)\n", engine_id,
+                 post_cmds[0], post_cmds[1] ? post_cmds[1] : "(NULL)");
+             ENGINE_finish(e);
+             return 0;
+         }
+         post_cmds += 2;
+     }
+     ENGINE_set_default(e, ENGINE_METHOD_ALL & ~ENGINE_METHOD_RAND);
+     /* Success */
+     return 1;
+ }
+
+Note that ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string() accepts a boolean argument that can
+relax the semantics of the function - if set non-zero it will only return
+failure if the ENGINE supported the given command name but failed while
+executing it, if the ENGINE doesn't support the command name it will simply
+return success without doing anything. In this case we assume the user is
+only supplying commands specific to the given ENGINE so we set this to
+FALSE.
+
+I<Discovering supported control commands>
+
+It is possible to discover at run-time the names, numerical-ids, descriptions
+and input parameters of the control commands supported by an ENGINE using a
+structural reference. Note that some control commands are defined by OpenSSL
+itself and it will intercept and handle these control commands on behalf of the
+ENGINE, ie. the ENGINE's ctrl() handler is not used for the control command.
+openssl/engine.h defines an index, ENGINE_CMD_BASE, that all control commands
+implemented by ENGINEs should be numbered from. Any command value lower than
+this symbol is considered a "generic" command is handled directly by the
+OpenSSL core routines.
+
+It is using these "core" control commands that one can discover the control
+commands implemented by a given ENGINE, specifically the commands:
+
+ ENGINE_HAS_CTRL_FUNCTION
+ ENGINE_CTRL_GET_FIRST_CMD_TYPE
+ ENGINE_CTRL_GET_NEXT_CMD_TYPE
+ ENGINE_CTRL_GET_CMD_FROM_NAME
+ ENGINE_CTRL_GET_NAME_LEN_FROM_CMD
+ ENGINE_CTRL_GET_NAME_FROM_CMD
+ ENGINE_CTRL_GET_DESC_LEN_FROM_CMD
+ ENGINE_CTRL_GET_DESC_FROM_CMD
+ ENGINE_CTRL_GET_CMD_FLAGS
+
+Whilst these commands are automatically processed by the OpenSSL framework code,
+they use various properties exposed by each ENGINE to process these
+queries. An ENGINE has 3 properties it exposes that can affect how this behaves;
+it can supply a ctrl() handler, it can specify ENGINE_FLAGS_MANUAL_CMD_CTRL in
+the ENGINE's flags, and it can expose an array of control command descriptions.
+If an ENGINE specifies the ENGINE_FLAGS_MANUAL_CMD_CTRL flag, then it will
+simply pass all these "core" control commands directly to the ENGINE's ctrl()
+handler (and thus, it must have supplied one), so it is up to the ENGINE to
+reply to these "discovery" commands itself. If that flag is not set, then the
+OpenSSL framework code will work with the following rules;
+
+ if no ctrl() handler supplied;
+     ENGINE_HAS_CTRL_FUNCTION returns FALSE (zero),
+     all other commands fail.
+ if a ctrl() handler was supplied but no array of control commands;
+     ENGINE_HAS_CTRL_FUNCTION returns TRUE,
+     all other commands fail.
+ if a ctrl() handler and array of control commands was supplied;
+     ENGINE_HAS_CTRL_FUNCTION returns TRUE,
+     all other commands proceed processing ...
+
+If the ENGINE's array of control commands is empty then all other commands will
+fail, otherwise; ENGINE_CTRL_GET_FIRST_CMD_TYPE returns the identifier of
+the first command supported by the ENGINE, ENGINE_GET_NEXT_CMD_TYPE takes the
+identifier of a command supported by the ENGINE and returns the next command
+identifier or fails if there are no more, ENGINE_CMD_FROM_NAME takes a string
+name for a command and returns the corresponding identifier or fails if no such
+command name exists, and the remaining commands take a command identifier and
+return properties of the corresponding commands. All except
+ENGINE_CTRL_GET_FLAGS return the string length of a command name or description,
+or populate a supplied character buffer with a copy of the command name or
+description. ENGINE_CTRL_GET_FLAGS returns a bitwise-OR'd mask of the following
+possible values:
+
+ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NUMERIC
+ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING
+ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NO_INPUT
+ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_INTERNAL
+
+If the ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_INTERNAL flag is set, then any other flags are purely
+informational to the caller - this flag will prevent the command being usable
+for any higher-level ENGINE functions such as ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string().
+"INTERNAL" commands are not intended to be exposed to text-based configuration
+by applications, administrations, users, etc. These can support arbitrary
+operations via ENGINE_ctrl(), including passing to and/or from the control
+commands data of any arbitrary type. These commands are supported in the
+discovery mechanisms simply to allow applications to determine if an ENGINE
+supports certain specific commands it might want to use (eg. application "foo"
+might query various ENGINEs to see if they implement "FOO_GET_VENDOR_LOGO_GIF" -
+and ENGINE could therefore decide whether or not to support this "foo"-specific
+extension).
+
+=head1 ENVIRONMENT
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<OPENSSL_ENGINES>
+
+The path to the engines directory.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<OPENSSL_init_crypto(3)>, L<RSA_new_method(3)>, L<dsa(3)>, L<dh(3)>, L<rand(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+ENGINE_cleanup(), ENGINE_load_openssl(), ENGINE_load_dynamic(), and
+ENGINE_load_cryptodev() were deprecated in OpenSSL 1.1.0 by
+OPENSSL_init_crypto().
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2002-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/ERR_GET_LIB.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/ERR_GET_LIB.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5602a8e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/ERR_GET_LIB.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+ERR_GET_LIB, ERR_GET_FUNC, ERR_GET_REASON, ERR_FATAL_ERROR
+- get information from error codes
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/err.h>
+
+ int ERR_GET_LIB(unsigned long e);
+
+ int ERR_GET_FUNC(unsigned long e);
+
+ int ERR_GET_REASON(unsigned long e);
+
+ int ERR_FATAL_ERROR(unsigned long e);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The error code returned by ERR_get_error() consists of a library
+number, function code and reason code. ERR_GET_LIB(), ERR_GET_FUNC()
+and ERR_GET_REASON() can be used to extract these.
+
+ERR_FATAL_ERROR() indicates whether a given error code is a fatal error.
+
+The library number and function code describe where the error
+occurred, the reason code is the information about what went wrong.
+
+Each sub-library of OpenSSL has a unique library number; function and
+reason codes are unique within each sub-library.  Note that different
+libraries may use the same value to signal different functions and
+reasons.
+
+B<ERR_R_...> reason codes such as B<ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE> are globally
+unique. However, when checking for sub-library specific reason codes,
+be sure to also compare the library number.
+
+ERR_GET_LIB(), ERR_GET_FUNC(), ERR_GET_REASON(), and ERR_FATAL_ERROR()
+ are macros.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+The library number, function code, reason code, and whether the error
+is fatal, respectively.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+ERR_GET_LIB(), ERR_GET_FUNC() and ERR_GET_REASON() are available in
+all versions of OpenSSL.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/ERR_clear_error.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/ERR_clear_error.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c876615
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/ERR_clear_error.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+ERR_clear_error - clear the error queue
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/err.h>
+
+ void ERR_clear_error(void);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+ERR_clear_error() empties the current thread's error queue.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+ERR_clear_error() has no return value.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/ERR_error_string.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/ERR_error_string.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..695eaf2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/ERR_error_string.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+ERR_error_string, ERR_error_string_n, ERR_lib_error_string,
+ERR_func_error_string, ERR_reason_error_string - obtain human-readable
+error message
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/err.h>
+
+ char *ERR_error_string(unsigned long e, char *buf);
+ void ERR_error_string_n(unsigned long e, char *buf, size_t len);
+
+ const char *ERR_lib_error_string(unsigned long e);
+ const char *ERR_func_error_string(unsigned long e);
+ const char *ERR_reason_error_string(unsigned long e);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+ERR_error_string() generates a human-readable string representing the
+error code I<e>, and places it at I<buf>. I<buf> must be at least 256
+bytes long. If I<buf> is B<NULL>, the error string is placed in a
+static buffer.
+Note that this function is not thread-safe and does no checks on the size
+of the buffer; use ERR_error_string_n() instead.
+
+ERR_error_string_n() is a variant of ERR_error_string() that writes
+at most I<len> characters (including the terminating 0)
+and truncates the string if necessary.
+For ERR_error_string_n(), I<buf> may not be B<NULL>.
+
+The string will have the following format:
+
+ error:[error code]:[library name]:[function name]:[reason string]
+
+I<error code> is an 8 digit hexadecimal number, I<library name>,
+I<function name> and I<reason string> are ASCII text.
+
+ERR_lib_error_string(), ERR_func_error_string() and
+ERR_reason_error_string() return the library name, function
+name and reason string respectively.
+
+If there is no text string registered for the given error code,
+the error string will contain the numeric code.
+
+L<ERR_print_errors(3)> can be used to print
+all error codes currently in the queue.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+ERR_error_string() returns a pointer to a static buffer containing the
+string if I<buf> B<== NULL>, I<buf> otherwise.
+
+ERR_lib_error_string(), ERR_func_error_string() and
+ERR_reason_error_string() return the strings, and B<NULL> if
+none is registered for the error code.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>,
+L<ERR_print_errors(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/ERR_get_error.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/ERR_get_error.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3b223c9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/ERR_get_error.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+ERR_get_error, ERR_peek_error, ERR_peek_last_error,
+ERR_get_error_line, ERR_peek_error_line, ERR_peek_last_error_line,
+ERR_get_error_line_data, ERR_peek_error_line_data,
+ERR_peek_last_error_line_data - obtain error code and data
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/err.h>
+
+ unsigned long ERR_get_error(void);
+ unsigned long ERR_peek_error(void);
+ unsigned long ERR_peek_last_error(void);
+
+ unsigned long ERR_get_error_line(const char **file, int *line);
+ unsigned long ERR_peek_error_line(const char **file, int *line);
+ unsigned long ERR_peek_last_error_line(const char **file, int *line);
+
+ unsigned long ERR_get_error_line_data(const char **file, int *line,
+         const char **data, int *flags);
+ unsigned long ERR_peek_error_line_data(const char **file, int *line,
+         const char **data, int *flags);
+ unsigned long ERR_peek_last_error_line_data(const char **file, int *line,
+         const char **data, int *flags);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+ERR_get_error() returns the earliest error code from the thread's error
+queue and removes the entry. This function can be called repeatedly
+until there are no more error codes to return.
+
+ERR_peek_error() returns the earliest error code from the thread's
+error queue without modifying it.
+
+ERR_peek_last_error() returns the latest error code from the thread's
+error queue without modifying it.
+
+See L<ERR_GET_LIB(3)> for obtaining information about
+location and reason of the error, and
+L<ERR_error_string(3)> for human-readable error
+messages.
+
+ERR_get_error_line(), ERR_peek_error_line() and
+ERR_peek_last_error_line() are the same as the above, but they
+additionally store the file name and line number where
+the error occurred in *B<file> and *B<line>, unless these are B<NULL>.
+
+ERR_get_error_line_data(), ERR_peek_error_line_data() and
+ERR_peek_last_error_line_data() store additional data and flags
+associated with the error code in *B<data>
+and *B<flags>, unless these are B<NULL>. *B<data> contains a string
+if *B<flags>&B<ERR_TXT_STRING> is true.
+
+An application B<MUST NOT> free the *B<data> pointer (or any other pointers
+returned by these functions) with OPENSSL_free() as freeing is handled
+automatically by the error library.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+The error code, or 0 if there is no error in the queue.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_error_string(3)>,
+L<ERR_GET_LIB(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/ERR_load_crypto_strings.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/ERR_load_crypto_strings.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..56d91d5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/ERR_load_crypto_strings.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+ERR_load_crypto_strings, SSL_load_error_strings, ERR_free_strings -
+load and free error strings
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+Deprecated:
+
+ #include <openssl/err.h>
+
+ #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+ void ERR_load_crypto_strings(void);
+ void ERR_free_strings(void);
+ #endif
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+ void SSL_load_error_strings(void);
+ #endif
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+All of the following functions are deprecated from OpenSSL 1.1.0. No explicit
+initialisation or de-initialisation is necessary. See L<OPENSSL_init_crypto(3)>
+and L<OPENSSL_init_ssl(3)>.
+
+ERR_load_crypto_strings() registers the error strings for all
+B<libcrypto> functions. SSL_load_error_strings() does the same,
+but also registers the B<libssl> error strings.
+
+In versions of OpenSSL prior to 1.1.0 ERR_free_strings() freed all previously
+loaded error strings. However from OpenSSL 1.1.0 it does nothing.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+ERR_load_crypto_strings(), SSL_load_error_strings() and
+ERR_free_strings() return no values.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_error_string(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+The ERR_load_crypto_strings(), SSL_load_error_strings(), and
+ERR_free_strings() functions were deprecated in OpenSSL 1.1.0 by
+OPENSSL_init_crypto() and OPENSSL_init_ssl().
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/ERR_load_strings.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/ERR_load_strings.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ee8de2c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/ERR_load_strings.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+ERR_load_strings, ERR_PACK, ERR_get_next_error_library - load
+arbitrary error strings
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/err.h>
+
+ void ERR_load_strings(int lib, ERR_STRING_DATA str[]);
+
+ int ERR_get_next_error_library(void);
+
+ unsigned long ERR_PACK(int lib, int func, int reason);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+ERR_load_strings() registers error strings for library number B<lib>.
+
+B<str> is an array of error string data:
+
+ typedef struct ERR_string_data_st
+ {
+        unsigned long error;
+        char *string;
+ } ERR_STRING_DATA;
+
+The error code is generated from the library number and a function and
+reason code: B<error> = ERR_PACK(B<lib>, B<func>, B<reason>).
+ERR_PACK() is a macro.
+
+The last entry in the array is {0,0}.
+
+ERR_get_next_error_library() can be used to assign library numbers
+to user libraries at runtime.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUE
+
+ERR_load_strings() returns no value. ERR_PACK() return the error code.
+ERR_get_next_error_library() returns zero on failure, otherwise a new
+library number.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_load_strings(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/ERR_print_errors.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/ERR_print_errors.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..134b374
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/ERR_print_errors.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+ERR_print_errors, ERR_print_errors_fp, ERR_print_errors_cb
+- print error messages
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/err.h>
+
+ void ERR_print_errors(BIO *bp);
+ void ERR_print_errors_fp(FILE *fp);
+ void ERR_print_errors_cb(int (*cb)(const char *str, size_t len, void *u),
+                          void *u)
+
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+ERR_print_errors() is a convenience function that prints the error
+strings for all errors that OpenSSL has recorded to B<bp>, thus
+emptying the error queue.
+
+ERR_print_errors_fp() is the same, except that the output goes to a
+B<FILE>.
+
+ERR_print_errors_cb() is the same, except that the callback function,
+B<cb>, is called for each error line with the string, length, and userdata
+B<u> as the callback parameters.
+
+The error strings will have the following format:
+
+ [pid]:error:[error code]:[library name]:[function name]:[reason string]:[file name]:[line]:[optional text message]
+
+I<error code> is an 8 digit hexadecimal number. I<library name>,
+I<function name> and I<reason string> are ASCII text, as is I<optional
+text message> if one was set for the respective error code.
+
+If there is no text string registered for the given error code,
+the error string will contain the numeric code.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+ERR_print_errors() and ERR_print_errors_fp() return no values.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_error_string(3)>,
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/ERR_put_error.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/ERR_put_error.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..14695ba
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/ERR_put_error.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+ERR_put_error, ERR_add_error_data - record an error
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/err.h>
+
+ void ERR_put_error(int lib, int func, int reason, const char *file,
+         int line);
+
+ void ERR_add_error_data(int num, ...);
+ void ERR_add_error_data(int num, va_list arg);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+ERR_put_error() adds an error code to the thread's error queue. It
+signals that the error of reason code B<reason> occurred in function
+B<func> of library B<lib>, in line number B<line> of B<file>.
+This function is usually called by a macro.
+
+ERR_add_error_data() associates the concatenation of its B<num> string
+arguments with the error code added last.
+ERR_add_error_vdata() is similar except the argument is a B<va_list>.
+
+L<ERR_load_strings(3)> can be used to register
+error strings so that the application can a generate human-readable
+error messages for the error code.
+
+=head2 Reporting errors
+
+Each sub-library has a specific macro XXXerr() that is used to report
+errors. Its first argument is a function code B<XXX_F_...>, the second
+argument is a reason code B<XXX_R_...>. Function codes are derived
+from the function names; reason codes consist of textual error
+descriptions. For example, the function ssl3_read_bytes() reports a
+"handshake failure" as follows:
+
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+
+Function and reason codes should consist of upper case characters,
+numbers and underscores only. The error file generation script translates
+function codes into function names by looking in the header files
+for an appropriate function name, if none is found it just uses
+the capitalized form such as "SSL3_READ_BYTES" in the above example.
+
+The trailing section of a reason code (after the "_R_") is translated
+into lower case and underscores changed to spaces.
+
+Although a library will normally report errors using its own specific
+XXXerr macro, another library's macro can be used. This is normally
+only done when a library wants to include ASN1 code which must use
+the ASN1err() macro.
+
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+ERR_put_error() and ERR_add_error_data() return
+no values.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_load_strings(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/ERR_remove_state.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/ERR_remove_state.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..617b4b7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/ERR_remove_state.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+ERR_remove_thread_state, ERR_remove_state - DEPRECATED
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+Deprecated:
+
+ #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10000000L
+ void ERR_remove_state(unsigned long pid);
+ #endif
+
+ #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+ void ERR_remove_thread_state(void *);
+ #endif
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The functions described here were used to free the error queue
+associated with the current or specified thread.
+
+They are now deprecated and do nothing, as the OpenSSL libraries now
+normally do all thread initialisation and deinitialisation
+automatically (see L<OPENSSL_init_crypto(3)>).
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUE
+
+The functions described here return no value.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+LL<OPENSSL_init_crypto(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+ERR_remove_state() was deprecated in OpenSSL 1.0.0 when
+ERR_remove_thread_state() was introduced.
+
+ERR_remove_thread_state() was deprecated in OpenSSL 1.1.0 when the
+thread handling functionality was entirely rewritten.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/ERR_set_mark.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/ERR_set_mark.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b3afea8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/ERR_set_mark.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+ERR_set_mark, ERR_pop_to_mark - set marks and pop errors until mark
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/err.h>
+
+ int ERR_set_mark(void);
+
+ int ERR_pop_to_mark(void);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+ERR_set_mark() sets a mark on the current topmost error record if there
+is one.
+
+ERR_pop_to_mark() will pop the top of the error stack until a mark is found.
+The mark is then removed.  If there is no mark, the whole stack is removed.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+ERR_set_mark() returns 0 if the error stack is empty, otherwise 1.
+
+ERR_pop_to_mark() returns 0 if there was no mark in the error stack, which
+implies that the stack became empty, otherwise 1.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2003-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_BytesToKey.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_BytesToKey.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..728c94e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_BytesToKey.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+EVP_BytesToKey - password based encryption routine
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+ int EVP_BytesToKey(const EVP_CIPHER *type, const EVP_MD *md,
+                    const unsigned char *salt,
+                    const unsigned char *data, int datal, int count,
+                    unsigned char *key, unsigned char *iv);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+EVP_BytesToKey() derives a key and IV from various parameters. B<type> is
+the cipher to derive the key and IV for. B<md> is the message digest to use.
+The B<salt> parameter is used as a salt in the derivation: it should point to
+an 8 byte buffer or NULL if no salt is used. B<data> is a buffer containing
+B<datal> bytes which is used to derive the keying data. B<count> is the
+iteration count to use. The derived key and IV will be written to B<key>
+and B<iv> respectively.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+A typical application of this function is to derive keying material for an
+encryption algorithm from a password in the B<data> parameter.
+
+Increasing the B<count> parameter slows down the algorithm which makes it
+harder for an attacker to perform a brute force attack using a large number
+of candidate passwords.
+
+If the total key and IV length is less than the digest length and
+B<MD5> is used then the derivation algorithm is compatible with PKCS#5 v1.5
+otherwise a non standard extension is used to derive the extra data.
+
+Newer applications should use a more modern algorithm such as PBKDF2 as
+defined in PKCS#5v2.1 and provided by PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC.
+
+=head1 KEY DERIVATION ALGORITHM
+
+The key and IV is derived by concatenating D_1, D_2, etc until
+enough data is available for the key and IV. D_i is defined as:
+
+        D_i = HASH^count(D_(i-1) || data || salt)
+
+where || denotes concatenation, D_0 is empty, HASH is the digest
+algorithm in use, HASH^1(data) is simply HASH(data), HASH^2(data)
+is HASH(HASH(data)) and so on.
+
+The initial bytes are used for the key and the subsequent bytes for
+the IV.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+If B<data> is NULL, then EVP_BytesToKey() returns the number of bytes
+needed to store the derived key.
+Otherwise, EVP_BytesToKey() returns the size of the derived key in bytes,
+or 0 on error.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<evp(3)>, L<rand(3)>,
+L<PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(3)>,
+L<EVP_EncryptInit(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3a57fcd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_cipher_data - Routines to
+inspect and modify EVP_CIPHER_CTX objects
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+ void *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx);
+ void *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_cipher_data(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, void *cipher_data);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data() function returns a pointer to the cipher
+data relevant to EVP_CIPHER_CTX. The contents of this data is specific to the
+particular implementation of the cipher. For example this data can be used by
+engines to store engine specific information. The data is automatically
+allocated and freed by OpenSSL, so applications and engines should not normally
+free this directly (but see below).
+
+The EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_cipher_data() function allows an application or engine to
+replace the cipher data with new data. A pointer to any existing cipher data is
+returned from this function. If the old data is no longer required then it
+should be freed through a call to OPENSSL_free().
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+The EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data() function returns a pointer to the current
+cipher data for the EVP_CIPHER_CTX.
+
+The EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_cipher_data() function returns a pointer to the old
+cipher data for the EVP_CIPHER_CTX.
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+The EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data() and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_cipher_data()
+functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_CIPHER_meth_new.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_CIPHER_meth_new.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..08e8290
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_CIPHER_meth_new.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,253 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+EVP_CIPHER_meth_new, EVP_CIPHER_meth_dup, EVP_CIPHER_meth_free,
+EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_iv_length, EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_flags,
+EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_impl_ctx_size, EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_init,
+EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_do_cipher, EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_cleanup,
+EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_set_asn1_params, EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_get_asn1_params,
+EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_ctrl, EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_init,
+EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_do_cipher, EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_cleanup,
+EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_set_asn1_params, EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_get_asn1_params,
+EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_ctrl - Routines to build up EVP_CIPHER methods
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+ EVP_CIPHER *EVP_CIPHER_meth_new(int cipher_type, int block_size, int key_len);
+ EVP_CIPHER *EVP_CIPHER_meth_dup(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher);
+ void EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(EVP_CIPHER *cipher);
+
+ int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_iv_length(EVP_CIPHER *cipher, int iv_len);
+ int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_flags(EVP_CIPHER *cipher, unsigned long flags);
+ int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_impl_ctx_size(EVP_CIPHER *cipher, int ctx_size);
+ int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_init(EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
+                              int (*init) (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+                                           const unsigned char *key,
+                                           const unsigned char *iv,
+                                           int enc));
+ int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
+                                   int (*do_cipher) (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+                                                     unsigned char *out,
+                                                     const unsigned char *in,
+                                                     size_t inl));
+ int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
+                                 int (*cleanup) (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *));
+ int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_set_asn1_params(EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
+                                         int (*set_asn1_parameters) (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *,
+                                                                     ASN1_TYPE *));
+ int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_get_asn1_params(EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
+                                         int (*get_asn1_parameters) (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *,
+                                                                     ASN1_TYPE *));
+ int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
+                              int (*ctrl) (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int type,
+                                           int arg, void *ptr));
+
+ int (*EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_init(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher))(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+                                                           const unsigned char *key,
+                                                           const unsigned char *iv,
+                                                           int enc);
+ int (*EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_do_cipher(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher))(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+                                                                unsigned char *out,
+                                                                const unsigned char *in,
+                                                                size_t inl);
+ int (*EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_cleanup(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher))(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *);
+ int (*EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_set_asn1_params(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher))(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *,
+                                                                      ASN1_TYPE *);
+ int (*EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_get_asn1_params(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher))(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *,
+                                                                ASN1_TYPE *);
+ int (*EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_ctrl(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher))(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *,
+                                                           int type, int arg,
+                                                           void *ptr);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The B<EVP_CIPHER> type is a structure for symmetric cipher method
+implementation.
+
+EVP_CIPHER_meth_new() creates a new B<EVP_CIPHER> structure.
+
+EVP_CIPHER_meth_dup() creates a copy of B<cipher>.
+
+EVP_CIPHER_meth_free() destroys a B<EVP_CIPHER> structure.
+
+EVP_CIPHER_meth_iv_length() sets the length of the IV.
+This is only needed when the implemented cipher mode requires it.
+
+EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_flags() sets the flags to describe optional
+behaviours in the particular B<cipher>.
+With the exception of cipher modes, of which only one may be present,
+several flags can be or'd together.
+The available flags are:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item EVP_CIPH_STREAM_CIPHER, EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
+EVP_CIPH_CFB_MODE, EVP_CIPH_OFB_MODE, EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE, EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE,
+EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE, EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE, EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE,
+EVP_CIPH_OCB_MODE
+
+The cipher mode.
+
+=item EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH
+
+This cipher is of variable length.
+
+=item EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV
+
+Storing and initialising the IV is left entirely to the
+implementation.
+
+=item EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT
+
+Set this if the implementation's init() function should be called even
+if B<key> is B<NULL>.
+
+=item EVP_CIPH_CTRL_INIT
+
+Set this to have the implementation's ctrl() function called with
+command code B<EVP_CTRL_INIT> early in its setup.
+
+=item EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_KEY_LENGTH
+
+Checking and setting the key length after creating the B<EVP_CIPHER>
+is left to the implementation.
+Whenever someone uses EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length() on a
+B<EVP_CIPHER> with this flag set, the implementation's ctrl() function
+will be called with the control code B<EVP_CTRL_SET_KEY_LENGTH> and
+the key length in B<arg>.
+
+=item EVP_CIPH_NO_PADDING
+
+Don't use standard block padding.
+
+=item EVP_CIPH_RAND_KEY
+
+Making a key with random content is left to the implementation.
+This is done by calling the implementation's ctrl() function with the
+control code B<EVP_CTRL_RAND_KEY> and the pointer to the key memory
+storage in B<ptr>.
+
+=item EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_COPY
+
+Set this to have the implementation's ctrl() function called with
+command code B<EVP_CTRL_COPY> at the end of EVP_CIPHER_CTX_copy().
+The intended use is for further things to deal with after the
+implementation specific data block has been copied.
+The destination B<EVP_CIPHER_CTX> is passed to the control with the
+B<ptr> parameter.
+The implementation specific data block is reached with
+EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data().
+
+=item EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1
+
+Use the default EVP routines to pass IV to and from ASN.1.
+
+=item EVP_CIPH_FLAG_LENGTH_BITS
+
+Signals that the length of the input buffer for encryption /
+decryption is to be understood as the number of bits bits instead of
+bytes for this implementation.
+This is only useful for CFB1 ciphers.
+
+=begin comment
+The FIPS flags seem to be unused, so I'm hiding them until I get an
+explanation or they get removed.  /RL
+
+=item EVP_CIPH_FLAG_FIPS
+
+=item EVP_CIPH_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW
+
+=end comment
+
+=item EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER
+
+This indicates that the implementation takes care of everything,
+including padding, buffering and finalization.
+The EVP routines will simply give them control and do nothing more.
+
+=item EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER
+
+This indicates that this is an AEAD cipher implementation.
+
+=item EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
+
+Allow interleaving of crypto blocks, a particular optimization only applicable
+to certain TLS ciphers.
+
+=back
+
+EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_impl_ctx_size() sets the size of the EVP_CIPHER's
+implementation context so that it can be automatically allocated.
+
+EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_init() sets the cipher init function for
+B<cipher>.
+The cipher init function is called by EVP_CipherInit(),
+EVP_CipherInit_ex(), EVP_EncryptInit(), EVP_EncryptInit_ex(),
+EVP_DecryptInit(), EVP_DecryptInit_ex().
+
+EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_do_cipher() sets the cipher function for
+B<cipher>.
+The cipher function is called by EVP_CipherUpdate(),
+EVP_EncryptUpdate(), EVP_DecryptUpdate(), EVP_CipherFinal(),
+EVP_EncryptFinal(), EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(), EVP_DecryptFinal() and
+EVP_DecryptFinal_ex().
+
+EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_cleanup() sets the function for B<cipher> to do
+extra cleanup before the method's private data structure is cleaned
+out and freed.
+Note that the cleanup function is passed a B<EVP_CIPHER_CTX *>, the
+private data structure is then available with
+EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data().
+This cleanup function is called by EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset() and
+EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free().
+
+EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_set_asn1_params() sets the function for B<cipher>
+to set the AlgorithmIdentifier "parameter" based on the passed cipher.
+This function is called by EVP_CIPHER_param_to_asn1().
+EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_get_asn1_params() sets the function for B<cipher>
+that sets the cipher parameters based on an ASN.1 AlgorithmIdentifier
+"parameter".
+Both these functions are needed when there is a need for custom data
+(more or other than the cipher IV).
+They are called by EVP_CIPHER_param_to_asn1() and
+EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param() respectively if defined.
+
+EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_ctrl() sets the control function for B<cipher>.
+
+EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_init(), EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_do_cipher(),
+EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_cleanup(), EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_set_asn1_params(),
+EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_get_asn1_params() and EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_ctrl()
+are all used to retrieve the method data given with the
+EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_*() functions above.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+EVP_CIPHER_meth_new() and EVP_CIPHER_meth_dup() return a pointer to a
+newly created B<EVP_CIPHER>, or NULL on failure.
+All EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_*() functions return 1.
+All EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_*() functions return pointers to their
+respective B<cipher> function.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<EVP_EncryptInit>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+The B<EVP_CIPHER> structure was openly available in OpenSSL before version
+1.1.0.
+The functions described here were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2016-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_DigestInit.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_DigestInit.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bb7ef7a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_DigestInit.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,259 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+EVP_MD_CTX_new, EVP_MD_CTX_reset, EVP_MD_CTX_free, EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex,
+EVP_DigestInit_ex, EVP_DigestUpdate, EVP_DigestFinal_ex,
+EVP_DigestInit, EVP_DigestFinal, EVP_MD_CTX_copy, EVP_MD_type,
+EVP_MD_pkey_type, EVP_MD_size, EVP_MD_block_size, EVP_MD_CTX_md, EVP_MD_CTX_size,
+EVP_MD_CTX_block_size, EVP_MD_CTX_type, EVP_md_null, EVP_md2, EVP_md5, EVP_sha1,
+EVP_sha224, EVP_sha256, EVP_sha384, EVP_sha512, EVP_mdc2,
+EVP_ripemd160, EVP_blake2b512, EVP_blake2s256, EVP_get_digestbyname,
+EVP_get_digestbynid, EVP_get_digestbyobj - EVP digest routines
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX *EVP_MD_CTX_new(void);
+ int EVP_MD_CTX_reset(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
+ void EVP_MD_CTX_free(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
+
+ int EVP_DigestInit_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *type, ENGINE *impl);
+ int EVP_DigestUpdate(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *d, size_t cnt);
+ int EVP_DigestFinal_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md,
+        unsigned int *s);
+
+ int EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *out, const EVP_MD_CTX *in);
+
+ int EVP_DigestInit(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *type);
+ int EVP_DigestFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md,
+        unsigned int *s);
+
+ int EVP_MD_CTX_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *out, EVP_MD_CTX *in);
+
+ int EVP_MD_type(const EVP_MD *md);
+ int EVP_MD_pkey_type(const EVP_MD *md);
+ int EVP_MD_size(const EVP_MD *md);
+ int EVP_MD_block_size(const EVP_MD *md);
+
+ const EVP_MD *EVP_MD_CTX_md(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
+ int EVP_MD_CTX_size(const EVP_MD *ctx);
+ int EVP_MD_CTX_block_size(const EVP_MD *ctx);
+ int EVP_MD_CTX_type(const EVP_MD *ctx);
+
+ const EVP_MD *EVP_md_null(void);
+ const EVP_MD *EVP_md2(void);
+ const EVP_MD *EVP_md5(void);
+ const EVP_MD *EVP_sha1(void);
+ const EVP_MD *EVP_mdc2(void);
+ const EVP_MD *EVP_ripemd160(void);
+ const EVP_MD *EVP_blake2b512(void);
+ const EVP_MD *EVP_blake2s256(void);
+
+ const EVP_MD *EVP_sha224(void);
+ const EVP_MD *EVP_sha256(void);
+ const EVP_MD *EVP_sha384(void);
+ const EVP_MD *EVP_sha512(void);
+
+ const EVP_MD *EVP_get_digestbyname(const char *name);
+ const EVP_MD *EVP_get_digestbynid(int type);
+ const EVP_MD *EVP_get_digestbyobj(const ASN1_OBJECT *o);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The EVP digest routines are a high level interface to message digests,
+and should be used instead of the cipher-specific functions.
+
+EVP_MD_CTX_new() allocates, initializes and returns a digest context.
+
+EVP_MD_CTX_reset() resets the digest context B<ctx>.  This can be used
+to reuse an already existing context.
+
+EVP_MD_CTX_free() cleans up digest context B<ctx> and frees up the
+space allocated to it.
+
+EVP_DigestInit_ex() sets up digest context B<ctx> to use a digest
+B<type> from ENGINE B<impl>. B<ctx> must be initialized before calling this
+function. B<type> will typically be supplied by a function such as EVP_sha1().
+If B<impl> is NULL then the default implementation of digest B<type> is used.
+
+EVP_DigestUpdate() hashes B<cnt> bytes of data at B<d> into the
+digest context B<ctx>. This function can be called several times on the
+same B<ctx> to hash additional data.
+
+EVP_DigestFinal_ex() retrieves the digest value from B<ctx> and places
+it in B<md>. If the B<s> parameter is not NULL then the number of
+bytes of data written (i.e. the length of the digest) will be written
+to the integer at B<s>, at most B<EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE> bytes will be written.
+After calling EVP_DigestFinal_ex() no additional calls to EVP_DigestUpdate()
+can be made, but EVP_DigestInit_ex() can be called to initialize a new
+digest operation.
+
+EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex() can be used to copy the message digest state from
+B<in> to B<out>. This is useful if large amounts of data are to be
+hashed which only differ in the last few bytes. B<out> must be initialized
+before calling this function.
+
+EVP_DigestInit() behaves in the same way as EVP_DigestInit_ex() except
+the passed context B<ctx> does not have to be initialized, and it always
+uses the default digest implementation.
+
+EVP_DigestFinal() is similar to EVP_DigestFinal_ex() except the digest
+context B<ctx> is automatically cleaned up.
+
+EVP_MD_CTX_copy() is similar to EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex() except the destination
+B<out> does not have to be initialized.
+
+EVP_MD_size() and EVP_MD_CTX_size() return the size of the message digest
+when passed an B<EVP_MD> or an B<EVP_MD_CTX> structure, i.e. the size of the
+hash.
+
+EVP_MD_block_size() and EVP_MD_CTX_block_size() return the block size of the
+message digest when passed an B<EVP_MD> or an B<EVP_MD_CTX> structure.
+
+EVP_MD_type() and EVP_MD_CTX_type() return the NID of the OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+representing the given message digest when passed an B<EVP_MD> structure.
+For example EVP_MD_type(EVP_sha1()) returns B<NID_sha1>. This function is
+normally used when setting ASN1 OIDs.
+
+EVP_MD_CTX_md() returns the B<EVP_MD> structure corresponding to the passed
+B<EVP_MD_CTX>.
+
+EVP_MD_pkey_type() returns the NID of the public key signing algorithm associated
+with this digest. For example EVP_sha1() is associated with RSA so this will
+return B<NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption>. Since digests and signature algorithms
+are no longer linked this function is only retained for compatibility
+reasons.
+
+EVP_md2(), EVP_md5(), EVP_sha1(), EVP_sha224(), EVP_sha256(),
+EVP_sha384(), EVP_sha512(), EVP_mdc2(), EVP_ripemd160(), EVP_blake2b512(), and
+EVP_blake2s256() return B<EVP_MD> structures for the MD2, MD5, SHA1, SHA224,
+SHA256, SHA384, SHA512, MDC2, RIPEMD160, BLAKE2b-512, and BLAKE2s-256 digest
+algorithms respectively.
+
+EVP_md_null() is a "null" message digest that does nothing: i.e. the hash it
+returns is of zero length.
+
+EVP_get_digestbyname(), EVP_get_digestbynid() and EVP_get_digestbyobj()
+return an B<EVP_MD> structure when passed a digest name, a digest NID or
+an ASN1_OBJECT structure respectively.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+EVP_DigestInit_ex(), EVP_DigestUpdate() and EVP_DigestFinal_ex() return 1 for
+success and 0 for failure.
+
+EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex() returns 1 if successful or 0 for failure.
+
+EVP_MD_type(), EVP_MD_pkey_type() and EVP_MD_type() return the NID of the
+corresponding OBJECT IDENTIFIER or NID_undef if none exists.
+
+EVP_MD_size(), EVP_MD_block_size(), EVP_MD_CTX_size() and
+EVP_MD_CTX_block_size() return the digest or block size in bytes.
+
+EVP_md_null(), EVP_md2(), EVP_md5(), EVP_sha1(),
+EVP_mdc2(), EVP_ripemd160(), EVP_blake2b512(), and EVP_blake2s256() return
+pointers to the corresponding EVP_MD structures.
+
+EVP_get_digestbyname(), EVP_get_digestbynid() and EVP_get_digestbyobj()
+return either an B<EVP_MD> structure or NULL if an error occurs.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The B<EVP> interface to message digests should almost always be used in
+preference to the low level interfaces. This is because the code then becomes
+transparent to the digest used and much more flexible.
+
+New applications should use the SHA2 digest algorithms such as SHA256.
+The other digest algorithms are still in common use.
+
+For most applications the B<impl> parameter to EVP_DigestInit_ex() will be
+set to NULL to use the default digest implementation.
+
+The functions EVP_DigestInit(), EVP_DigestFinal() and EVP_MD_CTX_copy() are
+obsolete but are retained to maintain compatibility with existing code. New
+applications should use EVP_DigestInit_ex(), EVP_DigestFinal_ex() and
+EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex() because they can efficiently reuse a digest context
+instead of initializing and cleaning it up on each call and allow non default
+implementations of digests to be specified.
+
+If digest contexts are not cleaned up after use
+memory leaks will occur.
+
+EVP_MD_CTX_size(), EVP_MD_CTX_block_size(), EVP_MD_CTX_type(),
+EVP_get_digestbynid() and EVP_get_digestbyobj() are defined as
+macros.
+
+
+=head1 EXAMPLE
+
+This example digests the data "Test Message\n" and "Hello World\n", using the
+digest name passed on the command line.
+
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+ main(int argc, char *argv[])
+ {
+ EVP_MD_CTX *mdctx;
+ const EVP_MD *md;
+ char mess1[] = "Test Message\n";
+ char mess2[] = "Hello World\n";
+ unsigned char md_value[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ int md_len, i;
+
+ if(!argv[1]) {
+        printf("Usage: mdtest digestname\n");
+        exit(1);
+ }
+
+ md = EVP_get_digestbyname(argv[1]);
+
+ if(!md) {
+        printf("Unknown message digest %s\n", argv[1]);
+        exit(1);
+ }
+
+ mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+ EVP_DigestInit_ex(mdctx, md, NULL);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(mdctx, mess1, strlen(mess1));
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(mdctx, mess2, strlen(mess2));
+ EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mdctx, md_value, &md_len);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(mdctx);
+
+ printf("Digest is: ");
+ for (i = 0; i < md_len; i++)
+        printf("%02x", md_value[i]);
+ printf("\n");
+
+ exit(0);
+ }
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<dgst(1)>,
+L<evp(7)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+B<EVP_MD_CTX> became opaque in OpenSSL 1.1.  Consequently, stack
+allocated B<EVP_MD_CTX>s are no longer supported.
+
+EVP_MD_CTX_create() and EVP_MD_CTX_destroy() were renamed to
+EVP_MD_CTX_new() and EVP_MD_CTX_free() in OpenSSL 1.1.
+
+The link between digests and signing algorithms was fixed in OpenSSL 1.0 and
+later, so now EVP_sha1() can be used with RSA and DSA. The legacy EVP_dss1()
+was removed in OpenSSL 1.1.0
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_DigestSignInit.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_DigestSignInit.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7ec06b7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_DigestSignInit.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+EVP_DigestSignInit, EVP_DigestSignUpdate, EVP_DigestSignFinal - EVP signing functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+ int EVP_DigestSignInit(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx,
+                        const EVP_MD *type, ENGINE *e, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+ int EVP_DigestSignUpdate(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *d, size_t cnt);
+ int EVP_DigestSignFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The EVP signature routines are a high level interface to digital signatures.
+
+EVP_DigestSignInit() sets up signing context B<ctx> to use digest B<type> from
+ENGINE B<impl> and private key B<pkey>. B<ctx> must be created with
+EVP_MD_CTX_new() before calling this function. If B<pctx> is not NULL the
+EVP_PKEY_CTX of the signing operation will be written to B<*pctx>: this can
+be used to set alternative signing options.
+
+EVP_DigestSignUpdate() hashes B<cnt> bytes of data at B<d> into the
+signature context B<ctx>. This function can be called several times on the
+same B<ctx> to include additional data. This function is currently implemented
+using a macro.
+
+EVP_DigestSignFinal() signs the data in B<ctx> places the signature in B<sig>.
+If B<sig> is B<NULL> then the maximum size of the output buffer is written to
+the B<siglen> parameter. If B<sig> is not B<NULL> then before the call the
+B<siglen> parameter should contain the length of the B<sig> buffer, if the
+call is successful the signature is written to B<sig> and the amount of data
+written to B<siglen>.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+EVP_DigestSignInit() EVP_DigestSignUpdate() and EVP_DigestSignaFinal() return
+1 for success and 0 or a negative value for failure. In particular a return
+value of -2 indicates the operation is not supported by the public key
+algorithm.
+
+The error codes can be obtained from L<ERR_get_error(3)>.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The B<EVP> interface to digital signatures should almost always be used in
+preference to the low level interfaces. This is because the code then becomes
+transparent to the algorithm used and much more flexible.
+
+In previous versions of OpenSSL there was a link between message digest types
+and public key algorithms. This meant that "clone" digests such as EVP_dss1()
+needed to be used to sign using SHA1 and DSA. This is no longer necessary and
+the use of clone digest is now discouraged.
+
+For some key types and parameters the random number generator must be seeded
+or the operation will fail.
+
+The call to EVP_DigestSignFinal() internally finalizes a copy of the digest
+context. This means that calls to EVP_DigestSignUpdate() and
+EVP_DigestSignFinal() can be called later to digest and sign additional data.
+
+Since only a copy of the digest context is ever finalized the context must
+be cleaned up after use by calling EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup() or a memory leak
+will occur.
+
+The use of EVP_PKEY_size() with these functions is discouraged because some
+signature operations may have a signature length which depends on the
+parameters set. As a result EVP_PKEY_size() would have to return a value
+which indicates the maximum possible signature for any set of parameters.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<EVP_DigestVerifyInit(3)>,
+L<EVP_DigestInit(3)>,
+L<evp(7)>, L<HMAC(3)>, L<MD2(3)>,
+L<MD5(3)>, L<MDC2(3)>, L<RIPEMD160(3)>,
+L<SHA1(3)>, L<dgst(1)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+EVP_DigestSignInit(), EVP_DigestSignUpdate() and EVP_DigestSignFinal()
+were first added to OpenSSL 1.0.0.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2006-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_DigestVerifyInit.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_DigestVerifyInit.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ce59422
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_DigestVerifyInit.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+EVP_DigestVerifyInit, EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate, EVP_DigestVerifyFinal - EVP signature verification functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+ int EVP_DigestVerifyInit(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx,
+                        const EVP_MD *type, ENGINE *e, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+ int EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *d, size_t cnt);
+ int EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The EVP signature routines are a high level interface to digital signatures.
+
+EVP_DigestVerifyInit() sets up verification context B<ctx> to use digest
+B<type> from ENGINE B<impl> and public key B<pkey>. B<ctx> must be created
+with EVP_MD_CTX_new() before calling this function. If B<pctx> is not NULL the
+EVP_PKEY_CTX of the verification operation will be written to B<*pctx>: this
+can be used to set alternative verification options.
+
+EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate() hashes B<cnt> bytes of data at B<d> into the
+verification context B<ctx>. This function can be called several times on the
+same B<ctx> to include additional data. This function is currently implemented
+using a macro.
+
+EVP_DigestVerifyFinal() verifies the data in B<ctx> against the signature in
+B<sig> of length B<siglen>.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+EVP_DigestVerifyInit() and EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate() return 1 for success and 0
+for failure.
+
+EVP_DigestVerifyFinal() returns 1 for success; any other value indicates
+failure.  A return value of zero indicates that the signature did not verify
+successfully (that is, tbs did not match the original data or the signature had
+an invalid form), while other values indicate a more serious error (and
+sometimes also indicate an invalid signature form).
+
+The error codes can be obtained from L<ERR_get_error(3)>.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The B<EVP> interface to digital signatures should almost always be used in
+preference to the low level interfaces. This is because the code then becomes
+transparent to the algorithm used and much more flexible.
+
+In previous versions of OpenSSL there was a link between message digest types
+and public key algorithms. This meant that "clone" digests such as EVP_dss1()
+needed to be used to sign using SHA1 and DSA. This is no longer necessary and
+the use of clone digest is now discouraged.
+
+For some key types and parameters the random number generator must be seeded
+or the operation will fail.
+
+The call to EVP_DigestVerifyFinal() internally finalizes a copy of the digest
+context. This means that EVP_VerifyUpdate() and EVP_VerifyFinal() can
+be called later to digest and verify additional data.
+
+Since only a copy of the digest context is ever finalized the context must
+be cleaned up after use by calling EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup() or a memory leak
+will occur.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<EVP_DigestSignInit(3)>,
+L<EVP_DigestInit(3)>,
+L<evp(7)>, L<HMAC(3)>, L<MD2(3)>,
+L<MD5(3)>, L<MDC2(3)>, L<RIPEMD160(3)>,
+L<SHA1(3)>, L<dgst(1)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+EVP_DigestVerifyInit(), EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate() and EVP_DigestVerifyFinal()
+were first added to OpenSSL 1.0.0.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2006-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_EncodeInit.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_EncodeInit.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d919b14
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_EncodeInit.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+EVP_ENCODE_CTX_new, EVP_ENCODE_CTX_free, EVP_ENCODE_CTX_copy,
+EVP_ENCODE_CTX_num, EVP_EncodeInit, EVP_EncodeUpdate, EVP_EncodeFinal,
+EVP_EncodeBlock, EVP_DecodeInit, EVP_DecodeUpdate, EVP_DecodeFinal,
+EVP_DecodeBlock - EVP base 64 encode/decode routines
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+ EVP_ENCODE_CTX *EVP_ENCODE_CTX_new(void);
+ void EVP_ENCODE_CTX_free(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx);
+ int EVP_ENCODE_CTX_copy(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *dctx, EVP_ENCODE_CTX *sctx);
+ int EVP_ENCODE_CTX_num(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx);
+ void EVP_EncodeInit(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx);
+ int EVP_EncodeUpdate(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
+                      const unsigned char *in, int inl);
+ void EVP_EncodeFinal(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl);
+ int EVP_EncodeBlock(unsigned char *t, const unsigned char *f, int n);
+
+ void EVP_DecodeInit(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx);
+ int EVP_DecodeUpdate(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
+                      const unsigned char *in, int inl);
+ int EVP_DecodeFinal(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned
+                     char *out, int *outl);
+ int EVP_DecodeBlock(unsigned char *t, const unsigned char *f, int n);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The EVP encode routines provide a high level interface to base 64 encoding and
+decoding. Base 64 encoding converts binary data into a printable form that uses
+the characters A-Z, a-z, 0-9, "+" and "/" to represent the data. For every 3
+bytes of binary data provided 4 bytes of base 64 encoded data will be produced
+plus some occasional newlines (see below). If the input data length is not a
+multiple of 3 then the output data will be padded at the end using the "="
+character.
+
+EVP_ENCODE_CTX_new() allocates, initializes and returns a context to be used for
+the encode/decode functions.
+
+EVP_ENCODE_CTX_free() cleans up an encode/decode context B<ctx> and frees up the
+space allocated to it.
+
+Encoding of binary data is performed in blocks of 48 input bytes (or less for
+the final block). For each 48 byte input block encoded 64 bytes of base 64 data
+is output plus an additional newline character (i.e. 65 bytes in total). The
+final block (which may be less than 48 bytes) will output 4 bytes for every 3
+bytes of input. If the data length is not divisible by 3 then a full 4 bytes is
+still output for the final 1 or 2 bytes of input. Similarly a newline character
+will also be output.
+
+EVP_EncodeInit() initialises B<ctx> for the start of a new encoding operation.
+
+EVP_EncodeUpdate() encode B<inl> bytes of data found in the buffer pointed to by
+B<in>. The output is stored in the buffer B<out> and the number of bytes output
+is stored in B<*outl>. It is the caller's responsibility to ensure that the
+buffer at B<out> is sufficiently large to accommodate the output data. Only full
+blocks of data (48 bytes) will be immediately processed and output by this
+function. Any remainder is held in the B<ctx> object and will be processed by a
+subsequent call to EVP_EncodeUpdate() or EVP_EncodeFinal(). To calculate the
+required size of the output buffer add together the value of B<inl> with the
+amount of unprocessed data held in B<ctx> and divide the result by 48 (ignore
+any remainder). This gives the number of blocks of data that will be processed.
+Ensure the output buffer contains 65 bytes of storage for each block, plus an
+additional byte for a NUL terminator. EVP_EncodeUpdate() may be called
+repeatedly to process large amounts of input data. In the event of an error
+EVP_EncodeUpdate() will set B<*outl> to 0 and return 0. On success 1 will be
+returned.
+
+EVP_EncodeFinal() must be called at the end of an encoding operation. It will
+process any partial block of data remaining in the B<ctx> object. The output
+data will be stored in B<out> and the length of the data written will be stored
+in B<*outl>. It is the caller's responsibility to ensure that B<out> is
+sufficiently large to accommodate the output data which will never be more than
+65 bytes plus an additional NUL terminator (i.e. 66 bytes in total).
+
+EVP_ENCODE_CTX_copy() can be used to copy a context B<sctx> to a context
+B<dctx>. B<dctx> must be initialized before calling this function.
+
+EVP_ENCODE_CTX_num() will return the number of as yet unprocessed bytes still to
+be encoded or decoded that are pending in the B<ctx> object.
+
+EVP_EncodeBlock() encodes a full block of input data in B<f> and of length
+B<dlen> and stores it in B<t>. For every 3 bytes of input provided 4 bytes of
+output data will be produced. If B<dlen> is not divisible by 3 then the block is
+encoded as a final block of data and the output is padded such that it is always
+divisible by 4. Additionally a NUL terminator character will be added. For
+example if 16 bytes of input data is provided then 24 bytes of encoded data is
+created plus 1 byte for a NUL terminator (i.e. 25 bytes in total). The length of
+the data generated I<without> the NUL terminator is returned from the function.
+
+EVP_DecodeInit() initialises B<ctx> for the start of a new decoding operation.
+
+EVP_DecodeUpdate() decodes B<inl> characters of data found in the buffer pointed
+to by B<in>. The output is stored in the buffer B<out> and the number of bytes
+output is stored in B<*outl>. It is the caller's responsibility to ensure that
+the buffer at B<out> is sufficiently large to accommodate the output data. This
+function will attempt to decode as much data as possible in 4 byte chunks. Any
+whitespace, newline or carriage return characters are ignored. Any partial chunk
+of unprocessed data (1, 2 or 3 bytes) that remains at the end will be held in
+the B<ctx> object and processed by a subsequent call to EVP_DecodeUpdate(). If
+any illegal base 64 characters are encountered or if the base 64 padding
+character "=" is encountered in the middle of the data then the function returns
+-1 to indicate an error. A return value of 0 or 1 indicates successful
+processing of the data. A return value of 0 additionally indicates that the last
+input data characters processed included the base 64 padding character "=" and
+therefore no more non-padding character data is expected to be processed. For
+every 4 valid base 64 bytes processed (ignoring whitespace, carriage returns and
+line feeds), 3 bytes of binary output data will be produced (or less at the end
+of the data where the padding character "=" has been used).
+
+EVP_DecodeFinal() must be called at the end of a decoding operation. If there
+is any unprocessed data still in B<ctx> then the input data must not have been
+a multiple of 4 and therefore an error has occurred. The function will return -1
+in this case. Otherwise the function returns 1 on success.
+
+EVP_DecodeBlock() will decode the block of B<n> characters of base 64 data
+contained in B<f> and store the result in B<t>. Any leading whitespace will be
+trimmed as will any trailing whitespace, newlines, carriage returns or EOF
+characters. After such trimming the length of the data in B<f> must be divisible
+by 4. For every 4 input bytes exactly 3 output bytes will be produced. The
+output will be padded with 0 bits if necessary to ensure that the output is
+always 3 bytes for every 4 input bytes. This function will return the length of
+the data decoded or -1 on error.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+EVP_ENCODE_CTX_new() returns a pointer to the newly allocated EVP_ENCODE_CTX
+object or NULL on error.
+
+EVP_ENCODE_CTX_num() returns the number of bytes pending encoding or decoding in
+B<ctx>.
+
+EVP_EncodeUpdate() returns 0 on error or 1 on success.
+
+EVP_EncodeBlock() returns the number of bytes encoded excluding the NUL
+terminator.
+
+EVP_DecodeUpdate() returns -1 on error and 0 or 1 on success. If 0 is returned
+then no more non-padding base 64 characters are expected.
+
+EVP_DecodeFinal() returns -1 on error or 1 on success.
+
+EVP_DecodeBlock() returns the length of the data decoded or -1 on error.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<evp(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_EncryptInit.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_EncryptInit.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d1af772
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_EncryptInit.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,661 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free,
+EVP_EncryptInit_ex, EVP_EncryptUpdate, EVP_EncryptFinal_ex,
+EVP_DecryptInit_ex, EVP_DecryptUpdate, EVP_DecryptFinal_ex,
+EVP_CipherInit_ex, EVP_CipherUpdate, EVP_CipherFinal_ex,
+EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl, EVP_EncryptInit,
+EVP_EncryptFinal, EVP_DecryptInit, EVP_DecryptFinal,
+EVP_CipherInit, EVP_CipherFinal, EVP_get_cipherbyname,
+EVP_get_cipherbynid, EVP_get_cipherbyobj, EVP_CIPHER_nid,
+EVP_CIPHER_block_size, EVP_CIPHER_key_length, EVP_CIPHER_iv_length,
+EVP_CIPHER_flags, EVP_CIPHER_mode, EVP_CIPHER_type, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher,
+EVP_CIPHER_CTX_nid, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length,
+EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data,
+EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_type, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_flags,
+EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode, EVP_CIPHER_param_to_asn1, EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param,
+EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding, EVP_enc_null, EVP_des_cbc, EVP_des_ecb,
+EVP_des_cfb, EVP_des_ofb, EVP_des_ede_cbc, EVP_des_ede, EVP_des_ede_ofb,
+EVP_des_ede_cfb, EVP_des_ede3_cbc, EVP_des_ede3, EVP_des_ede3_ofb,
+EVP_des_ede3_cfb, EVP_desx_cbc, EVP_rc4, EVP_rc4_40, EVP_rc4_hmac_md5,
+EVP_idea_cbc, EVP_idea_ecb, EVP_idea_cfb, EVP_idea_ofb, EVP_rc2_cbc,
+EVP_rc2_ecb, EVP_rc2_cfb, EVP_rc2_ofb, EVP_rc2_40_cbc, EVP_rc2_64_cbc,
+EVP_bf_cbc, EVP_bf_ecb, EVP_bf_cfb, EVP_bf_ofb, EVP_cast5_cbc,
+EVP_cast5_ecb, EVP_cast5_cfb, EVP_cast5_ofb, EVP_rc5_32_12_16_cbc,
+EVP_rc5_32_12_16_ecb, EVP_rc5_32_12_16_cfb, EVP_rc5_32_12_16_ofb,
+EVP_aes_128_cbc, EVP_aes_128_ecb, EVP_aes_128_cfb, EVP_aes_128_ofb,
+EVP_aes_192_cbc, EVP_aes_192_ecb, EVP_aes_192_cfb, EVP_aes_192_ofb,
+EVP_aes_256_cbc, EVP_aes_256_ecb, EVP_aes_256_cfb, EVP_aes_256_ofb,
+EVP_aes_128_gcm, EVP_aes_192_gcm, EVP_aes_256_gcm,
+EVP_aes_128_ccm, EVP_aes_192_ccm, EVP_aes_256_ccm,
+EVP_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1, EVP_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha1,
+EVP_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha256, EVP_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha256,
+EVP_chacha20, EVP_chacha20_poly1305 - EVP cipher routines
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+=for comment generic
+
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(void);
+ int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx);
+ void EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx);
+
+ int EVP_EncryptInit_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *type,
+         ENGINE *impl, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv);
+ int EVP_EncryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+         int *outl, const unsigned char *in, int inl);
+ int EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+         int *outl);
+
+ int EVP_DecryptInit_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *type,
+         ENGINE *impl, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv);
+ int EVP_DecryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+         int *outl, const unsigned char *in, int inl);
+ int EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *outm,
+         int *outl);
+
+ int EVP_CipherInit_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *type,
+         ENGINE *impl, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc);
+ int EVP_CipherUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+         int *outl, const unsigned char *in, int inl);
+ int EVP_CipherFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *outm,
+         int *outl);
+
+ int EVP_EncryptInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *type,
+         const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv);
+ int EVP_EncryptFinal(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+         int *outl);
+
+ int EVP_DecryptInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *type,
+         const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv);
+ int EVP_DecryptFinal(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *outm,
+         int *outl);
+
+ int EVP_CipherInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *type,
+         const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc);
+ int EVP_CipherFinal(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *outm,
+         int *outl);
+
+ int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *x, int padding);
+ int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *x, int keylen);
+ int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type, int arg, void *ptr);
+
+ const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_get_cipherbyname(const char *name);
+ const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_get_cipherbynid(int nid);
+ const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_get_cipherbyobj(const ASN1_OBJECT *a);
+
+ int EVP_CIPHER_nid(const EVP_CIPHER *e);
+ int EVP_CIPHER_block_size(const EVP_CIPHER *e);
+ int EVP_CIPHER_key_length(const EVP_CIPHER *e)
+ int EVP_CIPHER_key_length(const EVP_CIPHER *e);
+ int EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(const EVP_CIPHER *e);
+ unsigned long EVP_CIPHER_flags(const EVP_CIPHER *e);
+ unsigned long EVP_CIPHER_mode(const EVP_CIPHER *e);
+ int EVP_CIPHER_type(const EVP_CIPHER *ctx);
+
+ const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx);
+ int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_nid(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx);
+ int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx);
+ int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx);
+ int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx);
+ void *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx);
+ void EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, void *data);
+ int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_type(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx);
+ int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx);
+
+ int EVP_CIPHER_param_to_asn1(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type);
+ int EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The EVP cipher routines are a high level interface to certain
+symmetric ciphers.
+
+EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new() creates a cipher context.
+
+EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free() clears all information from a cipher context
+and free up any allocated memory associate with it, including B<ctx>
+itself. This function should be called after all operations using a
+cipher are complete so sensitive information does not remain in
+memory.
+
+EVP_EncryptInit_ex() sets up cipher context B<ctx> for encryption
+with cipher B<type> from ENGINE B<impl>. B<ctx> must be created
+before calling this function. B<type> is normally supplied
+by a function such as EVP_aes_256_cbc(). If B<impl> is NULL then the
+default implementation is used. B<key> is the symmetric key to use
+and B<iv> is the IV to use (if necessary), the actual number of bytes
+used for the key and IV depends on the cipher. It is possible to set
+all parameters to NULL except B<type> in an initial call and supply
+the remaining parameters in subsequent calls, all of which have B<type>
+set to NULL. This is done when the default cipher parameters are not
+appropriate.
+
+EVP_EncryptUpdate() encrypts B<inl> bytes from the buffer B<in> and
+writes the encrypted version to B<out>. This function can be called
+multiple times to encrypt successive blocks of data. The amount
+of data written depends on the block alignment of the encrypted data:
+as a result the amount of data written may be anything from zero bytes
+to (inl + cipher_block_size - 1) so B<out> should contain sufficient
+room. The actual number of bytes written is placed in B<outl>. It also
+checks if B<in> and B<out> are partially overlapping, and if they are
+0 is returned to indicate failure.
+
+If padding is enabled (the default) then EVP_EncryptFinal_ex() encrypts
+the "final" data, that is any data that remains in a partial block.
+It uses standard block padding (aka PKCS padding) as described in
+the NOTES section, below. The encrypted
+final data is written to B<out> which should have sufficient space for
+one cipher block. The number of bytes written is placed in B<outl>. After
+this function is called the encryption operation is finished and no further
+calls to EVP_EncryptUpdate() should be made.
+
+If padding is disabled then EVP_EncryptFinal_ex() will not encrypt any more
+data and it will return an error if any data remains in a partial block:
+that is if the total data length is not a multiple of the block size.
+
+EVP_DecryptInit_ex(), EVP_DecryptUpdate() and EVP_DecryptFinal_ex() are the
+corresponding decryption operations. EVP_DecryptFinal() will return an
+error code if padding is enabled and the final block is not correctly
+formatted. The parameters and restrictions are identical to the encryption
+operations except that if padding is enabled the decrypted data buffer B<out>
+passed to EVP_DecryptUpdate() should have sufficient room for
+(B<inl> + cipher_block_size) bytes unless the cipher block size is 1 in
+which case B<inl> bytes is sufficient.
+
+EVP_CipherInit_ex(), EVP_CipherUpdate() and EVP_CipherFinal_ex() are
+functions that can be used for decryption or encryption. The operation
+performed depends on the value of the B<enc> parameter. It should be set
+to 1 for encryption, 0 for decryption and -1 to leave the value unchanged
+(the actual value of 'enc' being supplied in a previous call).
+
+EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset() clears all information from a cipher context
+and free up any allocated memory associate with it, except the B<ctx>
+itself. This function should be called anytime B<ctx> is to be reused
+for another EVP_CipherInit() / EVP_CipherUpdate() / EVP_CipherFinal()
+series of calls.
+
+EVP_EncryptInit(), EVP_DecryptInit() and EVP_CipherInit() behave in a
+similar way to EVP_EncryptInit_ex(), EVP_DecryptInit_ex() and
+EVP_CipherInit_ex() except the B<ctx> parameter does not need to be
+initialized and they always use the default cipher implementation.
+
+EVP_EncryptFinal(), EVP_DecryptFinal() and EVP_CipherFinal() are
+identical to EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(), EVP_DecryptFinal_ex() and
+EVP_CipherFinal_ex(). In previous releases they also cleaned up
+the B<ctx>, but this is no longer done and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_clean()
+must be called to free any context resources.
+
+EVP_get_cipherbyname(), EVP_get_cipherbynid() and EVP_get_cipherbyobj()
+return an EVP_CIPHER structure when passed a cipher name, a NID or an
+ASN1_OBJECT structure.
+
+EVP_CIPHER_nid() and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_nid() return the NID of a cipher when
+passed an B<EVP_CIPHER> or B<EVP_CIPHER_CTX> structure.  The actual NID
+value is an internal value which may not have a corresponding OBJECT
+IDENTIFIER.
+
+EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding() enables or disables padding. This
+function should be called after the context is set up for encryption
+or decryption with EVP_EncryptInit_ex(), EVP_DecryptInit_ex() or
+EVP_CipherInit_ex(). By default encryption operations are padded using
+standard block padding and the padding is checked and removed when
+decrypting. If the B<pad> parameter is zero then no padding is
+performed, the total amount of data encrypted or decrypted must then
+be a multiple of the block size or an error will occur.
+
+EVP_CIPHER_key_length() and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length() return the key
+length of a cipher when passed an B<EVP_CIPHER> or B<EVP_CIPHER_CTX>
+structure. The constant B<EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH> is the maximum key length
+for all ciphers. Note: although EVP_CIPHER_key_length() is fixed for a
+given cipher, the value of EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length() may be different
+for variable key length ciphers.
+
+EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length() sets the key length of the cipher ctx.
+If the cipher is a fixed length cipher then attempting to set the key
+length to any value other than the fixed value is an error.
+
+EVP_CIPHER_iv_length() and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length() return the IV
+length of a cipher when passed an B<EVP_CIPHER> or B<EVP_CIPHER_CTX>.
+It will return zero if the cipher does not use an IV.  The constant
+B<EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH> is the maximum IV length for all ciphers.
+
+EVP_CIPHER_block_size() and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size() return the block
+size of a cipher when passed an B<EVP_CIPHER> or B<EVP_CIPHER_CTX>
+structure. The constant B<EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH> is also the maximum block
+length for all ciphers.
+
+EVP_CIPHER_type() and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_type() return the type of the passed
+cipher or context. This "type" is the actual NID of the cipher OBJECT
+IDENTIFIER as such it ignores the cipher parameters and 40 bit RC2 and
+128 bit RC2 have the same NID. If the cipher does not have an object
+identifier or does not have ASN1 support this function will return
+B<NID_undef>.
+
+EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher() returns the B<EVP_CIPHER> structure when passed
+an B<EVP_CIPHER_CTX> structure.
+
+EVP_CIPHER_mode() and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode() return the block cipher mode:
+EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, EVP_CIPH_CFB_MODE or
+EVP_CIPH_OFB_MODE. If the cipher is a stream cipher then
+EVP_CIPH_STREAM_CIPHER is returned.
+
+EVP_CIPHER_param_to_asn1() sets the AlgorithmIdentifier "parameter" based
+on the passed cipher. This will typically include any parameters and an
+IV. The cipher IV (if any) must be set when this call is made. This call
+should be made before the cipher is actually "used" (before any
+EVP_EncryptUpdate(), EVP_DecryptUpdate() calls for example). This function
+may fail if the cipher does not have any ASN1 support.
+
+EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param() sets the cipher parameters based on an ASN1
+AlgorithmIdentifier "parameter". The precise effect depends on the cipher
+In the case of RC2, for example, it will set the IV and effective key length.
+This function should be called after the base cipher type is set but before
+the key is set. For example EVP_CipherInit() will be called with the IV and
+key set to NULL, EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param() will be called and finally
+EVP_CipherInit() again with all parameters except the key set to NULL. It is
+possible for this function to fail if the cipher does not have any ASN1 support
+or the parameters cannot be set (for example the RC2 effective key length
+is not supported.
+
+EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl() allows various cipher specific parameters to be determined
+and set.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new() returns a pointer to a newly created
+B<EVP_CIPHER_CTX> for success and B<NULL> for failure.
+
+EVP_EncryptInit_ex(), EVP_EncryptUpdate() and EVP_EncryptFinal_ex()
+return 1 for success and 0 for failure.
+
+EVP_DecryptInit_ex() and EVP_DecryptUpdate() return 1 for success and 0 for failure.
+EVP_DecryptFinal_ex() returns 0 if the decrypt failed or 1 for success.
+
+EVP_CipherInit_ex() and EVP_CipherUpdate() return 1 for success and 0 for failure.
+EVP_CipherFinal_ex() returns 0 for a decryption failure or 1 for success.
+
+EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset() returns 1 for success and 0 for failure.
+
+EVP_get_cipherbyname(), EVP_get_cipherbynid() and EVP_get_cipherbyobj()
+return an B<EVP_CIPHER> structure or NULL on error.
+
+EVP_CIPHER_nid() and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_nid() return a NID.
+
+EVP_CIPHER_block_size() and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size() return the block
+size.
+
+EVP_CIPHER_key_length() and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length() return the key
+length.
+
+EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding() always returns 1.
+
+EVP_CIPHER_iv_length() and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length() return the IV
+length or zero if the cipher does not use an IV.
+
+EVP_CIPHER_type() and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_type() return the NID of the cipher's
+OBJECT IDENTIFIER or NID_undef if it has no defined OBJECT IDENTIFIER.
+
+EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher() returns an B<EVP_CIPHER> structure.
+
+EVP_CIPHER_param_to_asn1() and EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param() return greater
+than zero for success and zero or a negative number.
+
+=head1 CIPHER LISTING
+
+All algorithms have a fixed key length unless otherwise stated.
+
+=over 4
+
+=item EVP_enc_null()
+
+Null cipher: does nothing.
+
+=item EVP_aes_128_cbc(), EVP_aes_128_ecb(), EVP_aes_128_cfb(), EVP_aes_128_ofb()
+
+AES with a 128-bit key in CBC, ECB, CFB and OFB modes respectively.
+
+=item EVP_aes_192_cbc(), EVP_aes_192_ecb(), EVP_aes_192_cfb(), EVP_aes_192_ofb()
+
+AES with a 192-bit key in CBC, ECB, CFB and OFB modes respectively.
+
+=item EVP_aes_256_cbc(), EVP_aes_256_ecb(), EVP_aes_256_cfb(), EVP_aes_256_ofb()
+
+AES with a 256-bit key in CBC, ECB, CFB and OFB modes respectively.
+
+=item EVP_des_cbc(), EVP_des_ecb(), EVP_des_cfb(), EVP_des_ofb()
+
+DES in CBC, ECB, CFB and OFB modes respectively.
+
+=item EVP_des_ede_cbc(), EVP_des_ede(), EVP_des_ede_ofb(), EVP_des_ede_cfb()
+
+Two key triple DES in CBC, ECB, CFB and OFB modes respectively.
+
+=item EVP_des_ede3_cbc(), EVP_des_ede3(), EVP_des_ede3_ofb(), EVP_des_ede3_cfb()
+
+Three key triple DES in CBC, ECB, CFB and OFB modes respectively.
+
+=item EVP_desx_cbc()
+
+DESX algorithm in CBC mode.
+
+=item EVP_rc4()
+
+RC4 stream cipher. This is a variable key length cipher with default key length 128 bits.
+
+=item EVP_rc4_40()
+
+RC4 stream cipher with 40 bit key length.
+This is obsolete and new code should use EVP_rc4()
+and the EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length() function.
+
+=item EVP_idea_cbc() EVP_idea_ecb(), EVP_idea_cfb(), EVP_idea_ofb()
+
+IDEA encryption algorithm in CBC, ECB, CFB and OFB modes respectively.
+
+=item EVP_rc2_cbc(), EVP_rc2_ecb(), EVP_rc2_cfb(), EVP_rc2_ofb()
+
+RC2 encryption algorithm in CBC, ECB, CFB and OFB modes respectively. This is a variable key
+length cipher with an additional parameter called "effective key bits" or "effective key length".
+By default both are set to 128 bits.
+
+=item EVP_rc2_40_cbc(), EVP_rc2_64_cbc()
+
+RC2 algorithm in CBC mode with a default key length and effective key length of 40 and 64 bits.
+These are obsolete and new code should use EVP_rc2_cbc(), EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length() and
+EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl() to set the key length and effective key length.
+
+=item EVP_bf_cbc(), EVP_bf_ecb(), EVP_bf_cfb(), EVP_bf_ofb()
+
+Blowfish encryption algorithm in CBC, ECB, CFB and OFB modes respectively. This is a variable key
+length cipher.
+
+=item EVP_cast5_cbc(), EVP_cast5_ecb(), EVP_cast5_cfb(), EVP_cast5_ofb()
+
+CAST encryption algorithm in CBC, ECB, CFB and OFB modes respectively. This is a variable key
+length cipher.
+
+=item EVP_rc5_32_12_16_cbc(), EVP_rc5_32_12_16_ecb(), EVP_rc5_32_12_16_cfb(), EVP_rc5_32_12_16_ofb()
+
+RC5 encryption algorithm in CBC, ECB, CFB and OFB modes respectively. This is a variable key length
+cipher with an additional "number of rounds" parameter. By default the key length is set to 128
+bits and 12 rounds.
+
+=item EVP_aes_128_gcm(), EVP_aes_192_gcm(), EVP_aes_256_gcm()
+
+AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM) for 128, 192 and 256 bit keys respectively.
+These ciphers require additional control operations to function correctly: see
+the L</GCM and OCB Modes> section below for details.
+
+=item EVP_aes_128_ocb(void), EVP_aes_192_ocb(void), EVP_aes_256_ocb(void)
+
+Offset Codebook Mode (OCB) for 128, 192 and 256 bit keys respectively.
+These ciphers require additional control operations to function correctly: see
+the L</GCM and OCB Modes> section below for details.
+
+=item EVP_aes_128_ccm(), EVP_aes_192_ccm(), EVP_aes_256_ccm()
+
+AES Counter with CBC-MAC Mode (CCM) for 128, 192 and 256 bit keys respectively.
+These ciphers require additional control operations to function correctly: see
+CCM mode section below for details.
+
+=item EVP_chacha20()
+
+The ChaCha20 stream cipher. The key length is 256 bits, the IV is 96 bits long.
+
+=item EVP_chacha20_poly1305()
+
+Authenticated encryption with ChaCha20-Poly1305. Like EVP_chacha20() the key is
+256 bits and the IV is 96 bits. This supports additional authenticated
+data (AAD) and produces a 128 bit authentication tag. See the
+L</GCM and OCB Modes> section for more information.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 GCM and OCB Modes
+
+For GCM and OCB mode ciphers the behaviour of the EVP interface is subtly
+altered and several additional ctrl operations are supported.
+
+To specify any additional authenticated data (AAD) a call to EVP_CipherUpdate(),
+EVP_EncryptUpdate() or EVP_DecryptUpdate() should be made with the output
+parameter B<out> set to B<NULL>.
+
+When decrypting the return value of EVP_DecryptFinal() or EVP_CipherFinal()
+indicates if the operation was successful. If it does not indicate success
+the authentication operation has failed and any output data B<MUST NOT>
+be used as it is corrupted.
+
+The following ctrls are supported in both GCM and OCB modes:
+
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN, ivlen, NULL);
+
+Sets the IV length: this call can only be made before specifying an IV. If
+not called a default IV length is used. For GCM AES and OCB AES the default is
+12 (i.e. 96 bits). For OCB mode the maximum is 15.
+
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG, taglen, tag);
+
+Writes B<taglen> bytes of the tag value to the buffer indicated by B<tag>.
+This call can only be made when encrypting data and B<after> all data has been
+processed (e.g. after an EVP_EncryptFinal() call). For OCB mode the taglen must
+either be 16 or the value previously set via EVP_CTRL_OCB_SET_TAGLEN.
+
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG, taglen, tag);
+
+Sets the expected tag to B<taglen> bytes from B<tag>. This call is only legal
+when decrypting data. For OCB mode the taglen must either be 16 or the value
+previously set via EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG.
+
+In OCB mode calling this with B<tag> set to NULL sets the tag length. The tag
+length can only be set before specifying an IV. If not called a default tag
+length is used. For OCB AES the default is 16 (i.e. 128 bits). This is also the
+maximum tag length for OCB.
+
+=head1 CCM Mode
+
+The behaviour of CCM mode ciphers is similar to GCM mode but with a few
+additional requirements and different ctrl values.
+
+Like GCM and OCB modes any additional authenticated data (AAD) is passed by calling
+EVP_CipherUpdate(), EVP_EncryptUpdate() or EVP_DecryptUpdate() with the output
+parameter B<out> set to B<NULL>. Additionally the total plaintext or ciphertext
+length B<MUST> be passed to EVP_CipherUpdate(), EVP_EncryptUpdate() or
+EVP_DecryptUpdate() with the output and input parameters (B<in> and B<out>)
+set to B<NULL> and the length passed in the B<inl> parameter.
+
+The following ctrls are supported in CCM mode:
+
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG, taglen, tag);
+
+This call is made to set the expected B<CCM> tag value when decrypting or
+the length of the tag (with the B<tag> parameter set to NULL) when encrypting.
+The tag length is often referred to as B<M>. If not set a default value is
+used (12 for AES).
+
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_L, ivlen, NULL);
+
+Sets the CCM B<L> value. If not set a default is used (8 for AES).
+
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN, ivlen, NULL);
+
+Sets the CCM nonce (IV) length: this call can only be made before specifying
+an nonce value. The nonce length is given by B<15 - L> so it is 7 by default
+for AES.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+Where possible the B<EVP> interface to symmetric ciphers should be used in
+preference to the low level interfaces. This is because the code then becomes
+transparent to the cipher used and much more flexible. Additionally, the
+B<EVP> interface will ensure the use of platform specific cryptographic
+acceleration such as AES-NI (the low level interfaces do not provide the
+guarantee).
+
+PKCS padding works by adding B<n> padding bytes of value B<n> to make the total
+length of the encrypted data a multiple of the block size. Padding is always
+added so if the data is already a multiple of the block size B<n> will equal
+the block size. For example if the block size is 8 and 11 bytes are to be
+encrypted then 5 padding bytes of value 5 will be added.
+
+When decrypting the final block is checked to see if it has the correct form.
+
+Although the decryption operation can produce an error if padding is enabled,
+it is not a strong test that the input data or key is correct. A random block
+has better than 1 in 256 chance of being of the correct format and problems with
+the input data earlier on will not produce a final decrypt error.
+
+If padding is disabled then the decryption operation will always succeed if
+the total amount of data decrypted is a multiple of the block size.
+
+The functions EVP_EncryptInit(), EVP_EncryptFinal(), EVP_DecryptInit(),
+EVP_CipherInit() and EVP_CipherFinal() are obsolete but are retained for
+compatibility with existing code. New code should use EVP_EncryptInit_ex(),
+EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(), EVP_DecryptInit_ex(), EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(),
+EVP_CipherInit_ex() and EVP_CipherFinal_ex() because they can reuse an
+existing context without allocating and freeing it up on each call.
+
+EVP_get_cipherbynid(), and EVP_get_cipherbyobj() are implemented as macros.
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+For RC5 the number of rounds can currently only be set to 8, 12 or 16. This is
+a limitation of the current RC5 code rather than the EVP interface.
+
+EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH and EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH only refer to the internal ciphers with
+default key lengths. If custom ciphers exceed these values the results are
+unpredictable. This is because it has become standard practice to define a
+generic key as a fixed unsigned char array containing EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH bytes.
+
+The ASN1 code is incomplete (and sometimes inaccurate) it has only been tested
+for certain common S/MIME ciphers (RC2, DES, triple DES) in CBC mode.
+
+=head1 EXAMPLES
+
+Encrypt a string using IDEA:
+
+ int do_crypt(char *outfile)
+        {
+        unsigned char outbuf[1024];
+        int outlen, tmplen;
+        /* Bogus key and IV: we'd normally set these from
+         * another source.
+         */
+        unsigned char key[] = {0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15};
+        unsigned char iv[] = {1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8};
+        char intext[] = "Some Crypto Text";
+        EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
+        FILE *out;
+
+        ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+        EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_idea_cbc(), NULL, key, iv);
+
+        if(!EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, outbuf, &outlen, intext, strlen(intext)))
+                {
+                /* Error */
+                return 0;
+                }
+        /* Buffer passed to EVP_EncryptFinal() must be after data just
+         * encrypted to avoid overwriting it.
+         */
+        if(!EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, outbuf + outlen, &tmplen))
+                {
+                /* Error */
+                return 0;
+                }
+        outlen += tmplen;
+        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
+        /* Need binary mode for fopen because encrypted data is
+         * binary data. Also cannot use strlen() on it because
+         * it won't be null terminated and may contain embedded
+         * nulls.
+         */
+        out = fopen(outfile, "wb");
+        fwrite(outbuf, 1, outlen, out);
+        fclose(out);
+        return 1;
+        }
+
+The ciphertext from the above example can be decrypted using the B<openssl>
+utility with the command line (shown on two lines for clarity):
+
+ openssl idea -d <filename
+          -K 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F -iv 0102030405060708
+
+General encryption and decryption function example using FILE I/O and AES128
+with a 128-bit key:
+
+ int do_crypt(FILE *in, FILE *out, int do_encrypt)
+        {
+        /* Allow enough space in output buffer for additional block */
+        unsigned char inbuf[1024], outbuf[1024 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
+        int inlen, outlen;
+        EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
+        /* Bogus key and IV: we'd normally set these from
+         * another source.
+         */
+        unsigned char key[] = "0123456789abcdeF";
+        unsigned char iv[] = "1234567887654321";
+
+        /* Don't set key or IV right away; we want to check lengths */
+        ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+        EVP_CipherInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, NULL, NULL,
+                do_encrypt);
+        OPENSSL_assert(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) == 16);
+        OPENSSL_assert(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) == 16);
+
+        /* Now we can set key and IV */
+        EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, key, iv, do_encrypt);
+
+        for(;;)
+                {
+                inlen = fread(inbuf, 1, 1024, in);
+                if (inlen <= 0) break;
+                if(!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx, outbuf, &outlen, inbuf, inlen))
+                        {
+                        /* Error */
+                        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
+                        return 0;
+                        }
+                fwrite(outbuf, 1, outlen, out);
+                }
+        if(!EVP_CipherFinal_ex(ctx, outbuf, &outlen))
+                {
+                /* Error */
+                EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
+                return 0;
+                }
+        fwrite(outbuf, 1, outlen, out);
+
+        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
+        return 1;
+        }
+
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<evp(7)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+Support for OCB mode was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0
+
+B<EVP_CIPHER_CTX> was made opaque in OpenSSL 1.1.0.  As a result,
+EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset() appeared and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup()
+disappeared.  EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init() remains as an alias for
+EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset().
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_MD_meth_new.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_MD_meth_new.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4dac672
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_MD_meth_new.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,179 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+EVP_MD_meth_dup,
+EVP_MD_meth_new, EVP_MD_meth_free, EVP_MD_meth_set_input_blocksize,
+EVP_MD_meth_set_result_size, EVP_MD_meth_set_app_datasize,
+EVP_MD_meth_set_flags, EVP_MD_meth_set_init, EVP_MD_meth_set_update,
+EVP_MD_meth_set_final, EVP_MD_meth_set_copy, EVP_MD_meth_set_cleanup,
+EVP_MD_meth_set_ctrl, EVP_MD_meth_get_input_blocksize,
+EVP_MD_meth_get_result_size, EVP_MD_meth_get_app_datasize,
+EVP_MD_meth_get_flags, EVP_MD_meth_get_init, EVP_MD_meth_get_update,
+EVP_MD_meth_get_final, EVP_MD_meth_get_copy, EVP_MD_meth_get_cleanup,
+EVP_MD_meth_get_ctrl
+- Routines to build up EVP_MD methods
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+ EVP_MD *EVP_MD_meth_new(int md_type, int pkey_type);
+ void EVP_MD_meth_free(EVP_MD *md);
+ EVP_MD *EVP_MD_meth_dup(const EVP_MD *md);
+
+ int EVP_MD_meth_set_input_blocksize(EVP_MD *md, int blocksize);
+ int EVP_MD_meth_set_result_size(EVP_MD *md, int resultsize);
+ int EVP_MD_meth_set_app_datasize(EVP_MD *md, int datasize);
+ int EVP_MD_meth_set_flags(EVP_MD *md, unsigned long flags);
+ int EVP_MD_meth_set_init(EVP_MD *md, int (*init)(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx));
+ int EVP_MD_meth_set_update(EVP_MD *md, int (*update)(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
+                                                      const void *data,
+                                                      size_t count));
+ int EVP_MD_meth_set_final(EVP_MD *md, int (*final)(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
+                                                    unsigned char *md));
+ int EVP_MD_meth_set_copy(EVP_MD *md, int (*copy)(EVP_MD_CTX *to,
+                                                  const EVP_MD_CTX *from));
+ int EVP_MD_meth_set_cleanup(EVP_MD *md, int (*cleanup)(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx));
+ int EVP_MD_meth_set_ctrl(EVP_MD *md, int (*ctrl)(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, int cmd,
+                                                  int p1, void *p2));
+
+ int EVP_MD_meth_get_input_blocksize(const EVP_MD *md);
+ int EVP_MD_meth_get_result_size(const EVP_MD *md);
+ int EVP_MD_meth_get_app_datasize(const EVP_MD *md);
+ unsigned long EVP_MD_meth_get_flags(const EVP_MD *md);
+ int (*EVP_MD_meth_get_init(const EVP_MD *md))(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
+ int (*EVP_MD_meth_get_update(const EVP_MD *md))(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
+                                                 const void *data,
+                                                 size_t count);
+ int (*EVP_MD_meth_get_final(const EVP_MD *md))(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
+                                                unsigned char *md);
+ int (*EVP_MD_meth_get_copy(const EVP_MD *md))(EVP_MD_CTX *to,
+                                               const EVP_MD_CTX *from);
+ int (*EVP_MD_meth_get_cleanup(const EVP_MD *md))(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
+ int (*EVP_MD_meth_get_ctrl(const EVP_MD *md))(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, int cmd,
+                                               int p1, void *p2);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The B<EVP_MD> type is a structure for digest method implementation.
+It can also have associated public/private key signing and verifying
+routines.
+
+EVP_MD_meth_new() creates a new B<EVP_MD> structure.
+
+EVP_MD_meth_dup() creates a copy of B<md>.
+
+EVP_MD_meth_free() destroys a B<EVP_MD> structure.
+
+EVP_MD_meth_set_input_blocksize() sets the internal input block size
+for the method B<md> to B<blocksize> bytes.
+
+EVP_MD_meth_set_result_size() sets the size of the result that the
+digest method in B<md> is expected to produce to B<resultsize> bytes.
+
+The digest method may have its own private data, which OpenSSL will
+allocate for it.  EVP_MD_meth_set_app_datasize() should be used to
+set the size for it to B<datasize>.
+
+EVP_MD_meth_set_flags() sets the flags to describe optional
+behaviours in the particular B<md>.  Several flags can be or'd
+together.  The available flags are:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item EVP_MD_FLAG_ONESHOT
+
+This digest method can only handles one block of input.
+
+=item EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_NULL
+
+When setting up a DigestAlgorithmIdentifier, this flag will have the
+parameter set to NULL by default.  Use this for PKCS#1.  I<Note: if
+combined with EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT, the latter will override.>
+
+=item EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT
+
+When setting up a DigestAlgorithmIdentifier, this flag will have the
+parameter be left absent by default.  I<Note: if combined with
+EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_NULL, the latter will be overridden.>
+
+=item EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_CUSTOM
+
+Custom DigestAlgorithmIdentifier handling via ctrl, with
+B<EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT> as default.  I<Note: if combined with
+EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_NULL, the latter will be overridden.>
+Currently unused.
+
+=back
+
+EVP_MD_meth_set_init() sets the digest init function for B<md>.
+The digest init function is called by EVP_DigestInit(),
+EVP_DigestInit_ex(), EVP_SignInit, EVP_SignInit_ex(), EVP_VerifyInit()
+and EVP_VerifyInit_ex().
+
+EVP_MD_meth_set_update() sets the digest update function for B<md>.
+The digest update function is called by EVP_DigestUpdate(),
+EVP_SignUpdate().
+
+EVP_MD_meth_set_final() sets the digest final function for B<md>.
+The digest final function is called by EVP_DigestFinal(),
+EVP_DigestFinal_ex(), EVP_SignFinal() and EVP_VerifyFinal().
+
+EVP_MD_meth_set_copy() sets the function for B<md> to do extra
+computations after the method's private data structure has been copied
+from one B<EVP_MD_CTX> to another.  If all that's needed is to copy
+the data, there is no need for this copy function.
+Note that the copy function is passed two B<EVP_MD_CTX *>, the private
+data structure is then available with EVP_MD_CTX_md_data().
+This copy function is called by EVP_MD_CTX_copy() and
+EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex().
+
+EVP_MD_meth_set_cleanup() sets the function for B<md> to do extra
+cleanup before the method's private data structure is cleaned out and
+freed.
+Note that the cleanup function is passed a B<EVP_MD_CTX *>, the
+private data structure is then available with EVP_MD_CTX_md_data().
+This cleanup function is called by EVP_MD_CTX_reset() and
+EVP_MD_CTX_free().
+
+EVP_MD_meth_set_ctrl() sets the control function for B<md>.
+
+EVP_MD_meth_get_input_blocksize(), EVP_MD_meth_get_result_size(),
+EVP_MD_meth_get_app_datasize(), EVP_MD_meth_get_flags(),
+EVP_MD_meth_get_init(), EVP_MD_meth_get_update(),
+EVP_MD_meth_get_final(), EVP_MD_meth_get_copy(),
+EVP_MD_meth_get_cleanup() and EVP_MD_meth_get_ctrl() are all used
+to retrieve the method data given with the EVP_MD_meth_set_*()
+functions above.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+EVP_MD_meth_new() and EVP_MD_meth_dup() return a pointer to a newly
+created B<EVP_MD>, or NULL on failure.
+All EVP_MD_meth_set_*() functions return 1.
+EVP_MD_get_input_blocksize(), EVP_MD_meth_get_result_size(),
+EVP_MD_meth_get_app_datasize() and EVP_MD_meth_get_flags() return the
+indicated sizes or flags.
+All other EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_*() functions return pointers to their
+respective B<md> function.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<EVP_DigestInit(3)>, L<EVP_SignInit(3)>, L<EVP_VerifyInit(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+The B<EVP_MD> structure was openly available in OpenSSL before version
+1.1.0.  The functions described here were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2015-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_OpenInit.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_OpenInit.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ff84490
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_OpenInit.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+EVP_OpenInit, EVP_OpenUpdate, EVP_OpenFinal - EVP envelope decryption
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+ int EVP_OpenInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, EVP_CIPHER *type, unsigned char *ek,
+                int ekl, unsigned char *iv, EVP_PKEY *priv);
+ int EVP_OpenUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+         int *outl, unsigned char *in, int inl);
+ int EVP_OpenFinal(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+         int *outl);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The EVP envelope routines are a high level interface to envelope
+decryption. They decrypt a public key encrypted symmetric key and
+then decrypt data using it.
+
+EVP_OpenInit() initializes a cipher context B<ctx> for decryption
+with cipher B<type>. It decrypts the encrypted symmetric key of length
+B<ekl> bytes passed in the B<ek> parameter using the private key B<priv>.
+The IV is supplied in the B<iv> parameter.
+
+EVP_OpenUpdate() and EVP_OpenFinal() have exactly the same properties
+as the EVP_DecryptUpdate() and EVP_DecryptFinal() routines, as
+documented on the L<EVP_EncryptInit(3)> manual
+page.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+It is possible to call EVP_OpenInit() twice in the same way as
+EVP_DecryptInit(). The first call should have B<priv> set to NULL
+and (after setting any cipher parameters) it should be called again
+with B<type> set to NULL.
+
+If the cipher passed in the B<type> parameter is a variable length
+cipher then the key length will be set to the value of the recovered
+key length. If the cipher is a fixed length cipher then the recovered
+key length must match the fixed cipher length.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+EVP_OpenInit() returns 0 on error or a non zero integer (actually the
+recovered secret key size) if successful.
+
+EVP_OpenUpdate() returns 1 for success or 0 for failure.
+
+EVP_OpenFinal() returns 0 if the decrypt failed or 1 for success.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<evp(3)>, L<rand(3)>,
+L<EVP_EncryptInit(3)>,
+L<EVP_SealInit(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0eece53
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,358 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD,
+EVP_PKEY_asn1_new,
+EVP_PKEY_asn1_copy,
+EVP_PKEY_asn1_free,
+EVP_PKEY_asn1_add0,
+EVP_PKEY_asn1_add_alias,
+EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_public,
+EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_private,
+EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_param,
+EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_free,
+EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_ctrl,
+EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_item,
+EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_security_bits,
+EVP_PKEY_get0_asn1
+- manipulating and registering EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD structure
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+ typedef struct evp_pkey_asn1_method_st EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD;
+
+ EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *EVP_PKEY_asn1_new(int id, int flags,
+                                         const char *pem_str,
+                                         const char *info);
+ void EVP_PKEY_asn1_copy(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *dst,
+                         const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *src);
+ void EVP_PKEY_asn1_free(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth);
+ int EVP_PKEY_asn1_add0(const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth);
+ int EVP_PKEY_asn1_add_alias(int to, int from);
+
+ void EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_public(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth,
+                               int (*pub_decode) (EVP_PKEY *pk,
+                                                  X509_PUBKEY *pub),
+                               int (*pub_encode) (X509_PUBKEY *pub,
+                                                  const EVP_PKEY *pk),
+                               int (*pub_cmp) (const EVP_PKEY *a,
+                                               const EVP_PKEY *b),
+                               int (*pub_print) (BIO *out,
+                                                 const EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+                                                 int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx),
+                               int (*pkey_size) (const EVP_PKEY *pk),
+                               int (*pkey_bits) (const EVP_PKEY *pk));
+ void EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_private(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth,
+                                int (*priv_decode) (EVP_PKEY *pk,
+                                                    const PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO
+                                                    *p8inf),
+                                int (*priv_encode) (PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8,
+                                                    const EVP_PKEY *pk),
+                                int (*priv_print) (BIO *out,
+                                                   const EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+                                                   int indent,
+                                                   ASN1_PCTX *pctx));
+ void EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_param(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth,
+                              int (*param_decode) (EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+                                                   const unsigned char **pder,
+                                                   int derlen),
+                              int (*param_encode) (const EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+                                                   unsigned char **pder),
+                              int (*param_missing) (const EVP_PKEY *pk),
+                              int (*param_copy) (EVP_PKEY *to,
+                                                 const EVP_PKEY *from),
+                              int (*param_cmp) (const EVP_PKEY *a,
+                                                const EVP_PKEY *b),
+                              int (*param_print) (BIO *out,
+                                                  const EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+                                                  int indent,
+                                                  ASN1_PCTX *pctx));
+
+ void EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_free(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth,
+                             void (*pkey_free) (EVP_PKEY *pkey));
+ void EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth,
+                             int (*pkey_ctrl) (EVP_PKEY *pkey, int op,
+                                               long arg1, void *arg2));
+ void EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_item(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth,
+                             int (*item_verify) (EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
+                                                 const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+                                                 void *asn,
+                                                 X509_ALGOR *a,
+                                                 ASN1_BIT_STRING *sig,
+                                                 EVP_PKEY *pkey),
+                             int (*item_sign) (EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
+                                               const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+                                               void *asn,
+                                               X509_ALGOR *alg1,
+                                               X509_ALGOR *alg2,
+                                               ASN1_BIT_STRING *sig));
+
+ void EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_security_bits(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth,
+                                      int (*pkey_security_bits) (const EVP_PKEY
+                                                                 *pk));
+
+ const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *EVP_PKEY_get0_asn1(const EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+B<EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD> is a structure which holds a set of ASN.1
+conversion, printing and information methods for a specific public key
+algorithm.
+
+There are two places where the B<EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD> objects are
+stored: one is a built-in array representing the standard methods for
+different algorithms, and the other one is a stack of user-defined
+application-specific methods, which can be manipulated by using
+L<EVP_PKEY_asn1_add0(3)>.
+
+=head2 Methods
+
+The methods are the underlying implementations of a particular public
+key algorithm present by the B<EVP_PKEY> object.
+
+ int (*pub_decode) (EVP_PKEY *pk, X509_PUBKEY *pub);
+ int (*pub_encode) (X509_PUBKEY *pub, const EVP_PKEY *pk);
+ int (*pub_cmp) (const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b);
+ int (*pub_print) (BIO *out, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent,
+                   ASN1_PCTX *pctx);
+
+The pub_decode() and pub_encode() methods are called to decode /
+encode B<X509_PUBKEY> ASN.1 parameters to / from B<pk>.
+They MUST return 0 on error, 1 on success.
+They're called by L<X509_PUBKEY_get0(3)> and L<X509_PUBKEY_set(3)>.
+
+The pub_cmp() method is called when two public keys are to be
+compared.
+It MUST return 1 when the keys are equal, 0 otherwise.
+It's called by L<EVP_PKEY_cmp(3)>.
+
+The pub_print() method is called to print a public key in humanly
+readable text to B<out>, indented B<indent> spaces.
+It MUST return 0 on error, 1 on success.
+It's called by L<EVP_PKEY_print_public(3)>.
+
+ int (*priv_decode) (EVP_PKEY *pk, const PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf);
+ int (*priv_encode) (PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, const EVP_PKEY *pk);
+ int (*priv_print) (BIO *out, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent,
+                    ASN1_PCTX *pctx);
+
+The priv_decode() and priv_encode() methods are called to decode /
+encode B<PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO> form private key to / from B<pk>.
+They MUST return 0 on error, 1 on success.
+They're called by L<EVP_PKCS82PKEY(3)> and L<EVP_PKEY2PKCS8(3)>.
+
+The priv_print() method is called to print a private key in humanly
+readable text to B<out>, indented B<indent> spaces.
+It MUST return 0 on error, 1 on success.
+It's called by L<EVP_PKEY_print_private(3)>.
+
+ int (*pkey_size) (const EVP_PKEY *pk);
+ int (*pkey_bits) (const EVP_PKEY *pk);
+ int (*pkey_security_bits) (const EVP_PKEY *pk);
+
+The pkey_size() method returns the key size in bytes.
+It's called by L<EVP_PKEY_size(3)>.
+
+The pkey_bits() method returns the key size in bits.
+It's called by L<EVP_PKEY_bits(3)>.
+
+ int (*param_decode) (EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+                      const unsigned char **pder, int derlen);
+ int (*param_encode) (const EVP_PKEY *pkey, unsigned char **pder);
+ int (*param_missing) (const EVP_PKEY *pk);
+ int (*param_copy) (EVP_PKEY *to, const EVP_PKEY *from);
+ int (*param_cmp) (const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b);
+ int (*param_print) (BIO *out, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent,
+                     ASN1_PCTX *pctx);
+
+The param_decode() and param_encode() methods are called to decode /
+encode DER formatted parameters to / from B<pk>.
+They MUST return 0 on error, 1 on success.
+They're called by L<PEM_read_bio_Parameters(3)> and the B<file:>
+L<OSSL_STORE_LOADER(3)>.
+
+The param_missing() method returns 0 if a key parameter is missing,
+otherwise 1.
+It's called by L<EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(3)>.
+
+The param_copy() method copies key parameters from B<from> to B<to>.
+It MUST return 0 on error, 1 on success.
+It's called by L<EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(3)>.
+
+The param_cmp() method compares the parameters of keys B<a> and B<b>.
+It MUST return 1 when the keys are equal, 0 when not equal, or a
+negative number on error.
+It's called by L<EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(3)>.
+
+The param_print() method prints the private key parameters in humanly
+readable text to B<out>, indented B<indent> spaces.
+It MUST return 0 on error, 1 on success.
+It's called by L<EVP_PKEY_print_params(3)>.
+
+ int (*sig_print) (BIO *out,
+                   const X509_ALGOR *sigalg, const ASN1_STRING *sig,
+                   int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx);
+
+The sig_print() method prints a signature in humanly readable text to
+B<out>, indented B<indent> spaces.
+B<sigalg> contains the exact signature algorithm.
+If the signature in B<sig> doesn't correspond to what this method
+expects, X509_signature_dump() must be used as a last resort.
+It MUST return 0 on error, 1 on success.
+It's called by L<X509_signature_print(3)>.
+
+ void (*pkey_free) (EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+
+The pkey_free() method helps freeing the internals of B<pkey>.
+It's called by L<EVP_PKEY_free(3)>, L<EVP_PKEY_set_type(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_set_type_str(3)>, and L<EVP_PKEY_assign(3)>.
+
+ int (*pkey_ctrl) (EVP_PKEY *pkey, int op, long arg1, void *arg2);
+
+The pkey_ctrl() method adds extra algorithm specific control.
+It's called by L<EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(3)>, L<PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_set(3)>,
+L<PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_set(3)>, ...
+
+ int (*old_priv_decode) (EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+                         const unsigned char **pder, int derlen);
+ int (*old_priv_encode) (const EVP_PKEY *pkey, unsigned char **pder);
+
+The old_priv_decode() and old_priv_encode() methods decode / encode
+they private key B<pkey> from / to a DER formatted array.
+These are exclusively used to help decoding / encoding older (pre
+PKCS#8) PEM formatted encrypted private keys.
+old_priv_decode() MUST return 0 on error, 1 on success.
+old_priv_encode() MUST the return same kind of values as
+i2d_PrivateKey().
+They're called by L<d2i_PrivateKey(3)> and L<i2d_PrivateKey(3)>.
+
+ int (*item_verify) (EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *asn,
+                     X509_ALGOR *a, ASN1_BIT_STRING *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+ int (*item_sign) (EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *asn,
+                   X509_ALGOR *alg1, X509_ALGOR *alg2,
+                   ASN1_BIT_STRING *sig);
+
+The item_sign() and  item_verify() methods make it possible to have
+algorithm specific signatures and verification of them.
+
+item_sign() MUST return one of:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item <=0
+
+error
+
+=item Z<>1
+
+item_sign() did everything, OpenSSL internals just needs to pass the
+signature length back.
+
+=item Z<>2
+
+item_sign() did nothing, OpenSSL internal standard routines are
+expected to continue with the default signature production.
+
+=item Z<>3
+
+item_sign() set the algorithm identifier B<algor1> and B<algor2>,
+OpenSSL internals should just sign using those algorithms.
+
+=back
+
+item_verify() MUST return one of:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item <=0
+
+error
+
+=item Z<>1
+
+item_sign() did everything, OpenSSL internals just needs to pass the
+signature length back.
+
+=item Z<>2
+
+item_sign() did nothing, OpenSSL internal standard routines are
+expected to continue with the default signature production.
+
+=back
+
+item_verify() and item_sign() are called by L<ASN1_item_verify(3)> and
+L<ASN1_item_sign(3)>, and by extension, L<X509_verify(3)>,
+L<X509_REQ_verify(3)>, L<X509_sign(3)>, L<X509_REQ_sign(3)>, ...
+
+=head2 Functions
+
+EVP_PKEY_asn1_new() creates and returns a new B<EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD>
+object, and associates the given B<id>, B<flags>, B<pem_str> and
+B<info>.
+B<id> is a NID, B<pem_str> is the PEM type string, B<info> is a
+descriptive string.
+The following B<flags> are supported:
+
+ ASN1_PKEY_SIGPARAM_NULL
+
+If B<ASN1_PKEY_SIGPARAM_NULL> is set, then the signature algorithm
+parameters are given the type B<V_ASN1_NULL> by default, otherwise
+they will be given the type B<V_ASN1_UNDEF> (i.e. the parameter is
+omitted).
+See L<X509_ALGOR_set0(3)> for more information.
+
+EVP_PKEY_asn1_copy() copies an B<EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD> object from
+B<src> to B<dst>.
+This function is not thread safe, it's recommended to only use this
+when initializing the application.
+
+EVP_PKEY_asn1_free() frees an existing B<EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD> pointed
+by B<ameth>.
+
+EVP_PKEY_asn1_add0() adds B<ameth> to the user defined stack of
+methods unless another B<EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD> with the same NID is
+already there.
+This function is not thread safe, it's recommended to only use this
+when initializing the application.
+
+EVP_PKEY_asn1_add_alias() creates an alias with the NID B<to> for the
+B<EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD> with NID B<from> unless another
+B<EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD> with the same NID is already added.
+This function is not thread safe, it's recommended to only use this
+when initializing the application.
+
+EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_public(), EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_private(),
+EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_param(), EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_free(),
+EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_ctrl(), EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_item(), and
+EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_security_bits() set the diverse methods of the given
+B<EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD> object.
+
+EVP_PKEY_get0_asn1() finds the B<EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD> associated
+with the key B<pkey>.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+EVP_PKEY_asn1_new() returns NULL on error, or a pointer to an
+B<EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD> object otherwise.
+
+EVP_PKEY_asn1_add0() and EVP_PKEY_asn1_add_alias() return 0 on error,
+or 1 on success.
+
+EVP_PKEY_get0_asn1() returns NULL on error, or a pointer to a constant
+B<EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD> object otherwise.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a30450b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl, EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl_str,
+EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md, EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding,
+EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen, EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_rsa_keygen_bits,
+EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_pubexp, EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dsa_paramgen_bits,
+EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_paramgen_prime_len,
+EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_paramgen_generator,
+EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid,
+EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_param_enc - algorithm specific control operations
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+ int EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int keytype, int optype,
+                                int cmd, int p1, void *p2);
+ int EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const char *type,
+                                                const char *value);
+
+ #include <openssl/rsa.h>
+
+ int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md);
+
+ int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int pad);
+ int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int len);
+ int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_rsa_keygen_bits(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int mbits);
+ int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_pubexp(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, BIGNUM *pubexp);
+
+ #include <openssl/dsa.h>
+ int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dsa_paramgen_bits(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int nbits);
+
+ #include <openssl/dh.h>
+ int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_paramgen_prime_len(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int len);
+ int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_paramgen_generator(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int gen);
+
+ #include <openssl/ec.h>
+ int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int nid);
+ int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_param_enc(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int param_enc);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The function EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() sends a control operation to the context
+B<ctx>. The key type used must match B<keytype> if it is not -1. The parameter
+B<optype> is a mask indicating which operations the control can be applied to.
+The control command is indicated in B<cmd> and any additional arguments in
+B<p1> and B<p2>.
+
+Applications will not normally call EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() directly but will
+instead call one of the algorithm specific macros below.
+
+The function EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl_str() allows an application to send an algorithm
+specific control operation to a context B<ctx> in string form. This is
+intended to be used for options specified on the command line or in text
+files. The commands supported are documented in the openssl utility
+command line pages for the option B<-pkeyopt> which is supported by the
+B<pkeyutl>, B<genpkey> and B<req> commands.
+
+All the remaining "functions" are implemented as macros.
+
+The EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md() macro sets the message digest type used
+in a signature. It can be used with any public key algorithm supporting
+signature operations.
+
+The macro EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding() sets the RSA padding mode for B<ctx>.
+The B<pad> parameter can take the value RSA_PKCS1_PADDING for PKCS#1 padding,
+RSA_SSLV23_PADDING for SSLv23 padding, RSA_NO_PADDING for no padding,
+RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING for OAEP padding (encrypt and decrypt only),
+RSA_X931_PADDING for X9.31 padding (signature operations only) and
+RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING (sign and verify only).
+
+Two RSA padding modes behave differently if EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md()
+is used. If this macro is called for PKCS#1 padding the plaintext buffer is
+an actual digest value and is encapsulated in a DigestInfo structure according
+to PKCS#1 when signing and this structure is expected (and stripped off) when
+verifying. If this control is not used with RSA and PKCS#1 padding then the
+supplied data is used directly and not encapsulated. In the case of X9.31
+padding for RSA the algorithm identifier byte is added or checked and removed
+if this control is called. If it is not called then the first byte of the plaintext
+buffer is expected to be the algorithm identifier byte.
+
+The EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen() macro sets the RSA PSS salt length to
+B<len> as its name implies it is only supported for PSS padding.  Two special
+values are supported: -1 sets the salt length to the digest length. When
+signing -2 sets the salt length to the maximum permissible value. When
+verifying -2 causes the salt length to be automatically determined based on the
+B<PSS> block structure. If this macro is not called a salt length value of -2
+is used by default.
+
+The EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_rsa_keygen_bits() macro sets the RSA key length for
+RSA key generation to B<bits>. If not specified 1024 bits is used.
+
+The EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_pubexp() macro sets the public exponent value
+for RSA key generation to B<pubexp> currently it should be an odd integer. The
+B<pubexp> pointer is used internally by this function so it should not be
+modified or free after the call. If this macro is not called then 65537 is used.
+
+The macro EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dsa_paramgen_bits() sets the number of bits used
+for DSA parameter generation to B<bits>. If not specified 1024 is used.
+
+The macro EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_paramgen_prime_len() sets the length of the DH
+prime parameter B<p> for DH parameter generation. If this macro is not called
+then 1024 is used.
+
+The EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_paramgen_generator() macro sets DH generator to B<gen>
+for DH parameter generation. If not specified 2 is used.
+
+The EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid() sets the EC curve for EC parameter
+generation to B<nid>. For EC parameter generation this macro must be called
+or an error occurs because there is no default curve.
+This function can also be called to set the curve explicitly when
+generating an EC key.
+
+The EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_param_enc() sets the EC parameter encoding to
+B<param_enc> when generating EC parameters or an EC key. The encoding can be
+B<OPENSSL_EC_EXPLICIT_CURVE> for explicit parameters (the default in versions
+of OpenSSL before 1.1.0) or B<OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE> to use named curve form.
+For maximum compatibility the named curve form should be used. Note: the
+B<OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE> value was only added to OpenSSL 1.1.0; previous
+versions should use 0 instead.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() and its macros return a positive value for success and 0
+or a negative value for failure. In particular a return value of -2
+indicates the operation is not supported by the public key algorithm.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_encrypt(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_decrypt(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_sign(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_verify(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_derive(3)>
+L<EVP_PKEY_keygen(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+These functions were first added to OpenSSL 1.0.0.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_CTX_new.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_CTX_new.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..eff94cd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_CTX_new.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+EVP_PKEY_CTX_new, EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id, EVP_PKEY_CTX_dup, EVP_PKEY_CTX_free - public key algorithm context functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(EVP_PKEY *pkey, ENGINE *e);
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(int id, ENGINE *e);
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *EVP_PKEY_CTX_dup(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);
+ void EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The EVP_PKEY_CTX_new() function allocates public key algorithm context using
+the algorithm specified in B<pkey> and ENGINE B<e>.
+
+The EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id() function allocates public key algorithm context
+using the algorithm specified by B<id> and ENGINE B<e>. It is normally used
+when no B<EVP_PKEY> structure is associated with the operations, for example
+during parameter generation of key generation for some algorithms.
+
+EVP_PKEY_CTX_dup() duplicates the context B<ctx>.
+
+EVP_PKEY_CTX_free() frees up the context B<ctx>.
+If B<ctx> is NULL, nothing is done.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The B<EVP_PKEY_CTX> structure is an opaque public key algorithm context used
+by the OpenSSL high level public key API. Contexts B<MUST NOT> be shared between
+threads: that is it is not permissible to use the same context simultaneously
+in two threads.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(), EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(), EVP_PKEY_CTX_dup() returns either
+the newly allocated B<EVP_PKEY_CTX> structure of B<NULL> if an error occurred.
+
+EVP_PKEY_CTX_free() does not return a value.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<EVP_PKEY_new(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+These functions were first added to OpenSSL 1.0.0.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_hkdf_md.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_hkdf_md.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..61e0eec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_hkdf_md.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_hkdf_md, EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_hkdf_salt,
+EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_hkdf_key, EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_hkdf_info -
+HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand key derivation algorithm
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/kdf.h>
+
+ int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_hkdf_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx, const EVP_MD *md);
+
+ int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_hkdf_salt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx, unsigned char *salt,
+                                 int saltlen);
+
+ int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_hkdf_key(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx, unsigned char *key,
+                                int keylen);
+
+ int EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_hkdf_info(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx, unsigned char *info,
+                                 int infolen);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The EVP_PKEY_HKDF algorithm implements the HKDF key derivation function.
+HKDF follows the "extract-then-expand" paradigm, where the KDF logically
+consists of two modules. The first stage takes the input keying material
+and "extracts" from it a fixed-length pseudorandom key K. The second stage
+"expands" the key K into several additional pseudorandom keys (the output
+of the KDF).
+
+EVP_PKEY_set_hkdf_md() sets the message digest associated with the HKDF.
+
+EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_hkdf_salt() sets the salt to B<saltlen> bytes of the
+buffer B<salt>. Any existing value is replaced.
+
+EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_hkdf_key() sets the key to B<keylen> bytes of the buffer
+B<key>. Any existing value is replaced.
+
+EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_hkdf_info() sets the info value to B<infolen> bytes of the
+buffer B<info>. If a value is already set, it is appended to the existing
+value.
+
+=head1 STRING CTRLS
+
+HKDF also supports string based control operations via
+L<EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl_str(3)>.
+The B<type> parameter "md" uses the supplied B<value> as the name of the digest
+algorithm to use.
+The B<type> parameters "salt", "key" and "info" use the supplied B<value>
+parameter as a B<seed>, B<key> or B<info> value.
+The names "hexsalt", "hexkey" and "hexinfo" are similar except they take a hex
+string which is converted to binary.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+All these functions are implemented as macros.
+
+A context for HKDF can be obtained by calling:
+
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_new_id(EVP_PKEY_HKDF, NULL);
+
+The digest, key, salt and info values must be set before a key is derived or
+an error occurs.
+
+The total length of the info buffer cannot exceed 1024 bytes in length: this
+should be more than enough for any normal use of HKDF.
+
+The output length of the KDF is specified via the length parameter to the
+L<EVP_PKEY_derive(3)> function.
+Since the HKDF output length is variable, passing a B<NULL> buffer as a means
+to obtain the requisite length is not meaningful with HKDF.
+Instead, the caller must allocate a buffer of the desired length, and pass that
+buffer to L<EVP_PKEY_derive(3)> along with (a pointer initialized to) the
+desired length.
+
+Optimised versions of HKDF can be implemented in an ENGINE.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+All these functions return 1 for success and 0 or a negative value for failure.
+In particular a return value of -2 indicates the operation is not supported by
+the public key algorithm.
+
+=head1 EXAMPLE
+
+This example derives 10 bytes using SHA-256 with the secret key "secret",
+salt value "salt" and info value "label":
+
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx;
+ unsigned char out[10];
+ size_t outlen = sizeof(out);
+ pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_HKDF, NULL);
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx) <= 0)
+    /* Error */
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_hkdf_md(pctx, EVP_sha256()) <= 0)
+    /* Error */
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_salt(pctx, "salt", 4) <= 0)
+    /* Error */
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_key(pctx, "secret", 6) <= 0)
+    /* Error */
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_hkdf_info(pctx, "label", 6) <= 0)
+    /* Error */
+ if (EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx, out, &outlen) <= 0)
+    /* Error */
+
+=head1 CONFORMING TO
+
+RFC 5869
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl_str(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_derive(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_tls1_prf_md.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_tls1_prf_md.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f1f0ae4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_tls1_prf_md.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_tls1_prf_md,
+EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_tls1_prf_secret, EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_tls1_prf_seed -
+TLS PRF key derivation algorithm
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/kdf.h>
+
+ int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_tls1_prf_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx, const EVP_MD *md);
+ int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_tls1_prf_secret(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx,
+                                       unsigned char *sec, int seclen);
+ int EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_tls1_prf_seed(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx,
+                                     unsigned char *seed, int seedlen);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The B<EVP_PKEY_TLS1_PRF> algorithm implements the PRF key derivation function for
+TLS. It has no associated private key and only implements key derivation
+using L<EVP_PKEY_derive(3)>.
+
+EVP_PKEY_set_tls1_prf_md() sets the message digest associated with the
+TLS PRF. EVP_md5_sha1() is treated as a special case which uses the PRF
+algorithm using both B<MD5> and B<SHA1> as used in TLS 1.0 and 1.1.
+
+EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_tls1_prf_secret() sets the secret value of the TLS PRF
+to B<seclen> bytes of the buffer B<sec>. Any existing secret value is replaced
+and any seed is reset.
+
+EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_tls1_prf_seed() sets the seed to B<seedlen> bytes of B<seed>.
+If a seed is already set it is appended to the existing value.
+
+=head1 STRING CTRLS
+
+The TLS PRF also supports string based control operations using
+L<EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl_str(3)>.
+The B<type> parameter "md" uses the supplied B<value> as the name of the digest
+algorithm to use.
+The B<type> parameters "secret" and "seed" use the supplied B<value> parameter
+as a secret or seed value.
+The names "hexsecret" and "hexseed" are similar except they take a hex string
+which is converted to binary.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+All these functions are implemented as macros.
+
+A context for the TLS PRF can be obtained by calling:
+
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_new_id(EVP_PKEY_TLS1_PRF, NULL);
+
+The digest, secret value and seed must be set before a key is derived or an
+error occurs.
+
+The total length of all seeds cannot exceed 1024 bytes in length: this should
+be more than enough for any normal use of the TLS PRF.
+
+The output length of the PRF is specified by the length parameter in the
+EVP_PKEY_derive() function. Since the output length is variable, setting
+the buffer to B<NULL> is not meaningful for the TLS PRF.
+
+Optimised versions of the TLS PRF can be implemented in an ENGINE.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+All these functions return 1 for success and 0 or a negative value for failure.
+In particular a return value of -2 indicates the operation is not supported by
+the public key algorithm.
+
+=head1 EXAMPLE
+
+This example derives 10 bytes using SHA-256 with the secret key "secret"
+and seed value "seed":
+
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx;
+ unsigned char out[10];
+ size_t outlen = sizeof(out);
+ pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_TLS1_PRF, NULL);
+ if (EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx) <= 0)
+    /* Error */
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_tls1_prf_md(pctx, EVP_sha256()) <= 0)
+    /* Error */
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_tls1_prf_secret(pctx, "secret", 6) <= 0)
+    /* Error */
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_tls1_prf_seed(pctx, "seed", 4) <= 0)
+    /* Error */
+ if (EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx, out, &outlen) <= 0)
+    /* Error */
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl_str(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_derive(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_asn1_get_count.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_asn1_get_count.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9ad2dae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_asn1_get_count.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+EVP_PKEY_asn1_find,
+EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str,
+EVP_PKEY_asn1_get_count,
+EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0,
+EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info
+- enumerate public key ASN.1 methods
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+ int EVP_PKEY_asn1_get_count(void);
+ const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0(int idx);
+ const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *EVP_PKEY_asn1_find(ENGINE **pe, int type);
+ const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str(ENGINE **pe,
+                                                    const char *str, int len);
+ int EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(int *ppkey_id, int *pkey_base_id,
+                             int *ppkey_flags, const char **pinfo,
+                             const char **ppem_str,
+                             const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+EVP_PKEY_asn1_count() returns a count of the number of public key
+ASN.1 methods available: it includes standard methods and any methods
+added by the application.
+
+EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0() returns the public key ASN.1 method B<idx>.
+The value of B<idx> must be between zero and EVP_PKEY_asn1_get_count()
+- 1.
+
+EVP_PKEY_asn1_find() looks up the B<EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD> with NID
+B<type>.
+If B<pe> isn't B<NULL>, then it will look up an engine implementing a
+B<EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD> for the NID B<type> and return that instead,
+and also set B<*pe> to point at the engine that implements it.
+
+EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str() looks up the B<EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD> with PEM
+type string B<str>.
+Just like EVP_PKEY_asn1_find(), if B<pe> isn't B<NULL>, then it will
+look up an engine implementing a B<EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD> for the NID
+B<type> and return that instead, and also set B<*pe> to point at the
+engine that implements it.
+
+EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info() returns the public key ID, base public key
+ID (both NIDs), any flags, the method description and PEM type string
+associated with the public key ASN.1 method B<*ameth>. 
+
+EVP_PKEY_asn1_count(), EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0(), EVP_PKEY_asn1_find() and
+EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str() are not thread safe, but as long as all
+B<EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD> objects are added before the application gets
+threaded, using them is safe.  See L<EVP_PKEY_asn1_add0(3)>.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+EVP_PKEY_asn1_count() returns the number of available public key methods.
+
+EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0() return a public key method or B<NULL> if B<idx> is
+out of range.
+
+EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info() returns 0 on failure, 1 on success.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<EVP_PKEY_asn1_new(3)>, L<EVP_PKEY_asn1_add0(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_cmp.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_cmp.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..270d635
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_cmp.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters, EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters, EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters,
+EVP_PKEY_cmp - public key parameter and comparison functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+ int EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(const EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+ int EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(EVP_PKEY *to, const EVP_PKEY *from);
+
+ int EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b);
+ int EVP_PKEY_cmp(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The function EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters() returns 1 if the public key
+parameters of B<pkey> are missing and 0 if they are present or the algorithm
+doesn't use parameters.
+
+The function EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters() copies the parameters from key
+B<from> to key B<to>. An error is returned if the parameters are missing in
+B<from> or present in both B<from> and B<to> and mismatch. If the parameters
+in B<from> and B<to> are both present and match this function has no effect.
+
+The function EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters() compares the parameters of keys
+B<a> and B<b>.
+
+The function EVP_PKEY_cmp() compares the public key components and parameters
+(if present) of keys B<a> and B<b>.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The main purpose of the functions EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters() and
+EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters() is to handle public keys in certificates where the
+parameters are sometimes omitted from a public key if they are inherited from
+the CA that signed it.
+
+Since OpenSSL private keys contain public key components too the function
+EVP_PKEY_cmp() can also be used to determine if a private key matches
+a public key.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+The function EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters() returns 1 if the public key
+parameters of B<pkey> are missing and 0 if they are present or the algorithm
+doesn't use parameters.
+
+These functions EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters() returns 1 for success and 0 for
+failure.
+
+The function EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters() and EVP_PKEY_cmp() return 1 if the
+keys match, 0 if they don't match, -1 if the key types are different and
+-2 if the operation is not supported.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_keygen(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_decrypt.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_decrypt.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ca732ed
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_decrypt.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init, EVP_PKEY_decrypt - decrypt using a public key algorithm
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+ int EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);
+ int EVP_PKEY_decrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                        unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
+                        const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init() function initializes a public key algorithm
+context using key B<pkey> for a decryption operation.
+
+The EVP_PKEY_decrypt() function performs a public key decryption operation
+using B<ctx>. The data to be decrypted is specified using the B<in> and
+B<inlen> parameters. If B<out> is B<NULL> then the maximum size of the output
+buffer is written to the B<outlen> parameter. If B<out> is not B<NULL> then
+before the call the B<outlen> parameter should contain the length of the
+B<out> buffer, if the call is successful the decrypted data is written to
+B<out> and the amount of data written to B<outlen>.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+After the call to EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init() algorithm specific control
+operations can be performed to set any appropriate parameters for the
+operation.
+
+The function EVP_PKEY_decrypt() can be called more than once on the same
+context if several operations are performed using the same parameters.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init() and EVP_PKEY_decrypt() return 1 for success and 0
+or a negative value for failure. In particular a return value of -2
+indicates the operation is not supported by the public key algorithm.
+
+=head1 EXAMPLE
+
+Decrypt data using OAEP (for RSA keys):
+
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include <openssl/rsa.h>
+
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx;
+ unsigned char *out, *in;
+ size_t outlen, inlen;
+ EVP_PKEY *key;
+ /* NB: assumes key in, inlen are already set up
+  * and that key is an RSA private key
+  */
+ ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(key);
+ if (!ctx)
+        /* Error occurred */
+ if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(ctx) <= 0)
+        /* Error */
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, RSA_OAEP_PADDING) <= 0)
+        /* Error */
+
+ /* Determine buffer length */
+ if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(ctx, NULL, &outlen, in, inlen) <= 0)
+        /* Error */
+
+ out = OPENSSL_malloc(outlen);
+
+ if (!out)
+        /* malloc failure */
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(ctx, out, &outlen, in, inlen) <= 0)
+        /* Error */
+
+ /* Decrypted data is outlen bytes written to buffer out */
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_encrypt(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_sign(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_verify(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_derive(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+These functions were first added to OpenSSL 1.0.0.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_derive.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_derive.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f70a0b8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_derive.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+EVP_PKEY_derive_init, EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, EVP_PKEY_derive - derive public key algorithm shared secret
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+ int EVP_PKEY_derive_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);
+ int EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *peer);
+ int EVP_PKEY_derive(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key, size_t *keylen);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The EVP_PKEY_derive_init() function initializes a public key algorithm
+context using key B<pkey> for shared secret derivation.
+
+The EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer() function sets the peer key: this will normally
+be a public key.
+
+The EVP_PKEY_derive() derives a shared secret using B<ctx>.
+If B<key> is B<NULL> then the maximum size of the output buffer is written to
+the B<keylen> parameter. If B<key> is not B<NULL> then before the call the
+B<keylen> parameter should contain the length of the B<key> buffer, if the call
+is successful the shared secret is written to B<key> and the amount of data
+written to B<keylen>.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+After the call to EVP_PKEY_derive_init() algorithm specific control
+operations can be performed to set any appropriate parameters for the
+operation.
+
+The function EVP_PKEY_derive() can be called more than once on the same
+context if several operations are performed using the same parameters.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+EVP_PKEY_derive_init() and EVP_PKEY_derive() return 1 for success and 0
+or a negative value for failure. In particular a return value of -2
+indicates the operation is not supported by the public key algorithm.
+
+=head1 EXAMPLE
+
+Derive shared secret (for example DH or EC keys):
+
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include <openssl/rsa.h>
+
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx;
+ unsigned char *skey;
+ size_t skeylen;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey, *peerkey;
+ /* NB: assumes pkey, peerkey have been already set up */
+
+ ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey);
+ if (!ctx)
+        /* Error occurred */
+ if (EVP_PKEY_derive_init(ctx) <= 0)
+        /* Error */
+ if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(ctx, peerkey) <= 0)
+        /* Error */
+
+ /* Determine buffer length */
+ if (EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, NULL, &skeylen) <= 0)
+        /* Error */
+
+ skey = OPENSSL_malloc(skeylen);
+
+ if (!skey)
+        /* malloc failure */
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, skey, &skeylen) <= 0)
+        /* Error */
+
+ /* Shared secret is skey bytes written to buffer skey */
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_encrypt(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_decrypt(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_sign(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_verify(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(3)>,
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+These functions were first added to OpenSSL 1.0.0.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_encrypt.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_encrypt.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..01336e1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_encrypt.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init, EVP_PKEY_encrypt - encrypt using a public key algorithm
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+ int EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);
+ int EVP_PKEY_encrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                        unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
+                        const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init() function initializes a public key algorithm
+context using key B<pkey> for an encryption operation.
+
+The EVP_PKEY_encrypt() function performs a public key encryption operation
+using B<ctx>. The data to be encrypted is specified using the B<in> and
+B<inlen> parameters. If B<out> is B<NULL> then the maximum size of the output
+buffer is written to the B<outlen> parameter. If B<out> is not B<NULL> then
+before the call the B<outlen> parameter should contain the length of the
+B<out> buffer, if the call is successful the encrypted data is written to
+B<out> and the amount of data written to B<outlen>.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+After the call to EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init() algorithm specific control
+operations can be performed to set any appropriate parameters for the
+operation.
+
+The function EVP_PKEY_encrypt() can be called more than once on the same
+context if several operations are performed using the same parameters.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init() and EVP_PKEY_encrypt() return 1 for success and 0
+or a negative value for failure. In particular a return value of -2
+indicates the operation is not supported by the public key algorithm.
+
+=head1 EXAMPLE
+
+Encrypt data using OAEP (for RSA keys). See also L<PEM_read_PUBKEY(3)> or
+L<d2i_X509(3)> for means to load a public key. You may also simply
+set 'eng = NULL;' to start with the default OpenSSL RSA implementation:
+
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include <openssl/rsa.h>
+ #include <openssl/engine.h>
+
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx;
+ ENGINE *eng;
+ unsigned char *out, *in;
+ size_t outlen, inlen;
+ EVP_PKEY *key;
+ /* NB: assumes eng, key, in, inlen are already set up,
+  * and that key is an RSA public key
+  */
+ ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(key, eng);
+ if (!ctx)
+        /* Error occurred */
+ if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(ctx) <= 0)
+        /* Error */
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, RSA_OAEP_PADDING) <= 0)
+        /* Error */
+
+ /* Determine buffer length */
+ if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(ctx, NULL, &outlen, in, inlen) <= 0)
+        /* Error */
+
+ out = OPENSSL_malloc(outlen);
+
+ if (!out)
+        /* malloc failure */
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(ctx, out, &outlen, in, inlen) <= 0)
+        /* Error */
+
+ /* Encrypted data is outlen bytes written to buffer out */
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<d2i_X509(3)>,
+L<engine(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_decrypt(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_sign(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_verify(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_derive(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+These functions were first added to OpenSSL 1.0.0.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3dce5c5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid - get default signature digest
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ int EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int *pnid);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid() function sets B<pnid> to the default
+message digest NID for the public key signature operations associated with key
+B<pkey>.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+For all current standard OpenSSL public key algorithms SHA1 is returned.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+The EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid() function returns 1 if the message digest
+is advisory (that is other digests can be used) and 2 if it is mandatory (other
+digests can not be used).  It returns 0 or a negative value for failure. In
+particular a return value of -2 indicates the operation is not supported by the
+public key algorithm.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_sign(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_verify(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(3)>,
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+This function was first added to OpenSSL 1.0.0.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_keygen.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_keygen.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b1e708f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_keygen.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,175 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+EVP_PKEY_keygen_init, EVP_PKEY_keygen, EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init,
+EVP_PKEY_paramgen, EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_cb, EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_cb,
+EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_keygen_info, EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_app_data,
+EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_app_data,
+EVP_PKEY_gen_cb
+- key and parameter generation functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+ int EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);
+ int EVP_PKEY_keygen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY **ppkey);
+ int EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);
+ int EVP_PKEY_paramgen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY **ppkey);
+
+ typedef int EVP_PKEY_gen_cb(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);
+
+ void EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_cb(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_gen_cb *cb);
+ EVP_PKEY_gen_cb *EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_cb(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);
+
+ int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_keygen_info(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int idx);
+
+ void EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_app_data(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, void *data);
+ void *EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_app_data(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The EVP_PKEY_keygen_init() function initializes a public key algorithm
+context using key B<pkey> for a key generation operation.
+
+The EVP_PKEY_keygen() function performs a key generation operation, the
+generated key is written to B<ppkey>.
+
+The functions EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init() and EVP_PKEY_paramgen() are similar
+except parameters are generated.
+
+The function EVP_PKEY_set_cb() sets the key or parameter generation callback
+to B<cb>. The function EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_cb() returns the key or parameter
+generation callback.
+
+The function EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_keygen_info() returns parameters associated
+with the generation operation. If B<idx> is -1 the total number of
+parameters available is returned. Any non negative value returns the value of
+that parameter. EVP_PKEY_CTX_gen_keygen_info() with a non-negative value for
+B<idx> should only be called within the generation callback.
+
+If the callback returns 0 then the key generation operation is aborted and an
+error occurs. This might occur during a time consuming operation where
+a user clicks on a "cancel" button.
+
+The functions EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_app_data() and EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_app_data() set
+and retrieve an opaque pointer. This can be used to set some application
+defined value which can be retrieved in the callback: for example a handle
+which is used to update a "progress dialog".
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+After the call to EVP_PKEY_keygen_init() or EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init() algorithm
+specific control operations can be performed to set any appropriate parameters
+for the operation.
+
+The functions EVP_PKEY_keygen() and EVP_PKEY_paramgen() can be called more than
+once on the same context if several operations are performed using the same
+parameters.
+
+The meaning of the parameters passed to the callback will depend on the
+algorithm and the specific implementation of the algorithm. Some might not
+give any useful information at all during key or parameter generation. Others
+might not even call the callback.
+
+The operation performed by key or parameter generation depends on the algorithm
+used. In some cases (e.g. EC with a supplied named curve) the "generation"
+option merely sets the appropriate fields in an EVP_PKEY structure.
+
+In OpenSSL an EVP_PKEY structure containing a private key also contains the
+public key components and parameters (if any). An OpenSSL private key is
+equivalent to what some libraries call a "key pair". A private key can be used
+in functions which require the use of a public key or parameters.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(), EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(), EVP_PKEY_keygen() and
+EVP_PKEY_paramgen() return 1 for success and 0 or a negative value for failure.
+In particular a return value of -2 indicates the operation is not supported by
+the public key algorithm.
+
+=head1 EXAMPLES
+
+Generate a 2048 bit RSA key:
+
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include <openssl/rsa.h>
+
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_RSA, NULL);
+ if (!ctx)
+        /* Error occurred */
+ if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(ctx) <= 0)
+        /* Error */
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_bits(ctx, 2048) <= 0)
+        /* Error */
+
+ /* Generate key */
+ if (EVP_PKEY_keygen(ctx, &pkey) <= 0)
+        /* Error */
+
+Generate a key from a set of parameters:
+
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include <openssl/rsa.h>
+
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL, *param;
+ /* Assumed param is set up already */
+ ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(param);
+ if (!ctx)
+        /* Error occurred */
+ if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(ctx) <= 0)
+        /* Error */
+
+ /* Generate key */
+ if (EVP_PKEY_keygen(ctx, &pkey) <= 0)
+        /* Error */
+
+Example of generation callback for OpenSSL public key implementations:
+
+ /* Application data is a BIO to output status to */
+
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, status_bio);
+
+ static int genpkey_cb(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
+        {
+        char c = '*';
+        BIO *b = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_app_data(ctx);
+        int p;
+        p = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_keygen_info(ctx, 0);
+        if (p == 0) c = '.';
+        if (p == 1) c = '+';
+        if (p == 2) c = '*';
+        if (p == 3) c = '\n';
+        BIO_write(b, &c, 1);
+        (void)BIO_flush(b);
+        return 1;
+        }
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_encrypt(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_decrypt(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_sign(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_verify(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_derive(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+These functions were first added to OpenSSL 1.0.0.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_new.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_new.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..956d699
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_new.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+EVP_PKEY_new, EVP_PKEY_up_ref, EVP_PKEY_free - private key allocation functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+ EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKEY_new(void);
+ int EVP_PKEY_up_ref(EVP_PKEY *key);
+ void EVP_PKEY_free(EVP_PKEY *key);
+
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The EVP_PKEY_new() function allocates an empty B<EVP_PKEY> structure which is
+used by OpenSSL to store private keys. The reference count is set to B<1>.
+
+EVP_PKEY_up_ref() increments the reference count of B<key>.
+
+EVP_PKEY_free() decrements the reference count of B<key> and, if the reference
+count is zero, frees it up. If B<key> is NULL, nothing is done.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The B<EVP_PKEY> structure is used by various OpenSSL functions which require a
+general private key without reference to any particular algorithm.
+
+The structure returned by EVP_PKEY_new() is empty. To add a private key to this
+empty structure the functions described in L<EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(3)> should be
+used.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+EVP_PKEY_new() returns either the newly allocated B<EVP_PKEY> structure or
+B<NULL> if an error occurred.
+
+EVP_PKEY_up_ref() returns 1 for success and 0 for failure.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+EVP_PKEY_new() and EVP_PKEY_free() exist in all versions of OpenSSL.
+
+EVP_PKEY_up_ref() was first added to OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_print_private.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_print_private.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9f1d324
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_print_private.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+EVP_PKEY_print_public, EVP_PKEY_print_private, EVP_PKEY_print_params - public key algorithm printing routines
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+ int EVP_PKEY_print_public(BIO *out, const EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+                                int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx);
+ int EVP_PKEY_print_private(BIO *out, const EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+                                int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx);
+ int EVP_PKEY_print_params(BIO *out, const EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+                                int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The functions EVP_PKEY_print_public(), EVP_PKEY_print_private() and
+EVP_PKEY_print_params() print out the public, private or parameter components
+of key B<pkey> respectively. The key is sent to BIO B<out> in human readable
+form. The parameter B<indent> indicated how far the printout should be indented.
+
+The B<pctx> parameter allows the print output to be finely tuned by using
+ASN1 printing options. If B<pctx> is set to NULL then default values will
+be used.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+Currently no public key algorithms include any options in the B<pctx> parameter
+parameter.
+
+If the key does not include all the components indicated by the function then
+only those contained in the key will be printed. For example passing a public
+key to EVP_PKEY_print_private() will only print the public components.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+These functions all return 1 for success and 0 or a negative value for failure.
+In particular a return value of -2 indicates the operation is not supported by
+the public key algorithm.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_keygen(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+These functions were first added to OpenSSL 1.0.0.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..884cf91
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA, EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA, EVP_PKEY_set1_DH, EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY,
+EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA, EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA, EVP_PKEY_get1_DH, EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY,
+EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA, EVP_PKEY_get0_DSA, EVP_PKEY_get0_DH, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY,
+EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA, EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA, EVP_PKEY_assign_DH,
+EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY, EVP_PKEY_get0_hmac, EVP_PKEY_type, EVP_PKEY_id,
+EVP_PKEY_base_id, EVP_PKEY_set1_engine - EVP_PKEY assignment functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+ int EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey, RSA *key);
+ int EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey, DSA *key);
+ int EVP_PKEY_set1_DH(EVP_PKEY *pkey, DH *key);
+ int EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(EVP_PKEY *pkey, EC_KEY *key);
+
+ RSA *EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+ DSA *EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+ DH *EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+ EC_KEY *EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+
+ const unsigned char *EVP_PKEY_get0_hmac(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, size_t *len);
+ RSA *EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+ DSA *EVP_PKEY_get0_DSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+ DH *EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+ EC_KEY *EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+
+ int EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey, RSA *key);
+ int EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey, DSA *key);
+ int EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(EVP_PKEY *pkey, DH *key);
+ int EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY(EVP_PKEY *pkey, EC_KEY *key);
+
+ int EVP_PKEY_id(const EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+ int EVP_PKEY_base_id(const EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+ int EVP_PKEY_type(int type);
+
+ int EVP_PKEY_set1_engine(EVP_PKEY *pkey, ENGINE *engine);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(), EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(), EVP_PKEY_set1_DH() and
+EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY() set the key referenced by B<pkey> to B<key>.
+
+EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(), EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA(), EVP_PKEY_get1_DH() and
+EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY() return the referenced key in B<pkey> or
+B<NULL> if the key is not of the correct type.
+
+EVP_PKEY_get0_hmac(), EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(), EVP_PKEY_get0_DSA(),
+EVP_PKEY_get0_DH() and EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY() also return the
+referenced key in B<pkey> or B<NULL> if the key is not of the
+correct type but the reference count of the returned key is
+B<not> incremented and so must not be freed up after use.
+
+EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(), EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(), EVP_PKEY_assign_DH()
+and EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY() also set the referenced key to B<key>
+however these use the supplied B<key> internally and so B<key>
+will be freed when the parent B<pkey> is freed.
+
+EVP_PKEY_base_id() returns the type of B<pkey>. For example
+an RSA key will return B<EVP_PKEY_RSA>.
+
+EVP_PKEY_id() returns the actual OID associated with B<pkey>. Historically keys
+using the same algorithm could use different OIDs. For example an RSA key could
+use the OIDs corresponding to the NIDs B<NID_rsaEncryption> (equivalent to
+B<EVP_PKEY_RSA>) or B<NID_rsa> (equivalent to B<EVP_PKEY_RSA2>). The use of
+alternative non-standard OIDs is now rare so B<EVP_PKEY_RSA2> et al are not
+often seen in practice.
+
+EVP_PKEY_type() returns the underlying type of the NID B<type>. For example
+EVP_PKEY_type(EVP_PKEY_RSA2) will return B<EVP_PKEY_RSA>.
+
+EVP_PKEY_set1_engine() sets the ENGINE handling B<pkey> to B<engine>. It
+must be called after the key algorithm and components are set up.
+If B<engine> does not include an B<EVP_PKEY_METHOD> for B<pkey> an
+error occurs.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+In accordance with the OpenSSL naming convention the key obtained
+from or assigned to the B<pkey> using the B<1> functions must be
+freed as well as B<pkey>.
+
+EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(), EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(), EVP_PKEY_assign_DH()
+and EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY() are implemented as macros.
+
+Most applications wishing to know a key type will simply call
+EVP_PKEY_base_id() and will not care about the actual type:
+which will be identical in almost all cases.
+
+Previous versions of this document suggested using EVP_PKEY_type(pkey->type)
+to determine the type of a key. Since B<EVP_PKEY> is now opaque this
+is no longer possible: the equivalent is EVP_PKEY_base_id(pkey).
+
+EVP_PKEY_set1_engine() is typically used by an ENGINE returning an HSM
+key as part of its routine to load a private key.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(), EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(), EVP_PKEY_set1_DH() and
+EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY() return 1 for success or 0 for failure.
+
+EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(), EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA(), EVP_PKEY_get1_DH() and
+EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY() return the referenced key or B<NULL> if
+an error occurred.
+
+EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(), EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(), EVP_PKEY_assign_DH()
+and EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY() return 1 for success and 0 for failure.
+
+EVP_PKEY_base_id(), EVP_PKEY_id() and EVP_PKEY_type() return a key
+type or B<NID_undef> (equivalently B<EVP_PKEY_NONE>) on error.
+
+EVP_PKEY_set1_engine() returns 1 for success and 0 for failure.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<EVP_PKEY_new(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_sign.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_sign.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9b3c8d4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_sign.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+EVP_PKEY_sign_init, EVP_PKEY_sign - sign using a public key algorithm
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+ int EVP_PKEY_sign_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);
+ int EVP_PKEY_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                        unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen,
+                        const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The EVP_PKEY_sign_init() function initializes a public key algorithm
+context using key B<pkey> for a signing operation.
+
+The EVP_PKEY_sign() function performs a public key signing operation
+using B<ctx>. The data to be signed is specified using the B<tbs> and
+B<tbslen> parameters. If B<sig> is B<NULL> then the maximum size of the output
+buffer is written to the B<siglen> parameter. If B<sig> is not B<NULL> then
+before the call the B<siglen> parameter should contain the length of the
+B<sig> buffer, if the call is successful the signature is written to
+B<sig> and the amount of data written to B<siglen>.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+EVP_PKEY_sign() does not hash the data to be signed, and therefore is
+normally used to sign digests. For signing arbitrary messages, see the
+L<EVP_DigestSignInit(3)> and
+L<EVP_SignInit(3)> signing interfaces instead.
+
+After the call to EVP_PKEY_sign_init() algorithm specific control
+operations can be performed to set any appropriate parameters for the
+operation (see L<EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(3)>).
+
+The function EVP_PKEY_sign() can be called more than once on the same
+context if several operations are performed using the same parameters.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+EVP_PKEY_sign_init() and EVP_PKEY_sign() return 1 for success and 0
+or a negative value for failure. In particular a return value of -2
+indicates the operation is not supported by the public key algorithm.
+
+=head1 EXAMPLE
+
+Sign data using RSA with PKCS#1 padding and SHA256 digest:
+
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include <openssl/rsa.h>
+
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx;
+ /* md is a SHA-256 digest in this example. */
+ unsigned char *md, *sig;
+ size_t mdlen = 32, siglen;
+ EVP_PKEY *signing_key;
+
+ /*
+  * NB: assumes signing_key and md are set up before the next
+  * step. signing_key must be an RSA private key and md must
+  * point to the SHA-256 digest to be signed.
+  */
+ ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(signing_key, NULL /* no engine */);
+ if (!ctx)
+        /* Error occurred */
+ if (EVP_PKEY_sign_init(ctx) <= 0)
+        /* Error */
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) <= 0)
+        /* Error */
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(ctx, EVP_sha256()) <= 0)
+        /* Error */
+
+ /* Determine buffer length */
+ if (EVP_PKEY_sign(ctx, NULL, &siglen, md, mdlen) <= 0)
+        /* Error */
+
+ sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen);
+
+ if (!sig)
+        /* malloc failure */
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_sign(ctx, sig, &siglen, md, mdlen) <= 0)
+        /* Error */
+
+ /* Signature is siglen bytes written to buffer sig */
+
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_encrypt(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_decrypt(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_verify(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_derive(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+These functions were first added to OpenSSL 1.0.0.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_verify.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_verify.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e84f880
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_verify.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+EVP_PKEY_verify_init, EVP_PKEY_verify - signature verification using a public key algorithm
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+ int EVP_PKEY_verify_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);
+ int EVP_PKEY_verify(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                        const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen,
+                        const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The EVP_PKEY_verify_init() function initializes a public key algorithm
+context using key B<pkey> for a signature verification operation.
+
+The EVP_PKEY_verify() function performs a public key verification operation
+using B<ctx>. The signature is specified using the B<sig> and
+B<siglen> parameters. The verified data (i.e. the data believed originally
+signed) is specified using the B<tbs> and B<tbslen> parameters.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+After the call to EVP_PKEY_verify_init() algorithm specific control
+operations can be performed to set any appropriate parameters for the
+operation.
+
+The function EVP_PKEY_verify() can be called more than once on the same
+context if several operations are performed using the same parameters.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+EVP_PKEY_verify_init() and EVP_PKEY_verify() return 1 if the verification was
+successful and 0 if it failed. Unlike other functions the return value 0 from
+EVP_PKEY_verify() only indicates that the signature did not not verify
+successfully (that is tbs did not match the original data or the signature was
+of invalid form) it is not an indication of a more serious error.
+
+A negative value indicates an error other that signature verification failure.
+In particular a return value of -2 indicates the operation is not supported by
+the public key algorithm.
+
+=head1 EXAMPLE
+
+Verify signature using PKCS#1 and SHA256 digest:
+
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include <openssl/rsa.h>
+
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx;
+ unsigned char *md, *sig;
+ size_t mdlen, siglen;
+ EVP_PKEY *verify_key;
+ /* NB: assumes verify_key, sig, siglen md and mdlen are already set up
+  * and that verify_key is an RSA public key
+  */
+ ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(verify_key);
+ if (!ctx)
+        /* Error occurred */
+ if (EVP_PKEY_verify_init(ctx) <= 0)
+        /* Error */
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) <= 0)
+        /* Error */
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(ctx, EVP_sha256()) <= 0)
+        /* Error */
+
+ /* Perform operation */
+ ret = EVP_PKEY_verify(ctx, sig, siglen, md, mdlen);
+
+ /* ret == 1 indicates success, 0 verify failure and < 0 for some
+  * other error.
+  */
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_encrypt(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_decrypt(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_sign(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_derive(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+These functions were first added to OpenSSL 1.0.0.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_verify_recover.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_verify_recover.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..837bc64
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_verify_recover.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init, EVP_PKEY_verify_recover - recover signature using a public key algorithm
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+ int EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);
+ int EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                        unsigned char *rout, size_t *routlen,
+                        const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init() function initializes a public key algorithm
+context using key B<pkey> for a verify recover operation.
+
+The EVP_PKEY_verify_recover() function recovers signed data
+using B<ctx>. The signature is specified using the B<sig> and
+B<siglen> parameters. If B<rout> is B<NULL> then the maximum size of the output
+buffer is written to the B<routlen> parameter. If B<rout> is not B<NULL> then
+before the call the B<routlen> parameter should contain the length of the
+B<rout> buffer, if the call is successful recovered data is written to
+B<rout> and the amount of data written to B<routlen>.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+Normally an application is only interested in whether a signature verification
+operation is successful in those cases the EVP_verify() function should be
+used.
+
+Sometimes however it is useful to obtain the data originally signed using a
+signing operation. Only certain public key algorithms can recover a signature
+in this way (for example RSA in PKCS padding mode).
+
+After the call to EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init() algorithm specific control
+operations can be performed to set any appropriate parameters for the
+operation.
+
+The function EVP_PKEY_verify_recover() can be called more than once on the same
+context if several operations are performed using the same parameters.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init() and EVP_PKEY_verify_recover() return 1 for success
+and 0 or a negative value for failure. In particular a return value of -2
+indicates the operation is not supported by the public key algorithm.
+
+=head1 EXAMPLE
+
+Recover digest originally signed using PKCS#1 and SHA256 digest:
+
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include <openssl/rsa.h>
+
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx;
+ unsigned char *rout, *sig;
+ size_t routlen, siglen;
+ EVP_PKEY *verify_key;
+ /* NB: assumes verify_key, sig and siglen are already set up
+  * and that verify_key is an RSA public key
+  */
+ ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(verify_key);
+ if (!ctx)
+        /* Error occurred */
+ if (EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init(ctx) <= 0)
+        /* Error */
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) <= 0)
+        /* Error */
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(ctx, EVP_sha256()) <= 0)
+        /* Error */
+
+ /* Determine buffer length */
+ if (EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(ctx, NULL, &routlen, sig, siglen) <= 0)
+        /* Error */
+
+ rout = OPENSSL_malloc(routlen);
+
+ if (!rout)
+        /* malloc failure */
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(ctx, rout, &routlen, sig, siglen) <= 0)
+        /* Error */
+
+ /* Recovered data is routlen bytes written to buffer rout */
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_encrypt(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_decrypt(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_sign(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_verify(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_derive(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+These functions were first added to OpenSSL 1.0.0.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2013-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_SealInit.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_SealInit.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..30bd680
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_SealInit.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+EVP_SealInit, EVP_SealUpdate, EVP_SealFinal - EVP envelope encryption
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+ int EVP_SealInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *type,
+                  unsigned char **ek, int *ekl, unsigned char *iv,
+                  EVP_PKEY **pubk, int npubk);
+ int EVP_SealUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+         int *outl, unsigned char *in, int inl);
+ int EVP_SealFinal(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+         int *outl);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The EVP envelope routines are a high level interface to envelope
+encryption. They generate a random key and IV (if required) then
+"envelope" it by using public key encryption. Data can then be
+encrypted using this key.
+
+EVP_SealInit() initializes a cipher context B<ctx> for encryption
+with cipher B<type> using a random secret key and IV. B<type> is normally
+supplied by a function such as EVP_aes_256_cbc(). The secret key is encrypted
+using one or more public keys, this allows the same encrypted data to be
+decrypted using any of the corresponding private keys. B<ek> is an array of
+buffers where the public key encrypted secret key will be written, each buffer
+must contain enough room for the corresponding encrypted key: that is
+B<ek[i]> must have room for B<EVP_PKEY_size(pubk[i])> bytes. The actual
+size of each encrypted secret key is written to the array B<ekl>. B<pubk> is
+an array of B<npubk> public keys.
+
+The B<iv> parameter is a buffer where the generated IV is written to. It must
+contain enough room for the corresponding cipher's IV, as determined by (for
+example) EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(type).
+
+If the cipher does not require an IV then the B<iv> parameter is ignored
+and can be B<NULL>.
+
+EVP_SealUpdate() and EVP_SealFinal() have exactly the same properties
+as the EVP_EncryptUpdate() and EVP_EncryptFinal() routines, as
+documented on the L<EVP_EncryptInit(3)> manual
+page.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+EVP_SealInit() returns 0 on error or B<npubk> if successful.
+
+EVP_SealUpdate() and EVP_SealFinal() return 1 for success and 0 for
+failure.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+Because a random secret key is generated the random number generator
+must be seeded before calling EVP_SealInit().
+
+The public key must be RSA because it is the only OpenSSL public key
+algorithm that supports key transport.
+
+Envelope encryption is the usual method of using public key encryption
+on large amounts of data, this is because public key encryption is slow
+but symmetric encryption is fast. So symmetric encryption is used for
+bulk encryption and the small random symmetric key used is transferred
+using public key encryption.
+
+It is possible to call EVP_SealInit() twice in the same way as
+EVP_EncryptInit(). The first call should have B<npubk> set to 0
+and (after setting any cipher parameters) it should be called again
+with B<type> set to NULL.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<evp(3)>, L<rand(3)>,
+L<EVP_EncryptInit(3)>,
+L<EVP_OpenInit(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_SignInit.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_SignInit.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..21eb868
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_SignInit.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+EVP_PKEY_size,
+EVP_SignInit, EVP_SignInit_ex, EVP_SignUpdate, EVP_SignFinal - EVP signing
+functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+ int EVP_SignInit_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *type, ENGINE *impl);
+ int EVP_SignUpdate(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *d, unsigned int cnt);
+ int EVP_SignFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, unsigned int *s, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+
+ void EVP_SignInit(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *type);
+
+ int EVP_PKEY_size(EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The EVP signature routines are a high level interface to digital
+signatures.
+
+EVP_SignInit_ex() sets up signing context B<ctx> to use digest
+B<type> from ENGINE B<impl>. B<ctx> must be created with
+EVP_MD_CTX_new() before calling this function.
+
+EVP_SignUpdate() hashes B<cnt> bytes of data at B<d> into the
+signature context B<ctx>. This function can be called several times on the
+same B<ctx> to include additional data.
+
+EVP_SignFinal() signs the data in B<ctx> using the private key B<pkey> and
+places the signature in B<sig>. B<sig> must be at least EVP_PKEY_size(pkey)
+bytes in size. B<s> is an OUT parameter, and not used as an IN parameter.
+The number of bytes of data written (i.e. the length of the signature)
+will be written to the integer at B<s>, at most EVP_PKEY_size(pkey) bytes
+will be written.
+
+EVP_SignInit() initializes a signing context B<ctx> to use the default
+implementation of digest B<type>.
+
+EVP_PKEY_size() returns the maximum size of a signature in bytes. The actual
+signature returned by EVP_SignFinal() may be smaller.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+EVP_SignInit_ex(), EVP_SignUpdate() and EVP_SignFinal() return 1
+for success and 0 for failure.
+
+EVP_PKEY_size() returns the maximum size of a signature in bytes.
+
+The error codes can be obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)>.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The B<EVP> interface to digital signatures should almost always be used in
+preference to the low level interfaces. This is because the code then becomes
+transparent to the algorithm used and much more flexible.
+
+When signing with DSA private keys the random number generator must be seeded
+or the operation will fail. The random number generator does not need to be
+seeded for RSA signatures.
+
+The call to EVP_SignFinal() internally finalizes a copy of the digest context.
+This means that calls to EVP_SignUpdate() and EVP_SignFinal() can be called
+later to digest and sign additional data.
+
+Since only a copy of the digest context is ever finalized the context must
+be cleaned up after use by calling EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup() or a memory leak
+will occur.
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+Older versions of this documentation wrongly stated that calls to
+EVP_SignUpdate() could not be made after calling EVP_SignFinal().
+
+Since the private key is passed in the call to EVP_SignFinal() any error
+relating to the private key (for example an unsuitable key and digest
+combination) will not be indicated until after potentially large amounts of
+data have been passed through EVP_SignUpdate().
+
+It is not possible to change the signing parameters using these function.
+
+The previous two bugs are fixed in the newer EVP_SignDigest*() function.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<EVP_VerifyInit(3)>,
+L<EVP_DigestInit(3)>,
+L<evp(7)>, L<HMAC(3)>, L<MD2(3)>,
+L<MD5(3)>, L<MDC2(3)>, L<RIPEMD160(3)>,
+L<SHA1(3)>, L<dgst(1)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_VerifyInit.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_VerifyInit.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9214609
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/EVP_VerifyInit.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+EVP_VerifyInit_ex,
+EVP_VerifyInit, EVP_VerifyUpdate, EVP_VerifyFinal
+- EVP signature verification functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+ int EVP_VerifyInit_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *type, ENGINE *impl);
+ int EVP_VerifyUpdate(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *d, unsigned int cnt);
+ int EVP_VerifyFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+
+ int EVP_VerifyInit(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *type);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The EVP signature verification routines are a high level interface to digital
+signatures.
+
+EVP_VerifyInit_ex() sets up verification context B<ctx> to use digest
+B<type> from ENGINE B<impl>. B<ctx> must be created by calling
+EVP_MD_CTX_new() before calling this function.
+
+EVP_VerifyUpdate() hashes B<cnt> bytes of data at B<d> into the
+verification context B<ctx>. This function can be called several times on the
+same B<ctx> to include additional data.
+
+EVP_VerifyFinal() verifies the data in B<ctx> using the public key B<pkey>
+and against the B<siglen> bytes at B<sigbuf>.
+
+EVP_VerifyInit() initializes verification context B<ctx> to use the default
+implementation of digest B<type>.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+EVP_VerifyInit_ex() and EVP_VerifyUpdate() return 1 for success and 0 for
+failure.
+
+EVP_VerifyFinal() returns 1 for a correct signature, 0 for failure and -1 if some
+other error occurred.
+
+The error codes can be obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)>.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The B<EVP> interface to digital signatures should almost always be used in
+preference to the low level interfaces. This is because the code then becomes
+transparent to the algorithm used and much more flexible.
+
+The call to EVP_VerifyFinal() internally finalizes a copy of the digest context.
+This means that calls to EVP_VerifyUpdate() and EVP_VerifyFinal() can be called
+later to digest and verify additional data.
+
+Since only a copy of the digest context is ever finalized the context must
+be cleaned up after use by calling EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup() or a memory leak
+will occur.
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+Older versions of this documentation wrongly stated that calls to
+EVP_VerifyUpdate() could not be made after calling EVP_VerifyFinal().
+
+Since the public key is passed in the call to EVP_SignFinal() any error
+relating to the private key (for example an unsuitable key and digest
+combination) will not be indicated until after potentially large amounts of
+data have been passed through EVP_SignUpdate().
+
+It is not possible to change the signing parameters using these function.
+
+The previous two bugs are fixed in the newer EVP_VerifyDigest*() function.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<evp(7)>,
+L<EVP_SignInit(3)>,
+L<EVP_DigestInit(3)>,
+L<evp(7)>, L<HMAC(3)>, L<MD2(3)>,
+L<MD5(3)>, L<MDC2(3)>, L<RIPEMD160(3)>,
+L<SHA1(3)>, L<dgst(1)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/HMAC.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/HMAC.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..219c9ba
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/HMAC.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+HMAC,
+HMAC_CTX_new,
+HMAC_CTX_reset,
+HMAC_CTX_free,
+HMAC_Init,
+HMAC_Init_ex,
+HMAC_Update,
+HMAC_Final,
+HMAC_CTX_copy,
+HMAC_CTX_set_flags,
+HMAC_CTX_get_md
+- HMAC message authentication code
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/hmac.h>
+
+ unsigned char *HMAC(const EVP_MD *evp_md, const void *key,
+               int key_len, const unsigned char *d, int n,
+               unsigned char *md, unsigned int *md_len);
+
+ HMAC_CTX *HMAC_CTX_new(void);
+ int HMAC_CTX_reset(HMAC_CTX *ctx);
+
+ int HMAC_Init_ex(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const void *key, int key_len,
+                   const EVP_MD *md, ENGINE *impl);
+ int HMAC_Update(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *data, int len);
+ int HMAC_Final(HMAC_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *len);
+
+ void HMAC_CTX_free(HMAC_CTX *ctx);
+
+ int HMAC_CTX_copy(HMAC_CTX *dctx, HMAC_CTX *sctx);
+ void HMAC_CTX_set_flags(HMAC_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags);
+ const EVP_MD *HMAC_CTX_get_md(const HMAC_CTX *ctx);
+
+Deprecated:
+
+ #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+ int HMAC_Init(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const void *key, int key_len,
+               const EVP_MD *md);
+ #endif
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+HMAC is a MAC (message authentication code), i.e. a keyed hash
+function used for message authentication, which is based on a hash
+function.
+
+HMAC() computes the message authentication code of the B<n> bytes at
+B<d> using the hash function B<evp_md> and the key B<key> which is
+B<key_len> bytes long.
+
+It places the result in B<md> (which must have space for the output of
+the hash function, which is no more than B<EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE> bytes).
+If B<md> is NULL, the digest is placed in a static array.  The size of
+the output is placed in B<md_len>, unless it is B<NULL>. Note: passing a NULL
+value for B<md>  to use the static array is not thread safe.
+
+B<evp_md> can be EVP_sha1(), EVP_ripemd160() etc.
+
+HMAC_CTX_new() creates a new HMAC_CTX in heap memory.
+
+HMAC_CTX_reset() zeroes an existing B<HMAC_CTX> and associated
+resources, making it suitable for new computations as if it was newly
+created with HMAC_CTX_new().
+
+HMAC_CTX_free() erases the key and other data from the B<HMAC_CTX>,
+releases any associated resources and finally frees the B<HMAC_CTX>
+itself.
+
+The following functions may be used if the message is not completely
+stored in memory:
+
+HMAC_Init() initializes a B<HMAC_CTX> structure to use the hash
+function B<evp_md> and the key B<key> which is B<key_len> bytes
+long. It is deprecated and only included for backward compatibility
+with OpenSSL 0.9.6b.
+
+HMAC_Init_ex() initializes or reuses a B<HMAC_CTX> structure to use the hash
+function B<evp_md> and key B<key>. If both are NULL (or B<evp_md> is the same
+as the previous digest used by B<ctx> and B<key> is NULL) the existing key is
+reused. B<ctx> must have been created with HMAC_CTX_new() before the first use
+of an B<HMAC_CTX> in this function. B<N.B. HMAC_Init() had this undocumented
+behaviour in previous versions of OpenSSL - failure to switch to HMAC_Init_ex()
+in programs that expect it will cause them to stop working>.
+
+B<NOTE:> If HMAC_Init_ex() is called with B<key> NULL and B<evp_md> is not the
+same as the previous digest used by B<ctx> then an error is returned
+because reuse of an existing key with a different digest is not supported.
+
+HMAC_Update() can be called repeatedly with chunks of the message to
+be authenticated (B<len> bytes at B<data>).
+
+HMAC_Final() places the message authentication code in B<md>, which
+must have space for the hash function output.
+
+HMAC_CTX_copy() copies all of the internal state from B<sctx> into B<dctx>.
+
+HMAC_CTX_set_flags() applies the specified flags to the internal EVP_MD_CTXs.
+These flags have the same meaning as for L<EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(3)>.
+
+HMAC_CTX_get_md() returns the EVP_MD that has previously been set for the
+supplied HMAC_CTX.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+HMAC() returns a pointer to the message authentication code or NULL if
+an error occurred.
+
+HMAC_CTX_new() returns a pointer to a new B<HMAC_CTX> on success or
+B<NULL> if an error occurred.
+
+HMAC_CTX_reset(), HMAC_Init_ex(), HMAC_Update(), HMAC_Final() and
+HMAC_CTX_copy() return 1 for success or 0 if an error occurred.
+
+HMAC_CTX_get_md() return the EVP_MD previously set for the supplied HMAC_CTX or
+NULL if no EVP_MD has been set.
+
+=head1 CONFORMING TO
+
+RFC 2104
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<sha(3)>, L<evp(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+HMAC_CTX_init() was replaced with HMAC_CTX_reset() in OpenSSL versions 1.1.0.
+
+HMAC_CTX_cleanup() existed in OpenSSL versions before 1.1.0.
+
+HMAC_CTX_new(), HMAC_CTX_free() and HMAC_CTX_get_md() are new in OpenSSL version
+1.1.0.
+
+HMAC_Init_ex(), HMAC_Update() and HMAC_Final() did not return values in
+versions of OpenSSL before 1.0.0.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/MD5.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/MD5.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..78da750
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/MD5.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+MD2, MD4, MD5, MD2_Init, MD2_Update, MD2_Final, MD4_Init, MD4_Update,
+MD4_Final, MD5_Init, MD5_Update, MD5_Final - MD2, MD4, and MD5 hash functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/md2.h>
+
+ unsigned char *MD2(const unsigned char *d, unsigned long n,
+                  unsigned char *md);
+
+ int MD2_Init(MD2_CTX *c);
+ int MD2_Update(MD2_CTX *c, const unsigned char *data,
+                  unsigned long len);
+ int MD2_Final(unsigned char *md, MD2_CTX *c);
+
+
+ #include <openssl/md4.h>
+
+ unsigned char *MD4(const unsigned char *d, unsigned long n,
+                  unsigned char *md);
+
+ int MD4_Init(MD4_CTX *c);
+ int MD4_Update(MD4_CTX *c, const void *data,
+                  unsigned long len);
+ int MD4_Final(unsigned char *md, MD4_CTX *c);
+
+
+ #include <openssl/md5.h>
+
+ unsigned char *MD5(const unsigned char *d, unsigned long n,
+                  unsigned char *md);
+
+ int MD5_Init(MD5_CTX *c);
+ int MD5_Update(MD5_CTX *c, const void *data,
+                  unsigned long len);
+ int MD5_Final(unsigned char *md, MD5_CTX *c);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+MD2, MD4, and MD5 are cryptographic hash functions with a 128 bit output.
+
+MD2(), MD4(), and MD5() compute the MD2, MD4, and MD5 message digest
+of the B<n> bytes at B<d> and place it in B<md> (which must have space
+for MD2_DIGEST_LENGTH == MD4_DIGEST_LENGTH == MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH == 16
+bytes of output). If B<md> is NULL, the digest is placed in a static
+array.
+
+The following functions may be used if the message is not completely
+stored in memory:
+
+MD2_Init() initializes a B<MD2_CTX> structure.
+
+MD2_Update() can be called repeatedly with chunks of the message to
+be hashed (B<len> bytes at B<data>).
+
+MD2_Final() places the message digest in B<md>, which must have space
+for MD2_DIGEST_LENGTH == 16 bytes of output, and erases the B<MD2_CTX>.
+
+MD4_Init(), MD4_Update(), MD4_Final(), MD5_Init(), MD5_Update(), and
+MD5_Final() are analogous using an B<MD4_CTX> and B<MD5_CTX> structure.
+
+Applications should use the higher level functions
+L<EVP_DigestInit(3)>
+etc. instead of calling the hash functions directly.
+
+=head1 NOTE
+
+MD2, MD4, and MD5 are recommended only for compatibility with existing
+applications. In new applications, SHA-1 or RIPEMD-160 should be
+preferred.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+MD2(), MD4(), and MD5() return pointers to the hash value.
+
+MD2_Init(), MD2_Update(), MD2_Final(), MD4_Init(), MD4_Update(),
+MD4_Final(), MD5_Init(), MD5_Update(), and MD5_Final() return 1 for
+success, 0 otherwise.
+
+=head1 CONFORMING TO
+
+RFC 1319, RFC 1320, RFC 1321
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<EVP_DigestInit(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/MDC2_Init.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/MDC2_Init.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f7db71b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/MDC2_Init.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+MDC2, MDC2_Init, MDC2_Update, MDC2_Final - MDC2 hash function
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/mdc2.h>
+
+ unsigned char *MDC2(const unsigned char *d, unsigned long n,
+                  unsigned char *md);
+
+ int MDC2_Init(MDC2_CTX *c);
+ int MDC2_Update(MDC2_CTX *c, const unsigned char *data,
+                  unsigned long len);
+ int MDC2_Final(unsigned char *md, MDC2_CTX *c);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+MDC2 is a method to construct hash functions with 128 bit output from
+block ciphers.  These functions are an implementation of MDC2 with
+DES.
+
+MDC2() computes the MDC2 message digest of the B<n>
+bytes at B<d> and places it in B<md> (which must have space for
+MDC2_DIGEST_LENGTH == 16 bytes of output). If B<md> is NULL, the digest
+is placed in a static array.
+
+The following functions may be used if the message is not completely
+stored in memory:
+
+MDC2_Init() initializes a B<MDC2_CTX> structure.
+
+MDC2_Update() can be called repeatedly with chunks of the message to
+be hashed (B<len> bytes at B<data>).
+
+MDC2_Final() places the message digest in B<md>, which must have space
+for MDC2_DIGEST_LENGTH == 16 bytes of output, and erases the B<MDC2_CTX>.
+
+Applications should use the higher level functions
+L<EVP_DigestInit(3)> etc. instead of calling the
+hash functions directly.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+MDC2() returns a pointer to the hash value.
+
+MDC2_Init(), MDC2_Update() and MDC2_Final() return 1 for success, 0 otherwise.
+
+=head1 CONFORMING TO
+
+ISO/IEC 10118-2, with DES
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<EVP_DigestInit(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/OBJ_nid2obj.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/OBJ_nid2obj.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3ada667
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/OBJ_nid2obj.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,198 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+i2t_ASN1_OBJECT,
+OBJ_length, OBJ_get0_data, OBJ_nid2obj, OBJ_nid2ln,
+OBJ_nid2sn, OBJ_obj2nid, OBJ_txt2nid, OBJ_ln2nid, OBJ_sn2nid, OBJ_cmp,
+OBJ_dup, OBJ_txt2obj, OBJ_obj2txt, OBJ_create, OBJ_cleanup
+- ASN1 object utility functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/objects.h>
+
+ ASN1_OBJECT *OBJ_nid2obj(int n);
+ const char *OBJ_nid2ln(int n);
+ const char *OBJ_nid2sn(int n);
+
+ int OBJ_obj2nid(const ASN1_OBJECT *o);
+ int OBJ_ln2nid(const char *ln);
+ int OBJ_sn2nid(const char *sn);
+
+ int OBJ_txt2nid(const char *s);
+
+ ASN1_OBJECT *OBJ_txt2obj(const char *s, int no_name);
+ int OBJ_obj2txt(char *buf, int buf_len, const ASN1_OBJECT *a, int no_name);
+
+ int i2t_ASN1_OBJECT(char *buf, int buf_len, const ASN1_OBJECT *a);
+
+ int OBJ_cmp(const ASN1_OBJECT *a, const ASN1_OBJECT *b);
+ ASN1_OBJECT *OBJ_dup(const ASN1_OBJECT *o);
+
+ int OBJ_create(const char *oid, const char *sn, const char *ln);
+
+ size_t OBJ_length(const ASN1_OBJECT *obj);
+ const unsigned char *OBJ_get0_data(const ASN1_OBJECT *obj);
+
+Deprecated:
+
+ #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+ void OBJ_cleanup(void)
+ #endif
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The ASN1 object utility functions process ASN1_OBJECT structures which are
+a representation of the ASN1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER (OID) type.
+For convenience, OIDs are usually represented in source code as numeric
+identifiers, or B<NID>s.  OpenSSL has an internal table of OIDs that
+are generated when the library is built, and their corresponding NIDs
+are available as defined constants.  For the functions below, application
+code should treat all returned values -- OIDs, NIDs, or names -- as
+constants.
+
+OBJ_nid2obj(), OBJ_nid2ln() and OBJ_nid2sn() convert the NID B<n> to
+an ASN1_OBJECT structure, its long name and its short name respectively,
+or B<NULL> is an error occurred.
+
+OBJ_obj2nid(), OBJ_ln2nid(), OBJ_sn2nid() return the corresponding NID
+for the object B<o>, the long name <ln> or the short name <sn> respectively
+or NID_undef if an error occurred.
+
+OBJ_txt2nid() returns NID corresponding to text string <s>. B<s> can be
+a long name, a short name or the numerical representation of an object.
+
+OBJ_txt2obj() converts the text string B<s> into an ASN1_OBJECT structure.
+If B<no_name> is 0 then long names and short names will be interpreted
+as well as numerical forms. If B<no_name> is 1 only the numerical form
+is acceptable.
+
+OBJ_obj2txt() converts the B<ASN1_OBJECT> B<a> into a textual representation.
+The representation is written as a null terminated string to B<buf>
+at most B<buf_len> bytes are written, truncating the result if necessary.
+The total amount of space required is returned. If B<no_name> is 0 then
+if the object has a long or short name then that will be used, otherwise
+the numerical form will be used. If B<no_name> is 1 then the numerical
+form will always be used.
+
+i2t_ASN1_OBJECT() is the same as OBJ_obj2txt() with the B<no_name> set to zero.
+
+OBJ_cmp() compares B<a> to B<b>. If the two are identical 0 is returned.
+
+OBJ_dup() returns a copy of B<o>.
+
+OBJ_create() adds a new object to the internal table. B<oid> is the
+numerical form of the object, B<sn> the short name and B<ln> the
+long name. A new NID is returned for the created object.
+
+OBJ_length() returns the size of the content octets of B<obj>.
+
+OBJ_get0_data() returns a pointer to the content octets of B<obj>.
+The returned pointer is an internal pointer which B<must not> be freed.
+
+In OpenSSL versions prior to 1.1.0 OBJ_cleanup() cleaned up OpenSSLs internal
+object table and was called before an application exits if any new objects were
+added using OBJ_create(). This function is deprecated in version 1.1.0 and now
+does nothing if called. No explicit de-initialisation is now required. See
+L<OPENSSL_init_crypto(3)> for further information.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+Objects in OpenSSL can have a short name, a long name and a numerical
+identifier (NID) associated with them. A standard set of objects is
+represented in an internal table. The appropriate values are defined
+in the header file B<objects.h>.
+
+For example the OID for commonName has the following definitions:
+
+ #define SN_commonName                   "CN"
+ #define LN_commonName                   "commonName"
+ #define NID_commonName                  13
+
+New objects can be added by calling OBJ_create().
+
+Table objects have certain advantages over other objects: for example
+their NIDs can be used in a C language switch statement. They are
+also static constant structures which are shared: that is there
+is only a single constant structure for each table object.
+
+Objects which are not in the table have the NID value NID_undef.
+
+Objects do not need to be in the internal tables to be processed,
+the functions OBJ_txt2obj() and OBJ_obj2txt() can process the numerical
+form of an OID.
+
+Some objects are used to represent algorithms which do not have a
+corresponding ASN.1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER encoding (for example no OID currently
+exists for a particular algorithm). As a result they B<cannot> be encoded or
+decoded as part of ASN.1 structures. Applications can determine if there
+is a corresponding OBJECT IDENTIFIER by checking OBJ_length() is not zero.
+
+These functions cannot return B<const> because an B<ASN1_OBJECT> can
+represent both an internal, constant, OID and a dynamically-created one.
+The latter cannot be constant because it needs to be freed after use.
+
+=head1 EXAMPLES
+
+Create an object for B<commonName>:
+
+ ASN1_OBJECT *o;
+ o = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_commonName);
+
+Check if an object is B<commonName>
+
+ if (OBJ_obj2nid(obj) == NID_commonName)
+        /* Do something */
+
+Create a new NID and initialize an object from it:
+
+ int new_nid;
+ ASN1_OBJECT *obj;
+
+ new_nid = OBJ_create("1.2.3.4", "NewOID", "New Object Identifier");
+
+ obj = OBJ_nid2obj(new_nid);
+
+Create a new object directly:
+
+ obj = OBJ_txt2obj("1.2.3.4", 1);
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+OBJ_obj2txt() is awkward and messy to use: it doesn't follow the
+convention of other OpenSSL functions where the buffer can be set
+to B<NULL> to determine the amount of data that should be written.
+Instead B<buf> must point to a valid buffer and B<buf_len> should
+be set to a positive value. A buffer length of 80 should be more
+than enough to handle any OID encountered in practice.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+OBJ_nid2obj() returns an B<ASN1_OBJECT> structure or B<NULL> is an
+error occurred.
+
+OBJ_nid2ln() and OBJ_nid2sn() returns a valid string or B<NULL>
+on error.
+
+OBJ_obj2nid(), OBJ_ln2nid(), OBJ_sn2nid() and OBJ_txt2nid() return
+a NID or B<NID_undef> on error.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+OBJ_cleanup() was deprecated in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/OCSP_REQUEST_new.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/OCSP_REQUEST_new.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..97c2337
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/OCSP_REQUEST_new.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+OCSP_REQUEST_new, OCSP_REQUEST_free, OCSP_request_add0_id, OCSP_request_sign,
+OCSP_request_add1_cert, OCSP_request_onereq_count,
+OCSP_request_onereq_get0 - OCSP request functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
+
+ OCSP_REQUEST *OCSP_REQUEST_new(void);
+ void OCSP_REQUEST_free(OCSP_REQUEST *req);
+
+ OCSP_ONEREQ *OCSP_request_add0_id(OCSP_REQUEST *req, OCSP_CERTID *cid);
+
+ int OCSP_request_sign(OCSP_REQUEST *req,
+                       X509 *signer, EVP_PKEY *key, const EVP_MD *dgst,
+                       STACK_OF(X509) *certs, unsigned long flags);
+
+ int OCSP_request_add1_cert(OCSP_REQUEST *req, X509 *cert);
+
+ int OCSP_request_onereq_count(OCSP_REQUEST *req);
+ OCSP_ONEREQ *OCSP_request_onereq_get0(OCSP_REQUEST *req, int i);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+OCSP_REQUEST_new() allocates and returns an empty B<OCSP_REQUEST> structure.
+
+OCSP_REQUEST_free() frees up the request structure B<req>.
+
+OCSP_request_add0_id() adds certificate ID B<cid> to B<req>. It returns
+the B<OCSP_ONEREQ> structure added so an application can add additional
+extensions to the request. The B<id> parameter B<MUST NOT> be freed up after
+the operation.
+
+OCSP_request_sign() signs OCSP request B<req> using certificate
+B<signer>, private key B<key>, digest B<dgst> and additional certificates
+B<certs>. If the B<flags> option B<OCSP_NOCERTS> is set then no certificates
+will be included in the request.
+
+OCSP_request_add1_cert() adds certificate B<cert> to request B<req>. The
+application is responsible for freeing up B<cert> after use.
+
+OCSP_request_onereq_count() returns the total number of B<OCSP_ONEREQ>
+structures in B<req>.
+
+OCSP_request_onereq_get0() returns an internal pointer to the B<OCSP_ONEREQ>
+contained in B<req> of index B<i>. The index value B<i> runs from 0 to
+OCSP_request_onereq_count(req) - 1.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+OCSP_REQUEST_new() returns an empty B<OCSP_REQUEST> structure or B<NULL> if
+an error occurred.
+
+OCSP_request_add0_id() returns the B<OCSP_ONEREQ> structure containing B<cid>
+or B<NULL> if an error occurred.
+
+OCSP_request_sign() and OCSP_request_add1_cert() return 1 for success and 0
+for failure.
+
+OCSP_request_onereq_count() returns the total number of B<OCSP_ONEREQ>
+structures in B<req>.
+
+OCSP_request_onereq_get0() returns a pointer to an B<OCSP_ONEREQ> structure
+or B<NULL> if the index value is out or range.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+An OCSP request structure contains one or more B<OCSP_ONEREQ> structures
+corresponding to each certificate.
+
+OCSP_request_onereq_count() and OCSP_request_onereq_get0() are mainly used by
+OCSP responders.
+
+=head1 EXAMPLE
+
+Create an B<OCSP_REQUEST> structure for certificate B<cert> with issuer
+B<issuer>:
+
+ OCSP_REQUEST *req;
+ OCSP_ID *cid;
+
+ req = OCSP_REQUEST_new();
+ if (req == NULL)
+    /* error */
+ cid = OCSP_cert_to_id(EVP_sha1(), cert, issuer);
+ if (cid == NULL)
+    /* error */
+
+ if (OCSP_REQUEST_add0_id(req, cid) == NULL)
+    /* error */
+
+  /* Do something with req, e.g. query responder */
+
+ OCSP_REQUEST_free(req);
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<crypto(3)>,
+L<OCSP_cert_to_id(3)>,
+L<OCSP_request_add1_nonce(3)>,
+L<OCSP_response_find_status(3)>,
+L<OCSP_response_status(3)>,
+L<OCSP_sendreq_new(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/OCSP_cert_to_id.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/OCSP_cert_to_id.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0e37937
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/OCSP_cert_to_id.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+OCSP_cert_to_id, OCSP_cert_id_new, OCSP_CERTID_free, OCSP_id_issuer_cmp,
+OCSP_id_cmp, OCSP_id_get0_info - OCSP certificate ID utility functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
+
+ OCSP_CERTID *OCSP_cert_to_id(const EVP_MD *dgst,
+                              X509 *subject, X509 *issuer);
+
+ OCSP_CERTID *OCSP_cert_id_new(const EVP_MD *dgst,
+                               X509_NAME *issuerName,
+                               ASN1_BIT_STRING *issuerKey,
+                               ASN1_INTEGER *serialNumber);
+
+ void OCSP_CERTID_free(OCSP_CERTID *id);
+
+ int OCSP_id_issuer_cmp(OCSP_CERTID *a, OCSP_CERTID *b);
+ int OCSP_id_cmp(OCSP_CERTID *a, OCSP_CERTID *b);
+
+ int OCSP_id_get0_info(ASN1_OCTET_STRING **piNameHash, ASN1_OBJECT **pmd,
+                       ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pikeyHash,
+                       ASN1_INTEGER **pserial, OCSP_CERTID *cid);
+
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+OCSP_cert_to_id() creates and returns a new B<OCSP_CERTID> structure using
+message digest B<dgst> for certificate B<subject> with issuer B<issuer>. If
+B<dgst> is B<NULL> then SHA1 is used.
+
+OCSP_cert_id_new() creates and returns a new B<OCSP_CERTID> using B<dgst> and
+issuer name B<issuerName>, issuer key hash B<issuerKey> and serial number
+B<serialNumber>.
+
+OCSP_CERTID_free() frees up B<id>.
+
+OCSP_id_cmp() compares B<OCSP_CERTID> B<a> and B<b>.
+
+OCSP_id_issuer_cmp() compares only the issuer name of B<OCSP_CERTID> B<a> and B<b>.
+
+OCSP_id_get0_info() returns the issuer name hash, hash OID, issuer key hash and
+serial number contained in B<cid>. If any of the values are not required the
+corresponding parameter can be set to B<NULL>.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+OCSP_cert_to_id() and OCSP_cert_id_new() return either a pointer to a valid
+B<OCSP_CERTID> structure or B<NULL> if an error occurred.
+
+OCSP_id_cmp() and OCSP_id_issuer_cmp() returns zero for a match and non-zero
+otherwise.
+
+OCSP_CERTID_free() does not return a value.
+
+OCSP_id_get0_info() returns 1 for success and 0 for failure.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+OCSP clients will typically only use OCSP_cert_to_id() or OCSP_cert_id_new():
+the other functions are used by responder applications.
+
+The values returned by OCSP_id_get0_info() are internal pointers and B<MUST
+NOT> be freed up by an application: they will be freed when the corresponding
+B<OCSP_CERTID> structure is freed.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<crypto(3)>,
+L<OCSP_request_add1_nonce(3)>,
+L<OCSP_REQUEST_new(3)>,
+L<OCSP_response_find_status(3)>,
+L<OCSP_response_status(3)>,
+L<OCSP_sendreq_new(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/OCSP_request_add1_nonce.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/OCSP_request_add1_nonce.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dab42c6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/OCSP_request_add1_nonce.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+OCSP_request_add1_nonce, OCSP_basic_add1_nonce, OCSP_check_nonce, OCSP_copy_nonce - OCSP nonce functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
+
+ int OCSP_request_add1_nonce(OCSP_REQUEST *req, unsigned char *val, int len);
+ int OCSP_basic_add1_nonce(OCSP_BASICRESP *resp, unsigned char *val, int len);
+ int OCSP_copy_nonce(OCSP_BASICRESP *resp, OCSP_REQUEST *req);
+ int OCSP_check_nonce(OCSP_REQUEST *req, OCSP_BASICRESP *resp);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+OCSP_request_add1_nonce() adds a nonce of value B<val> and length B<len> to
+OCSP request B<req>. If B<val> is B<NULL> a random nonce is used. If B<len>
+is zero or negative a default length will be used (currently 16 bytes).
+
+OCSP_basic_add1_nonce() is identical to OCSP_request_add1_nonce() except
+it adds a nonce to OCSP basic response B<resp>.
+
+OCSP_check_nonce() compares the nonce value in B<req> and B<resp>.
+
+OCSP_copy_nonce() copys any nonce value present in B<req> to B<resp>.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+OCSP_request_add1_nonce() and OCSP_basic_add1_nonce() return 1 for success
+and 0 for failure.
+
+OCSP_copy_nonce() returns 1 if a nonce was successfully copied, 2 if no nonce
+was present in B<req> and 0 if an error occurred.
+
+OCSP_check_nonce() returns the result of the nonce comparison between B<req>
+and B<resp>. The return value indicates the result of the comparison.  If
+nonces are present and equal 1 is returned. If the nonces are absent 2 is
+returned. If a nonce is present in the response only 3 is returned. If nonces
+are present and unequal 0 is returned. If the nonce is present in the request
+only then -1 is returned.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+For most purposes the nonce value in a request is set to a random value so
+the B<val> parameter in OCSP_request_add1_nonce() is usually NULL.
+
+An OCSP nonce is typically added to an OCSP request to thwart replay attacks
+by checking the same nonce value appears in the response.
+
+Some responders may include a nonce in all responses even if one is not
+supplied.
+
+Some responders cache OCSP responses and do not sign each response for
+performance reasons. As a result they do not support nonces.
+
+The return values of OCSP_check_nonce() can be checked to cover each case.  A
+positive return value effectively indicates success: nonces are both present
+and match, both absent or present in the response only. A non-zero return
+additionally covers the case where the nonce is present in the request only:
+this will happen if the responder doesn't support nonces. A zero return value
+indicates present and mismatched nonces: this should be treated as an error
+condition.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<crypto(3)>,
+L<OCSP_cert_to_id(3)>,
+L<OCSP_REQUEST_new(3)>,
+L<OCSP_response_find_status(3)>,
+L<OCSP_response_status(3)>,
+L<OCSP_sendreq_new(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/OCSP_resp_find_status.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/OCSP_resp_find_status.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5123f0a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/OCSP_resp_find_status.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+OCSP_resp_get0_certs,
+OCSP_resp_get0_signer,
+OCSP_resp_get0_id,
+OCSP_resp_get0_produced_at,
+OCSP_resp_find_status, OCSP_resp_count, OCSP_resp_get0, OCSP_resp_find,
+OCSP_single_get0_status, OCSP_check_validity
+- OCSP response utility functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
+
+ int OCSP_resp_find_status(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, OCSP_CERTID *id, int *status,
+                           int *reason,
+                           ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **revtime,
+                           ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **thisupd,
+                           ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **nextupd);
+
+ int OCSP_resp_count(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs);
+ OCSP_SINGLERESP *OCSP_resp_get0(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, int idx);
+ int OCSP_resp_find(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, OCSP_CERTID *id, int last);
+ int OCSP_single_get0_status(OCSP_SINGLERESP *single, int *reason,
+                             ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **revtime,
+                             ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **thisupd,
+                             ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **nextupd);
+
+ const ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *OCSP_resp_get0_produced_at(
+                             const OCSP_BASICRESP* single);
+
+ const STACK_OF(X509) *OCSP_resp_get0_certs(const OCSP_BASICRESP *bs);
+
+ int OCSP_resp_get0_signer(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, X509 **signer,
+                           STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs);
+
+ int OCSP_resp_get0_id(const OCSP_BASICRESP *bs,
+                       const ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pid,
+                       const X509_NAME **pname);
+
+ int OCSP_check_validity(ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *thisupd,
+                         ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *nextupd,
+                         long sec, long maxsec);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+OCSP_resp_find_status() searches B<bs> for an OCSP response for B<id>. If it is
+successful the fields of the response are returned in B<*status>, B<*reason>,
+B<*revtime>, B<*thisupd> and B<*nextupd>.  The B<*status> value will be one of
+B<V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_GOOD>, B<V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_REVOKED> or
+B<V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_UNKNOWN>. The B<*reason> and B<*revtime> fields are only
+set if the status is B<V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_REVOKED>. If set the B<*reason> field
+will be set to the revocation reason which will be one of
+B<OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_NOSTATUS>, B<OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_UNSPECIFIED>,
+B<OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_KEYCOMPROMISE>, B<OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_CACOMPROMISE>,
+B<OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_AFFILIATIONCHANGED>, B<OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_SUPERSEDED>,
+B<OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_CESSATIONOFOPERATION>,
+B<OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_CERTIFICATEHOLD> or B<OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_REMOVEFROMCRL>.
+
+OCSP_resp_count() returns the number of B<OCSP_SINGLERESP> structures in B<bs>.
+
+OCSP_resp_get0() returns the B<OCSP_SINGLERESP> structure in B<bs>
+corresponding to index B<idx>. Where B<idx> runs from 0 to
+OCSP_resp_count(bs) - 1.
+
+OCSP_resp_find() searches B<bs> for B<id> and returns the index of the first
+matching entry after B<last> or starting from the beginning if B<last> is -1.
+
+OCSP_single_get0_status() extracts the fields of B<single> in B<*reason>,
+B<*revtime>, B<*thisupd> and B<*nextupd>.
+
+OCSP_resp_get0_produced_at() extracts the B<producedAt> field from the
+single response B<bs>.
+
+OCSP_resp_get0_certs() returns any certificates included in B<bs>.
+
+OCSP_resp_get0_signer() attempts to retrieve the certificate that directly
+signed B<bs>.  The OCSP protocol does not require that this certificate
+is included in the B<certs> field of the response, so additional certificates
+can be supplied in B<extra_certs> if the certificates that may have
+signed the response are known via some out-of-band mechanism.
+
+OCSP_resp_get0_id() gets the responder id of B<bs>. If the responder ID is
+a name then <*pname> is set to the name and B<*pid> is set to NULL. If the
+responder ID is by key ID then B<*pid> is set to the key ID and B<*pname>
+is set to NULL.
+
+OCSP_check_validity() checks the validity of B<thisupd> and B<nextupd> values
+which will be typically obtained from OCSP_resp_find_status() or
+OCSP_single_get0_status(). If B<sec> is non-zero it indicates how many seconds
+leeway should be allowed in the check. If B<maxsec> is positive it indicates
+the maximum age of B<thisupd> in seconds.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+OCSP_resp_find_status() returns 1 if B<id> is found in B<bs> and 0 otherwise.
+
+OCSP_resp_count() returns the total number of B<OCSP_SINGLERESP> fields in
+B<bs>.
+
+OCSP_resp_get0() returns a pointer to an B<OCSP_SINGLERESP> structure or
+B<NULL> if B<idx> is out of range.
+
+OCSP_resp_find() returns the index of B<id> in B<bs> (which may be 0) or -1 if
+B<id> was not found.
+
+OCSP_single_get0_status() returns the status of B<single> or -1 if an error
+occurred.
+
+OCSP_resp_get0_signer() returns 1 if the signing certificate was located,
+or 0 on error.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+Applications will typically call OCSP_resp_find_status() using the certificate
+ID of interest and then check its validity using OCSP_check_validity(). They
+can then take appropriate action based on the status of the certificate.
+
+An OCSP response for a certificate contains B<thisUpdate> and B<nextUpdate>
+fields. Normally the current time should be between these two values. To
+account for clock skew the B<maxsec> field can be set to non-zero in
+OCSP_check_validity(). Some responders do not set the B<nextUpdate> field, this
+would otherwise mean an ancient response would be considered valid: the
+B<maxsec> parameter to OCSP_check_validity() can be used to limit the permitted
+age of responses.
+
+The values written to B<*revtime>, B<*thisupd> and B<*nextupd> by
+OCSP_resp_find_status() and OCSP_single_get0_status() are internal pointers
+which B<MUST NOT> be freed up by the calling application. Any or all of these
+parameters can be set to NULL if their value is not required.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<crypto(3)>,
+L<OCSP_cert_to_id(3)>,
+L<OCSP_request_add1_nonce(3)>,
+L<OCSP_REQUEST_new(3)>,
+L<OCSP_response_status(3)>,
+L<OCSP_sendreq_new(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/OCSP_response_status.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/OCSP_response_status.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..180ab8d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/OCSP_response_status.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+OCSP_response_status, OCSP_response_get1_basic, OCSP_response_create,
+OCSP_RESPONSE_free, OCSP_RESPID_set_by_name,
+OCSP_RESPID_set_by_key, OCSP_RESPID_match - OCSP response functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
+
+ int OCSP_response_status(OCSP_RESPONSE *resp);
+ OCSP_BASICRESP *OCSP_response_get1_basic(OCSP_RESPONSE *resp);
+ OCSP_RESPONSE *OCSP_response_create(int status, OCSP_BASICRESP *bs);
+ void OCSP_RESPONSE_free(OCSP_RESPONSE *resp);
+
+ int OCSP_RESPID_set_by_name(OCSP_RESPID *respid, X509 *cert);
+ int OCSP_RESPID_set_by_key(OCSP_RESPID *respid, X509 *cert);
+ int OCSP_RESPID_match(OCSP_RESPID *respid, X509 *cert);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+OCSP_response_status() returns the OCSP response status of B<resp>. It returns
+one of the values: B<OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_SUCCESSFUL>,
+B<OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_MALFORMEDREQUEST>,
+B<OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_INTERNALERROR>, B<OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_TRYLATER>
+B<OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_SIGREQUIRED>, or B<OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_UNAUTHORIZED>.
+
+OCSP_response_get1_basic() decodes and returns the B<OCSP_BASICRESP> structure
+contained in B<resp>.
+
+OCSP_response_create() creates and returns an B<OCSP_RESPONSE> structure for
+B<status> and optionally including basic response B<bs>.
+
+OCSP_RESPONSE_free() frees up OCSP response B<resp>.
+
+OCSP_RESPID_set_by_name() sets the name of the OCSP_RESPID to be the same as the
+subject name in the supplied X509 certificate B<cert> for the OCSP responder.
+
+OCSP_RESPID_set_by_key() sets the key of the OCSP_RESPID to be the same as the
+key in the supplied X509 certificate B<cert> for the OCSP responder. The key is
+stored as a SHA1 hash.
+
+Note that an OCSP_RESPID can only have one of the name, or the key set. Calling
+OCSP_RESPID_set_by_name() or OCSP_RESPID_set_by_key() will clear any existing
+setting.
+
+OCSP_RESPID_match() tests whether the OCSP_RESPID given in B<respid> matches
+with the X509 certificate B<cert>.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+OCSP_RESPONSE_status() returns a status value.
+
+OCSP_response_get1_basic() returns an B<OCSP_BASICRESP> structure pointer or
+B<NULL> if an error occurred.
+
+OCSP_response_create() returns an B<OCSP_RESPONSE> structure pointer or B<NULL>
+if an error occurred.
+
+OCSP_RESPONSE_free() does not return a value.
+
+OCSP_RESPID_set_by_name() and OCSP_RESPID_set_by_key() return 1 on success or 0
+on failure.
+
+OCSP_RESPID_match() returns 1 if the OCSP_RESPID and the X509 certificate match
+or 0 otherwise.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+OCSP_response_get1_basic() is only called if the status of a response is
+B<OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_SUCCESSFUL>.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<crypto(3)>
+L<OCSP_cert_to_id(3)>
+L<OCSP_request_add1_nonce(3)>
+L<OCSP_REQUEST_new(3)>
+L<OCSP_response_find_status(3)>
+L<OCSP_sendreq_new(3)>
+L<OCSP_RESPID_new(3)>
+L<OCSP_RESPID_free(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+The OCSP_RESPID_set_by_name(), OCSP_RESPID_set_by_key() and OCSP_RESPID_match()
+functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0a.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/OCSP_sendreq_new.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/OCSP_sendreq_new.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c7fdc9b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/OCSP_sendreq_new.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+OCSP_sendreq_new, OCSP_sendreq_nbio, OCSP_REQ_CTX_free,
+OCSP_set_max_response_length, OCSP_REQ_CTX_add1_header,
+OCSP_REQ_CTX_set1_req, OCSP_sendreq_bio - OCSP responder query functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
+
+ OCSP_REQ_CTX *OCSP_sendreq_new(BIO *io, const char *path, OCSP_REQUEST *req,
+                                int maxline);
+
+ int OCSP_sendreq_nbio(OCSP_RESPONSE **presp, OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx);
+
+ void OCSP_REQ_CTX_free(OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx);
+
+ void OCSP_set_max_response_length(OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx, unsigned long len);
+
+ int OCSP_REQ_CTX_add1_header(OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx,
+                              const char *name, const char *value);
+
+ int OCSP_REQ_CTX_set1_req(OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx, OCSP_REQUEST *req);
+
+ OCSP_RESPONSE *OCSP_sendreq_bio(BIO *io, const char *path, OCSP_REQUEST *req,
+                                 int maxline);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The function OCSP_sendreq_new() returns an B<OCSP_CTX> structure using the
+responder B<io>, the URL path B<path>, the OCSP request B<req> and with a
+response header maximum line length of B<maxline>. If B<maxline> is zero a
+default value of 4k is used. The OCSP request B<req> may be set to B<NULL>
+and provided later if required.
+
+OCSP_sendreq_nbio() performs non-blocking I/O on the OCSP request context
+B<rctx>. When the operation is complete it returns the response in B<*presp>.
+
+OCSP_REQ_CTX_free() frees up the OCSP context B<rctx>.
+
+OCSP_set_max_response_length() sets the maximum response length for B<rctx>
+to B<len>. If the response exceeds this length an error occurs. If not
+set a default value of 100k is used.
+
+OCSP_REQ_CTX_add1_header() adds header B<name> with value B<value> to the
+context B<rctx>. It can be called more than once to add multiple headers.
+It B<MUST> be called before any calls to OCSP_sendreq_nbio(). The B<req>
+parameter in the initial to OCSP_sendreq_new() call MUST be set to B<NULL> if
+additional headers are set.
+
+OCSP_REQ_CTX_set1_req() sets the OCSP request in B<rctx> to B<req>. This
+function should be called after any calls to OCSP_REQ_CTX_add1_header().
+
+OCSP_sendreq_bio() performs an OCSP request using the responder B<io>, the URL
+path B<path>, the OCSP request B<req> and with a response header maximum line
+length of B<maxline>. If B<maxline> is zero a default value of 4k is used.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+OCSP_sendreq_new() returns a valid B<OCSP_REQ_CTX> structure or B<NULL> if
+an error occurred.
+
+OCSP_sendreq_nbio() returns B<1> if the operation was completed successfully,
+B<-1> if the operation should be retried and B<0> if an error occurred.
+
+OCSP_REQ_CTX_add1_header() and OCSP_REQ_CTX_set1_req() return B<1> for success
+and B<0> for failure.
+
+OCSP_sendreq_bio() returns the B<OCSP_RESPONSE> structure sent by the
+responder or B<NULL> if an error occurred.
+
+OCSP_REQ_CTX_free() and OCSP_set_max_response_length() do not return values.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+These functions only perform a minimal HTTP query to a responder. If an
+application wishes to support more advanced features it should use an
+alternative more complete HTTP library.
+
+Currently only HTTP POST queries to responders are supported.
+
+The arguments to OCSP_sendreq_new() correspond to the components of the URL.
+For example if the responder URL is B<http://ocsp.com/ocspreq> the BIO
+B<io> should be connected to host B<ocsp.com> on port 80 and B<path>
+should be set to B<"/ocspreq">
+
+The headers added with OCSP_REQ_CTX_add1_header() are of the form
+"B<name>: B<value>" or just "B<name>" if B<value> is B<NULL>. So to add
+a Host header for B<ocsp.com> you would call:
+
+ OCSP_REQ_CTX_add1_header(ctx, "Host", "ocsp.com");
+
+If OCSP_sendreq_nbio() indicates an operation should be retried the
+corresponding BIO can be examined to determine which operation (read or
+write) should be retried and appropriate action taken (for example a select()
+call on the underlying socket).
+
+OCSP_sendreq_bio() does not support retries and so cannot handle non-blocking
+I/O efficiently. It is retained for compatibility and its use in new
+applications is not recommended.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<crypto(3)>,
+L<OCSP_cert_to_id(3)>,
+L<OCSP_request_add1_nonce(3)>,
+L<OCSP_REQUEST_new(3)>,
+L<OCSP_response_find_status(3)>,
+L<OCSP_response_status(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_Applink.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_Applink.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d3a461b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_Applink.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+OPENSSL_Applink - glue between OpenSSL BIO and Win32 compiler run-time
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ __declspec(dllexport) void **OPENSSL_Applink();
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+OPENSSL_Applink is application-side interface which provides a glue
+between OpenSSL BIO layer and Win32 compiler run-time environment.
+Even though it appears at application side, it's essentially OpenSSL
+private interface. For this reason application developers are not
+expected to implement it, but to compile provided module with
+compiler of their choice and link it into the target application.
+The referred module is available as F<applink.c>, located alongside
+the public header files (only on the platforms where applicable).
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_LH_COMPFUNC.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_LH_COMPFUNC.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e760ae3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_LH_COMPFUNC.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,239 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+DECLARE_LHASH_OF,
+OPENSSL_LH_COMPFUNC, OPENSSL_LH_HASHFUNC, OPENSSL_LH_DOALL_FUNC,
+LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN_TYPE,
+IMPLEMENT_LHASH_HASH_FN, IMPLEMENT_LHASH_COMP_FN,
+lh_TYPE_new, lh_TYPE_free,
+lh_TYPE_insert, lh_TYPE_delete, lh_TYPE_retrieve,
+lh_TYPE_doall, lh_TYPE_doall_arg, lh_TYPE_error - dynamic hash table
+
+=for comment generic
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/lhash.h>
+
+ DECLARE_LHASH_OF(TYPE);
+
+ LHASH *lh_TYPE_new();
+ void lh_TYPE_free(LHASH_OF(TYPE *table);
+
+ TYPE *lh_TYPE_insert(LHASH_OF(TYPE *table, TYPE *data);
+ TYPE *lh_TYPE_delete(LHASH_OF(TYPE *table, TYPE *data);
+ TYPE *lh_retrieve(LHASH_OFTYPE *table, TYPE *data);
+
+ void lh_TYPE_doall(LHASH_OF(TYPE *table, OPENSSL_LH_DOALL_FUNC func);
+ void lh_TYPE_doall_arg(LHASH_OF(TYPE) *table, OPENSSL_LH_DOALL_FUNCARG func,
+          TYPE, TYPE *arg);
+
+ int lh_TYPE_error(LHASH_OF(TYPE) *table);
+
+ typedef int (*OPENSSL_LH_COMPFUNC)(const void *, const void *);
+ typedef unsigned long (*OPENSSL_LH_HASHFUNC)(const void *);
+ typedef void (*OPENSSL_LH_DOALL_FUNC)(const void *);
+ typedef void (*LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN_TYPE)(const void *, const void *);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+This library implements type-checked dynamic hash tables. The hash
+table entries can be arbitrary structures. Usually they consist of key
+and value fields.  In the description here, I<TYPE> is used a placeholder
+for any of the OpenSSL datatypes, such as I<SSL_SESSION>.
+
+lh_TYPE_new() creates a new B<LHASH_OF(TYPE)> structure to store
+arbitrary data entries, and specifies the 'hash' and 'compare'
+callbacks to be used in organising the table's entries.  The B<hash>
+callback takes a pointer to a table entry as its argument and returns
+an unsigned long hash value for its key field.  The hash value is
+normally truncated to a power of 2, so make sure that your hash
+function returns well mixed low order bits.  The B<compare> callback
+takes two arguments (pointers to two hash table entries), and returns
+0 if their keys are equal, non-zero otherwise.
+
+If your hash table
+will contain items of some particular type and the B<hash> and
+B<compare> callbacks hash/compare these types, then the
+B<IMPLEMENT_LHASH_HASH_FN> and B<IMPLEMENT_LHASH_COMP_FN> macros can be
+used to create callback wrappers of the prototypes required by
+lh_TYPE_new() as shown in this example:
+
+ /*
+  * Implement the hash and compare functions; "stuff" can be any word.
+  */
+ static unsigned long stuff_hash(const TYPE *a)
+ {
+     ...
+ }
+ static int stuff_cmp(const TYPE *a, const TYPE *b)
+ {
+     ...
+ }
+
+ /*
+  * Implement the wrapper functions.
+  */
+ static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_HASH_FN(stuff, TYPE)
+ static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_COMP_FN(stuff, TYPE)
+
+If the type is going to be used in several places, the following macros
+can be used in a common header file to declare the function wrappers:
+
+ DECLARE_LHASH_HASH_FN(stuff, TYPE)
+ DECLARE_LHASH_COMP_FN(stuff, TYPE)
+
+Then a hash table of TYPE objects can be created using this:
+
+ LHASH_OF(TYPE) *htable;
+
+ htable = lh_TYPE_new(LHASH_HASH_FN(stuff), LHASH_COMP_FN(stuff));
+
+lh_TYPE_free() frees the B<LHASH_OF(TYPE)> structure
+B<table>. Allocated hash table entries will not be freed; consider
+using lh_TYPE_doall() to deallocate any remaining entries in the
+hash table (see below).
+
+lh_TYPE_insert() inserts the structure pointed to by B<data> into
+B<table>.  If there already is an entry with the same key, the old
+value is replaced. Note that lh_TYPE_insert() stores pointers, the
+data are not copied.
+
+lh_TYPE_delete() deletes an entry from B<table>.
+
+lh_TYPE_retrieve() looks up an entry in B<table>. Normally, B<data>
+is a structure with the key field(s) set; the function will return a
+pointer to a fully populated structure.
+
+lh_TYPE_doall() will, for every entry in the hash table, call
+B<func> with the data item as its parameter.
+For example:
+
+ /* Cleans up resources belonging to 'a' (this is implemented elsewhere) */
+ void TYPE_cleanup_doall(TYPE *a);
+
+ /* Implement a prototype-compatible wrapper for "TYPE_cleanup" */
+ IMPLEMENT_LHASH_DOALL_FN(TYPE_cleanup, TYPE)
+
+ /* Call "TYPE_cleanup" against all items in a hash table. */
+ lh_TYPE_doall(hashtable, LHASH_DOALL_FN(TYPE_cleanup));
+
+ /* Then the hash table itself can be deallocated */
+ lh_TYPE_free(hashtable);
+
+When doing this, be careful if you delete entries from the hash table
+in your callbacks: the table may decrease in size, moving the item
+that you are currently on down lower in the hash table - this could
+cause some entries to be skipped during the iteration.  The second
+best solution to this problem is to set hash-E<gt>down_load=0 before
+you start (which will stop the hash table ever decreasing in size).
+The best solution is probably to avoid deleting items from the hash
+table inside a "doall" callback!
+
+lh_TYPE_doall_arg() is the same as lh_TYPE_doall() except that
+B<func> will be called with B<arg> as the second argument and B<func>
+should be of type B<LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN_TYPE> (a callback prototype
+that is passed both the table entry and an extra argument).  As with
+lh_doall(), you can instead choose to declare your callback with a
+prototype matching the types you are dealing with and use the
+declare/implement macros to create compatible wrappers that cast
+variables before calling your type-specific callbacks.  An example of
+this is demonstrated here (printing all hash table entries to a BIO
+that is provided by the caller):
+
+ /* Prints item 'a' to 'output_bio' (this is implemented elsewhere) */
+ void TYPE_print_doall_arg(const TYPE *a, BIO *output_bio);
+
+ /* Implement a prototype-compatible wrapper for "TYPE_print" */
+ static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN(TYPE, const TYPE, BIO)
+
+ /* Print out the entire hashtable to a particular BIO */
+ lh_TYPE_doall_arg(hashtable, LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN(TYPE_print), BIO,
+                   logging_bio);
+
+
+lh_TYPE_error() can be used to determine if an error occurred in the last
+operation.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+lh_TYPE_new() returns B<NULL> on error, otherwise a pointer to the new
+B<LHASH> structure.
+
+When a hash table entry is replaced, lh_TYPE_insert() returns the value
+being replaced. B<NULL> is returned on normal operation and on error.
+
+lh_TYPE_delete() returns the entry being deleted.  B<NULL> is returned if
+there is no such value in the hash table.
+
+lh_TYPE_retrieve() returns the hash table entry if it has been found,
+B<NULL> otherwise.
+
+lh_TYPE_error() returns 1 if an error occurred in the last operation, 0
+otherwise.
+
+lh_TYPE_free(), lh_TYPE_doall() and lh_TYPE_doall_arg() return no values.
+
+=head1 NOTE
+
+The various LHASH macros and callback types exist to make it possible
+to write type-checked code without resorting to function-prototype
+casting - an evil that makes application code much harder to
+audit/verify and also opens the window of opportunity for stack
+corruption and other hard-to-find bugs.  It also, apparently, violates
+ANSI-C.
+
+The LHASH code regards table entries as constant data.  As such, it
+internally represents lh_insert()'d items with a "const void *"
+pointer type.  This is why callbacks such as those used by lh_doall()
+and lh_doall_arg() declare their prototypes with "const", even for the
+parameters that pass back the table items' data pointers - for
+consistency, user-provided data is "const" at all times as far as the
+LHASH code is concerned.  However, as callers are themselves providing
+these pointers, they can choose whether they too should be treating
+all such parameters as constant.
+
+As an example, a hash table may be maintained by code that, for
+reasons of encapsulation, has only "const" access to the data being
+indexed in the hash table (ie. it is returned as "const" from
+elsewhere in their code) - in this case the LHASH prototypes are
+appropriate as-is.  Conversely, if the caller is responsible for the
+life-time of the data in question, then they may well wish to make
+modifications to table item passed back in the lh_doall() or
+lh_doall_arg() callbacks (see the "TYPE_cleanup" example above).  If
+so, the caller can either cast the "const" away (if they're providing
+the raw callbacks themselves) or use the macros to declare/implement
+the wrapper functions without "const" types.
+
+Callers that only have "const" access to data they're indexing in a
+table, yet declare callbacks without constant types (or cast the
+"const" away themselves), are therefore creating their own risks/bugs
+without being encouraged to do so by the API.  On a related note,
+those auditing code should pay special attention to any instances of
+DECLARE/IMPLEMENT_LHASH_DOALL_[ARG_]_FN macros that provide types
+without any "const" qualifiers.
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+lh_TYPE_insert() returns B<NULL> both for success and error.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<lh_stats(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+In OpenSSL 1.0.0, the lhash interface was revamped for better
+type checking.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_LH_stats.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_LH_stats.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c454a47
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_LH_stats.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+OPENSSL_LH_stats, OPENSSL_LH_node_stats, OPENSSL_LH_node_usage_stats,
+OPENSSL_LH_stats_bio,
+OPENSSL_LH_node_stats_bio, OPENSSL_LH_node_usage_stats_bio - LHASH statistics
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/lhash.h>
+
+ void OPENSSL_LH_stats(LHASH *table, FILE *out);
+ void OPENSSL_LH_node_stats(LHASH *table, FILE *out);
+ void OPENSSL_LH_node_usage_stats(LHASH *table, FILE *out);
+
+ void OPENSSL_LH_stats_bio(LHASH *table, BIO *out);
+ void OPENSSL_LH_node_stats_bio(LHASH *table, BIO *out);
+ void OPENSSL_LH_node_usage_stats_bio(LHASH *table, BIO *out);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The B<LHASH> structure records statistics about most aspects of
+accessing the hash table.  This is mostly a legacy of Eric Young
+writing this library for the reasons of implementing what looked like
+a nice algorithm rather than for a particular software product.
+
+OPENSSL_LH_stats() prints out statistics on the size of the hash table, how
+many entries are in it, and the number and result of calls to the
+routines in this library.
+
+OPENSSL_LH_node_stats() prints the number of entries for each 'bucket' in the
+hash table.
+
+OPENSSL_LH_node_usage_stats() prints out a short summary of the state of the
+hash table.  It prints the 'load' and the 'actual load'.  The load is
+the average number of data items per 'bucket' in the hash table.  The
+'actual load' is the average number of items per 'bucket', but only
+for buckets which contain entries.  So the 'actual load' is the
+average number of searches that will need to find an item in the hash
+table, while the 'load' is the average number that will be done to
+record a miss.
+
+OPENSSL_LH_stats_bio(), OPENSSL_LH_node_stats_bio() and OPENSSL_LH_node_usage_stats_bio()
+are the same as the above, except that the output goes to a B<BIO>.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+These functions do not return values.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<bio(3)>, L<lhash(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f50faec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, OpenSSL_version,
+OpenSSL_version_num - get OpenSSL version number
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+ #define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0xnnnnnnnnnL
+
+ #include <openssl/crypto.h>
+
+ unsigned long OpenSSL_version_num();
+ const char *OpenSSL_version(int t);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER is a numeric release version identifier:
+
+ MNNFFPPS: major minor fix patch status
+
+The status nibble has one of the values 0 for development, 1 to e for betas
+1 to 14, and f for release.
+
+for example
+
+ 0x000906000 == 0.9.6 dev
+ 0x000906023 == 0.9.6b beta 3
+ 0x00090605f == 0.9.6e release
+
+Versions prior to 0.9.3 have identifiers E<lt> 0x0930.
+Versions between 0.9.3 and 0.9.5 had a version identifier with this
+interpretation:
+
+ MMNNFFRBB major minor fix final beta/patch
+
+for example
+
+ 0x000904100 == 0.9.4 release
+ 0x000905000 == 0.9.5 dev
+
+Version 0.9.5a had an interim interpretation that is like the current one,
+except the patch level got the highest bit set, to keep continuity.  The
+number was therefore 0x0090581f.
+
+OpenSSL_version_num() returns the version number.
+
+The macro OPENSSL_VERSION_AT_LEAST(major,minor) can be used at compile
+time test if the current version is at least as new as the version provided.
+The arguments major, minor and fix correspond to the version information
+as given above.
+
+OpenSSL_version() returns different strings depending on B<t>:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item OPENSSL_VERSION
+
+The text variant of the version number and the release date.  For example,
+"OpenSSL 1.0.1a 15 Oct 2015".
+
+=item OPENSSL_CFLAGS
+
+The compiler flags set for the compilation process in the form
+"compiler: ..."  if available or "compiler: information not available"
+otherwise.
+
+=item OPENSSL_BUILT_ON
+
+The date of the build process in the form "built on: ..." if available
+or "built on: date not available" otherwise.
+
+=item OPENSSL_PLATFORM
+
+The "Configure" target of the library build in the form "platform: ..."
+if available or "platform: information not available" otherwise.
+
+=item OPENSSL_DIR
+
+The "OPENSSLDIR" setting of the library build in the form "OPENSSLDIR: "...""
+if available or "OPENSSLDIR: N/A" otherwise.
+
+=item OPENSSL_ENGINES_DIR
+
+The "ENGINESDIR" setting of the library build in the form "ENGINESDIR: "...""
+if available or "ENGINESDIR: N/A" otherwise.
+
+=back
+
+For an unknown B<t>, the text "not available" is returned.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUE
+
+The version number.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<crypto(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_config.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_config.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..eae634a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_config.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+OPENSSL_config, OPENSSL_no_config - simple OpenSSL configuration functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/conf.h>
+
+ #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+ void OPENSSL_config(const char *appname);
+ void OPENSSL_no_config(void);
+ #endif
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+OPENSSL_config() configures OpenSSL using the standard B<openssl.cnf> and
+reads from the application section B<appname>. If B<appname> is NULL then
+the default section, B<openssl_conf>, will be used.
+Errors are silently ignored.
+Multiple calls have no effect.
+
+OPENSSL_no_config() disables configuration. If called before OPENSSL_config()
+no configuration takes place.
+
+If the application is built with B<OPENSSL_LOAD_CONF> defined, then a
+call to OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms() will implicitly call OPENSSL_config()
+first.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The OPENSSL_config() function is designed to be a very simple "call it and
+forget it" function.
+It is however B<much> better than nothing. Applications which need finer
+control over their configuration functionality should use the configuration
+functions such as CONF_modules_load() directly. This function is deprecated
+and its use should be avoided.
+Applications should instead call CONF_modules_load() during
+initialization (that is before starting any threads).
+
+There are several reasons why calling the OpenSSL configuration routines is
+advisable. For example, to load dynamic ENGINEs from shared libraries (DSOs).
+However very few applications currently support the control interface and so
+very few can load and use dynamic ENGINEs. Equally in future more sophisticated
+ENGINEs will require certain control operations to customize them. If an
+application calls OPENSSL_config() it doesn't need to know or care about
+ENGINE control operations because they can be performed by editing a
+configuration file.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+Neither OPENSSL_config() nor OPENSSL_no_config() return a value.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<conf(5)>,
+L<CONF_modules_load_file(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+The OPENSSL_no_config() and OPENSSL_config() functions were
+deprecated in OpenSSL 1.1.0 by OPENSSL_init_crypto().
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_ia32cap.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_ia32cap.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b0ab0ce
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_ia32cap.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+OPENSSL_ia32cap - the x86[_64] processor capabilities vector
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ env OPENSSL_ia32cap=... <application>
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+OpenSSL supports a range of x86[_64] instruction set extensions. These
+extensions are denoted by individual bits in capability vector returned
+by processor in EDX:ECX register pair after executing CPUID instruction
+with EAX=1 input value (see Intel Application Note #241618). This vector
+is copied to memory upon toolkit initialization and used to choose
+between different code paths to provide optimal performance across wide
+range of processors. For the moment of this writing following bits are
+significant:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item bit #4 denoting presence of Time-Stamp Counter.
+
+=item bit #19 denoting availability of CLFLUSH instruction;
+
+=item bit #20, reserved by Intel, is used to choose among RC4 code paths;
+
+=item bit #23 denoting MMX support;
+
+=item bit #24, FXSR bit, denoting availability of XMM registers;
+
+=item bit #25 denoting SSE support;
+
+=item bit #26 denoting SSE2 support;
+
+=item bit #28 denoting Hyperthreading, which is used to distinguish
+cores with shared cache;
+
+=item bit #30, reserved by Intel, denotes specifically Intel CPUs;
+
+=item bit #33 denoting availability of PCLMULQDQ instruction;
+
+=item bit #41 denoting SSSE3, Supplemental SSE3, support;
+
+=item bit #43 denoting AMD XOP support (forced to zero on non-AMD CPUs);
+
+=item bit #54 denoting availability of MOVBE instruction;
+
+=item bit #57 denoting AES-NI instruction set extension;
+
+=item bit #58, XSAVE bit, lack of which in combination with MOVBE is used
+to identify Atom Silvermont core;
+
+=item bit #59, OSXSAVE bit, denoting availability of YMM registers;
+
+=item bit #60 denoting AVX extension;
+
+=item bit #62 denoting availability of RDRAND instruction;
+
+=back
+
+For example, in 32-bit application context clearing bit #26 at run-time
+disables high-performance SSE2 code present in the crypto library, while
+clearing bit #24 disables SSE2 code operating on 128-bit XMM register
+bank. You might have to do the latter if target OpenSSL application is
+executed on SSE2 capable CPU, but under control of OS that does not
+enable XMM registers. Historically address of the capability vector copy
+was exposed to application through OPENSSL_ia32cap_loc(), but not
+anymore. Now the only way to affect the capability detection is to set
+OPENSSL_ia32cap environment variable prior target application start. To
+give a specific example, on Intel P4 processor 'env
+OPENSSL_ia32cap=0x16980010 apps/openssl', or better yet 'env
+OPENSSL_ia32cap=~0x1000000 apps/openssl' would achieve the desired
+effect. Alternatively you can reconfigure the toolkit with no-sse2
+option and recompile.
+
+Less intuitive is clearing bit #28, or ~0x10000000 in the "environment
+variable" terms. The truth is that it's not copied from CPUID output
+verbatim, but is adjusted to reflect whether or not the data cache is
+actually shared between logical cores. This in turn affects the decision
+on whether or not expensive countermeasures against cache-timing attacks
+are applied, most notably in AES assembler module.
+
+The capability vector is further extended with EBX value returned by
+CPUID with EAX=7 and ECX=0 as input. Following bits are significant:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item bit #64+3 denoting availability of BMI1 instructions, e.g. ANDN;
+
+=item bit #64+5 denoting availability of AVX2 instructions;
+
+=item bit #64+8 denoting availability of BMI2 instructions, e.g. MULX
+and RORX;
+
+=item bit #64+16 denoting availability of AVX512F extension;
+
+=item bit #64+18 denoting availability of RDSEED instruction;
+
+=item bit #64+19 denoting availability of ADCX and ADOX instructions;
+
+=item bit #64+29 denoting availability of SHA extension;
+
+=item bit #64+30 denoting availability of AVX512BW extension;
+
+=item bit #64+31 denoting availability of AVX512VL extension;
+
+=back
+
+To control this extended capability word use ':' as delimiter when
+setting up OPENSSL_ia32cap environment variable. For example assigning
+':~0x20' would disable AVX2 code paths, and ':0' - all post-AVX
+extensions.
+
+It should be noted that whether or not some of the most "fancy"
+extension code paths are actually assembled depends on current assembler
+version. Base minimum of AES-NI/PCLMULQDQ, SSSE3 and SHA extension code
+paths are always assembled. Besides that, minimum assembler version
+requirements are summarized in below table:
+
+   Extension   | GNU as | nasm   | llvm
+   ------------+--------+--------+--------
+   AVX         | 2.19   | 2.09   | 3.0
+   AVX2        | 2.22   | 2.10   | 3.1
+   AVX512      | 2.25   | 2.11.8 | 3.6
+
+B<OPENSSL_ia32cap> is a macro returning the first word of the vector.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_init_crypto.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_init_crypto.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f0b3c8a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_init_crypto.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,245 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+OPENSSL_init_new, OPENSSL_INIT_set_config_appname, OPENSSL_INIT_free,
+OPENSSL_init_crypto, OPENSSL_cleanup,
+OPENSSL_atexit, OPENSSL_thread_stop - OpenSSL
+initialisation and deinitialisation functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/crypto.h>
+
+ void OPENSSL_cleanup(void);
+ int OPENSSL_init_crypto(uint64_t opts, const OPENSSL_INIT_SETTINGS *settings);
+ int OPENSSL_atexit(void (*handler)(void));
+ void OPENSSL_thread_stop(void);
+
+ OPENSSL_INIT_SETTINGS *OPENSSL_init_new(void);
+ int OPENSSL_INIT_set_config_appname(OPENSSL_INIT_SETTINGS *init,
+                                     const char* name);
+ void OPENSSL_INIT_free(OPENSSL_INIT_SETTINGS *init);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+During normal operation OpenSSL (libcrypto) will allocate various resources at
+start up that must, subsequently, be freed on close down of the library.
+Additionally some resources are allocated on a per thread basis (if the
+application is multi-threaded), and these resources must be freed prior to the
+thread closing.
+
+As of version 1.1.0 OpenSSL will automatically allocate all resources that it
+needs so no explicit initialisation is required. Similarly it will also
+automatically deinitialise as required.
+
+However, there way be situations when explicit initialisation is desirable or
+needed, for example when some non-default initialisation is required. The
+function OPENSSL_init_crypto() can be used for this purpose for
+libcrypto (see also L<OPENSSL_init_ssl(3)> for the libssl
+equivalent).
+
+Numerous internal OpenSSL functions call OPENSSL_init_crypto().
+Therefore, in order to perform non-default initialisation,
+OPENSSL_init_crypto() MUST be called by application code prior to
+any other OpenSSL function calls.
+
+The B<opts> parameter specifies which aspects of libcrypto should be
+initialised. Valid options are:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item OPENSSL_INIT_NO_LOAD_CRYPTO_STRINGS
+
+Suppress automatic loading of the libcrypto error strings. This option is
+not a default option. Once selected subsequent calls to
+OPENSSL_init_crypto() with the option
+B<OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_CRYPTO_STRINGS> will be ignored.
+
+=item OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_CRYPTO_STRINGS
+
+Automatic loading of the libcrypto error strings. With this option the
+library will automatically load the libcrypto error strings.
+This option is a default option. Once selected subsequent calls to
+OPENSSL_init_crypto() with the option
+B<OPENSSL_INIT_NO_LOAD_CRYPTO_STRINGS> will be ignored.
+
+=item OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_CIPHERS
+
+With this option the library will automatically load and make available all
+libcrypto ciphers. This option is a default option. Once selected subsequent
+calls to OPENSSL_init_crypto() with the option
+B<OPENSSL_INIT_NO_ADD_ALL_CIPHERS> will be ignored.
+
+=item OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_DIGESTS
+
+With this option the library will automatically load and make available all
+libcrypto digests. This option is a default option. Once selected subsequent
+calls to OPENSSL_init_crypto() with the option
+B<OPENSSL_INIT_NO_ADD_ALL_CIPHERS> will be ignored.
+
+=item OPENSSL_INIT_NO_ADD_ALL_CIPHERS
+
+With this option the library will suppress automatic loading of libcrypto
+ciphers. This option is not a default option. Once selected subsequent
+calls to OPENSSL_init_crypto() with the option
+B<OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_CIPHERS> will be ignored.
+
+=item OPENSSL_INIT_NO_ADD_ALL_DIGESTS
+
+With this option the library will suppress automatic loading of libcrypto
+digests. This option is not a default option. Once selected subsequent
+calls to OPENSSL_init_crypto() with the option
+B<OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_DIGESTS> will be ignored.
+
+=item OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_CONFIG
+
+With this option an OpenSSL configuration file will be automatically loaded and
+used by calling OPENSSL_config(). This is not a default option.
+See the description of OPENSSL_init_new(), below.
+
+=item OPENSSL_INIT_NO_LOAD_CONFIG
+
+With this option the loading of OpenSSL configuration files will be suppressed.
+It is the equivalent of calling OPENSSL_no_config(). This is not a default
+option.
+
+=item OPENSSL_INIT_ASYNC
+
+With this option the library with automatically initialise the libcrypto async
+sub-library (see L<ASYNC_start_job(3)>). This is a default option.
+
+=item OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_RDRAND
+
+With this option the library will automatically load and initialise the
+RDRAND engine (if available). This not a default option.
+
+=item OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_DYNAMIC
+
+With this option the library will automatically load and initialise the
+dynamic engine. This not a default option.
+
+=item OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_OPENSSL
+
+With this option the library will automatically load and initialise the
+openssl engine. This not a default option.
+
+=item OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_CRYPTODEV
+
+With this option the library will automatically load and initialise the
+cryptodev engine (if available). This not a default option.
+
+=item OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_CAPI
+
+With this option the library will automatically load and initialise the
+CAPI engine (if available). This not a default option.
+
+=item OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_PADLOCK
+
+With this option the library will automatically load and initialise the
+padlock engine (if available). This not a default option.
+
+=item OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_DASYNC
+
+With this option the library will automatically load and initialise the
+DASYNC engine. This not a default option.
+
+=item OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_ALL_BUILTIN
+
+With this option the library will automatically load and initialise all the
+built in engines listed above with the exception of the openssl and dasync
+engines. This not a default option.
+
+=back
+
+Multiple options may be combined together in a single call to
+OPENSSL_init_crypto(). For example:
+
+ OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_NO_ADD_ALL_CIPHERS
+                     | OPENSSL_INIT_NO_ADD_ALL_DIGESTS, NULL);
+
+The OPENSSL_cleanup() function deinitialises OpenSSL (both libcrypto
+and libssl). All resources allocated by OpenSSL are freed. Typically there
+should be no need to call this function directly as it is initiated
+automatically on application exit. This is done via the standard C library
+atexit() function. In the event that the application will close in a manner
+that will not call the registered atexit() handlers then the application should
+call OPENSSL_cleanup() directly. Developers of libraries using OpenSSL
+are discouraged from calling this function and should instead, typically, rely
+on auto-deinitialisation. This is to avoid error conditions where both an
+application and a library it depends on both use OpenSSL, and the library
+deinitialises it before the application has finished using it.
+
+Once OPENSSL_cleanup() has been called the library cannot be reinitialised.
+Attempts to call OPENSSL_init_crypto() will fail and an ERR_R_INIT_FAIL error
+will be added to the error stack. Note that because initialisation has failed
+OpenSSL error strings will not be available, only an error code. This code can
+be put through the openssl errstr command line application to produce a human
+readable error (see L<errstr(1)>).
+
+The OPENSSL_atexit() function enables the registration of a
+function to be called during OPENSSL_cleanup(). Stop handlers are
+called after deinitialisation of resources local to a thread, but before other
+process wide resources are freed. In the event that multiple stop handlers are
+registered, no guarantees are made about the order of execution.
+
+The OPENSSL_thread_stop() function deallocates resources associated
+with the current thread. Typically this function will be called automatically by
+the library when the thread exits. This should only be called directly if
+resources should be freed at an earlier time, or under the circumstances
+described in the NOTES section below.
+
+The B<OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_CONFIG> flag will load a default configuration
+file.  To specify a different file, an B<OPENSSL_INIT_SETTINGS> must
+be created and used. The routines
+OPENSSL_init_new() and OPENSSL_INIT_set_config_appname() can be used to
+allocate the object and set the application name, and then the
+object can be released with OPENSSL_INIT_free() when done.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+Resources local to a thread are deallocated automatically when the thread exits
+(e.g. in a pthreads environment, when pthread_exit() is called). On Windows
+platforms this is done in response to a DLL_THREAD_DETACH message being sent to
+the libcrypto32.dll entry point. Some windows functions may cause threads to exit
+without sending this message (for example ExitProcess()). If the application
+uses such functions, then the application must free up OpenSSL resources
+directly via a call to OPENSSL_thread_stop() on each thread. Similarly this
+message will also not be sent if OpenSSL is linked statically, and therefore
+applications using static linking should also call OPENSSL_thread_stop() on each
+thread. Additionally if OpenSSL is loaded dynamically via LoadLibrary() and the
+threads are not destroyed until after FreeLibrary() is called then each thread
+should call OPENSSL_thread_stop() prior to the FreeLibrary() call.
+
+On Linux/Unix where OpenSSL has been loaded via dlopen() and the application is
+multi-threaded and if dlclose() is subsequently called prior to the threads
+being destroyed then OpenSSL will not be able to deallocate resources associated
+with those threads. The application should either call OPENSSL_thread_stop() on
+each thread prior to the dlclose() call, or alternatively the original dlopen()
+call should use the RTLD_NODELETE flag (where available on the platform).
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+The functions OPENSSL_init_crypto, OPENSSL_atexit() and
+OPENSSL_INIT_set_config_appname() return 1 on success or 0 on error.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<OPENSSL_init_ssl(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+The OPENSSL_init_crypto(), OPENSSL_cleanup(), OPENSSL_atexit(),
+OPENSSL_thread_stop(), OPENSSL_init_new(), OPENSSL_INIT_set_config_appname()
+and OPENSSL_INIT_free() functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2016-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_instrument_bus.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_instrument_bus.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1407261
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_instrument_bus.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+OPENSSL_instrument_bus, OPENSSL_instrument_bus2 - instrument references to memory bus
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #ifdef OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ
+ size_t OPENSSL_instrument_bus(int *vector, size_t num);
+ size_t OPENSSL_instrument_bus2(int *vector, size_t num, size_t max);
+ #endif
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+It was empirically found that timings of references to primary memory
+are subject to irregular, apparently non-deterministic variations. The
+subroutines in question instrument these references for purposes of
+gathering entropy for random number generator. In order to make it
+bus-bound a 'flush cache line' instruction is used between probes. In
+addition probes are added to B<vector> elements in atomic or
+interlocked manner, which should contribute additional noise on
+multi-processor systems. This also means that B<vector[num]> should be
+zeroed upon invocation (if you want to retrieve actual probe values).
+
+OPENSSL_instrument_bus() performs B<num> probes and records the number of
+oscillator cycles every probe took.
+
+OPENSSL_instrument_bus2() on the other hand B<accumulates> consecutive
+probes with the same value, i.e. in a way it records duration of
+periods when probe values appeared deterministic. The subroutine
+performs at most B<max> probes in attempt to fill the B<vector[num]>,
+with B<max> value of 0 meaning "as many as it takes."
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUE
+
+Return value of 0 indicates that CPU is not capable of performing the
+benchmark, either because oscillator counter or 'flush cache line' is
+not available on current platform. For reference, on x86 'flush cache
+line' was introduced with the SSE2 extensions.
+
+Otherwise number of recorded values is returned.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_load_builtin_modules.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_load_builtin_modules.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..112718a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_load_builtin_modules.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+OPENSSL_load_builtin_modules, ASN1_add_oid_module, ENGINE_add_conf_module - add standard configuration modules
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/conf.h>
+
+ void OPENSSL_load_builtin_modules(void);
+ void ASN1_add_oid_module(void);
+ ENGINE_add_conf_module();
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The function OPENSSL_load_builtin_modules() adds all the standard OpenSSL
+configuration modules to the internal list. They can then be used by the
+OpenSSL configuration code.
+
+ASN1_add_oid_module() adds just the ASN1 OBJECT module.
+
+ENGINE_add_conf_module() adds just the ENGINE configuration module.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+If the simple configuration function OPENSSL_config() is called then
+OPENSSL_load_builtin_modules() is called automatically.
+
+Applications which use the configuration functions directly will need to
+call OPENSSL_load_builtin_modules() themselves I<before> any other
+configuration code.
+
+Applications should call OPENSSL_load_builtin_modules() to load all
+configuration modules instead of adding modules selectively: otherwise
+functionality may be missing from the application if an when new
+modules are added.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUE
+
+None of the functions return a value.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<conf(3)>, L<OPENSSL_config(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_malloc.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_malloc.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2104f43
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_malloc.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,207 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+OPENSSL_malloc_init,
+OPENSSL_malloc, OPENSSL_zalloc, OPENSSL_realloc, OPENSSL_free,
+OPENSSL_clear_realloc, OPENSSL_clear_free, OPENSSL_cleanse,
+CRYPTO_malloc, CRYPTO_zalloc, CRYPTO_realloc, CRYPTO_free,
+OPENSSL_strdup, OPENSSL_strndup,
+OPENSSL_memdup, OPENSSL_strlcpy, OPENSSL_strlcat,
+OPENSSL_hexstr2buf, OPENSSL_buf2hexstr, OPENSSL_hexchar2int,
+CRYPTO_strdup, CRYPTO_strndup,
+OPENSSL_mem_debug_push, OPENSSL_mem_debug_pop,
+CRYPTO_mem_debug_push, CRYPTO_mem_debug_pop,
+CRYPTO_clear_realloc, CRYPTO_clear_free,
+CRYPTO_get_mem_functions, CRYPTO_set_mem_functions,
+CRYPTO_set_mem_debug, CRYPTO_mem_ctrl,
+CRYPTO_mem_leaks, CRYPTO_mem_leaks_fp - Memory allocation functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/crypto.h>
+
+ int OPENSSL_malloc_init(void)
+
+ void *OPENSSL_malloc(size_t num)
+ void *OPENSSL_zalloc(size_t num)
+ void *OPENSSL_realloc(void *addr, size_t num)
+ void OPENSSL_free(void *addr)
+ char *OPENSSL_strdup(const char *str)
+ char *OPENSSL_strndup(const char *str, size_t s)
+ size_t OPENSSL_strlcat(char *dst, const char *src, size_t size);
+ size_t OPENSSL_strlcpy(char *dst, const char *src, size_t size);
+ void *OPENSSL_memdup(void *data, size_t s)
+ void *OPENSSL_clear_realloc(void *p, size_t old_len, size_t num)
+ void OPENSSL_clear_free(void *str, size_t num)
+ void OPENSSL_cleanse(void *ptr, size_t len);
+
+ unsigned char *OPENSSL_hexstr2buf(const char *str, long *len);
+ char *OPENSSL_buf2hexstr(const unsigned char *buffer, long len);
+ int OPENSSL_hexchar2int(unsigned char c);
+
+ void *CRYPTO_malloc(size_t num, const char *file, int line)
+ void *CRYPTO_zalloc(size_t num, const char *file, int line)
+ void *CRYPTO_realloc(void *p, size_t num, const char *file, int line)
+ void CRYPTO_free(void *str, const char *, int)
+ char *CRYPTO_strdup(const char *p, const char *file, int line)
+ char *CRYPTO_strndup(const char *p, size_t num, const char *file, int line)
+ void *CRYPTO_clear_realloc(void *p, size_t old_len, size_t num, const char *file, int line)
+ void CRYPTO_clear_free(void *str, size_t num, const char *, int)
+
+ void CRYPTO_get_mem_functions(
+         void *(**m)(size_t, const char *, int),
+         void *(**r)(void *, size_t, const char *, int),
+         void (**f)(void *, const char *, int))
+ int CRYPTO_set_mem_functions(
+         void *(*m)(size_t, const char *, int),
+         void *(*r)(void *, size_t, const char *, int),
+         void (*f)(void *, const char *, int))
+
+ int CRYPTO_set_mem_debug(int onoff)
+
+ int CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(int mode);
+
+ int OPENSSL_mem_debug_push(const char *info)
+ int OPENSSL_mem_debug_pop(void);
+
+ int CRYPTO_mem_debug_push(const char *info, const char *file, int line);
+ int CRYPTO_mem_debug_pop(void);
+
+ void CRYPTO_mem_leaks(BIO *b);
+ void CRYPTO_mem_leaks_fp(FILE *fp);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+OpenSSL memory allocation is handled by the B<OPENSSL_xxx> API. These are
+generally macro's that add the standard C B<__FILE__> and B<__LINE__>
+parameters and call a lower-level B<CRYPTO_xxx> API.
+Some functions do not add those parameters, but exist for consistency.
+
+OPENSSL_malloc_init() sets the lower-level memory allocation functions
+to their default implementation.
+It is generally not necessary to call this, except perhaps in certain
+shared-library situations.
+
+OPENSSL_malloc(), OPENSSL_realloc(), and OPENSSL_free() are like the
+C malloc(), realloc(), and free() functions.
+OPENSSL_zalloc() calls memset() to zero the memory before returning.
+
+OPENSSL_clear_realloc() and OPENSSL_clear_free() should be used
+when the buffer at B<addr> holds sensitive information.
+The old buffer is filled with zero's by calling OPENSSL_cleanse()
+before ultimately calling OPENSSL_free().
+
+OPENSSL_cleanse() fills B<ptr> of size B<len> with a string of 0's.
+Use OPENSSL_cleanse() with care if the memory is a mapping of a file.
+If the storage controller uses write compression, then its possible
+that sensitive tail bytes will survive zeroization because the block of
+zeros will be compressed. If the storage controller uses wear leveling,
+then the old sensitive data will not be overwritten; rather, a block of
+0's will be written at a new physical location.
+
+OPENSSL_strdup(), OPENSSL_strndup() and OPENSSL_memdup() are like the
+equivalent C functions, except that memory is allocated by calling the
+OPENSSL_malloc() and should be released by calling OPENSSL_free().
+
+OPENSSL_strlcpy(),
+OPENSSL_strlcat() and OPENSSL_strnlen() are equivalents of the common C
+library functions and are provided for portability.
+
+OPENSSL_hexstr2buf() parses B<str> as a hex string and returns a
+pointer to the parsed value. The memory is allocated by calling
+OPENSSL_malloc() and should be released by calling OPENSSL_free().
+If B<len> is not NULL, it is filled in with the output length.
+Colons between two-character hex "bytes" are ignored.
+An odd number of hex digits is an error.
+
+OPENSSL_buf2hexstr() takes the specified buffer and length, and returns
+a hex string for value, or NULL on error.
+B<Buffer> cannot be NULL; if B<len> is 0 an empty string is returned.
+
+OPENSSL_hexchar2int() converts a character to the hexadecimal equivalent,
+or returns -1 on error.
+
+If no allocations have been done, it is possible to "swap out" the default
+implementations for OPENSSL_malloc(), OPENSSL_realloc and OPENSSL_free()
+and replace them with alternate versions (hooks).
+CRYPTO_get_mem_functions() function fills in the given arguments with the
+function pointers for the current implementations.
+With CRYPTO_set_mem_functions(), you can specify a different set of functions.
+If any of B<m>, B<r>, or B<f> are NULL, then the function is not changed.
+
+The default implementation can include some debugging capability (if enabled
+at build-time).
+This adds some overhead by keeping a list of all memory allocations, and
+removes items from the list when they are free'd.
+This is most useful for identifying memory leaks.
+CRYPTO_set_mem_debug() turns this tracking on and off.  In order to have
+any effect, is must be called before any of the allocation functions
+(e.g., CRYPTO_malloc()) are called, and is therefore normally one of the
+first lines of main() in an application.
+
+CRYPTO_mem_ctrl() provides fine-grained control of memory leak tracking.
+To enable tracking call CRYPTO_mem_ctrl() with a B<mode> argument of
+the B<CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON>.
+To disable tracking call CRYPTO_mem_ctrl() with a B<mode> argument of
+the B<CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_OFF>.
+
+While checking memory, it can be useful to store additional context
+about what is being done.
+For example, identifying the field names when parsing a complicated
+data structure.
+OPENSSL_mem_debug_push() (which calls CRYPTO_mem_debug_push())
+attachs an identifying string to the allocation stack.
+This must be a global or other static string; it is not copied.
+OPENSSL_mem_debug_pop() removes identifying state from the stack.
+
+At the end of the program, calling CRYPTO_mem_leaks() or
+CRYPTO_mem_leaks_fp() will report all "leaked" memory, writing it
+to the specified BIO B<b> or FILE B<fp>. These functions return 1 if
+there are no leaks, 0 if there are leaks and -1 if an error occurred.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+OPENSSL_malloc_init(), OPENSSL_free(), OPENSSL_clear_free()
+CRYPTO_free(), CRYPTO_clear_free() and CRYPTO_get_mem_functions()
+return no value.
+
+CRYPTO_mem_leaks() and CRYPTO_mem_leaks_fp() return 1 if there
+are no leaks, 0 if there are leaks and -1 if an error occurred.
+
+OPENSSL_malloc(), OPENSSL_zalloc(), OPENSSL_realloc(),
+OPENSSL_clear_realloc(),
+CRYPTO_malloc(), CRYPTO_zalloc(), CRYPTO_realloc(),
+CRYPTO_clear_realloc(),
+OPENSSL_buf2hexstr(), OPENSSL_hexstr2buf(),
+OPENSSL_strdup(), and OPENSSL_strndup()
+return a pointer to allocated memory or NULL on error.
+
+CRYPTO_set_mem_functions() and CRYPTO_set_mem_debug()
+return 1 on success or 0 on failure (almost
+always because allocations have already happened).
+
+CRYPTO_mem_ctrl() returns -1 if an error occurred, otherwise the
+previous value of the mode.
+
+OPENSSL_mem_debug_push() and OPENSSL_mem_debug_pop()
+return 1 on success or 0 on failure.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+While it's permitted to swap out only a few and not all the functions
+with CRYPTO_set_mem_functions(), it's recommended to swap them all out
+at once.  I<This applies specially if OpenSSL was built with the
+configuration option> C<crypto-mdebug> I<enabled.  In case, swapping out
+only, say, the malloc() implementation is outright dangerous.>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_secure_malloc.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_secure_malloc.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3f27d76
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_secure_malloc.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+CRYPTO_secure_malloc_init, CRYPTO_secure_malloc_initialized,
+CRYPTO_secure_malloc_done, OPENSSL_secure_malloc, CRYPTO_secure_malloc,
+OPENSSL_secure_zalloc, CRYPTO_secure_zalloc, OPENSSL_secure_free,
+OPENSSL_secure_clear_free, CRYPTO_secure_free, CRYPTO_secure_clear_free,
+OPENSSL_secure_actual_size, OPENSSL_secure_allocated, CRYPTO_secure_used
+- secure heap storage
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/crypto.h>
+
+ int CRYPTO_secure_malloc_init(size_t size, int minsize);
+
+ int CRYPTO_secure_malloc_initialized();
+
+ int CRYPTO_secure_malloc_done();
+
+ void *OPENSSL_secure_malloc(size_t num);
+ void *CRYPTO_secure_malloc(size_t num, const char *file, int line);
+
+ void *OPENSSL_secure_zalloc(size_t num);
+ void *CRYPTO_secure_zalloc(size_t num, const char *file, int line);
+
+ void OPENSSL_secure_free(void* ptr);
+ void CRYPTO_secure_free(void *ptr, const char *, int);
+
+ void OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(void* ptr, size_t num);
+ void CRYPTO_secure_clear_free(void *ptr, size_t num, const char *, int);
+
+ size_t OPENSSL_secure_actual_size(const void *ptr);
+ int OPENSSL_secure_allocated(const void *ptr);
+
+ size_t CRYPTO_secure_used();
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+In order to help protect applications (particularly long-running servers)
+from pointer overruns or underruns that could return arbitrary data from
+the program's dynamic memory area, where keys and other sensitive
+information might be stored, OpenSSL supports the concept of a "secure heap."
+The level and type of security guarantees depend on the operating system.
+It is a good idea to review the code and see if it addresses your
+threat model and concerns.
+
+If a secure heap is used, then private key B<BIGNUM> values are stored there.
+This protects long-term storage of private keys, but will not necessarily
+put all intermediate values and computations there.
+
+CRYPTO_secure_malloc_init() creates the secure heap, with the specified
+C<size> in bytes. The C<minsize> parameter is the minimum size to
+allocate from the heap. Both C<size> and C<minsize> must be a power
+of two.
+
+CRYPTO_secure_malloc_initialized() indicates whether or not the secure
+heap as been initialized and is available.
+
+CRYPTO_secure_malloc_done() releases the heap and makes the memory unavailable
+to the process if all secure memory has been freed.
+It can take noticeably long to complete.
+
+OPENSSL_secure_malloc() allocates C<num> bytes from the heap.
+If CRYPTO_secure_malloc_init() is not called, this is equivalent to
+calling OPENSSL_malloc().
+It is a macro that expands to
+CRYPTO_secure_malloc() and adds the C<__FILE__> and C<__LINE__> parameters.
+
+OPENSSL_secure_zalloc() and CRYPTO_secure_zalloc() are like
+OPENSSL_secure_malloc() and CRYPTO_secure_malloc(), respectively,
+except that they call memset() to zero the memory before returning.
+
+OPENSSL_secure_free() releases the memory at C<ptr> back to the heap.
+It must be called with a value previously obtained from
+OPENSSL_secure_malloc().
+If CRYPTO_secure_malloc_init() is not called, this is equivalent to
+calling OPENSSL_free().
+It exists for consistency with OPENSSL_secure_malloc() , and
+is a macro that expands to CRYPTO_secure_free() and adds the C<__FILE__>
+and C<__LINE__> parameters..
+
+OPENSSL_secure_allocated() tells whether or not a pointer is within
+the secure heap.
+OPENSSL_secure_actual_size() tells the actual size allocated to the
+pointer; implementations may allocate more space than initially
+requested, in order to "round up" and reduce secure heap fragmentation.
+
+CRYPTO_secure_used() returns the number of bytes allocated in the
+secure heap.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+CRYPTO_secure_malloc_init() returns 0 on failure, 1 if successful,
+and 2 if successful but the heap could not be protected by memory
+mapping.
+
+CRYPTO_secure_malloc_initialized() returns 1 if the secure heap is
+available (that is, if CRYPTO_secure_malloc_init() has been called,
+but CRYPTO_secure_malloc_done() has not been called or failed) or 0 if not.
+
+OPENSSL_secure_malloc() and OPENSSL_secure_zalloc() return a pointer into
+the secure heap of the requested size, or C<NULL> if memory could not be
+allocated.
+
+CRYPTO_secure_allocated() returns 1 if the pointer is in the secure heap, or 0 if not.
+
+CRYPTO_secure_malloc_done() returns 1 if the secure memory area is released, or 0 if not.
+
+OPENSSL_secure_free() and OPENSSL_secure_clear_free() return no values.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<OPENSSL_malloc(3)>,
+L<BN_new(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+OPENSSL_secure_clear_free() was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0g.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..aaa28dd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms, OpenSSL_add_all_ciphers, OpenSSL_add_all_digests, EVP_cleanup -
+add algorithms to internal table
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+Deprecated:
+
+ # if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+ void OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(void);
+ void OpenSSL_add_all_ciphers(void);
+ void OpenSSL_add_all_digests(void);
+
+ void EVP_cleanup(void)
+# endif
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+OpenSSL keeps an internal table of digest algorithms and ciphers. It uses
+this table to lookup ciphers via functions such as EVP_get_cipher_byname(). In
+OpenSSL versions prior to 1.1.0 these functions initialised and de-initialised
+this table. From OpenSSL 1.1.0 they are deprecated. No explicit initialisation
+or de-initialisation is required. See L<OPENSSL_init_crypto(3)> for further
+information.
+
+OpenSSL_add_all_digests() adds all digest algorithms to the table.
+
+OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms() adds all algorithms to the table (digests and
+ciphers).
+
+OpenSSL_add_all_ciphers() adds all encryption algorithms to the table including
+password based encryption algorithms.
+
+In versions prior to 1.1.0 EVP_cleanup() removed all ciphers and digests from
+the table. It no longer has any effect in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+None of the functions return a value.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+A typical application will call OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms() initially and
+EVP_cleanup() before exiting.
+
+An application does not need to add algorithms to use them explicitly, for example
+by EVP_sha1(). It just needs to add them if it (or any of the functions it calls)
+needs to lookup algorithms.
+
+The cipher and digest lookup functions are used in many parts of the library. If
+the table is not initialized several functions will misbehave and complain they
+cannot find algorithms. This includes the PEM, PKCS#12, SSL and S/MIME libraries.
+This is a common query in the OpenSSL mailing lists.
+
+Calling OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms() links in all algorithms: as a result a
+statically linked executable can be quite large. If this is important it is possible
+to just add the required ciphers and digests.
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+Although the functions do not return error codes it is possible for them to fail.
+This will only happen as a result of a memory allocation failure so this is not
+too much of a problem in practice.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<evp(3)>, L<EVP_DigestInit(3)>,
+L<EVP_EncryptInit(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+The OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(), OpenSSL_add_all_ciphers(),
+OpenSSL_add_all_digests(), and EVP_cleanup(), functions
+were deprecated in OpenSSL 1.1.0 by OPENSSL_init_crypto().
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/PEM_read.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/PEM_read.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..66cbc7d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/PEM_read.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+PEM_write, PEM_write_bio,
+PEM_read, PEM_read_bio, PEM_do_header, PEM_get_EVP_CIPHER_INFO
+- PEM encoding routines
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/pem.h>
+
+ int PEM_write(FILE *fp, const char *name, const char *header,
+               const unsigned char *data, long len)
+ int PEM_write_bio(BIO *bp, const char *name, const char *header,
+                   const unsigned char *data, long len)
+
+ int PEM_read(FILE *fp, char **name, char **header,
+              unsigned char **data, long *len);
+ int PEM_read_bio(BIO *bp, char **name, char **header,
+                  unsigned char **data, long *len);
+
+ int PEM_get_EVP_CIPHER_INFO(char *header, EVP_CIPHER_INFO *cinfo);
+ int PEM_do_header(EVP_CIPHER_INFO *cinfo, unsigned char *data, long *len,
+                   pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+These functions read and write PEM-encoded objects, using the PEM
+type B<name>, any additional B<header> information, and the raw
+B<data> of length B<len>.
+
+PEM is the term used for binary content encoding first defined in IETF
+RFC 1421.  The content is a series of base64-encoded lines, surrounded
+by begin/end markers each on their own line.  For example:
+
+ -----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+ MIICdg....
+ ... bhTQ==
+ -----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+Optional header line(s) may appear after the begin line, and their
+existence depends on the type of object being written or read.
+
+PEM_write() writes to the file B<fp>, while PEM_write_bio() writes to
+the BIO B<bp>.  The B<name> is the name to use in the marker, the
+B<header> is the header value or NULL, and B<data> and B<len> specify
+the data and its length.
+
+The final B<data> buffer is typically an ASN.1 object which can be decoded with
+the B<d2i> function appropriate to the type B<name>; see L<d2i_X509(3)>
+for examples.
+
+PEM_read() reads from the file B<fp>, while PEM_read_bio() reads
+from the BIO B<bp>.
+Both skip any non-PEM data that precedes the start of the next PEM object.
+When an object is successfully retrieved, the type name from the "----BEGIN
+<type>-----" is returned via the B<name> argument, any encapsulation headers
+are returned in B<header> and the base64-decoded content and its length are
+returned via B<data> and B<len> respectively.
+The B<name>, B<header> and B<data> pointers are allocated via OPENSSL_malloc()
+and should be freed by the caller via OPENSSL_free() when no longer needed.
+
+PEM_get_EVP_CIPHER_INFO() can be used to determine the B<data> returned by
+PEM_read() or PEM_read_bio() is encrypted and to retrieve the associated cipher
+and IV.
+The caller passes a pointer to structure of type B<EVP_CIPHER_INFO> via the
+B<cinfo> argument and the B<header> returned via PEM_read() or PEM_read_bio().
+If the call is successful 1 is returned and the cipher and IV are stored at the
+address pointed to by B<cinfo>.
+When the header is malformed, or not supported or when the cipher is unknown
+or some internal error happens 0 is returned.
+This function is deprecated, see B<NOTES> below.
+
+PEM_do_header() can then be used to decrypt the data if the header
+indicates encryption.
+The B<cinfo> argument is a pointer to the structure initialized by the previous
+call to PEM_get_EVP_CIPHER_INFO().
+The B<data> and B<len> arguments are those returned by the previous call to
+PEM_read() or PEM_read_bio().
+The B<cb> and B<u> arguments make it possible to override the default password
+prompt function as described in L<PEM_read_PrivateKey(3)>.
+On successful completion the B<data> is decrypted in place, and B<len> is
+updated to indicate the plaintext length.
+This function is deprecated, see B<NOTES> below.
+
+If the data is a priori known to not be encrypted, then neither PEM_do_header()
+nor PEM_get_EVP_CIPHER_INFO() need be called.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+PEM_read() and PEM_read_bio() return 1 on success and 0 on failure, the latter
+includes the case when no more PEM objects remain in the input file.
+To distinguish end of file from more serious errors the caller must peek at the
+error stack and check for B<PEM_R_NO_START_LINE>, which indicates that no more
+PEM objects were found.  See L<ERR_peek_last_error(3)>, L<ERR_GET_REASON(3)>.
+
+PEM_get_EVP_CIPHER_INFO() and PEM_do_header() return 1 on success, and 0 on
+failure.
+The B<data> is likely meaningless if these functions fail.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The PEM_get_EVP_CIPHER_INFO() and PEM_do_header() functions are deprecated.
+This is because the underlying PEM encryption format is obsolete, and should
+be avoided.
+It uses an encryption format with an OpenSSL-specific key-derivation function,
+which employs MD5 with an iteration count of 1!
+Instead, private keys should be stored in PKCS#8 form, with a strong PKCS#5
+v2.0 PBE.
+See L<PEM_write_PrivateKey(3)> and L<d2i_PKCS8PrivateKey_bio(3)>.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_peek_last_error(3)>, L<ERR_GET_LIB(3)>,
+L<d2i_PKCS8PrivateKey_bio(3)>.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 1998-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/PEM_read_CMS.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/PEM_read_CMS.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..649c808
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/PEM_read_CMS.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+DECLARE_PEM_rw,
+PEM_read_CMS,
+PEM_read_bio_CMS,
+PEM_write_CMS,
+PEM_write_bio_CMS,
+PEM_write_DHxparams,
+PEM_write_bio_DHxparams,
+PEM_read_ECPKParameters,
+PEM_read_bio_ECPKParameters,
+PEM_write_ECPKParameters,
+PEM_write_bio_ECPKParameters,
+PEM_read_ECPrivateKey,
+PEM_write_ECPrivateKey,
+PEM_write_bio_ECPrivateKey,
+PEM_read_EC_PUBKEY,
+PEM_read_bio_EC_PUBKEY,
+PEM_write_EC_PUBKEY,
+PEM_write_bio_EC_PUBKEY,
+PEM_read_NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE,
+PEM_read_bio_NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE,
+PEM_write_NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE,
+PEM_write_bio_NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE,
+PEM_read_PKCS8,
+PEM_read_bio_PKCS8,
+PEM_write_PKCS8,
+PEM_write_bio_PKCS8,
+PEM_write_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO,
+PEM_read_bio_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO,
+PEM_read_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO,
+PEM_write_bio_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO,
+PEM_read_SSL_SESSION,
+PEM_read_bio_SSL_SESSION,
+PEM_write_SSL_SESSION,
+PEM_write_bio_SSL_SESSION
+- PEM object encoding routines
+
+=for comment generic
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/pem.h>
+
+ DECLARE_PEM_rw(name, TYPE)
+
+ TYPE *PEM_read_TYPE(FILE *fp, TYPE **a, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);
+ TYPE *PEM_read_bio_TYPE(BIO *bp, TYPE **a, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);
+ int PEM_write_TYPE(FILE *fp, const TYPE *a);
+ int PEM_write_bio_TYPE(BIO *bp, const TYPE *a);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+In the description below, I<TYPE> is used
+as a placeholder for any of the OpenSSL datatypes, such as I<X509>.
+The macro B<DECLARE_PEM_rw> expands to the set of declarations shown in
+the next four lines of the synopsis.
+
+These routines convert between local instances of ASN1 datatypes and
+the PEM encoding.  For more information on the templates, see
+L<ASN1_ITEM(3)>.  For more information on the lower-level routines used
+by the functions here, see L<PEM_read(3)>.
+
+PEM_read_TYPE() reads a PEM-encoded object of I<TYPE> from the file B<fp>
+and returns it.  The B<cb> and B<u> parameters are as described in
+L<pem_password_cb(3)>.
+
+PEM_read_bio_TYPE() is similar to PEM_read_TYPE() but reads from the BIO B<bp>.
+
+PEM_write_TYPE() writes the PEM encoding of the object B<a> to the file B<fp>.
+
+PEM_write_bio_TYPE() similarly writes to the BIO B<bp>.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+PEM_read_TYPE() and PEM_read_bio_TYPE() return a pointer to an allocated
+object, which should be released by calling TYPE_free(), or NULL on error.
+
+PEM_write_TYPE() and PEM_write_bio_TYPE() return the number of bytes written
+or zero on error.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<PEM_read(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 1998-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6b3006e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,481 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+pem_password_cb,
+PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey, PEM_read_PrivateKey, PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey,
+PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey_traditional, PEM_write_PrivateKey,
+PEM_write_bio_PKCS8PrivateKey, PEM_write_PKCS8PrivateKey,
+PEM_write_bio_PKCS8PrivateKey_nid, PEM_write_PKCS8PrivateKey_nid,
+PEM_read_bio_PUBKEY, PEM_read_PUBKEY, PEM_write_bio_PUBKEY, PEM_write_PUBKEY,
+PEM_read_bio_RSAPrivateKey, PEM_read_RSAPrivateKey,
+PEM_write_bio_RSAPrivateKey, PEM_write_RSAPrivateKey,
+PEM_read_bio_RSAPublicKey, PEM_read_RSAPublicKey, PEM_write_bio_RSAPublicKey,
+PEM_write_RSAPublicKey, PEM_read_bio_RSA_PUBKEY, PEM_read_RSA_PUBKEY,
+PEM_write_bio_RSA_PUBKEY, PEM_write_RSA_PUBKEY, PEM_read_bio_DSAPrivateKey,
+PEM_read_DSAPrivateKey, PEM_write_bio_DSAPrivateKey, PEM_write_DSAPrivateKey,
+PEM_read_bio_DSA_PUBKEY, PEM_read_DSA_PUBKEY, PEM_write_bio_DSA_PUBKEY,
+PEM_write_DSA_PUBKEY, PEM_read_bio_DSAparams, PEM_read_DSAparams,
+PEM_write_bio_DSAparams, PEM_write_DSAparams, PEM_read_bio_DHparams,
+PEM_read_DHparams, PEM_write_bio_DHparams, PEM_write_DHparams,
+PEM_read_bio_X509, PEM_read_X509, PEM_write_bio_X509, PEM_write_X509,
+PEM_read_bio_X509_AUX, PEM_read_X509_AUX, PEM_write_bio_X509_AUX,
+PEM_write_X509_AUX, PEM_read_bio_X509_REQ, PEM_read_X509_REQ,
+PEM_write_bio_X509_REQ, PEM_write_X509_REQ, PEM_write_bio_X509_REQ_NEW,
+PEM_write_X509_REQ_NEW, PEM_read_bio_X509_CRL, PEM_read_X509_CRL,
+PEM_write_bio_X509_CRL, PEM_write_X509_CRL, PEM_read_bio_PKCS7, PEM_read_PKCS7,
+PEM_write_bio_PKCS7, PEM_write_PKCS7 - PEM routines
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/pem.h>
+
+ typedef int pem_password_cb(char *buf, int size, int rwflag, void *u);
+
+ EVP_PKEY *PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY **x,
+                                   pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);
+ EVP_PKEY *PEM_read_PrivateKey(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY **x,
+                               pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);
+ int PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc,
+                              unsigned char *kstr, int klen,
+                              pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);
+ int PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey_traditional(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *x,
+                                          const EVP_CIPHER *enc,
+                                          unsigned char *kstr, int klen,
+                                          pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);
+ int PEM_write_PrivateKey(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc,
+                          unsigned char *kstr, int klen,
+                          pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);
+
+ int PEM_write_bio_PKCS8PrivateKey(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc,
+                                   char *kstr, int klen,
+                                   pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);
+ int PEM_write_PKCS8PrivateKey(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc,
+                               char *kstr, int klen,
+                               pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);
+ int PEM_write_bio_PKCS8PrivateKey_nid(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *x, int nid,
+                                       char *kstr, int klen,
+                                       pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);
+ int PEM_write_PKCS8PrivateKey_nid(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY *x, int nid,
+                                   char *kstr, int klen,
+                                   pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);
+
+ EVP_PKEY *PEM_read_bio_PUBKEY(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY **x,
+                               pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);
+ EVP_PKEY *PEM_read_PUBKEY(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY **x,
+                           pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);
+ int PEM_write_bio_PUBKEY(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *x);
+ int PEM_write_PUBKEY(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY *x);
+
+ RSA *PEM_read_bio_RSAPrivateKey(BIO *bp, RSA **x,
+                                 pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);
+ RSA *PEM_read_RSAPrivateKey(FILE *fp, RSA **x,
+                             pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);
+ int PEM_write_bio_RSAPrivateKey(BIO *bp, RSA *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc,
+                                 unsigned char *kstr, int klen,
+                                 pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);
+ int PEM_write_RSAPrivateKey(FILE *fp, RSA *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc,
+                             unsigned char *kstr, int klen,
+                             pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);
+
+ RSA *PEM_read_bio_RSAPublicKey(BIO *bp, RSA **x,
+                                pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);
+ RSA *PEM_read_RSAPublicKey(FILE *fp, RSA **x,
+                            pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);
+ int PEM_write_bio_RSAPublicKey(BIO *bp, RSA *x);
+ int PEM_write_RSAPublicKey(FILE *fp, RSA *x);
+
+ RSA *PEM_read_bio_RSA_PUBKEY(BIO *bp, RSA **x,
+                              pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);
+ RSA *PEM_read_RSA_PUBKEY(FILE *fp, RSA **x,
+                          pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);
+ int PEM_write_bio_RSA_PUBKEY(BIO *bp, RSA *x);
+ int PEM_write_RSA_PUBKEY(FILE *fp, RSA *x);
+
+ DSA *PEM_read_bio_DSAPrivateKey(BIO *bp, DSA **x,
+                                 pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);
+ DSA *PEM_read_DSAPrivateKey(FILE *fp, DSA **x,
+                             pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);
+ int PEM_write_bio_DSAPrivateKey(BIO *bp, DSA *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc,
+                                 unsigned char *kstr, int klen,
+                                 pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);
+ int PEM_write_DSAPrivateKey(FILE *fp, DSA *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc,
+                             unsigned char *kstr, int klen,
+                             pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);
+
+ DSA *PEM_read_bio_DSA_PUBKEY(BIO *bp, DSA **x,
+                              pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);
+ DSA *PEM_read_DSA_PUBKEY(FILE *fp, DSA **x,
+                          pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);
+ int PEM_write_bio_DSA_PUBKEY(BIO *bp, DSA *x);
+ int PEM_write_DSA_PUBKEY(FILE *fp, DSA *x);
+
+ DSA *PEM_read_bio_DSAparams(BIO *bp, DSA **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);
+ DSA *PEM_read_DSAparams(FILE *fp, DSA **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);
+ int PEM_write_bio_DSAparams(BIO *bp, DSA *x);
+ int PEM_write_DSAparams(FILE *fp, DSA *x);
+
+ DH *PEM_read_bio_DHparams(BIO *bp, DH **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);
+ DH *PEM_read_DHparams(FILE *fp, DH **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);
+ int PEM_write_bio_DHparams(BIO *bp, DH *x);
+ int PEM_write_DHparams(FILE *fp, DH *x);
+
+ X509 *PEM_read_bio_X509(BIO *bp, X509 **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);
+ X509 *PEM_read_X509(FILE *fp, X509 **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);
+ int PEM_write_bio_X509(BIO *bp, X509 *x);
+ int PEM_write_X509(FILE *fp, X509 *x);
+
+ X509 *PEM_read_bio_X509_AUX(BIO *bp, X509 **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);
+ X509 *PEM_read_X509_AUX(FILE *fp, X509 **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);
+ int PEM_write_bio_X509_AUX(BIO *bp, X509 *x);
+ int PEM_write_X509_AUX(FILE *fp, X509 *x);
+
+ X509_REQ *PEM_read_bio_X509_REQ(BIO *bp, X509_REQ **x,
+                                 pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);
+ X509_REQ *PEM_read_X509_REQ(FILE *fp, X509_REQ **x,
+                             pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);
+ int PEM_write_bio_X509_REQ(BIO *bp, X509_REQ *x);
+ int PEM_write_X509_REQ(FILE *fp, X509_REQ *x);
+ int PEM_write_bio_X509_REQ_NEW(BIO *bp, X509_REQ *x);
+ int PEM_write_X509_REQ_NEW(FILE *fp, X509_REQ *x);
+
+ X509_CRL *PEM_read_bio_X509_CRL(BIO *bp, X509_CRL **x,
+                                 pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);
+ X509_CRL *PEM_read_X509_CRL(FILE *fp, X509_CRL **x,
+                             pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);
+ int PEM_write_bio_X509_CRL(BIO *bp, X509_CRL *x);
+ int PEM_write_X509_CRL(FILE *fp, X509_CRL *x);
+
+ PKCS7 *PEM_read_bio_PKCS7(BIO *bp, PKCS7 **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);
+ PKCS7 *PEM_read_PKCS7(FILE *fp, PKCS7 **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);
+ int PEM_write_bio_PKCS7(BIO *bp, PKCS7 *x);
+ int PEM_write_PKCS7(FILE *fp, PKCS7 *x);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The PEM functions read or write structures in PEM format. In
+this sense PEM format is simply base64 encoded data surrounded
+by header lines.
+
+For more details about the meaning of arguments see the
+B<PEM FUNCTION ARGUMENTS> section.
+
+Each operation has four functions associated with it. For
+clarity the term "B<foobar> functions" will be used to collectively
+refer to the PEM_read_bio_foobar(), PEM_read_foobar(),
+PEM_write_bio_foobar() and PEM_write_foobar() functions.
+
+The B<PrivateKey> functions read or write a private key in PEM format using an
+EVP_PKEY structure. The write routines use PKCS#8 private key format and are
+equivalent to PEM_write_bio_PKCS8PrivateKey().The read functions transparently
+handle traditional and PKCS#8 format encrypted and unencrypted keys.
+
+PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey_traditional() writes out a private key in legacy
+"traditional" format.
+
+PEM_write_bio_PKCS8PrivateKey() and PEM_write_PKCS8PrivateKey() write a private
+key in an EVP_PKEY structure in PKCS#8 EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo format using
+PKCS#5 v2.0 password based encryption algorithms. The B<cipher> argument
+specifies the encryption algorithm to use: unlike some other PEM routines the
+encryption is applied at the PKCS#8 level and not in the PEM headers. If
+B<cipher> is NULL then no encryption is used and a PKCS#8 PrivateKeyInfo
+structure is used instead.
+
+PEM_write_bio_PKCS8PrivateKey_nid() and PEM_write_PKCS8PrivateKey_nid()
+also write out a private key as a PKCS#8 EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo however
+it uses PKCS#5 v1.5 or PKCS#12 encryption algorithms instead. The algorithm
+to use is specified in the B<nid> parameter and should be the NID of the
+corresponding OBJECT IDENTIFIER (see NOTES section).
+
+The B<PUBKEY> functions process a public key using an EVP_PKEY
+structure. The public key is encoded as a SubjectPublicKeyInfo
+structure.
+
+The B<RSAPrivateKey> functions process an RSA private key using an
+RSA structure. The write routines uses traditional format. The read
+routines handles the same formats as the B<PrivateKey>
+functions but an error occurs if the private key is not RSA.
+
+The B<RSAPublicKey> functions process an RSA public key using an
+RSA structure. The public key is encoded using a PKCS#1 RSAPublicKey
+structure.
+
+The B<RSA_PUBKEY> functions also process an RSA public key using
+an RSA structure. However the public key is encoded using a
+SubjectPublicKeyInfo structure and an error occurs if the public
+key is not RSA.
+
+The B<DSAPrivateKey> functions process a DSA private key using a
+DSA structure. The write routines uses traditional format. The read
+routines handles the same formats as the B<PrivateKey>
+functions but an error occurs if the private key is not DSA.
+
+The B<DSA_PUBKEY> functions process a DSA public key using
+a DSA structure. The public key is encoded using a
+SubjectPublicKeyInfo structure and an error occurs if the public
+key is not DSA.
+
+The B<DSAparams> functions process DSA parameters using a DSA
+structure. The parameters are encoded using a Dss-Parms structure
+as defined in RFC2459.
+
+The B<DHparams> functions process DH parameters using a DH
+structure. The parameters are encoded using a PKCS#3 DHparameter
+structure.
+
+The B<X509> functions process an X509 certificate using an X509
+structure. They will also process a trusted X509 certificate but
+any trust settings are discarded.
+
+The B<X509_AUX> functions process a trusted X509 certificate using
+an X509 structure.
+
+The B<X509_REQ> and B<X509_REQ_NEW> functions process a PKCS#10
+certificate request using an X509_REQ structure. The B<X509_REQ>
+write functions use B<CERTIFICATE REQUEST> in the header whereas
+the B<X509_REQ_NEW> functions use B<NEW CERTIFICATE REQUEST>
+(as required by some CAs). The B<X509_REQ> read functions will
+handle either form so there are no B<X509_REQ_NEW> read functions.
+
+The B<X509_CRL> functions process an X509 CRL using an X509_CRL
+structure.
+
+The B<PKCS7> functions process a PKCS#7 ContentInfo using a PKCS7
+structure.
+
+=head1 PEM FUNCTION ARGUMENTS
+
+The PEM functions have many common arguments.
+
+The B<bp> BIO parameter (if present) specifies the BIO to read from
+or write to.
+
+The B<fp> FILE parameter (if present) specifies the FILE pointer to
+read from or write to.
+
+The PEM read functions all take an argument B<TYPE **x> and return
+a B<TYPE *> pointer. Where B<TYPE> is whatever structure the function
+uses. If B<x> is NULL then the parameter is ignored. If B<x> is not
+NULL but B<*x> is NULL then the structure returned will be written
+to B<*x>. If neither B<x> nor B<*x> is NULL then an attempt is made
+to reuse the structure at B<*x> (but see BUGS and EXAMPLES sections).
+Irrespective of the value of B<x> a pointer to the structure is always
+returned (or NULL if an error occurred).
+
+The PEM functions which write private keys take an B<enc> parameter
+which specifies the encryption algorithm to use, encryption is done
+at the PEM level. If this parameter is set to NULL then the private
+key is written in unencrypted form.
+
+The B<cb> argument is the callback to use when querying for the pass
+phrase used for encrypted PEM structures (normally only private keys).
+
+For the PEM write routines if the B<kstr> parameter is not NULL then
+B<klen> bytes at B<kstr> are used as the passphrase and B<cb> is
+ignored.
+
+If the B<cb> parameters is set to NULL and the B<u> parameter is not
+NULL then the B<u> parameter is interpreted as a null terminated string
+to use as the passphrase. If both B<cb> and B<u> are NULL then the
+default callback routine is used which will typically prompt for the
+passphrase on the current terminal with echoing turned off.
+
+The default passphrase callback is sometimes inappropriate (for example
+in a GUI application) so an alternative can be supplied. The callback
+routine has the following form:
+
+ int cb(char *buf, int size, int rwflag, void *u);
+
+B<buf> is the buffer to write the passphrase to. B<size> is the maximum
+length of the passphrase (i.e. the size of buf). B<rwflag> is a flag
+which is set to 0 when reading and 1 when writing. A typical routine
+will ask the user to verify the passphrase (for example by prompting
+for it twice) if B<rwflag> is 1. The B<u> parameter has the same
+value as the B<u> parameter passed to the PEM routine. It allows
+arbitrary data to be passed to the callback by the application
+(for example a window handle in a GUI application). The callback
+B<must> return the number of characters in the passphrase or 0 if
+an error occurred.
+
+=head1 EXAMPLES
+
+Although the PEM routines take several arguments in almost all applications
+most of them are set to 0 or NULL.
+
+Read a certificate in PEM format from a BIO:
+
+ X509 *x;
+ x = PEM_read_bio_X509(bp, NULL, 0, NULL);
+ if (x == NULL) {
+     /* Error */
+ }
+
+Alternative method:
+
+ X509 *x = NULL;
+ if (!PEM_read_bio_X509(bp, &x, 0, NULL)) {
+     /* Error */
+ }
+
+Write a certificate to a BIO:
+
+ if (!PEM_write_bio_X509(bp, x)) {
+     /* Error */
+ }
+
+Write a private key (using traditional format) to a BIO using
+triple DES encryption, the pass phrase is prompted for:
+
+ if (!PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey(bp, key, EVP_des_ede3_cbc(), NULL, 0, 0, NULL)) {
+     /* Error */
+ }
+
+Write a private key (using PKCS#8 format) to a BIO using triple
+DES encryption, using the pass phrase "hello":
+
+ if (!PEM_write_bio_PKCS8PrivateKey(bp, key, EVP_des_ede3_cbc(), NULL, 0, 0, "hello")) {
+     /* Error */
+ }
+
+Read a private key from a BIO using a pass phrase callback:
+
+ key = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(bp, NULL, pass_cb, "My Private Key");
+ if (key == NULL) {
+     /* Error */
+ }
+
+Skeleton pass phrase callback:
+
+ int pass_cb(char *buf, int size, int rwflag, void *u)
+ {
+     int len;
+     char *tmp;
+
+     /* We'd probably do something else if 'rwflag' is 1 */
+     printf("Enter pass phrase for \"%s\"\n", (char *)u);
+
+     /* get pass phrase, length 'len' into 'tmp' */
+     tmp = "hello";
+     len = strlen(tmp);
+     if (len <= 0)
+         return 0;
+
+     if (len > size)
+         len = size;
+     memcpy(buf, tmp, len);
+     return len;
+ }
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The old B<PrivateKey> write routines are retained for compatibility.
+New applications should write private keys using the
+PEM_write_bio_PKCS8PrivateKey() or PEM_write_PKCS8PrivateKey() routines
+because they are more secure (they use an iteration count of 2048 whereas
+the traditional routines use a count of 1) unless compatibility with older
+versions of OpenSSL is important.
+
+The B<PrivateKey> read routines can be used in all applications because
+they handle all formats transparently.
+
+A frequent cause of problems is attempting to use the PEM routines like
+this:
+
+ X509 *x;
+ PEM_read_bio_X509(bp, &x, 0, NULL);
+
+this is a bug because an attempt will be made to reuse the data at B<x>
+which is an uninitialised pointer.
+
+=head1 PEM ENCRYPTION FORMAT
+
+These old B<PrivateKey> routines use a non standard technique for encryption.
+
+The private key (or other data) takes the following form:
+
+ -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+ Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED
+ DEK-Info: DES-EDE3-CBC,3F17F5316E2BAC89
+
+ ...base64 encoded data...
+ -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+The line beginning with I<Proc-Type> contains the version and the
+protection on the encapsulated data. The line beginning I<DEK-Info>
+contains two comma separated values: the encryption algorithm name as
+used by EVP_get_cipherbyname() and an initialization vector used by the
+cipher encoded as a set of hexadecimal digits. After those two lines is
+the base64-encoded encrypted data.
+
+The encryption key is derived using EVP_BytesToKey(). The cipher's
+initialization vector is passed to EVP_BytesToKey() as the B<salt>
+parameter. Internally, B<PKCS5_SALT_LEN> bytes of the salt are used
+(regardless of the size of the initialization vector). The user's
+password is passed to EVP_BytesToKey() using the B<data> and B<datal>
+parameters. Finally, the library uses an iteration count of 1 for
+EVP_BytesToKey().
+
+The B<key> derived by EVP_BytesToKey() along with the original initialization
+vector is then used to decrypt the encrypted data. The B<iv> produced by
+EVP_BytesToKey() is not utilized or needed, and NULL should be passed to
+the function.
+
+The pseudo code to derive the key would look similar to:
+
+ EVP_CIPHER* cipher = EVP_des_ede3_cbc();
+ EVP_MD* md = EVP_md5();
+
+ unsigned int nkey = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher);
+ unsigned int niv = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
+ unsigned char key[nkey];
+ unsigned char iv[niv];
+
+ memcpy(iv, HexToBin("3F17F5316E2BAC89"), niv);
+ rc = EVP_BytesToKey(cipher, md, iv /*salt*/, pword, plen, 1, key, NULL /*iv*/);
+ if (rc != nkey) {
+     /* Error */
+ }
+
+ /* On success, use key and iv to initialize the cipher */
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+The PEM read routines in some versions of OpenSSL will not correctly reuse
+an existing structure. Therefore the following:
+
+ PEM_read_bio_X509(bp, &x, 0, NULL);
+
+where B<x> already contains a valid certificate, may not work, whereas:
+
+ X509_free(x);
+ x = PEM_read_bio_X509(bp, NULL, 0, NULL);
+
+is guaranteed to work.
+
+=head1 RETURN CODES
+
+The read routines return either a pointer to the structure read or NULL
+if an error occurred.
+
+The write routines return 1 for success or 0 for failure.
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+The old Netscape certificate sequences were no longer documented
+in OpenSSL 1.1; applications should use the PKCS7 standard instead
+as they will be formally deprecated in a future releases.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<EVP_EncryptInit(3)>, L<EVP_BytesToKey(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/PEM_write_bio_CMS_stream.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/PEM_write_bio_CMS_stream.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c73fafd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/PEM_write_bio_CMS_stream.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+PEM_write_bio_CMS_stream - output CMS_ContentInfo structure in PEM format
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/cms.h>
+
+ int PEM_write_bio_CMS_stream(BIO *out, CMS_ContentInfo *cms, BIO *data, int flags);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+PEM_write_bio_CMS_stream() outputs a CMS_ContentInfo structure in PEM format.
+
+It is otherwise identical to the function SMIME_write_CMS().
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+This function is effectively a version of the PEM_write_bio_CMS() supporting
+streaming.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+PEM_write_bio_CMS_stream() returns 1 for success or 0 for failure.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>, L<CMS_sign(3)>,
+L<CMS_verify(3)>, L<CMS_encrypt(3)>
+L<CMS_decrypt(3)>,
+L<PEM_write(3)>,
+L<SMIME_write_CMS(3)>,
+L<i2d_CMS_bio_stream(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+PEM_write_bio_CMS_stream() was added to OpenSSL 1.0.0
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/PEM_write_bio_PKCS7_stream.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/PEM_write_bio_PKCS7_stream.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..77f97aa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/PEM_write_bio_PKCS7_stream.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+PEM_write_bio_PKCS7_stream - output PKCS7 structure in PEM format
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/pkcs7.h>
+
+ int PEM_write_bio_PKCS7_stream(BIO *out, PKCS7 *p7, BIO *data, int flags);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+PEM_write_bio_PKCS7_stream() outputs a PKCS7 structure in PEM format.
+
+It is otherwise identical to the function SMIME_write_PKCS7().
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+This function is effectively a version of the PEM_write_bio_PKCS7() supporting
+streaming.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+PEM_write_bio_PKCS7_stream() returns 1 for success or 0 for failure.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>, L<PKCS7_sign(3)>,
+L<PKCS7_verify(3)>, L<PKCS7_encrypt(3)>
+L<PKCS7_decrypt(3)>,
+L<SMIME_write_PKCS7(3)>,
+L<i2d_PKCS7_bio_stream(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+PEM_write_bio_PKCS7_stream() was added to OpenSSL 1.0.0
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2007-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/PKCS12_create.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/PKCS12_create.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0a43b96
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/PKCS12_create.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+PKCS12_create - create a PKCS#12 structure
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
+
+ PKCS12 *PKCS12_create(const char *pass, const char *name, EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+                       X509 *cert, STACK_OF(X509) *ca,
+                       int nid_key, int nid_cert, int iter, int mac_iter, int keytype);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+PKCS12_create() creates a PKCS#12 structure.
+
+B<pass> is the passphrase to use. B<name> is the B<friendlyName> to use for
+the supplied certificate and key. B<pkey> is the private key to include in
+the structure and B<cert> its corresponding certificates. B<ca>, if not B<NULL>
+is an optional set of certificates to also include in the structure.
+
+B<nid_key> and B<nid_cert> are the encryption algorithms that should be used
+for the key and certificate respectively. B<iter> is the encryption algorithm
+iteration count to use and B<mac_iter> is the MAC iteration count to use.
+B<keytype> is the type of key.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The parameters B<nid_key>, B<nid_cert>, B<iter>, B<mac_iter> and B<keytype>
+can all be set to zero and sensible defaults will be used.
+
+These defaults are: 40 bit RC2 encryption for certificates, triple DES
+encryption for private keys, a key iteration count of PKCS12_DEFAULT_ITER
+(currently 2048) and a MAC iteration count of 1.
+
+The default MAC iteration count is 1 in order to retain compatibility with
+old software which did not interpret MAC iteration counts. If such compatibility
+is not required then B<mac_iter> should be set to PKCS12_DEFAULT_ITER.
+
+B<keytype> adds a flag to the store private key. This is a non standard extension
+that is only currently interpreted by MSIE. If set to zero the flag is omitted,
+if set to B<KEY_SIG> the key can be used for signing only, if set to B<KEY_EX>
+it can be used for signing and encryption. This option was useful for old
+export grade software which could use signing only keys of arbitrary size but
+had restrictions on the permissible sizes of keys which could be used for
+encryption.
+
+If a certificate contains an B<alias> or B<keyid> then this will be
+used for the corresponding B<friendlyName> or B<localKeyID> in the
+PKCS12 structure.
+
+Either B<pkey>, B<cert> or both can be B<NULL> to indicate that no key or
+certificate is required. In previous versions both had to be present or
+a fatal error is returned.
+
+B<nid_key> or B<nid_cert> can be set to -1 indicating that no encryption
+should be used.
+
+B<mac_iter> can be set to -1 and the MAC will then be omitted entirely.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<d2i_PKCS12(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/PKCS12_newpass.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/PKCS12_newpass.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6b22fd7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/PKCS12_newpass.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+PKCS12_newpass - change the password of a PKCS12 structure
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
+
+ int PKCS12_newpass(PKCS12 *p12, const char *oldpass, const char *newpass);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+PKCS12_newpass() changes the password of a PKCS12 structure.
+
+B<p12> is a pointer to a PKCS12 structure. B<oldpass> is the existing password
+and B<newpass> is the new password.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+Each of B<oldpass> and B<newpass> is independently interpreted as a string in
+the UTF-8 encoding. If it is not valid UTF-8, it is assumed to be ISO8859-1
+instead.
+
+In particular, this means that passwords in the locale character set
+(or code page on Windows) must potentially be converted to UTF-8 before
+use. This may include passwords from local text files, or input from
+the terminal or command line. Refer to the documentation of
+L<UI_OpenSSL(3)>, for example.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+PKCS12_newpass() returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. Applications can
+retrieve the most recent error from PKCS12_newpass() with ERR_get_error().
+
+=head1 EXAMPLE
+
+This example loads a PKCS#12 file, changes its password and writes out
+the result to a new file.
+
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <stdlib.h>
+ #include <openssl/pem.h>
+ #include <openssl/err.h>
+ #include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
+
+ int main(int argc, char **argv)
+ {
+    FILE *fp;
+    PKCS12 *p12;
+    if (argc != 5) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Usage: pkread p12file password newpass opfile\n");
+        return 1;
+    }
+    if ((fp = fopen(argv[1], "rb")) == NULL) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Error opening file %s\n", argv[1]);
+        return 1;
+    }
+    p12 = d2i_PKCS12_fp(fp, NULL);
+    fclose(fp);
+    if (p12 == NULL) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Error reading PKCS#12 file\n");
+        ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+        return 1;
+    }
+    if (PKCS12_newpass(p12, argv[2], argv[3]) == 0) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Error changing password\n");
+        ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+        PKCS12_free(p12);
+        return 1;
+    }
+    if ((fp = fopen(argv[4], "wb")) == NULL) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Error opening file %s\n", argv[4]);
+        PKCS12_free(p12);
+        return 1;
+    }
+    i2d_PKCS12_fp(fp, p12);
+    PKCS12_free(p12);
+    fclose(fp);
+    return 0;
+ }
+
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+If the PKCS#12 structure does not have a password, then you must use the empty
+string "" for B<oldpass>. Using NULL for B<oldpass> will result in a
+PKCS12_newpass() failure.
+
+If the wrong password is used for B<oldpass> then the function will fail,
+with a MAC verification error. In rare cases the PKCS12 structure does not
+contain a MAC: in this case it will usually fail with a decryption padding
+error.
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+The password format is a NULL terminated ASCII string which is converted to
+Unicode form internally. As a result some passwords cannot be supplied to
+this function.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<PKCS12_create(3)>, L<ERR_get_error(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/PKCS12_parse.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/PKCS12_parse.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c03c371
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/PKCS12_parse.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+PKCS12_parse - parse a PKCS#12 structure
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
+
+int PKCS12_parse(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert, STACK_OF(X509) **ca);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+PKCS12_parse() parses a PKCS12 structure.
+
+B<p12> is the B<PKCS12> structure to parse. B<pass> is the passphrase to use.
+If successful the private key will be written to B<*pkey>, the corresponding
+certificate to B<*cert> and any additional certificates to B<*ca>.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The parameters B<pkey> and B<cert> cannot be B<NULL>. B<ca> can be <NULL> in
+which case additional certificates will be discarded. B<*ca> can also be a
+valid STACK in which case additional certificates are appended to B<*ca>. If
+B<*ca> is B<NULL> a new STACK will be allocated.
+
+The B<friendlyName> and B<localKeyID> attributes (if present) on each
+certificate will be stored in the B<alias> and B<keyid> attributes of the
+B<X509> structure.
+
+The parameter B<pass> is interpreted as a string in the UTF-8 encoding. If it
+is not valid UTF-8, then it is assumed to be ISO8859-1 instead.
+
+In particular, this means that passwords in the locale character set
+(or code page on Windows) must potentially be converted to UTF-8 before
+use. This may include passwords from local text files, or input from
+the terminal or command line. Refer to the documentation of
+L<UI_OpenSSL(3)>, for example.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+PKCS12_parse() returns 1 for success and zero if an error occurred.
+
+The error can be obtained from L<ERR_get_error(3)>
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+Only a single private key and corresponding certificate is returned by this
+function. More complex PKCS#12 files with multiple private keys will only
+return the first match.
+
+Only B<friendlyName> and B<localKeyID> attributes are currently stored in
+certificates. Other attributes are discarded.
+
+Attributes currently cannot be stored in the private key B<EVP_PKEY> structure.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<d2i_PKCS12(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5cc2caa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC, PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC_SHA1 - password based derivation routines with salt and iteration count
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+ int PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(const char *pass, int passlen,
+                       const unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, int iter,
+                       const EVP_MD *digest,
+                       int keylen, unsigned char *out);
+
+int PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC_SHA1(const char *pass, int passlen,
+                           const unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, int iter,
+                           int keylen, unsigned char *out);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC() derives a key from a password using a salt and iteration count
+as specified in RFC 2898.
+
+B<pass> is the password used in the derivation of length B<passlen>. B<pass>
+is an optional parameter and can be NULL. If B<passlen> is -1, then the
+function will calculate the length of B<pass> using strlen().
+
+B<salt> is the salt used in the derivation of length B<saltlen>. If the
+B<salt> is NULL, then B<saltlen> must be 0. The function will not
+attempt to calculate the length of the B<salt> because it is not assumed to
+be NULL terminated.
+
+B<iter> is the iteration count and its value should be greater than or
+equal to 1. RFC 2898 suggests an iteration count of at least 1000. Any
+B<iter> less than 1 is treated as a single iteration.
+
+B<digest> is the message digest function used in the derivation. Values include
+any of the EVP_* message digests. PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC_SHA1() calls
+PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC() with EVP_sha1().
+
+The derived key will be written to B<out>. The size of the B<out> buffer
+is specified via B<keylen>.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+A typical application of this function is to derive keying material for an
+encryption algorithm from a password in the B<pass>, a salt in B<salt>,
+and an iteration count.
+
+Increasing the B<iter> parameter slows down the algorithm which makes it
+harder for an attacker to perform a brute force attack using a large number
+of candidate passwords.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC() and PBKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC_SHA1() return 1 on success or 0 on error.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<evp(3)>, L<rand(3)>,
+L<EVP_BytesToKey(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2014-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/PKCS7_decrypt.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/PKCS7_decrypt.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4ed8aa7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/PKCS7_decrypt.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+PKCS7_decrypt - decrypt content from a PKCS#7 envelopedData structure
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/pkcs7.h>
+
+ int PKCS7_decrypt(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *cert, BIO *data, int flags);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+PKCS7_decrypt() extracts and decrypts the content from a PKCS#7 envelopedData
+structure. B<pkey> is the private key of the recipient, B<cert> is the
+recipients certificate, B<data> is a BIO to write the content to and
+B<flags> is an optional set of flags.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+Although the recipients certificate is not needed to decrypt the data it is needed
+to locate the appropriate (of possible several) recipients in the PKCS#7 structure.
+
+The following flags can be passed in the B<flags> parameter.
+
+If the B<PKCS7_TEXT> flag is set MIME headers for type B<text/plain> are deleted
+from the content. If the content is not of type B<text/plain> then an error is
+returned.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+PKCS7_decrypt() returns either 1 for success or 0 for failure.
+The error can be obtained from ERR_get_error(3)
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+PKCS7_decrypt() must be passed the correct recipient key and certificate. It would
+be better if it could look up the correct key and certificate from a database.
+
+The lack of single pass processing and need to hold all data in memory as
+mentioned in PKCS7_sign() also applies to PKCS7_verify().
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>, L<PKCS7_encrypt(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/PKCS7_encrypt.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/PKCS7_encrypt.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4e1afc9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/PKCS7_encrypt.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+PKCS7_encrypt - create a PKCS#7 envelopedData structure
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/pkcs7.h>
+
+ PKCS7 *PKCS7_encrypt(STACK_OF(X509) *certs, BIO *in, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, int flags);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+PKCS7_encrypt() creates and returns a PKCS#7 envelopedData structure. B<certs>
+is a list of recipient certificates. B<in> is the content to be encrypted.
+B<cipher> is the symmetric cipher to use. B<flags> is an optional set of flags.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+Only RSA keys are supported in PKCS#7 and envelopedData so the recipient
+certificates supplied to this function must all contain RSA public keys, though
+they do not have to be signed using the RSA algorithm.
+
+EVP_des_ede3_cbc() (triple DES) is the algorithm of choice for S/MIME use
+because most clients will support it.
+
+Some old "export grade" clients may only support weak encryption using 40 or 64
+bit RC2. These can be used by passing EVP_rc2_40_cbc() and EVP_rc2_64_cbc()
+respectively.
+
+The algorithm passed in the B<cipher> parameter must support ASN1 encoding of
+its parameters.
+
+Many browsers implement a "sign and encrypt" option which is simply an S/MIME
+envelopedData containing an S/MIME signed message. This can be readily produced
+by storing the S/MIME signed message in a memory BIO and passing it to
+PKCS7_encrypt().
+
+The following flags can be passed in the B<flags> parameter.
+
+If the B<PKCS7_TEXT> flag is set MIME headers for type B<text/plain> are
+prepended to the data.
+
+Normally the supplied content is translated into MIME canonical format (as
+required by the S/MIME specifications) if B<PKCS7_BINARY> is set no translation
+occurs. This option should be used if the supplied data is in binary format
+otherwise the translation will corrupt it. If B<PKCS7_BINARY> is set then
+B<PKCS7_TEXT> is ignored.
+
+If the B<PKCS7_STREAM> flag is set a partial B<PKCS7> structure is output
+suitable for streaming I/O: no data is read from the BIO B<in>.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+If the flag B<PKCS7_STREAM> is set the returned B<PKCS7> structure is B<not>
+complete and outputting its contents via a function that does not
+properly finalize the B<PKCS7> structure will give unpredictable
+results.
+
+Several functions including SMIME_write_PKCS7(), i2d_PKCS7_bio_stream(),
+PEM_write_bio_PKCS7_stream() finalize the structure. Alternatively finalization
+can be performed by obtaining the streaming ASN1 B<BIO> directly using
+BIO_new_PKCS7().
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+PKCS7_encrypt() returns either a PKCS7 structure or NULL if an error occurred.
+The error can be obtained from ERR_get_error(3).
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>, L<PKCS7_decrypt(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+The B<PKCS7_STREAM> flag was added in OpenSSL 1.0.0.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/PKCS7_sign.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/PKCS7_sign.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f319f66
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/PKCS7_sign.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+PKCS7_sign - create a PKCS#7 signedData structure
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/pkcs7.h>
+
+ PKCS7 *PKCS7_sign(X509 *signcert, EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, BIO *data, int flags);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+PKCS7_sign() creates and returns a PKCS#7 signedData structure. B<signcert> is
+the certificate to sign with, B<pkey> is the corresponding private key.
+B<certs> is an optional additional set of certificates to include in the PKCS#7
+structure (for example any intermediate CAs in the chain).
+
+The data to be signed is read from BIO B<data>.
+
+B<flags> is an optional set of flags.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+Any of the following flags (ored together) can be passed in the B<flags>
+parameter.
+
+Many S/MIME clients expect the signed content to include valid MIME headers. If
+the B<PKCS7_TEXT> flag is set MIME headers for type B<text/plain> are prepended
+to the data.
+
+If B<PKCS7_NOCERTS> is set the signer's certificate will not be included in the
+PKCS7 structure, the signer's certificate must still be supplied in the
+B<signcert> parameter though. This can reduce the size of the signature if the
+signers certificate can be obtained by other means: for example a previously
+signed message.
+
+The data being signed is included in the PKCS7 structure, unless
+B<PKCS7_DETACHED> is set in which case it is omitted. This is used for PKCS7
+detached signatures which are used in S/MIME plaintext signed messages for
+example.
+
+Normally the supplied content is translated into MIME canonical format (as
+required by the S/MIME specifications) if B<PKCS7_BINARY> is set no translation
+occurs. This option should be used if the supplied data is in binary format
+otherwise the translation will corrupt it.
+
+The signedData structure includes several PKCS#7 authenticatedAttributes
+including the signing time, the PKCS#7 content type and the supported list of
+ciphers in an SMIMECapabilities attribute. If B<PKCS7_NOATTR> is set then no
+authenticatedAttributes will be used. If B<PKCS7_NOSMIMECAP> is set then just
+the SMIMECapabilities are omitted.
+
+If present the SMIMECapabilities attribute indicates support for the following
+algorithms: triple DES, 128 bit RC2, 64 bit RC2, DES and 40 bit RC2. If any of
+these algorithms is disabled then it will not be included.
+
+If the flags B<PKCS7_STREAM> is set then the returned B<PKCS7> structure is
+just initialized ready to perform the signing operation. The signing is however
+B<not> performed and the data to be signed is not read from the B<data>
+parameter. Signing is deferred until after the data has been written. In this
+way data can be signed in a single pass.
+
+If the B<PKCS7_PARTIAL> flag is set a partial B<PKCS7> structure is output to
+which additional signers and capabilities can be added before finalization.
+
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+If the flag B<PKCS7_STREAM> is set the returned B<PKCS7> structure is B<not>
+complete and outputting its contents via a function that does not properly
+finalize the B<PKCS7> structure will give unpredictable results.
+
+Several functions including SMIME_write_PKCS7(), i2d_PKCS7_bio_stream(),
+PEM_write_bio_PKCS7_stream() finalize the structure. Alternatively finalization
+can be performed by obtaining the streaming ASN1 B<BIO> directly using
+BIO_new_PKCS7().
+
+If a signer is specified it will use the default digest for the signing
+algorithm. This is B<SHA1> for both RSA and DSA keys.
+
+The B<certs>, B<signcert> and B<pkey> parameters can all be
+B<NULL> if the B<PKCS7_PARTIAL> flag is set. One or more signers can be added
+using the function PKCS7_sign_add_signer(). PKCS7_final() must also be
+called to finalize the structure if streaming is not enabled. Alternative
+signing digests can also be specified using this method.
+
+If B<signcert> and B<pkey> are NULL then a certificates only
+PKCS#7 structure is output.
+
+In versions of OpenSSL before 1.0.0 the B<signcert> and B<pkey> parameters must
+B<NOT> be NULL.
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+Some advanced attributes such as counter signatures are not supported.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+PKCS7_sign() returns either a valid PKCS7 structure or NULL if an error
+occurred.  The error can be obtained from ERR_get_error(3).
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>, L<PKCS7_verify(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+The B<PKCS7_PARTIAL> flag, and the ability for B<certs>, B<signcert>,
+and B<pkey> parameters to be B<NULL> to be was added in OpenSSL 1.0.0
+
+The B<PKCS7_STREAM> flag was added in OpenSSL 1.0.0
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/PKCS7_sign_add_signer.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/PKCS7_sign_add_signer.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..88fef77
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/PKCS7_sign_add_signer.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+PKCS7_sign_add_signer - add a signer PKCS7 signed data structure
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/pkcs7.h>
+
+ PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *PKCS7_sign_add_signer(PKCS7 *p7, X509 *signcert, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *md, int flags);
+
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+PKCS7_sign_add_signer() adds a signer with certificate B<signcert> and private
+key B<pkey> using message digest B<md> to a PKCS7 signed data structure
+B<p7>.
+
+The PKCS7 structure should be obtained from an initial call to PKCS7_sign()
+with the flag B<PKCS7_PARTIAL> set or in the case or re-signing a valid PKCS7
+signed data structure.
+
+If the B<md> parameter is B<NULL> then the default digest for the public
+key algorithm will be used.
+
+Unless the B<PKCS7_REUSE_DIGEST> flag is set the returned PKCS7 structure
+is not complete and must be finalized either by streaming (if applicable) or
+a call to PKCS7_final().
+
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The main purpose of this function is to provide finer control over a PKCS#7
+signed data structure where the simpler PKCS7_sign() function defaults are
+not appropriate. For example if multiple signers or non default digest
+algorithms are needed.
+
+Any of the following flags (ored together) can be passed in the B<flags>
+parameter.
+
+If B<PKCS7_REUSE_DIGEST> is set then an attempt is made to copy the content
+digest value from the PKCS7 structure: to add a signer to an existing structure.
+An error occurs if a matching digest value cannot be found to copy. The
+returned PKCS7 structure will be valid and finalized when this flag is set.
+
+If B<PKCS7_PARTIAL> is set in addition to B<PKCS7_REUSE_DIGEST> then the
+B<PKCS7_SIGNER_INO> structure will not be finalized so additional attributes
+can be added. In this case an explicit call to PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_sign() is
+needed to finalize it.
+
+If B<PKCS7_NOCERTS> is set the signer's certificate will not be included in the
+PKCS7 structure, the signer's certificate must still be supplied in the
+B<signcert> parameter though. This can reduce the size of the signature if the
+signers certificate can be obtained by other means: for example a previously
+signed message.
+
+The signedData structure includes several PKCS#7 authenticatedAttributes
+including the signing time, the PKCS#7 content type and the supported list of
+ciphers in an SMIMECapabilities attribute. If B<PKCS7_NOATTR> is set then no
+authenticatedAttributes will be used. If B<PKCS7_NOSMIMECAP> is set then just
+the SMIMECapabilities are omitted.
+
+If present the SMIMECapabilities attribute indicates support for the following
+algorithms: triple DES, 128 bit RC2, 64 bit RC2, DES and 40 bit RC2. If any of
+these algorithms is disabled then it will not be included.
+
+
+PKCS7_sign_add_signers() returns an internal pointer to the PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO
+structure just added, this can be used to set additional attributes
+before it is finalized.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+PKCS7_sign_add_signers() returns an internal pointer to the PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO
+structure just added or NULL if an error occurs.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>, L<PKCS7_sign(3)>,
+L<PKCS7_final(3)>,
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+PPKCS7_sign_add_signer() was added to OpenSSL 1.0.0
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2007-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/PKCS7_verify.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/PKCS7_verify.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c34808e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/PKCS7_verify.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+PKCS7_verify, PKCS7_get0_signers - verify a PKCS#7 signedData structure
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/pkcs7.h>
+
+ int PKCS7_verify(PKCS7 *p7, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, X509_STORE *store, BIO *indata, BIO *out, int flags);
+
+ STACK_OF(X509) *PKCS7_get0_signers(PKCS7 *p7, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, int flags);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+PKCS7_verify() verifies a PKCS#7 signedData structure. B<p7> is the PKCS7
+structure to verify. B<certs> is a set of certificates in which to search for
+the signer's certificate. B<store> is a trusted certificate store (used for
+chain verification). B<indata> is the signed data if the content is not
+present in B<p7> (that is it is detached). The content is written to B<out>
+if it is not NULL.
+
+B<flags> is an optional set of flags, which can be used to modify the verify
+operation.
+
+PKCS7_get0_signers() retrieves the signer's certificates from B<p7>, it does
+B<not> check their validity or whether any signatures are valid. The B<certs>
+and B<flags> parameters have the same meanings as in PKCS7_verify().
+
+=head1 VERIFY PROCESS
+
+Normally the verify process proceeds as follows.
+
+Initially some sanity checks are performed on B<p7>. The type of B<p7> must
+be signedData. There must be at least one signature on the data and if
+the content is detached B<indata> cannot be B<NULL>.  If the content is
+not detached and B<indata> is not B<NULL>, then the structure has both
+embedded and external content. To treat this as an error, use the flag
+B<PKCS7_NO_DUAL_CONTENT>.
+The default behavior allows this, for compatibility with older
+versions of OpenSSL.
+
+An attempt is made to locate all the signer's certificates, first looking in
+the B<certs> parameter (if it is not B<NULL>) and then looking in any certificates
+contained in the B<p7> structure itself. If any signer's certificates cannot be
+located the operation fails.
+
+Each signer's certificate is chain verified using the B<smimesign> purpose and
+the supplied trusted certificate store. Any internal certificates in the message
+are used as untrusted CAs. If any chain verify fails an error code is returned.
+
+Finally the signed content is read (and written to B<out> is it is not NULL) and
+the signature's checked.
+
+If all signature's verify correctly then the function is successful.
+
+Any of the following flags (ored together) can be passed in the B<flags> parameter
+to change the default verify behaviour. Only the flag B<PKCS7_NOINTERN> is
+meaningful to PKCS7_get0_signers().
+
+If B<PKCS7_NOINTERN> is set the certificates in the message itself are not
+searched when locating the signer's certificate. This means that all the signers
+certificates must be in the B<certs> parameter.
+
+If the B<PKCS7_TEXT> flag is set MIME headers for type B<text/plain> are deleted
+from the content. If the content is not of type B<text/plain> then an error is
+returned.
+
+If B<PKCS7_NOVERIFY> is set the signer's certificates are not chain verified.
+
+If B<PKCS7_NOCHAIN> is set then the certificates contained in the message are
+not used as untrusted CAs. This means that the whole verify chain (apart from
+the signer's certificate) must be contained in the trusted store.
+
+If B<PKCS7_NOSIGS> is set then the signatures on the data are not checked.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+One application of B<PKCS7_NOINTERN> is to only accept messages signed by
+a small number of certificates. The acceptable certificates would be passed
+in the B<certs> parameter. In this case if the signer is not one of the
+certificates supplied in B<certs> then the verify will fail because the
+signer cannot be found.
+
+Care should be taken when modifying the default verify behaviour, for example
+setting B<PKCS7_NOVERIFY|PKCS7_NOSIGS> will totally disable all verification
+and any signed message will be considered valid. This combination is however
+useful if one merely wishes to write the content to B<out> and its validity
+is not considered important.
+
+Chain verification should arguably be performed  using the signing time rather
+than the current time. However since the signing time is supplied by the
+signer it cannot be trusted without additional evidence (such as a trusted
+timestamp).
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+PKCS7_verify() returns one for a successful verification and zero
+if an error occurs.
+
+PKCS7_get0_signers() returns all signers or B<NULL> if an error occurred.
+
+The error can be obtained from L<ERR_get_error(3)>
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+The trusted certificate store is not searched for the signers certificate,
+this is primarily due to the inadequacies of the current B<X509_STORE>
+functionality.
+
+The lack of single pass processing and need to hold all data in memory as
+mentioned in PKCS7_sign() also applies to PKCS7_verify().
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>, L<PKCS7_sign(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/RAND_add.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/RAND_add.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..46de165
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/RAND_add.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+RAND_add, RAND_seed, RAND_status, RAND_event, RAND_screen - add
+entropy to the PRNG
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+ void RAND_seed(const void *buf, int num);
+
+ void RAND_add(const void *buf, int num, double entropy);
+
+ int  RAND_status(void);
+
+ #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+ int  RAND_event(UINT iMsg, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lParam);
+ void RAND_screen(void);
+ #endif
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+RAND_add() mixes the B<num> bytes at B<buf> into the PRNG state. Thus,
+if the data at B<buf> are unpredictable to an adversary, this
+increases the uncertainty about the state and makes the PRNG output
+less predictable. Suitable input comes from user interaction (random
+key presses, mouse movements) and certain hardware events. The
+B<entropy> argument is (the lower bound of) an estimate of how much
+randomness is contained in B<buf>, measured in bytes. Details about
+sources of randomness and how to estimate their entropy can be found
+in the literature, e.g. RFC 1750.
+
+RAND_add() may be called with sensitive data such as user entered
+passwords. The seed values cannot be recovered from the PRNG output.
+
+OpenSSL makes sure that the PRNG state is unique for each thread. On
+systems that provide C</dev/urandom>, the randomness device is used
+to seed the PRNG transparently. However, on all other systems, the
+application is responsible for seeding the PRNG by calling RAND_add(),
+L<RAND_egd(3)>
+or L<RAND_load_file(3)>.
+
+RAND_seed() is equivalent to RAND_add() when B<num == entropy>.
+
+RAND_event() and RAND_screen() are deprecated and should not be called.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+RAND_status() returns 1 if the PRNG has been seeded
+with enough data, 0 otherwise.
+
+RAND_event() calls RAND_poll() and returns RAND_status().
+
+RAND_screen calls RAND_poll().
+
+The other functions do not return values.
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+RAND_event() and RAND_screen() are deprecated since OpenSSL
+1.1.0.  Use the functions described above instead.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<rand(3)>, L<RAND_egd(3)>,
+L<RAND_load_file(3)>, L<RAND_cleanup(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/RAND_bytes.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/RAND_bytes.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..684215c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/RAND_bytes.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+RAND_bytes, RAND_pseudo_bytes - generate random data
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+ int RAND_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
+
+Deprecated:
+
+ #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+ int RAND_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
+ #endif
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+RAND_bytes() puts B<num> cryptographically strong pseudo-random bytes
+into B<buf>. An error occurs if the PRNG has not been seeded with
+enough randomness to ensure an unpredictable byte sequence.
+
+RAND_pseudo_bytes() has been deprecated. Users should use RAND_bytes() instead.
+RAND_pseudo_bytes() puts B<num> pseudo-random bytes into B<buf>.
+Pseudo-random byte sequences generated by RAND_pseudo_bytes() will be
+unique if they are of sufficient length, but are not necessarily
+unpredictable. They can be used for non-cryptographic purposes and for
+certain purposes in cryptographic protocols, but usually not for key
+generation etc.
+
+The contents of B<buf> is mixed into the entropy pool before retrieving
+the new pseudo-random bytes unless disabled at compile time (see FAQ).
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+RAND_bytes() returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise. The error code can be
+obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)>. RAND_pseudo_bytes() returns 1 if the
+bytes generated are cryptographically strong, 0 otherwise. Both
+functions return -1 if they are not supported by the current RAND
+method.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<rand(3)>, L<ERR_get_error(3)>,
+L<RAND_add(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/RAND_cleanup.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/RAND_cleanup.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2640c7d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/RAND_cleanup.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+RAND_cleanup - erase the PRNG state
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+ #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+ void RAND_cleanup(void)
+ #endif
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+Prior to OpenSSL 1.1.0 RAND_cleanup() erases the memory used by the PRNG. This
+function is deprecated and as of version 1.1.0 does nothing. No explicit
+initialisation or de-initialisation is necessary. See L<OPENSSL_init_crypto(3)>.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUE
+
+RAND_cleanup() returns no value.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<rand(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+RAND_cleanup() was deprecated in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/RAND_egd.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/RAND_egd.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fcc57c0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/RAND_egd.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+RAND_egd, RAND_egd_bytes, RAND_query_egd_bytes - query entropy gathering daemon
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+ int RAND_egd(const char *path);
+ int RAND_egd_bytes(const char *path, int bytes);
+
+ int RAND_query_egd_bytes(const char *path, unsigned char *buf, int bytes);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+RAND_egd() queries the entropy gathering daemon EGD on socket B<path>.
+It queries 255 bytes and uses L<RAND_add(3)> to seed the
+OpenSSL built-in PRNG. RAND_egd(path) is a wrapper for
+RAND_egd_bytes(path, 255);
+
+RAND_egd_bytes() queries the entropy gathering daemon EGD on socket B<path>.
+It queries B<bytes> bytes and uses L<RAND_add(3)> to seed the
+OpenSSL built-in PRNG.
+This function is more flexible than RAND_egd().
+When only one secret key must
+be generated, it is not necessary to request the full amount 255 bytes from
+the EGD socket. This can be advantageous, since the amount of entropy
+that can be retrieved from EGD over time is limited.
+
+RAND_query_egd_bytes() performs the actual query of the EGD daemon on socket
+B<path>. If B<buf> is given, B<bytes> bytes are queried and written into
+B<buf>. If B<buf> is NULL, B<bytes> bytes are queried and used to seed the
+OpenSSL built-in PRNG using L<RAND_add(3)>.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+On systems without /dev/*random devices providing entropy from the kernel,
+the EGD entropy gathering daemon can be used to collect entropy. It provides
+a socket interface through which entropy can be gathered in chunks up to
+255 bytes. Several chunks can be queried during one connection.
+
+EGD is available from http://www.lothar.com/tech/crypto/ (C<perl
+Makefile.PL; make; make install> to install). It is run as B<egd>
+I<path>, where I<path> is an absolute path designating a socket. When
+RAND_egd() is called with that path as an argument, it tries to read
+random bytes that EGD has collected. RAND_egd() retrieves entropy from the
+daemon using the daemon's "non-blocking read" command which shall
+be answered immediately by the daemon without waiting for additional
+entropy to be collected. The write and read socket operations in the
+communication are blocking.
+
+Alternatively, the EGD-interface compatible daemon PRNGD can be used. It is
+available from
+http://prngd.sourceforge.net/ .
+PRNGD does employ an internal PRNG itself and can therefore never run
+out of entropy.
+
+OpenSSL automatically queries EGD when entropy is requested via RAND_bytes()
+or the status is checked via RAND_status() for the first time, if the socket
+is located at /var/run/egd-pool, /dev/egd-pool or /etc/egd-pool.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUE
+
+RAND_egd() and RAND_egd_bytes() return the number of bytes read from the
+daemon on success, and -1 if the connection failed or the daemon did not
+return enough data to fully seed the PRNG.
+
+RAND_query_egd_bytes() returns the number of bytes read from the daemon on
+success, and -1 if the connection failed. The PRNG state is not considered.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<rand(3)>, L<RAND_add(3)>,
+L<RAND_cleanup(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/RAND_load_file.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/RAND_load_file.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1053a92
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/RAND_load_file.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+RAND_load_file, RAND_write_file, RAND_file_name - PRNG seed file
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+ const char *RAND_file_name(char *buf, size_t num);
+
+ int RAND_load_file(const char *filename, long max_bytes);
+
+ int RAND_write_file(const char *filename);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+RAND_file_name() generates a default path for the random seed
+file. B<buf> points to a buffer of size B<num> in which to store the
+filename.
+
+On all systems, if the environment variable B<RANDFILE> is set, its
+value will be used as the seed file name.
+
+Otherwise, the file is called ".rnd", found in platform dependent locations:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item On Windows (in order of preference)
+
+%HOME%, %USERPROFILE%, %SYSTEMROOT%, C:\
+
+=item On VMS
+
+SYS$LOGIN:
+
+=item On all other systems
+
+$HOME
+
+=back
+
+If C<$HOME> (on non-Windows and non-VMS system) is not set either, or
+B<num> is too small for the path name, an error occurs.
+
+RAND_load_file() reads a number of bytes from file B<filename> and
+adds them to the PRNG. If B<max_bytes> is non-negative,
+up to B<max_bytes> are read;
+if B<max_bytes> is -1, the complete file is read.
+
+RAND_write_file() writes a number of random bytes (currently 1024) to
+file B<filename> which can be used to initialize the PRNG by calling
+RAND_load_file() in a later session.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+RAND_load_file() returns the number of bytes read or -1 on error.
+
+RAND_write_file() returns the number of bytes written, and -1 if the
+bytes written were generated without appropriate seed.
+
+RAND_file_name() returns a pointer to B<buf> on success, and NULL on
+error.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<rand(3)>, L<RAND_add(3)>, L<RAND_cleanup(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/RAND_set_rand_method.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/RAND_set_rand_method.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..02fe90c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/RAND_set_rand_method.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+RAND_set_rand_method, RAND_get_rand_method, RAND_OpenSSL - select RAND method
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+ void RAND_set_rand_method(const RAND_METHOD *meth);
+
+ const RAND_METHOD *RAND_get_rand_method(void);
+
+ RAND_METHOD *RAND_OpenSSL(void);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+A B<RAND_METHOD> specifies the functions that OpenSSL uses for random number
+generation. By modifying the method, alternative implementations such as
+hardware RNGs may be used. IMPORTANT: See the NOTES section for important
+information about how these RAND API functions are affected by the use of
+B<ENGINE> API calls.
+
+Initially, the default RAND_METHOD is the OpenSSL internal implementation, as
+returned by RAND_OpenSSL().
+
+RAND_set_default_method() makes B<meth> the method for PRNG use. B<NB>: This is
+true only whilst no ENGINE has been set as a default for RAND, so this function
+is no longer recommended.
+
+RAND_get_default_method() returns a pointer to the current RAND_METHOD.
+However, the meaningfulness of this result is dependent on whether the ENGINE
+API is being used, so this function is no longer recommended.
+
+=head1 THE RAND_METHOD STRUCTURE
+
+ typedef struct rand_meth_st
+ {
+        void (*seed)(const void *buf, int num);
+        int (*bytes)(unsigned char *buf, int num);
+        void (*cleanup)(void);
+        void (*add)(const void *buf, int num, int entropy);
+        int (*pseudorand)(unsigned char *buf, int num);
+        int (*status)(void);
+ } RAND_METHOD;
+
+The components point to method implementations used by (or called by), in order,
+RAND_seed(), RAND_bytes(), internal RAND cleanup, RAND_add(), RAND_pseudo_rand()
+and RAND_status().
+Each component may be NULL if the function is not implemented.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+RAND_set_rand_method() returns no value. RAND_get_rand_method() and
+RAND_OpenSSL() return pointers to the respective methods.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+RAND_METHOD implementations are grouped together with other
+algorithmic APIs (eg. RSA_METHOD, EVP_CIPHER, etc) in B<ENGINE> modules. If a
+default ENGINE is specified for RAND functionality using an ENGINE API function,
+that will override any RAND defaults set using the RAND API (ie.
+RAND_set_rand_method()). For this reason, the ENGINE API is the recommended way
+to control default implementations for use in RAND and other cryptographic
+algorithms.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<rand(3)>, L<engine(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/RC4_set_key.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/RC4_set_key.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fe5d2d1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/RC4_set_key.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+RC4_set_key, RC4 - RC4 encryption
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/rc4.h>
+
+ void RC4_set_key(RC4_KEY *key, int len, const unsigned char *data);
+
+ void RC4(RC4_KEY *key, unsigned long len, const unsigned char *indata,
+          unsigned char *outdata);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+This library implements the Alleged RC4 cipher, which is described for
+example in I<Applied Cryptography>.  It is believed to be compatible
+with RC4[TM], a proprietary cipher of RSA Security Inc.
+
+RC4 is a stream cipher with variable key length.  Typically, 128 bit
+(16 byte) keys are used for strong encryption, but shorter insecure
+key sizes have been widely used due to export restrictions.
+
+RC4 consists of a key setup phase and the actual encryption or
+decryption phase.
+
+RC4_set_key() sets up the B<RC4_KEY> B<key> using the B<len> bytes long
+key at B<data>.
+
+RC4() encrypts or decrypts the B<len> bytes of data at B<indata> using
+B<key> and places the result at B<outdata>.  Repeated RC4() calls with
+the same B<key> yield a continuous key stream.
+
+Since RC4 is a stream cipher (the input is XORed with a pseudo-random
+key stream to produce the output), decryption uses the same function
+calls as encryption.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+RC4_set_key() and RC4() do not return values.
+
+=head1 NOTE
+
+Applications should use the higher level functions
+L<EVP_EncryptInit(3)> etc. instead of calling these
+functions directly.
+
+It is difficult to securely use stream ciphers. For example, do not perform
+multiple encryptions using the same key stream.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<EVP_EncryptInit(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/RIPEMD160_Init.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/RIPEMD160_Init.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a372e32
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/RIPEMD160_Init.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+RIPEMD160, RIPEMD160_Init, RIPEMD160_Update, RIPEMD160_Final -
+RIPEMD-160 hash function
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ripemd.h>
+
+ unsigned char *RIPEMD160(const unsigned char *d, unsigned long n,
+                  unsigned char *md);
+
+ int RIPEMD160_Init(RIPEMD160_CTX *c);
+ int RIPEMD160_Update(RIPEMD_CTX *c, const void *data,
+                  unsigned long len);
+ int RIPEMD160_Final(unsigned char *md, RIPEMD160_CTX *c);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+RIPEMD-160 is a cryptographic hash function with a
+160 bit output.
+
+RIPEMD160() computes the RIPEMD-160 message digest of the B<n>
+bytes at B<d> and places it in B<md> (which must have space for
+RIPEMD160_DIGEST_LENGTH == 20 bytes of output). If B<md> is NULL, the digest
+is placed in a static array.
+
+The following functions may be used if the message is not completely
+stored in memory:
+
+RIPEMD160_Init() initializes a B<RIPEMD160_CTX> structure.
+
+RIPEMD160_Update() can be called repeatedly with chunks of the message to
+be hashed (B<len> bytes at B<data>).
+
+RIPEMD160_Final() places the message digest in B<md>, which must have
+space for RIPEMD160_DIGEST_LENGTH == 20 bytes of output, and erases
+the B<RIPEMD160_CTX>.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+RIPEMD160() returns a pointer to the hash value.
+
+RIPEMD160_Init(), RIPEMD160_Update() and RIPEMD160_Final() return 1 for
+success, 0 otherwise.
+
+=head1 NOTE
+
+Applications should use the higher level functions
+L<EVP_DigestInit(3)> etc. instead of calling these
+functions directly.
+
+=head1 CONFORMING TO
+
+ISO/IEC 10118-3 (draft) (??)
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<EVP_DigestInit(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/RSA_blinding_on.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/RSA_blinding_on.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..33d49d3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/RSA_blinding_on.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+RSA_blinding_on, RSA_blinding_off - protect the RSA operation from timing attacks
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/rsa.h>
+
+ int RSA_blinding_on(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+ void RSA_blinding_off(RSA *rsa);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+RSA is vulnerable to timing attacks. In a setup where attackers can
+measure the time of RSA decryption or signature operations, blinding
+must be used to protect the RSA operation from that attack.
+
+RSA_blinding_on() turns blinding on for key B<rsa> and generates a
+random blinding factor. B<ctx> is B<NULL> or a pre-allocated and
+initialized B<BN_CTX>. The random number generator must be seeded
+prior to calling RSA_blinding_on().
+
+RSA_blinding_off() turns blinding off and frees the memory used for
+the blinding factor.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+RSA_blinding_on() returns 1 on success, and 0 if an error occurred.
+
+RSA_blinding_off() returns no value.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/RSA_check_key.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/RSA_check_key.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d8689f4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/RSA_check_key.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+RSA_check_key_ex, RSA_check_key - validate private RSA keys
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/rsa.h>
+
+ int RSA_check_key_ex(RSA *rsa, BN_GENCB *cb);
+
+ int RSA_check_key(RSA *rsa);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+RSA_check_key_ex() function validates RSA keys.
+It checks that B<p> and B<q> are
+in fact prime, and that B<n = p*q>.
+
+It does not work on RSA public keys that have only the modulus
+and public exponent elements populated.
+It also checks that B<d*e = 1 mod (p-1*q-1)>,
+and that B<dmp1>, B<dmq1> and B<iqmp> are set correctly or are B<NULL>.
+It performs integrity checks on all
+the RSA key material, so the RSA key structure must contain all the private
+key data too.
+Therefore, it cannot be used with any arbitrary RSA key object,
+even if it is otherwise fit for regular RSA operation.
+
+The B<cb> parameter is a callback that will be invoked in the same
+manner as L<BN_is_prime_ex(3)>.
+
+RSA_check_key() is equivalent to RSA_check_key_ex() with a NULL B<cb>.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUE
+
+RSA_check_key_ex() and RSA_check_key()
+return 1 if B<rsa> is a valid RSA key, and 0 otherwise.
+They return -1 if an error occurs while checking the key.
+
+If the key is invalid or an error occurred, the reason code can be
+obtained using L<ERR_get_error(3)>.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+Unlike most other RSA functions, this function does B<not> work
+transparently with any underlying ENGINE implementation because it uses the
+key data in the RSA structure directly. An ENGINE implementation can
+override the way key data is stored and handled, and can even provide
+support for HSM keys - in which case the RSA structure may contain B<no>
+key data at all! If the ENGINE in question is only being used for
+acceleration or analysis purposes, then in all likelihood the RSA key data
+is complete and untouched, but this can't be assumed in the general case.
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+A method of verifying the RSA key using opaque RSA API functions might need
+to be considered. Right now RSA_check_key() simply uses the RSA structure
+elements directly, bypassing the RSA_METHOD table altogether (and
+completely violating encapsulation and object-orientation in the process).
+The best fix will probably be to introduce a "check_key()" handler to the
+RSA_METHOD function table so that alternative implementations can also
+provide their own verifiers.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<BN_is_prime_ex(3)>,
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+RSA_check_key_ex() appeared after OpenSSL 1.0.2.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/RSA_generate_key.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/RSA_generate_key.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e51c0b1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/RSA_generate_key.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+RSA_generate_key_ex, RSA_generate_key - generate RSA key pair
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/rsa.h>
+
+ int RSA_generate_key_ex(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e, BN_GENCB *cb);
+
+Deprecated:
+
+ #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x00908000L
+ RSA *RSA_generate_key(int num, unsigned long e,
+    void (*callback)(int, int, void *), void *cb_arg);
+ #endif
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+RSA_generate_key_ex() generates a key pair and stores it in the B<RSA>
+structure provided in B<rsa>. The pseudo-random number generator must
+be seeded prior to calling RSA_generate_key_ex().
+
+The modulus size will be of length B<bits>, and the public exponent will be
+B<e>. Key sizes with B<num> E<lt> 1024 should be considered insecure.
+The exponent is an odd number, typically 3, 17 or 65537.
+
+A callback function may be used to provide feedback about the
+progress of the key generation. If B<cb> is not B<NULL>, it
+will be called as follows using the BN_GENCB_call() function
+described on the L<BN_generate_prime(3)> page.
+
+=over 2
+
+=item *
+
+While a random prime number is generated, it is called as
+described in L<BN_generate_prime(3)>.
+
+=item *
+
+When the n-th randomly generated prime is rejected as not
+suitable for the key, B<BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n)> is called.
+
+=item *
+
+When a random p has been found with p-1 relatively prime to B<e>,
+it is called as B<BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 0)>.
+
+=back
+
+The process is then repeated for prime q with B<BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 1)>.
+
+RSA_generate_key() is deprecated (new applications should use
+RSA_generate_key_ex() instead). RSA_generate_key() works in the same way as
+RSA_generate_key_ex() except it uses "old style" call backs. See
+L<BN_generate_prime(3)> for further details.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUE
+
+RSA_generate_key_ex() returns 1 on success or 0 on error.
+RSA_generate_key() returns the key on success or B<NULL> on error.
+
+The error codes can be obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)>.
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+B<BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, x)> is used with two different meanings.
+
+RSA_generate_key() goes into an infinite loop for illegal input values.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>, L<RAND_bytes(3)>,
+L<RSA_generate_key(3)>, L<BN_generate_prime(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/RSA_get0_key.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/RSA_get0_key.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..579a2df
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/RSA_get0_key.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+RSA_set0_key, RSA_set0_factors, RSA_set0_crt_params, RSA_get0_key,
+RSA_get0_factors, RSA_get0_crt_params, RSA_clear_flags,
+RSA_test_flags, RSA_set_flags, RSA_get0_engine - Routines for getting
+and setting data in an RSA object
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/rsa.h>
+
+ int RSA_set0_key(RSA *r, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *d);
+ int RSA_set0_factors(RSA *r, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q);
+ int RSA_set0_crt_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *dmp1, BIGNUM *dmq1, BIGNUM *iqmp);
+ void RSA_get0_key(const RSA *r,
+                   const BIGNUM **n, const BIGNUM **e, const BIGNUM **d);
+ void RSA_get0_factors(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q);
+ void RSA_get0_crt_params(const RSA *r,
+                          const BIGNUM **dmp1, const BIGNUM **dmq1,
+                          const BIGNUM **iqmp);
+ void RSA_clear_flags(RSA *r, int flags);
+ int RSA_test_flags(const RSA *r, int flags);
+ void RSA_set_flags(RSA *r, int flags);
+ ENGINE *RSA_get0_engine(RSA *r);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+An RSA object contains the components for the public and private key,
+B<n>, B<e>, B<d>, B<p>, B<q>, B<dmp1>, B<dmq1> and B<iqmp>.  B<n> is
+the modulus common to both public and private key, B<e> is the public
+exponent and B<d> is the private exponent.  B<p>, B<q>, B<dmp1>,
+B<dmq1> and B<iqmp> are the factors for the second representation of a
+private key (see PKCS#1 section 3 Key Types), where B<p> and B<q> are
+the first and second factor of B<n> and B<dmp1>, B<dmq1> and B<iqmp>
+are the exponents and coefficient for CRT calculations.
+
+The B<n>, B<e> and B<d> parameters can be obtained by calling
+RSA_get0_key().  If they have not been set yet, then B<*n>, B<*e> and
+B<*d> will be set to NULL.  Otherwise, they are set to pointers to
+their respective values. These point directly to the internal
+representations of the values and therefore should not be freed
+by the caller.
+
+The B<n>, B<e> and B<d> parameter values can be set by calling
+RSA_set0_key() and passing the new values for B<n>, B<e> and B<d> as
+parameters to the function.  The values B<n> and B<e> must be non-NULL
+the first time this function is called on a given RSA object. The
+value B<d> may be NULL. On subsequent calls any of these values may be
+NULL which means the corresponding RSA field is left untouched.
+Calling this function transfers the memory management of the values to
+the RSA object, and therefore the values that have been passed in
+should not be freed by the caller after this function has been called.
+
+In a similar fashion, the B<p> and B<q> parameters can be obtained and
+set with RSA_get0_factors() and RSA_set0_factors(), and the B<dmp1>,
+B<dmq1> and B<iqmp> parameters can be obtained and set with
+RSA_get0_crt_params() and RSA_set0_crt_params().
+
+For RSA_get0_key(), RSA_get0_factors(), and RSA_get0_crt_params(),
+NULL value BIGNUM ** output parameters are permitted.  The functions
+ignore NULL parameters but return values for other, non-NULL, parameters.
+
+RSA_set_flags() sets the flags in the B<flags> parameter on the RSA
+object. Multiple flags can be passed in one go (bitwise ORed together).
+Any flags that are already set are left set. RSA_test_flags() tests to
+see whether the flags passed in the B<flags> parameter are currently
+set in the RSA object. Multiple flags can be tested in one go. All
+flags that are currently set are returned, or zero if none of the
+flags are set. RSA_clear_flags() clears the specified flags within the
+RSA object.
+
+RSA_get0_engine() returns a handle to the ENGINE that has been set for
+this RSA object, or NULL if no such ENGINE has been set.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+Values retrieved with RSA_get0_key() are owned by the RSA object used
+in the call and may therefore I<not> be passed to RSA_set0_key().  If
+needed, duplicate the received value using BN_dup() and pass the
+duplicate.  The same applies to RSA_get0_factors() and RSA_set0_factors()
+as well as RSA_get0_crt_params() and RSA_set0_crt_params().
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+RSA_set0_key(), RSA_set0_factors and RSA_set0_crt_params() return 1 on
+success or 0 on failure.
+
+RSA_test_flags() returns the current state of the flags in the RSA object.
+
+RSA_get0_engine() returns the ENGINE set for the RSA object or NULL if no
+ENGINE has been set.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<rsa(3)>, L<RSA_new(3)>, L<RSA_size(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+The functions described here were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/RSA_meth_new.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/RSA_meth_new.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9970aa6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/RSA_meth_new.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,235 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+RSA_meth_get0_app_data, RSA_meth_set0_app_data,
+RSA_meth_new, RSA_meth_free, RSA_meth_dup, RSA_meth_get0_name,
+RSA_meth_set1_name, RSA_meth_get_flags, RSA_meth_set_flags,
+RSA_meth_get_pub_enc,
+RSA_meth_set_pub_enc, RSA_meth_get_pub_dec, RSA_meth_set_pub_dec,
+RSA_meth_get_priv_enc, RSA_meth_set_priv_enc, RSA_meth_get_priv_dec,
+RSA_meth_set_priv_dec, RSA_meth_get_mod_exp, RSA_meth_set_mod_exp,
+RSA_meth_get_bn_mod_exp, RSA_meth_set_bn_mod_exp, RSA_meth_get_init,
+RSA_meth_set_init, RSA_meth_get_finish, RSA_meth_set_finish,
+RSA_meth_get_sign, RSA_meth_set_sign, RSA_meth_get_verify,
+RSA_meth_set_verify, RSA_meth_get_keygen, RSA_meth_set_keygen
+- Routines to build up RSA methods
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/rsa.h>
+
+ RSA_METHOD *RSA_meth_new(const char *name, int flags);
+ void RSA_meth_free(RSA_METHOD *meth);
+ RSA_METHOD *RSA_meth_dup(const RSA_METHOD *meth);
+ const char *RSA_meth_get0_name(const RSA_METHOD *meth);
+ int RSA_meth_set1_name(RSA_METHOD *meth, const char *name);
+ int RSA_meth_get_flags(RSA_METHOD *meth);
+ int RSA_meth_set_flags(RSA_METHOD *meth, int flags);
+ void *RSA_meth_get0_app_data(const RSA_METHOD *meth);
+ int RSA_meth_set0_app_data(RSA_METHOD *meth, void *app_data);
+ int (*RSA_meth_get_pub_enc(const RSA_METHOD *meth))
+     (int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+      unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+ int RSA_meth_set_pub_enc(RSA_METHOD *rsa,
+                          int (*pub_enc) (int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+                                          unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,
+                                          int padding));
+ int (*RSA_meth_get_pub_dec(const RSA_METHOD *meth))
+     (int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+      unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+ int RSA_meth_set_pub_dec(RSA_METHOD *rsa,
+                          int (*pub_dec) (int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+                                          unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,
+                                          int padding));
+ int (*RSA_meth_get_priv_enc(const RSA_METHOD *meth))
+     (int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+      unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+ int RSA_meth_set_priv_enc(RSA_METHOD *rsa,
+                           int (*priv_enc) (int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+                                            unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,
+                                            int padding));
+ int (*RSA_meth_get_priv_dec(const RSA_METHOD *meth))
+     (int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+      unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+ int RSA_meth_set_priv_dec(RSA_METHOD *rsa,
+                           int (*priv_dec) (int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+                                            unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,
+                                            int padding));
+     /* Can be null */
+ int (*RSA_meth_get_mod_exp(const RSA_METHOD *meth))
+     (BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx);
+ int RSA_meth_set_mod_exp(RSA_METHOD *rsa,
+                          int (*mod_exp) (BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa,
+                                          BN_CTX *ctx));
+     /* Can be null */
+ int (*RSA_meth_get_bn_mod_exp(const RSA_METHOD *meth))
+     (BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
+      const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx);
+ int RSA_meth_set_bn_mod_exp(RSA_METHOD *rsa,
+                             int (*bn_mod_exp) (BIGNUM *r,
+                                                const BIGNUM *a,
+                                                const BIGNUM *p,
+                                                const BIGNUM *m,
+                                                BN_CTX *ctx,
+                                                BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx));
+     /* called at new */
+ int (*RSA_meth_get_init(const RSA_METHOD *meth)) (RSA *rsa);
+ int RSA_meth_set_init(RSA_METHOD *rsa, int (*init) (RSA *rsa));
+     /* called at free */
+ int (*RSA_meth_get_finish(const RSA_METHOD *meth)) (RSA *rsa);
+ int RSA_meth_set_finish(RSA_METHOD *rsa, int (*finish) (RSA *rsa));
+ int (*RSA_meth_get_sign(const RSA_METHOD *meth))
+     (int type,
+      const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_length,
+      unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen,
+      const RSA *rsa);
+ int RSA_meth_set_sign(RSA_METHOD *rsa,
+                       int (*sign) (int type, const unsigned char *m,
+                                    unsigned int m_length,
+                                    unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen,
+                                    const RSA *rsa));
+ int (*RSA_meth_get_verify(const RSA_METHOD *meth))
+     (int dtype, const unsigned char *m,
+      unsigned int m_length, const unsigned char *sigbuf,
+      unsigned int siglen, const RSA *rsa);
+ int RSA_meth_set_verify(RSA_METHOD *rsa,
+                         int (*verify) (int dtype, const unsigned char *m,
+                                        unsigned int m_length,
+                                        const unsigned char *sigbuf,
+                                        unsigned int siglen, const RSA *rsa));
+ int (*RSA_meth_get_keygen(const RSA_METHOD *meth))
+     (RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e, BN_GENCB *cb);
+ int RSA_meth_set_keygen(RSA_METHOD *rsa,
+                         int (*keygen) (RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e,
+                                        BN_GENCB *cb));
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The B<RSA_METHOD> type is a structure used for the provision of custom
+RSA implementations. It provides a set of of functions used by OpenSSL
+for the implementation of the various RSA capabilities. See the L<rsa>
+page for more information.
+
+RSA_meth_new() creates a new B<RSA_METHOD> structure. It should be
+given a unique B<name> and a set of B<flags>. The B<name> should be a
+NULL terminated string, which will be duplicated and stored in the
+B<RSA_METHOD> object. It is the callers responsibility to free the
+original string. The flags will be used during the construction of a
+new B<RSA> object based on this B<RSA_METHOD>. Any new B<RSA> object
+will have those flags set by default.
+
+RSA_meth_dup() creates a duplicate copy of the B<RSA_METHOD> object
+passed as a parameter. This might be useful for creating a new
+B<RSA_METHOD> based on an existing one, but with some differences.
+
+RSA_meth_free() destroys an B<RSA_METHOD> structure and frees up any
+memory associated with it.
+
+RSA_meth_get0_name() will return a pointer to the name of this
+RSA_METHOD. This is a pointer to the internal name string and so
+should not be freed by the caller. RSA_meth_set1_name() sets the name
+of the RSA_METHOD to B<name>. The string is duplicated and the copy is
+stored in the RSA_METHOD structure, so the caller remains responsible
+for freeing the memory associated with the name.
+
+RSA_meth_get_flags() returns the current value of the flags associated
+with this RSA_METHOD. RSA_meth_set_flags() provides the ability to set
+these flags.
+
+The functions RSA_meth_get0_app_data() and RSA_meth_set0_app_data()
+provide the ability to associate implementation specific data with the
+RSA_METHOD. It is the application's responsibility to free this data
+before the RSA_METHOD is freed via a call to RSA_meth_free().
+
+RSA_meth_get_sign() and RSA_meth_set_sign() get and set the function
+used for creating an RSA signature respectively. This function will be
+called in response to the application calling RSA_sign(). The
+parameters for the function have the same meaning as for RSA_sign().
+
+RSA_meth_get_verify() and RSA_meth_set_verify() get and set the
+function used for verifying an RSA signature respectively. This
+function will be called in response to the application calling
+RSA_verify(). The parameters for the function have the same meaning as
+for RSA_verify().
+
+RSA_meth_get_mod_exp() and RSA_meth_set_mod_exp() get and set the
+function used for CRT computations.
+
+RSA_meth_get_bn_mod_exp() and RSA_meth_set_bn_mod_exp() get and set
+the function used for CRT computations, specifically the following
+value:
+
+ r = a ^ p mod m
+
+Both the mod_exp() and bn_mod_exp() functions are called by the
+default OpenSSL method during encryption, decryption, signing and
+verification.
+
+RSA_meth_get_init() and RSA_meth_set_init() get and set the function
+used for creating a new RSA instance respectively. This function will
+be called in response to the application calling RSA_new() (if the
+current default RSA_METHOD is this one) or RSA_new_method(). The
+RSA_new() and RSA_new_method() functions will allocate the memory for
+the new RSA object, and a pointer to this newly allocated structure
+will be passed as a parameter to the function. This function may be
+NULL.
+
+RSA_meth_get_finish() and RSA_meth_set_finish() get and set the
+function used for destroying an instance of an RSA object respectively.
+This function will be called in response to the application calling
+RSA_free(). A pointer to the RSA to be destroyed is passed as a
+parameter. The destroy function should be used for RSA implementation
+specific clean up. The memory for the RSA itself should not be freed
+by this function. This function may be NULL.
+
+RSA_meth_get_keygen() and RSA_meth_set_keygen() get and set the
+function used for generating a new RSA key pair respectively. This
+function will be called in response to the application calling
+RSA_generate_key(). The parameter for the function has the same
+meaning as for RSA_generate_key().
+
+RSA_meth_get_pub_enc(), RSA_meth_set_pub_enc(),
+RSA_meth_get_pub_dec(), RSA_meth_set_pub_dec(),
+RSA_meth_get_priv_enc(), RSA_meth_set_priv_enc(),
+RSA_meth_get_priv_dec(), RSA_meth_set_priv_dec() get and set the
+functions used for public and private key encryption and decryption.
+These functions will be called in response to the application calling
+RSA_public_encrypt(), RSA_private_decrypt(), RSA_private_encrypt() and
+RSA_public_decrypt() and take the same parameters as those.
+
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+RSA_meth_new() and RSA_meth_dup() return the newly allocated
+RSA_METHOD object or NULL on failure.
+
+RSA_meth_get0_name() and RSA_meth_get_flags() return the name and
+flags associated with the RSA_METHOD respectively.
+
+All other RSA_meth_get_*() functions return the appropriate function
+pointer that has been set in the RSA_METHOD, or NULL if no such
+pointer has yet been set.
+
+RSA_meth_set1_name and all RSA_meth_set_*() functions return 1 on
+success or 0 on failure.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<RSA_new(3)>, L<RSA_generate_key(3)>, L<RSA_sign(3)>,
+L<RSA_set_method(3)>, L<RSA_size(3)>, L<RSA_get0_key(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+The functions described here were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/RSA_new.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/RSA_new.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3317920
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/RSA_new.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+RSA_new, RSA_free - allocate and free RSA objects
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/rsa.h>
+
+ RSA * RSA_new(void);
+
+ void RSA_free(RSA *rsa);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+RSA_new() allocates and initializes an B<RSA> structure. It is equivalent to
+calling RSA_new_method(NULL).
+
+RSA_free() frees the B<RSA> structure and its components. The key is
+erased before the memory is returned to the system.
+If B<rsa> is NULL nothing is done.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+If the allocation fails, RSA_new() returns B<NULL> and sets an error
+code that can be obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)>. Otherwise it returns
+a pointer to the newly allocated structure.
+
+RSA_free() returns no value.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>,
+L<RSA_generate_key(3)>,
+L<RSA_new_method(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5b53eb9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1, RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1,
+RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2, RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2,
+RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP, RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP,
+RSA_padding_add_SSLv23, RSA_padding_check_SSLv23,
+RSA_padding_add_none, RSA_padding_check_none - asymmetric encryption
+padding
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/rsa.h>
+
+ int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+    unsigned char *f, int fl);
+
+ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+    unsigned char *f, int fl, int rsa_len);
+
+ int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+    unsigned char *f, int fl);
+
+ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+    unsigned char *f, int fl, int rsa_len);
+
+ int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+    unsigned char *f, int fl, unsigned char *p, int pl);
+
+ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+    unsigned char *f, int fl, int rsa_len, unsigned char *p, int pl);
+
+ int RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+    unsigned char *f, int fl);
+
+ int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+    unsigned char *f, int fl, int rsa_len);
+
+ int RSA_padding_add_none(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+    unsigned char *f, int fl);
+
+ int RSA_padding_check_none(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+    unsigned char *f, int fl, int rsa_len);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The RSA_padding_xxx_xxx() functions are called from the RSA encrypt,
+decrypt, sign and verify functions. Normally they should not be called
+from application programs.
+
+However, they can also be called directly to implement padding for other
+asymmetric ciphers. RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP() and
+RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP() may be used in an application combined
+with B<RSA_NO_PADDING> in order to implement OAEP with an encoding
+parameter.
+
+RSA_padding_add_xxx() encodes B<fl> bytes from B<f> so as to fit into
+B<tlen> bytes and stores the result at B<to>. An error occurs if B<fl>
+does not meet the size requirements of the encoding method.
+
+The following encoding methods are implemented:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item PKCS1_type_1
+
+PKCS #1 v2.0 EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 (PKCS #1 v1.5 block type 1); used for signatures
+
+=item PKCS1_type_2
+
+PKCS #1 v2.0 EME-PKCS1-v1_5 (PKCS #1 v1.5 block type 2)
+
+=item PKCS1_OAEP
+
+PKCS #1 v2.0 EME-OAEP
+
+=item SSLv23
+
+PKCS #1 EME-PKCS1-v1_5 with SSL-specific modification
+
+=item none
+
+simply copy the data
+
+=back
+
+The random number generator must be seeded prior to calling
+RSA_padding_add_xxx().
+
+RSA_padding_check_xxx() verifies that the B<fl> bytes at B<f> contain
+a valid encoding for a B<rsa_len> byte RSA key in the respective
+encoding method and stores the recovered data of at most B<tlen> bytes
+(for B<RSA_NO_PADDING>: of size B<tlen>)
+at B<to>.
+
+For RSA_padding_xxx_OAEP(), B<p> points to the encoding parameter
+of length B<pl>. B<p> may be B<NULL> if B<pl> is 0.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+The RSA_padding_add_xxx() functions return 1 on success, 0 on error.
+The RSA_padding_check_xxx() functions return the length of the
+recovered data, -1 on error. Error codes can be obtained by calling
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>.
+
+=head1 WARNING
+
+The RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2() padding check leaks timing
+information which can potentially be used to mount a Bleichenbacher
+padding oracle attack. This is an inherent weakness in the PKCS #1
+v1.5 padding design. Prefer PKCS1_OAEP padding.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<RSA_public_encrypt(3)>,
+L<RSA_private_decrypt(3)>,
+L<RSA_sign(3)>, L<RSA_verify(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/RSA_print.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/RSA_print.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1367478
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/RSA_print.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+RSA_print, RSA_print_fp,
+DSAparams_print, DSAparams_print_fp, DSA_print, DSA_print_fp,
+DHparams_print, DHparams_print_fp - print cryptographic parameters
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/rsa.h>
+
+ int RSA_print(BIO *bp, RSA *x, int offset);
+ int RSA_print_fp(FILE *fp, RSA *x, int offset);
+
+ #include <openssl/dsa.h>
+
+ int DSAparams_print(BIO *bp, DSA *x);
+ int DSAparams_print_fp(FILE *fp, DSA *x);
+ int DSA_print(BIO *bp, DSA *x, int offset);
+ int DSA_print_fp(FILE *fp, DSA *x, int offset);
+
+ #include <openssl/dh.h>
+
+ int DHparams_print(BIO *bp, DH *x);
+ int DHparams_print_fp(FILE *fp, DH *x);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+A human-readable hexadecimal output of the components of the RSA
+key, DSA parameters or key or DH parameters is printed to B<bp> or B<fp>.
+
+The output lines are indented by B<offset> spaces.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+These functions return 1 on success, 0 on error.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<BN_bn2bin(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/RSA_private_encrypt.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/RSA_private_encrypt.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1eb7a0a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/RSA_private_encrypt.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+RSA_private_encrypt, RSA_public_decrypt - low level signature operations
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/rsa.h>
+
+ int RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+    unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+
+ int RSA_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+    unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+These functions handle RSA signatures at a low level.
+
+RSA_private_encrypt() signs the B<flen> bytes at B<from> (usually a
+message digest with an algorithm identifier) using the private key
+B<rsa> and stores the signature in B<to>. B<to> must point to
+B<RSA_size(rsa)> bytes of memory.
+
+B<padding> denotes one of the following modes:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item RSA_PKCS1_PADDING
+
+PKCS #1 v1.5 padding. This function does not handle the
+B<algorithmIdentifier> specified in PKCS #1. When generating or
+verifying PKCS #1 signatures, L<RSA_sign(3)> and L<RSA_verify(3)> should be
+used.
+
+=item RSA_NO_PADDING
+
+Raw RSA signature. This mode should I<only> be used to implement
+cryptographically sound padding modes in the application code.
+Signing user data directly with RSA is insecure.
+
+=back
+
+RSA_public_decrypt() recovers the message digest from the B<flen>
+bytes long signature at B<from> using the signer's public key
+B<rsa>. B<to> must point to a memory section large enough to hold the
+message digest (which is smaller than B<RSA_size(rsa) -
+11>). B<padding> is the padding mode that was used to sign the data.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+RSA_private_encrypt() returns the size of the signature (i.e.,
+RSA_size(rsa)). RSA_public_decrypt() returns the size of the
+recovered message digest.
+
+On error, -1 is returned; the error codes can be
+obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)>.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>,
+L<RSA_sign(3)>, L<RSA_verify(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/RSA_public_encrypt.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/RSA_public_encrypt.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b1dd50d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/RSA_public_encrypt.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+RSA_public_encrypt, RSA_private_decrypt - RSA public key cryptography
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/rsa.h>
+
+ int RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+    unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+
+ int RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+     unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+RSA_public_encrypt() encrypts the B<flen> bytes at B<from> (usually a
+session key) using the public key B<rsa> and stores the ciphertext in
+B<to>. B<to> must point to RSA_size(B<rsa>) bytes of memory.
+
+B<padding> denotes one of the following modes:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item RSA_PKCS1_PADDING
+
+PKCS #1 v1.5 padding. This currently is the most widely used mode.
+
+=item RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING
+
+EME-OAEP as defined in PKCS #1 v2.0 with SHA-1, MGF1 and an empty
+encoding parameter. This mode is recommended for all new applications.
+
+=item RSA_SSLV23_PADDING
+
+PKCS #1 v1.5 padding with an SSL-specific modification that denotes
+that the server is SSL3 capable.
+
+=item RSA_NO_PADDING
+
+Raw RSA encryption. This mode should I<only> be used to implement
+cryptographically sound padding modes in the application code.
+Encrypting user data directly with RSA is insecure.
+
+=back
+
+B<flen> must be less than RSA_size(B<rsa>) - 11 for the PKCS #1 v1.5
+based padding modes, less than RSA_size(B<rsa>) - 41 for
+RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING and exactly RSA_size(B<rsa>) for RSA_NO_PADDING.
+The random number generator must be seeded prior to calling
+RSA_public_encrypt().
+
+RSA_private_decrypt() decrypts the B<flen> bytes at B<from> using the
+private key B<rsa> and stores the plaintext in B<to>. B<to> must point
+to a memory section large enough to hold the decrypted data (which is
+smaller than RSA_size(B<rsa>)). B<padding> is the padding mode that
+was used to encrypt the data.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+RSA_public_encrypt() returns the size of the encrypted data (i.e.,
+RSA_size(B<rsa>)). RSA_private_decrypt() returns the size of the
+recovered plaintext.
+
+On error, -1 is returned; the error codes can be
+obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)>.
+
+=head1 WARNING
+
+Decryption failures in the RSA_PKCS1_PADDING mode leak information
+which can potentially be used to mount a Bleichenbacher padding oracle
+attack. This is an inherent weakness in the PKCS #1 v1.5 padding
+design. Prefer RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING.
+
+=head1 CONFORMING TO
+
+SSL, PKCS #1 v2.0
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>, L<rand(3)>,
+L<RSA_size(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/RSA_set_method.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/RSA_set_method.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..668ad7a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/RSA_set_method.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,186 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+RSA_set_default_method, RSA_get_default_method, RSA_set_method,
+RSA_get_method, RSA_PKCS1_OpenSSL, RSA_flags,
+RSA_new_method - select RSA method
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/rsa.h>
+
+ void RSA_set_default_method(const RSA_METHOD *meth);
+
+ RSA_METHOD *RSA_get_default_method(void);
+
+ int RSA_set_method(RSA *rsa, const RSA_METHOD *meth);
+
+ RSA_METHOD *RSA_get_method(const RSA *rsa);
+
+ RSA_METHOD *RSA_PKCS1_OpenSSL(void);
+
+ int RSA_flags(const RSA *rsa);
+
+ RSA *RSA_new_method(ENGINE *engine);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+An B<RSA_METHOD> specifies the functions that OpenSSL uses for RSA
+operations. By modifying the method, alternative implementations such as
+hardware accelerators may be used. IMPORTANT: See the NOTES section for
+important information about how these RSA API functions are affected by the
+use of B<ENGINE> API calls.
+
+Initially, the default RSA_METHOD is the OpenSSL internal implementation,
+as returned by RSA_PKCS1_OpenSSL().
+
+RSA_set_default_method() makes B<meth> the default method for all RSA
+structures created later.
+B<NB>: This is true only whilst no ENGINE has
+been set as a default for RSA, so this function is no longer recommended.
+This function is not thread-safe and should not be called at the same time
+as other OpenSSL functions.
+
+RSA_get_default_method() returns a pointer to the current default
+RSA_METHOD. However, the meaningfulness of this result is dependent on
+whether the ENGINE API is being used, so this function is no longer
+recommended.
+
+RSA_set_method() selects B<meth> to perform all operations using the key
+B<rsa>. This will replace the RSA_METHOD used by the RSA key and if the
+previous method was supplied by an ENGINE, the handle to that ENGINE will
+be released during the change. It is possible to have RSA keys that only
+work with certain RSA_METHOD implementations (eg. from an ENGINE module
+that supports embedded hardware-protected keys), and in such cases
+attempting to change the RSA_METHOD for the key can have unexpected
+results.
+
+RSA_get_method() returns a pointer to the RSA_METHOD being used by B<rsa>.
+This method may or may not be supplied by an ENGINE implementation, but if
+it is, the return value can only be guaranteed to be valid as long as the
+RSA key itself is valid and does not have its implementation changed by
+RSA_set_method().
+
+RSA_flags() returns the B<flags> that are set for B<rsa>'s current
+RSA_METHOD. See the BUGS section.
+
+RSA_new_method() allocates and initializes an RSA structure so that
+B<engine> will be used for the RSA operations. If B<engine> is NULL, the
+default ENGINE for RSA operations is used, and if no default ENGINE is set,
+the RSA_METHOD controlled by RSA_set_default_method() is used.
+
+RSA_flags() returns the B<flags> that are set for B<rsa>'s current method.
+
+RSA_new_method() allocates and initializes an B<RSA> structure so that
+B<method> will be used for the RSA operations. If B<method> is B<NULL>,
+the default method is used.
+
+=head1 THE RSA_METHOD STRUCTURE
+
+ typedef struct rsa_meth_st
+ {
+     /* name of the implementation */
+        const char *name;
+
+     /* encrypt */
+        int (*rsa_pub_enc)(int flen, unsigned char *from,
+          unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+
+     /* verify arbitrary data */
+        int (*rsa_pub_dec)(int flen, unsigned char *from,
+          unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+
+     /* sign arbitrary data */
+        int (*rsa_priv_enc)(int flen, unsigned char *from,
+          unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+
+     /* decrypt */
+        int (*rsa_priv_dec)(int flen, unsigned char *from,
+          unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+
+     /* compute r0 = r0 ^ I mod rsa->n (May be NULL for some
+                                        implementations) */
+        int (*rsa_mod_exp)(BIGNUM *r0, BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa);
+
+     /* compute r = a ^ p mod m (May be NULL for some implementations) */
+        int (*bn_mod_exp)(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
+          const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx);
+
+     /* called at RSA_new */
+        int (*init)(RSA *rsa);
+
+     /* called at RSA_free */
+        int (*finish)(RSA *rsa);
+
+     /* RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY        - rsa_mod_exp is called for private key
+      *                            operations, even if p,q,dmp1,dmq1,iqmp
+      *                            are NULL
+      * RSA_METHOD_FLAG_NO_CHECK - don't check pub/private match
+      */
+        int flags;
+
+        char *app_data; /* ?? */
+
+        int (*rsa_sign)(int type,
+                const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_length,
+                unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa);
+        int (*rsa_verify)(int dtype,
+                const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_length,
+                const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen,
+                                                                const RSA *rsa);
+     /* keygen. If NULL builtin RSA key generation will be used */
+        int (*rsa_keygen)(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e, BN_GENCB *cb);
+
+ } RSA_METHOD;
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+RSA_PKCS1_OpenSSL(), RSA_PKCS1_null_method(), RSA_get_default_method()
+and RSA_get_method() return pointers to the respective RSA_METHODs.
+
+RSA_set_default_method() returns no value.
+
+RSA_set_method() returns a pointer to the old RSA_METHOD implementation
+that was replaced. However, this return value should probably be ignored
+because if it was supplied by an ENGINE, the pointer could be invalidated
+at any time if the ENGINE is unloaded (in fact it could be unloaded as a
+result of the RSA_set_method() function releasing its handle to the
+ENGINE). For this reason, the return type may be replaced with a B<void>
+declaration in a future release.
+
+RSA_new_method() returns NULL and sets an error code that can be obtained
+by L<ERR_get_error(3)> if the allocation fails. Otherwise
+it returns a pointer to the newly allocated structure.
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+The behaviour of RSA_flags() is a mis-feature that is left as-is for now
+to avoid creating compatibility problems. RSA functionality, such as the
+encryption functions, are controlled by the B<flags> value in the RSA key
+itself, not by the B<flags> value in the RSA_METHOD attached to the RSA key
+(which is what this function returns). If the flags element of an RSA key
+is changed, the changes will be honoured by RSA functionality but will not
+be reflected in the return value of the RSA_flags() function - in effect
+RSA_flags() behaves more like an RSA_default_flags() function (which does
+not currently exist).
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<RSA_new(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+The RSA_null_method(), which was a partial attempt to avoid patent issues,
+was replaced to always return NULL in OpenSSL 1.1.0f.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/RSA_sign.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/RSA_sign.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fbb38d8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/RSA_sign.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+RSA_sign, RSA_verify - RSA signatures
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/rsa.h>
+
+ int RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
+    unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, RSA *rsa);
+
+ int RSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
+    unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, RSA *rsa);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+RSA_sign() signs the message digest B<m> of size B<m_len> using the
+private key B<rsa> using RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified in RFC 3447. It
+stores the signature in B<sigret> and the signature size in B<siglen>.
+B<sigret> must point to RSA_size(B<rsa>) bytes of memory.
+Note that PKCS #1 adds meta-data, placing limits on the size of the
+key that can be used.
+See L<RSA_private_encrypt(3)> for lower-level
+operations.
+
+B<type> denotes the message digest algorithm that was used to generate
+B<m>.
+If B<type> is B<NID_md5_sha1>,
+an SSL signature (MD5 and SHA1 message digests with PKCS #1 padding
+and no algorithm identifier) is created.
+
+RSA_verify() verifies that the signature B<sigbuf> of size B<siglen>
+matches a given message digest B<m> of size B<m_len>. B<type> denotes
+the message digest algorithm that was used to generate the signature.
+B<rsa> is the signer's public key.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+RSA_sign() returns 1 on success.
+RSA_verify() returns 1 on successful verification.
+
+The error codes can be obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)>.
+
+=head1 CONFORMING TO
+
+SSL, PKCS #1 v2.0
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>,
+L<RSA_private_encrypt(3)>,
+L<RSA_public_decrypt(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..16303c9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, RSA_verify_ASN1_OCTET_STRING - RSA signatures
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/rsa.h>
+
+ int RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(int dummy, unsigned char *m,
+    unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen,
+    RSA *rsa);
+
+ int RSA_verify_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(int dummy, unsigned char *m,
+    unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen,
+    RSA *rsa);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING() signs the octet string B<m> of size
+B<m_len> using the private key B<rsa> represented in DER using PKCS #1
+padding. It stores the signature in B<sigret> and the signature size
+in B<siglen>. B<sigret> must point to B<RSA_size(rsa)> bytes of
+memory.
+
+B<dummy> is ignored.
+
+The random number generator must be seeded prior to calling RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING().
+
+RSA_verify_ASN1_OCTET_STRING() verifies that the signature B<sigbuf>
+of size B<siglen> is the DER representation of a given octet string
+B<m> of size B<m_len>. B<dummy> is ignored. B<rsa> is the signer's
+public key.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING() returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
+RSA_verify_ASN1_OCTET_STRING() returns 1 on successful verification, 0
+otherwise.
+
+The error codes can be obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)>.
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+These functions serve no recognizable purpose.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>,
+L<rand(3)>, L<RSA_sign(3)>,
+L<RSA_verify(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/RSA_size.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/RSA_size.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..eb6e481
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/RSA_size.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+RSA_size, RSA_bits - get RSA modulus size
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+
+int RSA_size(const RSA *rsa);
+
+int RSA_bits(const RSA *rsa);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+RSA_size() returns the RSA modulus size in bytes. It can be used to
+determine how much memory must be allocated for an RSA encrypted
+value.
+
+RSA_bits() returns the number of significant bits.
+
+B<rsa> and B<rsa-E<gt>n> must not be B<NULL>.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUE
+
+The size.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<BN_num_bits(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+RSA_bits() was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/SCT_new.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/SCT_new.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fb395a5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/SCT_new.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SCT_new, SCT_new_from_base64, SCT_free, SCT_LIST_free,
+SCT_get_version, SCT_set_version,
+SCT_get_log_entry_type, SCT_set_log_entry_type,
+SCT_get0_log_id, SCT_set0_log_id, SCT_set1_log_id,
+SCT_get_timestamp, SCT_set_timestamp,
+SCT_get_signature_nid, SCT_set_signature_nid,
+SCT_get0_signature, SCT_set0_signature, SCT_set1_signature,
+SCT_get0_extensions, SCT_set0_extensions, SCT_set1_extensions,
+SCT_get_source, SCT_set_source
+- A Certificate Transparency Signed Certificate Timestamp
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ct.h>
+
+ typedef enum {
+  CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_NOT_SET = -1,
+  CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_X509 = 0,
+  CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_PRECERT = 1
+ } ct_log_entry_type_t;
+
+ typedef enum {
+  SCT_VERSION_NOT_SET = -1,
+  SCT_VERSION_V1 = 0
+ } sct_version_t;
+
+ typedef enum {
+  SCT_SOURCE_UNKNOWN,
+  SCT_SOURCE_TLS_EXTENSION,
+  SCT_SOURCE_X509V3_EXTENSION,
+  SCT_SOURCE_OCSP_STAPLED_RESPONSE
+ } sct_source_t;
+
+ SCT *SCT_new(void);
+ SCT *SCT_new_from_base64(unsigned char version,
+                          const char *logid_base64,
+                          ct_log_entry_type_t entry_type,
+                          uint64_t timestamp,
+                          const char *extensions_base64,
+                          const char *signature_base64);
+
+ void SCT_free(SCT *sct);
+ void SCT_LIST_free(STACK_OF(SCT) *a);
+
+ sct_version_t SCT_get_version(const SCT *sct);
+ int SCT_set_version(SCT *sct, sct_version_t version);
+
+ ct_log_entry_type_t SCT_get_log_entry_type(const SCT *sct);
+ int SCT_set_log_entry_type(SCT *sct, ct_log_entry_type_t entry_type);
+
+ size_t SCT_get0_log_id(const SCT *sct, unsigned char **log_id);
+ int SCT_set0_log_id(SCT *sct, unsigned char *log_id, size_t log_id_len);
+ int SCT_set1_log_id(SCT *sct, const unsigned char *log_id, size_t log_id_len);
+
+ uint64_t SCT_get_timestamp(const SCT *sct);
+ void SCT_set_timestamp(SCT *sct, uint64_t timestamp);
+
+ int SCT_get_signature_nid(const SCT *sct);
+ int SCT_set_signature_nid(SCT *sct, int nid);
+
+ size_t SCT_get0_signature(const SCT *sct, unsigned char **sig);
+ void SCT_set0_signature(SCT *sct, unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len);
+ int SCT_set1_signature(SCT *sct, const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len);
+
+ size_t SCT_get0_extensions(const SCT *sct, unsigned char **ext);
+ void SCT_set0_extensions(SCT *sct, unsigned char *ext, size_t ext_len);
+ int SCT_set1_extensions(SCT *sct, const unsigned char *ext, size_t ext_len);
+
+ sct_source_t SCT_get_source(const SCT *sct);
+ int SCT_set_source(SCT *sct, sct_source_t source);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+Signed Certificate Timestamps (SCTs) are defined by RFC 6962, Section 3.2.
+They constitute a promise by a Certificate Transparency (CT) log to publicly
+record a certificate. By cryptographically verifying that a log did indeed issue
+an SCT, some confidence can be gained that the certificate is publicly known.
+
+An internal representation of an SCT can be created in one of two ways.
+The first option is to create a blank SCT, using SCT_new(), and then populate
+it using:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item * SCT_set_version() to set the SCT version.
+
+Only SCT_VERSION_V1 is currently supported.
+
+=item * SCT_set_log_entry_type() to set the type of certificate the SCT was issued for:
+
+B<CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_X509> for a normal certificate.
+B<CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_PRECERT> for a pre-certificate.
+
+=item * SCT_set0_log_id() or SCT_set1_log_id() to set the LogID of the CT log that the SCT came from.
+
+The former takes ownership, whereas the latter makes a copy.
+See RFC 6962, Section 3.2 for the definition of LogID.
+
+=item * SCT_set_timestamp() to set the time the SCT was issued (epoch time in milliseconds).
+
+=item * SCT_set_signature_nid() to set the NID of the signature.
+
+=item * SCT_set0_signature() or SCT_set1_signature() to set the raw signature value.
+
+The former takes ownership, whereas the latter makes a copy.
+
+=item * SCT_set0_extensions() or B<SCT_set1_extensions> to provide SCT extensions.
+
+The former takes ownership, whereas the latter makes a copy.
+
+=back
+
+Alternatively, the SCT can be pre-populated from the following data using
+SCT_new_from_base64():
+
+=over 4
+
+=item * The SCT version (only SCT_VERSION_V1 is currently supported).
+
+=item * The LogID (see RFC 6962, Section 3.2), base64 encoded.
+
+=item * The type of certificate the SCT was issued for:
+
+B<CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_X509> for a normal certificate.
+B<CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_PRECERT> for a pre-certificate.
+
+=item * The time that the SCT was issued (epoch time in milliseconds).
+
+=item * The SCT extensions, base64 encoded.
+
+=item * The SCT signature, base64 encoded.
+
+=back
+
+SCT_set_source() can be used to record where the SCT was found
+(TLS extension, X.509 certificate extension or OCSP response). This is not
+required for verifying the SCT.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+Some of the setters return int, instead of void. These will all return 1 on
+success, 0 on failure. They will not make changes on failure.
+
+All of the setters will reset the validation status of the SCT to
+SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET (see L<SCT_validate(3)>).
+
+SCT_set_source() will call SCT_set_log_entry_type() if the type of
+certificate the SCT was issued for can be inferred from where the SCT was found.
+For example, an SCT found in an X.509 extension must have been issued for a pre-
+certificate.
+
+SCT_set_source() will not refuse unknown values.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+SCT_set_version() returns 1 if the specified version is supported, 0 otherwise.
+
+SCT_set_log_entry_type() returns 1 if the specified log entry type is supported, 0 otherwise.
+
+SCT_set0_log_id() and B<SCT_set1_log_id> return 1 if the specified LogID is a
+valid SHA-256 hash, 0 otherwise. Additionally, B<SCT_set1_log_id> returns 0 if
+malloc fails.
+
+B<SCT_set_signature_nid> returns 1 if the specified NID is supported, 0 otherwise.
+
+B<SCT_set1_extensions> and B<SCT_set1_signature> return 1 if the supplied buffer
+is copied successfully, 0 otherwise (i.e. if malloc fails).
+
+B<SCT_set_source> returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ct(7)>,
+L<SCT_validate(3)>,
+L<OBJ_nid2obj(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+These functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2016-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/SCT_print.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/SCT_print.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..88ad43e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/SCT_print.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SCT_print, SCT_LIST_print, SCT_validation_status_string -
+Prints Signed Certificate Timestamps in a human-readable way
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ct.h>
+
+ void SCT_print(const SCT *sct, BIO *out, int indent, const CTLOG_STORE *logs);
+ void SCT_LIST_print(const STACK_OF(SCT) *sct_list, BIO *out, int indent,
+                     const char *separator, const CTLOG_STORE *logs);
+ const char *SCT_validation_status_string(const SCT *sct);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SCT_print() prints a single Signed Certificate Timestamp (SCT) to a L<bio> in
+a human-readable format. SCT_LIST_print() prints an entire list of SCTs in a
+similar way. A separator can be specified to delimit each SCT in the output.
+
+The output can be indented by a specified number of spaces. If a B<CTLOG_STORE>
+is provided, it will be used to print the description of the CT log that issued
+each SCT (if that log is in the CTLOG_STORE). Alternatively, NULL can be passed
+as the CTLOG_STORE parameter to disable this feature.
+
+SCT_validation_status_string() will return the validation status of an SCT as
+a human-readable string. Call SCT_validate() or SCT_LIST_validate()
+beforehand in order to set the validation status of an SCT first.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ct(3)>,
+L<bio(3)>,
+L<CTLOG_STORE_new(3)>,
+L<SCT_validate(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+These functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/SCT_validate.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/SCT_validate.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3c03e97
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/SCT_validate.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SCT_validate, SCT_LIST_validate, SCT_get_validation_status -
+checks Signed Certificate Timestamps (SCTs) are valid
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ct.h>
+
+ typedef enum {
+  SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET,
+  SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN_LOG,
+  SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_VALID,
+  SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_INVALID,
+  SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_UNVERIFIED,
+  SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN_VERSION
+ } sct_validation_status_t;
+
+ int SCT_validate(SCT *sct, const CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx);
+ int SCT_LIST_validate(const STACK_OF(SCT) *scts, CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx);
+ sct_validation_status_t SCT_get_validation_status(const SCT *sct);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SCT_validate() will check that an SCT is valid and verify its signature.
+SCT_LIST_validate() performs the same checks on an entire stack of SCTs.
+The result of the validation checks can be obtained by passing the SCT to
+SCT_get_validation_status().
+
+A CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX must be provided that specifies:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item * The certificate the SCT was issued for.
+
+Failure to provide the certificate will result in the validation status being
+SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_UNVERIFIED.
+
+=item * The issuer of that certificate.
+
+This is only required if the SCT was issued for a pre-certificate
+(see RFC 6962). If it is required but not provided, the validation status will
+be SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_UNVERIFIED.
+
+=item * A CTLOG_STORE that contains the CT log that issued this SCT.
+
+If the SCT was issued by a log that is not in this CTLOG_STORE, the validation
+status will be SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN_LOG.
+
+=back
+
+If the SCT is of an unsupported version (only v1 is currently supported), the
+validation status will be SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN_VERSION.
+
+If the SCT's signature is incorrect, its timestamp is in the future (relative to
+the time in CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX), or if it is otherwise invalid, the validation
+status will be SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_INVALID.
+
+If all checks pass, the validation status will be SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_VALID.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+A return value of 0 from SCT_LIST_validate() should not be interpreted as a
+failure. At a minimum, only one valid SCT may provide sufficient confidence
+that a certificate has been publicly logged.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+SCT_validate() returns a negative integer if an internal error occurs, 0 if the
+SCT fails validation, or 1 if the SCT passes validation.
+
+SCT_LIST_validate() returns a negative integer if an internal error occurs, 0
+if any of SCTs fails validation, or 1 if they all pass validation.
+
+SCT_get_validation_status() returns the validation status of the SCT.
+If SCT_validate() or SCT_LIST_validate() have not been passed that SCT, the
+returned value will be SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ct(7)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+These functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/SHA256_Init.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/SHA256_Init.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f3565bb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/SHA256_Init.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SHA1, SHA1_Init, SHA1_Update, SHA1_Final, SHA224, SHA224_Init, SHA224_Update,
+SHA224_Final, SHA256, SHA256_Init, SHA256_Update, SHA256_Final, SHA384,
+SHA384_Init, SHA384_Update, SHA384_Final, SHA512, SHA512_Init, SHA512_Update,
+SHA512_Final - Secure Hash Algorithm
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/sha.h>
+
+ int SHA1_Init(SHA_CTX *c);
+ int SHA1_Update(SHA_CTX *c, const void *data, size_t len);
+ int SHA1_Final(unsigned char *md, SHA_CTX *c);
+ unsigned char *SHA1(const unsigned char *d, size_t n,
+      unsigned char *md);
+
+ int SHA224_Init(SHA256_CTX *c);
+ int SHA224_Update(SHA256_CTX *c, const void *data, size_t len);
+ int SHA224_Final(unsigned char *md, SHA256_CTX *c);
+ unsigned char *SHA224(const unsigned char *d, size_t n,
+      unsigned char *md);
+
+ int SHA256_Init(SHA256_CTX *c);
+ int SHA256_Update(SHA256_CTX *c, const void *data, size_t len);
+ int SHA256_Final(unsigned char *md, SHA256_CTX *c);
+ unsigned char *SHA256(const unsigned char *d, size_t n,
+      unsigned char *md);
+
+ int SHA384_Init(SHA512_CTX *c);
+ int SHA384_Update(SHA512_CTX *c, const void *data, size_t len);
+ int SHA384_Final(unsigned char *md, SHA512_CTX *c);
+ unsigned char *SHA384(const unsigned char *d, size_t n,
+      unsigned char *md);
+
+ int SHA512_Init(SHA512_CTX *c);
+ int SHA512_Update(SHA512_CTX *c, const void *data, size_t len);
+ int SHA512_Final(unsigned char *md, SHA512_CTX *c);
+ unsigned char *SHA512(const unsigned char *d, size_t n,
+      unsigned char *md);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+Applications should use the higher level functions
+L<EVP_DigestInit(3)> etc. instead of calling the hash
+functions directly.
+
+SHA-1 (Secure Hash Algorithm) is a cryptographic hash function with a
+160 bit output.
+
+SHA1() computes the SHA-1 message digest of the B<n>
+bytes at B<d> and places it in B<md> (which must have space for
+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH == 20 bytes of output). If B<md> is NULL, the digest
+is placed in a static array. Note: setting B<md> to NULL is B<not thread safe>.
+
+The following functions may be used if the message is not completely
+stored in memory:
+
+SHA1_Init() initializes a B<SHA_CTX> structure.
+
+SHA1_Update() can be called repeatedly with chunks of the message to
+be hashed (B<len> bytes at B<data>).
+
+SHA1_Final() places the message digest in B<md>, which must have space
+for SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH == 20 bytes of output, and erases the B<SHA_CTX>.
+
+The SHA224, SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512 families of functions operate in the
+same way as for the SHA1 functions. Note that SHA224 and SHA256 use a
+B<SHA256_CTX> object instead of B<SHA_CTX>. SHA384 and SHA512 use B<SHA512_CTX>.
+The buffer B<md> must have space for the output from the SHA variant being used
+(defined by SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH and
+SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH). Also note that, as for the SHA1() function above, the
+SHA224(), SHA256(), SHA384() and SHA512() functions are not thread safe if
+B<md> is NULL.
+
+The predecessor of SHA-1, SHA, is also implemented, but it should be
+used only when backward compatibility is required.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+SHA1(), SHA224(), SHA256(), SHA384() and SHA512() return a pointer to the hash
+value.
+
+SHA1_Init(), SHA1_Update() and SHA1_Final() and equivalent SHA224, SHA256,
+SHA384 and SHA512 functions return 1 for success, 0 otherwise.
+
+=head1 CONFORMING TO
+
+US Federal Information Processing Standard FIPS PUB 180-4 (Secure Hash
+Standard),
+ANSI X9.30
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<EVP_DigestInit(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/SMIME_read_CMS.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/SMIME_read_CMS.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..efde0bd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/SMIME_read_CMS.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SMIME_read_CMS - parse S/MIME message
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/cms.h>
+
+ CMS_ContentInfo *SMIME_read_CMS(BIO *in, BIO **bcont);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SMIME_read_CMS() parses a message in S/MIME format.
+
+B<in> is a BIO to read the message from.
+
+If cleartext signing is used then the content is saved in a memory bio which is
+written to B<*bcont>, otherwise B<*bcont> is set to NULL.
+
+The parsed CMS_ContentInfo structure is returned or NULL if an
+error occurred.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+If B<*bcont> is not NULL then the message is clear text signed. B<*bcont> can
+then be passed to CMS_verify() with the B<CMS_DETACHED> flag set.
+
+Otherwise the type of the returned structure can be determined
+using CMS_get0_type().
+
+To support future functionality if B<bcont> is not NULL B<*bcont> should be
+initialized to NULL. For example:
+
+ BIO *cont = NULL;
+ CMS_ContentInfo *cms;
+
+ cms = SMIME_read_CMS(in, &cont);
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+The MIME parser used by SMIME_read_CMS() is somewhat primitive.  While it will
+handle most S/MIME messages more complex compound formats may not work.
+
+The parser assumes that the CMS_ContentInfo structure is always base64 encoded
+and will not handle the case where it is in binary format or uses quoted
+printable format.
+
+The use of a memory BIO to hold the signed content limits the size of message
+which can be processed due to memory restraints: a streaming single pass option
+should be available.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+SMIME_read_CMS() returns a valid B<CMS_ContentInfo> structure or B<NULL>
+if an error occurred. The error can be obtained from ERR_get_error(3).
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>, L<CMS_type(3)>
+L<SMIME_read_CMS(3)>, L<CMS_sign(3)>,
+L<CMS_verify(3)>, L<CMS_encrypt(3)>
+L<CMS_decrypt(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/SMIME_read_PKCS7.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/SMIME_read_PKCS7.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3eb8bbc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/SMIME_read_PKCS7.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SMIME_read_PKCS7 - parse S/MIME message
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/pkcs7.h>
+
+ PKCS7 *SMIME_read_PKCS7(BIO *in, BIO **bcont);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SMIME_read_PKCS7() parses a message in S/MIME format.
+
+B<in> is a BIO to read the message from.
+
+If cleartext signing is used then the content is saved in
+a memory bio which is written to B<*bcont>, otherwise
+B<*bcont> is set to B<NULL>.
+
+The parsed PKCS#7 structure is returned or B<NULL> if an
+error occurred.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+If B<*bcont> is not B<NULL> then the message is clear text
+signed. B<*bcont> can then be passed to PKCS7_verify() with
+the B<PKCS7_DETACHED> flag set.
+
+Otherwise the type of the returned structure can be determined
+using PKCS7_type_is_enveloped(), etc.
+
+To support future functionality if B<bcont> is not B<NULL>
+B<*bcont> should be initialized to B<NULL>. For example:
+
+ BIO *cont = NULL;
+ PKCS7 *p7;
+
+ p7 = SMIME_read_PKCS7(in, &cont);
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+The MIME parser used by SMIME_read_PKCS7() is somewhat primitive.
+While it will handle most S/MIME messages more complex compound
+formats may not work.
+
+The parser assumes that the PKCS7 structure is always base64
+encoded and will not handle the case where it is in binary format
+or uses quoted printable format.
+
+The use of a memory BIO to hold the signed content limits the size
+of message which can be processed due to memory restraints: a
+streaming single pass option should be available.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+SMIME_read_PKCS7() returns a valid B<PKCS7> structure or B<NULL>
+is an error occurred. The error can be obtained from ERR_get_error(3).
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>,
+L<SMIME_read_PKCS7(3)>, L<PKCS7_sign(3)>,
+L<PKCS7_verify(3)>, L<PKCS7_encrypt(3)>
+L<PKCS7_decrypt(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2002-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/SMIME_write_CMS.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/SMIME_write_CMS.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d58baeb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/SMIME_write_CMS.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SMIME_write_CMS - convert CMS structure to S/MIME format
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/cms.h>
+
+ int SMIME_write_CMS(BIO *out, CMS_ContentInfo *cms, BIO *data, int flags);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SMIME_write_CMS() adds the appropriate MIME headers to a CMS
+structure to produce an S/MIME message.
+
+B<out> is the BIO to write the data to. B<cms> is the appropriate
+B<CMS_ContentInfo> structure. If streaming is enabled then the content must be
+supplied in the B<data> argument. B<flags> is an optional set of flags.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The following flags can be passed in the B<flags> parameter.
+
+If B<CMS_DETACHED> is set then cleartext signing will be used, this option only
+makes sense for SignedData where B<CMS_DETACHED> is also set when CMS_sign() is
+called.
+
+If the B<CMS_TEXT> flag is set MIME headers for type B<text/plain> are added to
+the content, this only makes sense if B<CMS_DETACHED> is also set.
+
+If the B<CMS_STREAM> flag is set streaming is performed. This flag should only
+be set if B<CMS_STREAM> was also set in the previous call to a CMS_ContentInfo
+creation function.
+
+If cleartext signing is being used and B<CMS_STREAM> not set then the data must
+be read twice: once to compute the signature in CMS_sign() and once to output
+the S/MIME message.
+
+If streaming is performed the content is output in BER format using indefinite
+length constructed encoding except in the case of signed data with detached
+content where the content is absent and DER format is used.
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+SMIME_write_CMS() always base64 encodes CMS structures, there should be an
+option to disable this.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+SMIME_write_CMS() returns 1 for success or 0 for failure.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>, L<CMS_sign(3)>,
+L<CMS_verify(3)>, L<CMS_encrypt(3)>
+L<CMS_decrypt(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/SMIME_write_PKCS7.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/SMIME_write_PKCS7.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b573123
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/SMIME_write_PKCS7.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SMIME_write_PKCS7 - convert PKCS#7 structure to S/MIME format
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/pkcs7.h>
+
+ int SMIME_write_PKCS7(BIO *out, PKCS7 *p7, BIO *data, int flags);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SMIME_write_PKCS7() adds the appropriate MIME headers to a PKCS#7
+structure to produce an S/MIME message.
+
+B<out> is the BIO to write the data to. B<p7> is the appropriate B<PKCS7>
+structure. If streaming is enabled then the content must be supplied in the
+B<data> argument. B<flags> is an optional set of flags.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The following flags can be passed in the B<flags> parameter.
+
+If B<PKCS7_DETACHED> is set then cleartext signing will be used,
+this option only makes sense for signedData where B<PKCS7_DETACHED>
+is also set when PKCS7_sign() is also called.
+
+If the B<PKCS7_TEXT> flag is set MIME headers for type B<text/plain>
+are added to the content, this only makes sense if B<PKCS7_DETACHED>
+is also set.
+
+If the B<PKCS7_STREAM> flag is set streaming is performed. This flag should
+only be set if B<PKCS7_STREAM> was also set in the previous call to
+PKCS7_sign() or PKCS7_encrypt().
+
+If cleartext signing is being used and B<PKCS7_STREAM> not set then
+the data must be read twice: once to compute the signature in PKCS7_sign()
+and once to output the S/MIME message.
+
+If streaming is performed the content is output in BER format using indefinite
+length constructed encoding except in the case of signed data with detached
+content where the content is absent and DER format is used.
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+SMIME_write_PKCS7() always base64 encodes PKCS#7 structures, there
+should be an option to disable this.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+SMIME_write_PKCS7() returns 1 for success or 0 for failure.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>, L<PKCS7_sign(3)>,
+L<PKCS7_verify(3)>, L<PKCS7_encrypt(3)>
+L<PKCS7_decrypt(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_use_srtp.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_use_srtp.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2746d50
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_use_srtp.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_use_srtp,
+SSL_set_tlsext_use_srtp,
+SSL_get_srtp_profiles,
+SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile
+- Configure and query SRTP support
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/srtp.h>
+
+ int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_use_srtp(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *profiles);
+ int SSL_set_tlsext_use_srtp(SSL *ssl, const char *profiles);
+
+ STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *SSL_get_srtp_profiles(SSL *ssl);
+ SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile(SSL *s);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SRTP is the Secure Real-Time Transport Protocol. OpenSSL implements support for
+the "use_srtp" DTLS extension defined in RFC5764. This provides a mechanism for
+establishing SRTP keying material, algorithms and parameters using DTLS. This
+capability may be used as part of an implementation that conforms to RFC5763.
+OpenSSL does not implement SRTP itself or RFC5763. Note that OpenSSL does not
+support the use of SRTP Master Key Identifiers (MKIs). Also note that this
+extension is only supported in DTLS. Any SRTP configuration will be ignored if a
+TLS connection is attempted.
+
+An OpenSSL client wishing to send the "use_srtp" extension should call
+SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_use_srtp() to set its use for all SSL objects subsequently
+created from an SSL_CTX. Alternatively a client may call
+SSL_set_tlsext_use_srtp() to set its use for an individual SSL object. The
+B<profiles> parameters should point to a NUL-terminated, colon delimited list of
+SRTP protection profile names.
+
+The currently supported protection profile names are:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item SRTP_AES128_CM_SHA1_80
+
+This corresponds to SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_80 defined in RFC5764.
+
+=item SRTP_AES128_CM_SHA1_32
+
+This corresponds to SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32 defined in RFC5764.
+
+=item SRTP_AEAD_AES_128_GCM
+
+This corresponds to the profile of the same name defined in RFC7714.
+
+=item SRTP_AEAD_AES_256_GCM
+
+This corresponds to the profile of the same name defined in RFC7714.
+
+=back
+
+Supplying an unrecognised protection profile name will result in an error.
+
+An OpenSSL server wishing to support the "use_srtp" extension should also call
+SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_use_srtp() or SSL_set_tlsext_use_srtp() to indicate the
+protection profiles that it is willing to negotiate.
+
+The currently configured list of protection profiles for either a client or a
+server can be obtained by calling SSL_get_srtp_profiles(). This returns a stack
+of SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE objects. The memory pointed to in the return value of
+this function should not be freed by the caller.
+
+After a handshake has been completed the negotiated SRTP protection profile (if
+any) can be obtained (on the client or the server) by calling
+SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile(). This function will return NULL if no SRTP
+protection profile was negotiated. The memory returned from this function should
+not be freed by the caller.
+
+If an SRTP protection profile has been sucessfully negotiated then the SRTP
+keying material (on both the client and server) should be obtained via a call to
+L<SSL_export_keying_material(3)>. This call should provide a label value of
+"EXTRACTOR-dtls_srtp" and a NULL context value (use_context is 0). The total
+length of keying material obtained should be equal to two times the sum of the
+master key length and the salt length as defined for the protection profile in
+use. This provides the client write master key, the server write master key, the
+client write master salt and the server write master salt in that order.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_use_srtp() and SSL_set_tlsext_use_srtp() return 0 on success
+or 1 on error.
+
+SSL_get_srtp_profiles() returns a stack of SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE objects on
+success or NULL on error or if no protection profiles have been configured.
+
+SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile() returns a pointer to an SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE
+object if one has been negotiated or NULL otherwise.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<SSL_export_keying_material(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/UI_STRING.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/UI_STRING.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..340d9b2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/UI_STRING.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+UI_STRING, UI_string_types, UI_get_string_type,
+UI_get_input_flags, UI_get0_output_string,
+UI_get0_action_string, UI_get0_result_string,
+UI_get0_test_string, UI_get_result_minsize,
+UI_get_result_maxsize, UI_set_result
+- User interface string parsing
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ui.h>
+
+ typedef struct ui_string_st UI_STRING;
+
+ enum UI_string_types {
+     UIT_NONE = 0,
+     UIT_PROMPT,                 /* Prompt for a string */
+     UIT_VERIFY,                 /* Prompt for a string and verify */
+     UIT_BOOLEAN,                /* Prompt for a yes/no response */
+     UIT_INFO,                   /* Send info to the user */
+     UIT_ERROR                   /* Send an error message to the user */
+ };
+
+ enum UI_string_types UI_get_string_type(UI_STRING *uis);
+ int UI_get_input_flags(UI_STRING *uis);
+ const char *UI_get0_output_string(UI_STRING *uis);
+ const char *UI_get0_action_string(UI_STRING *uis);
+ const char *UI_get0_result_string(UI_STRING *uis);
+ const char *UI_get0_test_string(UI_STRING *uis);
+ int UI_get_result_minsize(UI_STRING *uis);
+ int UI_get_result_maxsize(UI_STRING *uis);
+ int UI_set_result(UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis, const char *result);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The B<UI_STRING> gets created internally and added to a B<UI> whenever
+one of the functions UI_add_input_string(), UI_dup_input_string(),
+UI_add_verify_string(), UI_dup_verify_string(),
+UI_add_input_boolean(), UI_dup_input_boolean(), UI_add_info_string(),
+UI_dup_info_string(), UI_add_error_string() or UI_dup_error_string()
+is called.
+For a B<UI_METHOD> user, there's no need to know more.
+For a B<UI_METHOD> creator, it is of interest to fetch text from these
+B<UI_STRING> objects as well as adding results to some of them.
+
+UI_get_string_type() is used to retrieve the type of the given
+B<UI_STRING>.
+
+UI_get_input_flags() is used to retrieve the flags associated with the
+given B<UI_STRING>.
+
+UI_get0_output_string() is used to retrieve the actual string to
+output (prompt, info, error, ...).
+
+UI_get0_action_string() is used to retrieve the action description
+associated with a B<UIT_BOOLEAN> type B<UI_STRING>.
+For all other B<UI_STRING> types, NULL is returned.
+See L<UI_add_input_boolean(3)>.
+
+UI_get0_result_string() is used to retrieve the result of a prompt.
+This is only useful for B<UIT_PROMPT> and B<UIT_VERIFY> type strings.
+For all other B<UI_STRING> types, NULL is returned.
+
+UI_get0_test_string() is used to retrieve the string to compare the
+prompt result with.
+This is only useful for B<UIT_VERIFY> type strings.
+For all other B<UI_STRING> types, NULL is returned.
+
+UI_get_result_minsize() and UI_get_result_maxsize() are used to
+retrieve the minimum and maximum required size of the result.
+This is only useful for B<UIT_PROMPT> and B<UIT_VERIFY> type strings.
+For all other B<UI_STRING> types, -1 is returned.
+
+UI_set_result() is used to set the result value of a prompt.
+For B<UIT_PROMPT> and B<UIT_VERIFY> type UI strings, this sets the
+result retrievable with UI_get0_result_string() by copying the
+contents of B<result> if its length fits the minimum and maximum size
+requirements.
+For B<UIT_BOOLEAN> type UI strings, this sets the first character of
+the result retrievable with UI_get0_result_string() to the first
+B<ok_char> given with UI_add_input_boolean() or UI_dup_input_boolean()
+if the B<result> matched any of them, or the first of the
+B<cancel_chars> if the B<result> matched any of them, otherwise it's
+set to the NUL char C<\0>.
+See L<UI_add_input_boolean(3)> for more information on B<ok_chars> and
+B<cancel_chars>.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+UI_get_string_type() returns the UI string type.
+
+UI_get_input_flags() returns the UI string flags.
+
+UI_get0_output_string() returns the UI string output string.
+
+UI_get0_action_string() returns the UI string action description
+string for B<UIT_BOOLEAN> type UI strings, NULL for any other type.
+
+UI_get0_result_string() returns the UI string result buffer for
+B<UIT_PROMPT> and B<UIT_VERIFY> type UI strings, NULL for any other
+type.
+
+UI_get0_test_string() returns the UI string action description
+string for B<UIT_VERIFY> type UI strings, NULL for any other type.
+
+UI_get_result_minsize() returns the minimum allowed result size for
+the UI string for  for B<UIT_PROMPT> and B<UIT_VERIFY> type strings,
+-1 for any other type.
+
+UI_get_result_maxsize() returns the minimum allowed result size for
+the UI string for  for B<UIT_PROMPT> and B<UIT_VERIFY> type strings,
+-1 for any other type.
+
+UI_set_result() returns 0 on success or when the UI string is of any
+type other than B<UIT_PROMPT>, B<UIT_VERIFY> or B<UIT_BOOLEAN>, -1 on
+error.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<UI(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/UI_create_method.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/UI_create_method.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1c40153
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/UI_create_method.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,202 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+UI_METHOD,
+UI_create_method, UI_destroy_method, UI_method_set_opener,
+UI_method_set_writer, UI_method_set_flusher, UI_method_set_reader,
+UI_method_set_closer, UI_method_set_prompt_constructor,
+UI_method_set_ex_data, UI_method_get_opener, UI_method_get_writer,
+UI_method_get_flusher, UI_method_get_reader, UI_method_get_closer,
+UI_method_get_prompt_constructor, UI_method_get_ex_data - user
+interface method creation and destruction
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ui.h>
+
+ typedef struct ui_method_st UI_METHOD;
+
+ UI_METHOD *UI_create_method(const char *name);
+ void UI_destroy_method(UI_METHOD *ui_method);
+ int UI_method_set_opener(UI_METHOD *method, int (*opener) (UI *ui));
+ int UI_method_set_writer(UI_METHOD *method,
+                          int (*writer) (UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis));
+ int UI_method_set_flusher(UI_METHOD *method, int (*flusher) (UI *ui));
+ int UI_method_set_reader(UI_METHOD *method,
+                          int (*reader) (UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis));
+ int UI_method_set_closer(UI_METHOD *method, int (*closer) (UI *ui));
+ int UI_method_set_prompt_constructor(UI_METHOD *method,
+                                      char *(*prompt_constructor) (UI *ui,
+                                                                   const char
+                                                                   *object_desc,
+                                                                   const char
+                                                                   *object_name));
+ int UI_method_set_ex_data(UI_METHOD *method, int idx, void *data);
+ int (*UI_method_get_opener(const UI_METHOD *method)) (UI *);
+ int (*UI_method_get_writer(const UI_METHOD *method)) (UI *, UI_STRING *);
+ int (*UI_method_get_flusher(const UI_METHOD *method)) (UI *);
+ int (*UI_method_get_reader(const UI_METHOD *method)) (UI *, UI_STRING *);
+ int (*UI_method_get_closer(const UI_METHOD *method)) (UI *);
+ char *(*UI_method_get_prompt_constructor(const UI_METHOD *method))
+     (UI *, const char *, const char *);
+ const void *UI_method_get_ex_data(const UI_METHOD *method, int idx);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+A method contains a few functions that implement the low level of the
+User Interface.
+These functions are:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item an opener
+
+This function takes a reference to a UI and starts a session, for
+example by opening a channel to a tty, or by creating a dialog box.
+
+=item a writer
+
+This function takes a reference to a UI and a UI String, and writes
+the string where appropriate, maybe to the tty, maybe added as a field
+label in a dialog box.
+Note that this gets fed all strings associated with a UI, one after
+the other, so care must be taken which ones it actually uses.
+
+=item a flusher
+
+This function takes a reference to a UI, and flushes everything that
+has been output so far.
+For example, if the method builds up a dialog box, this can be used to
+actually display it and accepting input ended with a pressed button.
+
+=item a reader
+
+This function takes a reference to a UI and a UI string and reads off
+the given prompt, maybe from the tty, maybe from a field in a dialog
+box.
+Note that this gets fed all strings associated with a UI, one after
+the other, so care must be taken which ones it actually uses.
+
+=item a closer
+
+This function takes a reference to a UI, and closes the session, maybe
+by closing the channel to the tty, maybe by destroying a dialog box.
+
+=back
+
+All of these functions are expected to return 0 on error, 1 on
+success, or -1 on out-off-band events, for example if some prompting
+has been cancelled (by pressing Ctrl-C, for example).
+Only the flusher or the reader are expected to return -1.
+If returned by another of the functions, it's treated as if 0 was
+returned.
+
+Regarding the writer and the reader, don't assume the former should
+only write and don't assume the latter should only read.
+This depends on the needs of the method.
+
+For example, a typical tty reader wouldn't write the prompts in the
+write, but would rather do so in the reader, because of the sequential
+nature of prompting on a tty.
+This is how the UI_OpenSSL() method does it.
+
+In contrast, a method that builds up a dialog box would add all prompt
+text in the writer, have all input read in the flusher and store the
+results in some temporary buffer, and finally have the reader just
+fetch those results.
+
+The central function that uses these method functions is UI_process(),
+and it does it in five steps:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item 1.
+
+Open the session using the opener function if that one's defined.
+If an error occurs, jump to 5.
+
+=item 2.
+
+For every UI String associated with the UI, call the writer function
+if that one's defined.
+If an error occurs, jump to 5.
+
+=item 3.
+
+Flush everything using the flusher function if that one's defined.
+If an error occurs, jump to 5.
+
+=item 4.
+
+For every UI String associated with the UI, call the reader function
+if that one's defined.
+If an error occurs, jump to 5.
+
+=item 5.
+
+Close the session using the closer function if that one's defined.
+
+=back
+
+UI_create_method() creates a new UI method with a given B<name>.
+
+UI_destroy_method() destroys the given UI method B<ui_method>.
+
+UI_method_set_opener(), UI_method_set_writer(),
+UI_method_set_flusher(), UI_method_set_reader() and
+UI_method_set_closer() set the five main method function to the given
+function pointer.
+
+UI_method_set_prompt_constructor() sets the prompt constructor.
+See L<UI_construct_prompt(3)>.
+
+UI_method_set_ex_data() sets application specific data with a given
+EX_DATA index.
+See L<CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(3)> for general information on how to
+get that index.
+
+UI_method_get_opener(), UI_method_get_writer(),
+UI_method_get_flusher(), UI_method_get_reader(),
+UI_method_get_closer() and UI_method_get_prompt_constructor() return
+the different method functions.
+
+UI_method_get_ex_data() returns the application data previously stored
+with UI_method_set_ex_data().
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+UI_create_method() returns a UI_METHOD pointer on success, NULL on
+error.
+
+UI_method_set_opener(), UI_method_set_writer(),
+UI_method_set_flusher(), UI_method_set_reader(),
+UI_method_set_closer() and UI_method_set_prompt_constructor() return
+0 on success, -1 if the given B<method> is NULL.
+
+UI_method_set_ex_data() returns 1 on success and 0 on error (because
+CRYPTO_set_ex_data() does so).
+
+UI_method_get_opener(), UI_method_get_writer(),
+UI_method_get_flusher(), UI_method_get_reader(),
+UI_method_get_closer() and UI_method_get_prompt_constructor() return
+the requested function pointer if it's set in the method, otherwise
+NULL.
+
+UI_method_get_ex_data() returns a pointer to the application specific
+data associated with the method.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<UI(3)>, L<CRYPTO_get_ex_data(3)>, L<UI_STRING(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/UI_new.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/UI_new.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5b98cf8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/UI_new.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,203 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+UI,
+UI_new, UI_new_method, UI_free, UI_add_input_string, UI_dup_input_string,
+UI_add_verify_string, UI_dup_verify_string, UI_add_input_boolean,
+UI_dup_input_boolean, UI_add_info_string, UI_dup_info_string,
+UI_add_error_string, UI_dup_error_string, UI_construct_prompt,
+UI_add_user_data, UI_get0_user_data, UI_get0_result, UI_process,
+UI_ctrl, UI_set_default_method, UI_get_default_method, UI_get_method,
+UI_set_method, UI_OpenSSL, UI_null - user interface
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ui.h>
+
+ typedef struct ui_st UI;
+
+ UI *UI_new(void);
+ UI *UI_new_method(const UI_METHOD *method);
+ void UI_free(UI *ui);
+
+ int UI_add_input_string(UI *ui, const char *prompt, int flags,
+        char *result_buf, int minsize, int maxsize);
+ int UI_dup_input_string(UI *ui, const char *prompt, int flags,
+        char *result_buf, int minsize, int maxsize);
+ int UI_add_verify_string(UI *ui, const char *prompt, int flags,
+        char *result_buf, int minsize, int maxsize, const char *test_buf);
+ int UI_dup_verify_string(UI *ui, const char *prompt, int flags,
+        char *result_buf, int minsize, int maxsize, const char *test_buf);
+ int UI_add_input_boolean(UI *ui, const char *prompt, const char *action_desc,
+        const char *ok_chars, const char *cancel_chars,
+        int flags, char *result_buf);
+ int UI_dup_input_boolean(UI *ui, const char *prompt, const char *action_desc,
+        const char *ok_chars, const char *cancel_chars,
+        int flags, char *result_buf);
+ int UI_add_info_string(UI *ui, const char *text);
+ int UI_dup_info_string(UI *ui, const char *text);
+ int UI_add_error_string(UI *ui, const char *text);
+ int UI_dup_error_string(UI *ui, const char *text);
+
+ char *UI_construct_prompt(UI *ui_method,
+        const char *object_desc, const char *object_name);
+
+ void *UI_add_user_data(UI *ui, void *user_data);
+ void *UI_get0_user_data(UI *ui);
+
+ const char *UI_get0_result(UI *ui, int i);
+
+ int UI_process(UI *ui);
+
+ int UI_ctrl(UI *ui, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)());
+
+ void UI_set_default_method(const UI_METHOD *meth);
+ const UI_METHOD *UI_get_default_method(void);
+ const UI_METHOD *UI_get_method(UI *ui);
+ const UI_METHOD *UI_set_method(UI *ui, const UI_METHOD *meth);
+
+ UI_METHOD *UI_OpenSSL(void);
+ const UI_METHOD *UI_null(void);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+UI stands for User Interface, and is general purpose set of routines to
+prompt the user for text-based information.  Through user-written methods
+(see L<UI_create_method(3)>), prompting can be done in any way
+imaginable, be it plain text prompting, through dialog boxes or from a
+cell phone.
+
+All the functions work through a context of the type UI.  This context
+contains all the information needed to prompt correctly as well as a
+reference to a UI_METHOD, which is an ordered vector of functions that
+carry out the actual prompting.
+
+The first thing to do is to create a UI with UI_new() or UI_new_method(),
+then add information to it with the UI_add or UI_dup functions.  Also,
+user-defined random data can be passed down to the underlying method
+through calls to UI_add_user_data.  The default UI method doesn't care
+about these data, but other methods might.  Finally, use UI_process()
+to actually perform the prompting and UI_get0_result() to find the result
+to the prompt.
+
+A UI can contain more than one prompt, which are performed in the given
+sequence.  Each prompt gets an index number which is returned by the
+UI_add and UI_dup functions, and has to be used to get the corresponding
+result with UI_get0_result().
+
+The functions are as follows:
+
+UI_new() creates a new UI using the default UI method.  When done with
+this UI, it should be freed using UI_free().
+
+UI_new_method() creates a new UI using the given UI method.  When done with
+this UI, it should be freed using UI_free().
+
+UI_OpenSSL() returns the built-in UI method (note: not necessarely the
+default one, since the default can be changed.  See further on).  This
+method is the most machine/OS dependent part of OpenSSL and normally
+generates the most problems when porting.
+
+UI_null() returns a UI method that does nothing.  Its use is to avoid
+getting internal defaults for passed UI_METHOD pointers.
+
+UI_free() removes a UI from memory, along with all other pieces of memory
+that's connected to it, like duplicated input strings, results and others.
+If B<ui> is NULL nothing is done.
+
+UI_add_input_string() and UI_add_verify_string() add a prompt to the UI,
+as well as flags and a result buffer and the desired minimum and maximum
+sizes of the result, not counting the final NUL character.  The given
+information is used to prompt for information, for example a password,
+and to verify a password (i.e. having the user enter it twice and check
+that the same string was entered twice).  UI_add_verify_string() takes
+and extra argument that should be a pointer to the result buffer of the
+input string that it's supposed to verify, or verification will fail.
+
+UI_add_input_boolean() adds a prompt to the UI that's supposed to be answered
+in a boolean way, with a single character for yes and a different character
+for no.  A set of characters that can be used to cancel the prompt is given
+as well.  The prompt itself is divided in two, one part being the
+descriptive text (given through the I<prompt> argument) and one describing
+the possible answers (given through the I<action_desc> argument).
+
+UI_add_info_string() and UI_add_error_string() add strings that are shown at
+the same time as the prompt for extra information or to show an error string.
+The difference between the two is only conceptual.  With the builtin method,
+there's no technical difference between them.  Other methods may make a
+difference between them, however.
+
+The flags currently supported are B<UI_INPUT_FLAG_ECHO>, which is relevant for
+UI_add_input_string() and will have the users response be echoed (when
+prompting for a password, this flag should obviously not be used, and
+B<UI_INPUT_FLAG_DEFAULT_PWD>, which means that a default password of some
+sort will be used (completely depending on the application and the UI
+method).
+
+UI_dup_input_string(), UI_dup_verify_string(), UI_dup_input_boolean(),
+UI_dup_info_string() and UI_dup_error_string() are basically the same
+as their UI_add counterparts, except that they make their own copies
+of all strings.
+
+UI_construct_prompt() is a helper function that can be used to create
+a prompt from two pieces of information: an description and a name.
+The default constructor (if there is none provided by the method used)
+creates a string "Enter I<description> for I<name>:".  With the
+description "pass phrase" and the file name "foo.key", that becomes
+"Enter pass phrase for foo.key:".  Other methods may create whatever
+string and may include encodings that will be processed by the other
+method functions.
+
+UI_add_user_data() adds a piece of memory for the method to use at any
+time.  The builtin UI method doesn't care about this info.  Note that several
+calls to this function doesn't add data, it replaces the previous blob
+with the one given as argument.
+
+UI_get0_user_data() retrieves the data that has last been given to the
+UI with UI_add_user_data().
+
+UI_get0_result() returns a pointer to the result buffer associated with
+the information indexed by I<i>.
+
+UI_process() goes through the information given so far, does all the printing
+and prompting and returns the final status, which is -2 on out-of-band events
+(Interrupt, Cancel, ...), -1 on error and 0 on success.
+
+UI_ctrl() adds extra control for the application author.  For now, it
+understands two commands: B<UI_CTRL_PRINT_ERRORS>, which makes UI_process()
+print the OpenSSL error stack as part of processing the UI, and
+B<UI_CTRL_IS_REDOABLE>, which returns a flag saying if the used UI can
+be used again or not.
+
+UI_set_default_method() changes the default UI method to the one given.
+This function is not thread-safe and should not be called at the same time
+as other OpenSSL functions.
+
+UI_get_default_method() returns a pointer to the current default UI method.
+
+UI_get_method() returns the UI method associated with a given UI.
+
+UI_set_method() changes the UI method associated with a given UI.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The resulting strings that the built in method UI_OpenSSL() generate
+are assumed to be encoded according to the current locale or (for
+Windows) code page.
+For applications having different demands, these strings need to be
+converted appropriately by the caller.
+For Windows, if the OPENSSL_WIN32_UTF8 environment variable is set,
+the built-in method UI_OpenSSL() will produce UTF-8 encoded strings
+instead.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2001-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509V3_get_d2i.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509V3_get_d2i.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ac560b2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509V3_get_d2i.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,241 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+X509_get0_extensions, X509_CRL_get0_extensions, X509_REVOKED_get0_extensions,
+X509V3_get_d2i, X509V3_add1_i2d, X509V3_EXT_d2i, X509V3_EXT_i2d,
+X509_get_ext_d2i, X509_add1_ext_i2d, X509_CRL_get_ext_d2i,
+X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d, X509_REVOKED_get_ext_d2i,
+X509_REVOKED_add1_ext_i2d - X509 extension decode and encode functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+
+ void *X509V3_get_d2i(const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *x, int nid, int *crit,
+                      int *idx);
+ int X509V3_add1_i2d(STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) **x, int nid, void *value,
+                     int crit, unsigned long flags);
+
+ void *X509V3_EXT_d2i(X509_EXTENSION *ext);
+ X509_EXTENSION *X509V3_EXT_i2d(int ext_nid, int crit, void *ext);
+
+ void *X509_get_ext_d2i(const X509 *x, int nid, int *crit, int *idx);
+ int X509_add1_ext_i2d(X509 *x, int nid, void *value, int crit,
+                       unsigned long flags);
+
+ void *X509_CRL_get_ext_d2i(const X509_CRL *crl, int nid, int *crit, int *idx);
+ int X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(X509_CRL *crl, int nid, void *value, int crit,
+                           unsigned long flags);
+
+ void *X509_REVOKED_get_ext_d2i(const X509_REVOKED *r, int nid, int *crit, int *idx);
+ int X509_REVOKED_add1_ext_i2d(X509_REVOKED *r, int nid, void *value, int crit,
+                               unsigned long flags);
+
+ const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *X509_get0_extensions(const X509 *x);
+ const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *X509_CRL_get0_extensions(const X509_CRL *crl);
+ const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *X509_REVOKED_get0_extensions(const X509_REVOKED *r);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+X509V3_get_ext_d2i() looks for an extension with OID B<nid> in the extensions
+B<x> and, if found, decodes it. If B<idx> is B<NULL> then only one
+occurrence of an extension is permissible otherwise the first extension after
+index B<*idx> is returned and B<*idx> updated to the location of the extension.
+If B<crit> is not B<NULL> then B<*crit> is set to a status value: -2 if the
+extension occurs multiple times (this is only returned if B<idx> is B<NULL>),
+-1 if the extension could not be found, 0 if the extension is found and is
+not critical and 1 if critical. A pointer to an extension specific structure
+or B<NULL> is returned.
+
+X509V3_add1_i2d() adds extension B<value> to STACK B<*x> (allocating a new
+STACK if necessary) using OID B<nid> and criticality B<crit> according
+to B<flags>.
+
+X509V3_EXT_d2i() attempts to decode the ASN.1 data contained in extension
+B<ext> and returns a pointer to an extension specific structure or B<NULL>
+if the extension could not be decoded (invalid syntax or not supported).
+
+X509V3_EXT_i2d() encodes the extension specific structure B<ext>
+with OID B<ext_nid> and criticality B<crit>.
+
+X509_get_ext_d2i() and X509_add1_ext_i2d() operate on the extensions of
+certificate B<x>, they are otherwise identical to X509V3_get_d2i() and
+X509V3_add_i2d().
+
+X509_CRL_get_ext_d2i() and X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d() operate on the extensions
+of CRL B<crl>, they are otherwise identical to X509V3_get_d2i() and
+X509V3_add_i2d().
+
+X509_REVOKED_get_ext_d2i() and X509_REVOKED_add1_ext_i2d() operate on the
+extensions of B<X509_REVOKED> structure B<r> (i.e for CRL entry extensions),
+they are otherwise identical to X509V3_get_d2i() and X509V3_add_i2d().
+
+X509_get0_extensions(), X509_CRL_get0_extensions() and
+X509_REVOKED_get0_extensions() return a stack of all the extensions
+of a certificate a CRL or a CRL entry respectively.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+In almost all cases an extension can occur at most once and multiple
+occurrences is an error. Therefore the B<idx> parameter is usually B<NULL>.
+
+The B<flags> parameter may be one of the following values.
+
+B<X509V3_ADD_DEFAULT> appends a new extension only if the extension does
+not already exist. An error is returned if the extension does already
+exist.
+
+B<X509V3_ADD_APPEND> appends a new extension, ignoring whether the extension
+already exists.
+
+B<X509V3_ADD_REPLACE> replaces an extension if it exists otherwise appends
+a new extension.
+
+B<X509V3_ADD_REPLACE_EXISTING> replaces an existing extension if it exists
+otherwise returns an error.
+
+B<X509V3_ADD_KEEP_EXISTING> appends a new extension only if the extension does
+not already exist. An error B<is not> returned if the extension does already
+exist.
+
+B<X509V3_ADD_DELETE> extension B<nid> is deleted: no new extension is added.
+
+If B<X509V3_ADD_SILENT> is ored with B<flags>: any error returned will not
+be added to the error queue.
+
+The function X509V3_get_d2i() will return B<NULL> if the extension is not
+found, occurs multiple times or cannot be decoded. It is possible to
+determine the precise reason by checking the value of B<*crit>.
+
+=head1 SUPPORTED EXTENSIONS
+
+The following sections contain a list of all supported extensions
+including their name and NID.
+
+=head2 PKIX Certificate Extensions
+
+The following certificate extensions are defined in PKIX standards such as
+RFC5280.
+
+ Basic Constraints                  NID_basic_constraints
+ Key Usage                          NID_key_usage
+ Extended Key Usage                 NID_ext_key_usage
+
+ Subject Key Identifier             NID_subject_key_identifier
+ Authority Key Identifier           NID_authority_key_identifier
+
+ Private Key Usage Period           NID_private_key_usage_period
+
+ Subject Alternative Name           NID_subject_alt_name
+ Issuer Alternative Name            NID_issuer_alt_name
+
+ Authority Information Access       NID_info_access
+ Subject Information Access         NID_sinfo_access
+
+ Name Constraints                   NID_name_constraints
+
+ Certificate Policies               NID_certificate_policies
+ Policy Mappings                    NID_policy_mappings
+ Policy Constraints                 NID_policy_constraints
+ Inhibit Any Policy                 NID_inhibit_any_policy
+
+ TLS Feature                        NID_tlsfeature
+
+=head2 Netscape Certificate Extensions
+
+The following are (largely obsolete) Netscape certificate extensions.
+
+ Netscape Cert Type                 NID_netscape_cert_type
+ Netscape Base Url                  NID_netscape_base_url
+ Netscape Revocation Url            NID_netscape_revocation_url
+ Netscape CA Revocation Url         NID_netscape_ca_revocation_url
+ Netscape Renewal Url               NID_netscape_renewal_url
+ Netscape CA Policy Url             NID_netscape_ca_policy_url
+ Netscape SSL Server Name           NID_netscape_ssl_server_name
+ Netscape Comment                   NID_netscape_comment
+
+=head2 Miscellaneous Certificate Extensions
+
+ Strong Extranet ID                 NID_sxnet
+ Proxy Certificate Information      NID_proxyCertInfo
+
+=head2 PKIX CRL Extensions
+
+The following are CRL extensions from PKIX standards such as RFC5280.
+
+ CRL Number                         NID_crl_number
+ CRL Distribution Points            NID_crl_distribution_points
+ Delta CRL Indicator                NID_delta_crl
+ Freshest CRL                       NID_freshest_crl
+ Invalidity Date                    NID_invalidity_date
+ Issuing Distribution Point         NID_issuing_distribution_point
+
+The following are CRL entry extensions from PKIX standards such as RFC5280.
+
+ CRL Reason Code                    NID_crl_reason
+ Certificate Issuer                 NID_certificate_issuer
+
+=head2 OCSP Extensions
+
+ OCSP Nonce                         NID_id_pkix_OCSP_Nonce
+ OCSP CRL ID                        NID_id_pkix_OCSP_CrlID
+ Acceptable OCSP Responses          NID_id_pkix_OCSP_acceptableResponses
+ OCSP No Check                      NID_id_pkix_OCSP_noCheck
+ OCSP Archive Cutoff                NID_id_pkix_OCSP_archiveCutoff
+ OCSP Service Locator               NID_id_pkix_OCSP_serviceLocator
+ Hold Instruction Code              NID_hold_instruction_code
+
+=head2 Certificate Transparency Extensions
+
+The following extensions are used by certificate transparency, RFC6962
+
+ CT Precertificate SCTs             NID_ct_precert_scts
+ CT Certificate SCTs                NID_ct_cert_scts
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+X509V3_EXT_d2i() and *X509V3_get_d2i() return a pointer to an extension
+specific structure of B<NULL> if an error occurs.
+
+X509V3_EXT_i2d() returns a pointer to an B<X509_EXTENSION> structure
+or B<NULL> if an error occurs.
+
+X509V3_add1_i2d() returns 1 if the operation is successful and 0 if it
+fails due to a non-fatal error (extension not found, already exists,
+cannot be encoded) or -1 due to a fatal error such as a memory allocation
+failure.
+
+X509_get0_extensions(), X509_CRL_get0_extensions() and
+X509_REVOKED_get0_extensions() return a stack of extensions. They return
+NULL if no extensions are present.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<d2i_X509(3)>,
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>,
+L<X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(3)>,
+L<X509_get0_signature(3)>,
+L<X509_get_ext_d2i(3)>,
+L<X509_get_extension_flags(3)>,
+L<X509_get_pubkey(3)>,
+L<X509_get_subject_name(3)>,
+L<X509_get_version(3)>,
+L<X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(3)>,
+L<X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(3)>,
+L<X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(3)>,
+L<X509_NAME_print_ex(3)>,
+L<X509_new(3)>,
+L<X509_sign(3)>,
+L<X509_verify_cert(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_ALGOR_dup.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_ALGOR_dup.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..21845e9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_ALGOR_dup.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+X509_ALGOR_dup, X509_ALGOR_set0, X509_ALGOR_get0, X509_ALGOR_set_md, X509_ALGOR_cmp - AlgorithmIdentifier functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+ X509_ALGOR *X509_ALGOR_dup(X509_ALGOR *alg);
+ int X509_ALGOR_set0(X509_ALGOR *alg, ASN1_OBJECT *aobj, int ptype, void *pval);
+ void X509_ALGOR_get0(const ASN1_OBJECT **paobj, int *pptype,
+                      const void **ppval, const X509_ALGOR *alg);
+ void X509_ALGOR_set_md(X509_ALGOR *alg, const EVP_MD *md);
+ int X509_ALGOR_cmp(const X509_ALGOR *a, const X509_ALGOR *b);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+X509_ALGOR_dup() returns a copy of B<alg>.
+
+X509_ALGOR_set0() sets the algorithm OID of B<alg> to B<aobj> and the
+associated parameter type to B<ptype> with value B<pval>. If B<ptype> is
+B<V_ASN1_UNDEF> the parameter is omitted, otherwise B<ptype> and B<pval> have
+the same meaning as the B<type> and B<value> parameters to ASN1_TYPE_set().
+All the supplied parameters are used internally so must B<NOT> be freed after
+this call.
+
+X509_ALGOR_get0() is the inverse of X509_ALGOR_set0(): it returns the
+algorithm OID in B<*paobj> and the associated parameter in B<*pptype>
+and B<*ppval> from the B<AlgorithmIdentifier> B<alg>.
+
+X509_ALGOR_set_md() sets the B<AlgorithmIdentifier> B<alg> to appropriate
+values for the message digest B<md>.
+
+X509_ALGOR_cmp() compares B<a> and B<b> and returns 0 if they have identical
+encodings and non-zero otherwise.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_CRL_get0_by_serial.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_CRL_get0_by_serial.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a704228
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_CRL_get0_by_serial.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+X509_CRL_get0_by_serial, X509_CRL_get0_by_cert, X509_CRL_get_REVOKED,
+X509_REVOKED_get0_serialNumber, X509_REVOKED_get0_revocationDate,
+X509_REVOKED_set_serialNumber, X509_REVOKED_set_revocationDate,
+X509_CRL_add0_revoked, X509_CRL_sort - CRL revoked entry utility
+functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+ int X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(X509_CRL *crl,
+                             X509_REVOKED **ret, ASN1_INTEGER *serial);
+ int X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(X509_CRL *crl, X509_REVOKED **ret, X509 *x);
+
+ STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(X509_CRL *crl);
+
+ const ASN1_INTEGER *X509_REVOKED_get0_serialNumber(const X509_REVOKED *r);
+ const ASN1_TIME *X509_REVOKED_get0_revocationDate(const X509_REVOKED *r);
+
+ int X509_REVOKED_set_serialNumber(X509_REVOKED *r, ASN1_INTEGER *serial);
+ int X509_REVOKED_set_revocationDate(X509_REVOKED *r, ASN1_TIME *tm);
+
+ int X509_CRL_add0_revoked(X509_CRL *crl, X509_REVOKED *rev);
+
+ int X509_CRL_sort(X509_CRL *crl);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+X509_CRL_get0_by_serial() attempts to find a revoked entry in B<crl> for
+serial number B<serial>. If it is successful it sets B<*ret> to the internal
+pointer of the matching entry, as a result B<*ret> must not be freed up
+after the call.
+
+X509_CRL_get0_by_cert() is similar to X509_get0_by_serial() except it
+looks for a revoked entry using the serial number of certificate B<x>.
+
+X509_CRL_get_REVOKED() returns an internal pointer to a stack of all
+revoked entries for B<crl>.
+
+X509_REVOKED_get0_serialNumber() returns an internal pointer to the
+serial number of B<r>.
+
+X509_REVOKED_get0_revocationDate() returns an internal pointer to the
+revocation date of B<r>.
+
+X509_REVOKED_set_serialNumber() sets the serial number of B<r> to B<serial>.
+The supplied B<serial> pointer is not used internally so it should be
+freed up after use.
+
+X509_REVOKED_set_revocationDate() sets the revocation date of B<r> to
+B<tm>. The supplied B<tm> pointer is not used internally so it should be
+freed up after use.
+
+X509_CRL_add0_revoked() appends revoked entry B<rev> to CRL B<crl>. The
+pointer B<rev> is used internally so it must not be freed up after the call:
+it is freed when the parent CRL is freed.
+
+X509_CRL_sort() sorts the revoked entries of B<crl> into ascending serial
+number order.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+Applications can determine the number of revoked entries returned by
+X509_CRL_get_revoked() using sk_X509_REVOKED_num() and examine each one
+in turn using sk_X509_REVOKED_value().
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+X509_CRL_get0_by_serial() and X509_CRL_get0_by_cert() return 0 for failure,
+1 on success except if the revoked entry has the reason C<removeFromCRL> (8),
+in which case 2 is returned.
+
+X509_REVOKED_set_serialNumber(), X509_REVOKED_set_revocationDate(),
+X509_CRL_add0_revoked() and X509_CRL_sort() return 1 for success and 0 for
+failure.
+
+X509_REVOKED_get0_serialNumber() returns an B<ASN1_INTEGER> pointer.
+
+X509_REVOKED_get0_revocationDate() returns an B<ASN1_TIME> value.
+
+X509_CRL_get_REVOKED() returns a STACK of revoked entries.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<d2i_X509(3)>,
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>,
+L<X509_get0_signature(3)>,
+L<X509_get_ext_d2i(3)>,
+L<X509_get_extension_flags(3)>,
+L<X509_get_pubkey(3)>,
+L<X509_get_subject_name(3)>,
+L<X509_get_version(3)>,
+L<X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(3)>,
+L<X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(3)>,
+L<X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(3)>,
+L<X509_NAME_print_ex(3)>,
+L<X509_new(3)>,
+L<X509_sign(3)>,
+L<X509V3_get_d2i(3)>,
+L<X509_verify_cert(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_EXTENSION_set_object.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_EXTENSION_set_object.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f3f0de6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_EXTENSION_set_object.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+X509_EXTENSION_set_object, X509_EXTENSION_set_critical,
+X509_EXTENSION_set_data, X509_EXTENSION_create_by_NID,
+X509_EXTENSION_create_by_OBJ, X509_EXTENSION_get_object,
+X509_EXTENSION_get_critical, X509_EXTENSION_get_data - extension utility
+functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ int X509_EXTENSION_set_object(X509_EXTENSION *ex, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj);
+ int X509_EXTENSION_set_critical(X509_EXTENSION *ex, int crit);
+ int X509_EXTENSION_set_data(X509_EXTENSION *ex, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *data);
+
+ X509_EXTENSION *X509_EXTENSION_create_by_NID(X509_EXTENSION **ex,
+                                              int nid, int crit,
+                                              ASN1_OCTET_STRING *data);
+ X509_EXTENSION *X509_EXTENSION_create_by_OBJ(X509_EXTENSION **ex,
+                                              const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int crit,
+                                              ASN1_OCTET_STRING *data);
+
+ ASN1_OBJECT *X509_EXTENSION_get_object(X509_EXTENSION *ex);
+ int X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(const X509_EXTENSION *ex);
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING *X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_EXTENSION *ne);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+X509_EXTENSION_set_object() sets the extension type of B<ex> to B<obj>. The
+B<obj> pointer is duplicated internally so B<obj> should be freed up after use.
+
+X509_EXTENSION_set_critical() sets the criticality of B<ex> to B<crit>. If
+B<crit> is zero the extension in non-critical otherwise it is critical.
+
+X509_EXTENSION_set_data() sets the data in extension B<ex> to B<data>. The
+B<data> pointer is duplicated internally.
+
+X509_EXTENSION_create_by_NID() creates an extension of type B<nid>,
+criticality B<crit> using data B<data>. The created extension is returned and
+written to B<*ex> reusing or allocating a new extension if necessary so B<*ex>
+should either be B<NULL> or a valid B<X509_EXTENSION> structure it must
+B<not> be an uninitialised pointer.
+
+X509_EXTENSION_create_by_OBJ() is identical to X509_EXTENSION_create_by_NID()
+except it creates and extension using B<obj> instead of a NID.
+
+X509_EXTENSION_get_object() returns the extension type of B<ex> as an
+B<ASN1_OBJECT> pointer. The returned pointer is an internal value which must
+not be freed up.
+
+X509_EXTENSION_get_critical() returns the criticality of extension B<ex> it
+returns B<1> for critical and B<0> for non-critical.
+
+X509_EXTENSION_get_data() returns the data of extension B<ex>. The returned
+pointer is an internal value which must not be freed up.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+These functions manipulate the contents of an extension directly. Most
+applications will want to parse or encode and add an extension: they should
+use the extension encode and decode functions instead such as
+X509_add1_ext_i2d() and X509_get_ext_d2i().
+
+The B<data> associated with an extension is the extension encoding in an
+B<ASN1_OCTET_STRING> structure.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+X509_EXTENSION_set_object() X509_EXTENSION_set_critical() and
+X509_EXTENSION_set_data() return B<1> for success and B<0> for failure.
+
+X509_EXTENSION_create_by_NID() and X509_EXTENSION_create_by_OBJ() return
+an B<X509_EXTENSION> pointer or B<NULL> if an error occurs.
+
+X509_EXTENSION_get_object() returns an B<ASN1_OBJECT> pointer.
+
+X509_EXTENSION_get_critical() returns B<0> for non-critical and B<1> for
+critical.
+
+X509_EXTENSION_get_data() returns an B<ASN1_OCTET_STRING> pointer.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<X509V3_get_d2i(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_LOOKUP_hash_dir.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_LOOKUP_hash_dir.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5f8dfa9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_LOOKUP_hash_dir.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+X509_LOOKUP_hash_dir, X509_LOOKUP_file,
+X509_load_cert_file,
+X509_load_crl_file,
+X509_load_cert_crl_file - Default OpenSSL certificate
+lookup methods
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+  #include <openssl/x509_vfy.h>
+
+  X509_LOOKUP_METHOD *X509_LOOKUP_hash_dir(void);
+  X509_LOOKUP_METHOD *X509_LOOKUP_file(void);
+
+  int X509_load_cert_file(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, const char *file, int type);
+  int X509_load_crl_file(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, const char *file, int type);
+  int X509_load_cert_crl_file(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, const char *file, int type);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+B<X509_LOOKUP_hash_dir> and B<X509_LOOKUP_file> are two certificate
+lookup methods to use with B<X509_STORE>, provided by OpenSSL library.
+
+Users of the library typically do not need to create instances of these
+methods manually, they would be created automatically by
+L<X509_STORE_load_locations(3)> or
+L<SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(3)>
+functions.
+
+Internally loading of certificates and CRLs is implemented via functions
+B<X509_load_cert_crl_file>, B<X509_load_cert_file> and
+B<X509_load_crl_file>. These functions support parameter I<type>, which
+can be one of constants B<FILETYPE_PEM>, B<FILETYPE_ASN1> and
+B<FILETYPE_DEFAULT>. They load certificates and/or CRLs from specified
+file into memory cache of B<X509_STORE> objects which given B<ctx>
+parameter is associated with.
+
+Functions B<X509_load_cert_file> and
+B<X509_load_crl_file> can load both PEM and DER formats depending of
+type value. Because DER format cannot contain more than one certificate
+or CRL object (while PEM can contain several concatenated PEM objects)
+B<X509_load_cert_crl_file> with B<FILETYPE_ASN1> is equivalent to
+B<X509_load_cert_file>.
+
+Constant B<FILETYPE_DEFAULT> with NULL filename causes these functions
+to load default certificate store file (see
+L<X509_STORE_set_default_paths(3)>.
+
+
+Functions return number of objects loaded from file or 0 in case of
+error.
+
+Both methods support adding several certificate locations into one
+B<X509_STORE>.
+
+This page documents certificate store formats used by these methods and
+caching policy.
+
+=head2 File Method
+
+The B<X509_LOOKUP_file> method loads all the certificates or CRLs
+present in a file into memory at the time the file is added as a
+lookup source.
+
+File format is ASCII text which contains concatenated PEM certificates
+and CRLs.
+
+This method should be used by applications which work with a small
+set of CAs.
+
+=head2 Hashed Directory Method
+
+B<X509_LOOKUP_hash_dir> is a more advanced method, which loads
+certificates and CRLs on demand, and caches them in memory once
+they are loaded. As of OpenSSL 1.0.0, it also checks for newer CRLs
+upon each lookup, so that newer CRLs are as soon as they appear in
+the directory.
+
+The directory should contain one certificate or CRL per file in PEM format,
+with a file name of the form I<hash>.I<N> for a certificate, or
+I<hash>.B<r>I<N> for a CRL.
+The I<hash> is the value returned by the L<X509_NAME_hash(3)> function applied
+to the subject name for certificates or issuer name for CRLs.
+The hash can also be obtained via the B<-hash> option of the L<x509(1)> or
+L<crl(1)> commands.
+
+The .I<N> or .B<r>I<N> suffix is a sequence number that starts at zero, and is
+incremented consecutively for each certificate or CRL with the same I<hash>
+value.
+Gaps in the sequence numbers are not supported, it is assumed that there are no
+more objects with the same hash beyond the first missing number in the
+sequence.
+
+Sequence numbers make it possible for the directory to contain multiple
+certificates with same subject name hash value.
+For example, it is possible to have in the store several certificates with same
+subject or several CRLs with same issuer (and, for example, different validity
+period).
+
+When checking for new CRLs once one CRL for given hash value is
+loaded, hash_dir lookup method checks only for certificates with
+sequence number greater than that of the already cached CRL.
+
+Note that the hash algorithm used for subject name hashing changed in OpenSSL
+1.0.0, and all certificate stores have to be rehashed when moving from OpenSSL
+0.9.8 to 1.0.0.
+
+OpenSSL includes a L<rehash(1)> utility which creates symlinks with correct
+hashed names for all files with .pem suffix in a given directory.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<PEM_read_PrivateKey(3)>,
+L<X509_STORE_load_locations(3)>,
+L<X509_store_add_lookup(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(3)>,
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2015-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..72e0f7b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object, X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data,
+X509_NAME_ENTRY_set_object, X509_NAME_ENTRY_set_data,
+X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_txt, X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_NID,
+X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_OBJ - X509_NAME_ENTRY utility functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+ ASN1_OBJECT * X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(const X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne);
+ ASN1_STRING * X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(const X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne);
+
+ int X509_NAME_ENTRY_set_object(X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj);
+ int X509_NAME_ENTRY_set_data(X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne, int type, const unsigned char *bytes, int len);
+
+ X509_NAME_ENTRY *X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_txt(X509_NAME_ENTRY **ne, const char *field, int type, const unsigned char *bytes, int len);
+ X509_NAME_ENTRY *X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_NID(X509_NAME_ENTRY **ne, int nid, int type, const unsigned char *bytes, int len);
+ X509_NAME_ENTRY *X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_OBJ(X509_NAME_ENTRY **ne, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int type, const unsigned char *bytes, int len);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object() retrieves the field name of B<ne> in
+and B<ASN1_OBJECT> structure.
+
+X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data() retrieves the field value of B<ne> in
+and B<ASN1_STRING> structure.
+
+X509_NAME_ENTRY_set_object() sets the field name of B<ne> to B<obj>.
+
+X509_NAME_ENTRY_set_data() sets the field value of B<ne> to string type
+B<type> and value determined by B<bytes> and B<len>.
+
+X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_txt(), X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_NID()
+and X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_OBJ() create and return an
+B<X509_NAME_ENTRY> structure.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object() and X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data() can be
+used to examine an B<X509_NAME_ENTRY> function as returned by
+X509_NAME_get_entry() for example.
+
+X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_txt(), X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_NID(),
+and X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_OBJ() create and return an
+
+X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_txt(), X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_OBJ(),
+X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_NID() and X509_NAME_ENTRY_set_data()
+are seldom used in practice because B<X509_NAME_ENTRY> structures
+are almost always part of B<X509_NAME> structures and the
+corresponding B<X509_NAME> functions are typically used to
+create and add new entries in a single operation.
+
+The arguments of these functions support similar options to the similarly
+named ones of the corresponding B<X509_NAME> functions such as
+X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(). So for example B<type> can be set to
+B<MBSTRING_ASC> but in the case of X509_set_data() the field name must be
+set first so the relevant field information can be looked up internally.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>, L<d2i_X509_NAME(3)>,
+L<OBJ_nid2obj(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..27e5baf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt, X509_NAME_add_entry_by_OBJ, X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID,
+X509_NAME_add_entry, X509_NAME_delete_entry - X509_NAME modification functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+ int X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(X509_NAME *name, const char *field, int type, const unsigned char *bytes, int len, int loc, int set);
+
+ int X509_NAME_add_entry_by_OBJ(X509_NAME *name, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int type, const unsigned char *bytes, int len, int loc, int set);
+
+ int X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID(X509_NAME *name, int nid, int type, const unsigned char *bytes, int len, int loc, int set);
+
+ int X509_NAME_add_entry(X509_NAME *name, const X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne, int loc, int set);
+
+ X509_NAME_ENTRY *X509_NAME_delete_entry(X509_NAME *name, int loc);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(), X509_NAME_add_entry_by_OBJ() and
+X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID() add a field whose name is defined
+by a string B<field>, an object B<obj> or a NID B<nid> respectively.
+The field value to be added is in B<bytes> of length B<len>. If
+B<len> is -1 then the field length is calculated internally using
+strlen(bytes).
+
+The type of field is determined by B<type> which can either be a
+definition of the type of B<bytes> (such as B<MBSTRING_ASC>) or a
+standard ASN1 type (such as B<V_ASN1_IA5STRING>). The new entry is
+added to a position determined by B<loc> and B<set>.
+
+X509_NAME_add_entry() adds a copy of B<X509_NAME_ENTRY> structure B<ne>
+to B<name>. The new entry is added to a position determined by B<loc>
+and B<set>. Since a copy of B<ne> is added B<ne> must be freed up after
+the call.
+
+X509_NAME_delete_entry() deletes an entry from B<name> at position
+B<loc>. The deleted entry is returned and must be freed up.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The use of string types such as B<MBSTRING_ASC> or B<MBSTRING_UTF8>
+is strongly recommended for the B<type> parameter. This allows the
+internal code to correctly determine the type of the field and to
+apply length checks according to the relevant standards. This is
+done using ASN1_STRING_set_by_NID().
+
+If instead an ASN1 type is used no checks are performed and the
+supplied data in B<bytes> is used directly.
+
+In X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt() the B<field> string represents
+the field name using OBJ_txt2obj(field, 0).
+
+The B<loc> and B<set> parameters determine where a new entry should
+be added. For almost all applications B<loc> can be set to -1 and B<set>
+to 0. This adds a new entry to the end of B<name> as a single valued
+RelativeDistinguishedName (RDN).
+
+B<loc> actually determines the index where the new entry is inserted:
+if it is -1 it is appended.
+
+B<set> determines how the new type is added. If it is zero a
+new RDN is created.
+
+If B<set> is -1 or 1 it is added to the previous or next RDN
+structure respectively. This will then be a multivalued RDN:
+since multivalues RDNs are very seldom used B<set> is almost
+always set to zero.
+
+=head1 EXAMPLES
+
+Create an B<X509_NAME> structure:
+
+"C=UK, O=Disorganized Organization, CN=Joe Bloggs"
+
+ X509_NAME *nm;
+ nm = X509_NAME_new();
+ if (nm == NULL)
+        /* Some error */
+ if (!X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(nm, "C", MBSTRING_ASC,
+                        "UK", -1, -1, 0))
+        /* Error */
+ if (!X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(nm, "O", MBSTRING_ASC,
+                        "Disorganized Organization", -1, -1, 0))
+        /* Error */
+ if (!X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(nm, "CN", MBSTRING_ASC,
+                        "Joe Bloggs", -1, -1, 0))
+        /* Error */
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(), X509_NAME_add_entry_by_OBJ(),
+X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID() and X509_NAME_add_entry() return 1 for
+success of 0 if an error occurred.
+
+X509_NAME_delete_entry() returns either the deleted B<X509_NAME_ENTRY>
+structure of B<NULL> if an error occurred.
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+B<type> can still be set to B<V_ASN1_APP_CHOOSE> to use a
+different algorithm to determine field types. Since this form does
+not understand multicharacter types, performs no length checks and
+can result in invalid field types its use is strongly discouraged.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>, L<d2i_X509_NAME(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_get0_der.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_get0_der.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f91fd4d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_get0_der.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+X509_NAME_get0_der - get X509_NAME DER encoding
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+ int X509_NAME_get0_der(X509_NAME *nm, const unsigned char **pder,
+                        size_t *pderlen)
+
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The function X509_NAME_get0_der() returns an internal pointer to the
+encoding of an B<X509_NAME> structure in B<*pder> and consisting of
+B<*pderlen> bytes. It is useful for applications that wish to examine
+the encoding of an B<X509_NAME> structure without copying it.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+The function X509_NAME_get0_der() returns 1 for success and 0 if an error
+occurred.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<d2i_X509(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2d6713b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID, X509_NAME_get_index_by_OBJ, X509_NAME_get_entry,
+X509_NAME_entry_count, X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID, X509_NAME_get_text_by_OBJ -
+X509_NAME lookup and enumeration functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+ int X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(X509_NAME *name, int nid, int lastpos);
+ int X509_NAME_get_index_by_OBJ(X509_NAME *name, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int lastpos);
+
+ int X509_NAME_entry_count(const X509_NAME *name);
+ X509_NAME_ENTRY *X509_NAME_get_entry(const X509_NAME *name, int loc);
+
+ int X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(X509_NAME *name, int nid, char *buf, int len);
+ int X509_NAME_get_text_by_OBJ(X509_NAME *name, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, char *buf, int len);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+These functions allow an B<X509_NAME> structure to be examined. The
+B<X509_NAME> structure is the same as the B<Name> type defined in
+RFC2459 (and elsewhere) and used for example in certificate subject
+and issuer names.
+
+X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID() and X509_NAME_get_index_by_OBJ() retrieve
+the next index matching B<nid> or B<obj> after B<lastpos>. B<lastpos>
+should initially be set to -1. If there are no more entries -1 is returned.
+If B<nid> is invalid (doesn't correspond to a valid OID) then -2 is returned.
+
+X509_NAME_entry_count() returns the total number of entries in B<name>.
+
+X509_NAME_get_entry() retrieves the B<X509_NAME_ENTRY> from B<name>
+corresponding to index B<loc>. Acceptable values for B<loc> run from
+0 to (X509_NAME_entry_count(name) - 1). The value returned is an
+internal pointer which must not be freed.
+
+X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(), X509_NAME_get_text_by_OBJ() retrieve
+the "text" from the first entry in B<name> which matches B<nid> or
+B<obj>, if no such entry exists -1 is returned. At most B<len> bytes
+will be written and the text written to B<buf> will be null
+terminated. The length of the output string written is returned
+excluding the terminating null. If B<buf> is <NULL> then the amount
+of space needed in B<buf> (excluding the final null) is returned.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID() and X509_NAME_get_text_by_OBJ() are
+legacy functions which have various limitations which make them
+of minimal use in practice. They can only find the first matching
+entry and will copy the contents of the field verbatim: this can
+be highly confusing if the target is a multicharacter string type
+like a BMPString or a UTF8String.
+
+For a more general solution X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID() or
+X509_NAME_get_index_by_OBJ() should be used followed by
+X509_NAME_get_entry() on any matching indices and then the
+various B<X509_NAME_ENTRY> utility functions on the result.
+
+The list of all relevant B<NID_*> and B<OBJ_* codes> can be found in
+the source code header files E<lt>openssl/obj_mac.hE<gt> and/or
+E<lt>openssl/objects.hE<gt>.
+
+Applications which could pass invalid NIDs to X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID()
+should check for the return value of -2. Alternatively the NID validity
+can be determined first by checking OBJ_nid2obj(nid) is not NULL.
+
+=head1 EXAMPLES
+
+Process all entries:
+
+ int i;
+ X509_NAME_ENTRY *e;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < X509_NAME_entry_count(nm); i++)
+        {
+        e = X509_NAME_get_entry(nm, i);
+        /* Do something with e */
+        }
+
+Process all commonName entries:
+
+ int lastpos = -1;
+ X509_NAME_ENTRY *e;
+
+ for (;;)
+        {
+        lastpos = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(nm, NID_commonName, lastpos);
+        if (lastpos == -1)
+                break;
+        e = X509_NAME_get_entry(nm, lastpos);
+        /* Do something with e */
+        }
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID() and X509_NAME_get_index_by_OBJ()
+return the index of the next matching entry or -1 if not found.
+X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID() can also return -2 if the supplied
+NID is invalid.
+
+X509_NAME_entry_count() returns the total number of entries.
+
+X509_NAME_get_entry() returns an B<X509_NAME> pointer to the
+requested entry or B<NULL> if the index is invalid.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>, L<d2i_X509_NAME(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_print_ex.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_print_ex.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3e9caa8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_print_ex.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+X509_NAME_print_ex, X509_NAME_print_ex_fp, X509_NAME_print,
+X509_NAME_oneline - X509_NAME printing routines
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+ int X509_NAME_print_ex(BIO *out, const X509_NAME *nm, int indent, unsigned long flags);
+ int X509_NAME_print_ex_fp(FILE *fp, const X509_NAME *nm, int indent, unsigned long flags);
+ char * X509_NAME_oneline(const X509_NAME *a, char *buf, int size);
+ int X509_NAME_print(BIO *bp, const X509_NAME *name, int obase);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+X509_NAME_print_ex() prints a human readable version of B<nm> to BIO B<out>. Each
+line (for multiline formats) is indented by B<indent> spaces. The output format
+can be extensively customised by use of the B<flags> parameter.
+
+X509_NAME_print_ex_fp() is identical to X509_NAME_print_ex() except the output is
+written to FILE pointer B<fp>.
+
+X509_NAME_oneline() prints an ASCII version of B<a> to B<buf>.
+If B<buf> is B<NULL> then a buffer is dynamically allocated and returned, and
+B<size> is ignored.
+Otherwise, at most B<size> bytes will be written, including the ending '\0',
+and B<buf> is returned.
+
+X509_NAME_print() prints out B<name> to B<bp> indenting each line by B<obase>
+characters. Multiple lines are used if the output (including indent) exceeds
+80 characters.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The functions X509_NAME_oneline() and X509_NAME_print() are legacy functions which
+produce a non standard output form, they don't handle multi character fields and
+have various quirks and inconsistencies. Their use is strongly discouraged in new
+applications.
+
+Although there are a large number of possible flags for most purposes
+B<XN_FLAG_ONELINE>, B<XN_FLAG_MULTILINE> or B<XN_FLAG_RFC2253> will suffice.
+As noted on the L<ASN1_STRING_print_ex(3)> manual page
+for UTF8 terminals the B<ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_MSB> should be unset: so for example
+B<XN_FLAG_ONELINE & ~ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_MSB> would be used.
+
+The complete set of the flags supported by X509_NAME_print_ex() is listed below.
+
+Several options can be ored together.
+
+The options B<XN_FLAG_SEP_COMMA_PLUS>, B<XN_FLAG_SEP_CPLUS_SPC>,
+B<XN_FLAG_SEP_SPLUS_SPC> and B<XN_FLAG_SEP_MULTILINE> determine the field separators
+to use. Two distinct separators are used between distinct RelativeDistinguishedName
+components and separate values in the same RDN for a multi-valued RDN. Multi-valued
+RDNs are currently very rare so the second separator will hardly ever be used.
+
+B<XN_FLAG_SEP_COMMA_PLUS> uses comma and plus as separators. B<XN_FLAG_SEP_CPLUS_SPC>
+uses comma and plus with spaces: this is more readable that plain comma and plus.
+B<XN_FLAG_SEP_SPLUS_SPC> uses spaced semicolon and plus. B<XN_FLAG_SEP_MULTILINE> uses
+spaced newline and plus respectively.
+
+If B<XN_FLAG_DN_REV> is set the whole DN is printed in reversed order.
+
+The fields B<XN_FLAG_FN_SN>, B<XN_FLAG_FN_LN>, B<XN_FLAG_FN_OID>,
+B<XN_FLAG_FN_NONE> determine how a field name is displayed. It will
+use the short name (e.g. CN) the long name (e.g. commonName) always
+use OID numerical form (normally OIDs are only used if the field name is not
+recognised) and no field name respectively.
+
+If B<XN_FLAG_SPC_EQ> is set then spaces will be placed around the '=' character
+separating field names and values.
+
+If B<XN_FLAG_DUMP_UNKNOWN_FIELDS> is set then the encoding of unknown fields is
+printed instead of the values.
+
+If B<XN_FLAG_FN_ALIGN> is set then field names are padded to 20 characters: this
+is only of use for multiline format.
+
+Additionally all the options supported by ASN1_STRING_print_ex() can be used to
+control how each field value is displayed.
+
+In addition a number options can be set for commonly used formats.
+
+B<XN_FLAG_RFC2253> sets options which produce an output compatible with RFC2253 it
+is equivalent to:
+ B<ASN1_STRFLGS_RFC2253 | XN_FLAG_SEP_COMMA_PLUS | XN_FLAG_DN_REV | XN_FLAG_FN_SN | XN_FLAG_DUMP_UNKNOWN_FIELDS>
+
+
+B<XN_FLAG_ONELINE> is a more readable one line format which is the same as:
+ B<ASN1_STRFLGS_RFC2253 | ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_QUOTE | XN_FLAG_SEP_CPLUS_SPC | XN_FLAG_SPC_EQ | XN_FLAG_FN_SN>
+
+B<XN_FLAG_MULTILINE> is a multiline format which is the same as:
+ B<ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_CTRL | ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_MSB | XN_FLAG_SEP_MULTILINE | XN_FLAG_SPC_EQ | XN_FLAG_FN_LN | XN_FLAG_FN_ALIGN>
+
+B<XN_FLAG_COMPAT> uses a format identical to X509_NAME_print(): in fact it calls X509_NAME_print() internally.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ASN1_STRING_print_ex(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_PUBKEY_new.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_PUBKEY_new.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b133105
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_PUBKEY_new.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+X509_PUBKEY_new, X509_PUBKEY_free, X509_PUBKEY_set, X509_PUBKEY_get0,
+X509_PUBKEY_get, d2i_PUBKEY, i2d_PUBKEY, d2i_PUBKEY_bio, d2i_PUBKEY_fp,
+i2d_PUBKEY_fp, i2d_PUBKEY_bio, X509_PUBKEY_set0_param,
+X509_PUBKEY_get0_param - SubjectPublicKeyInfo public key functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+ X509_PUBKEY *X509_PUBKEY_new(void);
+ void X509_PUBKEY_free(X509_PUBKEY *a);
+
+ int X509_PUBKEY_set(X509_PUBKEY **x, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+ EVP_PKEY *X509_PUBKEY_get0(X509_PUBKEY *key);
+ EVP_PKEY *X509_PUBKEY_get(X509_PUBKEY *key);
+
+ EVP_PKEY *d2i_PUBKEY(EVP_PKEY **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length);
+ int i2d_PUBKEY(EVP_PKEY *a, unsigned char **pp);
+
+ EVP_PKEY *d2i_PUBKEY_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY **a);
+ EVP_PKEY *d2i_PUBKEY_fp(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY **a);
+
+ int i2d_PUBKEY_fp(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+ int i2d_PUBKEY_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+
+ int X509_PUBKEY_set0_param(X509_PUBKEY *pub, ASN1_OBJECT *aobj,
+                            int ptype, void *pval,
+                            unsigned char *penc, int penclen);
+ int X509_PUBKEY_get0_param(ASN1_OBJECT **ppkalg,
+                            const unsigned char **pk, int *ppklen,
+                            X509_ALGOR **pa, X509_PUBKEY *pub);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The B<X509_PUBKEY> structure represents the ASN.1 B<SubjectPublicKeyInfo>
+structure defined in RFC5280 and used in certificates and certificate requests.
+
+X509_PUBKEY_new() allocates and initializes an B<X509_PUBKEY> structure.
+
+X509_PUBKEY_free() frees up B<X509_PUBKEY> structure B<a>. If B<a> is NULL
+nothing is done.
+
+X509_PUBKEY_set() sets the public key in B<*x> to the public key contained
+in the B<EVP_PKEY> structure B<pkey>. If B<*x> is not NULL any existing
+public key structure will be freed.
+
+X509_PUBKEY_get0() returns the public key contained in B<key>. The returned
+value is an internal pointer which B<MUST NOT> be freed after use.
+
+X509_PUBKEY_get() is similar to X509_PUBKEY_get0() except the reference
+count on the returned key is incremented so it B<MUST> be freed using
+EVP_PKEY_free() after use.
+
+d2i_PUBKEY() and i2d_PUBKEY() decode and encode an B<EVP_PKEY> structure
+using B<SubjectPublicKeyInfo> format. They otherwise follow the conventions of
+other ASN.1 functions such as d2i_X509().
+
+d2i_PUBKEY_bio(), d2i_PUBKEY_fp(), i2d_PUBKEY_bio() and i2d_PUBKEY_fp() are
+similar to d2i_PUBKEY() and i2d_PUBKEY() except they decode or encode using a
+B<BIO> or B<FILE> pointer.
+
+X509_PUBKEY_set0_param() sets the public key parameters of B<pub>. The
+OID associated with the algorithm is set to B<aobj>. The type of the
+algorithm parameters is set to B<type> using the structure B<pval>.
+The encoding of the public key itself is set to the B<penclen>
+bytes contained in buffer B<penc>. On success ownership of all the supplied
+parameters is passed to B<pub> so they must not be freed after the
+call.
+
+X509_PUBKEY_get0_param() retrieves the public key parameters from B<pub>,
+B<*ppkalg> is set to the associated OID and the encoding consists of
+B<*ppklen> bytes at B<*pk>, B<*pa> is set to the associated
+AlgorithmIdentifier for the public key. If the value of any of these
+parameters is not required it can be set to B<NULL>. All of the
+retrieved pointers are internal and must not be freed after the
+call.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The B<X509_PUBKEY> functions can be used to encode and decode public keys
+in a standard format.
+
+In many cases applications will not call the B<X509_PUBKEY> functions
+directly: they will instead call wrapper functions such as X509_get0_pubkey().
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+If the allocation fails, X509_PUBKEY_new() returns B<NULL> and sets an error
+code that can be obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)>.
+
+Otherwise it returns a pointer to the newly allocated structure.
+
+X509_PUBKEY_free() does not return a value.
+
+X509_PUBKEY_get0() and X509_PUBKEY_get() return a pointer to an B<EVP_PKEY>
+structure or B<NULL> if an error occurs.
+
+X509_PUBKEY_set(), X509_PUBKEY_set0_param() and X509_PUBKEY_get0_param()
+return 1 for success and 0 if an error occurred.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<d2i_X509(3)>,
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>,
+L<X509_get_pubkey(3)>,
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_SIG_get0.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_SIG_get0.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d24eadc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_SIG_get0.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+X509_SIG_get0, X509_SIG_getm - DigestInfo functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+ void X509_SIG_get0(const X509_SIG *sig, const X509_ALGOR **palg,
+                    const ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pdigest);
+ void X509_SIG_getm(X509_SIG *sig, X509_ALGOR **palg,
+                    ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pdigest,
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+X509_SIG_get0() returns pointers to the algorithm identifier and digest
+value in B<sig>. X509_SIG_getm() is identical to X509_SIG_get0()
+except the pointers returned are not constant and can be modified:
+for example to initialise them.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<d2i_X509(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_get_error.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_get_error.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..105e051
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_get_error.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,338 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_error, X509_STORE_CTX_set_error,
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth, X509_STORE_CTX_set_error_depth,
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert, X509_STORE_CTX_set_current_cert,
+X509_STORE_CTX_get0_cert, X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain,
+X509_verify_cert_error_string - get or set certificate verification status
+information
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+ int   X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+ void  X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int s);
+ int   X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+ void  X509_STORE_CTX_set_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth);
+ X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+ void  X509_STORE_CTX_set_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
+ X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+
+ STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+
+ const char *X509_verify_cert_error_string(long n);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+These functions are typically called after X509_verify_cert() has indicated
+an error or in a verification callback to determine the nature of an error.
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_error() returns the error code of B<ctx>, see
+the B<ERROR CODES> section for a full description of all error codes.
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_set_error() sets the error code of B<ctx> to B<s>. For example
+it might be used in a verification callback to set an error based on additional
+checks.
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth() returns the B<depth> of the error. This is a
+non-negative integer representing where in the certificate chain the error
+occurred. If it is zero it occurred in the end entity certificate, one if
+it is the certificate which signed the end entity certificate and so on.
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_set_error_depth() sets the error B<depth>.
+This can be used in combination with X509_STORE_CTX_set_error() to set the
+depth at which an error condition was detected.
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert() returns the certificate in B<ctx> which
+caused the error or B<NULL> if no certificate is relevant.
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_set_current_cert() sets the certificate B<x> in B<ctx> which
+caused the error.
+This value is not intended to remain valid for very long, and remains owned by
+the caller.
+It may be examined by a verification callback invoked to handle each error
+encountered during chain verification and is no longer required after such a
+callback.
+If a callback wishes the save the certificate for use after it returns, it
+needs to increment its reference count via L<X509_up_ref(3)>.
+Once such a I<saved> certificate is no longer needed it can be freed with
+L<X509_free(3)>.
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_get0_cert() retrieves an internal pointer to the
+certificate being verified by the B<ctx>.
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain() returns a complete validate chain if a previous
+call to X509_verify_cert() is successful. If the call to X509_verify_cert()
+is B<not> successful the returned chain may be incomplete or invalid. The
+returned chain persists after the B<ctx> structure is freed, when it is
+no longer needed it should be free up using:
+
+  sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free);
+
+X509_verify_cert_error_string() returns a human readable error string for
+verification error B<n>.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_error() returns B<X509_V_OK> or an error code.
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth() returns a non-negative error depth.
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert() returns the certificate which caused the
+error or B<NULL> if no certificate is relevant to the error.
+
+X509_verify_cert_error_string() returns a human readable error string for
+verification error B<n>.
+
+=head1 ERROR CODES
+
+A list of error codes and messages is shown below.  Some of the
+error codes are defined but currently never returned: these are described as
+"unused".
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<X509_V_OK: ok>
+
+the operation was successful.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT: unable to get issuer certificate>
+
+the issuer certificate could not be found: this occurs if the issuer certificate
+of an untrusted certificate cannot be found.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL: unable to get certificate CRL>
+
+the CRL of a certificate could not be found.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE: unable to decrypt certificate's signature>
+
+the certificate signature could not be decrypted. This means that the actual
+signature value could not be determined rather than it not matching the
+expected value, this is only meaningful for RSA keys.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE: unable to decrypt CRL's signature>
+
+the CRL signature could not be decrypted: this means that the actual signature
+value could not be determined rather than it not matching the expected value.
+Unused.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY: unable to decode issuer public key>
+
+the public key in the certificate SubjectPublicKeyInfo could not be read.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: certificate signature failure>
+
+the signature of the certificate is invalid.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: CRL signature failure>
+
+the signature of the certificate is invalid.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID: certificate is not yet valid>
+
+the certificate is not yet valid: the notBefore date is after the current time.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED: certificate has expired>
+
+the certificate has expired: that is the notAfter date is before the current time.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID: CRL is not yet valid>
+
+the CRL is not yet valid.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED: CRL has expired>
+
+the CRL has expired.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD: format error in certificate's notBefore field>
+
+the certificate notBefore field contains an invalid time.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD: format error in certificate's notAfter field>
+
+the certificate notAfter field contains an invalid time.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD: format error in CRL's lastUpdate field>
+
+the CRL lastUpdate field contains an invalid time.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD: format error in CRL's nextUpdate field>
+
+the CRL nextUpdate field contains an invalid time.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM: out of memory>
+
+an error occurred trying to allocate memory. This should never happen.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT: self signed certificate>
+
+the passed certificate is self signed and the same certificate cannot be found
+in the list of trusted certificates.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN: self signed certificate in certificate chain>
+
+the certificate chain could be built up using the untrusted certificates but
+the root could not be found locally.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY: unable to get local issuer certificate>
+
+the issuer certificate of a locally looked up certificate could not be found.
+This normally means the list of trusted certificates is not complete.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE: unable to verify the first certificate>
+
+no signatures could be verified because the chain contains only one certificate
+and it is not self signed.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG: certificate chain too long>
+
+the certificate chain length is greater than the supplied maximum depth. Unused.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED: certificate revoked>
+
+the certificate has been revoked.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA: invalid CA certificate>
+
+a CA certificate is invalid. Either it is not a CA or its extensions are not
+consistent with the supplied purpose.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED: path length constraint exceeded>
+
+the basicConstraints path-length parameter has been exceeded.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE: unsupported certificate purpose>
+
+the supplied certificate cannot be used for the specified purpose.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED: certificate not trusted>
+
+the root CA is not marked as trusted for the specified purpose.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED: certificate rejected>
+
+the root CA is marked to reject the specified purpose.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH: subject issuer mismatch>
+
+the current candidate issuer certificate was rejected because its subject name
+did not match the issuer name of the current certificate. This is only set
+if issuer check debugging is enabled it is used for status notification and
+is B<not> in itself an error.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_AKID_SKID_MISMATCH: authority and subject key identifier mismatch>
+
+the current candidate issuer certificate was rejected because its subject key
+identifier was present and did not match the authority key identifier current
+certificate. This is only set if issuer check debugging is enabled it is used
+for status notification and is B<not> in itself an error.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH: authority and issuer serial number mismatch>
+
+the current candidate issuer certificate was rejected because its issuer name
+and serial number was present and did not match the authority key identifier of
+the current certificate. This is only set if issuer check debugging is enabled
+it is used for status notification and is B<not> in itself an error.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CERTSIGN:key usage does not include certificate signing>
+
+the current candidate issuer certificate was rejected because its keyUsage
+extension does not permit certificate signing. This is only set if issuer check
+debugging is enabled it is used for status notification and is B<not> in itself
+an error.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION: invalid or inconsistent certificate extension>
+
+A certificate extension had an invalid value (for example an incorrect
+encoding) or some value inconsistent with other extensions.
+
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION: invalid or inconsistent certificate policy extension>
+
+A certificate policies extension had an invalid value (for example an incorrect
+encoding) or some value inconsistent with other extensions. This error only
+occurs if policy processing is enabled.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY: no explicit policy>
+
+The verification flags were set to require and explicit policy but none was
+present.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE: Different CRL scope>
+
+The only CRLs that could be found did not match the scope of the certificate.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION_FEATURE: Unsupported extension feature>
+
+Some feature of a certificate extension is not supported. Unused.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION: permitted subtree violation>
+
+A name constraint violation occurred in the permitted subtrees.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_EXCLUDED_VIOLATION: excluded subtree violation>
+
+A name constraint violation occurred in the excluded subtrees.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_SUBTREE_MINMAX: name constraints minimum and maximum not supported>
+
+A certificate name constraints extension included a minimum or maximum field:
+this is not supported.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CONSTRAINT_TYPE: unsupported name constraint type>
+
+An unsupported name constraint type was encountered. OpenSSL currently only
+supports directory name, DNS name, email and URI types.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CONSTRAINT_SYNTAX: unsupported or invalid name constraint syntax>
+
+The format of the name constraint is not recognised: for example an email
+address format of a form not mentioned in RFC3280. This could be caused by
+a garbage extension or some new feature not currently supported.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR: CRL path validation error>
+
+An error occurred when attempting to verify the CRL path. This error can only
+happen if extended CRL checking is enabled.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION: application verification failure>
+
+an application specific error. This will never be returned unless explicitly
+set by an application.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The above functions should be used instead of directly referencing the fields
+in the B<X509_VERIFY_CTX> structure.
+
+In versions of OpenSSL before 1.0 the current certificate returned by
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert() was never B<NULL>. Applications should
+check the return value before printing out any debugging information relating
+to the current certificate.
+
+If an unrecognised error code is passed to X509_verify_cert_error_string() the
+numerical value of the unknown code is returned in a static buffer. This is not
+thread safe but will never happen unless an invalid code is passed.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<X509_verify_cert(3)>,
+L<X509_up_ref(3)>,
+L<X509_free(3)>.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2009-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_new.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_new.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2828ed7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_new.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,174 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_new, X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup, X509_STORE_CTX_free,
+X509_STORE_CTX_init, X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack, X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert,
+X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls,
+X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain, X509_STORE_CTX_set0_verified_chain,
+X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param, X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param,
+X509_STORE_CTX_get0_untrusted, X509_STORE_CTX_set0_untrusted,
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted,
+X509_STORE_CTX_set_default,
+X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify,
+X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn
+- X509_STORE_CTX initialisation
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/x509_vfy.h>
+
+ X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void);
+ void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+ void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+
+ int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store,
+                         X509 *x509, STACK_OF(X509) *chain);
+
+ void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk);
+
+ void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
+ STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(X609_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+ void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_verified_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *chain);
+ void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk);
+
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+ void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param);
+ int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name);
+
+ STACK_OF(X509)* X509_STORE_CTX_get0_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+ void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk);
+
+ int X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+
+ typedef int (*X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn)(X509_STORE_CTX *);
+ void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn verify);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+These functions initialise an B<X509_STORE_CTX> structure for subsequent use
+by X509_verify_cert().
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_new() returns a newly initialised B<X509_STORE_CTX> structure.
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup() internally cleans up an B<X509_STORE_CTX> structure.
+The context can then be reused with an new call to X509_STORE_CTX_init().
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_free() completely frees up B<ctx>. After this call B<ctx>
+is no longer valid.
+If B<ctx> is NULL nothing is done.
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_init() sets up B<ctx> for a subsequent verification operation.
+It must be called before each call to X509_verify_cert(), i.e. a B<ctx> is only
+good for one call to X509_verify_cert(); if you want to verify a second
+certificate with the same B<ctx> then you must call X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup()
+and then X509_STORE_CTX_init() again before the second call to
+X509_verify_cert(). The trusted certificate store is set to B<store>, the end
+entity certificate to be verified is set to B<x509> and a set of additional
+certificates (which will be untrusted but may be used to build the chain) in
+B<chain>. Any or all of the B<store>, B<x509> and B<chain> parameters can be
+B<NULL>.
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack() sets the set of trusted certificates of
+B<ctx> to B<sk>. This is an alternative way of specifying trusted certificates
+instead of using an B<X509_STORE>.
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert() sets the certificate to be verified in B<ctx> to
+B<x>.
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_set0_verified_chain() sets the validated chain used
+by B<ctx> to be B<chain>.
+Ownership of the chain is transferred to B<ctx> and should not be
+free'd by the caller.
+X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain() returns a the internal pointer used by the
+B<ctx> that contains the validated chain.
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls() sets a set of CRLs to use to aid certificate
+verification to B<sk>. These CRLs will only be used if CRL verification is
+enabled in the associated B<X509_VERIFY_PARAM> structure. This might be
+used where additional "useful" CRLs are supplied as part of a protocol,
+for example in a PKCS#7 structure.
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param() retrieves an internal pointer
+to the verification parameters associated with B<ctx>.
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_get0_untrusted() retrieves an internal pointer to the
+stack of untrusted certificates associated with B<ctx>.
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_set0_untrusted() sets the internal point to the stack
+of untrusted certificates associated with B<ctx> to B<sk>.
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param() sets the internal verification parameter pointer
+to B<param>. After this call B<param> should not be used.
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_set_default() looks up and sets the default verification
+method to B<name>. This uses the function X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup() to
+find an appropriate set of parameters from B<name>.
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted() returns the number of untrusted certificates
+that were used in building the chain following a call to X509_verify_cert().
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify() provides the capability for overriding the default
+verify function. This function is responsible for verifying chain signatures and
+expiration times.
+
+A verify function is defined as an X509_STORE_CTX_verify type which has the
+following signature:
+
+ int (*verify)(X509_STORE_CTX *);
+
+This function should receive the current X509_STORE_CTX as a parameter and
+return 1 on success or 0 on failure.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The certificates and CRLs in a store are used internally and should B<not>
+be freed up until after the associated B<X509_STORE_CTX> is freed.
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+The certificates and CRLs in a context are used internally and should B<not>
+be freed up until after the associated B<X509_STORE_CTX> is freed. Copies
+should be made or reference counts increased instead.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_new() returns an newly allocates context or B<NULL> is an
+error occurred.
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_init() returns 1 for success or 0 if an error occurred.
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param() returns a pointer to an B<X509_VERIFY_PARAM>
+structure or B<NULL> if an error occurred.
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(), X509_STORE_CTX_free(),
+X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(),
+X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(),
+X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls() and X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param() do not return
+values.
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_set_default() returns 1 for success or 0 if an error occurred.
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted() returns the number of untrusted certificates
+used.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<X509_verify_cert(3)>
+L<X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls() was first added to OpenSSL 1.0.0
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted() was first added to OpenSSL 1.1.0
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2009-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3be256d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,215 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_cleanup,
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_crls,
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_certs,
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_policy,
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_cert_crl,
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_crl,
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_get_crl,
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_revocation,
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_issued,
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_get_issuer,
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify_cb,
+X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb,
+X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb
+- get and set verification callback
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/x509_vfy.h>
+
+ typedef int (*X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *);
+
+ X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+
+ void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
+                                   X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb verify_cb);
+
+ X509_STORE_CTX_get_issuer_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_get_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+ X509_STORE_CTX_check_issued_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+ X509_STORE_CTX_check_revocation_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+ X509_STORE_CTX_get_crl_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_get_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+ X509_STORE_CTX_check_crl_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+ X509_STORE_CTX_cert_crl_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+ X509_STORE_CTX_check_policy_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+ X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_certs_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_certs(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+ X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_crls_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+ X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb() sets the verification callback of B<ctx> to
+B<verify_cb> overwriting any existing callback.
+
+The verification callback can be used to customise the operation of certificate
+verification, either by overriding error conditions or logging errors for
+debugging purposes.
+
+However a verification callback is B<not> essential and the default operation
+is often sufficient.
+
+The B<ok> parameter to the callback indicates the value the callback should
+return to retain the default behaviour. If it is zero then an error condition
+is indicated. If it is 1 then no error occurred. If the flag
+B<X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY> is set then B<ok> is set to 2 to indicate the
+policy checking is complete.
+
+The B<ctx> parameter to the callback is the B<X509_STORE_CTX> structure that
+is performing the verification operation. A callback can examine this
+structure and receive additional information about the error, for example
+by calling X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(). Additional application data can
+be passed to the callback via the B<ex_data> mechanism.
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify_cb() returns the value of the current callback
+for the specific B<ctx>.
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_get_issuer(),
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_issued(), X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_revocation(),
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_get_crl(), X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_crl(),
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_cert_crl(), X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_policy(),
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_certs(), X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_crls()
+and X509_STORE_CTX_get_cleanup() return the function pointers cached
+from the corresponding B<X509_STORE>, please see
+L<X509_STORE_set_verify(3)> for more information.
+
+
+=head1 WARNING
+
+In general a verification callback should B<NOT> unconditionally return 1 in
+all circumstances because this will allow verification to succeed no matter
+what the error. This effectively removes all security from the application
+because B<any> certificate (including untrusted generated ones) will be
+accepted.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The verification callback can be set and inherited from the parent structure
+performing the operation. In some cases (such as S/MIME verification) the
+B<X509_STORE_CTX> structure is created and destroyed internally and the
+only way to set a custom verification callback is by inheriting it from the
+associated B<X509_STORE>.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb() does not return a value.
+
+=head1 EXAMPLES
+
+Default callback operation:
+
+ int verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+        {
+        return ok;
+        }
+
+Simple example, suppose a certificate in the chain is expired and we wish
+to continue after this error:
+
+ int verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+        {
+        /* Tolerate certificate expiration */
+        if (X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx) == X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED)
+                        return 1;
+        /* Otherwise don't override */
+        return ok;
+        }
+
+More complex example, we don't wish to continue after B<any> certificate has
+expired just one specific case:
+
+ int verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+        {
+        int err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
+        X509 *err_cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx);
+        if (err == X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED)
+                {
+                if (check_is_acceptable_expired_cert(err_cert)
+                        return 1;
+                }
+        return ok;
+        }
+
+Full featured logging callback. In this case the B<bio_err> is assumed to be
+a global logging B<BIO>, an alternative would to store a BIO in B<ctx> using
+B<ex_data>.
+
+ int verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+        {
+        X509 *err_cert;
+        int err, depth;
+
+        err_cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx);
+        err =   X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
+        depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx);
+
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "depth=%d ", depth);
+        if (err_cert)
+                {
+                X509_NAME_print_ex(bio_err, X509_get_subject_name(err_cert),
+                                        0, XN_FLAG_ONELINE);
+                BIO_puts(bio_err, "\n");
+                }
+        else
+                BIO_puts(bio_err, "<no cert>\n");
+        if (!ok)
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "verify error:num=%d:%s\n", err,
+                        X509_verify_cert_error_string(err));
+        switch (err)
+                {
+        case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
+                BIO_puts(bio_err, "issuer= ");
+                X509_NAME_print_ex(bio_err, X509_get_issuer_name(err_cert),
+                                        0, XN_FLAG_ONELINE);
+                BIO_puts(bio_err, "\n");
+                break;
+        case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID:
+        case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD:
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "notBefore=");
+                ASN1_TIME_print(bio_err, X509_get_notBefore(err_cert));
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n");
+                break;
+        case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
+        case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD:
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "notAfter=");
+                ASN1_TIME_print(bio_err, X509_get_notAfter(err_cert));
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n");
+                break;
+        case X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY:
+                policies_print(bio_err, ctx);
+                break;
+                }
+        if (err == X509_V_OK && ok == 2)
+                /* print out policies */
+
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "verify return:%d\n", ok);
+        return(ok);
+        }
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(3)>
+L<X509_STORE_set_verify_cb_func(3)>
+L<X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_get_issuer(),
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_issued(), X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_revocation(),
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_get_crl(), X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_crl(),
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_cert_crl(), X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_policy(),
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_certs(), X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_crls()
+and X509_STORE_CTX_get_cleanup() were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2009-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_get0_param.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_get0_param.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0aed725
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_get0_param.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+X509_STORE_get0_param, X509_STORE_set1_param,
+X509_STORE_get0_objects - X509_STORE setter and getter functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/x509_vfy.h>
+
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_get0_param(X509_STORE *ctx);
+ int X509_STORE_set1_param(X509_STORE *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *pm);
+ STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT) *X509_STORE_get0_objects(X509_STORE *ctx);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+X509_STORE_set1_param() sets the verification parameters
+to B<pm> for B<ctx>.
+
+X509_STORE_get0_param() retrieves an internal pointer to the verification
+parameters for B<ctx>. The returned pointer must not be freed by the
+calling application
+
+X509_STORE_get0_objects() retrieve an internal pointer to the store's
+X509 object cache. The cache contains B<X509> and B<X509_CRL> objects. The
+returned pointer must not be freed by the calling application.
+
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+X509_STORE_get0_param() returns a pointer to an
+B<X509_VERIFY_PARAM> structure.
+
+X509_STORE_set1_param() returns 1 for success and 0 for failure.
+
+X509_STORE_get0_objects() returns a pointer to a stack of B<X509_OBJECT>.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<X509_STORE_new(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+B<X509_STORE_get0_param> and B<X509_STORE_get0_objects> were added in
+OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_new.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_new.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f7a5c81
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_new.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+X509_STORE_new, X509_STORE_up_ref, X509_STORE_free, X509_STORE_lock,
+X509_STORE_unlock - X509_STORE allocation, freeing and locking functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/x509_vfy.h>
+
+ X509_STORE *X509_STORE_new(void);
+ void X509_STORE_free(X509_STORE *v);
+ int X509_STORE_lock(X509_STORE *v);
+ int X509_STORE_unlock(X509_STORE *v);
+ int X509_STORE_up_ref(X509_STORE *v);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The X509_STORE_new() function returns a new X509_STORE.
+
+X509_STORE_up_ref() increments the reference count associated with the
+X509_STORE object.
+
+X509_STORE_lock() locks the store from modification by other threads,
+X509_STORE_unlock() locks it.
+
+X509_STORE_free() frees up a single X509_STORE object.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+X509_STORE_new() returns a newly created X509_STORE or NULL if the call fails.
+
+X509_STORE_up_ref(), X509_STORE_lock() and X509_STORE_unlock() return
+1 for success and 0 for failure.
+
+X509_STORE_free() does not return values.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<X509_STORE_set_verify_cb_func(3)>
+L<X509_STORE_get0_param(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+The X509_STORE_up_ref(), X509_STORE_lock() and X509_STORE_unlock()
+functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_set_verify_cb_func.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_set_verify_cb_func.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..12a4646
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_set_verify_cb_func.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,265 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+X509_STORE_set_lookup_crls_cb,
+X509_STORE_set_verify_func,
+X509_STORE_get_cleanup,
+X509_STORE_set_cleanup,
+X509_STORE_get_lookup_crls,
+X509_STORE_set_lookup_crls,
+X509_STORE_get_lookup_certs,
+X509_STORE_set_lookup_certs,
+X509_STORE_get_check_policy,
+X509_STORE_set_check_policy,
+X509_STORE_get_cert_crl,
+X509_STORE_set_cert_crl,
+X509_STORE_get_check_crl,
+X509_STORE_set_check_crl,
+X509_STORE_get_get_crl,
+X509_STORE_set_get_crl,
+X509_STORE_get_check_revocation,
+X509_STORE_set_check_revocation,
+X509_STORE_get_check_issued,
+X509_STORE_set_check_issued,
+X509_STORE_get_get_issuer,
+X509_STORE_set_get_issuer,
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify,
+X509_STORE_set_verify,
+X509_STORE_get_verify_cb,
+X509_STORE_set_verify_cb_func, X509_STORE_set_verify_cb,
+X509_STORE_CTX_cert_crl_fn, X509_STORE_CTX_check_crl_fn,
+X509_STORE_CTX_check_issued_fn, X509_STORE_CTX_check_policy_fn,
+X509_STORE_CTX_check_revocation_fn, X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup_fn,
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_crl_fn, X509_STORE_CTX_get_issuer_fn,
+X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_certs_fn, X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_crls_fn
+- set verification callback
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/x509_vfy.h>
+
+ typedef int (*X509_STORE_CTX_get_issuer_fn)(X509 **issuer,
+                                             X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
+ typedef int (*X509_STORE_CTX_check_issued_fn)(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
+                                               X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
+ typedef int (*X509_STORE_CTX_check_revocation_fn)(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+ typedef int (*X509_STORE_CTX_get_crl_fn)(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
+                                          X509_CRL **crl, X509 *x);
+ typedef int (*X509_STORE_CTX_check_crl_fn)(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl);
+ typedef int (*X509_STORE_CTX_cert_crl_fn)(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
+                                           X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
+ typedef int (*X509_STORE_CTX_check_policy_fn)(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+ typedef STACK_OF(X509) *(*X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_certs_fn)(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
+                                                           X509_NAME *nm);
+ typedef STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *(*X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_crls_fn)(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
+                                                              X509_NAME *nm);
+ typedef int (*X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup_fn)(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+
+ void X509_STORE_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE *ctx,
+                               X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb verify_cb);
+ X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb X509_STORE_get_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+
+ void X509_STORE_set_verify(X509_STORE *ctx, X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn verify);
+ X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+
+ void X509_STORE_set_get_issuer(X509_STORE *ctx,
+                                X509_STORE_CTX_get_issuer_fn get_issuer);
+ X509_STORE_CTX_get_issuer_fn X509_STORE_get_get_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+
+ void X509_STORE_set_check_issued(X509_STORE *ctx,
+                                  X509_STORE_CTX_check_issued_fn check_issued);
+ X509_STORE_CTX_check_issued_fn X509_STORE_get_check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+
+ void X509_STORE_set_check_revocation(X509_STORE *ctx,
+                                      X509_STORE_CTX_check_revocation_fn check_revocation);
+ X509_STORE_CTX_check_revocation_fn X509_STORE_get_check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+
+ void X509_STORE_set_get_crl(X509_STORE *ctx,
+                             X509_STORE_CTX_get_crl_fn get_crl);
+ X509_STORE_CTX_get_crl_fn X509_STORE_get_get_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+
+ void X509_STORE_set_check_crl(X509_STORE *ctx,
+                               X509_STORE_CTX_check_crl_fn check_crl);
+ X509_STORE_CTX_check_crl_fn X509_STORE_get_check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+
+ void X509_STORE_set_cert_crl(X509_STORE *ctx,
+                              X509_STORE_CTX_cert_crl_fn cert_crl);
+ X509_STORE_CTX_cert_crl_fn X509_STORE_get_cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+
+ void X509_STORE_set_check_policy(X509_STORE *ctx,
+                                  X509_STORE_CTX_check_policy_fn check_policy);
+ X509_STORE_CTX_check_policy_fn X509_STORE_get_check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+
+ void X509_STORE_set_lookup_certs(X509_STORE *ctx,
+                                  X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_certs_fn lookup_certs);
+ X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_certs_fn X509_STORE_get_lookup_certs(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+
+ void X509_STORE_set_lookup_crls(X509_STORE *ctx,
+                                 X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_crls_fn lookup_crls);
+ X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_crls_fn X509_STORE_get_lookup_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+
+ void X509_STORE_set_cleanup(X509_STORE *ctx,
+                             X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup_fn cleanup);
+ X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup_fn X509_STORE_get_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+
+ /* Aliases */
+ void X509_STORE_set_verify_cb_func(X509_STORE *st,
+                                    X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb verify_cb);
+ void X509_STORE_set_verify_func(X509_STORE *ctx,
+                                 X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn verify);
+ void X509_STORE_set_lookup_crls_cb(X509_STORE *ctx,
+                                    X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_crls_fn lookup_crls);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+X509_STORE_set_verify_cb() sets the verification callback of B<ctx> to
+B<verify_cb> overwriting the previous callback.
+The callback assigned with this function becomes a default for the one
+that can be assigned directly to the corresponding B<X509_STORE_CTX>,
+please see L<X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(3)> for further information.
+
+X509_STORE_set_verify() sets the final chain verification function for
+B<ctx> to B<verify>.
+Its purpose is to go through the chain of certificates and check that
+all signatures are valid and that the current time is within the
+limits of each certificate's first and last validity time.
+The final chain verification functions must return 0 on failure and 1
+on success.
+I<If no chain verification function is provided, the internal default
+function will be used instead.>
+
+X509_STORE_set_get_issuer() sets the function to get the issuer
+certificate that verifies the given certificate B<x>.
+When found, the issuer certificate must be assigned to B<*issuer>.
+This function must return 0 on failure and 1 on success.
+I<If no function to get the issuer is provided, the internal default
+function will be used instead.>
+
+X509_STORE_set_check_issued() sets the function to check that a given
+certificate B<x> is issued with the issuer certificate B<issuer>.
+This function must return 0 on failure (among others if B<x> hasn't
+been issued with B<issuer>) and 1 on success.
+I<If no function to get the issuer is provided, the internal default
+function will be used instead.>
+
+X509_STORE_set_check_revocation() sets the revocation checking
+function.
+Its purpose is to look through the final chain and check the
+revocation status for each certificate.
+It must return 0 on failure and 1 on success.
+I<If no function to get the issuer is provided, the internal default
+function will be used instead.>
+
+X509_STORE_set_get_crl() sets the function to get the crl for a given
+certificate B<x>.
+When found, the crl must be assigned to B<*crl>.
+This function must return 0 on failure and 1 on success.
+I<If no function to get the issuer is provided, the internal default
+function will be used instead.>
+
+X509_STORE_set_check_crl() sets the function to check the validity of
+the given B<crl>.
+This function must return 0 on failure and 1 on success.
+I<If no function to get the issuer is provided, the internal default
+function will be used instead.>
+
+X509_STORE_set_cert_crl() sets the function to check the revocation
+status of the given certificate B<x> against the given B<crl>.
+This function must return 0 on failure and 1 on success.
+I<If no function to get the issuer is provided, the internal default
+function will be used instead.>
+
+X509_STORE_set_check_policy() sets the function to check the policies
+of all the certificates in the final chain..
+This function must return 0 on failure and 1 on success.
+I<If no function to get the issuer is provided, the internal default
+function will be used instead.>
+
+X509_STORE_set_lookup_certs() and X509_STORE_set_lookup_crls() set the
+functions to look up all the certs or all the CRLs that match the
+given name B<nm>.
+These functions return NULL on failure and a pointer to a stack of
+certificates (B<X509>) or to a stack of CRLs (B<X509_CRL>) on
+success.
+I<If no function to get the issuer is provided, the internal default
+function will be used instead.>
+
+X509_STORE_set_cleanup() sets the final cleanup function, which is
+called when the context (B<X509_STORE_CTX>) is being torn down.
+This function doesn't return any value.
+I<If no function to get the issuer is provided, the internal default
+function will be used instead.>
+
+X509_STORE_get_verify_cb(), X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify(),
+X509_STORE_get_get_issuer(), X509_STORE_get_check_issued(),
+X509_STORE_get_check_revocation(), X509_STORE_get_get_crl(),
+X509_STORE_get_check_crl(), X509_STORE_set_verify(),
+X509_STORE_set_get_issuer(), X509_STORE_get_cert_crl(),
+X509_STORE_get_check_policy(), X509_STORE_get_lookup_certs(),
+X509_STORE_get_lookup_crls() and X509_STORE_get_cleanup() all return
+the function pointer assigned with X509_STORE_set_check_issued(),
+X509_STORE_set_check_revocation(), X509_STORE_set_get_crl(),
+X509_STORE_set_check_crl(), X509_STORE_set_cert_crl(),
+X509_STORE_set_check_policy(), X509_STORE_set_lookup_certs(),
+X509_STORE_set_lookup_crls() and X509_STORE_set_cleanup(), or NULL if
+no assignment has been made.
+
+X509_STORE_set_verify_cb_func(), X509_STORE_set_verify_func() and
+X509_STORE_set_lookup_crls_cb() are aliases for
+X509_STORE_set_verify_cb(), X509_STORE_set_verify() and
+X509_STORE_set_lookup_crls, available as macros for backward
+compatibility.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+All the callbacks from a B<X509_STORE> are inherited by the
+corresponding B<X509_STORE_CTX> structure when it is initialized.
+See L<X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(3)> for further details.
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+The macro version of this function was the only one available before
+OpenSSL 1.0.0.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+The X509_STORE_set_*() functions do not return a value.
+
+The X509_STORE_get_*() functions return a pointer of the appropriate
+function type.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(3)>, L<X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(3)>,
+L<X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb(3)>, L<X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn(3)>,
+L<CMS_verify(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+X509_STORE_set_verify_cb() was added to OpenSSL 1.0.0.
+
+X509_STORE_set_verify_cb(), X509_STORE_get_verify_cb(),
+X509_STORE_set_verify(), X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify(),
+X509_STORE_set_get_issuer(), X509_STORE_get_get_issuer(),
+X509_STORE_set_check_issued(), X509_STORE_get_check_issued(),
+X509_STORE_set_check_revocation(), X509_STORE_get_check_revocation(),
+X509_STORE_set_get_crl(), X509_STORE_get_get_crl(),
+X509_STORE_set_check_crl(), X509_STORE_get_check_crl(),
+X509_STORE_set_cert_crl(), X509_STORE_get_cert_crl(),
+X509_STORE_set_check_policy(), X509_STORE_get_check_policy(),
+X509_STORE_set_lookup_certs(), X509_STORE_get_lookup_certs(),
+X509_STORE_set_lookup_crls(), X509_STORE_get_lookup_crls(),
+X509_STORE_set_cleanup() and X509_STORE_get_cleanup() were added in
+OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2009-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5263fac
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,359 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_clear_flags,
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_flags, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose,
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_inh_flags, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_inh_flags,
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth,
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_auth_level,
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_auth_level, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time,
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_time,
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_policies,
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add1_host,
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_hostflags, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_peername,
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_email, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip,
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip_asc
+- X509 verification parameters
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/x509_vfy.h>
+
+ int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
+                                 unsigned long flags);
+ int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_clear_flags(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
+                                   unsigned long flags);
+ unsigned long X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_flags(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param);
+
+ int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_inh_flags(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
+                                     uint32_t flags);
+ uint32_t X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_inh_flags(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param);
+
+ int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, int purpose);
+ int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, int trust);
+
+ void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, time_t t);
+ time_t X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_time(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param);
+
+ int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
+                                        ASN1_OBJECT *policy);
+ int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_policies(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
+                                        STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *policies);
+
+ void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, int depth);
+ int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param);
+
+ void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_auth_level(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
+                                        int auth_level);
+ int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_auth_level(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param);
+
+ int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
+                                 const char *name, size_t namelen);
+ int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add1_host(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
+                                 const char *name, size_t namelen);
+ void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_hostflags(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
+                                      unsigned int flags);
+ char *X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_peername(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param);
+ int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_email(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
+                                 const char *email, size_t emaillen);
+ int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
+                               const unsigned char *ip, size_t iplen);
+ int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip_asc(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, const char *ipasc);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+These functions manipulate the B<X509_VERIFY_PARAM> structure associated with
+a certificate verification operation.
+
+The X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags() function sets the flags in B<param> by oring
+it with B<flags>. See the B<VERIFICATION FLAGS> section for a complete
+description of values the B<flags> parameter can take.
+
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_flags() returns the flags in B<param>.
+
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_inh_flags() returns the inheritance flags in B<param>
+which specifies how verification flags are copied from one structure to
+another. X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_inh_flags() sets the inheritance flags.
+See the B<INHERITANCE FLAGS> section for a description of these bits.
+
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_clear_flags() clears the flags B<flags> in B<param>.
+
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose() sets the verification purpose in B<param>
+to B<purpose>. This determines the acceptable purpose of the certificate
+chain, for example SSL client or SSL server.
+
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust() sets the trust setting in B<param> to
+B<trust>.
+
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time() sets the verification time in B<param> to
+B<t>. Normally the current time is used.
+
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() enables policy checking (it is disabled
+by default) and adds B<policy> to the acceptable policy set.
+
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_policies() enables policy checking (it is disabled
+by default) and sets the acceptable policy set to B<policies>. Any existing
+policy set is cleared. The B<policies> parameter can be B<NULL> to clear
+an existing policy set.
+
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth() sets the maximum verification depth to B<depth>.
+That is the maximum number of intermediate CA certificates that can appear in a
+chain.
+A maximal depth chain contains 2 more certificates than the limit, since
+neither the end-entity certificate nor the trust-anchor count against this
+limit.
+Thus a B<depth> limit of 0 only allows the end-entity certificate to be signed
+directly by the trust-anchor, while with a B<depth> limit of 1 there can be one
+intermediate CA certificate between the trust-anchor and the end-entity
+certificate.
+
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_auth_level() sets the authentication security level to
+B<auth_level>.
+The authentication security level determines the acceptable signature and public
+key strength when verifying certificate chains.
+For a certificate chain to validate, the public keys of all the certificates
+must meet the specified security level.
+The signature algorithm security level is not enforced for the chain's I<trust
+anchor> certificate, which is either directly trusted or validated by means other
+than its signature.
+See L<SSL_CTX_set_security_level(3)> for the definitions of the available
+levels.
+The default security level is -1, or "not set".
+At security level 0 or lower all algorithms are acceptable.
+Security level 1 requires at least 80-bit-equivalent security and is broadly
+interoperable, though it will, for example, reject MD5 signatures or RSA keys
+shorter than 1024 bits.
+
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host() sets the expected DNS hostname to
+B<name> clearing any previously specified host name or names.  If
+B<name> is NULL, or empty the list of hostnames is cleared, and
+name checks are not performed on the peer certificate.  If B<name>
+is NUL-terminated, B<namelen> may be zero, otherwise B<namelen>
+must be set to the length of B<name>.  When a hostname is specified,
+certificate verification automatically invokes L<X509_check_host(3)>
+with flags equal to the B<flags> argument given to
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_hostflags() (default zero).  Applications
+are strongly advised to use this interface in preference to explicitly
+calling L<X509_check_host(3)>, hostname checks are out of scope
+with the DANE-EE(3) certificate usage, and the internal check will
+be suppressed as appropriate when DANE support is added to OpenSSL.
+
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add1_host() adds B<name> as an additional reference
+identifier that can match the peer's certificate.  Any previous names
+set via X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host() or X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add1_host()
+are retained, no change is made if B<name> is NULL or empty.  When
+multiple names are configured, the peer is considered verified when
+any name matches.
+
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_peername() returns the DNS hostname or subject
+CommonName from the peer certificate that matched one of the reference
+identifiers.  When wildcard matching is not disabled, or when a
+reference identifier specifies a parent domain (starts with ".")
+rather than a hostname, the peer name may be a wildcard name or a
+sub-domain of the reference identifier respectively.  The return
+string is allocated by the library and is no longer valid once the
+associated B<param> argument is freed.  Applications must not free
+the return value.
+
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_email() sets the expected RFC822 email address to
+B<email>.  If B<email> is NUL-terminated, B<emaillen> may be zero, otherwise
+B<emaillen> must be set to the length of B<email>.  When an email address
+is specified, certificate verification automatically invokes
+L<X509_check_email(3)>.
+
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip() sets the expected IP address to B<ip>.
+The B<ip> argument is in binary format, in network byte-order and
+B<iplen> must be set to 4 for IPv4 and 16 for IPv6.  When an IP
+address is specified, certificate verification automatically invokes
+L<X509_check_ip(3)>.
+
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip_asc() sets the expected IP address to
+B<ipasc>.  The B<ipasc> argument is a NUL-terminal ASCII string:
+dotted decimal quad for IPv4 and colon-separated hexadecimal for
+IPv6.  The condensed "::" notation is supported for IPv6 addresses.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(), X509_VERIFY_PARAM_clear_flags(),
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_inh_flags(),
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(), X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(),
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_policies(),
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host(), X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add1_host(),
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_email(), X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip() and
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip_asc() return 1 for success and 0 for
+failure.
+
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_flags() returns the current verification flags.
+
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_inh_flags() returns the current inheritance flags.
+
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time() and X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth() do not return
+values.
+
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth() returns the current verification depth.
+
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_auth_level() returns the current authentication security
+level.
+
+=head1 VERIFICATION FLAGS
+
+The verification flags consists of zero or more of the following flags
+ored together.
+
+B<X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK> enables CRL checking for the certificate chain leaf
+certificate. An error occurs if a suitable CRL cannot be found.
+
+B<X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL> enables CRL checking for the entire certificate
+chain.
+
+B<X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL> disabled critical extension checking. By default
+any unhandled critical extensions in certificates or (if checked) CRLs results
+in a fatal error. If this flag is set unhandled critical extensions are
+ignored. B<WARNING> setting this option for anything other than debugging
+purposes can be a security risk. Finer control over which extensions are
+supported can be performed in the verification callback.
+
+The B<X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT> flag disables workarounds for some broken
+certificates and makes the verification strictly apply B<X509> rules.
+
+B<X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS> enables proxy certificate verification.
+
+B<X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK> enables certificate policy checking, by default
+no policy checking is performed. Additional information is sent to the
+verification callback relating to policy checking.
+
+B<X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY>, B<X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY> and
+B<X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP> set the B<require explicit policy>, B<inhibit any
+policy> and B<inhibit policy mapping> flags respectively as defined in
+B<RFC3280>. Policy checking is automatically enabled if any of these flags
+are set.
+
+If B<X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY> is set and the policy checking is successful
+a special status code is set to the verification callback. This permits it
+to examine the valid policy tree and perform additional checks or simply
+log it for debugging purposes.
+
+By default some additional features such as indirect CRLs and CRLs signed by
+different keys are disabled. If B<X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT> is set
+they are enabled.
+
+If B<X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS> is set delta CRLs (if present) are used to
+determine certificate status. If not set deltas are ignored.
+
+B<X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE> enables checking of the root CA self signed
+certificate signature. By default this check is disabled because it doesn't
+add any additional security but in some cases applications might want to
+check the signature anyway. A side effect of not checking the root CA
+signature is that disabled or unsupported message digests on the root CA
+are not treated as fatal errors.
+
+When B<X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST> is set, construction of the certificate chain
+in L<X509_verify_cert(3)> will search the trust store for issuer certificates
+before searching the provided untrusted certificates.
+Local issuer certificates are often more likely to satisfy local security
+requirements and lead to a locally trusted root.
+This is especially important when some certificates in the trust store have
+explicit trust settings (see "TRUST SETTINGS" in L<x509(1)>).
+As of OpenSSL 1.1.0 this option is on by default.
+
+The B<X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS> flag suppresses checking for alternative
+chains.
+By default, unless B<X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST> is set, when building a
+certificate chain, if the first certificate chain found is not trusted, then
+OpenSSL will attempt to replace untrusted certificates supplied by the peer
+with certificates from the trust store to see if an alternative chain can be
+found that is trusted.
+As of OpenSSL 1.1.0, with B<X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST> always set, this option
+has no effect.
+
+The B<X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN> flag causes intermediate certificates in the
+trust store to be treated as trust-anchors, in the same way as the self-signed
+root CA certificates.
+This makes it possible to trust certificates issued by an intermediate CA
+without having to trust its ancestor root CA.
+With OpenSSL 1.1.0 and later and <X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN> set, chain
+construction stops as soon as the first certificate from the trust store is
+added to the chain, whether that certificate is a self-signed "root"
+certificate or a not self-signed intermediate certificate.
+Thus, when an intermediate certificate is found in the trust store, the
+verified chain passed to callbacks may be shorter than it otherwise would
+be without the B<X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN> flag.
+
+The B<X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME> flag suppresses checking the validity period
+of certificates and CRLs against the current time. If X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time()
+is used to specify a verification time, the check is not suppressed.
+
+=head1 INHERITANCE FLAGS
+
+These flags specify how parameters are "inherited" from one structure to
+another.
+
+If B<X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE> is set then the current setting is zeroed
+after the next call.
+
+If B<X509_VP_FLAG_LOCKED> is set then no values are copied.  This overrides
+all of the following flags.
+
+If B<X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT> is set then anything set in the source is copied
+to the destination. Effectively the values in "to" become default values
+which will be used only if nothing new is set in "from".  This is the
+default.
+
+If B<X509_VP_FLAG_OVERWRITE> is set then all value are copied across whether
+they are set or not. Flags is still Ored though.
+
+If B<X509_VP_FLAG_RESET_FLAGS> is set then the flags value is copied instead
+of ORed.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The above functions should be used to manipulate verification parameters
+instead of legacy functions which work in specific structures such as
+X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags().
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+Delta CRL checking is currently primitive. Only a single delta can be used and
+(partly due to limitations of B<X509_STORE>) constructed CRLs are not
+maintained.
+
+If CRLs checking is enable CRLs are expected to be available in the
+corresponding B<X509_STORE> structure. No attempt is made to download
+CRLs from the CRL distribution points extension.
+
+=head1 EXAMPLE
+
+Enable CRL checking when performing certificate verification during SSL
+connections associated with an B<SSL_CTX> structure B<ctx>:
+
+  X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
+  param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
+  X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(param, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK);
+  SSL_CTX_set1_param(ctx, param);
+  X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(param);
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<X509_verify_cert(3)>,
+L<X509_check_host(3)>,
+L<X509_check_email(3)>,
+L<X509_check_ip(3)>,
+L<x509(1)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+The B<X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS> flag was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0
+The legacy B<X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK> flag is deprecated as of
+OpenSSL 1.1.0, and has no effect.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2009-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_check_ca.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_check_ca.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b79efb5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_check_ca.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+X509_check_ca - check if given certificate is CA certificate
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+   #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+
+   int X509_check_ca(X509 *cert);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+This function checks if given certificate is CA certificate (can be used
+to sign other certificates).
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUE
+
+Function return 0, if it is not CA certificate, 1 if it is proper X509v3
+CA certificate with B<basicConstraints> extension CA:TRUE,
+3, if it is self-signed X509 v1 certificate, 4, if it is certificate with
+B<keyUsage> extension with bit B<keyCertSign> set, but without
+B<basicConstraints>, and 5 if it has outdated Netscape Certificate Type
+extension telling that it is CA certificate.
+
+Actually, any non-zero value means that this certificate could have been
+used to sign other certificates.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<X509_verify_cert(3)>,
+L<X509_check_issued(3)>,
+L<X509_check_purpose(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_check_host.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_check_host.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9384815
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_check_host.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+X509_check_host, X509_check_email, X509_check_ip, X509_check_ip_asc - X.509 certificate matching
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+ int X509_check_host(X509 *, const char *name, size_t namelen,
+                     unsigned int flags, char **peername);
+ int X509_check_email(X509 *, const char *address, size_t addresslen,
+                      unsigned int flags);
+ int X509_check_ip(X509 *, const unsigned char *address, size_t addresslen,
+                   unsigned int flags);
+ int X509_check_ip_asc(X509 *, const char *address, unsigned int flags);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The certificate matching functions are used to check whether a
+certificate matches a given host name, email address, or IP address.
+The validity of the certificate and its trust level has to be checked by
+other means.
+
+X509_check_host() checks if the certificate Subject Alternative
+Name (SAN) or Subject CommonName (CN) matches the specified host
+name, which must be encoded in the preferred name syntax described
+in section 3.5 of RFC 1034.  By default, wildcards are supported
+and they match  only in the left-most label; but they may match
+part of that label with an explicit prefix or suffix.  For example,
+by default, the host B<name> "www.example.com" would match a
+certificate with a SAN or CN value of "*.example.com", "w*.example.com"
+or "*w.example.com".
+
+Per section 6.4.2 of RFC 6125, B<name> values representing international
+domain names must be given in A-label form.  The B<namelen> argument
+must be the number of characters in the name string or zero in which
+case the length is calculated with strlen(B<name>).  When B<name> starts
+with a dot (e.g ".example.com"), it will be matched by a certificate
+valid for any sub-domain of B<name>, (see also
+B<X509_CHECK_FLAG_SINGLE_LABEL_SUBDOMAINS> below).
+
+When the certificate is matched, and B<peername> is not NULL, a
+pointer to a copy of the matching SAN or CN from the peer certificate
+is stored at the address passed in B<peername>.  The application
+is responsible for freeing the peername via OPENSSL_free() when it
+is no longer needed.
+
+X509_check_email() checks if the certificate matches the specified
+email B<address>.  Only the mailbox syntax of RFC 822 is supported,
+comments are not allowed, and no attempt is made to normalize quoted
+characters.  The B<addresslen> argument must be the number of
+characters in the address string or zero in which case the length
+is calculated with strlen(B<address>).
+
+X509_check_ip() checks if the certificate matches a specified IPv4 or
+IPv6 address.  The B<address> array is in binary format, in network
+byte order.  The length is either 4 (IPv4) or 16 (IPv6).  Only
+explicitly marked addresses in the certificates are considered; IP
+addresses stored in DNS names and Common Names are ignored.
+
+X509_check_ip_asc() is similar, except that the NUL-terminated
+string B<address> is first converted to the internal representation.
+
+The B<flags> argument is usually 0.  It can be the bitwise OR of the
+flags:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<X509_CHECK_FLAG_ALWAYS_CHECK_SUBJECT>,
+
+=item B<X509_CHECK_FLAG_NEVER_CHECK_SUBJECT>,
+
+=item B<X509_CHECK_FLAG_NO_WILDCARDS>,
+
+=item B<X509_CHECK_FLAG_NO_PARTIAL_WILDCARDS>,
+
+=item B<X509_CHECK_FLAG_MULTI_LABEL_WILDCARDS>.
+
+=item B<X509_CHECK_FLAG_SINGLE_LABEL_SUBDOMAINS>.
+
+=back
+
+The B<X509_CHECK_FLAG_ALWAYS_CHECK_SUBJECT> flag causes the function
+to consider the subject DN even if the certificate contains at least
+one subject alternative name of the right type (DNS name or email
+address as appropriate); the default is to ignore the subject DN
+when at least one corresponding subject alternative names is present.
+
+The B<X509_CHECK_FLAG_NEVER_CHECK_SUBJECT> flag causes the function to never
+consider the subject DN even if the certificate contains no subject alternative
+names of the right type (DNS name or email address as appropriate); the default
+is to use the subject DN when no corresponding subject alternative names are
+present.
+
+If set, B<X509_CHECK_FLAG_NO_WILDCARDS> disables wildcard
+expansion; this only applies to B<X509_check_host>.
+
+If set, B<X509_CHECK_FLAG_NO_PARTIAL_WILDCARDS> suppresses support
+for "*" as wildcard pattern in labels that have a prefix or suffix,
+such as: "www*" or "*www"; this only applies to B<X509_check_host>.
+
+If set, B<X509_CHECK_FLAG_MULTI_LABEL_WILDCARDS> allows a "*" that
+constitutes the complete label of a DNS name (e.g. "*.example.com")
+to match more than one label in B<name>; this flag only applies
+to B<X509_check_host>.
+
+If set, B<X509_CHECK_FLAG_SINGLE_LABEL_SUBDOMAINS> restricts B<name>
+values which start with ".", that would otherwise match any sub-domain
+in the peer certificate, to only match direct child sub-domains.
+Thus, for instance, with this flag set a B<name> of ".example.com"
+would match a peer certificate with a DNS name of "www.example.com",
+but would not match a peer certificate with a DNS name of
+"www.sub.example.com"; this flag only applies to B<X509_check_host>.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+The functions return 1 for a successful match, 0 for a failed match
+and -1 for an internal error: typically a memory allocation failure
+or an ASN.1 decoding error.
+
+All functions can also return -2 if the input is malformed. For example,
+X509_check_host() returns -2 if the provided B<name> contains embedded
+NULs.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+Applications are encouraged to use X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host()
+rather than explicitly calling L<X509_check_host(3)>. Host name
+checks are out of scope with the DANE-EE(3) certificate usage,
+and the internal checks will be suppressed as appropriate when
+DANE support is added to OpenSSL.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<SSL_get_verify_result(3)>,
+L<X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host(3)>,
+L<X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add1_host(3)>,
+L<X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_email(3)>,
+L<X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip(3)>,
+L<X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ipasc(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+These functions were added in OpenSSL 1.0.2.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2012-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_check_issued.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_check_issued.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8e4b111
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_check_issued.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+X509_check_issued - checks if certificate is issued by another
+certificate
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+
+ int X509_check_issued(X509 *issuer, X509 *subject);
+
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+This function checks if certificate I<subject> was issued using CA
+certificate I<issuer>. This function takes into account not only
+matching of issuer field of I<subject> with subject field of I<issuer>,
+but also compares B<authorityKeyIdentifier> extension of I<subject> with
+B<subjectKeyIdentifier> of I<issuer> if B<authorityKeyIdentifier>
+present in the I<subject> certificate and checks B<keyUsage> field of
+I<issuer>.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUE
+
+Function return B<X509_V_OK> if certificate I<subject> is issued by
+I<issuer> or some B<X509_V_ERR*> constant to indicate an error.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<X509_verify_cert(3)>,
+L<X509_check_ca(3)>,
+L<verify(1)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_digest.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_digest.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3c76c8f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_digest.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+X509_digest, X509_CRL_digest,
+X509_pubkey_digest,
+X509_NAME_digest,
+X509_REQ_digest,
+PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL_digest
+- get digest of various objects
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+ int X509_digest(const X509 *data, const EVP_MD *type, unsigned char *md,
+                 unsigned int *len);
+
+ int X509_CRL_digest(const X509_CRL *data, const EVP_MD *type, unsigned char *md,
+                 unsigned int *len);
+
+ int X509_pubkey_digest(const X509 *data, const EVP_MD *type,
+                        unsigned char *md, unsigned int *len);
+
+ int X509_REQ_digest(const X509_REQ *data, const EVP_MD *type,
+                     unsigned char *md, unsigned int *len);
+
+ int X509_NAME_digest(const X509_NAME *data, const EVP_MD *type,
+                      unsigned char *md, unsigned int *len);
+
+ int PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL_digest(PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL *data,
+                                    const EVP_MD *type, unsigned char *md,
+                                    unsigned int *len);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+X509_pubkey_digest() returns a digest of the DER representation of the public
+key in the specified X509 B<data> object.
+All other functions described here return a digest of the DER representation
+of their entire B<data> objects.
+
+The B<type> parameter specifies the digest to
+be used, such as EVP_sha1(). The B<md> is a pointer to the buffer where the
+digest will be copied and is assumed to be large enough; the constant
+B<EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE> is suggested. The B<len> parameter, if not NULL, points
+to a place where the digest size will be stored.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+All functions described here return 1 for success and 0 for failure.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<EVP_sha1(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_dup.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_dup.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c5d01b2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_dup.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,303 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS,
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS,
+ASN1_ITEM,
+ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_free,
+ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_new,
+ASIdOrRange_free,
+ASIdOrRange_new,
+ASIdentifierChoice_free,
+ASIdentifierChoice_new,
+ASIdentifiers_free,
+ASIdentifiers_new,
+ASRange_free,
+ASRange_new,
+AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS_free,
+AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS_new,
+AUTHORITY_KEYID_free,
+AUTHORITY_KEYID_new,
+BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_free,
+BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_new,
+CERTIFICATEPOLICIES_free,
+CERTIFICATEPOLICIES_new,
+CMS_ContentInfo_free,
+CMS_ContentInfo_new,
+CMS_ContentInfo_print_ctx,
+CMS_ReceiptRequest_free,
+CMS_ReceiptRequest_new,
+CRL_DIST_POINTS_free,
+CRL_DIST_POINTS_new,
+DIRECTORYSTRING_free,
+DIRECTORYSTRING_new,
+DISPLAYTEXT_free,
+DISPLAYTEXT_new,
+DIST_POINT_NAME_free,
+DIST_POINT_NAME_new,
+DIST_POINT_free,
+DIST_POINT_new,
+DSAparams_dup,
+ECPARAMETERS_free,
+ECPARAMETERS_new,
+ECPKPARAMETERS_free,
+ECPKPARAMETERS_new,
+EDIPARTYNAME_free,
+EDIPARTYNAME_new,
+ESS_CERT_ID_dup,
+ESS_CERT_ID_free,
+ESS_CERT_ID_new,
+ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL_dup,
+ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL_free,
+ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL_new,
+ESS_SIGNING_CERT_dup,
+ESS_SIGNING_CERT_free,
+ESS_SIGNING_CERT_new,
+EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE_free,
+EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE_new,
+GENERAL_NAMES_free,
+GENERAL_NAMES_new,
+GENERAL_NAME_dup,
+GENERAL_NAME_free,
+GENERAL_NAME_new,
+GENERAL_SUBTREE_free,
+GENERAL_SUBTREE_new,
+IPAddressChoice_free,
+IPAddressChoice_new,
+IPAddressFamily_free,
+IPAddressFamily_new,
+IPAddressOrRange_free,
+IPAddressOrRange_new,
+IPAddressRange_free,
+IPAddressRange_new,
+ISSUING_DIST_POINT_free,
+ISSUING_DIST_POINT_new,
+NAME_CONSTRAINTS_free,
+NAME_CONSTRAINTS_new,
+NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE_free,
+NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE_new,
+NETSCAPE_SPKAC_free,
+NETSCAPE_SPKAC_new,
+NETSCAPE_SPKI_free,
+NETSCAPE_SPKI_new,
+NOTICEREF_free,
+NOTICEREF_new,
+OCSP_BASICRESP_free,
+OCSP_BASICRESP_new,
+OCSP_CERTID_dup,
+OCSP_CERTID_new,
+OCSP_CERTSTATUS_free,
+OCSP_CERTSTATUS_new,
+OCSP_CRLID_free,
+OCSP_CRLID_new,
+OCSP_ONEREQ_free,
+OCSP_ONEREQ_new,
+OCSP_REQINFO_free,
+OCSP_REQINFO_new,
+OCSP_RESPBYTES_free,
+OCSP_RESPBYTES_new,
+OCSP_RESPDATA_free,
+OCSP_RESPDATA_new,
+OCSP_RESPID_free,
+OCSP_RESPID_new,
+OCSP_RESPONSE_new,
+OCSP_REVOKEDINFO_free,
+OCSP_REVOKEDINFO_new,
+OCSP_SERVICELOC_free,
+OCSP_SERVICELOC_new,
+OCSP_SIGNATURE_free,
+OCSP_SIGNATURE_new,
+OCSP_SINGLERESP_free,
+OCSP_SINGLERESP_new,
+OTHERNAME_free,
+OTHERNAME_new,
+PBE2PARAM_free,
+PBE2PARAM_new,
+PBEPARAM_free,
+PBEPARAM_new,
+PBKDF2PARAM_free,
+PBKDF2PARAM_new,
+PKCS12_BAGS_free,
+PKCS12_BAGS_new,
+PKCS12_MAC_DATA_free,
+PKCS12_MAC_DATA_new,
+PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free,
+PKCS12_SAFEBAG_new,
+PKCS12_free,
+PKCS12_new,
+PKCS7_DIGEST_free,
+PKCS7_DIGEST_new,
+PKCS7_ENCRYPT_free,
+PKCS7_ENCRYPT_new,
+PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT_free,
+PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT_new,
+PKCS7_ENVELOPE_free,
+PKCS7_ENVELOPE_new,
+PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL_free,
+PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL_new,
+PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_free,
+PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_new,
+PKCS7_SIGNED_free,
+PKCS7_SIGNED_new,
+PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_free,
+PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_new,
+PKCS7_SIGN_ENVELOPE_free,
+PKCS7_SIGN_ENVELOPE_new,
+PKCS7_dup,
+PKCS7_free,
+PKCS7_new,
+PKCS7_print_ctx,
+PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free,
+PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_new,
+PKEY_USAGE_PERIOD_free,
+PKEY_USAGE_PERIOD_new,
+POLICYINFO_free,
+POLICYINFO_new,
+POLICYQUALINFO_free,
+POLICYQUALINFO_new,
+POLICY_CONSTRAINTS_free,
+POLICY_CONSTRAINTS_new,
+POLICY_MAPPING_free,
+POLICY_MAPPING_new,
+PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION_free,
+PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION_new,
+PROXY_POLICY_free,
+PROXY_POLICY_new,
+RSAPrivateKey_dup,
+RSAPublicKey_dup,
+RSA_OAEP_PARAMS_free,
+RSA_OAEP_PARAMS_new,
+RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free,
+RSA_PSS_PARAMS_new,
+SCT_LIST_free,
+SXNETID_free,
+SXNETID_new,
+SXNET_free,
+SXNET_new,
+TLS_FEATURE_free,
+TLS_FEATURE_new,
+TS_ACCURACY_dup,
+TS_ACCURACY_free,
+TS_ACCURACY_new,
+TS_MSG_IMPRINT_dup,
+TS_MSG_IMPRINT_free,
+TS_MSG_IMPRINT_new,
+TS_REQ_dup,
+TS_REQ_free,
+TS_REQ_new,
+TS_RESP_dup,
+TS_RESP_free,
+TS_RESP_new,
+TS_STATUS_INFO_dup,
+TS_STATUS_INFO_free,
+TS_STATUS_INFO_new,
+TS_TST_INFO_dup,
+TS_TST_INFO_free,
+TS_TST_INFO_new,
+USERNOTICE_free,
+USERNOTICE_new,
+X509_ALGOR_free,
+X509_ALGOR_new,
+X509_ATTRIBUTE_dup,
+X509_ATTRIBUTE_free,
+X509_ATTRIBUTE_new,
+X509_CERT_AUX_free,
+X509_CERT_AUX_new,
+X509_CINF_free,
+X509_CINF_new,
+X509_CRL_INFO_free,
+X509_CRL_INFO_new,
+X509_CRL_dup,
+X509_CRL_free,
+X509_CRL_new,
+X509_EXTENSION_dup,
+X509_EXTENSION_free,
+X509_EXTENSION_new,
+X509_NAME_ENTRY_dup,
+X509_NAME_ENTRY_free,
+X509_NAME_ENTRY_new,
+X509_NAME_dup,
+X509_NAME_free,
+X509_NAME_new,
+X509_REQ_INFO_free,
+X509_REQ_INFO_new,
+X509_REQ_dup,
+X509_REQ_free,
+X509_REQ_new,
+X509_REVOKED_dup,
+X509_REVOKED_free,
+X509_REVOKED_new,
+X509_SIG_free,
+X509_SIG_new,
+X509_VAL_free,
+X509_VAL_new,
+X509_dup,
+- ASN1 object utilities
+
+=for comment generic
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+
+ DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(type)
+ IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(stname)
+
+ typedef struct ASN1_ITEM_st ASN1_ITEM;
+
+ extern const ASN1_ITEM TYPE_it;
+ TYPE *TYPE_new(void);
+ TYPE *TYPE_dup(TYPE *a);
+ void TYPE_free(TYPE *a);
+ int TYPE_print_ctx(BIO *out, TYPE *a, int indent, const ASN1_PCTX *pctx);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+In the description below, I<TYPE> is used
+as a placeholder for any of the OpenSSL datatypes, such as I<X509>.
+
+The OpenSSL ASN1 parsing library templates are like a data-driven bytecode
+interpreter.
+Every ASN1 object as a global variable, TYPE_it, that describes the item
+such as its fields.  (On systems which cannot export variables from shared
+libraries, the global is instead a function which returns a pointer to a
+static variable.
+
+The macro DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS() is typically used in header files
+to generate the function declarations.
+
+The macro IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS() is used once in a source file
+to generate the function bodies.
+
+
+TYPE_new() allocates an empty object of the indicated type.
+The object returned must be released by calling TYPE_free().
+
+TYPE_dup() copies an existing object.
+
+TYPE_free() releases the object and all pointers and sub-objects
+within it.
+
+TYPE_print_ctx() prints the object B<a> on the specified BIO B<out>.
+Each line will be prefixed with B<indent> spaces.
+The B<pctx> specifies the printing context and is for internal
+use; use NULL to get the default behavior.  If a print function is
+user-defined, then pass in any B<pctx> down to any nested calls.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+TYPE_new() and TYPE_dup() return a pointer to the object or NULL on failure.
+
+TYPE_print_ctx() returns 1 on success or zero on failure.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_get0_notBefore.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_get0_notBefore.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0427d41
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_get0_notBefore.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+X509_get0_notBefore, X509_getm_notBefore, X509_get0_notAfter,
+X509_getm_notAfter, X509_set1_notBefore, X509_set1_notAfter,
+X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate, X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate, X509_CRL_set1_lastUpdate,
+X509_CRL_set1_nextUpdate - get or set certificate or CRL dates
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+ const ASN1_TIME *X509_get0_notBefore(const X509 *x);
+ const ASN1_TIME *X509_get0_notAfter(const X509 *x);
+
+ ASN1_TIME *X509_getm_notBefore(const X509 *x);
+ ASN1_TIME *X509_getm_notAfter(const X509 *x);
+
+ int X509_set1_notBefore(X509 *x, const ASN1_TIME *tm);
+ int X509_set1_notAfter(X509 *x, const ASN1_TIME *tm);
+
+ const ASN1_TIME *X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(const X509_CRL *crl);
+ const ASN1_TIME *X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(const X509_CRL *crl);
+
+ int X509_CRL_set1_lastUpdate(X509_CRL *x, const ASN1_TIME *tm);
+ int X509_CRL_set1_nextUpdate(X509_CRL *x, const ASN1_TIME *tm);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+X509_get0_notBefore() and X509_get0_notAfter() return the B<notBefore>
+and B<notAfter> fields of certificate B<x> respectively. The value
+returned is an internal pointer which must not be freed up after
+the call.
+
+X509_getm_notBefore() and X509_getm_notAfter() are similar to
+X509_get0_notBefore() and X509_get0_notAfter() except they return
+non-constant mutable references to the associated date field of
+the certificate.
+
+X509_set1_notBefore() and X509_set1_notAfter() set the B<notBefore>
+and B<notAfter> fields of B<x> to B<tm>. Ownership of the passed
+parameter B<tm> is not transferred by these functions so it must
+be freed up after the call.
+
+X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate() and X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate() return the
+B<lastUpdate> and B<nextUpdate> fields of B<crl>. The value
+returned is an internal pointer which must not be freed up after
+the call. If the B<nextUpdate> field is absent from B<crl> then
+B<NULL> is returned.
+
+X509_CRL_set1_lastUpdate() and X509_CRL_set1_nextUpdate() set the B<lastUpdate>
+and B<nextUpdate> fields of B<crl> to B<tm>. Ownership of the passed parameter
+B<tm> is not transferred by these functions so it must be freed up after the
+call.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+X509_get0_notBefore(), X509_get0_notAfter() and X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate()
+return a pointer to an B<ASN1_TIME> structure.
+
+X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate() return a pointer to an B<ASN1_TIME> structure
+or NULL if the B<lastUpdate> field is absent.
+
+X509_set1_notBefore(), X509_set1_notAfter(), X509_CRL_set1_lastUpdate() and
+X509_CRL_set1_nextUpdate() return 1 for success or 0 for failure.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<d2i_X509(3)>,
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>,
+L<X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(3)>,
+L<X509_get0_signature(3)>,
+L<X509_get_ext_d2i(3)>,
+L<X509_get_extension_flags(3)>,
+L<X509_get_pubkey(3)>,
+L<X509_get_subject_name(3)>,
+L<X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(3)>,
+L<X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(3)>,
+L<X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(3)>,
+L<X509_NAME_print_ex(3)>,
+L<X509_new(3)>,
+L<X509_sign(3)>,
+L<X509V3_get_d2i(3)>,
+L<X509_verify_cert(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+These functions are available in all versions of OpenSSL.
+
+X509_get_notBefore() and X509_get_notAfter() were deprecated in OpenSSL
+1.1.0
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_get0_signature.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_get0_signature.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..61a2dda
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_get0_signature.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+X509_get0_signature, X509_get_signature_nid, X509_get0_tbs_sigalg,
+X509_REQ_get0_signature, X509_REQ_get_signature_nid, X509_CRL_get0_signature,
+X509_CRL_get_signature_nid - signature information
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+ void X509_get0_signature(const ASN1_BIT_STRING **psig,
+                          const X509_ALGOR **palg,
+                          const X509 *x);
+ int X509_get_signature_nid(const X509 *x);
+ const X509_ALGOR *X509_get0_tbs_sigalg(const X509 *x);
+
+ void X509_REQ_get0_signature(const X509_REQ *crl,
+                              const ASN1_BIT_STRING **psig,
+                              const X509_ALGOR **palg);
+ int X509_REQ_get_signature_nid(const X509_REQ *crl);
+
+ void X509_CRL_get0_signature(const X509_CRL *crl,
+                              const ASN1_BIT_STRING **psig,
+                              const X509_ALGOR **palg);
+ int X509_CRL_get_signature_nid(const X509_CRL *crl);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+X509_get0_signature() sets B<*psig> to the signature of B<x> and B<*palg>
+to the signature algorithm of B<x>. The values returned are internal
+pointers which B<MUST NOT> be freed up after the call.
+
+X509_get0_tbs_sigalg() returns the signature algorithm in the signed
+portion of B<x>.
+
+X509_get_signature_nid() returns the NID corresponding to the signature
+algorithm of B<x>.
+
+X509_REQ_get0_signature(), X509_REQ_get_signature_nid()
+X509_CRL_get0_signature() and X509_CRL_get_signature_nid() perform the
+same function for certificate requests and CRLs.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+These functions provide lower level access to signatures in certificates
+where an application wishes to analyse or generate a signature in a form
+where X509_sign() et al is not appropriate (for example a non standard
+or unsupported format).
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+X509_get_signature_nid(), X509_REQ_get_signature_nid() and
+X509_CRL_get_signature_nid() return a NID.
+
+X509_get0_signature(), X509_REQ_get0_signature() and
+X509_CRL_get0_signature() do not return values.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<d2i_X509(3)>,
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>,
+L<X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(3)>,
+L<X509_get_ext_d2i(3)>,
+L<X509_get_extension_flags(3)>,
+L<X509_get_pubkey(3)>,
+L<X509_get_subject_name(3)>,
+L<X509_get_version(3)>,
+L<X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(3)>,
+L<X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(3)>,
+L<X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(3)>,
+L<X509_NAME_print_ex(3)>,
+L<X509_new(3)>,
+L<X509_sign(3)>,
+L<X509V3_get_d2i(3)>,
+L<X509_verify_cert(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+X509_get0_signature() and X509_get_signature_nid() were first added to
+OpenSSL 1.0.2.
+
+X509_REQ_get0_signature(), X509_REQ_get_signature_nid(),
+X509_CRL_get0_signature() and X509_CRL_get_signature_nid() were first added
+to OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_get0_uids.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_get0_uids.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4eab26e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_get0_uids.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+X509_get0_uids - get certificate unique identifiers
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+ void X509_get0_uids(const X509 *x, const ASN1_BIT_STRING **piuid,
+                     const ASN1_BIT_STRING **psuid);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+X509_get0_uids() sets B<*piuid> and B<*psuid> to the issuer and subject unique
+identifiers of certificate B<x> or NULL if the fields are not present.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The issuer and subject unique identifier fields are very rarely encountered in
+practice outside test cases.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+X509_get0_uids() does not return a value.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<d2i_X509(3)>,
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>,
+L<X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(3)>,
+L<X509_get0_signature(3)>,
+L<X509_get_ext_d2i(3)>,
+L<X509_get_extension_flags(3)>,
+L<X509_get_pubkey(3)>,
+L<X509_get_subject_name(3)>,
+L<X509_get_version(3)>,
+L<X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(3)>,
+L<X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(3)>,
+L<X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(3)>,
+L<X509_NAME_print_ex(3)>,
+L<X509_new(3)>,
+L<X509_sign(3)>,
+L<X509V3_get_d2i(3)>,
+L<X509_verify_cert(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_get_extension_flags.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_get_extension_flags.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c07ef97
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_get_extension_flags.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+X509_get0_subject_key_id,
+X509_get0_authority_key_id,
+X509_get_pathlen,
+X509_get_extension_flags,
+X509_get_key_usage,
+X509_get_extended_key_usage,
+X509_set_proxy_flag,
+X509_set_proxy_pathlen,
+X509_get_proxy_pathlen - retrieve certificate extension data
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+   #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+
+   long X509_get_pathlen(X509 *x);
+   uint32_t X509_get_extension_flags(X509 *x);
+   uint32_t X509_get_key_usage(X509 *x);
+   uint32_t X509_get_extended_key_usage(X509 *x);
+   const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *X509_get0_subject_key_id(X509 *x);
+   const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *X509_get0_authority_key_id(X509 *x);
+   void X509_set_proxy_flag(X509 *x);
+   void X509_set_proxy_pathlen(int l);
+   long X509_get_proxy_pathlen(X509 *x);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+These functions retrieve information related to commonly used certificate extensions.
+
+X509_get_pathlen() retrieves the path length extension from a certificate.
+This extension is used to limit the length of a cert chain that may be
+issued from that CA.
+
+X509_get_extension_flags() retrieves general information about a certificate,
+it will return one or more of the following flags ored together.
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<EXFLAG_V1>
+
+The certificate is an obsolete version 1 certificate.
+
+=item B<EXFLAG_BCONS>
+
+The certificate contains a basic constraints extension.
+
+=item B<EXFLAG_CA>
+
+The certificate contains basic constraints and asserts the CA flag.
+
+=item B<EXFLAG_PROXY>
+
+The certificate is a valid proxy certificate.
+
+=item B<EXFLAG_SI>
+
+The certificate is self issued (that is subject and issuer names match).
+
+=item B<EXFLAG_SS>
+
+The subject and issuer names match and extension values imply it is self
+signed.
+
+=item B<EXFLAG_FRESHEST>
+
+The freshest CRL extension is present in the certificate.
+
+=item B<EXFLAG_CRITICAL>
+
+The certificate contains an unhandled critical extension.
+
+=item B<EXFLAG_INVALID>
+
+Some certificate extension values are invalid or inconsistent. The
+certificate should be rejected.
+
+=item B<EXFLAG_KUSAGE>
+
+The certificate contains a key usage extension. The value can be retrieved
+using X509_get_key_usage().
+
+=item B<EXFLAG_XKUSAGE>
+
+The certificate contains an extended key usage extension. The value can be
+retrieved using X509_get_extended_key_usage().
+
+=back
+
+X509_get_key_usage() returns the value of the key usage extension.  If key
+usage is present will return zero or more of the flags:
+B<KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE>, B<KU_NON_REPUDIATION>, B<KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT>,
+B<KU_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT>, B<KU_KEY_AGREEMENT>, B<KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN>,
+B<KU_CRL_SIGN>, B<KU_ENCIPHER_ONLY> or B<KU_DECIPHER_ONLY> corresponding to
+individual key usage bits. If key usage is absent then B<UINT32_MAX> is
+returned.
+
+X509_get_extended_key_usage() returns the value of the extended key usage
+extension. If extended key usage is present it will return zero or more of the
+flags: B<XKU_SSL_SERVER>, B<XKU_SSL_CLIENT>, B<XKU_SMIME>, B<XKU_CODE_SIGN>
+B<XKU_OCSP_SIGN>, B<XKU_TIMESTAMP>, B<XKU_DVCS> or B<XKU_ANYEKU>. These
+correspond to the OIDs B<id-kp-serverAuth>, B<id-kp-clientAuth>,
+B<id-kp-emailProtection>, B<id-kp-codeSigning>, B<id-kp-OCSPSigning>,
+B<id-kp-timeStamping>, B<id-kp-dvcs> and B<anyExtendedKeyUsage> respectively.
+Additionally B<XKU_SGC> is set if either Netscape or Microsoft SGC OIDs are
+present.
+
+X509_get0_subject_key_id() returns an internal pointer to the subject key
+identifier of B<x> as an B<ASN1_OCTET_STRING> or B<NULL> if the extension
+is not present or cannot be parsed.
+
+X509_get0_authority_key_id() returns an internal pointer to the authority key
+identifier of B<x> as an B<ASN1_OCTET_STRING> or B<NULL> if the extension
+is not present or cannot be parsed.
+
+X509_set_proxy_flag() marks the certificate with the B<EXFLAG_PROXY> flag.
+This is for the users who need to mark non-RFC3820 proxy certificates as
+such, as OpenSSL only detects RFC3820 compliant ones.
+
+X509_set_proxy_pathlen() sets the proxy certificate path length for the given
+certificate B<x>.  This is for the users who need to mark non-RFC3820 proxy
+certificates as such, as OpenSSL only detects RFC3820 compliant ones.
+
+X509_get_proxy_pathlen() returns the proxy certificate path length for the
+given certificate B<x> if it is a proxy certificate.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The value of the flags correspond to extension values which are cached
+in the B<X509> structure. If the flags returned do not provide sufficient
+information an application should examine extension values directly
+for example using X509_get_ext_d2i().
+
+If the key usage or extended key usage extension is absent then typically usage
+is unrestricted. For this reason X509_get_key_usage() and
+X509_get_extended_key_usage() return B<UINT32_MAX> when the corresponding
+extension is absent. Applications can additionally check the return value of
+X509_get_extension_flags() and take appropriate action is an extension is
+absent.
+
+If X509_get0_subject_key_id() returns B<NULL> then the extension may be
+absent or malformed. Applications can determine the precise reason using
+X509_get_ext_d2i().
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUE
+
+X509_get_pathlen() returns the path length value, or -1 if the extension
+is not present.
+
+X509_get_extension_flags(), X509_get_key_usage() and
+X509_get_extended_key_usage() return sets of flags corresponding to the
+certificate extension values.
+
+X509_get0_subject_key_id() returns the subject key identifier as a
+pointer to an B<ASN1_OCTET_STRING> structure or B<NULL> if the extension
+is absent or an error occurred during parsing.
+
+X509_get_proxy_pathlen() returns the path length value if the given
+certificate is a proxy one and has a path length set, and -1 otherwise.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<X509_check_purpose(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+X509_get_pathlen(), X509_set_proxy_flag(), X509_set_proxy_pathlen() and
+X509_get_proxy_pathlen() were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2015-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_get_pubkey.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_get_pubkey.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2b9a956
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_get_pubkey.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+X509_get_pubkey, X509_get0_pubkey, X509_set_pubkey, X509_get_X509_PUBKEY,
+X509_REQ_get_pubkey, X509_REQ_get0_pubkey, X509_REQ_set_pubkey,
+X509_REQ_get_X509_PUBKEY - get or set certificate or certificate request
+public key
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+ EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x);
+ EVP_PKEY *X509_get0_pubkey(const X509 *x);
+ int X509_set_pubkey(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+ X509_PUBKEY *X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(X509 *x);
+
+ EVP_PKEY *X509_REQ_get_pubkey(X509_REQ *req);
+ EVP_PKEY *X509_REQ_get0_pubkey(X509_REQ *req);
+ int X509_REQ_set_pubkey(X509_REQ *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+ X509_PUBKEY *X509_REQ_get_X509_PUBKEY(X509_REQ *x);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+X509_get_pubkey() attempts to decode the public key for certificate B<x>. If
+successful it returns the public key as an B<EVP_PKEY> pointer with its
+reference count incremented: this means the returned key must be freed up
+after use. X509_get0_pubkey() is similar except it does B<not> increment
+the reference count of the returned B<EVP_PKEY> so it must not be freed up
+after use.
+
+X509_get_X509_PUBKEY() returns an internal pointer to the B<X509_PUBKEY>
+structure which encodes the certificate of B<x>. The returned value
+must not be freed up after use.
+
+X509_set_pubkey() attempts to set the public key for certificate B<x> to
+B<pkey>. The key B<pkey> should be freed up after use.
+
+X509_REQ_get_pubkey(), X509_REQ_get0_pubkey(), X509_REQ_set_pubkey() and
+X509_REQ_get_X509_PUBKEY() are similar but operate on certificate request B<req>.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The first time a public key is decoded the B<EVP_PKEY> structure is
+cached in the certificate or certificate request itself. Subsequent calls
+return the cached structure with its reference count incremented to
+improve performance.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+X509_get_pubkey(), X509_get0_pubkey(), X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(),
+X509_REQ_get_pubkey() and X509_REQ_get_X509_PUBKEY() return a public key or
+B<NULL> if an error occurred.
+
+X509_set_pubkey() and X509_REQ_set_pubkey() return 1 for success and 0
+for failure.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<d2i_X509(3)>,
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>,
+L<X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(3)>,
+L<X509_get0_signature(3)>,
+L<X509_get_ext_d2i(3)>,
+L<X509_get_extension_flags(3)>,
+L<X509_get_subject_name(3)>,
+L<X509_get_version(3)>,
+L<X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(3)>,
+L<X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(3)>,
+L<X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(3)>,
+L<X509_NAME_print_ex(3)>,
+L<X509_new(3)>,
+L<X509_sign(3)>,
+L<X509V3_get_d2i(3)>,
+L<X509_verify_cert(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_get_serialNumber.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_get_serialNumber.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2e81c62
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_get_serialNumber.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+X509_get_serialNumber,
+X509_get0_serialNumber,
+X509_set_serialNumber
+- get or set certificate serial number
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+ ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *x);
+ const ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get0_serialNumber(const X509 *x);
+ int X509_set_serialNumber(X509 *x, ASN1_INTEGER *serial);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+X509_get_serialNumber() returns the serial number of certificate B<x> as an
+B<ASN1_INTEGER> structure which can be examined or initialised. The value
+returned is an internal pointer which B<MUST NOT> be freed up after the call.
+
+X509_get0_serialNumber() is the same as X509_get_serialNumber() except it
+accepts a const parameter and returns a const result.
+
+X509_set_serialNumber() sets the serial number of certificate B<x> to
+B<serial>. A copy of the serial number is used internally so B<serial> should
+be freed up after use.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+X509_get_serialNumber() and X509_get0_serialNumber() return an B<ASN1_INTEGER>
+structure.
+
+X509_set_serialNumber() returns 1 for success and 0 for failure.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<d2i_X509(3)>,
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>,
+L<X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(3)>,
+L<X509_get0_signature(3)>,
+L<X509_get_ext_d2i(3)>,
+L<X509_get_extension_flags(3)>,
+L<X509_get_pubkey(3)>,
+L<X509_get_subject_name(3)>,
+L<X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(3)>,
+L<X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(3)>,
+L<X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(3)>,
+L<X509_NAME_print_ex(3)>,
+L<X509_new(3)>,
+L<X509_sign(3)>,
+L<X509V3_get_d2i(3)>,
+L<X509_verify_cert(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+X509_get_serialNumber() and X509_set_serialNumber() are available in
+all versions of OpenSSL. X509_get0_serialNumber() was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_get_subject_name.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_get_subject_name.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ce36bbf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_get_subject_name.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+X509_get_subject_name, X509_set_subject_name, X509_get_issuer_name,
+X509_set_issuer_name, X509_REQ_get_subject_name, X509_REQ_set_subject_name,
+X509_CRL_get_issuer, X509_CRL_set_issuer_name - get and set issuer or
+subject names
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+ X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(const X509 *x);
+ int X509_set_subject_name(X509 *x, X509_NAME *name);
+
+ X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(const X509 *x);
+ int X509_set_issuer_name(X509 *x, X509_NAME *name);
+
+ X509_NAME *X509_REQ_get_subject_name(const X509_REQ *req);
+ int X509_REQ_set_subject_name(X509_REQ *req, X509_NAME *name);
+
+ X509_NAME *X509_CRL_get_issuer(const X509_CRL *crl);
+ int X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(X509_CRL *x, X509_NAME *name);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+X509_get_subject_name() returns the subject name of certificate B<x>. The
+returned value is an internal pointer which B<MUST NOT> be freed.
+
+X509_set_subject_name() sets the issuer name of certificate B<x> to
+B<name>. The B<name> parameter is copied internally and should be freed
+up when it is no longer needed.
+
+X509_get_issuer_name() and X509_set_issuer_name() are identical to
+X509_get_subject_name() and X509_set_subject_name() except the get and
+set the issuer name of B<x>.
+
+Similarly X509_REQ_get_subject_name(), X509_REQ_set_subject_name(),
+ X509_CRL_get_issuer() and X509_CRL_set_issuer_name() get or set the subject
+or issuer names of certificate requests of CRLs respectively.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+X509_get_subject_name(), X509_get_issuer_name(), X509_REQ_get_subject_name()
+and X509_CRL_get_issuer() return an B<X509_NAME> pointer.
+
+X509_set_subject_name(), X509_set_issuer_name(), X509_REQ_set_subject_name()
+and X509_CRL_set_issuer_name() return 1 for success and 0 for failure.
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+X509_REQ_get_subject_name() is a function in OpenSSL 1.1.0 and a macro in
+earlier versions.
+
+X509_CRL_get_issuer() is a function in OpenSSL 1.1.0. It was first added
+to OpenSSL 1.0.0 as a macro.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<d2i_X509(3)>,
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>, L<d2i_X509(3)>
+L<X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(3)>,
+L<X509_get0_signature(3)>,
+L<X509_get_ext_d2i(3)>,
+L<X509_get_extension_flags(3)>,
+L<X509_get_pubkey(3)>,
+L<X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(3)>,
+L<X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(3)>,
+L<X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(3)>,
+L<X509_NAME_print_ex(3)>,
+L<X509_new(3)>,
+L<X509_sign(3)>,
+L<X509V3_get_d2i(3)>,
+L<X509_verify_cert(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_get_version.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_get_version.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c1826ea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_get_version.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+X509_get_version, X509_set_version, X509_REQ_get_version, X509_REQ_set_version,
+X509_CRL_get_version, X509_CRL_set_version - get or set certificate,
+certificate request or CRL version
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+ long X509_get_version(const X509 *x);
+ int X509_set_version(X509 *x, long version);
+
+ long X509_REQ_get_version(const X509_REQ *req);
+ int X509_REQ_set_version(X509_REQ *x, long version);
+
+ long X509_CRL_get_version(const X509_CRL *crl);
+ int X509_CRL_set_version(X509_CRL *x, long version);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+X509_get_version() returns the numerical value of the version field of
+certificate B<x>. Note: this is defined by standards (X.509 et al) to be one
+less than the certificate version. So a version 3 certificate will return 2 and
+a version 1 certificate will return 0.
+
+X509_set_version() sets the numerical value of the version field of certificate
+B<x> to B<version>.
+
+Similarly X509_REQ_get_version(), X509_REQ_set_version(),
+X509_CRL_get_version() and X509_CRL_set_version() get and set the version
+number of certificate requests and CRLs.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The version field of certificates, certificate requests and CRLs has a
+DEFAULT value of B<v1(0)> meaning the field should be omitted for version
+1. This is handled transparently by these functions.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+X509_get_version(), X509_REQ_get_version() and X509_CRL_get_version()
+return the numerical value of the version field.
+
+X509_set_version(), X509_REQ_set_version() and X509_CRL_set_version()
+return 1 for success and 0 for failure.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<d2i_X509(3)>,
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>,
+L<X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(3)>,
+L<X509_get0_signature(3)>,
+L<X509_get_ext_d2i(3)>,
+L<X509_get_extension_flags(3)>,
+L<X509_get_pubkey(3)>,
+L<X509_get_subject_name(3)>,
+L<X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(3)>,
+L<X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(3)>,
+L<X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(3)>,
+L<X509_NAME_print_ex(3)>,
+L<X509_new(3)>,
+L<X509_sign(3)>,
+L<X509V3_get_d2i(3)>,
+L<X509_verify_cert(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+X509_get_version(), X509_REQ_get_version() and X509_CRL_get_version() are
+functions in OpenSSL 1.1.0, in previous versions they were macros.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_new.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_new.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4f53499
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_new.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+X509_chain_up_ref,
+X509_new, X509_free, X509_up_ref - X509 certificate ASN1 allocation functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+ X509 *X509_new(void);
+ void X509_free(X509 *a);
+ int X509_up_ref(X509 *a);
+ STACK_OF(X509) *X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509) *x);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The X509 ASN1 allocation routines, allocate and free an
+X509 structure, which represents an X509 certificate.
+
+X509_new() allocates and initializes a X509 structure with reference count
+B<1>.
+
+X509_free() decrements the reference count of B<X509> structure B<a> and
+frees it up if the reference count is zero. If B<a> is NULL nothing is done.
+
+X509_up_ref() increments the reference count of B<a>.
+
+X509_chain_up_ref() increases the reference count of all certificates in
+chain B<x> and returns a copy of the stack.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The function X509_up_ref() if useful if a certificate structure is being
+used by several different operations each of which will free it up after
+use: this avoids the need to duplicate the entire certificate structure.
+
+The function X509_chain_up_ref() doesn't just up the reference count of
+each certificate it also returns a copy of the stack, using sk_X509_dup(),
+but it serves a similar purpose: the returned chain persists after the
+original has been freed.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+If the allocation fails, X509_new() returns B<NULL> and sets an error
+code that can be obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)>.
+Otherwise it returns a pointer to the newly allocated structure.
+
+X509_up_ref() returns 1 for success and 0 for failure.
+
+X509_chain_up_ref() returns a copy of the stack or B<NULL> if an error
+occurred.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<d2i_X509(3)>,
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>,
+L<X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(3)>,
+L<X509_get0_signature(3)>,
+L<X509_get_ext_d2i(3)>,
+L<X509_get_extension_flags(3)>,
+L<X509_get_pubkey(3)>,
+L<X509_get_subject_name(3)>,
+L<X509_get_version(3)>,
+L<X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(3)>,
+L<X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(3)>,
+L<X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(3)>,
+L<X509_NAME_print_ex(3)>,
+L<X509_sign(3)>,
+L<X509V3_get_d2i(3)>,
+L<X509_verify_cert(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_sign.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_sign.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..994fd43
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_sign.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+X509_sign, X509_sign_ctx, X509_verify, X509_REQ_sign, X509_REQ_sign_ctx,
+X509_REQ_verify, X509_CRL_sign, X509_CRL_sign_ctx, X509_CRL_verify -
+sign or verify certificate, certificate request or CRL signature
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+ int X509_sign(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *md);
+ int X509_sign_ctx(X509 *x, EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
+ int X509_verify(X509 *a, EVP_PKEY *r);
+
+ int X509_REQ_sign(X509_REQ *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *md);
+ int X509_REQ_sign_ctx(X509_REQ *x, EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
+ int X509_REQ_verify(X509_REQ *a, EVP_PKEY *r);
+
+ int X509_CRL_sign(X509_CRL *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *md);
+ int X509_CRL_sign_ctx(X509_CRL *x, EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
+ int X509_CRL_verify(X509_CRL *a, EVP_PKEY *r);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+X509_sign() signs certificate B<x> using private key B<pkey> and message
+digest B<md> and sets the signature in B<x>. X509_sign_ctx() also signs
+certificate B<x> but uses the parameters contained in digest context B<ctx>.
+
+X509_verify() verifies the signature of certificate B<x> using public key
+B<pkey>. Only the signature is checked: no other checks (such as certificate
+chain validity) are performed.
+
+X509_REQ_sign(), X509_REQ_sign_ctx(), X509_REQ_verify(),
+X509_CRL_sign(), X509_CRL_sign_ctx() and X509_CRL_verify() sign and verify
+certificate requests and CRLs respectively.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+X509_sign_ctx() is used where the default parameters for the corresponding
+public key and digest are not suitable. It can be used to sign keys using
+RSA-PSS for example.
+
+For efficiency reasons and to work around ASN.1 encoding issues the encoding
+of the signed portion of a certificate, certificate request and CRL is cached
+internally. If the signed portion of the structure is modified the encoding
+is not always updated meaning a stale version is sometimes used. This is not
+normally a problem because modifying the signed portion will invalidate the
+signature and signing will always update the encoding.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+X509_sign(), X509_sign_ctx(), X509_REQ_sign(), X509_REQ_sign_ctx(),
+X509_CRL_sign() and X509_CRL_sign_ctx() return the size of the signature
+in bytes for success and zero for failure.
+
+X509_verify(), X509_REQ_verify() and X509_CRL_verify() return 1 if the
+signature is valid and 0 if the signature check fails. If the signature
+could not be checked at all because it was invalid or some other error
+occurred then -1 is returned.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<d2i_X509(3)>,
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>,
+L<X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(3)>,
+L<X509_get0_signature(3)>,
+L<X509_get_ext_d2i(3)>,
+L<X509_get_extension_flags(3)>,
+L<X509_get_pubkey(3)>,
+L<X509_get_subject_name(3)>,
+L<X509_get_version(3)>,
+L<X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(3)>,
+L<X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(3)>,
+L<X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(3)>,
+L<X509_NAME_print_ex(3)>,
+L<X509_new(3)>,
+L<X509V3_get_d2i(3)>,
+L<X509_verify_cert(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+X509_sign(), X509_REQ_sign() and X509_CRL_sign() are available in all
+versions of OpenSSL.
+
+X509_sign_ctx(), X509_REQ_sign_ctx() and X509_CRL_sign_ctx() were first added
+to OpenSSL 1.0.1.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_verify_cert.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_verify_cert.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..74acf8d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509_verify_cert.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+X509_verify_cert - discover and verify X509 certificate chain
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The X509_verify_cert() function attempts to discover and validate a
+certificate chain based on parameters in B<ctx>. A complete description of
+the process is contained in the L<verify(1)> manual page.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+If a complete chain can be built and validated this function returns 1,
+otherwise it return zero, in exceptional circumstances it can also
+return a negative code.
+
+If the function fails additional error information can be obtained by
+examining B<ctx> using, for example X509_STORE_CTX_get_error().
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+Applications rarely call this function directly but it is used by
+OpenSSL internally for certificate validation, in both the S/MIME and
+SSL/TLS code.
+
+A negative return value from X509_verify_cert() can occur if it is invoked
+incorrectly, such as with no certificate set in B<ctx>, or when it is called
+twice in succession without reinitialising B<ctx> for the second call.
+A negative return value can also happen due to internal resource problems or if
+a retry operation is requested during internal lookups (which never happens
+with standard lookup methods).
+Applications must check for <= 0 return value on error.
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+This function uses the header B<x509.h> as opposed to most chain verification
+functions which use B<x509_vfy.h>.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2009-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509v3_get_ext_by_NID.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509v3_get_ext_by_NID.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..032f71c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/X509v3_get_ext_by_NID.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+X509v3_get_ext_count, X509v3_get_ext, X509v3_get_ext_by_NID,
+X509v3_get_ext_by_OBJ, X509v3_get_ext_by_critical, X509v3_delete_ext,
+X509v3_add_ext, X509_get_ext_count, X509_get_ext,
+X509_get_ext_by_NID, X509_get_ext_by_OBJ, X509_get_ext_by_critical,
+X509_delete_ext, X509_add_ext, X509_CRL_get_ext_count, X509_CRL_get_ext,
+X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID, X509_CRL_get_ext_by_OBJ, X509_CRL_get_ext_by_critical,
+X509_CRL_delete_ext, X509_CRL_add_ext, X509_REVOKED_get_ext_count,
+X509_REVOKED_get_ext, X509_REVOKED_get_ext_by_NID, X509_REVOKED_get_ext_by_OBJ,
+X509_REVOKED_get_ext_by_critical, X509_REVOKED_delete_ext,
+X509_REVOKED_add_ext - extension stack utility functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+ int X509v3_get_ext_count(const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *x);
+ X509_EXTENSION *X509v3_get_ext(const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *x, int loc);
+
+ int X509v3_get_ext_by_NID(const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *x,
+                           int nid, int lastpos);
+ int X509v3_get_ext_by_OBJ(const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *x,
+                           const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int lastpos);
+ int X509v3_get_ext_by_critical(const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *x,
+                                int crit, int lastpos);
+ X509_EXTENSION *X509v3_delete_ext(STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *x, int loc);
+ STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *X509v3_add_ext(STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) **x,
+                                          X509_EXTENSION *ex, int loc);
+
+ int X509_get_ext_count(const X509 *x);
+ X509_EXTENSION *X509_get_ext(const X509 *x, int loc);
+ int X509_get_ext_by_NID(const X509 *x, int nid, int lastpos);
+ int X509_get_ext_by_OBJ(const X509 *x, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int lastpos);
+ int X509_get_ext_by_critical(const X509 *x, int crit, int lastpos);
+ X509_EXTENSION *X509_delete_ext(X509 *x, int loc);
+ int X509_add_ext(X509 *x, X509_EXTENSION *ex, int loc);
+
+ int X509_CRL_get_ext_count(const X509_CRL *x);
+ X509_EXTENSION *X509_CRL_get_ext(const X509_CRL *x, int loc);
+ int X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(const X509_CRL *x, int nid, int lastpos);
+ int X509_CRL_get_ext_by_OBJ(const X509_CRL *x, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int lastpos);
+ int X509_CRL_get_ext_by_critical(const X509_CRL *x, int crit, int lastpos);
+ X509_EXTENSION *X509_CRL_delete_ext(X509_CRL *x, int loc);
+ int X509_CRL_add_ext(X509_CRL *x, X509_EXTENSION *ex, int loc);
+
+ int X509_REVOKED_get_ext_count(const X509_REVOKED *x);
+ X509_EXTENSION *X509_REVOKED_get_ext(const X509_REVOKED *x, int loc);
+ int X509_REVOKED_get_ext_by_NID(const X509_REVOKED *x, int nid, int lastpos);
+ int X509_REVOKED_get_ext_by_OBJ(const X509_REVOKED *x, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj,
+                                int lastpos);
+ int X509_REVOKED_get_ext_by_critical(const X509_REVOKED *x, int crit, int lastpos);
+ X509_EXTENSION *X509_REVOKED_delete_ext(X509_REVOKED *x, int loc);
+ int X509_REVOKED_add_ext(X509_REVOKED *x, X509_EXTENSION *ex, int loc);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+X509v3_get_ext_count() retrieves the number of extensions in B<x>.
+
+X509v3_get_ext() retrieves extension B<loc> from B<x>. The index B<loc>
+can take any value from B<0> to X509_get_ext_count(x) - 1. The returned
+extension is an internal pointer which B<must not> be freed up by the
+application.
+
+X509v3_get_ext_by_NID() and X509v3_get_ext_by_OBJ() look for an extension
+with B<nid> or B<obj> from extension stack B<x>. The search starts from the
+extension after B<lastpos> or from the beginning if <lastpos> is B<-1>. If
+the extension is found its index is returned otherwise B<-1> is returned.
+
+X509v3_get_ext_by_critical() is similar to X509v3_get_ext_by_NID() except it
+looks for an extension of criticality B<crit>. A zero value for B<crit>
+looks for a non-critical extension a non-zero value looks for a critical
+extension.
+
+X509v3_delete_ext() deletes the extension with index B<loc> from B<x>. The
+deleted extension is returned and must be freed by the caller. If B<loc>
+is in invalid index value B<NULL> is returned.
+
+X509v3_add_ext() adds extension B<ex> to stack B<*x> at position B<loc>. If
+B<loc> is B<-1> the new extension is added to the end. If B<*x> is B<NULL>
+a new stack will be allocated. The passed extension B<ex> is duplicated
+internally so it must be freed after use.
+
+X509_get_ext_count(), X509_get_ext(), X509_get_ext_by_NID(),
+X509_get_ext_by_OBJ(), X509_get_ext_by_critical(), X509_delete_ext()
+and X509_add_ext() operate on the extensions of certificate B<x> they are
+otherwise identical to the X509v3 functions.
+
+X509_CRL_get_ext_count(), X509_CRL_get_ext(), X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(),
+X509_CRL_get_ext_by_OBJ(), X509_CRL_get_ext_by_critical(),
+X509_CRL_delete_ext() and X509_CRL_add_ext() operate on the extensions of
+CRL B<x> they are otherwise identical to the X509v3 functions.
+
+X509_REVOKED_get_ext_count(), X509_REVOKED_get_ext(),
+X509_REVOKED_get_ext_by_NID(), X509_REVOKED_get_ext_by_OBJ(),
+X509_REVOKED_get_ext_by_critical(), X509_REVOKED_delete_ext() and
+X509_REVOKED_add_ext() operate on the extensions of CRL entry B<x>
+they are otherwise identical to the X509v3 functions.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+These functions are used to examine stacks of extensions directly. Many
+applications will want to parse or encode and add an extension: they should
+use the extension encode and decode functions instead such as
+X509_add1_ext_i2d() and X509_get_ext_d2i().
+
+Extension indices start from zero, so a zero index return value is B<not> an
+error. These search functions start from the extension B<after> the B<lastpos>
+parameter so it should initially be set to B<-1>, if it is set to zero the
+initial extension will not be checked.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+X509v3_get_ext_count() returns the extension count.
+
+X509v3_get_ext() and X509v3_delete_ext() return an B<X509_EXTENSION> pointer
+or B<NULL> if an error occurs.
+
+X509v3_get_ext_by_NID() X509v3_get_ext_by_OBJ() and
+X509v3_get_ext_by_critical() return the an extension index or B<-1> if an
+error occurs.
+
+X509v3_add_ext() returns a stack of extensions or B<NULL> on error.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<X509V3_get_d2i(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/bio.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/bio.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1e1dd02
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/bio.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+=pod
+
+=for comment openssl_manual_section 7
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+bio - Basic I/O abstraction
+
+=for comment generic
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/bio.h>
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+A BIO is an I/O abstraction, it hides many of the underlying I/O
+details from an application. If an application uses a BIO for its
+I/O it can transparently handle SSL connections, unencrypted network
+connections and file I/O.
+
+There are two type of BIO, a source/sink BIO and a filter BIO.
+
+As its name implies a source/sink BIO is a source and/or sink of data,
+examples include a socket BIO and a file BIO.
+
+A filter BIO takes data from one BIO and passes it through to
+another, or the application. The data may be left unmodified (for
+example a message digest BIO) or translated (for example an
+encryption BIO). The effect of a filter BIO may change according
+to the I/O operation it is performing: for example an encryption
+BIO will encrypt data if it is being written to and decrypt data
+if it is being read from.
+
+BIOs can be joined together to form a chain (a single BIO is a chain
+with one component). A chain normally consist of one source/sink
+BIO and one or more filter BIOs. Data read from or written to the
+first BIO then traverses the chain to the end (normally a source/sink
+BIO).
+
+
+Some BIOs (such as memory BIOs) can be used immediately after calling
+BIO_new(). Others (such as file BIOs) need some additional initialization,
+and frequently a utility function exists to create and initialize such BIOs.
+
+If BIO_free() is called on a BIO chain it will only free one BIO resulting
+in a memory leak.
+
+Calling BIO_free_all() a single BIO has the same effect as calling BIO_free()
+on it other than the discarded return value.
+
+Normally the B<type> argument is supplied by a function which returns a
+pointer to a BIO_METHOD. There is a naming convention for such functions:
+a source/sink BIO is normally called BIO_s_*() and a filter BIO
+BIO_f_*();
+
+=head1 EXAMPLE
+
+Create a memory BIO:
+
+ BIO *mem = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<BIO_ctrl(3)>,
+L<BIO_f_base64(3)>, L<BIO_f_buffer(3)>,
+L<BIO_f_cipher(3)>, L<BIO_f_md(3)>,
+L<BIO_f_null(3)>, L<BIO_f_ssl(3)>,
+L<BIO_find_type(3)>, L<BIO_new(3)>,
+L<BIO_new_bio_pair(3)>,
+L<BIO_push(3)>, L<BIO_read(3)>,
+L<BIO_s_accept(3)>, L<BIO_s_bio(3)>,
+L<BIO_s_connect(3)>, L<BIO_s_fd(3)>,
+L<BIO_s_file(3)>, L<BIO_s_mem(3)>,
+L<BIO_s_mem(3)>,
+L<BIO_s_null(3)>, L<BIO_s_socket(3)>,
+L<BIO_set_callback(3)>,
+L<BIO_should_retry(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/crypto.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/crypto.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..082f843
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/crypto.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+=pod
+
+=for comment openssl_manual_section:7
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+crypto - OpenSSL cryptographic library
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+See the individual manual pages for details.
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The OpenSSL B<crypto> library implements a wide range of cryptographic
+algorithms used in various Internet standards. The services provided
+by this library are used by the OpenSSL implementations of SSL, TLS
+and S/MIME, and they have also been used to implement SSH, OpenPGP, and
+other cryptographic standards.
+
+B<libcrypto> consists of a number of sub-libraries that implement the
+individual algorithms.
+
+The functionality includes symmetric encryption, public key
+cryptography and key agreement, certificate handling, cryptographic
+hash functions, cryptographic pseudo-random number generator, and
+various utilities.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+Some of the newer functions follow a naming convention using the numbers
+B<0> and B<1>. For example the functions:
+
+ int X509_CRL_add0_revoked(X509_CRL *crl, X509_REVOKED *rev);
+ int X509_add1_trust_object(X509 *x, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj);
+
+The B<0> version uses the supplied structure pointer directly
+in the parent and it will be freed up when the parent is freed.
+In the above example B<crl> would be freed but B<rev> would not.
+
+The B<1> function uses a copy of the supplied structure pointer
+(or in some cases increases its link count) in the parent and
+so both (B<x> and B<obj> above) should be freed up.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+See the individual manual pages for details.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<openssl(1)>, L<ssl(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/ct.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/ct.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..60718b3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/ct.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+=pod
+
+=for comment openssl_manual_section:7
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+ct - Certificate Transparency
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ct.h>
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+This library implements Certificate Transparency (CT) verification for TLS
+clients, as defined in RFC 6962. This verification can provide some confidence
+that a certificate has been publicly logged in a set of CT logs.
+
+By default, these checks are disabled. They can be enabled using
+SSL_CTX_ct_enable() or SSL_ct_enable().
+
+This library can also be used to parse and examine CT data structures, such as
+Signed Certificate Timestamps (SCTs), or to read a list of CT logs. There are
+functions for:
+- decoding and encoding SCTs in DER and TLS wire format.
+- printing SCTs.
+- verifying the authenticity of SCTs.
+- loading a CT log list from a CONF file.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<d2i_SCT_LIST(3)>,
+L<CTLOG_STORE_new(3)>,
+L<CTLOG_STORE_get0_log_by_id(3)>,
+L<SCT_new(3)>,
+L<SCT_print(3)>,
+L<SCT_validate(3)>,
+L<SCT_validate(3)>,
+L<CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_new(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_ct_validation_callback(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+This library was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2016-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/d2i_DHparams.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/d2i_DHparams.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cd1c162
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/d2i_DHparams.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+d2i_DHparams, i2d_DHparams - PKCS#3 DH parameter functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/dh.h>
+
+ DH *d2i_DHparams(DH **a, unsigned char **pp, long length);
+ int i2d_DHparams(DH *a, unsigned char **pp);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+These functions decode and encode PKCS#3 DH parameters using the
+DHparameter structure described in PKCS#3.
+
+Otherwise these behave in a similar way to d2i_X509() and i2d_X509()
+described in the L<d2i_X509(3)> manual page.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<d2i_X509(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/d2i_Netscape_RSA.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/d2i_Netscape_RSA.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ee39bd8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/d2i_Netscape_RSA.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+i2d_Netscape_RSA,
+d2i_Netscape_RSA
+- insecure RSA public and private key encoding functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/rsa.h>
+
+ int i2d_Netscape_RSA(RSA *a, unsigned char **pp, int (*cb)());
+ RSA * d2i_Netscape_RSA(RSA **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length, int (*cb)());
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+These functions decode and encode an RSA private
+key in NET format.  These functions are present to provide compatibility
+with very old software. This format has some severe security weaknesses
+and should be avoided if possible.
+
+These functions are similar to the B<d2i_RSAPrivateKey> functions.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<d2i_RSAPrivateKey(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/d2i_PKCS8PrivateKey_bio.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/d2i_PKCS8PrivateKey_bio.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..164d93f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/d2i_PKCS8PrivateKey_bio.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+d2i_PKCS8PrivateKey_bio, d2i_PKCS8PrivateKey_fp,
+i2d_PKCS8PrivateKey_bio, i2d_PKCS8PrivateKey_fp,
+i2d_PKCS8PrivateKey_nid_bio, i2d_PKCS8PrivateKey_nid_fp - PKCS#8 format private key functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+ EVP_PKEY *d2i_PKCS8PrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);
+ EVP_PKEY *d2i_PKCS8PrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);
+
+ int i2d_PKCS8PrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc,
+                                  char *kstr, int klen,
+                                  pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);
+
+ int i2d_PKCS8PrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc,
+                                  char *kstr, int klen,
+                                  pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);
+
+ int i2d_PKCS8PrivateKey_nid_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *x, int nid,
+                                  char *kstr, int klen,
+                                  pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);
+
+ int i2d_PKCS8PrivateKey_nid_fp(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY *x, int nid,
+                                  char *kstr, int klen,
+                                  pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The PKCS#8 functions encode and decode private keys in PKCS#8 format using both
+PKCS#5 v1.5 and PKCS#5 v2.0 password based encryption algorithms.
+
+Other than the use of DER as opposed to PEM these functions are identical to the
+corresponding B<PEM> function as described in L<PEM_read_PrivateKey(3)>.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+These functions are currently the only way to store encrypted private keys using DER format.
+
+Currently all the functions use BIOs or FILE pointers, there are no functions which
+work directly on memory: this can be readily worked around by converting the buffers
+to memory BIOs, see L<BIO_s_mem(3)> for details.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<PEM_read_PrivateKey(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/d2i_PrivateKey.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/d2i_PrivateKey.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f5b4667
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/d2i_PrivateKey.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+d2i_PrivateKey, d2i_PublicKey, d2i_AutoPrivateKey,
+i2d_PrivateKey, i2d_PublicKey,
+d2i_PrivateKey_bio, d2i_PrivateKey_fp
+- decode and encode functions for reading and saving EVP_PKEY structures
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+ EVP_PKEY *d2i_PrivateKey(int type, EVP_PKEY **a, const unsigned char **pp,
+                          long length);
+ EVP_PKEY *d2i_PublicKey(int type, EVP_PKEY **a, const unsigned char **pp,
+                         long length);
+ EVP_PKEY *d2i_AutoPrivateKey(EVP_PKEY **a, const unsigned char **pp,
+                              long length);
+ int i2d_PrivateKey(EVP_PKEY *a, unsigned char **pp);
+ int i2d_PublicKey(EVP_PKEY *a, unsigned char **pp);
+
+ EVP_PKEY *d2i_PrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY **a);
+ EVP_PKEY *d2i_PrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY **a)
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+d2i_PrivateKey() decodes a private key using algorithm B<type>. It attempts to
+use any key specific format or PKCS#8 unencrypted PrivateKeyInfo format. The
+B<type> parameter should be a public key algorithm constant such as
+B<EVP_PKEY_RSA>. An error occurs if the decoded key does not match B<type>.
+d2i_PublicKey() does the same for public keys.
+
+d2i_AutoPrivateKey() is similar to d2i_PrivateKey() except it attempts to
+automatically detect the private key format.
+
+i2d_PrivateKey() encodes B<key>. It uses a key specific format or, if none is
+defined for that key type, PKCS#8 unencrypted PrivateKeyInfo format.
+i2d_PublicKey() does the same for public keys.
+
+These functions are similar to the d2i_X509() functions; see L<d2i_X509(3)>.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+All these functions use DER format and unencrypted keys. Applications wishing
+to encrypt or decrypt private keys should use other functions such as
+d2i_PKC8PrivateKey() instead.
+
+If the B<*a> is not NULL when calling d2i_PrivateKey() or d2i_AutoPrivateKey()
+(i.e. an existing structure is being reused) and the key format is PKCS#8
+then B<*a> will be freed and replaced on a successful call.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+d2i_PrivateKey() and d2i_AutoPrivateKey() return a valid B<EVP_KEY> structure
+or B<NULL> if an error occurs. The error code can be obtained by calling
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>.
+
+i2d_PrivateKey() returns the number of bytes successfully encoded or a
+negative value if an error occurs. The error code can be obtained by calling
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<crypto(7)>,
+L<d2i_PKCS8PrivateKey_bio(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/d2i_X509.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/d2i_X509.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1fbe5ca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/d2i_X509.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,601 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+d2i_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION,
+d2i_ASIdOrRange,
+d2i_ASIdentifierChoice,
+d2i_ASIdentifiers,
+d2i_ASN1_BIT_STRING,
+d2i_ASN1_BMPSTRING,
+d2i_ASN1_ENUMERATED,
+d2i_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME,
+d2i_ASN1_GENERALSTRING,
+d2i_ASN1_IA5STRING,
+d2i_ASN1_INTEGER,
+d2i_ASN1_NULL,
+d2i_ASN1_OBJECT,
+d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+d2i_ASN1_PRINTABLE,
+d2i_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING,
+d2i_ASN1_SEQUENCE_ANY,
+d2i_ASN1_SET_ANY,
+d2i_ASN1_T61STRING,
+d2i_ASN1_TIME,
+d2i_ASN1_TYPE,
+d2i_ASN1_UINTEGER,
+d2i_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING,
+d2i_ASN1_UTCTIME,
+d2i_ASN1_UTF8STRING,
+d2i_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING,
+d2i_ASRange,
+d2i_AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS,
+d2i_AUTHORITY_KEYID,
+d2i_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS,
+d2i_CERTIFICATEPOLICIES,
+d2i_CMS_ContentInfo,
+d2i_CMS_ReceiptRequest,
+d2i_CMS_bio,
+d2i_CRL_DIST_POINTS,
+d2i_DHxparams,
+d2i_DIRECTORYSTRING,
+d2i_DISPLAYTEXT,
+d2i_DIST_POINT,
+d2i_DIST_POINT_NAME,
+d2i_DSAPrivateKey,
+d2i_DSAPrivateKey_bio,
+d2i_DSAPrivateKey_fp,
+d2i_DSAPublicKey,
+d2i_DSA_PUBKEY,
+d2i_DSA_PUBKEY_bio,
+d2i_DSA_PUBKEY_fp,
+d2i_DSA_SIG,
+d2i_DSAparams,
+d2i_ECPKParameters,
+d2i_ECParameters,
+d2i_ECPrivateKey,
+d2i_ECPrivateKey_bio,
+d2i_ECPrivateKey_fp,
+d2i_EC_PUBKEY,
+d2i_EC_PUBKEY_bio,
+d2i_EC_PUBKEY_fp,
+d2i_EDIPARTYNAME,
+d2i_ESS_CERT_ID,
+d2i_ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL,
+d2i_ESS_SIGNING_CERT,
+d2i_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE,
+d2i_GENERAL_NAME,
+d2i_GENERAL_NAMES,
+d2i_IPAddressChoice,
+d2i_IPAddressFamily,
+d2i_IPAddressOrRange,
+d2i_IPAddressRange,
+d2i_ISSUING_DIST_POINT,
+d2i_NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE,
+d2i_NETSCAPE_SPKAC,
+d2i_NETSCAPE_SPKI,
+d2i_NOTICEREF,
+d2i_OCSP_BASICRESP,
+d2i_OCSP_CERTID,
+d2i_OCSP_CERTSTATUS,
+d2i_OCSP_CRLID,
+d2i_OCSP_ONEREQ,
+d2i_OCSP_REQINFO,
+d2i_OCSP_REQUEST,
+d2i_OCSP_RESPBYTES,
+d2i_OCSP_RESPDATA,
+d2i_OCSP_RESPID,
+d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE,
+d2i_OCSP_REVOKEDINFO,
+d2i_OCSP_SERVICELOC,
+d2i_OCSP_SIGNATURE,
+d2i_OCSP_SINGLERESP,
+d2i_OTHERNAME,
+d2i_PBE2PARAM,
+d2i_PBEPARAM,
+d2i_PBKDF2PARAM,
+d2i_PKCS12,
+d2i_PKCS12_BAGS,
+d2i_PKCS12_MAC_DATA,
+d2i_PKCS12_SAFEBAG,
+d2i_PKCS12_bio,
+d2i_PKCS12_fp,
+d2i_PKCS7,
+d2i_PKCS7_DIGEST,
+d2i_PKCS7_ENCRYPT,
+d2i_PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT,
+d2i_PKCS7_ENVELOPE,
+d2i_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL,
+d2i_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO,
+d2i_PKCS7_SIGNED,
+d2i_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO,
+d2i_PKCS7_SIGN_ENVELOPE,
+d2i_PKCS7_bio,
+d2i_PKCS7_fp,
+d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO,
+d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_bio,
+d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_fp,
+d2i_PKCS8_bio,
+d2i_PKCS8_fp,
+d2i_PKEY_USAGE_PERIOD,
+d2i_POLICYINFO,
+d2i_POLICYQUALINFO,
+d2i_PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION,
+d2i_PROXY_POLICY,
+d2i_RSAPrivateKey,
+d2i_RSAPrivateKey_bio,
+d2i_RSAPrivateKey_fp,
+d2i_RSAPublicKey,
+d2i_RSAPublicKey_bio,
+d2i_RSAPublicKey_fp,
+d2i_RSA_OAEP_PARAMS,
+d2i_RSA_PSS_PARAMS,
+d2i_RSA_PUBKEY,
+d2i_RSA_PUBKEY_bio,
+d2i_RSA_PUBKEY_fp,
+d2i_SCT_LIST,
+d2i_SXNET,
+d2i_SXNETID,
+d2i_TS_ACCURACY,
+d2i_TS_MSG_IMPRINT,
+d2i_TS_MSG_IMPRINT_bio,
+d2i_TS_MSG_IMPRINT_fp,
+d2i_TS_REQ,
+d2i_TS_REQ_bio,
+d2i_TS_REQ_fp,
+d2i_TS_RESP,
+d2i_TS_RESP_bio,
+d2i_TS_RESP_fp,
+d2i_TS_STATUS_INFO,
+d2i_TS_TST_INFO,
+d2i_TS_TST_INFO_bio,
+d2i_TS_TST_INFO_fp,
+d2i_USERNOTICE,
+d2i_X509,
+d2i_X509_ALGOR,
+d2i_X509_ALGORS,
+d2i_X509_ATTRIBUTE,
+d2i_X509_CERT_AUX,
+d2i_X509_CINF,
+d2i_X509_CRL,
+d2i_X509_CRL_INFO,
+d2i_X509_CRL_bio,
+d2i_X509_CRL_fp,
+d2i_X509_EXTENSION,
+d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS,
+d2i_X509_NAME,
+d2i_X509_NAME_ENTRY,
+d2i_X509_PUBKEY,
+d2i_X509_REQ,
+d2i_X509_REQ_INFO,
+d2i_X509_REQ_bio,
+d2i_X509_REQ_fp,
+d2i_X509_REVOKED,
+d2i_X509_SIG,
+d2i_X509_VAL,
+i2d_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION,
+i2d_ASIdOrRange,
+i2d_ASIdentifierChoice,
+i2d_ASIdentifiers,
+i2d_ASN1_BIT_STRING,
+i2d_ASN1_BMPSTRING,
+i2d_ASN1_ENUMERATED,
+i2d_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME,
+i2d_ASN1_GENERALSTRING,
+i2d_ASN1_IA5STRING,
+i2d_ASN1_INTEGER,
+i2d_ASN1_NULL,
+i2d_ASN1_OBJECT,
+i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+i2d_ASN1_PRINTABLE,
+i2d_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING,
+i2d_ASN1_SEQUENCE_ANY,
+i2d_ASN1_SET_ANY,
+i2d_ASN1_T61STRING,
+i2d_ASN1_TIME,
+i2d_ASN1_TYPE,
+i2d_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING,
+i2d_ASN1_UTCTIME,
+i2d_ASN1_UTF8STRING,
+i2d_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING,
+i2d_ASN1_bio_stream,
+i2d_ASRange,
+i2d_AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS,
+i2d_AUTHORITY_KEYID,
+i2d_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS,
+i2d_CERTIFICATEPOLICIES,
+i2d_CMS_ContentInfo,
+i2d_CMS_ReceiptRequest,
+i2d_CMS_bio,
+i2d_CRL_DIST_POINTS,
+i2d_DHxparams,
+i2d_DIRECTORYSTRING,
+i2d_DISPLAYTEXT,
+i2d_DIST_POINT,
+i2d_DIST_POINT_NAME,
+i2d_DSAPrivateKey,
+i2d_DSAPrivateKey_bio,
+i2d_DSAPrivateKey_fp,
+i2d_DSAPublicKey,
+i2d_DSA_PUBKEY,
+i2d_DSA_PUBKEY_bio,
+i2d_DSA_PUBKEY_fp,
+i2d_DSA_SIG,
+i2d_DSAparams,
+i2d_ECPKParameters,
+i2d_ECParameters,
+i2d_ECPrivateKey,
+i2d_ECPrivateKey_bio,
+i2d_ECPrivateKey_fp,
+i2d_EC_PUBKEY,
+i2d_EC_PUBKEY_bio,
+i2d_EC_PUBKEY_fp,
+i2d_EDIPARTYNAME,
+i2d_ESS_CERT_ID,
+i2d_ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL,
+i2d_ESS_SIGNING_CERT,
+i2d_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE,
+i2d_GENERAL_NAME,
+i2d_GENERAL_NAMES,
+i2d_IPAddressChoice,
+i2d_IPAddressFamily,
+i2d_IPAddressOrRange,
+i2d_IPAddressRange,
+i2d_ISSUING_DIST_POINT,
+i2d_NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE,
+i2d_NETSCAPE_SPKAC,
+i2d_NETSCAPE_SPKI,
+i2d_NOTICEREF,
+i2d_OCSP_BASICRESP,
+i2d_OCSP_CERTID,
+i2d_OCSP_CERTSTATUS,
+i2d_OCSP_CRLID,
+i2d_OCSP_ONEREQ,
+i2d_OCSP_REQINFO,
+i2d_OCSP_REQUEST,
+i2d_OCSP_RESPBYTES,
+i2d_OCSP_RESPDATA,
+i2d_OCSP_RESPID,
+i2d_OCSP_RESPONSE,
+i2d_OCSP_REVOKEDINFO,
+i2d_OCSP_SERVICELOC,
+i2d_OCSP_SIGNATURE,
+i2d_OCSP_SINGLERESP,
+i2d_OTHERNAME,
+i2d_PBE2PARAM,
+i2d_PBEPARAM,
+i2d_PBKDF2PARAM,
+i2d_PKCS12,
+i2d_PKCS12_BAGS,
+i2d_PKCS12_MAC_DATA,
+i2d_PKCS12_SAFEBAG,
+i2d_PKCS12_bio,
+i2d_PKCS12_fp,
+i2d_PKCS7,
+i2d_PKCS7_DIGEST,
+i2d_PKCS7_ENCRYPT,
+i2d_PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT,
+i2d_PKCS7_ENVELOPE,
+i2d_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL,
+i2d_PKCS7_NDEF,
+i2d_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO,
+i2d_PKCS7_SIGNED,
+i2d_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO,
+i2d_PKCS7_SIGN_ENVELOPE,
+i2d_PKCS7_bio,
+i2d_PKCS7_fp,
+i2d_PKCS8PrivateKeyInfo_bio,
+i2d_PKCS8PrivateKeyInfo_fp,
+i2d_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO,
+i2d_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_bio,
+i2d_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_fp,
+i2d_PKCS8_bio,
+i2d_PKCS8_fp,
+i2d_PKEY_USAGE_PERIOD,
+i2d_POLICYINFO,
+i2d_POLICYQUALINFO,
+i2d_PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION,
+i2d_PROXY_POLICY,
+i2d_PublicKey,
+i2d_RSAPrivateKey,
+i2d_RSAPrivateKey_bio,
+i2d_RSAPrivateKey_fp,
+i2d_RSAPublicKey,
+i2d_RSAPublicKey_bio,
+i2d_RSAPublicKey_fp,
+i2d_RSA_OAEP_PARAMS,
+i2d_RSA_PSS_PARAMS,
+i2d_RSA_PUBKEY,
+i2d_RSA_PUBKEY_bio,
+i2d_RSA_PUBKEY_fp,
+i2d_SCT_LIST,
+i2d_SXNET,
+i2d_SXNETID,
+i2d_TS_ACCURACY,
+i2d_TS_MSG_IMPRINT,
+i2d_TS_MSG_IMPRINT_bio,
+i2d_TS_MSG_IMPRINT_fp,
+i2d_TS_REQ,
+i2d_TS_REQ_bio,
+i2d_TS_REQ_fp,
+i2d_TS_RESP,
+i2d_TS_RESP_bio,
+i2d_TS_RESP_fp,
+i2d_TS_STATUS_INFO,
+i2d_TS_TST_INFO,
+i2d_TS_TST_INFO_bio,
+i2d_TS_TST_INFO_fp,
+i2d_USERNOTICE,
+i2d_X509,
+i2d_X509_ALGOR,
+i2d_X509_ALGORS,
+i2d_X509_ATTRIBUTE,
+i2d_X509_CERT_AUX,
+i2d_X509_CINF,
+i2d_X509_CRL,
+i2d_X509_CRL_INFO,
+i2d_X509_CRL_bio,
+i2d_X509_CRL_fp,
+i2d_X509_EXTENSION,
+i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS,
+i2d_X509_NAME,
+i2d_X509_NAME_ENTRY,
+i2d_X509_PUBKEY,
+i2d_X509_REQ,
+i2d_X509_REQ_INFO,
+i2d_X509_REQ_bio,
+i2d_X509_REQ_fp,
+i2d_X509_REVOKED,
+i2d_X509_SIG,
+i2d_X509_VAL,
+- convert objects from/to ASN.1/DER representation
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+=for comment generic
+
+ TYPE *d2i_TYPE(TYPE **a, unsigned char **ppin, long length);
+ TYPE *d2i_TYPE_bio(BIO *bp, TYPE **a);
+ TYPE *d2i_TYPE_fp(FILE *fp, TYPE **a);
+
+ int i2d_TYPE(TYPE *a, unsigned char **ppout);
+ int i2d_TYPE_fp(FILE *fp, TYPE *a);
+ int i2d_TYPE_bio(BIO *bp, TYPE *a);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+In the description here, I<TYPE> is used a placeholder
+for any of the OpenSSL datatypes, such as I<X509_CRL>.
+The function parameters I<ppin> and I<ppout> are generally
+either both named I<pp> in the headers, or I<in> and I<out>.
+
+These functions convert OpenSSL objects to and from their ASN.1/DER
+encoding.  Unlike the C structures which can have pointers to sub-objects
+within, the DER is a serialized encoding, suitable for sending over the
+network, writing to a file, and so on.
+
+d2i_TYPE() attempts to decode B<len> bytes at B<*ppin>. If successful a
+pointer to the B<TYPE> structure is returned and B<*ppin> is incremented to
+the byte following the parsed data.  If B<a> is not B<NULL> then a pointer
+to the returned structure is also written to B<*a>.  If an error occurred
+then B<NULL> is returned.
+
+On a successful return, if B<*a> is not B<NULL> then it is assumed that B<*a>
+contains a valid B<TYPE> structure and an attempt is made to reuse it. This
+"reuse" capability is present for historical compatibility but its use is
+B<strongly discouraged> (see BUGS below, and the discussion in the RETURN
+VALUES section).
+
+d2i_TYPE_bio() is similar to d2i_TYPE() except it attempts
+to parse data from BIO B<bp>.
+
+d2i_TYPE_fp() is similar to d2i_TYPE() except it attempts
+to parse data from FILE pointer B<fp>.
+
+i2d_TYPE() encodes the structure pointed to by B<a> into DER format.
+If B<ppout> is not B<NULL>, it writes the DER encoded data to the buffer
+at B<*ppout>, and increments it to point after the data just written.
+If the return value is negative an error occurred, otherwise it
+returns the length of the encoded data.
+
+If B<*ppout> is B<NULL> memory will be allocated for a buffer and the encoded
+data written to it. In this case B<*ppout> is not incremented and it points
+to the start of the data just written.
+
+i2d_TYPE_bio() is similar to i2d_TYPE() except it writes
+the encoding of the structure B<a> to BIO B<bp> and it
+returns 1 for success and 0 for failure.
+
+i2d_TYPE_fp() is similar to i2d_TYPE() except it writes
+the encoding of the structure B<a> to BIO B<bp> and it
+returns 1 for success and 0 for failure.
+
+These routines do not encrypt private keys and therefore offer no
+security; use L<PEM_write_PrivateKey(3)> or similar for writing to files.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The letters B<i> and B<d> in B<i2d_TYPE> stand for
+"internal" (that is, an internal C structure) and "DER" respectively.
+So B<i2d_TYPE> converts from internal to DER.
+
+The functions can also understand B<BER> forms.
+
+The actual TYPE structure passed to i2d_TYPE() must be a valid
+populated B<TYPE> structure -- it B<cannot> simply be fed with an
+empty structure such as that returned by TYPE_new().
+
+The encoded data is in binary form and may contain embedded zeroes.
+Therefore any FILE pointers or BIOs should be opened in binary mode.
+Functions such as strlen() will B<not> return the correct length
+of the encoded structure.
+
+The ways that B<*ppin> and B<*ppout> are incremented after the operation
+can trap the unwary. See the B<WARNINGS> section for some common
+errors.
+The reason for this-auto increment behaviour is to reflect a typical
+usage of ASN1 functions: after one structure is encoded or decoded
+another will be processed after it.
+
+The following points about the data types might be useful:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<ASN1_OBJECT>
+
+Represents an ASN1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER.
+
+=item B<DHparams>
+
+Represents a PKCS#3 DH parameters structure.
+
+=item B<DHparamx>
+
+Represents a ANSI X9.42 DH parameters structure.
+
+=item B<DSA_PUBKEY>
+
+Represents a DSA public key using a B<SubjectPublicKeyInfo> structure.
+
+=item B<DSAPublicKey, DSAPrivateKey>
+
+Use a non-standard OpenSSL format and should be avoided; use B<DSA_PUBKEY>,
+B<PEM_write_PrivateKey(3)>, or similar instead.
+
+=item B<RSAPublicKey>
+
+Represents a PKCS#1 RSA public key structure.
+
+=item B<X509_ALGOR>
+
+Represents an B<AlgorithmIdentifier> structure as used in IETF RFC 6960 and
+elsewhere.
+
+=item B<X509_Name>
+
+Represents a B<Name> type as used for subject and issuer names in
+IETF RFC 6960 and elsewhere.
+
+=item B<X509_REQ>
+
+Represents a PKCS#10 certificate request.
+
+=item B<X509_SIG>
+
+Represents the B<DigestInfo> structure defined in PKCS#1 and PKCS#7.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 EXAMPLES
+
+Allocate and encode the DER encoding of an X509 structure:
+
+ int len;
+ unsigned char *buf;
+
+ buf = NULL;
+ len = i2d_X509(x, &buf);
+ if (len < 0)
+     /* error */
+
+Attempt to decode a buffer:
+
+ X509 *x;
+ unsigned char *buf, *p;
+ int len;
+
+ /* Set up buf and len to point to the input buffer. */
+ p = buf;
+ x = d2i_X509(NULL, &p, len);
+ if (x == NULL)
+     /* error */
+
+Alternative technique:
+
+ X509 *x;
+ unsigned char *buf, *p;
+ int len;
+
+ /* Set up buf and len to point to the input buffer. */
+ p = buf;
+ x = NULL;
+
+ if (d2i_X509(&x, &p, len) == NULL)
+     /* error */
+
+=head1 WARNINGS
+
+Using a temporary variable is mandatory. A common
+mistake is to attempt to use a buffer directly as follows:
+
+ int len;
+ unsigned char *buf;
+
+ len = i2d_X509(x, NULL);
+ buf = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
+ ...
+ i2d_X509(x, &buf);
+ ...
+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
+
+This code will result in B<buf> apparently containing garbage because
+it was incremented after the call to point after the data just written.
+Also B<buf> will no longer contain the pointer allocated by OPENSSL_malloc()
+and the subsequent call to OPENSSL_free() is likely to crash.
+
+Another trap to avoid is misuse of the B<a> argument to d2i_TYPE():
+
+ X509 *x;
+
+ if (d2i_X509(&x, &p, len) == NULL)
+     /* error */
+
+This will probably crash somewhere in d2i_X509(). The reason for this
+is that the variable B<x> is uninitialized and an attempt will be made to
+interpret its (invalid) value as an B<X509> structure, typically causing
+a segmentation violation. If B<x> is set to NULL first then this will not
+happen.
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+In some versions of OpenSSL the "reuse" behaviour of d2i_TYPE() when
+B<*px> is valid is broken and some parts of the reused structure may
+persist if they are not present in the new one. As a result the use
+of this "reuse" behaviour is strongly discouraged.
+
+i2d_TYPE() will not return an error in many versions of OpenSSL,
+if mandatory fields are not initialized due to a programming error
+then the encoded structure may contain invalid data or omit the
+fields entirely and will not be parsed by d2i_TYPE(). This may be
+fixed in future so code should not assume that i2d_TYPE() will
+always succeed.
+
+Any function which encodes a structure (i2d_TYPE(),
+i2d_TYPE() or i2d_TYPE()) may return a stale encoding if the
+structure has been modified after deserialization or previous
+serialization. This is because some objects cache the encoding for
+efficiency reasons.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+d2i_TYPE(), d2i_TYPE_bio() and d2i_TYPE_fp() return a valid B<TYPE> structure
+or B<NULL> if an error occurs.  If the "reuse" capability has been used with
+a valid structure being passed in via B<a>, then the object is not freed in
+the event of error but may be in a potentially invalid or inconsistent state.
+
+i2d_TYPE() returns the number of bytes successfully encoded or a negative
+value if an error occurs.
+
+i2d_TYPE_bio() and i2d_TYPE_fp() return 1 for success and 0 if an error
+occurs.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/des_modes.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/des_modes.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d5a3f8d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/des_modes.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,261 @@
+=pod
+
+=for comment openssl_manual_section:7
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+des_modes - the variants of DES and other crypto algorithms of OpenSSL
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+Several crypto algorithms for OpenSSL can be used in a number of modes.  Those
+are used for using block ciphers in a way similar to stream ciphers, among
+other things.
+
+=head1 OVERVIEW
+
+=head2 Electronic Codebook Mode (ECB)
+
+Normally, this is found as the function I<algorithm>_ecb_encrypt().
+
+=over 4
+
+=item *
+
+64 bits are enciphered at a time.
+
+=item *
+
+The order of the blocks can be rearranged without detection.
+
+=item *
+
+The same plaintext block always produces the same ciphertext block
+(for the same key) making it vulnerable to a 'dictionary attack'.
+
+=item *
+
+An error will only affect one ciphertext block.
+
+=back
+
+=head2 Cipher Block Chaining Mode (CBC)
+
+Normally, this is found as the function I<algorithm>_cbc_encrypt().
+Be aware that des_cbc_encrypt() is not really DES CBC (it does
+not update the IV); use des_ncbc_encrypt() instead.
+
+=over 4
+
+=item *
+
+a multiple of 64 bits are enciphered at a time.
+
+=item *
+
+The CBC mode produces the same ciphertext whenever the same
+plaintext is encrypted using the same key and starting variable.
+
+=item *
+
+The chaining operation makes the ciphertext blocks dependent on the
+current and all preceding plaintext blocks and therefore blocks can not
+be rearranged.
+
+=item *
+
+The use of different starting variables prevents the same plaintext
+enciphering to the same ciphertext.
+
+=item *
+
+An error will affect the current and the following ciphertext blocks.
+
+=back
+
+=head2 Cipher Feedback Mode (CFB)
+
+Normally, this is found as the function I<algorithm>_cfb_encrypt().
+
+=over 4
+
+=item *
+
+a number of bits (j) <= 64 are enciphered at a time.
+
+=item *
+
+The CFB mode produces the same ciphertext whenever the same
+plaintext is encrypted using the same key and starting variable.
+
+=item *
+
+The chaining operation makes the ciphertext variables dependent on the
+current and all preceding variables and therefore j-bit variables are
+chained together and can not be rearranged.
+
+=item *
+
+The use of different starting variables prevents the same plaintext
+enciphering to the same ciphertext.
+
+=item *
+
+The strength of the CFB mode depends on the size of k (maximal if
+j == k).  In my implementation this is always the case.
+
+=item *
+
+Selection of a small value for j will require more cycles through
+the encipherment algorithm per unit of plaintext and thus cause
+greater processing overheads.
+
+=item *
+
+Only multiples of j bits can be enciphered.
+
+=item *
+
+An error will affect the current and the following ciphertext variables.
+
+=back
+
+=head2 Output Feedback Mode (OFB)
+
+Normally, this is found as the function I<algorithm>_ofb_encrypt().
+
+=over 4
+
+
+=item *
+
+a number of bits (j) <= 64 are enciphered at a time.
+
+=item *
+
+The OFB mode produces the same ciphertext whenever the same
+plaintext enciphered using the same key and starting variable.  More
+over, in the OFB mode the same key stream is produced when the same
+key and start variable are used.  Consequently, for security reasons
+a specific start variable should be used only once for a given key.
+
+=item *
+
+The absence of chaining makes the OFB more vulnerable to specific attacks.
+
+=item *
+
+The use of different start variables values prevents the same
+plaintext enciphering to the same ciphertext, by producing different
+key streams.
+
+=item *
+
+Selection of a small value for j will require more cycles through
+the encipherment algorithm per unit of plaintext and thus cause
+greater processing overheads.
+
+=item *
+
+Only multiples of j bits can be enciphered.
+
+=item *
+
+OFB mode of operation does not extend ciphertext errors in the
+resultant plaintext output.  Every bit error in the ciphertext causes
+only one bit to be in error in the deciphered plaintext.
+
+=item *
+
+OFB mode is not self-synchronizing.  If the two operation of
+encipherment and decipherment get out of synchronism, the system needs
+to be re-initialized.
+
+=item *
+
+Each re-initialization should use a value of the start variable
+different from the start variable values used before with the same
+key.  The reason for this is that an identical bit stream would be
+produced each time from the same parameters.  This would be
+susceptible to a 'known plaintext' attack.
+
+=back
+
+=head2 Triple ECB Mode
+
+Normally, this is found as the function I<algorithm>_ecb3_encrypt().
+
+=over 4
+
+=item *
+
+Encrypt with key1, decrypt with key2 and encrypt with key3 again.
+
+=item *
+
+As for ECB encryption but increases the key length to 168 bits.
+There are theoretic attacks that can be used that make the effective
+key length 112 bits, but this attack also requires 2^56 blocks of
+memory, not very likely, even for the NSA.
+
+=item *
+
+If both keys are the same it is equivalent to encrypting once with
+just one key.
+
+=item *
+
+If the first and last key are the same, the key length is 112 bits.
+There are attacks that could reduce the effective key strength
+to only slightly more than 56 bits, but these require a lot of memory.
+
+=item *
+
+If all 3 keys are the same, this is effectively the same as normal
+ecb mode.
+
+=back
+
+=head2 Triple CBC Mode
+
+Normally, this is found as the function I<algorithm>_ede3_cbc_encrypt().
+
+=over 4
+
+=item *
+
+Encrypt with key1, decrypt with key2 and then encrypt with key3.
+
+=item *
+
+As for CBC encryption but increases the key length to 168 bits with
+the same restrictions as for triple ecb mode.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+This text was been written in large parts by Eric Young in his original
+documentation for SSLeay, the predecessor of OpenSSL.  In turn, he attributed
+it to:
+
+        AS 2805.5.2
+        Australian Standard
+        Electronic funds transfer - Requirements for interfaces,
+        Part 5.2: Modes of operation for an n-bit block cipher algorithm
+        Appendix A
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<BF_encrypt(3)>, L<DES_crypt(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/evp.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/evp.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..02051df
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/evp.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+=pod
+
+=for comment openssl_manual_section:7
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+evp - high-level cryptographic functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The EVP library provides a high-level interface to cryptographic
+functions.
+
+L<B<EVP_Seal>I<...>|EVP_SealInit(3)> and L<B<EVP_Open>I<...>|EVP_OpenInit(3)>
+provide public key encryption and decryption to implement digital "envelopes".
+
+The L<B<EVP_DigestSign>I<...>|EVP_DigestSignInit(3)> and
+L<B<EVP_DigestVerify>I<...>|EVP_DigestVerifyInit(3)> functions implement
+digital signatures and Message Authentication Codes (MACs). Also see the older
+L<B<EVP_Sign>I<...>|EVP_SignInit(3)> and L<B<EVP_Verify>I<...>|EVP_VerifyInit(3)>
+functions.
+
+Symmetric encryption is available with the L<B<EVP_Encrypt>I<...>|EVP_EncryptInit(3)>
+functions.  The L<B<EVP_Digest>I<...>|EVP_DigestInit(3)> functions provide message digests.
+
+The B<EVP_PKEY>I<...> functions provide a high level interface to
+asymmetric algorithms. To create a new EVP_PKEY see
+L<EVP_PKEY_new(3)>. EVP_PKEYs can be associated
+with a private key of a particular algorithm by using the functions
+described on the L<EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(3)> page, or
+new keys can be generated using L<EVP_PKEY_keygen(3)>.
+EVP_PKEYs can be compared using L<EVP_PKEY_cmp(3)>, or printed using
+L<EVP_PKEY_print_private(3)>.
+
+The EVP_PKEY functions support the full range of asymmetric algorithm operations:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item For key agreement see L<EVP_PKEY_derive(3)>
+
+=item For signing and verifying see L<EVP_PKEY_sign(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_verify(3)> and L<EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(3)>.
+However, note that
+these functions do not perform a digest of the data to be signed. Therefore
+normally you would use the L<EVP_DigestSignInit(3)>
+functions for this purpose.
+
+=item For encryption and decryption see L<EVP_PKEY_encrypt(3)>
+and L<EVP_PKEY_decrypt(3)> respectively. However, note that
+these functions perform encryption and decryption only. As public key
+encryption is an expensive operation, normally you would wrap
+an encrypted message in a "digital envelope" using the L<EVP_SealInit(3)> and
+L<EVP_OpenInit(3)> functions.
+
+=back
+
+The L<EVP_BytesToKey(3)> function provides some limited support for password
+based encryption. Careful selection of the parameters will provide a PKCS#5 PBKDF1 compatible
+implementation. However, new applications should not typically use this (preferring, for example,
+PBKDF2 from PCKS#5).
+
+The L<B<EVP_Encode>I<...>|EVP_EncodeInit(3)> and
+L<B<EVP_Decode>I<...>|EVP_EncodeInit(3)> functions implement base 64 encoding
+and decoding.
+
+All the symmetric algorithms (ciphers), digests and asymmetric algorithms
+(public key algorithms) can be replaced by L<engine(3)> modules providing alternative
+implementations. If ENGINE implementations of ciphers or digests are registered
+as defaults, then the various EVP functions will automatically use those
+implementations automatically in preference to built in software
+implementations. For more information, consult the engine(3) man page.
+
+Although low level algorithm specific functions exist for many algorithms
+their use is discouraged. They cannot be used with an ENGINE and ENGINE
+versions of new algorithms cannot be accessed using the low level functions.
+Also makes code harder to adapt to new algorithms and some options are not
+cleanly supported at the low level and some operations are more efficient
+using the high level interface.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<EVP_DigestInit(3)>,
+L<EVP_EncryptInit(3)>,
+L<EVP_OpenInit(3)>,
+L<EVP_SealInit(3)>,
+L<EVP_DigestSignInit(3)>,
+L<EVP_SignInit(3)>,
+L<EVP_VerifyInit(3)>,
+L<EVP_EncodeInit(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_new(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_keygen(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_print_private(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_decrypt(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_encrypt(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_sign(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_verify(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_derive(3)>,
+L<EVP_BytesToKey(3)>,
+L<engine(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/i2d_CMS_bio_stream.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/i2d_CMS_bio_stream.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ece7a48
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/i2d_CMS_bio_stream.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+i2d_CMS_bio_stream - output CMS_ContentInfo structure in BER format
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/cms.h>
+
+ int i2d_CMS_bio_stream(BIO *out, CMS_ContentInfo *cms, BIO *data, int flags);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+i2d_CMS_bio_stream() outputs a CMS_ContentInfo structure in BER format.
+
+It is otherwise identical to the function SMIME_write_CMS().
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+This function is effectively a version of the i2d_CMS_bio() supporting
+streaming.
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+The prefix "i2d" is arguably wrong because the function outputs BER format.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+i2d_CMS_bio_stream() returns 1 for success or 0 for failure.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>, L<CMS_sign(3)>,
+L<CMS_verify(3)>, L<CMS_encrypt(3)>
+L<CMS_decrypt(3)>,
+L<SMIME_write_CMS(3)>,
+L<PEM_write_bio_CMS_stream(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+i2d_CMS_bio_stream() was added to OpenSSL 1.0.0
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/i2d_PKCS7_bio_stream.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/i2d_PKCS7_bio_stream.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b42940a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/i2d_PKCS7_bio_stream.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+i2d_PKCS7_bio_stream - output PKCS7 structure in BER format
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/pkcs7.h>
+
+ int i2d_PKCS7_bio_stream(BIO *out, PKCS7 *p7, BIO *data, int flags);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+i2d_PKCS7_bio_stream() outputs a PKCS7 structure in BER format.
+
+It is otherwise identical to the function SMIME_write_PKCS7().
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+This function is effectively a version of the d2i_PKCS7_bio() supporting
+streaming.
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+The prefix "i2d" is arguably wrong because the function outputs BER format.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+i2d_PKCS7_bio_stream() returns 1 for success or 0 for failure.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>, L<PKCS7_sign(3)>,
+L<PKCS7_verify(3)>, L<PKCS7_encrypt(3)>
+L<PKCS7_decrypt(3)>,
+L<SMIME_write_PKCS7(3)>,
+L<PEM_write_bio_PKCS7_stream(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+i2d_PKCS7_bio_stream() was added to OpenSSL 1.0.0
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/i2d_re_X509_tbs.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/i2d_re_X509_tbs.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..672c7ab
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/i2d_re_X509_tbs.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+d2i_X509_AUX, i2d_X509_AUX,
+i2d_re_X509_tbs, i2d_re_X509_CRL_tbs, i2d_re_X509_REQ_tbs
+- X509 encode and decode functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+ X509 *d2i_X509_AUX(X509 **px, const unsigned char **in, long len);
+ int i2d_X509_AUX(X509 *x, unsigned char **out);
+ int i2d_re_X509_tbs(X509 *x, unsigned char **out);
+ int i2d_re_X509_CRL_tbs(X509_CRL *crl, unsigned char **pp);
+ int i2d_re_X509_REQ_tbs(X509_REQ *req, unsigned char **pp);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The X509 encode and decode routines encode and parse an
+B<X509> structure, which represents an X509 certificate.
+
+d2i_X509_AUX() is similar to L<d2i_X509(3)> but the input is expected to
+consist of an X509 certificate followed by auxiliary trust information.
+This is used by the PEM routines to read "TRUSTED CERTIFICATE" objects.
+This function should not be called on untrusted input.
+
+i2d_X509_AUX() is similar to L<i2d_X509(3)>, but the encoded output
+contains both the certificate and any auxiliary trust information.
+This is used by the PEM routines to write "TRUSTED CERTIFICATE" objects.
+Note that this is a non-standard OpenSSL-specific data format.
+
+i2d_re_X509_tbs() is similar to L<i2d_X509(3)> except it encodes only
+the TBSCertificate portion of the certificate.  i2d_re_X509_CRL_tbs()
+and i2d_re_X509_REQ_tbs() are analogous for CRL and certificate request,
+respectively.  The "re" in B<i2d_re_X509_tbs> stands for "re-encode",
+and ensures that a fresh encoding is generated in case the object has been
+modified after creation (see the BUGS section).
+
+The encoding of the TBSCertificate portion of a certificate is cached
+in the B<X509> structure internally to improve encoding performance
+and to ensure certificate signatures are verified correctly in some
+certificates with broken (non-DER) encodings.
+
+If, after modification, the B<X509> object is re-signed with X509_sign(),
+the encoding is automatically renewed. Otherwise, the encoding of the
+TBSCertificate portion of the B<X509> can be manually renewed by calling
+i2d_re_X509_tbs().
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_get_error(3)>
+L<X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(3)>,
+L<X509_get0_signature(3)>,
+L<X509_get_ext_d2i(3)>,
+L<X509_get_extension_flags(3)>,
+L<X509_get_pubkey(3)>,
+L<X509_get_subject_name(3)>,
+L<X509_get_version(3)>,
+L<X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(3)>,
+L<X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(3)>,
+L<X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(3)>,
+L<X509_NAME_print_ex(3)>,
+L<X509_new(3)>,
+L<X509_sign(3)>,
+L<X509V3_get_d2i(3)>,
+L<X509_verify_cert(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/o2i_SCT_LIST.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/o2i_SCT_LIST.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..82922fc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/o2i_SCT_LIST.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+o2i_SCT_LIST, i2o_SCT_LIST, o2i_SCT, i2o_SCT -
+decode and encode Signed Certificate Timestamp lists in TLS wire format
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ct.h>
+
+ STACK_OF(SCT) *o2i_SCT_LIST(STACK_OF(SCT) **a, const unsigned char **pp, size_t len);
+ int i2o_SCT_LIST(const STACK_OF(SCT) *a, unsigned char **pp);
+ SCT *o2i_SCT(SCT **psct, const unsigned char **in, size_t len);
+ int i2o_SCT(const SCT *sct, unsigned char **out);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The SCT_LIST and SCT functions are very similar to the i2d and d2i family of
+functions, except that they convert to and from TLS wire format, as described in
+RFC 6962. See L<d2i_SCT_LIST> for more information about how the parameters are
+treated and the return values.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+All of the functions have return values consistent with those stated for
+L<d2i_SCT_LIST> and L<i2d_SCT_LIST>.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ct(3)>,
+L<d2i_SCT_LIST(3)>,
+L<i2d_SCT_LIST(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+These functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/x509.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/x509.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..483b037
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/crypto/x509.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+=pod
+
+=for comment openssl_manual_section:7
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+x509 - X.509 certificate handling
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+An X.509 certificate is a structured grouping of information about
+an individual, a device, or anything one can imagine.  A X.509 CRL
+(certificate revocation list) is a tool to help determine if a
+certificate is still valid.  The exact definition of those can be
+found in the X.509 document from ITU-T, or in RFC3280 from PKIX.
+In OpenSSL, the type X509 is used to express such a certificate, and
+the type X509_CRL is used to express a CRL.
+
+A related structure is a certificate request, defined in PKCS#10 from
+RSA Security, Inc, also reflected in RFC2896.  In OpenSSL, the type
+X509_REQ is used to express such a certificate request.
+
+To handle some complex parts of a certificate, there are the types
+X509_NAME (to express a certificate name), X509_ATTRIBUTE (to express
+a certificate attributes), X509_EXTENSION (to express a certificate
+extension) and a few more.
+
+Finally, there's the supertype X509_INFO, which can contain a CRL, a
+certificate and a corresponding private key.
+
+B<X509_>I<...>, B<d2i_X509_>I<...> and B<i2d_X509_>I<...> handle X.509
+certificates, with some exceptions, shown below.
+
+B<X509_CRL_>I<...>, B<d2i_X509_CRL_>I<...> and B<i2d_X509_CRL_>I<...>
+handle X.509 CRLs.
+
+B<X509_REQ_>I<...>, B<d2i_X509_REQ_>I<...> and B<i2d_X509_REQ_>I<...>
+handle PKCS#10 certificate requests.
+
+B<X509_NAME_>I<...> handle certificate names.
+
+B<X509_ATTRIBUTE_>I<...> handle certificate attributes.
+
+B<X509_EXTENSION_>I<...> handle certificate extensions.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(3)>,
+L<X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(3)>,
+L<X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID(3)>,
+L<X509_NAME_print_ex(3)>,
+L<X509_NAME_new(3)>,
+L<d2i_X509(3)>,
+L<d2i_X509_ALGOR(3)>,
+L<d2i_X509_CRL(3)>,
+L<d2i_X509_NAME(3)>,
+L<d2i_X509_REQ(3)>,
+L<d2i_X509_SIG(3)>,
+L<X509v3(3)>,
+L<crypto(7)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2003-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/dir-locals.example.el b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/dir-locals.example.el
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dc0d554
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/dir-locals.example.el
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+;;; This is an example of what a .dir-locals.el suitable for OpenSSL
+;;; development could look like.
+;;;
+;;; Apart from setting the CC mode style to "OpenSSL-II", it also
+;;; makes sure that tabs are never used for indentation in any file,
+;;; and that the fill column is 78.
+;;;
+;;; For more information see (info "(emacs) Directory Variables")
+
+((nil
+  (indent-tabs-mode . nil)
+  (fill-column . 70)
+  )
+ (c-mode
+  (c-file-style . "OpenSSL-II")))
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/fingerprints.txt b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/fingerprints.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1863224
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/fingerprints.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+Fingerprints for Signing Releases
+
+OpenSSL releases are signed with PGP/GnuPG keys.  This file contains
+the fingerprints of team members who are "authorized" to sign the
+next release.
+
+The signature is a detached cleartxt signature, with the same name
+as the release but with ".asc" appended.  For example, release
+1.0.1h can be found in openssl-1.0.1h.tar.gz with the signature
+in the file named openssl-1.0.1h.tar.gz.asc.
+
+The following is the list of fingerprints for the keys that are
+currently in use to sign OpenSSL distributions:
+
+pub   4096R/7DF9EE8C 2014-10-04
+      Key fingerprint = 7953 AC1F BC3D C8B3 B292  393E D5E9 E43F 7DF9 EE8C
+uid                  Richard Levitte <richard@opensslfoundation.com>
+uid                  Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
+uid                  Richard Levitte <richard@openssl.com>
+
+pub   4096R/FA40E9E2 2005-03-19
+      Key fingerprint = 6260 5AA4 334A F9F0 DDE5  D349 D357 7507 FA40 E9E2
+uid                  Dr Stephen N Henson <steve@openssl.org>
+
+pub   2048R/0E604491 2013-04-30            
+      Key fingerprint = 8657 ABB2 60F0 56B1 E519 0839 D9C4 D26D 0E60 4491
+uid                  Matt Caswell <frodo@baggins.org>
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/openssl-c-indent.el b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/openssl-c-indent.el
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cca1183
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/openssl-c-indent.el
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+;;; This Emacs Lisp file defines a C indentation style for OpenSSL.
+;;;
+;;; This definition is for the "CC mode" package, which is the default
+;;; mode for editing C source files in Emacs 20, not for the older
+;;; c-mode.el (which was the default in less recent release of Emacs 19).
+;;;
+;;; Recommended use is to add this line in your .emacs:
+;;;
+;;;   (load (expand-file-name "~/PATH/TO/openssl-c-indent.el"))
+;;;
+;;; To activate this indentation style, visit a C file, type
+;;; M-x c-set-style <RET> (or C-c . for short), and enter "eay".
+;;; To toggle the auto-newline feature of CC mode, type C-c C-a.
+;;;
+;;; If you're an OpenSSL developer, you might find it more comfortable
+;;; to have this style be permanent in your OpenSSL development
+;;; directory.  To have that, please perform this:
+;;;
+;;;    M-x add-dir-local-variable <RET> c-mode <RET> c-file-style <RET>
+;;;    "OpenSSL-II" <RET>
+;;;
+;;; A new buffer with .dir-locals.el will appear.  Save it (C-x C-s).
+;;;
+;;; Alternatively, have a look at dir-locals.example.el
+
+;;; For suggesting improvements, please send e-mail to levitte@openssl.org.
+
+;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
+;; Note, it could be easy to inherit from the "gnu" style...  however,
+;; one never knows if that style will change somewhere in the future,
+;; so I've chosen to copy the "gnu" style values explicitly instead
+;; and mark them with a comment.                // RLevitte 2015-08-31
+;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
+
+(c-add-style "OpenSSL-II"
+             '((c-basic-offset . 4)
+               (indent-tabs-mode . nil)
+               (fill-column . 78)
+               (comment-column . 33)
+               (c-comment-only-line-offset 0 . 0)            ; From "gnu" style
+               (c-hanging-braces-alist                       ; From "gnu" style
+                (substatement-open before after)             ; From "gnu" style
+                (arglist-cont-nonempty))                     ; From "gnu" style
+               (c-offsets-alist
+                (statement-block-intro . +)                  ; From "gnu" style
+                (knr-argdecl-intro . 0)
+                (knr-argdecl . 0)
+                (substatement-open . +)                      ; From "gnu" style
+                (substatement-label . 0)                     ; From "gnu" style
+                (label . 1)
+                (statement-case-open . +)                    ; From "gnu" style
+                (statement-cont . +)                         ; From "gnu" style
+                (arglist-intro . c-lineup-arglist-intro-after-paren) ; From "gnu" style
+                (arglist-close . c-lineup-arglist)           ; From "gnu" style
+                (inline-open . 0)                            ; From "gnu" style
+                (brace-list-open . +)                        ; From "gnu" style
+                (topmost-intro-cont first c-lineup-topmost-intro-cont
+                                    c-lineup-gnu-DEFUN-intro-cont) ; From "gnu" style
+                )
+               (c-special-indent-hook . c-gnu-impose-minimum) ; From "gnu" style
+               (c-block-comment-prefix . "* ")
+               ))
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/DTLSv1_listen.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/DTLSv1_listen.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a839d9f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/DTLSv1_listen.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+DTLSv1_listen - listen for incoming DTLS connections
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ int DTLSv1_listen(SSL *ssl, BIO_ADDR *peer);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+DTLSv1_listen() listens for new incoming DTLS connections. If a ClientHello is
+received that does not contain a cookie, then DTLSv1_listen() responds with a
+HelloVerifyRequest. If a ClientHello is received with a cookie that is verified
+then control is returned to user code to enable the handshake to be completed
+(for example by using SSL_accept()).
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+Datagram based protocols can be susceptible to Denial of Service attacks. A
+DTLS attacker could, for example, submit a series of handshake initiation
+requests that cause the server to allocate state (and possibly perform
+cryptographic operations) thus consuming server resources. The attacker could
+also (with UDP) quite simply forge the source IP address in such an attack.
+
+As a counter measure to that DTLS includes a stateless cookie mechanism. The
+idea is that when a client attempts to connect to a server it sends a
+ClientHello message. The server responds with a HelloVerifyRequest which
+contains a unique cookie. The client then resends the ClientHello, but this time
+includes the cookie in the message thus proving that the client is capable of
+receiving messages sent to that address. All of this can be done by the server
+without allocating any state, and thus without consuming expensive resources.
+
+OpenSSL implements this capability via the DTLSv1_listen() function. The B<ssl>
+parameter should be a newly allocated SSL object with its read and write BIOs
+set, in the same way as might be done for a call to SSL_accept(). Typically the
+read BIO will be in an "unconnected" state and thus capable of receiving
+messages from any peer.
+
+When a ClientHello is received that contains a cookie that has been verified,
+then DTLSv1_listen() will return with the B<ssl> parameter updated into a state
+where the handshake can be continued by a call to (for example) SSL_accept().
+Additionally the B<BIO_ADDR> pointed to by B<peer> will be filled in with
+details of the peer that sent the ClientHello. If the underlying BIO is unable
+to obtain the B<BIO_ADDR> of the peer (for example because the BIO does not
+support this), then B<*peer> will be cleared and the family set to AF_UNSPEC.
+Typically user code is expected to "connect" the underlying socket to the peer
+and continue the handshake in a connected state.
+
+Prior to calling DTLSv1_listen() user code must ensure that cookie generation
+and verification callbacks have been set up using
+SSL_CTX_set_cookie_generate_cb() and SSL_CTX_set_cookie_verify_cb()
+respectively.
+
+Since DTLSv1_listen() operates entirely statelessly whilst processing incoming
+ClientHellos it is unable to process fragmented messages (since this would
+require the allocation of state). An implication of this is that DTLSv1_listen()
+B<only> supports ClientHellos that fit inside a single datagram.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+From OpenSSL 1.1.0 a return value of >= 1 indicates success. In this instance
+the B<peer> value will be filled in and the B<ssl> object set up ready to
+continue the handshake.
+
+A return value of 0 indicates a non-fatal error. This could (for
+example) be because of non-blocking IO, or some invalid message having been
+received from a peer. Errors may be placed on the OpenSSL error queue with
+further information if appropriate. Typically user code is expected to retry the
+call to DTLSv1_listen() in the event of a non-fatal error. Any old errors on the
+error queue will be cleared in the subsequent call.
+
+A return value of <0 indicates a fatal error. This could (for example) be
+because of a failure to allocate sufficient memory for the operation.
+
+Prior to OpenSSL 1.1.0 fatal and non-fatal errors both produce return codes
+<= 0 (in typical implementations user code treats all errors as non-fatal),
+whilst return codes >0 indicate success.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<SSL_get_error(3)>, L<SSL_accept(3)>,
+L<ssl(3)>, L<bio(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+DTLSv1_listen() return codes were clarified in OpenSSL 1.1.0. The type of "peer"
+also changed in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/OPENSSL_init_ssl.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/OPENSSL_init_ssl.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b963e5e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/OPENSSL_init_ssl.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+OPENSSL_init_ssl - OpenSSL (libssl and libcrypto) initialisation
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ int OPENSSL_init_ssl(uint64_t opts, const OPENSSL_INIT_SETTINGS *settings);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+During normal operation OpenSSL (libssl and libcrypto) will allocate various
+resources at start up that must, subsequently, be freed on close down of the
+library. Additionally some resources are allocated on a per thread basis (if the
+application is multi-threaded), and these resources must be freed prior to the
+thread closing.
+
+As of version 1.1.0 OpenSSL will automatically allocate all resources that it
+needs so no explicit initialisation is required. Similarly it will also
+automatically deinitialise as required.
+
+However, there may be situations when explicit initialisation is desirable or
+needed, for example when some non-default initialisation is required. The
+function OPENSSL_init_ssl() can be used for this purpose. Calling
+this function will explicitly initialise BOTH libcrypto and libssl. To
+explicitly initialise ONLY libcrypto see the
+L<OPENSSL_init_crypto(3)> function.
+
+Numerous internal OpenSSL functions call OPENSSL_init_ssl().
+Therefore, in order to perform non-default initialisation,
+OPENSSL_init_ssl() MUST be called by application code prior to
+any other OpenSSL function calls.
+
+The B<opts> parameter specifies which aspects of libssl and libcrypto should be
+initialised. Valid options for libcrypto are described on the
+L<OPENSSL_init_crypto(3)> page. In addition to any libcrypto
+specific option the following libssl options can also be used:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item OPENSSL_INIT_NO_LOAD_SSL_STRINGS
+
+Suppress automatic loading of the libssl error strings. This option is
+not a default option. Once selected subsequent calls to
+OPENSSL_init_ssl() with the option
+B<OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_SSL_STRINGS> will be ignored.
+
+=item OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_SSL_STRINGS
+
+Automatic loading of the libssl error strings. This option is a
+default option. Once selected subsequent calls to
+OPENSSL_init_ssl() with the option
+B<OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_SSL_STRINGS> will be ignored.
+
+=back
+
+OPENSSL_init_ssl() takes a B<settings> parameter which can be used to
+set parameter values.  See L<OPENSSL_init_crypto(3)> for details.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+The function OPENSSL_init_ssl() returns 1 on success or 0 on error.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<OPENSSL_init_crypto(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+The OPENSSL_init_ssl() function was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CIPHER_get_name.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CIPHER_get_name.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b7ee3c8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CIPHER_get_name.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_CIPHER_get_cipher_nid, SSL_CIPHER_get_digest_nid, SSL_CIPHER_get_kx_nid,
+SSL_CIPHER_get_auth_nid, SSL_CIPHER_is_aead,
+SSL_CIPHER_get_name, SSL_CIPHER_get_bits,
+SSL_CIPHER_get_version, SSL_CIPHER_description
+- get SSL_CIPHER properties
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ const char *SSL_CIPHER_get_name(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher);
+ int SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, int *alg_bits);
+ char *SSL_CIPHER_get_version(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher);
+ char *SSL_CIPHER_description(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, char *buf, int size);
+ int SSL_CIPHER_get_cipher_nid(const SSL_CIPHER *c);
+ int SSL_CIPHER_get_digest_nid(const SSL_CIPHER *c);
+ int SSL_CIPHER_get_kx_nid(const SSL_CIPHER *c);
+ int SSL_CIPHER_get_auth_nid(const SSL_CIPHER *c);
+ int SSL_CIPHER_is_aead(const SSL_CIPHER *c);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_CIPHER_get_name() returns a pointer to the name of B<cipher>. If the
+B<cipher> is NULL, it returns "(NONE)".
+
+SSL_CIPHER_get_bits() returns the number of secret bits used for B<cipher>.
+If B<cipher> is NULL, 0 is returned.
+
+SSL_CIPHER_get_version() returns string which indicates the SSL/TLS protocol
+version that first defined the cipher.  It returns "(NONE)" if B<cipher> is NULL.
+
+SSL_CIPHER_get_cipher_nid() returns the cipher NID corresponding to B<c>.
+If there is no cipher (e.g. for ciphersuites with no encryption) then
+B<NID_undef> is returned.
+
+SSL_CIPHER_get_digest_nid() returns the digest NID corresponding to the MAC
+used by B<c>. If there is no digest (e.g. for AEAD ciphersuites) then
+B<NID_undef> is returned.
+
+SSL_CIPHER_get_kx_nid() returns the key exchange NID corresponding to the method
+used by B<c>. If there is no key exchange, then B<NID_undef> is returned. Examples (not comprehensive):
+
+ NID_kx_rsa
+ NID_kx_ecdhe
+ NID_kx_dhe
+ NID_kx_psk
+
+SSL_CIPHER_get_auth_nid() returns the authentication NID corresponding to the method
+used by B<c>. If there is no authentication, then B<NID_undef> is returned.
+Examples (not comprehensive):
+
+ NID_auth_rsa
+ NID_auth_ecdsa
+ NID_auth_psk
+
+SSL_CIPHER_is_aead() returns 1 if the cipher B<c> is AEAD (e.g. GCM or
+ChaCha20/Poly1305), and 0 if it is not AEAD.
+
+SSL_CIPHER_description() returns a textual description of the cipher used
+into the buffer B<buf> of length B<len> provided.  If B<buf> is provided, it
+must be at least 128 bytes, otherwise a buffer will be allocated using
+OPENSSL_malloc().  If the provided buffer is too small, or the allocation fails,
+B<NULL> is returned.
+
+The string returned by SSL_CIPHER_description() consists of several fields
+separated by whitespace:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item <ciphername>
+
+Textual representation of the cipher name.
+
+=item <protocol version>
+
+Protocol version, such as B<TLSv1.2>, when the cipher was first defined.
+
+=item Kx=<key exchange>
+
+Key exchange method such as B<RSA>, B<ECDHE>, etc.
+
+=item Au=<authentication>
+
+Authentication method such as B<RSA>, B<None>, etc.. None is the
+representation of anonymous ciphers.
+
+=item Enc=<symmetric encryption method>
+
+Encryption method, with number of secret bits, such as B<AESGCM(128)>.
+
+=item Mac=<message authentication code>
+
+Message digest, such as B<SHA256>.
+
+=back
+
+Some examples for the output of SSL_CIPHER_description():
+
+ ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH     Au=RSA  Enc=AESGCM(256) Mac=AEAD
+ RSA-PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA384 TLSv1.0 Kx=RSAPSK   Au=RSA  Enc=AES(256)  Mac=SHA384
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+SSL_CIPHER_get_version() was updated to always return the correct protocol
+string in OpenSSL 1.1.
+
+SSL_CIPHER_description() was changed to return B<NULL> on error,
+rather than a fixed string, in OpenSSL 1.1
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(3)>, L<SSL_get_current_cipher(3)>,
+L<SSL_get_ciphers(3)>, L<ciphers(1)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_COMP_add_compression_method.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_COMP_add_compression_method.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..15929df
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_COMP_add_compression_method.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_COMP_add_compression_method, SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods,
+SSL_COMP_get0_name, SSL_COMP_get_id, SSL_COMP_free_compression_methods
+- handle SSL/TLS integrated compression methods
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ int SSL_COMP_add_compression_method(int id, COMP_METHOD *cm);
+ STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(void);
+ const char *SSL_COMP_get0_name(const SSL_COMP *comp);
+ int SSL_COMP_get_id(const SSL_COMP *comp);
+
+Deprecated:
+
+ #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+ void SSL_COMP_free_compression_methods(void)
+ #endif
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_COMP_add_compression_method() adds the compression method B<cm> with
+the identifier B<id> to the list of available compression methods. This
+list is globally maintained for all SSL operations within this application.
+It cannot be set for specific SSL_CTX or SSL objects.
+
+SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods() returns a stack of all of the available
+compression methods or NULL on error.
+
+SSL_COMP_get0_name() returns the name of the compression method B<comp>.
+
+SSL_COMP_get_id() returns the id of the compression method B<comp>.
+
+In versions of OpenSSL prior to 1.1.0 SSL_COMP_free_compression_methods() freed
+the internal table of compression methods that were built internally, and
+possibly augmented by adding SSL_COMP_add_compression_method(). However this is
+now unnecessary from version 1.1.0.  No explicit initialisation or
+de-initialisation is necessary. See L<OPENSSL_init_crypto(3)> and
+L<OPENSSL_init_ssl(3)>. From OpenSSL 1.1.0 calling this function does nothing.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The TLS standard (or SSLv3) allows the integration of compression methods
+into the communication. The TLS RFC does however not specify compression
+methods or their corresponding identifiers, so there is currently no compatible
+way to integrate compression with unknown peers. It is therefore currently not
+recommended to integrate compression into applications. Applications for
+non-public use may agree on certain compression methods. Using different
+compression methods with the same identifier will lead to connection failure.
+
+An OpenSSL client speaking a protocol that allows compression (SSLv3, TLSv1)
+will unconditionally send the list of all compression methods enabled with
+SSL_COMP_add_compression_method() to the server during the handshake.
+Unlike the mechanisms to set a cipher list, there is no method available to
+restrict the list of compression method on a per connection basis.
+
+An OpenSSL server will match the identifiers listed by a client against
+its own compression methods and will unconditionally activate compression
+when a matching identifier is found. There is no way to restrict the list
+of compression methods supported on a per connection basis.
+
+If enabled during compilation, the OpenSSL library will have the
+COMP_zlib() compression method available.
+
+=head1 WARNINGS
+
+Once the identities of the compression methods for the TLS protocol have
+been standardized, the compression API will most likely be changed. Using
+it in the current state is not recommended.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+SSL_COMP_add_compression_method() may return the following values:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item Z<>0
+
+The operation succeeded.
+
+=item Z<>1
+
+The operation failed. Check the error queue to find out the reason.
+
+=back
+
+SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods() returns the stack of compressions methods or
+NULL on error.
+
+SSL_COMP_get0_name() returns the name of the compression method or NULL on error.
+
+SSL_COMP_get_id() returns the name of the compression method or -1 on error.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+SSL_COMP_free_compression_methods() was deprecated in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+SSL_COMP_get0_name() and SSL_comp_get_id() were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0d.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CONF_CTX_new.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CONF_CTX_new.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..79f0bbc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CONF_CTX_new.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_CONF_CTX_new, SSL_CONF_CTX_free - SSL configuration allocation functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ SSL_CONF_CTX *SSL_CONF_CTX_new(void);
+ void SSL_CONF_CTX_free(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The function SSL_CONF_CTX_new() allocates and initialises an B<SSL_CONF_CTX>
+structure for use with the SSL_CONF functions.
+
+The function SSL_CONF_CTX_free() frees up the context B<cctx>.
+If B<cctx> is NULL nothing is done.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+SSL_CONF_CTX_new() returns either the newly allocated B<SSL_CONF_CTX> structure
+or B<NULL> if an error occurs.
+
+SSL_CONF_CTX_free() does not return a value.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<SSL_CONF_CTX_set_flags(3)>,
+L<SSL_CONF_CTX_set_ssl_ctx(3)>,
+L<SSL_CONF_CTX_set1_prefix(3)>,
+L<SSL_CONF_cmd(3)>,
+L<SSL_CONF_cmd_argv(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+These functions were first added to OpenSSL 1.0.2
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2012-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CONF_CTX_set1_prefix.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CONF_CTX_set1_prefix.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..da9e580
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CONF_CTX_set1_prefix.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_CONF_CTX_set1_prefix - Set configuration context command prefix
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ unsigned int SSL_CONF_CTX_set1_prefix(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *prefix);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The function SSL_CONF_CTX_set1_prefix() sets the command prefix of B<cctx>
+to B<prefix>. If B<prefix> is B<NULL> it is restored to the default value.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+Command prefixes alter the commands recognised by subsequent SSL_CTX_cmd()
+calls. For example for files, if the prefix "SSL" is set then command names
+such as "SSLProtocol", "SSLOptions" etc. are recognised instead of "Protocol"
+and "Options". Similarly for command lines if the prefix is "--ssl-" then
+"--ssl-no_tls1_2" is recognised instead of "-no_tls1_2".
+
+If the B<SSL_CONF_FLAG_CMDLINE> flag is set then prefix checks are case
+sensitive and "-" is the default. In the unlikely even an application
+explicitly wants to set no prefix it must be explicitly set to "".
+
+If the B<SSL_CONF_FLAG_FILE> flag is set then prefix checks are case
+insensitive and no prefix is the default.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+SSL_CONF_CTX_set1_prefix() returns 1 for success and 0 for failure.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<SSL_CONF_CTX_new(3)>,
+L<SSL_CONF_CTX_set_flags(3)>,
+L<SSL_CONF_CTX_set_ssl_ctx(3)>,
+L<SSL_CONF_cmd(3)>,
+L<SSL_CONF_cmd_argv(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+These functions were first added to OpenSSL 1.0.2
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2012-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CONF_CTX_set_flags.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CONF_CTX_set_flags.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..efd8da3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CONF_CTX_set_flags.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_CONF_CTX_set_flags, SSL_CONF_CTX_clear_flags - Set of clear SSL configuration context flags
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ unsigned int SSL_CONF_CTX_set_flags(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, unsigned int flags);
+ unsigned int SSL_CONF_CTX_clear_flags(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, unsigned int flags);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The function SSL_CONF_CTX_set_flags() sets B<flags> in the context B<cctx>.
+
+The function SSL_CONF_CTX_clear_flags() clears B<flags> in the context B<cctx>.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The flags set affect how subsequent calls to SSL_CONF_cmd() or
+SSL_CONF_argv() behave.
+
+Currently the following B<flags> values are recognised:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item SSL_CONF_FLAG_CMDLINE, SSL_CONF_FLAG_FILE
+
+recognise options intended for command line or configuration file use. At
+least one of these flags must be set.
+
+=item SSL_CONF_FLAG_CLIENT, SSL_CONF_FLAG_SERVER
+
+recognise options intended for use in SSL/TLS clients or servers. One or
+both of these flags must be set.
+
+=item SSL_CONF_FLAG_CERTIFICATE
+
+recognise certificate and private key options.
+
+=item SSL_CONF_FLAG_REQUIRE_PRIVATE
+
+If this option is set then if a private key is not specified for a certificate
+it will attempt to load a private key from the certificate file when
+SSL_CONF_CTX_finish() is called. If a key cannot be loaded from the certificate
+file an error occurs.
+
+=item SSL_CONF_FLAG_SHOW_ERRORS
+
+indicate errors relating to unrecognised options or missing arguments in
+the error queue. If this option isn't set such errors are only reflected
+in the return values of SSL_CONF_set_cmd() or SSL_CONF_set_argv()
+
+=back
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+SSL_CONF_CTX_set_flags() and SSL_CONF_CTX_clear_flags() returns the new flags
+value after setting or clearing flags.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<SSL_CONF_CTX_new(3)>,
+L<SSL_CONF_CTX_set_ssl_ctx(3)>,
+L<SSL_CONF_CTX_set1_prefix(3)>,
+L<SSL_CONF_cmd(3)>,
+L<SSL_CONF_cmd_argv(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+These functions were first added to OpenSSL 1.0.2
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2012-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CONF_CTX_set_ssl_ctx.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CONF_CTX_set_ssl_ctx.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7e4120f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CONF_CTX_set_ssl_ctx.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_CONF_CTX_set_ssl_ctx, SSL_CONF_CTX_set_ssl - set context to configure
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ void SSL_CONF_CTX_set_ssl_ctx(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, SSL_CTX *ctx);
+ void SSL_CONF_CTX_set_ssl(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, SSL *ssl);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_CONF_CTX_set_ssl_ctx() sets the context associated with B<cctx> to the
+B<SSL_CTX> structure B<ctx>. Any previous B<SSL> or B<SSL_CTX> associated with
+B<cctx> is cleared. Subsequent calls to SSL_CONF_cmd() will be sent to
+B<ctx>.
+
+SSL_CONF_CTX_set_ssl() sets the context associated with B<cctx> to the
+B<SSL> structure B<ssl>. Any previous B<SSL> or B<SSL_CTX> associated with
+B<cctx> is cleared. Subsequent calls to SSL_CONF_cmd() will be sent to
+B<ssl>.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The context need not be set or it can be set to B<NULL> in which case only
+syntax checking of commands is performed, where possible.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+SSL_CONF_CTX_set_ssl_ctx() and SSL_CTX_set_ssl() do not return a value.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<SSL_CONF_CTX_new(3)>,
+L<SSL_CONF_CTX_set_flags(3)>,
+L<SSL_CONF_CTX_set1_prefix(3)>,
+L<SSL_CONF_cmd(3)>,
+L<SSL_CONF_cmd_argv(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+These functions were first added to OpenSSL 1.0.2
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2012-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CONF_cmd.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CONF_cmd.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a28e218
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CONF_cmd.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,563 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_CONF_cmd_value_type, SSL_CONF_finish,
+SSL_CONF_cmd - send configuration command
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ int SSL_CONF_cmd(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *cmd, const char *value);
+ int SSL_CONF_cmd_value_type(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *cmd);
+ int SSL_CONF_finish(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The function SSL_CONF_cmd() performs configuration operation B<cmd> with
+optional parameter B<value> on B<ctx>. Its purpose is to simplify application
+configuration of B<SSL_CTX> or B<SSL> structures by providing a common
+framework for command line options or configuration files.
+
+SSL_CONF_cmd_value_type() returns the type of value that B<cmd> refers to.
+
+The function SSL_CONF_finish() must be called after all configuration
+operations have been completed. It is used to finalise any operations
+or to process defaults.
+
+=head1 SUPPORTED COMMAND LINE COMMANDS
+
+Currently supported B<cmd> names for command lines (i.e. when the
+flag B<SSL_CONF_CMDLINE> is set) are listed below. Note: all B<cmd> names
+are case sensitive. Unless otherwise stated commands can be used by
+both clients and servers and the B<value> parameter is not used. The default
+prefix for command line commands is B<-> and that is reflected below.
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<-sigalgs>
+
+This sets the supported signature algorithms for TLS v1.2. For clients this
+value is used directly for the supported signature algorithms extension. For
+servers it is used to determine which signature algorithms to support.
+
+The B<value> argument should be a colon separated list of signature algorithms
+in order of decreasing preference of the form B<algorithm+hash>. B<algorithm>
+is one of B<RSA>, B<DSA> or B<ECDSA> and B<hash> is a supported algorithm
+OID short name such as B<SHA1>, B<SHA224>, B<SHA256>, B<SHA384> of B<SHA512>.
+Note: algorithm and hash names are case sensitive.
+
+If this option is not set then all signature algorithms supported by the
+OpenSSL library are permissible.
+
+=item B<-client_sigalgs>
+
+This sets the supported signature algorithms associated with client
+authentication for TLS v1.2. For servers the value is used in the supported
+signature algorithms field of a certificate request. For clients it is
+used to determine which signature algorithm to with the client certificate.
+If a server does not request a certificate this option has no effect.
+
+The syntax of B<value> is identical to B<-sigalgs>. If not set then
+the value set for B<-sigalgs> will be used instead.
+
+=item B<-curves>
+
+This sets the supported elliptic curves. For clients the curves are
+sent using the supported curves extension. For servers it is used
+to determine which curve to use. This setting affects curves used for both
+signatures and key exchange, if applicable.
+
+The B<value> argument is a colon separated list of curves. The curve can be
+either the B<NIST> name (e.g. B<P-256>) or an OpenSSL OID name (e.g
+B<prime256v1>). Curve names are case sensitive.
+
+=item B<-named_curve>
+
+This sets the temporary curve used for ephemeral ECDH modes. Only used by
+servers
+
+The B<value> argument is a curve name or the special value B<auto> which
+picks an appropriate curve based on client and server preferences. The curve
+can be either the B<NIST> name (e.g. B<P-256>) or an OpenSSL OID name
+(e.g B<prime256v1>). Curve names are case sensitive.
+
+=item B<-cipher>
+
+Sets the cipher suite list to B<value>. Note: syntax checking of B<value> is
+currently not performed unless a B<SSL> or B<SSL_CTX> structure is
+associated with B<cctx>.
+
+=item B<-cert>
+
+Attempts to use the file B<value> as the certificate for the appropriate
+context. It currently uses SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file() if an B<SSL_CTX>
+structure is set or SSL_use_certificate_file() with filetype PEM if an B<SSL>
+structure is set. This option is only supported if certificate operations
+are permitted.
+
+=item B<-key>
+
+Attempts to use the file B<value> as the private key for the appropriate
+context. This option is only supported if certificate operations
+are permitted. Note: if no B<-key> option is set then a private key is
+not loaded unless the flag B<SSL_CONF_FLAG_REQUIRE_PRIVATE> is set.
+
+=item B<-dhparam>
+
+Attempts to use the file B<value> as the set of temporary DH parameters for
+the appropriate context. This option is only supported if certificate
+operations are permitted.
+
+=item B<-no_renegotiation>
+
+Disables all attempts at renegotiation in TLSv1.2 and earlier, same as setting
+B<SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION>.
+
+=item B<-min_protocol>, B<-max_protocol>
+
+Sets the minimum and maximum supported protocol.
+Currently supported protocol values are B<SSLv3>, B<TLSv1>,
+B<TLSv1.1>, B<TLSv1.2> for TLS and B<DTLSv1>, B<DTLSv1.2> for DTLS,
+and B<None> for no limit.
+If the either bound is not specified then only the other bound applies,
+if specified.
+To restrict the supported protocol versions use these commands rather
+than the deprecated alternative commands below.
+
+=item B<-no_ssl3>, B<-no_tls1>, B<-no_tls1_1>, B<-no_tls1_2>
+
+Disables protocol support for SSLv3, TLSv1.0, TLSv1.1 or TLSv1.2 by setting the
+corresponding options B<SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3>, B<SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1>, B<SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1>
+and B<SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2> respectively.
+These options are deprecated, instead use B<-min_protocol> and B<-max_protocol>.
+
+=item B<-bugs>
+
+Various bug workarounds are set, same as setting B<SSL_OP_ALL>.
+
+=item B<-comp>
+
+Enables support for SSL/TLS compression, same as clearing
+B<SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION>.
+This command was introduced in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+As of OpenSSL 1.1.0, compression is off by default.
+
+=item B<-no_comp>
+
+Disables support for SSL/TLS compression, same as setting
+B<SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION>.
+As of OpenSSL 1.1.0, compression is off by default.
+
+=item B<-no_ticket>
+
+Disables support for session tickets, same as setting B<SSL_OP_NO_TICKET>.
+
+=item B<-serverpref>
+
+Use server and not client preference order when determining which cipher suite,
+signature algorithm or elliptic curve to use for an incoming connection.
+Equivalent to B<SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE>. Only used by servers.
+
+=item B<-no_resumption_on_reneg>
+
+set SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION flag. Only used by servers.
+
+=item B<-legacyrenegotiation>
+
+permits the use of unsafe legacy renegotiation. Equivalent to setting
+B<SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION>.
+
+=item B<-legacy_server_connect>, B<-no_legacy_server_connect>
+
+permits or prohibits the use of unsafe legacy renegotiation for OpenSSL
+clients only. Equivalent to setting or clearing B<SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT>.
+Set by default.
+
+=item B<-strict>
+
+enables strict mode protocol handling. Equivalent to setting
+B<SSL_CERT_FLAG_TLS_STRICT>.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 SUPPORTED CONFIGURATION FILE COMMANDS
+
+Currently supported B<cmd> names for configuration files (i.e. when the
+flag B<SSL_CONF_FLAG_FILE> is set) are listed below. All configuration file
+B<cmd> names are case insensitive so B<signaturealgorithms> is recognised
+as well as B<SignatureAlgorithms>. Unless otherwise stated the B<value> names
+are also case insensitive.
+
+Note: the command prefix (if set) alters the recognised B<cmd> values.
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<CipherString>
+
+Sets the cipher suite list to B<value>. Note: syntax checking of B<value> is
+currently not performed unless an B<SSL> or B<SSL_CTX> structure is
+associated with B<cctx>.
+
+=item B<Certificate>
+
+Attempts to use the file B<value> as the certificate for the appropriate
+context. It currently uses SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file() if an B<SSL_CTX>
+structure is set or SSL_use_certificate_file() with filetype PEM if an B<SSL>
+structure is set. This option is only supported if certificate operations
+are permitted.
+
+=item B<PrivateKey>
+
+Attempts to use the file B<value> as the private key for the appropriate
+context. This option is only supported if certificate operations
+are permitted. Note: if no B<PrivateKey> option is set then a private key is
+not loaded unless the B<SSL_CONF_FLAG_REQUIRE_PRIVATE> is set.
+
+=item B<ChainCAFile>, B<ChainCAPath>, B<VerifyCAFile>, B<VerifyCAPath>
+
+These options indicate a file or directory used for building certificate
+chains or verifying certificate chains. These options are only supported
+if certificate operations are permitted.
+
+=item B<ServerInfoFile>
+
+Attempts to use the file B<value> in the "serverinfo" extension using the
+function SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo_file.
+
+=item B<DHParameters>
+
+Attempts to use the file B<value> as the set of temporary DH parameters for
+the appropriate context. This option is only supported if certificate
+operations are permitted.
+
+=item B<NoRenegotiation>
+
+Disables all attempts at renegotiation in TLSv1.2 and earlier, same as setting
+B<SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION>.
+
+=item B<SignatureAlgorithms>
+
+This sets the supported signature algorithms for TLS v1.2. For clients this
+value is used directly for the supported signature algorithms extension. For
+servers it is used to determine which signature algorithms to support.
+
+The B<value> argument should be a colon separated list of signature algorithms
+in order of decreasing preference of the form B<algorithm+hash>. B<algorithm>
+is one of B<RSA>, B<DSA> or B<ECDSA> and B<hash> is a supported algorithm
+OID short name such as B<SHA1>, B<SHA224>, B<SHA256>, B<SHA384> of B<SHA512>.
+Note: algorithm and hash names are case sensitive.
+
+If this option is not set then all signature algorithms supported by the
+OpenSSL library are permissible.
+
+=item B<ClientSignatureAlgorithms>
+
+This sets the supported signature algorithms associated with client
+authentication for TLS v1.2. For servers the value is used in the supported
+signature algorithms field of a certificate request. For clients it is
+used to determine which signature algorithm to with the client certificate.
+
+The syntax of B<value> is identical to B<SignatureAlgorithms>. If not set then
+the value set for B<SignatureAlgorithms> will be used instead.
+
+=item B<Curves>
+
+This sets the supported elliptic curves. For clients the curves are
+sent using the supported curves extension. For servers it is used
+to determine which curve to use. This setting affects curves used for both
+signatures and key exchange, if applicable.
+
+The B<value> argument is a colon separated list of curves. The curve can be
+either the B<NIST> name (e.g. B<P-256>) or an OpenSSL OID name (e.g
+B<prime256v1>). Curve names are case sensitive.
+
+=item B<MinProtocol>
+
+This sets the minimum supported SSL, TLS or DTLS version.
+
+Currently supported protocol values are B<SSLv3>, B<TLSv1>, B<TLSv1.1>,
+B<TLSv1.2>, B<DTLSv1> and B<DTLSv1.2>.
+The value B<None> will disable the limit.
+
+=item B<MaxProtocol>
+
+This sets the maximum supported SSL, TLS or DTLS version.
+
+Currently supported protocol values are B<SSLv3>, B<TLSv1>, B<TLSv1.1>,
+B<TLSv1.2>, B<DTLSv1> and B<DTLSv1.2>.
+The value B<None> will disable the limit.
+
+=item B<Protocol>
+
+This can be used to enable or disable certain versions of the SSL,
+TLS or DTLS protocol.
+
+The B<value> argument is a comma separated list of supported protocols
+to enable or disable.
+If a protocol is preceded by B<-> that version is disabled.
+
+All protocol versions are enabled by default.
+You need to disable at least one protocol version for this setting have any
+effect.
+Only enabling some protocol versions does not disable the other protocol
+versions.
+
+Currently supported protocol values are B<SSLv3>, B<TLSv1>, B<TLSv1.1>,
+B<TLSv1.2>, B<DTLSv1> and B<DTLSv1.2>.
+The special value B<ALL> refers to all supported versions.
+
+This can't enable protocols that are disabled using B<MinProtocol>
+or B<MaxProtocol>, but can disable protocols that are still allowed
+by them.
+
+The B<Protocol> command is fragile and deprecated; do not use it.
+Use B<MinProtocol> and B<MaxProtocol> instead.
+If you do use B<Protocol>, make sure that the resulting range of enabled
+protocols has no "holes", e.g. if TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.2 are both enabled, make
+sure to also leave TLS 1.1 enabled.
+
+=item B<Options>
+
+The B<value> argument is a comma separated list of various flags to set.
+If a flag string is preceded B<-> it is disabled.
+See the L<SSL_CTX_set_options(3)> function for more details of
+individual options.
+
+Each option is listed below. Where an operation is enabled by default
+the B<-flag> syntax is needed to disable it.
+
+B<SessionTicket>: session ticket support, enabled by default. Inverse of
+B<SSL_OP_NO_TICKET>: that is B<-SessionTicket> is the same as setting
+B<SSL_OP_NO_TICKET>.
+
+B<Compression>: SSL/TLS compression support, enabled by default. Inverse
+of B<SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION>.
+
+B<EmptyFragments>: use empty fragments as a countermeasure against a
+SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 protocol vulnerability affecting CBC ciphers. It
+is set by default. Inverse of B<SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS>.
+
+B<Bugs>: enable various bug workarounds. Same as B<SSL_OP_ALL>.
+
+B<DHSingle>: enable single use DH keys, set by default. Inverse of
+B<SSL_OP_DH_SINGLE>. Only used by servers.
+
+B<ECDHSingle> enable single use ECDH keys, set by default. Inverse of
+B<SSL_OP_ECDH_SINGLE>. Only used by servers.
+
+B<ServerPreference> use server and not client preference order when
+determining which cipher suite, signature algorithm or elliptic curve
+to use for an incoming connection.  Equivalent to
+B<SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE>. Only used by servers.
+
+B<NoResumptionOnRenegotiation> set
+B<SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION> flag. Only used by servers.
+
+B<UnsafeLegacyRenegotiation> permits the use of unsafe legacy renegotiation.
+Equivalent to B<SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION>.
+
+B<UnsafeLegacyServerConnect> permits the use of unsafe legacy renegotiation
+for OpenSSL clients only. Equivalent to B<SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT>.
+Set by default.
+
+=item B<VerifyMode>
+
+The B<value> argument is a comma separated list of flags to set.
+
+B<Peer> enables peer verification: for clients only.
+
+B<Request> requests but does not require a certificate from the client.
+Servers only.
+
+B<Require> requests and requires a certificate from the client: an error
+occurs if the client does not present a certificate. Servers only.
+
+B<Once> requests a certificate from a client only on the initial connection:
+not when renegotiating. Servers only.
+
+=item B<ClientCAFile>, B<ClientCAPath>
+
+A file or directory of certificates in PEM format whose names are used as the
+set of acceptable names for client CAs. Servers only. This option is only
+supported if certificate operations are permitted.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 SUPPORTED COMMAND TYPES
+
+The function SSL_CONF_cmd_value_type() currently returns one of the following
+types:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<SSL_CONF_TYPE_UNKNOWN>
+
+The B<cmd> string is unrecognised, this return value can be use to flag
+syntax errors.
+
+=item B<SSL_CONF_TYPE_STRING>
+
+The value is a string without any specific structure.
+
+=item B<SSL_CONF_TYPE_FILE>
+
+The value is a file name.
+
+=item B<SSL_CONF_TYPE_DIR>
+
+The value is a directory name.
+
+=item B<SSL_CONF_TYPE_NONE>
+
+The value string is not used e.g. a command line option which doesn't take an
+argument.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The order of operations is significant. This can be used to set either defaults
+or values which cannot be overridden. For example if an application calls:
+
+ SSL_CONF_cmd(ctx, "Protocol", "-SSLv3");
+ SSL_CONF_cmd(ctx, userparam, uservalue);
+
+it will disable SSLv3 support by default but the user can override it. If
+however the call sequence is:
+
+ SSL_CONF_cmd(ctx, userparam, uservalue);
+ SSL_CONF_cmd(ctx, "Protocol", "-SSLv3");
+
+SSLv3 is B<always> disabled and attempt to override this by the user are
+ignored.
+
+By checking the return code of SSL_CTX_cmd() it is possible to query if a
+given B<cmd> is recognised, this is useful if SSL_CTX_cmd() values are
+mixed with additional application specific operations.
+
+For example an application might call SSL_CTX_cmd() and if it returns
+-2 (unrecognised command) continue with processing of application specific
+commands.
+
+Applications can also use SSL_CTX_cmd() to process command lines though the
+utility function SSL_CTX_cmd_argv() is normally used instead. One way
+to do this is to set the prefix to an appropriate value using
+SSL_CONF_CTX_set1_prefix(), pass the current argument to B<cmd> and the
+following argument to B<value> (which may be NULL).
+
+In this case if the return value is positive then it is used to skip that
+number of arguments as they have been processed by SSL_CTX_cmd(). If -2 is
+returned then B<cmd> is not recognised and application specific arguments
+can be checked instead. If -3 is returned a required argument is missing
+and an error is indicated. If 0 is returned some other error occurred and
+this can be reported back to the user.
+
+The function SSL_CONF_cmd_value_type() can be used by applications to
+check for the existence of a command or to perform additional syntax
+checking or translation of the command value. For example if the return
+value is B<SSL_CONF_TYPE_FILE> an application could translate a relative
+pathname to an absolute pathname.
+
+=head1 EXAMPLES
+
+Set supported signature algorithms:
+
+ SSL_CONF_cmd(ctx, "SignatureAlgorithms", "ECDSA+SHA256:RSA+SHA256:DSA+SHA256");
+
+There are various ways to select the supported protocols.
+
+This set the minimum protocol version to TLSv1, and so disables SSLv3.
+This is the recommended way to disable protocols.
+
+ SSL_CONF_cmd(ctx, "MinProtocol", "TLSv1");
+
+The following also disables SSLv3:
+
+ SSL_CONF_cmd(ctx, "Protocol", "-SSLv3");
+
+The following will first enable all protocols, and then disable
+SSLv3.
+If no protocol versions were disabled before this has the same effect as
+"-SSLv3", but if some versions were disables this will re-enable them before
+disabling SSLv3.
+
+ SSL_CONF_cmd(ctx, "Protocol", "ALL,-SSLv3");
+
+Only enable TLSv1.2:
+
+ SSL_CONF_cmd(ctx, "MinProtocol", "TLSv1.2");
+ SSL_CONF_cmd(ctx, "MaxProtocol", "TLSv1.2");
+
+This also only enables TLSv1.2:
+
+ SSL_CONF_cmd(ctx, "Protocol", "-ALL,TLSv1.2");
+
+Disable TLS session tickets:
+
+ SSL_CONF_cmd(ctx, "Options", "-SessionTicket");
+
+Enable compression:
+
+ SSL_CONF_cmd(ctx, "Options", "Compression");
+
+Set supported curves to P-256, P-384:
+
+ SSL_CONF_cmd(ctx, "Curves", "P-256:P-384");
+
+Set automatic support for any elliptic curve for key exchange:
+
+ SSL_CONF_cmd(ctx, "ECDHParameters", "Automatic");
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+SSL_CONF_cmd() returns 1 if the value of B<cmd> is recognised and B<value> is
+B<NOT> used and 2 if both B<cmd> and B<value> are used. In other words it
+returns the number of arguments processed. This is useful when processing
+command lines.
+
+A return value of -2 means B<cmd> is not recognised.
+
+A return value of -3 means B<cmd> is recognised and the command requires a
+value but B<value> is NULL.
+
+A return code of 0 indicates that both B<cmd> and B<value> are valid but an
+error occurred attempting to perform the operation: for example due to an
+error in the syntax of B<value> in this case the error queue may provide
+additional information.
+
+SSL_CONF_finish() returns 1 for success and 0 for failure.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<SSL_CONF_CTX_new(3)>,
+L<SSL_CONF_CTX_set_flags(3)>,
+L<SSL_CONF_CTX_set1_prefix(3)>,
+L<SSL_CONF_CTX_set_ssl_ctx(3)>,
+L<SSL_CONF_cmd_argv(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_options(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+SSL_CONF_cmd() was first added to OpenSSL 1.0.2
+
+B<SSL_OP_NO_SSL2> doesn't have effect since 1.1.0, but the macro is retained
+for backwards compatibility.
+
+B<SSL_CONF_TYPE_NONE> was first added to OpenSSL 1.1.0. In earlier versions of
+OpenSSL passing a command which didn't take an argument would return
+B<SSL_CONF_TYPE_UNKNOWN>.
+
+B<MinProtocol> and B<MaxProtocol> where added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2012-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CONF_cmd_argv.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CONF_cmd_argv.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..15529a5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CONF_cmd_argv.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_CONF_cmd_argv - SSL configuration command line processing
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ int SSL_CONF_cmd_argv(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, int *pargc, char ***pargv);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The function SSL_CONF_cmd_argv() processes at most two command line
+arguments from B<pargv> and B<pargc>. The values of B<pargv> and B<pargc>
+are updated to reflect the number of command options processed. The B<pargc>
+argument can be set to B<NULL> is it is not used.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+SSL_CONF_cmd_argv() returns the number of command arguments processed: 0, 1, 2
+or a negative error code.
+
+If -2 is returned then an argument for a command is missing.
+
+If -1 is returned the command is recognised but couldn't be processed due
+to an error: for example a syntax error in the argument.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<SSL_CONF_CTX_new(3)>,
+L<SSL_CONF_CTX_set_flags(3)>,
+L<SSL_CONF_CTX_set1_prefix(3)>,
+L<SSL_CONF_CTX_set_ssl_ctx(3)>,
+L<SSL_CONF_cmd(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+These functions were first added to OpenSSL 1.0.2
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2012-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_add1_chain_cert.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_add1_chain_cert.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1f0418b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_add1_chain_cert.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_CTX_set0_chain, SSL_CTX_set1_chain, SSL_CTX_add0_chain_cert,
+SSL_CTX_add1_chain_cert, SSL_CTX_get0_chain_certs, SSL_CTX_clear_chain_certs,
+SSL_set0_chain, SSL_set1_chain, SSL_add0_chain_cert, SSL_add1_chain_cert,
+SSL_get0_chain_certs, SSL_clear_chain_certs, SSL_CTX_build_cert_chain,
+SSL_build_cert_chain, SSL_CTX_select_current_cert,
+SSL_select_current_cert, SSL_CTX_set_current_cert, SSL_set_current_cert - extra
+chain certificate processing
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ int SSL_CTX_set0_chain(SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk);
+ int SSL_CTX_set1_chain(SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk);
+ int SSL_CTX_add0_chain_cert(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x509);
+ int SSL_CTX_add1_chain_cert(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x509);
+ int SSL_CTX_get0_chain_certs(SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) **sk);
+ int SSL_CTX_clear_chain_certs(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+
+ int SSL_set0_chain(SSL *ssl, STACK_OF(X509) *sk);
+ int SSL_set1_chain(SSL *ssl, STACK_OF(X509) *sk);
+ int SSL_add0_chain_cert(SSL *ssl, X509 *x509);
+ int SSL_add1_chain_cert(SSL *ssl, X509 *x509);
+ int SSL_get0_chain_certs(SSL *ssl, STACK_OF(X509) **sk);
+ int SSL_clear_chain_certs(SSL *ssl);
+
+ int SSL_CTX_build_cert_chain(SSL_CTX *ctx, flags);
+ int SSL_build_cert_chain(SSL *ssl, flags);
+
+ int SSL_CTX_select_current_cert(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x509);
+ int SSL_select_current_cert(SSL *ssl, X509 *x509);
+ int SSL_CTX_set_current_cert(SSL_CTX *ctx, long op);
+ int SSL_set_current_cert(SSL *ssl, long op);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_CTX_set0_chain() and SSL_CTX_set1_chain() set the certificate chain
+associated with the current certificate of B<ctx> to B<sk>.
+
+SSL_CTX_add0_chain_cert() and SSL_CTX_add1_chain_cert() append the single
+certificate B<x509> to the chain associated with the current certificate of
+B<ctx>.
+
+SSL_CTX_get0_chain_certs() retrieves the chain associated with the current
+certificate of B<ctx>.
+
+SSL_CTX_clear_chain_certs() clears any existing chain associated with the
+current certificate of B<ctx>.  (This is implemented by calling
+SSL_CTX_set0_chain() with B<sk> set to B<NULL>).
+
+SSL_CTX_build_cert_chain() builds the certificate chain for B<ctx> normally
+this uses the chain store or the verify store if the chain store is not set.
+If the function is successful the built chain will replace any existing chain.
+The B<flags> parameter can be set to B<SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_UNTRUSTED> to use
+existing chain certificates as untrusted CAs, B<SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_NO_ROOT>
+to omit the root CA from the built chain, B<SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_CHECK> to
+use all existing chain certificates only to build the chain (effectively
+sanity checking and rearranging them if necessary), the flag
+B<SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_IGNORE_ERROR> ignores any errors during verification:
+if flag B<SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_CLEAR_ERROR> is also set verification errors
+are cleared from the error queue.
+
+Each of these functions operates on the I<current> end entity
+(i.e. server or client) certificate. This is the last certificate loaded or
+selected on the corresponding B<ctx> structure.
+
+SSL_CTX_select_current_cert() selects B<x509> as the current end entity
+certificate, but only if B<x509> has already been loaded into B<ctx> using a
+function such as SSL_CTX_use_certificate().
+
+SSL_set0_chain(), SSL_set1_chain(), SSL_add0_chain_cert(),
+SSL_add1_chain_cert(), SSL_get0_chain_certs(), SSL_clear_chain_certs(),
+SSL_build_cert_chain(), SSL_select_current_cert() and SSL_set_current_cert()
+are similar except they apply to SSL structure B<ssl>.
+
+SSL_CTX_set_current_cert() changes the current certificate to a value based
+on the B<op> argument. Currently B<op> can be B<SSL_CERT_SET_FIRST> to use
+the first valid certificate or B<SSL_CERT_SET_NEXT> to set the next valid
+certificate after the current certificate. These two operations can be
+used to iterate over all certificates in an B<SSL_CTX> structure.
+
+SSL_set_current_cert() also supports the option B<SSL_CERT_SET_SERVER>.
+If B<ssl> is a server and has sent a certificate to a connected client
+this option sets that certificate to the current certificate and returns 1.
+If the negotiated ciphersuite is anonymous (and thus no certificate will
+be sent) 2 is returned and the current certificate is unchanged. If B<ssl>
+is not a server or a certificate has not been sent 0 is returned and
+the current certificate is unchanged.
+
+All these functions are implemented as macros. Those containing a B<1>
+increment the reference count of the supplied certificate or chain so it must
+be freed at some point after the operation. Those containing a B<0> do
+not increment reference counts and the supplied certificate or chain
+B<MUST NOT> be freed after the operation.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The chains associate with an SSL_CTX structure are copied to any SSL
+structures when SSL_new() is called. SSL structures will not be affected
+by any chains subsequently changed in the parent SSL_CTX.
+
+One chain can be set for each key type supported by a server. So, for example,
+an RSA and a DSA certificate can (and often will) have different chains.
+
+The functions SSL_CTX_build_cert_chain() and SSL_build_cert_chain() can
+be used to check application configuration and to ensure any necessary
+subordinate CAs are sent in the correct order. Misconfigured applications
+sending incorrect certificate chains often cause problems with peers.
+
+For example an application can add any set of certificates using
+SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file() then call SSL_CTX_build_cert_chain()
+with the option B<SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_CHECK> to check and reorder them.
+
+Applications can issue non fatal warnings when checking chains by setting
+the flag B<SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_IGNORE_ERRORS> and checking the return
+value.
+
+Calling SSL_CTX_build_cert_chain() or SSL_build_cert_chain() is more
+efficient than the automatic chain building as it is only performed once.
+Automatic chain building is performed on each new session.
+
+If any certificates are added using these functions no certificates added
+using SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert() will be used.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+SSL_set_current_cert() with B<SSL_CERT_SET_SERVER> return 1 for success, 2 if
+no server certificate is used because the ciphersuites is anonymous and 0
+for failure.
+
+SSL_CTX_build_cert_chain() and SSL_build_cert_chain() return 1 for success
+and 0 for failure. If the flag B<SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_IGNORE_ERROR> and
+a verification error occurs then 2 is returned.
+
+All other functions return 1 for success and 0 for failure.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+These functions were first added to OpenSSL 1.0.2.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2013-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e2783de
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert, SSL_CTX_clear_extra_chain_certs - add or clear
+extra chain certificates
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ long SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x509);
+ long SSL_CTX_clear_extra_chain_certs(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert() adds the certificate B<x509> to the extra chain
+certificates associated with B<ctx>. Several certificates can be added one
+after another.
+
+SSL_CTX_clear_extra_chain_certs() clears all extra chain certificates
+associated with B<ctx>.
+
+These functions are implemented as macros.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+When sending a certificate chain, extra chain certificates are sent in order
+following the end entity certificate.
+
+If no chain is specified, the library will try to complete the chain from the
+available CA certificates in the trusted CA storage, see
+L<SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(3)>.
+
+The B<x509> certificate provided to SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert() will be
+freed by the library when the B<SSL_CTX> is destroyed. An application
+B<should not> free the B<x509> object.
+
+=head1 RESTRICTIONS
+
+Only one set of extra chain certificates can be specified per SSL_CTX
+structure. Different chains for different certificates (for example if both
+RSA and DSA certificates are specified by the same server) or different SSL
+structures with the same parent SSL_CTX cannot be specified using this
+function. For more flexibility functions such as SSL_add1_chain_cert() should
+be used instead.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert() and SSL_CTX_clear_extra_chain_certs() return
+1 on success and 0 for failure. Check out the error stack to find out the
+reason for failure.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_use_certificate(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(3)>
+L<SSL_CTX_set0_chain(3)>
+L<SSL_CTX_set1_chain(3)>
+L<SSL_CTX_add0_chain_cert(3)>
+L<SSL_CTX_add1_chain_cert(3)>
+L<SSL_set0_chain(3)>
+L<SSL_set1_chain(3)>
+L<SSL_add0_chain_cert(3)>
+L<SSL_add1_chain_cert(3)>
+L<SSL_CTX_build_cert_chain(3)>
+L<SSL_build_cert_chain(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_add_session.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_add_session.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dbdd9f0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_add_session.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_CTX_add_session, SSL_add_session, SSL_CTX_remove_session, SSL_remove_session - manipulate session cache
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ int SSL_CTX_add_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c);
+ int SSL_add_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c);
+
+ int SSL_CTX_remove_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c);
+ int SSL_remove_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_CTX_add_session() adds the session B<c> to the context B<ctx>. The
+reference count for session B<c> is incremented by 1. If a session with
+the same session id already exists, the old session is removed by calling
+L<SSL_SESSION_free(3)>.
+
+SSL_CTX_remove_session() removes the session B<c> from the context B<ctx>.
+L<SSL_SESSION_free(3)> is called once for B<c>.
+
+SSL_add_session() and SSL_remove_session() are synonyms for their
+SSL_CTX_*() counterparts.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+When adding a new session to the internal session cache, it is examined
+whether a session with the same session id already exists. In this case
+it is assumed that both sessions are identical. If the same session is
+stored in a different SSL_SESSION object, The old session is
+removed and replaced by the new session. If the session is actually
+identical (the SSL_SESSION object is identical), SSL_CTX_add_session()
+is a no-op, and the return value is 0.
+
+If a server SSL_CTX is configured with the SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE
+flag then the internal cache will not be populated automatically by new
+sessions negotiated by the SSL/TLS implementation, even though the internal
+cache will be searched automatically for session-resume requests (the
+latter can be suppressed by SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP). So the
+application can use SSL_CTX_add_session() directly to have full control
+over the sessions that can be resumed if desired.
+
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+The following values are returned by all functions:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item Z<>0
+
+ The operation failed. In case of the add operation, it was tried to add
+ the same (identical) session twice. In case of the remove operation, the
+ session was not found in the cache.
+
+=item Z<>1
+
+ The operation succeeded.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(3)>,
+L<SSL_SESSION_free(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_config.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_config.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ec744ad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_config.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_CTX_config, SSL_config - configure SSL_CTX or SSL structure
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ int SSL_CTX_config(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *name);
+ int SSL_config(SSL *s, const char *name);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The functions SSL_CTX_config() and SSL_config() configure an B<SSL_CTX> or
+B<SSL> structure using the configuration B<name>.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+By calling SSL_CTX_config() or SSL_config() an application can perform many
+complex tasks based on the contents of the configuration file: greatly
+simplifying application configuration code. A degree of future proofing
+can also be achieved: an application can support configuration features
+in newer versions of OpenSSL automatically.
+
+A configuration file must have been previously loaded, for example using
+CONF_modules_load_file(). See L<config(3)> for details of the configuration
+file syntax.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+SSL_CTX_config() and SSL_config() return 1 for success or 0 if an error
+occurred.
+
+=head1 EXAMPLE
+
+If the file "config.cnf" contains the following:
+
+ testapp = test_sect
+
+ [test_sect]
+ # list of configuration modules
+
+ ssl_conf = ssl_sect
+
+ [ssl_sect]
+
+ server = server_section
+
+ [server_section]
+
+ RSA.Certificate = server-rsa.pem
+ ECDSA.Certificate = server-ecdsa.pem
+ Ciphers = ALL:!RC4
+
+An application could call:
+
+ if (CONF_modules_load_file("config.cnf", "testapp", 0) <= 0) {
+      fprintf(stderr, "Error processing config file\n");
+      goto err;
+ }
+
+ ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_server_method());
+
+ if (SSL_CTX_config(ctx, "server") == 0) {
+     fprintf(stderr, "Error configuring server.\n");
+     goto err;
+ }
+
+In this example two certificates and the cipher list are configured without
+the need for any additional application code.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<config(3)>,
+L<SSL_CONF_cmd(3)>,
+L<CONF_modules_load_file(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+SSL_CTX_config() and SSL_config() were first added to OpenSSL 1.1.0
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_ctrl.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_ctrl.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e8386a5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_ctrl.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_CTX_ctrl, SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl, SSL_ctrl, SSL_callback_ctrl - internal handling functions for SSL_CTX and SSL objects
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ long SSL_CTX_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, void *parg);
+ long SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *, int cmd, void (*fp)());
+
+ long SSL_ctrl(SSL *ssl, int cmd, long larg, void *parg);
+ long SSL_callback_ctrl(SSL *, int cmd, void (*fp)());
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The SSL_*_ctrl() family of functions is used to manipulate settings of
+the SSL_CTX and SSL objects. Depending on the command B<cmd> the arguments
+B<larg>, B<parg>, or B<fp> are evaluated. These functions should never
+be called directly. All functionalities needed are made available via
+other functions or macros.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+The return values of the SSL*_ctrl() functions depend on the command
+supplied via the B<cmd> parameter.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_dane_enable.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_dane_enable.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cdb6d1b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_dane_enable.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,384 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_CTX_dane_enable, SSL_CTX_dane_mtype_set, SSL_dane_enable,
+SSL_dane_tlsa_add, SSL_get0_dane_authority, SSL_get0_dane_tlsa,
+SSL_CTX_dane_set_flags, SSL_CTX_dane_clear_flags,
+SSL_dane_set_flags, SSL_dane_clear_flags
+- enable DANE TLS authentication of the remote TLS server in the local
+TLS client
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ int SSL_CTX_dane_enable(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+ int SSL_CTX_dane_mtype_set(SSL_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md,
+                            uint8_t mtype, uint8_t ord);
+ int SSL_dane_enable(SSL *s, const char *basedomain);
+ int SSL_dane_tlsa_add(SSL *s, uint8_t usage, uint8_t selector,
+                       uint8_t mtype, unsigned char *data, size_t dlen);
+ int SSL_get0_dane_authority(SSL *s, X509 **mcert, EVP_PKEY **mspki);
+ int SSL_get0_dane_tlsa(SSL *s, uint8_t *usage, uint8_t *selector,
+                        uint8_t *mtype, unsigned const char **data,
+                        size_t *dlen);
+ unsigned long SSL_CTX_dane_set_flags(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags);
+ unsigned long SSL_CTX_dane_clear_flags(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags);
+ unsigned long SSL_dane_set_flags(SSL *ssl, unsigned long flags);
+ unsigned long SSL_dane_clear_flags(SSL *ssl, unsigned long flags);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+These functions implement support for DANE TLSA (RFC6698 and RFC7671)
+peer authentication.
+
+SSL_CTX_dane_enable() must be called first to initialize the shared state
+required for DANE support.
+Individual connections associated with the context can then enable
+per-connection DANE support as appropriate.
+DANE authentication is implemented in the L<X509_verify_cert(3)> function, and
+applications that override L<X509_verify_cert(3)> via
+L<SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(3)> are responsible to authenticate the peer
+chain in whatever manner they see fit.
+
+SSL_CTX_dane_mtype_set() may then be called zero or more times to adjust the
+supported digest algorithms.
+This must be done before any SSL handles are created for the context.
+
+The B<mtype> argument specifies a DANE TLSA matching type and the B<md>
+argument specifies the associated digest algorithm handle.
+The B<ord> argument specifies a strength ordinal.
+Algorithms with a larger strength ordinal are considered more secure.
+Strength ordinals are used to implement RFC7671 digest algorithm agility.
+Specifying a B<NULL> digest algorithm for a matching type disables
+support for that matching type.
+Matching type Full(0) cannot be modified or disabled.
+
+By default, matching type C<SHA2-256(1)> (see RFC7218 for definitions
+of the DANE TLSA parameter acronyms) is mapped to C<EVP_sha256()>
+with a strength ordinal of C<1> and matching type C<SHA2-512(2)>
+is mapped to C<EVP_sha512()> with a strength ordinal of C<2>.
+
+SSL_dane_enable() must be called before the SSL handshake is initiated with
+L<SSL_connect(3)> if (and only if) you want to enable DANE for that connection.
+(The connection must be associated with a DANE-enabled SSL context).
+The B<basedomain> argument specifies the RFC7671 TLSA base domain,
+which will be the primary peer reference identifier for certificate
+name checks.
+Additional server names can be specified via L<SSL_add1_host(3)>.
+The B<basedomain> is used as the default SNI hint if none has yet been
+specified via L<SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(3)>.
+
+SSL_dane_tlsa_add() may then be called one or more times, to load each of the
+TLSA records that apply to the remote TLS peer.
+(This too must be done prior to the beginning of the SSL handshake).
+The arguments specify the fields of the TLSA record.
+The B<data> field is provided in binary (wire RDATA) form, not the hexadecimal
+ASCII presentation form, with an explicit length passed via B<dlen>.
+The library takes a copy of the B<data> buffer contents and the caller may
+free the original B<data> buffer when convenient.
+A return value of 0 indicates that "unusable" TLSA records (with invalid or
+unsupported parameters) were provided.
+A negative return value indicates an internal error in processing the record.
+
+The caller is expected to check the return value of each SSL_dane_tlsa_add()
+call and take appropriate action if none are usable or an internal error
+is encountered in processing some records.
+
+If no TLSA records are added successfully, DANE authentication is not enabled,
+and authentication will be based on any configured traditional trust-anchors;
+authentication success in this case does not mean that the peer was
+DANE-authenticated.
+
+SSL_get0_dane_authority() can be used to get more detailed information about
+the matched DANE trust-anchor after successful connection completion.
+The return value is negative if DANE verification failed (or was not enabled),
+0 if an EE TLSA record directly matched the leaf certificate, or a positive
+number indicating the depth at which a TA record matched an issuer certificate.
+The complete verified chain can be retrieved via L<SSL_get0_verified_chain(3)>.
+The return value is an index into this verified chain, rather than the list of
+certificates sent by the peer as returned by L<SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(3)>.
+
+If the B<mcert> argument is not B<NULL> and a TLSA record matched a chain
+certificate, a pointer to the matching certificate is returned via B<mcert>.
+The returned address is a short-term internal reference to the certificate and
+must not be freed by the application.
+Applications that want to retain access to the certificate can call
+L<X509_up_ref(3)> to obtain a long-term reference which must then be freed via
+L<X509_free(3)> once no longer needed.
+
+If no TLSA records directly matched any elements of the certificate chain, but
+a DANE-TA(2) SPKI(1) Full(0) record provided the public key that signed an
+element of the chain, then that key is returned via B<mspki> argument (if not
+NULL).
+In this case the return value is the depth of the top-most element of the
+validated certificate chain.
+As with B<mcert> this is a short-term internal reference, and
+L<EVP_PKEY_up_ref(3)> and L<EVP_PKEY_free(3)> can be used to acquire and
+release long-term references respectively.
+
+SSL_get0_dane_tlsa() can be used to retrieve the fields of the TLSA record that
+matched the peer certificate chain.
+The return value indicates the match depth or failure to match just as with
+SSL_get0_dane_authority().
+When the return value is non-negative, the storage pointed to by the B<usage>,
+B<selector>, B<mtype> and B<data> parameters is updated to the corresponding
+TLSA record fields.
+The B<data> field is in binary wire form, and is therefore not NUL-terminated,
+its length is returned via the B<dlen> parameter.
+If any of these parameters is NULL, the corresponding field is not returned.
+The B<data> parameter is set to a short-term internal-copy of the associated
+data field and must not be freed by the application.
+Applications that need long-term access to this field need to copy the content.
+
+SSL_CTX_dane_set_flags() and SSL_dane_set_flags() can be used to enable
+optional DANE verification features.
+SSL_CTX_dane_clear_flags() and SSL_dane_clear_flags() can be used to disable
+the same features.
+The B<flags> argument is a bitmask of the features to enable or disable.
+The B<flags> set for an B<SSL_CTX> context are copied to each B<SSL> handle
+associated with that context at the time the handle is created.
+Subsequent changes in the context's B<flags> have no effect on the B<flags> set
+for the handle.
+
+At present, the only available option is B<DANE_FLAG_NO_DANE_EE_NAMECHECKS>
+which can be used to disable server name checks when authenticating via
+DANE-EE(3) TLSA records.
+For some applications, primarily web browsers, it is not safe to disable name
+checks due to "unknown key share" attacks, in which a malicious server can
+convince a client that a connection to a victim server is instead a secure
+connection to the malicious server.
+The malicious server may then be able to violate cross-origin scripting
+restrictions.
+Thus, despite the text of RFC7671, name checks are by default enabled for
+DANE-EE(3) TLSA records, and can be disabled in applications where it is safe
+to do so.
+In particular, SMTP and XMPP clients should set this option as SRV and MX
+records already make it possible for a remote domain to redirect client
+connections to any server of its choice, and in any case SMTP and XMPP clients
+do not execute scripts downloaded from remote servers.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+The functions SSL_CTX_dane_enable(), SSL_CTX_dane_mtype_set(),
+SSL_dane_enable() and SSL_dane_tlsa_add() return a positive value on success.
+Negative return values indicate resource problems (out of memory, etc.) in the
+SSL library, while a return value of B<0> indicates incorrect usage or invalid
+input, such as an unsupported TLSA record certificate usage, selector or
+matching type.
+Invalid input also includes malformed data, either a digest length that does
+not match the digest algorithm, or a C<Full(0)> (binary ASN.1 DER form)
+certificate or a public key that fails to parse.
+
+The functions SSL_get0_dane_authority() and SSL_get0_dane_tlsa() return a
+negative value when DANE authentication failed or was not enabled, a
+non-negative value indicates the chain depth at which the TLSA record matched a
+chain certificate, or the depth of the top-most certificate, when the TLSA
+record is a full public key that is its signer.
+
+The functions SSL_CTX_dane_set_flags(), SSL_CTX_dane_clear_flags(),
+SSL_dane_set_flags() and SSL_dane_clear_flags() return the B<flags> in effect
+before they were called.
+
+=head1 EXAMPLE
+
+Suppose "smtp.example.com" is the MX host of the domain "example.com", and has
+DNSSEC-validated TLSA records.
+The calls below will perform DANE authentication and arrange to match either
+the MX hostname or the destination domain name in the SMTP server certificate.
+Wildcards are supported, but must match the entire label.
+The actual name matched in the certificate (which might be a wildcard) is
+retrieved, and must be copied by the application if it is to be retained beyond
+the lifetime of the SSL connection.
+
+  SSL_CTX *ctx;
+  SSL *ssl;
+  int (*verify_cb)(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *sctx) = NULL;
+  int num_usable = 0;
+  const char *nexthop_domain = "example.com";
+  const char *dane_tlsa_domain = "smtp.example.com";
+  uint8_t usage, selector, mtype;
+
+  if ((ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_client_method())) == NULL)
+    /* handle error */
+  if (SSL_CTX_dane_enable(ctx) <= 0)
+    /* handle error */
+
+  if ((ssl = SSL_new(ctx)) == NULL)
+    /* handle error */
+
+  if (SSL_dane_enable(ssl, dane_tlsa_domain) <= 0)
+    /* handle error */
+
+  /*
+   * For many applications it is safe to skip DANE-EE(3) namechecks.  Do not
+   * disable the checks unless "unknown key share" attacks pose no risk for
+   * your application.
+   */
+  SSL_dane_set_flags(ssl, DANE_FLAG_NO_DANE_EE_NAMECHECKS);
+
+  if (!SSL_add1_host(ssl, nexthop_domain))
+    /* handle error */
+  SSL_set_hostflags(ssl, X509_CHECK_FLAG_NO_PARTIAL_WILDCARDS);
+
+  for (... each TLSA record ...) {
+    unsigned char *data;
+    size_t len;
+    int ret;
+
+    /* set usage, selector, mtype, data, len */
+
+    /*
+     * Opportunistic DANE TLS clients support only DANE-TA(2) or DANE-EE(3).
+     * They treat all other certificate usages, and in particular PKIX-TA(0)
+     * and PKIX-EE(1), as unusable.
+     */
+    switch (usage) {
+    default:
+    case 0:     /* PKIX-TA(0) */
+    case 1:     /* PKIX-EE(1) */
+        continue;
+    case 2:     /* DANE-TA(2) */
+    case 3:     /* DANE-EE(3) */
+        break;
+    }
+
+    ret = SSL_dane_tlsa_add(ssl, usage, selector, mtype, data, len);
+    /* free data as appropriate */
+
+    if (ret < 0)
+        /* handle SSL library internal error */
+    else if (ret == 0)
+        /* handle unusable TLSA record */
+    else
+      ++num_usable;
+  }
+
+  /*
+   * At this point, the verification mode is still the default SSL_VERIFY_NONE.
+   * Opportunistic DANE clients use unauthenticated TLS when all TLSA records
+   * are unusable, so continue the handshake even if authentication fails.
+   */
+  if (num_usable == 0) {
+    /* Log all records unusable? */
+
+    /* Optionally set verify_cb to a suitable non-NULL callback. */
+    SSL_set_verify(ssl, SSL_VERIFY_NONE, verify_cb);
+  } else {
+    /* At least one usable record.  We expect to verify the peer */
+
+    /* Optionally set verify_cb to a suitable non-NULL callback. */
+
+    /*
+     * Below we elect to fail the handshake when peer verification fails.
+     * Alternatively, use the permissive SSL_VERIFY_NONE verification mode,
+     * complete the handshake, check the verification status, and if not
+     * verified disconnect gracefully at the application layer, especially if
+     * application protocol supports informing the server that authentication
+     * failed.
+     */
+    SSL_set_verify(ssl, SSL_VERIFY_PEER, verify_cb);
+  }
+
+  /*
+   * Load any saved session for resumption, making sure that the previous
+   * session applied the same security and authentication requirements that
+   * would be expected of a fresh connection.
+   */
+
+  /* Perform SSL_connect() handshake and handle errors here */
+
+  if (SSL_session_reused(ssl)) {
+      if (SSL_get_verify_result(ssl) == X509_V_OK) {
+        /*
+         * Resumed session was originally verified, this connection is
+         * authenticated.
+         */
+      } else {
+        /*
+         * Resumed session was not originally verified, this connection is not
+         * authenticated.
+         */
+      }
+  } else if (SSL_get_verify_result(ssl) == X509_V_OK) {
+    const char *peername = SSL_get0_peername(ssl);
+    EVP_PKEY *mspki = NULL;
+
+    int depth = SSL_get0_dane_authority(ssl, NULL, &mspki);
+    if (depth >= 0) {
+        (void) SSL_get0_dane_tlsa(ssl, &usage, &selector, &mtype, NULL, NULL);
+        printf("DANE TLSA %d %d %d %s at depth %d\n", usage, selector, mtype,
+               (mspki != NULL) ? "TA public key verified certificate" :
+               depth ? "matched TA certificate" : "matched EE certificate",
+               depth);
+    }
+    if (peername != NULL) {
+      /* Name checks were in scope and matched the peername */
+      printf("Verified peername: %s\n", peername);
+    }
+  } else {
+    /*
+     * Not authenticated, presumably all TLSA rrs unusable, but possibly a
+     * callback suppressed connection termination despite the presence of
+     * usable TLSA RRs none of which matched.  Do whatever is appropriate for
+     * fresh unauthenticated connections.
+     */
+  }
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+It is expected that the majority of clients employing DANE TLS will be doing
+"opportunistic DANE TLS" in the sense of RFC7672 and RFC7435.
+That is, they will use DANE authentication when DNSSEC-validated TLSA records
+are published for a given peer, and otherwise will use unauthenticated TLS or
+even cleartext.
+
+Such applications should generally treat any TLSA records published by the peer
+with usages PKIX-TA(0) and PKIX-EE(1) as "unusable", and should not include
+them among the TLSA records used to authenticate peer connections.
+In addition, some TLSA records with supported usages may be "unusable" as a
+result of invalid or unsupported parameters.
+
+When a peer has TLSA records, but none are "usable", an opportunistic
+application must avoid cleartext, but cannot authenticate the peer,
+and so should generally proceed with an unauthenticated connection.
+Opportunistic applications need to note the return value of each
+call to SSL_dane_tlsa_add(), and if all return 0 (due to invalid
+or unsupported parameters) disable peer authentication by calling
+L<SSL_set_verify(3)> with B<mode> equal to B<SSL_VERIFY_NONE>.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<SSL_new(3)>,
+L<SSL_add1_host(3)>,
+L<SSL_set_hostflags(3)>,
+L<SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(3)>,
+L<SSL_set_verify(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(3)>,
+L<SSL_get0_verified_chain(3)>,
+L<SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(3)>,
+L<SSL_get_verify_result(3)>,
+L<SSL_connect(3)>,
+L<SSL_get0_peername(3)>,
+L<X509_verify_cert(3)>,
+L<X509_up_ref(3)>,
+L<X509_free(3)>,
+L<EVP_get_digestbyname(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_up_ref(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_free(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+These functions were first added to OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_flush_sessions.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_flush_sessions.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7639451
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_flush_sessions.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_CTX_flush_sessions, SSL_flush_sessions - remove expired sessions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ void SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx, long tm);
+ void SSL_flush_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx, long tm);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_CTX_flush_sessions() causes a run through the session cache of
+B<ctx> to remove sessions expired at time B<tm>.
+
+SSL_flush_sessions() is a synonym for SSL_CTX_flush_sessions().
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+If enabled, the internal session cache will collect all sessions established
+up to the specified maximum number (see SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size()).
+As sessions will not be reused ones they are expired, they should be
+removed from the cache to save resources. This can either be done
+ automatically whenever 255 new sessions were established (see
+L<SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(3)>)
+or manually by calling SSL_CTX_flush_sessions().
+
+The parameter B<tm> specifies the time which should be used for the
+expiration test, in most cases the actual time given by time(0)
+will be used.
+
+SSL_CTX_flush_sessions() will only check sessions stored in the internal
+cache. When a session is found and removed, the remove_session_cb is however
+called to synchronize with the external cache (see
+L<SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(3)>).
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_timeout(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_free.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_free.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e5cc1aa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_free.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_CTX_free - free an allocated SSL_CTX object
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ void SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_CTX_free() decrements the reference count of B<ctx>, and removes the
+SSL_CTX object pointed to by B<ctx> and frees up the allocated memory if the reference count has reached 0.
+
+It also calls the free()ing procedures for indirectly affected items, if
+applicable: the session cache, the list of ciphers, the list of Client CAs,
+the certificates and keys.
+
+If B<ctx> is NULL nothing is done.
+
+=head1 WARNINGS
+
+If a session-remove callback is set (SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb()), this
+callback will be called for each session being freed from B<ctx>'s
+session cache. This implies, that all corresponding sessions from an
+external session cache are removed as well. If this is not desired, the user
+should explicitly unset the callback by calling
+SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb(B<ctx>, NULL) prior to calling SSL_CTX_free().
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+SSL_CTX_free() does not provide diagnostic information.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<SSL_CTX_new(3)>, L<ssl(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_get0_param.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_get0_param.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6b93737
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_get0_param.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_CTX_get0_param, SSL_get0_param, SSL_CTX_set1_param, SSL_set1_param -
+get and set verification parameters
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM *SSL_CTX_get0_param(SSL_CTX *ctx)
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM *SSL_get0_param(SSL *ssl)
+ int SSL_CTX_set1_param(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm)
+ int SSL_set1_param(SSL *ssl, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm)
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_CTX_get0_param() and SSL_get0_param() retrieve an internal pointer to
+the verification parameters for B<ctx> or B<ssl> respectively. The returned
+pointer must not be freed by the calling application.
+
+SSL_CTX_set1_param() and SSL_set1_param() set the verification parameters
+to B<vpm> for B<ctx> or B<ssl>.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+Typically parameters are retrieved from an B<SSL_CTX> or B<SSL> structure
+using SSL_CTX_get0_param() or SSL_get0_param() and an application modifies
+them to suit its needs: for example to add a hostname check.
+
+=head1 EXAMPLE
+
+Check hostname matches "www.foo.com" in peer certificate:
+
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = SSL_get0_param(ssl);
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host(vpm, "www.foo.com", 0);
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+SSL_CTX_get0_param() and SSL_get0_param() return a pointer to an
+B<X509_VERIFY_PARAM> structure.
+
+SSL_CTX_set1_param() and SSL_set1_param() return 1 for success and 0
+for failure.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+These functions were first added to OpenSSL 1.0.2.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bd10034
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode, SSL_get_verify_mode, SSL_CTX_get_verify_depth, SSL_get_verify_depth, SSL_get_verify_callback, SSL_CTX_get_verify_callback - get currently set verification parameters
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ int SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode(const SSL_CTX *ctx);
+ int SSL_get_verify_mode(const SSL *ssl);
+ int SSL_CTX_get_verify_depth(const SSL_CTX *ctx);
+ int SSL_get_verify_depth(const SSL *ssl);
+ int (*SSL_CTX_get_verify_callback(const SSL_CTX *ctx))(int, X509_STORE_CTX *);
+ int (*SSL_get_verify_callback(const SSL *ssl))(int, X509_STORE_CTX *);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode() returns the verification mode currently set in
+B<ctx>.
+
+SSL_get_verify_mode() returns the verification mode currently set in
+B<ssl>.
+
+SSL_CTX_get_verify_depth() returns the verification depth limit currently set
+in B<ctx>. If no limit has been explicitly set, -1 is returned and the
+default value will be used.
+
+SSL_get_verify_depth() returns the verification depth limit currently set
+in B<ssl>. If no limit has been explicitly set, -1 is returned and the
+default value will be used.
+
+SSL_CTX_get_verify_callback() returns a function pointer to the verification
+callback currently set in B<ctx>. If no callback was explicitly set, the
+NULL pointer is returned and the default callback will be used.
+
+SSL_get_verify_callback() returns a function pointer to the verification
+callback currently set in B<ssl>. If no callback was explicitly set, the
+NULL pointer is returned and the default callback will be used.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+See DESCRIPTION
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(3)>, L<SSL_CTX_set_verify(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_has_client_custom_ext.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_has_client_custom_ext.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d9e9a06
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_has_client_custom_ext.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_CTX_has_client_custom_ext - check whether a handler exists for a particular
+client extension type
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ int SSL_CTX_has_client_custom_ext(const SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned int ext_type);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_CTX_has_client_custom_ext() checks whether a handler has been set for a
+client extension of type B<ext_type> using SSL_CTX_add_client_custom_ext().
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+Returns 1 if a handler has been set, 0 otherwise.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_add_client_custom_ext(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..59d11e0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,161 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations, SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths,
+SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_dir, SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_file - set
+default locations for trusted CA certificates
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ int SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *CAfile,
+                                   const char *CApath);
+
+ int SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+
+ int SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_dir(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+
+ int SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_file(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations() specifies the locations for B<ctx>, at
+which CA certificates for verification purposes are located. The certificates
+available via B<CAfile> and B<CApath> are trusted.
+
+SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths() specifies that the default locations from
+which CA certificates are loaded should be used. There is one default directory
+and one default file. The default CA certificates directory is called "certs" in
+the default OpenSSL directory. Alternatively the SSL_CERT_DIR environment
+variable can be defined to override this location. The default CA certificates
+file is called "cert.pem" in the default OpenSSL directory. Alternatively the
+SSL_CERT_FILE environment variable can be defined to override this location.
+
+SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_dir() is similar to
+SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths() except that just the default directory is
+used.
+
+SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_file() is similar to
+SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths() except that just the default file is
+used.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+If B<CAfile> is not NULL, it points to a file of CA certificates in PEM
+format. The file can contain several CA certificates identified by
+
+ -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+ ... (CA certificate in base64 encoding) ...
+ -----END CERTIFICATE-----
+
+sequences. Before, between, and after the certificates text is allowed
+which can be used e.g. for descriptions of the certificates.
+
+The B<CAfile> is processed on execution of the SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations()
+function.
+
+If B<CApath> is not NULL, it points to a directory containing CA certificates
+in PEM format. The files each contain one CA certificate. The files are
+looked up by the CA subject name hash value, which must hence be available.
+If more than one CA certificate with the same name hash value exist, the
+extension must be different (e.g. 9d66eef0.0, 9d66eef0.1 etc). The search
+is performed in the ordering of the extension number, regardless of other
+properties of the certificates.
+Use the B<c_rehash> utility to create the necessary links.
+
+The certificates in B<CApath> are only looked up when required, e.g. when
+building the certificate chain or when actually performing the verification
+of a peer certificate.
+
+When looking up CA certificates, the OpenSSL library will first search the
+certificates in B<CAfile>, then those in B<CApath>. Certificate matching
+is done based on the subject name, the key identifier (if present), and the
+serial number as taken from the certificate to be verified. If these data
+do not match, the next certificate will be tried. If a first certificate
+matching the parameters is found, the verification process will be performed;
+no other certificates for the same parameters will be searched in case of
+failure.
+
+In server mode, when requesting a client certificate, the server must send
+the list of CAs of which it will accept client certificates. This list
+is not influenced by the contents of B<CAfile> or B<CApath> and must
+explicitly be set using the
+L<SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(3)>
+family of functions.
+
+When building its own certificate chain, an OpenSSL client/server will
+try to fill in missing certificates from B<CAfile>/B<CApath>, if the
+certificate chain was not explicitly specified (see
+L<SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_use_certificate(3)>.
+
+=head1 WARNINGS
+
+If several CA certificates matching the name, key identifier, and serial
+number condition are available, only the first one will be examined. This
+may lead to unexpected results if the same CA certificate is available
+with different expiration dates. If a "certificate expired" verification
+error occurs, no other certificate will be searched. Make sure to not
+have expired certificates mixed with valid ones.
+
+=head1 EXAMPLES
+
+Generate a CA certificate file with descriptive text from the CA certificates
+ca1.pem ca2.pem ca3.pem:
+
+ #!/bin/sh
+ rm CAfile.pem
+ for i in ca1.pem ca2.pem ca3.pem ; do
+   openssl x509 -in $i -text >> CAfile.pem
+ done
+
+Prepare the directory /some/where/certs containing several CA certificates
+for use as B<CApath>:
+
+ cd /some/where/certs
+ c_rehash .
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+For SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations the following return values can occur:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item Z<>0
+
+The operation failed because B<CAfile> and B<CApath> are NULL or the
+processing at one of the locations specified failed. Check the error
+stack to find out the reason.
+
+=item Z<>1
+
+The operation succeeded.
+
+=back
+
+SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(), SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_dir() and
+SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_file() all return 1 on success or 0 on failure. A
+missing default location is still treated as a success.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(3)>,
+L<SSL_get_client_CA_list(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_use_certificate(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_cert_store(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_new.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_new.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7b35bdd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_new.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,218 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+TLSv1_2_method, TLSv1_2_server_method, TLSv1_2_client_method,
+SSL_CTX_new, SSL_CTX_up_ref, SSLv3_method, SSLv3_server_method,
+SSLv3_client_method, TLSv1_method, TLSv1_server_method, TLSv1_client_method,
+TLSv1_1_method, TLSv1_1_server_method, TLSv1_1_client_method, TLS_method,
+TLS_server_method, TLS_client_method, SSLv23_method, SSLv23_server_method,
+SSLv23_client_method, DTLS_method, DTLS_server_method, DTLS_client_method,
+DTLSv1_method, DTLSv1_server_method, DTLSv1_client_method,
+DTLSv1_2_method, DTLSv1_2_server_method, DTLSv1_2_client_method
+- create a new SSL_CTX object as framework for TLS/SSL or DTLS enabled
+functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *method);
+ int SSL_CTX_up_ref(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+
+ const SSL_METHOD *TLS_method(void);
+ const SSL_METHOD *TLS_server_method(void);
+ const SSL_METHOD *TLS_client_method(void);
+
+ const SSL_METHOD *SSLv23_method(void);
+ const SSL_METHOD *SSLv23_server_method(void);
+ const SSL_METHOD *SSLv23_client_method(void);
+
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
+ const SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_method(void);
+ const SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_server_method(void);
+ const SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_client_method(void);
+ #endif
+
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_METHOD
+ const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_method(void);
+ const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_server_method(void);
+ const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_client_method(void);
+ #endif
+
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1_METHOD
+ const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_1_method(void);
+ const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_1_server_method(void);
+ const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_1_client_method(void);
+ #endif
+
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2_METHOD
+ const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_2_method(void);
+ const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_2_server_method(void);
+ const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_2_client_method(void);
+ #endif
+
+ const SSL_METHOD *DTLS_method(void);
+ const SSL_METHOD *DTLS_server_method(void);
+ const SSL_METHOD *DTLS_client_method(void);
+
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_METHOD
+ const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_method(void);
+ const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_server_method(void);
+ const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_client_method(void);
+ #endif
+
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2_METHOD
+ const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_2_method(void);
+ const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_2_server_method(void);
+ const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_2_client_method(void);
+ #endif
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_CTX_new() creates a new B<SSL_CTX> object as framework to
+establish TLS/SSL or DTLS enabled connections. An B<SSL_CTX> object is
+reference counted. Creating an B<SSL_CTX> object for the first time increments
+the reference count. Freeing it (using SSL_CTX_free) decrements it. When the
+reference count drops to zero, any memory or resources allocated to the
+B<SSL_CTX> object are freed. SSL_CTX_up_ref() increments the reference count for
+an existing B<SSL_CTX> structure.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The SSL_CTX object uses B<method> as connection method.
+The methods exist in a generic type (for client and server use), a server only
+type, and a client only type.
+B<method> can be of the following types:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item TLS_method(), TLS_server_method(), TLS_client_method()
+
+These are the general-purpose I<version-flexible> SSL/TLS methods.
+The actual protocol version used will be negotiated to the highest version
+mutually supported by the client and the server.
+The supported protocols are SSLv3, TLSv1, TLSv1.1 and TLSv1.2.
+Applications should use these methods, and avoid the version-specific
+methods described below.
+
+=item SSLv23_method(), SSLv23_server_method(), SSLv23_client_method()
+
+Use of these functions is deprecated. They have been replaced with the above
+TLS_method(), TLS_server_method() and TLS_client_method() respectively. New
+code should use those functions instead.
+
+=item TLSv1_2_method(), TLSv1_2_server_method(), TLSv1_2_client_method()
+
+A TLS/SSL connection established with these methods will only understand the
+TLSv1.2 protocol.
+
+=item TLSv1_1_method(), TLSv1_1_server_method(), TLSv1_1_client_method()
+
+A TLS/SSL connection established with these methods will only understand the
+TLSv1.1 protocol.
+
+=item TLSv1_method(), TLSv1_server_method(), TLSv1_client_method()
+
+A TLS/SSL connection established with these methods will only understand the
+TLSv1 protocol.
+
+=item SSLv3_method(), SSLv3_server_method(), SSLv3_client_method()
+
+A TLS/SSL connection established with these methods will only understand the
+SSLv3 protocol.
+The SSLv3 protocol is deprecated and should not be used.
+
+=item DTLS_method(), DTLS_server_method(), DTLS_client_method()
+
+These are the version-flexible DTLS methods.
+Currently supported protocols are DTLS 1.0 and DTLS 1.2.
+
+=item DTLSv1_2_method(), DTLSv1_2_server_method(), DTLSv1_2_client_method()
+
+These are the version-specific methods for DTLSv1.2.
+
+=item DTLSv1_method(), DTLSv1_server_method(), DTLSv1_client_method()
+
+These are the version-specific methods for DTLSv1.
+
+=back
+
+SSL_CTX_new() initializes the list of ciphers, the session cache setting, the
+callbacks, the keys and certificates and the options to their default values.
+
+TLS_method(), TLS_server_method(), TLS_client_method(), DTLS_method(),
+DTLS_server_method() and DTLS_client_method() are the I<version-flexible>
+methods.
+All other methods only support one specific protocol version.
+Use the I<version-flexible> methods instead of the version specific methods.
+
+If you want to limit the supported protocols for the version flexible
+methods you can use L<SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(3)>,
+L<SSL_set_min_proto_version(3)>, L<SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(3)> and
+L<SSL_set_max_proto_version(3)> functions.
+Using these functions it is possible to choose e.g. TLS_server_method()
+and be able to negotiate with all possible clients, but to only
+allow newer protocols like TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1 or TLS 1.2.
+
+The list of protocols available can also be limited using the
+B<SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3>, B<SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1>, B<SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1> and
+B<SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2> options of the L<SSL_CTX_set_options(3)> or
+L<SSL_set_options(3)> functions, but this approach is not recommended.
+Clients should avoid creating "holes" in the set of protocols they support.
+When disabling a protocol, make sure that you also disable either all previous
+or all subsequent protocol versions.
+In clients, when a protocol version is disabled without disabling I<all>
+previous protocol versions, the effect is to also disable all subsequent
+protocol versions.
+
+The SSLv3 protocol is deprecated and should generally not be used.
+Applications should typically use L<SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(3)> to set
+the minimum protocol to at least B<TLS1_VERSION>.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+The following return values can occur:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item NULL
+
+The creation of a new SSL_CTX object failed. Check the error stack to find out
+the reason.
+
+=item Pointer to an SSL_CTX object
+
+The return value points to an allocated SSL_CTX object.
+
+SSL_CTX_up_ref() returns 1 for success and 0 for failure.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+Support for SSLv2 and the corresponding SSLv2_method(),
+SSLv2_server_method() and SSLv2_client_method() functions where
+removed in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+SSLv23_method(), SSLv23_server_method() and SSLv23_client_method()
+were deprecated and the preferred TLS_method(), TLS_server_method()
+and TLS_client_method() functions were introduced in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+All version-specific methods were deprecated in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<SSL_CTX_set_options(3)>, L<SSL_CTX_free(3)>, L<SSL_accept(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(3)>, L<ssl(3)>, L<SSL_set_connect_state(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_sess_number.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_sess_number.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..049c04c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_sess_number.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_CTX_sess_number, SSL_CTX_sess_connect, SSL_CTX_sess_connect_good, SSL_CTX_sess_connect_renegotiate, SSL_CTX_sess_accept, SSL_CTX_sess_accept_good, SSL_CTX_sess_accept_renegotiate, SSL_CTX_sess_hits, SSL_CTX_sess_cb_hits, SSL_CTX_sess_misses, SSL_CTX_sess_timeouts, SSL_CTX_sess_cache_full - obtain session cache statistics
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ long SSL_CTX_sess_number(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+ long SSL_CTX_sess_connect(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+ long SSL_CTX_sess_connect_good(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+ long SSL_CTX_sess_connect_renegotiate(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+ long SSL_CTX_sess_accept(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+ long SSL_CTX_sess_accept_good(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+ long SSL_CTX_sess_accept_renegotiate(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+ long SSL_CTX_sess_hits(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+ long SSL_CTX_sess_cb_hits(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+ long SSL_CTX_sess_misses(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+ long SSL_CTX_sess_timeouts(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+ long SSL_CTX_sess_cache_full(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_CTX_sess_number() returns the current number of sessions in the internal
+session cache.
+
+SSL_CTX_sess_connect() returns the number of started SSL/TLS handshakes in
+client mode.
+
+SSL_CTX_sess_connect_good() returns the number of successfully established
+SSL/TLS sessions in client mode.
+
+SSL_CTX_sess_connect_renegotiate() returns the number of start renegotiations
+in client mode.
+
+SSL_CTX_sess_accept() returns the number of started SSL/TLS handshakes in
+server mode.
+
+SSL_CTX_sess_accept_good() returns the number of successfully established
+SSL/TLS sessions in server mode.
+
+SSL_CTX_sess_accept_renegotiate() returns the number of start renegotiations
+in server mode.
+
+SSL_CTX_sess_hits() returns the number of successfully reused sessions.
+In client mode a session set with L<SSL_set_session(3)>
+successfully reused is counted as a hit. In server mode a session successfully
+retrieved from internal or external cache is counted as a hit.
+
+SSL_CTX_sess_cb_hits() returns the number of successfully retrieved sessions
+from the external session cache in server mode.
+
+SSL_CTX_sess_misses() returns the number of sessions proposed by clients
+that were not found in the internal session cache in server mode.
+
+SSL_CTX_sess_timeouts() returns the number of sessions proposed by clients
+and either found in the internal or external session cache in server mode,
+ but that were invalid due to timeout. These sessions are not included in
+the SSL_CTX_sess_hits() count.
+
+SSL_CTX_sess_cache_full() returns the number of sessions that were removed
+because the maximum session cache size was exceeded.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+The functions return the values indicated in the DESCRIPTION section.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(3)>, L<SSL_set_session(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(3)>
+L<SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5aef10b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size, SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size - manipulate session cache size
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ long SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size(SSL_CTX *ctx, long t);
+ long SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size() sets the size of the internal session cache
+of context B<ctx> to B<t>.
+This value is a hint and not an absolute; see the notes below.
+
+SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size() returns the currently valid session cache size.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The internal session cache size is SSL_SESSION_CACHE_MAX_SIZE_DEFAULT,
+currently 1024*20, so that up to 20000 sessions can be held. This size
+can be modified using the SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size() call. A special
+case is the size 0, which is used for unlimited size.
+
+If adding the session makes the cache exceed its size, then unused
+sessions are dropped from the end of the cache.
+Cache space may also be reclaimed by calling
+L<SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(3)> to remove
+expired sessions.
+
+If the size of the session cache is reduced and more sessions are already
+in the session cache, old session will be removed at the next time a
+session shall be added. This removal is not synchronized with the
+expiration of sessions.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size() returns the previously valid size.
+
+SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size() returns the currently valid size.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_sess_number(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d2b0e04
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb, SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb, SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb, SSL_CTX_sess_get_new_cb, SSL_CTX_sess_get_remove_cb, SSL_CTX_sess_get_get_cb - provide callback functions for server side external session caching
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ void SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                              int (*new_session_cb)(SSL *, SSL_SESSION *));
+ void SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+           void (*remove_session_cb)(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *));
+ void SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+           SSL_SESSION (*get_session_cb)(SSL *, const unsigned char *, int, int *));
+
+ int (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(struct ssl_st *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess);
+ void (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(struct ssl_ctx_st *ctx, SSL_SESSION *sess);
+ SSL_SESSION *(*SSL_CTX_sess_get_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(struct ssl_st *ssl, const unsigned char *data, int len, int *copy);
+
+ int (*new_session_cb)(struct ssl_st *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess);
+ void (*remove_session_cb)(struct ssl_ctx_st *ctx, SSL_SESSION *sess);
+ SSL_SESSION *(*get_session_cb)(struct ssl_st *ssl, unsigned char *data,
+               int len, int *copy);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb() sets the callback function, which is automatically
+called whenever a new session was negotiated.
+
+SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb() sets the callback function, which is
+automatically called whenever a session is removed by the SSL engine,
+because it is considered faulty or the session has become obsolete because
+of exceeding the timeout value.
+
+SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb() sets the callback function which is called,
+whenever a SSL/TLS client proposed to resume a session but the session
+could not be found in the internal session cache (see
+L<SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(3)>).
+(SSL/TLS server only.)
+
+SSL_CTX_sess_get_new_cb(), SSL_CTX_sess_get_remove_cb(), and
+SSL_CTX_sess_get_get_cb() allow to retrieve the function pointers of the
+provided callback functions. If a callback function has not been set,
+the NULL pointer is returned.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+In order to allow external session caching, synchronization with the internal
+session cache is realized via callback functions. Inside these callback
+functions, session can be saved to disk or put into a database using the
+L<d2i_SSL_SESSION(3)> interface.
+
+The new_session_cb() is called, whenever a new session has been negotiated
+and session caching is enabled (see
+L<SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(3)>).
+The new_session_cb() is passed the B<ssl> connection and the ssl session
+B<sess>. If the callback returns B<0>, the session will be immediately
+removed again.
+
+The remove_session_cb() is called, whenever the SSL engine removes a session
+from the internal cache. This happens when the session is removed because
+it is expired or when a connection was not shutdown cleanly. It also happens
+for all sessions in the internal session cache when
+L<SSL_CTX_free(3)> is called. The remove_session_cb() is passed
+the B<ctx> and the ssl session B<sess>. It does not provide any feedback.
+
+The get_session_cb() is only called on SSL/TLS servers with the session id
+proposed by the client. The get_session_cb() is always called, also when
+session caching was disabled. The get_session_cb() is passed the
+B<ssl> connection, the session id of length B<length> at the memory location
+B<data>. With the parameter B<copy> the callback can require the
+SSL engine to increment the reference count of the SSL_SESSION object,
+Normally the reference count is not incremented and therefore the
+session must not be explicitly freed with
+L<SSL_SESSION_free(3)>.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(3)>, L<d2i_SSL_SESSION(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(3)>,
+L<SSL_SESSION_free(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_free(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_sessions.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_sessions.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bc4a55e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_sessions.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_CTX_sessions - access internal session cache
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ struct lhash_st *SSL_CTX_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_CTX_sessions() returns a pointer to the lhash databases containing the
+internal session cache for B<ctx>.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The sessions in the internal session cache are kept in an
+L<lhash(3)> type database. It is possible to directly
+access this database e.g. for searching. In parallel, the sessions
+form a linked list which is maintained separately from the
+L<lhash(3)> operations, so that the database must not be
+modified directly but by using the
+L<SSL_CTX_add_session(3)> family of functions.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(3)>, L<lhash(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_add_session(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set1_curves.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set1_curves.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b0276c8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set1_curves.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_CTX_set1_curves, SSL_CTX_set1_curves_list, SSL_set1_curves,
+SSL_set1_curves_list, SSL_get1_curves, SSL_get_shared_curve - EC supported curve functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ int SSL_CTX_set1_curves(SSL_CTX *ctx, int *clist, int clistlen);
+ int SSL_CTX_set1_curves_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *list);
+
+ int SSL_set1_curves(SSL *ssl, int *clist, int clistlen);
+ int SSL_set1_curves_list(SSL *ssl, char *list);
+
+ int SSL_get1_curves(SSL *ssl, int *curves);
+ int SSL_get_shared_curve(SSL *s, int n);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_CTX_set1_curves() sets the supported curves for B<ctx> to B<clistlen>
+curves in the array B<clist>. The array consist of all NIDs of curves in
+preference order. For a TLS client the curves are used directly in the
+supported curves extension. For a TLS server the curves are used to
+determine the set of shared curves.
+
+SSL_CTX_set1_curves_list() sets the supported curves for B<ctx> to
+string B<list>. The string is a colon separated list of curve NIDs or
+names, for example "P-521:P-384:P-256".
+
+SSL_set1_curves() and SSL_set1_curves_list() are similar except they set
+supported curves for the SSL structure B<ssl>.
+
+SSL_get1_curves() returns the set of supported curves sent by a client
+in the supported curves extension. It returns the total number of
+supported curves. The B<curves> parameter can be B<NULL> to simply
+return the number of curves for memory allocation purposes. The
+B<curves> array is in the form of a set of curve NIDs in preference
+order. It can return zero if the client did not send a supported curves
+extension.
+
+SSL_get_shared_curve() returns shared curve B<n> for a server-side
+SSL B<ssl>. If B<n> is -1 then the total number of shared curves is
+returned, which may be zero. Other than for diagnostic purposes,
+most applications will only be interested in the first shared curve
+so B<n> is normally set to zero. If the value B<n> is out of range,
+NID_undef is returned.
+
+All these functions are implemented as macros.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+If an application wishes to make use of several of these functions for
+configuration purposes either on a command line or in a file it should
+consider using the SSL_CONF interface instead of manually parsing options.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+SSL_CTX_set1_curves(), SSL_CTX_set1_curves_list(), SSL_set1_curves() and
+SSL_set1_curves_list(), return 1 for success and 0 for failure.
+
+SSL_get1_curves() returns the number of curves, which may be zero.
+
+SSL_get_shared_curve() returns the NID of shared curve B<n> or NID_undef if there
+is no shared curve B<n>; or the total number of shared curves if B<n>
+is -1.
+
+When called on a client B<ssl>, SSL_get_shared_curve() has no meaning and
+returns -1.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+These functions were first added to OpenSSL 1.0.2.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2013-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e9073b9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs, SSL_set1_sigalgs, SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs_list,
+SSL_set1_sigalgs_list, SSL_CTX_set1_client_sigalgs,
+SSL_set1_client_sigalgs, SSL_CTX_set1_client_sigalgs_list,
+SSL_set1_client_sigalgs_list - set supported signature algorithms
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ long SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs(SSL_CTX *ctx, const int *slist, long slistlen);
+ long SSL_set1_sigalgs(SSL *ssl, const int *slist, long slistlen);
+ long SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *str);
+ long SSL_set1_sigalgs_list(SSL *ssl, const char *str);
+
+ long SSL_CTX_set1_client_sigalgs(SSL_CTX *ctx, const int *slist, long slistlen);
+ long SSL_set1_client_sigalgs(SSL *ssl, const int *slist, long slistlen);
+ long SSL_CTX_set1_client_sigalgs_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *str);
+ long SSL_set1_client_sigalgs_list(SSL *ssl, const char *str);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs() and SSL_set1_sigalgs() set the supported signature
+algorithms for B<ctx> or B<ssl>. The array B<slist> of length B<slistlen>
+must consist of pairs of NIDs corresponding to digest and public key
+algorithms.
+
+SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs_list() and SSL_set1_sigalgs_list() set the supported
+signature algorithms for B<ctx> or B<ssl>. The B<str> parameter
+must be a null terminated string consisting or a colon separated list of
+public key algorithms and digests separated by B<+>.
+
+SSL_CTX_set1_client_sigalgs(), SSL_set1_client_sigalgs(),
+SSL_CTX_set1_client_sigalgs_list() and SSL_set1_client_sigalgs_list() set
+signature algorithms related to client authentication, otherwise they are
+identical to SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs(), SSL_set1_sigalgs(),
+SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs_list() and SSL_set1_sigalgs_list().
+
+All these functions are implemented as macros. The signature algorithm
+parameter (integer array or string) is not freed: the application should
+free it, if necessary.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+If an application wishes to allow the setting of signature algorithms
+as one of many user configurable options it should consider using the more
+flexible SSL_CONF API instead.
+
+The signature algorithms set by a client are used directly in the supported
+signature algorithm in the client hello message.
+
+The supported signature algorithms set by a server are not sent to the
+client but are used to determine the set of shared signature algorithms
+and (if server preferences are set with SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE)
+their order.
+
+The client authentication signature algorithms set by a server are sent
+in a certificate request message if client authentication is enabled,
+otherwise they are unused.
+
+Similarly client authentication signature algorithms set by a client are
+used to determined the set of client authentication shared signature
+algorithms.
+
+Signature algorithms will neither be advertised nor used if the security level
+prohibits them (for example SHA1 if the security level is 4 or more).
+
+Currently the NID_md5, NID_sha1, NID_sha224, NID_sha256, NID_sha384 and
+NID_sha512 digest NIDs are supported and the public key algorithm NIDs
+EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_DSA and EVP_PKEY_EC.
+
+The short or long name values for digests can be used in a string (for
+example "MD5", "SHA1", "SHA224", "SHA256", "SHA384", "SHA512") and
+the public key algorithm strings "RSA", "DSA" or "ECDSA".
+
+The use of MD5 as a digest is strongly discouraged due to security weaknesses.
+
+=head1 EXAMPLES
+
+Set supported signature algorithms to SHA256 with ECDSA and SHA256 with RSA
+using an array:
+
+    const int slist[] = {NID_sha256, EVP_PKEY_EC, NID_sha256, EVP_PKEY_RSA};
+
+    SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs(ctx, slist, 4);
+
+Set supported signature algorithms to SHA256 with ECDSA and SHA256 with RSA
+using a string:
+
+    SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs_list(ctx, "ECDSA+SHA256:RSA+SHA256");
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+All these functions return 1 for success and 0 for failure.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(3)>, L<SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(3)>,
+L<SSL_CONF_CTX_new(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set1_verify_cert_store.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set1_verify_cert_store.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bfe8b70
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set1_verify_cert_store.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_CTX_set0_verify_cert_store, SSL_CTX_set1_verify_cert_store,
+SSL_CTX_set0_chain_cert_store, SSL_CTX_set1_chain_cert_store,
+SSL_set0_verify_cert_store, SSL_set1_verify_cert_store,
+SSL_set0_chain_cert_store, SSL_set1_chain_cert_store - set certificate
+verification or chain store
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ int SSL_CTX_set0_verify_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *st);
+ int SSL_CTX_set1_verify_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *st);
+ int SSL_CTX_set0_chain_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *st);
+ int SSL_CTX_set1_chain_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *st);
+
+ int SSL_set0_verify_cert_store(SSL *ctx, X509_STORE *st);
+ int SSL_set1_verify_cert_store(SSL *ctx, X509_STORE *st);
+ int SSL_set0_chain_cert_store(SSL *ctx, X509_STORE *st);
+ int SSL_set1_chain_cert_store(SSL *ctx, X509_STORE *st);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_CTX_set0_verify_cert_store() and SSL_CTX_set1_verify_cert_store()
+set the certificate store used for certificate verification to B<st>.
+
+SSL_CTX_set0_chain_cert_store() and SSL_CTX_set1_chain_cert_store()
+set the certificate store used for certificate chain building to B<st>.
+
+SSL_set0_verify_cert_store(), SSL_set1_verify_cert_store(),
+SSL_set0_chain_cert_store() and SSL_set1_chain_cert_store() are similar
+except they apply to SSL structure B<ssl>.
+
+All these functions are implemented as macros. Those containing a B<1>
+increment the reference count of the supplied store so it must
+be freed at some point after the operation. Those containing a B<0> do
+not increment reference counts and the supplied store B<MUST NOT> be freed
+after the operation.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The stores pointers associated with an SSL_CTX structure are copied to any SSL
+structures when SSL_new() is called. As a result SSL structures will not be
+affected if the parent SSL_CTX store pointer is set to a new value.
+
+The verification store is used to verify the certificate chain sent by the
+peer: that is an SSL/TLS client will use the verification store to verify
+the server's certificate chain and a SSL/TLS server will use it to verify
+any client certificate chain.
+
+The chain store is used to build the certificate chain.
+
+If the mode B<SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN> is set or a certificate chain is
+configured already (for example using the functions such as
+L<SSL_CTX_add1_chain_cert(3)> or
+L<SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(3)>) then
+automatic chain building is disabled.
+
+If the mode B<SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN> is set then automatic chain building
+is disabled.
+
+If the chain or the verification store is not set then the store associated
+with the parent SSL_CTX is used instead to retain compatibility with previous
+versions of OpenSSL.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+All these functions return 1 for success and 0 for failure.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(3)>
+L<SSL_CTX_set0_chain(3)>
+L<SSL_CTX_set1_chain(3)>
+L<SSL_CTX_add0_chain_cert(3)>
+L<SSL_CTX_add1_chain_cert(3)>
+L<SSL_set0_chain(3)>
+L<SSL_set1_chain(3)>
+L<SSL_add0_chain_cert(3)>
+L<SSL_add1_chain_cert(3)>
+L<SSL_CTX_build_cert_chain(3)>
+L<SSL_build_cert_chain(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+These functions were first added to OpenSSL 1.0.2.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2013-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..56c8609
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,197 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos, SSL_set_alpn_protos, SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb,
+SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb, SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb,
+SSL_select_next_proto, SSL_get0_alpn_selected, SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated
+- handle application layer protocol negotiation (ALPN)
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ int SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *protos,
+                             unsigned int protos_len);
+ int SSL_set_alpn_protos(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *protos,
+                         unsigned int protos_len);
+ void SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                 int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
+                                            const unsigned char **out,
+                                            unsigned char *outlen,
+                                            const unsigned char *in,
+                                            unsigned int inlen,
+                                            void *arg), void *arg);
+ void SSL_get0_alpn_selected(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **data,
+                             unsigned int *len);
+
+ void SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                            int (*cb)(SSL *ssl,
+                                                      const unsigned char **out,
+                                                      unsigned int *outlen,
+                                                      void *arg),
+                                            void *arg);
+ void SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                               int (*cb)(SSL *s,
+                                         unsigned char **out,
+                                         unsigned char *outlen,
+                                         const unsigned char *in,
+                                         unsigned int inlen,
+                                         void *arg),
+                               void *arg);
+ int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen,
+                           const unsigned char *server,
+                           unsigned int server_len,
+                           const unsigned char *client,
+                           unsigned int client_len)
+ void SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(const SSL *s, const unsigned char **data,
+                             unsigned *len);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos() and SSL_set_alpn_protos() are used by the client to
+set the list of protocols available to be negotiated. The B<protos> must be in
+protocol-list format, described below. The length of B<protos> is specified in
+B<protos_len>.
+
+SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb() sets the application callback B<cb> used by a
+server to select which protocol to use for the incoming connection. When B<cb>
+is NULL, ALPN is not used. The B<arg> value is a pointer which is passed to
+the application callback.
+
+B<cb> is the application defined callback. The B<in>, B<inlen> parameters are a
+vector in protocol-list format. The value of the B<out>, B<outlen> vector
+should be set to the value of a single protocol selected from the B<in>,
+B<inlen> vector. The B<out> buffer may point directly into B<in>, or to a
+buffer that outlives the handshake. The B<arg> parameter is the pointer set via
+SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb().
+
+SSL_select_next_proto() is a helper function used to select protocols. It
+implements the standard protocol selection. It is expected that this function
+is called from the application callback B<cb>. The protocol data in B<server>,
+B<server_len> and B<client>, B<client_len> must be in the protocol-list format
+described below. The first item in the B<server>, B<server_len> list that
+matches an item in the B<client>, B<client_len> list is selected, and returned
+in B<out>, B<outlen>. The B<out> value will point into either B<server> or
+B<client>, so it should be copied immediately. If no match is found, the first
+item in B<client>, B<client_len> is returned in B<out>, B<outlen>. This
+function can also be used in the NPN callback.
+
+SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb() sets a callback B<cb> that is called when a
+client needs to select a protocol from the server's provided list, and a
+user-defined pointer argument B<arg> which will be passed to this callback.
+For the callback itself, B<out>
+must be set to point to the selected protocol (which may be within B<in>).
+The length of the protocol name must be written into B<outlen>. The
+server's advertised protocols are provided in B<in> and B<inlen>. The
+callback can assume that B<in> is syntactically valid. The client must
+select a protocol. It is fatal to the connection if this callback returns
+a value other than B<SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK>. The B<arg> parameter is the pointer
+set via SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb().
+
+SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb() sets a callback B<cb> that is called
+when a TLS server needs a list of supported protocols for Next Protocol
+Negotiation. The returned list must be in protocol-list format, described
+below.  The list is
+returned by setting B<out> to point to it and B<outlen> to its length. This
+memory will not be modified, but the B<SSL> does keep a
+reference to it. The callback should return B<SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK> if it
+wishes to advertise. Otherwise, no such extension will be included in the
+ServerHello.
+
+SSL_get0_alpn_selected() returns a pointer to the selected protocol in B<data>
+with length B<len>. It is not NUL-terminated. B<data> is set to NULL and B<len>
+is set to 0 if no protocol has been selected. B<data> must not be freed.
+
+SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated() sets B<data> and B<len> to point to the
+client's requested protocol for this connection. If the client did not
+request any protocol or NPN is not enabled, then B<data> is set to NULL and
+B<len> to 0. Note that
+the client can request any protocol it chooses. The value returned from
+this function need not be a member of the list of supported protocols
+provided by the callback.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The protocol-lists must be in wire-format, which is defined as a vector of
+non-empty, 8-bit length-prefixed, byte strings. The length-prefix byte is not
+included in the length. Each string is limited to 255 bytes. A byte-string
+length of 0 is invalid. A truncated byte-string is invalid. The length of the
+vector is not in the vector itself, but in a separate variable.
+
+Example:
+
+ unsigned char vector[] = {
+     6, 's', 'p', 'd', 'y', '/', '1',
+     8, 'h', 't', 't', 'p', '/', '1', '.', '1'
+ };
+ unsigned int length = sizeof(vector);
+
+The ALPN callback is executed after the servername callback; as that servername
+callback may update the SSL_CTX, and subsequently, the ALPN callback.
+
+If there is no ALPN proposed in the ClientHello, the ALPN callback is not
+invoked.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos() and SSL_set_alpn_protos() return 0 on success, and
+non-0 on failure. WARNING: these functions reverse the return value convention.
+
+SSL_select_next_proto() returns one of the following:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED
+
+A match was found and is returned in B<out>, B<outlen>.
+
+=item OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP
+
+No match was found. The first item in B<client>, B<client_len> is returned in
+B<out>, B<outlen>.
+
+=back
+
+The ALPN select callback B<cb>, must return one of the following:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK
+
+ALPN protocol selected.
+
+=item SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL
+
+There was no overlap between the client's supplied list and the server
+configuration.
+
+=item SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK
+
+ALPN protocol not selected, e.g., because no ALPN protocols are configured for
+this connection.
+
+=back
+
+The callback set using SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb() should return
+B<SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK> if successful. Any other value is fatal to the connection.
+
+The callback set using SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb() should return
+B<SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK> if it wishes to advertise. Otherwise, no such extension
+will be included in the ServerHello.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(7)>, L<SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2016-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..eaa7a4e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb, SSL_set_cert_cb - handle certificate callback function
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ void SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *c, int (*cert_cb)(SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg);
+ void SSL_set_cert_cb(SSL *s, int (*cert_cb)(SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg);
+
+ int (*cert_cb)(SSL *ssl, void *arg);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb() and SSL_set_cert_cb() sets the cert_cb() callback,
+B<arg> value is pointer which is passed to the application callback.
+
+When cert_cb() is NULL, no callback function is used.
+
+cert_cb() is the application defined callback. It is called before a
+certificate will be used by a client or server. The callback can then inspect
+the passed B<ssl> structure and set or clear any appropriate certificates. If
+the callback is successful it B<MUST> return 1 even if no certificates have
+been set. A zero is returned on error which will abort the handshake with a
+fatal internal error alert. A negative return value will suspend the handshake
+and the handshake function will return immediately.
+L<SSL_get_error(3)> will return SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP to
+indicate, that the handshake was suspended. The next call to the handshake
+function will again lead to the call of cert_cb(). It is the job of the
+cert_cb() to store information about the state of the last call,
+if required to continue.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+An application will typically call SSL_use_certificate() and
+SSL_use_PrivateKey() to set the end entity certificate and private key.
+It can add intermediate and optionally the root CA certificates using
+SSL_add1_chain_cert().
+
+It might also call SSL_certs_clear() to delete any certificates associated
+with the B<SSL> object.
+
+The certificate callback functionality supersedes the (largely broken)
+functionality provided by the old client certificate callback interface.
+It is B<always> called even is a certificate is already set so the callback
+can modify or delete the existing certificate.
+
+A more advanced callback might examine the handshake parameters and set
+whatever chain is appropriate. For example a legacy client supporting only
+TLS v1.0 might receive a certificate chain signed using SHA1 whereas a
+TLS v1.2 client which advertises support for SHA256 could receive a chain
+using SHA256.
+
+Normal server sanity checks are performed on any certificates set
+by the callback. So if an EC chain is set for a curve the client does not
+support it will B<not> be used.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(3)>, L<SSL_use_certificate(3)>,
+L<SSL_add1_chain_cert(3)>,
+L<SSL_get_client_CA_list(3)>,
+L<SSL_clear(3)>, L<SSL_free(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2014-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_cert_store.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_cert_store.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7f7a794
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_cert_store.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_CTX_set_cert_store, SSL_CTX_get_cert_store - manipulate X509 certificate verification storage
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ void SSL_CTX_set_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store);
+ X509_STORE *SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(const SSL_CTX *ctx);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_CTX_set_cert_store() sets/replaces the certificate verification storage
+of B<ctx> to/with B<store>. If another X509_STORE object is currently
+set in B<ctx>, it will be X509_STORE_free()ed.
+
+SSL_CTX_get_cert_store() returns a pointer to the current certificate
+verification storage.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+In order to verify the certificates presented by the peer, trusted CA
+certificates must be accessed. These CA certificates are made available
+via lookup methods, handled inside the X509_STORE. From the X509_STORE
+the X509_STORE_CTX used when verifying certificates is created.
+
+Typically the trusted certificate store is handled indirectly via using
+L<SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(3)>.
+Using the SSL_CTX_set_cert_store() and SSL_CTX_get_cert_store() functions
+it is possible to manipulate the X509_STORE object beyond the
+L<SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(3)>
+call.
+
+Currently no detailed documentation on how to use the X509_STORE
+object is available. Not all members of the X509_STORE are used when
+the verification takes place. So will e.g. the verify_callback() be
+overridden with the verify_callback() set via the
+L<SSL_CTX_set_verify(3)> family of functions.
+This document must therefore be updated when documentation about the
+X509_STORE object and its handling becomes available.
+
+=head1 RESTRICTIONS
+
+The X509_STORE structure used by an SSL_CTX is used for verifying peer
+certificates and building certificate chains, it is also shared by
+every child SSL structure. Applications wanting finer control can use
+functions such as SSL_CTX_set1_verify_cert_store() instead.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+SSL_CTX_set_cert_store() does not return diagnostic output.
+
+SSL_CTX_get_cert_store() returns the current setting.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_verify(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..af303f2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback - set peer certificate verification procedure
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ void SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*callback)(X509_STORE_CTX *, void *), void *arg);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback() sets the verification callback function for
+I<ctx>. SSL objects that are created from I<ctx> inherit the setting valid at
+the time when L<SSL_new(3)> is called.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+Whenever a certificate is verified during a SSL/TLS handshake, a verification
+function is called. If the application does not explicitly specify a
+verification callback function, the built-in verification function is used.
+If a verification callback I<callback> is specified via
+SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(), the supplied callback function is called
+instead. By setting I<callback> to NULL, the default behaviour is restored.
+
+When the verification must be performed, I<callback> will be called with
+the arguments callback(X509_STORE_CTX *x509_store_ctx, void *arg). The
+argument I<arg> is specified by the application when setting I<callback>.
+
+I<callback> should return 1 to indicate verification success and 0 to
+indicate verification failure. If SSL_VERIFY_PEER is set and I<callback>
+returns 0, the handshake will fail. As the verification procedure may
+allow to continue the connection in case of failure (by always returning 1)
+the verification result must be set in any case using the B<error>
+member of I<x509_store_ctx> so that the calling application will be informed
+about the detailed result of the verification procedure!
+
+Within I<x509_store_ctx>, I<callback> has access to the I<verify_callback>
+function set using L<SSL_CTX_set_verify(3)>.
+
+=head1 WARNINGS
+
+Do not mix the verification callback described in this function with the
+B<verify_callback> function called during the verification process. The
+latter is set using the L<SSL_CTX_set_verify(3)>
+family of functions.
+
+Providing a complete verification procedure including certificate purpose
+settings etc is a complex task. The built-in procedure is quite powerful
+and in most cases it should be sufficient to modify its behaviour using
+the B<verify_callback> function.
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback() does not provide diagnostic information.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(3)>, L<SSL_CTX_set_verify(3)>,
+L<SSL_get_verify_result(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4e66917
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list, SSL_set_cipher_list - choose list of available SSL_CIPHERs
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ int SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *str);
+ int SSL_set_cipher_list(SSL *ssl, const char *str);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list() sets the list of available ciphers for B<ctx>
+using the control string B<str>. The format of the string is described
+in L<ciphers(1)>. The list of ciphers is inherited by all
+B<ssl> objects created from B<ctx>.
+
+SSL_set_cipher_list() sets the list of ciphers only for B<ssl>.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The control string B<str> should be universally usable and not depend
+on details of the library configuration (ciphers compiled in). Thus no
+syntax checking takes place. Items that are not recognized, because the
+corresponding ciphers are not compiled in or because they are mistyped,
+are simply ignored. Failure is only flagged if no ciphers could be collected
+at all.
+
+It should be noted, that inclusion of a cipher to be used into the list is
+a necessary condition. On the client side, the inclusion into the list is
+also sufficient unless the security level excludes it. On the server side,
+additional restrictions apply. All ciphers have additional requirements.
+ADH ciphers don't need a certificate, but DH-parameters must have been set.
+All other ciphers need a corresponding certificate and key.
+
+A RSA cipher can only be chosen, when a RSA certificate is available.
+RSA ciphers using DHE need a certificate and key and additional DH-parameters
+(see L<SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(3)>).
+
+A DSA cipher can only be chosen, when a DSA certificate is available.
+DSA ciphers always use DH key exchange and therefore need DH-parameters
+(see L<SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(3)>).
+
+When these conditions are not met for any cipher in the list (e.g. a
+client only supports export RSA ciphers with an asymmetric key length
+of 512 bits and the server is not configured to use temporary RSA
+keys), the "no shared cipher" (SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER) error is generated
+and the handshake will fail.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list() and SSL_set_cipher_list() return 1 if any cipher
+could be selected and 0 on complete failure.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(3)>, L<SSL_get_ciphers(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_use_certificate(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(3)>,
+L<ciphers(1)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0252e7b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list, SSL_set_client_CA_list, SSL_CTX_add_client_CA,
+SSL_add_client_CA - set list of CAs sent to the client when requesting a
+client certificate
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ void SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *list);
+ void SSL_set_client_CA_list(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *list);
+ int SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *cacert);
+ int SSL_add_client_CA(SSL *ssl, X509 *cacert);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list() sets the B<list> of CAs sent to the client when
+requesting a client certificate for B<ctx>.
+
+SSL_set_client_CA_list() sets the B<list> of CAs sent to the client when
+requesting a client certificate for the chosen B<ssl>, overriding the
+setting valid for B<ssl>'s SSL_CTX object.
+
+SSL_CTX_add_client_CA() adds the CA name extracted from B<cacert> to the
+list of CAs sent to the client when requesting a client certificate for
+B<ctx>.
+
+SSL_add_client_CA() adds the CA name extracted from B<cacert> to the
+list of CAs sent to the client when requesting a client certificate for
+the chosen B<ssl>, overriding the setting valid for B<ssl>'s SSL_CTX object.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+When a TLS/SSL server requests a client certificate (see
+B<SSL_CTX_set_verify(3)>), it sends a list of CAs, for which
+it will accept certificates, to the client.
+
+This list must explicitly be set using SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list() for
+B<ctx> and SSL_set_client_CA_list() for the specific B<ssl>. The list
+specified overrides the previous setting. The CAs listed do not become
+trusted (B<list> only contains the names, not the complete certificates); use
+L<SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(3)>
+to additionally load them for verification.
+
+If the list of acceptable CAs is compiled in a file, the
+L<SSL_load_client_CA_file(3)>
+function can be used to help importing the necessary data.
+
+SSL_CTX_add_client_CA() and SSL_add_client_CA() can be used to add additional
+items the list of client CAs. If no list was specified before using
+SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list() or SSL_set_client_CA_list(), a new client
+CA list for B<ctx> or B<ssl> (as appropriate) is opened.
+
+These functions are only useful for TLS/SSL servers.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list() and SSL_set_client_CA_list() do not return
+diagnostic information.
+
+SSL_CTX_add_client_CA() and SSL_add_client_CA() have the following return
+values:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item Z<>0
+
+A failure while manipulating the STACK_OF(X509_NAME) object occurred or
+the X509_NAME could not be extracted from B<cacert>. Check the error stack
+to find out the reason.
+
+=item Z<>1
+
+The operation succeeded.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 EXAMPLES
+
+Scan all certificates in B<CAfile> and list them as acceptable CAs:
+
+  SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(ctx, SSL_load_client_CA_file(CAfile));
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(3)>,
+L<SSL_get_client_CA_list(3)>,
+L<SSL_load_client_CA_file(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..aed7d4f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb, SSL_CTX_get_client_cert_cb - handle client certificate callback function
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ void SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*client_cert_cb)(SSL *ssl, X509 **x509, EVP_PKEY **pkey));
+ int (*SSL_CTX_get_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL *ssl, X509 **x509, EVP_PKEY **pkey);
+ int (*client_cert_cb)(SSL *ssl, X509 **x509, EVP_PKEY **pkey);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb() sets the client_cert_cb() callback, that is
+called when a client certificate is requested by a server and no certificate
+was yet set for the SSL object.
+
+When client_cert_cb() is NULL, no callback function is used.
+
+SSL_CTX_get_client_cert_cb() returns a pointer to the currently set callback
+function.
+
+client_cert_cb() is the application defined callback. If it wants to
+set a certificate, a certificate/private key combination must be set
+using the B<x509> and B<pkey> arguments and "1" must be returned. The
+certificate will be installed into B<ssl>, see the NOTES and BUGS sections.
+If no certificate should be set, "0" has to be returned and no certificate
+will be sent. A negative return value will suspend the handshake and the
+handshake function will return immediately. L<SSL_get_error(3)>
+will return SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP to indicate, that the handshake was
+suspended. The next call to the handshake function will again lead to the call
+of client_cert_cb(). It is the job of the client_cert_cb() to store information
+about the state of the last call, if required to continue.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+During a handshake (or renegotiation) a server may request a certificate
+from the client. A client certificate must only be sent, when the server
+did send the request.
+
+When a certificate was set using the
+L<SSL_CTX_use_certificate(3)> family of functions,
+it will be sent to the server. The TLS standard requires that only a
+certificate is sent, if it matches the list of acceptable CAs sent by the
+server. This constraint is violated by the default behavior of the OpenSSL
+library. Using the callback function it is possible to implement a proper
+selection routine or to allow a user interaction to choose the certificate to
+be sent.
+
+If a callback function is defined and no certificate was yet defined for the
+SSL object, the callback function will be called.
+If the callback function returns a certificate, the OpenSSL library
+will try to load the private key and certificate data into the SSL
+object using the SSL_use_certificate() and SSL_use_private_key() functions.
+Thus it will permanently install the certificate and key for this SSL
+object. It will not be reset by calling L<SSL_clear(3)>.
+If the callback returns no certificate, the OpenSSL library will not send
+a certificate.
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+The client_cert_cb() cannot return a complete certificate chain, it can
+only return one client certificate. If the chain only has a length of 2,
+the root CA certificate may be omitted according to the TLS standard and
+thus a standard conforming answer can be sent to the server. For a
+longer chain, the client must send the complete chain (with the option
+to leave out the root CA certificate). This can only be accomplished by
+either adding the intermediate CA certificates into the trusted
+certificate store for the SSL_CTX object (resulting in having to add
+CA certificates that otherwise maybe would not be trusted), or by adding
+the chain certificates using the
+L<SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(3)>
+function, which is only available for the SSL_CTX object as a whole and that
+therefore probably can only apply for one client certificate, making
+the concept of the callback function (to allow the choice from several
+certificates) questionable.
+
+Once the SSL object has been used in conjunction with the callback function,
+the certificate will be set for the SSL object and will not be cleared
+even when L<SSL_clear(3)> is being called. It is therefore
+mandatory to destroy the SSL object using L<SSL_free(3)>
+and create a new one to return to the previous state.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(3)>, L<SSL_CTX_use_certificate(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(3)>,
+L<SSL_get_client_CA_list(3)>,
+L<SSL_clear(3)>, L<SSL_free(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_ct_validation_callback.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_ct_validation_callback.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..afa45dc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_ct_validation_callback.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+ssl_ct_validation_cb,
+SSL_enable_ct, SSL_CTX_enable_ct, SSL_disable_ct, SSL_CTX_disable_ct,
+SSL_set_ct_validation_callback, SSL_CTX_set_ct_validation_callback,
+SSL_ct_is_enabled, SSL_CTX_ct_is_enabled -
+control Certificate Transparency policy
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ typedef int (*ssl_ct_validation_cb)(const CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx,
+                                    const STACK_OF(SCT) *scts, void *arg);
+
+ int SSL_enable_ct(SSL *s, int validation_mode);
+ int SSL_CTX_enable_ct(SSL_CTX *ctx, int validation_mode);
+ int SSL_set_ct_validation_callback(SSL *s, ssl_ct_validation_cb callback,
+                                    void *arg);
+ int SSL_CTX_set_ct_validation_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                        ssl_ct_validation_cb callback,
+                                        void *arg);
+ void SSL_disable_ct(SSL *s);
+ void SSL_CTX_disable_ct(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+ int SSL_ct_is_enabled(const SSL *s);
+ int SSL_CTX_ct_is_enabled(const SSL_CTX *ctx);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_enable_ct() and SSL_CTX_enable_ct() enable the processing of signed
+certificate timestamps (SCTs) either for a given SSL connection or for all
+connections that share the given SSL context, respectively.
+This is accomplished by setting a built-in CT validation callback.
+The behaviour of the callback is determined by the B<validation_mode> argument,
+which can be either of B<SSL_CT_VALIDATION_PERMISSIVE> or
+B<SSL_CT_VALIDATION_STRICT> as described below.
+
+If B<validation_mode> is equal to B<SSL_CT_VALIDATION_STRICT>, then in a full
+TLS handshake with the verification mode set to B<SSL_VERIFY_PEER>, if the peer
+presents no valid SCTs the handshake will be aborted.
+If the verification mode is B<SSL_VERIFY_NONE>, the handshake will continue
+despite lack of valid SCTs.
+However, in that case if the verification status before the built-in callback
+was B<X509_V_OK> it will be set to B<X509_V_ERR_NO_VALID_SCTS> after the
+callback.
+Applications can call L<SSL_get_verify_result(3)> to check the status at
+handshake completion, even after session resumption since the verification
+status is part of the saved session state.
+See L<SSL_set_verify(3)>, <SSL_get_verify_result(3)>, L<SSL_session_reused(3)>.
+
+If B<validation_mode> is equal to B<SSL_CT_VALIDATION_PERMISSIVE>, then the
+handshake continues, and the verification status is not modified, regardless of
+the validation status of any SCTs.
+The application can still inspect the validation status of the SCTs at
+handshake completion.
+Note that with session resumption there will not be any SCTs presented during
+the handshake.
+Therefore, in applications that delay SCT policy enforcement until after
+handshake completion, such delayed SCT checks should only be performed when the
+session is not resumed.
+
+SSL_set_ct_validation_callback() and SSL_CTX_set_ct_validation_callback()
+register a custom callback that may implement a different policy than either of
+the above.
+This callback can examine the peer's SCTs and determine whether they are
+sufficient to allow the connection to continue.
+The TLS handshake is aborted if the verification mode is not B<SSL_VERIFY_NONE>
+and the callback returns a non-positive result.
+
+An arbitrary callback context argument, B<arg>, can be passed in when setting
+the callback.
+This will be passed to the callback whenever it is invoked.
+Ownership of this context remains with the caller.
+
+If no callback is set, SCTs will not be requested and Certificate Transparency
+validation will not occur.
+
+No callback will be invoked when the peer presents no certificate, e.g. by
+employing an anonymous (aNULL) ciphersuite.
+In that case the handshake continues as it would had no callback been
+requested.
+Callbacks are also not invoked when the peer certificate chain is invalid or
+validated via DANE-TA(2) or DANE-EE(3) TLSA records which use a private X.509
+PKI, or no X.509 PKI at all, respectively.
+Clients that require SCTs are expected to not have enabled any aNULL ciphers
+nor to have specified server verification via DANE-TA(2) or DANE-EE(3) TLSA
+records.
+
+SSL_disable_ct() and SSL_CTX_disable_ct() turn off CT processing, whether
+enabled via the built-in or the custom callbacks, by setting a NULL callback.
+These may be implemented as macros.
+
+SSL_ct_is_enabled() and SSL_CTX_ct_is_enabled() return 1 if CT processing is
+enabled via either SSL_enable_ct() or a non-null custom callback, and 0
+otherwise.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+When SCT processing is enabled, OCSP stapling will be enabled. This is because
+one possible source of SCTs is the OCSP response from a server.
+
+The time returned by SSL_SESSION_get_time() will be used to evaluate whether any
+presented SCTs have timestamps that are in the future (and therefore invalid).
+
+=head1 RESTRICTIONS
+
+Certificate Transparency validation cannot be enabled and so a callback cannot
+be set if a custom client extension handler has been registered to handle SCT
+extensions (B<TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp>).
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+SSL_enable_ct(), SSL_CTX_enable_ct(), SSL_CTX_set_ct_validation_callback() and
+SSL_set_ct_validation_callback() return 1 if the B<callback> is successfully
+set.
+They return 0 if an error occurs, e.g. a custom client extension handler has
+been setup to handle SCTs.
+
+SSL_disable_ct() and SSL_CTX_disable_ct() do not return a result.
+
+SSL_CTX_ct_is_enabled() and SSL_ct_is_enabled() return a 1 if a non-null CT
+validation callback is set, or 0 if no callback (or equivalently a NULL
+callback) is set.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(7)>,
+<SSL_get_verify_result(3)>,
+L<SSL_session_reused(3)>,
+L<SSL_set_verify(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_verify(3)>,
+L<SSL_SESSION_get_time(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2016-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_ctlog_list_file.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_ctlog_list_file.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4a2fa94
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_ctlog_list_file.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_CTX_set_default_ctlog_list_file, SSL_CTX_set_ctlog_list_file -
+load a Certificate Transparency log list from a file
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ int SSL_CTX_set_default_ctlog_list_file(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+ int SSL_CTX_set_ctlog_list_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *path);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_CTX_set_default_ctlog_list_file() loads a list of Certificate Transparency
+(CT) logs from the default file location, "ct_log_list.cnf", found in the
+directory where OpenSSL is installed.
+
+SSL_CTX_set_ctlog_list_file() loads a list of CT logs from a specific path.
+See L<CTLOG_STORE_new(3)> for the file format.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+These functions will not clear the existing CT log list - it will be appended
+to. To replace the existing list, use L<SSL_CTX_set0_ctlog_store> first. 
+
+If an error occurs whilst parsing a particular log entry in the file, that log
+entry will be skipped.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+SSL_CTX_set_default_ctlog_list_file() and SSL_CTX_set_ctlog_list_file()
+return 1 if the log list is successfully loaded, and 0 if an error occurs. In
+the case of an error, the log list may have been partially loaded.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_ct_validation_callback(3)>,
+L<CTLOG_STORE_new(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2196906
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb, SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata,
+SSL_CTX_get_default_passwd_cb, SSL_CTX_get_default_passwd_cb_userdata,
+SSL_set_default_passwd_cb, SSL_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata,
+SSL_get_default_passwd_cb, SSL_get_default_passwd_cb_userdata - set or
+get passwd callback for encrypted PEM file handling
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, pem_password_cb *cb);
+ void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *u);
+ pem_password_cb *SSL_CTX_get_default_passwd_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+ void *SSL_CTX_get_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+
+ void SSL_set_default_passwd_cb(SSL *s, pem_password_cb *cb);
+ void SSL_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL *s, void *u);
+ pem_password_cb *SSL_get_default_passwd_cb(SSL *s);
+ void *SSL_get_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL *s);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb() sets the default password callback called
+when loading/storing a PEM certificate with encryption.
+
+SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata() sets a pointer to userdata, B<u>,
+which will be provided to the password callback on invocation.
+
+SSL_CTX_get_default_passwd_cb() returns a function pointer to the password
+callback currently set in B<ctx>. If no callback was explicitly set, the
+NULL pointer is returned.
+
+SSL_CTX_get_default_passwd_cb_userdata() returns a pointer to the userdata
+currently set in B<ctx>. If no userdata was explicitly set, the NULL pointer
+is returned.
+
+SSL_set_default_passwd_cb(), SSL_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(),
+SSL_get_default_passwd_cb() and SSL_get_default_passwd_cb_userdata() perform
+the same function as their SSL_CTX counterparts, but using an SSL object.
+
+The password callback, which must be provided by the application, hands back the
+password to be used during decryption.
+On invocation a pointer to userdata
+is provided. The function must store the password into the provided buffer
+B<buf> which is of size B<size>. The actual length of the password must
+be returned to the calling function. B<rwflag> indicates whether the
+callback is used for reading/decryption (rwflag=0) or writing/encryption
+(rwflag=1).
+For more details, see L<pem_password_cb(3)>.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+When loading or storing private keys, a password might be supplied to
+protect the private key. The way this password can be supplied may depend
+on the application. If only one private key is handled, it can be practical
+to have the callback handle the password dialog interactively. If several
+keys have to be handled, it can be practical to ask for the password once,
+then keep it in memory and use it several times. In the last case, the
+password could be stored into the userdata storage and the
+callback only returns the password already stored.
+
+When asking for the password interactively, the callback can use
+B<rwflag> to check, whether an item shall be encrypted (rwflag=1).
+In this case the password dialog may ask for the same password twice
+for comparison in order to catch typos, that would make decryption
+impossible.
+
+Other items in PEM formatting (certificates) can also be encrypted, it is
+however not usual, as certificate information is considered public.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+These functions do not provide diagnostic information.
+
+=head1 EXAMPLES
+
+The following example returns the password provided as userdata to the
+calling function. The password is considered to be a '\0' terminated
+string. If the password does not fit into the buffer, the password is
+truncated.
+
+ int my_cb(char *buf, int size, int rwflag, void *u)
+ {
+      strncpy(buf, (char *)u, size);
+      buf[size - 1] = '\0';
+      return strlen(buf);
+ }
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+SSL_CTX_get_default_passwd_cb(), SSL_CTX_get_default_passwd_cb_userdata(),
+SSL_set_default_passwd_cb() and SSL_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata() were
+first added to OpenSSL 1.1.0
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_use_certificate(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_ex_data.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_ex_data.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fd0364b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_ex_data.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_CTX_get_ex_data, SSL_CTX_set_ex_data,
+SSL_get_ex_data, SSL_set_ex_data
+- Store and retrieve extra data from the SSL_CTX, SSL or SSL_SESSION
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ void *SSL_CTX_get_ex_data(const SSL_CTX *s, int idx);
+
+ int SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(SSL_CTX *s, int idx, void *arg);
+
+ void *SSL_get_ex_data(const SSL *s, int idx);
+
+ int SSL_set_ex_data(SSL *s, int idx, void *arg);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL*_set_ex_data() functions can be used to store arbitrary user data into the
+B<SSL_CTX>, or B<SSL> object. The user must supply a unique index
+which they can subsequently use to retrieve the data using SSL*_get_ex_data().
+
+For more detailed information see L<CRYPTO_get_ex_data(3)> and
+L<CRYPTO_set_ex_data(3)> which implement these functions and
+L<CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(3)> for generating a unique index.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+The SSL*_set_ex_data() functions return 1 if the item is successfully stored
+and 0 if it is not.
+The SSL*_get_ex_data() functions return the ex_data pointer if successful,
+otherwise NULL.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<CRYPTO_get_ex_data(3)>, L<CRYPTO_set_ex_data(3)>,
+L<CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1b1171f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id, SSL_set_generate_session_id,
+SSL_has_matching_session_id, GEN_SESSION_CB
+- manipulate generation of SSL session IDs (server only)
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ typedef int (*GEN_SESSION_CB)(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *id,
+                               unsigned int *id_len);
+
+ int SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id(SSL_CTX *ctx, GEN_SESSION_CB cb);
+ int SSL_set_generate_session_id(SSL *ssl, GEN_SESSION_CB, cb);
+ int SSL_has_matching_session_id(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *id,
+                                 unsigned int id_len);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id() sets the callback function for generating
+new session ids for SSL/TLS sessions for B<ctx> to be B<cb>.
+
+SSL_set_generate_session_id() sets the callback function for generating
+new session ids for SSL/TLS sessions for B<ssl> to be B<cb>.
+
+SSL_has_matching_session_id() checks, whether a session with id B<id>
+(of length B<id_len>) is already contained in the internal session cache
+of the parent context of B<ssl>.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+When a new session is established between client and server, the server
+generates a session id. The session id is an arbitrary sequence of bytes.
+The length of the session id is between 1 and 32 bytes.  The session id is not
+security critical but must be unique for the server. Additionally, the session id is
+transmitted in the clear when reusing the session so it must not contain
+sensitive information.
+
+Without a callback being set, an OpenSSL server will generate a unique
+session id from pseudo random numbers of the maximum possible length.
+Using the callback function, the session id can be changed to contain
+additional information like e.g. a host id in order to improve load balancing
+or external caching techniques.
+
+The callback function receives a pointer to the memory location to put
+B<id> into and a pointer to the maximum allowed length B<id_len>. The
+buffer at location B<id> is only guaranteed to have the size B<id_len>.
+The callback is only allowed to generate a shorter id and reduce B<id_len>;
+the callback B<must never> increase B<id_len> or write to the location
+B<id> exceeding the given limit.
+
+The location B<id> is filled with 0x00 before the callback is called, so the
+callback may only fill part of the possible length and leave B<id_len>
+untouched while maintaining reproducibility.
+
+Since the sessions must be distinguished, session ids must be unique.
+Without the callback a random number is used, so that the probability
+of generating the same session id is extremely small (2^256 for SSLv3/TLSv1).
+In order to assure the uniqueness of the generated session id, the callback must call
+SSL_has_matching_session_id() and generate another id if a conflict occurs.
+If an id conflict is not resolved, the handshake will fail.
+If the application codes e.g. a unique host id, a unique process number, and
+a unique sequence number into the session id, uniqueness could easily be
+achieved without randomness added (it should however be taken care that
+no confidential information is leaked this way). If the application can not
+guarantee uniqueness, it is recommended to use the maximum B<id_len> and
+fill in the bytes not used to code special information with random data
+to avoid collisions.
+
+SSL_has_matching_session_id() will only query the internal session cache,
+not the external one. Since the session id is generated before the
+handshake is completed, it is not immediately added to the cache. If
+another thread is using the same internal session cache, a race condition
+can occur in that another thread generates the same session id.
+Collisions can also occur when using an external session cache, since
+the external cache is not tested with SSL_has_matching_session_id()
+and the same race condition applies.
+
+The callback must return 0 if it cannot generate a session id for whatever
+reason and return 1 on success.
+
+=head1 EXAMPLES
+
+The callback function listed will generate a session id with the
+server id given, and will fill the rest with pseudo random bytes:
+
+ const char session_id_prefix = "www-18";
+
+ #define MAX_SESSION_ID_ATTEMPTS 10
+ static int generate_session_id(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *id,
+                              unsigned int *id_len)
+ {
+      unsigned int count = 0;
+      do {
+          RAND_pseudo_bytes(id, *id_len);
+          /*
+           * Prefix the session_id with the required prefix. NB: If our
+           * prefix is too long, clip it - but there will be worse effects
+           * anyway, eg. the server could only possibly create 1 session
+           * ID (ie. the prefix!) so all future session negotiations will
+           * fail due to conflicts.
+           */
+          memcpy(id, session_id_prefix,
+                 (strlen(session_id_prefix) < *id_len) ?
+                    strlen(session_id_prefix) : *id_len);
+      }
+      while (SSL_has_matching_session_id(ssl, id, *id_len) &&
+              (++count < MAX_SESSION_ID_ATTEMPTS));
+      if (count >= MAX_SESSION_ID_ATTEMPTS)
+              return 0;
+      return 1;
+  }
+
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id() and SSL_set_generate_session_id()
+always return 1.
+
+SSL_has_matching_session_id() returns 1 if another session with the
+same id is already in the cache.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(7)>, L<SSL_get_version(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_info_callback.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_info_callback.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f36f217
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_info_callback.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_CTX_set_info_callback, SSL_CTX_get_info_callback, SSL_set_info_callback, SSL_get_info_callback - handle information callback for SSL connections
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ void SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*callback)());
+ void (*SSL_CTX_get_info_callback(const SSL_CTX *ctx))();
+
+ void SSL_set_info_callback(SSL *ssl, void (*callback)());
+ void (*SSL_get_info_callback(const SSL *ssl))();
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_CTX_set_info_callback() sets the B<callback> function, that can be used to
+obtain state information for SSL objects created from B<ctx> during connection
+setup and use. The setting for B<ctx> is overridden from the setting for
+a specific SSL object, if specified.
+When B<callback> is NULL, no callback function is used.
+
+SSL_set_info_callback() sets the B<callback> function, that can be used to
+obtain state information for B<ssl> during connection setup and use.
+When B<callback> is NULL, the callback setting currently valid for
+B<ctx> is used.
+
+SSL_CTX_get_info_callback() returns a pointer to the currently set information
+callback function for B<ctx>.
+
+SSL_get_info_callback() returns a pointer to the currently set information
+callback function for B<ssl>.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+When setting up a connection and during use, it is possible to obtain state
+information from the SSL/TLS engine. When set, an information callback function
+is called whenever the state changes, an alert appears, or an error occurs.
+
+The callback function is called as B<callback(SSL *ssl, int where, int ret)>.
+The B<where> argument specifies information about where (in which context)
+the callback function was called. If B<ret> is 0, an error condition occurred.
+If an alert is handled, SSL_CB_ALERT is set and B<ret> specifies the alert
+information.
+
+B<where> is a bitmask made up of the following bits:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item SSL_CB_LOOP
+
+Callback has been called to indicate state change inside a loop.
+
+=item SSL_CB_EXIT
+
+Callback has been called to indicate error exit of a handshake function.
+(May be soft error with retry option for non-blocking setups.)
+
+=item SSL_CB_READ
+
+Callback has been called during read operation.
+
+=item SSL_CB_WRITE
+
+Callback has been called during write operation.
+
+=item SSL_CB_ALERT
+
+Callback has been called due to an alert being sent or received.
+
+=item SSL_CB_READ_ALERT               (SSL_CB_ALERT|SSL_CB_READ)
+
+=item SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT              (SSL_CB_ALERT|SSL_CB_WRITE)
+
+=item SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP              (SSL_ST_ACCEPT|SSL_CB_LOOP)
+
+=item SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT              (SSL_ST_ACCEPT|SSL_CB_EXIT)
+
+=item SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP             (SSL_ST_CONNECT|SSL_CB_LOOP)
+
+=item SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT             (SSL_ST_CONNECT|SSL_CB_EXIT)
+
+=item SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START
+
+Callback has been called because a new handshake is started.
+
+=item SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE           0x20
+
+Callback has been called because a handshake is finished.
+
+=back
+
+The current state information can be obtained using the
+L<SSL_state_string(3)> family of functions.
+
+The B<ret> information can be evaluated using the
+L<SSL_alert_type_string(3)> family of functions.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+SSL_set_info_callback() does not provide diagnostic information.
+
+SSL_get_info_callback() returns the current setting.
+
+=head1 EXAMPLES
+
+The following example callback function prints state strings, information
+about alerts being handled and error messages to the B<bio_err> BIO.
+
+ void apps_ssl_info_callback(SSL *s, int where, int ret)
+        {
+        const char *str;
+        int w;
+
+        w = where & ~SSL_ST_MASK;
+
+        if (w & SSL_ST_CONNECT) str = "SSL_connect";
+        else if (w & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) str = "SSL_accept";
+        else str = "undefined";
+
+        if (where & SSL_CB_LOOP)
+                {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s:%s\n", str, SSL_state_string_long(s));
+                }
+        else if (where & SSL_CB_ALERT)
+                {
+                str = (where & SSL_CB_READ) ? "read" : "write";
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "SSL3 alert %s:%s:%s\n",
+                        str,
+                        SSL_alert_type_string_long(ret),
+                        SSL_alert_desc_string_long(ret));
+                }
+        else if (where & SSL_CB_EXIT)
+                {
+                if (ret == 0)
+                        BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s:failed in %s\n",
+                                str, SSL_state_string_long(s));
+                else if (ret < 0)
+                        {
+                        BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s:error in %s\n",
+                                str, SSL_state_string_long(s));
+                        }
+                }
+        }
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(3)>, L<SSL_state_string(3)>,
+L<SSL_alert_type_string(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_max_cert_list.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_max_cert_list.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..482751e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_max_cert_list.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_CTX_set_max_cert_list, SSL_CTX_get_max_cert_list, SSL_set_max_cert_list, SSL_get_max_cert_list - manipulate allowed size for the peer's certificate chain
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ long SSL_CTX_set_max_cert_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, long size);
+ long SSL_CTX_get_max_cert_list(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+
+ long SSL_set_max_cert_list(SSL *ssl, long size);
+ long SSL_get_max_cert_list(SSL *ctx);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_CTX_set_max_cert_list() sets the maximum size allowed for the peer's
+certificate chain for all SSL objects created from B<ctx> to be <size> bytes.
+The SSL objects inherit the setting valid for B<ctx> at the time
+L<SSL_new(3)> is being called.
+
+SSL_CTX_get_max_cert_list() returns the currently set maximum size for B<ctx>.
+
+SSL_set_max_cert_list() sets the maximum size allowed for the peer's
+certificate chain for B<ssl> to be <size> bytes. This setting stays valid
+until a new value is set.
+
+SSL_get_max_cert_list() returns the currently set maximum size for B<ssl>.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+During the handshake process, the peer may send a certificate chain.
+The TLS/SSL standard does not give any maximum size of the certificate chain.
+The OpenSSL library handles incoming data by a dynamically allocated buffer.
+In order to prevent this buffer from growing without bounds due to data
+received from a faulty or malicious peer, a maximum size for the certificate
+chain is set.
+
+The default value for the maximum certificate chain size is 100kB (30kB
+on the 16bit DOS platform). This should be sufficient for usual certificate
+chains (OpenSSL's default maximum chain length is 10, see
+L<SSL_CTX_set_verify(3)>, and certificates
+without special extensions have a typical size of 1-2kB).
+
+For special applications it can be necessary to extend the maximum certificate
+chain size allowed to be sent by the peer, see e.g. the work on
+"Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Proxy Certificate Profile"
+and "TLS Delegation Protocol" at http://www.ietf.org/ and
+http://www.globus.org/ .
+
+Under normal conditions it should never be necessary to set a value smaller
+than the default, as the buffer is handled dynamically and only uses the
+memory actually required by the data sent by the peer.
+
+If the maximum certificate chain size allowed is exceeded, the handshake will
+fail with a SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE error.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+SSL_CTX_set_max_cert_list() and SSL_set_max_cert_list() return the previously
+set value.
+
+SSL_CTX_get_max_cert_list() and SSL_get_max_cert_list() return the currently
+set value.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(3)>, L<SSL_new(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_verify(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ff080e4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version, SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version,
+SSL_CTX_get_min_proto_version, SSL_CTX_get_max_proto_version,
+SSL_set_min_proto_version, SSL_set_max_proto_version,
+SSL_get_min_proto_version, SSL_get_max_proto_version - Get and set minimum
+and maximum supported protocol version
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ int SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(SSL_CTX *ctx, int version);
+ int SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(SSL_CTX *ctx, int version);
+ int SSL_CTX_get_min_proto_version(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+ int SSL_CTX_get_max_proto_version(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+
+ int SSL_set_min_proto_version(SSL *ssl, int version);
+ int SSL_set_max_proto_version(SSL *ssl, int version);
+ int SSL_get_min_proto_version(SSL *ssl);
+ int SSL_get_max_proto_version(SSL *ssl);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The functions get or set the minimum and maximum supported protocol versions
+for the B<ctx> or B<ssl>.
+This works in combination with the options set via
+L<SSL_CTX_set_options(3)> that also make it possible to disable
+specific protocol versions.
+Use these functions instead of disabling specific protocol versions.
+
+Setting the minimum or maximum version to 0, will enable protocol
+versions down to the lowest version, or up to the highest version
+supported by the library, respectively.
+
+Getters return 0 in case B<ctx> or B<ssl> have been configured to
+automatically use the lowest or highest version supported by the library.
+
+Currently supported versions are B<SSL3_VERSION>, B<TLS1_VERSION>,
+B<TLS1_1_VERSION>, B<TLS1_2_VERSION> for TLS and B<DTLS1_VERSION>,
+B<DTLS1_2_VERSION> for DTLS.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+These setter functions return 1 on success and 0 on failure. The getter
+functions return the configured version or 0 for auto-configuration of
+lowest or highest protocol, respectively.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+All these functions are implemented using macros.
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+The setter functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0. The getter functions
+were added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<SSL_CTX_set_options(3)>, L<SSL_CONF_cmd(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_mode.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_mode.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1b3e783
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_mode.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_CTX_set_mode, SSL_set_mode, SSL_CTX_get_mode, SSL_get_mode - manipulate SSL engine mode
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ long SSL_CTX_set_mode(SSL_CTX *ctx, long mode);
+ long SSL_set_mode(SSL *ssl, long mode);
+
+ long SSL_CTX_get_mode(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+ long SSL_get_mode(SSL *ssl);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_CTX_set_mode() adds the mode set via bitmask in B<mode> to B<ctx>.
+Options already set before are not cleared.
+
+SSL_set_mode() adds the mode set via bitmask in B<mode> to B<ssl>.
+Options already set before are not cleared.
+
+SSL_CTX_get_mode() returns the mode set for B<ctx>.
+
+SSL_get_mode() returns the mode set for B<ssl>.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The following mode changes are available:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE
+
+Allow SSL_write(..., n) to return r with 0 < r < n (i.e. report success
+when just a single record has been written). When not set (the default),
+SSL_write() will only report success once the complete chunk was written.
+Once SSL_write() returns with r, r bytes have been successfully written
+and the next call to SSL_write() must only send the n-r bytes left,
+imitating the behaviour of write().
+
+=item SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER
+
+Make it possible to retry SSL_write() with changed buffer location
+(the buffer contents must stay the same). This is not the default to avoid
+the misconception that non-blocking SSL_write() behaves like
+non-blocking write().
+
+=item SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY
+
+Never bother the application with retries if the transport is blocking.
+If a renegotiation take place during normal operation, a
+L<SSL_read(3)> or L<SSL_write(3)> would return
+with -1 and indicate the need to retry with SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ.
+In a non-blocking environment applications must be prepared to handle
+incomplete read/write operations.
+In a blocking environment, applications are not always prepared to
+deal with read/write operations returning without success report. The
+flag SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY will cause read/write operations to only
+return after the handshake and successful completion.
+
+=item SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
+
+When we no longer need a read buffer or a write buffer for a given SSL,
+then release the memory we were using to hold it.
+Using this flag can
+save around 34k per idle SSL connection.
+This flag has no effect on SSL v2 connections, or on DTLS connections.
+
+=item SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV
+
+Send TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV in the ClientHello.
+To be set only by applications that reconnect with a downgraded protocol
+version; see draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00 for details.
+
+DO NOT ENABLE THIS if your application attempts a normal handshake.
+Only use this in explicit fallback retries, following the guidance
+in draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00.
+
+=item SSL_MODE_ASYNC
+
+Enable asynchronous processing. TLS I/O operations may indicate a retry with
+SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC with this mode set if an asynchronous capable engine is
+used to perform cryptographic operations. See L<SSL_get_error(3)>.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+SSL_CTX_set_mode() and SSL_set_mode() return the new mode bitmask
+after adding B<mode>.
+
+SSL_CTX_get_mode() and SSL_get_mode() return the current bitmask.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(3)>, L<SSL_read(3)>, L<SSL_write(3)>, L<SSL_get_error(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+SSL_MODE_ASYNC was first added to OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9546e75
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback, SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback_arg, SSL_set_msg_callback, SSL_set_msg_callback_arg - install callback for observing protocol messages
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg));
+ void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback_arg(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *arg);
+
+ void SSL_set_msg_callback(SSL *ssl, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg));
+ void SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(SSL *ssl, void *arg);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback() or SSL_set_msg_callback() can be used to
+define a message callback function I<cb> for observing all SSL/TLS
+protocol messages (such as handshake messages) that are received or
+sent.  SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback_arg() and SSL_set_msg_callback_arg()
+can be used to set argument I<arg> to the callback function, which is
+available for arbitrary application use.
+
+SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback() and SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback_arg() specify
+default settings that will be copied to new B<SSL> objects by
+L<SSL_new(3)>. SSL_set_msg_callback() and
+SSL_set_msg_callback_arg() modify the actual settings of an B<SSL>
+object. Using a B<0> pointer for I<cb> disables the message callback.
+
+When I<cb> is called by the SSL/TLS library for a protocol message,
+the function arguments have the following meaning:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item I<write_p>
+
+This flag is B<0> when a protocol message has been received and B<1>
+when a protocol message has been sent.
+
+=item I<version>
+
+The protocol version according to which the protocol message is
+interpreted by the library. Currently, this is one of
+B<SSL2_VERSION>, B<SSL3_VERSION> and B<TLS1_VERSION> (for SSL 2.0, SSL
+3.0 and TLS 1.0, respectively).
+
+=item I<content_type>
+
+In the case of SSL 2.0, this is always B<0>.  In the case of SSL 3.0
+or TLS 1.0, this is one of the B<ContentType> values defined in the
+protocol specification (B<change_cipher_spec(20)>, B<alert(21)>,
+B<handshake(22)>; but never B<application_data(23)> because the
+callback will only be called for protocol messages).
+
+=item I<buf>, I<len>
+
+I<buf> points to a buffer containing the protocol message, which
+consists of I<len> bytes. The buffer is no longer valid after the
+callback function has returned.
+
+=item I<ssl>
+
+The B<SSL> object that received or sent the message.
+
+=item I<arg>
+
+The user-defined argument optionally defined by
+SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback_arg() or SSL_set_msg_callback_arg().
+
+=back
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+Protocol messages are passed to the callback function after decryption
+and fragment collection where applicable. (Thus record boundaries are
+not visible.)
+
+If processing a received protocol message results in an error,
+the callback function may not be called.  For example, the callback
+function will never see messages that are considered too large to be
+processed.
+
+Due to automatic protocol version negotiation, I<version> is not
+necessarily the protocol version used by the sender of the message: If
+a TLS 1.0 ClientHello message is received by an SSL 3.0-only server,
+I<version> will be B<SSL3_VERSION>.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(3)>, L<SSL_new(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..241aeb3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,307 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_CTX_set_options, SSL_set_options, SSL_CTX_clear_options,
+SSL_clear_options, SSL_CTX_get_options, SSL_get_options,
+SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support - manipulate SSL options
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ long SSL_CTX_set_options(SSL_CTX *ctx, long options);
+ long SSL_set_options(SSL *ssl, long options);
+
+ long SSL_CTX_clear_options(SSL_CTX *ctx, long options);
+ long SSL_clear_options(SSL *ssl, long options);
+
+ long SSL_CTX_get_options(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+ long SSL_get_options(SSL *ssl);
+
+ long SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support(SSL *ssl);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_CTX_set_options() adds the options set via bitmask in B<options> to B<ctx>.
+Options already set before are not cleared!
+
+SSL_set_options() adds the options set via bitmask in B<options> to B<ssl>.
+Options already set before are not cleared!
+
+SSL_CTX_clear_options() clears the options set via bitmask in B<options>
+to B<ctx>.
+
+SSL_clear_options() clears the options set via bitmask in B<options> to B<ssl>.
+
+SSL_CTX_get_options() returns the options set for B<ctx>.
+
+SSL_get_options() returns the options set for B<ssl>.
+
+SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support() indicates whether the peer supports
+secure renegotiation.
+Note, this is implemented via a macro.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The behaviour of the SSL library can be changed by setting several options.
+The options are coded as bitmasks and can be combined by a bitwise B<or>
+operation (|).
+
+SSL_CTX_set_options() and SSL_set_options() affect the (external)
+protocol behaviour of the SSL library. The (internal) behaviour of
+the API can be changed by using the similar
+L<SSL_CTX_set_mode(3)> and SSL_set_mode() functions.
+
+During a handshake, the option settings of the SSL object are used. When
+a new SSL object is created from a context using SSL_new(), the current
+option setting is copied. Changes to B<ctx> do not affect already created
+SSL objects. SSL_clear() does not affect the settings.
+
+The following B<bug workaround> options are available:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item SSL_OP_SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG
+
+...
+
+=item SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
+
+...
+
+=item SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG
+
+Don't prefer ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers when the client appears to be Safari on OS X.
+OS X 10.8..10.8.3 has broken support for ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers.
+
+=item SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG
+
+...
+
+=item SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG
+
+...
+
+=item SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS
+
+Disables a countermeasure against a SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 protocol
+vulnerability affecting CBC ciphers, which cannot be handled by some
+broken SSL implementations.  This option has no effect for connections
+using other ciphers.
+
+=item SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING
+
+Adds a padding extension to ensure the ClientHello size is never between
+256 and 511 bytes in length. This is needed as a workaround for some
+implementations.
+
+=item SSL_OP_ALL
+
+All of the above bug workarounds.
+
+=back
+
+It is usually safe to use B<SSL_OP_ALL> to enable the bug workaround
+options if compatibility with somewhat broken implementations is
+desired.
+
+The following B<modifying> options are available:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
+
+Disable version rollback attack detection.
+
+During the client key exchange, the client must send the same information
+about acceptable SSL/TLS protocol levels as during the first hello. Some
+clients violate this rule by adapting to the server's answer. (Example:
+the client sends a SSLv2 hello and accepts up to SSLv3.1=TLSv1, the server
+only understands up to SSLv3. In this case the client must still use the
+same SSLv3.1=TLSv1 announcement. Some clients step down to SSLv3 with respect
+to the server's answer and violate the version rollback protection.)
+
+=item SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE
+
+Always create a new key when using temporary/ephemeral DH parameters
+(see L<SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(3)>).
+This option must be used to prevent small subgroup attacks, when
+the DH parameters were not generated using "strong" primes
+(e.g. when using DSA-parameters, see L<dhparam(1)>).
+If "strong" primes were used, it is not strictly necessary to generate
+a new DH key during each handshake but it is also recommended.
+B<SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE> should therefore be enabled whenever
+temporary/ephemeral DH parameters are used.
+
+=item SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA
+
+This option is no longer implemented and is treated as no op.
+
+=item SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
+
+When choosing a cipher, use the server's preferences instead of the client
+preferences. When not set, the SSL server will always follow the clients
+preferences. When set, the SSL/TLS server will choose following its
+own preferences.
+
+=item SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1
+
+...
+
+=item SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2
+
+...
+
+
+=item SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1,
+SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2, SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1, SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2
+
+These options turn off the SSLv3, TLSv1, TLSv1.1 or TLSv1.2 protocol
+versions with TLS or the DTLSv1, DTLSv1.2 versions with DTLS,
+respectively.
+As of OpenSSL 1.1.0, these options are deprecated, use
+L<SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(3)> and
+L<SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(3)> instead.
+
+=item SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
+
+When performing renegotiation as a server, always start a new session
+(i.e., session resumption requests are only accepted in the initial
+handshake). This option is not needed for clients.
+
+=item SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
+
+Normally clients and servers will, where possible, transparently make use
+of RFC4507bis tickets for stateless session resumption.
+
+If this option is set this functionality is disabled and tickets will
+not be used by clients or servers.
+
+=item SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
+
+Allow legacy insecure renegotiation between OpenSSL and unpatched clients or
+servers. See the B<SECURE RENEGOTIATION> section for more details.
+
+=item SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT
+
+Allow legacy insecure renegotiation between OpenSSL and unpatched servers
+B<only>: this option is currently set by default. See the
+B<SECURE RENEGOTIATION> section for more details.
+
+=item SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC
+
+Normally clients and servers will transparently attempt to negotiate the
+RFC7366 Encrypt-then-MAC option on TLS and DTLS connection.
+
+If this option is set, Encrypt-then-MAC is disabled. Clients will not
+propose, and servers will not accept the extension.
+
+=item SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION
+
+Disable all renegotiation in TLSv1.2 and earlier. Do not send HelloRequest
+messages, and ignore renegotiation requests via ClientHello.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 SECURE RENEGOTIATION
+
+OpenSSL always attempts to use secure renegotiation as
+described in RFC5746. This counters the prefix attack described in
+CVE-2009-3555 and elsewhere.
+
+This attack has far reaching consequences which application writers should be
+aware of. In the description below an implementation supporting secure
+renegotiation is referred to as I<patched>. A server not supporting secure
+renegotiation is referred to as I<unpatched>.
+
+The following sections describe the operations permitted by OpenSSL's secure
+renegotiation implementation.
+
+=head2 Patched client and server
+
+Connections and renegotiation are always permitted by OpenSSL implementations.
+
+=head2 Unpatched client and patched OpenSSL server
+
+The initial connection succeeds but client renegotiation is denied by the
+server with a B<no_renegotiation> warning alert if TLS v1.0 is used or a fatal
+B<handshake_failure> alert in SSL v3.0.
+
+If the patched OpenSSL server attempts to renegotiate a fatal
+B<handshake_failure> alert is sent. This is because the server code may be
+unaware of the unpatched nature of the client.
+
+If the option B<SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION> is set then
+renegotiation B<always> succeeds.
+
+=head2 Patched OpenSSL client and unpatched server.
+
+If the option B<SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT> or
+B<SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION> is set then initial connections
+and renegotiation between patched OpenSSL clients and unpatched servers
+succeeds. If neither option is set then initial connections to unpatched
+servers will fail.
+
+The option B<SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT> is currently set by default even
+though it has security implications: otherwise it would be impossible to
+connect to unpatched servers (i.e. all of them initially) and this is clearly
+not acceptable. Renegotiation is permitted because this does not add any
+additional security issues: during an attack clients do not see any
+renegotiations anyway.
+
+As more servers become patched the option B<SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT> will
+B<not> be set by default in a future version of OpenSSL.
+
+OpenSSL client applications wishing to ensure they can connect to unpatched
+servers should always B<set> B<SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT>
+
+OpenSSL client applications that want to ensure they can B<not> connect to
+unpatched servers (and thus avoid any security issues) should always B<clear>
+B<SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT> using SSL_CTX_clear_options() or
+SSL_clear_options().
+
+The difference between the B<SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT> and
+B<SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION> options is that
+B<SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT> enables initial connections and secure
+renegotiation between OpenSSL clients and unpatched servers B<only>, while
+B<SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION> allows initial connections
+and renegotiation between OpenSSL and unpatched clients or servers.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+SSL_CTX_set_options() and SSL_set_options() return the new options bitmask
+after adding B<options>.
+
+SSL_CTX_clear_options() and SSL_clear_options() return the new options bitmask
+after clearing B<options>.
+
+SSL_CTX_get_options() and SSL_get_options() return the current bitmask.
+
+SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support() returns 1 is the peer supports
+secure renegotiation and 0 if it does not.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(3)>, L<SSL_new(3)>, L<SSL_clear(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(3)>,
+L<dhparam(1)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+The attempt to always try to use secure renegotiation was added in
+Openssl 0.9.8m.
+
+B<SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION> was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0h.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2001-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a417508
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback, SSL_set_psk_client_callback - set PSK client callback
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ void SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+        unsigned int (*callback)(SSL *ssl, const char *hint,
+        char *identity, unsigned int max_identity_len,
+        unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len));
+ void SSL_set_psk_client_callback(SSL *ssl,
+        unsigned int (*callback)(SSL *ssl, const char *hint,
+        char *identity, unsigned int max_identity_len,
+        unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len));
+
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+A client application must provide a callback function which is called
+when the client is sending the ClientKeyExchange message to the server.
+
+The purpose of the callback function is to select the PSK identity and
+the pre-shared key to use during the connection setup phase.
+
+The callback is set using functions SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback()
+or SSL_set_psk_client_callback(). The callback function is given the
+connection in parameter B<ssl>, a B<NULL>-terminated PSK identity hint
+sent by the server in parameter B<hint>, a buffer B<identity> of
+length B<max_identity_len> bytes where the resulting
+B<NULL>-terminated identity is to be stored, and a buffer B<psk> of
+length B<max_psk_len> bytes where the resulting pre-shared key is to
+be stored.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+Note that parameter B<hint> given to the callback may be B<NULL>.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+Return values from the client callback are interpreted as follows:
+
+On success (callback found a PSK identity and a pre-shared key to use)
+the length (> 0) of B<psk> in bytes is returned.
+
+Otherwise or on errors callback should return 0. In this case
+the connection setup fails.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+Copyright 2005 Nokia.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d39d747
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown, SSL_CTX_get_quiet_shutdown, SSL_set_quiet_shutdown, SSL_get_quiet_shutdown - manipulate shutdown behaviour
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ void SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode);
+ int SSL_CTX_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL_CTX *ctx);
+
+ void SSL_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL *ssl, int mode);
+ int SSL_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL *ssl);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown() sets the "quiet shutdown" flag for B<ctx> to be
+B<mode>. SSL objects created from B<ctx> inherit the B<mode> valid at the time
+L<SSL_new(3)> is called. B<mode> may be 0 or 1.
+
+SSL_CTX_get_quiet_shutdown() returns the "quiet shutdown" setting of B<ctx>.
+
+SSL_set_quiet_shutdown() sets the "quiet shutdown" flag for B<ssl> to be
+B<mode>. The setting stays valid until B<ssl> is removed with
+L<SSL_free(3)> or SSL_set_quiet_shutdown() is called again.
+It is not changed when L<SSL_clear(3)> is called.
+B<mode> may be 0 or 1.
+
+SSL_get_quiet_shutdown() returns the "quiet shutdown" setting of B<ssl>.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+Normally when a SSL connection is finished, the parties must send out
+"close notify" alert messages using L<SSL_shutdown(3)>
+for a clean shutdown.
+
+When setting the "quiet shutdown" flag to 1, L<SSL_shutdown(3)>
+will set the internal flags to SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN|SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN.
+(L<SSL_shutdown(3)> then behaves like
+L<SSL_set_shutdown(3)> called with
+SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN|SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN.)
+The session is thus considered to be shutdown, but no "close notify" alert
+is sent to the peer. This behaviour violates the TLS standard.
+
+The default is normal shutdown behaviour as described by the TLS standard.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown() and SSL_set_quiet_shutdown() do not return
+diagnostic information.
+
+SSL_CTX_get_quiet_shutdown() and SSL_get_quiet_shutdown return the current
+setting.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(3)>, L<SSL_shutdown(3)>,
+L<SSL_set_shutdown(3)>, L<SSL_new(3)>,
+L<SSL_clear(3)>, L<SSL_free(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bea8390
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead, SSL_CTX_get_read_ahead,
+SSL_set_read_ahead, SSL_get_read_ahead,
+SSL_CTX_get_default_read_ahead
+- manage whether to read as many input bytes as possible
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ void SSL_set_read_ahead(SSL *s, int yes);
+ int SSL_get_read_ahead(const SSL *s);
+
+ SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead(SSL_CTX *ctx, int yes);
+ long SSL_CTX_get_read_ahead(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+ long SSL_CTX_get_default_read_ahead(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead() and SSL_set_read_ahead() set whether we should read as
+many input bytes as possible (for non-blocking reads) or not. For example if
+B<x> bytes are currently required by OpenSSL, but B<y> bytes are available from
+the underlying BIO (where B<y> > B<x>), then OpenSSL will read all B<y> bytes
+into its buffer (providing that the buffer is large enough) if reading ahead is
+on, or B<x> bytes otherwise. The parameter B<yes> or B<m> should be 0 to ensure
+reading ahead is off, or non zero otherwise.
+SSL_CTX_set_default_read_ahead() is identical to SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead().
+
+SSL_CTX_get_read_ahead() and SSL_get_read_ahead() indicate whether reading
+ahead has been set or not.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+These functions have no impact when used with DTLS. The return values for
+SSL_CTX_get_read_head() and SSL_get_read_ahead() are undefined for DTLS. Setting
+B<read_ahead> can impact the behaviour of the SSL_pending() function
+(see L<SSL_pending(3)>).
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+SSL_get_read_ahead() and SSL_CTX_get_read_ahead() return 0 if reading ahead is off,
+and non zero otherwise.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(3)>, L<SSL_pending(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_security_level.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_security_level.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..577b393
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_security_level.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_CTX_set_security_level, SSL_set_security_level, SSL_CTX_get_security_level, SSL_get_security_level, SSL_CTX_set_security_callback, SSL_set_security_callback, SSL_CTX_get_security_callback, SSL_get_security_callback, SSL_CTX_set0_security_ex_data, SSL_set0_security_ex_data, SSL_CTX_get0_security_ex_data, SSL_get0_security_ex_data - SSL/TLS security framework
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ void SSL_CTX_set_security_level(SSL_CTX *ctx, int level);
+ void SSL_set_security_level(SSL *s, int level);
+
+ int SSL_CTX_get_security_level(const SSL_CTX *ctx);
+ int SSL_get_security_level(const SSL *s);
+
+ void SSL_CTX_set_security_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                int (*cb)(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, int bits, int nid,
+                                                        void *other, void *ex));
+
+ void SSL_set_security_callback(SSL *s,
+                int (*cb)(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, int bits, int nid,
+                                                        void *other, void *ex));
+
+ int (*SSL_CTX_get_security_callback(const SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other, void *ex);
+ int (*SSL_get_security_callback(const SSL *s))(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other, void *ex);
+
+ void SSL_CTX_set0_security_ex_data(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *ex);
+ void SSL_set0_security_ex_data(SSL *s, void *ex);
+
+ void *SSL_CTX_get0_security_ex_data(const SSL_CTX *ctx);
+ void *SSL_get0_security_ex_data(const SSL *s);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The functions SSL_CTX_set_security_level() and SSL_set_security_level() set
+the security level to B<level>. If not set the library default security level
+is used.
+
+The functions SSL_CTX_get_security_level() and SSL_get_security_level()
+retrieve the current security level.
+
+SSL_CTX_set_security_callback(), SSL_set_security_callback(),
+SSL_CTX_get_security_callback() and SSL_get_security_callback() get or set
+the security callback associated with B<ctx> or B<s>. If not set a default
+security callback is used. The meaning of the parameters and the behaviour
+of the default callbacks is described below.
+
+SSL_CTX_set0_security_ex_data(), SSL_set0_security_ex_data(),
+SSL_CTX_get0_security_ex_data() and SSL_get0_security_ex_data() set the
+extra data pointer passed to the B<ex> parameter of the callback. This
+value is passed to the callback verbatim and can be set to any convenient
+application specific value.
+
+=head1 DEFAULT CALLBACK BEHAVIOUR
+
+If an application doesn't set its own security callback the default
+callback is used. It is intended to provide sane defaults. The meaning
+of each level is described below.
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<Level 0>
+
+Everything is permitted. This retains compatibility with previous versions of
+OpenSSL.
+
+=item B<Level 1>
+
+The security level corresponds to a minimum of 80 bits of security. Any
+parameters offering below 80 bits of security are excluded. As a result RSA,
+DSA and DH keys shorter than 1024 bits and ECC keys shorter than 160 bits
+are prohibited. All export ciphersuites are prohibited since they all offer
+less than 80 bits of security. SSL version 2 is prohibited. Any ciphersuite
+using MD5 for the MAC is also prohibited.
+
+=item B<Level 2>
+
+Security level set to 112 bits of security. As a result RSA, DSA and DH keys
+shorter than 2048 bits and ECC keys shorter than 224 bits are prohibited.
+In addition to the level 1 exclusions any ciphersuite using RC4 is also
+prohibited. SSL version 3 is also not allowed. Compression is disabled.
+
+=item B<Level 3>
+
+Security level set to 128 bits of security. As a result RSA, DSA and DH keys
+shorter than 3072 bits and ECC keys shorter than 256 bits are prohibited.
+In addition to the level 2 exclusions ciphersuites not offering forward
+secrecy are prohibited. TLS versions below 1.1 are not permitted. Session
+tickets are disabled.
+
+=item B<Level 4>
+
+Security level set to 192 bits of security. As a result RSA, DSA and DH keys
+shorter than 7680 bits and ECC keys shorter than 384 bits are prohibited.
+Ciphersuites using SHA1 for the MAC are prohibited. TLS versions below 1.2 are
+not permitted.
+
+=item B<Level 5>
+
+Security level set to 256 bits of security. As a result RSA, DSA and DH keys
+shorter than 15360 bits and ECC keys shorter than 512 bits are prohibited.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 APPLICATION DEFINED SECURITY CALLBACKS
+
+I<Documentation to be provided.>
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+B<WARNING> at this time setting the security level higher than 1 for
+general internet use is likely to cause B<considerable> interoperability
+issues and is not recommended. This is because the B<SHA1> algorithm
+is very widely used in certificates and will be rejected at levels
+higher than 1 because it only offers 80 bits of security.
+
+The default security level can be configured when OpenSSL is compiled by
+setting B<-DOPENSSL_TLS_SECURITY_LEVEL=level>. If not set then 1 is used.
+
+The security framework disables or reject parameters inconsistent with the
+set security level. In the past this was difficult as applications had to set
+a number of distinct parameters (supported ciphers, supported curves supported
+signature algorithms) to achieve this end and some cases (DH parameter size
+for example) could not be checked at all.
+
+By setting an appropriate security level much of this complexity can be
+avoided.
+
+The bits of security limits affect all relevant parameters including
+ciphersuite encryption algorithms, supported ECC curves, supported
+signature algorithms, DH parameter sizes, certificate key sizes and
+signature algorithms. This limit applies no matter what other custom
+settings an application has set: so if the ciphersuite is set to B<ALL>
+then only ciphersuites consistent with the security level are permissible.
+
+See SP800-57 for how the security limits are related to individual
+algorithms.
+
+Some security levels require large key sizes for non-ECC public key
+algorithms which can severely degrade performance. For example 256 bits
+of security requires the use of RSA keys of at least 15360 bits in size.
+
+Some restrictions can be gracefully handled: for example ciphersuites
+offering insufficient security are not sent by the client and will not
+be selected by the server. Other restrictions such as the peer certificate
+key size or the DH parameter size will abort the handshake with a fatal
+alert.
+
+Attempts to set certificates or parameters with insufficient security are
+also blocked. For example trying to set a certificate using a 512 bit RSA
+key using SSL_CTX_use_certificate() at level 1. Applications which do not
+check the return values for errors will misbehave: for example it might
+appear that a certificate is not set at all because it had been rejected.
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+These functions were first added to OpenSSL 1.1.0
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2014-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b237076
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode, SSL_CTX_get_session_cache_mode - enable/disable session caching
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ long SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(SSL_CTX ctx, long mode);
+ long SSL_CTX_get_session_cache_mode(SSL_CTX ctx);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode() enables/disables session caching
+by setting the operational mode for B<ctx> to <mode>.
+
+SSL_CTX_get_session_cache_mode() returns the currently used cache mode.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The OpenSSL library can store/retrieve SSL/TLS sessions for later reuse.
+The sessions can be held in memory for each B<ctx>, if more than one
+SSL_CTX object is being maintained, the sessions are unique for each SSL_CTX
+object.
+
+In order to reuse a session, a client must send the session's id to the
+server. It can only send exactly one id.  The server then either
+agrees to reuse the session or it starts a full handshake (to create a new
+session).
+
+A server will look up the session in its internal session storage. If the
+session is not found in internal storage or lookups for the internal storage
+have been deactivated (SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP), the server will try
+the external storage if available.
+
+Since a client may try to reuse a session intended for use in a different
+context, the session id context must be set by the server (see
+L<SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(3)>).
+
+The following session cache modes and modifiers are available:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item SSL_SESS_CACHE_OFF
+
+No session caching for client or server takes place.
+
+=item SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
+
+Client sessions are added to the session cache. As there is no reliable way
+for the OpenSSL library to know whether a session should be reused or which
+session to choose (due to the abstract BIO layer the SSL engine does not
+have details about the connection), the application must select the session
+to be reused by using the L<SSL_set_session(3)>
+function. This option is not activated by default.
+
+=item SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
+
+Server sessions are added to the session cache. When a client proposes a
+session to be reused, the server looks for the corresponding session in (first)
+the internal session cache (unless SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP is set),
+then (second) in the external cache if available. If the session is found, the
+server will try to reuse the session.  This is the default.
+
+=item SSL_SESS_CACHE_BOTH
+
+Enable both SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT and SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER at the same time.
+
+=item SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR
+
+Normally the session cache is checked for expired sessions every
+255 connections using the
+L<SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(3)> function. Since
+this may lead to a delay which cannot be controlled, the automatic
+flushing may be disabled and
+L<SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(3)> can be called
+explicitly by the application.
+
+=item SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP
+
+By setting this flag, session-resume operations in an SSL/TLS server will not
+automatically look up sessions in the internal cache, even if sessions are
+automatically stored there. If external session caching callbacks are in use,
+this flag guarantees that all lookups are directed to the external cache.
+As automatic lookup only applies for SSL/TLS servers, the flag has no effect on
+clients.
+
+=item SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE
+
+Depending on the presence of SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT and/or SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER,
+sessions negotiated in an SSL/TLS handshake may be cached for possible reuse.
+Normally a new session is added to the internal cache as well as any external
+session caching (callback) that is configured for the SSL_CTX. This flag will
+prevent sessions being stored in the internal cache (though the application can
+add them manually using L<SSL_CTX_add_session(3)>). Note:
+in any SSL/TLS servers where external caching is configured, any successful
+session lookups in the external cache (ie. for session-resume requests) would
+normally be copied into the local cache before processing continues - this flag
+prevents these additions to the internal cache as well.
+
+=item SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL
+
+Enable both SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP and
+SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE at the same time.
+
+
+=back
+
+The default mode is SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode() returns the previously set cache mode.
+
+SSL_CTX_get_session_cache_mode() returns the currently set cache mode.
+
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(3)>, L<SSL_set_session(3)>,
+L<SSL_session_reused(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_add_session(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_sess_number(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_timeout(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a873b03
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context, SSL_set_session_id_context - set context within which session can be reused (server side only)
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ int SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sid_ctx,
+                                    unsigned int sid_ctx_len);
+ int SSL_set_session_id_context(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *sid_ctx,
+                                unsigned int sid_ctx_len);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context() sets the context B<sid_ctx> of length
+B<sid_ctx_len> within which a session can be reused for the B<ctx> object.
+
+SSL_set_session_id_context() sets the context B<sid_ctx> of length
+B<sid_ctx_len> within which a session can be reused for the B<ssl> object.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+Sessions are generated within a certain context. When exporting/importing
+sessions with B<i2d_SSL_SESSION>/B<d2i_SSL_SESSION> it would be possible,
+to re-import a session generated from another context (e.g. another
+application), which might lead to malfunctions. Therefore each application
+must set its own session id context B<sid_ctx> which is used to distinguish
+the contexts and is stored in exported sessions. The B<sid_ctx> can be
+any kind of binary data with a given length, it is therefore possible
+to use e.g. the name of the application and/or the hostname and/or service
+name ...
+
+The session id context becomes part of the session. The session id context
+is set by the SSL/TLS server. The SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context() and
+SSL_set_session_id_context() functions are therefore only useful on the
+server side.
+
+OpenSSL clients will check the session id context returned by the server
+when reusing a session.
+
+The maximum length of the B<sid_ctx> is limited to
+B<SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH>.
+
+=head1 WARNINGS
+
+If the session id context is not set on an SSL/TLS server and client
+certificates are used, stored sessions
+will not be reused but a fatal error will be flagged and the handshake
+will fail.
+
+If a server returns a different session id context to an OpenSSL client
+when reusing a session, an error will be flagged and the handshake will
+fail. OpenSSL servers will always return the correct session id context,
+as an OpenSSL server checks the session id context itself before reusing
+a session as described above.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context() and SSL_set_session_id_context()
+return the following values:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item Z<>0
+
+The length B<sid_ctx_len> of the session id context B<sid_ctx> exceeded
+the maximum allowed length of B<SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH>. The error
+is logged to the error stack.
+
+=item Z<>1
+
+The operation succeeded.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_split_send_fragment.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_split_send_fragment.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..accf5af
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_split_send_fragment.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_CTX_set_max_send_fragment, SSL_set_max_send_fragment,
+SSL_CTX_set_split_send_fragment, SSL_set_split_send_fragment,
+SSL_CTX_set_max_pipelines, SSL_set_max_pipelines,
+SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len, SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len - Control
+fragment sizes and pipelining operations
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ long SSL_CTX_set_max_send_fragment(SSL_CTX *ctx, long);
+ long SSL_set_max_send_fragment(SSL *ssl, long m);
+
+ long SSL_CTX_set_max_pipelines(SSL_CTX *ctx, long m);
+ long SSL_set_max_pipelines(SSL_CTX *ssl, long m);
+
+ long SSL_CTX_set_split_send_fragment(SSL_CTX *ctx, long m);
+ long SSL_set_split_send_fragment(SSL *ssl, long m);
+
+ void SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t len);
+ void SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL *s, size_t len);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+Some engines are able to process multiple simultaneous crypto operations. This
+capability could be utilised to parallelise the processing of a single
+connection. For example a single write can be split into multiple records and
+each one encrypted independently and in parallel. Note: this will only work in
+TLS1.1+. There is no support in SSLv3, TLSv1.0 or DTLS (any version). This
+capability is known as "pipelining" within OpenSSL.
+
+In order to benefit from the pipelining capability. You need to have an engine
+that provides ciphers that support this. The OpenSSL "dasync" engine provides
+AES128-SHA based ciphers that have this capability. However these are for
+development and test purposes only.
+
+SSL_CTX_set_max_send_fragment() and SSL_set_max_send_fragment() set the
+B<max_send_fragment> parameter for SSL_CTX and SSL objects respectively. This
+value restricts the amount of plaintext bytes that will be sent in any one
+SSL/TLS record. By default its value is SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH (16384). These
+functions will only accept a value in the range 512 - SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH.
+
+SSL_CTX_set_max_pipelines() and SSL_set_max_pipelines() set the maximum number
+of pipelines that will be used at any one time. This value applies to both
+"read" pipelining and "write" pipelining. By default only one pipeline will be
+used (i.e. normal non-parallel operation). The number of pipelines set must be
+in the range 1 - SSL_MAX_PIPELINES (32). Setting this to a value > 1 will also
+automatically turn on "read_ahead" (see L<SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead(3)>). This is
+explained further below. OpenSSL will only every use more than one pipeline if
+a ciphersuite is negotiated that uses a pipeline capable cipher provided by an
+engine.
+
+Pipelining operates slightly differently for reading encrypted data compared to
+writing encrypted data. SSL_CTX_set_split_send_fragment() and
+SSL_set_split_send_fragment() define how data is split up into pipelines when
+writing encrypted data. The number of pipelines used will be determined by the
+amount of data provided to the SSL_write() call divided by
+B<split_send_fragment>.
+
+For example if B<split_send_fragment> is set to 2000 and B<max_pipelines> is 4
+then:
+
+SSL_write called with 0-2000 bytes == 1 pipeline used
+
+SSL_write called with 2001-4000 bytes == 2 pipelines used
+
+SSL_write called with 4001-6000 bytes == 3 pipelines used
+
+SSL_write called with 6001+ bytes == 4 pipelines used
+
+B<split_send_fragment> must always be less than or equal to
+B<max_send_fragment>. By default it is set to be equal to B<max_send_fragment>.
+This will mean that the same number of records will always be created as would
+have been created in the non-parallel case, although the data will be
+apportioned differently. In the parallel case data will be spread equally
+between the pipelines.
+
+Read pipelining is controlled in a slightly different way than with write
+pipelining. While reading we are constrained by the number of records that the
+peer (and the network) can provide to us in one go. The more records we can get
+in one go the more opportunity we have to parallelise the processing. As noted
+above when setting B<max_pipelines> to a value greater than one, B<read_ahead>
+is automatically set. The B<read_ahead> parameter causes OpenSSL to attempt to
+read as much data into the read buffer as the network can provide and will fit
+into the buffer. Without this set data is read into the read buffer one record
+at a time. The more data that can be read, the more opportunity there is for
+parallelising the processing at the cost of increased memory overhead per
+connection. Setting B<read_ahead> can impact the behaviour of the SSL_pending()
+function (see L<SSL_pending(3)>).
+
+The SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len() and SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len()
+functions control the size of the read buffer that will be used. The B<len>
+parameter sets the size of the buffer. The value will only be used if it is
+greater than the default that would have been used anyway. The normal default
+value depends on a number of factors but it will be at least
+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD (16704) bytes.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+All non-void functions return 1 on success and 0 on failure.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+With the exception of SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len() and
+SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len() all these functions are implemented using
+macros.
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+The SSL_CTX_set_max_pipelines(), SSL_set_max_pipelines(),
+SSL_CTX_set_split_send_fragment(), SSL_set_split_send_fragment(),
+SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len() and  SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len()
+functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead(3)>, L<SSL_pending(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..22c0370
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version, SSL_set_ssl_method, SSL_get_ssl_method
+- choose a new TLS/SSL method
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ int SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SSL_METHOD *method);
+ int SSL_set_ssl_method(SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *method);
+ const SSL_METHOD *SSL_get_ssl_method(SSL *ssl);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version() sets a new default TLS/SSL B<method> for SSL objects
+newly created from this B<ctx>. SSL objects already created with
+L<SSL_new(3)> are not affected, except when
+L<SSL_clear(3)> is being called.
+
+SSL_set_ssl_method() sets a new TLS/SSL B<method> for a particular B<ssl>
+object. It may be reset, when SSL_clear() is called.
+
+SSL_get_ssl_method() returns a function pointer to the TLS/SSL method
+set in B<ssl>.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The available B<method> choices are described in
+L<SSL_CTX_new(3)>.
+
+When L<SSL_clear(3)> is called and no session is connected to
+an SSL object, the method of the SSL object is reset to the method currently
+set in the corresponding SSL_CTX object.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+The following return values can occur for SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version()
+and SSL_set_ssl_method():
+
+=over 4
+
+=item Z<>0
+
+The new choice failed, check the error stack to find out the reason.
+
+=item Z<>1
+
+The operation succeeded.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<SSL_CTX_new(3)>, L<SSL_new(3)>,
+L<SSL_clear(3)>, L<ssl(3)>,
+L<SSL_set_connect_state(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_timeout.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_timeout.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..470efdf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_timeout.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_CTX_set_timeout, SSL_CTX_get_timeout - manipulate timeout values for session caching
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ long SSL_CTX_set_timeout(SSL_CTX *ctx, long t);
+ long SSL_CTX_get_timeout(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_CTX_set_timeout() sets the timeout for newly created sessions for
+B<ctx> to B<t>. The timeout value B<t> must be given in seconds.
+
+SSL_CTX_get_timeout() returns the currently set timeout value for B<ctx>.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+Whenever a new session is created, it is assigned a maximum lifetime. This
+lifetime is specified by storing the creation time of the session and the
+timeout value valid at this time. If the actual time is later than creation
+time plus timeout, the session is not reused.
+
+Due to this realization, all sessions behave according to the timeout value
+valid at the time of the session negotiation. Changes of the timeout value
+do not affect already established sessions.
+
+The expiration time of a single session can be modified using the
+L<SSL_SESSION_get_time(3)> family of functions.
+
+Expired sessions are removed from the internal session cache, whenever
+L<SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(3)> is called, either
+directly by the application or automatically (see
+L<SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(3)>)
+
+The default value for session timeout is decided on a per protocol
+basis, see L<SSL_get_default_timeout(3)>.
+All currently supported protocols have the same default timeout value
+of 300 seconds.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+SSL_CTX_set_timeout() returns the previously set timeout value.
+
+SSL_CTX_get_timeout() returns the currently set timeout value.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(3)>,
+L<SSL_SESSION_get_time(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(3)>,
+L<SSL_get_default_timeout(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c12ff0e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb,
+SSL_CTX_get_tlsext_status_cb,
+SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg,
+SSL_CTX_get_tlsext_status_arg,
+SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_type,
+SSL_CTX_get_tlsext_status_type,
+SSL_set_tlsext_status_type,
+SSL_get_tlsext_status_type,
+SSL_get_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp,
+SSL_set_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp
+- OCSP Certificate Status Request functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/tls1.h>
+
+ long SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                   int (*callback)(SSL *, void *));
+ long SSL_CTX_get_tlsext_status_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                   int (**callback)(SSL *, void *));
+
+ long SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *arg);
+ long SSL_CTX_get_tlsext_status_arg(SSL_CTX *ctx, void **arg);
+
+ long SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_type(SSL_CTX *ctx, int type);
+ long SSL_CTX_get_tlsext_status_type(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+
+ long SSL_set_tlsext_status_type(SSL *s, int type);
+ long SSL_get_tlsext_status_type(SSL *s);
+
+ long SSL_get_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(ssl, unsigned char **resp);
+ long SSL_set_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(ssl, unsigned char *resp, int len);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+A client application may request that a server send back an OCSP status response
+(also known as OCSP stapling). To do so the client should call the
+SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_type() function prior to the creation of any SSL
+objects. Alternatively an application can call the SSL_set_tlsext_status_type()
+function on an individual SSL object prior to the start of the handshake.
+Currently the only supported type is B<TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp>. This value
+should be passed in the B<type> argument. Calling
+SSL_CTX_get_tlsext_status_type() will return the type B<TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp>
+previously set via SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_type() or -1 if not set.
+
+The client should additionally provide a callback function to decide what to do
+with the returned OCSP response by calling SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(). The
+callback function should determine whether the returned OCSP response is
+acceptable or not. The callback will be passed as an argument the value
+previously set via a call to SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(). Note that the
+callback will not be called in the event of a handshake where session resumption
+occurs (because there are no Certificates exchanged in such a handshake).
+The callback previously set via SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb() can be retrieved
+by calling SSL_CTX_get_tlsext_status_cb(), and the argument by calling
+SSL_CTX_get_tlsext_status_arg().
+
+On the client side SSL_get_tlsext_status_type() can be used to determine whether
+the client has previously called SSL_set_tlsext_status_type(). It will return
+B<TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp> if it has been called or -1 otherwise. On the server
+side SSL_get_tlsext_status_type() can be used to determine whether the client
+requested OCSP stapling. If the client requested it then this function will
+return B<TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp>, or -1 otherwise.
+
+The response returned by the server can be obtained via a call to
+SSL_get_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(). The value B<*resp> will be updated to point
+to the OCSP response data and the return value will be the length of that data.
+Typically a callback would obtain an OCSP_RESPONSE object from this data via a
+call to the d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE() function. If the server has not provided any
+response data then B<*resp> will be NULL and the return value from
+SSL_get_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp() will be -1.
+
+A server application must also call the SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb() function
+if it wants to be able to provide clients with OCSP Certificate Status
+responses. Typically the server callback would obtain the server certificate
+that is being sent back to the client via a call to SSL_get_certificate();
+obtain the OCSP response to be sent back; and then set that response data by
+calling SSL_set_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(). A pointer to the response data should
+be provided in the B<resp> argument, and the length of that data should be in
+the B<len> argument.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+The callback when used on the client side should return a negative value on
+error; 0 if the response is not acceptable (in which case the handshake will
+fail) or a positive value if it is acceptable.
+
+The callback when used on the server side should return with either
+SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK (meaning that the OCSP response that has been set should be
+returned), SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK (meaning that an OCSP response should not be
+returned) or SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL (meaning that a fatal error has
+occurred).
+
+SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(), SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(),
+SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_type(), SSL_set_tlsext_status_type() and
+SSL_set_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp() return 0 on error or 1 on success.
+
+SSL_CTX_get_tlsext_status_type() returns the value previously set by
+SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_type(), or -1 if not set.
+
+SSL_get_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp() returns the length of the OCSP response data
+or -1 if there is no OCSP response data.
+
+SSL_get_tlsext_status_type() returns B<TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp> on the client
+side if SSL_set_tlsext_status_type() was previously called, or on the server
+side if the client requested OCSP stapling. Otherwise -1 is returned.
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+SSL_get_tlsext_status_type(), SSL_CTX_get_tlsext_status_type() and
+SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_type() were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..34d8ce9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,198 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb - set a callback for session ticket processing
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/tls1.h>
+
+ long SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb(SSL_CTX sslctx,
+        int (*cb)(SSL *s, unsigned char key_name[16],
+                  unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH],
+                  EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, HMAC_CTX *hctx, int enc));
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb() sets a callback function I<cb> for handling
+session tickets for the ssl context I<sslctx>. Session tickets, defined in
+RFC5077 provide an enhanced session resumption capability where the server
+implementation is not required to maintain per session state. It only applies
+to TLS and there is no SSLv3 implementation.
+
+The callback function I<cb> will be called for every client instigated TLS
+session when session ticket extension is presented in the TLS hello
+message. It is the responsibility of this function to create or retrieve the
+cryptographic parameters and to maintain their state.
+
+The OpenSSL library uses your callback function to help implement a common TLS
+ticket construction state according to RFC5077 Section 4 such that per session
+state is unnecessary and a small set of cryptographic variables needs to be
+maintained by the callback function implementation.
+
+In order to reuse a session, a TLS client must send the a session ticket
+extension to the server. The client can only send exactly one session ticket.
+The server, through the callback function, either agrees to reuse the session
+ticket information or it starts a full TLS handshake to create a new session
+ticket.
+
+Before the callback function is started I<ctx> and I<hctx> have been
+initialised with EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init and HMAC_CTX_init respectively.
+
+For new sessions tickets, when the client doesn't present a session ticket, or
+an attempted retrieval of the ticket failed, or a renew option was indicated,
+the callback function will be called with I<enc> equal to 1. The OpenSSL
+library expects that the function will set an arbitrary I<name>, initialize
+I<iv>, and set the cipher context I<ctx> and the hash context I<hctx>.
+
+The I<name> is 16 characters long and is used as a key identifier.
+
+The I<iv> length is the length of the IV of the corresponding cipher. The
+maximum IV length is B<EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH> bytes defined in B<evp.h>.
+
+The initialization vector I<iv> should be a random value. The cipher context
+I<ctx> should use the initialisation vector I<iv>. The cipher context can be
+set using L<EVP_EncryptInit_ex(3)>. The hmac context can be set using
+L<HMAC_Init_ex(3)>.
+
+When the client presents a session ticket, the callback function with be called
+with I<enc> set to 0 indicating that the I<cb> function should retrieve a set
+of parameters. In this case I<name> and I<iv> have already been parsed out of
+the session ticket. The OpenSSL library expects that the I<name> will be used
+to retrieve a cryptographic parameters and that the cryptographic context
+I<ctx> will be set with the retrieved parameters and the initialization vector
+I<iv>. using a function like L<EVP_DecryptInit_ex(3)>. The I<hctx> needs to be
+set using L<HMAC_Init_ex(3)>.
+
+If the I<name> is still valid but a renewal of the ticket is required the
+callback function should return 2. The library will call the callback again
+with an argument of enc equal to 1 to set the new ticket.
+
+The return value of the I<cb> function is used by OpenSSL to determine what
+further processing will occur. The following return values have meaning:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item Z<>2
+
+This indicates that the I<ctx> and I<hctx> have been set and the session can
+continue on those parameters. Additionally it indicates that the session
+ticket is in a renewal period and should be replaced. The OpenSSL library will
+call I<cb> again with an enc argument of 1 to set the new ticket (see RFC5077
+3.3 paragraph 2).
+
+=item Z<>1
+
+This indicates that the I<ctx> and I<hctx> have been set and the session can
+continue on those parameters.
+
+=item Z<>0
+
+This indicates that it was not possible to set/retrieve a session ticket and
+the SSL/TLS session will continue by negotiating a set of cryptographic
+parameters or using the alternate SSL/TLS resumption mechanism, session ids.
+
+If called with enc equal to 0 the library will call the I<cb> again to get
+a new set of parameters.
+
+=item less than 0
+
+This indicates an error.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+Session resumption shortcuts the TLS so that the client certificate
+negotiation don't occur. It makes up for this by storing client certificate
+an all other negotiated state information encrypted within the ticket. In a
+resumed session the applications will have all this state information available
+exactly as if a full negotiation had occurred.
+
+If an attacker can obtain the key used to encrypt a session ticket, they can
+obtain the master secret for any ticket using that key and decrypt any traffic
+using that session: even if the ciphersuite supports forward secrecy. As
+a result applications may wish to use multiple keys and avoid using long term
+keys stored in files.
+
+Applications can use longer keys to maintain a consistent level of security.
+For example if a ciphersuite uses 256 bit ciphers but only a 128 bit ticket key
+the overall security is only 128 bits because breaking the ticket key will
+enable an attacker to obtain the session keys.
+
+=head1 EXAMPLES
+
+Reference Implementation:
+  SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb(SSL, ssl_tlsext_ticket_key_cb);
+  ....
+
+  static int ssl_tlsext_ticket_key_cb(SSL *s, unsigned char key_name[16], unsigned char *iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, HMAC_CTX *hctx, int enc)
+  {
+      if (enc) { /* create new session */
+          if (RAND_bytes(iv, EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) ) {
+              return -1; /* insufficient random */
+          }
+
+          key = currentkey(); /* something that you need to implement */
+          if ( !key ) {
+              /* current key doesn't exist or isn't valid */
+              key = createkey(); /* something that you need to implement.
+                                   * createkey needs to initialise, a name,
+                                   * an aes_key, a hmac_key and optionally
+                                   * an expire time. */
+              if ( !key ) { /* key couldn't be created */
+                  return 0;
+              }
+          }
+          memcpy(key_name, key->name, 16);
+
+          EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, key->aes_key, iv);
+          HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, key->hmac_key, 16, EVP_sha256(), NULL);
+
+          return 1;
+
+      } else { /* retrieve session */
+          key = findkey(name);
+
+          if  (!key || key->expire < now() ) {
+              return 0;
+          }
+
+          HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, key->hmac_key, 16, EVP_sha256(), NULL);
+          EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, key->aes_key, iv );
+
+          if (key->expire < ( now() - RENEW_TIME ) ) {
+              /* return 2 - this session will get a new ticket even though the current is still valid */
+              return 2;
+          }
+          return 1;
+
+      }
+  }
+
+
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+returns 0 to indicate the callback function was set.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(3)>, L<SSL_set_session(3)>,
+L<SSL_session_reused(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_add_session(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_sess_number(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(3)>,
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2014-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fbfb8cb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback, SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh, SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback, SSL_set_tmp_dh - handle DH keys for ephemeral key exchange
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+            DH *(*tmp_dh_callback)(SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength));
+ long SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(SSL_CTX *ctx, DH *dh);
+
+ void SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL *ctx,
+            DH *(*tmp_dh_callback)(SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength));
+ long SSL_set_tmp_dh(SSL *ssl, DH *dh)
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback() sets the callback function for B<ctx> to be
+used when a DH parameters are required to B<tmp_dh_callback>.
+The callback is inherited by all B<ssl> objects created from B<ctx>.
+
+SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh() sets DH parameters to be used to be B<dh>.
+The key is inherited by all B<ssl> objects created from B<ctx>.
+
+SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback() sets the callback only for B<ssl>.
+
+SSL_set_tmp_dh() sets the parameters only for B<ssl>.
+
+These functions apply to SSL/TLS servers only.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+When using a cipher with RSA authentication, an ephemeral DH key exchange
+can take place. Ciphers with DSA keys always use ephemeral DH keys as well.
+In these cases, the session data are negotiated using the
+ephemeral/temporary DH key and the key supplied and certified
+by the certificate chain is only used for signing.
+Anonymous ciphers (without a permanent server key) also use ephemeral DH keys.
+
+Using ephemeral DH key exchange yields forward secrecy, as the connection
+can only be decrypted, when the DH key is known. By generating a temporary
+DH key inside the server application that is lost when the application
+is left, it becomes impossible for an attacker to decrypt past sessions,
+even if he gets hold of the normal (certified) key, as this key was
+only used for signing.
+
+In order to perform a DH key exchange the server must use a DH group
+(DH parameters) and generate a DH key. The server will always generate
+a new DH key during the negotiation.
+
+As generating DH parameters is extremely time consuming, an application
+should not generate the parameters on the fly but supply the parameters.
+DH parameters can be reused, as the actual key is newly generated during
+the negotiation. The risk in reusing DH parameters is that an attacker
+may specialize on a very often used DH group. Applications should therefore
+generate their own DH parameters during the installation process using the
+openssl L<dhparam(1)> application. This application
+guarantees that "strong" primes are used.
+
+Files dh2048.pem, and dh4096.pem in the 'apps' directory of the current
+version of the OpenSSL distribution contain the 'SKIP' DH parameters,
+which use safe primes and were generated verifiably pseudo-randomly.
+These files can be converted into C code using the B<-C> option of the
+L<dhparam(1)> application. Generation of custom DH
+parameters during installation should still be preferred to stop an
+attacker from specializing on a commonly used group. File dh1024.pem
+contains old parameters that must not be used by applications.
+
+An application may either directly specify the DH parameters or
+can supply the DH parameters via a callback function.
+
+Previous versions of the callback used B<is_export> and B<keylength>
+parameters to control parameter generation for export and non-export
+cipher suites. Modern servers that do not support export ciphersuites
+are advised to either use SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh() or alternatively, use
+the callback but ignore B<keylength> and B<is_export> and simply
+supply at least 2048-bit parameters in the callback.
+
+=head1 EXAMPLES
+
+Setup DH parameters with a key length of 2048 bits. (Error handling
+partly left out.)
+
+ Command-line parameter generation:
+ $ openssl dhparam -out dh_param_2048.pem 2048
+
+ Code for setting up parameters during server initialization:
+
+ ...
+ SSL_CTX ctx = SSL_CTX_new();
+ ...
+
+ /* Set up ephemeral DH parameters. */
+ DH *dh_2048 = NULL;
+ FILE *paramfile;
+ paramfile = fopen("dh_param_2048.pem", "r");
+ if (paramfile) {
+   dh_2048 = PEM_read_DHparams(paramfile, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+   fclose(paramfile);
+ } else {
+   /* Error. */
+ }
+ if (dh_2048 == NULL) {
+   /* Error. */
+ }
+ if (SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(ctx, dh_2048) != 1) {
+   /* Error. */
+ }
+ ...
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback() and SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback() do not return
+diagnostic output.
+
+SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh() and SSL_set_tmp_dh() do return 1 on success and 0
+on failure. Check the error queue to find out the reason of failure.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(3)>, L<SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_options(3)>,
+L<ciphers(1)>, L<dhparam(1)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_verify.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_verify.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7993498
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_verify.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,307 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx,
+SSL_CTX_set_verify, SSL_set_verify,
+SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth, SSL_set_verify_depth,
+SSL_verify_cb
+- set peer certificate verification parameters
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ void SSL_CTX_set_verify(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode, SSL_verify_cb verify_callback);
+ void SSL_set_verify(SSL *s, int mode, SSL_verify_cb verify_callback);
+ SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(void);
+
+ void SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(SSL_CTX *ctx, int depth);
+ void SSL_set_verify_depth(SSL *s, int depth);
+
+
+ typedef int (*SSL_verify_cb)(int preverify_ok, X509_STORE_CTX *x509_ctx);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_CTX_set_verify() sets the verification flags for B<ctx> to be B<mode> and
+specifies the B<verify_callback> function to be used. If no callback function
+shall be specified, the NULL pointer can be used for B<verify_callback>.
+
+SSL_set_verify() sets the verification flags for B<ssl> to be B<mode> and
+specifies the B<verify_callback> function to be used. If no callback function
+shall be specified, the NULL pointer can be used for B<verify_callback>. In
+this case last B<verify_callback> set specifically for this B<ssl> remains. If
+no special B<callback> was set before, the default callback for the underlying
+B<ctx> is used, that was valid at the time B<ssl> was created with
+L<SSL_new(3)>. Within the callback function,
+B<SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx> can be called to get the data index
+of the current SSL object that is doing the verification.
+
+SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth() sets the maximum B<depth> for the certificate chain
+verification that shall be allowed for B<ctx>.
+
+SSL_set_verify_depth() sets the maximum B<depth> for the certificate chain
+verification that shall be allowed for B<ssl>.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The verification of certificates can be controlled by a set of logically
+or'ed B<mode> flags:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item SSL_VERIFY_NONE
+
+B<Server mode:> the server will not send a client certificate request to the
+client, so the client will not send a certificate.
+
+B<Client mode:> if not using an anonymous cipher (by default disabled), the
+server will send a certificate which will be checked. The result of the
+certificate verification process can be checked after the TLS/SSL handshake
+using the L<SSL_get_verify_result(3)> function.
+The handshake will be continued regardless of the verification result.
+
+=item SSL_VERIFY_PEER
+
+B<Server mode:> the server sends a client certificate request to the client.
+The certificate returned (if any) is checked. If the verification process
+fails, the TLS/SSL handshake is
+immediately terminated with an alert message containing the reason for
+the verification failure.
+The behaviour can be controlled by the additional
+SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT and SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE flags.
+
+B<Client mode:> the server certificate is verified. If the verification process
+fails, the TLS/SSL handshake is
+immediately terminated with an alert message containing the reason for
+the verification failure. If no server certificate is sent, because an
+anonymous cipher is used, SSL_VERIFY_PEER is ignored.
+
+=item SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
+
+B<Server mode:> if the client did not return a certificate, the TLS/SSL
+handshake is immediately terminated with a "handshake failure" alert.
+This flag must be used together with SSL_VERIFY_PEER.
+
+B<Client mode:> ignored
+
+=item SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE
+
+B<Server mode:> only request a client certificate on the initial TLS/SSL
+handshake. Do not ask for a client certificate again in case of a
+renegotiation. This flag must be used together with SSL_VERIFY_PEER.
+
+B<Client mode:> ignored
+
+=back
+
+If the B<mode> is SSL_VERIFY_NONE none of the other flags may be set.
+
+The actual verification procedure is performed either using the built-in
+verification procedure or using another application provided verification
+function set with
+L<SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(3)>.
+The following descriptions apply in the case of the built-in procedure. An
+application provided procedure also has access to the verify depth information
+and the verify_callback() function, but the way this information is used
+may be different.
+
+SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth() and SSL_set_verify_depth() set a limit on the
+number of certificates between the end-entity and trust-anchor certificates.
+Neither the
+end-entity nor the trust-anchor certificates count against B<depth>. If the
+certificate chain needed to reach a trusted issuer is longer than B<depth+2>,
+X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG will be issued.
+The depth count is "level 0:peer certificate", "level 1: CA certificate",
+"level 2: higher level CA certificate", and so on. Setting the maximum
+depth to 2 allows the levels 0, 1, 2 and 3 (0 being the end-entity and 3 the
+trust-anchor).
+The default depth limit is 100,
+allowing for the peer certificate, at most 100 intermediate CA certificates and
+a final trust anchor certificate.
+
+The B<verify_callback> function is used to control the behaviour when the
+SSL_VERIFY_PEER flag is set. It must be supplied by the application and
+receives two arguments: B<preverify_ok> indicates, whether the verification of
+the certificate in question was passed (preverify_ok=1) or not
+(preverify_ok=0). B<x509_ctx> is a pointer to the complete context used
+for the certificate chain verification.
+
+The certificate chain is checked starting with the deepest nesting level
+(the root CA certificate) and worked upward to the peer's certificate.
+At each level signatures and issuer attributes are checked. Whenever
+a verification error is found, the error number is stored in B<x509_ctx>
+and B<verify_callback> is called with B<preverify_ok>=0. By applying
+X509_CTX_store_* functions B<verify_callback> can locate the certificate
+in question and perform additional steps (see EXAMPLES). If no error is
+found for a certificate, B<verify_callback> is called with B<preverify_ok>=1
+before advancing to the next level.
+
+The return value of B<verify_callback> controls the strategy of the further
+verification process. If B<verify_callback> returns 0, the verification
+process is immediately stopped with "verification failed" state. If
+SSL_VERIFY_PEER is set, a verification failure alert is sent to the peer and
+the TLS/SSL handshake is terminated. If B<verify_callback> returns 1,
+the verification process is continued. If B<verify_callback> always returns
+1, the TLS/SSL handshake will not be terminated with respect to verification
+failures and the connection will be established. The calling process can
+however retrieve the error code of the last verification error using
+L<SSL_get_verify_result(3)> or by maintaining its
+own error storage managed by B<verify_callback>.
+
+If no B<verify_callback> is specified, the default callback will be used.
+Its return value is identical to B<preverify_ok>, so that any verification
+failure will lead to a termination of the TLS/SSL handshake with an
+alert message, if SSL_VERIFY_PEER is set.
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+In client mode, it is not checked whether the SSL_VERIFY_PEER flag
+is set, but whether any flags are set. This can lead to
+unexpected behaviour if SSL_VERIFY_PEER and other flags are not used as
+required.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+The SSL*_set_verify*() functions do not provide diagnostic information.
+
+=head1 EXAMPLES
+
+The following code sequence realizes an example B<verify_callback> function
+that will always continue the TLS/SSL handshake regardless of verification
+failure, if wished. The callback realizes a verification depth limit with
+more informational output.
+
+All verification errors are printed; information about the certificate chain
+is printed on request.
+The example is realized for a server that does allow but not require client
+certificates.
+
+The example makes use of the ex_data technique to store application data
+into/retrieve application data from the SSL structure
+(see L<CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(3)>,
+L<SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(3)>).
+
+ ...
+ typedef struct {
+   int verbose_mode;
+   int verify_depth;
+   int always_continue;
+ } mydata_t;
+ int mydata_index;
+ ...
+ static int verify_callback(int preverify_ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+ {
+    char    buf[256];
+    X509   *err_cert;
+    int     err, depth;
+    SSL    *ssl;
+    mydata_t *mydata;
+
+    err_cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx);
+    err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
+    depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx);
+
+    /*
+     * Retrieve the pointer to the SSL of the connection currently treated
+     * and the application specific data stored into the SSL object.
+     */
+    ssl = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx());
+    mydata = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, mydata_index);
+
+    X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(err_cert), buf, 256);
+
+    /*
+     * Catch a too long certificate chain. The depth limit set using
+     * SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth() is by purpose set to "limit+1" so
+     * that whenever the "depth>verify_depth" condition is met, we
+     * have violated the limit and want to log this error condition.
+     * We must do it here, because the CHAIN_TOO_LONG error would not
+     * be found explicitly; only errors introduced by cutting off the
+     * additional certificates would be logged.
+     */
+    if (depth > mydata->verify_depth) {
+        preverify_ok = 0;
+        err = X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG;
+        X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, err);
+    }
+    if (!preverify_ok) {
+        printf("verify error:num=%d:%s:depth=%d:%s\n", err,
+                 X509_verify_cert_error_string(err), depth, buf);
+    }
+    else if (mydata->verbose_mode)
+    {
+        printf("depth=%d:%s\n", depth, buf);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * At this point, err contains the last verification error. We can use
+     * it for something special
+     */
+    if (!preverify_ok && (err == X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT))
+    {
+      X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(err_cert), buf, 256);
+      printf("issuer= %s\n", buf);
+    }
+
+    if (mydata->always_continue)
+      return 1;
+    else
+      return preverify_ok;
+ }
+ ...
+
+ mydata_t mydata;
+
+ ...
+ mydata_index = SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, "mydata index", NULL, NULL, NULL);
+
+ ...
+ SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx, SSL_VERIFY_PEER|SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE,
+                    verify_callback);
+
+ /*
+  * Let the verify_callback catch the verify_depth error so that we get
+  * an appropriate error in the logfile.
+  */
+ SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(verify_depth + 1);
+
+ /*
+  * Set up the SSL specific data into "mydata" and store it into th SSL
+  * structure.
+  */
+ mydata.verify_depth = verify_depth; ...
+ SSL_set_ex_data(ssl, mydata_index, &mydata);
+
+ ...
+ SSL_accept(ssl);       /* check of success left out for clarity */
+ if (peer = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl))
+ {
+   if (SSL_get_verify_result(ssl) == X509_V_OK)
+   {
+     /* The client sent a certificate which verified OK */
+   }
+ }
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(7)>, L<SSL_new(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode(3)>,
+L<SSL_get_verify_result(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(3)>,
+L<SSL_get_peer_certificate(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(3)>,
+L<SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(3)>,
+L<CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_use_certificate.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_use_certificate.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c645f58
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_use_certificate.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_CTX_use_certificate, SSL_CTX_use_certificate_ASN1,
+SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file, SSL_use_certificate, SSL_use_certificate_ASN1,
+SSL_use_certificate_file, SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file,
+SSL_use_certificate_chain_file,
+SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey, SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_ASN1,
+SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file, SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey,
+SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1, SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_file,
+SSL_use_PrivateKey_file, SSL_use_PrivateKey_ASN1, SSL_use_PrivateKey,
+SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey, SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1,
+SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_file, SSL_CTX_check_private_key, SSL_check_private_key
+- load certificate and key data
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ int SSL_CTX_use_certificate(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
+ int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_ASN1(SSL_CTX *ctx, int len, unsigned char *d);
+ int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file, int type);
+ int SSL_use_certificate(SSL *ssl, X509 *x);
+ int SSL_use_certificate_ASN1(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *d, int len);
+ int SSL_use_certificate_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file, int type);
+
+ int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file);
+ int SSL_use_certificate_chain_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file);
+
+ int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(SSL_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+ int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_ASN1(int pk, SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *d,
+                                 long len);
+ int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file, int type);
+ int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey(SSL_CTX *ctx, RSA *rsa);
+ int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *d, long len);
+ int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file, int type);
+ int SSL_use_PrivateKey(SSL *ssl, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+ int SSL_use_PrivateKey_ASN1(int pk, SSL *ssl, unsigned char *d, long len);
+ int SSL_use_PrivateKey_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file, int type);
+ int SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey(SSL *ssl, RSA *rsa);
+ int SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *d, long len);
+ int SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file, int type);
+
+ int SSL_CTX_check_private_key(const SSL_CTX *ctx);
+ int SSL_check_private_key(const SSL *ssl);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+These functions load the certificates and private keys into the SSL_CTX
+or SSL object, respectively.
+
+The SSL_CTX_* class of functions loads the certificates and keys into the
+SSL_CTX object B<ctx>. The information is passed to SSL objects B<ssl>
+created from B<ctx> with L<SSL_new(3)> by copying, so that
+changes applied to B<ctx> do not propagate to already existing SSL objects.
+
+The SSL_* class of functions only loads certificates and keys into a
+specific SSL object. The specific information is kept, when
+L<SSL_clear(3)> is called for this SSL object.
+
+SSL_CTX_use_certificate() loads the certificate B<x> into B<ctx>,
+SSL_use_certificate() loads B<x> into B<ssl>. The rest of the
+certificates needed to form the complete certificate chain can be
+specified using the
+L<SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(3)>
+function.
+
+SSL_CTX_use_certificate_ASN1() loads the ASN1 encoded certificate from
+the memory location B<d> (with length B<len>) into B<ctx>,
+SSL_use_certificate_ASN1() loads the ASN1 encoded certificate into B<ssl>.
+
+SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file() loads the first certificate stored in B<file>
+into B<ctx>. The formatting B<type> of the certificate must be specified
+from the known types SSL_FILETYPE_PEM, SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1.
+SSL_use_certificate_file() loads the certificate from B<file> into B<ssl>.
+See the NOTES section on why SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file()
+should be preferred.
+
+SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file() loads a certificate chain from
+B<file> into B<ctx>. The certificates must be in PEM format and must
+be sorted starting with the subject's certificate (actual client or server
+certificate), followed by intermediate CA certificates if applicable, and
+ending at the highest level (root) CA. SSL_use_certificate_chain_file() is
+similar except it loads the certificate chain into B<ssl>.
+
+SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey() adds B<pkey> as private key to B<ctx>.
+SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey() adds the private key B<rsa> of type RSA
+to B<ctx>. SSL_use_PrivateKey() adds B<pkey> as private key to B<ssl>;
+SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey() adds B<rsa> as private key of type RSA to B<ssl>.
+If a certificate has already been set and the private does not belong
+to the certificate an error is returned. To change a certificate, private
+key pair the new certificate needs to be set with SSL_use_certificate()
+or SSL_CTX_use_certificate() before setting the private key with
+SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey() or SSL_use_PrivateKey().
+
+
+SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_ASN1() adds the private key of type B<pk>
+stored at memory location B<d> (length B<len>) to B<ctx>.
+SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1() adds the private key of type RSA
+stored at memory location B<d> (length B<len>) to B<ctx>.
+SSL_use_PrivateKey_ASN1() and SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1() add the private
+key to B<ssl>.
+
+SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file() adds the first private key found in
+B<file> to B<ctx>. The formatting B<type> of the certificate must be specified
+from the known types SSL_FILETYPE_PEM, SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1.
+SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_file() adds the first private RSA key found in
+B<file> to B<ctx>. SSL_use_PrivateKey_file() adds the first private key found
+in B<file> to B<ssl>; SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_file() adds the first private
+RSA key found to B<ssl>.
+
+SSL_CTX_check_private_key() checks the consistency of a private key with
+the corresponding certificate loaded into B<ctx>. If more than one
+key/certificate pair (RSA/DSA) is installed, the last item installed will
+be checked. If e.g. the last item was a RSA certificate or key, the RSA
+key/certificate pair will be checked. SSL_check_private_key() performs
+the same check for B<ssl>. If no key/certificate was explicitly added for
+this B<ssl>, the last item added into B<ctx> will be checked.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The internal certificate store of OpenSSL can hold several private
+key/certificate pairs at a time. The certificate used depends on the
+cipher selected, see also L<SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(3)>.
+
+When reading certificates and private keys from file, files of type
+SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1 (also known as B<DER>, binary encoding) can only contain
+one certificate or private key, consequently
+SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file() is only applicable to PEM formatting.
+Files of type SSL_FILETYPE_PEM can contain more than one item.
+
+SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file() adds the first certificate found
+in the file to the certificate store. The other certificates are added
+to the store of chain certificates using L<SSL_CTX_add1_chain_cert(3)>. Note: versions of OpenSSL before 1.0.2 only had a single
+certificate chain store for all certificate types, OpenSSL 1.0.2 and later
+have a separate chain store for each type. SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file()
+should be used instead of the SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file() function in order
+to allow the use of complete certificate chains even when no trusted CA
+storage is used or when the CA issuing the certificate shall not be added to
+the trusted CA storage.
+
+If additional certificates are needed to complete the chain during the
+TLS negotiation, CA certificates are additionally looked up in the
+locations of trusted CA certificates, see
+L<SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(3)>.
+
+The private keys loaded from file can be encrypted. In order to successfully
+load encrypted keys, a function returning the passphrase must have been
+supplied, see
+L<SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(3)>.
+(Certificate files might be encrypted as well from the technical point
+of view, it however does not make sense as the data in the certificate
+is considered public anyway.)
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+On success, the functions return 1.
+Otherwise check out the error stack to find out the reason.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(3)>, L<SSL_new(3)>, L<SSL_clear(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..753074a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint, SSL_use_psk_identity_hint,
+SSL_CTX_set_psk_server_callback, SSL_set_psk_server_callback - set PSK
+identity hint to use
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ int SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *hint);
+ int SSL_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL *ssl, const char *hint);
+
+ void SSL_CTX_set_psk_server_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+        unsigned int (*callback)(SSL *ssl, const char *identity,
+        unsigned char *psk, int max_psk_len));
+ void SSL_set_psk_server_callback(SSL *ssl,
+        unsigned int (*callback)(SSL *ssl, const char *identity,
+        unsigned char *psk, int max_psk_len));
+
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint() sets the given B<NULL>-terminated PSK
+identity hint B<hint> to SSL context object
+B<ctx>. SSL_use_psk_identity_hint() sets the given B<NULL>-terminated
+PSK identity hint B<hint> to SSL connection object B<ssl>. If B<hint>
+is B<NULL> the current hint from B<ctx> or B<ssl> is deleted.
+
+In the case where PSK identity hint is B<NULL>, the server
+does not send the ServerKeyExchange message to the client.
+
+A server application must provide a callback function which is called
+when the server receives the ClientKeyExchange message from the
+client. The purpose of the callback function is to validate the
+received PSK identity and to fetch the pre-shared key used during the
+connection setup phase. The callback is set using functions
+SSL_CTX_set_psk_server_callback() or
+SSL_set_psk_server_callback(). The callback function is given the
+connection in parameter B<ssl>, B<NULL>-terminated PSK identity sent
+by the client in parameter B<identity>, and a buffer B<psk> of length
+B<max_psk_len> bytes where the pre-shared key is to be stored.
+
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint() and SSL_use_psk_identity_hint() return
+1 on success, 0 otherwise.
+
+Return values from the server callback are interpreted as follows:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item Z<>0
+
+PSK identity was not found. An "unknown_psk_identity" alert message
+will be sent and the connection setup fails.
+
+=item E<gt>0
+
+PSK identity was found and the server callback has provided the PSK
+successfully in parameter B<psk>. Return value is the length of
+B<psk> in bytes. It is an error to return a value greater than
+B<max_psk_len>.
+
+If the PSK identity was not found but the callback instructs the
+protocol to continue anyway, the callback must provide some random
+data to B<psk> and return the length of the random data, so the
+connection will fail with decryption_error before it will be finished
+completely.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+Copyright 2005 Nokia.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bd496ff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo, SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo_file - use serverinfo extension
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ int SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *serverinfo,
+                            size_t serverinfo_length);
+
+ int SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+These functions load "serverinfo" TLS ServerHello Extensions into the SSL_CTX.
+A "serverinfo" extension is returned in response to an empty ClientHello
+Extension.
+
+SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo() loads one or more serverinfo extensions from
+a byte array into B<ctx>.  The extensions must be concatenated into a
+sequence of bytes.  Each extension must consist of a 2-byte Extension Type,
+a 2-byte length, and then length bytes of extension_data.
+
+SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo_file() loads one or more serverinfo extensions from
+B<file> into B<ctx>.  The extensions must be in PEM format.  Each extension
+must consist of a 2-byte Extension Type, a 2-byte length, and then length
+bytes of extension_data.  Each PEM extension name must begin with the phrase
+"BEGIN SERVERINFO FOR ".
+
+If more than one certificate (RSA/DSA) is installed using
+SSL_CTX_use_certificate(), the serverinfo extension will be loaded into the
+last certificate installed.  If e.g. the last item was a RSA certificate, the
+loaded serverinfo extension data will be loaded for that certificate.  To
+use the serverinfo extension for multiple certificates,
+SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo() needs to be called multiple times, once B<after>
+each time a certificate is loaded.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+On success, the functions return 1.
+On failure, the functions return 0.  Check out the error stack to find out
+the reason.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2013-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_SESSION_free.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_SESSION_free.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5bea785
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_SESSION_free.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_SESSION_new,
+SSL_SESSION_up_ref,
+SSL_SESSION_free - create, free and manage SSL_SESSION structures
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_new(void);
+ int SSL_SESSION_up_ref(SSL_SESSION *ses);
+ void SSL_SESSION_free(SSL_SESSION *session);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_SESSION_new() creates a new SSL_SESSION structure and returns a pointer to
+it.
+
+SSL_SESSION_up_ref() increments the reference count on the given SSL_SESSION
+structure.
+
+SSL_SESSION_free() decrements the reference count of B<session> and removes
+the B<SSL_SESSION> structure pointed to by B<session> and frees up the allocated
+memory, if the reference count has reached 0.
+If B<session> is NULL nothing is done.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+SSL_SESSION objects are allocated, when a TLS/SSL handshake operation
+is successfully completed. Depending on the settings, see
+L<SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(3)>,
+the SSL_SESSION objects are internally referenced by the SSL_CTX and
+linked into its session cache. SSL objects may be using the SSL_SESSION object;
+as a session may be reused, several SSL objects may be using one SSL_SESSION
+object at the same time. It is therefore crucial to keep the reference
+count (usage information) correct and not delete a SSL_SESSION object
+that is still used, as this may lead to program failures due to
+dangling pointers. These failures may also appear delayed, e.g.
+when an SSL_SESSION object was completely freed as the reference count
+incorrectly became 0, but it is still referenced in the internal
+session cache and the cache list is processed during a
+L<SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(3)> operation.
+
+SSL_SESSION_free() must only be called for SSL_SESSION objects, for
+which the reference count was explicitly incremented (e.g.
+by calling SSL_get1_session(), see L<SSL_get_session(3)>)
+or when the SSL_SESSION object was generated outside a TLS handshake
+operation, e.g. by using L<d2i_SSL_SESSION(3)>.
+It must not be called on other SSL_SESSION objects, as this would cause
+incorrect reference counts and therefore program failures.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+SSL_SESSION_new returns a pointer to the newly allocated SSL_SESSION structure
+or NULL on error.
+
+SSL_SESSION_up_ref returns 1 on success or 0 on error.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(3)>, L<SSL_get_session(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(3)>,
+L<d2i_SSL_SESSION(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fdd36ed
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher - retrieve the SSL cipher associated with a session
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher(const SSL_SESSSION *s);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher() retrieves the cipher that was used by the
+connection when the session was created, or NULL if it cannot be determined.
+
+The value returned is a pointer to an object maintained within B<s> and
+should not be released.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(3)>,
+L<d2i_SSL_SESSION(3)>,
+L<SSL_SESSION_get_time(3)>,
+L<SSL_SESSION_get0_hostname(3)>,
+L<SSL_SESSION_free(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher() was first added to OpenSSL 1.1.0
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_SESSION_get0_hostname.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_SESSION_get0_hostname.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6fb12be
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_SESSION_get0_hostname.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_SESSION_get0_hostname - retrieve the SNI hostname associated with a session
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ const char *SSL_SESSION_get0_hostname(const SSL_SESSSION *s);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_SESSION_get0_hostname() retrieves the SNI value that was sent by the
+client when the session was created, or NULL if no value was sent.
+
+The value returned is a pointer to memory maintained within B<s> and
+should not be free'd.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(3)>,
+L<d2i_SSL_SESSION(3)>,
+L<SSL_SESSION_get_time(3)>,
+L<SSL_SESSION_free(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_SESSION_get0_id_context.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_SESSION_get0_id_context.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ee4a256
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_SESSION_get0_id_context.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_SESSION_get0_id_context,
+SSL_SESSION_set1_id_context
+- get and set the SSL ID context associated with a session
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ const unsigned char *SSL_SESSION_get0_id_context(const SSL_SESSION *s,
+                                                  unsigned int *len)
+ int SSL_SESSION_set1_id_context(SSL_SESSION *s, const unsigned char *sid_ctx,
+                                unsigned int sid_ctx_len);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+See L<SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(3)> for further details on session ID
+contexts.
+
+SSL_SESSION_get0_id_context() returns the ID context associated with
+the SSL/TLS session B<s>. The length of the ID context is written to
+B<*len> if B<len> is not NULL.
+
+The value returned is a pointer to an object maintained within B<s> and
+should not be released.
+
+SSL_SESSION_set1_id_context() takes a copy of the provided ID context given in
+B<sid_ctx> and associates it with the session B<s>. The length of the ID context
+is given by B<sid_ctx_len> which must not exceed SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH bytes.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+SSL_SESSION_set1_id_context() returns 1 on success or 0 on error.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(3)>,
+L<SSL_set_session_id_context(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+SSL_SESSION_get0_id_context() was first added to OpenSSL 1.1.0
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_SESSION_get0_peer.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_SESSION_get0_peer.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a95f8a5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_SESSION_get0_peer.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_SESSION_get0_peer
+- get details about peer's certificate for a session
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ X509 *SSL_SESSION_get0_peer(SSL_SESSION *s);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_SESSION_get0_peer() returns the peer certificate associated with the session
+B<s> or NULL if no peer certificate is available. The caller should not free the
+returned value (unless L<X509_up_ref(3)> has also been called).
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+SSL_SESSION_get0_peer() returns a pointer to the peer certificate or NULL if
+no peer certificate is available.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_SESSION_get_compress_id.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_SESSION_get_compress_id.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5045c53
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_SESSION_get_compress_id.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_SESSION_get_compress_id
+- get details about the compression associated with a session
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ unsigned int SSL_SESSION_get_compress_id(const SSL_SESSION *s);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+If compression has been negotiated for an ssl session then
+SSL_SESSION_get_compress_id() will return the id for the compression method or
+0 otherwise. The only built-in supported compression method is zlib which has an
+id of 1.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+SSL_SESSION_get_compress_id() returns the id of the compression method or 0 if
+none.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e922abc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data,
+SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data
+- get and set application specific data on a session
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ int SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data(SSL_SESSION *ss, int idx, void *data);
+ void *SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(const SSL_SESSION *s, int idx);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data() enables an application to store arbitrary application
+specific data B<data> in an SSL_SESSION structure B<ss>. The index B<idx> should
+be a value previously returned from a call to L<CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(3)>.
+
+SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data() retrieves application specific data previously stored
+in an SSL_SESSION structure B<s>. The B<idx> value should be the same as that
+used when originally storing the data.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data() returns 1 for success or 0 for failure.
+
+SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data() returns the previously stored value or NULL on
+failure. NULL may also be a valid value.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(3)>,
+L<CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_SESSION_get_protocol_version.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_SESSION_get_protocol_version.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a033fdd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_SESSION_get_protocol_version.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_SESSION_get_protocol_version - retrieve session protocol version
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ int SSL_SESSION_get_protocol_version(const SSL_SESSION *s);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_SESSION_get_protocol_version() returns the protocol version number used
+by session B<s>.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+SSL_SESSION_get_protocol_version() returns a number indicating the protocol
+version used for the session; this number matches the constants I<e.g.>
+B<TLS1_VERSION> or B<TLS1_2_VERSION>.
+
+Note that the SSL_SESSION_get_protocol_version() function
+does B<not> perform a null check on the provided session B<s> pointer.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+SSL_SESSION_get_protocol_version() was first added to OpenSSL 1.1.0
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_SESSION_get_time.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_SESSION_get_time.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e98d128
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_SESSION_get_time.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_SESSION_get_time, SSL_SESSION_set_time, SSL_SESSION_get_timeout,
+SSL_SESSION_set_timeout,
+SSL_get_time, SSL_set_time, SSL_get_timeout, SSL_set_timeout
+- retrieve and manipulate session time and timeout settings
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ long SSL_SESSION_get_time(const SSL_SESSION *s);
+ long SSL_SESSION_set_time(SSL_SESSION *s, long tm);
+ long SSL_SESSION_get_timeout(const SSL_SESSION *s);
+ long SSL_SESSION_set_timeout(SSL_SESSION *s, long tm);
+
+ long SSL_get_time(const SSL_SESSION *s);
+ long SSL_set_time(SSL_SESSION *s, long tm);
+ long SSL_get_timeout(const SSL_SESSION *s);
+ long SSL_set_timeout(SSL_SESSION *s, long tm);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_SESSION_get_time() returns the time at which the session B<s> was
+established. The time is given in seconds since the Epoch and therefore
+compatible to the time delivered by the time() call.
+
+SSL_SESSION_set_time() replaces the creation time of the session B<s> with
+the chosen value B<tm>.
+
+SSL_SESSION_get_timeout() returns the timeout value set for session B<s>
+in seconds.
+
+SSL_SESSION_set_timeout() sets the timeout value for session B<s> in seconds
+to B<tm>.
+
+The SSL_get_time(), SSL_set_time(), SSL_get_timeout(), and SSL_set_timeout()
+functions are synonyms for the SSL_SESSION_*() counterparts.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+Sessions are expired by examining the creation time and the timeout value.
+Both are set at creation time of the session to the actual time and the
+default timeout value at creation, respectively, as set by
+L<SSL_CTX_set_timeout(3)>.
+Using these functions it is possible to extend or shorten the lifetime
+of the session.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+SSL_SESSION_get_time() and SSL_SESSION_get_timeout() return the currently
+valid values.
+
+SSL_SESSION_set_time() and SSL_SESSION_set_timeout() return 1 on success.
+
+If any of the function is passed the NULL pointer for the session B<s>,
+0 is returned.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(7)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_timeout(3)>,
+L<SSL_get_default_timeout(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_SESSION_has_ticket.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_SESSION_has_ticket.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a84440b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_SESSION_has_ticket.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_SESSION_get0_ticket,
+SSL_SESSION_has_ticket, SSL_SESSION_get_ticket_lifetime_hint
+- get details about the ticket associated with a session
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ int SSL_SESSION_has_ticket(const SSL_SESSION *s);
+ unsigned long SSL_SESSION_get_ticket_lifetime_hint(const SSL_SESSION *s);
+ void SSL_SESSION_get0_ticket(const SSL_SESSION *s, const unsigned char **tick,
+                              size_t *len);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_SESSION_has_ticket() returns 1 if there is a Session Ticket associated with
+this session, and 0 otherwise.
+
+SSL_SESSION_get_ticket_lifetime_hint returns the lifetime hint in seconds
+associated with the session ticket.
+
+SSL_SESSION_get0_ticket obtains a pointer to the ticket associated with a
+session. The length of the ticket is written to B<*len>. If B<tick> is non
+NULL then a pointer to the ticket is written to B<*tick>. The pointer is only
+valid while the connection is in use. The session (and hence the ticket pointer)
+may also become invalid as a result of a call to SSL_CTX_flush_sessions().
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(7)>,
+L<d2i_SSL_SESSION(3)>,
+L<SSL_SESSION_get_time(3)>,
+L<SSL_SESSION_free(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+SSL_SESSION_has_ticket, SSL_SESSION_get_ticket_lifetime_hint and
+SSL_SESSION_get0_ticket were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_SESSION_print.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_SESSION_print.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9a44c11
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_SESSION_print.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_SESSION_print,
+SSL_SESSION_print_fp,
+SSL_SESSION_print_keylog
+- printf information about a session
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ int SSL_SESSION_print(BIO *fp, const SSL_SESSION *ses);
+ int SSL_SESSION_print_fp(FILE *fp, const SSL_SESSION *ses);
+ int SSL_SESSION_print_keylog(BIO *bp, const SSL_SESSION *x);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_SESSION_print() prints summary information about the session provided in
+B<ses> to the BIO B<fp>.
+
+SSL_SESSION_print_fp() does the same as SSL_SESSION_print() except it prints it
+to the FILE B<fp>.
+
+SSL_SESSION_print_keylog() prints session information to the provided BIO <bp>
+in NSS keylog format.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+SSL_SESSION_print(), SSL_SESSION_print_fp() and SSL_SESSION_print_keylog return
+1 on success or 0 on error.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_SESSION_set1_id.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_SESSION_set1_id.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0bd9b83
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_SESSION_set1_id.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_SESSION_get_id,
+SSL_SESSION_set1_id
+- get and set the SSL session ID
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ const unsigned char *SSL_SESSION_get_id(const SSL_SESSION *s,
+                                         unsigned int *len)
+ int SSL_SESSION_set1_id(SSL_SESSION *s, const unsigned char *sid,
+                         unsigned int sid_len);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_SESSION_get_id() returns a pointer to the internal session id value for the
+session B<s>. The length of the id in bytes is stored in B<*len>. The length may
+be 0. The caller should not free the returned pointer directly.
+
+SSL_SESSION_set1_id() sets the the session ID for the B<ssl> SSL/TLS session
+to B<sid> of length B<sid_len>.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+SSL_SESSION_get_id() returns a pointer to the session id value.
+SSL_SESSION_set1_id() returns 1 for success and 0 for failure, for example
+if the supplied session ID length exceeds B<SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH>.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+SSL_SESSION_set1_id() was first added to OpenSSL 1.1.0
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_accept.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_accept.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3248cac
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_accept.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_accept - wait for a TLS/SSL client to initiate a TLS/SSL handshake
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ int SSL_accept(SSL *ssl);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_accept() waits for a TLS/SSL client to initiate the TLS/SSL handshake.
+The communication channel must already have been set and assigned to the
+B<ssl> by setting an underlying B<BIO>.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The behaviour of SSL_accept() depends on the underlying BIO.
+
+If the underlying BIO is B<blocking>, SSL_accept() will only return once the
+handshake has been finished or an error occurred.
+
+If the underlying BIO is B<non-blocking>, SSL_accept() will also return
+when the underlying BIO could not satisfy the needs of SSL_accept()
+to continue the handshake, indicating the problem by the return value -1.
+In this case a call to SSL_get_error() with the
+return value of SSL_accept() will yield B<SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ> or
+B<SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE>. The calling process then must repeat the call after
+taking appropriate action to satisfy the needs of SSL_accept().
+The action depends on the underlying BIO. When using a non-blocking socket,
+nothing is to be done, but select() can be used to check for the required
+condition. When using a buffering BIO, like a BIO pair, data must be written
+into or retrieved out of the BIO before being able to continue.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+The following return values can occur:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item Z<>0
+
+The TLS/SSL handshake was not successful but was shut down controlled and
+by the specifications of the TLS/SSL protocol. Call SSL_get_error() with the
+return value B<ret> to find out the reason.
+
+=item Z<>1
+
+The TLS/SSL handshake was successfully completed, a TLS/SSL connection has been
+established.
+
+=item E<lt>0
+
+The TLS/SSL handshake was not successful because a fatal error occurred either
+at the protocol level or a connection failure occurred. The shutdown was
+not clean. It can also occur of action is need to continue the operation
+for non-blocking BIOs. Call SSL_get_error() with the return value B<ret>
+to find out the reason.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<SSL_get_error(3)>, L<SSL_connect(3)>,
+L<SSL_shutdown(3)>, L<ssl(3)>, L<bio(3)>,
+L<SSL_set_connect_state(3)>,
+L<SSL_do_handshake(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_new(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_alert_type_string.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_alert_type_string.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6e2768e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_alert_type_string.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,242 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_alert_type_string, SSL_alert_type_string_long, SSL_alert_desc_string, SSL_alert_desc_string_long - get textual description of alert information
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ const char *SSL_alert_type_string(int value);
+ const char *SSL_alert_type_string_long(int value);
+
+ const char *SSL_alert_desc_string(int value);
+ const char *SSL_alert_desc_string_long(int value);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_alert_type_string() returns a one letter string indicating the
+type of the alert specified by B<value>.
+
+SSL_alert_type_string_long() returns a string indicating the type of the alert
+specified by B<value>.
+
+SSL_alert_desc_string() returns a two letter string as a short form
+describing the reason of the alert specified by B<value>.
+
+SSL_alert_desc_string_long() returns a string describing the reason
+of the alert specified by B<value>.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+When one side of an SSL/TLS communication wants to inform the peer about
+a special situation, it sends an alert. The alert is sent as a special message
+and does not influence the normal data stream (unless its contents results
+in the communication being canceled).
+
+A warning alert is sent, when a non-fatal error condition occurs. The
+"close notify" alert is sent as a warning alert. Other examples for
+non-fatal errors are certificate errors ("certificate expired",
+"unsupported certificate"), for which a warning alert may be sent.
+(The sending party may however decide to send a fatal error.) The
+receiving side may cancel the connection on reception of a warning
+alert on it discretion.
+
+Several alert messages must be sent as fatal alert messages as specified
+by the TLS RFC. A fatal alert always leads to a connection abort.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+The following strings can occur for SSL_alert_type_string() or
+SSL_alert_type_string_long():
+
+=over 4
+
+=item "W"/"warning"
+
+=item "F"/"fatal"
+
+=item "U"/"unknown"
+
+This indicates that no support is available for this alert type.
+Probably B<value> does not contain a correct alert message.
+
+=back
+
+The following strings can occur for SSL_alert_desc_string() or
+SSL_alert_desc_string_long():
+
+=over 4
+
+=item "CN"/"close notify"
+
+The connection shall be closed. This is a warning alert.
+
+=item "UM"/"unexpected message"
+
+An inappropriate message was received. This alert is always fatal
+and should never be observed in communication between proper
+implementations.
+
+=item "BM"/"bad record mac"
+
+This alert is returned if a record is received with an incorrect
+MAC. This message is always fatal.
+
+=item "DF"/"decompression failure"
+
+The decompression function received improper input (e.g. data
+that would expand to excessive length). This message is always
+fatal.
+
+=item "HF"/"handshake failure"
+
+Reception of a handshake_failure alert message indicates that the
+sender was unable to negotiate an acceptable set of security
+parameters given the options available. This is a fatal error.
+
+=item "NC"/"no certificate"
+
+A client, that was asked to send a certificate, does not send a certificate
+(SSLv3 only).
+
+=item "BC"/"bad certificate"
+
+A certificate was corrupt, contained signatures that did not
+verify correctly, etc
+
+=item "UC"/"unsupported certificate"
+
+A certificate was of an unsupported type.
+
+=item "CR"/"certificate revoked"
+
+A certificate was revoked by its signer.
+
+=item "CE"/"certificate expired"
+
+A certificate has expired or is not currently valid.
+
+=item "CU"/"certificate unknown"
+
+Some other (unspecified) issue arose in processing the
+certificate, rendering it unacceptable.
+
+=item "IP"/"illegal parameter"
+
+A field in the handshake was out of range or inconsistent with
+other fields. This is always fatal.
+
+=item "DC"/"decryption failed"
+
+A TLSCiphertext decrypted in an invalid way: either it wasn't an
+even multiple of the block length or its padding values, when
+checked, weren't correct. This message is always fatal.
+
+=item "RO"/"record overflow"
+
+A TLSCiphertext record was received which had a length more than
+2^14+2048 bytes, or a record decrypted to a TLSCompressed record
+with more than 2^14+1024 bytes. This message is always fatal.
+
+=item "CA"/"unknown CA"
+
+A valid certificate chain or partial chain was received, but the
+certificate was not accepted because the CA certificate could not
+be located or couldn't be matched with a known, trusted CA.  This
+message is always fatal.
+
+=item "AD"/"access denied"
+
+A valid certificate was received, but when access control was
+applied, the sender decided not to proceed with negotiation.
+This message is always fatal.
+
+=item "DE"/"decode error"
+
+A message could not be decoded because some field was out of the
+specified range or the length of the message was incorrect. This
+message is always fatal.
+
+=item "CY"/"decrypt error"
+
+A handshake cryptographic operation failed, including being
+unable to correctly verify a signature, decrypt a key exchange,
+or validate a finished message.
+
+=item "ER"/"export restriction"
+
+A negotiation not in compliance with export restrictions was
+detected; for example, attempting to transfer a 1024 bit
+ephemeral RSA key for the RSA_EXPORT handshake method. This
+message is always fatal.
+
+=item "PV"/"protocol version"
+
+The protocol version the client has attempted to negotiate is
+recognized, but not supported. (For example, old protocol
+versions might be avoided for security reasons). This message is
+always fatal.
+
+=item "IS"/"insufficient security"
+
+Returned instead of handshake_failure when a negotiation has
+failed specifically because the server requires ciphers more
+secure than those supported by the client. This message is always
+fatal.
+
+=item "IE"/"internal error"
+
+An internal error unrelated to the peer or the correctness of the
+protocol makes it impossible to continue (such as a memory
+allocation failure). This message is always fatal.
+
+=item "US"/"user canceled"
+
+This handshake is being canceled for some reason unrelated to a
+protocol failure. If the user cancels an operation after the
+handshake is complete, just closing the connection by sending a
+close_notify is more appropriate. This alert should be followed
+by a close_notify. This message is generally a warning.
+
+=item "NR"/"no renegotiation"
+
+Sent by the client in response to a hello request or by the
+server in response to a client hello after initial handshaking.
+Either of these would normally lead to renegotiation; when that
+is not appropriate, the recipient should respond with this alert;
+at that point, the original requester can decide whether to
+proceed with the connection. One case where this would be
+appropriate would be where a server has spawned a process to
+satisfy a request; the process might receive security parameters
+(key length, authentication, etc.) at startup and it might be
+difficult to communicate changes to these parameters after that
+point. This message is always a warning.
+
+=item "UP"/"unknown PSK identity"
+
+Sent by the server to indicate that it does not recognize a PSK
+identity or an SRP identity.
+
+=item "UK"/"unknown"
+
+This indicates that no description is available for this alert type.
+Probably B<value> does not contain a correct alert message.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(3)>, L<SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_check_chain.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_check_chain.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8691994
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_check_chain.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_check_chain - check certificate chain suitability
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_check_chain() checks whether certificate B<x>, private key B<pk> and
+certificate chain B<chain> is suitable for use with the current session
+B<s>.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+SSL_check_chain() returns a bitmap of flags indicating the validity of the
+chain.
+
+B<CERT_PKEY_VALID>: the chain can be used with the current session.
+If this flag is B<not> set then the certificate will never be used even
+if the application tries to set it because it is inconsistent with the
+peer preferences.
+
+B<CERT_PKEY_SIGN>: the EE key can be used for signing.
+
+B<CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE>: the signature algorithm of the EE certificate is
+acceptable.
+
+B<CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE>: the signature algorithms of all CA certificates
+are acceptable.
+
+B<CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM>: the parameters of the end entity certificate are
+acceptable (e.g. it is a supported curve).
+
+B<CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM>: the parameters of all CA certificates are acceptable.
+
+B<CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN>: the end entity certificate algorithm
+can be used explicitly for signing (i.e. it is mentioned in the signature
+algorithms extension).
+
+B<CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME>: the issuer name is acceptable. This is only
+meaningful for client authentication.
+
+B<CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE>: the certificate type is acceptable. Only meaningful
+for client authentication.
+
+B<CERT_PKEY_SUITEB>: chain is suitable for Suite B use.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+SSL_check_chain() must be called in servers after a client hello message or in
+clients after a certificate request message. It will typically be called
+in the certificate callback.
+
+An application wishing to support multiple certificate chains may call this
+function on each chain in turn: starting with the one it considers the
+most secure. It could then use the chain of the first set which returns
+suitable flags.
+
+As a minimum the flag B<CERT_PKEY_VALID> must be set for a chain to be
+usable. An application supporting multiple chains with different CA signature
+algorithms may also wish to check B<CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE> too. If no
+chain is suitable a server should fall back to the most secure chain which
+sets B<CERT_PKEY_VALID>.
+
+The validity of a chain is determined by checking if it matches a supported
+signature algorithm, supported curves and in the case of client authentication
+certificate types and issuer names.
+
+Since the supported signature algorithms extension is only used in TLS 1.2
+and DTLS 1.2 the results for earlier versions of TLS and DTLS may not be
+very useful. Applications may wish to specify a different "legacy" chain
+for earlier versions of TLS or DTLS.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb(3)>,
+L<ssl(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_clear.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_clear.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ed0ad60
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_clear.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_clear - reset SSL object to allow another connection
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ int SSL_clear(SSL *ssl);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+Reset B<ssl> to allow another connection. All settings (method, ciphers,
+BIOs) are kept.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+SSL_clear is used to prepare an SSL object for a new connection. While all
+settings are kept, a side effect is the handling of the current SSL session.
+If a session is still B<open>, it is considered bad and will be removed
+from the session cache, as required by RFC2246. A session is considered open,
+if L<SSL_shutdown(3)> was not called for the connection
+or at least L<SSL_set_shutdown(3)> was used to
+set the SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN state.
+
+If a session was closed cleanly, the session object will be kept and all
+settings corresponding. This explicitly means, that e.g. the special method
+used during the session will be kept for the next handshake. So if the
+session was a TLSv1 session, a SSL client object will use a TLSv1 client
+method for the next handshake and a SSL server object will use a TLSv1
+server method, even if TLS_*_methods were chosen on startup. This
+will might lead to connection failures (see L<SSL_new(3)>)
+for a description of the method's properties.
+
+=head1 WARNINGS
+
+SSL_clear() resets the SSL object to allow for another connection. The
+reset operation however keeps several settings of the last sessions
+(some of these settings were made automatically during the last
+handshake). It only makes sense for a new connection with the exact
+same peer that shares these settings, and may fail if that peer
+changes its settings between connections. Use the sequence
+L<SSL_get_session(3)>;
+L<SSL_new(3)>;
+L<SSL_set_session(3)>;
+L<SSL_free(3)>
+instead to avoid such failures
+(or simply L<SSL_free(3)>; L<SSL_new(3)>
+if session reuse is not desired).
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+The following return values can occur:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item Z<>0
+
+The SSL_clear() operation could not be performed. Check the error stack to
+find out the reason.
+
+=item Z<>1
+
+The SSL_clear() operation was successful.
+
+=back
+
+L<SSL_new(3)>, L<SSL_free(3)>,
+L<SSL_shutdown(3)>, L<SSL_set_shutdown(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_options(3)>, L<ssl(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_connect.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_connect.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..df198f9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_connect.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_connect - initiate the TLS/SSL handshake with an TLS/SSL server
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ int SSL_connect(SSL *ssl);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_connect() initiates the TLS/SSL handshake with a server. The communication
+channel must already have been set and assigned to the B<ssl> by setting an
+underlying B<BIO>.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The behaviour of SSL_connect() depends on the underlying BIO.
+
+If the underlying BIO is B<blocking>, SSL_connect() will only return once the
+handshake has been finished or an error occurred.
+
+If the underlying BIO is B<non-blocking>, SSL_connect() will also return
+when the underlying BIO could not satisfy the needs of SSL_connect()
+to continue the handshake, indicating the problem by the return value -1.
+In this case a call to SSL_get_error() with the
+return value of SSL_connect() will yield B<SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ> or
+B<SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE>. The calling process then must repeat the call after
+taking appropriate action to satisfy the needs of SSL_connect().
+The action depends on the underlying BIO. When using a non-blocking socket,
+nothing is to be done, but select() can be used to check for the required
+condition. When using a buffering BIO, like a BIO pair, data must be written
+into or retrieved out of the BIO before being able to continue.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+The following return values can occur:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item Z<>0
+
+The TLS/SSL handshake was not successful but was shut down controlled and
+by the specifications of the TLS/SSL protocol. Call SSL_get_error() with the
+return value B<ret> to find out the reason.
+
+=item Z<>1
+
+The TLS/SSL handshake was successfully completed, a TLS/SSL connection has been
+established.
+
+=item E<lt>0
+
+The TLS/SSL handshake was not successful, because a fatal error occurred either
+at the protocol level or a connection failure occurred. The shutdown was
+not clean. It can also occur of action is need to continue the operation
+for non-blocking BIOs. Call SSL_get_error() with the return value B<ret>
+to find out the reason.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<SSL_get_error(3)>, L<SSL_accept(3)>,
+L<SSL_shutdown(3)>, L<ssl(3)>, L<bio(3)>,
+L<SSL_set_connect_state(3)>,
+L<SSL_do_handshake(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_new(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_do_handshake.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_do_handshake.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ffb71cc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_do_handshake.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_do_handshake - perform a TLS/SSL handshake
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ int SSL_do_handshake(SSL *ssl);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_do_handshake() will wait for a SSL/TLS handshake to take place. If the
+connection is in client mode, the handshake will be started. The handshake
+routines may have to be explicitly set in advance using either
+L<SSL_set_connect_state(3)> or
+L<SSL_set_accept_state(3)>.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The behaviour of SSL_do_handshake() depends on the underlying BIO.
+
+If the underlying BIO is B<blocking>, SSL_do_handshake() will only return
+once the handshake has been finished or an error occurred.
+
+If the underlying BIO is B<non-blocking>, SSL_do_handshake() will also return
+when the underlying BIO could not satisfy the needs of SSL_do_handshake()
+to continue the handshake. In this case a call to SSL_get_error() with the
+return value of SSL_do_handshake() will yield B<SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ> or
+B<SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE>. The calling process then must repeat the call after
+taking appropriate action to satisfy the needs of SSL_do_handshake().
+The action depends on the underlying BIO. When using a non-blocking socket,
+nothing is to be done, but select() can be used to check for the required
+condition. When using a buffering BIO, like a BIO pair, data must be written
+into or retrieved out of the BIO before being able to continue.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+The following return values can occur:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item Z<>0
+
+The TLS/SSL handshake was not successful but was shut down controlled and
+by the specifications of the TLS/SSL protocol. Call SSL_get_error() with the
+return value B<ret> to find out the reason.
+
+=item Z<>1
+
+The TLS/SSL handshake was successfully completed, a TLS/SSL connection has been
+established.
+
+=item E<lt>0
+
+The TLS/SSL handshake was not successful because a fatal error occurred either
+at the protocol level or a connection failure occurred. The shutdown was
+not clean. It can also occur of action is need to continue the operation
+for non-blocking BIOs. Call SSL_get_error() with the return value B<ret>
+to find out the reason.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<SSL_get_error(3)>, L<SSL_connect(3)>,
+L<SSL_accept(3)>, L<ssl(3)>, L<bio(3)>,
+L<SSL_set_connect_state(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_export_keying_material.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_export_keying_material.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ccb99ec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_export_keying_material.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_export_keying_material - obtain keying material for application use
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ int SSL_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
+                                const char *label, size_t llen,
+                                const unsigned char *context,
+                                size_t contextlen, int use_context);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+During the creation of a TLS or DTLS connection shared keying material is
+established between the two endpoints. The function SSL_export_keying_material()
+enables an application to use some of this keying material for its own purposes
+in accordance with RFC5705.
+
+An application may need to securely establish the context within which this
+keying material will be used. For example this may include identifiers for the
+application session, application algorithms or parameters, or the lifetime of
+the context. The context value is left to the application but must be the same
+on both sides of the communication.
+
+For a given SSL connection B<s>, B<olen> bytes of data will be written to
+B<out>. The application specific context should be supplied in the location
+pointed to by B<context> and should be B<contextlen> bytes long. Provision of
+a context is optional. If the context should be omitted entirely then
+B<use_context> should be set to 0. Otherwise it should be any other value. If
+B<use_context> is 0 then the values of B<context> and B<contextlen> are ignored.
+Note that a zero length context is treated differently to no context at all, and
+will result in different keying material being returned.
+
+An application specific label should be provided in the location pointed to by
+B<label> and should be B<llen> bytes long. Typically this will be a value from
+the IANA Exporter Label Registry
+(L<https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xhtml#exporter-labels>).
+Alternatively labels beginning with "EXPERIMENTAL" are permitted by the standard
+to be used without registration.
+
+Note that this function is only defined for TLSv1.0 and above, and DTLSv1.0 and
+above. Attempting to use it in SSLv3 will result in an error.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+SSL_export_keying_material() returns 0 or -1 on failure or 1 on success.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_extension_supported.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_extension_supported.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..166c35a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_extension_supported.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_extension_supported,
+SSL_CTX_add_client_custom_ext, SSL_CTX_add_server_custom_ext,
+custom_ext_add_cb, custom_ext_free_cb, custom_ext_parse_cb
+- custom TLS extension handling
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ int SSL_CTX_add_client_custom_ext(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned int ext_type,
+                                   custom_ext_add_cb add_cb,
+                                   custom_ext_free_cb free_cb, void *add_arg,
+                                   custom_ext_parse_cb parse_cb,
+                                   void *parse_arg);
+
+ int SSL_CTX_add_server_custom_ext(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned int ext_type,
+                                   custom_ext_add_cb add_cb,
+                                   custom_ext_free_cb free_cb, void *add_arg,
+                                   custom_ext_parse_cb parse_cb,
+                                   void *parse_arg);
+
+ int SSL_extension_supported(unsigned int ext_type);
+
+ typedef int (*custom_ext_add_cb)(SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type,
+                                  const unsigned char **out,
+                                  size_t *outlen, int *al,
+                                  void *add_arg);
+
+ typedef void (*custom_ext_free_cb)(SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type,
+                                    const unsigned char *out,
+                                    void *add_arg);
+
+ typedef int (*custom_ext_parse_cb)(SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type,
+                                    const unsigned char *in,
+                                    size_t inlen, int *al,
+                                    void *parse_arg);
+
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_CTX_add_client_custom_ext() adds a custom extension for a TLS client
+with extension type B<ext_type> and callbacks B<add_cb>, B<free_cb> and
+B<parse_cb>.
+
+SSL_CTX_add_server_custom_ext() adds a custom extension for a TLS server
+with extension type B<ext_type> and callbacks B<add_cb>, B<free_cb> and
+B<parse_cb>.
+
+In both cases the extension type must not be handled by OpenSSL internally
+or an error occurs.
+
+SSL_extension_supported() returns 1 if the extension B<ext_type> is handled
+internally by OpenSSL and 0 otherwise.
+
+=head1 EXTENSION CALLBACKS
+
+The callback B<add_cb> is called to send custom extension data to be
+included in ClientHello for TLS clients or ServerHello for servers. The
+B<ext_type> parameter is set to the extension type which will be added and
+B<add_arg> to the value set when the extension handler was added.
+
+If the application wishes to include the extension B<ext_type> it should
+set B<*out> to the extension data, set B<*outlen> to the length of the
+extension data and return 1.
+
+If the B<add_cb> does not wish to include the extension it must return 0.
+
+If B<add_cb> returns -1 a fatal handshake error occurs using the TLS
+alert value specified in B<*al>.
+
+For clients (but not servers) if B<add_cb> is set to NULL a zero length
+extension is added for B<ext_type>.
+
+For clients every registered B<add_cb> is always called to see if the
+application wishes to add an extension to ClientHello.
+
+For servers every registered B<add_cb> is called once if and only if the
+corresponding extension was received in ClientHello to see if the application
+wishes to add the extension to ServerHello. That is, if no corresponding extension
+was received in ClientHello then B<add_cb> will not be called.
+
+If an extension is added (that is B<add_cb> returns 1) B<free_cb> is called
+(if it is set) with the value of B<out> set by the add callback. It can be
+used to free up any dynamic extension data set by B<add_cb>. Since B<out> is
+constant (to permit use of constant data in B<add_cb>) applications may need to
+cast away const to free the data.
+
+The callback B<parse_cb> receives data for TLS extensions. For TLS clients
+the extension data will come from ServerHello and for TLS servers it will
+come from ClientHello.
+
+The extension data consists of B<inlen> bytes in the buffer B<in> for the
+extension B<extension_type>.
+
+If the B<parse_cb> considers the extension data acceptable it must return
+1. If it returns 0 or a negative value a fatal handshake error occurs
+using the TLS alert value specified in B<*al>.
+
+The buffer B<in> is a temporary internal buffer which will not be valid after
+the callback returns.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The B<add_arg> and B<parse_arg> parameters can be set to arbitrary values
+which will be passed to the corresponding callbacks. They can, for example,
+be used to store the extension data received in a convenient structure or
+pass the extension data to be added or freed when adding extensions.
+
+The B<ext_type> parameter corresponds to the B<extension_type> field of
+RFC5246 et al. It is B<not> a NID.
+
+If the same custom extension type is received multiple times a fatal
+B<decode_error> alert is sent and the handshake aborts. If a custom extension
+is received in ServerHello which was not sent in ClientHello a fatal
+B<unsupported_extension> alert is sent and the handshake is aborted. The
+ServerHello B<add_cb> callback is only called if the corresponding extension
+was received in ClientHello. This is compliant with the TLS specifications.
+This behaviour ensures that each callback is called at most once and that
+an application can never send unsolicited extensions.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+SSL_CTX_add_client_custom_ext() and SSL_CTX_add_server_custom_ext() return 1 for
+success and 0 for failure. A failure can occur if an attempt is made to
+add the same B<ext_type> more than once, if an attempt is made to use an
+extension type handled internally by OpenSSL or if an internal error occurs
+(for example a memory allocation failure).
+
+SSL_extension_supported() returns 1 if the extension B<ext_type> is handled
+internally by OpenSSL and 0 otherwise.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2014-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_free.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_free.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..eb69a16
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_free.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_free - free an allocated SSL structure
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ void SSL_free(SSL *ssl);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_free() decrements the reference count of B<ssl>, and removes the SSL
+structure pointed to by B<ssl> and frees up the allocated memory if the
+reference count has reached 0.
+If B<ssl> is NULL nothing is done.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+SSL_free() also calls the free()ing procedures for indirectly affected items, if
+applicable: the buffering BIO, the read and write BIOs,
+cipher lists specially created for this B<ssl>, the B<SSL_SESSION>.
+Do not explicitly free these indirectly freed up items before or after
+calling SSL_free(), as trying to free things twice may lead to program
+failure.
+
+The ssl session has reference counts from two users: the SSL object, for
+which the reference count is removed by SSL_free() and the internal
+session cache. If the session is considered bad, because
+L<SSL_shutdown(3)> was not called for the connection
+and L<SSL_set_shutdown(3)> was not used to set the
+SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN state, the session will also be removed
+from the session cache as required by RFC2246.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+SSL_free() does not provide diagnostic information.
+
+L<SSL_new(3)>, L<SSL_clear(3)>,
+L<SSL_shutdown(3)>, L<SSL_set_shutdown(3)>,
+L<ssl(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_get0_peer_scts.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_get0_peer_scts.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..05d39fe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_get0_peer_scts.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_get0_peer_scts - get SCTs received
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ const STACK_OF(SCT) *SSL_get0_peer_scts(SSL *s);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_get0_peer_scts() returns the signed certificate timestamps (SCTs) that have
+been received. If this is the first time that this function has been called for
+a given B<SSL> instance, it will examine the TLS extensions, OCSP response and
+the peer's certificate for SCTs. Future calls will return the same SCTs.
+
+=head1 RESTRICTIONS
+
+If no Certificate Transparency validation callback has been set (using
+B<SSL_CTX_set_ct_validation_callback> or B<SSL_set_ct_validation_callback>),
+this function is not guaranteed to return all of the SCTs that the peer is
+capable of sending.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+SSL_get0_peer_scts() returns a list of SCTs found, or NULL if an error occurs.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_ct_validation_callback(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_get_SSL_CTX.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_get_SSL_CTX.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..98b9bc6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_get_SSL_CTX.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_get_SSL_CTX - get the SSL_CTX from which an SSL is created
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ SSL_CTX *SSL_get_SSL_CTX(const SSL *ssl);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_get_SSL_CTX() returns a pointer to the SSL_CTX object, from which
+B<ssl> was created with L<SSL_new(3)>.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+The pointer to the SSL_CTX object is returned.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(3)>, L<SSL_new(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_get_all_async_fds.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_get_all_async_fds.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b4fa4ee
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_get_all_async_fds.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_waiting_for_async,
+SSL_get_all_async_fds,
+SSL_get_changed_async_fds
+- manage asynchronous operations
+
+=for comment multiple includes
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/async.h>
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ int SSL_waiting_for_async(SSL *s);
+ int SSL_get_all_async_fds(SSL *s, OSSL_ASYNC_FD *fd, size_t *numfds);
+ int SSL_get_changed_async_fds(SSL *s, OSSL_ASYNC_FD *addfd, size_t *numaddfds,
+                               OSSL_ASYNC_FD *delfd, size_t *numdelfds);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_waiting_for_async() determines whether an SSL connection is currently
+waiting for asynchronous operations to complete (see the SSL_MODE_ASYNC mode in
+L<SSL_CTX_set_mode(3)>).
+
+SSL_get_all_async_fds() returns a list of file descriptor which can be used in a
+call to select() or poll() to determine whether the current asynchronous
+operation has completed or not. A completed operation will result in data
+appearing as "read ready" on the file descriptor (no actual data should be read
+from the file descriptor). This function should only be called if the SSL object
+is currently waiting for asynchronous work to complete (i.e.
+SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC has been received - see L<SSL_get_error(3)>). Typically the
+list will only contain one file descriptor. However if multiple asynchronous
+capable engines are in use then more than one is possible. The number of file
+descriptors returned is stored in B<*numfds> and the file descriptors themselves
+are in B<*fds>. The B<fds> parameter may be NULL in which case no file
+descriptors are returned but B<*numfds> is still populated. It is the callers
+responsibility to ensure sufficient memory is allocated at B<*fds> so typically
+this function is called twice (once with a NULL B<fds> parameter and once
+without).
+
+SSL_get_changed_async_fds() returns a list of the asynchronous file descriptors
+that have been added and a list that have been deleted since the last
+SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC was received (or since the SSL object was created if no
+SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC has been received). Similar to SSL_get_all_async_fds() it
+is the callers responsibility to ensure that B<*addfd> and B<*delfd> have
+sufficient memory allocated, although they may be NULL. The number of added fds
+and the number of deleted fds are stored in B<*numaddfds> and B<*numdelfds>
+respectively.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+SSL_waiting_for_async() will return 1 if the current SSL operation is waiting
+for an async operation to complete and 0 otherwise.
+
+SSL_get_all_async_fds() and SSL_get_changed_async_fds() return 1 on success or
+0 on error.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+On Windows platforms the openssl/async.h header is dependent on some
+of the types customarily made available by including windows.h. The
+application developer is likely to require control over when the latter
+is included, commonly as one of the first included headers. Therefore
+it is defined as an application developer's responsibility to include
+windows.h prior to async.h.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<SSL_get_error(3)>, L<SSL_CTX_set_mode(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+SSL_waiting_for_async(), SSL_get_all_async_fds() and SSL_get_changed_async_fds()
+were first added to OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_get_ciphers.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_get_ciphers.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cc55095
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_get_ciphers.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_get1_supported_ciphers, SSL_get_client_ciphers,
+SSL_get_ciphers, SSL_CTX_get_ciphers, SSL_get_cipher_list
+- get list of available SSL_CIPHERs
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get_ciphers(const SSL *ssl);
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_CTX_get_ciphers(const SSL_CTX *ctx);
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get1_supported_ciphers(SSL *s);
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get_client_ciphers(const SSL *ssl);
+ const char *SSL_get_cipher_list(const SSL *ssl, int priority);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_get_ciphers() returns the stack of available SSL_CIPHERs for B<ssl>,
+sorted by preference. If B<ssl> is NULL or no ciphers are available, NULL
+is returned.
+
+SSL_CTX_get_ciphers() returns the stack of available SSL_CIPHERs for B<ctx>.
+
+SSL_get1_supported_ciphers() returns the stack of enabled SSL_CIPHERs for
+B<ssl>, sorted by preference.
+The list depends on settings like the cipher list, the supported protocol
+versions, the security level, and the enabled signature algorithms.
+SRP and PSK ciphers are only enabled if the appropriate callbacks or settings
+have been applied.
+This is the list that will be sent by the client to the server.
+The list supported by the server might include more ciphers in case there is a
+hole in the list of supported protocols.
+The server will also not use ciphers from this list depending on the
+configured certificates and DH parameters.
+If B<ssl> is NULL or no ciphers are available, NULL is returned.
+
+SSL_get_client_ciphers() returns the stack of available SSL_CIPHERs matching the
+list received from the client on B<ssl>. If B<ssl> is NULL, no ciphers are
+available, or B<ssl> is not operating in server mode, NULL is returned.
+
+SSL_get_cipher_list() returns a pointer to the name of the SSL_CIPHER
+listed for B<ssl> with B<priority>. If B<ssl> is NULL, no ciphers are
+available, or there are less ciphers than B<priority> available, NULL
+is returned.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The details of the ciphers obtained by SSL_get_ciphers(), SSL_CTX_get_ciphers()
+SSL_get1_supported_ciphers() and SSL_get_client_ciphers() can be obtained using
+the L<SSL_CIPHER_get_name(3)> family of functions.
+
+Call SSL_get_cipher_list() with B<priority> starting from 0 to obtain the
+sorted list of available ciphers, until NULL is returned.
+
+Note: SSL_get_ciphers(), SSL_CTX_get_ciphers() and SSL_get_client_ciphers()
+return a pointer to an internal cipher stack, which will be freed later on when
+the SSL or SSL_SESSION object is freed.  Therefore, the calling code B<MUST NOT>
+free the return value itself.
+
+The stack returned by SSL_get1_supported_ciphers() should be freed using
+sk_SSL_CIPHER_free().
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+See DESCRIPTION
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(3)>, L<SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(3)>,
+L<SSL_CIPHER_get_name(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_get_client_CA_list.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_get_client_CA_list.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b6092fe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_get_client_CA_list.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_get_client_CA_list, SSL_CTX_get_client_CA_list - get list of client CAs
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_get_client_CA_list(const SSL *s);
+ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_CTX_get_client_CA_list(const SSL_CTX *ctx);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_CTX_get_client_CA_list() returns the list of client CAs explicitly set for
+B<ctx> using L<SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(3)>.
+
+SSL_get_client_CA_list() returns the list of client CAs explicitly
+set for B<ssl> using SSL_set_client_CA_list() or B<ssl>'s SSL_CTX object with
+L<SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(3)>, when in
+server mode. In client mode, SSL_get_client_CA_list returns the list of
+client CAs sent from the server, if any.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list() and SSL_set_client_CA_list() do not return
+diagnostic information.
+
+SSL_CTX_add_client_CA() and SSL_add_client_CA() have the following return
+values:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item STACK_OF(X509_NAMES)
+
+List of CA names explicitly set (for B<ctx> or in server mode) or send
+by the server (client mode).
+
+=item NULL
+
+No client CA list was explicitly set (for B<ctx> or in server mode) or
+the server did not send a list of CAs (client mode).
+
+=back
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_get_client_random.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_get_client_random.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..46a2aa3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_get_client_random.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_get_client_random, SSL_get_server_random, SSL_SESSION_get_master_key - retrieve internal TLS/SSL random values and master key
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ size_t SSL_get_client_random(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen);
+ size_t SSL_get_server_random(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen);
+ size_t SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(const SSL_SESSION *session, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_get_client_random() extracts the random value sent from the client
+to the server during the initial SSL/TLS handshake.  It copies as many
+bytes as it can of this value into the buffer provided in B<out>,
+which must have at least B<outlen> bytes available. It returns the
+total number of bytes that were actually copied.  If B<outlen> is
+zero, SSL_get_client_random() copies nothing, and returns the
+total size of the client_random value.
+
+SSL_get_server_random() behaves the same, but extracts the random value
+sent from the server to the client during the initial SSL/TLS handshake.
+
+SSL_SESSION_get_master_key() behaves the same, but extracts the master
+secret used to guarantee the security of the SSL/TLS session.  This one
+can be dangerous if misused; see NOTES below.
+
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+You probably shouldn't use these functions.
+
+These functions expose internal values from the TLS handshake, for
+use in low-level protocols.  You probably should not use them, unless
+you are implementing something that needs access to the internal protocol
+details.
+
+Despite the names of SSL_get_client_random() and SSL_get_server_random(), they
+ARE NOT random number generators.  Instead, they return the mostly-random values that
+were already generated and used in the TLS protocol.  Using them
+in place of RAND_bytes() would be grossly foolish.
+
+The security of your TLS session depends on keeping the master key secret:
+do not expose it, or any information about it, to anybody.
+If you need to calculate another secret value that depends on the master
+secret, you should probably use SSL_export_keying_material() instead, and
+forget that you ever saw these functions.
+
+In current versions of the TLS protocols, the length of client_random
+(and also server_random) is always SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE bytes. Support for
+other outlen arguments to the SSL_get_*_random() functions is provided
+in case of the unlikely event that a future version or variant of TLS
+uses some other length there.
+
+Finally, though the "client_random" and "server_random" values are called
+"random", many TLS implementations will generate four bytes of those
+values based on their view of the current time.
+
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+If B<outlen> is greater than 0, these functions return the number of bytes
+actually copied, which will be less than or equal to B<outlen>.
+
+If B<outlen> is 0, these functions return the maximum number
+of bytes they would copy--that is, the length of the underlying field.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(3)>,
+L<RAND_bytes(3)>,
+L<SSL_export_keying_material(3)>
+
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_get_current_cipher.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_get_current_cipher.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..87cecb0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_get_current_cipher.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_get_current_cipher, SSL_get_cipher_name, SSL_get_cipher,
+SSL_get_cipher_bits, SSL_get_cipher_version - get SSL_CIPHER of a connection
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_current_cipher(const SSL *ssl);
+
+ const char *SSL_get_cipher_name(const SSL *s);
+ const char *SSL_get_cipher(const SSL *s);
+ int SSL_get_cipher_bits(const SSL *s, int *np) \
+ const char *SSL_get_cipher_version(const SSL *s);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_get_current_cipher() returns a pointer to an SSL_CIPHER object containing
+the description of the actually used cipher of a connection established with
+the B<ssl> object.
+See L<SSL_CIPHER_get_name(3)> for more details.
+
+SSL_get_cipher_name() obtains the
+name of the currently used cipher.
+SSL_get_cipher() is identical to SSL_get_cipher_name().
+SSL_get_cipher_bits() is a
+macro to obtain the number of secret/algorithm bits used and
+SSL_get_cipher_version() returns the protocol name.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+SSL_get_current_cipher() returns the cipher actually used, or NULL if
+no session has been established.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+These are implemented as macros.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(3)>, L<SSL_CIPHER_get_name(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_get_default_timeout.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_get_default_timeout.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..875d38a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_get_default_timeout.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_get_default_timeout - get default session timeout value
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ long SSL_get_default_timeout(const SSL *ssl);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_get_default_timeout() returns the default timeout value assigned to
+SSL_SESSION objects negotiated for the protocol valid for B<ssl>.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+Whenever a new session is negotiated, it is assigned a timeout value,
+after which it will not be accepted for session reuse. If the timeout
+value was not explicitly set using
+L<SSL_CTX_set_timeout(3)>, the hardcoded default
+timeout for the protocol will be used.
+
+SSL_get_default_timeout() return this hardcoded value, which is 300 seconds
+for all currently supported protocols.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+See description.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(3)>,
+L<SSL_SESSION_get_time(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(3)>,
+L<SSL_get_default_timeout(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_get_error.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_get_error.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..47d2358
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_get_error.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_get_error - obtain result code for TLS/SSL I/O operation
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ int SSL_get_error(const SSL *ssl, int ret);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_get_error() returns a result code (suitable for the C "switch"
+statement) for a preceding call to SSL_connect(), SSL_accept(), SSL_do_handshake(),
+SSL_read(), SSL_peek(), or SSL_write() on B<ssl>.  The value returned by
+that TLS/SSL I/O function must be passed to SSL_get_error() in parameter
+B<ret>.
+
+In addition to B<ssl> and B<ret>, SSL_get_error() inspects the
+current thread's OpenSSL error queue.  Thus, SSL_get_error() must be
+used in the same thread that performed the TLS/SSL I/O operation, and no
+other OpenSSL function calls should appear in between.  The current
+thread's error queue must be empty before the TLS/SSL I/O operation is
+attempted, or SSL_get_error() will not work reliably.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+The following return values can currently occur:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item SSL_ERROR_NONE
+
+The TLS/SSL I/O operation completed.  This result code is returned
+if and only if B<ret E<gt> 0>.
+
+=item SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN
+
+The TLS/SSL connection has been closed.
+If the protocol version is SSL 3.0 or higher, this result code is returned only
+if a closure alert has occurred in the protocol, i.e. if the connection has been
+closed cleanly.
+Note that in this case B<SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN> does not necessarily
+indicate that the underlying transport has been closed.
+
+
+=item SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ, SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE
+
+The operation did not complete; the same TLS/SSL I/O function should be
+called again later.  If, by then, the underlying B<BIO> has data
+available for reading (if the result code is B<SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ>)
+or allows writing data (B<SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE>), then some TLS/SSL
+protocol progress will take place, i.e. at least part of an TLS/SSL
+record will be read or written.  Note that the retry may again lead to
+a B<SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ> or B<SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE> condition.
+There is no fixed upper limit for the number of iterations that
+may be necessary until progress becomes visible at application
+protocol level.
+
+For socket B<BIO>s (e.g. when SSL_set_fd() was used), select() or
+poll() on the underlying socket can be used to find out when the
+TLS/SSL I/O function should be retried.
+
+Caveat: Any TLS/SSL I/O function can lead to either of
+B<SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ> and B<SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE>.  In particular,
+SSL_read() or SSL_peek() may want to write data and SSL_write() may want
+to read data.  This is mainly because TLS/SSL handshakes may occur at any
+time during the protocol (initiated by either the client or the server);
+SSL_read(), SSL_peek(), and SSL_write() will handle any pending handshakes.
+
+=item SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT, SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT
+
+The operation did not complete; the same TLS/SSL I/O function should be
+called again later. The underlying BIO was not connected yet to the peer
+and the call would block in connect()/accept(). The SSL function should be
+called again when the connection is established. These messages can only
+appear with a BIO_s_connect() or BIO_s_accept() BIO, respectively.
+In order to find out, when the connection has been successfully established,
+on many platforms select() or poll() for writing on the socket file descriptor
+can be used.
+
+=item SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP
+
+The operation did not complete because an application callback set by
+SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb() has asked to be called again.
+The TLS/SSL I/O function should be called again later.
+Details depend on the application.
+
+=item SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC
+
+The operation did not complete because an asynchronous engine is still
+processing data. This will only occur if the mode has been set to SSL_MODE_ASYNC
+using L<SSL_CTX_set_mode(3)> or L<SSL_set_mode(3)> and an asynchronous capable
+engine is being used. An application can determine whether the engine has
+completed its processing using select() or poll() on the asynchronous wait file
+descriptor. This file descriptor is available by calling
+L<SSL_get_all_async_fds(3)> or L<SSL_get_changed_async_fds(3)>. The TLS/SSL I/O
+function should be called again later. The function B<must> be called from the
+same thread that the original call was made from.
+
+=item SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC_JOB
+
+The asynchronous job could not be started because there were no async jobs
+available in the pool (see ASYNC_init_thread(3)). This will only occur if the
+mode has been set to SSL_MODE_ASYNC using L<SSL_CTX_set_mode(3)> or
+L<SSL_set_mode(3)> and a maximum limit has been set on the async job pool
+through a call to L<ASYNC_init_thread(3)>. The application should retry the
+operation after a currently executing asynchronous operation for the current
+thread has completed.
+
+=item SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL
+
+Some non-recoverable I/O error occurred.
+The OpenSSL error queue may contain more information on the error.
+For socket I/O on Unix systems, consult B<errno> for details.
+
+=item SSL_ERROR_SSL
+
+A failure in the SSL library occurred, usually a protocol error.  The
+OpenSSL error queue contains more information on the error.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(3)>, L<err(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_get_extms_support.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_get_extms_support.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ba4de3a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_get_extms_support.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_get_extms_support - extended master secret support
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ int SSL_get_extms_support(SSL *ssl);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_get_extms_support() indicates whether the current session used extended
+master secret.
+
+This function is implemented as a macro.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+SSL_get_extms_support() returns 1 if the current session used extended
+master secret, 0 if it did not and -1 if a handshake is currently in
+progress i.e. it is not possible to determine if extended master secret
+was used.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_get_fd.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_get_fd.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cd5b6ec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_get_fd.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_get_fd, SSL_get_rfd, SSL_get_wfd - get file descriptor linked to an SSL object
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ int SSL_get_fd(const SSL *ssl);
+ int SSL_get_rfd(const SSL *ssl);
+ int SSL_get_wfd(const SSL *ssl);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_get_fd() returns the file descriptor which is linked to B<ssl>.
+SSL_get_rfd() and SSL_get_wfd() return the file descriptors for the
+read or the write channel, which can be different. If the read and the
+write channel are different, SSL_get_fd() will return the file descriptor
+of the read channel.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+The following return values can occur:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item -1
+
+The operation failed, because the underlying BIO is not of the correct type
+(suitable for file descriptors).
+
+=item E<gt>=0
+
+The file descriptor linked to B<ssl>.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<SSL_set_fd(3)>, L<ssl(3)> , L<bio(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_get_peer_cert_chain.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_get_peer_cert_chain.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f122124
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_get_peer_cert_chain.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_get_peer_cert_chain, SSL_get0_verified_chain - get the X509 certificate
+chain of the peer
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ STACK_OF(X509) *SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(const SSL *ssl);
+ STACK_OF(X509) *SSL_get0_verified_chain(const SSL *ssl);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_get_peer_cert_chain() returns a pointer to STACK_OF(X509) certificates
+forming the certificate chain sent by the peer. If called on the client side,
+the stack also contains the peer's certificate; if called on the server
+side, the peer's certificate must be obtained separately using
+L<SSL_get_peer_certificate(3)>.
+If the peer did not present a certificate, NULL is returned.
+
+NB: SSL_get_peer_cert_chain() returns the peer chain as sent by the peer: it
+only consists of certificates the peer has sent (in the order the peer
+has sent them) it is B<not> a verified chain.
+
+SSL_get0_verified_chain() returns the B<verified> certificate chain
+of the peer including the peer's end entity certificate. It must be called
+after a session has been successfully established. If peer verification was
+not successful (as indicated by SSL_get_verify_result() not returning
+X509_V_OK) the chain may be incomplete or invalid.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+If the session is resumed peers do not send certificates so a NULL pointer
+is returned by these functions. Applications can call SSL_session_reused()
+to determine whether a session is resumed.
+
+The reference count of each certificate in the returned STACK_OF(X509) object
+is not incremented and the returned stack may be invalidated by renegotiation.
+If applications wish to use any certificates in the returned chain
+indefinitely they must increase the reference counts using X509_up_ref() or
+obtain a copy of the whole chain with X509_chain_up_ref().
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+The following return values can occur:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item NULL
+
+No certificate was presented by the peer or no connection was established
+or the certificate chain is no longer available when a session is reused.
+
+=item Pointer to a STACK_OF(X509)
+
+The return value points to the certificate chain presented by the peer.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(3)>, L<SSL_get_peer_certificate(3)>, L<X509_up_ref(3)>,
+L<X509_chain_up_ref(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_get_peer_certificate.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_get_peer_certificate.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..57ed272
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_get_peer_certificate.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_get_peer_certificate - get the X509 certificate of the peer
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ X509 *SSL_get_peer_certificate(const SSL *ssl);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_get_peer_certificate() returns a pointer to the X509 certificate the
+peer presented. If the peer did not present a certificate, NULL is returned.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+Due to the protocol definition, a TLS/SSL server will always send a
+certificate, if present. A client will only send a certificate when
+explicitly requested to do so by the server (see
+L<SSL_CTX_set_verify(3)>). If an anonymous cipher
+is used, no certificates are sent.
+
+That a certificate is returned does not indicate information about the
+verification state, use L<SSL_get_verify_result(3)>
+to check the verification state.
+
+The reference count of the X509 object is incremented by one, so that it
+will not be destroyed when the session containing the peer certificate is
+freed. The X509 object must be explicitly freed using X509_free().
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+The following return values can occur:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item NULL
+
+No certificate was presented by the peer or no connection was established.
+
+=item Pointer to an X509 certificate
+
+The return value points to the certificate presented by the peer.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(3)>, L<SSL_get_verify_result(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_verify(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_get_psk_identity.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_get_psk_identity.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d330eee
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_get_psk_identity.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_get_psk_identity, SSL_get_psk_identity_hint - get PSK client identity and hint
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ const char *SSL_get_psk_identity_hint(const SSL *ssl);
+ const char *SSL_get_psk_identity(const SSL *ssl);
+
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_get_psk_identity_hint() is used to retrieve the PSK identity hint
+used during the connection setup related to SSL object
+B<ssl>. Similarly, SSL_get_psk_identity() is used to retrieve the PSK
+identity used during the connection setup.
+
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+If non-B<NULL>, SSL_get_psk_identity_hint() returns the PSK identity
+hint and SSL_get_psk_identity() returns the PSK identity. Both are
+B<NULL>-terminated. SSL_get_psk_identity_hint() may return B<NULL> if
+no PSK identity hint was used during the connection setup.
+
+Note that the return value is valid only during the lifetime of the
+SSL object B<ssl>.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+Copyright 2005 Nokia.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_get_rbio.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_get_rbio.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5ac4ca2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_get_rbio.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_get_rbio, SSL_get_wbio - get BIO linked to an SSL object
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ BIO *SSL_get_rbio(SSL *ssl);
+ BIO *SSL_get_wbio(SSL *ssl);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_get_rbio() and SSL_get_wbio() return pointers to the BIOs for the
+read or the write channel, which can be different. The reference count
+of the BIO is not incremented.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+The following return values can occur:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item NULL
+
+No BIO was connected to the SSL object
+
+=item Any other pointer
+
+The BIO linked to B<ssl>.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<SSL_set_bio(3)>, L<ssl(3)> , L<bio(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_get_session.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_get_session.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..99936ad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_get_session.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_get_session, SSL_get0_session, SSL_get1_session - retrieve TLS/SSL session data
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ SSL_SESSION *SSL_get_session(const SSL *ssl);
+ SSL_SESSION *SSL_get0_session(const SSL *ssl);
+ SSL_SESSION *SSL_get1_session(SSL *ssl);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_get_session() returns a pointer to the B<SSL_SESSION> actually used in
+B<ssl>. The reference count of the B<SSL_SESSION> is not incremented, so
+that the pointer can become invalid by other operations.
+
+SSL_get0_session() is the same as SSL_get_session().
+
+SSL_get1_session() is the same as SSL_get_session(), but the reference
+count of the B<SSL_SESSION> is incremented by one.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The ssl session contains all information required to re-establish the
+connection without a new handshake.
+
+SSL_get0_session() returns a pointer to the actual session. As the
+reference counter is not incremented, the pointer is only valid while
+the connection is in use. If L<SSL_clear(3)> or
+L<SSL_free(3)> is called, the session may be removed completely
+(if considered bad), and the pointer obtained will become invalid. Even
+if the session is valid, it can be removed at any time due to timeout
+during L<SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(3)>.
+
+If the data is to be kept, SSL_get1_session() will increment the reference
+count, so that the session will not be implicitly removed by other operations
+but stays in memory. In order to remove the session
+L<SSL_SESSION_free(3)> must be explicitly called once
+to decrement the reference count again.
+
+SSL_SESSION objects keep internal link information about the session cache
+list, when being inserted into one SSL_CTX object's session cache.
+One SSL_SESSION object, regardless of its reference count, must therefore
+only be used with one SSL_CTX object (and the SSL objects created
+from this SSL_CTX object).
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+The following return values can occur:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item NULL
+
+There is no session available in B<ssl>.
+
+=item Pointer to an SSL_SESSION
+
+The return value points to the data of an SSL session.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(3)>, L<SSL_free(3)>,
+L<SSL_clear(3)>,
+L<SSL_SESSION_free(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_get_shared_sigalgs.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_get_shared_sigalgs.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6a70e90
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_get_shared_sigalgs.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_get_shared_sigalgs, SSL_get_sigalgs - get supported signature algorithms
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
+                            int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
+                            unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash);
+
+ int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
+                     int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
+                     unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_get_shared_sigalgs() returns information about the shared signature
+algorithms supported by peer B<s>. The parameter B<idx> indicates the index
+of the shared signature algorithm to return starting from zero. The signature
+algorithm NID is written to B<*psign>, the hash NID to B<*phash> and the
+sign and hash NID to B<*psignhash>. The raw signature and hash values
+are written to B<*rsig> and B<*rhash>.
+
+SSL_get_sigalgs() is similar to SSL_get_shared_sigalgs() except it returns
+information about all signature algorithms supported by B<s> in the order
+they were sent by the peer.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+SSL_get_shared_sigalgs() and SSL_get_sigalgs() return the number of
+signature algorithms or B<0> if the B<idx> parameter is out of range.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+These functions are typically called for debugging purposes (to report
+the peer's preferences) or where an application wants finer control over
+certificate selection. Most applications will rely on internal handling
+and will not need to call them.
+
+If an application is only interested in the highest preference shared
+signature algorithm it can just set B<idx> to zero.
+
+Any or all of the parameters B<psign>, B<phash>, B<psignhash>, B<rsig> or
+B<rhash> can be set to B<NULL> if the value is not required. By setting
+them all to B<NULL> and setting B<idx> to zero the total number of
+signature algorithms can be determined: which can be zero.
+
+These functions must be called after the peer has sent a list of supported
+signature algorithms: after a client hello (for servers) or a certificate
+request (for clients). They can (for example) be called in the certificate
+callback.
+
+Only TLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.2 currently support signature algorithms. If these
+functions are called on an earlier version of TLS or DTLS zero is returned.
+
+The shared signature algorithms returned by SSL_get_shared_sigalgs() are
+ordered according to configuration and peer preferences.
+
+The raw values correspond to the on the wire form as defined by RFC5246 et al.
+The NIDs are OpenSSL equivalents. For example if the peer sent sha256(4) and
+rsa(1) then B<*rhash> would be 4, B<*rsign> 1, B<*phash> NID_sha256, B<*psig>
+NID_rsaEncryption and B<*psighash> NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption.
+
+If a signature algorithm is not recognised the corresponding NIDs
+will be set to B<NID_undef>. This may be because the value is not supported
+or is not an appropriate combination (for example MD5 and DSA).
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb(3)>,
+L<ssl(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_get_verify_result.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_get_verify_result.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3b8b657
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_get_verify_result.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_get_verify_result - get result of peer certificate verification
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ long SSL_get_verify_result(const SSL *ssl);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_get_verify_result() returns the result of the verification of the
+X509 certificate presented by the peer, if any.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+SSL_get_verify_result() can only return one error code while the verification
+of a certificate can fail because of many reasons at the same time. Only
+the last verification error that occurred during the processing is available
+from SSL_get_verify_result().
+
+The verification result is part of the established session and is restored
+when a session is reused.
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+If no peer certificate was presented, the returned result code is
+X509_V_OK. This is because no verification error occurred, it does however
+not indicate success. SSL_get_verify_result() is only useful in connection
+with L<SSL_get_peer_certificate(3)>.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+The following return values can currently occur:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item X509_V_OK
+
+The verification succeeded or no peer certificate was presented.
+
+=item Any other value
+
+Documented in L<verify(1)>.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(3)>, L<SSL_set_verify_result(3)>,
+L<SSL_get_peer_certificate(3)>,
+L<verify(1)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_get_version.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_get_version.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..23b6497
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_get_version.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_get_version, SSL_is_dtls - get the protocol information of a connection
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ const char *SSL_get_version(const SSL *ssl);
+
+ int SSL_is_dtls(const SSL *ssl);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_get_version() returns the name of the protocol used for the
+connection B<ssl>.
+
+SSL_is_dtls() returns one if the connection is using DTLS, zero if not.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+SSL_get_version() returns one of the following strings:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item SSLv3
+
+The connection uses the SSLv3 protocol.
+
+=item TLSv1
+
+The connection uses the TLSv1.0 protocol.
+
+=item TLSv1.1
+
+The connection uses the TLSv1.1 protocol.
+
+=item TLSv1.2
+
+The connection uses the TLSv1.2 protocol.
+
+=item unknown
+
+This indicates that no version has been set (no connection established).
+
+=back
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+SSL_is_dtls() was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_library_init.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_library_init.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..85768a1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_library_init.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_library_init, OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms
+- initialize SSL library by registering algorithms
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ int SSL_library_init(void);
+
+ int OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms(void);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_library_init() registers the available SSL/TLS ciphers and digests.
+
+OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms() is a synonym for SSL_library_init() and is
+implemented as a macro.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+SSL_library_init() must be called before any other action takes place.
+SSL_library_init() is not reentrant.
+
+=head1 WARNING
+
+SSL_library_init() adds ciphers and digests used directly and indirectly by
+SSL/TLS.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+SSL_library_init() always returns "1", so it is safe to discard the return
+value.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(7)>,
+L<RAND_add(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+The SSL_library_init() and OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms() functions were
+deprecated in OpenSSL 1.1.0 by OPENSSL_init_ssl().
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_load_client_CA_file.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_load_client_CA_file.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cc6a19c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_load_client_CA_file.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_load_client_CA_file - load certificate names from file
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_load_client_CA_file(const char *file);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_load_client_CA_file() reads certificates from B<file> and returns
+a STACK_OF(X509_NAME) with the subject names found.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+SSL_load_client_CA_file() reads a file of PEM formatted certificates and
+extracts the X509_NAMES of the certificates found. While the name suggests
+the specific usage as support function for
+L<SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(3)>,
+it is not limited to CA certificates.
+
+=head1 EXAMPLES
+
+Load names of CAs from file and use it as a client CA list:
+
+ SSL_CTX *ctx;
+ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *cert_names;
+
+ ...
+ cert_names = SSL_load_client_CA_file("/path/to/CAfile.pem");
+ if (cert_names != NULL)
+   SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(ctx, cert_names);
+ else
+   error_handling();
+ ...
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+The following return values can occur:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item NULL
+
+The operation failed, check out the error stack for the reason.
+
+=item Pointer to STACK_OF(X509_NAME)
+
+Pointer to the subject names of the successfully read certificates.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_new.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_new.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a5a3ff9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_new.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_new, SSL_up_ref - create a new SSL structure for a connection
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+ int SSL_up_ref(SSL *s);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_new() creates a new B<SSL> structure which is needed to hold the
+data for a TLS/SSL connection. The new structure inherits the settings
+of the underlying context B<ctx>: connection method,
+options, verification settings, timeout settings. An B<SSL> structure is
+reference counted. Creating an B<SSL> structure for the first time increments
+the reference count. Freeing it (using SSL_free) decrements it. When the
+reference count drops to zero, any memory or resources allocated to the B<SSL>
+structure are freed. SSL_up_ref() increments the reference count for an
+existing B<SSL> structure.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+The following return values can occur:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item NULL
+
+The creation of a new SSL structure failed. Check the error stack to
+find out the reason.
+
+=item Pointer to an SSL structure
+
+The return value points to an allocated SSL structure.
+
+SSL_up_ref() returns 1 for success and 0 for failure.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<SSL_free(3)>, L<SSL_clear(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_options(3)>,
+L<SSL_get_SSL_CTX(3)>,
+L<ssl(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_pending.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_pending.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f6ed565
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_pending.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_pending, SSL_has_pending - check for readable bytes buffered in an
+SSL object
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ int SSL_pending(const SSL *ssl);
+ int SSL_has_pending(const SSL *s);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+Data is received in whole blocks known as records from the peer. A whole record
+is processed (e.g. decrypted) in one go and is buffered by OpenSSL until it is
+read by the application via a call to L<SSL_read(3)>.
+
+SSL_pending() returns the number of bytes which have been processed, buffered
+and are available inside B<ssl> for immediate read.
+
+If the B<SSL> object's I<read_ahead> flag is set (see
+L<SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead(3)>), additional protocol bytes (beyond the current
+record) may have been read containing more TLS/SSL records. This also applies to
+DTLS and pipelining (see L<SSL_CTX_set_split_send_fragment(3)>). These
+additional bytes will be buffered by OpenSSL but will remain unprocessed until
+they are needed. As these bytes are still in an unprocessed state SSL_pending()
+will ignore them. Therefore it is possible for no more bytes to be readable from
+the underlying BIO (because OpenSSL has already read them) and for SSL_pending()
+to return 0, even though readable application data bytes are available (because
+the data is in unprocessed buffered records).
+
+SSL_has_pending() returns 1 if B<s> has buffered data (whether processed or
+unprocessed) and 0 otherwise. Note that it is possible for SSL_has_pending() to
+return 1, and then a subsequent call to SSL_read() to return no data because the
+unprocessed buffered data when processed yielded no application data (for
+example this can happen during renegotiation). It is also possible in this
+scenario for SSL_has_pending() to continue to return 1 even after an SSL_read()
+call because the buffered and unprocessed data is not yet processable (e.g.
+because OpenSSL has only received a partial record so far).
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+SSL_pending() returns the number of buffered and processed application data
+bytes that are pending and are available for immediate read. SSL_has_pending()
+returns 1 if there is buffered record data in the SSL object and 0 otherwise.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<SSL_read(3)>, L<SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_split_send_fragment(3)>, L<ssl(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+The SSL_has_pending() function was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_read.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_read.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..20ccf40
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_read.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_read - read bytes from a TLS/SSL connection
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ int SSL_read(SSL *ssl, void *buf, int num);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_read() tries to read B<num> bytes from the specified B<ssl> into the
+buffer B<buf>.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+If necessary, SSL_read() will negotiate a TLS/SSL session, if
+not already explicitly performed by L<SSL_connect(3)> or
+L<SSL_accept(3)>. If the
+peer requests a re-negotiation, it will be performed transparently during
+the SSL_read() operation. The behaviour of SSL_read() depends on the
+underlying BIO.
+
+For the transparent negotiation to succeed, the B<ssl> must have been
+initialized to client or server mode. This is being done by calling
+L<SSL_set_connect_state(3)> or SSL_set_accept_state()
+before the first call to an SSL_read() or L<SSL_write(3)>
+function.
+
+SSL_read() works based on the SSL/TLS records. The data are received in
+records (with a maximum record size of 16kB for SSLv3/TLSv1). Only when a
+record has been completely received, it can be processed (decryption and
+check of integrity). Therefore data that was not retrieved at the last
+call of SSL_read() can still be buffered inside the SSL layer and will be
+retrieved on the next call to SSL_read(). If B<num> is higher than the
+number of bytes buffered, SSL_read() will return with the bytes buffered.
+If no more bytes are in the buffer, SSL_read() will trigger the processing
+of the next record. Only when the record has been received and processed
+completely, SSL_read() will return reporting success. At most the contents
+of the record will be returned. As the size of an SSL/TLS record may exceed
+the maximum packet size of the underlying transport (e.g. TCP), it may
+be necessary to read several packets from the transport layer before the
+record is complete and SSL_read() can succeed.
+
+If the underlying BIO is B<blocking>, SSL_read() will only return, once the
+read operation has been finished or an error occurred, except when a
+renegotiation take place, in which case a SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ may occur.
+This behaviour can be controlled with the SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY flag of the
+L<SSL_CTX_set_mode(3)> call.
+
+If the underlying BIO is B<non-blocking>, SSL_read() will also return
+when the underlying BIO could not satisfy the needs of SSL_read()
+to continue the operation. In this case a call to
+L<SSL_get_error(3)> with the
+return value of SSL_read() will yield B<SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ> or
+B<SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE>. As at any time a re-negotiation is possible, a
+call to SSL_read() can also cause write operations! The calling process
+then must repeat the call after taking appropriate action to satisfy the
+needs of SSL_read(). The action depends on the underlying BIO. When using a
+non-blocking socket, nothing is to be done, but select() can be used to check
+for the required condition. When using a buffering BIO, like a BIO pair, data
+must be written into or retrieved out of the BIO before being able to continue.
+
+L<SSL_pending(3)> can be used to find out whether there
+are buffered bytes available for immediate retrieval. In this case
+SSL_read() can be called without blocking or actually receiving new
+data from the underlying socket.
+
+=head1 WARNING
+
+When an SSL_read() operation has to be repeated because of
+B<SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ> or B<SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE>, it must be repeated
+with the same arguments.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+The following return values can occur:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item E<gt> 0
+
+The read operation was successful.
+The return value is the number of bytes actually read from the TLS/SSL
+connection.
+
+=item Z<><= 0
+
+The read operation was not successful, because either the connection was closed,
+an error occurred or action must be taken by the calling process.
+Call L<SSL_get_error(3)> with the return value B<ret> to find out the reason.
+
+Old documentation indicated a difference between 0 and -1, and that -1 was
+retryable.
+You should instead call SSL_get_error() to find out if it's retryable.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<SSL_get_error(3)>, L<SSL_write(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_mode(3)>, L<SSL_CTX_new(3)>,
+L<SSL_connect(3)>, L<SSL_accept(3)>
+L<SSL_set_connect_state(3)>,
+L<SSL_pending(3)>,
+L<SSL_shutdown(3)>, L<SSL_set_shutdown(3)>,
+L<ssl(3)>, L<bio(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_rstate_string.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_rstate_string.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7775913
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_rstate_string.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_rstate_string, SSL_rstate_string_long - get textual description of state of an SSL object during read operation
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ const char *SSL_rstate_string(SSL *ssl);
+ const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(SSL *ssl);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_rstate_string() returns a 2 letter string indicating the current read state
+of the SSL object B<ssl>.
+
+SSL_rstate_string_long() returns a string indicating the current read state of
+the SSL object B<ssl>.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+When performing a read operation, the SSL/TLS engine must parse the record,
+consisting of header and body. When working in a blocking environment,
+SSL_rstate_string[_long]() should always return "RD"/"read done".
+
+This function should only seldom be needed in applications.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+SSL_rstate_string() and SSL_rstate_string_long() can return the following
+values:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item "RH"/"read header"
+
+The header of the record is being evaluated.
+
+=item "RB"/"read body"
+
+The body of the record is being evaluated.
+
+=item "RD"/"read done"
+
+The record has been completely processed.
+
+=item "unknown"/"unknown"
+
+The read state is unknown. This should never happen.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_session_reused.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_session_reused.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..eda66b2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_session_reused.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_session_reused - query whether a reused session was negotiated during handshake
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ int SSL_session_reused(SSL *ssl);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+Query, whether a reused session was negotiated during the handshake.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+During the negotiation, a client can propose to reuse a session. The server
+then looks up the session in its cache. If both client and server agree
+on the session, it will be reused and a flag is being set that can be
+queried by the application.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+The following return values can occur:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item Z<>0
+
+A new session was negotiated.
+
+=item Z<>1
+
+A session was reused.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(3)>, L<SSL_set_session(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_set1_host.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_set1_host.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3339a0e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_set1_host.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_set1_host, SSL_add1_host, SSL_set_hostflags, SSL_get0_peername -
+SSL server verification parameters
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ int SSL_set1_host(SSL *s, const char *hostname);
+ int SSL_add1_host(SSL *s, const char *hostname);
+ void SSL_set_hostflags(SSL *s, unsigned int flags);
+ const char *SSL_get0_peername(SSL *s);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+These functions configure server hostname checks in the SSL client.
+
+SSL_set1_host() sets the expected DNS hostname to B<name> clearing
+any previously specified host name or names.  If B<name> is NULL,
+or the empty string the list of hostnames is cleared, and name
+checks are not performed on the peer certificate.  When a non-empty
+B<name> is specified, certificate verification automatically checks
+the peer hostname via L<X509_check_host(3)> with B<flags> as specified
+via SSL_set_hostflags().  Clients that enable DANE TLSA authentication
+via L<SSL_dane_enable(3)> should leave it to that function to set
+the primary reference identifier of the peer, and should not call
+SSL_set1_host().
+
+SSL_add1_host() adds B<name> as an additional reference identifier
+that can match the peer's certificate.  Any previous names set via
+SSL_set1_host() or SSL_add1_host() are retained, no change is made
+if B<name> is NULL or empty.  When multiple names are configured,
+the peer is considered verified when any name matches.  This function
+is required for DANE TLSA in the presence of service name indirection
+via CNAME, MX or SRV records as specified in RFC7671, RFC7672 or
+RFC7673.
+
+SSL_set_hostflags() sets the B<flags> that will be passed to
+L<X509_check_host(3)> when name checks are applicable, by default
+the B<flags> value is 0.  See L<X509_check_host(3)> for the list
+of available flags and their meaning.
+
+SSL_get0_peername() returns the DNS hostname or subject CommonName
+from the peer certificate that matched one of the reference
+identifiers.  When wildcard matching is not disabled, the name
+matched in the peer certificate may be a wildcard name.  When one
+of the reference identifiers configured via SSL_set1_host() or
+SSL_add1_host() starts with ".", which indicates a parent domain prefix
+rather than a fixed name, the matched peer name may be a sub-domain
+of the reference identifier.  The returned string is allocated by
+the library and is no longer valid once the associated B<ssl> handle
+is cleared or freed, or a renegotiation takes place.  Applications
+must not free the return value.
+
+SSL clients are advised to use these functions in preference to
+explicitly calling L<X509_check_host(3)>.  Hostname checks are out
+of scope with the RFC7671 DANE-EE(3) certificate usage, and the
+internal check will be suppressed as appropriate when DANE is
+enabled.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+SSL_set1_host() and SSL_add1_host() return 1 for success and 0 for
+failure.
+
+SSL_get0_peername() returns NULL if peername verification is not
+applicable (as with RFC7671 DANE-EE(3)), or no trusted peername was
+matched.  Otherwise, it returns the matched peername.  To determine
+whether verification succeeded call L<SSL_get_verify_result(3)>.
+
+=head1 EXAMPLE
+
+Suppose "smtp.example.com" is the MX host of the domain "example.com".
+The calls below will arrange to match either the MX hostname or the
+destination domain name in the SMTP server certificate.  Wildcards
+are supported, but must match the entire label.  The actual name
+matched in the certificate (which might be a wildcard) is retrieved,
+and must be copied by the application if it is to be retained beyond
+the lifetime of the SSL connection.
+
+  SSL_set_hostflags(ssl, X509_CHECK_FLAG_NO_PARTIAL_WILDCARDS);
+  if (!SSL_set1_host(ssl, "smtp.example.com")) {
+    /* handle error */
+  }
+  if (!SSL_add1_host(ssl, "example.com")) {
+    /* handle error */
+  }
+
+  /* XXX: Perform SSL_connect() handshake and handle errors here */
+
+  if (SSL_get_verify_result(ssl) == X509_V_OK) {
+      const char *peername = SSL_get0_peername(ssl);
+
+      if (peername != NULL) {
+          /* Name checks were in scope and matched the peername */
+      }
+  }
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<X509_check_host(3)>,
+L<SSL_get_verify_result(3)>.
+L<SSL_dane_enable(3)>.
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+These functions were first added to OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_set_bio.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_set_bio.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4230940
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_set_bio.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_set_bio, SSL_set0_rbio, SSL_set0_wbio - connect the SSL object with a BIO
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ void SSL_set_bio(SSL *ssl, BIO *rbio, BIO *wbio);
+ void SSL_set0_rbio(SSL *s, BIO *rbio);
+ void SSL_set0_wbio(SSL *s, BIO *wbio);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_set0_rbio() connects the BIO B<rbio> for the read operations of the B<ssl>
+object. The SSL engine inherits the behaviour of B<rbio>. If the BIO is
+non-blocking then the B<ssl> object will also have non-blocking behaviour. This
+function transfers ownership of B<rbio> to B<ssl>. It will be automatically
+freed using L<BIO_free_all(3)> when the B<ssl> is freed. On calling this
+function, any existing B<rbio> that was previously set will also be freed via a
+call to L<BIO_free_all(3)> (this includes the case where the B<rbio> is set to
+the same value as previously).
+
+SSL_set0_wbio() works in the same as SSL_set0_rbio() except that it connects
+the BIO B<wbio> for the write operations of the B<ssl> object. Note that if the
+rbio and wbio are the same then SSL_set0_rbio() and SSL_set0_wbio() each take
+ownership of one reference. Therefore it may be necessary to increment the
+number of references available using L<BIO_up_ref(3)> before calling the set0
+functions.
+
+SSL_set_bio() does a similar job as SSL_set0_rbio() and SSL_set0_wbio() except
+that it connects both the B<rbio> and the B<wbio> at the same time. This
+function transfers the ownership of B<rbio> and B<wbio> to B<ssl> except that
+the rules for this are much more complex. For this reason this function is
+considered a legacy function and SSL_set0_rbio() and SSL_set0_wbio() should be
+used in preference. The ownership rules are as follows:
+
+=over 2
+
+=item *
+
+If neither the rbio or wbio have changed from their previous values then nothing
+is done.
+
+=item *
+
+If the rbio and wbio parameters are different and both are different to their
+previously set values then one reference is consumed for the rbio and one
+reference is consumed for the wbio.
+
+=item *
+
+If the rbio and wbio parameters are the same and the rbio is not the same as the
+previously set value then one reference is consumed.
+
+=item *
+
+If the rbio and wbio parameters are the same and the rbio is the same as the
+previously set value, then no additional references are consumed.
+
+=item *
+
+If the rbio and wbio parameters are different and the rbio is the same as the
+previously set value then one reference is consumed for the wbio and no
+references are consumed for the rbio.
+
+=item *
+
+If the rbio and wbio parameters are different and the wbio is the same as the
+previously set value and the old rbio and wbio values were the same as each
+other then one reference is consumed for the rbio and no references are consumed
+for the wbio.
+
+=item *
+
+If the rbio and wbio parameters are different and the wbio is the same as the
+previously set value and the old rbio and wbio values were different to each
+other then one reference is consumed for the rbio and one reference is consumed
+for the wbio.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+SSL_set_bio(), SSL_set_rbio() and SSL_set_wbio() cannot fail.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<SSL_get_rbio(3)>,
+L<SSL_connect(3)>, L<SSL_accept(3)>,
+L<SSL_shutdown(3)>, L<ssl(7)>, L<bio(7)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+SSL_set0_rbio() and SSL_set0_wbio() were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_set_connect_state.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_set_connect_state.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9031aa7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_set_connect_state.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_set_connect_state, SSL_set_accept_state - prepare SSL object to work in client or server mode
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ void SSL_set_connect_state(SSL *ssl);
+
+ void SSL_set_accept_state(SSL *ssl);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_set_connect_state() sets B<ssl> to work in client mode.
+
+SSL_set_accept_state() sets B<ssl> to work in server mode.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+When the SSL_CTX object was created with L<SSL_CTX_new(3)>,
+it was either assigned a dedicated client method, a dedicated server
+method, or a generic method, that can be used for both client and
+server connections. (The method might have been changed with
+L<SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(3)> or
+SSL_set_ssl_method(3).)
+
+When beginning a new handshake, the SSL engine must know whether it must
+call the connect (client) or accept (server) routines. Even though it may
+be clear from the method chosen, whether client or server mode was
+requested, the handshake routines must be explicitly set.
+
+When using the L<SSL_connect(3)> or
+L<SSL_accept(3)> routines, the correct handshake
+routines are automatically set. When performing a transparent negotiation
+using L<SSL_write(3)> or L<SSL_read(3)>, the
+handshake routines must be explicitly set in advance using either
+SSL_set_connect_state() or SSL_set_accept_state().
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+SSL_set_connect_state() and SSL_set_accept_state() do not return diagnostic
+information.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(3)>, L<SSL_new(3)>, L<SSL_CTX_new(3)>,
+LL<SSL_connect(3)>, L<SSL_accept(3)>,
+L<SSL_write(3)>, L<SSL_read(3)>,
+L<SSL_do_handshake(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_set_fd.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_set_fd.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e1f9988
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_set_fd.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_set_fd, SSL_set_rfd, SSL_set_wfd - connect the SSL object with a file descriptor
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ int SSL_set_fd(SSL *ssl, int fd);
+ int SSL_set_rfd(SSL *ssl, int fd);
+ int SSL_set_wfd(SSL *ssl, int fd);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_set_fd() sets the file descriptor B<fd> as the input/output facility
+for the TLS/SSL (encrypted) side of B<ssl>. B<fd> will typically be the
+socket file descriptor of a network connection.
+
+When performing the operation, a B<socket BIO> is automatically created to
+interface between the B<ssl> and B<fd>. The BIO and hence the SSL engine
+inherit the behaviour of B<fd>. If B<fd> is non-blocking, the B<ssl> will
+also have non-blocking behaviour.
+
+If there was already a BIO connected to B<ssl>, BIO_free() will be called
+(for both the reading and writing side, if different).
+
+SSL_set_rfd() and SSL_set_wfd() perform the respective action, but only
+for the read channel or the write channel, which can be set independently.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+The following return values can occur:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item Z<>0
+
+The operation failed. Check the error stack to find out why.
+
+=item Z<>1
+
+The operation succeeded.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<SSL_get_fd(3)>, L<SSL_set_bio(3)>,
+L<SSL_connect(3)>, L<SSL_accept(3)>,
+L<SSL_shutdown(3)>, L<ssl(3)> , L<bio(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_set_session.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_set_session.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1de533f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_set_session.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_set_session - set a TLS/SSL session to be used during TLS/SSL connect
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ int SSL_set_session(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *session);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_set_session() sets B<session> to be used when the TLS/SSL connection
+is to be established. SSL_set_session() is only useful for TLS/SSL clients.
+When the session is set, the reference count of B<session> is incremented
+by 1. If the session is not reused, the reference count is decremented
+again during SSL_connect(). Whether the session was reused can be queried
+with the L<SSL_session_reused(3)> call.
+
+If there is already a session set inside B<ssl> (because it was set with
+SSL_set_session() before or because the same B<ssl> was already used for
+a connection), SSL_SESSION_free() will be called for that session. If that old
+session is still B<open>, it is considered bad and will be removed from the
+session cache (if used). A session is considered open, if L<SSL_shutdown(3)> was
+not called for the connection (or at least L<SSL_set_shutdown(3)> was used to
+set the SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN state).
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+SSL_SESSION objects keep internal link information about the session cache
+list, when being inserted into one SSL_CTX object's session cache.
+One SSL_SESSION object, regardless of its reference count, must therefore
+only be used with one SSL_CTX object (and the SSL objects created
+from this SSL_CTX object).
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+The following return values can occur:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item Z<>0
+
+The operation failed; check the error stack to find out the reason.
+
+=item Z<>1
+
+The operation succeeded.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(3)>, L<SSL_SESSION_free(3)>,
+L<SSL_get_session(3)>,
+L<SSL_session_reused(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_set_shutdown.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_set_shutdown.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ecdf60c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_set_shutdown.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_set_shutdown, SSL_get_shutdown - manipulate shutdown state of an SSL connection
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ void SSL_set_shutdown(SSL *ssl, int mode);
+
+ int SSL_get_shutdown(const SSL *ssl);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_set_shutdown() sets the shutdown state of B<ssl> to B<mode>.
+
+SSL_get_shutdown() returns the shutdown mode of B<ssl>.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The shutdown state of an ssl connection is a bitmask of:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item Z<>0
+
+No shutdown setting, yet.
+
+=item SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN
+
+A "close notify" shutdown alert was sent to the peer, the connection is being
+considered closed and the session is closed and correct.
+
+=item SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
+
+A shutdown alert was received form the peer, either a normal "close notify"
+or a fatal error.
+
+=back
+
+SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN and SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN can be set at the same time.
+
+The shutdown state of the connection is used to determine the state of
+the ssl session. If the session is still open, when
+L<SSL_clear(3)> or L<SSL_free(3)> is called,
+it is considered bad and removed according to RFC2246.
+The actual condition for a correctly closed session is SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN
+(according to the TLS RFC, it is acceptable to only send the "close notify"
+alert but to not wait for the peer's answer, when the underlying connection
+is closed).
+SSL_set_shutdown() can be used to set this state without sending a
+close alert to the peer (see L<SSL_shutdown(3)>).
+
+If a "close notify" was received, SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN will be set,
+for setting SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN the application must however still call
+L<SSL_shutdown(3)> or SSL_set_shutdown() itself.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+SSL_set_shutdown() does not return diagnostic information.
+
+SSL_get_shutdown() returns the current setting.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(3)>, L<SSL_shutdown(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(3)>,
+L<SSL_clear(3)>, L<SSL_free(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_set_verify_result.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_set_verify_result.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8738d78
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_set_verify_result.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_set_verify_result - override result of peer certificate verification
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ void SSL_set_verify_result(SSL *ssl, long verify_result);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_set_verify_result() sets B<verify_result> of the object B<ssl> to be the
+result of the verification of the X509 certificate presented by the peer,
+if any.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+SSL_set_verify_result() overrides the verification result. It only changes
+the verification result of the B<ssl> object. It does not become part of the
+established session, so if the session is to be reused later, the original
+value will reappear.
+
+The valid codes for B<verify_result> are documented in L<verify(1)>.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+SSL_set_verify_result() does not provide a return value.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(3)>, L<SSL_get_verify_result(3)>,
+L<SSL_get_peer_certificate(3)>,
+L<verify(1)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_shutdown.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_shutdown.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e8ec454
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_shutdown.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_shutdown - shut down a TLS/SSL connection
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ int SSL_shutdown(SSL *ssl);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_shutdown() shuts down an active TLS/SSL connection. It sends the
+"close notify" shutdown alert to the peer.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+SSL_shutdown() tries to send the "close notify" shutdown alert to the peer.
+Whether the operation succeeds or not, the SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN flag is set and
+a currently open session is considered closed and good and will be kept in the
+session cache for further reuse.
+
+The shutdown procedure consists of 2 steps: the sending of the "close notify"
+shutdown alert and the reception of the peer's "close notify" shutdown
+alert. According to the TLS standard, it is acceptable for an application
+to only send its shutdown alert and then close the underlying connection
+without waiting for the peer's response (this way resources can be saved,
+as the process can already terminate or serve another connection).
+When the underlying connection shall be used for more communications, the
+complete shutdown procedure (bidirectional "close notify" alerts) must be
+performed, so that the peers stay synchronized.
+
+SSL_shutdown() supports both uni- and bidirectional shutdown by its 2 step
+behaviour.
+
+=over 4
+
+=item When the application is the first party to send the "close notify"
+alert, SSL_shutdown() will only send the alert and then set the
+SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN flag (so that the session is considered good and will
+be kept in cache). SSL_shutdown() will then return with 0. If a unidirectional
+shutdown is enough (the underlying connection shall be closed anyway), this
+first call to SSL_shutdown() is sufficient. In order to complete the
+bidirectional shutdown handshake, SSL_shutdown() must be called again.
+The second call will make SSL_shutdown() wait for the peer's "close notify"
+shutdown alert. On success, the second call to SSL_shutdown() will return
+with 1.
+
+=item If the peer already sent the "close notify" alert B<and> it was
+already processed implicitly inside another function
+(L<SSL_read(3)>), the SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN flag is set.
+SSL_shutdown() will send the "close notify" alert, set the SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN
+flag and will immediately return with 1.
+Whether SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN is already set can be checked using the
+SSL_get_shutdown() (see also L<SSL_set_shutdown(3)> call.
+
+=back
+
+It is therefore recommended, to check the return value of SSL_shutdown()
+and call SSL_shutdown() again, if the bidirectional shutdown is not yet
+complete (return value of the first call is 0).
+
+The behaviour of SSL_shutdown() additionally depends on the underlying BIO.
+
+If the underlying BIO is B<blocking>, SSL_shutdown() will only return once the
+handshake step has been finished or an error occurred.
+
+If the underlying BIO is B<non-blocking>, SSL_shutdown() will also return
+when the underlying BIO could not satisfy the needs of SSL_shutdown()
+to continue the handshake. In this case a call to SSL_get_error() with the
+return value of SSL_shutdown() will yield B<SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ> or
+B<SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE>. The calling process then must repeat the call after
+taking appropriate action to satisfy the needs of SSL_shutdown().
+The action depends on the underlying BIO. When using a non-blocking socket,
+nothing is to be done, but select() can be used to check for the required
+condition. When using a buffering BIO, like a BIO pair, data must be written
+into or retrieved out of the BIO before being able to continue.
+
+SSL_shutdown() can be modified to only set the connection to "shutdown"
+state but not actually send the "close notify" alert messages,
+see L<SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(3)>.
+When "quiet shutdown" is enabled, SSL_shutdown() will always succeed
+and return 1.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+The following return values can occur:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item Z<>0
+
+The shutdown is not yet finished. Call SSL_shutdown() for a second time,
+if a bidirectional shutdown shall be performed.
+The output of L<SSL_get_error(3)> may be misleading, as an
+erroneous SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL may be flagged even though no error occurred.
+
+=item Z<>1
+
+The shutdown was successfully completed. The "close notify" alert was sent
+and the peer's "close notify" alert was received.
+
+=item E<lt>0
+
+The shutdown was not successful because a fatal error occurred either
+at the protocol level or a connection failure occurred. It can also occur if
+action is need to continue the operation for non-blocking BIOs.
+Call L<SSL_get_error(3)> with the return value B<ret>
+to find out the reason.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<SSL_get_error(3)>, L<SSL_connect(3)>,
+L<SSL_accept(3)>, L<SSL_set_shutdown(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(3)>,
+L<SSL_clear(3)>, L<SSL_free(3)>,
+L<ssl(3)>, L<bio(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_state_string.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_state_string.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a2f59e8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_state_string.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_state_string, SSL_state_string_long - get textual description of state of an SSL object
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ const char *SSL_state_string(const SSL *ssl);
+ const char *SSL_state_string_long(const SSL *ssl);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_state_string() returns a 6 letter string indicating the current state
+of the SSL object B<ssl>.
+
+SSL_state_string_long() returns a string indicating the current state of
+the SSL object B<ssl>.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+During its use, an SSL objects passes several states. The state is internally
+maintained. Querying the state information is not very informative before
+or when a connection has been established. It however can be of significant
+interest during the handshake.
+
+When using non-blocking sockets, the function call performing the handshake
+may return with SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ or SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE condition,
+so that SSL_state_string[_long]() may be called.
+
+For both blocking or non-blocking sockets, the details state information
+can be used within the info_callback function set with the
+SSL_set_info_callback() call.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+Detailed description of possible states to be included later.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(3)>, L<SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_want.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_want.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e179d6b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_want.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_want, SSL_want_nothing, SSL_want_read, SSL_want_write, SSL_want_x509_lookup,
+SSL_want_async, SSL_want_async_job - obtain state information TLS/SSL I/O
+operation
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ int SSL_want(const SSL *ssl);
+ int SSL_want_nothing(const SSL *ssl);
+ int SSL_want_read(const SSL *ssl);
+ int SSL_want_write(const SSL *ssl);
+ int SSL_want_x509_lookup(const SSL *ssl);
+ int SSL_want_async(const SSL *ssl);
+ int SSL_want_async_job(const SSL *ssl);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_want() returns state information for the SSL object B<ssl>.
+
+The other SSL_want_*() calls are shortcuts for the possible states returned
+by SSL_want().
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+SSL_want() examines the internal state information of the SSL object. Its
+return values are similar to that of L<SSL_get_error(3)>.
+Unlike L<SSL_get_error(3)>, which also evaluates the
+error queue, the results are obtained by examining an internal state flag
+only. The information must therefore only be used for normal operation under
+non-blocking I/O. Error conditions are not handled and must be treated
+using L<SSL_get_error(3)>.
+
+The result returned by SSL_want() should always be consistent with
+the result of L<SSL_get_error(3)>.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+The following return values can currently occur for SSL_want():
+
+=over 4
+
+=item SSL_NOTHING
+
+There is no data to be written or to be read.
+
+=item SSL_WRITING
+
+There are data in the SSL buffer that must be written to the underlying
+B<BIO> layer in order to complete the actual SSL_*() operation.
+A call to L<SSL_get_error(3)> should return
+SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE.
+
+=item SSL_READING
+
+More data must be read from the underlying B<BIO> layer in order to
+complete the actual SSL_*() operation.
+A call to L<SSL_get_error(3)> should return
+SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ.
+
+=item SSL_X509_LOOKUP
+
+The operation did not complete because an application callback set by
+SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb() has asked to be called again.
+A call to L<SSL_get_error(3)> should return
+SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP.
+
+=item SSL_ASYNC_PAUSED
+
+An asynchronous operation partially completed and was then paused. See
+L<SSL_get_all_async_fds(3)>. A call to L<SSL_get_error(3)> should return
+SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC.
+
+=item SSL_ASYNC_NO_JOBS
+
+The asynchronous job could not be started because there were no async jobs
+available in the pool (see ASYNC_init_thread(3)). A call to L<SSL_get_error(3)>
+should return SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC_JOB.
+
+=back
+
+SSL_want_nothing(), SSL_want_read(), SSL_want_write(), SSL_want_x509_lookup(),
+SSL_want_async() and SSL_want_async_job() return 1, when the corresponding
+condition is true or 0 otherwise.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(3)>, L<err(3)>, L<SSL_get_error(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_write.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_write.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ef3b92a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/SSL_write.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_write - write bytes to a TLS/SSL connection
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ int SSL_write(SSL *ssl, const void *buf, int num);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_write() writes B<num> bytes from the buffer B<buf> into the specified
+B<ssl> connection.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+If necessary, SSL_write() will negotiate a TLS/SSL session, if
+not already explicitly performed by L<SSL_connect(3)> or
+L<SSL_accept(3)>. If the
+peer requests a re-negotiation, it will be performed transparently during
+the SSL_write() operation. The behaviour of SSL_write() depends on the
+underlying BIO.
+
+For the transparent negotiation to succeed, the B<ssl> must have been
+initialized to client or server mode. This is being done by calling
+L<SSL_set_connect_state(3)> or SSL_set_accept_state()
+before the first call to an L<SSL_read(3)> or SSL_write() function.
+
+If the underlying BIO is B<blocking>, SSL_write() will only return, once the
+write operation has been finished or an error occurred, except when a
+renegotiation take place, in which case a SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ may occur.
+This behaviour can be controlled with the SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY flag of the
+L<SSL_CTX_set_mode(3)> call.
+
+If the underlying BIO is B<non-blocking>, SSL_write() will also return,
+when the underlying BIO could not satisfy the needs of SSL_write()
+to continue the operation. In this case a call to
+L<SSL_get_error(3)> with the
+return value of SSL_write() will yield B<SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ> or
+B<SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE>. As at any time a re-negotiation is possible, a
+call to SSL_write() can also cause read operations! The calling process
+then must repeat the call after taking appropriate action to satisfy the
+needs of SSL_write(). The action depends on the underlying BIO. When using a
+non-blocking socket, nothing is to be done, but select() can be used to check
+for the required condition. When using a buffering BIO, like a BIO pair, data
+must be written into or retrieved out of the BIO before being able to continue.
+
+SSL_write() will only return with success, when the complete contents
+of B<buf> of length B<num> has been written. This default behaviour
+can be changed with the SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE option of
+L<SSL_CTX_set_mode(3)>. When this flag is set,
+SSL_write() will also return with success, when a partial write has been
+successfully completed. In this case the SSL_write() operation is considered
+completed. The bytes are sent and a new SSL_write() operation with a new
+buffer (with the already sent bytes removed) must be started.
+A partial write is performed with the size of a message block, which is
+16kB for SSLv3/TLSv1.
+
+=head1 WARNING
+
+When an SSL_write() operation has to be repeated because of
+B<SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ> or B<SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE>, it must be repeated
+with the same arguments.
+
+When calling SSL_write() with num=0 bytes to be sent the behaviour is
+undefined.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+The following return values can occur:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item E<gt> 0
+
+The write operation was successful, the return value is the number of
+bytes actually written to the TLS/SSL connection.
+
+=item Z<><= 0
+
+The write operation was not successful, because either the connection was
+closed, an error occurred or action must be taken by the calling process.
+Call SSL_get_error() with the return value B<ret> to find out the reason.
+
+Old documentation indicated a difference between 0 and -1, and that -1 was
+retryable.
+You should instead call SSL_get_error() to find out if it's retryable.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<SSL_get_error(3)>, L<SSL_read(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_mode(3)>, L<SSL_CTX_new(3)>,
+L<SSL_connect(3)>, L<SSL_accept(3)>
+L<SSL_set_connect_state(3)>,
+L<ssl(3)>, L<bio(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/d2i_SSL_SESSION.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/d2i_SSL_SESSION.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d6b1707
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/d2i_SSL_SESSION.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+d2i_SSL_SESSION, i2d_SSL_SESSION - convert SSL_SESSION object from/to ASN1 representation
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ SSL_SESSION *d2i_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length);
+ int i2d_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION *in, unsigned char **pp);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+These functions decode and encode an SSL_SESSION object.
+For encoding details see L<d2i_X509(3)>.
+
+SSL_SESSION objects keep internal link information about the session cache
+list, when being inserted into one SSL_CTX object's session cache.
+One SSL_SESSION object, regardless of its reference count, must therefore
+only be used with one SSL_CTX object (and the SSL objects created
+from this SSL_CTX object).
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+d2i_SSL_SESSION() returns a pointer to the newly allocated SSL_SESSION
+object. In case of failure the NULL-pointer is returned and the error message
+can be retrieved from the error stack.
+
+i2d_SSL_SESSION() returns the size of the ASN1 representation in bytes.
+When the session is not valid, B<0> is returned and no operation is performed.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(3)>, L<SSL_SESSION_free(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(3)>,
+L<d2i_X509(3)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/ssl.pod b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/ssl.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4d91907
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/doc/ssl/ssl.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,843 @@
+=pod
+
+=for comment openssl_manual_section:7
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+ssl - OpenSSL SSL/TLS library
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+See the individual manual pages for details.
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The OpenSSL B<ssl> library implements the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL v2/v3) and
+Transport Layer Security (TLS v1) protocols. It provides a rich API which is
+documented here.
+
+Then an B<SSL_CTX> object is created as a framework to establish
+TLS/SSL enabled connections (see L<SSL_CTX_new(3)>).
+Various options regarding certificates, algorithms etc. can be set
+in this object.
+
+When a network connection has been created, it can be assigned to an
+B<SSL> object. After the B<SSL> object has been created using
+L<SSL_new(3)>, L<SSL_set_fd(3)> or
+L<SSL_set_bio(3)> can be used to associate the network
+connection with the object.
+
+Then the TLS/SSL handshake is performed using
+L<SSL_accept(3)> or L<SSL_connect(3)>
+respectively.
+L<SSL_read(3)> and L<SSL_write(3)> are
+used to read and write data on the TLS/SSL connection.
+L<SSL_shutdown(3)> can be used to shut down the
+TLS/SSL connection.
+
+=head1 DATA STRUCTURES
+
+Currently the OpenSSL B<ssl> library functions deals with the following data
+structures:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<SSL_METHOD> (SSL Method)
+
+That's a dispatch structure describing the internal B<ssl> library
+methods/functions which implement the various protocol versions (SSLv3
+TLSv1, ...). It's needed to create an B<SSL_CTX>.
+
+=item B<SSL_CIPHER> (SSL Cipher)
+
+This structure holds the algorithm information for a particular cipher which
+are a core part of the SSL/TLS protocol. The available ciphers are configured
+on a B<SSL_CTX> basis and the actually used ones are then part of the
+B<SSL_SESSION>.
+
+=item B<SSL_CTX> (SSL Context)
+
+That's the global context structure which is created by a server or client
+once per program life-time and which holds mainly default values for the
+B<SSL> structures which are later created for the connections.
+
+=item B<SSL_SESSION> (SSL Session)
+
+This is a structure containing the current TLS/SSL session details for a
+connection: B<SSL_CIPHER>s, client and server certificates, keys, etc.
+
+=item B<SSL> (SSL Connection)
+
+That's the main SSL/TLS structure which is created by a server or client per
+established connection. This actually is the core structure in the SSL API.
+Under run-time the application usually deals with this structure which has
+links to mostly all other structures.
+
+=back
+
+
+=head1 HEADER FILES
+
+Currently the OpenSSL B<ssl> library provides the following C header files
+containing the prototypes for the data structures and functions:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<ssl.h>
+
+That's the common header file for the SSL/TLS API.  Include it into your
+program to make the API of the B<ssl> library available. It internally
+includes both more private SSL headers and headers from the B<crypto> library.
+Whenever you need hard-core details on the internals of the SSL API, look
+inside this header file.
+
+OPENSSL_VERSION_AT_LEAST(major,minor) can be
+used in C<#if> statements in order to determine which version of the library is
+being used. This can be used to either enable optional features at compile
+time, or work around issues with a previous version.
+See L<OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER(3)>.
+
+=item B<ssl2.h>
+
+Unused. Present for backwards compatibility only.
+
+=item B<ssl3.h>
+
+That's the sub header file dealing with the SSLv3 protocol only.
+I<Usually you don't have to include it explicitly because
+it's already included by ssl.h>.
+
+=item B<tls1.h>
+
+That's the sub header file dealing with the TLSv1 protocol only.
+I<Usually you don't have to include it explicitly because
+it's already included by ssl.h>.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 API FUNCTIONS
+
+Currently the OpenSSL B<ssl> library exports 214 API functions.
+They are documented in the following:
+
+=head2 Dealing with Protocol Methods
+
+Here we document the various API functions which deal with the SSL/TLS
+protocol methods defined in B<SSL_METHOD> structures.
+
+=over 4
+
+=item const SSL_METHOD *B<TLS_method>(void);
+
+Constructor for the I<version-flexible> SSL_METHOD structure for clients,
+servers or both.
+See L<SSL_CTX_new(3)> for details.
+
+=item const SSL_METHOD *B<TLS_client_method>(void);
+
+Constructor for the I<version-flexible> SSL_METHOD structure for clients.
+
+=item const SSL_METHOD *B<TLS_server_method>(void);
+
+Constructor for the I<version-flexible> SSL_METHOD structure for servers.
+
+=item const SSL_METHOD *B<TLSv1_2_method>(void);
+
+Constructor for the TLSv1.2 SSL_METHOD structure for clients, servers or both.
+
+=item const SSL_METHOD *B<TLSv1_2_client_method>(void);
+
+Constructor for the TLSv1.2 SSL_METHOD structure for clients.
+
+=item const SSL_METHOD *B<TLSv1_2_server_method>(void);
+
+Constructor for the TLSv1.2 SSL_METHOD structure for servers.
+
+=item const SSL_METHOD *B<TLSv1_1_method>(void);
+
+Constructor for the TLSv1.1 SSL_METHOD structure for clients, servers or both.
+
+=item const SSL_METHOD *B<TLSv1_1_client_method>(void);
+
+Constructor for the TLSv1.1 SSL_METHOD structure for clients.
+
+=item const SSL_METHOD *B<TLSv1_1_server_method>(void);
+
+Constructor for the TLSv1.1 SSL_METHOD structure for servers.
+
+=item const SSL_METHOD *B<TLSv1_method>(void);
+
+Constructor for the TLSv1 SSL_METHOD structure for clients, servers or both.
+
+=item const SSL_METHOD *B<TLSv1_client_method>(void);
+
+Constructor for the TLSv1 SSL_METHOD structure for clients.
+
+=item const SSL_METHOD *B<TLSv1_server_method>(void);
+
+Constructor for the TLSv1 SSL_METHOD structure for servers.
+
+=item const SSL_METHOD *B<SSLv3_method>(void);
+
+Constructor for the SSLv3 SSL_METHOD structure for clients, servers or both.
+
+=item const SSL_METHOD *B<SSLv3_client_method>(void);
+
+Constructor for the SSLv3 SSL_METHOD structure for clients.
+
+=item const SSL_METHOD *B<SSLv3_server_method>(void);
+
+Constructor for the SSLv3 SSL_METHOD structure for servers.
+
+=back
+
+=head2 Dealing with Ciphers
+
+Here we document the various API functions which deal with the SSL/TLS
+ciphers defined in B<SSL_CIPHER> structures.
+
+=over 4
+
+=item char *B<SSL_CIPHER_description>(SSL_CIPHER *cipher, char *buf, int len);
+
+Write a string to I<buf> (with a maximum size of I<len>) containing a human
+readable description of I<cipher>. Returns I<buf>.
+
+=item int B<SSL_CIPHER_get_bits>(SSL_CIPHER *cipher, int *alg_bits);
+
+Determine the number of bits in I<cipher>. Because of export crippled ciphers
+there are two bits: The bits the algorithm supports in general (stored to
+I<alg_bits>) and the bits which are actually used (the return value).
+
+=item const char *B<SSL_CIPHER_get_name>(SSL_CIPHER *cipher);
+
+Return the internal name of I<cipher> as a string. These are the various
+strings defined by the I<SSL3_TXT_xxx> and I<TLS1_TXT_xxx>
+definitions in the header files.
+
+=item const char *B<SSL_CIPHER_get_version>(SSL_CIPHER *cipher);
+
+Returns a string like "C<SSLv3>" or "C<TLSv1.2>" which indicates the
+SSL/TLS protocol version to which I<cipher> belongs (i.e. where it was defined
+in the specification the first time).
+
+=back
+
+=head2 Dealing with Protocol Contexts
+
+Here we document the various API functions which deal with the SSL/TLS
+protocol context defined in the B<SSL_CTX> structure.
+
+=over 4
+
+=item int B<SSL_CTX_add_client_CA>(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
+
+=item long B<SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert>(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x509);
+
+=item int B<SSL_CTX_add_session>(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c);
+
+=item int B<SSL_CTX_check_private_key>(const SSL_CTX *ctx);
+
+=item long B<SSL_CTX_ctrl>(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, char *parg);
+
+=item void B<SSL_CTX_flush_sessions>(SSL_CTX *s, long t);
+
+=item void B<SSL_CTX_free>(SSL_CTX *a);
+
+=item char *B<SSL_CTX_get_app_data>(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+
+=item X509_STORE *B<SSL_CTX_get_cert_store>(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+
+=item STACK *B<SSL_CTX_get_ciphers>(const SSL_CTX *ctx);
+
+=item STACK *B<SSL_CTX_get_client_CA_list>(const SSL_CTX *ctx);
+
+=item int (*B<SSL_CTX_get_client_cert_cb>(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL *ssl, X509 **x509, EVP_PKEY **pkey);
+
+=item void B<SSL_CTX_get_default_read_ahead>(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+
+=item char *B<SSL_CTX_get_ex_data>(const SSL_CTX *s, int idx);
+
+=item int B<SSL_CTX_get_ex_new_index>(long argl, char *argp, int (*new_func);(void), int (*dup_func)(void), void (*free_func)(void))
+
+=item void (*B<SSL_CTX_get_info_callback>(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL *ssl, int cb, int ret);
+
+=item int B<SSL_CTX_get_quiet_shutdown>(const SSL_CTX *ctx);
+
+=item void B<SSL_CTX_get_read_ahead>(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+
+=item int B<SSL_CTX_get_session_cache_mode>(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+
+=item long B<SSL_CTX_get_timeout>(const SSL_CTX *ctx);
+
+=item int (*B<SSL_CTX_get_verify_callback>(const SSL_CTX *ctx))(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+
+=item int B<SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode>(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+
+=item int B<SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations>(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *CAfile, const char *CApath);
+
+=item SSL_CTX *B<SSL_CTX_new>(const SSL_METHOD *meth);
+
+=item int SSL_CTX_up_ref(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+
+=item int B<SSL_CTX_remove_session>(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c);
+
+=item int B<SSL_CTX_sess_accept>(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+
+=item int B<SSL_CTX_sess_accept_good>(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+
+=item int B<SSL_CTX_sess_accept_renegotiate>(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+
+=item int B<SSL_CTX_sess_cache_full>(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+
+=item int B<SSL_CTX_sess_cb_hits>(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+
+=item int B<SSL_CTX_sess_connect>(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+
+=item int B<SSL_CTX_sess_connect_good>(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+
+=item int B<SSL_CTX_sess_connect_renegotiate>(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+
+=item int B<SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size>(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+
+=item SSL_SESSION *(*B<SSL_CTX_sess_get_get_cb>(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *data, int len, int *copy);
+
+=item int (*B<SSL_CTX_sess_get_new_cb>(SSL_CTX *ctx)(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess);
+
+=item void (*B<SSL_CTX_sess_get_remove_cb>(SSL_CTX *ctx)(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *sess);
+
+=item int B<SSL_CTX_sess_hits>(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+
+=item int B<SSL_CTX_sess_misses>(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+
+=item int B<SSL_CTX_sess_number>(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+
+=item void B<SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size>(SSL_CTX *ctx, t);
+
+=item void B<SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb>(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *(*cb)(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *data, int len, int *copy));
+
+=item void B<SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb>(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess));
+
+=item void B<SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb>(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb)(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *sess));
+
+=item int B<SSL_CTX_sess_timeouts>(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+
+=item LHASH *B<SSL_CTX_sessions>(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+
+=item int B<SSL_CTX_set_app_data>(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *arg);
+
+=item void B<SSL_CTX_set_cert_store>(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *cs);
+
+=item void B<SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_cb>(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(), char *arg)
+
+=item int B<SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list>(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *str);
+
+=item void B<SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list>(SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK *list);
+
+=item void B<SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb>(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, X509 **x509, EVP_PKEY **pkey));
+
+=item int B<SSL_CTX_set_ct_validation_callback>(SSL_CTX *ctx, ssl_ct_validation_cb callback, void *arg);
+
+=item void B<SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb>(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb);(void))
+
+=item void B<SSL_CTX_set_default_read_ahead>(SSL_CTX *ctx, int m);
+
+=item int B<SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths>(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+
+Use the default paths to locate trusted CA certificates. There is one default
+directory path and one default file path. Both are set via this call.
+
+=item int B<SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_dir>(SSL_CTX *ctx)
+
+Use the default directory path to locate trusted CA certificates.
+
+=item int B<SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_file>(SSL_CTX *ctx)
+
+Use the file path to locate trusted CA certificates.
+
+=item int B<SSL_CTX_set_ex_data>(SSL_CTX *s, int idx, char *arg);
+
+=item void B<SSL_CTX_set_info_callback>(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb)(SSL *ssl, int cb, int ret));
+
+=item void B<SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback>(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg));
+
+=item void B<SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback_arg>(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *arg);
+
+=item unsigned long B<SSL_CTX_clear_options>(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned long op);
+
+=item unsigned long B<SSL_CTX_get_options>(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+
+=item unsigned long B<SSL_CTX_set_options>(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned long op);
+
+=item void B<SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown>(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode);
+
+=item void B<SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead>(SSL_CTX *ctx, int m);
+
+=item void B<SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode>(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode);
+
+=item int B<SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version>(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SSL_METHOD *meth);
+
+=item void B<SSL_CTX_set_timeout>(SSL_CTX *ctx, long t);
+
+=item long B<SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh>(SSL_CTX* ctx, DH *dh);
+
+=item long B<SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback>(SSL_CTX *ctx, DH *(*cb)(void));
+
+=item void B<SSL_CTX_set_verify>(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode, int (*cb);(void))
+
+=item int B<SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey>(SSL_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+
+=item int B<SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_ASN1>(int type, SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *d, long len);
+
+=item int B<SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file>(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file, int type);
+
+=item int B<SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey>(SSL_CTX *ctx, RSA *rsa);
+
+=item int B<SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1>(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *d, long len);
+
+=item int B<SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_file>(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file, int type);
+
+=item int B<SSL_CTX_use_certificate>(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
+
+=item int B<SSL_CTX_use_certificate_ASN1>(SSL_CTX *ctx, int len, unsigned char *d);
+
+=item int B<SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file>(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file, int type);
+
+=item X509 *B<SSL_CTX_get0_certificate>(const SSL_CTX *ctx);
+
+=item EVP_PKEY *B<SSL_CTX_get0_privatekey>(const SSL_CTX *ctx);
+
+=item void B<SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback>(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned int (*callback)(SSL *ssl, const char *hint, char *identity, unsigned int max_identity_len, unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len));
+
+=item int B<SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint>(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *hint);
+
+=item void B<SSL_CTX_set_psk_server_callback>(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned int (*callback)(SSL *ssl, const char *identity, unsigned char *psk, int max_psk_len));
+
+
+=back
+
+=head2 Dealing with Sessions
+
+Here we document the various API functions which deal with the SSL/TLS
+sessions defined in the B<SSL_SESSION> structures.
+
+=over 4
+
+=item int B<SSL_SESSION_cmp>(const SSL_SESSION *a, const SSL_SESSION *b);
+
+=item void B<SSL_SESSION_free>(SSL_SESSION *ss);
+
+=item char *B<SSL_SESSION_get_app_data>(SSL_SESSION *s);
+
+=item char *B<SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data>(const SSL_SESSION *s, int idx);
+
+=item int B<SSL_SESSION_get_ex_new_index>(long argl, char *argp, int (*new_func);(void), int (*dup_func)(void), void (*free_func)(void))
+
+=item long B<SSL_SESSION_get_time>(const SSL_SESSION *s);
+
+=item long B<SSL_SESSION_get_timeout>(const SSL_SESSION *s);
+
+=item unsigned long B<SSL_SESSION_hash>(const SSL_SESSION *a);
+
+=item SSL_SESSION *B<SSL_SESSION_new>(void);
+
+=item int B<SSL_SESSION_print>(BIO *bp, const SSL_SESSION *x);
+
+=item int B<SSL_SESSION_print_fp>(FILE *fp, const SSL_SESSION *x);
+
+=item int B<SSL_SESSION_set_app_data>(SSL_SESSION *s, char *a);
+
+=item int B<SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data>(SSL_SESSION *s, int idx, char *arg);
+
+=item long B<SSL_SESSION_set_time>(SSL_SESSION *s, long t);
+
+=item long B<SSL_SESSION_set_timeout>(SSL_SESSION *s, long t);
+
+=back
+
+=head2 Dealing with Connections
+
+Here we document the various API functions which deal with the SSL/TLS
+connection defined in the B<SSL> structure.
+
+=over 4
+
+=item int B<SSL_accept>(SSL *ssl);
+
+=item int B<SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack>(STACK *stack, const char *dir);
+
+=item int B<SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack>(STACK *stack, const char *file);
+
+=item int B<SSL_add_client_CA>(SSL *ssl, X509 *x);
+
+=item char *B<SSL_alert_desc_string>(int value);
+
+=item char *B<SSL_alert_desc_string_long>(int value);
+
+=item char *B<SSL_alert_type_string>(int value);
+
+=item char *B<SSL_alert_type_string_long>(int value);
+
+=item int B<SSL_check_private_key>(const SSL *ssl);
+
+=item void B<SSL_clear>(SSL *ssl);
+
+=item long B<SSL_clear_num_renegotiations>(SSL *ssl);
+
+=item int B<SSL_connect>(SSL *ssl);
+
+=item int B<SSL_copy_session_id>(SSL *t, const SSL *f);
+
+Sets the session details for B<t> to be the same as in B<f>. Returns 1 on
+success or 0 on failure.
+
+=item long B<SSL_ctrl>(SSL *ssl, int cmd, long larg, char *parg);
+
+=item int B<SSL_do_handshake>(SSL *ssl);
+
+=item SSL *B<SSL_dup>(SSL *ssl);
+
+SSL_dup() allows applications to configure an SSL handle for use
+in multiple SSL connections, and then duplicate it prior to initiating
+each connection with the duplicated handle.
+Use of SSL_dup() avoids the need to repeat the configuration of the
+handles for each connection.
+
+For SSL_dup() to work, the connection MUST be in its initial state
+and MUST NOT have not yet have started the SSL handshake.
+For connections that are not in their initial state SSL_dup() just
+increments an internal reference count and returns the I<same>
+handle.
+It may be possible to use L<SSL_clear(3)> to recycle an SSL handle
+that is not in its initial state for re-use, but this is best
+avoided.
+Instead, save and restore the session, if desired, and construct a
+fresh handle for each connection.
+
+=item STACK *B<SSL_dup_CA_list>(STACK *sk);
+
+=item void B<SSL_free>(SSL *ssl);
+
+=item SSL_CTX *B<SSL_get_SSL_CTX>(const SSL *ssl);
+
+=item char *B<SSL_get_app_data>(SSL *ssl);
+
+=item X509 *B<SSL_get_certificate>(const SSL *ssl);
+
+=item const char *B<SSL_get_cipher>(const SSL *ssl);
+
+=item int B<SSL_is_dtls>(const SSL *ssl);
+
+=item int B<SSL_get_cipher_bits>(const SSL *ssl, int *alg_bits);
+
+=item char *B<SSL_get_cipher_list>(const SSL *ssl, int n);
+
+=item char *B<SSL_get_cipher_name>(const SSL *ssl);
+
+=item char *B<SSL_get_cipher_version>(const SSL *ssl);
+
+=item STACK *B<SSL_get_ciphers>(const SSL *ssl);
+
+=item STACK *B<SSL_get_client_CA_list>(const SSL *ssl);
+
+=item SSL_CIPHER *B<SSL_get_current_cipher>(SSL *ssl);
+
+=item long B<SSL_get_default_timeout>(const SSL *ssl);
+
+=item int B<SSL_get_error>(const SSL *ssl, int i);
+
+=item char *B<SSL_get_ex_data>(const SSL *ssl, int idx);
+
+=item int B<SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx>(void);
+
+=item int B<SSL_get_ex_new_index>(long argl, char *argp, int (*new_func);(void), int (*dup_func)(void), void (*free_func)(void))
+
+=item int B<SSL_get_fd>(const SSL *ssl);
+
+=item void (*B<SSL_get_info_callback>(const SSL *ssl);)()
+
+=item int B<SSL_get_key_update_type>(SSL *s);
+
+=item STACK *B<SSL_get_peer_cert_chain>(const SSL *ssl);
+
+=item X509 *B<SSL_get_peer_certificate>(const SSL *ssl);
+
+=item const STACK_OF(SCT) *B<SSL_get0_peer_scts>(SSL *s);
+
+=item EVP_PKEY *B<SSL_get_privatekey>(const SSL *ssl);
+
+=item int B<SSL_get_quiet_shutdown>(const SSL *ssl);
+
+=item BIO *B<SSL_get_rbio>(const SSL *ssl);
+
+=item int B<SSL_get_read_ahead>(const SSL *ssl);
+
+=item SSL_SESSION *B<SSL_get_session>(const SSL *ssl);
+
+=item char *B<SSL_get_shared_ciphers>(const SSL *ssl, char *buf, int len);
+
+=item int B<SSL_get_shutdown>(const SSL *ssl);
+
+=item const SSL_METHOD *B<SSL_get_ssl_method>(SSL *ssl);
+
+=item int B<SSL_get_state>(const SSL *ssl);
+
+=item long B<SSL_get_time>(const SSL *ssl);
+
+=item long B<SSL_get_timeout>(const SSL *ssl);
+
+=item int (*B<SSL_get_verify_callback>(const SSL *ssl))(int, X509_STORE_CTX *)
+
+=item int B<SSL_get_verify_mode>(const SSL *ssl);
+
+=item long B<SSL_get_verify_result>(const SSL *ssl);
+
+=item char *B<SSL_get_version>(const SSL *ssl);
+
+=item BIO *B<SSL_get_wbio>(const SSL *ssl);
+
+=item int B<SSL_in_accept_init>(SSL *ssl);
+
+=item int B<SSL_in_before>(SSL *ssl);
+
+=item int B<SSL_in_connect_init>(SSL *ssl);
+
+=item int B<SSL_in_init>(SSL *ssl);
+
+=item int B<SSL_is_init_finished>(SSL *ssl);
+
+=item int B<SSL_key_update>(SSL *s, int updatetype);
+
+=item STACK *B<SSL_load_client_CA_file>(const char *file);
+
+=item SSL *B<SSL_new>(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+
+=item int SSL_up_ref(SSL *s);
+
+=item long B<SSL_num_renegotiations>(SSL *ssl);
+
+=item int B<SSL_peek>(SSL *ssl, void *buf, int num);
+
+=item int B<SSL_pending>(const SSL *ssl);
+
+=item int B<SSL_read>(SSL *ssl, void *buf, int num);
+
+=item int B<SSL_renegotiate>(SSL *ssl);
+
+=item char *B<SSL_rstate_string>(SSL *ssl);
+
+=item char *B<SSL_rstate_string_long>(SSL *ssl);
+
+=item long B<SSL_session_reused>(SSL *ssl);
+
+=item void B<SSL_set_accept_state>(SSL *ssl);
+
+=item void B<SSL_set_app_data>(SSL *ssl, char *arg);
+
+=item void B<SSL_set_bio>(SSL *ssl, BIO *rbio, BIO *wbio);
+
+=item int B<SSL_set_cipher_list>(SSL *ssl, char *str);
+
+=item void B<SSL_set_client_CA_list>(SSL *ssl, STACK *list);
+
+=item void B<SSL_set_connect_state>(SSL *ssl);
+
+=item int B<SSL_set_ct_validation_callback>(SSL *ssl, ssl_ct_validation_cb callback, void *arg);
+
+=item int B<SSL_set_ex_data>(SSL *ssl, int idx, char *arg);
+
+=item int B<SSL_set_fd>(SSL *ssl, int fd);
+
+=item void B<SSL_set_info_callback>(SSL *ssl, void (*cb);(void))
+
+=item void B<SSL_set_msg_callback>(SSL *ctx, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg));
+
+=item void B<SSL_set_msg_callback_arg>(SSL *ctx, void *arg);
+
+=item unsigned long B<SSL_clear_options>(SSL *ssl, unsigned long op);
+
+=item unsigned long B<SSL_get_options>(SSL *ssl);
+
+=item unsigned long B<SSL_set_options>(SSL *ssl, unsigned long op);
+
+=item void B<SSL_set_quiet_shutdown>(SSL *ssl, int mode);
+
+=item void B<SSL_set_read_ahead>(SSL *ssl, int yes);
+
+=item int B<SSL_set_rfd>(SSL *ssl, int fd);
+
+=item int B<SSL_set_session>(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *session);
+
+=item void B<SSL_set_shutdown>(SSL *ssl, int mode);
+
+=item int B<SSL_set_ssl_method>(SSL *ssl, const SSL_METHOD *meth);
+
+=item void B<SSL_set_time>(SSL *ssl, long t);
+
+=item void B<SSL_set_timeout>(SSL *ssl, long t);
+
+=item void B<SSL_set_verify>(SSL *ssl, int mode, int (*callback);(void))
+
+=item void B<SSL_set_verify_result>(SSL *ssl, long arg);
+
+=item int B<SSL_set_wfd>(SSL *ssl, int fd);
+
+=item int B<SSL_shutdown>(SSL *ssl);
+
+=item OSSL_HANDSHAKE_STATE B<SSL_get_state>(const SSL *ssl);
+
+Returns the current handshake state.
+
+=item char *B<SSL_state_string>(const SSL *ssl);
+
+=item char *B<SSL_state_string_long>(const SSL *ssl);
+
+=item long B<SSL_total_renegotiations>(SSL *ssl);
+
+=item int B<SSL_use_PrivateKey>(SSL *ssl, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+
+=item int B<SSL_use_PrivateKey_ASN1>(int type, SSL *ssl, unsigned char *d, long len);
+
+=item int B<SSL_use_PrivateKey_file>(SSL *ssl, const char *file, int type);
+
+=item int B<SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey>(SSL *ssl, RSA *rsa);
+
+=item int B<SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1>(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *d, long len);
+
+=item int B<SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_file>(SSL *ssl, const char *file, int type);
+
+=item int B<SSL_use_certificate>(SSL *ssl, X509 *x);
+
+=item int B<SSL_use_certificate_ASN1>(SSL *ssl, int len, unsigned char *d);
+
+=item int B<SSL_use_certificate_file>(SSL *ssl, const char *file, int type);
+
+=item int B<SSL_version>(const SSL *ssl);
+
+=item int B<SSL_want>(const SSL *ssl);
+
+=item int B<SSL_want_nothing>(const SSL *ssl);
+
+=item int B<SSL_want_read>(const SSL *ssl);
+
+=item int B<SSL_want_write>(const SSL *ssl);
+
+=item int B<SSL_want_x509_lookup>(const SSL *ssl);
+
+=item int B<SSL_write>(SSL *ssl, const void *buf, int num);
+
+=item void B<SSL_set_psk_client_callback>(SSL *ssl, unsigned int (*callback)(SSL *ssl, const char *hint, char *identity, unsigned int max_identity_len, unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len));
+
+=item int B<SSL_use_psk_identity_hint>(SSL *ssl, const char *hint);
+
+=item void B<SSL_set_psk_server_callback>(SSL *ssl, unsigned int (*callback)(SSL *ssl, const char *identity, unsigned char *psk, int max_psk_len));
+
+=item const char *B<SSL_get_psk_identity_hint>(SSL *ssl);
+
+=item const char *B<SSL_get_psk_identity>(SSL *ssl);
+
+=back
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+See the individual manual pages for details.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<openssl(1)>, L<crypto(7)>,
+L<CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(3)>,
+L<SSL_accept(3)>, L<SSL_clear(3)>,
+L<SSL_connect(3)>,
+L<SSL_CIPHER_get_name(3)>,
+L<SSL_COMP_add_compression_method(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_add_session(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_ctrl(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(3)>
+L<SSL_CTX_new(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_sess_number(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_sessions(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_cert_store(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_max_cert_list(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_mode(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_options(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_security_level(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_timeout(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_verify(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_use_certificate(3)>,
+L<SSL_alert_type_string(3)>,
+L<SSL_do_handshake(3)>,
+L<SSL_enable_ct(3)>,
+L<SSL_get_SSL_CTX(3)>,
+L<SSL_get_ciphers(3)>,
+L<SSL_get_client_CA_list(3)>,
+L<SSL_get_default_timeout(3)>,
+L<SSL_get_error(3)>,
+L<SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(3)>,
+L<SSL_get_fd(3)>,
+L<SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(3)>,
+L<SSL_get_rbio(3)>,
+L<SSL_get_session(3)>,
+L<SSL_get_verify_result(3)>,
+L<SSL_get_version(3)>,
+L<SSL_load_client_CA_file(3)>,
+L<SSL_new(3)>,
+L<SSL_pending(3)>,
+L<SSL_read_ex(3)>,
+L<SSL_read(3)>,
+L<SSL_rstate_string(3)>,
+L<SSL_session_reused(3)>,
+L<SSL_set_bio(3)>,
+L<SSL_set_connect_state(3)>,
+L<SSL_set_fd(3)>,
+L<SSL_set_session(3)>,
+L<SSL_set_shutdown(3)>,
+L<SSL_shutdown(3)>,
+L<SSL_state_string(3)>,
+L<SSL_want(3)>,
+L<SSL_write_ex(3)>,
+L<SSL_write(3)>,
+L<SSL_SESSION_free(3)>,
+L<SSL_SESSION_get_time(3)>,
+L<d2i_SSL_SESSION(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint(3)>,
+L<SSL_get_psk_identity(3)>,
+L<DTLSv1_listen(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+B<SSLv2_client_method>, B<SSLv2_server_method> and B<SSLv2_method> were removed
+in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+The return type of B<SSL_copy_session_id> was changed from void to int in
+OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2000-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/e_os.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/e_os.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dfa159f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/e_os.h
@@ -0,0 +1,527 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_E_OS_H
+# define HEADER_E_OS_H
+
+# include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+
+# include <openssl/e_os2.h>
+/*
+ * <openssl/e_os2.h> contains what we can justify to make visible to the
+ * outside; this file e_os.h is not part of the exported interface.
+ */
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/* Used to checking reference counts, most while doing perl5 stuff :-) */
+# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_STDIO)
+#  if defined(REF_PRINT)
+#   error "REF_PRINT requires stdio"
+#  endif
+# endif
+
+/*
+ * BIO_printf format modifier for [u]int64_t.
+ */
+# if defined(__LP64__) || (defined(__SIZEOF_LONG__) && __SIZEOF_LONG__==8)
+#  define BIO_PRI64 "l"     /* 'll' does work "universally", but 'l' is
+                             * here to shut -Wformat warnings in LP64... */
+# else
+#  define BIO_PRI64 "ll"
+# endif
+
+# if !defined(NDEBUG) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_STDIO)
+#  define REF_ASSERT_ISNT(test) \
+    (void)((test) ? (OPENSSL_die("refcount error", __FILE__, __LINE__), 1) : 0)
+# else
+#  define REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i)
+# endif
+# ifdef REF_PRINT
+#  define REF_PRINT_COUNT(a, b) \
+        fprintf(stderr, "%p:%4d:%s\n", b, b->references, a)
+# else
+#  define REF_PRINT_COUNT(a, b)
+# endif
+
+# define osslargused(x)      (void)x
+# define OPENSSL_CONF        "openssl.cnf"
+
+# ifndef DEVRANDOM
+/*
+ * set this to a comma-separated list of 'random' device files to try out. My
+ * default, we will try to read at least one of these files
+ */
+#  define DEVRANDOM "/dev/urandom","/dev/random","/dev/srandom"
+# endif
+# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EGD) && !defined(DEVRANDOM_EGD)
+/*
+ * set this to a comma-separated list of 'egd' sockets to try out. These
+ * sockets will be tried in the order listed in case accessing the device
+ * files listed in DEVRANDOM did not return enough entropy.
+ */
+#  define DEVRANDOM_EGD "/var/run/egd-pool","/dev/egd-pool","/etc/egd-pool","/etc/entropy"
+# endif
+
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS)
+#  define NO_SYS_PARAM_H
+#  define NO_CHMOD
+#  define NO_SYSLOG
+# endif
+
+/********************************************************************
+ The Microsoft section
+ ********************************************************************/
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) && !defined(WIN32)
+#  define WIN32
+# endif
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) && !defined(WINDOWS)
+#  define WINDOWS
+# endif
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) && !defined(MSDOS)
+#  define MSDOS
+# endif
+
+# if (defined(MSDOS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI)) && !defined(GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS)
+#  define GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS
+# endif
+
+# ifdef WIN32
+#  define NO_SYS_UN_H
+#  define get_last_sys_error()    GetLastError()
+#  define clear_sys_error()       SetLastError(0)
+#  if !defined(WINNT)
+#   define WIN_CONSOLE_BUG
+#  endif
+# else
+#  define get_last_sys_error()    errno
+#  define clear_sys_error()       errno=0
+# endif
+
+# if defined(WINDOWS)
+#  define get_last_socket_error() WSAGetLastError()
+#  define clear_socket_error()    WSASetLastError(0)
+#  define readsocket(s,b,n)       recv((s),(b),(n),0)
+#  define writesocket(s,b,n)      send((s),(b),(n),0)
+# elif defined(__DJGPP__)
+#  define WATT32
+#  define WATT32_NO_OLDIES
+#  define get_last_socket_error() errno
+#  define clear_socket_error()    errno=0
+#  define closesocket(s)          close_s(s)
+#  define readsocket(s,b,n)       read_s(s,b,n)
+#  define writesocket(s,b,n)      send(s,b,n,0)
+# elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
+#  define get_last_socket_error() errno
+#  define clear_socket_error()    errno=0
+#  define ioctlsocket(a,b,c)      ioctl(a,b,c)
+#  define closesocket(s)          close(s)
+#  define readsocket(s,b,n)       recv((s),(b),(n),0)
+#  define writesocket(s,b,n)      send((s),(b),(n),0)
+# elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS)
+#  define get_last_socket_error() errno
+#  define clear_socket_error()    errno=0
+#  define ioctlsocket(a,b,c)          ioctl((a),(b),(int)(c))
+#  define closesocket(s)              close(s)
+#  define readsocket(s,b,n)           read((s),(b),(n))
+#  define writesocket(s,b,n)          write((s),(char *)(b),(n))
+# else
+#  define get_last_socket_error() errno
+#  define clear_socket_error()    errno=0
+#  define ioctlsocket(a,b,c)      ioctl(a,b,c)
+#  define closesocket(s)          close(s)
+#  define readsocket(s,b,n)       read((s),(b),(n))
+#  define writesocket(s,b,n)      write((s),(b),(n))
+# endif
+
+# if (defined(WINDOWS) || defined(MSDOS))
+
+#  ifdef __DJGPP__
+#   include <unistd.h>
+#   include <sys/stat.h>
+#   include <sys/socket.h>
+#   include <sys/un.h>
+#   include <tcp.h>
+#   include <netdb.h>
+#   define _setmode setmode
+#   define _O_TEXT O_TEXT
+#   define _O_BINARY O_BINARY
+#   define HAS_LFN_SUPPORT(name)  (pathconf((name), _PC_NAME_MAX) > 12)
+#   undef DEVRANDOM_EGD  /*  Neither MS-DOS nor FreeDOS provide 'egd' sockets.  */
+#   undef DEVRANDOM
+#   define DEVRANDOM "/dev/urandom\x24"
+#  endif                        /* __DJGPP__ */
+
+#  ifndef S_IFDIR
+#   define S_IFDIR     _S_IFDIR
+#  endif
+
+#  ifndef S_IFMT
+#   define S_IFMT      _S_IFMT
+#  endif
+
+#  if !defined(WINNT) && !defined(__DJGPP__)
+#   define NO_SYSLOG
+#  endif
+
+#  ifdef WINDOWS
+#   if !defined(_WIN32_WCE) && !defined(_WIN32_WINNT)
+       /*
+        * Defining _WIN32_WINNT here in e_os.h implies certain "discipline."
+        * Most notably we ought to check for availability of each specific
+        * routine that was introduced after denoted _WIN32_WINNT with
+        * GetProcAddress(). Normally newer functions are masked with higher
+        * _WIN32_WINNT in SDK headers. So that if you wish to use them in
+        * some module, you'd need to override _WIN32_WINNT definition in
+        * the target module in order to "reach for" prototypes, but replace
+        * calls to new functions with indirect calls. Alternatively it
+        * might be possible to achieve the goal by /DELAYLOAD-ing .DLLs
+        * and check for current OS version instead.
+        */
+#    define _WIN32_WINNT 0x0501
+#   endif
+#   if defined(_WIN32_WINNT) || defined(_WIN32_WCE)
+       /*
+        * Just like defining _WIN32_WINNT including winsock2.h implies
+        * certain "discipline" for maintaining [broad] binary compatibility.
+        * As long as structures are invariant among Winsock versions,
+        * it's sufficient to check for specific Winsock2 API availability
+        * at run-time [DSO_global_lookup is recommended]...
+        */
+#    include <winsock2.h>
+#    include <ws2tcpip.h>
+       /* yes, they have to be #included prior to <windows.h> */
+#   endif
+#   include <windows.h>
+#   include <stdio.h>
+#   include <stddef.h>
+#   include <errno.h>
+#   if defined(_WIN32_WCE) && !defined(EACCES)
+#    define EACCES   13
+#   endif
+#   include <string.h>
+#   ifdef _WIN64
+#    define strlen(s) _strlen31(s)
+/* cut strings to 2GB */
+static __inline unsigned int _strlen31(const char *str)
+{
+    unsigned int len = 0;
+    while (*str && len < 0x80000000U)
+        str++, len++;
+    return len & 0x7FFFFFFF;
+}
+#   endif
+#   include <malloc.h>
+#   if defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER<=1200 && defined(_MT) && defined(isspace)
+       /* compensate for bug in VC6 ctype.h */
+#    undef isspace
+#    undef isdigit
+#    undef isalnum
+#    undef isupper
+#    undef isxdigit
+#   endif
+#   if defined(_MSC_VER) && !defined(_WIN32_WCE) && !defined(_DLL) && defined(stdin)
+#    if _MSC_VER>=1300 && _MSC_VER<1600
+#     undef stdin
+#     undef stdout
+#     undef stderr
+FILE *__iob_func();
+#     define stdin  (&__iob_func()[0])
+#     define stdout (&__iob_func()[1])
+#     define stderr (&__iob_func()[2])
+#    elif _MSC_VER<1300 && defined(I_CAN_LIVE_WITH_LNK4049)
+#     undef stdin
+#     undef stdout
+#     undef stderr
+         /*
+          * pre-1300 has __p__iob(), but it's available only in msvcrt.lib,
+          * or in other words with /MD. Declaring implicit import, i.e. with
+          * _imp_ prefix, works correctly with all compiler options, but
+          * without /MD results in LINK warning LNK4049: 'locally defined
+          * symbol "__iob" imported'.
+          */
+extern FILE *_imp___iob;
+#     define stdin  (&_imp___iob[0])
+#     define stdout (&_imp___iob[1])
+#     define stderr (&_imp___iob[2])
+#    endif
+#   endif
+#  endif
+#  include <io.h>
+#  include <fcntl.h>
+
+#  ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE
+#   define OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO
+#  endif
+
+#  define EXIT(n) exit(n)
+#  define LIST_SEPARATOR_CHAR ';'
+#  ifndef X_OK
+#   define X_OK        0
+#  endif
+#  ifndef W_OK
+#   define W_OK        2
+#  endif
+#  ifndef R_OK
+#   define R_OK        4
+#  endif
+#  ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE
+#   define DEFAULT_HOME  ""
+#  else
+#   define DEFAULT_HOME  "C:"
+#  endif
+
+/* Avoid Visual Studio 13 GetVersion deprecated problems */
+#  if defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER>=1800
+#   define check_winnt() (1)
+#   define check_win_minplat(x) (1)
+#  else
+#   define check_winnt() (GetVersion() < 0x80000000)
+#   define check_win_minplat(x) (LOBYTE(LOWORD(GetVersion())) >= (x))
+#  endif
+
+# else                          /* The non-microsoft world */
+
+#  ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+#   define VMS 1
+  /*
+   * some programs don't include stdlib, so exit() and others give implicit
+   * function warnings
+   */
+#   include <stdlib.h>
+#   if defined(__DECC)
+#    include <unistd.h>
+#   else
+#    include <unixlib.h>
+#   endif
+#   define LIST_SEPARATOR_CHAR ','
+  /* We don't have any well-defined random devices on VMS, yet... */
+#   undef DEVRANDOM
+  /*-
+     We need to do this since VMS has the following coding on status codes:
+
+     Bits 0-2: status type: 0 = warning, 1 = success, 2 = error, 3 = info ...
+               The important thing to know is that odd numbers are considered
+               good, while even ones are considered errors.
+     Bits 3-15: actual status number
+     Bits 16-27: facility number.  0 is considered "unknown"
+     Bits 28-31: control bits.  If bit 28 is set, the shell won't try to
+                 output the message (which, for random codes, just looks ugly)
+
+     So, what we do here is to change 0 to 1 to get the default success status,
+     and everything else is shifted up to fit into the status number field, and
+     the status is tagged as an error, which is what is wanted here.
+
+     Finally, we add the VMS C facility code 0x35a000, because there are some
+     programs, such as Perl, that will reinterpret the code back to something
+     POSIXly.  'man perlvms' explains it further.
+
+     NOTE: the perlvms manual wants to turn all codes 2 to 255 into success
+     codes (status type = 1).  I couldn't disagree more.  Fortunately, the
+     status type doesn't seem to bother Perl.
+     -- Richard Levitte
+  */
+#   define EXIT(n)  exit((n) ? (((n) << 3) | 2 | 0x10000000 | 0x35a000) : 1)
+
+#   define NO_SYS_PARAM_H
+#   define NO_SYS_UN_H
+
+#   define DEFAULT_HOME "SYS$LOGIN:"
+
+#  else
+     /* !defined VMS */
+#   ifdef OPENSSL_UNISTD
+#    include OPENSSL_UNISTD
+#   else
+#    include <unistd.h>
+#   endif
+#   include <sys/types.h>
+#   ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32_CYGWIN
+#    include <io.h>
+#    include <fcntl.h>
+#   endif
+
+#   define LIST_SEPARATOR_CHAR ':'
+#   define EXIT(n)             exit(n)
+#  endif
+
+# endif
+
+/*************/
+
+# ifdef USE_SOCKETS
+#  ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
+#  elif defined(WINDOWS) || defined(MSDOS)
+      /* windows world */
+#   if !defined(__DJGPP__)
+#    if defined(_WIN32_WCE) && _WIN32_WCE<410
+#     define getservbyname _masked_declaration_getservbyname
+#    endif
+#    if !defined(IPPROTO_IP)
+         /* winsock[2].h was included already? */
+#     include <winsock.h>
+#    endif
+#    ifdef getservbyname
+#     undef getservbyname
+         /* this is used to be wcecompat/include/winsock_extras.h */
+struct servent *PASCAL getservbyname(const char *, const char *);
+#    endif
+
+#    ifdef _WIN64
+/*
+ * Even though sizeof(SOCKET) is 8, it's safe to cast it to int, because
+ * the value constitutes an index in per-process table of limited size
+ * and not a real pointer. And we also depend on fact that all processors
+ * Windows run on happen to be two's-complement, which allows to
+ * interchange INVALID_SOCKET and -1.
+ */
+#     define socket(d,t,p)   ((int)socket(d,t,p))
+#     define accept(s,f,l)   ((int)accept(s,f,l))
+#    endif
+#   else
+#   endif
+
+#  else
+
+#   ifndef NO_SYS_PARAM_H
+#    include <sys/param.h>
+#   endif
+#   ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS
+#    include <time.h>
+#   endif
+
+#   include <netdb.h>
+#   if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS_NODECC)
+#    include <socket.h>
+#    include <in.h>
+#    include <inet.h>
+#   else
+#    include <sys/socket.h>
+#    ifndef NO_SYS_UN_H
+#     ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS
+#      include <streams/un.h>
+#     else
+#      include <sys/un.h>
+#     endif
+#     ifndef UNIX_PATH_MAX
+#      define UNIX_PATH_MAX sizeof(((struct sockaddr_un *)NULL)->sun_path)
+#     endif
+#    endif
+#    ifdef FILIO_H
+#     include <sys/filio.h> /* FIONBIO in some SVR4, e.g. unixware, solaris */
+#    endif
+#    include <netinet/in.h>
+#    include <arpa/inet.h>
+#    include <netinet/tcp.h>
+#   endif
+
+#   ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_AIX
+#    include <sys/select.h>
+#   endif
+
+#   ifdef __QNX__
+#    include <sys/select.h>
+#   endif
+
+#   ifndef VMS
+#    include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#   else
+        /* ioctl is only in VMS > 7.0 and when socketshr is not used */
+#    if !defined(TCPIP_TYPE_SOCKETSHR) && defined(__VMS_VER) && (__VMS_VER > 70000000)
+#     include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#    endif
+#   endif
+
+#   ifdef VMS
+#    include <unixio.h>
+#    if defined(TCPIP_TYPE_SOCKETSHR)
+#     include <socketshr.h>
+#    endif
+#   endif
+
+#   ifndef INVALID_SOCKET
+#    define INVALID_SOCKET      (-1)
+#   endif                       /* INVALID_SOCKET */
+#  endif
+
+/*
+ * Some IPv6 implementations are broken, disable them in known bad versions.
+ */
+#  if !defined(OPENSSL_USE_IPV6)
+#   if defined(AF_INET6) && !defined(NETWARE_CLIB)
+#    define OPENSSL_USE_IPV6 1
+#   else
+#    define OPENSSL_USE_IPV6 0
+#   endif
+#  endif
+
+# endif
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_EXIT
+#  if defined(MONOLITH) && !defined(OPENSSL_C)
+#   define OPENSSL_EXIT(n) return(n)
+#  else
+#   define OPENSSL_EXIT(n) do { EXIT(n); return(n); } while(0)
+#  endif
+# endif
+
+/***********************************************/
+
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS)
+#  define strcasecmp _stricmp
+#  define strncasecmp _strnicmp
+#  if (_MSC_VER >= 1310)
+#   define open _open
+#   define fdopen _fdopen
+#   define close _close
+#   ifndef strdup
+#    define strdup _strdup
+#   endif
+#   define unlink _unlink
+#  endif
+# else
+#  include <strings.h>
+# endif
+
+/* vxworks */
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS)
+#  include <ioLib.h>
+#  include <tickLib.h>
+#  include <sysLib.h>
+
+#  define TTY_STRUCT int
+
+#  define sleep(a) taskDelay((a) * sysClkRateGet())
+
+#  include <vxWorks.h>
+#  include <sockLib.h>
+#  include <taskLib.h>
+
+#  define getpid taskIdSelf
+
+/*
+ * NOTE: these are implemented by helpers in database app! if the database is
+ * not linked, we need to implement them elswhere
+ */
+struct hostent *gethostbyname(const char *name);
+struct hostent *gethostbyaddr(const char *addr, int length, int type);
+struct servent *getservbyname(const char *name, const char *proto);
+
+# endif
+/* end vxworks */
+
+#define OSSL_NELEM(x)    (sizeof(x)/sizeof((x)[0]))
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/afalg/build.info b/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/afalg/build.info
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8601b1a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/afalg/build.info
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+IF[{- !$disabled{"engine"} -}]
+  IF[{- !$disabled{afalg} -}]
+    IF[{- $disabled{"dynamic-engine"} -}]
+      LIBS=../../libcrypto
+      SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=e_afalg.c e_afalg_err.c
+    ELSE
+      ENGINES=afalg
+      SOURCE[afalg]=e_afalg.c e_afalg_err.c
+      DEPEND[afalg]=../../libcrypto
+      INCLUDE[afalg]= ../../include
+    ENDIF
+  ENDIF
+ENDIF
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/afalg/e_afalg.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/afalg/e_afalg.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6d6e877
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/afalg/e_afalg.c
@@ -0,0 +1,830 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* Required for vmsplice */
+#ifndef _GNU_SOURCE
+# define _GNU_SOURCE
+#endif
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#include <openssl/async.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <linux/version.h>
+#define K_MAJ   4
+#define K_MIN1  1
+#define K_MIN2  0
+#if LINUX_VERSION_CODE < KERNEL_VERSION(K_MAJ, K_MIN1, K_MIN2) || \
+    !defined(AF_ALG)
+# ifndef PEDANTIC
+#  warning "AFALG ENGINE requires Kernel Headers >= 4.1.0"
+#  warning "Skipping Compilation of AFALG engine"
+# endif
+void engine_load_afalg_int(void);
+void engine_load_afalg_int(void)
+{
+}
+#else
+
+# include <linux/if_alg.h>
+# include <fcntl.h>
+# include <sys/utsname.h>
+
+# include <linux/aio_abi.h>
+# include <sys/syscall.h>
+# include <errno.h>
+
+# include "e_afalg.h"
+
+# define AFALG_LIB_NAME "AFALG"
+# include "e_afalg_err.h"
+
+# ifndef SOL_ALG
+#  define SOL_ALG 279
+# endif
+
+# ifdef ALG_ZERO_COPY
+#  ifndef SPLICE_F_GIFT
+#   define SPLICE_F_GIFT    (0x08)
+#  endif
+# endif
+
+# define ALG_AES_IV_LEN 16
+# define ALG_IV_LEN(len) (sizeof(struct af_alg_iv) + (len))
+# define ALG_OP_TYPE     unsigned int
+# define ALG_OP_LEN      (sizeof(ALG_OP_TYPE))
+
+#define ALG_MAX_SALG_NAME       64
+#define ALG_MAX_SALG_TYPE       14
+
+# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE
+void engine_load_afalg_int(void);
+# endif
+
+/* Local Linkage Functions */
+static int afalg_init_aio(afalg_aio *aio);
+static int afalg_fin_cipher_aio(afalg_aio *ptr, int sfd,
+                                unsigned char *buf, size_t len);
+static int afalg_create_sk(afalg_ctx *actx, const char *ciphertype,
+                                const char *ciphername);
+static int afalg_destroy(ENGINE *e);
+static int afalg_init(ENGINE *e);
+static int afalg_finish(ENGINE *e);
+static const EVP_CIPHER *afalg_aes_128_cbc(void);
+static int afalg_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher,
+                         const int **nids, int nid);
+static int afalg_cipher_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+                             const unsigned char *iv, int enc);
+static int afalg_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                           const unsigned char *in, size_t inl);
+static int afalg_cipher_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx);
+static int afalg_chk_platform(void);
+
+/* Engine Id and Name */
+static const char *engine_afalg_id = "afalg";
+static const char *engine_afalg_name = "AFALG engine support";
+
+static int afalg_cipher_nids[] = {
+    NID_aes_128_cbc
+};
+
+static EVP_CIPHER *_hidden_aes_128_cbc = NULL;
+
+static ossl_inline int io_setup(unsigned n, aio_context_t *ctx)
+{
+    return syscall(__NR_io_setup, n, ctx);
+}
+
+static ossl_inline int eventfd(int n)
+{
+    return syscall(__NR_eventfd2, n, 0);
+}
+
+static ossl_inline int io_destroy(aio_context_t ctx)
+{
+    return syscall(__NR_io_destroy, ctx);
+}
+
+static ossl_inline int io_read(aio_context_t ctx, long n, struct iocb **iocb)
+{
+    return syscall(__NR_io_submit, ctx, n, iocb);
+}
+
+static ossl_inline int io_getevents(aio_context_t ctx, long min, long max,
+                               struct io_event *events,
+                               struct timespec *timeout)
+{
+    return syscall(__NR_io_getevents, ctx, min, max, events, timeout);
+}
+
+static void afalg_waitfd_cleanup(ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *ctx, const void *key,
+                                 OSSL_ASYNC_FD waitfd, void *custom)
+{
+    close(waitfd);
+}
+
+static int afalg_setup_async_event_notification(afalg_aio *aio)
+{
+    ASYNC_JOB *job;
+    ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *waitctx;
+    void *custom = NULL;
+    int ret;
+
+    if ((job = ASYNC_get_current_job()) != NULL) {
+        /* Async mode */
+        waitctx = ASYNC_get_wait_ctx(job);
+        if (waitctx == NULL) {
+            ALG_WARN("%s: ASYNC_get_wait_ctx error", __func__);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        /* Get waitfd from ASYNC_WAIT_CTX if it is alreday set */
+        ret = ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_fd(waitctx, engine_afalg_id,
+                                    &aio->efd, &custom);
+        if (ret == 0) {
+            /*
+             * waitfd is not set in ASYNC_WAIT_CTX, create a new one
+             * and set it. efd will be signaled when AIO operation completes
+             */
+            aio->efd = eventfd(0);
+            if (aio->efd == -1) {
+                ALG_PERR("%s: Failed to get eventfd : ", __func__);
+                AFALGerr(AFALG_F_AFALG_SETUP_ASYNC_EVENT_NOTIFICATION,
+                         AFALG_R_EVENTFD_FAILED);
+                return 0;
+            }
+            ret = ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_set_wait_fd(waitctx, engine_afalg_id,
+                                             aio->efd, custom,
+                                             afalg_waitfd_cleanup);
+            if (ret == 0) {
+                ALG_WARN("%s: Failed to set wait fd", __func__);
+                close(aio->efd);
+                return 0;
+            }
+            /* make fd non-blocking in async mode */
+            if (fcntl(aio->efd, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK) != 0) {
+                ALG_WARN("%s: Failed to set event fd as NONBLOCKING",
+                         __func__);
+            }
+        }
+        aio->mode = MODE_ASYNC;
+    } else {
+        /* Sync mode */
+        aio->efd = eventfd(0);
+        if (aio->efd == -1) {
+            ALG_PERR("%s: Failed to get eventfd : ", __func__);
+            AFALGerr(AFALG_F_AFALG_SETUP_ASYNC_EVENT_NOTIFICATION,
+                     AFALG_R_EVENTFD_FAILED);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        aio->mode = MODE_SYNC;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int afalg_init_aio(afalg_aio *aio)
+{
+    int r = -1;
+
+    /* Initialise for AIO */
+    aio->aio_ctx = 0;
+    r = io_setup(MAX_INFLIGHTS, &aio->aio_ctx);
+    if (r < 0) {
+        ALG_PERR("%s: io_setup error : ", __func__);
+        AFALGerr(AFALG_F_AFALG_INIT_AIO, AFALG_R_IO_SETUP_FAILED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    memset(aio->cbt, 0, sizeof(aio->cbt));
+    aio->efd = -1;
+    aio->mode = MODE_UNINIT;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int afalg_fin_cipher_aio(afalg_aio *aio, int sfd, unsigned char *buf,
+                                size_t len)
+{
+    int r;
+    int retry = 0;
+    unsigned int done = 0;
+    struct iocb *cb;
+    struct timespec timeout;
+    struct io_event events[MAX_INFLIGHTS];
+    u_int64_t eval = 0;
+
+    timeout.tv_sec = 0;
+    timeout.tv_nsec = 0;
+
+    /* if efd has not been initialised yet do it here */
+    if (aio->mode == MODE_UNINIT) {
+        r = afalg_setup_async_event_notification(aio);
+        if (r == 0)
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    cb = &(aio->cbt[0 % MAX_INFLIGHTS]);
+    memset(cb, '\0', sizeof(*cb));
+    cb->aio_fildes = sfd;
+    cb->aio_lio_opcode = IOCB_CMD_PREAD;
+    /*
+     * The pointer has to be converted to unsigned value first to avoid
+     * sign extension on cast to 64 bit value in 32-bit builds
+     */
+    cb->aio_buf = (size_t)buf;
+    cb->aio_offset = 0;
+    cb->aio_data = 0;
+    cb->aio_nbytes = len;
+    cb->aio_flags = IOCB_FLAG_RESFD;
+    cb->aio_resfd = aio->efd;
+
+    /*
+     * Perform AIO read on AFALG socket, this in turn performs an async
+     * crypto operation in kernel space
+     */
+    r = io_read(aio->aio_ctx, 1, &cb);
+    if (r < 0) {
+        ALG_PWARN("%s: io_read failed : ", __func__);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    do {
+        /* While AIO read is being performed pause job */
+        ASYNC_pause_job();
+
+        /* Check for completion of AIO read */
+        r = read(aio->efd, &eval, sizeof(eval));
+        if (r < 0) {
+            if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK)
+                continue;
+            ALG_PERR("%s: read failed for event fd : ", __func__);
+            return 0;
+        } else if (r == 0 || eval <= 0) {
+            ALG_WARN("%s: eventfd read %d bytes, eval = %lu\n", __func__, r,
+                     eval);
+        }
+        if (eval > 0) {
+
+            /* Get results of AIO read */
+            r = io_getevents(aio->aio_ctx, 1, MAX_INFLIGHTS,
+                             events, &timeout);
+            if (r > 0) {
+                /*
+                 * events.res indicates the actual status of the operation.
+                 * Handle the error condition first.
+                 */
+                if (events[0].res < 0) {
+                    /*
+                     * Underlying operation cannot be completed at the time
+                     * of previous submission. Resubmit for the operation.
+                     */
+                    if (events[0].res == -EBUSY && retry++ < 3) {
+                        r = io_read(aio->aio_ctx, 1, &cb);
+                        if (r < 0) {
+                            ALG_PERR("%s: retry %d for io_read failed : ",
+                                     __func__, retry);
+                            return 0;
+                        }
+                        continue;
+                    } else {
+                        /*
+                         * Retries exceed for -EBUSY or unrecoverable error
+                         * condition for this instance of operation.
+                         */
+                        ALG_WARN
+                            ("%s: Crypto Operation failed with code %lld\n",
+                             __func__, events[0].res);
+                        return 0;
+                    }
+                }
+                /* Operation successful. */
+                done = 1;
+            } else if (r < 0) {
+                ALG_PERR("%s: io_getevents failed : ", __func__);
+                return 0;
+            } else {
+                ALG_WARN("%s: io_geteventd read 0 bytes\n", __func__);
+            }
+        }
+    } while (!done);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static ossl_inline void afalg_set_op_sk(struct cmsghdr *cmsg,
+                                   const ALG_OP_TYPE op)
+{
+    cmsg->cmsg_level = SOL_ALG;
+    cmsg->cmsg_type = ALG_SET_OP;
+    cmsg->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(ALG_OP_LEN);
+    memcpy(CMSG_DATA(cmsg), &op, ALG_OP_LEN);
+}
+
+static void afalg_set_iv_sk(struct cmsghdr *cmsg, const unsigned char *iv,
+                            const unsigned int len)
+{
+    struct af_alg_iv *aiv;
+
+    cmsg->cmsg_level = SOL_ALG;
+    cmsg->cmsg_type = ALG_SET_IV;
+    cmsg->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(ALG_IV_LEN(len));
+    aiv = (struct af_alg_iv *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg);
+    aiv->ivlen = len;
+    memcpy(aiv->iv, iv, len);
+}
+
+static ossl_inline int afalg_set_key(afalg_ctx *actx, const unsigned char *key,
+                                const int klen)
+{
+    int ret;
+    ret = setsockopt(actx->bfd, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_KEY, key, klen);
+    if (ret < 0) {
+        ALG_PERR("%s: Failed to set socket option : ", __func__);
+        AFALGerr(AFALG_F_AFALG_SET_KEY, AFALG_R_SOCKET_SET_KEY_FAILED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int afalg_create_sk(afalg_ctx *actx, const char *ciphertype,
+                                const char *ciphername)
+{
+    struct sockaddr_alg sa;
+    int r = -1;
+
+    actx->bfd = actx->sfd = -1;
+
+    memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
+    sa.salg_family = AF_ALG;
+    strncpy((char *) sa.salg_type, ciphertype, ALG_MAX_SALG_TYPE);
+    sa.salg_type[ALG_MAX_SALG_TYPE-1] = '\0';
+    strncpy((char *) sa.salg_name, ciphername, ALG_MAX_SALG_NAME);
+    sa.salg_name[ALG_MAX_SALG_NAME-1] = '\0';
+
+    actx->bfd = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
+    if (actx->bfd == -1) {
+        ALG_PERR("%s: Failed to open socket : ", __func__);
+        AFALGerr(AFALG_F_AFALG_CREATE_SK, AFALG_R_SOCKET_CREATE_FAILED);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    r = bind(actx->bfd, (struct sockaddr *)&sa, sizeof(sa));
+    if (r < 0) {
+        ALG_PERR("%s: Failed to bind socket : ", __func__);
+        AFALGerr(AFALG_F_AFALG_CREATE_SK, AFALG_R_SOCKET_BIND_FAILED);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    actx->sfd = accept(actx->bfd, NULL, 0);
+    if (actx->sfd < 0) {
+        ALG_PERR("%s: Socket Accept Failed : ", __func__);
+        AFALGerr(AFALG_F_AFALG_CREATE_SK, AFALG_R_SOCKET_ACCEPT_FAILED);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+
+ err:
+    if (actx->bfd >= 0)
+        close(actx->bfd);
+    if (actx->sfd >= 0)
+        close(actx->sfd);
+    actx->bfd = actx->sfd = -1;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int afalg_start_cipher_sk(afalg_ctx *actx, const unsigned char *in,
+                                 size_t inl, const unsigned char *iv,
+                                 unsigned int enc)
+{
+    struct msghdr msg = { 0 };
+    struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
+    struct iovec iov;
+    ssize_t sbytes;
+# ifdef ALG_ZERO_COPY
+    int ret;
+# endif
+    char cbuf[CMSG_SPACE(ALG_IV_LEN(ALG_AES_IV_LEN)) + CMSG_SPACE(ALG_OP_LEN)];
+
+    memset(cbuf, 0, sizeof(cbuf));
+    msg.msg_control = cbuf;
+    msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(cbuf);
+
+    /*
+     * cipher direction (i.e. encrypt or decrypt) and iv are sent to the
+     * kernel as part of sendmsg()'s ancillary data
+     */
+    cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg);
+    afalg_set_op_sk(cmsg, enc);
+    cmsg = CMSG_NXTHDR(&msg, cmsg);
+    afalg_set_iv_sk(cmsg, iv, ALG_AES_IV_LEN);
+
+    /* iov that describes input data */
+    iov.iov_base = (unsigned char *)in;
+    iov.iov_len = inl;
+
+    msg.msg_flags = MSG_MORE;
+
+# ifdef ALG_ZERO_COPY
+    /*
+     * ZERO_COPY mode
+     * Works best when buffer is 4k aligned
+     * OPENS: out of place processing (i.e. out != in)
+     */
+
+    /* Input data is not sent as part of call to sendmsg() */
+    msg.msg_iovlen = 0;
+    msg.msg_iov = NULL;
+
+    /* Sendmsg() sends iv and cipher direction to the kernel */
+    sbytes = sendmsg(actx->sfd, &msg, 0);
+    if (sbytes < 0) {
+        ALG_PERR("%s: sendmsg failed for zero copy cipher operation : ",
+                 __func__);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * vmsplice and splice are used to pin the user space input buffer for
+     * kernel space processing avoiding copys from user to kernel space
+     */
+    ret = vmsplice(actx->zc_pipe[1], &iov, 1, SPLICE_F_GIFT);
+    if (ret < 0) {
+        ALG_PERR("%s: vmsplice failed : ", __func__);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    ret = splice(actx->zc_pipe[0], NULL, actx->sfd, NULL, inl, 0);
+    if (ret < 0) {
+        ALG_PERR("%s: splice failed : ", __func__);
+        return 0;
+    }
+# else
+    msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
+    msg.msg_iov = &iov;
+
+    /* Sendmsg() sends iv, cipher direction and input data to the kernel */
+    sbytes = sendmsg(actx->sfd, &msg, 0);
+    if (sbytes < 0) {
+        ALG_PERR("%s: sendmsg failed for cipher operation : ", __func__);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (sbytes != (ssize_t) inl) {
+        ALG_WARN("Cipher operation send bytes %zd != inlen %zd\n", sbytes,
+                inl);
+        return 0;
+    }
+# endif
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int afalg_cipher_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+                             const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
+{
+    int ciphertype;
+    int ret;
+    afalg_ctx *actx;
+    char ciphername[ALG_MAX_SALG_NAME];
+
+    if (ctx == NULL || key == NULL) {
+        ALG_WARN("%s: Null Parameter\n", __func__);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx) == NULL) {
+        ALG_WARN("%s: Cipher object NULL\n", __func__);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    actx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(ctx);
+    if (actx == NULL) {
+        ALG_WARN("%s: Cipher data NULL\n", __func__);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    ciphertype = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_nid(ctx);
+    switch (ciphertype) {
+    case NID_aes_128_cbc:
+        strncpy(ciphername, "cbc(aes)", ALG_MAX_SALG_NAME);
+        break;
+    default:
+        ALG_WARN("%s: Unsupported Cipher type %d\n", __func__, ciphertype);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    ciphername[ALG_MAX_SALG_NAME-1]='\0';
+
+    if (ALG_AES_IV_LEN != EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx)) {
+        ALG_WARN("%s: Unsupported IV length :%d\n", __func__,
+                EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx));
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* Setup AFALG socket for crypto processing */
+    ret = afalg_create_sk(actx, "skcipher", ciphername);
+    if (ret < 1)
+        return 0;
+
+
+    ret = afalg_set_key(actx, key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx));
+    if (ret < 1)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* Setup AIO ctx to allow async AFALG crypto processing */
+    if (afalg_init_aio(&actx->aio) == 0)
+        goto err;
+
+# ifdef ALG_ZERO_COPY
+    pipe(actx->zc_pipe);
+# endif
+
+    actx->init_done = MAGIC_INIT_NUM;
+
+    return 1;
+
+err:
+    close(actx->sfd);
+    close(actx->bfd);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int afalg_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                           const unsigned char *in, size_t inl)
+{
+    afalg_ctx *actx;
+    int ret;
+    char nxtiv[ALG_AES_IV_LEN] = { 0 };
+
+    if (ctx == NULL || out == NULL || in == NULL) {
+        ALG_WARN("NULL parameter passed to function %s\n", __func__);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    actx = (afalg_ctx *) EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(ctx);
+    if (actx == NULL || actx->init_done != MAGIC_INIT_NUM) {
+        ALG_WARN("%s afalg ctx passed\n",
+                 ctx == NULL ? "NULL" : "Uninitialised");
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * set iv now for decrypt operation as the input buffer can be
+     * overwritten for inplace operation where in = out.
+     */
+    if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx) == 0) {
+        memcpy(nxtiv, in + (inl - ALG_AES_IV_LEN), ALG_AES_IV_LEN);
+    }
+
+    /* Send input data to kernel space */
+    ret = afalg_start_cipher_sk(actx, (unsigned char *)in, inl,
+                                EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv(ctx),
+                                EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx));
+    if (ret < 1) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* Perform async crypto operation in kernel space */
+    ret = afalg_fin_cipher_aio(&actx->aio, actx->sfd, out, inl);
+    if (ret < 1)
+        return 0;
+
+    if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) {
+        memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), out + (inl - ALG_AES_IV_LEN),
+               ALG_AES_IV_LEN);
+    } else {
+        memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), nxtiv, ALG_AES_IV_LEN);
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int afalg_cipher_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    afalg_ctx *actx;
+
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+        ALG_WARN("NULL parameter passed to function %s\n", __func__);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    actx = (afalg_ctx *) EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(ctx);
+    if (actx == NULL || actx->init_done != MAGIC_INIT_NUM) {
+        ALG_WARN("%s afalg ctx passed\n",
+                 ctx == NULL ? "NULL" : "Uninitialised");
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    close(actx->sfd);
+    close(actx->bfd);
+# ifdef ALG_ZERO_COPY
+    close(actx->zc_pipe[0]);
+    close(actx->zc_pipe[1]);
+# endif
+    /* close efd in sync mode, async mode is closed in afalg_waitfd_cleanup() */
+    if (actx->aio.mode == MODE_SYNC)
+        close(actx->aio.efd);
+    io_destroy(actx->aio.aio_ctx);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static const EVP_CIPHER *afalg_aes_128_cbc(void)
+{
+    if (_hidden_aes_128_cbc == NULL
+        && ((_hidden_aes_128_cbc =
+             EVP_CIPHER_meth_new(NID_aes_128_cbc,
+                                 AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+                                 AES_KEY_SIZE_128)) == NULL
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_iv_length(_hidden_aes_128_cbc, AES_IV_LEN)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_flags(_hidden_aes_128_cbc,
+                                          EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE |
+                                          EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_init(_hidden_aes_128_cbc,
+                                         afalg_cipher_init)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_do_cipher(_hidden_aes_128_cbc,
+                                              afalg_do_cipher)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_cleanup(_hidden_aes_128_cbc,
+                                            afalg_cipher_cleanup)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_impl_ctx_size(_hidden_aes_128_cbc,
+                                                  sizeof(afalg_ctx)))) {
+        EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(_hidden_aes_128_cbc);
+        _hidden_aes_128_cbc = NULL;
+    }
+    return _hidden_aes_128_cbc;
+}
+
+static int afalg_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher,
+                         const int **nids, int nid)
+{
+    int r = 1;
+
+    if (cipher == NULL) {
+        *nids = afalg_cipher_nids;
+        return (sizeof(afalg_cipher_nids) / sizeof(afalg_cipher_nids[0]));
+    }
+
+    switch (nid) {
+    case NID_aes_128_cbc:
+        *cipher = afalg_aes_128_cbc();
+        break;
+    default:
+        *cipher = NULL;
+        r = 0;
+    }
+
+    return r;
+}
+
+static int bind_afalg(ENGINE *e)
+{
+    /* Ensure the afalg error handling is set up */
+    ERR_load_AFALG_strings();
+
+    if (!ENGINE_set_id(e, engine_afalg_id)
+        || !ENGINE_set_name(e, engine_afalg_name)
+        || !ENGINE_set_destroy_function(e, afalg_destroy)
+        || !ENGINE_set_init_function(e, afalg_init)
+        || !ENGINE_set_finish_function(e, afalg_finish)) {
+        AFALGerr(AFALG_F_BIND_AFALG, AFALG_R_INIT_FAILED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Create _hidden_aes_128_cbc by calling afalg_aes_128_cbc
+     * now, as bind_aflag can only be called by one thread at a
+     * time.
+     */
+    if (afalg_aes_128_cbc() == NULL) {
+        AFALGerr(AFALG_F_BIND_AFALG, AFALG_R_INIT_FAILED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (!ENGINE_set_ciphers(e, afalg_ciphers)) {
+        AFALGerr(AFALG_F_BIND_AFALG, AFALG_R_INIT_FAILED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE
+static int bind_helper(ENGINE *e, const char *id)
+{
+    if (id && (strcmp(id, engine_afalg_id) != 0))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (!afalg_chk_platform())
+        return 0;
+
+    if (!bind_afalg(e))
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_CHECK_FN()
+    IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN(bind_helper)
+# endif
+
+static int afalg_chk_platform(void)
+{
+    int ret;
+    int i;
+    int kver[3] = { -1, -1, -1 };
+    int sock;
+    char *str;
+    struct utsname ut;
+
+    ret = uname(&ut);
+    if (ret != 0) {
+        AFALGerr(AFALG_F_AFALG_CHK_PLATFORM,
+                 AFALG_R_FAILED_TO_GET_PLATFORM_INFO);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    str = strtok(ut.release, ".");
+    for (i = 0; i < 3 && str != NULL; i++) {
+        kver[i] = atoi(str);
+        str = strtok(NULL, ".");
+    }
+
+    if (KERNEL_VERSION(kver[0], kver[1], kver[2])
+        < KERNEL_VERSION(K_MAJ, K_MIN1, K_MIN2)) {
+        ALG_ERR("ASYNC AFALG not supported this kernel(%d.%d.%d)\n",
+                 kver[0], kver[1], kver[2]);
+        ALG_ERR("ASYNC AFALG requires kernel version %d.%d.%d or later\n",
+                 K_MAJ, K_MIN1, K_MIN2);
+        AFALGerr(AFALG_F_AFALG_CHK_PLATFORM,
+                 AFALG_R_KERNEL_DOES_NOT_SUPPORT_ASYNC_AFALG);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* Test if we can actually create an AF_ALG socket */
+    sock = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
+    if (sock == -1) {
+        AFALGerr(AFALG_F_AFALG_CHK_PLATFORM, AFALG_R_SOCKET_CREATE_FAILED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    close(sock);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE
+static ENGINE *engine_afalg(void)
+{
+    ENGINE *ret = ENGINE_new();
+    if (ret == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    if (!bind_afalg(ret)) {
+        ENGINE_free(ret);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+void engine_load_afalg_int(void)
+{
+    ENGINE *toadd;
+
+    if (!afalg_chk_platform())
+        return;
+
+    toadd = engine_afalg();
+    if (toadd == NULL)
+        return;
+    ENGINE_add(toadd);
+    ENGINE_free(toadd);
+    ERR_clear_error();
+}
+# endif
+
+static int afalg_init(ENGINE *e)
+{
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int afalg_finish(ENGINE *e)
+{
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int afalg_destroy(ENGINE *e)
+{
+    ERR_unload_AFALG_strings();
+    EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(_hidden_aes_128_cbc);
+    _hidden_aes_128_cbc = NULL;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+#endif                          /* KERNEL VERSION */
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/afalg/e_afalg.ec b/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/afalg/e_afalg.ec
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2d14d65
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/afalg/e_afalg.ec
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+L       AFALG    e_afalg_err.h e_afalg_err.c
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/afalg/e_afalg.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/afalg/e_afalg.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..948d67e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/afalg/e_afalg.h
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_AFALG_H
+# define HEADER_AFALG_H
+
+# if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__ >= 4 && \
+     (!defined(__STDC_VERSION__) || __STDC_VERSION__ < 199901L)
+#  pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wvariadic-macros"
+# endif
+
+# ifdef ALG_DEBUG
+#  define ALG_DGB(x, ...) fprintf(stderr, "ALG_DBG: " x, __VA_ARGS__)
+#  define ALG_INFO(x, ...) fprintf(stderr, "ALG_INFO: " x, __VA_ARGS__)
+#  define ALG_WARN(x, ...) fprintf(stderr, "ALG_WARN: " x, __VA_ARGS__)
+# else
+#  define ALG_DGB(x, ...)
+#  define ALG_INFO(x, ...)
+#  define ALG_WARN(x, ...)
+# endif
+
+# define ALG_ERR(x, ...) fprintf(stderr, "ALG_ERR: " x, __VA_ARGS__)
+# define ALG_PERR(x, ...) \
+                do { \
+                    fprintf(stderr, "ALG_PERR: " x, __VA_ARGS__); \
+                    perror(NULL); \
+                } while(0)
+# define ALG_PWARN(x, ...) \
+                do { \
+                    fprintf(stderr, "ALG_PERR: " x, __VA_ARGS__); \
+                    perror(NULL); \
+                } while(0)
+
+# ifndef AES_BLOCK_SIZE
+#  define AES_BLOCK_SIZE   16
+# endif
+# define AES_KEY_SIZE_128 16
+# define AES_IV_LEN       16
+
+# define MAX_INFLIGHTS 1
+
+typedef enum {
+    MODE_UNINIT = 0,
+    MODE_SYNC,
+    MODE_ASYNC
+} op_mode;
+
+struct afalg_aio_st {
+    int efd;
+    op_mode mode;
+    aio_context_t aio_ctx;
+    struct io_event events[MAX_INFLIGHTS];
+    struct iocb cbt[MAX_INFLIGHTS];
+};
+typedef struct afalg_aio_st afalg_aio;
+
+/*
+ * MAGIC Number to identify correct initialisation
+ * of afalg_ctx.
+ */
+# define MAGIC_INIT_NUM 0x1890671
+
+struct afalg_ctx_st {
+    int init_done;
+    int sfd;
+    int bfd;
+# ifdef ALG_ZERO_COPY
+    int zc_pipe[2];
+# endif
+    afalg_aio aio;
+};
+
+typedef struct afalg_ctx_st afalg_ctx;
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/afalg/e_afalg_err.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/afalg/e_afalg_err.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ca394ed
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/afalg/e_afalg_err.c
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * NOTE: this file was auto generated by the mkerr.pl script: any changes
+ * made to it will be overwritten when the script next updates this file,
+ * only reason strings will be preserved.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include "e_afalg_err.h"
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+
+# define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(0,func,0)
+# define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(0,0,reason)
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA AFALG_str_functs[] = {
+    {ERR_FUNC(AFALG_F_AFALG_CHK_PLATFORM), "afalg_chk_platform"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(AFALG_F_AFALG_CREATE_BIND_SK), "afalg_create_bind_sk"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(AFALG_F_AFALG_CREATE_BIND_SOCKET), "afalg_create_bind_sk"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(AFALG_F_AFALG_CREATE_SK), "afalg_create_sk"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(AFALG_F_AFALG_INIT_AIO), "afalg_init_aio"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(AFALG_F_AFALG_SETUP_ASYNC_EVENT_NOTIFICATION),
+     "afalg_setup_async_event_notification"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(AFALG_F_AFALG_SET_KEY), "afalg_set_key"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(AFALG_F_AFALG_SOCKET), "afalg_socket"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(AFALG_F_AFALG_START_CIPHER_SK), "afalg_start_cipher_sk"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(AFALG_F_BIND_AFALG), "bind_afalg"},
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA AFALG_str_reasons[] = {
+    {ERR_REASON(AFALG_R_EVENTFD_FAILED), "eventfd failed"},
+    {ERR_REASON(AFALG_R_FAILED_TO_GET_PLATFORM_INFO),
+     "failed to get platform info"},
+    {ERR_REASON(AFALG_R_INIT_FAILED), "init failed"},
+    {ERR_REASON(AFALG_R_IO_SETUP_FAILED), "io setup failed"},
+    {ERR_REASON(AFALG_R_KERNEL_DOES_NOT_SUPPORT_AFALG),
+     "kernel does not support afalg"},
+    {ERR_REASON(AFALG_R_KERNEL_DOES_NOT_SUPPORT_ASYNC_AFALG),
+     "kernel does not support async afalg"},
+    {ERR_REASON(AFALG_R_MEM_ALLOC_FAILED), "mem alloc failed"},
+    {ERR_REASON(AFALG_R_SOCKET_ACCEPT_FAILED), "socket accept failed"},
+    {ERR_REASON(AFALG_R_SOCKET_BIND_FAILED), "socket bind failed"},
+    {ERR_REASON(AFALG_R_SOCKET_CREATE_FAILED), "socket create failed"},
+    {ERR_REASON(AFALG_R_SOCKET_OPERATION_FAILED), "socket operation failed"},
+    {ERR_REASON(AFALG_R_SOCKET_SET_KEY_FAILED), "socket set key failed"},
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+
+#endif
+
+#ifdef AFALG_LIB_NAME
+static ERR_STRING_DATA AFALG_lib_name[] = {
+    {0, AFALG_LIB_NAME},
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+#endif
+
+static int AFALG_lib_error_code = 0;
+static int AFALG_error_init = 1;
+
+void ERR_load_AFALG_strings(void)
+{
+    if (AFALG_lib_error_code == 0)
+        AFALG_lib_error_code = ERR_get_next_error_library();
+
+    if (AFALG_error_init) {
+        AFALG_error_init = 0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+        ERR_load_strings(AFALG_lib_error_code, AFALG_str_functs);
+        ERR_load_strings(AFALG_lib_error_code, AFALG_str_reasons);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef AFALG_LIB_NAME
+        AFALG_lib_name->error = ERR_PACK(AFALG_lib_error_code, 0, 0);
+        ERR_load_strings(0, AFALG_lib_name);
+#endif
+    }
+}
+
+void ERR_unload_AFALG_strings(void)
+{
+    if (AFALG_error_init == 0) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+        ERR_unload_strings(AFALG_lib_error_code, AFALG_str_functs);
+        ERR_unload_strings(AFALG_lib_error_code, AFALG_str_reasons);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef AFALG_LIB_NAME
+        ERR_unload_strings(0, AFALG_lib_name);
+#endif
+        AFALG_error_init = 1;
+    }
+}
+
+void ERR_AFALG_error(int function, int reason, char *file, int line)
+{
+    if (AFALG_lib_error_code == 0)
+        AFALG_lib_error_code = ERR_get_next_error_library();
+    ERR_PUT_error(AFALG_lib_error_code, function, reason, file, line);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/afalg/e_afalg_err.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/afalg/e_afalg_err.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..21abc97
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/afalg/e_afalg_err.h
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * NOTE: this file was auto generated by the mkerr.pl script: any changes
+ * made to it will be overwritten when the script next updates this file,
+ * only reason strings will be preserved.
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_AFALG_ERR_H
+# define HEADER_AFALG_ERR_H
+
+# ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+# endif
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+void ERR_load_AFALG_strings(void);
+void ERR_unload_AFALG_strings(void);
+void ERR_AFALG_error(int function, int reason, char *file, int line);
+# define AFALGerr(f,r) ERR_AFALG_error((f),(r),__FILE__,__LINE__)
+
+/* Error codes for the AFALG functions. */
+
+/* Function codes. */
+# define AFALG_F_AFALG_CHK_PLATFORM                       100
+# define AFALG_F_AFALG_CREATE_BIND_SK                     106
+# define AFALG_F_AFALG_CREATE_BIND_SOCKET                 105
+# define AFALG_F_AFALG_CREATE_SK                          108
+# define AFALG_F_AFALG_INIT_AIO                           101
+# define AFALG_F_AFALG_SETUP_ASYNC_EVENT_NOTIFICATION     107
+# define AFALG_F_AFALG_SET_KEY                            109
+# define AFALG_F_AFALG_SOCKET                             102
+# define AFALG_F_AFALG_START_CIPHER_SK                    103
+# define AFALG_F_BIND_AFALG                               104
+
+/* Reason codes. */
+# define AFALG_R_EVENTFD_FAILED                           108
+# define AFALG_R_FAILED_TO_GET_PLATFORM_INFO              111
+# define AFALG_R_INIT_FAILED                              100
+# define AFALG_R_IO_SETUP_FAILED                          105
+# define AFALG_R_KERNEL_DOES_NOT_SUPPORT_AFALG            101
+# define AFALG_R_KERNEL_DOES_NOT_SUPPORT_ASYNC_AFALG      107
+# define AFALG_R_MEM_ALLOC_FAILED                         102
+# define AFALG_R_SOCKET_ACCEPT_FAILED                     110
+# define AFALG_R_SOCKET_BIND_FAILED                       103
+# define AFALG_R_SOCKET_CREATE_FAILED                     109
+# define AFALG_R_SOCKET_OPERATION_FAILED                  104
+# define AFALG_R_SOCKET_SET_KEY_FAILED                    106
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/asm/e_padlock-x86.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/asm/e_padlock-x86.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bf6b312
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/asm/e_padlock-x86.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,618 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+
+# September 2011
+#
+# Assembler helpers for Padlock engine. Compared to original engine
+# version relying on inline assembler and compiled with gcc 3.4.6 it
+# was measured to provide ~100% improvement on misaligned data in ECB
+# mode and ~75% in CBC mode. For aligned data improvement can be
+# observed for short inputs only, e.g. 45% for 64-byte messages in
+# ECB mode, 20% in CBC. Difference in performance for aligned vs.
+# misaligned data depends on misalignment and is either ~1.8x or 2.9x.
+# These are approximately same factors as for hardware support, so
+# there is little reason to rely on the latter. On the contrary, it
+# might actually hurt performance in mixture of aligned and misaligned
+# buffers, because a) if you choose to flip 'align' flag in control
+# word on per-buffer basis, then you'd have to reload key context,
+# which incurs penalty; b) if you choose to set 'align' flag
+# permanently, it limits performance even for aligned data to ~1/2.
+# All above mentioned results were collected on 1.5GHz C7. Nano on the
+# other hand handles unaligned data more gracefully. Depending on
+# algorithm and how unaligned data is, hardware can be up to 70% more
+# efficient than below software alignment procedures, nor does 'align'
+# flag have affect on aligned performance [if has any meaning at all].
+# Therefore suggestion is to unconditionally set 'align' flag on Nano
+# for optimal performance.
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../crypto/perlasm");
+require "x86asm.pl";
+
+$output=pop;
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+&asm_init($ARGV[0],$0);
+
+%PADLOCK_PREFETCH=(ecb=>128, cbc=>64);	# prefetch errata
+$PADLOCK_CHUNK=512;	# Must be a power of 2 larger than 16
+
+$ctx="edx";
+$out="edi";
+$inp="esi";
+$len="ecx";
+$chunk="ebx";
+
+&function_begin_B("padlock_capability");
+	&push	("ebx");
+	&pushf	();
+	&pop	("eax");
+	&mov	("ecx","eax");
+	&xor	("eax",1<<21);
+	&push	("eax");
+	&popf	();
+	&pushf	();
+	&pop	("eax");
+	&xor	("ecx","eax");
+	&xor	("eax","eax");
+	&bt	("ecx",21);
+	&jnc	(&label("noluck"));
+	&cpuid	();
+	&xor	("eax","eax");
+	&cmp	("ebx","0x".unpack("H*",'tneC'));
+	&jne	(&label("noluck"));
+	&cmp	("edx","0x".unpack("H*",'Hrua'));
+	&jne	(&label("noluck"));
+	&cmp	("ecx","0x".unpack("H*",'slua'));
+	&jne	(&label("noluck"));
+	&mov	("eax",0xC0000000);
+	&cpuid	();
+	&mov	("edx","eax");
+	&xor	("eax","eax");
+	&cmp	("edx",0xC0000001);
+	&jb	(&label("noluck"));
+	&mov	("eax",1);
+	&cpuid	();
+	&or	("eax",0x0f);
+	&xor	("ebx","ebx");
+	&and	("eax",0x0fff);
+	&cmp	("eax",0x06ff);		# check for Nano
+	&sete	("bl");
+	&mov	("eax",0xC0000001);
+	&push	("ebx");
+	&cpuid	();
+	&pop	("ebx");
+	&mov	("eax","edx");
+	&shl	("ebx",4);		# bit#4 denotes Nano
+	&and	("eax",0xffffffef);
+	&or	("eax","ebx")
+&set_label("noluck");
+	&pop	("ebx");
+	&ret	();
+&function_end_B("padlock_capability")
+
+&function_begin_B("padlock_key_bswap");
+	&mov	("edx",&wparam(0));
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(240,"edx"));
+&set_label("bswap_loop");
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(0,"edx"));
+	&bswap	("eax");
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,"edx"),"eax");
+	&lea	("edx",&DWP(4,"edx"));
+	&sub	("ecx",1);
+	&jnz	(&label("bswap_loop"));
+	&ret	();
+&function_end_B("padlock_key_bswap");
+
+# This is heuristic key context tracing. At first one
+# believes that one should use atomic swap instructions,
+# but it's not actually necessary. Point is that if
+# padlock_saved_context was changed by another thread
+# after we've read it and before we compare it with ctx,
+# our key *shall* be reloaded upon thread context switch
+# and we are therefore set in either case...
+&static_label("padlock_saved_context");
+
+&function_begin_B("padlock_verify_context");
+	&mov	($ctx,&wparam(0));
+	&lea	("eax",($::win32 or $::coff) ? &DWP(&label("padlock_saved_context")) :
+		       &DWP(&label("padlock_saved_context")."-".&label("verify_pic_point")));
+	&pushf	();
+	&call	("_padlock_verify_ctx");
+&set_label("verify_pic_point");
+	&lea	("esp",&DWP(4,"esp"));
+	&ret	();
+&function_end_B("padlock_verify_context");
+
+&function_begin_B("_padlock_verify_ctx");
+	&add	("eax",&DWP(0,"esp")) if(!($::win32 or $::coff));# &padlock_saved_context
+	&bt	(&DWP(4,"esp"),30);		# eflags
+	&jnc	(&label("verified"));
+	&cmp	($ctx,&DWP(0,"eax"));
+	&je	(&label("verified"));
+	&pushf	();
+	&popf	();
+&set_label("verified");
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,"eax"),$ctx);
+	&ret	();
+&function_end_B("_padlock_verify_ctx");
+
+&function_begin_B("padlock_reload_key");
+	&pushf	();
+	&popf	();
+	&ret	();
+&function_end_B("padlock_reload_key");
+
+&function_begin_B("padlock_aes_block");
+	&push	("edi");
+	&push	("esi");
+	&push	("ebx");
+	&mov	($out,&wparam(0));		# must be 16-byte aligned
+	&mov	($inp,&wparam(1));		# must be 16-byte aligned
+	&mov	($ctx,&wparam(2));
+	&mov	($len,1);
+	&lea	("ebx",&DWP(32,$ctx));		# key
+	&lea	($ctx,&DWP(16,$ctx));		# control word
+	&data_byte(0xf3,0x0f,0xa7,0xc8);	# rep xcryptecb
+	&pop	("ebx");
+	&pop	("esi");
+	&pop	("edi");
+	&ret	();
+&function_end_B("padlock_aes_block");
+
+sub generate_mode {
+my ($mode,$opcode) = @_;
+# int padlock_$mode_encrypt(void *out, const void *inp,
+#		struct padlock_cipher_data *ctx, size_t len);
+&function_begin("padlock_${mode}_encrypt");
+	&mov	($out,&wparam(0));
+	&mov	($inp,&wparam(1));
+	&mov	($ctx,&wparam(2));
+	&mov	($len,&wparam(3));
+	&test	($ctx,15);
+	&jnz	(&label("${mode}_abort"));
+	&test	($len,15);
+	&jnz	(&label("${mode}_abort"));
+	&lea	("eax",($::win32 or $::coff) ? &DWP(&label("padlock_saved_context")) :
+		       &DWP(&label("padlock_saved_context")."-".&label("${mode}_pic_point")));
+	&pushf	();
+	&cld	();
+	&call	("_padlock_verify_ctx");
+&set_label("${mode}_pic_point");
+	&lea	($ctx,&DWP(16,$ctx));	# control word
+	&xor	("eax","eax");
+					if ($mode eq "ctr32") {
+	&movq	("mm0",&QWP(-16,$ctx));	# load [upper part of] counter
+					} else {
+	&xor	("ebx","ebx");
+	&test	(&DWP(0,$ctx),1<<5);	# align bit in control word
+	&jnz	(&label("${mode}_aligned"));
+	&test	($out,0x0f);
+	&setz	("al");			# !out_misaligned
+	&test	($inp,0x0f);
+	&setz	("bl");			# !inp_misaligned
+	&test	("eax","ebx");
+	&jnz	(&label("${mode}_aligned"));
+	&neg	("eax");
+					}
+	&mov	($chunk,$PADLOCK_CHUNK);
+	&not	("eax");		# out_misaligned?-1:0
+	&lea	("ebp",&DWP(-24,"esp"));
+	&cmp	($len,$chunk);
+	&cmovc	($chunk,$len);		# chunk=len>PADLOCK_CHUNK?PADLOCK_CHUNK:len
+	&and	("eax",$chunk);		# out_misaligned?chunk:0
+	&mov	($chunk,$len);
+	&neg	("eax");
+	&and	($chunk,$PADLOCK_CHUNK-1);	# chunk=len%PADLOCK_CHUNK
+	&lea	("esp",&DWP(0,"eax","ebp"));	# alloca
+	&mov	("eax",$PADLOCK_CHUNK);
+	&cmovz	($chunk,"eax");			# chunk=chunk?:PADLOCK_CHUNK
+	&mov	("eax","ebp");
+	&and	("ebp",-16);
+	&and	("esp",-16);
+	&mov	(&DWP(16,"ebp"),"eax");
+    if ($PADLOCK_PREFETCH{$mode}) {
+	&cmp	($len,$chunk);
+	&ja	(&label("${mode}_loop"));
+	&mov	("eax",$inp);		# check if prefetch crosses page
+	&cmp	("ebp","esp");
+	&cmove	("eax",$out);
+	&add	("eax",$len);
+	&neg	("eax");
+	&and	("eax",0xfff);		# distance to page boundary
+	&cmp	("eax",$PADLOCK_PREFETCH{$mode});
+	&mov	("eax",-$PADLOCK_PREFETCH{$mode});
+	&cmovae	("eax",$chunk);		# mask=distance<prefetch?-prefetch:-1
+	&and	($chunk,"eax");
+	&jz	(&label("${mode}_unaligned_tail"));
+    }
+	&jmp	(&label("${mode}_loop"));
+
+&set_label("${mode}_loop",16);
+	&mov	(&DWP(0,"ebp"),$out);		# save parameters
+	&mov	(&DWP(4,"ebp"),$inp);
+	&mov	(&DWP(8,"ebp"),$len);
+	&mov	($len,$chunk);
+	&mov	(&DWP(12,"ebp"),$chunk);	# chunk
+						if ($mode eq "ctr32") {
+	&mov	("ecx",&DWP(-4,$ctx));
+	&xor	($out,$out);
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(-8,$ctx));		# borrow $len
+&set_label("${mode}_prepare");
+	&mov	(&DWP(12,"esp",$out),"ecx");
+	&bswap	("ecx");
+	&movq	(&QWP(0,"esp",$out),"mm0");
+	&inc	("ecx");
+	&mov	(&DWP(8,"esp",$out),"eax");
+	&bswap	("ecx");
+	&lea	($out,&DWP(16,$out));
+	&cmp	($out,$chunk);
+	&jb	(&label("${mode}_prepare"));
+
+	&mov	(&DWP(-4,$ctx),"ecx");
+	&lea	($inp,&DWP(0,"esp"));
+	&lea	($out,&DWP(0,"esp"));
+	&mov	($len,$chunk);
+						} else {
+	&test	($out,0x0f);			# out_misaligned
+	&cmovnz	($out,"esp");
+	&test	($inp,0x0f);			# inp_misaligned
+	&jz	(&label("${mode}_inp_aligned"));
+	&shr	($len,2);
+	&data_byte(0xf3,0xa5);			# rep movsl
+	&sub	($out,$chunk);
+	&mov	($len,$chunk);
+	&mov	($inp,$out);
+&set_label("${mode}_inp_aligned");
+						}
+	&lea	("eax",&DWP(-16,$ctx));		# ivp
+	&lea	("ebx",&DWP(16,$ctx));		# key
+	&shr	($len,4);			# len/=AES_BLOCK_SIZE
+	&data_byte(0xf3,0x0f,0xa7,$opcode);	# rep xcrypt*
+						if ($mode !~ /ecb|ctr/) {
+	&movaps	("xmm0",&QWP(0,"eax"));
+	&movaps	(&QWP(-16,$ctx),"xmm0");	# copy [or refresh] iv
+						}
+	&mov	($out,&DWP(0,"ebp"));		# restore parameters
+	&mov	($chunk,&DWP(12,"ebp"));
+						if ($mode eq "ctr32") {
+	&mov	($inp,&DWP(4,"ebp"));
+	&xor	($len,$len);
+&set_label("${mode}_xor");
+	&movups	("xmm1",&QWP(0,$inp,$len));
+	&lea	($len,&DWP(16,$len));
+	&pxor	("xmm1",&QWP(-16,"esp",$len));
+	&movups	(&QWP(-16,$out,$len),"xmm1");
+	&cmp	($len,$chunk);
+	&jb	(&label("${mode}_xor"));
+						} else {
+	&test	($out,0x0f);
+	&jz	(&label("${mode}_out_aligned"));
+	&mov	($len,$chunk);
+	&lea	($inp,&DWP(0,"esp"));
+	&shr	($len,2);
+	&data_byte(0xf3,0xa5);			# rep movsl
+	&sub	($out,$chunk);
+&set_label("${mode}_out_aligned");
+	&mov	($inp,&DWP(4,"ebp"));
+						}
+	&mov	($len,&DWP(8,"ebp"));
+	&add	($out,$chunk);
+	&add	($inp,$chunk);
+	&sub	($len,$chunk);
+	&mov	($chunk,$PADLOCK_CHUNK);
+    if (!$PADLOCK_PREFETCH{$mode}) {
+	&jnz	(&label("${mode}_loop"));
+    } else {
+	&jz	(&label("${mode}_break"));
+	&cmp	($len,$chunk);
+	&jae	(&label("${mode}_loop"));
+
+&set_label("${mode}_unaligned_tail");
+	&xor	("eax","eax");
+	&cmp	("esp","ebp");
+	&cmove	("eax",$len);
+	&sub	("esp","eax");			# alloca
+	&mov	("eax", $out);			# save parameters
+	&mov	($chunk,$len);
+	&shr	($len,2);
+	&lea	($out,&DWP(0,"esp"));
+	&data_byte(0xf3,0xa5);			# rep movsl
+	&mov	($inp,"esp");
+	&mov	($out,"eax");			# restore parameters
+	&mov	($len,$chunk);
+	&jmp	(&label("${mode}_loop"));
+
+&set_label("${mode}_break",16);
+    }
+						if ($mode ne "ctr32") {
+	&cmp	("esp","ebp");
+	&je	(&label("${mode}_done"));
+						}
+	&pxor	("xmm0","xmm0");
+	&lea	("eax",&DWP(0,"esp"));
+&set_label("${mode}_bzero");
+	&movaps	(&QWP(0,"eax"),"xmm0");
+	&lea	("eax",&DWP(16,"eax"));
+	&cmp	("ebp","eax");
+	&ja	(&label("${mode}_bzero"));
+
+&set_label("${mode}_done");
+	&mov	("ebp",&DWP(16,"ebp"));
+	&lea	("esp",&DWP(24,"ebp"));
+						if ($mode ne "ctr32") {
+	&jmp	(&label("${mode}_exit"));
+
+&set_label("${mode}_aligned",16);
+    if ($PADLOCK_PREFETCH{$mode}) {
+	&lea	("ebp",&DWP(0,$inp,$len));
+	&neg	("ebp");
+	&and	("ebp",0xfff);			# distance to page boundary
+	&xor	("eax","eax");
+	&cmp	("ebp",$PADLOCK_PREFETCH{$mode});
+	&mov	("ebp",$PADLOCK_PREFETCH{$mode}-1);
+	&cmovae	("ebp","eax");
+	&and	("ebp",$len);			# remainder
+	&sub	($len,"ebp");
+	&jz	(&label("${mode}_aligned_tail"));
+    }
+	&lea	("eax",&DWP(-16,$ctx));		# ivp
+	&lea	("ebx",&DWP(16,$ctx));		# key
+	&shr	($len,4);			# len/=AES_BLOCK_SIZE
+	&data_byte(0xf3,0x0f,0xa7,$opcode);	# rep xcrypt*
+						if ($mode ne "ecb") {
+	&movaps	("xmm0",&QWP(0,"eax"));
+	&movaps	(&QWP(-16,$ctx),"xmm0");	# copy [or refresh] iv
+						}
+    if ($PADLOCK_PREFETCH{$mode}) {
+	&test	("ebp","ebp");
+	&jz	(&label("${mode}_exit"));
+
+&set_label("${mode}_aligned_tail");
+	&mov	($len,"ebp");
+	&lea	("ebp",&DWP(-24,"esp"));
+	&mov	("esp","ebp");
+	&mov	("eax","ebp");
+	&sub	("esp",$len);
+	&and	("ebp",-16);
+	&and	("esp",-16);
+	&mov	(&DWP(16,"ebp"),"eax");
+	&mov	("eax", $out);			# save parameters
+	&mov	($chunk,$len);
+	&shr	($len,2);
+	&lea	($out,&DWP(0,"esp"));
+	&data_byte(0xf3,0xa5);			# rep movsl
+	&mov	($inp,"esp");
+	&mov	($out,"eax");			# restore parameters
+	&mov	($len,$chunk);
+	&jmp	(&label("${mode}_loop"));
+    }
+&set_label("${mode}_exit");			}
+	&mov	("eax",1);
+	&lea	("esp",&DWP(4,"esp"));		# popf
+	&emms	()				if ($mode eq "ctr32");
+&set_label("${mode}_abort");
+&function_end("padlock_${mode}_encrypt");
+}
+
+&generate_mode("ecb",0xc8);
+&generate_mode("cbc",0xd0);
+&generate_mode("cfb",0xe0);
+&generate_mode("ofb",0xe8);
+&generate_mode("ctr32",0xc8);	# yes, it implements own CTR with ECB opcode,
+				# because hardware CTR was introduced later
+				# and even has errata on certain C7 stepping.
+				# own implementation *always* works, though
+				# ~15% slower than dedicated hardware...
+
+&function_begin_B("padlock_xstore");
+	&push	("edi");
+	&mov	("edi",&wparam(0));
+	&mov	("edx",&wparam(1));
+	&data_byte(0x0f,0xa7,0xc0);		# xstore
+	&pop	("edi");
+	&ret	();
+&function_end_B("padlock_xstore");
+
+&function_begin_B("_win32_segv_handler");
+	&mov	("eax",1);			# ExceptionContinueSearch
+	&mov	("edx",&wparam(0));		# *ExceptionRecord
+	&mov	("ecx",&wparam(2));		# *ContextRecord
+	&cmp	(&DWP(0,"edx"),0xC0000005)	# ExceptionRecord->ExceptionCode == STATUS_ACCESS_VIOLATION
+	&jne	(&label("ret"));
+	&add	(&DWP(184,"ecx"),4);		# skip over rep sha*
+	&mov	("eax",0);			# ExceptionContinueExecution
+&set_label("ret");
+	&ret	();
+&function_end_B("_win32_segv_handler");
+&safeseh("_win32_segv_handler")			if ($::win32);
+
+&function_begin_B("padlock_sha1_oneshot");
+	&push	("edi");
+	&push	("esi");
+	&xor	("eax","eax");
+	&mov	("edi",&wparam(0));
+	&mov	("esi",&wparam(1));
+	&mov	("ecx",&wparam(2));
+    if ($::win32 or $::coff) {
+    	&push	(&::islabel("_win32_segv_handler"));
+	&data_byte(0x64,0xff,0x30);		# push	%fs:(%eax)
+	&data_byte(0x64,0x89,0x20);		# mov	%esp,%fs:(%eax)
+    }
+	&mov	("edx","esp");			# put aside %esp
+	&add	("esp",-128);			# 32 is enough but spec says 128
+	&movups	("xmm0",&QWP(0,"edi"));		# copy-in context
+	&and	("esp",-16);
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(16,"edi"));
+	&movaps	(&QWP(0,"esp"),"xmm0");
+	&mov	("edi","esp");
+	&mov	(&DWP(16,"esp"),"eax");
+	&xor	("eax","eax");
+	&data_byte(0xf3,0x0f,0xa6,0xc8);	# rep xsha1
+	&movaps	("xmm0",&QWP(0,"esp"));
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(16,"esp"));
+	&mov	("esp","edx");			# restore %esp
+    if ($::win32 or $::coff) {
+	&data_byte(0x64,0x8f,0x05,0,0,0,0);	# pop	%fs:0
+	&lea	("esp",&DWP(4,"esp"));
+    }
+	&mov	("edi",&wparam(0));
+	&movups	(&QWP(0,"edi"),"xmm0");		# copy-out context
+	&mov	(&DWP(16,"edi"),"eax");
+	&pop	("esi");
+	&pop	("edi");
+	&ret	();
+&function_end_B("padlock_sha1_oneshot");
+
+&function_begin_B("padlock_sha1_blocks");
+	&push	("edi");
+	&push	("esi");
+	&mov	("edi",&wparam(0));
+	&mov	("esi",&wparam(1));
+	&mov	("edx","esp");			# put aside %esp
+	&mov	("ecx",&wparam(2));
+	&add	("esp",-128);
+	&movups	("xmm0",&QWP(0,"edi"));		# copy-in context
+	&and	("esp",-16);
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(16,"edi"));
+	&movaps	(&QWP(0,"esp"),"xmm0");
+	&mov	("edi","esp");
+	&mov	(&DWP(16,"esp"),"eax");
+	&mov	("eax",-1);
+	&data_byte(0xf3,0x0f,0xa6,0xc8);	# rep xsha1
+	&movaps	("xmm0",&QWP(0,"esp"));
+	&mov	("eax",&DWP(16,"esp"));
+	&mov	("esp","edx");			# restore %esp
+	&mov	("edi",&wparam(0));
+	&movups	(&QWP(0,"edi"),"xmm0");		# copy-out context
+	&mov	(&DWP(16,"edi"),"eax");
+ 	&pop	("esi");
+	&pop	("edi");
+	&ret	();
+&function_end_B("padlock_sha1_blocks");
+
+&function_begin_B("padlock_sha256_oneshot");
+	&push	("edi");
+	&push	("esi");
+	&xor	("eax","eax");
+	&mov	("edi",&wparam(0));
+	&mov	("esi",&wparam(1));
+	&mov	("ecx",&wparam(2));
+    if ($::win32 or $::coff) {
+    	&push	(&::islabel("_win32_segv_handler"));
+	&data_byte(0x64,0xff,0x30);		# push	%fs:(%eax)
+	&data_byte(0x64,0x89,0x20);		# mov	%esp,%fs:(%eax)
+    }
+	&mov	("edx","esp");			# put aside %esp
+	&add	("esp",-128);
+	&movups	("xmm0",&QWP(0,"edi"));		# copy-in context
+	&and	("esp",-16);
+	&movups	("xmm1",&QWP(16,"edi"));
+	&movaps	(&QWP(0,"esp"),"xmm0");
+	&mov	("edi","esp");
+	&movaps	(&QWP(16,"esp"),"xmm1");
+	&xor	("eax","eax");
+	&data_byte(0xf3,0x0f,0xa6,0xd0);	# rep xsha256
+	&movaps	("xmm0",&QWP(0,"esp"));
+	&movaps	("xmm1",&QWP(16,"esp"));
+	&mov	("esp","edx");			# restore %esp
+    if ($::win32 or $::coff) {
+	&data_byte(0x64,0x8f,0x05,0,0,0,0);	# pop	%fs:0
+	&lea	("esp",&DWP(4,"esp"));
+    }
+	&mov	("edi",&wparam(0));
+	&movups	(&QWP(0,"edi"),"xmm0");		# copy-out context
+	&movups	(&QWP(16,"edi"),"xmm1");
+	&pop	("esi");
+	&pop	("edi");
+	&ret	();
+&function_end_B("padlock_sha256_oneshot");
+
+&function_begin_B("padlock_sha256_blocks");
+	&push	("edi");
+	&push	("esi");
+	&mov	("edi",&wparam(0));
+	&mov	("esi",&wparam(1));
+	&mov	("ecx",&wparam(2));
+	&mov	("edx","esp");			# put aside %esp
+	&add	("esp",-128);
+	&movups	("xmm0",&QWP(0,"edi"));		# copy-in context
+	&and	("esp",-16);
+	&movups	("xmm1",&QWP(16,"edi"));
+	&movaps	(&QWP(0,"esp"),"xmm0");
+	&mov	("edi","esp");
+	&movaps	(&QWP(16,"esp"),"xmm1");
+	&mov	("eax",-1);
+	&data_byte(0xf3,0x0f,0xa6,0xd0);	# rep xsha256
+	&movaps	("xmm0",&QWP(0,"esp"));
+	&movaps	("xmm1",&QWP(16,"esp"));
+	&mov	("esp","edx");			# restore %esp
+	&mov	("edi",&wparam(0));
+	&movups	(&QWP(0,"edi"),"xmm0");		# copy-out context
+	&movups	(&QWP(16,"edi"),"xmm1");
+	&pop	("esi");
+	&pop	("edi");
+	&ret	();
+&function_end_B("padlock_sha256_blocks");
+
+&function_begin_B("padlock_sha512_blocks");
+	&push	("edi");
+	&push	("esi");
+	&mov	("edi",&wparam(0));
+	&mov	("esi",&wparam(1));
+	&mov	("ecx",&wparam(2));
+	&mov	("edx","esp");			# put aside %esp
+	&add	("esp",-128);
+	&movups	("xmm0",&QWP(0,"edi"));		# copy-in context
+	&and	("esp",-16);
+	&movups	("xmm1",&QWP(16,"edi"));
+	&movups	("xmm2",&QWP(32,"edi"));
+	&movups	("xmm3",&QWP(48,"edi"));
+	&movaps	(&QWP(0,"esp"),"xmm0");
+	&mov	("edi","esp");
+	&movaps	(&QWP(16,"esp"),"xmm1");
+	&movaps	(&QWP(32,"esp"),"xmm2");
+	&movaps	(&QWP(48,"esp"),"xmm3");
+	&data_byte(0xf3,0x0f,0xa6,0xe0);	# rep xsha512
+	&movaps	("xmm0",&QWP(0,"esp"));
+	&movaps	("xmm1",&QWP(16,"esp"));
+	&movaps	("xmm2",&QWP(32,"esp"));
+	&movaps	("xmm3",&QWP(48,"esp"));
+	&mov	("esp","edx");			# restore %esp
+	&mov	("edi",&wparam(0));
+	&movups	(&QWP(0,"edi"),"xmm0");		# copy-out context
+	&movups	(&QWP(16,"edi"),"xmm1");
+	&movups	(&QWP(32,"edi"),"xmm2");
+	&movups	(&QWP(48,"edi"),"xmm3");
+	&pop	("esi");
+	&pop	("edi");
+	&ret	();
+&function_end_B("padlock_sha512_blocks");
+
+&asciz	("VIA Padlock x86 module, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>");
+&align	(16);
+
+&dataseg();
+# Essentially this variable belongs in thread local storage.
+# Having this variable global on the other hand can only cause
+# few bogus key reloads [if any at all on signle-CPU system],
+# so we accept the penalty...
+&set_label("padlock_saved_context",4);
+&data_word(0);
+
+&asm_finish();
+
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/asm/e_padlock-x86_64.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/asm/e_padlock-x86_64.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..da285ab
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/asm/e_padlock-x86_64.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,574 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+
+# September 2011
+#
+# Assembler helpers for Padlock engine. See even e_padlock-x86.pl for
+# details.
+
+$flavour = shift;
+$output  = shift;
+if ($flavour =~ /\./) { $output = $flavour; undef $flavour; }
+
+$win64=0; $win64=1 if ($flavour =~ /[nm]asm|mingw64/ || $output =~ /\.asm$/);
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+( $xlate="${dir}x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
+( $xlate="${dir}../../crypto/perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
+die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl";
+
+open OUT,"| \"$^X\" \"$xlate\" $flavour \"$output\"";
+*STDOUT=*OUT;
+
+$code=".text\n";
+
+%PADLOCK_PREFETCH=(ecb=>128, cbc=>64, ctr32=>32);	# prefetch errata
+$PADLOCK_CHUNK=512;	# Must be a power of 2 between 32 and 2^20
+
+$ctx="%rdx";
+$out="%rdi";
+$inp="%rsi";
+$len="%rcx";
+$chunk="%rbx";
+
+($arg1,$arg2,$arg3,$arg4)=$win64?("%rcx","%rdx","%r8", "%r9") : # Win64 order
+                                 ("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx","%rcx"); # Unix order
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	padlock_capability
+.type	padlock_capability,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+padlock_capability:
+	mov	%rbx,%r8
+	xor	%eax,%eax
+	cpuid
+	xor	%eax,%eax
+	cmp	\$`"0x".unpack("H*",'tneC')`,%ebx
+	jne	.Lnoluck
+	cmp	\$`"0x".unpack("H*",'Hrua')`,%edx
+	jne	.Lnoluck
+	cmp	\$`"0x".unpack("H*",'slua')`,%ecx
+	jne	.Lnoluck
+	mov	\$0xC0000000,%eax
+	cpuid
+	mov	%eax,%edx
+	xor	%eax,%eax
+	cmp	\$0xC0000001,%edx
+	jb	.Lnoluck
+	mov	\$0xC0000001,%eax
+	cpuid
+	mov	%edx,%eax
+	and	\$0xffffffef,%eax
+	or	\$0x10,%eax		# set Nano bit#4
+.Lnoluck:
+	mov	%r8,%rbx
+	ret
+.size	padlock_capability,.-padlock_capability
+
+.globl	padlock_key_bswap
+.type	padlock_key_bswap,\@abi-omnipotent,0
+.align	16
+padlock_key_bswap:
+	mov	240($arg1),%edx
+.Lbswap_loop:
+	mov	($arg1),%eax
+	bswap	%eax
+	mov	%eax,($arg1)
+	lea	4($arg1),$arg1
+	sub	\$1,%edx
+	jnz	.Lbswap_loop
+	ret
+.size	padlock_key_bswap,.-padlock_key_bswap
+
+.globl	padlock_verify_context
+.type	padlock_verify_context,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+padlock_verify_context:
+	mov	$arg1,$ctx
+	pushf
+	lea	.Lpadlock_saved_context(%rip),%rax
+	call	_padlock_verify_ctx
+	lea	8(%rsp),%rsp
+	ret
+.size	padlock_verify_context,.-padlock_verify_context
+
+.type	_padlock_verify_ctx,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+_padlock_verify_ctx:
+	mov	8(%rsp),%r8
+	bt	\$30,%r8
+	jnc	.Lverified
+	cmp	(%rax),$ctx
+	je	.Lverified
+	pushf
+	popf
+.Lverified:
+	mov	$ctx,(%rax)
+	ret
+.size	_padlock_verify_ctx,.-_padlock_verify_ctx
+
+.globl	padlock_reload_key
+.type	padlock_reload_key,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+padlock_reload_key:
+	pushf
+	popf
+	ret
+.size	padlock_reload_key,.-padlock_reload_key
+
+.globl	padlock_aes_block
+.type	padlock_aes_block,\@function,3
+.align	16
+padlock_aes_block:
+	mov	%rbx,%r8
+	mov	\$1,$len
+	lea	32($ctx),%rbx		# key
+	lea	16($ctx),$ctx		# control word
+	.byte	0xf3,0x0f,0xa7,0xc8	# rep xcryptecb
+	mov	%r8,%rbx
+	ret
+.size	padlock_aes_block,.-padlock_aes_block
+
+.globl	padlock_xstore
+.type	padlock_xstore,\@function,2
+.align	16
+padlock_xstore:
+	mov	%esi,%edx
+	.byte	0x0f,0xa7,0xc0		# xstore
+	ret
+.size	padlock_xstore,.-padlock_xstore
+
+.globl	padlock_sha1_oneshot
+.type	padlock_sha1_oneshot,\@function,3
+.align	16
+padlock_sha1_oneshot:
+	mov	%rdx,%rcx
+	mov	%rdi,%rdx		# put aside %rdi
+	movups	(%rdi),%xmm0		# copy-in context
+	sub	\$128+8,%rsp
+	mov	16(%rdi),%eax
+	movaps	%xmm0,(%rsp)
+	mov	%rsp,%rdi
+	mov	%eax,16(%rsp)
+	xor	%rax,%rax
+	.byte	0xf3,0x0f,0xa6,0xc8	# rep xsha1
+	movaps	(%rsp),%xmm0
+	mov	16(%rsp),%eax
+	add	\$128+8,%rsp
+	movups	%xmm0,(%rdx)		# copy-out context
+	mov	%eax,16(%rdx)
+	ret
+.size	padlock_sha1_oneshot,.-padlock_sha1_oneshot
+
+.globl	padlock_sha1_blocks
+.type	padlock_sha1_blocks,\@function,3
+.align	16
+padlock_sha1_blocks:
+	mov	%rdx,%rcx
+	mov	%rdi,%rdx		# put aside %rdi
+	movups	(%rdi),%xmm0		# copy-in context
+	sub	\$128+8,%rsp
+	mov	16(%rdi),%eax
+	movaps	%xmm0,(%rsp)
+	mov	%rsp,%rdi
+	mov	%eax,16(%rsp)
+	mov	\$-1,%rax
+	.byte	0xf3,0x0f,0xa6,0xc8	# rep xsha1
+	movaps	(%rsp),%xmm0
+	mov	16(%rsp),%eax
+	add	\$128+8,%rsp
+	movups	%xmm0,(%rdx)		# copy-out context
+	mov	%eax,16(%rdx)
+	ret
+.size	padlock_sha1_blocks,.-padlock_sha1_blocks
+
+.globl	padlock_sha256_oneshot
+.type	padlock_sha256_oneshot,\@function,3
+.align	16
+padlock_sha256_oneshot:
+	mov	%rdx,%rcx
+	mov	%rdi,%rdx		# put aside %rdi
+	movups	(%rdi),%xmm0		# copy-in context
+	sub	\$128+8,%rsp
+	movups	16(%rdi),%xmm1
+	movaps	%xmm0,(%rsp)
+	mov	%rsp,%rdi
+	movaps	%xmm1,16(%rsp)
+	xor	%rax,%rax
+	.byte	0xf3,0x0f,0xa6,0xd0	# rep xsha256
+	movaps	(%rsp),%xmm0
+	movaps	16(%rsp),%xmm1
+	add	\$128+8,%rsp
+	movups	%xmm0,(%rdx)		# copy-out context
+	movups	%xmm1,16(%rdx)
+	ret
+.size	padlock_sha256_oneshot,.-padlock_sha256_oneshot
+
+.globl	padlock_sha256_blocks
+.type	padlock_sha256_blocks,\@function,3
+.align	16
+padlock_sha256_blocks:
+	mov	%rdx,%rcx
+	mov	%rdi,%rdx		# put aside %rdi
+	movups	(%rdi),%xmm0		# copy-in context
+	sub	\$128+8,%rsp
+	movups	16(%rdi),%xmm1
+	movaps	%xmm0,(%rsp)
+	mov	%rsp,%rdi
+	movaps	%xmm1,16(%rsp)
+	mov	\$-1,%rax
+	.byte	0xf3,0x0f,0xa6,0xd0	# rep xsha256
+	movaps	(%rsp),%xmm0
+	movaps	16(%rsp),%xmm1
+	add	\$128+8,%rsp
+	movups	%xmm0,(%rdx)		# copy-out context
+	movups	%xmm1,16(%rdx)
+	ret
+.size	padlock_sha256_blocks,.-padlock_sha256_blocks
+
+.globl	padlock_sha512_blocks
+.type	padlock_sha512_blocks,\@function,3
+.align	16
+padlock_sha512_blocks:
+	mov	%rdx,%rcx
+	mov	%rdi,%rdx		# put aside %rdi
+	movups	(%rdi),%xmm0		# copy-in context
+	sub	\$128+8,%rsp
+	movups	16(%rdi),%xmm1
+	movups	32(%rdi),%xmm2
+	movups	48(%rdi),%xmm3
+	movaps	%xmm0,(%rsp)
+	mov	%rsp,%rdi
+	movaps	%xmm1,16(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm2,32(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm3,48(%rsp)
+	.byte	0xf3,0x0f,0xa6,0xe0	# rep xha512
+	movaps	(%rsp),%xmm0
+	movaps	16(%rsp),%xmm1
+	movaps	32(%rsp),%xmm2
+	movaps	48(%rsp),%xmm3
+	add	\$128+8,%rsp
+	movups	%xmm0,(%rdx)		# copy-out context
+	movups	%xmm1,16(%rdx)
+	movups	%xmm2,32(%rdx)
+	movups	%xmm3,48(%rdx)
+	ret
+.size	padlock_sha512_blocks,.-padlock_sha512_blocks
+___
+
+sub generate_mode {
+my ($mode,$opcode) = @_;
+# int padlock_$mode_encrypt(void *out, const void *inp,
+#		struct padlock_cipher_data *ctx, size_t len);
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	padlock_${mode}_encrypt
+.type	padlock_${mode}_encrypt,\@function,4
+.align	16
+padlock_${mode}_encrypt:
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%rbx
+
+	xor	%eax,%eax
+	test	\$15,$ctx
+	jnz	.L${mode}_abort
+	test	\$15,$len
+	jnz	.L${mode}_abort
+	lea	.Lpadlock_saved_context(%rip),%rax
+	pushf
+	cld
+	call	_padlock_verify_ctx
+	lea	16($ctx),$ctx		# control word
+	xor	%eax,%eax
+	xor	%ebx,%ebx
+	testl	\$`1<<5`,($ctx)		# align bit in control word
+	jnz	.L${mode}_aligned
+	test	\$0x0f,$out
+	setz	%al			# !out_misaligned
+	test	\$0x0f,$inp
+	setz	%bl			# !inp_misaligned
+	test	%ebx,%eax
+	jnz	.L${mode}_aligned
+	neg	%rax
+	mov	\$$PADLOCK_CHUNK,$chunk
+	not	%rax			# out_misaligned?-1:0
+	lea	(%rsp),%rbp
+	cmp	$chunk,$len
+	cmovc	$len,$chunk		# chunk=len>PADLOCK_CHUNK?PADLOCK_CHUNK:len
+	and	$chunk,%rax		# out_misaligned?chunk:0
+	mov	$len,$chunk
+	neg	%rax
+	and	\$$PADLOCK_CHUNK-1,$chunk	# chunk%=PADLOCK_CHUNK
+	lea	(%rax,%rbp),%rsp
+	mov	\$$PADLOCK_CHUNK,%rax
+	cmovz	%rax,$chunk			# chunk=chunk?:PADLOCK_CHUNK
+___
+$code.=<<___				if ($mode eq "ctr32");
+.L${mode}_reenter:
+	mov	-4($ctx),%eax		# pull 32-bit counter
+	bswap	%eax
+	neg	%eax
+	and	\$`$PADLOCK_CHUNK/16-1`,%eax
+	mov	\$$PADLOCK_CHUNK,$chunk
+	shl	\$4,%eax
+	cmovz	$chunk,%rax
+	cmp	%rax,$len
+	cmova	%rax,$chunk		# don't let counter cross PADLOCK_CHUNK
+	cmovbe	$len,$chunk
+___
+$code.=<<___				if ($PADLOCK_PREFETCH{$mode});
+	cmp	$chunk,$len
+	ja	.L${mode}_loop
+	mov	$inp,%rax		# check if prefetch crosses page
+	cmp	%rsp,%rbp
+	cmove	$out,%rax
+	add	$len,%rax
+	neg	%rax
+	and	\$0xfff,%rax		# distance to page boundary
+	cmp	\$$PADLOCK_PREFETCH{$mode},%rax
+	mov	\$-$PADLOCK_PREFETCH{$mode},%rax
+	cmovae	$chunk,%rax		# mask=distance<prefetch?-prefetch:-1
+	and	%rax,$chunk
+	jz	.L${mode}_unaligned_tail
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	jmp	.L${mode}_loop
+.align	16
+.L${mode}_loop:
+	cmp	$len,$chunk		# ctr32 artefact
+	cmova	$len,$chunk		# ctr32 artefact
+	mov	$out,%r8		# save parameters
+	mov	$inp,%r9
+	mov	$len,%r10
+	mov	$chunk,$len
+	mov	$chunk,%r11
+	test	\$0x0f,$out		# out_misaligned
+	cmovnz	%rsp,$out
+	test	\$0x0f,$inp		# inp_misaligned
+	jz	.L${mode}_inp_aligned
+	shr	\$3,$len
+	.byte	0xf3,0x48,0xa5		# rep movsq
+	sub	$chunk,$out
+	mov	$chunk,$len
+	mov	$out,$inp
+.L${mode}_inp_aligned:
+	lea	-16($ctx),%rax		# ivp
+	lea	16($ctx),%rbx		# key
+	shr	\$4,$len
+	.byte	0xf3,0x0f,0xa7,$opcode	# rep xcrypt*
+___
+$code.=<<___				if ($mode !~ /ecb|ctr/);
+	movdqa	(%rax),%xmm0
+	movdqa	%xmm0,-16($ctx)		# copy [or refresh] iv
+___
+$code.=<<___				if ($mode eq "ctr32");
+	mov	-4($ctx),%eax		# pull 32-bit counter
+	test	\$0xffff0000,%eax
+	jnz	.L${mode}_no_carry
+	bswap	%eax
+	add	\$0x10000,%eax
+	bswap	%eax
+	mov	%eax,-4($ctx)
+.L${mode}_no_carry:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	mov	%r8,$out		# restore parameters
+	mov	%r11,$chunk
+	test	\$0x0f,$out
+	jz	.L${mode}_out_aligned
+	mov	$chunk,$len
+	lea	(%rsp),$inp
+	shr	\$3,$len
+	.byte	0xf3,0x48,0xa5		# rep movsq
+	sub	$chunk,$out
+.L${mode}_out_aligned:
+	mov	%r9,$inp
+	mov	%r10,$len
+	add	$chunk,$out
+	add	$chunk,$inp
+	sub	$chunk,$len
+	mov	\$$PADLOCK_CHUNK,$chunk
+___
+					if (!$PADLOCK_PREFETCH{$mode}) {
+$code.=<<___;
+	jnz	.L${mode}_loop
+___
+					} else {
+$code.=<<___;
+	jz	.L${mode}_break
+	cmp	$chunk,$len
+	jae	.L${mode}_loop
+___
+$code.=<<___				if ($mode eq "ctr32");
+	mov	$len,$chunk
+	mov	$inp,%rax		# check if prefetch crosses page
+	cmp	%rsp,%rbp
+	cmove	$out,%rax
+	add	$len,%rax
+	neg	%rax
+	and	\$0xfff,%rax		# distance to page boundary
+	cmp	\$$PADLOCK_PREFETCH{$mode},%rax
+	mov	\$-$PADLOCK_PREFETCH{$mode},%rax
+	cmovae	$chunk,%rax
+	and	%rax,$chunk
+	jnz	.L${mode}_loop
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+.L${mode}_unaligned_tail:
+	xor	%eax,%eax
+	cmp	%rsp,%rbp
+	cmove	$len,%rax
+	mov	$out,%r8		# save parameters
+	mov	$len,$chunk
+	sub	%rax,%rsp		# alloca
+	shr	\$3,$len
+	lea	(%rsp),$out
+	.byte	0xf3,0x48,0xa5		# rep movsq
+	mov	%rsp,$inp
+	mov	%r8, $out		# restore parameters
+	mov	$chunk,$len
+	jmp	.L${mode}_loop
+.align	16
+.L${mode}_break:
+___
+					}
+$code.=<<___;
+	cmp	%rbp,%rsp
+	je	.L${mode}_done
+
+	pxor	%xmm0,%xmm0
+	lea	(%rsp),%rax
+.L${mode}_bzero:
+	movaps	%xmm0,(%rax)
+	lea	16(%rax),%rax
+	cmp	%rax,%rbp
+	ja	.L${mode}_bzero
+
+.L${mode}_done:
+	lea	(%rbp),%rsp
+	jmp	.L${mode}_exit
+
+.align	16
+.L${mode}_aligned:
+___
+$code.=<<___				if ($mode eq "ctr32");
+	mov	-4($ctx),%eax		# pull 32-bit counter
+	bswap	%eax
+	neg	%eax
+	and	\$0xffff,%eax
+	mov	\$`16*0x10000`,$chunk
+	shl	\$4,%eax
+	cmovz	$chunk,%rax
+	cmp	%rax,$len
+	cmova	%rax,$chunk		# don't let counter cross 2^16
+	cmovbe	$len,$chunk
+	jbe	.L${mode}_aligned_skip
+
+.L${mode}_aligned_loop:
+	mov	$len,%r10		# save parameters
+	mov	$chunk,$len
+	mov	$chunk,%r11
+
+	lea	-16($ctx),%rax		# ivp
+	lea	16($ctx),%rbx		# key
+	shr	\$4,$len		# len/=AES_BLOCK_SIZE
+	.byte	0xf3,0x0f,0xa7,$opcode	# rep xcrypt*
+
+	mov	-4($ctx),%eax		# pull 32-bit counter
+	bswap	%eax
+	add	\$0x10000,%eax
+	bswap	%eax
+	mov	%eax,-4($ctx)
+
+	mov	%r10,$len		# restore parameters
+	sub	%r11,$len
+	mov	\$`16*0x10000`,$chunk
+	jz	.L${mode}_exit
+	cmp	$chunk,$len
+	jae	.L${mode}_aligned_loop
+
+.L${mode}_aligned_skip:
+___
+$code.=<<___				if ($PADLOCK_PREFETCH{$mode});
+	lea	($inp,$len),%rbp
+	neg	%rbp
+	and	\$0xfff,%rbp		# distance to page boundary
+	xor	%eax,%eax
+	cmp	\$$PADLOCK_PREFETCH{$mode},%rbp
+	mov	\$$PADLOCK_PREFETCH{$mode}-1,%rbp
+	cmovae	%rax,%rbp
+	and	$len,%rbp		# remainder
+	sub	%rbp,$len
+	jz	.L${mode}_aligned_tail
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	lea	-16($ctx),%rax		# ivp
+	lea	16($ctx),%rbx		# key
+	shr	\$4,$len		# len/=AES_BLOCK_SIZE
+	.byte	0xf3,0x0f,0xa7,$opcode	# rep xcrypt*
+___
+$code.=<<___				if ($mode !~ /ecb|ctr/);
+	movdqa	(%rax),%xmm0
+	movdqa	%xmm0,-16($ctx)		# copy [or refresh] iv
+___
+$code.=<<___				if ($PADLOCK_PREFETCH{$mode});
+	test	%rbp,%rbp		# check remainder
+	jz	.L${mode}_exit
+
+.L${mode}_aligned_tail:
+	mov	$out,%r8
+	mov	%rbp,$chunk
+	mov	%rbp,$len
+	lea	(%rsp),%rbp
+	sub	$len,%rsp
+	shr	\$3,$len
+	lea	(%rsp),$out
+	.byte	0xf3,0x48,0xa5		# rep movsq	
+	lea	(%r8),$out
+	lea	(%rsp),$inp
+	mov	$chunk,$len
+	jmp	.L${mode}_loop
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+.L${mode}_exit:
+	mov	\$1,%eax
+	lea	8(%rsp),%rsp
+.L${mode}_abort:
+	pop	%rbx
+	pop	%rbp
+	ret
+.size	padlock_${mode}_encrypt,.-padlock_${mode}_encrypt
+___
+}
+
+&generate_mode("ecb",0xc8);
+&generate_mode("cbc",0xd0);
+&generate_mode("cfb",0xe0);
+&generate_mode("ofb",0xe8);
+&generate_mode("ctr32",0xd8);	# all 64-bit CPUs have working CTR...
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.asciz	"VIA Padlock x86_64 module, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+.align	16
+.data
+.align	8
+.Lpadlock_saved_context:
+	.quad	0
+___
+$code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval($1)/gem;
+
+print $code;
+
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/build.info b/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/build.info
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1c47e77
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/build.info
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+IF[{- !$disabled{"engine"} -}]
+  IF[{- $disabled{"dynamic-engine"} -}]
+    LIBS=../libcrypto
+    SOURCE[../libcrypto]=\
+            e_padlock.c {- $target{padlock_asm_src} -}
+    IF[{- !$disabled{capieng} -}]
+      SOURCE[../libcrypto]=e_capi.c
+    ENDIF
+  ELSE
+    ENGINES=padlock
+    SOURCE[padlock]=e_padlock.c {- $target{padlock_asm_src} -}
+    DEPEND[padlock]=../libcrypto
+    INCLUDE[padlock]=../include
+    IF[{- !$disabled{capieng} -}]
+      ENGINES=capi
+      SOURCE[capi]=e_capi.c
+      DEPEND[capi]=../libcrypto
+      INCLUDE[capi]=../include
+    ENDIF
+
+    ENGINES_NO_INST=ossltest dasync
+    SOURCE[dasync]=e_dasync.c
+    DEPEND[dasync]=../libcrypto
+    INCLUDE[dasync]=../include
+    SOURCE[ossltest]=e_ossltest.c
+    DEPEND[ossltest]=../libcrypto
+    INCLUDE[ossltest]=../include
+  ENDIF
+
+  GENERATE[e_padlock-x86.s]=asm/e_padlock-x86.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $(CFLAGS) $(LIB_CFLAGS) $(PROCESSOR)
+  GENERATE[e_padlock-x86_64.s]=asm/e_padlock-x86_64.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME)
+ENDIF
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/e_capi.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/e_capi.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4660f1a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/e_capi.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1888 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifdef _WIN32
+# ifndef _WIN32_WINNT
+#  define _WIN32_WINNT 0x0400
+# endif
+# include <windows.h>
+# include <wincrypt.h>
+
+# include <stdio.h>
+# include <string.h>
+# include <stdlib.h>
+# include <malloc.h>
+# ifndef alloca
+#  define alloca _alloca
+# endif
+
+# include <openssl/crypto.h>
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAPIENG
+
+#  include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#  include <openssl/bn.h>
+#  include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#  include <openssl/dsa.h>
+
+/*
+ * This module uses several "new" interfaces, among which is
+ * CertGetCertificateContextProperty. CERT_KEY_PROV_INFO_PROP_ID is
+ * one of possible values you can pass to function in question. By
+ * checking if it's defined we can see if wincrypt.h and accompanying
+ * crypt32.lib are in shape. The native MingW32 headers up to and
+ * including __W32API_VERSION 3.14 lack of struct DSSPUBKEY and the
+ * defines CERT_STORE_PROV_SYSTEM_A and CERT_STORE_READONLY_FLAG,
+ * so we check for these too and avoid compiling.
+ * Yes, it's rather "weak" test and if compilation fails,
+ * then re-configure with -DOPENSSL_NO_CAPIENG.
+ */
+#  if defined(CERT_KEY_PROV_INFO_PROP_ID) && \
+    defined(CERT_STORE_PROV_SYSTEM_A) && \
+    defined(CERT_STORE_READONLY_FLAG)
+#   define __COMPILE_CAPIENG
+#  endif                        /* CERT_KEY_PROV_INFO_PROP_ID */
+# endif                         /* OPENSSL_NO_CAPIENG */
+#endif                          /* _WIN32 */
+
+#ifdef __COMPILE_CAPIENG
+
+# undef X509_EXTENSIONS
+
+/* Definitions which may be missing from earlier version of headers */
+# ifndef CERT_STORE_OPEN_EXISTING_FLAG
+#  define CERT_STORE_OPEN_EXISTING_FLAG                   0x00004000
+# endif
+
+# ifndef CERT_STORE_CREATE_NEW_FLAG
+#  define CERT_STORE_CREATE_NEW_FLAG                      0x00002000
+# endif
+
+# ifndef CERT_SYSTEM_STORE_CURRENT_USER
+#  define CERT_SYSTEM_STORE_CURRENT_USER                  0x00010000
+# endif
+
+# ifndef ALG_SID_SHA_256
+#  define ALG_SID_SHA_256   12
+# endif
+# ifndef ALG_SID_SHA_384
+#  define ALG_SID_SHA_384   13
+# endif
+# ifndef ALG_SID_SHA_512
+#  define ALG_SID_SHA_512   14
+# endif
+
+# ifndef CALG_SHA_256
+#  define CALG_SHA_256      (ALG_CLASS_HASH | ALG_TYPE_ANY | ALG_SID_SHA_256)
+# endif
+# ifndef CALG_SHA_384
+#  define CALG_SHA_384      (ALG_CLASS_HASH | ALG_TYPE_ANY | ALG_SID_SHA_384)
+# endif
+# ifndef CALG_SHA_512
+#  define CALG_SHA_512      (ALG_CLASS_HASH | ALG_TYPE_ANY | ALG_SID_SHA_512)
+# endif
+
+# ifndef PROV_RSA_AES
+#  define PROV_RSA_AES 24
+# endif
+
+# include <openssl/engine.h>
+# include <openssl/pem.h>
+# include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+
+# include "e_capi_err.h"
+# include "e_capi_err.c"
+
+static const char *engine_capi_id = "capi";
+static const char *engine_capi_name = "CryptoAPI ENGINE";
+
+typedef struct CAPI_CTX_st CAPI_CTX;
+typedef struct CAPI_KEY_st CAPI_KEY;
+
+static void capi_addlasterror(void);
+static void capi_adderror(DWORD err);
+
+static void CAPI_trace(CAPI_CTX *ctx, char *format, ...);
+
+static int capi_list_providers(CAPI_CTX *ctx, BIO *out);
+static int capi_list_containers(CAPI_CTX *ctx, BIO *out);
+int capi_list_certs(CAPI_CTX *ctx, BIO *out, char *storename);
+void capi_free_key(CAPI_KEY *key);
+
+static PCCERT_CONTEXT capi_find_cert(CAPI_CTX *ctx, const char *id,
+                                     HCERTSTORE hstore);
+
+CAPI_KEY *capi_find_key(CAPI_CTX *ctx, const char *id);
+
+static EVP_PKEY *capi_load_privkey(ENGINE *eng, const char *key_id,
+                                   UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
+static int capi_rsa_sign(int dtype, const unsigned char *m,
+                         unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *sigret,
+                         unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa);
+static int capi_rsa_priv_enc(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+                             unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+static int capi_rsa_priv_dec(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+                             unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+static int capi_rsa_free(RSA *rsa);
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+static DSA_SIG *capi_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *digest, int dlen,
+                                 DSA *dsa);
+static int capi_dsa_free(DSA *dsa);
+# endif
+
+static int capi_load_ssl_client_cert(ENGINE *e, SSL *ssl,
+                                     STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn, X509 **pcert,
+                                     EVP_PKEY **pkey, STACK_OF(X509) **pother,
+                                     UI_METHOD *ui_method,
+                                     void *callback_data);
+
+static int cert_select_simple(ENGINE *e, SSL *ssl, STACK_OF(X509) *certs);
+# ifdef OPENSSL_CAPIENG_DIALOG
+static int cert_select_dialog(ENGINE *e, SSL *ssl, STACK_OF(X509) *certs);
+# endif
+
+void engine_load_capi_int(void);
+
+typedef PCCERT_CONTEXT(WINAPI *CERTDLG)(HCERTSTORE, HWND, LPCWSTR,
+                                        LPCWSTR, DWORD, DWORD, void *);
+typedef HWND(WINAPI *GETCONSWIN)(void);
+
+/*
+ * This structure contains CAPI ENGINE specific data: it contains various
+ * global options and affects how other functions behave.
+ */
+
+# define CAPI_DBG_TRACE  2
+# define CAPI_DBG_ERROR  1
+
+struct CAPI_CTX_st {
+    int debug_level;
+    char *debug_file;
+    /* Parameters to use for container lookup */
+    DWORD keytype;
+    LPSTR cspname;
+    DWORD csptype;
+    /* Certificate store name to use */
+    LPSTR storename;
+    LPSTR ssl_client_store;
+    /* System store flags */
+    DWORD store_flags;
+/* Lookup string meanings in load_private_key */
+# define CAPI_LU_SUBSTR          1  /* Substring of subject: uses "storename" */
+# define CAPI_LU_FNAME           2  /* Friendly name: uses storename */
+# define CAPI_LU_CONTNAME        3  /* Container name: uses cspname, keytype */
+    int lookup_method;
+/* Info to dump with dumpcerts option */
+# define CAPI_DMP_SUMMARY        0x1    /* Issuer and serial name strings */
+# define CAPI_DMP_FNAME          0x2    /* Friendly name */
+# define CAPI_DMP_FULL           0x4    /* Full X509_print dump */
+# define CAPI_DMP_PEM            0x8    /* Dump PEM format certificate */
+# define CAPI_DMP_PSKEY          0x10   /* Dump pseudo key (if possible) */
+# define CAPI_DMP_PKEYINFO       0x20   /* Dump key info (if possible) */
+    DWORD dump_flags;
+    int (*client_cert_select) (ENGINE *e, SSL *ssl, STACK_OF(X509) *certs);
+    CERTDLG certselectdlg;
+    GETCONSWIN getconswindow;
+};
+
+static CAPI_CTX *capi_ctx_new(void);
+static void capi_ctx_free(CAPI_CTX *ctx);
+static int capi_ctx_set_provname(CAPI_CTX *ctx, LPSTR pname, DWORD type,
+                                 int check);
+static int capi_ctx_set_provname_idx(CAPI_CTX *ctx, int idx);
+
+# define CAPI_CMD_LIST_CERTS             ENGINE_CMD_BASE
+# define CAPI_CMD_LOOKUP_CERT            (ENGINE_CMD_BASE + 1)
+# define CAPI_CMD_DEBUG_LEVEL            (ENGINE_CMD_BASE + 2)
+# define CAPI_CMD_DEBUG_FILE             (ENGINE_CMD_BASE + 3)
+# define CAPI_CMD_KEYTYPE                (ENGINE_CMD_BASE + 4)
+# define CAPI_CMD_LIST_CSPS              (ENGINE_CMD_BASE + 5)
+# define CAPI_CMD_SET_CSP_IDX            (ENGINE_CMD_BASE + 6)
+# define CAPI_CMD_SET_CSP_NAME           (ENGINE_CMD_BASE + 7)
+# define CAPI_CMD_SET_CSP_TYPE           (ENGINE_CMD_BASE + 8)
+# define CAPI_CMD_LIST_CONTAINERS        (ENGINE_CMD_BASE + 9)
+# define CAPI_CMD_LIST_OPTIONS           (ENGINE_CMD_BASE + 10)
+# define CAPI_CMD_LOOKUP_METHOD          (ENGINE_CMD_BASE + 11)
+# define CAPI_CMD_STORE_NAME             (ENGINE_CMD_BASE + 12)
+# define CAPI_CMD_STORE_FLAGS            (ENGINE_CMD_BASE + 13)
+
+static const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN capi_cmd_defns[] = {
+    {CAPI_CMD_LIST_CERTS,
+     "list_certs",
+     "List all certificates in store",
+     ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NO_INPUT},
+    {CAPI_CMD_LOOKUP_CERT,
+     "lookup_cert",
+     "Lookup and output certificates",
+     ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING},
+    {CAPI_CMD_DEBUG_LEVEL,
+     "debug_level",
+     "debug level (1=errors, 2=trace)",
+     ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NUMERIC},
+    {CAPI_CMD_DEBUG_FILE,
+     "debug_file",
+     "debugging filename)",
+     ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING},
+    {CAPI_CMD_KEYTYPE,
+     "key_type",
+     "Key type: 1=AT_KEYEXCHANGE (default), 2=AT_SIGNATURE",
+     ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NUMERIC},
+    {CAPI_CMD_LIST_CSPS,
+     "list_csps",
+     "List all CSPs",
+     ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NO_INPUT},
+    {CAPI_CMD_SET_CSP_IDX,
+     "csp_idx",
+     "Set CSP by index",
+     ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NUMERIC},
+    {CAPI_CMD_SET_CSP_NAME,
+     "csp_name",
+     "Set CSP name, (default CSP used if not specified)",
+     ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING},
+    {CAPI_CMD_SET_CSP_TYPE,
+     "csp_type",
+     "Set CSP type, (default RSA_PROV_FULL)",
+     ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NUMERIC},
+    {CAPI_CMD_LIST_CONTAINERS,
+     "list_containers",
+     "list container names",
+     ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NO_INPUT},
+    {CAPI_CMD_LIST_OPTIONS,
+     "list_options",
+     "Set list options (1=summary,2=friendly name, 4=full printout, 8=PEM output, 16=XXX, "
+     "32=private key info)",
+     ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NUMERIC},
+    {CAPI_CMD_LOOKUP_METHOD,
+     "lookup_method",
+     "Set key lookup method (1=substring, 2=friendlyname, 3=container name)",
+     ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NUMERIC},
+    {CAPI_CMD_STORE_NAME,
+     "store_name",
+     "certificate store name, default \"MY\"",
+     ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING},
+    {CAPI_CMD_STORE_FLAGS,
+     "store_flags",
+     "Certificate store flags: 1 = system store",
+     ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NUMERIC},
+
+    {0, NULL, NULL, 0}
+};
+
+static int capi_idx = -1;
+static int rsa_capi_idx = -1;
+static int dsa_capi_idx = -1;
+static int cert_capi_idx = -1;
+
+static int capi_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f) (void))
+{
+    int ret = 1;
+    CAPI_CTX *ctx;
+    BIO *out;
+    LPSTR tmpstr;
+    if (capi_idx == -1) {
+        CAPIerr(CAPI_F_CAPI_CTRL, CAPI_R_ENGINE_NOT_INITIALIZED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    ctx = ENGINE_get_ex_data(e, capi_idx);
+    out = BIO_new_fp(stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+    if (out == NULL) {
+        CAPIerr(CAPI_F_CAPI_CTRL, CAPI_R_FILE_OPEN_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    switch (cmd) {
+    case CAPI_CMD_LIST_CSPS:
+        ret = capi_list_providers(ctx, out);
+        break;
+
+    case CAPI_CMD_LIST_CERTS:
+        ret = capi_list_certs(ctx, out, NULL);
+        break;
+
+    case CAPI_CMD_LOOKUP_CERT:
+        ret = capi_list_certs(ctx, out, p);
+        break;
+
+    case CAPI_CMD_LIST_CONTAINERS:
+        ret = capi_list_containers(ctx, out);
+        break;
+
+    case CAPI_CMD_STORE_NAME:
+        tmpstr = OPENSSL_strdup(p);
+        if (tmpstr != NULL) {
+            OPENSSL_free(ctx->storename);
+            ctx->storename = tmpstr;
+            CAPI_trace(ctx, "Setting store name to %s\n", p);
+        } else {
+            CAPIerr(CAPI_F_CAPI_CTRL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            ret = 0;
+        }
+        break;
+
+    case CAPI_CMD_STORE_FLAGS:
+        if (i & 1) {
+            ctx->store_flags |= CERT_SYSTEM_STORE_LOCAL_MACHINE;
+            ctx->store_flags &= ~CERT_SYSTEM_STORE_CURRENT_USER;
+        } else {
+            ctx->store_flags |= CERT_SYSTEM_STORE_CURRENT_USER;
+            ctx->store_flags &= ~CERT_SYSTEM_STORE_LOCAL_MACHINE;
+        }
+        CAPI_trace(ctx, "Setting flags to %d\n", i);
+        break;
+
+    case CAPI_CMD_DEBUG_LEVEL:
+        ctx->debug_level = (int)i;
+        CAPI_trace(ctx, "Setting debug level to %d\n", ctx->debug_level);
+        break;
+
+    case CAPI_CMD_DEBUG_FILE:
+        tmpstr = OPENSSL_strdup(p);
+        if (tmpstr != NULL) {
+            ctx->debug_file = tmpstr;
+            CAPI_trace(ctx, "Setting debug file to %s\n", ctx->debug_file);
+        } else {
+            CAPIerr(CAPI_F_CAPI_CTRL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            ret = 0;
+        }
+        break;
+
+    case CAPI_CMD_KEYTYPE:
+        ctx->keytype = i;
+        CAPI_trace(ctx, "Setting key type to %d\n", ctx->keytype);
+        break;
+
+    case CAPI_CMD_SET_CSP_IDX:
+        ret = capi_ctx_set_provname_idx(ctx, i);
+        break;
+
+    case CAPI_CMD_LIST_OPTIONS:
+        ctx->dump_flags = i;
+        break;
+
+    case CAPI_CMD_LOOKUP_METHOD:
+        if (i < 1 || i > 3) {
+            CAPIerr(CAPI_F_CAPI_CTRL, CAPI_R_INVALID_LOOKUP_METHOD);
+            BIO_free(out);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        ctx->lookup_method = i;
+        break;
+
+    case CAPI_CMD_SET_CSP_NAME:
+        ret = capi_ctx_set_provname(ctx, p, ctx->csptype, 1);
+        break;
+
+    case CAPI_CMD_SET_CSP_TYPE:
+        ctx->csptype = i;
+        break;
+
+    default:
+        CAPIerr(CAPI_F_CAPI_CTRL, CAPI_R_UNKNOWN_COMMAND);
+        ret = 0;
+    }
+
+    BIO_free(out);
+    return ret;
+
+}
+
+static RSA_METHOD *capi_rsa_method = NULL;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+static DSA_METHOD *capi_dsa_method = NULL;
+# endif
+
+static int use_aes_csp = 0;
+static const WCHAR rsa_aes_cspname[] =
+    L"Microsoft Enhanced RSA and AES Cryptographic Provider";
+static const WCHAR rsa_enh_cspname[] =
+    L"Microsoft Enhanced Cryptographic Provider v1.0";
+
+static int capi_init(ENGINE *e)
+{
+    CAPI_CTX *ctx;
+    const RSA_METHOD *ossl_rsa_meth;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+    const DSA_METHOD *ossl_dsa_meth;
+# endif
+    HCRYPTPROV hprov;
+
+    if (capi_idx < 0) {
+        capi_idx = ENGINE_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
+        if (capi_idx < 0)
+            goto memerr;
+
+        cert_capi_idx = X509_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
+
+        /* Setup RSA_METHOD */
+        rsa_capi_idx = RSA_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
+        ossl_rsa_meth = RSA_PKCS1_OpenSSL();
+        if (   !RSA_meth_set_pub_enc(capi_rsa_method,
+                                     RSA_meth_get_pub_enc(ossl_rsa_meth))
+            || !RSA_meth_set_pub_dec(capi_rsa_method,
+                                     RSA_meth_get_pub_dec(ossl_rsa_meth))
+            || !RSA_meth_set_priv_enc(capi_rsa_method, capi_rsa_priv_enc)
+            || !RSA_meth_set_priv_dec(capi_rsa_method, capi_rsa_priv_dec)
+            || !RSA_meth_set_mod_exp(capi_rsa_method,
+                                     RSA_meth_get_mod_exp(ossl_rsa_meth))
+            || !RSA_meth_set_bn_mod_exp(capi_rsa_method,
+                                        RSA_meth_get_bn_mod_exp(ossl_rsa_meth))
+            || !RSA_meth_set_finish(capi_rsa_method, capi_rsa_free)
+            || !RSA_meth_set_sign(capi_rsa_method, capi_rsa_sign)) {
+            goto memerr;
+        }
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+        /* Setup DSA Method */
+        dsa_capi_idx = DSA_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
+        ossl_dsa_meth = DSA_OpenSSL();
+        if (   !DSA_meth_set_sign(capi_dsa_method, capi_dsa_do_sign)
+            || !DSA_meth_set_verify(capi_dsa_method,
+                                    DSA_meth_get_verify(ossl_dsa_meth))
+            || !DSA_meth_set_finish(capi_dsa_method, capi_dsa_free)
+            || !DSA_meth_set_mod_exp(capi_dsa_method,
+                                     DSA_meth_get_mod_exp(ossl_dsa_meth))
+            || !DSA_meth_set_bn_mod_exp(capi_dsa_method,
+                                    DSA_meth_get_bn_mod_exp(ossl_dsa_meth))) {
+            goto memerr;
+        }
+# endif
+    }
+
+    ctx = capi_ctx_new();
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        goto memerr;
+
+    ENGINE_set_ex_data(e, capi_idx, ctx);
+
+# ifdef OPENSSL_CAPIENG_DIALOG
+    {
+        HMODULE cryptui = LoadLibrary(TEXT("CRYPTUI.DLL"));
+        HMODULE kernel = GetModuleHandle(TEXT("KERNEL32.DLL"));
+        if (cryptui)
+            ctx->certselectdlg =
+                (CERTDLG) GetProcAddress(cryptui,
+                                         "CryptUIDlgSelectCertificateFromStore");
+        if (kernel)
+            ctx->getconswindow =
+                (GETCONSWIN) GetProcAddress(kernel, "GetConsoleWindow");
+        if (cryptui && !OPENSSL_isservice())
+            ctx->client_cert_select = cert_select_dialog;
+    }
+# endif
+
+    /* See if there is RSA+AES CSP */
+    if (CryptAcquireContextW(&hprov, NULL, rsa_aes_cspname, PROV_RSA_AES,
+                             CRYPT_VERIFYCONTEXT)) {
+        use_aes_csp = 1;
+        CryptReleaseContext(hprov, 0);
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+
+ memerr:
+    CAPIerr(CAPI_F_CAPI_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return 0;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int capi_destroy(ENGINE *e)
+{
+    RSA_meth_free(capi_rsa_method);
+    capi_rsa_method = NULL;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+    DSA_meth_free(capi_dsa_method);
+    capi_dsa_method = NULL;
+# endif
+    ERR_unload_CAPI_strings();
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int capi_finish(ENGINE *e)
+{
+    CAPI_CTX *ctx;
+    ctx = ENGINE_get_ex_data(e, capi_idx);
+    capi_ctx_free(ctx);
+    ENGINE_set_ex_data(e, capi_idx, NULL);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * CryptoAPI key application data. This contains a handle to the private key
+ * container (for sign operations) and a handle to the key (for decrypt
+ * operations).
+ */
+
+struct CAPI_KEY_st {
+    /* Associated certificate context (if any) */
+    PCCERT_CONTEXT pcert;
+    HCRYPTPROV hprov;
+    HCRYPTKEY key;
+    DWORD keyspec;
+};
+
+static int bind_capi(ENGINE *e)
+{
+    capi_rsa_method = RSA_meth_new("CryptoAPI RSA method", 0);
+    if (capi_rsa_method == NULL)
+        return 0;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+    capi_dsa_method = DSA_meth_new("CryptoAPI DSA method", 0);
+    if (capi_dsa_method == NULL)
+        goto memerr;
+# endif
+    if (!ENGINE_set_id(e, engine_capi_id)
+        || !ENGINE_set_name(e, engine_capi_name)
+        || !ENGINE_set_flags(e, ENGINE_FLAGS_NO_REGISTER_ALL)
+        || !ENGINE_set_init_function(e, capi_init)
+        || !ENGINE_set_finish_function(e, capi_finish)
+        || !ENGINE_set_destroy_function(e, capi_destroy)
+        || !ENGINE_set_RSA(e, capi_rsa_method)
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+        || !ENGINE_set_DSA(e, capi_dsa_method)
+# endif
+        || !ENGINE_set_load_privkey_function(e, capi_load_privkey)
+        || !ENGINE_set_load_ssl_client_cert_function(e,
+                                                     capi_load_ssl_client_cert)
+        || !ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(e, capi_cmd_defns)
+        || !ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(e, capi_ctrl))
+        goto memerr;
+    ERR_load_CAPI_strings();
+
+    return 1;
+ memerr:
+    RSA_meth_free(capi_rsa_method);
+    capi_rsa_method = NULL;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+    DSA_meth_free(capi_dsa_method);
+    capi_dsa_method = NULL;
+# endif
+    return 0;
+}
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE
+static int bind_helper(ENGINE *e, const char *id)
+{
+    if (id && (strcmp(id, engine_capi_id) != 0))
+        return 0;
+    if (!bind_capi(e))
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_CHECK_FN()
+    IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN(bind_helper)
+# else
+static ENGINE *engine_capi(void)
+{
+    ENGINE *ret = ENGINE_new();
+    if (ret == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    if (!bind_capi(ret)) {
+        ENGINE_free(ret);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+void engine_load_capi_int(void)
+{
+    /* Copied from eng_[openssl|dyn].c */
+    ENGINE *toadd = engine_capi();
+    if (!toadd)
+        return;
+    ENGINE_add(toadd);
+    ENGINE_free(toadd);
+    ERR_clear_error();
+}
+# endif
+
+static int lend_tobn(BIGNUM *bn, unsigned char *bin, int binlen)
+{
+    int i;
+    /*
+     * Reverse buffer in place: since this is a keyblob structure that will
+     * be freed up after conversion anyway it doesn't matter if we change
+     * it.
+     */
+    for (i = 0; i < binlen / 2; i++) {
+        unsigned char c;
+        c = bin[i];
+        bin[i] = bin[binlen - i - 1];
+        bin[binlen - i - 1] = c;
+    }
+
+    if (!BN_bin2bn(bin, binlen, bn))
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Given a CAPI_KEY get an EVP_PKEY structure */
+
+static EVP_PKEY *capi_get_pkey(ENGINE *eng, CAPI_KEY *key)
+{
+    unsigned char *pubkey = NULL;
+    DWORD len;
+    BLOBHEADER *bh;
+    RSA *rkey = NULL;
+    DSA *dkey = NULL;
+    EVP_PKEY *ret = NULL;
+    if (!CryptExportKey(key->key, 0, PUBLICKEYBLOB, 0, NULL, &len)) {
+        CAPIerr(CAPI_F_CAPI_GET_PKEY, CAPI_R_PUBKEY_EXPORT_LENGTH_ERROR);
+        capi_addlasterror();
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    pubkey = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
+
+    if (pubkey == NULL)
+        goto memerr;
+
+    if (!CryptExportKey(key->key, 0, PUBLICKEYBLOB, 0, pubkey, &len)) {
+        CAPIerr(CAPI_F_CAPI_GET_PKEY, CAPI_R_PUBKEY_EXPORT_ERROR);
+        capi_addlasterror();
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    bh = (BLOBHEADER *) pubkey;
+    if (bh->bType != PUBLICKEYBLOB) {
+        CAPIerr(CAPI_F_CAPI_GET_PKEY, CAPI_R_INVALID_PUBLIC_KEY_BLOB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (bh->aiKeyAlg == CALG_RSA_SIGN || bh->aiKeyAlg == CALG_RSA_KEYX) {
+        RSAPUBKEY *rp;
+        DWORD rsa_modlen;
+        BIGNUM *e = NULL, *n = NULL;
+        unsigned char *rsa_modulus;
+        rp = (RSAPUBKEY *) (bh + 1);
+        if (rp->magic != 0x31415352) {
+            char magstr[10];
+            BIO_snprintf(magstr, 10, "%lx", rp->magic);
+            CAPIerr(CAPI_F_CAPI_GET_PKEY,
+                    CAPI_R_INVALID_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY_BLOB_MAGIC_NUMBER);
+            ERR_add_error_data(2, "magic=0x", magstr);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        rsa_modulus = (unsigned char *)(rp + 1);
+        rkey = RSA_new_method(eng);
+        if (!rkey)
+            goto memerr;
+
+        e = BN_new();
+        n = BN_new();
+
+        if (e == NULL || n == NULL) {
+            BN_free(e);
+            BN_free(n);
+            goto memerr;
+        }
+
+        RSA_set0_key(rkey, n, e, NULL);
+
+        if (!BN_set_word(e, rp->pubexp))
+            goto memerr;
+
+        rsa_modlen = rp->bitlen / 8;
+        if (!lend_tobn(n, rsa_modulus, rsa_modlen))
+            goto memerr;
+
+        RSA_set_ex_data(rkey, rsa_capi_idx, key);
+
+        if ((ret = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL)
+            goto memerr;
+
+        EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(ret, rkey);
+        rkey = NULL;
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+    } else if (bh->aiKeyAlg == CALG_DSS_SIGN) {
+        DSSPUBKEY *dp;
+        DWORD dsa_plen;
+        unsigned char *btmp;
+        BIGNUM *p, *q, *g, *pub_key;
+        dp = (DSSPUBKEY *) (bh + 1);
+        if (dp->magic != 0x31535344) {
+            char magstr[10];
+            BIO_snprintf(magstr, 10, "%lx", dp->magic);
+            CAPIerr(CAPI_F_CAPI_GET_PKEY,
+                    CAPI_R_INVALID_DSA_PUBLIC_KEY_BLOB_MAGIC_NUMBER);
+            ERR_add_error_data(2, "magic=0x", magstr);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        dsa_plen = dp->bitlen / 8;
+        btmp = (unsigned char *)(dp + 1);
+        dkey = DSA_new_method(eng);
+        if (!dkey)
+            goto memerr;
+        p = BN_new();
+        q = BN_new();
+        g = BN_new();
+        pub_key = BN_new();
+        if (p == NULL || q == NULL || g == NULL || pub_key == NULL) {
+            BN_free(p);
+            BN_free(q);
+            BN_free(g);
+            BN_free(pub_key);
+            goto memerr;
+        }
+        DSA_set0_pqg(dkey, p, q, g);
+        DSA_set0_key(dkey, pub_key, NULL);
+        if (!lend_tobn(p, btmp, dsa_plen))
+            goto memerr;
+        btmp += dsa_plen;
+        if (!lend_tobn(q, btmp, 20))
+            goto memerr;
+        btmp += 20;
+        if (!lend_tobn(g, btmp, dsa_plen))
+            goto memerr;
+        btmp += dsa_plen;
+        if (!lend_tobn(pub_key, btmp, dsa_plen))
+            goto memerr;
+        btmp += dsa_plen;
+
+        DSA_set_ex_data(dkey, dsa_capi_idx, key);
+
+        if ((ret = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL)
+            goto memerr;
+
+        EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(ret, dkey);
+        dkey = NULL;
+# endif
+    } else {
+        char algstr[10];
+        BIO_snprintf(algstr, 10, "%ux", bh->aiKeyAlg);
+        CAPIerr(CAPI_F_CAPI_GET_PKEY,
+                CAPI_R_UNSUPPORTED_PUBLIC_KEY_ALGORITHM);
+        ERR_add_error_data(2, "aiKeyAlg=0x", algstr);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_free(pubkey);
+    if (!ret) {
+        RSA_free(rkey);
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+        DSA_free(dkey);
+# endif
+    }
+
+    return ret;
+
+ memerr:
+    CAPIerr(CAPI_F_CAPI_GET_PKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    goto err;
+
+}
+
+static EVP_PKEY *capi_load_privkey(ENGINE *eng, const char *key_id,
+                                   UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data)
+{
+    CAPI_CTX *ctx;
+    CAPI_KEY *key;
+    EVP_PKEY *ret;
+    ctx = ENGINE_get_ex_data(eng, capi_idx);
+
+    if (!ctx) {
+        CAPIerr(CAPI_F_CAPI_LOAD_PRIVKEY, CAPI_R_CANT_FIND_CAPI_CONTEXT);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    key = capi_find_key(ctx, key_id);
+
+    if (!key)
+        return NULL;
+
+    ret = capi_get_pkey(eng, key);
+
+    if (!ret)
+        capi_free_key(key);
+    return ret;
+
+}
+
+/* CryptoAPI RSA operations */
+
+int capi_rsa_priv_enc(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+                      unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+{
+    CAPIerr(CAPI_F_CAPI_RSA_PRIV_ENC, CAPI_R_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+    return -1;
+}
+
+int capi_rsa_sign(int dtype, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
+                  unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa)
+{
+    ALG_ID alg;
+    HCRYPTHASH hash;
+    DWORD slen;
+    unsigned int i;
+    int ret = -1;
+    CAPI_KEY *capi_key;
+    CAPI_CTX *ctx;
+
+    ctx = ENGINE_get_ex_data(RSA_get0_engine(rsa), capi_idx);
+
+    CAPI_trace(ctx, "Called CAPI_rsa_sign()\n");
+
+    capi_key = RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, rsa_capi_idx);
+    if (!capi_key) {
+        CAPIerr(CAPI_F_CAPI_RSA_SIGN, CAPI_R_CANT_GET_KEY);
+        return -1;
+    }
+/* Convert the signature type to a CryptoAPI algorithm ID */
+    switch (dtype) {
+    case NID_sha256:
+        alg = CALG_SHA_256;
+        break;
+
+    case NID_sha384:
+        alg = CALG_SHA_384;
+        break;
+
+    case NID_sha512:
+        alg = CALG_SHA_512;
+        break;
+
+    case NID_sha1:
+        alg = CALG_SHA1;
+        break;
+
+    case NID_md5:
+        alg = CALG_MD5;
+        break;
+
+    case NID_md5_sha1:
+        alg = CALG_SSL3_SHAMD5;
+        break;
+    default:
+        {
+            char algstr[10];
+            BIO_snprintf(algstr, 10, "%x", dtype);
+            CAPIerr(CAPI_F_CAPI_RSA_SIGN, CAPI_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM_NID);
+            ERR_add_error_data(2, "NID=0x", algstr);
+            return -1;
+        }
+    }
+
+/* Create the hash object */
+    if (!CryptCreateHash(capi_key->hprov, alg, 0, 0, &hash)) {
+        CAPIerr(CAPI_F_CAPI_RSA_SIGN, CAPI_R_CANT_CREATE_HASH_OBJECT);
+        capi_addlasterror();
+        return -1;
+    }
+/* Set the hash value to the value passed */
+
+    if (!CryptSetHashParam(hash, HP_HASHVAL, (unsigned char *)m, 0)) {
+        CAPIerr(CAPI_F_CAPI_RSA_SIGN, CAPI_R_CANT_SET_HASH_VALUE);
+        capi_addlasterror();
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+/* Finally sign it */
+    slen = RSA_size(rsa);
+    if (!CryptSignHash(hash, capi_key->keyspec, NULL, 0, sigret, &slen)) {
+        CAPIerr(CAPI_F_CAPI_RSA_SIGN, CAPI_R_ERROR_SIGNING_HASH);
+        capi_addlasterror();
+        goto err;
+    } else {
+        ret = 1;
+        /* Inplace byte reversal of signature */
+        for (i = 0; i < slen / 2; i++) {
+            unsigned char c;
+            c = sigret[i];
+            sigret[i] = sigret[slen - i - 1];
+            sigret[slen - i - 1] = c;
+        }
+        *siglen = slen;
+    }
+
+    /* Now cleanup */
+
+ err:
+    CryptDestroyHash(hash);
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int capi_rsa_priv_dec(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+                      unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+{
+    int i;
+    unsigned char *tmpbuf;
+    CAPI_KEY *capi_key;
+    CAPI_CTX *ctx;
+    DWORD dlen;
+
+    if (flen <= 0)
+        return flen;
+
+    ctx = ENGINE_get_ex_data(RSA_get0_engine(rsa), capi_idx);
+
+    CAPI_trace(ctx, "Called capi_rsa_priv_dec()\n");
+
+    capi_key = RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, rsa_capi_idx);
+    if (!capi_key) {
+        CAPIerr(CAPI_F_CAPI_RSA_PRIV_DEC, CAPI_R_CANT_GET_KEY);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (padding != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) {
+        char errstr[10];
+        BIO_snprintf(errstr, 10, "%d", padding);
+        CAPIerr(CAPI_F_CAPI_RSA_PRIV_DEC, CAPI_R_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING);
+        ERR_add_error_data(2, "padding=", errstr);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    /* Create temp reverse order version of input */
+    if ((tmpbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(flen)) == NULL) {
+        CAPIerr(CAPI_F_CAPI_RSA_PRIV_DEC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return -1;
+    }
+    for (i = 0; i < flen; i++)
+        tmpbuf[flen - i - 1] = from[i];
+
+    /* Finally decrypt it */
+    dlen = flen;
+    if (!CryptDecrypt(capi_key->key, 0, TRUE, 0, tmpbuf, &dlen)) {
+        CAPIerr(CAPI_F_CAPI_RSA_PRIV_DEC, CAPI_R_DECRYPT_ERROR);
+        capi_addlasterror();
+        OPENSSL_free(tmpbuf);
+        return -1;
+    } else {
+        memcpy(to, tmpbuf, (flen = (int)dlen));
+    }
+    OPENSSL_free(tmpbuf);
+
+    return flen;
+}
+
+static int capi_rsa_free(RSA *rsa)
+{
+    CAPI_KEY *capi_key;
+    capi_key = RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, rsa_capi_idx);
+    capi_free_key(capi_key);
+    RSA_set_ex_data(rsa, rsa_capi_idx, 0);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+/* CryptoAPI DSA operations */
+
+static DSA_SIG *capi_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *digest, int dlen,
+                                 DSA *dsa)
+{
+    HCRYPTHASH hash;
+    DWORD slen;
+    DSA_SIG *ret = NULL;
+    CAPI_KEY *capi_key;
+    CAPI_CTX *ctx;
+    unsigned char csigbuf[40];
+
+    ctx = ENGINE_get_ex_data(DSA_get0_engine(dsa), capi_idx);
+
+    CAPI_trace(ctx, "Called CAPI_dsa_do_sign()\n");
+
+    capi_key = DSA_get_ex_data(dsa, dsa_capi_idx);
+
+    if (!capi_key) {
+        CAPIerr(CAPI_F_CAPI_DSA_DO_SIGN, CAPI_R_CANT_GET_KEY);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    if (dlen != 20) {
+        CAPIerr(CAPI_F_CAPI_DSA_DO_SIGN, CAPI_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    /* Create the hash object */
+    if (!CryptCreateHash(capi_key->hprov, CALG_SHA1, 0, 0, &hash)) {
+        CAPIerr(CAPI_F_CAPI_DSA_DO_SIGN, CAPI_R_CANT_CREATE_HASH_OBJECT);
+        capi_addlasterror();
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    /* Set the hash value to the value passed */
+    if (!CryptSetHashParam(hash, HP_HASHVAL, (unsigned char *)digest, 0)) {
+        CAPIerr(CAPI_F_CAPI_DSA_DO_SIGN, CAPI_R_CANT_SET_HASH_VALUE);
+        capi_addlasterror();
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* Finally sign it */
+    slen = sizeof(csigbuf);
+    if (!CryptSignHash(hash, capi_key->keyspec, NULL, 0, csigbuf, &slen)) {
+        CAPIerr(CAPI_F_CAPI_DSA_DO_SIGN, CAPI_R_ERROR_SIGNING_HASH);
+        capi_addlasterror();
+        goto err;
+    } else {
+        BIGNUM *r = BN_new(), *s = BN_new();
+
+        if (r == NULL || s == NULL
+            || !lend_tobn(r, csigbuf, 20)
+            || !lend_tobn(s, csigbuf + 20, 20)
+            || (ret = DSA_SIG_new()) == NULL) {
+            BN_free(r); /* BN_free checks for BIGNUM * being NULL */
+            BN_free(s);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        DSA_SIG_set0(ret, r, s);
+    }
+
+    /* Now cleanup */
+
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(csigbuf, 40);
+    CryptDestroyHash(hash);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int capi_dsa_free(DSA *dsa)
+{
+    CAPI_KEY *capi_key;
+    capi_key = DSA_get_ex_data(dsa, dsa_capi_idx);
+    capi_free_key(capi_key);
+    DSA_set_ex_data(dsa, dsa_capi_idx, 0);
+    return 1;
+}
+# endif
+
+static void capi_vtrace(CAPI_CTX *ctx, int level, char *format,
+                        va_list argptr)
+{
+    BIO *out;
+
+    if (!ctx || (ctx->debug_level < level) || (!ctx->debug_file))
+        return;
+    out = BIO_new_file(ctx->debug_file, "a+");
+    if (out == NULL) {
+        CAPIerr(CAPI_F_CAPI_VTRACE, CAPI_R_FILE_OPEN_ERROR);
+        return;
+    }
+    BIO_vprintf(out, format, argptr);
+    BIO_free(out);
+}
+
+static void CAPI_trace(CAPI_CTX *ctx, char *format, ...)
+{
+    va_list args;
+    va_start(args, format);
+    capi_vtrace(ctx, CAPI_DBG_TRACE, format, args);
+    va_end(args);
+}
+
+static void capi_addlasterror(void)
+{
+    capi_adderror(GetLastError());
+}
+
+static void capi_adderror(DWORD err)
+{
+    char errstr[10];
+    BIO_snprintf(errstr, 10, "%lX", err);
+    ERR_add_error_data(2, "Error code= 0x", errstr);
+}
+
+static char *wide_to_asc(LPCWSTR wstr)
+{
+    char *str;
+    int len_0, sz;
+
+    if (!wstr)
+        return NULL;
+    len_0 = (int)wcslen(wstr) + 1; /* WideCharToMultiByte expects int */
+    sz = WideCharToMultiByte(CP_ACP, 0, wstr, len_0, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
+    if (!sz) {
+        CAPIerr(CAPI_F_WIDE_TO_ASC, CAPI_R_WIN32_ERROR);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    str = OPENSSL_malloc(sz);
+    if (str == NULL) {
+        CAPIerr(CAPI_F_WIDE_TO_ASC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    if (!WideCharToMultiByte(CP_ACP, 0, wstr, len_0, str, sz, NULL, NULL)) {
+        OPENSSL_free(str);
+        CAPIerr(CAPI_F_WIDE_TO_ASC, CAPI_R_WIN32_ERROR);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    return str;
+}
+
+static int capi_get_provname(CAPI_CTX *ctx, LPSTR *pname, DWORD *ptype,
+                             DWORD idx)
+{
+    DWORD len, err;
+    LPTSTR name;
+    CAPI_trace(ctx, "capi_get_provname, index=%d\n", idx);
+    if (!CryptEnumProviders(idx, NULL, 0, ptype, NULL, &len)) {
+        err = GetLastError();
+        if (err == ERROR_NO_MORE_ITEMS)
+            return 2;
+        CAPIerr(CAPI_F_CAPI_GET_PROVNAME, CAPI_R_CRYPTENUMPROVIDERS_ERROR);
+        capi_adderror(err);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    name = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
+    if (name == NULL) {
+        CAPIerr(CAPI_F_CAPI_GET_PROVNAME, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (!CryptEnumProviders(idx, NULL, 0, ptype, name, &len)) {
+        err = GetLastError();
+        OPENSSL_free(name);
+        if (err == ERROR_NO_MORE_ITEMS)
+            return 2;
+        CAPIerr(CAPI_F_CAPI_GET_PROVNAME, CAPI_R_CRYPTENUMPROVIDERS_ERROR);
+        capi_adderror(err);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (sizeof(TCHAR) != sizeof(char)) {
+        *pname = wide_to_asc((WCHAR *)name);
+        OPENSSL_free(name);
+        if (*pname == NULL)
+            return 0;
+    } else {
+        *pname = (char *)name;
+    }
+    CAPI_trace(ctx, "capi_get_provname, returned name=%s, type=%d\n", *pname,
+               *ptype);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int capi_list_providers(CAPI_CTX *ctx, BIO *out)
+{
+    DWORD idx, ptype;
+    int ret;
+    LPSTR provname = NULL;
+    CAPI_trace(ctx, "capi_list_providers\n");
+    BIO_printf(out, "Available CSPs:\n");
+    for (idx = 0;; idx++) {
+        ret = capi_get_provname(ctx, &provname, &ptype, idx);
+        if (ret == 2)
+            break;
+        if (ret == 0)
+            break;
+        BIO_printf(out, "%lu. %s, type %lu\n", idx, provname, ptype);
+        OPENSSL_free(provname);
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int capi_list_containers(CAPI_CTX *ctx, BIO *out)
+{
+    int ret = 1;
+    HCRYPTPROV hprov;
+    DWORD err, idx, flags, buflen = 0, clen;
+    LPSTR cname;
+    LPWSTR cspname = NULL;
+
+    CAPI_trace(ctx, "Listing containers CSP=%s, type = %d\n", ctx->cspname,
+               ctx->csptype);
+    if (ctx->cspname != NULL) {
+        if ((clen = MultiByteToWideChar(CP_ACP, 0, ctx->cspname, -1,
+                                        NULL, 0))) {
+            cspname = alloca(clen * sizeof(WCHAR));
+            MultiByteToWideChar(CP_ACP, 0, ctx->cspname, -1, (WCHAR *)cspname,
+                                clen);
+        }
+        if (cspname == NULL) {
+            CAPIerr(CAPI_F_CAPI_LIST_CONTAINERS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            capi_addlasterror();
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+    if (!CryptAcquireContextW(&hprov, NULL, cspname, ctx->csptype,
+                              CRYPT_VERIFYCONTEXT)) {
+        CAPIerr(CAPI_F_CAPI_LIST_CONTAINERS,
+                CAPI_R_CRYPTACQUIRECONTEXT_ERROR);
+        capi_addlasterror();
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (!CryptGetProvParam(hprov, PP_ENUMCONTAINERS, NULL, &buflen,
+                           CRYPT_FIRST)) {
+        CAPIerr(CAPI_F_CAPI_LIST_CONTAINERS, CAPI_R_ENUMCONTAINERS_ERROR);
+        capi_addlasterror();
+        CryptReleaseContext(hprov, 0);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    CAPI_trace(ctx, "Got max container len %d\n", buflen);
+    if (buflen == 0)
+        buflen = 1024;
+    cname = OPENSSL_malloc(buflen);
+    if (cname == NULL) {
+        CAPIerr(CAPI_F_CAPI_LIST_CONTAINERS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    for (idx = 0;; idx++) {
+        clen = buflen;
+        cname[0] = 0;
+
+        if (idx == 0)
+            flags = CRYPT_FIRST;
+        else
+            flags = 0;
+        if (!CryptGetProvParam(hprov, PP_ENUMCONTAINERS, (BYTE *)cname,
+                               &clen, flags)) {
+            err = GetLastError();
+            if (err == ERROR_NO_MORE_ITEMS)
+                goto done;
+            CAPIerr(CAPI_F_CAPI_LIST_CONTAINERS, CAPI_R_ENUMCONTAINERS_ERROR);
+            capi_adderror(err);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        CAPI_trace(ctx, "Container name %s, len=%d, index=%d, flags=%d\n",
+                   cname, clen, idx, flags);
+        if (!cname[0] && (clen == buflen)) {
+            CAPI_trace(ctx, "Enumerate bug: using workaround\n");
+            goto done;
+        }
+        BIO_printf(out, "%lu. %s\n", idx, cname);
+    }
+ err:
+
+    ret = 0;
+
+ done:
+    OPENSSL_free(cname);
+    CryptReleaseContext(hprov, 0);
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static CRYPT_KEY_PROV_INFO *capi_get_prov_info(CAPI_CTX *ctx,
+                                               PCCERT_CONTEXT cert)
+{
+    DWORD len;
+    CRYPT_KEY_PROV_INFO *pinfo;
+
+    if (!CertGetCertificateContextProperty(cert, CERT_KEY_PROV_INFO_PROP_ID,
+                                           NULL, &len))
+        return NULL;
+    pinfo = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
+    if (pinfo == NULL) {
+        CAPIerr(CAPI_F_CAPI_GET_PROV_INFO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    if (!CertGetCertificateContextProperty(cert, CERT_KEY_PROV_INFO_PROP_ID,
+                                           pinfo, &len)) {
+        CAPIerr(CAPI_F_CAPI_GET_PROV_INFO,
+                CAPI_R_ERROR_GETTING_KEY_PROVIDER_INFO);
+        capi_addlasterror();
+        OPENSSL_free(pinfo);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    return pinfo;
+}
+
+static void capi_dump_prov_info(CAPI_CTX *ctx, BIO *out,
+                                CRYPT_KEY_PROV_INFO *pinfo)
+{
+    char *provname = NULL, *contname = NULL;
+    if (!pinfo) {
+        BIO_printf(out, "  No Private Key\n");
+        return;
+    }
+    provname = wide_to_asc(pinfo->pwszProvName);
+    contname = wide_to_asc(pinfo->pwszContainerName);
+    if (!provname || !contname)
+        goto err;
+
+    BIO_printf(out, "  Private Key Info:\n");
+    BIO_printf(out, "    Provider Name:  %s, Provider Type %lu\n", provname,
+               pinfo->dwProvType);
+    BIO_printf(out, "    Container Name: %s, Key Type %lu\n", contname,
+               pinfo->dwKeySpec);
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_free(provname);
+    OPENSSL_free(contname);
+}
+
+static char *capi_cert_get_fname(CAPI_CTX *ctx, PCCERT_CONTEXT cert)
+{
+    LPWSTR wfname;
+    DWORD dlen;
+
+    CAPI_trace(ctx, "capi_cert_get_fname\n");
+    if (!CertGetCertificateContextProperty(cert, CERT_FRIENDLY_NAME_PROP_ID,
+                                           NULL, &dlen))
+        return NULL;
+    wfname = OPENSSL_malloc(dlen);
+    if (wfname == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    if (CertGetCertificateContextProperty(cert, CERT_FRIENDLY_NAME_PROP_ID,
+                                          wfname, &dlen)) {
+        char *fname = wide_to_asc(wfname);
+        OPENSSL_free(wfname);
+        return fname;
+    }
+    CAPIerr(CAPI_F_CAPI_CERT_GET_FNAME, CAPI_R_ERROR_GETTING_FRIENDLY_NAME);
+    capi_addlasterror();
+
+    OPENSSL_free(wfname);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+static void capi_dump_cert(CAPI_CTX *ctx, BIO *out, PCCERT_CONTEXT cert)
+{
+    X509 *x;
+    const unsigned char *p;
+    unsigned long flags = ctx->dump_flags;
+    if (flags & CAPI_DMP_FNAME) {
+        char *fname;
+        fname = capi_cert_get_fname(ctx, cert);
+        if (fname) {
+            BIO_printf(out, "  Friendly Name \"%s\"\n", fname);
+            OPENSSL_free(fname);
+        } else {
+            BIO_printf(out, "  <No Friendly Name>\n");
+        }
+    }
+
+    p = cert->pbCertEncoded;
+    x = d2i_X509(NULL, &p, cert->cbCertEncoded);
+    if (!x)
+        BIO_printf(out, "  <Can't parse certificate>\n");
+    if (flags & CAPI_DMP_SUMMARY) {
+        BIO_printf(out, "  Subject: ");
+        X509_NAME_print_ex(out, X509_get_subject_name(x), 0, XN_FLAG_ONELINE);
+        BIO_printf(out, "\n  Issuer: ");
+        X509_NAME_print_ex(out, X509_get_issuer_name(x), 0, XN_FLAG_ONELINE);
+        BIO_printf(out, "\n");
+    }
+    if (flags & CAPI_DMP_FULL)
+        X509_print_ex(out, x, XN_FLAG_ONELINE, 0);
+
+    if (flags & CAPI_DMP_PKEYINFO) {
+        CRYPT_KEY_PROV_INFO *pinfo;
+        pinfo = capi_get_prov_info(ctx, cert);
+        capi_dump_prov_info(ctx, out, pinfo);
+        OPENSSL_free(pinfo);
+    }
+
+    if (flags & CAPI_DMP_PEM)
+        PEM_write_bio_X509(out, x);
+    X509_free(x);
+}
+
+static HCERTSTORE capi_open_store(CAPI_CTX *ctx, char *storename)
+{
+    HCERTSTORE hstore;
+
+    if (!storename)
+        storename = ctx->storename;
+    if (!storename)
+        storename = "MY";
+    CAPI_trace(ctx, "Opening certificate store %s\n", storename);
+
+    hstore = CertOpenStore(CERT_STORE_PROV_SYSTEM_A, 0, 0,
+                           ctx->store_flags, storename);
+    if (!hstore) {
+        CAPIerr(CAPI_F_CAPI_OPEN_STORE, CAPI_R_ERROR_OPENING_STORE);
+        capi_addlasterror();
+    }
+    return hstore;
+}
+
+int capi_list_certs(CAPI_CTX *ctx, BIO *out, char *id)
+{
+    char *storename;
+    int idx;
+    int ret = 1;
+    HCERTSTORE hstore;
+    PCCERT_CONTEXT cert = NULL;
+
+    storename = ctx->storename;
+    if (!storename)
+        storename = "MY";
+    CAPI_trace(ctx, "Listing certs for store %s\n", storename);
+
+    hstore = capi_open_store(ctx, storename);
+    if (!hstore)
+        return 0;
+    if (id) {
+        cert = capi_find_cert(ctx, id, hstore);
+        if (!cert) {
+            ret = 0;
+            goto err;
+        }
+        capi_dump_cert(ctx, out, cert);
+        CertFreeCertificateContext(cert);
+    } else {
+        for (idx = 0;; idx++) {
+            cert = CertEnumCertificatesInStore(hstore, cert);
+            if (!cert)
+                break;
+            BIO_printf(out, "Certificate %d\n", idx);
+            capi_dump_cert(ctx, out, cert);
+        }
+    }
+ err:
+    CertCloseStore(hstore, 0);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static PCCERT_CONTEXT capi_find_cert(CAPI_CTX *ctx, const char *id,
+                                     HCERTSTORE hstore)
+{
+    PCCERT_CONTEXT cert = NULL;
+    char *fname = NULL;
+    int match;
+    switch (ctx->lookup_method) {
+    case CAPI_LU_SUBSTR:
+        return CertFindCertificateInStore(hstore, X509_ASN_ENCODING, 0,
+                                          CERT_FIND_SUBJECT_STR_A, id, NULL);
+    case CAPI_LU_FNAME:
+        for (;;) {
+            cert = CertEnumCertificatesInStore(hstore, cert);
+            if (!cert)
+                return NULL;
+            fname = capi_cert_get_fname(ctx, cert);
+            if (fname) {
+                if (strcmp(fname, id))
+                    match = 0;
+                else
+                    match = 1;
+                OPENSSL_free(fname);
+                if (match)
+                    return cert;
+            }
+        }
+    default:
+        return NULL;
+    }
+}
+
+static CAPI_KEY *capi_get_key(CAPI_CTX *ctx, const WCHAR *contname,
+                              const WCHAR *provname, DWORD ptype,
+                              DWORD keyspec)
+{
+    DWORD dwFlags = 0;
+    CAPI_KEY *key = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*key));
+
+    if (key == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    /* If PROV_RSA_AES supported use it instead */
+    if (ptype == PROV_RSA_FULL && use_aes_csp &&
+        wcscmp(provname, rsa_enh_cspname) == 0) {
+        provname = rsa_aes_cspname;
+        ptype = PROV_RSA_AES;
+    }
+    if (ctx && ctx->debug_level >= CAPI_DBG_TRACE && ctx->debug_file) {
+        /* above 'if' is [complementary] copy from CAPI_trace and serves
+	 * as optimization to minimize [below] malloc-ations */
+        char *_contname = wide_to_asc(contname);
+        char *_provname = wide_to_asc(provname);
+
+        CAPI_trace(ctx, "capi_get_key, contname=%s, provname=%s, type=%d\n",
+                   _contname, _provname, ptype);
+        OPENSSL_free(_provname);
+        OPENSSL_free(_contname);
+    }
+    if (ctx->store_flags & CERT_SYSTEM_STORE_LOCAL_MACHINE)
+        dwFlags = CRYPT_MACHINE_KEYSET;
+    if (!CryptAcquireContextW(&key->hprov, contname, provname, ptype,
+                              dwFlags)) {
+        CAPIerr(CAPI_F_CAPI_GET_KEY, CAPI_R_CRYPTACQUIRECONTEXT_ERROR);
+        capi_addlasterror();
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (!CryptGetUserKey(key->hprov, keyspec, &key->key)) {
+        CAPIerr(CAPI_F_CAPI_GET_KEY, CAPI_R_GETUSERKEY_ERROR);
+        capi_addlasterror();
+        CryptReleaseContext(key->hprov, 0);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    key->keyspec = keyspec;
+    key->pcert = NULL;
+    return key;
+
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_free(key);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+static CAPI_KEY *capi_get_cert_key(CAPI_CTX *ctx, PCCERT_CONTEXT cert)
+{
+    CAPI_KEY *key = NULL;
+    CRYPT_KEY_PROV_INFO *pinfo = NULL;
+
+    pinfo = capi_get_prov_info(ctx, cert);
+
+    if (pinfo != NULL)
+        key = capi_get_key(ctx, pinfo->pwszContainerName, pinfo->pwszProvName,
+                           pinfo->dwProvType, pinfo->dwKeySpec);
+
+    OPENSSL_free(pinfo);
+    return key;
+}
+
+CAPI_KEY *capi_find_key(CAPI_CTX *ctx, const char *id)
+{
+    PCCERT_CONTEXT cert;
+    HCERTSTORE hstore;
+    CAPI_KEY *key = NULL;
+
+    switch (ctx->lookup_method) {
+    case CAPI_LU_SUBSTR:
+    case CAPI_LU_FNAME:
+        hstore = capi_open_store(ctx, NULL);
+        if (!hstore)
+            return NULL;
+        cert = capi_find_cert(ctx, id, hstore);
+        if (cert) {
+            key = capi_get_cert_key(ctx, cert);
+            CertFreeCertificateContext(cert);
+        }
+        CertCloseStore(hstore, 0);
+        break;
+
+    case CAPI_LU_CONTNAME:
+        {
+            WCHAR *contname, *provname;
+            DWORD len;
+
+            if ((len = MultiByteToWideChar(CP_ACP, 0, id, -1, NULL, 0)) &&
+                (contname = alloca(len * sizeof(WCHAR)),
+                 MultiByteToWideChar(CP_ACP, 0, id, -1, contname, len)) &&
+                (len = MultiByteToWideChar(CP_ACP, 0, ctx->cspname, -1,
+                                           NULL, 0)) &&
+                (provname = alloca(len * sizeof(WCHAR)),
+                 MultiByteToWideChar(CP_ACP, 0, ctx->cspname, -1,
+                                     provname, len)))
+                key = capi_get_key(ctx, contname, provname,
+                                   ctx->csptype, ctx->keytype);
+        }
+        break;
+    }
+
+    return key;
+}
+
+void capi_free_key(CAPI_KEY *key)
+{
+    if (!key)
+        return;
+    CryptDestroyKey(key->key);
+    CryptReleaseContext(key->hprov, 0);
+    if (key->pcert)
+        CertFreeCertificateContext(key->pcert);
+    OPENSSL_free(key);
+}
+
+/* Initialize a CAPI_CTX structure */
+
+static CAPI_CTX *capi_ctx_new(void)
+{
+    CAPI_CTX *ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx));
+
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+        CAPIerr(CAPI_F_CAPI_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    ctx->csptype = PROV_RSA_FULL;
+    ctx->dump_flags = CAPI_DMP_SUMMARY | CAPI_DMP_FNAME;
+    ctx->keytype = AT_KEYEXCHANGE;
+    ctx->store_flags = CERT_STORE_OPEN_EXISTING_FLAG |
+        CERT_STORE_READONLY_FLAG | CERT_SYSTEM_STORE_CURRENT_USER;
+    ctx->lookup_method = CAPI_LU_SUBSTR;
+    ctx->client_cert_select = cert_select_simple;
+    return ctx;
+}
+
+static void capi_ctx_free(CAPI_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    CAPI_trace(ctx, "Calling capi_ctx_free with %lx\n", ctx);
+    if (!ctx)
+        return;
+    OPENSSL_free(ctx->cspname);
+    OPENSSL_free(ctx->debug_file);
+    OPENSSL_free(ctx->storename);
+    OPENSSL_free(ctx->ssl_client_store);
+    OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+}
+
+static int capi_ctx_set_provname(CAPI_CTX *ctx, LPSTR pname, DWORD type,
+                                 int check)
+{
+    LPSTR tmpcspname;
+
+    CAPI_trace(ctx, "capi_ctx_set_provname, name=%s, type=%d\n", pname, type);
+    if (check) {
+        HCRYPTPROV hprov;
+        LPWSTR name = NULL;
+        DWORD len;
+
+        if ((len = MultiByteToWideChar(CP_ACP, 0, pname, -1, NULL, 0))) {
+            name = alloca(len * sizeof(WCHAR));
+            MultiByteToWideChar(CP_ACP, 0, pname, -1, (WCHAR *)name, len);
+        }
+        if (name == NULL || !CryptAcquireContextW(&hprov, NULL, name, type,
+                                                  CRYPT_VERIFYCONTEXT)) {
+            CAPIerr(CAPI_F_CAPI_CTX_SET_PROVNAME,
+                    CAPI_R_CRYPTACQUIRECONTEXT_ERROR);
+            capi_addlasterror();
+            return 0;
+        }
+        CryptReleaseContext(hprov, 0);
+    }
+    tmpcspname = OPENSSL_strdup(pname);
+    if (tmpcspname == NULL) {
+        CAPIerr(CAPI_F_CAPI_CTX_SET_PROVNAME, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    OPENSSL_free(ctx->cspname);
+    ctx->cspname = tmpcspname;
+    ctx->csptype = type;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int capi_ctx_set_provname_idx(CAPI_CTX *ctx, int idx)
+{
+    LPSTR pname;
+    DWORD type;
+    int res;
+    if (capi_get_provname(ctx, &pname, &type, idx) != 1)
+        return 0;
+    res = capi_ctx_set_provname(ctx, pname, type, 0);
+    OPENSSL_free(pname);
+    return res;
+}
+
+static int cert_issuer_match(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn, X509 *x)
+{
+    int i;
+    X509_NAME *nm;
+    /* Special case: empty list: match anything */
+    if (sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn) <= 0)
+        return 1;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn); i++) {
+        nm = sk_X509_NAME_value(ca_dn, i);
+        if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_get_issuer_name(x)))
+            return 1;
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int capi_load_ssl_client_cert(ENGINE *e, SSL *ssl,
+                                     STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn, X509 **pcert,
+                                     EVP_PKEY **pkey, STACK_OF(X509) **pother,
+                                     UI_METHOD *ui_method,
+                                     void *callback_data)
+{
+    STACK_OF(X509) *certs = NULL;
+    X509 *x;
+    char *storename;
+    const unsigned char *p;
+    int i, client_cert_idx;
+    HCERTSTORE hstore;
+    PCCERT_CONTEXT cert = NULL, excert = NULL;
+    CAPI_CTX *ctx;
+    CAPI_KEY *key;
+    ctx = ENGINE_get_ex_data(e, capi_idx);
+
+    *pcert = NULL;
+    *pkey = NULL;
+
+    storename = ctx->ssl_client_store;
+    if (!storename)
+        storename = "MY";
+
+    hstore = capi_open_store(ctx, storename);
+    if (!hstore)
+        return 0;
+    /* Enumerate all certificates collect any matches */
+    for (i = 0;; i++) {
+        cert = CertEnumCertificatesInStore(hstore, cert);
+        if (!cert)
+            break;
+        p = cert->pbCertEncoded;
+        x = d2i_X509(NULL, &p, cert->cbCertEncoded);
+        if (!x) {
+            CAPI_trace(ctx, "Can't Parse Certificate %d\n", i);
+            continue;
+        }
+        if (cert_issuer_match(ca_dn, x)
+            && X509_check_purpose(x, X509_PURPOSE_SSL_CLIENT, 0)) {
+            key = capi_get_cert_key(ctx, cert);
+            if (!key) {
+                X509_free(x);
+                continue;
+            }
+            /*
+             * Match found: attach extra data to it so we can retrieve the
+             * key later.
+             */
+            excert = CertDuplicateCertificateContext(cert);
+            key->pcert = excert;
+            X509_set_ex_data(x, cert_capi_idx, key);
+
+            if (!certs)
+                certs = sk_X509_new_null();
+
+            sk_X509_push(certs, x);
+        } else {
+            X509_free(x);
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (cert)
+        CertFreeCertificateContext(cert);
+    if (hstore)
+        CertCloseStore(hstore, 0);
+
+    if (!certs)
+        return 0;
+
+    /* Select the appropriate certificate */
+
+    client_cert_idx = ctx->client_cert_select(e, ssl, certs);
+
+    /* Set the selected certificate and free the rest */
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
+        x = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
+        if (i == client_cert_idx)
+            *pcert = x;
+        else {
+            key = X509_get_ex_data(x, cert_capi_idx);
+            capi_free_key(key);
+            X509_free(x);
+        }
+    }
+
+    sk_X509_free(certs);
+
+    if (!*pcert)
+        return 0;
+
+    /* Setup key for selected certificate */
+
+    key = X509_get_ex_data(*pcert, cert_capi_idx);
+    *pkey = capi_get_pkey(e, key);
+    X509_set_ex_data(*pcert, cert_capi_idx, NULL);
+
+    return 1;
+
+}
+
+/* Simple client cert selection function: always select first */
+
+static int cert_select_simple(ENGINE *e, SSL *ssl, STACK_OF(X509) *certs)
+{
+    return 0;
+}
+
+# ifdef OPENSSL_CAPIENG_DIALOG
+
+/*
+ * More complex cert selection function, using standard function
+ * CryptUIDlgSelectCertificateFromStore() to produce a dialog box.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Definitions which are in cryptuiapi.h but this is not present in older
+ * versions of headers.
+ */
+
+#  ifndef CRYPTUI_SELECT_LOCATION_COLUMN
+#   define CRYPTUI_SELECT_LOCATION_COLUMN                   0x000000010
+#   define CRYPTUI_SELECT_INTENDEDUSE_COLUMN                0x000000004
+#  endif
+
+#  define dlg_title L"OpenSSL Application SSL Client Certificate Selection"
+#  define dlg_prompt L"Select a certificate to use for authentication"
+#  define dlg_columns      CRYPTUI_SELECT_LOCATION_COLUMN \
+                        |CRYPTUI_SELECT_INTENDEDUSE_COLUMN
+
+static int cert_select_dialog(ENGINE *e, SSL *ssl, STACK_OF(X509) *certs)
+{
+    X509 *x;
+    HCERTSTORE dstore;
+    PCCERT_CONTEXT cert;
+    CAPI_CTX *ctx;
+    CAPI_KEY *key;
+    HWND hwnd;
+    int i, idx = -1;
+    if (sk_X509_num(certs) == 1)
+        return 0;
+    ctx = ENGINE_get_ex_data(e, capi_idx);
+    /* Create an in memory store of certificates */
+    dstore = CertOpenStore(CERT_STORE_PROV_MEMORY, 0, 0,
+                           CERT_STORE_CREATE_NEW_FLAG, NULL);
+    if (!dstore) {
+        CAPIerr(CAPI_F_CERT_SELECT_DIALOG, CAPI_R_ERROR_CREATING_STORE);
+        capi_addlasterror();
+        goto err;
+    }
+    /* Add all certificates to store */
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
+        x = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
+        key = X509_get_ex_data(x, cert_capi_idx);
+
+        if (!CertAddCertificateContextToStore(dstore, key->pcert,
+                                              CERT_STORE_ADD_NEW, NULL)) {
+            CAPIerr(CAPI_F_CERT_SELECT_DIALOG, CAPI_R_ERROR_ADDING_CERT);
+            capi_addlasterror();
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+    }
+    hwnd = GetForegroundWindow();
+    if (!hwnd)
+        hwnd = GetActiveWindow();
+    if (!hwnd && ctx->getconswindow)
+        hwnd = ctx->getconswindow();
+    /* Call dialog to select one */
+    cert = ctx->certselectdlg(dstore, hwnd, dlg_title, dlg_prompt,
+                              dlg_columns, 0, NULL);
+
+    /* Find matching cert from list */
+    if (cert) {
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
+            x = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
+            key = X509_get_ex_data(x, cert_capi_idx);
+            if (CertCompareCertificate
+                (X509_ASN_ENCODING | PKCS_7_ASN_ENCODING, cert->pCertInfo,
+                 key->pcert->pCertInfo)) {
+                idx = i;
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+ err:
+    if (dstore)
+        CertCloseStore(dstore, 0);
+    return idx;
+
+}
+# endif
+
+#else                           /* !__COMPILE_CAPIENG */
+# include <openssl/engine.h>
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE
+OPENSSL_EXPORT
+    int bind_engine(ENGINE *e, const char *id, const dynamic_fns *fns);
+OPENSSL_EXPORT
+    int bind_engine(ENGINE *e, const char *id, const dynamic_fns *fns)
+{
+    return 0;
+}
+
+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_CHECK_FN()
+# else
+void engine_load_capi_int(void);
+void engine_load_capi_int(void)
+{
+}
+# endif
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/e_capi.ec b/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/e_capi.ec
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d2ad668
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/e_capi.ec
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+L       CAPI    e_capi_err.h e_capi_err.c
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/e_capi_err.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/e_capi_err.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..64e963a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/e_capi_err.c
@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * NOTE: this file was auto generated by the mkerr.pl script: any changes
+ * made to it will be overwritten when the script next updates this file,
+ * only reason strings will be preserved.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include "e_capi_err.h"
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+
+# define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(0,func,0)
+# define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(0,0,reason)
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA CAPI_str_functs[] = {
+    {ERR_FUNC(CAPI_F_CAPI_CERT_GET_FNAME), "CAPI_CERT_GET_FNAME"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CAPI_F_CAPI_CTRL), "CAPI_CTRL"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CAPI_F_CAPI_CTX_NEW), "CAPI_CTX_NEW"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CAPI_F_CAPI_CTX_SET_PROVNAME), "CAPI_CTX_SET_PROVNAME"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CAPI_F_CAPI_DSA_DO_SIGN), "CAPI_DSA_DO_SIGN"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CAPI_F_CAPI_GET_KEY), "CAPI_GET_KEY"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CAPI_F_CAPI_GET_PKEY), "CAPI_GET_PKEY"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CAPI_F_CAPI_GET_PROVNAME), "CAPI_GET_PROVNAME"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CAPI_F_CAPI_GET_PROV_INFO), "CAPI_GET_PROV_INFO"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CAPI_F_CAPI_INIT), "CAPI_INIT"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CAPI_F_CAPI_LIST_CONTAINERS), "CAPI_LIST_CONTAINERS"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CAPI_F_CAPI_LOAD_PRIVKEY), "CAPI_LOAD_PRIVKEY"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CAPI_F_CAPI_OPEN_STORE), "CAPI_OPEN_STORE"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CAPI_F_CAPI_RSA_PRIV_DEC), "CAPI_RSA_PRIV_DEC"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CAPI_F_CAPI_RSA_PRIV_ENC), "CAPI_RSA_PRIV_ENC"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CAPI_F_CAPI_RSA_SIGN), "CAPI_RSA_SIGN"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CAPI_F_CAPI_VTRACE), "CAPI_VTRACE"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CAPI_F_CERT_SELECT_DIALOG), "CERT_SELECT_DIALOG"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CAPI_F_CLIENT_CERT_SELECT), "CLIENT_CERT_SELECT"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CAPI_F_WIDE_TO_ASC), "WIDE_TO_ASC"},
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA CAPI_str_reasons[] = {
+    {ERR_REASON(CAPI_R_CANT_CREATE_HASH_OBJECT), "cant create hash object"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CAPI_R_CANT_FIND_CAPI_CONTEXT), "cant find capi context"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CAPI_R_CANT_GET_KEY), "cant get key"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CAPI_R_CANT_SET_HASH_VALUE), "cant set hash value"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CAPI_R_CRYPTACQUIRECONTEXT_ERROR),
+     "cryptacquirecontext error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CAPI_R_CRYPTENUMPROVIDERS_ERROR), "cryptenumproviders error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CAPI_R_DECRYPT_ERROR), "decrypt error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CAPI_R_ENGINE_NOT_INITIALIZED), "engine not initialized"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CAPI_R_ENUMCONTAINERS_ERROR), "enumcontainers error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CAPI_R_ERROR_ADDING_CERT), "error adding cert"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CAPI_R_ERROR_CREATING_STORE), "error creating store"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CAPI_R_ERROR_GETTING_FRIENDLY_NAME),
+     "error getting friendly name"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CAPI_R_ERROR_GETTING_KEY_PROVIDER_INFO),
+     "error getting key provider info"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CAPI_R_ERROR_OPENING_STORE), "error opening store"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CAPI_R_ERROR_SIGNING_HASH), "error signing hash"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CAPI_R_FILE_OPEN_ERROR), "file open error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CAPI_R_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED), "function not supported"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CAPI_R_GETUSERKEY_ERROR), "getuserkey error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CAPI_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH), "invalid digest length"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CAPI_R_INVALID_DSA_PUBLIC_KEY_BLOB_MAGIC_NUMBER),
+     "invalid dsa public key blob magic number"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CAPI_R_INVALID_LOOKUP_METHOD), "invalid lookup method"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CAPI_R_INVALID_PUBLIC_KEY_BLOB), "invalid public key blob"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CAPI_R_INVALID_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY_BLOB_MAGIC_NUMBER),
+     "invalid rsa public key blob magic number"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CAPI_R_PUBKEY_EXPORT_ERROR), "pubkey export error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CAPI_R_PUBKEY_EXPORT_LENGTH_ERROR),
+     "pubkey export length error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CAPI_R_UNKNOWN_COMMAND), "unknown command"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CAPI_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM_NID),
+     "unsupported algorithm nid"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CAPI_R_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING), "unsupported padding"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CAPI_R_UNSUPPORTED_PUBLIC_KEY_ALGORITHM),
+     "unsupported public key algorithm"},
+    {ERR_REASON(CAPI_R_WIN32_ERROR), "win32 error"},
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CAPI_LIB_NAME
+static ERR_STRING_DATA CAPI_lib_name[] = {
+    {0, CAPI_LIB_NAME},
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+#endif
+
+static int CAPI_lib_error_code = 0;
+static int CAPI_error_init = 1;
+
+static void ERR_load_CAPI_strings(void)
+{
+    if (CAPI_lib_error_code == 0)
+        CAPI_lib_error_code = ERR_get_next_error_library();
+
+    if (CAPI_error_init) {
+        CAPI_error_init = 0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+        ERR_load_strings(CAPI_lib_error_code, CAPI_str_functs);
+        ERR_load_strings(CAPI_lib_error_code, CAPI_str_reasons);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CAPI_LIB_NAME
+        CAPI_lib_name->error = ERR_PACK(CAPI_lib_error_code, 0, 0);
+        ERR_load_strings(0, CAPI_lib_name);
+#endif
+    }
+}
+
+static void ERR_unload_CAPI_strings(void)
+{
+    if (CAPI_error_init == 0) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+        ERR_unload_strings(CAPI_lib_error_code, CAPI_str_functs);
+        ERR_unload_strings(CAPI_lib_error_code, CAPI_str_reasons);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CAPI_LIB_NAME
+        ERR_unload_strings(0, CAPI_lib_name);
+#endif
+        CAPI_error_init = 1;
+    }
+}
+
+static void ERR_CAPI_error(int function, int reason, char *file, int line)
+{
+    if (CAPI_lib_error_code == 0)
+        CAPI_lib_error_code = ERR_get_next_error_library();
+    ERR_PUT_error(CAPI_lib_error_code, function, reason, file, line);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/e_capi_err.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/e_capi_err.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bbaffad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/e_capi_err.h
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * NOTE: this file was auto generated by the mkerr.pl script: any changes
+ * made to it will be overwritten when the script next updates this file,
+ * only reason strings will be preserved.
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_CAPI_ERR_H
+# define HEADER_CAPI_ERR_H
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+static void ERR_load_CAPI_strings(void);
+static void ERR_unload_CAPI_strings(void);
+static void ERR_CAPI_error(int function, int reason, char *file, int line);
+# define CAPIerr(f,r) ERR_CAPI_error((f),(r),OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE)
+
+/* Error codes for the CAPI functions. */
+
+/* Function codes. */
+# define CAPI_F_CAPI_CERT_GET_FNAME                       99
+# define CAPI_F_CAPI_CTRL                                 100
+# define CAPI_F_CAPI_CTX_NEW                              101
+# define CAPI_F_CAPI_CTX_SET_PROVNAME                     102
+# define CAPI_F_CAPI_DSA_DO_SIGN                          114
+# define CAPI_F_CAPI_GET_KEY                              103
+# define CAPI_F_CAPI_GET_PKEY                             115
+# define CAPI_F_CAPI_GET_PROVNAME                         104
+# define CAPI_F_CAPI_GET_PROV_INFO                        105
+# define CAPI_F_CAPI_INIT                                 106
+# define CAPI_F_CAPI_LIST_CONTAINERS                      107
+# define CAPI_F_CAPI_LOAD_PRIVKEY                         108
+# define CAPI_F_CAPI_OPEN_STORE                           109
+# define CAPI_F_CAPI_RSA_PRIV_DEC                         110
+# define CAPI_F_CAPI_RSA_PRIV_ENC                         111
+# define CAPI_F_CAPI_RSA_SIGN                             112
+# define CAPI_F_CAPI_VTRACE                               118
+# define CAPI_F_CERT_SELECT_DIALOG                        117
+# define CAPI_F_CLIENT_CERT_SELECT                        116
+# define CAPI_F_WIDE_TO_ASC                               113
+
+/* Reason codes. */
+# define CAPI_R_CANT_CREATE_HASH_OBJECT                   99
+# define CAPI_R_CANT_FIND_CAPI_CONTEXT                    100
+# define CAPI_R_CANT_GET_KEY                              101
+# define CAPI_R_CANT_SET_HASH_VALUE                       102
+# define CAPI_R_CRYPTACQUIRECONTEXT_ERROR                 103
+# define CAPI_R_CRYPTENUMPROVIDERS_ERROR                  104
+# define CAPI_R_DECRYPT_ERROR                             105
+# define CAPI_R_ENGINE_NOT_INITIALIZED                    106
+# define CAPI_R_ENUMCONTAINERS_ERROR                      107
+# define CAPI_R_ERROR_ADDING_CERT                         125
+# define CAPI_R_ERROR_CREATING_STORE                      126
+# define CAPI_R_ERROR_GETTING_FRIENDLY_NAME               108
+# define CAPI_R_ERROR_GETTING_KEY_PROVIDER_INFO           109
+# define CAPI_R_ERROR_OPENING_STORE                       110
+# define CAPI_R_ERROR_SIGNING_HASH                        111
+# define CAPI_R_FILE_OPEN_ERROR                           128
+# define CAPI_R_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED                    112
+# define CAPI_R_GETUSERKEY_ERROR                          113
+# define CAPI_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH                     124
+# define CAPI_R_INVALID_DSA_PUBLIC_KEY_BLOB_MAGIC_NUMBER  122
+# define CAPI_R_INVALID_LOOKUP_METHOD                     114
+# define CAPI_R_INVALID_PUBLIC_KEY_BLOB                   115
+# define CAPI_R_INVALID_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY_BLOB_MAGIC_NUMBER  123
+# define CAPI_R_PUBKEY_EXPORT_ERROR                       116
+# define CAPI_R_PUBKEY_EXPORT_LENGTH_ERROR                117
+# define CAPI_R_UNKNOWN_COMMAND                           118
+# define CAPI_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM_NID                 119
+# define CAPI_R_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING                       120
+# define CAPI_R_UNSUPPORTED_PUBLIC_KEY_ALGORITHM          121
+# define CAPI_R_WIN32_ERROR                               127
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/e_chil.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/e_chil.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8d81b46
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/e_chil.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1285 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include "internal/dso.h"
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#include <openssl/ui.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+# include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+# include <openssl/dh.h>
+#endif
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_CHIL
+
+/*-
+ * Attribution notice: nCipher have said several times that it's OK for
+ * us to implement a general interface to their boxes, and recently declared
+ * their HWCryptoHook to be public, and therefore available for us to use.
+ * Thanks, nCipher.
+ *
+ * The hwcryptohook.h included here is from May 2000.
+ * [Richard Levitte]
+ */
+#  ifdef FLAT_INC
+#   include "hwcryptohook.h"
+#  else
+#   include "vendor_defns/hwcryptohook.h"
+#  endif
+
+#  define HWCRHK_LIB_NAME "CHIL engine"
+#  include "e_chil_err.c"
+
+static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *chil_lock;
+
+static int hwcrhk_destroy(ENGINE *e);
+static int hwcrhk_init(ENGINE *e);
+static int hwcrhk_finish(ENGINE *e);
+static int hwcrhk_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f) (void));
+
+/* Functions to handle mutexes */
+static int hwcrhk_mutex_init(HWCryptoHook_Mutex *,
+                             HWCryptoHook_CallerContext *);
+static int hwcrhk_mutex_lock(HWCryptoHook_Mutex *);
+static void hwcrhk_mutex_unlock(HWCryptoHook_Mutex *);
+static void hwcrhk_mutex_destroy(HWCryptoHook_Mutex *);
+
+/* BIGNUM stuff */
+static int hwcrhk_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
+                          const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+#  ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+/* RSA stuff */
+static int hwcrhk_rsa_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa,
+                              BN_CTX *ctx);
+/* This function is aliased to mod_exp (with the mont stuff dropped). */
+static int hwcrhk_mod_exp_mont(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
+                               const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx,
+                               BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx);
+static int hwcrhk_rsa_finish(RSA *rsa);
+#  endif
+
+#  ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+/* DH stuff */
+/* This function is alised to mod_exp (with the DH and mont dropped). */
+static int hwcrhk_mod_exp_dh(const DH *dh, BIGNUM *r,
+                             const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
+                             const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx,
+                             BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx);
+#  endif
+
+/* RAND stuff */
+static int hwcrhk_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
+static int hwcrhk_rand_status(void);
+
+/* KM stuff */
+static EVP_PKEY *hwcrhk_load_privkey(ENGINE *eng, const char *key_id,
+                                     UI_METHOD *ui_method,
+                                     void *callback_data);
+static EVP_PKEY *hwcrhk_load_pubkey(ENGINE *eng, const char *key_id,
+                                    UI_METHOD *ui_method,
+                                    void *callback_data);
+
+/* Interaction stuff */
+static int hwcrhk_insert_card(const char *prompt_info,
+                              const char *wrong_info,
+                              HWCryptoHook_PassphraseContext * ppctx,
+                              HWCryptoHook_CallerContext * cactx);
+static int hwcrhk_get_pass(const char *prompt_info,
+                           int *len_io, char *buf,
+                           HWCryptoHook_PassphraseContext * ppctx,
+                           HWCryptoHook_CallerContext * cactx);
+static void hwcrhk_log_message(void *logstr, const char *message);
+
+/* The definitions for control commands specific to this engine */
+#  define HWCRHK_CMD_SO_PATH              ENGINE_CMD_BASE
+#  define HWCRHK_CMD_FORK_CHECK           (ENGINE_CMD_BASE + 1)
+#  define HWCRHK_CMD_THREAD_LOCKING       (ENGINE_CMD_BASE + 2)
+#  define HWCRHK_CMD_SET_USER_INTERFACE   (ENGINE_CMD_BASE + 3)
+#  define HWCRHK_CMD_SET_CALLBACK_DATA    (ENGINE_CMD_BASE + 4)
+static const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN hwcrhk_cmd_defns[] = {
+    {HWCRHK_CMD_SO_PATH,
+     "SO_PATH",
+     "Specifies the path to the 'hwcrhk' shared library",
+     ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING},
+    {HWCRHK_CMD_FORK_CHECK,
+     "FORK_CHECK",
+     "Turns fork() checking on (non-zero) or off (zero)",
+     ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NUMERIC},
+    {HWCRHK_CMD_THREAD_LOCKING,
+     "THREAD_LOCKING",
+     "Turns thread-safe locking on (zero) or off (non-zero)",
+     ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NUMERIC},
+    {HWCRHK_CMD_SET_USER_INTERFACE,
+     "SET_USER_INTERFACE",
+     "Set the global user interface (internal)",
+     ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_INTERNAL},
+    {HWCRHK_CMD_SET_CALLBACK_DATA,
+     "SET_CALLBACK_DATA",
+     "Set the global user interface extra data (internal)",
+     ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_INTERNAL},
+    {0, NULL, NULL, 0}
+};
+
+#  ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+/* Our internal RSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */
+static RSA_METHOD hwcrhk_rsa = {
+    "CHIL RSA method",
+    NULL,
+    NULL,
+    NULL,
+    NULL,
+    hwcrhk_rsa_mod_exp,
+    hwcrhk_mod_exp_mont,
+    NULL,
+    hwcrhk_rsa_finish,
+    0,
+    NULL,
+    NULL,
+    NULL,
+    NULL
+};
+#  endif
+
+#  ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+/* Our internal DH_METHOD that we provide pointers to */
+static DH_METHOD hwcrhk_dh = {
+    "CHIL DH method",
+    NULL,
+    NULL,
+    hwcrhk_mod_exp_dh,
+    NULL,
+    NULL,
+    0,
+    NULL,
+    NULL
+};
+#  endif
+
+static RAND_METHOD hwcrhk_rand = {
+    /* "CHIL RAND method", */
+    NULL,
+    hwcrhk_rand_bytes,
+    NULL,
+    NULL,
+    hwcrhk_rand_bytes,
+    hwcrhk_rand_status,
+};
+
+/* Constants used when creating the ENGINE */
+static const char *engine_hwcrhk_id = "chil";
+static const char *engine_hwcrhk_name = "CHIL hardware engine support";
+#  ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE
+/* Compatibility hack, the dynamic library uses this form in the path */
+static const char *engine_hwcrhk_id_alt = "ncipher";
+#  endif
+
+/* Internal stuff for HWCryptoHook */
+
+/* Some structures needed for proper use of thread locks */
+/*
+ * hwcryptohook.h has some typedefs that turn struct HWCryptoHook_MutexValue
+ * into HWCryptoHook_Mutex
+ */
+struct HWCryptoHook_MutexValue {
+    CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock;
+};
+
+/*
+ * hwcryptohook.h has some typedefs that turn struct
+ * HWCryptoHook_PassphraseContextValue into HWCryptoHook_PassphraseContext
+ */
+struct HWCryptoHook_PassphraseContextValue {
+    UI_METHOD *ui_method;
+    void *callback_data;
+};
+
+/*
+ * hwcryptohook.h has some typedefs that turn struct
+ * HWCryptoHook_CallerContextValue into HWCryptoHook_CallerContext
+ */
+struct HWCryptoHook_CallerContextValue {
+    pem_password_cb *password_callback; /* Deprecated! Only present for
+                                         * backward compatibility! */
+    UI_METHOD *ui_method;
+    void *callback_data;
+};
+
+/*
+ * The MPI structure in HWCryptoHook is pretty compatible with OpenSSL
+ * BIGNUM's, so lets define a couple of conversion macros
+ */
+#  define BN2MPI(mp, bn) \
+    {mp.size = bn->top * sizeof(BN_ULONG); mp.buf = (unsigned char *)bn->d;}
+#  define MPI2BN(bn, mp) \
+    {mp.size = bn->dmax * sizeof(BN_ULONG); mp.buf = (unsigned char *)bn->d;}
+
+static BIO *logstream = NULL;
+static int disable_mutex_callbacks = 0;
+
+/*
+ * One might wonder why these are needed, since one can pass down at least a
+ * UI_METHOD and a pointer to callback data to the key-loading functions. The
+ * thing is that the ModExp and RSAImmed functions can load keys as well, if
+ * the data they get is in a special, nCipher-defined format (hint: if you
+ * look at the private exponent of the RSA data as a string, you'll see this
+ * string: "nCipher KM tool key id", followed by some bytes, followed a key
+ * identity string, followed by more bytes.  This happens when you use
+ * "embed" keys instead of "hwcrhk" keys).  Unfortunately, those functions do
+ * not take any passphrase or caller context, and our functions can't really
+ * take any callback data either.  Still, the "insert_card" and
+ * "get_passphrase" callbacks may be called down the line, and will need to
+ * know what user interface callbacks to call, and having callback data from
+ * the application may be a nice thing as well, so we need to keep track of
+ * that globally.
+ */
+static HWCryptoHook_CallerContext password_context = { NULL, NULL, NULL };
+
+/* Stuff to pass to the HWCryptoHook library */
+static HWCryptoHook_InitInfo hwcrhk_globals = {
+    HWCryptoHook_InitFlags_SimpleForkCheck, /* Flags */
+    &logstream,                 /* logstream */
+    sizeof(BN_ULONG),           /* limbsize */
+    0,                          /* mslimb first: false for BNs */
+    -1,                         /* msbyte first: use native */
+    0,                          /* Max mutexes, 0 = no small limit */
+    0,                          /* Max simultaneous, 0 = default */
+
+    /*
+     * The next few are mutex stuff: we write wrapper functions around the OS
+     * mutex functions.  We initialise them to 0 here, and change that to
+     * actual function pointers in hwcrhk_init() if dynamic locks are
+     * supported (that is, if the application programmer has made sure of
+     * setting up callbacks bafore starting this engine) *and* if
+     * disable_mutex_callbacks hasn't been set by a call to
+     * ENGINE_ctrl(ENGINE_CTRL_CHIL_NO_LOCKING).
+     */
+    sizeof(HWCryptoHook_Mutex),
+    0,
+    0,
+    0,
+    0,
+
+    /*
+     * The next few are condvar stuff: we write wrapper functions round the
+     * OS functions.  Currently not implemented and not and absolute
+     * necessity even in threaded programs, therefore 0'ed.  Will hopefully
+     * be implemented some day, since it enhances the efficiency of
+     * HWCryptoHook.
+     */
+    0,                          /* sizeof(HWCryptoHook_CondVar), */
+    0,                          /* hwcrhk_cv_init, */
+    0,                          /* hwcrhk_cv_wait, */
+    0,                          /* hwcrhk_cv_signal, */
+    0,                          /* hwcrhk_cv_broadcast, */
+    0,                          /* hwcrhk_cv_destroy, */
+
+    hwcrhk_get_pass,            /* pass phrase */
+    hwcrhk_insert_card,         /* insert a card */
+    hwcrhk_log_message          /* Log message */
+};
+
+/* Now, to our own code */
+
+/*
+ * This internal function is used by ENGINE_chil() and possibly by the
+ * "dynamic" ENGINE support too
+ */
+static int bind_helper(ENGINE *e)
+{
+#  ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+    const RSA_METHOD *meth1;
+#  endif
+#  ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+    const DH_METHOD *meth2;
+#  endif
+
+    chil_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
+    if (chil_lock == NULL) {
+        HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_BIND_HELPER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (!ENGINE_set_id(e, engine_hwcrhk_id) ||
+        !ENGINE_set_name(e, engine_hwcrhk_name) ||
+#  ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+        !ENGINE_set_RSA(e, &hwcrhk_rsa) ||
+#  endif
+#  ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+        !ENGINE_set_DH(e, &hwcrhk_dh) ||
+#  endif
+        !ENGINE_set_RAND(e, &hwcrhk_rand) ||
+        !ENGINE_set_destroy_function(e, hwcrhk_destroy) ||
+        !ENGINE_set_init_function(e, hwcrhk_init) ||
+        !ENGINE_set_finish_function(e, hwcrhk_finish) ||
+        !ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(e, hwcrhk_ctrl) ||
+        !ENGINE_set_load_privkey_function(e, hwcrhk_load_privkey) ||
+        !ENGINE_set_load_pubkey_function(e, hwcrhk_load_pubkey) ||
+        !ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(e, hwcrhk_cmd_defns))
+        return 0;
+
+#  ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+    /*
+     * We know that the "PKCS1_OpenSSL()" functions hook properly to the
+     * cswift-specific mod_exp and mod_exp_crt so we use those functions. NB:
+     * We don't use ENGINE_openssl() or anything "more generic" because
+     * something like the RSAref code may not hook properly, and if you own
+     * one of these cards then you have the right to do RSA operations on it
+     * anyway!
+     */
+    meth1 = RSA_PKCS1_OpenSSL();
+    hwcrhk_rsa.rsa_pub_enc = meth1->rsa_pub_enc;
+    hwcrhk_rsa.rsa_pub_dec = meth1->rsa_pub_dec;
+    hwcrhk_rsa.rsa_priv_enc = meth1->rsa_priv_enc;
+    hwcrhk_rsa.rsa_priv_dec = meth1->rsa_priv_dec;
+#  endif
+
+#  ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+    /* Much the same for Diffie-Hellman */
+    meth2 = DH_OpenSSL();
+    hwcrhk_dh.generate_key = meth2->generate_key;
+    hwcrhk_dh.compute_key = meth2->compute_key;
+#  endif
+
+    /* Ensure the hwcrhk error handling is set up */
+    ERR_load_HWCRHK_strings();
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+#  ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE
+static ENGINE *engine_chil(void)
+{
+    ENGINE *ret = ENGINE_new();
+    if (ret == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    if (!bind_helper(ret)) {
+        ENGINE_free(ret);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+void ENGINE_load_chil(void)
+{
+    /* Copied from eng_[openssl|dyn].c */
+    ENGINE *toadd = engine_chil();
+    if (!toadd)
+        return;
+    ENGINE_add(toadd);
+    ENGINE_free(toadd);
+    ERR_clear_error();
+}
+#  endif
+
+/*
+ * This is a process-global DSO handle used for loading and unloading the
+ * HWCryptoHook library. NB: This is only set (or unset) during an init() or
+ * finish() call (reference counts permitting) and they're operating with
+ * global locks, so this should be thread-safe implicitly.
+ */
+static DSO *hwcrhk_dso = NULL;
+static HWCryptoHook_ContextHandle hwcrhk_context = 0;
+#  ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+/* Index for KM handle.  Not really used yet. */
+static int hndidx_rsa = -1;
+#  endif
+
+/*
+ * These are the function pointers that are (un)set when the library has
+ * successfully (un)loaded.
+ */
+static HWCryptoHook_Init_t *p_hwcrhk_Init = NULL;
+static HWCryptoHook_Finish_t *p_hwcrhk_Finish = NULL;
+static HWCryptoHook_ModExp_t *p_hwcrhk_ModExp = NULL;
+#  ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+static HWCryptoHook_RSA_t *p_hwcrhk_RSA = NULL;
+#  endif
+static HWCryptoHook_RandomBytes_t *p_hwcrhk_RandomBytes = NULL;
+#  ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+static HWCryptoHook_RSALoadKey_t *p_hwcrhk_RSALoadKey = NULL;
+static HWCryptoHook_RSAGetPublicKey_t *p_hwcrhk_RSAGetPublicKey = NULL;
+static HWCryptoHook_RSAUnloadKey_t *p_hwcrhk_RSAUnloadKey = NULL;
+#  endif
+static HWCryptoHook_ModExpCRT_t *p_hwcrhk_ModExpCRT = NULL;
+
+/* Used in the DSO operations. */
+static const char *HWCRHK_LIBNAME = NULL;
+static void free_HWCRHK_LIBNAME(void)
+{
+    OPENSSL_free(HWCRHK_LIBNAME);
+    HWCRHK_LIBNAME = NULL;
+}
+
+static const char *get_HWCRHK_LIBNAME(void)
+{
+    if (HWCRHK_LIBNAME)
+        return HWCRHK_LIBNAME;
+    return "nfhwcrhk";
+}
+
+static long set_HWCRHK_LIBNAME(const char *name)
+{
+    free_HWCRHK_LIBNAME();
+    return (((HWCRHK_LIBNAME = OPENSSL_strdup(name)) != NULL) ? 1 : 0);
+}
+
+static const char *n_hwcrhk_Init = "HWCryptoHook_Init";
+static const char *n_hwcrhk_Finish = "HWCryptoHook_Finish";
+static const char *n_hwcrhk_ModExp = "HWCryptoHook_ModExp";
+#  ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+static const char *n_hwcrhk_RSA = "HWCryptoHook_RSA";
+#  endif
+static const char *n_hwcrhk_RandomBytes = "HWCryptoHook_RandomBytes";
+#  ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+static const char *n_hwcrhk_RSALoadKey = "HWCryptoHook_RSALoadKey";
+static const char *n_hwcrhk_RSAGetPublicKey = "HWCryptoHook_RSAGetPublicKey";
+static const char *n_hwcrhk_RSAUnloadKey = "HWCryptoHook_RSAUnloadKey";
+#  endif
+static const char *n_hwcrhk_ModExpCRT = "HWCryptoHook_ModExpCRT";
+
+/*
+ * HWCryptoHook library functions and mechanics - these are used by the
+ * higher-level functions further down. NB: As and where there's no error
+ * checking, take a look lower down where these functions are called, the
+ * checking and error handling is probably down there.
+ */
+
+/* utility function to obtain a context */
+static int get_context(HWCryptoHook_ContextHandle * hac,
+                       HWCryptoHook_CallerContext * cac)
+{
+    char tempbuf[1024];
+    HWCryptoHook_ErrMsgBuf rmsg;
+
+    rmsg.buf = tempbuf;
+    rmsg.size = sizeof(tempbuf);
+
+    *hac = p_hwcrhk_Init(&hwcrhk_globals, sizeof(hwcrhk_globals), &rmsg, cac);
+    if (!*hac)
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* similarly to release one. */
+static void release_context(HWCryptoHook_ContextHandle hac)
+{
+    p_hwcrhk_Finish(hac);
+}
+
+/* Destructor (complements the "ENGINE_chil()" constructor) */
+static int hwcrhk_destroy(ENGINE *e)
+{
+    free_HWCRHK_LIBNAME();
+    ERR_unload_HWCRHK_strings();
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(chil_lock);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* (de)initialisation functions. */
+static int hwcrhk_init(ENGINE *e)
+{
+    HWCryptoHook_Init_t *p1;
+    HWCryptoHook_Finish_t *p2;
+    HWCryptoHook_ModExp_t *p3;
+#  ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+    HWCryptoHook_RSA_t *p4;
+    HWCryptoHook_RSALoadKey_t *p5;
+    HWCryptoHook_RSAGetPublicKey_t *p6;
+    HWCryptoHook_RSAUnloadKey_t *p7;
+#  endif
+    HWCryptoHook_RandomBytes_t *p8;
+    HWCryptoHook_ModExpCRT_t *p9;
+
+    if (hwcrhk_dso != NULL) {
+        HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_INIT, HWCRHK_R_ALREADY_LOADED);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    /* Attempt to load libnfhwcrhk.so/nfhwcrhk.dll/whatever. */
+    hwcrhk_dso = DSO_load(NULL, get_HWCRHK_LIBNAME(), NULL, 0);
+    if (hwcrhk_dso == NULL) {
+        HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_INIT, HWCRHK_R_DSO_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+#define BINDIT(t, name) (t *)DSO_bind_func(hwcrhk_dso, name)
+    if ((p1 = BINDIT(HWCryptoHook_Init_t, n_hwcrhk_Init)) == NULL
+        || (p2 = BINDIT(HWCryptoHook_Finish_t, n_hwcrhk_Finish)) == NULL
+        || (p3 = BINDIT(HWCryptoHook_ModExp_t, n_hwcrhk_ModExp)) == NULL
+#  ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+        || (p4 = BINDIT(HWCryptoHook_RSA_t, n_hwcrhk_RSA)) == NULL
+        || (p5 = BINDIT(HWCryptoHook_RSALoadKey_t, n_hwcrhk_RSALoadKey)) == NULL
+        || (p6 = BINDIT(HWCryptoHook_RSAGetPublicKey_t, n_hwcrhk_RSAGetPublicKey)) == NULL
+        || (p7 = BINDIT(HWCryptoHook_RSAUnloadKey_t, n_hwcrhk_RSAUnloadKey)) == NULL
+#  endif
+        || (p8 = BINDIT(HWCryptoHook_RandomBytes_t, n_hwcrhk_RandomBytes)) == NULL
+        || (p9 = BINDIT(HWCryptoHook_ModExpCRT_t, n_hwcrhk_ModExpCRT)) == NULL) {
+        HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_INIT, HWCRHK_R_DSO_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    /* Copy the pointers */
+    p_hwcrhk_Init = p1;
+    p_hwcrhk_Finish = p2;
+    p_hwcrhk_ModExp = p3;
+#  ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+    p_hwcrhk_RSA = p4;
+    p_hwcrhk_RSALoadKey = p5;
+    p_hwcrhk_RSAGetPublicKey = p6;
+    p_hwcrhk_RSAUnloadKey = p7;
+#  endif
+    p_hwcrhk_RandomBytes = p8;
+    p_hwcrhk_ModExpCRT = p9;
+
+    /*
+     * Check if the application decided to support dynamic locks, and if it
+     * does, use them.
+     */
+    if (disable_mutex_callbacks == 0) {
+        hwcrhk_globals.mutex_init = hwcrhk_mutex_init;
+        hwcrhk_globals.mutex_acquire = hwcrhk_mutex_lock;
+        hwcrhk_globals.mutex_release = hwcrhk_mutex_unlock;
+        hwcrhk_globals.mutex_destroy = hwcrhk_mutex_destroy;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Try and get a context - if not, we may have a DSO but no accelerator!
+     */
+    if (!get_context(&hwcrhk_context, &password_context)) {
+        HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_INIT, HWCRHK_R_UNIT_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    /* Everything's fine. */
+#  ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+    if (hndidx_rsa == -1)
+        hndidx_rsa = RSA_get_ex_new_index(0,
+                                          "nFast HWCryptoHook RSA key handle",
+                                          NULL, NULL, NULL);
+#  endif
+    return 1;
+ err:
+    DSO_free(hwcrhk_dso);
+    hwcrhk_dso = NULL;
+    p_hwcrhk_Init = NULL;
+    p_hwcrhk_Finish = NULL;
+    p_hwcrhk_ModExp = NULL;
+#  ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+    p_hwcrhk_RSA = NULL;
+    p_hwcrhk_RSALoadKey = NULL;
+    p_hwcrhk_RSAGetPublicKey = NULL;
+    p_hwcrhk_RSAUnloadKey = NULL;
+#  endif
+    p_hwcrhk_ModExpCRT = NULL;
+    p_hwcrhk_RandomBytes = NULL;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int hwcrhk_finish(ENGINE *e)
+{
+    int to_return = 1;
+    free_HWCRHK_LIBNAME();
+    if (hwcrhk_dso == NULL) {
+        HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_FINISH, HWCRHK_R_NOT_LOADED);
+        to_return = 0;
+        goto err;
+    }
+    release_context(hwcrhk_context);
+    if (!DSO_free(hwcrhk_dso)) {
+        HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_FINISH, HWCRHK_R_DSO_FAILURE);
+        to_return = 0;
+        goto err;
+    }
+ err:
+    BIO_free(logstream);
+    hwcrhk_dso = NULL;
+    p_hwcrhk_Init = NULL;
+    p_hwcrhk_Finish = NULL;
+    p_hwcrhk_ModExp = NULL;
+#  ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+    p_hwcrhk_RSA = NULL;
+    p_hwcrhk_RSALoadKey = NULL;
+    p_hwcrhk_RSAGetPublicKey = NULL;
+    p_hwcrhk_RSAUnloadKey = NULL;
+#  endif
+    p_hwcrhk_ModExpCRT = NULL;
+    p_hwcrhk_RandomBytes = NULL;
+    return to_return;
+}
+
+static int hwcrhk_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f) (void))
+{
+    int to_return = 1;
+
+    switch (cmd) {
+    case HWCRHK_CMD_SO_PATH:
+        if (hwcrhk_dso) {
+            HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_CTRL, HWCRHK_R_ALREADY_LOADED);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        if (p == NULL) {
+            HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        return set_HWCRHK_LIBNAME((const char *)p);
+    case ENGINE_CTRL_SET_LOGSTREAM:
+        {
+            BIO *bio = (BIO *)p;
+
+            CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(chil_lock);
+            BIO_free(logstream);
+            logstream = NULL;
+            if (BIO_up_ref(bio))
+                logstream = bio;
+            else
+                HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_CTRL, HWCRHK_R_BIO_WAS_FREED);
+        }
+        CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(chil_lock);
+        break;
+    case ENGINE_CTRL_SET_PASSWORD_CALLBACK:
+        CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(chil_lock);
+        password_context.password_callback = (pem_password_cb *)f;
+        CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(chil_lock);
+        break;
+    case ENGINE_CTRL_SET_USER_INTERFACE:
+    case HWCRHK_CMD_SET_USER_INTERFACE:
+        CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(chil_lock);
+        password_context.ui_method = (UI_METHOD *)p;
+        CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(chil_lock);
+        break;
+    case ENGINE_CTRL_SET_CALLBACK_DATA:
+    case HWCRHK_CMD_SET_CALLBACK_DATA:
+        CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(chil_lock);
+        password_context.callback_data = p;
+        CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(chil_lock);
+        break;
+        /*
+         * this enables or disables the "SimpleForkCheck" flag used in the
+         * initialisation structure.
+         */
+    case ENGINE_CTRL_CHIL_SET_FORKCHECK:
+    case HWCRHK_CMD_FORK_CHECK:
+        CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(chil_lock);
+        if (i)
+            hwcrhk_globals.flags |= HWCryptoHook_InitFlags_SimpleForkCheck;
+        else
+            hwcrhk_globals.flags &= ~HWCryptoHook_InitFlags_SimpleForkCheck;
+        CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(chil_lock);
+        break;
+        /*
+         * This will prevent the initialisation function from "installing"
+         * the mutex-handling callbacks, even if they are available from
+         * within the library (or were provided to the library from the
+         * calling application). This is to remove any baggage for
+         * applications not using multithreading.
+         */
+    case ENGINE_CTRL_CHIL_NO_LOCKING:
+        CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(chil_lock);
+        disable_mutex_callbacks = 1;
+        CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(chil_lock);
+        break;
+    case HWCRHK_CMD_THREAD_LOCKING:
+        CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(chil_lock);
+        disable_mutex_callbacks = ((i == 0) ? 0 : 1);
+        CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(chil_lock);
+        break;
+
+        /* The command isn't understood by this engine */
+    default:
+        HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_CTRL,
+                  HWCRHK_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
+        to_return = 0;
+        break;
+    }
+
+    return to_return;
+}
+
+static EVP_PKEY *hwcrhk_load_privkey(ENGINE *eng, const char *key_id,
+                                     UI_METHOD *ui_method,
+                                     void *callback_data)
+{
+#  ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+    RSA *rtmp = NULL;
+#  endif
+    EVP_PKEY *res = NULL;
+#  ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+    HWCryptoHook_MPI e, n;
+    HWCryptoHook_RSAKeyHandle *hptr;
+#  endif
+#  if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA)
+    char tempbuf[1024];
+    HWCryptoHook_ErrMsgBuf rmsg;
+    HWCryptoHook_PassphraseContext ppctx;
+#  endif
+
+#  if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA)
+    rmsg.buf = tempbuf;
+    rmsg.size = sizeof(tempbuf);
+#  endif
+
+    if (!hwcrhk_context) {
+        HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_LOAD_PRIVKEY, HWCRHK_R_NOT_INITIALISED);
+        goto err;
+    }
+#  ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+    hptr = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*hptr));
+    if (hptr == NULL) {
+        HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_LOAD_PRIVKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    ppctx.ui_method = ui_method;
+    ppctx.callback_data = callback_data;
+    if (p_hwcrhk_RSALoadKey(hwcrhk_context, key_id, hptr, &rmsg, &ppctx)) {
+        HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_LOAD_PRIVKEY, HWCRHK_R_CHIL_ERROR);
+        ERR_add_error_data(1, rmsg.buf);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (!*hptr) {
+        HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_LOAD_PRIVKEY, HWCRHK_R_NO_KEY);
+        goto err;
+    }
+#  endif
+#  ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+    rtmp = RSA_new_method(eng);
+    RSA_set_ex_data(rtmp, hndidx_rsa, (char *)hptr);
+    rtmp->e = BN_new();
+    rtmp->n = BN_new();
+    rtmp->flags |= RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY;
+    MPI2BN(rtmp->e, e);
+    MPI2BN(rtmp->n, n);
+    if (p_hwcrhk_RSAGetPublicKey(*hptr, &n, &e, &rmsg)
+        != HWCRYPTOHOOK_ERROR_MPISIZE) {
+        HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_LOAD_PRIVKEY, HWCRHK_R_CHIL_ERROR);
+        ERR_add_error_data(1, rmsg.buf);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    bn_expand2(rtmp->e, e.size / sizeof(BN_ULONG));
+    bn_expand2(rtmp->n, n.size / sizeof(BN_ULONG));
+    MPI2BN(rtmp->e, e);
+    MPI2BN(rtmp->n, n);
+
+    if (p_hwcrhk_RSAGetPublicKey(*hptr, &n, &e, &rmsg)) {
+        HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_LOAD_PRIVKEY, HWCRHK_R_CHIL_ERROR);
+        ERR_add_error_data(1, rmsg.buf);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    rtmp->e->top = e.size / sizeof(BN_ULONG);
+    bn_fix_top(rtmp->e);
+    rtmp->n->top = n.size / sizeof(BN_ULONG);
+    bn_fix_top(rtmp->n);
+
+    res = EVP_PKEY_new();
+    if (res == NULL) {
+        HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_LOAD_PRIVKEY, HWCRHK_R_CHIL_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(res, rtmp);
+#  endif
+
+    if (res == NULL)
+        HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_LOAD_PRIVKEY,
+                  HWCRHK_R_PRIVATE_KEY_ALGORITHMS_DISABLED);
+
+    return res;
+ err:
+#  ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+    RSA_free(rtmp);
+#  endif
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+static EVP_PKEY *hwcrhk_load_pubkey(ENGINE *eng, const char *key_id,
+                                    UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY *res = NULL;
+
+#  ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+    res = hwcrhk_load_privkey(eng, key_id, ui_method, callback_data);
+#  endif
+
+    if (res)
+        switch (res->type) {
+#  ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+        case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
+            {
+                RSA *rsa = NULL;
+
+                CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(chil_lock);
+                rsa = res->pkey.rsa;
+                res->pkey.rsa = RSA_new();
+                res->pkey.rsa->n = rsa->n;
+                res->pkey.rsa->e = rsa->e;
+                rsa->n = NULL;
+                rsa->e = NULL;
+                CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(chil_lock);
+                RSA_free(rsa);
+            }
+            break;
+#  endif
+        default:
+            HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_LOAD_PUBKEY,
+                      HWCRHK_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+    return res;
+ err:
+    EVP_PKEY_free(res);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+/* A little mod_exp */
+static int hwcrhk_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
+                          const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    char tempbuf[1024];
+    HWCryptoHook_ErrMsgBuf rmsg;
+    /*
+     * Since HWCryptoHook_MPI is pretty compatible with BIGNUM's, we use them
+     * directly, plus a little macro magic.  We only thing we need to make
+     * sure of is that enough space is allocated.
+     */
+    HWCryptoHook_MPI m_a, m_p, m_n, m_r;
+    int to_return, ret;
+
+    to_return = 0;              /* expect failure */
+    rmsg.buf = tempbuf;
+    rmsg.size = sizeof(tempbuf);
+
+    if (!hwcrhk_context) {
+        HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_MOD_EXP, HWCRHK_R_NOT_INITIALISED);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    /* Prepare the params */
+    bn_expand2(r, m->top);      /* Check for error !! */
+    BN2MPI(m_a, a);
+    BN2MPI(m_p, p);
+    BN2MPI(m_n, m);
+    MPI2BN(r, m_r);
+
+    /* Perform the operation */
+    ret = p_hwcrhk_ModExp(hwcrhk_context, m_a, m_p, m_n, &m_r, &rmsg);
+
+    /* Convert the response */
+    r->top = m_r.size / sizeof(BN_ULONG);
+    bn_fix_top(r);
+
+    if (ret < 0) {
+        /*
+         * FIXME: When this error is returned, HWCryptoHook is telling us
+         * that falling back to software computation might be a good thing.
+         */
+        if (ret == HWCRYPTOHOOK_ERROR_FALLBACK) {
+            HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_MOD_EXP, HWCRHK_R_REQUEST_FALLBACK);
+        } else {
+            HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_MOD_EXP, HWCRHK_R_REQUEST_FAILED);
+        }
+        ERR_add_error_data(1, rmsg.buf);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    to_return = 1;
+ err:
+    return to_return;
+}
+
+#  ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+static int hwcrhk_rsa_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa,
+                              BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    char tempbuf[1024];
+    HWCryptoHook_ErrMsgBuf rmsg;
+    HWCryptoHook_RSAKeyHandle *hptr;
+    int to_return = 0, ret;
+
+    rmsg.buf = tempbuf;
+    rmsg.size = sizeof(tempbuf);
+
+    if (!hwcrhk_context) {
+        HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_RSA_MOD_EXP, HWCRHK_R_NOT_INITIALISED);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * This provides support for nForce keys.  Since that's opaque data all
+     * we do is provide a handle to the proper key and let HWCryptoHook take
+     * care of the rest.
+     */
+    if ((hptr =
+         (HWCryptoHook_RSAKeyHandle *) RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, hndidx_rsa))
+        != NULL) {
+        HWCryptoHook_MPI m_a, m_r;
+
+        if (!rsa->n) {
+            HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_RSA_MOD_EXP,
+                      HWCRHK_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENTS);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        /* Prepare the params */
+        bn_expand2(r, rsa->n->top); /* Check for error !! */
+        BN2MPI(m_a, I);
+        MPI2BN(r, m_r);
+
+        /* Perform the operation */
+        ret = p_hwcrhk_RSA(m_a, *hptr, &m_r, &rmsg);
+
+        /* Convert the response */
+        r->top = m_r.size / sizeof(BN_ULONG);
+        bn_fix_top(r);
+
+        if (ret < 0) {
+            /*
+             * FIXME: When this error is returned, HWCryptoHook is telling us
+             * that falling back to software computation might be a good
+             * thing.
+             */
+            if (ret == HWCRYPTOHOOK_ERROR_FALLBACK) {
+                HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_RSA_MOD_EXP,
+                          HWCRHK_R_REQUEST_FALLBACK);
+            } else {
+                HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_RSA_MOD_EXP,
+                          HWCRHK_R_REQUEST_FAILED);
+            }
+            ERR_add_error_data(1, rmsg.buf);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    } else {
+        HWCryptoHook_MPI m_a, m_p, m_q, m_dmp1, m_dmq1, m_iqmp, m_r;
+
+        if (!rsa->p || !rsa->q || !rsa->dmp1 || !rsa->dmq1 || !rsa->iqmp) {
+            HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_RSA_MOD_EXP,
+                      HWCRHK_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENTS);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        /* Prepare the params */
+        bn_expand2(r, rsa->n->top); /* Check for error !! */
+        BN2MPI(m_a, I);
+        BN2MPI(m_p, rsa->p);
+        BN2MPI(m_q, rsa->q);
+        BN2MPI(m_dmp1, rsa->dmp1);
+        BN2MPI(m_dmq1, rsa->dmq1);
+        BN2MPI(m_iqmp, rsa->iqmp);
+        MPI2BN(r, m_r);
+
+        /* Perform the operation */
+        ret = p_hwcrhk_ModExpCRT(hwcrhk_context, m_a, m_p, m_q,
+                                 m_dmp1, m_dmq1, m_iqmp, &m_r, &rmsg);
+
+        /* Convert the response */
+        r->top = m_r.size / sizeof(BN_ULONG);
+        bn_fix_top(r);
+
+        if (ret < 0) {
+            /*
+             * FIXME: When this error is returned, HWCryptoHook is telling us
+             * that falling back to software computation might be a good
+             * thing.
+             */
+            if (ret == HWCRYPTOHOOK_ERROR_FALLBACK) {
+                HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_RSA_MOD_EXP,
+                          HWCRHK_R_REQUEST_FALLBACK);
+            } else {
+                HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_RSA_MOD_EXP,
+                          HWCRHK_R_REQUEST_FAILED);
+            }
+            ERR_add_error_data(1, rmsg.buf);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+    /*
+     * If we're here, we must be here with some semblance of success :-)
+     */
+    to_return = 1;
+ err:
+    return to_return;
+}
+#  endif
+
+#  ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+/* This function is aliased to mod_exp (with the mont stuff dropped). */
+static int hwcrhk_mod_exp_mont(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
+                               const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx,
+                               BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx)
+{
+    return hwcrhk_mod_exp(r, a, p, m, ctx);
+}
+
+static int hwcrhk_rsa_finish(RSA *rsa)
+{
+    HWCryptoHook_RSAKeyHandle *hptr;
+
+    hptr = RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, hndidx_rsa);
+    if (hptr) {
+        p_hwcrhk_RSAUnloadKey(*hptr, NULL);
+        OPENSSL_free(hptr);
+        RSA_set_ex_data(rsa, hndidx_rsa, NULL);
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+#  endif
+
+#  ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+/* This function is aliased to mod_exp (with the dh and mont dropped). */
+static int hwcrhk_mod_exp_dh(const DH *dh, BIGNUM *r,
+                             const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
+                             const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx)
+{
+    return hwcrhk_mod_exp(r, a, p, m, ctx);
+}
+#  endif
+
+/* Random bytes are good */
+static int hwcrhk_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
+{
+    char tempbuf[1024];
+    HWCryptoHook_ErrMsgBuf rmsg;
+    int to_return = 0;          /* assume failure */
+    int ret;
+
+    rmsg.buf = tempbuf;
+    rmsg.size = sizeof(tempbuf);
+
+    if (!hwcrhk_context) {
+        HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_RAND_BYTES, HWCRHK_R_NOT_INITIALISED);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    ret = p_hwcrhk_RandomBytes(hwcrhk_context, buf, num, &rmsg);
+    if (ret < 0) {
+        /*
+         * FIXME: When this error is returned, HWCryptoHook is telling us
+         * that falling back to software computation might be a good thing.
+         */
+        if (ret == HWCRYPTOHOOK_ERROR_FALLBACK) {
+            HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_RAND_BYTES, HWCRHK_R_REQUEST_FALLBACK);
+        } else {
+            HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_RAND_BYTES, HWCRHK_R_REQUEST_FAILED);
+        }
+        ERR_add_error_data(1, rmsg.buf);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    to_return = 1;
+ err:
+    return to_return;
+}
+
+static int hwcrhk_rand_status(void)
+{
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Mutex calls: since the HWCryptoHook model closely follows the POSIX model
+ * these just wrap the POSIX functions and add some logging.
+ */
+
+static int hwcrhk_mutex_init(HWCryptoHook_Mutex * mt,
+                             HWCryptoHook_CallerContext * cactx)
+{
+    mt->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
+    if (mt->lock == NULL) {
+        HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_MUTEX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 1;               /* failure */
+    }
+    return 0;                   /* success */
+}
+
+static int hwcrhk_mutex_lock(HWCryptoHook_Mutex * mt)
+{
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(mt->lock);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static void hwcrhk_mutex_unlock(HWCryptoHook_Mutex * mt)
+{
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(mt->lock);
+}
+
+static void hwcrhk_mutex_destroy(HWCryptoHook_Mutex * mt)
+{
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(mt->lock);
+}
+
+static int hwcrhk_get_pass(const char *prompt_info,
+                           int *len_io, char *buf,
+                           HWCryptoHook_PassphraseContext * ppctx,
+                           HWCryptoHook_CallerContext * cactx)
+{
+    pem_password_cb *callback = NULL;
+    void *callback_data = NULL;
+    UI_METHOD *ui_method = NULL;
+    /*
+     * Despite what the documentation says prompt_info can be an empty
+     * string.
+     */
+    if (prompt_info && !*prompt_info)
+        prompt_info = NULL;
+
+    if (cactx) {
+        if (cactx->ui_method)
+            ui_method = cactx->ui_method;
+        if (cactx->password_callback)
+            callback = cactx->password_callback;
+        if (cactx->callback_data)
+            callback_data = cactx->callback_data;
+    }
+    if (ppctx) {
+        if (ppctx->ui_method) {
+            ui_method = ppctx->ui_method;
+            callback = NULL;
+        }
+        if (ppctx->callback_data)
+            callback_data = ppctx->callback_data;
+    }
+    if (callback == NULL && ui_method == NULL) {
+        HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_GET_PASS, HWCRHK_R_NO_CALLBACK);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (ui_method) {
+        UI *ui = UI_new_method(ui_method);
+        if (ui) {
+            int ok;
+            char *prompt = UI_construct_prompt(ui,
+                                               "pass phrase", prompt_info);
+
+            ok = UI_add_input_string(ui, prompt,
+                                     UI_INPUT_FLAG_DEFAULT_PWD,
+                                     buf, 0, (*len_io) - 1);
+            UI_add_user_data(ui, callback_data);
+            UI_ctrl(ui, UI_CTRL_PRINT_ERRORS, 1, 0, 0);
+
+            if (ok >= 0)
+                do {
+                    ok = UI_process(ui);
+                }
+                while (ok < 0 && UI_ctrl(ui, UI_CTRL_IS_REDOABLE, 0, 0, 0));
+
+            if (ok >= 0)
+                *len_io = strlen(buf);
+
+            UI_free(ui);
+            OPENSSL_free(prompt);
+        }
+    } else {
+        *len_io = callback(buf, *len_io, 0, callback_data);
+    }
+    if (!*len_io)
+        return -1;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int hwcrhk_insert_card(const char *prompt_info,
+                              const char *wrong_info,
+                              HWCryptoHook_PassphraseContext * ppctx,
+                              HWCryptoHook_CallerContext * cactx)
+{
+    int ok = -1;
+    UI *ui;
+    void *callback_data = NULL;
+    UI_METHOD *ui_method = NULL;
+
+    if (cactx) {
+        if (cactx->ui_method)
+            ui_method = cactx->ui_method;
+        if (cactx->callback_data)
+            callback_data = cactx->callback_data;
+    }
+    if (ppctx) {
+        if (ppctx->ui_method)
+            ui_method = ppctx->ui_method;
+        if (ppctx->callback_data)
+            callback_data = ppctx->callback_data;
+    }
+    if (ui_method == NULL) {
+        HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_INSERT_CARD, HWCRHK_R_NO_CALLBACK);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    ui = UI_new_method(ui_method);
+
+    if (ui) {
+        char answer = '\0';
+        char buf[BUFSIZ];
+        /*
+         * Despite what the documentation says wrong_info can be an empty
+         * string.
+         */
+        if (wrong_info && *wrong_info)
+            BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf) - 1,
+                         "Current card: \"%s\"\n", wrong_info);
+        else
+            buf[0] = 0;
+        ok = UI_dup_info_string(ui, buf);
+        if (ok >= 0 && prompt_info) {
+            BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf) - 1,
+                         "Insert card \"%s\"", prompt_info);
+            ok = UI_dup_input_boolean(ui, buf,
+                                      "\n then hit <enter> or C<enter> to cancel\n",
+                                      "\r\n", "Cc", UI_INPUT_FLAG_ECHO,
+                                      &answer);
+        }
+        UI_add_user_data(ui, callback_data);
+
+        if (ok >= 0)
+            ok = UI_process(ui);
+        UI_free(ui);
+
+        if (ok == -2 || (ok >= 0 && answer == 'C'))
+            ok = 1;
+        else if (ok < 0)
+            ok = -1;
+        else
+            ok = 0;
+    }
+    return ok;
+}
+
+static void hwcrhk_log_message(void *logstr, const char *message)
+{
+    BIO *lstream = NULL;
+
+    if (logstr)
+        lstream = *(BIO **)logstr;
+    if (lstream) {
+        BIO_printf(lstream, "%s\n", message);
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * This stuff is needed if this ENGINE is being compiled into a
+ * self-contained shared-library.
+ */
+#  ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE
+static int bind_fn(ENGINE *e, const char *id)
+{
+    if (id && (strcmp(id, engine_hwcrhk_id) != 0) &&
+        (strcmp(id, engine_hwcrhk_id_alt) != 0))
+        return 0;
+    if (!bind_helper(e))
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_CHECK_FN()
+    IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN(bind_fn)
+#  endif                        /* OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE */
+# endif                         /* !OPENSSL_NO_HW_CHIL */
+#endif                          /* !OPENSSL_NO_HW */
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/e_chil.ec b/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/e_chil.ec
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b5a76e1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/e_chil.ec
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+L HWCRHK	e_chil_err.h			e_chil_err.c
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/e_chil_err.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/e_chil_err.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0058684
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/e_chil_err.c
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * NOTE: this file was auto generated by the mkerr.pl script: any changes
+ * made to it will be overwritten when the script next updates this file,
+ * only reason strings will be preserved.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include "e_chil_err.h"
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+
+# define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(0,func,0)
+# define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(0,0,reason)
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA HWCRHK_str_functs[] = {
+    {ERR_FUNC(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_CTRL), "HWCRHK_CTRL"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_FINISH), "HWCRHK_FINISH"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_GET_PASS), "HWCRHK_GET_PASS"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_INIT), "HWCRHK_INIT"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_INSERT_CARD), "HWCRHK_INSERT_CARD"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_LOAD_PRIVKEY), "HWCRHK_LOAD_PRIVKEY"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_LOAD_PUBKEY), "HWCRHK_LOAD_PUBKEY"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_MOD_EXP), "HWCRHK_MOD_EXP"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_RAND_BYTES), "HWCRHK_RAND_BYTES"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_RSA_MOD_EXP), "HWCRHK_RSA_MOD_EXP"},
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA HWCRHK_str_reasons[] = {
+    {ERR_REASON(HWCRHK_R_ALREADY_LOADED), "already loaded"},
+    {ERR_REASON(HWCRHK_R_BIO_WAS_FREED), "bio was freed"},
+    {ERR_REASON(HWCRHK_R_CHIL_ERROR), "chil error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(HWCRHK_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED),
+     "ctrl command not implemented"},
+    {ERR_REASON(HWCRHK_R_DSO_FAILURE), "dso failure"},
+    {ERR_REASON(HWCRHK_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENTS), "missing key components"},
+    {ERR_REASON(HWCRHK_R_NOT_INITIALISED), "not initialised"},
+    {ERR_REASON(HWCRHK_R_NOT_LOADED), "not loaded"},
+    {ERR_REASON(HWCRHK_R_NO_CALLBACK), "no callback"},
+    {ERR_REASON(HWCRHK_R_NO_KEY), "no key"},
+    {ERR_REASON(HWCRHK_R_PRIVATE_KEY_ALGORITHMS_DISABLED),
+     "private key algorithms disabled"},
+    {ERR_REASON(HWCRHK_R_REQUEST_FAILED), "request failed"},
+    {ERR_REASON(HWCRHK_R_REQUEST_FALLBACK), "request fallback"},
+    {ERR_REASON(HWCRHK_R_UNIT_FAILURE), "unit failure"},
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HWCRHK_LIB_NAME
+static ERR_STRING_DATA HWCRHK_lib_name[] = {
+    {0, HWCRHK_LIB_NAME},
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+#endif
+
+static int HWCRHK_lib_error_code = 0;
+static int HWCRHK_error_init = 1;
+
+static void ERR_load_HWCRHK_strings(void)
+{
+    if (HWCRHK_lib_error_code == 0)
+        HWCRHK_lib_error_code = ERR_get_next_error_library();
+
+    if (HWCRHK_error_init) {
+        HWCRHK_error_init = 0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+        ERR_load_strings(HWCRHK_lib_error_code, HWCRHK_str_functs);
+        ERR_load_strings(HWCRHK_lib_error_code, HWCRHK_str_reasons);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HWCRHK_LIB_NAME
+        HWCRHK_lib_name->error = ERR_PACK(HWCRHK_lib_error_code, 0, 0);
+        ERR_load_strings(0, HWCRHK_lib_name);
+#endif
+    }
+}
+
+static void ERR_unload_HWCRHK_strings(void)
+{
+    if (HWCRHK_error_init == 0) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+        ERR_unload_strings(HWCRHK_lib_error_code, HWCRHK_str_functs);
+        ERR_unload_strings(HWCRHK_lib_error_code, HWCRHK_str_reasons);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HWCRHK_LIB_NAME
+        ERR_unload_strings(0, HWCRHK_lib_name);
+#endif
+        HWCRHK_error_init = 1;
+    }
+}
+
+static void ERR_HWCRHK_error(int function, int reason, char *file, int line)
+{
+    if (HWCRHK_lib_error_code == 0)
+        HWCRHK_lib_error_code = ERR_get_next_error_library();
+    ERR_PUT_error(HWCRHK_lib_error_code, function, reason, file, line);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/e_chil_err.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/e_chil_err.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b0f0dd9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/e_chil_err.h
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * NOTE: this file was auto generated by the mkerr.pl script: any changes
+ * made to it will be overwritten when the script next updates this file,
+ * only reason strings will be preserved.
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_HWCRHK_ERR_H
+# define HEADER_HWCRHK_ERR_H
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+static void ERR_load_HWCRHK_strings(void);
+static void ERR_unload_HWCRHK_strings(void);
+static void ERR_HWCRHK_error(int function, int reason, char *file, int line);
+# define HWCRHKerr(f,r) ERR_HWCRHK_error((f),(r),OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE)
+
+/* Error codes for the HWCRHK functions. */
+
+/* Function codes. */
+# define HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_CTRL                             100
+# define HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_FINISH                           101
+# define HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_GET_PASS                         102
+# define HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_INIT                             103
+# define HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_INSERT_CARD                      104
+# define HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_LOAD_PRIVKEY                     105
+# define HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_LOAD_PUBKEY                      106
+# define HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_MOD_EXP                          107
+# define HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_RAND_BYTES                       108
+# define HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_RSA_MOD_EXP                      109
+# define HWCRHK_F_BIND_HELPER                             110
+# define HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_MUTEX_INIT                       111
+
+/* Reason codes. */
+# define HWCRHK_R_ALREADY_LOADED                          100
+# define HWCRHK_R_BIO_WAS_FREED                           101
+# define HWCRHK_R_CHIL_ERROR                              102
+# define HWCRHK_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED            103
+# define HWCRHK_R_DSO_FAILURE                             104
+# define HWCRHK_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENTS                  105
+# define HWCRHK_R_NOT_INITIALISED                         106
+# define HWCRHK_R_NOT_LOADED                              107
+# define HWCRHK_R_NO_CALLBACK                             108
+# define HWCRHK_R_NO_KEY                                  109
+# define HWCRHK_R_PRIVATE_KEY_ALGORITHMS_DISABLED         110
+# define HWCRHK_R_REQUEST_FAILED                          111
+# define HWCRHK_R_REQUEST_FALLBACK                        112
+# define HWCRHK_R_UNIT_FAILURE                            113
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/e_dasync.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/e_dasync.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b672a3a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/e_dasync.c
@@ -0,0 +1,771 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2015-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#if defined(_WIN32)
+# include <windows.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
+#include <openssl/aes.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/async.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+#include <openssl/modes.h>
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX) && defined(OPENSSL_THREADS)
+# undef ASYNC_POSIX
+# define ASYNC_POSIX
+# include <unistd.h>
+#elif defined(_WIN32)
+# undef ASYNC_WIN
+# define ASYNC_WIN
+#endif
+
+#define DASYNC_LIB_NAME "DASYNC"
+#include "e_dasync_err.c"
+
+/* Engine Id and Name */
+static const char *engine_dasync_id = "dasync";
+static const char *engine_dasync_name = "Dummy Async engine support";
+
+
+/* Engine Lifetime functions */
+static int dasync_destroy(ENGINE *e);
+static int dasync_init(ENGINE *e);
+static int dasync_finish(ENGINE *e);
+void engine_load_dasync_int(void);
+
+
+/* Set up digests. Just SHA1 for now */
+static int dasync_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest,
+                          const int **nids, int nid);
+
+static void dummy_pause_job(void);
+
+/* SHA1 */
+static int dasync_sha1_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
+static int dasync_sha1_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data,
+                             size_t count);
+static int dasync_sha1_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md);
+
+/*
+ * Holds the EVP_MD object for sha1 in this engine. Set up once only during
+ * engine bind and can then be reused many times.
+ */
+static EVP_MD *_hidden_sha1_md = NULL;
+static const EVP_MD *dasync_sha1(void)
+{
+    return _hidden_sha1_md;
+}
+static void destroy_digests(void)
+{
+    EVP_MD_meth_free(_hidden_sha1_md);
+    _hidden_sha1_md = NULL;
+}
+
+static int dasync_digest_nids(const int **nids)
+{
+    static int digest_nids[2] = { 0, 0 };
+    static int pos = 0;
+    static int init = 0;
+
+    if (!init) {
+        const EVP_MD *md;
+        if ((md = dasync_sha1()) != NULL)
+            digest_nids[pos++] = EVP_MD_type(md);
+        digest_nids[pos] = 0;
+        init = 1;
+    }
+    *nids = digest_nids;
+    return pos;
+}
+
+/* RSA */
+
+static int dasync_pub_enc(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+                    unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+static int dasync_pub_dec(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+                    unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+static int dasync_rsa_priv_enc(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+                      unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+static int dasync_rsa_priv_dec(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+                      unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+static int dasync_rsa_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa,
+                              BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+static int dasync_rsa_init(RSA *rsa);
+static int dasync_rsa_finish(RSA *rsa);
+
+static RSA_METHOD *dasync_rsa_method = NULL;
+
+/* AES */
+
+static int dasync_aes128_cbc_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type, int arg,
+                                  void *ptr);
+static int dasync_aes128_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+                                  const unsigned char *iv, int enc);
+static int dasync_aes128_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                                    const unsigned char *in, size_t inl);
+static int dasync_aes128_cbc_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx);
+
+static int dasync_aes128_cbc_hmac_sha1_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type,
+                                             int arg, void *ptr);
+static int dasync_aes128_cbc_hmac_sha1_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+                                                 const unsigned char *key,
+                                                 const unsigned char *iv,
+                                                 int enc);
+static int dasync_aes128_cbc_hmac_sha1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+                                               unsigned char *out,
+                                               const unsigned char *in,
+                                               size_t inl);
+static int dasync_aes128_cbc_hmac_sha1_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx);
+
+struct dasync_pipeline_ctx {
+    void *inner_cipher_data;
+    unsigned int numpipes;
+    unsigned char **inbufs;
+    unsigned char **outbufs;
+    size_t *lens;
+    int enc;
+    unsigned char tlsaad[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES][EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN];
+    unsigned int aadctr;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Holds the EVP_CIPHER object for aes_128_cbc in this engine. Set up once only
+ * during engine bind and can then be reused many times.
+ */
+static EVP_CIPHER *_hidden_aes_128_cbc = NULL;
+static const EVP_CIPHER *dasync_aes_128_cbc(void)
+{
+    return _hidden_aes_128_cbc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Holds the EVP_CIPHER object for aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1 in this engine. Set up
+ * once only during engine bind and can then be reused many times.
+ */
+static EVP_CIPHER *_hidden_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1 = NULL;
+static const EVP_CIPHER *dasync_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1(void)
+{
+    return _hidden_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1;
+}
+
+static void destroy_ciphers(void)
+{
+    EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(_hidden_aes_128_cbc);
+    EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(_hidden_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1);
+    _hidden_aes_128_cbc = NULL;
+    _hidden_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1 = NULL;
+}
+
+static int dasync_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher,
+                                   const int **nids, int nid);
+
+static int dasync_cipher_nids[] = {
+    NID_aes_128_cbc,
+    NID_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1,
+    0
+};
+
+static int bind_dasync(ENGINE *e)
+{
+    /* Setup RSA_METHOD */
+    if ((dasync_rsa_method = RSA_meth_new("Dummy Async RSA method", 0)) == NULL
+        || RSA_meth_set_pub_enc(dasync_rsa_method, dasync_pub_enc) == 0
+        || RSA_meth_set_pub_dec(dasync_rsa_method, dasync_pub_dec) == 0
+        || RSA_meth_set_priv_enc(dasync_rsa_method, dasync_rsa_priv_enc) == 0
+        || RSA_meth_set_priv_dec(dasync_rsa_method, dasync_rsa_priv_dec) == 0
+        || RSA_meth_set_mod_exp(dasync_rsa_method, dasync_rsa_mod_exp) == 0
+        || RSA_meth_set_bn_mod_exp(dasync_rsa_method, BN_mod_exp_mont) == 0
+        || RSA_meth_set_init(dasync_rsa_method, dasync_rsa_init) == 0
+        || RSA_meth_set_finish(dasync_rsa_method, dasync_rsa_finish) == 0) {
+        DASYNCerr(DASYNC_F_BIND_DASYNC, DASYNC_R_INIT_FAILED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* Ensure the dasync error handling is set up */
+    ERR_load_DASYNC_strings();
+
+    if (!ENGINE_set_id(e, engine_dasync_id)
+        || !ENGINE_set_name(e, engine_dasync_name)
+        || !ENGINE_set_RSA(e, dasync_rsa_method)
+        || !ENGINE_set_digests(e, dasync_digests)
+        || !ENGINE_set_ciphers(e, dasync_ciphers)
+        || !ENGINE_set_destroy_function(e, dasync_destroy)
+        || !ENGINE_set_init_function(e, dasync_init)
+        || !ENGINE_set_finish_function(e, dasync_finish)) {
+        DASYNCerr(DASYNC_F_BIND_DASYNC, DASYNC_R_INIT_FAILED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Set up the EVP_CIPHER and EVP_MD objects for the ciphers/digests
+     * supplied by this engine
+     */
+    _hidden_sha1_md = EVP_MD_meth_new(NID_sha1, NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption);
+    if (_hidden_sha1_md == NULL
+        || !EVP_MD_meth_set_result_size(_hidden_sha1_md, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH)
+        || !EVP_MD_meth_set_input_blocksize(_hidden_sha1_md, SHA_CBLOCK)
+        || !EVP_MD_meth_set_app_datasize(_hidden_sha1_md,
+                                         sizeof(EVP_MD *) + sizeof(SHA_CTX))
+        || !EVP_MD_meth_set_flags(_hidden_sha1_md, EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT)
+        || !EVP_MD_meth_set_init(_hidden_sha1_md, dasync_sha1_init)
+        || !EVP_MD_meth_set_update(_hidden_sha1_md, dasync_sha1_update)
+        || !EVP_MD_meth_set_final(_hidden_sha1_md, dasync_sha1_final)) {
+        EVP_MD_meth_free(_hidden_sha1_md);
+        _hidden_sha1_md = NULL;
+    }
+
+    _hidden_aes_128_cbc = EVP_CIPHER_meth_new(NID_aes_128_cbc,
+                                              16 /* block size */,
+                                              16 /* key len */);
+    if (_hidden_aes_128_cbc == NULL
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_iv_length(_hidden_aes_128_cbc,16)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_flags(_hidden_aes_128_cbc,
+                                          EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1
+                                          | EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE
+                                          | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_init(_hidden_aes_128_cbc,
+                                         dasync_aes128_init_key)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_do_cipher(_hidden_aes_128_cbc,
+                                              dasync_aes128_cbc_cipher)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_cleanup(_hidden_aes_128_cbc,
+                                            dasync_aes128_cbc_cleanup)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_ctrl(_hidden_aes_128_cbc,
+                                         dasync_aes128_cbc_ctrl)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_impl_ctx_size(_hidden_aes_128_cbc,
+                                sizeof(struct dasync_pipeline_ctx))) {
+        EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(_hidden_aes_128_cbc);
+        _hidden_aes_128_cbc = NULL;
+    }
+
+    _hidden_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1 = EVP_CIPHER_meth_new(
+                                                NID_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1,
+                                                16 /* block size */,
+                                                16 /* key len */);
+    if (_hidden_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1 == NULL
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_iv_length(_hidden_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1,16)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_flags(_hidden_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1,
+                                            EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE
+                                          | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1
+                                          | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER
+                                          | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_init(_hidden_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1,
+                                         dasync_aes128_cbc_hmac_sha1_init_key)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_do_cipher(_hidden_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1,
+                                            dasync_aes128_cbc_hmac_sha1_cipher)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_cleanup(_hidden_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1,
+                                            dasync_aes128_cbc_hmac_sha1_cleanup)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_ctrl(_hidden_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1,
+                                         dasync_aes128_cbc_hmac_sha1_ctrl)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_impl_ctx_size(_hidden_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1,
+                                sizeof(struct dasync_pipeline_ctx))) {
+        EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(_hidden_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1);
+        _hidden_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1 = NULL;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE
+static int bind_helper(ENGINE *e, const char *id)
+{
+    if (id && (strcmp(id, engine_dasync_id) != 0))
+        return 0;
+    if (!bind_dasync(e))
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_CHECK_FN()
+    IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN(bind_helper)
+# endif
+
+static ENGINE *engine_dasync(void)
+{
+    ENGINE *ret = ENGINE_new();
+    if (!ret)
+        return NULL;
+    if (!bind_dasync(ret)) {
+        ENGINE_free(ret);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+void engine_load_dasync_int(void)
+{
+    ENGINE *toadd = engine_dasync();
+    if (!toadd)
+        return;
+    ENGINE_add(toadd);
+    ENGINE_free(toadd);
+    ERR_clear_error();
+}
+
+static int dasync_init(ENGINE *e)
+{
+    return 1;
+}
+
+
+static int dasync_finish(ENGINE *e)
+{
+    return 1;
+}
+
+
+static int dasync_destroy(ENGINE *e)
+{
+    destroy_digests();
+    destroy_ciphers();
+    RSA_meth_free(dasync_rsa_method);
+    ERR_unload_DASYNC_strings();
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int dasync_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest,
+                          const int **nids, int nid)
+{
+    int ok = 1;
+    if (!digest) {
+        /* We are returning a list of supported nids */
+        return dasync_digest_nids(nids);
+    }
+    /* We are being asked for a specific digest */
+    switch (nid) {
+    case NID_sha1:
+        *digest = dasync_sha1();
+        break;
+    default:
+        ok = 0;
+        *digest = NULL;
+        break;
+    }
+    return ok;
+}
+
+static int dasync_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher,
+                                   const int **nids, int nid)
+{
+    int ok = 1;
+    if (cipher == NULL) {
+        /* We are returning a list of supported nids */
+        *nids = dasync_cipher_nids;
+        return (sizeof(dasync_cipher_nids) -
+                1) / sizeof(dasync_cipher_nids[0]);
+    }
+    /* We are being asked for a specific cipher */
+    switch (nid) {
+    case NID_aes_128_cbc:
+        *cipher = dasync_aes_128_cbc();
+        break;
+    case NID_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1:
+        *cipher = dasync_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1();
+        break;
+    default:
+        ok = 0;
+        *cipher = NULL;
+        break;
+    }
+    return ok;
+}
+
+static void wait_cleanup(ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *ctx, const void *key,
+                         OSSL_ASYNC_FD readfd, void *pvwritefd)
+{
+    OSSL_ASYNC_FD *pwritefd = (OSSL_ASYNC_FD *)pvwritefd;
+#if defined(ASYNC_WIN)
+    CloseHandle(readfd);
+    CloseHandle(*pwritefd);
+#elif defined(ASYNC_POSIX)
+    close(readfd);
+    close(*pwritefd);
+#endif
+    OPENSSL_free(pwritefd);
+}
+
+#define DUMMY_CHAR 'X'
+
+static void dummy_pause_job(void) {
+    ASYNC_JOB *job;
+    ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *waitctx;
+    OSSL_ASYNC_FD pipefds[2] = {0, 0};
+    OSSL_ASYNC_FD *writefd;
+#if defined(ASYNC_WIN)
+    DWORD numwritten, numread;
+    char buf = DUMMY_CHAR;
+#elif defined(ASYNC_POSIX)
+    char buf = DUMMY_CHAR;
+#endif
+
+    if ((job = ASYNC_get_current_job()) == NULL)
+        return;
+
+    waitctx = ASYNC_get_wait_ctx(job);
+
+    if (ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_fd(waitctx, engine_dasync_id, &pipefds[0],
+                              (void **)&writefd)) {
+        pipefds[1] = *writefd;
+    } else {
+        writefd = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*writefd));
+        if (writefd == NULL)
+            return;
+#if defined(ASYNC_WIN)
+        if (CreatePipe(&pipefds[0], &pipefds[1], NULL, 256) == 0) {
+            OPENSSL_free(writefd);
+            return;
+        }
+#elif defined(ASYNC_POSIX)
+        if (pipe(pipefds) != 0) {
+            OPENSSL_free(writefd);
+            return;
+        }
+#endif
+        *writefd = pipefds[1];
+
+        if(!ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_set_wait_fd(waitctx, engine_dasync_id, pipefds[0],
+                                       writefd, wait_cleanup)) {
+            wait_cleanup(waitctx, engine_dasync_id, pipefds[0], writefd);
+            return;
+        }
+    }
+    /*
+     * In the Dummy async engine we are cheating. We signal that the job
+     * is complete by waking it before the call to ASYNC_pause_job(). A real
+     * async engine would only wake when the job was actually complete
+     */
+#if defined(ASYNC_WIN)
+    WriteFile(pipefds[1], &buf, 1, &numwritten, NULL);
+#elif defined(ASYNC_POSIX)
+    if (write(pipefds[1], &buf, 1) < 0)
+        return;
+#endif
+
+    /* Ignore errors - we carry on anyway */
+    ASYNC_pause_job();
+
+    /* Clear the wake signal */
+#if defined(ASYNC_WIN)
+    ReadFile(pipefds[0], &buf, 1, &numread, NULL);
+#elif defined(ASYNC_POSIX)
+    if (read(pipefds[0], &buf, 1) < 0)
+        return;
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * SHA1 implementation. At the moment we just defer to the standard
+ * implementation
+ */
+#undef data
+#define data(ctx) ((SHA_CTX *)EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx))
+static int dasync_sha1_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    dummy_pause_job();
+
+    return SHA1_Init(data(ctx));
+}
+
+static int dasync_sha1_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data,
+                             size_t count)
+{
+    dummy_pause_job();
+
+    return SHA1_Update(data(ctx), data, (size_t)count);
+}
+
+static int dasync_sha1_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md)
+{
+    dummy_pause_job();
+
+    return SHA1_Final(md, data(ctx));
+}
+
+/*
+ * RSA implementation
+ */
+
+static int dasync_pub_enc(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+                    unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) {
+    /* Ignore errors - we carry on anyway */
+    dummy_pause_job();
+    return RSA_meth_get_pub_enc(RSA_PKCS1_OpenSSL())
+        (flen, from, to, rsa, padding);
+}
+
+static int dasync_pub_dec(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+                    unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) {
+    /* Ignore errors - we carry on anyway */
+    dummy_pause_job();
+    return RSA_meth_get_pub_dec(RSA_PKCS1_OpenSSL())
+        (flen, from, to, rsa, padding);
+}
+
+static int dasync_rsa_priv_enc(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+                      unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+{
+    /* Ignore errors - we carry on anyway */
+    dummy_pause_job();
+    return RSA_meth_get_priv_enc(RSA_PKCS1_OpenSSL())
+        (flen, from, to, rsa, padding);
+}
+
+static int dasync_rsa_priv_dec(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+                      unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+{
+    /* Ignore errors - we carry on anyway */
+    dummy_pause_job();
+    return RSA_meth_get_priv_dec(RSA_PKCS1_OpenSSL())
+        (flen, from, to, rsa, padding);
+}
+
+static int dasync_rsa_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    /* Ignore errors - we carry on anyway */
+    dummy_pause_job();
+    return RSA_meth_get_mod_exp(RSA_PKCS1_OpenSSL())(r0, I, rsa, ctx);
+}
+
+static int dasync_rsa_init(RSA *rsa)
+{
+    return RSA_meth_get_init(RSA_PKCS1_OpenSSL())(rsa);
+}
+static int dasync_rsa_finish(RSA *rsa)
+{
+    return RSA_meth_get_finish(RSA_PKCS1_OpenSSL())(rsa);
+}
+
+/* Cipher helper functions */
+
+static int dasync_cipher_ctrl_helper(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type, int arg,
+                                     void *ptr, int aeadcapable)
+{
+    int ret;
+    struct dasync_pipeline_ctx *pipe_ctx =
+        (struct dasync_pipeline_ctx *)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(ctx);
+
+    if (pipe_ctx == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    switch (type) {
+        case EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_OUTPUT_BUFS:
+            pipe_ctx->numpipes = arg;
+            pipe_ctx->outbufs = (unsigned char **)ptr;
+            break;
+
+        case EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_INPUT_BUFS:
+            pipe_ctx->numpipes = arg;
+            pipe_ctx->inbufs = (unsigned char **)ptr;
+            break;
+
+        case EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_INPUT_LENS:
+            pipe_ctx->numpipes = arg;
+            pipe_ctx->lens = (size_t *)ptr;
+            break;
+
+        case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY:
+            if (!aeadcapable)
+                return -1;
+            EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_cipher_data(ctx, pipe_ctx->inner_cipher_data);
+            ret = EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_ctrl(EVP_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1())
+                                          (ctx, type, arg, ptr);
+            EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_cipher_data(ctx, pipe_ctx);
+            return ret;
+
+        case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD:
+        {
+            unsigned char *p = ptr;
+            unsigned int len;
+
+            if (!aeadcapable || arg != EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN)
+                return -1;
+
+            if (pipe_ctx->aadctr >= SSL_MAX_PIPELINES)
+                return -1;
+
+            memcpy(pipe_ctx->tlsaad[pipe_ctx->aadctr], ptr,
+                   EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN);
+            pipe_ctx->aadctr++;
+
+            len = p[arg - 2] << 8 | p[arg - 1];
+
+            if (pipe_ctx->enc) {
+                if ((p[arg - 4] << 8 | p[arg - 3]) >= TLS1_1_VERSION) {
+                    if (len < AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
+                        return 0;
+                    len -= AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+                }
+
+                return ((len + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
+                        & -AES_BLOCK_SIZE) - len;
+            } else {
+                return SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+            }
+        }
+
+        default:
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int dasync_cipher_init_key_helper(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+                                         const unsigned char *key,
+                                         const unsigned char *iv, int enc,
+                                         const EVP_CIPHER *cipher)
+{
+    int ret;
+    struct dasync_pipeline_ctx *pipe_ctx =
+        (struct dasync_pipeline_ctx *)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(ctx);
+
+    if (pipe_ctx->inner_cipher_data == NULL
+            && EVP_CIPHER_impl_ctx_size(cipher) != 0) {
+        pipe_ctx->inner_cipher_data = OPENSSL_zalloc(
+            EVP_CIPHER_impl_ctx_size(cipher));
+        if (pipe_ctx->inner_cipher_data == NULL) {
+            DASYNCerr(DASYNC_F_DASYNC_CIPHER_INIT_KEY_HELPER,
+                        ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    pipe_ctx->numpipes = 0;
+    pipe_ctx->aadctr = 0;
+
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_cipher_data(ctx, pipe_ctx->inner_cipher_data);
+    ret = EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_init(cipher)(ctx, key, iv, enc);
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_cipher_data(ctx, pipe_ctx);
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int dasync_cipher_helper(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                                const unsigned char *in, size_t inl,
+                                const EVP_CIPHER *cipher)
+{
+    int ret = 1;
+    unsigned int i, pipes;
+    struct dasync_pipeline_ctx *pipe_ctx =
+        (struct dasync_pipeline_ctx *)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(ctx);
+
+    pipes = pipe_ctx->numpipes;
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_cipher_data(ctx, pipe_ctx->inner_cipher_data);
+    if (pipes == 0) {
+        if (pipe_ctx->aadctr != 0) {
+            if (pipe_ctx->aadctr != 1)
+                return -1;
+            EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_ctrl(cipher)
+                                    (ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD,
+                                     EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN,
+                                     pipe_ctx->tlsaad[0]);
+        }
+        ret = EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_do_cipher(cipher)
+                                           (ctx, out, in, inl);
+    } else {
+        if (pipe_ctx->aadctr > 0 && pipe_ctx->aadctr != pipes)
+            return -1;
+        for (i = 0; i < pipes; i++) {
+            if (pipe_ctx->aadctr > 0) {
+                EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_ctrl(cipher)
+                                        (ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD,
+                                         EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN,
+                                         pipe_ctx->tlsaad[i]);
+            }
+            ret = ret && EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_do_cipher(cipher)
+                                (ctx, pipe_ctx->outbufs[i], pipe_ctx->inbufs[i],
+                                 pipe_ctx->lens[i]);
+        }
+        pipe_ctx->numpipes = 0;
+    }
+    pipe_ctx->aadctr = 0;
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_cipher_data(ctx, pipe_ctx);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int dasync_cipher_cleanup_helper(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+                                        const EVP_CIPHER *cipher)
+{
+    struct dasync_pipeline_ctx *pipe_ctx =
+        (struct dasync_pipeline_ctx *)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(ctx);
+
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(pipe_ctx->inner_cipher_data,
+                       EVP_CIPHER_impl_ctx_size(cipher));
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * AES128 CBC Implementation
+ */
+
+static int dasync_aes128_cbc_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type, int arg,
+                                  void *ptr)
+{
+    return dasync_cipher_ctrl_helper(ctx, type, arg, ptr, 0);
+}
+
+static int dasync_aes128_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+                             const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
+{
+    return dasync_cipher_init_key_helper(ctx, key, iv, enc, EVP_aes_128_cbc());
+}
+
+static int dasync_aes128_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                               const unsigned char *in, size_t inl)
+{
+    return dasync_cipher_helper(ctx, out, in, inl, EVP_aes_128_cbc());
+}
+
+static int dasync_aes128_cbc_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return dasync_cipher_cleanup_helper(ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc());
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * AES128 CBC HMAC SHA1 Implementation
+ */
+
+static int dasync_aes128_cbc_hmac_sha1_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type,
+                                             int arg, void *ptr)
+{
+    return dasync_cipher_ctrl_helper(ctx, type, arg, ptr, 1);
+}
+
+static int dasync_aes128_cbc_hmac_sha1_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+                                                const unsigned char *key,
+                                                const unsigned char *iv,
+                                                int enc)
+{
+    return dasync_cipher_init_key_helper(ctx, key, iv, enc,
+                                         EVP_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1());
+}
+
+static int dasync_aes128_cbc_hmac_sha1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+                                               unsigned char *out,
+                                               const unsigned char *in,
+                                               size_t inl)
+{
+    return dasync_cipher_helper(ctx, out, in, inl, EVP_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1());
+}
+
+static int dasync_aes128_cbc_hmac_sha1_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return dasync_cipher_cleanup_helper(ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1());
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/e_dasync.ec b/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/e_dasync.ec
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..385faa0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/e_dasync.ec
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+L       DASYNC    e_dasync_err.h e_dasync_err.c
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/e_dasync_err.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/e_dasync_err.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a9e7765
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/e_dasync_err.c
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * NOTE: this file was auto generated by the mkerr.pl script: any changes
+ * made to it will be overwritten when the script next updates this file,
+ * only reason strings will be preserved.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include "e_dasync_err.h"
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+
+# define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(0,func,0)
+# define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(0,0,reason)
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA DASYNC_str_functs[] = {
+    {ERR_FUNC(DASYNC_F_BIND_DASYNC), "bind_dasync"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DASYNC_F_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC_CODE), "CIPHER_AES_128_CBC_CODE"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DASYNC_F_DASYNC_AES128_CBC_HMAC_SHA1_INIT_KEY),
+     "dasync_aes128_cbc_hmac_sha1_init_key"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DASYNC_F_DASYNC_AES128_INIT_KEY), "dasync_aes128_init_key"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DASYNC_F_DASYNC_BN_MOD_EXP), "DASYNC_BN_MOD_EXP"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DASYNC_F_DASYNC_CIPHER_INIT_KEY_HELPER),
+     "dasync_cipher_init_key_helper"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DASYNC_F_DASYNC_MOD_EXP), "DASYNC_MOD_EXP"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DASYNC_F_DASYNC_PRIVATE_DECRYPT), "DASYNC_PRIVATE_DECRYPT"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DASYNC_F_DASYNC_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT), "DASYNC_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DASYNC_F_DASYNC_PUBLIC_DECRYPT), "DASYNC_PUBLIC_DECRYPT"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DASYNC_F_DASYNC_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT), "DASYNC_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT"},
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA DASYNC_str_reasons[] = {
+    {ERR_REASON(DASYNC_R_INIT_FAILED), "init failed"},
+    {ERR_REASON(DASYNC_R_LENGTH_NOT_BLOCK_ALIGNED),
+     "length not block aligned"},
+    {ERR_REASON(DASYNC_R_UNKNOWN_FAULT), "unknown fault"},
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+
+#endif
+
+#ifdef DASYNC_LIB_NAME
+static ERR_STRING_DATA DASYNC_lib_name[] = {
+    {0, DASYNC_LIB_NAME},
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+#endif
+
+static int DASYNC_lib_error_code = 0;
+static int DASYNC_error_init = 1;
+
+static void ERR_load_DASYNC_strings(void)
+{
+    if (DASYNC_lib_error_code == 0)
+        DASYNC_lib_error_code = ERR_get_next_error_library();
+
+    if (DASYNC_error_init) {
+        DASYNC_error_init = 0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+        ERR_load_strings(DASYNC_lib_error_code, DASYNC_str_functs);
+        ERR_load_strings(DASYNC_lib_error_code, DASYNC_str_reasons);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef DASYNC_LIB_NAME
+        DASYNC_lib_name->error = ERR_PACK(DASYNC_lib_error_code, 0, 0);
+        ERR_load_strings(0, DASYNC_lib_name);
+#endif
+    }
+}
+
+static void ERR_unload_DASYNC_strings(void)
+{
+    if (DASYNC_error_init == 0) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+        ERR_unload_strings(DASYNC_lib_error_code, DASYNC_str_functs);
+        ERR_unload_strings(DASYNC_lib_error_code, DASYNC_str_reasons);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef DASYNC_LIB_NAME
+        ERR_unload_strings(0, DASYNC_lib_name);
+#endif
+        DASYNC_error_init = 1;
+    }
+}
+
+static void ERR_DASYNC_error(int function, int reason, char *file, int line)
+{
+    if (DASYNC_lib_error_code == 0)
+        DASYNC_lib_error_code = ERR_get_next_error_library();
+    ERR_PUT_error(DASYNC_lib_error_code, function, reason, file, line);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/e_dasync_err.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/e_dasync_err.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b01fead
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/e_dasync_err.h
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * NOTE: this file was auto generated by the mkerr.pl script: any changes
+ * made to it will be overwritten when the script next updates this file,
+ * only reason strings will be preserved.
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_DASYNC_ERR_H
+# define HEADER_DASYNC_ERR_H
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+static void ERR_load_DASYNC_strings(void);
+static void ERR_unload_DASYNC_strings(void);
+static void ERR_DASYNC_error(int function, int reason, char *file, int line);
+# define DASYNCerr(f,r) ERR_DASYNC_error((f),(r),OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE)
+
+/* Error codes for the DASYNC functions. */
+
+/* Function codes. */
+# define DASYNC_F_BIND_DASYNC                             107
+# define DASYNC_F_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC_CODE                 100
+# define DASYNC_F_DASYNC_AES128_CBC_HMAC_SHA1_INIT_KEY    109
+# define DASYNC_F_DASYNC_AES128_INIT_KEY                  108
+# define DASYNC_F_DASYNC_BN_MOD_EXP                       101
+# define DASYNC_F_DASYNC_CIPHER_INIT_KEY_HELPER           110
+# define DASYNC_F_DASYNC_MOD_EXP                          102
+# define DASYNC_F_DASYNC_PRIVATE_DECRYPT                  103
+# define DASYNC_F_DASYNC_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT                  104
+# define DASYNC_F_DASYNC_PUBLIC_DECRYPT                   105
+# define DASYNC_F_DASYNC_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT                   106
+
+/* Reason codes. */
+# define DASYNC_R_INIT_FAILED                             102
+# define DASYNC_R_LENGTH_NOT_BLOCK_ALIGNED                100
+# define DASYNC_R_UNKNOWN_FAULT                           101
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/e_ossltest.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/e_ossltest.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b4c83cb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/e_ossltest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,568 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * This is the OSSLTEST engine. It provides deliberately crippled digest
+ * implementations for test purposes. It is highly insecure and must NOT be
+ * used for any purpose except testing
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/modes.h>
+#include <openssl/aes.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+
+#define OSSLTEST_LIB_NAME "OSSLTEST"
+#include "e_ossltest_err.c"
+
+/* Engine Id and Name */
+static const char *engine_ossltest_id = "ossltest";
+static const char *engine_ossltest_name = "OpenSSL Test engine support";
+
+
+/* Engine Lifetime functions */
+static int ossltest_destroy(ENGINE *e);
+static int ossltest_init(ENGINE *e);
+static int ossltest_finish(ENGINE *e);
+void ENGINE_load_ossltest(void);
+
+
+/* Set up digests */
+static int ossltest_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest,
+                          const int **nids, int nid);
+
+/* MD5 */
+static int digest_md5_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
+static int digest_md5_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data,
+                             size_t count);
+static int digest_md5_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md);
+
+static EVP_MD *_hidden_md5_md = NULL;
+static const EVP_MD *digest_md5(void)
+{
+    if (_hidden_md5_md == NULL) {
+        EVP_MD *md;
+
+        if ((md = EVP_MD_meth_new(NID_md5, NID_md5WithRSAEncryption)) == NULL
+            || !EVP_MD_meth_set_result_size(md, MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH)
+            || !EVP_MD_meth_set_input_blocksize(md, MD5_CBLOCK)
+            || !EVP_MD_meth_set_app_datasize(md,
+                                             sizeof(EVP_MD *) + sizeof(MD5_CTX))
+            || !EVP_MD_meth_set_flags(md, 0)
+            || !EVP_MD_meth_set_init(md, digest_md5_init)
+            || !EVP_MD_meth_set_update(md, digest_md5_update)
+            || !EVP_MD_meth_set_final(md, digest_md5_final)) {
+            EVP_MD_meth_free(md);
+            md = NULL;
+        }
+        _hidden_md5_md = md;
+    }
+    return _hidden_md5_md;
+}
+
+/* SHA1 */
+static int digest_sha1_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
+static int digest_sha1_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data,
+                              size_t count);
+static int digest_sha1_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md);
+
+static EVP_MD *_hidden_sha1_md = NULL;
+static const EVP_MD *digest_sha1(void)
+{
+    if (_hidden_sha1_md == NULL) {
+        EVP_MD *md;
+
+        if ((md = EVP_MD_meth_new(NID_sha1, NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption)) == NULL
+            || !EVP_MD_meth_set_result_size(md, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH)
+            || !EVP_MD_meth_set_input_blocksize(md, SHA_CBLOCK)
+            || !EVP_MD_meth_set_app_datasize(md,
+                                             sizeof(EVP_MD *) + sizeof(SHA_CTX))
+            || !EVP_MD_meth_set_flags(md, EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT)
+            || !EVP_MD_meth_set_init(md, digest_sha1_init)
+            || !EVP_MD_meth_set_update(md, digest_sha1_update)
+            || !EVP_MD_meth_set_final(md, digest_sha1_final)) {
+            EVP_MD_meth_free(md);
+            md = NULL;
+        }
+        _hidden_sha1_md = md;
+    }
+    return _hidden_sha1_md;
+}
+
+/* SHA256 */
+static int digest_sha256_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
+static int digest_sha256_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data,
+                                size_t count);
+static int digest_sha256_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md);
+
+static EVP_MD *_hidden_sha256_md = NULL;
+static const EVP_MD *digest_sha256(void)
+{
+    if (_hidden_sha256_md == NULL) {
+        EVP_MD *md;
+
+        if ((md = EVP_MD_meth_new(NID_sha256, NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption)) == NULL
+            || !EVP_MD_meth_set_result_size(md, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)
+            || !EVP_MD_meth_set_input_blocksize(md, SHA256_CBLOCK)
+            || !EVP_MD_meth_set_app_datasize(md,
+                                             sizeof(EVP_MD *) + sizeof(SHA256_CTX))
+            || !EVP_MD_meth_set_flags(md, EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT)
+            || !EVP_MD_meth_set_init(md, digest_sha256_init)
+            || !EVP_MD_meth_set_update(md, digest_sha256_update)
+            || !EVP_MD_meth_set_final(md, digest_sha256_final)) {
+            EVP_MD_meth_free(md);
+            md = NULL;
+        }
+        _hidden_sha256_md = md;
+    }
+    return _hidden_sha256_md;
+}
+
+/* SHA384/SHA512 */
+static int digest_sha384_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
+static int digest_sha512_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
+static int digest_sha512_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data,
+                                size_t count);
+static int digest_sha384_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md);
+static int digest_sha512_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md);
+
+static EVP_MD *_hidden_sha384_md = NULL;
+static const EVP_MD *digest_sha384(void)
+{
+    if (_hidden_sha384_md == NULL) {
+        EVP_MD *md;
+
+        if ((md = EVP_MD_meth_new(NID_sha384, NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption)) == NULL
+            || !EVP_MD_meth_set_result_size(md, SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH)
+            || !EVP_MD_meth_set_input_blocksize(md, SHA512_CBLOCK)
+            || !EVP_MD_meth_set_app_datasize(md,
+                                             sizeof(EVP_MD *) + sizeof(SHA512_CTX))
+            || !EVP_MD_meth_set_flags(md, EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT)
+            || !EVP_MD_meth_set_init(md, digest_sha384_init)
+            || !EVP_MD_meth_set_update(md, digest_sha512_update)
+            || !EVP_MD_meth_set_final(md, digest_sha384_final)) {
+            EVP_MD_meth_free(md);
+            md = NULL;
+        }
+        _hidden_sha384_md = md;
+    }
+    return _hidden_sha384_md;
+}
+static EVP_MD *_hidden_sha512_md = NULL;
+static const EVP_MD *digest_sha512(void)
+{
+    if (_hidden_sha512_md == NULL) {
+        EVP_MD *md;
+
+        if ((md = EVP_MD_meth_new(NID_sha512, NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption)) == NULL
+            || !EVP_MD_meth_set_result_size(md, SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH)
+            || !EVP_MD_meth_set_input_blocksize(md, SHA512_CBLOCK)
+            || !EVP_MD_meth_set_app_datasize(md,
+                                             sizeof(EVP_MD *) + sizeof(SHA512_CTX))
+            || !EVP_MD_meth_set_flags(md, EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT)
+            || !EVP_MD_meth_set_init(md, digest_sha512_init)
+            || !EVP_MD_meth_set_update(md, digest_sha512_update)
+            || !EVP_MD_meth_set_final(md, digest_sha512_final)) {
+            EVP_MD_meth_free(md);
+            md = NULL;
+        }
+        _hidden_sha512_md = md;
+    }
+    return _hidden_sha512_md;
+}
+static void destroy_digests(void)
+{
+    EVP_MD_meth_free(_hidden_md5_md);
+    _hidden_md5_md = NULL;
+    EVP_MD_meth_free(_hidden_sha1_md);
+    _hidden_sha1_md = NULL;
+    EVP_MD_meth_free(_hidden_sha256_md);
+    _hidden_sha256_md = NULL;
+    EVP_MD_meth_free(_hidden_sha384_md);
+    _hidden_sha384_md = NULL;
+    EVP_MD_meth_free(_hidden_sha512_md);
+    _hidden_sha512_md = NULL;
+}
+static int ossltest_digest_nids(const int **nids)
+{
+    static int digest_nids[6] = { 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 };
+    static int pos = 0;
+    static int init = 0;
+
+    if (!init) {
+        const EVP_MD *md;
+        if ((md = digest_md5()) != NULL)
+            digest_nids[pos++] = EVP_MD_type(md);
+        if ((md = digest_sha1()) != NULL)
+            digest_nids[pos++] = EVP_MD_type(md);
+        if ((md = digest_sha256()) != NULL)
+            digest_nids[pos++] = EVP_MD_type(md);
+        if ((md = digest_sha384()) != NULL)
+            digest_nids[pos++] = EVP_MD_type(md);
+        if ((md = digest_sha512()) != NULL)
+            digest_nids[pos++] = EVP_MD_type(md);
+        digest_nids[pos] = 0;
+        init = 1;
+    }
+    *nids = digest_nids;
+    return pos;
+}
+
+/* Setup ciphers */
+static int ossltest_ciphers(ENGINE *, const EVP_CIPHER **,
+                            const int **, int);
+
+static int ossltest_cipher_nids[] = {
+    NID_aes_128_cbc, 0
+};
+
+/* AES128 */
+
+int ossltest_aes128_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+                             const unsigned char *iv, int enc);
+int ossltest_aes128_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                               const unsigned char *in, size_t inl);
+
+static EVP_CIPHER *_hidden_aes_128_cbc = NULL;
+static const EVP_CIPHER *ossltest_aes_128_cbc(void)
+{
+    if (_hidden_aes_128_cbc == NULL
+        && ((_hidden_aes_128_cbc = EVP_CIPHER_meth_new(NID_aes_128_cbc,
+                                                       16 /* block size */,
+                                                       16 /* key len */)) == NULL
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_iv_length(_hidden_aes_128_cbc,16)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_flags(_hidden_aes_128_cbc,
+                                          EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1
+                                          | EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_init(_hidden_aes_128_cbc,
+                                         ossltest_aes128_init_key)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_do_cipher(_hidden_aes_128_cbc,
+                                              ossltest_aes128_cbc_cipher)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_impl_ctx_size(_hidden_aes_128_cbc,
+                                                  EVP_CIPHER_impl_ctx_size(EVP_aes_128_cbc())))) {
+        EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(_hidden_aes_128_cbc);
+        _hidden_aes_128_cbc = NULL;
+    }
+    return _hidden_aes_128_cbc;
+}
+static void destroy_ciphers(void)
+{
+    EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(_hidden_aes_128_cbc);
+    _hidden_aes_128_cbc = NULL;
+}
+
+static int bind_ossltest(ENGINE *e)
+{
+    /* Ensure the ossltest error handling is set up */
+    ERR_load_OSSLTEST_strings();
+
+    if (!ENGINE_set_id(e, engine_ossltest_id)
+        || !ENGINE_set_name(e, engine_ossltest_name)
+        || !ENGINE_set_digests(e, ossltest_digests)
+        || !ENGINE_set_ciphers(e, ossltest_ciphers)
+        || !ENGINE_set_destroy_function(e, ossltest_destroy)
+        || !ENGINE_set_init_function(e, ossltest_init)
+        || !ENGINE_set_finish_function(e, ossltest_finish)) {
+        OSSLTESTerr(OSSLTEST_F_BIND_OSSLTEST, OSSLTEST_R_INIT_FAILED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE
+static int bind_helper(ENGINE *e, const char *id)
+{
+    if (id && (strcmp(id, engine_ossltest_id) != 0))
+        return 0;
+    if (!bind_ossltest(e))
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_CHECK_FN()
+    IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN(bind_helper)
+#endif
+
+static ENGINE *engine_ossltest(void)
+{
+    ENGINE *ret = ENGINE_new();
+    if (ret == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    if (!bind_ossltest(ret)) {
+        ENGINE_free(ret);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+void ENGINE_load_ossltest(void)
+{
+    /* Copied from eng_[openssl|dyn].c */
+    ENGINE *toadd = engine_ossltest();
+    if (!toadd)
+        return;
+    ENGINE_add(toadd);
+    ENGINE_free(toadd);
+    ERR_clear_error();
+}
+
+
+static int ossltest_init(ENGINE *e)
+{
+    return 1;
+}
+
+
+static int ossltest_finish(ENGINE *e)
+{
+    return 1;
+}
+
+
+static int ossltest_destroy(ENGINE *e)
+{
+    destroy_digests();
+    destroy_ciphers();
+    ERR_unload_OSSLTEST_strings();
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int ossltest_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest,
+                          const int **nids, int nid)
+{
+    int ok = 1;
+    if (!digest) {
+        /* We are returning a list of supported nids */
+        return ossltest_digest_nids(nids);
+    }
+    /* We are being asked for a specific digest */
+    switch (nid) {
+    case NID_md5:
+        *digest = digest_md5();
+        break;
+    case NID_sha1:
+        *digest = digest_sha1();
+        break;
+    case NID_sha256:
+        *digest = digest_sha256();
+        break;
+    case NID_sha384:
+        *digest = digest_sha384();
+        break;
+    case NID_sha512:
+        *digest = digest_sha512();
+        break;
+    default:
+        ok = 0;
+        *digest = NULL;
+        break;
+    }
+    return ok;
+}
+
+static int ossltest_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher,
+                          const int **nids, int nid)
+{
+    int ok = 1;
+    if (!cipher) {
+        /* We are returning a list of supported nids */
+        *nids = ossltest_cipher_nids;
+        return (sizeof(ossltest_cipher_nids) - 1)
+               / sizeof(ossltest_cipher_nids[0]);
+    }
+    /* We are being asked for a specific cipher */
+    switch (nid) {
+    case NID_aes_128_cbc:
+        *cipher = ossltest_aes_128_cbc();
+        break;
+    default:
+        ok = 0;
+        *cipher = NULL;
+        break;
+    }
+    return ok;
+}
+
+static void fill_known_data(unsigned char *md, unsigned int len)
+{
+    unsigned int i;
+
+    for (i=0; i<len; i++) {
+        md[i] = (unsigned char)(i & 0xff);
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * MD5 implementation. We go through the motions of doing MD5 by deferring to
+ * the standard implementation. Then we overwrite the result with a will defined
+ * value, so that all "MD5" digests using the test engine always end up with
+ * the same value.
+ */
+#undef data
+#define data(ctx) ((MD5_CTX *)EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx))
+static int digest_md5_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return MD5_Init(data(ctx));
+}
+
+static int digest_md5_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data,
+                             size_t count)
+{
+    return MD5_Update(data(ctx), data, (size_t)count);
+}
+
+static int digest_md5_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md)
+{
+    int ret;
+    ret = MD5_Final(md, data(ctx));
+
+    if (ret > 0) {
+        fill_known_data(md, MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * SHA1 implementation.
+ */
+#undef data
+#define data(ctx) ((SHA_CTX *)EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx))
+static int digest_sha1_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return SHA1_Init(data(ctx));
+}
+
+static int digest_sha1_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data,
+                              size_t count)
+{
+    return SHA1_Update(data(ctx), data, (size_t)count);
+}
+
+static int digest_sha1_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md)
+{
+    int ret;
+    ret = SHA1_Final(md, data(ctx));
+
+    if (ret > 0) {
+        fill_known_data(md, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * SHA256 implementation.
+ */
+#undef data
+#define data(ctx) ((SHA256_CTX *)EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx))
+static int digest_sha256_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return SHA256_Init(data(ctx));
+}
+
+static int digest_sha256_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data,
+                                size_t count)
+{
+    return SHA256_Update(data(ctx), data, (size_t)count);
+}
+
+static int digest_sha256_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md)
+{
+    int ret;
+    ret = SHA256_Final(md, data(ctx));
+
+    if (ret > 0) {
+        fill_known_data(md, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * SHA384/512 implementation.
+ */
+#undef data
+#define data(ctx) ((SHA512_CTX *)EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx))
+static int digest_sha384_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return SHA384_Init(data(ctx));
+}
+
+static int digest_sha512_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return SHA512_Init(data(ctx));
+}
+
+static int digest_sha512_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data,
+                                size_t count)
+{
+    return SHA512_Update(data(ctx), data, (size_t)count);
+}
+
+static int digest_sha384_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md)
+{
+    int ret;
+    /* Actually uses SHA512_Final! */
+    ret = SHA512_Final(md, data(ctx));
+
+    if (ret > 0) {
+        fill_known_data(md, SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int digest_sha512_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md)
+{
+    int ret;
+    ret = SHA512_Final(md, data(ctx));
+
+    if (ret > 0) {
+        fill_known_data(md, SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * AES128 Implementation
+ */
+
+int ossltest_aes128_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+                             const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
+{
+    return EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_init(EVP_aes_128_cbc()) (ctx, key, iv, enc);
+}
+
+int ossltest_aes128_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                               const unsigned char *in, size_t inl)
+{
+    unsigned char *tmpbuf;
+    int ret;
+
+    tmpbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(inl);
+    if (tmpbuf == NULL)
+        return -1;
+
+    /* Remember what we were asked to encrypt */
+    memcpy(tmpbuf, in, inl);
+
+    /* Go through the motions of encrypting it */
+    ret = EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_do_cipher(EVP_aes_128_cbc())(ctx, out, in, inl);
+
+    /* Throw it all away and just use the plaintext as the output */
+    memcpy(out, tmpbuf, inl);
+    OPENSSL_free(tmpbuf);
+
+    return ret;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/e_ossltest.ec b/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/e_ossltest.ec
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d8a1bef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/e_ossltest.ec
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+L       OSSLTEST    e_ossltest_err.h e_ossltest_err.c
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/e_ossltest_err.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/e_ossltest_err.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..71d0578
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/e_ossltest_err.c
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * NOTE: this file was auto generated by the mkerr.pl script: any changes
+ * made to it will be overwritten when the script next updates this file,
+ * only reason strings will be preserved.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include "e_ossltest_err.h"
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+
+# define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(0,func,0)
+# define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(0,0,reason)
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA OSSLTEST_str_functs[] = {
+    {ERR_FUNC(OSSLTEST_F_BIND_OSSLTEST), "BIND_OSSLTEST"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(OSSLTEST_F_OSSLTEST_AES128_INIT_KEY),
+     "OSSLTEST_AES128_INIT_KEY"},
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA OSSLTEST_str_reasons[] = {
+    {ERR_REASON(OSSLTEST_R_INIT_FAILED), "init failed"},
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+
+#endif
+
+#ifdef OSSLTEST_LIB_NAME
+static ERR_STRING_DATA OSSLTEST_lib_name[] = {
+    {0, OSSLTEST_LIB_NAME},
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+#endif
+
+static int OSSLTEST_lib_error_code = 0;
+static int OSSLTEST_error_init = 1;
+
+static void ERR_load_OSSLTEST_strings(void)
+{
+    if (OSSLTEST_lib_error_code == 0)
+        OSSLTEST_lib_error_code = ERR_get_next_error_library();
+
+    if (OSSLTEST_error_init) {
+        OSSLTEST_error_init = 0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+        ERR_load_strings(OSSLTEST_lib_error_code, OSSLTEST_str_functs);
+        ERR_load_strings(OSSLTEST_lib_error_code, OSSLTEST_str_reasons);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef OSSLTEST_LIB_NAME
+        OSSLTEST_lib_name->error = ERR_PACK(OSSLTEST_lib_error_code, 0, 0);
+        ERR_load_strings(0, OSSLTEST_lib_name);
+#endif
+    }
+}
+
+static void ERR_unload_OSSLTEST_strings(void)
+{
+    if (OSSLTEST_error_init == 0) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+        ERR_unload_strings(OSSLTEST_lib_error_code, OSSLTEST_str_functs);
+        ERR_unload_strings(OSSLTEST_lib_error_code, OSSLTEST_str_reasons);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef OSSLTEST_LIB_NAME
+        ERR_unload_strings(0, OSSLTEST_lib_name);
+#endif
+        OSSLTEST_error_init = 1;
+    }
+}
+
+static void ERR_OSSLTEST_error(int function, int reason, char *file, int line)
+{
+    if (OSSLTEST_lib_error_code == 0)
+        OSSLTEST_lib_error_code = ERR_get_next_error_library();
+    ERR_PUT_error(OSSLTEST_lib_error_code, function, reason, file, line);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/e_ossltest_err.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/e_ossltest_err.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a323c39
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/e_ossltest_err.h
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * NOTE: this file was auto generated by the mkerr.pl script: any changes
+ * made to it will be overwritten when the script next updates this file,
+ * only reason strings will be preserved.
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_OSSLTEST_ERR_H
+# define HEADER_OSSLTEST_ERR_H
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+static void ERR_load_OSSLTEST_strings(void);
+static void ERR_unload_OSSLTEST_strings(void);
+static void ERR_OSSLTEST_error(int function, int reason, char *file, int line);
+# define OSSLTESTerr(f,r) ERR_OSSLTEST_error((f),(r),OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE)
+
+/* Error codes for the OSSLTEST functions. */
+
+/* Function codes. */
+# define OSSLTEST_F_BIND_OSSLTEST                         100
+# define OSSLTEST_F_OSSLTEST_AES128_INIT_KEY              101
+
+/* Reason codes. */
+# define OSSLTEST_R_INIT_FAILED                           100
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/e_padlock.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/e_padlock.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b86f165
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/e_padlock.c
@@ -0,0 +1,747 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/aes.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/modes.h>
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PADLOCK
+
+/* Attempt to have a single source for both 0.9.7 and 0.9.8 :-) */
+#  if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00908000L)
+#   ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE
+#    define DYNAMIC_ENGINE
+#   endif
+#  elif (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L)
+#   ifdef ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT
+#    define DYNAMIC_ENGINE
+#   endif
+#  else
+#   error "Only OpenSSL >= 0.9.7 is supported"
+#  endif
+
+/*
+ * VIA PadLock AES is available *ONLY* on some x86 CPUs. Not only that it
+ * doesn't exist elsewhere, but it even can't be compiled on other platforms!
+ */
+
+#  undef COMPILE_HW_PADLOCK
+#  if !defined(I386_ONLY) && defined(PADLOCK_ASM)
+#   define COMPILE_HW_PADLOCK
+#   ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE
+static ENGINE *ENGINE_padlock(void);
+#   endif
+#  endif
+
+#  ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE
+void engine_load_padlock_int(void);
+void engine_load_padlock_int(void)
+{
+/* On non-x86 CPUs it just returns. */
+#   ifdef COMPILE_HW_PADLOCK
+    ENGINE *toadd = ENGINE_padlock();
+    if (!toadd)
+        return;
+    ENGINE_add(toadd);
+    ENGINE_free(toadd);
+    ERR_clear_error();
+#   endif
+}
+
+#  endif
+
+#  ifdef COMPILE_HW_PADLOCK
+
+/* Function for ENGINE detection and control */
+static int padlock_available(void);
+static int padlock_init(ENGINE *e);
+
+/* RNG Stuff */
+static RAND_METHOD padlock_rand;
+
+/* Cipher Stuff */
+static int padlock_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher,
+                           const int **nids, int nid);
+
+/* Engine names */
+static const char *padlock_id = "padlock";
+static char padlock_name[100];
+
+/* Available features */
+static int padlock_use_ace = 0; /* Advanced Cryptography Engine */
+static int padlock_use_rng = 0; /* Random Number Generator */
+
+/* ===== Engine "management" functions ===== */
+
+/* Prepare the ENGINE structure for registration */
+static int padlock_bind_helper(ENGINE *e)
+{
+    /* Check available features */
+    padlock_available();
+
+    /*
+     * RNG is currently disabled for reasons discussed in commentary just
+     * before padlock_rand_bytes function.
+     */
+    padlock_use_rng = 0;
+
+    /* Generate a nice engine name with available features */
+    BIO_snprintf(padlock_name, sizeof(padlock_name),
+                 "VIA PadLock (%s, %s)",
+                 padlock_use_rng ? "RNG" : "no-RNG",
+                 padlock_use_ace ? "ACE" : "no-ACE");
+
+    /* Register everything or return with an error */
+    if (!ENGINE_set_id(e, padlock_id) ||
+        !ENGINE_set_name(e, padlock_name) ||
+        !ENGINE_set_init_function(e, padlock_init) ||
+        (padlock_use_ace && !ENGINE_set_ciphers(e, padlock_ciphers)) ||
+        (padlock_use_rng && !ENGINE_set_RAND(e, &padlock_rand))) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* Everything looks good */
+    return 1;
+}
+
+#   ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE
+/* Constructor */
+static ENGINE *ENGINE_padlock(void)
+{
+    ENGINE *eng = ENGINE_new();
+
+    if (eng == NULL) {
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    if (!padlock_bind_helper(eng)) {
+        ENGINE_free(eng);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    return eng;
+}
+#   endif
+
+/* Check availability of the engine */
+static int padlock_init(ENGINE *e)
+{
+    return (padlock_use_rng || padlock_use_ace);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This stuff is needed if this ENGINE is being compiled into a
+ * self-contained shared-library.
+ */
+#   ifdef DYNAMIC_ENGINE
+static int padlock_bind_fn(ENGINE *e, const char *id)
+{
+    if (id && (strcmp(id, padlock_id) != 0)) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (!padlock_bind_helper(e)) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_CHECK_FN()
+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN(padlock_bind_fn)
+#   endif                       /* DYNAMIC_ENGINE */
+/* ===== Here comes the "real" engine ===== */
+
+/* Some AES-related constants */
+#   define AES_BLOCK_SIZE          16
+#   define AES_KEY_SIZE_128        16
+#   define AES_KEY_SIZE_192        24
+#   define AES_KEY_SIZE_256        32
+    /*
+     * Here we store the status information relevant to the current context.
+     */
+    /*
+     * BIG FAT WARNING: Inline assembler in PADLOCK_XCRYPT_ASM() depends on
+     * the order of items in this structure.  Don't blindly modify, reorder,
+     * etc!
+     */
+struct padlock_cipher_data {
+    unsigned char iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; /* Initialization vector */
+    union {
+        unsigned int pad[4];
+        struct {
+            int rounds:4;
+            int dgst:1;         /* n/a in C3 */
+            int align:1;        /* n/a in C3 */
+            int ciphr:1;        /* n/a in C3 */
+            unsigned int keygen:1;
+            int interm:1;
+            unsigned int encdec:1;
+            int ksize:2;
+        } b;
+    } cword;                    /* Control word */
+    AES_KEY ks;                 /* Encryption key */
+};
+
+/* Interface to assembler module */
+unsigned int padlock_capability();
+void padlock_key_bswap(AES_KEY *key);
+void padlock_verify_context(struct padlock_cipher_data *ctx);
+void padlock_reload_key();
+void padlock_aes_block(void *out, const void *inp,
+                       struct padlock_cipher_data *ctx);
+int padlock_ecb_encrypt(void *out, const void *inp,
+                        struct padlock_cipher_data *ctx, size_t len);
+int padlock_cbc_encrypt(void *out, const void *inp,
+                        struct padlock_cipher_data *ctx, size_t len);
+int padlock_cfb_encrypt(void *out, const void *inp,
+                        struct padlock_cipher_data *ctx, size_t len);
+int padlock_ofb_encrypt(void *out, const void *inp,
+                        struct padlock_cipher_data *ctx, size_t len);
+int padlock_ctr32_encrypt(void *out, const void *inp,
+                          struct padlock_cipher_data *ctx, size_t len);
+int padlock_xstore(void *out, int edx);
+void padlock_sha1_oneshot(void *ctx, const void *inp, size_t len);
+void padlock_sha1(void *ctx, const void *inp, size_t len);
+void padlock_sha256_oneshot(void *ctx, const void *inp, size_t len);
+void padlock_sha256(void *ctx, const void *inp, size_t len);
+
+/*
+ * Load supported features of the CPU to see if the PadLock is available.
+ */
+static int padlock_available(void)
+{
+    unsigned int edx = padlock_capability();
+
+    /* Fill up some flags */
+    padlock_use_ace = ((edx & (0x3 << 6)) == (0x3 << 6));
+    padlock_use_rng = ((edx & (0x3 << 2)) == (0x3 << 2));
+
+    return padlock_use_ace + padlock_use_rng;
+}
+
+/* ===== AES encryption/decryption ===== */
+
+#   if defined(NID_aes_128_cfb128) && ! defined (NID_aes_128_cfb)
+#    define NID_aes_128_cfb NID_aes_128_cfb128
+#   endif
+
+#   if defined(NID_aes_128_ofb128) && ! defined (NID_aes_128_ofb)
+#    define NID_aes_128_ofb NID_aes_128_ofb128
+#   endif
+
+#   if defined(NID_aes_192_cfb128) && ! defined (NID_aes_192_cfb)
+#    define NID_aes_192_cfb NID_aes_192_cfb128
+#   endif
+
+#   if defined(NID_aes_192_ofb128) && ! defined (NID_aes_192_ofb)
+#    define NID_aes_192_ofb NID_aes_192_ofb128
+#   endif
+
+#   if defined(NID_aes_256_cfb128) && ! defined (NID_aes_256_cfb)
+#    define NID_aes_256_cfb NID_aes_256_cfb128
+#   endif
+
+#   if defined(NID_aes_256_ofb128) && ! defined (NID_aes_256_ofb)
+#    define NID_aes_256_ofb NID_aes_256_ofb128
+#   endif
+
+/* List of supported ciphers. */
+static const int padlock_cipher_nids[] = {
+    NID_aes_128_ecb,
+    NID_aes_128_cbc,
+    NID_aes_128_cfb,
+    NID_aes_128_ofb,
+    NID_aes_128_ctr,
+
+    NID_aes_192_ecb,
+    NID_aes_192_cbc,
+    NID_aes_192_cfb,
+    NID_aes_192_ofb,
+    NID_aes_192_ctr,
+
+    NID_aes_256_ecb,
+    NID_aes_256_cbc,
+    NID_aes_256_cfb,
+    NID_aes_256_ofb,
+    NID_aes_256_ctr
+};
+
+static int padlock_cipher_nids_num = (sizeof(padlock_cipher_nids) /
+                                      sizeof(padlock_cipher_nids[0]));
+
+/* Function prototypes ... */
+static int padlock_aes_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+                                const unsigned char *iv, int enc);
+
+#   define NEAREST_ALIGNED(ptr) ( (unsigned char *)(ptr) +         \
+        ( (0x10 - ((size_t)(ptr) & 0x0F)) & 0x0F )      )
+#   define ALIGNED_CIPHER_DATA(ctx) ((struct padlock_cipher_data *)\
+        NEAREST_ALIGNED(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(ctx)))
+
+static int
+padlock_ecb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out_arg,
+                   const unsigned char *in_arg, size_t nbytes)
+{
+    return padlock_ecb_encrypt(out_arg, in_arg,
+                               ALIGNED_CIPHER_DATA(ctx), nbytes);
+}
+
+static int
+padlock_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out_arg,
+                   const unsigned char *in_arg, size_t nbytes)
+{
+    struct padlock_cipher_data *cdata = ALIGNED_CIPHER_DATA(ctx);
+    int ret;
+
+    memcpy(cdata->iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv(ctx), AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+    if ((ret = padlock_cbc_encrypt(out_arg, in_arg, cdata, nbytes)))
+        memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), cdata->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+padlock_cfb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out_arg,
+                   const unsigned char *in_arg, size_t nbytes)
+{
+    struct padlock_cipher_data *cdata = ALIGNED_CIPHER_DATA(ctx);
+    size_t chunk;
+
+    if ((chunk = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_num(ctx))) {   /* borrow chunk variable */
+        unsigned char *ivp = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx);
+
+        if (chunk >= AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
+            return 0;           /* bogus value */
+
+        if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx))
+            while (chunk < AES_BLOCK_SIZE && nbytes != 0) {
+                ivp[chunk] = *(out_arg++) = *(in_arg++) ^ ivp[chunk];
+                chunk++, nbytes--;
+        } else
+            while (chunk < AES_BLOCK_SIZE && nbytes != 0) {
+                unsigned char c = *(in_arg++);
+                *(out_arg++) = c ^ ivp[chunk];
+                ivp[chunk++] = c, nbytes--;
+            }
+
+        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, chunk % AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+    }
+
+    if (nbytes == 0)
+        return 1;
+
+    memcpy(cdata->iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv(ctx), AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+
+    if ((chunk = nbytes & ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1))) {
+        if (!padlock_cfb_encrypt(out_arg, in_arg, cdata, chunk))
+            return 0;
+        nbytes -= chunk;
+    }
+
+    if (nbytes) {
+        unsigned char *ivp = cdata->iv;
+
+        out_arg += chunk;
+        in_arg += chunk;
+        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, nbytes);
+        if (cdata->cword.b.encdec) {
+            cdata->cword.b.encdec = 0;
+            padlock_reload_key();
+            padlock_aes_block(ivp, ivp, cdata);
+            cdata->cword.b.encdec = 1;
+            padlock_reload_key();
+            while (nbytes) {
+                unsigned char c = *(in_arg++);
+                *(out_arg++) = c ^ *ivp;
+                *(ivp++) = c, nbytes--;
+            }
+        } else {
+            padlock_reload_key();
+            padlock_aes_block(ivp, ivp, cdata);
+            padlock_reload_key();
+            while (nbytes) {
+                *ivp = *(out_arg++) = *(in_arg++) ^ *ivp;
+                ivp++, nbytes--;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), cdata->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+padlock_ofb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out_arg,
+                   const unsigned char *in_arg, size_t nbytes)
+{
+    struct padlock_cipher_data *cdata = ALIGNED_CIPHER_DATA(ctx);
+    size_t chunk;
+
+    /*
+     * ctx->num is maintained in byte-oriented modes, such as CFB and OFB...
+     */
+    if ((chunk = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_num(ctx))) {   /* borrow chunk variable */
+        unsigned char *ivp = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx);
+
+        if (chunk >= AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
+            return 0;           /* bogus value */
+
+        while (chunk < AES_BLOCK_SIZE && nbytes != 0) {
+            *(out_arg++) = *(in_arg++) ^ ivp[chunk];
+            chunk++, nbytes--;
+        }
+
+        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, chunk % AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+    }
+
+    if (nbytes == 0)
+        return 1;
+
+    memcpy(cdata->iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv(ctx), AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+
+    if ((chunk = nbytes & ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1))) {
+        if (!padlock_ofb_encrypt(out_arg, in_arg, cdata, chunk))
+            return 0;
+        nbytes -= chunk;
+    }
+
+    if (nbytes) {
+        unsigned char *ivp = cdata->iv;
+
+        out_arg += chunk;
+        in_arg += chunk;
+        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, nbytes);
+        padlock_reload_key();   /* empirically found */
+        padlock_aes_block(ivp, ivp, cdata);
+        padlock_reload_key();   /* empirically found */
+        while (nbytes) {
+            *(out_arg++) = *(in_arg++) ^ *ivp;
+            ivp++, nbytes--;
+        }
+    }
+
+    memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), cdata->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static void padlock_ctr32_encrypt_glue(const unsigned char *in,
+                                       unsigned char *out, size_t blocks,
+                                       struct padlock_cipher_data *ctx,
+                                       const unsigned char *ivec)
+{
+    memcpy(ctx->iv, ivec, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+    padlock_ctr32_encrypt(out, in, ctx, AES_BLOCK_SIZE * blocks);
+}
+
+static int
+padlock_ctr_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out_arg,
+                   const unsigned char *in_arg, size_t nbytes)
+{
+    struct padlock_cipher_data *cdata = ALIGNED_CIPHER_DATA(ctx);
+    unsigned int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_num(ctx);
+
+    CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt_ctr32(in_arg, out_arg, nbytes,
+                                cdata, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx),
+                                EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx), &num,
+                                (ctr128_f) padlock_ctr32_encrypt_glue);
+
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, (size_t)num);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+#   define EVP_CIPHER_block_size_ECB       AES_BLOCK_SIZE
+#   define EVP_CIPHER_block_size_CBC       AES_BLOCK_SIZE
+#   define EVP_CIPHER_block_size_OFB       1
+#   define EVP_CIPHER_block_size_CFB       1
+#   define EVP_CIPHER_block_size_CTR       1
+
+/*
+ * Declaring so many ciphers by hand would be a pain. Instead introduce a bit
+ * of preprocessor magic :-)
+ */
+#   define DECLARE_AES_EVP(ksize,lmode,umode)      \
+static EVP_CIPHER *_hidden_aes_##ksize##_##lmode = NULL; \
+static const EVP_CIPHER *padlock_aes_##ksize##_##lmode(void) \
+{                                                                       \
+    if (_hidden_aes_##ksize##_##lmode == NULL                           \
+        && ((_hidden_aes_##ksize##_##lmode =                            \
+             EVP_CIPHER_meth_new(NID_aes_##ksize##_##lmode,             \
+                                 EVP_CIPHER_block_size_##umode,         \
+                                 AES_KEY_SIZE_##ksize)) == NULL         \
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_iv_length(_hidden_aes_##ksize##_##lmode, \
+                                              AES_BLOCK_SIZE)           \
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_flags(_hidden_aes_##ksize##_##lmode, \
+                                          0 | EVP_CIPH_##umode##_MODE)  \
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_init(_hidden_aes_##ksize##_##lmode, \
+                                         padlock_aes_init_key)          \
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_do_cipher(_hidden_aes_##ksize##_##lmode, \
+                                              padlock_##lmode##_cipher) \
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_impl_ctx_size(_hidden_aes_##ksize##_##lmode, \
+                                                  sizeof(struct padlock_cipher_data) + 16) \
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_set_asn1_params(_hidden_aes_##ksize##_##lmode, \
+                                                    EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv) \
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_get_asn1_params(_hidden_aes_##ksize##_##lmode, \
+                                                    EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv))) { \
+        EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(_hidden_aes_##ksize##_##lmode);            \
+        _hidden_aes_##ksize##_##lmode = NULL;                           \
+    }                                                                   \
+    return _hidden_aes_##ksize##_##lmode;                               \
+}
+
+DECLARE_AES_EVP(128, ecb, ECB)
+DECLARE_AES_EVP(128, cbc, CBC)
+DECLARE_AES_EVP(128, cfb, CFB)
+DECLARE_AES_EVP(128, ofb, OFB)
+DECLARE_AES_EVP(128, ctr, CTR)
+
+DECLARE_AES_EVP(192, ecb, ECB)
+DECLARE_AES_EVP(192, cbc, CBC)
+DECLARE_AES_EVP(192, cfb, CFB)
+DECLARE_AES_EVP(192, ofb, OFB)
+DECLARE_AES_EVP(192, ctr, CTR)
+
+DECLARE_AES_EVP(256, ecb, ECB)
+DECLARE_AES_EVP(256, cbc, CBC)
+DECLARE_AES_EVP(256, cfb, CFB)
+DECLARE_AES_EVP(256, ofb, OFB)
+DECLARE_AES_EVP(256, ctr, CTR)
+
+static int
+padlock_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher, const int **nids,
+                int nid)
+{
+    /* No specific cipher => return a list of supported nids ... */
+    if (!cipher) {
+        *nids = padlock_cipher_nids;
+        return padlock_cipher_nids_num;
+    }
+
+    /* ... or the requested "cipher" otherwise */
+    switch (nid) {
+    case NID_aes_128_ecb:
+        *cipher = padlock_aes_128_ecb();
+        break;
+    case NID_aes_128_cbc:
+        *cipher = padlock_aes_128_cbc();
+        break;
+    case NID_aes_128_cfb:
+        *cipher = padlock_aes_128_cfb();
+        break;
+    case NID_aes_128_ofb:
+        *cipher = padlock_aes_128_ofb();
+        break;
+    case NID_aes_128_ctr:
+        *cipher = padlock_aes_128_ctr();
+        break;
+
+    case NID_aes_192_ecb:
+        *cipher = padlock_aes_192_ecb();
+        break;
+    case NID_aes_192_cbc:
+        *cipher = padlock_aes_192_cbc();
+        break;
+    case NID_aes_192_cfb:
+        *cipher = padlock_aes_192_cfb();
+        break;
+    case NID_aes_192_ofb:
+        *cipher = padlock_aes_192_ofb();
+        break;
+    case NID_aes_192_ctr:
+        *cipher = padlock_aes_192_ctr();
+        break;
+
+    case NID_aes_256_ecb:
+        *cipher = padlock_aes_256_ecb();
+        break;
+    case NID_aes_256_cbc:
+        *cipher = padlock_aes_256_cbc();
+        break;
+    case NID_aes_256_cfb:
+        *cipher = padlock_aes_256_cfb();
+        break;
+    case NID_aes_256_ofb:
+        *cipher = padlock_aes_256_ofb();
+        break;
+    case NID_aes_256_ctr:
+        *cipher = padlock_aes_256_ctr();
+        break;
+
+    default:
+        /* Sorry, we don't support this NID */
+        *cipher = NULL;
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Prepare the encryption key for PadLock usage */
+static int
+padlock_aes_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+                     const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
+{
+    struct padlock_cipher_data *cdata;
+    int key_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8;
+    unsigned long mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx);
+
+    if (key == NULL)
+        return 0;               /* ERROR */
+
+    cdata = ALIGNED_CIPHER_DATA(ctx);
+    memset(cdata, 0, sizeof(*cdata));
+
+    /* Prepare Control word. */
+    if (mode == EVP_CIPH_OFB_MODE || mode == EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE)
+        cdata->cword.b.encdec = 0;
+    else
+        cdata->cword.b.encdec = (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx) == 0);
+    cdata->cword.b.rounds = 10 + (key_len - 128) / 32;
+    cdata->cword.b.ksize = (key_len - 128) / 64;
+
+    switch (key_len) {
+    case 128:
+        /*
+         * PadLock can generate an extended key for AES128 in hardware
+         */
+        memcpy(cdata->ks.rd_key, key, AES_KEY_SIZE_128);
+        cdata->cword.b.keygen = 0;
+        break;
+
+    case 192:
+    case 256:
+        /*
+         * Generate an extended AES key in software. Needed for AES192/AES256
+         */
+        /*
+         * Well, the above applies to Stepping 8 CPUs and is listed as
+         * hardware errata. They most likely will fix it at some point and
+         * then a check for stepping would be due here.
+         */
+        if ((mode == EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE || mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
+            && !enc)
+            AES_set_decrypt_key(key, key_len, &cdata->ks);
+        else
+            AES_set_encrypt_key(key, key_len, &cdata->ks);
+#   ifndef AES_ASM
+        /*
+         * OpenSSL C functions use byte-swapped extended key.
+         */
+        padlock_key_bswap(&cdata->ks);
+#   endif
+        cdata->cword.b.keygen = 1;
+        break;
+
+    default:
+        /* ERROR */
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * This is done to cover for cases when user reuses the
+     * context for new key. The catch is that if we don't do
+     * this, padlock_eas_cipher might proceed with old key...
+     */
+    padlock_reload_key();
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* ===== Random Number Generator ===== */
+/*
+ * This code is not engaged. The reason is that it does not comply
+ * with recommendations for VIA RNG usage for secure applications
+ * (posted at http://www.via.com.tw/en/viac3/c3.jsp) nor does it
+ * provide meaningful error control...
+ */
+/*
+ * Wrapper that provides an interface between the API and the raw PadLock
+ * RNG
+ */
+static int padlock_rand_bytes(unsigned char *output, int count)
+{
+    unsigned int eax, buf;
+
+    while (count >= 8) {
+        eax = padlock_xstore(output, 0);
+        if (!(eax & (1 << 6)))
+            return 0;           /* RNG disabled */
+        /* this ---vv--- covers DC bias, Raw Bits and String Filter */
+        if (eax & (0x1F << 10))
+            return 0;
+        if ((eax & 0x1F) == 0)
+            continue;           /* no data, retry... */
+        if ((eax & 0x1F) != 8)
+            return 0;           /* fatal failure...  */
+        output += 8;
+        count -= 8;
+    }
+    while (count > 0) {
+        eax = padlock_xstore(&buf, 3);
+        if (!(eax & (1 << 6)))
+            return 0;           /* RNG disabled */
+        /* this ---vv--- covers DC bias, Raw Bits and String Filter */
+        if (eax & (0x1F << 10))
+            return 0;
+        if ((eax & 0x1F) == 0)
+            continue;           /* no data, retry... */
+        if ((eax & 0x1F) != 1)
+            return 0;           /* fatal failure...  */
+        *output++ = (unsigned char)buf;
+        count--;
+    }
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(&buf, sizeof(buf));
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Dummy but necessary function */
+static int padlock_rand_status(void)
+{
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Prepare structure for registration */
+static RAND_METHOD padlock_rand = {
+    NULL,                       /* seed */
+    padlock_rand_bytes,         /* bytes */
+    NULL,                       /* cleanup */
+    NULL,                       /* add */
+    padlock_rand_bytes,         /* pseudorand */
+    padlock_rand_status,        /* rand status */
+};
+
+#  endif                        /* COMPILE_HW_PADLOCK */
+# endif                         /* !OPENSSL_NO_HW_PADLOCK */
+#endif                          /* !OPENSSL_NO_HW */
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_HW) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_HW_PADLOCK) \
+        || !defined(COMPILE_HW_PADLOCK)
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE
+OPENSSL_EXPORT
+    int bind_engine(ENGINE *e, const char *id, const dynamic_fns *fns);
+OPENSSL_EXPORT
+    int bind_engine(ENGINE *e, const char *id, const dynamic_fns *fns)
+{
+    return 0;
+}
+
+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_CHECK_FN()
+# endif
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/e_padlock.ec b/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/e_padlock.ec
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5c8a1d2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/e_padlock.ec
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+L PADLOCK	e_padlock_err.h			e_padlock_err.c
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/vendor_defns/hwcryptohook.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/vendor_defns/hwcryptohook.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c3dcd56
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/engines/vendor_defns/hwcryptohook.h
@@ -0,0 +1,509 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*-
+ * ModExp / RSA (with/without KM) plugin API
+ *
+ * The application will load a dynamic library which
+ * exports entrypoint(s) defined in this file.
+ *
+ * This set of entrypoints provides only a multithreaded,
+ * synchronous-within-each-thread, facility.
+ *
+ *
+ * This file is Copyright 1998-2000 nCipher Corporation Limited.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with opr without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright notice,
+ *    this list of conditions, and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above
+ *    copyright notice, this list of conditions, and the following
+ *    disclaimer, in the documentation and/or other materials provided
+ *    with the distribution
+ *
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL NCIPHER CORPORATION LIMITED (`NCIPHER') AND/OR
+ * ANY OTHER AUTHORS OR DISTRIBUTORS OF THIS FILE BE LIABLE for any
+ * damages arising directly or indirectly from this file, its use or
+ * this licence.  Without prejudice to the generality of the
+ * foregoing: all liability shall be excluded for direct, indirect,
+ * special, incidental, consequential or other damages or any loss of
+ * profits, business, revenue goodwill or anticipated savings;
+ * liability shall be excluded even if nCipher or anyone else has been
+ * advised of the possibility of damage.  In any event, if the
+ * exclusion of liability is not effective, the liability of nCipher
+ * or any author or distributor shall be limited to the lesser of the
+ * price paid and 1,000 pounds sterling. This licence only fails to
+ * exclude or limit liability for death or personal injury arising out
+ * of negligence, and only to the extent that such an exclusion or
+ * limitation is not effective.
+ *
+ * NCIPHER AND THE AUTHORS AND DISTRIBUTORS SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIM ALL
+ * AND ANY WARRANTIES (WHETHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED), including, but not
+ * limited to, any implied warranties of merchantability, fitness for
+ * a particular purpose, satisfactory quality, and/or non-infringement
+ * of any third party rights.
+ *
+ * US Government use: This software and documentation is Commercial
+ * Computer Software and Computer Software Documentation, as defined in
+ * sub-paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(5) of DFAR 252.227-7014, "Rights in
+ * Noncommercial Computer Software and Noncommercial Computer Software
+ * Documentation."  Use, duplication or disclosure by the Government is
+ * subject to the terms and conditions specified here.
+ *
+ * By using or distributing this file you will be accepting these
+ * terms and conditions, including the limitation of liability and
+ * lack of warranty.  If you do not wish to accept these terms and
+ * conditions, DO NOT USE THE FILE.
+ *
+ *
+ * The actual dynamically loadable plugin, and the library files for
+ * static linking, which are also provided in some distributions, are
+ * not covered by the licence described above.  You should have
+ * received a separate licence with terms and conditions for these
+ * library files; if you received the library files without a licence,
+ * please contact nCipher.
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifndef HWCRYPTOHOOK_H
+# define HWCRYPTOHOOK_H
+
+# include <sys/types.h>
+# include <stdio.h>
+
+# ifndef HWCRYPTOHOOK_DECLARE_APPTYPES
+#  define HWCRYPTOHOOK_DECLARE_APPTYPES 1
+# endif
+
+# define HWCRYPTOHOOK_ERROR_FAILED   -1
+# define HWCRYPTOHOOK_ERROR_FALLBACK -2
+# define HWCRYPTOHOOK_ERROR_MPISIZE  -3
+
+# if HWCRYPTOHOOK_DECLARE_APPTYPES
+
+/*-
+ * These structs are defined by the application and opaque to the
+ * crypto plugin.  The application may define these as it sees fit.
+ * Default declarations are provided here, but the application may
+ *  #define HWCRYPTOHOOK_DECLARE_APPTYPES 0
+ * to prevent these declarations, and instead provide its own
+ * declarations of these types.  (Pointers to them must still be
+ * ordinary pointers to structs or unions, or the resulting combined
+ * program will have a type inconsistency.)
+ */
+typedef struct HWCryptoHook_MutexValue HWCryptoHook_Mutex;
+typedef struct HWCryptoHook_CondVarValue HWCryptoHook_CondVar;
+typedef struct HWCryptoHook_PassphraseContextValue
+ HWCryptoHook_PassphraseContext;
+typedef struct HWCryptoHook_CallerContextValue HWCryptoHook_CallerContext;
+
+# endif                         /* HWCRYPTOHOOK_DECLARE_APPTYPES */
+
+/*-
+ * These next two structs are opaque to the application.  The crypto
+ * plugin will return pointers to them; the caller simply manipulates
+ * the pointers.
+ */
+typedef struct HWCryptoHook_Context *HWCryptoHook_ContextHandle;
+typedef struct HWCryptoHook_RSAKey *HWCryptoHook_RSAKeyHandle;
+
+typedef struct {
+    char *buf;
+    size_t size;
+} HWCryptoHook_ErrMsgBuf;
+/*-
+ * Used for error reporting.  When a HWCryptoHook function fails it
+ * will return a sentinel value (0 for pointer-valued functions, or a
+ * negative number, usually HWCRYPTOHOOK_ERROR_FAILED, for
+ * integer-valued ones).  It will, if an ErrMsgBuf is passed, also put
+ * an error message there.
+ *
+ * size is the size of the buffer, and will not be modified.  If you
+ * pass 0 for size you must pass 0 for buf, and nothing will be
+ * recorded (just as if you passed 0 for the struct pointer).
+ * Messages written to the buffer will always be null-terminated, even
+ * when truncated to fit within size bytes.
+ *
+ * The contents of the buffer are not defined if there is no error.
+ */
+
+typedef struct HWCryptoHook_MPIStruct {
+    unsigned char *buf;
+    size_t size;
+} HWCryptoHook_MPI;
+/*-
+ * When one of these is returned, a pointer is passed to the function.
+ * At call, size is the space available.  Afterwards it is updated to
+ * be set to the actual length (which may be more than the space available,
+ * if there was not enough room and the result was truncated).
+ * buf (the pointer) is not updated.
+ *
+ * size is in bytes and may be zero at call or return, but must be a
+ * multiple of the limb size.  Zero limbs at the MS end are not
+ * permitted.
+ */
+
+# define HWCryptoHook_InitFlags_FallbackModExp    0x0002UL
+# define HWCryptoHook_InitFlags_FallbackRSAImmed  0x0004UL
+/*-
+ * Enable requesting fallback to software in case of problems with the
+ * hardware support.  This indicates to the crypto provider that the
+ * application is prepared to fall back to software operation if the
+ * ModExp* or RSAImmed* functions return HWCRYPTOHOOK_ERROR_FALLBACK.
+ * Without this flag those calls will never return
+ * HWCRYPTOHOOK_ERROR_FALLBACK.  The flag will also cause the crypto
+ * provider to avoid repeatedly attempting to contact dead hardware
+ * within a short interval, if appropriate.
+ */
+
+# define HWCryptoHook_InitFlags_SimpleForkCheck   0x0010UL
+/*-
+ * Without _SimpleForkCheck the library is allowed to assume that the
+ * application will not fork and call the library in the child(ren).
+ *
+ * When it is specified, this is allowed.  However, after a fork
+ * neither parent nor child may unload any loaded keys or call
+ * _Finish.  Instead, they should call exit (or die with a signal)
+ * without calling _Finish.  After all the children have died the
+ * parent may unload keys or call _Finish.
+ *
+ * This flag only has any effect on UN*X platforms.
+ */
+
+typedef struct {
+    unsigned long flags;
+    void *logstream;            /* usually a FILE*.  See below. */
+    size_t limbsize;            /* bignum format - size of radix type, must
+                                 * be power of 2 */
+    int mslimbfirst;            /* 0 or 1 */
+    int msbytefirst;            /* 0 or 1; -1 = native */
+    /*-
+    * All the callback functions should return 0 on success, or a
+    * nonzero integer (whose value will be visible in the error message
+    * put in the buffer passed to the call).
+    *
+    * If a callback is not available pass a null function pointer.
+    *
+    * The callbacks may not call down again into the crypto plugin.
+    */
+    /*-
+    * For thread-safety.  Set everything to 0 if you promise only to be
+    * singlethreaded.  maxsimultaneous is the number of calls to
+    * ModExp[Crt]/RSAImmed{Priv,Pub}/RSA.  If you don't know what to
+    * put there then say 0 and the hook library will use a default.
+    *
+    * maxmutexes is a small limit on the number of simultaneous mutexes
+    * which will be requested by the library.  If there is no small
+    * limit, set it to 0.  If the crypto plugin cannot create the
+    * advertised number of mutexes the calls to its functions may fail.
+    * If a low number of mutexes is advertised the plugin will try to
+    * do the best it can.  Making larger numbers of mutexes available
+    * may improve performance and parallelism by reducing contention
+    * over critical sections.  Unavailability of any mutexes, implying
+    * single-threaded operation, should be indicated by the setting
+    * mutex_init et al to 0.
+    */
+    int maxmutexes;
+    int maxsimultaneous;
+    size_t mutexsize;
+    int (*mutex_init) (HWCryptoHook_Mutex *,
+                       HWCryptoHook_CallerContext * cactx);
+    int (*mutex_acquire) (HWCryptoHook_Mutex *);
+    void (*mutex_release) (HWCryptoHook_Mutex *);
+    void (*mutex_destroy) (HWCryptoHook_Mutex *);
+    /*-
+    * For greater efficiency, can use condition vars internally for
+    * synchronisation.  In this case maxsimultaneous is ignored, but
+    * the other mutex stuff must be available.  In singlethreaded
+    * programs, set everything to 0.
+    */
+    size_t condvarsize;
+    int (*condvar_init) (HWCryptoHook_CondVar *,
+                         HWCryptoHook_CallerContext * cactx);
+    int (*condvar_wait) (HWCryptoHook_CondVar *, HWCryptoHook_Mutex *);
+    void (*condvar_signal) (HWCryptoHook_CondVar *);
+    void (*condvar_broadcast) (HWCryptoHook_CondVar *);
+    void (*condvar_destroy) (HWCryptoHook_CondVar *);
+    /*-
+    * The semantics of acquiring and releasing mutexes and broadcasting
+    * and waiting on condition variables are expected to be those from
+    * POSIX threads (pthreads).  The mutexes may be (in pthread-speak)
+    * fast mutexes, recursive mutexes, or nonrecursive ones.
+    *
+    * The _release/_signal/_broadcast and _destroy functions must
+    * always succeed when given a valid argument; if they are given an
+    * invalid argument then the program (crypto plugin + application)
+    * has an internal error, and they should abort the program.
+    */
+    int (*getpassphrase) (const char *prompt_info,
+                          int *len_io, char *buf,
+                          HWCryptoHook_PassphraseContext * ppctx,
+                          HWCryptoHook_CallerContext * cactx);
+    /*-
+    * Passphrases and the prompt_info, if they contain high-bit-set
+    * characters, are UTF-8.  The prompt_info may be a null pointer if
+    * no prompt information is available (it should not be an empty
+    * string).  It will not contain text like `enter passphrase';
+    * instead it might say something like `Operator Card for John
+    * Smith' or `SmartCard in nFast Module #1, Slot #1'.
+    *
+    * buf points to a buffer in which to return the passphrase; on
+    * entry *len_io is the length of the buffer.  It should be updated
+    * by the callback.  The returned passphrase should not be
+    * null-terminated by the callback.
+    */
+    int (*getphystoken) (const char *prompt_info,
+                         const char *wrong_info,
+                         HWCryptoHook_PassphraseContext * ppctx,
+                         HWCryptoHook_CallerContext * cactx);
+    /*-
+    * Requests that the human user physically insert a different
+    * smartcard, DataKey, etc.  The plugin should check whether the
+    * currently inserted token(s) are appropriate, and if they are it
+    * should not make this call.
+    *
+    * prompt_info is as before.  wrong_info is a description of the
+    * currently inserted token(s) so that the user is told what
+    * something is.  wrong_info, like prompt_info, may be null, but
+    * should not be an empty string.  Its contents should be
+    * syntactically similar to that of prompt_info.
+    */
+    /*-
+    * Note that a single LoadKey operation might cause several calls to
+    * getpassphrase and/or requestphystoken.  If requestphystoken is
+    * not provided (ie, a null pointer is passed) then the plugin may
+    * not support loading keys for which authorisation by several cards
+    * is required.  If getpassphrase is not provided then cards with
+    * passphrases may not be supported.
+    *
+    * getpassphrase and getphystoken do not need to check that the
+    * passphrase has been entered correctly or the correct token
+    * inserted; the crypto plugin will do that.  If this is not the
+    * case then the crypto plugin is responsible for calling these
+    * routines again as appropriate until the correct token(s) and
+    * passphrase(s) are supplied as required, or until any retry limits
+    * implemented by the crypto plugin are reached.
+    *
+    * In either case, the application must allow the user to say `no'
+    * or `cancel' to indicate that they do not know the passphrase or
+    * have the appropriate token; this should cause the callback to
+    * return nonzero indicating error.
+    */
+    void (*logmessage) (void *logstream, const char *message);
+    /*-
+    * A log message will be generated at least every time something goes
+    * wrong and an ErrMsgBuf is filled in (or would be if one was
+    * provided).  Other diagnostic information may be written there too,
+    * including more detailed reasons for errors which are reported in an
+    * ErrMsgBuf.
+    *
+    * When a log message is generated, this callback is called.  It
+    * should write a message to the relevant logging arrangements.
+    *
+    * The message string passed will be null-terminated and may be of arbitrary
+    * length.  It will not be prefixed by the time and date, nor by the
+    * name of the library that is generating it - if this is required,
+    * the logmessage callback must do it.  The message will not have a
+    * trailing newline (though it may contain internal newlines).
+    *
+    * If a null pointer is passed for logmessage a default function is
+    * used.  The default function treats logstream as a FILE* which has
+    * been converted to a void*.  If logstream is 0 it does nothing.
+    * Otherwise it prepends the date and time and library name and
+    * writes the message to logstream.  Each line will be prefixed by a
+    * descriptive string containing the date, time and identity of the
+    * crypto plugin.  Errors on the logstream are not reported
+    * anywhere, and the default function doesn't flush the stream, so
+    * the application must set the buffering how it wants it.
+    *
+    * The crypto plugin may also provide a facility to have copies of
+    * log messages sent elsewhere, and or for adjusting the verbosity
+    * of the log messages; any such facilities will be configured by
+    * external means.
+    */
+} HWCryptoHook_InitInfo;
+
+typedef
+HWCryptoHook_ContextHandle HWCryptoHook_Init_t(const HWCryptoHook_InitInfo *
+                                               initinfo, size_t initinfosize,
+                                               const HWCryptoHook_ErrMsgBuf *
+                                               errors,
+                                               HWCryptoHook_CallerContext *
+                                               cactx);
+extern HWCryptoHook_Init_t HWCryptoHook_Init;
+
+/*-
+ * Caller should set initinfosize to the size of the HWCryptoHook struct,
+ * so it can be extended later.
+ *
+ * On success, a message for display or logging by the server,
+ * including the name and version number of the plugin, will be filled
+ * in into *errors; on failure *errors is used for error handling, as
+ * usual.
+ */
+
+/*-
+ * All these functions return 0 on success, HWCRYPTOHOOK_ERROR_FAILED
+ * on most failures.  HWCRYPTOHOOK_ERROR_MPISIZE means at least one of
+ * the output MPI buffer(s) was too small; the sizes of all have been
+ * set to the desired size (and for those where the buffer was large
+ * enough, the value may have been copied in), and no error message
+ * has been recorded.
+ *
+ * You may pass 0 for the errors struct.  In any case, unless you set
+ * _NoStderr at init time then messages may be reported to stderr.
+ */
+
+/*-
+ * The RSAImmed* functions (and key managed RSA) only work with
+ * modules which have an RSA patent licence - currently that means KM
+ * units; the ModExp* ones work with all modules, so you need a patent
+ * licence in the software in the US.  They are otherwise identical.
+ */
+
+typedef
+void HWCryptoHook_Finish_t(HWCryptoHook_ContextHandle hwctx);
+extern HWCryptoHook_Finish_t HWCryptoHook_Finish;
+/* You must not have any calls going or keys loaded when you call this. */
+
+typedef
+int HWCryptoHook_RandomBytes_t(HWCryptoHook_ContextHandle hwctx,
+                               unsigned char *buf, size_t len,
+                               const HWCryptoHook_ErrMsgBuf * errors);
+extern HWCryptoHook_RandomBytes_t HWCryptoHook_RandomBytes;
+
+typedef
+int HWCryptoHook_ModExp_t(HWCryptoHook_ContextHandle hwctx,
+                          HWCryptoHook_MPI a,
+                          HWCryptoHook_MPI p,
+                          HWCryptoHook_MPI n,
+                          HWCryptoHook_MPI * r,
+                          const HWCryptoHook_ErrMsgBuf * errors);
+extern HWCryptoHook_ModExp_t HWCryptoHook_ModExp;
+
+typedef
+int HWCryptoHook_RSAImmedPub_t(HWCryptoHook_ContextHandle hwctx,
+                               HWCryptoHook_MPI m,
+                               HWCryptoHook_MPI e,
+                               HWCryptoHook_MPI n,
+                               HWCryptoHook_MPI * r,
+                               const HWCryptoHook_ErrMsgBuf * errors);
+extern HWCryptoHook_RSAImmedPub_t HWCryptoHook_RSAImmedPub;
+
+typedef
+int HWCryptoHook_ModExpCRT_t(HWCryptoHook_ContextHandle hwctx,
+                             HWCryptoHook_MPI a,
+                             HWCryptoHook_MPI p,
+                             HWCryptoHook_MPI q,
+                             HWCryptoHook_MPI dmp1,
+                             HWCryptoHook_MPI dmq1,
+                             HWCryptoHook_MPI iqmp,
+                             HWCryptoHook_MPI * r,
+                             const HWCryptoHook_ErrMsgBuf * errors);
+extern HWCryptoHook_ModExpCRT_t HWCryptoHook_ModExpCRT;
+
+typedef
+int HWCryptoHook_RSAImmedPriv_t(HWCryptoHook_ContextHandle hwctx,
+                                HWCryptoHook_MPI m,
+                                HWCryptoHook_MPI p,
+                                HWCryptoHook_MPI q,
+                                HWCryptoHook_MPI dmp1,
+                                HWCryptoHook_MPI dmq1,
+                                HWCryptoHook_MPI iqmp,
+                                HWCryptoHook_MPI * r,
+                                const HWCryptoHook_ErrMsgBuf * errors);
+extern HWCryptoHook_RSAImmedPriv_t HWCryptoHook_RSAImmedPriv;
+
+/*-
+ * The RSAImmed* and ModExp* functions may return E_FAILED or
+ * E_FALLBACK for failure.
+ *
+ * E_FAILED means the failure is permanent and definite and there
+ *    should be no attempt to fall back to software.  (Eg, for some
+ *    applications, which support only the acceleration-only
+ *    functions, the `key material' may actually be an encoded key
+ *    identifier, and doing the operation in software would give wrong
+ *    answers.)
+ *
+ * E_FALLBACK means that doing the computation in software would seem
+ *    reasonable.  If an application pays attention to this and is
+ *    able to fall back, it should also set the Fallback init flags.
+ */
+
+typedef
+int HWCryptoHook_RSALoadKey_t(HWCryptoHook_ContextHandle hwctx,
+                              const char *key_ident,
+                              HWCryptoHook_RSAKeyHandle * keyhandle_r,
+                              const HWCryptoHook_ErrMsgBuf * errors,
+                              HWCryptoHook_PassphraseContext * ppctx);
+extern HWCryptoHook_RSALoadKey_t HWCryptoHook_RSALoadKey;
+/*-
+ * The key_ident is a null-terminated string configured by the
+ * user via the application's usual configuration mechanisms.
+ * It is provided to the user by the crypto provider's key management
+ * system.  The user must be able to enter at least any string of between
+ * 1 and 1023 characters inclusive, consisting of printable 7-bit
+ * ASCII characters.  The provider should avoid using
+ * any characters except alphanumerics and the punctuation
+ * characters  _ - + . / @ ~  (the user is expected to be able
+ * to enter these without quoting).  The string may be case-sensitive.
+ * The application may allow the user to enter other NULL-terminated strings,
+ * and the provider must cope (returning an error if the string is not
+ * valid).
+ *
+ * If the key does not exist, no error is recorded and 0 is returned;
+ * keyhandle_r will be set to 0 instead of to a key handle.
+ */
+
+typedef
+int HWCryptoHook_RSAGetPublicKey_t(HWCryptoHook_RSAKeyHandle k,
+                                   HWCryptoHook_MPI * n,
+                                   HWCryptoHook_MPI * e,
+                                   const HWCryptoHook_ErrMsgBuf * errors);
+extern HWCryptoHook_RSAGetPublicKey_t HWCryptoHook_RSAGetPublicKey;
+/*-
+ * The crypto plugin will not store certificates.
+ *
+ * Although this function for acquiring the public key value is
+ * provided, it is not the purpose of this API to deal fully with the
+ * handling of the public key.
+ *
+ * It is expected that the crypto supplier's key generation program
+ * will provide general facilities for producing X.509
+ * self-certificates and certificate requests in PEM format.  These
+ * will be given to the user so that they can configure them in the
+ * application, send them to CAs, or whatever.
+ *
+ * In case this kind of certificate handling is not appropriate, the
+ * crypto supplier's key generation program should be able to be
+ * configured not to generate such a self-certificate or certificate
+ * request.  Then the application will need to do all of this, and
+ * will need to store and handle the public key and certificates
+ * itself.
+ */
+
+typedef
+int HWCryptoHook_RSAUnloadKey_t(HWCryptoHook_RSAKeyHandle k,
+                                const HWCryptoHook_ErrMsgBuf * errors);
+extern HWCryptoHook_RSAUnloadKey_t HWCryptoHook_RSAUnloadKey;
+/* Might fail due to locking problems, or other serious internal problems. */
+
+typedef
+int HWCryptoHook_RSA_t(HWCryptoHook_MPI m,
+                       HWCryptoHook_RSAKeyHandle k,
+                       HWCryptoHook_MPI * r,
+                       const HWCryptoHook_ErrMsgBuf * errors);
+extern HWCryptoHook_RSA_t HWCryptoHook_RSA;
+/* RSA private key operation (sign or decrypt) - raw, unpadded. */
+
+#endif                          /* HWCRYPTOHOOK_H */
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/Downloaded.txt b/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/Downloaded.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..af0c20a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/Downloaded.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+Intro
+-----
+
+If we find a useful Perl module that isn't one of the core Perl
+modules, we may choose to bundle it with the OpenSSL source.
+
+Here, we simply list those modules and where we downloaded them from.
+
+Downloaded and bundled Perl modules
+-----------------------------------
+
+Text::Template 1.46 was downloaded from
+http://search.cpan.org/CPAN/authors/id/M/MJ/MJD/Text-Template-1.46.tar.gz
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/Artistic b/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/Artistic
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5f22124
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/Artistic
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+
+
+
+
+			 The "Artistic License"
+
+				Preamble
+
+The intent of this document is to state the conditions under which a
+Package may be copied, such that the Copyright Holder maintains some
+semblance of artistic control over the development of the package,
+while giving the users of the package the right to use and distribute
+the Package in a more-or-less customary fashion, plus the right to make
+reasonable modifications.
+
+Definitions:
+
+	"Package" refers to the collection of files distributed by the
+	Copyright Holder, and derivatives of that collection of files
+	created through textual modification.
+
+	"Standard Version" refers to such a Package if it has not been
+	modified, or has been modified in accordance with the wishes
+	of the Copyright Holder as specified below.
+
+	"Copyright Holder" is whoever is named in the copyright or
+	copyrights for the package.
+
+	"You" is you, if you're thinking about copying or distributing
+	this Package.
+
+	"Reasonable copying fee" is whatever you can justify on the
+	basis of media cost, duplication charges, time of people involved,
+	and so on.  (You will not be required to justify it to the
+	Copyright Holder, but only to the computing community at large
+	as a market that must bear the fee.)
+
+	"Freely Available" means that no fee is charged for the item
+	itself, though there may be fees involved in handling the item.
+	It also means that recipients of the item may redistribute it
+	under the same conditions they received it.
+
+1. You may make and give away verbatim copies of the source form of the
+Standard Version of this Package without restriction, provided that you
+duplicate all of the original copyright notices and associated disclaimers.
+
+2. You may apply bug fixes, portability fixes and other modifications
+derived from the Public Domain or from the Copyright Holder.  A Package
+modified in such a way shall still be considered the Standard Version.
+
+3. You may otherwise modify your copy of this Package in any way, provided
+that you insert a prominent notice in each changed file stating how and
+when you changed that file, and provided that you do at least ONE of the
+following:
+
+    a) place your modifications in the Public Domain or otherwise make them
+    Freely Available, such as by posting said modifications to Usenet or
+    an equivalent medium, or placing the modifications on a major archive
+    site such as uunet.uu.net, or by allowing the Copyright Holder to include
+    your modifications in the Standard Version of the Package.
+
+    b) use the modified Package only within your corporation or organization.
+
+    c) rename any non-standard executables so the names do not conflict
+    with standard executables, which must also be provided, and provide
+    a separate manual page for each non-standard executable that clearly
+    documents how it differs from the Standard Version.
+
+    d) make other distribution arrangements with the Copyright Holder.
+
+4. You may distribute the programs of this Package in object code or
+executable form, provided that you do at least ONE of the following:
+
+    a) distribute a Standard Version of the executables and library files,
+    together with instructions (in the manual page or equivalent) on where
+    to get the Standard Version.
+
+    b) accompany the distribution with the machine-readable source of
+    the Package with your modifications.
+
+    c) give non-standard executables non-standard names, and clearly
+    document the differences in manual pages (or equivalent), together
+    with instructions on where to get the Standard Version.
+
+    d) make other distribution arrangements with the Copyright Holder.
+
+5. You may charge a reasonable copying fee for any distribution of this
+Package.  You may charge any fee you choose for support of this
+Package.  You may not charge a fee for this Package itself.  However,
+you may distribute this Package in aggregate with other (possibly
+commercial) programs as part of a larger (possibly commercial) software
+distribution provided that you do not advertise this Package as a
+product of your own.  You may embed this Package's interpreter within
+an executable of yours (by linking); this shall be construed as a mere
+form of aggregation, provided that the complete Standard Version of the
+interpreter is so embedded.
+
+6. The scripts and library files supplied as input to or produced as
+output from the programs of this Package do not automatically fall
+under the copyright of this Package, but belong to whoever generated
+them, and may be sold commercially, and may be aggregated with this
+Package.  If such scripts or library files are aggregated with this
+Package via the so-called "undump" or "unexec" methods of producing a
+binary executable image, then distribution of such an image shall
+neither be construed as a distribution of this Package nor shall it
+fall under the restrictions of Paragraphs 3 and 4, provided that you do
+not represent such an executable image as a Standard Version of this
+Package.
+
+7. C subroutines (or comparably compiled subroutines in other
+languages) supplied by you and linked into this Package in order to
+emulate subroutines and variables of the language defined by this
+Package shall not be considered part of this Package, but are the
+equivalent of input as in Paragraph 6, provided these subroutines do
+not change the language in any way that would cause it to fail the
+regression tests for the language.
+
+8. Aggregation of this Package with a commercial distribution is always
+permitted provided that the use of this Package is embedded; that is,
+when no overt attempt is made to make this Package's interfaces visible
+to the end user of the commercial distribution.  Such use shall not be
+construed as a distribution of this Package.
+
+9. The name of the Copyright Holder may not be used to endorse or promote
+products derived from this software without specific prior written permission.
+
+10. THIS PACKAGE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR
+IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, THE IMPLIED
+WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTIBILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
+
+				The End
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/COPYING b/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/COPYING
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a3f6b12
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/COPYING
@@ -0,0 +1,340 @@
+		    GNU GENERAL PUBLIC LICENSE
+		       Version 2, June 1991
+
+ Copyright (C) 1989, 1991 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+                          59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA
+                          02111-1307, USA.
+ Everyone is permitted to copy and distribute verbatim copies
+ of this license document, but changing it is not allowed.
+
+			    Preamble
+
+  The licenses for most software are designed to take away your
+freedom to share and change it.  By contrast, the GNU General Public
+License is intended to guarantee your freedom to share and change free
+software--to make sure the software is free for all its users.  This
+General Public License applies to most of the Free Software
+Foundation's software and to any other program whose authors commit to
+using it.  (Some other Free Software Foundation software is covered by
+the GNU Library General Public License instead.)  You can apply it to
+your programs, too.
+
+  When we speak of free software, we are referring to freedom, not
+price.  Our General Public Licenses are designed to make sure that you
+have the freedom to distribute copies of free software (and charge for
+this service if you wish), that you receive source code or can get it
+if you want it, that you can change the software or use pieces of it
+in new free programs; and that you know you can do these things.
+
+  To protect your rights, we need to make restrictions that forbid
+anyone to deny you these rights or to ask you to surrender the rights.
+These restrictions translate to certain responsibilities for you if you
+distribute copies of the software, or if you modify it.
+
+  For example, if you distribute copies of such a program, whether
+gratis or for a fee, you must give the recipients all the rights that
+you have.  You must make sure that they, too, receive or can get the
+source code.  And you must show them these terms so they know their
+rights.
+
+  We protect your rights with two steps: (1) copyright the software, and
+(2) offer you this license which gives you legal permission to copy,
+distribute and/or modify the software.
+
+  Also, for each author's protection and ours, we want to make certain
+that everyone understands that there is no warranty for this free
+software.  If the software is modified by someone else and passed on, we
+want its recipients to know that what they have is not the original, so
+that any problems introduced by others will not reflect on the original
+authors' reputations.
+
+  Finally, any free program is threatened constantly by software
+patents.  We wish to avoid the danger that redistributors of a free
+program will individually obtain patent licenses, in effect making the
+program proprietary.  To prevent this, we have made it clear that any
+patent must be licensed for everyone's free use or not licensed at all.
+
+  The precise terms and conditions for copying, distribution and
+modification follow.
+
+		    GNU GENERAL PUBLIC LICENSE
+   TERMS AND CONDITIONS FOR COPYING, DISTRIBUTION AND MODIFICATION
+
+  0. This License applies to any program or other work which contains
+a notice placed by the copyright holder saying it may be distributed
+under the terms of this General Public License.  The "Program", below,
+refers to any such program or work, and a "work based on the Program"
+means either the Program or any derivative work under copyright law:
+that is to say, a work containing the Program or a portion of it,
+either verbatim or with modifications and/or translated into another
+language.  (Hereinafter, translation is included without limitation in
+the term "modification".)  Each licensee is addressed as "you".
+
+Activities other than copying, distribution and modification are not
+covered by this License; they are outside its scope.  The act of
+running the Program is not restricted, and the output from the Program
+is covered only if its contents constitute a work based on the
+Program (independent of having been made by running the Program).
+Whether that is true depends on what the Program does.
+
+  1. You may copy and distribute verbatim copies of the Program's
+source code as you receive it, in any medium, provided that you
+conspicuously and appropriately publish on each copy an appropriate
+copyright notice and disclaimer of warranty; keep intact all the
+notices that refer to this License and to the absence of any warranty;
+and give any other recipients of the Program a copy of this License
+along with the Program.
+
+You may charge a fee for the physical act of transferring a copy, and
+you may at your option offer warranty protection in exchange for a fee.
+
+  2. You may modify your copy or copies of the Program or any portion
+of it, thus forming a work based on the Program, and copy and
+distribute such modifications or work under the terms of Section 1
+above, provided that you also meet all of these conditions:
+
+    a) You must cause the modified files to carry prominent notices
+    stating that you changed the files and the date of any change.
+
+    b) You must cause any work that you distribute or publish, that in
+    whole or in part contains or is derived from the Program or any
+    part thereof, to be licensed as a whole at no charge to all third
+    parties under the terms of this License.
+
+    c) If the modified program normally reads commands interactively
+    when run, you must cause it, when started running for such
+    interactive use in the most ordinary way, to print or display an
+    announcement including an appropriate copyright notice and a
+    notice that there is no warranty (or else, saying that you provide
+    a warranty) and that users may redistribute the program under
+    these conditions, and telling the user how to view a copy of this
+    License.  (Exception: if the Program itself is interactive but
+    does not normally print such an announcement, your work based on
+    the Program is not required to print an announcement.)
+
+These requirements apply to the modified work as a whole.  If
+identifiable sections of that work are not derived from the Program,
+and can be reasonably considered independent and separate works in
+themselves, then this License, and its terms, do not apply to those
+sections when you distribute them as separate works.  But when you
+distribute the same sections as part of a whole which is a work based
+on the Program, the distribution of the whole must be on the terms of
+this License, whose permissions for other licensees extend to the
+entire whole, and thus to each and every part regardless of who wrote it.
+
+Thus, it is not the intent of this section to claim rights or contest
+your rights to work written entirely by you; rather, the intent is to
+exercise the right to control the distribution of derivative or
+collective works based on the Program.
+
+In addition, mere aggregation of another work not based on the Program
+with the Program (or with a work based on the Program) on a volume of
+a storage or distribution medium does not bring the other work under
+the scope of this License.
+
+  3. You may copy and distribute the Program (or a work based on it,
+under Section 2) in object code or executable form under the terms of
+Sections 1 and 2 above provided that you also do one of the following:
+
+    a) Accompany it with the complete corresponding machine-readable
+    source code, which must be distributed under the terms of Sections
+    1 and 2 above on a medium customarily used for software interchange; or,
+
+    b) Accompany it with a written offer, valid for at least three
+    years, to give any third party, for a charge no more than your
+    cost of physically performing source distribution, a complete
+    machine-readable copy of the corresponding source code, to be
+    distributed under the terms of Sections 1 and 2 above on a medium
+    customarily used for software interchange; or,
+
+    c) Accompany it with the information you received as to the offer
+    to distribute corresponding source code.  (This alternative is
+    allowed only for noncommercial distribution and only if you
+    received the program in object code or executable form with such
+    an offer, in accord with Subsection b above.)
+
+The source code for a work means the preferred form of the work for
+making modifications to it.  For an executable work, complete source
+code means all the source code for all modules it contains, plus any
+associated interface definition files, plus the scripts used to
+control compilation and installation of the executable.  However, as a
+special exception, the source code distributed need not include
+anything that is normally distributed (in either source or binary
+form) with the major components (compiler, kernel, and so on) of the
+operating system on which the executable runs, unless that component
+itself accompanies the executable.
+
+If distribution of executable or object code is made by offering
+access to copy from a designated place, then offering equivalent
+access to copy the source code from the same place counts as
+distribution of the source code, even though third parties are not
+compelled to copy the source along with the object code.
+
+  4. You may not copy, modify, sublicense, or distribute the Program
+except as expressly provided under this License.  Any attempt
+otherwise to copy, modify, sublicense or distribute the Program is
+void, and will automatically terminate your rights under this License.
+However, parties who have received copies, or rights, from you under
+this License will not have their licenses terminated so long as such
+parties remain in full compliance.
+
+  5. You are not required to accept this License, since you have not
+signed it.  However, nothing else grants you permission to modify or
+distribute the Program or its derivative works.  These actions are
+prohibited by law if you do not accept this License.  Therefore, by
+modifying or distributing the Program (or any work based on the
+Program), you indicate your acceptance of this License to do so, and
+all its terms and conditions for copying, distributing or modifying
+the Program or works based on it.
+
+  6. Each time you redistribute the Program (or any work based on the
+Program), the recipient automatically receives a license from the
+original licensor to copy, distribute or modify the Program subject to
+these terms and conditions.  You may not impose any further
+restrictions on the recipients' exercise of the rights granted herein.
+You are not responsible for enforcing compliance by third parties to
+this License.
+
+  7. If, as a consequence of a court judgment or allegation of patent
+infringement or for any other reason (not limited to patent issues),
+conditions are imposed on you (whether by court order, agreement or
+otherwise) that contradict the conditions of this License, they do not
+excuse you from the conditions of this License.  If you cannot
+distribute so as to satisfy simultaneously your obligations under this
+License and any other pertinent obligations, then as a consequence you
+may not distribute the Program at all.  For example, if a patent
+license would not permit royalty-free redistribution of the Program by
+all those who receive copies directly or indirectly through you, then
+the only way you could satisfy both it and this License would be to
+refrain entirely from distribution of the Program.
+
+If any portion of this section is held invalid or unenforceable under
+any particular circumstance, the balance of the section is intended to
+apply and the section as a whole is intended to apply in other
+circumstances.
+
+It is not the purpose of this section to induce you to infringe any
+patents or other property right claims or to contest validity of any
+such claims; this section has the sole purpose of protecting the
+integrity of the free software distribution system, which is
+implemented by public license practices.  Many people have made
+generous contributions to the wide range of software distributed
+through that system in reliance on consistent application of that
+system; it is up to the author/donor to decide if he or she is willing
+to distribute software through any other system and a licensee cannot
+impose that choice.
+
+This section is intended to make thoroughly clear what is believed to
+be a consequence of the rest of this License.
+
+  8. If the distribution and/or use of the Program is restricted in
+certain countries either by patents or by copyrighted interfaces, the
+original copyright holder who places the Program under this License
+may add an explicit geographical distribution limitation excluding
+those countries, so that distribution is permitted only in or among
+countries not thus excluded.  In such case, this License incorporates
+the limitation as if written in the body of this License.
+
+  9. The Free Software Foundation may publish revised and/or new versions
+of the General Public License from time to time.  Such new versions will
+be similar in spirit to the present version, but may differ in detail to
+address new problems or concerns.
+
+Each version is given a distinguishing version number.  If the Program
+specifies a version number of this License which applies to it and "any
+later version", you have the option of following the terms and conditions
+either of that version or of any later version published by the Free
+Software Foundation.  If the Program does not specify a version number of
+this License, you may choose any version ever published by the Free Software
+Foundation.
+
+  10. If you wish to incorporate parts of the Program into other free
+programs whose distribution conditions are different, write to the author
+to ask for permission.  For software which is copyrighted by the Free
+Software Foundation, write to the Free Software Foundation; we sometimes
+make exceptions for this.  Our decision will be guided by the two goals
+of preserving the free status of all derivatives of our free software and
+of promoting the sharing and reuse of software generally.
+
+			    NO WARRANTY
+
+  11. BECAUSE THE PROGRAM IS LICENSED FREE OF CHARGE, THERE IS NO WARRANTY
+FOR THE PROGRAM, TO THE EXTENT PERMITTED BY APPLICABLE LAW.  EXCEPT WHEN
+OTHERWISE STATED IN WRITING THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND/OR OTHER PARTIES
+PROVIDE THE PROGRAM "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESSED
+OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  THE ENTIRE RISK AS
+TO THE QUALITY AND PERFORMANCE OF THE PROGRAM IS WITH YOU.  SHOULD THE
+PROGRAM PROVE DEFECTIVE, YOU ASSUME THE COST OF ALL NECESSARY SERVICING,
+REPAIR OR CORRECTION.
+
+  12. IN NO EVENT UNLESS REQUIRED BY APPLICABLE LAW OR AGREED TO IN WRITING
+WILL ANY COPYRIGHT HOLDER, OR ANY OTHER PARTY WHO MAY MODIFY AND/OR
+REDISTRIBUTE THE PROGRAM AS PERMITTED ABOVE, BE LIABLE TO YOU FOR DAMAGES,
+INCLUDING ANY GENERAL, SPECIAL, INCIDENTAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES ARISING
+OUT OF THE USE OR INABILITY TO USE THE PROGRAM (INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED
+TO LOSS OF DATA OR DATA BEING RENDERED INACCURATE OR LOSSES SUSTAINED BY
+YOU OR THIRD PARTIES OR A FAILURE OF THE PROGRAM TO OPERATE WITH ANY OTHER
+PROGRAMS), EVEN IF SUCH HOLDER OR OTHER PARTY HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE
+POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES.
+
+		     END OF TERMS AND CONDITIONS
+
+	Appendix: How to Apply These Terms to Your New Programs
+
+  If you develop a new program, and you want it to be of the greatest
+possible use to the public, the best way to achieve this is to make it
+free software which everyone can redistribute and change under these terms.
+
+  To do so, attach the following notices to the program.  It is safest
+to attach them to the start of each source file to most effectively
+convey the exclusion of warranty; and each file should have at least
+the "copyright" line and a pointer to where the full notice is found.
+
+    <one line to give the program's name and a brief idea of what it does.>
+    Copyright (C) 19yy  <name of author>
+
+    This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+    it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+    the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+    (at your option) any later version.
+
+    This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+    but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+    MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+    GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+    You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+    along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+    Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA.
+
+Also add information on how to contact you by electronic and paper mail.
+
+If the program is interactive, make it output a short notice like this
+when it starts in an interactive mode:
+
+    Gnomovision version 69, Copyright (C) 19yy name of author
+    Gnomovision comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY; for details type `show w'.
+    This is free software, and you are welcome to redistribute it
+    under certain conditions; type `show c' for details.
+
+The hypothetical commands `show w' and `show c' should show the appropriate
+parts of the General Public License.  Of course, the commands you use may
+be called something other than `show w' and `show c'; they could even be
+mouse-clicks or menu items--whatever suits your program.
+
+You should also get your employer (if you work as a programmer) or your
+school, if any, to sign a "copyright disclaimer" for the program, if
+necessary.  Here is a sample; alter the names:
+
+  Yoyodyne, Inc., hereby disclaims all copyright interest in the program
+  `Gnomovision' (which makes passes at compilers) written by James Hacker.
+
+  <signature of Ty Coon>, 1 April 1989
+  Ty Coon, President of Vice
+
+This General Public License does not permit incorporating your program into
+proprietary programs.  If your program is a subroutine library, you may
+consider it more useful to permit linking proprietary applications with the
+library.  If this is what you want to do, use the GNU Library General
+Public License instead of this License.
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/INSTALL b/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/INSTALL
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7c5e4c6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/INSTALL
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+
+To install:
+
+	perl Makefile.PL
+
+to construct the Makefile, then
+
+	make test
+
+to test the package.  If it fails any tests, please send me the output
+of `make test' and `perl -V'.  I'll tell you whether it is safe to go
+ahead, or I'll provide a fix.
+
+If it passes the tests, use
+
+	make install
+
+to install it.
+
+Detailed documentation is at the bottom of the lib/Text/Template.pm
+file.  You may be able to view it with the following command:
+
+        perldoc Text::Template
+ 
+Or:
+
+        perldoc lib/Text/Template.pm
+
+If you have problems, send me mail:
+
+mjd-perl-template+@plover.com
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/MANIFEST b/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/MANIFEST
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..22460fe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/MANIFEST
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+MANIFEST
+COPYING
+Artistic
+Makefile.PL
+INSTALL
+README
+lib/Text/Template.pm
+lib/Text/Template/Preprocess.pm
+t/00-version.t
+t/01-basic.t
+t/02-hash.t
+t/03-out.t
+t/04-safe.t
+t/05-safe2.t
+t/06-ofh.t
+t/07-safe3.t
+t/08-exported.t
+t/09-error.t
+t/10-delimiters.t
+t/11-prepend.t
+t/12-preprocess.t
+t/13-taint.t
+t/14-broken.t
+META.yml                                 Module meta-data (added by MakeMaker)
+META.json                                Module JSON meta-data (added by MakeMaker)
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/META.json b/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/META.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6b335eb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/META.json
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+{
+   "abstract" : "unknown",
+   "author" : [
+      "unknown"
+   ],
+   "dynamic_config" : 1,
+   "generated_by" : "ExtUtils::MakeMaker version 6.62, CPAN::Meta::Converter version 2.120630",
+   "license" : [
+      "unknown"
+   ],
+   "meta-spec" : {
+      "url" : "http://search.cpan.org/perldoc?CPAN::Meta::Spec",
+      "version" : "2"
+   },
+   "name" : "Text-Template",
+   "no_index" : {
+      "directory" : [
+         "t",
+         "inc"
+      ]
+   },
+   "prereqs" : {
+      "build" : {
+         "requires" : {
+            "ExtUtils::MakeMaker" : "0"
+         }
+      },
+      "configure" : {
+         "requires" : {
+            "ExtUtils::MakeMaker" : "0"
+         }
+      },
+      "runtime" : {
+         "requires" : {}
+      }
+   },
+   "release_status" : "stable",
+   "version" : "1.46"
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/META.yml b/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/META.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a2e2715
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/META.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+---
+abstract: unknown
+author:
+  - unknown
+build_requires:
+  ExtUtils::MakeMaker: 0
+configure_requires:
+  ExtUtils::MakeMaker: 0
+dynamic_config: 1
+generated_by: 'ExtUtils::MakeMaker version 6.62, CPAN::Meta::Converter version 2.120630'
+license: unknown
+meta-spec:
+  url: http://module-build.sourceforge.net/META-spec-v1.4.html
+  version: 1.4
+name: Text-Template
+no_index:
+  directory:
+    - t
+    - inc
+requires: {}
+version: 1.46
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/Makefile.PL b/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/Makefile.PL
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..491e03c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/Makefile.PL
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+use ExtUtils::MakeMaker;
+WriteMakefile(
+	      NAME => 'Text::Template',
+	      VERSION_FROM => 'lib/Text/Template.pm',
+#	      'linkext' => {LINKTYPE => ''},
+	      'dist' => {COMPRESS => 'gzip', SUFFIX => 'gz'},
+);
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/README b/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/README
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e184d8c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/README
@@ -0,0 +1,339 @@
+
+Text::Template v1.46
+
+This is a library for generating form letters, building HTML pages, or
+filling in templates generally.  A `template' is a piece of text that
+has little Perl programs embedded in it here and there.  When you
+`fill in' a template, you evaluate the little programs and replace
+them with their values.  
+
+Here's an example of a template:
+
+	Dear {$title} {$lastname},
+
+	It has come to our attention that you are delinquent in your
+	{$monthname[$last_paid_month]} payment.  Please remit
+	${sprintf("%.2f", $amount)} immediately, or your patellae may
+	be needlessly endangered.
+
+			Love,
+
+			Mark "{nickname(rand 20)}" Dominus
+
+
+The result of filling in this template is a string, which might look
+something like this:
+
+	Dear Mr. Gates,
+
+	It has come to our attention that you are delinquent in your
+	February payment.  Please remit
+	$392.12 immediately, or your patellae may
+	be needlessly endangered.
+
+
+			Love,
+
+			Mark "Vizopteryx" Dominus
+
+You can store a template in a file outside your program.  People can
+modify the template without modifying the program.  You can separate
+the formatting details from the main code, and put the formatting
+parts of the program into the template.  That prevents code bloat and
+encourages functional separation.
+
+You can fill in the template in a `Safe' compartment.  This means that
+if you don't trust the person who wrote the code in the template, you
+won't have to worry that they are tampering with your program when you
+execute it.  
+
+----------------------------------------------------------------
+
+Text::Template was originally released some time in late 1995 or early
+1996.  After three years of study and investigation, I rewrote it from
+scratch in January 1999.  The new version, 1.0, was much faster,
+delivered better functionality and was almost 100% backward-compatible
+with the previous beta versions.
+
+I have added a number of useful features and conveniences since the
+1.0 release, while still retaining backward compatibility.  With one
+merely cosmetic change, the current version of Text::Template passes
+the test suite that the old beta versions passed.
+
+Questions or comments should be addressed to
+mjd-perl-template+@plover.com.  This address goes directly to me, and
+not to anyone else; it is not a mailing list address.
+
+To receive occasional announcements of new versions of T::T, send an
+empty note to mjd-perl-template-request@plover.com.  This mailing list
+is not for discussion; it is for announcements only.  Therefore, there
+is no address for sending messages to the list.
+
+You can get the most recent version of Text::Template, news, comments,
+and other collateral information from
+<URL:http://www.plover.com/~mjd/perl/Template/>.
+
+----------------------------------------------------------------
+
+What's new in v1.46 since v1.44:
+
+        Thanks to Rik Signes, there is a new
+        Text::Template->append_text_to_output method, which
+        Text::Template always uses whenever it wants to emit output.
+        You can subclass this to get control over the output, for
+        example for postprocessing.
+
+        A spurious warning is no longer emitted when the TYPE
+        parameter to ->new is omitted.
+
+----------------------------------------------------------------
+What's new in v1.44 since v1.43: 
+
+This is a maintentance release.  There are no feature changes.
+
+        _scrubpkg, which was responsible for eptying out temporary
+        packages after the module had done with them, wasn't always
+        working; the result was memory-leaks in long-running
+        applications.  This should be fixed now, and there is a test
+        in the test suite for it.
+
+        Minor changes to the test suite to prevent spurious errors.
+
+        Minor documentation changes.
+
+----------------------------------------------------------------
+What's new in v1.43 since v1.42:
+
+        The ->new method now fails immediately and sets
+        $Text::Template::ERROR if the file that is named by a filename
+        argument does not exist or cannot be opened for some other
+        reason.  Formerly, the constructor would succeed and the
+        ->fill_in call would fail.
+
+----------------------------------------------------------------
+
+What's new in v1.42 since v1.41:
+
+This is a maintentance release.  There are no feature changes.
+
+        Fixed a bug relating to use of UNTAINT under perl 5.005_03 and
+        possibly other versions.
+
+        Taint-related tests are now more comprehensive.
+----------------------------------------------------------------
+
+What's new in v1.41 since v1.40:
+
+This is a maintentance release.  There are no feature changes.
+
+        Tests now work correctly on Windows systems and possibly on
+        other non-unix systems.
+
+----------------------------------------------------------------
+
+What's new in v1.40 since v1.31:
+
+        New UNTAINT option tells the module that it is safe to 'eval'
+        code even though it has come from a file or filehandle.
+
+        Code added to prevent memory leaks when filling many
+        templates.  Thanks to Itamar Almeida de Carvalho.
+
+        Bug fix:  $OUT was not correctly initialized when used in
+        conjunction with SAFE.
+
+        You may now use a glob ref when passing a filehandle to the
+        ->new funcion.  Formerly, a glob was reuqired.
+
+        New subclass:  Text::Template::Preprocess.  Just like
+        Text::Template, but you may supply a PREPROCESS option in the
+        constructor or the fill_in call; this is a function which
+        receives each code fragment prior to evaluation, and which may
+        modify and return the fragment; the modified fragment is what
+        is evaluated.
+
+        Error messages passed to BROKEN subroutines will now report
+        the correct line number of the template at which the error
+        occurred:
+
+                Illegal division by zero at template line 37.
+
+        If the template comes from a file, the filename will be
+        reported as well:
+
+                Illegal division by zero at catalog.tmpl line 37.
+
+
+        INCOMPATIBLE CHANGE:
+
+        The format of the default error message has changed.  It used
+        to look like:
+
+                Program fragment at line 30 delivered error ``Illegal division by zero''
+
+        It now looks like:
+
+                Program fragment delivered error ``Illegal division by zero at catalog.tmpl line 37''
+
+        Note that the default message used to report the line number
+        at which the program fragment began; it now reports the line
+        number at which the error actually occurred.
+
+----------------------------------------------------------------
+What's new in v1.31 since v1.23:
+
+	Just bug fixes---fill_in_string was failing.  Thanks to 
+        Donald L. Greer Jr. for the test case.
+
+----------------------------------------------------------------
+What's new in v1.23 since v1.22:
+
+	Small bug fix:  DELIMITER and other arguments were being
+	ignored in calls to fill_in_file and fill_this_in.  (Thanks to
+	Jonathan Roy for reporting this.)
+
+----------------------------------------------------------------
+What's new in v1.22 since v1.20:
+
+	You can now specify that certain Perl statements be prepended
+	to the beginning of every program fragment in a template,
+	either per template, or for all templates, or for the duration
+	of only one call to fill_in.  This is useful, for example, if
+	you want to enable `strict' checks in your templates but you
+	don't want to manually add `use strict' to the front of every
+	program fragment everywhere.
+
+----------------------------------------------------------------
+What's new in v1.20 since v1.12:
+
+	You can now specify that the program fragment delimiters are
+	strings other than { and }.  This has three interesting
+	effects: First, it changes the delimiter strings.  Second, it
+	disables the special meaning of \, so you have to be really,
+	really sure that the delimiters will not appear in your
+	templates.  And third, because of the simplifications
+	introduced by the elimination of \ processing, template
+	parsing is 20-25% faster.
+
+	See the manual section on `Alternative Delimiters'.
+
+	Fixed bug having to do with undefined values in HASH options.
+	In particular, Text::Template no longer generates a warning if
+	you try to give a variable an undefined value.
+
+----------------------------------------------------------------
+
+What's new in v1.12 since v1.11:
+
+	I forgot to say that Text::Template ISA Exporter, so the
+	exported functions never got exported.  Duhhh!
+
+	Template TYPEs are now case-insensitive.  The `new' method now
+	diagnoses attempts to use an invalid TYPE.
+
+	More tests for these things.
+
+----------------------------------------------------------------
+
+What's new in v1.11 since v1.10:
+
+	Fixed a bug in the way backslashes were processed.  The 1.10
+	behavior was incompatible with the beta versions and was also
+	inconvenient.  (`\n' in templates was replaced with `n' before
+	it was given to Perl for evaluation.)  The new behavior is
+	also incompatible with the beta versions, but it is only a
+	little bit incompatible, and it is probbaly better.
+
+	Documentation for the new behavior, and tests for the bug.
+
+----------------------------------------------------------------
+
+What's new in v1.10 since v1.03:
+
+	New OUTPUT option delivers template results directly to a
+	filehandle instead of making them into a string.  Saves space
+	and time. 
+
+	PACKAGE and HASH now work intelligently with SAFE.
+
+	Fragments may now output data directly to the template, rather
+	than having to arrange to return it as a return value at the
+	end.  This means that where you used to have to write this:
+
+			{ my $blist = '';
+		          foreach $i (@items) {
+		            $blist .= qq{  * $i\n};
+		          }    
+		          $blist;
+		        } 
+
+	You can now write this instead, because $OUT is special.
+
+			{ foreach $i (@items) {
+		            $OUT.= "  * $i\n";
+		          }    
+		        } 
+
+	(`A spoonful of sugar makes the medicine go down.')
+
+	Fixed some small bugs.  Worked around a bug in Perl that does
+	the wrong thing with $x = <Y> when $x contains a glob.
+
+	More documentation.  Errors fixed.
+
+	Lots more tests.  
+
+----------------------------------------------------------------
+
+What's new in v1.03 since v1.0:
+
+	Code added to support HASH option to fill_in.
+	(Incl. `_gensym' function.)
+	
+	Documentation for HASH.
+	
+	New test file for HASH.
+	
+	Note about failure of lexical variables to propagate into
+ 	templates.  Why does this surprise people?
+	
+	Bug fix: program fragments are evaluated in an environment with
+ 	`no strict' by default.  Otherwise, you get a lot of `Global
+ 	symbol "$v" requires explicit package name' failures.  Why didn't
+ 	the test program pick this up?  Because the only variable the test
+ 	program ever used was `$a', which is exempt.  Duhhhhh.
+	
+	Fixed the test program.
+	
+	Various minor documentation fixes.
+
+
+
+----------------------------------------------------------------
+
+Improvements of 1.0 over the old 0.1beta:
+
+New features:
+
+      At least twice as fast 
+
+      Better support for filling out the same template more than once 
+
+      Now supports evaluation of program fragments in Safe
+      compartments. (Thanks, Jonathan!)  
+
+      Better argument syntax 
+
+      More convenience functions 
+
+      The parser is much better and simpler. 
+
+      Once a template is parsed, the parsed version is stored so that
+      it needn't be parsed again.  
+
+      BROKEN function behavior is rationalized. You can now pass an
+      arbitrary argument to your BROKEN function, or return a value
+      from it to the main program.  
+
+      Documentation overhauled. 
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/lib/Text/Template.pm b/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/lib/Text/Template.pm
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dc4f3ba
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/lib/Text/Template.pm
@@ -0,0 +1,1973 @@
+# -*- perl -*-
+# Text::Template.pm
+#
+# Fill in `templates'
+#
+# Copyright 2013 M. J. Dominus.
+# You may copy and distribute this program under the
+# same terms as Perl iteself.  
+# If in doubt, write to mjd-perl-template+@plover.com for a license.
+#
+# Version 1.46
+
+package Text::Template;
+require 5.004;
+use Exporter;
+@ISA = qw(Exporter);
+@EXPORT_OK = qw(fill_in_file fill_in_string TTerror);
+use vars '$ERROR';
+use strict;
+
+$Text::Template::VERSION = '1.46';
+my %GLOBAL_PREPEND = ('Text::Template' => '');
+
+sub Version {
+  $Text::Template::VERSION;
+}
+
+sub _param {
+  my $kk;
+  my ($k, %h) = @_;
+  for $kk ($k, "\u$k", "\U$k", "-$k", "-\u$k", "-\U$k") {
+    return $h{$kk} if exists $h{$kk};
+  }
+  return;
+}
+
+sub always_prepend
+{
+  my $pack = shift;
+  my $old = $GLOBAL_PREPEND{$pack};
+  $GLOBAL_PREPEND{$pack} = shift;
+  $old;
+}
+
+{
+  my %LEGAL_TYPE;
+  BEGIN { 
+    %LEGAL_TYPE = map {$_=>1} qw(FILE FILEHANDLE STRING ARRAY);
+  }
+  sub new {
+    my $pack = shift;
+    my %a = @_;
+    my $stype = uc(_param('type', %a) || "FILE");
+    my $source = _param('source', %a);
+    my $untaint = _param('untaint', %a);
+    my $prepend = _param('prepend', %a);
+    my $alt_delim = _param('delimiters', %a);
+    my $broken = _param('broken', %a);
+    unless (defined $source) {
+      require Carp;
+      Carp::croak("Usage: $ {pack}::new(TYPE => ..., SOURCE => ...)");
+    }
+    unless ($LEGAL_TYPE{$stype}) {
+      require Carp;
+      Carp::croak("Illegal value `$stype' for TYPE parameter");
+    }
+    my $self = {TYPE => $stype,
+		PREPEND => $prepend,
+                UNTAINT => $untaint,
+                BROKEN => $broken,
+		(defined $alt_delim ? (DELIM => $alt_delim) : ()),
+	       };
+    # Under 5.005_03, if any of $stype, $prepend, $untaint, or $broken
+    # are tainted, all the others become tainted too as a result of
+    # sharing the expression with them.  We install $source separately
+    # to prevent it from acquiring a spurious taint.
+    $self->{SOURCE} = $source;
+
+    bless $self => $pack;
+    return unless $self->_acquire_data;
+    
+    $self;
+  }
+}
+
+# Convert template objects of various types to type STRING,
+# in which the template data is embedded in the object itself.
+sub _acquire_data {
+  my ($self) = @_;
+  my $type = $self->{TYPE};
+  if ($type eq 'STRING') {
+    # nothing necessary    
+  } elsif ($type eq 'FILE') {
+    my $data = _load_text($self->{SOURCE});
+    unless (defined $data) {
+      # _load_text already set $ERROR
+      return undef;
+    }
+    if ($self->{UNTAINT} && _is_clean($self->{SOURCE})) {
+      _unconditionally_untaint($data);
+    }
+    $self->{TYPE} = 'STRING';
+    $self->{FILENAME} = $self->{SOURCE};
+    $self->{SOURCE} = $data;
+  } elsif ($type eq 'ARRAY') {
+    $self->{TYPE} = 'STRING';
+    $self->{SOURCE} = join '', @{$self->{SOURCE}};
+  } elsif ($type eq 'FILEHANDLE') {
+    $self->{TYPE} = 'STRING';
+    local $/;
+    my $fh = $self->{SOURCE};
+    my $data = <$fh>; # Extra assignment avoids bug in Solaris perl5.00[45].
+    if ($self->{UNTAINT}) {
+      _unconditionally_untaint($data);
+    }
+    $self->{SOURCE} = $data;
+  } else {
+    # This should have been caught long ago, so it represents a 
+    # drastic `can't-happen' sort of failure
+    my $pack = ref $self;
+    die "Can only acquire data for $pack objects of subtype STRING, but this is $type; aborting";
+  }
+  $self->{DATA_ACQUIRED} = 1;
+}
+
+sub source {
+  my ($self) = @_;
+  $self->_acquire_data unless $self->{DATA_ACQUIRED};
+  return $self->{SOURCE};
+}
+
+sub set_source_data {
+  my ($self, $newdata) = @_;
+  $self->{SOURCE} = $newdata;
+  $self->{DATA_ACQUIRED} = 1;
+  $self->{TYPE} = 'STRING';
+  1;
+}
+
+sub compile {
+  my $self = shift;
+
+  return 1 if $self->{TYPE} eq 'PREPARSED';
+
+  return undef unless $self->_acquire_data;
+  unless ($self->{TYPE} eq 'STRING') {
+    my $pack = ref $self;
+    # This should have been caught long ago, so it represents a 
+    # drastic `can't-happen' sort of failure
+    die "Can only compile $pack objects of subtype STRING, but this is $self->{TYPE}; aborting";
+  }
+
+  my @tokens;
+  my $delim_pats = shift() || $self->{DELIM};
+
+  
+
+  my ($t_open, $t_close) = ('{', '}');
+  my $DELIM;			# Regex matches a delimiter if $delim_pats
+  if (defined $delim_pats) {
+    ($t_open, $t_close) = @$delim_pats;
+    $DELIM = "(?:(?:\Q$t_open\E)|(?:\Q$t_close\E))";
+    @tokens = split /($DELIM|\n)/, $self->{SOURCE};
+  } else {
+    @tokens = split /(\\\\(?=\\*[{}])|\\[{}]|[{}\n])/, $self->{SOURCE};
+  }
+  my $state = 'TEXT';
+  my $depth = 0;
+  my $lineno = 1;
+  my @content;
+  my $cur_item = '';
+  my $prog_start;
+  while (@tokens) {
+    my $t = shift @tokens;
+    next if $t eq '';
+    if ($t eq $t_open) {	# Brace or other opening delimiter
+      if ($depth == 0) {
+	push @content, [$state, $cur_item, $lineno] if $cur_item ne '';
+	$cur_item = '';
+	$state = 'PROG';
+	$prog_start = $lineno;
+      } else {
+	$cur_item .= $t;
+      }
+      $depth++;
+    } elsif ($t eq $t_close) {	# Brace or other closing delimiter
+      $depth--;
+      if ($depth < 0) {
+	$ERROR = "Unmatched close brace at line $lineno";
+	return undef;
+      } elsif ($depth == 0) {
+	push @content, [$state, $cur_item, $prog_start] if $cur_item ne '';
+	$state = 'TEXT';
+	$cur_item = '';
+      } else {
+	$cur_item .= $t;
+      }
+    } elsif (!$delim_pats && $t eq '\\\\') { # precedes \\\..\\\{ or \\\..\\\}
+      $cur_item .= '\\';
+    } elsif (!$delim_pats && $t =~ /^\\([{}])$/) { # Escaped (literal) brace?
+	$cur_item .= $1;
+    } elsif ($t eq "\n") {	# Newline
+      $lineno++;
+      $cur_item .= $t;
+    } else {			# Anything else
+      $cur_item .= $t;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if ($state eq 'PROG') {
+    $ERROR = "End of data inside program text that began at line $prog_start";
+    return undef;
+  } elsif ($state eq 'TEXT') {
+    push @content, [$state, $cur_item, $lineno] if $cur_item ne '';
+  } else {
+    die "Can't happen error #1";
+  }
+  
+  $self->{TYPE} = 'PREPARSED';
+  $self->{SOURCE} = \@content;
+  1;
+}
+
+sub prepend_text {
+  my ($self) = @_;
+  my $t = $self->{PREPEND};
+  unless (defined $t) {
+    $t = $GLOBAL_PREPEND{ref $self};
+    unless (defined $t) {
+      $t = $GLOBAL_PREPEND{'Text::Template'};
+    }
+  }
+  $self->{PREPEND} = $_[1] if $#_ >= 1;
+  return $t;
+}
+
+sub fill_in {
+  my $fi_self = shift;
+  my %fi_a = @_;
+
+  unless ($fi_self->{TYPE} eq 'PREPARSED') {
+    my $delims = _param('delimiters', %fi_a);
+    my @delim_arg = (defined $delims ? ($delims) : ());
+    $fi_self->compile(@delim_arg)
+      or return undef;
+  }
+
+  my $fi_varhash = _param('hash', %fi_a);
+  my $fi_package = _param('package', %fi_a) ;
+  my $fi_broken  = 
+    _param('broken', %fi_a)  || $fi_self->{BROKEN} || \&_default_broken;
+  my $fi_broken_arg = _param('broken_arg', %fi_a) || [];
+  my $fi_safe = _param('safe', %fi_a);
+  my $fi_ofh = _param('output', %fi_a);
+  my $fi_eval_package;
+  my $fi_scrub_package = 0;
+  my $fi_filename = _param('filename') || $fi_self->{FILENAME} || 'template';
+
+  my $fi_prepend = _param('prepend', %fi_a);
+  unless (defined $fi_prepend) {
+    $fi_prepend = $fi_self->prepend_text;
+  }
+
+  if (defined $fi_safe) {
+    $fi_eval_package = 'main';
+  } elsif (defined $fi_package) {
+    $fi_eval_package = $fi_package;
+  } elsif (defined $fi_varhash) {
+    $fi_eval_package = _gensym();
+    $fi_scrub_package = 1;
+  } else {
+    $fi_eval_package = caller;
+  }
+
+  my $fi_install_package;
+  if (defined $fi_varhash) {
+    if (defined $fi_package) {
+      $fi_install_package = $fi_package;
+    } elsif (defined $fi_safe) {
+      $fi_install_package = $fi_safe->root;
+    } else {
+      $fi_install_package = $fi_eval_package; # The gensymmed one
+    }
+    _install_hash($fi_varhash => $fi_install_package);
+  }
+
+  if (defined $fi_package && defined $fi_safe) {
+    no strict 'refs';
+    # Big fat magic here: Fix it so that the user-specified package
+    # is the default one available in the safe compartment.
+    *{$fi_safe->root . '::'} = \%{$fi_package . '::'};   # LOD
+  }
+
+  my $fi_r = '';
+  my $fi_item;
+  foreach $fi_item (@{$fi_self->{SOURCE}}) {
+    my ($fi_type, $fi_text, $fi_lineno) = @$fi_item;
+    if ($fi_type eq 'TEXT') {
+      $fi_self->append_text_to_output(
+        text   => $fi_text,
+        handle => $fi_ofh,
+        out    => \$fi_r,
+        type   => $fi_type,
+      );
+    } elsif ($fi_type eq 'PROG') {
+      no strict;
+      my $fi_lcomment = "#line $fi_lineno $fi_filename";
+      my $fi_progtext = 
+        "package $fi_eval_package; $fi_prepend;\n$fi_lcomment\n$fi_text;";
+      my $fi_res;
+      my $fi_eval_err = '';
+      if ($fi_safe) {
+        $fi_safe->reval(q{undef $OUT});
+	$fi_res = $fi_safe->reval($fi_progtext);
+	$fi_eval_err = $@;
+	my $OUT = $fi_safe->reval('$OUT');
+	$fi_res = $OUT if defined $OUT;
+      } else {
+	my $OUT;
+	$fi_res = eval $fi_progtext;
+	$fi_eval_err = $@;
+	$fi_res = $OUT if defined $OUT;
+      }
+
+      # If the value of the filled-in text really was undef,
+      # change it to an explicit empty string to avoid undefined
+      # value warnings later.
+      $fi_res = '' unless defined $fi_res;
+
+      if ($fi_eval_err) {
+	$fi_res = $fi_broken->(text => $fi_text,
+			       error => $fi_eval_err,
+			       lineno => $fi_lineno,
+			       arg => $fi_broken_arg,
+			       );
+	if (defined $fi_res) {
+          $fi_self->append_text_to_output(
+            text   => $fi_res,
+            handle => $fi_ofh,
+            out    => \$fi_r,
+            type   => $fi_type,
+          );
+	} else {
+	  return $fi_res;		# Undefined means abort processing
+	}
+      } else {
+        $fi_self->append_text_to_output(
+          text   => $fi_res,
+          handle => $fi_ofh,
+          out    => \$fi_r,
+          type   => $fi_type,
+        );
+      }
+    } else {
+      die "Can't happen error #2";
+    }
+  }
+
+  _scrubpkg($fi_eval_package) if $fi_scrub_package;
+  defined $fi_ofh ? 1 : $fi_r;
+}
+
+sub append_text_to_output {
+  my ($self, %arg) = @_;
+
+  if (defined $arg{handle}) {
+    print { $arg{handle} } $arg{text};
+  } else {
+    ${ $arg{out} } .= $arg{text};
+  }
+
+  return;
+}
+
+sub fill_this_in {
+  my $pack = shift;
+  my $text = shift;
+  my $templ = $pack->new(TYPE => 'STRING', SOURCE => $text, @_)
+    or return undef;
+  $templ->compile or return undef;
+  my $result = $templ->fill_in(@_);
+  $result;
+}
+
+sub fill_in_string {
+  my $string = shift;
+  my $package = _param('package', @_);
+  push @_, 'package' => scalar(caller) unless defined $package;
+  Text::Template->fill_this_in($string, @_);
+}
+
+sub fill_in_file {
+  my $fn = shift;
+  my $templ = Text::Template->new(TYPE => 'FILE', SOURCE => $fn, @_)
+    or return undef;
+  $templ->compile or return undef;
+  my $text = $templ->fill_in(@_);
+  $text;
+}
+
+sub _default_broken {
+  my %a = @_;
+  my $prog_text = $a{text};
+  my $err = $a{error};
+  my $lineno = $a{lineno};
+  chomp $err;
+#  $err =~ s/\s+at .*//s;
+  "Program fragment delivered error ``$err''";
+}
+
+sub _load_text {
+  my $fn = shift;
+  local *F;
+  unless (open F, $fn) {
+    $ERROR = "Couldn't open file $fn: $!";
+    return undef;
+  }
+  local $/;
+  <F>;
+}
+
+sub _is_clean {
+  my $z;
+  eval { ($z = join('', @_)), eval '#' . substr($z,0,0); 1 }   # LOD
+}
+
+sub _unconditionally_untaint {
+  for (@_) {
+    ($_) = /(.*)/s;
+  }
+}
+
+{
+  my $seqno = 0;
+  sub _gensym {
+    __PACKAGE__ . '::GEN' . $seqno++;
+  }
+  sub _scrubpkg {
+    my $s = shift;
+    $s =~ s/^Text::Template:://;
+    no strict 'refs';
+    my $hash = $Text::Template::{$s."::"};
+    foreach my $key (keys %$hash) {
+      undef $hash->{$key};
+    }
+  }
+}
+  
+# Given a hashful of variables (or a list of such hashes)
+# install the variables into the specified package,
+# overwriting whatever variables were there before.
+sub _install_hash {
+  my $hashlist = shift;
+  my $dest = shift;
+  if (UNIVERSAL::isa($hashlist, 'HASH')) {
+    $hashlist = [$hashlist];
+  }
+  my $hash;
+  foreach $hash (@$hashlist) {
+    my $name;
+    foreach $name (keys %$hash) {
+      my $val = $hash->{$name};
+      no strict 'refs';
+      local *SYM = *{"$ {dest}::$name"};
+      if (! defined $val) {
+	delete ${"$ {dest}::"}{$name};
+      } elsif (ref $val) {
+	*SYM = $val;
+      } else {
+ 	*SYM = \$val;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+sub TTerror { $ERROR }
+
+1;
+
+
+=head1 NAME 
+
+Text::Template - Expand template text with embedded Perl
+
+=head1 VERSION
+
+This file documents C<Text::Template> version B<1.46>
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ use Text::Template;
+
+
+ $template = Text::Template->new(TYPE => 'FILE',  SOURCE => 'filename.tmpl');
+ $template = Text::Template->new(TYPE => 'ARRAY', SOURCE => [ ... ] );
+ $template = Text::Template->new(TYPE => 'FILEHANDLE', SOURCE => $fh );
+ $template = Text::Template->new(TYPE => 'STRING', SOURCE => '...' );
+ $template = Text::Template->new(PREPEND => q{use strict;}, ...);
+
+ # Use a different template file syntax:
+ $template = Text::Template->new(DELIMITERS => [$open, $close], ...);
+
+ $recipient = 'King';
+ $text = $template->fill_in();  # Replaces `{$recipient}' with `King'
+ print $text;
+
+ $T::recipient = 'Josh';
+ $text = $template->fill_in(PACKAGE => T);
+
+ # Pass many variables explicitly
+ $hash = { recipient => 'Abed-Nego',
+           friends => [ 'me', 'you' ],
+           enemies => { loathsome => 'Bill Gates',
+                        fearsome => 'Larry Ellison' },
+         };
+ $text = $template->fill_in(HASH => $hash, ...);
+ # $recipient is Abed-Nego,
+ # @friends is ( 'me', 'you' ),
+ # %enemies is ( loathsome => ..., fearsome => ... )
+
+
+ # Call &callback in case of programming errors in template
+ $text = $template->fill_in(BROKEN => \&callback, BROKEN_ARG => $ref, ...);
+
+ # Evaluate program fragments in Safe compartment with restricted permissions
+ $text = $template->fill_in(SAFE => $compartment, ...);
+
+ # Print result text instead of returning it
+ $success = $template->fill_in(OUTPUT => \*FILEHANDLE, ...);
+
+ # Parse template with different template file syntax:
+ $text = $template->fill_in(DELIMITERS => [$open, $close], ...);
+ # Note that this is *faster* than using the default delimiters
+
+ # Prepend specified perl code to each fragment before evaluating:
+ $text = $template->fill_in(PREPEND => q{use strict 'vars';}, ...);
+
+ use Text::Template 'fill_in_string';
+ $text = fill_in_string( <<EOM, PACKAGE => 'T', ...);
+ Dear {$recipient},
+ Pay me at once.
+        Love, 
+         G.V.
+ EOM
+
+ use Text::Template 'fill_in_file';
+ $text = fill_in_file($filename, ...);
+
+ # All templates will always have `use strict vars' attached to all fragments
+ Text::Template->always_prepend(q{use strict 'vars';});
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+This is a library for generating form letters, building HTML pages, or
+filling in templates generally.  A `template' is a piece of text that
+has little Perl programs embedded in it here and there.  When you
+`fill in' a template, you evaluate the little programs and replace
+them with their values.  
+
+You can store a template in a file outside your program.  People can
+modify the template without modifying the program.  You can separate
+the formatting details from the main code, and put the formatting
+parts of the program into the template.  That prevents code bloat and
+encourages functional separation.
+
+=head2 Example
+
+Here's an example of a template, which we'll suppose is stored in the
+file C<formletter.tmpl>:
+
+	Dear {$title} {$lastname},
+
+	It has come to our attention that you are delinquent in your
+	{$monthname[$last_paid_month]} payment.  Please remit
+	${sprintf("%.2f", $amount)} immediately, or your patellae may
+	be needlessly endangered.
+
+			Love,
+
+			Mark "Vizopteryx" Dominus
+
+
+The result of filling in this template is a string, which might look
+something like this:
+
+	Dear Mr. Gates,
+
+	It has come to our attention that you are delinquent in your
+	February payment.  Please remit
+	$392.12 immediately, or your patellae may
+	be needlessly endangered.
+
+
+			Love,
+
+			Mark "Vizopteryx" Dominus
+
+Here is a complete program that transforms the example
+template into the example result, and prints it out:
+
+	use Text::Template;
+
+	my $template = Text::Template->new(SOURCE => 'formletter.tmpl')
+	  or die "Couldn't construct template: $Text::Template::ERROR";
+
+	my @monthname = qw(January February March April May June
+                           July August September October November December);
+	my %vars = (title => 'Mr.',
+		    firstname => 'Bill',
+		    lastname => 'Gates',
+		    last_paid_month => 1,   # February
+		    amount => 392.12,
+		    monthname => \@monthname,
+		   );
+
+	my $result = $template->fill_in(HASH => \%vars);
+
+	if (defined $result) { print $result }
+	else { die "Couldn't fill in template: $Text::Template::ERROR" }
+
+
+=head2 Philosophy
+
+When people make a template module like this one, they almost always
+start by inventing a special syntax for substitutions.  For example,
+they build it so that a string like C<%%VAR%%> is replaced with the
+value of C<$VAR>.  Then they realize the need extra formatting, so
+they put in some special syntax for formatting.  Then they need a
+loop, so they invent a loop syntax.  Pretty soon they have a new
+little template language.
+
+This approach has two problems: First, their little language is
+crippled. If you need to do something the author hasn't thought of,
+you lose.  Second: Who wants to learn another language?  You already
+know Perl, so why not use it?
+
+C<Text::Template> templates are programmed in I<Perl>.  You embed Perl
+code in your template, with C<{> at the beginning and C<}> at the end.
+If you want a variable interpolated, you write it the way you would in
+Perl.  If you need to make a loop, you can use any of the Perl loop
+constructions.  All the Perl built-in functions are available.
+
+=head1 Details
+
+=head2 Template Parsing
+
+The C<Text::Template> module scans the template source.  An open brace
+C<{> begins a program fragment, which continues until the matching
+close brace C<}>.  When the template is filled in, the program
+fragments are evaluated, and each one is replaced with the resulting
+value to yield the text that is returned.
+
+A backslash C<\> in front of a brace (or another backslash that is in
+front of a brace) escapes its special meaning.  The result of filling
+out this template:
+
+	\{ The sum of 1 and 2 is {1+2}  \}
+
+is
+
+	{ The sum of 1 and 2 is 3  }
+
+If you have an unmatched brace, C<Text::Template> will return a
+failure code and a warning about where the problem is.  Backslashes
+that do not precede a brace are passed through unchanged.  If you have
+a template like this:
+
+	{ "String that ends in a newline.\n" }
+
+The backslash inside the string is passed through to Perl unchanged,
+so the C<\n> really does turn into a newline.  See the note at the end
+for details about the way backslashes work.  Backslash processing is
+I<not> done when you specify alternative delimiters with the
+C<DELIMITERS> option.  (See L<"Alternative Delimiters">, below.)
+
+Each program fragment should be a sequence of Perl statements, which
+are evaluated the usual way.  The result of the last statement
+executed will be evaluted in scalar context; the result of this
+statement is a string, which is interpolated into the template in
+place of the program fragment itself.
+
+The fragments are evaluated in order, and side effects from earlier
+fragments will persist into later fragments:
+
+	{$x = @things; ''}The Lord High Chamberlain has gotten {$x}
+	things for me this year.  
+	{ $diff = $x - 17; 
+	  $more = 'more'
+	  if ($diff == 0) {
+	    $diff = 'no';
+	  } elsif ($diff < 0) {
+	    $more = 'fewer';
+	  } 
+          '';
+	} 
+	That is {$diff} {$more} than he gave me last year.
+
+The value of C<$x> set in the first line will persist into the next
+fragment that begins on the third line, and the values of C<$diff> and
+C<$more> set in the second fragment will persist and be interpolated
+into the last line.  The output will look something like this:
+
+	The Lord High Chamberlain has gotten 42
+	things for me this year.  
+
+	That is 25 more than he gave me last year.
+
+That is all the syntax there is.  
+
+=head2 The C<$OUT> variable
+
+There is one special trick you can play in a template.  Here is the
+motivation for it:  Suppose you are going to pass an array, C<@items>,
+into the template, and you want the template to generate a bulleted
+list with a header, like this:
+
+	Here is a list of the things I have got for you since 1907:
+	  * Ivory
+	  * Apes
+	  * Peacocks
+	  * ...
+
+One way to do it is with a template like this:
+
+	Here is a list of the things I have got for you since 1907:
+	{ my $blist = '';
+          foreach $i (@items) {
+            $blist .= qq{  * $i\n};
+          }    
+          $blist;
+        } 
+
+Here we construct the list in a variable called C<$blist>, which we
+return at the end.  This is a little cumbersome.  There is a shortcut.
+
+Inside of templates, there is a special variable called C<$OUT>.
+Anything you append to this variable will appear in the output of the
+template.  Also, if you use C<$OUT> in a program fragment, the normal
+behavior, of replacing the fragment with its return value, is
+disabled; instead the fragment is replaced with the value of C<$OUT>.
+This means that you can write the template above like this:
+
+	Here is a list of the things I have got for you since 1907:
+	{ foreach $i (@items) {
+            $OUT .= "  * $i\n";
+          }    
+        } 
+
+C<$OUT> is reinitialized to the empty string at the start of each
+program fragment.  It is private to C<Text::Template>, so 
+you can't use a variable named C<$OUT> in your template without
+invoking the special behavior.
+
+=head2 General Remarks
+
+All C<Text::Template> functions return C<undef> on failure, and set the
+variable C<$Text::Template::ERROR> to contain an explanation of what
+went wrong.  For example, if you try to create a template from a file
+that does not exist, C<$Text::Template::ERROR> will contain something like:
+
+	Couldn't open file xyz.tmpl: No such file or directory
+
+=head2 C<new>
+
+	$template = new Text::Template ( TYPE => ..., SOURCE => ... );
+
+This creates and returns a new template object.  C<new> returns
+C<undef> and sets C<$Text::Template::ERROR> if it can't create the
+template object.  C<SOURCE> says where the template source code will
+come from.  C<TYPE> says what kind of object the source is.
+
+The most common type of source is a file:
+
+	new Text::Template ( TYPE => 'FILE', SOURCE => $filename );
+
+This reads the template from the specified file.  The filename is
+opened with the Perl C<open> command, so it can be a pipe or anything
+else that makes sense with C<open>.
+
+The C<TYPE> can also be C<STRING>, in which case the C<SOURCE> should
+be a string:
+
+	new Text::Template ( TYPE => 'STRING', 
+                             SOURCE => "This is the actual template!" );
+
+The C<TYPE> can be C<ARRAY>, in which case the source should be a
+reference to an array of strings.  The concatenation of these strings
+is the template:
+
+	new Text::Template ( TYPE => 'ARRAY', 
+                             SOURCE => [ "This is ", "the actual", 
+                                         " template!",
+                                       ]
+                           );
+
+The C<TYPE> can be FILEHANDLE, in which case the source should be an
+open filehandle (such as you got from the C<FileHandle> or C<IO::*>
+packages, or a glob, or a reference to a glob).  In this case
+C<Text::Template> will read the text from the filehandle up to
+end-of-file, and that text is the template:
+
+	# Read template source code from STDIN:
+	new Text::Template ( TYPE => 'FILEHANDLE', 
+                             SOURCE => \*STDIN  );
+
+
+If you omit the C<TYPE> attribute, it's taken to be C<FILE>.
+C<SOURCE> is required.  If you omit it, the program will abort.
+
+The words C<TYPE> and C<SOURCE> can be spelled any of the following ways:
+
+	TYPE	SOURCE
+	Type	Source
+	type	source
+	-TYPE	-SOURCE
+	-Type	-Source
+	-type	-source
+
+Pick a style you like and stick with it.
+
+=over 4
+
+=item C<DELIMITERS>
+
+You may also add a C<DELIMITERS> option.  If this option is present,
+its value should be a reference to an array of two strings.  The first
+string is the string that signals the beginning of each program
+fragment, and the second string is the string that signals the end of
+each program fragment.  See L<"Alternative Delimiters">, below.
+
+=item C<UNTAINT>
+
+If your program is running in taint mode, you may have problems if
+your templates are stored in files.  Data read from files is
+considered 'untrustworthy', and taint mode will not allow you to
+evaluate the Perl code in the file.  (It is afraid that a malicious
+person might have tampered with the file.)
+
+In some environments, however, local files are trustworthy.  You can
+tell C<Text::Template> that a certain file is trustworthy by supplying
+C<UNTAINT =E<gt> 1> in the call to C<new>.  This will tell
+C<Text::Template> to disable taint checks on template code that has
+come from a file, as long as the filename itself is considered
+trustworthy.  It will also disable taint checks on template code that
+comes from a filehandle.  When used with C<TYPE =E<gt> 'string'> or C<TYPE
+=E<gt> 'array'>, it has no effect.
+
+See L<perlsec> for more complete information about tainting.
+
+Thanks to Steve Palincsar, Gerard Vreeswijk, and Dr. Christoph Baehr
+for help with this feature.
+
+=item C<PREPEND>
+
+This option is passed along to the C<fill_in> call unless it is
+overridden in the arguments to C<fill_in>.  See L<C<PREPEND> feature
+and using C<strict> in templates> below.
+
+=item C<BROKEN>
+
+This option is passed along to the C<fill_in> call unless it is
+overridden in the arguments to C<fill_in>.  See L<C<BROKEN>> below.
+
+=back
+
+=head2 C<compile>
+
+	$template->compile()
+
+Loads all the template text from the template's source, parses and
+compiles it.  If successful, returns true; otherwise returns false and
+sets C<$Text::Template::ERROR>.  If the template is already compiled,
+it returns true and does nothing.  
+
+You don't usually need to invoke this function, because C<fill_in>
+(see below) compiles the template if it isn't compiled already.
+
+If there is an argument to this function, it must be a reference to an
+array containing alternative delimiter strings.  See C<"Alternative
+Delimiters">, below.
+
+=head2 C<fill_in>
+
+	$template->fill_in(OPTIONS);
+
+Fills in a template.  Returns the resulting text if successful.
+Otherwise, returns C<undef>  and sets C<$Text::Template::ERROR>.
+
+The I<OPTIONS> are a hash, or a list of key-value pairs.  You can
+write the key names in any of the six usual styles as above; this
+means that where this manual says C<PACKAGE> (for example) you can
+actually use any of
+
+	PACKAGE Package package -PACKAGE -Package -package
+
+Pick a style you like and stick with it.  The all-lowercase versions
+may yield spurious warnings about
+
+	Ambiguous use of package => resolved to "package"
+
+so you might like to avoid them and use the capitalized versions.
+
+At present, there are eight legal options:  C<PACKAGE>, C<BROKEN>,
+C<BROKEN_ARG>, C<SAFE>, C<HASH>, C<OUTPUT>, and C<DELIMITERS>.
+
+=over 4
+
+=item C<PACKAGE>
+
+C<PACKAGE> specifies the name of a package in which the program
+fragments should be evaluated.  The default is to use the package from
+which C<fill_in> was called.  For example, consider this template:
+
+	The value of the variable x is {$x}.
+
+If you use C<$template-E<gt>fill_in(PACKAGE =E<gt> 'R')> , then the C<$x> in
+the template is actually replaced with the value of C<$R::x>.  If you
+omit the C<PACKAGE> option, C<$x> will be replaced with the value of
+the C<$x> variable in the package that actually called C<fill_in>.
+
+You should almost always use C<PACKAGE>.  If you don't, and your
+template makes changes to variables, those changes will be propagated
+back into the main program.  Evaluating the template in a private
+package helps prevent this.  The template can still modify variables
+in your program if it wants to, but it will have to do so explicitly.
+See the section at the end on `Security'.
+
+Here's an example of using C<PACKAGE>:
+
+	Your Royal Highness,
+
+	Enclosed please find a list of things I have gotten
+	for you since 1907:
+
+	{ foreach $item (@items) {
+            $item_no++;
+	    $OUT .= " $item_no. \u$item\n";
+	  }
+	}
+
+	Signed,
+	Lord High Chamberlain
+
+We want to pass in an array which will be assigned to the array
+C<@items>.  Here's how to do that:
+
+
+	@items = ('ivory', 'apes', 'peacocks', );
+	$template->fill_in();
+
+This is not very safe.  The reason this isn't as safe is that if you
+had a variable named C<$item_no> in scope in your program at the point
+you called C<fill_in>, its value would be clobbered by the act of
+filling out the template.  The problem is the same as if you had
+written a subroutine that used those variables in the same way that
+the template does.  (C<$OUT> is special in templates and is always
+safe.)
+
+One solution to this is to make the C<$item_no> variable private to the
+template by declaring it with C<my>.  If the template does this, you
+are safe.
+
+But if you use the C<PACKAGE> option, you will probably be safe even
+if the template does I<not> declare its variables with C<my>:
+
+	@Q::items = ('ivory', 'apes', 'peacocks', );
+	$template->fill_in(PACKAGE => 'Q');
+
+In this case the template will clobber the variable C<$Q::item_no>,
+which is not related to the one your program was using.
+
+Templates cannot affect variables in the main program that are
+declared with C<my>, unless you give the template references to those
+variables.
+
+=item C<HASH>
+
+You may not want to put the template variables into a package.
+Packages can be hard to manage:  You can't copy them, for example.
+C<HASH> provides an alternative.  
+
+The value for C<HASH> should be a reference to a hash that maps
+variable names to values.  For example, 
+
+	$template->fill_in(HASH => { recipient => "The King",
+				     items => ['gold', 'frankincense', 'myrrh'],
+	                             object => \$self,
+				   });
+
+will fill out the template and use C<"The King"> as the value of
+C<$recipient> and the list of items as the value of C<@items>.  Note
+that we pass an array reference, but inside the template it appears as
+an array.  In general, anything other than a simple string or number
+should be passed by reference.
+
+We also want to pass an object, which is in C<$self>; note that we
+pass a reference to the object, C<\$self> instead.  Since we've passed
+a reference to a scalar, inside the template the object appears as
+C<$object>.  
+
+The full details of how it works are a little involved, so you might
+want to skip to the next section.
+
+Suppose the key in the hash is I<key> and the value is I<value>.  
+
+=over 4
+
+=item *
+
+If the I<value> is C<undef>, then any variables named C<$key>,
+C<@key>, C<%key>, etc., are undefined.  
+
+=item *
+
+If the I<value> is a string or a number, then C<$key> is set to that
+value in the template.
+
+=item *
+
+For anything else, you must pass a reference.
+
+If the I<value> is a reference to an array, then C<@key> is set to
+that array.  If the I<value> is a reference to a hash, then C<%key> is
+set to that hash.  Similarly if I<value> is any other kind of
+reference.  This means that
+
+	var => "foo"
+
+and
+
+	var => \"foo"
+
+have almost exactly the same effect.  (The difference is that in the
+former case, the value is copied, and in the latter case it is
+aliased.)  
+
+=item *
+
+In particular, if you want the template to get an object or any kind,
+you must pass a reference to it:
+
+	$template->fill_in(HASH => { database_handle => \$dbh, ... });
+
+If you do this, the template will have a variable C<$database_handle>
+which is the database handle object.  If you leave out the C<\>, the
+template will have a hash C<%database_handle>, which exposes the
+internal structure of the database handle object; you don't want that.
+
+=back
+
+Normally, the way this works is by allocating a private package,
+loading all the variables into the package, and then filling out the
+template as if you had specified that package.  A new package is
+allocated each time.  However, if you I<also> use the C<PACKAGE>
+option, C<Text::Template> loads the variables into the package you
+specified, and they stay there after the call returns.  Subsequent
+calls to C<fill_in> that use the same package will pick up the values
+you loaded in.
+
+If the argument of C<HASH> is a reference to an array instead of a
+reference to a hash, then the array should contain a list of hashes
+whose contents are loaded into the template package one after the
+other.  You can use this feature if you want to combine several sets
+of variables.  For example, one set of variables might be the defaults
+for a fill-in form, and the second set might be the user inputs, which
+override the defaults when they are present:
+
+	$template->fill_in(HASH => [\%defaults, \%user_input]);
+
+You can also use this to set two variables with the same name:
+
+	$template->fill_in(HASH => [{ v => "The King" },
+                                    { v => [1,2,3] },
+	                           ]
+                          );
+
+This sets C<$v> to C<"The King"> and C<@v> to C<(1,2,3)>.	
+
+=item C<BROKEN>
+
+If any of the program fragments fails to compile or aborts for any
+reason, and you have set the C<BROKEN> option to a function reference,
+C<Text::Template> will invoke the function.  This function is called
+the I<C<BROKEN> function>.  The C<BROKEN> function will tell
+C<Text::Template> what to do next.  
+
+If the C<BROKEN> function returns C<undef>, C<Text::Template> will
+immediately abort processing the template and return the text that it
+has accumulated so far.  If your function does this, it should set a
+flag that you can examine after C<fill_in> returns so that you can
+tell whether there was a premature return or not. 
+
+If the C<BROKEN> function returns any other value, that value will be
+interpolated into the template as if that value had been the return
+value of the program fragment to begin with.  For example, if the
+C<BROKEN> function returns an error string, the error string will be
+interpolated into the output of the template in place of the program
+fragment that cased the error.
+
+If you don't specify a C<BROKEN> function, C<Text::Template> supplies
+a default one that returns something like
+
+	Program fragment delivered error ``Illegal division by 0 at
+	template line 37''
+
+(Note that the format of this message has changed slightly since
+version 1.31.)  The return value of the C<BROKEN> function is
+interpolated into the template at the place the error occurred, so
+that this template:
+
+	(3+4)*5 = { 3+4)*5 }
+
+yields this result:
+
+	(3+4)*5 = Program fragment delivered error ``syntax error at template line 1''
+
+If you specify a value for the C<BROKEN> attribute, it should be a
+reference to a function that C<fill_in> can call instead of the
+default function.
+
+C<fill_in> will pass a hash to the C<broken> function.
+The hash will have at least these three members:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item C<text>
+
+The source code of the program fragment that failed
+
+=item C<error>
+
+The text of the error message (C<$@>) generated by eval.
+
+The text has been modified to omit the trailing newline and to include
+the name of the template file (if there was one).  The line number
+counts from the beginning of the template, not from the beginning of
+the failed program fragment.
+
+=item C<lineno>
+
+The line number of the template at which the program fragment began.
+
+=back
+
+There may also be an C<arg> member.  See C<BROKEN_ARG>, below
+
+=item C<BROKEN_ARG>
+
+If you supply the C<BROKEN_ARG> option to C<fill_in>, the value of the
+option is passed to the C<BROKEN> function whenever it is called.  The
+default C<BROKEN> function ignores the C<BROKEN_ARG>, but you can
+write a custom C<BROKEN> function that uses the C<BROKEN_ARG> to get
+more information about what went wrong. 
+
+The C<BROKEN> function could also use the C<BROKEN_ARG> as a reference
+to store an error message or some other information that it wants to
+communicate back to the caller.  For example:
+
+	$error = '';
+
+	sub my_broken {	
+	   my %args = @_;
+	   my $err_ref = $args{arg};
+	   ...
+	   $$err_ref = "Some error message";
+	   return undef;
+	}
+
+	$template->fill_in(BROKEN => \&my_broken,
+			   BROKEN_ARG => \$error,
+			  );
+
+	if ($error) {
+	  die "It didn't work: $error";
+	}
+
+If one of the program fragments in the template fails, it will call
+the C<BROKEN> function, C<my_broken>, and pass it the C<BROKEN_ARG>,
+which is a reference to C<$error>.  C<my_broken> can store an error
+message into C<$error> this way.  Then the function that called
+C<fill_in> can see if C<my_broken> has left an error message for it
+to find, and proceed accordingly.
+
+=item C<SAFE>
+
+If you give C<fill_in> a C<SAFE> option, its value should be a safe
+compartment object from the C<Safe> package.  All evaluation of
+program fragments will be performed in this compartment.  See L<Safe>
+for full details about such compartments and how to restrict the
+operations that can be performed in them.
+
+If you use the C<PACKAGE> option with C<SAFE>, the package you specify
+will be placed into the safe compartment and evaluation will take
+place in that package as usual.  
+
+If not, C<SAFE> operation is a little different from the default.
+Usually, if you don't specify a package, evaluation of program
+fragments occurs in the package from which the template was invoked.
+But in C<SAFE> mode the evaluation occurs inside the safe compartment
+and cannot affect the calling package.  Normally, if you use C<HASH>
+without C<PACKAGE>, the hash variables are imported into a private,
+one-use-only package.  But if you use C<HASH> and C<SAFE> together
+without C<PACKAGE>, the hash variables will just be loaded into the
+root namespace of the C<Safe> compartment.
+
+=item C<OUTPUT>
+
+If your template is going to generate a lot of text that you are just
+going to print out again anyway,  you can save memory by having
+C<Text::Template> print out the text as it is generated instead of
+making it into a big string and returning the string.  If you supply
+the C<OUTPUT> option to C<fill_in>, the value should be a filehandle.
+The generated text will be printed to this filehandle as it is
+constructed.  For example:
+
+	$template->fill_in(OUTPUT => \*STDOUT, ...);
+
+fills in the C<$template> as usual, but the results are immediately
+printed to STDOUT.  This may result in the output appearing more
+quickly than it would have otherwise.
+
+If you use C<OUTPUT>, the return value from C<fill_in> is still true on
+success and false on failure, but the complete text is not returned to
+the caller.
+
+=item C<PREPEND>
+
+You can have some Perl code prepended automatically to the beginning
+of every program fragment.  See L<C<PREPEND> feature and using
+C<strict> in templates> below.
+
+=item C<DELIMITERS>
+
+If this option is present, its value should be a reference to a list
+of two strings.  The first string is the string that signals the
+beginning of each program fragment, and the second string is the
+string that signals the end of each program fragment.  See
+L<"Alternative Delimiters">, below.  
+
+If you specify C<DELIMITERS> in the call to C<fill_in>, they override
+any delimiters you set when you created the template object with
+C<new>. 
+
+=back
+
+=head1 Convenience Functions
+
+=head2 C<fill_this_in>
+
+The basic way to fill in a template is to create a template object and
+then call C<fill_in> on it.   This is useful if you want to fill in
+the same template more than once.
+
+In some programs, this can be cumbersome.  C<fill_this_in> accepts a
+string, which contains the template, and a list of options, which are
+passed to C<fill_in> as above.  It constructs the template object for
+you, fills it in as specified, and returns the results.  It returns
+C<undef> and sets C<$Text::Template::ERROR> if it couldn't generate
+any results.
+
+An example:
+
+	$Q::name = 'Donald';
+	$Q::amount = 141.61;
+	$Q::part = 'hyoid bone';
+
+	$text = Text::Template->fill_this_in( <<'EOM', PACKAGE => Q);
+	Dear {$name},
+	You owe me \\${sprintf('%.2f', $amount)}.  
+	Pay or I will break your {$part}.
+		Love,
+		Grand Vizopteryx of Irkutsk.
+	EOM
+
+Notice how we included the template in-line in the program by using a
+`here document' with the C<E<lt>E<lt>> notation.
+
+C<fill_this_in> is a deprecated feature.  It is only here for
+backwards compatibility, and may be removed in some far-future version
+in C<Text::Template>.  You should use C<fill_in_string> instead.  It
+is described in the next section.
+
+=head2 C<fill_in_string>
+
+It is stupid that C<fill_this_in> is a class method.  It should have
+been just an imported function, so that you could omit the
+C<Text::Template-E<gt>> in the example above.  But I made the mistake
+four years ago and it is too late to change it.
+
+C<fill_in_string> is exactly like C<fill_this_in> except that it is
+not a method and you can omit the C<Text::Template-E<gt>> and just say
+
+	print fill_in_string(<<'EOM', ...);
+	Dear {$name},
+	  ...
+	EOM
+
+To use C<fill_in_string>, you need to say
+
+	use Text::Template 'fill_in_string';
+
+at the top of your program.   You should probably use
+C<fill_in_string> instead of C<fill_this_in>.
+
+=head2 C<fill_in_file>
+
+If you import C<fill_in_file>, you can say
+
+	$text = fill_in_file(filename, ...);
+
+The C<...> are passed to C<fill_in> as above.  The filename is the
+name of the file that contains the template you want to fill in.  It
+returns the result text. or C<undef>, as usual.
+
+If you are going to fill in the same file more than once in the same
+program you should use the longer C<new> / C<fill_in> sequence instead.
+It will be a lot faster because it only has to read and parse the file
+once.
+
+=head2 Including files into templates
+
+People always ask for this.  ``Why don't you have an include
+function?'' they want to know.  The short answer is this is Perl, and
+Perl already has an include function.  If you want it, you can just put
+
+	{qx{cat filename}}
+
+into your template.  VoilE<agrave>.
+
+If you don't want to use C<cat>, you can write a little four-line
+function that opens a file and dumps out its contents, and call it
+from the template.  I wrote one for you.  In the template, you can say
+
+	{Text::Template::_load_text(filename)}
+
+If that is too verbose, here is a trick.  Suppose the template package
+that you are going to be mentioning in the C<fill_in> call is package
+C<Q>.  Then in the main program, write
+
+	*Q::include = \&Text::Template::_load_text;
+
+This imports the C<_load_text> function into package C<Q> with the
+name C<include>.  From then on, any template that you fill in with
+package C<Q> can say
+
+	{include(filename)}
+
+to insert the text from the named file at that point.  If you are
+using the C<HASH> option instead, just put C<include =E<gt>
+\&Text::Template::_load_text> into the hash instead of importing it
+explicitly.
+
+Suppose you don't want to insert a plain text file, but rather you
+want to include one template within another?  Just use C<fill_in_file>
+in the template itself:
+
+	{Text::Template::fill_in_file(filename)}
+
+You can do the same importing trick if this is too much to type.
+
+=head1 Miscellaneous
+
+=head2 C<my> variables
+
+People are frequently surprised when this doesn't work:
+
+	my $recipient = 'The King';
+	my $text = fill_in_file('formletter.tmpl');
+
+The text C<The King> doesn't get into the form letter.  Why not?
+Because C<$recipient> is a C<my> variable, and the whole point of
+C<my> variables is that they're private and inaccessible except in the
+scope in which they're declared.  The template is not part of that
+scope, so the template can't see C<$recipient>.  
+
+If that's not the behavior you want, don't use C<my>.  C<my> means a
+private variable, and in this case you don't want the variable to be
+private.  Put the variables into package variables in some other
+package, and use the C<PACKAGE> option to C<fill_in>:
+
+	$Q::recipient = $recipient;
+	my $text = fill_in_file('formletter.tmpl', PACKAGE => 'Q');
+	
+
+or pass the names and values in a hash with the C<HASH> option:
+
+	my $text = fill_in_file('formletter.tmpl', HASH => { recipient => $recipient });
+
+=head2 Security Matters
+
+All variables are evaluated in the package you specify with the
+C<PACKAGE> option of C<fill_in>.  if you use this option, and if your
+templates don't do anything egregiously stupid, you won't have to
+worry that evaluation of the little programs will creep out into the
+rest of your program and wreck something.
+
+Nevertheless, there's really no way (except with C<Safe>) to protect
+against a template that says
+
+	{ $Important::Secret::Security::Enable = 0; 
+	  # Disable security checks in this program 
+	}
+
+or
+
+	{ $/ = "ho ho ho";   # Sabotage future uses of <FH>.
+	  # $/ is always a global variable
+	}
+
+or even
+
+	{ system("rm -rf /") }
+
+so B<don't> go filling in templates unless you're sure you know what's
+in them.  If you're worried, or you can't trust the person who wrote
+the template, use the C<SAFE> option.
+
+A final warning: program fragments run a small risk of accidentally
+clobbering local variables in the C<fill_in> function itself.  These
+variables all have names that begin with C<$fi_>, so if you stay away
+from those names you'll be safe.  (Of course, if you're a real wizard
+you can tamper with them deliberately for exciting effects; this is
+actually how C<$OUT> works.)  I can fix this, but it will make the
+package slower to do it, so I would prefer not to.  If you are worried
+about this, send me mail and I will show you what to do about it.
+
+=head2 Alternative Delimiters
+
+Lorenzo Valdettaro pointed out that if you are using C<Text::Template>
+to generate TeX output, the choice of braces as the program fragment
+delimiters makes you suffer suffer suffer.  Starting in version 1.20,
+you can change the choice of delimiters to something other than curly
+braces.
+
+In either the C<new()> call or the C<fill_in()> call, you can specify
+an alternative set of delimiters with the C<DELIMITERS> option.  For
+example, if you would like code fragments to be delimited by C<[@-->
+and C<--@]> instead of C<{> and C<}>, use
+
+	... DELIMITERS => [ '[@--', '--@]' ], ...
+
+Note that these delimiters are I<literal strings>, not regexes.  (I
+tried for regexes, but it complicates the lexical analysis too much.)
+Note also that C<DELIMITERS> disables the special meaning of the
+backslash, so if you want to include the delimiters in the literal
+text of your template file, you are out of luck---it is up to you to
+choose delimiters that do not conflict with what you are doing.  The
+delimiter strings may still appear inside of program fragments as long
+as they nest properly.  This means that if for some reason you
+absolutely must have a program fragment that mentions one of the
+delimiters, like this:
+
+	[@--
+		print "Oh no, a delimiter: --@]\n"
+	--@]
+
+you may be able to make it work by doing this instead:
+
+	[@--
+		# Fake matching delimiter in a comment: [@--
+		print "Oh no, a delimiter: --@]\n"
+	--@]
+
+It may be safer to choose delimiters that begin with a newline
+character.  
+
+Because the parsing of templates is simplified by the absence of
+backslash escapes, using alternative C<DELIMITERS> may speed up the
+parsing process by 20-25%.  This shows that my original choice of C<{>
+and C<}> was very bad. 
+
+=head2 C<PREPEND> feature and using C<strict> in templates
+
+Suppose you would like to use C<strict> in your templates to detect
+undeclared variables and the like.  But each code fragment is a
+separate lexical scope, so you have to turn on C<strict> at the top of
+each and every code fragment:
+
+	{ use strict;
+	  use vars '$foo';
+	  $foo = 14;
+	  ...
+	}
+
+	...
+
+	{ # we forgot to put `use strict' here
+	  my $result = $boo + 12;    # $boo is misspelled and should be $foo
+	  # No error is raised on `$boo'
+	}
+
+Because we didn't put C<use strict> at the top of the second fragment,
+it was only active in the first fragment, and we didn't get any
+C<strict> checking in the second fragment.  Then we mispelled C<$foo>
+and the error wasn't caught.  
+
+C<Text::Template> version 1.22 and higher has a new feature to make
+this easier.  You can specify that any text at all be automatically
+added to the beginning of each program fragment.  
+
+When you make a call to C<fill_in>, you can specify a
+
+	PREPEND => 'some perl statements here'
+
+option; the statements will be prepended to each program fragment for
+that one call only.  Suppose that the C<fill_in> call included a
+
+	PREPEND => 'use strict;'
+
+option, and that the template looked like this:
+
+	{ use vars '$foo';
+	  $foo = 14;
+	  ...
+	}
+
+	...
+
+	{ my $result = $boo + 12;    # $boo is misspelled and should be $foo
+	  ...
+	}
+
+The code in the second fragment would fail, because C<$boo> has not
+been declared.  C<use strict> was implied, even though you did not
+write it explicitly, because the C<PREPEND> option added it for you
+automatically.
+
+There are two other ways to do this.  At the time you create the
+template object with C<new>, you can also supply a C<PREPEND> option,
+in which case the statements will be prepended each time you fill in
+that template.  If the C<fill_in> call has its own C<PREPEND> option,
+this overrides the one specified at the time you created the
+template.  Finally, you can make the class method call
+
+	Text::Template->always_prepend('perl statements');
+
+If you do this, then call calls to C<fill_in> for I<any> template will
+attach the perl statements to the beginning of each program fragment,
+except where overridden by C<PREPEND> options to C<new> or C<fill_in>.
+
+=head2 Prepending in Derived Classes
+
+This section is technical, and you should skip it on the first few
+readings. 
+
+Normally there are three places that prepended text could come from.
+It could come from the C<PREPEND> option in the C<fill_in> call, from
+the C<PREPEND> option in the C<new> call that created the template
+object, or from the argument of the C<always_prepend> call.
+C<Text::Template> looks for these three things in order and takes the
+first one that it finds.
+
+In a subclass of C<Text::Template>, this last possibility is
+ambiguous.  Suppose C<S> is a subclass of C<Text::Template>.  Should 
+
+	Text::Template->always_prepend(...);
+
+affect objects in class C<Derived>?  The answer is that you can have it
+either way.  
+
+The C<always_prepend> value for C<Text::Template> is normally stored
+in  a hash variable named C<%GLOBAL_PREPEND> under the key
+C<Text::Template>.  When C<Text::Template> looks to see what text to
+prepend, it first looks in the template object itself, and if not, it
+looks in C<$GLOBAL_PREPEND{I<class>}> where I<class> is the class to
+which the template object belongs.  If it doesn't find any value, it
+looks in C<$GLOBAL_PREPEND{'Text::Template'}>.  This means that
+objects in class C<Derived> I<will> be affected by
+
+	Text::Template->always_prepend(...);
+
+I<unless> there is also a call to
+
+	Derived->always_prepend(...);
+
+So when you're designing your derived class, you can arrange to have
+your objects ignore C<Text::Template::always_prepend> calls by simply
+putting C<Derived-E<gt>always_prepend('')> at the top of your module.
+
+Of course, there is also a final escape hatch: Templates support a
+C<prepend_text> that is used to look up the appropriate text to be
+prepended at C<fill_in> time.  Your derived class can override this
+method to get an arbitrary effect.
+
+=head2 JavaScript
+
+Jennifer D. St Clair asks:
+
+	> Most of my pages contain JavaScript and Stylesheets.
+        > How do I change the template identifier?  
+
+Jennifer is worried about the braces in the JavaScript being taken as
+the delimiters of the Perl program fragments.  Of course, disaster
+will ensue when perl tries to evaluate these as if they were Perl
+programs.  The best choice is to find some unambiguous delimiter
+strings that you can use in your template instead of curly braces, and
+then use the C<DELIMITERS> option.  However, if you can't do this for
+some reason, there are  two easy workarounds:
+
+1. You can put C<\> in front of C<{>, C<}>, or C<\> to remove its
+special meaning.  So, for example, instead of
+
+	    if (br== "n3") { 
+		// etc.
+	    }
+
+you can put
+
+	    if (br== "n3") \{ 
+		// etc.
+	    \}
+
+and it'll come out of the template engine the way you want.
+
+But here is another method that is probably better.  To see how it
+works, first consider what happens if you put this into a template:
+
+	    { 'foo' }
+
+Since it's in braces, it gets evaluated, and obviously, this is going
+to turn into
+
+	    foo
+
+So now here's the trick: In Perl, C<q{...}> is the same as C<'...'>.
+So if we wrote
+
+	    {q{foo}}
+
+it would turn into 
+
+	    foo
+
+So for your JavaScript, just write
+
+	    {q{if (br== "n3") { 
+	  	 // etc.
+	       }}
+	    }
+
+and it'll come out as
+
+	      if (br== "n3") { 
+	  	  // etc.
+	      }
+
+which is what you want.
+
+
+=head2 Shut Up!
+
+People sometimes try to put an initialization section at the top of
+their templates, like this:
+
+	{ ...
+	  $var = 17;
+	}
+
+Then they complain because there is a C<17> at the top of the output
+that they didn't want to have there.  
+
+Remember that a program fragment is replaced with its own return
+value, and that in Perl the return value of a code block is the value
+of the last expression that was evaluated, which in this case is 17.
+If it didn't do that, you wouldn't be able to write C<{$recipient}>
+and have the recipient filled in.
+
+To prevent the 17 from appearing in the output is very simple:
+
+	{ ...
+	  $var = 17;
+	  '';
+	}
+
+Now the last expression evaluated yields the empty string, which is
+invisible.  If you don't like the way this looks, use
+
+	{ ...
+	  $var = 17;
+	  ($SILENTLY);
+	}
+
+instead.  Presumably, C<$SILENTLY> has no value, so nothing will be
+interpolated.  This is what is known as a `trick'.
+
+=head2 Compatibility
+
+Every effort has been made to make this module compatible with older
+versions.  The only known exceptions follow:
+
+The output format of the default C<BROKEN> subroutine has changed
+twice, most recently between versions 1.31 and 1.40.
+
+Starting in version 1.10, the C<$OUT> variable is arrogated for a
+special meaning.  If you had templates before version 1.10 that
+happened to use a variable named C<$OUT>, you will have to change them
+to use some other variable or all sorts of strangeness will result.
+
+Between versions 0.1b and 1.00 the behavior of the \ metacharacter
+changed.  In 0.1b, \\ was special everywhere, and the template
+processor always replaced it with a single backslash before passing
+the code to Perl for evaluation.  The rule now is more complicated but
+probably more convenient.  See the section on backslash processing,
+below, for a full discussion.
+
+=head2 Backslash Processing
+
+In C<Text::Template> beta versions, the backslash was special whenever
+it appeared before a brace or another backslash.  That meant that
+while C<{"\n"}> did indeed generate a newline, C<{"\\"}> did not
+generate a backslash, because the code passed to Perl for evaluation
+was C<"\"> which is a syntax error.  If you wanted a backslash, you
+would have had to write C<{"\\\\"}>.
+
+In C<Text::Template> versions 1.00 through 1.10, there was a bug:
+Backslash was special everywhere.  In these versions, C<{"\n"}>
+generated the letter C<n>.
+
+The bug has been corrected in version 1.11, but I did not go back to
+exactly the old rule, because I did not like the idea of having to
+write C<{"\\\\"}> to get one backslash.  The rule is now more
+complicated to remember, but probably easier to use.  The rule is now:
+Backslashes are always passed to Perl unchanged I<unless> they occur
+as part of a sequence like C<\\\\\\{> or C<\\\\\\}>.  In these
+contexts, they are special; C<\\> is replaced with C<\>, and C<\{> and
+C<\}> signal a literal brace. 
+
+Examples:
+
+	\{ foo \}
+
+is I<not> evaluated, because the C<\> before the braces signals that
+they should be taken literally.  The result in the output looks like this: 
+
+	{ foo }
+
+
+This is a syntax error:
+
+	{ "foo}" }
+
+because C<Text::Template> thinks that the code ends at the first C<}>,
+and then gets upset when it sees the second one.  To make this work
+correctly, use
+
+	{ "foo\}" }
+
+This passes C<"foo}"> to Perl for evaluation.  Note there's no C<\> in
+the evaluated code.  If you really want a C<\> in the evaluated code,
+use
+
+	{ "foo\\\}" }
+
+This passes C<"foo\}"> to Perl for evaluation.
+
+Starting with C<Text::Template> version 1.20, backslash processing is
+disabled if you use the C<DELIMITERS> option to specify alternative
+delimiter strings.
+
+=head2 A short note about C<$Text::Template::ERROR>
+
+In the past some people have fretted about `violating the package
+boundary' by examining a variable inside the C<Text::Template>
+package.  Don't feel this way.  C<$Text::Template::ERROR> is part of
+the published, official interface to this package.  It is perfectly OK
+to inspect this variable.  The interface is not going to change.
+
+If it really, really bothers you, you can import a function called
+C<TTerror> that returns the current value of the C<$ERROR> variable.
+So you can say:
+
+	use Text::Template 'TTerror';
+
+	my $template = new Text::Template (SOURCE => $filename);
+	unless ($template) {
+	  my $err = TTerror;
+	  die "Couldn't make template: $err; aborting";
+	}
+
+I don't see what benefit this has over just doing this:
+
+	use Text::Template;
+
+	my $template = new Text::Template (SOURCE => $filename)
+	  or die "Couldn't make template: $Text::Template::ERROR; aborting";
+
+But if it makes you happy to do it that way, go ahead.
+
+=head2 Sticky Widgets in Template Files
+
+The C<CGI> module provides functions for `sticky widgets', which are
+form input controls that retain their values from one page to the
+next.   Sometimes people want to know how to include these widgets
+into their template output.
+
+It's totally straightforward.  Just call the C<CGI> functions from
+inside the template:
+
+	{ $q->checkbox_group(NAME => 'toppings',
+		  	     LINEBREAK => true,
+			     COLUMNS => 3,
+			     VALUES => \@toppings,
+			    );
+	}
+
+=head2 Automatic preprocessing of program fragments
+
+It may be useful to preprocess the program fragments before they are
+evaluated.  See C<Text::Template::Preprocess> for more details.
+
+=head2 Automatic postprocessing of template hunks
+
+It may be useful to process hunks of output before they are appended to
+the result text.  For this, subclass and replace the C<append_text_to_result>
+method.  It is passed a list of pairs with these entries:
+
+  handle - a filehandle to which to print the desired output
+  out    - a ref to a string to which to append, to use if handle is not given
+  text   - the text that will be appended
+  type   - where the text came from: TEXT for literal text, PROG for code
+
+=head2 Author
+
+Mark Jason Dominus, Plover Systems
+
+Please send questions and other remarks about this software to
+C<mjd-perl-template+@plover.com>
+
+You can join a very low-volume (E<lt>10 messages per year) mailing
+list for announcements about this package.  Send an empty note to
+C<mjd-perl-template-request@plover.com> to join.
+
+For updates, visit C<http://www.plover.com/~mjd/perl/Template/>.
+
+=head2 Support?
+
+This software is version 1.46.  It may have bugs.  Suggestions and bug
+reports are always welcome.  Send them to
+C<mjd-perl-template+@plover.com>.  (That is my address, not the address
+of the mailing list.  The mailing list address is a secret.)
+
+=head1 LICENSE
+
+    Text::Template version 1.46
+    Copyright 2013 Mark Jason Dominus
+
+    This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+    modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+    published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the
+    License, or (at your option) any later version.  You may also can
+    redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms of the Perl
+    Artistic License.
+
+    This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+    but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+    MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+    GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+    You should have received copies of the GNU General Public License
+    along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+    Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA.
+
+
+=head1 THANKS
+
+Many thanks to the following people for offering support,
+encouragement, advice, bug reports, and all the other good stuff.  
+
+David H. Adler /
+Joel Appelbaum /
+Klaus Arnhold /
+AntE<oacute>nio AragE<atilde>o /
+Kevin Atteson /
+Chris.Brezil /
+Mike Brodhead /
+Tom Brown /
+Dr. Frank Bucolo /
+Tim Bunce /
+Juan E. Camacho /
+Itamar Almeida de Carvalho /
+Joseph Cheek /
+Gene Damon /
+San Deng /
+Bob Dougherty /
+Marek Grac /
+Dan Franklin /
+gary at dls.net /
+Todd A. Green /
+Donald L. Greer Jr. /
+Michelangelo Grigni /
+Zac Hansen /
+Tom Henry /
+Jarko Hietaniemi /
+Matt X. Hunter /
+Robert M. Ioffe /
+Daniel LaLiberte /
+Reuven M. Lerner /
+Trip Lilley / 
+Yannis Livassof /
+Val Luck /
+Kevin Madsen /
+David Marshall /
+James Mastros /
+Joel Meulenberg /
+Jason Moore /
+Sergey Myasnikov /
+Chris Nandor /
+Bek Oberin /
+Steve Palincsar /
+Ron Pero /
+Hans Persson /
+Sean Roehnelt /
+Jonathan Roy /
+Shabbir J. Safdar /
+Jennifer D. St Clair /
+Uwe Schneider /
+Randal L. Schwartz /
+Michael G Schwern /
+Yonat Sharon /
+Brian C. Shensky /
+Niklas Skoglund /
+Tom Snee /
+Fred Steinberg /
+Hans Stoop /
+Michael J. Suzio /
+Dennis Taylor /
+James H. Thompson /
+Shad Todd /
+Lieven Tomme /
+Lorenzo Valdettaro /
+Larry Virden /
+Andy Wardley /
+Archie Warnock /
+Chris Wesley /
+Matt Womer /
+Andrew G Wood /
+Daini Xie /
+Michaely Yeung
+
+Special thanks to:
+
+=over 2
+
+=item Jonathan Roy 
+
+for telling me how to do the C<Safe> support (I spent two years
+worrying about it, and then Jonathan pointed out that it was trivial.)
+
+=item Ranjit Bhatnagar 
+
+for demanding less verbose fragments like they have in ASP, for
+helping me figure out the Right Thing, and, especially, for talking me
+out of adding any new syntax.  These discussions resulted in the
+C<$OUT> feature.
+
+=back
+
+=head2 Bugs and Caveats
+
+C<my> variables in C<fill_in> are still susceptible to being clobbered
+by template evaluation.  They all begin with C<fi_>, so avoid those
+names in your templates.
+
+The line number information will be wrong if the template's lines are
+not terminated by C<"\n">.  You should let me know if this is a
+problem.  If you do, I will fix it.
+
+The C<$OUT> variable has a special meaning in templates, so you cannot
+use it as if it were a regular variable.
+
+There are not quite enough tests in the test suite.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/lib/Text/Template/Preprocess.pm b/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/lib/Text/Template/Preprocess.pm
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1e41037
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/lib/Text/Template/Preprocess.pm
@@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
+
+package Text::Template::Preprocess;
+use Text::Template;
+@ISA = qw(Text::Template);
+$Text::Template::Preprocess::VERSION = 1.46;
+
+sub fill_in {
+  my $self = shift;
+  my (%args) = @_;
+  my $pp = $args{PREPROCESSOR} || $self->{PREPROCESSOR} ;
+  if ($pp) {
+    local $_ = $self->source();
+#    print "# fill_in: before <$_>\n";
+    &$pp;
+#    print "# fill_in: after <$_>\n";
+    $self->set_source_data($_);
+  }
+  $self->SUPER::fill_in(@_);
+}
+
+sub preprocessor {
+  my ($self, $pp) = @_;
+  my $old_pp = $self->{PREPROCESSOR};
+  $self->{PREPROCESSOR} = $pp if @_ > 1;  # OK to pass $pp=undef
+  $old_pp;
+}
+
+1;
+
+
+=head1 NAME 
+
+Text::Template::Preprocess - Expand template text with embedded Perl
+
+=head1 VERSION
+
+This file documents C<Text::Template::Preprocess> version B<1.46>
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ use Text::Template::Preprocess;
+
+ my $t = Text::Template::Preprocess->new(...);  # identical to Text::Template
+
+ # Fill in template, but preprocess each code fragment with pp().
+ my $result = $t->fill_in(..., PREPROCESSOR => \&pp);
+
+ my $old_pp = $t->preprocessor(\&new_pp);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+C<Text::Template::Preprocess> provides a new C<PREPROCESSOR> option to
+C<fill_in>.  If the C<PREPROCESSOR> option is supplied, it must be a
+reference to a preprocessor subroutine.  When filling out a template,
+C<Text::Template::Preprocessor> will use this subroutine to preprocess
+the program fragment prior to evaluating the code.
+
+The preprocessor subroutine will be called repeatedly, once for each
+program fragment.  The program fragment will be in C<$_>.  The
+subroutine should modify the contents of C<$_> and return.
+C<Text::Template::Preprocess> will then execute contents of C<$_> and
+insert the result into the appropriate part of the template.
+
+C<Text::Template::Preprocess> objects also support a utility method,
+C<preprocessor()>, which sets a new preprocessor for the object.  This
+preprocessor is used for all subsequent calls to C<fill_in> except
+where overridden by an explicit C<PREPROCESSOR> option.
+C<preprocessor()> returns the previous default preprocessor function,
+or undefined if there wasn't one.  When invoked with no arguments,
+C<preprocessor()> returns the object's current default preprocessor
+function without changing it.
+
+In all other respects, C<Text::Template::Preprocess> is identical to
+C<Text::Template>.
+
+=head1 WHY?
+
+One possible purpose:  If your files contain a lot of JavaScript, like
+this:
+
+
+        Plain text here...
+        { perl code }
+        <script language=JavaScript>
+     	      if (br== "n3") { 
+	  	  // etc.
+	      }
+        </script>
+        { more perl code }
+        More plain text...
+
+You don't want C<Text::Template> to confuse the curly braces in the
+JavaScript program with executable Perl code.  One strategy:
+
+        sub quote_scripts {
+          s(<script(.*?)</script>)(q{$1})gsi;
+        }
+
+Then use C<PREPROCESSOR =E<gt> \&quote_scripts>.  This will transform 
+
+
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<Text::Template>
+
+=head1 AUTHOR
+
+
+Mark Jason Dominus, Plover Systems
+
+Please send questions and other remarks about this software to
+C<mjd-perl-template+@plover.com>
+
+You can join a very low-volume (E<lt>10 messages per year) mailing
+list for announcements about this package.  Send an empty note to
+C<mjd-perl-template-request@plover.com> to join.
+
+For updates, visit C<http://www.plover.com/~mjd/perl/Template/>.
+
+=head1 LICENSE
+
+    Text::Template::Preprocess version 1.46
+    Copyright 2013 Mark Jason Dominus
+
+    This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+    modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+    published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the
+    License, or (at your option) any later version.  You may also can
+    redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms of the Perl
+    Artistic License.
+
+    This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+    but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+    MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+    GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+    You should have received copies of the GNU General Public License
+    along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+    Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA.
+
+
+=cut
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/t/00-version.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/t/00-version.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5f9560f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/t/00-version.t
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+#!perl
+
+use Text::Template;
+print "1..1\n";
+
+if ($Text::Template::VERSION == 1.46) {
+        print "ok 1\n";
+} else {
+        print "not ok 1\n";
+}
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/t/01-basic.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/t/01-basic.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..be43390
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/t/01-basic.t
@@ -0,0 +1,266 @@
+#!perl
+#
+# Tests of basic, essential functionality
+#
+
+use Text::Template;
+$X::v = $Y::v = 0;		# Suppress `var used only once'
+
+print "1..31\n";
+
+$n=1;
+
+$template_1 = <<EOM;
+We will put value of \$v (which is "abc") here -> {\$v}
+We will evaluate 1+1 here -> {1 + 1}
+EOM
+
+# (1) Construct temporary template file for testing
+# file operations
+$TEMPFILE = "tt$$";
+open(TMP, "> $TEMPFILE") or print "not ok $n\n" && &abort("Couldn\'t write tempfile $TEMPFILE: $!");
+print TMP $template_1;
+close TMP;
+print "ok $n\n"; $n++;
+
+# (2) Build template from file
+$template = new Text::Template ('type' => 'FILE', 'source' => $TEMPFILE);
+if (defined($template)) {
+  print "ok $n\n";
+} else {
+  print "not ok $n $Text::Template::ERROR\n";
+}
+$n++;
+
+# (3) Fill in template from file
+$X::v = "abc";	
+$resultX = <<EOM;
+We will put value of \$v (which is "abc") here -> abc
+We will evaluate 1+1 here -> 2
+EOM
+$Y::v = "ABC";	
+$resultY = <<EOM;
+We will put value of \$v (which is "abc") here -> ABC
+We will evaluate 1+1 here -> 2
+EOM
+
+$text = $template->fill_in('package' => X);
+if ($text eq $resultX) {
+  print "ok $n\n";
+} else {
+  print "not ok $n\n";
+}
+$n++;
+
+# (4) Fill in same template again
+$text = $template->fill_in('package' => Y);
+if ($text eq $resultY) {
+  print "ok $n\n";
+} else {
+  print "not ok $n\n";
+}
+$n++;
+
+
+
+# (5) Simple test of `fill_this_in'
+$text = Text::Template->fill_this_in( $template_1, 'package' => X);
+if ($text eq $resultX) {
+  print "ok $n\n";
+} else {
+  print "not ok $n\n";
+}
+$n++;
+
+# (6) test creation of template from filehandle
+if (open (TMPL, "< $TEMPFILE")) {
+  $template = new Text::Template ('type' => 'FILEHANDLE', 
+				  'source' => *TMPL);
+  if (defined($template)) {
+    print "ok $n\n";
+  } else {
+    print "not ok $n $Text::Template::ERROR\n";
+  }
+  $n++;
+
+# (7) test filling in of template from filehandle
+  $text = $template->fill_in('package' => X);
+  if ($text eq $resultX) {
+    print "ok $n\n";
+  } else {
+    print "not ok $n\n";
+  }
+  $n++;
+
+# (8) test second fill_in on same template object
+  $text = $template->fill_in('package' => Y);
+  if ($text eq $resultY) {
+    print "ok $n\n";
+  } else {
+    print "not ok $n\n";
+  }
+  $n++;
+  close TMPL;
+} else {
+  print "not ok $n\n";  $n++;
+  print "not ok $n\n";  $n++;
+  print "not ok $n\n";  $n++;
+}
+
+
+# (9) test creation of template from array
+$template = new Text::Template 
+    ('type' => 'ARRAY', 
+     'source' => [ 
+		  'We will put value of $v (which is "abc") here -> {$v}',
+		  "\n",
+		  'We will evaluate 1+1 here -> {1+1}',
+		  "\n",
+		  ]);
+if (defined($template)) {
+  print "ok $n\n";
+} else {
+  print "not ok $n $Text::Template::ERROR\n";
+}
+$n++;
+
+# (10) test filling in of template from array
+$text = $template->fill_in('package' => X);
+if ($text eq $resultX) {
+  print "ok $n\n";
+} else {
+  print "not ok $n\n";
+}
+$n++;
+
+# (11) test second fill_in on same array template object
+$text = $template->fill_in('package' => Y);
+if ($text eq $resultY) {
+  print "ok $n\n";
+} else {
+  print "not ok $n\n";
+  print STDERR "$resultX\n---\n$text";
+  unless (!defined($text)) { print STDERR "ERROR: $Text::Template::ERROR\n"};
+}
+$n++;
+
+
+
+# (12) Make sure \ is working properly
+# Test added for version 1.11
+my $tmpl = Text::Template->new(TYPE => 'STRING',
+			       SOURCE => 'B{"\\}"}C{"\\{"}D',
+			       );
+# This should fail if the \ are not interpreted properly.
+my $text = $tmpl->fill_in();
+print +($text eq "B}C{D" ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n";
+$n++;
+
+# (13) Make sure \ is working properly
+# Test added for version 1.11
+$tmpl = Text::Template->new(TYPE => 'STRING',
+			    SOURCE => qq{A{"\t"}B},
+			   );
+# Symptom of old problem:  ALL \ were special in templates, so
+# The lexer would return (A, PROGTEXT("t"), B), and the
+# result text would be AtB instead of A(tab)B.
+$text = $tmpl->fill_in();
+
+print +($text eq "A\tB" ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n";
+$n++;
+
+# (14-27) Make sure \ is working properly
+# Test added for version 1.11
+# This is a sort of general test.
+my @tests = ('{""}' => '',	# (14)
+	     '{"}"}' => undef,  # (15)
+	     '{"\\}"}' => '}',	# One backslash
+	     '{"\\\\}"}' => undef, # Two backslashes
+	     '{"\\\\\\}"}' => '}', # Three backslashes
+	     '{"\\\\\\\\}"}' => undef, # Four backslashes
+	     '{"\\\\\\\\\\}"}' => '\}', # Five backslashes  (20)
+	     '{"x20"}' => 'x20',
+	     '{"\\x20"}' => ' ',	# One backslash
+	     '{"\\\\x20"}' => '\\x20', # Two backslashes
+	     '{"\\\\\\x20"}' => '\\ ', # Three backslashes
+	     '{"\\\\\\\\x20"}' => '\\\\x20', # Four backslashes  (25)
+	     '{"\\\\\\\\\\x20"}' => '\\\\ ', # Five backslashes
+	     '{"\\x20\\}"}' => ' }', # (27)
+	    );
+
+my $i;
+for ($i=0; $i<@tests; $i+=2) {
+  my $tmpl = Text::Template->new(TYPE => 'STRING',
+				 SOURCE => $tests[$i],
+				);
+  my $text = $tmpl->fill_in;
+  my $result = $tests[$i+1];
+  my $ok = (! defined $text && ! defined $result
+	    || $text eq $result);
+  unless ($ok) {
+    print STDERR "($n) expected .$result., got .$text.\n";
+  }
+  print +($ok ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n";
+  $n++;
+}
+
+
+# (28-30) I discovered that you can't pass a glob ref as your filehandle.
+# MJD 20010827
+# (28) test creation of template from filehandle
+if (open (TMPL, "< $TEMPFILE")) {
+  $template = new Text::Template ('type' => 'FILEHANDLE', 
+				  'source' => \*TMPL);
+  if (defined($template)) {
+    print "ok $n\n";
+  } else {
+    print "not ok $n $Text::Template::ERROR\n";
+  }
+  $n++;
+
+# (29) test filling in of template from filehandle
+  $text = $template->fill_in('package' => X);
+  if ($text eq $resultX) {
+    print "ok $n\n";
+  } else {
+    print "not ok $n\n";
+  }
+  $n++;
+
+# (30) test second fill_in on same template object
+  $text = $template->fill_in('package' => Y);
+  if ($text eq $resultY) {
+    print "ok $n\n";
+  } else {
+    print "not ok $n\n";
+  }
+  $n++;
+  close TMPL;
+} else {
+  print "not ok $n\n";  $n++;
+  print "not ok $n\n";  $n++;
+  print "not ok $n\n";  $n++;
+}
+
+# (31) Test _scrubpkg for leakiness
+$Text::Template::GEN0::test = 1;
+Text::Template::_scrubpkg('Text::Template::GEN0');
+if ($Text::Template::GEN0::test) {
+  print "not ok $n\n";
+} else {
+  print "ok $n\n";
+}
+$n++;
+
+
+END {unlink $TEMPFILE;}
+
+exit;
+
+
+
+
+sub abort {
+  unlink $TEMPFILE;
+  die $_[0];
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/t/02-hash.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/t/02-hash.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..29ba51a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/t/02-hash.t
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+#!perl
+#
+# test apparatus for Text::Template module
+# still incomplete.
+
+use Text::Template;
+
+die "This is the test program for Text::Template version 1.46.
+You are using version $Text::Template::VERSION instead.
+That does not make sense.\n
+Aborting"
+  unless $Text::Template::VERSION == 1.46;
+
+
+print "1..12\n";
+
+$n=1;
+
+$template = 'We will put value of $v (which is "good") here -> {$v}';
+
+$v = 'oops (main)';
+$Q::v = 'oops (Q)';
+
+$vars = { 'v' => \'good' };
+
+# (1) Build template from string
+$template = new Text::Template ('type' => 'STRING', 'source' => $template);
+print +($template ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n";
+$n++;
+
+# (2) Fill in template in anonymous package
+$result2 = 'We will put value of $v (which is "good") here -> good';
+$text = $template->fill_in(HASH => $vars);
+print +($text eq $result2 ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n";
+$n++;
+
+# (3) Did we clobber the main variable?
+print +($v eq 'oops (main)' ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n";
+$n++;
+
+# (4) Fill in same template again
+$result4 = 'We will put value of $v (which is "good") here -> good';
+$text = $template->fill_in(HASH => $vars);
+print +($text eq $result4 ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n";
+$n++;
+
+# (5) Now with a package
+$result5 = 'We will put value of $v (which is "good") here -> good';
+$text = $template->fill_in(HASH => $vars, PACKAGE => 'Q');
+print +($text eq $result5 ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n";
+$n++;
+
+# (6) We expect to have clobbered the Q variable.
+print +($Q::v eq 'good' ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n";
+$n++;
+
+# (7) Now let's try it without a package
+$result7 = 'We will put value of $v (which is "good") here -> good';
+$text = $template->fill_in(HASH => $vars);
+print +($text eq $result7 ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n";
+$n++;
+
+# (8-11) Now what does it do when we pass a hash with undefined values?
+# Roy says it does something bad. (Added for 1.20.)
+my $WARNINGS = 0;
+{
+  local $SIG{__WARN__} = sub {$WARNINGS++};
+  local $^W = 1;       # Make sure this is on for this test
+  $template8 = 'We will put value of $v (which is "good") here -> {defined $v ? "bad" : "good"}';
+  $result8 = 'We will put value of $v (which is "good") here -> good';
+  my $template = 
+    new Text::Template ('type' => 'STRING', 'source' => $template8);
+  my $text = $template->fill_in(HASH => {'v' => undef});
+  # (8) Did we generate a warning?
+  print +($WARNINGS == 0 ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n";
+  $n++;
+  
+  # (9) Was the output correct?
+  print +($text eq $result8 ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n";
+  $n++;
+
+  # (10-11) Let's try that again, with a twist this time
+  $WARNINGS = 0;
+  $text = $template->fill_in(HASH => [{'v' => 17}, {'v' => undef}]);
+  # (10) Did we generate a warning?
+  print +($WARNINGS == 0 ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n";
+  $n++;
+  
+  # (11) Was the output correct?
+  if ($] < 5.005) {
+    print "ok $n # skipped -- not supported before 5.005\n";
+  } else {
+    print +($text eq $result8 ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n";
+  }
+  $n++;
+}
+
+
+# (12) Now we'll test the multiple-hash option  (Added for 1.20.)
+$text = Text::Template::fill_in_string(q{$v: {$v}.  @v: [{"@v"}].},
+				       HASH => [{'v' => 17}, 
+						{'v' => ['a', 'b', 'c']},
+						{'v' => \23},
+					       ]);
+$result = q{$v: 23.  @v: [a b c].};
+print +($text eq $result ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n";
+$n++;
+
+
+exit;
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/t/03-out.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/t/03-out.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0ba65a5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/t/03-out.t
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+#!perl
+#
+# test apparatus for Text::Template module
+# still incomplete.
+#
+
+use Text::Template;
+
+die "This is the test program for Text::Template version 1.46
+You are using version $Text::Template::VERSION instead.
+That does not make sense.\n
+Aborting"
+  unless $Text::Template::VERSION == 1.46;
+
+print "1..1\n";
+
+$n=1;
+
+$template = q{
+This line should have a 3: {1+2}
+
+This line should have several numbers:
+{ $t = ''; foreach $n (1 .. 20) { $t .= $n . ' ' } $t }
+};
+
+$templateOUT = q{
+This line should have a 3: { $OUT = 1+2 }
+
+This line should have several numbers:
+{ foreach $n (1 .. 20) { $OUT .= $n . ' ' } }
+};
+
+# Build templates from string
+$template = new Text::Template ('type' => 'STRING', 'source' => $template)
+  or die;
+$templateOUT = new Text::Template ('type' => 'STRING', 'source' => $templateOUT)
+  or die;
+
+# Fill in templates
+$text = $template->fill_in()
+  or die;
+$textOUT = $templateOUT->fill_in()
+  or die;
+
+# (1) They should be the same
+print +($text eq $textOUT ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n";
+$n++;
+
+# Missing:  Test this feature in Safe compartments; 
+# it's a totally different code path.
+# Decision: Put that into safe.t, because that file should
+# be skipped when Safe.pm is unavailable.
+
+
+exit;
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/t/04-safe.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/t/04-safe.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4c07121
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/t/04-safe.t
@@ -0,0 +1,161 @@
+#!perl
+#
+# test apparatus for Text::Template module
+# still incomplete.
+
+use Text::Template;
+
+BEGIN {
+  eval "use Safe";
+  if ($@) {
+    print "1..0\n";
+    exit 0;
+  }
+}
+
+die "This is the test program for Text::Template version 1.46.
+You are using version $Text::Template::VERSION instead.
+That does not make sense.\n
+Aborting"
+  unless $Text::Template::VERSION == 1.46;
+
+print "1..16\n";
+
+if ($^O eq 'MacOS') {
+  $BADOP = qq{};
+  $FAILURE = q{};
+} else {
+  $BADOP = qq{kill 0};
+  $FAILURE = q{Program fragment at line 1 delivered error ``kill trapped by operation mask''};
+}
+
+$n=1;
+$v = $v = 119;
+
+$c = new Safe or die;
+
+$goodtemplate = q{This should succeed: { $v }};
+$goodoutput   = q{This should succeed: 119};
+
+$template1 = new Text::Template ('type' => 'STRING', 'source' => $goodtemplate)
+  or die;
+$template2 = new Text::Template ('type' => 'STRING', 'source' => $goodtemplate)
+  or die;
+
+$text1 = $template1->fill_in();
+$text2 = $template1->fill_in(SAFE => $c);
+$ERR2 = $@;
+$text3 = $template2->fill_in(SAFE => $c);
+$ERR3 = $@;
+
+# (1)(2)(3) None of these should have failed.
+print +(defined $text1 ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n";
+$n++;
+print +(defined $text2 ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n";
+$n++;
+print +(defined $text3 ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n";
+$n++;
+
+# (4) Safe and non-safe fills of different template objects with the
+# same template text should yield the same result.
+# print +($text1 eq $text3 ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n";
+# (4) voided this test:  it's not true, because the unsafe fill
+# uses package main, while the safe fill uses the secret safe package.
+# We could alias the secret safe package to be identical to main,
+# but that wouldn't be safe.  If you want the aliasing, you have to
+# request it explicitly with `PACKAGE'.
+print "ok $n\n";
+$n++;
+
+# (5) Safe and non-safe fills of the same template object
+# should yield the same result.
+# (5) voided this test for the same reason as #4.
+# print +($text1 eq $text2 ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n";
+print "ok $n\n";
+$n++;
+
+# (6) Make sure the output was actually correct
+print +($text1 eq $goodoutput ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n";
+$n++;
+
+
+$badtemplate     = qq{This should fail: { $BADOP; 'NOFAIL' }};
+$badnosafeoutput = q{This should fail: NOFAIL};
+$badsafeoutput   = q{This should fail: Program fragment delivered error ``kill trapped by operation mask at template line 1.''};
+
+$template1 = new Text::Template ('type' => 'STRING', 'source' => $badtemplate)
+  or die;
+$template2 = new Text::Template ('type' => 'STRING', 'source' => $badtemplate)
+  or die;
+
+$text1 = $template1->fill_in();
+$text2 = $template1->fill_in(SAFE => $c);
+$ERR2 = $@;
+$text3 = $template2->fill_in(SAFE => $c);
+$ERR3 = $@;
+$text4 = $template1->fill_in();
+
+# (7)(8)(9)(10) None of these should have failed.
+print +(defined $text1 ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n";
+$n++;
+print +(defined $text2 ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n";
+$n++;
+print +(defined $text3 ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n";
+$n++;
+print +(defined $text4 ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n";
+$n++;
+
+# (11) text1 and text4 should be the same (using safe in between
+# didn't change anything.)
+print +($text1 eq $text4 ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n";
+$n++;
+
+# (12) text2 and text3 should be the same (same template text in different
+# objects
+print +($text2 eq $text3 ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n";
+$n++;
+
+# (13) text1 should yield badnosafeoutput
+print +($text1 eq $badnosafeoutput ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n";
+$n++;
+
+# (14) text2 should yield badsafeoutput
+$text2 =~ s/'kill'/kill/;  # 5.8.1 added quote marks around the op name
+print "# expected: <$badsafeoutput>\n# got     : <$text2>\n";
+print +($text2 eq $badsafeoutput ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n";
+$n++;
+
+
+$template = q{{$x=1}{$x+1}};
+
+$template1 = new Text::Template ('type' => 'STRING', 'source' => $template)
+  or die;
+$template2 = new Text::Template ('type' => 'STRING', 'source' => $template)
+  or die;
+
+$text1 = $template1->fill_in();
+$text2 = $template1->fill_in(SAFE => new Safe);
+
+# (15) Do effects persist in safe compartments?
+print +($text1 eq $text2 ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n";
+$n++;
+
+# (16) Try the BROKEN routine in safe compartments
+sub my_broken { 
+  my %a = @_; $a{error} =~ s/ at.*//s;
+  "OK! text:$a{text} error:$a{error} lineno:$a{lineno} arg:$a{arg}" ;
+}
+$templateB = new Text::Template (TYPE => 'STRING', SOURCE => '{die}')
+    or die;
+$text1 = $templateB->fill_in(BROKEN => \&my_broken, 
+			     BROKEN_ARG => 'barg',
+			     SAFE => new Safe,
+			     );
+$result1 = qq{OK! text:die error:Died lineno:1 arg:barg};
+print +($text1 eq $result1 ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n";
+$n++;
+
+
+
+exit;
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/t/05-safe2.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/t/05-safe2.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0353477
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/t/05-safe2.t
@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+#!perl
+#
+# test apparatus for Text::Template module
+# still incomplete.
+
+use Text::Template;
+
+BEGIN {
+  eval "use Safe";
+  if ($@) {
+    print "1..0\n";
+    exit 0;
+  }
+}
+
+die "This is the test program for Text::Template version 1.46.
+You are using version $Text::Template::VERSION instead.
+That does not make sense.\n
+Aborting"
+  unless $Text::Template::VERSION == 1.46;
+
+print "1..12\n";
+$n = 1;
+
+$c = new Safe or die;
+
+# Test handling of packages and importing.
+$c->reval('$P = "safe root"');
+$P = $P = 'main';
+$Q::P = $Q::P = 'Q';
+
+# How to effectively test the gensymming?
+
+$t = new Text::Template TYPE => 'STRING', SOURCE => 'package is {$P}'
+    or die;
+
+# (1) Default behavior: Inherit from calling package, `main' in this case.
+$text = $t->fill_in();
+print +($text eq 'package is main' ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n";
+$n++;
+
+# (2) When a package is specified, we should use that package instead.
+$text = $t->fill_in(PACKAGE => 'Q');
+print +($text eq 'package is Q' ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n";
+$n++;
+
+# (3) When no package is specified in safe mode, we should use the
+# default safe root.
+$text = $t->fill_in(SAFE => $c);
+print +($text eq 'package is safe root' ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n";
+$n++;
+
+# (4) When a package is specified in safe mode, we should use the
+# default safe root, after aliasing to the specified package
+$text = $t->fill_in(SAFE => $c, PACKAGE => Q);
+print +($text eq 'package is Q' ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n";
+$n++;
+
+# Now let's see if hash vars are installed properly into safe templates
+$t = new Text::Template TYPE => 'STRING', SOURCE => 'hash is {$H}'
+    or die;
+
+# (5) First in default mode
+$text = $t->fill_in(HASH => {H => 'good5'} );
+print +($text eq 'hash is good5' ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n";
+$n++;
+
+# (6) Now in packages
+$text = $t->fill_in(HASH => {H => 'good6'}, PACKAGE => 'Q' );
+print +($text eq 'hash is good6' ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n";
+$n++;
+
+# (7) Now in the default root of the safe compartment
+$text = $t->fill_in(HASH => {H => 'good7'}, SAFE => $c );
+print +($text eq 'hash is good7' ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n";
+$n++;
+
+# (8) Now in the default root after aliasing to a package that
+# got the hash stuffed in
+$text = $t->fill_in(HASH => {H => 'good8'}, SAFE => $c, PACKAGE => 'Q2' );
+print +($text eq 'hash is good8' ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n";
+$n++;
+
+# Now let's make sure that none of the packages leaked on each other.
+# (9) This var should NOT have been installed into the main package
+print +(defined $H ? 'not ' : ''), "ok $n\n";
+$H=$H;
+$n++;
+
+# (10) good6 was overwritten in test 7, so there's nothing to test for here.
+print "ok $n\n";
+$n++;
+
+# (11) this value overwrote the one from test 6.
+print +($Q::H eq 'good7' ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n";
+$Q::H = $Q::H;
+$n++;
+
+# (12) 
+print +($Q2::H eq 'good8' ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n";
+$Q2::H = $Q2::H;
+$n++;
+
+
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/t/06-ofh.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/t/06-ofh.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6865ad1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/t/06-ofh.t
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+#!perl
+#
+# test apparatus for Text::Template module
+# still incomplete.
+
+use Text::Template;
+
+die "This is the test program for Text::Template version 1.46.
+You are using version $Text::Template::VERSION instead.
+That does not make sense.\n
+Aborting"
+  unless $Text::Template::VERSION == 1.46;
+
+print "1..2\n";
+
+$n=1;
+
+$template = new Text::Template TYPE => STRING, SOURCE => q{My process ID is {$$}};
+$of = "t$$";
+END { unlink $of }
+open O, "> $of" or die;
+
+$text = $template->fill_in(OUTPUT => \*O);
+
+# (1) No $text should have been constructed.  Return value should be true.
+print +($text eq '1' ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n";
+$n++;
+
+close O or die;
+open I, "< $of" or die;
+{ local $/; $t = <I> }
+close I;
+
+# (2) The text should have been printed to the file
+print +($t eq "My process ID is $$" ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n";
+$n++;
+
+exit;
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/t/07-safe3.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/t/07-safe3.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5f438f6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/t/07-safe3.t
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+#!perl
+#
+# test apparatus for Text::Template module
+
+use Text::Template;
+
+BEGIN {
+  eval "use Safe";
+  if ($@) {
+    print "1..0\n";
+    exit 0;
+  }
+}
+
+die "This is the test program for Text::Template version 1.46.
+You are using version $Text::Template::VERSION instead.
+That does not make sense.\n
+Aborting"
+  unless $Text::Template::VERSION == 1.46;
+
+print "1..3\n";
+
+$n=1;
+
+# Test the OUT feature with safe compartments
+
+$template = q{
+This line should have a 3: {1+2}
+
+This line should have several numbers:
+{ $t = ''; foreach $n (1 .. 20) { $t .= $n . ' ' } $t }
+};
+
+$templateOUT = q{
+This line should have a 3: { $OUT = 1+2 }
+
+This line should have several numbers:
+{ foreach $n (1 .. 20) { $OUT .= $n . ' ' } }
+};
+
+$c = new Safe;
+
+# Build templates from string
+$template = new Text::Template ('type' => 'STRING', 'source' => $template,
+			       SAFE => $c)
+  or die;
+$templateOUT = new Text::Template ('type' => 'STRING', 'source' => $templateOUT,
+				  SAFE => $c)
+  or die;
+
+# Fill in templates
+$text = $template->fill_in()
+  or die;
+$textOUT = $templateOUT->fill_in()
+  or die;
+
+# (1) They should be the same
+print +($text eq $textOUT ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n";
+$n++;
+
+# (2-3)  "Joel Appelbaum" <joel@orbz.com> <000701c0ac2c$aed1d6e0$0201a8c0@prime>
+# "Contrary to the documentation the $OUT variable is not always
+# undefined at the start of each program fragment.  The $OUT variable
+# is never undefined after it is used once if you are using the SAFE
+# option.  The result is that every fragment after the fragment that
+# $OUT was used in is replaced by the old $OUT value instead of the
+# result of the fragment.  This holds true even after the
+# Text::Template object goes out of scope and a new one is created!"
+#
+# Also reported by Daini Xie.
+
+{
+  my $template = q{{$OUT = 'x'}y{$OUT .= 'z'}};
+  my $expected = "xyz";
+  my $s = Safe->new;
+  my $o = Text::Template->new(type => 'string',
+                              source => $template,
+                             );
+  for (1..2) {
+    my $r = $o->fill_in(SAFE => $s);
+    if ($r ne $expected) {
+      print "not ok $n # <$r>\n";
+    } else {
+      print "ok $n\n";
+    }
+    $n++;
+  }
+}
+
+exit;
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/t/08-exported.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/t/08-exported.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ef9cfaf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/t/08-exported.t
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+#!perl
+#
+# test apparatus for Text::Template module
+# still incomplete.
+
+use Text::Template 'fill_in_file', 'fill_in_string';
+
+die "This is the test program for Text::Template version 1.46.
+You are using version $Text::Template::VERSION instead.
+That does not make sense.\n
+Aborting"
+  unless $Text::Template::VERSION == 1.46;
+
+print "1..6\n";
+
+$n=1;
+$Q::n = $Q::n = 119; 
+
+# (1) Test fill_in_string
+$out = fill_in_string('The value of $n is {$n}.', PACKAGE => 'Q' );
+print +($out eq 'The value of $n is 119.' ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n";
+$n++;
+
+# (2) Test fill_in_file
+$TEMPFILE = "tt$$";
+open F, "> $TEMPFILE" or die "Couldn't open test file: $!; aborting";
+print F 'The value of $n is {$n}.', "\n";
+close F or die "Couldn't write test file: $!; aborting";
+$R::n = $R::n = 8128; 
+
+$out = fill_in_file($TEMPFILE, PACKAGE => 'R');
+print +($out eq "The value of \$n is 8128.\n" ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n";
+$n++;
+
+# (3) Jonathan Roy reported this bug:
+open F, "> $TEMPFILE" or die "Couldn't open test file: $!; aborting";
+print F "With a message here? [% \$var %]\n";
+close F  or die "Couldn't close test file: $!; aborting";
+$out = fill_in_file($TEMPFILE, DELIMITERS => ['[%', '%]'],
+		    HASH => { "var" => \"It is good!" });
+print +($out eq "With a message here? It is good!\n" ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n";
+$n++;
+
+# (4) It probably occurs in fill_this_in also:
+$out = 
+  Text::Template->fill_this_in("With a message here? [% \$var %]\n",
+                      DELIMITERS => ['[%', '%]'],
+                      HASH => { "var" => \"It is good!" });
+print +($out eq "With a message here? It is good!\n" ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n";
+$n++;
+
+# (5) This test failed in 1.25.  It was supplied by Donald L. Greer Jr.
+# Note that it's different from (1)  in that there's no explicit 
+# package=> argument.
+use vars qw($string $foo $r);
+$string='Hello {$foo}';
+$foo="Don";
+$r = fill_in_string($string);
+print (($r eq 'Hello Don' ? '' : 'not '), 'ok ', $n++, "\n");
+
+# (6) This test failed in 1.25.  It's a variation on (5)
+package Q2;
+use Text::Template 'fill_in_string';
+use vars qw($string $foo $r);
+$string='Hello {$foo}';
+$foo="Don";
+$r = fill_in_string($string);
+print (($r eq 'Hello Don' ? '' : 'not '), 'ok ', $main::n++, "\n");
+
+package main;
+
+END { $TEMPFILE && unlink $TEMPFILE }
+
+exit;
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/t/09-error.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/t/09-error.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..40f9fac
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/t/09-error.t
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+#!perl
+#
+# test apparatus for Text::Template module
+# still incomplete.
+
+use Text::Template;
+
+die "This is the test program for Text::Template version 1.46.
+You are using version $Text::Template::VERSION instead.
+That does not make sense.\n
+Aborting"
+  unless $Text::Template::VERSION == 1.46;
+
+print "1..5\n";
+$n = 1;
+
+# (1-2) Missing source
+eval {
+  Text::Template->new();
+};
+unless ($@ =~ /^\QUsage: Text::Template::new(TYPE => ..., SOURCE => ...)/) {
+  print STDERR $@;
+  print "not ";
+}
+print "ok $n\n";
+$n++;
+
+eval {
+  Text::Template->new(TYPE => 'FILE');
+};
+if ($@ =~ /^\QUsage: Text::Template::new(TYPE => ..., SOURCE => ...)/) {
+  print "ok $n\n";
+} else {
+  print STDERR $@;
+  print "not ok $n\n";
+}
+$n++;
+
+# (3) Invalid type
+eval {
+  Text::Template->new(TYPE => 'wlunch', SOURCE => 'fish food');
+};
+if ($@ =~ /^\QIllegal value `WLUNCH' for TYPE parameter/) {
+  print "ok $n\n";
+} else {
+  print STDERR $@;
+  print "not ok $n\n";
+}
+$n++;
+
+# (4-5) File does not exist
+my $o = Text::Template->new(TYPE => 'file', 
+                            SOURCE => 'this file does not exist');
+print $o ? "not ok $n\n" : "ok $n\n";
+$n++;
+print defined($Text::Template::ERROR) 
+      && $Text::Template::ERROR =~ /^Couldn't open file/
+  ? "ok $n\n" : "not ok $n\n";
+$n++;
+
+
+exit;
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/t/10-delimiters.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/t/10-delimiters.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f74d591
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/t/10-delimiters.t
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+#!perl
+#
+# Tests for user-specified delimiter functions
+# These tests first appeared in version 1.20.
+
+use Text::Template;
+
+die "This is the test program for Text::Template version 1.46.
+You are using version $Text::Template::VERSION instead.
+That does not make sense.\n
+Aborting"
+  unless $Text::Template::VERSION == 1.46;
+
+print "1..18\n";
+$n = 1;
+
+# (1) Try a simple delimiter: <<..>>
+# First with the delimiters specified at object creation time
+$V = $V = 119;
+$template = q{The value of $V is <<$V>>.};
+$result = q{The value of $V is 119.};
+$template1 = Text::Template->new(TYPE => STRING, 
+				 SOURCE => $template,
+				 DELIMITERS => ['<<', '>>']
+				)
+  or die "Couldn't construct template object: $Text::Template::ERROR; aborting";
+$text = $template1->fill_in();
+print +($text eq $result ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n";
+$n++;
+
+# (2) Now with delimiter choice deferred until fill-in time.
+$template1 = Text::Template->new(TYPE => STRING, SOURCE => $template);
+$text = $template1->fill_in(DELIMITERS => ['<<', '>>']);
+print +($text eq $result ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n";
+$n++;
+
+# (3) Now we'll try using regex metacharacters
+# First with the delimiters specified at object creation time
+$template = q{The value of $V is [$V].};
+$template1 = Text::Template->new(TYPE => STRING, 
+				 SOURCE => $template,
+				 DELIMITERS => ['[', ']']
+				)
+  or die "Couldn't construct template object: $Text::Template::ERROR; aborting";
+$text = $template1->fill_in();
+print +($text eq $result ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n";
+$n++;
+
+# (4) Now with delimiter choice deferred until fill-in time.
+$template1 = Text::Template->new(TYPE => STRING, SOURCE => $template);
+$text = $template1->fill_in(DELIMITERS => ['[', ']']);
+print +($text eq $result ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n";
+$n++;
+
+
+
+# (5-18) Make sure \ is working properly
+# (That is to say, it is ignored.)
+# These tests are similar to those in 01-basic.t.
+my @tests = ('{""}' => '',	# (5)
+
+	     # Backslashes don't matter
+	     '{"}"}' => undef,
+	     '{"\\}"}' => undef,	# One backslash
+	     '{"\\\\}"}' => undef, # Two backslashes
+	     '{"\\\\\\}"}' => undef, # Three backslashes 
+	     '{"\\\\\\\\}"}' => undef, # Four backslashes (10)
+	     '{"\\\\\\\\\\}"}' => undef, # Five backslashes
+	     
+	     # Backslashes are always passed directly to Perl
+	     '{"x20"}' => 'x20',
+	     '{"\\x20"}' => ' ',	# One backslash
+	     '{"\\\\x20"}' => '\\x20', # Two backslashes
+	     '{"\\\\\\x20"}' => '\\ ', # Three backslashes (15)
+	     '{"\\\\\\\\x20"}' => '\\\\x20', # Four backslashes
+	     '{"\\\\\\\\\\x20"}' => '\\\\ ', # Five backslashes
+	     '{"\\x20\\}"}' => undef, # (18)
+	    );
+
+my $i;
+for ($i=0; $i<@tests; $i+=2) {
+  my $tmpl = Text::Template->new(TYPE => 'STRING',
+				 SOURCE => $tests[$i],
+				 DELIMITERS => ['{', '}'],
+				);
+  my $text = $tmpl->fill_in;
+  my $result = $tests[$i+1];
+  my $ok = (! defined $text && ! defined $result
+	    || $text eq $result);
+  unless ($ok) {
+    print STDERR "($n) expected .$result., got .$text.\n";
+  }
+  print +($ok ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n";
+  $n++;
+}
+
+
+exit;
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/t/11-prepend.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/t/11-prepend.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fe242e5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/t/11-prepend.t
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+#!perl
+#
+# Tests for PREPEND features
+# These tests first appeared in version 1.22.
+
+use Text::Template;
+
+die "This is the test program for Text::Template version 1.46
+You are using version $Text::Template::VERSION instead.
+That does not make sense.\n
+Aborting"
+  unless $Text::Template::VERSION == 1.46;
+
+print "1..9\n";
+my $n = 1;
+
+@Emptyclass1::ISA = 'Text::Template';
+@Emptyclass2::ISA = 'Text::Template';
+
+my $tin = q{The value of $foo is: {$foo}};
+
+Text::Template->always_prepend(q{$foo = "global"});
+
+$tmpl1 = Text::Template->new(TYPE => 'STRING',
+				SOURCE => $tin,		
+			      );
+
+$tmpl2 = Text::Template->new(TYPE => 'STRING',
+			     SOURCE => $tin,		
+			     PREPEND => q{$foo = "template"},
+			     );
+
+$tmpl1->compile;
+$tmpl2->compile;
+
+$t1 = $tmpl1->fill_in(PACKAGE => 'T1');
+$t2 = $tmpl2->fill_in(PACKAGE => 'T2');
+$t3 = $tmpl2->fill_in(PREPEND => q{$foo = "fillin"}, PACKAGE => 'T3');
+
+($t1 eq 'The value of $foo is: global') or print "not ";
+print "ok $n\n"; $n++;
+($t2 eq 'The value of $foo is: template') or print "not ";
+print "ok $n\n"; $n++;
+($t3 eq 'The value of $foo is: fillin') or print "not ";
+print "ok $n\n"; $n++;
+
+Emptyclass1->always_prepend(q{$foo = 'Emptyclass global';});
+$tmpl1 = Emptyclass1->new(TYPE => 'STRING',
+				SOURCE => $tin,		
+			      );
+
+$tmpl2 = Emptyclass1->new(TYPE => 'STRING',
+			     SOURCE => $tin,		
+			     PREPEND => q{$foo = "template"},
+			     );
+
+$tmpl1->compile;
+$tmpl2->compile;
+
+$t1 = $tmpl1->fill_in(PACKAGE => 'T4');
+$t2 = $tmpl2->fill_in(PACKAGE => 'T5');
+$t3 = $tmpl2->fill_in(PREPEND => q{$foo = "fillin"}, PACKAGE => 'T6');
+
+($t1 eq 'The value of $foo is: Emptyclass global') or print "not ";
+print "ok $n\n"; $n++;
+($t2 eq 'The value of $foo is: template') or print "not ";
+print "ok $n\n"; $n++;
+($t3 eq 'The value of $foo is: fillin') or print "not ";
+print "ok $n\n"; $n++;
+
+$tmpl1 = Emptyclass2->new(TYPE => 'STRING',
+				SOURCE => $tin,		
+			      );
+
+$tmpl2 = Emptyclass2->new(TYPE => 'STRING',
+			     SOURCE => $tin,		
+			     PREPEND => q{$foo = "template"},
+			     );
+
+$tmpl1->compile;
+$tmpl2->compile;
+
+$t1 = $tmpl1->fill_in(PACKAGE => 'T4');
+$t2 = $tmpl2->fill_in(PACKAGE => 'T5');
+$t3 = $tmpl2->fill_in(PREPEND => q{$foo = "fillin"}, PACKAGE => 'T6');
+
+($t1 eq 'The value of $foo is: global') or print "not ";
+print "ok $n\n"; $n++;
+($t2 eq 'The value of $foo is: template') or print "not ";
+print "ok $n\n"; $n++;
+($t3 eq 'The value of $foo is: fillin') or print "not ";
+print "ok $n\n"; $n++;
+
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/t/12-preprocess.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/t/12-preprocess.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..60b6b0c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/t/12-preprocess.t
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+#!perl
+#
+# Tests for PREPROCESSOR features
+# These tests first appeared in version 1.25.
+
+use Text::Template::Preprocess;
+
+die "This is the test program for Text::Template::Preprocess version 1.46.
+You are using version $Text::Template::Preprocess::VERSION instead.
+That does not make sense.\n
+Aborting"
+  unless $Text::Template::Preprocess::VERSION == 1.46;
+
+$TMPFILE = "tt$$";
+
+print "1..8\n";
+my $n = 1;
+
+my $py = sub { tr/x/y/ };
+my $pz = sub { tr/x/z/ };
+
+my $t = 'xxx The value of $x is {$x}';
+my $outx = 'xxx The value of $x is 119';
+my $outy = 'yyy The value of $y is 23';
+my $outz = 'zzz The value of $z is 5';
+open TF, "> $TMPFILE" or die "Couldn't open test file: $!; aborting";
+print TF $t;
+close TF;
+
+@result = ($outx, $outy, $outz, $outz);
+for my $trial (1, 0) {
+  for my $test (0 .. 3) {
+    my $tmpl;
+    if ($trial == 0) {
+      $tmpl = new Text::Template::Preprocess 
+	(TYPE => 'STRING', SOURCE => $t) or die;
+    } else {
+      open TF, "< $TMPFILE" or die "Couldn't open test file: $!; aborting";
+      $tmpl = new Text::Template::Preprocess 
+	(TYPE => 'FILEHANDLE', SOURCE => \*TF) or die;
+    }
+    $tmpl->preprocessor($py) if ($test & 1) == 1;
+    my @args = ((($test & 2) == 2) ? (PREPROCESSOR => $pz) : ());
+    my $o = $tmpl->fill_in(@args, 
+			   HASH => {x => 119, 'y' => 23, z => 5});
+#    print STDERR "$o/$result[$test]\n";
+    print +(($o eq $result[$test]) ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n";
+    $n++;
+  }
+}
+
+unlink $TMPFILE;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/t/13-taint.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/t/13-taint.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d92a374
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/t/13-taint.t
@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+#!perl -T
+# Tests for taint-mode features
+
+use lib 'blib/lib';
+use Text::Template;
+
+die "This is the test program for Text::Template version 1.46.
+You are using version $Text::Template::VERSION instead.
+That does not make sense.\n
+Aborting"
+  unless $Text::Template::VERSION == 1.46;
+
+my $r = int(rand(10000));
+my $file = "tt$r";
+
+# makes its arguments tainted
+sub taint {
+  for (@_) {
+    $_ .= substr($0,0,0);       # LOD
+  }
+}
+
+
+print "1..21\n";
+
+my $n =1;
+print "ok ", $n++, "\n";
+
+my $template = 'The value of $n is {$n}.';
+
+open T, "> $file" or die "Couldn't write temporary file $file: $!";
+print T $template, "\n";
+close T or die "Couldn't finish temporary file $file: $!";
+
+sub should_fail {
+  my $obj = Text::Template->new(@_);
+  eval {$obj->fill_in()};
+  if ($@) {
+    print "ok $n # $@\n";
+  } else {
+    print "not ok $n # (didn't fail)\n";
+  }
+  $n++;
+}
+
+sub should_work {
+  my $obj = Text::Template->new(@_);
+  eval {$obj->fill_in()};
+  if ($@) {
+    print "not ok $n # $@\n";
+  } else {
+    print "ok $n\n";
+  }
+  $n++;
+}
+
+sub should_be_tainted {
+  if (Text::Template::_is_clean($_[0])) {
+    print "not ok $n\n"; $n++; return;
+  }
+  print "ok $n\n"; $n++; return; 
+}
+
+sub should_be_clean {
+  unless (Text::Template::_is_clean($_[0])) {
+    print "not ok $n\n"; $n++; return;
+  }
+  print "ok $n\n"; $n++; return; 
+}
+
+# Tainted filename should die with and without UNTAINT option
+# untainted filename should die without UNTAINT option
+# filehandle should die without UNTAINT option
+# string and array with tainted data should die either way
+
+# (2)-(7)
+my $tfile = $file;
+taint($tfile);
+should_be_tainted($tfile);
+should_be_clean($file);
+should_fail TYPE => 'file', SOURCE => $tfile;
+should_fail TYPE => 'file', SOURCE => $tfile, UNTAINT => 1;
+should_fail TYPE => 'file', SOURCE => $file;
+should_work TYPE => 'file', SOURCE => $file, UNTAINT => 1;
+
+# (8-9)
+open H, "< $file" or die "Couldn't open $file for reading: $!; aborting";
+should_fail TYPE => 'filehandle', SOURCE => \*H;
+close H;
+open H, "< $file" or die "Couldn't open $file for reading: $!; aborting";
+should_work TYPE => 'filehandle', SOURCE => \*H, UNTAINT => 1;
+close H;
+
+# (10-15)
+my $ttemplate = $template;
+taint($ttemplate);
+should_be_tainted($ttemplate);
+should_be_clean($template);
+should_fail TYPE => 'string', SOURCE => $ttemplate;
+should_fail TYPE => 'string', SOURCE => $ttemplate, UNTAINT => 1;
+should_work TYPE => 'string', SOURCE => $template;
+should_work TYPE => 'string', SOURCE => $template, UNTAINT => 1;
+
+# (16-19)
+my $array = [ $template ];
+my $tarray = [ $ttemplate ];
+should_fail TYPE => 'array', SOURCE => $tarray;
+should_fail TYPE => 'array', SOURCE => $tarray, UNTAINT => 1;
+should_work TYPE => 'array', SOURCE => $array;
+should_work TYPE => 'array', SOURCE => $array, UNTAINT => 1;
+
+# (20-21) Test _unconditionally_untaint utility function
+Text::Template::_unconditionally_untaint($ttemplate);
+should_be_clean($ttemplate);
+Text::Template::_unconditionally_untaint($tfile);
+should_be_clean($tfile);
+
+END { unlink $file }
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/t/14-broken.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/t/14-broken.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d362395
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/t/14-broken.t
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+#!perl
+# test apparatus for Text::Template module
+
+use Text::Template;
+
+print "1..5\n";
+
+$n=1;
+
+die "This is the test program for Text::Template version 1.46.
+You are using version $Text::Template::VERSION instead.
+That does not make sense.\n
+Aborting"
+  unless $Text::Template::VERSION == 1.46;
+
+# (1) basic error delivery
+{ my $r = Text::Template->new(TYPE => 'string',
+                              SOURCE => '{1/0}',
+                             )->fill_in();
+  if ($r eq q{Program fragment delivered error ``Illegal division by zero at template line 1.''}) {
+    print "ok $n\n";
+  } else {
+    print "not ok $n\n# $r\n";
+  }
+  $n++;
+}
+
+# (2) BROKEN sub called in ->new?
+{ my $r = Text::Template->new(TYPE => 'string',
+                              SOURCE => '{1/0}',
+                              BROKEN => sub {'---'},
+                             )->fill_in();
+  if ($r eq q{---}) {
+    print "ok $n\n";
+  } else {
+    print "not ok $n\n# $r\n";
+  }
+  $n++;
+}
+
+# (3) BROKEN sub called in ->fill_in?
+{ my $r = Text::Template->new(TYPE => 'string',
+                              SOURCE => '{1/0}',
+                             )->fill_in(BROKEN => sub {'---'});
+  if ($r eq q{---}) {
+    print "ok $n\n";
+  } else {
+    print "not ok $n\n# $r\n";
+  }
+  $n++;
+}
+
+# (4) BROKEN sub passed correct args when called in ->new?
+{ my $r = Text::Template->new(TYPE => 'string',
+                              SOURCE => '{1/0}',
+                              BROKEN => sub { my %a = @_;
+                                qq{$a{lineno},$a{error},$a{text}}
+                              },
+                             )->fill_in();
+  if ($r eq qq{1,Illegal division by zero at template line 1.\n,1/0}) {
+    print "ok $n\n";
+  } else {
+    print "not ok $n\n# $r\n";
+  }
+  $n++;
+}
+
+# (5) BROKEN sub passed correct args when called in ->fill_in?
+{ my $r = Text::Template->new(TYPE => 'string',
+                              SOURCE => '{1/0}',
+                             )->fill_in(BROKEN => 
+                                        sub { my %a = @_;
+                                              qq{$a{lineno},$a{error},$a{text}}
+                                            });
+  if ($r eq qq{1,Illegal division by zero at template line 1.\n,1/0}) {
+    print "ok $n\n";
+  } else {
+    print "not ok $n\n# $r\n";
+  }
+  $n++;
+}
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/transfer/Text/Template.pm b/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/transfer/Text/Template.pm
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7dbfe3f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/external/perl/transfer/Text/Template.pm
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+# Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+# Quick transfer to the downloaded Text::Template
+
+BEGIN {
+    use File::Spec::Functions;
+    use File::Basename;
+    use lib catdir(dirname(__FILE__), "..", "..", "Text-Template-1.46", "lib");
+    # Some unpackers on VMS convert periods in directory names to underscores
+    use lib catdir(dirname(__FILE__), "..", "..", "Text-Template-1_46", "lib");
+    use Text::Template;
+    shift @INC;                 # Takes away the effect of use lib
+    shift @INC;                 # Takes away the effect of use lib
+}
+1;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/fuzz/README.md b/openssl-1.1.0h/fuzz/README.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c5a1ba9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/fuzz/README.md
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+# I Can Haz Fuzz?
+
+LibFuzzer
+=========
+
+Or, how to fuzz OpenSSL with [libfuzzer](http://llvm.org/docs/LibFuzzer.html).
+
+Starting from a vanilla+OpenSSH server Ubuntu install.
+
+Use Chrome's handy recent build of clang. Older versions may also work.
+
+    $ sudo apt-get install git
+    $ mkdir git-work
+    $ git clone https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/tools/clang
+    $ clang/scripts/update.py
+
+You may want to git pull and re-run the update from time to time.
+
+Update your path:
+
+    $ PATH=~/third_party/llvm-build/Release+Asserts/bin/:$PATH
+
+Get and build libFuzzer (there is a git mirror at
+https://github.com/llvm-mirror/llvm/tree/master/lib/Fuzzer if you prefer):
+
+    $ cd
+    $ sudo apt-get install subversion
+    $ mkdir svn-work
+    $ cd svn-work
+    $ svn co http://llvm.org/svn/llvm-project/llvm/trunk/lib/Fuzzer
+    $ cd Fuzzer
+    $ clang++ -c -g -O2 -std=c++11 *.cpp
+    $ ar r libFuzzer.a *.o
+    $ ranlib libFuzzer.a
+
+Configure for fuzzing:
+
+    $ CC=clang ./config enable-fuzz-libfuzzer \
+            --with-fuzzer-include=../../svn-work/Fuzzer \
+            --with-fuzzer-lib=../../svn-work/Fuzzer/libFuzzer \
+            -DPEDANTIC enable-asan enable-ubsan no-shared
+    $ sudo apt-get install make
+    $ LDCMD=clang++ make -j
+    $ fuzz/helper.py $FUZZER
+
+Where $FUZZER is one of the executables in `fuzz/`.
+
+If you get a crash, you should find a corresponding input file in
+`fuzz/corpora/$FUZZER-crash/`. You can reproduce the crash with
+
+    $ fuzz/$FUZZER <crashfile>
+
+AFL
+===
+
+Configure for fuzzing:
+
+    $ sudo apt-get install afl-clang
+    $ CC=afl-clang-fast ./config enable-fuzz-afl no-shared
+    $ make
+
+Run one of the fuzzers:
+
+    $ afl-fuzz -i fuzz/corpora/$FUZZER -o fuzz/corpora/$FUZZER/out fuzz/$FUZZER
+
+Where $FUZZER is one of the executables in `fuzz/`.
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/fuzz/asn1.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/fuzz/asn1.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5125f36
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/fuzz/asn1.c
@@ -0,0 +1,222 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL licenses, (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ * or in the file LICENSE in the source distribution.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Fuzz ASN.1 parsing for various data structures. Specify which on the
+ * command line:
+ *
+ * asn1 <data structure>
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#include <openssl/ec.h>
+#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
+#include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/ts.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/cms.h>
+#include "fuzzer.h"
+
+static ASN1_ITEM_EXP *item_type[] = {
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(ACCESS_DESCRIPTION),
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASIdentifierChoice),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASIdentifiers),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASIdOrRange),
+#endif
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_ANY),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_BIT_STRING),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_BMPSTRING),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_BOOLEAN),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_ENUMERATED),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_FBOOLEAN),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_GENERALSTRING),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_IA5STRING),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_INTEGER),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_NULL),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_OBJECT),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_OCTET_STRING),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_OCTET_STRING_NDEF),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_PRINTABLE),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_SEQUENCE),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_SEQUENCE_ANY),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_SET_ANY),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_T61STRING),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_TBOOLEAN),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_TIME),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_UTCTIME),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_UTF8STRING),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_VISIBLESTRING),
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASRange),
+#endif
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(AUTHORITY_KEYID),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(BASIC_CONSTRAINTS),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(BIGNUM),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(CBIGNUM),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(CERTIFICATEPOLICIES),
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(CMS_ContentInfo),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(CMS_ReceiptRequest),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(CRL_DIST_POINTS),
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(DHparams),
+#endif
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(DIRECTORYSTRING),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(DISPLAYTEXT),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(DIST_POINT),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(DIST_POINT_NAME),
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(ECPARAMETERS),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(ECPKPARAMETERS),
+#endif
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(EDIPARTYNAME),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(GENERAL_NAME),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(GENERAL_NAMES),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(GENERAL_SUBTREE),
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(IPAddressChoice),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(IPAddressFamily),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(IPAddressOrRange),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(IPAddressRange),
+#endif
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(ISSUING_DIST_POINT),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(LONG),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(NAME_CONSTRAINTS),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(NETSCAPE_SPKAC),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(NETSCAPE_SPKI),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(NOTICEREF),
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(OCSP_BASICRESP),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(OCSP_CERTID),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(OCSP_CERTSTATUS),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(OCSP_CRLID),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(OCSP_ONEREQ),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(OCSP_REQINFO),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(OCSP_REQUEST),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(OCSP_RESPBYTES),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(OCSP_RESPDATA),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(OCSP_RESPID),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(OCSP_RESPONSE),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(OCSP_REVOKEDINFO),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(OCSP_SERVICELOC),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(OCSP_SIGNATURE),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(OCSP_SINGLERESP),
+#endif
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(OTHERNAME),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(PBE2PARAM),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(PBEPARAM),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(PBKDF2PARAM),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(PKCS12),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(PKCS12_AUTHSAFES),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(PKCS12_BAGS),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(PKCS12_MAC_DATA),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(PKCS12_SAFEBAG),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(PKCS12_SAFEBAGS),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(PKCS7),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(PKCS7_ATTR_SIGN),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(PKCS7_ATTR_VERIFY),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(PKCS7_DIGEST),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(PKCS7_ENCRYPT),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(PKCS7_ENVELOPE),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(PKCS7_SIGNED),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(PKCS7_SIGN_ENVELOPE),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(PKEY_USAGE_PERIOD),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(POLICY_CONSTRAINTS),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(POLICYINFO),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(POLICY_MAPPING),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(POLICY_MAPPINGS),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(POLICYQUALINFO),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(PROXY_POLICY),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(RSA_OAEP_PARAMS),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(RSAPrivateKey),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(RSA_PSS_PARAMS),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(RSAPublicKey),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(SXNET),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(SXNETID),
+    /*ASN1_ITEM_ref(TS_RESP),  want to do this, but type is hidden, however d2i exists... */
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(USERNOTICE),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(X509),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(X509_ALGOR),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(X509_ALGORS),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(X509_ATTRIBUTE),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(X509_CERT_AUX),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(X509_CINF),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(X509_CRL),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(X509_CRL_INFO),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(X509_EXTENSION),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(X509_EXTENSIONS),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(X509_NAME),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(X509_NAME_ENTRY),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(X509_PUBKEY),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(X509_REQ),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(X509_REQ_INFO),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(X509_REVOKED),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(X509_SIG),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(X509_VAL),
+    ASN1_ITEM_ref(ZLONG),
+    NULL
+};
+
+int FuzzerInitialize(int *argc, char ***argv) {
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int FuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t *buf, size_t len) {
+    int n;
+
+    ASN1_PCTX *pctx = ASN1_PCTX_new();
+
+    ASN1_PCTX_set_flags(pctx, ASN1_PCTX_FLAGS_SHOW_ABSENT |
+        ASN1_PCTX_FLAGS_SHOW_SEQUENCE | ASN1_PCTX_FLAGS_SHOW_SSOF |
+        ASN1_PCTX_FLAGS_SHOW_TYPE | ASN1_PCTX_FLAGS_SHOW_FIELD_STRUCT_NAME);
+    ASN1_PCTX_set_str_flags(pctx, ASN1_STRFLGS_UTF8_CONVERT |
+        ASN1_STRFLGS_SHOW_TYPE | ASN1_STRFLGS_DUMP_ALL);
+
+    for (n = 0; item_type[n] != NULL; ++n) {
+        const uint8_t *b = buf;
+        unsigned char *der = NULL;
+        const ASN1_ITEM *i = ASN1_ITEM_ptr(item_type[n]);
+        ASN1_VALUE *o = ASN1_item_d2i(NULL, &b, len, i);
+
+        if (o != NULL) {
+            BIO *bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_null());
+            ASN1_item_print(bio, o, 4, i, pctx);
+            BIO_free(bio);
+
+            ASN1_item_i2d(o, &der, i);
+            OPENSSL_free(der);
+
+            ASN1_item_free(o, i);
+        }
+    }
+
+    ASN1_PCTX_free(pctx);
+
+    return 0;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/fuzz/asn1parse.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/fuzz/asn1parse.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b3a6dab
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/fuzz/asn1parse.c
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL licenses, (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ * or in the file LICENSE in the source distribution.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Fuzz the parser used for dumping ASN.1 using "openssl asn1parse".
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include "fuzzer.h"
+
+int FuzzerInitialize(int *argc, char ***argv) {
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int FuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t *buf, size_t len) {
+    static BIO *bio_out;
+
+    if (bio_out == NULL)
+        bio_out = BIO_new_file("/dev/null", "w");
+
+    (void)ASN1_parse_dump(bio_out, buf, len, 0, 0);
+    return 0;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/fuzz/bignum.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/fuzz/bignum.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..43e134b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/fuzz/bignum.c
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL licenses, (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ * or in the file LICENSE in the source distribution.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Confirm that a^b mod c agrees when calculated cleverly vs naively, for
+ * random a, b and c.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include "fuzzer.h"
+
+int FuzzerInitialize(int *argc, char ***argv) {
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int FuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t *buf, size_t len) {
+    static BN_CTX *ctx;
+    static BIGNUM *b1;
+    static BIGNUM *b2;
+    static BIGNUM *b3;
+    static BIGNUM *b4;
+    static BIGNUM *b5;
+    int success = 0;
+    size_t l1 = 0, l2 = 0, l3 = 0;
+    int s1 = 0, s2 = 0, s3 = 0;
+
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+        b1 = BN_new();
+        b2 = BN_new();
+        b3 = BN_new();
+        b4 = BN_new();
+        b5 = BN_new();
+        ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+    }
+    /* Divide the input into three parts, using the values of the first two
+     * bytes to choose lengths, which generate b1, b2 and b3. Use three bits
+     * of the third byte to choose signs for the three numbers.
+     */
+    if (len > 2) {
+        len -= 3;
+        l1 = (buf[0] * len) / 255;
+        ++buf;
+        l2 = (buf[0] * (len - l1)) / 255;
+        ++buf;
+        l3 = len - l1 - l2;
+
+        s1 = buf[0] & 1;
+        s2 = buf[0] & 2;
+        s3 = buf[0] & 4;
+        ++buf;
+    }
+    OPENSSL_assert(BN_bin2bn(buf, l1, b1) == b1);
+    BN_set_negative(b1, s1);
+    OPENSSL_assert(BN_bin2bn(buf + l1, l2, b2) == b2);
+    BN_set_negative(b2, s2);
+    OPENSSL_assert(BN_bin2bn(buf + l1 + l2, l3, b3) == b3);
+    BN_set_negative(b3, s3);
+
+    /* mod 0 is undefined */
+    if (BN_is_zero(b3)) {
+        success = 1;
+        goto done;
+    }
+
+    OPENSSL_assert(BN_mod_exp(b4, b1, b2, b3, ctx));
+    OPENSSL_assert(BN_mod_exp_simple(b5, b1, b2, b3, ctx));
+
+    success = BN_cmp(b4, b5) == 0;
+    if (!success) {
+        BN_print_fp(stdout, b1);
+        putchar('\n');
+        BN_print_fp(stdout, b2);
+        putchar('\n');
+        BN_print_fp(stdout, b3);
+        putchar('\n');
+        BN_print_fp(stdout, b4);
+        putchar('\n');
+        BN_print_fp(stdout, b5);
+        putchar('\n');
+    }
+
+ done:
+    OPENSSL_assert(success);
+
+    return 0;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/fuzz/bndiv.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/fuzz/bndiv.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..45a3937
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/fuzz/bndiv.c
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL licenses, (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ * or in the file LICENSE in the source distribution.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Confirm that if (d, r) = a / b, then b * d + r == a, and that sign(d) ==
+ * sign(a), and 0 <= r <= b
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include "fuzzer.h"
+
+int FuzzerInitialize(int *argc, char ***argv) {
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int FuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t *buf, size_t len) {
+    static BN_CTX *ctx;
+    static BIGNUM *b1;
+    static BIGNUM *b2;
+    static BIGNUM *b3;
+    static BIGNUM *b4;
+    static BIGNUM *b5;
+    int success = 0;
+    size_t l1 = 0, l2 = 0;
+    /* s1 and s2 will be the signs for b1 and b2. */
+    int s1 = 0, s2 = 0;
+
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+        b1 = BN_new();
+        b2 = BN_new();
+        b3 = BN_new();
+        b4 = BN_new();
+        b5 = BN_new();
+        ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+    }
+    /* We are going to split the buffer in two, sizes l1 and l2, giving b1 and
+     * b2.
+     */
+    if (len > 0) {
+        --len;
+        /* Use first byte to divide the remaining buffer into 3Fths. I admit
+         * this disallows some number sizes. If it matters, better ideas are
+         * welcome (Ben).
+         */
+        l1 = ((buf[0] & 0x3f) * len) / 0x3f;
+        s1 = buf[0] & 0x40;
+        s2 = buf[0] & 0x80;
+        ++buf;
+        l2 = len - l1;
+    }
+    OPENSSL_assert(BN_bin2bn(buf, l1, b1) == b1);
+    BN_set_negative(b1, s1);
+    OPENSSL_assert(BN_bin2bn(buf + l1, l2, b2) == b2);
+    BN_set_negative(b2, s2);
+
+    /* divide by 0 is an error */
+    if (BN_is_zero(b2)) {
+        success = 1;
+        goto done;
+    }
+
+    OPENSSL_assert(BN_div(b3, b4, b1, b2, ctx));
+    if (BN_is_zero(b1))
+        success = BN_is_zero(b3) && BN_is_zero(b4);
+    else if (BN_is_negative(b1))
+        success = (BN_is_negative(b3) != BN_is_negative(b2) || BN_is_zero(b3))
+            && (BN_is_negative(b4) || BN_is_zero(b4));
+    else
+        success = (BN_is_negative(b3) == BN_is_negative(b2)  || BN_is_zero(b3))
+            && (!BN_is_negative(b4) || BN_is_zero(b4));
+    OPENSSL_assert(BN_mul(b5, b3, b2, ctx));
+    OPENSSL_assert(BN_add(b5, b5, b4));
+
+    success = success && BN_cmp(b5, b1) == 0;
+    if (!success) {
+        BN_print_fp(stdout, b1);
+        putchar('\n');
+        BN_print_fp(stdout, b2);
+        putchar('\n');
+        BN_print_fp(stdout, b3);
+        putchar('\n');
+        BN_print_fp(stdout, b4);
+        putchar('\n');
+        BN_print_fp(stdout, b5);
+        putchar('\n');
+        printf("%d %d %d %d %d %d %d\n", BN_is_negative(b1),
+               BN_is_negative(b2),
+               BN_is_negative(b3), BN_is_negative(b4), BN_is_zero(b4),
+               BN_is_negative(b3) != BN_is_negative(b2)
+               && (BN_is_negative(b4) || BN_is_zero(b4)),
+               BN_cmp(b5, b1));
+        puts("----\n");
+    }
+
+ done:
+    OPENSSL_assert(success);
+
+    return 0;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/fuzz/build.info b/openssl-1.1.0h/fuzz/build.info
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..eade218
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/fuzz/build.info
@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+{- use File::Spec::Functions;
+   our $ex_inc = $withargs{fuzzer_include} &&
+       (file_name_is_absolute($withargs{fuzzer_include}) ?
+        $withargs{fuzzer_include} : catdir(updir(), $withargs{fuzzer_include}));
+   our $ex_lib = $withargs{fuzzer_lib} &&
+       (file_name_is_absolute($withargs{fuzzer_lib}) ?
+        $withargs{fuzzer_lib} : catfile(updir(), $withargs{fuzzer_lib}));
+   ""
+-}
+
+IF[{- !$disabled{"fuzz-afl"} || !$disabled{"fuzz-libfuzzer"} -}]
+  PROGRAMS_NO_INST=asn1 asn1parse bignum bndiv conf crl server x509
+
+  IF[{- !$disabled{"cms"} -}]
+    PROGRAMS_NO_INST=cms
+  ENDIF
+
+  IF[{- !$disabled{"ct"} -}]
+    PROGRAMS_NO_INST=ct
+  ENDIF
+
+  SOURCE[asn1]=asn1.c driver.c
+  INCLUDE[asn1]=../include {- $ex_inc -}
+  DEPEND[asn1]=../libcrypto {- $ex_lib -}
+
+  SOURCE[asn1parse]=asn1parse.c driver.c
+  INCLUDE[asn1parse]=../include {- $ex_inc -}
+  DEPEND[asn1parse]=../libcrypto {- $ex_lib -}
+
+  SOURCE[bignum]=bignum.c driver.c
+  INCLUDE[bignum]=../include {- $ex_inc -}
+  DEPEND[bignum]=../libcrypto {- $ex_lib -}
+
+  SOURCE[bndiv]=bndiv.c driver.c
+  INCLUDE[bndiv]=../include {- $ex_inc -}
+  DEPEND[bndiv]=../libcrypto {- $ex_lib -}
+
+  SOURCE[cms]=cms.c driver.c
+  INCLUDE[cms]=../include {- $ex_inc -}
+  DEPEND[cms]=../libcrypto {- $ex_lib -}
+
+  SOURCE[conf]=conf.c driver.c
+  INCLUDE[conf]=../include {- $ex_inc -}
+  DEPEND[conf]=../libcrypto {- $ex_lib -}
+
+  SOURCE[crl]=crl.c driver.c
+  INCLUDE[crl]=../include {- $ex_inc -}
+  DEPEND[crl]=../libcrypto {- $ex_lib -}
+
+  SOURCE[ct]=ct.c driver.c
+  INCLUDE[ct]=../include {- $ex_inc -}
+  DEPEND[ct]=../libcrypto {- $ex_lib -}
+
+  SOURCE[server]=server.c driver.c
+  INCLUDE[server]=../include {- $ex_inc -}
+  DEPEND[server]=../libcrypto ../libssl {- $ex_lib -}
+
+  SOURCE[x509]=x509.c driver.c
+  INCLUDE[x509]=../include {- $ex_inc -}
+  DEPEND[x509]=../libcrypto {- $ex_lib -}
+ENDIF
+
+IF[{- !$disabled{tests} -}]
+  PROGRAMS_NO_INST=asn1-test asn1parse-test bignum-test bndiv-test conf-test crl-test server-test x509-test
+
+  IF[{- !$disabled{"cms"} -}]
+    PROGRAMS_NO_INST=cms-test
+  ENDIF
+
+  IF[{- !$disabled{"ct"} -}]
+    PROGRAMS_NO_INST=ct-test
+  ENDIF
+
+  SOURCE[asn1-test]=asn1.c test-corpus.c
+  INCLUDE[asn1-test]=../include
+  DEPEND[asn1-test]=../libcrypto
+
+  SOURCE[asn1parse-test]=asn1parse.c test-corpus.c
+  INCLUDE[asn1parse-test]=../include
+  DEPEND[asn1parse-test]=../libcrypto
+
+  SOURCE[bignum-test]=bignum.c test-corpus.c
+  INCLUDE[bignum-test]=../include
+  DEPEND[bignum-test]=../libcrypto
+
+  SOURCE[bndiv-test]=bndiv.c test-corpus.c
+  INCLUDE[bndiv-test]=../include
+  DEPEND[bndiv-test]=../libcrypto
+
+  SOURCE[cms-test]=cms.c test-corpus.c
+  INCLUDE[cms-test]=../include
+  DEPEND[cms-test]=../libcrypto
+
+  SOURCE[conf-test]=conf.c test-corpus.c
+  INCLUDE[conf-test]=../include
+  DEPEND[conf-test]=../libcrypto
+
+  SOURCE[crl-test]=crl.c test-corpus.c
+  INCLUDE[crl-test]=../include
+  DEPEND[crl-test]=../libcrypto
+
+  SOURCE[ct-test]=ct.c test-corpus.c
+  INCLUDE[ct-test]=../include
+  DEPEND[ct-test]=../libcrypto
+
+  SOURCE[server-test]=server.c test-corpus.c
+  INCLUDE[server-test]=../include
+  DEPEND[server-test]=../libcrypto ../libssl
+
+  SOURCE[x509-test]=x509.c test-corpus.c
+  INCLUDE[x509-test]=../include
+  DEPEND[x509-test]=../libcrypto
+ENDIF
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/fuzz/cms.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/fuzz/cms.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..94390e7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/fuzz/cms.c
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL licenses, (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ * or in the file LICENSE in the source distribution.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Test CMS DER parsing.
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/cms.h>
+#include "fuzzer.h"
+
+int FuzzerInitialize(int *argc, char ***argv) {
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int FuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t *buf, size_t len) {
+    CMS_ContentInfo *i;
+    BIO *in;
+    if (!len) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    in = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+    OPENSSL_assert((size_t)BIO_write(in, buf, len) == len);
+    i = d2i_CMS_bio(in, NULL);
+    CMS_ContentInfo_free(i);
+    BIO_free(in);
+    return 0;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/fuzz/conf.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/fuzz/conf.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..30b13c8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/fuzz/conf.c
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL licenses, (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ * or in the file LICENSE in the source distribution.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Test configuration parsing.
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/conf.h>
+#include "fuzzer.h"
+
+int FuzzerInitialize(int *argc, char ***argv) {
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int FuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t *buf, size_t len) {
+    CONF *conf;
+    BIO *in;
+    long eline;
+
+    if (len == 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    conf = NCONF_new(NULL);
+    in = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+    OPENSSL_assert((size_t)BIO_write(in, buf, len) == len);
+    NCONF_load_bio(conf, in, &eline);
+    NCONF_free(conf);
+    BIO_free(in);
+
+    return 0;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/fuzz/crl.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/fuzz/crl.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..728943f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/fuzz/crl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL licenses, (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ * or in the file LICENSE in the source distribution.
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include "fuzzer.h"
+
+int FuzzerInitialize(int *argc, char ***argv) {
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int FuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t *buf, size_t len) {
+    const unsigned char *p = buf;
+    unsigned char *der = NULL;
+
+    X509_CRL *crl = d2i_X509_CRL(NULL, &p, len);
+    if (crl != NULL) {
+        BIO *bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_null());
+        X509_CRL_print(bio, crl);
+        BIO_free(bio);
+
+        i2d_X509_CRL(crl, &der);
+        OPENSSL_free(der);
+
+        X509_CRL_free(crl);
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/fuzz/ct.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/fuzz/ct.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..411ccef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/fuzz/ct.c
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL licenses, (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ * or in the file LICENSE in the source distribution.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Fuzz the SCT parser.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/ct.h>
+#include "fuzzer.h"
+
+int FuzzerInitialize(int *argc, char ***argv) {
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int FuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t *buf, size_t len) {
+    const uint8_t **pp = &buf;
+    unsigned char *der = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(SCT) *scts = d2i_SCT_LIST(NULL, pp, len);
+    if (scts != NULL) {
+        BIO *bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_null());
+        SCT_LIST_print(scts, bio, 4, "\n", NULL);
+        BIO_free(bio);
+
+        if (i2d_SCT_LIST(scts, &der)) {
+            /* Silence unused result warning */
+        }
+        OPENSSL_free(der);
+
+        SCT_LIST_free(scts);
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/fuzz/driver.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/fuzz/driver.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c530fed
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/fuzz/driver.c
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL licenses, (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ * or in the file LICENSE in the source distribution.
+ */
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+#include "fuzzer.h"
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FUZZ_LIBFUZZER
+
+int LLVMFuzzerInitialize(int *argc, char ***argv)
+{
+    if (FuzzerInitialize)
+        return FuzzerInitialize(argc, argv);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t *buf, size_t len) {
+    return FuzzerTestOneInput(buf, len);
+}
+
+#elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_FUZZ_AFL)
+
+#define BUF_SIZE 65536
+
+int main(int argc, char** argv)
+{
+    if (FuzzerInitialize)
+        FuzzerInitialize(&argc, &argv);
+
+    while (__AFL_LOOP(10000)) {
+        uint8_t *buf = malloc(BUF_SIZE);
+        size_t size = read(0, buf, BUF_SIZE);
+
+        FuzzerTestOneInput(buf, size);
+        free(buf);
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+#else
+
+#error "Unsupported fuzzer"
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/fuzz/fuzzer.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/fuzz/fuzzer.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..04d605d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/fuzz/fuzzer.h
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL licenses, (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ * or in the file LICENSE in the source distribution.
+ */
+
+int FuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t *buf, size_t len);
+int FuzzerInitialize(int *argc, char ***argv);
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/fuzz/helper.py b/openssl-1.1.0h/fuzz/helper.py
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..f5f9d77
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/fuzz/helper.py
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+#!/usr/bin/python
+#
+# Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+"""Fuzzing helper, creates and uses corpus/crash directories.
+
+fuzzer.py <fuzzer> <extra fuzzer arguments>
+"""
+
+import os
+import subprocess
+import sys
+
+FUZZER = sys.argv[1]
+
+THIS_DIR = os.path.abspath(os.path.dirname(__file__))
+CORPORA_DIR = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(THIS_DIR, "corpora"))
+
+FUZZER_DIR = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(CORPORA_DIR, FUZZER))
+if not os.path.isdir(FUZZER_DIR):
+    os.mkdir(FUZZER_DIR)
+
+corpora = []
+
+def _create(d):
+    dd = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(CORPORA_DIR, d))
+    if not os.path.isdir(dd):
+        os.mkdir(dd)
+    corpora.append(dd)
+
+def _add(d):
+    dd = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(CORPORA_DIR, d))
+    if os.path.isdir(dd):
+        corpora.append(dd)
+
+def main():
+    _create(FUZZER)
+    _create(FUZZER + "-crash")
+    _add(FUZZER + "-seed")
+
+    cmd = ([os.path.abspath(os.path.join(THIS_DIR, FUZZER))]  + sys.argv[2:]
+           + ["-artifact_prefix=" + corpora[1] + "/"] + corpora)
+    print " ".join(cmd)
+    subprocess.call(cmd)
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    main()
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/fuzz/server.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/fuzz/server.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..35449d8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/fuzz/server.c
@@ -0,0 +1,250 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL licenses, (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ * or in the file LICENSE in the source distribution.
+ */
+
+/* Shamelessly copied from BoringSSL and converted to C. */
+
+/* Test first part of SSL server handshake. */
+
+
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include "fuzzer.h"
+
+static const uint8_t kCertificateDER[] = {
+    0x30, 0x82, 0x02, 0xff, 0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0xe7, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01,
+    0x02, 0x02, 0x11, 0x00, 0xb1, 0x84, 0xee, 0x34, 0x99, 0x98, 0x76, 0xfb,
+    0x6f, 0xb2, 0x15, 0xc8, 0x47, 0x79, 0x05, 0x9b, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09,
+    0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0b, 0x05, 0x00, 0x30,
+    0x12, 0x31, 0x10, 0x30, 0x0e, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x13, 0x07,
+    0x41, 0x63, 0x6d, 0x65, 0x20, 0x43, 0x6f, 0x30, 0x1e, 0x17, 0x0d, 0x31,
+    0x35, 0x31, 0x31, 0x30, 0x37, 0x30, 0x30, 0x32, 0x34, 0x35, 0x36, 0x5a,
+    0x17, 0x0d, 0x31, 0x36, 0x31, 0x31, 0x30, 0x36, 0x30, 0x30, 0x32, 0x34,
+    0x35, 0x36, 0x5a, 0x30, 0x12, 0x31, 0x10, 0x30, 0x0e, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55,
+    0x04, 0x0a, 0x13, 0x07, 0x41, 0x63, 0x6d, 0x65, 0x20, 0x43, 0x6f, 0x30,
+    0x82, 0x01, 0x22, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7,
+    0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x05, 0x00, 0x03, 0x82, 0x01, 0x0f, 0x00, 0x30,
+    0x82, 0x01, 0x0a, 0x02, 0x82, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0xce, 0x47, 0xcb, 0x11,
+    0xbb, 0xd2, 0x9d, 0x8e, 0x9e, 0xd2, 0x1e, 0x14, 0xaf, 0xc7, 0xea, 0xb6,
+    0xc9, 0x38, 0x2a, 0x6f, 0xb3, 0x7e, 0xfb, 0xbc, 0xfc, 0x59, 0x42, 0xb9,
+    0x56, 0xf0, 0x4c, 0x3f, 0xf7, 0x31, 0x84, 0xbe, 0xac, 0x03, 0x9e, 0x71,
+    0x91, 0x85, 0xd8, 0x32, 0xbd, 0x00, 0xea, 0xac, 0x65, 0xf6, 0x03, 0xc8,
+    0x0f, 0x8b, 0xfd, 0x6e, 0x58, 0x88, 0x04, 0x41, 0x92, 0x74, 0xa6, 0x57,
+    0x2e, 0x8e, 0x88, 0xd5, 0x3d, 0xda, 0x14, 0x3e, 0x63, 0x88, 0x22, 0xe3,
+    0x53, 0xe9, 0xba, 0x39, 0x09, 0xac, 0xfb, 0xd0, 0x4c, 0xf2, 0x3c, 0x20,
+    0xd6, 0x97, 0xe6, 0xed, 0xf1, 0x62, 0x1e, 0xe5, 0xc9, 0x48, 0xa0, 0xca,
+    0x2e, 0x3c, 0x14, 0x5a, 0x82, 0xd4, 0xed, 0xb1, 0xe3, 0x43, 0xc1, 0x2a,
+    0x59, 0xa5, 0xb9, 0xc8, 0x48, 0xa7, 0x39, 0x23, 0x74, 0xa7, 0x37, 0xb0,
+    0x6f, 0xc3, 0x64, 0x99, 0x6c, 0xa2, 0x82, 0xc8, 0xf6, 0xdb, 0x86, 0x40,
+    0xce, 0xd1, 0x85, 0x9f, 0xce, 0x69, 0xf4, 0x15, 0x2a, 0x23, 0xca, 0xea,
+    0xb7, 0x7b, 0xdf, 0xfb, 0x43, 0x5f, 0xff, 0x7a, 0x49, 0x49, 0x0e, 0xe7,
+    0x02, 0x51, 0x45, 0x13, 0xe8, 0x90, 0x64, 0x21, 0x0c, 0x26, 0x2b, 0x5d,
+    0xfc, 0xe4, 0xb5, 0x86, 0x89, 0x43, 0x22, 0x4c, 0xf3, 0x3b, 0xf3, 0x09,
+    0xc4, 0xa4, 0x10, 0x80, 0xf2, 0x46, 0xe2, 0x46, 0x8f, 0x76, 0x50, 0xbf,
+    0xaf, 0x2b, 0x90, 0x1b, 0x78, 0xc7, 0xcf, 0xc1, 0x77, 0xd0, 0xfb, 0xa9,
+    0xfb, 0xc9, 0x66, 0x5a, 0xc5, 0x9b, 0x31, 0x41, 0x67, 0x01, 0xbe, 0x33,
+    0x10, 0xba, 0x05, 0x58, 0xed, 0x76, 0x53, 0xde, 0x5d, 0xc1, 0xe8, 0xbb,
+    0x9f, 0xf1, 0xcd, 0xfb, 0xdf, 0x64, 0x7f, 0xd7, 0x18, 0xab, 0x0f, 0x94,
+    0x28, 0x95, 0x4a, 0xcc, 0x6a, 0xa9, 0x50, 0xc7, 0x05, 0x47, 0x10, 0x41,
+    0x02, 0x03, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0xa3, 0x50, 0x30, 0x4e, 0x30, 0x0e, 0x06,
+    0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x0f, 0x01, 0x01, 0xff, 0x04, 0x04, 0x03, 0x02, 0x05,
+    0xa0, 0x30, 0x13, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x25, 0x04, 0x0c, 0x30, 0x0a,
+    0x06, 0x08, 0x2b, 0x06, 0x01, 0x05, 0x05, 0x07, 0x03, 0x01, 0x30, 0x0c,
+    0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x13, 0x01, 0x01, 0xff, 0x04, 0x02, 0x30, 0x00,
+    0x30, 0x19, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x11, 0x04, 0x12, 0x30, 0x10, 0x82,
+    0x0e, 0x66, 0x75, 0x7a, 0x7a, 0x2e, 0x62, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x69, 0x6e, 0x67,
+    0x73, 0x73, 0x6c, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7,
+    0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0b, 0x05, 0x00, 0x03, 0x82, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0x92,
+    0xde, 0xef, 0x96, 0x06, 0x7b, 0xff, 0x71, 0x7d, 0x4e, 0xa0, 0x7d, 0xae,
+    0xb8, 0x22, 0xb4, 0x2c, 0xf7, 0x96, 0x9c, 0x37, 0x1d, 0x8f, 0xe7, 0xd9,
+    0x47, 0xff, 0x3f, 0xe9, 0x35, 0x95, 0x0e, 0xdd, 0xdc, 0x7f, 0xc8, 0x8a,
+    0x1e, 0x36, 0x1d, 0x38, 0x47, 0xfc, 0x76, 0xd2, 0x1f, 0x98, 0xa1, 0x36,
+    0xac, 0xc8, 0x70, 0x38, 0x0a, 0x3d, 0x51, 0x8d, 0x0f, 0x03, 0x1b, 0xef,
+    0x62, 0xa1, 0xcb, 0x2b, 0x4a, 0x8c, 0x12, 0x2b, 0x54, 0x50, 0x9a, 0x6b,
+    0xfe, 0xaf, 0xd9, 0xf6, 0xbf, 0x58, 0x11, 0x58, 0x5e, 0xe5, 0x86, 0x1e,
+    0x3b, 0x6b, 0x30, 0x7e, 0x72, 0x89, 0xe8, 0x6b, 0x7b, 0xb7, 0xaf, 0xef,
+    0x8b, 0xa9, 0x3e, 0xb0, 0xcd, 0x0b, 0xef, 0xb0, 0x0c, 0x96, 0x2b, 0xc5,
+    0x3b, 0xd5, 0xf1, 0xc2, 0xae, 0x3a, 0x60, 0xd9, 0x0f, 0x75, 0x37, 0x55,
+    0x4d, 0x62, 0xd2, 0xed, 0x96, 0xac, 0x30, 0x6b, 0xda, 0xa1, 0x48, 0x17,
+    0x96, 0x23, 0x85, 0x9a, 0x57, 0x77, 0xe9, 0x22, 0xa2, 0x37, 0x03, 0xba,
+    0x49, 0x77, 0x40, 0x3b, 0x76, 0x4b, 0xda, 0xc1, 0x04, 0x57, 0x55, 0x34,
+    0x22, 0x83, 0x45, 0x29, 0xab, 0x2e, 0x11, 0xff, 0x0d, 0xab, 0x55, 0xb1,
+    0xa7, 0x58, 0x59, 0x05, 0x25, 0xf9, 0x1e, 0x3d, 0xb7, 0xac, 0x04, 0x39,
+    0x2c, 0xf9, 0xaf, 0xb8, 0x68, 0xfb, 0x8e, 0x35, 0x71, 0x32, 0xff, 0x70,
+    0xe9, 0x46, 0x6d, 0x5c, 0x06, 0x90, 0x88, 0x23, 0x48, 0x0c, 0x50, 0xeb,
+    0x0a, 0xa9, 0xae, 0xe8, 0xfc, 0xbe, 0xa5, 0x76, 0x94, 0xd7, 0x64, 0x22,
+    0x38, 0x98, 0x17, 0xa4, 0x3a, 0xa7, 0x59, 0x9f, 0x1d, 0x3b, 0x75, 0x90,
+    0x1a, 0x81, 0xef, 0x19, 0xfb, 0x2b, 0xb7, 0xa7, 0x64, 0x61, 0x22, 0xa4,
+    0x6f, 0x7b, 0xfa, 0x58, 0xbb, 0x8c, 0x4e, 0x77, 0x67, 0xd0, 0x5d, 0x58,
+    0x76, 0x8a, 0xbb,
+};
+
+static const uint8_t kRSAPrivateKeyDER[] = {
+    0x30, 0x82, 0x04, 0xa5, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, 0x02, 0x82, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00,
+    0xce, 0x47, 0xcb, 0x11, 0xbb, 0xd2, 0x9d, 0x8e, 0x9e, 0xd2, 0x1e, 0x14,
+    0xaf, 0xc7, 0xea, 0xb6, 0xc9, 0x38, 0x2a, 0x6f, 0xb3, 0x7e, 0xfb, 0xbc,
+    0xfc, 0x59, 0x42, 0xb9, 0x56, 0xf0, 0x4c, 0x3f, 0xf7, 0x31, 0x84, 0xbe,
+    0xac, 0x03, 0x9e, 0x71, 0x91, 0x85, 0xd8, 0x32, 0xbd, 0x00, 0xea, 0xac,
+    0x65, 0xf6, 0x03, 0xc8, 0x0f, 0x8b, 0xfd, 0x6e, 0x58, 0x88, 0x04, 0x41,
+    0x92, 0x74, 0xa6, 0x57, 0x2e, 0x8e, 0x88, 0xd5, 0x3d, 0xda, 0x14, 0x3e,
+    0x63, 0x88, 0x22, 0xe3, 0x53, 0xe9, 0xba, 0x39, 0x09, 0xac, 0xfb, 0xd0,
+    0x4c, 0xf2, 0x3c, 0x20, 0xd6, 0x97, 0xe6, 0xed, 0xf1, 0x62, 0x1e, 0xe5,
+    0xc9, 0x48, 0xa0, 0xca, 0x2e, 0x3c, 0x14, 0x5a, 0x82, 0xd4, 0xed, 0xb1,
+    0xe3, 0x43, 0xc1, 0x2a, 0x59, 0xa5, 0xb9, 0xc8, 0x48, 0xa7, 0x39, 0x23,
+    0x74, 0xa7, 0x37, 0xb0, 0x6f, 0xc3, 0x64, 0x99, 0x6c, 0xa2, 0x82, 0xc8,
+    0xf6, 0xdb, 0x86, 0x40, 0xce, 0xd1, 0x85, 0x9f, 0xce, 0x69, 0xf4, 0x15,
+    0x2a, 0x23, 0xca, 0xea, 0xb7, 0x7b, 0xdf, 0xfb, 0x43, 0x5f, 0xff, 0x7a,
+    0x49, 0x49, 0x0e, 0xe7, 0x02, 0x51, 0x45, 0x13, 0xe8, 0x90, 0x64, 0x21,
+    0x0c, 0x26, 0x2b, 0x5d, 0xfc, 0xe4, 0xb5, 0x86, 0x89, 0x43, 0x22, 0x4c,
+    0xf3, 0x3b, 0xf3, 0x09, 0xc4, 0xa4, 0x10, 0x80, 0xf2, 0x46, 0xe2, 0x46,
+    0x8f, 0x76, 0x50, 0xbf, 0xaf, 0x2b, 0x90, 0x1b, 0x78, 0xc7, 0xcf, 0xc1,
+    0x77, 0xd0, 0xfb, 0xa9, 0xfb, 0xc9, 0x66, 0x5a, 0xc5, 0x9b, 0x31, 0x41,
+    0x67, 0x01, 0xbe, 0x33, 0x10, 0xba, 0x05, 0x58, 0xed, 0x76, 0x53, 0xde,
+    0x5d, 0xc1, 0xe8, 0xbb, 0x9f, 0xf1, 0xcd, 0xfb, 0xdf, 0x64, 0x7f, 0xd7,
+    0x18, 0xab, 0x0f, 0x94, 0x28, 0x95, 0x4a, 0xcc, 0x6a, 0xa9, 0x50, 0xc7,
+    0x05, 0x47, 0x10, 0x41, 0x02, 0x03, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x82, 0x01,
+    0x01, 0x00, 0xa8, 0x47, 0xb9, 0x4a, 0x06, 0x47, 0x93, 0x71, 0x3d, 0xef,
+    0x7b, 0xca, 0xb4, 0x7c, 0x0a, 0xe6, 0x82, 0xd0, 0xe7, 0x0d, 0xa9, 0x08,
+    0xf6, 0xa4, 0xfd, 0xd8, 0x73, 0xae, 0x6f, 0x56, 0x29, 0x5e, 0x25, 0x72,
+    0xa8, 0x30, 0x44, 0x73, 0xcf, 0x56, 0x26, 0xb9, 0x61, 0xde, 0x42, 0x81,
+    0xf4, 0xf0, 0x1f, 0x5d, 0xcb, 0x47, 0xf2, 0x26, 0xe9, 0xe0, 0x93, 0x28,
+    0xa3, 0x10, 0x3b, 0x42, 0x1e, 0x51, 0x11, 0x12, 0x06, 0x5e, 0xaf, 0xce,
+    0xb0, 0xa5, 0x14, 0xdd, 0x82, 0x58, 0xa1, 0xa4, 0x12, 0xdf, 0x65, 0x1d,
+    0x51, 0x70, 0x64, 0xd5, 0x58, 0x68, 0x11, 0xa8, 0x6a, 0x23, 0xc2, 0xbf,
+    0xa1, 0x25, 0x24, 0x47, 0xb3, 0xa4, 0x3c, 0x83, 0x96, 0xb7, 0x1f, 0xf4,
+    0x44, 0xd4, 0xd1, 0xe9, 0xfc, 0x33, 0x68, 0x5e, 0xe2, 0x68, 0x99, 0x9c,
+    0x91, 0xe8, 0x72, 0xc9, 0xd7, 0x8c, 0x80, 0x20, 0x8e, 0x77, 0x83, 0x4d,
+    0xe4, 0xab, 0xf9, 0x74, 0xa1, 0xdf, 0xd3, 0xc0, 0x0d, 0x5b, 0x05, 0x51,
+    0xc2, 0x6f, 0xb2, 0x91, 0x02, 0xec, 0xc0, 0x02, 0x1a, 0x5c, 0x91, 0x05,
+    0xf1, 0xe3, 0xfa, 0x65, 0xc2, 0xad, 0x24, 0xe6, 0xe5, 0x3c, 0xb6, 0x16,
+    0xf1, 0xa1, 0x67, 0x1a, 0x9d, 0x37, 0x56, 0xbf, 0x01, 0xd7, 0x3b, 0x35,
+    0x30, 0x57, 0x73, 0xf4, 0xf0, 0x5e, 0xa7, 0xe8, 0x0a, 0xc1, 0x94, 0x17,
+    0xcf, 0x0a, 0xbd, 0xf5, 0x31, 0xa7, 0x2d, 0xf7, 0xf5, 0xd9, 0x8c, 0xc2,
+    0x01, 0xbd, 0xda, 0x16, 0x8e, 0xb9, 0x30, 0x40, 0xa6, 0x6e, 0xbd, 0xcd,
+    0x4d, 0x84, 0x67, 0x4e, 0x0b, 0xce, 0xd5, 0xef, 0xf8, 0x08, 0x63, 0x02,
+    0xc6, 0xc7, 0xf7, 0x67, 0x92, 0xe2, 0x23, 0x9d, 0x27, 0x22, 0x1d, 0xc6,
+    0x67, 0x5e, 0x66, 0xbf, 0x03, 0xb8, 0xa9, 0x67, 0xd4, 0x39, 0xd8, 0x75,
+    0xfa, 0xe8, 0xed, 0x56, 0xb8, 0x81, 0x02, 0x81, 0x81, 0x00, 0xf7, 0x46,
+    0x68, 0xc6, 0x13, 0xf8, 0xba, 0x0f, 0x83, 0xdb, 0x05, 0xa8, 0x25, 0x00,
+    0x70, 0x9c, 0x9e, 0x8b, 0x12, 0x34, 0x0d, 0x96, 0xcf, 0x0d, 0x98, 0x9b,
+    0x8d, 0x9c, 0x96, 0x78, 0xd1, 0x3c, 0x01, 0x8c, 0xb9, 0x35, 0x5c, 0x20,
+    0x42, 0xb4, 0x38, 0xe3, 0xd6, 0x54, 0xe7, 0x55, 0xd6, 0x26, 0x8a, 0x0c,
+    0xf6, 0x1f, 0xe0, 0x04, 0xc1, 0x22, 0x42, 0x19, 0x61, 0xc4, 0x94, 0x7c,
+    0x07, 0x2e, 0x80, 0x52, 0xfe, 0x8d, 0xe6, 0x92, 0x3a, 0x91, 0xfe, 0x72,
+    0x99, 0xe1, 0x2a, 0x73, 0x76, 0xb1, 0x24, 0x20, 0x67, 0xde, 0x28, 0xcb,
+    0x0e, 0xe6, 0x52, 0xb5, 0xfa, 0xfb, 0x8b, 0x1e, 0x6a, 0x1d, 0x09, 0x26,
+    0xb9, 0xa7, 0x61, 0xba, 0xf8, 0x79, 0xd2, 0x66, 0x57, 0x28, 0xd7, 0x31,
+    0xb5, 0x0b, 0x27, 0x19, 0x1e, 0x6f, 0x46, 0xfc, 0x54, 0x95, 0xeb, 0x78,
+    0x01, 0xb6, 0xd9, 0x79, 0x5a, 0x4d, 0x02, 0x81, 0x81, 0x00, 0xd5, 0x8f,
+    0x16, 0x53, 0x2f, 0x57, 0x93, 0xbf, 0x09, 0x75, 0xbf, 0x63, 0x40, 0x3d,
+    0x27, 0xfd, 0x23, 0x21, 0xde, 0x9b, 0xe9, 0x73, 0x3f, 0x49, 0x02, 0xd2,
+    0x38, 0x96, 0xcf, 0xc3, 0xba, 0x92, 0x07, 0x87, 0x52, 0xa9, 0x35, 0xe3,
+    0x0c, 0xe4, 0x2f, 0x05, 0x7b, 0x37, 0xa5, 0x40, 0x9c, 0x3b, 0x94, 0xf7,
+    0xad, 0xa0, 0xee, 0x3a, 0xa8, 0xfb, 0x1f, 0x11, 0x1f, 0xd8, 0x9a, 0x80,
+    0x42, 0x3d, 0x7f, 0xa4, 0xb8, 0x9a, 0xaa, 0xea, 0x72, 0xc1, 0xe3, 0xed,
+    0x06, 0x60, 0x92, 0x37, 0xf9, 0xba, 0xfb, 0x9e, 0xed, 0x05, 0xa6, 0xd4,
+    0x72, 0x68, 0x4f, 0x63, 0xfe, 0xd6, 0x10, 0x0d, 0x4f, 0x0a, 0x93, 0xc6,
+    0xb9, 0xd7, 0xaf, 0xfd, 0xd9, 0x57, 0x7d, 0xcb, 0x75, 0xe8, 0x93, 0x2b,
+    0xae, 0x4f, 0xea, 0xd7, 0x30, 0x0b, 0x58, 0x44, 0x82, 0x0f, 0x84, 0x5d,
+    0x62, 0x11, 0x78, 0xea, 0x5f, 0xc5, 0x02, 0x81, 0x81, 0x00, 0x82, 0x0c,
+    0xc1, 0xe6, 0x0b, 0x72, 0xf1, 0x48, 0x5f, 0xac, 0xbd, 0x98, 0xe5, 0x7d,
+    0x09, 0xbd, 0x15, 0x95, 0x47, 0x09, 0xa1, 0x6c, 0x03, 0x91, 0xbf, 0x05,
+    0x70, 0xc1, 0x3e, 0x52, 0x64, 0x99, 0x0e, 0xa7, 0x98, 0x70, 0xfb, 0xf6,
+    0xeb, 0x9e, 0x25, 0x9d, 0x8e, 0x88, 0x30, 0xf2, 0xf0, 0x22, 0x6c, 0xd0,
+    0xcc, 0x51, 0x8f, 0x5c, 0x70, 0xc7, 0x37, 0xc4, 0x69, 0xab, 0x1d, 0xfc,
+    0xed, 0x3a, 0x03, 0xbb, 0xa2, 0xad, 0xb6, 0xea, 0x89, 0x6b, 0x67, 0x4b,
+    0x96, 0xaa, 0xd9, 0xcc, 0xc8, 0x4b, 0xfa, 0x18, 0x21, 0x08, 0xb2, 0xa3,
+    0xb9, 0x3e, 0x61, 0x99, 0xdc, 0x5a, 0x97, 0x9c, 0x73, 0x6a, 0xb9, 0xf9,
+    0x68, 0x03, 0x24, 0x5f, 0x55, 0x77, 0x9c, 0xb4, 0xbe, 0x7a, 0x78, 0x53,
+    0x68, 0x48, 0x69, 0x53, 0xc8, 0xb1, 0xf5, 0xbf, 0x98, 0x2d, 0x11, 0x1e,
+    0x98, 0xa8, 0x36, 0x50, 0xa0, 0xb1, 0x02, 0x81, 0x81, 0x00, 0x90, 0x88,
+    0x30, 0x71, 0xc7, 0xfe, 0x9b, 0x6d, 0x95, 0x37, 0x6d, 0x79, 0xfc, 0x85,
+    0xe7, 0x44, 0x78, 0xbc, 0x79, 0x6e, 0x47, 0x86, 0xc9, 0xf3, 0xdd, 0xc6,
+    0xec, 0xa9, 0x94, 0x9f, 0x40, 0xeb, 0x87, 0xd0, 0xdb, 0xee, 0xcd, 0x1b,
+    0x87, 0x23, 0xff, 0x76, 0xd4, 0x37, 0x8a, 0xcd, 0xb9, 0x6e, 0xd1, 0x98,
+    0xf6, 0x97, 0x8d, 0xe3, 0x81, 0x6d, 0xc3, 0x4e, 0xd1, 0xa0, 0xc4, 0x9f,
+    0xbd, 0x34, 0xe5, 0xe8, 0x53, 0x4f, 0xca, 0x10, 0xb5, 0xed, 0xe7, 0x16,
+    0x09, 0x54, 0xde, 0x60, 0xa7, 0xd1, 0x16, 0x6e, 0x2e, 0xb7, 0xbe, 0x7a,
+    0xd5, 0x9b, 0x26, 0xef, 0xe4, 0x0e, 0x77, 0xfa, 0xa9, 0xdd, 0xdc, 0xb9,
+    0x88, 0x19, 0x23, 0x70, 0xc7, 0xe1, 0x60, 0xaf, 0x8c, 0x73, 0x04, 0xf7,
+    0x71, 0x17, 0x81, 0x36, 0x75, 0xbb, 0x97, 0xd7, 0x75, 0xb6, 0x8e, 0xbc,
+    0xac, 0x9c, 0x6a, 0x9b, 0x24, 0x89, 0x02, 0x81, 0x80, 0x5a, 0x2b, 0xc7,
+    0x6b, 0x8c, 0x65, 0xdb, 0x04, 0x73, 0xab, 0x25, 0xe1, 0x5b, 0xbc, 0x3c,
+    0xcf, 0x5a, 0x3c, 0x04, 0xae, 0x97, 0x2e, 0xfd, 0xa4, 0x97, 0x1f, 0x05,
+    0x17, 0x27, 0xac, 0x7c, 0x30, 0x85, 0xb4, 0x82, 0x3f, 0x5b, 0xb7, 0x94,
+    0x3b, 0x7f, 0x6c, 0x0c, 0xc7, 0x16, 0xc6, 0xa0, 0xbd, 0x80, 0xb0, 0x81,
+    0xde, 0xa0, 0x23, 0xa6, 0xf6, 0x75, 0x33, 0x51, 0x35, 0xa2, 0x75, 0x55,
+    0x70, 0x4d, 0x42, 0xbb, 0xcf, 0x54, 0xe4, 0xdb, 0x2d, 0x88, 0xa0, 0x7a,
+    0xf2, 0x17, 0xa7, 0xdd, 0x13, 0x44, 0x9f, 0x5f, 0x6b, 0x2c, 0x42, 0x42,
+    0x8b, 0x13, 0x4d, 0xf9, 0x5b, 0xf8, 0x33, 0x42, 0xd9, 0x9e, 0x50, 0x1c,
+    0x7c, 0xbc, 0xfa, 0x62, 0x85, 0x0b, 0xcf, 0x99, 0xda, 0x9e, 0x04, 0x90,
+    0xb2, 0xc6, 0xb2, 0x0a, 0x2a, 0x7c, 0x6d, 0x6a, 0x40, 0xfc, 0xf5, 0x50,
+    0x98, 0x46, 0x89, 0x82, 0x40,
+};
+
+static SSL_CTX *ctx;
+
+int FuzzerInitialize(int *argc, char ***argv) {
+    const uint8_t *bufp = kRSAPrivateKeyDER;
+    RSA *privkey;
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+    int ret;
+    X509 *cert;
+
+    ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_method());
+    privkey = d2i_RSAPrivateKey(NULL, &bufp, sizeof(kRSAPrivateKeyDER));
+    OPENSSL_assert(privkey != NULL);
+    pkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
+    EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, privkey);
+    ret = SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(ctx, pkey);
+    OPENSSL_assert(ret == 1);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+    bufp = kCertificateDER;
+    cert = d2i_X509(NULL, &bufp, sizeof(kCertificateDER));
+    OPENSSL_assert(cert != NULL);
+    ret = SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx, cert);
+    OPENSSL_assert(ret == 1);
+    X509_free(cert);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int FuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t *buf, size_t len) {
+    SSL *server;
+    BIO *in;
+    BIO *out;
+    if (!len) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+    /* TODO: make this work for OpenSSL. There's a PREDICT define that may do
+     * the job.
+     * TODO: use the ossltest engine (optionally?) to disable crypto checks.
+     * RAND_reset_for_fuzzing();
+     */
+
+    /* This only fuzzes the initial flow from the client so far. */
+    server = SSL_new(ctx);
+    in = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+    out = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+    SSL_set_bio(server, in, out);
+    SSL_set_accept_state(server);
+    OPENSSL_assert((size_t)BIO_write(in, buf, len) == len);
+    if (SSL_do_handshake(server) == 1) {
+        /* Keep reading application data until error or EOF. */
+        uint8_t tmp[1024];
+        for (;;) {
+            if (SSL_read(server, tmp, sizeof(tmp)) <= 0) {
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    SSL_free(server);
+    return 0;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/fuzz/test-corpus.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/fuzz/test-corpus.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c553697
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/fuzz/test-corpus.c
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL licenses, (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ * or in the file LICENSE in the source distribution.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Given a list of files, run each of them through the fuzzer.  Note that
+ * failure will be indicated by some kind of crash. Switching on things like
+ * asan improves the test.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include "fuzzer.h"
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+    int n;
+
+    FuzzerInitialize(&argc, &argv);
+
+    for (n = 1; n < argc; ++n) {
+        struct stat st;
+        FILE *f;
+        unsigned char *buf;
+        size_t s;
+
+        stat(argv[n], &st);
+        f = fopen(argv[n], "rb");
+        if (f == NULL)
+            continue;
+        buf = malloc(st.st_size);
+        s = fread(buf, 1, st.st_size, f);
+        OPENSSL_assert(s == (size_t)st.st_size);
+        FuzzerTestOneInput(buf, s);
+        free(buf);
+        fclose(f);
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/fuzz/x509.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/fuzz/x509.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b2851f1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/fuzz/x509.c
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL licenses, (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ * or in the file LICENSE in the source distribution.
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include "fuzzer.h"
+
+int FuzzerInitialize(int *argc, char ***argv) {
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int FuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t *buf, size_t len) {
+    const unsigned char *p = buf;
+    unsigned char *der = NULL;
+
+    X509 *x509 = d2i_X509(NULL, &p, len);
+    if (x509 != NULL) {
+        BIO *bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_null());
+        /* This will load and print the public key as well as extensions */
+        X509_print(bio, x509);
+        BIO_free(bio);
+
+        i2d_X509(x509, &der);
+        OPENSSL_free(der);
+
+        X509_free(x509);
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/internal/asn1t.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/internal/asn1t.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..32d637d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/internal/asn1t.h
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(INT32)
+DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(ZINT32)
+DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(UINT32)
+DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(ZUINT32)
+DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(INT64)
+DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(ZINT64)
+DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(UINT64)
+DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(ZUINT64)
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/internal/bio.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/internal/bio.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3a933e0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/internal/bio.h
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+
+struct bio_method_st {
+    int type;
+    char *name;
+    int (*bwrite) (BIO *, const char *, int);
+    int (*bread) (BIO *, char *, int);
+    int (*bputs) (BIO *, const char *);
+    int (*bgets) (BIO *, char *, int);
+    long (*ctrl) (BIO *, int, long, void *);
+    int (*create) (BIO *);
+    int (*destroy) (BIO *);
+    long (*callback_ctrl) (BIO *, int, BIO_info_cb *);
+};
+
+void bio_free_ex_data(BIO *bio);
+void bio_cleanup(void);
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/internal/comp.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/internal/comp.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ac6e38b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/internal/comp.h
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/comp.h>
+
+void comp_zlib_cleanup_int(void);
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/internal/conf.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/internal/conf.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ada3f92
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/internal/conf.h
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_INTERNAL_CONF_H
+# define HEADER_INTERNAL_CONF_H
+
+#include <openssl/conf.h>
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+
+struct ossl_init_settings_st {
+    char *appname;
+};
+
+void openssl_config_int(const char *appname);
+void openssl_no_config_int(void);
+void conf_modules_free_int(void);
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/internal/constant_time_locl.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/internal/constant_time_locl.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d27fb14
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/internal/constant_time_locl.h
@@ -0,0 +1,185 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2014-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_CONSTANT_TIME_LOCL_H
+# define HEADER_CONSTANT_TIME_LOCL_H
+
+# include <openssl/e_os2.h>              /* For 'ossl_inline' */
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/*-
+ * The boolean methods return a bitmask of all ones (0xff...f) for true
+ * and 0 for false. This is useful for choosing a value based on the result
+ * of a conditional in constant time. For example,
+ *
+ * if (a < b) {
+ *   c = a;
+ * } else {
+ *   c = b;
+ * }
+ *
+ * can be written as
+ *
+ * unsigned int lt = constant_time_lt(a, b);
+ * c = constant_time_select(lt, a, b);
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Returns the given value with the MSB copied to all the other
+ * bits. Uses the fact that arithmetic shift shifts-in the sign bit.
+ * However, this is not ensured by the C standard so you may need to
+ * replace this with something else on odd CPUs.
+ */
+static ossl_inline unsigned int constant_time_msb(unsigned int a);
+
+/*
+ * Returns 0xff..f if a < b and 0 otherwise.
+ */
+static ossl_inline unsigned int constant_time_lt(unsigned int a,
+                                                 unsigned int b);
+/* Convenience method for getting an 8-bit mask. */
+static ossl_inline unsigned char constant_time_lt_8(unsigned int a,
+                                                    unsigned int b);
+
+/*
+ * Returns 0xff..f if a >= b and 0 otherwise.
+ */
+static ossl_inline unsigned int constant_time_ge(unsigned int a,
+                                                 unsigned int b);
+/* Convenience method for getting an 8-bit mask. */
+static ossl_inline unsigned char constant_time_ge_8(unsigned int a,
+                                                    unsigned int b);
+
+/*
+ * Returns 0xff..f if a == 0 and 0 otherwise.
+ */
+static ossl_inline unsigned int constant_time_is_zero(unsigned int a);
+/* Convenience method for getting an 8-bit mask. */
+static ossl_inline unsigned char constant_time_is_zero_8(unsigned int a);
+
+/*
+ * Returns 0xff..f if a == b and 0 otherwise.
+ */
+static ossl_inline unsigned int constant_time_eq(unsigned int a,
+                                                 unsigned int b);
+/* Convenience method for getting an 8-bit mask. */
+static ossl_inline unsigned char constant_time_eq_8(unsigned int a,
+                                                    unsigned int b);
+/* Signed integers. */
+static ossl_inline unsigned int constant_time_eq_int(int a, int b);
+/* Convenience method for getting an 8-bit mask. */
+static ossl_inline unsigned char constant_time_eq_int_8(int a, int b);
+
+/*-
+ * Returns (mask & a) | (~mask & b).
+ *
+ * When |mask| is all 1s or all 0s (as returned by the methods above),
+ * the select methods return either |a| (if |mask| is nonzero) or |b|
+ * (if |mask| is zero).
+ */
+static ossl_inline unsigned int constant_time_select(unsigned int mask,
+                                                     unsigned int a,
+                                                     unsigned int b);
+/* Convenience method for unsigned chars. */
+static ossl_inline unsigned char constant_time_select_8(unsigned char mask,
+                                                        unsigned char a,
+                                                        unsigned char b);
+/* Convenience method for signed integers. */
+static ossl_inline int constant_time_select_int(unsigned int mask, int a,
+                                                int b);
+
+static ossl_inline unsigned int constant_time_msb(unsigned int a)
+{
+    return 0 - (a >> (sizeof(a) * 8 - 1));
+}
+
+static ossl_inline unsigned int constant_time_lt(unsigned int a,
+                                                 unsigned int b)
+{
+    return constant_time_msb(a ^ ((a ^ b) | ((a - b) ^ b)));
+}
+
+static ossl_inline unsigned char constant_time_lt_8(unsigned int a,
+                                                    unsigned int b)
+{
+    return (unsigned char)(constant_time_lt(a, b));
+}
+
+static ossl_inline unsigned int constant_time_ge(unsigned int a,
+                                                 unsigned int b)
+{
+    return ~constant_time_lt(a, b);
+}
+
+static ossl_inline unsigned char constant_time_ge_8(unsigned int a,
+                                                    unsigned int b)
+{
+    return (unsigned char)(constant_time_ge(a, b));
+}
+
+static ossl_inline unsigned int constant_time_is_zero(unsigned int a)
+{
+    return constant_time_msb(~a & (a - 1));
+}
+
+static ossl_inline unsigned char constant_time_is_zero_8(unsigned int a)
+{
+    return (unsigned char)(constant_time_is_zero(a));
+}
+
+static ossl_inline unsigned int constant_time_eq(unsigned int a,
+                                                 unsigned int b)
+{
+    return constant_time_is_zero(a ^ b);
+}
+
+static ossl_inline unsigned char constant_time_eq_8(unsigned int a,
+                                                    unsigned int b)
+{
+    return (unsigned char)(constant_time_eq(a, b));
+}
+
+static ossl_inline unsigned int constant_time_eq_int(int a, int b)
+{
+    return constant_time_eq((unsigned)(a), (unsigned)(b));
+}
+
+static ossl_inline unsigned char constant_time_eq_int_8(int a, int b)
+{
+    return constant_time_eq_8((unsigned)(a), (unsigned)(b));
+}
+
+static ossl_inline unsigned int constant_time_select(unsigned int mask,
+                                                     unsigned int a,
+                                                     unsigned int b)
+{
+    return (mask & a) | (~mask & b);
+}
+
+static ossl_inline unsigned char constant_time_select_8(unsigned char mask,
+                                                        unsigned char a,
+                                                        unsigned char b)
+{
+    return (unsigned char)(constant_time_select(mask, a, b));
+}
+
+static ossl_inline int constant_time_select_int(unsigned int mask, int a,
+                                                int b)
+{
+    return (int)(constant_time_select(mask, (unsigned)(a), (unsigned)(b)));
+}
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif                          /* HEADER_CONSTANT_TIME_LOCL_H */
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/internal/dane.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/internal/dane.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a1cb548
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/internal/dane.h
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_INTERNAL_DANE_H
+#define HEADER_INTERNAL_DANE_H
+
+#include <openssl/safestack.h>
+
+/*-
+ * Certificate usages:
+ * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6698#section-2.1.1
+ */
+#define DANETLS_USAGE_PKIX_TA   0
+#define DANETLS_USAGE_PKIX_EE   1
+#define DANETLS_USAGE_DANE_TA   2
+#define DANETLS_USAGE_DANE_EE   3
+#define DANETLS_USAGE_LAST      DANETLS_USAGE_DANE_EE
+
+/*-
+ * Selectors:
+ * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6698#section-2.1.2
+ */
+#define DANETLS_SELECTOR_CERT   0
+#define DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI   1
+#define DANETLS_SELECTOR_LAST   DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI
+
+/*-
+ * Matching types:
+ * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6698#section-2.1.3
+ */
+#define DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL   0
+#define DANETLS_MATCHING_2256   1
+#define DANETLS_MATCHING_2512   2
+#define DANETLS_MATCHING_LAST   DANETLS_MATCHING_2512
+
+typedef struct danetls_record_st {
+    uint8_t usage;
+    uint8_t selector;
+    uint8_t mtype;
+    unsigned char *data;
+    size_t dlen;
+    EVP_PKEY *spki;
+} danetls_record;
+
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(danetls_record)
+
+/*
+ * Shared DANE context
+ */
+struct dane_ctx_st {
+    const EVP_MD  **mdevp;      /* mtype -> digest */
+    uint8_t        *mdord;      /* mtype -> preference */
+    uint8_t         mdmax;      /* highest supported mtype */
+    unsigned long   flags;      /* feature bitmask */
+};
+
+/*
+ * Per connection DANE state
+ */
+struct ssl_dane_st {
+    struct dane_ctx_st *dctx;
+    STACK_OF(danetls_record) *trecs;
+    STACK_OF(X509) *certs;      /* DANE-TA(2) Cert(0) Full(0) certs */
+    danetls_record *mtlsa;      /* Matching TLSA record */
+    X509           *mcert;      /* DANE matched cert */
+    uint32_t        umask;      /* Usages present */
+    int             mdpth;      /* Depth of matched cert */
+    int             pdpth;      /* Depth of PKIX trust */
+    unsigned long   flags;      /* feature bitmask */
+};
+
+#define DANETLS_ENABLED(dane)  \
+    ((dane) != NULL && sk_danetls_record_num((dane)->trecs) > 0)
+
+#define DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(u)   (((uint32_t)1) << u)
+
+#define DANETLS_PKIX_TA_MASK (DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(DANETLS_USAGE_PKIX_TA))
+#define DANETLS_PKIX_EE_MASK (DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(DANETLS_USAGE_PKIX_EE))
+#define DANETLS_DANE_TA_MASK (DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(DANETLS_USAGE_DANE_TA))
+#define DANETLS_DANE_EE_MASK (DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(DANETLS_USAGE_DANE_EE))
+
+#define DANETLS_PKIX_MASK (DANETLS_PKIX_TA_MASK | DANETLS_PKIX_EE_MASK)
+#define DANETLS_DANE_MASK (DANETLS_DANE_TA_MASK | DANETLS_DANE_EE_MASK)
+#define DANETLS_TA_MASK (DANETLS_PKIX_TA_MASK | DANETLS_DANE_TA_MASK)
+#define DANETLS_EE_MASK (DANETLS_PKIX_EE_MASK | DANETLS_DANE_EE_MASK)
+
+#define DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane) ((dane) && ((dane)->umask & DANETLS_PKIX_MASK))
+#define DANETLS_HAS_DANE(dane) ((dane) && ((dane)->umask & DANETLS_DANE_MASK))
+#define DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane)   ((dane) && ((dane)->umask & DANETLS_TA_MASK))
+#define DANETLS_HAS_EE(dane)   ((dane) && ((dane)->umask & DANETLS_EE_MASK))
+
+#define DANETLS_HAS_PKIX_TA(dane) ((dane)&&((dane)->umask & DANETLS_PKIX_TA_MASK))
+#define DANETLS_HAS_PKIX_EE(dane) ((dane)&&((dane)->umask & DANETLS_PKIX_EE_MASK))
+#define DANETLS_HAS_DANE_TA(dane) ((dane)&&((dane)->umask & DANETLS_DANE_TA_MASK))
+#define DANETLS_HAS_DANE_EE(dane) ((dane)&&((dane)->umask & DANETLS_DANE_EE_MASK))
+
+#endif /* HEADER_INTERNAL_DANE_H */
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/internal/dso.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/internal/dso.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7c52032
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/internal/dso.h
@@ -0,0 +1,239 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_DSO_H
+# define HEADER_DSO_H
+
+# include <openssl/crypto.h>
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/* These values are used as commands to DSO_ctrl() */
+# define DSO_CTRL_GET_FLAGS      1
+# define DSO_CTRL_SET_FLAGS      2
+# define DSO_CTRL_OR_FLAGS       3
+
+/*
+ * By default, DSO_load() will translate the provided filename into a form
+ * typical for the platform using the dso_name_converter function of the
+ * method. Eg. win32 will transform "blah" into "blah.dll", and dlfcn will
+ * transform it into "libblah.so". This callback could even utilise the
+ * DSO_METHOD's converter too if it only wants to override behaviour for
+ * one or two possible DSO methods. However, the following flag can be
+ * set in a DSO to prevent *any* native name-translation at all - eg. if
+ * the caller has prompted the user for a path to a driver library so the
+ * filename should be interpreted as-is.
+ */
+# define DSO_FLAG_NO_NAME_TRANSLATION            0x01
+/*
+ * An extra flag to give if only the extension should be added as
+ * translation.  This is obviously only of importance on Unix and other
+ * operating systems where the translation also may prefix the name with
+ * something, like 'lib', and ignored everywhere else. This flag is also
+ * ignored if DSO_FLAG_NO_NAME_TRANSLATION is used at the same time.
+ */
+# define DSO_FLAG_NAME_TRANSLATION_EXT_ONLY      0x02
+
+/*
+ * Don't unload the DSO when we call DSO_free()
+ */
+# define DSO_FLAG_NO_UNLOAD_ON_FREE              0x04
+/*
+ * The following flag controls the translation of symbol names to upper case.
+ * This is currently only being implemented for OpenVMS.
+ */
+# define DSO_FLAG_UPCASE_SYMBOL                  0x10
+
+/*
+ * This flag loads the library with public symbols. Meaning: The exported
+ * symbols of this library are public to all libraries loaded after this
+ * library. At the moment only implemented in unix.
+ */
+# define DSO_FLAG_GLOBAL_SYMBOLS                 0x20
+
+typedef void (*DSO_FUNC_TYPE) (void);
+
+typedef struct dso_st DSO;
+typedef struct dso_meth_st DSO_METHOD;
+
+/*
+ * The function prototype used for method functions (or caller-provided
+ * callbacks) that transform filenames. They are passed a DSO structure
+ * pointer (or NULL if they are to be used independently of a DSO object) and
+ * a filename to transform. They should either return NULL (if there is an
+ * error condition) or a newly allocated string containing the transformed
+ * form that the caller will need to free with OPENSSL_free() when done.
+ */
+typedef char *(*DSO_NAME_CONVERTER_FUNC)(DSO *, const char *);
+/*
+ * The function prototype used for method functions (or caller-provided
+ * callbacks) that merge two file specifications. They are passed a DSO
+ * structure pointer (or NULL if they are to be used independently of a DSO
+ * object) and two file specifications to merge. They should either return
+ * NULL (if there is an error condition) or a newly allocated string
+ * containing the result of merging that the caller will need to free with
+ * OPENSSL_free() when done. Here, merging means that bits and pieces are
+ * taken from each of the file specifications and added together in whatever
+ * fashion that is sensible for the DSO method in question.  The only rule
+ * that really applies is that if the two specification contain pieces of the
+ * same type, the copy from the first string takes priority.  One could see
+ * it as the first specification is the one given by the user and the second
+ * being a bunch of defaults to add on if they're missing in the first.
+ */
+typedef char *(*DSO_MERGER_FUNC)(DSO *, const char *, const char *);
+
+DSO *DSO_new(void);
+int DSO_free(DSO *dso);
+int DSO_flags(DSO *dso);
+int DSO_up_ref(DSO *dso);
+long DSO_ctrl(DSO *dso, int cmd, long larg, void *parg);
+
+/*
+ * These functions can be used to get/set the platform-independent filename
+ * used for a DSO. NB: set will fail if the DSO is already loaded.
+ */
+const char *DSO_get_filename(DSO *dso);
+int DSO_set_filename(DSO *dso, const char *filename);
+/*
+ * This function will invoke the DSO's name_converter callback to translate a
+ * filename, or if the callback isn't set it will instead use the DSO_METHOD's
+ * converter. If "filename" is NULL, the "filename" in the DSO itself will be
+ * used. If the DSO_FLAG_NO_NAME_TRANSLATION flag is set, then the filename is
+ * simply duplicated. NB: This function is usually called from within a
+ * DSO_METHOD during the processing of a DSO_load() call, and is exposed so
+ * that caller-created DSO_METHODs can do the same thing. A non-NULL return
+ * value will need to be OPENSSL_free()'d.
+ */
+char *DSO_convert_filename(DSO *dso, const char *filename);
+/*
+ * This function will invoke the DSO's merger callback to merge two file
+ * specifications, or if the callback isn't set it will instead use the
+ * DSO_METHOD's merger.  A non-NULL return value will need to be
+ * OPENSSL_free()'d.
+ */
+char *DSO_merge(DSO *dso, const char *filespec1, const char *filespec2);
+
+/*
+ * The all-singing all-dancing load function, you normally pass NULL for the
+ * first and third parameters. Use DSO_up_ref and DSO_free for subsequent
+ * reference count handling. Any flags passed in will be set in the
+ * constructed DSO after its init() function but before the load operation.
+ * If 'dso' is non-NULL, 'flags' is ignored.
+ */
+DSO *DSO_load(DSO *dso, const char *filename, DSO_METHOD *meth, int flags);
+
+/* This function binds to a function inside a shared library. */
+DSO_FUNC_TYPE DSO_bind_func(DSO *dso, const char *symname);
+
+/*
+ * This method is the default, but will beg, borrow, or steal whatever method
+ * should be the default on any particular platform (including
+ * DSO_METH_null() if necessary).
+ */
+DSO_METHOD *DSO_METHOD_openssl(void);
+
+/*
+ * This function writes null-terminated pathname of DSO module containing
+ * 'addr' into 'sz' large caller-provided 'path' and returns the number of
+ * characters [including trailing zero] written to it. If 'sz' is 0 or
+ * negative, 'path' is ignored and required amount of characters [including
+ * trailing zero] to accommodate pathname is returned. If 'addr' is NULL, then
+ * pathname of cryptolib itself is returned. Negative or zero return value
+ * denotes error.
+ */
+int DSO_pathbyaddr(void *addr, char *path, int sz);
+
+/*
+ * Like DSO_pathbyaddr() but instead returns a handle to the DSO for the symbol
+ * or NULL on error.
+ */
+DSO *DSO_dsobyaddr(void *addr, int flags);
+
+/*
+ * This function should be used with caution! It looks up symbols in *all*
+ * loaded modules and if module gets unloaded by somebody else attempt to
+ * dereference the pointer is doomed to have fatal consequences. Primary
+ * usage for this function is to probe *core* system functionality, e.g.
+ * check if getnameinfo(3) is available at run-time without bothering about
+ * OS-specific details such as libc.so.versioning or where does it actually
+ * reside: in libc itself or libsocket.
+ */
+void *DSO_global_lookup(const char *name);
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+/*
+ * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
+ * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
+ */
+
+int ERR_load_DSO_strings(void);
+
+/* Error codes for the DSO functions. */
+
+/* Function codes. */
+# define DSO_F_DLFCN_BIND_FUNC                            100
+# define DSO_F_DLFCN_LOAD                                 102
+# define DSO_F_DLFCN_MERGER                               130
+# define DSO_F_DLFCN_NAME_CONVERTER                       123
+# define DSO_F_DLFCN_UNLOAD                               103
+# define DSO_F_DL_BIND_FUNC                               104
+# define DSO_F_DL_LOAD                                    106
+# define DSO_F_DL_MERGER                                  131
+# define DSO_F_DL_NAME_CONVERTER                          124
+# define DSO_F_DL_UNLOAD                                  107
+# define DSO_F_DSO_BIND_FUNC                              108
+# define DSO_F_DSO_CONVERT_FILENAME                       126
+# define DSO_F_DSO_CTRL                                   110
+# define DSO_F_DSO_FREE                                   111
+# define DSO_F_DSO_GET_FILENAME                           127
+# define DSO_F_DSO_GLOBAL_LOOKUP                          139
+# define DSO_F_DSO_LOAD                                   112
+# define DSO_F_DSO_MERGE                                  132
+# define DSO_F_DSO_NEW_METHOD                             113
+# define DSO_F_DSO_PATHBYADDR                             105
+# define DSO_F_DSO_SET_FILENAME                           129
+# define DSO_F_DSO_UP_REF                                 114
+# define DSO_F_VMS_BIND_SYM                               115
+# define DSO_F_VMS_LOAD                                   116
+# define DSO_F_VMS_MERGER                                 133
+# define DSO_F_VMS_UNLOAD                                 117
+# define DSO_F_WIN32_BIND_FUNC                            101
+# define DSO_F_WIN32_GLOBALLOOKUP                         142
+# define DSO_F_WIN32_JOINER                               135
+# define DSO_F_WIN32_LOAD                                 120
+# define DSO_F_WIN32_MERGER                               134
+# define DSO_F_WIN32_NAME_CONVERTER                       125
+# define DSO_F_WIN32_PATHBYADDR                           109
+# define DSO_F_WIN32_SPLITTER                             136
+# define DSO_F_WIN32_UNLOAD                               121
+
+/* Reason codes. */
+# define DSO_R_CTRL_FAILED                                100
+# define DSO_R_DSO_ALREADY_LOADED                         110
+# define DSO_R_EMPTY_FILE_STRUCTURE                       113
+# define DSO_R_FAILURE                                    114
+# define DSO_R_FILENAME_TOO_BIG                           101
+# define DSO_R_FINISH_FAILED                              102
+# define DSO_R_INCORRECT_FILE_SYNTAX                      115
+# define DSO_R_LOAD_FAILED                                103
+# define DSO_R_NAME_TRANSLATION_FAILED                    109
+# define DSO_R_NO_FILENAME                                111
+# define DSO_R_NULL_HANDLE                                104
+# define DSO_R_SET_FILENAME_FAILED                        112
+# define DSO_R_STACK_ERROR                                105
+# define DSO_R_SYM_FAILURE                                106
+# define DSO_R_UNLOAD_FAILED                              107
+# define DSO_R_UNSUPPORTED                                108
+
+# ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+# endif
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/internal/err.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/internal/err.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d46b8bd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/internal/err.h
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef INTERNAL_ERR_H
+# define INTERNAL_ERR_H
+
+void err_free_strings_int(void);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/internal/numbers.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/internal/numbers.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..31931df
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/internal/numbers.h
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_NUMBERS_H
+# define HEADER_NUMBERS_H
+
+# include <limits.h>
+
+# if (-1 & 3) == 0x03		/* Two's complement */
+
+#  define __MAXUINT__(T) ((T) -1)
+#  define __MAXINT__(T) ((T) ((((T) 1) << ((sizeof(T) * CHAR_BIT) - 1)) ^ __MAXUINT__(T)))
+#  define __MININT__(T) (-__MAXINT__(T) - 1)
+
+# elif (-1 & 3) == 0x02		/* One's complement */
+
+#  define __MAXUINT__(T) (((T) -1) + 1)
+#  define __MAXINT__(T) ((T) ((((T) 1) << ((sizeof(T) * CHAR_BIT) - 1)) ^ __MAXUINT__(T)))
+#  define __MININT__(T) (-__MAXINT__(T))
+
+# elif (-1 & 3) == 0x01		/* Sign/magnitude */
+
+#  define __MAXINT__(T) ((T) (((((T) 1) << ((sizeof(T) * CHAR_BIT) - 2)) - 1) | (((T) 1) << ((sizeof(T) * CHAR_BIT) - 2))))
+#  define __MAXUINT__(T) ((T) (__MAXINT__(T) | (((T) 1) << ((sizeof(T) * CHAR_BIT) - 1))))
+#  define __MININT__(T) (-__MAXINT__(T))
+
+# else
+
+#  error "do not know the integer encoding on this architecture"
+
+# endif
+
+# ifndef INT8_MAX
+#  define INT8_MIN __MININT__(int8_t)
+#  define INT8_MAX __MAXINT__(int8_t)
+#  define UINT8_MAX __MAXUINT__(uint8_t)
+# endif
+
+# ifndef INT16_MAX
+#  define INT16_MIN __MININT__(int16_t)
+#  define INT16_MAX __MAXINT__(int16_t)
+#  define UINT16_MAX __MAXUINT__(uint16_t)
+# endif
+
+# ifndef INT32_MAX
+#  define INT32_MIN __MININT__(int32_t)
+#  define INT32_MAX __MAXINT__(int32_t)
+#  define UINT32_MAX __MAXUINT__(uint32_t)
+# endif
+
+# ifndef INT64_MAX
+#  define INT64_MIN __MININT__(int64_t)
+#  define INT64_MAX __MAXINT__(int64_t)
+#  define UINT64_MAX __MAXUINT__(uint64_t)
+# endif
+
+# ifndef SIZE_MAX
+#  define SIZE_MAX __MAXUINT__(size_t)
+# endif
+
+#endif
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/internal/o_dir.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/internal/o_dir.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..178c2ed
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/internal/o_dir.h
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Copied from Richard Levitte's (richard@levitte.org) LP library.  All
+ * symbol names have been changed, with permission from the author.
+ */
+
+/* $LP: LPlib/source/LPdir.h,v 1.1 2004/06/14 08:56:04 _cvs_levitte Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2004, Richard Levitte <richard@levitte.org>
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef O_DIR_H
+# define O_DIR_H
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+typedef struct OPENSSL_dir_context_st OPENSSL_DIR_CTX;
+
+  /*
+   * returns NULL on error or end-of-directory. If it is end-of-directory,
+   * errno will be zero
+   */
+const char *OPENSSL_DIR_read(OPENSSL_DIR_CTX **ctx, const char *directory);
+  /* returns 1 on success, 0 on error */
+int OPENSSL_DIR_end(OPENSSL_DIR_CTX **ctx);
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif                          /* LPDIR_H */
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/internal/o_str.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/internal/o_str.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..86403c9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/internal/o_str.h
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2003-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_O_STR_H
+# define HEADER_O_STR_H
+
+# include <stddef.h>            /* to get size_t */
+
+int OPENSSL_memcmp(const void *p1, const void *p2, size_t n);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/internal/thread_once.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/internal/thread_once.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2242443
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/internal/thread_once.h
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+
+#define DEFINE_RUN_ONCE(init)                   \
+    static int init(void);                     \
+    int init##_ossl_ret_ = 0;                   \
+    void init##_ossl_(void)                     \
+    {                                           \
+        init##_ossl_ret_ = init();              \
+    }                                           \
+    static int init(void)
+#define DECLARE_RUN_ONCE(init)                  \
+    extern int init##_ossl_ret_;                \
+    void init##_ossl_(void);
+
+#define DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(init)            \
+    static int init(void);                     \
+    static int init##_ossl_ret_ = 0;            \
+    static void init##_ossl_(void)              \
+    {                                           \
+        init##_ossl_ret_ = init();              \
+    }                                           \
+    static int init(void)
+
+/*
+ * RUN_ONCE - use CRYPTO_THREAD_run_once, and check if the init succeeded
+ * @once: pointer to static object of type CRYPTO_ONCE
+ * @init: function name that was previously given to DEFINE_RUN_ONCE,
+ *        DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC or DECLARE_RUN_ONCE.  This function
+ *        must return 1 for success or 0 for failure.
+ *
+ * The return value is 1 on success (*) or 0 in case of error.
+ *
+ * (*) by convention, since the init function must return 1 on success.
+ */
+#define RUN_ONCE(once, init)                                            \
+    (CRYPTO_THREAD_run_once(once, init##_ossl_) ? init##_ossl_ret_ : 0)
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/__DECC_INCLUDE_EPILOGUE.H b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/__DECC_INCLUDE_EPILOGUE.H
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c350018
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/__DECC_INCLUDE_EPILOGUE.H
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * This file is only used by HP C on VMS, and is included automatically
+ * after each header file from this directory
+ */
+
+/* restore state.  Must correspond to the save in __decc_include_prologue.h */
+#pragma names restore
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/__DECC_INCLUDE_PROLOGUE.H b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/__DECC_INCLUDE_PROLOGUE.H
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9a9c777
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/__DECC_INCLUDE_PROLOGUE.H
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * This file is only used by HP C on VMS, and is included automatically
+ * after each header file from this directory
+ */
+
+/* save state */
+#pragma names save
+/* have the compiler shorten symbols larger than 31 chars to 23 chars
+ * followed by a 8 hex char CRC
+ */
+#pragma names as_is,shortened
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/aes.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/aes.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..245c552
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/aes.h
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_AES_H
+# define HEADER_AES_H
+
+# include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+
+# include <stddef.h>
+# ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+# endif
+
+# define AES_ENCRYPT     1
+# define AES_DECRYPT     0
+
+/*
+ * Because array size can't be a const in C, the following two are macros.
+ * Both sizes are in bytes.
+ */
+# define AES_MAXNR 14
+# define AES_BLOCK_SIZE 16
+
+/* This should be a hidden type, but EVP requires that the size be known */
+struct aes_key_st {
+# ifdef AES_LONG
+    unsigned long rd_key[4 * (AES_MAXNR + 1)];
+# else
+    unsigned int rd_key[4 * (AES_MAXNR + 1)];
+# endif
+    int rounds;
+};
+typedef struct aes_key_st AES_KEY;
+
+const char *AES_options(void);
+
+int AES_set_encrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, const int bits,
+                        AES_KEY *key);
+int AES_set_decrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, const int bits,
+                        AES_KEY *key);
+
+void AES_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                 const AES_KEY *key);
+void AES_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                 const AES_KEY *key);
+
+void AES_ecb_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                     const AES_KEY *key, const int enc);
+void AES_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                     size_t length, const AES_KEY *key,
+                     unsigned char *ivec, const int enc);
+void AES_cfb128_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                        size_t length, const AES_KEY *key,
+                        unsigned char *ivec, int *num, const int enc);
+void AES_cfb1_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                      size_t length, const AES_KEY *key,
+                      unsigned char *ivec, int *num, const int enc);
+void AES_cfb8_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                      size_t length, const AES_KEY *key,
+                      unsigned char *ivec, int *num, const int enc);
+void AES_ofb128_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                        size_t length, const AES_KEY *key,
+                        unsigned char *ivec, int *num);
+/* NB: the IV is _two_ blocks long */
+void AES_ige_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                     size_t length, const AES_KEY *key,
+                     unsigned char *ivec, const int enc);
+/* NB: the IV is _four_ blocks long */
+void AES_bi_ige_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                        size_t length, const AES_KEY *key,
+                        const AES_KEY *key2, const unsigned char *ivec,
+                        const int enc);
+
+int AES_wrap_key(AES_KEY *key, const unsigned char *iv,
+                 unsigned char *out,
+                 const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen);
+int AES_unwrap_key(AES_KEY *key, const unsigned char *iv,
+                   unsigned char *out,
+                   const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen);
+
+
+# ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+# endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/asn1.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/asn1.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..05ae1db
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/asn1.h
@@ -0,0 +1,1100 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_ASN1_H
+# define HEADER_ASN1_H
+
+# include <time.h>
+# include <openssl/e_os2.h>
+# include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+# include <openssl/bio.h>
+# include <openssl/stack.h>
+# include <openssl/safestack.h>
+
+# include <openssl/symhacks.h>
+
+# include <openssl/ossl_typ.h>
+# if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+#  include <openssl/bn.h>
+# endif
+
+# ifdef OPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBCRYPTO
+#  undef OPENSSL_EXTERN
+#  define OPENSSL_EXTERN OPENSSL_EXPORT
+# endif
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+# define V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL                0x00
+# define V_ASN1_APPLICATION              0x40
+# define V_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC         0x80
+# define V_ASN1_PRIVATE                  0xc0
+
+# define V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED              0x20
+# define V_ASN1_PRIMITIVE_TAG            0x1f
+# define V_ASN1_PRIMATIVE_TAG            0x1f
+
+# define V_ASN1_APP_CHOOSE               -2/* let the recipient choose */
+# define V_ASN1_OTHER                    -3/* used in ASN1_TYPE */
+# define V_ASN1_ANY                      -4/* used in ASN1 template code */
+
+# define V_ASN1_UNDEF                    -1
+/* ASN.1 tag values */
+# define V_ASN1_EOC                      0
+# define V_ASN1_BOOLEAN                  1 /**/
+# define V_ASN1_INTEGER                  2
+# define V_ASN1_BIT_STRING               3
+# define V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING             4
+# define V_ASN1_NULL                     5
+# define V_ASN1_OBJECT                   6
+# define V_ASN1_OBJECT_DESCRIPTOR        7
+# define V_ASN1_EXTERNAL                 8
+# define V_ASN1_REAL                     9
+# define V_ASN1_ENUMERATED               10
+# define V_ASN1_UTF8STRING               12
+# define V_ASN1_SEQUENCE                 16
+# define V_ASN1_SET                      17
+# define V_ASN1_NUMERICSTRING            18 /**/
+# define V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING          19
+# define V_ASN1_T61STRING                20
+# define V_ASN1_TELETEXSTRING            20/* alias */
+# define V_ASN1_VIDEOTEXSTRING           21 /**/
+# define V_ASN1_IA5STRING                22
+# define V_ASN1_UTCTIME                  23
+# define V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME          24 /**/
+# define V_ASN1_GRAPHICSTRING            25 /**/
+# define V_ASN1_ISO64STRING              26 /**/
+# define V_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING            26/* alias */
+# define V_ASN1_GENERALSTRING            27 /**/
+# define V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING          28 /**/
+# define V_ASN1_BMPSTRING                30
+
+/*
+ * NB the constants below are used internally by ASN1_INTEGER
+ * and ASN1_ENUMERATED to indicate the sign. They are *not* on
+ * the wire tag values.
+ */
+
+# define V_ASN1_NEG                      0x100
+# define V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER              (2 | V_ASN1_NEG)
+# define V_ASN1_NEG_ENUMERATED           (10 | V_ASN1_NEG)
+
+/* For use with d2i_ASN1_type_bytes() */
+# define B_ASN1_NUMERICSTRING    0x0001
+# define B_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING  0x0002
+# define B_ASN1_T61STRING        0x0004
+# define B_ASN1_TELETEXSTRING    0x0004
+# define B_ASN1_VIDEOTEXSTRING   0x0008
+# define B_ASN1_IA5STRING        0x0010
+# define B_ASN1_GRAPHICSTRING    0x0020
+# define B_ASN1_ISO64STRING      0x0040
+# define B_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING    0x0040
+# define B_ASN1_GENERALSTRING    0x0080
+# define B_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING  0x0100
+# define B_ASN1_OCTET_STRING     0x0200
+# define B_ASN1_BIT_STRING       0x0400
+# define B_ASN1_BMPSTRING        0x0800
+# define B_ASN1_UNKNOWN          0x1000
+# define B_ASN1_UTF8STRING       0x2000
+# define B_ASN1_UTCTIME          0x4000
+# define B_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME  0x8000
+# define B_ASN1_SEQUENCE         0x10000
+/* For use with ASN1_mbstring_copy() */
+# define MBSTRING_FLAG           0x1000
+# define MBSTRING_UTF8           (MBSTRING_FLAG)
+# define MBSTRING_ASC            (MBSTRING_FLAG|1)
+# define MBSTRING_BMP            (MBSTRING_FLAG|2)
+# define MBSTRING_UNIV           (MBSTRING_FLAG|4)
+# define SMIME_OLDMIME           0x400
+# define SMIME_CRLFEOL           0x800
+# define SMIME_STREAM            0x1000
+    struct X509_algor_st;
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR)
+
+# define ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT 0x08/* Set if 0x07 has bits left value */
+/*
+ * This indicates that the ASN1_STRING is not a real value but just a place
+ * holder for the location where indefinite length constructed data should be
+ * inserted in the memory buffer
+ */
+# define ASN1_STRING_FLAG_NDEF 0x010
+
+/*
+ * This flag is used by the CMS code to indicate that a string is not
+ * complete and is a place holder for content when it had all been accessed.
+ * The flag will be reset when content has been written to it.
+ */
+
+# define ASN1_STRING_FLAG_CONT 0x020
+/*
+ * This flag is used by ASN1 code to indicate an ASN1_STRING is an MSTRING
+ * type.
+ */
+# define ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING 0x040
+/* String is embedded and only content should be freed */
+# define ASN1_STRING_FLAG_EMBED 0x080
+/* This is the base type that holds just about everything :-) */
+struct asn1_string_st {
+    int length;
+    int type;
+    unsigned char *data;
+    /*
+     * The value of the following field depends on the type being held.  It
+     * is mostly being used for BIT_STRING so if the input data has a
+     * non-zero 'unused bits' value, it will be handled correctly
+     */
+    long flags;
+};
+
+/*
+ * ASN1_ENCODING structure: this is used to save the received encoding of an
+ * ASN1 type. This is useful to get round problems with invalid encodings
+ * which can break signatures.
+ */
+
+typedef struct ASN1_ENCODING_st {
+    unsigned char *enc;         /* DER encoding */
+    long len;                   /* Length of encoding */
+    int modified;               /* set to 1 if 'enc' is invalid */
+} ASN1_ENCODING;
+
+/* Used with ASN1 LONG type: if a long is set to this it is omitted */
+# define ASN1_LONG_UNDEF 0x7fffffffL
+
+# define STABLE_FLAGS_MALLOC     0x01
+/*
+ * A zero passed to ASN1_STRING_TABLE_new_add for the flags is interpreted
+ * as "don't change" and STABLE_FLAGS_MALLOC is always set. By setting
+ * STABLE_FLAGS_MALLOC only we can clear the existing value. Use the alias
+ * STABLE_FLAGS_CLEAR to reflect this.
+ */
+# define STABLE_FLAGS_CLEAR      STABLE_FLAGS_MALLOC
+# define STABLE_NO_MASK          0x02
+# define DIRSTRING_TYPE  \
+ (B_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING|B_ASN1_T61STRING|B_ASN1_BMPSTRING|B_ASN1_UTF8STRING)
+# define PKCS9STRING_TYPE (DIRSTRING_TYPE|B_ASN1_IA5STRING)
+
+typedef struct asn1_string_table_st {
+    int nid;
+    long minsize;
+    long maxsize;
+    unsigned long mask;
+    unsigned long flags;
+} ASN1_STRING_TABLE;
+
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(ASN1_STRING_TABLE)
+
+/* size limits: this stuff is taken straight from RFC2459 */
+
+# define ub_name                         32768
+# define ub_common_name                  64
+# define ub_locality_name                128
+# define ub_state_name                   128
+# define ub_organization_name            64
+# define ub_organization_unit_name       64
+# define ub_title                        64
+# define ub_email_address                128
+
+/*
+ * Declarations for template structures: for full definitions see asn1t.h
+ */
+typedef struct ASN1_TEMPLATE_st ASN1_TEMPLATE;
+typedef struct ASN1_TLC_st ASN1_TLC;
+/* This is just an opaque pointer */
+typedef struct ASN1_VALUE_st ASN1_VALUE;
+
+/* Declare ASN1 functions: the implement macro in in asn1t.h */
+
+# define DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(type) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_name(type, type)
+
+# define DECLARE_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(type) \
+        DECLARE_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS_name(type, type)
+
+# define DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_name(type, name) \
+        DECLARE_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS_name(type, name) \
+        DECLARE_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS(type, name, name)
+
+# define DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_fname(type, itname, name) \
+        DECLARE_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS_name(type, name) \
+        DECLARE_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS(type, itname, name)
+
+# define DECLARE_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS(type, itname, name) \
+        type *d2i_##name(type **a, const unsigned char **in, long len); \
+        int i2d_##name(type *a, unsigned char **out); \
+        DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(itname)
+
+# define DECLARE_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const(type, name) \
+        type *d2i_##name(type **a, const unsigned char **in, long len); \
+        int i2d_##name(const type *a, unsigned char **out); \
+        DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(name)
+
+# define DECLARE_ASN1_NDEF_FUNCTION(name) \
+        int i2d_##name##_NDEF(name *a, unsigned char **out);
+
+# define DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const(name) \
+        DECLARE_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(name) \
+        DECLARE_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const(name, name)
+
+# define DECLARE_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS_name(type, name) \
+        type *name##_new(void); \
+        void name##_free(type *a);
+
+# define DECLARE_ASN1_PRINT_FUNCTION(stname) \
+        DECLARE_ASN1_PRINT_FUNCTION_fname(stname, stname)
+
+# define DECLARE_ASN1_PRINT_FUNCTION_fname(stname, fname) \
+        int fname##_print_ctx(BIO *out, stname *x, int indent, \
+                                         const ASN1_PCTX *pctx);
+
+# define D2I_OF(type) type *(*)(type **,const unsigned char **,long)
+# define I2D_OF(type) int (*)(type *,unsigned char **)
+# define I2D_OF_const(type) int (*)(const type *,unsigned char **)
+
+# define CHECKED_D2I_OF(type, d2i) \
+    ((d2i_of_void*) (1 ? d2i : ((D2I_OF(type))0)))
+# define CHECKED_I2D_OF(type, i2d) \
+    ((i2d_of_void*) (1 ? i2d : ((I2D_OF(type))0)))
+# define CHECKED_NEW_OF(type, xnew) \
+    ((void *(*)(void)) (1 ? xnew : ((type *(*)(void))0)))
+# define CHECKED_PTR_OF(type, p) \
+    ((void*) (1 ? p : (type*)0))
+# define CHECKED_PPTR_OF(type, p) \
+    ((void**) (1 ? p : (type**)0))
+
+# define TYPEDEF_D2I_OF(type) typedef type *d2i_of_##type(type **,const unsigned char **,long)
+# define TYPEDEF_I2D_OF(type) typedef int i2d_of_##type(type *,unsigned char **)
+# define TYPEDEF_D2I2D_OF(type) TYPEDEF_D2I_OF(type); TYPEDEF_I2D_OF(type)
+
+TYPEDEF_D2I2D_OF(void);
+
+/*-
+ * The following macros and typedefs allow an ASN1_ITEM
+ * to be embedded in a structure and referenced. Since
+ * the ASN1_ITEM pointers need to be globally accessible
+ * (possibly from shared libraries) they may exist in
+ * different forms. On platforms that support it the
+ * ASN1_ITEM structure itself will be globally exported.
+ * Other platforms will export a function that returns
+ * an ASN1_ITEM pointer.
+ *
+ * To handle both cases transparently the macros below
+ * should be used instead of hard coding an ASN1_ITEM
+ * pointer in a structure.
+ *
+ * The structure will look like this:
+ *
+ * typedef struct SOMETHING_st {
+ *      ...
+ *      ASN1_ITEM_EXP *iptr;
+ *      ...
+ * } SOMETHING;
+ *
+ * It would be initialised as e.g.:
+ *
+ * SOMETHING somevar = {...,ASN1_ITEM_ref(X509),...};
+ *
+ * and the actual pointer extracted with:
+ *
+ * const ASN1_ITEM *it = ASN1_ITEM_ptr(somevar.iptr);
+ *
+ * Finally an ASN1_ITEM pointer can be extracted from an
+ * appropriate reference with: ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509). This
+ * would be used when a function takes an ASN1_ITEM * argument.
+ *
+ */
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION
+
+/* ASN1_ITEM pointer exported type */
+typedef const ASN1_ITEM ASN1_ITEM_EXP;
+
+/* Macro to obtain ASN1_ITEM pointer from exported type */
+#  define ASN1_ITEM_ptr(iptr) (iptr)
+
+/* Macro to include ASN1_ITEM pointer from base type */
+#  define ASN1_ITEM_ref(iptr) (&(iptr##_it))
+
+#  define ASN1_ITEM_rptr(ref) (&(ref##_it))
+
+#  define DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(name) \
+        OPENSSL_EXTERN const ASN1_ITEM name##_it;
+
+# else
+
+/*
+ * Platforms that can't easily handle shared global variables are declared as
+ * functions returning ASN1_ITEM pointers.
+ */
+
+/* ASN1_ITEM pointer exported type */
+typedef const ASN1_ITEM *ASN1_ITEM_EXP (void);
+
+/* Macro to obtain ASN1_ITEM pointer from exported type */
+#  define ASN1_ITEM_ptr(iptr) (iptr())
+
+/* Macro to include ASN1_ITEM pointer from base type */
+#  define ASN1_ITEM_ref(iptr) (iptr##_it)
+
+#  define ASN1_ITEM_rptr(ref) (ref##_it())
+
+#  define DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(name) \
+        const ASN1_ITEM * name##_it(void);
+
+# endif
+
+/* Parameters used by ASN1_STRING_print_ex() */
+
+/*
+ * These determine which characters to escape: RFC2253 special characters,
+ * control characters and MSB set characters
+ */
+
+# define ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_2253           1
+# define ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_CTRL           2
+# define ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_MSB            4
+
+/*
+ * This flag determines how we do escaping: normally RC2253 backslash only,
+ * set this to use backslash and quote.
+ */
+
+# define ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_QUOTE          8
+
+/* These three flags are internal use only. */
+
+/* Character is a valid PrintableString character */
+# define CHARTYPE_PRINTABLESTRING        0x10
+/* Character needs escaping if it is the first character */
+# define CHARTYPE_FIRST_ESC_2253         0x20
+/* Character needs escaping if it is the last character */
+# define CHARTYPE_LAST_ESC_2253          0x40
+
+/*
+ * NB the internal flags are safely reused below by flags handled at the top
+ * level.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * If this is set we convert all character strings to UTF8 first
+ */
+
+# define ASN1_STRFLGS_UTF8_CONVERT       0x10
+
+/*
+ * If this is set we don't attempt to interpret content: just assume all
+ * strings are 1 byte per character. This will produce some pretty odd
+ * looking output!
+ */
+
+# define ASN1_STRFLGS_IGNORE_TYPE        0x20
+
+/* If this is set we include the string type in the output */
+# define ASN1_STRFLGS_SHOW_TYPE          0x40
+
+/*
+ * This determines which strings to display and which to 'dump' (hex dump of
+ * content octets or DER encoding). We can only dump non character strings or
+ * everything. If we don't dump 'unknown' they are interpreted as character
+ * strings with 1 octet per character and are subject to the usual escaping
+ * options.
+ */
+
+# define ASN1_STRFLGS_DUMP_ALL           0x80
+# define ASN1_STRFLGS_DUMP_UNKNOWN       0x100
+
+/*
+ * These determine what 'dumping' does, we can dump the content octets or the
+ * DER encoding: both use the RFC2253 #XXXXX notation.
+ */
+
+# define ASN1_STRFLGS_DUMP_DER           0x200
+
+/*
+ * This flag specifies that RC2254 escaping shall be performed.
+ */
+#define ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_2254           0x400
+
+/*
+ * All the string flags consistent with RFC2253, escaping control characters
+ * isn't essential in RFC2253 but it is advisable anyway.
+ */
+
+# define ASN1_STRFLGS_RFC2253    (ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_2253 | \
+                                ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_CTRL | \
+                                ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_MSB | \
+                                ASN1_STRFLGS_UTF8_CONVERT | \
+                                ASN1_STRFLGS_DUMP_UNKNOWN | \
+                                ASN1_STRFLGS_DUMP_DER)
+
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(ASN1_INTEGER)
+
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(ASN1_GENERALSTRING)
+
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(ASN1_UTF8STRING)
+
+typedef struct asn1_type_st {
+    int type;
+    union {
+        char *ptr;
+        ASN1_BOOLEAN boolean;
+        ASN1_STRING *asn1_string;
+        ASN1_OBJECT *object;
+        ASN1_INTEGER *integer;
+        ASN1_ENUMERATED *enumerated;
+        ASN1_BIT_STRING *bit_string;
+        ASN1_OCTET_STRING *octet_string;
+        ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING *printablestring;
+        ASN1_T61STRING *t61string;
+        ASN1_IA5STRING *ia5string;
+        ASN1_GENERALSTRING *generalstring;
+        ASN1_BMPSTRING *bmpstring;
+        ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING *universalstring;
+        ASN1_UTCTIME *utctime;
+        ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *generalizedtime;
+        ASN1_VISIBLESTRING *visiblestring;
+        ASN1_UTF8STRING *utf8string;
+        /*
+         * set and sequence are left complete and still contain the set or
+         * sequence bytes
+         */
+        ASN1_STRING *set;
+        ASN1_STRING *sequence;
+        ASN1_VALUE *asn1_value;
+    } value;
+} ASN1_TYPE;
+
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(ASN1_TYPE)
+
+typedef STACK_OF(ASN1_TYPE) ASN1_SEQUENCE_ANY;
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const(ASN1_SEQUENCE_ANY, ASN1_SEQUENCE_ANY)
+DECLARE_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const(ASN1_SEQUENCE_ANY, ASN1_SET_ANY)
+
+/* This is used to contain a list of bit names */
+typedef struct BIT_STRING_BITNAME_st {
+    int bitnum;
+    const char *lname;
+    const char *sname;
+} BIT_STRING_BITNAME;
+
+# define B_ASN1_TIME \
+                        B_ASN1_UTCTIME | \
+                        B_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME
+
+# define B_ASN1_PRINTABLE \
+                        B_ASN1_NUMERICSTRING| \
+                        B_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING| \
+                        B_ASN1_T61STRING| \
+                        B_ASN1_IA5STRING| \
+                        B_ASN1_BIT_STRING| \
+                        B_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING|\
+                        B_ASN1_BMPSTRING|\
+                        B_ASN1_UTF8STRING|\
+                        B_ASN1_SEQUENCE|\
+                        B_ASN1_UNKNOWN
+
+# define B_ASN1_DIRECTORYSTRING \
+                        B_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING| \
+                        B_ASN1_TELETEXSTRING|\
+                        B_ASN1_BMPSTRING|\
+                        B_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING|\
+                        B_ASN1_UTF8STRING
+
+# define B_ASN1_DISPLAYTEXT \
+                        B_ASN1_IA5STRING| \
+                        B_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING| \
+                        B_ASN1_BMPSTRING|\
+                        B_ASN1_UTF8STRING
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_fname(ASN1_TYPE, ASN1_ANY, ASN1_TYPE)
+
+int ASN1_TYPE_get(const ASN1_TYPE *a);
+void ASN1_TYPE_set(ASN1_TYPE *a, int type, void *value);
+int ASN1_TYPE_set1(ASN1_TYPE *a, int type, const void *value);
+int ASN1_TYPE_cmp(const ASN1_TYPE *a, const ASN1_TYPE *b);
+
+ASN1_TYPE *ASN1_TYPE_pack_sequence(const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *s, ASN1_TYPE **t);
+void *ASN1_TYPE_unpack_sequence(const ASN1_ITEM *it, const ASN1_TYPE *t);
+
+ASN1_OBJECT *ASN1_OBJECT_new(void);
+void ASN1_OBJECT_free(ASN1_OBJECT *a);
+int i2d_ASN1_OBJECT(const ASN1_OBJECT *a, unsigned char **pp);
+ASN1_OBJECT *d2i_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT **a, const unsigned char **pp,
+                             long length);
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(ASN1_OBJECT)
+
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT)
+
+ASN1_STRING *ASN1_STRING_new(void);
+void ASN1_STRING_free(ASN1_STRING *a);
+void ASN1_STRING_clear_free(ASN1_STRING *a);
+int ASN1_STRING_copy(ASN1_STRING *dst, const ASN1_STRING *str);
+ASN1_STRING *ASN1_STRING_dup(const ASN1_STRING *a);
+ASN1_STRING *ASN1_STRING_type_new(int type);
+int ASN1_STRING_cmp(const ASN1_STRING *a, const ASN1_STRING *b);
+  /*
+   * Since this is used to store all sorts of things, via macros, for now,
+   * make its data void *
+   */
+int ASN1_STRING_set(ASN1_STRING *str, const void *data, int len);
+void ASN1_STRING_set0(ASN1_STRING *str, void *data, int len);
+int ASN1_STRING_length(const ASN1_STRING *x);
+void ASN1_STRING_length_set(ASN1_STRING *x, int n);
+int ASN1_STRING_type(const ASN1_STRING *x);
+DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(unsigned char *ASN1_STRING_data(ASN1_STRING *x))
+const unsigned char *ASN1_STRING_get0_data(const ASN1_STRING *x);
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_BIT_STRING)
+int ASN1_BIT_STRING_set(ASN1_BIT_STRING *a, unsigned char *d, int length);
+int ASN1_BIT_STRING_set_bit(ASN1_BIT_STRING *a, int n, int value);
+int ASN1_BIT_STRING_get_bit(const ASN1_BIT_STRING *a, int n);
+int ASN1_BIT_STRING_check(const ASN1_BIT_STRING *a,
+                          const unsigned char *flags, int flags_len);
+
+int ASN1_BIT_STRING_name_print(BIO *out, ASN1_BIT_STRING *bs,
+                               BIT_STRING_BITNAME *tbl, int indent);
+int ASN1_BIT_STRING_num_asc(const char *name, BIT_STRING_BITNAME *tbl);
+int ASN1_BIT_STRING_set_asc(ASN1_BIT_STRING *bs, const char *name, int value,
+                            BIT_STRING_BITNAME *tbl);
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_INTEGER)
+ASN1_INTEGER *d2i_ASN1_UINTEGER(ASN1_INTEGER **a, const unsigned char **pp,
+                                long length);
+ASN1_INTEGER *ASN1_INTEGER_dup(const ASN1_INTEGER *x);
+int ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(const ASN1_INTEGER *x, const ASN1_INTEGER *y);
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_ENUMERATED)
+
+int ASN1_UTCTIME_check(const ASN1_UTCTIME *a);
+ASN1_UTCTIME *ASN1_UTCTIME_set(ASN1_UTCTIME *s, time_t t);
+ASN1_UTCTIME *ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(ASN1_UTCTIME *s, time_t t,
+                               int offset_day, long offset_sec);
+int ASN1_UTCTIME_set_string(ASN1_UTCTIME *s, const char *str);
+int ASN1_UTCTIME_cmp_time_t(const ASN1_UTCTIME *s, time_t t);
+
+int ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_check(const ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *a);
+ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set(ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *s,
+                                               time_t t);
+ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *s,
+                                               time_t t, int offset_day,
+                                               long offset_sec);
+int ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set_string(ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *s, const char *str);
+int ASN1_TIME_diff(int *pday, int *psec,
+                   const ASN1_TIME *from, const ASN1_TIME *to);
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_OCTET_STRING)
+ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ASN1_OCTET_STRING_dup(const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *a);
+int ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *a,
+                          const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *b);
+int ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(ASN1_OCTET_STRING *str, const unsigned char *data,
+                          int len);
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_VISIBLESTRING)
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING)
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_UTF8STRING)
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_NULL)
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_BMPSTRING)
+
+int UTF8_getc(const unsigned char *str, int len, unsigned long *val);
+int UTF8_putc(unsigned char *str, int len, unsigned long value);
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_name(ASN1_STRING, ASN1_PRINTABLE)
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_name(ASN1_STRING, DIRECTORYSTRING)
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_name(ASN1_STRING, DISPLAYTEXT)
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING)
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_T61STRING)
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_IA5STRING)
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_GENERALSTRING)
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_UTCTIME)
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_TIME)
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(ASN1_OCTET_STRING_NDEF)
+
+ASN1_TIME *ASN1_TIME_set(ASN1_TIME *s, time_t t);
+ASN1_TIME *ASN1_TIME_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, time_t t,
+                         int offset_day, long offset_sec);
+int ASN1_TIME_check(const ASN1_TIME *t);
+ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *ASN1_TIME_to_generalizedtime(const ASN1_TIME *t,
+                                                   ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **out);
+int ASN1_TIME_set_string(ASN1_TIME *s, const char *str);
+
+int i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(BIO *bp, const ASN1_INTEGER *a);
+int a2i_ASN1_INTEGER(BIO *bp, ASN1_INTEGER *bs, char *buf, int size);
+int i2a_ASN1_ENUMERATED(BIO *bp, const ASN1_ENUMERATED *a);
+int a2i_ASN1_ENUMERATED(BIO *bp, ASN1_ENUMERATED *bs, char *buf, int size);
+int i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(BIO *bp, const ASN1_OBJECT *a);
+int a2i_ASN1_STRING(BIO *bp, ASN1_STRING *bs, char *buf, int size);
+int i2a_ASN1_STRING(BIO *bp, const ASN1_STRING *a, int type);
+int i2t_ASN1_OBJECT(char *buf, int buf_len, const ASN1_OBJECT *a);
+
+int a2d_ASN1_OBJECT(unsigned char *out, int olen, const char *buf, int num);
+ASN1_OBJECT *ASN1_OBJECT_create(int nid, unsigned char *data, int len,
+                                const char *sn, const char *ln);
+
+int ASN1_INTEGER_get_int64(int64_t *pr, const ASN1_INTEGER *a);
+int ASN1_INTEGER_set_int64(ASN1_INTEGER *a, int64_t r);
+int ASN1_INTEGER_get_uint64(uint64_t *pr, const ASN1_INTEGER *a);
+int ASN1_INTEGER_set_uint64(ASN1_INTEGER *a, uint64_t r);
+
+int ASN1_INTEGER_set(ASN1_INTEGER *a, long v);
+long ASN1_INTEGER_get(const ASN1_INTEGER *a);
+ASN1_INTEGER *BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(const BIGNUM *bn, ASN1_INTEGER *ai);
+BIGNUM *ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(const ASN1_INTEGER *ai, BIGNUM *bn);
+
+int ASN1_ENUMERATED_get_int64(int64_t *pr, const ASN1_ENUMERATED *a);
+int ASN1_ENUMERATED_set_int64(ASN1_ENUMERATED *a, int64_t r);
+
+
+int ASN1_ENUMERATED_set(ASN1_ENUMERATED *a, long v);
+long ASN1_ENUMERATED_get(const ASN1_ENUMERATED *a);
+ASN1_ENUMERATED *BN_to_ASN1_ENUMERATED(const BIGNUM *bn, ASN1_ENUMERATED *ai);
+BIGNUM *ASN1_ENUMERATED_to_BN(const ASN1_ENUMERATED *ai, BIGNUM *bn);
+
+/* General */
+/* given a string, return the correct type, max is the maximum length */
+int ASN1_PRINTABLE_type(const unsigned char *s, int max);
+
+unsigned long ASN1_tag2bit(int tag);
+
+/* SPECIALS */
+int ASN1_get_object(const unsigned char **pp, long *plength, int *ptag,
+                    int *pclass, long omax);
+int ASN1_check_infinite_end(unsigned char **p, long len);
+int ASN1_const_check_infinite_end(const unsigned char **p, long len);
+void ASN1_put_object(unsigned char **pp, int constructed, int length,
+                     int tag, int xclass);
+int ASN1_put_eoc(unsigned char **pp);
+int ASN1_object_size(int constructed, int length, int tag);
+
+/* Used to implement other functions */
+void *ASN1_dup(i2d_of_void *i2d, d2i_of_void *d2i, void *x);
+
+# define ASN1_dup_of(type,i2d,d2i,x) \
+    ((type*)ASN1_dup(CHECKED_I2D_OF(type, i2d), \
+                     CHECKED_D2I_OF(type, d2i), \
+                     CHECKED_PTR_OF(type, x)))
+
+# define ASN1_dup_of_const(type,i2d,d2i,x) \
+    ((type*)ASN1_dup(CHECKED_I2D_OF(const type, i2d), \
+                     CHECKED_D2I_OF(type, d2i), \
+                     CHECKED_PTR_OF(const type, x)))
+
+void *ASN1_item_dup(const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *x);
+
+/* ASN1 alloc/free macros for when a type is only used internally */
+
+# define M_ASN1_new_of(type) (type *)ASN1_item_new(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(type))
+# define M_ASN1_free_of(x, type) \
+                ASN1_item_free(CHECKED_PTR_OF(type, x), ASN1_ITEM_rptr(type))
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+void *ASN1_d2i_fp(void *(*xnew) (void), d2i_of_void *d2i, FILE *in, void **x);
+
+#  define ASN1_d2i_fp_of(type,xnew,d2i,in,x) \
+    ((type*)ASN1_d2i_fp(CHECKED_NEW_OF(type, xnew), \
+                        CHECKED_D2I_OF(type, d2i), \
+                        in, \
+                        CHECKED_PPTR_OF(type, x)))
+
+void *ASN1_item_d2i_fp(const ASN1_ITEM *it, FILE *in, void *x);
+int ASN1_i2d_fp(i2d_of_void *i2d, FILE *out, void *x);
+
+#  define ASN1_i2d_fp_of(type,i2d,out,x) \
+    (ASN1_i2d_fp(CHECKED_I2D_OF(type, i2d), \
+                 out, \
+                 CHECKED_PTR_OF(type, x)))
+
+#  define ASN1_i2d_fp_of_const(type,i2d,out,x) \
+    (ASN1_i2d_fp(CHECKED_I2D_OF(const type, i2d), \
+                 out, \
+                 CHECKED_PTR_OF(const type, x)))
+
+int ASN1_item_i2d_fp(const ASN1_ITEM *it, FILE *out, void *x);
+int ASN1_STRING_print_ex_fp(FILE *fp, const ASN1_STRING *str, unsigned long flags);
+# endif
+
+int ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(unsigned char **out, const ASN1_STRING *in);
+
+void *ASN1_d2i_bio(void *(*xnew) (void), d2i_of_void *d2i, BIO *in, void **x);
+
+#  define ASN1_d2i_bio_of(type,xnew,d2i,in,x) \
+    ((type*)ASN1_d2i_bio( CHECKED_NEW_OF(type, xnew), \
+                          CHECKED_D2I_OF(type, d2i), \
+                          in, \
+                          CHECKED_PPTR_OF(type, x)))
+
+void *ASN1_item_d2i_bio(const ASN1_ITEM *it, BIO *in, void *x);
+int ASN1_i2d_bio(i2d_of_void *i2d, BIO *out, unsigned char *x);
+
+#  define ASN1_i2d_bio_of(type,i2d,out,x) \
+    (ASN1_i2d_bio(CHECKED_I2D_OF(type, i2d), \
+                  out, \
+                  CHECKED_PTR_OF(type, x)))
+
+#  define ASN1_i2d_bio_of_const(type,i2d,out,x) \
+    (ASN1_i2d_bio(CHECKED_I2D_OF(const type, i2d), \
+                  out, \
+                  CHECKED_PTR_OF(const type, x)))
+
+int ASN1_item_i2d_bio(const ASN1_ITEM *it, BIO *out, void *x);
+int ASN1_UTCTIME_print(BIO *fp, const ASN1_UTCTIME *a);
+int ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(BIO *fp, const ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *a);
+int ASN1_TIME_print(BIO *fp, const ASN1_TIME *a);
+int ASN1_STRING_print(BIO *bp, const ASN1_STRING *v);
+int ASN1_STRING_print_ex(BIO *out, const ASN1_STRING *str, unsigned long flags);
+int ASN1_buf_print(BIO *bp, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen, int off);
+int ASN1_bn_print(BIO *bp, const char *number, const BIGNUM *num,
+                  unsigned char *buf, int off);
+int ASN1_parse(BIO *bp, const unsigned char *pp, long len, int indent);
+int ASN1_parse_dump(BIO *bp, const unsigned char *pp, long len, int indent,
+                    int dump);
+const char *ASN1_tag2str(int tag);
+
+/* Used to load and write Netscape format cert */
+
+int ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING_to_string(ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING *s);
+
+int ASN1_TYPE_set_octetstring(ASN1_TYPE *a, unsigned char *data, int len);
+int ASN1_TYPE_get_octetstring(const ASN1_TYPE *a, unsigned char *data, int max_len);
+int ASN1_TYPE_set_int_octetstring(ASN1_TYPE *a, long num,
+                                  unsigned char *data, int len);
+int ASN1_TYPE_get_int_octetstring(const ASN1_TYPE *a, long *num,
+                                  unsigned char *data, int max_len);
+
+void *ASN1_item_unpack(const ASN1_STRING *oct, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
+
+ASN1_STRING *ASN1_item_pack(void *obj, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+                            ASN1_OCTET_STRING **oct);
+
+void ASN1_STRING_set_default_mask(unsigned long mask);
+int ASN1_STRING_set_default_mask_asc(const char *p);
+unsigned long ASN1_STRING_get_default_mask(void);
+int ASN1_mbstring_copy(ASN1_STRING **out, const unsigned char *in, int len,
+                       int inform, unsigned long mask);
+int ASN1_mbstring_ncopy(ASN1_STRING **out, const unsigned char *in, int len,
+                        int inform, unsigned long mask,
+                        long minsize, long maxsize);
+
+ASN1_STRING *ASN1_STRING_set_by_NID(ASN1_STRING **out,
+                                    const unsigned char *in, int inlen,
+                                    int inform, int nid);
+ASN1_STRING_TABLE *ASN1_STRING_TABLE_get(int nid);
+int ASN1_STRING_TABLE_add(int, long, long, unsigned long, unsigned long);
+void ASN1_STRING_TABLE_cleanup(void);
+
+/* ASN1 template functions */
+
+/* Old API compatible functions */
+ASN1_VALUE *ASN1_item_new(const ASN1_ITEM *it);
+void ASN1_item_free(ASN1_VALUE *val, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
+ASN1_VALUE *ASN1_item_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **val, const unsigned char **in,
+                          long len, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
+int ASN1_item_i2d(ASN1_VALUE *val, unsigned char **out, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
+int ASN1_item_ndef_i2d(ASN1_VALUE *val, unsigned char **out,
+                       const ASN1_ITEM *it);
+
+void ASN1_add_oid_module(void);
+void ASN1_add_stable_module(void);
+
+ASN1_TYPE *ASN1_generate_nconf(const char *str, CONF *nconf);
+ASN1_TYPE *ASN1_generate_v3(const char *str, X509V3_CTX *cnf);
+int ASN1_str2mask(const char *str, unsigned long *pmask);
+
+/* ASN1 Print flags */
+
+/* Indicate missing OPTIONAL fields */
+# define ASN1_PCTX_FLAGS_SHOW_ABSENT             0x001
+/* Mark start and end of SEQUENCE */
+# define ASN1_PCTX_FLAGS_SHOW_SEQUENCE           0x002
+/* Mark start and end of SEQUENCE/SET OF */
+# define ASN1_PCTX_FLAGS_SHOW_SSOF               0x004
+/* Show the ASN1 type of primitives */
+# define ASN1_PCTX_FLAGS_SHOW_TYPE               0x008
+/* Don't show ASN1 type of ANY */
+# define ASN1_PCTX_FLAGS_NO_ANY_TYPE             0x010
+/* Don't show ASN1 type of MSTRINGs */
+# define ASN1_PCTX_FLAGS_NO_MSTRING_TYPE         0x020
+/* Don't show field names in SEQUENCE */
+# define ASN1_PCTX_FLAGS_NO_FIELD_NAME           0x040
+/* Show structure names of each SEQUENCE field */
+# define ASN1_PCTX_FLAGS_SHOW_FIELD_STRUCT_NAME  0x080
+/* Don't show structure name even at top level */
+# define ASN1_PCTX_FLAGS_NO_STRUCT_NAME          0x100
+
+int ASN1_item_print(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE *ifld, int indent,
+                    const ASN1_ITEM *it, const ASN1_PCTX *pctx);
+ASN1_PCTX *ASN1_PCTX_new(void);
+void ASN1_PCTX_free(ASN1_PCTX *p);
+unsigned long ASN1_PCTX_get_flags(const ASN1_PCTX *p);
+void ASN1_PCTX_set_flags(ASN1_PCTX *p, unsigned long flags);
+unsigned long ASN1_PCTX_get_nm_flags(const ASN1_PCTX *p);
+void ASN1_PCTX_set_nm_flags(ASN1_PCTX *p, unsigned long flags);
+unsigned long ASN1_PCTX_get_cert_flags(const ASN1_PCTX *p);
+void ASN1_PCTX_set_cert_flags(ASN1_PCTX *p, unsigned long flags);
+unsigned long ASN1_PCTX_get_oid_flags(const ASN1_PCTX *p);
+void ASN1_PCTX_set_oid_flags(ASN1_PCTX *p, unsigned long flags);
+unsigned long ASN1_PCTX_get_str_flags(const ASN1_PCTX *p);
+void ASN1_PCTX_set_str_flags(ASN1_PCTX *p, unsigned long flags);
+
+ASN1_SCTX *ASN1_SCTX_new(int (*scan_cb) (ASN1_SCTX *ctx));
+void ASN1_SCTX_free(ASN1_SCTX *p);
+const ASN1_ITEM *ASN1_SCTX_get_item(ASN1_SCTX *p);
+const ASN1_TEMPLATE *ASN1_SCTX_get_template(ASN1_SCTX *p);
+unsigned long ASN1_SCTX_get_flags(ASN1_SCTX *p);
+void ASN1_SCTX_set_app_data(ASN1_SCTX *p, void *data);
+void *ASN1_SCTX_get_app_data(ASN1_SCTX *p);
+
+const BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_asn1(void);
+
+BIO *BIO_new_NDEF(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE *val, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
+
+int i2d_ASN1_bio_stream(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE *val, BIO *in, int flags,
+                        const ASN1_ITEM *it);
+int PEM_write_bio_ASN1_stream(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE *val, BIO *in, int flags,
+                              const char *hdr, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
+int SMIME_write_ASN1(BIO *bio, ASN1_VALUE *val, BIO *data, int flags,
+                     int ctype_nid, int econt_nid,
+                     STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) *mdalgs, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
+ASN1_VALUE *SMIME_read_ASN1(BIO *bio, BIO **bcont, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
+int SMIME_crlf_copy(BIO *in, BIO *out, int flags);
+int SMIME_text(BIO *in, BIO *out);
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+/*
+ * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
+ * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
+ */
+
+int ERR_load_ASN1_strings(void);
+
+/* Error codes for the ASN1 functions. */
+
+/* Function codes. */
+# define ASN1_F_A2D_ASN1_OBJECT                           100
+# define ASN1_F_A2I_ASN1_INTEGER                          102
+# define ASN1_F_A2I_ASN1_STRING                           103
+# define ASN1_F_APPEND_EXP                                176
+# define ASN1_F_ASN1_BIT_STRING_SET_BIT                   183
+# define ASN1_F_ASN1_CB                                   177
+# define ASN1_F_ASN1_CHECK_TLEN                           104
+# define ASN1_F_ASN1_COLLECT                              106
+# define ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_EX_PRIMITIVE                     108
+# define ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_FP                               109
+# define ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO                         107
+# define ASN1_F_ASN1_DIGEST                               184
+# define ASN1_F_ASN1_DO_ADB                               110
+# define ASN1_F_ASN1_DO_LOCK                              233
+# define ASN1_F_ASN1_DUP                                  111
+# define ASN1_F_ASN1_EX_C2I                               204
+# define ASN1_F_ASN1_FIND_END                             190
+# define ASN1_F_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_ADJ                  216
+# define ASN1_F_ASN1_GENERATE_V3                          178
+# define ASN1_F_ASN1_GET_INT64                            224
+# define ASN1_F_ASN1_GET_OBJECT                           114
+# define ASN1_F_ASN1_GET_UINT64                           225
+# define ASN1_F_ASN1_I2D_BIO                              116
+# define ASN1_F_ASN1_I2D_FP                               117
+# define ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_D2I_FP                          206
+# define ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_DUP                             191
+# define ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EMBED_D2I                       120
+# define ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EMBED_NEW                       121
+# define ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_I2D_BIO                         192
+# define ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_I2D_FP                          193
+# define ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_PACK                            198
+# define ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_SIGN                            195
+# define ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_SIGN_CTX                        220
+# define ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_UNPACK                          199
+# define ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY                          197
+# define ASN1_F_ASN1_MBSTRING_NCOPY                       122
+# define ASN1_F_ASN1_OBJECT_NEW                           123
+# define ASN1_F_ASN1_OUTPUT_DATA                          214
+# define ASN1_F_ASN1_PCTX_NEW                             205
+# define ASN1_F_ASN1_SCTX_NEW                             221
+# define ASN1_F_ASN1_SIGN                                 128
+# define ASN1_F_ASN1_STR2TYPE                             179
+# define ASN1_F_ASN1_STRING_GET_INT64                     227
+# define ASN1_F_ASN1_STRING_GET_UINT64                    230
+# define ASN1_F_ASN1_STRING_SET                           186
+# define ASN1_F_ASN1_STRING_TABLE_ADD                     129
+# define ASN1_F_ASN1_STRING_TO_BN                         228
+# define ASN1_F_ASN1_STRING_TYPE_NEW                      130
+# define ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_EX_D2I                      132
+# define ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NEW                         133
+# define ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NOEXP_D2I                   131
+# define ASN1_F_ASN1_TIME_ADJ                             217
+# define ASN1_F_ASN1_TYPE_GET_INT_OCTETSTRING             134
+# define ASN1_F_ASN1_TYPE_GET_OCTETSTRING                 135
+# define ASN1_F_ASN1_UTCTIME_ADJ                          218
+# define ASN1_F_ASN1_VERIFY                               137
+# define ASN1_F_B64_READ_ASN1                             209
+# define ASN1_F_B64_WRITE_ASN1                            210
+# define ASN1_F_BIO_NEW_NDEF                              208
+# define ASN1_F_BITSTR_CB                                 180
+# define ASN1_F_BN_TO_ASN1_STRING                         229
+# define ASN1_F_C2I_ASN1_BIT_STRING                       189
+# define ASN1_F_C2I_ASN1_INTEGER                          194
+# define ASN1_F_C2I_ASN1_OBJECT                           196
+# define ASN1_F_C2I_IBUF                                  226
+# define ASN1_F_C2I_UINT64_INT                            101
+# define ASN1_F_COLLECT_DATA                              140
+# define ASN1_F_D2I_ASN1_OBJECT                           147
+# define ASN1_F_D2I_ASN1_UINTEGER                         150
+# define ASN1_F_D2I_AUTOPRIVATEKEY                        207
+# define ASN1_F_D2I_PRIVATEKEY                            154
+# define ASN1_F_D2I_PUBLICKEY                             155
+# define ASN1_F_DO_TCREATE                                222
+# define ASN1_F_I2D_ASN1_BIO_STREAM                       211
+# define ASN1_F_I2D_DSA_PUBKEY                            161
+# define ASN1_F_I2D_EC_PUBKEY                             181
+# define ASN1_F_I2D_PRIVATEKEY                            163
+# define ASN1_F_I2D_PUBLICKEY                             164
+# define ASN1_F_I2D_RSA_PUBKEY                            165
+# define ASN1_F_LONG_C2I                                  166
+# define ASN1_F_OID_MODULE_INIT                           174
+# define ASN1_F_PARSE_TAGGING                             182
+# define ASN1_F_PKCS5_PBE2_SET_IV                         167
+# define ASN1_F_PKCS5_PBE2_SET_SCRYPT                     231
+# define ASN1_F_PKCS5_PBE_SET                             202
+# define ASN1_F_PKCS5_PBE_SET0_ALGOR                      215
+# define ASN1_F_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SET                          219
+# define ASN1_F_PKCS5_SCRYPT_SET                          232
+# define ASN1_F_SMIME_READ_ASN1                           212
+# define ASN1_F_SMIME_TEXT                                213
+# define ASN1_F_STBL_MODULE_INIT                          223
+# define ASN1_F_UINT32_C2I                                105
+# define ASN1_F_UINT64_C2I                                112
+# define ASN1_F_X509_CRL_ADD0_REVOKED                     169
+# define ASN1_F_X509_INFO_NEW                             170
+# define ASN1_F_X509_NAME_ENCODE                          203
+# define ASN1_F_X509_NAME_EX_D2I                          158
+# define ASN1_F_X509_NAME_EX_NEW                          171
+# define ASN1_F_X509_PKEY_NEW                             173
+
+/* Reason codes. */
+# define ASN1_R_ADDING_OBJECT                             171
+# define ASN1_R_ASN1_PARSE_ERROR                          203
+# define ASN1_R_ASN1_SIG_PARSE_ERROR                      204
+# define ASN1_R_AUX_ERROR                                 100
+# define ASN1_R_BAD_OBJECT_HEADER                         102
+# define ASN1_R_BMPSTRING_IS_WRONG_LENGTH                 214
+# define ASN1_R_BN_LIB                                    105
+# define ASN1_R_BOOLEAN_IS_WRONG_LENGTH                   106
+# define ASN1_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL                          107
+# define ASN1_R_CIPHER_HAS_NO_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER           108
+# define ASN1_R_CONTEXT_NOT_INITIALISED                   217
+# define ASN1_R_DATA_IS_WRONG                             109
+# define ASN1_R_DECODE_ERROR                              110
+# define ASN1_R_DEPTH_EXCEEDED                            174
+# define ASN1_R_DIGEST_AND_KEY_TYPE_NOT_SUPPORTED         198
+# define ASN1_R_ENCODE_ERROR                              112
+# define ASN1_R_ERROR_GETTING_TIME                        173
+# define ASN1_R_ERROR_LOADING_SECTION                     172
+# define ASN1_R_ERROR_SETTING_CIPHER_PARAMS               114
+# define ASN1_R_EXPECTING_AN_INTEGER                      115
+# define ASN1_R_EXPECTING_AN_OBJECT                       116
+# define ASN1_R_EXPLICIT_LENGTH_MISMATCH                  119
+# define ASN1_R_EXPLICIT_TAG_NOT_CONSTRUCTED              120
+# define ASN1_R_FIELD_MISSING                             121
+# define ASN1_R_FIRST_NUM_TOO_LARGE                       122
+# define ASN1_R_HEADER_TOO_LONG                           123
+# define ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_BITSTRING_FORMAT                  175
+# define ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_BOOLEAN                           176
+# define ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_CHARACTERS                        124
+# define ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_FORMAT                            177
+# define ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_HEX                               178
+# define ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_IMPLICIT_TAG                      179
+# define ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_INTEGER                           180
+# define ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_NEGATIVE_VALUE                    226
+# define ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_NESTED_TAGGING                    181
+# define ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_NULL                              125
+# define ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_NULL_VALUE                        182
+# define ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_OBJECT                            183
+# define ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_OPTIONAL_ANY                      126
+# define ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_OPTIONS_ON_ITEM_TEMPLATE          170
+# define ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING                           221
+# define ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_TAGGED_ANY                        127
+# define ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_TIME_VALUE                        184
+# define ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_ZERO_CONTENT                      222
+# define ASN1_R_INTEGER_NOT_ASCII_FORMAT                  185
+# define ASN1_R_INTEGER_TOO_LARGE_FOR_LONG                128
+# define ASN1_R_INVALID_BIT_STRING_BITS_LEFT              220
+# define ASN1_R_INVALID_BMPSTRING_LENGTH                  129
+# define ASN1_R_INVALID_DIGIT                             130
+# define ASN1_R_INVALID_MIME_TYPE                         205
+# define ASN1_R_INVALID_MODIFIER                          186
+# define ASN1_R_INVALID_NUMBER                            187
+# define ASN1_R_INVALID_OBJECT_ENCODING                   216
+# define ASN1_R_INVALID_SCRYPT_PARAMETERS                 227
+# define ASN1_R_INVALID_SEPARATOR                         131
+# define ASN1_R_INVALID_STRING_TABLE_VALUE                218
+# define ASN1_R_INVALID_UNIVERSALSTRING_LENGTH            133
+# define ASN1_R_INVALID_UTF8STRING                        134
+# define ASN1_R_INVALID_VALUE                             219
+# define ASN1_R_LIST_ERROR                                188
+# define ASN1_R_MIME_NO_CONTENT_TYPE                      206
+# define ASN1_R_MIME_PARSE_ERROR                          207
+# define ASN1_R_MIME_SIG_PARSE_ERROR                      208
+# define ASN1_R_MISSING_EOC                               137
+# define ASN1_R_MISSING_SECOND_NUMBER                     138
+# define ASN1_R_MISSING_VALUE                             189
+# define ASN1_R_MSTRING_NOT_UNIVERSAL                     139
+# define ASN1_R_MSTRING_WRONG_TAG                         140
+# define ASN1_R_NESTED_ASN1_STRING                        197
+# define ASN1_R_NESTED_TOO_DEEP                           201
+# define ASN1_R_NON_HEX_CHARACTERS                        141
+# define ASN1_R_NOT_ASCII_FORMAT                          190
+# define ASN1_R_NOT_ENOUGH_DATA                           142
+# define ASN1_R_NO_CONTENT_TYPE                           209
+# define ASN1_R_NO_MATCHING_CHOICE_TYPE                   143
+# define ASN1_R_NO_MULTIPART_BODY_FAILURE                 210
+# define ASN1_R_NO_MULTIPART_BOUNDARY                     211
+# define ASN1_R_NO_SIG_CONTENT_TYPE                       212
+# define ASN1_R_NULL_IS_WRONG_LENGTH                      144
+# define ASN1_R_OBJECT_NOT_ASCII_FORMAT                   191
+# define ASN1_R_ODD_NUMBER_OF_CHARS                       145
+# define ASN1_R_SECOND_NUMBER_TOO_LARGE                   147
+# define ASN1_R_SEQUENCE_LENGTH_MISMATCH                  148
+# define ASN1_R_SEQUENCE_NOT_CONSTRUCTED                  149
+# define ASN1_R_SEQUENCE_OR_SET_NEEDS_CONFIG              192
+# define ASN1_R_SHORT_LINE                                150
+# define ASN1_R_SIG_INVALID_MIME_TYPE                     213
+# define ASN1_R_STREAMING_NOT_SUPPORTED                   202
+# define ASN1_R_STRING_TOO_LONG                           151
+# define ASN1_R_STRING_TOO_SHORT                          152
+# define ASN1_R_THE_ASN1_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER_IS_NOT_KNOWN_FOR_THIS_MD 154
+# define ASN1_R_TIME_NOT_ASCII_FORMAT                     193
+# define ASN1_R_TOO_LARGE                                 223
+# define ASN1_R_TOO_LONG                                  155
+# define ASN1_R_TOO_SMALL                                 224
+# define ASN1_R_TYPE_NOT_CONSTRUCTED                      156
+# define ASN1_R_TYPE_NOT_PRIMITIVE                        195
+# define ASN1_R_UNEXPECTED_EOC                            159
+# define ASN1_R_UNIVERSALSTRING_IS_WRONG_LENGTH           215
+# define ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_FORMAT                            160
+# define ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM          161
+# define ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_OBJECT_TYPE                       162
+# define ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE                   163
+# define ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM               199
+# define ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_TAG                               194
+# define ASN1_R_UNSUPPORTED_ANY_DEFINED_BY_TYPE           164
+# define ASN1_R_UNSUPPORTED_PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE               167
+# define ASN1_R_UNSUPPORTED_TYPE                          196
+# define ASN1_R_WRONG_INTEGER_TYPE                        225
+# define ASN1_R_WRONG_PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE                     200
+# define ASN1_R_WRONG_TAG                                 168
+
+# ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+# endif
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/asn1t.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/asn1t.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a524829
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/asn1t.h
@@ -0,0 +1,929 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_ASN1T_H
+# define HEADER_ASN1T_H
+
+# include <stddef.h>
+# include <openssl/e_os2.h>
+# include <openssl/asn1.h>
+
+# ifdef OPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBCRYPTO
+#  undef OPENSSL_EXTERN
+#  define OPENSSL_EXTERN OPENSSL_EXPORT
+# endif
+
+/* ASN1 template defines, structures and functions */
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION
+
+/* Macro to obtain ASN1_ADB pointer from a type (only used internally) */
+#  define ASN1_ADB_ptr(iptr) ((const ASN1_ADB *)(iptr))
+
+/* Macros for start and end of ASN1_ITEM definition */
+
+#  define ASN1_ITEM_start(itname) \
+        OPENSSL_GLOBAL const ASN1_ITEM itname##_it = {
+
+#  define static_ASN1_ITEM_start(itname) \
+        static const ASN1_ITEM itname##_it = {
+
+#  define ASN1_ITEM_end(itname)                 \
+                };
+
+# else
+
+/* Macro to obtain ASN1_ADB pointer from a type (only used internally) */
+#  define ASN1_ADB_ptr(iptr) ((const ASN1_ADB *)(iptr()))
+
+/* Macros for start and end of ASN1_ITEM definition */
+
+#  define ASN1_ITEM_start(itname) \
+        const ASN1_ITEM * itname##_it(void) \
+        { \
+                static const ASN1_ITEM local_it = {
+
+#  define static_ASN1_ITEM_start(itname) \
+        static ASN1_ITEM_start(itname)
+
+#  define ASN1_ITEM_end(itname) \
+                }; \
+        return &local_it; \
+        }
+
+# endif
+
+/* Macros to aid ASN1 template writing */
+
+# define ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE(tname) \
+        static const ASN1_TEMPLATE tname##_item_tt
+
+# define ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE_END(tname) \
+        ;\
+        ASN1_ITEM_start(tname) \
+                ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE,\
+                -1,\
+                &tname##_item_tt,\
+                0,\
+                NULL,\
+                0,\
+                #tname \
+        ASN1_ITEM_end(tname)
+# define static_ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE_END(tname) \
+        ;\
+        static_ASN1_ITEM_start(tname) \
+                ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE,\
+                -1,\
+                &tname##_item_tt,\
+                0,\
+                NULL,\
+                0,\
+                #tname \
+        ASN1_ITEM_end(tname)
+
+/* This is a ASN1 type which just embeds a template */
+
+/*-
+ * This pair helps declare a SEQUENCE. We can do:
+ *
+ *      ASN1_SEQUENCE(stname) = {
+ *              ... SEQUENCE components ...
+ *      } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(stname)
+ *
+ *      This will produce an ASN1_ITEM called stname_it
+ *      for a structure called stname.
+ *
+ *      If you want the same structure but a different
+ *      name then use:
+ *
+ *      ASN1_SEQUENCE(itname) = {
+ *              ... SEQUENCE components ...
+ *      } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_name(stname, itname)
+ *
+ *      This will create an item called itname_it using
+ *      a structure called stname.
+ */
+
+# define ASN1_SEQUENCE(tname) \
+        static const ASN1_TEMPLATE tname##_seq_tt[]
+
+# define ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(stname) ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_name(stname, stname)
+
+# define static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(stname) static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_name(stname, stname)
+
+# define ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_name(stname, tname) \
+        ;\
+        ASN1_ITEM_start(tname) \
+                ASN1_ITYPE_SEQUENCE,\
+                V_ASN1_SEQUENCE,\
+                tname##_seq_tt,\
+                sizeof(tname##_seq_tt) / sizeof(ASN1_TEMPLATE),\
+                NULL,\
+                sizeof(stname),\
+                #stname \
+        ASN1_ITEM_end(tname)
+
+# define static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_name(stname, tname) \
+        ;\
+        static_ASN1_ITEM_start(tname) \
+                ASN1_ITYPE_SEQUENCE,\
+                V_ASN1_SEQUENCE,\
+                tname##_seq_tt,\
+                sizeof(tname##_seq_tt) / sizeof(ASN1_TEMPLATE),\
+                NULL,\
+                sizeof(stname),\
+                #stname \
+        ASN1_ITEM_end(tname)
+
+# define ASN1_NDEF_SEQUENCE(tname) \
+        ASN1_SEQUENCE(tname)
+
+# define ASN1_NDEF_SEQUENCE_cb(tname, cb) \
+        ASN1_SEQUENCE_cb(tname, cb)
+
+# define ASN1_SEQUENCE_cb(tname, cb) \
+        static const ASN1_AUX tname##_aux = {NULL, 0, 0, 0, cb, 0}; \
+        ASN1_SEQUENCE(tname)
+
+# define ASN1_BROKEN_SEQUENCE(tname) \
+        static const ASN1_AUX tname##_aux = {NULL, ASN1_AFLG_BROKEN, 0, 0, 0, 0}; \
+        ASN1_SEQUENCE(tname)
+
+# define ASN1_SEQUENCE_ref(tname, cb) \
+        static const ASN1_AUX tname##_aux = {NULL, ASN1_AFLG_REFCOUNT, offsetof(tname, references), offsetof(tname, lock), cb, 0}; \
+        ASN1_SEQUENCE(tname)
+
+# define ASN1_SEQUENCE_enc(tname, enc, cb) \
+        static const ASN1_AUX tname##_aux = {NULL, ASN1_AFLG_ENCODING, 0, 0, cb, offsetof(tname, enc)}; \
+        ASN1_SEQUENCE(tname)
+
+# define ASN1_NDEF_SEQUENCE_END(tname) \
+        ;\
+        ASN1_ITEM_start(tname) \
+                ASN1_ITYPE_NDEF_SEQUENCE,\
+                V_ASN1_SEQUENCE,\
+                tname##_seq_tt,\
+                sizeof(tname##_seq_tt) / sizeof(ASN1_TEMPLATE),\
+                NULL,\
+                sizeof(tname),\
+                #tname \
+        ASN1_ITEM_end(tname)
+# define static_ASN1_NDEF_SEQUENCE_END(tname) \
+        ;\
+        static_ASN1_ITEM_start(tname) \
+                ASN1_ITYPE_NDEF_SEQUENCE,\
+                V_ASN1_SEQUENCE,\
+                tname##_seq_tt,\
+                sizeof(tname##_seq_tt) / sizeof(ASN1_TEMPLATE),\
+                NULL,\
+                sizeof(tname),\
+                #tname \
+        ASN1_ITEM_end(tname)
+
+# define ASN1_BROKEN_SEQUENCE_END(stname) ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_ref(stname, stname)
+# define static_ASN1_BROKEN_SEQUENCE_END(stname) \
+        static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_ref(stname, stname)
+
+# define ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_enc(stname, tname) ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_ref(stname, tname)
+
+# define ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_cb(stname, tname) ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_ref(stname, tname)
+# define static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_cb(stname, tname) static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_ref(stname, tname)
+
+# define ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_ref(stname, tname) \
+        ;\
+        ASN1_ITEM_start(tname) \
+                ASN1_ITYPE_SEQUENCE,\
+                V_ASN1_SEQUENCE,\
+                tname##_seq_tt,\
+                sizeof(tname##_seq_tt) / sizeof(ASN1_TEMPLATE),\
+                &tname##_aux,\
+                sizeof(stname),\
+                #stname \
+        ASN1_ITEM_end(tname)
+# define static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_ref(stname, tname) \
+        ;\
+        static_ASN1_ITEM_start(tname) \
+                ASN1_ITYPE_SEQUENCE,\
+                V_ASN1_SEQUENCE,\
+                tname##_seq_tt,\
+                sizeof(tname##_seq_tt) / sizeof(ASN1_TEMPLATE),\
+                &tname##_aux,\
+                sizeof(stname),\
+                #stname \
+        ASN1_ITEM_end(tname)
+
+# define ASN1_NDEF_SEQUENCE_END_cb(stname, tname) \
+        ;\
+        ASN1_ITEM_start(tname) \
+                ASN1_ITYPE_NDEF_SEQUENCE,\
+                V_ASN1_SEQUENCE,\
+                tname##_seq_tt,\
+                sizeof(tname##_seq_tt) / sizeof(ASN1_TEMPLATE),\
+                &tname##_aux,\
+                sizeof(stname),\
+                #stname \
+        ASN1_ITEM_end(tname)
+
+/*-
+ * This pair helps declare a CHOICE type. We can do:
+ *
+ *      ASN1_CHOICE(chname) = {
+ *              ... CHOICE options ...
+ *      ASN1_CHOICE_END(chname)
+ *
+ *      This will produce an ASN1_ITEM called chname_it
+ *      for a structure called chname. The structure
+ *      definition must look like this:
+ *      typedef struct {
+ *              int type;
+ *              union {
+ *                      ASN1_SOMETHING *opt1;
+ *                      ASN1_SOMEOTHER *opt2;
+ *              } value;
+ *      } chname;
+ *
+ *      the name of the selector must be 'type'.
+ *      to use an alternative selector name use the
+ *      ASN1_CHOICE_END_selector() version.
+ */
+
+# define ASN1_CHOICE(tname) \
+        static const ASN1_TEMPLATE tname##_ch_tt[]
+
+# define ASN1_CHOICE_cb(tname, cb) \
+        static const ASN1_AUX tname##_aux = {NULL, 0, 0, 0, cb, 0}; \
+        ASN1_CHOICE(tname)
+
+# define ASN1_CHOICE_END(stname) ASN1_CHOICE_END_name(stname, stname)
+
+# define static_ASN1_CHOICE_END(stname) static_ASN1_CHOICE_END_name(stname, stname)
+
+# define ASN1_CHOICE_END_name(stname, tname) ASN1_CHOICE_END_selector(stname, tname, type)
+
+# define static_ASN1_CHOICE_END_name(stname, tname) static_ASN1_CHOICE_END_selector(stname, tname, type)
+
+# define ASN1_CHOICE_END_selector(stname, tname, selname) \
+        ;\
+        ASN1_ITEM_start(tname) \
+                ASN1_ITYPE_CHOICE,\
+                offsetof(stname,selname) ,\
+                tname##_ch_tt,\
+                sizeof(tname##_ch_tt) / sizeof(ASN1_TEMPLATE),\
+                NULL,\
+                sizeof(stname),\
+                #stname \
+        ASN1_ITEM_end(tname)
+
+# define static_ASN1_CHOICE_END_selector(stname, tname, selname) \
+        ;\
+        static_ASN1_ITEM_start(tname) \
+                ASN1_ITYPE_CHOICE,\
+                offsetof(stname,selname) ,\
+                tname##_ch_tt,\
+                sizeof(tname##_ch_tt) / sizeof(ASN1_TEMPLATE),\
+                NULL,\
+                sizeof(stname),\
+                #stname \
+        ASN1_ITEM_end(tname)
+
+# define ASN1_CHOICE_END_cb(stname, tname, selname) \
+        ;\
+        ASN1_ITEM_start(tname) \
+                ASN1_ITYPE_CHOICE,\
+                offsetof(stname,selname) ,\
+                tname##_ch_tt,\
+                sizeof(tname##_ch_tt) / sizeof(ASN1_TEMPLATE),\
+                &tname##_aux,\
+                sizeof(stname),\
+                #stname \
+        ASN1_ITEM_end(tname)
+
+/* This helps with the template wrapper form of ASN1_ITEM */
+
+# define ASN1_EX_TEMPLATE_TYPE(flags, tag, name, type) { \
+        (flags), (tag), 0,\
+        #name, ASN1_ITEM_ref(type) }
+
+/* These help with SEQUENCE or CHOICE components */
+
+/* used to declare other types */
+
+# define ASN1_EX_TYPE(flags, tag, stname, field, type) { \
+        (flags), (tag), offsetof(stname, field),\
+        #field, ASN1_ITEM_ref(type) }
+
+/* implicit and explicit helper macros */
+
+# define ASN1_IMP_EX(stname, field, type, tag, ex) \
+                ASN1_EX_TYPE(ASN1_TFLG_IMPLICIT | ex, tag, stname, field, type)
+
+# define ASN1_EXP_EX(stname, field, type, tag, ex) \
+                ASN1_EX_TYPE(ASN1_TFLG_EXPLICIT | ex, tag, stname, field, type)
+
+/* Any defined by macros: the field used is in the table itself */
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION
+#  define ASN1_ADB_OBJECT(tblname) { ASN1_TFLG_ADB_OID, -1, 0, #tblname, (const ASN1_ITEM *)&(tblname##_adb) }
+#  define ASN1_ADB_INTEGER(tblname) { ASN1_TFLG_ADB_INT, -1, 0, #tblname, (const ASN1_ITEM *)&(tblname##_adb) }
+# else
+#  define ASN1_ADB_OBJECT(tblname) { ASN1_TFLG_ADB_OID, -1, 0, #tblname, tblname##_adb }
+#  define ASN1_ADB_INTEGER(tblname) { ASN1_TFLG_ADB_INT, -1, 0, #tblname, tblname##_adb }
+# endif
+/* Plain simple type */
+# define ASN1_SIMPLE(stname, field, type) ASN1_EX_TYPE(0,0, stname, field, type)
+/* Embedded simple type */
+# define ASN1_EMBED(stname, field, type) ASN1_EX_TYPE(ASN1_TFLG_EMBED,0, stname, field, type)
+
+/* OPTIONAL simple type */
+# define ASN1_OPT(stname, field, type) ASN1_EX_TYPE(ASN1_TFLG_OPTIONAL, 0, stname, field, type)
+# define ASN1_OPT_EMBED(stname, field, type) ASN1_EX_TYPE(ASN1_TFLG_OPTIONAL|ASN1_TFLG_EMBED, 0, stname, field, type)
+
+/* IMPLICIT tagged simple type */
+# define ASN1_IMP(stname, field, type, tag) ASN1_IMP_EX(stname, field, type, tag, 0)
+# define ASN1_IMP_EMBED(stname, field, type, tag) ASN1_IMP_EX(stname, field, type, tag, ASN1_TFLG_EMBED)
+
+/* IMPLICIT tagged OPTIONAL simple type */
+# define ASN1_IMP_OPT(stname, field, type, tag) ASN1_IMP_EX(stname, field, type, tag, ASN1_TFLG_OPTIONAL)
+# define ASN1_IMP_OPT_EMBED(stname, field, type, tag) ASN1_IMP_EX(stname, field, type, tag, ASN1_TFLG_OPTIONAL|ASN1_TFLG_EMBED)
+
+/* Same as above but EXPLICIT */
+
+# define ASN1_EXP(stname, field, type, tag) ASN1_EXP_EX(stname, field, type, tag, 0)
+# define ASN1_EXP_EMBED(stname, field, type, tag) ASN1_EXP_EX(stname, field, type, tag, ASN1_TFLG_EMBED)
+# define ASN1_EXP_OPT(stname, field, type, tag) ASN1_EXP_EX(stname, field, type, tag, ASN1_TFLG_OPTIONAL)
+# define ASN1_EXP_OPT_EMBED(stname, field, type, tag) ASN1_EXP_EX(stname, field, type, tag, ASN1_TFLG_OPTIONAL|ASN1_TFLG_EMBED)
+
+/* SEQUENCE OF type */
+# define ASN1_SEQUENCE_OF(stname, field, type) \
+                ASN1_EX_TYPE(ASN1_TFLG_SEQUENCE_OF, 0, stname, field, type)
+
+/* OPTIONAL SEQUENCE OF */
+# define ASN1_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(stname, field, type) \
+                ASN1_EX_TYPE(ASN1_TFLG_SEQUENCE_OF|ASN1_TFLG_OPTIONAL, 0, stname, field, type)
+
+/* Same as above but for SET OF */
+
+# define ASN1_SET_OF(stname, field, type) \
+                ASN1_EX_TYPE(ASN1_TFLG_SET_OF, 0, stname, field, type)
+
+# define ASN1_SET_OF_OPT(stname, field, type) \
+                ASN1_EX_TYPE(ASN1_TFLG_SET_OF|ASN1_TFLG_OPTIONAL, 0, stname, field, type)
+
+/* Finally compound types of SEQUENCE, SET, IMPLICIT, EXPLICIT and OPTIONAL */
+
+# define ASN1_IMP_SET_OF(stname, field, type, tag) \
+                        ASN1_IMP_EX(stname, field, type, tag, ASN1_TFLG_SET_OF)
+
+# define ASN1_EXP_SET_OF(stname, field, type, tag) \
+                        ASN1_EXP_EX(stname, field, type, tag, ASN1_TFLG_SET_OF)
+
+# define ASN1_IMP_SET_OF_OPT(stname, field, type, tag) \
+                        ASN1_IMP_EX(stname, field, type, tag, ASN1_TFLG_SET_OF|ASN1_TFLG_OPTIONAL)
+
+# define ASN1_EXP_SET_OF_OPT(stname, field, type, tag) \
+                        ASN1_EXP_EX(stname, field, type, tag, ASN1_TFLG_SET_OF|ASN1_TFLG_OPTIONAL)
+
+# define ASN1_IMP_SEQUENCE_OF(stname, field, type, tag) \
+                        ASN1_IMP_EX(stname, field, type, tag, ASN1_TFLG_SEQUENCE_OF)
+
+# define ASN1_IMP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(stname, field, type, tag) \
+                        ASN1_IMP_EX(stname, field, type, tag, ASN1_TFLG_SEQUENCE_OF|ASN1_TFLG_OPTIONAL)
+
+# define ASN1_EXP_SEQUENCE_OF(stname, field, type, tag) \
+                        ASN1_EXP_EX(stname, field, type, tag, ASN1_TFLG_SEQUENCE_OF)
+
+# define ASN1_EXP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(stname, field, type, tag) \
+                        ASN1_EXP_EX(stname, field, type, tag, ASN1_TFLG_SEQUENCE_OF|ASN1_TFLG_OPTIONAL)
+
+/* EXPLICIT using indefinite length constructed form */
+# define ASN1_NDEF_EXP(stname, field, type, tag) \
+                        ASN1_EXP_EX(stname, field, type, tag, ASN1_TFLG_NDEF)
+
+/* EXPLICIT OPTIONAL using indefinite length constructed form */
+# define ASN1_NDEF_EXP_OPT(stname, field, type, tag) \
+                        ASN1_EXP_EX(stname, field, type, tag, ASN1_TFLG_OPTIONAL|ASN1_TFLG_NDEF)
+
+/* Macros for the ASN1_ADB structure */
+
+# define ASN1_ADB(name) \
+        static const ASN1_ADB_TABLE name##_adbtbl[]
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION
+
+#  define ASN1_ADB_END(name, flags, field, adb_cb, def, none) \
+        ;\
+        static const ASN1_ADB name##_adb = {\
+                flags,\
+                offsetof(name, field),\
+                adb_cb,\
+                name##_adbtbl,\
+                sizeof(name##_adbtbl) / sizeof(ASN1_ADB_TABLE),\
+                def,\
+                none\
+        }
+
+# else
+
+#  define ASN1_ADB_END(name, flags, field, adb_cb, def, none) \
+        ;\
+        static const ASN1_ITEM *name##_adb(void) \
+        { \
+        static const ASN1_ADB internal_adb = \
+                {\
+                flags,\
+                offsetof(name, field),\
+                adb_cb,\
+                name##_adbtbl,\
+                sizeof(name##_adbtbl) / sizeof(ASN1_ADB_TABLE),\
+                def,\
+                none\
+                }; \
+                return (const ASN1_ITEM *) &internal_adb; \
+        } \
+        void dummy_function(void)
+
+# endif
+
+# define ADB_ENTRY(val, template) {val, template}
+
+# define ASN1_ADB_TEMPLATE(name) \
+        static const ASN1_TEMPLATE name##_tt
+
+/*
+ * This is the ASN1 template structure that defines a wrapper round the
+ * actual type. It determines the actual position of the field in the value
+ * structure, various flags such as OPTIONAL and the field name.
+ */
+
+struct ASN1_TEMPLATE_st {
+    unsigned long flags;        /* Various flags */
+    long tag;                   /* tag, not used if no tagging */
+    unsigned long offset;       /* Offset of this field in structure */
+    const char *field_name;     /* Field name */
+    ASN1_ITEM_EXP *item;        /* Relevant ASN1_ITEM or ASN1_ADB */
+};
+
+/* Macro to extract ASN1_ITEM and ASN1_ADB pointer from ASN1_TEMPLATE */
+
+# define ASN1_TEMPLATE_item(t) (t->item_ptr)
+# define ASN1_TEMPLATE_adb(t) (t->item_ptr)
+
+typedef struct ASN1_ADB_TABLE_st ASN1_ADB_TABLE;
+typedef struct ASN1_ADB_st ASN1_ADB;
+
+struct ASN1_ADB_st {
+    unsigned long flags;        /* Various flags */
+    unsigned long offset;       /* Offset of selector field */
+    int (*adb_cb)(long *psel);  /* Application callback */
+    const ASN1_ADB_TABLE *tbl;  /* Table of possible types */
+    long tblcount;              /* Number of entries in tbl */
+    const ASN1_TEMPLATE *default_tt; /* Type to use if no match */
+    const ASN1_TEMPLATE *null_tt; /* Type to use if selector is NULL */
+};
+
+struct ASN1_ADB_TABLE_st {
+    long value;                 /* NID for an object or value for an int */
+    const ASN1_TEMPLATE tt;     /* item for this value */
+};
+
+/* template flags */
+
+/* Field is optional */
+# define ASN1_TFLG_OPTIONAL      (0x1)
+
+/* Field is a SET OF */
+# define ASN1_TFLG_SET_OF        (0x1 << 1)
+
+/* Field is a SEQUENCE OF */
+# define ASN1_TFLG_SEQUENCE_OF   (0x2 << 1)
+
+/*
+ * Special case: this refers to a SET OF that will be sorted into DER order
+ * when encoded *and* the corresponding STACK will be modified to match the
+ * new order.
+ */
+# define ASN1_TFLG_SET_ORDER     (0x3 << 1)
+
+/* Mask for SET OF or SEQUENCE OF */
+# define ASN1_TFLG_SK_MASK       (0x3 << 1)
+
+/*
+ * These flags mean the tag should be taken from the tag field. If EXPLICIT
+ * then the underlying type is used for the inner tag.
+ */
+
+/* IMPLICIT tagging */
+# define ASN1_TFLG_IMPTAG        (0x1 << 3)
+
+/* EXPLICIT tagging, inner tag from underlying type */
+# define ASN1_TFLG_EXPTAG        (0x2 << 3)
+
+# define ASN1_TFLG_TAG_MASK      (0x3 << 3)
+
+/* context specific IMPLICIT */
+# define ASN1_TFLG_IMPLICIT      ASN1_TFLG_IMPTAG|ASN1_TFLG_CONTEXT
+
+/* context specific EXPLICIT */
+# define ASN1_TFLG_EXPLICIT      ASN1_TFLG_EXPTAG|ASN1_TFLG_CONTEXT
+
+/*
+ * If tagging is in force these determine the type of tag to use. Otherwise
+ * the tag is determined by the underlying type. These values reflect the
+ * actual octet format.
+ */
+
+/* Universal tag */
+# define ASN1_TFLG_UNIVERSAL     (0x0<<6)
+/* Application tag */
+# define ASN1_TFLG_APPLICATION   (0x1<<6)
+/* Context specific tag */
+# define ASN1_TFLG_CONTEXT       (0x2<<6)
+/* Private tag */
+# define ASN1_TFLG_PRIVATE       (0x3<<6)
+
+# define ASN1_TFLG_TAG_CLASS     (0x3<<6)
+
+/*
+ * These are for ANY DEFINED BY type. In this case the 'item' field points to
+ * an ASN1_ADB structure which contains a table of values to decode the
+ * relevant type
+ */
+
+# define ASN1_TFLG_ADB_MASK      (0x3<<8)
+
+# define ASN1_TFLG_ADB_OID       (0x1<<8)
+
+# define ASN1_TFLG_ADB_INT       (0x1<<9)
+
+/*
+ * This flag when present in a SEQUENCE OF, SET OF or EXPLICIT causes
+ * indefinite length constructed encoding to be used if required.
+ */
+
+# define ASN1_TFLG_NDEF          (0x1<<11)
+
+/* Field is embedded and not a pointer */
+# define ASN1_TFLG_EMBED         (0x1 << 12)
+
+/* This is the actual ASN1 item itself */
+
+struct ASN1_ITEM_st {
+    char itype;                 /* The item type, primitive, SEQUENCE, CHOICE
+                                 * or extern */
+    long utype;                 /* underlying type */
+    const ASN1_TEMPLATE *templates; /* If SEQUENCE or CHOICE this contains
+                                     * the contents */
+    long tcount;                /* Number of templates if SEQUENCE or CHOICE */
+    const void *funcs;          /* functions that handle this type */
+    long size;                  /* Structure size (usually) */
+    const char *sname;          /* Structure name */
+};
+
+/*-
+ * These are values for the itype field and
+ * determine how the type is interpreted.
+ *
+ * For PRIMITIVE types the underlying type
+ * determines the behaviour if items is NULL.
+ *
+ * Otherwise templates must contain a single
+ * template and the type is treated in the
+ * same way as the type specified in the template.
+ *
+ * For SEQUENCE types the templates field points
+ * to the members, the size field is the
+ * structure size.
+ *
+ * For CHOICE types the templates field points
+ * to each possible member (typically a union)
+ * and the 'size' field is the offset of the
+ * selector.
+ *
+ * The 'funcs' field is used for application
+ * specific functions.
+ *
+ * The EXTERN type uses a new style d2i/i2d.
+ * The new style should be used where possible
+ * because it avoids things like the d2i IMPLICIT
+ * hack.
+ *
+ * MSTRING is a multiple string type, it is used
+ * for a CHOICE of character strings where the
+ * actual strings all occupy an ASN1_STRING
+ * structure. In this case the 'utype' field
+ * has a special meaning, it is used as a mask
+ * of acceptable types using the B_ASN1 constants.
+ *
+ * NDEF_SEQUENCE is the same as SEQUENCE except
+ * that it will use indefinite length constructed
+ * encoding if requested.
+ *
+ */
+
+# define ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE            0x0
+
+# define ASN1_ITYPE_SEQUENCE             0x1
+
+# define ASN1_ITYPE_CHOICE               0x2
+
+# define ASN1_ITYPE_EXTERN               0x4
+
+# define ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING              0x5
+
+# define ASN1_ITYPE_NDEF_SEQUENCE        0x6
+
+/*
+ * Cache for ASN1 tag and length, so we don't keep re-reading it for things
+ * like CHOICE
+ */
+
+struct ASN1_TLC_st {
+    char valid;                 /* Values below are valid */
+    int ret;                    /* return value */
+    long plen;                  /* length */
+    int ptag;                   /* class value */
+    int pclass;                 /* class value */
+    int hdrlen;                 /* header length */
+};
+
+/* Typedefs for ASN1 function pointers */
+typedef int ASN1_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len,
+                        const ASN1_ITEM *it, int tag, int aclass, char opt,
+                        ASN1_TLC *ctx);
+
+typedef int ASN1_ex_i2d(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out,
+                        const ASN1_ITEM *it, int tag, int aclass);
+typedef int ASN1_ex_new_func(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
+typedef void ASN1_ex_free_func(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
+
+typedef int ASN1_ex_print_func(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE **pval,
+                               int indent, const char *fname,
+                               const ASN1_PCTX *pctx);
+
+typedef int ASN1_primitive_i2c(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char *cont,
+                               int *putype, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
+typedef int ASN1_primitive_c2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char *cont,
+                               int len, int utype, char *free_cont,
+                               const ASN1_ITEM *it);
+typedef int ASN1_primitive_print(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE **pval,
+                                 const ASN1_ITEM *it, int indent,
+                                 const ASN1_PCTX *pctx);
+
+typedef struct ASN1_EXTERN_FUNCS_st {
+    void *app_data;
+    ASN1_ex_new_func *asn1_ex_new;
+    ASN1_ex_free_func *asn1_ex_free;
+    ASN1_ex_free_func *asn1_ex_clear;
+    ASN1_ex_d2i *asn1_ex_d2i;
+    ASN1_ex_i2d *asn1_ex_i2d;
+    ASN1_ex_print_func *asn1_ex_print;
+} ASN1_EXTERN_FUNCS;
+
+typedef struct ASN1_PRIMITIVE_FUNCS_st {
+    void *app_data;
+    unsigned long flags;
+    ASN1_ex_new_func *prim_new;
+    ASN1_ex_free_func *prim_free;
+    ASN1_ex_free_func *prim_clear;
+    ASN1_primitive_c2i *prim_c2i;
+    ASN1_primitive_i2c *prim_i2c;
+    ASN1_primitive_print *prim_print;
+} ASN1_PRIMITIVE_FUNCS;
+
+/*
+ * This is the ASN1_AUX structure: it handles various miscellaneous
+ * requirements. For example the use of reference counts and an informational
+ * callback. The "informational callback" is called at various points during
+ * the ASN1 encoding and decoding. It can be used to provide minor
+ * customisation of the structures used. This is most useful where the
+ * supplied routines *almost* do the right thing but need some extra help at
+ * a few points. If the callback returns zero then it is assumed a fatal
+ * error has occurred and the main operation should be abandoned. If major
+ * changes in the default behaviour are required then an external type is
+ * more appropriate.
+ */
+
+typedef int ASN1_aux_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **in, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+                        void *exarg);
+
+typedef struct ASN1_AUX_st {
+    void *app_data;
+    int flags;
+    int ref_offset;             /* Offset of reference value */
+    int ref_lock;               /* Lock type to use */
+    ASN1_aux_cb *asn1_cb;
+    int enc_offset;             /* Offset of ASN1_ENCODING structure */
+} ASN1_AUX;
+
+/* For print related callbacks exarg points to this structure */
+typedef struct ASN1_PRINT_ARG_st {
+    BIO *out;
+    int indent;
+    const ASN1_PCTX *pctx;
+} ASN1_PRINT_ARG;
+
+/* For streaming related callbacks exarg points to this structure */
+typedef struct ASN1_STREAM_ARG_st {
+    /* BIO to stream through */
+    BIO *out;
+    /* BIO with filters appended */
+    BIO *ndef_bio;
+    /* Streaming I/O boundary */
+    unsigned char **boundary;
+} ASN1_STREAM_ARG;
+
+/* Flags in ASN1_AUX */
+
+/* Use a reference count */
+# define ASN1_AFLG_REFCOUNT      1
+/* Save the encoding of structure (useful for signatures) */
+# define ASN1_AFLG_ENCODING      2
+/* The Sequence length is invalid */
+# define ASN1_AFLG_BROKEN        4
+
+/* operation values for asn1_cb */
+
+# define ASN1_OP_NEW_PRE         0
+# define ASN1_OP_NEW_POST        1
+# define ASN1_OP_FREE_PRE        2
+# define ASN1_OP_FREE_POST       3
+# define ASN1_OP_D2I_PRE         4
+# define ASN1_OP_D2I_POST        5
+# define ASN1_OP_I2D_PRE         6
+# define ASN1_OP_I2D_POST        7
+# define ASN1_OP_PRINT_PRE       8
+# define ASN1_OP_PRINT_POST      9
+# define ASN1_OP_STREAM_PRE      10
+# define ASN1_OP_STREAM_POST     11
+# define ASN1_OP_DETACHED_PRE    12
+# define ASN1_OP_DETACHED_POST   13
+
+/* Macro to implement a primitive type */
+# define IMPLEMENT_ASN1_TYPE(stname) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_TYPE_ex(stname, stname, 0)
+# define IMPLEMENT_ASN1_TYPE_ex(itname, vname, ex) \
+                                ASN1_ITEM_start(itname) \
+                                        ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE, V_##vname, NULL, 0, NULL, ex, #itname \
+                                ASN1_ITEM_end(itname)
+
+/* Macro to implement a multi string type */
+# define IMPLEMENT_ASN1_MSTRING(itname, mask) \
+                                ASN1_ITEM_start(itname) \
+                                        ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING, mask, NULL, 0, NULL, sizeof(ASN1_STRING), #itname \
+                                ASN1_ITEM_end(itname)
+
+# define IMPLEMENT_EXTERN_ASN1(sname, tag, fptrs) \
+        ASN1_ITEM_start(sname) \
+                ASN1_ITYPE_EXTERN, \
+                tag, \
+                NULL, \
+                0, \
+                &fptrs, \
+                0, \
+                #sname \
+        ASN1_ITEM_end(sname)
+
+/* Macro to implement standard functions in terms of ASN1_ITEM structures */
+
+# define IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(stname) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_fname(stname, stname, stname)
+
+# define IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_name(stname, itname) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_fname(stname, itname, itname)
+
+# define IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_ENCODE_name(stname, itname) \
+                        IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_ENCODE_fname(stname, itname, itname)
+
+# define IMPLEMENT_STATIC_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(stname) \
+                IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS_pfname(static, stname, stname, stname)
+
+# define IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(stname) \
+                IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS_fname(stname, stname, stname)
+
+# define IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS_pfname(pre, stname, itname, fname) \
+        pre stname *fname##_new(void) \
+        { \
+                return (stname *)ASN1_item_new(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(itname)); \
+        } \
+        pre void fname##_free(stname *a) \
+        { \
+                ASN1_item_free((ASN1_VALUE *)a, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(itname)); \
+        }
+
+# define IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS_fname(stname, itname, fname) \
+        stname *fname##_new(void) \
+        { \
+                return (stname *)ASN1_item_new(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(itname)); \
+        } \
+        void fname##_free(stname *a) \
+        { \
+                ASN1_item_free((ASN1_VALUE *)a, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(itname)); \
+        }
+
+# define IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_fname(stname, itname, fname) \
+        IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_fname(stname, itname, fname) \
+        IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS_fname(stname, itname, fname)
+
+# define IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_fname(stname, itname, fname) \
+        stname *d2i_##fname(stname **a, const unsigned char **in, long len) \
+        { \
+                return (stname *)ASN1_item_d2i((ASN1_VALUE **)a, in, len, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(itname));\
+        } \
+        int i2d_##fname(stname *a, unsigned char **out) \
+        { \
+                return ASN1_item_i2d((ASN1_VALUE *)a, out, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(itname));\
+        }
+
+# define IMPLEMENT_ASN1_NDEF_FUNCTION(stname) \
+        int i2d_##stname##_NDEF(stname *a, unsigned char **out) \
+        { \
+                return ASN1_item_ndef_i2d((ASN1_VALUE *)a, out, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(stname));\
+        }
+
+# define IMPLEMENT_STATIC_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS(stname) \
+        static stname *d2i_##stname(stname **a, \
+                                   const unsigned char **in, long len) \
+        { \
+                return (stname *)ASN1_item_d2i((ASN1_VALUE **)a, in, len, \
+                                               ASN1_ITEM_rptr(stname)); \
+        } \
+        static int i2d_##stname(stname *a, unsigned char **out) \
+        { \
+                return ASN1_item_i2d((ASN1_VALUE *)a, out, \
+                                     ASN1_ITEM_rptr(stname)); \
+        }
+
+/*
+ * This includes evil casts to remove const: they will go away when full ASN1
+ * constification is done.
+ */
+# define IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const_fname(stname, itname, fname) \
+        stname *d2i_##fname(stname **a, const unsigned char **in, long len) \
+        { \
+                return (stname *)ASN1_item_d2i((ASN1_VALUE **)a, in, len, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(itname));\
+        } \
+        int i2d_##fname(const stname *a, unsigned char **out) \
+        { \
+                return ASN1_item_i2d((ASN1_VALUE *)a, out, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(itname));\
+        }
+
+# define IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(stname) \
+        stname * stname##_dup(stname *x) \
+        { \
+        return ASN1_item_dup(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(stname), x); \
+        }
+
+# define IMPLEMENT_ASN1_PRINT_FUNCTION(stname) \
+        IMPLEMENT_ASN1_PRINT_FUNCTION_fname(stname, stname, stname)
+
+# define IMPLEMENT_ASN1_PRINT_FUNCTION_fname(stname, itname, fname) \
+        int fname##_print_ctx(BIO *out, stname *x, int indent, \
+                                                const ASN1_PCTX *pctx) \
+        { \
+                return ASN1_item_print(out, (ASN1_VALUE *)x, indent, \
+                        ASN1_ITEM_rptr(itname), pctx); \
+        }
+
+# define IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const(name) \
+                IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const_fname(name, name, name)
+
+# define IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const_fname(stname, itname, fname) \
+        IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const_fname(stname, itname, fname) \
+        IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS_fname(stname, itname, fname)
+
+/* external definitions for primitive types */
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(ASN1_BOOLEAN)
+DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(ASN1_TBOOLEAN)
+DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(ASN1_FBOOLEAN)
+DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(ASN1_SEQUENCE)
+DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CBIGNUM)
+DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(BIGNUM)
+DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(LONG)
+DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(ZLONG)
+
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(ASN1_VALUE)
+
+/* Functions used internally by the ASN1 code */
+
+int ASN1_item_ex_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
+void ASN1_item_ex_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
+
+int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len,
+                     const ASN1_ITEM *it, int tag, int aclass, char opt,
+                     ASN1_TLC *ctx);
+
+int ASN1_item_ex_i2d(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out,
+                     const ASN1_ITEM *it, int tag, int aclass);
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/async.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/async.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5b2e496
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/async.h
@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+#ifndef HEADER_ASYNC_H
+# define HEADER_ASYNC_H
+
+#if defined(_WIN32)
+# if defined(BASETYPES) || defined(_WINDEF_H)
+/* application has to include <windows.h> to use this */
+#define OSSL_ASYNC_FD       HANDLE
+#define OSSL_BAD_ASYNC_FD   INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE
+# endif
+#else
+#define OSSL_ASYNC_FD       int
+#define OSSL_BAD_ASYNC_FD   -1
+#endif
+
+
+# ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+# endif
+
+typedef struct async_job_st ASYNC_JOB;
+typedef struct async_wait_ctx_st ASYNC_WAIT_CTX;
+
+#define ASYNC_ERR      0
+#define ASYNC_NO_JOBS  1
+#define ASYNC_PAUSE    2
+#define ASYNC_FINISH   3
+
+int ASYNC_init_thread(size_t max_size, size_t init_size);
+void ASYNC_cleanup_thread(void);
+
+#ifdef OSSL_ASYNC_FD
+ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_new(void);
+void ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_free(ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *ctx);
+int ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_set_wait_fd(ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *ctx, const void *key,
+                               OSSL_ASYNC_FD fd,
+                               void *custom_data,
+                               void (*cleanup)(ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *, const void *,
+                                               OSSL_ASYNC_FD, void *));
+int ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_fd(ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *ctx, const void *key,
+                        OSSL_ASYNC_FD *fd, void **custom_data);
+int ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_all_fds(ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *ctx, OSSL_ASYNC_FD *fd,
+                               size_t *numfds);
+int ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_changed_fds(ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *ctx, OSSL_ASYNC_FD *addfd,
+                                   size_t *numaddfds, OSSL_ASYNC_FD *delfd,
+                                   size_t *numdelfds);
+int ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_clear_fd(ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *ctx, const void *key);
+#endif
+
+int ASYNC_is_capable(void);
+
+int ASYNC_start_job(ASYNC_JOB **job, ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *ctx, int *ret,
+                    int (*func)(void *), void *args, size_t size);
+int ASYNC_pause_job(void);
+
+ASYNC_JOB *ASYNC_get_current_job(void);
+ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *ASYNC_get_wait_ctx(ASYNC_JOB *job);
+void ASYNC_block_pause(void);
+void ASYNC_unblock_pause(void);
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+/*
+ * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
+ * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
+ */
+
+int ERR_load_ASYNC_strings(void);
+
+/* Error codes for the ASYNC functions. */
+
+/* Function codes. */
+# define ASYNC_F_ASYNC_CTX_NEW                            100
+# define ASYNC_F_ASYNC_INIT_THREAD                        101
+# define ASYNC_F_ASYNC_JOB_NEW                            102
+# define ASYNC_F_ASYNC_PAUSE_JOB                          103
+# define ASYNC_F_ASYNC_START_FUNC                         104
+# define ASYNC_F_ASYNC_START_JOB                          105
+
+/* Reason codes. */
+# define ASYNC_R_FAILED_TO_SET_POOL                       101
+# define ASYNC_R_FAILED_TO_SWAP_CONTEXT                   102
+# define ASYNC_R_INIT_FAILED                              105
+# define ASYNC_R_INVALID_POOL_SIZE                        103
+
+# ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+# endif
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/bio.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/bio.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f435bd8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/bio.h
@@ -0,0 +1,852 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_BIO_H
+# define HEADER_BIO_H
+
+# include <openssl/e_os2.h>
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+#  include <stdio.h>
+# endif
+# include <stdarg.h>
+
+# include <openssl/crypto.h>
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+#  include <openssl/e_os2.h>
+# endif
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/* There are the classes of BIOs */
+# define BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR     0x0100 /* socket, fd, connect or accept */
+# define BIO_TYPE_FILTER         0x0200
+# define BIO_TYPE_SOURCE_SINK    0x0400
+
+/* These are the 'types' of BIOs */
+# define BIO_TYPE_NONE             0
+# define BIO_TYPE_MEM            ( 1|BIO_TYPE_SOURCE_SINK)
+# define BIO_TYPE_FILE           ( 2|BIO_TYPE_SOURCE_SINK)
+
+# define BIO_TYPE_FD             ( 4|BIO_TYPE_SOURCE_SINK|BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR)
+# define BIO_TYPE_SOCKET         ( 5|BIO_TYPE_SOURCE_SINK|BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR)
+# define BIO_TYPE_NULL           ( 6|BIO_TYPE_SOURCE_SINK)
+# define BIO_TYPE_SSL            ( 7|BIO_TYPE_FILTER)
+# define BIO_TYPE_MD             ( 8|BIO_TYPE_FILTER)
+# define BIO_TYPE_BUFFER         ( 9|BIO_TYPE_FILTER)
+# define BIO_TYPE_CIPHER         (10|BIO_TYPE_FILTER)
+# define BIO_TYPE_BASE64         (11|BIO_TYPE_FILTER)
+# define BIO_TYPE_CONNECT        (12|BIO_TYPE_SOURCE_SINK|BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR)
+# define BIO_TYPE_ACCEPT         (13|BIO_TYPE_SOURCE_SINK|BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR)
+
+# define BIO_TYPE_NBIO_TEST      (16|BIO_TYPE_FILTER)/* server proxy BIO */
+# define BIO_TYPE_NULL_FILTER    (17|BIO_TYPE_FILTER)
+# define BIO_TYPE_BIO            (19|BIO_TYPE_SOURCE_SINK)/* half a BIO pair */
+# define BIO_TYPE_LINEBUFFER     (20|BIO_TYPE_FILTER)
+# define BIO_TYPE_DGRAM          (21|BIO_TYPE_SOURCE_SINK|BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR)
+# define BIO_TYPE_ASN1           (22|BIO_TYPE_FILTER)
+# define BIO_TYPE_COMP           (23|BIO_TYPE_FILTER)
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+#  define BIO_TYPE_DGRAM_SCTP    (24|BIO_TYPE_SOURCE_SINK|BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR)
+# endif
+
+#define BIO_TYPE_START           128
+
+/*
+ * BIO_FILENAME_READ|BIO_CLOSE to open or close on free.
+ * BIO_set_fp(in,stdin,BIO_NOCLOSE);
+ */
+# define BIO_NOCLOSE             0x00
+# define BIO_CLOSE               0x01
+
+/*
+ * These are used in the following macros and are passed to BIO_ctrl()
+ */
+# define BIO_CTRL_RESET          1/* opt - rewind/zero etc */
+# define BIO_CTRL_EOF            2/* opt - are we at the eof */
+# define BIO_CTRL_INFO           3/* opt - extra tit-bits */
+# define BIO_CTRL_SET            4/* man - set the 'IO' type */
+# define BIO_CTRL_GET            5/* man - get the 'IO' type */
+# define BIO_CTRL_PUSH           6/* opt - internal, used to signify change */
+# define BIO_CTRL_POP            7/* opt - internal, used to signify change */
+# define BIO_CTRL_GET_CLOSE      8/* man - set the 'close' on free */
+# define BIO_CTRL_SET_CLOSE      9/* man - set the 'close' on free */
+# define BIO_CTRL_PENDING        10/* opt - is their more data buffered */
+# define BIO_CTRL_FLUSH          11/* opt - 'flush' buffered output */
+# define BIO_CTRL_DUP            12/* man - extra stuff for 'duped' BIO */
+# define BIO_CTRL_WPENDING       13/* opt - number of bytes still to write */
+# define BIO_CTRL_SET_CALLBACK   14/* opt - set callback function */
+# define BIO_CTRL_GET_CALLBACK   15/* opt - set callback function */
+
+# define BIO_CTRL_SET_FILENAME   30/* BIO_s_file special */
+
+/* dgram BIO stuff */
+# define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_CONNECT       31/* BIO dgram special */
+# define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_CONNECTED 32/* allow for an externally connected
+                                         * socket to be passed in */
+# define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_RECV_TIMEOUT 33/* setsockopt, essentially */
+# define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_RECV_TIMEOUT 34/* getsockopt, essentially */
+# define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_SEND_TIMEOUT 35/* setsockopt, essentially */
+# define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_SEND_TIMEOUT 36/* getsockopt, essentially */
+
+# define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_RECV_TIMER_EXP 37/* flag whether the last */
+# define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_SEND_TIMER_EXP 38/* I/O operation tiemd out */
+
+/* #ifdef IP_MTU_DISCOVER */
+# define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_MTU_DISCOVER       39/* set DF bit on egress packets */
+/* #endif */
+
+# define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU          40/* as kernel for current MTU */
+# define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_FALLBACK_MTU   47
+# define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_MTU            41/* get cached value for MTU */
+# define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_MTU            42/* set cached value for MTU.
+                                              * want to use this if asking
+                                              * the kernel fails */
+
+# define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_MTU_EXCEEDED       43/* check whether the MTU was
+                                              * exceed in the previous write
+                                              * operation */
+
+# define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_PEER           46
+# define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEER           44/* Destination for the data */
+
+# define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_NEXT_TIMEOUT   45/* Next DTLS handshake timeout
+                                              * to adjust socket timeouts */
+# define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_DONT_FRAG      48
+
+# define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_MTU_OVERHEAD   49
+
+/* Deliberately outside of OPENSSL_NO_SCTP - used in bss_dgram.c */
+#  define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_IN_HANDSHAKE    50
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+/* SCTP stuff */
+#  define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY                51
+#  define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY               52
+#  define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD               53
+#  define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_GET_SNDINFO         60
+#  define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_SNDINFO         61
+#  define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_GET_RCVINFO         62
+#  define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_RCVINFO         63
+#  define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_GET_PRINFO                  64
+#  define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_PRINFO                  65
+#  define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SAVE_SHUTDOWN               70
+# endif
+
+# define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEEK_MODE      71
+
+/* modifiers */
+# define BIO_FP_READ             0x02
+# define BIO_FP_WRITE            0x04
+# define BIO_FP_APPEND           0x08
+# define BIO_FP_TEXT             0x10
+
+# define BIO_FLAGS_READ          0x01
+# define BIO_FLAGS_WRITE         0x02
+# define BIO_FLAGS_IO_SPECIAL    0x04
+# define BIO_FLAGS_RWS (BIO_FLAGS_READ|BIO_FLAGS_WRITE|BIO_FLAGS_IO_SPECIAL)
+# define BIO_FLAGS_SHOULD_RETRY  0x08
+# ifndef BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK
+/*
+ * "UPLINK" flag denotes file descriptors provided by application. It
+ * defaults to 0, as most platforms don't require UPLINK interface.
+ */
+#  define BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK        0
+# endif
+
+# define BIO_FLAGS_BASE64_NO_NL  0x100
+
+/*
+ * This is used with memory BIOs:
+ * BIO_FLAGS_MEM_RDONLY means we shouldn't free up or change the data in any way;
+ * BIO_FLAGS_NONCLEAR_RST means we shouldn't clear data on reset.
+ */
+# define BIO_FLAGS_MEM_RDONLY    0x200
+# define BIO_FLAGS_NONCLEAR_RST  0x400
+
+typedef union bio_addr_st BIO_ADDR;
+typedef struct bio_addrinfo_st BIO_ADDRINFO;
+
+int BIO_get_new_index(void);
+void BIO_set_flags(BIO *b, int flags);
+int BIO_test_flags(const BIO *b, int flags);
+void BIO_clear_flags(BIO *b, int flags);
+
+# define BIO_get_flags(b) BIO_test_flags(b, ~(0x0))
+# define BIO_set_retry_special(b) \
+                BIO_set_flags(b, (BIO_FLAGS_IO_SPECIAL|BIO_FLAGS_SHOULD_RETRY))
+# define BIO_set_retry_read(b) \
+                BIO_set_flags(b, (BIO_FLAGS_READ|BIO_FLAGS_SHOULD_RETRY))
+# define BIO_set_retry_write(b) \
+                BIO_set_flags(b, (BIO_FLAGS_WRITE|BIO_FLAGS_SHOULD_RETRY))
+
+/* These are normally used internally in BIOs */
+# define BIO_clear_retry_flags(b) \
+                BIO_clear_flags(b, (BIO_FLAGS_RWS|BIO_FLAGS_SHOULD_RETRY))
+# define BIO_get_retry_flags(b) \
+                BIO_test_flags(b, (BIO_FLAGS_RWS|BIO_FLAGS_SHOULD_RETRY))
+
+/* These should be used by the application to tell why we should retry */
+# define BIO_should_read(a)              BIO_test_flags(a, BIO_FLAGS_READ)
+# define BIO_should_write(a)             BIO_test_flags(a, BIO_FLAGS_WRITE)
+# define BIO_should_io_special(a)        BIO_test_flags(a, BIO_FLAGS_IO_SPECIAL)
+# define BIO_retry_type(a)               BIO_test_flags(a, BIO_FLAGS_RWS)
+# define BIO_should_retry(a)             BIO_test_flags(a, BIO_FLAGS_SHOULD_RETRY)
+
+/*
+ * The next three are used in conjunction with the BIO_should_io_special()
+ * condition.  After this returns true, BIO *BIO_get_retry_BIO(BIO *bio, int
+ * *reason); will walk the BIO stack and return the 'reason' for the special
+ * and the offending BIO. Given a BIO, BIO_get_retry_reason(bio) will return
+ * the code.
+ */
+/*
+ * Returned from the SSL bio when the certificate retrieval code had an error
+ */
+# define BIO_RR_SSL_X509_LOOKUP          0x01
+/* Returned from the connect BIO when a connect would have blocked */
+# define BIO_RR_CONNECT                  0x02
+/* Returned from the accept BIO when an accept would have blocked */
+# define BIO_RR_ACCEPT                   0x03
+
+/* These are passed by the BIO callback */
+# define BIO_CB_FREE     0x01
+# define BIO_CB_READ     0x02
+# define BIO_CB_WRITE    0x03
+# define BIO_CB_PUTS     0x04
+# define BIO_CB_GETS     0x05
+# define BIO_CB_CTRL     0x06
+
+/*
+ * The callback is called before and after the underling operation, The
+ * BIO_CB_RETURN flag indicates if it is after the call
+ */
+# define BIO_CB_RETURN   0x80
+# define BIO_CB_return(a) ((a)|BIO_CB_RETURN)
+# define BIO_cb_pre(a)   (!((a)&BIO_CB_RETURN))
+# define BIO_cb_post(a)  ((a)&BIO_CB_RETURN)
+
+typedef long (*BIO_callback_fn)(BIO *b, int oper, const char *argp, int argi,
+                                long argl, long ret);
+BIO_callback_fn BIO_get_callback(const BIO *b);
+void BIO_set_callback(BIO *b, BIO_callback_fn callback);
+char *BIO_get_callback_arg(const BIO *b);
+void BIO_set_callback_arg(BIO *b, char *arg);
+
+typedef struct bio_method_st BIO_METHOD;
+
+const char *BIO_method_name(const BIO *b);
+int BIO_method_type(const BIO *b);
+
+typedef int BIO_info_cb(BIO *, int, int);
+typedef BIO_info_cb bio_info_cb;  /* backward compatibility */
+
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(BIO)
+
+/* Prefix and suffix callback in ASN1 BIO */
+typedef int asn1_ps_func (BIO *b, unsigned char **pbuf, int *plen,
+                          void *parg);
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+/* SCTP parameter structs */
+struct bio_dgram_sctp_sndinfo {
+    uint16_t snd_sid;
+    uint16_t snd_flags;
+    uint32_t snd_ppid;
+    uint32_t snd_context;
+};
+
+struct bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo {
+    uint16_t rcv_sid;
+    uint16_t rcv_ssn;
+    uint16_t rcv_flags;
+    uint32_t rcv_ppid;
+    uint32_t rcv_tsn;
+    uint32_t rcv_cumtsn;
+    uint32_t rcv_context;
+};
+
+struct bio_dgram_sctp_prinfo {
+    uint16_t pr_policy;
+    uint32_t pr_value;
+};
+# endif
+
+/*
+ * #define BIO_CONN_get_param_hostname BIO_ctrl
+ */
+
+# define BIO_C_SET_CONNECT                       100
+# define BIO_C_DO_STATE_MACHINE                  101
+# define BIO_C_SET_NBIO                          102
+/* # define BIO_C_SET_PROXY_PARAM                   103 */
+# define BIO_C_SET_FD                            104
+# define BIO_C_GET_FD                            105
+# define BIO_C_SET_FILE_PTR                      106
+# define BIO_C_GET_FILE_PTR                      107
+# define BIO_C_SET_FILENAME                      108
+# define BIO_C_SET_SSL                           109
+# define BIO_C_GET_SSL                           110
+# define BIO_C_SET_MD                            111
+# define BIO_C_GET_MD                            112
+# define BIO_C_GET_CIPHER_STATUS                 113
+# define BIO_C_SET_BUF_MEM                       114
+# define BIO_C_GET_BUF_MEM_PTR                   115
+# define BIO_C_GET_BUFF_NUM_LINES                116
+# define BIO_C_SET_BUFF_SIZE                     117
+# define BIO_C_SET_ACCEPT                        118
+# define BIO_C_SSL_MODE                          119
+# define BIO_C_GET_MD_CTX                        120
+/* # define BIO_C_GET_PROXY_PARAM                   121 */
+# define BIO_C_SET_BUFF_READ_DATA                122/* data to read first */
+# define BIO_C_GET_CONNECT                       123
+# define BIO_C_GET_ACCEPT                        124
+# define BIO_C_SET_SSL_RENEGOTIATE_BYTES         125
+# define BIO_C_GET_SSL_NUM_RENEGOTIATES          126
+# define BIO_C_SET_SSL_RENEGOTIATE_TIMEOUT       127
+# define BIO_C_FILE_SEEK                         128
+# define BIO_C_GET_CIPHER_CTX                    129
+# define BIO_C_SET_BUF_MEM_EOF_RETURN            130/* return end of input
+                                                     * value */
+# define BIO_C_SET_BIND_MODE                     131
+# define BIO_C_GET_BIND_MODE                     132
+# define BIO_C_FILE_TELL                         133
+# define BIO_C_GET_SOCKS                         134
+# define BIO_C_SET_SOCKS                         135
+
+# define BIO_C_SET_WRITE_BUF_SIZE                136/* for BIO_s_bio */
+# define BIO_C_GET_WRITE_BUF_SIZE                137
+# define BIO_C_MAKE_BIO_PAIR                     138
+# define BIO_C_DESTROY_BIO_PAIR                  139
+# define BIO_C_GET_WRITE_GUARANTEE               140
+# define BIO_C_GET_READ_REQUEST                  141
+# define BIO_C_SHUTDOWN_WR                       142
+# define BIO_C_NREAD0                            143
+# define BIO_C_NREAD                             144
+# define BIO_C_NWRITE0                           145
+# define BIO_C_NWRITE                            146
+# define BIO_C_RESET_READ_REQUEST                147
+# define BIO_C_SET_MD_CTX                        148
+
+# define BIO_C_SET_PREFIX                        149
+# define BIO_C_GET_PREFIX                        150
+# define BIO_C_SET_SUFFIX                        151
+# define BIO_C_GET_SUFFIX                        152
+
+# define BIO_C_SET_EX_ARG                        153
+# define BIO_C_GET_EX_ARG                        154
+
+# define BIO_C_SET_CONNECT_MODE                  155
+
+# define BIO_set_app_data(s,arg)         BIO_set_ex_data(s,0,arg)
+# define BIO_get_app_data(s)             BIO_get_ex_data(s,0)
+
+# define BIO_set_nbio(b,n)             BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_NBIO,(n),NULL)
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
+/* IP families we support, for BIO_s_connect() and BIO_s_accept() */
+/* Note: the underlying operating system may not support some of them */
+#  define BIO_FAMILY_IPV4                         4
+#  define BIO_FAMILY_IPV6                         6
+#  define BIO_FAMILY_IPANY                        256
+
+/* BIO_s_connect() */
+#  define BIO_set_conn_hostname(b,name) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_CONNECT,0,(char *)name)
+#  define BIO_set_conn_port(b,port)     BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_CONNECT,1,(char *)port)
+#  define BIO_set_conn_address(b,addr)  BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_CONNECT,2,(char *)addr)
+#  define BIO_set_conn_ip_family(b,f)   BIO_int_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_CONNECT,3,f)
+#  define BIO_get_conn_hostname(b)      ((const char *)BIO_ptr_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_CONNECT,0))
+#  define BIO_get_conn_port(b)          ((const char *)BIO_ptr_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_CONNECT,1))
+#  define BIO_get_conn_address(b)       ((const BIO_ADDR *)BIO_ptr_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_CONNECT,2))
+#  define BIO_get_conn_ip_family(b)     BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_CONNECT,3,NULL)
+#  define BIO_set_conn_mode(b,n)        BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_CONNECT_MODE,(n),NULL)
+
+/* BIO_s_accept() */
+#  define BIO_set_accept_name(b,name)   BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_ACCEPT,0,(char *)name)
+#  define BIO_set_accept_port(b,port)   BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_ACCEPT,1,(char *)port)
+#  define BIO_get_accept_name(b)        ((const char *)BIO_ptr_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_ACCEPT,0))
+#  define BIO_get_accept_port(b)        ((const char *)BIO_ptr_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_ACCEPT,1))
+#  define BIO_get_peer_name(b)          ((const char *)BIO_ptr_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_ACCEPT,2))
+#  define BIO_get_peer_port(b)          ((const char *)BIO_ptr_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_ACCEPT,3))
+/* #define BIO_set_nbio(b,n)    BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_NBIO,(n),NULL) */
+#  define BIO_set_nbio_accept(b,n)      BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_ACCEPT,2,(n)?(void *)"a":NULL)
+#  define BIO_set_accept_bios(b,bio)    BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_ACCEPT,3,(char *)bio)
+#  define BIO_set_accept_ip_family(b,f) BIO_int_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_ACCEPT,4,f)
+#  define BIO_get_accept_ip_family(b)   BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_ACCEPT,4,NULL)
+
+/* Aliases kept for backward compatibility */
+#  define BIO_BIND_NORMAL                 0
+#  define BIO_BIND_REUSEADDR              BIO_SOCK_REUSEADDR
+#  define BIO_BIND_REUSEADDR_IF_UNUSED    BIO_SOCK_REUSEADDR
+#  define BIO_set_bind_mode(b,mode) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_BIND_MODE,mode,NULL)
+#  define BIO_get_bind_mode(b)    BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_BIND_MODE,0,NULL)
+
+/* BIO_s_accept() and BIO_s_connect() */
+#  define BIO_do_connect(b)       BIO_do_handshake(b)
+#  define BIO_do_accept(b)        BIO_do_handshake(b)
+# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SOCK */
+
+# define BIO_do_handshake(b)     BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_DO_STATE_MACHINE,0,NULL)
+
+/* BIO_s_datagram(), BIO_s_fd(), BIO_s_socket(), BIO_s_accept() and BIO_s_connect() */
+# define BIO_set_fd(b,fd,c)      BIO_int_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_FD,c,fd)
+# define BIO_get_fd(b,c)         BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_FD,0,(char *)c)
+
+/* BIO_s_file() */
+# define BIO_set_fp(b,fp,c)      BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_FILE_PTR,c,(char *)fp)
+# define BIO_get_fp(b,fpp)       BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_FILE_PTR,0,(char *)fpp)
+
+/* BIO_s_fd() and BIO_s_file() */
+# define BIO_seek(b,ofs) (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_FILE_SEEK,ofs,NULL)
+# define BIO_tell(b)     (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_FILE_TELL,0,NULL)
+
+/*
+ * name is cast to lose const, but might be better to route through a
+ * function so we can do it safely
+ */
+# ifdef CONST_STRICT
+/*
+ * If you are wondering why this isn't defined, its because CONST_STRICT is
+ * purely a compile-time kludge to allow const to be checked.
+ */
+int BIO_read_filename(BIO *b, const char *name);
+# else
+#  define BIO_read_filename(b,name) (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_FILENAME, \
+                BIO_CLOSE|BIO_FP_READ,(char *)name)
+# endif
+# define BIO_write_filename(b,name) (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_FILENAME, \
+                BIO_CLOSE|BIO_FP_WRITE,name)
+# define BIO_append_filename(b,name) (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_FILENAME, \
+                BIO_CLOSE|BIO_FP_APPEND,name)
+# define BIO_rw_filename(b,name) (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_FILENAME, \
+                BIO_CLOSE|BIO_FP_READ|BIO_FP_WRITE,name)
+
+/*
+ * WARNING WARNING, this ups the reference count on the read bio of the SSL
+ * structure.  This is because the ssl read BIO is now pointed to by the
+ * next_bio field in the bio.  So when you free the BIO, make sure you are
+ * doing a BIO_free_all() to catch the underlying BIO.
+ */
+# define BIO_set_ssl(b,ssl,c)    BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_SSL,c,(char *)ssl)
+# define BIO_get_ssl(b,sslp)     BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_SSL,0,(char *)sslp)
+# define BIO_set_ssl_mode(b,client)      BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SSL_MODE,client,NULL)
+# define BIO_set_ssl_renegotiate_bytes(b,num) \
+        BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_SSL_RENEGOTIATE_BYTES,num,NULL)
+# define BIO_get_num_renegotiates(b) \
+        BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_SSL_NUM_RENEGOTIATES,0,NULL)
+# define BIO_set_ssl_renegotiate_timeout(b,seconds) \
+        BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_SSL_RENEGOTIATE_TIMEOUT,seconds,NULL)
+
+/* defined in evp.h */
+/* #define BIO_set_md(b,md)     BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_MD,1,(char *)md) */
+
+# define BIO_get_mem_data(b,pp)  BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_CTRL_INFO,0,(char *)pp)
+# define BIO_set_mem_buf(b,bm,c) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_BUF_MEM,c,(char *)bm)
+# define BIO_get_mem_ptr(b,pp)   BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_BUF_MEM_PTR,0,(char *)pp)
+# define BIO_set_mem_eof_return(b,v) \
+                                BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_BUF_MEM_EOF_RETURN,v,NULL)
+
+/* For the BIO_f_buffer() type */
+# define BIO_get_buffer_num_lines(b)     BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_BUFF_NUM_LINES,0,NULL)
+# define BIO_set_buffer_size(b,size)     BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_BUFF_SIZE,size,NULL)
+# define BIO_set_read_buffer_size(b,size) BIO_int_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_BUFF_SIZE,size,0)
+# define BIO_set_write_buffer_size(b,size) BIO_int_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_BUFF_SIZE,size,1)
+# define BIO_set_buffer_read_data(b,buf,num) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_BUFF_READ_DATA,num,buf)
+
+/* Don't use the next one unless you know what you are doing :-) */
+# define BIO_dup_state(b,ret)    BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_CTRL_DUP,0,(char *)(ret))
+
+# define BIO_reset(b)            (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_CTRL_RESET,0,NULL)
+# define BIO_eof(b)              (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_CTRL_EOF,0,NULL)
+# define BIO_set_close(b,c)      (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_CTRL_SET_CLOSE,(c),NULL)
+# define BIO_get_close(b)        (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_CTRL_GET_CLOSE,0,NULL)
+# define BIO_pending(b)          (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_CTRL_PENDING,0,NULL)
+# define BIO_wpending(b)         (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_CTRL_WPENDING,0,NULL)
+/* ...pending macros have inappropriate return type */
+size_t BIO_ctrl_pending(BIO *b);
+size_t BIO_ctrl_wpending(BIO *b);
+# define BIO_flush(b)            (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_CTRL_FLUSH,0,NULL)
+# define BIO_get_info_callback(b,cbp) (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_CTRL_GET_CALLBACK,0, \
+                                                   cbp)
+# define BIO_set_info_callback(b,cb) (int)BIO_callback_ctrl(b,BIO_CTRL_SET_CALLBACK,cb)
+
+/* For the BIO_f_buffer() type */
+# define BIO_buffer_get_num_lines(b) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_CTRL_GET,0,NULL)
+
+/* For BIO_s_bio() */
+# define BIO_set_write_buf_size(b,size) (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_WRITE_BUF_SIZE,size,NULL)
+# define BIO_get_write_buf_size(b,size) (size_t)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_WRITE_BUF_SIZE,size,NULL)
+# define BIO_make_bio_pair(b1,b2)   (int)BIO_ctrl(b1,BIO_C_MAKE_BIO_PAIR,0,b2)
+# define BIO_destroy_bio_pair(b)    (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_DESTROY_BIO_PAIR,0,NULL)
+# define BIO_shutdown_wr(b) (int)BIO_ctrl(b, BIO_C_SHUTDOWN_WR, 0, NULL)
+/* macros with inappropriate type -- but ...pending macros use int too: */
+# define BIO_get_write_guarantee(b) (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_WRITE_GUARANTEE,0,NULL)
+# define BIO_get_read_request(b)    (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_READ_REQUEST,0,NULL)
+size_t BIO_ctrl_get_write_guarantee(BIO *b);
+size_t BIO_ctrl_get_read_request(BIO *b);
+int BIO_ctrl_reset_read_request(BIO *b);
+
+/* ctrl macros for dgram */
+# define BIO_ctrl_dgram_connect(b,peer)  \
+                     (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_CONNECT,0, (char *)peer)
+# define BIO_ctrl_set_connected(b,peer) \
+         (int)BIO_ctrl(b, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_CONNECTED, 0, (char *)peer)
+# define BIO_dgram_recv_timedout(b) \
+         (int)BIO_ctrl(b, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_RECV_TIMER_EXP, 0, NULL)
+# define BIO_dgram_send_timedout(b) \
+         (int)BIO_ctrl(b, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_SEND_TIMER_EXP, 0, NULL)
+# define BIO_dgram_get_peer(b,peer) \
+         (int)BIO_ctrl(b, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_PEER, 0, (char *)peer)
+# define BIO_dgram_set_peer(b,peer) \
+         (int)BIO_ctrl(b, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEER, 0, (char *)peer)
+# define BIO_dgram_get_mtu_overhead(b) \
+         (unsigned int)BIO_ctrl((b), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_MTU_OVERHEAD, 0, NULL)
+
+#define BIO_get_ex_new_index(l, p, newf, dupf, freef) \
+    CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_BIO, l, p, newf, dupf, freef)
+int BIO_set_ex_data(BIO *bio, int idx, void *data);
+void *BIO_get_ex_data(BIO *bio, int idx);
+uint64_t BIO_number_read(BIO *bio);
+uint64_t BIO_number_written(BIO *bio);
+
+/* For BIO_f_asn1() */
+int BIO_asn1_set_prefix(BIO *b, asn1_ps_func *prefix,
+                        asn1_ps_func *prefix_free);
+int BIO_asn1_get_prefix(BIO *b, asn1_ps_func **pprefix,
+                        asn1_ps_func **pprefix_free);
+int BIO_asn1_set_suffix(BIO *b, asn1_ps_func *suffix,
+                        asn1_ps_func *suffix_free);
+int BIO_asn1_get_suffix(BIO *b, asn1_ps_func **psuffix,
+                        asn1_ps_func **psuffix_free);
+
+const BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_file(void);
+BIO *BIO_new_file(const char *filename, const char *mode);
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+BIO *BIO_new_fp(FILE *stream, int close_flag);
+# endif
+BIO *BIO_new(const BIO_METHOD *type);
+int BIO_free(BIO *a);
+void BIO_set_data(BIO *a, void *ptr);
+void *BIO_get_data(BIO *a);
+void BIO_set_init(BIO *a, int init);
+int BIO_get_init(BIO *a);
+void BIO_set_shutdown(BIO *a, int shut);
+int BIO_get_shutdown(BIO *a);
+void BIO_vfree(BIO *a);
+int BIO_up_ref(BIO *a);
+int BIO_read(BIO *b, void *data, int len);
+int BIO_gets(BIO *bp, char *buf, int size);
+int BIO_write(BIO *b, const void *data, int len);
+int BIO_puts(BIO *bp, const char *buf);
+int BIO_indent(BIO *b, int indent, int max);
+long BIO_ctrl(BIO *bp, int cmd, long larg, void *parg);
+long BIO_callback_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, BIO_info_cb *fp);
+void *BIO_ptr_ctrl(BIO *bp, int cmd, long larg);
+long BIO_int_ctrl(BIO *bp, int cmd, long larg, int iarg);
+BIO *BIO_push(BIO *b, BIO *append);
+BIO *BIO_pop(BIO *b);
+void BIO_free_all(BIO *a);
+BIO *BIO_find_type(BIO *b, int bio_type);
+BIO *BIO_next(BIO *b);
+void BIO_set_next(BIO *b, BIO *next);
+BIO *BIO_get_retry_BIO(BIO *bio, int *reason);
+int BIO_get_retry_reason(BIO *bio);
+void BIO_set_retry_reason(BIO *bio, int reason);
+BIO *BIO_dup_chain(BIO *in);
+
+int BIO_nread0(BIO *bio, char **buf);
+int BIO_nread(BIO *bio, char **buf, int num);
+int BIO_nwrite0(BIO *bio, char **buf);
+int BIO_nwrite(BIO *bio, char **buf, int num);
+
+long BIO_debug_callback(BIO *bio, int cmd, const char *argp, int argi,
+                        long argl, long ret);
+
+const BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_mem(void);
+const BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_secmem(void);
+BIO *BIO_new_mem_buf(const void *buf, int len);
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
+const BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_socket(void);
+const BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_connect(void);
+const BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_accept(void);
+# endif
+const BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_fd(void);
+const BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_log(void);
+const BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_bio(void);
+const BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_null(void);
+const BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_null(void);
+const BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_buffer(void);
+const BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_linebuffer(void);
+const BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_nbio_test(void);
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DGRAM
+const BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_datagram(void);
+int BIO_dgram_non_fatal_error(int error);
+BIO *BIO_new_dgram(int fd, int close_flag);
+#  ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+const BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_datagram_sctp(void);
+BIO *BIO_new_dgram_sctp(int fd, int close_flag);
+int BIO_dgram_is_sctp(BIO *bio);
+int BIO_dgram_sctp_notification_cb(BIO *b,
+                                   void (*handle_notifications) (BIO *bio,
+                                                                 void *context,
+                                                                 void *buf),
+                                   void *context);
+int BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry(BIO *b);
+int BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(BIO *b);
+#  endif
+# endif
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
+int BIO_sock_should_retry(int i);
+int BIO_sock_non_fatal_error(int error);
+# endif
+
+int BIO_fd_should_retry(int i);
+int BIO_fd_non_fatal_error(int error);
+int BIO_dump_cb(int (*cb) (const void *data, size_t len, void *u),
+                void *u, const char *s, int len);
+int BIO_dump_indent_cb(int (*cb) (const void *data, size_t len, void *u),
+                       void *u, const char *s, int len, int indent);
+int BIO_dump(BIO *b, const char *bytes, int len);
+int BIO_dump_indent(BIO *b, const char *bytes, int len, int indent);
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+int BIO_dump_fp(FILE *fp, const char *s, int len);
+int BIO_dump_indent_fp(FILE *fp, const char *s, int len, int indent);
+# endif
+int BIO_hex_string(BIO *out, int indent, int width, unsigned char *data,
+                   int datalen);
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
+BIO_ADDR *BIO_ADDR_new(void);
+int BIO_ADDR_rawmake(BIO_ADDR *ap, int family,
+                     const void *where, size_t wherelen, unsigned short port);
+void BIO_ADDR_free(BIO_ADDR *);
+void BIO_ADDR_clear(BIO_ADDR *ap);
+int BIO_ADDR_family(const BIO_ADDR *ap);
+int BIO_ADDR_rawaddress(const BIO_ADDR *ap, void *p, size_t *l);
+unsigned short BIO_ADDR_rawport(const BIO_ADDR *ap);
+char *BIO_ADDR_hostname_string(const BIO_ADDR *ap, int numeric);
+char *BIO_ADDR_service_string(const BIO_ADDR *ap, int numeric);
+char *BIO_ADDR_path_string(const BIO_ADDR *ap);
+
+const BIO_ADDRINFO *BIO_ADDRINFO_next(const BIO_ADDRINFO *bai);
+int BIO_ADDRINFO_family(const BIO_ADDRINFO *bai);
+int BIO_ADDRINFO_socktype(const BIO_ADDRINFO *bai);
+int BIO_ADDRINFO_protocol(const BIO_ADDRINFO *bai);
+const BIO_ADDR *BIO_ADDRINFO_address(const BIO_ADDRINFO *bai);
+void BIO_ADDRINFO_free(BIO_ADDRINFO *bai);
+
+enum BIO_hostserv_priorities {
+    BIO_PARSE_PRIO_HOST, BIO_PARSE_PRIO_SERV
+};
+int BIO_parse_hostserv(const char *hostserv, char **host, char **service,
+                       enum BIO_hostserv_priorities hostserv_prio);
+enum BIO_lookup_type {
+    BIO_LOOKUP_CLIENT, BIO_LOOKUP_SERVER
+};
+int BIO_lookup(const char *host, const char *service,
+               enum BIO_lookup_type lookup_type,
+               int family, int socktype, BIO_ADDRINFO **res);
+int BIO_sock_error(int sock);
+int BIO_socket_ioctl(int fd, long type, void *arg);
+int BIO_socket_nbio(int fd, int mode);
+int BIO_sock_init(void);
+# if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+#  define BIO_sock_cleanup() while(0) continue
+# endif
+int BIO_set_tcp_ndelay(int sock, int turn_on);
+
+DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(struct hostent *BIO_gethostbyname(const char *name))
+DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(int BIO_get_port(const char *str, unsigned short *port_ptr))
+DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(int BIO_get_host_ip(const char *str, unsigned char *ip))
+DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(int BIO_get_accept_socket(char *host_port, int mode))
+DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(int BIO_accept(int sock, char **ip_port))
+
+union BIO_sock_info_u {
+    BIO_ADDR *addr;
+};
+enum BIO_sock_info_type {
+    BIO_SOCK_INFO_ADDRESS
+};
+int BIO_sock_info(int sock,
+                  enum BIO_sock_info_type type, union BIO_sock_info_u *info);
+
+#  define BIO_SOCK_REUSEADDR    0x01
+#  define BIO_SOCK_V6_ONLY      0x02
+#  define BIO_SOCK_KEEPALIVE    0x04
+#  define BIO_SOCK_NONBLOCK     0x08
+#  define BIO_SOCK_NODELAY      0x10
+
+int BIO_socket(int domain, int socktype, int protocol, int options);
+int BIO_connect(int sock, const BIO_ADDR *addr, int options);
+int BIO_listen(int sock, const BIO_ADDR *addr, int options);
+int BIO_accept_ex(int accept_sock, BIO_ADDR *addr, int options);
+int BIO_closesocket(int sock);
+
+BIO *BIO_new_socket(int sock, int close_flag);
+BIO *BIO_new_connect(const char *host_port);
+BIO *BIO_new_accept(const char *host_port);
+# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SOCK*/
+
+BIO *BIO_new_fd(int fd, int close_flag);
+
+int BIO_new_bio_pair(BIO **bio1, size_t writebuf1,
+                     BIO **bio2, size_t writebuf2);
+/*
+ * If successful, returns 1 and in *bio1, *bio2 two BIO pair endpoints.
+ * Otherwise returns 0 and sets *bio1 and *bio2 to NULL. Size 0 uses default
+ * value.
+ */
+
+void BIO_copy_next_retry(BIO *b);
+
+/*
+ * long BIO_ghbn_ctrl(int cmd,int iarg,char *parg);
+ */
+
+# ifdef __GNUC__
+#  define __bio_h__attr__ __attribute__
+# else
+#  define __bio_h__attr__(x)
+# endif
+int BIO_printf(BIO *bio, const char *format, ...)
+__bio_h__attr__((__format__(__printf__, 2, 3)));
+int BIO_vprintf(BIO *bio, const char *format, va_list args)
+__bio_h__attr__((__format__(__printf__, 2, 0)));
+int BIO_snprintf(char *buf, size_t n, const char *format, ...)
+__bio_h__attr__((__format__(__printf__, 3, 4)));
+int BIO_vsnprintf(char *buf, size_t n, const char *format, va_list args)
+__bio_h__attr__((__format__(__printf__, 3, 0)));
+# undef __bio_h__attr__
+
+
+BIO_METHOD *BIO_meth_new(int type, const char *name);
+void BIO_meth_free(BIO_METHOD *biom);
+int (*BIO_meth_get_write(BIO_METHOD *biom)) (BIO *, const char *, int);
+int BIO_meth_set_write(BIO_METHOD *biom,
+                       int (*write) (BIO *, const char *, int));
+int (*BIO_meth_get_read(BIO_METHOD *biom)) (BIO *, char *, int);
+int BIO_meth_set_read(BIO_METHOD *biom,
+                      int (*read) (BIO *, char *, int));
+int (*BIO_meth_get_puts(BIO_METHOD *biom)) (BIO *, const char *);
+int BIO_meth_set_puts(BIO_METHOD *biom,
+                      int (*puts) (BIO *, const char *));
+int (*BIO_meth_get_gets(BIO_METHOD *biom)) (BIO *, char *, int);
+int BIO_meth_set_gets(BIO_METHOD *biom,
+                      int (*gets) (BIO *, char *, int));
+long (*BIO_meth_get_ctrl(BIO_METHOD *biom)) (BIO *, int, long, void *);
+int BIO_meth_set_ctrl(BIO_METHOD *biom,
+                      long (*ctrl) (BIO *, int, long, void *));
+int (*BIO_meth_get_create(BIO_METHOD *bion)) (BIO *);
+int BIO_meth_set_create(BIO_METHOD *biom, int (*create) (BIO *));
+int (*BIO_meth_get_destroy(BIO_METHOD *biom)) (BIO *);
+int BIO_meth_set_destroy(BIO_METHOD *biom, int (*destroy) (BIO *));
+long (*BIO_meth_get_callback_ctrl(BIO_METHOD *biom))
+                                 (BIO *, int, BIO_info_cb *);
+int BIO_meth_set_callback_ctrl(BIO_METHOD *biom,
+                               long (*callback_ctrl) (BIO *, int,
+                                                      BIO_info_cb *));
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+/*
+ * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
+ * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
+ */
+
+int ERR_load_BIO_strings(void);
+
+/* Error codes for the BIO functions. */
+
+/* Function codes. */
+# define BIO_F_ACPT_STATE                                 100
+# define BIO_F_ADDR_STRINGS                               134
+# define BIO_F_BIO_ACCEPT                                 101
+# define BIO_F_BIO_ACCEPT_EX                              137
+# define BIO_F_BIO_ADDR_NEW                               144
+# define BIO_F_BIO_CALLBACK_CTRL                          131
+# define BIO_F_BIO_CONNECT                                138
+# define BIO_F_BIO_CTRL                                   103
+# define BIO_F_BIO_GETS                                   104
+# define BIO_F_BIO_GET_HOST_IP                            106
+# define BIO_F_BIO_GET_NEW_INDEX                          102
+# define BIO_F_BIO_GET_PORT                               107
+# define BIO_F_BIO_LISTEN                                 139
+# define BIO_F_BIO_LOOKUP                                 135
+# define BIO_F_BIO_MAKE_PAIR                              121
+# define BIO_F_BIO_METH_NEW                               146
+# define BIO_F_BIO_NEW                                    108
+# define BIO_F_BIO_NEW_FILE                               109
+# define BIO_F_BIO_NEW_MEM_BUF                            126
+# define BIO_F_BIO_NREAD                                  123
+# define BIO_F_BIO_NREAD0                                 124
+# define BIO_F_BIO_NWRITE                                 125
+# define BIO_F_BIO_NWRITE0                                122
+# define BIO_F_BIO_PARSE_HOSTSERV                         136
+# define BIO_F_BIO_PUTS                                   110
+# define BIO_F_BIO_READ                                   111
+# define BIO_F_BIO_SOCKET                                 140
+# define BIO_F_BIO_SOCKET_NBIO                            142
+# define BIO_F_BIO_SOCK_INFO                              141
+# define BIO_F_BIO_SOCK_INIT                              112
+# define BIO_F_BIO_WRITE                                  113
+# define BIO_F_BUFFER_CTRL                                114
+# define BIO_F_CONN_CTRL                                  127
+# define BIO_F_CONN_STATE                                 115
+# define BIO_F_DGRAM_SCTP_READ                            132
+# define BIO_F_DGRAM_SCTP_WRITE                           133
+# define BIO_F_FILE_CTRL                                  116
+# define BIO_F_FILE_READ                                  130
+# define BIO_F_LINEBUFFER_CTRL                            129
+# define BIO_F_MEM_WRITE                                  117
+# define BIO_F_SSL_NEW                                    118
+
+/* Reason codes. */
+# define BIO_R_ACCEPT_ERROR                               100
+# define BIO_R_ADDRINFO_ADDR_IS_NOT_AF_INET               141
+# define BIO_R_AMBIGUOUS_HOST_OR_SERVICE                  129
+# define BIO_R_BAD_FOPEN_MODE                             101
+# define BIO_R_BROKEN_PIPE                                124
+# define BIO_R_CONNECT_ERROR                              103
+# define BIO_R_GETHOSTBYNAME_ADDR_IS_NOT_AF_INET          107
+# define BIO_R_GETSOCKNAME_ERROR                          132
+# define BIO_R_GETSOCKNAME_TRUNCATED_ADDRESS              133
+# define BIO_R_GETTING_SOCKTYPE                           134
+# define BIO_R_INVALID_ARGUMENT                           125
+# define BIO_R_INVALID_SOCKET                             135
+# define BIO_R_IN_USE                                     123
+# define BIO_R_LISTEN_V6_ONLY                             136
+# define BIO_R_LOOKUP_RETURNED_NOTHING                    142
+# define BIO_R_MALFORMED_HOST_OR_SERVICE                  130
+# define BIO_R_NBIO_CONNECT_ERROR                         110
+# define BIO_R_NO_ACCEPT_ADDR_OR_SERVICE_SPECIFIED        143
+# define BIO_R_NO_HOSTNAME_OR_SERVICE_SPECIFIED           144
+# define BIO_R_NO_PORT_DEFINED                            113
+# define BIO_R_NO_SUCH_FILE                               128
+# define BIO_R_NULL_PARAMETER                             115
+# define BIO_R_UNABLE_TO_BIND_SOCKET                      117
+# define BIO_R_UNABLE_TO_CREATE_SOCKET                    118
+# define BIO_R_UNABLE_TO_KEEPALIVE                        137
+# define BIO_R_UNABLE_TO_LISTEN_SOCKET                    119
+# define BIO_R_UNABLE_TO_NODELAY                          138
+# define BIO_R_UNABLE_TO_REUSEADDR                        139
+# define BIO_R_UNAVAILABLE_IP_FAMILY                      145
+# define BIO_R_UNINITIALIZED                              120
+# define BIO_R_UNKNOWN_INFO_TYPE                          140
+# define BIO_R_UNSUPPORTED_IP_FAMILY                      146
+# define BIO_R_UNSUPPORTED_METHOD                         121
+# define BIO_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL_FAMILY                131
+# define BIO_R_WRITE_TO_READ_ONLY_BIO                     126
+# define BIO_R_WSASTARTUP                                 122
+
+# ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+# endif
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/blowfish.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/blowfish.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cd3e460
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/blowfish.h
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_BLOWFISH_H
+# define HEADER_BLOWFISH_H
+
+# include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BF
+# include <openssl/e_os2.h>
+# ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+# endif
+
+# define BF_ENCRYPT      1
+# define BF_DECRYPT      0
+
+/*-
+ * !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
+ * ! BF_LONG has to be at least 32 bits wide.                     !
+ * !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
+ */
+# define BF_LONG unsigned int
+
+# define BF_ROUNDS       16
+# define BF_BLOCK        8
+
+typedef struct bf_key_st {
+    BF_LONG P[BF_ROUNDS + 2];
+    BF_LONG S[4 * 256];
+} BF_KEY;
+
+void BF_set_key(BF_KEY *key, int len, const unsigned char *data);
+
+void BF_encrypt(BF_LONG *data, const BF_KEY *key);
+void BF_decrypt(BF_LONG *data, const BF_KEY *key);
+
+void BF_ecb_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                    const BF_KEY *key, int enc);
+void BF_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, long length,
+                    const BF_KEY *schedule, unsigned char *ivec, int enc);
+void BF_cfb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                      long length, const BF_KEY *schedule,
+                      unsigned char *ivec, int *num, int enc);
+void BF_ofb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                      long length, const BF_KEY *schedule,
+                      unsigned char *ivec, int *num);
+const char *BF_options(void);
+
+# ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+# endif
+# endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/bn.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/bn.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..54ae760
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/bn.h
@@ -0,0 +1,575 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ *
+ * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ *
+ * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the Eric Young open source
+ * license provided above.
+ *
+ * The binary polynomial arithmetic software is originally written by
+ * Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_BN_H
+# define HEADER_BN_H
+
+# include <openssl/e_os2.h>
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+#  include <stdio.h>
+# endif
+# include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+# include <openssl/ossl_typ.h>
+# include <openssl/crypto.h>
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * 64-bit processor with LP64 ABI
+ */
+# ifdef SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG
+#  define BN_ULONG        unsigned long
+#  define BN_BYTES        8
+# endif
+
+/*
+ * 64-bit processor other than LP64 ABI
+ */
+# ifdef SIXTY_FOUR_BIT
+#  define BN_ULONG        unsigned long long
+#  define BN_BYTES        8
+# endif
+
+# ifdef THIRTY_TWO_BIT
+#  define BN_ULONG        unsigned int
+#  define BN_BYTES        4
+# endif
+
+# define BN_BITS2       (BN_BYTES * 8)
+# define BN_BITS        (BN_BITS2 * 2)
+# define BN_TBIT        ((BN_ULONG)1 << (BN_BITS2 - 1))
+
+# define BN_FLG_MALLOCED         0x01
+# define BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA      0x02
+
+/*
+ * avoid leaking exponent information through timing,
+ * BN_mod_exp_mont() will call BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime,
+ * BN_div() will call BN_div_no_branch,
+ * BN_mod_inverse() will call BN_mod_inverse_no_branch.
+ */
+# define BN_FLG_CONSTTIME        0x04
+# define BN_FLG_SECURE           0x08
+
+# if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x00908000L
+/* deprecated name for the flag */
+#  define BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME BN_FLG_CONSTTIME
+#  define BN_FLG_FREE            0x8000 /* used for debugging */
+# endif
+
+void BN_set_flags(BIGNUM *b, int n);
+int BN_get_flags(const BIGNUM *b, int n);
+
+/* Values for |top| in BN_rand() */
+#define BN_RAND_TOP_ANY    -1
+#define BN_RAND_TOP_ONE     0
+#define BN_RAND_TOP_TWO     1
+
+/* Values for |bottom| in BN_rand() */
+#define BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ANY  0
+#define BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ODD  1
+
+/*
+ * get a clone of a BIGNUM with changed flags, for *temporary* use only (the
+ * two BIGNUMs cannot be used in parallel!). Also only for *read only* use. The
+ * value |dest| should be a newly allocated BIGNUM obtained via BN_new() that
+ * has not been otherwise initialised or used.
+ */
+void BN_with_flags(BIGNUM *dest, const BIGNUM *b, int flags);
+
+/* Wrapper function to make using BN_GENCB easier */
+int BN_GENCB_call(BN_GENCB *cb, int a, int b);
+
+BN_GENCB *BN_GENCB_new(void);
+void BN_GENCB_free(BN_GENCB *cb);
+
+/* Populate a BN_GENCB structure with an "old"-style callback */
+void BN_GENCB_set_old(BN_GENCB *gencb, void (*callback) (int, int, void *),
+                      void *cb_arg);
+
+/* Populate a BN_GENCB structure with a "new"-style callback */
+void BN_GENCB_set(BN_GENCB *gencb, int (*callback) (int, int, BN_GENCB *),
+                  void *cb_arg);
+
+void *BN_GENCB_get_arg(BN_GENCB *cb);
+
+# define BN_prime_checks 0      /* default: select number of iterations based
+                                 * on the size of the number */
+
+/*
+ * number of Miller-Rabin iterations for an error rate of less than 2^-80 for
+ * random 'b'-bit input, b >= 100 (taken from table 4.4 in the Handbook of
+ * Applied Cryptography [Menezes, van Oorschot, Vanstone; CRC Press 1996];
+ * original paper: Damgaard, Landrock, Pomerance: Average case error
+ * estimates for the strong probable prime test. -- Math. Comp. 61 (1993)
+ * 177-194)
+ */
+# define BN_prime_checks_for_size(b) ((b) >= 1300 ?  2 : \
+                                (b) >=  850 ?  3 : \
+                                (b) >=  650 ?  4 : \
+                                (b) >=  550 ?  5 : \
+                                (b) >=  450 ?  6 : \
+                                (b) >=  400 ?  7 : \
+                                (b) >=  350 ?  8 : \
+                                (b) >=  300 ?  9 : \
+                                (b) >=  250 ? 12 : \
+                                (b) >=  200 ? 15 : \
+                                (b) >=  150 ? 18 : \
+                                /* b >= 100 */ 27)
+
+# define BN_num_bytes(a) ((BN_num_bits(a)+7)/8)
+
+int BN_abs_is_word(const BIGNUM *a, const BN_ULONG w);
+int BN_is_zero(const BIGNUM *a);
+int BN_is_one(const BIGNUM *a);
+int BN_is_word(const BIGNUM *a, const BN_ULONG w);
+int BN_is_odd(const BIGNUM *a);
+
+# define BN_one(a)       (BN_set_word((a),1))
+
+void BN_zero_ex(BIGNUM *a);
+
+# if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT >= 0x00908000L
+#  define BN_zero(a)      BN_zero_ex(a)
+# else
+#  define BN_zero(a)      (BN_set_word((a),0))
+# endif
+
+const BIGNUM *BN_value_one(void);
+char *BN_options(void);
+BN_CTX *BN_CTX_new(void);
+BN_CTX *BN_CTX_secure_new(void);
+void BN_CTX_free(BN_CTX *c);
+void BN_CTX_start(BN_CTX *ctx);
+BIGNUM *BN_CTX_get(BN_CTX *ctx);
+void BN_CTX_end(BN_CTX *ctx);
+int BN_rand(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom);
+int BN_pseudo_rand(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom);
+int BN_rand_range(BIGNUM *rnd, const BIGNUM *range);
+int BN_pseudo_rand_range(BIGNUM *rnd, const BIGNUM *range);
+int BN_num_bits(const BIGNUM *a);
+int BN_num_bits_word(BN_ULONG l);
+int BN_security_bits(int L, int N);
+BIGNUM *BN_new(void);
+BIGNUM *BN_secure_new(void);
+void BN_clear_free(BIGNUM *a);
+BIGNUM *BN_copy(BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b);
+void BN_swap(BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b);
+BIGNUM *BN_bin2bn(const unsigned char *s, int len, BIGNUM *ret);
+int BN_bn2bin(const BIGNUM *a, unsigned char *to);
+int BN_bn2binpad(const BIGNUM *a, unsigned char *to, int tolen);
+BIGNUM *BN_lebin2bn(const unsigned char *s, int len, BIGNUM *ret);
+int BN_bn2lebinpad(const BIGNUM *a, unsigned char *to, int tolen);
+BIGNUM *BN_mpi2bn(const unsigned char *s, int len, BIGNUM *ret);
+int BN_bn2mpi(const BIGNUM *a, unsigned char *to);
+int BN_sub(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b);
+int BN_usub(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b);
+int BN_uadd(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b);
+int BN_add(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b);
+int BN_mul(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int BN_sqr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *ctx);
+/** BN_set_negative sets sign of a BIGNUM
+ * \param  b  pointer to the BIGNUM object
+ * \param  n  0 if the BIGNUM b should be positive and a value != 0 otherwise
+ */
+void BN_set_negative(BIGNUM *b, int n);
+/** BN_is_negative returns 1 if the BIGNUM is negative
+ * \param  b  pointer to the BIGNUM object
+ * \return 1 if a < 0 and 0 otherwise
+ */
+int BN_is_negative(const BIGNUM *b);
+
+int BN_div(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *m, const BIGNUM *d,
+           BN_CTX *ctx);
+# define BN_mod(rem,m,d,ctx) BN_div(NULL,(rem),(m),(d),(ctx))
+int BN_nnmod(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *m, const BIGNUM *d, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int BN_mod_add(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *m,
+               BN_CTX *ctx);
+int BN_mod_add_quick(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
+                     const BIGNUM *m);
+int BN_mod_sub(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *m,
+               BN_CTX *ctx);
+int BN_mod_sub_quick(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
+                     const BIGNUM *m);
+int BN_mod_mul(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *m,
+               BN_CTX *ctx);
+int BN_mod_sqr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int BN_mod_lshift1(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int BN_mod_lshift1_quick(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *m);
+int BN_mod_lshift(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, int n, const BIGNUM *m,
+                  BN_CTX *ctx);
+int BN_mod_lshift_quick(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, int n, const BIGNUM *m);
+
+BN_ULONG BN_mod_word(const BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w);
+BN_ULONG BN_div_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w);
+int BN_mul_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w);
+int BN_add_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w);
+int BN_sub_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w);
+int BN_set_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w);
+BN_ULONG BN_get_word(const BIGNUM *a);
+
+int BN_cmp(const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b);
+void BN_free(BIGNUM *a);
+int BN_is_bit_set(const BIGNUM *a, int n);
+int BN_lshift(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, int n);
+int BN_lshift1(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a);
+int BN_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+int BN_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
+               const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int BN_mod_exp_mont(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
+                    const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx);
+int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
+                              const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx,
+                              BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont);
+int BN_mod_exp_mont_word(BIGNUM *r, BN_ULONG a, const BIGNUM *p,
+                         const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx);
+int BN_mod_exp2_mont(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a1, const BIGNUM *p1,
+                     const BIGNUM *a2, const BIGNUM *p2, const BIGNUM *m,
+                     BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx);
+int BN_mod_exp_simple(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
+                      const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+int BN_mask_bits(BIGNUM *a, int n);
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+int BN_print_fp(FILE *fp, const BIGNUM *a);
+# endif
+int BN_print(BIO *bio, const BIGNUM *a);
+int BN_reciprocal(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *m, int len, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int BN_rshift(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, int n);
+int BN_rshift1(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a);
+void BN_clear(BIGNUM *a);
+BIGNUM *BN_dup(const BIGNUM *a);
+int BN_ucmp(const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b);
+int BN_set_bit(BIGNUM *a, int n);
+int BN_clear_bit(BIGNUM *a, int n);
+char *BN_bn2hex(const BIGNUM *a);
+char *BN_bn2dec(const BIGNUM *a);
+int BN_hex2bn(BIGNUM **a, const char *str);
+int BN_dec2bn(BIGNUM **a, const char *str);
+int BN_asc2bn(BIGNUM **a, const char *str);
+int BN_gcd(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int BN_kronecker(const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx); /* returns
+                                                                  * -2 for
+                                                                  * error */
+BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *ret,
+                       const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n, BN_CTX *ctx);
+BIGNUM *BN_mod_sqrt(BIGNUM *ret,
+                    const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+void BN_consttime_swap(BN_ULONG swap, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, int nwords);
+
+/* Deprecated versions */
+DEPRECATEDIN_0_9_8(BIGNUM *BN_generate_prime(BIGNUM *ret, int bits, int safe,
+                                             const BIGNUM *add,
+                                             const BIGNUM *rem,
+                                             void (*callback) (int, int,
+                                                               void *),
+                                             void *cb_arg))
+DEPRECATEDIN_0_9_8(int
+                   BN_is_prime(const BIGNUM *p, int nchecks,
+                               void (*callback) (int, int, void *),
+                               BN_CTX *ctx, void *cb_arg))
+DEPRECATEDIN_0_9_8(int
+                   BN_is_prime_fasttest(const BIGNUM *p, int nchecks,
+                                        void (*callback) (int, int, void *),
+                                        BN_CTX *ctx, void *cb_arg,
+                                        int do_trial_division))
+
+/* Newer versions */
+int BN_generate_prime_ex(BIGNUM *ret, int bits, int safe, const BIGNUM *add,
+                         const BIGNUM *rem, BN_GENCB *cb);
+int BN_is_prime_ex(const BIGNUM *p, int nchecks, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_GENCB *cb);
+int BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(const BIGNUM *p, int nchecks, BN_CTX *ctx,
+                            int do_trial_division, BN_GENCB *cb);
+
+int BN_X931_generate_Xpq(BIGNUM *Xp, BIGNUM *Xq, int nbits, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+int BN_X931_derive_prime_ex(BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *p1, BIGNUM *p2,
+                            const BIGNUM *Xp, const BIGNUM *Xp1,
+                            const BIGNUM *Xp2, const BIGNUM *e, BN_CTX *ctx,
+                            BN_GENCB *cb);
+int BN_X931_generate_prime_ex(BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *p1, BIGNUM *p2, BIGNUM *Xp1,
+                              BIGNUM *Xp2, const BIGNUM *Xp, const BIGNUM *e,
+                              BN_CTX *ctx, BN_GENCB *cb);
+
+BN_MONT_CTX *BN_MONT_CTX_new(void);
+int BN_mod_mul_montgomery(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
+                          BN_MONT_CTX *mont, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int BN_to_montgomery(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_MONT_CTX *mont,
+                     BN_CTX *ctx);
+int BN_from_montgomery(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_MONT_CTX *mont,
+                       BN_CTX *ctx);
+void BN_MONT_CTX_free(BN_MONT_CTX *mont);
+int BN_MONT_CTX_set(BN_MONT_CTX *mont, const BIGNUM *mod, BN_CTX *ctx);
+BN_MONT_CTX *BN_MONT_CTX_copy(BN_MONT_CTX *to, BN_MONT_CTX *from);
+BN_MONT_CTX *BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(BN_MONT_CTX **pmont, CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock,
+                                    const BIGNUM *mod, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+/* BN_BLINDING flags */
+# define BN_BLINDING_NO_UPDATE   0x00000001
+# define BN_BLINDING_NO_RECREATE 0x00000002
+
+BN_BLINDING *BN_BLINDING_new(const BIGNUM *A, const BIGNUM *Ai, BIGNUM *mod);
+void BN_BLINDING_free(BN_BLINDING *b);
+int BN_BLINDING_update(BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int BN_BLINDING_convert(BIGNUM *n, BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int BN_BLINDING_invert(BIGNUM *n, BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *r, BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *);
+int BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(BIGNUM *n, const BIGNUM *r, BN_BLINDING *b,
+                          BN_CTX *);
+
+int BN_BLINDING_is_current_thread(BN_BLINDING *b);
+void BN_BLINDING_set_current_thread(BN_BLINDING *b);
+int BN_BLINDING_lock(BN_BLINDING *b);
+int BN_BLINDING_unlock(BN_BLINDING *b);
+
+unsigned long BN_BLINDING_get_flags(const BN_BLINDING *);
+void BN_BLINDING_set_flags(BN_BLINDING *, unsigned long);
+BN_BLINDING *BN_BLINDING_create_param(BN_BLINDING *b,
+                                      const BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx,
+                                      int (*bn_mod_exp) (BIGNUM *r,
+                                                         const BIGNUM *a,
+                                                         const BIGNUM *p,
+                                                         const BIGNUM *m,
+                                                         BN_CTX *ctx,
+                                                         BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx),
+                                      BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx);
+
+DEPRECATEDIN_0_9_8(void BN_set_params(int mul, int high, int low, int mont))
+DEPRECATEDIN_0_9_8(int BN_get_params(int which)) /* 0, mul, 1 high, 2 low, 3
+                                                  * mont */
+
+BN_RECP_CTX *BN_RECP_CTX_new(void);
+void BN_RECP_CTX_free(BN_RECP_CTX *recp);
+int BN_RECP_CTX_set(BN_RECP_CTX *recp, const BIGNUM *rdiv, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int BN_mod_mul_reciprocal(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y,
+                          BN_RECP_CTX *recp, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int BN_mod_exp_recp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
+                    const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int BN_div_recp(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *m,
+                BN_RECP_CTX *recp, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+
+/*
+ * Functions for arithmetic over binary polynomials represented by BIGNUMs.
+ * The BIGNUM::neg property of BIGNUMs representing binary polynomials is
+ * ignored. Note that input arguments are not const so that their bit arrays
+ * can be expanded to the appropriate size if needed.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * r = a + b
+ */
+int BN_GF2m_add(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b);
+#  define BN_GF2m_sub(r, a, b) BN_GF2m_add(r, a, b)
+/*
+ * r=a mod p
+ */
+int BN_GF2m_mod(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p);
+/* r = (a * b) mod p */
+int BN_GF2m_mod_mul(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
+                    const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx);
+/* r = (a * a) mod p */
+int BN_GF2m_mod_sqr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx);
+/* r = (1 / b) mod p */
+int BN_GF2m_mod_inv(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx);
+/* r = (a / b) mod p */
+int BN_GF2m_mod_div(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
+                    const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx);
+/* r = (a ^ b) mod p */
+int BN_GF2m_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
+                    const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx);
+/* r = sqrt(a) mod p */
+int BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
+                     BN_CTX *ctx);
+/* r^2 + r = a mod p */
+int BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
+                           BN_CTX *ctx);
+#  define BN_GF2m_cmp(a, b) BN_ucmp((a), (b))
+/*-
+ * Some functions allow for representation of the irreducible polynomials
+ * as an unsigned int[], say p.  The irreducible f(t) is then of the form:
+ *     t^p[0] + t^p[1] + ... + t^p[k]
+ * where m = p[0] > p[1] > ... > p[k] = 0.
+ */
+/* r = a mod p */
+int BN_GF2m_mod_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const int p[]);
+/* r = (a * b) mod p */
+int BN_GF2m_mod_mul_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
+                        const int p[], BN_CTX *ctx);
+/* r = (a * a) mod p */
+int BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const int p[],
+                        BN_CTX *ctx);
+/* r = (1 / b) mod p */
+int BN_GF2m_mod_inv_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *b, const int p[],
+                        BN_CTX *ctx);
+/* r = (a / b) mod p */
+int BN_GF2m_mod_div_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
+                        const int p[], BN_CTX *ctx);
+/* r = (a ^ b) mod p */
+int BN_GF2m_mod_exp_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
+                        const int p[], BN_CTX *ctx);
+/* r = sqrt(a) mod p */
+int BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
+                         const int p[], BN_CTX *ctx);
+/* r^2 + r = a mod p */
+int BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
+                               const int p[], BN_CTX *ctx);
+int BN_GF2m_poly2arr(const BIGNUM *a, int p[], int max);
+int BN_GF2m_arr2poly(const int p[], BIGNUM *a);
+
+# endif
+
+/*
+ * faster mod functions for the 'NIST primes' 0 <= a < p^2
+ */
+int BN_nist_mod_192(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int BN_nist_mod_224(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int BN_nist_mod_256(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int BN_nist_mod_384(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int BN_nist_mod_521(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+const BIGNUM *BN_get0_nist_prime_192(void);
+const BIGNUM *BN_get0_nist_prime_224(void);
+const BIGNUM *BN_get0_nist_prime_256(void);
+const BIGNUM *BN_get0_nist_prime_384(void);
+const BIGNUM *BN_get0_nist_prime_521(void);
+
+int (*BN_nist_mod_func(const BIGNUM *p)) (BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
+                                          const BIGNUM *field, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+int BN_generate_dsa_nonce(BIGNUM *out, const BIGNUM *range,
+                          const BIGNUM *priv, const unsigned char *message,
+                          size_t message_len, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+/* Primes from RFC 2409 */
+BIGNUM *BN_get_rfc2409_prime_768(BIGNUM *bn);
+BIGNUM *BN_get_rfc2409_prime_1024(BIGNUM *bn);
+
+/* Primes from RFC 3526 */
+BIGNUM *BN_get_rfc3526_prime_1536(BIGNUM *bn);
+BIGNUM *BN_get_rfc3526_prime_2048(BIGNUM *bn);
+BIGNUM *BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(BIGNUM *bn);
+BIGNUM *BN_get_rfc3526_prime_4096(BIGNUM *bn);
+BIGNUM *BN_get_rfc3526_prime_6144(BIGNUM *bn);
+BIGNUM *BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(BIGNUM *bn);
+
+# if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+#  define get_rfc2409_prime_768 BN_get_rfc2409_prime_768
+#  define get_rfc2409_prime_1024 BN_get_rfc2409_prime_1024
+#  define get_rfc3526_prime_1536 BN_get_rfc3526_prime_1536
+#  define get_rfc3526_prime_2048 BN_get_rfc3526_prime_2048
+#  define get_rfc3526_prime_3072 BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072
+#  define get_rfc3526_prime_4096 BN_get_rfc3526_prime_4096
+#  define get_rfc3526_prime_6144 BN_get_rfc3526_prime_6144
+#  define get_rfc3526_prime_8192 BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192
+# endif
+
+int BN_bntest_rand(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom);
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+/*
+ * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
+ * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
+ */
+
+int ERR_load_BN_strings(void);
+
+/* Error codes for the BN functions. */
+
+/* Function codes. */
+# define BN_F_BNRAND                                      127
+# define BN_F_BN_BLINDING_CONVERT_EX                      100
+# define BN_F_BN_BLINDING_CREATE_PARAM                    128
+# define BN_F_BN_BLINDING_INVERT_EX                       101
+# define BN_F_BN_BLINDING_NEW                             102
+# define BN_F_BN_BLINDING_UPDATE                          103
+# define BN_F_BN_BN2DEC                                   104
+# define BN_F_BN_BN2HEX                                   105
+# define BN_F_BN_COMPUTE_WNAF                             142
+# define BN_F_BN_CTX_GET                                  116
+# define BN_F_BN_CTX_NEW                                  106
+# define BN_F_BN_CTX_START                                129
+# define BN_F_BN_DIV                                      107
+# define BN_F_BN_DIV_RECP                                 130
+# define BN_F_BN_EXP                                      123
+# define BN_F_BN_EXPAND_INTERNAL                          120
+# define BN_F_BN_GENCB_NEW                                143
+# define BN_F_BN_GENERATE_DSA_NONCE                       140
+# define BN_F_BN_GENERATE_PRIME_EX                        141
+# define BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD                                 131
+# define BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_EXP                             132
+# define BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_MUL                             133
+# define BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_SOLVE_QUAD                      134
+# define BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_SOLVE_QUAD_ARR                  135
+# define BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_SQR                             136
+# define BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_SQRT                            137
+# define BN_F_BN_LSHIFT                                   145
+# define BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP2_MONT                            118
+# define BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_MONT                             109
+# define BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_MONT_CONSTTIME                   124
+# define BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_MONT_WORD                        117
+# define BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_RECP                             125
+# define BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_SIMPLE                           126
+# define BN_F_BN_MOD_INVERSE                              110
+# define BN_F_BN_MOD_INVERSE_NO_BRANCH                    139
+# define BN_F_BN_MOD_LSHIFT_QUICK                         119
+# define BN_F_BN_MOD_SQRT                                 121
+# define BN_F_BN_MPI2BN                                   112
+# define BN_F_BN_NEW                                      113
+# define BN_F_BN_RAND                                     114
+# define BN_F_BN_RAND_RANGE                               122
+# define BN_F_BN_RSHIFT                                   146
+# define BN_F_BN_SET_WORDS                                144
+# define BN_F_BN_USUB                                     115
+
+/* Reason codes. */
+# define BN_R_ARG2_LT_ARG3                                100
+# define BN_R_BAD_RECIPROCAL                              101
+# define BN_R_BIGNUM_TOO_LONG                             114
+# define BN_R_BITS_TOO_SMALL                              118
+# define BN_R_CALLED_WITH_EVEN_MODULUS                    102
+# define BN_R_DIV_BY_ZERO                                 103
+# define BN_R_ENCODING_ERROR                              104
+# define BN_R_EXPAND_ON_STATIC_BIGNUM_DATA                105
+# define BN_R_INPUT_NOT_REDUCED                           110
+# define BN_R_INVALID_LENGTH                              106
+# define BN_R_INVALID_RANGE                               115
+# define BN_R_INVALID_SHIFT                               119
+# define BN_R_NOT_A_SQUARE                                111
+# define BN_R_NOT_INITIALIZED                             107
+# define BN_R_NO_INVERSE                                  108
+# define BN_R_NO_SOLUTION                                 116
+# define BN_R_PRIVATE_KEY_TOO_LARGE                       117
+# define BN_R_P_IS_NOT_PRIME                              112
+# define BN_R_TOO_MANY_ITERATIONS                         113
+# define BN_R_TOO_MANY_TEMPORARY_VARIABLES                109
+
+# ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+# endif
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/buffer.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/buffer.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..35160b4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/buffer.h
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_BUFFER_H
+# define HEADER_BUFFER_H
+
+# include <openssl/ossl_typ.h>
+# ifndef HEADER_CRYPTO_H
+#  include <openssl/crypto.h>
+# endif
+
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+# include <stddef.h>
+# include <sys/types.h>
+
+/*
+ * These names are outdated as of OpenSSL 1.1; a future release
+ * will move them to be deprecated.
+ */
+# define BUF_strdup(s) OPENSSL_strdup(s)
+# define BUF_strndup(s, size) OPENSSL_strndup(s, size)
+# define BUF_memdup(data, size) OPENSSL_memdup(data, size)
+# define BUF_strlcpy(dst, src, size)  OPENSSL_strlcpy(dst, src, size)
+# define BUF_strlcat(dst, src, size) OPENSSL_strlcat(dst, src, size)
+# define BUF_strnlen(str, maxlen) OPENSSL_strnlen(str, maxlen)
+
+struct buf_mem_st {
+    size_t length;              /* current number of bytes */
+    char *data;
+    size_t max;                 /* size of buffer */
+    unsigned long flags;
+};
+
+# define BUF_MEM_FLAG_SECURE  0x01
+
+BUF_MEM *BUF_MEM_new(void);
+BUF_MEM *BUF_MEM_new_ex(unsigned long flags);
+void BUF_MEM_free(BUF_MEM *a);
+size_t BUF_MEM_grow(BUF_MEM *str, size_t len);
+size_t BUF_MEM_grow_clean(BUF_MEM *str, size_t len);
+void BUF_reverse(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t siz);
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+/*
+ * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
+ * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
+ */
+
+int ERR_load_BUF_strings(void);
+
+/* Error codes for the BUF functions. */
+
+/* Function codes. */
+# define BUF_F_BUF_MEM_GROW                               100
+# define BUF_F_BUF_MEM_GROW_CLEAN                         105
+# define BUF_F_BUF_MEM_NEW                                101
+
+/* Reason codes. */
+
+# ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+# endif
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/camellia.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/camellia.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..151f3c1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/camellia.h
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_CAMELLIA_H
+# define HEADER_CAMELLIA_H
+
+# include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA
+# include <stddef.h>
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+# define CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT        1
+# define CAMELLIA_DECRYPT        0
+
+/*
+ * Because array size can't be a const in C, the following two are macros.
+ * Both sizes are in bytes.
+ */
+
+/* This should be a hidden type, but EVP requires that the size be known */
+
+# define CAMELLIA_BLOCK_SIZE 16
+# define CAMELLIA_TABLE_BYTE_LEN 272
+# define CAMELLIA_TABLE_WORD_LEN (CAMELLIA_TABLE_BYTE_LEN / 4)
+
+typedef unsigned int KEY_TABLE_TYPE[CAMELLIA_TABLE_WORD_LEN]; /* to match
+                                                               * with WORD */
+
+struct camellia_key_st {
+    union {
+        double d;               /* ensures 64-bit align */
+        KEY_TABLE_TYPE rd_key;
+    } u;
+    int grand_rounds;
+};
+typedef struct camellia_key_st CAMELLIA_KEY;
+
+int Camellia_set_key(const unsigned char *userKey, const int bits,
+                     CAMELLIA_KEY *key);
+
+void Camellia_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                      const CAMELLIA_KEY *key);
+void Camellia_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                      const CAMELLIA_KEY *key);
+
+void Camellia_ecb_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                          const CAMELLIA_KEY *key, const int enc);
+void Camellia_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                          size_t length, const CAMELLIA_KEY *key,
+                          unsigned char *ivec, const int enc);
+void Camellia_cfb128_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                             size_t length, const CAMELLIA_KEY *key,
+                             unsigned char *ivec, int *num, const int enc);
+void Camellia_cfb1_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                           size_t length, const CAMELLIA_KEY *key,
+                           unsigned char *ivec, int *num, const int enc);
+void Camellia_cfb8_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                           size_t length, const CAMELLIA_KEY *key,
+                           unsigned char *ivec, int *num, const int enc);
+void Camellia_ofb128_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                             size_t length, const CAMELLIA_KEY *key,
+                             unsigned char *ivec, int *num);
+void Camellia_ctr128_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                             size_t length, const CAMELLIA_KEY *key,
+                             unsigned char ivec[CAMELLIA_BLOCK_SIZE],
+                             unsigned char ecount_buf[CAMELLIA_BLOCK_SIZE],
+                             unsigned int *num);
+
+# ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+# endif
+# endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/cast.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/cast.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2cc89ae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/cast.h
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_CAST_H
+# define HEADER_CAST_H
+
+# include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAST
+# ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+# endif
+
+# define CAST_ENCRYPT    1
+# define CAST_DECRYPT    0
+
+# define CAST_LONG unsigned int
+
+# define CAST_BLOCK      8
+# define CAST_KEY_LENGTH 16
+
+typedef struct cast_key_st {
+    CAST_LONG data[32];
+    int short_key;              /* Use reduced rounds for short key */
+} CAST_KEY;
+
+void CAST_set_key(CAST_KEY *key, int len, const unsigned char *data);
+void CAST_ecb_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                      const CAST_KEY *key, int enc);
+void CAST_encrypt(CAST_LONG *data, const CAST_KEY *key);
+void CAST_decrypt(CAST_LONG *data, const CAST_KEY *key);
+void CAST_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                      long length, const CAST_KEY *ks, unsigned char *iv,
+                      int enc);
+void CAST_cfb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                        long length, const CAST_KEY *schedule,
+                        unsigned char *ivec, int *num, int enc);
+void CAST_ofb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                        long length, const CAST_KEY *schedule,
+                        unsigned char *ivec, int *num);
+
+# ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+# endif
+# endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/cmac.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/cmac.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3535a9a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/cmac.h
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2010-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_CMAC_H
+# define HEADER_CMAC_H
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMAC
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+# include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+/* Opaque */
+typedef struct CMAC_CTX_st CMAC_CTX;
+
+CMAC_CTX *CMAC_CTX_new(void);
+void CMAC_CTX_cleanup(CMAC_CTX *ctx);
+void CMAC_CTX_free(CMAC_CTX *ctx);
+EVP_CIPHER_CTX *CMAC_CTX_get0_cipher_ctx(CMAC_CTX *ctx);
+int CMAC_CTX_copy(CMAC_CTX *out, const CMAC_CTX *in);
+
+int CMAC_Init(CMAC_CTX *ctx, const void *key, size_t keylen,
+              const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, ENGINE *impl);
+int CMAC_Update(CMAC_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t dlen);
+int CMAC_Final(CMAC_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *poutlen);
+int CMAC_resume(CMAC_CTX *ctx);
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+# endif
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/cms.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/cms.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7e534e0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/cms.h
@@ -0,0 +1,512 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_CMS_H
+# define HEADER_CMS_H
+
+# include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
+# include <openssl/x509.h>
+# include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+# ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+# endif
+
+typedef struct CMS_ContentInfo_st CMS_ContentInfo;
+typedef struct CMS_SignerInfo_st CMS_SignerInfo;
+typedef struct CMS_CertificateChoices CMS_CertificateChoices;
+typedef struct CMS_RevocationInfoChoice_st CMS_RevocationInfoChoice;
+typedef struct CMS_RecipientInfo_st CMS_RecipientInfo;
+typedef struct CMS_ReceiptRequest_st CMS_ReceiptRequest;
+typedef struct CMS_Receipt_st CMS_Receipt;
+typedef struct CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_st CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey;
+typedef struct CMS_OtherKeyAttribute_st CMS_OtherKeyAttribute;
+
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(CMS_SignerInfo)
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey)
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientInfo)
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(CMS_RevocationInfoChoice)
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(CMS_ContentInfo)
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(CMS_ReceiptRequest)
+DECLARE_ASN1_PRINT_FUNCTION(CMS_ContentInfo)
+
+# define CMS_SIGNERINFO_ISSUER_SERIAL    0
+# define CMS_SIGNERINFO_KEYIDENTIFIER    1
+
+# define CMS_RECIPINFO_NONE              -1
+# define CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS             0
+# define CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE             1
+# define CMS_RECIPINFO_KEK               2
+# define CMS_RECIPINFO_PASS              3
+# define CMS_RECIPINFO_OTHER             4
+
+/* S/MIME related flags */
+
+# define CMS_TEXT                        0x1
+# define CMS_NOCERTS                     0x2
+# define CMS_NO_CONTENT_VERIFY           0x4
+# define CMS_NO_ATTR_VERIFY              0x8
+# define CMS_NOSIGS                      \
+                        (CMS_NO_CONTENT_VERIFY|CMS_NO_ATTR_VERIFY)
+# define CMS_NOINTERN                    0x10
+# define CMS_NO_SIGNER_CERT_VERIFY       0x20
+# define CMS_NOVERIFY                    0x20
+# define CMS_DETACHED                    0x40
+# define CMS_BINARY                      0x80
+# define CMS_NOATTR                      0x100
+# define CMS_NOSMIMECAP                  0x200
+# define CMS_NOOLDMIMETYPE               0x400
+# define CMS_CRLFEOL                     0x800
+# define CMS_STREAM                      0x1000
+# define CMS_NOCRL                       0x2000
+# define CMS_PARTIAL                     0x4000
+# define CMS_REUSE_DIGEST                0x8000
+# define CMS_USE_KEYID                   0x10000
+# define CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT               0x20000
+# define CMS_KEY_PARAM                   0x40000
+# define CMS_ASCIICRLF                   0x80000
+
+const ASN1_OBJECT *CMS_get0_type(const CMS_ContentInfo *cms);
+
+BIO *CMS_dataInit(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, BIO *icont);
+int CMS_dataFinal(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, BIO *bio);
+
+ASN1_OCTET_STRING **CMS_get0_content(CMS_ContentInfo *cms);
+int CMS_is_detached(CMS_ContentInfo *cms);
+int CMS_set_detached(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, int detached);
+
+# ifdef HEADER_PEM_H
+DECLARE_PEM_rw_const(CMS, CMS_ContentInfo)
+# endif
+int CMS_stream(unsigned char ***boundary, CMS_ContentInfo *cms);
+CMS_ContentInfo *d2i_CMS_bio(BIO *bp, CMS_ContentInfo **cms);
+int i2d_CMS_bio(BIO *bp, CMS_ContentInfo *cms);
+
+BIO *BIO_new_CMS(BIO *out, CMS_ContentInfo *cms);
+int i2d_CMS_bio_stream(BIO *out, CMS_ContentInfo *cms, BIO *in, int flags);
+int PEM_write_bio_CMS_stream(BIO *out, CMS_ContentInfo *cms, BIO *in,
+                             int flags);
+CMS_ContentInfo *SMIME_read_CMS(BIO *bio, BIO **bcont);
+int SMIME_write_CMS(BIO *bio, CMS_ContentInfo *cms, BIO *data, int flags);
+
+int CMS_final(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, BIO *data, BIO *dcont,
+              unsigned int flags);
+
+CMS_ContentInfo *CMS_sign(X509 *signcert, EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+                          STACK_OF(X509) *certs, BIO *data,
+                          unsigned int flags);
+
+CMS_ContentInfo *CMS_sign_receipt(CMS_SignerInfo *si,
+                                  X509 *signcert, EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+                                  STACK_OF(X509) *certs, unsigned int flags);
+
+int CMS_data(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, BIO *out, unsigned int flags);
+CMS_ContentInfo *CMS_data_create(BIO *in, unsigned int flags);
+
+int CMS_digest_verify(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, BIO *dcont, BIO *out,
+                      unsigned int flags);
+CMS_ContentInfo *CMS_digest_create(BIO *in, const EVP_MD *md,
+                                   unsigned int flags);
+
+int CMS_EncryptedData_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
+                              const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
+                              BIO *dcont, BIO *out, unsigned int flags);
+
+CMS_ContentInfo *CMS_EncryptedData_encrypt(BIO *in, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
+                                           const unsigned char *key,
+                                           size_t keylen, unsigned int flags);
+
+int CMS_EncryptedData_set1_key(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, const EVP_CIPHER *ciph,
+                               const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen);
+
+int CMS_verify(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
+               X509_STORE *store, BIO *dcont, BIO *out, unsigned int flags);
+
+int CMS_verify_receipt(CMS_ContentInfo *rcms, CMS_ContentInfo *ocms,
+                       STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
+                       X509_STORE *store, unsigned int flags);
+
+STACK_OF(X509) *CMS_get0_signers(CMS_ContentInfo *cms);
+
+CMS_ContentInfo *CMS_encrypt(STACK_OF(X509) *certs, BIO *in,
+                             const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, unsigned int flags);
+
+int CMS_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *cert,
+                BIO *dcont, BIO *out, unsigned int flags);
+
+int CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, EVP_PKEY *pk, X509 *cert);
+int CMS_decrypt_set1_key(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
+                         unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
+                         const unsigned char *id, size_t idlen);
+int CMS_decrypt_set1_password(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
+                              unsigned char *pass, ossl_ssize_t passlen);
+
+STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientInfo) *CMS_get0_RecipientInfos(CMS_ContentInfo *cms);
+int CMS_RecipientInfo_type(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri);
+EVP_PKEY_CTX *CMS_RecipientInfo_get0_pkey_ctx(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri);
+CMS_ContentInfo *CMS_EnvelopedData_create(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher);
+CMS_RecipientInfo *CMS_add1_recipient_cert(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
+                                           X509 *recip, unsigned int flags);
+int CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_pkey(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+int CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_cert_cmp(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509 *cert);
+int CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_get0_algs(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
+                                     EVP_PKEY **pk, X509 **recip,
+                                     X509_ALGOR **palg);
+int CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_get0_signer_id(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
+                                          ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid,
+                                          X509_NAME **issuer,
+                                          ASN1_INTEGER **sno);
+
+CMS_RecipientInfo *CMS_add0_recipient_key(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, int nid,
+                                          unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
+                                          unsigned char *id, size_t idlen,
+                                          ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *date,
+                                          ASN1_OBJECT *otherTypeId,
+                                          ASN1_TYPE *otherType);
+
+int CMS_RecipientInfo_kekri_get0_id(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
+                                    X509_ALGOR **palg,
+                                    ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pid,
+                                    ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **pdate,
+                                    ASN1_OBJECT **potherid,
+                                    ASN1_TYPE **pothertype);
+
+int CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_key(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
+                               unsigned char *key, size_t keylen);
+
+int CMS_RecipientInfo_kekri_id_cmp(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
+                                   const unsigned char *id, size_t idlen);
+
+int CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_password(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
+                                    unsigned char *pass,
+                                    ossl_ssize_t passlen);
+
+CMS_RecipientInfo *CMS_add0_recipient_password(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
+                                               int iter, int wrap_nid,
+                                               int pbe_nid,
+                                               unsigned char *pass,
+                                               ossl_ssize_t passlen,
+                                               const EVP_CIPHER *kekciph);
+
+int CMS_RecipientInfo_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, CMS_RecipientInfo *ri);
+int CMS_RecipientInfo_encrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, CMS_RecipientInfo *ri);
+
+int CMS_uncompress(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, BIO *dcont, BIO *out,
+                   unsigned int flags);
+CMS_ContentInfo *CMS_compress(BIO *in, int comp_nid, unsigned int flags);
+
+int CMS_set1_eContentType(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, const ASN1_OBJECT *oid);
+const ASN1_OBJECT *CMS_get0_eContentType(CMS_ContentInfo *cms);
+
+CMS_CertificateChoices *CMS_add0_CertificateChoices(CMS_ContentInfo *cms);
+int CMS_add0_cert(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, X509 *cert);
+int CMS_add1_cert(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, X509 *cert);
+STACK_OF(X509) *CMS_get1_certs(CMS_ContentInfo *cms);
+
+CMS_RevocationInfoChoice *CMS_add0_RevocationInfoChoice(CMS_ContentInfo *cms);
+int CMS_add0_crl(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, X509_CRL *crl);
+int CMS_add1_crl(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, X509_CRL *crl);
+STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *CMS_get1_crls(CMS_ContentInfo *cms);
+
+int CMS_SignedData_init(CMS_ContentInfo *cms);
+CMS_SignerInfo *CMS_add1_signer(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
+                                X509 *signer, EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md,
+                                unsigned int flags);
+EVP_PKEY_CTX *CMS_SignerInfo_get0_pkey_ctx(CMS_SignerInfo *si);
+EVP_MD_CTX *CMS_SignerInfo_get0_md_ctx(CMS_SignerInfo *si);
+STACK_OF(CMS_SignerInfo) *CMS_get0_SignerInfos(CMS_ContentInfo *cms);
+
+void CMS_SignerInfo_set1_signer_cert(CMS_SignerInfo *si, X509 *signer);
+int CMS_SignerInfo_get0_signer_id(CMS_SignerInfo *si,
+                                  ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid,
+                                  X509_NAME **issuer, ASN1_INTEGER **sno);
+int CMS_SignerInfo_cert_cmp(CMS_SignerInfo *si, X509 *cert);
+int CMS_set1_signers_certs(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
+                           unsigned int flags);
+void CMS_SignerInfo_get0_algs(CMS_SignerInfo *si, EVP_PKEY **pk,
+                              X509 **signer, X509_ALGOR **pdig,
+                              X509_ALGOR **psig);
+ASN1_OCTET_STRING *CMS_SignerInfo_get0_signature(CMS_SignerInfo *si);
+int CMS_SignerInfo_sign(CMS_SignerInfo *si);
+int CMS_SignerInfo_verify(CMS_SignerInfo *si);
+int CMS_SignerInfo_verify_content(CMS_SignerInfo *si, BIO *chain);
+
+int CMS_add_smimecap(CMS_SignerInfo *si, STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) *algs);
+int CMS_add_simple_smimecap(STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) **algs,
+                            int algnid, int keysize);
+int CMS_add_standard_smimecap(STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) **smcap);
+
+int CMS_signed_get_attr_count(const CMS_SignerInfo *si);
+int CMS_signed_get_attr_by_NID(const CMS_SignerInfo *si, int nid,
+                               int lastpos);
+int CMS_signed_get_attr_by_OBJ(const CMS_SignerInfo *si, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj,
+                               int lastpos);
+X509_ATTRIBUTE *CMS_signed_get_attr(const CMS_SignerInfo *si, int loc);
+X509_ATTRIBUTE *CMS_signed_delete_attr(CMS_SignerInfo *si, int loc);
+int CMS_signed_add1_attr(CMS_SignerInfo *si, X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr);
+int CMS_signed_add1_attr_by_OBJ(CMS_SignerInfo *si,
+                                const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int type,
+                                const void *bytes, int len);
+int CMS_signed_add1_attr_by_NID(CMS_SignerInfo *si,
+                                int nid, int type,
+                                const void *bytes, int len);
+int CMS_signed_add1_attr_by_txt(CMS_SignerInfo *si,
+                                const char *attrname, int type,
+                                const void *bytes, int len);
+void *CMS_signed_get0_data_by_OBJ(CMS_SignerInfo *si, const ASN1_OBJECT *oid,
+                                  int lastpos, int type);
+
+int CMS_unsigned_get_attr_count(const CMS_SignerInfo *si);
+int CMS_unsigned_get_attr_by_NID(const CMS_SignerInfo *si, int nid,
+                                 int lastpos);
+int CMS_unsigned_get_attr_by_OBJ(const CMS_SignerInfo *si,
+                                 const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int lastpos);
+X509_ATTRIBUTE *CMS_unsigned_get_attr(const CMS_SignerInfo *si, int loc);
+X509_ATTRIBUTE *CMS_unsigned_delete_attr(CMS_SignerInfo *si, int loc);
+int CMS_unsigned_add1_attr(CMS_SignerInfo *si, X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr);
+int CMS_unsigned_add1_attr_by_OBJ(CMS_SignerInfo *si,
+                                  const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int type,
+                                  const void *bytes, int len);
+int CMS_unsigned_add1_attr_by_NID(CMS_SignerInfo *si,
+                                  int nid, int type,
+                                  const void *bytes, int len);
+int CMS_unsigned_add1_attr_by_txt(CMS_SignerInfo *si,
+                                  const char *attrname, int type,
+                                  const void *bytes, int len);
+void *CMS_unsigned_get0_data_by_OBJ(CMS_SignerInfo *si, ASN1_OBJECT *oid,
+                                    int lastpos, int type);
+
+# ifdef HEADER_X509V3_H
+
+int CMS_get1_ReceiptRequest(CMS_SignerInfo *si, CMS_ReceiptRequest **prr);
+CMS_ReceiptRequest *CMS_ReceiptRequest_create0(unsigned char *id, int idlen,
+                                               int allorfirst,
+                                               STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAMES)
+                                               *receiptList, STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAMES)
+                                               *receiptsTo);
+int CMS_add1_ReceiptRequest(CMS_SignerInfo *si, CMS_ReceiptRequest *rr);
+void CMS_ReceiptRequest_get0_values(CMS_ReceiptRequest *rr,
+                                    ASN1_STRING **pcid,
+                                    int *pallorfirst,
+                                    STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAMES) **plist,
+                                    STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAMES) **prto);
+# endif
+int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_alg(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
+                                    X509_ALGOR **palg,
+                                    ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pukm);
+STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey)
+*CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_reks(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri);
+
+int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_orig_id(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
+                                        X509_ALGOR **pubalg,
+                                        ASN1_BIT_STRING **pubkey,
+                                        ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid,
+                                        X509_NAME **issuer,
+                                        ASN1_INTEGER **sno);
+
+int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_orig_id_cmp(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509 *cert);
+
+int CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_get0_id(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek,
+                                      ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid,
+                                      ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **tm,
+                                      CMS_OtherKeyAttribute **other,
+                                      X509_NAME **issuer, ASN1_INTEGER **sno);
+int CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_cert_cmp(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek,
+                                       X509 *cert);
+int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_set0_pkey(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, EVP_PKEY *pk);
+EVP_CIPHER_CTX *CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_ctx(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri);
+int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
+                                   CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
+                                   CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek);
+
+int CMS_SharedInfo_encode(unsigned char **pder, X509_ALGOR *kekalg,
+                          ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ukm, int keylen);
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+/*
+ * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
+ * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
+ */
+
+int ERR_load_CMS_strings(void);
+
+/* Error codes for the CMS functions. */
+
+/* Function codes. */
+# define CMS_F_CHECK_CONTENT                              99
+# define CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_CERT                              164
+# define CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_KEY                     100
+# define CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_PASSWORD                165
+# define CMS_F_CMS_ADD1_RECEIPTREQUEST                    158
+# define CMS_F_CMS_ADD1_RECIPIENT_CERT                    101
+# define CMS_F_CMS_ADD1_SIGNER                            102
+# define CMS_F_CMS_ADD1_SIGNINGTIME                       103
+# define CMS_F_CMS_COMPRESS                               104
+# define CMS_F_CMS_COMPRESSEDDATA_CREATE                  105
+# define CMS_F_CMS_COMPRESSEDDATA_INIT_BIO                106
+# define CMS_F_CMS_COPY_CONTENT                           107
+# define CMS_F_CMS_COPY_MESSAGEDIGEST                     108
+# define CMS_F_CMS_DATA                                   109
+# define CMS_F_CMS_DATAFINAL                              110
+# define CMS_F_CMS_DATAINIT                               111
+# define CMS_F_CMS_DECRYPT                                112
+# define CMS_F_CMS_DECRYPT_SET1_KEY                       113
+# define CMS_F_CMS_DECRYPT_SET1_PASSWORD                  166
+# define CMS_F_CMS_DECRYPT_SET1_PKEY                      114
+# define CMS_F_CMS_DIGESTALGORITHM_FIND_CTX               115
+# define CMS_F_CMS_DIGESTALGORITHM_INIT_BIO               116
+# define CMS_F_CMS_DIGESTEDDATA_DO_FINAL                  117
+# define CMS_F_CMS_DIGEST_VERIFY                          118
+# define CMS_F_CMS_ENCODE_RECEIPT                         161
+# define CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPT                                119
+# define CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO              120
+# define CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDDATA_DECRYPT                  121
+# define CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDDATA_ENCRYPT                  122
+# define CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDDATA_SET1_KEY                 123
+# define CMS_F_CMS_ENVELOPEDDATA_CREATE                   124
+# define CMS_F_CMS_ENVELOPEDDATA_INIT_BIO                 125
+# define CMS_F_CMS_ENVELOPED_DATA_INIT                    126
+# define CMS_F_CMS_ENV_ASN1_CTRL                          171
+# define CMS_F_CMS_FINAL                                  127
+# define CMS_F_CMS_GET0_CERTIFICATE_CHOICES               128
+# define CMS_F_CMS_GET0_CONTENT                           129
+# define CMS_F_CMS_GET0_ECONTENT_TYPE                     130
+# define CMS_F_CMS_GET0_ENVELOPED                         131
+# define CMS_F_CMS_GET0_REVOCATION_CHOICES                132
+# define CMS_F_CMS_GET0_SIGNED                            133
+# define CMS_F_CMS_MSGSIGDIGEST_ADD1                      162
+# define CMS_F_CMS_RECEIPTREQUEST_CREATE0                 159
+# define CMS_F_CMS_RECEIPT_VERIFY                         160
+# define CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_DECRYPT                  134
+# define CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_ENCRYPT                  169
+# define CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_ENCRYPT             178
+# define CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_GET0_ALG            175
+# define CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_GET0_ORIG_ID        173
+# define CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_GET0_REKS           172
+# define CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_ORIG_ID_CMP         174
+# define CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KEKRI_DECRYPT            135
+# define CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KEKRI_ENCRYPT            136
+# define CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KEKRI_GET0_ID            137
+# define CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KEKRI_ID_CMP             138
+# define CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KTRI_CERT_CMP            139
+# define CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KTRI_DECRYPT             140
+# define CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KTRI_ENCRYPT             141
+# define CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KTRI_GET0_ALGS           142
+# define CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KTRI_GET0_SIGNER_ID      143
+# define CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_PWRI_CRYPT               167
+# define CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_SET0_KEY                 144
+# define CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_SET0_PASSWORD            168
+# define CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_SET0_PKEY                145
+# define CMS_F_CMS_SD_ASN1_CTRL                           170
+# define CMS_F_CMS_SET1_IAS                               176
+# define CMS_F_CMS_SET1_KEYID                             177
+# define CMS_F_CMS_SET1_SIGNERIDENTIFIER                  146
+# define CMS_F_CMS_SET_DETACHED                           147
+# define CMS_F_CMS_SIGN                                   148
+# define CMS_F_CMS_SIGNED_DATA_INIT                       149
+# define CMS_F_CMS_SIGNERINFO_CONTENT_SIGN                150
+# define CMS_F_CMS_SIGNERINFO_SIGN                        151
+# define CMS_F_CMS_SIGNERINFO_VERIFY                      152
+# define CMS_F_CMS_SIGNERINFO_VERIFY_CERT                 153
+# define CMS_F_CMS_SIGNERINFO_VERIFY_CONTENT              154
+# define CMS_F_CMS_SIGN_RECEIPT                           163
+# define CMS_F_CMS_STREAM                                 155
+# define CMS_F_CMS_UNCOMPRESS                             156
+# define CMS_F_CMS_VERIFY                                 157
+
+/* Reason codes. */
+# define CMS_R_ADD_SIGNER_ERROR                           99
+# define CMS_R_CERTIFICATE_ALREADY_PRESENT                175
+# define CMS_R_CERTIFICATE_HAS_NO_KEYID                   160
+# define CMS_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR                   100
+# define CMS_R_CIPHER_INITIALISATION_ERROR                101
+# define CMS_R_CIPHER_PARAMETER_INITIALISATION_ERROR      102
+# define CMS_R_CMS_DATAFINAL_ERROR                        103
+# define CMS_R_CMS_LIB                                    104
+# define CMS_R_CONTENTIDENTIFIER_MISMATCH                 170
+# define CMS_R_CONTENT_NOT_FOUND                          105
+# define CMS_R_CONTENT_TYPE_MISMATCH                      171
+# define CMS_R_CONTENT_TYPE_NOT_COMPRESSED_DATA           106
+# define CMS_R_CONTENT_TYPE_NOT_ENVELOPED_DATA            107
+# define CMS_R_CONTENT_TYPE_NOT_SIGNED_DATA               108
+# define CMS_R_CONTENT_VERIFY_ERROR                       109
+# define CMS_R_CTRL_ERROR                                 110
+# define CMS_R_CTRL_FAILURE                               111
+# define CMS_R_DECRYPT_ERROR                              112
+# define CMS_R_ERROR_GETTING_PUBLIC_KEY                   113
+# define CMS_R_ERROR_READING_MESSAGEDIGEST_ATTRIBUTE      114
+# define CMS_R_ERROR_SETTING_KEY                          115
+# define CMS_R_ERROR_SETTING_RECIPIENTINFO                116
+# define CMS_R_INVALID_ENCRYPTED_KEY_LENGTH               117
+# define CMS_R_INVALID_KEY_ENCRYPTION_PARAMETER           176
+# define CMS_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH                         118
+# define CMS_R_MD_BIO_INIT_ERROR                          119
+# define CMS_R_MESSAGEDIGEST_ATTRIBUTE_WRONG_LENGTH       120
+# define CMS_R_MESSAGEDIGEST_WRONG_LENGTH                 121
+# define CMS_R_MSGSIGDIGEST_ERROR                         172
+# define CMS_R_MSGSIGDIGEST_VERIFICATION_FAILURE          162
+# define CMS_R_MSGSIGDIGEST_WRONG_LENGTH                  163
+# define CMS_R_NEED_ONE_SIGNER                            164
+# define CMS_R_NOT_A_SIGNED_RECEIPT                       165
+# define CMS_R_NOT_ENCRYPTED_DATA                         122
+# define CMS_R_NOT_KEK                                    123
+# define CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT                          181
+# define CMS_R_NOT_KEY_TRANSPORT                          124
+# define CMS_R_NOT_PWRI                                   177
+# define CMS_R_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEY_TYPE            125
+# define CMS_R_NO_CIPHER                                  126
+# define CMS_R_NO_CONTENT                                 127
+# define CMS_R_NO_CONTENT_TYPE                            173
+# define CMS_R_NO_DEFAULT_DIGEST                          128
+# define CMS_R_NO_DIGEST_SET                              129
+# define CMS_R_NO_KEY                                     130
+# define CMS_R_NO_KEY_OR_CERT                             174
+# define CMS_R_NO_MATCHING_DIGEST                         131
+# define CMS_R_NO_MATCHING_RECIPIENT                      132
+# define CMS_R_NO_MATCHING_SIGNATURE                      166
+# define CMS_R_NO_MSGSIGDIGEST                            167
+# define CMS_R_NO_PASSWORD                                178
+# define CMS_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY                             133
+# define CMS_R_NO_PUBLIC_KEY                              134
+# define CMS_R_NO_RECEIPT_REQUEST                         168
+# define CMS_R_NO_SIGNERS                                 135
+# define CMS_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DOES_NOT_MATCH_CERTIFICATE     136
+# define CMS_R_RECEIPT_DECODE_ERROR                       169
+# define CMS_R_RECIPIENT_ERROR                            137
+# define CMS_R_SIGNER_CERTIFICATE_NOT_FOUND               138
+# define CMS_R_SIGNFINAL_ERROR                            139
+# define CMS_R_SMIME_TEXT_ERROR                           140
+# define CMS_R_STORE_INIT_ERROR                           141
+# define CMS_R_TYPE_NOT_COMPRESSED_DATA                   142
+# define CMS_R_TYPE_NOT_DATA                              143
+# define CMS_R_TYPE_NOT_DIGESTED_DATA                     144
+# define CMS_R_TYPE_NOT_ENCRYPTED_DATA                    145
+# define CMS_R_TYPE_NOT_ENVELOPED_DATA                    146
+# define CMS_R_UNABLE_TO_FINALIZE_CONTEXT                 147
+# define CMS_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER                             148
+# define CMS_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST_ALGORIHM                    149
+# define CMS_R_UNKNOWN_ID                                 150
+# define CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM          151
+# define CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_CONTENT_TYPE                   152
+# define CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEK_ALGORITHM                  153
+# define CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM       179
+# define CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_RECIPIENT_TYPE                 154
+# define CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_RECPIENTINFO_TYPE              155
+# define CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_TYPE                           156
+# define CMS_R_UNWRAP_ERROR                               157
+# define CMS_R_UNWRAP_FAILURE                             180
+# define CMS_R_VERIFICATION_FAILURE                       158
+# define CMS_R_WRAP_ERROR                                 159
+
+#  ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+#  endif
+# endif
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/comp.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/comp.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..260ff1e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/comp.h
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_COMP_H
+# define HEADER_COMP_H
+
+# include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+# include <openssl/crypto.h>
+# ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+# endif
+
+
+
+COMP_CTX *COMP_CTX_new(COMP_METHOD *meth);
+const COMP_METHOD *COMP_CTX_get_method(const COMP_CTX *ctx);
+int COMP_CTX_get_type(const COMP_CTX* comp);
+int COMP_get_type(const COMP_METHOD *meth);
+const char *COMP_get_name(const COMP_METHOD *meth);
+void COMP_CTX_free(COMP_CTX *ctx);
+
+int COMP_compress_block(COMP_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int olen,
+                        unsigned char *in, int ilen);
+int COMP_expand_block(COMP_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int olen,
+                      unsigned char *in, int ilen);
+
+COMP_METHOD *COMP_zlib(void);
+
+#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+#define COMP_zlib_cleanup() while(0) continue
+#endif
+
+# ifdef HEADER_BIO_H
+#  ifdef ZLIB
+const BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_zlib(void);
+#  endif
+# endif
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+/*
+ * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
+ * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
+ */
+
+int ERR_load_COMP_strings(void);
+
+/* Error codes for the COMP functions. */
+
+/* Function codes. */
+# define COMP_F_BIO_ZLIB_FLUSH                            99
+# define COMP_F_BIO_ZLIB_NEW                              100
+# define COMP_F_BIO_ZLIB_READ                             101
+# define COMP_F_BIO_ZLIB_WRITE                            102
+
+/* Reason codes. */
+# define COMP_R_ZLIB_DEFLATE_ERROR                        99
+# define COMP_R_ZLIB_INFLATE_ERROR                        100
+# define COMP_R_ZLIB_NOT_SUPPORTED                        101
+
+#  ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+#  endif
+# endif
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/conf.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/conf.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..980a51b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/conf.h
@@ -0,0 +1,217 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef  HEADER_CONF_H
+# define HEADER_CONF_H
+
+# include <openssl/bio.h>
+# include <openssl/lhash.h>
+# include <openssl/stack.h>
+# include <openssl/safestack.h>
+# include <openssl/e_os2.h>
+
+# include <openssl/ossl_typ.h>
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+typedef struct {
+    char *section;
+    char *name;
+    char *value;
+} CONF_VALUE;
+
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE)
+DEFINE_LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE);
+
+struct conf_st;
+struct conf_method_st;
+typedef struct conf_method_st CONF_METHOD;
+
+struct conf_method_st {
+    const char *name;
+    CONF *(*create) (CONF_METHOD *meth);
+    int (*init) (CONF *conf);
+    int (*destroy) (CONF *conf);
+    int (*destroy_data) (CONF *conf);
+    int (*load_bio) (CONF *conf, BIO *bp, long *eline);
+    int (*dump) (const CONF *conf, BIO *bp);
+    int (*is_number) (const CONF *conf, char c);
+    int (*to_int) (const CONF *conf, char c);
+    int (*load) (CONF *conf, const char *name, long *eline);
+};
+
+/* Module definitions */
+
+typedef struct conf_imodule_st CONF_IMODULE;
+typedef struct conf_module_st CONF_MODULE;
+
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(CONF_MODULE)
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(CONF_IMODULE)
+
+/* DSO module function typedefs */
+typedef int conf_init_func (CONF_IMODULE *md, const CONF *cnf);
+typedef void conf_finish_func (CONF_IMODULE *md);
+
+# define CONF_MFLAGS_IGNORE_ERRORS       0x1
+# define CONF_MFLAGS_IGNORE_RETURN_CODES 0x2
+# define CONF_MFLAGS_SILENT              0x4
+# define CONF_MFLAGS_NO_DSO              0x8
+# define CONF_MFLAGS_IGNORE_MISSING_FILE 0x10
+# define CONF_MFLAGS_DEFAULT_SECTION     0x20
+
+int CONF_set_default_method(CONF_METHOD *meth);
+void CONF_set_nconf(CONF *conf, LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *hash);
+LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *CONF_load(LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *conf, const char *file,
+                                long *eline);
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *CONF_load_fp(LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *conf, FILE *fp,
+                                   long *eline);
+# endif
+LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *CONF_load_bio(LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *conf, BIO *bp,
+                                    long *eline);
+STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *CONF_get_section(LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *conf,
+                                       const char *section);
+char *CONF_get_string(LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *conf, const char *group,
+                      const char *name);
+long CONF_get_number(LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *conf, const char *group,
+                     const char *name);
+void CONF_free(LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *conf);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+int CONF_dump_fp(LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *conf, FILE *out);
+#endif
+int CONF_dump_bio(LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *conf, BIO *out);
+
+DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(void OPENSSL_config(const char *config_name))
+
+#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+# define OPENSSL_no_config() \
+    OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_NO_LOAD_CONFIG, NULL)
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * New conf code.  The semantics are different from the functions above. If
+ * that wasn't the case, the above functions would have been replaced
+ */
+
+struct conf_st {
+    CONF_METHOD *meth;
+    void *meth_data;
+    LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *data;
+};
+
+CONF *NCONF_new(CONF_METHOD *meth);
+CONF_METHOD *NCONF_default(void);
+CONF_METHOD *NCONF_WIN32(void);
+void NCONF_free(CONF *conf);
+void NCONF_free_data(CONF *conf);
+
+int NCONF_load(CONF *conf, const char *file, long *eline);
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+int NCONF_load_fp(CONF *conf, FILE *fp, long *eline);
+# endif
+int NCONF_load_bio(CONF *conf, BIO *bp, long *eline);
+STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *NCONF_get_section(const CONF *conf,
+                                        const char *section);
+char *NCONF_get_string(const CONF *conf, const char *group, const char *name);
+int NCONF_get_number_e(const CONF *conf, const char *group, const char *name,
+                       long *result);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+int NCONF_dump_fp(const CONF *conf, FILE *out);
+#endif
+int NCONF_dump_bio(const CONF *conf, BIO *out);
+
+#define NCONF_get_number(c,g,n,r) NCONF_get_number_e(c,g,n,r)
+
+/* Module functions */
+
+int CONF_modules_load(const CONF *cnf, const char *appname,
+                      unsigned long flags);
+int CONF_modules_load_file(const char *filename, const char *appname,
+                           unsigned long flags);
+void CONF_modules_unload(int all);
+void CONF_modules_finish(void);
+#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+# define CONF_modules_free() while(0) continue
+#endif
+int CONF_module_add(const char *name, conf_init_func *ifunc,
+                    conf_finish_func *ffunc);
+
+const char *CONF_imodule_get_name(const CONF_IMODULE *md);
+const char *CONF_imodule_get_value(const CONF_IMODULE *md);
+void *CONF_imodule_get_usr_data(const CONF_IMODULE *md);
+void CONF_imodule_set_usr_data(CONF_IMODULE *md, void *usr_data);
+CONF_MODULE *CONF_imodule_get_module(const CONF_IMODULE *md);
+unsigned long CONF_imodule_get_flags(const CONF_IMODULE *md);
+void CONF_imodule_set_flags(CONF_IMODULE *md, unsigned long flags);
+void *CONF_module_get_usr_data(CONF_MODULE *pmod);
+void CONF_module_set_usr_data(CONF_MODULE *pmod, void *usr_data);
+
+char *CONF_get1_default_config_file(void);
+
+int CONF_parse_list(const char *list, int sep, int nospc,
+                    int (*list_cb) (const char *elem, int len, void *usr),
+                    void *arg);
+
+void OPENSSL_load_builtin_modules(void);
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+/*
+ * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
+ * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
+ */
+
+int ERR_load_CONF_strings(void);
+
+/* Error codes for the CONF functions. */
+
+/* Function codes. */
+# define CONF_F_CONF_DUMP_FP                              104
+# define CONF_F_CONF_LOAD                                 100
+# define CONF_F_CONF_LOAD_FP                              103
+# define CONF_F_CONF_PARSE_LIST                           119
+# define CONF_F_DEF_LOAD                                  120
+# define CONF_F_DEF_LOAD_BIO                              121
+# define CONF_F_MODULE_INIT                               115
+# define CONF_F_MODULE_LOAD_DSO                           117
+# define CONF_F_MODULE_RUN                                118
+# define CONF_F_NCONF_DUMP_BIO                            105
+# define CONF_F_NCONF_DUMP_FP                             106
+# define CONF_F_NCONF_GET_NUMBER_E                        112
+# define CONF_F_NCONF_GET_SECTION                         108
+# define CONF_F_NCONF_GET_STRING                          109
+# define CONF_F_NCONF_LOAD                                113
+# define CONF_F_NCONF_LOAD_BIO                            110
+# define CONF_F_NCONF_LOAD_FP                             114
+# define CONF_F_NCONF_NEW                                 111
+# define CONF_F_STR_COPY                                  101
+
+/* Reason codes. */
+# define CONF_R_ERROR_LOADING_DSO                         110
+# define CONF_R_LIST_CANNOT_BE_NULL                       115
+# define CONF_R_MISSING_CLOSE_SQUARE_BRACKET              100
+# define CONF_R_MISSING_EQUAL_SIGN                        101
+# define CONF_R_MISSING_INIT_FUNCTION                     112
+# define CONF_R_MODULE_INITIALIZATION_ERROR               109
+# define CONF_R_NO_CLOSE_BRACE                            102
+# define CONF_R_NO_CONF                                   105
+# define CONF_R_NO_CONF_OR_ENVIRONMENT_VARIABLE           106
+# define CONF_R_NO_SECTION                                107
+# define CONF_R_NO_SUCH_FILE                              114
+# define CONF_R_NO_VALUE                                  108
+# define CONF_R_UNABLE_TO_CREATE_NEW_SECTION              103
+# define CONF_R_UNKNOWN_MODULE_NAME                       113
+# define CONF_R_VARIABLE_EXPANSION_TOO_LONG               116
+# define CONF_R_VARIABLE_HAS_NO_VALUE                     104
+
+# ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+# endif
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/conf_api.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/conf_api.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a0275ad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/conf_api.h
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef  HEADER_CONF_API_H
+# define HEADER_CONF_API_H
+
+# include <openssl/lhash.h>
+# include <openssl/conf.h>
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/* Up until OpenSSL 0.9.5a, this was new_section */
+CONF_VALUE *_CONF_new_section(CONF *conf, const char *section);
+/* Up until OpenSSL 0.9.5a, this was get_section */
+CONF_VALUE *_CONF_get_section(const CONF *conf, const char *section);
+/* Up until OpenSSL 0.9.5a, this was CONF_get_section */
+STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *_CONF_get_section_values(const CONF *conf,
+                                               const char *section);
+
+int _CONF_add_string(CONF *conf, CONF_VALUE *section, CONF_VALUE *value);
+char *_CONF_get_string(const CONF *conf, const char *section,
+                       const char *name);
+long _CONF_get_number(const CONF *conf, const char *section,
+                      const char *name);
+
+int _CONF_new_data(CONF *conf);
+void _CONF_free_data(CONF *conf);
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/crypto.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/crypto.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1ba7f25
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/crypto.h
@@ -0,0 +1,467 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ * ECDH support in OpenSSL originally developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_CRYPTO_H
+# define HEADER_CRYPTO_H
+
+# include <stdlib.h>
+# include <time.h>
+
+# include <openssl/e_os2.h>
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+#  include <stdio.h>
+# endif
+
+# include <openssl/stack.h>
+# include <openssl/safestack.h>
+# include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+# include <openssl/ossl_typ.h>
+# include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+
+# ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+#  include <openssl/ebcdic.h>
+# endif
+
+/*
+ * Resolve problems on some operating systems with symbol names that clash
+ * one way or another
+ */
+# include <openssl/symhacks.h>
+
+# if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+#  include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+# endif
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+# if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+#  define SSLeay                  OpenSSL_version_num
+#  define SSLeay_version          OpenSSL_version
+#  define SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER   OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER
+#  define SSLEAY_VERSION          OPENSSL_VERSION
+#  define SSLEAY_CFLAGS           OPENSSL_CFLAGS
+#  define SSLEAY_BUILT_ON         OPENSSL_BUILT_ON
+#  define SSLEAY_PLATFORM         OPENSSL_PLATFORM
+#  define SSLEAY_DIR              OPENSSL_DIR
+
+/*
+ * Old type for allocating dynamic locks. No longer used. Use the new thread
+ * API instead.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+    int dummy;
+} CRYPTO_dynlock;
+
+# endif /* OPENSSL_API_COMPAT */
+
+typedef void CRYPTO_RWLOCK;
+
+CRYPTO_RWLOCK *CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(void);
+int CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock);
+int CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock);
+int CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock);
+void CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock);
+
+int CRYPTO_atomic_add(int *val, int amount, int *ret, CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock);
+
+/*
+ * The following can be used to detect memory leaks in the library. If
+ * used, it turns on malloc checking
+ */
+# define CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_OFF     0x0   /* Control only */
+# define CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON      0x1   /* Control and mode bit */
+# define CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE  0x2   /* Control and mode bit */
+# define CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_DISABLE 0x3   /* Control only */
+
+struct crypto_ex_data_st {
+    STACK_OF(void) *sk;
+};
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(void)
+
+/*
+ * Per class, we have a STACK of function pointers.
+ */
+# define CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL              0
+# define CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX          1
+# define CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION      2
+# define CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509             3
+# define CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE       4
+# define CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX   5
+# define CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_DH               6
+# define CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_DSA              7
+# define CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_EC_KEY           8
+# define CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RSA              9
+# define CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_ENGINE          10
+# define CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_UI              11
+# define CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_BIO             12
+# define CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_APP             13
+# define CRYPTO_EX_INDEX__COUNT          14
+
+/*
+ * This is the default callbacks, but we can have others as well: this is
+ * needed in Win32 where the application malloc and the library malloc may
+ * not be the same.
+ */
+#define OPENSSL_malloc_init() \
+    CRYPTO_set_mem_functions(CRYPTO_malloc, CRYPTO_realloc, CRYPTO_free)
+
+int CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(int mode);
+
+# define OPENSSL_malloc(num) \
+        CRYPTO_malloc(num, OPENSSL_FILE, OPENSSL_LINE)
+# define OPENSSL_zalloc(num) \
+        CRYPTO_zalloc(num, OPENSSL_FILE, OPENSSL_LINE)
+# define OPENSSL_realloc(addr, num) \
+        CRYPTO_realloc(addr, num, OPENSSL_FILE, OPENSSL_LINE)
+# define OPENSSL_clear_realloc(addr, old_num, num) \
+        CRYPTO_clear_realloc(addr, old_num, num, OPENSSL_FILE, OPENSSL_LINE)
+# define OPENSSL_clear_free(addr, num) \
+        CRYPTO_clear_free(addr, num, OPENSSL_FILE, OPENSSL_LINE)
+# define OPENSSL_free(addr) \
+        CRYPTO_free(addr, OPENSSL_FILE, OPENSSL_LINE)
+# define OPENSSL_memdup(str, s) \
+        CRYPTO_memdup((str), s, OPENSSL_FILE, OPENSSL_LINE)
+# define OPENSSL_strdup(str) \
+        CRYPTO_strdup(str, OPENSSL_FILE, OPENSSL_LINE)
+# define OPENSSL_strndup(str, n) \
+        CRYPTO_strndup(str, n, OPENSSL_FILE, OPENSSL_LINE)
+# define OPENSSL_secure_malloc(num) \
+        CRYPTO_secure_malloc(num, OPENSSL_FILE, OPENSSL_LINE)
+# define OPENSSL_secure_zalloc(num) \
+        CRYPTO_secure_zalloc(num, OPENSSL_FILE, OPENSSL_LINE)
+# define OPENSSL_secure_free(addr) \
+        CRYPTO_secure_free(addr, OPENSSL_FILE, OPENSSL_LINE)
+# define OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(addr, num) \
+        CRYPTO_secure_clear_free(addr, num, OPENSSL_FILE, OPENSSL_LINE)
+# define OPENSSL_secure_actual_size(ptr) \
+        CRYPTO_secure_actual_size(ptr)
+
+size_t OPENSSL_strlcpy(char *dst, const char *src, size_t siz);
+size_t OPENSSL_strlcat(char *dst, const char *src, size_t siz);
+size_t OPENSSL_strnlen(const char *str, size_t maxlen);
+char *OPENSSL_buf2hexstr(const unsigned char *buffer, long len);
+unsigned char *OPENSSL_hexstr2buf(const char *str, long *len);
+int OPENSSL_hexchar2int(unsigned char c);
+
+# define OPENSSL_MALLOC_MAX_NELEMS(type)  (((1U<<(sizeof(int)*8-1))-1)/sizeof(type))
+
+unsigned long OpenSSL_version_num(void);
+const char *OpenSSL_version(int type);
+# define OPENSSL_VERSION          0
+# define OPENSSL_CFLAGS           1
+# define OPENSSL_BUILT_ON         2
+# define OPENSSL_PLATFORM         3
+# define OPENSSL_DIR              4
+# define OPENSSL_ENGINES_DIR      5
+
+int OPENSSL_issetugid(void);
+
+typedef void CRYPTO_EX_new (void *parent, void *ptr, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad,
+                           int idx, long argl, void *argp);
+typedef void CRYPTO_EX_free (void *parent, void *ptr, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad,
+                             int idx, long argl, void *argp);
+typedef int CRYPTO_EX_dup (CRYPTO_EX_DATA *to, const CRYPTO_EX_DATA *from,
+                           void *from_d, int idx, long argl, void *argp);
+__owur int CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(int class_index, long argl, void *argp,
+                            CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,
+                            CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func);
+/* No longer use an index. */
+int CRYPTO_free_ex_index(int class_index, int idx);
+
+/*
+ * Initialise/duplicate/free CRYPTO_EX_DATA variables corresponding to a
+ * given class (invokes whatever per-class callbacks are applicable)
+ */
+int CRYPTO_new_ex_data(int class_index, void *obj, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad);
+int CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(int class_index, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *to,
+                       const CRYPTO_EX_DATA *from);
+
+void CRYPTO_free_ex_data(int class_index, void *obj, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad);
+
+/*
+ * Get/set data in a CRYPTO_EX_DATA variable corresponding to a particular
+ * index (relative to the class type involved)
+ */
+int CRYPTO_set_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, int idx, void *val);
+void *CRYPTO_get_ex_data(const CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, int idx);
+
+# if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+/*
+ * This function cleans up all "ex_data" state. It mustn't be called under
+ * potential race-conditions.
+ */
+# define CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data() while(0) continue
+
+/*
+ * The old locking functions have been removed completely without compatibility
+ * macros. This is because the old functions either could not properly report
+ * errors, or the returned error values were not clearly documented.
+ * Replacing the locking functions with with no-ops would cause race condition
+ * issues in the affected applications. It is far better for them to fail at
+ * compile time.
+ * On the other hand, the locking callbacks are no longer used.  Consequently,
+ * the callback management functions can be safely replaced with no-op macros.
+ */
+#  define CRYPTO_num_locks()            (1)
+#  define CRYPTO_set_locking_callback(func)
+#  define CRYPTO_get_locking_callback()         (NULL)
+#  define CRYPTO_set_add_lock_callback(func)
+#  define CRYPTO_get_add_lock_callback()        (NULL)
+
+/*
+ * These defines where used in combination with the old locking callbacks,
+ * they are not called anymore, but old code that's not called might still
+ * use them.
+ */
+#  define CRYPTO_LOCK             1
+#  define CRYPTO_UNLOCK           2
+#  define CRYPTO_READ             4
+#  define CRYPTO_WRITE            8
+
+/* This structure is no longer used */
+typedef struct crypto_threadid_st {
+    int dummy;
+} CRYPTO_THREADID;
+/* Only use CRYPTO_THREADID_set_[numeric|pointer]() within callbacks */
+#  define CRYPTO_THREADID_set_numeric(id, val)
+#  define CRYPTO_THREADID_set_pointer(id, ptr)
+#  define CRYPTO_THREADID_set_callback(threadid_func)   (0)
+#  define CRYPTO_THREADID_get_callback()                (NULL)
+#  define CRYPTO_THREADID_current(id)
+#  define CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(a, b)                     (-1)
+#  define CRYPTO_THREADID_cpy(dest, src)
+#  define CRYPTO_THREADID_hash(id)                      (0UL)
+
+#  if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10000000L
+#   define CRYPTO_set_id_callback(func)
+#   define CRYPTO_get_id_callback()                     (NULL)
+#   define CRYPTO_thread_id()                           (0UL)
+#  endif /* OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10000000L */
+
+#  define CRYPTO_set_dynlock_create_callback(dyn_create_function)
+#  define CRYPTO_set_dynlock_lock_callback(dyn_lock_function)
+#  define CRYPTO_set_dynlock_destroy_callback(dyn_destroy_function)
+#  define CRYPTO_get_dynlock_create_callback()          (NULL)
+#  define CRYPTO_get_dynlock_lock_callback()            (NULL)
+#  define CRYPTO_get_dynlock_destroy_callback()         (NULL)
+# endif /* OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L */
+
+int CRYPTO_set_mem_functions(
+        void *(*m) (size_t, const char *, int),
+        void *(*r) (void *, size_t, const char *, int),
+        void (*f) (void *, const char *, int));
+int CRYPTO_set_mem_debug(int flag);
+void CRYPTO_get_mem_functions(
+        void *(**m) (size_t, const char *, int),
+        void *(**r) (void *, size_t, const char *, int),
+        void (**f) (void *, const char *, int));
+
+void *CRYPTO_malloc(size_t num, const char *file, int line);
+void *CRYPTO_zalloc(size_t num, const char *file, int line);
+void *CRYPTO_memdup(const void *str, size_t siz, const char *file, int line);
+char *CRYPTO_strdup(const char *str, const char *file, int line);
+char *CRYPTO_strndup(const char *str, size_t s, const char *file, int line);
+void CRYPTO_free(void *ptr, const char *file, int line);
+void CRYPTO_clear_free(void *ptr, size_t num, const char *file, int line);
+void *CRYPTO_realloc(void *addr, size_t num, const char *file, int line);
+void *CRYPTO_clear_realloc(void *addr, size_t old_num, size_t num,
+                           const char *file, int line);
+
+int CRYPTO_secure_malloc_init(size_t sz, int minsize);
+int CRYPTO_secure_malloc_done(void);
+void *CRYPTO_secure_malloc(size_t num, const char *file, int line);
+void *CRYPTO_secure_zalloc(size_t num, const char *file, int line);
+void CRYPTO_secure_free(void *ptr, const char *file, int line);
+void CRYPTO_secure_clear_free(void *ptr, size_t num,
+                              const char *file, int line);
+int CRYPTO_secure_allocated(const void *ptr);
+int CRYPTO_secure_malloc_initialized(void);
+size_t CRYPTO_secure_actual_size(void *ptr);
+size_t CRYPTO_secure_used(void);
+
+void OPENSSL_cleanse(void *ptr, size_t len);
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG
+#  define OPENSSL_mem_debug_push(info) \
+        CRYPTO_mem_debug_push(info, OPENSSL_FILE, OPENSSL_LINE)
+#  define OPENSSL_mem_debug_pop() \
+        CRYPTO_mem_debug_pop()
+int CRYPTO_mem_debug_push(const char *info, const char *file, int line);
+int CRYPTO_mem_debug_pop(void);
+
+/*-
+ * Debugging functions (enabled by CRYPTO_set_mem_debug(1))
+ * The flag argument has the following significance:
+ *   0:   called before the actual memory allocation has taken place
+ *   1:   called after the actual memory allocation has taken place
+ */
+void CRYPTO_mem_debug_malloc(void *addr, size_t num, int flag,
+        const char *file, int line);
+void CRYPTO_mem_debug_realloc(void *addr1, void *addr2, size_t num, int flag,
+        const char *file, int line);
+void CRYPTO_mem_debug_free(void *addr, int flag,
+        const char *file, int line);
+
+#  ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+int CRYPTO_mem_leaks_fp(FILE *);
+#  endif
+int CRYPTO_mem_leaks(BIO *bio);
+# endif
+
+/* die if we have to */
+ossl_noreturn void OPENSSL_die(const char *assertion, const char *file, int line);
+# if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+#  define OpenSSLDie(f,l,a) OPENSSL_die((a),(f),(l))
+# endif
+# define OPENSSL_assert(e) \
+    (void)((e) ? 0 : (OPENSSL_die("assertion failed: " #e, OPENSSL_FILE, OPENSSL_LINE), 1))
+
+int OPENSSL_isservice(void);
+
+int FIPS_mode(void);
+int FIPS_mode_set(int r);
+
+void OPENSSL_init(void);
+
+struct tm *OPENSSL_gmtime(const time_t *timer, struct tm *result);
+int OPENSSL_gmtime_adj(struct tm *tm, int offset_day, long offset_sec);
+int OPENSSL_gmtime_diff(int *pday, int *psec,
+                        const struct tm *from, const struct tm *to);
+
+/*
+ * CRYPTO_memcmp returns zero iff the |len| bytes at |a| and |b| are equal.
+ * It takes an amount of time dependent on |len|, but independent of the
+ * contents of |a| and |b|. Unlike memcmp, it cannot be used to put elements
+ * into a defined order as the return value when a != b is undefined, other
+ * than to be non-zero.
+ */
+int CRYPTO_memcmp(const volatile void * volatile in_a,
+                  const volatile void * volatile in_b,
+                  size_t len);
+
+/* Standard initialisation options */
+# define OPENSSL_INIT_NO_LOAD_CRYPTO_STRINGS 0x00000001L
+# define OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_CRYPTO_STRINGS    0x00000002L
+# define OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_CIPHERS        0x00000004L
+# define OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_DIGESTS        0x00000008L
+# define OPENSSL_INIT_NO_ADD_ALL_CIPHERS     0x00000010L
+# define OPENSSL_INIT_NO_ADD_ALL_DIGESTS     0x00000020L
+# define OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_CONFIG            0x00000040L
+# define OPENSSL_INIT_NO_LOAD_CONFIG         0x00000080L
+# define OPENSSL_INIT_ASYNC                  0x00000100L
+# define OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_RDRAND          0x00000200L
+# define OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_DYNAMIC         0x00000400L
+# define OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_OPENSSL         0x00000800L
+# define OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_CRYPTODEV       0x00001000L
+# define OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_CAPI            0x00002000L
+# define OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_PADLOCK         0x00004000L
+# define OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_AFALG           0x00008000L
+/* OPENSSL_INIT flag 0x00010000 reserved for internal use */
+/* OPENSSL_INIT flag range 0xfff00000 reserved for OPENSSL_init_ssl() */
+/* Max OPENSSL_INIT flag value is 0x80000000 */
+
+/* openssl and dasync not counted as builtin */
+# define OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_ALL_BUILTIN \
+    (OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_RDRAND | OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_DYNAMIC \
+    | OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_CRYPTODEV | OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_CAPI | \
+    OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_PADLOCK)
+
+
+/* Library initialisation functions */
+void OPENSSL_cleanup(void);
+int OPENSSL_init_crypto(uint64_t opts, const OPENSSL_INIT_SETTINGS *settings);
+int OPENSSL_atexit(void (*handler)(void));
+void OPENSSL_thread_stop(void);
+
+/* Low-level control of initialization */
+OPENSSL_INIT_SETTINGS *OPENSSL_INIT_new(void);
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+int OPENSSL_INIT_set_config_appname(OPENSSL_INIT_SETTINGS *settings,
+                                    const char *config_file);
+# endif
+void OPENSSL_INIT_free(OPENSSL_INIT_SETTINGS *settings);
+
+# if defined(OPENSSL_THREADS) && !defined(CRYPTO_TDEBUG)
+#  if defined(_WIN32)
+#   if defined(BASETYPES) || defined(_WINDEF_H)
+/* application has to include <windows.h> in order to use this */
+typedef DWORD CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL;
+typedef DWORD CRYPTO_THREAD_ID;
+
+typedef LONG CRYPTO_ONCE;
+#    define CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT 0
+#   endif
+#  else
+#   include <pthread.h>
+typedef pthread_once_t CRYPTO_ONCE;
+typedef pthread_key_t CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL;
+typedef pthread_t CRYPTO_THREAD_ID;
+
+#   define CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT PTHREAD_ONCE_INIT
+#  endif
+# endif
+
+# if !defined(CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT)
+typedef unsigned int CRYPTO_ONCE;
+typedef unsigned int CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL;
+typedef unsigned int CRYPTO_THREAD_ID;
+#  define CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT 0
+# endif
+
+int CRYPTO_THREAD_run_once(CRYPTO_ONCE *once, void (*init)(void));
+
+int CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local(CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL *key, void (*cleanup)(void *));
+void *CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL *key);
+int CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL *key, void *val);
+int CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL *key);
+
+CRYPTO_THREAD_ID CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id(void);
+int CRYPTO_THREAD_compare_id(CRYPTO_THREAD_ID a, CRYPTO_THREAD_ID b);
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+/*
+ * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
+ * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
+ */
+
+int ERR_load_CRYPTO_strings(void);
+
+/* Error codes for the CRYPTO functions. */
+
+/* Function codes. */
+# define CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_DUP_EX_DATA                      110
+# define CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_FREE_EX_DATA                     111
+# define CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_GET_EX_NEW_INDEX                 100
+# define CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_MEMDUP                           115
+# define CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_NEW_EX_DATA                      112
+# define CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_SET_EX_DATA                      102
+# define CRYPTO_F_FIPS_MODE_SET                           109
+# define CRYPTO_F_GET_AND_LOCK                            113
+# define CRYPTO_F_OPENSSL_BUF2HEXSTR                      117
+# define CRYPTO_F_OPENSSL_HEXSTR2BUF                      118
+# define CRYPTO_F_OPENSSL_INIT_CRYPTO                     116
+
+/* Reason codes. */
+# define CRYPTO_R_FIPS_MODE_NOT_SUPPORTED                 101
+# define CRYPTO_R_ILLEGAL_HEX_DIGIT                       102
+# define CRYPTO_R_ODD_NUMBER_OF_DIGITS                    103
+
+# ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+# endif
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/ct.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/ct.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bf29fba
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/ct.h
@@ -0,0 +1,533 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_CT_H
+# define HEADER_CT_H
+
+# include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
+# include <openssl/ossl_typ.h>
+# include <openssl/safestack.h>
+# include <openssl/x509.h>
+# ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+# endif
+
+
+/* Minimum RSA key size, from RFC6962 */
+# define SCT_MIN_RSA_BITS 2048
+
+/* All hashes are SHA256 in v1 of Certificate Transparency */
+# define CT_V1_HASHLEN SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH
+
+typedef enum {
+    CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_NOT_SET = -1,
+    CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_X509 = 0,
+    CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_PRECERT = 1
+} ct_log_entry_type_t;
+
+typedef enum {
+    SCT_VERSION_NOT_SET = -1,
+    SCT_VERSION_V1 = 0
+} sct_version_t;
+
+typedef enum {
+    SCT_SOURCE_UNKNOWN,
+    SCT_SOURCE_TLS_EXTENSION,
+    SCT_SOURCE_X509V3_EXTENSION,
+    SCT_SOURCE_OCSP_STAPLED_RESPONSE
+} sct_source_t;
+
+typedef enum {
+    SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET,
+    SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN_LOG,
+    SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_VALID,
+    SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_INVALID,
+    SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_UNVERIFIED,
+    SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN_VERSION
+} sct_validation_status_t;
+
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(SCT)
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(CTLOG)
+
+/******************************************
+ * CT policy evaluation context functions *
+ ******************************************/
+
+/*
+ * Creates a new, empty policy evaluation context.
+ * The caller is responsible for calling CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_free when finished
+ * with the CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX.
+ */
+CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_new(void);
+
+/* Deletes a policy evaluation context and anything it owns. */
+void CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_free(CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx);
+
+/* Gets the peer certificate that the SCTs are for */
+X509* CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_get0_cert(const CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx);
+
+/*
+ * Sets the certificate associated with the received SCTs.
+ * Increments the reference count of cert.
+ * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+int CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set1_cert(CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert);
+
+/* Gets the issuer of the aforementioned certificate */
+X509* CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_get0_issuer(const CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx);
+
+/*
+ * Sets the issuer of the certificate associated with the received SCTs.
+ * Increments the reference count of issuer.
+ * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+int CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set1_issuer(CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx, X509 *issuer);
+
+/* Gets the CT logs that are trusted sources of SCTs */
+const CTLOG_STORE *CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_get0_log_store(const CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx);
+
+/* Sets the log store that is in use. It must outlive the CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX. */
+void CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set_shared_CTLOG_STORE(CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx,
+                                               CTLOG_STORE *log_store);
+
+/*
+ * Gets the time, in milliseconds since the Unix epoch, that will be used as the
+ * current time when checking whether an SCT was issued in the future.
+ * Such SCTs will fail validation, as required by RFC6962.
+ */
+uint64_t CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_get_time(const CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx);
+
+/*
+ * Sets the time to evaluate SCTs against, in milliseconds since the Unix epoch.
+ * If an SCT's timestamp is after this time, it will be interpreted as having
+ * been issued in the future. RFC6962 states that "TLS clients MUST reject SCTs
+ * whose timestamp is in the future", so an SCT will not validate in this case.
+ */
+void CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set_time(CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx, uint64_t time_in_ms);
+
+/*****************
+ * SCT functions *
+ *****************/
+
+/*
+ * Creates a new, blank SCT.
+ * The caller is responsible for calling SCT_free when finished with the SCT.
+ */
+SCT *SCT_new(void);
+
+/*
+ * Creates a new SCT from some base64-encoded strings.
+ * The caller is responsible for calling SCT_free when finished with the SCT.
+ */
+SCT *SCT_new_from_base64(unsigned char version,
+                         const char *logid_base64,
+                         ct_log_entry_type_t entry_type,
+                         uint64_t timestamp,
+                         const char *extensions_base64,
+                         const char *signature_base64);
+
+/*
+ * Frees the SCT and the underlying data structures.
+ */
+void SCT_free(SCT *sct);
+
+/*
+ * Free a stack of SCTs, and the underlying SCTs themselves.
+ * Intended to be compatible with X509V3_EXT_FREE.
+ */
+void SCT_LIST_free(STACK_OF(SCT) *a);
+
+/*
+ * Returns the version of the SCT.
+ */
+sct_version_t SCT_get_version(const SCT *sct);
+
+/*
+ * Set the version of an SCT.
+ * Returns 1 on success, 0 if the version is unrecognized.
+ */
+__owur int SCT_set_version(SCT *sct, sct_version_t version);
+
+/*
+ * Returns the log entry type of the SCT.
+ */
+ct_log_entry_type_t SCT_get_log_entry_type(const SCT *sct);
+
+/*
+ * Set the log entry type of an SCT.
+ * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+__owur int SCT_set_log_entry_type(SCT *sct, ct_log_entry_type_t entry_type);
+
+/*
+ * Gets the ID of the log that an SCT came from.
+ * Ownership of the log ID remains with the SCT.
+ * Returns the length of the log ID.
+ */
+size_t SCT_get0_log_id(const SCT *sct, unsigned char **log_id);
+
+/*
+ * Set the log ID of an SCT to point directly to the *log_id specified.
+ * The SCT takes ownership of the specified pointer.
+ * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+__owur int SCT_set0_log_id(SCT *sct, unsigned char *log_id, size_t log_id_len);
+
+/*
+ * Set the log ID of an SCT.
+ * This makes a copy of the log_id.
+ * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+__owur int SCT_set1_log_id(SCT *sct, const unsigned char *log_id,
+                           size_t log_id_len);
+
+/*
+ * Returns the timestamp for the SCT (epoch time in milliseconds).
+ */
+uint64_t SCT_get_timestamp(const SCT *sct);
+
+/*
+ * Set the timestamp of an SCT (epoch time in milliseconds).
+ */
+void SCT_set_timestamp(SCT *sct, uint64_t timestamp);
+
+/*
+ * Return the NID for the signature used by the SCT.
+ * For CT v1, this will be either NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption or
+ * NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256 (or NID_undef if incorrect/unset).
+ */
+int SCT_get_signature_nid(const SCT *sct);
+
+/*
+ * Set the signature type of an SCT
+ * For CT v1, this should be either NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption or
+ * NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256.
+ * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+__owur int SCT_set_signature_nid(SCT *sct, int nid);
+
+/*
+ * Set *ext to point to the extension data for the SCT. ext must not be NULL.
+ * The SCT retains ownership of this pointer.
+ * Returns length of the data pointed to.
+ */
+size_t SCT_get0_extensions(const SCT *sct, unsigned char **ext);
+
+/*
+ * Set the extensions of an SCT to point directly to the *ext specified.
+ * The SCT takes ownership of the specified pointer.
+ */
+void SCT_set0_extensions(SCT *sct, unsigned char *ext, size_t ext_len);
+
+/*
+ * Set the extensions of an SCT.
+ * This takes a copy of the ext.
+ * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+__owur int SCT_set1_extensions(SCT *sct, const unsigned char *ext,
+                               size_t ext_len);
+
+/*
+ * Set *sig to point to the signature for the SCT. sig must not be NULL.
+ * The SCT retains ownership of this pointer.
+ * Returns length of the data pointed to.
+ */
+size_t SCT_get0_signature(const SCT *sct, unsigned char **sig);
+
+/*
+ * Set the signature of an SCT to point directly to the *sig specified.
+ * The SCT takes ownership of the specified pointer.
+ */
+void SCT_set0_signature(SCT *sct, unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len);
+
+/*
+ * Set the signature of an SCT to be a copy of the *sig specified.
+ * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+__owur int SCT_set1_signature(SCT *sct, const unsigned char *sig,
+                              size_t sig_len);
+
+/*
+ * The origin of this SCT, e.g. TLS extension, OCSP response, etc.
+ */
+sct_source_t SCT_get_source(const SCT *sct);
+
+/*
+ * Set the origin of this SCT, e.g. TLS extension, OCSP response, etc.
+ * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+__owur int SCT_set_source(SCT *sct, sct_source_t source);
+
+/*
+ * Returns a text string describing the validation status of |sct|.
+ */
+const char *SCT_validation_status_string(const SCT *sct);
+
+/*
+ * Pretty-prints an |sct| to |out|.
+ * It will be indented by the number of spaces specified by |indent|.
+ * If |logs| is not NULL, it will be used to lookup the CT log that the SCT came
+ * from, so that the log name can be printed.
+ */
+void SCT_print(const SCT *sct, BIO *out, int indent, const CTLOG_STORE *logs);
+
+/*
+ * Pretty-prints an |sct_list| to |out|.
+ * It will be indented by the number of spaces specified by |indent|.
+ * SCTs will be delimited by |separator|.
+ * If |logs| is not NULL, it will be used to lookup the CT log that each SCT
+ * came from, so that the log names can be printed.
+ */
+void SCT_LIST_print(const STACK_OF(SCT) *sct_list, BIO *out, int indent,
+                    const char *separator, const CTLOG_STORE *logs);
+
+/*
+ * Gets the last result of validating this SCT.
+ * If it has not been validated yet, returns SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET.
+ */
+sct_validation_status_t SCT_get_validation_status(const SCT *sct);
+
+/*
+ * Validates the given SCT with the provided context.
+ * Sets the "validation_status" field of the SCT.
+ * Returns 1 if the SCT is valid and the signature verifies.
+ * Returns 0 if the SCT is invalid or could not be verified.
+ * Returns -1 if an error occurs.
+ */
+__owur int SCT_validate(SCT *sct, const CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx);
+
+/*
+ * Validates the given list of SCTs with the provided context.
+ * Sets the "validation_status" field of each SCT.
+ * Returns 1 if there are no invalid SCTs and all signatures verify.
+ * Returns 0 if at least one SCT is invalid or could not be verified.
+ * Returns a negative integer if an error occurs.
+ */
+__owur int SCT_LIST_validate(const STACK_OF(SCT) *scts,
+                             CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx);
+
+
+/*********************************
+ * SCT parsing and serialisation *
+ *********************************/
+
+/*
+ * Serialize (to TLS format) a stack of SCTs and return the length.
+ * "a" must not be NULL.
+ * If "pp" is NULL, just return the length of what would have been serialized.
+ * If "pp" is not NULL and "*pp" is null, function will allocate a new pointer
+ * for data that caller is responsible for freeing (only if function returns
+ * successfully).
+ * If "pp" is NULL and "*pp" is not NULL, caller is responsible for ensuring
+ * that "*pp" is large enough to accept all of the serialized data.
+ * Returns < 0 on error, >= 0 indicating bytes written (or would have been)
+ * on success.
+ */
+__owur int i2o_SCT_LIST(const STACK_OF(SCT) *a, unsigned char **pp);
+
+/*
+ * Convert TLS format SCT list to a stack of SCTs.
+ * If "a" or "*a" is NULL, a new stack will be created that the caller is
+ * responsible for freeing (by calling SCT_LIST_free).
+ * "**pp" and "*pp" must not be NULL.
+ * Upon success, "*pp" will point to after the last bytes read, and a stack
+ * will be returned.
+ * Upon failure, a NULL pointer will be returned, and the position of "*pp" is
+ * not defined.
+ */
+STACK_OF(SCT) *o2i_SCT_LIST(STACK_OF(SCT) **a, const unsigned char **pp,
+                            size_t len);
+
+/*
+ * Serialize (to DER format) a stack of SCTs and return the length.
+ * "a" must not be NULL.
+ * If "pp" is NULL, just returns the length of what would have been serialized.
+ * If "pp" is not NULL and "*pp" is null, function will allocate a new pointer
+ * for data that caller is responsible for freeing (only if function returns
+ * successfully).
+ * If "pp" is NULL and "*pp" is not NULL, caller is responsible for ensuring
+ * that "*pp" is large enough to accept all of the serialized data.
+ * Returns < 0 on error, >= 0 indicating bytes written (or would have been)
+ * on success.
+ */
+__owur int i2d_SCT_LIST(const STACK_OF(SCT) *a, unsigned char **pp);
+
+/*
+ * Parses an SCT list in DER format and returns it.
+ * If "a" or "*a" is NULL, a new stack will be created that the caller is
+ * responsible for freeing (by calling SCT_LIST_free).
+ * "**pp" and "*pp" must not be NULL.
+ * Upon success, "*pp" will point to after the last bytes read, and a stack
+ * will be returned.
+ * Upon failure, a NULL pointer will be returned, and the position of "*pp" is
+ * not defined.
+ */
+STACK_OF(SCT) *d2i_SCT_LIST(STACK_OF(SCT) **a, const unsigned char **pp,
+                            long len);
+
+/*
+ * Serialize (to TLS format) an |sct| and write it to |out|.
+ * If |out| is null, no SCT will be output but the length will still be returned.
+ * If |out| points to a null pointer, a string will be allocated to hold the
+ * TLS-format SCT. It is the responsibility of the caller to free it.
+ * If |out| points to an allocated string, the TLS-format SCT will be written
+ * to it.
+ * The length of the SCT in TLS format will be returned.
+ */
+__owur int i2o_SCT(const SCT *sct, unsigned char **out);
+
+/*
+ * Parses an SCT in TLS format and returns it.
+ * If |psct| is not null, it will end up pointing to the parsed SCT. If it
+ * already points to a non-null pointer, the pointer will be free'd.
+ * |in| should be a pointer to a string containing the TLS-format SCT.
+ * |in| will be advanced to the end of the SCT if parsing succeeds.
+ * |len| should be the length of the SCT in |in|.
+ * Returns NULL if an error occurs.
+ * If the SCT is an unsupported version, only the SCT's 'sct' and 'sct_len'
+ * fields will be populated (with |in| and |len| respectively).
+ */
+SCT *o2i_SCT(SCT **psct, const unsigned char **in, size_t len);
+
+/********************
+ * CT log functions *
+ ********************/
+
+/*
+ * Creates a new CT log instance with the given |public_key| and |name|.
+ * Takes ownership of |public_key| but copies |name|.
+ * Returns NULL if malloc fails or if |public_key| cannot be converted to DER.
+ * Should be deleted by the caller using CTLOG_free when no longer needed.
+ */
+CTLOG *CTLOG_new(EVP_PKEY *public_key, const char *name);
+
+/*
+ * Creates a new CTLOG instance with the base64-encoded SubjectPublicKeyInfo DER
+ * in |pkey_base64|. The |name| is a string to help users identify this log.
+ * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
+ * Should be deleted by the caller using CTLOG_free when no longer needed.
+ */
+int CTLOG_new_from_base64(CTLOG ** ct_log,
+                          const char *pkey_base64, const char *name);
+
+/*
+ * Deletes a CT log instance and its fields.
+ */
+void CTLOG_free(CTLOG *log);
+
+/* Gets the name of the CT log */
+const char *CTLOG_get0_name(const CTLOG *log);
+/* Gets the ID of the CT log */
+void CTLOG_get0_log_id(const CTLOG *log, const uint8_t **log_id,
+                       size_t *log_id_len);
+/* Gets the public key of the CT log */
+EVP_PKEY *CTLOG_get0_public_key(const CTLOG *log);
+
+/**************************
+ * CT log store functions *
+ **************************/
+
+/*
+ * Creates a new CT log store.
+ * Should be deleted by the caller using CTLOG_STORE_free when no longer needed.
+ */
+CTLOG_STORE *CTLOG_STORE_new(void);
+
+/*
+ * Deletes a CT log store and all of the CT log instances held within.
+ */
+void CTLOG_STORE_free(CTLOG_STORE *store);
+
+/*
+ * Finds a CT log in the store based on its log ID.
+ * Returns the CT log, or NULL if no match is found.
+ */
+const CTLOG *CTLOG_STORE_get0_log_by_id(const CTLOG_STORE *store,
+                                        const uint8_t *log_id,
+                                        size_t log_id_len);
+
+/*
+ * Loads a CT log list into a |store| from a |file|.
+ * Returns 1 if loading is successful, or 0 otherwise.
+ */
+__owur int CTLOG_STORE_load_file(CTLOG_STORE *store, const char *file);
+
+/*
+ * Loads the default CT log list into a |store|.
+ * See internal/cryptlib.h for the environment variable and file path that are
+ * consulted to find the default file.
+ * Returns 1 if loading is successful, or 0 otherwise.
+ */
+__owur int CTLOG_STORE_load_default_file(CTLOG_STORE *store);
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+/*
+ * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
+ * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
+ */
+
+int ERR_load_CT_strings(void);
+
+/* Error codes for the CT functions. */
+
+/* Function codes. */
+# define CT_F_CTLOG_NEW                                   117
+# define CT_F_CTLOG_NEW_FROM_BASE64                       118
+# define CT_F_CTLOG_NEW_FROM_CONF                         119
+# define CT_F_CTLOG_STORE_LOAD_CTX_NEW                    122
+# define CT_F_CTLOG_STORE_LOAD_FILE                       123
+# define CT_F_CTLOG_STORE_LOAD_LOG                        130
+# define CT_F_CTLOG_STORE_NEW                             131
+# define CT_F_CT_BASE64_DECODE                            124
+# define CT_F_CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_NEW                      133
+# define CT_F_CT_V1_LOG_ID_FROM_PKEY                      125
+# define CT_F_I2O_SCT                                     107
+# define CT_F_I2O_SCT_LIST                                108
+# define CT_F_I2O_SCT_SIGNATURE                           109
+# define CT_F_O2I_SCT                                     110
+# define CT_F_O2I_SCT_LIST                                111
+# define CT_F_O2I_SCT_SIGNATURE                           112
+# define CT_F_SCT_CTX_NEW                                 126
+# define CT_F_SCT_CTX_VERIFY                              128
+# define CT_F_SCT_NEW                                     100
+# define CT_F_SCT_NEW_FROM_BASE64                         127
+# define CT_F_SCT_SET0_LOG_ID                             101
+# define CT_F_SCT_SET1_EXTENSIONS                         114
+# define CT_F_SCT_SET1_LOG_ID                             115
+# define CT_F_SCT_SET1_SIGNATURE                          116
+# define CT_F_SCT_SET_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE                      102
+# define CT_F_SCT_SET_SIGNATURE_NID                       103
+# define CT_F_SCT_SET_VERSION                             104
+
+/* Reason codes. */
+# define CT_R_BASE64_DECODE_ERROR                         108
+# define CT_R_INVALID_LOG_ID_LENGTH                       100
+# define CT_R_LOG_CONF_INVALID                            109
+# define CT_R_LOG_CONF_INVALID_KEY                        110
+# define CT_R_LOG_CONF_MISSING_DESCRIPTION                111
+# define CT_R_LOG_CONF_MISSING_KEY                        112
+# define CT_R_LOG_KEY_INVALID                             113
+# define CT_R_SCT_FUTURE_TIMESTAMP                        116
+# define CT_R_SCT_INVALID                                 104
+# define CT_R_SCT_INVALID_SIGNATURE                       107
+# define CT_R_SCT_LIST_INVALID                            105
+# define CT_R_SCT_LOG_ID_MISMATCH                         114
+# define CT_R_SCT_NOT_SET                                 106
+# define CT_R_SCT_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION                     115
+# define CT_R_UNRECOGNIZED_SIGNATURE_NID                  101
+# define CT_R_UNSUPPORTED_ENTRY_TYPE                      102
+# define CT_R_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION                         103
+
+#  ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+#  endif
+# endif
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/des.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/des.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..be4abbd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/des.h
@@ -0,0 +1,174 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_DES_H
+# define HEADER_DES_H
+
+# include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
+# ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+# endif
+# include <openssl/e_os2.h>
+
+typedef unsigned int DES_LONG;
+
+# ifdef OPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBCRYPTO
+#  undef OPENSSL_EXTERN
+#  define OPENSSL_EXTERN OPENSSL_EXPORT
+# endif
+
+typedef unsigned char DES_cblock[8];
+typedef /* const */ unsigned char const_DES_cblock[8];
+/*
+ * With "const", gcc 2.8.1 on Solaris thinks that DES_cblock * and
+ * const_DES_cblock * are incompatible pointer types.
+ */
+
+typedef struct DES_ks {
+    union {
+        DES_cblock cblock;
+        /*
+         * make sure things are correct size on machines with 8 byte longs
+         */
+        DES_LONG deslong[2];
+    } ks[16];
+} DES_key_schedule;
+
+# define DES_KEY_SZ      (sizeof(DES_cblock))
+# define DES_SCHEDULE_SZ (sizeof(DES_key_schedule))
+
+# define DES_ENCRYPT     1
+# define DES_DECRYPT     0
+
+# define DES_CBC_MODE    0
+# define DES_PCBC_MODE   1
+
+# define DES_ecb2_encrypt(i,o,k1,k2,e) \
+        DES_ecb3_encrypt((i),(o),(k1),(k2),(k1),(e))
+
+# define DES_ede2_cbc_encrypt(i,o,l,k1,k2,iv,e) \
+        DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt((i),(o),(l),(k1),(k2),(k1),(iv),(e))
+
+# define DES_ede2_cfb64_encrypt(i,o,l,k1,k2,iv,n,e) \
+        DES_ede3_cfb64_encrypt((i),(o),(l),(k1),(k2),(k1),(iv),(n),(e))
+
+# define DES_ede2_ofb64_encrypt(i,o,l,k1,k2,iv,n) \
+        DES_ede3_ofb64_encrypt((i),(o),(l),(k1),(k2),(k1),(iv),(n))
+
+OPENSSL_DECLARE_GLOBAL(int, DES_check_key); /* defaults to false */
+# define DES_check_key OPENSSL_GLOBAL_REF(DES_check_key)
+
+const char *DES_options(void);
+void DES_ecb3_encrypt(const_DES_cblock *input, DES_cblock *output,
+                      DES_key_schedule *ks1, DES_key_schedule *ks2,
+                      DES_key_schedule *ks3, int enc);
+DES_LONG DES_cbc_cksum(const unsigned char *input, DES_cblock *output,
+                       long length, DES_key_schedule *schedule,
+                       const_DES_cblock *ivec);
+/* DES_cbc_encrypt does not update the IV!  Use DES_ncbc_encrypt instead. */
+void DES_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output,
+                     long length, DES_key_schedule *schedule,
+                     DES_cblock *ivec, int enc);
+void DES_ncbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output,
+                      long length, DES_key_schedule *schedule,
+                      DES_cblock *ivec, int enc);
+void DES_xcbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output,
+                      long length, DES_key_schedule *schedule,
+                      DES_cblock *ivec, const_DES_cblock *inw,
+                      const_DES_cblock *outw, int enc);
+void DES_cfb_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, int numbits,
+                     long length, DES_key_schedule *schedule,
+                     DES_cblock *ivec, int enc);
+void DES_ecb_encrypt(const_DES_cblock *input, DES_cblock *output,
+                     DES_key_schedule *ks, int enc);
+
+/*
+ * This is the DES encryption function that gets called by just about every
+ * other DES routine in the library.  You should not use this function except
+ * to implement 'modes' of DES.  I say this because the functions that call
+ * this routine do the conversion from 'char *' to long, and this needs to be
+ * done to make sure 'non-aligned' memory access do not occur.  The
+ * characters are loaded 'little endian'. Data is a pointer to 2 unsigned
+ * long's and ks is the DES_key_schedule to use.  enc, is non zero specifies
+ * encryption, zero if decryption.
+ */
+void DES_encrypt1(DES_LONG *data, DES_key_schedule *ks, int enc);
+
+/*
+ * This functions is the same as DES_encrypt1() except that the DES initial
+ * permutation (IP) and final permutation (FP) have been left out.  As for
+ * DES_encrypt1(), you should not use this function. It is used by the
+ * routines in the library that implement triple DES. IP() DES_encrypt2()
+ * DES_encrypt2() DES_encrypt2() FP() is the same as DES_encrypt1()
+ * DES_encrypt1() DES_encrypt1() except faster :-).
+ */
+void DES_encrypt2(DES_LONG *data, DES_key_schedule *ks, int enc);
+
+void DES_encrypt3(DES_LONG *data, DES_key_schedule *ks1,
+                  DES_key_schedule *ks2, DES_key_schedule *ks3);
+void DES_decrypt3(DES_LONG *data, DES_key_schedule *ks1,
+                  DES_key_schedule *ks2, DES_key_schedule *ks3);
+void DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output,
+                          long length,
+                          DES_key_schedule *ks1, DES_key_schedule *ks2,
+                          DES_key_schedule *ks3, DES_cblock *ivec, int enc);
+void DES_ede3_cfb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                            long length, DES_key_schedule *ks1,
+                            DES_key_schedule *ks2, DES_key_schedule *ks3,
+                            DES_cblock *ivec, int *num, int enc);
+void DES_ede3_cfb_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                          int numbits, long length, DES_key_schedule *ks1,
+                          DES_key_schedule *ks2, DES_key_schedule *ks3,
+                          DES_cblock *ivec, int enc);
+void DES_ede3_ofb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                            long length, DES_key_schedule *ks1,
+                            DES_key_schedule *ks2, DES_key_schedule *ks3,
+                            DES_cblock *ivec, int *num);
+char *DES_fcrypt(const char *buf, const char *salt, char *ret);
+char *DES_crypt(const char *buf, const char *salt);
+void DES_ofb_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, int numbits,
+                     long length, DES_key_schedule *schedule,
+                     DES_cblock *ivec);
+void DES_pcbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output,
+                      long length, DES_key_schedule *schedule,
+                      DES_cblock *ivec, int enc);
+DES_LONG DES_quad_cksum(const unsigned char *input, DES_cblock output[],
+                        long length, int out_count, DES_cblock *seed);
+int DES_random_key(DES_cblock *ret);
+void DES_set_odd_parity(DES_cblock *key);
+int DES_check_key_parity(const_DES_cblock *key);
+int DES_is_weak_key(const_DES_cblock *key);
+/*
+ * DES_set_key (= set_key = DES_key_sched = key_sched) calls
+ * DES_set_key_checked if global variable DES_check_key is set,
+ * DES_set_key_unchecked otherwise.
+ */
+int DES_set_key(const_DES_cblock *key, DES_key_schedule *schedule);
+int DES_key_sched(const_DES_cblock *key, DES_key_schedule *schedule);
+int DES_set_key_checked(const_DES_cblock *key, DES_key_schedule *schedule);
+void DES_set_key_unchecked(const_DES_cblock *key, DES_key_schedule *schedule);
+void DES_string_to_key(const char *str, DES_cblock *key);
+void DES_string_to_2keys(const char *str, DES_cblock *key1, DES_cblock *key2);
+void DES_cfb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                       long length, DES_key_schedule *schedule,
+                       DES_cblock *ivec, int *num, int enc);
+void DES_ofb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                       long length, DES_key_schedule *schedule,
+                       DES_cblock *ivec, int *num);
+
+# define DES_fixup_key_parity DES_set_odd_parity
+
+# ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+# endif
+# endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/dh.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/dh.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fbd4790
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/dh.h
@@ -0,0 +1,361 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_DH_H
+# define HEADER_DH_H
+
+# include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+# include <openssl/e_os2.h>
+# include <openssl/bio.h>
+# include <openssl/asn1.h>
+# include <openssl/ossl_typ.h>
+# if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+#  include <openssl/bn.h>
+# endif
+
+# ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+# endif
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS
+#  define OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS    10000
+# endif
+
+# define OPENSSL_DH_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS 1024
+
+# define DH_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P     0x01
+
+# if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+/*
+ * Does nothing. Previously this switched off constant time behaviour.
+ */
+#  define DH_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME 0x00
+# endif
+
+/*
+ * If this flag is set the DH method is FIPS compliant and can be used in
+ * FIPS mode. This is set in the validated module method. If an application
+ * sets this flag in its own methods it is its responsibility to ensure the
+ * result is compliant.
+ */
+
+# define DH_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD                     0x0400
+
+/*
+ * If this flag is set the operations normally disabled in FIPS mode are
+ * permitted it is then the applications responsibility to ensure that the
+ * usage is compliant.
+ */
+
+# define DH_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW                  0x0400
+
+/* Already defined in ossl_typ.h */
+/* typedef struct dh_st DH; */
+/* typedef struct dh_method DH_METHOD; */
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(DHparams)
+
+# define DH_GENERATOR_2          2
+/* #define DH_GENERATOR_3       3 */
+# define DH_GENERATOR_5          5
+
+/* DH_check error codes */
+# define DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME            0x01
+# define DH_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME       0x02
+# define DH_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR    0x04
+# define DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR       0x08
+# define DH_CHECK_Q_NOT_PRIME            0x10
+# define DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE        0x20
+# define DH_CHECK_INVALID_J_VALUE        0x40
+
+/* DH_check_pub_key error codes */
+# define DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_SMALL       0x01
+# define DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_LARGE       0x02
+# define DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID         0x04
+
+/*
+ * primes p where (p-1)/2 is prime too are called "safe"; we define this for
+ * backward compatibility:
+ */
+# define DH_CHECK_P_NOT_STRONG_PRIME     DH_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME
+
+# define d2i_DHparams_fp(fp,x) \
+    (DH *)ASN1_d2i_fp((char *(*)())DH_new, \
+                      (char *(*)())d2i_DHparams, \
+                      (fp), \
+                      (unsigned char **)(x))
+# define i2d_DHparams_fp(fp,x) \
+    ASN1_i2d_fp(i2d_DHparams,(fp), (unsigned char *)(x))
+# define d2i_DHparams_bio(bp,x) \
+    ASN1_d2i_bio_of(DH, DH_new, d2i_DHparams, bp, x)
+# define i2d_DHparams_bio(bp,x) \
+    ASN1_i2d_bio_of_const(DH,i2d_DHparams,bp,x)
+
+# define d2i_DHxparams_fp(fp,x) \
+    (DH *)ASN1_d2i_fp((char *(*)())DH_new, \
+                      (char *(*)())d2i_DHxparams, \
+                      (fp), \
+                      (unsigned char **)(x))
+# define i2d_DHxparams_fp(fp,x) \
+    ASN1_i2d_fp(i2d_DHxparams,(fp), (unsigned char *)(x))
+# define d2i_DHxparams_bio(bp,x) \
+    ASN1_d2i_bio_of(DH, DH_new, d2i_DHxparams, bp, x)
+# define i2d_DHxparams_bio(bp,x) \
+    ASN1_i2d_bio_of_const(DH, i2d_DHxparams, bp, x)
+
+DH *DHparams_dup(DH *);
+
+const DH_METHOD *DH_OpenSSL(void);
+
+void DH_set_default_method(const DH_METHOD *meth);
+const DH_METHOD *DH_get_default_method(void);
+int DH_set_method(DH *dh, const DH_METHOD *meth);
+DH *DH_new_method(ENGINE *engine);
+
+DH *DH_new(void);
+void DH_free(DH *dh);
+int DH_up_ref(DH *dh);
+int DH_bits(const DH *dh);
+int DH_size(const DH *dh);
+int DH_security_bits(const DH *dh);
+#define DH_get_ex_new_index(l, p, newf, dupf, freef) \
+    CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_DH, l, p, newf, dupf, freef)
+int DH_set_ex_data(DH *d, int idx, void *arg);
+void *DH_get_ex_data(DH *d, int idx);
+
+/* Deprecated version */
+DEPRECATEDIN_0_9_8(DH *DH_generate_parameters(int prime_len, int generator,
+                                              void (*callback) (int, int,
+                                                                void *),
+                                              void *cb_arg))
+
+/* New version */
+int DH_generate_parameters_ex(DH *dh, int prime_len, int generator,
+                              BN_GENCB *cb);
+
+int DH_check_params(const DH *dh, int *ret);
+int DH_check(const DH *dh, int *codes);
+int DH_check_pub_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM *pub_key, int *codes);
+int DH_generate_key(DH *dh);
+int DH_compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh);
+int DH_compute_key_padded(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh);
+DH *d2i_DHparams(DH **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length);
+int i2d_DHparams(const DH *a, unsigned char **pp);
+DH *d2i_DHxparams(DH **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length);
+int i2d_DHxparams(const DH *a, unsigned char **pp);
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+int DHparams_print_fp(FILE *fp, const DH *x);
+# endif
+int DHparams_print(BIO *bp, const DH *x);
+
+/* RFC 5114 parameters */
+DH *DH_get_1024_160(void);
+DH *DH_get_2048_224(void);
+DH *DH_get_2048_256(void);
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
+/* RFC2631 KDF */
+int DH_KDF_X9_42(unsigned char *out, size_t outlen,
+                 const unsigned char *Z, size_t Zlen,
+                 ASN1_OBJECT *key_oid,
+                 const unsigned char *ukm, size_t ukmlen, const EVP_MD *md);
+# endif
+
+void DH_get0_pqg(const DH *dh,
+                 const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q, const BIGNUM **g);
+int DH_set0_pqg(DH *dh, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g);
+void DH_get0_key(const DH *dh,
+                 const BIGNUM **pub_key, const BIGNUM **priv_key);
+int DH_set0_key(DH *dh, BIGNUM *pub_key, BIGNUM *priv_key);
+void DH_clear_flags(DH *dh, int flags);
+int DH_test_flags(const DH *dh, int flags);
+void DH_set_flags(DH *dh, int flags);
+ENGINE *DH_get0_engine(DH *d);
+long DH_get_length(const DH *dh);
+int DH_set_length(DH *dh, long length);
+
+DH_METHOD *DH_meth_new(const char *name, int flags);
+void DH_meth_free(DH_METHOD *dhm);
+DH_METHOD *DH_meth_dup(const DH_METHOD *dhm);
+const char *DH_meth_get0_name(const DH_METHOD *dhm);
+int DH_meth_set1_name(DH_METHOD *dhm, const char *name);
+int DH_meth_get_flags(DH_METHOD *dhm);
+int DH_meth_set_flags(DH_METHOD *dhm, int flags);
+void *DH_meth_get0_app_data(const DH_METHOD *dhm);
+int DH_meth_set0_app_data(DH_METHOD *dhm, void *app_data);
+int (*DH_meth_get_generate_key(const DH_METHOD *dhm)) (DH *);
+int DH_meth_set_generate_key(DH_METHOD *dhm, int (*generate_key) (DH *));
+int (*DH_meth_get_compute_key(const DH_METHOD *dhm))
+        (unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh);
+int DH_meth_set_compute_key(DH_METHOD *dhm,
+        int (*compute_key) (unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh));
+int (*DH_meth_get_bn_mod_exp(const DH_METHOD *dhm))
+    (const DH *, BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *,
+     BN_CTX *, BN_MONT_CTX *);
+int DH_meth_set_bn_mod_exp(DH_METHOD *dhm,
+    int (*bn_mod_exp) (const DH *, BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *,
+                       const BIGNUM *, BN_CTX *, BN_MONT_CTX *));
+int (*DH_meth_get_init(const DH_METHOD *dhm))(DH *);
+int DH_meth_set_init(DH_METHOD *dhm, int (*init)(DH *));
+int (*DH_meth_get_finish(const DH_METHOD *dhm)) (DH *);
+int DH_meth_set_finish(DH_METHOD *dhm, int (*finish) (DH *));
+int (*DH_meth_get_generate_params(const DH_METHOD *dhm))
+        (DH *, int, int, BN_GENCB *);
+int DH_meth_set_generate_params(DH_METHOD *dhm,
+        int (*generate_params) (DH *, int, int, BN_GENCB *));
+
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_paramgen_prime_len(ctx, len) \
+        EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_DH, EVP_PKEY_OP_PARAMGEN, \
+                        EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_PARAMGEN_PRIME_LEN, len, NULL)
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_paramgen_subprime_len(ctx, len) \
+        EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_DH, EVP_PKEY_OP_PARAMGEN, \
+                        EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_PARAMGEN_SUBPRIME_LEN, len, NULL)
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_paramgen_type(ctx, typ) \
+        EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_DH, EVP_PKEY_OP_PARAMGEN, \
+                        EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_PARAMGEN_TYPE, typ, NULL)
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_paramgen_generator(ctx, gen) \
+        EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_DH, EVP_PKEY_OP_PARAMGEN, \
+                        EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_PARAMGEN_GENERATOR, gen, NULL)
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_rfc5114(ctx, gen) \
+        EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_DHX, EVP_PKEY_OP_PARAMGEN, \
+                        EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_RFC5114, gen, NULL)
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dhx_rfc5114(ctx, gen) \
+        EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_DHX, EVP_PKEY_OP_PARAMGEN, \
+                        EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_RFC5114, gen, NULL)
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_kdf_type(ctx, kdf) \
+        EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_DHX, \
+                                EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE, \
+                                EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_KDF_TYPE, kdf, NULL)
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_dh_kdf_type(ctx) \
+        EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_DHX, \
+                                EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE, \
+                                EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_KDF_TYPE, -2, NULL)
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_dh_kdf_oid(ctx, oid) \
+        EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_DHX, \
+                                EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE, \
+                                EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_KDF_OID, 0, (void *)oid)
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_dh_kdf_oid(ctx, poid) \
+        EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_DHX, \
+                                EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE, \
+                                EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_DH_KDF_OID, 0, (void *)poid)
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_kdf_md(ctx, md) \
+        EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_DHX, \
+                                EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE, \
+                                EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_KDF_MD, 0, (void *)md)
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_dh_kdf_md(ctx, pmd) \
+        EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_DHX, \
+                                EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE, \
+                                EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_DH_KDF_MD, 0, (void *)pmd)
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_kdf_outlen(ctx, len) \
+        EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_DHX, \
+                                EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE, \
+                                EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_KDF_OUTLEN, len, NULL)
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_dh_kdf_outlen(ctx, plen) \
+        EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_DHX, \
+                                EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE, \
+                        EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_DH_KDF_OUTLEN, 0, (void *)plen)
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_dh_kdf_ukm(ctx, p, plen) \
+        EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_DHX, \
+                                EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE, \
+                                EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_KDF_UKM, plen, (void *)p)
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_dh_kdf_ukm(ctx, p) \
+        EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_DHX, \
+                                EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE, \
+                                EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_DH_KDF_UKM, 0, (void *)p)
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_PARAMGEN_PRIME_LEN     (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 1)
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_PARAMGEN_GENERATOR     (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 2)
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_RFC5114                (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 3)
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_PARAMGEN_SUBPRIME_LEN  (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 4)
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_PARAMGEN_TYPE          (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 5)
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_KDF_TYPE               (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 6)
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_KDF_MD                 (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 7)
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_DH_KDF_MD             (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 8)
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_KDF_OUTLEN             (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 9)
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_DH_KDF_OUTLEN         (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 10)
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_KDF_UKM                (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 11)
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_DH_KDF_UKM            (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 12)
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_KDF_OID                (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 13)
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_DH_KDF_OID            (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 14)
+
+/* KDF types */
+# define EVP_PKEY_DH_KDF_NONE                            1
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
+# define EVP_PKEY_DH_KDF_X9_42                           2
+# endif
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+/*
+ * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
+ * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
+ */
+
+int ERR_load_DH_strings(void);
+
+/* Error codes for the DH functions. */
+
+/* Function codes. */
+# define DH_F_COMPUTE_KEY                                 102
+# define DH_F_DHPARAMS_PRINT_FP                           101
+# define DH_F_DH_BUILTIN_GENPARAMS                        106
+# define DH_F_DH_CMS_DECRYPT                              114
+# define DH_F_DH_CMS_SET_PEERKEY                          115
+# define DH_F_DH_CMS_SET_SHARED_INFO                      116
+# define DH_F_DH_METH_DUP                                 117
+# define DH_F_DH_METH_NEW                                 118
+# define DH_F_DH_METH_SET1_NAME                           119
+# define DH_F_DH_NEW_METHOD                               105
+# define DH_F_DH_PARAM_DECODE                             107
+# define DH_F_DH_PRIV_DECODE                              110
+# define DH_F_DH_PRIV_ENCODE                              111
+# define DH_F_DH_PUB_DECODE                               108
+# define DH_F_DH_PUB_ENCODE                               109
+# define DH_F_DO_DH_PRINT                                 100
+# define DH_F_GENERATE_KEY                                103
+# define DH_F_PKEY_DH_DERIVE                              112
+# define DH_F_PKEY_DH_KEYGEN                              113
+
+/* Reason codes. */
+# define DH_R_BAD_GENERATOR                               101
+# define DH_R_BN_DECODE_ERROR                             109
+# define DH_R_BN_ERROR                                    106
+# define DH_R_DECODE_ERROR                                104
+# define DH_R_INVALID_PUBKEY                              102
+# define DH_R_KDF_PARAMETER_ERROR                         112
+# define DH_R_KEYS_NOT_SET                                108
+# define DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE                           103
+# define DH_R_NO_PARAMETERS_SET                           107
+# define DH_R_NO_PRIVATE_VALUE                            100
+# define DH_R_PARAMETER_ENCODING_ERROR                    105
+# define DH_R_PEER_KEY_ERROR                              111
+# define DH_R_SHARED_INFO_ERROR                           113
+
+#  ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+#  endif
+# endif
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/dsa.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/dsa.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..139718e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/dsa.h
@@ -0,0 +1,283 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * The DSS routines are based on patches supplied by
+ * Steven Schoch <schoch@sheba.arc.nasa.gov>.
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_DSA_H
+# define HEADER_DSA_H
+
+# include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+# ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+# endif
+# include <openssl/e_os2.h>
+# include <openssl/bio.h>
+# include <openssl/crypto.h>
+# include <openssl/ossl_typ.h>
+# include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+# include <openssl/bn.h>
+# if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+#  include <openssl/dh.h>
+# endif
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS
+#  define OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS   10000
+# endif
+
+# define OPENSSL_DSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS 1024
+
+# define DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P   0x01
+# if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+/*
+ * Does nothing. Previously this switched off constant time behaviour.
+ */
+#  define DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME       0x00
+# endif
+
+/*
+ * If this flag is set the DSA method is FIPS compliant and can be used in
+ * FIPS mode. This is set in the validated module method. If an application
+ * sets this flag in its own methods it is its responsibility to ensure the
+ * result is compliant.
+ */
+
+# define DSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD                    0x0400
+
+/*
+ * If this flag is set the operations normally disabled in FIPS mode are
+ * permitted it is then the applications responsibility to ensure that the
+ * usage is compliant.
+ */
+
+# define DSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW                 0x0400
+# define DSA_FLAG_FIPS_CHECKED                   0x0800
+
+/* Already defined in ossl_typ.h */
+/* typedef struct dsa_st DSA; */
+/* typedef struct dsa_method DSA_METHOD; */
+
+typedef struct DSA_SIG_st DSA_SIG;
+
+# define d2i_DSAparams_fp(fp,x) (DSA *)ASN1_d2i_fp((char *(*)())DSA_new, \
+                (char *(*)())d2i_DSAparams,(fp),(unsigned char **)(x))
+# define i2d_DSAparams_fp(fp,x) ASN1_i2d_fp(i2d_DSAparams,(fp), \
+                (unsigned char *)(x))
+# define d2i_DSAparams_bio(bp,x) ASN1_d2i_bio_of(DSA,DSA_new,d2i_DSAparams,bp,x)
+# define i2d_DSAparams_bio(bp,x) ASN1_i2d_bio_of_const(DSA,i2d_DSAparams,bp,x)
+
+DSA *DSAparams_dup(DSA *x);
+DSA_SIG *DSA_SIG_new(void);
+void DSA_SIG_free(DSA_SIG *a);
+int i2d_DSA_SIG(const DSA_SIG *a, unsigned char **pp);
+DSA_SIG *d2i_DSA_SIG(DSA_SIG **v, const unsigned char **pp, long length);
+void DSA_SIG_get0(const DSA_SIG *sig, const BIGNUM **pr, const BIGNUM **ps);
+int DSA_SIG_set0(DSA_SIG *sig, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *s);
+
+DSA_SIG *DSA_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa);
+int DSA_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
+                  DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa);
+
+const DSA_METHOD *DSA_OpenSSL(void);
+
+void DSA_set_default_method(const DSA_METHOD *);
+const DSA_METHOD *DSA_get_default_method(void);
+int DSA_set_method(DSA *dsa, const DSA_METHOD *);
+const DSA_METHOD *DSA_get_method(DSA *d);
+
+DSA *DSA_new(void);
+DSA *DSA_new_method(ENGINE *engine);
+void DSA_free(DSA *r);
+/* "up" the DSA object's reference count */
+int DSA_up_ref(DSA *r);
+int DSA_size(const DSA *);
+int DSA_bits(const DSA *d);
+int DSA_security_bits(const DSA *d);
+        /* next 4 return -1 on error */
+int DSA_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp);
+int DSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen,
+             unsigned char *sig, unsigned int *siglen, DSA *dsa);
+int DSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
+               const unsigned char *sigbuf, int siglen, DSA *dsa);
+#define DSA_get_ex_new_index(l, p, newf, dupf, freef) \
+    CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_DSA, l, p, newf, dupf, freef)
+int DSA_set_ex_data(DSA *d, int idx, void *arg);
+void *DSA_get_ex_data(DSA *d, int idx);
+
+DSA *d2i_DSAPublicKey(DSA **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length);
+DSA *d2i_DSAPrivateKey(DSA **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length);
+DSA *d2i_DSAparams(DSA **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length);
+
+/* Deprecated version */
+DEPRECATEDIN_0_9_8(DSA *DSA_generate_parameters(int bits,
+                                                unsigned char *seed,
+                                                int seed_len,
+                                                int *counter_ret,
+                                                unsigned long *h_ret, void
+                                                 (*callback) (int, int,
+                                                              void *),
+                                                void *cb_arg))
+
+/* New version */
+int DSA_generate_parameters_ex(DSA *dsa, int bits,
+                               const unsigned char *seed, int seed_len,
+                               int *counter_ret, unsigned long *h_ret,
+                               BN_GENCB *cb);
+
+int DSA_generate_key(DSA *a);
+int i2d_DSAPublicKey(const DSA *a, unsigned char **pp);
+int i2d_DSAPrivateKey(const DSA *a, unsigned char **pp);
+int i2d_DSAparams(const DSA *a, unsigned char **pp);
+
+int DSAparams_print(BIO *bp, const DSA *x);
+int DSA_print(BIO *bp, const DSA *x, int off);
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+int DSAparams_print_fp(FILE *fp, const DSA *x);
+int DSA_print_fp(FILE *bp, const DSA *x, int off);
+# endif
+
+# define DSS_prime_checks 50
+/*
+ * Primality test according to FIPS PUB 186[-1], Appendix 2.1: 50 rounds of
+ * Rabin-Miller
+ */
+# define DSA_is_prime(n, callback, cb_arg) \
+        BN_is_prime(n, DSS_prime_checks, callback, NULL, cb_arg)
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+/*
+ * Convert DSA structure (key or just parameters) into DH structure (be
+ * careful to avoid small subgroup attacks when using this!)
+ */
+DH *DSA_dup_DH(const DSA *r);
+# endif
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dsa_paramgen_bits(ctx, nbits) \
+        EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_DSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_PARAMGEN, \
+                                EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DSA_PARAMGEN_BITS, nbits, NULL)
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DSA_PARAMGEN_BITS         (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 1)
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DSA_PARAMGEN_Q_BITS       (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 2)
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DSA_PARAMGEN_MD           (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 3)
+
+void DSA_get0_pqg(const DSA *d,
+                  const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q, const BIGNUM **g);
+int DSA_set0_pqg(DSA *d, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g);
+void DSA_get0_key(const DSA *d,
+                  const BIGNUM **pub_key, const BIGNUM **priv_key);
+int DSA_set0_key(DSA *d, BIGNUM *pub_key, BIGNUM *priv_key);
+void DSA_clear_flags(DSA *d, int flags);
+int DSA_test_flags(const DSA *d, int flags);
+void DSA_set_flags(DSA *d, int flags);
+ENGINE *DSA_get0_engine(DSA *d);
+
+DSA_METHOD *DSA_meth_new(const char *name, int flags);
+void DSA_meth_free(DSA_METHOD *dsam);
+DSA_METHOD *DSA_meth_dup(const DSA_METHOD *dsam);
+const char *DSA_meth_get0_name(const DSA_METHOD *dsam);
+int DSA_meth_set1_name(DSA_METHOD *dsam, const char *name);
+int DSA_meth_get_flags(DSA_METHOD *dsam);
+int DSA_meth_set_flags(DSA_METHOD *dsam, int flags);
+void *DSA_meth_get0_app_data(const DSA_METHOD *dsam);
+int DSA_meth_set0_app_data(DSA_METHOD *dsam, void *app_data);
+DSA_SIG *(*DSA_meth_get_sign(const DSA_METHOD *dsam))
+        (const unsigned char *, int, DSA *);
+int DSA_meth_set_sign(DSA_METHOD *dsam,
+                       DSA_SIG *(*sign) (const unsigned char *, int, DSA *));
+int (*DSA_meth_get_sign_setup(const DSA_METHOD *dsam))
+        (DSA *, BN_CTX *, BIGNUM **, BIGNUM **);
+int DSA_meth_set_sign_setup(DSA_METHOD *dsam,
+        int (*sign_setup) (DSA *, BN_CTX *, BIGNUM **, BIGNUM **));
+int (*DSA_meth_get_verify(const DSA_METHOD *dsam))
+        (const unsigned char *, int , DSA_SIG *, DSA *);
+int DSA_meth_set_verify(DSA_METHOD *dsam,
+    int (*verify) (const unsigned char *, int, DSA_SIG *, DSA *));
+int (*DSA_meth_get_mod_exp(const DSA_METHOD *dsam))
+        (DSA *, BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *,
+         const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, BN_CTX *, BN_MONT_CTX *);
+int DSA_meth_set_mod_exp(DSA_METHOD *dsam,
+    int (*mod_exp) (DSA *, BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *,
+                    const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, BN_CTX *,
+                    BN_MONT_CTX *));
+int (*DSA_meth_get_bn_mod_exp(const DSA_METHOD *dsam))
+    (DSA *, BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *,
+     BN_CTX *, BN_MONT_CTX *);
+int DSA_meth_set_bn_mod_exp(DSA_METHOD *dsam,
+    int (*bn_mod_exp) (DSA *, BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *,
+                       const BIGNUM *, BN_CTX *, BN_MONT_CTX *));
+int (*DSA_meth_get_init(const DSA_METHOD *dsam))(DSA *);
+int DSA_meth_set_init(DSA_METHOD *dsam, int (*init)(DSA *));
+int (*DSA_meth_get_finish(const DSA_METHOD *dsam)) (DSA *);
+int DSA_meth_set_finish(DSA_METHOD *dsam, int (*finish) (DSA *));
+int (*DSA_meth_get_paramgen(const DSA_METHOD *dsam))
+        (DSA *, int, const unsigned char *, int, int *, unsigned long *,
+         BN_GENCB *);
+int DSA_meth_set_paramgen(DSA_METHOD *dsam,
+        int (*paramgen) (DSA *, int, const unsigned char *, int, int *,
+                         unsigned long *, BN_GENCB *));
+int (*DSA_meth_get_keygen(const DSA_METHOD *dsam)) (DSA *);
+int DSA_meth_set_keygen(DSA_METHOD *dsam, int (*keygen) (DSA *));
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+/*
+ * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
+ * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
+ */
+
+int ERR_load_DSA_strings(void);
+
+/* Error codes for the DSA functions. */
+
+/* Function codes. */
+# define DSA_F_DSAPARAMS_PRINT                            100
+# define DSA_F_DSAPARAMS_PRINT_FP                         101
+# define DSA_F_DSA_BUILTIN_PARAMGEN                       125
+# define DSA_F_DSA_BUILTIN_PARAMGEN2                      126
+# define DSA_F_DSA_DO_SIGN                                112
+# define DSA_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY                              113
+# define DSA_F_DSA_METH_DUP                               127
+# define DSA_F_DSA_METH_NEW                               128
+# define DSA_F_DSA_METH_SET1_NAME                         129
+# define DSA_F_DSA_NEW_METHOD                             103
+# define DSA_F_DSA_PARAM_DECODE                           119
+# define DSA_F_DSA_PRINT_FP                               105
+# define DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_DECODE                            115
+# define DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_ENCODE                            116
+# define DSA_F_DSA_PUB_DECODE                             117
+# define DSA_F_DSA_PUB_ENCODE                             118
+# define DSA_F_DSA_SIGN                                   106
+# define DSA_F_DSA_SIGN_SETUP                             107
+# define DSA_F_DSA_SIG_NEW                                102
+# define DSA_F_OLD_DSA_PRIV_DECODE                        122
+# define DSA_F_PKEY_DSA_CTRL                              120
+# define DSA_F_PKEY_DSA_KEYGEN                            121
+
+/* Reason codes. */
+# define DSA_R_BAD_Q_VALUE                                102
+# define DSA_R_BN_DECODE_ERROR                            108
+# define DSA_R_BN_ERROR                                   109
+# define DSA_R_DECODE_ERROR                               104
+# define DSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_TYPE                        106
+# define DSA_R_INVALID_PARAMETERS                         112
+# define DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS                         101
+# define DSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE                          103
+# define DSA_R_NO_PARAMETERS_SET                          107
+# define DSA_R_PARAMETER_ENCODING_ERROR                   105
+# define DSA_R_Q_NOT_PRIME                                113
+# define DSA_R_SEED_LEN_SMALL                             110
+
+#  ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+#  endif
+# endif
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/dtls1.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/dtls1.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f4769f8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/dtls1.h
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_DTLS1_H
+# define HEADER_DTLS1_H
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+# define DTLS1_VERSION                   0xFEFF
+# define DTLS1_2_VERSION                 0xFEFD
+# define DTLS_MIN_VERSION                DTLS1_VERSION
+# define DTLS_MAX_VERSION                DTLS1_2_VERSION
+# define DTLS1_VERSION_MAJOR             0xFE
+
+# define DTLS1_BAD_VER                   0x0100
+
+/* Special value for method supporting multiple versions */
+# define DTLS_ANY_VERSION                0x1FFFF
+
+/* lengths of messages */
+# define DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH                     256
+
+# define DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH                  13
+
+# define DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH                  12
+
+# define DTLS1_HM_BAD_FRAGMENT                   -2
+# define DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY                 -3
+
+# define DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH                  1
+
+# ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
+#  define DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH                   7
+# else
+#  define DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH                   2
+# endif
+
+
+/* Timeout multipliers (timeout slice is defined in apps/timeouts.h */
+# define DTLS1_TMO_READ_COUNT                      2
+# define DTLS1_TMO_WRITE_COUNT                     2
+
+# define DTLS1_TMO_ALERT_COUNT                     12
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/e_os2.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/e_os2.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9800e15
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/e_os2.h
@@ -0,0 +1,297 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_E_OS2_H
+# define HEADER_E_OS2_H
+
+# include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/******************************************************************************
+ * Detect operating systems.  This probably needs completing.
+ * The result is that at least one OPENSSL_SYS_os macro should be defined.
+ * However, if none is defined, Unix is assumed.
+ **/
+
+# define OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX
+
+/* --------------------- Microsoft operating systems ---------------------- */
+
+/*
+ * Note that MSDOS actually denotes 32-bit environments running on top of
+ * MS-DOS, such as DJGPP one.
+ */
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS)
+#  undef OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX
+# endif
+
+/*
+ * For 32 bit environment, there seems to be the CygWin environment and then
+ * all the others that try to do the same thing Microsoft does...
+ */
+/*
+ * UEFI lives here because it might be built with a Microsoft toolchain and
+ * we need to avoid the false positive match on Windows.
+ */
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI)
+#  undef OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX
+# elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UWIN)
+#  undef OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX
+#  define OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32_UWIN
+# else
+#  if defined(__CYGWIN__) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_CYGWIN)
+#   define OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32_CYGWIN
+#  else
+#   if defined(_WIN32) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32)
+#    undef OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX
+#    if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32)
+#     define OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
+#    endif
+#   endif
+#   if defined(_WIN64) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN64)
+#    undef OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX
+#    if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN64)
+#     define OPENSSL_SYS_WIN64
+#    endif
+#   endif
+#   if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINNT)
+#    undef OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX
+#   endif
+#   if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE)
+#    undef OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX
+#   endif
+#  endif
+# endif
+
+/* Anything that tries to look like Microsoft is "Windows" */
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN64) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINNT) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE)
+#  undef OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX
+#  define OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS
+#  ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS
+#   define OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS
+#  endif
+# endif
+
+/*
+ * DLL settings.  This part is a bit tough, because it's up to the
+ * application implementor how he or she will link the application, so it
+ * requires some macro to be used.
+ */
+# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS
+#  ifndef OPENSSL_OPT_WINDLL
+#   if defined(_WINDLL)         /* This is used when building OpenSSL to
+                                 * indicate that DLL linkage should be used */
+#    define OPENSSL_OPT_WINDLL
+#   endif
+#  endif
+# endif
+
+/* ------------------------------- OpenVMS -------------------------------- */
+# if defined(__VMS) || defined(VMS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
+#  if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
+#   undef OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX
+#  endif
+#  define OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+#  if defined(__DECC)
+#   define OPENSSL_SYS_VMS_DECC
+#  elif defined(__DECCXX)
+#   define OPENSSL_SYS_VMS_DECC
+#   define OPENSSL_SYS_VMS_DECCXX
+#  else
+#   define OPENSSL_SYS_VMS_NODECC
+#  endif
+# endif
+
+/* -------------------------------- Unix ---------------------------------- */
+# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX
+#  if defined(linux) || defined(__linux__) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_LINUX)
+#   define OPENSSL_SYS_LINUX
+#  endif
+#  if defined(_AIX) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_AIX)
+#   define OPENSSL_SYS_AIX
+#  endif
+# endif
+
+/* -------------------------------- VOS ----------------------------------- */
+# if defined(__VOS__) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VOS)
+#  define OPENSSL_SYS_VOS
+#  ifdef __HPPA__
+#   define OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_HPPA
+#  endif
+#  ifdef __IA32__
+#   define OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_IA32
+#  endif
+# endif
+
+/**
+ * That's it for OS-specific stuff
+ *****************************************************************************/
+
+/* Specials for I/O an exit */
+# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS
+#  define OPENSSL_UNISTD_IO <io.h>
+#  define OPENSSL_DECLARE_EXIT extern void exit(int);
+# else
+#  define OPENSSL_UNISTD_IO OPENSSL_UNISTD
+#  define OPENSSL_DECLARE_EXIT  /* declared in unistd.h */
+# endif
+
+/*-
+ * Definitions of OPENSSL_GLOBAL and OPENSSL_EXTERN, to define and declare
+ * certain global symbols that, with some compilers under VMS, have to be
+ * defined and declared explicitly with globaldef and globalref.
+ * Definitions of OPENSSL_EXPORT and OPENSSL_IMPORT, to define and declare
+ * DLL exports and imports for compilers under Win32.  These are a little
+ * more complicated to use.  Basically, for any library that exports some
+ * global variables, the following code must be present in the header file
+ * that declares them, before OPENSSL_EXTERN is used:
+ *
+ * #ifdef SOME_BUILD_FLAG_MACRO
+ * # undef OPENSSL_EXTERN
+ * # define OPENSSL_EXTERN OPENSSL_EXPORT
+ * #endif
+ *
+ * The default is to have OPENSSL_EXPORT, OPENSSL_EXTERN and OPENSSL_GLOBAL
+ * have some generally sensible values.
+ */
+
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS_NODECC)
+#  define OPENSSL_EXPORT globalref
+#  define OPENSSL_EXTERN globalref
+#  define OPENSSL_GLOBAL globaldef
+# elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) && defined(OPENSSL_OPT_WINDLL)
+#  define OPENSSL_EXPORT extern __declspec(dllexport)
+#  define OPENSSL_EXTERN extern __declspec(dllimport)
+#  define OPENSSL_GLOBAL
+# else
+#  define OPENSSL_EXPORT extern
+#  define OPENSSL_EXTERN extern
+#  define OPENSSL_GLOBAL
+# endif
+
+/*-
+ * Macros to allow global variables to be reached through function calls when
+ * required (if a shared library version requires it, for example.
+ * The way it's done allows definitions like this:
+ *
+ *      // in foobar.c
+ *      OPENSSL_IMPLEMENT_GLOBAL(int,foobar,0)
+ *      // in foobar.h
+ *      OPENSSL_DECLARE_GLOBAL(int,foobar);
+ *      #define foobar OPENSSL_GLOBAL_REF(foobar)
+ */
+# ifdef OPENSSL_EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION
+#  define OPENSSL_IMPLEMENT_GLOBAL(type,name,value)                      \
+        type *_shadow_##name(void)                                      \
+        { static type _hide_##name=value; return &_hide_##name; }
+#  define OPENSSL_DECLARE_GLOBAL(type,name) type *_shadow_##name(void)
+#  define OPENSSL_GLOBAL_REF(name) (*(_shadow_##name()))
+# else
+#  define OPENSSL_IMPLEMENT_GLOBAL(type,name,value) OPENSSL_GLOBAL type _shadow_##name=value;
+#  define OPENSSL_DECLARE_GLOBAL(type,name) OPENSSL_EXPORT type _shadow_##name
+#  define OPENSSL_GLOBAL_REF(name) _shadow_##name
+# endif
+
+# ifdef _WIN32
+#  ifdef _WIN64
+#   define ossl_ssize_t __int64
+#   define OSSL_SSIZE_MAX _I64_MAX
+#  else
+#   define ossl_ssize_t int
+#   define OSSL_SSIZE_MAX INT_MAX
+#  endif
+# endif
+
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI) && !defined(ossl_ssize_t)
+#  define ossl_ssize_t INTN
+#  define OSSL_SSIZE_MAX MAX_INTN
+# endif
+
+# ifndef ossl_ssize_t
+#  define ossl_ssize_t ssize_t
+#  if defined(SSIZE_MAX)
+#   define OSSL_SSIZE_MAX SSIZE_MAX
+#  elif defined(_POSIX_SSIZE_MAX)
+#   define OSSL_SSIZE_MAX _POSIX_SSIZE_MAX
+#  endif
+# endif
+
+# ifdef DEBUG_UNUSED
+#  define __owur __attribute__((__warn_unused_result__))
+# else
+#  define __owur
+# endif
+
+/* Standard integer types */
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI)
+typedef INT8 int8_t;
+typedef UINT8 uint8_t;
+typedef INT16 int16_t;
+typedef UINT16 uint16_t;
+typedef INT32 int32_t;
+typedef UINT32 uint32_t;
+typedef INT64 int64_t;
+typedef UINT64 uint64_t;
+# elif (defined(__STDC_VERSION__) && __STDC_VERSION__ >= 199901L) || \
+     defined(__osf__) || defined(__sgi) || defined(__hpux) || \
+     defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) || defined (__OpenBSD__)
+#  include <inttypes.h>
+# elif defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER<=1500
+/*
+ * minimally required typdefs for systems not supporting inttypes.h or
+ * stdint.h: currently just older VC++
+ */
+typedef signed char int8_t;
+typedef unsigned char uint8_t;
+typedef short int16_t;
+typedef unsigned short uint16_t;
+typedef int int32_t;
+typedef unsigned int uint32_t;
+typedef __int64 int64_t;
+typedef unsigned __int64 uint64_t;
+# else
+#  include <stdint.h>
+# endif
+
+/* ossl_inline: portable inline definition usable in public headers */
+# if !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus)
+#  if defined(__STDC_VERSION__) && __STDC_VERSION__>=199901L
+   /* just use inline */
+#   define ossl_inline inline
+#  elif defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2
+#   define ossl_inline __inline__
+#  elif defined(_MSC_VER)
+  /*
+   * Visual Studio: inline is available in C++ only, however
+   * __inline is available for C, see
+   * http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/z8y1yy88.aspx
+   */
+#   define ossl_inline __inline
+#  else
+#   define ossl_inline
+#  endif
+# else
+#  define ossl_inline inline
+# endif
+
+# if defined(__STDC_VERSION__) && __STDC_VERSION__ >= 201112L
+#  define ossl_noreturn _Noreturn
+# elif defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__ >= 2
+#  define ossl_noreturn __attribute__((noreturn))
+# else
+#  define ossl_noreturn
+# endif
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/ebcdic.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/ebcdic.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..aa01285
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/ebcdic.h
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_EBCDIC_H
+# define HEADER_EBCDIC_H
+
+# include <stdlib.h>
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/* Avoid name clashes with other applications */
+# define os_toascii   _openssl_os_toascii
+# define os_toebcdic  _openssl_os_toebcdic
+# define ebcdic2ascii _openssl_ebcdic2ascii
+# define ascii2ebcdic _openssl_ascii2ebcdic
+
+extern const unsigned char os_toascii[256];
+extern const unsigned char os_toebcdic[256];
+void *ebcdic2ascii(void *dest, const void *srce, size_t count);
+void *ascii2ebcdic(void *dest, const void *srce, size_t count);
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/ec.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/ec.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f06680a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/ec.h
@@ -0,0 +1,1576 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ *
+ * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ *
+ * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license provided above.
+ *
+ * The elliptic curve binary polynomial software is originally written by
+ * Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_EC_H
+# define HEADER_EC_H
+
+# include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+# include <openssl/asn1.h>
+# include <openssl/symhacks.h>
+# if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+#  include <openssl/bn.h>
+# endif
+# ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+# endif
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS
+#  define OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS 661
+# endif
+
+/** Enum for the point conversion form as defined in X9.62 (ECDSA)
+ *  for the encoding of a elliptic curve point (x,y) */
+typedef enum {
+        /** the point is encoded as z||x, where the octet z specifies
+         *  which solution of the quadratic equation y is  */
+    POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED = 2,
+        /** the point is encoded as z||x||y, where z is the octet 0x04  */
+    POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED = 4,
+        /** the point is encoded as z||x||y, where the octet z specifies
+         *  which solution of the quadratic equation y is  */
+    POINT_CONVERSION_HYBRID = 6
+} point_conversion_form_t;
+
+typedef struct ec_method_st EC_METHOD;
+typedef struct ec_group_st EC_GROUP;
+typedef struct ec_point_st EC_POINT;
+typedef struct ecpk_parameters_st ECPKPARAMETERS;
+typedef struct ec_parameters_st ECPARAMETERS;
+
+/********************************************************************/
+/*               EC_METHODs for curves over GF(p)                   */
+/********************************************************************/
+
+/** Returns the basic GFp ec methods which provides the basis for the
+ *  optimized methods.
+ *  \return  EC_METHOD object
+ */
+const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_simple_method(void);
+
+/** Returns GFp methods using montgomery multiplication.
+ *  \return  EC_METHOD object
+ */
+const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_mont_method(void);
+
+/** Returns GFp methods using optimized methods for NIST recommended curves
+ *  \return  EC_METHOD object
+ */
+const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_nist_method(void);
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128
+/** Returns 64-bit optimized methods for nistp224
+ *  \return  EC_METHOD object
+ */
+const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_nistp224_method(void);
+
+/** Returns 64-bit optimized methods for nistp256
+ *  \return  EC_METHOD object
+ */
+const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_nistp256_method(void);
+
+/** Returns 64-bit optimized methods for nistp521
+ *  \return  EC_METHOD object
+ */
+const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_nistp521_method(void);
+# endif
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+/********************************************************************/
+/*           EC_METHOD for curves over GF(2^m)                      */
+/********************************************************************/
+
+/** Returns the basic GF2m ec method
+ *  \return  EC_METHOD object
+ */
+const EC_METHOD *EC_GF2m_simple_method(void);
+
+# endif
+
+/********************************************************************/
+/*                   EC_GROUP functions                             */
+/********************************************************************/
+
+/** Creates a new EC_GROUP object
+ *  \param   meth  EC_METHOD to use
+ *  \return  newly created EC_GROUP object or NULL in case of an error.
+ */
+EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new(const EC_METHOD *meth);
+
+/** Frees a EC_GROUP object
+ *  \param  group  EC_GROUP object to be freed.
+ */
+void EC_GROUP_free(EC_GROUP *group);
+
+/** Clears and frees a EC_GROUP object
+ *  \param  group  EC_GROUP object to be cleared and freed.
+ */
+void EC_GROUP_clear_free(EC_GROUP *group);
+
+/** Copies EC_GROUP objects. Note: both EC_GROUPs must use the same EC_METHOD.
+ *  \param  dst  destination EC_GROUP object
+ *  \param  src  source EC_GROUP object
+ *  \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred.
+ */
+int EC_GROUP_copy(EC_GROUP *dst, const EC_GROUP *src);
+
+/** Creates a new EC_GROUP object and copies the copies the content
+ *  form src to the newly created EC_KEY object
+ *  \param  src  source EC_GROUP object
+ *  \return newly created EC_GROUP object or NULL in case of an error.
+ */
+EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_dup(const EC_GROUP *src);
+
+/** Returns the EC_METHOD of the EC_GROUP object.
+ *  \param  group  EC_GROUP object
+ *  \return EC_METHOD used in this EC_GROUP object.
+ */
+const EC_METHOD *EC_GROUP_method_of(const EC_GROUP *group);
+
+/** Returns the field type of the EC_METHOD.
+ *  \param  meth  EC_METHOD object
+ *  \return NID of the underlying field type OID.
+ */
+int EC_METHOD_get_field_type(const EC_METHOD *meth);
+
+/** Sets the generator and it's order/cofactor of a EC_GROUP object.
+ *  \param  group      EC_GROUP object
+ *  \param  generator  EC_POINT object with the generator.
+ *  \param  order      the order of the group generated by the generator.
+ *  \param  cofactor   the index of the sub-group generated by the generator
+ *                     in the group of all points on the elliptic curve.
+ *  \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred
+ */
+int EC_GROUP_set_generator(EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *generator,
+                           const BIGNUM *order, const BIGNUM *cofactor);
+
+/** Returns the generator of a EC_GROUP object.
+ *  \param  group  EC_GROUP object
+ *  \return the currently used generator (possibly NULL).
+ */
+const EC_POINT *EC_GROUP_get0_generator(const EC_GROUP *group);
+
+/** Returns the montgomery data for order(Generator)
+ *  \param  group  EC_GROUP object
+ *  \return the currently used montgomery data (possibly NULL).
+*/
+BN_MONT_CTX *EC_GROUP_get_mont_data(const EC_GROUP *group);
+
+/** Gets the order of a EC_GROUP
+ *  \param  group  EC_GROUP object
+ *  \param  order  BIGNUM to which the order is copied
+ *  \param  ctx    unused
+ *  \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred
+ */
+int EC_GROUP_get_order(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *order, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+/** Gets the order of an EC_GROUP
+ *  \param  group  EC_GROUP object
+ *  \return the group order
+ */
+const BIGNUM *EC_GROUP_get0_order(const EC_GROUP *group);
+
+/** Gets the number of bits of the order of an EC_GROUP
+ *  \param  group  EC_GROUP object
+ *  \return number of bits of group order.
+ */
+int EC_GROUP_order_bits(const EC_GROUP *group);
+
+/** Gets the cofactor of a EC_GROUP
+ *  \param  group     EC_GROUP object
+ *  \param  cofactor  BIGNUM to which the cofactor is copied
+ *  \param  ctx       unused
+ *  \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred
+ */
+int EC_GROUP_get_cofactor(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *cofactor,
+                          BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+/** Gets the cofactor of an EC_GROUP
+ *  \param  group  EC_GROUP object
+ *  \return the group cofactor
+ */
+const BIGNUM *EC_GROUP_get0_cofactor(const EC_GROUP *group);
+
+/** Sets the name of a EC_GROUP object
+ *  \param  group  EC_GROUP object
+ *  \param  nid    NID of the curve name OID
+ */
+void EC_GROUP_set_curve_name(EC_GROUP *group, int nid);
+
+/** Returns the curve name of a EC_GROUP object
+ *  \param  group  EC_GROUP object
+ *  \return NID of the curve name OID or 0 if not set.
+ */
+int EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(const EC_GROUP *group);
+
+void EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(EC_GROUP *group, int flag);
+int EC_GROUP_get_asn1_flag(const EC_GROUP *group);
+
+void EC_GROUP_set_point_conversion_form(EC_GROUP *group,
+                                        point_conversion_form_t form);
+point_conversion_form_t EC_GROUP_get_point_conversion_form(const EC_GROUP *);
+
+unsigned char *EC_GROUP_get0_seed(const EC_GROUP *x);
+size_t EC_GROUP_get_seed_len(const EC_GROUP *);
+size_t EC_GROUP_set_seed(EC_GROUP *, const unsigned char *, size_t len);
+
+/** Sets the parameter of a ec over GFp defined by y^2 = x^3 + a*x + b
+ *  \param  group  EC_GROUP object
+ *  \param  p      BIGNUM with the prime number
+ *  \param  a      BIGNUM with parameter a of the equation
+ *  \param  b      BIGNUM with parameter b of the equation
+ *  \param  ctx    BN_CTX object (optional)
+ *  \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred
+ */
+int EC_GROUP_set_curve_GFp(EC_GROUP *group, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a,
+                           const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+/** Gets the parameter of the ec over GFp defined by y^2 = x^3 + a*x + b
+ *  \param  group  EC_GROUP object
+ *  \param  p      BIGNUM for the prime number
+ *  \param  a      BIGNUM for parameter a of the equation
+ *  \param  b      BIGNUM for parameter b of the equation
+ *  \param  ctx    BN_CTX object (optional)
+ *  \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred
+ */
+int EC_GROUP_get_curve_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *a,
+                           BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+/** Sets the parameter of a ec over GF2m defined by y^2 + x*y = x^3 + a*x^2 + b
+ *  \param  group  EC_GROUP object
+ *  \param  p      BIGNUM with the polynomial defining the underlying field
+ *  \param  a      BIGNUM with parameter a of the equation
+ *  \param  b      BIGNUM with parameter b of the equation
+ *  \param  ctx    BN_CTX object (optional)
+ *  \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred
+ */
+int EC_GROUP_set_curve_GF2m(EC_GROUP *group, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a,
+                            const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+/** Gets the parameter of the ec over GF2m defined by y^2 + x*y = x^3 + a*x^2 + b
+ *  \param  group  EC_GROUP object
+ *  \param  p      BIGNUM for the polynomial defining the underlying field
+ *  \param  a      BIGNUM for parameter a of the equation
+ *  \param  b      BIGNUM for parameter b of the equation
+ *  \param  ctx    BN_CTX object (optional)
+ *  \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred
+ */
+int EC_GROUP_get_curve_GF2m(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *a,
+                            BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx);
+# endif
+/** Returns the number of bits needed to represent a field element
+ *  \param  group  EC_GROUP object
+ *  \return number of bits needed to represent a field element
+ */
+int EC_GROUP_get_degree(const EC_GROUP *group);
+
+/** Checks whether the parameter in the EC_GROUP define a valid ec group
+ *  \param  group  EC_GROUP object
+ *  \param  ctx    BN_CTX object (optional)
+ *  \return 1 if group is a valid ec group and 0 otherwise
+ */
+int EC_GROUP_check(const EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+/** Checks whether the discriminant of the elliptic curve is zero or not
+ *  \param  group  EC_GROUP object
+ *  \param  ctx    BN_CTX object (optional)
+ *  \return 1 if the discriminant is not zero and 0 otherwise
+ */
+int EC_GROUP_check_discriminant(const EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+/** Compares two EC_GROUP objects
+ *  \param  a    first EC_GROUP object
+ *  \param  b    second EC_GROUP object
+ *  \param  ctx  BN_CTX object (optional)
+ *  \return 0 if the groups are equal, 1 if not, or -1 on error
+ */
+int EC_GROUP_cmp(const EC_GROUP *a, const EC_GROUP *b, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+/*
+ * EC_GROUP_new_GF*() calls EC_GROUP_new() and EC_GROUP_set_GF*() after
+ * choosing an appropriate EC_METHOD
+ */
+
+/** Creates a new EC_GROUP object with the specified parameters defined
+ *  over GFp (defined by the equation y^2 = x^3 + a*x + b)
+ *  \param  p    BIGNUM with the prime number
+ *  \param  a    BIGNUM with the parameter a of the equation
+ *  \param  b    BIGNUM with the parameter b of the equation
+ *  \param  ctx  BN_CTX object (optional)
+ *  \return newly created EC_GROUP object with the specified parameters
+ */
+EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp(const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a,
+                                 const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx);
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+/** Creates a new EC_GROUP object with the specified parameters defined
+ *  over GF2m (defined by the equation y^2 + x*y = x^3 + a*x^2 + b)
+ *  \param  p    BIGNUM with the polynomial defining the underlying field
+ *  \param  a    BIGNUM with the parameter a of the equation
+ *  \param  b    BIGNUM with the parameter b of the equation
+ *  \param  ctx  BN_CTX object (optional)
+ *  \return newly created EC_GROUP object with the specified parameters
+ */
+EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m(const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a,
+                                  const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx);
+# endif
+
+/** Creates a EC_GROUP object with a curve specified by a NID
+ *  \param  nid  NID of the OID of the curve name
+ *  \return newly created EC_GROUP object with specified curve or NULL
+ *          if an error occurred
+ */
+EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(int nid);
+
+/** Creates a new EC_GROUP object from an ECPARAMETERS object
+ *  \param  params  pointer to the ECPARAMETERS object
+ *  \return newly created EC_GROUP object with specified curve or NULL
+ *          if an error occurred
+ */
+EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters(const ECPARAMETERS *params);
+
+/** Creates an ECPARAMETERS object for the the given EC_GROUP object.
+ *  \param  group   pointer to the EC_GROUP object
+ *  \param  params  pointer to an existing ECPARAMETERS object or NULL
+ *  \return pointer to the new ECPARAMETERS object or NULL
+ *          if an error occurred.
+ */
+ECPARAMETERS *EC_GROUP_get_ecparameters(const EC_GROUP *group,
+                                        ECPARAMETERS *params);
+
+/** Creates a new EC_GROUP object from an ECPKPARAMETERS object
+ *  \param  params  pointer to an existing ECPKPARAMETERS object, or NULL
+ *  \return newly created EC_GROUP object with specified curve, or NULL
+ *          if an error occurred
+ */
+EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters(const ECPKPARAMETERS *params);
+
+/** Creates an ECPKPARAMETERS object for the the given EC_GROUP object.
+ *  \param  group   pointer to the EC_GROUP object
+ *  \param  params  pointer to an existing ECPKPARAMETERS object or NULL
+ *  \return pointer to the new ECPKPARAMETERS object or NULL
+ *          if an error occurred.
+ */
+ECPKPARAMETERS *EC_GROUP_get_ecpkparameters(const EC_GROUP *group,
+                                            ECPKPARAMETERS *params);
+
+/********************************************************************/
+/*               handling of internal curves                        */
+/********************************************************************/
+
+typedef struct {
+    int nid;
+    const char *comment;
+} EC_builtin_curve;
+
+/*
+ * EC_builtin_curves(EC_builtin_curve *r, size_t size) returns number of all
+ * available curves or zero if a error occurred. In case r is not zero,
+ * nitems EC_builtin_curve structures are filled with the data of the first
+ * nitems internal groups
+ */
+size_t EC_get_builtin_curves(EC_builtin_curve *r, size_t nitems);
+
+const char *EC_curve_nid2nist(int nid);
+int EC_curve_nist2nid(const char *name);
+
+/********************************************************************/
+/*                    EC_POINT functions                            */
+/********************************************************************/
+
+/** Creates a new EC_POINT object for the specified EC_GROUP
+ *  \param  group  EC_GROUP the underlying EC_GROUP object
+ *  \return newly created EC_POINT object or NULL if an error occurred
+ */
+EC_POINT *EC_POINT_new(const EC_GROUP *group);
+
+/** Frees a EC_POINT object
+ *  \param  point  EC_POINT object to be freed
+ */
+void EC_POINT_free(EC_POINT *point);
+
+/** Clears and frees a EC_POINT object
+ *  \param  point  EC_POINT object to be cleared and freed
+ */
+void EC_POINT_clear_free(EC_POINT *point);
+
+/** Copies EC_POINT object
+ *  \param  dst  destination EC_POINT object
+ *  \param  src  source EC_POINT object
+ *  \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred
+ */
+int EC_POINT_copy(EC_POINT *dst, const EC_POINT *src);
+
+/** Creates a new EC_POINT object and copies the content of the supplied
+ *  EC_POINT
+ *  \param  src    source EC_POINT object
+ *  \param  group  underlying the EC_GROUP object
+ *  \return newly created EC_POINT object or NULL if an error occurred
+ */
+EC_POINT *EC_POINT_dup(const EC_POINT *src, const EC_GROUP *group);
+
+/** Returns the EC_METHOD used in EC_POINT object
+ *  \param  point  EC_POINT object
+ *  \return the EC_METHOD used
+ */
+const EC_METHOD *EC_POINT_method_of(const EC_POINT *point);
+
+/** Sets a point to infinity (neutral element)
+ *  \param  group  underlying EC_GROUP object
+ *  \param  point  EC_POINT to set to infinity
+ *  \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred
+ */
+int EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point);
+
+/** Sets the jacobian projective coordinates of a EC_POINT over GFp
+ *  \param  group  underlying EC_GROUP object
+ *  \param  p      EC_POINT object
+ *  \param  x      BIGNUM with the x-coordinate
+ *  \param  y      BIGNUM with the y-coordinate
+ *  \param  z      BIGNUM with the z-coordinate
+ *  \param  ctx    BN_CTX object (optional)
+ *  \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred
+ */
+int EC_POINT_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group,
+                                             EC_POINT *p, const BIGNUM *x,
+                                             const BIGNUM *y, const BIGNUM *z,
+                                             BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+/** Gets the jacobian projective coordinates of a EC_POINT over GFp
+ *  \param  group  underlying EC_GROUP object
+ *  \param  p      EC_POINT object
+ *  \param  x      BIGNUM for the x-coordinate
+ *  \param  y      BIGNUM for the y-coordinate
+ *  \param  z      BIGNUM for the z-coordinate
+ *  \param  ctx    BN_CTX object (optional)
+ *  \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred
+ */
+int EC_POINT_get_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group,
+                                             const EC_POINT *p, BIGNUM *x,
+                                             BIGNUM *y, BIGNUM *z,
+                                             BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+/** Sets the affine coordinates of a EC_POINT over GFp
+ *  \param  group  underlying EC_GROUP object
+ *  \param  p      EC_POINT object
+ *  \param  x      BIGNUM with the x-coordinate
+ *  \param  y      BIGNUM with the y-coordinate
+ *  \param  ctx    BN_CTX object (optional)
+ *  \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred
+ */
+int EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *p,
+                                        const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y,
+                                        BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+/** Gets the affine coordinates of a EC_POINT over GFp
+ *  \param  group  underlying EC_GROUP object
+ *  \param  p      EC_POINT object
+ *  \param  x      BIGNUM for the x-coordinate
+ *  \param  y      BIGNUM for the y-coordinate
+ *  \param  ctx    BN_CTX object (optional)
+ *  \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred
+ */
+int EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group,
+                                        const EC_POINT *p, BIGNUM *x,
+                                        BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+/** Sets the x9.62 compressed coordinates of a EC_POINT over GFp
+ *  \param  group  underlying EC_GROUP object
+ *  \param  p      EC_POINT object
+ *  \param  x      BIGNUM with x-coordinate
+ *  \param  y_bit  integer with the y-Bit (either 0 or 1)
+ *  \param  ctx    BN_CTX object (optional)
+ *  \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred
+ */
+int EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group,
+                                            EC_POINT *p, const BIGNUM *x,
+                                            int y_bit, BN_CTX *ctx);
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+/** Sets the affine coordinates of a EC_POINT over GF2m
+ *  \param  group  underlying EC_GROUP object
+ *  \param  p      EC_POINT object
+ *  \param  x      BIGNUM with the x-coordinate
+ *  \param  y      BIGNUM with the y-coordinate
+ *  \param  ctx    BN_CTX object (optional)
+ *  \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred
+ */
+int EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *p,
+                                         const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y,
+                                         BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+/** Gets the affine coordinates of a EC_POINT over GF2m
+ *  \param  group  underlying EC_GROUP object
+ *  \param  p      EC_POINT object
+ *  \param  x      BIGNUM for the x-coordinate
+ *  \param  y      BIGNUM for the y-coordinate
+ *  \param  ctx    BN_CTX object (optional)
+ *  \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred
+ */
+int EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m(const EC_GROUP *group,
+                                         const EC_POINT *p, BIGNUM *x,
+                                         BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+/** Sets the x9.62 compressed coordinates of a EC_POINT over GF2m
+ *  \param  group  underlying EC_GROUP object
+ *  \param  p      EC_POINT object
+ *  \param  x      BIGNUM with x-coordinate
+ *  \param  y_bit  integer with the y-Bit (either 0 or 1)
+ *  \param  ctx    BN_CTX object (optional)
+ *  \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred
+ */
+int EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GF2m(const EC_GROUP *group,
+                                             EC_POINT *p, const BIGNUM *x,
+                                             int y_bit, BN_CTX *ctx);
+# endif
+/** Encodes a EC_POINT object to a octet string
+ *  \param  group  underlying EC_GROUP object
+ *  \param  p      EC_POINT object
+ *  \param  form   point conversion form
+ *  \param  buf    memory buffer for the result. If NULL the function returns
+ *                 required buffer size.
+ *  \param  len    length of the memory buffer
+ *  \param  ctx    BN_CTX object (optional)
+ *  \return the length of the encoded octet string or 0 if an error occurred
+ */
+size_t EC_POINT_point2oct(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *p,
+                          point_conversion_form_t form,
+                          unsigned char *buf, size_t len, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+/** Decodes a EC_POINT from a octet string
+ *  \param  group  underlying EC_GROUP object
+ *  \param  p      EC_POINT object
+ *  \param  buf    memory buffer with the encoded ec point
+ *  \param  len    length of the encoded ec point
+ *  \param  ctx    BN_CTX object (optional)
+ *  \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred
+ */
+int EC_POINT_oct2point(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *p,
+                       const unsigned char *buf, size_t len, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+/** Encodes an EC_POINT object to an allocated octet string
+ *  \param  group  underlying EC_GROUP object
+ *  \param  point  EC_POINT object
+ *  \param  form   point conversion form
+ *  \param  pbuf   returns pointer to allocated buffer
+ *  \param  ctx    BN_CTX object (optional)
+ *  \return the length of the encoded octet string or 0 if an error occurred
+ */
+size_t EC_POINT_point2buf(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point,
+                          point_conversion_form_t form,
+                          unsigned char **pbuf, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+/* other interfaces to point2oct/oct2point: */
+BIGNUM *EC_POINT_point2bn(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *,
+                          point_conversion_form_t form, BIGNUM *, BN_CTX *);
+EC_POINT *EC_POINT_bn2point(const EC_GROUP *, const BIGNUM *,
+                            EC_POINT *, BN_CTX *);
+char *EC_POINT_point2hex(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *,
+                         point_conversion_form_t form, BN_CTX *);
+EC_POINT *EC_POINT_hex2point(const EC_GROUP *, const char *,
+                             EC_POINT *, BN_CTX *);
+
+/********************************************************************/
+/*         functions for doing EC_POINT arithmetic                  */
+/********************************************************************/
+
+/** Computes the sum of two EC_POINT
+ *  \param  group  underlying EC_GROUP object
+ *  \param  r      EC_POINT object for the result (r = a + b)
+ *  \param  a      EC_POINT object with the first summand
+ *  \param  b      EC_POINT object with the second summand
+ *  \param  ctx    BN_CTX object (optional)
+ *  \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred
+ */
+int EC_POINT_add(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const EC_POINT *a,
+                 const EC_POINT *b, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+/** Computes the double of a EC_POINT
+ *  \param  group  underlying EC_GROUP object
+ *  \param  r      EC_POINT object for the result (r = 2 * a)
+ *  \param  a      EC_POINT object
+ *  \param  ctx    BN_CTX object (optional)
+ *  \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred
+ */
+int EC_POINT_dbl(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const EC_POINT *a,
+                 BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+/** Computes the inverse of a EC_POINT
+ *  \param  group  underlying EC_GROUP object
+ *  \param  a      EC_POINT object to be inverted (it's used for the result as well)
+ *  \param  ctx    BN_CTX object (optional)
+ *  \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred
+ */
+int EC_POINT_invert(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *a, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+/** Checks whether the point is the neutral element of the group
+ *  \param  group  the underlying EC_GROUP object
+ *  \param  p      EC_POINT object
+ *  \return 1 if the point is the neutral element and 0 otherwise
+ */
+int EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *p);
+
+/** Checks whether the point is on the curve
+ *  \param  group  underlying EC_GROUP object
+ *  \param  point  EC_POINT object to check
+ *  \param  ctx    BN_CTX object (optional)
+ *  \return 1 if the point is on the curve, 0 if not, or -1 on error
+ */
+int EC_POINT_is_on_curve(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point,
+                         BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+/** Compares two EC_POINTs
+ *  \param  group  underlying EC_GROUP object
+ *  \param  a      first EC_POINT object
+ *  \param  b      second EC_POINT object
+ *  \param  ctx    BN_CTX object (optional)
+ *  \return 1 if the points are not equal, 0 if they are, or -1 on error
+ */
+int EC_POINT_cmp(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *a, const EC_POINT *b,
+                 BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+int EC_POINT_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int EC_POINTs_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *group, size_t num,
+                          EC_POINT *points[], BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+/** Computes r = generator * n + sum_{i=0}^{num-1} p[i] * m[i]
+ *  \param  group  underlying EC_GROUP object
+ *  \param  r      EC_POINT object for the result
+ *  \param  n      BIGNUM with the multiplier for the group generator (optional)
+ *  \param  num    number further summands
+ *  \param  p      array of size num of EC_POINT objects
+ *  \param  m      array of size num of BIGNUM objects
+ *  \param  ctx    BN_CTX object (optional)
+ *  \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred
+ */
+int EC_POINTs_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *n,
+                  size_t num, const EC_POINT *p[], const BIGNUM *m[],
+                  BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+/** Computes r = generator * n + q * m
+ *  \param  group  underlying EC_GROUP object
+ *  \param  r      EC_POINT object for the result
+ *  \param  n      BIGNUM with the multiplier for the group generator (optional)
+ *  \param  q      EC_POINT object with the first factor of the second summand
+ *  \param  m      BIGNUM with the second factor of the second summand
+ *  \param  ctx    BN_CTX object (optional)
+ *  \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred
+ */
+int EC_POINT_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *n,
+                 const EC_POINT *q, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+/** Stores multiples of generator for faster point multiplication
+ *  \param  group  EC_GROUP object
+ *  \param  ctx    BN_CTX object (optional)
+ *  \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred
+ */
+int EC_GROUP_precompute_mult(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+/** Reports whether a precomputation has been done
+ *  \param  group  EC_GROUP object
+ *  \return 1 if a pre-computation has been done and 0 otherwise
+ */
+int EC_GROUP_have_precompute_mult(const EC_GROUP *group);
+
+/********************************************************************/
+/*                       ASN1 stuff                                 */
+/********************************************************************/
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(ECPKPARAMETERS)
+DECLARE_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(ECPKPARAMETERS)
+DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(ECPARAMETERS)
+DECLARE_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(ECPARAMETERS)
+
+/*
+ * EC_GROUP_get_basis_type() returns the NID of the basis type used to
+ * represent the field elements
+ */
+int EC_GROUP_get_basis_type(const EC_GROUP *);
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+int EC_GROUP_get_trinomial_basis(const EC_GROUP *, unsigned int *k);
+int EC_GROUP_get_pentanomial_basis(const EC_GROUP *, unsigned int *k1,
+                                   unsigned int *k2, unsigned int *k3);
+# endif
+
+# define OPENSSL_EC_EXPLICIT_CURVE  0x000
+# define OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE     0x001
+
+EC_GROUP *d2i_ECPKParameters(EC_GROUP **, const unsigned char **in, long len);
+int i2d_ECPKParameters(const EC_GROUP *, unsigned char **out);
+
+# define d2i_ECPKParameters_bio(bp,x) ASN1_d2i_bio_of(EC_GROUP,NULL,d2i_ECPKParameters,bp,x)
+# define i2d_ECPKParameters_bio(bp,x) ASN1_i2d_bio_of_const(EC_GROUP,i2d_ECPKParameters,bp,x)
+# define d2i_ECPKParameters_fp(fp,x) (EC_GROUP *)ASN1_d2i_fp(NULL, \
+                (char *(*)())d2i_ECPKParameters,(fp),(unsigned char **)(x))
+# define i2d_ECPKParameters_fp(fp,x) ASN1_i2d_fp(i2d_ECPKParameters,(fp), \
+                (unsigned char *)(x))
+
+int ECPKParameters_print(BIO *bp, const EC_GROUP *x, int off);
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+int ECPKParameters_print_fp(FILE *fp, const EC_GROUP *x, int off);
+# endif
+
+/********************************************************************/
+/*                      EC_KEY functions                            */
+/********************************************************************/
+
+/* some values for the encoding_flag */
+# define EC_PKEY_NO_PARAMETERS   0x001
+# define EC_PKEY_NO_PUBKEY       0x002
+
+/* some values for the flags field */
+# define EC_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW  0x1
+# define EC_FLAG_FIPS_CHECKED    0x2
+# define EC_FLAG_COFACTOR_ECDH   0x1000
+
+/** Creates a new EC_KEY object.
+ *  \return EC_KEY object or NULL if an error occurred.
+ */
+EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new(void);
+
+int EC_KEY_get_flags(const EC_KEY *key);
+
+void EC_KEY_set_flags(EC_KEY *key, int flags);
+
+void EC_KEY_clear_flags(EC_KEY *key, int flags);
+
+/** Creates a new EC_KEY object using a named curve as underlying
+ *  EC_GROUP object.
+ *  \param  nid  NID of the named curve.
+ *  \return EC_KEY object or NULL if an error occurred.
+ */
+EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(int nid);
+
+/** Frees a EC_KEY object.
+ *  \param  key  EC_KEY object to be freed.
+ */
+void EC_KEY_free(EC_KEY *key);
+
+/** Copies a EC_KEY object.
+ *  \param  dst  destination EC_KEY object
+ *  \param  src  src EC_KEY object
+ *  \return dst or NULL if an error occurred.
+ */
+EC_KEY *EC_KEY_copy(EC_KEY *dst, const EC_KEY *src);
+
+/** Creates a new EC_KEY object and copies the content from src to it.
+ *  \param  src  the source EC_KEY object
+ *  \return newly created EC_KEY object or NULL if an error occurred.
+ */
+EC_KEY *EC_KEY_dup(const EC_KEY *src);
+
+/** Increases the internal reference count of a EC_KEY object.
+ *  \param  key  EC_KEY object
+ *  \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred.
+ */
+int EC_KEY_up_ref(EC_KEY *key);
+
+/** Returns the EC_GROUP object of a EC_KEY object
+ *  \param  key  EC_KEY object
+ *  \return the EC_GROUP object (possibly NULL).
+ */
+const EC_GROUP *EC_KEY_get0_group(const EC_KEY *key);
+
+/** Sets the EC_GROUP of a EC_KEY object.
+ *  \param  key    EC_KEY object
+ *  \param  group  EC_GROUP to use in the EC_KEY object (note: the EC_KEY
+ *                 object will use an own copy of the EC_GROUP).
+ *  \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred.
+ */
+int EC_KEY_set_group(EC_KEY *key, const EC_GROUP *group);
+
+/** Returns the private key of a EC_KEY object.
+ *  \param  key  EC_KEY object
+ *  \return a BIGNUM with the private key (possibly NULL).
+ */
+const BIGNUM *EC_KEY_get0_private_key(const EC_KEY *key);
+
+/** Sets the private key of a EC_KEY object.
+ *  \param  key  EC_KEY object
+ *  \param  prv  BIGNUM with the private key (note: the EC_KEY object
+ *               will use an own copy of the BIGNUM).
+ *  \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred.
+ */
+int EC_KEY_set_private_key(EC_KEY *key, const BIGNUM *prv);
+
+/** Returns the public key of a EC_KEY object.
+ *  \param  key  the EC_KEY object
+ *  \return a EC_POINT object with the public key (possibly NULL)
+ */
+const EC_POINT *EC_KEY_get0_public_key(const EC_KEY *key);
+
+/** Sets the public key of a EC_KEY object.
+ *  \param  key  EC_KEY object
+ *  \param  pub  EC_POINT object with the public key (note: the EC_KEY object
+ *               will use an own copy of the EC_POINT object).
+ *  \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred.
+ */
+int EC_KEY_set_public_key(EC_KEY *key, const EC_POINT *pub);
+
+unsigned EC_KEY_get_enc_flags(const EC_KEY *key);
+void EC_KEY_set_enc_flags(EC_KEY *eckey, unsigned int flags);
+point_conversion_form_t EC_KEY_get_conv_form(const EC_KEY *key);
+void EC_KEY_set_conv_form(EC_KEY *eckey, point_conversion_form_t cform);
+
+#define EC_KEY_get_ex_new_index(l, p, newf, dupf, freef) \
+    CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_EC_KEY, l, p, newf, dupf, freef)
+int EC_KEY_set_ex_data(EC_KEY *key, int idx, void *arg);
+void *EC_KEY_get_ex_data(const EC_KEY *key, int idx);
+
+/* wrapper functions for the underlying EC_GROUP object */
+void EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag(EC_KEY *eckey, int asn1_flag);
+
+/** Creates a table of pre-computed multiples of the generator to
+ *  accelerate further EC_KEY operations.
+ *  \param  key  EC_KEY object
+ *  \param  ctx  BN_CTX object (optional)
+ *  \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred.
+ */
+int EC_KEY_precompute_mult(EC_KEY *key, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+/** Creates a new ec private (and optional a new public) key.
+ *  \param  key  EC_KEY object
+ *  \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred.
+ */
+int EC_KEY_generate_key(EC_KEY *key);
+
+/** Verifies that a private and/or public key is valid.
+ *  \param  key  the EC_KEY object
+ *  \return 1 on success and 0 otherwise.
+ */
+int EC_KEY_check_key(const EC_KEY *key);
+
+/** Indicates if an EC_KEY can be used for signing.
+ *  \param  eckey  the EC_KEY object
+ *  \return 1 if can can sign and 0 otherwise.
+ */
+int EC_KEY_can_sign(const EC_KEY *eckey);
+
+/** Sets a public key from affine coordinates performing
+ *  necessary NIST PKV tests.
+ *  \param  key  the EC_KEY object
+ *  \param  x    public key x coordinate
+ *  \param  y    public key y coordinate
+ *  \return 1 on success and 0 otherwise.
+ */
+int EC_KEY_set_public_key_affine_coordinates(EC_KEY *key, BIGNUM *x,
+                                             BIGNUM *y);
+
+/** Encodes an EC_KEY public key to an allocated octet string
+ *  \param  key    key to encode
+ *  \param  form   point conversion form
+ *  \param  pbuf   returns pointer to allocated buffer
+ *  \param  ctx    BN_CTX object (optional)
+ *  \return the length of the encoded octet string or 0 if an error occurred
+ */
+size_t EC_KEY_key2buf(const EC_KEY *key, point_conversion_form_t form,
+                      unsigned char **pbuf, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+/** Decodes a EC_KEY public key from a octet string
+ *  \param  key    key to decode
+ *  \param  buf    memory buffer with the encoded ec point
+ *  \param  len    length of the encoded ec point
+ *  \param  ctx    BN_CTX object (optional)
+ *  \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred
+ */
+
+int EC_KEY_oct2key(EC_KEY *key, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len,
+                   BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+/** Decodes an EC_KEY private key from an octet string
+ *  \param  key    key to decode
+ *  \param  buf    memory buffer with the encoded private key
+ *  \param  len    length of the encoded key
+ *  \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred
+ */
+
+int EC_KEY_oct2priv(EC_KEY *key, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len);
+
+/** Encodes a EC_KEY private key to an octet string
+ *  \param  key    key to encode
+ *  \param  buf    memory buffer for the result. If NULL the function returns
+ *                 required buffer size.
+ *  \param  len    length of the memory buffer
+ *  \return the length of the encoded octet string or 0 if an error occurred
+ */
+
+size_t EC_KEY_priv2oct(const EC_KEY *key, unsigned char *buf, size_t len);
+
+/** Encodes an EC_KEY private key to an allocated octet string
+ *  \param  eckey  key to encode
+ *  \param  pbuf   returns pointer to allocated buffer
+ *  \return the length of the encoded octet string or 0 if an error occurred
+ */
+size_t EC_KEY_priv2buf(const EC_KEY *eckey, unsigned char **pbuf);
+
+/********************************************************************/
+/*        de- and encoding functions for SEC1 ECPrivateKey          */
+/********************************************************************/
+
+/** Decodes a private key from a memory buffer.
+ *  \param  key  a pointer to a EC_KEY object which should be used (or NULL)
+ *  \param  in   pointer to memory with the DER encoded private key
+ *  \param  len  length of the DER encoded private key
+ *  \return the decoded private key or NULL if an error occurred.
+ */
+EC_KEY *d2i_ECPrivateKey(EC_KEY **key, const unsigned char **in, long len);
+
+/** Encodes a private key object and stores the result in a buffer.
+ *  \param  key  the EC_KEY object to encode
+ *  \param  out  the buffer for the result (if NULL the function returns number
+ *               of bytes needed).
+ *  \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred.
+ */
+int i2d_ECPrivateKey(EC_KEY *key, unsigned char **out);
+
+/********************************************************************/
+/*        de- and encoding functions for EC parameters              */
+/********************************************************************/
+
+/** Decodes ec parameter from a memory buffer.
+ *  \param  key  a pointer to a EC_KEY object which should be used (or NULL)
+ *  \param  in   pointer to memory with the DER encoded ec parameters
+ *  \param  len  length of the DER encoded ec parameters
+ *  \return a EC_KEY object with the decoded parameters or NULL if an error
+ *          occurred.
+ */
+EC_KEY *d2i_ECParameters(EC_KEY **key, const unsigned char **in, long len);
+
+/** Encodes ec parameter and stores the result in a buffer.
+ *  \param  key  the EC_KEY object with ec parameters to encode
+ *  \param  out  the buffer for the result (if NULL the function returns number
+ *               of bytes needed).
+ *  \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred.
+ */
+int i2d_ECParameters(EC_KEY *key, unsigned char **out);
+
+/********************************************************************/
+/*         de- and encoding functions for EC public key             */
+/*         (octet string, not DER -- hence 'o2i' and 'i2o')         */
+/********************************************************************/
+
+/** Decodes a ec public key from a octet string.
+ *  \param  key  a pointer to a EC_KEY object which should be used
+ *  \param  in   memory buffer with the encoded public key
+ *  \param  len  length of the encoded public key
+ *  \return EC_KEY object with decoded public key or NULL if an error
+ *          occurred.
+ */
+EC_KEY *o2i_ECPublicKey(EC_KEY **key, const unsigned char **in, long len);
+
+/** Encodes a ec public key in an octet string.
+ *  \param  key  the EC_KEY object with the public key
+ *  \param  out  the buffer for the result (if NULL the function returns number
+ *               of bytes needed).
+ *  \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred
+ */
+int i2o_ECPublicKey(const EC_KEY *key, unsigned char **out);
+
+/** Prints out the ec parameters on human readable form.
+ *  \param  bp   BIO object to which the information is printed
+ *  \param  key  EC_KEY object
+ *  \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred
+ */
+int ECParameters_print(BIO *bp, const EC_KEY *key);
+
+/** Prints out the contents of a EC_KEY object
+ *  \param  bp   BIO object to which the information is printed
+ *  \param  key  EC_KEY object
+ *  \param  off  line offset
+ *  \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred
+ */
+int EC_KEY_print(BIO *bp, const EC_KEY *key, int off);
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+/** Prints out the ec parameters on human readable form.
+ *  \param  fp   file descriptor to which the information is printed
+ *  \param  key  EC_KEY object
+ *  \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred
+ */
+int ECParameters_print_fp(FILE *fp, const EC_KEY *key);
+
+/** Prints out the contents of a EC_KEY object
+ *  \param  fp   file descriptor to which the information is printed
+ *  \param  key  EC_KEY object
+ *  \param  off  line offset
+ *  \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred
+ */
+int EC_KEY_print_fp(FILE *fp, const EC_KEY *key, int off);
+
+# endif
+
+const EC_KEY_METHOD *EC_KEY_OpenSSL(void);
+const EC_KEY_METHOD *EC_KEY_get_default_method(void);
+void EC_KEY_set_default_method(const EC_KEY_METHOD *meth);
+const EC_KEY_METHOD *EC_KEY_get_method(const EC_KEY *key);
+int EC_KEY_set_method(EC_KEY *key, const EC_KEY_METHOD *meth);
+EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new_method(ENGINE *engine);
+
+int ECDH_KDF_X9_62(unsigned char *out, size_t outlen,
+                   const unsigned char *Z, size_t Zlen,
+                   const unsigned char *sinfo, size_t sinfolen,
+                   const EVP_MD *md);
+
+int ECDH_compute_key(void *out, size_t outlen, const EC_POINT *pub_key,
+                     const EC_KEY *ecdh,
+                     void *(*KDF) (const void *in, size_t inlen,
+                                   void *out, size_t *outlen));
+
+typedef struct ECDSA_SIG_st ECDSA_SIG;
+
+/** Allocates and initialize a ECDSA_SIG structure
+ *  \return pointer to a ECDSA_SIG structure or NULL if an error occurred
+ */
+ECDSA_SIG *ECDSA_SIG_new(void);
+
+/** frees a ECDSA_SIG structure
+ *  \param  sig  pointer to the ECDSA_SIG structure
+ */
+void ECDSA_SIG_free(ECDSA_SIG *sig);
+
+/** DER encode content of ECDSA_SIG object (note: this function modifies *pp
+ *  (*pp += length of the DER encoded signature)).
+ *  \param  sig  pointer to the ECDSA_SIG object
+ *  \param  pp   pointer to a unsigned char pointer for the output or NULL
+ *  \return the length of the DER encoded ECDSA_SIG object or 0
+ */
+int i2d_ECDSA_SIG(const ECDSA_SIG *sig, unsigned char **pp);
+
+/** Decodes a DER encoded ECDSA signature (note: this function changes *pp
+ *  (*pp += len)).
+ *  \param  sig  pointer to ECDSA_SIG pointer (may be NULL)
+ *  \param  pp   memory buffer with the DER encoded signature
+ *  \param  len  length of the buffer
+ *  \return pointer to the decoded ECDSA_SIG structure (or NULL)
+ */
+ECDSA_SIG *d2i_ECDSA_SIG(ECDSA_SIG **sig, const unsigned char **pp, long len);
+
+/** Accessor for r and s fields of ECDSA_SIG
+ *  \param  sig  pointer to ECDSA_SIG pointer
+ *  \param  pr   pointer to BIGNUM pointer for r (may be NULL)
+ *  \param  ps   pointer to BIGNUM pointer for s (may be NULL)
+ */
+void ECDSA_SIG_get0(const ECDSA_SIG *sig, const BIGNUM **pr, const BIGNUM **ps);
+
+/** Setter for r and s fields of ECDSA_SIG
+ *  \param  sig  pointer to ECDSA_SIG pointer
+ *  \param  r    pointer to BIGNUM for r (may be NULL)
+ *  \param  s    pointer to BIGNUM for s (may be NULL)
+ */
+int ECDSA_SIG_set0(ECDSA_SIG *sig, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *s);
+
+/** Computes the ECDSA signature of the given hash value using
+ *  the supplied private key and returns the created signature.
+ *  \param  dgst      pointer to the hash value
+ *  \param  dgst_len  length of the hash value
+ *  \param  eckey     EC_KEY object containing a private EC key
+ *  \return pointer to a ECDSA_SIG structure or NULL if an error occurred
+ */
+ECDSA_SIG *ECDSA_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
+                         EC_KEY *eckey);
+
+/** Computes ECDSA signature of a given hash value using the supplied
+ *  private key (note: sig must point to ECDSA_size(eckey) bytes of memory).
+ *  \param  dgst     pointer to the hash value to sign
+ *  \param  dgstlen  length of the hash value
+ *  \param  kinv     BIGNUM with a pre-computed inverse k (optional)
+ *  \param  rp       BIGNUM with a pre-computed rp value (optional),
+ *                   see ECDSA_sign_setup
+ *  \param  eckey    EC_KEY object containing a private EC key
+ *  \return pointer to a ECDSA_SIG structure or NULL if an error occurred
+ */
+ECDSA_SIG *ECDSA_do_sign_ex(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgstlen,
+                            const BIGNUM *kinv, const BIGNUM *rp,
+                            EC_KEY *eckey);
+
+/** Verifies that the supplied signature is a valid ECDSA
+ *  signature of the supplied hash value using the supplied public key.
+ *  \param  dgst      pointer to the hash value
+ *  \param  dgst_len  length of the hash value
+ *  \param  sig       ECDSA_SIG structure
+ *  \param  eckey     EC_KEY object containing a public EC key
+ *  \return 1 if the signature is valid, 0 if the signature is invalid
+ *          and -1 on error
+ */
+int ECDSA_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
+                    const ECDSA_SIG *sig, EC_KEY *eckey);
+
+/** Precompute parts of the signing operation
+ *  \param  eckey  EC_KEY object containing a private EC key
+ *  \param  ctx    BN_CTX object (optional)
+ *  \param  kinv   BIGNUM pointer for the inverse of k
+ *  \param  rp     BIGNUM pointer for x coordinate of k * generator
+ *  \return 1 on success and 0 otherwise
+ */
+int ECDSA_sign_setup(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx, BIGNUM **kinv, BIGNUM **rp);
+
+/** Computes ECDSA signature of a given hash value using the supplied
+ *  private key (note: sig must point to ECDSA_size(eckey) bytes of memory).
+ *  \param  type     this parameter is ignored
+ *  \param  dgst     pointer to the hash value to sign
+ *  \param  dgstlen  length of the hash value
+ *  \param  sig      memory for the DER encoded created signature
+ *  \param  siglen   pointer to the length of the returned signature
+ *  \param  eckey    EC_KEY object containing a private EC key
+ *  \return 1 on success and 0 otherwise
+ */
+int ECDSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dgstlen,
+               unsigned char *sig, unsigned int *siglen, EC_KEY *eckey);
+
+/** Computes ECDSA signature of a given hash value using the supplied
+ *  private key (note: sig must point to ECDSA_size(eckey) bytes of memory).
+ *  \param  type     this parameter is ignored
+ *  \param  dgst     pointer to the hash value to sign
+ *  \param  dgstlen  length of the hash value
+ *  \param  sig      buffer to hold the DER encoded signature
+ *  \param  siglen   pointer to the length of the returned signature
+ *  \param  kinv     BIGNUM with a pre-computed inverse k (optional)
+ *  \param  rp       BIGNUM with a pre-computed rp value (optional),
+ *                   see ECDSA_sign_setup
+ *  \param  eckey    EC_KEY object containing a private EC key
+ *  \return 1 on success and 0 otherwise
+ */
+int ECDSA_sign_ex(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dgstlen,
+                  unsigned char *sig, unsigned int *siglen,
+                  const BIGNUM *kinv, const BIGNUM *rp, EC_KEY *eckey);
+
+/** Verifies that the given signature is valid ECDSA signature
+ *  of the supplied hash value using the specified public key.
+ *  \param  type     this parameter is ignored
+ *  \param  dgst     pointer to the hash value
+ *  \param  dgstlen  length of the hash value
+ *  \param  sig      pointer to the DER encoded signature
+ *  \param  siglen   length of the DER encoded signature
+ *  \param  eckey    EC_KEY object containing a public EC key
+ *  \return 1 if the signature is valid, 0 if the signature is invalid
+ *          and -1 on error
+ */
+int ECDSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dgstlen,
+                 const unsigned char *sig, int siglen, EC_KEY *eckey);
+
+/** Returns the maximum length of the DER encoded signature
+ *  \param  eckey  EC_KEY object
+ *  \return numbers of bytes required for the DER encoded signature
+ */
+int ECDSA_size(const EC_KEY *eckey);
+
+/********************************************************************/
+/*  EC_KEY_METHOD constructors, destructors, writers and accessors  */
+/********************************************************************/
+
+EC_KEY_METHOD *EC_KEY_METHOD_new(const EC_KEY_METHOD *meth);
+void EC_KEY_METHOD_free(EC_KEY_METHOD *meth);
+void EC_KEY_METHOD_set_init(EC_KEY_METHOD *meth,
+                            int (*init)(EC_KEY *key),
+                            void (*finish)(EC_KEY *key),
+                            int (*copy)(EC_KEY *dest, const EC_KEY *src),
+                            int (*set_group)(EC_KEY *key, const EC_GROUP *grp),
+                            int (*set_private)(EC_KEY *key,
+                                               const BIGNUM *priv_key),
+                            int (*set_public)(EC_KEY *key,
+                                              const EC_POINT *pub_key));
+
+void EC_KEY_METHOD_set_keygen(EC_KEY_METHOD *meth,
+                              int (*keygen)(EC_KEY *key));
+
+void EC_KEY_METHOD_set_compute_key(EC_KEY_METHOD *meth,
+                                   int (*ckey)(unsigned char **psec,
+                                               size_t *pseclen,
+                                               const EC_POINT *pub_key,
+                                               const EC_KEY *ecdh));
+
+void EC_KEY_METHOD_set_sign(EC_KEY_METHOD *meth,
+                            int (*sign)(int type, const unsigned char *dgst,
+                                        int dlen, unsigned char *sig,
+                                        unsigned int *siglen,
+                                        const BIGNUM *kinv, const BIGNUM *r,
+                                        EC_KEY *eckey),
+                            int (*sign_setup)(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in,
+                                              BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp),
+                            ECDSA_SIG *(*sign_sig)(const unsigned char *dgst,
+                                                   int dgst_len,
+                                                   const BIGNUM *in_kinv,
+                                                   const BIGNUM *in_r,
+                                                   EC_KEY *eckey));
+
+void EC_KEY_METHOD_set_verify(EC_KEY_METHOD *meth,
+                              int (*verify)(int type, const unsigned
+                                            char *dgst, int dgst_len,
+                                            const unsigned char *sigbuf,
+                                            int sig_len, EC_KEY *eckey),
+                              int (*verify_sig)(const unsigned char *dgst,
+                                                int dgst_len,
+                                                const ECDSA_SIG *sig,
+                                                EC_KEY *eckey));
+
+void EC_KEY_METHOD_get_init(const EC_KEY_METHOD *meth,
+                            int (**pinit)(EC_KEY *key),
+                            void (**pfinish)(EC_KEY *key),
+                            int (**pcopy)(EC_KEY *dest, const EC_KEY *src),
+                            int (**pset_group)(EC_KEY *key,
+                                               const EC_GROUP *grp),
+                            int (**pset_private)(EC_KEY *key,
+                                                 const BIGNUM *priv_key),
+                            int (**pset_public)(EC_KEY *key,
+                                                const EC_POINT *pub_key));
+
+void EC_KEY_METHOD_get_keygen(const EC_KEY_METHOD *meth,
+                              int (**pkeygen)(EC_KEY *key));
+
+void EC_KEY_METHOD_get_compute_key(const EC_KEY_METHOD *meth,
+                                   int (**pck)(unsigned char **psec,
+                                               size_t *pseclen,
+                                               const EC_POINT *pub_key,
+                                               const EC_KEY *ecdh));
+
+void EC_KEY_METHOD_get_sign(const EC_KEY_METHOD *meth,
+                            int (**psign)(int type, const unsigned char *dgst,
+                                          int dlen, unsigned char *sig,
+                                          unsigned int *siglen,
+                                          const BIGNUM *kinv, const BIGNUM *r,
+                                          EC_KEY *eckey),
+                            int (**psign_setup)(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in,
+                                                BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp),
+                            ECDSA_SIG *(**psign_sig)(const unsigned char *dgst,
+                                                     int dgst_len,
+                                                     const BIGNUM *in_kinv,
+                                                     const BIGNUM *in_r,
+                                                     EC_KEY *eckey));
+
+void EC_KEY_METHOD_get_verify(const EC_KEY_METHOD *meth,
+                              int (**pverify)(int type, const unsigned
+                                              char *dgst, int dgst_len,
+                                              const unsigned char *sigbuf,
+                                              int sig_len, EC_KEY *eckey),
+                              int (**pverify_sig)(const unsigned char *dgst,
+                                                  int dgst_len,
+                                                  const ECDSA_SIG *sig,
+                                                  EC_KEY *eckey));
+
+# define ECParameters_dup(x) ASN1_dup_of(EC_KEY,i2d_ECParameters,d2i_ECParameters,x)
+
+# ifndef __cplusplus
+#  if defined(__SUNPRO_C)
+#   if __SUNPRO_C >= 0x520
+#    pragma error_messages (default,E_ARRAY_OF_INCOMPLETE_NONAME,E_ARRAY_OF_INCOMPLETE)
+#   endif
+#  endif
+# endif
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(ctx, nid) \
+        EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_EC, \
+                                EVP_PKEY_OP_PARAMGEN|EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN, \
+                                EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_PARAMGEN_CURVE_NID, nid, NULL)
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_param_enc(ctx, flag) \
+        EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_EC, \
+                                EVP_PKEY_OP_PARAMGEN|EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN, \
+                                EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_PARAM_ENC, flag, NULL)
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ecdh_cofactor_mode(ctx, flag) \
+        EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_EC, \
+                                EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE, \
+                                EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_ECDH_COFACTOR, flag, NULL)
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_ecdh_cofactor_mode(ctx) \
+        EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_EC, \
+                                EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE, \
+                                EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_ECDH_COFACTOR, -2, NULL)
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ecdh_kdf_type(ctx, kdf) \
+        EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_EC, \
+                                EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE, \
+                                EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_KDF_TYPE, kdf, NULL)
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_ecdh_kdf_type(ctx) \
+        EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_EC, \
+                                EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE, \
+                                EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_KDF_TYPE, -2, NULL)
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ecdh_kdf_md(ctx, md) \
+        EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_EC, \
+                                EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE, \
+                                EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_KDF_MD, 0, (void *)md)
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_ecdh_kdf_md(ctx, pmd) \
+        EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_EC, \
+                                EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE, \
+                                EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_EC_KDF_MD, 0, (void *)pmd)
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ecdh_kdf_outlen(ctx, len) \
+        EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_EC, \
+                                EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE, \
+                                EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_KDF_OUTLEN, len, NULL)
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_ecdh_kdf_outlen(ctx, plen) \
+        EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_EC, \
+                                EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE, \
+                        EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_EC_KDF_OUTLEN, 0, (void *)plen)
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_ecdh_kdf_ukm(ctx, p, plen) \
+        EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_EC, \
+                                EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE, \
+                                EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_KDF_UKM, plen, (void *)p)
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_ecdh_kdf_ukm(ctx, p) \
+        EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_EC, \
+                                EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE, \
+                                EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_EC_KDF_UKM, 0, (void *)p)
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_PARAMGEN_CURVE_NID             (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 1)
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_PARAM_ENC                      (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 2)
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_ECDH_COFACTOR                  (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 3)
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_KDF_TYPE                       (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 4)
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_KDF_MD                         (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 5)
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_EC_KDF_MD                     (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 6)
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_KDF_OUTLEN                     (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 7)
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_EC_KDF_OUTLEN                 (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 8)
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_KDF_UKM                        (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 9)
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_EC_KDF_UKM                    (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 10)
+/* KDF types */
+# define EVP_PKEY_ECDH_KDF_NONE                          1
+# define EVP_PKEY_ECDH_KDF_X9_62                         2
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+/*
+ * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
+ * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
+ */
+
+int ERR_load_EC_strings(void);
+
+/* Error codes for the EC functions. */
+
+/* Function codes. */
+# define EC_F_BN_TO_FELEM                                 224
+# define EC_F_D2I_ECPARAMETERS                            144
+# define EC_F_D2I_ECPKPARAMETERS                          145
+# define EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY                            146
+# define EC_F_DO_EC_KEY_PRINT                             221
+# define EC_F_ECDH_CMS_DECRYPT                            238
+# define EC_F_ECDH_CMS_SET_SHARED_INFO                    239
+# define EC_F_ECDH_COMPUTE_KEY                            246
+# define EC_F_ECDH_SIMPLE_COMPUTE_KEY                     257
+# define EC_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN_EX                            251
+# define EC_F_ECDSA_DO_VERIFY                             252
+# define EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_EX                               254
+# define EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP                            248
+# define EC_F_ECDSA_SIG_NEW                               265
+# define EC_F_ECDSA_VERIFY                                253
+# define EC_F_ECKEY_PARAM2TYPE                            223
+# define EC_F_ECKEY_PARAM_DECODE                          212
+# define EC_F_ECKEY_PRIV_DECODE                           213
+# define EC_F_ECKEY_PRIV_ENCODE                           214
+# define EC_F_ECKEY_PUB_DECODE                            215
+# define EC_F_ECKEY_PUB_ENCODE                            216
+# define EC_F_ECKEY_TYPE2PARAM                            220
+# define EC_F_ECPARAMETERS_PRINT                          147
+# define EC_F_ECPARAMETERS_PRINT_FP                       148
+# define EC_F_ECPKPARAMETERS_PRINT                        149
+# define EC_F_ECPKPARAMETERS_PRINT_FP                     150
+# define EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_GET_AFFINE                     240
+# define EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_MULT_PRECOMPUTE                243
+# define EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_POINTS_MUL                     241
+# define EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_PRE_COMP_NEW                   244
+# define EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_WINDOWED_MUL                   242
+# define EC_F_ECX_KEY_OP                                  266
+# define EC_F_ECX_PRIV_ENCODE                             267
+# define EC_F_ECX_PUB_ENCODE                              268
+# define EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2CURVE                         153
+# define EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID                       154
+# define EC_F_EC_GF2M_MONTGOMERY_POINT_MULTIPLY           208
+# define EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_GROUP_CHECK_DISCRIMINANT     159
+# define EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_GROUP_SET_CURVE              195
+# define EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_OCT2POINT                    160
+# define EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_POINT2OCT                    161
+# define EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES 162
+# define EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_POINT_SET_AFFINE_COORDINATES 163
+# define EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_SET_COMPRESSED_COORDINATES   164
+# define EC_F_EC_GFP_MONT_FIELD_DECODE                    133
+# define EC_F_EC_GFP_MONT_FIELD_ENCODE                    134
+# define EC_F_EC_GFP_MONT_FIELD_MUL                       131
+# define EC_F_EC_GFP_MONT_FIELD_SET_TO_ONE                209
+# define EC_F_EC_GFP_MONT_FIELD_SQR                       132
+# define EC_F_EC_GFP_MONT_GROUP_SET_CURVE                 189
+# define EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP224_GROUP_SET_CURVE             225
+# define EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP224_POINTS_MUL                  228
+# define EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP224_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES 226
+# define EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP256_GROUP_SET_CURVE             230
+# define EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP256_POINTS_MUL                  231
+# define EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP256_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES 232
+# define EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP521_GROUP_SET_CURVE             233
+# define EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP521_POINTS_MUL                  234
+# define EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP521_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES 235
+# define EC_F_EC_GFP_NIST_FIELD_MUL                       200
+# define EC_F_EC_GFP_NIST_FIELD_SQR                       201
+# define EC_F_EC_GFP_NIST_GROUP_SET_CURVE                 202
+# define EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_GROUP_CHECK_DISCRIMINANT      165
+# define EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_GROUP_SET_CURVE               166
+# define EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_MAKE_AFFINE                   102
+# define EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_OCT2POINT                     103
+# define EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_POINT2OCT                     104
+# define EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_POINTS_MAKE_AFFINE            137
+# define EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES  167
+# define EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_POINT_SET_AFFINE_COORDINATES  168
+# define EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_SET_COMPRESSED_COORDINATES    169
+# define EC_F_EC_GROUP_CHECK                              170
+# define EC_F_EC_GROUP_CHECK_DISCRIMINANT                 171
+# define EC_F_EC_GROUP_COPY                               106
+# define EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_CURVE_GF2M                     172
+# define EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_CURVE_GFP                      130
+# define EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_DEGREE                         173
+# define EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_ECPARAMETERS                   261
+# define EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_ECPKPARAMETERS                 262
+# define EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_PENTANOMIAL_BASIS              193
+# define EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_TRINOMIAL_BASIS                194
+# define EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW                                108
+# define EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_BY_CURVE_NAME                  174
+# define EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA                      175
+# define EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS              263
+# define EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPKPARAMETERS            264
+# define EC_F_EC_GROUP_SET_CURVE_GF2M                     176
+# define EC_F_EC_GROUP_SET_CURVE_GFP                      109
+# define EC_F_EC_GROUP_SET_GENERATOR                      111
+# define EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY                            177
+# define EC_F_EC_KEY_COPY                                 178
+# define EC_F_EC_KEY_GENERATE_KEY                         179
+# define EC_F_EC_KEY_NEW                                  182
+# define EC_F_EC_KEY_NEW_METHOD                           245
+# define EC_F_EC_KEY_OCT2PRIV                             255
+# define EC_F_EC_KEY_PRINT                                180
+# define EC_F_EC_KEY_PRINT_FP                             181
+# define EC_F_EC_KEY_PRIV2OCT                             256
+# define EC_F_EC_KEY_SET_PUBLIC_KEY_AFFINE_COORDINATES    229
+# define EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY                     258
+# define EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_OCT2PRIV                      259
+# define EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_PRIV2OCT                      260
+# define EC_F_EC_POINTS_MAKE_AFFINE                       136
+# define EC_F_EC_POINT_ADD                                112
+# define EC_F_EC_POINT_CMP                                113
+# define EC_F_EC_POINT_COPY                               114
+# define EC_F_EC_POINT_DBL                                115
+# define EC_F_EC_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GF2M        183
+# define EC_F_EC_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GFP         116
+# define EC_F_EC_POINT_GET_JPROJECTIVE_COORDINATES_GFP    117
+# define EC_F_EC_POINT_INVERT                             210
+# define EC_F_EC_POINT_IS_AT_INFINITY                     118
+# define EC_F_EC_POINT_IS_ON_CURVE                        119
+# define EC_F_EC_POINT_MAKE_AFFINE                        120
+# define EC_F_EC_POINT_NEW                                121
+# define EC_F_EC_POINT_OCT2POINT                          122
+# define EC_F_EC_POINT_POINT2OCT                          123
+# define EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GF2M        185
+# define EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GFP         124
+# define EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_COMPRESSED_COORDINATES_GF2M    186
+# define EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_COMPRESSED_COORDINATES_GFP     125
+# define EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_JPROJECTIVE_COORDINATES_GFP    126
+# define EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_TO_INFINITY                    127
+# define EC_F_EC_PRE_COMP_NEW                             196
+# define EC_F_EC_WNAF_MUL                                 187
+# define EC_F_EC_WNAF_PRECOMPUTE_MULT                     188
+# define EC_F_I2D_ECPARAMETERS                            190
+# define EC_F_I2D_ECPKPARAMETERS                          191
+# define EC_F_I2D_ECPRIVATEKEY                            192
+# define EC_F_I2O_ECPUBLICKEY                             151
+# define EC_F_NISTP224_PRE_COMP_NEW                       227
+# define EC_F_NISTP256_PRE_COMP_NEW                       236
+# define EC_F_NISTP521_PRE_COMP_NEW                       237
+# define EC_F_O2I_ECPUBLICKEY                             152
+# define EC_F_OLD_EC_PRIV_DECODE                          222
+# define EC_F_OSSL_ECDH_COMPUTE_KEY                       247
+# define EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG                         249
+# define EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG                       250
+# define EC_F_PKEY_ECX_DERIVE                             269
+# define EC_F_PKEY_EC_CTRL                                197
+# define EC_F_PKEY_EC_CTRL_STR                            198
+# define EC_F_PKEY_EC_DERIVE                              217
+# define EC_F_PKEY_EC_KEYGEN                              199
+# define EC_F_PKEY_EC_PARAMGEN                            219
+# define EC_F_PKEY_EC_SIGN                                218
+
+/* Reason codes. */
+# define EC_R_ASN1_ERROR                                  115
+# define EC_R_BAD_SIGNATURE                               156
+# define EC_R_BIGNUM_OUT_OF_RANGE                         144
+# define EC_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL                            100
+# define EC_R_COORDINATES_OUT_OF_RANGE                    146
+# define EC_R_CURVE_DOES_NOT_SUPPORT_ECDH                 160
+# define EC_R_CURVE_DOES_NOT_SUPPORT_SIGNING              159
+# define EC_R_D2I_ECPKPARAMETERS_FAILURE                  117
+# define EC_R_DECODE_ERROR                                142
+# define EC_R_DISCRIMINANT_IS_ZERO                        118
+# define EC_R_EC_GROUP_NEW_BY_NAME_FAILURE                119
+# define EC_R_FIELD_TOO_LARGE                             143
+# define EC_R_GF2M_NOT_SUPPORTED                          147
+# define EC_R_GROUP2PKPARAMETERS_FAILURE                  120
+# define EC_R_I2D_ECPKPARAMETERS_FAILURE                  121
+# define EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS                        101
+# define EC_R_INVALID_ARGUMENT                            112
+# define EC_R_INVALID_COMPRESSED_POINT                    110
+# define EC_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_BIT                     109
+# define EC_R_INVALID_CURVE                               141
+# define EC_R_INVALID_DIGEST                              151
+# define EC_R_INVALID_DIGEST_TYPE                         138
+# define EC_R_INVALID_ENCODING                            102
+# define EC_R_INVALID_FIELD                               103
+# define EC_R_INVALID_FORM                                104
+# define EC_R_INVALID_GROUP_ORDER                         122
+# define EC_R_INVALID_KEY                                 116
+# define EC_R_INVALID_OUTPUT_LENGTH                       161
+# define EC_R_INVALID_PEER_KEY                            133
+# define EC_R_INVALID_PENTANOMIAL_BASIS                   132
+# define EC_R_INVALID_PRIVATE_KEY                         123
+# define EC_R_INVALID_TRINOMIAL_BASIS                     137
+# define EC_R_KDF_PARAMETER_ERROR                         148
+# define EC_R_KEYS_NOT_SET                                140
+# define EC_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS                          124
+# define EC_R_MISSING_PRIVATE_KEY                         125
+# define EC_R_NEED_NEW_SETUP_VALUES                       157
+# define EC_R_NOT_A_NIST_PRIME                            135
+# define EC_R_NOT_IMPLEMENTED                             126
+# define EC_R_NOT_INITIALIZED                             111
+# define EC_R_NO_PARAMETERS_SET                           139
+# define EC_R_NO_PRIVATE_VALUE                            154
+# define EC_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED                     152
+# define EC_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER                       134
+# define EC_R_PEER_KEY_ERROR                              149
+# define EC_R_PKPARAMETERS2GROUP_FAILURE                  127
+# define EC_R_POINT_ARITHMETIC_FAILURE                    155
+# define EC_R_POINT_AT_INFINITY                           106
+# define EC_R_POINT_IS_NOT_ON_CURVE                       107
+# define EC_R_RANDOM_NUMBER_GENERATION_FAILED             158
+# define EC_R_SHARED_INFO_ERROR                           150
+# define EC_R_SLOT_FULL                                   108
+# define EC_R_UNDEFINED_GENERATOR                         113
+# define EC_R_UNDEFINED_ORDER                             128
+# define EC_R_UNKNOWN_GROUP                               129
+# define EC_R_UNKNOWN_ORDER                               114
+# define EC_R_UNSUPPORTED_FIELD                           131
+# define EC_R_WRONG_CURVE_PARAMETERS                      145
+# define EC_R_WRONG_ORDER                                 130
+
+#  ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+#  endif
+# endif
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/ecdh.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/ecdh.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..681f3d5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/ecdh.h
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/ec.h>
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/ecdsa.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/ecdsa.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..681f3d5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/ecdsa.h
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/ec.h>
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/engine.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/engine.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..26cf714
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/engine.h
@@ -0,0 +1,840 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ * ECDH support in OpenSSL originally developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_ENGINE_H
+# define HEADER_ENGINE_H
+
+# include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+# if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+#  include <openssl/bn.h>
+#  include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#  include <openssl/dsa.h>
+#  include <openssl/dh.h>
+#  include <openssl/ec.h>
+#  include <openssl/rand.h>
+#  include <openssl/ui.h>
+#  include <openssl/err.h>
+# endif
+# include <openssl/ossl_typ.h>
+# include <openssl/symhacks.h>
+# include <openssl/x509.h>
+# ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+# endif
+
+/*
+ * These flags are used to control combinations of algorithm (methods) by
+ * bitwise "OR"ing.
+ */
+# define ENGINE_METHOD_RSA               (unsigned int)0x0001
+# define ENGINE_METHOD_DSA               (unsigned int)0x0002
+# define ENGINE_METHOD_DH                (unsigned int)0x0004
+# define ENGINE_METHOD_RAND              (unsigned int)0x0008
+# define ENGINE_METHOD_CIPHERS           (unsigned int)0x0040
+# define ENGINE_METHOD_DIGESTS           (unsigned int)0x0080
+# define ENGINE_METHOD_PKEY_METHS        (unsigned int)0x0200
+# define ENGINE_METHOD_PKEY_ASN1_METHS   (unsigned int)0x0400
+# define ENGINE_METHOD_EC                (unsigned int)0x0800
+/* Obvious all-or-nothing cases. */
+# define ENGINE_METHOD_ALL               (unsigned int)0xFFFF
+# define ENGINE_METHOD_NONE              (unsigned int)0x0000
+
+/*
+ * This(ese) flag(s) controls behaviour of the ENGINE_TABLE mechanism used
+ * internally to control registration of ENGINE implementations, and can be
+ * set by ENGINE_set_table_flags(). The "NOINIT" flag prevents attempts to
+ * initialise registered ENGINEs if they are not already initialised.
+ */
+# define ENGINE_TABLE_FLAG_NOINIT        (unsigned int)0x0001
+
+/* ENGINE flags that can be set by ENGINE_set_flags(). */
+/* Not used */
+/* #define ENGINE_FLAGS_MALLOCED        0x0001 */
+
+/*
+ * This flag is for ENGINEs that wish to handle the various 'CMD'-related
+ * control commands on their own. Without this flag, ENGINE_ctrl() handles
+ * these control commands on behalf of the ENGINE using their "cmd_defns"
+ * data.
+ */
+# define ENGINE_FLAGS_MANUAL_CMD_CTRL    (int)0x0002
+
+/*
+ * This flag is for ENGINEs who return new duplicate structures when found
+ * via "ENGINE_by_id()". When an ENGINE must store state (eg. if
+ * ENGINE_ctrl() commands are called in sequence as part of some stateful
+ * process like key-generation setup and execution), it can set this flag -
+ * then each attempt to obtain the ENGINE will result in it being copied into
+ * a new structure. Normally, ENGINEs don't declare this flag so
+ * ENGINE_by_id() just increments the existing ENGINE's structural reference
+ * count.
+ */
+# define ENGINE_FLAGS_BY_ID_COPY         (int)0x0004
+
+/*
+ * This flag if for an ENGINE that does not want its methods registered as
+ * part of ENGINE_register_all_complete() for example if the methods are not
+ * usable as default methods.
+ */
+
+# define ENGINE_FLAGS_NO_REGISTER_ALL    (int)0x0008
+
+/*
+ * ENGINEs can support their own command types, and these flags are used in
+ * ENGINE_CTRL_GET_CMD_FLAGS to indicate to the caller what kind of input
+ * each command expects. Currently only numeric and string input is
+ * supported. If a control command supports none of the _NUMERIC, _STRING, or
+ * _NO_INPUT options, then it is regarded as an "internal" control command -
+ * and not for use in config setting situations. As such, they're not
+ * available to the ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string() function, only raw ENGINE_ctrl()
+ * access. Changes to this list of 'command types' should be reflected
+ * carefully in ENGINE_cmd_is_executable() and ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string().
+ */
+
+/* accepts a 'long' input value (3rd parameter to ENGINE_ctrl) */
+# define ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NUMERIC         (unsigned int)0x0001
+/*
+ * accepts string input (cast from 'void*' to 'const char *', 4th parameter
+ * to ENGINE_ctrl)
+ */
+# define ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING          (unsigned int)0x0002
+/*
+ * Indicates that the control command takes *no* input. Ie. the control
+ * command is unparameterised.
+ */
+# define ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NO_INPUT        (unsigned int)0x0004
+/*
+ * Indicates that the control command is internal. This control command won't
+ * be shown in any output, and is only usable through the ENGINE_ctrl_cmd()
+ * function.
+ */
+# define ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_INTERNAL        (unsigned int)0x0008
+
+/*
+ * NB: These 3 control commands are deprecated and should not be used.
+ * ENGINEs relying on these commands should compile conditional support for
+ * compatibility (eg. if these symbols are defined) but should also migrate
+ * the same functionality to their own ENGINE-specific control functions that
+ * can be "discovered" by calling applications. The fact these control
+ * commands wouldn't be "executable" (ie. usable by text-based config)
+ * doesn't change the fact that application code can find and use them
+ * without requiring per-ENGINE hacking.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * These flags are used to tell the ctrl function what should be done. All
+ * command numbers are shared between all engines, even if some don't make
+ * sense to some engines.  In such a case, they do nothing but return the
+ * error ENGINE_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED.
+ */
+# define ENGINE_CTRL_SET_LOGSTREAM               1
+# define ENGINE_CTRL_SET_PASSWORD_CALLBACK       2
+# define ENGINE_CTRL_HUP                         3/* Close and reinitialise
+                                                   * any handles/connections
+                                                   * etc. */
+# define ENGINE_CTRL_SET_USER_INTERFACE          4/* Alternative to callback */
+# define ENGINE_CTRL_SET_CALLBACK_DATA           5/* User-specific data, used
+                                                   * when calling the password
+                                                   * callback and the user
+                                                   * interface */
+# define ENGINE_CTRL_LOAD_CONFIGURATION          6/* Load a configuration,
+                                                   * given a string that
+                                                   * represents a file name
+                                                   * or so */
+# define ENGINE_CTRL_LOAD_SECTION                7/* Load data from a given
+                                                   * section in the already
+                                                   * loaded configuration */
+
+/*
+ * These control commands allow an application to deal with an arbitrary
+ * engine in a dynamic way. Warn: Negative return values indicate errors FOR
+ * THESE COMMANDS because zero is used to indicate 'end-of-list'. Other
+ * commands, including ENGINE-specific command types, return zero for an
+ * error. An ENGINE can choose to implement these ctrl functions, and can
+ * internally manage things however it chooses - it does so by setting the
+ * ENGINE_FLAGS_MANUAL_CMD_CTRL flag (using ENGINE_set_flags()). Otherwise
+ * the ENGINE_ctrl() code handles this on the ENGINE's behalf using the
+ * cmd_defns data (set using ENGINE_set_cmd_defns()). This means an ENGINE's
+ * ctrl() handler need only implement its own commands - the above "meta"
+ * commands will be taken care of.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Returns non-zero if the supplied ENGINE has a ctrl() handler. If "not",
+ * then all the remaining control commands will return failure, so it is
+ * worth checking this first if the caller is trying to "discover" the
+ * engine's capabilities and doesn't want errors generated unnecessarily.
+ */
+# define ENGINE_CTRL_HAS_CTRL_FUNCTION           10
+/*
+ * Returns a positive command number for the first command supported by the
+ * engine. Returns zero if no ctrl commands are supported.
+ */
+# define ENGINE_CTRL_GET_FIRST_CMD_TYPE          11
+/*
+ * The 'long' argument specifies a command implemented by the engine, and the
+ * return value is the next command supported, or zero if there are no more.
+ */
+# define ENGINE_CTRL_GET_NEXT_CMD_TYPE           12
+/*
+ * The 'void*' argument is a command name (cast from 'const char *'), and the
+ * return value is the command that corresponds to it.
+ */
+# define ENGINE_CTRL_GET_CMD_FROM_NAME           13
+/*
+ * The next two allow a command to be converted into its corresponding string
+ * form. In each case, the 'long' argument supplies the command. In the
+ * NAME_LEN case, the return value is the length of the command name (not
+ * counting a trailing EOL). In the NAME case, the 'void*' argument must be a
+ * string buffer large enough, and it will be populated with the name of the
+ * command (WITH a trailing EOL).
+ */
+# define ENGINE_CTRL_GET_NAME_LEN_FROM_CMD       14
+# define ENGINE_CTRL_GET_NAME_FROM_CMD           15
+/* The next two are similar but give a "short description" of a command. */
+# define ENGINE_CTRL_GET_DESC_LEN_FROM_CMD       16
+# define ENGINE_CTRL_GET_DESC_FROM_CMD           17
+/*
+ * With this command, the return value is the OR'd combination of
+ * ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_*** values that indicate what kind of input a given
+ * engine-specific ctrl command expects.
+ */
+# define ENGINE_CTRL_GET_CMD_FLAGS               18
+
+/*
+ * ENGINE implementations should start the numbering of their own control
+ * commands from this value. (ie. ENGINE_CMD_BASE, ENGINE_CMD_BASE + 1, etc).
+ */
+# define ENGINE_CMD_BASE                         200
+
+/*
+ * NB: These 2 nCipher "chil" control commands are deprecated, and their
+ * functionality is now available through ENGINE-specific control commands
+ * (exposed through the above-mentioned 'CMD'-handling). Code using these 2
+ * commands should be migrated to the more general command handling before
+ * these are removed.
+ */
+
+/* Flags specific to the nCipher "chil" engine */
+# define ENGINE_CTRL_CHIL_SET_FORKCHECK          100
+        /*
+         * Depending on the value of the (long)i argument, this sets or
+         * unsets the SimpleForkCheck flag in the CHIL API to enable or
+         * disable checking and workarounds for applications that fork().
+         */
+# define ENGINE_CTRL_CHIL_NO_LOCKING             101
+        /*
+         * This prevents the initialisation function from providing mutex
+         * callbacks to the nCipher library.
+         */
+
+/*
+ * If an ENGINE supports its own specific control commands and wishes the
+ * framework to handle the above 'ENGINE_CMD_***'-manipulation commands on
+ * its behalf, it should supply a null-terminated array of ENGINE_CMD_DEFN
+ * entries to ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(). It should also implement a ctrl()
+ * handler that supports the stated commands (ie. the "cmd_num" entries as
+ * described by the array). NB: The array must be ordered in increasing order
+ * of cmd_num. "null-terminated" means that the last ENGINE_CMD_DEFN element
+ * has cmd_num set to zero and/or cmd_name set to NULL.
+ */
+typedef struct ENGINE_CMD_DEFN_st {
+    unsigned int cmd_num;       /* The command number */
+    const char *cmd_name;       /* The command name itself */
+    const char *cmd_desc;       /* A short description of the command */
+    unsigned int cmd_flags;     /* The input the command expects */
+} ENGINE_CMD_DEFN;
+
+/* Generic function pointer */
+typedef int (*ENGINE_GEN_FUNC_PTR) (void);
+/* Generic function pointer taking no arguments */
+typedef int (*ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR) (ENGINE *);
+/* Specific control function pointer */
+typedef int (*ENGINE_CTRL_FUNC_PTR) (ENGINE *, int, long, void *,
+                                     void (*f) (void));
+/* Generic load_key function pointer */
+typedef EVP_PKEY *(*ENGINE_LOAD_KEY_PTR)(ENGINE *, const char *,
+                                         UI_METHOD *ui_method,
+                                         void *callback_data);
+typedef int (*ENGINE_SSL_CLIENT_CERT_PTR) (ENGINE *, SSL *ssl,
+                                           STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn,
+                                           X509 **pcert, EVP_PKEY **pkey,
+                                           STACK_OF(X509) **pother,
+                                           UI_METHOD *ui_method,
+                                           void *callback_data);
+/*-
+ * These callback types are for an ENGINE's handler for cipher and digest logic.
+ * These handlers have these prototypes;
+ *   int foo(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher, const int **nids, int nid);
+ *   int foo(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest, const int **nids, int nid);
+ * Looking at how to implement these handlers in the case of cipher support, if
+ * the framework wants the EVP_CIPHER for 'nid', it will call;
+ *   foo(e, &p_evp_cipher, NULL, nid);    (return zero for failure)
+ * If the framework wants a list of supported 'nid's, it will call;
+ *   foo(e, NULL, &p_nids, 0); (returns number of 'nids' or -1 for error)
+ */
+/*
+ * Returns to a pointer to the array of supported cipher 'nid's. If the
+ * second parameter is non-NULL it is set to the size of the returned array.
+ */
+typedef int (*ENGINE_CIPHERS_PTR) (ENGINE *, const EVP_CIPHER **,
+                                   const int **, int);
+typedef int (*ENGINE_DIGESTS_PTR) (ENGINE *, const EVP_MD **, const int **,
+                                   int);
+typedef int (*ENGINE_PKEY_METHS_PTR) (ENGINE *, EVP_PKEY_METHOD **,
+                                      const int **, int);
+typedef int (*ENGINE_PKEY_ASN1_METHS_PTR) (ENGINE *, EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD **,
+                                           const int **, int);
+/*
+ * STRUCTURE functions ... all of these functions deal with pointers to
+ * ENGINE structures where the pointers have a "structural reference". This
+ * means that their reference is to allowed access to the structure but it
+ * does not imply that the structure is functional. To simply increment or
+ * decrement the structural reference count, use ENGINE_by_id and
+ * ENGINE_free. NB: This is not required when iterating using ENGINE_get_next
+ * as it will automatically decrement the structural reference count of the
+ * "current" ENGINE and increment the structural reference count of the
+ * ENGINE it returns (unless it is NULL).
+ */
+
+/* Get the first/last "ENGINE" type available. */
+ENGINE *ENGINE_get_first(void);
+ENGINE *ENGINE_get_last(void);
+/* Iterate to the next/previous "ENGINE" type (NULL = end of the list). */
+ENGINE *ENGINE_get_next(ENGINE *e);
+ENGINE *ENGINE_get_prev(ENGINE *e);
+/* Add another "ENGINE" type into the array. */
+int ENGINE_add(ENGINE *e);
+/* Remove an existing "ENGINE" type from the array. */
+int ENGINE_remove(ENGINE *e);
+/* Retrieve an engine from the list by its unique "id" value. */
+ENGINE *ENGINE_by_id(const char *id);
+
+#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+# define ENGINE_load_openssl() \
+    OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_OPENSSL, NULL)
+# define ENGINE_load_dynamic() \
+    OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_DYNAMIC, NULL)
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STATIC_ENGINE
+#  define ENGINE_load_padlock() \
+    OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_PADLOCK, NULL)
+#  define ENGINE_load_capi() \
+    OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_CAPI, NULL)
+#  define ENGINE_load_afalg() \
+    OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_AFALG, NULL)
+# endif
+# define ENGINE_load_cryptodev() \
+    OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_CRYPTODEV, NULL)
+# define ENGINE_load_rdrand() \
+    OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_RDRAND, NULL)
+#endif
+void ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(void);
+
+/*
+ * Get and set global flags (ENGINE_TABLE_FLAG_***) for the implementation
+ * "registry" handling.
+ */
+unsigned int ENGINE_get_table_flags(void);
+void ENGINE_set_table_flags(unsigned int flags);
+
+/*- Manage registration of ENGINEs per "table". For each type, there are 3
+ * functions;
+ *   ENGINE_register_***(e) - registers the implementation from 'e' (if it has one)
+ *   ENGINE_unregister_***(e) - unregister the implementation from 'e'
+ *   ENGINE_register_all_***() - call ENGINE_register_***() for each 'e' in the list
+ * Cleanup is automatically registered from each table when required.
+ */
+
+int ENGINE_register_RSA(ENGINE *e);
+void ENGINE_unregister_RSA(ENGINE *e);
+void ENGINE_register_all_RSA(void);
+
+int ENGINE_register_DSA(ENGINE *e);
+void ENGINE_unregister_DSA(ENGINE *e);
+void ENGINE_register_all_DSA(void);
+
+int ENGINE_register_EC(ENGINE *e);
+void ENGINE_unregister_EC(ENGINE *e);
+void ENGINE_register_all_EC(void);
+
+int ENGINE_register_DH(ENGINE *e);
+void ENGINE_unregister_DH(ENGINE *e);
+void ENGINE_register_all_DH(void);
+
+int ENGINE_register_RAND(ENGINE *e);
+void ENGINE_unregister_RAND(ENGINE *e);
+void ENGINE_register_all_RAND(void);
+
+int ENGINE_register_ciphers(ENGINE *e);
+void ENGINE_unregister_ciphers(ENGINE *e);
+void ENGINE_register_all_ciphers(void);
+
+int ENGINE_register_digests(ENGINE *e);
+void ENGINE_unregister_digests(ENGINE *e);
+void ENGINE_register_all_digests(void);
+
+int ENGINE_register_pkey_meths(ENGINE *e);
+void ENGINE_unregister_pkey_meths(ENGINE *e);
+void ENGINE_register_all_pkey_meths(void);
+
+int ENGINE_register_pkey_asn1_meths(ENGINE *e);
+void ENGINE_unregister_pkey_asn1_meths(ENGINE *e);
+void ENGINE_register_all_pkey_asn1_meths(void);
+
+/*
+ * These functions register all support from the above categories. Note, use
+ * of these functions can result in static linkage of code your application
+ * may not need. If you only need a subset of functionality, consider using
+ * more selective initialisation.
+ */
+int ENGINE_register_complete(ENGINE *e);
+int ENGINE_register_all_complete(void);
+
+/*
+ * Send parametrised control commands to the engine. The possibilities to
+ * send down an integer, a pointer to data or a function pointer are
+ * provided. Any of the parameters may or may not be NULL, depending on the
+ * command number. In actuality, this function only requires a structural
+ * (rather than functional) reference to an engine, but many control commands
+ * may require the engine be functional. The caller should be aware of trying
+ * commands that require an operational ENGINE, and only use functional
+ * references in such situations.
+ */
+int ENGINE_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f) (void));
+
+/*
+ * This function tests if an ENGINE-specific command is usable as a
+ * "setting". Eg. in an application's config file that gets processed through
+ * ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(). If this returns zero, it is not available to
+ * ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(), only ENGINE_ctrl().
+ */
+int ENGINE_cmd_is_executable(ENGINE *e, int cmd);
+
+/*
+ * This function works like ENGINE_ctrl() with the exception of taking a
+ * command name instead of a command number, and can handle optional
+ * commands. See the comment on ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string() for an explanation
+ * on how to use the cmd_name and cmd_optional.
+ */
+int ENGINE_ctrl_cmd(ENGINE *e, const char *cmd_name,
+                    long i, void *p, void (*f) (void), int cmd_optional);
+
+/*
+ * This function passes a command-name and argument to an ENGINE. The
+ * cmd_name is converted to a command number and the control command is
+ * called using 'arg' as an argument (unless the ENGINE doesn't support such
+ * a command, in which case no control command is called). The command is
+ * checked for input flags, and if necessary the argument will be converted
+ * to a numeric value. If cmd_optional is non-zero, then if the ENGINE
+ * doesn't support the given cmd_name the return value will be success
+ * anyway. This function is intended for applications to use so that users
+ * (or config files) can supply engine-specific config data to the ENGINE at
+ * run-time to control behaviour of specific engines. As such, it shouldn't
+ * be used for calling ENGINE_ctrl() functions that return data, deal with
+ * binary data, or that are otherwise supposed to be used directly through
+ * ENGINE_ctrl() in application code. Any "return" data from an ENGINE_ctrl()
+ * operation in this function will be lost - the return value is interpreted
+ * as failure if the return value is zero, success otherwise, and this
+ * function returns a boolean value as a result. In other words, vendors of
+ * 'ENGINE'-enabled devices should write ENGINE implementations with
+ * parameterisations that work in this scheme, so that compliant ENGINE-based
+ * applications can work consistently with the same configuration for the
+ * same ENGINE-enabled devices, across applications.
+ */
+int ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(ENGINE *e, const char *cmd_name, const char *arg,
+                           int cmd_optional);
+
+/*
+ * These functions are useful for manufacturing new ENGINE structures. They
+ * don't address reference counting at all - one uses them to populate an
+ * ENGINE structure with personalised implementations of things prior to
+ * using it directly or adding it to the builtin ENGINE list in OpenSSL.
+ * These are also here so that the ENGINE structure doesn't have to be
+ * exposed and break binary compatibility!
+ */
+ENGINE *ENGINE_new(void);
+int ENGINE_free(ENGINE *e);
+int ENGINE_up_ref(ENGINE *e);
+int ENGINE_set_id(ENGINE *e, const char *id);
+int ENGINE_set_name(ENGINE *e, const char *name);
+int ENGINE_set_RSA(ENGINE *e, const RSA_METHOD *rsa_meth);
+int ENGINE_set_DSA(ENGINE *e, const DSA_METHOD *dsa_meth);
+int ENGINE_set_EC(ENGINE *e, const EC_KEY_METHOD *ecdsa_meth);
+int ENGINE_set_DH(ENGINE *e, const DH_METHOD *dh_meth);
+int ENGINE_set_RAND(ENGINE *e, const RAND_METHOD *rand_meth);
+int ENGINE_set_destroy_function(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR destroy_f);
+int ENGINE_set_init_function(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR init_f);
+int ENGINE_set_finish_function(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR finish_f);
+int ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_CTRL_FUNC_PTR ctrl_f);
+int ENGINE_set_load_privkey_function(ENGINE *e,
+                                     ENGINE_LOAD_KEY_PTR loadpriv_f);
+int ENGINE_set_load_pubkey_function(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_LOAD_KEY_PTR loadpub_f);
+int ENGINE_set_load_ssl_client_cert_function(ENGINE *e,
+                                             ENGINE_SSL_CLIENT_CERT_PTR
+                                             loadssl_f);
+int ENGINE_set_ciphers(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_CIPHERS_PTR f);
+int ENGINE_set_digests(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_DIGESTS_PTR f);
+int ENGINE_set_pkey_meths(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_PKEY_METHS_PTR f);
+int ENGINE_set_pkey_asn1_meths(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_PKEY_ASN1_METHS_PTR f);
+int ENGINE_set_flags(ENGINE *e, int flags);
+int ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(ENGINE *e, const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN *defns);
+/* These functions allow control over any per-structure ENGINE data. */
+#define ENGINE_get_ex_new_index(l, p, newf, dupf, freef) \
+    CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_ENGINE, l, p, newf, dupf, freef)
+int ENGINE_set_ex_data(ENGINE *e, int idx, void *arg);
+void *ENGINE_get_ex_data(const ENGINE *e, int idx);
+
+#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+/*
+ * This function previously cleaned up anything that needs it. Auto-deinit will
+ * now take care of it so it is no longer required to call this function.
+ */
+# define ENGINE_cleanup() while(0) continue
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * These return values from within the ENGINE structure. These can be useful
+ * with functional references as well as structural references - it depends
+ * which you obtained. Using the result for functional purposes if you only
+ * obtained a structural reference may be problematic!
+ */
+const char *ENGINE_get_id(const ENGINE *e);
+const char *ENGINE_get_name(const ENGINE *e);
+const RSA_METHOD *ENGINE_get_RSA(const ENGINE *e);
+const DSA_METHOD *ENGINE_get_DSA(const ENGINE *e);
+const EC_KEY_METHOD *ENGINE_get_EC(const ENGINE *e);
+const DH_METHOD *ENGINE_get_DH(const ENGINE *e);
+const RAND_METHOD *ENGINE_get_RAND(const ENGINE *e);
+ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR ENGINE_get_destroy_function(const ENGINE *e);
+ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR ENGINE_get_init_function(const ENGINE *e);
+ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR ENGINE_get_finish_function(const ENGINE *e);
+ENGINE_CTRL_FUNC_PTR ENGINE_get_ctrl_function(const ENGINE *e);
+ENGINE_LOAD_KEY_PTR ENGINE_get_load_privkey_function(const ENGINE *e);
+ENGINE_LOAD_KEY_PTR ENGINE_get_load_pubkey_function(const ENGINE *e);
+ENGINE_SSL_CLIENT_CERT_PTR ENGINE_get_ssl_client_cert_function(const ENGINE
+                                                               *e);
+ENGINE_CIPHERS_PTR ENGINE_get_ciphers(const ENGINE *e);
+ENGINE_DIGESTS_PTR ENGINE_get_digests(const ENGINE *e);
+ENGINE_PKEY_METHS_PTR ENGINE_get_pkey_meths(const ENGINE *e);
+ENGINE_PKEY_ASN1_METHS_PTR ENGINE_get_pkey_asn1_meths(const ENGINE *e);
+const EVP_CIPHER *ENGINE_get_cipher(ENGINE *e, int nid);
+const EVP_MD *ENGINE_get_digest(ENGINE *e, int nid);
+const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *ENGINE_get_pkey_meth(ENGINE *e, int nid);
+const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ENGINE_get_pkey_asn1_meth(ENGINE *e, int nid);
+const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ENGINE_get_pkey_asn1_meth_str(ENGINE *e,
+                                                          const char *str,
+                                                          int len);
+const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ENGINE_pkey_asn1_find_str(ENGINE **pe,
+                                                      const char *str,
+                                                      int len);
+const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN *ENGINE_get_cmd_defns(const ENGINE *e);
+int ENGINE_get_flags(const ENGINE *e);
+
+/*
+ * FUNCTIONAL functions. These functions deal with ENGINE structures that
+ * have (or will) be initialised for use. Broadly speaking, the structural
+ * functions are useful for iterating the list of available engine types,
+ * creating new engine types, and other "list" operations. These functions
+ * actually deal with ENGINEs that are to be used. As such these functions
+ * can fail (if applicable) when particular engines are unavailable - eg. if
+ * a hardware accelerator is not attached or not functioning correctly. Each
+ * ENGINE has 2 reference counts; structural and functional. Every time a
+ * functional reference is obtained or released, a corresponding structural
+ * reference is automatically obtained or released too.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Initialise a engine type for use (or up its reference count if it's
+ * already in use). This will fail if the engine is not currently operational
+ * and cannot initialise.
+ */
+int ENGINE_init(ENGINE *e);
+/*
+ * Free a functional reference to a engine type. This does not require a
+ * corresponding call to ENGINE_free as it also releases a structural
+ * reference.
+ */
+int ENGINE_finish(ENGINE *e);
+
+/*
+ * The following functions handle keys that are stored in some secondary
+ * location, handled by the engine.  The storage may be on a card or
+ * whatever.
+ */
+EVP_PKEY *ENGINE_load_private_key(ENGINE *e, const char *key_id,
+                                  UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
+EVP_PKEY *ENGINE_load_public_key(ENGINE *e, const char *key_id,
+                                 UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
+int ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(ENGINE *e, SSL *s,
+                                STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn, X509 **pcert,
+                                EVP_PKEY **ppkey, STACK_OF(X509) **pother,
+                                UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
+
+/*
+ * This returns a pointer for the current ENGINE structure that is (by
+ * default) performing any RSA operations. The value returned is an
+ * incremented reference, so it should be free'd (ENGINE_finish) before it is
+ * discarded.
+ */
+ENGINE *ENGINE_get_default_RSA(void);
+/* Same for the other "methods" */
+ENGINE *ENGINE_get_default_DSA(void);
+ENGINE *ENGINE_get_default_EC(void);
+ENGINE *ENGINE_get_default_DH(void);
+ENGINE *ENGINE_get_default_RAND(void);
+/*
+ * These functions can be used to get a functional reference to perform
+ * ciphering or digesting corresponding to "nid".
+ */
+ENGINE *ENGINE_get_cipher_engine(int nid);
+ENGINE *ENGINE_get_digest_engine(int nid);
+ENGINE *ENGINE_get_pkey_meth_engine(int nid);
+ENGINE *ENGINE_get_pkey_asn1_meth_engine(int nid);
+
+/*
+ * This sets a new default ENGINE structure for performing RSA operations. If
+ * the result is non-zero (success) then the ENGINE structure will have had
+ * its reference count up'd so the caller should still free their own
+ * reference 'e'.
+ */
+int ENGINE_set_default_RSA(ENGINE *e);
+int ENGINE_set_default_string(ENGINE *e, const char *def_list);
+/* Same for the other "methods" */
+int ENGINE_set_default_DSA(ENGINE *e);
+int ENGINE_set_default_EC(ENGINE *e);
+int ENGINE_set_default_DH(ENGINE *e);
+int ENGINE_set_default_RAND(ENGINE *e);
+int ENGINE_set_default_ciphers(ENGINE *e);
+int ENGINE_set_default_digests(ENGINE *e);
+int ENGINE_set_default_pkey_meths(ENGINE *e);
+int ENGINE_set_default_pkey_asn1_meths(ENGINE *e);
+
+/*
+ * The combination "set" - the flags are bitwise "OR"d from the
+ * ENGINE_METHOD_*** defines above. As with the "ENGINE_register_complete()"
+ * function, this function can result in unnecessary static linkage. If your
+ * application requires only specific functionality, consider using more
+ * selective functions.
+ */
+int ENGINE_set_default(ENGINE *e, unsigned int flags);
+
+void ENGINE_add_conf_module(void);
+
+/* Deprecated functions ... */
+/* int ENGINE_clear_defaults(void); */
+
+/**************************/
+/* DYNAMIC ENGINE SUPPORT */
+/**************************/
+
+/* Binary/behaviour compatibility levels */
+# define OSSL_DYNAMIC_VERSION            (unsigned long)0x00030000
+/*
+ * Binary versions older than this are too old for us (whether we're a loader
+ * or a loadee)
+ */
+# define OSSL_DYNAMIC_OLDEST             (unsigned long)0x00030000
+
+/*
+ * When compiling an ENGINE entirely as an external shared library, loadable
+ * by the "dynamic" ENGINE, these types are needed. The 'dynamic_fns'
+ * structure type provides the calling application's (or library's) error
+ * functionality and memory management function pointers to the loaded
+ * library. These should be used/set in the loaded library code so that the
+ * loading application's 'state' will be used/changed in all operations. The
+ * 'static_state' pointer allows the loaded library to know if it shares the
+ * same static data as the calling application (or library), and thus whether
+ * these callbacks need to be set or not.
+ */
+typedef void *(*dyn_MEM_malloc_fn) (size_t, const char *, int);
+typedef void *(*dyn_MEM_realloc_fn) (void *, size_t, const char *, int);
+typedef void (*dyn_MEM_free_fn) (void *, const char *, int);
+typedef struct st_dynamic_MEM_fns {
+    dyn_MEM_malloc_fn malloc_fn;
+    dyn_MEM_realloc_fn realloc_fn;
+    dyn_MEM_free_fn free_fn;
+} dynamic_MEM_fns;
+/*
+ * FIXME: Perhaps the memory and locking code (crypto.h) should declare and
+ * use these types so we (and any other dependent code) can simplify a bit??
+ */
+/* The top-level structure */
+typedef struct st_dynamic_fns {
+    void *static_state;
+    dynamic_MEM_fns mem_fns;
+} dynamic_fns;
+
+/*
+ * The version checking function should be of this prototype. NB: The
+ * ossl_version value passed in is the OSSL_DYNAMIC_VERSION of the loading
+ * code. If this function returns zero, it indicates a (potential) version
+ * incompatibility and the loaded library doesn't believe it can proceed.
+ * Otherwise, the returned value is the (latest) version supported by the
+ * loading library. The loader may still decide that the loaded code's
+ * version is unsatisfactory and could veto the load. The function is
+ * expected to be implemented with the symbol name "v_check", and a default
+ * implementation can be fully instantiated with
+ * IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_CHECK_FN().
+ */
+typedef unsigned long (*dynamic_v_check_fn) (unsigned long ossl_version);
+# define IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_CHECK_FN() \
+        OPENSSL_EXPORT unsigned long v_check(unsigned long v); \
+        OPENSSL_EXPORT unsigned long v_check(unsigned long v) { \
+                if (v >= OSSL_DYNAMIC_OLDEST) return OSSL_DYNAMIC_VERSION; \
+                return 0; }
+
+/*
+ * This function is passed the ENGINE structure to initialise with its own
+ * function and command settings. It should not adjust the structural or
+ * functional reference counts. If this function returns zero, (a) the load
+ * will be aborted, (b) the previous ENGINE state will be memcpy'd back onto
+ * the structure, and (c) the shared library will be unloaded. So
+ * implementations should do their own internal cleanup in failure
+ * circumstances otherwise they could leak. The 'id' parameter, if non-NULL,
+ * represents the ENGINE id that the loader is looking for. If this is NULL,
+ * the shared library can choose to return failure or to initialise a
+ * 'default' ENGINE. If non-NULL, the shared library must initialise only an
+ * ENGINE matching the passed 'id'. The function is expected to be
+ * implemented with the symbol name "bind_engine". A standard implementation
+ * can be instantiated with IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN(fn) where the parameter
+ * 'fn' is a callback function that populates the ENGINE structure and
+ * returns an int value (zero for failure). 'fn' should have prototype;
+ * [static] int fn(ENGINE *e, const char *id);
+ */
+typedef int (*dynamic_bind_engine) (ENGINE *e, const char *id,
+                                    const dynamic_fns *fns);
+# define IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN(fn) \
+        OPENSSL_EXPORT \
+        int bind_engine(ENGINE *e, const char *id, const dynamic_fns *fns); \
+        OPENSSL_EXPORT \
+        int bind_engine(ENGINE *e, const char *id, const dynamic_fns *fns) { \
+            if (ENGINE_get_static_state() == fns->static_state) goto skip_cbs; \
+            CRYPTO_set_mem_functions(fns->mem_fns.malloc_fn, \
+                                     fns->mem_fns.realloc_fn, \
+                                     fns->mem_fns.free_fn); \
+        skip_cbs: \
+            if (!fn(e, id)) return 0; \
+            return 1; }
+
+/*
+ * If the loading application (or library) and the loaded ENGINE library
+ * share the same static data (eg. they're both dynamically linked to the
+ * same libcrypto.so) we need a way to avoid trying to set system callbacks -
+ * this would fail, and for the same reason that it's unnecessary to try. If
+ * the loaded ENGINE has (or gets from through the loader) its own copy of
+ * the libcrypto static data, we will need to set the callbacks. The easiest
+ * way to detect this is to have a function that returns a pointer to some
+ * static data and let the loading application and loaded ENGINE compare
+ * their respective values.
+ */
+void *ENGINE_get_static_state(void);
+
+# if defined(__OpenBSD__) || defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(HAVE_CRYPTODEV)
+DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(void ENGINE_setup_bsd_cryptodev(void))
+# endif
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+/*
+ * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
+ * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
+ */
+
+int ERR_load_ENGINE_strings(void);
+
+/* Error codes for the ENGINE functions. */
+
+/* Function codes. */
+# define ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_CTRL                            180
+# define ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_GET_DATA_CTX                    181
+# define ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_LOAD                            182
+# define ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_SET_DATA_CTX                    183
+# define ENGINE_F_ENGINE_ADD                              105
+# define ENGINE_F_ENGINE_BY_ID                            106
+# define ENGINE_F_ENGINE_CMD_IS_EXECUTABLE                170
+# define ENGINE_F_ENGINE_CTRL                             142
+# define ENGINE_F_ENGINE_CTRL_CMD                         178
+# define ENGINE_F_ENGINE_CTRL_CMD_STRING                  171
+# define ENGINE_F_ENGINE_FINISH                           107
+# define ENGINE_F_ENGINE_GET_CIPHER                       185
+# define ENGINE_F_ENGINE_GET_DIGEST                       186
+# define ENGINE_F_ENGINE_GET_FIRST                        195
+# define ENGINE_F_ENGINE_GET_LAST                         196
+# define ENGINE_F_ENGINE_GET_NEXT                         115
+# define ENGINE_F_ENGINE_GET_PKEY_ASN1_METH               193
+# define ENGINE_F_ENGINE_GET_PKEY_METH                    192
+# define ENGINE_F_ENGINE_GET_PREV                         116
+# define ENGINE_F_ENGINE_INIT                             119
+# define ENGINE_F_ENGINE_LIST_ADD                         120
+# define ENGINE_F_ENGINE_LIST_REMOVE                      121
+# define ENGINE_F_ENGINE_LOAD_PRIVATE_KEY                 150
+# define ENGINE_F_ENGINE_LOAD_PUBLIC_KEY                  151
+# define ENGINE_F_ENGINE_LOAD_SSL_CLIENT_CERT             194
+# define ENGINE_F_ENGINE_NEW                              122
+# define ENGINE_F_ENGINE_PKEY_ASN1_FIND_STR               197
+# define ENGINE_F_ENGINE_REMOVE                           123
+# define ENGINE_F_ENGINE_SET_DEFAULT_STRING               189
+# define ENGINE_F_ENGINE_SET_ID                           129
+# define ENGINE_F_ENGINE_SET_NAME                         130
+# define ENGINE_F_ENGINE_TABLE_REGISTER                   184
+# define ENGINE_F_ENGINE_UNLOCKED_FINISH                  191
+# define ENGINE_F_ENGINE_UP_REF                           190
+# define ENGINE_F_INT_CTRL_HELPER                         172
+# define ENGINE_F_INT_ENGINE_CONFIGURE                    188
+# define ENGINE_F_INT_ENGINE_MODULE_INIT                  187
+
+/* Reason codes. */
+# define ENGINE_R_ALREADY_LOADED                          100
+# define ENGINE_R_ARGUMENT_IS_NOT_A_NUMBER                133
+# define ENGINE_R_CMD_NOT_EXECUTABLE                      134
+# define ENGINE_R_COMMAND_TAKES_INPUT                     135
+# define ENGINE_R_COMMAND_TAKES_NO_INPUT                  136
+# define ENGINE_R_CONFLICTING_ENGINE_ID                   103
+# define ENGINE_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED            119
+# define ENGINE_R_DSO_FAILURE                             104
+# define ENGINE_R_DSO_NOT_FOUND                           132
+# define ENGINE_R_ENGINES_SECTION_ERROR                   148
+# define ENGINE_R_ENGINE_CONFIGURATION_ERROR              102
+# define ENGINE_R_ENGINE_IS_NOT_IN_LIST                   105
+# define ENGINE_R_ENGINE_SECTION_ERROR                    149
+# define ENGINE_R_FAILED_LOADING_PRIVATE_KEY              128
+# define ENGINE_R_FAILED_LOADING_PUBLIC_KEY               129
+# define ENGINE_R_FINISH_FAILED                           106
+# define ENGINE_R_ID_OR_NAME_MISSING                      108
+# define ENGINE_R_INIT_FAILED                             109
+# define ENGINE_R_INTERNAL_LIST_ERROR                     110
+# define ENGINE_R_INVALID_ARGUMENT                        143
+# define ENGINE_R_INVALID_CMD_NAME                        137
+# define ENGINE_R_INVALID_CMD_NUMBER                      138
+# define ENGINE_R_INVALID_INIT_VALUE                      151
+# define ENGINE_R_INVALID_STRING                          150
+# define ENGINE_R_NOT_INITIALISED                         117
+# define ENGINE_R_NOT_LOADED                              112
+# define ENGINE_R_NO_CONTROL_FUNCTION                     120
+# define ENGINE_R_NO_INDEX                                144
+# define ENGINE_R_NO_LOAD_FUNCTION                        125
+# define ENGINE_R_NO_REFERENCE                            130
+# define ENGINE_R_NO_SUCH_ENGINE                          116
+# define ENGINE_R_UNIMPLEMENTED_CIPHER                    146
+# define ENGINE_R_UNIMPLEMENTED_DIGEST                    147
+# define ENGINE_R_UNIMPLEMENTED_PUBLIC_KEY_METHOD         101
+# define ENGINE_R_VERSION_INCOMPATIBILITY                 145
+
+#  ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+#  endif
+# endif
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/err.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/err.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..29a261c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/err.h
@@ -0,0 +1,260 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_ERR_H
+# define HEADER_ERR_H
+
+# include <openssl/e_os2.h>
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+#  include <stdio.h>
+#  include <stdlib.h>
+# endif
+
+# include <openssl/ossl_typ.h>
+# include <openssl/bio.h>
+# include <openssl/lhash.h>
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+#  define ERR_PUT_error(a,b,c,d,e)        ERR_put_error(a,b,c,d,e)
+# else
+#  define ERR_PUT_error(a,b,c,d,e)        ERR_put_error(a,b,c,NULL,0)
+# endif
+
+# include <errno.h>
+
+# define ERR_TXT_MALLOCED        0x01
+# define ERR_TXT_STRING          0x02
+
+# define ERR_FLAG_MARK           0x01
+
+# define ERR_NUM_ERRORS  16
+typedef struct err_state_st {
+    int err_flags[ERR_NUM_ERRORS];
+    unsigned long err_buffer[ERR_NUM_ERRORS];
+    char *err_data[ERR_NUM_ERRORS];
+    int err_data_flags[ERR_NUM_ERRORS];
+    const char *err_file[ERR_NUM_ERRORS];
+    int err_line[ERR_NUM_ERRORS];
+    int top, bottom;
+} ERR_STATE;
+
+/* library */
+# define ERR_LIB_NONE            1
+# define ERR_LIB_SYS             2
+# define ERR_LIB_BN              3
+# define ERR_LIB_RSA             4
+# define ERR_LIB_DH              5
+# define ERR_LIB_EVP             6
+# define ERR_LIB_BUF             7
+# define ERR_LIB_OBJ             8
+# define ERR_LIB_PEM             9
+# define ERR_LIB_DSA             10
+# define ERR_LIB_X509            11
+/* #define ERR_LIB_METH         12 */
+# define ERR_LIB_ASN1            13
+# define ERR_LIB_CONF            14
+# define ERR_LIB_CRYPTO          15
+# define ERR_LIB_EC              16
+# define ERR_LIB_SSL             20
+/* #define ERR_LIB_SSL23        21 */
+/* #define ERR_LIB_SSL2         22 */
+/* #define ERR_LIB_SSL3         23 */
+/* #define ERR_LIB_RSAREF       30 */
+/* #define ERR_LIB_PROXY        31 */
+# define ERR_LIB_BIO             32
+# define ERR_LIB_PKCS7           33
+# define ERR_LIB_X509V3          34
+# define ERR_LIB_PKCS12          35
+# define ERR_LIB_RAND            36
+# define ERR_LIB_DSO             37
+# define ERR_LIB_ENGINE          38
+# define ERR_LIB_OCSP            39
+# define ERR_LIB_UI              40
+# define ERR_LIB_COMP            41
+# define ERR_LIB_ECDSA           42
+# define ERR_LIB_ECDH            43
+# define ERR_LIB_STORE           44
+# define ERR_LIB_FIPS            45
+# define ERR_LIB_CMS             46
+# define ERR_LIB_TS              47
+# define ERR_LIB_HMAC            48
+/* # define ERR_LIB_JPAKE       49 */
+# define ERR_LIB_CT              50
+# define ERR_LIB_ASYNC           51
+# define ERR_LIB_KDF             52
+
+# define ERR_LIB_USER            128
+
+# define SYSerr(f,r)  ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_SYS,(f),(r),OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE)
+# define BNerr(f,r)   ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_BN,(f),(r),OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE)
+# define RSAerr(f,r)  ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_RSA,(f),(r),OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE)
+# define DHerr(f,r)   ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_DH,(f),(r),OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE)
+# define EVPerr(f,r)  ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_EVP,(f),(r),OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE)
+# define BUFerr(f,r)  ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_BUF,(f),(r),OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE)
+# define OBJerr(f,r)  ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_OBJ,(f),(r),OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE)
+# define PEMerr(f,r)  ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_PEM,(f),(r),OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE)
+# define DSAerr(f,r)  ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_DSA,(f),(r),OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE)
+# define X509err(f,r) ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_X509,(f),(r),OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE)
+# define ASN1err(f,r) ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_ASN1,(f),(r),OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE)
+# define CONFerr(f,r) ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_CONF,(f),(r),OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE)
+# define CRYPTOerr(f,r) ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_CRYPTO,(f),(r),OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE)
+# define ECerr(f,r)   ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_EC,(f),(r),OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE)
+# define SSLerr(f,r)  ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_SSL,(f),(r),OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE)
+# define BIOerr(f,r)  ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_BIO,(f),(r),OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE)
+# define PKCS7err(f,r) ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_PKCS7,(f),(r),OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE)
+# define X509V3err(f,r) ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_X509V3,(f),(r),OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE)
+# define PKCS12err(f,r) ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_PKCS12,(f),(r),OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE)
+# define RANDerr(f,r) ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_RAND,(f),(r),OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE)
+# define DSOerr(f,r) ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_DSO,(f),(r),OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE)
+# define ENGINEerr(f,r) ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_ENGINE,(f),(r),OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE)
+# define OCSPerr(f,r) ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_OCSP,(f),(r),OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE)
+# define UIerr(f,r) ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_UI,(f),(r),OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE)
+# define COMPerr(f,r) ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_COMP,(f),(r),OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE)
+# define ECDSAerr(f,r)  ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_ECDSA,(f),(r),OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE)
+# define ECDHerr(f,r)  ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_ECDH,(f),(r),OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE)
+# define STOREerr(f,r) ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_STORE,(f),(r),OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE)
+# define FIPSerr(f,r) ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_FIPS,(f),(r),OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE)
+# define CMSerr(f,r) ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_CMS,(f),(r),OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE)
+# define TSerr(f,r) ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_TS,(f),(r),OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE)
+# define HMACerr(f,r) ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_HMAC,(f),(r),OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE)
+# define CTerr(f,r) ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_CT,(f),(r),OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE)
+# define ASYNCerr(f,r) ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_ASYNC,(f),(r),OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE)
+# define KDFerr(f,r) ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_KDF,(f),(r),OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE)
+
+# define ERR_PACK(l,f,r) ( \
+        (((unsigned int)(l) & 0x0FF) << 24L) | \
+        (((unsigned int)(f) & 0xFFF) << 12L) | \
+        (((unsigned int)(r) & 0xFFF)       ) )
+# define ERR_GET_LIB(l)          (int)(((l) >> 24L) & 0x0FFL)
+# define ERR_GET_FUNC(l)         (int)(((l) >> 12L) & 0xFFFL)
+# define ERR_GET_REASON(l)       (int)( (l)         & 0xFFFL)
+# define ERR_FATAL_ERROR(l)      (int)( (l)         & ERR_R_FATAL)
+
+/* OS functions */
+# define SYS_F_FOPEN             1
+# define SYS_F_CONNECT           2
+# define SYS_F_GETSERVBYNAME     3
+# define SYS_F_SOCKET            4
+# define SYS_F_IOCTLSOCKET       5
+# define SYS_F_BIND              6
+# define SYS_F_LISTEN            7
+# define SYS_F_ACCEPT            8
+# define SYS_F_WSASTARTUP        9/* Winsock stuff */
+# define SYS_F_OPENDIR           10
+# define SYS_F_FREAD             11
+# define SYS_F_GETADDRINFO       12
+# define SYS_F_GETNAMEINFO       13
+# define SYS_F_SETSOCKOPT        14
+# define SYS_F_GETSOCKOPT        15
+# define SYS_F_GETSOCKNAME       16
+# define SYS_F_GETHOSTBYNAME     17
+# define SYS_F_FFLUSH            18
+
+/* reasons */
+# define ERR_R_SYS_LIB   ERR_LIB_SYS/* 2 */
+# define ERR_R_BN_LIB    ERR_LIB_BN/* 3 */
+# define ERR_R_RSA_LIB   ERR_LIB_RSA/* 4 */
+# define ERR_R_DH_LIB    ERR_LIB_DH/* 5 */
+# define ERR_R_EVP_LIB   ERR_LIB_EVP/* 6 */
+# define ERR_R_BUF_LIB   ERR_LIB_BUF/* 7 */
+# define ERR_R_OBJ_LIB   ERR_LIB_OBJ/* 8 */
+# define ERR_R_PEM_LIB   ERR_LIB_PEM/* 9 */
+# define ERR_R_DSA_LIB   ERR_LIB_DSA/* 10 */
+# define ERR_R_X509_LIB  ERR_LIB_X509/* 11 */
+# define ERR_R_ASN1_LIB  ERR_LIB_ASN1/* 13 */
+# define ERR_R_EC_LIB    ERR_LIB_EC/* 16 */
+# define ERR_R_BIO_LIB   ERR_LIB_BIO/* 32 */
+# define ERR_R_PKCS7_LIB ERR_LIB_PKCS7/* 33 */
+# define ERR_R_X509V3_LIB ERR_LIB_X509V3/* 34 */
+# define ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB ERR_LIB_ENGINE/* 38 */
+# define ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB ERR_LIB_ECDSA/* 42 */
+
+# define ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR                 58
+# define ERR_R_MISSING_ASN1_EOS                  63
+
+/* fatal error */
+# define ERR_R_FATAL                             64
+# define ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE                    (1|ERR_R_FATAL)
+# define ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED       (2|ERR_R_FATAL)
+# define ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER             (3|ERR_R_FATAL)
+# define ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR                    (4|ERR_R_FATAL)
+# define ERR_R_DISABLED                          (5|ERR_R_FATAL)
+# define ERR_R_INIT_FAIL                         (6|ERR_R_FATAL)
+# define ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT           (7)
+
+/*
+ * 99 is the maximum possible ERR_R_... code, higher values are reserved for
+ * the individual libraries
+ */
+
+typedef struct ERR_string_data_st {
+    unsigned long error;
+    const char *string;
+} ERR_STRING_DATA;
+
+DEFINE_LHASH_OF(ERR_STRING_DATA);
+
+void ERR_put_error(int lib, int func, int reason, const char *file, int line);
+void ERR_set_error_data(char *data, int flags);
+
+unsigned long ERR_get_error(void);
+unsigned long ERR_get_error_line(const char **file, int *line);
+unsigned long ERR_get_error_line_data(const char **file, int *line,
+                                      const char **data, int *flags);
+unsigned long ERR_peek_error(void);
+unsigned long ERR_peek_error_line(const char **file, int *line);
+unsigned long ERR_peek_error_line_data(const char **file, int *line,
+                                       const char **data, int *flags);
+unsigned long ERR_peek_last_error(void);
+unsigned long ERR_peek_last_error_line(const char **file, int *line);
+unsigned long ERR_peek_last_error_line_data(const char **file, int *line,
+                                            const char **data, int *flags);
+void ERR_clear_error(void);
+char *ERR_error_string(unsigned long e, char *buf);
+void ERR_error_string_n(unsigned long e, char *buf, size_t len);
+const char *ERR_lib_error_string(unsigned long e);
+const char *ERR_func_error_string(unsigned long e);
+const char *ERR_reason_error_string(unsigned long e);
+void ERR_print_errors_cb(int (*cb) (const char *str, size_t len, void *u),
+                         void *u);
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+void ERR_print_errors_fp(FILE *fp);
+# endif
+void ERR_print_errors(BIO *bp);
+void ERR_add_error_data(int num, ...);
+void ERR_add_error_vdata(int num, va_list args);
+int ERR_load_strings(int lib, ERR_STRING_DATA str[]);
+int ERR_unload_strings(int lib, ERR_STRING_DATA str[]);
+int ERR_load_ERR_strings(void);
+
+#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+# define ERR_load_crypto_strings() \
+    OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_CRYPTO_STRINGS, NULL)
+# define ERR_free_strings() while(0) continue
+#endif
+
+DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(void ERR_remove_thread_state(void *))
+DEPRECATEDIN_1_0_0(void ERR_remove_state(unsigned long pid))
+ERR_STATE *ERR_get_state(void);
+
+int ERR_get_next_error_library(void);
+
+int ERR_set_mark(void);
+int ERR_pop_to_mark(void);
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/evp.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/evp.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..43c97a7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/evp.h
@@ -0,0 +1,1597 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_ENVELOPE_H
+# define HEADER_ENVELOPE_H
+
+# include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+# include <openssl/ossl_typ.h>
+# include <openssl/symhacks.h>
+# include <openssl/bio.h>
+
+# define EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE                 64/* longest known is SHA512 */
+# define EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH              64
+# define EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH               16
+# define EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH            32
+
+# define PKCS5_SALT_LEN                  8
+/* Default PKCS#5 iteration count */
+# define PKCS5_DEFAULT_ITER              2048
+
+# include <openssl/objects.h>
+
+# define EVP_PK_RSA      0x0001
+# define EVP_PK_DSA      0x0002
+# define EVP_PK_DH       0x0004
+# define EVP_PK_EC       0x0008
+# define EVP_PKT_SIGN    0x0010
+# define EVP_PKT_ENC     0x0020
+# define EVP_PKT_EXCH    0x0040
+# define EVP_PKS_RSA     0x0100
+# define EVP_PKS_DSA     0x0200
+# define EVP_PKS_EC      0x0400
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_NONE   NID_undef
+# define EVP_PKEY_RSA    NID_rsaEncryption
+# define EVP_PKEY_RSA2   NID_rsa
+# define EVP_PKEY_DSA    NID_dsa
+# define EVP_PKEY_DSA1   NID_dsa_2
+# define EVP_PKEY_DSA2   NID_dsaWithSHA
+# define EVP_PKEY_DSA3   NID_dsaWithSHA1
+# define EVP_PKEY_DSA4   NID_dsaWithSHA1_2
+# define EVP_PKEY_DH     NID_dhKeyAgreement
+# define EVP_PKEY_DHX    NID_dhpublicnumber
+# define EVP_PKEY_EC     NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey
+# define EVP_PKEY_HMAC   NID_hmac
+# define EVP_PKEY_CMAC   NID_cmac
+# define EVP_PKEY_TLS1_PRF NID_tls1_prf
+# define EVP_PKEY_HKDF   NID_hkdf
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_MO_SIGN        0x0001
+# define EVP_PKEY_MO_VERIFY      0x0002
+# define EVP_PKEY_MO_ENCRYPT     0x0004
+# define EVP_PKEY_MO_DECRYPT     0x0008
+
+# ifndef EVP_MD
+EVP_MD *EVP_MD_meth_new(int md_type, int pkey_type);
+EVP_MD *EVP_MD_meth_dup(const EVP_MD *md);
+void EVP_MD_meth_free(EVP_MD *md);
+
+int EVP_MD_meth_set_input_blocksize(EVP_MD *md, int blocksize);
+int EVP_MD_meth_set_result_size(EVP_MD *md, int resultsize);
+int EVP_MD_meth_set_app_datasize(EVP_MD *md, int datasize);
+int EVP_MD_meth_set_flags(EVP_MD *md, unsigned long flags);
+int EVP_MD_meth_set_init(EVP_MD *md, int (*init)(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx));
+int EVP_MD_meth_set_update(EVP_MD *md, int (*update)(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
+                                                     const void *data,
+                                                     size_t count));
+int EVP_MD_meth_set_final(EVP_MD *md, int (*final)(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
+                                                   unsigned char *md));
+int EVP_MD_meth_set_copy(EVP_MD *md, int (*copy)(EVP_MD_CTX *to,
+                                                 const EVP_MD_CTX *from));
+int EVP_MD_meth_set_cleanup(EVP_MD *md, int (*cleanup)(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx));
+int EVP_MD_meth_set_ctrl(EVP_MD *md, int (*ctrl)(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, int cmd,
+                                                 int p1, void *p2));
+
+int EVP_MD_meth_get_input_blocksize(const EVP_MD *md);
+int EVP_MD_meth_get_result_size(const EVP_MD *md);
+int EVP_MD_meth_get_app_datasize(const EVP_MD *md);
+unsigned long EVP_MD_meth_get_flags(const EVP_MD *md);
+int (*EVP_MD_meth_get_init(const EVP_MD *md))(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
+int (*EVP_MD_meth_get_update(const EVP_MD *md))(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
+                                                const void *data,
+                                                size_t count);
+int (*EVP_MD_meth_get_final(const EVP_MD *md))(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
+                                               unsigned char *md);
+int (*EVP_MD_meth_get_copy(const EVP_MD *md))(EVP_MD_CTX *to,
+                                              const EVP_MD_CTX *from);
+int (*EVP_MD_meth_get_cleanup(const EVP_MD *md))(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
+int (*EVP_MD_meth_get_ctrl(const EVP_MD *md))(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, int cmd,
+                                              int p1, void *p2);
+
+/* digest can only handle a single block */
+#  define EVP_MD_FLAG_ONESHOT     0x0001
+
+/* DigestAlgorithmIdentifier flags... */
+
+#  define EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_MASK               0x0018
+
+/* NULL or absent parameter accepted. Use NULL */
+
+#  define EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_NULL               0x0000
+
+/* NULL or absent parameter accepted. Use NULL for PKCS#1 otherwise absent */
+
+#  define EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT             0x0008
+
+/* Custom handling via ctrl */
+
+#  define EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_CUSTOM             0x0018
+
+/* Note if suitable for use in FIPS mode */
+#  define EVP_MD_FLAG_FIPS        0x0400
+
+/* Digest ctrls */
+
+#  define EVP_MD_CTRL_DIGALGID                    0x1
+#  define EVP_MD_CTRL_MICALG                      0x2
+
+/* Minimum Algorithm specific ctrl value */
+
+#  define EVP_MD_CTRL_ALG_CTRL                    0x1000
+
+# endif                         /* !EVP_MD */
+
+/* values for EVP_MD_CTX flags */
+
+# define EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_ONESHOT         0x0001/* digest update will be
+                                                * called once only */
+# define EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_CLEANED         0x0002/* context has already been
+                                                * cleaned */
+# define EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_REUSE           0x0004/* Don't free up ctx->md_data
+                                                * in EVP_MD_CTX_reset */
+/*
+ * FIPS and pad options are ignored in 1.0.0, definitions are here so we
+ * don't accidentally reuse the values for other purposes.
+ */
+
+# define EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW  0x0008/* Allow use of non FIPS
+                                                * digest in FIPS mode */
+
+/*
+ * The following PAD options are also currently ignored in 1.0.0, digest
+ * parameters are handled through EVP_DigestSign*() and EVP_DigestVerify*()
+ * instead.
+ */
+# define EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_PAD_MASK        0xF0/* RSA mode to use */
+# define EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_PAD_PKCS1       0x00/* PKCS#1 v1.5 mode */
+# define EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_PAD_X931        0x10/* X9.31 mode */
+# define EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_PAD_PSS         0x20/* PSS mode */
+
+# define EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NO_INIT         0x0100/* Don't initialize md_data */
+/*
+ * Some functions such as EVP_DigestSign only finalise copies of internal
+ * contexts so additional data can be included after the finalisation call.
+ * This is inefficient if this functionality is not required: it is disabled
+ * if the following flag is set.
+ */
+# define EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_FINALISE        0x0200
+
+EVP_CIPHER *EVP_CIPHER_meth_new(int cipher_type, int block_size, int key_len);
+EVP_CIPHER *EVP_CIPHER_meth_dup(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher);
+void EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(EVP_CIPHER *cipher);
+
+int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_iv_length(EVP_CIPHER *cipher, int iv_len);
+int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_flags(EVP_CIPHER *cipher, unsigned long flags);
+int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_impl_ctx_size(EVP_CIPHER *cipher, int ctx_size);
+int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_init(EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
+                             int (*init) (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+                                          const unsigned char *key,
+                                          const unsigned char *iv,
+                                          int enc));
+int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
+                                  int (*do_cipher) (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+                                                    unsigned char *out,
+                                                    const unsigned char *in,
+                                                    size_t inl));
+int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
+                                int (*cleanup) (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *));
+int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_set_asn1_params(EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
+                                        int (*set_asn1_parameters) (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *,
+                                                                    ASN1_TYPE *));
+int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_get_asn1_params(EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
+                                        int (*get_asn1_parameters) (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *,
+                                                                    ASN1_TYPE *));
+int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
+                             int (*ctrl) (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int type,
+                                          int arg, void *ptr));
+
+int (*EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_init(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher))(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+                                                          const unsigned char *key,
+                                                          const unsigned char *iv,
+                                                          int enc);
+int (*EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_do_cipher(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher))(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+                                                               unsigned char *out,
+                                                               const unsigned char *in,
+                                                               size_t inl);
+int (*EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_cleanup(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher))(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *);
+int (*EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_set_asn1_params(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher))(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *,
+                                                                     ASN1_TYPE *);
+int (*EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_get_asn1_params(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher))(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *,
+                                                               ASN1_TYPE *);
+int (*EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_ctrl(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher))(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *,
+                                                          int type, int arg,
+                                                          void *ptr);
+
+/* Values for cipher flags */
+
+/* Modes for ciphers */
+
+# define         EVP_CIPH_STREAM_CIPHER          0x0
+# define         EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE               0x1
+# define         EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE               0x2
+# define         EVP_CIPH_CFB_MODE               0x3
+# define         EVP_CIPH_OFB_MODE               0x4
+# define         EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE               0x5
+# define         EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE               0x6
+# define         EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE               0x7
+# define         EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE               0x10001
+# define         EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE              0x10002
+# define         EVP_CIPH_OCB_MODE               0x10003
+# define         EVP_CIPH_MODE                   0xF0007
+/* Set if variable length cipher */
+# define         EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH        0x8
+/* Set if the iv handling should be done by the cipher itself */
+# define         EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV              0x10
+/* Set if the cipher's init() function should be called if key is NULL */
+# define         EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT       0x20
+/* Call ctrl() to init cipher parameters */
+# define         EVP_CIPH_CTRL_INIT              0x40
+/* Don't use standard key length function */
+# define         EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_KEY_LENGTH      0x80
+/* Don't use standard block padding */
+# define         EVP_CIPH_NO_PADDING             0x100
+/* cipher handles random key generation */
+# define         EVP_CIPH_RAND_KEY               0x200
+/* cipher has its own additional copying logic */
+# define         EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_COPY            0x400
+/* Allow use default ASN1 get/set iv */
+# define         EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1      0x1000
+/* Buffer length in bits not bytes: CFB1 mode only */
+# define         EVP_CIPH_FLAG_LENGTH_BITS       0x2000
+/* Note if suitable for use in FIPS mode */
+# define         EVP_CIPH_FLAG_FIPS              0x4000
+/* Allow non FIPS cipher in FIPS mode */
+# define         EVP_CIPH_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW    0x8000
+/*
+ * Cipher handles any and all padding logic as well as finalisation.
+ */
+# define         EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER     0x100000
+# define         EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER       0x200000
+# define         EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0x400000
+/* Cipher can handle pipeline operations */
+# define         EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE          0X800000
+
+/*
+ * Cipher context flag to indicate we can handle wrap mode: if allowed in
+ * older applications it could overflow buffers.
+ */
+
+# define         EVP_CIPHER_CTX_FLAG_WRAP_ALLOW  0x1
+
+/* ctrl() values */
+
+# define         EVP_CTRL_INIT                   0x0
+# define         EVP_CTRL_SET_KEY_LENGTH         0x1
+# define         EVP_CTRL_GET_RC2_KEY_BITS       0x2
+# define         EVP_CTRL_SET_RC2_KEY_BITS       0x3
+# define         EVP_CTRL_GET_RC5_ROUNDS         0x4
+# define         EVP_CTRL_SET_RC5_ROUNDS         0x5
+# define         EVP_CTRL_RAND_KEY               0x6
+# define         EVP_CTRL_PBE_PRF_NID            0x7
+# define         EVP_CTRL_COPY                   0x8
+# define         EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN         0x9
+# define         EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG           0x10
+# define         EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG           0x11
+# define         EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IV_FIXED      0x12
+# define         EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IVLEN          EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN
+# define         EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG            EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG
+# define         EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG            EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG
+# define         EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED       EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IV_FIXED
+# define         EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN             0x13
+# define         EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_IVLEN          EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN
+# define         EVP_CTRL_CCM_GET_TAG            EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG
+# define         EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_TAG            EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG
+# define         EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_IV_FIXED       EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IV_FIXED
+# define         EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_L              0x14
+# define         EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_MSGLEN         0x15
+/*
+ * AEAD cipher deduces payload length and returns number of bytes required to
+ * store MAC and eventual padding. Subsequent call to EVP_Cipher even
+ * appends/verifies MAC.
+ */
+# define         EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD          0x16
+/* Used by composite AEAD ciphers, no-op in GCM, CCM... */
+# define         EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY       0x17
+/* Set the GCM invocation field, decrypt only */
+# define         EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_INV         0x18
+
+# define         EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD  0x19
+# define         EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT      0x1a
+# define         EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_DECRYPT      0x1b
+# define         EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE  0x1c
+
+# define         EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET             0x1d
+
+/* EVP_CTRL_SET_SBOX takes the char * specifying S-boxes */
+# define         EVP_CTRL_SET_SBOX                       0x1e
+/*
+ * EVP_CTRL_SBOX_USED takes a 'size_t' and 'char *', pointing at a
+ * pre-allocated buffer with specified size
+ */
+# define         EVP_CTRL_SBOX_USED                      0x1f
+/* EVP_CTRL_KEY_MESH takes 'size_t' number of bytes to mesh the key after,
+ * 0 switches meshing off
+ */
+# define         EVP_CTRL_KEY_MESH                       0x20
+/* EVP_CTRL_BLOCK_PADDING_MODE takes the padding mode */
+# define         EVP_CTRL_BLOCK_PADDING_MODE             0x21
+
+/* Set the output buffers to use for a pipelined operation */
+# define         EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_OUTPUT_BUFS       0x22
+/* Set the input buffers to use for a pipelined operation */
+# define         EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_INPUT_BUFS        0x23
+/* Set the input buffer lengths to use for a pipelined operation */
+# define         EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_INPUT_LENS        0x24
+
+/* Padding modes */
+#define EVP_PADDING_PKCS7       1
+#define EVP_PADDING_ISO7816_4   2
+#define EVP_PADDING_ANSI923     3
+#define EVP_PADDING_ISO10126    4
+#define EVP_PADDING_ZERO        5
+
+/* RFC 5246 defines additional data to be 13 bytes in length */
+# define         EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN           13
+
+typedef struct {
+    unsigned char *out;
+    const unsigned char *inp;
+    size_t len;
+    unsigned int interleave;
+} EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM;
+
+/* GCM TLS constants */
+/* Length of fixed part of IV derived from PRF */
+# define EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN                        4
+/* Length of explicit part of IV part of TLS records */
+# define EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN                     8
+/* Length of tag for TLS */
+# define EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN                             16
+
+/* CCM TLS constants */
+/* Length of fixed part of IV derived from PRF */
+# define EVP_CCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN                        4
+/* Length of explicit part of IV part of TLS records */
+# define EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN                     8
+
+typedef struct evp_cipher_info_st {
+    const EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
+    unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+} EVP_CIPHER_INFO;
+
+
+/* Password based encryption function */
+typedef int (EVP_PBE_KEYGEN) (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const char *pass,
+                              int passlen, ASN1_TYPE *param,
+                              const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, const EVP_MD *md,
+                              int en_de);
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+#  define EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey,rsa) EVP_PKEY_assign((pkey),EVP_PKEY_RSA,\
+                                        (char *)(rsa))
+# endif
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+#  define EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(pkey,dsa) EVP_PKEY_assign((pkey),EVP_PKEY_DSA,\
+                                        (char *)(dsa))
+# endif
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+#  define EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkey,dh) EVP_PKEY_assign((pkey),EVP_PKEY_DH,\
+                                        (char *)(dh))
+# endif
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+#  define EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY(pkey,eckey) EVP_PKEY_assign((pkey),EVP_PKEY_EC,\
+                                        (char *)(eckey))
+# endif
+
+/* Add some extra combinations */
+# define EVP_get_digestbynid(a) EVP_get_digestbyname(OBJ_nid2sn(a))
+# define EVP_get_digestbyobj(a) EVP_get_digestbynid(OBJ_obj2nid(a))
+# define EVP_get_cipherbynid(a) EVP_get_cipherbyname(OBJ_nid2sn(a))
+# define EVP_get_cipherbyobj(a) EVP_get_cipherbynid(OBJ_obj2nid(a))
+
+int EVP_MD_type(const EVP_MD *md);
+# define EVP_MD_nid(e)                   EVP_MD_type(e)
+# define EVP_MD_name(e)                  OBJ_nid2sn(EVP_MD_nid(e))
+int EVP_MD_pkey_type(const EVP_MD *md);
+int EVP_MD_size(const EVP_MD *md);
+int EVP_MD_block_size(const EVP_MD *md);
+unsigned long EVP_MD_flags(const EVP_MD *md);
+
+const EVP_MD *EVP_MD_CTX_md(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
+int (*EVP_MD_CTX_update_fn(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx))(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
+                                             const void *data, size_t count);
+void EVP_MD_CTX_set_update_fn(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
+                              int (*update) (EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
+                                             const void *data, size_t count));
+# define EVP_MD_CTX_size(e)              EVP_MD_size(EVP_MD_CTX_md(e))
+# define EVP_MD_CTX_block_size(e)        EVP_MD_block_size(EVP_MD_CTX_md(e))
+# define EVP_MD_CTX_type(e)              EVP_MD_type(EVP_MD_CTX_md(e))
+EVP_PKEY_CTX *EVP_MD_CTX_pkey_ctx(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
+void *EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
+
+int EVP_CIPHER_nid(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher);
+# define EVP_CIPHER_name(e)              OBJ_nid2sn(EVP_CIPHER_nid(e))
+int EVP_CIPHER_block_size(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher);
+int EVP_CIPHER_impl_ctx_size(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher);
+int EVP_CIPHER_key_length(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher);
+int EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher);
+unsigned long EVP_CIPHER_flags(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher);
+# define EVP_CIPHER_mode(e)              (EVP_CIPHER_flags(e) & EVP_CIPH_MODE)
+
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx);
+int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx);
+int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_nid(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx);
+int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx);
+int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx);
+int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx);
+const unsigned char *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx);
+const unsigned char *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_original_iv(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx);
+unsigned char *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx);
+unsigned char *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx);
+int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_num(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx);
+void EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int num);
+int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_copy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *out, const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *in);
+void *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx);
+void EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, void *data);
+void *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx);
+void *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_cipher_data(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, void *cipher_data);
+# define EVP_CIPHER_CTX_type(c)         EVP_CIPHER_type(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(c))
+# if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+#  define EVP_CIPHER_CTX_flags(c)       EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(c))
+# endif
+# define EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(c)         EVP_CIPHER_mode(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(c))
+
+# define EVP_ENCODE_LENGTH(l)    (((l+2)/3*4)+(l/48+1)*2+80)
+# define EVP_DECODE_LENGTH(l)    ((l+3)/4*3+80)
+
+# define EVP_SignInit_ex(a,b,c)          EVP_DigestInit_ex(a,b,c)
+# define EVP_SignInit(a,b)               EVP_DigestInit(a,b)
+# define EVP_SignUpdate(a,b,c)           EVP_DigestUpdate(a,b,c)
+# define EVP_VerifyInit_ex(a,b,c)        EVP_DigestInit_ex(a,b,c)
+# define EVP_VerifyInit(a,b)             EVP_DigestInit(a,b)
+# define EVP_VerifyUpdate(a,b,c)         EVP_DigestUpdate(a,b,c)
+# define EVP_OpenUpdate(a,b,c,d,e)       EVP_DecryptUpdate(a,b,c,d,e)
+# define EVP_SealUpdate(a,b,c,d,e)       EVP_EncryptUpdate(a,b,c,d,e)
+# define EVP_DigestSignUpdate(a,b,c)     EVP_DigestUpdate(a,b,c)
+# define EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(a,b,c)   EVP_DigestUpdate(a,b,c)
+
+# ifdef CONST_STRICT
+void BIO_set_md(BIO *, const EVP_MD *md);
+# else
+#  define BIO_set_md(b,md)               BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_MD,0,(char *)md)
+# endif
+# define BIO_get_md(b,mdp)               BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_MD,0,(char *)mdp)
+# define BIO_get_md_ctx(b,mdcp)     BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_MD_CTX,0,(char *)mdcp)
+# define BIO_set_md_ctx(b,mdcp)     BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_MD_CTX,0,(char *)mdcp)
+# define BIO_get_cipher_status(b)        BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_CIPHER_STATUS,0,NULL)
+# define BIO_get_cipher_ctx(b,c_pp)      BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_CIPHER_CTX,0,(char *)c_pp)
+
+/*__owur*/ int EVP_Cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c,
+                          unsigned char *out,
+                          const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inl);
+
+# define EVP_add_cipher_alias(n,alias) \
+        OBJ_NAME_add((alias),OBJ_NAME_TYPE_CIPHER_METH|OBJ_NAME_ALIAS,(n))
+# define EVP_add_digest_alias(n,alias) \
+        OBJ_NAME_add((alias),OBJ_NAME_TYPE_MD_METH|OBJ_NAME_ALIAS,(n))
+# define EVP_delete_cipher_alias(alias) \
+        OBJ_NAME_remove(alias,OBJ_NAME_TYPE_CIPHER_METH|OBJ_NAME_ALIAS);
+# define EVP_delete_digest_alias(alias) \
+        OBJ_NAME_remove(alias,OBJ_NAME_TYPE_MD_METH|OBJ_NAME_ALIAS);
+
+int EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, int cmd, int p1, void *p2);
+EVP_MD_CTX *EVP_MD_CTX_new(void);
+int EVP_MD_CTX_reset(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
+void EVP_MD_CTX_free(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
+# define EVP_MD_CTX_create()     EVP_MD_CTX_new()
+# define EVP_MD_CTX_init(ctx)    EVP_MD_CTX_reset((ctx))
+# define EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ctx) EVP_MD_CTX_free((ctx))
+__owur int EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *out, const EVP_MD_CTX *in);
+void EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, int flags);
+void EVP_MD_CTX_clear_flags(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, int flags);
+int EVP_MD_CTX_test_flags(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, int flags);
+__owur int EVP_DigestInit_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *type,
+                                 ENGINE *impl);
+__owur int EVP_DigestUpdate(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *d,
+                                size_t cnt);
+__owur int EVP_DigestFinal_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md,
+                                  unsigned int *s);
+__owur int EVP_Digest(const void *data, size_t count,
+                          unsigned char *md, unsigned int *size,
+                          const EVP_MD *type, ENGINE *impl);
+
+__owur int EVP_MD_CTX_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *out, const EVP_MD_CTX *in);
+__owur int EVP_DigestInit(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *type);
+__owur int EVP_DigestFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md,
+                           unsigned int *s);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_UI
+int EVP_read_pw_string(char *buf, int length, const char *prompt, int verify);
+int EVP_read_pw_string_min(char *buf, int minlen, int maxlen,
+                           const char *prompt, int verify);
+void EVP_set_pw_prompt(const char *prompt);
+char *EVP_get_pw_prompt(void);
+#endif
+
+__owur int EVP_BytesToKey(const EVP_CIPHER *type, const EVP_MD *md,
+                          const unsigned char *salt,
+                          const unsigned char *data, int datal, int count,
+                          unsigned char *key, unsigned char *iv);
+
+void EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int flags);
+void EVP_CIPHER_CTX_clear_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int flags);
+int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_test_flags(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int flags);
+
+__owur int EVP_EncryptInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
+                           const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv);
+/*__owur*/ int EVP_EncryptInit_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+                                  const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, ENGINE *impl,
+                                  const unsigned char *key,
+                                  const unsigned char *iv);
+/*__owur*/ int EVP_EncryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                                 int *outl, const unsigned char *in, int inl);
+/*__owur*/ int EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                                   int *outl);
+/*__owur*/ int EVP_EncryptFinal(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                                int *outl);
+
+__owur int EVP_DecryptInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
+                           const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv);
+/*__owur*/ int EVP_DecryptInit_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+                                  const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, ENGINE *impl,
+                                  const unsigned char *key,
+                                  const unsigned char *iv);
+/*__owur*/ int EVP_DecryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                                 int *outl, const unsigned char *in, int inl);
+__owur int EVP_DecryptFinal(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *outm,
+                            int *outl);
+/*__owur*/ int EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *outm,
+                                   int *outl);
+
+__owur int EVP_CipherInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
+                          const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv,
+                          int enc);
+/*__owur*/ int EVP_CipherInit_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+                                 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, ENGINE *impl,
+                                 const unsigned char *key,
+                                 const unsigned char *iv, int enc);
+__owur int EVP_CipherUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                            int *outl, const unsigned char *in, int inl);
+__owur int EVP_CipherFinal(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *outm,
+                           int *outl);
+__owur int EVP_CipherFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *outm,
+                              int *outl);
+
+__owur int EVP_SignFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *s,
+                         EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+
+__owur int EVP_VerifyFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sigbuf,
+                           unsigned int siglen, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+
+/*__owur*/ int EVP_DigestSignInit(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx,
+                                  const EVP_MD *type, ENGINE *e,
+                                  EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+__owur int EVP_DigestSignFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sigret,
+                               size_t *siglen);
+
+__owur int EVP_DigestVerifyInit(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx,
+                                const EVP_MD *type, ENGINE *e,
+                                EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+__owur int EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sig,
+                                 size_t siglen);
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+__owur int EVP_OpenInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *type,
+                        const unsigned char *ek, int ekl,
+                        const unsigned char *iv, EVP_PKEY *priv);
+__owur int EVP_OpenFinal(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl);
+
+__owur int EVP_SealInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *type,
+                        unsigned char **ek, int *ekl, unsigned char *iv,
+                        EVP_PKEY **pubk, int npubk);
+__owur int EVP_SealFinal(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl);
+# endif
+
+EVP_ENCODE_CTX *EVP_ENCODE_CTX_new(void);
+void EVP_ENCODE_CTX_free(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx);
+int EVP_ENCODE_CTX_copy(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *dctx, EVP_ENCODE_CTX *sctx);
+int EVP_ENCODE_CTX_num(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx);
+void EVP_EncodeInit(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx);
+int EVP_EncodeUpdate(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
+                     const unsigned char *in, int inl);
+void EVP_EncodeFinal(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl);
+int EVP_EncodeBlock(unsigned char *t, const unsigned char *f, int n);
+
+void EVP_DecodeInit(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx);
+int EVP_DecodeUpdate(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
+                     const unsigned char *in, int inl);
+int EVP_DecodeFinal(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned
+                    char *out, int *outl);
+int EVP_DecodeBlock(unsigned char *t, const unsigned char *f, int n);
+
+# if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+#  define EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(c)      EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(c)
+#  define EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(c)   EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(c)
+# endif
+EVP_CIPHER_CTX *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(void);
+int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c);
+void EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c);
+int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *x, int keylen);
+int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int pad);
+int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type, int arg, void *ptr);
+int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key);
+
+const BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_md(void);
+const BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_base64(void);
+const BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_cipher(void);
+const BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_reliable(void);
+__owur int BIO_set_cipher(BIO *b, const EVP_CIPHER *c, const unsigned char *k,
+                          const unsigned char *i, int enc);
+
+const EVP_MD *EVP_md_null(void);
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD2
+const EVP_MD *EVP_md2(void);
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD4
+const EVP_MD *EVP_md4(void);
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+const EVP_MD *EVP_md5(void);
+const EVP_MD *EVP_md5_sha1(void);
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BLAKE2
+const EVP_MD *EVP_blake2b512(void);
+const EVP_MD *EVP_blake2s256(void);
+# endif
+const EVP_MD *EVP_sha1(void);
+const EVP_MD *EVP_sha224(void);
+const EVP_MD *EVP_sha256(void);
+const EVP_MD *EVP_sha384(void);
+const EVP_MD *EVP_sha512(void);
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MDC2
+const EVP_MD *EVP_mdc2(void);
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RMD160
+const EVP_MD *EVP_ripemd160(void);
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WHIRLPOOL
+const EVP_MD *EVP_whirlpool(void);
+# endif
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_enc_null(void); /* does nothing :-) */
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ecb(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ede(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ede3(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ede_ecb(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ede3_ecb(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_cfb64(void);
+#  define EVP_des_cfb EVP_des_cfb64
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_cfb1(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_cfb8(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ede_cfb64(void);
+#  define EVP_des_ede_cfb EVP_des_ede_cfb64
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ede3_cfb64(void);
+#  define EVP_des_ede3_cfb EVP_des_ede3_cfb64
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ede3_cfb1(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ede3_cfb8(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ofb(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ede_ofb(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ede3_ofb(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_cbc(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ede_cbc(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ede3_cbc(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_desx_cbc(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ede3_wrap(void);
+/*
+ * This should now be supported through the dev_crypto ENGINE. But also, why
+ * are rc4 and md5 declarations made here inside a "NO_DES" precompiler
+ * branch?
+ */
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_rc4(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_rc4_40(void);
+#  ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_rc4_hmac_md5(void);
+#  endif
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_IDEA
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_idea_ecb(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_idea_cfb64(void);
+#  define EVP_idea_cfb EVP_idea_cfb64
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_idea_ofb(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_idea_cbc(void);
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC2
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_rc2_ecb(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_rc2_cbc(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_rc2_40_cbc(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_rc2_64_cbc(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_rc2_cfb64(void);
+#  define EVP_rc2_cfb EVP_rc2_cfb64
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_rc2_ofb(void);
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BF
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_bf_ecb(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_bf_cbc(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_bf_cfb64(void);
+#  define EVP_bf_cfb EVP_bf_cfb64
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_bf_ofb(void);
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAST
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_cast5_ecb(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_cast5_cbc(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_cast5_cfb64(void);
+#  define EVP_cast5_cfb EVP_cast5_cfb64
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_cast5_ofb(void);
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC5
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_rc5_32_12_16_cbc(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_rc5_32_12_16_ecb(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_rc5_32_12_16_cfb64(void);
+#  define EVP_rc5_32_12_16_cfb EVP_rc5_32_12_16_cfb64
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_rc5_32_12_16_ofb(void);
+# endif
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_128_ecb(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_128_cbc(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_128_cfb1(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_128_cfb8(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_128_cfb128(void);
+# define EVP_aes_128_cfb EVP_aes_128_cfb128
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_128_ofb(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_128_ctr(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_128_ccm(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_128_gcm(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_128_xts(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_128_wrap(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_128_wrap_pad(void);
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCB
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_128_ocb(void);
+# endif
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_192_ecb(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_192_cbc(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_192_cfb1(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_192_cfb8(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_192_cfb128(void);
+# define EVP_aes_192_cfb EVP_aes_192_cfb128
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_192_ofb(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_192_ctr(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_192_ccm(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_192_gcm(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_192_wrap(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_192_wrap_pad(void);
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCB
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_192_ocb(void);
+# endif
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_256_ecb(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_256_cbc(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_256_cfb1(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_256_cfb8(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_256_cfb128(void);
+# define EVP_aes_256_cfb EVP_aes_256_cfb128
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_256_ofb(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_256_ctr(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_256_ccm(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_256_gcm(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_256_xts(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_256_wrap(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_256_wrap_pad(void);
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCB
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_256_ocb(void);
+# endif
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha1(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha256(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha256(void);
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_camellia_128_ecb(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_camellia_128_cbc(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_camellia_128_cfb1(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_camellia_128_cfb8(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_camellia_128_cfb128(void);
+#  define EVP_camellia_128_cfb EVP_camellia_128_cfb128
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_camellia_128_ofb(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_camellia_128_ctr(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_camellia_192_ecb(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_camellia_192_cbc(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_camellia_192_cfb1(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_camellia_192_cfb8(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_camellia_192_cfb128(void);
+#  define EVP_camellia_192_cfb EVP_camellia_192_cfb128
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_camellia_192_ofb(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_camellia_192_ctr(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_camellia_256_ecb(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_camellia_256_cbc(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_camellia_256_cfb1(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_camellia_256_cfb8(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_camellia_256_cfb128(void);
+#  define EVP_camellia_256_cfb EVP_camellia_256_cfb128
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_camellia_256_ofb(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_camellia_256_ctr(void);
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CHACHA
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_chacha20(void);
+#  ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POLY1305
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_chacha20_poly1305(void);
+#  endif
+# endif
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SEED
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_seed_ecb(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_seed_cbc(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_seed_cfb128(void);
+#  define EVP_seed_cfb EVP_seed_cfb128
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_seed_ofb(void);
+# endif
+
+# if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+#  define OPENSSL_add_all_algorithms_conf() \
+    OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_CIPHERS \
+                        | OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_DIGESTS \
+                        | OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_CONFIG, NULL)
+#  define OPENSSL_add_all_algorithms_noconf() \
+    OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_CIPHERS \
+                        | OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_DIGESTS, NULL)
+
+#  ifdef OPENSSL_LOAD_CONF
+#   define OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms() \
+    OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_CIPHERS \
+                        | OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_DIGESTS \
+                        | OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_CONFIG, NULL)
+#  else
+#   define OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms() \
+    OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_CIPHERS \
+                        | OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_DIGESTS, NULL)
+#  endif
+
+#  define OpenSSL_add_all_ciphers() \
+    OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_CIPHERS, NULL)
+#  define OpenSSL_add_all_digests() \
+    OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_DIGESTS, NULL)
+
+#  define EVP_cleanup() while(0) continue
+# endif
+
+int EVP_add_cipher(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher);
+int EVP_add_digest(const EVP_MD *digest);
+
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_get_cipherbyname(const char *name);
+const EVP_MD *EVP_get_digestbyname(const char *name);
+
+void EVP_CIPHER_do_all(void (*fn) (const EVP_CIPHER *ciph,
+                                   const char *from, const char *to, void *x),
+                       void *arg);
+void EVP_CIPHER_do_all_sorted(void (*fn)
+                               (const EVP_CIPHER *ciph, const char *from,
+                                const char *to, void *x), void *arg);
+
+void EVP_MD_do_all(void (*fn) (const EVP_MD *ciph,
+                               const char *from, const char *to, void *x),
+                   void *arg);
+void EVP_MD_do_all_sorted(void (*fn)
+                           (const EVP_MD *ciph, const char *from,
+                            const char *to, void *x), void *arg);
+
+int EVP_PKEY_decrypt_old(unsigned char *dec_key,
+                         const unsigned char *enc_key, int enc_key_len,
+                         EVP_PKEY *private_key);
+int EVP_PKEY_encrypt_old(unsigned char *enc_key,
+                         const unsigned char *key, int key_len,
+                         EVP_PKEY *pub_key);
+int EVP_PKEY_type(int type);
+int EVP_PKEY_id(const EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+int EVP_PKEY_base_id(const EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+int EVP_PKEY_bits(const EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+int EVP_PKEY_security_bits(const EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+int EVP_PKEY_size(EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+int EVP_PKEY_set_type(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int type);
+int EVP_PKEY_set_type_str(EVP_PKEY *pkey, const char *str, int len);
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+int EVP_PKEY_set1_engine(EVP_PKEY *pkey, ENGINE *e);
+# endif
+int EVP_PKEY_assign(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int type, void *key);
+void *EVP_PKEY_get0(const EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+const unsigned char *EVP_PKEY_get0_hmac(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, size_t *len);
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+struct rsa_st;
+int EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey, struct rsa_st *key);
+struct rsa_st *EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+struct rsa_st *EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+struct dsa_st;
+int EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey, struct dsa_st *key);
+struct dsa_st *EVP_PKEY_get0_DSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+struct dsa_st *EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+struct dh_st;
+int EVP_PKEY_set1_DH(EVP_PKEY *pkey, struct dh_st *key);
+struct dh_st *EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+struct dh_st *EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+struct ec_key_st;
+int EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(EVP_PKEY *pkey, struct ec_key_st *key);
+struct ec_key_st *EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+struct ec_key_st *EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+# endif
+
+EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKEY_new(void);
+int EVP_PKEY_up_ref(EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+void EVP_PKEY_free(EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+
+EVP_PKEY *d2i_PublicKey(int type, EVP_PKEY **a, const unsigned char **pp,
+                        long length);
+int i2d_PublicKey(EVP_PKEY *a, unsigned char **pp);
+
+EVP_PKEY *d2i_PrivateKey(int type, EVP_PKEY **a, const unsigned char **pp,
+                         long length);
+EVP_PKEY *d2i_AutoPrivateKey(EVP_PKEY **a, const unsigned char **pp,
+                             long length);
+int i2d_PrivateKey(EVP_PKEY *a, unsigned char **pp);
+
+int EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(EVP_PKEY *to, const EVP_PKEY *from);
+int EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(const EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+int EVP_PKEY_save_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int mode);
+int EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b);
+
+int EVP_PKEY_cmp(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b);
+
+int EVP_PKEY_print_public(BIO *out, const EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+                          int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx);
+int EVP_PKEY_print_private(BIO *out, const EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+                           int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx);
+int EVP_PKEY_print_params(BIO *out, const EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+                          int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx);
+
+int EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int *pnid);
+
+int EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+                                   const unsigned char *pt, size_t ptlen);
+size_t EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(EVP_PKEY *pkey, unsigned char **ppt);
+
+int EVP_CIPHER_type(const EVP_CIPHER *ctx);
+
+/* calls methods */
+int EVP_CIPHER_param_to_asn1(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type);
+int EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type);
+
+/* These are used by EVP_CIPHER methods */
+int EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type);
+int EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type);
+
+/* PKCS5 password based encryption */
+int PKCS5_PBE_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const char *pass, int passlen,
+                       ASN1_TYPE *param, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
+                       const EVP_MD *md, int en_de);
+int PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC_SHA1(const char *pass, int passlen,
+                           const unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, int iter,
+                           int keylen, unsigned char *out);
+int PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(const char *pass, int passlen,
+                      const unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, int iter,
+                      const EVP_MD *digest, int keylen, unsigned char *out);
+int PKCS5_v2_PBE_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const char *pass, int passlen,
+                          ASN1_TYPE *param, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
+                          const EVP_MD *md, int en_de);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCRYPT
+int EVP_PBE_scrypt(const char *pass, size_t passlen,
+                   const unsigned char *salt, size_t saltlen,
+                   uint64_t N, uint64_t r, uint64_t p, uint64_t maxmem,
+                   unsigned char *key, size_t keylen);
+
+int PKCS5_v2_scrypt_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const char *pass,
+                             int passlen, ASN1_TYPE *param,
+                             const EVP_CIPHER *c, const EVP_MD *md, int en_de);
+#endif
+
+void PKCS5_PBE_add(void);
+
+int EVP_PBE_CipherInit(ASN1_OBJECT *pbe_obj, const char *pass, int passlen,
+                       ASN1_TYPE *param, EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int en_de);
+
+/* PBE type */
+
+/* Can appear as the outermost AlgorithmIdentifier */
+# define EVP_PBE_TYPE_OUTER      0x0
+/* Is an PRF type OID */
+# define EVP_PBE_TYPE_PRF        0x1
+/* Is a PKCS#5 v2.0 KDF */
+# define EVP_PBE_TYPE_KDF        0x2
+
+int EVP_PBE_alg_add_type(int pbe_type, int pbe_nid, int cipher_nid,
+                         int md_nid, EVP_PBE_KEYGEN *keygen);
+int EVP_PBE_alg_add(int nid, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, const EVP_MD *md,
+                    EVP_PBE_KEYGEN *keygen);
+int EVP_PBE_find(int type, int pbe_nid, int *pcnid, int *pmnid,
+                 EVP_PBE_KEYGEN **pkeygen);
+void EVP_PBE_cleanup(void);
+int EVP_PBE_get(int *ptype, int *ppbe_nid, size_t num);
+
+# define ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS         0x1
+# define ASN1_PKEY_DYNAMIC       0x2
+# define ASN1_PKEY_SIGPARAM_NULL 0x4
+
+# define ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN       0x1
+# define ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_ENCRYPT    0x2
+# define ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_DEFAULT_MD_NID   0x3
+# define ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_SIGN         0x5
+# define ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_ENVELOPE     0x7
+# define ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_RI_TYPE      0x8
+
+# define ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_SET1_TLS_ENCPT   0x9
+# define ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_GET1_TLS_ENCPT   0xa
+
+int EVP_PKEY_asn1_get_count(void);
+const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0(int idx);
+const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *EVP_PKEY_asn1_find(ENGINE **pe, int type);
+const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str(ENGINE **pe,
+                                                   const char *str, int len);
+int EVP_PKEY_asn1_add0(const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth);
+int EVP_PKEY_asn1_add_alias(int to, int from);
+int EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(int *ppkey_id, int *pkey_base_id,
+                            int *ppkey_flags, const char **pinfo,
+                            const char **ppem_str,
+                            const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth);
+
+const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *EVP_PKEY_get0_asn1(const EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *EVP_PKEY_asn1_new(int id, int flags,
+                                        const char *pem_str,
+                                        const char *info);
+void EVP_PKEY_asn1_copy(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *dst,
+                        const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *src);
+void EVP_PKEY_asn1_free(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth);
+void EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_public(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth,
+                              int (*pub_decode) (EVP_PKEY *pk,
+                                                 X509_PUBKEY *pub),
+                              int (*pub_encode) (X509_PUBKEY *pub,
+                                                 const EVP_PKEY *pk),
+                              int (*pub_cmp) (const EVP_PKEY *a,
+                                              const EVP_PKEY *b),
+                              int (*pub_print) (BIO *out,
+                                                const EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+                                                int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx),
+                              int (*pkey_size) (const EVP_PKEY *pk),
+                              int (*pkey_bits) (const EVP_PKEY *pk));
+void EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_private(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth,
+                               int (*priv_decode) (EVP_PKEY *pk,
+                                                   const PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO
+                                                   *p8inf),
+                               int (*priv_encode) (PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8,
+                                                   const EVP_PKEY *pk),
+                               int (*priv_print) (BIO *out,
+                                                  const EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+                                                  int indent,
+                                                  ASN1_PCTX *pctx));
+void EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_param(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth,
+                             int (*param_decode) (EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+                                                  const unsigned char **pder,
+                                                  int derlen),
+                             int (*param_encode) (const EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+                                                  unsigned char **pder),
+                             int (*param_missing) (const EVP_PKEY *pk),
+                             int (*param_copy) (EVP_PKEY *to,
+                                                const EVP_PKEY *from),
+                             int (*param_cmp) (const EVP_PKEY *a,
+                                               const EVP_PKEY *b),
+                             int (*param_print) (BIO *out,
+                                                 const EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+                                                 int indent,
+                                                 ASN1_PCTX *pctx));
+
+void EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_free(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth,
+                            void (*pkey_free) (EVP_PKEY *pkey));
+void EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth,
+                            int (*pkey_ctrl) (EVP_PKEY *pkey, int op,
+                                              long arg1, void *arg2));
+void EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_item(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth,
+                            int (*item_verify) (EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
+                                                const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+                                                void *asn,
+                                                X509_ALGOR *a,
+                                                ASN1_BIT_STRING *sig,
+                                                EVP_PKEY *pkey),
+                            int (*item_sign) (EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
+                                              const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+                                              void *asn,
+                                              X509_ALGOR *alg1,
+                                              X509_ALGOR *alg2,
+                                              ASN1_BIT_STRING *sig));
+
+void EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_security_bits(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth,
+                                     int (*pkey_security_bits) (const EVP_PKEY
+                                                                *pk));
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_OP_UNDEFINED           0
+# define EVP_PKEY_OP_PARAMGEN            (1<<1)
+# define EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN              (1<<2)
+# define EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN                (1<<3)
+# define EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY              (1<<4)
+# define EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFYRECOVER       (1<<5)
+# define EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGNCTX             (1<<6)
+# define EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFYCTX           (1<<7)
+# define EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT             (1<<8)
+# define EVP_PKEY_OP_DECRYPT             (1<<9)
+# define EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE              (1<<10)
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG    \
+        (EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN | EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY | EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFYRECOVER \
+                | EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGNCTX | EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFYCTX)
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT \
+        (EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT | EVP_PKEY_OP_DECRYPT)
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_NOGEN \
+        (EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT | EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE)
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_GEN \
+                (EVP_PKEY_OP_PARAMGEN | EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN)
+
+# define  EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(ctx, md) \
+                EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG,  \
+                                        EVP_PKEY_CTRL_MD, 0, (void *)md)
+
+# define  EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_signature_md(ctx, pmd)        \
+                EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG,  \
+                                        EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_MD, 0, (void *)pmd)
+
+# define  EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_mac_key(ctx, key, len)        \
+                EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN,  \
+                                  EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_MAC_KEY, len, (void *)key)
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_MD                1
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY          2
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_ENCRYPT     3
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_DECRYPT     4
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN        5
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_MAC_KEY       6
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DIGESTINIT        7
+
+/* Used by GOST key encryption in TLS */
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV            8
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_ENCRYPT       9
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_DECRYPT       10
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_SIGN          11
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CIPHER            12
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_MD            13
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL               0x1000
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_FLAG_AUTOARGLEN        2
+/*
+ * Method handles all operations: don't assume any digest related defaults.
+ */
+# define EVP_PKEY_FLAG_SIGCTX_CUSTOM     4
+
+const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *EVP_PKEY_meth_find(int type);
+EVP_PKEY_METHOD *EVP_PKEY_meth_new(int id, int flags);
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_get0_info(int *ppkey_id, int *pflags,
+                             const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *meth);
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_copy(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *dst, const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *src);
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_free(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth);
+int EVP_PKEY_meth_add0(const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth);
+
+EVP_PKEY_CTX *EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(EVP_PKEY *pkey, ENGINE *e);
+EVP_PKEY_CTX *EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(int id, ENGINE *e);
+EVP_PKEY_CTX *EVP_PKEY_CTX_dup(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);
+void EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);
+
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int keytype, int optype,
+                      int cmd, int p1, void *p2);
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const char *type,
+                          const char *value);
+
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_str2ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int cmd, const char *str);
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_hex2ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int cmd, const char *hex);
+
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_operation(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);
+void EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_keygen_info(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int *dat, int datlen);
+
+EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(int type, ENGINE *e,
+                               const unsigned char *key, int keylen);
+
+void EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_data(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, void *data);
+void *EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);
+EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);
+
+EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_peerkey(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);
+
+void EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_app_data(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, void *data);
+void *EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_app_data(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);
+
+int EVP_PKEY_sign_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);
+int EVP_PKEY_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                  unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen,
+                  const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen);
+int EVP_PKEY_verify_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);
+int EVP_PKEY_verify(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                    const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen,
+                    const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen);
+int EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);
+int EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                            unsigned char *rout, size_t *routlen,
+                            const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen);
+int EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);
+int EVP_PKEY_encrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                     unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
+                     const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen);
+int EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);
+int EVP_PKEY_decrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                     unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
+                     const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen);
+
+int EVP_PKEY_derive_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);
+int EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *peer);
+int EVP_PKEY_derive(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key, size_t *keylen);
+
+typedef int EVP_PKEY_gen_cb(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);
+
+int EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);
+int EVP_PKEY_paramgen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY **ppkey);
+int EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);
+int EVP_PKEY_keygen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY **ppkey);
+
+void EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_cb(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_gen_cb *cb);
+EVP_PKEY_gen_cb *EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_cb(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);
+
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_keygen_info(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int idx);
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_set_init(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                            int (*init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx));
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_set_copy(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                            int (*copy) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *dst,
+                                         EVP_PKEY_CTX *src));
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_set_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                               void (*cleanup) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx));
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_set_paramgen(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                                int (*paramgen_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx),
+                                int (*paramgen) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                                 EVP_PKEY *pkey));
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_set_keygen(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                              int (*keygen_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx),
+                              int (*keygen) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                             EVP_PKEY *pkey));
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_set_sign(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                            int (*sign_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx),
+                            int (*sign) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                         unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen,
+                                         const unsigned char *tbs,
+                                         size_t tbslen));
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_set_verify(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                              int (*verify_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx),
+                              int (*verify) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                             const unsigned char *sig,
+                                             size_t siglen,
+                                             const unsigned char *tbs,
+                                             size_t tbslen));
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_set_verify_recover(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                                      int (*verify_recover_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX
+                                                                  *ctx),
+                                      int (*verify_recover) (EVP_PKEY_CTX
+                                                             *ctx,
+                                                             unsigned char
+                                                             *sig,
+                                                             size_t *siglen,
+                                                             const unsigned
+                                                             char *tbs,
+                                                             size_t tbslen));
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_set_signctx(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                               int (*signctx_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                                    EVP_MD_CTX *mctx),
+                               int (*signctx) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                               unsigned char *sig,
+                                               size_t *siglen,
+                                               EVP_MD_CTX *mctx));
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_set_verifyctx(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                                 int (*verifyctx_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                                        EVP_MD_CTX *mctx),
+                                 int (*verifyctx) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                                   const unsigned char *sig,
+                                                   int siglen,
+                                                   EVP_MD_CTX *mctx));
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_set_encrypt(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                               int (*encrypt_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx),
+                               int (*encryptfn) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                                 unsigned char *out,
+                                                 size_t *outlen,
+                                                 const unsigned char *in,
+                                                 size_t inlen));
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_set_decrypt(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                               int (*decrypt_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx),
+                               int (*decrypt) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                               unsigned char *out,
+                                               size_t *outlen,
+                                               const unsigned char *in,
+                                               size_t inlen));
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_set_derive(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                              int (*derive_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx),
+                              int (*derive) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                             unsigned char *key,
+                                             size_t *keylen));
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_set_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                            int (*ctrl) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1,
+                                         void *p2),
+                            int (*ctrl_str) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                             const char *type,
+                                             const char *value));
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_init(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                            int (**pinit) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx));
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_copy(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                            int (**pcopy) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *dst,
+                                           EVP_PKEY_CTX *src));
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                               void (**pcleanup) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx));
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_paramgen(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                                int (**pparamgen_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx),
+                                int (**pparamgen) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                                   EVP_PKEY *pkey));
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_keygen(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                              int (**pkeygen_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx),
+                              int (**pkeygen) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                               EVP_PKEY *pkey));
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_sign(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                            int (**psign_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx),
+                            int (**psign) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                           unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen,
+                                           const unsigned char *tbs,
+                                           size_t tbslen));
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_verify(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                              int (**pverify_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx),
+                              int (**pverify) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                               const unsigned char *sig,
+                                               size_t siglen,
+                                               const unsigned char *tbs,
+                                               size_t tbslen));
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_verify_recover(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                                      int (**pverify_recover_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX
+                                                                    *ctx),
+                                      int (**pverify_recover) (EVP_PKEY_CTX
+                                                               *ctx,
+                                                               unsigned char
+                                                               *sig,
+                                                               size_t *siglen,
+                                                               const unsigned
+                                                               char *tbs,
+                                                               size_t tbslen));
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_signctx(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                               int (**psignctx_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                                      EVP_MD_CTX *mctx),
+                               int (**psignctx) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                                 unsigned char *sig,
+                                                 size_t *siglen,
+                                                 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx));
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_verifyctx(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                                 int (**pverifyctx_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                                          EVP_MD_CTX *mctx),
+                                 int (**pverifyctx) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                                     const unsigned char *sig,
+                                                     int siglen,
+                                                     EVP_MD_CTX *mctx));
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_encrypt(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                               int (**pencrypt_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx),
+                               int (**pencryptfn) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                                   unsigned char *out,
+                                                   size_t *outlen,
+                                                   const unsigned char *in,
+                                                   size_t inlen));
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_decrypt(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                               int (**pdecrypt_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx),
+                               int (**pdecrypt) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                                 unsigned char *out,
+                                                 size_t *outlen,
+                                                 const unsigned char *in,
+                                                 size_t inlen));
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_derive(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                              int (**pderive_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx),
+                              int (**pderive) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                               unsigned char *key,
+                                               size_t *keylen));
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                            int (**pctrl) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1,
+                                           void *p2),
+                            int (**pctrl_str) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                               const char *type,
+                                               const char *value));
+
+void EVP_add_alg_module(void);
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+/*
+ * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
+ * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
+ */
+
+int ERR_load_EVP_strings(void);
+
+/* Error codes for the EVP functions. */
+
+/* Function codes. */
+# define EVP_F_AESNI_INIT_KEY                             165
+# define EVP_F_AES_INIT_KEY                               133
+# define EVP_F_AES_OCB_CIPHER                             169
+# define EVP_F_AES_T4_INIT_KEY                            178
+# define EVP_F_AES_WRAP_CIPHER                            170
+# define EVP_F_ALG_MODULE_INIT                            177
+# define EVP_F_CAMELLIA_INIT_KEY                          159
+# define EVP_F_CHACHA20_POLY1305_CTRL                     182
+# define EVP_F_CMLL_T4_INIT_KEY                           179
+# define EVP_F_DES_EDE3_WRAP_CIPHER                       171
+# define EVP_F_DO_SIGVER_INIT                             161
+# define EVP_F_EVP_CIPHERINIT_EX                          123
+# define EVP_F_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_COPY                        163
+# define EVP_F_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_CTRL                        124
+# define EVP_F_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_SET_KEY_LENGTH              122
+# define EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTFINAL_EX                        101
+# define EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTUPDATE                          166
+# define EVP_F_EVP_DIGESTINIT_EX                          128
+# define EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTFINAL_EX                        127
+# define EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTUPDATE                          167
+# define EVP_F_EVP_MD_CTX_COPY_EX                         110
+# define EVP_F_EVP_MD_SIZE                                162
+# define EVP_F_EVP_OPENINIT                               102
+# define EVP_F_EVP_PBE_ALG_ADD                            115
+# define EVP_F_EVP_PBE_ALG_ADD_TYPE                       160
+# define EVP_F_EVP_PBE_CIPHERINIT                         116
+# define EVP_F_EVP_PBE_SCRYPT                             181
+# define EVP_F_EVP_PKCS82PKEY                             111
+# define EVP_F_EVP_PKEY2PKCS8                             113
+# define EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_ASN1_ADD0                         168
+# define EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_COPY_PARAMETERS                   103
+# define EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_CTX_CTRL                          137
+# define EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_CTX_CTRL_STR                      150
+# define EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_CTX_DUP                           156
+# define EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_DECRYPT                           104
+# define EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_DECRYPT_INIT                      138
+# define EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_DECRYPT_OLD                       151
+# define EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_DERIVE                            153
+# define EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_DERIVE_INIT                       154
+# define EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_DERIVE_SET_PEER                   155
+# define EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_ENCRYPT                           105
+# define EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_ENCRYPT_INIT                      139
+# define EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_ENCRYPT_OLD                       152
+# define EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_GET0_DH                           119
+# define EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_GET0_DSA                          120
+# define EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_GET0_EC_KEY                       131
+# define EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_GET0_HMAC                         183
+# define EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_GET0_RSA                          121
+# define EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_KEYGEN                            146
+# define EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_KEYGEN_INIT                       147
+# define EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_NEW                               106
+# define EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_PARAMGEN                          148
+# define EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_PARAMGEN_INIT                     149
+# define EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_SET1_ENGINE                       187
+# define EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_SIGN                              140
+# define EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_SIGN_INIT                         141
+# define EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_VERIFY                            142
+# define EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_VERIFY_INIT                       143
+# define EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_VERIFY_RECOVER                    144
+# define EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_VERIFY_RECOVER_INIT               145
+# define EVP_F_EVP_SIGNFINAL                              107
+# define EVP_F_EVP_VERIFYFINAL                            108
+# define EVP_F_INT_CTX_NEW                                157
+# define EVP_F_PKCS5_PBE_KEYIVGEN                         117
+# define EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBE_KEYIVGEN                      118
+# define EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBKDF2_KEYIVGEN                   164
+# define EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_SCRYPT_KEYIVGEN                   180
+# define EVP_F_PKEY_SET_TYPE                              158
+# define EVP_F_RC2_MAGIC_TO_METH                          109
+# define EVP_F_RC5_CTRL                                   125
+
+/* Reason codes. */
+# define EVP_R_AES_KEY_SETUP_FAILED                       143
+# define EVP_R_BAD_DECRYPT                                100
+# define EVP_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL                           155
+# define EVP_R_CAMELLIA_KEY_SETUP_FAILED                  157
+# define EVP_R_CIPHER_PARAMETER_ERROR                     122
+# define EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED                      147
+# define EVP_R_COPY_ERROR                                 173
+# define EVP_R_CTRL_NOT_IMPLEMENTED                       132
+# define EVP_R_CTRL_OPERATION_NOT_IMPLEMENTED             133
+# define EVP_R_DATA_NOT_MULTIPLE_OF_BLOCK_LENGTH          138
+# define EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR                               114
+# define EVP_R_DIFFERENT_KEY_TYPES                        101
+# define EVP_R_DIFFERENT_PARAMETERS                       153
+# define EVP_R_ERROR_LOADING_SECTION                      165
+# define EVP_R_ERROR_SETTING_FIPS_MODE                    166
+# define EVP_R_EXPECTING_AN_HMAC_KEY                      174
+# define EVP_R_EXPECTING_AN_RSA_KEY                       127
+# define EVP_R_EXPECTING_A_DH_KEY                         128
+# define EVP_R_EXPECTING_A_DSA_KEY                        129
+# define EVP_R_EXPECTING_A_EC_KEY                         142
+# define EVP_R_FIPS_MODE_NOT_SUPPORTED                    167
+# define EVP_R_ILLEGAL_SCRYPT_PARAMETERS                  171
+# define EVP_R_INITIALIZATION_ERROR                       134
+# define EVP_R_INPUT_NOT_INITIALIZED                      111
+# define EVP_R_INVALID_DIGEST                             152
+# define EVP_R_INVALID_FIPS_MODE                          168
+# define EVP_R_INVALID_KEY                                163
+# define EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH                         130
+# define EVP_R_INVALID_OPERATION                          148
+# define EVP_R_KEYGEN_FAILURE                             120
+# define EVP_R_MEMORY_LIMIT_EXCEEDED                      172
+# define EVP_R_MESSAGE_DIGEST_IS_NULL                     159
+# define EVP_R_METHOD_NOT_SUPPORTED                       144
+# define EVP_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS                         103
+# define EVP_R_NO_CIPHER_SET                              131
+# define EVP_R_NO_DEFAULT_DIGEST                          158
+# define EVP_R_NO_DIGEST_SET                              139
+# define EVP_R_NO_KEY_SET                                 154
+# define EVP_R_NO_OPERATION_SET                           149
+# define EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE   150
+# define EVP_R_OPERATON_NOT_INITIALIZED                   151
+# define EVP_R_PARTIALLY_OVERLAPPING                      162
+# define EVP_R_PKEY_APPLICATION_ASN1_METHOD_ALREADY_REGISTERED 175
+# define EVP_R_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD_ALREADY_REGISTERED        164
+# define EVP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DECODE_ERROR                   145
+# define EVP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_ENCODE_ERROR                   146
+# define EVP_R_PUBLIC_KEY_NOT_RSA                         106
+# define EVP_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER                             160
+# define EVP_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST                             161
+# define EVP_R_UNKNOWN_OPTION                             169
+# define EVP_R_UNKNOWN_PBE_ALGORITHM                      121
+# define EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM                      156
+# define EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER                         107
+# define EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEYLENGTH                      123
+# define EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_DERIVATION_FUNCTION        124
+# define EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE                       108
+# define EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_NUMBER_OF_ROUNDS               135
+# define EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_PRF                            125
+# define EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_PRIVATE_KEY_ALGORITHM          118
+# define EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_SALT_TYPE                      126
+# define EVP_R_WRAP_MODE_NOT_ALLOWED                      170
+# define EVP_R_WRONG_FINAL_BLOCK_LENGTH                   109
+
+# ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+# endif
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/hmac.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/hmac.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9f06896
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/hmac.h
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_HMAC_H
+# define HEADER_HMAC_H
+
+# include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+
+# include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+# define HMAC_MAX_MD_CBLOCK      128/* largest known is SHA512 */
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+size_t HMAC_size(const HMAC_CTX *e);
+HMAC_CTX *HMAC_CTX_new(void);
+int HMAC_CTX_reset(HMAC_CTX *ctx);
+void HMAC_CTX_free(HMAC_CTX *ctx);
+
+DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(__owur int HMAC_Init(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const void *key, int len,
+                     const EVP_MD *md))
+
+/*__owur*/ int HMAC_Init_ex(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const void *key, int len,
+                            const EVP_MD *md, ENGINE *impl);
+/*__owur*/ int HMAC_Update(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *data,
+                           size_t len);
+/*__owur*/ int HMAC_Final(HMAC_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md,
+                          unsigned int *len);
+unsigned char *HMAC(const EVP_MD *evp_md, const void *key, int key_len,
+                    const unsigned char *d, size_t n, unsigned char *md,
+                    unsigned int *md_len);
+__owur int HMAC_CTX_copy(HMAC_CTX *dctx, HMAC_CTX *sctx);
+
+void HMAC_CTX_set_flags(HMAC_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags);
+const EVP_MD *HMAC_CTX_get_md(const HMAC_CTX *ctx);
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/idea.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/idea.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4334f3e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/idea.h
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_IDEA_H
+# define HEADER_IDEA_H
+
+# include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_IDEA
+# ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+# endif
+
+typedef unsigned int IDEA_INT;
+
+# define IDEA_ENCRYPT    1
+# define IDEA_DECRYPT    0
+
+# define IDEA_BLOCK      8
+# define IDEA_KEY_LENGTH 16
+
+typedef struct idea_key_st {
+    IDEA_INT data[9][6];
+} IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE;
+
+const char *IDEA_options(void);
+void IDEA_ecb_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                      IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE *ks);
+void IDEA_set_encrypt_key(const unsigned char *key, IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE *ks);
+void IDEA_set_decrypt_key(IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE *ek, IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE *dk);
+void IDEA_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                      long length, IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE *ks, unsigned char *iv,
+                      int enc);
+void IDEA_cfb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                        long length, IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE *ks, unsigned char *iv,
+                        int *num, int enc);
+void IDEA_ofb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                        long length, IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE *ks, unsigned char *iv,
+                        int *num);
+void IDEA_encrypt(unsigned long *in, IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE *ks);
+
+# if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+#  define idea_options          IDEA_options
+#  define idea_ecb_encrypt      IDEA_ecb_encrypt
+#  define idea_set_encrypt_key  IDEA_set_encrypt_key
+#  define idea_set_decrypt_key  IDEA_set_decrypt_key
+#  define idea_cbc_encrypt      IDEA_cbc_encrypt
+#  define idea_cfb64_encrypt    IDEA_cfb64_encrypt
+#  define idea_ofb64_encrypt    IDEA_ofb64_encrypt
+#  define idea_encrypt          IDEA_encrypt
+# endif
+
+# ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+# endif
+# endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/kdf.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/kdf.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9f87f78
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/kdf.h
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_KDF_H
+# define HEADER_KDF_H
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_TLS_MD       (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL)
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_TLS_SECRET   (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 1)
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_TLS_SEED     (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 2)
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_HKDF_MD      (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 3)
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_HKDF_SALT    (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 4)
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_HKDF_KEY     (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 5)
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_HKDF_INFO    (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 6)
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_tls1_prf_md(pctx, md) \
+            EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE, \
+                              EVP_PKEY_CTRL_TLS_MD, 0, (void *)md)
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_tls1_prf_secret(pctx, sec, seclen) \
+            EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE, \
+                              EVP_PKEY_CTRL_TLS_SECRET, seclen, (void *)sec)
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_tls1_prf_seed(pctx, seed, seedlen) \
+            EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE, \
+                              EVP_PKEY_CTRL_TLS_SEED, seedlen, (void *)seed)
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_hkdf_md(pctx, md) \
+            EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE, \
+                              EVP_PKEY_CTRL_HKDF_MD, 0, (void *)md)
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_hkdf_salt(pctx, salt, saltlen) \
+            EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE, \
+                              EVP_PKEY_CTRL_HKDF_SALT, saltlen, (void *)salt)
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_hkdf_key(pctx, key, keylen) \
+            EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE, \
+                              EVP_PKEY_CTRL_HKDF_KEY, keylen, (void *)key)
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_hkdf_info(pctx, info, infolen) \
+            EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE, \
+                              EVP_PKEY_CTRL_HKDF_INFO, infolen, (void *)info)
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+/*
+ * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
+ * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
+ */
+
+int ERR_load_KDF_strings(void);
+
+/* Error codes for the KDF functions. */
+
+/* Function codes. */
+# define KDF_F_PKEY_TLS1_PRF_CTRL_STR                     100
+# define KDF_F_PKEY_TLS1_PRF_DERIVE                       101
+
+/* Reason codes. */
+# define KDF_R_INVALID_DIGEST                             100
+# define KDF_R_MISSING_PARAMETER                          101
+# define KDF_R_VALUE_MISSING                              102
+
+# ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+# endif
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/lhash.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/lhash.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..82d40c1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/lhash.h
@@ -0,0 +1,217 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Header for dynamic hash table routines Author - Eric Young
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_LHASH_H
+# define HEADER_LHASH_H
+
+# include <openssl/e_os2.h>
+# include <openssl/bio.h>
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+typedef struct lhash_node_st OPENSSL_LH_NODE;
+typedef int (*OPENSSL_LH_COMPFUNC) (const void *, const void *);
+typedef unsigned long (*OPENSSL_LH_HASHFUNC) (const void *);
+typedef void (*OPENSSL_LH_DOALL_FUNC) (void *);
+typedef void (*OPENSSL_LH_DOALL_FUNCARG) (void *, void *);
+typedef struct lhash_st OPENSSL_LHASH;
+
+/*
+ * Macros for declaring and implementing type-safe wrappers for LHASH
+ * callbacks. This way, callbacks can be provided to LHASH structures without
+ * function pointer casting and the macro-defined callbacks provide
+ * per-variable casting before deferring to the underlying type-specific
+ * callbacks. NB: It is possible to place a "static" in front of both the
+ * DECLARE and IMPLEMENT macros if the functions are strictly internal.
+ */
+
+/* First: "hash" functions */
+# define DECLARE_LHASH_HASH_FN(name, o_type) \
+        unsigned long name##_LHASH_HASH(const void *);
+# define IMPLEMENT_LHASH_HASH_FN(name, o_type) \
+        unsigned long name##_LHASH_HASH(const void *arg) { \
+                const o_type *a = arg; \
+                return name##_hash(a); }
+# define LHASH_HASH_FN(name) name##_LHASH_HASH
+
+/* Second: "compare" functions */
+# define DECLARE_LHASH_COMP_FN(name, o_type) \
+        int name##_LHASH_COMP(const void *, const void *);
+# define IMPLEMENT_LHASH_COMP_FN(name, o_type) \
+        int name##_LHASH_COMP(const void *arg1, const void *arg2) { \
+                const o_type *a = arg1;             \
+                const o_type *b = arg2; \
+                return name##_cmp(a,b); }
+# define LHASH_COMP_FN(name) name##_LHASH_COMP
+
+/* Fourth: "doall_arg" functions */
+# define DECLARE_LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN(name, o_type, a_type) \
+        void name##_LHASH_DOALL_ARG(void *, void *);
+# define IMPLEMENT_LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN(name, o_type, a_type) \
+        void name##_LHASH_DOALL_ARG(void *arg1, void *arg2) { \
+                o_type *a = arg1; \
+                a_type *b = arg2; \
+                name##_doall_arg(a, b); }
+# define LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN(name) name##_LHASH_DOALL_ARG
+
+
+# define LH_LOAD_MULT    256
+
+int OPENSSL_LH_error(OPENSSL_LHASH *lh);
+OPENSSL_LHASH *OPENSSL_LH_new(OPENSSL_LH_HASHFUNC h, OPENSSL_LH_COMPFUNC c);
+void OPENSSL_LH_free(OPENSSL_LHASH *lh);
+void *OPENSSL_LH_insert(OPENSSL_LHASH *lh, void *data);
+void *OPENSSL_LH_delete(OPENSSL_LHASH *lh, const void *data);
+void *OPENSSL_LH_retrieve(OPENSSL_LHASH *lh, const void *data);
+void OPENSSL_LH_doall(OPENSSL_LHASH *lh, OPENSSL_LH_DOALL_FUNC func);
+void OPENSSL_LH_doall_arg(OPENSSL_LHASH *lh, OPENSSL_LH_DOALL_FUNCARG func, void *arg);
+unsigned long OPENSSL_LH_strhash(const char *c);
+unsigned long OPENSSL_LH_num_items(const OPENSSL_LHASH *lh);
+unsigned long OPENSSL_LH_get_down_load(const OPENSSL_LHASH *lh);
+void OPENSSL_LH_set_down_load(OPENSSL_LHASH *lh, unsigned long down_load);
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+void OPENSSL_LH_stats(const OPENSSL_LHASH *lh, FILE *fp);
+void OPENSSL_LH_node_stats(const OPENSSL_LHASH *lh, FILE *fp);
+void OPENSSL_LH_node_usage_stats(const OPENSSL_LHASH *lh, FILE *fp);
+# endif
+void OPENSSL_LH_stats_bio(const OPENSSL_LHASH *lh, BIO *out);
+void OPENSSL_LH_node_stats_bio(const OPENSSL_LHASH *lh, BIO *out);
+void OPENSSL_LH_node_usage_stats_bio(const OPENSSL_LHASH *lh, BIO *out);
+
+# if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+#  define _LHASH OPENSSL_LHASH
+#  define LHASH_NODE OPENSSL_LH_NODE
+#  define lh_error OPENSSL_LH_error
+#  define lh_new OPENSSL_lh_new
+#  define lh_free OPENSSL_LH_free
+#  define lh_insert OPENSSL_LH_insert
+#  define lh_delete OPENSSL_LH_delete
+#  define lh_retrieve OPENSSL_LH_retrieve
+#  define lh_doall OPENSSL_LH_doall
+#  define lh_doall_arg OPENSSL_LH_doall_arg
+#  define lh_strhash OPENSSL_LH_strhash
+#  define lh_num_items OPENSSL_LH_num_items
+#  ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+#   define lh_stats OPENSSL_LH_stats
+#   define lh_node_stats OPENSSL_LH_node_stats
+#   define lh_node_usage_stats OPENSSL_LH_node_usage_stats
+#  endif
+#  define lh_stats_bio OPENSSL_LH_stats_bio
+#  define lh_node_stats_bio OPENSSL_LH_node_stats_bio
+#  define lh_node_usage_stats_bio OPENSSL_LH_node_usage_stats_bio
+# endif
+
+/* Type checking... */
+
+# define LHASH_OF(type) struct lhash_st_##type
+
+# define DEFINE_LHASH_OF(type) \
+    LHASH_OF(type) { union lh_##type##_dummy { void* d1; unsigned long d2; int d3; } dummy; }; \
+    static ossl_inline LHASH_OF(type) * \
+        lh_##type##_new(unsigned long (*hfn)(const type *), \
+                        int (*cfn)(const type *, const type *)) \
+    { \
+        return (LHASH_OF(type) *) \
+            OPENSSL_LH_new((OPENSSL_LH_HASHFUNC)hfn, (OPENSSL_LH_COMPFUNC)cfn); \
+    } \
+    static ossl_inline void lh_##type##_free(LHASH_OF(type) *lh) \
+    { \
+        OPENSSL_LH_free((OPENSSL_LHASH *)lh); \
+    } \
+    static ossl_inline type *lh_##type##_insert(LHASH_OF(type) *lh, type *d) \
+    { \
+        return (type *)OPENSSL_LH_insert((OPENSSL_LHASH *)lh, d); \
+    } \
+    static ossl_inline type *lh_##type##_delete(LHASH_OF(type) *lh, const type *d) \
+    { \
+        return (type *)OPENSSL_LH_delete((OPENSSL_LHASH *)lh, d); \
+    } \
+    static ossl_inline type *lh_##type##_retrieve(LHASH_OF(type) *lh, const type *d) \
+    { \
+        return (type *)OPENSSL_LH_retrieve((OPENSSL_LHASH *)lh, d); \
+    } \
+    static ossl_inline int lh_##type##_error(LHASH_OF(type) *lh) \
+    { \
+        return OPENSSL_LH_error((OPENSSL_LHASH *)lh); \
+    } \
+    static ossl_inline unsigned long lh_##type##_num_items(LHASH_OF(type) *lh) \
+    { \
+        return OPENSSL_LH_num_items((OPENSSL_LHASH *)lh); \
+    } \
+    static ossl_inline void lh_##type##_node_stats_bio(const LHASH_OF(type) *lh, BIO *out) \
+    { \
+        OPENSSL_LH_node_stats_bio((const OPENSSL_LHASH *)lh, out); \
+    } \
+    static ossl_inline void lh_##type##_node_usage_stats_bio(const LHASH_OF(type) *lh, BIO *out) \
+    { \
+        OPENSSL_LH_node_usage_stats_bio((const OPENSSL_LHASH *)lh, out); \
+    } \
+    static ossl_inline void lh_##type##_stats_bio(const LHASH_OF(type) *lh, BIO *out) \
+    { \
+        OPENSSL_LH_stats_bio((const OPENSSL_LHASH *)lh, out); \
+    } \
+    static ossl_inline unsigned long lh_##type##_get_down_load(LHASH_OF(type) *lh) \
+    { \
+        return OPENSSL_LH_get_down_load((OPENSSL_LHASH *)lh); \
+    } \
+    static ossl_inline void lh_##type##_set_down_load(LHASH_OF(type) *lh, unsigned long dl) \
+    { \
+        OPENSSL_LH_set_down_load((OPENSSL_LHASH *)lh, dl); \
+    } \
+    static ossl_inline void lh_##type##_doall(LHASH_OF(type) *lh, \
+                                         void (*doall)(type *)) \
+    { \
+        OPENSSL_LH_doall((OPENSSL_LHASH *)lh, (OPENSSL_LH_DOALL_FUNC)doall); \
+    } \
+    LHASH_OF(type)
+
+#define IMPLEMENT_LHASH_DOALL_ARG_CONST(type, argtype) \
+    int_implement_lhash_doall(type, argtype, const type)
+
+#define IMPLEMENT_LHASH_DOALL_ARG(type, argtype) \
+    int_implement_lhash_doall(type, argtype, type)
+
+#define int_implement_lhash_doall(type, argtype, cbargtype) \
+    static ossl_inline void \
+        lh_##type##_doall_##argtype(LHASH_OF(type) *lh, \
+                                   void (*fn)(cbargtype *, argtype *), \
+                                   argtype *arg) \
+    { \
+        OPENSSL_LH_doall_arg((OPENSSL_LHASH *)lh, (OPENSSL_LH_DOALL_FUNCARG)fn, (void *)arg); \
+    } \
+    LHASH_OF(type)
+
+DEFINE_LHASH_OF(OPENSSL_STRING);
+# ifdef _MSC_VER
+/*
+ * push and pop this warning:
+ *   warning C4090: 'function': different 'const' qualifiers
+ */
+#  pragma warning (push)
+#  pragma warning (disable: 4090)
+# endif
+
+DEFINE_LHASH_OF(OPENSSL_CSTRING);
+
+# ifdef _MSC_VER
+#  pragma warning (pop)
+# endif
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/md2.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/md2.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7faf8e3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/md2.h
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_MD2_H
+# define HEADER_MD2_H
+
+# include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD2
+# include <stddef.h>
+# ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+# endif
+
+typedef unsigned char MD2_INT;
+
+# define MD2_DIGEST_LENGTH       16
+# define MD2_BLOCK               16
+
+typedef struct MD2state_st {
+    unsigned int num;
+    unsigned char data[MD2_BLOCK];
+    MD2_INT cksm[MD2_BLOCK];
+    MD2_INT state[MD2_BLOCK];
+} MD2_CTX;
+
+const char *MD2_options(void);
+int MD2_Init(MD2_CTX *c);
+int MD2_Update(MD2_CTX *c, const unsigned char *data, size_t len);
+int MD2_Final(unsigned char *md, MD2_CTX *c);
+unsigned char *MD2(const unsigned char *d, size_t n, unsigned char *md);
+
+# ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+# endif
+# endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/md4.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/md4.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..940e29d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/md4.h
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_MD4_H
+# define HEADER_MD4_H
+
+# include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD4
+# include <openssl/e_os2.h>
+# include <stddef.h>
+# ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+# endif
+
+/*-
+ * !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
+ * ! MD4_LONG has to be at least 32 bits wide.                     !
+ * !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
+ */
+# define MD4_LONG unsigned int
+
+# define MD4_CBLOCK      64
+# define MD4_LBLOCK      (MD4_CBLOCK/4)
+# define MD4_DIGEST_LENGTH 16
+
+typedef struct MD4state_st {
+    MD4_LONG A, B, C, D;
+    MD4_LONG Nl, Nh;
+    MD4_LONG data[MD4_LBLOCK];
+    unsigned int num;
+} MD4_CTX;
+
+int MD4_Init(MD4_CTX *c);
+int MD4_Update(MD4_CTX *c, const void *data, size_t len);
+int MD4_Final(unsigned char *md, MD4_CTX *c);
+unsigned char *MD4(const unsigned char *d, size_t n, unsigned char *md);
+void MD4_Transform(MD4_CTX *c, const unsigned char *b);
+
+# ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+# endif
+# endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/md5.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/md5.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2deb772
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/md5.h
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_MD5_H
+# define HEADER_MD5_H
+
+# include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+# include <openssl/e_os2.h>
+# include <stddef.h>
+# ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+# endif
+
+/*
+ * !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
+ * ! MD5_LONG has to be at least 32 bits wide.                     !
+ * !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
+ */
+# define MD5_LONG unsigned int
+
+# define MD5_CBLOCK      64
+# define MD5_LBLOCK      (MD5_CBLOCK/4)
+# define MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH 16
+
+typedef struct MD5state_st {
+    MD5_LONG A, B, C, D;
+    MD5_LONG Nl, Nh;
+    MD5_LONG data[MD5_LBLOCK];
+    unsigned int num;
+} MD5_CTX;
+
+int MD5_Init(MD5_CTX *c);
+int MD5_Update(MD5_CTX *c, const void *data, size_t len);
+int MD5_Final(unsigned char *md, MD5_CTX *c);
+unsigned char *MD5(const unsigned char *d, size_t n, unsigned char *md);
+void MD5_Transform(MD5_CTX *c, const unsigned char *b);
+# ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+# endif
+# endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/mdc2.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/mdc2.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..aabd2bf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/mdc2.h
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_MDC2_H
+# define HEADER_MDC2_H
+
+# include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MDC2
+# include <stdlib.h>
+# include <openssl/des.h>
+# ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+# endif
+
+# define MDC2_BLOCK              8
+# define MDC2_DIGEST_LENGTH      16
+
+typedef struct mdc2_ctx_st {
+    unsigned int num;
+    unsigned char data[MDC2_BLOCK];
+    DES_cblock h, hh;
+    int pad_type;               /* either 1 or 2, default 1 */
+} MDC2_CTX;
+
+int MDC2_Init(MDC2_CTX *c);
+int MDC2_Update(MDC2_CTX *c, const unsigned char *data, size_t len);
+int MDC2_Final(unsigned char *md, MDC2_CTX *c);
+unsigned char *MDC2(const unsigned char *d, size_t n, unsigned char *md);
+
+# ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+# endif
+# endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/modes.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/modes.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a04c6a5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/modes.h
@@ -0,0 +1,203 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+typedef void (*block128_f) (const unsigned char in[16],
+                            unsigned char out[16], const void *key);
+
+typedef void (*cbc128_f) (const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                          size_t len, const void *key,
+                          unsigned char ivec[16], int enc);
+
+typedef void (*ctr128_f) (const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                          size_t blocks, const void *key,
+                          const unsigned char ivec[16]);
+
+typedef void (*ccm128_f) (const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                          size_t blocks, const void *key,
+                          const unsigned char ivec[16],
+                          unsigned char cmac[16]);
+
+void CRYPTO_cbc128_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                           size_t len, const void *key,
+                           unsigned char ivec[16], block128_f block);
+void CRYPTO_cbc128_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                           size_t len, const void *key,
+                           unsigned char ivec[16], block128_f block);
+
+void CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                           size_t len, const void *key,
+                           unsigned char ivec[16],
+                           unsigned char ecount_buf[16], unsigned int *num,
+                           block128_f block);
+
+void CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt_ctr32(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                                 size_t len, const void *key,
+                                 unsigned char ivec[16],
+                                 unsigned char ecount_buf[16],
+                                 unsigned int *num, ctr128_f ctr);
+
+void CRYPTO_ofb128_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                           size_t len, const void *key,
+                           unsigned char ivec[16], int *num,
+                           block128_f block);
+
+void CRYPTO_cfb128_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                           size_t len, const void *key,
+                           unsigned char ivec[16], int *num,
+                           int enc, block128_f block);
+void CRYPTO_cfb128_8_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                             size_t length, const void *key,
+                             unsigned char ivec[16], int *num,
+                             int enc, block128_f block);
+void CRYPTO_cfb128_1_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                             size_t bits, const void *key,
+                             unsigned char ivec[16], int *num,
+                             int enc, block128_f block);
+
+size_t CRYPTO_cts128_encrypt_block(const unsigned char *in,
+                                   unsigned char *out, size_t len,
+                                   const void *key, unsigned char ivec[16],
+                                   block128_f block);
+size_t CRYPTO_cts128_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                             size_t len, const void *key,
+                             unsigned char ivec[16], cbc128_f cbc);
+size_t CRYPTO_cts128_decrypt_block(const unsigned char *in,
+                                   unsigned char *out, size_t len,
+                                   const void *key, unsigned char ivec[16],
+                                   block128_f block);
+size_t CRYPTO_cts128_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                             size_t len, const void *key,
+                             unsigned char ivec[16], cbc128_f cbc);
+
+size_t CRYPTO_nistcts128_encrypt_block(const unsigned char *in,
+                                       unsigned char *out, size_t len,
+                                       const void *key,
+                                       unsigned char ivec[16],
+                                       block128_f block);
+size_t CRYPTO_nistcts128_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                                 size_t len, const void *key,
+                                 unsigned char ivec[16], cbc128_f cbc);
+size_t CRYPTO_nistcts128_decrypt_block(const unsigned char *in,
+                                       unsigned char *out, size_t len,
+                                       const void *key,
+                                       unsigned char ivec[16],
+                                       block128_f block);
+size_t CRYPTO_nistcts128_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                                 size_t len, const void *key,
+                                 unsigned char ivec[16], cbc128_f cbc);
+
+typedef struct gcm128_context GCM128_CONTEXT;
+
+GCM128_CONTEXT *CRYPTO_gcm128_new(void *key, block128_f block);
+void CRYPTO_gcm128_init(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx, void *key, block128_f block);
+void CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx, const unsigned char *iv,
+                         size_t len);
+int CRYPTO_gcm128_aad(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx, const unsigned char *aad,
+                      size_t len);
+int CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
+                          const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                          size_t len);
+int CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
+                          const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                          size_t len);
+int CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt_ctr32(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
+                                const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                                size_t len, ctr128_f stream);
+int CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt_ctr32(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
+                                const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                                size_t len, ctr128_f stream);
+int CRYPTO_gcm128_finish(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx, const unsigned char *tag,
+                         size_t len);
+void CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx, unsigned char *tag, size_t len);
+void CRYPTO_gcm128_release(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx);
+
+typedef struct ccm128_context CCM128_CONTEXT;
+
+void CRYPTO_ccm128_init(CCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
+                        unsigned int M, unsigned int L, void *key,
+                        block128_f block);
+int CRYPTO_ccm128_setiv(CCM128_CONTEXT *ctx, const unsigned char *nonce,
+                        size_t nlen, size_t mlen);
+void CRYPTO_ccm128_aad(CCM128_CONTEXT *ctx, const unsigned char *aad,
+                       size_t alen);
+int CRYPTO_ccm128_encrypt(CCM128_CONTEXT *ctx, const unsigned char *inp,
+                          unsigned char *out, size_t len);
+int CRYPTO_ccm128_decrypt(CCM128_CONTEXT *ctx, const unsigned char *inp,
+                          unsigned char *out, size_t len);
+int CRYPTO_ccm128_encrypt_ccm64(CCM128_CONTEXT *ctx, const unsigned char *inp,
+                                unsigned char *out, size_t len,
+                                ccm128_f stream);
+int CRYPTO_ccm128_decrypt_ccm64(CCM128_CONTEXT *ctx, const unsigned char *inp,
+                                unsigned char *out, size_t len,
+                                ccm128_f stream);
+size_t CRYPTO_ccm128_tag(CCM128_CONTEXT *ctx, unsigned char *tag, size_t len);
+
+typedef struct xts128_context XTS128_CONTEXT;
+
+int CRYPTO_xts128_encrypt(const XTS128_CONTEXT *ctx,
+                          const unsigned char iv[16],
+                          const unsigned char *inp, unsigned char *out,
+                          size_t len, int enc);
+
+size_t CRYPTO_128_wrap(void *key, const unsigned char *iv,
+                       unsigned char *out,
+                       const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen,
+                       block128_f block);
+
+size_t CRYPTO_128_unwrap(void *key, const unsigned char *iv,
+                         unsigned char *out,
+                         const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen,
+                         block128_f block);
+size_t CRYPTO_128_wrap_pad(void *key, const unsigned char *icv,
+                           unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+                           size_t inlen, block128_f block);
+size_t CRYPTO_128_unwrap_pad(void *key, const unsigned char *icv,
+                             unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+                             size_t inlen, block128_f block);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCB
+typedef struct ocb128_context OCB128_CONTEXT;
+
+typedef void (*ocb128_f) (const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                          size_t blocks, const void *key,
+                          size_t start_block_num,
+                          unsigned char offset_i[16],
+                          const unsigned char L_[][16],
+                          unsigned char checksum[16]);
+
+OCB128_CONTEXT *CRYPTO_ocb128_new(void *keyenc, void *keydec,
+                                  block128_f encrypt, block128_f decrypt,
+                                  ocb128_f stream);
+int CRYPTO_ocb128_init(OCB128_CONTEXT *ctx, void *keyenc, void *keydec,
+                       block128_f encrypt, block128_f decrypt,
+                       ocb128_f stream);
+int CRYPTO_ocb128_copy_ctx(OCB128_CONTEXT *dest, OCB128_CONTEXT *src,
+                           void *keyenc, void *keydec);
+int CRYPTO_ocb128_setiv(OCB128_CONTEXT *ctx, const unsigned char *iv,
+                        size_t len, size_t taglen);
+int CRYPTO_ocb128_aad(OCB128_CONTEXT *ctx, const unsigned char *aad,
+                      size_t len);
+int CRYPTO_ocb128_encrypt(OCB128_CONTEXT *ctx, const unsigned char *in,
+                          unsigned char *out, size_t len);
+int CRYPTO_ocb128_decrypt(OCB128_CONTEXT *ctx, const unsigned char *in,
+                          unsigned char *out, size_t len);
+int CRYPTO_ocb128_finish(OCB128_CONTEXT *ctx, const unsigned char *tag,
+                         size_t len);
+int CRYPTO_ocb128_tag(OCB128_CONTEXT *ctx, unsigned char *tag, size_t len);
+void CRYPTO_ocb128_cleanup(OCB128_CONTEXT *ctx);
+#endif                          /* OPENSSL_NO_OCB */
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/obj_mac.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/obj_mac.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f97f3ea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/obj_mac.h
@@ -0,0 +1,4577 @@
+/*
+ * WARNING: do not edit!
+ * Generated by crypto/objects/objects.pl
+ *
+ * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#define SN_undef                        "UNDEF"
+#define LN_undef                        "undefined"
+#define NID_undef                       0
+#define OBJ_undef                       0L
+
+#define SN_itu_t                "ITU-T"
+#define LN_itu_t                "itu-t"
+#define NID_itu_t               645
+#define OBJ_itu_t               0L
+
+#define NID_ccitt               404
+#define OBJ_ccitt               OBJ_itu_t
+
+#define SN_iso          "ISO"
+#define LN_iso          "iso"
+#define NID_iso         181
+#define OBJ_iso         1L
+
+#define SN_joint_iso_itu_t              "JOINT-ISO-ITU-T"
+#define LN_joint_iso_itu_t              "joint-iso-itu-t"
+#define NID_joint_iso_itu_t             646
+#define OBJ_joint_iso_itu_t             2L
+
+#define NID_joint_iso_ccitt             393
+#define OBJ_joint_iso_ccitt             OBJ_joint_iso_itu_t
+
+#define SN_member_body          "member-body"
+#define LN_member_body          "ISO Member Body"
+#define NID_member_body         182
+#define OBJ_member_body         OBJ_iso,2L
+
+#define SN_identified_organization              "identified-organization"
+#define NID_identified_organization             676
+#define OBJ_identified_organization             OBJ_iso,3L
+
+#define SN_hmac_md5             "HMAC-MD5"
+#define LN_hmac_md5             "hmac-md5"
+#define NID_hmac_md5            780
+#define OBJ_hmac_md5            OBJ_identified_organization,6L,1L,5L,5L,8L,1L,1L
+
+#define SN_hmac_sha1            "HMAC-SHA1"
+#define LN_hmac_sha1            "hmac-sha1"
+#define NID_hmac_sha1           781
+#define OBJ_hmac_sha1           OBJ_identified_organization,6L,1L,5L,5L,8L,1L,2L
+
+#define SN_certicom_arc         "certicom-arc"
+#define NID_certicom_arc                677
+#define OBJ_certicom_arc                OBJ_identified_organization,132L
+
+#define SN_international_organizations          "international-organizations"
+#define LN_international_organizations          "International Organizations"
+#define NID_international_organizations         647
+#define OBJ_international_organizations         OBJ_joint_iso_itu_t,23L
+
+#define SN_wap          "wap"
+#define NID_wap         678
+#define OBJ_wap         OBJ_international_organizations,43L
+
+#define SN_wap_wsg              "wap-wsg"
+#define NID_wap_wsg             679
+#define OBJ_wap_wsg             OBJ_wap,1L
+
+#define SN_selected_attribute_types             "selected-attribute-types"
+#define LN_selected_attribute_types             "Selected Attribute Types"
+#define NID_selected_attribute_types            394
+#define OBJ_selected_attribute_types            OBJ_joint_iso_itu_t,5L,1L,5L
+
+#define SN_clearance            "clearance"
+#define NID_clearance           395
+#define OBJ_clearance           OBJ_selected_attribute_types,55L
+
+#define SN_ISO_US               "ISO-US"
+#define LN_ISO_US               "ISO US Member Body"
+#define NID_ISO_US              183
+#define OBJ_ISO_US              OBJ_member_body,840L
+
+#define SN_X9_57                "X9-57"
+#define LN_X9_57                "X9.57"
+#define NID_X9_57               184
+#define OBJ_X9_57               OBJ_ISO_US,10040L
+
+#define SN_X9cm         "X9cm"
+#define LN_X9cm         "X9.57 CM ?"
+#define NID_X9cm                185
+#define OBJ_X9cm                OBJ_X9_57,4L
+
+#define SN_dsa          "DSA"
+#define LN_dsa          "dsaEncryption"
+#define NID_dsa         116
+#define OBJ_dsa         OBJ_X9cm,1L
+
+#define SN_dsaWithSHA1          "DSA-SHA1"
+#define LN_dsaWithSHA1          "dsaWithSHA1"
+#define NID_dsaWithSHA1         113
+#define OBJ_dsaWithSHA1         OBJ_X9cm,3L
+
+#define SN_ansi_X9_62           "ansi-X9-62"
+#define LN_ansi_X9_62           "ANSI X9.62"
+#define NID_ansi_X9_62          405
+#define OBJ_ansi_X9_62          OBJ_ISO_US,10045L
+
+#define OBJ_X9_62_id_fieldType          OBJ_ansi_X9_62,1L
+
+#define SN_X9_62_prime_field            "prime-field"
+#define NID_X9_62_prime_field           406
+#define OBJ_X9_62_prime_field           OBJ_X9_62_id_fieldType,1L
+
+#define SN_X9_62_characteristic_two_field               "characteristic-two-field"
+#define NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field              407
+#define OBJ_X9_62_characteristic_two_field              OBJ_X9_62_id_fieldType,2L
+
+#define SN_X9_62_id_characteristic_two_basis            "id-characteristic-two-basis"
+#define NID_X9_62_id_characteristic_two_basis           680
+#define OBJ_X9_62_id_characteristic_two_basis           OBJ_X9_62_characteristic_two_field,3L
+
+#define SN_X9_62_onBasis                "onBasis"
+#define NID_X9_62_onBasis               681
+#define OBJ_X9_62_onBasis               OBJ_X9_62_id_characteristic_two_basis,1L
+
+#define SN_X9_62_tpBasis                "tpBasis"
+#define NID_X9_62_tpBasis               682
+#define OBJ_X9_62_tpBasis               OBJ_X9_62_id_characteristic_two_basis,2L
+
+#define SN_X9_62_ppBasis                "ppBasis"
+#define NID_X9_62_ppBasis               683
+#define OBJ_X9_62_ppBasis               OBJ_X9_62_id_characteristic_two_basis,3L
+
+#define OBJ_X9_62_id_publicKeyType              OBJ_ansi_X9_62,2L
+
+#define SN_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey         "id-ecPublicKey"
+#define NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey                408
+#define OBJ_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey                OBJ_X9_62_id_publicKeyType,1L
+
+#define OBJ_X9_62_ellipticCurve         OBJ_ansi_X9_62,3L
+
+#define OBJ_X9_62_c_TwoCurve            OBJ_X9_62_ellipticCurve,0L
+
+#define SN_X9_62_c2pnb163v1             "c2pnb163v1"
+#define NID_X9_62_c2pnb163v1            684
+#define OBJ_X9_62_c2pnb163v1            OBJ_X9_62_c_TwoCurve,1L
+
+#define SN_X9_62_c2pnb163v2             "c2pnb163v2"
+#define NID_X9_62_c2pnb163v2            685
+#define OBJ_X9_62_c2pnb163v2            OBJ_X9_62_c_TwoCurve,2L
+
+#define SN_X9_62_c2pnb163v3             "c2pnb163v3"
+#define NID_X9_62_c2pnb163v3            686
+#define OBJ_X9_62_c2pnb163v3            OBJ_X9_62_c_TwoCurve,3L
+
+#define SN_X9_62_c2pnb176v1             "c2pnb176v1"
+#define NID_X9_62_c2pnb176v1            687
+#define OBJ_X9_62_c2pnb176v1            OBJ_X9_62_c_TwoCurve,4L
+
+#define SN_X9_62_c2tnb191v1             "c2tnb191v1"
+#define NID_X9_62_c2tnb191v1            688
+#define OBJ_X9_62_c2tnb191v1            OBJ_X9_62_c_TwoCurve,5L
+
+#define SN_X9_62_c2tnb191v2             "c2tnb191v2"
+#define NID_X9_62_c2tnb191v2            689
+#define OBJ_X9_62_c2tnb191v2            OBJ_X9_62_c_TwoCurve,6L
+
+#define SN_X9_62_c2tnb191v3             "c2tnb191v3"
+#define NID_X9_62_c2tnb191v3            690
+#define OBJ_X9_62_c2tnb191v3            OBJ_X9_62_c_TwoCurve,7L
+
+#define SN_X9_62_c2onb191v4             "c2onb191v4"
+#define NID_X9_62_c2onb191v4            691
+#define OBJ_X9_62_c2onb191v4            OBJ_X9_62_c_TwoCurve,8L
+
+#define SN_X9_62_c2onb191v5             "c2onb191v5"
+#define NID_X9_62_c2onb191v5            692
+#define OBJ_X9_62_c2onb191v5            OBJ_X9_62_c_TwoCurve,9L
+
+#define SN_X9_62_c2pnb208w1             "c2pnb208w1"
+#define NID_X9_62_c2pnb208w1            693
+#define OBJ_X9_62_c2pnb208w1            OBJ_X9_62_c_TwoCurve,10L
+
+#define SN_X9_62_c2tnb239v1             "c2tnb239v1"
+#define NID_X9_62_c2tnb239v1            694
+#define OBJ_X9_62_c2tnb239v1            OBJ_X9_62_c_TwoCurve,11L
+
+#define SN_X9_62_c2tnb239v2             "c2tnb239v2"
+#define NID_X9_62_c2tnb239v2            695
+#define OBJ_X9_62_c2tnb239v2            OBJ_X9_62_c_TwoCurve,12L
+
+#define SN_X9_62_c2tnb239v3             "c2tnb239v3"
+#define NID_X9_62_c2tnb239v3            696
+#define OBJ_X9_62_c2tnb239v3            OBJ_X9_62_c_TwoCurve,13L
+
+#define SN_X9_62_c2onb239v4             "c2onb239v4"
+#define NID_X9_62_c2onb239v4            697
+#define OBJ_X9_62_c2onb239v4            OBJ_X9_62_c_TwoCurve,14L
+
+#define SN_X9_62_c2onb239v5             "c2onb239v5"
+#define NID_X9_62_c2onb239v5            698
+#define OBJ_X9_62_c2onb239v5            OBJ_X9_62_c_TwoCurve,15L
+
+#define SN_X9_62_c2pnb272w1             "c2pnb272w1"
+#define NID_X9_62_c2pnb272w1            699
+#define OBJ_X9_62_c2pnb272w1            OBJ_X9_62_c_TwoCurve,16L
+
+#define SN_X9_62_c2pnb304w1             "c2pnb304w1"
+#define NID_X9_62_c2pnb304w1            700
+#define OBJ_X9_62_c2pnb304w1            OBJ_X9_62_c_TwoCurve,17L
+
+#define SN_X9_62_c2tnb359v1             "c2tnb359v1"
+#define NID_X9_62_c2tnb359v1            701
+#define OBJ_X9_62_c2tnb359v1            OBJ_X9_62_c_TwoCurve,18L
+
+#define SN_X9_62_c2pnb368w1             "c2pnb368w1"
+#define NID_X9_62_c2pnb368w1            702
+#define OBJ_X9_62_c2pnb368w1            OBJ_X9_62_c_TwoCurve,19L
+
+#define SN_X9_62_c2tnb431r1             "c2tnb431r1"
+#define NID_X9_62_c2tnb431r1            703
+#define OBJ_X9_62_c2tnb431r1            OBJ_X9_62_c_TwoCurve,20L
+
+#define OBJ_X9_62_primeCurve            OBJ_X9_62_ellipticCurve,1L
+
+#define SN_X9_62_prime192v1             "prime192v1"
+#define NID_X9_62_prime192v1            409
+#define OBJ_X9_62_prime192v1            OBJ_X9_62_primeCurve,1L
+
+#define SN_X9_62_prime192v2             "prime192v2"
+#define NID_X9_62_prime192v2            410
+#define OBJ_X9_62_prime192v2            OBJ_X9_62_primeCurve,2L
+
+#define SN_X9_62_prime192v3             "prime192v3"
+#define NID_X9_62_prime192v3            411
+#define OBJ_X9_62_prime192v3            OBJ_X9_62_primeCurve,3L
+
+#define SN_X9_62_prime239v1             "prime239v1"
+#define NID_X9_62_prime239v1            412
+#define OBJ_X9_62_prime239v1            OBJ_X9_62_primeCurve,4L
+
+#define SN_X9_62_prime239v2             "prime239v2"
+#define NID_X9_62_prime239v2            413
+#define OBJ_X9_62_prime239v2            OBJ_X9_62_primeCurve,5L
+
+#define SN_X9_62_prime239v3             "prime239v3"
+#define NID_X9_62_prime239v3            414
+#define OBJ_X9_62_prime239v3            OBJ_X9_62_primeCurve,6L
+
+#define SN_X9_62_prime256v1             "prime256v1"
+#define NID_X9_62_prime256v1            415
+#define OBJ_X9_62_prime256v1            OBJ_X9_62_primeCurve,7L
+
+#define OBJ_X9_62_id_ecSigType          OBJ_ansi_X9_62,4L
+
+#define SN_ecdsa_with_SHA1              "ecdsa-with-SHA1"
+#define NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1             416
+#define OBJ_ecdsa_with_SHA1             OBJ_X9_62_id_ecSigType,1L
+
+#define SN_ecdsa_with_Recommended               "ecdsa-with-Recommended"
+#define NID_ecdsa_with_Recommended              791
+#define OBJ_ecdsa_with_Recommended              OBJ_X9_62_id_ecSigType,2L
+
+#define SN_ecdsa_with_Specified         "ecdsa-with-Specified"
+#define NID_ecdsa_with_Specified                792
+#define OBJ_ecdsa_with_Specified                OBJ_X9_62_id_ecSigType,3L
+
+#define SN_ecdsa_with_SHA224            "ecdsa-with-SHA224"
+#define NID_ecdsa_with_SHA224           793
+#define OBJ_ecdsa_with_SHA224           OBJ_ecdsa_with_Specified,1L
+
+#define SN_ecdsa_with_SHA256            "ecdsa-with-SHA256"
+#define NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256           794
+#define OBJ_ecdsa_with_SHA256           OBJ_ecdsa_with_Specified,2L
+
+#define SN_ecdsa_with_SHA384            "ecdsa-with-SHA384"
+#define NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384           795
+#define OBJ_ecdsa_with_SHA384           OBJ_ecdsa_with_Specified,3L
+
+#define SN_ecdsa_with_SHA512            "ecdsa-with-SHA512"
+#define NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512           796
+#define OBJ_ecdsa_with_SHA512           OBJ_ecdsa_with_Specified,4L
+
+#define OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve          OBJ_certicom_arc,0L
+
+#define SN_secp112r1            "secp112r1"
+#define NID_secp112r1           704
+#define OBJ_secp112r1           OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,6L
+
+#define SN_secp112r2            "secp112r2"
+#define NID_secp112r2           705
+#define OBJ_secp112r2           OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,7L
+
+#define SN_secp128r1            "secp128r1"
+#define NID_secp128r1           706
+#define OBJ_secp128r1           OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,28L
+
+#define SN_secp128r2            "secp128r2"
+#define NID_secp128r2           707
+#define OBJ_secp128r2           OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,29L
+
+#define SN_secp160k1            "secp160k1"
+#define NID_secp160k1           708
+#define OBJ_secp160k1           OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,9L
+
+#define SN_secp160r1            "secp160r1"
+#define NID_secp160r1           709
+#define OBJ_secp160r1           OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,8L
+
+#define SN_secp160r2            "secp160r2"
+#define NID_secp160r2           710
+#define OBJ_secp160r2           OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,30L
+
+#define SN_secp192k1            "secp192k1"
+#define NID_secp192k1           711
+#define OBJ_secp192k1           OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,31L
+
+#define SN_secp224k1            "secp224k1"
+#define NID_secp224k1           712
+#define OBJ_secp224k1           OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,32L
+
+#define SN_secp224r1            "secp224r1"
+#define NID_secp224r1           713
+#define OBJ_secp224r1           OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,33L
+
+#define SN_secp256k1            "secp256k1"
+#define NID_secp256k1           714
+#define OBJ_secp256k1           OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,10L
+
+#define SN_secp384r1            "secp384r1"
+#define NID_secp384r1           715
+#define OBJ_secp384r1           OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,34L
+
+#define SN_secp521r1            "secp521r1"
+#define NID_secp521r1           716
+#define OBJ_secp521r1           OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,35L
+
+#define SN_sect113r1            "sect113r1"
+#define NID_sect113r1           717
+#define OBJ_sect113r1           OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,4L
+
+#define SN_sect113r2            "sect113r2"
+#define NID_sect113r2           718
+#define OBJ_sect113r2           OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,5L
+
+#define SN_sect131r1            "sect131r1"
+#define NID_sect131r1           719
+#define OBJ_sect131r1           OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,22L
+
+#define SN_sect131r2            "sect131r2"
+#define NID_sect131r2           720
+#define OBJ_sect131r2           OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,23L
+
+#define SN_sect163k1            "sect163k1"
+#define NID_sect163k1           721
+#define OBJ_sect163k1           OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,1L
+
+#define SN_sect163r1            "sect163r1"
+#define NID_sect163r1           722
+#define OBJ_sect163r1           OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,2L
+
+#define SN_sect163r2            "sect163r2"
+#define NID_sect163r2           723
+#define OBJ_sect163r2           OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,15L
+
+#define SN_sect193r1            "sect193r1"
+#define NID_sect193r1           724
+#define OBJ_sect193r1           OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,24L
+
+#define SN_sect193r2            "sect193r2"
+#define NID_sect193r2           725
+#define OBJ_sect193r2           OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,25L
+
+#define SN_sect233k1            "sect233k1"
+#define NID_sect233k1           726
+#define OBJ_sect233k1           OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,26L
+
+#define SN_sect233r1            "sect233r1"
+#define NID_sect233r1           727
+#define OBJ_sect233r1           OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,27L
+
+#define SN_sect239k1            "sect239k1"
+#define NID_sect239k1           728
+#define OBJ_sect239k1           OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,3L
+
+#define SN_sect283k1            "sect283k1"
+#define NID_sect283k1           729
+#define OBJ_sect283k1           OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,16L
+
+#define SN_sect283r1            "sect283r1"
+#define NID_sect283r1           730
+#define OBJ_sect283r1           OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,17L
+
+#define SN_sect409k1            "sect409k1"
+#define NID_sect409k1           731
+#define OBJ_sect409k1           OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,36L
+
+#define SN_sect409r1            "sect409r1"
+#define NID_sect409r1           732
+#define OBJ_sect409r1           OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,37L
+
+#define SN_sect571k1            "sect571k1"
+#define NID_sect571k1           733
+#define OBJ_sect571k1           OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,38L
+
+#define SN_sect571r1            "sect571r1"
+#define NID_sect571r1           734
+#define OBJ_sect571r1           OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,39L
+
+#define OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid            OBJ_wap_wsg,4L
+
+#define SN_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls1               "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls1"
+#define NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls1              735
+#define OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls1              OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid,1L
+
+#define SN_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls3               "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls3"
+#define NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls3              736
+#define OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls3              OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid,3L
+
+#define SN_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls4               "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls4"
+#define NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls4              737
+#define OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls4              OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid,4L
+
+#define SN_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls5               "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls5"
+#define NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls5              738
+#define OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls5              OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid,5L
+
+#define SN_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls6               "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls6"
+#define NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls6              739
+#define OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls6              OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid,6L
+
+#define SN_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls7               "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls7"
+#define NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls7              740
+#define OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls7              OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid,7L
+
+#define SN_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls8               "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls8"
+#define NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls8              741
+#define OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls8              OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid,8L
+
+#define SN_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls9               "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls9"
+#define NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls9              742
+#define OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls9              OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid,9L
+
+#define SN_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls10              "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls10"
+#define NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls10             743
+#define OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls10             OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid,10L
+
+#define SN_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls11              "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls11"
+#define NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls11             744
+#define OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls11             OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid,11L
+
+#define SN_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls12              "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls12"
+#define NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls12             745
+#define OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls12             OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid,12L
+
+#define SN_cast5_cbc            "CAST5-CBC"
+#define LN_cast5_cbc            "cast5-cbc"
+#define NID_cast5_cbc           108
+#define OBJ_cast5_cbc           OBJ_ISO_US,113533L,7L,66L,10L
+
+#define SN_cast5_ecb            "CAST5-ECB"
+#define LN_cast5_ecb            "cast5-ecb"
+#define NID_cast5_ecb           109
+
+#define SN_cast5_cfb64          "CAST5-CFB"
+#define LN_cast5_cfb64          "cast5-cfb"
+#define NID_cast5_cfb64         110
+
+#define SN_cast5_ofb64          "CAST5-OFB"
+#define LN_cast5_ofb64          "cast5-ofb"
+#define NID_cast5_ofb64         111
+
+#define LN_pbeWithMD5AndCast5_CBC               "pbeWithMD5AndCast5CBC"
+#define NID_pbeWithMD5AndCast5_CBC              112
+#define OBJ_pbeWithMD5AndCast5_CBC              OBJ_ISO_US,113533L,7L,66L,12L
+
+#define SN_id_PasswordBasedMAC          "id-PasswordBasedMAC"
+#define LN_id_PasswordBasedMAC          "password based MAC"
+#define NID_id_PasswordBasedMAC         782
+#define OBJ_id_PasswordBasedMAC         OBJ_ISO_US,113533L,7L,66L,13L
+
+#define SN_id_DHBasedMac                "id-DHBasedMac"
+#define LN_id_DHBasedMac                "Diffie-Hellman based MAC"
+#define NID_id_DHBasedMac               783
+#define OBJ_id_DHBasedMac               OBJ_ISO_US,113533L,7L,66L,30L
+
+#define SN_rsadsi               "rsadsi"
+#define LN_rsadsi               "RSA Data Security, Inc."
+#define NID_rsadsi              1
+#define OBJ_rsadsi              OBJ_ISO_US,113549L
+
+#define SN_pkcs         "pkcs"
+#define LN_pkcs         "RSA Data Security, Inc. PKCS"
+#define NID_pkcs                2
+#define OBJ_pkcs                OBJ_rsadsi,1L
+
+#define SN_pkcs1                "pkcs1"
+#define NID_pkcs1               186
+#define OBJ_pkcs1               OBJ_pkcs,1L
+
+#define LN_rsaEncryption                "rsaEncryption"
+#define NID_rsaEncryption               6
+#define OBJ_rsaEncryption               OBJ_pkcs1,1L
+
+#define SN_md2WithRSAEncryption         "RSA-MD2"
+#define LN_md2WithRSAEncryption         "md2WithRSAEncryption"
+#define NID_md2WithRSAEncryption                7
+#define OBJ_md2WithRSAEncryption                OBJ_pkcs1,2L
+
+#define SN_md4WithRSAEncryption         "RSA-MD4"
+#define LN_md4WithRSAEncryption         "md4WithRSAEncryption"
+#define NID_md4WithRSAEncryption                396
+#define OBJ_md4WithRSAEncryption                OBJ_pkcs1,3L
+
+#define SN_md5WithRSAEncryption         "RSA-MD5"
+#define LN_md5WithRSAEncryption         "md5WithRSAEncryption"
+#define NID_md5WithRSAEncryption                8
+#define OBJ_md5WithRSAEncryption                OBJ_pkcs1,4L
+
+#define SN_sha1WithRSAEncryption                "RSA-SHA1"
+#define LN_sha1WithRSAEncryption                "sha1WithRSAEncryption"
+#define NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption               65
+#define OBJ_sha1WithRSAEncryption               OBJ_pkcs1,5L
+
+#define SN_rsaesOaep            "RSAES-OAEP"
+#define LN_rsaesOaep            "rsaesOaep"
+#define NID_rsaesOaep           919
+#define OBJ_rsaesOaep           OBJ_pkcs1,7L
+
+#define SN_mgf1         "MGF1"
+#define LN_mgf1         "mgf1"
+#define NID_mgf1                911
+#define OBJ_mgf1                OBJ_pkcs1,8L
+
+#define SN_pSpecified           "PSPECIFIED"
+#define LN_pSpecified           "pSpecified"
+#define NID_pSpecified          935
+#define OBJ_pSpecified          OBJ_pkcs1,9L
+
+#define SN_rsassaPss            "RSASSA-PSS"
+#define LN_rsassaPss            "rsassaPss"
+#define NID_rsassaPss           912
+#define OBJ_rsassaPss           OBJ_pkcs1,10L
+
+#define SN_sha256WithRSAEncryption              "RSA-SHA256"
+#define LN_sha256WithRSAEncryption              "sha256WithRSAEncryption"
+#define NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption             668
+#define OBJ_sha256WithRSAEncryption             OBJ_pkcs1,11L
+
+#define SN_sha384WithRSAEncryption              "RSA-SHA384"
+#define LN_sha384WithRSAEncryption              "sha384WithRSAEncryption"
+#define NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption             669
+#define OBJ_sha384WithRSAEncryption             OBJ_pkcs1,12L
+
+#define SN_sha512WithRSAEncryption              "RSA-SHA512"
+#define LN_sha512WithRSAEncryption              "sha512WithRSAEncryption"
+#define NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption             670
+#define OBJ_sha512WithRSAEncryption             OBJ_pkcs1,13L
+
+#define SN_sha224WithRSAEncryption              "RSA-SHA224"
+#define LN_sha224WithRSAEncryption              "sha224WithRSAEncryption"
+#define NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption             671
+#define OBJ_sha224WithRSAEncryption             OBJ_pkcs1,14L
+
+#define SN_pkcs3                "pkcs3"
+#define NID_pkcs3               27
+#define OBJ_pkcs3               OBJ_pkcs,3L
+
+#define LN_dhKeyAgreement               "dhKeyAgreement"
+#define NID_dhKeyAgreement              28
+#define OBJ_dhKeyAgreement              OBJ_pkcs3,1L
+
+#define SN_pkcs5                "pkcs5"
+#define NID_pkcs5               187
+#define OBJ_pkcs5               OBJ_pkcs,5L
+
+#define SN_pbeWithMD2AndDES_CBC         "PBE-MD2-DES"
+#define LN_pbeWithMD2AndDES_CBC         "pbeWithMD2AndDES-CBC"
+#define NID_pbeWithMD2AndDES_CBC                9
+#define OBJ_pbeWithMD2AndDES_CBC                OBJ_pkcs5,1L
+
+#define SN_pbeWithMD5AndDES_CBC         "PBE-MD5-DES"
+#define LN_pbeWithMD5AndDES_CBC         "pbeWithMD5AndDES-CBC"
+#define NID_pbeWithMD5AndDES_CBC                10
+#define OBJ_pbeWithMD5AndDES_CBC                OBJ_pkcs5,3L
+
+#define SN_pbeWithMD2AndRC2_CBC         "PBE-MD2-RC2-64"
+#define LN_pbeWithMD2AndRC2_CBC         "pbeWithMD2AndRC2-CBC"
+#define NID_pbeWithMD2AndRC2_CBC                168
+#define OBJ_pbeWithMD2AndRC2_CBC                OBJ_pkcs5,4L
+
+#define SN_pbeWithMD5AndRC2_CBC         "PBE-MD5-RC2-64"
+#define LN_pbeWithMD5AndRC2_CBC         "pbeWithMD5AndRC2-CBC"
+#define NID_pbeWithMD5AndRC2_CBC                169
+#define OBJ_pbeWithMD5AndRC2_CBC                OBJ_pkcs5,6L
+
+#define SN_pbeWithSHA1AndDES_CBC                "PBE-SHA1-DES"
+#define LN_pbeWithSHA1AndDES_CBC                "pbeWithSHA1AndDES-CBC"
+#define NID_pbeWithSHA1AndDES_CBC               170
+#define OBJ_pbeWithSHA1AndDES_CBC               OBJ_pkcs5,10L
+
+#define SN_pbeWithSHA1AndRC2_CBC                "PBE-SHA1-RC2-64"
+#define LN_pbeWithSHA1AndRC2_CBC                "pbeWithSHA1AndRC2-CBC"
+#define NID_pbeWithSHA1AndRC2_CBC               68
+#define OBJ_pbeWithSHA1AndRC2_CBC               OBJ_pkcs5,11L
+
+#define LN_id_pbkdf2            "PBKDF2"
+#define NID_id_pbkdf2           69
+#define OBJ_id_pbkdf2           OBJ_pkcs5,12L
+
+#define LN_pbes2                "PBES2"
+#define NID_pbes2               161
+#define OBJ_pbes2               OBJ_pkcs5,13L
+
+#define LN_pbmac1               "PBMAC1"
+#define NID_pbmac1              162
+#define OBJ_pbmac1              OBJ_pkcs5,14L
+
+#define SN_pkcs7                "pkcs7"
+#define NID_pkcs7               20
+#define OBJ_pkcs7               OBJ_pkcs,7L
+
+#define LN_pkcs7_data           "pkcs7-data"
+#define NID_pkcs7_data          21
+#define OBJ_pkcs7_data          OBJ_pkcs7,1L
+
+#define LN_pkcs7_signed         "pkcs7-signedData"
+#define NID_pkcs7_signed                22
+#define OBJ_pkcs7_signed                OBJ_pkcs7,2L
+
+#define LN_pkcs7_enveloped              "pkcs7-envelopedData"
+#define NID_pkcs7_enveloped             23
+#define OBJ_pkcs7_enveloped             OBJ_pkcs7,3L
+
+#define LN_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped             "pkcs7-signedAndEnvelopedData"
+#define NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped            24
+#define OBJ_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped            OBJ_pkcs7,4L
+
+#define LN_pkcs7_digest         "pkcs7-digestData"
+#define NID_pkcs7_digest                25
+#define OBJ_pkcs7_digest                OBJ_pkcs7,5L
+
+#define LN_pkcs7_encrypted              "pkcs7-encryptedData"
+#define NID_pkcs7_encrypted             26
+#define OBJ_pkcs7_encrypted             OBJ_pkcs7,6L
+
+#define SN_pkcs9                "pkcs9"
+#define NID_pkcs9               47
+#define OBJ_pkcs9               OBJ_pkcs,9L
+
+#define LN_pkcs9_emailAddress           "emailAddress"
+#define NID_pkcs9_emailAddress          48
+#define OBJ_pkcs9_emailAddress          OBJ_pkcs9,1L
+
+#define LN_pkcs9_unstructuredName               "unstructuredName"
+#define NID_pkcs9_unstructuredName              49
+#define OBJ_pkcs9_unstructuredName              OBJ_pkcs9,2L
+
+#define LN_pkcs9_contentType            "contentType"
+#define NID_pkcs9_contentType           50
+#define OBJ_pkcs9_contentType           OBJ_pkcs9,3L
+
+#define LN_pkcs9_messageDigest          "messageDigest"
+#define NID_pkcs9_messageDigest         51
+#define OBJ_pkcs9_messageDigest         OBJ_pkcs9,4L
+
+#define LN_pkcs9_signingTime            "signingTime"
+#define NID_pkcs9_signingTime           52
+#define OBJ_pkcs9_signingTime           OBJ_pkcs9,5L
+
+#define LN_pkcs9_countersignature               "countersignature"
+#define NID_pkcs9_countersignature              53
+#define OBJ_pkcs9_countersignature              OBJ_pkcs9,6L
+
+#define LN_pkcs9_challengePassword              "challengePassword"
+#define NID_pkcs9_challengePassword             54
+#define OBJ_pkcs9_challengePassword             OBJ_pkcs9,7L
+
+#define LN_pkcs9_unstructuredAddress            "unstructuredAddress"
+#define NID_pkcs9_unstructuredAddress           55
+#define OBJ_pkcs9_unstructuredAddress           OBJ_pkcs9,8L
+
+#define LN_pkcs9_extCertAttributes              "extendedCertificateAttributes"
+#define NID_pkcs9_extCertAttributes             56
+#define OBJ_pkcs9_extCertAttributes             OBJ_pkcs9,9L
+
+#define SN_ext_req              "extReq"
+#define LN_ext_req              "Extension Request"
+#define NID_ext_req             172
+#define OBJ_ext_req             OBJ_pkcs9,14L
+
+#define SN_SMIMECapabilities            "SMIME-CAPS"
+#define LN_SMIMECapabilities            "S/MIME Capabilities"
+#define NID_SMIMECapabilities           167
+#define OBJ_SMIMECapabilities           OBJ_pkcs9,15L
+
+#define SN_SMIME                "SMIME"
+#define LN_SMIME                "S/MIME"
+#define NID_SMIME               188
+#define OBJ_SMIME               OBJ_pkcs9,16L
+
+#define SN_id_smime_mod         "id-smime-mod"
+#define NID_id_smime_mod                189
+#define OBJ_id_smime_mod                OBJ_SMIME,0L
+
+#define SN_id_smime_ct          "id-smime-ct"
+#define NID_id_smime_ct         190
+#define OBJ_id_smime_ct         OBJ_SMIME,1L
+
+#define SN_id_smime_aa          "id-smime-aa"
+#define NID_id_smime_aa         191
+#define OBJ_id_smime_aa         OBJ_SMIME,2L
+
+#define SN_id_smime_alg         "id-smime-alg"
+#define NID_id_smime_alg                192
+#define OBJ_id_smime_alg                OBJ_SMIME,3L
+
+#define SN_id_smime_cd          "id-smime-cd"
+#define NID_id_smime_cd         193
+#define OBJ_id_smime_cd         OBJ_SMIME,4L
+
+#define SN_id_smime_spq         "id-smime-spq"
+#define NID_id_smime_spq                194
+#define OBJ_id_smime_spq                OBJ_SMIME,5L
+
+#define SN_id_smime_cti         "id-smime-cti"
+#define NID_id_smime_cti                195
+#define OBJ_id_smime_cti                OBJ_SMIME,6L
+
+#define SN_id_smime_mod_cms             "id-smime-mod-cms"
+#define NID_id_smime_mod_cms            196
+#define OBJ_id_smime_mod_cms            OBJ_id_smime_mod,1L
+
+#define SN_id_smime_mod_ess             "id-smime-mod-ess"
+#define NID_id_smime_mod_ess            197
+#define OBJ_id_smime_mod_ess            OBJ_id_smime_mod,2L
+
+#define SN_id_smime_mod_oid             "id-smime-mod-oid"
+#define NID_id_smime_mod_oid            198
+#define OBJ_id_smime_mod_oid            OBJ_id_smime_mod,3L
+
+#define SN_id_smime_mod_msg_v3          "id-smime-mod-msg-v3"
+#define NID_id_smime_mod_msg_v3         199
+#define OBJ_id_smime_mod_msg_v3         OBJ_id_smime_mod,4L
+
+#define SN_id_smime_mod_ets_eSignature_88               "id-smime-mod-ets-eSignature-88"
+#define NID_id_smime_mod_ets_eSignature_88              200
+#define OBJ_id_smime_mod_ets_eSignature_88              OBJ_id_smime_mod,5L
+
+#define SN_id_smime_mod_ets_eSignature_97               "id-smime-mod-ets-eSignature-97"
+#define NID_id_smime_mod_ets_eSignature_97              201
+#define OBJ_id_smime_mod_ets_eSignature_97              OBJ_id_smime_mod,6L
+
+#define SN_id_smime_mod_ets_eSigPolicy_88               "id-smime-mod-ets-eSigPolicy-88"
+#define NID_id_smime_mod_ets_eSigPolicy_88              202
+#define OBJ_id_smime_mod_ets_eSigPolicy_88              OBJ_id_smime_mod,7L
+
+#define SN_id_smime_mod_ets_eSigPolicy_97               "id-smime-mod-ets-eSigPolicy-97"
+#define NID_id_smime_mod_ets_eSigPolicy_97              203
+#define OBJ_id_smime_mod_ets_eSigPolicy_97              OBJ_id_smime_mod,8L
+
+#define SN_id_smime_ct_receipt          "id-smime-ct-receipt"
+#define NID_id_smime_ct_receipt         204
+#define OBJ_id_smime_ct_receipt         OBJ_id_smime_ct,1L
+
+#define SN_id_smime_ct_authData         "id-smime-ct-authData"
+#define NID_id_smime_ct_authData                205
+#define OBJ_id_smime_ct_authData                OBJ_id_smime_ct,2L
+
+#define SN_id_smime_ct_publishCert              "id-smime-ct-publishCert"
+#define NID_id_smime_ct_publishCert             206
+#define OBJ_id_smime_ct_publishCert             OBJ_id_smime_ct,3L
+
+#define SN_id_smime_ct_TSTInfo          "id-smime-ct-TSTInfo"
+#define NID_id_smime_ct_TSTInfo         207
+#define OBJ_id_smime_ct_TSTInfo         OBJ_id_smime_ct,4L
+
+#define SN_id_smime_ct_TDTInfo          "id-smime-ct-TDTInfo"
+#define NID_id_smime_ct_TDTInfo         208
+#define OBJ_id_smime_ct_TDTInfo         OBJ_id_smime_ct,5L
+
+#define SN_id_smime_ct_contentInfo              "id-smime-ct-contentInfo"
+#define NID_id_smime_ct_contentInfo             209
+#define OBJ_id_smime_ct_contentInfo             OBJ_id_smime_ct,6L
+
+#define SN_id_smime_ct_DVCSRequestData          "id-smime-ct-DVCSRequestData"
+#define NID_id_smime_ct_DVCSRequestData         210
+#define OBJ_id_smime_ct_DVCSRequestData         OBJ_id_smime_ct,7L
+
+#define SN_id_smime_ct_DVCSResponseData         "id-smime-ct-DVCSResponseData"
+#define NID_id_smime_ct_DVCSResponseData                211
+#define OBJ_id_smime_ct_DVCSResponseData                OBJ_id_smime_ct,8L
+
+#define SN_id_smime_ct_compressedData           "id-smime-ct-compressedData"
+#define NID_id_smime_ct_compressedData          786
+#define OBJ_id_smime_ct_compressedData          OBJ_id_smime_ct,9L
+
+#define SN_id_smime_ct_contentCollection                "id-smime-ct-contentCollection"
+#define NID_id_smime_ct_contentCollection               1058
+#define OBJ_id_smime_ct_contentCollection               OBJ_id_smime_ct,19L
+
+#define SN_id_smime_ct_authEnvelopedData                "id-smime-ct-authEnvelopedData"
+#define NID_id_smime_ct_authEnvelopedData               1059
+#define OBJ_id_smime_ct_authEnvelopedData               OBJ_id_smime_ct,23L
+
+#define SN_id_ct_asciiTextWithCRLF              "id-ct-asciiTextWithCRLF"
+#define NID_id_ct_asciiTextWithCRLF             787
+#define OBJ_id_ct_asciiTextWithCRLF             OBJ_id_smime_ct,27L
+
+#define SN_id_ct_xml            "id-ct-xml"
+#define NID_id_ct_xml           1060
+#define OBJ_id_ct_xml           OBJ_id_smime_ct,28L
+
+#define SN_id_smime_aa_receiptRequest           "id-smime-aa-receiptRequest"
+#define NID_id_smime_aa_receiptRequest          212
+#define OBJ_id_smime_aa_receiptRequest          OBJ_id_smime_aa,1L
+
+#define SN_id_smime_aa_securityLabel            "id-smime-aa-securityLabel"
+#define NID_id_smime_aa_securityLabel           213
+#define OBJ_id_smime_aa_securityLabel           OBJ_id_smime_aa,2L
+
+#define SN_id_smime_aa_mlExpandHistory          "id-smime-aa-mlExpandHistory"
+#define NID_id_smime_aa_mlExpandHistory         214
+#define OBJ_id_smime_aa_mlExpandHistory         OBJ_id_smime_aa,3L
+
+#define SN_id_smime_aa_contentHint              "id-smime-aa-contentHint"
+#define NID_id_smime_aa_contentHint             215
+#define OBJ_id_smime_aa_contentHint             OBJ_id_smime_aa,4L
+
+#define SN_id_smime_aa_msgSigDigest             "id-smime-aa-msgSigDigest"
+#define NID_id_smime_aa_msgSigDigest            216
+#define OBJ_id_smime_aa_msgSigDigest            OBJ_id_smime_aa,5L
+
+#define SN_id_smime_aa_encapContentType         "id-smime-aa-encapContentType"
+#define NID_id_smime_aa_encapContentType                217
+#define OBJ_id_smime_aa_encapContentType                OBJ_id_smime_aa,6L
+
+#define SN_id_smime_aa_contentIdentifier                "id-smime-aa-contentIdentifier"
+#define NID_id_smime_aa_contentIdentifier               218
+#define OBJ_id_smime_aa_contentIdentifier               OBJ_id_smime_aa,7L
+
+#define SN_id_smime_aa_macValue         "id-smime-aa-macValue"
+#define NID_id_smime_aa_macValue                219
+#define OBJ_id_smime_aa_macValue                OBJ_id_smime_aa,8L
+
+#define SN_id_smime_aa_equivalentLabels         "id-smime-aa-equivalentLabels"
+#define NID_id_smime_aa_equivalentLabels                220
+#define OBJ_id_smime_aa_equivalentLabels                OBJ_id_smime_aa,9L
+
+#define SN_id_smime_aa_contentReference         "id-smime-aa-contentReference"
+#define NID_id_smime_aa_contentReference                221
+#define OBJ_id_smime_aa_contentReference                OBJ_id_smime_aa,10L
+
+#define SN_id_smime_aa_encrypKeyPref            "id-smime-aa-encrypKeyPref"
+#define NID_id_smime_aa_encrypKeyPref           222
+#define OBJ_id_smime_aa_encrypKeyPref           OBJ_id_smime_aa,11L
+
+#define SN_id_smime_aa_signingCertificate               "id-smime-aa-signingCertificate"
+#define NID_id_smime_aa_signingCertificate              223
+#define OBJ_id_smime_aa_signingCertificate              OBJ_id_smime_aa,12L
+
+#define SN_id_smime_aa_smimeEncryptCerts                "id-smime-aa-smimeEncryptCerts"
+#define NID_id_smime_aa_smimeEncryptCerts               224
+#define OBJ_id_smime_aa_smimeEncryptCerts               OBJ_id_smime_aa,13L
+
+#define SN_id_smime_aa_timeStampToken           "id-smime-aa-timeStampToken"
+#define NID_id_smime_aa_timeStampToken          225
+#define OBJ_id_smime_aa_timeStampToken          OBJ_id_smime_aa,14L
+
+#define SN_id_smime_aa_ets_sigPolicyId          "id-smime-aa-ets-sigPolicyId"
+#define NID_id_smime_aa_ets_sigPolicyId         226
+#define OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_sigPolicyId         OBJ_id_smime_aa,15L
+
+#define SN_id_smime_aa_ets_commitmentType               "id-smime-aa-ets-commitmentType"
+#define NID_id_smime_aa_ets_commitmentType              227
+#define OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_commitmentType              OBJ_id_smime_aa,16L
+
+#define SN_id_smime_aa_ets_signerLocation               "id-smime-aa-ets-signerLocation"
+#define NID_id_smime_aa_ets_signerLocation              228
+#define OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_signerLocation              OBJ_id_smime_aa,17L
+
+#define SN_id_smime_aa_ets_signerAttr           "id-smime-aa-ets-signerAttr"
+#define NID_id_smime_aa_ets_signerAttr          229
+#define OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_signerAttr          OBJ_id_smime_aa,18L
+
+#define SN_id_smime_aa_ets_otherSigCert         "id-smime-aa-ets-otherSigCert"
+#define NID_id_smime_aa_ets_otherSigCert                230
+#define OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_otherSigCert                OBJ_id_smime_aa,19L
+
+#define SN_id_smime_aa_ets_contentTimestamp             "id-smime-aa-ets-contentTimestamp"
+#define NID_id_smime_aa_ets_contentTimestamp            231
+#define OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_contentTimestamp            OBJ_id_smime_aa,20L
+
+#define SN_id_smime_aa_ets_CertificateRefs              "id-smime-aa-ets-CertificateRefs"
+#define NID_id_smime_aa_ets_CertificateRefs             232
+#define OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_CertificateRefs             OBJ_id_smime_aa,21L
+
+#define SN_id_smime_aa_ets_RevocationRefs               "id-smime-aa-ets-RevocationRefs"
+#define NID_id_smime_aa_ets_RevocationRefs              233
+#define OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_RevocationRefs              OBJ_id_smime_aa,22L
+
+#define SN_id_smime_aa_ets_certValues           "id-smime-aa-ets-certValues"
+#define NID_id_smime_aa_ets_certValues          234
+#define OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_certValues          OBJ_id_smime_aa,23L
+
+#define SN_id_smime_aa_ets_revocationValues             "id-smime-aa-ets-revocationValues"
+#define NID_id_smime_aa_ets_revocationValues            235
+#define OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_revocationValues            OBJ_id_smime_aa,24L
+
+#define SN_id_smime_aa_ets_escTimeStamp         "id-smime-aa-ets-escTimeStamp"
+#define NID_id_smime_aa_ets_escTimeStamp                236
+#define OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_escTimeStamp                OBJ_id_smime_aa,25L
+
+#define SN_id_smime_aa_ets_certCRLTimestamp             "id-smime-aa-ets-certCRLTimestamp"
+#define NID_id_smime_aa_ets_certCRLTimestamp            237
+#define OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_certCRLTimestamp            OBJ_id_smime_aa,26L
+
+#define SN_id_smime_aa_ets_archiveTimeStamp             "id-smime-aa-ets-archiveTimeStamp"
+#define NID_id_smime_aa_ets_archiveTimeStamp            238
+#define OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_archiveTimeStamp            OBJ_id_smime_aa,27L
+
+#define SN_id_smime_aa_signatureType            "id-smime-aa-signatureType"
+#define NID_id_smime_aa_signatureType           239
+#define OBJ_id_smime_aa_signatureType           OBJ_id_smime_aa,28L
+
+#define SN_id_smime_aa_dvcs_dvc         "id-smime-aa-dvcs-dvc"
+#define NID_id_smime_aa_dvcs_dvc                240
+#define OBJ_id_smime_aa_dvcs_dvc                OBJ_id_smime_aa,29L
+
+#define SN_id_smime_alg_ESDHwith3DES            "id-smime-alg-ESDHwith3DES"
+#define NID_id_smime_alg_ESDHwith3DES           241
+#define OBJ_id_smime_alg_ESDHwith3DES           OBJ_id_smime_alg,1L
+
+#define SN_id_smime_alg_ESDHwithRC2             "id-smime-alg-ESDHwithRC2"
+#define NID_id_smime_alg_ESDHwithRC2            242
+#define OBJ_id_smime_alg_ESDHwithRC2            OBJ_id_smime_alg,2L
+
+#define SN_id_smime_alg_3DESwrap                "id-smime-alg-3DESwrap"
+#define NID_id_smime_alg_3DESwrap               243
+#define OBJ_id_smime_alg_3DESwrap               OBJ_id_smime_alg,3L
+
+#define SN_id_smime_alg_RC2wrap         "id-smime-alg-RC2wrap"
+#define NID_id_smime_alg_RC2wrap                244
+#define OBJ_id_smime_alg_RC2wrap                OBJ_id_smime_alg,4L
+
+#define SN_id_smime_alg_ESDH            "id-smime-alg-ESDH"
+#define NID_id_smime_alg_ESDH           245
+#define OBJ_id_smime_alg_ESDH           OBJ_id_smime_alg,5L
+
+#define SN_id_smime_alg_CMS3DESwrap             "id-smime-alg-CMS3DESwrap"
+#define NID_id_smime_alg_CMS3DESwrap            246
+#define OBJ_id_smime_alg_CMS3DESwrap            OBJ_id_smime_alg,6L
+
+#define SN_id_smime_alg_CMSRC2wrap              "id-smime-alg-CMSRC2wrap"
+#define NID_id_smime_alg_CMSRC2wrap             247
+#define OBJ_id_smime_alg_CMSRC2wrap             OBJ_id_smime_alg,7L
+
+#define SN_id_alg_PWRI_KEK              "id-alg-PWRI-KEK"
+#define NID_id_alg_PWRI_KEK             893
+#define OBJ_id_alg_PWRI_KEK             OBJ_id_smime_alg,9L
+
+#define SN_id_smime_cd_ldap             "id-smime-cd-ldap"
+#define NID_id_smime_cd_ldap            248
+#define OBJ_id_smime_cd_ldap            OBJ_id_smime_cd,1L
+
+#define SN_id_smime_spq_ets_sqt_uri             "id-smime-spq-ets-sqt-uri"
+#define NID_id_smime_spq_ets_sqt_uri            249
+#define OBJ_id_smime_spq_ets_sqt_uri            OBJ_id_smime_spq,1L
+
+#define SN_id_smime_spq_ets_sqt_unotice         "id-smime-spq-ets-sqt-unotice"
+#define NID_id_smime_spq_ets_sqt_unotice                250
+#define OBJ_id_smime_spq_ets_sqt_unotice                OBJ_id_smime_spq,2L
+
+#define SN_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfOrigin               "id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfOrigin"
+#define NID_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfOrigin              251
+#define OBJ_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfOrigin              OBJ_id_smime_cti,1L
+
+#define SN_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfReceipt              "id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfReceipt"
+#define NID_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfReceipt             252
+#define OBJ_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfReceipt             OBJ_id_smime_cti,2L
+
+#define SN_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfDelivery             "id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfDelivery"
+#define NID_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfDelivery            253
+#define OBJ_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfDelivery            OBJ_id_smime_cti,3L
+
+#define SN_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfSender               "id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfSender"
+#define NID_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfSender              254
+#define OBJ_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfSender              OBJ_id_smime_cti,4L
+
+#define SN_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfApproval             "id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfApproval"
+#define NID_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfApproval            255
+#define OBJ_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfApproval            OBJ_id_smime_cti,5L
+
+#define SN_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfCreation             "id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfCreation"
+#define NID_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfCreation            256
+#define OBJ_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfCreation            OBJ_id_smime_cti,6L
+
+#define LN_friendlyName         "friendlyName"
+#define NID_friendlyName                156
+#define OBJ_friendlyName                OBJ_pkcs9,20L
+
+#define LN_localKeyID           "localKeyID"
+#define NID_localKeyID          157
+#define OBJ_localKeyID          OBJ_pkcs9,21L
+
+#define SN_ms_csp_name          "CSPName"
+#define LN_ms_csp_name          "Microsoft CSP Name"
+#define NID_ms_csp_name         417
+#define OBJ_ms_csp_name         1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,311L,17L,1L
+
+#define SN_LocalKeySet          "LocalKeySet"
+#define LN_LocalKeySet          "Microsoft Local Key set"
+#define NID_LocalKeySet         856
+#define OBJ_LocalKeySet         1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,311L,17L,2L
+
+#define OBJ_certTypes           OBJ_pkcs9,22L
+
+#define LN_x509Certificate              "x509Certificate"
+#define NID_x509Certificate             158
+#define OBJ_x509Certificate             OBJ_certTypes,1L
+
+#define LN_sdsiCertificate              "sdsiCertificate"
+#define NID_sdsiCertificate             159
+#define OBJ_sdsiCertificate             OBJ_certTypes,2L
+
+#define OBJ_crlTypes            OBJ_pkcs9,23L
+
+#define LN_x509Crl              "x509Crl"
+#define NID_x509Crl             160
+#define OBJ_x509Crl             OBJ_crlTypes,1L
+
+#define OBJ_pkcs12              OBJ_pkcs,12L
+
+#define OBJ_pkcs12_pbeids               OBJ_pkcs12,1L
+
+#define SN_pbe_WithSHA1And128BitRC4             "PBE-SHA1-RC4-128"
+#define LN_pbe_WithSHA1And128BitRC4             "pbeWithSHA1And128BitRC4"
+#define NID_pbe_WithSHA1And128BitRC4            144
+#define OBJ_pbe_WithSHA1And128BitRC4            OBJ_pkcs12_pbeids,1L
+
+#define SN_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC4              "PBE-SHA1-RC4-40"
+#define LN_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC4              "pbeWithSHA1And40BitRC4"
+#define NID_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC4             145
+#define OBJ_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC4             OBJ_pkcs12_pbeids,2L
+
+#define SN_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC           "PBE-SHA1-3DES"
+#define LN_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC           "pbeWithSHA1And3-KeyTripleDES-CBC"
+#define NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC          146
+#define OBJ_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC          OBJ_pkcs12_pbeids,3L
+
+#define SN_pbe_WithSHA1And2_Key_TripleDES_CBC           "PBE-SHA1-2DES"
+#define LN_pbe_WithSHA1And2_Key_TripleDES_CBC           "pbeWithSHA1And2-KeyTripleDES-CBC"
+#define NID_pbe_WithSHA1And2_Key_TripleDES_CBC          147
+#define OBJ_pbe_WithSHA1And2_Key_TripleDES_CBC          OBJ_pkcs12_pbeids,4L
+
+#define SN_pbe_WithSHA1And128BitRC2_CBC         "PBE-SHA1-RC2-128"
+#define LN_pbe_WithSHA1And128BitRC2_CBC         "pbeWithSHA1And128BitRC2-CBC"
+#define NID_pbe_WithSHA1And128BitRC2_CBC                148
+#define OBJ_pbe_WithSHA1And128BitRC2_CBC                OBJ_pkcs12_pbeids,5L
+
+#define SN_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC          "PBE-SHA1-RC2-40"
+#define LN_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC          "pbeWithSHA1And40BitRC2-CBC"
+#define NID_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC         149
+#define OBJ_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC         OBJ_pkcs12_pbeids,6L
+
+#define OBJ_pkcs12_Version1             OBJ_pkcs12,10L
+
+#define OBJ_pkcs12_BagIds               OBJ_pkcs12_Version1,1L
+
+#define LN_keyBag               "keyBag"
+#define NID_keyBag              150
+#define OBJ_keyBag              OBJ_pkcs12_BagIds,1L
+
+#define LN_pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag          "pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag"
+#define NID_pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag         151
+#define OBJ_pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag         OBJ_pkcs12_BagIds,2L
+
+#define LN_certBag              "certBag"
+#define NID_certBag             152
+#define OBJ_certBag             OBJ_pkcs12_BagIds,3L
+
+#define LN_crlBag               "crlBag"
+#define NID_crlBag              153
+#define OBJ_crlBag              OBJ_pkcs12_BagIds,4L
+
+#define LN_secretBag            "secretBag"
+#define NID_secretBag           154
+#define OBJ_secretBag           OBJ_pkcs12_BagIds,5L
+
+#define LN_safeContentsBag              "safeContentsBag"
+#define NID_safeContentsBag             155
+#define OBJ_safeContentsBag             OBJ_pkcs12_BagIds,6L
+
+#define SN_md2          "MD2"
+#define LN_md2          "md2"
+#define NID_md2         3
+#define OBJ_md2         OBJ_rsadsi,2L,2L
+
+#define SN_md4          "MD4"
+#define LN_md4          "md4"
+#define NID_md4         257
+#define OBJ_md4         OBJ_rsadsi,2L,4L
+
+#define SN_md5          "MD5"
+#define LN_md5          "md5"
+#define NID_md5         4
+#define OBJ_md5         OBJ_rsadsi,2L,5L
+
+#define SN_md5_sha1             "MD5-SHA1"
+#define LN_md5_sha1             "md5-sha1"
+#define NID_md5_sha1            114
+
+#define LN_hmacWithMD5          "hmacWithMD5"
+#define NID_hmacWithMD5         797
+#define OBJ_hmacWithMD5         OBJ_rsadsi,2L,6L
+
+#define LN_hmacWithSHA1         "hmacWithSHA1"
+#define NID_hmacWithSHA1                163
+#define OBJ_hmacWithSHA1                OBJ_rsadsi,2L,7L
+
+#define LN_hmacWithSHA224               "hmacWithSHA224"
+#define NID_hmacWithSHA224              798
+#define OBJ_hmacWithSHA224              OBJ_rsadsi,2L,8L
+
+#define LN_hmacWithSHA256               "hmacWithSHA256"
+#define NID_hmacWithSHA256              799
+#define OBJ_hmacWithSHA256              OBJ_rsadsi,2L,9L
+
+#define LN_hmacWithSHA384               "hmacWithSHA384"
+#define NID_hmacWithSHA384              800
+#define OBJ_hmacWithSHA384              OBJ_rsadsi,2L,10L
+
+#define LN_hmacWithSHA512               "hmacWithSHA512"
+#define NID_hmacWithSHA512              801
+#define OBJ_hmacWithSHA512              OBJ_rsadsi,2L,11L
+
+#define SN_rc2_cbc              "RC2-CBC"
+#define LN_rc2_cbc              "rc2-cbc"
+#define NID_rc2_cbc             37
+#define OBJ_rc2_cbc             OBJ_rsadsi,3L,2L
+
+#define SN_rc2_ecb              "RC2-ECB"
+#define LN_rc2_ecb              "rc2-ecb"
+#define NID_rc2_ecb             38
+
+#define SN_rc2_cfb64            "RC2-CFB"
+#define LN_rc2_cfb64            "rc2-cfb"
+#define NID_rc2_cfb64           39
+
+#define SN_rc2_ofb64            "RC2-OFB"
+#define LN_rc2_ofb64            "rc2-ofb"
+#define NID_rc2_ofb64           40
+
+#define SN_rc2_40_cbc           "RC2-40-CBC"
+#define LN_rc2_40_cbc           "rc2-40-cbc"
+#define NID_rc2_40_cbc          98
+
+#define SN_rc2_64_cbc           "RC2-64-CBC"
+#define LN_rc2_64_cbc           "rc2-64-cbc"
+#define NID_rc2_64_cbc          166
+
+#define SN_rc4          "RC4"
+#define LN_rc4          "rc4"
+#define NID_rc4         5
+#define OBJ_rc4         OBJ_rsadsi,3L,4L
+
+#define SN_rc4_40               "RC4-40"
+#define LN_rc4_40               "rc4-40"
+#define NID_rc4_40              97
+
+#define SN_des_ede3_cbc         "DES-EDE3-CBC"
+#define LN_des_ede3_cbc         "des-ede3-cbc"
+#define NID_des_ede3_cbc                44
+#define OBJ_des_ede3_cbc                OBJ_rsadsi,3L,7L
+
+#define SN_rc5_cbc              "RC5-CBC"
+#define LN_rc5_cbc              "rc5-cbc"
+#define NID_rc5_cbc             120
+#define OBJ_rc5_cbc             OBJ_rsadsi,3L,8L
+
+#define SN_rc5_ecb              "RC5-ECB"
+#define LN_rc5_ecb              "rc5-ecb"
+#define NID_rc5_ecb             121
+
+#define SN_rc5_cfb64            "RC5-CFB"
+#define LN_rc5_cfb64            "rc5-cfb"
+#define NID_rc5_cfb64           122
+
+#define SN_rc5_ofb64            "RC5-OFB"
+#define LN_rc5_ofb64            "rc5-ofb"
+#define NID_rc5_ofb64           123
+
+#define SN_ms_ext_req           "msExtReq"
+#define LN_ms_ext_req           "Microsoft Extension Request"
+#define NID_ms_ext_req          171
+#define OBJ_ms_ext_req          1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,311L,2L,1L,14L
+
+#define SN_ms_code_ind          "msCodeInd"
+#define LN_ms_code_ind          "Microsoft Individual Code Signing"
+#define NID_ms_code_ind         134
+#define OBJ_ms_code_ind         1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,311L,2L,1L,21L
+
+#define SN_ms_code_com          "msCodeCom"
+#define LN_ms_code_com          "Microsoft Commercial Code Signing"
+#define NID_ms_code_com         135
+#define OBJ_ms_code_com         1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,311L,2L,1L,22L
+
+#define SN_ms_ctl_sign          "msCTLSign"
+#define LN_ms_ctl_sign          "Microsoft Trust List Signing"
+#define NID_ms_ctl_sign         136
+#define OBJ_ms_ctl_sign         1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,311L,10L,3L,1L
+
+#define SN_ms_sgc               "msSGC"
+#define LN_ms_sgc               "Microsoft Server Gated Crypto"
+#define NID_ms_sgc              137
+#define OBJ_ms_sgc              1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,311L,10L,3L,3L
+
+#define SN_ms_efs               "msEFS"
+#define LN_ms_efs               "Microsoft Encrypted File System"
+#define NID_ms_efs              138
+#define OBJ_ms_efs              1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,311L,10L,3L,4L
+
+#define SN_ms_smartcard_login           "msSmartcardLogin"
+#define LN_ms_smartcard_login           "Microsoft Smartcardlogin"
+#define NID_ms_smartcard_login          648
+#define OBJ_ms_smartcard_login          1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,311L,20L,2L,2L
+
+#define SN_ms_upn               "msUPN"
+#define LN_ms_upn               "Microsoft Universal Principal Name"
+#define NID_ms_upn              649
+#define OBJ_ms_upn              1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,311L,20L,2L,3L
+
+#define SN_idea_cbc             "IDEA-CBC"
+#define LN_idea_cbc             "idea-cbc"
+#define NID_idea_cbc            34
+#define OBJ_idea_cbc            1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,188L,7L,1L,1L,2L
+
+#define SN_idea_ecb             "IDEA-ECB"
+#define LN_idea_ecb             "idea-ecb"
+#define NID_idea_ecb            36
+
+#define SN_idea_cfb64           "IDEA-CFB"
+#define LN_idea_cfb64           "idea-cfb"
+#define NID_idea_cfb64          35
+
+#define SN_idea_ofb64           "IDEA-OFB"
+#define LN_idea_ofb64           "idea-ofb"
+#define NID_idea_ofb64          46
+
+#define SN_bf_cbc               "BF-CBC"
+#define LN_bf_cbc               "bf-cbc"
+#define NID_bf_cbc              91
+#define OBJ_bf_cbc              1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,3029L,1L,2L
+
+#define SN_bf_ecb               "BF-ECB"
+#define LN_bf_ecb               "bf-ecb"
+#define NID_bf_ecb              92
+
+#define SN_bf_cfb64             "BF-CFB"
+#define LN_bf_cfb64             "bf-cfb"
+#define NID_bf_cfb64            93
+
+#define SN_bf_ofb64             "BF-OFB"
+#define LN_bf_ofb64             "bf-ofb"
+#define NID_bf_ofb64            94
+
+#define SN_id_pkix              "PKIX"
+#define NID_id_pkix             127
+#define OBJ_id_pkix             1L,3L,6L,1L,5L,5L,7L
+
+#define SN_id_pkix_mod          "id-pkix-mod"
+#define NID_id_pkix_mod         258
+#define OBJ_id_pkix_mod         OBJ_id_pkix,0L
+
+#define SN_id_pe                "id-pe"
+#define NID_id_pe               175
+#define OBJ_id_pe               OBJ_id_pkix,1L
+
+#define SN_id_qt                "id-qt"
+#define NID_id_qt               259
+#define OBJ_id_qt               OBJ_id_pkix,2L
+
+#define SN_id_kp                "id-kp"
+#define NID_id_kp               128
+#define OBJ_id_kp               OBJ_id_pkix,3L
+
+#define SN_id_it                "id-it"
+#define NID_id_it               260
+#define OBJ_id_it               OBJ_id_pkix,4L
+
+#define SN_id_pkip              "id-pkip"
+#define NID_id_pkip             261
+#define OBJ_id_pkip             OBJ_id_pkix,5L
+
+#define SN_id_alg               "id-alg"
+#define NID_id_alg              262
+#define OBJ_id_alg              OBJ_id_pkix,6L
+
+#define SN_id_cmc               "id-cmc"
+#define NID_id_cmc              263
+#define OBJ_id_cmc              OBJ_id_pkix,7L
+
+#define SN_id_on                "id-on"
+#define NID_id_on               264
+#define OBJ_id_on               OBJ_id_pkix,8L
+
+#define SN_id_pda               "id-pda"
+#define NID_id_pda              265
+#define OBJ_id_pda              OBJ_id_pkix,9L
+
+#define SN_id_aca               "id-aca"
+#define NID_id_aca              266
+#define OBJ_id_aca              OBJ_id_pkix,10L
+
+#define SN_id_qcs               "id-qcs"
+#define NID_id_qcs              267
+#define OBJ_id_qcs              OBJ_id_pkix,11L
+
+#define SN_id_cct               "id-cct"
+#define NID_id_cct              268
+#define OBJ_id_cct              OBJ_id_pkix,12L
+
+#define SN_id_ppl               "id-ppl"
+#define NID_id_ppl              662
+#define OBJ_id_ppl              OBJ_id_pkix,21L
+
+#define SN_id_ad                "id-ad"
+#define NID_id_ad               176
+#define OBJ_id_ad               OBJ_id_pkix,48L
+
+#define SN_id_pkix1_explicit_88         "id-pkix1-explicit-88"
+#define NID_id_pkix1_explicit_88                269
+#define OBJ_id_pkix1_explicit_88                OBJ_id_pkix_mod,1L
+
+#define SN_id_pkix1_implicit_88         "id-pkix1-implicit-88"
+#define NID_id_pkix1_implicit_88                270
+#define OBJ_id_pkix1_implicit_88                OBJ_id_pkix_mod,2L
+
+#define SN_id_pkix1_explicit_93         "id-pkix1-explicit-93"
+#define NID_id_pkix1_explicit_93                271
+#define OBJ_id_pkix1_explicit_93                OBJ_id_pkix_mod,3L
+
+#define SN_id_pkix1_implicit_93         "id-pkix1-implicit-93"
+#define NID_id_pkix1_implicit_93                272
+#define OBJ_id_pkix1_implicit_93                OBJ_id_pkix_mod,4L
+
+#define SN_id_mod_crmf          "id-mod-crmf"
+#define NID_id_mod_crmf         273
+#define OBJ_id_mod_crmf         OBJ_id_pkix_mod,5L
+
+#define SN_id_mod_cmc           "id-mod-cmc"
+#define NID_id_mod_cmc          274
+#define OBJ_id_mod_cmc          OBJ_id_pkix_mod,6L
+
+#define SN_id_mod_kea_profile_88                "id-mod-kea-profile-88"
+#define NID_id_mod_kea_profile_88               275
+#define OBJ_id_mod_kea_profile_88               OBJ_id_pkix_mod,7L
+
+#define SN_id_mod_kea_profile_93                "id-mod-kea-profile-93"
+#define NID_id_mod_kea_profile_93               276
+#define OBJ_id_mod_kea_profile_93               OBJ_id_pkix_mod,8L
+
+#define SN_id_mod_cmp           "id-mod-cmp"
+#define NID_id_mod_cmp          277
+#define OBJ_id_mod_cmp          OBJ_id_pkix_mod,9L
+
+#define SN_id_mod_qualified_cert_88             "id-mod-qualified-cert-88"
+#define NID_id_mod_qualified_cert_88            278
+#define OBJ_id_mod_qualified_cert_88            OBJ_id_pkix_mod,10L
+
+#define SN_id_mod_qualified_cert_93             "id-mod-qualified-cert-93"
+#define NID_id_mod_qualified_cert_93            279
+#define OBJ_id_mod_qualified_cert_93            OBJ_id_pkix_mod,11L
+
+#define SN_id_mod_attribute_cert                "id-mod-attribute-cert"
+#define NID_id_mod_attribute_cert               280
+#define OBJ_id_mod_attribute_cert               OBJ_id_pkix_mod,12L
+
+#define SN_id_mod_timestamp_protocol            "id-mod-timestamp-protocol"
+#define NID_id_mod_timestamp_protocol           281
+#define OBJ_id_mod_timestamp_protocol           OBJ_id_pkix_mod,13L
+
+#define SN_id_mod_ocsp          "id-mod-ocsp"
+#define NID_id_mod_ocsp         282
+#define OBJ_id_mod_ocsp         OBJ_id_pkix_mod,14L
+
+#define SN_id_mod_dvcs          "id-mod-dvcs"
+#define NID_id_mod_dvcs         283
+#define OBJ_id_mod_dvcs         OBJ_id_pkix_mod,15L
+
+#define SN_id_mod_cmp2000               "id-mod-cmp2000"
+#define NID_id_mod_cmp2000              284
+#define OBJ_id_mod_cmp2000              OBJ_id_pkix_mod,16L
+
+#define SN_info_access          "authorityInfoAccess"
+#define LN_info_access          "Authority Information Access"
+#define NID_info_access         177
+#define OBJ_info_access         OBJ_id_pe,1L
+
+#define SN_biometricInfo                "biometricInfo"
+#define LN_biometricInfo                "Biometric Info"
+#define NID_biometricInfo               285
+#define OBJ_biometricInfo               OBJ_id_pe,2L
+
+#define SN_qcStatements         "qcStatements"
+#define NID_qcStatements                286
+#define OBJ_qcStatements                OBJ_id_pe,3L
+
+#define SN_ac_auditEntity               "ac-auditEntity"
+#define NID_ac_auditEntity              287
+#define OBJ_ac_auditEntity              OBJ_id_pe,4L
+
+#define SN_ac_targeting         "ac-targeting"
+#define NID_ac_targeting                288
+#define OBJ_ac_targeting                OBJ_id_pe,5L
+
+#define SN_aaControls           "aaControls"
+#define NID_aaControls          289
+#define OBJ_aaControls          OBJ_id_pe,6L
+
+#define SN_sbgp_ipAddrBlock             "sbgp-ipAddrBlock"
+#define NID_sbgp_ipAddrBlock            290
+#define OBJ_sbgp_ipAddrBlock            OBJ_id_pe,7L
+
+#define SN_sbgp_autonomousSysNum                "sbgp-autonomousSysNum"
+#define NID_sbgp_autonomousSysNum               291
+#define OBJ_sbgp_autonomousSysNum               OBJ_id_pe,8L
+
+#define SN_sbgp_routerIdentifier                "sbgp-routerIdentifier"
+#define NID_sbgp_routerIdentifier               292
+#define OBJ_sbgp_routerIdentifier               OBJ_id_pe,9L
+
+#define SN_ac_proxying          "ac-proxying"
+#define NID_ac_proxying         397
+#define OBJ_ac_proxying         OBJ_id_pe,10L
+
+#define SN_sinfo_access         "subjectInfoAccess"
+#define LN_sinfo_access         "Subject Information Access"
+#define NID_sinfo_access                398
+#define OBJ_sinfo_access                OBJ_id_pe,11L
+
+#define SN_proxyCertInfo                "proxyCertInfo"
+#define LN_proxyCertInfo                "Proxy Certificate Information"
+#define NID_proxyCertInfo               663
+#define OBJ_proxyCertInfo               OBJ_id_pe,14L
+
+#define SN_tlsfeature           "tlsfeature"
+#define LN_tlsfeature           "TLS Feature"
+#define NID_tlsfeature          1020
+#define OBJ_tlsfeature          OBJ_id_pe,24L
+
+#define SN_id_qt_cps            "id-qt-cps"
+#define LN_id_qt_cps            "Policy Qualifier CPS"
+#define NID_id_qt_cps           164
+#define OBJ_id_qt_cps           OBJ_id_qt,1L
+
+#define SN_id_qt_unotice                "id-qt-unotice"
+#define LN_id_qt_unotice                "Policy Qualifier User Notice"
+#define NID_id_qt_unotice               165
+#define OBJ_id_qt_unotice               OBJ_id_qt,2L
+
+#define SN_textNotice           "textNotice"
+#define NID_textNotice          293
+#define OBJ_textNotice          OBJ_id_qt,3L
+
+#define SN_server_auth          "serverAuth"
+#define LN_server_auth          "TLS Web Server Authentication"
+#define NID_server_auth         129
+#define OBJ_server_auth         OBJ_id_kp,1L
+
+#define SN_client_auth          "clientAuth"
+#define LN_client_auth          "TLS Web Client Authentication"
+#define NID_client_auth         130
+#define OBJ_client_auth         OBJ_id_kp,2L
+
+#define SN_code_sign            "codeSigning"
+#define LN_code_sign            "Code Signing"
+#define NID_code_sign           131
+#define OBJ_code_sign           OBJ_id_kp,3L
+
+#define SN_email_protect                "emailProtection"
+#define LN_email_protect                "E-mail Protection"
+#define NID_email_protect               132
+#define OBJ_email_protect               OBJ_id_kp,4L
+
+#define SN_ipsecEndSystem               "ipsecEndSystem"
+#define LN_ipsecEndSystem               "IPSec End System"
+#define NID_ipsecEndSystem              294
+#define OBJ_ipsecEndSystem              OBJ_id_kp,5L
+
+#define SN_ipsecTunnel          "ipsecTunnel"
+#define LN_ipsecTunnel          "IPSec Tunnel"
+#define NID_ipsecTunnel         295
+#define OBJ_ipsecTunnel         OBJ_id_kp,6L
+
+#define SN_ipsecUser            "ipsecUser"
+#define LN_ipsecUser            "IPSec User"
+#define NID_ipsecUser           296
+#define OBJ_ipsecUser           OBJ_id_kp,7L
+
+#define SN_time_stamp           "timeStamping"
+#define LN_time_stamp           "Time Stamping"
+#define NID_time_stamp          133
+#define OBJ_time_stamp          OBJ_id_kp,8L
+
+#define SN_OCSP_sign            "OCSPSigning"
+#define LN_OCSP_sign            "OCSP Signing"
+#define NID_OCSP_sign           180
+#define OBJ_OCSP_sign           OBJ_id_kp,9L
+
+#define SN_dvcs         "DVCS"
+#define LN_dvcs         "dvcs"
+#define NID_dvcs                297
+#define OBJ_dvcs                OBJ_id_kp,10L
+
+#define SN_ipsec_IKE            "ipsecIKE"
+#define LN_ipsec_IKE            "ipsec Internet Key Exchange"
+#define NID_ipsec_IKE           1022
+#define OBJ_ipsec_IKE           OBJ_id_kp,17L
+
+#define SN_capwapAC             "capwapAC"
+#define LN_capwapAC             "Ctrl/provision WAP Access"
+#define NID_capwapAC            1023
+#define OBJ_capwapAC            OBJ_id_kp,18L
+
+#define SN_capwapWTP            "capwapWTP"
+#define LN_capwapWTP            "Ctrl/Provision WAP Termination"
+#define NID_capwapWTP           1024
+#define OBJ_capwapWTP           OBJ_id_kp,19L
+
+#define SN_sshClient            "secureShellClient"
+#define LN_sshClient            "SSH Client"
+#define NID_sshClient           1025
+#define OBJ_sshClient           OBJ_id_kp,21L
+
+#define SN_sshServer            "secureShellServer"
+#define LN_sshServer            "SSH Server"
+#define NID_sshServer           1026
+#define OBJ_sshServer           OBJ_id_kp,22L
+
+#define SN_sendRouter           "sendRouter"
+#define LN_sendRouter           "Send Router"
+#define NID_sendRouter          1027
+#define OBJ_sendRouter          OBJ_id_kp,23L
+
+#define SN_sendProxiedRouter            "sendProxiedRouter"
+#define LN_sendProxiedRouter            "Send Proxied Router"
+#define NID_sendProxiedRouter           1028
+#define OBJ_sendProxiedRouter           OBJ_id_kp,24L
+
+#define SN_sendOwner            "sendOwner"
+#define LN_sendOwner            "Send Owner"
+#define NID_sendOwner           1029
+#define OBJ_sendOwner           OBJ_id_kp,25L
+
+#define SN_sendProxiedOwner             "sendProxiedOwner"
+#define LN_sendProxiedOwner             "Send Proxied Owner"
+#define NID_sendProxiedOwner            1030
+#define OBJ_sendProxiedOwner            OBJ_id_kp,26L
+
+#define SN_id_it_caProtEncCert          "id-it-caProtEncCert"
+#define NID_id_it_caProtEncCert         298
+#define OBJ_id_it_caProtEncCert         OBJ_id_it,1L
+
+#define SN_id_it_signKeyPairTypes               "id-it-signKeyPairTypes"
+#define NID_id_it_signKeyPairTypes              299
+#define OBJ_id_it_signKeyPairTypes              OBJ_id_it,2L
+
+#define SN_id_it_encKeyPairTypes                "id-it-encKeyPairTypes"
+#define NID_id_it_encKeyPairTypes               300
+#define OBJ_id_it_encKeyPairTypes               OBJ_id_it,3L
+
+#define SN_id_it_preferredSymmAlg               "id-it-preferredSymmAlg"
+#define NID_id_it_preferredSymmAlg              301
+#define OBJ_id_it_preferredSymmAlg              OBJ_id_it,4L
+
+#define SN_id_it_caKeyUpdateInfo                "id-it-caKeyUpdateInfo"
+#define NID_id_it_caKeyUpdateInfo               302
+#define OBJ_id_it_caKeyUpdateInfo               OBJ_id_it,5L
+
+#define SN_id_it_currentCRL             "id-it-currentCRL"
+#define NID_id_it_currentCRL            303
+#define OBJ_id_it_currentCRL            OBJ_id_it,6L
+
+#define SN_id_it_unsupportedOIDs                "id-it-unsupportedOIDs"
+#define NID_id_it_unsupportedOIDs               304
+#define OBJ_id_it_unsupportedOIDs               OBJ_id_it,7L
+
+#define SN_id_it_subscriptionRequest            "id-it-subscriptionRequest"
+#define NID_id_it_subscriptionRequest           305
+#define OBJ_id_it_subscriptionRequest           OBJ_id_it,8L
+
+#define SN_id_it_subscriptionResponse           "id-it-subscriptionResponse"
+#define NID_id_it_subscriptionResponse          306
+#define OBJ_id_it_subscriptionResponse          OBJ_id_it,9L
+
+#define SN_id_it_keyPairParamReq                "id-it-keyPairParamReq"
+#define NID_id_it_keyPairParamReq               307
+#define OBJ_id_it_keyPairParamReq               OBJ_id_it,10L
+
+#define SN_id_it_keyPairParamRep                "id-it-keyPairParamRep"
+#define NID_id_it_keyPairParamRep               308
+#define OBJ_id_it_keyPairParamRep               OBJ_id_it,11L
+
+#define SN_id_it_revPassphrase          "id-it-revPassphrase"
+#define NID_id_it_revPassphrase         309
+#define OBJ_id_it_revPassphrase         OBJ_id_it,12L
+
+#define SN_id_it_implicitConfirm                "id-it-implicitConfirm"
+#define NID_id_it_implicitConfirm               310
+#define OBJ_id_it_implicitConfirm               OBJ_id_it,13L
+
+#define SN_id_it_confirmWaitTime                "id-it-confirmWaitTime"
+#define NID_id_it_confirmWaitTime               311
+#define OBJ_id_it_confirmWaitTime               OBJ_id_it,14L
+
+#define SN_id_it_origPKIMessage         "id-it-origPKIMessage"
+#define NID_id_it_origPKIMessage                312
+#define OBJ_id_it_origPKIMessage                OBJ_id_it,15L
+
+#define SN_id_it_suppLangTags           "id-it-suppLangTags"
+#define NID_id_it_suppLangTags          784
+#define OBJ_id_it_suppLangTags          OBJ_id_it,16L
+
+#define SN_id_regCtrl           "id-regCtrl"
+#define NID_id_regCtrl          313
+#define OBJ_id_regCtrl          OBJ_id_pkip,1L
+
+#define SN_id_regInfo           "id-regInfo"
+#define NID_id_regInfo          314
+#define OBJ_id_regInfo          OBJ_id_pkip,2L
+
+#define SN_id_regCtrl_regToken          "id-regCtrl-regToken"
+#define NID_id_regCtrl_regToken         315
+#define OBJ_id_regCtrl_regToken         OBJ_id_regCtrl,1L
+
+#define SN_id_regCtrl_authenticator             "id-regCtrl-authenticator"
+#define NID_id_regCtrl_authenticator            316
+#define OBJ_id_regCtrl_authenticator            OBJ_id_regCtrl,2L
+
+#define SN_id_regCtrl_pkiPublicationInfo                "id-regCtrl-pkiPublicationInfo"
+#define NID_id_regCtrl_pkiPublicationInfo               317
+#define OBJ_id_regCtrl_pkiPublicationInfo               OBJ_id_regCtrl,3L
+
+#define SN_id_regCtrl_pkiArchiveOptions         "id-regCtrl-pkiArchiveOptions"
+#define NID_id_regCtrl_pkiArchiveOptions                318
+#define OBJ_id_regCtrl_pkiArchiveOptions                OBJ_id_regCtrl,4L
+
+#define SN_id_regCtrl_oldCertID         "id-regCtrl-oldCertID"
+#define NID_id_regCtrl_oldCertID                319
+#define OBJ_id_regCtrl_oldCertID                OBJ_id_regCtrl,5L
+
+#define SN_id_regCtrl_protocolEncrKey           "id-regCtrl-protocolEncrKey"
+#define NID_id_regCtrl_protocolEncrKey          320
+#define OBJ_id_regCtrl_protocolEncrKey          OBJ_id_regCtrl,6L
+
+#define SN_id_regInfo_utf8Pairs         "id-regInfo-utf8Pairs"
+#define NID_id_regInfo_utf8Pairs                321
+#define OBJ_id_regInfo_utf8Pairs                OBJ_id_regInfo,1L
+
+#define SN_id_regInfo_certReq           "id-regInfo-certReq"
+#define NID_id_regInfo_certReq          322
+#define OBJ_id_regInfo_certReq          OBJ_id_regInfo,2L
+
+#define SN_id_alg_des40         "id-alg-des40"
+#define NID_id_alg_des40                323
+#define OBJ_id_alg_des40                OBJ_id_alg,1L
+
+#define SN_id_alg_noSignature           "id-alg-noSignature"
+#define NID_id_alg_noSignature          324
+#define OBJ_id_alg_noSignature          OBJ_id_alg,2L
+
+#define SN_id_alg_dh_sig_hmac_sha1              "id-alg-dh-sig-hmac-sha1"
+#define NID_id_alg_dh_sig_hmac_sha1             325
+#define OBJ_id_alg_dh_sig_hmac_sha1             OBJ_id_alg,3L
+
+#define SN_id_alg_dh_pop                "id-alg-dh-pop"
+#define NID_id_alg_dh_pop               326
+#define OBJ_id_alg_dh_pop               OBJ_id_alg,4L
+
+#define SN_id_cmc_statusInfo            "id-cmc-statusInfo"
+#define NID_id_cmc_statusInfo           327
+#define OBJ_id_cmc_statusInfo           OBJ_id_cmc,1L
+
+#define SN_id_cmc_identification                "id-cmc-identification"
+#define NID_id_cmc_identification               328
+#define OBJ_id_cmc_identification               OBJ_id_cmc,2L
+
+#define SN_id_cmc_identityProof         "id-cmc-identityProof"
+#define NID_id_cmc_identityProof                329
+#define OBJ_id_cmc_identityProof                OBJ_id_cmc,3L
+
+#define SN_id_cmc_dataReturn            "id-cmc-dataReturn"
+#define NID_id_cmc_dataReturn           330
+#define OBJ_id_cmc_dataReturn           OBJ_id_cmc,4L
+
+#define SN_id_cmc_transactionId         "id-cmc-transactionId"
+#define NID_id_cmc_transactionId                331
+#define OBJ_id_cmc_transactionId                OBJ_id_cmc,5L
+
+#define SN_id_cmc_senderNonce           "id-cmc-senderNonce"
+#define NID_id_cmc_senderNonce          332
+#define OBJ_id_cmc_senderNonce          OBJ_id_cmc,6L
+
+#define SN_id_cmc_recipientNonce                "id-cmc-recipientNonce"
+#define NID_id_cmc_recipientNonce               333
+#define OBJ_id_cmc_recipientNonce               OBJ_id_cmc,7L
+
+#define SN_id_cmc_addExtensions         "id-cmc-addExtensions"
+#define NID_id_cmc_addExtensions                334
+#define OBJ_id_cmc_addExtensions                OBJ_id_cmc,8L
+
+#define SN_id_cmc_encryptedPOP          "id-cmc-encryptedPOP"
+#define NID_id_cmc_encryptedPOP         335
+#define OBJ_id_cmc_encryptedPOP         OBJ_id_cmc,9L
+
+#define SN_id_cmc_decryptedPOP          "id-cmc-decryptedPOP"
+#define NID_id_cmc_decryptedPOP         336
+#define OBJ_id_cmc_decryptedPOP         OBJ_id_cmc,10L
+
+#define SN_id_cmc_lraPOPWitness         "id-cmc-lraPOPWitness"
+#define NID_id_cmc_lraPOPWitness                337
+#define OBJ_id_cmc_lraPOPWitness                OBJ_id_cmc,11L
+
+#define SN_id_cmc_getCert               "id-cmc-getCert"
+#define NID_id_cmc_getCert              338
+#define OBJ_id_cmc_getCert              OBJ_id_cmc,15L
+
+#define SN_id_cmc_getCRL                "id-cmc-getCRL"
+#define NID_id_cmc_getCRL               339
+#define OBJ_id_cmc_getCRL               OBJ_id_cmc,16L
+
+#define SN_id_cmc_revokeRequest         "id-cmc-revokeRequest"
+#define NID_id_cmc_revokeRequest                340
+#define OBJ_id_cmc_revokeRequest                OBJ_id_cmc,17L
+
+#define SN_id_cmc_regInfo               "id-cmc-regInfo"
+#define NID_id_cmc_regInfo              341
+#define OBJ_id_cmc_regInfo              OBJ_id_cmc,18L
+
+#define SN_id_cmc_responseInfo          "id-cmc-responseInfo"
+#define NID_id_cmc_responseInfo         342
+#define OBJ_id_cmc_responseInfo         OBJ_id_cmc,19L
+
+#define SN_id_cmc_queryPending          "id-cmc-queryPending"
+#define NID_id_cmc_queryPending         343
+#define OBJ_id_cmc_queryPending         OBJ_id_cmc,21L
+
+#define SN_id_cmc_popLinkRandom         "id-cmc-popLinkRandom"
+#define NID_id_cmc_popLinkRandom                344
+#define OBJ_id_cmc_popLinkRandom                OBJ_id_cmc,22L
+
+#define SN_id_cmc_popLinkWitness                "id-cmc-popLinkWitness"
+#define NID_id_cmc_popLinkWitness               345
+#define OBJ_id_cmc_popLinkWitness               OBJ_id_cmc,23L
+
+#define SN_id_cmc_confirmCertAcceptance         "id-cmc-confirmCertAcceptance"
+#define NID_id_cmc_confirmCertAcceptance                346
+#define OBJ_id_cmc_confirmCertAcceptance                OBJ_id_cmc,24L
+
+#define SN_id_on_personalData           "id-on-personalData"
+#define NID_id_on_personalData          347
+#define OBJ_id_on_personalData          OBJ_id_on,1L
+
+#define SN_id_on_permanentIdentifier            "id-on-permanentIdentifier"
+#define LN_id_on_permanentIdentifier            "Permanent Identifier"
+#define NID_id_on_permanentIdentifier           858
+#define OBJ_id_on_permanentIdentifier           OBJ_id_on,3L
+
+#define SN_id_pda_dateOfBirth           "id-pda-dateOfBirth"
+#define NID_id_pda_dateOfBirth          348
+#define OBJ_id_pda_dateOfBirth          OBJ_id_pda,1L
+
+#define SN_id_pda_placeOfBirth          "id-pda-placeOfBirth"
+#define NID_id_pda_placeOfBirth         349
+#define OBJ_id_pda_placeOfBirth         OBJ_id_pda,2L
+
+#define SN_id_pda_gender                "id-pda-gender"
+#define NID_id_pda_gender               351
+#define OBJ_id_pda_gender               OBJ_id_pda,3L
+
+#define SN_id_pda_countryOfCitizenship          "id-pda-countryOfCitizenship"
+#define NID_id_pda_countryOfCitizenship         352
+#define OBJ_id_pda_countryOfCitizenship         OBJ_id_pda,4L
+
+#define SN_id_pda_countryOfResidence            "id-pda-countryOfResidence"
+#define NID_id_pda_countryOfResidence           353
+#define OBJ_id_pda_countryOfResidence           OBJ_id_pda,5L
+
+#define SN_id_aca_authenticationInfo            "id-aca-authenticationInfo"
+#define NID_id_aca_authenticationInfo           354
+#define OBJ_id_aca_authenticationInfo           OBJ_id_aca,1L
+
+#define SN_id_aca_accessIdentity                "id-aca-accessIdentity"
+#define NID_id_aca_accessIdentity               355
+#define OBJ_id_aca_accessIdentity               OBJ_id_aca,2L
+
+#define SN_id_aca_chargingIdentity              "id-aca-chargingIdentity"
+#define NID_id_aca_chargingIdentity             356
+#define OBJ_id_aca_chargingIdentity             OBJ_id_aca,3L
+
+#define SN_id_aca_group         "id-aca-group"
+#define NID_id_aca_group                357
+#define OBJ_id_aca_group                OBJ_id_aca,4L
+
+#define SN_id_aca_role          "id-aca-role"
+#define NID_id_aca_role         358
+#define OBJ_id_aca_role         OBJ_id_aca,5L
+
+#define SN_id_aca_encAttrs              "id-aca-encAttrs"
+#define NID_id_aca_encAttrs             399
+#define OBJ_id_aca_encAttrs             OBJ_id_aca,6L
+
+#define SN_id_qcs_pkixQCSyntax_v1               "id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v1"
+#define NID_id_qcs_pkixQCSyntax_v1              359
+#define OBJ_id_qcs_pkixQCSyntax_v1              OBJ_id_qcs,1L
+
+#define SN_id_cct_crs           "id-cct-crs"
+#define NID_id_cct_crs          360
+#define OBJ_id_cct_crs          OBJ_id_cct,1L
+
+#define SN_id_cct_PKIData               "id-cct-PKIData"
+#define NID_id_cct_PKIData              361
+#define OBJ_id_cct_PKIData              OBJ_id_cct,2L
+
+#define SN_id_cct_PKIResponse           "id-cct-PKIResponse"
+#define NID_id_cct_PKIResponse          362
+#define OBJ_id_cct_PKIResponse          OBJ_id_cct,3L
+
+#define SN_id_ppl_anyLanguage           "id-ppl-anyLanguage"
+#define LN_id_ppl_anyLanguage           "Any language"
+#define NID_id_ppl_anyLanguage          664
+#define OBJ_id_ppl_anyLanguage          OBJ_id_ppl,0L
+
+#define SN_id_ppl_inheritAll            "id-ppl-inheritAll"
+#define LN_id_ppl_inheritAll            "Inherit all"
+#define NID_id_ppl_inheritAll           665
+#define OBJ_id_ppl_inheritAll           OBJ_id_ppl,1L
+
+#define SN_Independent          "id-ppl-independent"
+#define LN_Independent          "Independent"
+#define NID_Independent         667
+#define OBJ_Independent         OBJ_id_ppl,2L
+
+#define SN_ad_OCSP              "OCSP"
+#define LN_ad_OCSP              "OCSP"
+#define NID_ad_OCSP             178
+#define OBJ_ad_OCSP             OBJ_id_ad,1L
+
+#define SN_ad_ca_issuers                "caIssuers"
+#define LN_ad_ca_issuers                "CA Issuers"
+#define NID_ad_ca_issuers               179
+#define OBJ_ad_ca_issuers               OBJ_id_ad,2L
+
+#define SN_ad_timeStamping              "ad_timestamping"
+#define LN_ad_timeStamping              "AD Time Stamping"
+#define NID_ad_timeStamping             363
+#define OBJ_ad_timeStamping             OBJ_id_ad,3L
+
+#define SN_ad_dvcs              "AD_DVCS"
+#define LN_ad_dvcs              "ad dvcs"
+#define NID_ad_dvcs             364
+#define OBJ_ad_dvcs             OBJ_id_ad,4L
+
+#define SN_caRepository         "caRepository"
+#define LN_caRepository         "CA Repository"
+#define NID_caRepository                785
+#define OBJ_caRepository                OBJ_id_ad,5L
+
+#define OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP                OBJ_ad_OCSP
+
+#define SN_id_pkix_OCSP_basic           "basicOCSPResponse"
+#define LN_id_pkix_OCSP_basic           "Basic OCSP Response"
+#define NID_id_pkix_OCSP_basic          365
+#define OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_basic          OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP,1L
+
+#define SN_id_pkix_OCSP_Nonce           "Nonce"
+#define LN_id_pkix_OCSP_Nonce           "OCSP Nonce"
+#define NID_id_pkix_OCSP_Nonce          366
+#define OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_Nonce          OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP,2L
+
+#define SN_id_pkix_OCSP_CrlID           "CrlID"
+#define LN_id_pkix_OCSP_CrlID           "OCSP CRL ID"
+#define NID_id_pkix_OCSP_CrlID          367
+#define OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_CrlID          OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP,3L
+
+#define SN_id_pkix_OCSP_acceptableResponses             "acceptableResponses"
+#define LN_id_pkix_OCSP_acceptableResponses             "Acceptable OCSP Responses"
+#define NID_id_pkix_OCSP_acceptableResponses            368
+#define OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_acceptableResponses            OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP,4L
+
+#define SN_id_pkix_OCSP_noCheck         "noCheck"
+#define LN_id_pkix_OCSP_noCheck         "OCSP No Check"
+#define NID_id_pkix_OCSP_noCheck                369
+#define OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_noCheck                OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP,5L
+
+#define SN_id_pkix_OCSP_archiveCutoff           "archiveCutoff"
+#define LN_id_pkix_OCSP_archiveCutoff           "OCSP Archive Cutoff"
+#define NID_id_pkix_OCSP_archiveCutoff          370
+#define OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_archiveCutoff          OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP,6L
+
+#define SN_id_pkix_OCSP_serviceLocator          "serviceLocator"
+#define LN_id_pkix_OCSP_serviceLocator          "OCSP Service Locator"
+#define NID_id_pkix_OCSP_serviceLocator         371
+#define OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_serviceLocator         OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP,7L
+
+#define SN_id_pkix_OCSP_extendedStatus          "extendedStatus"
+#define LN_id_pkix_OCSP_extendedStatus          "Extended OCSP Status"
+#define NID_id_pkix_OCSP_extendedStatus         372
+#define OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_extendedStatus         OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP,8L
+
+#define SN_id_pkix_OCSP_valid           "valid"
+#define NID_id_pkix_OCSP_valid          373
+#define OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_valid          OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP,9L
+
+#define SN_id_pkix_OCSP_path            "path"
+#define NID_id_pkix_OCSP_path           374
+#define OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_path           OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP,10L
+
+#define SN_id_pkix_OCSP_trustRoot               "trustRoot"
+#define LN_id_pkix_OCSP_trustRoot               "Trust Root"
+#define NID_id_pkix_OCSP_trustRoot              375
+#define OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_trustRoot              OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP,11L
+
+#define SN_algorithm            "algorithm"
+#define LN_algorithm            "algorithm"
+#define NID_algorithm           376
+#define OBJ_algorithm           1L,3L,14L,3L,2L
+
+#define SN_md5WithRSA           "RSA-NP-MD5"
+#define LN_md5WithRSA           "md5WithRSA"
+#define NID_md5WithRSA          104
+#define OBJ_md5WithRSA          OBJ_algorithm,3L
+
+#define SN_des_ecb              "DES-ECB"
+#define LN_des_ecb              "des-ecb"
+#define NID_des_ecb             29
+#define OBJ_des_ecb             OBJ_algorithm,6L
+
+#define SN_des_cbc              "DES-CBC"
+#define LN_des_cbc              "des-cbc"
+#define NID_des_cbc             31
+#define OBJ_des_cbc             OBJ_algorithm,7L
+
+#define SN_des_ofb64            "DES-OFB"
+#define LN_des_ofb64            "des-ofb"
+#define NID_des_ofb64           45
+#define OBJ_des_ofb64           OBJ_algorithm,8L
+
+#define SN_des_cfb64            "DES-CFB"
+#define LN_des_cfb64            "des-cfb"
+#define NID_des_cfb64           30
+#define OBJ_des_cfb64           OBJ_algorithm,9L
+
+#define SN_rsaSignature         "rsaSignature"
+#define NID_rsaSignature                377
+#define OBJ_rsaSignature                OBJ_algorithm,11L
+
+#define SN_dsa_2                "DSA-old"
+#define LN_dsa_2                "dsaEncryption-old"
+#define NID_dsa_2               67
+#define OBJ_dsa_2               OBJ_algorithm,12L
+
+#define SN_dsaWithSHA           "DSA-SHA"
+#define LN_dsaWithSHA           "dsaWithSHA"
+#define NID_dsaWithSHA          66
+#define OBJ_dsaWithSHA          OBJ_algorithm,13L
+
+#define SN_shaWithRSAEncryption         "RSA-SHA"
+#define LN_shaWithRSAEncryption         "shaWithRSAEncryption"
+#define NID_shaWithRSAEncryption                42
+#define OBJ_shaWithRSAEncryption                OBJ_algorithm,15L
+
+#define SN_des_ede_ecb          "DES-EDE"
+#define LN_des_ede_ecb          "des-ede"
+#define NID_des_ede_ecb         32
+#define OBJ_des_ede_ecb         OBJ_algorithm,17L
+
+#define SN_des_ede3_ecb         "DES-EDE3"
+#define LN_des_ede3_ecb         "des-ede3"
+#define NID_des_ede3_ecb                33
+
+#define SN_des_ede_cbc          "DES-EDE-CBC"
+#define LN_des_ede_cbc          "des-ede-cbc"
+#define NID_des_ede_cbc         43
+
+#define SN_des_ede_cfb64                "DES-EDE-CFB"
+#define LN_des_ede_cfb64                "des-ede-cfb"
+#define NID_des_ede_cfb64               60
+
+#define SN_des_ede3_cfb64               "DES-EDE3-CFB"
+#define LN_des_ede3_cfb64               "des-ede3-cfb"
+#define NID_des_ede3_cfb64              61
+
+#define SN_des_ede_ofb64                "DES-EDE-OFB"
+#define LN_des_ede_ofb64                "des-ede-ofb"
+#define NID_des_ede_ofb64               62
+
+#define SN_des_ede3_ofb64               "DES-EDE3-OFB"
+#define LN_des_ede3_ofb64               "des-ede3-ofb"
+#define NID_des_ede3_ofb64              63
+
+#define SN_desx_cbc             "DESX-CBC"
+#define LN_desx_cbc             "desx-cbc"
+#define NID_desx_cbc            80
+
+#define SN_sha          "SHA"
+#define LN_sha          "sha"
+#define NID_sha         41
+#define OBJ_sha         OBJ_algorithm,18L
+
+#define SN_sha1         "SHA1"
+#define LN_sha1         "sha1"
+#define NID_sha1                64
+#define OBJ_sha1                OBJ_algorithm,26L
+
+#define SN_dsaWithSHA1_2                "DSA-SHA1-old"
+#define LN_dsaWithSHA1_2                "dsaWithSHA1-old"
+#define NID_dsaWithSHA1_2               70
+#define OBJ_dsaWithSHA1_2               OBJ_algorithm,27L
+
+#define SN_sha1WithRSA          "RSA-SHA1-2"
+#define LN_sha1WithRSA          "sha1WithRSA"
+#define NID_sha1WithRSA         115
+#define OBJ_sha1WithRSA         OBJ_algorithm,29L
+
+#define SN_ripemd160            "RIPEMD160"
+#define LN_ripemd160            "ripemd160"
+#define NID_ripemd160           117
+#define OBJ_ripemd160           1L,3L,36L,3L,2L,1L
+
+#define SN_ripemd160WithRSA             "RSA-RIPEMD160"
+#define LN_ripemd160WithRSA             "ripemd160WithRSA"
+#define NID_ripemd160WithRSA            119
+#define OBJ_ripemd160WithRSA            1L,3L,36L,3L,3L,1L,2L
+
+#define SN_blake2b512           "BLAKE2b512"
+#define LN_blake2b512           "blake2b512"
+#define NID_blake2b512          1056
+#define OBJ_blake2b512          1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,1722L,12L,2L,1L,16L
+
+#define SN_blake2s256           "BLAKE2s256"
+#define LN_blake2s256           "blake2s256"
+#define NID_blake2s256          1057
+#define OBJ_blake2s256          1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,1722L,12L,2L,2L,8L
+
+#define SN_sxnet                "SXNetID"
+#define LN_sxnet                "Strong Extranet ID"
+#define NID_sxnet               143
+#define OBJ_sxnet               1L,3L,101L,1L,4L,1L
+
+#define SN_X500         "X500"
+#define LN_X500         "directory services (X.500)"
+#define NID_X500                11
+#define OBJ_X500                2L,5L
+
+#define SN_X509         "X509"
+#define NID_X509                12
+#define OBJ_X509                OBJ_X500,4L
+
+#define SN_commonName           "CN"
+#define LN_commonName           "commonName"
+#define NID_commonName          13
+#define OBJ_commonName          OBJ_X509,3L
+
+#define SN_surname              "SN"
+#define LN_surname              "surname"
+#define NID_surname             100
+#define OBJ_surname             OBJ_X509,4L
+
+#define LN_serialNumber         "serialNumber"
+#define NID_serialNumber                105
+#define OBJ_serialNumber                OBJ_X509,5L
+
+#define SN_countryName          "C"
+#define LN_countryName          "countryName"
+#define NID_countryName         14
+#define OBJ_countryName         OBJ_X509,6L
+
+#define SN_localityName         "L"
+#define LN_localityName         "localityName"
+#define NID_localityName                15
+#define OBJ_localityName                OBJ_X509,7L
+
+#define SN_stateOrProvinceName          "ST"
+#define LN_stateOrProvinceName          "stateOrProvinceName"
+#define NID_stateOrProvinceName         16
+#define OBJ_stateOrProvinceName         OBJ_X509,8L
+
+#define SN_streetAddress                "street"
+#define LN_streetAddress                "streetAddress"
+#define NID_streetAddress               660
+#define OBJ_streetAddress               OBJ_X509,9L
+
+#define SN_organizationName             "O"
+#define LN_organizationName             "organizationName"
+#define NID_organizationName            17
+#define OBJ_organizationName            OBJ_X509,10L
+
+#define SN_organizationalUnitName               "OU"
+#define LN_organizationalUnitName               "organizationalUnitName"
+#define NID_organizationalUnitName              18
+#define OBJ_organizationalUnitName              OBJ_X509,11L
+
+#define SN_title                "title"
+#define LN_title                "title"
+#define NID_title               106
+#define OBJ_title               OBJ_X509,12L
+
+#define LN_description          "description"
+#define NID_description         107
+#define OBJ_description         OBJ_X509,13L
+
+#define LN_searchGuide          "searchGuide"
+#define NID_searchGuide         859
+#define OBJ_searchGuide         OBJ_X509,14L
+
+#define LN_businessCategory             "businessCategory"
+#define NID_businessCategory            860
+#define OBJ_businessCategory            OBJ_X509,15L
+
+#define LN_postalAddress                "postalAddress"
+#define NID_postalAddress               861
+#define OBJ_postalAddress               OBJ_X509,16L
+
+#define LN_postalCode           "postalCode"
+#define NID_postalCode          661
+#define OBJ_postalCode          OBJ_X509,17L
+
+#define LN_postOfficeBox                "postOfficeBox"
+#define NID_postOfficeBox               862
+#define OBJ_postOfficeBox               OBJ_X509,18L
+
+#define LN_physicalDeliveryOfficeName           "physicalDeliveryOfficeName"
+#define NID_physicalDeliveryOfficeName          863
+#define OBJ_physicalDeliveryOfficeName          OBJ_X509,19L
+
+#define LN_telephoneNumber              "telephoneNumber"
+#define NID_telephoneNumber             864
+#define OBJ_telephoneNumber             OBJ_X509,20L
+
+#define LN_telexNumber          "telexNumber"
+#define NID_telexNumber         865
+#define OBJ_telexNumber         OBJ_X509,21L
+
+#define LN_teletexTerminalIdentifier            "teletexTerminalIdentifier"
+#define NID_teletexTerminalIdentifier           866
+#define OBJ_teletexTerminalIdentifier           OBJ_X509,22L
+
+#define LN_facsimileTelephoneNumber             "facsimileTelephoneNumber"
+#define NID_facsimileTelephoneNumber            867
+#define OBJ_facsimileTelephoneNumber            OBJ_X509,23L
+
+#define LN_x121Address          "x121Address"
+#define NID_x121Address         868
+#define OBJ_x121Address         OBJ_X509,24L
+
+#define LN_internationaliSDNNumber              "internationaliSDNNumber"
+#define NID_internationaliSDNNumber             869
+#define OBJ_internationaliSDNNumber             OBJ_X509,25L
+
+#define LN_registeredAddress            "registeredAddress"
+#define NID_registeredAddress           870
+#define OBJ_registeredAddress           OBJ_X509,26L
+
+#define LN_destinationIndicator         "destinationIndicator"
+#define NID_destinationIndicator                871
+#define OBJ_destinationIndicator                OBJ_X509,27L
+
+#define LN_preferredDeliveryMethod              "preferredDeliveryMethod"
+#define NID_preferredDeliveryMethod             872
+#define OBJ_preferredDeliveryMethod             OBJ_X509,28L
+
+#define LN_presentationAddress          "presentationAddress"
+#define NID_presentationAddress         873
+#define OBJ_presentationAddress         OBJ_X509,29L
+
+#define LN_supportedApplicationContext          "supportedApplicationContext"
+#define NID_supportedApplicationContext         874
+#define OBJ_supportedApplicationContext         OBJ_X509,30L
+
+#define SN_member               "member"
+#define NID_member              875
+#define OBJ_member              OBJ_X509,31L
+
+#define SN_owner                "owner"
+#define NID_owner               876
+#define OBJ_owner               OBJ_X509,32L
+
+#define LN_roleOccupant         "roleOccupant"
+#define NID_roleOccupant                877
+#define OBJ_roleOccupant                OBJ_X509,33L
+
+#define SN_seeAlso              "seeAlso"
+#define NID_seeAlso             878
+#define OBJ_seeAlso             OBJ_X509,34L
+
+#define LN_userPassword         "userPassword"
+#define NID_userPassword                879
+#define OBJ_userPassword                OBJ_X509,35L
+
+#define LN_userCertificate              "userCertificate"
+#define NID_userCertificate             880
+#define OBJ_userCertificate             OBJ_X509,36L
+
+#define LN_cACertificate                "cACertificate"
+#define NID_cACertificate               881
+#define OBJ_cACertificate               OBJ_X509,37L
+
+#define LN_authorityRevocationList              "authorityRevocationList"
+#define NID_authorityRevocationList             882
+#define OBJ_authorityRevocationList             OBJ_X509,38L
+
+#define LN_certificateRevocationList            "certificateRevocationList"
+#define NID_certificateRevocationList           883
+#define OBJ_certificateRevocationList           OBJ_X509,39L
+
+#define LN_crossCertificatePair         "crossCertificatePair"
+#define NID_crossCertificatePair                884
+#define OBJ_crossCertificatePair                OBJ_X509,40L
+
+#define SN_name         "name"
+#define LN_name         "name"
+#define NID_name                173
+#define OBJ_name                OBJ_X509,41L
+
+#define SN_givenName            "GN"
+#define LN_givenName            "givenName"
+#define NID_givenName           99
+#define OBJ_givenName           OBJ_X509,42L
+
+#define SN_initials             "initials"
+#define LN_initials             "initials"
+#define NID_initials            101
+#define OBJ_initials            OBJ_X509,43L
+
+#define LN_generationQualifier          "generationQualifier"
+#define NID_generationQualifier         509
+#define OBJ_generationQualifier         OBJ_X509,44L
+
+#define LN_x500UniqueIdentifier         "x500UniqueIdentifier"
+#define NID_x500UniqueIdentifier                503
+#define OBJ_x500UniqueIdentifier                OBJ_X509,45L
+
+#define SN_dnQualifier          "dnQualifier"
+#define LN_dnQualifier          "dnQualifier"
+#define NID_dnQualifier         174
+#define OBJ_dnQualifier         OBJ_X509,46L
+
+#define LN_enhancedSearchGuide          "enhancedSearchGuide"
+#define NID_enhancedSearchGuide         885
+#define OBJ_enhancedSearchGuide         OBJ_X509,47L
+
+#define LN_protocolInformation          "protocolInformation"
+#define NID_protocolInformation         886
+#define OBJ_protocolInformation         OBJ_X509,48L
+
+#define LN_distinguishedName            "distinguishedName"
+#define NID_distinguishedName           887
+#define OBJ_distinguishedName           OBJ_X509,49L
+
+#define LN_uniqueMember         "uniqueMember"
+#define NID_uniqueMember                888
+#define OBJ_uniqueMember                OBJ_X509,50L
+
+#define LN_houseIdentifier              "houseIdentifier"
+#define NID_houseIdentifier             889
+#define OBJ_houseIdentifier             OBJ_X509,51L
+
+#define LN_supportedAlgorithms          "supportedAlgorithms"
+#define NID_supportedAlgorithms         890
+#define OBJ_supportedAlgorithms         OBJ_X509,52L
+
+#define LN_deltaRevocationList          "deltaRevocationList"
+#define NID_deltaRevocationList         891
+#define OBJ_deltaRevocationList         OBJ_X509,53L
+
+#define SN_dmdName              "dmdName"
+#define NID_dmdName             892
+#define OBJ_dmdName             OBJ_X509,54L
+
+#define LN_pseudonym            "pseudonym"
+#define NID_pseudonym           510
+#define OBJ_pseudonym           OBJ_X509,65L
+
+#define SN_role         "role"
+#define LN_role         "role"
+#define NID_role                400
+#define OBJ_role                OBJ_X509,72L
+
+#define SN_X500algorithms               "X500algorithms"
+#define LN_X500algorithms               "directory services - algorithms"
+#define NID_X500algorithms              378
+#define OBJ_X500algorithms              OBJ_X500,8L
+
+#define SN_rsa          "RSA"
+#define LN_rsa          "rsa"
+#define NID_rsa         19
+#define OBJ_rsa         OBJ_X500algorithms,1L,1L
+
+#define SN_mdc2WithRSA          "RSA-MDC2"
+#define LN_mdc2WithRSA          "mdc2WithRSA"
+#define NID_mdc2WithRSA         96
+#define OBJ_mdc2WithRSA         OBJ_X500algorithms,3L,100L
+
+#define SN_mdc2         "MDC2"
+#define LN_mdc2         "mdc2"
+#define NID_mdc2                95
+#define OBJ_mdc2                OBJ_X500algorithms,3L,101L
+
+#define SN_id_ce                "id-ce"
+#define NID_id_ce               81
+#define OBJ_id_ce               OBJ_X500,29L
+
+#define SN_subject_directory_attributes         "subjectDirectoryAttributes"
+#define LN_subject_directory_attributes         "X509v3 Subject Directory Attributes"
+#define NID_subject_directory_attributes                769
+#define OBJ_subject_directory_attributes                OBJ_id_ce,9L
+
+#define SN_subject_key_identifier               "subjectKeyIdentifier"
+#define LN_subject_key_identifier               "X509v3 Subject Key Identifier"
+#define NID_subject_key_identifier              82
+#define OBJ_subject_key_identifier              OBJ_id_ce,14L
+
+#define SN_key_usage            "keyUsage"
+#define LN_key_usage            "X509v3 Key Usage"
+#define NID_key_usage           83
+#define OBJ_key_usage           OBJ_id_ce,15L
+
+#define SN_private_key_usage_period             "privateKeyUsagePeriod"
+#define LN_private_key_usage_period             "X509v3 Private Key Usage Period"
+#define NID_private_key_usage_period            84
+#define OBJ_private_key_usage_period            OBJ_id_ce,16L
+
+#define SN_subject_alt_name             "subjectAltName"
+#define LN_subject_alt_name             "X509v3 Subject Alternative Name"
+#define NID_subject_alt_name            85
+#define OBJ_subject_alt_name            OBJ_id_ce,17L
+
+#define SN_issuer_alt_name              "issuerAltName"
+#define LN_issuer_alt_name              "X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name"
+#define NID_issuer_alt_name             86
+#define OBJ_issuer_alt_name             OBJ_id_ce,18L
+
+#define SN_basic_constraints            "basicConstraints"
+#define LN_basic_constraints            "X509v3 Basic Constraints"
+#define NID_basic_constraints           87
+#define OBJ_basic_constraints           OBJ_id_ce,19L
+
+#define SN_crl_number           "crlNumber"
+#define LN_crl_number           "X509v3 CRL Number"
+#define NID_crl_number          88
+#define OBJ_crl_number          OBJ_id_ce,20L
+
+#define SN_crl_reason           "CRLReason"
+#define LN_crl_reason           "X509v3 CRL Reason Code"
+#define NID_crl_reason          141
+#define OBJ_crl_reason          OBJ_id_ce,21L
+
+#define SN_invalidity_date              "invalidityDate"
+#define LN_invalidity_date              "Invalidity Date"
+#define NID_invalidity_date             142
+#define OBJ_invalidity_date             OBJ_id_ce,24L
+
+#define SN_delta_crl            "deltaCRL"
+#define LN_delta_crl            "X509v3 Delta CRL Indicator"
+#define NID_delta_crl           140
+#define OBJ_delta_crl           OBJ_id_ce,27L
+
+#define SN_issuing_distribution_point           "issuingDistributionPoint"
+#define LN_issuing_distribution_point           "X509v3 Issuing Distribution Point"
+#define NID_issuing_distribution_point          770
+#define OBJ_issuing_distribution_point          OBJ_id_ce,28L
+
+#define SN_certificate_issuer           "certificateIssuer"
+#define LN_certificate_issuer           "X509v3 Certificate Issuer"
+#define NID_certificate_issuer          771
+#define OBJ_certificate_issuer          OBJ_id_ce,29L
+
+#define SN_name_constraints             "nameConstraints"
+#define LN_name_constraints             "X509v3 Name Constraints"
+#define NID_name_constraints            666
+#define OBJ_name_constraints            OBJ_id_ce,30L
+
+#define SN_crl_distribution_points              "crlDistributionPoints"
+#define LN_crl_distribution_points              "X509v3 CRL Distribution Points"
+#define NID_crl_distribution_points             103
+#define OBJ_crl_distribution_points             OBJ_id_ce,31L
+
+#define SN_certificate_policies         "certificatePolicies"
+#define LN_certificate_policies         "X509v3 Certificate Policies"
+#define NID_certificate_policies                89
+#define OBJ_certificate_policies                OBJ_id_ce,32L
+
+#define SN_any_policy           "anyPolicy"
+#define LN_any_policy           "X509v3 Any Policy"
+#define NID_any_policy          746
+#define OBJ_any_policy          OBJ_certificate_policies,0L
+
+#define SN_policy_mappings              "policyMappings"
+#define LN_policy_mappings              "X509v3 Policy Mappings"
+#define NID_policy_mappings             747
+#define OBJ_policy_mappings             OBJ_id_ce,33L
+
+#define SN_authority_key_identifier             "authorityKeyIdentifier"
+#define LN_authority_key_identifier             "X509v3 Authority Key Identifier"
+#define NID_authority_key_identifier            90
+#define OBJ_authority_key_identifier            OBJ_id_ce,35L
+
+#define SN_policy_constraints           "policyConstraints"
+#define LN_policy_constraints           "X509v3 Policy Constraints"
+#define NID_policy_constraints          401
+#define OBJ_policy_constraints          OBJ_id_ce,36L
+
+#define SN_ext_key_usage                "extendedKeyUsage"
+#define LN_ext_key_usage                "X509v3 Extended Key Usage"
+#define NID_ext_key_usage               126
+#define OBJ_ext_key_usage               OBJ_id_ce,37L
+
+#define SN_freshest_crl         "freshestCRL"
+#define LN_freshest_crl         "X509v3 Freshest CRL"
+#define NID_freshest_crl                857
+#define OBJ_freshest_crl                OBJ_id_ce,46L
+
+#define SN_inhibit_any_policy           "inhibitAnyPolicy"
+#define LN_inhibit_any_policy           "X509v3 Inhibit Any Policy"
+#define NID_inhibit_any_policy          748
+#define OBJ_inhibit_any_policy          OBJ_id_ce,54L
+
+#define SN_target_information           "targetInformation"
+#define LN_target_information           "X509v3 AC Targeting"
+#define NID_target_information          402
+#define OBJ_target_information          OBJ_id_ce,55L
+
+#define SN_no_rev_avail         "noRevAvail"
+#define LN_no_rev_avail         "X509v3 No Revocation Available"
+#define NID_no_rev_avail                403
+#define OBJ_no_rev_avail                OBJ_id_ce,56L
+
+#define SN_anyExtendedKeyUsage          "anyExtendedKeyUsage"
+#define LN_anyExtendedKeyUsage          "Any Extended Key Usage"
+#define NID_anyExtendedKeyUsage         910
+#define OBJ_anyExtendedKeyUsage         OBJ_ext_key_usage,0L
+
+#define SN_netscape             "Netscape"
+#define LN_netscape             "Netscape Communications Corp."
+#define NID_netscape            57
+#define OBJ_netscape            2L,16L,840L,1L,113730L
+
+#define SN_netscape_cert_extension              "nsCertExt"
+#define LN_netscape_cert_extension              "Netscape Certificate Extension"
+#define NID_netscape_cert_extension             58
+#define OBJ_netscape_cert_extension             OBJ_netscape,1L
+
+#define SN_netscape_data_type           "nsDataType"
+#define LN_netscape_data_type           "Netscape Data Type"
+#define NID_netscape_data_type          59
+#define OBJ_netscape_data_type          OBJ_netscape,2L
+
+#define SN_netscape_cert_type           "nsCertType"
+#define LN_netscape_cert_type           "Netscape Cert Type"
+#define NID_netscape_cert_type          71
+#define OBJ_netscape_cert_type          OBJ_netscape_cert_extension,1L
+
+#define SN_netscape_base_url            "nsBaseUrl"
+#define LN_netscape_base_url            "Netscape Base Url"
+#define NID_netscape_base_url           72
+#define OBJ_netscape_base_url           OBJ_netscape_cert_extension,2L
+
+#define SN_netscape_revocation_url              "nsRevocationUrl"
+#define LN_netscape_revocation_url              "Netscape Revocation Url"
+#define NID_netscape_revocation_url             73
+#define OBJ_netscape_revocation_url             OBJ_netscape_cert_extension,3L
+
+#define SN_netscape_ca_revocation_url           "nsCaRevocationUrl"
+#define LN_netscape_ca_revocation_url           "Netscape CA Revocation Url"
+#define NID_netscape_ca_revocation_url          74
+#define OBJ_netscape_ca_revocation_url          OBJ_netscape_cert_extension,4L
+
+#define SN_netscape_renewal_url         "nsRenewalUrl"
+#define LN_netscape_renewal_url         "Netscape Renewal Url"
+#define NID_netscape_renewal_url                75
+#define OBJ_netscape_renewal_url                OBJ_netscape_cert_extension,7L
+
+#define SN_netscape_ca_policy_url               "nsCaPolicyUrl"
+#define LN_netscape_ca_policy_url               "Netscape CA Policy Url"
+#define NID_netscape_ca_policy_url              76
+#define OBJ_netscape_ca_policy_url              OBJ_netscape_cert_extension,8L
+
+#define SN_netscape_ssl_server_name             "nsSslServerName"
+#define LN_netscape_ssl_server_name             "Netscape SSL Server Name"
+#define NID_netscape_ssl_server_name            77
+#define OBJ_netscape_ssl_server_name            OBJ_netscape_cert_extension,12L
+
+#define SN_netscape_comment             "nsComment"
+#define LN_netscape_comment             "Netscape Comment"
+#define NID_netscape_comment            78
+#define OBJ_netscape_comment            OBJ_netscape_cert_extension,13L
+
+#define SN_netscape_cert_sequence               "nsCertSequence"
+#define LN_netscape_cert_sequence               "Netscape Certificate Sequence"
+#define NID_netscape_cert_sequence              79
+#define OBJ_netscape_cert_sequence              OBJ_netscape_data_type,5L
+
+#define SN_ns_sgc               "nsSGC"
+#define LN_ns_sgc               "Netscape Server Gated Crypto"
+#define NID_ns_sgc              139
+#define OBJ_ns_sgc              OBJ_netscape,4L,1L
+
+#define SN_org          "ORG"
+#define LN_org          "org"
+#define NID_org         379
+#define OBJ_org         OBJ_iso,3L
+
+#define SN_dod          "DOD"
+#define LN_dod          "dod"
+#define NID_dod         380
+#define OBJ_dod         OBJ_org,6L
+
+#define SN_iana         "IANA"
+#define LN_iana         "iana"
+#define NID_iana                381
+#define OBJ_iana                OBJ_dod,1L
+
+#define OBJ_internet            OBJ_iana
+
+#define SN_Directory            "directory"
+#define LN_Directory            "Directory"
+#define NID_Directory           382
+#define OBJ_Directory           OBJ_internet,1L
+
+#define SN_Management           "mgmt"
+#define LN_Management           "Management"
+#define NID_Management          383
+#define OBJ_Management          OBJ_internet,2L
+
+#define SN_Experimental         "experimental"
+#define LN_Experimental         "Experimental"
+#define NID_Experimental                384
+#define OBJ_Experimental                OBJ_internet,3L
+
+#define SN_Private              "private"
+#define LN_Private              "Private"
+#define NID_Private             385
+#define OBJ_Private             OBJ_internet,4L
+
+#define SN_Security             "security"
+#define LN_Security             "Security"
+#define NID_Security            386
+#define OBJ_Security            OBJ_internet,5L
+
+#define SN_SNMPv2               "snmpv2"
+#define LN_SNMPv2               "SNMPv2"
+#define NID_SNMPv2              387
+#define OBJ_SNMPv2              OBJ_internet,6L
+
+#define LN_Mail         "Mail"
+#define NID_Mail                388
+#define OBJ_Mail                OBJ_internet,7L
+
+#define SN_Enterprises          "enterprises"
+#define LN_Enterprises          "Enterprises"
+#define NID_Enterprises         389
+#define OBJ_Enterprises         OBJ_Private,1L
+
+#define SN_dcObject             "dcobject"
+#define LN_dcObject             "dcObject"
+#define NID_dcObject            390
+#define OBJ_dcObject            OBJ_Enterprises,1466L,344L
+
+#define SN_mime_mhs             "mime-mhs"
+#define LN_mime_mhs             "MIME MHS"
+#define NID_mime_mhs            504
+#define OBJ_mime_mhs            OBJ_Mail,1L
+
+#define SN_mime_mhs_headings            "mime-mhs-headings"
+#define LN_mime_mhs_headings            "mime-mhs-headings"
+#define NID_mime_mhs_headings           505
+#define OBJ_mime_mhs_headings           OBJ_mime_mhs,1L
+
+#define SN_mime_mhs_bodies              "mime-mhs-bodies"
+#define LN_mime_mhs_bodies              "mime-mhs-bodies"
+#define NID_mime_mhs_bodies             506
+#define OBJ_mime_mhs_bodies             OBJ_mime_mhs,2L
+
+#define SN_id_hex_partial_message               "id-hex-partial-message"
+#define LN_id_hex_partial_message               "id-hex-partial-message"
+#define NID_id_hex_partial_message              507
+#define OBJ_id_hex_partial_message              OBJ_mime_mhs_headings,1L
+
+#define SN_id_hex_multipart_message             "id-hex-multipart-message"
+#define LN_id_hex_multipart_message             "id-hex-multipart-message"
+#define NID_id_hex_multipart_message            508
+#define OBJ_id_hex_multipart_message            OBJ_mime_mhs_headings,2L
+
+#define SN_zlib_compression             "ZLIB"
+#define LN_zlib_compression             "zlib compression"
+#define NID_zlib_compression            125
+#define OBJ_zlib_compression            OBJ_id_smime_alg,8L
+
+#define OBJ_csor                2L,16L,840L,1L,101L,3L
+
+#define OBJ_nistAlgorithms              OBJ_csor,4L
+
+#define OBJ_aes         OBJ_nistAlgorithms,1L
+
+#define SN_aes_128_ecb          "AES-128-ECB"
+#define LN_aes_128_ecb          "aes-128-ecb"
+#define NID_aes_128_ecb         418
+#define OBJ_aes_128_ecb         OBJ_aes,1L
+
+#define SN_aes_128_cbc          "AES-128-CBC"
+#define LN_aes_128_cbc          "aes-128-cbc"
+#define NID_aes_128_cbc         419
+#define OBJ_aes_128_cbc         OBJ_aes,2L
+
+#define SN_aes_128_ofb128               "AES-128-OFB"
+#define LN_aes_128_ofb128               "aes-128-ofb"
+#define NID_aes_128_ofb128              420
+#define OBJ_aes_128_ofb128              OBJ_aes,3L
+
+#define SN_aes_128_cfb128               "AES-128-CFB"
+#define LN_aes_128_cfb128               "aes-128-cfb"
+#define NID_aes_128_cfb128              421
+#define OBJ_aes_128_cfb128              OBJ_aes,4L
+
+#define SN_id_aes128_wrap               "id-aes128-wrap"
+#define NID_id_aes128_wrap              788
+#define OBJ_id_aes128_wrap              OBJ_aes,5L
+
+#define SN_aes_128_gcm          "id-aes128-GCM"
+#define LN_aes_128_gcm          "aes-128-gcm"
+#define NID_aes_128_gcm         895
+#define OBJ_aes_128_gcm         OBJ_aes,6L
+
+#define SN_aes_128_ccm          "id-aes128-CCM"
+#define LN_aes_128_ccm          "aes-128-ccm"
+#define NID_aes_128_ccm         896
+#define OBJ_aes_128_ccm         OBJ_aes,7L
+
+#define SN_id_aes128_wrap_pad           "id-aes128-wrap-pad"
+#define NID_id_aes128_wrap_pad          897
+#define OBJ_id_aes128_wrap_pad          OBJ_aes,8L
+
+#define SN_aes_192_ecb          "AES-192-ECB"
+#define LN_aes_192_ecb          "aes-192-ecb"
+#define NID_aes_192_ecb         422
+#define OBJ_aes_192_ecb         OBJ_aes,21L
+
+#define SN_aes_192_cbc          "AES-192-CBC"
+#define LN_aes_192_cbc          "aes-192-cbc"
+#define NID_aes_192_cbc         423
+#define OBJ_aes_192_cbc         OBJ_aes,22L
+
+#define SN_aes_192_ofb128               "AES-192-OFB"
+#define LN_aes_192_ofb128               "aes-192-ofb"
+#define NID_aes_192_ofb128              424
+#define OBJ_aes_192_ofb128              OBJ_aes,23L
+
+#define SN_aes_192_cfb128               "AES-192-CFB"
+#define LN_aes_192_cfb128               "aes-192-cfb"
+#define NID_aes_192_cfb128              425
+#define OBJ_aes_192_cfb128              OBJ_aes,24L
+
+#define SN_id_aes192_wrap               "id-aes192-wrap"
+#define NID_id_aes192_wrap              789
+#define OBJ_id_aes192_wrap              OBJ_aes,25L
+
+#define SN_aes_192_gcm          "id-aes192-GCM"
+#define LN_aes_192_gcm          "aes-192-gcm"
+#define NID_aes_192_gcm         898
+#define OBJ_aes_192_gcm         OBJ_aes,26L
+
+#define SN_aes_192_ccm          "id-aes192-CCM"
+#define LN_aes_192_ccm          "aes-192-ccm"
+#define NID_aes_192_ccm         899
+#define OBJ_aes_192_ccm         OBJ_aes,27L
+
+#define SN_id_aes192_wrap_pad           "id-aes192-wrap-pad"
+#define NID_id_aes192_wrap_pad          900
+#define OBJ_id_aes192_wrap_pad          OBJ_aes,28L
+
+#define SN_aes_256_ecb          "AES-256-ECB"
+#define LN_aes_256_ecb          "aes-256-ecb"
+#define NID_aes_256_ecb         426
+#define OBJ_aes_256_ecb         OBJ_aes,41L
+
+#define SN_aes_256_cbc          "AES-256-CBC"
+#define LN_aes_256_cbc          "aes-256-cbc"
+#define NID_aes_256_cbc         427
+#define OBJ_aes_256_cbc         OBJ_aes,42L
+
+#define SN_aes_256_ofb128               "AES-256-OFB"
+#define LN_aes_256_ofb128               "aes-256-ofb"
+#define NID_aes_256_ofb128              428
+#define OBJ_aes_256_ofb128              OBJ_aes,43L
+
+#define SN_aes_256_cfb128               "AES-256-CFB"
+#define LN_aes_256_cfb128               "aes-256-cfb"
+#define NID_aes_256_cfb128              429
+#define OBJ_aes_256_cfb128              OBJ_aes,44L
+
+#define SN_id_aes256_wrap               "id-aes256-wrap"
+#define NID_id_aes256_wrap              790
+#define OBJ_id_aes256_wrap              OBJ_aes,45L
+
+#define SN_aes_256_gcm          "id-aes256-GCM"
+#define LN_aes_256_gcm          "aes-256-gcm"
+#define NID_aes_256_gcm         901
+#define OBJ_aes_256_gcm         OBJ_aes,46L
+
+#define SN_aes_256_ccm          "id-aes256-CCM"
+#define LN_aes_256_ccm          "aes-256-ccm"
+#define NID_aes_256_ccm         902
+#define OBJ_aes_256_ccm         OBJ_aes,47L
+
+#define SN_id_aes256_wrap_pad           "id-aes256-wrap-pad"
+#define NID_id_aes256_wrap_pad          903
+#define OBJ_id_aes256_wrap_pad          OBJ_aes,48L
+
+#define SN_aes_128_cfb1         "AES-128-CFB1"
+#define LN_aes_128_cfb1         "aes-128-cfb1"
+#define NID_aes_128_cfb1                650
+
+#define SN_aes_192_cfb1         "AES-192-CFB1"
+#define LN_aes_192_cfb1         "aes-192-cfb1"
+#define NID_aes_192_cfb1                651
+
+#define SN_aes_256_cfb1         "AES-256-CFB1"
+#define LN_aes_256_cfb1         "aes-256-cfb1"
+#define NID_aes_256_cfb1                652
+
+#define SN_aes_128_cfb8         "AES-128-CFB8"
+#define LN_aes_128_cfb8         "aes-128-cfb8"
+#define NID_aes_128_cfb8                653
+
+#define SN_aes_192_cfb8         "AES-192-CFB8"
+#define LN_aes_192_cfb8         "aes-192-cfb8"
+#define NID_aes_192_cfb8                654
+
+#define SN_aes_256_cfb8         "AES-256-CFB8"
+#define LN_aes_256_cfb8         "aes-256-cfb8"
+#define NID_aes_256_cfb8                655
+
+#define SN_aes_128_ctr          "AES-128-CTR"
+#define LN_aes_128_ctr          "aes-128-ctr"
+#define NID_aes_128_ctr         904
+
+#define SN_aes_192_ctr          "AES-192-CTR"
+#define LN_aes_192_ctr          "aes-192-ctr"
+#define NID_aes_192_ctr         905
+
+#define SN_aes_256_ctr          "AES-256-CTR"
+#define LN_aes_256_ctr          "aes-256-ctr"
+#define NID_aes_256_ctr         906
+
+#define SN_aes_128_ocb          "AES-128-OCB"
+#define LN_aes_128_ocb          "aes-128-ocb"
+#define NID_aes_128_ocb         958
+
+#define SN_aes_192_ocb          "AES-192-OCB"
+#define LN_aes_192_ocb          "aes-192-ocb"
+#define NID_aes_192_ocb         959
+
+#define SN_aes_256_ocb          "AES-256-OCB"
+#define LN_aes_256_ocb          "aes-256-ocb"
+#define NID_aes_256_ocb         960
+
+#define SN_aes_128_xts          "AES-128-XTS"
+#define LN_aes_128_xts          "aes-128-xts"
+#define NID_aes_128_xts         913
+
+#define SN_aes_256_xts          "AES-256-XTS"
+#define LN_aes_256_xts          "aes-256-xts"
+#define NID_aes_256_xts         914
+
+#define SN_des_cfb1             "DES-CFB1"
+#define LN_des_cfb1             "des-cfb1"
+#define NID_des_cfb1            656
+
+#define SN_des_cfb8             "DES-CFB8"
+#define LN_des_cfb8             "des-cfb8"
+#define NID_des_cfb8            657
+
+#define SN_des_ede3_cfb1                "DES-EDE3-CFB1"
+#define LN_des_ede3_cfb1                "des-ede3-cfb1"
+#define NID_des_ede3_cfb1               658
+
+#define SN_des_ede3_cfb8                "DES-EDE3-CFB8"
+#define LN_des_ede3_cfb8                "des-ede3-cfb8"
+#define NID_des_ede3_cfb8               659
+
+#define OBJ_nist_hashalgs               OBJ_nistAlgorithms,2L
+
+#define SN_sha256               "SHA256"
+#define LN_sha256               "sha256"
+#define NID_sha256              672
+#define OBJ_sha256              OBJ_nist_hashalgs,1L
+
+#define SN_sha384               "SHA384"
+#define LN_sha384               "sha384"
+#define NID_sha384              673
+#define OBJ_sha384              OBJ_nist_hashalgs,2L
+
+#define SN_sha512               "SHA512"
+#define LN_sha512               "sha512"
+#define NID_sha512              674
+#define OBJ_sha512              OBJ_nist_hashalgs,3L
+
+#define SN_sha224               "SHA224"
+#define LN_sha224               "sha224"
+#define NID_sha224              675
+#define OBJ_sha224              OBJ_nist_hashalgs,4L
+
+#define OBJ_dsa_with_sha2               OBJ_nistAlgorithms,3L
+
+#define SN_dsa_with_SHA224              "dsa_with_SHA224"
+#define NID_dsa_with_SHA224             802
+#define OBJ_dsa_with_SHA224             OBJ_dsa_with_sha2,1L
+
+#define SN_dsa_with_SHA256              "dsa_with_SHA256"
+#define NID_dsa_with_SHA256             803
+#define OBJ_dsa_with_SHA256             OBJ_dsa_with_sha2,2L
+
+#define SN_hold_instruction_code                "holdInstructionCode"
+#define LN_hold_instruction_code                "Hold Instruction Code"
+#define NID_hold_instruction_code               430
+#define OBJ_hold_instruction_code               OBJ_id_ce,23L
+
+#define OBJ_holdInstruction             OBJ_X9_57,2L
+
+#define SN_hold_instruction_none                "holdInstructionNone"
+#define LN_hold_instruction_none                "Hold Instruction None"
+#define NID_hold_instruction_none               431
+#define OBJ_hold_instruction_none               OBJ_holdInstruction,1L
+
+#define SN_hold_instruction_call_issuer         "holdInstructionCallIssuer"
+#define LN_hold_instruction_call_issuer         "Hold Instruction Call Issuer"
+#define NID_hold_instruction_call_issuer                432
+#define OBJ_hold_instruction_call_issuer                OBJ_holdInstruction,2L
+
+#define SN_hold_instruction_reject              "holdInstructionReject"
+#define LN_hold_instruction_reject              "Hold Instruction Reject"
+#define NID_hold_instruction_reject             433
+#define OBJ_hold_instruction_reject             OBJ_holdInstruction,3L
+
+#define SN_data         "data"
+#define NID_data                434
+#define OBJ_data                OBJ_itu_t,9L
+
+#define SN_pss          "pss"
+#define NID_pss         435
+#define OBJ_pss         OBJ_data,2342L
+
+#define SN_ucl          "ucl"
+#define NID_ucl         436
+#define OBJ_ucl         OBJ_pss,19200300L
+
+#define SN_pilot                "pilot"
+#define NID_pilot               437
+#define OBJ_pilot               OBJ_ucl,100L
+
+#define LN_pilotAttributeType           "pilotAttributeType"
+#define NID_pilotAttributeType          438
+#define OBJ_pilotAttributeType          OBJ_pilot,1L
+
+#define LN_pilotAttributeSyntax         "pilotAttributeSyntax"
+#define NID_pilotAttributeSyntax                439
+#define OBJ_pilotAttributeSyntax                OBJ_pilot,3L
+
+#define LN_pilotObjectClass             "pilotObjectClass"
+#define NID_pilotObjectClass            440
+#define OBJ_pilotObjectClass            OBJ_pilot,4L
+
+#define LN_pilotGroups          "pilotGroups"
+#define NID_pilotGroups         441
+#define OBJ_pilotGroups         OBJ_pilot,10L
+
+#define LN_iA5StringSyntax              "iA5StringSyntax"
+#define NID_iA5StringSyntax             442
+#define OBJ_iA5StringSyntax             OBJ_pilotAttributeSyntax,4L
+
+#define LN_caseIgnoreIA5StringSyntax            "caseIgnoreIA5StringSyntax"
+#define NID_caseIgnoreIA5StringSyntax           443
+#define OBJ_caseIgnoreIA5StringSyntax           OBJ_pilotAttributeSyntax,5L
+
+#define LN_pilotObject          "pilotObject"
+#define NID_pilotObject         444
+#define OBJ_pilotObject         OBJ_pilotObjectClass,3L
+
+#define LN_pilotPerson          "pilotPerson"
+#define NID_pilotPerson         445
+#define OBJ_pilotPerson         OBJ_pilotObjectClass,4L
+
+#define SN_account              "account"
+#define NID_account             446
+#define OBJ_account             OBJ_pilotObjectClass,5L
+
+#define SN_document             "document"
+#define NID_document            447
+#define OBJ_document            OBJ_pilotObjectClass,6L
+
+#define SN_room         "room"
+#define NID_room                448
+#define OBJ_room                OBJ_pilotObjectClass,7L
+
+#define LN_documentSeries               "documentSeries"
+#define NID_documentSeries              449
+#define OBJ_documentSeries              OBJ_pilotObjectClass,9L
+
+#define SN_Domain               "domain"
+#define LN_Domain               "Domain"
+#define NID_Domain              392
+#define OBJ_Domain              OBJ_pilotObjectClass,13L
+
+#define LN_rFC822localPart              "rFC822localPart"
+#define NID_rFC822localPart             450
+#define OBJ_rFC822localPart             OBJ_pilotObjectClass,14L
+
+#define LN_dNSDomain            "dNSDomain"
+#define NID_dNSDomain           451
+#define OBJ_dNSDomain           OBJ_pilotObjectClass,15L
+
+#define LN_domainRelatedObject          "domainRelatedObject"
+#define NID_domainRelatedObject         452
+#define OBJ_domainRelatedObject         OBJ_pilotObjectClass,17L
+
+#define LN_friendlyCountry              "friendlyCountry"
+#define NID_friendlyCountry             453
+#define OBJ_friendlyCountry             OBJ_pilotObjectClass,18L
+
+#define LN_simpleSecurityObject         "simpleSecurityObject"
+#define NID_simpleSecurityObject                454
+#define OBJ_simpleSecurityObject                OBJ_pilotObjectClass,19L
+
+#define LN_pilotOrganization            "pilotOrganization"
+#define NID_pilotOrganization           455
+#define OBJ_pilotOrganization           OBJ_pilotObjectClass,20L
+
+#define LN_pilotDSA             "pilotDSA"
+#define NID_pilotDSA            456
+#define OBJ_pilotDSA            OBJ_pilotObjectClass,21L
+
+#define LN_qualityLabelledData          "qualityLabelledData"
+#define NID_qualityLabelledData         457
+#define OBJ_qualityLabelledData         OBJ_pilotObjectClass,22L
+
+#define SN_userId               "UID"
+#define LN_userId               "userId"
+#define NID_userId              458
+#define OBJ_userId              OBJ_pilotAttributeType,1L
+
+#define LN_textEncodedORAddress         "textEncodedORAddress"
+#define NID_textEncodedORAddress                459
+#define OBJ_textEncodedORAddress                OBJ_pilotAttributeType,2L
+
+#define SN_rfc822Mailbox                "mail"
+#define LN_rfc822Mailbox                "rfc822Mailbox"
+#define NID_rfc822Mailbox               460
+#define OBJ_rfc822Mailbox               OBJ_pilotAttributeType,3L
+
+#define SN_info         "info"
+#define NID_info                461
+#define OBJ_info                OBJ_pilotAttributeType,4L
+
+#define LN_favouriteDrink               "favouriteDrink"
+#define NID_favouriteDrink              462
+#define OBJ_favouriteDrink              OBJ_pilotAttributeType,5L
+
+#define LN_roomNumber           "roomNumber"
+#define NID_roomNumber          463
+#define OBJ_roomNumber          OBJ_pilotAttributeType,6L
+
+#define SN_photo                "photo"
+#define NID_photo               464
+#define OBJ_photo               OBJ_pilotAttributeType,7L
+
+#define LN_userClass            "userClass"
+#define NID_userClass           465
+#define OBJ_userClass           OBJ_pilotAttributeType,8L
+
+#define SN_host         "host"
+#define NID_host                466
+#define OBJ_host                OBJ_pilotAttributeType,9L
+
+#define SN_manager              "manager"
+#define NID_manager             467
+#define OBJ_manager             OBJ_pilotAttributeType,10L
+
+#define LN_documentIdentifier           "documentIdentifier"
+#define NID_documentIdentifier          468
+#define OBJ_documentIdentifier          OBJ_pilotAttributeType,11L
+
+#define LN_documentTitle                "documentTitle"
+#define NID_documentTitle               469
+#define OBJ_documentTitle               OBJ_pilotAttributeType,12L
+
+#define LN_documentVersion              "documentVersion"
+#define NID_documentVersion             470
+#define OBJ_documentVersion             OBJ_pilotAttributeType,13L
+
+#define LN_documentAuthor               "documentAuthor"
+#define NID_documentAuthor              471
+#define OBJ_documentAuthor              OBJ_pilotAttributeType,14L
+
+#define LN_documentLocation             "documentLocation"
+#define NID_documentLocation            472
+#define OBJ_documentLocation            OBJ_pilotAttributeType,15L
+
+#define LN_homeTelephoneNumber          "homeTelephoneNumber"
+#define NID_homeTelephoneNumber         473
+#define OBJ_homeTelephoneNumber         OBJ_pilotAttributeType,20L
+
+#define SN_secretary            "secretary"
+#define NID_secretary           474
+#define OBJ_secretary           OBJ_pilotAttributeType,21L
+
+#define LN_otherMailbox         "otherMailbox"
+#define NID_otherMailbox                475
+#define OBJ_otherMailbox                OBJ_pilotAttributeType,22L
+
+#define LN_lastModifiedTime             "lastModifiedTime"
+#define NID_lastModifiedTime            476
+#define OBJ_lastModifiedTime            OBJ_pilotAttributeType,23L
+
+#define LN_lastModifiedBy               "lastModifiedBy"
+#define NID_lastModifiedBy              477
+#define OBJ_lastModifiedBy              OBJ_pilotAttributeType,24L
+
+#define SN_domainComponent              "DC"
+#define LN_domainComponent              "domainComponent"
+#define NID_domainComponent             391
+#define OBJ_domainComponent             OBJ_pilotAttributeType,25L
+
+#define LN_aRecord              "aRecord"
+#define NID_aRecord             478
+#define OBJ_aRecord             OBJ_pilotAttributeType,26L
+
+#define LN_pilotAttributeType27         "pilotAttributeType27"
+#define NID_pilotAttributeType27                479
+#define OBJ_pilotAttributeType27                OBJ_pilotAttributeType,27L
+
+#define LN_mXRecord             "mXRecord"
+#define NID_mXRecord            480
+#define OBJ_mXRecord            OBJ_pilotAttributeType,28L
+
+#define LN_nSRecord             "nSRecord"
+#define NID_nSRecord            481
+#define OBJ_nSRecord            OBJ_pilotAttributeType,29L
+
+#define LN_sOARecord            "sOARecord"
+#define NID_sOARecord           482
+#define OBJ_sOARecord           OBJ_pilotAttributeType,30L
+
+#define LN_cNAMERecord          "cNAMERecord"
+#define NID_cNAMERecord         483
+#define OBJ_cNAMERecord         OBJ_pilotAttributeType,31L
+
+#define LN_associatedDomain             "associatedDomain"
+#define NID_associatedDomain            484
+#define OBJ_associatedDomain            OBJ_pilotAttributeType,37L
+
+#define LN_associatedName               "associatedName"
+#define NID_associatedName              485
+#define OBJ_associatedName              OBJ_pilotAttributeType,38L
+
+#define LN_homePostalAddress            "homePostalAddress"
+#define NID_homePostalAddress           486
+#define OBJ_homePostalAddress           OBJ_pilotAttributeType,39L
+
+#define LN_personalTitle                "personalTitle"
+#define NID_personalTitle               487
+#define OBJ_personalTitle               OBJ_pilotAttributeType,40L
+
+#define LN_mobileTelephoneNumber                "mobileTelephoneNumber"
+#define NID_mobileTelephoneNumber               488
+#define OBJ_mobileTelephoneNumber               OBJ_pilotAttributeType,41L
+
+#define LN_pagerTelephoneNumber         "pagerTelephoneNumber"
+#define NID_pagerTelephoneNumber                489
+#define OBJ_pagerTelephoneNumber                OBJ_pilotAttributeType,42L
+
+#define LN_friendlyCountryName          "friendlyCountryName"
+#define NID_friendlyCountryName         490
+#define OBJ_friendlyCountryName         OBJ_pilotAttributeType,43L
+
+#define SN_uniqueIdentifier             "uid"
+#define LN_uniqueIdentifier             "uniqueIdentifier"
+#define NID_uniqueIdentifier            102
+#define OBJ_uniqueIdentifier            OBJ_pilotAttributeType,44L
+
+#define LN_organizationalStatus         "organizationalStatus"
+#define NID_organizationalStatus                491
+#define OBJ_organizationalStatus                OBJ_pilotAttributeType,45L
+
+#define LN_janetMailbox         "janetMailbox"
+#define NID_janetMailbox                492
+#define OBJ_janetMailbox                OBJ_pilotAttributeType,46L
+
+#define LN_mailPreferenceOption         "mailPreferenceOption"
+#define NID_mailPreferenceOption                493
+#define OBJ_mailPreferenceOption                OBJ_pilotAttributeType,47L
+
+#define LN_buildingName         "buildingName"
+#define NID_buildingName                494
+#define OBJ_buildingName                OBJ_pilotAttributeType,48L
+
+#define LN_dSAQuality           "dSAQuality"
+#define NID_dSAQuality          495
+#define OBJ_dSAQuality          OBJ_pilotAttributeType,49L
+
+#define LN_singleLevelQuality           "singleLevelQuality"
+#define NID_singleLevelQuality          496
+#define OBJ_singleLevelQuality          OBJ_pilotAttributeType,50L
+
+#define LN_subtreeMinimumQuality                "subtreeMinimumQuality"
+#define NID_subtreeMinimumQuality               497
+#define OBJ_subtreeMinimumQuality               OBJ_pilotAttributeType,51L
+
+#define LN_subtreeMaximumQuality                "subtreeMaximumQuality"
+#define NID_subtreeMaximumQuality               498
+#define OBJ_subtreeMaximumQuality               OBJ_pilotAttributeType,52L
+
+#define LN_personalSignature            "personalSignature"
+#define NID_personalSignature           499
+#define OBJ_personalSignature           OBJ_pilotAttributeType,53L
+
+#define LN_dITRedirect          "dITRedirect"
+#define NID_dITRedirect         500
+#define OBJ_dITRedirect         OBJ_pilotAttributeType,54L
+
+#define SN_audio                "audio"
+#define NID_audio               501
+#define OBJ_audio               OBJ_pilotAttributeType,55L
+
+#define LN_documentPublisher            "documentPublisher"
+#define NID_documentPublisher           502
+#define OBJ_documentPublisher           OBJ_pilotAttributeType,56L
+
+#define SN_id_set               "id-set"
+#define LN_id_set               "Secure Electronic Transactions"
+#define NID_id_set              512
+#define OBJ_id_set              OBJ_international_organizations,42L
+
+#define SN_set_ctype            "set-ctype"
+#define LN_set_ctype            "content types"
+#define NID_set_ctype           513
+#define OBJ_set_ctype           OBJ_id_set,0L
+
+#define SN_set_msgExt           "set-msgExt"
+#define LN_set_msgExt           "message extensions"
+#define NID_set_msgExt          514
+#define OBJ_set_msgExt          OBJ_id_set,1L
+
+#define SN_set_attr             "set-attr"
+#define NID_set_attr            515
+#define OBJ_set_attr            OBJ_id_set,3L
+
+#define SN_set_policy           "set-policy"
+#define NID_set_policy          516
+#define OBJ_set_policy          OBJ_id_set,5L
+
+#define SN_set_certExt          "set-certExt"
+#define LN_set_certExt          "certificate extensions"
+#define NID_set_certExt         517
+#define OBJ_set_certExt         OBJ_id_set,7L
+
+#define SN_set_brand            "set-brand"
+#define NID_set_brand           518
+#define OBJ_set_brand           OBJ_id_set,8L
+
+#define SN_setct_PANData                "setct-PANData"
+#define NID_setct_PANData               519
+#define OBJ_setct_PANData               OBJ_set_ctype,0L
+
+#define SN_setct_PANToken               "setct-PANToken"
+#define NID_setct_PANToken              520
+#define OBJ_setct_PANToken              OBJ_set_ctype,1L
+
+#define SN_setct_PANOnly                "setct-PANOnly"
+#define NID_setct_PANOnly               521
+#define OBJ_setct_PANOnly               OBJ_set_ctype,2L
+
+#define SN_setct_OIData         "setct-OIData"
+#define NID_setct_OIData                522
+#define OBJ_setct_OIData                OBJ_set_ctype,3L
+
+#define SN_setct_PI             "setct-PI"
+#define NID_setct_PI            523
+#define OBJ_setct_PI            OBJ_set_ctype,4L
+
+#define SN_setct_PIData         "setct-PIData"
+#define NID_setct_PIData                524
+#define OBJ_setct_PIData                OBJ_set_ctype,5L
+
+#define SN_setct_PIDataUnsigned         "setct-PIDataUnsigned"
+#define NID_setct_PIDataUnsigned                525
+#define OBJ_setct_PIDataUnsigned                OBJ_set_ctype,6L
+
+#define SN_setct_HODInput               "setct-HODInput"
+#define NID_setct_HODInput              526
+#define OBJ_setct_HODInput              OBJ_set_ctype,7L
+
+#define SN_setct_AuthResBaggage         "setct-AuthResBaggage"
+#define NID_setct_AuthResBaggage                527
+#define OBJ_setct_AuthResBaggage                OBJ_set_ctype,8L
+
+#define SN_setct_AuthRevReqBaggage              "setct-AuthRevReqBaggage"
+#define NID_setct_AuthRevReqBaggage             528
+#define OBJ_setct_AuthRevReqBaggage             OBJ_set_ctype,9L
+
+#define SN_setct_AuthRevResBaggage              "setct-AuthRevResBaggage"
+#define NID_setct_AuthRevResBaggage             529
+#define OBJ_setct_AuthRevResBaggage             OBJ_set_ctype,10L
+
+#define SN_setct_CapTokenSeq            "setct-CapTokenSeq"
+#define NID_setct_CapTokenSeq           530
+#define OBJ_setct_CapTokenSeq           OBJ_set_ctype,11L
+
+#define SN_setct_PInitResData           "setct-PInitResData"
+#define NID_setct_PInitResData          531
+#define OBJ_setct_PInitResData          OBJ_set_ctype,12L
+
+#define SN_setct_PI_TBS         "setct-PI-TBS"
+#define NID_setct_PI_TBS                532
+#define OBJ_setct_PI_TBS                OBJ_set_ctype,13L
+
+#define SN_setct_PResData               "setct-PResData"
+#define NID_setct_PResData              533
+#define OBJ_setct_PResData              OBJ_set_ctype,14L
+
+#define SN_setct_AuthReqTBS             "setct-AuthReqTBS"
+#define NID_setct_AuthReqTBS            534
+#define OBJ_setct_AuthReqTBS            OBJ_set_ctype,16L
+
+#define SN_setct_AuthResTBS             "setct-AuthResTBS"
+#define NID_setct_AuthResTBS            535
+#define OBJ_setct_AuthResTBS            OBJ_set_ctype,17L
+
+#define SN_setct_AuthResTBSX            "setct-AuthResTBSX"
+#define NID_setct_AuthResTBSX           536
+#define OBJ_setct_AuthResTBSX           OBJ_set_ctype,18L
+
+#define SN_setct_AuthTokenTBS           "setct-AuthTokenTBS"
+#define NID_setct_AuthTokenTBS          537
+#define OBJ_setct_AuthTokenTBS          OBJ_set_ctype,19L
+
+#define SN_setct_CapTokenData           "setct-CapTokenData"
+#define NID_setct_CapTokenData          538
+#define OBJ_setct_CapTokenData          OBJ_set_ctype,20L
+
+#define SN_setct_CapTokenTBS            "setct-CapTokenTBS"
+#define NID_setct_CapTokenTBS           539
+#define OBJ_setct_CapTokenTBS           OBJ_set_ctype,21L
+
+#define SN_setct_AcqCardCodeMsg         "setct-AcqCardCodeMsg"
+#define NID_setct_AcqCardCodeMsg                540
+#define OBJ_setct_AcqCardCodeMsg                OBJ_set_ctype,22L
+
+#define SN_setct_AuthRevReqTBS          "setct-AuthRevReqTBS"
+#define NID_setct_AuthRevReqTBS         541
+#define OBJ_setct_AuthRevReqTBS         OBJ_set_ctype,23L
+
+#define SN_setct_AuthRevResData         "setct-AuthRevResData"
+#define NID_setct_AuthRevResData                542
+#define OBJ_setct_AuthRevResData                OBJ_set_ctype,24L
+
+#define SN_setct_AuthRevResTBS          "setct-AuthRevResTBS"
+#define NID_setct_AuthRevResTBS         543
+#define OBJ_setct_AuthRevResTBS         OBJ_set_ctype,25L
+
+#define SN_setct_CapReqTBS              "setct-CapReqTBS"
+#define NID_setct_CapReqTBS             544
+#define OBJ_setct_CapReqTBS             OBJ_set_ctype,26L
+
+#define SN_setct_CapReqTBSX             "setct-CapReqTBSX"
+#define NID_setct_CapReqTBSX            545
+#define OBJ_setct_CapReqTBSX            OBJ_set_ctype,27L
+
+#define SN_setct_CapResData             "setct-CapResData"
+#define NID_setct_CapResData            546
+#define OBJ_setct_CapResData            OBJ_set_ctype,28L
+
+#define SN_setct_CapRevReqTBS           "setct-CapRevReqTBS"
+#define NID_setct_CapRevReqTBS          547
+#define OBJ_setct_CapRevReqTBS          OBJ_set_ctype,29L
+
+#define SN_setct_CapRevReqTBSX          "setct-CapRevReqTBSX"
+#define NID_setct_CapRevReqTBSX         548
+#define OBJ_setct_CapRevReqTBSX         OBJ_set_ctype,30L
+
+#define SN_setct_CapRevResData          "setct-CapRevResData"
+#define NID_setct_CapRevResData         549
+#define OBJ_setct_CapRevResData         OBJ_set_ctype,31L
+
+#define SN_setct_CredReqTBS             "setct-CredReqTBS"
+#define NID_setct_CredReqTBS            550
+#define OBJ_setct_CredReqTBS            OBJ_set_ctype,32L
+
+#define SN_setct_CredReqTBSX            "setct-CredReqTBSX"
+#define NID_setct_CredReqTBSX           551
+#define OBJ_setct_CredReqTBSX           OBJ_set_ctype,33L
+
+#define SN_setct_CredResData            "setct-CredResData"
+#define NID_setct_CredResData           552
+#define OBJ_setct_CredResData           OBJ_set_ctype,34L
+
+#define SN_setct_CredRevReqTBS          "setct-CredRevReqTBS"
+#define NID_setct_CredRevReqTBS         553
+#define OBJ_setct_CredRevReqTBS         OBJ_set_ctype,35L
+
+#define SN_setct_CredRevReqTBSX         "setct-CredRevReqTBSX"
+#define NID_setct_CredRevReqTBSX                554
+#define OBJ_setct_CredRevReqTBSX                OBJ_set_ctype,36L
+
+#define SN_setct_CredRevResData         "setct-CredRevResData"
+#define NID_setct_CredRevResData                555
+#define OBJ_setct_CredRevResData                OBJ_set_ctype,37L
+
+#define SN_setct_PCertReqData           "setct-PCertReqData"
+#define NID_setct_PCertReqData          556
+#define OBJ_setct_PCertReqData          OBJ_set_ctype,38L
+
+#define SN_setct_PCertResTBS            "setct-PCertResTBS"
+#define NID_setct_PCertResTBS           557
+#define OBJ_setct_PCertResTBS           OBJ_set_ctype,39L
+
+#define SN_setct_BatchAdminReqData              "setct-BatchAdminReqData"
+#define NID_setct_BatchAdminReqData             558
+#define OBJ_setct_BatchAdminReqData             OBJ_set_ctype,40L
+
+#define SN_setct_BatchAdminResData              "setct-BatchAdminResData"
+#define NID_setct_BatchAdminResData             559
+#define OBJ_setct_BatchAdminResData             OBJ_set_ctype,41L
+
+#define SN_setct_CardCInitResTBS                "setct-CardCInitResTBS"
+#define NID_setct_CardCInitResTBS               560
+#define OBJ_setct_CardCInitResTBS               OBJ_set_ctype,42L
+
+#define SN_setct_MeAqCInitResTBS                "setct-MeAqCInitResTBS"
+#define NID_setct_MeAqCInitResTBS               561
+#define OBJ_setct_MeAqCInitResTBS               OBJ_set_ctype,43L
+
+#define SN_setct_RegFormResTBS          "setct-RegFormResTBS"
+#define NID_setct_RegFormResTBS         562
+#define OBJ_setct_RegFormResTBS         OBJ_set_ctype,44L
+
+#define SN_setct_CertReqData            "setct-CertReqData"
+#define NID_setct_CertReqData           563
+#define OBJ_setct_CertReqData           OBJ_set_ctype,45L
+
+#define SN_setct_CertReqTBS             "setct-CertReqTBS"
+#define NID_setct_CertReqTBS            564
+#define OBJ_setct_CertReqTBS            OBJ_set_ctype,46L
+
+#define SN_setct_CertResData            "setct-CertResData"
+#define NID_setct_CertResData           565
+#define OBJ_setct_CertResData           OBJ_set_ctype,47L
+
+#define SN_setct_CertInqReqTBS          "setct-CertInqReqTBS"
+#define NID_setct_CertInqReqTBS         566
+#define OBJ_setct_CertInqReqTBS         OBJ_set_ctype,48L
+
+#define SN_setct_ErrorTBS               "setct-ErrorTBS"
+#define NID_setct_ErrorTBS              567
+#define OBJ_setct_ErrorTBS              OBJ_set_ctype,49L
+
+#define SN_setct_PIDualSignedTBE                "setct-PIDualSignedTBE"
+#define NID_setct_PIDualSignedTBE               568
+#define OBJ_setct_PIDualSignedTBE               OBJ_set_ctype,50L
+
+#define SN_setct_PIUnsignedTBE          "setct-PIUnsignedTBE"
+#define NID_setct_PIUnsignedTBE         569
+#define OBJ_setct_PIUnsignedTBE         OBJ_set_ctype,51L
+
+#define SN_setct_AuthReqTBE             "setct-AuthReqTBE"
+#define NID_setct_AuthReqTBE            570
+#define OBJ_setct_AuthReqTBE            OBJ_set_ctype,52L
+
+#define SN_setct_AuthResTBE             "setct-AuthResTBE"
+#define NID_setct_AuthResTBE            571
+#define OBJ_setct_AuthResTBE            OBJ_set_ctype,53L
+
+#define SN_setct_AuthResTBEX            "setct-AuthResTBEX"
+#define NID_setct_AuthResTBEX           572
+#define OBJ_setct_AuthResTBEX           OBJ_set_ctype,54L
+
+#define SN_setct_AuthTokenTBE           "setct-AuthTokenTBE"
+#define NID_setct_AuthTokenTBE          573
+#define OBJ_setct_AuthTokenTBE          OBJ_set_ctype,55L
+
+#define SN_setct_CapTokenTBE            "setct-CapTokenTBE"
+#define NID_setct_CapTokenTBE           574
+#define OBJ_setct_CapTokenTBE           OBJ_set_ctype,56L
+
+#define SN_setct_CapTokenTBEX           "setct-CapTokenTBEX"
+#define NID_setct_CapTokenTBEX          575
+#define OBJ_setct_CapTokenTBEX          OBJ_set_ctype,57L
+
+#define SN_setct_AcqCardCodeMsgTBE              "setct-AcqCardCodeMsgTBE"
+#define NID_setct_AcqCardCodeMsgTBE             576
+#define OBJ_setct_AcqCardCodeMsgTBE             OBJ_set_ctype,58L
+
+#define SN_setct_AuthRevReqTBE          "setct-AuthRevReqTBE"
+#define NID_setct_AuthRevReqTBE         577
+#define OBJ_setct_AuthRevReqTBE         OBJ_set_ctype,59L
+
+#define SN_setct_AuthRevResTBE          "setct-AuthRevResTBE"
+#define NID_setct_AuthRevResTBE         578
+#define OBJ_setct_AuthRevResTBE         OBJ_set_ctype,60L
+
+#define SN_setct_AuthRevResTBEB         "setct-AuthRevResTBEB"
+#define NID_setct_AuthRevResTBEB                579
+#define OBJ_setct_AuthRevResTBEB                OBJ_set_ctype,61L
+
+#define SN_setct_CapReqTBE              "setct-CapReqTBE"
+#define NID_setct_CapReqTBE             580
+#define OBJ_setct_CapReqTBE             OBJ_set_ctype,62L
+
+#define SN_setct_CapReqTBEX             "setct-CapReqTBEX"
+#define NID_setct_CapReqTBEX            581
+#define OBJ_setct_CapReqTBEX            OBJ_set_ctype,63L
+
+#define SN_setct_CapResTBE              "setct-CapResTBE"
+#define NID_setct_CapResTBE             582
+#define OBJ_setct_CapResTBE             OBJ_set_ctype,64L
+
+#define SN_setct_CapRevReqTBE           "setct-CapRevReqTBE"
+#define NID_setct_CapRevReqTBE          583
+#define OBJ_setct_CapRevReqTBE          OBJ_set_ctype,65L
+
+#define SN_setct_CapRevReqTBEX          "setct-CapRevReqTBEX"
+#define NID_setct_CapRevReqTBEX         584
+#define OBJ_setct_CapRevReqTBEX         OBJ_set_ctype,66L
+
+#define SN_setct_CapRevResTBE           "setct-CapRevResTBE"
+#define NID_setct_CapRevResTBE          585
+#define OBJ_setct_CapRevResTBE          OBJ_set_ctype,67L
+
+#define SN_setct_CredReqTBE             "setct-CredReqTBE"
+#define NID_setct_CredReqTBE            586
+#define OBJ_setct_CredReqTBE            OBJ_set_ctype,68L
+
+#define SN_setct_CredReqTBEX            "setct-CredReqTBEX"
+#define NID_setct_CredReqTBEX           587
+#define OBJ_setct_CredReqTBEX           OBJ_set_ctype,69L
+
+#define SN_setct_CredResTBE             "setct-CredResTBE"
+#define NID_setct_CredResTBE            588
+#define OBJ_setct_CredResTBE            OBJ_set_ctype,70L
+
+#define SN_setct_CredRevReqTBE          "setct-CredRevReqTBE"
+#define NID_setct_CredRevReqTBE         589
+#define OBJ_setct_CredRevReqTBE         OBJ_set_ctype,71L
+
+#define SN_setct_CredRevReqTBEX         "setct-CredRevReqTBEX"
+#define NID_setct_CredRevReqTBEX                590
+#define OBJ_setct_CredRevReqTBEX                OBJ_set_ctype,72L
+
+#define SN_setct_CredRevResTBE          "setct-CredRevResTBE"
+#define NID_setct_CredRevResTBE         591
+#define OBJ_setct_CredRevResTBE         OBJ_set_ctype,73L
+
+#define SN_setct_BatchAdminReqTBE               "setct-BatchAdminReqTBE"
+#define NID_setct_BatchAdminReqTBE              592
+#define OBJ_setct_BatchAdminReqTBE              OBJ_set_ctype,74L
+
+#define SN_setct_BatchAdminResTBE               "setct-BatchAdminResTBE"
+#define NID_setct_BatchAdminResTBE              593
+#define OBJ_setct_BatchAdminResTBE              OBJ_set_ctype,75L
+
+#define SN_setct_RegFormReqTBE          "setct-RegFormReqTBE"
+#define NID_setct_RegFormReqTBE         594
+#define OBJ_setct_RegFormReqTBE         OBJ_set_ctype,76L
+
+#define SN_setct_CertReqTBE             "setct-CertReqTBE"
+#define NID_setct_CertReqTBE            595
+#define OBJ_setct_CertReqTBE            OBJ_set_ctype,77L
+
+#define SN_setct_CertReqTBEX            "setct-CertReqTBEX"
+#define NID_setct_CertReqTBEX           596
+#define OBJ_setct_CertReqTBEX           OBJ_set_ctype,78L
+
+#define SN_setct_CertResTBE             "setct-CertResTBE"
+#define NID_setct_CertResTBE            597
+#define OBJ_setct_CertResTBE            OBJ_set_ctype,79L
+
+#define SN_setct_CRLNotificationTBS             "setct-CRLNotificationTBS"
+#define NID_setct_CRLNotificationTBS            598
+#define OBJ_setct_CRLNotificationTBS            OBJ_set_ctype,80L
+
+#define SN_setct_CRLNotificationResTBS          "setct-CRLNotificationResTBS"
+#define NID_setct_CRLNotificationResTBS         599
+#define OBJ_setct_CRLNotificationResTBS         OBJ_set_ctype,81L
+
+#define SN_setct_BCIDistributionTBS             "setct-BCIDistributionTBS"
+#define NID_setct_BCIDistributionTBS            600
+#define OBJ_setct_BCIDistributionTBS            OBJ_set_ctype,82L
+
+#define SN_setext_genCrypt              "setext-genCrypt"
+#define LN_setext_genCrypt              "generic cryptogram"
+#define NID_setext_genCrypt             601
+#define OBJ_setext_genCrypt             OBJ_set_msgExt,1L
+
+#define SN_setext_miAuth                "setext-miAuth"
+#define LN_setext_miAuth                "merchant initiated auth"
+#define NID_setext_miAuth               602
+#define OBJ_setext_miAuth               OBJ_set_msgExt,3L
+
+#define SN_setext_pinSecure             "setext-pinSecure"
+#define NID_setext_pinSecure            603
+#define OBJ_setext_pinSecure            OBJ_set_msgExt,4L
+
+#define SN_setext_pinAny                "setext-pinAny"
+#define NID_setext_pinAny               604
+#define OBJ_setext_pinAny               OBJ_set_msgExt,5L
+
+#define SN_setext_track2                "setext-track2"
+#define NID_setext_track2               605
+#define OBJ_setext_track2               OBJ_set_msgExt,7L
+
+#define SN_setext_cv            "setext-cv"
+#define LN_setext_cv            "additional verification"
+#define NID_setext_cv           606
+#define OBJ_setext_cv           OBJ_set_msgExt,8L
+
+#define SN_set_policy_root              "set-policy-root"
+#define NID_set_policy_root             607
+#define OBJ_set_policy_root             OBJ_set_policy,0L
+
+#define SN_setCext_hashedRoot           "setCext-hashedRoot"
+#define NID_setCext_hashedRoot          608
+#define OBJ_setCext_hashedRoot          OBJ_set_certExt,0L
+
+#define SN_setCext_certType             "setCext-certType"
+#define NID_setCext_certType            609
+#define OBJ_setCext_certType            OBJ_set_certExt,1L
+
+#define SN_setCext_merchData            "setCext-merchData"
+#define NID_setCext_merchData           610
+#define OBJ_setCext_merchData           OBJ_set_certExt,2L
+
+#define SN_setCext_cCertRequired                "setCext-cCertRequired"
+#define NID_setCext_cCertRequired               611
+#define OBJ_setCext_cCertRequired               OBJ_set_certExt,3L
+
+#define SN_setCext_tunneling            "setCext-tunneling"
+#define NID_setCext_tunneling           612
+#define OBJ_setCext_tunneling           OBJ_set_certExt,4L
+
+#define SN_setCext_setExt               "setCext-setExt"
+#define NID_setCext_setExt              613
+#define OBJ_setCext_setExt              OBJ_set_certExt,5L
+
+#define SN_setCext_setQualf             "setCext-setQualf"
+#define NID_setCext_setQualf            614
+#define OBJ_setCext_setQualf            OBJ_set_certExt,6L
+
+#define SN_setCext_PGWYcapabilities             "setCext-PGWYcapabilities"
+#define NID_setCext_PGWYcapabilities            615
+#define OBJ_setCext_PGWYcapabilities            OBJ_set_certExt,7L
+
+#define SN_setCext_TokenIdentifier              "setCext-TokenIdentifier"
+#define NID_setCext_TokenIdentifier             616
+#define OBJ_setCext_TokenIdentifier             OBJ_set_certExt,8L
+
+#define SN_setCext_Track2Data           "setCext-Track2Data"
+#define NID_setCext_Track2Data          617
+#define OBJ_setCext_Track2Data          OBJ_set_certExt,9L
+
+#define SN_setCext_TokenType            "setCext-TokenType"
+#define NID_setCext_TokenType           618
+#define OBJ_setCext_TokenType           OBJ_set_certExt,10L
+
+#define SN_setCext_IssuerCapabilities           "setCext-IssuerCapabilities"
+#define NID_setCext_IssuerCapabilities          619
+#define OBJ_setCext_IssuerCapabilities          OBJ_set_certExt,11L
+
+#define SN_setAttr_Cert         "setAttr-Cert"
+#define NID_setAttr_Cert                620
+#define OBJ_setAttr_Cert                OBJ_set_attr,0L
+
+#define SN_setAttr_PGWYcap              "setAttr-PGWYcap"
+#define LN_setAttr_PGWYcap              "payment gateway capabilities"
+#define NID_setAttr_PGWYcap             621
+#define OBJ_setAttr_PGWYcap             OBJ_set_attr,1L
+
+#define SN_setAttr_TokenType            "setAttr-TokenType"
+#define NID_setAttr_TokenType           622
+#define OBJ_setAttr_TokenType           OBJ_set_attr,2L
+
+#define SN_setAttr_IssCap               "setAttr-IssCap"
+#define LN_setAttr_IssCap               "issuer capabilities"
+#define NID_setAttr_IssCap              623
+#define OBJ_setAttr_IssCap              OBJ_set_attr,3L
+
+#define SN_set_rootKeyThumb             "set-rootKeyThumb"
+#define NID_set_rootKeyThumb            624
+#define OBJ_set_rootKeyThumb            OBJ_setAttr_Cert,0L
+
+#define SN_set_addPolicy                "set-addPolicy"
+#define NID_set_addPolicy               625
+#define OBJ_set_addPolicy               OBJ_setAttr_Cert,1L
+
+#define SN_setAttr_Token_EMV            "setAttr-Token-EMV"
+#define NID_setAttr_Token_EMV           626
+#define OBJ_setAttr_Token_EMV           OBJ_setAttr_TokenType,1L
+
+#define SN_setAttr_Token_B0Prime                "setAttr-Token-B0Prime"
+#define NID_setAttr_Token_B0Prime               627
+#define OBJ_setAttr_Token_B0Prime               OBJ_setAttr_TokenType,2L
+
+#define SN_setAttr_IssCap_CVM           "setAttr-IssCap-CVM"
+#define NID_setAttr_IssCap_CVM          628
+#define OBJ_setAttr_IssCap_CVM          OBJ_setAttr_IssCap,3L
+
+#define SN_setAttr_IssCap_T2            "setAttr-IssCap-T2"
+#define NID_setAttr_IssCap_T2           629
+#define OBJ_setAttr_IssCap_T2           OBJ_setAttr_IssCap,4L
+
+#define SN_setAttr_IssCap_Sig           "setAttr-IssCap-Sig"
+#define NID_setAttr_IssCap_Sig          630
+#define OBJ_setAttr_IssCap_Sig          OBJ_setAttr_IssCap,5L
+
+#define SN_setAttr_GenCryptgrm          "setAttr-GenCryptgrm"
+#define LN_setAttr_GenCryptgrm          "generate cryptogram"
+#define NID_setAttr_GenCryptgrm         631
+#define OBJ_setAttr_GenCryptgrm         OBJ_setAttr_IssCap_CVM,1L
+
+#define SN_setAttr_T2Enc                "setAttr-T2Enc"
+#define LN_setAttr_T2Enc                "encrypted track 2"
+#define NID_setAttr_T2Enc               632
+#define OBJ_setAttr_T2Enc               OBJ_setAttr_IssCap_T2,1L
+
+#define SN_setAttr_T2cleartxt           "setAttr-T2cleartxt"
+#define LN_setAttr_T2cleartxt           "cleartext track 2"
+#define NID_setAttr_T2cleartxt          633
+#define OBJ_setAttr_T2cleartxt          OBJ_setAttr_IssCap_T2,2L
+
+#define SN_setAttr_TokICCsig            "setAttr-TokICCsig"
+#define LN_setAttr_TokICCsig            "ICC or token signature"
+#define NID_setAttr_TokICCsig           634
+#define OBJ_setAttr_TokICCsig           OBJ_setAttr_IssCap_Sig,1L
+
+#define SN_setAttr_SecDevSig            "setAttr-SecDevSig"
+#define LN_setAttr_SecDevSig            "secure device signature"
+#define NID_setAttr_SecDevSig           635
+#define OBJ_setAttr_SecDevSig           OBJ_setAttr_IssCap_Sig,2L
+
+#define SN_set_brand_IATA_ATA           "set-brand-IATA-ATA"
+#define NID_set_brand_IATA_ATA          636
+#define OBJ_set_brand_IATA_ATA          OBJ_set_brand,1L
+
+#define SN_set_brand_Diners             "set-brand-Diners"
+#define NID_set_brand_Diners            637
+#define OBJ_set_brand_Diners            OBJ_set_brand,30L
+
+#define SN_set_brand_AmericanExpress            "set-brand-AmericanExpress"
+#define NID_set_brand_AmericanExpress           638
+#define OBJ_set_brand_AmericanExpress           OBJ_set_brand,34L
+
+#define SN_set_brand_JCB                "set-brand-JCB"
+#define NID_set_brand_JCB               639
+#define OBJ_set_brand_JCB               OBJ_set_brand,35L
+
+#define SN_set_brand_Visa               "set-brand-Visa"
+#define NID_set_brand_Visa              640
+#define OBJ_set_brand_Visa              OBJ_set_brand,4L
+
+#define SN_set_brand_MasterCard         "set-brand-MasterCard"
+#define NID_set_brand_MasterCard                641
+#define OBJ_set_brand_MasterCard                OBJ_set_brand,5L
+
+#define SN_set_brand_Novus              "set-brand-Novus"
+#define NID_set_brand_Novus             642
+#define OBJ_set_brand_Novus             OBJ_set_brand,6011L
+
+#define SN_des_cdmf             "DES-CDMF"
+#define LN_des_cdmf             "des-cdmf"
+#define NID_des_cdmf            643
+#define OBJ_des_cdmf            OBJ_rsadsi,3L,10L
+
+#define SN_rsaOAEPEncryptionSET         "rsaOAEPEncryptionSET"
+#define NID_rsaOAEPEncryptionSET                644
+#define OBJ_rsaOAEPEncryptionSET                OBJ_rsadsi,1L,1L,6L
+
+#define SN_ipsec3               "Oakley-EC2N-3"
+#define LN_ipsec3               "ipsec3"
+#define NID_ipsec3              749
+
+#define SN_ipsec4               "Oakley-EC2N-4"
+#define LN_ipsec4               "ipsec4"
+#define NID_ipsec4              750
+
+#define SN_whirlpool            "whirlpool"
+#define NID_whirlpool           804
+#define OBJ_whirlpool           OBJ_iso,0L,10118L,3L,0L,55L
+
+#define SN_cryptopro            "cryptopro"
+#define NID_cryptopro           805
+#define OBJ_cryptopro           OBJ_member_body,643L,2L,2L
+
+#define SN_cryptocom            "cryptocom"
+#define NID_cryptocom           806
+#define OBJ_cryptocom           OBJ_member_body,643L,2L,9L
+
+#define SN_id_tc26              "id-tc26"
+#define NID_id_tc26             974
+#define OBJ_id_tc26             OBJ_member_body,643L,7L,1L
+
+#define SN_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001          "id-GostR3411-94-with-GostR3410-2001"
+#define LN_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001          "GOST R 34.11-94 with GOST R 34.10-2001"
+#define NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001         807
+#define OBJ_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001         OBJ_cryptopro,3L
+
+#define SN_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_94            "id-GostR3411-94-with-GostR3410-94"
+#define LN_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_94            "GOST R 34.11-94 with GOST R 34.10-94"
+#define NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_94           808
+#define OBJ_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_94           OBJ_cryptopro,4L
+
+#define SN_id_GostR3411_94              "md_gost94"
+#define LN_id_GostR3411_94              "GOST R 34.11-94"
+#define NID_id_GostR3411_94             809
+#define OBJ_id_GostR3411_94             OBJ_cryptopro,9L
+
+#define SN_id_HMACGostR3411_94          "id-HMACGostR3411-94"
+#define LN_id_HMACGostR3411_94          "HMAC GOST 34.11-94"
+#define NID_id_HMACGostR3411_94         810
+#define OBJ_id_HMACGostR3411_94         OBJ_cryptopro,10L
+
+#define SN_id_GostR3410_2001            "gost2001"
+#define LN_id_GostR3410_2001            "GOST R 34.10-2001"
+#define NID_id_GostR3410_2001           811
+#define OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001           OBJ_cryptopro,19L
+
+#define SN_id_GostR3410_94              "gost94"
+#define LN_id_GostR3410_94              "GOST R 34.10-94"
+#define NID_id_GostR3410_94             812
+#define OBJ_id_GostR3410_94             OBJ_cryptopro,20L
+
+#define SN_id_Gost28147_89              "gost89"
+#define LN_id_Gost28147_89              "GOST 28147-89"
+#define NID_id_Gost28147_89             813
+#define OBJ_id_Gost28147_89             OBJ_cryptopro,21L
+
+#define SN_gost89_cnt           "gost89-cnt"
+#define NID_gost89_cnt          814
+
+#define SN_gost89_cnt_12                "gost89-cnt-12"
+#define NID_gost89_cnt_12               975
+
+#define SN_gost89_cbc           "gost89-cbc"
+#define NID_gost89_cbc          1009
+
+#define SN_gost89_ecb           "gost89-ecb"
+#define NID_gost89_ecb          1010
+
+#define SN_gost89_ctr           "gost89-ctr"
+#define NID_gost89_ctr          1011
+
+#define SN_id_Gost28147_89_MAC          "gost-mac"
+#define LN_id_Gost28147_89_MAC          "GOST 28147-89 MAC"
+#define NID_id_Gost28147_89_MAC         815
+#define OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_MAC         OBJ_cryptopro,22L
+
+#define SN_gost_mac_12          "gost-mac-12"
+#define NID_gost_mac_12         976
+
+#define SN_id_GostR3411_94_prf          "prf-gostr3411-94"
+#define LN_id_GostR3411_94_prf          "GOST R 34.11-94 PRF"
+#define NID_id_GostR3411_94_prf         816
+#define OBJ_id_GostR3411_94_prf         OBJ_cryptopro,23L
+
+#define SN_id_GostR3410_2001DH          "id-GostR3410-2001DH"
+#define LN_id_GostR3410_2001DH          "GOST R 34.10-2001 DH"
+#define NID_id_GostR3410_2001DH         817
+#define OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001DH         OBJ_cryptopro,98L
+
+#define SN_id_GostR3410_94DH            "id-GostR3410-94DH"
+#define LN_id_GostR3410_94DH            "GOST R 34.10-94 DH"
+#define NID_id_GostR3410_94DH           818
+#define OBJ_id_GostR3410_94DH           OBJ_cryptopro,99L
+
+#define SN_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_KeyMeshing         "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-KeyMeshing"
+#define NID_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_KeyMeshing                819
+#define OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_KeyMeshing                OBJ_cryptopro,14L,1L
+
+#define SN_id_Gost28147_89_None_KeyMeshing              "id-Gost28147-89-None-KeyMeshing"
+#define NID_id_Gost28147_89_None_KeyMeshing             820
+#define OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_None_KeyMeshing             OBJ_cryptopro,14L,0L
+
+#define SN_id_GostR3411_94_TestParamSet         "id-GostR3411-94-TestParamSet"
+#define NID_id_GostR3411_94_TestParamSet                821
+#define OBJ_id_GostR3411_94_TestParamSet                OBJ_cryptopro,30L,0L
+
+#define SN_id_GostR3411_94_CryptoProParamSet            "id-GostR3411-94-CryptoProParamSet"
+#define NID_id_GostR3411_94_CryptoProParamSet           822
+#define OBJ_id_GostR3411_94_CryptoProParamSet           OBJ_cryptopro,30L,1L
+
+#define SN_id_Gost28147_89_TestParamSet         "id-Gost28147-89-TestParamSet"
+#define NID_id_Gost28147_89_TestParamSet                823
+#define OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_TestParamSet                OBJ_cryptopro,31L,0L
+
+#define SN_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_A_ParamSet         "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet"
+#define NID_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_A_ParamSet                824
+#define OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_A_ParamSet                OBJ_cryptopro,31L,1L
+
+#define SN_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_B_ParamSet         "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-B-ParamSet"
+#define NID_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_B_ParamSet                825
+#define OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_B_ParamSet                OBJ_cryptopro,31L,2L
+
+#define SN_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_C_ParamSet         "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-C-ParamSet"
+#define NID_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_C_ParamSet                826
+#define OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_C_ParamSet                OBJ_cryptopro,31L,3L
+
+#define SN_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_D_ParamSet         "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-D-ParamSet"
+#define NID_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_D_ParamSet                827
+#define OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_D_ParamSet                OBJ_cryptopro,31L,4L
+
+#define SN_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_Oscar_1_1_ParamSet         "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-Oscar-1-1-ParamSet"
+#define NID_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_Oscar_1_1_ParamSet                828
+#define OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_Oscar_1_1_ParamSet                OBJ_cryptopro,31L,5L
+
+#define SN_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_Oscar_1_0_ParamSet         "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-Oscar-1-0-ParamSet"
+#define NID_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_Oscar_1_0_ParamSet                829
+#define OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_Oscar_1_0_ParamSet                OBJ_cryptopro,31L,6L
+
+#define SN_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_RIC_1_ParamSet             "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-RIC-1-ParamSet"
+#define NID_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_RIC_1_ParamSet            830
+#define OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_RIC_1_ParamSet            OBJ_cryptopro,31L,7L
+
+#define SN_id_GostR3410_94_TestParamSet         "id-GostR3410-94-TestParamSet"
+#define NID_id_GostR3410_94_TestParamSet                831
+#define OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_TestParamSet                OBJ_cryptopro,32L,0L
+
+#define SN_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_A_ParamSet         "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet"
+#define NID_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_A_ParamSet                832
+#define OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_A_ParamSet                OBJ_cryptopro,32L,2L
+
+#define SN_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_B_ParamSet         "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-B-ParamSet"
+#define NID_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_B_ParamSet                833
+#define OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_B_ParamSet                OBJ_cryptopro,32L,3L
+
+#define SN_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_C_ParamSet         "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-C-ParamSet"
+#define NID_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_C_ParamSet                834
+#define OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_C_ParamSet                OBJ_cryptopro,32L,4L
+
+#define SN_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_D_ParamSet         "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-D-ParamSet"
+#define NID_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_D_ParamSet                835
+#define OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_D_ParamSet                OBJ_cryptopro,32L,5L
+
+#define SN_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_XchA_ParamSet              "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-XchA-ParamSet"
+#define NID_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_XchA_ParamSet             836
+#define OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_XchA_ParamSet             OBJ_cryptopro,33L,1L
+
+#define SN_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_XchB_ParamSet              "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-XchB-ParamSet"
+#define NID_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_XchB_ParamSet             837
+#define OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_XchB_ParamSet             OBJ_cryptopro,33L,2L
+
+#define SN_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_XchC_ParamSet              "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-XchC-ParamSet"
+#define NID_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_XchC_ParamSet             838
+#define OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_XchC_ParamSet             OBJ_cryptopro,33L,3L
+
+#define SN_id_GostR3410_2001_TestParamSet               "id-GostR3410-2001-TestParamSet"
+#define NID_id_GostR3410_2001_TestParamSet              839
+#define OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001_TestParamSet              OBJ_cryptopro,35L,0L
+
+#define SN_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_A_ParamSet               "id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet"
+#define NID_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_A_ParamSet              840
+#define OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_A_ParamSet              OBJ_cryptopro,35L,1L
+
+#define SN_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_B_ParamSet               "id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-B-ParamSet"
+#define NID_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_B_ParamSet              841
+#define OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_B_ParamSet              OBJ_cryptopro,35L,2L
+
+#define SN_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_C_ParamSet               "id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-C-ParamSet"
+#define NID_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_C_ParamSet              842
+#define OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_C_ParamSet              OBJ_cryptopro,35L,3L
+
+#define SN_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_XchA_ParamSet            "id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-XchA-ParamSet"
+#define NID_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_XchA_ParamSet           843
+#define OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_XchA_ParamSet           OBJ_cryptopro,36L,0L
+
+#define SN_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_XchB_ParamSet            "id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-XchB-ParamSet"
+#define NID_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_XchB_ParamSet           844
+#define OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_XchB_ParamSet           OBJ_cryptopro,36L,1L
+
+#define SN_id_GostR3410_94_a            "id-GostR3410-94-a"
+#define NID_id_GostR3410_94_a           845
+#define OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_a           OBJ_id_GostR3410_94,1L
+
+#define SN_id_GostR3410_94_aBis         "id-GostR3410-94-aBis"
+#define NID_id_GostR3410_94_aBis                846
+#define OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_aBis                OBJ_id_GostR3410_94,2L
+
+#define SN_id_GostR3410_94_b            "id-GostR3410-94-b"
+#define NID_id_GostR3410_94_b           847
+#define OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_b           OBJ_id_GostR3410_94,3L
+
+#define SN_id_GostR3410_94_bBis         "id-GostR3410-94-bBis"
+#define NID_id_GostR3410_94_bBis                848
+#define OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_bBis                OBJ_id_GostR3410_94,4L
+
+#define SN_id_Gost28147_89_cc           "id-Gost28147-89-cc"
+#define LN_id_Gost28147_89_cc           "GOST 28147-89 Cryptocom ParamSet"
+#define NID_id_Gost28147_89_cc          849
+#define OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_cc          OBJ_cryptocom,1L,6L,1L
+
+#define SN_id_GostR3410_94_cc           "gost94cc"
+#define LN_id_GostR3410_94_cc           "GOST 34.10-94 Cryptocom"
+#define NID_id_GostR3410_94_cc          850
+#define OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_cc          OBJ_cryptocom,1L,5L,3L
+
+#define SN_id_GostR3410_2001_cc         "gost2001cc"
+#define LN_id_GostR3410_2001_cc         "GOST 34.10-2001 Cryptocom"
+#define NID_id_GostR3410_2001_cc                851
+#define OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001_cc                OBJ_cryptocom,1L,5L,4L
+
+#define SN_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_94_cc         "id-GostR3411-94-with-GostR3410-94-cc"
+#define LN_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_94_cc         "GOST R 34.11-94 with GOST R 34.10-94 Cryptocom"
+#define NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_94_cc                852
+#define OBJ_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_94_cc                OBJ_cryptocom,1L,3L,3L
+
+#define SN_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001_cc               "id-GostR3411-94-with-GostR3410-2001-cc"
+#define LN_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001_cc               "GOST R 34.11-94 with GOST R 34.10-2001 Cryptocom"
+#define NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001_cc              853
+#define OBJ_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001_cc              OBJ_cryptocom,1L,3L,4L
+
+#define SN_id_GostR3410_2001_ParamSet_cc                "id-GostR3410-2001-ParamSet-cc"
+#define LN_id_GostR3410_2001_ParamSet_cc                "GOST R 3410-2001 Parameter Set Cryptocom"
+#define NID_id_GostR3410_2001_ParamSet_cc               854
+#define OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001_ParamSet_cc               OBJ_cryptocom,1L,8L,1L
+
+#define SN_id_tc26_algorithms           "id-tc26-algorithms"
+#define NID_id_tc26_algorithms          977
+#define OBJ_id_tc26_algorithms          OBJ_id_tc26,1L
+
+#define SN_id_tc26_sign         "id-tc26-sign"
+#define NID_id_tc26_sign                978
+#define OBJ_id_tc26_sign                OBJ_id_tc26_algorithms,1L
+
+#define SN_id_GostR3410_2012_256                "gost2012_256"
+#define LN_id_GostR3410_2012_256                "GOST R 34.10-2012 with 256 bit modulus"
+#define NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256               979
+#define OBJ_id_GostR3410_2012_256               OBJ_id_tc26_sign,1L
+
+#define SN_id_GostR3410_2012_512                "gost2012_512"
+#define LN_id_GostR3410_2012_512                "GOST R 34.10-2012 with 512 bit modulus"
+#define NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512               980
+#define OBJ_id_GostR3410_2012_512               OBJ_id_tc26_sign,2L
+
+#define SN_id_tc26_digest               "id-tc26-digest"
+#define NID_id_tc26_digest              981
+#define OBJ_id_tc26_digest              OBJ_id_tc26_algorithms,2L
+
+#define SN_id_GostR3411_2012_256                "md_gost12_256"
+#define LN_id_GostR3411_2012_256                "GOST R 34.11-2012 with 256 bit hash"
+#define NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256               982
+#define OBJ_id_GostR3411_2012_256               OBJ_id_tc26_digest,2L
+
+#define SN_id_GostR3411_2012_512                "md_gost12_512"
+#define LN_id_GostR3411_2012_512                "GOST R 34.11-2012 with 512 bit hash"
+#define NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512               983
+#define OBJ_id_GostR3411_2012_512               OBJ_id_tc26_digest,3L
+
+#define SN_id_tc26_signwithdigest               "id-tc26-signwithdigest"
+#define NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest              984
+#define OBJ_id_tc26_signwithdigest              OBJ_id_tc26_algorithms,3L
+
+#define SN_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256             "id-tc26-signwithdigest-gost3410-2012-256"
+#define LN_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256             "GOST R 34.10-2012 with GOST R 34.11-2012 (256 bit)"
+#define NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256            985
+#define OBJ_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256            OBJ_id_tc26_signwithdigest,2L
+
+#define SN_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512             "id-tc26-signwithdigest-gost3410-2012-512"
+#define LN_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512             "GOST R 34.10-2012 with GOST R 34.11-2012 (512 bit)"
+#define NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512            986
+#define OBJ_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512            OBJ_id_tc26_signwithdigest,3L
+
+#define SN_id_tc26_mac          "id-tc26-mac"
+#define NID_id_tc26_mac         987
+#define OBJ_id_tc26_mac         OBJ_id_tc26_algorithms,4L
+
+#define SN_id_tc26_hmac_gost_3411_2012_256              "id-tc26-hmac-gost-3411-2012-256"
+#define LN_id_tc26_hmac_gost_3411_2012_256              "HMAC GOST 34.11-2012 256 bit"
+#define NID_id_tc26_hmac_gost_3411_2012_256             988
+#define OBJ_id_tc26_hmac_gost_3411_2012_256             OBJ_id_tc26_mac,1L
+
+#define SN_id_tc26_hmac_gost_3411_2012_512              "id-tc26-hmac-gost-3411-2012-512"
+#define LN_id_tc26_hmac_gost_3411_2012_512              "HMAC GOST 34.11-2012 512 bit"
+#define NID_id_tc26_hmac_gost_3411_2012_512             989
+#define OBJ_id_tc26_hmac_gost_3411_2012_512             OBJ_id_tc26_mac,2L
+
+#define SN_id_tc26_cipher               "id-tc26-cipher"
+#define NID_id_tc26_cipher              990
+#define OBJ_id_tc26_cipher              OBJ_id_tc26_algorithms,5L
+
+#define SN_id_tc26_agreement            "id-tc26-agreement"
+#define NID_id_tc26_agreement           991
+#define OBJ_id_tc26_agreement           OBJ_id_tc26_algorithms,6L
+
+#define SN_id_tc26_agreement_gost_3410_2012_256         "id-tc26-agreement-gost-3410-2012-256"
+#define NID_id_tc26_agreement_gost_3410_2012_256                992
+#define OBJ_id_tc26_agreement_gost_3410_2012_256                OBJ_id_tc26_agreement,1L
+
+#define SN_id_tc26_agreement_gost_3410_2012_512         "id-tc26-agreement-gost-3410-2012-512"
+#define NID_id_tc26_agreement_gost_3410_2012_512                993
+#define OBJ_id_tc26_agreement_gost_3410_2012_512                OBJ_id_tc26_agreement,2L
+
+#define SN_id_tc26_constants            "id-tc26-constants"
+#define NID_id_tc26_constants           994
+#define OBJ_id_tc26_constants           OBJ_id_tc26,2L
+
+#define SN_id_tc26_sign_constants               "id-tc26-sign-constants"
+#define NID_id_tc26_sign_constants              995
+#define OBJ_id_tc26_sign_constants              OBJ_id_tc26_constants,1L
+
+#define SN_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_constants         "id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-constants"
+#define NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_constants                996
+#define OBJ_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_constants                OBJ_id_tc26_sign_constants,2L
+
+#define SN_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetTest              "id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-paramSetTest"
+#define LN_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetTest              "GOST R 34.10-2012 (512 bit) testing parameter set"
+#define NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetTest             997
+#define OBJ_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetTest             OBJ_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_constants,0L
+
+#define SN_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetA         "id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-paramSetA"
+#define LN_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetA         "GOST R 34.10-2012 (512 bit) ParamSet A"
+#define NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetA                998
+#define OBJ_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetA                OBJ_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_constants,1L
+
+#define SN_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetB         "id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-paramSetB"
+#define LN_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetB         "GOST R 34.10-2012 (512 bit) ParamSet B"
+#define NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetB                999
+#define OBJ_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetB                OBJ_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_constants,2L
+
+#define SN_id_tc26_digest_constants             "id-tc26-digest-constants"
+#define NID_id_tc26_digest_constants            1000
+#define OBJ_id_tc26_digest_constants            OBJ_id_tc26_constants,2L
+
+#define SN_id_tc26_cipher_constants             "id-tc26-cipher-constants"
+#define NID_id_tc26_cipher_constants            1001
+#define OBJ_id_tc26_cipher_constants            OBJ_id_tc26_constants,5L
+
+#define SN_id_tc26_gost_28147_constants         "id-tc26-gost-28147-constants"
+#define NID_id_tc26_gost_28147_constants                1002
+#define OBJ_id_tc26_gost_28147_constants                OBJ_id_tc26_cipher_constants,1L
+
+#define SN_id_tc26_gost_28147_param_Z           "id-tc26-gost-28147-param-Z"
+#define LN_id_tc26_gost_28147_param_Z           "GOST 28147-89 TC26 parameter set"
+#define NID_id_tc26_gost_28147_param_Z          1003
+#define OBJ_id_tc26_gost_28147_param_Z          OBJ_id_tc26_gost_28147_constants,1L
+
+#define SN_INN          "INN"
+#define LN_INN          "INN"
+#define NID_INN         1004
+#define OBJ_INN         OBJ_member_body,643L,3L,131L,1L,1L
+
+#define SN_OGRN         "OGRN"
+#define LN_OGRN         "OGRN"
+#define NID_OGRN                1005
+#define OBJ_OGRN                OBJ_member_body,643L,100L,1L
+
+#define SN_SNILS                "SNILS"
+#define LN_SNILS                "SNILS"
+#define NID_SNILS               1006
+#define OBJ_SNILS               OBJ_member_body,643L,100L,3L
+
+#define SN_subjectSignTool              "subjectSignTool"
+#define LN_subjectSignTool              "Signing Tool of Subject"
+#define NID_subjectSignTool             1007
+#define OBJ_subjectSignTool             OBJ_member_body,643L,100L,111L
+
+#define SN_issuerSignTool               "issuerSignTool"
+#define LN_issuerSignTool               "Signing Tool of Issuer"
+#define NID_issuerSignTool              1008
+#define OBJ_issuerSignTool              OBJ_member_body,643L,100L,112L
+
+#define SN_grasshopper_ecb              "grasshopper-ecb"
+#define NID_grasshopper_ecb             1012
+
+#define SN_grasshopper_ctr              "grasshopper-ctr"
+#define NID_grasshopper_ctr             1013
+
+#define SN_grasshopper_ofb              "grasshopper-ofb"
+#define NID_grasshopper_ofb             1014
+
+#define SN_grasshopper_cbc              "grasshopper-cbc"
+#define NID_grasshopper_cbc             1015
+
+#define SN_grasshopper_cfb              "grasshopper-cfb"
+#define NID_grasshopper_cfb             1016
+
+#define SN_grasshopper_mac              "grasshopper-mac"
+#define NID_grasshopper_mac             1017
+
+#define SN_camellia_128_cbc             "CAMELLIA-128-CBC"
+#define LN_camellia_128_cbc             "camellia-128-cbc"
+#define NID_camellia_128_cbc            751
+#define OBJ_camellia_128_cbc            1L,2L,392L,200011L,61L,1L,1L,1L,2L
+
+#define SN_camellia_192_cbc             "CAMELLIA-192-CBC"
+#define LN_camellia_192_cbc             "camellia-192-cbc"
+#define NID_camellia_192_cbc            752
+#define OBJ_camellia_192_cbc            1L,2L,392L,200011L,61L,1L,1L,1L,3L
+
+#define SN_camellia_256_cbc             "CAMELLIA-256-CBC"
+#define LN_camellia_256_cbc             "camellia-256-cbc"
+#define NID_camellia_256_cbc            753
+#define OBJ_camellia_256_cbc            1L,2L,392L,200011L,61L,1L,1L,1L,4L
+
+#define SN_id_camellia128_wrap          "id-camellia128-wrap"
+#define NID_id_camellia128_wrap         907
+#define OBJ_id_camellia128_wrap         1L,2L,392L,200011L,61L,1L,1L,3L,2L
+
+#define SN_id_camellia192_wrap          "id-camellia192-wrap"
+#define NID_id_camellia192_wrap         908
+#define OBJ_id_camellia192_wrap         1L,2L,392L,200011L,61L,1L,1L,3L,3L
+
+#define SN_id_camellia256_wrap          "id-camellia256-wrap"
+#define NID_id_camellia256_wrap         909
+#define OBJ_id_camellia256_wrap         1L,2L,392L,200011L,61L,1L,1L,3L,4L
+
+#define OBJ_ntt_ds              0L,3L,4401L,5L
+
+#define OBJ_camellia            OBJ_ntt_ds,3L,1L,9L
+
+#define SN_camellia_128_ecb             "CAMELLIA-128-ECB"
+#define LN_camellia_128_ecb             "camellia-128-ecb"
+#define NID_camellia_128_ecb            754
+#define OBJ_camellia_128_ecb            OBJ_camellia,1L
+
+#define SN_camellia_128_ofb128          "CAMELLIA-128-OFB"
+#define LN_camellia_128_ofb128          "camellia-128-ofb"
+#define NID_camellia_128_ofb128         766
+#define OBJ_camellia_128_ofb128         OBJ_camellia,3L
+
+#define SN_camellia_128_cfb128          "CAMELLIA-128-CFB"
+#define LN_camellia_128_cfb128          "camellia-128-cfb"
+#define NID_camellia_128_cfb128         757
+#define OBJ_camellia_128_cfb128         OBJ_camellia,4L
+
+#define SN_camellia_128_gcm             "CAMELLIA-128-GCM"
+#define LN_camellia_128_gcm             "camellia-128-gcm"
+#define NID_camellia_128_gcm            961
+#define OBJ_camellia_128_gcm            OBJ_camellia,6L
+
+#define SN_camellia_128_ccm             "CAMELLIA-128-CCM"
+#define LN_camellia_128_ccm             "camellia-128-ccm"
+#define NID_camellia_128_ccm            962
+#define OBJ_camellia_128_ccm            OBJ_camellia,7L
+
+#define SN_camellia_128_ctr             "CAMELLIA-128-CTR"
+#define LN_camellia_128_ctr             "camellia-128-ctr"
+#define NID_camellia_128_ctr            963
+#define OBJ_camellia_128_ctr            OBJ_camellia,9L
+
+#define SN_camellia_128_cmac            "CAMELLIA-128-CMAC"
+#define LN_camellia_128_cmac            "camellia-128-cmac"
+#define NID_camellia_128_cmac           964
+#define OBJ_camellia_128_cmac           OBJ_camellia,10L
+
+#define SN_camellia_192_ecb             "CAMELLIA-192-ECB"
+#define LN_camellia_192_ecb             "camellia-192-ecb"
+#define NID_camellia_192_ecb            755
+#define OBJ_camellia_192_ecb            OBJ_camellia,21L
+
+#define SN_camellia_192_ofb128          "CAMELLIA-192-OFB"
+#define LN_camellia_192_ofb128          "camellia-192-ofb"
+#define NID_camellia_192_ofb128         767
+#define OBJ_camellia_192_ofb128         OBJ_camellia,23L
+
+#define SN_camellia_192_cfb128          "CAMELLIA-192-CFB"
+#define LN_camellia_192_cfb128          "camellia-192-cfb"
+#define NID_camellia_192_cfb128         758
+#define OBJ_camellia_192_cfb128         OBJ_camellia,24L
+
+#define SN_camellia_192_gcm             "CAMELLIA-192-GCM"
+#define LN_camellia_192_gcm             "camellia-192-gcm"
+#define NID_camellia_192_gcm            965
+#define OBJ_camellia_192_gcm            OBJ_camellia,26L
+
+#define SN_camellia_192_ccm             "CAMELLIA-192-CCM"
+#define LN_camellia_192_ccm             "camellia-192-ccm"
+#define NID_camellia_192_ccm            966
+#define OBJ_camellia_192_ccm            OBJ_camellia,27L
+
+#define SN_camellia_192_ctr             "CAMELLIA-192-CTR"
+#define LN_camellia_192_ctr             "camellia-192-ctr"
+#define NID_camellia_192_ctr            967
+#define OBJ_camellia_192_ctr            OBJ_camellia,29L
+
+#define SN_camellia_192_cmac            "CAMELLIA-192-CMAC"
+#define LN_camellia_192_cmac            "camellia-192-cmac"
+#define NID_camellia_192_cmac           968
+#define OBJ_camellia_192_cmac           OBJ_camellia,30L
+
+#define SN_camellia_256_ecb             "CAMELLIA-256-ECB"
+#define LN_camellia_256_ecb             "camellia-256-ecb"
+#define NID_camellia_256_ecb            756
+#define OBJ_camellia_256_ecb            OBJ_camellia,41L
+
+#define SN_camellia_256_ofb128          "CAMELLIA-256-OFB"
+#define LN_camellia_256_ofb128          "camellia-256-ofb"
+#define NID_camellia_256_ofb128         768
+#define OBJ_camellia_256_ofb128         OBJ_camellia,43L
+
+#define SN_camellia_256_cfb128          "CAMELLIA-256-CFB"
+#define LN_camellia_256_cfb128          "camellia-256-cfb"
+#define NID_camellia_256_cfb128         759
+#define OBJ_camellia_256_cfb128         OBJ_camellia,44L
+
+#define SN_camellia_256_gcm             "CAMELLIA-256-GCM"
+#define LN_camellia_256_gcm             "camellia-256-gcm"
+#define NID_camellia_256_gcm            969
+#define OBJ_camellia_256_gcm            OBJ_camellia,46L
+
+#define SN_camellia_256_ccm             "CAMELLIA-256-CCM"
+#define LN_camellia_256_ccm             "camellia-256-ccm"
+#define NID_camellia_256_ccm            970
+#define OBJ_camellia_256_ccm            OBJ_camellia,47L
+
+#define SN_camellia_256_ctr             "CAMELLIA-256-CTR"
+#define LN_camellia_256_ctr             "camellia-256-ctr"
+#define NID_camellia_256_ctr            971
+#define OBJ_camellia_256_ctr            OBJ_camellia,49L
+
+#define SN_camellia_256_cmac            "CAMELLIA-256-CMAC"
+#define LN_camellia_256_cmac            "camellia-256-cmac"
+#define NID_camellia_256_cmac           972
+#define OBJ_camellia_256_cmac           OBJ_camellia,50L
+
+#define SN_camellia_128_cfb1            "CAMELLIA-128-CFB1"
+#define LN_camellia_128_cfb1            "camellia-128-cfb1"
+#define NID_camellia_128_cfb1           760
+
+#define SN_camellia_192_cfb1            "CAMELLIA-192-CFB1"
+#define LN_camellia_192_cfb1            "camellia-192-cfb1"
+#define NID_camellia_192_cfb1           761
+
+#define SN_camellia_256_cfb1            "CAMELLIA-256-CFB1"
+#define LN_camellia_256_cfb1            "camellia-256-cfb1"
+#define NID_camellia_256_cfb1           762
+
+#define SN_camellia_128_cfb8            "CAMELLIA-128-CFB8"
+#define LN_camellia_128_cfb8            "camellia-128-cfb8"
+#define NID_camellia_128_cfb8           763
+
+#define SN_camellia_192_cfb8            "CAMELLIA-192-CFB8"
+#define LN_camellia_192_cfb8            "camellia-192-cfb8"
+#define NID_camellia_192_cfb8           764
+
+#define SN_camellia_256_cfb8            "CAMELLIA-256-CFB8"
+#define LN_camellia_256_cfb8            "camellia-256-cfb8"
+#define NID_camellia_256_cfb8           765
+
+#define SN_kisa         "KISA"
+#define LN_kisa         "kisa"
+#define NID_kisa                773
+#define OBJ_kisa                OBJ_member_body,410L,200004L
+
+#define SN_seed_ecb             "SEED-ECB"
+#define LN_seed_ecb             "seed-ecb"
+#define NID_seed_ecb            776
+#define OBJ_seed_ecb            OBJ_kisa,1L,3L
+
+#define SN_seed_cbc             "SEED-CBC"
+#define LN_seed_cbc             "seed-cbc"
+#define NID_seed_cbc            777
+#define OBJ_seed_cbc            OBJ_kisa,1L,4L
+
+#define SN_seed_cfb128          "SEED-CFB"
+#define LN_seed_cfb128          "seed-cfb"
+#define NID_seed_cfb128         779
+#define OBJ_seed_cfb128         OBJ_kisa,1L,5L
+
+#define SN_seed_ofb128          "SEED-OFB"
+#define LN_seed_ofb128          "seed-ofb"
+#define NID_seed_ofb128         778
+#define OBJ_seed_ofb128         OBJ_kisa,1L,6L
+
+#define SN_hmac         "HMAC"
+#define LN_hmac         "hmac"
+#define NID_hmac                855
+
+#define SN_cmac         "CMAC"
+#define LN_cmac         "cmac"
+#define NID_cmac                894
+
+#define SN_rc4_hmac_md5         "RC4-HMAC-MD5"
+#define LN_rc4_hmac_md5         "rc4-hmac-md5"
+#define NID_rc4_hmac_md5                915
+
+#define SN_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1                "AES-128-CBC-HMAC-SHA1"
+#define LN_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1                "aes-128-cbc-hmac-sha1"
+#define NID_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1               916
+
+#define SN_aes_192_cbc_hmac_sha1                "AES-192-CBC-HMAC-SHA1"
+#define LN_aes_192_cbc_hmac_sha1                "aes-192-cbc-hmac-sha1"
+#define NID_aes_192_cbc_hmac_sha1               917
+
+#define SN_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha1                "AES-256-CBC-HMAC-SHA1"
+#define LN_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha1                "aes-256-cbc-hmac-sha1"
+#define NID_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha1               918
+
+#define SN_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha256              "AES-128-CBC-HMAC-SHA256"
+#define LN_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha256              "aes-128-cbc-hmac-sha256"
+#define NID_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha256             948
+
+#define SN_aes_192_cbc_hmac_sha256              "AES-192-CBC-HMAC-SHA256"
+#define LN_aes_192_cbc_hmac_sha256              "aes-192-cbc-hmac-sha256"
+#define NID_aes_192_cbc_hmac_sha256             949
+
+#define SN_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha256              "AES-256-CBC-HMAC-SHA256"
+#define LN_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha256              "aes-256-cbc-hmac-sha256"
+#define NID_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha256             950
+
+#define SN_chacha20_poly1305            "ChaCha20-Poly1305"
+#define LN_chacha20_poly1305            "chacha20-poly1305"
+#define NID_chacha20_poly1305           1018
+
+#define SN_chacha20             "ChaCha20"
+#define LN_chacha20             "chacha20"
+#define NID_chacha20            1019
+
+#define SN_dhpublicnumber               "dhpublicnumber"
+#define LN_dhpublicnumber               "X9.42 DH"
+#define NID_dhpublicnumber              920
+#define OBJ_dhpublicnumber              OBJ_ISO_US,10046L,2L,1L
+
+#define SN_brainpoolP160r1              "brainpoolP160r1"
+#define NID_brainpoolP160r1             921
+#define OBJ_brainpoolP160r1             1L,3L,36L,3L,3L,2L,8L,1L,1L,1L
+
+#define SN_brainpoolP160t1              "brainpoolP160t1"
+#define NID_brainpoolP160t1             922
+#define OBJ_brainpoolP160t1             1L,3L,36L,3L,3L,2L,8L,1L,1L,2L
+
+#define SN_brainpoolP192r1              "brainpoolP192r1"
+#define NID_brainpoolP192r1             923
+#define OBJ_brainpoolP192r1             1L,3L,36L,3L,3L,2L,8L,1L,1L,3L
+
+#define SN_brainpoolP192t1              "brainpoolP192t1"
+#define NID_brainpoolP192t1             924
+#define OBJ_brainpoolP192t1             1L,3L,36L,3L,3L,2L,8L,1L,1L,4L
+
+#define SN_brainpoolP224r1              "brainpoolP224r1"
+#define NID_brainpoolP224r1             925
+#define OBJ_brainpoolP224r1             1L,3L,36L,3L,3L,2L,8L,1L,1L,5L
+
+#define SN_brainpoolP224t1              "brainpoolP224t1"
+#define NID_brainpoolP224t1             926
+#define OBJ_brainpoolP224t1             1L,3L,36L,3L,3L,2L,8L,1L,1L,6L
+
+#define SN_brainpoolP256r1              "brainpoolP256r1"
+#define NID_brainpoolP256r1             927
+#define OBJ_brainpoolP256r1             1L,3L,36L,3L,3L,2L,8L,1L,1L,7L
+
+#define SN_brainpoolP256t1              "brainpoolP256t1"
+#define NID_brainpoolP256t1             928
+#define OBJ_brainpoolP256t1             1L,3L,36L,3L,3L,2L,8L,1L,1L,8L
+
+#define SN_brainpoolP320r1              "brainpoolP320r1"
+#define NID_brainpoolP320r1             929
+#define OBJ_brainpoolP320r1             1L,3L,36L,3L,3L,2L,8L,1L,1L,9L
+
+#define SN_brainpoolP320t1              "brainpoolP320t1"
+#define NID_brainpoolP320t1             930
+#define OBJ_brainpoolP320t1             1L,3L,36L,3L,3L,2L,8L,1L,1L,10L
+
+#define SN_brainpoolP384r1              "brainpoolP384r1"
+#define NID_brainpoolP384r1             931
+#define OBJ_brainpoolP384r1             1L,3L,36L,3L,3L,2L,8L,1L,1L,11L
+
+#define SN_brainpoolP384t1              "brainpoolP384t1"
+#define NID_brainpoolP384t1             932
+#define OBJ_brainpoolP384t1             1L,3L,36L,3L,3L,2L,8L,1L,1L,12L
+
+#define SN_brainpoolP512r1              "brainpoolP512r1"
+#define NID_brainpoolP512r1             933
+#define OBJ_brainpoolP512r1             1L,3L,36L,3L,3L,2L,8L,1L,1L,13L
+
+#define SN_brainpoolP512t1              "brainpoolP512t1"
+#define NID_brainpoolP512t1             934
+#define OBJ_brainpoolP512t1             1L,3L,36L,3L,3L,2L,8L,1L,1L,14L
+
+#define OBJ_x9_63_scheme                1L,3L,133L,16L,840L,63L,0L
+
+#define OBJ_secg_scheme         OBJ_certicom_arc,1L
+
+#define SN_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha1kdf_scheme            "dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme"
+#define NID_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha1kdf_scheme           936
+#define OBJ_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha1kdf_scheme           OBJ_x9_63_scheme,2L
+
+#define SN_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha224kdf_scheme          "dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme"
+#define NID_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha224kdf_scheme         937
+#define OBJ_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha224kdf_scheme         OBJ_secg_scheme,11L,0L
+
+#define SN_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha256kdf_scheme          "dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme"
+#define NID_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha256kdf_scheme         938
+#define OBJ_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha256kdf_scheme         OBJ_secg_scheme,11L,1L
+
+#define SN_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha384kdf_scheme          "dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme"
+#define NID_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha384kdf_scheme         939
+#define OBJ_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha384kdf_scheme         OBJ_secg_scheme,11L,2L
+
+#define SN_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha512kdf_scheme          "dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme"
+#define NID_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha512kdf_scheme         940
+#define OBJ_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha512kdf_scheme         OBJ_secg_scheme,11L,3L
+
+#define SN_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha1kdf_scheme               "dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme"
+#define NID_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha1kdf_scheme              941
+#define OBJ_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha1kdf_scheme              OBJ_x9_63_scheme,3L
+
+#define SN_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha224kdf_scheme             "dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme"
+#define NID_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha224kdf_scheme            942
+#define OBJ_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha224kdf_scheme            OBJ_secg_scheme,14L,0L
+
+#define SN_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha256kdf_scheme             "dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme"
+#define NID_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha256kdf_scheme            943
+#define OBJ_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha256kdf_scheme            OBJ_secg_scheme,14L,1L
+
+#define SN_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha384kdf_scheme             "dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme"
+#define NID_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha384kdf_scheme            944
+#define OBJ_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha384kdf_scheme            OBJ_secg_scheme,14L,2L
+
+#define SN_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha512kdf_scheme             "dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme"
+#define NID_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha512kdf_scheme            945
+#define OBJ_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha512kdf_scheme            OBJ_secg_scheme,14L,3L
+
+#define SN_dh_std_kdf           "dh-std-kdf"
+#define NID_dh_std_kdf          946
+
+#define SN_dh_cofactor_kdf              "dh-cofactor-kdf"
+#define NID_dh_cofactor_kdf             947
+
+#define SN_ct_precert_scts              "ct_precert_scts"
+#define LN_ct_precert_scts              "CT Precertificate SCTs"
+#define NID_ct_precert_scts             951
+#define OBJ_ct_precert_scts             1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,11129L,2L,4L,2L
+
+#define SN_ct_precert_poison            "ct_precert_poison"
+#define LN_ct_precert_poison            "CT Precertificate Poison"
+#define NID_ct_precert_poison           952
+#define OBJ_ct_precert_poison           1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,11129L,2L,4L,3L
+
+#define SN_ct_precert_signer            "ct_precert_signer"
+#define LN_ct_precert_signer            "CT Precertificate Signer"
+#define NID_ct_precert_signer           953
+#define OBJ_ct_precert_signer           1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,11129L,2L,4L,4L
+
+#define SN_ct_cert_scts         "ct_cert_scts"
+#define LN_ct_cert_scts         "CT Certificate SCTs"
+#define NID_ct_cert_scts                954
+#define OBJ_ct_cert_scts                1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,11129L,2L,4L,5L
+
+#define SN_jurisdictionLocalityName             "jurisdictionL"
+#define LN_jurisdictionLocalityName             "jurisdictionLocalityName"
+#define NID_jurisdictionLocalityName            955
+#define OBJ_jurisdictionLocalityName            1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,311L,60L,2L,1L,1L
+
+#define SN_jurisdictionStateOrProvinceName              "jurisdictionST"
+#define LN_jurisdictionStateOrProvinceName              "jurisdictionStateOrProvinceName"
+#define NID_jurisdictionStateOrProvinceName             956
+#define OBJ_jurisdictionStateOrProvinceName             1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,311L,60L,2L,1L,2L
+
+#define SN_jurisdictionCountryName              "jurisdictionC"
+#define LN_jurisdictionCountryName              "jurisdictionCountryName"
+#define NID_jurisdictionCountryName             957
+#define OBJ_jurisdictionCountryName             1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,311L,60L,2L,1L,3L
+
+#define SN_id_scrypt            "id-scrypt"
+#define NID_id_scrypt           973
+#define OBJ_id_scrypt           1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,11591L,4L,11L
+
+#define SN_tls1_prf             "TLS1-PRF"
+#define LN_tls1_prf             "tls1-prf"
+#define NID_tls1_prf            1021
+
+#define SN_hkdf         "HKDF"
+#define LN_hkdf         "hkdf"
+#define NID_hkdf                1036
+
+#define SN_id_pkinit            "id-pkinit"
+#define NID_id_pkinit           1031
+#define OBJ_id_pkinit           1L,3L,6L,1L,5L,2L,3L
+
+#define SN_pkInitClientAuth             "pkInitClientAuth"
+#define LN_pkInitClientAuth             "PKINIT Client Auth"
+#define NID_pkInitClientAuth            1032
+#define OBJ_pkInitClientAuth            OBJ_id_pkinit,4L
+
+#define SN_pkInitKDC            "pkInitKDC"
+#define LN_pkInitKDC            "Signing KDC Response"
+#define NID_pkInitKDC           1033
+#define OBJ_pkInitKDC           OBJ_id_pkinit,5L
+
+#define SN_X25519               "X25519"
+#define NID_X25519              1034
+#define OBJ_X25519              1L,3L,101L,110L
+
+#define SN_X448         "X448"
+#define NID_X448                1035
+#define OBJ_X448                1L,3L,101L,111L
+
+#define SN_kx_rsa               "KxRSA"
+#define LN_kx_rsa               "kx-rsa"
+#define NID_kx_rsa              1037
+
+#define SN_kx_ecdhe             "KxECDHE"
+#define LN_kx_ecdhe             "kx-ecdhe"
+#define NID_kx_ecdhe            1038
+
+#define SN_kx_dhe               "KxDHE"
+#define LN_kx_dhe               "kx-dhe"
+#define NID_kx_dhe              1039
+
+#define SN_kx_ecdhe_psk         "KxECDHE-PSK"
+#define LN_kx_ecdhe_psk         "kx-ecdhe-psk"
+#define NID_kx_ecdhe_psk                1040
+
+#define SN_kx_dhe_psk           "KxDHE-PSK"
+#define LN_kx_dhe_psk           "kx-dhe-psk"
+#define NID_kx_dhe_psk          1041
+
+#define SN_kx_rsa_psk           "KxRSA_PSK"
+#define LN_kx_rsa_psk           "kx-rsa-psk"
+#define NID_kx_rsa_psk          1042
+
+#define SN_kx_psk               "KxPSK"
+#define LN_kx_psk               "kx-psk"
+#define NID_kx_psk              1043
+
+#define SN_kx_srp               "KxSRP"
+#define LN_kx_srp               "kx-srp"
+#define NID_kx_srp              1044
+
+#define SN_kx_gost              "KxGOST"
+#define LN_kx_gost              "kx-gost"
+#define NID_kx_gost             1045
+
+#define SN_auth_rsa             "AuthRSA"
+#define LN_auth_rsa             "auth-rsa"
+#define NID_auth_rsa            1046
+
+#define SN_auth_ecdsa           "AuthECDSA"
+#define LN_auth_ecdsa           "auth-ecdsa"
+#define NID_auth_ecdsa          1047
+
+#define SN_auth_psk             "AuthPSK"
+#define LN_auth_psk             "auth-psk"
+#define NID_auth_psk            1048
+
+#define SN_auth_dss             "AuthDSS"
+#define LN_auth_dss             "auth-dss"
+#define NID_auth_dss            1049
+
+#define SN_auth_gost01          "AuthGOST01"
+#define LN_auth_gost01          "auth-gost01"
+#define NID_auth_gost01         1050
+
+#define SN_auth_gost12          "AuthGOST12"
+#define LN_auth_gost12          "auth-gost12"
+#define NID_auth_gost12         1051
+
+#define SN_auth_srp             "AuthSRP"
+#define LN_auth_srp             "auth-srp"
+#define NID_auth_srp            1052
+
+#define SN_auth_null            "AuthNULL"
+#define LN_auth_null            "auth-null"
+#define NID_auth_null           1053
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/objects.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/objects.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d4462fe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/objects.h
@@ -0,0 +1,1097 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_OBJECTS_H
+# define HEADER_OBJECTS_H
+
+# define USE_OBJ_MAC
+
+# ifdef USE_OBJ_MAC
+#  include <openssl/obj_mac.h>
+# else
+#  define SN_undef                        "UNDEF"
+#  define LN_undef                        "undefined"
+#  define NID_undef                       0
+#  define OBJ_undef                       0L
+
+#  define SN_Algorithm                    "Algorithm"
+#  define LN_algorithm                    "algorithm"
+#  define NID_algorithm                   38
+#  define OBJ_algorithm                   1L,3L,14L,3L,2L
+
+#  define LN_rsadsi                       "rsadsi"
+#  define NID_rsadsi                      1
+#  define OBJ_rsadsi                      1L,2L,840L,113549L
+
+#  define LN_pkcs                         "pkcs"
+#  define NID_pkcs                        2
+#  define OBJ_pkcs                        OBJ_rsadsi,1L
+
+#  define SN_md2                          "MD2"
+#  define LN_md2                          "md2"
+#  define NID_md2                         3
+#  define OBJ_md2                         OBJ_rsadsi,2L,2L
+
+#  define SN_md5                          "MD5"
+#  define LN_md5                          "md5"
+#  define NID_md5                         4
+#  define OBJ_md5                         OBJ_rsadsi,2L,5L
+
+#  define SN_rc4                          "RC4"
+#  define LN_rc4                          "rc4"
+#  define NID_rc4                         5
+#  define OBJ_rc4                         OBJ_rsadsi,3L,4L
+
+#  define LN_rsaEncryption                "rsaEncryption"
+#  define NID_rsaEncryption               6
+#  define OBJ_rsaEncryption               OBJ_pkcs,1L,1L
+
+#  define SN_md2WithRSAEncryption         "RSA-MD2"
+#  define LN_md2WithRSAEncryption         "md2WithRSAEncryption"
+#  define NID_md2WithRSAEncryption        7
+#  define OBJ_md2WithRSAEncryption        OBJ_pkcs,1L,2L
+
+#  define SN_md5WithRSAEncryption         "RSA-MD5"
+#  define LN_md5WithRSAEncryption         "md5WithRSAEncryption"
+#  define NID_md5WithRSAEncryption        8
+#  define OBJ_md5WithRSAEncryption        OBJ_pkcs,1L,4L
+
+#  define SN_pbeWithMD2AndDES_CBC         "PBE-MD2-DES"
+#  define LN_pbeWithMD2AndDES_CBC         "pbeWithMD2AndDES-CBC"
+#  define NID_pbeWithMD2AndDES_CBC        9
+#  define OBJ_pbeWithMD2AndDES_CBC        OBJ_pkcs,5L,1L
+
+#  define SN_pbeWithMD5AndDES_CBC         "PBE-MD5-DES"
+#  define LN_pbeWithMD5AndDES_CBC         "pbeWithMD5AndDES-CBC"
+#  define NID_pbeWithMD5AndDES_CBC        10
+#  define OBJ_pbeWithMD5AndDES_CBC        OBJ_pkcs,5L,3L
+
+#  define LN_X500                         "X500"
+#  define NID_X500                        11
+#  define OBJ_X500                        2L,5L
+
+#  define LN_X509                         "X509"
+#  define NID_X509                        12
+#  define OBJ_X509                        OBJ_X500,4L
+
+#  define SN_commonName                   "CN"
+#  define LN_commonName                   "commonName"
+#  define NID_commonName                  13
+#  define OBJ_commonName                  OBJ_X509,3L
+
+#  define SN_countryName                  "C"
+#  define LN_countryName                  "countryName"
+#  define NID_countryName                 14
+#  define OBJ_countryName                 OBJ_X509,6L
+
+#  define SN_localityName                 "L"
+#  define LN_localityName                 "localityName"
+#  define NID_localityName                15
+#  define OBJ_localityName                OBJ_X509,7L
+
+/* Postal Address? PA */
+
+/* should be "ST" (rfc1327) but MS uses 'S' */
+#  define SN_stateOrProvinceName          "ST"
+#  define LN_stateOrProvinceName          "stateOrProvinceName"
+#  define NID_stateOrProvinceName         16
+#  define OBJ_stateOrProvinceName         OBJ_X509,8L
+
+#  define SN_organizationName             "O"
+#  define LN_organizationName             "organizationName"
+#  define NID_organizationName            17
+#  define OBJ_organizationName            OBJ_X509,10L
+
+#  define SN_organizationalUnitName       "OU"
+#  define LN_organizationalUnitName       "organizationalUnitName"
+#  define NID_organizationalUnitName      18
+#  define OBJ_organizationalUnitName      OBJ_X509,11L
+
+#  define SN_rsa                          "RSA"
+#  define LN_rsa                          "rsa"
+#  define NID_rsa                         19
+#  define OBJ_rsa                         OBJ_X500,8L,1L,1L
+
+#  define LN_pkcs7                        "pkcs7"
+#  define NID_pkcs7                       20
+#  define OBJ_pkcs7                       OBJ_pkcs,7L
+
+#  define LN_pkcs7_data                   "pkcs7-data"
+#  define NID_pkcs7_data                  21
+#  define OBJ_pkcs7_data                  OBJ_pkcs7,1L
+
+#  define LN_pkcs7_signed                 "pkcs7-signedData"
+#  define NID_pkcs7_signed                22
+#  define OBJ_pkcs7_signed                OBJ_pkcs7,2L
+
+#  define LN_pkcs7_enveloped              "pkcs7-envelopedData"
+#  define NID_pkcs7_enveloped             23
+#  define OBJ_pkcs7_enveloped             OBJ_pkcs7,3L
+
+#  define LN_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped     "pkcs7-signedAndEnvelopedData"
+#  define NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped    24
+#  define OBJ_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped    OBJ_pkcs7,4L
+
+#  define LN_pkcs7_digest                 "pkcs7-digestData"
+#  define NID_pkcs7_digest                25
+#  define OBJ_pkcs7_digest                OBJ_pkcs7,5L
+
+#  define LN_pkcs7_encrypted              "pkcs7-encryptedData"
+#  define NID_pkcs7_encrypted             26
+#  define OBJ_pkcs7_encrypted             OBJ_pkcs7,6L
+
+#  define LN_pkcs3                        "pkcs3"
+#  define NID_pkcs3                       27
+#  define OBJ_pkcs3                       OBJ_pkcs,3L
+
+#  define LN_dhKeyAgreement               "dhKeyAgreement"
+#  define NID_dhKeyAgreement              28
+#  define OBJ_dhKeyAgreement              OBJ_pkcs3,1L
+
+#  define SN_des_ecb                      "DES-ECB"
+#  define LN_des_ecb                      "des-ecb"
+#  define NID_des_ecb                     29
+#  define OBJ_des_ecb                     OBJ_algorithm,6L
+
+#  define SN_des_cfb64                    "DES-CFB"
+#  define LN_des_cfb64                    "des-cfb"
+#  define NID_des_cfb64                   30
+/* IV + num */
+#  define OBJ_des_cfb64                   OBJ_algorithm,9L
+
+#  define SN_des_cbc                      "DES-CBC"
+#  define LN_des_cbc                      "des-cbc"
+#  define NID_des_cbc                     31
+/* IV */
+#  define OBJ_des_cbc                     OBJ_algorithm,7L
+
+#  define SN_des_ede                      "DES-EDE"
+#  define LN_des_ede                      "des-ede"
+#  define NID_des_ede                     32
+/* ?? */
+#  define OBJ_des_ede                     OBJ_algorithm,17L
+
+#  define SN_des_ede3                     "DES-EDE3"
+#  define LN_des_ede3                     "des-ede3"
+#  define NID_des_ede3                    33
+
+#  define SN_idea_cbc                     "IDEA-CBC"
+#  define LN_idea_cbc                     "idea-cbc"
+#  define NID_idea_cbc                    34
+#  define OBJ_idea_cbc                    1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,188L,7L,1L,1L,2L
+
+#  define SN_idea_cfb64                   "IDEA-CFB"
+#  define LN_idea_cfb64                   "idea-cfb"
+#  define NID_idea_cfb64                  35
+
+#  define SN_idea_ecb                     "IDEA-ECB"
+#  define LN_idea_ecb                     "idea-ecb"
+#  define NID_idea_ecb                    36
+
+#  define SN_rc2_cbc                      "RC2-CBC"
+#  define LN_rc2_cbc                      "rc2-cbc"
+#  define NID_rc2_cbc                     37
+#  define OBJ_rc2_cbc                     OBJ_rsadsi,3L,2L
+
+#  define SN_rc2_ecb                      "RC2-ECB"
+#  define LN_rc2_ecb                      "rc2-ecb"
+#  define NID_rc2_ecb                     38
+
+#  define SN_rc2_cfb64                    "RC2-CFB"
+#  define LN_rc2_cfb64                    "rc2-cfb"
+#  define NID_rc2_cfb64                   39
+
+#  define SN_rc2_ofb64                    "RC2-OFB"
+#  define LN_rc2_ofb64                    "rc2-ofb"
+#  define NID_rc2_ofb64                   40
+
+#  define SN_sha                          "SHA"
+#  define LN_sha                          "sha"
+#  define NID_sha                         41
+#  define OBJ_sha                         OBJ_algorithm,18L
+
+#  define SN_shaWithRSAEncryption         "RSA-SHA"
+#  define LN_shaWithRSAEncryption         "shaWithRSAEncryption"
+#  define NID_shaWithRSAEncryption        42
+#  define OBJ_shaWithRSAEncryption        OBJ_algorithm,15L
+
+#  define SN_des_ede_cbc                  "DES-EDE-CBC"
+#  define LN_des_ede_cbc                  "des-ede-cbc"
+#  define NID_des_ede_cbc                 43
+
+#  define SN_des_ede3_cbc                 "DES-EDE3-CBC"
+#  define LN_des_ede3_cbc                 "des-ede3-cbc"
+#  define NID_des_ede3_cbc                44
+#  define OBJ_des_ede3_cbc                OBJ_rsadsi,3L,7L
+
+#  define SN_des_ofb64                    "DES-OFB"
+#  define LN_des_ofb64                    "des-ofb"
+#  define NID_des_ofb64                   45
+#  define OBJ_des_ofb64                   OBJ_algorithm,8L
+
+#  define SN_idea_ofb64                   "IDEA-OFB"
+#  define LN_idea_ofb64                   "idea-ofb"
+#  define NID_idea_ofb64                  46
+
+#  define LN_pkcs9                        "pkcs9"
+#  define NID_pkcs9                       47
+#  define OBJ_pkcs9                       OBJ_pkcs,9L
+
+#  define SN_pkcs9_emailAddress           "Email"
+#  define LN_pkcs9_emailAddress           "emailAddress"
+#  define NID_pkcs9_emailAddress          48
+#  define OBJ_pkcs9_emailAddress          OBJ_pkcs9,1L
+
+#  define LN_pkcs9_unstructuredName       "unstructuredName"
+#  define NID_pkcs9_unstructuredName      49
+#  define OBJ_pkcs9_unstructuredName      OBJ_pkcs9,2L
+
+#  define LN_pkcs9_contentType            "contentType"
+#  define NID_pkcs9_contentType           50
+#  define OBJ_pkcs9_contentType           OBJ_pkcs9,3L
+
+#  define LN_pkcs9_messageDigest          "messageDigest"
+#  define NID_pkcs9_messageDigest         51
+#  define OBJ_pkcs9_messageDigest         OBJ_pkcs9,4L
+
+#  define LN_pkcs9_signingTime            "signingTime"
+#  define NID_pkcs9_signingTime           52
+#  define OBJ_pkcs9_signingTime           OBJ_pkcs9,5L
+
+#  define LN_pkcs9_countersignature       "countersignature"
+#  define NID_pkcs9_countersignature      53
+#  define OBJ_pkcs9_countersignature      OBJ_pkcs9,6L
+
+#  define LN_pkcs9_challengePassword      "challengePassword"
+#  define NID_pkcs9_challengePassword     54
+#  define OBJ_pkcs9_challengePassword     OBJ_pkcs9,7L
+
+#  define LN_pkcs9_unstructuredAddress    "unstructuredAddress"
+#  define NID_pkcs9_unstructuredAddress   55
+#  define OBJ_pkcs9_unstructuredAddress   OBJ_pkcs9,8L
+
+#  define LN_pkcs9_extCertAttributes      "extendedCertificateAttributes"
+#  define NID_pkcs9_extCertAttributes     56
+#  define OBJ_pkcs9_extCertAttributes     OBJ_pkcs9,9L
+
+#  define SN_netscape                     "Netscape"
+#  define LN_netscape                     "Netscape Communications Corp."
+#  define NID_netscape                    57
+#  define OBJ_netscape                    2L,16L,840L,1L,113730L
+
+#  define SN_netscape_cert_extension      "nsCertExt"
+#  define LN_netscape_cert_extension      "Netscape Certificate Extension"
+#  define NID_netscape_cert_extension     58
+#  define OBJ_netscape_cert_extension     OBJ_netscape,1L
+
+#  define SN_netscape_data_type           "nsDataType"
+#  define LN_netscape_data_type           "Netscape Data Type"
+#  define NID_netscape_data_type          59
+#  define OBJ_netscape_data_type          OBJ_netscape,2L
+
+#  define SN_des_ede_cfb64                "DES-EDE-CFB"
+#  define LN_des_ede_cfb64                "des-ede-cfb"
+#  define NID_des_ede_cfb64               60
+
+#  define SN_des_ede3_cfb64               "DES-EDE3-CFB"
+#  define LN_des_ede3_cfb64               "des-ede3-cfb"
+#  define NID_des_ede3_cfb64              61
+
+#  define SN_des_ede_ofb64                "DES-EDE-OFB"
+#  define LN_des_ede_ofb64                "des-ede-ofb"
+#  define NID_des_ede_ofb64               62
+
+#  define SN_des_ede3_ofb64               "DES-EDE3-OFB"
+#  define LN_des_ede3_ofb64               "des-ede3-ofb"
+#  define NID_des_ede3_ofb64              63
+
+/* I'm not sure about the object ID */
+#  define SN_sha1                         "SHA1"
+#  define LN_sha1                         "sha1"
+#  define NID_sha1                        64
+#  define OBJ_sha1                        OBJ_algorithm,26L
+/* 28 Jun 1996 - eay */
+/* #define OBJ_sha1                     1L,3L,14L,2L,26L,05L <- wrong */
+
+#  define SN_sha1WithRSAEncryption        "RSA-SHA1"
+#  define LN_sha1WithRSAEncryption        "sha1WithRSAEncryption"
+#  define NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption       65
+#  define OBJ_sha1WithRSAEncryption       OBJ_pkcs,1L,5L
+
+#  define SN_dsaWithSHA                   "DSA-SHA"
+#  define LN_dsaWithSHA                   "dsaWithSHA"
+#  define NID_dsaWithSHA                  66
+#  define OBJ_dsaWithSHA                  OBJ_algorithm,13L
+
+#  define SN_dsa_2                        "DSA-old"
+#  define LN_dsa_2                        "dsaEncryption-old"
+#  define NID_dsa_2                       67
+#  define OBJ_dsa_2                       OBJ_algorithm,12L
+
+/* proposed by microsoft to RSA */
+#  define SN_pbeWithSHA1AndRC2_CBC        "PBE-SHA1-RC2-64"
+#  define LN_pbeWithSHA1AndRC2_CBC        "pbeWithSHA1AndRC2-CBC"
+#  define NID_pbeWithSHA1AndRC2_CBC       68
+#  define OBJ_pbeWithSHA1AndRC2_CBC       OBJ_pkcs,5L,11L
+
+/*
+ * proposed by microsoft to RSA as pbeWithSHA1AndRC4: it is now defined
+ * explicitly in PKCS#5 v2.0 as id-PBKDF2 which is something completely
+ * different.
+ */
+#  define LN_id_pbkdf2                    "PBKDF2"
+#  define NID_id_pbkdf2                   69
+#  define OBJ_id_pbkdf2                   OBJ_pkcs,5L,12L
+
+#  define SN_dsaWithSHA1_2                "DSA-SHA1-old"
+#  define LN_dsaWithSHA1_2                "dsaWithSHA1-old"
+#  define NID_dsaWithSHA1_2               70
+/* Got this one from 'sdn706r20.pdf' which is actually an NSA document :-) */
+#  define OBJ_dsaWithSHA1_2               OBJ_algorithm,27L
+
+#  define SN_netscape_cert_type           "nsCertType"
+#  define LN_netscape_cert_type           "Netscape Cert Type"
+#  define NID_netscape_cert_type          71
+#  define OBJ_netscape_cert_type          OBJ_netscape_cert_extension,1L
+
+#  define SN_netscape_base_url            "nsBaseUrl"
+#  define LN_netscape_base_url            "Netscape Base Url"
+#  define NID_netscape_base_url           72
+#  define OBJ_netscape_base_url           OBJ_netscape_cert_extension,2L
+
+#  define SN_netscape_revocation_url      "nsRevocationUrl"
+#  define LN_netscape_revocation_url      "Netscape Revocation Url"
+#  define NID_netscape_revocation_url     73
+#  define OBJ_netscape_revocation_url     OBJ_netscape_cert_extension,3L
+
+#  define SN_netscape_ca_revocation_url   "nsCaRevocationUrl"
+#  define LN_netscape_ca_revocation_url   "Netscape CA Revocation Url"
+#  define NID_netscape_ca_revocation_url  74
+#  define OBJ_netscape_ca_revocation_url  OBJ_netscape_cert_extension,4L
+
+#  define SN_netscape_renewal_url         "nsRenewalUrl"
+#  define LN_netscape_renewal_url         "Netscape Renewal Url"
+#  define NID_netscape_renewal_url        75
+#  define OBJ_netscape_renewal_url        OBJ_netscape_cert_extension,7L
+
+#  define SN_netscape_ca_policy_url       "nsCaPolicyUrl"
+#  define LN_netscape_ca_policy_url       "Netscape CA Policy Url"
+#  define NID_netscape_ca_policy_url      76
+#  define OBJ_netscape_ca_policy_url      OBJ_netscape_cert_extension,8L
+
+#  define SN_netscape_ssl_server_name     "nsSslServerName"
+#  define LN_netscape_ssl_server_name     "Netscape SSL Server Name"
+#  define NID_netscape_ssl_server_name    77
+#  define OBJ_netscape_ssl_server_name    OBJ_netscape_cert_extension,12L
+
+#  define SN_netscape_comment             "nsComment"
+#  define LN_netscape_comment             "Netscape Comment"
+#  define NID_netscape_comment            78
+#  define OBJ_netscape_comment            OBJ_netscape_cert_extension,13L
+
+#  define SN_netscape_cert_sequence       "nsCertSequence"
+#  define LN_netscape_cert_sequence       "Netscape Certificate Sequence"
+#  define NID_netscape_cert_sequence      79
+#  define OBJ_netscape_cert_sequence      OBJ_netscape_data_type,5L
+
+#  define SN_desx_cbc                     "DESX-CBC"
+#  define LN_desx_cbc                     "desx-cbc"
+#  define NID_desx_cbc                    80
+
+#  define SN_id_ce                        "id-ce"
+#  define NID_id_ce                       81
+#  define OBJ_id_ce                       2L,5L,29L
+
+#  define SN_subject_key_identifier       "subjectKeyIdentifier"
+#  define LN_subject_key_identifier       "X509v3 Subject Key Identifier"
+#  define NID_subject_key_identifier      82
+#  define OBJ_subject_key_identifier      OBJ_id_ce,14L
+
+#  define SN_key_usage                    "keyUsage"
+#  define LN_key_usage                    "X509v3 Key Usage"
+#  define NID_key_usage                   83
+#  define OBJ_key_usage                   OBJ_id_ce,15L
+
+#  define SN_private_key_usage_period     "privateKeyUsagePeriod"
+#  define LN_private_key_usage_period     "X509v3 Private Key Usage Period"
+#  define NID_private_key_usage_period    84
+#  define OBJ_private_key_usage_period    OBJ_id_ce,16L
+
+#  define SN_subject_alt_name             "subjectAltName"
+#  define LN_subject_alt_name             "X509v3 Subject Alternative Name"
+#  define NID_subject_alt_name            85
+#  define OBJ_subject_alt_name            OBJ_id_ce,17L
+
+#  define SN_issuer_alt_name              "issuerAltName"
+#  define LN_issuer_alt_name              "X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name"
+#  define NID_issuer_alt_name             86
+#  define OBJ_issuer_alt_name             OBJ_id_ce,18L
+
+#  define SN_basic_constraints            "basicConstraints"
+#  define LN_basic_constraints            "X509v3 Basic Constraints"
+#  define NID_basic_constraints           87
+#  define OBJ_basic_constraints           OBJ_id_ce,19L
+
+#  define SN_crl_number                   "crlNumber"
+#  define LN_crl_number                   "X509v3 CRL Number"
+#  define NID_crl_number                  88
+#  define OBJ_crl_number                  OBJ_id_ce,20L
+
+#  define SN_certificate_policies         "certificatePolicies"
+#  define LN_certificate_policies         "X509v3 Certificate Policies"
+#  define NID_certificate_policies        89
+#  define OBJ_certificate_policies        OBJ_id_ce,32L
+
+#  define SN_authority_key_identifier     "authorityKeyIdentifier"
+#  define LN_authority_key_identifier     "X509v3 Authority Key Identifier"
+#  define NID_authority_key_identifier    90
+#  define OBJ_authority_key_identifier    OBJ_id_ce,35L
+
+#  define SN_bf_cbc                       "BF-CBC"
+#  define LN_bf_cbc                       "bf-cbc"
+#  define NID_bf_cbc                      91
+#  define OBJ_bf_cbc                      1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,3029L,1L,2L
+
+#  define SN_bf_ecb                       "BF-ECB"
+#  define LN_bf_ecb                       "bf-ecb"
+#  define NID_bf_ecb                      92
+
+#  define SN_bf_cfb64                     "BF-CFB"
+#  define LN_bf_cfb64                     "bf-cfb"
+#  define NID_bf_cfb64                    93
+
+#  define SN_bf_ofb64                     "BF-OFB"
+#  define LN_bf_ofb64                     "bf-ofb"
+#  define NID_bf_ofb64                    94
+
+#  define SN_mdc2                         "MDC2"
+#  define LN_mdc2                         "mdc2"
+#  define NID_mdc2                        95
+#  define OBJ_mdc2                        2L,5L,8L,3L,101L
+/* An alternative?                      1L,3L,14L,3L,2L,19L */
+
+#  define SN_mdc2WithRSA                  "RSA-MDC2"
+#  define LN_mdc2WithRSA                  "mdc2withRSA"
+#  define NID_mdc2WithRSA                 96
+#  define OBJ_mdc2WithRSA                 2L,5L,8L,3L,100L
+
+#  define SN_rc4_40                       "RC4-40"
+#  define LN_rc4_40                       "rc4-40"
+#  define NID_rc4_40                      97
+
+#  define SN_rc2_40_cbc                   "RC2-40-CBC"
+#  define LN_rc2_40_cbc                   "rc2-40-cbc"
+#  define NID_rc2_40_cbc                  98
+
+#  define SN_givenName                    "G"
+#  define LN_givenName                    "givenName"
+#  define NID_givenName                   99
+#  define OBJ_givenName                   OBJ_X509,42L
+
+#  define SN_surname                      "S"
+#  define LN_surname                      "surname"
+#  define NID_surname                     100
+#  define OBJ_surname                     OBJ_X509,4L
+
+#  define SN_initials                     "I"
+#  define LN_initials                     "initials"
+#  define NID_initials                    101
+#  define OBJ_initials                    OBJ_X509,43L
+
+#  define SN_uniqueIdentifier             "UID"
+#  define LN_uniqueIdentifier             "uniqueIdentifier"
+#  define NID_uniqueIdentifier            102
+#  define OBJ_uniqueIdentifier            OBJ_X509,45L
+
+#  define SN_crl_distribution_points      "crlDistributionPoints"
+#  define LN_crl_distribution_points      "X509v3 CRL Distribution Points"
+#  define NID_crl_distribution_points     103
+#  define OBJ_crl_distribution_points     OBJ_id_ce,31L
+
+#  define SN_md5WithRSA                   "RSA-NP-MD5"
+#  define LN_md5WithRSA                   "md5WithRSA"
+#  define NID_md5WithRSA                  104
+#  define OBJ_md5WithRSA                  OBJ_algorithm,3L
+
+#  define SN_serialNumber                 "SN"
+#  define LN_serialNumber                 "serialNumber"
+#  define NID_serialNumber                105
+#  define OBJ_serialNumber                OBJ_X509,5L
+
+#  define SN_title                        "T"
+#  define LN_title                        "title"
+#  define NID_title                       106
+#  define OBJ_title                       OBJ_X509,12L
+
+#  define SN_description                  "D"
+#  define LN_description                  "description"
+#  define NID_description                 107
+#  define OBJ_description                 OBJ_X509,13L
+
+/* CAST5 is CAST-128, I'm just sticking with the documentation */
+#  define SN_cast5_cbc                    "CAST5-CBC"
+#  define LN_cast5_cbc                    "cast5-cbc"
+#  define NID_cast5_cbc                   108
+#  define OBJ_cast5_cbc                   1L,2L,840L,113533L,7L,66L,10L
+
+#  define SN_cast5_ecb                    "CAST5-ECB"
+#  define LN_cast5_ecb                    "cast5-ecb"
+#  define NID_cast5_ecb                   109
+
+#  define SN_cast5_cfb64                  "CAST5-CFB"
+#  define LN_cast5_cfb64                  "cast5-cfb"
+#  define NID_cast5_cfb64                 110
+
+#  define SN_cast5_ofb64                  "CAST5-OFB"
+#  define LN_cast5_ofb64                  "cast5-ofb"
+#  define NID_cast5_ofb64                 111
+
+#  define LN_pbeWithMD5AndCast5_CBC       "pbeWithMD5AndCast5CBC"
+#  define NID_pbeWithMD5AndCast5_CBC      112
+#  define OBJ_pbeWithMD5AndCast5_CBC      1L,2L,840L,113533L,7L,66L,12L
+
+/*-
+ * This is one sun will soon be using :-(
+ * id-dsa-with-sha1 ID  ::= {
+ *   iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) x9-57 (10040) x9cm(4) 3 }
+ */
+#  define SN_dsaWithSHA1                  "DSA-SHA1"
+#  define LN_dsaWithSHA1                  "dsaWithSHA1"
+#  define NID_dsaWithSHA1                 113
+#  define OBJ_dsaWithSHA1                 1L,2L,840L,10040L,4L,3L
+
+#  define NID_md5_sha1                    114
+#  define SN_md5_sha1                     "MD5-SHA1"
+#  define LN_md5_sha1                     "md5-sha1"
+
+#  define SN_sha1WithRSA                  "RSA-SHA1-2"
+#  define LN_sha1WithRSA                  "sha1WithRSA"
+#  define NID_sha1WithRSA                 115
+#  define OBJ_sha1WithRSA                 OBJ_algorithm,29L
+
+#  define SN_dsa                          "DSA"
+#  define LN_dsa                          "dsaEncryption"
+#  define NID_dsa                         116
+#  define OBJ_dsa                         1L,2L,840L,10040L,4L,1L
+
+#  define SN_ripemd160                    "RIPEMD160"
+#  define LN_ripemd160                    "ripemd160"
+#  define NID_ripemd160                   117
+#  define OBJ_ripemd160                   1L,3L,36L,3L,2L,1L
+
+/*
+ * The name should actually be rsaSignatureWithripemd160, but I'm going to
+ * continue using the convention I'm using with the other ciphers
+ */
+#  define SN_ripemd160WithRSA             "RSA-RIPEMD160"
+#  define LN_ripemd160WithRSA             "ripemd160WithRSA"
+#  define NID_ripemd160WithRSA            119
+#  define OBJ_ripemd160WithRSA            1L,3L,36L,3L,3L,1L,2L
+
+/*-
+ * Taken from rfc2040
+ *  RC5_CBC_Parameters ::= SEQUENCE {
+ *      version           INTEGER (v1_0(16)),
+ *      rounds            INTEGER (8..127),
+ *      blockSizeInBits   INTEGER (64, 128),
+ *      iv                OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
+ *      }
+ */
+#  define SN_rc5_cbc                      "RC5-CBC"
+#  define LN_rc5_cbc                      "rc5-cbc"
+#  define NID_rc5_cbc                     120
+#  define OBJ_rc5_cbc                     OBJ_rsadsi,3L,8L
+
+#  define SN_rc5_ecb                      "RC5-ECB"
+#  define LN_rc5_ecb                      "rc5-ecb"
+#  define NID_rc5_ecb                     121
+
+#  define SN_rc5_cfb64                    "RC5-CFB"
+#  define LN_rc5_cfb64                    "rc5-cfb"
+#  define NID_rc5_cfb64                   122
+
+#  define SN_rc5_ofb64                    "RC5-OFB"
+#  define LN_rc5_ofb64                    "rc5-ofb"
+#  define NID_rc5_ofb64                   123
+
+#  define SN_rle_compression              "RLE"
+#  define LN_rle_compression              "run length compression"
+#  define NID_rle_compression             124
+#  define OBJ_rle_compression             1L,1L,1L,1L,666L,1L
+
+#  define SN_zlib_compression             "ZLIB"
+#  define LN_zlib_compression             "zlib compression"
+#  define NID_zlib_compression            125
+#  define OBJ_zlib_compression            1L,1L,1L,1L,666L,2L
+
+#  define SN_ext_key_usage                "extendedKeyUsage"
+#  define LN_ext_key_usage                "X509v3 Extended Key Usage"
+#  define NID_ext_key_usage               126
+#  define OBJ_ext_key_usage               OBJ_id_ce,37
+
+#  define SN_id_pkix                      "PKIX"
+#  define NID_id_pkix                     127
+#  define OBJ_id_pkix                     1L,3L,6L,1L,5L,5L,7L
+
+#  define SN_id_kp                        "id-kp"
+#  define NID_id_kp                       128
+#  define OBJ_id_kp                       OBJ_id_pkix,3L
+
+/* PKIX extended key usage OIDs */
+
+#  define SN_server_auth                  "serverAuth"
+#  define LN_server_auth                  "TLS Web Server Authentication"
+#  define NID_server_auth                 129
+#  define OBJ_server_auth                 OBJ_id_kp,1L
+
+#  define SN_client_auth                  "clientAuth"
+#  define LN_client_auth                  "TLS Web Client Authentication"
+#  define NID_client_auth                 130
+#  define OBJ_client_auth                 OBJ_id_kp,2L
+
+#  define SN_code_sign                    "codeSigning"
+#  define LN_code_sign                    "Code Signing"
+#  define NID_code_sign                   131
+#  define OBJ_code_sign                   OBJ_id_kp,3L
+
+#  define SN_email_protect                "emailProtection"
+#  define LN_email_protect                "E-mail Protection"
+#  define NID_email_protect               132
+#  define OBJ_email_protect               OBJ_id_kp,4L
+
+#  define SN_time_stamp                   "timeStamping"
+#  define LN_time_stamp                   "Time Stamping"
+#  define NID_time_stamp                  133
+#  define OBJ_time_stamp                  OBJ_id_kp,8L
+
+/* Additional extended key usage OIDs: Microsoft */
+
+#  define SN_ms_code_ind                  "msCodeInd"
+#  define LN_ms_code_ind                  "Microsoft Individual Code Signing"
+#  define NID_ms_code_ind                 134
+#  define OBJ_ms_code_ind                 1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,311L,2L,1L,21L
+
+#  define SN_ms_code_com                  "msCodeCom"
+#  define LN_ms_code_com                  "Microsoft Commercial Code Signing"
+#  define NID_ms_code_com                 135
+#  define OBJ_ms_code_com                 1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,311L,2L,1L,22L
+
+#  define SN_ms_ctl_sign                  "msCTLSign"
+#  define LN_ms_ctl_sign                  "Microsoft Trust List Signing"
+#  define NID_ms_ctl_sign                 136
+#  define OBJ_ms_ctl_sign                 1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,311L,10L,3L,1L
+
+#  define SN_ms_sgc                       "msSGC"
+#  define LN_ms_sgc                       "Microsoft Server Gated Crypto"
+#  define NID_ms_sgc                      137
+#  define OBJ_ms_sgc                      1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,311L,10L,3L,3L
+
+#  define SN_ms_efs                       "msEFS"
+#  define LN_ms_efs                       "Microsoft Encrypted File System"
+#  define NID_ms_efs                      138
+#  define OBJ_ms_efs                      1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,311L,10L,3L,4L
+
+/* Additional usage: Netscape */
+
+#  define SN_ns_sgc                       "nsSGC"
+#  define LN_ns_sgc                       "Netscape Server Gated Crypto"
+#  define NID_ns_sgc                      139
+#  define OBJ_ns_sgc                      OBJ_netscape,4L,1L
+
+#  define SN_delta_crl                    "deltaCRL"
+#  define LN_delta_crl                    "X509v3 Delta CRL Indicator"
+#  define NID_delta_crl                   140
+#  define OBJ_delta_crl                   OBJ_id_ce,27L
+
+#  define SN_crl_reason                   "CRLReason"
+#  define LN_crl_reason                   "CRL Reason Code"
+#  define NID_crl_reason                  141
+#  define OBJ_crl_reason                  OBJ_id_ce,21L
+
+#  define SN_invalidity_date              "invalidityDate"
+#  define LN_invalidity_date              "Invalidity Date"
+#  define NID_invalidity_date             142
+#  define OBJ_invalidity_date             OBJ_id_ce,24L
+
+#  define SN_sxnet                        "SXNetID"
+#  define LN_sxnet                        "Strong Extranet ID"
+#  define NID_sxnet                       143
+#  define OBJ_sxnet                       1L,3L,101L,1L,4L,1L
+
+/* PKCS12 and related OBJECT IDENTIFIERS */
+
+#  define OBJ_pkcs12                      OBJ_pkcs,12L
+#  define OBJ_pkcs12_pbeids               OBJ_pkcs12, 1
+
+#  define SN_pbe_WithSHA1And128BitRC4     "PBE-SHA1-RC4-128"
+#  define LN_pbe_WithSHA1And128BitRC4     "pbeWithSHA1And128BitRC4"
+#  define NID_pbe_WithSHA1And128BitRC4    144
+#  define OBJ_pbe_WithSHA1And128BitRC4    OBJ_pkcs12_pbeids, 1L
+
+#  define SN_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC4      "PBE-SHA1-RC4-40"
+#  define LN_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC4      "pbeWithSHA1And40BitRC4"
+#  define NID_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC4     145
+#  define OBJ_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC4     OBJ_pkcs12_pbeids, 2L
+
+#  define SN_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC   "PBE-SHA1-3DES"
+#  define LN_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC   "pbeWithSHA1And3-KeyTripleDES-CBC"
+#  define NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC  146
+#  define OBJ_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC  OBJ_pkcs12_pbeids, 3L
+
+#  define SN_pbe_WithSHA1And2_Key_TripleDES_CBC   "PBE-SHA1-2DES"
+#  define LN_pbe_WithSHA1And2_Key_TripleDES_CBC   "pbeWithSHA1And2-KeyTripleDES-CBC"
+#  define NID_pbe_WithSHA1And2_Key_TripleDES_CBC  147
+#  define OBJ_pbe_WithSHA1And2_Key_TripleDES_CBC  OBJ_pkcs12_pbeids, 4L
+
+#  define SN_pbe_WithSHA1And128BitRC2_CBC         "PBE-SHA1-RC2-128"
+#  define LN_pbe_WithSHA1And128BitRC2_CBC         "pbeWithSHA1And128BitRC2-CBC"
+#  define NID_pbe_WithSHA1And128BitRC2_CBC        148
+#  define OBJ_pbe_WithSHA1And128BitRC2_CBC        OBJ_pkcs12_pbeids, 5L
+
+#  define SN_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC  "PBE-SHA1-RC2-40"
+#  define LN_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC  "pbeWithSHA1And40BitRC2-CBC"
+#  define NID_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC 149
+#  define OBJ_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC OBJ_pkcs12_pbeids, 6L
+
+#  define OBJ_pkcs12_Version1     OBJ_pkcs12, 10L
+
+#  define OBJ_pkcs12_BagIds       OBJ_pkcs12_Version1, 1L
+
+#  define LN_keyBag               "keyBag"
+#  define NID_keyBag              150
+#  define OBJ_keyBag              OBJ_pkcs12_BagIds, 1L
+
+#  define LN_pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag  "pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag"
+#  define NID_pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag 151
+#  define OBJ_pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag OBJ_pkcs12_BagIds, 2L
+
+#  define LN_certBag              "certBag"
+#  define NID_certBag             152
+#  define OBJ_certBag             OBJ_pkcs12_BagIds, 3L
+
+#  define LN_crlBag               "crlBag"
+#  define NID_crlBag              153
+#  define OBJ_crlBag              OBJ_pkcs12_BagIds, 4L
+
+#  define LN_secretBag            "secretBag"
+#  define NID_secretBag           154
+#  define OBJ_secretBag           OBJ_pkcs12_BagIds, 5L
+
+#  define LN_safeContentsBag      "safeContentsBag"
+#  define NID_safeContentsBag     155
+#  define OBJ_safeContentsBag     OBJ_pkcs12_BagIds, 6L
+
+#  define LN_friendlyName         "friendlyName"
+#  define NID_friendlyName        156
+#  define OBJ_friendlyName        OBJ_pkcs9, 20L
+
+#  define LN_localKeyID           "localKeyID"
+#  define NID_localKeyID          157
+#  define OBJ_localKeyID          OBJ_pkcs9, 21L
+
+#  define OBJ_certTypes           OBJ_pkcs9, 22L
+
+#  define LN_x509Certificate      "x509Certificate"
+#  define NID_x509Certificate     158
+#  define OBJ_x509Certificate     OBJ_certTypes, 1L
+
+#  define LN_sdsiCertificate      "sdsiCertificate"
+#  define NID_sdsiCertificate     159
+#  define OBJ_sdsiCertificate     OBJ_certTypes, 2L
+
+#  define OBJ_crlTypes            OBJ_pkcs9, 23L
+
+#  define LN_x509Crl              "x509Crl"
+#  define NID_x509Crl             160
+#  define OBJ_x509Crl             OBJ_crlTypes, 1L
+
+/* PKCS#5 v2 OIDs */
+
+#  define LN_pbes2                "PBES2"
+#  define NID_pbes2               161
+#  define OBJ_pbes2               OBJ_pkcs,5L,13L
+
+#  define LN_pbmac1               "PBMAC1"
+#  define NID_pbmac1              162
+#  define OBJ_pbmac1              OBJ_pkcs,5L,14L
+
+#  define LN_hmacWithSHA1         "hmacWithSHA1"
+#  define NID_hmacWithSHA1        163
+#  define OBJ_hmacWithSHA1        OBJ_rsadsi,2L,7L
+
+/* Policy Qualifier Ids */
+
+#  define LN_id_qt_cps            "Policy Qualifier CPS"
+#  define SN_id_qt_cps            "id-qt-cps"
+#  define NID_id_qt_cps           164
+#  define OBJ_id_qt_cps           OBJ_id_pkix,2L,1L
+
+#  define LN_id_qt_unotice        "Policy Qualifier User Notice"
+#  define SN_id_qt_unotice        "id-qt-unotice"
+#  define NID_id_qt_unotice       165
+#  define OBJ_id_qt_unotice       OBJ_id_pkix,2L,2L
+
+#  define SN_rc2_64_cbc                   "RC2-64-CBC"
+#  define LN_rc2_64_cbc                   "rc2-64-cbc"
+#  define NID_rc2_64_cbc                  166
+
+#  define SN_SMIMECapabilities            "SMIME-CAPS"
+#  define LN_SMIMECapabilities            "S/MIME Capabilities"
+#  define NID_SMIMECapabilities           167
+#  define OBJ_SMIMECapabilities           OBJ_pkcs9,15L
+
+#  define SN_pbeWithMD2AndRC2_CBC         "PBE-MD2-RC2-64"
+#  define LN_pbeWithMD2AndRC2_CBC         "pbeWithMD2AndRC2-CBC"
+#  define NID_pbeWithMD2AndRC2_CBC        168
+#  define OBJ_pbeWithMD2AndRC2_CBC        OBJ_pkcs,5L,4L
+
+#  define SN_pbeWithMD5AndRC2_CBC         "PBE-MD5-RC2-64"
+#  define LN_pbeWithMD5AndRC2_CBC         "pbeWithMD5AndRC2-CBC"
+#  define NID_pbeWithMD5AndRC2_CBC        169
+#  define OBJ_pbeWithMD5AndRC2_CBC        OBJ_pkcs,5L,6L
+
+#  define SN_pbeWithSHA1AndDES_CBC        "PBE-SHA1-DES"
+#  define LN_pbeWithSHA1AndDES_CBC        "pbeWithSHA1AndDES-CBC"
+#  define NID_pbeWithSHA1AndDES_CBC       170
+#  define OBJ_pbeWithSHA1AndDES_CBC       OBJ_pkcs,5L,10L
+
+/* Extension request OIDs */
+
+#  define LN_ms_ext_req                   "Microsoft Extension Request"
+#  define SN_ms_ext_req                   "msExtReq"
+#  define NID_ms_ext_req                  171
+#  define OBJ_ms_ext_req                  1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,311L,2L,1L,14L
+
+#  define LN_ext_req                      "Extension Request"
+#  define SN_ext_req                      "extReq"
+#  define NID_ext_req                     172
+#  define OBJ_ext_req                     OBJ_pkcs9,14L
+
+#  define SN_name                         "name"
+#  define LN_name                         "name"
+#  define NID_name                        173
+#  define OBJ_name                        OBJ_X509,41L
+
+#  define SN_dnQualifier                  "dnQualifier"
+#  define LN_dnQualifier                  "dnQualifier"
+#  define NID_dnQualifier                 174
+#  define OBJ_dnQualifier                 OBJ_X509,46L
+
+#  define SN_id_pe                        "id-pe"
+#  define NID_id_pe                       175
+#  define OBJ_id_pe                       OBJ_id_pkix,1L
+
+#  define SN_id_ad                        "id-ad"
+#  define NID_id_ad                       176
+#  define OBJ_id_ad                       OBJ_id_pkix,48L
+
+#  define SN_info_access                  "authorityInfoAccess"
+#  define LN_info_access                  "Authority Information Access"
+#  define NID_info_access                 177
+#  define OBJ_info_access                 OBJ_id_pe,1L
+
+#  define SN_ad_OCSP                      "OCSP"
+#  define LN_ad_OCSP                      "OCSP"
+#  define NID_ad_OCSP                     178
+#  define OBJ_ad_OCSP                     OBJ_id_ad,1L
+
+#  define SN_ad_ca_issuers                "caIssuers"
+#  define LN_ad_ca_issuers                "CA Issuers"
+#  define NID_ad_ca_issuers               179
+#  define OBJ_ad_ca_issuers               OBJ_id_ad,2L
+
+#  define SN_OCSP_sign                    "OCSPSigning"
+#  define LN_OCSP_sign                    "OCSP Signing"
+#  define NID_OCSP_sign                   180
+#  define OBJ_OCSP_sign                   OBJ_id_kp,9L
+# endif                         /* USE_OBJ_MAC */
+
+# include <openssl/bio.h>
+# include <openssl/asn1.h>
+
+# define OBJ_NAME_TYPE_UNDEF             0x00
+# define OBJ_NAME_TYPE_MD_METH           0x01
+# define OBJ_NAME_TYPE_CIPHER_METH       0x02
+# define OBJ_NAME_TYPE_PKEY_METH         0x03
+# define OBJ_NAME_TYPE_COMP_METH         0x04
+# define OBJ_NAME_TYPE_NUM               0x05
+
+# define OBJ_NAME_ALIAS                  0x8000
+
+# define OBJ_BSEARCH_VALUE_ON_NOMATCH            0x01
+# define OBJ_BSEARCH_FIRST_VALUE_ON_MATCH        0x02
+
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+typedef struct obj_name_st {
+    int type;
+    int alias;
+    const char *name;
+    const char *data;
+} OBJ_NAME;
+
+# define         OBJ_create_and_add_object(a,b,c) OBJ_create(a,b,c)
+
+int OBJ_NAME_init(void);
+int OBJ_NAME_new_index(unsigned long (*hash_func) (const char *),
+                       int (*cmp_func) (const char *, const char *),
+                       void (*free_func) (const char *, int, const char *));
+const char *OBJ_NAME_get(const char *name, int type);
+int OBJ_NAME_add(const char *name, int type, const char *data);
+int OBJ_NAME_remove(const char *name, int type);
+void OBJ_NAME_cleanup(int type); /* -1 for everything */
+void OBJ_NAME_do_all(int type, void (*fn) (const OBJ_NAME *, void *arg),
+                     void *arg);
+void OBJ_NAME_do_all_sorted(int type,
+                            void (*fn) (const OBJ_NAME *, void *arg),
+                            void *arg);
+
+ASN1_OBJECT *OBJ_dup(const ASN1_OBJECT *o);
+ASN1_OBJECT *OBJ_nid2obj(int n);
+const char *OBJ_nid2ln(int n);
+const char *OBJ_nid2sn(int n);
+int OBJ_obj2nid(const ASN1_OBJECT *o);
+ASN1_OBJECT *OBJ_txt2obj(const char *s, int no_name);
+int OBJ_obj2txt(char *buf, int buf_len, const ASN1_OBJECT *a, int no_name);
+int OBJ_txt2nid(const char *s);
+int OBJ_ln2nid(const char *s);
+int OBJ_sn2nid(const char *s);
+int OBJ_cmp(const ASN1_OBJECT *a, const ASN1_OBJECT *b);
+const void *OBJ_bsearch_(const void *key, const void *base, int num, int size,
+                         int (*cmp) (const void *, const void *));
+const void *OBJ_bsearch_ex_(const void *key, const void *base, int num,
+                            int size,
+                            int (*cmp) (const void *, const void *),
+                            int flags);
+
+# define _DECLARE_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(scope, type1, type2, nm)    \
+  static int nm##_cmp_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(const void *, const void *); \
+  static int nm##_cmp(type1 const *, type2 const *); \
+  scope type2 * OBJ_bsearch_##nm(type1 *key, type2 const *base, int num)
+
+# define DECLARE_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(type1, type2, cmp)   \
+  _DECLARE_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(static, type1, type2, cmp)
+# define DECLARE_OBJ_BSEARCH_GLOBAL_CMP_FN(type1, type2, nm)     \
+  type2 * OBJ_bsearch_##nm(type1 *key, type2 const *base, int num)
+
+/*-
+ * Unsolved problem: if a type is actually a pointer type, like
+ * nid_triple is, then its impossible to get a const where you need
+ * it. Consider:
+ *
+ * typedef int nid_triple[3];
+ * const void *a_;
+ * const nid_triple const *a = a_;
+ *
+ * The assignment discards a const because what you really want is:
+ *
+ * const int const * const *a = a_;
+ *
+ * But if you do that, you lose the fact that a is an array of 3 ints,
+ * which breaks comparison functions.
+ *
+ * Thus we end up having to cast, sadly, or unpack the
+ * declarations. Or, as I finally did in this case, declare nid_triple
+ * to be a struct, which it should have been in the first place.
+ *
+ * Ben, August 2008.
+ *
+ * Also, strictly speaking not all types need be const, but handling
+ * the non-constness means a lot of complication, and in practice
+ * comparison routines do always not touch their arguments.
+ */
+
+# define IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(type1, type2, nm)  \
+  static int nm##_cmp_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(const void *a_, const void *b_)    \
+      { \
+      type1 const *a = a_; \
+      type2 const *b = b_; \
+      return nm##_cmp(a,b); \
+      } \
+  static type2 *OBJ_bsearch_##nm(type1 *key, type2 const *base, int num) \
+      { \
+      return (type2 *)OBJ_bsearch_(key, base, num, sizeof(type2), \
+                                        nm##_cmp_BSEARCH_CMP_FN); \
+      } \
+      extern void dummy_prototype(void)
+
+# define IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_GLOBAL_CMP_FN(type1, type2, nm)   \
+  static int nm##_cmp_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(const void *a_, const void *b_)    \
+      { \
+      type1 const *a = a_; \
+      type2 const *b = b_; \
+      return nm##_cmp(a,b); \
+      } \
+  type2 *OBJ_bsearch_##nm(type1 *key, type2 const *base, int num) \
+      { \
+      return (type2 *)OBJ_bsearch_(key, base, num, sizeof(type2), \
+                                        nm##_cmp_BSEARCH_CMP_FN); \
+      } \
+      extern void dummy_prototype(void)
+
+# define OBJ_bsearch(type1,key,type2,base,num,cmp)                              \
+  ((type2 *)OBJ_bsearch_(CHECKED_PTR_OF(type1,key),CHECKED_PTR_OF(type2,base), \
+                         num,sizeof(type2),                             \
+                         ((void)CHECKED_PTR_OF(type1,cmp##_type_1),     \
+                          (void)CHECKED_PTR_OF(type2,cmp##_type_2),     \
+                          cmp##_BSEARCH_CMP_FN)))
+
+# define OBJ_bsearch_ex(type1,key,type2,base,num,cmp,flags)                      \
+  ((type2 *)OBJ_bsearch_ex_(CHECKED_PTR_OF(type1,key),CHECKED_PTR_OF(type2,base), \
+                         num,sizeof(type2),                             \
+                         ((void)CHECKED_PTR_OF(type1,cmp##_type_1),     \
+                          (void)type_2=CHECKED_PTR_OF(type2,cmp##_type_2), \
+                          cmp##_BSEARCH_CMP_FN)),flags)
+
+int OBJ_new_nid(int num);
+int OBJ_add_object(const ASN1_OBJECT *obj);
+int OBJ_create(const char *oid, const char *sn, const char *ln);
+#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+# define OBJ_cleanup() while(0) continue
+#endif
+int OBJ_create_objects(BIO *in);
+
+size_t OBJ_length(const ASN1_OBJECT *obj);
+const unsigned char *OBJ_get0_data(const ASN1_OBJECT *obj);
+
+int OBJ_find_sigid_algs(int signid, int *pdig_nid, int *ppkey_nid);
+int OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(int *psignid, int dig_nid, int pkey_nid);
+int OBJ_add_sigid(int signid, int dig_id, int pkey_id);
+void OBJ_sigid_free(void);
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+/*
+ * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
+ * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
+ */
+
+int ERR_load_OBJ_strings(void);
+
+/* Error codes for the OBJ functions. */
+
+/* Function codes. */
+# define OBJ_F_OBJ_ADD_OBJECT                             105
+# define OBJ_F_OBJ_CREATE                                 100
+# define OBJ_F_OBJ_DUP                                    101
+# define OBJ_F_OBJ_NAME_NEW_INDEX                         106
+# define OBJ_F_OBJ_NID2LN                                 102
+# define OBJ_F_OBJ_NID2OBJ                                103
+# define OBJ_F_OBJ_NID2SN                                 104
+
+/* Reason codes. */
+# define OBJ_R_OID_EXISTS                                 102
+# define OBJ_R_UNKNOWN_NID                                101
+
+# ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+# endif
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/ocsp.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/ocsp.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..90ebe5c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/ocsp.h
@@ -0,0 +1,398 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_OCSP_H
+# define HEADER_OCSP_H
+
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+
+/*
+ * These definitions are outside the OPENSSL_NO_OCSP guard because although for
+ * historical reasons they have OCSP_* names, they can actually be used
+ * independently of OCSP. E.g. see RFC5280
+ */
+/*-
+ *   CRLReason ::= ENUMERATED {
+ *        unspecified             (0),
+ *        keyCompromise           (1),
+ *        cACompromise            (2),
+ *        affiliationChanged      (3),
+ *        superseded              (4),
+ *        cessationOfOperation    (5),
+ *        certificateHold         (6),
+ *        removeFromCRL           (8) }
+ */
+#  define OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_NOSTATUS               -1
+#  define OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_UNSPECIFIED             0
+#  define OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_KEYCOMPROMISE           1
+#  define OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_CACOMPROMISE            2
+#  define OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_AFFILIATIONCHANGED      3
+#  define OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_SUPERSEDED              4
+#  define OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_CESSATIONOFOPERATION    5
+#  define OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_CERTIFICATEHOLD         6
+#  define OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_REMOVEFROMCRL           8
+
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+
+#  include <openssl/ossl_typ.h>
+#  include <openssl/x509.h>
+#  include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#  include <openssl/safestack.h>
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/* Various flags and values */
+
+#  define OCSP_DEFAULT_NONCE_LENGTH       16
+
+#  define OCSP_NOCERTS                    0x1
+#  define OCSP_NOINTERN                   0x2
+#  define OCSP_NOSIGS                     0x4
+#  define OCSP_NOCHAIN                    0x8
+#  define OCSP_NOVERIFY                   0x10
+#  define OCSP_NOEXPLICIT                 0x20
+#  define OCSP_NOCASIGN                   0x40
+#  define OCSP_NODELEGATED                0x80
+#  define OCSP_NOCHECKS                   0x100
+#  define OCSP_TRUSTOTHER                 0x200
+#  define OCSP_RESPID_KEY                 0x400
+#  define OCSP_NOTIME                     0x800
+
+typedef struct ocsp_cert_id_st OCSP_CERTID;
+
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(OCSP_CERTID)
+
+typedef struct ocsp_one_request_st OCSP_ONEREQ;
+
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(OCSP_ONEREQ)
+
+typedef struct ocsp_req_info_st OCSP_REQINFO;
+typedef struct ocsp_signature_st OCSP_SIGNATURE;
+typedef struct ocsp_request_st OCSP_REQUEST;
+
+#  define OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_SUCCESSFUL           0
+#  define OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_MALFORMEDREQUEST     1
+#  define OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_INTERNALERROR        2
+#  define OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_TRYLATER             3
+#  define OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_SIGREQUIRED          5
+#  define OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_UNAUTHORIZED         6
+
+typedef struct ocsp_resp_bytes_st OCSP_RESPBYTES;
+
+#  define V_OCSP_RESPID_NAME 0
+#  define V_OCSP_RESPID_KEY  1
+
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(OCSP_RESPID)
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OCSP_RESPID)
+
+typedef struct ocsp_revoked_info_st OCSP_REVOKEDINFO;
+
+#  define V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_GOOD    0
+#  define V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_REVOKED 1
+#  define V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_UNKNOWN 2
+
+typedef struct ocsp_cert_status_st OCSP_CERTSTATUS;
+typedef struct ocsp_single_response_st OCSP_SINGLERESP;
+
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP)
+
+typedef struct ocsp_response_data_st OCSP_RESPDATA;
+
+typedef struct ocsp_basic_response_st OCSP_BASICRESP;
+
+typedef struct ocsp_crl_id_st OCSP_CRLID;
+typedef struct ocsp_service_locator_st OCSP_SERVICELOC;
+
+#  define PEM_STRING_OCSP_REQUEST "OCSP REQUEST"
+#  define PEM_STRING_OCSP_RESPONSE "OCSP RESPONSE"
+
+#  define d2i_OCSP_REQUEST_bio(bp,p) ASN1_d2i_bio_of(OCSP_REQUEST,OCSP_REQUEST_new,d2i_OCSP_REQUEST,bp,p)
+
+#  define d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE_bio(bp,p) ASN1_d2i_bio_of(OCSP_RESPONSE,OCSP_RESPONSE_new,d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE,bp,p)
+
+#  define PEM_read_bio_OCSP_REQUEST(bp,x,cb) (OCSP_REQUEST *)PEM_ASN1_read_bio( \
+     (char *(*)())d2i_OCSP_REQUEST,PEM_STRING_OCSP_REQUEST,bp,(char **)x,cb,NULL)
+
+#   define PEM_read_bio_OCSP_RESPONSE(bp,x,cb)(OCSP_RESPONSE *)PEM_ASN1_read_bio(\
+     (char *(*)())d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE,PEM_STRING_OCSP_RESPONSE,bp,(char **)x,cb,NULL)
+
+#  define PEM_write_bio_OCSP_REQUEST(bp,o) \
+    PEM_ASN1_write_bio((int (*)())i2d_OCSP_REQUEST,PEM_STRING_OCSP_REQUEST,\
+                        bp,(char *)o, NULL,NULL,0,NULL,NULL)
+
+#  define PEM_write_bio_OCSP_RESPONSE(bp,o) \
+    PEM_ASN1_write_bio((int (*)())i2d_OCSP_RESPONSE,PEM_STRING_OCSP_RESPONSE,\
+                        bp,(char *)o, NULL,NULL,0,NULL,NULL)
+
+#  define i2d_OCSP_RESPONSE_bio(bp,o) ASN1_i2d_bio_of(OCSP_RESPONSE,i2d_OCSP_RESPONSE,bp,o)
+
+#  define i2d_OCSP_REQUEST_bio(bp,o) ASN1_i2d_bio_of(OCSP_REQUEST,i2d_OCSP_REQUEST,bp,o)
+
+#  define ASN1_BIT_STRING_digest(data,type,md,len) \
+        ASN1_item_digest(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(ASN1_BIT_STRING),type,data,md,len)
+
+#  define OCSP_CERTSTATUS_dup(cs)\
+                (OCSP_CERTSTATUS*)ASN1_dup((int(*)())i2d_OCSP_CERTSTATUS,\
+                (char *(*)())d2i_OCSP_CERTSTATUS,(char *)(cs))
+
+OCSP_CERTID *OCSP_CERTID_dup(OCSP_CERTID *id);
+
+OCSP_RESPONSE *OCSP_sendreq_bio(BIO *b, const char *path, OCSP_REQUEST *req);
+OCSP_REQ_CTX *OCSP_sendreq_new(BIO *io, const char *path, OCSP_REQUEST *req,
+                               int maxline);
+int OCSP_REQ_CTX_nbio(OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx);
+int OCSP_sendreq_nbio(OCSP_RESPONSE **presp, OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx);
+OCSP_REQ_CTX *OCSP_REQ_CTX_new(BIO *io, int maxline);
+void OCSP_REQ_CTX_free(OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx);
+void OCSP_set_max_response_length(OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx, unsigned long len);
+int OCSP_REQ_CTX_i2d(OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+                     ASN1_VALUE *val);
+int OCSP_REQ_CTX_nbio_d2i(OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx, ASN1_VALUE **pval,
+                          const ASN1_ITEM *it);
+BIO *OCSP_REQ_CTX_get0_mem_bio(OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx);
+int OCSP_REQ_CTX_i2d(OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+                     ASN1_VALUE *val);
+int OCSP_REQ_CTX_http(OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx, const char *op, const char *path);
+int OCSP_REQ_CTX_set1_req(OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx, OCSP_REQUEST *req);
+int OCSP_REQ_CTX_add1_header(OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx,
+                             const char *name, const char *value);
+
+OCSP_CERTID *OCSP_cert_to_id(const EVP_MD *dgst, const X509 *subject,
+                             const X509 *issuer);
+
+OCSP_CERTID *OCSP_cert_id_new(const EVP_MD *dgst,
+                              const X509_NAME *issuerName,
+                              const ASN1_BIT_STRING *issuerKey,
+                              const ASN1_INTEGER *serialNumber);
+
+OCSP_ONEREQ *OCSP_request_add0_id(OCSP_REQUEST *req, OCSP_CERTID *cid);
+
+int OCSP_request_add1_nonce(OCSP_REQUEST *req, unsigned char *val, int len);
+int OCSP_basic_add1_nonce(OCSP_BASICRESP *resp, unsigned char *val, int len);
+int OCSP_check_nonce(OCSP_REQUEST *req, OCSP_BASICRESP *bs);
+int OCSP_copy_nonce(OCSP_BASICRESP *resp, OCSP_REQUEST *req);
+
+int OCSP_request_set1_name(OCSP_REQUEST *req, X509_NAME *nm);
+int OCSP_request_add1_cert(OCSP_REQUEST *req, X509 *cert);
+
+int OCSP_request_sign(OCSP_REQUEST *req,
+                      X509 *signer,
+                      EVP_PKEY *key,
+                      const EVP_MD *dgst,
+                      STACK_OF(X509) *certs, unsigned long flags);
+
+int OCSP_response_status(OCSP_RESPONSE *resp);
+OCSP_BASICRESP *OCSP_response_get1_basic(OCSP_RESPONSE *resp);
+
+const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *OCSP_resp_get0_signature(const OCSP_BASICRESP *bs);
+int OCSP_resp_get0_signer(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, X509 **signer,
+                          STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs);
+
+int OCSP_resp_count(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs);
+OCSP_SINGLERESP *OCSP_resp_get0(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, int idx);
+const ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *OCSP_resp_get0_produced_at(const OCSP_BASICRESP* bs);
+const STACK_OF(X509) *OCSP_resp_get0_certs(const OCSP_BASICRESP *bs);
+int OCSP_resp_get0_id(const OCSP_BASICRESP *bs,
+                      const ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pid,
+                      const X509_NAME **pname);
+
+int OCSP_resp_find(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, OCSP_CERTID *id, int last);
+int OCSP_single_get0_status(OCSP_SINGLERESP *single, int *reason,
+                            ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **revtime,
+                            ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **thisupd,
+                            ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **nextupd);
+int OCSP_resp_find_status(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, OCSP_CERTID *id, int *status,
+                          int *reason,
+                          ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **revtime,
+                          ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **thisupd,
+                          ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **nextupd);
+int OCSP_check_validity(ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *thisupd,
+                        ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *nextupd, long sec, long maxsec);
+
+int OCSP_request_verify(OCSP_REQUEST *req, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
+                        X509_STORE *store, unsigned long flags);
+
+int OCSP_parse_url(const char *url, char **phost, char **pport, char **ppath,
+                   int *pssl);
+
+int OCSP_id_issuer_cmp(OCSP_CERTID *a, OCSP_CERTID *b);
+int OCSP_id_cmp(OCSP_CERTID *a, OCSP_CERTID *b);
+
+int OCSP_request_onereq_count(OCSP_REQUEST *req);
+OCSP_ONEREQ *OCSP_request_onereq_get0(OCSP_REQUEST *req, int i);
+OCSP_CERTID *OCSP_onereq_get0_id(OCSP_ONEREQ *one);
+int OCSP_id_get0_info(ASN1_OCTET_STRING **piNameHash, ASN1_OBJECT **pmd,
+                      ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pikeyHash,
+                      ASN1_INTEGER **pserial, OCSP_CERTID *cid);
+int OCSP_request_is_signed(OCSP_REQUEST *req);
+OCSP_RESPONSE *OCSP_response_create(int status, OCSP_BASICRESP *bs);
+OCSP_SINGLERESP *OCSP_basic_add1_status(OCSP_BASICRESP *rsp,
+                                        OCSP_CERTID *cid,
+                                        int status, int reason,
+                                        ASN1_TIME *revtime,
+                                        ASN1_TIME *thisupd,
+                                        ASN1_TIME *nextupd);
+int OCSP_basic_add1_cert(OCSP_BASICRESP *resp, X509 *cert);
+int OCSP_basic_sign(OCSP_BASICRESP *brsp,
+                    X509 *signer, EVP_PKEY *key, const EVP_MD *dgst,
+                    STACK_OF(X509) *certs, unsigned long flags);
+int OCSP_RESPID_set_by_name(OCSP_RESPID *respid, X509 *cert);
+int OCSP_RESPID_set_by_key(OCSP_RESPID *respid, X509 *cert);
+int OCSP_RESPID_match(OCSP_RESPID *respid, X509 *cert);
+
+X509_EXTENSION *OCSP_crlID_new(const char *url, long *n, char *tim);
+
+X509_EXTENSION *OCSP_accept_responses_new(char **oids);
+
+X509_EXTENSION *OCSP_archive_cutoff_new(char *tim);
+
+X509_EXTENSION *OCSP_url_svcloc_new(X509_NAME *issuer, const char **urls);
+
+int OCSP_REQUEST_get_ext_count(OCSP_REQUEST *x);
+int OCSP_REQUEST_get_ext_by_NID(OCSP_REQUEST *x, int nid, int lastpos);
+int OCSP_REQUEST_get_ext_by_OBJ(OCSP_REQUEST *x, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj,
+                                int lastpos);
+int OCSP_REQUEST_get_ext_by_critical(OCSP_REQUEST *x, int crit, int lastpos);
+X509_EXTENSION *OCSP_REQUEST_get_ext(OCSP_REQUEST *x, int loc);
+X509_EXTENSION *OCSP_REQUEST_delete_ext(OCSP_REQUEST *x, int loc);
+void *OCSP_REQUEST_get1_ext_d2i(OCSP_REQUEST *x, int nid, int *crit,
+                                int *idx);
+int OCSP_REQUEST_add1_ext_i2d(OCSP_REQUEST *x, int nid, void *value, int crit,
+                              unsigned long flags);
+int OCSP_REQUEST_add_ext(OCSP_REQUEST *x, X509_EXTENSION *ex, int loc);
+
+int OCSP_ONEREQ_get_ext_count(OCSP_ONEREQ *x);
+int OCSP_ONEREQ_get_ext_by_NID(OCSP_ONEREQ *x, int nid, int lastpos);
+int OCSP_ONEREQ_get_ext_by_OBJ(OCSP_ONEREQ *x, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int lastpos);
+int OCSP_ONEREQ_get_ext_by_critical(OCSP_ONEREQ *x, int crit, int lastpos);
+X509_EXTENSION *OCSP_ONEREQ_get_ext(OCSP_ONEREQ *x, int loc);
+X509_EXTENSION *OCSP_ONEREQ_delete_ext(OCSP_ONEREQ *x, int loc);
+void *OCSP_ONEREQ_get1_ext_d2i(OCSP_ONEREQ *x, int nid, int *crit, int *idx);
+int OCSP_ONEREQ_add1_ext_i2d(OCSP_ONEREQ *x, int nid, void *value, int crit,
+                             unsigned long flags);
+int OCSP_ONEREQ_add_ext(OCSP_ONEREQ *x, X509_EXTENSION *ex, int loc);
+
+int OCSP_BASICRESP_get_ext_count(OCSP_BASICRESP *x);
+int OCSP_BASICRESP_get_ext_by_NID(OCSP_BASICRESP *x, int nid, int lastpos);
+int OCSP_BASICRESP_get_ext_by_OBJ(OCSP_BASICRESP *x, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj,
+                                  int lastpos);
+int OCSP_BASICRESP_get_ext_by_critical(OCSP_BASICRESP *x, int crit,
+                                       int lastpos);
+X509_EXTENSION *OCSP_BASICRESP_get_ext(OCSP_BASICRESP *x, int loc);
+X509_EXTENSION *OCSP_BASICRESP_delete_ext(OCSP_BASICRESP *x, int loc);
+void *OCSP_BASICRESP_get1_ext_d2i(OCSP_BASICRESP *x, int nid, int *crit,
+                                  int *idx);
+int OCSP_BASICRESP_add1_ext_i2d(OCSP_BASICRESP *x, int nid, void *value,
+                                int crit, unsigned long flags);
+int OCSP_BASICRESP_add_ext(OCSP_BASICRESP *x, X509_EXTENSION *ex, int loc);
+
+int OCSP_SINGLERESP_get_ext_count(OCSP_SINGLERESP *x);
+int OCSP_SINGLERESP_get_ext_by_NID(OCSP_SINGLERESP *x, int nid, int lastpos);
+int OCSP_SINGLERESP_get_ext_by_OBJ(OCSP_SINGLERESP *x, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj,
+                                   int lastpos);
+int OCSP_SINGLERESP_get_ext_by_critical(OCSP_SINGLERESP *x, int crit,
+                                        int lastpos);
+X509_EXTENSION *OCSP_SINGLERESP_get_ext(OCSP_SINGLERESP *x, int loc);
+X509_EXTENSION *OCSP_SINGLERESP_delete_ext(OCSP_SINGLERESP *x, int loc);
+void *OCSP_SINGLERESP_get1_ext_d2i(OCSP_SINGLERESP *x, int nid, int *crit,
+                                   int *idx);
+int OCSP_SINGLERESP_add1_ext_i2d(OCSP_SINGLERESP *x, int nid, void *value,
+                                 int crit, unsigned long flags);
+int OCSP_SINGLERESP_add_ext(OCSP_SINGLERESP *x, X509_EXTENSION *ex, int loc);
+const OCSP_CERTID *OCSP_SINGLERESP_get0_id(const OCSP_SINGLERESP *x);
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OCSP_SINGLERESP)
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OCSP_CERTSTATUS)
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OCSP_REVOKEDINFO)
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OCSP_BASICRESP)
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OCSP_RESPDATA)
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OCSP_RESPID)
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OCSP_RESPONSE)
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OCSP_RESPBYTES)
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OCSP_ONEREQ)
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OCSP_CERTID)
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OCSP_REQUEST)
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OCSP_SIGNATURE)
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OCSP_REQINFO)
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OCSP_CRLID)
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OCSP_SERVICELOC)
+
+const char *OCSP_response_status_str(long s);
+const char *OCSP_cert_status_str(long s);
+const char *OCSP_crl_reason_str(long s);
+
+int OCSP_REQUEST_print(BIO *bp, OCSP_REQUEST *a, unsigned long flags);
+int OCSP_RESPONSE_print(BIO *bp, OCSP_RESPONSE *o, unsigned long flags);
+
+int OCSP_basic_verify(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
+                      X509_STORE *st, unsigned long flags);
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+/*
+ * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
+ * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
+ */
+
+int ERR_load_OCSP_strings(void);
+
+/* Error codes for the OCSP functions. */
+
+/* Function codes. */
+# define OCSP_F_D2I_OCSP_NONCE                            102
+# define OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_ADD1_STATUS                    103
+# define OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_SIGN                           104
+# define OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY                         105
+# define OCSP_F_OCSP_CERT_ID_NEW                          101
+# define OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_DELEGATED                      106
+# define OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_IDS                            107
+# define OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_ISSUER                         108
+# define OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_VALIDITY                       115
+# define OCSP_F_OCSP_MATCH_ISSUERID                       109
+# define OCSP_F_OCSP_PARSE_URL                            114
+# define OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_SIGN                         110
+# define OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY                       116
+# define OCSP_F_OCSP_RESPONSE_GET1_BASIC                  111
+# define OCSP_F_PARSE_HTTP_LINE1                          118
+
+/* Reason codes. */
+# define OCSP_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR                  101
+# define OCSP_R_DIGEST_ERR                                102
+# define OCSP_R_ERROR_IN_NEXTUPDATE_FIELD                 122
+# define OCSP_R_ERROR_IN_THISUPDATE_FIELD                 123
+# define OCSP_R_ERROR_PARSING_URL                         121
+# define OCSP_R_MISSING_OCSPSIGNING_USAGE                 103
+# define OCSP_R_NEXTUPDATE_BEFORE_THISUPDATE              124
+# define OCSP_R_NOT_BASIC_RESPONSE                        104
+# define OCSP_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_IN_CHAIN                  105
+# define OCSP_R_NO_RESPONSE_DATA                          108
+# define OCSP_R_NO_REVOKED_TIME                           109
+# define OCSP_R_NO_SIGNER_KEY                             130
+# define OCSP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DOES_NOT_MATCH_CERTIFICATE    110
+# define OCSP_R_REQUEST_NOT_SIGNED                        128
+# define OCSP_R_RESPONSE_CONTAINS_NO_REVOCATION_DATA      111
+# define OCSP_R_ROOT_CA_NOT_TRUSTED                       112
+# define OCSP_R_SERVER_RESPONSE_ERROR                     114
+# define OCSP_R_SERVER_RESPONSE_PARSE_ERROR               115
+# define OCSP_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE                         117
+# define OCSP_R_SIGNER_CERTIFICATE_NOT_FOUND              118
+# define OCSP_R_STATUS_EXPIRED                            125
+# define OCSP_R_STATUS_NOT_YET_VALID                      126
+# define OCSP_R_STATUS_TOO_OLD                            127
+# define OCSP_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST                    119
+# define OCSP_R_UNKNOWN_NID                               120
+# define OCSP_R_UNSUPPORTED_REQUESTORNAME_TYPE            129
+
+#  ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+#  endif
+# endif
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/opensslconf.h.in b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/opensslconf.h.in
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9f8634a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/opensslconf.h.in
@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+/*
+ * {- join("\n * ", @autowarntext) -}
+ *
+ * Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_ALGORITHM_DEFINES
+# error OPENSSL_ALGORITHM_DEFINES no longer supported
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * OpenSSL was configured with the following options:
+ */
+
+{- if (@{$config{openssl_sys_defines}}) {
+      foreach (@{$config{openssl_sys_defines}}) {
+	$OUT .= "#ifndef $_\n";
+	$OUT .= "# define $_ 1\n";
+	$OUT .= "#endif\n";
+      }
+    }
+    foreach (@{$config{openssl_api_defines}}) {
+        (my $macro, my $value) = $_ =~ /^(.*?)=(.*?)$/;
+        $OUT .= "#define $macro $value\n";
+    }
+    if (@{$config{openssl_algorithm_defines}}) {
+      foreach (@{$config{openssl_algorithm_defines}}) {
+	$OUT .= "#ifndef $_\n";
+	$OUT .= "# define $_\n";
+	$OUT .= "#endif\n";
+      }
+    }
+    if (@{$config{openssl_thread_defines}}) {
+      foreach (@{$config{openssl_thread_defines}}) {
+	$OUT .= "#ifndef $_\n";
+	$OUT .= "# define $_\n";
+	$OUT .= "#endif\n";
+      }
+    }
+    if (@{$config{openssl_other_defines}}) {
+      foreach (@{$config{openssl_other_defines}}) {
+	$OUT .= "#ifndef $_\n";
+	$OUT .= "# define $_\n";
+	$OUT .= "#endif\n";
+      }
+    }
+    "";
+-}
+
+/*
+ * Sometimes OPENSSSL_NO_xxx ends up with an empty file and some compilers
+ * don't like that.  This will hopefully silence them.
+ */
+#define NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT static void *dummy = &dummy;
+
+/*
+ * Applications should use -DOPENSSL_API_COMPAT=<version> to suppress the
+ * declarations of functions deprecated in or before <version>. Otherwise, they
+ * still won't see them if the library has been built to disable deprecated
+ * functions.
+ */
+#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED)
+# define DECLARE_DEPRECATED(f)
+#elif __GNUC__ > 3 || (__GNUC__ == 3 && __GNUC_MINOR__ > 0)
+# define DECLARE_DEPRECATED(f)    f __attribute__ ((deprecated));
+#else
+# define DECLARE_DEPRECATED(f)   f;
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_FILE
+# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_FILENAMES
+#  define OPENSSL_FILE ""
+#  define OPENSSL_LINE 0
+# else
+#  define OPENSSL_FILE __FILE__
+#  define OPENSSL_LINE __LINE__
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_MIN_API
+# define OPENSSL_MIN_API 0
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_API_COMPAT) || OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < OPENSSL_MIN_API
+# undef OPENSSL_API_COMPAT
+# define OPENSSL_API_COMPAT OPENSSL_MIN_API
+#endif
+
+#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+# define DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(f)   DECLARE_DEPRECATED(f)
+#else
+# define DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(f)
+#endif
+
+#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10000000L
+# define DEPRECATEDIN_1_0_0(f)   DECLARE_DEPRECATED(f)
+#else
+# define DEPRECATEDIN_1_0_0(f)
+#endif
+
+#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x00908000L
+# define DEPRECATEDIN_0_9_8(f)   DECLARE_DEPRECATED(f)
+#else
+# define DEPRECATEDIN_0_9_8(f)
+#endif
+
+{- $target{cpuid_obj} ne "mem_clr.o" ? "#define OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ" : "" -}
+
+/* Generate 80386 code? */
+{- $config{processor} eq "386" ? "#define" : "#undef" -} I386_ONLY
+
+#undef OPENSSL_UNISTD
+#define OPENSSL_UNISTD {- $target{unistd} -}
+
+{- $config{export_var_as_fn} ? "#define" : "#undef" -} OPENSSL_EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION
+
+/*
+ * The following are cipher-specific, but are part of the public API.
+ */
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI)
+{- $config{bn_ll} ? "# define" : "# undef" -} BN_LLONG
+/* Only one for the following should be defined */
+{- $config{b64l} ? "# define" : "# undef" -} SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG
+{- $config{b64}  ? "# define" : "# undef" -} SIXTY_FOUR_BIT
+{- $config{b32}  ? "# define" : "# undef" -} THIRTY_TWO_BIT
+#endif
+
+#define RC4_INT {- $config{rc4_int} -}
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/opensslv.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/opensslv.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4fb437f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/opensslv.h
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_OPENSSLV_H
+# define HEADER_OPENSSLV_H
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/*-
+ * Numeric release version identifier:
+ * MNNFFPPS: major minor fix patch status
+ * The status nibble has one of the values 0 for development, 1 to e for betas
+ * 1 to 14, and f for release.  The patch level is exactly that.
+ * For example:
+ * 0.9.3-dev      0x00903000
+ * 0.9.3-beta1    0x00903001
+ * 0.9.3-beta2-dev 0x00903002
+ * 0.9.3-beta2    0x00903002 (same as ...beta2-dev)
+ * 0.9.3          0x0090300f
+ * 0.9.3a         0x0090301f
+ * 0.9.4          0x0090400f
+ * 1.2.3z         0x102031af
+ *
+ * For continuity reasons (because 0.9.5 is already out, and is coded
+ * 0x00905100), between 0.9.5 and 0.9.6 the coding of the patch level
+ * part is slightly different, by setting the highest bit.  This means
+ * that 0.9.5a looks like this: 0x0090581f.  At 0.9.6, we can start
+ * with 0x0090600S...
+ *
+ * (Prior to 0.9.3-dev a different scheme was used: 0.9.2b is 0x0922.)
+ * (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for
+ *  major minor fix final patch/beta)
+ */
+# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER  0x1010008fL
+# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+#  define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.1.0h-fips  27 Mar 2018"
+# else
+#  define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.1.0h  27 Mar 2018"
+# endif
+
+#define OPENSSL_MAKE_VERSION(maj,min,fix,patch) ((0x10000000L)+((maj&0xff)<<20)+((min&0xff)<<12)+((fix&0xff)<<4)+patch)
+
+/* use this for #if tests, should never depend upon fix/patch */
+#define OPENSSL_VERSION_AT_LEAST(maj,min) (OPENSSL_MAKE_VERSION(maj,min, 0, 0) >= OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
+
+/*-
+ * The macros below are to be used for shared library (.so, .dll, ...)
+ * versioning.  That kind of versioning works a bit differently between
+ * operating systems.  The most usual scheme is to set a major and a minor
+ * number, and have the runtime loader check that the major number is equal
+ * to what it was at application link time, while the minor number has to
+ * be greater or equal to what it was at application link time.  With this
+ * scheme, the version number is usually part of the file name, like this:
+ *
+ *      libcrypto.so.0.9
+ *
+ * Some unixen also make a softlink with the major version number only:
+ *
+ *      libcrypto.so.0
+ *
+ * On Tru64 and IRIX 6.x it works a little bit differently.  There, the
+ * shared library version is stored in the file, and is actually a series
+ * of versions, separated by colons.  The rightmost version present in the
+ * library when linking an application is stored in the application to be
+ * matched at run time.  When the application is run, a check is done to
+ * see if the library version stored in the application matches any of the
+ * versions in the version string of the library itself.
+ * This version string can be constructed in any way, depending on what
+ * kind of matching is desired.  However, to implement the same scheme as
+ * the one used in the other unixen, all compatible versions, from lowest
+ * to highest, should be part of the string.  Consecutive builds would
+ * give the following versions strings:
+ *
+ *      3.0
+ *      3.0:3.1
+ *      3.0:3.1:3.2
+ *      4.0
+ *      4.0:4.1
+ *
+ * Notice how version 4 is completely incompatible with version, and
+ * therefore give the breach you can see.
+ *
+ * There may be other schemes as well that I haven't yet discovered.
+ *
+ * So, here's the way it works here: first of all, the library version
+ * number doesn't need at all to match the overall OpenSSL version.
+ * However, it's nice and more understandable if it actually does.
+ * The current library version is stored in the macro SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER,
+ * which is just a piece of text in the format "M.m.e" (Major, minor, edit).
+ * For the sake of Tru64, IRIX, and any other OS that behaves in similar ways,
+ * we need to keep a history of version numbers, which is done in the
+ * macro SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY.  The numbers are separated by colons and
+ * should only keep the versions that are binary compatible with the current.
+ */
+# define SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY ""
+# define SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER "1.1"
+
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+#endif                          /* HEADER_OPENSSLV_H */
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/ossl_typ.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..129a67f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
@@ -0,0 +1,190 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_OPENSSL_TYPES_H
+# define HEADER_OPENSSL_TYPES_H
+
+#include <limits.h>
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+# include <openssl/e_os2.h>
+
+# ifdef NO_ASN1_TYPEDEFS
+#  define ASN1_INTEGER            ASN1_STRING
+#  define ASN1_ENUMERATED         ASN1_STRING
+#  define ASN1_BIT_STRING         ASN1_STRING
+#  define ASN1_OCTET_STRING       ASN1_STRING
+#  define ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING    ASN1_STRING
+#  define ASN1_T61STRING          ASN1_STRING
+#  define ASN1_IA5STRING          ASN1_STRING
+#  define ASN1_UTCTIME            ASN1_STRING
+#  define ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME    ASN1_STRING
+#  define ASN1_TIME               ASN1_STRING
+#  define ASN1_GENERALSTRING      ASN1_STRING
+#  define ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING    ASN1_STRING
+#  define ASN1_BMPSTRING          ASN1_STRING
+#  define ASN1_VISIBLESTRING      ASN1_STRING
+#  define ASN1_UTF8STRING         ASN1_STRING
+#  define ASN1_BOOLEAN            int
+#  define ASN1_NULL               int
+# else
+typedef struct asn1_string_st ASN1_INTEGER;
+typedef struct asn1_string_st ASN1_ENUMERATED;
+typedef struct asn1_string_st ASN1_BIT_STRING;
+typedef struct asn1_string_st ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
+typedef struct asn1_string_st ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING;
+typedef struct asn1_string_st ASN1_T61STRING;
+typedef struct asn1_string_st ASN1_IA5STRING;
+typedef struct asn1_string_st ASN1_GENERALSTRING;
+typedef struct asn1_string_st ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING;
+typedef struct asn1_string_st ASN1_BMPSTRING;
+typedef struct asn1_string_st ASN1_UTCTIME;
+typedef struct asn1_string_st ASN1_TIME;
+typedef struct asn1_string_st ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME;
+typedef struct asn1_string_st ASN1_VISIBLESTRING;
+typedef struct asn1_string_st ASN1_UTF8STRING;
+typedef struct asn1_string_st ASN1_STRING;
+typedef int ASN1_BOOLEAN;
+typedef int ASN1_NULL;
+# endif
+
+typedef struct asn1_object_st ASN1_OBJECT;
+
+typedef struct ASN1_ITEM_st ASN1_ITEM;
+typedef struct asn1_pctx_st ASN1_PCTX;
+typedef struct asn1_sctx_st ASN1_SCTX;
+
+# ifdef _WIN32
+#  undef X509_NAME
+#  undef X509_EXTENSIONS
+#  undef PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL
+#  undef PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO
+#  undef OCSP_REQUEST
+#  undef OCSP_RESPONSE
+# endif
+
+# ifdef BIGNUM
+#  undef BIGNUM
+# endif
+struct dane_st;
+typedef struct bio_st BIO;
+typedef struct bignum_st BIGNUM;
+typedef struct bignum_ctx BN_CTX;
+typedef struct bn_blinding_st BN_BLINDING;
+typedef struct bn_mont_ctx_st BN_MONT_CTX;
+typedef struct bn_recp_ctx_st BN_RECP_CTX;
+typedef struct bn_gencb_st BN_GENCB;
+
+typedef struct buf_mem_st BUF_MEM;
+
+typedef struct evp_cipher_st EVP_CIPHER;
+typedef struct evp_cipher_ctx_st EVP_CIPHER_CTX;
+typedef struct evp_md_st EVP_MD;
+typedef struct evp_md_ctx_st EVP_MD_CTX;
+typedef struct evp_pkey_st EVP_PKEY;
+
+typedef struct evp_pkey_asn1_method_st EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD;
+
+typedef struct evp_pkey_method_st EVP_PKEY_METHOD;
+typedef struct evp_pkey_ctx_st EVP_PKEY_CTX;
+
+typedef struct evp_Encode_Ctx_st EVP_ENCODE_CTX;
+
+typedef struct hmac_ctx_st HMAC_CTX;
+
+typedef struct dh_st DH;
+typedef struct dh_method DH_METHOD;
+
+typedef struct dsa_st DSA;
+typedef struct dsa_method DSA_METHOD;
+
+typedef struct rsa_st RSA;
+typedef struct rsa_meth_st RSA_METHOD;
+
+typedef struct ec_key_st EC_KEY;
+typedef struct ec_key_method_st EC_KEY_METHOD;
+
+typedef struct rand_meth_st RAND_METHOD;
+
+typedef struct ssl_dane_st SSL_DANE;
+typedef struct x509_st X509;
+typedef struct X509_algor_st X509_ALGOR;
+typedef struct X509_crl_st X509_CRL;
+typedef struct x509_crl_method_st X509_CRL_METHOD;
+typedef struct x509_revoked_st X509_REVOKED;
+typedef struct X509_name_st X509_NAME;
+typedef struct X509_pubkey_st X509_PUBKEY;
+typedef struct x509_store_st X509_STORE;
+typedef struct x509_store_ctx_st X509_STORE_CTX;
+
+typedef struct x509_object_st X509_OBJECT;
+typedef struct x509_lookup_st X509_LOOKUP;
+typedef struct x509_lookup_method_st X509_LOOKUP_METHOD;
+typedef struct X509_VERIFY_PARAM_st X509_VERIFY_PARAM;
+
+typedef struct pkcs8_priv_key_info_st PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO;
+
+typedef struct v3_ext_ctx X509V3_CTX;
+typedef struct conf_st CONF;
+typedef struct ossl_init_settings_st OPENSSL_INIT_SETTINGS;
+
+typedef struct ui_st UI;
+typedef struct ui_method_st UI_METHOD;
+
+typedef struct engine_st ENGINE;
+typedef struct ssl_st SSL;
+typedef struct ssl_ctx_st SSL_CTX;
+
+typedef struct comp_ctx_st COMP_CTX;
+typedef struct comp_method_st COMP_METHOD;
+
+typedef struct X509_POLICY_NODE_st X509_POLICY_NODE;
+typedef struct X509_POLICY_LEVEL_st X509_POLICY_LEVEL;
+typedef struct X509_POLICY_TREE_st X509_POLICY_TREE;
+typedef struct X509_POLICY_CACHE_st X509_POLICY_CACHE;
+
+typedef struct AUTHORITY_KEYID_st AUTHORITY_KEYID;
+typedef struct DIST_POINT_st DIST_POINT;
+typedef struct ISSUING_DIST_POINT_st ISSUING_DIST_POINT;
+typedef struct NAME_CONSTRAINTS_st NAME_CONSTRAINTS;
+
+typedef struct crypto_ex_data_st CRYPTO_EX_DATA;
+
+typedef struct ocsp_req_ctx_st OCSP_REQ_CTX;
+typedef struct ocsp_response_st OCSP_RESPONSE;
+typedef struct ocsp_responder_id_st OCSP_RESPID;
+
+typedef struct sct_st SCT;
+typedef struct sct_ctx_st SCT_CTX;
+typedef struct ctlog_st CTLOG;
+typedef struct ctlog_store_st CTLOG_STORE;
+typedef struct ct_policy_eval_ctx_st CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX;
+
+#if defined(__STDC_VERSION__) && __STDC_VERSION__ >= 199901L && \
+    defined(INTMAX_MAX) && defined(UINTMAX_MAX)
+typedef intmax_t ossl_intmax_t;
+typedef uintmax_t ossl_uintmax_t;
+#else
+/*
+ * Not long long, because the C-library can only be expected to provide
+ * strtoll(), strtoull() at the same time as intmax_t and strtoimax(),
+ * strtoumax().  Since we use these for parsing arguments, we need the
+ * conversion functions, not just the sizes.
+ */
+typedef long ossl_intmax_t;
+typedef unsigned long ossl_uintmax_t;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+#endif                          /* def HEADER_OPENSSL_TYPES_H */
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/pem.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/pem.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2375d63
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/pem.h
@@ -0,0 +1,501 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_PEM_H
+# define HEADER_PEM_H
+
+# include <openssl/e_os2.h>
+# include <openssl/bio.h>
+# include <openssl/stack.h>
+# include <openssl/evp.h>
+# include <openssl/x509.h>
+# include <openssl/pem2.h>
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+# define PEM_BUFSIZE             1024
+
+# define PEM_STRING_X509_OLD     "X509 CERTIFICATE"
+# define PEM_STRING_X509         "CERTIFICATE"
+# define PEM_STRING_X509_TRUSTED "TRUSTED CERTIFICATE"
+# define PEM_STRING_X509_REQ_OLD "NEW CERTIFICATE REQUEST"
+# define PEM_STRING_X509_REQ     "CERTIFICATE REQUEST"
+# define PEM_STRING_X509_CRL     "X509 CRL"
+# define PEM_STRING_EVP_PKEY     "ANY PRIVATE KEY"
+# define PEM_STRING_PUBLIC       "PUBLIC KEY"
+# define PEM_STRING_RSA          "RSA PRIVATE KEY"
+# define PEM_STRING_RSA_PUBLIC   "RSA PUBLIC KEY"
+# define PEM_STRING_DSA          "DSA PRIVATE KEY"
+# define PEM_STRING_DSA_PUBLIC   "DSA PUBLIC KEY"
+# define PEM_STRING_PKCS7        "PKCS7"
+# define PEM_STRING_PKCS7_SIGNED "PKCS #7 SIGNED DATA"
+# define PEM_STRING_PKCS8        "ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY"
+# define PEM_STRING_PKCS8INF     "PRIVATE KEY"
+# define PEM_STRING_DHPARAMS     "DH PARAMETERS"
+# define PEM_STRING_DHXPARAMS    "X9.42 DH PARAMETERS"
+# define PEM_STRING_SSL_SESSION  "SSL SESSION PARAMETERS"
+# define PEM_STRING_DSAPARAMS    "DSA PARAMETERS"
+# define PEM_STRING_ECDSA_PUBLIC "ECDSA PUBLIC KEY"
+# define PEM_STRING_ECPARAMETERS "EC PARAMETERS"
+# define PEM_STRING_ECPRIVATEKEY "EC PRIVATE KEY"
+# define PEM_STRING_PARAMETERS   "PARAMETERS"
+# define PEM_STRING_CMS          "CMS"
+
+# define PEM_TYPE_ENCRYPTED      10
+# define PEM_TYPE_MIC_ONLY       20
+# define PEM_TYPE_MIC_CLEAR      30
+# define PEM_TYPE_CLEAR          40
+
+typedef struct pem_recip_st {
+    char *name;
+    X509_NAME *dn;
+    int cipher;
+    int key_enc;
+    /*      char iv[8]; unused and wrong size */
+} PEM_USER;
+
+typedef struct pem_ctx_st {
+    int type;                   /* what type of object */
+    struct {
+        int version;
+        int mode;
+    } proc_type;
+
+    char *domain;
+
+    struct {
+        int cipher;
+        /*-
+        unused, and wrong size
+        unsigned char iv[8]; */
+    } DEK_info;
+
+    PEM_USER *originator;
+
+    int num_recipient;
+    PEM_USER **recipient;
+
+/*-
+    XXX(ben): don#t think this is used!
+        STACK *x509_chain;      / * certificate chain */
+    EVP_MD *md;                 /* signature type */
+
+    int md_enc;                 /* is the md encrypted or not? */
+    int md_len;                 /* length of md_data */
+    char *md_data;              /* message digest, could be pkey encrypted */
+
+    EVP_CIPHER *dec;            /* date encryption cipher */
+    int key_len;                /* key length */
+    unsigned char *key;         /* key */
+  /*-
+    unused, and wrong size
+    unsigned char iv[8]; */
+
+    int data_enc;               /* is the data encrypted */
+    int data_len;
+    unsigned char *data;
+} PEM_CTX;
+
+/*
+ * These macros make the PEM_read/PEM_write functions easier to maintain and
+ * write. Now they are all implemented with either: IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw(...) or
+ * IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw_cb(...)
+ */
+
+# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+
+#  define IMPLEMENT_PEM_read_fp(name, type, str, asn1) /**/
+#  define IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_fp(name, type, str, asn1) /**/
+#  define IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_fp_const(name, type, str, asn1) /**/
+#  define IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_cb_fp(name, type, str, asn1) /**/
+#  define IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_cb_fp_const(name, type, str, asn1) /**/
+# else
+
+#  define IMPLEMENT_PEM_read_fp(name, type, str, asn1) \
+type *PEM_read_##name(FILE *fp, type **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u)\
+{ \
+return PEM_ASN1_read((d2i_of_void *)d2i_##asn1, str,fp,(void **)x,cb,u); \
+}
+
+#  define IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_fp(name, type, str, asn1) \
+int PEM_write_##name(FILE *fp, type *x) \
+{ \
+return PEM_ASN1_write((i2d_of_void *)i2d_##asn1,str,fp,x,NULL,NULL,0,NULL,NULL); \
+}
+
+#  define IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_fp_const(name, type, str, asn1) \
+int PEM_write_##name(FILE *fp, const type *x) \
+{ \
+return PEM_ASN1_write((i2d_of_void *)i2d_##asn1,str,fp,(void *)x,NULL,NULL,0,NULL,NULL); \
+}
+
+#  define IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_cb_fp(name, type, str, asn1) \
+int PEM_write_##name(FILE *fp, type *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, \
+             unsigned char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, \
+                  void *u) \
+        { \
+        return PEM_ASN1_write((i2d_of_void *)i2d_##asn1,str,fp,x,enc,kstr,klen,cb,u); \
+        }
+
+#  define IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_cb_fp_const(name, type, str, asn1) \
+int PEM_write_##name(FILE *fp, type *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, \
+             unsigned char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, \
+                  void *u) \
+        { \
+        return PEM_ASN1_write((i2d_of_void *)i2d_##asn1,str,fp,x,enc,kstr,klen,cb,u); \
+        }
+
+# endif
+
+# define IMPLEMENT_PEM_read_bio(name, type, str, asn1) \
+type *PEM_read_bio_##name(BIO *bp, type **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u)\
+{ \
+return PEM_ASN1_read_bio((d2i_of_void *)d2i_##asn1, str,bp,(void **)x,cb,u); \
+}
+
+# define IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_bio(name, type, str, asn1) \
+int PEM_write_bio_##name(BIO *bp, type *x) \
+{ \
+return PEM_ASN1_write_bio((i2d_of_void *)i2d_##asn1,str,bp,x,NULL,NULL,0,NULL,NULL); \
+}
+
+# define IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_bio_const(name, type, str, asn1) \
+int PEM_write_bio_##name(BIO *bp, const type *x) \
+{ \
+return PEM_ASN1_write_bio((i2d_of_void *)i2d_##asn1,str,bp,(void *)x,NULL,NULL,0,NULL,NULL); \
+}
+
+# define IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_cb_bio(name, type, str, asn1) \
+int PEM_write_bio_##name(BIO *bp, type *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, \
+             unsigned char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u) \
+        { \
+        return PEM_ASN1_write_bio((i2d_of_void *)i2d_##asn1,str,bp,x,enc,kstr,klen,cb,u); \
+        }
+
+# define IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_cb_bio_const(name, type, str, asn1) \
+int PEM_write_bio_##name(BIO *bp, type *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, \
+             unsigned char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u) \
+        { \
+        return PEM_ASN1_write_bio((i2d_of_void *)i2d_##asn1,str,bp,(void *)x,enc,kstr,klen,cb,u); \
+        }
+
+# define IMPLEMENT_PEM_write(name, type, str, asn1) \
+        IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_bio(name, type, str, asn1) \
+        IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_fp(name, type, str, asn1)
+
+# define IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_const(name, type, str, asn1) \
+        IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_bio_const(name, type, str, asn1) \
+        IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_fp_const(name, type, str, asn1)
+
+# define IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_cb(name, type, str, asn1) \
+        IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_cb_bio(name, type, str, asn1) \
+        IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_cb_fp(name, type, str, asn1)
+
+# define IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_cb_const(name, type, str, asn1) \
+        IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_cb_bio_const(name, type, str, asn1) \
+        IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_cb_fp_const(name, type, str, asn1)
+
+# define IMPLEMENT_PEM_read(name, type, str, asn1) \
+        IMPLEMENT_PEM_read_bio(name, type, str, asn1) \
+        IMPLEMENT_PEM_read_fp(name, type, str, asn1)
+
+# define IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw(name, type, str, asn1) \
+        IMPLEMENT_PEM_read(name, type, str, asn1) \
+        IMPLEMENT_PEM_write(name, type, str, asn1)
+
+# define IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw_const(name, type, str, asn1) \
+        IMPLEMENT_PEM_read(name, type, str, asn1) \
+        IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_const(name, type, str, asn1)
+
+# define IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw_cb(name, type, str, asn1) \
+        IMPLEMENT_PEM_read(name, type, str, asn1) \
+        IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_cb(name, type, str, asn1)
+
+/* These are the same except they are for the declarations */
+
+# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_STDIO)
+
+#  define DECLARE_PEM_read_fp(name, type) /**/
+#  define DECLARE_PEM_write_fp(name, type) /**/
+#  define DECLARE_PEM_write_fp_const(name, type) /**/
+#  define DECLARE_PEM_write_cb_fp(name, type) /**/
+# else
+
+#  define DECLARE_PEM_read_fp(name, type) \
+        type *PEM_read_##name(FILE *fp, type **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);
+
+#  define DECLARE_PEM_write_fp(name, type) \
+        int PEM_write_##name(FILE *fp, type *x);
+
+#  define DECLARE_PEM_write_fp_const(name, type) \
+        int PEM_write_##name(FILE *fp, const type *x);
+
+#  define DECLARE_PEM_write_cb_fp(name, type) \
+        int PEM_write_##name(FILE *fp, type *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, \
+             unsigned char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);
+
+# endif
+
+#  define DECLARE_PEM_read_bio(name, type) \
+        type *PEM_read_bio_##name(BIO *bp, type **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);
+
+#  define DECLARE_PEM_write_bio(name, type) \
+        int PEM_write_bio_##name(BIO *bp, type *x);
+
+#  define DECLARE_PEM_write_bio_const(name, type) \
+        int PEM_write_bio_##name(BIO *bp, const type *x);
+
+#  define DECLARE_PEM_write_cb_bio(name, type) \
+        int PEM_write_bio_##name(BIO *bp, type *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, \
+             unsigned char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);
+
+# define DECLARE_PEM_write(name, type) \
+        DECLARE_PEM_write_bio(name, type) \
+        DECLARE_PEM_write_fp(name, type)
+# define DECLARE_PEM_write_const(name, type) \
+        DECLARE_PEM_write_bio_const(name, type) \
+        DECLARE_PEM_write_fp_const(name, type)
+# define DECLARE_PEM_write_cb(name, type) \
+        DECLARE_PEM_write_cb_bio(name, type) \
+        DECLARE_PEM_write_cb_fp(name, type)
+# define DECLARE_PEM_read(name, type) \
+        DECLARE_PEM_read_bio(name, type) \
+        DECLARE_PEM_read_fp(name, type)
+# define DECLARE_PEM_rw(name, type) \
+        DECLARE_PEM_read(name, type) \
+        DECLARE_PEM_write(name, type)
+# define DECLARE_PEM_rw_const(name, type) \
+        DECLARE_PEM_read(name, type) \
+        DECLARE_PEM_write_const(name, type)
+# define DECLARE_PEM_rw_cb(name, type) \
+        DECLARE_PEM_read(name, type) \
+        DECLARE_PEM_write_cb(name, type)
+typedef int pem_password_cb (char *buf, int size, int rwflag, void *userdata);
+
+int PEM_get_EVP_CIPHER_INFO(char *header, EVP_CIPHER_INFO *cipher);
+int PEM_do_header(EVP_CIPHER_INFO *cipher, unsigned char *data, long *len,
+                  pem_password_cb *callback, void *u);
+
+int PEM_read_bio(BIO *bp, char **name, char **header,
+                 unsigned char **data, long *len);
+int PEM_write_bio(BIO *bp, const char *name, const char *hdr,
+                  const unsigned char *data, long len);
+int PEM_bytes_read_bio(unsigned char **pdata, long *plen, char **pnm,
+                       const char *name, BIO *bp, pem_password_cb *cb,
+                       void *u);
+void *PEM_ASN1_read_bio(d2i_of_void *d2i, const char *name, BIO *bp, void **x,
+                        pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);
+int PEM_ASN1_write_bio(i2d_of_void *i2d, const char *name, BIO *bp, void *x,
+                       const EVP_CIPHER *enc, unsigned char *kstr, int klen,
+                       pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);
+
+STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(BIO *bp, STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *sk,
+                                            pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);
+int PEM_X509_INFO_write_bio(BIO *bp, X509_INFO *xi, EVP_CIPHER *enc,
+                            unsigned char *kstr, int klen,
+                            pem_password_cb *cd, void *u);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+int PEM_read(FILE *fp, char **name, char **header,
+             unsigned char **data, long *len);
+int PEM_write(FILE *fp, const char *name, const char *hdr,
+              const unsigned char *data, long len);
+void *PEM_ASN1_read(d2i_of_void *d2i, const char *name, FILE *fp, void **x,
+                    pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);
+int PEM_ASN1_write(i2d_of_void *i2d, const char *name, FILE *fp,
+                   void *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, unsigned char *kstr,
+                   int klen, pem_password_cb *callback, void *u);
+STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *PEM_X509_INFO_read(FILE *fp, STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *sk,
+                                        pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);
+#endif
+
+int PEM_SignInit(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_MD *type);
+int PEM_SignUpdate(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *d, unsigned int cnt);
+int PEM_SignFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sigret,
+                  unsigned int *siglen, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+
+int PEM_def_callback(char *buf, int num, int w, void *key);
+void PEM_proc_type(char *buf, int type);
+void PEM_dek_info(char *buf, const char *type, int len, char *str);
+
+# include <openssl/symhacks.h>
+
+DECLARE_PEM_rw(X509, X509)
+DECLARE_PEM_rw(X509_AUX, X509)
+DECLARE_PEM_rw(X509_REQ, X509_REQ)
+DECLARE_PEM_write(X509_REQ_NEW, X509_REQ)
+DECLARE_PEM_rw(X509_CRL, X509_CRL)
+DECLARE_PEM_rw(PKCS7, PKCS7)
+DECLARE_PEM_rw(NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE, NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE)
+DECLARE_PEM_rw(PKCS8, X509_SIG)
+DECLARE_PEM_rw(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO)
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+DECLARE_PEM_rw_cb(RSAPrivateKey, RSA)
+DECLARE_PEM_rw_const(RSAPublicKey, RSA)
+DECLARE_PEM_rw(RSA_PUBKEY, RSA)
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+DECLARE_PEM_rw_cb(DSAPrivateKey, DSA)
+DECLARE_PEM_rw(DSA_PUBKEY, DSA)
+DECLARE_PEM_rw_const(DSAparams, DSA)
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+DECLARE_PEM_rw_const(ECPKParameters, EC_GROUP)
+DECLARE_PEM_rw_cb(ECPrivateKey, EC_KEY)
+DECLARE_PEM_rw(EC_PUBKEY, EC_KEY)
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+DECLARE_PEM_rw_const(DHparams, DH)
+DECLARE_PEM_write_const(DHxparams, DH)
+# endif
+DECLARE_PEM_rw_cb(PrivateKey, EVP_PKEY)
+DECLARE_PEM_rw(PUBKEY, EVP_PKEY)
+
+int PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey_traditional(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *x,
+                                         const EVP_CIPHER *enc,
+                                         unsigned char *kstr, int klen,
+                                         pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);
+
+int PEM_write_bio_PKCS8PrivateKey_nid(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *x, int nid,
+                                      char *kstr, int klen,
+                                      pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);
+int PEM_write_bio_PKCS8PrivateKey(BIO *, EVP_PKEY *, const EVP_CIPHER *,
+                                  char *, int, pem_password_cb *, void *);
+int i2d_PKCS8PrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc,
+                            char *kstr, int klen,
+                            pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);
+int i2d_PKCS8PrivateKey_nid_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *x, int nid,
+                                char *kstr, int klen,
+                                pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);
+EVP_PKEY *d2i_PKCS8PrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY **x, pem_password_cb *cb,
+                                  void *u);
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+int i2d_PKCS8PrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc,
+                           char *kstr, int klen,
+                           pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);
+int i2d_PKCS8PrivateKey_nid_fp(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY *x, int nid,
+                               char *kstr, int klen,
+                               pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);
+int PEM_write_PKCS8PrivateKey_nid(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY *x, int nid,
+                                  char *kstr, int klen,
+                                  pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);
+
+EVP_PKEY *d2i_PKCS8PrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY **x, pem_password_cb *cb,
+                                 void *u);
+
+int PEM_write_PKCS8PrivateKey(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc,
+                              char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cd,
+                              void *u);
+# endif
+EVP_PKEY *PEM_read_bio_Parameters(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY **x);
+int PEM_write_bio_Parameters(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *x);
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+EVP_PKEY *b2i_PrivateKey(const unsigned char **in, long length);
+EVP_PKEY *b2i_PublicKey(const unsigned char **in, long length);
+EVP_PKEY *b2i_PrivateKey_bio(BIO *in);
+EVP_PKEY *b2i_PublicKey_bio(BIO *in);
+int i2b_PrivateKey_bio(BIO *out, EVP_PKEY *pk);
+int i2b_PublicKey_bio(BIO *out, EVP_PKEY *pk);
+#  ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
+EVP_PKEY *b2i_PVK_bio(BIO *in, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);
+int i2b_PVK_bio(BIO *out, EVP_PKEY *pk, int enclevel,
+                pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);
+#  endif
+# endif
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+/*
+ * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
+ * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
+ */
+
+int ERR_load_PEM_strings(void);
+
+/* Error codes for the PEM functions. */
+
+/* Function codes. */
+# define PEM_F_B2I_DSS                                    127
+# define PEM_F_B2I_PVK_BIO                                128
+# define PEM_F_B2I_RSA                                    129
+# define PEM_F_CHECK_BITLEN_DSA                           130
+# define PEM_F_CHECK_BITLEN_RSA                           131
+# define PEM_F_D2I_PKCS8PRIVATEKEY_BIO                    120
+# define PEM_F_D2I_PKCS8PRIVATEKEY_FP                     121
+# define PEM_F_DO_B2I                                     132
+# define PEM_F_DO_B2I_BIO                                 133
+# define PEM_F_DO_BLOB_HEADER                             134
+# define PEM_F_DO_PK8PKEY                                 126
+# define PEM_F_DO_PK8PKEY_FP                              125
+# define PEM_F_DO_PVK_BODY                                135
+# define PEM_F_DO_PVK_HEADER                              136
+# define PEM_F_I2B_PVK                                    137
+# define PEM_F_I2B_PVK_BIO                                138
+# define PEM_F_LOAD_IV                                    101
+# define PEM_F_PEM_ASN1_READ                              102
+# define PEM_F_PEM_ASN1_READ_BIO                          103
+# define PEM_F_PEM_ASN1_WRITE                             104
+# define PEM_F_PEM_ASN1_WRITE_BIO                         105
+# define PEM_F_PEM_DEF_CALLBACK                           100
+# define PEM_F_PEM_DO_HEADER                              106
+# define PEM_F_PEM_GET_EVP_CIPHER_INFO                    107
+# define PEM_F_PEM_READ                                   108
+# define PEM_F_PEM_READ_BIO                               109
+# define PEM_F_PEM_READ_BIO_DHPARAMS                      141
+# define PEM_F_PEM_READ_BIO_PARAMETERS                    140
+# define PEM_F_PEM_READ_BIO_PRIVATEKEY                    123
+# define PEM_F_PEM_READ_DHPARAMS                          142
+# define PEM_F_PEM_READ_PRIVATEKEY                        124
+# define PEM_F_PEM_SIGNFINAL                              112
+# define PEM_F_PEM_WRITE                                  113
+# define PEM_F_PEM_WRITE_BIO                              114
+# define PEM_F_PEM_WRITE_PRIVATEKEY                       139
+# define PEM_F_PEM_X509_INFO_READ                         115
+# define PEM_F_PEM_X509_INFO_READ_BIO                     116
+# define PEM_F_PEM_X509_INFO_WRITE_BIO                    117
+
+/* Reason codes. */
+# define PEM_R_BAD_BASE64_DECODE                          100
+# define PEM_R_BAD_DECRYPT                                101
+# define PEM_R_BAD_END_LINE                               102
+# define PEM_R_BAD_IV_CHARS                               103
+# define PEM_R_BAD_MAGIC_NUMBER                           116
+# define PEM_R_BAD_PASSWORD_READ                          104
+# define PEM_R_BAD_VERSION_NUMBER                         117
+# define PEM_R_BIO_WRITE_FAILURE                          118
+# define PEM_R_CIPHER_IS_NULL                             127
+# define PEM_R_ERROR_CONVERTING_PRIVATE_KEY               115
+# define PEM_R_EXPECTING_PRIVATE_KEY_BLOB                 119
+# define PEM_R_EXPECTING_PUBLIC_KEY_BLOB                  120
+# define PEM_R_HEADER_TOO_LONG                            128
+# define PEM_R_INCONSISTENT_HEADER                        121
+# define PEM_R_KEYBLOB_HEADER_PARSE_ERROR                 122
+# define PEM_R_KEYBLOB_TOO_SHORT                          123
+# define PEM_R_MISSING_DEK_IV                             129
+# define PEM_R_NOT_DEK_INFO                               105
+# define PEM_R_NOT_ENCRYPTED                              106
+# define PEM_R_NOT_PROC_TYPE                              107
+# define PEM_R_NO_START_LINE                              108
+# define PEM_R_PROBLEMS_GETTING_PASSWORD                  109
+# define PEM_R_PVK_DATA_TOO_SHORT                         124
+# define PEM_R_PVK_TOO_SHORT                              125
+# define PEM_R_READ_KEY                                   111
+# define PEM_R_SHORT_HEADER                               112
+# define PEM_R_UNEXPECTED_DEK_IV                          130
+# define PEM_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER                         113
+# define PEM_R_UNSUPPORTED_ENCRYPTION                     114
+# define PEM_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_COMPONENTS                 126
+
+# ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+# endif
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/pem2.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/pem2.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cfe73f1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/pem2.h
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HEADER_PEM_H
+int ERR_load_PEM_strings(void);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/pkcs12.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/pkcs12.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..deaded9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/pkcs12.h
@@ -0,0 +1,282 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_PKCS12_H
+# define HEADER_PKCS12_H
+
+# include <openssl/bio.h>
+# include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+# define PKCS12_KEY_ID   1
+# define PKCS12_IV_ID    2
+# define PKCS12_MAC_ID   3
+
+/* Default iteration count */
+# ifndef PKCS12_DEFAULT_ITER
+#  define PKCS12_DEFAULT_ITER     PKCS5_DEFAULT_ITER
+# endif
+
+# define PKCS12_MAC_KEY_LENGTH 20
+
+# define PKCS12_SALT_LEN 8
+
+/* It's not clear if these are actually needed... */
+# define PKCS12_key_gen PKCS12_key_gen_utf8
+# define PKCS12_add_friendlyname PKCS12_add_friendlyname_utf8
+
+/* MS key usage constants */
+
+# define KEY_EX  0x10
+# define KEY_SIG 0x80
+
+typedef struct PKCS12_MAC_DATA_st PKCS12_MAC_DATA;
+
+typedef struct PKCS12_st PKCS12;
+
+typedef struct PKCS12_SAFEBAG_st PKCS12_SAFEBAG;
+
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG)
+
+typedef struct pkcs12_bag_st PKCS12_BAGS;
+
+# define PKCS12_ERROR    0
+# define PKCS12_OK       1
+
+/* Compatibility macros */
+
+#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+
+# define M_PKCS12_bag_type PKCS12_bag_type
+# define M_PKCS12_cert_bag_type PKCS12_cert_bag_type
+# define M_PKCS12_crl_bag_type PKCS12_cert_bag_type
+
+# define PKCS12_certbag2x509 PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get1_cert
+# define PKCS12_certbag2scrl PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get1_crl
+# define PKCS12_bag_type PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get_nid
+# define PKCS12_cert_bag_type PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get_bag_nid
+# define PKCS12_x5092certbag PKCS12_SAFEBAG_create_cert
+# define PKCS12_x509crl2certbag PKCS12_SAFEBAG_create_crl
+# define PKCS12_MAKE_KEYBAG PKCS12_SAFEBAG_create0_p8inf
+# define PKCS12_MAKE_SHKEYBAG PKCS12_SAFEBAG_create_pkcs8_encrypt
+
+#endif
+
+DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(ASN1_TYPE *PKCS12_get_attr(const PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, int attr_nid))
+
+ASN1_TYPE *PKCS8_get_attr(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, int attr_nid);
+int PKCS12_mac_present(const PKCS12 *p12);
+void PKCS12_get0_mac(const ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pmac,
+                     const X509_ALGOR **pmacalg,
+                     const ASN1_OCTET_STRING **psalt,
+                     const ASN1_INTEGER **piter,
+                     const PKCS12 *p12);
+
+const ASN1_TYPE *PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get0_attr(const PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag,
+                                          int attr_nid);
+const ASN1_OBJECT *PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get0_type(const PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag);
+int PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get_nid(const PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag);
+int PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get_bag_nid(const PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag);
+
+X509 *PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get1_cert(const PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag);
+X509_CRL *PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get1_crl(const PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag);
+const STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *
+PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get0_safes(const PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag);
+const PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get0_p8inf(const PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag);
+const X509_SIG *PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get0_pkcs8(const PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag);
+
+PKCS12_SAFEBAG *PKCS12_SAFEBAG_create_cert(X509 *x509);
+PKCS12_SAFEBAG *PKCS12_SAFEBAG_create_crl(X509_CRL *crl);
+PKCS12_SAFEBAG *PKCS12_SAFEBAG_create0_p8inf(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8);
+PKCS12_SAFEBAG *PKCS12_SAFEBAG_create0_pkcs8(X509_SIG *p8);
+PKCS12_SAFEBAG *PKCS12_SAFEBAG_create_pkcs8_encrypt(int pbe_nid,
+                                                    const char *pass,
+                                                    int passlen,
+                                                    unsigned char *salt,
+                                                    int saltlen, int iter,
+                                                    PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf);
+
+PKCS12_SAFEBAG *PKCS12_item_pack_safebag(void *obj, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+                                         int nid1, int nid2);
+PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *PKCS8_decrypt(const X509_SIG *p8, const char *pass,
+                                   int passlen);
+PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *PKCS12_decrypt_skey(const PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag,
+                                         const char *pass, int passlen);
+X509_SIG *PKCS8_encrypt(int pbe_nid, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
+                        const char *pass, int passlen, unsigned char *salt,
+                        int saltlen, int iter, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8);
+X509_SIG *PKCS8_set0_pbe(const char *pass, int passlen,
+                        PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf, X509_ALGOR *pbe);
+PKCS7 *PKCS12_pack_p7data(STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *sk);
+STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *PKCS12_unpack_p7data(PKCS7 *p7);
+PKCS7 *PKCS12_pack_p7encdata(int pbe_nid, const char *pass, int passlen,
+                             unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, int iter,
+                             STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags);
+STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *PKCS12_unpack_p7encdata(PKCS7 *p7, const char *pass,
+                                                  int passlen);
+
+int PKCS12_pack_authsafes(PKCS12 *p12, STACK_OF(PKCS7) *safes);
+STACK_OF(PKCS7) *PKCS12_unpack_authsafes(const PKCS12 *p12);
+
+int PKCS12_add_localkeyid(PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, unsigned char *name,
+                          int namelen);
+int PKCS12_add_friendlyname_asc(PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, const char *name,
+                                int namelen);
+int PKCS12_add_friendlyname_utf8(PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, const char *name,
+                                 int namelen);
+int PKCS12_add_CSPName_asc(PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, const char *name,
+                           int namelen);
+int PKCS12_add_friendlyname_uni(PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag,
+                                const unsigned char *name, int namelen);
+int PKCS8_add_keyusage(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, int usage);
+ASN1_TYPE *PKCS12_get_attr_gen(const STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *attrs,
+                               int attr_nid);
+char *PKCS12_get_friendlyname(PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag);
+const STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *
+PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get0_attrs(const PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag);
+unsigned char *PKCS12_pbe_crypt(const X509_ALGOR *algor,
+                                const char *pass, int passlen,
+                                const unsigned char *in, int inlen,
+                                unsigned char **data, int *datalen,
+                                int en_de);
+void *PKCS12_item_decrypt_d2i(const X509_ALGOR *algor, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+                              const char *pass, int passlen,
+                              const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *oct, int zbuf);
+ASN1_OCTET_STRING *PKCS12_item_i2d_encrypt(X509_ALGOR *algor,
+                                           const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+                                           const char *pass, int passlen,
+                                           void *obj, int zbuf);
+PKCS12 *PKCS12_init(int mode);
+int PKCS12_key_gen_asc(const char *pass, int passlen, unsigned char *salt,
+                       int saltlen, int id, int iter, int n,
+                       unsigned char *out, const EVP_MD *md_type);
+int PKCS12_key_gen_uni(unsigned char *pass, int passlen, unsigned char *salt,
+                       int saltlen, int id, int iter, int n,
+                       unsigned char *out, const EVP_MD *md_type);
+int PKCS12_key_gen_utf8(const char *pass, int passlen, unsigned char *salt,
+                        int saltlen, int id, int iter, int n,
+                        unsigned char *out, const EVP_MD *md_type);
+int PKCS12_PBE_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const char *pass, int passlen,
+                        ASN1_TYPE *param, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
+                        const EVP_MD *md_type, int en_de);
+int PKCS12_gen_mac(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen,
+                   unsigned char *mac, unsigned int *maclen);
+int PKCS12_verify_mac(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen);
+int PKCS12_set_mac(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen,
+                   unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, int iter,
+                   const EVP_MD *md_type);
+int PKCS12_setup_mac(PKCS12 *p12, int iter, unsigned char *salt,
+                     int saltlen, const EVP_MD *md_type);
+unsigned char *OPENSSL_asc2uni(const char *asc, int asclen,
+                               unsigned char **uni, int *unilen);
+char *OPENSSL_uni2asc(const unsigned char *uni, int unilen);
+unsigned char *OPENSSL_utf82uni(const char *asc, int asclen,
+                                unsigned char **uni, int *unilen);
+char *OPENSSL_uni2utf8(const unsigned char *uni, int unilen);
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PKCS12)
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PKCS12_MAC_DATA)
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PKCS12_SAFEBAG)
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PKCS12_BAGS)
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(PKCS12_SAFEBAGS)
+DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(PKCS12_AUTHSAFES)
+
+void PKCS12_PBE_add(void);
+int PKCS12_parse(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert,
+                 STACK_OF(X509) **ca);
+PKCS12 *PKCS12_create(const char *pass, const char *name, EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+                      X509 *cert, STACK_OF(X509) *ca, int nid_key, int nid_cert,
+                      int iter, int mac_iter, int keytype);
+
+PKCS12_SAFEBAG *PKCS12_add_cert(STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) **pbags, X509 *cert);
+PKCS12_SAFEBAG *PKCS12_add_key(STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) **pbags,
+                               EVP_PKEY *key, int key_usage, int iter,
+                               int key_nid, const char *pass);
+int PKCS12_add_safe(STACK_OF(PKCS7) **psafes, STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags,
+                    int safe_nid, int iter, const char *pass);
+PKCS12 *PKCS12_add_safes(STACK_OF(PKCS7) *safes, int p7_nid);
+
+int i2d_PKCS12_bio(BIO *bp, PKCS12 *p12);
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+int i2d_PKCS12_fp(FILE *fp, PKCS12 *p12);
+# endif
+PKCS12 *d2i_PKCS12_bio(BIO *bp, PKCS12 **p12);
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+PKCS12 *d2i_PKCS12_fp(FILE *fp, PKCS12 **p12);
+# endif
+int PKCS12_newpass(PKCS12 *p12, const char *oldpass, const char *newpass);
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+/*
+ * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
+ * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
+ */
+
+int ERR_load_PKCS12_strings(void);
+
+/* Error codes for the PKCS12 functions. */
+
+/* Function codes. */
+# define PKCS12_F_PKCS12_CREATE                           105
+# define PKCS12_F_PKCS12_GEN_MAC                          107
+# define PKCS12_F_PKCS12_INIT                             109
+# define PKCS12_F_PKCS12_ITEM_DECRYPT_D2I                 106
+# define PKCS12_F_PKCS12_ITEM_I2D_ENCRYPT                 108
+# define PKCS12_F_PKCS12_ITEM_PACK_SAFEBAG                117
+# define PKCS12_F_PKCS12_KEY_GEN_ASC                      110
+# define PKCS12_F_PKCS12_KEY_GEN_UNI                      111
+# define PKCS12_F_PKCS12_KEY_GEN_UTF8                     116
+# define PKCS12_F_PKCS12_NEWPASS                          128
+# define PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PACK_P7DATA                      114
+# define PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PACK_P7ENCDATA                   115
+# define PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE                            118
+# define PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PBE_CRYPT                        119
+# define PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PBE_KEYIVGEN                     120
+# define PKCS12_F_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_CREATE0_P8INF            112
+# define PKCS12_F_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_CREATE0_PKCS8            113
+# define PKCS12_F_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_CREATE_PKCS8_ENCRYPT     133
+# define PKCS12_F_PKCS12_SETUP_MAC                        122
+# define PKCS12_F_PKCS12_SET_MAC                          123
+# define PKCS12_F_PKCS12_UNPACK_AUTHSAFES                 130
+# define PKCS12_F_PKCS12_UNPACK_P7DATA                    131
+# define PKCS12_F_PKCS12_VERIFY_MAC                       126
+# define PKCS12_F_PKCS8_ENCRYPT                           125
+# define PKCS12_F_PKCS8_SET0_PBE                          132
+
+/* Reason codes. */
+# define PKCS12_R_CANT_PACK_STRUCTURE                     100
+# define PKCS12_R_CONTENT_TYPE_NOT_DATA                   121
+# define PKCS12_R_DECODE_ERROR                            101
+# define PKCS12_R_ENCODE_ERROR                            102
+# define PKCS12_R_ENCRYPT_ERROR                           103
+# define PKCS12_R_ERROR_SETTING_ENCRYPTED_DATA_TYPE       120
+# define PKCS12_R_INVALID_NULL_ARGUMENT                   104
+# define PKCS12_R_INVALID_NULL_PKCS12_POINTER             105
+# define PKCS12_R_IV_GEN_ERROR                            106
+# define PKCS12_R_KEY_GEN_ERROR                           107
+# define PKCS12_R_MAC_ABSENT                              108
+# define PKCS12_R_MAC_GENERATION_ERROR                    109
+# define PKCS12_R_MAC_SETUP_ERROR                         110
+# define PKCS12_R_MAC_STRING_SET_ERROR                    111
+# define PKCS12_R_MAC_VERIFY_FAILURE                      113
+# define PKCS12_R_PARSE_ERROR                             114
+# define PKCS12_R_PKCS12_ALGOR_CIPHERINIT_ERROR           115
+# define PKCS12_R_PKCS12_CIPHERFINAL_ERROR                116
+# define PKCS12_R_PKCS12_PBE_CRYPT_ERROR                  117
+# define PKCS12_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST_ALGORITHM                118
+# define PKCS12_R_UNSUPPORTED_PKCS12_MODE                 119
+
+# ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+# endif
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/pkcs7.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/pkcs7.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..691f722
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/pkcs7.h
@@ -0,0 +1,404 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_PKCS7_H
+# define HEADER_PKCS7_H
+
+# include <openssl/asn1.h>
+# include <openssl/bio.h>
+# include <openssl/e_os2.h>
+
+# include <openssl/symhacks.h>
+# include <openssl/ossl_typ.h>
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/*-
+Encryption_ID           DES-CBC
+Digest_ID               MD5
+Digest_Encryption_ID    rsaEncryption
+Key_Encryption_ID       rsaEncryption
+*/
+
+typedef struct pkcs7_issuer_and_serial_st {
+    X509_NAME *issuer;
+    ASN1_INTEGER *serial;
+} PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL;
+
+typedef struct pkcs7_signer_info_st {
+    ASN1_INTEGER *version;      /* version 1 */
+    PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL *issuer_and_serial;
+    X509_ALGOR *digest_alg;
+    STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *auth_attr; /* [ 0 ] */
+    X509_ALGOR *digest_enc_alg;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *enc_digest;
+    STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *unauth_attr; /* [ 1 ] */
+    /* The private key to sign with */
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+} PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO;
+
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO)
+
+typedef struct pkcs7_recip_info_st {
+    ASN1_INTEGER *version;      /* version 0 */
+    PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL *issuer_and_serial;
+    X509_ALGOR *key_enc_algor;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *enc_key;
+    X509 *cert;                 /* get the pub-key from this */
+} PKCS7_RECIP_INFO;
+
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO)
+
+typedef struct pkcs7_signed_st {
+    ASN1_INTEGER *version;      /* version 1 */
+    STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) *md_algs; /* md used */
+    STACK_OF(X509) *cert;       /* [ 0 ] */
+    STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crl;    /* [ 1 ] */
+    STACK_OF(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO) *signer_info;
+    struct pkcs7_st *contents;
+} PKCS7_SIGNED;
+/*
+ * The above structure is very very similar to PKCS7_SIGN_ENVELOPE. How about
+ * merging the two
+ */
+
+typedef struct pkcs7_enc_content_st {
+    ASN1_OBJECT *content_type;
+    X509_ALGOR *algorithm;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *enc_data; /* [ 0 ] */
+    const EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
+} PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT;
+
+typedef struct pkcs7_enveloped_st {
+    ASN1_INTEGER *version;      /* version 0 */
+    STACK_OF(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO) *recipientinfo;
+    PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT *enc_data;
+} PKCS7_ENVELOPE;
+
+typedef struct pkcs7_signedandenveloped_st {
+    ASN1_INTEGER *version;      /* version 1 */
+    STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) *md_algs; /* md used */
+    STACK_OF(X509) *cert;       /* [ 0 ] */
+    STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crl;    /* [ 1 ] */
+    STACK_OF(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO) *signer_info;
+    PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT *enc_data;
+    STACK_OF(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO) *recipientinfo;
+} PKCS7_SIGN_ENVELOPE;
+
+typedef struct pkcs7_digest_st {
+    ASN1_INTEGER *version;      /* version 0 */
+    X509_ALGOR *md;             /* md used */
+    struct pkcs7_st *contents;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *digest;
+} PKCS7_DIGEST;
+
+typedef struct pkcs7_encrypted_st {
+    ASN1_INTEGER *version;      /* version 0 */
+    PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT *enc_data;
+} PKCS7_ENCRYPT;
+
+typedef struct pkcs7_st {
+    /*
+     * The following is non NULL if it contains ASN1 encoding of this
+     * structure
+     */
+    unsigned char *asn1;
+    long length;
+# define PKCS7_S_HEADER  0
+# define PKCS7_S_BODY    1
+# define PKCS7_S_TAIL    2
+    int state;                  /* used during processing */
+    int detached;
+    ASN1_OBJECT *type;
+    /* content as defined by the type */
+    /*
+     * all encryption/message digests are applied to the 'contents', leaving
+     * out the 'type' field.
+     */
+    union {
+        char *ptr;
+        /* NID_pkcs7_data */
+        ASN1_OCTET_STRING *data;
+        /* NID_pkcs7_signed */
+        PKCS7_SIGNED *sign;
+        /* NID_pkcs7_enveloped */
+        PKCS7_ENVELOPE *enveloped;
+        /* NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped */
+        PKCS7_SIGN_ENVELOPE *signed_and_enveloped;
+        /* NID_pkcs7_digest */
+        PKCS7_DIGEST *digest;
+        /* NID_pkcs7_encrypted */
+        PKCS7_ENCRYPT *encrypted;
+        /* Anything else */
+        ASN1_TYPE *other;
+    } d;
+} PKCS7;
+
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(PKCS7)
+
+# define PKCS7_OP_SET_DETACHED_SIGNATURE 1
+# define PKCS7_OP_GET_DETACHED_SIGNATURE 2
+
+# define PKCS7_get_signed_attributes(si) ((si)->auth_attr)
+# define PKCS7_get_attributes(si)        ((si)->unauth_attr)
+
+# define PKCS7_type_is_signed(a) (OBJ_obj2nid((a)->type) == NID_pkcs7_signed)
+# define PKCS7_type_is_encrypted(a) (OBJ_obj2nid((a)->type) == NID_pkcs7_encrypted)
+# define PKCS7_type_is_enveloped(a) (OBJ_obj2nid((a)->type) == NID_pkcs7_enveloped)
+# define PKCS7_type_is_signedAndEnveloped(a) \
+                (OBJ_obj2nid((a)->type) == NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped)
+# define PKCS7_type_is_data(a)   (OBJ_obj2nid((a)->type) == NID_pkcs7_data)
+# define PKCS7_type_is_digest(a)   (OBJ_obj2nid((a)->type) == NID_pkcs7_digest)
+
+# define PKCS7_set_detached(p,v) \
+                PKCS7_ctrl(p,PKCS7_OP_SET_DETACHED_SIGNATURE,v,NULL)
+# define PKCS7_get_detached(p) \
+                PKCS7_ctrl(p,PKCS7_OP_GET_DETACHED_SIGNATURE,0,NULL)
+
+# define PKCS7_is_detached(p7) (PKCS7_type_is_signed(p7) && PKCS7_get_detached(p7))
+
+/* S/MIME related flags */
+
+# define PKCS7_TEXT              0x1
+# define PKCS7_NOCERTS           0x2
+# define PKCS7_NOSIGS            0x4
+# define PKCS7_NOCHAIN           0x8
+# define PKCS7_NOINTERN          0x10
+# define PKCS7_NOVERIFY          0x20
+# define PKCS7_DETACHED          0x40
+# define PKCS7_BINARY            0x80
+# define PKCS7_NOATTR            0x100
+# define PKCS7_NOSMIMECAP        0x200
+# define PKCS7_NOOLDMIMETYPE     0x400
+# define PKCS7_CRLFEOL           0x800
+# define PKCS7_STREAM            0x1000
+# define PKCS7_NOCRL             0x2000
+# define PKCS7_PARTIAL           0x4000
+# define PKCS7_REUSE_DIGEST      0x8000
+# define PKCS7_NO_DUAL_CONTENT   0x10000
+
+/* Flags: for compatibility with older code */
+
+# define SMIME_TEXT      PKCS7_TEXT
+# define SMIME_NOCERTS   PKCS7_NOCERTS
+# define SMIME_NOSIGS    PKCS7_NOSIGS
+# define SMIME_NOCHAIN   PKCS7_NOCHAIN
+# define SMIME_NOINTERN  PKCS7_NOINTERN
+# define SMIME_NOVERIFY  PKCS7_NOVERIFY
+# define SMIME_DETACHED  PKCS7_DETACHED
+# define SMIME_BINARY    PKCS7_BINARY
+# define SMIME_NOATTR    PKCS7_NOATTR
+
+/* CRLF ASCII canonicalisation */
+# define SMIME_ASCIICRLF         0x80000
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL)
+
+int PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL_digest(PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL *data,
+                                   const EVP_MD *type, unsigned char *md,
+                                   unsigned int *len);
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+PKCS7 *d2i_PKCS7_fp(FILE *fp, PKCS7 **p7);
+int i2d_PKCS7_fp(FILE *fp, PKCS7 *p7);
+# endif
+PKCS7 *PKCS7_dup(PKCS7 *p7);
+PKCS7 *d2i_PKCS7_bio(BIO *bp, PKCS7 **p7);
+int i2d_PKCS7_bio(BIO *bp, PKCS7 *p7);
+int i2d_PKCS7_bio_stream(BIO *out, PKCS7 *p7, BIO *in, int flags);
+int PEM_write_bio_PKCS7_stream(BIO *out, PKCS7 *p7, BIO *in, int flags);
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO)
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO)
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PKCS7_SIGNED)
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT)
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PKCS7_ENVELOPE)
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PKCS7_SIGN_ENVELOPE)
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PKCS7_DIGEST)
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PKCS7_ENCRYPT)
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PKCS7)
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(PKCS7_ATTR_SIGN)
+DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(PKCS7_ATTR_VERIFY)
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_NDEF_FUNCTION(PKCS7)
+DECLARE_ASN1_PRINT_FUNCTION(PKCS7)
+
+long PKCS7_ctrl(PKCS7 *p7, int cmd, long larg, char *parg);
+
+int PKCS7_set_type(PKCS7 *p7, int type);
+int PKCS7_set0_type_other(PKCS7 *p7, int type, ASN1_TYPE *other);
+int PKCS7_set_content(PKCS7 *p7, PKCS7 *p7_data);
+int PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_set(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *p7i, X509 *x509, EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+                          const EVP_MD *dgst);
+int PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_sign(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si);
+int PKCS7_add_signer(PKCS7 *p7, PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *p7i);
+int PKCS7_add_certificate(PKCS7 *p7, X509 *x509);
+int PKCS7_add_crl(PKCS7 *p7, X509_CRL *x509);
+int PKCS7_content_new(PKCS7 *p7, int nid);
+int PKCS7_dataVerify(X509_STORE *cert_store, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
+                     BIO *bio, PKCS7 *p7, PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si);
+int PKCS7_signatureVerify(BIO *bio, PKCS7 *p7, PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si,
+                          X509 *x509);
+
+BIO *PKCS7_dataInit(PKCS7 *p7, BIO *bio);
+int PKCS7_dataFinal(PKCS7 *p7, BIO *bio);
+BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKEY *pkey, BIO *in_bio, X509 *pcert);
+
+PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *PKCS7_add_signature(PKCS7 *p7, X509 *x509,
+                                       EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *dgst);
+X509 *PKCS7_cert_from_signer_info(PKCS7 *p7, PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si);
+int PKCS7_set_digest(PKCS7 *p7, const EVP_MD *md);
+STACK_OF(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO) *PKCS7_get_signer_info(PKCS7 *p7);
+
+PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *PKCS7_add_recipient(PKCS7 *p7, X509 *x509);
+void PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_get0_algs(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si, EVP_PKEY **pk,
+                                 X509_ALGOR **pdig, X509_ALGOR **psig);
+void PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_get0_alg(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri, X509_ALGOR **penc);
+int PKCS7_add_recipient_info(PKCS7 *p7, PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri);
+int PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_set(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *p7i, X509 *x509);
+int PKCS7_set_cipher(PKCS7 *p7, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher);
+int PKCS7_stream(unsigned char ***boundary, PKCS7 *p7);
+
+PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL *PKCS7_get_issuer_and_serial(PKCS7 *p7, int idx);
+ASN1_OCTET_STRING *PKCS7_digest_from_attributes(STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *sk);
+int PKCS7_add_signed_attribute(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *p7si, int nid, int type,
+                               void *data);
+int PKCS7_add_attribute(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *p7si, int nid, int atrtype,
+                        void *value);
+ASN1_TYPE *PKCS7_get_attribute(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si, int nid);
+ASN1_TYPE *PKCS7_get_signed_attribute(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si, int nid);
+int PKCS7_set_signed_attributes(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *p7si,
+                                STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *sk);
+int PKCS7_set_attributes(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *p7si,
+                         STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *sk);
+
+PKCS7 *PKCS7_sign(X509 *signcert, EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
+                  BIO *data, int flags);
+
+PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *PKCS7_sign_add_signer(PKCS7 *p7,
+                                         X509 *signcert, EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+                                         const EVP_MD *md, int flags);
+
+int PKCS7_final(PKCS7 *p7, BIO *data, int flags);
+int PKCS7_verify(PKCS7 *p7, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, X509_STORE *store,
+                 BIO *indata, BIO *out, int flags);
+STACK_OF(X509) *PKCS7_get0_signers(PKCS7 *p7, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
+                                   int flags);
+PKCS7 *PKCS7_encrypt(STACK_OF(X509) *certs, BIO *in, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
+                     int flags);
+int PKCS7_decrypt(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *cert, BIO *data,
+                  int flags);
+
+int PKCS7_add_attrib_smimecap(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si,
+                              STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) *cap);
+STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) *PKCS7_get_smimecap(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si);
+int PKCS7_simple_smimecap(STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) *sk, int nid, int arg);
+
+int PKCS7_add_attrib_content_type(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si, ASN1_OBJECT *coid);
+int PKCS7_add0_attrib_signing_time(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si, ASN1_TIME *t);
+int PKCS7_add1_attrib_digest(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si,
+                             const unsigned char *md, int mdlen);
+
+int SMIME_write_PKCS7(BIO *bio, PKCS7 *p7, BIO *data, int flags);
+PKCS7 *SMIME_read_PKCS7(BIO *bio, BIO **bcont);
+
+BIO *BIO_new_PKCS7(BIO *out, PKCS7 *p7);
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+/*
+ * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
+ * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
+ */
+
+int ERR_load_PKCS7_strings(void);
+
+/* Error codes for the PKCS7 functions. */
+
+/* Function codes. */
+# define PKCS7_F_DO_PKCS7_SIGNED_ATTRIB                   136
+# define PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ADD0_ATTRIB_SIGNING_TIME           135
+# define PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ADD_ATTRIB_SMIMECAP                118
+# define PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ADD_CERTIFICATE                    100
+# define PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ADD_CRL                            101
+# define PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ADD_RECIPIENT_INFO                 102
+# define PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ADD_SIGNATURE                      131
+# define PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ADD_SIGNER                         103
+# define PKCS7_F_PKCS7_BIO_ADD_DIGEST                     125
+# define PKCS7_F_PKCS7_COPY_EXISTING_DIGEST               138
+# define PKCS7_F_PKCS7_CTRL                               104
+# define PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE                         112
+# define PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL                          128
+# define PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAINIT                           105
+# define PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAVERIFY                         107
+# define PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DECRYPT                            114
+# define PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DECRYPT_RINFO                      133
+# define PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ENCODE_RINFO                       132
+# define PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ENCRYPT                            115
+# define PKCS7_F_PKCS7_FINAL                              134
+# define PKCS7_F_PKCS7_FIND_DIGEST                        127
+# define PKCS7_F_PKCS7_GET0_SIGNERS                       124
+# define PKCS7_F_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_SET                     130
+# define PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SET_CIPHER                         108
+# define PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SET_CONTENT                        109
+# define PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SET_DIGEST                         126
+# define PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SET_TYPE                           110
+# define PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGN                               116
+# define PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGNATUREVERIFY                    113
+# define PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_SET                    129
+# define PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_SIGN                   139
+# define PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGN_ADD_SIGNER                    137
+# define PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIMPLE_SMIMECAP                    119
+# define PKCS7_F_PKCS7_VERIFY                             117
+
+/* Reason codes. */
+# define PKCS7_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR                 117
+# define PKCS7_R_CIPHER_HAS_NO_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER          144
+# define PKCS7_R_CIPHER_NOT_INITIALIZED                   116
+# define PKCS7_R_CONTENT_AND_DATA_PRESENT                 118
+# define PKCS7_R_CTRL_ERROR                               152
+# define PKCS7_R_DECRYPT_ERROR                            119
+# define PKCS7_R_DIGEST_FAILURE                           101
+# define PKCS7_R_ENCRYPTION_CTRL_FAILURE                  149
+# define PKCS7_R_ENCRYPTION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEY_TYPE 150
+# define PKCS7_R_ERROR_ADDING_RECIPIENT                   120
+# define PKCS7_R_ERROR_SETTING_CIPHER                     121
+# define PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER                     143
+# define PKCS7_R_INVALID_SIGNED_DATA_TYPE                 155
+# define PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT                               122
+# define PKCS7_R_NO_DEFAULT_DIGEST                        151
+# define PKCS7_R_NO_MATCHING_DIGEST_TYPE_FOUND            154
+# define PKCS7_R_NO_RECIPIENT_MATCHES_CERTIFICATE         115
+# define PKCS7_R_NO_SIGNATURES_ON_DATA                    123
+# define PKCS7_R_NO_SIGNERS                               142
+# define PKCS7_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_ON_THIS_TYPE     104
+# define PKCS7_R_PKCS7_ADD_SIGNATURE_ERROR                124
+# define PKCS7_R_PKCS7_ADD_SIGNER_ERROR                   153
+# define PKCS7_R_PKCS7_DATASIGN                           145
+# define PKCS7_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DOES_NOT_MATCH_CERTIFICATE   127
+# define PKCS7_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE                        105
+# define PKCS7_R_SIGNER_CERTIFICATE_NOT_FOUND             128
+# define PKCS7_R_SIGNING_CTRL_FAILURE                     147
+# define PKCS7_R_SIGNING_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEY_TYPE  148
+# define PKCS7_R_SMIME_TEXT_ERROR                         129
+# define PKCS7_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_CERTIFICATE               106
+# define PKCS7_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_MEM_BIO                   107
+# define PKCS7_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_MESSAGE_DIGEST            108
+# define PKCS7_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST_TYPE                      109
+# define PKCS7_R_UNKNOWN_OPERATION                        110
+# define PKCS7_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER_TYPE                  111
+# define PKCS7_R_UNSUPPORTED_CONTENT_TYPE                 112
+# define PKCS7_R_WRONG_CONTENT_TYPE                       113
+# define PKCS7_R_WRONG_PKCS7_TYPE                         114
+
+# ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+# endif
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/rand.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/rand.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d521ae1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/rand.h
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_RAND_H
+# define HEADER_RAND_H
+
+# include <stdlib.h>
+# include <openssl/ossl_typ.h>
+# include <openssl/e_os2.h>
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/* Already defined in ossl_typ.h */
+/* typedef struct rand_meth_st RAND_METHOD; */
+
+struct rand_meth_st {
+    int (*seed) (const void *buf, int num);
+    int (*bytes) (unsigned char *buf, int num);
+    void (*cleanup) (void);
+    int (*add) (const void *buf, int num, double entropy);
+    int (*pseudorand) (unsigned char *buf, int num);
+    int (*status) (void);
+};
+
+# ifdef BN_DEBUG
+extern int rand_predictable;
+# endif
+
+int RAND_set_rand_method(const RAND_METHOD *meth);
+const RAND_METHOD *RAND_get_rand_method(void);
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+int RAND_set_rand_engine(ENGINE *engine);
+# endif
+RAND_METHOD *RAND_OpenSSL(void);
+#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+# define RAND_cleanup() while(0) continue
+#endif
+int RAND_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
+DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(int RAND_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num))
+void RAND_seed(const void *buf, int num);
+#if defined(__ANDROID__) && defined(__NDK_FPABI__)
+__NDK_FPABI__	/* __attribute__((pcs("aapcs"))) on ARM */
+#endif
+void RAND_add(const void *buf, int num, double entropy);
+int RAND_load_file(const char *file, long max_bytes);
+int RAND_write_file(const char *file);
+const char *RAND_file_name(char *file, size_t num);
+int RAND_status(void);
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EGD
+int RAND_query_egd_bytes(const char *path, unsigned char *buf, int bytes);
+int RAND_egd(const char *path);
+int RAND_egd_bytes(const char *path, int bytes);
+# endif
+int RAND_poll(void);
+
+#if defined(_WIN32) && (defined(BASETYPES) || defined(_WINDEF_H))
+/* application has to include <windows.h> in order to use these */
+DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(void RAND_screen(void))
+DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(int RAND_event(UINT, WPARAM, LPARAM))
+#endif
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+/*
+ * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
+ * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
+ */
+
+int ERR_load_RAND_strings(void);
+
+/* Error codes for the RAND functions. */
+
+/* Function codes. */
+# define RAND_F_RAND_BYTES                                100
+
+/* Reason codes. */
+# define RAND_R_PRNG_NOT_SEEDED                           100
+
+# ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+# endif
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/rc2.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/rc2.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..585f9e4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/rc2.h
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_RC2_H
+# define HEADER_RC2_H
+
+# include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC2
+# ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+# endif
+
+typedef unsigned int RC2_INT;
+
+# define RC2_ENCRYPT     1
+# define RC2_DECRYPT     0
+
+# define RC2_BLOCK       8
+# define RC2_KEY_LENGTH  16
+
+typedef struct rc2_key_st {
+    RC2_INT data[64];
+} RC2_KEY;
+
+void RC2_set_key(RC2_KEY *key, int len, const unsigned char *data, int bits);
+void RC2_ecb_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                     RC2_KEY *key, int enc);
+void RC2_encrypt(unsigned long *data, RC2_KEY *key);
+void RC2_decrypt(unsigned long *data, RC2_KEY *key);
+void RC2_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, long length,
+                     RC2_KEY *ks, unsigned char *iv, int enc);
+void RC2_cfb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                       long length, RC2_KEY *schedule, unsigned char *ivec,
+                       int *num, int enc);
+void RC2_ofb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                       long length, RC2_KEY *schedule, unsigned char *ivec,
+                       int *num);
+
+# ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+# endif
+# endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/rc4.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/rc4.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..86803b3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/rc4.h
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_RC4_H
+# define HEADER_RC4_H
+
+# include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
+# include <stddef.h>
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+typedef struct rc4_key_st {
+    RC4_INT x, y;
+    RC4_INT data[256];
+} RC4_KEY;
+
+const char *RC4_options(void);
+void RC4_set_key(RC4_KEY *key, int len, const unsigned char *data);
+void RC4(RC4_KEY *key, size_t len, const unsigned char *indata,
+         unsigned char *outdata);
+
+# ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+# endif
+# endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/rc5.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/rc5.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..793f88e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/rc5.h
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_RC5_H
+# define HEADER_RC5_H
+
+# include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC5
+# ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+# endif
+
+# define RC5_ENCRYPT     1
+# define RC5_DECRYPT     0
+
+# define RC5_32_INT unsigned int
+
+# define RC5_32_BLOCK            8
+# define RC5_32_KEY_LENGTH       16/* This is a default, max is 255 */
+
+/*
+ * This are the only values supported.  Tweak the code if you want more The
+ * most supported modes will be RC5-32/12/16 RC5-32/16/8
+ */
+# define RC5_8_ROUNDS    8
+# define RC5_12_ROUNDS   12
+# define RC5_16_ROUNDS   16
+
+typedef struct rc5_key_st {
+    /* Number of rounds */
+    int rounds;
+    RC5_32_INT data[2 * (RC5_16_ROUNDS + 1)];
+} RC5_32_KEY;
+
+void RC5_32_set_key(RC5_32_KEY *key, int len, const unsigned char *data,
+                    int rounds);
+void RC5_32_ecb_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                        RC5_32_KEY *key, int enc);
+void RC5_32_encrypt(unsigned long *data, RC5_32_KEY *key);
+void RC5_32_decrypt(unsigned long *data, RC5_32_KEY *key);
+void RC5_32_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                        long length, RC5_32_KEY *ks, unsigned char *iv,
+                        int enc);
+void RC5_32_cfb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                          long length, RC5_32_KEY *schedule,
+                          unsigned char *ivec, int *num, int enc);
+void RC5_32_ofb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                          long length, RC5_32_KEY *schedule,
+                          unsigned char *ivec, int *num);
+
+# ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+# endif
+# endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/ripemd.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/ripemd.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c42026a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/ripemd.h
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_RIPEMD_H
+# define HEADER_RIPEMD_H
+
+# include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RMD160
+# include <openssl/e_os2.h>
+# include <stddef.h>
+# ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+# endif
+
+# define RIPEMD160_LONG unsigned int
+
+# define RIPEMD160_CBLOCK        64
+# define RIPEMD160_LBLOCK        (RIPEMD160_CBLOCK/4)
+# define RIPEMD160_DIGEST_LENGTH 20
+
+typedef struct RIPEMD160state_st {
+    RIPEMD160_LONG A, B, C, D, E;
+    RIPEMD160_LONG Nl, Nh;
+    RIPEMD160_LONG data[RIPEMD160_LBLOCK];
+    unsigned int num;
+} RIPEMD160_CTX;
+
+int RIPEMD160_Init(RIPEMD160_CTX *c);
+int RIPEMD160_Update(RIPEMD160_CTX *c, const void *data, size_t len);
+int RIPEMD160_Final(unsigned char *md, RIPEMD160_CTX *c);
+unsigned char *RIPEMD160(const unsigned char *d, size_t n, unsigned char *md);
+void RIPEMD160_Transform(RIPEMD160_CTX *c, const unsigned char *b);
+
+# ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+# endif
+# endif
+
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/rsa.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/rsa.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d97d6e0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/rsa.h
@@ -0,0 +1,590 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_RSA_H
+# define HEADER_RSA_H
+
+# include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+# include <openssl/asn1.h>
+# include <openssl/bio.h>
+# include <openssl/crypto.h>
+# include <openssl/ossl_typ.h>
+# if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+#  include <openssl/bn.h>
+# endif
+# ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+# endif
+
+/* The types RSA and RSA_METHOD are defined in ossl_typ.h */
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS
+#  define OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS   16384
+# endif
+
+# define OPENSSL_RSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS 1024
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS
+#  define OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS 3072
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS
+
+/* exponent limit enforced for "large" modulus only */
+#  define OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS    64
+# endif
+
+# define RSA_3   0x3L
+# define RSA_F4  0x10001L
+
+# define RSA_METHOD_FLAG_NO_CHECK        0x0001/* don't check pub/private
+                                                * match */
+
+# define RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC           0x0002
+# define RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE          0x0004
+# define RSA_FLAG_BLINDING               0x0008
+# define RSA_FLAG_THREAD_SAFE            0x0010
+/*
+ * This flag means the private key operations will be handled by rsa_mod_exp
+ * and that they do not depend on the private key components being present:
+ * for example a key stored in external hardware. Without this flag
+ * bn_mod_exp gets called when private key components are absent.
+ */
+# define RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY               0x0020
+
+/*
+ * new with 0.9.6j and 0.9.7b; the built-in
+ * RSA implementation now uses blinding by
+ * default (ignoring RSA_FLAG_BLINDING),
+ * but other engines might not need it
+ */
+# define RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING            0x0080
+# if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+/*
+ * Does nothing. Previously this switched off constant time behaviour.
+ */
+#  define RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME           0x0000
+# endif
+# if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x00908000L
+/* deprecated name for the flag*/
+/*
+ * new with 0.9.7h; the built-in RSA
+ * implementation now uses constant time
+ * modular exponentiation for secret exponents
+ * by default. This flag causes the
+ * faster variable sliding window method to
+ * be used for all exponents.
+ */
+#  define RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME
+# endif
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, pad) \
+        EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PADDING, \
+                                pad, NULL)
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_padding(ctx, ppad) \
+        EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, -1, \
+                                EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PADDING, 0, ppad)
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(ctx, len) \
+        EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, \
+                                (EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN|EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY), \
+                                EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN, \
+                                len, NULL)
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_pss_saltlen(ctx, plen) \
+        EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, \
+                                (EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN|EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY), \
+                                EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN, \
+                                0, plen)
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_bits(ctx, bits) \
+        EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN, \
+                                EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_BITS, bits, NULL)
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_pubexp(ctx, pubexp) \
+        EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN, \
+                                EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_PUBEXP, 0, pubexp)
+
+# define  EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md(ctx, md)  \
+                EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, \
+                        EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT, \
+                                EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD, 0, (void *)md)
+
+# define  EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_oaep_md(ctx, md)  \
+                EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,  \
+                                EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_MD, 0, (void *)md)
+
+# define  EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_mgf1_md(ctx, pmd) \
+                EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, \
+                        EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT, \
+                                EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_MGF1_MD, 0, (void *)pmd)
+
+# define  EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_oaep_md(ctx, pmd) \
+                EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,  \
+                                EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_MD, 0, (void *)pmd)
+
+# define  EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_rsa_oaep_label(ctx, l, llen) \
+                EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,  \
+                                EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_LABEL, llen, (void *)l)
+
+# define  EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_rsa_oaep_label(ctx, l)       \
+                EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,  \
+                                EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_LABEL, 0, (void *)l)
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PADDING       (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 1)
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN   (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 2)
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_BITS   (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 3)
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_PUBEXP (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 4)
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD       (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 5)
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PADDING           (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 6)
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN       (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 7)
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_MGF1_MD           (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 8)
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_MD       (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 9)
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_LABEL    (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 10)
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_MD   (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 11)
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_LABEL (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 12)
+
+# define RSA_PKCS1_PADDING       1
+# define RSA_SSLV23_PADDING      2
+# define RSA_NO_PADDING          3
+# define RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING  4
+# define RSA_X931_PADDING        5
+/* EVP_PKEY_ only */
+# define RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING   6
+
+# define RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE  11
+
+# define RSA_set_app_data(s,arg)         RSA_set_ex_data(s,0,arg)
+# define RSA_get_app_data(s)             RSA_get_ex_data(s,0)
+
+RSA *RSA_new(void);
+RSA *RSA_new_method(ENGINE *engine);
+int RSA_bits(const RSA *rsa);
+int RSA_size(const RSA *rsa);
+int RSA_security_bits(const RSA *rsa);
+
+int RSA_set0_key(RSA *r, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *d);
+int RSA_set0_factors(RSA *r, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q);
+int RSA_set0_crt_params(RSA *r,BIGNUM *dmp1, BIGNUM *dmq1, BIGNUM *iqmp);
+void RSA_get0_key(const RSA *r,
+                  const BIGNUM **n, const BIGNUM **e, const BIGNUM **d);
+void RSA_get0_factors(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q);
+void RSA_get0_crt_params(const RSA *r,
+                         const BIGNUM **dmp1, const BIGNUM **dmq1,
+                         const BIGNUM **iqmp);
+void RSA_clear_flags(RSA *r, int flags);
+int RSA_test_flags(const RSA *r, int flags);
+void RSA_set_flags(RSA *r, int flags);
+ENGINE *RSA_get0_engine(const RSA *r);
+
+/* Deprecated version */
+DEPRECATEDIN_0_9_8(RSA *RSA_generate_key(int bits, unsigned long e, void
+                                         (*callback) (int, int, void *),
+                                         void *cb_arg))
+
+/* New version */
+int RSA_generate_key_ex(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e, BN_GENCB *cb);
+
+int RSA_X931_derive_ex(RSA *rsa, BIGNUM *p1, BIGNUM *p2, BIGNUM *q1,
+                       BIGNUM *q2, const BIGNUM *Xp1, const BIGNUM *Xp2,
+                       const BIGNUM *Xp, const BIGNUM *Xq1, const BIGNUM *Xq2,
+                       const BIGNUM *Xq, const BIGNUM *e, BN_GENCB *cb);
+int RSA_X931_generate_key_ex(RSA *rsa, int bits, const BIGNUM *e,
+                             BN_GENCB *cb);
+
+int RSA_check_key(const RSA *);
+int RSA_check_key_ex(const RSA *, BN_GENCB *cb);
+        /* next 4 return -1 on error */
+int RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+                       unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+int RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+                        unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+int RSA_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+                       unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+int RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+                        unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+void RSA_free(RSA *r);
+/* "up" the RSA object's reference count */
+int RSA_up_ref(RSA *r);
+
+int RSA_flags(const RSA *r);
+
+void RSA_set_default_method(const RSA_METHOD *meth);
+const RSA_METHOD *RSA_get_default_method(void);
+const RSA_METHOD *RSA_get_method(const RSA *rsa);
+int RSA_set_method(RSA *rsa, const RSA_METHOD *meth);
+
+/* these are the actual RSA functions */
+const RSA_METHOD *RSA_PKCS1_OpenSSL(void);
+
+const RSA_METHOD *RSA_null_method(void);
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const(RSA, RSAPublicKey)
+DECLARE_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const(RSA, RSAPrivateKey)
+
+typedef struct rsa_pss_params_st {
+    X509_ALGOR *hashAlgorithm;
+    X509_ALGOR *maskGenAlgorithm;
+    ASN1_INTEGER *saltLength;
+    ASN1_INTEGER *trailerField;
+} RSA_PSS_PARAMS;
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(RSA_PSS_PARAMS)
+
+typedef struct rsa_oaep_params_st {
+    X509_ALGOR *hashFunc;
+    X509_ALGOR *maskGenFunc;
+    X509_ALGOR *pSourceFunc;
+} RSA_OAEP_PARAMS;
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(RSA_OAEP_PARAMS)
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+int RSA_print_fp(FILE *fp, const RSA *r, int offset);
+# endif
+
+int RSA_print(BIO *bp, const RSA *r, int offset);
+
+/*
+ * The following 2 functions sign and verify a X509_SIG ASN1 object inside
+ * PKCS#1 padded RSA encryption
+ */
+int RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_length,
+             unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, RSA *rsa);
+int RSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_length,
+               const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, RSA *rsa);
+
+/*
+ * The following 2 function sign and verify a ASN1_OCTET_STRING object inside
+ * PKCS#1 padded RSA encryption
+ */
+int RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(int type,
+                               const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_length,
+                               unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen,
+                               RSA *rsa);
+int RSA_verify_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(int type, const unsigned char *m,
+                                 unsigned int m_length, unsigned char *sigbuf,
+                                 unsigned int siglen, RSA *rsa);
+
+int RSA_blinding_on(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx);
+void RSA_blinding_off(RSA *rsa);
+BN_BLINDING *RSA_setup_blinding(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+                                 const unsigned char *f, int fl);
+int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+                                   const unsigned char *f, int fl,
+                                   int rsa_len);
+int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+                                 const unsigned char *f, int fl);
+int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+                                   const unsigned char *f, int fl,
+                                   int rsa_len);
+int PKCS1_MGF1(unsigned char *mask, long len, const unsigned char *seed,
+               long seedlen, const EVP_MD *dgst);
+int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+                               const unsigned char *f, int fl,
+                               const unsigned char *p, int pl);
+int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+                                 const unsigned char *f, int fl, int rsa_len,
+                                 const unsigned char *p, int pl);
+int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+                                    const unsigned char *from, int flen,
+                                    const unsigned char *param, int plen,
+                                    const EVP_MD *md, const EVP_MD *mgf1md);
+int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+                                      const unsigned char *from, int flen,
+                                      int num, const unsigned char *param,
+                                      int plen, const EVP_MD *md,
+                                      const EVP_MD *mgf1md);
+int RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+                           const unsigned char *f, int fl);
+int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+                             const unsigned char *f, int fl, int rsa_len);
+int RSA_padding_add_none(unsigned char *to, int tlen, const unsigned char *f,
+                         int fl);
+int RSA_padding_check_none(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+                           const unsigned char *f, int fl, int rsa_len);
+int RSA_padding_add_X931(unsigned char *to, int tlen, const unsigned char *f,
+                         int fl);
+int RSA_padding_check_X931(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+                           const unsigned char *f, int fl, int rsa_len);
+int RSA_X931_hash_id(int nid);
+
+int RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS(RSA *rsa, const unsigned char *mHash,
+                         const EVP_MD *Hash, const unsigned char *EM,
+                         int sLen);
+int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS(RSA *rsa, unsigned char *EM,
+                              const unsigned char *mHash, const EVP_MD *Hash,
+                              int sLen);
+
+int RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(RSA *rsa, const unsigned char *mHash,
+                              const EVP_MD *Hash, const EVP_MD *mgf1Hash,
+                              const unsigned char *EM, int sLen);
+
+int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(RSA *rsa, unsigned char *EM,
+                                   const unsigned char *mHash,
+                                   const EVP_MD *Hash, const EVP_MD *mgf1Hash,
+                                   int sLen);
+
+#define RSA_get_ex_new_index(l, p, newf, dupf, freef) \
+    CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RSA, l, p, newf, dupf, freef)
+int RSA_set_ex_data(RSA *r, int idx, void *arg);
+void *RSA_get_ex_data(const RSA *r, int idx);
+
+RSA *RSAPublicKey_dup(RSA *rsa);
+RSA *RSAPrivateKey_dup(RSA *rsa);
+
+/*
+ * If this flag is set the RSA method is FIPS compliant and can be used in
+ * FIPS mode. This is set in the validated module method. If an application
+ * sets this flag in its own methods it is its responsibility to ensure the
+ * result is compliant.
+ */
+
+# define RSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD                    0x0400
+
+/*
+ * If this flag is set the operations normally disabled in FIPS mode are
+ * permitted it is then the applications responsibility to ensure that the
+ * usage is compliant.
+ */
+
+# define RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW                 0x0400
+/*
+ * Application has decided PRNG is good enough to generate a key: don't
+ * check.
+ */
+# define RSA_FLAG_CHECKED                        0x0800
+
+RSA_METHOD *RSA_meth_new(const char *name, int flags);
+void RSA_meth_free(RSA_METHOD *meth);
+RSA_METHOD *RSA_meth_dup(const RSA_METHOD *meth);
+const char *RSA_meth_get0_name(const RSA_METHOD *meth);
+int RSA_meth_set1_name(RSA_METHOD *meth, const char *name);
+int RSA_meth_get_flags(RSA_METHOD *meth);
+int RSA_meth_set_flags(RSA_METHOD *meth, int flags);
+void *RSA_meth_get0_app_data(const RSA_METHOD *meth);
+int RSA_meth_set0_app_data(RSA_METHOD *meth, void *app_data);
+int (*RSA_meth_get_pub_enc(const RSA_METHOD *meth))
+    (int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+     unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+int RSA_meth_set_pub_enc(RSA_METHOD *rsa,
+                         int (*pub_enc) (int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+                                         unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,
+                                         int padding));
+int (*RSA_meth_get_pub_dec(const RSA_METHOD *meth))
+    (int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+     unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+int RSA_meth_set_pub_dec(RSA_METHOD *rsa,
+                         int (*pub_dec) (int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+                                         unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,
+                                         int padding));
+int (*RSA_meth_get_priv_enc(const RSA_METHOD *meth))
+    (int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+     unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+int RSA_meth_set_priv_enc(RSA_METHOD *rsa,
+                          int (*priv_enc) (int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+                                           unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,
+                                           int padding));
+int (*RSA_meth_get_priv_dec(const RSA_METHOD *meth))
+    (int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+     unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+int RSA_meth_set_priv_dec(RSA_METHOD *rsa,
+                          int (*priv_dec) (int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+                                           unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,
+                                           int padding));
+int (*RSA_meth_get_mod_exp(const RSA_METHOD *meth))
+    (BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int RSA_meth_set_mod_exp(RSA_METHOD *rsa,
+                         int (*mod_exp) (BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa,
+                                         BN_CTX *ctx));
+int (*RSA_meth_get_bn_mod_exp(const RSA_METHOD *meth))
+    (BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
+     const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx);
+int RSA_meth_set_bn_mod_exp(RSA_METHOD *rsa,
+                            int (*bn_mod_exp) (BIGNUM *r,
+                                               const BIGNUM *a,
+                                               const BIGNUM *p,
+                                               const BIGNUM *m,
+                                               BN_CTX *ctx,
+                                               BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx));
+int (*RSA_meth_get_init(const RSA_METHOD *meth)) (RSA *rsa);
+int RSA_meth_set_init(RSA_METHOD *rsa, int (*init) (RSA *rsa));
+int (*RSA_meth_get_finish(const RSA_METHOD *meth)) (RSA *rsa);
+int RSA_meth_set_finish(RSA_METHOD *rsa, int (*finish) (RSA *rsa));
+int (*RSA_meth_get_sign(const RSA_METHOD *meth))
+    (int type,
+     const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_length,
+     unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen,
+     const RSA *rsa);
+int RSA_meth_set_sign(RSA_METHOD *rsa,
+                      int (*sign) (int type, const unsigned char *m,
+                                   unsigned int m_length,
+                                   unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen,
+                                   const RSA *rsa));
+int (*RSA_meth_get_verify(const RSA_METHOD *meth))
+    (int dtype, const unsigned char *m,
+     unsigned int m_length, const unsigned char *sigbuf,
+     unsigned int siglen, const RSA *rsa);
+int RSA_meth_set_verify(RSA_METHOD *rsa,
+                        int (*verify) (int dtype, const unsigned char *m,
+                                       unsigned int m_length,
+                                       const unsigned char *sigbuf,
+                                       unsigned int siglen, const RSA *rsa));
+int (*RSA_meth_get_keygen(const RSA_METHOD *meth))
+    (RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e, BN_GENCB *cb);
+int RSA_meth_set_keygen(RSA_METHOD *rsa,
+                        int (*keygen) (RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e,
+                                       BN_GENCB *cb));
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+/*
+ * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
+ * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
+ */
+
+int ERR_load_RSA_strings(void);
+
+/* Error codes for the RSA functions. */
+
+/* Function codes. */
+# define RSA_F_CHECK_PADDING_MD                           140
+# define RSA_F_ENCODE_PKCS1                               146
+# define RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY                             145
+# define RSA_F_OLD_RSA_PRIV_DECODE                        147
+# define RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL                              143
+# define RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL_STR                          144
+# define RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_SIGN                              142
+# define RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_VERIFY                            149
+# define RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_VERIFYRECOVER                     141
+# define RSA_F_RSA_ALGOR_TO_MD                            156
+# define RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN                         129
+# define RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY                              123
+# define RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX                           160
+# define RSA_F_RSA_CMS_DECRYPT                            159
+# define RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY                            148
+# define RSA_F_RSA_METH_DUP                               161
+# define RSA_F_RSA_METH_NEW                               162
+# define RSA_F_RSA_METH_SET1_NAME                         163
+# define RSA_F_RSA_MGF1_TO_MD                             157
+# define RSA_F_RSA_NEW_METHOD                             106
+# define RSA_F_RSA_NULL                                   124
+# define RSA_F_RSA_NULL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT                   132
+# define RSA_F_RSA_NULL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT                   133
+# define RSA_F_RSA_NULL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT                    134
+# define RSA_F_RSA_NULL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT                    135
+# define RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT                   101
+# define RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT                   102
+# define RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT                    103
+# define RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT                    104
+# define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_NONE                       107
+# define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP                 121
+# define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1            154
+# define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_PSS                  125
+# define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1             152
+# define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_TYPE_1               108
+# define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_TYPE_2               109
+# define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_SSLV23                     110
+# define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_X931                       127
+# define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_NONE                     111
+# define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP               122
+# define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1          153
+# define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1             112
+# define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2             113
+# define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23                   114
+# define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_X931                     128
+# define RSA_F_RSA_PRINT                                  115
+# define RSA_F_RSA_PRINT_FP                               116
+# define RSA_F_RSA_PRIV_ENCODE                            138
+# define RSA_F_RSA_PSS_TO_CTX                             155
+# define RSA_F_RSA_PUB_DECODE                             139
+# define RSA_F_RSA_SETUP_BLINDING                         136
+# define RSA_F_RSA_SIGN                                   117
+# define RSA_F_RSA_SIGN_ASN1_OCTET_STRING                 118
+# define RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY                                 119
+# define RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_ASN1_OCTET_STRING               120
+# define RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1                  126
+
+/* Reason codes. */
+# define RSA_R_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH                         100
+# define RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE                                101
+# define RSA_R_BAD_FIXED_HEADER_DECRYPT                   102
+# define RSA_R_BAD_PAD_BYTE_COUNT                         103
+# define RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE                              104
+# define RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_01                       106
+# define RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_02                       107
+# define RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN                  108
+# define RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE                             109
+# define RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE                110
+# define RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS                 132
+# define RSA_R_DATA_TOO_SMALL                             111
+# define RSA_R_DATA_TOO_SMALL_FOR_KEY_SIZE                122
+# define RSA_R_DIGEST_DOES_NOT_MATCH                      158
+# define RSA_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG_FOR_RSA_KEY                 112
+# define RSA_R_DMP1_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_D                    124
+# define RSA_R_DMQ1_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_D                    125
+# define RSA_R_D_E_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_1                     123
+# define RSA_R_FIRST_OCTET_INVALID                        133
+# define RSA_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE        144
+# define RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST                             157
+# define RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH                      143
+# define RSA_R_INVALID_HEADER                             137
+# define RSA_R_INVALID_LABEL                              160
+# define RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH                     131
+# define RSA_R_INVALID_MGF1_MD                            156
+# define RSA_R_INVALID_OAEP_PARAMETERS                    161
+# define RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING                            138
+# define RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE                       141
+# define RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_PARAMETERS                     149
+# define RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN                        146
+# define RSA_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH                        150
+# define RSA_R_INVALID_TRAILER                            139
+# define RSA_R_INVALID_X931_DIGEST                        142
+# define RSA_R_IQMP_NOT_INVERSE_OF_Q                      126
+# define RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL                         120
+# define RSA_R_LAST_OCTET_INVALID                         134
+# define RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE                          105
+# define RSA_R_NO_PUBLIC_EXPONENT                         140
+# define RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING                  113
+# define RSA_R_N_DOES_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q                       127
+# define RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR                        121
+# define RSA_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE   148
+# define RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED                       114
+# define RSA_R_PKCS_DECODING_ERROR                        159
+# define RSA_R_P_NOT_PRIME                                128
+# define RSA_R_Q_NOT_PRIME                                129
+# define RSA_R_RSA_OPERATIONS_NOT_SUPPORTED               130
+# define RSA_R_SLEN_CHECK_FAILED                          136
+# define RSA_R_SLEN_RECOVERY_FAILED                       135
+# define RSA_R_SSLV3_ROLLBACK_ATTACK                      115
+# define RSA_R_THE_ASN1_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER_IS_NOT_KNOWN_FOR_THIS_MD 116
+# define RSA_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE                     117
+# define RSA_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST                             166
+# define RSA_R_UNKNOWN_MASK_DIGEST                        151
+# define RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE                       118
+# define RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_ENCRYPTION_TYPE                162
+# define RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_LABEL_SOURCE                   163
+# define RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_MASK_ALGORITHM                 153
+# define RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_MASK_PARAMETER                 154
+# define RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_TYPE                 155
+# define RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING                              147
+# define RSA_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH                     119
+
+#  ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+#  endif
+# endif
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/safestack.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/safestack.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9fe733c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/safestack.h
@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_SAFESTACK_H
+# define HEADER_SAFESTACK_H
+
+# include <openssl/stack.h>
+# include <openssl/e_os2.h>
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+# define STACK_OF(type) struct stack_st_##type
+
+# define SKM_DEFINE_STACK_OF(t1, t2, t3) \
+    STACK_OF(t1); \
+    typedef int (*sk_##t1##_compfunc)(const t3 * const *a, const t3 *const *b); \
+    typedef void (*sk_##t1##_freefunc)(t3 *a); \
+    typedef t3 * (*sk_##t1##_copyfunc)(const t3 *a); \
+    static ossl_inline int sk_##t1##_num(const STACK_OF(t1) *sk) \
+    { \
+        return OPENSSL_sk_num((const OPENSSL_STACK *)sk); \
+    } \
+    static ossl_inline t2 *sk_##t1##_value(const STACK_OF(t1) *sk, int idx) \
+    { \
+        return (t2 *)OPENSSL_sk_value((const OPENSSL_STACK *)sk, idx); \
+    } \
+    static ossl_inline STACK_OF(t1) *sk_##t1##_new(sk_##t1##_compfunc compare) \
+    { \
+        return (STACK_OF(t1) *)OPENSSL_sk_new((OPENSSL_sk_compfunc)compare); \
+    } \
+    static ossl_inline STACK_OF(t1) *sk_##t1##_new_null(void) \
+    { \
+        return (STACK_OF(t1) *)OPENSSL_sk_new_null(); \
+    } \
+    static ossl_inline void sk_##t1##_free(STACK_OF(t1) *sk) \
+    { \
+        OPENSSL_sk_free((OPENSSL_STACK *)sk); \
+    } \
+    static ossl_inline void sk_##t1##_zero(STACK_OF(t1) *sk) \
+    { \
+        OPENSSL_sk_zero((OPENSSL_STACK *)sk); \
+    } \
+    static ossl_inline t2 *sk_##t1##_delete(STACK_OF(t1) *sk, int i) \
+    { \
+        return (t2 *)OPENSSL_sk_delete((OPENSSL_STACK *)sk, i); \
+    } \
+    static ossl_inline t2 *sk_##t1##_delete_ptr(STACK_OF(t1) *sk, t2 *ptr) \
+    { \
+        return (t2 *)OPENSSL_sk_delete_ptr((OPENSSL_STACK *)sk, \
+                                           (const void *)ptr); \
+    } \
+    static ossl_inline int sk_##t1##_push(STACK_OF(t1) *sk, t2 *ptr) \
+    { \
+        return OPENSSL_sk_push((OPENSSL_STACK *)sk, (const void *)ptr); \
+    } \
+    static ossl_inline int sk_##t1##_unshift(STACK_OF(t1) *sk, t2 *ptr) \
+    { \
+        return OPENSSL_sk_unshift((OPENSSL_STACK *)sk, (const void *)ptr); \
+    } \
+    static ossl_inline t2 *sk_##t1##_pop(STACK_OF(t1) *sk) \
+    { \
+        return (t2 *)OPENSSL_sk_pop((OPENSSL_STACK *)sk); \
+    } \
+    static ossl_inline t2 *sk_##t1##_shift(STACK_OF(t1) *sk) \
+    { \
+        return (t2 *)OPENSSL_sk_shift((OPENSSL_STACK *)sk); \
+    } \
+    static ossl_inline void sk_##t1##_pop_free(STACK_OF(t1) *sk, sk_##t1##_freefunc freefunc) \
+    { \
+        OPENSSL_sk_pop_free((OPENSSL_STACK *)sk, (OPENSSL_sk_freefunc)freefunc); \
+    } \
+    static ossl_inline int sk_##t1##_insert(STACK_OF(t1) *sk, t2 *ptr, int idx) \
+    { \
+        return OPENSSL_sk_insert((OPENSSL_STACK *)sk, (const void *)ptr, idx); \
+    } \
+    static ossl_inline t2 *sk_##t1##_set(STACK_OF(t1) *sk, int idx, t2 *ptr) \
+    { \
+        return (t2 *)OPENSSL_sk_set((OPENSSL_STACK *)sk, idx, (const void *)ptr); \
+    } \
+    static ossl_inline int sk_##t1##_find(STACK_OF(t1) *sk, t2 *ptr) \
+    { \
+        return OPENSSL_sk_find((OPENSSL_STACK *)sk, (const void *)ptr); \
+    } \
+    static ossl_inline int sk_##t1##_find_ex(STACK_OF(t1) *sk, t2 *ptr) \
+    { \
+        return OPENSSL_sk_find_ex((OPENSSL_STACK *)sk, (const void *)ptr); \
+    } \
+    static ossl_inline void sk_##t1##_sort(STACK_OF(t1) *sk) \
+    { \
+        OPENSSL_sk_sort((OPENSSL_STACK *)sk); \
+    } \
+    static ossl_inline int sk_##t1##_is_sorted(const STACK_OF(t1) *sk) \
+    { \
+        return OPENSSL_sk_is_sorted((const OPENSSL_STACK *)sk); \
+    } \
+    static ossl_inline STACK_OF(t1) * sk_##t1##_dup(const STACK_OF(t1) *sk) \
+    { \
+        return (STACK_OF(t1) *)OPENSSL_sk_dup((const OPENSSL_STACK *)sk); \
+    } \
+    static ossl_inline STACK_OF(t1) *sk_##t1##_deep_copy(const STACK_OF(t1) *sk, \
+                                                    sk_##t1##_copyfunc copyfunc, \
+                                                    sk_##t1##_freefunc freefunc) \
+    { \
+        return (STACK_OF(t1) *)OPENSSL_sk_deep_copy((const OPENSSL_STACK *)sk, \
+                                            (OPENSSL_sk_copyfunc)copyfunc, \
+                                            (OPENSSL_sk_freefunc)freefunc); \
+    } \
+    static ossl_inline sk_##t1##_compfunc sk_##t1##_set_cmp_func(STACK_OF(t1) *sk, sk_##t1##_compfunc compare) \
+    { \
+        return (sk_##t1##_compfunc)OPENSSL_sk_set_cmp_func((OPENSSL_STACK *)sk, (OPENSSL_sk_compfunc)compare); \
+    }
+
+# define DEFINE_SPECIAL_STACK_OF(t1, t2) SKM_DEFINE_STACK_OF(t1, t2, t2)
+# define DEFINE_STACK_OF(t) SKM_DEFINE_STACK_OF(t, t, t)
+# define DEFINE_SPECIAL_STACK_OF_CONST(t1, t2) \
+            SKM_DEFINE_STACK_OF(t1, const t2, t2)
+# define DEFINE_STACK_OF_CONST(t) SKM_DEFINE_STACK_OF(t, const t, t)
+
+/*-
+ * Strings are special: normally an lhash entry will point to a single
+ * (somewhat) mutable object. In the case of strings:
+ *
+ * a) Instead of a single char, there is an array of chars, NUL-terminated.
+ * b) The string may have be immutable.
+ *
+ * So, they need their own declarations. Especially important for
+ * type-checking tools, such as Deputy.
+ *
+ * In practice, however, it appears to be hard to have a const
+ * string. For now, I'm settling for dealing with the fact it is a
+ * string at all.
+ */
+typedef char *OPENSSL_STRING;
+typedef const char *OPENSSL_CSTRING;
+
+/*-
+ * Confusingly, LHASH_OF(STRING) deals with char ** throughout, but
+ * STACK_OF(STRING) is really more like STACK_OF(char), only, as mentioned
+ * above, instead of a single char each entry is a NUL-terminated array of
+ * chars. So, we have to implement STRING specially for STACK_OF. This is
+ * dealt with in the autogenerated macros below.
+ */
+DEFINE_SPECIAL_STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING, char)
+DEFINE_SPECIAL_STACK_OF_CONST(OPENSSL_CSTRING, char)
+
+/*
+ * Similarly, we sometimes use a block of characters, NOT nul-terminated.
+ * These should also be distinguished from "normal" stacks.
+ */
+typedef void *OPENSSL_BLOCK;
+DEFINE_SPECIAL_STACK_OF(OPENSSL_BLOCK, void)
+
+# ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+# endif
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/seed.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/seed.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..de10b08
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/seed.h
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2007-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2007 KISA(Korea Information Security Agency). All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Neither the name of author nor the names of its contributors may
+ *    be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_SEED_H
+# define HEADER_SEED_H
+
+# include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SEED
+# include <openssl/e_os2.h>
+# include <openssl/crypto.h>
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/* look whether we need 'long' to get 32 bits */
+# ifdef AES_LONG
+#  ifndef SEED_LONG
+#   define SEED_LONG 1
+#  endif
+# endif
+
+# include <sys/types.h>
+
+# define SEED_BLOCK_SIZE 16
+# define SEED_KEY_LENGTH 16
+
+typedef struct seed_key_st {
+# ifdef SEED_LONG
+    unsigned long data[32];
+# else
+    unsigned int data[32];
+# endif
+} SEED_KEY_SCHEDULE;
+
+void SEED_set_key(const unsigned char rawkey[SEED_KEY_LENGTH],
+                  SEED_KEY_SCHEDULE *ks);
+
+void SEED_encrypt(const unsigned char s[SEED_BLOCK_SIZE],
+                  unsigned char d[SEED_BLOCK_SIZE],
+                  const SEED_KEY_SCHEDULE *ks);
+void SEED_decrypt(const unsigned char s[SEED_BLOCK_SIZE],
+                  unsigned char d[SEED_BLOCK_SIZE],
+                  const SEED_KEY_SCHEDULE *ks);
+
+void SEED_ecb_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                      const SEED_KEY_SCHEDULE *ks, int enc);
+void SEED_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t len,
+                      const SEED_KEY_SCHEDULE *ks,
+                      unsigned char ivec[SEED_BLOCK_SIZE], int enc);
+void SEED_cfb128_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                         size_t len, const SEED_KEY_SCHEDULE *ks,
+                         unsigned char ivec[SEED_BLOCK_SIZE], int *num,
+                         int enc);
+void SEED_ofb128_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+                         size_t len, const SEED_KEY_SCHEDULE *ks,
+                         unsigned char ivec[SEED_BLOCK_SIZE], int *num);
+
+# ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+# endif
+# endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/sha.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/sha.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6a1eb0d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/sha.h
@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_SHA_H
+# define HEADER_SHA_H
+
+# include <openssl/e_os2.h>
+# include <stddef.h>
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/*-
+ * !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
+ * ! SHA_LONG has to be at least 32 bits wide.                    !
+ * !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
+ */
+# define SHA_LONG unsigned int
+
+# define SHA_LBLOCK      16
+# define SHA_CBLOCK      (SHA_LBLOCK*4)/* SHA treats input data as a
+                                        * contiguous array of 32 bit wide
+                                        * big-endian values. */
+# define SHA_LAST_BLOCK  (SHA_CBLOCK-8)
+# define SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH 20
+
+typedef struct SHAstate_st {
+    SHA_LONG h0, h1, h2, h3, h4;
+    SHA_LONG Nl, Nh;
+    SHA_LONG data[SHA_LBLOCK];
+    unsigned int num;
+} SHA_CTX;
+
+int SHA1_Init(SHA_CTX *c);
+int SHA1_Update(SHA_CTX *c, const void *data, size_t len);
+int SHA1_Final(unsigned char *md, SHA_CTX *c);
+unsigned char *SHA1(const unsigned char *d, size_t n, unsigned char *md);
+void SHA1_Transform(SHA_CTX *c, const unsigned char *data);
+
+# define SHA256_CBLOCK   (SHA_LBLOCK*4)/* SHA-256 treats input data as a
+                                        * contiguous array of 32 bit wide
+                                        * big-endian values. */
+
+typedef struct SHA256state_st {
+    SHA_LONG h[8];
+    SHA_LONG Nl, Nh;
+    SHA_LONG data[SHA_LBLOCK];
+    unsigned int num, md_len;
+} SHA256_CTX;
+
+int SHA224_Init(SHA256_CTX *c);
+int SHA224_Update(SHA256_CTX *c, const void *data, size_t len);
+int SHA224_Final(unsigned char *md, SHA256_CTX *c);
+unsigned char *SHA224(const unsigned char *d, size_t n, unsigned char *md);
+int SHA256_Init(SHA256_CTX *c);
+int SHA256_Update(SHA256_CTX *c, const void *data, size_t len);
+int SHA256_Final(unsigned char *md, SHA256_CTX *c);
+unsigned char *SHA256(const unsigned char *d, size_t n, unsigned char *md);
+void SHA256_Transform(SHA256_CTX *c, const unsigned char *data);
+
+# define SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH    28
+# define SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH    32
+# define SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH    48
+# define SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH    64
+
+/*
+ * Unlike 32-bit digest algorithms, SHA-512 *relies* on SHA_LONG64
+ * being exactly 64-bit wide. See Implementation Notes in sha512.c
+ * for further details.
+ */
+/*
+ * SHA-512 treats input data as a
+ * contiguous array of 64 bit
+ * wide big-endian values.
+ */
+# define SHA512_CBLOCK   (SHA_LBLOCK*8)
+# if (defined(_WIN32) || defined(_WIN64)) && !defined(__MINGW32__)
+#  define SHA_LONG64 unsigned __int64
+#  define U64(C)     C##UI64
+# elif defined(__arch64__)
+#  define SHA_LONG64 unsigned long
+#  define U64(C)     C##UL
+# else
+#  define SHA_LONG64 unsigned long long
+#  define U64(C)     C##ULL
+# endif
+
+typedef struct SHA512state_st {
+    SHA_LONG64 h[8];
+    SHA_LONG64 Nl, Nh;
+    union {
+        SHA_LONG64 d[SHA_LBLOCK];
+        unsigned char p[SHA512_CBLOCK];
+    } u;
+    unsigned int num, md_len;
+} SHA512_CTX;
+
+int SHA384_Init(SHA512_CTX *c);
+int SHA384_Update(SHA512_CTX *c, const void *data, size_t len);
+int SHA384_Final(unsigned char *md, SHA512_CTX *c);
+unsigned char *SHA384(const unsigned char *d, size_t n, unsigned char *md);
+int SHA512_Init(SHA512_CTX *c);
+int SHA512_Update(SHA512_CTX *c, const void *data, size_t len);
+int SHA512_Final(unsigned char *md, SHA512_CTX *c);
+unsigned char *SHA512(const unsigned char *d, size_t n, unsigned char *md);
+void SHA512_Transform(SHA512_CTX *c, const unsigned char *data);
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/srp.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/srp.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f2b6ec7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/srp.h
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_SRP_H
+# define HEADER_SRP_H
+
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+# include <stdio.h>
+# include <string.h>
+# include <openssl/safestack.h>
+# include <openssl/bn.h>
+# include <openssl/crypto.h>
+
+# ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+# endif
+
+typedef struct SRP_gN_cache_st {
+    char *b64_bn;
+    BIGNUM *bn;
+} SRP_gN_cache;
+
+
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(SRP_gN_cache)
+
+typedef struct SRP_user_pwd_st {
+    /* Owned by us. */
+    char *id;
+    BIGNUM *s;
+    BIGNUM *v;
+    /* Not owned by us. */
+    const BIGNUM *g;
+    const BIGNUM *N;
+    /* Owned by us. */
+    char *info;
+} SRP_user_pwd;
+
+void SRP_user_pwd_free(SRP_user_pwd *user_pwd);
+
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(SRP_user_pwd)
+
+typedef struct SRP_VBASE_st {
+    STACK_OF(SRP_user_pwd) *users_pwd;
+    STACK_OF(SRP_gN_cache) *gN_cache;
+/* to simulate a user */
+    char *seed_key;
+    const BIGNUM *default_g;
+    const BIGNUM *default_N;
+} SRP_VBASE;
+
+/*
+ * Internal structure storing N and g pair
+ */
+typedef struct SRP_gN_st {
+    char *id;
+    const BIGNUM *g;
+    const BIGNUM *N;
+} SRP_gN;
+
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(SRP_gN)
+
+SRP_VBASE *SRP_VBASE_new(char *seed_key);
+void SRP_VBASE_free(SRP_VBASE *vb);
+int SRP_VBASE_init(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *verifier_file);
+
+/* This method ignores the configured seed and fails for an unknown user. */
+DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(SRP_user_pwd *SRP_VBASE_get_by_user(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *username))
+/* NOTE: unlike in SRP_VBASE_get_by_user, caller owns the returned pointer.*/
+SRP_user_pwd *SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *username);
+
+char *SRP_create_verifier(const char *user, const char *pass, char **salt,
+                          char **verifier, const char *N, const char *g);
+int SRP_create_verifier_BN(const char *user, const char *pass, BIGNUM **salt,
+                           BIGNUM **verifier, const BIGNUM *N,
+                           const BIGNUM *g);
+
+# define SRP_NO_ERROR 0
+# define SRP_ERR_VBASE_INCOMPLETE_FILE 1
+# define SRP_ERR_VBASE_BN_LIB 2
+# define SRP_ERR_OPEN_FILE 3
+# define SRP_ERR_MEMORY 4
+
+# define DB_srptype      0
+# define DB_srpverifier  1
+# define DB_srpsalt      2
+# define DB_srpid        3
+# define DB_srpgN        4
+# define DB_srpinfo      5
+# undef  DB_NUMBER
+# define DB_NUMBER       6
+
+# define DB_SRP_INDEX    'I'
+# define DB_SRP_VALID    'V'
+# define DB_SRP_REVOKED  'R'
+# define DB_SRP_MODIF    'v'
+
+/* see srp.c */
+char *SRP_check_known_gN_param(const BIGNUM *g, const BIGNUM *N);
+SRP_gN *SRP_get_default_gN(const char *id);
+
+/* server side .... */
+BIGNUM *SRP_Calc_server_key(const BIGNUM *A, const BIGNUM *v, const BIGNUM *u,
+                            const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *N);
+BIGNUM *SRP_Calc_B(const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *N, const BIGNUM *g,
+                   const BIGNUM *v);
+int SRP_Verify_A_mod_N(const BIGNUM *A, const BIGNUM *N);
+BIGNUM *SRP_Calc_u(const BIGNUM *A, const BIGNUM *B, const BIGNUM *N);
+
+/* client side .... */
+BIGNUM *SRP_Calc_x(const BIGNUM *s, const char *user, const char *pass);
+BIGNUM *SRP_Calc_A(const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *N, const BIGNUM *g);
+BIGNUM *SRP_Calc_client_key(const BIGNUM *N, const BIGNUM *B, const BIGNUM *g,
+                            const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *u);
+int SRP_Verify_B_mod_N(const BIGNUM *B, const BIGNUM *N);
+
+# define SRP_MINIMAL_N 1024
+
+# ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+# endif
+# endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/srtp.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/srtp.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0b57c23
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/srtp.h
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * DTLS code by Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2006, Network Resonance, Inc. Copyright (C) 2011, RTFM, Inc.
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_D1_SRTP_H
+# define HEADER_D1_SRTP_H
+
+# include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+# define SRTP_AES128_CM_SHA1_80 0x0001
+# define SRTP_AES128_CM_SHA1_32 0x0002
+# define SRTP_AES128_F8_SHA1_80 0x0003
+# define SRTP_AES128_F8_SHA1_32 0x0004
+# define SRTP_NULL_SHA1_80      0x0005
+# define SRTP_NULL_SHA1_32      0x0006
+
+/* AEAD SRTP protection profiles from RFC 7714 */
+# define SRTP_AEAD_AES_128_GCM  0x0007
+# define SRTP_AEAD_AES_256_GCM  0x0008
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
+
+__owur int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_use_srtp(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *profiles);
+__owur int SSL_set_tlsext_use_srtp(SSL *ssl, const char *profiles);
+
+__owur STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *SSL_get_srtp_profiles(SSL *ssl);
+__owur SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile(SSL *s);
+
+# endif
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/ssl.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/ssl.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f070bd2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/ssl.h
@@ -0,0 +1,2567 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_SSL_H
+# define HEADER_SSL_H
+
+# include <openssl/e_os2.h>
+# include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+# include <openssl/comp.h>
+# include <openssl/bio.h>
+# if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+#  include <openssl/x509.h>
+#  include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#  include <openssl/lhash.h>
+#  include <openssl/buffer.h>
+# endif
+# include <openssl/pem.h>
+# include <openssl/hmac.h>
+# include <openssl/async.h>
+
+# include <openssl/safestack.h>
+# include <openssl/symhacks.h>
+# include <openssl/ct.h>
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/* OpenSSL version number for ASN.1 encoding of the session information */
+/*-
+ * Version 0 - initial version
+ * Version 1 - added the optional peer certificate
+ */
+# define SSL_SESSION_ASN1_VERSION 0x0001
+
+# define SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH           32
+# define SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH                  32
+
+# define SSL_MIN_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH_IN_BYTES     (512/8)
+# define SSL_MAX_KEY_ARG_LENGTH                  8
+# define SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH               48
+
+/* The maximum number of encrypt/decrypt pipelines we can support */
+# define SSL_MAX_PIPELINES  32
+
+/* text strings for the ciphers */
+
+/* These are used to specify which ciphers to use and not to use */
+
+# define SSL_TXT_LOW             "LOW"
+# define SSL_TXT_MEDIUM          "MEDIUM"
+# define SSL_TXT_HIGH            "HIGH"
+# define SSL_TXT_FIPS            "FIPS"
+
+# define SSL_TXT_aNULL           "aNULL"
+# define SSL_TXT_eNULL           "eNULL"
+# define SSL_TXT_NULL            "NULL"
+
+# define SSL_TXT_kRSA            "kRSA"
+# define SSL_TXT_kDHr            "kDHr"/* this cipher class has been removed */
+# define SSL_TXT_kDHd            "kDHd"/* this cipher class has been removed */
+# define SSL_TXT_kDH             "kDH"/* this cipher class has been removed */
+# define SSL_TXT_kEDH            "kEDH"/* alias for kDHE */
+# define SSL_TXT_kDHE            "kDHE"
+# define SSL_TXT_kECDHr          "kECDHr"/* this cipher class has been removed */
+# define SSL_TXT_kECDHe          "kECDHe"/* this cipher class has been removed */
+# define SSL_TXT_kECDH           "kECDH"/* this cipher class has been removed */
+# define SSL_TXT_kEECDH          "kEECDH"/* alias for kECDHE */
+# define SSL_TXT_kECDHE          "kECDHE"
+# define SSL_TXT_kPSK            "kPSK"
+# define SSL_TXT_kRSAPSK         "kRSAPSK"
+# define SSL_TXT_kECDHEPSK       "kECDHEPSK"
+# define SSL_TXT_kDHEPSK         "kDHEPSK"
+# define SSL_TXT_kGOST           "kGOST"
+# define SSL_TXT_kSRP            "kSRP"
+
+# define SSL_TXT_aRSA            "aRSA"
+# define SSL_TXT_aDSS            "aDSS"
+# define SSL_TXT_aDH             "aDH"/* this cipher class has been removed */
+# define SSL_TXT_aECDH           "aECDH"/* this cipher class has been removed */
+# define SSL_TXT_aECDSA          "aECDSA"
+# define SSL_TXT_aPSK            "aPSK"
+# define SSL_TXT_aGOST94         "aGOST94"
+# define SSL_TXT_aGOST01         "aGOST01"
+# define SSL_TXT_aGOST12         "aGOST12"
+# define SSL_TXT_aGOST           "aGOST"
+# define SSL_TXT_aSRP            "aSRP"
+
+# define SSL_TXT_DSS             "DSS"
+# define SSL_TXT_DH              "DH"
+# define SSL_TXT_DHE             "DHE"/* same as "kDHE:-ADH" */
+# define SSL_TXT_EDH             "EDH"/* alias for DHE */
+# define SSL_TXT_ADH             "ADH"
+# define SSL_TXT_RSA             "RSA"
+# define SSL_TXT_ECDH            "ECDH"
+# define SSL_TXT_EECDH           "EECDH"/* alias for ECDHE" */
+# define SSL_TXT_ECDHE           "ECDHE"/* same as "kECDHE:-AECDH" */
+# define SSL_TXT_AECDH           "AECDH"
+# define SSL_TXT_ECDSA           "ECDSA"
+# define SSL_TXT_PSK             "PSK"
+# define SSL_TXT_SRP             "SRP"
+
+# define SSL_TXT_DES             "DES"
+# define SSL_TXT_3DES            "3DES"
+# define SSL_TXT_RC4             "RC4"
+# define SSL_TXT_RC2             "RC2"
+# define SSL_TXT_IDEA            "IDEA"
+# define SSL_TXT_SEED            "SEED"
+# define SSL_TXT_AES128          "AES128"
+# define SSL_TXT_AES256          "AES256"
+# define SSL_TXT_AES             "AES"
+# define SSL_TXT_AES_GCM         "AESGCM"
+# define SSL_TXT_AES_CCM         "AESCCM"
+# define SSL_TXT_AES_CCM_8       "AESCCM8"
+# define SSL_TXT_CAMELLIA128     "CAMELLIA128"
+# define SSL_TXT_CAMELLIA256     "CAMELLIA256"
+# define SSL_TXT_CAMELLIA        "CAMELLIA"
+# define SSL_TXT_CHACHA20        "CHACHA20"
+# define SSL_TXT_GOST            "GOST89"
+
+# define SSL_TXT_MD5             "MD5"
+# define SSL_TXT_SHA1            "SHA1"
+# define SSL_TXT_SHA             "SHA"/* same as "SHA1" */
+# define SSL_TXT_GOST94          "GOST94"
+# define SSL_TXT_GOST89MAC       "GOST89MAC"
+# define SSL_TXT_GOST12          "GOST12"
+# define SSL_TXT_GOST89MAC12     "GOST89MAC12"
+# define SSL_TXT_SHA256          "SHA256"
+# define SSL_TXT_SHA384          "SHA384"
+
+# define SSL_TXT_SSLV3           "SSLv3"
+# define SSL_TXT_TLSV1           "TLSv1"
+# define SSL_TXT_TLSV1_1         "TLSv1.1"
+# define SSL_TXT_TLSV1_2         "TLSv1.2"
+
+# define SSL_TXT_ALL             "ALL"
+
+/*-
+ * COMPLEMENTOF* definitions. These identifiers are used to (de-select)
+ * ciphers normally not being used.
+ * Example: "RC4" will activate all ciphers using RC4 including ciphers
+ * without authentication, which would normally disabled by DEFAULT (due
+ * the "!ADH" being part of default). Therefore "RC4:!COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT"
+ * will make sure that it is also disabled in the specific selection.
+ * COMPLEMENTOF* identifiers are portable between version, as adjustments
+ * to the default cipher setup will also be included here.
+ *
+ * COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT does not experience the same special treatment that
+ * DEFAULT gets, as only selection is being done and no sorting as needed
+ * for DEFAULT.
+ */
+# define SSL_TXT_CMPALL          "COMPLEMENTOFALL"
+# define SSL_TXT_CMPDEF          "COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT"
+
+/*
+ * The following cipher list is used by default. It also is substituted when
+ * an application-defined cipher list string starts with 'DEFAULT'.
+ */
+# define SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST "ALL:!COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT:!eNULL"
+/*
+ * As of OpenSSL 1.0.0, ssl_create_cipher_list() in ssl/ssl_ciph.c always
+ * starts with a reasonable order, and all we have to do for DEFAULT is
+ * throwing out anonymous and unencrypted ciphersuites! (The latter are not
+ * actually enabled by ALL, but "ALL:RSA" would enable some of them.)
+ */
+
+/* Used in SSL_set_shutdown()/SSL_get_shutdown(); */
+# define SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN       1
+# define SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN   2
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+# define SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1       X509_FILETYPE_ASN1
+# define SSL_FILETYPE_PEM        X509_FILETYPE_PEM
+
+/*
+ * This is needed to stop compilers complaining about the 'struct ssl_st *'
+ * function parameters used to prototype callbacks in SSL_CTX.
+ */
+typedef struct ssl_st *ssl_crock_st;
+typedef struct tls_session_ticket_ext_st TLS_SESSION_TICKET_EXT;
+typedef struct ssl_method_st SSL_METHOD;
+typedef struct ssl_cipher_st SSL_CIPHER;
+typedef struct ssl_session_st SSL_SESSION;
+typedef struct tls_sigalgs_st TLS_SIGALGS;
+typedef struct ssl_conf_ctx_st SSL_CONF_CTX;
+typedef struct ssl_comp_st SSL_COMP;
+
+STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER);
+STACK_OF(SSL_COMP);
+
+/* SRTP protection profiles for use with the use_srtp extension (RFC 5764)*/
+typedef struct srtp_protection_profile_st {
+    const char *name;
+    unsigned long id;
+} SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE;
+
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE)
+
+typedef int (*tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_fn) (SSL *s,
+                                             const unsigned char *data,
+                                             int len, void *arg);
+typedef int (*tls_session_secret_cb_fn) (SSL *s, void *secret,
+                                         int *secret_len,
+                                         STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *peer_ciphers,
+                                         const SSL_CIPHER **cipher, void *arg);
+
+/* Typedefs for handling custom extensions */
+
+typedef int (*custom_ext_add_cb) (SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type,
+                                  const unsigned char **out,
+                                  size_t *outlen, int *al, void *add_arg);
+
+typedef void (*custom_ext_free_cb) (SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type,
+                                    const unsigned char *out, void *add_arg);
+
+typedef int (*custom_ext_parse_cb) (SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type,
+                                    const unsigned char *in,
+                                    size_t inlen, int *al, void *parse_arg);
+
+/* Typedef for verification callback */
+typedef int (*SSL_verify_cb)(int preverify_ok, X509_STORE_CTX *x509_ctx);
+
+/* Allow initial connection to servers that don't support RI */
+# define SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT                    0x00000004U
+# define SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING                           0x00000010U
+# define SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG                   0x00000040U
+
+/*
+ * Disable SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 CBC vulnerability workaround that was added in
+ * OpenSSL 0.9.6d.  Usually (depending on the application protocol) the
+ * workaround is not needed.  Unfortunately some broken SSL/TLS
+ * implementations cannot handle it at all, which is why we include it in
+ * SSL_OP_ALL. Added in 0.9.6e
+ */
+# define SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS              0x00000800U
+
+/* DTLS options */
+# define SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU                             0x00001000U
+/* Turn on Cookie Exchange (on relevant for servers) */
+# define SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE                          0x00002000U
+/* Don't use RFC4507 ticket extension */
+# define SSL_OP_NO_TICKET                                0x00004000U
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_METHOD
+/* Use Cisco's "speshul" version of DTLS_BAD_VER
+ * (only with deprecated DTLSv1_client_method())  */
+#  define SSL_OP_CISCO_ANYCONNECT                        0x00008000U
+# endif
+
+/* As server, disallow session resumption on renegotiation */
+# define SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION   0x00010000U
+/* Don't use compression even if supported */
+# define SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION                           0x00020000U
+/* Permit unsafe legacy renegotiation */
+# define SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION        0x00040000U
+/* Disable encrypt-then-mac */
+# define SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC                      0x00080000U
+/*
+ * Set on servers to choose the cipher according to the server's preferences
+ */
+# define SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE                 0x00400000U
+/*
+ * If set, a server will allow a client to issue a SSLv3.0 version number as
+ * latest version supported in the premaster secret, even when TLSv1.0
+ * (version 3.1) was announced in the client hello. Normally this is
+ * forbidden to prevent version rollback attacks.
+ */
+# define SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG                         0x00800000U
+
+# define SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3                                 0x02000000U
+# define SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1                                 0x04000000U
+# define SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2                               0x08000000U
+# define SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1                               0x10000000U
+
+# define SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1                                0x04000000U
+# define SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2                              0x08000000U
+
+# define SSL_OP_NO_SSL_MASK (SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3|\
+        SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1|SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1|SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2)
+# define SSL_OP_NO_DTLS_MASK (SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1|SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2)
+
+/* Disallow all renegotiation */
+# define SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION                         0x40000000U
+
+/*
+ * Make server add server-hello extension from early version of cryptopro
+ * draft, when GOST ciphersuite is negotiated. Required for interoperability
+ * with CryptoPro CSP 3.x
+ */
+# define SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG                     0x80000000U
+
+/*
+ * SSL_OP_ALL: various bug workarounds that should be rather harmless.
+ * This used to be 0x000FFFFFL before 0.9.7.
+ * This used to be 0x80000BFFU before 1.1.1.
+ */
+# define SSL_OP_ALL        (SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG|\
+                            SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS|\
+                            SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT|\
+                            SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING|\
+                            SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
+
+/* OBSOLETE OPTIONS: retained for compatibility */
+
+/* Removed from OpenSSL 1.1.0. Was 0x00000001L */
+/* Related to removed SSLv2. */
+# define SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_SESS_ID_BUG                    0x0
+/* Removed from OpenSSL 1.1.0. Was 0x00000002L */
+/* Related to removed SSLv2. */
+# define SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CHALLENGE_BUG                   0x0
+/* Removed from OpenSSL 0.9.8q and 1.0.0c. Was 0x00000008L */
+/* Dead forever, see CVE-2010-4180 */
+# define SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG         0x0
+/* Removed from OpenSSL 1.0.1h and 1.0.2. Was 0x00000010L */
+/* Refers to ancient SSLREF and SSLv2. */
+# define SSL_OP_SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG              0x0
+/* Removed from OpenSSL 1.1.0. Was 0x00000020 */
+# define SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER               0x0
+/* Removed from OpenSSL 0.9.7h and 0.9.8b. Was 0x00000040L */
+# define SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING                   0x0
+/* Removed from OpenSSL 1.1.0. Was 0x00000080 */
+/* Ancient SSLeay version. */
+# define SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG                 0x0
+/* Removed from OpenSSL 1.1.0. Was 0x00000100L */
+# define SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG                               0x0
+/* Removed from OpenSSL 1.1.0. Was 0x00000200L */
+# define SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG                    0x0
+/* Removed from OpenSSL 1.1.0. Was 0x00080000L */
+# define SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE                          0x0
+/* Removed from OpenSSL 1.1.0. Was 0x00100000L */
+# define SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE                            0x0
+/* Removed from OpenSSL 1.0.1k and 1.0.2. Was 0x00200000L */
+# define SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA                            0x0
+/* Removed from OpenSSL 1.1.0. Was 0x01000000L */
+# define SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2                                 0x0
+/* Removed from OpenSSL 1.0.1. Was 0x08000000L */
+# define SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1                            0x0
+/* Removed from OpenSSL 1.0.1. Was 0x10000000L */
+# define SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2                            0x0
+/* Removed from OpenSSL 1.1.0. Was 0x20000000L */ 
+# define SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG                       0x0
+/* Removed from OpenSSL 1.1.0. Was 0x40000000L */
+# define SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG          0x0
+
+/*
+ * Allow SSL_write(..., n) to return r with 0 < r < n (i.e. report success
+ * when just a single record has been written):
+ */
+# define SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE       0x00000001U
+/*
+ * Make it possible to retry SSL_write() with changed buffer location (buffer
+ * contents must stay the same!); this is not the default to avoid the
+ * misconception that non-blocking SSL_write() behaves like non-blocking
+ * write():
+ */
+# define SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER 0x00000002U
+/*
+ * Never bother the application with retries if the transport is blocking:
+ */
+# define SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY 0x00000004U
+/* Don't attempt to automatically build certificate chain */
+# define SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN 0x00000008U
+/*
+ * Save RAM by releasing read and write buffers when they're empty. (SSL3 and
+ * TLS only.) "Released" buffers are put onto a free-list in the context or
+ * just freed (depending on the context's setting for freelist_max_len).
+ */
+# define SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS 0x00000010U
+/*
+ * Send the current time in the Random fields of the ClientHello and
+ * ServerHello records for compatibility with hypothetical implementations
+ * that require it.
+ */
+# define SSL_MODE_SEND_CLIENTHELLO_TIME 0x00000020U
+# define SSL_MODE_SEND_SERVERHELLO_TIME 0x00000040U
+/*
+ * Send TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV in the ClientHello. To be set only by applications
+ * that reconnect with a downgraded protocol version; see
+ * draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00 for details. DO NOT ENABLE THIS if your
+ * application attempts a normal handshake. Only use this in explicit
+ * fallback retries, following the guidance in
+ * draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00.
+ */
+# define SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV 0x00000080U
+/*
+ * Support Asynchronous operation
+ */
+# define SSL_MODE_ASYNC 0x00000100U
+
+/* Cert related flags */
+/*
+ * Many implementations ignore some aspects of the TLS standards such as
+ * enforcing certificate chain algorithms. When this is set we enforce them.
+ */
+# define SSL_CERT_FLAG_TLS_STRICT                0x00000001U
+
+/* Suite B modes, takes same values as certificate verify flags */
+# define SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY       0x10000
+/* Suite B 192 bit only mode */
+# define SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS            0x20000
+/* Suite B 128 bit mode allowing 192 bit algorithms */
+# define SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS            0x30000
+
+/* Perform all sorts of protocol violations for testing purposes */
+# define SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL           0x10000000
+
+/* Flags for building certificate chains */
+/* Treat any existing certificates as untrusted CAs */
+# define SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_UNTRUSTED          0x1
+/* Don't include root CA in chain */
+# define SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_NO_ROOT            0x2
+/* Just check certificates already there */
+# define SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_CHECK              0x4
+/* Ignore verification errors */
+# define SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_IGNORE_ERROR       0x8
+/* Clear verification errors from queue */
+# define SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_CLEAR_ERROR        0x10
+
+/* Flags returned by SSL_check_chain */
+/* Certificate can be used with this session */
+# define CERT_PKEY_VALID         0x1
+/* Certificate can also be used for signing */
+# define CERT_PKEY_SIGN          0x2
+/* EE certificate signing algorithm OK */
+# define CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE  0x10
+/* CA signature algorithms OK */
+# define CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE  0x20
+/* EE certificate parameters OK */
+# define CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM      0x40
+/* CA certificate parameters OK */
+# define CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM      0x80
+/* Signing explicitly allowed as opposed to SHA1 fallback */
+# define CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN 0x100
+/* Client CA issuer names match (always set for server cert) */
+# define CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME   0x200
+/* Cert type matches client types (always set for server cert) */
+# define CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE     0x400
+/* Cert chain suitable to Suite B */
+# define CERT_PKEY_SUITEB        0x800
+
+# define SSL_CONF_FLAG_CMDLINE           0x1
+# define SSL_CONF_FLAG_FILE              0x2
+# define SSL_CONF_FLAG_CLIENT            0x4
+# define SSL_CONF_FLAG_SERVER            0x8
+# define SSL_CONF_FLAG_SHOW_ERRORS       0x10
+# define SSL_CONF_FLAG_CERTIFICATE       0x20
+# define SSL_CONF_FLAG_REQUIRE_PRIVATE   0x40
+/* Configuration value types */
+# define SSL_CONF_TYPE_UNKNOWN           0x0
+# define SSL_CONF_TYPE_STRING            0x1
+# define SSL_CONF_TYPE_FILE              0x2
+# define SSL_CONF_TYPE_DIR               0x3
+# define SSL_CONF_TYPE_NONE              0x4
+
+/*
+ * Note: SSL[_CTX]_set_{options,mode} use |= op on the previous value, they
+ * cannot be used to clear bits.
+ */
+
+unsigned long SSL_CTX_get_options(const SSL_CTX *ctx);
+unsigned long SSL_get_options(const SSL* s);
+unsigned long SSL_CTX_clear_options(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned long op);
+unsigned long SSL_clear_options(SSL *s, unsigned long op);
+unsigned long SSL_CTX_set_options(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned long op);
+unsigned long SSL_set_options(SSL *s, unsigned long op);
+
+# define SSL_CTX_set_mode(ctx,op) \
+        SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_MODE,(op),NULL)
+# define SSL_CTX_clear_mode(ctx,op) \
+        SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE,(op),NULL)
+# define SSL_CTX_get_mode(ctx) \
+        SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_MODE,0,NULL)
+# define SSL_clear_mode(ssl,op) \
+        SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE,(op),NULL)
+# define SSL_set_mode(ssl,op) \
+        SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_MODE,(op),NULL)
+# define SSL_get_mode(ssl) \
+        SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_MODE,0,NULL)
+# define SSL_set_mtu(ssl, mtu) \
+        SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_SET_MTU,(mtu),NULL)
+# define DTLS_set_link_mtu(ssl, mtu) \
+        SSL_ctrl((ssl),DTLS_CTRL_SET_LINK_MTU,(mtu),NULL)
+# define DTLS_get_link_min_mtu(ssl) \
+        SSL_ctrl((ssl),DTLS_CTRL_GET_LINK_MIN_MTU,0,NULL)
+
+# define SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support(ssl) \
+        SSL_ctrl((ssl), SSL_CTRL_GET_RI_SUPPORT, 0, NULL)
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+#  define SSL_heartbeat(ssl) \
+        SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_DTLS_EXT_SEND_HEARTBEAT,0,NULL)
+# endif
+
+# define SSL_CTX_set_cert_flags(ctx,op) \
+        SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_CERT_FLAGS,(op),NULL)
+# define SSL_set_cert_flags(s,op) \
+        SSL_ctrl((s),SSL_CTRL_CERT_FLAGS,(op),NULL)
+# define SSL_CTX_clear_cert_flags(ctx,op) \
+        SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_CERT_FLAGS,(op),NULL)
+# define SSL_clear_cert_flags(s,op) \
+        SSL_ctrl((s),SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_CERT_FLAGS,(op),NULL)
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                              void (*cb) (int write_p, int version,
+                                          int content_type, const void *buf,
+                                          size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg));
+void SSL_set_msg_callback(SSL *ssl,
+                          void (*cb) (int write_p, int version,
+                                      int content_type, const void *buf,
+                                      size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg));
+# define SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback_arg(ctx, arg) SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx), SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG, 0, (arg))
+# define SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(ssl, arg) SSL_ctrl((ssl), SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG, 0, (arg))
+
+# define SSL_get_extms_support(s) \
+        SSL_ctrl((s),SSL_CTRL_GET_EXTMS_SUPPORT,0,NULL)
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+
+/* see tls_srp.c */
+__owur int SSL_SRP_CTX_init(SSL *s);
+__owur int SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_init(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+int SSL_SRP_CTX_free(SSL *ctx);
+int SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+__owur int SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(SSL *s, int *ad);
+__owur int SRP_Calc_A_param(SSL *s);
+
+# endif
+
+/* 100k max cert list */
+# define SSL_MAX_CERT_LIST_DEFAULT 1024*100
+
+# define SSL_SESSION_CACHE_MAX_SIZE_DEFAULT      (1024*20)
+
+/*
+ * This callback type is used inside SSL_CTX, SSL, and in the functions that
+ * set them. It is used to override the generation of SSL/TLS session IDs in
+ * a server. Return value should be zero on an error, non-zero to proceed.
+ * Also, callbacks should themselves check if the id they generate is unique
+ * otherwise the SSL handshake will fail with an error - callbacks can do
+ * this using the 'ssl' value they're passed by;
+ * SSL_has_matching_session_id(ssl, id, *id_len) The length value passed in
+ * is set at the maximum size the session ID can be. In SSLv3/TLSv1 it is 32
+ * bytes. The callback can alter this length to be less if desired. It is
+ * also an error for the callback to set the size to zero.
+ */
+typedef int (*GEN_SESSION_CB) (const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *id,
+                               unsigned int *id_len);
+
+# define SSL_SESS_CACHE_OFF                      0x0000
+# define SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT                   0x0001
+# define SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER                   0x0002
+# define SSL_SESS_CACHE_BOTH     (SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT|SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
+# define SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR            0x0080
+/* enough comments already ... see SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(3) */
+# define SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP       0x0100
+# define SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE        0x0200
+# define SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL \
+        (SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP|SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE)
+
+LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION) *SSL_CTX_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+# define SSL_CTX_sess_number(ctx) \
+        SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_NUMBER,0,NULL)
+# define SSL_CTX_sess_connect(ctx) \
+        SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT,0,NULL)
+# define SSL_CTX_sess_connect_good(ctx) \
+        SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_GOOD,0,NULL)
+# define SSL_CTX_sess_connect_renegotiate(ctx) \
+        SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_RENEGOTIATE,0,NULL)
+# define SSL_CTX_sess_accept(ctx) \
+        SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT,0,NULL)
+# define SSL_CTX_sess_accept_renegotiate(ctx) \
+        SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_RENEGOTIATE,0,NULL)
+# define SSL_CTX_sess_accept_good(ctx) \
+        SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_GOOD,0,NULL)
+# define SSL_CTX_sess_hits(ctx) \
+        SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_HIT,0,NULL)
+# define SSL_CTX_sess_cb_hits(ctx) \
+        SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_CB_HIT,0,NULL)
+# define SSL_CTX_sess_misses(ctx) \
+        SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_MISSES,0,NULL)
+# define SSL_CTX_sess_timeouts(ctx) \
+        SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_TIMEOUTS,0,NULL)
+# define SSL_CTX_sess_cache_full(ctx) \
+        SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_CACHE_FULL,0,NULL)
+
+void SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                             int (*new_session_cb) (struct ssl_st *ssl,
+                                                    SSL_SESSION *sess));
+int (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (struct ssl_st *ssl,
+                                              SSL_SESSION *sess);
+void SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                void (*remove_session_cb) (struct ssl_ctx_st
+                                                           *ctx,
+                                                           SSL_SESSION
+                                                           *sess));
+void (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (struct ssl_ctx_st *ctx,
+                                                  SSL_SESSION *sess);
+void SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                             SSL_SESSION *(*get_session_cb) (struct ssl_st
+                                                             *ssl,
+                                                             const unsigned char
+                                                             *data, int len,
+                                                             int *copy));
+SSL_SESSION *(*SSL_CTX_sess_get_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (struct ssl_st *ssl,
+                                                       const unsigned char *data,
+                                                       int len, int *copy);
+void SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                               void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type,
+                                           int val));
+void (*SSL_CTX_get_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (const SSL *ssl, int type,
+                                                 int val);
+void SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                int (*client_cert_cb) (SSL *ssl, X509 **x509,
+                                                       EVP_PKEY **pkey));
+int (*SSL_CTX_get_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (SSL *ssl, X509 **x509,
+                                                 EVP_PKEY **pkey);
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+__owur int SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine(SSL_CTX *ctx, ENGINE *e);
+# endif
+void SSL_CTX_set_cookie_generate_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                    int (*app_gen_cookie_cb) (SSL *ssl,
+                                                              unsigned char
+                                                              *cookie,
+                                                              unsigned int
+                                                              *cookie_len));
+void SSL_CTX_set_cookie_verify_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                  int (*app_verify_cookie_cb) (SSL *ssl,
+                                                               const unsigned char
+                                                               *cookie,
+                                                               unsigned int
+                                                               cookie_len));
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+void SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(SSL_CTX *s,
+                                           int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
+                                                      const unsigned char
+                                                      **out,
+                                                      unsigned int *outlen,
+                                                      void *arg), void *arg);
+void SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(SSL_CTX *s,
+                                      int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
+                                                 unsigned char **out,
+                                                 unsigned char *outlen,
+                                                 const unsigned char *in,
+                                                 unsigned int inlen,
+                                                 void *arg), void *arg);
+void SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(const SSL *s, const unsigned char **data,
+                                    unsigned *len);
+# endif
+
+__owur int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen,
+                          const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen,
+                          const unsigned char *client,
+                          unsigned int client_len);
+
+# define OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED 0
+# define OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED  1
+# define OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP  2
+
+__owur int SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *protos,
+                                   unsigned int protos_len);
+__owur int SSL_set_alpn_protos(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *protos,
+                               unsigned int protos_len);
+void SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
+                                           const unsigned char **out,
+                                           unsigned char *outlen,
+                                           const unsigned char *in,
+                                           unsigned int inlen,
+                                           void *arg), void *arg);
+void SSL_get0_alpn_selected(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **data,
+                            unsigned int *len);
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+/*
+ * the maximum length of the buffer given to callbacks containing the
+ * resulting identity/psk
+ */
+#  define PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN 128
+#  define PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN 256
+void SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                     unsigned int (*psk_client_callback) (SSL
+                                                                          *ssl,
+                                                                          const
+                                                                          char
+                                                                          *hint,
+                                                                          char
+                                                                          *identity,
+                                                                          unsigned
+                                                                          int
+                                                                          max_identity_len,
+                                                                          unsigned
+                                                                          char
+                                                                          *psk,
+                                                                          unsigned
+                                                                          int
+                                                                          max_psk_len));
+void SSL_set_psk_client_callback(SSL *ssl,
+                                 unsigned int (*psk_client_callback) (SSL
+                                                                      *ssl,
+                                                                      const
+                                                                      char
+                                                                      *hint,
+                                                                      char
+                                                                      *identity,
+                                                                      unsigned
+                                                                      int
+                                                                      max_identity_len,
+                                                                      unsigned
+                                                                      char
+                                                                      *psk,
+                                                                      unsigned
+                                                                      int
+                                                                      max_psk_len));
+void SSL_CTX_set_psk_server_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                     unsigned int (*psk_server_callback) (SSL
+                                                                          *ssl,
+                                                                          const
+                                                                          char
+                                                                          *identity,
+                                                                          unsigned
+                                                                          char
+                                                                          *psk,
+                                                                          unsigned
+                                                                          int
+                                                                          max_psk_len));
+void SSL_set_psk_server_callback(SSL *ssl,
+                                 unsigned int (*psk_server_callback) (SSL
+                                                                      *ssl,
+                                                                      const
+                                                                      char
+                                                                      *identity,
+                                                                      unsigned
+                                                                      char
+                                                                      *psk,
+                                                                      unsigned
+                                                                      int
+                                                                      max_psk_len));
+__owur int SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *identity_hint);
+__owur int SSL_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL *s, const char *identity_hint);
+const char *SSL_get_psk_identity_hint(const SSL *s);
+const char *SSL_get_psk_identity(const SSL *s);
+# endif
+
+/* Register callbacks to handle custom TLS Extensions for client or server. */
+
+__owur int SSL_CTX_has_client_custom_ext(const SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                         unsigned int ext_type);
+
+__owur int SSL_CTX_add_client_custom_ext(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned int ext_type,
+                                  custom_ext_add_cb add_cb,
+                                  custom_ext_free_cb free_cb,
+                                  void *add_arg,
+                                  custom_ext_parse_cb parse_cb,
+                                  void *parse_arg);
+
+__owur int SSL_CTX_add_server_custom_ext(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned int ext_type,
+                                  custom_ext_add_cb add_cb,
+                                  custom_ext_free_cb free_cb,
+                                  void *add_arg,
+                                  custom_ext_parse_cb parse_cb,
+                                  void *parse_arg);
+
+__owur int SSL_extension_supported(unsigned int ext_type);
+
+# define SSL_NOTHING            1
+# define SSL_WRITING            2
+# define SSL_READING            3
+# define SSL_X509_LOOKUP        4
+# define SSL_ASYNC_PAUSED       5
+# define SSL_ASYNC_NO_JOBS      6
+
+/* These will only be used when doing non-blocking IO */
+# define SSL_want_nothing(s)     (SSL_want(s) == SSL_NOTHING)
+# define SSL_want_read(s)        (SSL_want(s) == SSL_READING)
+# define SSL_want_write(s)       (SSL_want(s) == SSL_WRITING)
+# define SSL_want_x509_lookup(s) (SSL_want(s) == SSL_X509_LOOKUP)
+# define SSL_want_async(s)       (SSL_want(s) == SSL_ASYNC_PAUSED)
+# define SSL_want_async_job(s)   (SSL_want(s) == SSL_ASYNC_NO_JOBS)
+
+# define SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM 1
+# define SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM 2
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+# include <openssl/ssl2.h>
+# include <openssl/ssl3.h>
+# include <openssl/tls1.h>      /* This is mostly sslv3 with a few tweaks */
+# include <openssl/dtls1.h>     /* Datagram TLS */
+# include <openssl/srtp.h>      /* Support for the use_srtp extension */
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * These need to be after the above set of includes due to a compiler bug
+ * in VisualStudio 2015
+ */
+DEFINE_STACK_OF_CONST(SSL_CIPHER)
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(SSL_COMP)
+
+/* compatibility */
+# define SSL_set_app_data(s,arg)         (SSL_set_ex_data(s,0,(char *)arg))
+# define SSL_get_app_data(s)             (SSL_get_ex_data(s,0))
+# define SSL_SESSION_set_app_data(s,a)   (SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data(s,0,(char *)a))
+# define SSL_SESSION_get_app_data(s)     (SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(s,0))
+# define SSL_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)       (SSL_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx,0))
+# define SSL_CTX_set_app_data(ctx,arg)   (SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(ctx,0,(char *)arg))
+DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(void SSL_set_debug(SSL *s, int debug))
+
+
+/*
+ * The valid handshake states (one for each type message sent and one for each
+ * type of message received). There are also two "special" states:
+ * TLS = TLS or DTLS state
+ * DTLS = DTLS specific state
+ * CR/SR = Client Read/Server Read
+ * CW/SW = Client Write/Server Write
+ *
+ * The "special" states are:
+ * TLS_ST_BEFORE = No handshake has been initiated yet
+ * TLS_ST_OK = A handshake has been successfully completed
+ */
+typedef enum {
+    TLS_ST_BEFORE,
+    TLS_ST_OK,
+    DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
+    TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO,
+    TLS_ST_CR_CERT,
+    TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS,
+    TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH,
+    TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ,
+    TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE,
+    TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET,
+    TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE,
+    TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED,
+    TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO,
+    TLS_ST_CW_CERT,
+    TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH,
+    TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY,
+    TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE,
+    TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO,
+    TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED,
+    TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ,
+    TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO,
+    DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
+    TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO,
+    TLS_ST_SW_CERT,
+    TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH,
+    TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ,
+    TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE,
+    TLS_ST_SR_CERT,
+    TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH,
+    TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY,
+    TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO,
+    TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE,
+    TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED,
+    TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET,
+    TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS,
+    TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE,
+    TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
+} OSSL_HANDSHAKE_STATE;
+
+/*
+ * Most of the following state values are no longer used and are defined to be
+ * the closest equivalent value in the current state machine code. Not all
+ * defines have an equivalent and are set to a dummy value (-1). SSL_ST_CONNECT
+ * and SSL_ST_ACCEPT are still in use in the definition of SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,
+ * SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP and SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT.
+ */
+
+# define SSL_ST_CONNECT                  0x1000
+# define SSL_ST_ACCEPT                   0x2000
+
+# define SSL_ST_MASK                     0x0FFF
+
+# define SSL_CB_LOOP                     0x01
+# define SSL_CB_EXIT                     0x02
+# define SSL_CB_READ                     0x04
+# define SSL_CB_WRITE                    0x08
+# define SSL_CB_ALERT                    0x4000/* used in callback */
+# define SSL_CB_READ_ALERT               (SSL_CB_ALERT|SSL_CB_READ)
+# define SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT              (SSL_CB_ALERT|SSL_CB_WRITE)
+# define SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP              (SSL_ST_ACCEPT|SSL_CB_LOOP)
+# define SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT              (SSL_ST_ACCEPT|SSL_CB_EXIT)
+# define SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP             (SSL_ST_CONNECT|SSL_CB_LOOP)
+# define SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT             (SSL_ST_CONNECT|SSL_CB_EXIT)
+# define SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START          0x10
+# define SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE           0x20
+
+/* Is the SSL_connection established? */
+# define SSL_in_connect_init(a)          (SSL_in_init(a) && !SSL_is_server(a))
+# define SSL_in_accept_init(a)           (SSL_in_init(a) && SSL_is_server(a))
+int SSL_in_init(SSL *s);
+int SSL_in_before(SSL *s);
+int SSL_is_init_finished(SSL *s);
+
+/*
+ * The following 3 states are kept in ssl->rlayer.rstate when reads fail, you
+ * should not need these
+ */
+# define SSL_ST_READ_HEADER                      0xF0
+# define SSL_ST_READ_BODY                        0xF1
+# define SSL_ST_READ_DONE                        0xF2
+
+/*-
+ * Obtain latest Finished message
+ *   -- that we sent (SSL_get_finished)
+ *   -- that we expected from peer (SSL_get_peer_finished).
+ * Returns length (0 == no Finished so far), copies up to 'count' bytes.
+ */
+size_t SSL_get_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count);
+size_t SSL_get_peer_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count);
+
+/*
+ * use either SSL_VERIFY_NONE or SSL_VERIFY_PEER, the last 2 options are
+ * 'ored' with SSL_VERIFY_PEER if they are desired
+ */
+# define SSL_VERIFY_NONE                 0x00
+# define SSL_VERIFY_PEER                 0x01
+# define SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT 0x02
+# define SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE          0x04
+
+# define OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms()    SSL_library_init()
+# if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+#  define SSLeay_add_ssl_algorithms()    SSL_library_init()
+# endif
+
+/* More backward compatibility */
+# define SSL_get_cipher(s) \
+                SSL_CIPHER_get_name(SSL_get_current_cipher(s))
+# define SSL_get_cipher_bits(s,np) \
+                SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(SSL_get_current_cipher(s),np)
+# define SSL_get_cipher_version(s) \
+                SSL_CIPHER_get_version(SSL_get_current_cipher(s))
+# define SSL_get_cipher_name(s) \
+                SSL_CIPHER_get_name(SSL_get_current_cipher(s))
+# define SSL_get_time(a)         SSL_SESSION_get_time(a)
+# define SSL_set_time(a,b)       SSL_SESSION_set_time((a),(b))
+# define SSL_get_timeout(a)      SSL_SESSION_get_timeout(a)
+# define SSL_set_timeout(a,b)    SSL_SESSION_set_timeout((a),(b))
+
+# define d2i_SSL_SESSION_bio(bp,s_id) ASN1_d2i_bio_of(SSL_SESSION,SSL_SESSION_new,d2i_SSL_SESSION,bp,s_id)
+# define i2d_SSL_SESSION_bio(bp,s_id) ASN1_i2d_bio_of(SSL_SESSION,i2d_SSL_SESSION,bp,s_id)
+
+DECLARE_PEM_rw(SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION)
+# define SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET            1000/* offset to get SSL_R_... value
+                                              * from SSL_AD_... */
+/* These alert types are for SSLv3 and TLSv1 */
+# define SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY             SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY
+/* fatal */
+# define SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE       SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
+/* fatal */
+# define SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC           SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC
+# define SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED        TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED
+# define SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW          TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW
+/* fatal */
+# define SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE    SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE
+/* fatal */
+# define SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE        SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
+/* Not for TLS */
+# define SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE           SSL3_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE
+# define SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE          SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
+# define SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE  SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE
+# define SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED      SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED
+# define SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED      SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED
+# define SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN      SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN
+/* fatal */
+# define SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER        SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
+/* fatal */
+# define SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA               TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
+/* fatal */
+# define SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED            TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED
+/* fatal */
+# define SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR             TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR
+# define SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR            TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
+/* fatal */
+# define SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION       TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION
+/* fatal */
+# define SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION         TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
+/* fatal */
+# define SSL_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY    TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY
+/* fatal */
+# define SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR           TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
+# define SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED           TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED
+# define SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION         TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
+# define SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION    TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION
+# define SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE
+# define SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME        TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME
+# define SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE
+# define SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE
+/* fatal */
+# define SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY     TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
+/* fatal */
+# define SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK   TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK
+# define SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL  TLS1_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL
+# define SSL_ERROR_NONE                  0
+# define SSL_ERROR_SSL                   1
+# define SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ             2
+# define SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE            3
+# define SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP      4
+# define SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL               5/* look at error stack/return
+                                           * value/errno */
+# define SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN           6
+# define SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT          7
+# define SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT           8
+# define SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC            9
+# define SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC_JOB       10
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH                     3
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH                   4
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB                  6
+# define SSL_CTRL_GET_CLIENT_CERT_REQUEST        9
+# define SSL_CTRL_GET_NUM_RENEGOTIATIONS         10
+# define SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_NUM_RENEGOTIATIONS       11
+# define SSL_CTRL_GET_TOTAL_RENEGOTIATIONS       12
+# define SSL_CTRL_GET_FLAGS                      13
+# define SSL_CTRL_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERT               14
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK               15
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG           16
+/* only applies to datagram connections */
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_MTU                17
+/* Stats */
+# define SSL_CTRL_SESS_NUMBER                    20
+# define SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT                   21
+# define SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_GOOD              22
+# define SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_RENEGOTIATE       23
+# define SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT                    24
+# define SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_GOOD               25
+# define SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_RENEGOTIATE        26
+# define SSL_CTRL_SESS_HIT                       27
+# define SSL_CTRL_SESS_CB_HIT                    28
+# define SSL_CTRL_SESS_MISSES                    29
+# define SSL_CTRL_SESS_TIMEOUTS                  30
+# define SSL_CTRL_SESS_CACHE_FULL                31
+# define SSL_CTRL_MODE                           33
+# define SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD                 40
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD                 41
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE            42
+# define SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE            43
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_MODE            44
+# define SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_MODE            45
+# define SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST              50
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST              51
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT          52
+/* see tls1.h for macros based on these */
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_CB       53
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_ARG      54
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME            55
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_DEBUG_CB            56
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_DEBUG_ARG           57
+# define SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEYS         58
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEYS         59
+/*# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_OPAQUE_PRF_INPUT    60 */
+/*# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_OPAQUE_PRF_INPUT_CB 61 */
+/*# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_OPAQUE_PRF_INPUT_CB_ARG 62 */
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB       63
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB_ARG   64
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_TYPE     65
+# define SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_EXTS     66
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_EXTS     67
+# define SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_IDS      68
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_IDS      69
+# define SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_OCSP_RESP        70
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_OCSP_RESP        71
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEY_CB       72
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_USERNAME_CB    75
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_VERIFY_PARAM_CB                76
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_GIVE_CLIENT_PWD_CB             77
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_ARG            78
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_USERNAME               79
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_STRENGTH               80
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_PASSWORD               81
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+#  define SSL_CTRL_DTLS_EXT_SEND_HEARTBEAT               85
+#  define SSL_CTRL_GET_DTLS_EXT_HEARTBEAT_PENDING        86
+#  define SSL_CTRL_SET_DTLS_EXT_HEARTBEAT_NO_REQUESTS    87
+# endif
+# define DTLS_CTRL_GET_TIMEOUT           73
+# define DTLS_CTRL_HANDLE_TIMEOUT        74
+# define SSL_CTRL_GET_RI_SUPPORT                 76
+# define SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE                     78
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_NOT_RESUMABLE_SESS_CB      79
+# define SSL_CTRL_GET_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERTS          82
+# define SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERTS        83
+# define SSL_CTRL_CHAIN                          88
+# define SSL_CTRL_CHAIN_CERT                     89
+# define SSL_CTRL_GET_CURVES                     90
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_CURVES                     91
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_CURVES_LIST                92
+# define SSL_CTRL_GET_SHARED_CURVE               93
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_SIGALGS                    97
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_SIGALGS_LIST               98
+# define SSL_CTRL_CERT_FLAGS                     99
+# define SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_CERT_FLAGS               100
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_CLIENT_SIGALGS             101
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_CLIENT_SIGALGS_LIST        102
+# define SSL_CTRL_GET_CLIENT_CERT_TYPES          103
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_CLIENT_CERT_TYPES          104
+# define SSL_CTRL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN               105
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_VERIFY_CERT_STORE          106
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_CHAIN_CERT_STORE           107
+# define SSL_CTRL_GET_PEER_SIGNATURE_NID         108
+# define SSL_CTRL_GET_SERVER_TMP_KEY             109
+# define SSL_CTRL_GET_RAW_CIPHERLIST             110
+# define SSL_CTRL_GET_EC_POINT_FORMATS           111
+# define SSL_CTRL_GET_CHAIN_CERTS                115
+# define SSL_CTRL_SELECT_CURRENT_CERT            116
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_CURRENT_CERT               117
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_DH_AUTO                    118
+# define DTLS_CTRL_SET_LINK_MTU                  120
+# define DTLS_CTRL_GET_LINK_MIN_MTU              121
+# define SSL_CTRL_GET_EXTMS_SUPPORT              122
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_MIN_PROTO_VERSION          123
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_PROTO_VERSION          124
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_SPLIT_SEND_FRAGMENT        125
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_PIPELINES              126
+# define SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_TYPE     127
+# define SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB       128
+# define SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB_ARG   129
+# define SSL_CTRL_GET_MIN_PROTO_VERSION          130
+# define SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_PROTO_VERSION          131
+# define SSL_CERT_SET_FIRST                      1
+# define SSL_CERT_SET_NEXT                       2
+# define SSL_CERT_SET_SERVER                     3
+# define DTLSv1_get_timeout(ssl, arg) \
+        SSL_ctrl(ssl,DTLS_CTRL_GET_TIMEOUT,0, (void *)arg)
+# define DTLSv1_handle_timeout(ssl) \
+        SSL_ctrl(ssl,DTLS_CTRL_HANDLE_TIMEOUT,0, NULL)
+# define SSL_num_renegotiations(ssl) \
+        SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_GET_NUM_RENEGOTIATIONS,0,NULL)
+# define SSL_clear_num_renegotiations(ssl) \
+        SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_NUM_RENEGOTIATIONS,0,NULL)
+# define SSL_total_renegotiations(ssl) \
+        SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_GET_TOTAL_RENEGOTIATIONS,0,NULL)
+# define SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(ctx,dh) \
+        SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH,0,(char *)dh)
+# define SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh(ctx,ecdh) \
+        SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH,0,(char *)ecdh)
+# define SSL_CTX_set_dh_auto(ctx, onoff) \
+        SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_DH_AUTO,onoff,NULL)
+# define SSL_set_dh_auto(s, onoff) \
+        SSL_ctrl(s,SSL_CTRL_SET_DH_AUTO,onoff,NULL)
+# define SSL_set_tmp_dh(ssl,dh) \
+        SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH,0,(char *)dh)
+# define SSL_set_tmp_ecdh(ssl,ecdh) \
+        SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH,0,(char *)ecdh)
+# define SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(ctx,x509) \
+        SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERT,0,(char *)x509)
+# define SSL_CTX_get_extra_chain_certs(ctx,px509) \
+        SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_GET_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERTS,0,px509)
+# define SSL_CTX_get_extra_chain_certs_only(ctx,px509) \
+        SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_GET_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERTS,1,px509)
+# define SSL_CTX_clear_extra_chain_certs(ctx) \
+        SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERTS,0,NULL)
+# define SSL_CTX_set0_chain(ctx,sk) \
+        SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_CHAIN,0,(char *)sk)
+# define SSL_CTX_set1_chain(ctx,sk) \
+        SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_CHAIN,1,(char *)sk)
+# define SSL_CTX_add0_chain_cert(ctx,x509) \
+        SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_CHAIN_CERT,0,(char *)x509)
+# define SSL_CTX_add1_chain_cert(ctx,x509) \
+        SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_CHAIN_CERT,1,(char *)x509)
+# define SSL_CTX_get0_chain_certs(ctx,px509) \
+        SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_GET_CHAIN_CERTS,0,px509)
+# define SSL_CTX_clear_chain_certs(ctx) \
+        SSL_CTX_set0_chain(ctx,NULL)
+# define SSL_CTX_build_cert_chain(ctx, flags) \
+        SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN, flags, NULL)
+# define SSL_CTX_select_current_cert(ctx,x509) \
+        SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SELECT_CURRENT_CERT,0,(char *)x509)
+# define SSL_CTX_set_current_cert(ctx, op) \
+        SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_CURRENT_CERT, op, NULL)
+# define SSL_CTX_set0_verify_cert_store(ctx,st) \
+        SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_VERIFY_CERT_STORE,0,(char *)st)
+# define SSL_CTX_set1_verify_cert_store(ctx,st) \
+        SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_VERIFY_CERT_STORE,1,(char *)st)
+# define SSL_CTX_set0_chain_cert_store(ctx,st) \
+        SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_CHAIN_CERT_STORE,0,(char *)st)
+# define SSL_CTX_set1_chain_cert_store(ctx,st) \
+        SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_CHAIN_CERT_STORE,1,(char *)st)
+# define SSL_set0_chain(ctx,sk) \
+        SSL_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_CHAIN,0,(char *)sk)
+# define SSL_set1_chain(ctx,sk) \
+        SSL_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_CHAIN,1,(char *)sk)
+# define SSL_add0_chain_cert(ctx,x509) \
+        SSL_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_CHAIN_CERT,0,(char *)x509)
+# define SSL_add1_chain_cert(ctx,x509) \
+        SSL_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_CHAIN_CERT,1,(char *)x509)
+# define SSL_get0_chain_certs(ctx,px509) \
+        SSL_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_GET_CHAIN_CERTS,0,px509)
+# define SSL_clear_chain_certs(ctx) \
+        SSL_set0_chain(ctx,NULL)
+# define SSL_build_cert_chain(s, flags) \
+        SSL_ctrl(s,SSL_CTRL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN, flags, NULL)
+# define SSL_select_current_cert(ctx,x509) \
+        SSL_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SELECT_CURRENT_CERT,0,(char *)x509)
+# define SSL_set_current_cert(ctx,op) \
+        SSL_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_CURRENT_CERT, op, NULL)
+# define SSL_set0_verify_cert_store(s,st) \
+        SSL_ctrl(s,SSL_CTRL_SET_VERIFY_CERT_STORE,0,(char *)st)
+# define SSL_set1_verify_cert_store(s,st) \
+        SSL_ctrl(s,SSL_CTRL_SET_VERIFY_CERT_STORE,1,(char *)st)
+# define SSL_set0_chain_cert_store(s,st) \
+        SSL_ctrl(s,SSL_CTRL_SET_CHAIN_CERT_STORE,0,(char *)st)
+# define SSL_set1_chain_cert_store(s,st) \
+        SSL_ctrl(s,SSL_CTRL_SET_CHAIN_CERT_STORE,1,(char *)st)
+# define SSL_get1_curves(ctx, s) \
+        SSL_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_GET_CURVES,0,(char *)s)
+# define SSL_CTX_set1_curves(ctx, clist, clistlen) \
+        SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_CURVES,clistlen,(char *)clist)
+# define SSL_CTX_set1_curves_list(ctx, s) \
+        SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_CURVES_LIST,0,(char *)s)
+# define SSL_set1_curves(ctx, clist, clistlen) \
+        SSL_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_CURVES,clistlen,(char *)clist)
+# define SSL_set1_curves_list(ctx, s) \
+        SSL_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_CURVES_LIST,0,(char *)s)
+# define SSL_get_shared_curve(s, n) \
+        SSL_ctrl(s,SSL_CTRL_GET_SHARED_CURVE,n,NULL)
+# define SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs(ctx, slist, slistlen) \
+        SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_SIGALGS,slistlen,(int *)slist)
+# define SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs_list(ctx, s) \
+        SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_SIGALGS_LIST,0,(char *)s)
+# define SSL_set1_sigalgs(ctx, slist, slistlen) \
+        SSL_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_SIGALGS,slistlen,(int *)slist)
+# define SSL_set1_sigalgs_list(ctx, s) \
+        SSL_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_SIGALGS_LIST,0,(char *)s)
+# define SSL_CTX_set1_client_sigalgs(ctx, slist, slistlen) \
+        SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_CLIENT_SIGALGS,slistlen,(int *)slist)
+# define SSL_CTX_set1_client_sigalgs_list(ctx, s) \
+        SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_CLIENT_SIGALGS_LIST,0,(char *)s)
+# define SSL_set1_client_sigalgs(ctx, slist, slistlen) \
+        SSL_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_CLIENT_SIGALGS,clistlen,(int *)slist)
+# define SSL_set1_client_sigalgs_list(ctx, s) \
+        SSL_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_CLIENT_SIGALGS_LIST,0,(char *)s)
+# define SSL_get0_certificate_types(s, clist) \
+        SSL_ctrl(s, SSL_CTRL_GET_CLIENT_CERT_TYPES, 0, (char *)clist)
+# define SSL_CTX_set1_client_certificate_types(ctx, clist, clistlen) \
+        SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_CLIENT_CERT_TYPES,clistlen,(char *)clist)
+# define SSL_set1_client_certificate_types(s, clist, clistlen) \
+        SSL_ctrl(s,SSL_CTRL_SET_CLIENT_CERT_TYPES,clistlen,(char *)clist)
+# define SSL_get_peer_signature_nid(s, pn) \
+        SSL_ctrl(s,SSL_CTRL_GET_PEER_SIGNATURE_NID,0,pn)
+# define SSL_get_server_tmp_key(s, pk) \
+        SSL_ctrl(s,SSL_CTRL_GET_SERVER_TMP_KEY,0,pk)
+# define SSL_get0_raw_cipherlist(s, plst) \
+        SSL_ctrl(s,SSL_CTRL_GET_RAW_CIPHERLIST,0,plst)
+# define SSL_get0_ec_point_formats(s, plst) \
+        SSL_ctrl(s,SSL_CTRL_GET_EC_POINT_FORMATS,0,plst)
+#define SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(ctx, version) \
+        SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_MIN_PROTO_VERSION, version, NULL)
+#define SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(ctx, version) \
+        SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_PROTO_VERSION, version, NULL)
+#define SSL_CTX_get_min_proto_version(ctx) \
+        SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_GET_MIN_PROTO_VERSION, 0, NULL)
+#define SSL_CTX_get_max_proto_version(ctx) \
+        SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_PROTO_VERSION, 0, NULL)
+#define SSL_set_min_proto_version(s, version) \
+        SSL_ctrl(s, SSL_CTRL_SET_MIN_PROTO_VERSION, version, NULL)
+#define SSL_set_max_proto_version(s, version) \
+        SSL_ctrl(s, SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_PROTO_VERSION, version, NULL)
+#define SSL_get_min_proto_version(s) \
+        SSL_ctrl(s, SSL_CTRL_GET_MIN_PROTO_VERSION, 0, NULL)
+#define SSL_get_max_proto_version(s) \
+        SSL_ctrl(s, SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_PROTO_VERSION, 0, NULL)
+
+#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+/* Provide some compatibility macros for removed functionality. */
+# define SSL_CTX_need_tmp_RSA(ctx)                0
+# define SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa(ctx,rsa)             1
+# define SSL_need_tmp_RSA(ssl)                    0
+# define SSL_set_tmp_rsa(ssl,rsa)                 1
+# define SSL_CTX_set_ecdh_auto(dummy, onoff)      ((onoff) != 0)
+# define SSL_set_ecdh_auto(dummy, onoff)          ((onoff) != 0)
+/*
+ * We "pretend" to call the callback to avoid warnings about unused static
+ * functions.
+ */
+# define SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(ctx, cb)    while(0) (cb)(NULL, 0, 0)
+# define SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback(ssl, cb)        while(0) (cb)(NULL, 0, 0)
+#endif
+
+__owur const BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_ssl(void);
+__owur BIO *BIO_new_ssl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int client);
+__owur BIO *BIO_new_ssl_connect(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+__owur BIO *BIO_new_buffer_ssl_connect(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+__owur int BIO_ssl_copy_session_id(BIO *to, BIO *from);
+void BIO_ssl_shutdown(BIO *ssl_bio);
+
+__owur int SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *, const char *str);
+__owur SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *meth);
+int SSL_CTX_up_ref(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+void SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *);
+__owur long SSL_CTX_set_timeout(SSL_CTX *ctx, long t);
+__owur long SSL_CTX_get_timeout(const SSL_CTX *ctx);
+__owur X509_STORE *SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(const SSL_CTX *);
+void SSL_CTX_set_cert_store(SSL_CTX *, X509_STORE *);
+__owur int SSL_want(const SSL *s);
+__owur int SSL_clear(SSL *s);
+
+void SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx, long tm);
+
+__owur const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_current_cipher(const SSL *s);
+__owur int SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(const SSL_CIPHER *c, int *alg_bits);
+__owur const char *SSL_CIPHER_get_version(const SSL_CIPHER *c);
+__owur const char *SSL_CIPHER_get_name(const SSL_CIPHER *c);
+__owur uint32_t SSL_CIPHER_get_id(const SSL_CIPHER *c);
+__owur int SSL_CIPHER_get_kx_nid(const SSL_CIPHER *c);
+__owur int SSL_CIPHER_get_auth_nid(const SSL_CIPHER *c);
+__owur int SSL_CIPHER_is_aead(const SSL_CIPHER *c);
+
+__owur int SSL_get_fd(const SSL *s);
+__owur int SSL_get_rfd(const SSL *s);
+__owur int SSL_get_wfd(const SSL *s);
+__owur const char *SSL_get_cipher_list(const SSL *s, int n);
+__owur char *SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *s, char *buf, int len);
+__owur int SSL_get_read_ahead(const SSL *s);
+__owur int SSL_pending(const SSL *s);
+__owur int SSL_has_pending(const SSL *s);
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
+__owur int SSL_set_fd(SSL *s, int fd);
+__owur int SSL_set_rfd(SSL *s, int fd);
+__owur int SSL_set_wfd(SSL *s, int fd);
+# endif
+void SSL_set0_rbio(SSL *s, BIO *rbio);
+void SSL_set0_wbio(SSL *s, BIO *wbio);
+void SSL_set_bio(SSL *s, BIO *rbio, BIO *wbio);
+__owur BIO *SSL_get_rbio(const SSL *s);
+__owur BIO *SSL_get_wbio(const SSL *s);
+__owur int SSL_set_cipher_list(SSL *s, const char *str);
+void SSL_set_read_ahead(SSL *s, int yes);
+__owur int SSL_get_verify_mode(const SSL *s);
+__owur int SSL_get_verify_depth(const SSL *s);
+__owur SSL_verify_cb SSL_get_verify_callback(const SSL *s);
+void SSL_set_verify(SSL *s, int mode, SSL_verify_cb callback);
+void SSL_set_verify_depth(SSL *s, int depth);
+void SSL_set_cert_cb(SSL *s, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg);
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+__owur int SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey(SSL *ssl, RSA *rsa);
+__owur int SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *d, long len);
+# endif
+__owur int SSL_use_PrivateKey(SSL *ssl, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+__owur int SSL_use_PrivateKey_ASN1(int pk, SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *d,
+                            long len);
+__owur int SSL_use_certificate(SSL *ssl, X509 *x);
+__owur int SSL_use_certificate_ASN1(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *d, int len);
+
+/* Set serverinfo data for the current active cert. */
+__owur int SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *serverinfo,
+                           size_t serverinfo_length);
+__owur int SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+__owur int SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file, int type);
+#endif
+
+__owur int SSL_use_PrivateKey_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file, int type);
+__owur int SSL_use_certificate_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file, int type);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+__owur int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file, int type);
+#endif
+__owur int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file, int type);
+__owur int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file, int type);
+/* PEM type */
+__owur int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file);
+__owur int SSL_use_certificate_chain_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file);
+__owur STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_load_client_CA_file(const char *file);
+__owur int SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stackCAs,
+                                        const char *file);
+int SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stackCAs,
+                                       const char *dir);
+
+#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+# define SSL_load_error_strings() \
+    OPENSSL_init_ssl(OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_SSL_STRINGS \
+                     | OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_CRYPTO_STRINGS, NULL)
+#endif
+
+__owur const char *SSL_state_string(const SSL *s);
+__owur const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL *s);
+__owur const char *SSL_state_string_long(const SSL *s);
+__owur const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL *s);
+__owur long SSL_SESSION_get_time(const SSL_SESSION *s);
+__owur long SSL_SESSION_set_time(SSL_SESSION *s, long t);
+__owur long SSL_SESSION_get_timeout(const SSL_SESSION *s);
+__owur long SSL_SESSION_set_timeout(SSL_SESSION *s, long t);
+__owur int SSL_SESSION_get_protocol_version(const SSL_SESSION *s);
+__owur const char *SSL_SESSION_get0_hostname(const SSL_SESSION *s);
+__owur const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher(const SSL_SESSION *s);
+__owur int SSL_SESSION_has_ticket(const SSL_SESSION *s);
+__owur unsigned long SSL_SESSION_get_ticket_lifetime_hint(const SSL_SESSION *s);
+void SSL_SESSION_get0_ticket(const SSL_SESSION *s, const unsigned char **tick,
+                            size_t *len);
+__owur int SSL_copy_session_id(SSL *to, const SSL *from);
+__owur X509 *SSL_SESSION_get0_peer(SSL_SESSION *s);
+__owur int SSL_SESSION_set1_id_context(SSL_SESSION *s, const unsigned char *sid_ctx,
+                                unsigned int sid_ctx_len);
+__owur int SSL_SESSION_set1_id(SSL_SESSION *s, const unsigned char *sid,
+                               unsigned int sid_len);
+
+__owur SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_new(void);
+const unsigned char *SSL_SESSION_get_id(const SSL_SESSION *s,
+                                        unsigned int *len);
+const unsigned char *SSL_SESSION_get0_id_context(const SSL_SESSION *s,
+                                                unsigned int *len);
+__owur unsigned int SSL_SESSION_get_compress_id(const SSL_SESSION *s);
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+int SSL_SESSION_print_fp(FILE *fp, const SSL_SESSION *ses);
+# endif
+int SSL_SESSION_print(BIO *fp, const SSL_SESSION *ses);
+int SSL_SESSION_print_keylog(BIO *bp, const SSL_SESSION *x);
+int SSL_SESSION_up_ref(SSL_SESSION *ses);
+void SSL_SESSION_free(SSL_SESSION *ses);
+__owur int i2d_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION *in, unsigned char **pp);
+__owur int SSL_set_session(SSL *to, SSL_SESSION *session);
+int SSL_CTX_add_session(SSL_CTX *s, SSL_SESSION *c);
+int SSL_CTX_remove_session(SSL_CTX *, SSL_SESSION *c);
+__owur int SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id(SSL_CTX *, GEN_SESSION_CB);
+__owur int SSL_set_generate_session_id(SSL *, GEN_SESSION_CB);
+__owur int SSL_has_matching_session_id(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *id,
+                                unsigned int id_len);
+SSL_SESSION *d2i_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION **a, const unsigned char **pp,
+                             long length);
+
+# ifdef HEADER_X509_H
+__owur X509 *SSL_get_peer_certificate(const SSL *s);
+# endif
+
+__owur STACK_OF(X509) *SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(const SSL *s);
+
+__owur int SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode(const SSL_CTX *ctx);
+__owur int SSL_CTX_get_verify_depth(const SSL_CTX *ctx);
+__owur SSL_verify_cb SSL_CTX_get_verify_callback(const SSL_CTX *ctx);
+void SSL_CTX_set_verify(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode, SSL_verify_cb callback);
+void SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(SSL_CTX *ctx, int depth);
+void SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                      int (*cb) (X509_STORE_CTX *, void *),
+                                      void *arg);
+void SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *c, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, void *arg),
+                         void *arg);
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+__owur int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey(SSL_CTX *ctx, RSA *rsa);
+__owur int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *d,
+                                   long len);
+# endif
+__owur int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(SSL_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+__owur int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_ASN1(int pk, SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                const unsigned char *d, long len);
+__owur int SSL_CTX_use_certificate(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
+__owur int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_ASN1(SSL_CTX *ctx, int len,
+                                 const unsigned char *d);
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, pem_password_cb *cb);
+void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *u);
+pem_password_cb *SSL_CTX_get_default_passwd_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+void *SSL_CTX_get_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+void SSL_set_default_passwd_cb(SSL *s, pem_password_cb *cb);
+void SSL_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL *s, void *u);
+pem_password_cb *SSL_get_default_passwd_cb(SSL *s);
+void *SSL_get_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL *s);
+
+__owur int SSL_CTX_check_private_key(const SSL_CTX *ctx);
+__owur int SSL_check_private_key(const SSL *ctx);
+
+__owur int SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sid_ctx,
+                                   unsigned int sid_ctx_len);
+
+SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+int SSL_up_ref(SSL *s);
+int SSL_is_dtls(const SSL *s);
+__owur int SSL_set_session_id_context(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *sid_ctx,
+                               unsigned int sid_ctx_len);
+
+__owur int SSL_CTX_set_purpose(SSL_CTX *s, int purpose);
+__owur int SSL_set_purpose(SSL *s, int purpose);
+__owur int SSL_CTX_set_trust(SSL_CTX *s, int trust);
+__owur int SSL_set_trust(SSL *s, int trust);
+
+__owur int SSL_set1_host(SSL *s, const char *hostname);
+__owur int SSL_add1_host(SSL *s, const char *hostname);
+__owur const char *SSL_get0_peername(SSL *s);
+void SSL_set_hostflags(SSL *s, unsigned int flags);
+
+__owur int SSL_CTX_dane_enable(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+__owur int SSL_CTX_dane_mtype_set(SSL_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md,
+                                  uint8_t mtype, uint8_t ord);
+__owur int SSL_dane_enable(SSL *s, const char *basedomain);
+__owur int SSL_dane_tlsa_add(SSL *s, uint8_t usage, uint8_t selector,
+                             uint8_t mtype, unsigned const char *data, size_t dlen);
+__owur int SSL_get0_dane_authority(SSL *s, X509 **mcert, EVP_PKEY **mspki);
+__owur int SSL_get0_dane_tlsa(SSL *s, uint8_t *usage, uint8_t *selector,
+                              uint8_t *mtype, unsigned const char **data,
+                              size_t *dlen);
+/*
+ * Bridge opacity barrier between libcrypt and libssl, also needed to support
+ * offline testing in test/danetest.c
+ */
+SSL_DANE *SSL_get0_dane(SSL *ssl);
+/*
+ * DANE flags
+ */
+unsigned long SSL_CTX_dane_set_flags(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags);
+unsigned long SSL_CTX_dane_clear_flags(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags);
+unsigned long SSL_dane_set_flags(SSL *ssl, unsigned long flags);
+unsigned long SSL_dane_clear_flags(SSL *ssl, unsigned long flags);
+
+__owur int SSL_CTX_set1_param(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm);
+__owur int SSL_set1_param(SSL *ssl, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm);
+
+__owur X509_VERIFY_PARAM *SSL_CTX_get0_param(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+__owur X509_VERIFY_PARAM *SSL_get0_param(SSL *ssl);
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+int SSL_CTX_set_srp_username(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *name);
+int SSL_CTX_set_srp_password(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *password);
+int SSL_CTX_set_srp_strength(SSL_CTX *ctx, int strength);
+int SSL_CTX_set_srp_client_pwd_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                        char *(*cb) (SSL *, void *));
+int SSL_CTX_set_srp_verify_param_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                          int (*cb) (SSL *, void *));
+int SSL_CTX_set_srp_username_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                      int (*cb) (SSL *, int *, void *));
+int SSL_CTX_set_srp_cb_arg(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *arg);
+
+int SSL_set_srp_server_param(SSL *s, const BIGNUM *N, const BIGNUM *g,
+                             BIGNUM *sa, BIGNUM *v, char *info);
+int SSL_set_srp_server_param_pw(SSL *s, const char *user, const char *pass,
+                                const char *grp);
+
+__owur BIGNUM *SSL_get_srp_g(SSL *s);
+__owur BIGNUM *SSL_get_srp_N(SSL *s);
+
+__owur char *SSL_get_srp_username(SSL *s);
+__owur char *SSL_get_srp_userinfo(SSL *s);
+# endif
+
+void SSL_certs_clear(SSL *s);
+void SSL_free(SSL *ssl);
+# ifdef OSSL_ASYNC_FD
+/*
+ * Windows application developer has to include windows.h to use these.
+ */
+__owur int SSL_waiting_for_async(SSL *s);
+__owur int SSL_get_all_async_fds(SSL *s, OSSL_ASYNC_FD *fds, size_t *numfds);
+__owur int SSL_get_changed_async_fds(SSL *s, OSSL_ASYNC_FD *addfd,
+                                     size_t *numaddfds, OSSL_ASYNC_FD *delfd,
+                                     size_t *numdelfds);
+# endif
+__owur int SSL_accept(SSL *ssl);
+__owur int SSL_connect(SSL *ssl);
+__owur int SSL_read(SSL *ssl, void *buf, int num);
+__owur int SSL_peek(SSL *ssl, void *buf, int num);
+__owur int SSL_write(SSL *ssl, const void *buf, int num);
+long SSL_ctrl(SSL *ssl, int cmd, long larg, void *parg);
+long SSL_callback_ctrl(SSL *, int, void (*)(void));
+long SSL_CTX_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, void *parg);
+long SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *, int, void (*)(void));
+
+__owur int SSL_get_error(const SSL *s, int ret_code);
+__owur const char *SSL_get_version(const SSL *s);
+
+/* This sets the 'default' SSL version that SSL_new() will create */
+__owur int SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SSL_METHOD *meth);
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
+DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(__owur const SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_method(void)) /* SSLv3 */
+DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(__owur const SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_server_method(void)) /* SSLv3 */
+DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(__owur const SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_client_method(void)) /* SSLv3 */
+# endif
+
+#define SSLv23_method           TLS_method
+#define SSLv23_server_method    TLS_server_method
+#define SSLv23_client_method    TLS_client_method
+
+/* Negotiate highest available SSL/TLS version */
+__owur const SSL_METHOD *TLS_method(void);
+__owur const SSL_METHOD *TLS_server_method(void);
+__owur const SSL_METHOD *TLS_client_method(void);
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_METHOD
+DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(__owur const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_method(void)) /* TLSv1.0 */
+DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(__owur const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_server_method(void)) /* TLSv1.0 */
+DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(__owur const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_client_method(void)) /* TLSv1.0 */
+# endif
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1_METHOD
+DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(__owur const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_1_method(void)) /* TLSv1.1 */
+DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(__owur const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_1_server_method(void)) /* TLSv1.1 */
+DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(__owur const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_1_client_method(void)) /* TLSv1.1 */
+# endif
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2_METHOD
+DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(__owur const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_2_method(void)) /* TLSv1.2 */
+DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(__owur const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_2_server_method(void)) /* TLSv1.2 */
+DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(__owur const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_2_client_method(void)) /* TLSv1.2 */
+# endif
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_METHOD
+DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(__owur const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_method(void)) /* DTLSv1.0 */
+DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(__owur const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_server_method(void)) /* DTLSv1.0 */
+DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(__owur const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_client_method(void)) /* DTLSv1.0 */
+# endif
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2_METHOD
+DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(__owur const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_2_method(void)) /* DTLSv1.2 */
+DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(__owur const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_2_server_method(void)) /* DTLSv1.2 */
+DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(__owur const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_2_client_method(void)) /* DTLSv1.2 */
+#endif
+
+__owur const SSL_METHOD *DTLS_method(void); /* DTLS 1.0 and 1.2 */
+__owur const SSL_METHOD *DTLS_server_method(void); /* DTLS 1.0 and 1.2 */
+__owur const SSL_METHOD *DTLS_client_method(void); /* DTLS 1.0 and 1.2 */
+
+__owur STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get_ciphers(const SSL *s);
+__owur STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_CTX_get_ciphers(const SSL_CTX *ctx);
+__owur STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get_client_ciphers(const SSL *s);
+__owur STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get1_supported_ciphers(SSL *s);
+
+__owur int SSL_do_handshake(SSL *s);
+int SSL_renegotiate(SSL *s);
+__owur int SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(SSL *s);
+__owur int SSL_renegotiate_pending(SSL *s);
+int SSL_shutdown(SSL *s);
+
+__owur const SSL_METHOD *SSL_CTX_get_ssl_method(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+__owur const SSL_METHOD *SSL_get_ssl_method(SSL *s);
+__owur int SSL_set_ssl_method(SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *method);
+__owur const char *SSL_alert_type_string_long(int value);
+__owur const char *SSL_alert_type_string(int value);
+__owur const char *SSL_alert_desc_string_long(int value);
+__owur const char *SSL_alert_desc_string(int value);
+
+void SSL_set_client_CA_list(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list);
+void SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list);
+__owur STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_get_client_CA_list(const SSL *s);
+__owur STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_CTX_get_client_CA_list(const SSL_CTX *s);
+__owur int SSL_add_client_CA(SSL *ssl, X509 *x);
+__owur int SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
+
+void SSL_set_connect_state(SSL *s);
+void SSL_set_accept_state(SSL *s);
+
+__owur long SSL_get_default_timeout(const SSL *s);
+
+#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+# define SSL_library_init() OPENSSL_init_ssl(0, NULL)
+#endif
+
+__owur char *SSL_CIPHER_description(const SSL_CIPHER *, char *buf, int size);
+__owur STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_dup_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk);
+
+__owur SSL *SSL_dup(SSL *ssl);
+
+__owur X509 *SSL_get_certificate(const SSL *ssl);
+/*
+ * EVP_PKEY
+ */ struct evp_pkey_st *SSL_get_privatekey(const SSL *ssl);
+
+__owur X509 *SSL_CTX_get0_certificate(const SSL_CTX *ctx);
+__owur EVP_PKEY *SSL_CTX_get0_privatekey(const SSL_CTX *ctx);
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode);
+__owur int SSL_CTX_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL_CTX *ctx);
+void SSL_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL *ssl, int mode);
+__owur int SSL_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL *ssl);
+void SSL_set_shutdown(SSL *ssl, int mode);
+__owur int SSL_get_shutdown(const SSL *ssl);
+__owur int SSL_version(const SSL *ssl);
+__owur int SSL_client_version(const SSL *s);
+__owur int SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+__owur int SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_dir(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+__owur int SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_file(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+__owur int SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *CAfile,
+                                  const char *CApath);
+# define SSL_get0_session SSL_get_session/* just peek at pointer */
+__owur SSL_SESSION *SSL_get_session(const SSL *ssl);
+__owur SSL_SESSION *SSL_get1_session(SSL *ssl); /* obtain a reference count */
+__owur SSL_CTX *SSL_get_SSL_CTX(const SSL *ssl);
+SSL_CTX *SSL_set_SSL_CTX(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX *ctx);
+void SSL_set_info_callback(SSL *ssl,
+                           void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val));
+void (*SSL_get_info_callback(const SSL *ssl)) (const SSL *ssl, int type,
+                                               int val);
+__owur OSSL_HANDSHAKE_STATE SSL_get_state(const SSL *ssl);
+
+void SSL_set_verify_result(SSL *ssl, long v);
+__owur long SSL_get_verify_result(const SSL *ssl);
+__owur STACK_OF(X509) *SSL_get0_verified_chain(const SSL *s);
+
+__owur size_t SSL_get_client_random(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *out,
+                                    size_t outlen);
+__owur size_t SSL_get_server_random(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *out,
+                                    size_t outlen);
+__owur size_t SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(const SSL_SESSION *ssl,
+                                         unsigned char *out, size_t outlen);
+
+#define SSL_get_ex_new_index(l, p, newf, dupf, freef) \
+    CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, l, p, newf, dupf, freef)
+__owur int SSL_set_ex_data(SSL *ssl, int idx, void *data);
+void *SSL_get_ex_data(const SSL *ssl, int idx);
+#define SSL_SESSION_get_ex_new_index(l, p, newf, dupf, freef) \
+    CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, l, p, newf, dupf, freef)
+__owur int SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data(SSL_SESSION *ss, int idx, void *data);
+void *SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(const SSL_SESSION *ss, int idx);
+#define SSL_CTX_get_ex_new_index(l, p, newf, dupf, freef) \
+    CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, l, p, newf, dupf, freef)
+__owur int SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(SSL_CTX *ssl, int idx, void *data);
+void *SSL_CTX_get_ex_data(const SSL_CTX *ssl, int idx);
+
+__owur int SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(void);
+
+# define SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size(ctx,t) \
+        SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE,t,NULL)
+# define SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx) \
+        SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE,0,NULL)
+# define SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(ctx,m) \
+        SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_MODE,m,NULL)
+# define SSL_CTX_get_session_cache_mode(ctx) \
+        SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_MODE,0,NULL)
+
+# define SSL_CTX_get_default_read_ahead(ctx) SSL_CTX_get_read_ahead(ctx)
+# define SSL_CTX_set_default_read_ahead(ctx,m) SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead(ctx,m)
+# define SSL_CTX_get_read_ahead(ctx) \
+        SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD,0,NULL)
+# define SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead(ctx,m) \
+        SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD,m,NULL)
+# define SSL_CTX_get_max_cert_list(ctx) \
+        SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST,0,NULL)
+# define SSL_CTX_set_max_cert_list(ctx,m) \
+        SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST,m,NULL)
+# define SSL_get_max_cert_list(ssl) \
+        SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST,0,NULL)
+# define SSL_set_max_cert_list(ssl,m) \
+        SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST,m,NULL)
+
+# define SSL_CTX_set_max_send_fragment(ctx,m) \
+        SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT,m,NULL)
+# define SSL_set_max_send_fragment(ssl,m) \
+        SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT,m,NULL)
+# define SSL_CTX_set_split_send_fragment(ctx,m) \
+        SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_SPLIT_SEND_FRAGMENT,m,NULL)
+# define SSL_set_split_send_fragment(ssl,m) \
+        SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_SPLIT_SEND_FRAGMENT,m,NULL)
+# define SSL_CTX_set_max_pipelines(ctx,m) \
+        SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_PIPELINES,m,NULL)
+# define SSL_set_max_pipelines(ssl,m) \
+        SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_PIPELINES,m,NULL)
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t len);
+void SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL *s, size_t len);
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+/* NB: the |keylength| is only applicable when is_export is true */
+void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                 DH *(*dh) (SSL *ssl, int is_export,
+                                            int keylength));
+void SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL *ssl,
+                             DH *(*dh) (SSL *ssl, int is_export,
+                                        int keylength));
+# endif
+
+__owur const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_compression(SSL *s);
+__owur const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_expansion(SSL *s);
+__owur const char *SSL_COMP_get_name(const COMP_METHOD *comp);
+__owur const char *SSL_COMP_get0_name(const SSL_COMP *comp);
+__owur int SSL_COMP_get_id(const SSL_COMP *comp);
+STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(void);
+__owur STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *SSL_COMP_set0_compression_methods(STACK_OF(SSL_COMP)
+                                                      *meths);
+#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+# define SSL_COMP_free_compression_methods() while(0) continue
+#endif
+__owur int SSL_COMP_add_compression_method(int id, COMP_METHOD *cm);
+
+const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *ptr);
+int SSL_CIPHER_get_cipher_nid(const SSL_CIPHER *c);
+int SSL_CIPHER_get_digest_nid(const SSL_CIPHER *c);
+
+/* TLS extensions functions */
+__owur int SSL_set_session_ticket_ext(SSL *s, void *ext_data, int ext_len);
+
+__owur int SSL_set_session_ticket_ext_cb(SSL *s, tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_fn cb,
+                                  void *arg);
+
+/* Pre-shared secret session resumption functions */
+__owur int SSL_set_session_secret_cb(SSL *s,
+                              tls_session_secret_cb_fn tls_session_secret_cb,
+                              void *arg);
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_not_resumable_session_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                                int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
+                                                           int
+                                                           is_forward_secure));
+
+void SSL_set_not_resumable_session_callback(SSL *ssl,
+                                            int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
+                                                       int
+                                                       is_forward_secure));
+# if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+#  define SSL_cache_hit(s) SSL_session_reused(s)
+# endif
+
+__owur int SSL_session_reused(SSL *s);
+__owur int SSL_is_server(const SSL *s);
+
+__owur __owur SSL_CONF_CTX *SSL_CONF_CTX_new(void);
+int SSL_CONF_CTX_finish(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx);
+void SSL_CONF_CTX_free(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx);
+unsigned int SSL_CONF_CTX_set_flags(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, unsigned int flags);
+__owur unsigned int SSL_CONF_CTX_clear_flags(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, unsigned int flags);
+__owur int SSL_CONF_CTX_set1_prefix(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *pre);
+
+void SSL_CONF_CTX_set_ssl(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, SSL *ssl);
+void SSL_CONF_CTX_set_ssl_ctx(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, SSL_CTX *ctx);
+
+__owur int SSL_CONF_cmd(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *cmd, const char *value);
+__owur int SSL_CONF_cmd_argv(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, int *pargc, char ***pargv);
+__owur int SSL_CONF_cmd_value_type(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *cmd);
+
+void SSL_add_ssl_module(void);
+int SSL_config(SSL *s, const char *name);
+int SSL_CTX_config(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *name);
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE
+void SSL_trace(int write_p, int version, int content_type,
+               const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg);
+__owur const char *SSL_CIPHER_standard_name(const SSL_CIPHER *c);
+# endif
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
+int DTLSv1_listen(SSL *s, BIO_ADDR *client);
+# endif
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
+
+/*
+ * A callback for verifying that the received SCTs are sufficient.
+ * Expected to return 1 if they are sufficient, otherwise 0.
+ * May return a negative integer if an error occurs.
+ * A connection should be aborted if the SCTs are deemed insufficient.
+ */
+typedef int(*ssl_ct_validation_cb)(const CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx,
+                                   const STACK_OF(SCT) *scts, void *arg);
+
+/*
+ * Sets a |callback| that is invoked upon receipt of ServerHelloDone to validate
+ * the received SCTs.
+ * If the callback returns a non-positive result, the connection is terminated.
+ * Call this function before beginning a handshake.
+ * If a NULL |callback| is provided, SCT validation is disabled.
+ * |arg| is arbitrary userdata that will be passed to the callback whenever it
+ * is invoked. Ownership of |arg| remains with the caller.
+ *
+ * NOTE: A side-effect of setting a CT callback is that an OCSP stapled response
+ *       will be requested.
+ */
+int SSL_set_ct_validation_callback(SSL *s, ssl_ct_validation_cb callback,
+                                   void *arg);
+int SSL_CTX_set_ct_validation_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                       ssl_ct_validation_cb callback,
+                                       void *arg);
+#define SSL_disable_ct(s) \
+        ((void) SSL_set_validation_callback((s), NULL, NULL))
+#define SSL_CTX_disable_ct(ctx) \
+        ((void) SSL_CTX_set_validation_callback((ctx), NULL, NULL))
+
+/*
+ * The validation type enumerates the available behaviours of the built-in SSL
+ * CT validation callback selected via SSL_enable_ct() and SSL_CTX_enable_ct().
+ * The underlying callback is a static function in libssl.
+ */
+enum {
+    SSL_CT_VALIDATION_PERMISSIVE = 0,
+    SSL_CT_VALIDATION_STRICT
+};
+
+/*
+ * Enable CT by setting up a callback that implements one of the built-in
+ * validation variants.  The SSL_CT_VALIDATION_PERMISSIVE variant always
+ * continues the handshake, the application can make appropriate decisions at
+ * handshake completion.  The SSL_CT_VALIDATION_STRICT variant requires at
+ * least one valid SCT, or else handshake termination will be requested.  The
+ * handshake may continue anyway if SSL_VERIFY_NONE is in effect.
+ */
+int SSL_enable_ct(SSL *s, int validation_mode);
+int SSL_CTX_enable_ct(SSL_CTX *ctx, int validation_mode);
+
+/*
+ * Report whether a non-NULL callback is enabled.
+ */
+int SSL_ct_is_enabled(const SSL *s);
+int SSL_CTX_ct_is_enabled(const SSL_CTX *ctx);
+
+/* Gets the SCTs received from a connection */
+const STACK_OF(SCT) *SSL_get0_peer_scts(SSL *s);
+
+/*
+ * Loads the CT log list from the default location.
+ * If a CTLOG_STORE has previously been set using SSL_CTX_set_ctlog_store,
+ * the log information loaded from this file will be appended to the
+ * CTLOG_STORE.
+ * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+int SSL_CTX_set_default_ctlog_list_file(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+
+/*
+ * Loads the CT log list from the specified file path.
+ * If a CTLOG_STORE has previously been set using SSL_CTX_set_ctlog_store,
+ * the log information loaded from this file will be appended to the
+ * CTLOG_STORE.
+ * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+int SSL_CTX_set_ctlog_list_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *path);
+
+/*
+ * Sets the CT log list used by all SSL connections created from this SSL_CTX.
+ * Ownership of the CTLOG_STORE is transferred to the SSL_CTX.
+ */
+void SSL_CTX_set0_ctlog_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, CTLOG_STORE *logs);
+
+/*
+ * Gets the CT log list used by all SSL connections created from this SSL_CTX.
+ * This will be NULL unless one of the following functions has been called:
+ * - SSL_CTX_set_default_ctlog_list_file
+ * - SSL_CTX_set_ctlog_list_file
+ * - SSL_CTX_set_ctlog_store
+ */
+const CTLOG_STORE *SSL_CTX_get0_ctlog_store(const SSL_CTX *ctx);
+
+# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_CT */
+
+/* What the "other" parameter contains in security callback */
+/* Mask for type */
+# define SSL_SECOP_OTHER_TYPE    0xffff0000
+# define SSL_SECOP_OTHER_NONE    0
+# define SSL_SECOP_OTHER_CIPHER  (1 << 16)
+# define SSL_SECOP_OTHER_CURVE   (2 << 16)
+# define SSL_SECOP_OTHER_DH      (3 << 16)
+# define SSL_SECOP_OTHER_PKEY    (4 << 16)
+# define SSL_SECOP_OTHER_SIGALG  (5 << 16)
+# define SSL_SECOP_OTHER_CERT    (6 << 16)
+
+/* Indicated operation refers to peer key or certificate */
+# define SSL_SECOP_PEER          0x1000
+
+/* Values for "op" parameter in security callback */
+
+/* Called to filter ciphers */
+/* Ciphers client supports */
+# define SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED      (1 | SSL_SECOP_OTHER_CIPHER)
+/* Cipher shared by client/server */
+# define SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SHARED         (2 | SSL_SECOP_OTHER_CIPHER)
+/* Sanity check of cipher server selects */
+# define SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK          (3 | SSL_SECOP_OTHER_CIPHER)
+/* Curves supported by client */
+# define SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED       (4 | SSL_SECOP_OTHER_CURVE)
+/* Curves shared by client/server */
+# define SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED          (5 | SSL_SECOP_OTHER_CURVE)
+/* Sanity check of curve server selects */
+# define SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK           (6 | SSL_SECOP_OTHER_CURVE)
+/* Temporary DH key */
+# define SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH                (7 | SSL_SECOP_OTHER_PKEY)
+/* SSL/TLS version */
+# define SSL_SECOP_VERSION               (9 | SSL_SECOP_OTHER_NONE)
+/* Session tickets */
+# define SSL_SECOP_TICKET                (10 | SSL_SECOP_OTHER_NONE)
+/* Supported signature algorithms sent to peer */
+# define SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED      (11 | SSL_SECOP_OTHER_SIGALG)
+/* Shared signature algorithm */
+# define SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED         (12 | SSL_SECOP_OTHER_SIGALG)
+/* Sanity check signature algorithm allowed */
+# define SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK          (13 | SSL_SECOP_OTHER_SIGALG)
+/* Used to get mask of supported public key signature algorithms */
+# define SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK           (14 | SSL_SECOP_OTHER_SIGALG)
+/* Use to see if compression is allowed */
+# define SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION           (15 | SSL_SECOP_OTHER_NONE)
+/* EE key in certificate */
+# define SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY                (16 | SSL_SECOP_OTHER_CERT)
+/* CA key in certificate */
+# define SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY                (17 | SSL_SECOP_OTHER_CERT)
+/* CA digest algorithm in certificate */
+# define SSL_SECOP_CA_MD                 (18 | SSL_SECOP_OTHER_CERT)
+/* Peer EE key in certificate */
+# define SSL_SECOP_PEER_EE_KEY           (SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | SSL_SECOP_PEER)
+/* Peer CA key in certificate */
+# define SSL_SECOP_PEER_CA_KEY           (SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | SSL_SECOP_PEER)
+/* Peer CA digest algorithm in certificate */
+# define SSL_SECOP_PEER_CA_MD            (SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | SSL_SECOP_PEER)
+
+void SSL_set_security_level(SSL *s, int level);
+__owur int SSL_get_security_level(const SSL *s);
+void SSL_set_security_callback(SSL *s,
+                               int (*cb) (const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx, int op,
+                                          int bits, int nid, void *other,
+                                          void *ex));
+int (*SSL_get_security_callback(const SSL *s)) (const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx, int op,
+                                                int bits, int nid,
+                                                void *other, void *ex);
+void SSL_set0_security_ex_data(SSL *s, void *ex);
+__owur void *SSL_get0_security_ex_data(const SSL *s);
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_security_level(SSL_CTX *ctx, int level);
+__owur int SSL_CTX_get_security_level(const SSL_CTX *ctx);
+void SSL_CTX_set_security_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                   int (*cb) (const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx, int op,
+                                              int bits, int nid, void *other,
+                                              void *ex));
+int (*SSL_CTX_get_security_callback(const SSL_CTX *ctx)) (const SSL *s,
+                                                          const SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                                          int op, int bits,
+                                                          int nid,
+                                                          void *other,
+                                                          void *ex);
+void SSL_CTX_set0_security_ex_data(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *ex);
+__owur void *SSL_CTX_get0_security_ex_data(const SSL_CTX *ctx);
+
+/* OPENSSL_INIT flag 0x010000 reserved for internal use */
+#define OPENSSL_INIT_NO_LOAD_SSL_STRINGS    0x00100000L
+#define OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_SSL_STRINGS       0x00200000L
+
+#define OPENSSL_INIT_SSL_DEFAULT \
+        (OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_SSL_STRINGS | OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_CRYPTO_STRINGS)
+
+int OPENSSL_init_ssl(uint64_t opts, const OPENSSL_INIT_SETTINGS *settings);
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_UNIT_TEST
+__owur const struct openssl_ssl_test_functions *SSL_test_functions(void);
+# endif
+
+extern const char SSL_version_str[];
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+/*
+ * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
+ * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
+ */
+
+int ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
+
+/* Error codes for the SSL functions. */
+
+/* Function codes. */
+# define SSL_F_CHECK_SUITEB_CIPHER_LIST                   331
+# define SSL_F_CT_MOVE_SCTS                               345
+# define SSL_F_CT_STRICT                                  349
+# define SSL_F_D2I_SSL_SESSION                            103
+# define SSL_F_DANE_CTX_ENABLE                            347
+# define SSL_F_DANE_MTYPE_SET                             393
+# define SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD                              394
+# define SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE                             245
+# define SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE                              104
+# define SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD                        247
+# define SSL_F_DTLS1_CHECK_TIMEOUT_NUM                    318
+# define SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT                            305
+# define SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT                  288
+# define SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_BUFFERED_RECORDS             424
+# define SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD                       257
+# define SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES                           258
+# define SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_FAILED                          339
+# define SSL_F_DTLS1_RETRANSMIT_MESSAGE                   390
+# define SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES                 268
+# define SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN                              350
+# define SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC          371
+# define SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST        385
+# define SSL_F_DTLS_GET_REASSEMBLED_MESSAGE               370
+# define SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY                  386
+# define SSL_F_DTLS_WAIT_FOR_DRY                          592
+# define SSL_F_OPENSSL_INIT_SSL                           342
+# define SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION         417
+# define SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION         418
+# define SSL_F_READ_STATE_MACHINE                         352
+# define SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE                   129
+# define SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM              130
+# define SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL                                  213
+# define SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL                              133
+# define SSL_F_SSL3_DIGEST_CACHED_RECORDS                 293
+# define SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC                 292
+# define SSL_F_SSL3_FINAL_FINISH_MAC                      285
+# define SSL_F_SSL3_GENERATE_KEY_BLOCK                    238
+# define SSL_F_SSL3_GENERATE_MASTER_SECRET                388
+# define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD                            143
+# define SSL_F_SSL3_INIT_FINISHED_MAC                     397
+# define SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN                     147
+# define SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES                            148
+# define SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N                                149
+# define SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK                       157
+# define SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_READ_BUFFER                     156
+# define SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_WRITE_BUFFER                    291
+# define SSL_F_SSL3_TAKE_MAC                              425
+# define SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES                           158
+# define SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING                         159
+# define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN                         316
+# define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF                        319
+# define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT        298
+# define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT                 277
+# define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT           307
+# define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK         215
+# define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_FILE_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK        216
+# define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT        299
+# define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT                 278
+# define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT           308
+# define SSL_F_SSL_BAD_METHOD                             160
+# define SSL_F_SSL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN                       332
+# define SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST                   161
+# define SSL_F_SSL_CERT_ADD0_CHAIN_CERT                   346
+# define SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP                               221
+# define SSL_F_SSL_CERT_NEW                               162
+# define SSL_F_SSL_CERT_SET0_CHAIN                        340
+# define SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY                      163
+# define SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT               280
+# define SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG            279
+# define SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_PROCESS_RULESTR                 230
+# define SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_STRENGTH_SORT                   231
+# define SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR                                  164
+# define SSL_F_SSL_COMP_ADD_COMPRESSION_METHOD            165
+# define SSL_F_SSL_CONF_CMD                               334
+# define SSL_F_SSL_CREATE_CIPHER_LIST                     166
+# define SSL_F_SSL_CTRL                                   232
+# define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY                  168
+# define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_ENABLE_CT                          398
+# define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_MAKE_PROFILES                      309
+# define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW                                169
+# define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_ALPN_PROTOS                    343
+# define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CIPHER_LIST                    269
+# define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CLIENT_CERT_ENGINE             290
+# define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CT_VALIDATION_CALLBACK         396
+# define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT             219
+# define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SSL_VERSION                    170
+# define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE                    171
+# define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_ASN1               172
+# define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE               173
+# define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY                     174
+# define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY_ASN1                175
+# define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE                176
+# define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT              272
+# define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY                  177
+# define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_ASN1             178
+# define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE             179
+# define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_SERVERINFO                     336
+# define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_SERVERINFO_FILE                337
+# define SSL_F_SSL_DANE_DUP                               403
+# define SSL_F_SSL_DANE_ENABLE                            395
+# define SSL_F_SSL_DO_CONFIG                              391
+# define SSL_F_SSL_DO_HANDSHAKE                           180
+# define SSL_F_SSL_DUP_CA_LIST                            408
+# define SSL_F_SSL_ENABLE_CT                              402
+# define SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION                        181
+# define SSL_F_SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION                       217
+# define SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_CERT_INDEX                  322
+# define SSL_F_SSL_GET_SIGN_PKEY                          183
+# define SSL_F_SSL_INIT_WBIO_BUFFER                       184
+# define SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE                    185
+# define SSL_F_SSL_MODULE_INIT                            392
+# define SSL_F_SSL_NEW                                    186
+# define SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT      300
+# define SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT               302
+# define SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT         310
+# define SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT      301
+# define SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT               303
+# define SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT         311
+# define SSL_F_SSL_PEEK                                   270
+# define SSL_F_SSL_READ                                   223
+# define SSL_F_SSL_RENEGOTIATE                            516
+# define SSL_F_SSL_RENEGOTIATE_ABBREVIATED                546
+# define SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT                320
+# define SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT                321
+# define SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_DUP                            348
+# define SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_NEW                            189
+# define SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_PRINT_FP                       190
+# define SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_SET1_ID                        423
+# define SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_SET1_ID_CONTEXT                312
+# define SSL_F_SSL_SET_ALPN_PROTOS                        344
+# define SSL_F_SSL_SET_CERT                               191
+# define SSL_F_SSL_SET_CIPHER_LIST                        271
+# define SSL_F_SSL_SET_CT_VALIDATION_CALLBACK             399
+# define SSL_F_SSL_SET_FD                                 192
+# define SSL_F_SSL_SET_PKEY                               193
+# define SSL_F_SSL_SET_RFD                                194
+# define SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION                            195
+# define SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT                 218
+# define SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION_TICKET_EXT                 294
+# define SSL_F_SSL_SET_WFD                                196
+# define SSL_F_SSL_SHUTDOWN                               224
+# define SSL_F_SSL_SRP_CTX_INIT                           313
+# define SSL_F_SSL_START_ASYNC_JOB                        389
+# define SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_FUNCTION                     197
+# define SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_VOID_FUNCTION                244
+# define SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE                        198
+# define SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_ASN1                   199
+# define SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE                   200
+# define SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY                         201
+# define SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY_ASN1                    202
+# define SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE                    203
+# define SSL_F_SSL_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT                  273
+# define SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY                      204
+# define SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_ASN1                 205
+# define SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE                 206
+# define SSL_F_SSL_VALIDATE_CT                            400
+# define SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN                      207
+# define SSL_F_SSL_WRITE                                  208
+# define SSL_F_STATE_MACHINE                              353
+# define SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG                    333
+# define SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE                   209
+# define SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS            341
+# define SSL_F_TLS1_ENC                                   401
+# define SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL                314
+# define SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST                         338
+# define SSL_F_TLS1_PRF                                   284
+# define SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK                       211
+# define SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS                    335
+# define SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK          354
+# define SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST          372
+# define SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE                      404
+# define SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE                    405
+# define SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST                     406
+# define SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE             407
+# define SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA                      409
+# define SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP                      410
+# define SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE           355
+# define SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO                 356
+# define SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE          357
+# define SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY                358
+# define SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED                     359
+# define SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_REQUEST                373
+# define SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET           428
+# define SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE           374
+# define SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_DONE                  375
+# define SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO                 376
+# define SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE          377
+# define SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY                       351
+# define SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER                     387
+# define SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO              378
+# define SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE       384
+# define SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE             360
+# define SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST            361
+# define SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS                    362
+# define SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY                    379
+# define SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC             363
+# define SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE                        411
+# define SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE                      412
+# define SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST                       413
+# define SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE               414
+# define SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA                        415
+# define SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP                        416
+# define SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE             380
+# define SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO                   381
+# define SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE            382
+# define SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED                       364
+# define SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE                   365
+# define SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET             366
+# define SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO                     383
+# define SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE             367
+# define SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE                    368
+# define SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO                   369
+# define SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE                        419
+# define SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE                      420
+# define SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE               421
+# define SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP                        422
+# define SSL_F_USE_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN_FILE                 220
+
+/* Reason codes. */
+# define SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE                      100
+# define SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT 272
+# define SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_0_NEEDED_IN_FIPS_MODE       143
+# define SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE     158
+# define SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC                     103
+# define SSL_R_BAD_DATA                                   390
+# define SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK              106
+# define SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION                          107
+# define SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE                               102
+# define SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH                          111
+# define SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT                               304
+# define SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT                                306
+# define SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_LENGTH                       332
+# define SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST                          105
+# define SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH                                 271
+# define SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH                          115
+# define SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER                116
+# define SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT                            119
+# define SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE                              123
+# define SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH                           347
+# define SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS                         371
+# define SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE                         352
+# define SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST           353
+# define SSL_R_BAD_SSL_FILETYPE                           124
+# define SSL_R_BAD_VALUE                                  384
+# define SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY                            127
+# define SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET                                128
+# define SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG                  129
+# define SSL_R_BN_LIB                                     130
+# define SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH                      131
+# define SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL                           397
+# define SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK                             398
+# define SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY                         133
+# define SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED                  134
+# define SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR                              377
+# define SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH                       135
+# define SSL_R_CIPHER_CODE_WRONG_LENGTH                   137
+# define SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE                 138
+# define SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT                         226
+# define SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG                 140
+# define SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED                       343
+# define SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE                        141
+# define SSL_R_COMPRESSION_ID_NOT_WITHIN_PRIVATE_RANGE    307
+# define SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR                  142
+# define SSL_R_CONNECTION_TYPE_NOT_SET                    144
+# define SSL_R_CONTEXT_NOT_DANE_ENABLED                   167
+# define SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE                400
+# define SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH                            308
+# define SSL_R_CUSTOM_EXT_HANDLER_ALREADY_INSTALLED       206
+# define SSL_R_DANE_ALREADY_ENABLED                       172
+# define SSL_R_DANE_CANNOT_OVERRIDE_MTYPE_FULL            173
+# define SSL_R_DANE_NOT_ENABLED                           175
+# define SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_CERTIFICATE                  180
+# define SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_CERTIFICATE_USAGE            184
+# define SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_DATA_LENGTH                  189
+# define SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH                192
+# define SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_MATCHING_TYPE                200
+# define SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_PUBLIC_KEY                   201
+# define SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_SELECTOR                     202
+# define SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_NULL_DATA                        203
+# define SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED              145
+# define SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG                       146
+# define SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED                          147
+# define SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC        281
+# define SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL                           394
+# define SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG            148
+# define SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED                        149
+# define SSL_R_DTLS_MESSAGE_TOO_BIG                       334
+# define SSL_R_DUPLICATE_COMPRESSION_ID                   309
+# define SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_SIGNING                   318
+# define SSL_R_ECDH_REQUIRED_FOR_SUITEB_MODE              374
+# define SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL                           399
+# define SSL_R_EMPTY_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST         354
+# define SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG                  150
+# define SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST              151
+# define SSL_R_ERROR_SETTING_TLSA_BASE_DOMAIN             204
+# define SSL_R_EXCEEDS_MAX_FRAGMENT_SIZE                  194
+# define SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE                     152
+# define SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE                      153
+# define SSL_R_FAILED_TO_INIT_ASYNC                       405
+# define SSL_R_FRAGMENTED_CLIENT_HELLO                    401
+# define SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS                     154
+# define SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST                        155
+# define SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST                               156
+# define SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST                      380
+# define SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK                     373
+# define SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION                   340
+# define SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS                         104
+# define SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND                            280
+# define SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM              341
+# define SSL_R_INVALID_CONFIGURATION_NAME                 113
+# define SSL_R_INVALID_CT_VALIDATION_TYPE                 212
+# define SSL_R_INVALID_NULL_CMD_NAME                      385
+# define SSL_R_INVALID_SEQUENCE_NUMBER                    402
+# define SSL_R_INVALID_SERVERINFO_DATA                    388
+# define SSL_R_INVALID_SRP_USERNAME                       357
+# define SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE                    328
+# define SSL_R_INVALID_TICKET_KEYS_LENGTH                 325
+# define SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH                            159
+# define SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG                            404
+# define SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT                           160
+# define SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG                                274
+# define SSL_R_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS                     161
+# define SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT                   165
+# define SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT                 381
+# define SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE                    168
+# define SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT                169
+# define SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT                   170
+# define SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM                          358
+# define SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY                         171
+# define SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY                       311
+# define SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED                   176
+# define SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED                    177
+# define SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET                         179
+# define SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE                       181
+# define SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED                       183
+# define SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH                            185
+# define SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_METHOD                      331
+# define SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED                   187
+# define SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER           330
+# define SSL_R_NO_METHOD_SPECIFIED                        188
+# define SSL_R_NO_PEM_EXTENSIONS                          389
+# define SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED                    190
+# define SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE                     191
+# define SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION                           339
+# define SSL_R_NO_REQUIRED_DIGEST                         324
+# define SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER                           193
+# define SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS             376
+# define SSL_R_NO_SRTP_PROFILES                           359
+# define SSL_R_NO_VALID_SCTS                              216
+# define SSL_R_NO_VERIFY_COOKIE_CALLBACK                  403
+# define SSL_R_NULL_SSL_CTX                               195
+# define SSL_R_NULL_SSL_METHOD_PASSED                     196
+# define SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED            197
+# define SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED 344
+# define SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG                     198
+# define SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT                               227
+# define SSL_R_PATH_TOO_LONG                              270
+# define SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE          199
+# define SSL_R_PEM_NAME_BAD_PREFIX                        391
+# define SSL_R_PEM_NAME_TOO_SHORT                         392
+# define SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE                           406
+# define SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN                       207
+# define SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND                     223
+# define SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB                           224
+# define SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB                           225
+# define SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET                           211
+# define SSL_R_READ_TIMEOUT_EXPIRED                       312
+# define SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH                     213
+# define SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL                           298
+# define SSL_R_RENEGOTIATE_EXT_TOO_LONG                   335
+# define SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR                 336
+# define SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH                     337
+# define SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING                    215
+# define SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING     342
+# define SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING           345
+# define SSL_R_SCT_VERIFICATION_FAILED                    208
+# define SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT                         275
+# define SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED           277
+# define SSL_R_SHUTDOWN_WHILE_IN_INIT                     407
+# define SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR                 360
+# define SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE      220
+# define SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC                                 361
+# define SSL_R_SRTP_COULD_NOT_ALLOCATE_PROFILES           362
+# define SSL_R_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST_TOO_LONG      363
+# define SSL_R_SRTP_UNKNOWN_PROTECTION_PROFILE            364
+# define SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_SERVERNAME                319
+# define SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_SERVERNAME_TYPE           320
+# define SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG                   300
+# define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_BAD_CERTIFICATE                1042
+# define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_BAD_RECORD_MAC                 1020
+# define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED            1045
+# define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED            1044
+# define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN            1046
+# define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE          1030
+# define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE              1040
+# define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER              1047
+# define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_NO_CERTIFICATE                 1041
+# define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE             1010
+# define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE        1043
+# define SSL_R_SSL_COMMAND_SECTION_EMPTY                  117
+# define SSL_R_SSL_COMMAND_SECTION_NOT_FOUND              125
+# define SSL_R_SSL_CTX_HAS_NO_DEFAULT_SSL_VERSION         228
+# define SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE                      229
+# define SSL_R_SSL_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS                 230
+# define SSL_R_SSL_NEGATIVE_LENGTH                        372
+# define SSL_R_SSL_SECTION_EMPTY                          126
+# define SSL_R_SSL_SECTION_NOT_FOUND                      136
+# define SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CALLBACK_FAILED             301
+# define SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONFLICT                    302
+# define SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG                    408
+# define SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG            273
+# define SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_HAS_BAD_LENGTH              303
+# define SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH               210
+# define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_ACCESS_DENIED                  1049
+# define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECODE_ERROR                   1050
+# define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPTION_FAILED              1021
+# define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPT_ERROR                  1051
+# define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_EXPORT_RESTRICTION             1060
+# define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK         1086
+# define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY          1071
+# define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INTERNAL_ERROR                 1080
+# define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_NO_RENEGOTIATION               1100
+# define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_PROTOCOL_VERSION               1070
+# define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_RECORD_OVERFLOW                1022
+# define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_UNKNOWN_CA                     1048
+# define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_USER_CANCELLED                 1090
+# define SSL_R_TLSV1_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE           1114
+# define SSL_R_TLSV1_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE      1113
+# define SSL_R_TLSV1_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE             1111
+# define SSL_R_TLSV1_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME                    1112
+# define SSL_R_TLSV1_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION                1110
+# define SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT           365
+# define SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING                      366
+# define SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL                 367
+# define SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST             157
+# define SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS                       409
+# define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS             314
+# define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS       239
+# define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_MD5_ROUTINES           242
+# define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_SHA1_ROUTINES          243
+# define SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE                         244
+# define SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD                          245
+# define SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED                              276
+# define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE                         246
+# define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE                   247
+# define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED                    248
+# define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE                        249
+# define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CMD_NAME                           386
+# define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_COMMAND                            139
+# define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST                             368
+# define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE                  250
+# define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE                          251
+# define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL                           252
+# define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_SSL_VERSION                        254
+# define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE                              255
+# define SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED       338
+# define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM          257
+# define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE                 315
+# define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL                       258
+# define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_SSL_VERSION                    259
+# define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE                    329
+# define SSL_R_USE_SRTP_NOT_NEGOTIATED                    369
+# define SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH                           166
+# define SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW                            396
+# define SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE                     383
+# define SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED                      261
+# define SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE                                378
+# define SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH                     264
+# define SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE                       265
+# define SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE                       370
+# define SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION                          266
+# define SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER                       267
+# define SSL_R_X509_LIB                                   268
+# define SSL_R_X509_VERIFICATION_SETUP_PROBLEMS           269
+
+# ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+# endif
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/ssl2.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/ssl2.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5321bd2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/ssl2.h
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_SSL2_H
+# define HEADER_SSL2_H
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+# define SSL2_VERSION            0x0002
+
+# define SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO            1
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/ssl3.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/ssl3.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4ca434e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/ssl3.h
@@ -0,0 +1,310 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_SSL3_H
+# define HEADER_SSL3_H
+
+# include <openssl/comp.h>
+# include <openssl/buffer.h>
+# include <openssl/evp.h>
+# include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Signalling cipher suite value from RFC 5746
+ * (TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV)
+ */
+# define SSL3_CK_SCSV                            0x030000FF
+
+/*
+ * Signalling cipher suite value from draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00
+ * (TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV)
+ */
+# define SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV                   0x03005600
+
+# define SSL3_CK_RSA_NULL_MD5                    0x03000001
+# define SSL3_CK_RSA_NULL_SHA                    0x03000002
+# define SSL3_CK_RSA_RC4_40_MD5                  0x03000003
+# define SSL3_CK_RSA_RC4_128_MD5                 0x03000004
+# define SSL3_CK_RSA_RC4_128_SHA                 0x03000005
+# define SSL3_CK_RSA_RC2_40_MD5                  0x03000006
+# define SSL3_CK_RSA_IDEA_128_SHA                0x03000007
+# define SSL3_CK_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA              0x03000008
+# define SSL3_CK_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA              0x03000009
+# define SSL3_CK_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA            0x0300000A
+
+# define SSL3_CK_DH_DSS_DES_40_CBC_SHA           0x0300000B
+# define SSL3_CK_DH_DSS_DES_64_CBC_SHA           0x0300000C
+# define SSL3_CK_DH_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA         0x0300000D
+# define SSL3_CK_DH_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA           0x0300000E
+# define SSL3_CK_DH_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA           0x0300000F
+# define SSL3_CK_DH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA         0x03000010
+
+# define SSL3_CK_DHE_DSS_DES_40_CBC_SHA          0x03000011
+# define SSL3_CK_EDH_DSS_DES_40_CBC_SHA          SSL3_CK_DHE_DSS_DES_40_CBC_SHA
+# define SSL3_CK_DHE_DSS_DES_64_CBC_SHA          0x03000012
+# define SSL3_CK_EDH_DSS_DES_64_CBC_SHA          SSL3_CK_DHE_DSS_DES_64_CBC_SHA
+# define SSL3_CK_DHE_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA        0x03000013
+# define SSL3_CK_EDH_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA        SSL3_CK_DHE_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA
+# define SSL3_CK_DHE_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA          0x03000014
+# define SSL3_CK_EDH_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA          SSL3_CK_DHE_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA
+# define SSL3_CK_DHE_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA          0x03000015
+# define SSL3_CK_EDH_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA          SSL3_CK_DHE_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA
+# define SSL3_CK_DHE_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA        0x03000016
+# define SSL3_CK_EDH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA        SSL3_CK_DHE_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA
+
+# define SSL3_CK_ADH_RC4_40_MD5                  0x03000017
+# define SSL3_CK_ADH_RC4_128_MD5                 0x03000018
+# define SSL3_CK_ADH_DES_40_CBC_SHA              0x03000019
+# define SSL3_CK_ADH_DES_64_CBC_SHA              0x0300001A
+# define SSL3_CK_ADH_DES_192_CBC_SHA             0x0300001B
+
+# define SSL3_TXT_RSA_NULL_MD5                   "NULL-MD5"
+# define SSL3_TXT_RSA_NULL_SHA                   "NULL-SHA"
+# define SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC4_40_MD5                 "EXP-RC4-MD5"
+# define SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC4_128_MD5                "RC4-MD5"
+# define SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC4_128_SHA                "RC4-SHA"
+# define SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC2_40_MD5                 "EXP-RC2-CBC-MD5"
+# define SSL3_TXT_RSA_IDEA_128_SHA               "IDEA-CBC-SHA"
+# define SSL3_TXT_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA             "EXP-DES-CBC-SHA"
+# define SSL3_TXT_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA             "DES-CBC-SHA"
+# define SSL3_TXT_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA           "DES-CBC3-SHA"
+
+# define SSL3_TXT_DH_DSS_DES_40_CBC_SHA          "EXP-DH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA"
+# define SSL3_TXT_DH_DSS_DES_64_CBC_SHA          "DH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA"
+# define SSL3_TXT_DH_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA        "DH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA"
+# define SSL3_TXT_DH_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA          "EXP-DH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA"
+# define SSL3_TXT_DH_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA          "DH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA"
+# define SSL3_TXT_DH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA        "DH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA"
+
+# define SSL3_TXT_DHE_DSS_DES_40_CBC_SHA         "EXP-DHE-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA"
+# define SSL3_TXT_DHE_DSS_DES_64_CBC_SHA         "DHE-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA"
+# define SSL3_TXT_DHE_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA       "DHE-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA"
+# define SSL3_TXT_DHE_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA         "EXP-DHE-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA"
+# define SSL3_TXT_DHE_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA         "DHE-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA"
+# define SSL3_TXT_DHE_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA       "DHE-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA"
+
+/*
+ * This next block of six "EDH" labels is for backward compatibility with
+ * older versions of OpenSSL.  New code should use the six "DHE" labels above
+ * instead:
+ */
+# define SSL3_TXT_EDH_DSS_DES_40_CBC_SHA         "EXP-EDH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA"
+# define SSL3_TXT_EDH_DSS_DES_64_CBC_SHA         "EDH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA"
+# define SSL3_TXT_EDH_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA       "EDH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA"
+# define SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA         "EXP-EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA"
+# define SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA         "EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA"
+# define SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA       "EDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA"
+
+# define SSL3_TXT_ADH_RC4_40_MD5                 "EXP-ADH-RC4-MD5"
+# define SSL3_TXT_ADH_RC4_128_MD5                "ADH-RC4-MD5"
+# define SSL3_TXT_ADH_DES_40_CBC_SHA             "EXP-ADH-DES-CBC-SHA"
+# define SSL3_TXT_ADH_DES_64_CBC_SHA             "ADH-DES-CBC-SHA"
+# define SSL3_TXT_ADH_DES_192_CBC_SHA            "ADH-DES-CBC3-SHA"
+
+# define SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH              32
+# define SSL3_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH          32
+
+# define SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE                 48
+# define SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE                        32
+# define SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE                    32
+# define SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH                   5
+
+# define SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH                  4
+
+# ifndef SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
+ /*
+  * Some will argue that this increases memory footprint, but it's not
+  * actually true. Point is that malloc has to return at least 64-bit aligned
+  * pointers, meaning that allocating 5 bytes wastes 3 bytes in either case.
+  * Suggested pre-gaping simply moves these wasted bytes from the end of
+  * allocated region to its front, but makes data payload aligned, which
+  * improves performance:-)
+  */
+#  define SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD                     8
+# else
+#  if (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1))!=0
+#   error "insane SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD"
+#   undef SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
+#  endif
+# endif
+
+/*
+ * This is the maximum MAC (digest) size used by the SSL library. Currently
+ * maximum of 20 is used by SHA1, but we reserve for future extension for
+ * 512-bit hashes.
+ */
+
+# define SSL3_RT_MAX_MD_SIZE                     64
+
+/*
+ * Maximum block size used in all ciphersuites. Currently 16 for AES.
+ */
+
+# define SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE            16
+
+# define SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA                       (16384)
+
+/* Maximum plaintext length: defined by SSL/TLS standards */
+# define SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH                16384
+/* Maximum compression overhead: defined by SSL/TLS standards */
+# define SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD         1024
+
+/*
+ * The standards give a maximum encryption overhead of 1024 bytes. In
+ * practice the value is lower than this. The overhead is the maximum number
+ * of padding bytes (256) plus the mac size.
+ */
+# define SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD  (256 + SSL3_RT_MAX_MD_SIZE)
+
+/*
+ * OpenSSL currently only uses a padding length of at most one block so the
+ * send overhead is smaller.
+ */
+
+# define SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD \
+                        (SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE + SSL3_RT_MAX_MD_SIZE)
+
+/* If compression isn't used don't include the compression overhead */
+
+# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+#  define SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH           SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
+# else
+#  define SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH   \
+                (SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH+SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD)
+# endif
+# define SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH    \
+                (SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD+SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH)
+# define SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE         \
+                (SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
+
+# define SSL3_MD_CLIENT_FINISHED_CONST   "\x43\x4C\x4E\x54"
+# define SSL3_MD_SERVER_FINISHED_CONST   "\x53\x52\x56\x52"
+
+# define SSL3_VERSION                    0x0300
+# define SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR              0x03
+# define SSL3_VERSION_MINOR              0x00
+
+# define SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC      20
+# define SSL3_RT_ALERT                   21
+# define SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE               22
+# define SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA        23
+# define DTLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT              24
+
+/* Pseudo content types to indicate additional parameters */
+# define TLS1_RT_CRYPTO                  0x1000
+# define TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_PREMASTER        (TLS1_RT_CRYPTO | 0x1)
+# define TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_CLIENT_RANDOM    (TLS1_RT_CRYPTO | 0x2)
+# define TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_SERVER_RANDOM    (TLS1_RT_CRYPTO | 0x3)
+# define TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_MASTER           (TLS1_RT_CRYPTO | 0x4)
+
+# define TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_READ             0x0000
+# define TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_WRITE            0x0100
+# define TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_MAC              (TLS1_RT_CRYPTO | 0x5)
+# define TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_KEY              (TLS1_RT_CRYPTO | 0x6)
+# define TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_IV               (TLS1_RT_CRYPTO | 0x7)
+# define TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_FIXED_IV         (TLS1_RT_CRYPTO | 0x8)
+
+/* Pseudo content type for SSL/TLS header info */
+# define SSL3_RT_HEADER                  0x100
+
+# define SSL3_AL_WARNING                 1
+# define SSL3_AL_FATAL                   2
+
+# define SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY             0
+# define SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE      10/* fatal */
+# define SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC          20/* fatal */
+# define SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE   30/* fatal */
+# define SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE       40/* fatal */
+# define SSL3_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE          41
+# define SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE         42
+# define SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE 43
+# define SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED     44
+# define SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED     45
+# define SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN     46
+# define SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER       47/* fatal */
+
+# define TLS1_HB_REQUEST         1
+# define TLS1_HB_RESPONSE        2
+
+
+# define SSL3_CT_RSA_SIGN                        1
+# define SSL3_CT_DSS_SIGN                        2
+# define SSL3_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH                    3
+# define SSL3_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH                    4
+# define SSL3_CT_RSA_EPHEMERAL_DH                5
+# define SSL3_CT_DSS_EPHEMERAL_DH                6
+# define SSL3_CT_FORTEZZA_DMS                    20
+/*
+ * SSL3_CT_NUMBER is used to size arrays and it must be large enough to
+ * contain all of the cert types defined either for SSLv3 and TLSv1.
+ */
+# define SSL3_CT_NUMBER                  9
+
+# define SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS       0x0001
+
+/* Removed from OpenSSL 1.1.0 */
+# define TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG              0x0
+
+# define TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY             0x0010
+
+/* Set if we encrypt then mac instead of usual mac then encrypt */
+# define TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_READ        0x0100
+# define TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC             TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_READ
+
+/* Set if extended master secret extension received from peer */
+# define TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS               0x0200
+
+# define TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_WRITE       0x0400
+
+# define SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST                   0
+# define SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO                    1
+# define SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO                    2
+# define SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET               4
+# define SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE                     11
+# define SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE             12
+# define SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST             13
+# define SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE                     14
+# define SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY              15
+# define SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE             16
+# define SSL3_MT_FINISHED                        20
+# define SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS              22
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+#  define SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO                      67
+# endif
+# define DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST    3
+
+/* Dummy message type for handling CCS like a normal handshake message */
+# define SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC              0x0101
+
+# define SSL3_MT_CCS                             1
+
+/* These are used when changing over to a new cipher */
+# define SSL3_CC_READ            0x01
+# define SSL3_CC_WRITE           0x02
+# define SSL3_CC_CLIENT          0x10
+# define SSL3_CC_SERVER          0x20
+# define SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE (SSL3_CC_CLIENT|SSL3_CC_WRITE)
+# define SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ  (SSL3_CC_SERVER|SSL3_CC_READ)
+# define SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ  (SSL3_CC_CLIENT|SSL3_CC_READ)
+# define SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE (SSL3_CC_SERVER|SSL3_CC_WRITE)
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/stack.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/stack.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..23ad3b8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/stack.h
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_STACK_H
+# define HEADER_STACK_H
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+typedef struct stack_st OPENSSL_STACK; /* Use STACK_OF(...) instead */
+
+typedef int (*OPENSSL_sk_compfunc)(const void *, const void *);
+typedef void (*OPENSSL_sk_freefunc)(void *);
+typedef void *(*OPENSSL_sk_copyfunc)(const void *);
+
+int OPENSSL_sk_num(const OPENSSL_STACK *);
+void *OPENSSL_sk_value(const OPENSSL_STACK *, int);
+
+void *OPENSSL_sk_set(OPENSSL_STACK *st, int i, const void *data);
+
+OPENSSL_STACK *OPENSSL_sk_new(OPENSSL_sk_compfunc cmp);
+OPENSSL_STACK *OPENSSL_sk_new_null(void);
+void OPENSSL_sk_free(OPENSSL_STACK *);
+void OPENSSL_sk_pop_free(OPENSSL_STACK *st, void (*func) (void *));
+OPENSSL_STACK *OPENSSL_sk_deep_copy(const OPENSSL_STACK *, OPENSSL_sk_copyfunc c, OPENSSL_sk_freefunc f);
+int OPENSSL_sk_insert(OPENSSL_STACK *sk, const void *data, int where);
+void *OPENSSL_sk_delete(OPENSSL_STACK *st, int loc);
+void *OPENSSL_sk_delete_ptr(OPENSSL_STACK *st, const void *p);
+int OPENSSL_sk_find(OPENSSL_STACK *st, const void *data);
+int OPENSSL_sk_find_ex(OPENSSL_STACK *st, const void *data);
+int OPENSSL_sk_push(OPENSSL_STACK *st, const void *data);
+int OPENSSL_sk_unshift(OPENSSL_STACK *st, const void *data);
+void *OPENSSL_sk_shift(OPENSSL_STACK *st);
+void *OPENSSL_sk_pop(OPENSSL_STACK *st);
+void OPENSSL_sk_zero(OPENSSL_STACK *st);
+OPENSSL_sk_compfunc OPENSSL_sk_set_cmp_func(OPENSSL_STACK *sk, OPENSSL_sk_compfunc cmp);
+OPENSSL_STACK *OPENSSL_sk_dup(const OPENSSL_STACK *st);
+void OPENSSL_sk_sort(OPENSSL_STACK *st);
+int OPENSSL_sk_is_sorted(const OPENSSL_STACK *st);
+
+# if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+#  define _STACK OPENSSL_STACK
+#  define sk_num OPENSSL_sk_num
+#  define sk_value OPENSSL_sk_value
+#  define sk_set OPENSSL_sk_set
+#  define sk_new OPENSSL_sk_new
+#  define sk_new_null OPENSSL_sk_new_null
+#  define sk_free OPENSSL_sk_free
+#  define sk_pop_free OPENSSL_sk_pop_free
+#  define sk_deep_copy OPENSSL_sk_deep_copy
+#  define sk_insert OPENSSL_sk_insert
+#  define sk_delete OPENSSL_sk_delete
+#  define sk_delete_ptr OPENSSL_sk_delete_ptr
+#  define sk_find OPENSSL_sk_find
+#  define sk_find_ex OPENSSL_sk_find_ex
+#  define sk_push OPENSSL_sk_push
+#  define sk_unshift OPENSSL_sk_unshift
+#  define sk_shift OPENSSL_sk_shift
+#  define sk_pop OPENSSL_sk_pop
+#  define sk_zero OPENSSL_sk_zero
+#  define sk_set_cmp_func OPENSSL_sk_set_cmp_func
+#  define sk_dup OPENSSL_sk_dup
+#  define sk_sort OPENSSL_sk_sort
+#  define sk_is_sorted OPENSSL_sk_is_sorted
+# endif
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/symhacks.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/symhacks.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..caf1f1a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/symhacks.h
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_SYMHACKS_H
+# define HEADER_SYMHACKS_H
+
+# include <openssl/e_os2.h>
+
+/* Case insensitive linking causes problems.... */
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
+#  undef ERR_load_CRYPTO_strings
+#  define ERR_load_CRYPTO_strings                 ERR_load_CRYPTOlib_strings
+#  undef OCSP_crlID_new
+#  define OCSP_crlID_new                          OCSP_crlID2_new
+
+#  undef d2i_ECPARAMETERS
+#  define d2i_ECPARAMETERS                        d2i_UC_ECPARAMETERS
+#  undef i2d_ECPARAMETERS
+#  define i2d_ECPARAMETERS                        i2d_UC_ECPARAMETERS
+#  undef d2i_ECPKPARAMETERS
+#  define d2i_ECPKPARAMETERS                      d2i_UC_ECPKPARAMETERS
+#  undef i2d_ECPKPARAMETERS
+#  define i2d_ECPKPARAMETERS                      i2d_UC_ECPKPARAMETERS
+
+/*
+ * These functions do not seem to exist! However, I'm paranoid... Original
+ * command in x509v3.h: These functions are being redefined in another
+ * directory, and clash when the linker is case-insensitive, so let's hide
+ * them a little, by giving them an extra 'o' at the beginning of the name...
+ */
+#  undef X509v3_cleanup_extensions
+#  define X509v3_cleanup_extensions               oX509v3_cleanup_extensions
+#  undef X509v3_add_extension
+#  define X509v3_add_extension                    oX509v3_add_extension
+#  undef X509v3_add_netscape_extensions
+#  define X509v3_add_netscape_extensions          oX509v3_add_netscape_extensions
+#  undef X509v3_add_standard_extensions
+#  define X509v3_add_standard_extensions          oX509v3_add_standard_extensions
+
+/* This one clashes with CMS_data_create */
+#  undef cms_Data_create
+#  define cms_Data_create                         priv_cms_Data_create
+
+# endif
+
+#endif                          /* ! defined HEADER_VMS_IDHACKS_H */
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/tls1.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/tls1.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3fe01fe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/tls1.h
@@ -0,0 +1,972 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ *
+ * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ *
+ * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license provided above.
+ *
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
+ * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_TLS1_H
+# define HEADER_TLS1_H
+
+# include <openssl/buffer.h>
+# include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/* Default security level if not overridden at config time */
+# ifndef OPENSSL_TLS_SECURITY_LEVEL
+#  define OPENSSL_TLS_SECURITY_LEVEL 1
+# endif
+
+# define TLS1_VERSION                    0x0301
+# define TLS1_1_VERSION                  0x0302
+# define TLS1_2_VERSION                  0x0303
+# define TLS_MAX_VERSION                 TLS1_2_VERSION
+
+/* Special value for method supporting multiple versions */
+# define TLS_ANY_VERSION                 0x10000
+
+# define TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR              0x03
+# define TLS1_VERSION_MINOR              0x01
+
+# define TLS1_1_VERSION_MAJOR            0x03
+# define TLS1_1_VERSION_MINOR            0x02
+
+# define TLS1_2_VERSION_MAJOR            0x03
+# define TLS1_2_VERSION_MINOR            0x03
+
+# define TLS1_get_version(s) \
+                ((SSL_version(s) >> 8) == TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR ? SSL_version(s) : 0)
+
+# define TLS1_get_client_version(s) \
+                ((SSL_client_version(s) >> 8) == TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR ? SSL_client_version(s) : 0)
+
+# define TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED       21
+# define TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW         22
+# define TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA              48/* fatal */
+# define TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED           49/* fatal */
+# define TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR            50/* fatal */
+# define TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR           51
+# define TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION      60/* fatal */
+# define TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION        70/* fatal */
+# define TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY   71/* fatal */
+# define TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR          80/* fatal */
+# define TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK  86/* fatal */
+# define TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED          90
+# define TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION        100
+/* codes 110-114 are from RFC3546 */
+# define TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION   110
+# define TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE 111
+# define TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME       112
+# define TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE 113
+# define TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE 114
+# define TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY    115/* fatal */
+# define TLS1_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL 120 /* fatal */
+
+/* ExtensionType values from RFC3546 / RFC4366 / RFC6066 */
+# define TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name                 0
+# define TLSEXT_TYPE_max_fragment_length         1
+# define TLSEXT_TYPE_client_certificate_url      2
+# define TLSEXT_TYPE_trusted_ca_keys             3
+# define TLSEXT_TYPE_truncated_hmac              4
+# define TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request              5
+/* ExtensionType values from RFC4681 */
+# define TLSEXT_TYPE_user_mapping                6
+/* ExtensionType values from RFC5878 */
+# define TLSEXT_TYPE_client_authz                7
+# define TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz                8
+/* ExtensionType values from RFC6091 */
+# define TLSEXT_TYPE_cert_type           9
+
+/* ExtensionType values from RFC4492 */
+# define TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves             10
+# define TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats            11
+
+/* ExtensionType value from RFC5054 */
+# define TLSEXT_TYPE_srp                         12
+
+/* ExtensionType values from RFC5246 */
+# define TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms        13
+
+/* ExtensionType value from RFC5764 */
+# define TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp    14
+
+/* ExtensionType value from RFC5620 */
+# define TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat   15
+
+/* ExtensionType value from RFC7301 */
+# define TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation 16
+
+/*
+ * Extension type for Certificate Transparency
+ * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6962#section-3.3.1
+ */
+# define TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp    18
+
+/*
+ * ExtensionType value for TLS padding extension.
+ * http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding
+ */
+# define TLSEXT_TYPE_padding     21
+
+/* ExtensionType value from RFC7366 */
+# define TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac    22
+
+/* ExtensionType value from RFC7627 */
+# define TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret      23
+
+/* ExtensionType value from RFC4507 */
+# define TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket              35
+
+/* Temporary extension type */
+# define TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate                 0xff01
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+/* This is not an IANA defined extension number */
+#  define TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg              13172
+# endif
+
+/* NameType value from RFC3546 */
+# define TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name 0
+/* status request value from RFC3546 */
+# define TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp 1
+
+/* ECPointFormat values from RFC4492 */
+# define TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_first                      0
+# define TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed               0
+# define TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime  1
+# define TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2  2
+# define TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_last                       2
+
+/* Signature and hash algorithms from RFC5246 */
+# define TLSEXT_signature_anonymous                      0
+# define TLSEXT_signature_rsa                            1
+# define TLSEXT_signature_dsa                            2
+# define TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa                          3
+# define TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001                  237
+# define TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256              238
+# define TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512              239
+
+/* Total number of different signature algorithms */
+# define TLSEXT_signature_num                            7
+
+# define TLSEXT_hash_none                                0
+# define TLSEXT_hash_md5                                 1
+# define TLSEXT_hash_sha1                                2
+# define TLSEXT_hash_sha224                              3
+# define TLSEXT_hash_sha256                              4
+# define TLSEXT_hash_sha384                              5
+# define TLSEXT_hash_sha512                              6
+# define TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411                           237
+# define TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256                   238
+# define TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512                   239
+
+/* Total number of different digest algorithms */
+
+# define TLSEXT_hash_num                                 10
+
+/* Flag set for unrecognised algorithms */
+# define TLSEXT_nid_unknown                              0x1000000
+
+/* ECC curves */
+
+# define TLSEXT_curve_P_256                              23
+# define TLSEXT_curve_P_384                              24
+
+# define TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name 255
+
+__owur const char *SSL_get_servername(const SSL *s, const int type);
+__owur int SSL_get_servername_type(const SSL *s);
+/*
+ * SSL_export_keying_material exports a value derived from the master secret,
+ * as specified in RFC 5705. It writes |olen| bytes to |out| given a label and
+ * optional context. (Since a zero length context is allowed, the |use_context|
+ * flag controls whether a context is included.) It returns 1 on success and
+ * 0 or -1 otherwise.
+ */
+__owur int SSL_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
+                                      const char *label, size_t llen,
+                                      const unsigned char *context,
+                                      size_t contextlen, int use_context);
+
+int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
+                    int *psign, int *phash, int *psignandhash,
+                    unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash);
+
+int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
+                           int *psign, int *phash, int *psignandhash,
+                           unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash);
+
+__owur int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain);
+
+# define SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(s,name) \
+SSL_ctrl(s,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME,TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name,(char *)name)
+
+# define SSL_set_tlsext_debug_callback(ssl, cb) \
+SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_DEBUG_CB,(void (*)(void))cb)
+
+# define SSL_set_tlsext_debug_arg(ssl, arg) \
+SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_DEBUG_ARG,0, (void *)arg)
+
+# define SSL_get_tlsext_status_type(ssl) \
+SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_TYPE,0, NULL)
+
+# define SSL_set_tlsext_status_type(ssl, type) \
+SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_TYPE,type, NULL)
+
+# define SSL_get_tlsext_status_exts(ssl, arg) \
+SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_EXTS,0, (void *)arg)
+
+# define SSL_set_tlsext_status_exts(ssl, arg) \
+SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_EXTS,0, (void *)arg)
+
+# define SSL_get_tlsext_status_ids(ssl, arg) \
+SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_IDS,0, (void *)arg)
+
+# define SSL_set_tlsext_status_ids(ssl, arg) \
+SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_IDS,0, (void *)arg)
+
+# define SSL_get_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(ssl, arg) \
+SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_OCSP_RESP,0, (void *)arg)
+
+# define SSL_set_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(ssl, arg, arglen) \
+SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_OCSP_RESP,arglen, (void *)arg)
+
+# define SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(ctx, cb) \
+SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_CB,(void (*)(void))cb)
+
+# define SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK 0
+# define SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING 1
+# define SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL 2
+# define SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK 3
+
+# define SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(ctx, arg) \
+SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_ARG,0, (void *)arg)
+
+# define SSL_CTX_get_tlsext_ticket_keys(ctx, keys, keylen) \
+        SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEYS,(keylen),(keys))
+# define SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_keys(ctx, keys, keylen) \
+        SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEYS,(keylen),(keys))
+
+# define SSL_CTX_get_tlsext_status_cb(ssl, cb) \
+SSL_CTX_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB,0, (void (**)(void))cb)
+# define SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(ssl, cb) \
+SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB,(void (*)(void))cb)
+
+# define SSL_CTX_get_tlsext_status_arg(ssl, arg) \
+        SSL_CTX_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB_ARG,0, (void *)arg)
+# define SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(ssl, arg) \
+        SSL_CTX_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB_ARG,0, (void *)arg)
+
+#define SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_type(ssl, type) \
+        SSL_CTX_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_TYPE, type, NULL)
+
+#define SSL_CTX_get_tlsext_status_type(ssl) \
+        SSL_CTX_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_TYPE, 0, NULL)
+
+# define SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb(ssl, cb) \
+SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEY_CB,(void (*)(void))cb)
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+#  define SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED                   0x01
+#  define SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS        0x02
+#  define SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS        0x04
+#  define SSL_get_dtlsext_heartbeat_pending(ssl) \
+        SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_GET_DTLS_EXT_HEARTBEAT_PENDING,0,NULL)
+#  define SSL_set_dtlsext_heartbeat_no_requests(ssl, arg) \
+        SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_SET_DTLS_EXT_HEARTBEAT_NO_REQUESTS,arg,NULL)
+
+#  if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+#   define SSL_CTRL_TLS_EXT_SEND_HEARTBEAT \
+        SSL_CTRL_DTLS_EXT_SEND_HEARTBEAT
+#   define SSL_CTRL_GET_TLS_EXT_HEARTBEAT_PENDING \
+        SSL_CTRL_GET_DTLS_EXT_HEARTBEAT_PENDING
+#   define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_HEARTBEAT_NO_REQUESTS \
+        SSL_CTRL_SET_DTLS_EXT_HEARTBEAT_NO_REQUESTS
+#   define SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED \
+        SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED
+#   define SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS \
+        SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS
+#   define SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS \
+        SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS
+#   define SSL_get_tlsext_heartbeat_pending(ssl) \
+        SSL_get_dtlsext_heartbeat_pending(ssl)
+#   define SSL_set_tlsext_heartbeat_no_requests(ssl, arg) \
+        SSL_set_dtlsext_heartbeat_no_requests(ssl, arg)
+#  endif
+# endif
+
+/* PSK ciphersuites from 4279 */
+# define TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA                    0x0300008A
+# define TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA               0x0300008B
+# define TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA                0x0300008C
+# define TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA                0x0300008D
+
+# define TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA                0x0300008E
+# define TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA           0x0300008F
+# define TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA            0x03000090
+# define TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA            0x03000091
+
+# define TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA                0x03000092
+# define TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA           0x03000093
+# define TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA            0x03000094
+# define TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA            0x03000095
+
+/* PSK ciphersuites from 5487 */
+# define TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256             0x030000A8
+# define TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384             0x030000A9
+# define TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256         0x030000AA
+# define TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384         0x030000AB
+# define TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256         0x030000AC
+# define TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384         0x030000AD
+
+# define TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256             0x030000AE
+# define TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384             0x030000AF
+# define TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256                    0x030000B0
+# define TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384                    0x030000B1
+
+# define TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256         0x030000B2
+# define TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384         0x030000B3
+# define TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256                0x030000B4
+# define TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384                0x030000B5
+
+# define TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256         0x030000B6
+# define TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384         0x030000B7
+# define TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256                0x030000B8
+# define TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384                0x030000B9
+
+/* NULL PSK ciphersuites from RFC4785 */
+# define TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA                       0x0300002C
+# define TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA                   0x0300002D
+# define TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA                   0x0300002E
+
+/* AES ciphersuites from RFC3268 */
+# define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA                    0x0300002F
+# define TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA                 0x03000030
+# define TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA                 0x03000031
+# define TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA                0x03000032
+# define TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA                0x03000033
+# define TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_128_SHA                    0x03000034
+
+# define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA                    0x03000035
+# define TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA                 0x03000036
+# define TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA                 0x03000037
+# define TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA                0x03000038
+# define TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA                0x03000039
+# define TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_256_SHA                    0x0300003A
+
+/* TLS v1.2 ciphersuites */
+# define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256                    0x0300003B
+# define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256                 0x0300003C
+# define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256                 0x0300003D
+# define TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA256              0x0300003E
+# define TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256              0x0300003F
+# define TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA256             0x03000040
+
+/* Camellia ciphersuites from RFC4132 */
+# define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA           0x03000041
+# define TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA        0x03000042
+# define TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA        0x03000043
+# define TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA       0x03000044
+# define TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA       0x03000045
+# define TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA           0x03000046
+
+/* TLS v1.2 ciphersuites */
+# define TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256             0x03000067
+# define TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA256              0x03000068
+# define TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256              0x03000069
+# define TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA256             0x0300006A
+# define TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256             0x0300006B
+# define TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_128_SHA256                 0x0300006C
+# define TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_256_SHA256                 0x0300006D
+
+/* Camellia ciphersuites from RFC4132 */
+# define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA           0x03000084
+# define TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA        0x03000085
+# define TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA        0x03000086
+# define TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA       0x03000087
+# define TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA       0x03000088
+# define TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA           0x03000089
+
+/* SEED ciphersuites from RFC4162 */
+# define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA                       0x03000096
+# define TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_SEED_SHA                    0x03000097
+# define TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA                    0x03000098
+# define TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_SHA                   0x03000099
+# define TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA                   0x0300009A
+# define TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_SEED_SHA                       0x0300009B
+
+/* TLS v1.2 GCM ciphersuites from RFC5288 */
+# define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256             0x0300009C
+# define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384             0x0300009D
+# define TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256         0x0300009E
+# define TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384         0x0300009F
+# define TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256          0x030000A0
+# define TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384          0x030000A1
+# define TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256         0x030000A2
+# define TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384         0x030000A3
+# define TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256          0x030000A4
+# define TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384          0x030000A5
+# define TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256             0x030000A6
+# define TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384             0x030000A7
+
+/* CCM ciphersuites from RFC6655 */
+# define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM                    0x0300C09C
+# define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM                    0x0300C09D
+# define TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM                0x0300C09E
+# define TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM                0x0300C09F
+# define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8                  0x0300C0A0
+# define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8                  0x0300C0A1
+# define TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8              0x0300C0A2
+# define TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8              0x0300C0A3
+# define TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM                    0x0300C0A4
+# define TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM                    0x0300C0A5
+# define TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM                0x0300C0A6
+# define TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM                0x0300C0A7
+# define TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8                  0x0300C0A8
+# define TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8                  0x0300C0A9
+# define TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8              0x0300C0AA
+# define TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8              0x0300C0AB
+
+/* CCM ciphersuites from RFC7251 */
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM            0x0300C0AC
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM            0x0300C0AD
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8          0x0300C0AE
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8          0x0300C0AF
+
+/* TLS 1.2 Camellia SHA-256 ciphersuites from RFC5932 */
+# define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256                0x030000BA
+# define TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256             0x030000BB
+# define TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256             0x030000BC
+# define TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256            0x030000BD
+# define TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256            0x030000BE
+# define TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256                0x030000BF
+
+# define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256                0x030000C0
+# define TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256             0x030000C1
+# define TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256             0x030000C2
+# define TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256            0x030000C3
+# define TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256            0x030000C4
+# define TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256                0x030000C5
+
+/* ECC ciphersuites from RFC4492 */
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA                0x0300C001
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA             0x0300C002
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA        0x0300C003
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA         0x0300C004
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA         0x0300C005
+
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA               0x0300C006
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA            0x0300C007
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA       0x0300C008
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA        0x0300C009
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA        0x0300C00A
+
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA                  0x0300C00B
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA               0x0300C00C
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA          0x0300C00D
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA           0x0300C00E
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA           0x0300C00F
+
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA                 0x0300C010
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA              0x0300C011
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA         0x0300C012
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA          0x0300C013
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA          0x0300C014
+
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA                 0x0300C015
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA              0x0300C016
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDH_anon_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA         0x0300C017
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA          0x0300C018
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA          0x0300C019
+
+/* SRP ciphersuites from RFC 5054 */
+# define TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA           0x0300C01A
+# define TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA       0x0300C01B
+# define TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA       0x0300C01C
+# define TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA            0x0300C01D
+# define TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA        0x0300C01E
+# define TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA        0x0300C01F
+# define TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA            0x0300C020
+# define TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA        0x0300C021
+# define TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA        0x0300C022
+
+/* ECDH HMAC based ciphersuites from RFC5289 */
+
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256         0x0300C023
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384         0x0300C024
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256          0x0300C025
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384          0x0300C026
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256           0x0300C027
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384           0x0300C028
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256            0x0300C029
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384            0x0300C02A
+
+/* ECDH GCM based ciphersuites from RFC5289 */
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256     0x0300C02B
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384     0x0300C02C
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256      0x0300C02D
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384      0x0300C02E
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256       0x0300C02F
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384       0x0300C030
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256        0x0300C031
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384        0x0300C032
+
+/* ECDHE PSK ciphersuites from RFC5489 */
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA              0x0300C033
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA         0x0300C034
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA          0x0300C035
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA          0x0300C036
+
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256       0x0300C037
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384       0x0300C038
+
+/* NULL PSK ciphersuites from RFC4785 */
+
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA                 0x0300C039
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256              0x0300C03A
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384              0x0300C03B
+
+/* Camellia-CBC ciphersuites from RFC6367 */
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0x0300C072
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0x0300C073
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256  0x0300C074
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384  0x0300C075
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256   0x0300C076
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384   0x0300C077
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256    0x0300C078
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384    0x0300C079
+
+# define TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256         0x0300C094
+# define TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384         0x0300C095
+# define TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256     0x0300C096
+# define TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384     0x0300C097
+# define TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256     0x0300C098
+# define TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384     0x0300C099
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256   0x0300C09A
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384   0x0300C09B
+
+/* draft-ietf-tls-chacha20-poly1305-03 */
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305         0x0300CCA8
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305       0x0300CCA9
+# define TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305           0x0300CCAA
+# define TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305               0x0300CCAB
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305         0x0300CCAC
+# define TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305           0x0300CCAD
+# define TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305           0x0300CCAE
+
+/*
+ * XXX Backward compatibility alert: Older versions of OpenSSL gave some DHE
+ * ciphers names with "EDH" instead of "DHE".  Going forward, we should be
+ * using DHE everywhere, though we may indefinitely maintain aliases for
+ * users or configurations that used "EDH"
+ */
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA               "DHE-DSS-RC4-SHA"
+
+# define TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA                      "PSK-NULL-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA                  "DHE-PSK-NULL-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA                  "RSA-PSK-NULL-SHA"
+
+/* AES ciphersuites from RFC3268 */
+# define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA                   "AES128-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA                "DH-DSS-AES128-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA                "DH-RSA-AES128-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA               "DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA               "DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_128_SHA                   "ADH-AES128-SHA"
+
+# define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA                   "AES256-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA                "DH-DSS-AES256-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA                "DH-RSA-AES256-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA               "DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA               "DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_256_SHA                   "ADH-AES256-SHA"
+
+/* ECC ciphersuites from RFC4492 */
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA               "ECDH-ECDSA-NULL-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA            "ECDH-ECDSA-RC4-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA       "ECDH-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA        "ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA        "ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-SHA"
+
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA              "ECDHE-ECDSA-NULL-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA           "ECDHE-ECDSA-RC4-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA      "ECDHE-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA       "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA       "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA"
+
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA                 "ECDH-RSA-NULL-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA              "ECDH-RSA-RC4-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA         "ECDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA          "ECDH-RSA-AES128-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA          "ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA"
+
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA                "ECDHE-RSA-NULL-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA             "ECDHE-RSA-RC4-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA        "ECDHE-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA         "ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA         "ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA"
+
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA                "AECDH-NULL-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA             "AECDH-RC4-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_anon_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA        "AECDH-DES-CBC3-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA         "AECDH-AES128-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA         "AECDH-AES256-SHA"
+
+/* PSK ciphersuites from RFC 4279 */
+# define TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA                   "PSK-RC4-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA              "PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA               "PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA               "PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA"
+
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA               "DHE-PSK-RC4-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA          "DHE-PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA           "DHE-PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA           "DHE-PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA               "RSA-PSK-RC4-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA          "RSA-PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA           "RSA-PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA           "RSA-PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA"
+
+/* PSK ciphersuites from RFC 5487 */
+# define TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256            "PSK-AES128-GCM-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384            "PSK-AES256-GCM-SHA384"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256        "DHE-PSK-AES128-GCM-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384        "DHE-PSK-AES256-GCM-SHA384"
+# define TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256        "RSA-PSK-AES128-GCM-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384        "RSA-PSK-AES256-GCM-SHA384"
+
+# define TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256            "PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384            "PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA384"
+# define TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256                   "PSK-NULL-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384                   "PSK-NULL-SHA384"
+
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256        "DHE-PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384        "DHE-PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA384"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256               "DHE-PSK-NULL-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384               "DHE-PSK-NULL-SHA384"
+
+# define TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256        "RSA-PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384        "RSA-PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA384"
+# define TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256               "RSA-PSK-NULL-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384               "RSA-PSK-NULL-SHA384"
+
+/* SRP ciphersuite from RFC 5054 */
+# define TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA          "SRP-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA      "SRP-RSA-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA      "SRP-DSS-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA           "SRP-AES-128-CBC-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA       "SRP-RSA-AES-128-CBC-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA       "SRP-DSS-AES-128-CBC-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA           "SRP-AES-256-CBC-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA       "SRP-RSA-AES-256-CBC-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA       "SRP-DSS-AES-256-CBC-SHA"
+
+/* Camellia ciphersuites from RFC4132 */
+# define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA          "CAMELLIA128-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA       "DH-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA       "DH-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA      "DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA      "DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA          "ADH-CAMELLIA128-SHA"
+
+# define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA          "CAMELLIA256-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA       "DH-DSS-CAMELLIA256-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA       "DH-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA      "DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA256-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA      "DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA          "ADH-CAMELLIA256-SHA"
+
+/* TLS 1.2 Camellia SHA-256 ciphersuites from RFC5932 */
+# define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256               "CAMELLIA128-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256            "DH-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256            "DH-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256           "DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256           "DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256               "ADH-CAMELLIA128-SHA256"
+
+# define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256               "CAMELLIA256-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256            "DH-DSS-CAMELLIA256-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256            "DH-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256           "DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA256-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256           "DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256               "ADH-CAMELLIA256-SHA256"
+
+# define TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256               "PSK-CAMELLIA128-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384               "PSK-CAMELLIA256-SHA384"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256           "DHE-PSK-CAMELLIA128-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384           "DHE-PSK-CAMELLIA256-SHA384"
+# define TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256           "RSA-PSK-CAMELLIA128-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384           "RSA-PSK-CAMELLIA256-SHA384"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256         "ECDHE-PSK-CAMELLIA128-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384         "ECDHE-PSK-CAMELLIA256-SHA384"
+
+/* SEED ciphersuites from RFC4162 */
+# define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA                      "SEED-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_SEED_SHA                   "DH-DSS-SEED-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA                   "DH-RSA-SEED-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_SHA                  "DHE-DSS-SEED-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA                  "DHE-RSA-SEED-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_SEED_SHA                      "ADH-SEED-SHA"
+
+/* TLS v1.2 ciphersuites */
+# define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256                   "NULL-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256                "AES128-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256                "AES256-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA256             "DH-DSS-AES128-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256             "DH-RSA-AES128-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA256            "DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256            "DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA256             "DH-DSS-AES256-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256             "DH-RSA-AES256-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA256            "DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256            "DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_128_SHA256                "ADH-AES128-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_256_SHA256                "ADH-AES256-SHA256"
+
+/* TLS v1.2 GCM ciphersuites from RFC5288 */
+# define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256            "AES128-GCM-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384            "AES256-GCM-SHA384"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256        "DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384        "DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256         "DH-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384         "DH-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256        "DHE-DSS-AES128-GCM-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384        "DHE-DSS-AES256-GCM-SHA384"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256         "DH-DSS-AES128-GCM-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384         "DH-DSS-AES256-GCM-SHA384"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256            "ADH-AES128-GCM-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384            "ADH-AES256-GCM-SHA384"
+
+/* CCM ciphersuites from RFC6655 */
+
+# define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM                   "AES128-CCM"
+# define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM                   "AES256-CCM"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM               "DHE-RSA-AES128-CCM"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM               "DHE-RSA-AES256-CCM"
+
+# define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8                 "AES128-CCM8"
+# define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8                 "AES256-CCM8"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8             "DHE-RSA-AES128-CCM8"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8             "DHE-RSA-AES256-CCM8"
+
+# define TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM                   "PSK-AES128-CCM"
+# define TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM                   "PSK-AES256-CCM"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM               "DHE-PSK-AES128-CCM"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM               "DHE-PSK-AES256-CCM"
+
+# define TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8                 "PSK-AES128-CCM8"
+# define TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8                 "PSK-AES256-CCM8"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8             "DHE-PSK-AES128-CCM8"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8             "DHE-PSK-AES256-CCM8"
+
+/* CCM ciphersuites from RFC7251 */
+
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM       "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-CCM"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM       "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-CCM"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8     "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-CCM8"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8     "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-CCM8"
+
+/* ECDH HMAC based ciphersuites from RFC5289 */
+
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256    "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384    "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256     "ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384     "ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256      "ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384      "ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256       "ECDH-RSA-AES128-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384       "ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA384"
+
+/* ECDH GCM based ciphersuites from RFC5289 */
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256    "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384    "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256     "ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384     "ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256      "ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384      "ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256       "ECDH-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384       "ECDH-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"
+
+/* TLS v1.2 PSK GCM ciphersuites from RFC5487 */
+# define TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256            "PSK-AES128-GCM-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384            "PSK-AES256-GCM-SHA384"
+
+/* ECDHE PSK ciphersuites from RFC 5489 */
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA               "ECDHE-PSK-RC4-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA          "ECDHE-PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA           "ECDHE-PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA           "ECDHE-PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA"
+
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256        "ECDHE-PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384        "ECDHE-PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA384"
+
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA                  "ECDHE-PSK-NULL-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256               "ECDHE-PSK-NULL-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384               "ECDHE-PSK-NULL-SHA384"
+
+/* Camellia-CBC ciphersuites from RFC6367 */
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 "ECDHE-ECDSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 "ECDHE-ECDSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA384"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256  "ECDH-ECDSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384  "ECDH-ECDSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA384"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256   "ECDHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384   "ECDHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA384"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256    "ECDH-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384    "ECDH-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA384"
+
+/* draft-ietf-tls-chacha20-poly1305-03 */
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305         "ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305       "ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305           "DHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305"
+# define TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305               "PSK-CHACHA20-POLY1305"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305         "ECDHE-PSK-CHACHA20-POLY1305"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305           "DHE-PSK-CHACHA20-POLY1305"
+# define TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305           "RSA-PSK-CHACHA20-POLY1305"
+
+# define TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN                 1
+# define TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN                 2
+# define TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH             3
+# define TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH             4
+# define TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN               64
+# define TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_ECDH           65
+# define TLS_CT_ECDSA_FIXED_ECDH         66
+# define TLS_CT_GOST01_SIGN              22
+# define TLS_CT_GOST12_SIGN              238
+# define TLS_CT_GOST12_512_SIGN          239
+
+/*
+ * when correcting this number, correct also SSL3_CT_NUMBER in ssl3.h (see
+ * comment there)
+ */
+# define TLS_CT_NUMBER                   9
+
+# define TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH          12
+
+# define TLS_MD_MAX_CONST_SIZE                   22
+# define TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST              "client finished"
+# define TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE         15
+# define TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST              "server finished"
+# define TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE         15
+# define TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST              "key expansion"
+# define TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE         13
+# define TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST           "client write key"
+# define TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST_SIZE      16
+# define TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST           "server write key"
+# define TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST_SIZE      16
+# define TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST                   "IV block"
+# define TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST_SIZE              8
+# define TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST              "master secret"
+# define TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE         13
+# define TLS_MD_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_CONST     "extended master secret"
+# define TLS_MD_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE        22
+
+# ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+#  undef TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
+/*
+ * client finished
+ */
+#  define TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST    "\x63\x6c\x69\x65\x6e\x74\x20\x66\x69\x6e\x69\x73\x68\x65\x64"
+
+#  undef TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
+/*
+ * server finished
+ */
+#  define TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST    "\x73\x65\x72\x76\x65\x72\x20\x66\x69\x6e\x69\x73\x68\x65\x64"
+
+#  undef TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST
+/*
+ * server write key
+ */
+#  define TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST "\x73\x65\x72\x76\x65\x72\x20\x77\x72\x69\x74\x65\x20\x6b\x65\x79"
+
+#  undef TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST
+/*
+ * key expansion
+ */
+#  define TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST    "\x6b\x65\x79\x20\x65\x78\x70\x61\x6e\x73\x69\x6f\x6e"
+
+#  undef TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST
+/*
+ * client write key
+ */
+#  define TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST "\x63\x6c\x69\x65\x6e\x74\x20\x77\x72\x69\x74\x65\x20\x6b\x65\x79"
+
+#  undef TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST
+/*
+ * server write key
+ */
+#  define TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST "\x73\x65\x72\x76\x65\x72\x20\x77\x72\x69\x74\x65\x20\x6b\x65\x79"
+
+#  undef TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST
+/*
+ * IV block
+ */
+#  define TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST         "\x49\x56\x20\x62\x6c\x6f\x63\x6b"
+
+#  undef TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST
+/*
+ * master secret
+ */
+#  define TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST    "\x6d\x61\x73\x74\x65\x72\x20\x73\x65\x63\x72\x65\x74"
+#  undef TLS_MD_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_CONST
+/*
+ * extended master secret
+ */
+#  define TLS_MD_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_CONST    "\x65\x78\x74\x65\x63\x64\x65\x64\x20\x6d\x61\x73\x74\x65\x72\x20\x73\x65\x63\x72\x65\x74"
+# endif
+
+/* TLS Session Ticket extension struct */
+struct tls_session_ticket_ext_st {
+    unsigned short length;
+    void *data;
+};
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/ts.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/ts.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a565982
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/ts.h
@@ -0,0 +1,643 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_TS_H
+# define HEADER_TS_H
+
+# include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TS
+# include <openssl/symhacks.h>
+# include <openssl/buffer.h>
+# include <openssl/evp.h>
+# include <openssl/bio.h>
+# include <openssl/stack.h>
+# include <openssl/asn1.h>
+# include <openssl/safestack.h>
+# include <openssl/rsa.h>
+# include <openssl/dsa.h>
+# include <openssl/dh.h>
+# ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+# endif
+
+# include <openssl/x509.h>
+# include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+
+typedef struct TS_msg_imprint_st TS_MSG_IMPRINT;
+typedef struct TS_req_st TS_REQ;
+typedef struct TS_accuracy_st TS_ACCURACY;
+typedef struct TS_tst_info_st TS_TST_INFO;
+
+/* Possible values for status. */
+# define TS_STATUS_GRANTED                       0
+# define TS_STATUS_GRANTED_WITH_MODS             1
+# define TS_STATUS_REJECTION                     2
+# define TS_STATUS_WAITING                       3
+# define TS_STATUS_REVOCATION_WARNING            4
+# define TS_STATUS_REVOCATION_NOTIFICATION       5
+
+/* Possible values for failure_info. */
+# define TS_INFO_BAD_ALG                 0
+# define TS_INFO_BAD_REQUEST             2
+# define TS_INFO_BAD_DATA_FORMAT         5
+# define TS_INFO_TIME_NOT_AVAILABLE      14
+# define TS_INFO_UNACCEPTED_POLICY       15
+# define TS_INFO_UNACCEPTED_EXTENSION    16
+# define TS_INFO_ADD_INFO_NOT_AVAILABLE  17
+# define TS_INFO_SYSTEM_FAILURE          25
+
+
+typedef struct TS_status_info_st TS_STATUS_INFO;
+typedef struct ESS_issuer_serial ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL;
+typedef struct ESS_cert_id ESS_CERT_ID;
+typedef struct ESS_signing_cert ESS_SIGNING_CERT;
+
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(ESS_CERT_ID)
+
+typedef struct TS_resp_st TS_RESP;
+
+TS_REQ *TS_REQ_new(void);
+void TS_REQ_free(TS_REQ *a);
+int i2d_TS_REQ(const TS_REQ *a, unsigned char **pp);
+TS_REQ *d2i_TS_REQ(TS_REQ **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length);
+
+TS_REQ *TS_REQ_dup(TS_REQ *a);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+TS_REQ *d2i_TS_REQ_fp(FILE *fp, TS_REQ **a);
+int i2d_TS_REQ_fp(FILE *fp, TS_REQ *a);
+#endif
+TS_REQ *d2i_TS_REQ_bio(BIO *fp, TS_REQ **a);
+int i2d_TS_REQ_bio(BIO *fp, TS_REQ *a);
+
+TS_MSG_IMPRINT *TS_MSG_IMPRINT_new(void);
+void TS_MSG_IMPRINT_free(TS_MSG_IMPRINT *a);
+int i2d_TS_MSG_IMPRINT(const TS_MSG_IMPRINT *a, unsigned char **pp);
+TS_MSG_IMPRINT *d2i_TS_MSG_IMPRINT(TS_MSG_IMPRINT **a,
+                                   const unsigned char **pp, long length);
+
+TS_MSG_IMPRINT *TS_MSG_IMPRINT_dup(TS_MSG_IMPRINT *a);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+TS_MSG_IMPRINT *d2i_TS_MSG_IMPRINT_fp(FILE *fp, TS_MSG_IMPRINT **a);
+int i2d_TS_MSG_IMPRINT_fp(FILE *fp, TS_MSG_IMPRINT *a);
+#endif
+TS_MSG_IMPRINT *d2i_TS_MSG_IMPRINT_bio(BIO *bio, TS_MSG_IMPRINT **a);
+int i2d_TS_MSG_IMPRINT_bio(BIO *bio, TS_MSG_IMPRINT *a);
+
+TS_RESP *TS_RESP_new(void);
+void TS_RESP_free(TS_RESP *a);
+int i2d_TS_RESP(const TS_RESP *a, unsigned char **pp);
+TS_RESP *d2i_TS_RESP(TS_RESP **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length);
+TS_TST_INFO *PKCS7_to_TS_TST_INFO(PKCS7 *token);
+TS_RESP *TS_RESP_dup(TS_RESP *a);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+TS_RESP *d2i_TS_RESP_fp(FILE *fp, TS_RESP **a);
+int i2d_TS_RESP_fp(FILE *fp, TS_RESP *a);
+#endif
+TS_RESP *d2i_TS_RESP_bio(BIO *bio, TS_RESP **a);
+int i2d_TS_RESP_bio(BIO *bio, TS_RESP *a);
+
+TS_STATUS_INFO *TS_STATUS_INFO_new(void);
+void TS_STATUS_INFO_free(TS_STATUS_INFO *a);
+int i2d_TS_STATUS_INFO(const TS_STATUS_INFO *a, unsigned char **pp);
+TS_STATUS_INFO *d2i_TS_STATUS_INFO(TS_STATUS_INFO **a,
+                                   const unsigned char **pp, long length);
+TS_STATUS_INFO *TS_STATUS_INFO_dup(TS_STATUS_INFO *a);
+
+TS_TST_INFO *TS_TST_INFO_new(void);
+void TS_TST_INFO_free(TS_TST_INFO *a);
+int i2d_TS_TST_INFO(const TS_TST_INFO *a, unsigned char **pp);
+TS_TST_INFO *d2i_TS_TST_INFO(TS_TST_INFO **a, const unsigned char **pp,
+                             long length);
+TS_TST_INFO *TS_TST_INFO_dup(TS_TST_INFO *a);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+TS_TST_INFO *d2i_TS_TST_INFO_fp(FILE *fp, TS_TST_INFO **a);
+int i2d_TS_TST_INFO_fp(FILE *fp, TS_TST_INFO *a);
+#endif
+TS_TST_INFO *d2i_TS_TST_INFO_bio(BIO *bio, TS_TST_INFO **a);
+int i2d_TS_TST_INFO_bio(BIO *bio, TS_TST_INFO *a);
+
+TS_ACCURACY *TS_ACCURACY_new(void);
+void TS_ACCURACY_free(TS_ACCURACY *a);
+int i2d_TS_ACCURACY(const TS_ACCURACY *a, unsigned char **pp);
+TS_ACCURACY *d2i_TS_ACCURACY(TS_ACCURACY **a, const unsigned char **pp,
+                             long length);
+TS_ACCURACY *TS_ACCURACY_dup(TS_ACCURACY *a);
+
+ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL *ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL_new(void);
+void ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL_free(ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL *a);
+int i2d_ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL(const ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL *a, unsigned char **pp);
+ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL *d2i_ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL(ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL **a,
+                                         const unsigned char **pp,
+                                         long length);
+ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL *ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL_dup(ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL *a);
+
+ESS_CERT_ID *ESS_CERT_ID_new(void);
+void ESS_CERT_ID_free(ESS_CERT_ID *a);
+int i2d_ESS_CERT_ID(const ESS_CERT_ID *a, unsigned char **pp);
+ESS_CERT_ID *d2i_ESS_CERT_ID(ESS_CERT_ID **a, const unsigned char **pp,
+                             long length);
+ESS_CERT_ID *ESS_CERT_ID_dup(ESS_CERT_ID *a);
+
+ESS_SIGNING_CERT *ESS_SIGNING_CERT_new(void);
+void ESS_SIGNING_CERT_free(ESS_SIGNING_CERT *a);
+int i2d_ESS_SIGNING_CERT(const ESS_SIGNING_CERT *a, unsigned char **pp);
+ESS_SIGNING_CERT *d2i_ESS_SIGNING_CERT(ESS_SIGNING_CERT **a,
+                                       const unsigned char **pp, long length);
+ESS_SIGNING_CERT *ESS_SIGNING_CERT_dup(ESS_SIGNING_CERT *a);
+
+int TS_REQ_set_version(TS_REQ *a, long version);
+long TS_REQ_get_version(const TS_REQ *a);
+
+int TS_STATUS_INFO_set_status(TS_STATUS_INFO *a, int i);
+const ASN1_INTEGER *TS_STATUS_INFO_get0_status(const TS_STATUS_INFO *a);
+
+const STACK_OF(ASN1_UTF8STRING) *
+TS_STATUS_INFO_get0_text(const TS_STATUS_INFO *a);
+
+const ASN1_BIT_STRING *
+TS_STATUS_INFO_get0_failure_info(const TS_STATUS_INFO *a);
+
+int TS_REQ_set_msg_imprint(TS_REQ *a, TS_MSG_IMPRINT *msg_imprint);
+TS_MSG_IMPRINT *TS_REQ_get_msg_imprint(TS_REQ *a);
+
+int TS_MSG_IMPRINT_set_algo(TS_MSG_IMPRINT *a, X509_ALGOR *alg);
+X509_ALGOR *TS_MSG_IMPRINT_get_algo(TS_MSG_IMPRINT *a);
+
+int TS_MSG_IMPRINT_set_msg(TS_MSG_IMPRINT *a, unsigned char *d, int len);
+ASN1_OCTET_STRING *TS_MSG_IMPRINT_get_msg(TS_MSG_IMPRINT *a);
+
+int TS_REQ_set_policy_id(TS_REQ *a, const ASN1_OBJECT *policy);
+ASN1_OBJECT *TS_REQ_get_policy_id(TS_REQ *a);
+
+int TS_REQ_set_nonce(TS_REQ *a, const ASN1_INTEGER *nonce);
+const ASN1_INTEGER *TS_REQ_get_nonce(const TS_REQ *a);
+
+int TS_REQ_set_cert_req(TS_REQ *a, int cert_req);
+int TS_REQ_get_cert_req(const TS_REQ *a);
+
+STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *TS_REQ_get_exts(TS_REQ *a);
+void TS_REQ_ext_free(TS_REQ *a);
+int TS_REQ_get_ext_count(TS_REQ *a);
+int TS_REQ_get_ext_by_NID(TS_REQ *a, int nid, int lastpos);
+int TS_REQ_get_ext_by_OBJ(TS_REQ *a, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int lastpos);
+int TS_REQ_get_ext_by_critical(TS_REQ *a, int crit, int lastpos);
+X509_EXTENSION *TS_REQ_get_ext(TS_REQ *a, int loc);
+X509_EXTENSION *TS_REQ_delete_ext(TS_REQ *a, int loc);
+int TS_REQ_add_ext(TS_REQ *a, X509_EXTENSION *ex, int loc);
+void *TS_REQ_get_ext_d2i(TS_REQ *a, int nid, int *crit, int *idx);
+
+/* Function declarations for TS_REQ defined in ts/ts_req_print.c */
+
+int TS_REQ_print_bio(BIO *bio, TS_REQ *a);
+
+/* Function declarations for TS_RESP defined in ts/ts_resp_utils.c */
+
+int TS_RESP_set_status_info(TS_RESP *a, TS_STATUS_INFO *info);
+TS_STATUS_INFO *TS_RESP_get_status_info(TS_RESP *a);
+
+/* Caller loses ownership of PKCS7 and TS_TST_INFO objects. */
+void TS_RESP_set_tst_info(TS_RESP *a, PKCS7 *p7, TS_TST_INFO *tst_info);
+PKCS7 *TS_RESP_get_token(TS_RESP *a);
+TS_TST_INFO *TS_RESP_get_tst_info(TS_RESP *a);
+
+int TS_TST_INFO_set_version(TS_TST_INFO *a, long version);
+long TS_TST_INFO_get_version(const TS_TST_INFO *a);
+
+int TS_TST_INFO_set_policy_id(TS_TST_INFO *a, ASN1_OBJECT *policy_id);
+ASN1_OBJECT *TS_TST_INFO_get_policy_id(TS_TST_INFO *a);
+
+int TS_TST_INFO_set_msg_imprint(TS_TST_INFO *a, TS_MSG_IMPRINT *msg_imprint);
+TS_MSG_IMPRINT *TS_TST_INFO_get_msg_imprint(TS_TST_INFO *a);
+
+int TS_TST_INFO_set_serial(TS_TST_INFO *a, const ASN1_INTEGER *serial);
+const ASN1_INTEGER *TS_TST_INFO_get_serial(const TS_TST_INFO *a);
+
+int TS_TST_INFO_set_time(TS_TST_INFO *a, const ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *gtime);
+const ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *TS_TST_INFO_get_time(const TS_TST_INFO *a);
+
+int TS_TST_INFO_set_accuracy(TS_TST_INFO *a, TS_ACCURACY *accuracy);
+TS_ACCURACY *TS_TST_INFO_get_accuracy(TS_TST_INFO *a);
+
+int TS_ACCURACY_set_seconds(TS_ACCURACY *a, const ASN1_INTEGER *seconds);
+const ASN1_INTEGER *TS_ACCURACY_get_seconds(const TS_ACCURACY *a);
+
+int TS_ACCURACY_set_millis(TS_ACCURACY *a, const ASN1_INTEGER *millis);
+const ASN1_INTEGER *TS_ACCURACY_get_millis(const TS_ACCURACY *a);
+
+int TS_ACCURACY_set_micros(TS_ACCURACY *a, const ASN1_INTEGER *micros);
+const ASN1_INTEGER *TS_ACCURACY_get_micros(const TS_ACCURACY *a);
+
+int TS_TST_INFO_set_ordering(TS_TST_INFO *a, int ordering);
+int TS_TST_INFO_get_ordering(const TS_TST_INFO *a);
+
+int TS_TST_INFO_set_nonce(TS_TST_INFO *a, const ASN1_INTEGER *nonce);
+const ASN1_INTEGER *TS_TST_INFO_get_nonce(const TS_TST_INFO *a);
+
+int TS_TST_INFO_set_tsa(TS_TST_INFO *a, GENERAL_NAME *tsa);
+GENERAL_NAME *TS_TST_INFO_get_tsa(TS_TST_INFO *a);
+
+STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *TS_TST_INFO_get_exts(TS_TST_INFO *a);
+void TS_TST_INFO_ext_free(TS_TST_INFO *a);
+int TS_TST_INFO_get_ext_count(TS_TST_INFO *a);
+int TS_TST_INFO_get_ext_by_NID(TS_TST_INFO *a, int nid, int lastpos);
+int TS_TST_INFO_get_ext_by_OBJ(TS_TST_INFO *a, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj,
+                               int lastpos);
+int TS_TST_INFO_get_ext_by_critical(TS_TST_INFO *a, int crit, int lastpos);
+X509_EXTENSION *TS_TST_INFO_get_ext(TS_TST_INFO *a, int loc);
+X509_EXTENSION *TS_TST_INFO_delete_ext(TS_TST_INFO *a, int loc);
+int TS_TST_INFO_add_ext(TS_TST_INFO *a, X509_EXTENSION *ex, int loc);
+void *TS_TST_INFO_get_ext_d2i(TS_TST_INFO *a, int nid, int *crit, int *idx);
+
+/*
+ * Declarations related to response generation, defined in ts/ts_resp_sign.c.
+ */
+
+/* Optional flags for response generation. */
+
+/* Don't include the TSA name in response. */
+# define TS_TSA_NAME             0x01
+
+/* Set ordering to true in response. */
+# define TS_ORDERING             0x02
+
+/*
+ * Include the signer certificate and the other specified certificates in
+ * the ESS signing certificate attribute beside the PKCS7 signed data.
+ * Only the signer certificates is included by default.
+ */
+# define TS_ESS_CERT_ID_CHAIN    0x04
+
+/* Forward declaration. */
+struct TS_resp_ctx;
+
+/* This must return a unique number less than 160 bits long. */
+typedef ASN1_INTEGER *(*TS_serial_cb) (struct TS_resp_ctx *, void *);
+
+/*
+ * This must return the seconds and microseconds since Jan 1, 1970 in the sec
+ * and usec variables allocated by the caller. Return non-zero for success
+ * and zero for failure.
+ */
+typedef int (*TS_time_cb) (struct TS_resp_ctx *, void *, long *sec,
+                           long *usec);
+
+/*
+ * This must process the given extension. It can modify the TS_TST_INFO
+ * object of the context. Return values: !0 (processed), 0 (error, it must
+ * set the status info/failure info of the response).
+ */
+typedef int (*TS_extension_cb) (struct TS_resp_ctx *, X509_EXTENSION *,
+                                void *);
+
+typedef struct TS_resp_ctx TS_RESP_CTX;
+
+DEFINE_STACK_OF_CONST(EVP_MD)
+
+/* Creates a response context that can be used for generating responses. */
+TS_RESP_CTX *TS_RESP_CTX_new(void);
+void TS_RESP_CTX_free(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx);
+
+/* This parameter must be set. */
+int TS_RESP_CTX_set_signer_cert(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx, X509 *signer);
+
+/* This parameter must be set. */
+int TS_RESP_CTX_set_signer_key(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *key);
+
+int TS_RESP_CTX_set_signer_digest(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx,
+                                  const EVP_MD *signer_digest);
+
+/* This parameter must be set. */
+int TS_RESP_CTX_set_def_policy(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx, const ASN1_OBJECT *def_policy);
+
+/* No additional certs are included in the response by default. */
+int TS_RESP_CTX_set_certs(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *certs);
+
+/*
+ * Adds a new acceptable policy, only the default policy is accepted by
+ * default.
+ */
+int TS_RESP_CTX_add_policy(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx, const ASN1_OBJECT *policy);
+
+/*
+ * Adds a new acceptable message digest. Note that no message digests are
+ * accepted by default. The md argument is shared with the caller.
+ */
+int TS_RESP_CTX_add_md(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md);
+
+/* Accuracy is not included by default. */
+int TS_RESP_CTX_set_accuracy(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx,
+                             int secs, int millis, int micros);
+
+/*
+ * Clock precision digits, i.e. the number of decimal digits: '0' means sec,
+ * '3' msec, '6' usec, and so on. Default is 0.
+ */
+int TS_RESP_CTX_set_clock_precision_digits(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx,
+                                           unsigned clock_precision_digits);
+/* At most we accept usec precision. */
+# define TS_MAX_CLOCK_PRECISION_DIGITS   6
+
+/* Maximum status message length */
+# define TS_MAX_STATUS_LENGTH   (1024 * 1024)
+
+/* No flags are set by default. */
+void TS_RESP_CTX_add_flags(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx, int flags);
+
+/* Default callback always returns a constant. */
+void TS_RESP_CTX_set_serial_cb(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx, TS_serial_cb cb, void *data);
+
+/* Default callback uses the gettimeofday() and gmtime() system calls. */
+void TS_RESP_CTX_set_time_cb(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx, TS_time_cb cb, void *data);
+
+/*
+ * Default callback rejects all extensions. The extension callback is called
+ * when the TS_TST_INFO object is already set up and not signed yet.
+ */
+/* FIXME: extension handling is not tested yet. */
+void TS_RESP_CTX_set_extension_cb(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx,
+                                  TS_extension_cb cb, void *data);
+
+/* The following methods can be used in the callbacks. */
+int TS_RESP_CTX_set_status_info(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx,
+                                int status, const char *text);
+
+/* Sets the status info only if it is still TS_STATUS_GRANTED. */
+int TS_RESP_CTX_set_status_info_cond(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx,
+                                     int status, const char *text);
+
+int TS_RESP_CTX_add_failure_info(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx, int failure);
+
+/* The get methods below can be used in the extension callback. */
+TS_REQ *TS_RESP_CTX_get_request(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx);
+
+TS_TST_INFO *TS_RESP_CTX_get_tst_info(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx);
+
+/*
+ * Creates the signed TS_TST_INFO and puts it in TS_RESP.
+ * In case of errors it sets the status info properly.
+ * Returns NULL only in case of memory allocation/fatal error.
+ */
+TS_RESP *TS_RESP_create_response(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx, BIO *req_bio);
+
+/*
+ * Declarations related to response verification,
+ * they are defined in ts/ts_resp_verify.c.
+ */
+
+int TS_RESP_verify_signature(PKCS7 *token, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
+                             X509_STORE *store, X509 **signer_out);
+
+/* Context structure for the generic verify method. */
+
+/* Verify the signer's certificate and the signature of the response. */
+# define TS_VFY_SIGNATURE        (1u << 0)
+/* Verify the version number of the response. */
+# define TS_VFY_VERSION          (1u << 1)
+/* Verify if the policy supplied by the user matches the policy of the TSA. */
+# define TS_VFY_POLICY           (1u << 2)
+/*
+ * Verify the message imprint provided by the user. This flag should not be
+ * specified with TS_VFY_DATA.
+ */
+# define TS_VFY_IMPRINT          (1u << 3)
+/*
+ * Verify the message imprint computed by the verify method from the user
+ * provided data and the MD algorithm of the response. This flag should not
+ * be specified with TS_VFY_IMPRINT.
+ */
+# define TS_VFY_DATA             (1u << 4)
+/* Verify the nonce value. */
+# define TS_VFY_NONCE            (1u << 5)
+/* Verify if the TSA name field matches the signer certificate. */
+# define TS_VFY_SIGNER           (1u << 6)
+/* Verify if the TSA name field equals to the user provided name. */
+# define TS_VFY_TSA_NAME         (1u << 7)
+
+/* You can use the following convenience constants. */
+# define TS_VFY_ALL_IMPRINT      (TS_VFY_SIGNATURE       \
+                                 | TS_VFY_VERSION       \
+                                 | TS_VFY_POLICY        \
+                                 | TS_VFY_IMPRINT       \
+                                 | TS_VFY_NONCE         \
+                                 | TS_VFY_SIGNER        \
+                                 | TS_VFY_TSA_NAME)
+# define TS_VFY_ALL_DATA         (TS_VFY_SIGNATURE       \
+                                 | TS_VFY_VERSION       \
+                                 | TS_VFY_POLICY        \
+                                 | TS_VFY_DATA          \
+                                 | TS_VFY_NONCE         \
+                                 | TS_VFY_SIGNER        \
+                                 | TS_VFY_TSA_NAME)
+
+typedef struct TS_verify_ctx TS_VERIFY_CTX;
+
+int TS_RESP_verify_response(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx, TS_RESP *response);
+int TS_RESP_verify_token(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx, PKCS7 *token);
+
+/*
+ * Declarations related to response verification context,
+ */
+TS_VERIFY_CTX *TS_VERIFY_CTX_new(void);
+void TS_VERIFY_CTX_init(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx);
+void TS_VERIFY_CTX_free(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx);
+void TS_VERIFY_CTX_cleanup(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx);
+int TS_VERIFY_CTX_set_flags(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx, int f);
+int TS_VERIFY_CTX_add_flags(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx, int f);
+BIO *TS_VERIFY_CTX_set_data(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx, BIO *b);
+unsigned char *TS_VERIFY_CTX_set_imprint(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx,
+                                         unsigned char *hexstr, long len);
+X509_STORE *TS_VERIFY_CTX_set_store(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *s);
+STACK_OF(X509) *TS_VERIFY_CTS_set_certs(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *certs);
+
+/*-
+ * If ctx is NULL, it allocates and returns a new object, otherwise
+ * it returns ctx. It initialises all the members as follows:
+ * flags = TS_VFY_ALL_IMPRINT & ~(TS_VFY_TSA_NAME | TS_VFY_SIGNATURE)
+ * certs = NULL
+ * store = NULL
+ * policy = policy from the request or NULL if absent (in this case
+ *      TS_VFY_POLICY is cleared from flags as well)
+ * md_alg = MD algorithm from request
+ * imprint, imprint_len = imprint from request
+ * data = NULL
+ * nonce, nonce_len = nonce from the request or NULL if absent (in this case
+ *      TS_VFY_NONCE is cleared from flags as well)
+ * tsa_name = NULL
+ * Important: after calling this method TS_VFY_SIGNATURE should be added!
+ */
+TS_VERIFY_CTX *TS_REQ_to_TS_VERIFY_CTX(TS_REQ *req, TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx);
+
+/* Function declarations for TS_RESP defined in ts/ts_resp_print.c */
+
+int TS_RESP_print_bio(BIO *bio, TS_RESP *a);
+int TS_STATUS_INFO_print_bio(BIO *bio, TS_STATUS_INFO *a);
+int TS_TST_INFO_print_bio(BIO *bio, TS_TST_INFO *a);
+
+/* Common utility functions defined in ts/ts_lib.c */
+
+int TS_ASN1_INTEGER_print_bio(BIO *bio, const ASN1_INTEGER *num);
+int TS_OBJ_print_bio(BIO *bio, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj);
+int TS_ext_print_bio(BIO *bio, const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *extensions);
+int TS_X509_ALGOR_print_bio(BIO *bio, const X509_ALGOR *alg);
+int TS_MSG_IMPRINT_print_bio(BIO *bio, TS_MSG_IMPRINT *msg);
+
+/*
+ * Function declarations for handling configuration options, defined in
+ * ts/ts_conf.c
+ */
+
+X509 *TS_CONF_load_cert(const char *file);
+STACK_OF(X509) *TS_CONF_load_certs(const char *file);
+EVP_PKEY *TS_CONF_load_key(const char *file, const char *pass);
+const char *TS_CONF_get_tsa_section(CONF *conf, const char *section);
+int TS_CONF_set_serial(CONF *conf, const char *section, TS_serial_cb cb,
+                       TS_RESP_CTX *ctx);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+int TS_CONF_set_crypto_device(CONF *conf, const char *section,
+                              const char *device);
+int TS_CONF_set_default_engine(const char *name);
+#endif
+int TS_CONF_set_signer_cert(CONF *conf, const char *section,
+                            const char *cert, TS_RESP_CTX *ctx);
+int TS_CONF_set_certs(CONF *conf, const char *section, const char *certs,
+                      TS_RESP_CTX *ctx);
+int TS_CONF_set_signer_key(CONF *conf, const char *section,
+                           const char *key, const char *pass,
+                           TS_RESP_CTX *ctx);
+int TS_CONF_set_signer_digest(CONF *conf, const char *section,
+                               const char *md, TS_RESP_CTX *ctx);
+int TS_CONF_set_def_policy(CONF *conf, const char *section,
+                           const char *policy, TS_RESP_CTX *ctx);
+int TS_CONF_set_policies(CONF *conf, const char *section, TS_RESP_CTX *ctx);
+int TS_CONF_set_digests(CONF *conf, const char *section, TS_RESP_CTX *ctx);
+int TS_CONF_set_accuracy(CONF *conf, const char *section, TS_RESP_CTX *ctx);
+int TS_CONF_set_clock_precision_digits(CONF *conf, const char *section,
+                                       TS_RESP_CTX *ctx);
+int TS_CONF_set_ordering(CONF *conf, const char *section, TS_RESP_CTX *ctx);
+int TS_CONF_set_tsa_name(CONF *conf, const char *section, TS_RESP_CTX *ctx);
+int TS_CONF_set_ess_cert_id_chain(CONF *conf, const char *section,
+                                  TS_RESP_CTX *ctx);
+
+/* -------------------------------------------------- */
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+/*
+ * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
+ * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
+ */
+
+int ERR_load_TS_strings(void);
+
+/* Error codes for the TS functions. */
+
+/* Function codes. */
+# define TS_F_DEF_SERIAL_CB                               110
+# define TS_F_DEF_TIME_CB                                 111
+# define TS_F_ESS_ADD_SIGNING_CERT                        112
+# define TS_F_ESS_CERT_ID_NEW_INIT                        113
+# define TS_F_ESS_SIGNING_CERT_NEW_INIT                   114
+# define TS_F_INT_TS_RESP_VERIFY_TOKEN                    149
+# define TS_F_PKCS7_TO_TS_TST_INFO                        148
+# define TS_F_TS_ACCURACY_SET_MICROS                      115
+# define TS_F_TS_ACCURACY_SET_MILLIS                      116
+# define TS_F_TS_ACCURACY_SET_SECONDS                     117
+# define TS_F_TS_CHECK_IMPRINTS                           100
+# define TS_F_TS_CHECK_NONCES                             101
+# define TS_F_TS_CHECK_POLICY                             102
+# define TS_F_TS_CHECK_SIGNING_CERTS                      103
+# define TS_F_TS_CHECK_STATUS_INFO                        104
+# define TS_F_TS_COMPUTE_IMPRINT                          145
+# define TS_F_TS_CONF_INVALID                             151
+# define TS_F_TS_CONF_LOAD_CERT                           153
+# define TS_F_TS_CONF_LOAD_CERTS                          154
+# define TS_F_TS_CONF_LOAD_KEY                            155
+# define TS_F_TS_CONF_LOOKUP_FAIL                         152
+# define TS_F_TS_CONF_SET_DEFAULT_ENGINE                  146
+# define TS_F_TS_GET_STATUS_TEXT                          105
+# define TS_F_TS_MSG_IMPRINT_SET_ALGO                     118
+# define TS_F_TS_REQ_SET_MSG_IMPRINT                      119
+# define TS_F_TS_REQ_SET_NONCE                            120
+# define TS_F_TS_REQ_SET_POLICY_ID                        121
+# define TS_F_TS_RESP_CREATE_RESPONSE                     122
+# define TS_F_TS_RESP_CREATE_TST_INFO                     123
+# define TS_F_TS_RESP_CTX_ADD_FAILURE_INFO                124
+# define TS_F_TS_RESP_CTX_ADD_MD                          125
+# define TS_F_TS_RESP_CTX_ADD_POLICY                      126
+# define TS_F_TS_RESP_CTX_NEW                             127
+# define TS_F_TS_RESP_CTX_SET_ACCURACY                    128
+# define TS_F_TS_RESP_CTX_SET_CERTS                       129
+# define TS_F_TS_RESP_CTX_SET_DEF_POLICY                  130
+# define TS_F_TS_RESP_CTX_SET_SIGNER_CERT                 131
+# define TS_F_TS_RESP_CTX_SET_STATUS_INFO                 132
+# define TS_F_TS_RESP_GET_POLICY                          133
+# define TS_F_TS_RESP_SET_GENTIME_WITH_PRECISION          134
+# define TS_F_TS_RESP_SET_STATUS_INFO                     135
+# define TS_F_TS_RESP_SET_TST_INFO                        150
+# define TS_F_TS_RESP_SIGN                                136
+# define TS_F_TS_RESP_VERIFY_SIGNATURE                    106
+# define TS_F_TS_TST_INFO_SET_ACCURACY                    137
+# define TS_F_TS_TST_INFO_SET_MSG_IMPRINT                 138
+# define TS_F_TS_TST_INFO_SET_NONCE                       139
+# define TS_F_TS_TST_INFO_SET_POLICY_ID                   140
+# define TS_F_TS_TST_INFO_SET_SERIAL                      141
+# define TS_F_TS_TST_INFO_SET_TIME                        142
+# define TS_F_TS_TST_INFO_SET_TSA                         143
+# define TS_F_TS_VERIFY                                   108
+# define TS_F_TS_VERIFY_CERT                              109
+# define TS_F_TS_VERIFY_CTX_NEW                           144
+
+/* Reason codes. */
+# define TS_R_BAD_PKCS7_TYPE                              132
+# define TS_R_BAD_TYPE                                    133
+# define TS_R_CANNOT_LOAD_CERT                            137
+# define TS_R_CANNOT_LOAD_KEY                             138
+# define TS_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR                    100
+# define TS_R_COULD_NOT_SET_ENGINE                        127
+# define TS_R_COULD_NOT_SET_TIME                          115
+# define TS_R_DETACHED_CONTENT                            134
+# define TS_R_ESS_ADD_SIGNING_CERT_ERROR                  116
+# define TS_R_ESS_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE_ERROR               101
+# define TS_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER                        102
+# define TS_R_INVALID_SIGNER_CERTIFICATE_PURPOSE          117
+# define TS_R_MESSAGE_IMPRINT_MISMATCH                    103
+# define TS_R_NONCE_MISMATCH                              104
+# define TS_R_NONCE_NOT_RETURNED                          105
+# define TS_R_NO_CONTENT                                  106
+# define TS_R_NO_TIME_STAMP_TOKEN                         107
+# define TS_R_PKCS7_ADD_SIGNATURE_ERROR                   118
+# define TS_R_PKCS7_ADD_SIGNED_ATTR_ERROR                 119
+# define TS_R_PKCS7_TO_TS_TST_INFO_FAILED                 129
+# define TS_R_POLICY_MISMATCH                             108
+# define TS_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DOES_NOT_MATCH_CERTIFICATE      120
+# define TS_R_RESPONSE_SETUP_ERROR                        121
+# define TS_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE                           109
+# define TS_R_THERE_MUST_BE_ONE_SIGNER                    110
+# define TS_R_TIME_SYSCALL_ERROR                          122
+# define TS_R_TOKEN_NOT_PRESENT                           130
+# define TS_R_TOKEN_PRESENT                               131
+# define TS_R_TSA_NAME_MISMATCH                           111
+# define TS_R_TSA_UNTRUSTED                               112
+# define TS_R_TST_INFO_SETUP_ERROR                        123
+# define TS_R_TS_DATASIGN                                 124
+# define TS_R_UNACCEPTABLE_POLICY                         125
+# define TS_R_UNSUPPORTED_MD_ALGORITHM                    126
+# define TS_R_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION                         113
+# define TS_R_VAR_BAD_VALUE                               135
+# define TS_R_VAR_LOOKUP_FAILURE                          136
+# define TS_R_WRONG_CONTENT_TYPE                          114
+
+#  ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+#  endif
+# endif
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/txt_db.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/txt_db.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0e6c943
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/txt_db.h
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_TXT_DB_H
+# define HEADER_TXT_DB_H
+
+# include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+# include <openssl/bio.h>
+# include <openssl/stack.h>
+# include <openssl/lhash.h>
+
+# define DB_ERROR_OK                     0
+# define DB_ERROR_MALLOC                 1
+# define DB_ERROR_INDEX_CLASH            2
+# define DB_ERROR_INDEX_OUT_OF_RANGE     3
+# define DB_ERROR_NO_INDEX               4
+# define DB_ERROR_INSERT_INDEX_CLASH     5
+# define DB_ERROR_WRONG_NUM_FIELDS       6
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+typedef OPENSSL_STRING *OPENSSL_PSTRING;
+DEFINE_SPECIAL_STACK_OF(OPENSSL_PSTRING, OPENSSL_STRING)
+
+typedef struct txt_db_st {
+    int num_fields;
+    STACK_OF(OPENSSL_PSTRING) *data;
+    LHASH_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) **index;
+    int (**qual) (OPENSSL_STRING *);
+    long error;
+    long arg1;
+    long arg2;
+    OPENSSL_STRING *arg_row;
+} TXT_DB;
+
+TXT_DB *TXT_DB_read(BIO *in, int num);
+long TXT_DB_write(BIO *out, TXT_DB *db);
+int TXT_DB_create_index(TXT_DB *db, int field, int (*qual) (OPENSSL_STRING *),
+                        OPENSSL_LH_HASHFUNC hash, OPENSSL_LH_COMPFUNC cmp);
+void TXT_DB_free(TXT_DB *db);
+OPENSSL_STRING *TXT_DB_get_by_index(TXT_DB *db, int idx,
+                                    OPENSSL_STRING *value);
+int TXT_DB_insert(TXT_DB *db, OPENSSL_STRING *value);
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/ui.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/ui.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..49e763d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/ui.h
@@ -0,0 +1,378 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_UI_H
+# define HEADER_UI_H
+
+# include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_UI
+
+#  if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+#   include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#  endif
+#  include <openssl/safestack.h>
+#  include <openssl/ossl_typ.h>
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * All the following functions return -1 or NULL on error and in some cases
+ * (UI_process()) -2 if interrupted or in some other way cancelled. When
+ * everything is fine, they return 0, a positive value or a non-NULL pointer,
+ * all depending on their purpose.
+ */
+
+/* Creators and destructor.   */
+UI *UI_new(void);
+UI *UI_new_method(const UI_METHOD *method);
+void UI_free(UI *ui);
+
+/*-
+   The following functions are used to add strings to be printed and prompt
+   strings to prompt for data.  The names are UI_{add,dup}_<function>_string
+   and UI_{add,dup}_input_boolean.
+
+   UI_{add,dup}_<function>_string have the following meanings:
+        add     add a text or prompt string.  The pointers given to these
+                functions are used verbatim, no copying is done.
+        dup     make a copy of the text or prompt string, then add the copy
+                to the collection of strings in the user interface.
+        <function>
+                The function is a name for the functionality that the given
+                string shall be used for.  It can be one of:
+                        input   use the string as data prompt.
+                        verify  use the string as verification prompt.  This
+                                is used to verify a previous input.
+                        info    use the string for informational output.
+                        error   use the string for error output.
+   Honestly, there's currently no difference between info and error for the
+   moment.
+
+   UI_{add,dup}_input_boolean have the same semantics for "add" and "dup",
+   and are typically used when one wants to prompt for a yes/no response.
+
+   All of the functions in this group take a UI and a prompt string.
+   The string input and verify addition functions also take a flag argument,
+   a buffer for the result to end up with, a minimum input size and a maximum
+   input size (the result buffer MUST be large enough to be able to contain
+   the maximum number of characters).  Additionally, the verify addition
+   functions takes another buffer to compare the result against.
+   The boolean input functions take an action description string (which should
+   be safe to ignore if the expected user action is obvious, for example with
+   a dialog box with an OK button and a Cancel button), a string of acceptable
+   characters to mean OK and to mean Cancel.  The two last strings are checked
+   to make sure they don't have common characters.  Additionally, the same
+   flag argument as for the string input is taken, as well as a result buffer.
+   The result buffer is required to be at least one byte long.  Depending on
+   the answer, the first character from the OK or the Cancel character strings
+   will be stored in the first byte of the result buffer.  No NUL will be
+   added, so the result is *not* a string.
+
+   On success, the all return an index of the added information.  That index
+   is useful when retrieving results with UI_get0_result(). */
+int UI_add_input_string(UI *ui, const char *prompt, int flags,
+                        char *result_buf, int minsize, int maxsize);
+int UI_dup_input_string(UI *ui, const char *prompt, int flags,
+                        char *result_buf, int minsize, int maxsize);
+int UI_add_verify_string(UI *ui, const char *prompt, int flags,
+                         char *result_buf, int minsize, int maxsize,
+                         const char *test_buf);
+int UI_dup_verify_string(UI *ui, const char *prompt, int flags,
+                         char *result_buf, int minsize, int maxsize,
+                         const char *test_buf);
+int UI_add_input_boolean(UI *ui, const char *prompt, const char *action_desc,
+                         const char *ok_chars, const char *cancel_chars,
+                         int flags, char *result_buf);
+int UI_dup_input_boolean(UI *ui, const char *prompt, const char *action_desc,
+                         const char *ok_chars, const char *cancel_chars,
+                         int flags, char *result_buf);
+int UI_add_info_string(UI *ui, const char *text);
+int UI_dup_info_string(UI *ui, const char *text);
+int UI_add_error_string(UI *ui, const char *text);
+int UI_dup_error_string(UI *ui, const char *text);
+
+/* These are the possible flags.  They can be or'ed together. */
+/* Use to have echoing of input */
+# define UI_INPUT_FLAG_ECHO              0x01
+/*
+ * Use a default password.  Where that password is found is completely up to
+ * the application, it might for example be in the user data set with
+ * UI_add_user_data().  It is not recommended to have more than one input in
+ * each UI being marked with this flag, or the application might get
+ * confused.
+ */
+#  define UI_INPUT_FLAG_DEFAULT_PWD       0x02
+
+/*-
+ * The user of these routines may want to define flags of their own.  The core
+ * UI won't look at those, but will pass them on to the method routines.  They
+ * must use higher bits so they don't get confused with the UI bits above.
+ * UI_INPUT_FLAG_USER_BASE tells which is the lowest bit to use.  A good
+ * example of use is this:
+ *
+ *    #define MY_UI_FLAG1       (0x01 << UI_INPUT_FLAG_USER_BASE)
+ *
+*/
+#  define UI_INPUT_FLAG_USER_BASE 16
+
+/*-
+ * The following function helps construct a prompt.  object_desc is a
+ * textual short description of the object, for example "pass phrase",
+ * and object_name is the name of the object (might be a card name or
+ * a file name.
+ * The returned string shall always be allocated on the heap with
+ * OPENSSL_malloc(), and need to be free'd with OPENSSL_free().
+ *
+ * If the ui_method doesn't contain a pointer to a user-defined prompt
+ * constructor, a default string is built, looking like this:
+ *
+ *       "Enter {object_desc} for {object_name}:"
+ *
+ * So, if object_desc has the value "pass phrase" and object_name has
+ * the value "foo.key", the resulting string is:
+ *
+ *       "Enter pass phrase for foo.key:"
+*/
+char *UI_construct_prompt(UI *ui_method,
+                          const char *object_desc, const char *object_name);
+
+/*
+ * The following function is used to store a pointer to user-specific data.
+ * Any previous such pointer will be returned and replaced.
+ *
+ * For callback purposes, this function makes a lot more sense than using
+ * ex_data, since the latter requires that different parts of OpenSSL or
+ * applications share the same ex_data index.
+ *
+ * Note that the UI_OpenSSL() method completely ignores the user data. Other
+ * methods may not, however.
+ */
+void *UI_add_user_data(UI *ui, void *user_data);
+/* We need a user data retrieving function as well.  */
+void *UI_get0_user_data(UI *ui);
+
+/* Return the result associated with a prompt given with the index i. */
+const char *UI_get0_result(UI *ui, int i);
+
+/* When all strings have been added, process the whole thing. */
+int UI_process(UI *ui);
+
+/*
+ * Give a user interface parametrised control commands.  This can be used to
+ * send down an integer, a data pointer or a function pointer, as well as be
+ * used to get information from a UI.
+ */
+int UI_ctrl(UI *ui, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f) (void));
+
+/* The commands */
+/*
+ * Use UI_CONTROL_PRINT_ERRORS with the value 1 to have UI_process print the
+ * OpenSSL error stack before printing any info or added error messages and
+ * before any prompting.
+ */
+#  define UI_CTRL_PRINT_ERRORS            1
+/*
+ * Check if a UI_process() is possible to do again with the same instance of
+ * a user interface.  This makes UI_ctrl() return 1 if it is redoable, and 0
+ * if not.
+ */
+# define UI_CTRL_IS_REDOABLE             2
+
+/* Some methods may use extra data */
+# define UI_set_app_data(s,arg)         UI_set_ex_data(s,0,arg)
+# define UI_get_app_data(s)             UI_get_ex_data(s,0)
+
+#define UI_get_ex_new_index(l, p, newf, dupf, freef) \
+    CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_UI, l, p, newf, dupf, freef)
+int UI_set_ex_data(UI *r, int idx, void *arg);
+void *UI_get_ex_data(UI *r, int idx);
+
+/* Use specific methods instead of the built-in one */
+void UI_set_default_method(const UI_METHOD *meth);
+const UI_METHOD *UI_get_default_method(void);
+const UI_METHOD *UI_get_method(UI *ui);
+const UI_METHOD *UI_set_method(UI *ui, const UI_METHOD *meth);
+
+/* The method with all the built-in thingies */
+UI_METHOD *UI_OpenSSL(void);
+
+/* ---------- For method writers ---------- */
+/*-
+   A method contains a number of functions that implement the low level
+   of the User Interface.  The functions are:
+
+        an opener       This function starts a session, maybe by opening
+                        a channel to a tty, or by opening a window.
+        a writer        This function is called to write a given string,
+                        maybe to the tty, maybe as a field label in a
+                        window.
+        a flusher       This function is called to flush everything that
+                        has been output so far.  It can be used to actually
+                        display a dialog box after it has been built.
+        a reader        This function is called to read a given prompt,
+                        maybe from the tty, maybe from a field in a
+                        window.  Note that it's called with all string
+                        structures, not only the prompt ones, so it must
+                        check such things itself.
+        a closer        This function closes the session, maybe by closing
+                        the channel to the tty, or closing the window.
+
+   All these functions are expected to return:
+
+        0       on error.
+        1       on success.
+        -1      on out-of-band events, for example if some prompting has
+                been canceled (by pressing Ctrl-C, for example).  This is
+                only checked when returned by the flusher or the reader.
+
+   The way this is used, the opener is first called, then the writer for all
+   strings, then the flusher, then the reader for all strings and finally the
+   closer.  Note that if you want to prompt from a terminal or other command
+   line interface, the best is to have the reader also write the prompts
+   instead of having the writer do it.  If you want to prompt from a dialog
+   box, the writer can be used to build up the contents of the box, and the
+   flusher to actually display the box and run the event loop until all data
+   has been given, after which the reader only grabs the given data and puts
+   them back into the UI strings.
+
+   All method functions take a UI as argument.  Additionally, the writer and
+   the reader take a UI_STRING.
+*/
+
+/*
+ * The UI_STRING type is the data structure that contains all the needed info
+ * about a string or a prompt, including test data for a verification prompt.
+ */
+typedef struct ui_string_st UI_STRING;
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(UI_STRING)
+
+/*
+ * The different types of strings that are currently supported. This is only
+ * needed by method authors.
+ */
+enum UI_string_types {
+    UIT_NONE = 0,
+    UIT_PROMPT,                 /* Prompt for a string */
+    UIT_VERIFY,                 /* Prompt for a string and verify */
+    UIT_BOOLEAN,                /* Prompt for a yes/no response */
+    UIT_INFO,                   /* Send info to the user */
+    UIT_ERROR                   /* Send an error message to the user */
+};
+
+/* Create and manipulate methods */
+UI_METHOD *UI_create_method(const char *name);
+void UI_destroy_method(UI_METHOD *ui_method);
+int UI_method_set_opener(UI_METHOD *method, int (*opener) (UI *ui));
+int UI_method_set_writer(UI_METHOD *method,
+                         int (*writer) (UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis));
+int UI_method_set_flusher(UI_METHOD *method, int (*flusher) (UI *ui));
+int UI_method_set_reader(UI_METHOD *method,
+                         int (*reader) (UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis));
+int UI_method_set_closer(UI_METHOD *method, int (*closer) (UI *ui));
+int UI_method_set_prompt_constructor(UI_METHOD *method,
+                                     char *(*prompt_constructor) (UI *ui,
+                                                                  const char
+                                                                  *object_desc,
+                                                                  const char
+                                                                  *object_name));
+int (*UI_method_get_opener(UI_METHOD *method)) (UI *);
+int (*UI_method_get_writer(UI_METHOD *method)) (UI *, UI_STRING *);
+int (*UI_method_get_flusher(UI_METHOD *method)) (UI *);
+int (*UI_method_get_reader(UI_METHOD *method)) (UI *, UI_STRING *);
+int (*UI_method_get_closer(UI_METHOD *method)) (UI *);
+char *(*UI_method_get_prompt_constructor(UI_METHOD *method)) (UI *,
+                                                              const char *,
+                                                              const char *);
+
+/*
+ * The following functions are helpers for method writers to access relevant
+ * data from a UI_STRING.
+ */
+
+/* Return type of the UI_STRING */
+enum UI_string_types UI_get_string_type(UI_STRING *uis);
+/* Return input flags of the UI_STRING */
+int UI_get_input_flags(UI_STRING *uis);
+/* Return the actual string to output (the prompt, info or error) */
+const char *UI_get0_output_string(UI_STRING *uis);
+/*
+ * Return the optional action string to output (the boolean prompt
+ * instruction)
+ */
+const char *UI_get0_action_string(UI_STRING *uis);
+/* Return the result of a prompt */
+const char *UI_get0_result_string(UI_STRING *uis);
+/*
+ * Return the string to test the result against.  Only useful with verifies.
+ */
+const char *UI_get0_test_string(UI_STRING *uis);
+/* Return the required minimum size of the result */
+int UI_get_result_minsize(UI_STRING *uis);
+/* Return the required maximum size of the result */
+int UI_get_result_maxsize(UI_STRING *uis);
+/* Set the result of a UI_STRING. */
+int UI_set_result(UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis, const char *result);
+
+/* A couple of popular utility functions */
+int UI_UTIL_read_pw_string(char *buf, int length, const char *prompt,
+                           int verify);
+int UI_UTIL_read_pw(char *buf, char *buff, int size, const char *prompt,
+                    int verify);
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+/*
+ * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
+ * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
+ */
+
+int ERR_load_UI_strings(void);
+
+/* Error codes for the UI functions. */
+
+/* Function codes. */
+# define UI_F_CLOSE_CONSOLE                               115
+# define UI_F_ECHO_CONSOLE                                116
+# define UI_F_GENERAL_ALLOCATE_BOOLEAN                    108
+# define UI_F_GENERAL_ALLOCATE_PROMPT                     109
+# define UI_F_NOECHO_CONSOLE                              117
+# define UI_F_OPEN_CONSOLE                                114
+# define UI_F_UI_CREATE_METHOD                            112
+# define UI_F_UI_CTRL                                     111
+# define UI_F_UI_DUP_ERROR_STRING                         101
+# define UI_F_UI_DUP_INFO_STRING                          102
+# define UI_F_UI_DUP_INPUT_BOOLEAN                        110
+# define UI_F_UI_DUP_INPUT_STRING                         103
+# define UI_F_UI_DUP_VERIFY_STRING                        106
+# define UI_F_UI_GET0_RESULT                              107
+# define UI_F_UI_NEW_METHOD                               104
+# define UI_F_UI_PROCESS                                  113
+# define UI_F_UI_SET_RESULT                               105
+
+/* Reason codes. */
+# define UI_R_COMMON_OK_AND_CANCEL_CHARACTERS             104
+# define UI_R_INDEX_TOO_LARGE                             102
+# define UI_R_INDEX_TOO_SMALL                             103
+# define UI_R_NO_RESULT_BUFFER                            105
+# define UI_R_PROCESSING_ERROR                            107
+# define UI_R_RESULT_TOO_LARGE                            100
+# define UI_R_RESULT_TOO_SMALL                            101
+# define UI_R_SYSASSIGN_ERROR                             109
+# define UI_R_SYSDASSGN_ERROR                             110
+# define UI_R_SYSQIOW_ERROR                               111
+# define UI_R_UNKNOWN_CONTROL_COMMAND                     106
+# define UI_R_UNKNOWN_TTYGET_ERRNO_VALUE                  108
+
+#  ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+#  endif
+# endif
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/whrlpool.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/whrlpool.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..20ea350
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/whrlpool.h
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_WHRLPOOL_H
+# define HEADER_WHRLPOOL_H
+
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WHIRLPOOL
+# include <openssl/e_os2.h>
+# include <stddef.h>
+# ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+# endif
+
+# define WHIRLPOOL_DIGEST_LENGTH (512/8)
+# define WHIRLPOOL_BBLOCK        512
+# define WHIRLPOOL_COUNTER       (256/8)
+
+typedef struct {
+    union {
+        unsigned char c[WHIRLPOOL_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+        /* double q is here to ensure 64-bit alignment */
+        double q[WHIRLPOOL_DIGEST_LENGTH / sizeof(double)];
+    } H;
+    unsigned char data[WHIRLPOOL_BBLOCK / 8];
+    unsigned int bitoff;
+    size_t bitlen[WHIRLPOOL_COUNTER / sizeof(size_t)];
+} WHIRLPOOL_CTX;
+
+int WHIRLPOOL_Init(WHIRLPOOL_CTX *c);
+int WHIRLPOOL_Update(WHIRLPOOL_CTX *c, const void *inp, size_t bytes);
+void WHIRLPOOL_BitUpdate(WHIRLPOOL_CTX *c, const void *inp, size_t bits);
+int WHIRLPOOL_Final(unsigned char *md, WHIRLPOOL_CTX *c);
+unsigned char *WHIRLPOOL(const void *inp, size_t bytes, unsigned char *md);
+
+# ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+# endif
+# endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/x509.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/x509.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ee98df8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/x509.h
@@ -0,0 +1,1123 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ * ECDH support in OpenSSL originally developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_X509_H
+# define HEADER_X509_H
+
+# include <openssl/e_os2.h>
+# include <openssl/ossl_typ.h>
+# include <openssl/symhacks.h>
+# include <openssl/buffer.h>
+# include <openssl/evp.h>
+# include <openssl/bio.h>
+# include <openssl/stack.h>
+# include <openssl/asn1.h>
+# include <openssl/safestack.h>
+# include <openssl/ec.h>
+
+# if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+#  include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#  include <openssl/dsa.h>
+#  include <openssl/dh.h>
+# endif
+
+# include <openssl/sha.h>
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+# define X509_FILETYPE_PEM       1
+# define X509_FILETYPE_ASN1      2
+# define X509_FILETYPE_DEFAULT   3
+
+# define X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE     0x0080
+# define X509v3_KU_NON_REPUDIATION       0x0040
+# define X509v3_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT      0x0020
+# define X509v3_KU_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT     0x0010
+# define X509v3_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT         0x0008
+# define X509v3_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN         0x0004
+# define X509v3_KU_CRL_SIGN              0x0002
+# define X509v3_KU_ENCIPHER_ONLY         0x0001
+# define X509v3_KU_DECIPHER_ONLY         0x8000
+# define X509v3_KU_UNDEF                 0xffff
+
+struct X509_algor_st {
+    ASN1_OBJECT *algorithm;
+    ASN1_TYPE *parameter;
+} /* X509_ALGOR */ ;
+
+typedef STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) X509_ALGORS;
+
+typedef struct X509_val_st {
+    ASN1_TIME *notBefore;
+    ASN1_TIME *notAfter;
+} X509_VAL;
+
+typedef struct X509_sig_st X509_SIG;
+
+typedef struct X509_name_entry_st X509_NAME_ENTRY;
+
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(X509_NAME_ENTRY)
+
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(X509_NAME)
+
+# define X509_EX_V_NETSCAPE_HACK         0x8000
+# define X509_EX_V_INIT                  0x0001
+typedef struct X509_extension_st X509_EXTENSION;
+
+typedef STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) X509_EXTENSIONS;
+
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION)
+
+typedef struct x509_attributes_st X509_ATTRIBUTE;
+
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
+
+typedef struct X509_req_info_st X509_REQ_INFO;
+
+typedef struct X509_req_st X509_REQ;
+
+typedef struct x509_cert_aux_st X509_CERT_AUX;
+
+typedef struct x509_cinf_st X509_CINF;
+
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(X509)
+
+/* This is used for a table of trust checking functions */
+
+typedef struct x509_trust_st {
+    int trust;
+    int flags;
+    int (*check_trust) (struct x509_trust_st *, X509 *, int);
+    char *name;
+    int arg1;
+    void *arg2;
+} X509_TRUST;
+
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(X509_TRUST)
+
+/* standard trust ids */
+
+# define X509_TRUST_DEFAULT      0 /* Only valid in purpose settings */
+
+# define X509_TRUST_COMPAT       1
+# define X509_TRUST_SSL_CLIENT   2
+# define X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER   3
+# define X509_TRUST_EMAIL        4
+# define X509_TRUST_OBJECT_SIGN  5
+# define X509_TRUST_OCSP_SIGN    6
+# define X509_TRUST_OCSP_REQUEST 7
+# define X509_TRUST_TSA          8
+
+/* Keep these up to date! */
+# define X509_TRUST_MIN          1
+# define X509_TRUST_MAX          8
+
+/* trust_flags values */
+# define X509_TRUST_DYNAMIC      (1U << 0)
+# define X509_TRUST_DYNAMIC_NAME (1U << 1)
+/* No compat trust if self-signed, preempts "DO_SS" */
+# define X509_TRUST_NO_SS_COMPAT (1U << 2)
+/* Compat trust if no explicit accepted trust EKUs */
+# define X509_TRUST_DO_SS_COMPAT (1U << 3)
+/* Accept "anyEKU" as a wildcard trust OID */
+# define X509_TRUST_OK_ANY_EKU   (1U << 4)
+
+/* check_trust return codes */
+
+# define X509_TRUST_TRUSTED      1
+# define X509_TRUST_REJECTED     2
+# define X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED    3
+
+/* Flags for X509_print_ex() */
+
+# define X509_FLAG_COMPAT                0
+# define X509_FLAG_NO_HEADER             1L
+# define X509_FLAG_NO_VERSION            (1L << 1)
+# define X509_FLAG_NO_SERIAL             (1L << 2)
+# define X509_FLAG_NO_SIGNAME            (1L << 3)
+# define X509_FLAG_NO_ISSUER             (1L << 4)
+# define X509_FLAG_NO_VALIDITY           (1L << 5)
+# define X509_FLAG_NO_SUBJECT            (1L << 6)
+# define X509_FLAG_NO_PUBKEY             (1L << 7)
+# define X509_FLAG_NO_EXTENSIONS         (1L << 8)
+# define X509_FLAG_NO_SIGDUMP            (1L << 9)
+# define X509_FLAG_NO_AUX                (1L << 10)
+# define X509_FLAG_NO_ATTRIBUTES         (1L << 11)
+# define X509_FLAG_NO_IDS                (1L << 12)
+
+/* Flags specific to X509_NAME_print_ex() */
+
+/* The field separator information */
+
+# define XN_FLAG_SEP_MASK        (0xf << 16)
+
+# define XN_FLAG_COMPAT          0/* Traditional; use old X509_NAME_print */
+# define XN_FLAG_SEP_COMMA_PLUS  (1 << 16)/* RFC2253 ,+ */
+# define XN_FLAG_SEP_CPLUS_SPC   (2 << 16)/* ,+ spaced: more readable */
+# define XN_FLAG_SEP_SPLUS_SPC   (3 << 16)/* ;+ spaced */
+# define XN_FLAG_SEP_MULTILINE   (4 << 16)/* One line per field */
+
+# define XN_FLAG_DN_REV          (1 << 20)/* Reverse DN order */
+
+/* How the field name is shown */
+
+# define XN_FLAG_FN_MASK         (0x3 << 21)
+
+# define XN_FLAG_FN_SN           0/* Object short name */
+# define XN_FLAG_FN_LN           (1 << 21)/* Object long name */
+# define XN_FLAG_FN_OID          (2 << 21)/* Always use OIDs */
+# define XN_FLAG_FN_NONE         (3 << 21)/* No field names */
+
+# define XN_FLAG_SPC_EQ          (1 << 23)/* Put spaces round '=' */
+
+/*
+ * This determines if we dump fields we don't recognise: RFC2253 requires
+ * this.
+ */
+
+# define XN_FLAG_DUMP_UNKNOWN_FIELDS (1 << 24)
+
+# define XN_FLAG_FN_ALIGN        (1 << 25)/* Align field names to 20
+                                           * characters */
+
+/* Complete set of RFC2253 flags */
+
+# define XN_FLAG_RFC2253 (ASN1_STRFLGS_RFC2253 | \
+                        XN_FLAG_SEP_COMMA_PLUS | \
+                        XN_FLAG_DN_REV | \
+                        XN_FLAG_FN_SN | \
+                        XN_FLAG_DUMP_UNKNOWN_FIELDS)
+
+/* readable oneline form */
+
+# define XN_FLAG_ONELINE (ASN1_STRFLGS_RFC2253 | \
+                        ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_QUOTE | \
+                        XN_FLAG_SEP_CPLUS_SPC | \
+                        XN_FLAG_SPC_EQ | \
+                        XN_FLAG_FN_SN)
+
+/* readable multiline form */
+
+# define XN_FLAG_MULTILINE (ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_CTRL | \
+                        ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_MSB | \
+                        XN_FLAG_SEP_MULTILINE | \
+                        XN_FLAG_SPC_EQ | \
+                        XN_FLAG_FN_LN | \
+                        XN_FLAG_FN_ALIGN)
+
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED)
+
+typedef struct X509_crl_info_st X509_CRL_INFO;
+
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(X509_CRL)
+
+typedef struct private_key_st {
+    int version;
+    /* The PKCS#8 data types */
+    X509_ALGOR *enc_algor;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *enc_pkey; /* encrypted pub key */
+    /* When decrypted, the following will not be NULL */
+    EVP_PKEY *dec_pkey;
+    /* used to encrypt and decrypt */
+    int key_length;
+    char *key_data;
+    int key_free;               /* true if we should auto free key_data */
+    /* expanded version of 'enc_algor' */
+    EVP_CIPHER_INFO cipher;
+} X509_PKEY;
+
+typedef struct X509_info_st {
+    X509 *x509;
+    X509_CRL *crl;
+    X509_PKEY *x_pkey;
+    EVP_CIPHER_INFO enc_cipher;
+    int enc_len;
+    char *enc_data;
+} X509_INFO;
+
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(X509_INFO)
+
+/*
+ * The next 2 structures and their 8 routines were sent to me by Pat Richard
+ * <patr@x509.com> and are used to manipulate Netscapes spki structures -
+ * useful if you are writing a CA web page
+ */
+typedef struct Netscape_spkac_st {
+    X509_PUBKEY *pubkey;
+    ASN1_IA5STRING *challenge;  /* challenge sent in atlas >= PR2 */
+} NETSCAPE_SPKAC;
+
+typedef struct Netscape_spki_st {
+    NETSCAPE_SPKAC *spkac;      /* signed public key and challenge */
+    X509_ALGOR sig_algor;
+    ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature;
+} NETSCAPE_SPKI;
+
+/* Netscape certificate sequence structure */
+typedef struct Netscape_certificate_sequence {
+    ASN1_OBJECT *type;
+    STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
+} NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE;
+
+/*- Unused (and iv length is wrong)
+typedef struct CBCParameter_st
+        {
+        unsigned char iv[8];
+        } CBC_PARAM;
+*/
+
+/* Password based encryption structure */
+
+typedef struct PBEPARAM_st {
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *salt;
+    ASN1_INTEGER *iter;
+} PBEPARAM;
+
+/* Password based encryption V2 structures */
+
+typedef struct PBE2PARAM_st {
+    X509_ALGOR *keyfunc;
+    X509_ALGOR *encryption;
+} PBE2PARAM;
+
+typedef struct PBKDF2PARAM_st {
+/* Usually OCTET STRING but could be anything */
+    ASN1_TYPE *salt;
+    ASN1_INTEGER *iter;
+    ASN1_INTEGER *keylength;
+    X509_ALGOR *prf;
+} PBKDF2PARAM;
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+# include <openssl/x509_vfy.h>
+# include <openssl/pkcs7.h>
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+# define X509_EXT_PACK_UNKNOWN   1
+# define X509_EXT_PACK_STRING    2
+
+# define         X509_extract_key(x)     X509_get_pubkey(x)/*****/
+# define         X509_REQ_extract_key(a) X509_REQ_get_pubkey(a)
+# define         X509_name_cmp(a,b)      X509_NAME_cmp((a),(b))
+
+void X509_CRL_set_default_method(const X509_CRL_METHOD *meth);
+X509_CRL_METHOD *X509_CRL_METHOD_new(int (*crl_init) (X509_CRL *crl),
+                                     int (*crl_free) (X509_CRL *crl),
+                                     int (*crl_lookup) (X509_CRL *crl,
+                                                        X509_REVOKED **ret,
+                                                        ASN1_INTEGER *ser,
+                                                        X509_NAME *issuer),
+                                     int (*crl_verify) (X509_CRL *crl,
+                                                        EVP_PKEY *pk));
+void X509_CRL_METHOD_free(X509_CRL_METHOD *m);
+
+void X509_CRL_set_meth_data(X509_CRL *crl, void *dat);
+void *X509_CRL_get_meth_data(X509_CRL *crl);
+
+const char *X509_verify_cert_error_string(long n);
+
+int X509_verify(X509 *a, EVP_PKEY *r);
+
+int X509_REQ_verify(X509_REQ *a, EVP_PKEY *r);
+int X509_CRL_verify(X509_CRL *a, EVP_PKEY *r);
+int NETSCAPE_SPKI_verify(NETSCAPE_SPKI *a, EVP_PKEY *r);
+
+NETSCAPE_SPKI *NETSCAPE_SPKI_b64_decode(const char *str, int len);
+char *NETSCAPE_SPKI_b64_encode(NETSCAPE_SPKI *x);
+EVP_PKEY *NETSCAPE_SPKI_get_pubkey(NETSCAPE_SPKI *x);
+int NETSCAPE_SPKI_set_pubkey(NETSCAPE_SPKI *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+
+int NETSCAPE_SPKI_print(BIO *out, NETSCAPE_SPKI *spki);
+
+int X509_signature_dump(BIO *bp, const ASN1_STRING *sig, int indent);
+int X509_signature_print(BIO *bp, const X509_ALGOR *alg,
+                         const ASN1_STRING *sig);
+
+int X509_sign(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *md);
+int X509_sign_ctx(X509 *x, EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+int X509_http_nbio(OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx, X509 **pcert);
+# endif
+int X509_REQ_sign(X509_REQ *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *md);
+int X509_REQ_sign_ctx(X509_REQ *x, EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
+int X509_CRL_sign(X509_CRL *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *md);
+int X509_CRL_sign_ctx(X509_CRL *x, EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+int X509_CRL_http_nbio(OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx, X509_CRL **pcrl);
+# endif
+int NETSCAPE_SPKI_sign(NETSCAPE_SPKI *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *md);
+
+int X509_pubkey_digest(const X509 *data, const EVP_MD *type,
+                       unsigned char *md, unsigned int *len);
+int X509_digest(const X509 *data, const EVP_MD *type,
+                unsigned char *md, unsigned int *len);
+int X509_CRL_digest(const X509_CRL *data, const EVP_MD *type,
+                    unsigned char *md, unsigned int *len);
+int X509_REQ_digest(const X509_REQ *data, const EVP_MD *type,
+                    unsigned char *md, unsigned int *len);
+int X509_NAME_digest(const X509_NAME *data, const EVP_MD *type,
+                     unsigned char *md, unsigned int *len);
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+X509 *d2i_X509_fp(FILE *fp, X509 **x509);
+int i2d_X509_fp(FILE *fp, X509 *x509);
+X509_CRL *d2i_X509_CRL_fp(FILE *fp, X509_CRL **crl);
+int i2d_X509_CRL_fp(FILE *fp, X509_CRL *crl);
+X509_REQ *d2i_X509_REQ_fp(FILE *fp, X509_REQ **req);
+int i2d_X509_REQ_fp(FILE *fp, X509_REQ *req);
+#  ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+RSA *d2i_RSAPrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp, RSA **rsa);
+int i2d_RSAPrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp, RSA *rsa);
+RSA *d2i_RSAPublicKey_fp(FILE *fp, RSA **rsa);
+int i2d_RSAPublicKey_fp(FILE *fp, RSA *rsa);
+RSA *d2i_RSA_PUBKEY_fp(FILE *fp, RSA **rsa);
+int i2d_RSA_PUBKEY_fp(FILE *fp, RSA *rsa);
+#  endif
+#  ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+DSA *d2i_DSA_PUBKEY_fp(FILE *fp, DSA **dsa);
+int i2d_DSA_PUBKEY_fp(FILE *fp, DSA *dsa);
+DSA *d2i_DSAPrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp, DSA **dsa);
+int i2d_DSAPrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp, DSA *dsa);
+#  endif
+#  ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+EC_KEY *d2i_EC_PUBKEY_fp(FILE *fp, EC_KEY **eckey);
+int i2d_EC_PUBKEY_fp(FILE *fp, EC_KEY *eckey);
+EC_KEY *d2i_ECPrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp, EC_KEY **eckey);
+int i2d_ECPrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp, EC_KEY *eckey);
+#  endif
+X509_SIG *d2i_PKCS8_fp(FILE *fp, X509_SIG **p8);
+int i2d_PKCS8_fp(FILE *fp, X509_SIG *p8);
+PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_fp(FILE *fp,
+                                                PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO **p8inf);
+int i2d_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_fp(FILE *fp, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf);
+int i2d_PKCS8PrivateKeyInfo_fp(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY *key);
+int i2d_PrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+EVP_PKEY *d2i_PrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY **a);
+int i2d_PUBKEY_fp(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+EVP_PKEY *d2i_PUBKEY_fp(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY **a);
+# endif
+
+X509 *d2i_X509_bio(BIO *bp, X509 **x509);
+int i2d_X509_bio(BIO *bp, X509 *x509);
+X509_CRL *d2i_X509_CRL_bio(BIO *bp, X509_CRL **crl);
+int i2d_X509_CRL_bio(BIO *bp, X509_CRL *crl);
+X509_REQ *d2i_X509_REQ_bio(BIO *bp, X509_REQ **req);
+int i2d_X509_REQ_bio(BIO *bp, X509_REQ *req);
+#  ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+RSA *d2i_RSAPrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, RSA **rsa);
+int i2d_RSAPrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, RSA *rsa);
+RSA *d2i_RSAPublicKey_bio(BIO *bp, RSA **rsa);
+int i2d_RSAPublicKey_bio(BIO *bp, RSA *rsa);
+RSA *d2i_RSA_PUBKEY_bio(BIO *bp, RSA **rsa);
+int i2d_RSA_PUBKEY_bio(BIO *bp, RSA *rsa);
+#  endif
+#  ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+DSA *d2i_DSA_PUBKEY_bio(BIO *bp, DSA **dsa);
+int i2d_DSA_PUBKEY_bio(BIO *bp, DSA *dsa);
+DSA *d2i_DSAPrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, DSA **dsa);
+int i2d_DSAPrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, DSA *dsa);
+#  endif
+#  ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+EC_KEY *d2i_EC_PUBKEY_bio(BIO *bp, EC_KEY **eckey);
+int i2d_EC_PUBKEY_bio(BIO *bp, EC_KEY *eckey);
+EC_KEY *d2i_ECPrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, EC_KEY **eckey);
+int i2d_ECPrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, EC_KEY *eckey);
+#  endif
+X509_SIG *d2i_PKCS8_bio(BIO *bp, X509_SIG **p8);
+int i2d_PKCS8_bio(BIO *bp, X509_SIG *p8);
+PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_bio(BIO *bp,
+                                                 PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO **p8inf);
+int i2d_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_bio(BIO *bp, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf);
+int i2d_PKCS8PrivateKeyInfo_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *key);
+int i2d_PrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+EVP_PKEY *d2i_PrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY **a);
+int i2d_PUBKEY_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+EVP_PKEY *d2i_PUBKEY_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY **a);
+
+X509 *X509_dup(X509 *x509);
+X509_ATTRIBUTE *X509_ATTRIBUTE_dup(X509_ATTRIBUTE *xa);
+X509_EXTENSION *X509_EXTENSION_dup(X509_EXTENSION *ex);
+X509_CRL *X509_CRL_dup(X509_CRL *crl);
+X509_REVOKED *X509_REVOKED_dup(X509_REVOKED *rev);
+X509_REQ *X509_REQ_dup(X509_REQ *req);
+X509_ALGOR *X509_ALGOR_dup(X509_ALGOR *xn);
+int X509_ALGOR_set0(X509_ALGOR *alg, ASN1_OBJECT *aobj, int ptype,
+                    void *pval);
+void X509_ALGOR_get0(const ASN1_OBJECT **paobj, int *pptype,
+                     const void **ppval, const X509_ALGOR *algor);
+void X509_ALGOR_set_md(X509_ALGOR *alg, const EVP_MD *md);
+int X509_ALGOR_cmp(const X509_ALGOR *a, const X509_ALGOR *b);
+
+X509_NAME *X509_NAME_dup(X509_NAME *xn);
+X509_NAME_ENTRY *X509_NAME_ENTRY_dup(X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne);
+
+int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *s, time_t *t);
+int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *s);
+ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj, time_t *t);
+ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s,
+                            int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *t);
+ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj);
+
+const char *X509_get_default_cert_area(void);
+const char *X509_get_default_cert_dir(void);
+const char *X509_get_default_cert_file(void);
+const char *X509_get_default_cert_dir_env(void);
+const char *X509_get_default_cert_file_env(void);
+const char *X509_get_default_private_dir(void);
+
+X509_REQ *X509_to_X509_REQ(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *md);
+X509 *X509_REQ_to_X509(X509_REQ *r, int days, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_ALGOR)
+DECLARE_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS(X509_ALGORS, X509_ALGORS, X509_ALGORS)
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_VAL)
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_PUBKEY)
+
+int X509_PUBKEY_set(X509_PUBKEY **x, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+EVP_PKEY *X509_PUBKEY_get0(X509_PUBKEY *key);
+EVP_PKEY *X509_PUBKEY_get(X509_PUBKEY *key);
+int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain);
+long X509_get_pathlen(X509 *x);
+int i2d_PUBKEY(EVP_PKEY *a, unsigned char **pp);
+EVP_PKEY *d2i_PUBKEY(EVP_PKEY **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length);
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+int i2d_RSA_PUBKEY(RSA *a, unsigned char **pp);
+RSA *d2i_RSA_PUBKEY(RSA **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length);
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+int i2d_DSA_PUBKEY(DSA *a, unsigned char **pp);
+DSA *d2i_DSA_PUBKEY(DSA **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length);
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+int i2d_EC_PUBKEY(EC_KEY *a, unsigned char **pp);
+EC_KEY *d2i_EC_PUBKEY(EC_KEY **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length);
+# endif
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_SIG)
+void X509_SIG_get0(const X509_SIG *sig, const X509_ALGOR **palg,
+                   const ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pdigest);
+void X509_SIG_getm(X509_SIG *sig, X509_ALGOR **palg,
+                   ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pdigest);
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_REQ_INFO)
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_REQ)
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
+X509_ATTRIBUTE *X509_ATTRIBUTE_create(int nid, int atrtype, void *value);
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_EXTENSION)
+DECLARE_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS(X509_EXTENSIONS, X509_EXTENSIONS, X509_EXTENSIONS)
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_NAME_ENTRY)
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_NAME)
+
+int X509_NAME_set(X509_NAME **xn, X509_NAME *name);
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_CINF)
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509)
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_CERT_AUX)
+
+#define X509_get_ex_new_index(l, p, newf, dupf, freef) \
+    CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509, l, p, newf, dupf, freef)
+int X509_set_ex_data(X509 *r, int idx, void *arg);
+void *X509_get_ex_data(X509 *r, int idx);
+int i2d_X509_AUX(X509 *a, unsigned char **pp);
+X509 *d2i_X509_AUX(X509 **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length);
+
+int i2d_re_X509_tbs(X509 *x, unsigned char **pp);
+
+void X509_get0_signature(const ASN1_BIT_STRING **psig,
+                         const X509_ALGOR **palg, const X509 *x);
+int X509_get_signature_nid(const X509 *x);
+
+int X509_trusted(const X509 *x);
+int X509_alias_set1(X509 *x, const unsigned char *name, int len);
+int X509_keyid_set1(X509 *x, const unsigned char *id, int len);
+unsigned char *X509_alias_get0(X509 *x, int *len);
+unsigned char *X509_keyid_get0(X509 *x, int *len);
+int (*X509_TRUST_set_default(int (*trust) (int, X509 *, int))) (int, X509 *,
+                                                                int);
+int X509_TRUST_set(int *t, int trust);
+int X509_add1_trust_object(X509 *x, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj);
+int X509_add1_reject_object(X509 *x, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj);
+void X509_trust_clear(X509 *x);
+void X509_reject_clear(X509 *x);
+
+STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *X509_get0_trust_objects(X509 *x);
+STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *X509_get0_reject_objects(X509 *x);
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_REVOKED)
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_CRL_INFO)
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_CRL)
+
+int X509_CRL_add0_revoked(X509_CRL *crl, X509_REVOKED *rev);
+int X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(X509_CRL *crl,
+                            X509_REVOKED **ret, ASN1_INTEGER *serial);
+int X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(X509_CRL *crl, X509_REVOKED **ret, X509 *x);
+
+X509_PKEY *X509_PKEY_new(void);
+void X509_PKEY_free(X509_PKEY *a);
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(NETSCAPE_SPKI)
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(NETSCAPE_SPKAC)
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE)
+
+X509_INFO *X509_INFO_new(void);
+void X509_INFO_free(X509_INFO *a);
+char *X509_NAME_oneline(const X509_NAME *a, char *buf, int size);
+
+int ASN1_verify(i2d_of_void *i2d, X509_ALGOR *algor1,
+                ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature, char *data, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+
+int ASN1_digest(i2d_of_void *i2d, const EVP_MD *type, char *data,
+                unsigned char *md, unsigned int *len);
+
+int ASN1_sign(i2d_of_void *i2d, X509_ALGOR *algor1,
+              X509_ALGOR *algor2, ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature,
+              char *data, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *type);
+
+int ASN1_item_digest(const ASN1_ITEM *it, const EVP_MD *type, void *data,
+                     unsigned char *md, unsigned int *len);
+
+int ASN1_item_verify(const ASN1_ITEM *it, X509_ALGOR *algor1,
+                     ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature, void *data, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+
+int ASN1_item_sign(const ASN1_ITEM *it, X509_ALGOR *algor1,
+                   X509_ALGOR *algor2, ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature, void *data,
+                   EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *type);
+int ASN1_item_sign_ctx(const ASN1_ITEM *it, X509_ALGOR *algor1,
+                       X509_ALGOR *algor2, ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature,
+                       void *asn, EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
+
+long X509_get_version(const X509 *x);
+int X509_set_version(X509 *x, long version);
+int X509_set_serialNumber(X509 *x, ASN1_INTEGER *serial);
+ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *x);
+const ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get0_serialNumber(const X509 *x);
+int X509_set_issuer_name(X509 *x, X509_NAME *name);
+X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(const X509 *a);
+int X509_set_subject_name(X509 *x, X509_NAME *name);
+X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(const X509 *a);
+const ASN1_TIME * X509_get0_notBefore(const X509 *x);
+ASN1_TIME *X509_getm_notBefore(const X509 *x);
+int X509_set1_notBefore(X509 *x, const ASN1_TIME *tm);
+const ASN1_TIME *X509_get0_notAfter(const X509 *x);
+ASN1_TIME *X509_getm_notAfter(const X509 *x);
+int X509_set1_notAfter(X509 *x, const ASN1_TIME *tm);
+int X509_set_pubkey(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+int X509_up_ref(X509 *x);
+int X509_get_signature_type(const X509 *x);
+
+# if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+#  define X509_get_notBefore X509_getm_notBefore
+#  define X509_get_notAfter X509_getm_notAfter
+#  define X509_set_notBefore X509_set1_notBefore
+#  define X509_set_notAfter X509_set1_notAfter
+#endif
+
+
+/*
+ * This one is only used so that a binary form can output, as in
+ * i2d_X509_NAME(X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(x), &buf)
+ */
+X509_PUBKEY *X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(const X509 *x);
+const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *X509_get0_extensions(const X509 *x);
+void X509_get0_uids(const X509 *x, const ASN1_BIT_STRING **piuid,
+                    const ASN1_BIT_STRING **psuid);
+const X509_ALGOR *X509_get0_tbs_sigalg(const X509 *x);
+
+EVP_PKEY *X509_get0_pubkey(const X509 *x);
+EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x);
+ASN1_BIT_STRING *X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(const X509 *x);
+int X509_certificate_type(const X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *pubkey);
+
+long X509_REQ_get_version(const X509_REQ *req);
+int X509_REQ_set_version(X509_REQ *x, long version);
+X509_NAME *X509_REQ_get_subject_name(const X509_REQ *req);
+int X509_REQ_set_subject_name(X509_REQ *req, X509_NAME *name);
+void X509_REQ_get0_signature(const X509_REQ *req, const ASN1_BIT_STRING **psig,
+                             const X509_ALGOR **palg);
+int X509_REQ_get_signature_nid(const X509_REQ *req);
+int i2d_re_X509_REQ_tbs(X509_REQ *req, unsigned char **pp);
+int X509_REQ_set_pubkey(X509_REQ *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+EVP_PKEY *X509_REQ_get_pubkey(X509_REQ *req);
+EVP_PKEY *X509_REQ_get0_pubkey(X509_REQ *req);
+X509_PUBKEY *X509_REQ_get_X509_PUBKEY(X509_REQ *req);
+int X509_REQ_extension_nid(int nid);
+int *X509_REQ_get_extension_nids(void);
+void X509_REQ_set_extension_nids(int *nids);
+STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *X509_REQ_get_extensions(X509_REQ *req);
+int X509_REQ_add_extensions_nid(X509_REQ *req, STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts,
+                                int nid);
+int X509_REQ_add_extensions(X509_REQ *req, STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts);
+int X509_REQ_get_attr_count(const X509_REQ *req);
+int X509_REQ_get_attr_by_NID(const X509_REQ *req, int nid, int lastpos);
+int X509_REQ_get_attr_by_OBJ(const X509_REQ *req, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj,
+                             int lastpos);
+X509_ATTRIBUTE *X509_REQ_get_attr(const X509_REQ *req, int loc);
+X509_ATTRIBUTE *X509_REQ_delete_attr(X509_REQ *req, int loc);
+int X509_REQ_add1_attr(X509_REQ *req, X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr);
+int X509_REQ_add1_attr_by_OBJ(X509_REQ *req,
+                              const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int type,
+                              const unsigned char *bytes, int len);
+int X509_REQ_add1_attr_by_NID(X509_REQ *req,
+                              int nid, int type,
+                              const unsigned char *bytes, int len);
+int X509_REQ_add1_attr_by_txt(X509_REQ *req,
+                              const char *attrname, int type,
+                              const unsigned char *bytes, int len);
+
+int X509_CRL_set_version(X509_CRL *x, long version);
+int X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(X509_CRL *x, X509_NAME *name);
+int X509_CRL_set1_lastUpdate(X509_CRL *x, const ASN1_TIME *tm);
+int X509_CRL_set1_nextUpdate(X509_CRL *x, const ASN1_TIME *tm);
+int X509_CRL_sort(X509_CRL *crl);
+int X509_CRL_up_ref(X509_CRL *crl);
+
+# if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+#  define X509_CRL_set_lastUpdate X509_CRL_set1_lastUpdate
+#  define X509_CRL_set_nextUpdate X509_CRL_set1_nextUpdate
+#endif
+
+long X509_CRL_get_version(const X509_CRL *crl);
+const ASN1_TIME *X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(const X509_CRL *crl);
+const ASN1_TIME *X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(const X509_CRL *crl);
+DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(ASN1_TIME *X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(X509_CRL *crl))
+DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(ASN1_TIME *X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(X509_CRL *crl))
+X509_NAME *X509_CRL_get_issuer(const X509_CRL *crl);
+const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *X509_CRL_get0_extensions(const X509_CRL *crl);
+STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(X509_CRL *crl);
+void X509_CRL_get0_signature(const X509_CRL *crl, const ASN1_BIT_STRING **psig,
+                             const X509_ALGOR **palg);
+int X509_CRL_get_signature_nid(const X509_CRL *crl);
+int i2d_re_X509_CRL_tbs(X509_CRL *req, unsigned char **pp);
+
+const ASN1_INTEGER *X509_REVOKED_get0_serialNumber(const X509_REVOKED *x);
+int X509_REVOKED_set_serialNumber(X509_REVOKED *x, ASN1_INTEGER *serial);
+const ASN1_TIME *X509_REVOKED_get0_revocationDate(const X509_REVOKED *x);
+int X509_REVOKED_set_revocationDate(X509_REVOKED *r, ASN1_TIME *tm);
+const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *
+X509_REVOKED_get0_extensions(const X509_REVOKED *r);
+
+X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer,
+                        EVP_PKEY *skey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags);
+
+int X509_REQ_check_private_key(X509_REQ *x509, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+
+int X509_check_private_key(const X509 *x509, const EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth,
+                            X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
+                            unsigned long flags);
+int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags);
+STACK_OF(X509) *X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509) *chain);
+
+int X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b);
+unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a);
+
+int X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b);
+unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *a);
+
+int X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b);
+unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x);
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *a);
+unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x);
+# endif
+
+int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b);
+int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b);
+unsigned long X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x);
+unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME *x);
+
+int X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b);
+int X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b);
+int X509_aux_print(BIO *out, X509 *x, int indent);
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+int X509_print_ex_fp(FILE *bp, X509 *x, unsigned long nmflag,
+                     unsigned long cflag);
+int X509_print_fp(FILE *bp, X509 *x);
+int X509_CRL_print_fp(FILE *bp, X509_CRL *x);
+int X509_REQ_print_fp(FILE *bp, X509_REQ *req);
+int X509_NAME_print_ex_fp(FILE *fp, const X509_NAME *nm, int indent,
+                          unsigned long flags);
+# endif
+
+int X509_NAME_print(BIO *bp, const X509_NAME *name, int obase);
+int X509_NAME_print_ex(BIO *out, const X509_NAME *nm, int indent,
+                       unsigned long flags);
+int X509_print_ex(BIO *bp, X509 *x, unsigned long nmflag,
+                  unsigned long cflag);
+int X509_print(BIO *bp, X509 *x);
+int X509_ocspid_print(BIO *bp, X509 *x);
+int X509_CRL_print(BIO *bp, X509_CRL *x);
+int X509_REQ_print_ex(BIO *bp, X509_REQ *x, unsigned long nmflag,
+                      unsigned long cflag);
+int X509_REQ_print(BIO *bp, X509_REQ *req);
+
+int X509_NAME_entry_count(const X509_NAME *name);
+int X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(X509_NAME *name, int nid, char *buf, int len);
+int X509_NAME_get_text_by_OBJ(X509_NAME *name, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj,
+                              char *buf, int len);
+
+/*
+ * NOTE: you should be passing -1, not 0 as lastpos. The functions that use
+ * lastpos, search after that position on.
+ */
+int X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(X509_NAME *name, int nid, int lastpos);
+int X509_NAME_get_index_by_OBJ(X509_NAME *name, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj,
+                               int lastpos);
+X509_NAME_ENTRY *X509_NAME_get_entry(const X509_NAME *name, int loc);
+X509_NAME_ENTRY *X509_NAME_delete_entry(X509_NAME *name, int loc);
+int X509_NAME_add_entry(X509_NAME *name, const X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne,
+                        int loc, int set);
+int X509_NAME_add_entry_by_OBJ(X509_NAME *name, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int type,
+                               const unsigned char *bytes, int len, int loc,
+                               int set);
+int X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID(X509_NAME *name, int nid, int type,
+                               const unsigned char *bytes, int len, int loc,
+                               int set);
+X509_NAME_ENTRY *X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_txt(X509_NAME_ENTRY **ne,
+                                               const char *field, int type,
+                                               const unsigned char *bytes,
+                                               int len);
+X509_NAME_ENTRY *X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_NID(X509_NAME_ENTRY **ne, int nid,
+                                               int type, 
+                                               const unsigned char *bytes,
+                                               int len);
+int X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(X509_NAME *name, const char *field, int type,
+                               const unsigned char *bytes, int len, int loc,
+                               int set);
+X509_NAME_ENTRY *X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_OBJ(X509_NAME_ENTRY **ne,
+                                               const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int type,
+                                               const unsigned char *bytes,
+                                               int len);
+int X509_NAME_ENTRY_set_object(X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj);
+int X509_NAME_ENTRY_set_data(X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne, int type,
+                             const unsigned char *bytes, int len);
+ASN1_OBJECT *X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(const X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne);
+ASN1_STRING * X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(const X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne);
+int X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(const X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne);
+
+int X509_NAME_get0_der(X509_NAME *nm, const unsigned char **pder,
+                       size_t *pderlen);
+
+int X509v3_get_ext_count(const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *x);
+int X509v3_get_ext_by_NID(const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *x,
+                          int nid, int lastpos);
+int X509v3_get_ext_by_OBJ(const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *x,
+                          const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int lastpos);
+int X509v3_get_ext_by_critical(const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *x,
+                               int crit, int lastpos);
+X509_EXTENSION *X509v3_get_ext(const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *x, int loc);
+X509_EXTENSION *X509v3_delete_ext(STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *x, int loc);
+STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *X509v3_add_ext(STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) **x,
+                                         X509_EXTENSION *ex, int loc);
+
+int X509_get_ext_count(const X509 *x);
+int X509_get_ext_by_NID(const X509 *x, int nid, int lastpos);
+int X509_get_ext_by_OBJ(const X509 *x, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int lastpos);
+int X509_get_ext_by_critical(const X509 *x, int crit, int lastpos);
+X509_EXTENSION *X509_get_ext(const X509 *x, int loc);
+X509_EXTENSION *X509_delete_ext(X509 *x, int loc);
+int X509_add_ext(X509 *x, X509_EXTENSION *ex, int loc);
+void *X509_get_ext_d2i(const X509 *x, int nid, int *crit, int *idx);
+int X509_add1_ext_i2d(X509 *x, int nid, void *value, int crit,
+                      unsigned long flags);
+
+int X509_CRL_get_ext_count(const X509_CRL *x);
+int X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(const X509_CRL *x, int nid, int lastpos);
+int X509_CRL_get_ext_by_OBJ(const X509_CRL *x, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj,
+                            int lastpos);
+int X509_CRL_get_ext_by_critical(const X509_CRL *x, int crit, int lastpos);
+X509_EXTENSION *X509_CRL_get_ext(const X509_CRL *x, int loc);
+X509_EXTENSION *X509_CRL_delete_ext(X509_CRL *x, int loc);
+int X509_CRL_add_ext(X509_CRL *x, X509_EXTENSION *ex, int loc);
+void *X509_CRL_get_ext_d2i(const X509_CRL *x, int nid, int *crit, int *idx);
+int X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(X509_CRL *x, int nid, void *value, int crit,
+                          unsigned long flags);
+
+int X509_REVOKED_get_ext_count(const X509_REVOKED *x);
+int X509_REVOKED_get_ext_by_NID(const X509_REVOKED *x, int nid, int lastpos);
+int X509_REVOKED_get_ext_by_OBJ(const X509_REVOKED *x, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj,
+                                int lastpos);
+int X509_REVOKED_get_ext_by_critical(const X509_REVOKED *x, int crit,
+                                     int lastpos);
+X509_EXTENSION *X509_REVOKED_get_ext(const X509_REVOKED *x, int loc);
+X509_EXTENSION *X509_REVOKED_delete_ext(X509_REVOKED *x, int loc);
+int X509_REVOKED_add_ext(X509_REVOKED *x, X509_EXTENSION *ex, int loc);
+void *X509_REVOKED_get_ext_d2i(const X509_REVOKED *x, int nid, int *crit,
+                               int *idx);
+int X509_REVOKED_add1_ext_i2d(X509_REVOKED *x, int nid, void *value, int crit,
+                              unsigned long flags);
+
+X509_EXTENSION *X509_EXTENSION_create_by_NID(X509_EXTENSION **ex,
+                                             int nid, int crit,
+                                             ASN1_OCTET_STRING *data);
+X509_EXTENSION *X509_EXTENSION_create_by_OBJ(X509_EXTENSION **ex,
+                                             const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int crit,
+                                             ASN1_OCTET_STRING *data);
+int X509_EXTENSION_set_object(X509_EXTENSION *ex, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj);
+int X509_EXTENSION_set_critical(X509_EXTENSION *ex, int crit);
+int X509_EXTENSION_set_data(X509_EXTENSION *ex, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *data);
+ASN1_OBJECT *X509_EXTENSION_get_object(X509_EXTENSION *ex);
+ASN1_OCTET_STRING *X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_EXTENSION *ne);
+int X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(const X509_EXTENSION *ex);
+
+int X509at_get_attr_count(const STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *x);
+int X509at_get_attr_by_NID(const STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *x, int nid,
+                           int lastpos);
+int X509at_get_attr_by_OBJ(const STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *sk,
+                           const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int lastpos);
+X509_ATTRIBUTE *X509at_get_attr(const STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *x, int loc);
+X509_ATTRIBUTE *X509at_delete_attr(STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *x, int loc);
+STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *X509at_add1_attr(STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) **x,
+                                           X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr);
+STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *X509at_add1_attr_by_OBJ(STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
+                                                  **x, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj,
+                                                  int type,
+                                                  const unsigned char *bytes,
+                                                  int len);
+STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *X509at_add1_attr_by_NID(STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
+                                                  **x, int nid, int type,
+                                                  const unsigned char *bytes,
+                                                  int len);
+STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *X509at_add1_attr_by_txt(STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
+                                                  **x, const char *attrname,
+                                                  int type,
+                                                  const unsigned char *bytes,
+                                                  int len);
+void *X509at_get0_data_by_OBJ(STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *x,
+                              const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int lastpos, int type);
+X509_ATTRIBUTE *X509_ATTRIBUTE_create_by_NID(X509_ATTRIBUTE **attr, int nid,
+                                             int atrtype, const void *data,
+                                             int len);
+X509_ATTRIBUTE *X509_ATTRIBUTE_create_by_OBJ(X509_ATTRIBUTE **attr,
+                                             const ASN1_OBJECT *obj,
+                                             int atrtype, const void *data,
+                                             int len);
+X509_ATTRIBUTE *X509_ATTRIBUTE_create_by_txt(X509_ATTRIBUTE **attr,
+                                             const char *atrname, int type,
+                                             const unsigned char *bytes,
+                                             int len);
+int X509_ATTRIBUTE_set1_object(X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj);
+int X509_ATTRIBUTE_set1_data(X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr, int attrtype,
+                             const void *data, int len);
+void *X509_ATTRIBUTE_get0_data(X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr, int idx, int atrtype,
+                               void *data);
+int X509_ATTRIBUTE_count(const X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr);
+ASN1_OBJECT *X509_ATTRIBUTE_get0_object(X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr);
+ASN1_TYPE *X509_ATTRIBUTE_get0_type(X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr, int idx);
+
+int EVP_PKEY_get_attr_count(const EVP_PKEY *key);
+int EVP_PKEY_get_attr_by_NID(const EVP_PKEY *key, int nid, int lastpos);
+int EVP_PKEY_get_attr_by_OBJ(const EVP_PKEY *key, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj,
+                             int lastpos);
+X509_ATTRIBUTE *EVP_PKEY_get_attr(const EVP_PKEY *key, int loc);
+X509_ATTRIBUTE *EVP_PKEY_delete_attr(EVP_PKEY *key, int loc);
+int EVP_PKEY_add1_attr(EVP_PKEY *key, X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr);
+int EVP_PKEY_add1_attr_by_OBJ(EVP_PKEY *key,
+                              const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int type,
+                              const unsigned char *bytes, int len);
+int EVP_PKEY_add1_attr_by_NID(EVP_PKEY *key,
+                              int nid, int type,
+                              const unsigned char *bytes, int len);
+int EVP_PKEY_add1_attr_by_txt(EVP_PKEY *key,
+                              const char *attrname, int type,
+                              const unsigned char *bytes, int len);
+
+int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+
+/* lookup a cert from a X509 STACK */
+X509 *X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name,
+                                     ASN1_INTEGER *serial);
+X509 *X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name);
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PBEPARAM)
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PBE2PARAM)
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PBKDF2PARAM)
+
+int PKCS5_pbe_set0_algor(X509_ALGOR *algor, int alg, int iter,
+                         const unsigned char *salt, int saltlen);
+
+X509_ALGOR *PKCS5_pbe_set(int alg, int iter,
+                          const unsigned char *salt, int saltlen);
+X509_ALGOR *PKCS5_pbe2_set(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, int iter,
+                           unsigned char *salt, int saltlen);
+X509_ALGOR *PKCS5_pbe2_set_iv(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, int iter,
+                              unsigned char *salt, int saltlen,
+                              unsigned char *aiv, int prf_nid);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCRYPT
+X509_ALGOR *PKCS5_pbe2_set_scrypt(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
+                                  const unsigned char *salt, int saltlen,
+                                  unsigned char *aiv, uint64_t N, uint64_t r,
+                                  uint64_t p);
+#endif
+
+X509_ALGOR *PKCS5_pbkdf2_set(int iter, unsigned char *salt, int saltlen,
+                             int prf_nid, int keylen);
+
+/* PKCS#8 utilities */
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO)
+
+EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKCS82PKEY(const PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8);
+PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *EVP_PKEY2PKCS8(EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+
+int PKCS8_pkey_set0(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *priv, ASN1_OBJECT *aobj,
+                    int version, int ptype, void *pval,
+                    unsigned char *penc, int penclen);
+int PKCS8_pkey_get0(const ASN1_OBJECT **ppkalg,
+                    const unsigned char **pk, int *ppklen,
+                    const X509_ALGOR **pa, const PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8);
+
+const STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *
+PKCS8_pkey_get0_attrs(const PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8);
+int PKCS8_pkey_add1_attr_by_NID(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, int nid, int type,
+                                const unsigned char *bytes, int len);
+
+int X509_PUBKEY_set0_param(X509_PUBKEY *pub, ASN1_OBJECT *aobj,
+                           int ptype, void *pval,
+                           unsigned char *penc, int penclen);
+int X509_PUBKEY_get0_param(ASN1_OBJECT **ppkalg,
+                           const unsigned char **pk, int *ppklen,
+                           X509_ALGOR **pa, X509_PUBKEY *pub);
+
+int X509_check_trust(X509 *x, int id, int flags);
+int X509_TRUST_get_count(void);
+X509_TRUST *X509_TRUST_get0(int idx);
+int X509_TRUST_get_by_id(int id);
+int X509_TRUST_add(int id, int flags, int (*ck) (X509_TRUST *, X509 *, int),
+                   const char *name, int arg1, void *arg2);
+void X509_TRUST_cleanup(void);
+int X509_TRUST_get_flags(const X509_TRUST *xp);
+char *X509_TRUST_get0_name(const X509_TRUST *xp);
+int X509_TRUST_get_trust(const X509_TRUST *xp);
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+/*
+ * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
+ * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
+ */
+
+int ERR_load_X509_strings(void);
+
+/* Error codes for the X509 functions. */
+
+/* Function codes. */
+# define X509_F_ADD_CERT_DIR                              100
+# define X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN                               106
+# define X509_F_BY_FILE_CTRL                              101
+# define X509_F_CHECK_NAME_CONSTRAINTS                    149
+# define X509_F_CHECK_POLICY                              145
+# define X509_F_DANE_I2D                                  107
+# define X509_F_DIR_CTRL                                  102
+# define X509_F_GET_CERT_BY_SUBJECT                       103
+# define X509_F_NETSCAPE_SPKI_B64_DECODE                  129
+# define X509_F_NETSCAPE_SPKI_B64_ENCODE                  130
+# define X509_F_X509AT_ADD1_ATTR                          135
+# define X509_F_X509V3_ADD_EXT                            104
+# define X509_F_X509_ATTRIBUTE_CREATE_BY_NID              136
+# define X509_F_X509_ATTRIBUTE_CREATE_BY_OBJ              137
+# define X509_F_X509_ATTRIBUTE_CREATE_BY_TXT              140
+# define X509_F_X509_ATTRIBUTE_GET0_DATA                  139
+# define X509_F_X509_ATTRIBUTE_SET1_DATA                  138
+# define X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY                    128
+# define X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF                             105
+# define X509_F_X509_CRL_PRINT_FP                         147
+# define X509_F_X509_EXTENSION_CREATE_BY_NID              108
+# define X509_F_X509_EXTENSION_CREATE_BY_OBJ              109
+# define X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS                110
+# define X509_F_X509_LOAD_CERT_CRL_FILE                   132
+# define X509_F_X509_LOAD_CERT_FILE                       111
+# define X509_F_X509_LOAD_CRL_FILE                        112
+# define X509_F_X509_NAME_ADD_ENTRY                       113
+# define X509_F_X509_NAME_ENTRY_CREATE_BY_NID             114
+# define X509_F_X509_NAME_ENTRY_CREATE_BY_TXT             131
+# define X509_F_X509_NAME_ENTRY_SET_OBJECT                115
+# define X509_F_X509_NAME_ONELINE                         116
+# define X509_F_X509_NAME_PRINT                           117
+# define X509_F_X509_OBJECT_NEW                           150
+# define X509_F_X509_PRINT_EX_FP                          118
+# define X509_F_X509_PUBKEY_DECODE                        148
+# define X509_F_X509_PUBKEY_GET0                          119
+# define X509_F_X509_PUBKEY_SET                           120
+# define X509_F_X509_REQ_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY                144
+# define X509_F_X509_REQ_PRINT_EX                         121
+# define X509_F_X509_REQ_PRINT_FP                         122
+# define X509_F_X509_REQ_TO_X509                          123
+# define X509_F_X509_STORE_ADD_CERT                       124
+# define X509_F_X509_STORE_ADD_CRL                        125
+# define X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_GET1_ISSUER                146
+# define X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT                       143
+# define X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW                        142
+# define X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT            134
+# define X509_F_X509_TO_X509_REQ                          126
+# define X509_F_X509_TRUST_ADD                            133
+# define X509_F_X509_TRUST_SET                            141
+# define X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT                          127
+
+/* Reason codes. */
+# define X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH                             110
+# define X509_R_BAD_SELECTOR                              133
+# define X509_R_BAD_X509_FILETYPE                         100
+# define X509_R_BASE64_DECODE_ERROR                       118
+# define X509_R_CANT_CHECK_DH_KEY                         114
+# define X509_R_CERT_ALREADY_IN_HASH_TABLE                101
+# define X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA                         127
+# define X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE                        131
+# define X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH                              128
+# define X509_R_INVALID_DIRECTORY                         113
+# define X509_R_INVALID_FIELD_NAME                        119
+# define X509_R_INVALID_TRUST                             123
+# define X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH                           129
+# define X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH                         115
+# define X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH                       116
+# define X509_R_LOADING_CERT_DIR                          103
+# define X509_R_LOADING_DEFAULTS                          104
+# define X509_R_METHOD_NOT_SUPPORTED                      124
+# define X509_R_NAME_TOO_LONG                             134
+# define X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER                       132
+# define X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY              105
+# define X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER                             130
+# define X509_R_PUBLIC_KEY_DECODE_ERROR                   125
+# define X509_R_PUBLIC_KEY_ENCODE_ERROR                   126
+# define X509_R_SHOULD_RETRY                              106
+# define X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN        107
+# define X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY            108
+# define X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE                          117
+# define X509_R_UNKNOWN_NID                               109
+# define X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID                        121
+# define X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID                          120
+# define X509_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM                     111
+# define X509_R_WRONG_LOOKUP_TYPE                         112
+# define X509_R_WRONG_TYPE                                122
+
+# ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+# endif
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/x509_vfy.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1aa0a33
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
@@ -0,0 +1,544 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_X509_VFY_H
+# define HEADER_X509_VFY_H
+
+/*
+ * Protect against recursion, x509.h and x509_vfy.h each include the other.
+ */
+# ifndef HEADER_X509_H
+#  include <openssl/x509.h>
+# endif
+
+# include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+# include <openssl/lhash.h>
+# include <openssl/bio.h>
+# include <openssl/crypto.h>
+# include <openssl/symhacks.h>
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/*-
+SSL_CTX -> X509_STORE
+                -> X509_LOOKUP
+                        ->X509_LOOKUP_METHOD
+                -> X509_LOOKUP
+                        ->X509_LOOKUP_METHOD
+
+SSL     -> X509_STORE_CTX
+                ->X509_STORE
+
+The X509_STORE holds the tables etc for verification stuff.
+A X509_STORE_CTX is used while validating a single certificate.
+The X509_STORE has X509_LOOKUPs for looking up certs.
+The X509_STORE then calls a function to actually verify the
+certificate chain.
+*/
+
+typedef enum {
+    X509_LU_NONE = 0,
+    X509_LU_X509, X509_LU_CRL
+} X509_LOOKUP_TYPE;
+
+#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+#define X509_LU_RETRY   -1
+#define X509_LU_FAIL    0
+#endif
+
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(X509_LOOKUP)
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT)
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(X509_VERIFY_PARAM)
+
+int X509_STORE_set_depth(X509_STORE *store, int depth);
+
+typedef int (*X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *);
+typedef int (*X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn)(X509_STORE_CTX *);
+typedef int (*X509_STORE_CTX_get_issuer_fn)(X509 **issuer,
+                                            X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
+typedef int (*X509_STORE_CTX_check_issued_fn)(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
+                                              X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
+typedef int (*X509_STORE_CTX_check_revocation_fn)(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+typedef int (*X509_STORE_CTX_get_crl_fn)(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
+                                         X509_CRL **crl, X509 *x);
+typedef int (*X509_STORE_CTX_check_crl_fn)(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl);
+typedef int (*X509_STORE_CTX_cert_crl_fn)(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
+                                          X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
+typedef int (*X509_STORE_CTX_check_policy_fn)(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+typedef STACK_OF(X509) *(*X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_certs_fn)(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
+                                                          X509_NAME *nm);
+typedef STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *(*X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_crls_fn)(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
+                                                             X509_NAME *nm);
+typedef int (*X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup_fn)(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth);
+
+# define X509_STORE_CTX_set_app_data(ctx,data) \
+        X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(ctx,0,data)
+# define X509_STORE_CTX_get_app_data(ctx) \
+        X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx,0)
+
+# define X509_L_FILE_LOAD        1
+# define X509_L_ADD_DIR          2
+
+# define X509_LOOKUP_load_file(x,name,type) \
+                X509_LOOKUP_ctrl((x),X509_L_FILE_LOAD,(name),(long)(type),NULL)
+
+# define X509_LOOKUP_add_dir(x,name,type) \
+                X509_LOOKUP_ctrl((x),X509_L_ADD_DIR,(name),(long)(type),NULL)
+
+# define         X509_V_OK                                       0
+# define         X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED                          1
+# define         X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT            2
+# define         X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL                    3
+# define         X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE     4
+# define         X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE      5
+# define         X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY   6
+# define         X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE               7
+# define         X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE                8
+# define         X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID                   9
+# define         X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED                     10
+# define         X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID                    11
+# define         X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED                      12
+# define         X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD       13
+# define         X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD        14
+# define         X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD       15
+# define         X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD       16
+# define         X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM                           17
+# define         X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT          18
+# define         X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN            19
+# define         X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY    20
+# define         X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE      21
+# define         X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG                  22
+# define         X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED                         23
+# define         X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA                           24
+# define         X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED                 25
+# define         X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE                      26
+# define         X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED                       27
+# define         X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED                        28
+/* These are 'informational' when looking for issuer cert */
+# define         X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH              29
+# define         X509_V_ERR_AKID_SKID_MISMATCH                   30
+# define         X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH          31
+# define         X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CERTSIGN                 32
+# define         X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER             33
+# define         X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION         34
+# define         X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN                 35
+# define         X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION     36
+# define         X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA                       37
+# define         X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED           38
+# define         X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE        39
+# define         X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED       40
+# define         X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION                    41
+# define         X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION             42
+# define         X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY                   43
+# define         X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE                  44
+# define         X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION_FEATURE        45
+# define         X509_V_ERR_UNNESTED_RESOURCE                    46
+# define         X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION                  47
+# define         X509_V_ERR_EXCLUDED_VIOLATION                   48
+# define         X509_V_ERR_SUBTREE_MINMAX                       49
+/* The application is not happy */
+# define         X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION             50
+# define         X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CONSTRAINT_TYPE          51
+# define         X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CONSTRAINT_SYNTAX        52
+# define         X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX              53
+# define         X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR            54
+/* Another issuer check debug option */
+# define         X509_V_ERR_PATH_LOOP                            55
+/* Suite B mode algorithm violation */
+# define         X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION              56
+# define         X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM            57
+# define         X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE                58
+# define         X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM  59
+# define         X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED              60
+# define         X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256 61
+/* Host, email and IP check errors */
+# define         X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH                    62
+# define         X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH                       63
+# define         X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH                  64
+/* DANE TLSA errors */
+# define         X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH                        65
+/* security level errors */
+# define         X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL                     66
+# define         X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL                     67
+# define         X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK                       68
+/* Caller error */
+# define         X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL                         69
+/* Issuer lookup error */
+# define         X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP                         70
+/* Certificate transparency */
+# define         X509_V_ERR_NO_VALID_SCTS                        71
+
+# define         X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION         72
+
+/* Certificate verify flags */
+
+# if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+#  define X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK             0x0   /* Deprecated */
+# endif
+/* Use check time instead of current time */
+# define X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME              0x2
+/* Lookup CRLs */
+# define X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK                   0x4
+/* Lookup CRLs for whole chain */
+# define X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL               0x8
+/* Ignore unhandled critical extensions */
+# define X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL             0x10
+/* Disable workarounds for broken certificates */
+# define X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT                 0x20
+/* Enable proxy certificate validation */
+# define X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS           0x40
+/* Enable policy checking */
+# define X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK                0x80
+/* Policy variable require-explicit-policy */
+# define X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY             0x100
+/* Policy variable inhibit-any-policy */
+# define X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY                 0x200
+/* Policy variable inhibit-policy-mapping */
+# define X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP                 0x400
+/* Notify callback that policy is OK */
+# define X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY               0x800
+/* Extended CRL features such as indirect CRLs, alternate CRL signing keys */
+# define X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT        0x1000
+/* Delta CRL support */
+# define X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS                  0x2000
+/* Check self-signed CA signature */
+# define X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE          0x4000
+/* Use trusted store first */
+# define X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST               0x8000
+/* Suite B 128 bit only mode: not normally used */
+# define X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY         0x10000
+/* Suite B 192 bit only mode */
+# define X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS              0x20000
+/* Suite B 128 bit mode allowing 192 bit algorithms */
+# define X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS              0x30000
+/* Allow partial chains if at least one certificate is in trusted store */
+# define X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN               0x80000
+/*
+ * If the initial chain is not trusted, do not attempt to build an alternative
+ * chain. Alternate chain checking was introduced in 1.1.0. Setting this flag
+ * will force the behaviour to match that of previous versions.
+ */
+# define X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS               0x100000
+/* Do not check certificate/CRL validity against current time */
+# define X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME               0x200000
+
+# define X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT                    0x1
+# define X509_VP_FLAG_OVERWRITE                  0x2
+# define X509_VP_FLAG_RESET_FLAGS                0x4
+# define X509_VP_FLAG_LOCKED                     0x8
+# define X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE                       0x10
+
+/* Internal use: mask of policy related options */
+# define X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_MASK (X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK \
+                                | X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY \
+                                | X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY \
+                                | X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP)
+
+int X509_OBJECT_idx_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT) *h, X509_LOOKUP_TYPE type,
+                               X509_NAME *name);
+X509_OBJECT *X509_OBJECT_retrieve_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT) *h,
+                                             X509_LOOKUP_TYPE type,
+                                             X509_NAME *name);
+X509_OBJECT *X509_OBJECT_retrieve_match(STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT) *h,
+                                        X509_OBJECT *x);
+int X509_OBJECT_up_ref_count(X509_OBJECT *a);
+X509_OBJECT *X509_OBJECT_new(void);
+void X509_OBJECT_free(X509_OBJECT *a);
+X509_LOOKUP_TYPE X509_OBJECT_get_type(const X509_OBJECT *a);
+X509 *X509_OBJECT_get0_X509(const X509_OBJECT *a);
+X509_CRL *X509_OBJECT_get0_X509_CRL(X509_OBJECT *a);
+X509_STORE *X509_STORE_new(void);
+void X509_STORE_free(X509_STORE *v);
+int X509_STORE_lock(X509_STORE *ctx);
+int X509_STORE_unlock(X509_STORE *ctx);
+int X509_STORE_up_ref(X509_STORE *v);
+STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT) *X509_STORE_get0_objects(X509_STORE *v);
+
+STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_certs(X509_STORE_CTX *st, X509_NAME *nm);
+STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *st, X509_NAME *nm);
+int X509_STORE_set_flags(X509_STORE *ctx, unsigned long flags);
+int X509_STORE_set_purpose(X509_STORE *ctx, int purpose);
+int X509_STORE_set_trust(X509_STORE *ctx, int trust);
+int X509_STORE_set1_param(X509_STORE *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *pm);
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_get0_param(X509_STORE *ctx);
+
+void X509_STORE_set_verify(X509_STORE *ctx, X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn verify);
+#define X509_STORE_set_verify_func(ctx, func) \
+            X509_STORE_set_verify((ctx),(func))
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
+                               X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn verify);
+X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn X509_STORE_get_verify(X509_STORE *ctx);
+void X509_STORE_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE *ctx,
+                              X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb verify_cb);
+# define X509_STORE_set_verify_cb_func(ctx,func) \
+            X509_STORE_set_verify_cb((ctx),(func))
+X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb X509_STORE_get_verify_cb(X509_STORE *ctx);
+void X509_STORE_set_get_issuer(X509_STORE *ctx,
+                               X509_STORE_CTX_get_issuer_fn get_issuer);
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_issuer_fn X509_STORE_get_get_issuer(X509_STORE *ctx);
+void X509_STORE_set_check_issued(X509_STORE *ctx,
+                                 X509_STORE_CTX_check_issued_fn check_issued);
+X509_STORE_CTX_check_issued_fn X509_STORE_get_check_issued(X509_STORE *ctx);
+void X509_STORE_set_check_revocation(X509_STORE *ctx,
+                                     X509_STORE_CTX_check_revocation_fn check_revocation);
+X509_STORE_CTX_check_revocation_fn X509_STORE_get_check_revocation(X509_STORE *ctx);
+void X509_STORE_set_get_crl(X509_STORE *ctx,
+                            X509_STORE_CTX_get_crl_fn get_crl);
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_crl_fn X509_STORE_get_get_crl(X509_STORE *ctx);
+void X509_STORE_set_check_crl(X509_STORE *ctx,
+                              X509_STORE_CTX_check_crl_fn check_crl);
+X509_STORE_CTX_check_crl_fn X509_STORE_get_check_crl(X509_STORE *ctx);
+void X509_STORE_set_cert_crl(X509_STORE *ctx,
+                             X509_STORE_CTX_cert_crl_fn cert_crl);
+X509_STORE_CTX_cert_crl_fn X509_STORE_get_cert_crl(X509_STORE *ctx);
+void X509_STORE_set_check_policy(X509_STORE *ctx,
+                                 X509_STORE_CTX_check_policy_fn check_policy);
+X509_STORE_CTX_check_policy_fn X509_STORE_get_check_policy(X509_STORE *ctx);
+void X509_STORE_set_lookup_certs(X509_STORE *ctx,
+                                 X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_certs_fn lookup_certs);
+X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_certs_fn X509_STORE_get_lookup_certs(X509_STORE *ctx);
+void X509_STORE_set_lookup_crls(X509_STORE *ctx,
+                                X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_crls_fn lookup_crls);
+#define X509_STORE_set_lookup_crls_cb(ctx, func) \
+    X509_STORE_set_lookup_crls((ctx), (func))
+X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_crls_fn X509_STORE_get_lookup_crls(X509_STORE *ctx);
+void X509_STORE_set_cleanup(X509_STORE *ctx,
+                            X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup_fn cleanup);
+X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup_fn X509_STORE_get_cleanup(X509_STORE *ctx);
+
+#define X509_STORE_get_ex_new_index(l, p, newf, dupf, freef) \
+    CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE, l, p, newf, dupf, freef)
+int X509_STORE_set_ex_data(X509_STORE *ctx, int idx, void *data);
+void *X509_STORE_get_ex_data(X509_STORE *ctx, int idx);
+
+X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void);
+
+int X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store,
+                        X509 *x509, STACK_OF(X509) *chain);
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk);
+void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+
+X509_STORE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_store(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+STACK_OF(X509)* X509_STORE_CTX_get0_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk);
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
+                                  X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb verify);
+X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_issuer_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_get_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+X509_STORE_CTX_check_issued_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+X509_STORE_CTX_check_revocation_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_crl_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_get_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+X509_STORE_CTX_check_crl_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+X509_STORE_CTX_cert_crl_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+X509_STORE_CTX_check_policy_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_certs_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_certs(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_crls_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+
+#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+# define X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain
+# define X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain X509_STORE_CTX_set0_untrusted
+# define X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack
+# define X509_STORE_get_by_subject X509_STORE_CTX_get_by_subject
+# define X509_STORE_get1_cert X509_STORE_CTX_get1_certs
+# define X509_STORE_get1_crl X509_STORE_CTX_get1_crls
+#endif
+
+X509_LOOKUP *X509_STORE_add_lookup(X509_STORE *v, X509_LOOKUP_METHOD *m);
+X509_LOOKUP_METHOD *X509_LOOKUP_hash_dir(void);
+X509_LOOKUP_METHOD *X509_LOOKUP_file(void);
+
+int X509_STORE_add_cert(X509_STORE *ctx, X509 *x);
+int X509_STORE_add_crl(X509_STORE *ctx, X509_CRL *x);
+
+int X509_STORE_CTX_get_by_subject(X509_STORE_CTX *vs, X509_LOOKUP_TYPE type,
+                                  X509_NAME *name, X509_OBJECT *ret);
+X509_OBJECT *X509_STORE_CTX_get_obj_by_subject(X509_STORE_CTX *vs,
+                                               X509_LOOKUP_TYPE type,
+                                               X509_NAME *name);
+
+int X509_LOOKUP_ctrl(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, int cmd, const char *argc,
+                     long argl, char **ret);
+
+int X509_load_cert_file(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, const char *file, int type);
+int X509_load_crl_file(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, const char *file, int type);
+int X509_load_cert_crl_file(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, const char *file, int type);
+
+X509_LOOKUP *X509_LOOKUP_new(X509_LOOKUP_METHOD *method);
+void X509_LOOKUP_free(X509_LOOKUP *ctx);
+int X509_LOOKUP_init(X509_LOOKUP *ctx);
+int X509_LOOKUP_by_subject(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, X509_LOOKUP_TYPE type,
+                           X509_NAME *name, X509_OBJECT *ret);
+int X509_LOOKUP_by_issuer_serial(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, X509_LOOKUP_TYPE type,
+                                 X509_NAME *name, ASN1_INTEGER *serial,
+                                 X509_OBJECT *ret);
+int X509_LOOKUP_by_fingerprint(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, X509_LOOKUP_TYPE type,
+                               const unsigned char *bytes, int len,
+                               X509_OBJECT *ret);
+int X509_LOOKUP_by_alias(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, X509_LOOKUP_TYPE type,
+                         const char *str, int len, X509_OBJECT *ret);
+int X509_LOOKUP_shutdown(X509_LOOKUP *ctx);
+
+int X509_STORE_load_locations(X509_STORE *ctx,
+                              const char *file, const char *dir);
+int X509_STORE_set_default_paths(X509_STORE *ctx);
+
+#define X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(l, p, newf, dupf, freef) \
+    CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, l, p, newf, dupf, freef)
+int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data);
+void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx);
+int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int s);
+int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth);
+X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
+X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *c, X509 *x);
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_verified_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *c, STACK_OF(X509) *sk);
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *c, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk);
+int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose);
+int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust);
+int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
+                                   int purpose, int trust);
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags);
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags,
+                             time_t t);
+
+X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+int X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param);
+int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name);
+
+/*
+ * Bridge opacity barrier between libcrypt and libssl, also needed to support
+ * offline testing in test/danetest.c
+ */
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_dane(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, SSL_DANE *dane);
+#define DANE_FLAG_NO_DANE_EE_NAMECHECKS (1L << 0)
+
+/* X509_VERIFY_PARAM functions */
+
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(void);
+void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param);
+int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *to,
+                              const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *from);
+int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *to,
+                           const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *from);
+int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_name(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, const char *name);
+int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
+                                unsigned long flags);
+int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_clear_flags(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
+                                  unsigned long flags);
+unsigned long X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_flags(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param);
+int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, int purpose);
+int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, int trust);
+void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, int depth);
+void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_auth_level(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, int auth_level);
+time_t X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_time(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param);
+void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, time_t t);
+int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
+                                  ASN1_OBJECT *policy);
+int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_policies(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
+                                    STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *policies);
+
+int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_inh_flags(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
+                                    uint32_t flags);
+uint32_t X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_inh_flags(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param);
+
+int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
+                                const char *name, size_t namelen);
+int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add1_host(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
+                                const char *name, size_t namelen);
+void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_hostflags(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
+                                     unsigned int flags);
+char *X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_peername(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *);
+void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_move_peername(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *);
+int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_email(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
+                                 const char *email, size_t emaillen);
+int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
+                              const unsigned char *ip, size_t iplen);
+int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip_asc(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
+                                  const char *ipasc);
+
+int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param);
+int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_auth_level(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param);
+const char *X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_name(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param);
+
+int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_table(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param);
+int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_count(void);
+const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0(int id);
+const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(const char *name);
+void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_table_cleanup(void);
+
+/* Non positive return values are errors */
+#define X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE  -2 /* Failure to satisfy explicit policy */
+#define X509_PCY_TREE_INVALID  -1 /* Inconsistent or invalid extensions */
+#define X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL  0 /* Internal error, most likely malloc */
+
+/*
+ * Positive return values form a bit mask, all but the first are internal to
+ * the library and don't appear in results from X509_policy_check().
+ */
+#define X509_PCY_TREE_VALID     1 /* The policy tree is valid */
+#define X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY     2 /* The policy tree is empty */
+#define X509_PCY_TREE_EXPLICIT  4 /* Explicit policy required */
+
+int X509_policy_check(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, int *pexplicit_policy,
+                      STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
+                      STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *policy_oids, unsigned int flags);
+
+void X509_policy_tree_free(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree);
+
+int X509_policy_tree_level_count(const X509_POLICY_TREE *tree);
+X509_POLICY_LEVEL *X509_policy_tree_get0_level(const X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
+                                               int i);
+
+STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *X509_policy_tree_get0_policies(const
+                                                           X509_POLICY_TREE
+                                                           *tree);
+
+STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *X509_policy_tree_get0_user_policies(const
+                                                                X509_POLICY_TREE
+                                                                *tree);
+
+int X509_policy_level_node_count(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level);
+
+X509_POLICY_NODE *X509_policy_level_get0_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
+                                              int i);
+
+const ASN1_OBJECT *X509_policy_node_get0_policy(const X509_POLICY_NODE *node);
+
+STACK_OF(POLICYQUALINFO) *X509_policy_node_get0_qualifiers(const
+                                                           X509_POLICY_NODE
+                                                           *node);
+const X509_POLICY_NODE *X509_policy_node_get0_parent(const X509_POLICY_NODE
+                                                     *node);
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/x509v3.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/x509v3.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c93b112
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/include/openssl/x509v3.h
@@ -0,0 +1,1008 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_X509V3_H
+# define HEADER_X509V3_H
+
+# include <openssl/bio.h>
+# include <openssl/x509.h>
+# include <openssl/conf.h>
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/* Forward reference */
+struct v3_ext_method;
+struct v3_ext_ctx;
+
+/* Useful typedefs */
+
+typedef void *(*X509V3_EXT_NEW)(void);
+typedef void (*X509V3_EXT_FREE) (void *);
+typedef void *(*X509V3_EXT_D2I)(void *, const unsigned char **, long);
+typedef int (*X509V3_EXT_I2D) (void *, unsigned char **);
+typedef STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *
+    (*X509V3_EXT_I2V) (const struct v3_ext_method *method, void *ext,
+                       STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *extlist);
+typedef void *(*X509V3_EXT_V2I)(const struct v3_ext_method *method,
+                                struct v3_ext_ctx *ctx,
+                                STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *values);
+typedef char *(*X509V3_EXT_I2S)(const struct v3_ext_method *method,
+                                void *ext);
+typedef void *(*X509V3_EXT_S2I)(const struct v3_ext_method *method,
+                                struct v3_ext_ctx *ctx, const char *str);
+typedef int (*X509V3_EXT_I2R) (const struct v3_ext_method *method, void *ext,
+                               BIO *out, int indent);
+typedef void *(*X509V3_EXT_R2I)(const struct v3_ext_method *method,
+                                struct v3_ext_ctx *ctx, const char *str);
+
+/* V3 extension structure */
+
+struct v3_ext_method {
+    int ext_nid;
+    int ext_flags;
+/* If this is set the following four fields are ignored */
+    ASN1_ITEM_EXP *it;
+/* Old style ASN1 calls */
+    X509V3_EXT_NEW ext_new;
+    X509V3_EXT_FREE ext_free;
+    X509V3_EXT_D2I d2i;
+    X509V3_EXT_I2D i2d;
+/* The following pair is used for string extensions */
+    X509V3_EXT_I2S i2s;
+    X509V3_EXT_S2I s2i;
+/* The following pair is used for multi-valued extensions */
+    X509V3_EXT_I2V i2v;
+    X509V3_EXT_V2I v2i;
+/* The following are used for raw extensions */
+    X509V3_EXT_I2R i2r;
+    X509V3_EXT_R2I r2i;
+    void *usr_data;             /* Any extension specific data */
+};
+
+typedef struct X509V3_CONF_METHOD_st {
+    char *(*get_string) (void *db, const char *section, const char *value);
+    STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *(*get_section) (void *db, const char *section);
+    void (*free_string) (void *db, char *string);
+    void (*free_section) (void *db, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *section);
+} X509V3_CONF_METHOD;
+
+/* Context specific info */
+struct v3_ext_ctx {
+# define CTX_TEST 0x1
+# define X509V3_CTX_REPLACE 0x2
+    int flags;
+    X509 *issuer_cert;
+    X509 *subject_cert;
+    X509_REQ *subject_req;
+    X509_CRL *crl;
+    X509V3_CONF_METHOD *db_meth;
+    void *db;
+/* Maybe more here */
+};
+
+typedef struct v3_ext_method X509V3_EXT_METHOD;
+
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(X509V3_EXT_METHOD)
+
+/* ext_flags values */
+# define X509V3_EXT_DYNAMIC      0x1
+# define X509V3_EXT_CTX_DEP      0x2
+# define X509V3_EXT_MULTILINE    0x4
+
+typedef BIT_STRING_BITNAME ENUMERATED_NAMES;
+
+typedef struct BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_st {
+    int ca;
+    ASN1_INTEGER *pathlen;
+} BASIC_CONSTRAINTS;
+
+typedef struct PKEY_USAGE_PERIOD_st {
+    ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *notBefore;
+    ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *notAfter;
+} PKEY_USAGE_PERIOD;
+
+typedef struct otherName_st {
+    ASN1_OBJECT *type_id;
+    ASN1_TYPE *value;
+} OTHERNAME;
+
+typedef struct EDIPartyName_st {
+    ASN1_STRING *nameAssigner;
+    ASN1_STRING *partyName;
+} EDIPARTYNAME;
+
+typedef struct GENERAL_NAME_st {
+# define GEN_OTHERNAME   0
+# define GEN_EMAIL       1
+# define GEN_DNS         2
+# define GEN_X400        3
+# define GEN_DIRNAME     4
+# define GEN_EDIPARTY    5
+# define GEN_URI         6
+# define GEN_IPADD       7
+# define GEN_RID         8
+    int type;
+    union {
+        char *ptr;
+        OTHERNAME *otherName;   /* otherName */
+        ASN1_IA5STRING *rfc822Name;
+        ASN1_IA5STRING *dNSName;
+        ASN1_TYPE *x400Address;
+        X509_NAME *directoryName;
+        EDIPARTYNAME *ediPartyName;
+        ASN1_IA5STRING *uniformResourceIdentifier;
+        ASN1_OCTET_STRING *iPAddress;
+        ASN1_OBJECT *registeredID;
+        /* Old names */
+        ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ip;  /* iPAddress */
+        X509_NAME *dirn;        /* dirn */
+        ASN1_IA5STRING *ia5;    /* rfc822Name, dNSName,
+                                 * uniformResourceIdentifier */
+        ASN1_OBJECT *rid;       /* registeredID */
+        ASN1_TYPE *other;       /* x400Address */
+    } d;
+} GENERAL_NAME;
+
+typedef struct ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_st {
+    ASN1_OBJECT *method;
+    GENERAL_NAME *location;
+} ACCESS_DESCRIPTION;
+
+typedef STACK_OF(ACCESS_DESCRIPTION) AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS;
+
+typedef STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE;
+
+typedef STACK_OF(ASN1_INTEGER) TLS_FEATURE;
+
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME)
+typedef STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) GENERAL_NAMES;
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAMES)
+
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(ACCESS_DESCRIPTION)
+
+typedef struct DIST_POINT_NAME_st {
+    int type;
+    union {
+        GENERAL_NAMES *fullname;
+        STACK_OF(X509_NAME_ENTRY) *relativename;
+    } name;
+/* If relativename then this contains the full distribution point name */
+    X509_NAME *dpname;
+} DIST_POINT_NAME;
+/* All existing reasons */
+# define CRLDP_ALL_REASONS       0x807f
+
+# define CRL_REASON_NONE                         -1
+# define CRL_REASON_UNSPECIFIED                  0
+# define CRL_REASON_KEY_COMPROMISE               1
+# define CRL_REASON_CA_COMPROMISE                2
+# define CRL_REASON_AFFILIATION_CHANGED          3
+# define CRL_REASON_SUPERSEDED                   4
+# define CRL_REASON_CESSATION_OF_OPERATION       5
+# define CRL_REASON_CERTIFICATE_HOLD             6
+# define CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL              8
+# define CRL_REASON_PRIVILEGE_WITHDRAWN          9
+# define CRL_REASON_AA_COMPROMISE                10
+
+struct DIST_POINT_st {
+    DIST_POINT_NAME *distpoint;
+    ASN1_BIT_STRING *reasons;
+    GENERAL_NAMES *CRLissuer;
+    int dp_reasons;
+};
+
+typedef STACK_OF(DIST_POINT) CRL_DIST_POINTS;
+
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(DIST_POINT)
+
+struct AUTHORITY_KEYID_st {
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *keyid;
+    GENERAL_NAMES *issuer;
+    ASN1_INTEGER *serial;
+};
+
+/* Strong extranet structures */
+
+typedef struct SXNET_ID_st {
+    ASN1_INTEGER *zone;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *user;
+} SXNETID;
+
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(SXNETID)
+
+typedef struct SXNET_st {
+    ASN1_INTEGER *version;
+    STACK_OF(SXNETID) *ids;
+} SXNET;
+
+typedef struct NOTICEREF_st {
+    ASN1_STRING *organization;
+    STACK_OF(ASN1_INTEGER) *noticenos;
+} NOTICEREF;
+
+typedef struct USERNOTICE_st {
+    NOTICEREF *noticeref;
+    ASN1_STRING *exptext;
+} USERNOTICE;
+
+typedef struct POLICYQUALINFO_st {
+    ASN1_OBJECT *pqualid;
+    union {
+        ASN1_IA5STRING *cpsuri;
+        USERNOTICE *usernotice;
+        ASN1_TYPE *other;
+    } d;
+} POLICYQUALINFO;
+
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(POLICYQUALINFO)
+
+typedef struct POLICYINFO_st {
+    ASN1_OBJECT *policyid;
+    STACK_OF(POLICYQUALINFO) *qualifiers;
+} POLICYINFO;
+
+typedef STACK_OF(POLICYINFO) CERTIFICATEPOLICIES;
+
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(POLICYINFO)
+
+typedef struct POLICY_MAPPING_st {
+    ASN1_OBJECT *issuerDomainPolicy;
+    ASN1_OBJECT *subjectDomainPolicy;
+} POLICY_MAPPING;
+
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(POLICY_MAPPING)
+
+typedef STACK_OF(POLICY_MAPPING) POLICY_MAPPINGS;
+
+typedef struct GENERAL_SUBTREE_st {
+    GENERAL_NAME *base;
+    ASN1_INTEGER *minimum;
+    ASN1_INTEGER *maximum;
+} GENERAL_SUBTREE;
+
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(GENERAL_SUBTREE)
+
+struct NAME_CONSTRAINTS_st {
+    STACK_OF(GENERAL_SUBTREE) *permittedSubtrees;
+    STACK_OF(GENERAL_SUBTREE) *excludedSubtrees;
+};
+
+typedef struct POLICY_CONSTRAINTS_st {
+    ASN1_INTEGER *requireExplicitPolicy;
+    ASN1_INTEGER *inhibitPolicyMapping;
+} POLICY_CONSTRAINTS;
+
+/* Proxy certificate structures, see RFC 3820 */
+typedef struct PROXY_POLICY_st {
+    ASN1_OBJECT *policyLanguage;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *policy;
+} PROXY_POLICY;
+
+typedef struct PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION_st {
+    ASN1_INTEGER *pcPathLengthConstraint;
+    PROXY_POLICY *proxyPolicy;
+} PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION;
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PROXY_POLICY)
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION)
+
+struct ISSUING_DIST_POINT_st {
+    DIST_POINT_NAME *distpoint;
+    int onlyuser;
+    int onlyCA;
+    ASN1_BIT_STRING *onlysomereasons;
+    int indirectCRL;
+    int onlyattr;
+};
+
+/* Values in idp_flags field */
+/* IDP present */
+# define IDP_PRESENT     0x1
+/* IDP values inconsistent */
+# define IDP_INVALID     0x2
+/* onlyuser true */
+# define IDP_ONLYUSER    0x4
+/* onlyCA true */
+# define IDP_ONLYCA      0x8
+/* onlyattr true */
+# define IDP_ONLYATTR    0x10
+/* indirectCRL true */
+# define IDP_INDIRECT    0x20
+/* onlysomereasons present */
+# define IDP_REASONS     0x40
+
+# define X509V3_conf_err(val) ERR_add_error_data(6, "section:", val->section, \
+",name:", val->name, ",value:", val->value);
+
+# define X509V3_set_ctx_test(ctx) \
+                        X509V3_set_ctx(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, CTX_TEST)
+# define X509V3_set_ctx_nodb(ctx) (ctx)->db = NULL;
+
+# define EXT_BITSTRING(nid, table) { nid, 0, ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_BIT_STRING), \
+                        0,0,0,0, \
+                        0,0, \
+                        (X509V3_EXT_I2V)i2v_ASN1_BIT_STRING, \
+                        (X509V3_EXT_V2I)v2i_ASN1_BIT_STRING, \
+                        NULL, NULL, \
+                        table}
+
+# define EXT_IA5STRING(nid) { nid, 0, ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_IA5STRING), \
+                        0,0,0,0, \
+                        (X509V3_EXT_I2S)i2s_ASN1_IA5STRING, \
+                        (X509V3_EXT_S2I)s2i_ASN1_IA5STRING, \
+                        0,0,0,0, \
+                        NULL}
+
+# define EXT_END { -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}
+
+/* X509_PURPOSE stuff */
+
+# define EXFLAG_BCONS            0x1
+# define EXFLAG_KUSAGE           0x2
+# define EXFLAG_XKUSAGE          0x4
+# define EXFLAG_NSCERT           0x8
+
+# define EXFLAG_CA               0x10
+/* Really self issued not necessarily self signed */
+# define EXFLAG_SI               0x20
+# define EXFLAG_V1               0x40
+# define EXFLAG_INVALID          0x80
+/* EXFLAG_SET is set to indicate that some values have been precomputed */
+# define EXFLAG_SET              0x100
+# define EXFLAG_CRITICAL         0x200
+# define EXFLAG_PROXY            0x400
+
+# define EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY   0x800
+# define EXFLAG_FRESHEST         0x1000
+/* Self signed */
+# define EXFLAG_SS               0x2000
+
+# define KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE    0x0080
+# define KU_NON_REPUDIATION      0x0040
+# define KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT     0x0020
+# define KU_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT    0x0010
+# define KU_KEY_AGREEMENT        0x0008
+# define KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN        0x0004
+# define KU_CRL_SIGN             0x0002
+# define KU_ENCIPHER_ONLY        0x0001
+# define KU_DECIPHER_ONLY        0x8000
+
+# define NS_SSL_CLIENT           0x80
+# define NS_SSL_SERVER           0x40
+# define NS_SMIME                0x20
+# define NS_OBJSIGN              0x10
+# define NS_SSL_CA               0x04
+# define NS_SMIME_CA             0x02
+# define NS_OBJSIGN_CA           0x01
+# define NS_ANY_CA               (NS_SSL_CA|NS_SMIME_CA|NS_OBJSIGN_CA)
+
+# define XKU_SSL_SERVER          0x1
+# define XKU_SSL_CLIENT          0x2
+# define XKU_SMIME               0x4
+# define XKU_CODE_SIGN           0x8
+# define XKU_SGC                 0x10
+# define XKU_OCSP_SIGN           0x20
+# define XKU_TIMESTAMP           0x40
+# define XKU_DVCS                0x80
+# define XKU_ANYEKU              0x100
+
+# define X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC    0x1
+# define X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME       0x2
+
+typedef struct x509_purpose_st {
+    int purpose;
+    int trust;                  /* Default trust ID */
+    int flags;
+    int (*check_purpose) (const struct x509_purpose_st *, const X509 *, int);
+    char *name;
+    char *sname;
+    void *usr_data;
+} X509_PURPOSE;
+
+# define X509_PURPOSE_SSL_CLIENT         1
+# define X509_PURPOSE_SSL_SERVER         2
+# define X509_PURPOSE_NS_SSL_SERVER      3
+# define X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_SIGN         4
+# define X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_ENCRYPT      5
+# define X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN           6
+# define X509_PURPOSE_ANY                7
+# define X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER        8
+# define X509_PURPOSE_TIMESTAMP_SIGN     9
+
+# define X509_PURPOSE_MIN                1
+# define X509_PURPOSE_MAX                9
+
+/* Flags for X509V3_EXT_print() */
+
+# define X509V3_EXT_UNKNOWN_MASK         (0xfL << 16)
+/* Return error for unknown extensions */
+# define X509V3_EXT_DEFAULT              0
+/* Print error for unknown extensions */
+# define X509V3_EXT_ERROR_UNKNOWN        (1L << 16)
+/* ASN1 parse unknown extensions */
+# define X509V3_EXT_PARSE_UNKNOWN        (2L << 16)
+/* BIO_dump unknown extensions */
+# define X509V3_EXT_DUMP_UNKNOWN         (3L << 16)
+
+/* Flags for X509V3_add1_i2d */
+
+# define X509V3_ADD_OP_MASK              0xfL
+# define X509V3_ADD_DEFAULT              0L
+# define X509V3_ADD_APPEND               1L
+# define X509V3_ADD_REPLACE              2L
+# define X509V3_ADD_REPLACE_EXISTING     3L
+# define X509V3_ADD_KEEP_EXISTING        4L
+# define X509V3_ADD_DELETE               5L
+# define X509V3_ADD_SILENT               0x10
+
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(X509_PURPOSE)
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(BASIC_CONSTRAINTS)
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(SXNET)
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(SXNETID)
+
+int SXNET_add_id_asc(SXNET **psx, const char *zone, const char *user, int userlen);
+int SXNET_add_id_ulong(SXNET **psx, unsigned long lzone, const char *user,
+                       int userlen);
+int SXNET_add_id_INTEGER(SXNET **psx, ASN1_INTEGER *izone, const char *user,
+                         int userlen);
+
+ASN1_OCTET_STRING *SXNET_get_id_asc(SXNET *sx, const char *zone);
+ASN1_OCTET_STRING *SXNET_get_id_ulong(SXNET *sx, unsigned long lzone);
+ASN1_OCTET_STRING *SXNET_get_id_INTEGER(SXNET *sx, ASN1_INTEGER *zone);
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(AUTHORITY_KEYID)
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PKEY_USAGE_PERIOD)
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(GENERAL_NAME)
+GENERAL_NAME *GENERAL_NAME_dup(GENERAL_NAME *a);
+int GENERAL_NAME_cmp(GENERAL_NAME *a, GENERAL_NAME *b);
+
+ASN1_BIT_STRING *v2i_ASN1_BIT_STRING(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
+                                     X509V3_CTX *ctx,
+                                     STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nval);
+STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *i2v_ASN1_BIT_STRING(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
+                                          ASN1_BIT_STRING *bits,
+                                          STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *extlist);
+char *i2s_ASN1_IA5STRING(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, ASN1_IA5STRING *ia5);
+ASN1_IA5STRING *s2i_ASN1_IA5STRING(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
+                                   X509V3_CTX *ctx, const char *str);
+
+STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *i2v_GENERAL_NAME(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
+                                       GENERAL_NAME *gen,
+                                       STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *ret);
+int GENERAL_NAME_print(BIO *out, GENERAL_NAME *gen);
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(GENERAL_NAMES)
+
+STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *i2v_GENERAL_NAMES(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
+                                        GENERAL_NAMES *gen,
+                                        STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *extlist);
+GENERAL_NAMES *v2i_GENERAL_NAMES(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
+                                 X509V3_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nval);
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OTHERNAME)
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(EDIPARTYNAME)
+int OTHERNAME_cmp(OTHERNAME *a, OTHERNAME *b);
+void GENERAL_NAME_set0_value(GENERAL_NAME *a, int type, void *value);
+void *GENERAL_NAME_get0_value(GENERAL_NAME *a, int *ptype);
+int GENERAL_NAME_set0_othername(GENERAL_NAME *gen,
+                                ASN1_OBJECT *oid, ASN1_TYPE *value);
+int GENERAL_NAME_get0_otherName(GENERAL_NAME *gen,
+                                ASN1_OBJECT **poid, ASN1_TYPE **pvalue);
+
+char *i2s_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
+                            const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ia5);
+ASN1_OCTET_STRING *s2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
+                                         X509V3_CTX *ctx, const char *str);
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE)
+int i2a_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION(BIO *bp, const ACCESS_DESCRIPTION *a);
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(TLS_FEATURE)
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(CERTIFICATEPOLICIES)
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(POLICYINFO)
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(POLICYQUALINFO)
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(USERNOTICE)
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(NOTICEREF)
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(CRL_DIST_POINTS)
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(DIST_POINT)
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(DIST_POINT_NAME)
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ISSUING_DIST_POINT)
+
+int DIST_POINT_set_dpname(DIST_POINT_NAME *dpn, X509_NAME *iname);
+
+int NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(X509 *x, NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc);
+int NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check_CN(X509 *x, NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc);
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ACCESS_DESCRIPTION)
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS)
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(POLICY_MAPPING)
+DECLARE_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(POLICY_MAPPING)
+DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(POLICY_MAPPINGS)
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(GENERAL_SUBTREE)
+DECLARE_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(GENERAL_SUBTREE)
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(NAME_CONSTRAINTS)
+DECLARE_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(NAME_CONSTRAINTS)
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(POLICY_CONSTRAINTS)
+DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(POLICY_CONSTRAINTS)
+
+GENERAL_NAME *a2i_GENERAL_NAME(GENERAL_NAME *out,
+                               const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
+                               X509V3_CTX *ctx, int gen_type,
+                               const char *value, int is_nc);
+
+# ifdef HEADER_CONF_H
+GENERAL_NAME *v2i_GENERAL_NAME(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
+                               X509V3_CTX *ctx, CONF_VALUE *cnf);
+GENERAL_NAME *v2i_GENERAL_NAME_ex(GENERAL_NAME *out,
+                                  const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
+                                  X509V3_CTX *ctx, CONF_VALUE *cnf,
+                                  int is_nc);
+void X509V3_conf_free(CONF_VALUE *val);
+
+X509_EXTENSION *X509V3_EXT_nconf_nid(CONF *conf, X509V3_CTX *ctx, int ext_nid,
+                                     const char *value);
+X509_EXTENSION *X509V3_EXT_nconf(CONF *conf, X509V3_CTX *ctx, const char *name,
+                                 const char *value);
+int X509V3_EXT_add_nconf_sk(CONF *conf, X509V3_CTX *ctx, const char *section,
+                            STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) **sk);
+int X509V3_EXT_add_nconf(CONF *conf, X509V3_CTX *ctx, const char *section,
+                         X509 *cert);
+int X509V3_EXT_REQ_add_nconf(CONF *conf, X509V3_CTX *ctx, const char *section,
+                             X509_REQ *req);
+int X509V3_EXT_CRL_add_nconf(CONF *conf, X509V3_CTX *ctx, const char *section,
+                             X509_CRL *crl);
+
+X509_EXTENSION *X509V3_EXT_conf_nid(LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *conf,
+                                    X509V3_CTX *ctx, int ext_nid,
+                                    const char *value);
+X509_EXTENSION *X509V3_EXT_conf(LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *conf, X509V3_CTX *ctx,
+                                const char *name, const char *value);
+int X509V3_EXT_add_conf(LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *conf, X509V3_CTX *ctx,
+                        const char *section, X509 *cert);
+int X509V3_EXT_REQ_add_conf(LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *conf, X509V3_CTX *ctx,
+                            const char *section, X509_REQ *req);
+int X509V3_EXT_CRL_add_conf(LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *conf, X509V3_CTX *ctx,
+                            const char *section, X509_CRL *crl);
+
+int X509V3_add_value_bool_nf(const char *name, int asn1_bool,
+                             STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) **extlist);
+int X509V3_get_value_bool(const CONF_VALUE *value, int *asn1_bool);
+int X509V3_get_value_int(const CONF_VALUE *value, ASN1_INTEGER **aint);
+void X509V3_set_nconf(X509V3_CTX *ctx, CONF *conf);
+void X509V3_set_conf_lhash(X509V3_CTX *ctx, LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *lhash);
+# endif
+
+char *X509V3_get_string(X509V3_CTX *ctx, const char *name, const char *section);
+STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *X509V3_get_section(X509V3_CTX *ctx, const char *section);
+void X509V3_string_free(X509V3_CTX *ctx, char *str);
+void X509V3_section_free(X509V3_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *section);
+void X509V3_set_ctx(X509V3_CTX *ctx, X509 *issuer, X509 *subject,
+                    X509_REQ *req, X509_CRL *crl, int flags);
+
+int X509V3_add_value(const char *name, const char *value,
+                     STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) **extlist);
+int X509V3_add_value_uchar(const char *name, const unsigned char *value,
+                           STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) **extlist);
+int X509V3_add_value_bool(const char *name, int asn1_bool,
+                          STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) **extlist);
+int X509V3_add_value_int(const char *name, const ASN1_INTEGER *aint,
+                         STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) **extlist);
+char *i2s_ASN1_INTEGER(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *meth, const ASN1_INTEGER *aint);
+ASN1_INTEGER *s2i_ASN1_INTEGER(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *meth, const char *value);
+char *i2s_ASN1_ENUMERATED(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *meth, const ASN1_ENUMERATED *aint);
+char *i2s_ASN1_ENUMERATED_TABLE(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *meth,
+                                const ASN1_ENUMERATED *aint);
+int X509V3_EXT_add(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *ext);
+int X509V3_EXT_add_list(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *extlist);
+int X509V3_EXT_add_alias(int nid_to, int nid_from);
+void X509V3_EXT_cleanup(void);
+
+const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *X509V3_EXT_get(X509_EXTENSION *ext);
+const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *X509V3_EXT_get_nid(int nid);
+int X509V3_add_standard_extensions(void);
+STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *X509V3_parse_list(const char *line);
+void *X509V3_EXT_d2i(X509_EXTENSION *ext);
+void *X509V3_get_d2i(const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *x, int nid, int *crit,
+                     int *idx);
+
+X509_EXTENSION *X509V3_EXT_i2d(int ext_nid, int crit, void *ext_struc);
+int X509V3_add1_i2d(STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) **x, int nid, void *value,
+                    int crit, unsigned long flags);
+
+#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+/* The new declarations are in crypto.h, but the old ones were here. */
+# define hex_to_string OPENSSL_buf2hexstr
+# define string_to_hex OPENSSL_hexstr2buf
+#endif
+
+void X509V3_EXT_val_prn(BIO *out, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *val, int indent,
+                        int ml);
+int X509V3_EXT_print(BIO *out, X509_EXTENSION *ext, unsigned long flag,
+                     int indent);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+int X509V3_EXT_print_fp(FILE *out, X509_EXTENSION *ext, int flag, int indent);
+#endif
+int X509V3_extensions_print(BIO *out, const char *title,
+                            const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts,
+                            unsigned long flag, int indent);
+
+int X509_check_ca(X509 *x);
+int X509_check_purpose(X509 *x, int id, int ca);
+int X509_supported_extension(X509_EXTENSION *ex);
+int X509_PURPOSE_set(int *p, int purpose);
+int X509_check_issued(X509 *issuer, X509 *subject);
+int X509_check_akid(X509 *issuer, AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid);
+void X509_set_proxy_flag(X509 *x);
+void X509_set_proxy_pathlen(X509 *x, long l);
+long X509_get_proxy_pathlen(X509 *x);
+
+uint32_t X509_get_extension_flags(X509 *x);
+uint32_t X509_get_key_usage(X509 *x);
+uint32_t X509_get_extended_key_usage(X509 *x);
+const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *X509_get0_subject_key_id(X509 *x);
+const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *X509_get0_authority_key_id(X509 *x);
+
+int X509_PURPOSE_get_count(void);
+X509_PURPOSE *X509_PURPOSE_get0(int idx);
+int X509_PURPOSE_get_by_sname(const char *sname);
+int X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(int id);
+int X509_PURPOSE_add(int id, int trust, int flags,
+                     int (*ck) (const X509_PURPOSE *, const X509 *, int),
+                     const char *name, const char *sname, void *arg);
+char *X509_PURPOSE_get0_name(const X509_PURPOSE *xp);
+char *X509_PURPOSE_get0_sname(const X509_PURPOSE *xp);
+int X509_PURPOSE_get_trust(const X509_PURPOSE *xp);
+void X509_PURPOSE_cleanup(void);
+int X509_PURPOSE_get_id(const X509_PURPOSE *);
+
+STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *X509_get1_email(X509 *x);
+STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *X509_REQ_get1_email(X509_REQ *x);
+void X509_email_free(STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sk);
+STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *X509_get1_ocsp(X509 *x);
+/* Flags for X509_check_* functions */
+
+/*
+ * Always check subject name for host match even if subject alt names present
+ */
+# define X509_CHECK_FLAG_ALWAYS_CHECK_SUBJECT    0x1
+/* Disable wildcard matching for dnsName fields and common name. */
+# define X509_CHECK_FLAG_NO_WILDCARDS    0x2
+/* Wildcards must not match a partial label. */
+# define X509_CHECK_FLAG_NO_PARTIAL_WILDCARDS 0x4
+/* Allow (non-partial) wildcards to match multiple labels. */
+# define X509_CHECK_FLAG_MULTI_LABEL_WILDCARDS 0x8
+/* Constraint verifier subdomain patterns to match a single labels. */
+# define X509_CHECK_FLAG_SINGLE_LABEL_SUBDOMAINS 0x10
+/* Never check the subject CN */
+# define X509_CHECK_FLAG_NEVER_CHECK_SUBJECT    0x20
+/*
+ * Match reference identifiers starting with "." to any sub-domain.
+ * This is a non-public flag, turned on implicitly when the subject
+ * reference identity is a DNS name.
+ */
+# define _X509_CHECK_FLAG_DOT_SUBDOMAINS 0x8000
+
+int X509_check_host(X509 *x, const char *chk, size_t chklen,
+                    unsigned int flags, char **peername);
+int X509_check_email(X509 *x, const char *chk, size_t chklen,
+                     unsigned int flags);
+int X509_check_ip(X509 *x, const unsigned char *chk, size_t chklen,
+                  unsigned int flags);
+int X509_check_ip_asc(X509 *x, const char *ipasc, unsigned int flags);
+
+ASN1_OCTET_STRING *a2i_IPADDRESS(const char *ipasc);
+ASN1_OCTET_STRING *a2i_IPADDRESS_NC(const char *ipasc);
+int X509V3_NAME_from_section(X509_NAME *nm, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *dn_sk,
+                             unsigned long chtype);
+
+void X509_POLICY_NODE_print(BIO *out, X509_POLICY_NODE *node, int indent);
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE)
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
+typedef struct ASRange_st {
+    ASN1_INTEGER *min, *max;
+} ASRange;
+
+# define ASIdOrRange_id          0
+# define ASIdOrRange_range       1
+
+typedef struct ASIdOrRange_st {
+    int type;
+    union {
+        ASN1_INTEGER *id;
+        ASRange *range;
+    } u;
+} ASIdOrRange;
+
+typedef STACK_OF(ASIdOrRange) ASIdOrRanges;
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(ASIdOrRange)
+
+# define ASIdentifierChoice_inherit              0
+# define ASIdentifierChoice_asIdsOrRanges        1
+
+typedef struct ASIdentifierChoice_st {
+    int type;
+    union {
+        ASN1_NULL *inherit;
+        ASIdOrRanges *asIdsOrRanges;
+    } u;
+} ASIdentifierChoice;
+
+typedef struct ASIdentifiers_st {
+    ASIdentifierChoice *asnum, *rdi;
+} ASIdentifiers;
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASRange)
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASIdOrRange)
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASIdentifierChoice)
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASIdentifiers)
+
+typedef struct IPAddressRange_st {
+    ASN1_BIT_STRING *min, *max;
+} IPAddressRange;
+
+# define IPAddressOrRange_addressPrefix  0
+# define IPAddressOrRange_addressRange   1
+
+typedef struct IPAddressOrRange_st {
+    int type;
+    union {
+        ASN1_BIT_STRING *addressPrefix;
+        IPAddressRange *addressRange;
+    } u;
+} IPAddressOrRange;
+
+typedef STACK_OF(IPAddressOrRange) IPAddressOrRanges;
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(IPAddressOrRange)
+
+# define IPAddressChoice_inherit                 0
+# define IPAddressChoice_addressesOrRanges       1
+
+typedef struct IPAddressChoice_st {
+    int type;
+    union {
+        ASN1_NULL *inherit;
+        IPAddressOrRanges *addressesOrRanges;
+    } u;
+} IPAddressChoice;
+
+typedef struct IPAddressFamily_st {
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *addressFamily;
+    IPAddressChoice *ipAddressChoice;
+} IPAddressFamily;
+
+typedef STACK_OF(IPAddressFamily) IPAddrBlocks;
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(IPAddressFamily)
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(IPAddressRange)
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(IPAddressOrRange)
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(IPAddressChoice)
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(IPAddressFamily)
+
+/*
+ * API tag for elements of the ASIdentifer SEQUENCE.
+ */
+# define V3_ASID_ASNUM   0
+# define V3_ASID_RDI     1
+
+/*
+ * AFI values, assigned by IANA.  It'd be nice to make the AFI
+ * handling code totally generic, but there are too many little things
+ * that would need to be defined for other address families for it to
+ * be worth the trouble.
+ */
+# define IANA_AFI_IPV4   1
+# define IANA_AFI_IPV6   2
+
+/*
+ * Utilities to construct and extract values from RFC3779 extensions,
+ * since some of the encodings (particularly for IP address prefixes
+ * and ranges) are a bit tedious to work with directly.
+ */
+int X509v3_asid_add_inherit(ASIdentifiers *asid, int which);
+int X509v3_asid_add_id_or_range(ASIdentifiers *asid, int which,
+                                ASN1_INTEGER *min, ASN1_INTEGER *max);
+int X509v3_addr_add_inherit(IPAddrBlocks *addr,
+                            const unsigned afi, const unsigned *safi);
+int X509v3_addr_add_prefix(IPAddrBlocks *addr,
+                           const unsigned afi, const unsigned *safi,
+                           unsigned char *a, const int prefixlen);
+int X509v3_addr_add_range(IPAddrBlocks *addr,
+                          const unsigned afi, const unsigned *safi,
+                          unsigned char *min, unsigned char *max);
+unsigned X509v3_addr_get_afi(const IPAddressFamily *f);
+int X509v3_addr_get_range(IPAddressOrRange *aor, const unsigned afi,
+                          unsigned char *min, unsigned char *max,
+                          const int length);
+
+/*
+ * Canonical forms.
+ */
+int X509v3_asid_is_canonical(ASIdentifiers *asid);
+int X509v3_addr_is_canonical(IPAddrBlocks *addr);
+int X509v3_asid_canonize(ASIdentifiers *asid);
+int X509v3_addr_canonize(IPAddrBlocks *addr);
+
+/*
+ * Tests for inheritance and containment.
+ */
+int X509v3_asid_inherits(ASIdentifiers *asid);
+int X509v3_addr_inherits(IPAddrBlocks *addr);
+int X509v3_asid_subset(ASIdentifiers *a, ASIdentifiers *b);
+int X509v3_addr_subset(IPAddrBlocks *a, IPAddrBlocks *b);
+
+/*
+ * Check whether RFC 3779 extensions nest properly in chains.
+ */
+int X509v3_asid_validate_path(X509_STORE_CTX *);
+int X509v3_addr_validate_path(X509_STORE_CTX *);
+int X509v3_asid_validate_resource_set(STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
+                                      ASIdentifiers *ext,
+                                      int allow_inheritance);
+int X509v3_addr_validate_resource_set(STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
+                                      IPAddrBlocks *ext, int allow_inheritance);
+
+#endif                         /* OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 */
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+/*
+ * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
+ * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
+ */
+
+int ERR_load_X509V3_strings(void);
+
+/* Error codes for the X509V3 functions. */
+
+/* Function codes. */
+# define X509V3_F_A2I_GENERAL_NAME                        164
+# define X509V3_F_ADDR_VALIDATE_PATH_INTERNAL             166
+# define X509V3_F_ASIDENTIFIERCHOICE_CANONIZE             161
+# define X509V3_F_ASIDENTIFIERCHOICE_IS_CANONICAL         162
+# define X509V3_F_BIGNUM_TO_STRING                        167
+# define X509V3_F_COPY_EMAIL                              122
+# define X509V3_F_COPY_ISSUER                             123
+# define X509V3_F_DO_DIRNAME                              144
+# define X509V3_F_DO_EXT_I2D                              135
+# define X509V3_F_DO_EXT_NCONF                            151
+# define X509V3_F_GNAMES_FROM_SECTNAME                    156
+# define X509V3_F_I2S_ASN1_ENUMERATED                     121
+# define X509V3_F_I2S_ASN1_IA5STRING                      149
+# define X509V3_F_I2S_ASN1_INTEGER                        120
+# define X509V3_F_I2V_AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS               138
+# define X509V3_F_NOTICE_SECTION                          132
+# define X509V3_F_NREF_NOS                                133
+# define X509V3_F_POLICY_SECTION                          131
+# define X509V3_F_PROCESS_PCI_VALUE                       150
+# define X509V3_F_R2I_CERTPOL                             130
+# define X509V3_F_R2I_PCI                                 155
+# define X509V3_F_S2I_ASN1_IA5STRING                      100
+# define X509V3_F_S2I_ASN1_INTEGER                        108
+# define X509V3_F_S2I_ASN1_OCTET_STRING                   112
+# define X509V3_F_S2I_SKEY_ID                             115
+# define X509V3_F_SET_DIST_POINT_NAME                     158
+# define X509V3_F_SXNET_ADD_ID_ASC                        125
+# define X509V3_F_SXNET_ADD_ID_INTEGER                    126
+# define X509V3_F_SXNET_ADD_ID_ULONG                      127
+# define X509V3_F_SXNET_GET_ID_ASC                        128
+# define X509V3_F_SXNET_GET_ID_ULONG                      129
+# define X509V3_F_V2I_ASIDENTIFIERS                       163
+# define X509V3_F_V2I_ASN1_BIT_STRING                     101
+# define X509V3_F_V2I_AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS               139
+# define X509V3_F_V2I_AUTHORITY_KEYID                     119
+# define X509V3_F_V2I_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS                   102
+# define X509V3_F_V2I_CRLD                                134
+# define X509V3_F_V2I_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE                  103
+# define X509V3_F_V2I_GENERAL_NAMES                       118
+# define X509V3_F_V2I_GENERAL_NAME_EX                     117
+# define X509V3_F_V2I_IDP                                 157
+# define X509V3_F_V2I_IPADDRBLOCKS                        159
+# define X509V3_F_V2I_ISSUER_ALT                          153
+# define X509V3_F_V2I_NAME_CONSTRAINTS                    147
+# define X509V3_F_V2I_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS                  146
+# define X509V3_F_V2I_POLICY_MAPPINGS                     145
+# define X509V3_F_V2I_SUBJECT_ALT                         154
+# define X509V3_F_V2I_TLS_FEATURE                         165
+# define X509V3_F_V3_GENERIC_EXTENSION                    116
+# define X509V3_F_X509V3_ADD1_I2D                         140
+# define X509V3_F_X509V3_ADD_VALUE                        105
+# define X509V3_F_X509V3_EXT_ADD                          104
+# define X509V3_F_X509V3_EXT_ADD_ALIAS                    106
+# define X509V3_F_X509V3_EXT_I2D                          136
+# define X509V3_F_X509V3_EXT_NCONF                        152
+# define X509V3_F_X509V3_GET_SECTION                      142
+# define X509V3_F_X509V3_GET_STRING                       143
+# define X509V3_F_X509V3_GET_VALUE_BOOL                   110
+# define X509V3_F_X509V3_PARSE_LIST                       109
+# define X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD                        137
+# define X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_SET                        141
+
+/* Reason codes. */
+# define X509V3_R_BAD_IP_ADDRESS                          118
+# define X509V3_R_BAD_OBJECT                              119
+# define X509V3_R_BN_DEC2BN_ERROR                         100
+# define X509V3_R_BN_TO_ASN1_INTEGER_ERROR                101
+# define X509V3_R_DIRNAME_ERROR                           149
+# define X509V3_R_DISTPOINT_ALREADY_SET                   160
+# define X509V3_R_DUPLICATE_ZONE_ID                       133
+# define X509V3_R_ERROR_CONVERTING_ZONE                   131
+# define X509V3_R_ERROR_CREATING_EXTENSION                144
+# define X509V3_R_ERROR_IN_EXTENSION                      128
+# define X509V3_R_EXPECTED_A_SECTION_NAME                 137
+# define X509V3_R_EXTENSION_EXISTS                        145
+# define X509V3_R_EXTENSION_NAME_ERROR                    115
+# define X509V3_R_EXTENSION_NOT_FOUND                     102
+# define X509V3_R_EXTENSION_SETTING_NOT_SUPPORTED         103
+# define X509V3_R_EXTENSION_VALUE_ERROR                   116
+# define X509V3_R_ILLEGAL_EMPTY_EXTENSION                 151
+# define X509V3_R_INCORRECT_POLICY_SYNTAX_TAG             152
+# define X509V3_R_INVALID_ASNUMBER                        162
+# define X509V3_R_INVALID_ASRANGE                         163
+# define X509V3_R_INVALID_BOOLEAN_STRING                  104
+# define X509V3_R_INVALID_EXTENSION_STRING                105
+# define X509V3_R_INVALID_INHERITANCE                     165
+# define X509V3_R_INVALID_IPADDRESS                       166
+# define X509V3_R_INVALID_MULTIPLE_RDNS                   161
+# define X509V3_R_INVALID_NAME                            106
+# define X509V3_R_INVALID_NULL_ARGUMENT                   107
+# define X509V3_R_INVALID_NULL_NAME                       108
+# define X509V3_R_INVALID_NULL_VALUE                      109
+# define X509V3_R_INVALID_NUMBER                          140
+# define X509V3_R_INVALID_NUMBERS                         141
+# define X509V3_R_INVALID_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER               110
+# define X509V3_R_INVALID_OPTION                          138
+# define X509V3_R_INVALID_POLICY_IDENTIFIER               134
+# define X509V3_R_INVALID_PROXY_POLICY_SETTING            153
+# define X509V3_R_INVALID_PURPOSE                         146
+# define X509V3_R_INVALID_SAFI                            164
+# define X509V3_R_INVALID_SECTION                         135
+# define X509V3_R_INVALID_SYNTAX                          143
+# define X509V3_R_ISSUER_DECODE_ERROR                     126
+# define X509V3_R_MISSING_VALUE                           124
+# define X509V3_R_NEED_ORGANIZATION_AND_NUMBERS           142
+# define X509V3_R_NO_CONFIG_DATABASE                      136
+# define X509V3_R_NO_ISSUER_CERTIFICATE                   121
+# define X509V3_R_NO_ISSUER_DETAILS                       127
+# define X509V3_R_NO_POLICY_IDENTIFIER                    139
+# define X509V3_R_NO_PROXY_CERT_POLICY_LANGUAGE_DEFINED   154
+# define X509V3_R_NO_PUBLIC_KEY                           114
+# define X509V3_R_NO_SUBJECT_DETAILS                      125
+# define X509V3_R_OPERATION_NOT_DEFINED                   148
+# define X509V3_R_OTHERNAME_ERROR                         147
+# define X509V3_R_POLICY_LANGUAGE_ALREADY_DEFINED         155
+# define X509V3_R_POLICY_PATH_LENGTH                      156
+# define X509V3_R_POLICY_PATH_LENGTH_ALREADY_DEFINED      157
+# define X509V3_R_POLICY_WHEN_PROXY_LANGUAGE_REQUIRES_NO_POLICY 159
+# define X509V3_R_SECTION_NOT_FOUND                       150
+# define X509V3_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_DETAILS            122
+# define X509V3_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_KEYID              123
+# define X509V3_R_UNKNOWN_BIT_STRING_ARGUMENT             111
+# define X509V3_R_UNKNOWN_EXTENSION                       129
+# define X509V3_R_UNKNOWN_EXTENSION_NAME                  130
+# define X509V3_R_UNKNOWN_OPTION                          120
+# define X509V3_R_UNSUPPORTED_OPTION                      117
+# define X509V3_R_UNSUPPORTED_TYPE                        167
+# define X509V3_R_USER_TOO_LONG                           132
+
+# ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+# endif
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/ms/applink.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/ms/applink.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..238dbff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/ms/applink.c
@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#define APPLINK_STDIN   1
+#define APPLINK_STDOUT  2
+#define APPLINK_STDERR  3
+#define APPLINK_FPRINTF 4
+#define APPLINK_FGETS   5
+#define APPLINK_FREAD   6
+#define APPLINK_FWRITE  7
+#define APPLINK_FSETMOD 8
+#define APPLINK_FEOF    9
+#define APPLINK_FCLOSE  10      /* should not be used */
+
+#define APPLINK_FOPEN   11      /* solely for completeness */
+#define APPLINK_FSEEK   12
+#define APPLINK_FTELL   13
+#define APPLINK_FFLUSH  14
+#define APPLINK_FERROR  15
+#define APPLINK_CLEARERR 16
+#define APPLINK_FILENO  17      /* to be used with below */
+
+#define APPLINK_OPEN    18      /* formally can't be used, as flags can vary */
+#define APPLINK_READ    19
+#define APPLINK_WRITE   20
+#define APPLINK_LSEEK   21
+#define APPLINK_CLOSE   22
+#define APPLINK_MAX     22      /* always same as last macro */
+
+#ifndef APPMACROS_ONLY
+# include <stdio.h>
+# include <io.h>
+# include <fcntl.h>
+
+static void *app_stdin(void)
+{
+    return stdin;
+}
+
+static void *app_stdout(void)
+{
+    return stdout;
+}
+
+static void *app_stderr(void)
+{
+    return stderr;
+}
+
+static int app_feof(FILE *fp)
+{
+    return feof(fp);
+}
+
+static int app_ferror(FILE *fp)
+{
+    return ferror(fp);
+}
+
+static void app_clearerr(FILE *fp)
+{
+    clearerr(fp);
+}
+
+static int app_fileno(FILE *fp)
+{
+    return _fileno(fp);
+}
+
+static int app_fsetmod(FILE *fp, char mod)
+{
+    return _setmode(_fileno(fp), mod == 'b' ? _O_BINARY : _O_TEXT);
+}
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+__declspec(dllexport)
+void **
+# if defined(__BORLANDC__)
+/*
+ * __stdcall appears to be the only way to get the name
+ * decoration right with Borland C. Otherwise it works
+ * purely incidentally, as we pass no parameters.
+ */
+__stdcall
+# else
+__cdecl
+# endif
+OPENSSL_Applink(void)
+{
+    static int once = 1;
+    static void *OPENSSL_ApplinkTable[APPLINK_MAX + 1] =
+        { (void *)APPLINK_MAX };
+
+    if (once) {
+        OPENSSL_ApplinkTable[APPLINK_STDIN] = app_stdin;
+        OPENSSL_ApplinkTable[APPLINK_STDOUT] = app_stdout;
+        OPENSSL_ApplinkTable[APPLINK_STDERR] = app_stderr;
+        OPENSSL_ApplinkTable[APPLINK_FPRINTF] = fprintf;
+        OPENSSL_ApplinkTable[APPLINK_FGETS] = fgets;
+        OPENSSL_ApplinkTable[APPLINK_FREAD] = fread;
+        OPENSSL_ApplinkTable[APPLINK_FWRITE] = fwrite;
+        OPENSSL_ApplinkTable[APPLINK_FSETMOD] = app_fsetmod;
+        OPENSSL_ApplinkTable[APPLINK_FEOF] = app_feof;
+        OPENSSL_ApplinkTable[APPLINK_FCLOSE] = fclose;
+
+        OPENSSL_ApplinkTable[APPLINK_FOPEN] = fopen;
+        OPENSSL_ApplinkTable[APPLINK_FSEEK] = fseek;
+        OPENSSL_ApplinkTable[APPLINK_FTELL] = ftell;
+        OPENSSL_ApplinkTable[APPLINK_FFLUSH] = fflush;
+        OPENSSL_ApplinkTable[APPLINK_FERROR] = app_ferror;
+        OPENSSL_ApplinkTable[APPLINK_CLEARERR] = app_clearerr;
+        OPENSSL_ApplinkTable[APPLINK_FILENO] = app_fileno;
+
+        OPENSSL_ApplinkTable[APPLINK_OPEN] = _open;
+        OPENSSL_ApplinkTable[APPLINK_READ] = _read;
+        OPENSSL_ApplinkTable[APPLINK_WRITE] = _write;
+        OPENSSL_ApplinkTable[APPLINK_LSEEK] = _lseek;
+        OPENSSL_ApplinkTable[APPLINK_CLOSE] = _close;
+
+        once = 0;
+    }
+
+    return OPENSSL_ApplinkTable;
+}
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/ms/cmp.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/ms/cmp.pl
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..265ce56
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/ms/cmp.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+($#ARGV == 1) || die "usage: cmp.pl <file1> <file2>\n";
+
+open(IN0,"<$ARGV[0]") || die "unable to open $ARGV[0]\n";
+open(IN1,"<$ARGV[1]") || die "unable to open $ARGV[1]\n";
+binmode IN0;
+binmode IN1;
+
+$tot=0;
+$ret=1;
+for (;;)
+{
+    $n1=sysread(IN0,$b1,4096);
+    $n2=sysread(IN1,$b2,4096);
+
+    last if ($n1 != $n2);
+    last if ($b1 ne $b2);
+    last if ($n1 < 0);
+    if ($n1 == 0)
+    {
+        $ret=0;
+        last;
+    }
+    $tot+=$n1;
+}
+
+close(IN0);
+close(IN1);
+if ($ret)
+{
+    printf STDERR "$ARGV[0] and $ARGV[1] are different\n";
+    @a1=unpack("C*",$b1);
+    @a2=unpack("C*",$b2);
+    for ($i=0; $i<=$#a1; $i++)
+    {
+        if ($a1[$i] ne $a2[$i])
+        {
+            printf "%02X %02X <<\n",$a1[$i],$a2[$i];
+            last;
+        }
+    }
+    $nm=$tot+$n1;
+    $tot+=$i+1;
+    printf STDERR "diff at char $tot of $nm\n";
+}
+exit($ret);
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/ms/segrenam.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/ms/segrenam.pl
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..372444a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/ms/segrenam.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+my $quiet = 1;
+
+unpack("L",pack("N",1))!=1 || die "only little-endian hosts are supported";
+
+# first argument can specify custom suffix...
+$suffix=(@ARGV[0]=~/^\$/) ? shift(@ARGV) : "\$m";
+#################################################################
+# rename segments in COFF modules according to %map table below #
+%map=( ".text"  => "fipstx$suffix",                             #
+       ".text\$"=> "fipstx$suffix",                             #
+       ".rdata" => "fipsrd$suffix",                             #
+       ".data"  => "fipsda$suffix" );                           #
+#################################################################
+
+# collect file list
+foreach (@ARGV) {
+    if (/\*/) { push(@files,glob($_)); }
+    else      { push(@files,$_);       }
+}
+
+use Fcntl;
+use Fcntl ":seek";
+
+foreach (@files) {
+    $file=$_;
+    print "processing $file\n" unless $quiet;
+
+    sysopen(FD,$file,O_RDWR|O_BINARY) || die "sysopen($file): $!";
+
+    # read IMAGE_DOS_HEADER
+    sysread(FD,$mz,64)==64 || die "$file is too short";
+    @dos_header=unpack("a2C58I",$mz);
+    if (@dos_header[0] eq "MZ") {
+        $e_lfanew=pop(@dos_header);
+        sysseek(FD,$e_lfanew,SEEK_SET) || die "$file is too short";
+        sysread(FD,$Magic,4)==4        || die "$file is too short";
+        unpack("I",$Magic)==0x4550     || die "$file is not COFF image";
+    } elsif ($file =~ /\.obj$/i) {
+        # .obj files have no IMAGE_DOS_HEADER
+        sysseek(FD,0,SEEK_SET)         || die "unable to rewind $file";
+    } else { next; }
+
+    # read IMAGE_FILE_HEADER
+    sysread(FD,$coff,20)==20 || die "$file is too short";
+    ($Machine,$NumberOfSections,$TimeDateStamp,
+     $PointerToSymbolTable,$NumberOfSysmbols,
+     $SizeOfOptionalHeader,$Characteristics)=unpack("SSIIISS",$coff);
+
+    # skip over IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER
+    sysseek(FD,$SizeOfOptionalHeader,SEEK_CUR) || die "$file is too short";
+
+    # traverse IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER table
+    for($i=0;$i<$NumberOfSections;$i++) {
+        sysread(FD,$SectionHeader,40)==40 || die "$file is too short";
+        ($Name,@opaque)=unpack("Z8C*",$SectionHeader);
+        if ($map{$Name}) {
+            sysseek(FD,-40,SEEK_CUR) || die "unable to rewind $file";
+            syswrite(FD,pack("a8C*",$map{$Name},@opaque))==40 || die "syswrite failed: $!";
+            printf "    %-8s -> %.8s\n",$Name,$map{$Name} unless $quiet;
+        }
+    }
+    close(FD);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/ms/tlhelp32.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/ms/tlhelp32.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9408dc3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/ms/tlhelp32.h
@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
+/*-
+        tlhelp32.h - Include file for Tool help functions.
+
+        Written by Mumit Khan <khan@nanotech.wisc.edu>
+
+        This file is part of a free library for the Win32 API.
+
+        This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+        but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+        MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
+
+*/
+#ifndef _TLHELP32_H
+# define _TLHELP32_H
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+# define HF32_DEFAULT    1
+# define HF32_SHARED     2
+# define LF32_FIXED      0x1
+# define LF32_FREE       0x2
+# define LF32_MOVEABLE   0x4
+# define MAX_MODULE_NAME32       255
+# define TH32CS_SNAPHEAPLIST     0x1
+# define TH32CS_SNAPPROCESS      0x2
+# define TH32CS_SNAPTHREAD       0x4
+# define TH32CS_SNAPMODULE       0x8
+# define TH32CS_SNAPALL  (TH32CS_SNAPHEAPLIST|TH32CS_SNAPPROCESS|TH32CS_SNAPTHREAD|TH32CS_SNAPMODULE)
+# define TH32CS_INHERIT  0x80000000
+typedef struct tagHEAPLIST32 {
+    DWORD dwSize;
+    DWORD th32ProcessID;
+    DWORD th32HeapID;
+    DWORD dwFlags;
+} HEAPLIST32, *PHEAPLIST32, *LPHEAPLIST32;
+typedef struct tagHEAPENTRY32 {
+    DWORD dwSize;
+    HANDLE hHandle;
+    DWORD dwAddress;
+    DWORD dwBlockSize;
+    DWORD dwFlags;
+    DWORD dwLockCount;
+    DWORD dwResvd;
+    DWORD th32ProcessID;
+    DWORD th32HeapID;
+} HEAPENTRY32, *PHEAPENTRY32, *LPHEAPENTRY32;
+typedef struct tagPROCESSENTRY32W {
+    DWORD dwSize;
+    DWORD cntUsage;
+    DWORD th32ProcessID;
+    DWORD th32DefaultHeapID;
+    DWORD th32ModuleID;
+    DWORD cntThreads;
+    DWORD th32ParentProcessID;
+    LONG pcPriClassBase;
+    DWORD dwFlags;
+    WCHAR szExeFile[MAX_PATH];
+} PROCESSENTRY32W, *PPROCESSENTRY32W, *LPPROCESSENTRY32W;
+typedef struct tagPROCESSENTRY32 {
+    DWORD dwSize;
+    DWORD cntUsage;
+    DWORD th32ProcessID;
+    DWORD th32DefaultHeapID;
+    DWORD th32ModuleID;
+    DWORD cntThreads;
+    DWORD th32ParentProcessID;
+    LONG pcPriClassBase;
+    DWORD dwFlags;
+    CHAR szExeFile[MAX_PATH];
+} PROCESSENTRY32, *PPROCESSENTRY32, *LPPROCESSENTRY32;
+typedef struct tagTHREADENTRY32 {
+    DWORD dwSize;
+    DWORD cntUsage;
+    DWORD th32ThreadID;
+    DWORD th32OwnerProcessID;
+    LONG tpBasePri;
+    LONG tpDeltaPri;
+    DWORD dwFlags;
+} THREADENTRY32, *PTHREADENTRY32, *LPTHREADENTRY32;
+typedef struct tagMODULEENTRY32W {
+    DWORD dwSize;
+    DWORD th32ModuleID;
+    DWORD th32ProcessID;
+    DWORD GlblcntUsage;
+    DWORD ProccntUsage;
+    BYTE *modBaseAddr;
+    DWORD modBaseSize;
+    HMODULE hModule;
+    WCHAR szModule[MAX_MODULE_NAME32 + 1];
+    WCHAR szExePath[MAX_PATH];
+} MODULEENTRY32W, *PMODULEENTRY32W, *LPMODULEENTRY32W;
+typedef struct tagMODULEENTRY32 {
+    DWORD dwSize;
+    DWORD th32ModuleID;
+    DWORD th32ProcessID;
+    DWORD GlblcntUsage;
+    DWORD ProccntUsage;
+    BYTE *modBaseAddr;
+    DWORD modBaseSize;
+    HMODULE hModule;
+    char szModule[MAX_MODULE_NAME32 + 1];
+    char szExePath[MAX_PATH];
+} MODULEENTRY32, *PMODULEENTRY32, *LPMODULEENTRY32;
+BOOL WINAPI Heap32First(LPHEAPENTRY32, DWORD, DWORD);
+BOOL WINAPI Heap32ListFirst(HANDLE, LPHEAPLIST32);
+BOOL WINAPI Heap32ListNext(HANDLE, LPHEAPLIST32);
+BOOL WINAPI Heap32Next(LPHEAPENTRY32);
+BOOL WINAPI Module32First(HANDLE, LPMODULEENTRY32);
+BOOL WINAPI Module32FirstW(HANDLE, LPMODULEENTRY32W);
+BOOL WINAPI Module32Next(HANDLE, LPMODULEENTRY32);
+BOOL WINAPI Module32NextW(HANDLE, LPMODULEENTRY32W);
+BOOL WINAPI Process32First(HANDLE, LPPROCESSENTRY32);
+BOOL WINAPI Process32FirstW(HANDLE, LPPROCESSENTRY32W);
+BOOL WINAPI Process32Next(HANDLE, LPPROCESSENTRY32);
+BOOL WINAPI Process32NextW(HANDLE, LPPROCESSENTRY32W);
+BOOL WINAPI Thread32First(HANDLE, LPTHREADENTRY32);
+BOOL WINAPI Thread32Next(HANDLE, LPTHREADENTRY32);
+BOOL WINAPI Toolhelp32ReadProcessMemory(DWORD, LPCVOID, LPVOID, DWORD,
+                                        LPDWORD);
+HANDLE WINAPI CreateToolhelp32Snapshot(DWORD, DWORD);
+# ifdef UNICODE
+#  define LPMODULEENTRY32 LPMODULEENTRY32W
+#  define LPPROCESSENTRY32 LPPROCESSENTRY32W
+#  define MODULEENTRY32 MODULEENTRY32W
+#  define Module32First Module32FirstW
+#  define Module32Next Module32NextW
+#  define PMODULEENTRY32 PMODULEENTRY32W
+#  define PPROCESSENTRY32 PPROCESSENTRY32W
+#  define PROCESSENTRY32 PROCESSENTRY32W
+#  define Process32First Process32FirstW
+#  define Process32Next Process32NextW
+# endif                         /* UNICODE */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+#endif                          /* _TLHELP32_H */
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/ms/uplink-common.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/ms/uplink-common.pl
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..e2ab594
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/ms/uplink-common.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+# pull APPLINK_MAX value from applink.c...
+$applink_c=$0;
+$applink_c=~s|[^/\\]+$||g;
+$applink_c.="applink.c";
+open(INPUT,$applink_c) || die "can't open $applink_c: $!";
+@max=grep {/APPLINK_MAX\s+(\d+)/} <INPUT>;
+close(INPUT);
+($#max==0) or die "can't find APPLINK_MAX in $applink_c";
+
+$max[0]=~/APPLINK_MAX\s+(\d+)/;
+$N=$1;	# number of entries in OPENSSL_UplinkTable not including
+	# OPENSSL_UplinkTable[0], which contains this value...
+
+1;
+
+# Idea is to fill the OPENSSL_UplinkTable with pointers to stubs
+# which invoke 'void OPENSSL_Uplink (ULONG_PTR *table,int index)';
+# and then dereference themselves. Latter shall result in endless
+# loop *unless* OPENSSL_Uplink does not replace 'table[index]' with
+# something else, e.g. as 'table[index]=unimplemented;'...
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/ms/uplink-ia64.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/ms/uplink-ia64.pl
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..0636f13
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/ms/uplink-ia64.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+$output = pop;
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+push(@INC,"${dir}.");
+
+require "uplink-common.pl";
+
+local $V=8;	# max number of args uplink functions may accept...
+my $loc0 = "r".(32+$V);
+print <<___;
+.text
+.global	OPENSSL_Uplink#
+.type	OPENSSL_Uplink#,\@function
+
+___
+for ($i=1;$i<=$N;$i++) {
+print <<___;
+.proc	lazy$i#
+lazy$i:
+	.prologue
+{ .mii;	.save	ar.pfs,$loc0
+	alloc	loc0=ar.pfs,$V,3,2,0
+	.save	b0,loc1
+	mov	loc1=b0
+	addl	loc2=\@ltoff(OPENSSL_UplinkTable#),gp	};;
+	.body
+{ .mmi;	ld8	out0=[loc2]
+	mov	out1=$i					};;
+{ .mib;	add	loc2=8*$i,out0
+	br.call.sptk.many	b0=OPENSSL_Uplink#	};;
+{ .mmi;	ld8	r31=[loc2];;
+	ld8	r30=[r31],8				};;
+{ .mii;	ld8	gp=[r31]
+	mov	b6=r30
+	mov	b0=loc1					};;
+{ .mib;	mov	ar.pfs=loc0
+	br.many	b6					};;
+.endp	lazy$i#
+
+___
+}
+print <<___;
+.data
+.global OPENSSL_UplinkTable#
+OPENSSL_UplinkTable:    data8   $N      // amount of following entries
+___
+for ($i=1;$i<=$N;$i++) {   print "      data8   \@fptr(lazy$i#)\n";   }
+print <<___;
+.size   OPENSSL_UplinkTable,.-OPENSSL_UplinkTable#
+___
+
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/ms/uplink-x86.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/ms/uplink-x86.pl
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..e25668e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/ms/uplink-x86.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+push(@INC, "${dir}.", "${dir}../crypto/perlasm");
+require "x86asm.pl";
+
+require "uplink-common.pl";
+
+$output = pop;
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+&asm_init($ARGV[0],"uplink-x86");
+
+&external_label("OPENSSL_Uplink");
+&public_label("OPENSSL_UplinkTable");
+
+for ($i=1;$i<=$N;$i++) {
+&function_begin_B("_\$lazy${i}");
+	&lea	("eax",&DWP(&label("OPENSSL_UplinkTable")));
+	&push	($i);
+	&push	("eax");
+	&call	(&label("OPENSSL_Uplink"));
+	&pop	("eax");
+	&add	("esp",4);
+	&jmp_ptr(&DWP(4*$i,"eax"));
+&function_end_B("_\$lazy${i}");
+}
+
+&dataseg();
+&align(4);
+&set_label("OPENSSL_UplinkTable");
+&data_word($N);
+for ($i=1;$i<=$N;$i++) {
+&data_word(&label("_\$lazy${i}"));
+}
+&asm_finish();
+
+close OUTPUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/ms/uplink-x86_64.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/ms/uplink-x86_64.pl
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..1f24450
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/ms/uplink-x86_64.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+$output=pop;
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+open OUT,"| \"$^X\" \"${dir}../crypto/perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl\" \"$output\"";
+*STDOUT=*OUT;
+push(@INC,"${dir}.");
+
+require "uplink-common.pl";
+
+$prefix="_lazy";
+
+print <<___;
+.text
+.extern	OPENSSL_Uplink
+.globl	OPENSSL_UplinkTable
+___
+for ($i=1;$i<=$N;$i++) {
+print <<___;
+.type	$prefix${i},\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+$prefix${i}:
+	.byte	0x48,0x83,0xEC,0x28	# sub rsp,40
+	mov	%rcx,48(%rsp)
+	mov	%rdx,56(%rsp)
+	mov	%r8,64(%rsp)
+	mov	%r9,72(%rsp)
+	lea	OPENSSL_UplinkTable(%rip),%rcx
+	mov	\$$i,%rdx
+	call	OPENSSL_Uplink
+	mov	48(%rsp),%rcx
+	mov	56(%rsp),%rdx
+	mov	64(%rsp),%r8
+	mov	72(%rsp),%r9
+	lea	OPENSSL_UplinkTable(%rip),%rax
+	add	\$40,%rsp
+	jmp	*8*$i(%rax)
+$prefix${i}_end:
+.size	$prefix${i},.-$prefix${i}
+___
+}
+print <<___;
+.data
+OPENSSL_UplinkTable:
+        .quad   $N
+___
+for ($i=1;$i<=$N;$i++) {   print "      .quad   $prefix$i\n";   }
+print <<___;
+.section	.pdata,"r"
+.align		4
+___
+for ($i=1;$i<=$N;$i++) {
+print <<___;
+	.rva	$prefix${i},$prefix${i}_end,${prefix}_unwind_info
+___
+}
+print <<___;
+.section	.xdata,"r"
+.align		8
+${prefix}_unwind_info:
+	.byte	0x01,0x04,0x01,0x00
+	.byte	0x04,0x42,0x00,0x00
+___
+
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/ms/uplink.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/ms/uplink.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7f7abfb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/ms/uplink.c
@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#if (defined(_WIN64) || defined(_WIN32_WCE)) && !defined(UNICODE)
+# define UNICODE
+#endif
+#if defined(UNICODE) && !defined(_UNICODE)
+# define _UNICODE
+#endif
+#if defined(_UNICODE) && !defined(UNICODE)
+# define UNICODE
+#endif
+
+#include <windows.h>
+#include <tchar.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "uplink.h"
+void OPENSSL_showfatal(const char *, ...);
+
+static TCHAR msg[128];
+
+static void unimplemented(void)
+{
+    OPENSSL_showfatal(sizeof(TCHAR) == sizeof(char) ? "%s\n" : "%S\n", msg);
+    ExitProcess(1);
+}
+
+void OPENSSL_Uplink(volatile void **table, int index)
+{
+    static HMODULE volatile apphandle = NULL;
+    static void **volatile applinktable = NULL;
+    int len;
+    void (*func) (void) = unimplemented;
+    HANDLE h;
+    void **p;
+
+    /*
+     * Note that the below code is not MT-safe in respect to msg buffer, but
+     * what's the worst thing that can happen? Error message might be
+     * misleading or corrupted. As error condition is fatal and should never
+     * be risen, I accept the risk...
+     */
+    /*
+     * One can argue that I should have used InterlockedExchangePointer or
+     * something to update static variables and table[]. Well, store
+     * instructions are as atomic as they can get and assigned values are
+     * effectively constant... So that volatile qualifier should be
+     * sufficient [it prohibits compiler to reorder memory access
+     * instructions].
+     */
+    do {
+        len = _sntprintf(msg, sizeof(msg) / sizeof(TCHAR),
+                         _T("OPENSSL_Uplink(%p,%02X): "), table, index);
+        _tcscpy(msg + len, _T("unimplemented function"));
+
+        if ((h = apphandle) == NULL) {
+            if ((h = GetModuleHandle(NULL)) == NULL) {
+                apphandle = (HMODULE) - 1;
+                _tcscpy(msg + len, _T("no host application"));
+                break;
+            }
+            apphandle = h;
+        }
+        if ((h = apphandle) == (HMODULE) - 1) /* revalidate */
+            break;
+
+        if (applinktable == NULL) {
+            void **(*applink) ();
+
+            applink = (void **(*)())GetProcAddress(h, "OPENSSL_Applink");
+            if (applink == NULL) {
+                apphandle = (HMODULE) - 1;
+                _tcscpy(msg + len, _T("no OPENSSL_Applink"));
+                break;
+            }
+            p = (*applink) ();
+            if (p == NULL) {
+                apphandle = (HMODULE) - 1;
+                _tcscpy(msg + len, _T("no ApplinkTable"));
+                break;
+            }
+            applinktable = p;
+        } else
+            p = applinktable;
+
+        if (index > (int)p[0])
+            break;
+
+        if (p[index])
+            func = p[index];
+    } while (0);
+
+    table[index] = func;
+}
+
+#if defined(_MSC_VER) && defined(_M_IX86)
+# define LAZY(i)         \
+__declspec(naked) static void lazy##i (void) {  \
+        _asm    push i                          \
+        _asm    push OFFSET OPENSSL_UplinkTable \
+        _asm    call OPENSSL_Uplink             \
+        _asm    add  esp,8                      \
+        _asm    jmp  OPENSSL_UplinkTable+4*i    }
+
+# if APPLINK_MAX>25
+#  error "Add more stubs..."
+# endif
+/* make some in advance... */
+LAZY(1) LAZY(2) LAZY(3) LAZY(4) LAZY(5)
+    LAZY(6) LAZY(7) LAZY(8) LAZY(9) LAZY(10)
+    LAZY(11) LAZY(12) LAZY(13) LAZY(14) LAZY(15)
+    LAZY(16) LAZY(17) LAZY(18) LAZY(19) LAZY(20)
+    LAZY(21) LAZY(22) LAZY(23) LAZY(24) LAZY(25)
+void *OPENSSL_UplinkTable[] = {
+    (void *)APPLINK_MAX,
+    lazy1, lazy2, lazy3, lazy4, lazy5,
+    lazy6, lazy7, lazy8, lazy9, lazy10,
+    lazy11, lazy12, lazy13, lazy14, lazy15,
+    lazy16, lazy17, lazy18, lazy19, lazy20,
+    lazy21, lazy22, lazy23, lazy24, lazy25,
+};
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SELFTEST
+main()
+{
+    UP_fprintf(UP_stdout, "hello, world!\n");
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/ms/uplink.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/ms/uplink.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f6cd038
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/ms/uplink.h
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#define APPMACROS_ONLY
+#include "applink.c"
+
+extern void *OPENSSL_UplinkTable[];
+
+#define UP_stdin  (*(void *(*)(void))OPENSSL_UplinkTable[APPLINK_STDIN])()
+#define UP_stdout (*(void *(*)(void))OPENSSL_UplinkTable[APPLINK_STDOUT])()
+#define UP_stderr (*(void *(*)(void))OPENSSL_UplinkTable[APPLINK_STDERR])()
+#define UP_fprintf (*(int (*)(void *,const char *,...))OPENSSL_UplinkTable[APPLINK_FPRINTF])
+#define UP_fgets  (*(char *(*)(char *,int,void *))OPENSSL_UplinkTable[APPLINK_FGETS])
+#define UP_fread  (*(size_t (*)(void *,size_t,size_t,void *))OPENSSL_UplinkTable[APPLINK_FREAD])
+#define UP_fwrite (*(size_t (*)(const void *,size_t,size_t,void *))OPENSSL_UplinkTable[APPLINK_FWRITE])
+#define UP_fsetmod (*(int (*)(void *,char))OPENSSL_UplinkTable[APPLINK_FSETMOD])
+#define UP_feof   (*(int (*)(void *))OPENSSL_UplinkTable[APPLINK_FEOF])
+#define UP_fclose (*(int (*)(void *))OPENSSL_UplinkTable[APPLINK_FCLOSE])
+
+#define UP_fopen  (*(void *(*)(const char *,const char *))OPENSSL_UplinkTable[APPLINK_FOPEN])
+#define UP_fseek  (*(int (*)(void *,long,int))OPENSSL_UplinkTable[APPLINK_FSEEK])
+#define UP_ftell  (*(long (*)(void *))OPENSSL_UplinkTable[APPLINK_FTELL])
+#define UP_fflush (*(int (*)(void *))OPENSSL_UplinkTable[APPLINK_FFLUSH])
+#define UP_ferror (*(int (*)(void *))OPENSSL_UplinkTable[APPLINK_FERROR])
+#define UP_clearerr (*(void (*)(void *))OPENSSL_UplinkTable[APPLINK_CLEARERR])
+#define UP_fileno (*(int (*)(void *))OPENSSL_UplinkTable[APPLINK_FILENO])
+
+#define UP_open   (*(int (*)(const char *,int,...))OPENSSL_UplinkTable[APPLINK_OPEN])
+#define UP_read   (*(ossl_ssize_t (*)(int,void *,size_t))OPENSSL_UplinkTable[APPLINK_READ])
+#define UP_write  (*(ossl_ssize_t (*)(int,const void *,size_t))OPENSSL_UplinkTable[APPLINK_WRITE])
+#define UP_lseek  (*(long (*)(int,long,int))OPENSSL_UplinkTable[APPLINK_LSEEK])
+#define UP_close  (*(int (*)(int))OPENSSL_UplinkTable[APPLINK_CLOSE])
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/os-dep/haiku.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/os-dep/haiku.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7e908ef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/os-dep/haiku.h
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+#include <sys/select.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/bio_ssl.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/bio_ssl.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..97540e6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/bio_ssl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,516 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include "internal/bio.h"
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+
+static int ssl_write(BIO *h, const char *buf, int num);
+static int ssl_read(BIO *h, char *buf, int size);
+static int ssl_puts(BIO *h, const char *str);
+static long ssl_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, long arg1, void *arg2);
+static int ssl_new(BIO *h);
+static int ssl_free(BIO *data);
+static long ssl_callback_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, BIO_info_cb *fp);
+typedef struct bio_ssl_st {
+    SSL *ssl;                   /* The ssl handle :-) */
+    /* re-negotiate every time the total number of bytes is this size */
+    int num_renegotiates;
+    unsigned long renegotiate_count;
+    unsigned long byte_count;
+    unsigned long renegotiate_timeout;
+    unsigned long last_time;
+} BIO_SSL;
+
+static const BIO_METHOD methods_sslp = {
+    BIO_TYPE_SSL,
+    "ssl",
+    ssl_write,
+    ssl_read,
+    ssl_puts,
+    NULL,                       /* ssl_gets,      */
+    ssl_ctrl,
+    ssl_new,
+    ssl_free,
+    ssl_callback_ctrl,
+};
+
+const BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_ssl(void)
+{
+    return (&methods_sslp);
+}
+
+static int ssl_new(BIO *bi)
+{
+    BIO_SSL *bs = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*bs));
+
+    if (bs == NULL) {
+        BIOerr(BIO_F_SSL_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return (0);
+    }
+    BIO_set_init(bi, 0);
+    BIO_set_data(bi, bs);
+    /* Clear all flags */
+    BIO_clear_flags(bi, ~0);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int ssl_free(BIO *a)
+{
+    BIO_SSL *bs;
+
+    if (a == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    bs = BIO_get_data(a);
+    if (bs->ssl != NULL)
+        SSL_shutdown(bs->ssl);
+    if (BIO_get_shutdown(a)) {
+        if (BIO_get_init(a))
+            SSL_free(bs->ssl);
+        /* Clear all flags */
+        BIO_clear_flags(a, ~0);
+        BIO_set_init(a, 0);
+    }
+    OPENSSL_free(bs);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int ssl_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
+{
+    int ret = 1;
+    BIO_SSL *sb;
+    SSL *ssl;
+    int retry_reason = 0;
+    int r = 0;
+
+    if (out == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    sb = BIO_get_data(b);
+    ssl = sb->ssl;
+
+    BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+
+    ret = SSL_read(ssl, out, outl);
+
+    switch (SSL_get_error(ssl, ret)) {
+    case SSL_ERROR_NONE:
+        if (ret <= 0)
+            break;
+        if (sb->renegotiate_count > 0) {
+            sb->byte_count += ret;
+            if (sb->byte_count > sb->renegotiate_count) {
+                sb->byte_count = 0;
+                sb->num_renegotiates++;
+                SSL_renegotiate(ssl);
+                r = 1;
+            }
+        }
+        if ((sb->renegotiate_timeout > 0) && (!r)) {
+            unsigned long tm;
+
+            tm = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
+            if (tm > sb->last_time + sb->renegotiate_timeout) {
+                sb->last_time = tm;
+                sb->num_renegotiates++;
+                SSL_renegotiate(ssl);
+            }
+        }
+
+        break;
+    case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
+        BIO_set_retry_read(b);
+        break;
+    case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
+        BIO_set_retry_write(b);
+        break;
+    case SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP:
+        BIO_set_retry_special(b);
+        retry_reason = BIO_RR_SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
+        break;
+    case SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT:
+        BIO_set_retry_special(b);
+        retry_reason = BIO_RR_ACCEPT;
+        break;
+    case SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT:
+        BIO_set_retry_special(b);
+        retry_reason = BIO_RR_CONNECT;
+        break;
+    case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
+    case SSL_ERROR_SSL:
+    case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN:
+    default:
+        break;
+    }
+
+    BIO_set_retry_reason(b, retry_reason);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static int ssl_write(BIO *b, const char *out, int outl)
+{
+    int ret, r = 0;
+    int retry_reason = 0;
+    SSL *ssl;
+    BIO_SSL *bs;
+
+    if (out == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    bs = BIO_get_data(b);
+    ssl = bs->ssl;
+
+    BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+
+    /*
+     * ret=SSL_do_handshake(ssl); if (ret > 0)
+     */
+    ret = SSL_write(ssl, out, outl);
+
+    switch (SSL_get_error(ssl, ret)) {
+    case SSL_ERROR_NONE:
+        if (ret <= 0)
+            break;
+        if (bs->renegotiate_count > 0) {
+            bs->byte_count += ret;
+            if (bs->byte_count > bs->renegotiate_count) {
+                bs->byte_count = 0;
+                bs->num_renegotiates++;
+                SSL_renegotiate(ssl);
+                r = 1;
+            }
+        }
+        if ((bs->renegotiate_timeout > 0) && (!r)) {
+            unsigned long tm;
+
+            tm = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
+            if (tm > bs->last_time + bs->renegotiate_timeout) {
+                bs->last_time = tm;
+                bs->num_renegotiates++;
+                SSL_renegotiate(ssl);
+            }
+        }
+        break;
+    case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
+        BIO_set_retry_write(b);
+        break;
+    case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
+        BIO_set_retry_read(b);
+        break;
+    case SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP:
+        BIO_set_retry_special(b);
+        retry_reason = BIO_RR_SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
+        break;
+    case SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT:
+        BIO_set_retry_special(b);
+        retry_reason = BIO_RR_CONNECT;
+    case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
+    case SSL_ERROR_SSL:
+    default:
+        break;
+    }
+
+    BIO_set_retry_reason(b, retry_reason);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static long ssl_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
+{
+    SSL **sslp, *ssl;
+    BIO_SSL *bs, *dbs;
+    BIO *dbio, *bio;
+    long ret = 1;
+    BIO *next;
+
+    bs = BIO_get_data(b);
+    next = BIO_next(b);
+    ssl = bs->ssl;
+    if ((ssl == NULL) && (cmd != BIO_C_SET_SSL))
+        return (0);
+    switch (cmd) {
+    case BIO_CTRL_RESET:
+        SSL_shutdown(ssl);
+
+        if (ssl->handshake_func == ssl->method->ssl_connect)
+            SSL_set_connect_state(ssl);
+        else if (ssl->handshake_func == ssl->method->ssl_accept)
+            SSL_set_accept_state(ssl);
+
+        if (!SSL_clear(ssl)) {
+            ret = 0;
+            break;
+        }
+
+        if (next != NULL)
+            ret = BIO_ctrl(next, cmd, num, ptr);
+        else if (ssl->rbio != NULL)
+            ret = BIO_ctrl(ssl->rbio, cmd, num, ptr);
+        else
+            ret = 1;
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_INFO:
+        ret = 0;
+        break;
+    case BIO_C_SSL_MODE:
+        if (num)                /* client mode */
+            SSL_set_connect_state(ssl);
+        else
+            SSL_set_accept_state(ssl);
+        break;
+    case BIO_C_SET_SSL_RENEGOTIATE_TIMEOUT:
+        ret = bs->renegotiate_timeout;
+        if (num < 60)
+            num = 5;
+        bs->renegotiate_timeout = (unsigned long)num;
+        bs->last_time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
+        break;
+    case BIO_C_SET_SSL_RENEGOTIATE_BYTES:
+        ret = bs->renegotiate_count;
+        if ((long)num >= 512)
+            bs->renegotiate_count = (unsigned long)num;
+        break;
+    case BIO_C_GET_SSL_NUM_RENEGOTIATES:
+        ret = bs->num_renegotiates;
+        break;
+    case BIO_C_SET_SSL:
+        if (ssl != NULL) {
+            ssl_free(b);
+            if (!ssl_new(b))
+                return 0;
+        }
+        BIO_set_shutdown(b, num);
+        ssl = (SSL *)ptr;
+        bs->ssl = ssl;
+        bio = SSL_get_rbio(ssl);
+        if (bio != NULL) {
+            if (next != NULL)
+                BIO_push(bio, next);
+            BIO_set_next(b, bio);
+            BIO_up_ref(bio);
+        }
+        BIO_set_init(b, 1);
+        break;
+    case BIO_C_GET_SSL:
+        if (ptr != NULL) {
+            sslp = (SSL **)ptr;
+            *sslp = ssl;
+        } else
+            ret = 0;
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_GET_CLOSE:
+        ret = BIO_get_shutdown(b);
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_SET_CLOSE:
+        BIO_set_shutdown(b, (int)num);
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_WPENDING:
+        ret = BIO_ctrl(ssl->wbio, cmd, num, ptr);
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_PENDING:
+        ret = SSL_pending(ssl);
+        if (ret == 0)
+            ret = BIO_pending(ssl->rbio);
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_FLUSH:
+        BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+        ret = BIO_ctrl(ssl->wbio, cmd, num, ptr);
+        BIO_copy_next_retry(b);
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_PUSH:
+        if ((next != NULL) && (next != ssl->rbio)) {
+            /*
+             * We are going to pass ownership of next to the SSL object...but
+             * we don't own a reference to pass yet - so up ref
+             */
+            BIO_up_ref(next);
+            SSL_set_bio(ssl, next, next);
+        }
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_POP:
+        /* Only detach if we are the BIO explicitly being popped */
+        if (b == ptr) {
+            /* This will clear the reference we obtained during push */
+            SSL_set_bio(ssl, NULL, NULL);
+        }
+        break;
+    case BIO_C_DO_STATE_MACHINE:
+        BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+
+        BIO_set_retry_reason(b, 0);
+        ret = (int)SSL_do_handshake(ssl);
+
+        switch (SSL_get_error(ssl, (int)ret)) {
+        case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
+            BIO_set_flags(b, BIO_FLAGS_READ | BIO_FLAGS_SHOULD_RETRY);
+            break;
+        case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
+            BIO_set_flags(b, BIO_FLAGS_WRITE | BIO_FLAGS_SHOULD_RETRY);
+            break;
+        case SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT:
+            BIO_set_flags(b, BIO_FLAGS_IO_SPECIAL | BIO_FLAGS_SHOULD_RETRY);
+            BIO_set_retry_reason(b, BIO_get_retry_reason(next));
+            break;
+        case SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP:
+            BIO_set_retry_special(b);
+            BIO_set_retry_reason(b, BIO_RR_SSL_X509_LOOKUP);
+            break;
+        default:
+            break;
+        }
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_DUP:
+        dbio = (BIO *)ptr;
+        dbs = BIO_get_data(dbio);
+        SSL_free(dbs->ssl);
+        dbs->ssl = SSL_dup(ssl);
+        dbs->num_renegotiates = bs->num_renegotiates;
+        dbs->renegotiate_count = bs->renegotiate_count;
+        dbs->byte_count = bs->byte_count;
+        dbs->renegotiate_timeout = bs->renegotiate_timeout;
+        dbs->last_time = bs->last_time;
+        ret = (dbs->ssl != NULL);
+        break;
+    case BIO_C_GET_FD:
+        ret = BIO_ctrl(ssl->rbio, cmd, num, ptr);
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_SET_CALLBACK:
+        {
+#if 0                           /* FIXME: Should this be used? -- Richard
+                                 * Levitte */
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTRL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+            ret = -1;
+#else
+            ret = 0;
+#endif
+        }
+        break;
+    default:
+        ret = BIO_ctrl(ssl->rbio, cmd, num, ptr);
+        break;
+    }
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static long ssl_callback_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, BIO_info_cb *fp)
+{
+    SSL *ssl;
+    BIO_SSL *bs;
+    long ret = 1;
+
+    bs = BIO_get_data(b);
+    ssl = bs->ssl;
+    switch (cmd) {
+    case BIO_CTRL_SET_CALLBACK:
+        ret = BIO_callback_ctrl(ssl->rbio, cmd, fp);
+        break;
+    default:
+        ret = 0;
+        break;
+    }
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static int ssl_puts(BIO *bp, const char *str)
+{
+    int n, ret;
+
+    n = strlen(str);
+    ret = BIO_write(bp, str, n);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+BIO *BIO_new_buffer_ssl_connect(SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
+    BIO *ret = NULL, *buf = NULL, *ssl = NULL;
+
+    if ((buf = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer())) == NULL)
+        return (NULL);
+    if ((ssl = BIO_new_ssl_connect(ctx)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if ((ret = BIO_push(buf, ssl)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    return (ret);
+ err:
+    BIO_free(buf);
+    BIO_free(ssl);
+#endif
+    return (NULL);
+}
+
+BIO *BIO_new_ssl_connect(SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
+    BIO *ret = NULL, *con = NULL, *ssl = NULL;
+
+    if ((con = BIO_new(BIO_s_connect())) == NULL)
+        return (NULL);
+    if ((ssl = BIO_new_ssl(ctx, 1)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if ((ret = BIO_push(ssl, con)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    return (ret);
+ err:
+    BIO_free(con);
+#endif
+    return (NULL);
+}
+
+BIO *BIO_new_ssl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int client)
+{
+    BIO *ret;
+    SSL *ssl;
+
+    if ((ret = BIO_new(BIO_f_ssl())) == NULL)
+        return (NULL);
+    if ((ssl = SSL_new(ctx)) == NULL) {
+        BIO_free(ret);
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+    if (client)
+        SSL_set_connect_state(ssl);
+    else
+        SSL_set_accept_state(ssl);
+
+    BIO_set_ssl(ret, ssl, BIO_CLOSE);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+int BIO_ssl_copy_session_id(BIO *t, BIO *f)
+{
+    BIO_SSL *tdata, *fdata;
+    t = BIO_find_type(t, BIO_TYPE_SSL);
+    f = BIO_find_type(f, BIO_TYPE_SSL);
+    if ((t == NULL) || (f == NULL))
+        return 0;
+    tdata = BIO_get_data(t);
+    fdata = BIO_get_data(f);
+    if ((tdata->ssl == NULL) || (fdata->ssl == NULL))
+        return (0);
+    if (!SSL_copy_session_id(tdata->ssl, (fdata->ssl)))
+        return 0;
+    return (1);
+}
+
+void BIO_ssl_shutdown(BIO *b)
+{
+    BIO_SSL *bdata;
+
+    for (; b != NULL; b = BIO_next(b)) {
+        if (BIO_method_type(b) != BIO_TYPE_SSL)
+            continue;
+        bdata = BIO_get_data(b);
+        if (bdata != NULL && bdata->ssl != NULL)
+            SSL_shutdown(bdata->ssl);
+    }
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/build.info b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/build.info
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6977246
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/build.info
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+LIBS=../libssl
+SOURCE[../libssl]=\
+        pqueue.c \
+        statem/statem_srvr.c statem/statem_clnt.c  s3_lib.c  s3_enc.c record/rec_layer_s3.c \
+        statem/statem_lib.c s3_cbc.c s3_msg.c \
+        methods.c   t1_lib.c  t1_enc.c t1_ext.c \
+        d1_lib.c  record/rec_layer_d1.c d1_msg.c \
+        statem/statem_dtls.c d1_srtp.c \
+        ssl_lib.c ssl_cert.c ssl_sess.c \
+        ssl_ciph.c ssl_stat.c ssl_rsa.c \
+        ssl_asn1.c ssl_txt.c ssl_init.c ssl_conf.c  ssl_mcnf.c \
+        bio_ssl.c ssl_err.c t1_reneg.c tls_srp.c t1_trce.c ssl_utst.c \
+        record/ssl3_buffer.c record/ssl3_record.c record/dtls1_bitmap.c \
+        statem/statem.c
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/d1_lib.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/d1_lib.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..55a81c3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/d1_lib.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1087 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#define USE_SOCKETS
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
+# include <sys/timeb.h>
+#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS)
+# include <sys/times.h>
+#elif !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32)
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+
+static void get_current_time(struct timeval *t);
+static int dtls1_set_handshake_header(SSL *s, int type, unsigned long len);
+static int dtls1_handshake_write(SSL *s);
+static unsigned int dtls1_link_min_mtu(void);
+
+/* XDTLS:  figure out the right values */
+static const unsigned int g_probable_mtu[] = { 1500, 512, 256 };
+
+const SSL3_ENC_METHOD DTLSv1_enc_data = {
+    tls1_enc,
+    tls1_mac,
+    tls1_setup_key_block,
+    tls1_generate_master_secret,
+    tls1_change_cipher_state,
+    tls1_final_finish_mac,
+    TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
+    TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
+    TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
+    tls1_alert_code,
+    tls1_export_keying_material,
+    SSL_ENC_FLAG_DTLS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
+    DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
+    dtls1_set_handshake_header,
+    dtls1_handshake_write
+};
+
+const SSL3_ENC_METHOD DTLSv1_2_enc_data = {
+    tls1_enc,
+    tls1_mac,
+    tls1_setup_key_block,
+    tls1_generate_master_secret,
+    tls1_change_cipher_state,
+    tls1_final_finish_mac,
+    TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
+    TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
+    TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
+    tls1_alert_code,
+    tls1_export_keying_material,
+    SSL_ENC_FLAG_DTLS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS
+        | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
+    DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
+    dtls1_set_handshake_header,
+    dtls1_handshake_write
+};
+
+long dtls1_default_timeout(void)
+{
+    /*
+     * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the DTLSv1 spec is way too long for
+     * http, the cache would over fill
+     */
+    return (60 * 60 * 2);
+}
+
+int dtls1_new(SSL *s)
+{
+    DTLS1_STATE *d1;
+
+    if (!DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_new(&s->rlayer)) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (!ssl3_new(s))
+        return (0);
+    if ((d1 = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*d1))) == NULL) {
+        ssl3_free(s);
+        return (0);
+    }
+
+    d1->buffered_messages = pqueue_new();
+    d1->sent_messages = pqueue_new();
+
+    if (s->server) {
+        d1->cookie_len = sizeof(s->d1->cookie);
+    }
+
+    d1->link_mtu = 0;
+    d1->mtu = 0;
+
+    if (d1->buffered_messages == NULL || d1->sent_messages == NULL) {
+        pqueue_free(d1->buffered_messages);
+        pqueue_free(d1->sent_messages);
+        OPENSSL_free(d1);
+        ssl3_free(s);
+        return (0);
+    }
+
+    s->d1 = d1;
+    s->method->ssl_clear(s);
+    return (1);
+}
+
+static void dtls1_clear_queues(SSL *s)
+{
+    dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s);
+    dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
+}
+
+void dtls1_clear_received_buffer(SSL *s)
+{
+    pitem *item = NULL;
+    hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
+
+    while ((item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_messages)) != NULL) {
+        frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
+        dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
+        pitem_free(item);
+    }
+}
+
+void dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(SSL *s)
+{
+    pitem *item = NULL;
+    hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
+
+    while ((item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->sent_messages)) != NULL) {
+        frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
+        dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
+        pitem_free(item);
+    }
+}
+
+
+void dtls1_free(SSL *s)
+{
+    DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_free(&s->rlayer);
+
+    ssl3_free(s);
+
+    dtls1_clear_queues(s);
+
+    pqueue_free(s->d1->buffered_messages);
+    pqueue_free(s->d1->sent_messages);
+
+    OPENSSL_free(s->d1);
+    s->d1 = NULL;
+}
+
+void dtls1_clear(SSL *s)
+{
+    pqueue *buffered_messages;
+    pqueue *sent_messages;
+    unsigned int mtu;
+    unsigned int link_mtu;
+
+    DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(&s->rlayer);
+
+    if (s->d1) {
+        buffered_messages = s->d1->buffered_messages;
+        sent_messages = s->d1->sent_messages;
+        mtu = s->d1->mtu;
+        link_mtu = s->d1->link_mtu;
+
+        dtls1_clear_queues(s);
+
+        memset(s->d1, 0, sizeof(*s->d1));
+
+        if (s->server) {
+            s->d1->cookie_len = sizeof(s->d1->cookie);
+        }
+
+        if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU) {
+            s->d1->mtu = mtu;
+            s->d1->link_mtu = link_mtu;
+        }
+
+        s->d1->buffered_messages = buffered_messages;
+        s->d1->sent_messages = sent_messages;
+    }
+
+    ssl3_clear(s);
+
+    if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
+        s->version = DTLS_MAX_VERSION;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_METHOD
+    else if (s->options & SSL_OP_CISCO_ANYCONNECT)
+        s->client_version = s->version = DTLS1_BAD_VER;
+#endif
+    else
+        s->version = s->method->version;
+}
+
+long dtls1_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    switch (cmd) {
+    case DTLS_CTRL_GET_TIMEOUT:
+        if (dtls1_get_timeout(s, (struct timeval *)parg) != NULL) {
+            ret = 1;
+        }
+        break;
+    case DTLS_CTRL_HANDLE_TIMEOUT:
+        ret = dtls1_handle_timeout(s);
+        break;
+    case DTLS_CTRL_SET_LINK_MTU:
+        if (larg < (long)dtls1_link_min_mtu())
+            return 0;
+        s->d1->link_mtu = larg;
+        return 1;
+    case DTLS_CTRL_GET_LINK_MIN_MTU:
+        return (long)dtls1_link_min_mtu();
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_MTU:
+        /*
+         *  We may not have a BIO set yet so can't call dtls1_min_mtu()
+         *  We'll have to make do with dtls1_link_min_mtu() and max overhead
+         */
+        if (larg < (long)dtls1_link_min_mtu() - DTLS1_MAX_MTU_OVERHEAD)
+            return 0;
+        s->d1->mtu = larg;
+        return larg;
+    default:
+        ret = ssl3_ctrl(s, cmd, larg, parg);
+        break;
+    }
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+void dtls1_start_timer(SSL *s)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+    /* Disable timer for SCTP */
+    if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
+        memset(&s->d1->next_timeout, 0, sizeof(s->d1->next_timeout));
+        return;
+    }
+#endif
+
+    /* If timer is not set, initialize duration with 1 second */
+    if (s->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec == 0 && s->d1->next_timeout.tv_usec == 0) {
+        s->d1->timeout_duration = 1;
+    }
+
+    /* Set timeout to current time */
+    get_current_time(&(s->d1->next_timeout));
+
+    /* Add duration to current time */
+    s->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec += s->d1->timeout_duration;
+    BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_NEXT_TIMEOUT, 0,
+             &(s->d1->next_timeout));
+}
+
+struct timeval *dtls1_get_timeout(SSL *s, struct timeval *timeleft)
+{
+    struct timeval timenow;
+
+    /* If no timeout is set, just return NULL */
+    if (s->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec == 0 && s->d1->next_timeout.tv_usec == 0) {
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    /* Get current time */
+    get_current_time(&timenow);
+
+    /* If timer already expired, set remaining time to 0 */
+    if (s->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec < timenow.tv_sec ||
+        (s->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec == timenow.tv_sec &&
+         s->d1->next_timeout.tv_usec <= timenow.tv_usec)) {
+        memset(timeleft, 0, sizeof(*timeleft));
+        return timeleft;
+    }
+
+    /* Calculate time left until timer expires */
+    memcpy(timeleft, &(s->d1->next_timeout), sizeof(struct timeval));
+    timeleft->tv_sec -= timenow.tv_sec;
+    timeleft->tv_usec -= timenow.tv_usec;
+    if (timeleft->tv_usec < 0) {
+        timeleft->tv_sec--;
+        timeleft->tv_usec += 1000000;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * If remaining time is less than 15 ms, set it to 0 to prevent issues
+     * because of small divergences with socket timeouts.
+     */
+    if (timeleft->tv_sec == 0 && timeleft->tv_usec < 15000) {
+        memset(timeleft, 0, sizeof(*timeleft));
+    }
+
+    return timeleft;
+}
+
+int dtls1_is_timer_expired(SSL *s)
+{
+    struct timeval timeleft;
+
+    /* Get time left until timeout, return false if no timer running */
+    if (dtls1_get_timeout(s, &timeleft) == NULL) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* Return false if timer is not expired yet */
+    if (timeleft.tv_sec > 0 || timeleft.tv_usec > 0) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* Timer expired, so return true */
+    return 1;
+}
+
+void dtls1_double_timeout(SSL *s)
+{
+    s->d1->timeout_duration *= 2;
+    if (s->d1->timeout_duration > 60)
+        s->d1->timeout_duration = 60;
+    dtls1_start_timer(s);
+}
+
+void dtls1_stop_timer(SSL *s)
+{
+    /* Reset everything */
+    memset(&s->d1->timeout, 0, sizeof(s->d1->timeout));
+    memset(&s->d1->next_timeout, 0, sizeof(s->d1->next_timeout));
+    s->d1->timeout_duration = 1;
+    BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_NEXT_TIMEOUT, 0,
+             &(s->d1->next_timeout));
+    /* Clear retransmission buffer */
+    dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
+}
+
+int dtls1_check_timeout_num(SSL *s)
+{
+    unsigned int mtu;
+
+    s->d1->timeout.num_alerts++;
+
+    /* Reduce MTU after 2 unsuccessful retransmissions */
+    if (s->d1->timeout.num_alerts > 2
+        && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU)) {
+        mtu =
+            BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_FALLBACK_MTU, 0, NULL);
+        if (mtu < s->d1->mtu)
+            s->d1->mtu = mtu;
+    }
+
+    if (s->d1->timeout.num_alerts > DTLS1_TMO_ALERT_COUNT) {
+        /* fail the connection, enough alerts have been sent */
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CHECK_TIMEOUT_NUM, SSL_R_READ_TIMEOUT_EXPIRED);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int dtls1_handle_timeout(SSL *s)
+{
+    /* if no timer is expired, don't do anything */
+    if (!dtls1_is_timer_expired(s)) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    dtls1_double_timeout(s);
+
+    if (dtls1_check_timeout_num(s) < 0)
+        return -1;
+
+    s->d1->timeout.read_timeouts++;
+    if (s->d1->timeout.read_timeouts > DTLS1_TMO_READ_COUNT) {
+        s->d1->timeout.read_timeouts = 1;
+    }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+    if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
+        s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
+        return dtls1_heartbeat(s);
+    }
+#endif
+
+    dtls1_start_timer(s);
+    return dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(s);
+}
+
+static void get_current_time(struct timeval *t)
+{
+#if defined(_WIN32)
+    SYSTEMTIME st;
+    union {
+        unsigned __int64 ul;
+        FILETIME ft;
+    } now;
+
+    GetSystemTime(&st);
+    SystemTimeToFileTime(&st, &now.ft);
+    /* re-bias to 1/1/1970 */
+# ifdef  __MINGW32__
+    now.ul -= 116444736000000000ULL;
+# else
+    /* *INDENT-OFF* */
+    now.ul -= 116444736000000000UI64;
+    /* *INDENT-ON* */
+# endif
+    t->tv_sec = (long)(now.ul / 10000000);
+    t->tv_usec = ((int)(now.ul % 10000000)) / 10;
+#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
+    struct timeb tb;
+    ftime(&tb);
+    t->tv_sec = (long)tb.time;
+    t->tv_usec = (long)tb.millitm * 1000;
+#else
+    gettimeofday(t, NULL);
+#endif
+}
+
+#define LISTEN_SUCCESS              2
+#define LISTEN_SEND_VERIFY_REQUEST  1
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
+int DTLSv1_listen(SSL *s, BIO_ADDR *client)
+{
+    int next, n, ret = 0, clearpkt = 0;
+    unsigned char cookie[DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH];
+    unsigned char seq[SEQ_NUM_SIZE];
+    const unsigned char *data;
+    unsigned char *p, *buf;
+    unsigned long reclen, fragoff, fraglen, msglen;
+    unsigned int rectype, versmajor, msgseq, msgtype, clientvers, cookielen;
+    BIO *rbio, *wbio;
+    BUF_MEM *bufm;
+    BIO_ADDR *tmpclient = NULL;
+    PACKET pkt, msgpkt, msgpayload, session, cookiepkt;
+
+    if (s->handshake_func == NULL) {
+        /* Not properly initialized yet */
+        SSL_set_accept_state(s);
+    }
+
+    /* Ensure there is no state left over from a previous invocation */
+    if (!SSL_clear(s))
+        return -1;
+
+    ERR_clear_error();
+
+    rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
+    wbio = SSL_get_wbio(s);
+
+    if (!rbio || !wbio) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * We only peek at incoming ClientHello's until we're sure we are going to
+     * to respond with a HelloVerifyRequest. If its a ClientHello with a valid
+     * cookie then we leave it in the BIO for accept to handle.
+     */
+    BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEEK_MODE, 1, NULL);
+
+    /*
+     * Note: This check deliberately excludes DTLS1_BAD_VER because that version
+     * requires the MAC to be calculated *including* the first ClientHello
+     * (without the cookie). Since DTLSv1_listen is stateless that cannot be
+     * supported. DTLS1_BAD_VER must use cookies in a stateful manner (e.g. via
+     * SSL_accept)
+     */
+    if ((s->version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff00)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_SSL_VERSION);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
+        if ((bufm = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            return -1;
+        }
+
+        if (!BUF_MEM_grow(bufm, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
+            BUF_MEM_free(bufm);
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            return -1;
+        }
+        s->init_buf = bufm;
+    }
+    buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+
+    do {
+        /* Get a packet */
+
+        clear_sys_error();
+        /*
+         * Technically a ClientHello could be SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
+         * + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH bytes long. Normally init_buf does not store
+         * the record header as well, but we do here. We've set up init_buf to
+         * be the standard size for simplicity. In practice we shouldn't ever
+         * receive a ClientHello as long as this. If we do it will get dropped
+         * in the record length check below.
+         */
+        n = BIO_read(rbio, buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH);
+
+        if (n <= 0) {
+            if (BIO_should_retry(rbio)) {
+                /* Non-blocking IO */
+                goto end;
+            }
+            return -1;
+        }
+
+        /* If we hit any problems we need to clear this packet from the BIO */
+        clearpkt = 1;
+
+        if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, buf, n)) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            return -1;
+        }
+
+        /*
+         * Parse the received record. If there are any problems with it we just
+         * dump it - with no alert. RFC6347 says this "Unlike TLS, DTLS is
+         * resilient in the face of invalid records (e.g., invalid formatting,
+         * length, MAC, etc.).  In general, invalid records SHOULD be silently
+         * discarded, thus preserving the association; however, an error MAY be
+         * logged for diagnostic purposes."
+         */
+
+        /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
+        if (n < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL);
+            goto end;
+        }
+
+        if (s->msg_callback)
+            s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, buf,
+                            DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+        /* Get the record header */
+        if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &rectype)
+            || !PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &versmajor)) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+            goto end;
+        }
+
+        if (rectype != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+            goto end;
+        }
+
+        /*
+         * Check record version number. We only check that the major version is
+         * the same.
+         */
+        if (versmajor != DTLS1_VERSION_MAJOR) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER);
+            goto end;
+        }
+
+        if (!PACKET_forward(&pkt, 1)
+            /* Save the sequence number: 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */
+            || !PACKET_copy_bytes(&pkt, seq, SEQ_NUM_SIZE)
+            || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&pkt, &msgpkt)) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+            goto end;
+        }
+        /*
+         * We allow data remaining at the end of the packet because there could
+         * be a second record (but we ignore it)
+         */
+
+        /* This is an initial ClientHello so the epoch has to be 0 */
+        if (seq[0] != 0 || seq[1] != 0) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+            goto end;
+        }
+
+        /* Get a pointer to the raw message for the later callback */
+        data = PACKET_data(&msgpkt);
+
+        /* Finished processing the record header, now process the message */
+        if (!PACKET_get_1(&msgpkt, &msgtype)
+            || !PACKET_get_net_3(&msgpkt, &msglen)
+            || !PACKET_get_net_2(&msgpkt, &msgseq)
+            || !PACKET_get_net_3(&msgpkt, &fragoff)
+            || !PACKET_get_net_3(&msgpkt, &fraglen)
+            || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&msgpkt, &msgpayload, fraglen)
+            || PACKET_remaining(&msgpkt) != 0) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+            goto end;
+        }
+
+        if (msgtype != SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+            goto end;
+        }
+
+        /* Message sequence number can only be 0 or 1 */
+        if (msgseq > 2) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_INVALID_SEQUENCE_NUMBER);
+            goto end;
+        }
+
+        /*
+         * We don't support fragment reassembly for ClientHellos whilst
+         * listening because that would require server side state (which is
+         * against the whole point of the ClientHello/HelloVerifyRequest
+         * mechanism). Instead we only look at the first ClientHello fragment
+         * and require that the cookie must be contained within it.
+         */
+        if (fragoff != 0 || fraglen > msglen) {
+            /* Non initial ClientHello fragment (or bad fragment) */
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_FRAGMENTED_CLIENT_HELLO);
+            goto end;
+        }
+
+        if (s->msg_callback)
+            s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, data,
+                            fraglen + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
+                            s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+        if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&msgpayload, &clientvers)) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+            goto end;
+        }
+
+        /*
+         * Verify client version is supported
+         */
+        if (DTLS_VERSION_LT(clientvers, (unsigned int)s->method->version) &&
+            s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
+            goto end;
+        }
+
+        if (!PACKET_forward(&msgpayload, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
+            || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&msgpayload, &session)
+            || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&msgpayload, &cookiepkt)) {
+            /*
+             * Could be malformed or the cookie does not fit within the initial
+             * ClientHello fragment. Either way we can't handle it.
+             */
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+            goto end;
+        }
+
+        /*
+         * Check if we have a cookie or not. If not we need to send a
+         * HelloVerifyRequest.
+         */
+        if (PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt) == 0) {
+            next = LISTEN_SEND_VERIFY_REQUEST;
+        } else {
+            /*
+             * We have a cookie, so lets check it.
+             */
+            if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb == NULL) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_NO_VERIFY_COOKIE_CALLBACK);
+                /* This is fatal */
+                return -1;
+            }
+            if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, PACKET_data(&cookiepkt),
+                                             PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt)) ==
+                0) {
+                /*
+                 * We treat invalid cookies in the same was as no cookie as
+                 * per RFC6347
+                 */
+                next = LISTEN_SEND_VERIFY_REQUEST;
+            } else {
+                /* Cookie verification succeeded */
+                next = LISTEN_SUCCESS;
+            }
+        }
+
+        if (next == LISTEN_SEND_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
+            /*
+             * There was no cookie in the ClientHello so we need to send a
+             * HelloVerifyRequest. If this fails we do not worry about trying
+             * to resend, we just drop it.
+             */
+
+            /*
+             * Dump the read packet, we don't need it any more. Ignore return
+             * value
+             */
+            BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEEK_MODE, 0, NULL);
+            BIO_read(rbio, buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH);
+            BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEEK_MODE, 1, NULL);
+
+            /* Generate the cookie */
+            if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
+                s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, cookie, &cookielen) == 0 ||
+                cookielen > 255) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
+                /* This is fatal */
+                return -1;
+            }
+
+            p = &buf[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH];
+            msglen = dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(p + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
+                                                   cookie, cookielen);
+
+            *p++ = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
+
+            /* Message length */
+            l2n3(msglen, p);
+
+            /* Message sequence number is always 0 for a HelloVerifyRequest */
+            s2n(0, p);
+
+            /*
+             * We never fragment a HelloVerifyRequest, so fragment offset is 0
+             * and fragment length is message length
+             */
+            l2n3(0, p);
+            l2n3(msglen, p);
+
+            /* Set reclen equal to length of whole handshake message */
+            reclen = msglen + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+
+            /* Add the record header */
+            p = buf;
+
+            *(p++) = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
+            /*
+             * Special case: for hello verify request, client version 1.0 and we
+             * haven't decided which version to use yet send back using version
+             * 1.0 header: otherwise some clients will ignore it.
+             */
+            if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
+                *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION >> 8;
+                *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff;
+            } else {
+                *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
+                *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
+            }
+
+            /*
+             * Record sequence number is always the same as in the received
+             * ClientHello
+             */
+            memcpy(p, seq, SEQ_NUM_SIZE);
+            p += SEQ_NUM_SIZE;
+
+            /* Length */
+            s2n(reclen, p);
+
+            /*
+             * Set reclen equal to length of whole record including record
+             * header
+             */
+            reclen += DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+
+            if (s->msg_callback)
+                s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, buf,
+                                DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+            if ((tmpclient = BIO_ADDR_new()) == NULL) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                goto end;
+            }
+
+            /*
+             * This is unnecessary if rbio and wbio are one and the same - but
+             * maybe they're not. We ignore errors here - some BIOs do not
+             * support this.
+             */
+            if (BIO_dgram_get_peer(rbio, tmpclient) > 0) {
+                (void)BIO_dgram_set_peer(wbio, tmpclient);
+            }
+            BIO_ADDR_free(tmpclient);
+            tmpclient = NULL;
+
+            if (BIO_write(wbio, buf, reclen) < (int)reclen) {
+                if (BIO_should_retry(wbio)) {
+                    /*
+                     * Non-blocking IO...but we're stateless, so we're just
+                     * going to drop this packet.
+                     */
+                    goto end;
+                }
+                return -1;
+            }
+
+            if (BIO_flush(wbio) <= 0) {
+                if (BIO_should_retry(wbio)) {
+                    /*
+                     * Non-blocking IO...but we're stateless, so we're just
+                     * going to drop this packet.
+                     */
+                    goto end;
+                }
+                return -1;
+            }
+        }
+    } while (next != LISTEN_SUCCESS);
+
+    /*
+     * Set expected sequence numbers to continue the handshake.
+     */
+    s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 1;
+    s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 1;
+    s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 1;
+    DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_set_write_sequence(&s->rlayer, seq);
+
+    /*
+     * We are doing cookie exchange, so make sure we set that option in the
+     * SSL object
+     */
+    SSL_set_options(s, SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE);
+
+    /*
+     * Tell the state machine that we've done the initial hello verify
+     * exchange
+     */
+    ossl_statem_set_hello_verify_done(s);
+
+    /*
+     * Some BIOs may not support this. If we fail we clear the client address
+     */
+    if (BIO_dgram_get_peer(rbio, client) <= 0)
+        BIO_ADDR_clear(client);
+
+    ret = 1;
+    clearpkt = 0;
+ end:
+    BIO_ADDR_free(tmpclient);
+    BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEEK_MODE, 0, NULL);
+    if (clearpkt) {
+        /* Dump this packet. Ignore return value */
+        BIO_read(rbio, buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH);
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+#endif
+
+static int dtls1_set_handshake_header(SSL *s, int htype, unsigned long len)
+{
+    dtls1_set_message_header(s, htype, len, 0, len);
+    s->init_num = (int)len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+    s->init_off = 0;
+    /* Buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
+
+    if (!dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0))
+        return 0;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int dtls1_handshake_write(SSL *s)
+{
+    return dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+
+# define HEARTBEAT_SIZE(payload, padding) ( \
+    1 /* heartbeat type */ + \
+    2 /* heartbeat length */ + \
+    (payload) + (padding))
+
+# define HEARTBEAT_SIZE_STD(payload) HEARTBEAT_SIZE(payload, 16)
+
+int dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned int length)
+{
+    unsigned char *pl;
+    unsigned short hbtype;
+    unsigned int payload;
+    unsigned int padding = 16;  /* Use minimum padding */
+
+    if (s->msg_callback)
+        s->msg_callback(0, s->version, DTLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
+                        p, length, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+    /* Read type and payload length */
+    if (HEARTBEAT_SIZE_STD(0) > length)
+        return 0;               /* silently discard */
+    if (length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
+        return 0;               /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
+
+    hbtype = *p++;
+    n2s(p, payload);
+    if (HEARTBEAT_SIZE_STD(payload) > length)
+        return 0;               /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
+    pl = p;
+
+    if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) {
+        unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
+        unsigned int write_length = HEARTBEAT_SIZE(payload, padding);
+        int r;
+
+        if (write_length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
+            return 0;
+
+        /* Allocate memory for the response. */
+        buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(write_length);
+        if (buffer == NULL)
+            return -1;
+        bp = buffer;
+
+        /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
+        *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
+        s2n(payload, bp);
+        memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
+        bp += payload;
+        /* Random padding */
+        if (RAND_bytes(bp, padding) <= 0) {
+            OPENSSL_free(buffer);
+            return -1;
+        }
+
+        r = dtls1_write_bytes(s, DTLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, write_length);
+
+        if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
+            s->msg_callback(1, s->version, DTLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
+                            buffer, write_length, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+        OPENSSL_free(buffer);
+
+        if (r < 0)
+            return r;
+    } else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) {
+        unsigned int seq;
+
+        /*
+         * We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16
+         * random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number
+         */
+        n2s(pl, seq);
+
+        if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) {
+            dtls1_stop_timer(s);
+            s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
+            s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int dtls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
+{
+    unsigned char *buf, *p;
+    int ret = -1;
+    unsigned int payload = 18;  /* Sequence number + random bytes */
+    unsigned int padding = 16;  /* Use minimum padding */
+    unsigned int size;
+
+    /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
+    if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
+        s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
+    if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
+    if (SSL_in_init(s) || ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    /*-
+     * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
+     * as payload to distinguish different messages and add
+     * some random stuff.
+     */
+    size = HEARTBEAT_SIZE(payload, padding);
+    buf = OPENSSL_malloc(size);
+    if (buf == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return -1;
+    }
+    p = buf;
+    /* Message Type */
+    *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
+    /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
+    s2n(payload, p);
+    /* Sequence number */
+    s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
+    /* 16 random bytes */
+    if (RAND_bytes(p, 16) <= 0) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    p += 16;
+    /* Random padding */
+    if (RAND_bytes(p, padding) <= 0) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    ret = dtls1_write_bytes(s, DTLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, size);
+    if (ret >= 0) {
+        if (s->msg_callback)
+            s->msg_callback(1, s->version, DTLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
+                            buf, size, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+        dtls1_start_timer(s);
+        s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
+    }
+
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_free(buf);
+
+    return ret;
+}
+#endif
+
+int dtls1_shutdown(SSL *s)
+{
+    int ret;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+    BIO *wbio;
+
+    wbio = SSL_get_wbio(s);
+    if (wbio != NULL && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(wbio) &&
+        !(s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN)) {
+        ret = BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry(wbio);
+        if (ret < 0)
+            return -1;
+
+        if (ret == 0)
+            BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SAVE_SHUTDOWN, 1,
+                     NULL);
+    }
+#endif
+    ret = ssl3_shutdown(s);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+    BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SAVE_SHUTDOWN, 0, NULL);
+#endif
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int dtls1_query_mtu(SSL *s)
+{
+    if (s->d1->link_mtu) {
+        s->d1->mtu =
+            s->d1->link_mtu - BIO_dgram_get_mtu_overhead(SSL_get_wbio(s));
+        s->d1->link_mtu = 0;
+    }
+
+    /* AHA!  Figure out the MTU, and stick to the right size */
+    if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu(s)) {
+        if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU)) {
+            s->d1->mtu =
+                BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU, 0, NULL);
+
+            /*
+             * I've seen the kernel return bogus numbers when it doesn't know
+             * (initial write), so just make sure we have a reasonable number
+             */
+            if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu(s)) {
+                /* Set to min mtu */
+                s->d1->mtu = dtls1_min_mtu(s);
+                BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_MTU,
+                         s->d1->mtu, NULL);
+            }
+        } else
+            return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static unsigned int dtls1_link_min_mtu(void)
+{
+    return (g_probable_mtu[(sizeof(g_probable_mtu) /
+                            sizeof(g_probable_mtu[0])) - 1]);
+}
+
+unsigned int dtls1_min_mtu(SSL *s)
+{
+    return dtls1_link_min_mtu() - BIO_dgram_get_mtu_overhead(SSL_get_wbio(s));
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/d1_msg.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/d1_msg.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7471fd3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/d1_msg.c
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#define USE_SOCKETS
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+
+int dtls1_write_app_data_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    if (SSL_in_init(s) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
+        i = s->handshake_func(s);
+        if (i < 0)
+            return (i);
+        if (i == 0) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES,
+                   SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+            return -1;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (len > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES, SSL_R_DTLS_MESSAGE_TOO_BIG);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    i = dtls1_write_bytes(s, type, buf_, len);
+    return i;
+}
+
+int dtls1_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
+{
+    int i, j;
+    void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
+    unsigned char buf[DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH];
+    unsigned char *ptr = &buf[0];
+
+    s->s3->alert_dispatch = 0;
+
+    memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+    *ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[0];
+    *ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[1];
+
+#ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
+    if (s->s3->send_alert[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE) {
+        s2n(s->d1->handshake_read_seq, ptr);
+        l2n3(s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off, ptr);
+    }
+#endif
+
+    i = do_dtls1_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &buf[0], sizeof(buf), 0);
+    if (i <= 0) {
+        s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1;
+        /* fprintf( stderr, "not done with alert\n" ); */
+    } else {
+        if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL
+#ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
+            || s->s3->send_alert[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
+#endif
+            )
+            (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
+
+        if (s->msg_callback)
+            s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert,
+                            2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+        if (s->info_callback != NULL)
+            cb = s->info_callback;
+        else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
+            cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
+
+        if (cb != NULL) {
+            j = (s->s3->send_alert[0] << 8) | s->s3->send_alert[1];
+            cb(s, SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT, j);
+        }
+    }
+    return (i);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/d1_srtp.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/d1_srtp.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7e88f17
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/d1_srtp.c
@@ -0,0 +1,329 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * DTLS code by Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2006, Network Resonance, Inc. Copyright (C) 2011, RTFM, Inc.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
+
+static SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE srtp_known_profiles[] = {
+    {
+     "SRTP_AES128_CM_SHA1_80",
+     SRTP_AES128_CM_SHA1_80,
+     },
+    {
+     "SRTP_AES128_CM_SHA1_32",
+     SRTP_AES128_CM_SHA1_32,
+     },
+    {
+     "SRTP_AEAD_AES_128_GCM",
+     SRTP_AEAD_AES_128_GCM,
+     },
+    {
+     "SRTP_AEAD_AES_256_GCM",
+     SRTP_AEAD_AES_256_GCM,
+     },
+    {0}
+};
+
+static int find_profile_by_name(char *profile_name,
+                                SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE **pptr, unsigned len)
+{
+    SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *p;
+
+    p = srtp_known_profiles;
+    while (p->name) {
+        if ((len == strlen(p->name))
+            && strncmp(p->name, profile_name, len) == 0) {
+            *pptr = p;
+            return 0;
+        }
+
+        p++;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int ssl_ctx_make_profiles(const char *profiles_string,
+                                 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) **out)
+{
+    STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *profiles;
+
+    char *col;
+    char *ptr = (char *)profiles_string;
+    SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *p;
+
+    if ((profiles = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_new_null()) == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_MAKE_PROFILES,
+               SSL_R_SRTP_COULD_NOT_ALLOCATE_PROFILES);
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    do {
+        col = strchr(ptr, ':');
+
+        if (!find_profile_by_name(ptr, &p, col ? col - ptr : (int)strlen(ptr))) {
+            if (sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_find(profiles, p) >= 0) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_MAKE_PROFILES,
+                       SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
+                goto err;
+            }
+
+            if (!sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_push(profiles, p)) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_MAKE_PROFILES,
+                       SSL_R_SRTP_COULD_NOT_ALLOCATE_PROFILES);
+                goto err;
+            }
+        } else {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_MAKE_PROFILES,
+                   SSL_R_SRTP_UNKNOWN_PROTECTION_PROFILE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        if (col)
+            ptr = col + 1;
+    } while (col);
+
+    sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(*out);
+
+    *out = profiles;
+
+    return 0;
+ err:
+    sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(profiles);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_use_srtp(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *profiles)
+{
+    return ssl_ctx_make_profiles(profiles, &ctx->srtp_profiles);
+}
+
+int SSL_set_tlsext_use_srtp(SSL *s, const char *profiles)
+{
+    return ssl_ctx_make_profiles(profiles, &s->srtp_profiles);
+}
+
+STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *SSL_get_srtp_profiles(SSL *s)
+{
+    if (s != NULL) {
+        if (s->srtp_profiles != NULL) {
+            return s->srtp_profiles;
+        } else if ((s->ctx != NULL) && (s->ctx->srtp_profiles != NULL)) {
+            return s->ctx->srtp_profiles;
+        }
+    }
+
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile(SSL *s)
+{
+    return s->srtp_profile;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note: this function returns 0 length if there are no profiles specified
+ */
+int ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len,
+                                     int maxlen)
+{
+    int ct = 0;
+    int i;
+    STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt = 0;
+    SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof;
+
+    clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
+    ct = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt); /* -1 if clnt == 0 */
+
+    if (p) {
+        if (ct == 0) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT,
+                   SSL_R_EMPTY_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
+            return 1;
+        }
+
+        if ((2 + ct * 2 + 1) > maxlen) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT,
+                   SSL_R_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST_TOO_LONG);
+            return 1;
+        }
+
+        /* Add the length */
+        s2n(ct * 2, p);
+        for (i = 0; i < ct; i++) {
+            prof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i);
+            s2n(prof->id, p);
+        }
+
+        /* Add an empty use_mki value */
+        *p++ = 0;
+    }
+
+    *len = 2 + ct * 2 + 1;
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
+{
+    SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *sprof;
+    STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *srvr;
+    unsigned int ct, mki_len, id;
+    int i, srtp_pref;
+    PACKET subpkt;
+
+    /* Pull off the length of the cipher suite list  and check it is even */
+    if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ct)
+        || (ct & 1) != 0 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &subpkt, ct)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT,
+               SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
+        *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    srvr = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
+    s->srtp_profile = NULL;
+    /* Search all profiles for a match initially */
+    srtp_pref = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(srvr);
+
+    while (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
+        if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &id)) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT,
+                   SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
+            *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+            return 1;
+        }
+
+        /*
+         * Only look for match in profiles of higher preference than
+         * current match.
+         * If no profiles have been have been configured then this
+         * does nothing.
+         */
+        for (i = 0; i < srtp_pref; i++) {
+            sprof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(srvr, i);
+            if (sprof->id == id) {
+                s->srtp_profile = sprof;
+                srtp_pref = i;
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Now extract the MKI value as a sanity check, but discard it for now
+     */
+    if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mki_len)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT,
+               SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
+        *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, mki_len)
+        || PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT,
+               SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE);
+        *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len,
+                                     int maxlen)
+{
+    if (p) {
+        if (maxlen < 5) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT,
+                   SSL_R_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST_TOO_LONG);
+            return 1;
+        }
+
+        if (s->srtp_profile == 0) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT,
+                   SSL_R_USE_SRTP_NOT_NEGOTIATED);
+            return 1;
+        }
+        s2n(2, p);
+        s2n(s->srtp_profile->id, p);
+        *p++ = 0;
+    }
+    *len = 5;
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
+{
+    unsigned int id, ct, mki;
+    int i;
+
+    STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt;
+    SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof;
+
+    if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ct)
+        || ct != 2 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &id)
+        || !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mki)
+        || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT,
+               SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
+        *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    if (mki != 0) {
+        /* Must be no MKI, since we never offer one */
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT,
+               SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE);
+        *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
+
+    /* Throw an error if the server gave us an unsolicited extension */
+    if (clnt == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT,
+               SSL_R_NO_SRTP_PROFILES);
+        *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Check to see if the server gave us something we support (and
+     * presumably offered)
+     */
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt); i++) {
+        prof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i);
+
+        if (prof->id == id) {
+            s->srtp_profile = prof;
+            *al = 0;
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT,
+           SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
+    *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/methods.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/methods.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c846143
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/methods.c
@@ -0,0 +1,266 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+
+/*-
+ * TLS/SSLv3 methods
+ */
+
+IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(TLS_ANY_VERSION, 0, 0,
+                        TLS_method,
+                        ossl_statem_accept,
+                        ossl_statem_connect, TLSv1_2_enc_data)
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2_METHOD
+IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(TLS1_2_VERSION, 0, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2,
+                        tlsv1_2_method,
+                        ossl_statem_accept,
+                        ossl_statem_connect, TLSv1_2_enc_data)
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1_METHOD
+IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(TLS1_1_VERSION, SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1,
+                        tlsv1_1_method,
+                        ossl_statem_accept,
+                        ossl_statem_connect, TLSv1_1_enc_data)
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_METHOD
+IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(TLS1_VERSION, SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1,
+                        tlsv1_method,
+                        ossl_statem_accept, ossl_statem_connect, TLSv1_enc_data)
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
+IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(sslv3_method, ossl_statem_accept, ossl_statem_connect)
+#endif
+/*-
+ * TLS/SSLv3 server methods
+ */
+IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(TLS_ANY_VERSION, 0, 0,
+                        TLS_server_method,
+                        ossl_statem_accept,
+                        ssl_undefined_function, TLSv1_2_enc_data)
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2_METHOD
+IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(TLS1_2_VERSION, 0, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2,
+                        tlsv1_2_server_method,
+                        ossl_statem_accept,
+                        ssl_undefined_function, TLSv1_2_enc_data)
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1_METHOD
+IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(TLS1_1_VERSION, SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1,
+                        tlsv1_1_server_method,
+                        ossl_statem_accept,
+                        ssl_undefined_function, TLSv1_1_enc_data)
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_METHOD
+IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(TLS1_VERSION, SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1,
+                        tlsv1_server_method,
+                        ossl_statem_accept,
+                        ssl_undefined_function, TLSv1_enc_data)
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
+IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(sslv3_server_method,
+                         ossl_statem_accept, ssl_undefined_function)
+#endif
+/*-
+ * TLS/SSLv3 client methods
+ */
+IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(TLS_ANY_VERSION, 0, 0,
+                        TLS_client_method,
+                        ssl_undefined_function,
+                        ossl_statem_connect, TLSv1_2_enc_data)
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2_METHOD
+IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(TLS1_2_VERSION, 0, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2,
+                        tlsv1_2_client_method,
+                        ssl_undefined_function,
+                        ossl_statem_connect, TLSv1_2_enc_data)
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1_METHOD
+IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(TLS1_1_VERSION, SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1,
+                        tlsv1_1_client_method,
+                        ssl_undefined_function,
+                        ossl_statem_connect, TLSv1_1_enc_data)
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_METHOD
+IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(TLS1_VERSION, SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1,
+                        tlsv1_client_method,
+                        ssl_undefined_function,
+                        ossl_statem_connect, TLSv1_enc_data)
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
+IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(sslv3_client_method,
+                         ssl_undefined_function, ossl_statem_connect)
+#endif
+/*-
+ * DTLS methods
+ */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_METHOD
+IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLS1_VERSION, SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB, SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1,
+                          dtlsv1_method,
+                          ossl_statem_accept,
+                          ossl_statem_connect, DTLSv1_enc_data)
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2_METHOD
+IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLS1_2_VERSION, 0, SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2,
+                          dtlsv1_2_method,
+                          ossl_statem_accept,
+                          ossl_statem_connect, DTLSv1_2_enc_data)
+#endif
+IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLS_ANY_VERSION, 0, 0,
+                          DTLS_method,
+                          ossl_statem_accept,
+                          ossl_statem_connect, DTLSv1_2_enc_data)
+
+/*-
+ * DTLS server methods
+ */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_METHOD
+IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLS1_VERSION, SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB, SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1,
+                          dtlsv1_server_method,
+                          ossl_statem_accept,
+                          ssl_undefined_function, DTLSv1_enc_data)
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2_METHOD
+IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLS1_2_VERSION, 0, SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2,
+                          dtlsv1_2_server_method,
+                          ossl_statem_accept,
+                          ssl_undefined_function, DTLSv1_2_enc_data)
+#endif
+IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLS_ANY_VERSION, 0, 0,
+                          DTLS_server_method,
+                          ossl_statem_accept,
+                          ssl_undefined_function, DTLSv1_2_enc_data)
+
+/*-
+ * DTLS client methods
+ */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_METHOD
+IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLS1_VERSION, SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB, SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1,
+                          dtlsv1_client_method,
+                          ssl_undefined_function,
+                          ossl_statem_connect, DTLSv1_enc_data)
+IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLS1_BAD_VER, SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB, SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1,
+                          dtls_bad_ver_client_method,
+                          ssl_undefined_function,
+                          ossl_statem_connect, DTLSv1_enc_data)
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2_METHOD
+IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLS1_2_VERSION, 0, SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2,
+                          dtlsv1_2_client_method,
+                          ssl_undefined_function,
+                          ossl_statem_connect, DTLSv1_2_enc_data)
+#endif
+IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLS_ANY_VERSION, 0, 0,
+                          DTLS_client_method,
+                          ssl_undefined_function,
+                          ossl_statem_connect, DTLSv1_2_enc_data)
+#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2_METHOD
+const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_2_method(void)
+{
+    return tlsv1_2_method();
+}
+
+const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_2_server_method(void)
+{
+    return tlsv1_2_server_method();
+}
+
+const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_2_client_method(void)
+{
+    return tlsv1_2_client_method();
+}
+# endif
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1_METHOD
+const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_1_method(void)
+{
+    return tlsv1_1_method();
+}
+
+const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_1_server_method(void)
+{
+    return tlsv1_1_server_method();
+}
+
+const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_1_client_method(void)
+{
+    return tlsv1_1_client_method();
+}
+# endif
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_METHOD
+const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_method(void)
+{
+    return tlsv1_method();
+}
+
+const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_server_method(void)
+{
+    return tlsv1_server_method();
+}
+
+const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_client_method(void)
+{
+    return tlsv1_client_method();
+}
+# endif
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
+const SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_method(void)
+{
+    return sslv3_method();
+}
+
+const SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_server_method(void)
+{
+    return sslv3_server_method();
+}
+
+const SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_client_method(void)
+{
+    return sslv3_client_method();
+}
+# endif
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2_METHOD
+const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_2_method(void)
+{
+    return dtlsv1_2_method();
+}
+
+const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_2_server_method(void)
+{
+    return dtlsv1_2_server_method();
+}
+
+const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_2_client_method(void)
+{
+    return dtlsv1_2_client_method();
+}
+# endif
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_METHOD
+const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_method(void)
+{
+    return dtlsv1_method();
+}
+
+const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_server_method(void)
+{
+    return dtlsv1_server_method();
+}
+
+const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_client_method(void)
+{
+    return dtlsv1_client_method();
+}
+# endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/packet_locl.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/packet_locl.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d34034d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/packet_locl.h
@@ -0,0 +1,555 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_PACKET_LOCL_H
+# define HEADER_PACKET_LOCL_H
+
+# include <string.h>
+# include <openssl/bn.h>
+# include <openssl/buffer.h>
+# include <openssl/crypto.h>
+# include <openssl/e_os2.h>
+
+# include "internal/numbers.h"
+
+# ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+# endif
+
+typedef struct {
+    /* Pointer to where we are currently reading from */
+    const unsigned char *curr;
+    /* Number of bytes remaining */
+    size_t remaining;
+} PACKET;
+
+/* Internal unchecked shorthand; don't use outside this file. */
+static ossl_inline void packet_forward(PACKET *pkt, size_t len)
+{
+    pkt->curr += len;
+    pkt->remaining -= len;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the number of bytes remaining to be read in the PACKET
+ */
+static ossl_inline size_t PACKET_remaining(const PACKET *pkt)
+{
+    return pkt->remaining;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns a pointer to the first byte after the packet data.
+ * Useful for integrating with non-PACKET parsing code.
+ * Specifically, we use PACKET_end() to verify that a d2i_... call
+ * has consumed the entire packet contents.
+ */
+static ossl_inline const unsigned char *PACKET_end(const PACKET *pkt)
+{
+    return pkt->curr + pkt->remaining;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns a pointer to the PACKET's current position.
+ * For use in non-PACKETized APIs.
+ */
+static ossl_inline const unsigned char *PACKET_data(const PACKET *pkt)
+{
+    return pkt->curr;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initialise a PACKET with |len| bytes held in |buf|. This does not make a
+ * copy of the data so |buf| must be present for the whole time that the PACKET
+ * is being used.
+ */
+__owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_buf_init(PACKET *pkt,
+                                              const unsigned char *buf,
+                                              size_t len)
+{
+    /* Sanity check for negative values. */
+    if (len > (size_t)(SIZE_MAX / 2))
+        return 0;
+
+    pkt->curr = buf;
+    pkt->remaining = len;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Initialize a PACKET to hold zero bytes. */
+static ossl_inline void PACKET_null_init(PACKET *pkt)
+{
+    pkt->curr = NULL;
+    pkt->remaining = 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns 1 if the packet has length |num| and its contents equal the |num|
+ * bytes read from |ptr|. Returns 0 otherwise (lengths or contents not equal).
+ * If lengths are equal, performs the comparison in constant time.
+ */
+__owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_equal(const PACKET *pkt, const void *ptr,
+                                           size_t num)
+{
+    if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != num)
+        return 0;
+    return CRYPTO_memcmp(pkt->curr, ptr, num) == 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Peek ahead and initialize |subpkt| with the next |len| bytes read from |pkt|.
+ * Data is not copied: the |subpkt| packet will share its underlying buffer with
+ * the original |pkt|, so data wrapped by |pkt| must outlive the |subpkt|.
+ */
+__owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_peek_sub_packet(const PACKET *pkt,
+                                                     PACKET *subpkt, size_t len)
+{
+    if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) < len)
+        return 0;
+
+    return PACKET_buf_init(subpkt, pkt->curr, len);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initialize |subpkt| with the next |len| bytes read from |pkt|. Data is not
+ * copied: the |subpkt| packet will share its underlying buffer with the
+ * original |pkt|, so data wrapped by |pkt| must outlive the |subpkt|.
+ */
+__owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_get_sub_packet(PACKET *pkt,
+                                                    PACKET *subpkt, size_t len)
+{
+    if (!PACKET_peek_sub_packet(pkt, subpkt, len))
+        return 0;
+
+    packet_forward(pkt, len);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Peek ahead at 2 bytes in network order from |pkt| and store the value in
+ * |*data|
+ */
+__owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_peek_net_2(const PACKET *pkt,
+                                                unsigned int *data)
+{
+    if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) < 2)
+        return 0;
+
+    *data = ((unsigned int)(*pkt->curr)) << 8;
+    *data |= *(pkt->curr + 1);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Equivalent of n2s */
+/* Get 2 bytes in network order from |pkt| and store the value in |*data| */
+__owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_get_net_2(PACKET *pkt, unsigned int *data)
+{
+    if (!PACKET_peek_net_2(pkt, data))
+        return 0;
+
+    packet_forward(pkt, 2);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Peek ahead at 3 bytes in network order from |pkt| and store the value in
+ * |*data|
+ */
+__owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_peek_net_3(const PACKET *pkt,
+                                                unsigned long *data)
+{
+    if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) < 3)
+        return 0;
+
+    *data = ((unsigned long)(*pkt->curr)) << 16;
+    *data |= ((unsigned long)(*(pkt->curr + 1))) << 8;
+    *data |= *(pkt->curr + 2);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Equivalent of n2l3 */
+/* Get 3 bytes in network order from |pkt| and store the value in |*data| */
+__owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_get_net_3(PACKET *pkt, unsigned long *data)
+{
+    if (!PACKET_peek_net_3(pkt, data))
+        return 0;
+
+    packet_forward(pkt, 3);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Peek ahead at 4 bytes in network order from |pkt| and store the value in
+ * |*data|
+ */
+__owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_peek_net_4(const PACKET *pkt,
+                                                unsigned long *data)
+{
+    if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) < 4)
+        return 0;
+
+    *data = ((unsigned long)(*pkt->curr)) << 24;
+    *data |= ((unsigned long)(*(pkt->curr + 1))) << 16;
+    *data |= ((unsigned long)(*(pkt->curr + 2))) << 8;
+    *data |= *(pkt->curr + 3);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Equivalent of n2l */
+/* Get 4 bytes in network order from |pkt| and store the value in |*data| */
+__owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_get_net_4(PACKET *pkt, unsigned long *data)
+{
+    if (!PACKET_peek_net_4(pkt, data))
+        return 0;
+
+    packet_forward(pkt, 4);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Peek ahead at 1 byte from |pkt| and store the value in |*data| */
+__owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_peek_1(const PACKET *pkt,
+                                            unsigned int *data)
+{
+    if (!PACKET_remaining(pkt))
+        return 0;
+
+    *data = *pkt->curr;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Get 1 byte from |pkt| and store the value in |*data| */
+__owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_get_1(PACKET *pkt, unsigned int *data)
+{
+    if (!PACKET_peek_1(pkt, data))
+        return 0;
+
+    packet_forward(pkt, 1);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Peek ahead at 4 bytes in reverse network order from |pkt| and store the value
+ * in |*data|
+ */
+__owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_peek_4(const PACKET *pkt,
+                                            unsigned long *data)
+{
+    if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) < 4)
+        return 0;
+
+    *data = *pkt->curr;
+    *data |= ((unsigned long)(*(pkt->curr + 1))) << 8;
+    *data |= ((unsigned long)(*(pkt->curr + 2))) << 16;
+    *data |= ((unsigned long)(*(pkt->curr + 3))) << 24;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Equivalent of c2l */
+/*
+ * Get 4 bytes in reverse network order from |pkt| and store the value in
+ * |*data|
+ */
+__owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_get_4(PACKET *pkt, unsigned long *data)
+{
+    if (!PACKET_peek_4(pkt, data))
+        return 0;
+
+    packet_forward(pkt, 4);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Peek ahead at |len| bytes from the |pkt| and store a pointer to them in
+ * |*data|. This just points at the underlying buffer that |pkt| is using. The
+ * caller should not free this data directly (it will be freed when the
+ * underlying buffer gets freed
+ */
+__owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_peek_bytes(const PACKET *pkt,
+                                                const unsigned char **data,
+                                                size_t len)
+{
+    if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) < len)
+        return 0;
+
+    *data = pkt->curr;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read |len| bytes from the |pkt| and store a pointer to them in |*data|. This
+ * just points at the underlying buffer that |pkt| is using. The caller should
+ * not free this data directly (it will be freed when the underlying buffer gets
+ * freed
+ */
+__owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_get_bytes(PACKET *pkt,
+                                               const unsigned char **data,
+                                               size_t len)
+{
+    if (!PACKET_peek_bytes(pkt, data, len))
+        return 0;
+
+    packet_forward(pkt, len);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Peek ahead at |len| bytes from |pkt| and copy them to |data| */
+__owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_peek_copy_bytes(const PACKET *pkt,
+                                                     unsigned char *data,
+                                                     size_t len)
+{
+    if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) < len)
+        return 0;
+
+    memcpy(data, pkt->curr, len);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read |len| bytes from |pkt| and copy them to |data|.
+ * The caller is responsible for ensuring that |data| can hold |len| bytes.
+ */
+__owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_copy_bytes(PACKET *pkt,
+                                                unsigned char *data, size_t len)
+{
+    if (!PACKET_peek_copy_bytes(pkt, data, len))
+        return 0;
+
+    packet_forward(pkt, len);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Copy packet data to |dest|, and set |len| to the number of copied bytes.
+ * If the packet has more than |dest_len| bytes, nothing is copied.
+ * Returns 1 if the packet data fits in |dest_len| bytes, 0 otherwise.
+ * Does not forward PACKET position (because it is typically the last thing
+ * done with a given PACKET).
+ */
+__owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_copy_all(const PACKET *pkt,
+                                              unsigned char *dest,
+                                              size_t dest_len, size_t *len)
+{
+    if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > dest_len) {
+        *len = 0;
+        return 0;
+    }
+    *len = pkt->remaining;
+    memcpy(dest, pkt->curr, pkt->remaining);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Copy |pkt| bytes to a newly allocated buffer and store a pointer to the
+ * result in |*data|, and the length in |len|.
+ * If |*data| is not NULL, the old data is OPENSSL_free'd.
+ * If the packet is empty, or malloc fails, |*data| will be set to NULL.
+ * Returns 1 if the malloc succeeds and 0 otherwise.
+ * Does not forward PACKET position (because it is typically the last thing
+ * done with a given PACKET).
+ */
+__owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_memdup(const PACKET *pkt,
+                                            unsigned char **data, size_t *len)
+{
+    size_t length;
+
+    OPENSSL_free(*data);
+    *data = NULL;
+    *len = 0;
+
+    length = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
+
+    if (length == 0)
+        return 1;
+
+    *data = OPENSSL_memdup(pkt->curr, length);
+    if (*data == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    *len = length;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read a C string from |pkt| and copy to a newly allocated, NUL-terminated
+ * buffer. Store a pointer to the result in |*data|.
+ * If |*data| is not NULL, the old data is OPENSSL_free'd.
+ * If the data in |pkt| does not contain a NUL-byte, the entire data is
+ * copied and NUL-terminated.
+ * Returns 1 if the malloc succeeds and 0 otherwise.
+ * Does not forward PACKET position (because it is typically the last thing done
+ * with a given PACKET).
+ */
+__owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_strndup(const PACKET *pkt, char **data)
+{
+    OPENSSL_free(*data);
+
+    /* This will succeed on an empty packet, unless pkt->curr == NULL. */
+    *data = OPENSSL_strndup((const char *)pkt->curr, PACKET_remaining(pkt));
+    return (*data != NULL);
+}
+
+/* Returns 1 if |pkt| contains at least one 0-byte, 0 otherwise. */
+static ossl_inline int PACKET_contains_zero_byte(const PACKET *pkt)
+{
+    return memchr(pkt->curr, 0, pkt->remaining) != NULL;
+}
+
+/* Move the current reading position forward |len| bytes */
+__owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_forward(PACKET *pkt, size_t len)
+{
+    if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) < len)
+        return 0;
+
+    packet_forward(pkt, len);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Reads a variable-length vector prefixed with a one-byte length, and stores
+ * the contents in |subpkt|. |pkt| can equal |subpkt|.
+ * Data is not copied: the |subpkt| packet will share its underlying buffer with
+ * the original |pkt|, so data wrapped by |pkt| must outlive the |subpkt|.
+ * Upon failure, the original |pkt| and |subpkt| are not modified.
+ */
+__owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(PACKET *pkt,
+                                                           PACKET *subpkt)
+{
+    unsigned int length;
+    const unsigned char *data;
+    PACKET tmp = *pkt;
+    if (!PACKET_get_1(&tmp, &length) ||
+        !PACKET_get_bytes(&tmp, &data, (size_t)length)) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    *pkt = tmp;
+    subpkt->curr = data;
+    subpkt->remaining = length;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Like PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1, but additionally, fails when there are
+ * leftover bytes in |pkt|.
+ */
+__owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(PACKET *pkt,
+                                                          PACKET *subpkt)
+{
+    unsigned int length;
+    const unsigned char *data;
+    PACKET tmp = *pkt;
+    if (!PACKET_get_1(&tmp, &length) ||
+        !PACKET_get_bytes(&tmp, &data, (size_t)length) ||
+        PACKET_remaining(&tmp) != 0) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    *pkt = tmp;
+    subpkt->curr = data;
+    subpkt->remaining = length;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Reads a variable-length vector prefixed with a two-byte length, and stores
+ * the contents in |subpkt|. |pkt| can equal |subpkt|.
+ * Data is not copied: the |subpkt| packet will share its underlying buffer with
+ * the original |pkt|, so data wrapped by |pkt| must outlive the |subpkt|.
+ * Upon failure, the original |pkt| and |subpkt| are not modified.
+ */
+__owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(PACKET *pkt,
+                                                           PACKET *subpkt)
+{
+    unsigned int length;
+    const unsigned char *data;
+    PACKET tmp = *pkt;
+
+    if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&tmp, &length) ||
+        !PACKET_get_bytes(&tmp, &data, (size_t)length)) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    *pkt = tmp;
+    subpkt->curr = data;
+    subpkt->remaining = length;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Like PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2, but additionally, fails when there are
+ * leftover bytes in |pkt|.
+ */
+__owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(PACKET *pkt,
+                                                          PACKET *subpkt)
+{
+    unsigned int length;
+    const unsigned char *data;
+    PACKET tmp = *pkt;
+
+    if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&tmp, &length) ||
+        !PACKET_get_bytes(&tmp, &data, (size_t)length) ||
+        PACKET_remaining(&tmp) != 0) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    *pkt = tmp;
+    subpkt->curr = data;
+    subpkt->remaining = length;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Reads a variable-length vector prefixed with a three-byte length, and stores
+ * the contents in |subpkt|. |pkt| can equal |subpkt|.
+ * Data is not copied: the |subpkt| packet will share its underlying buffer with
+ * the original |pkt|, so data wrapped by |pkt| must outlive the |subpkt|.
+ * Upon failure, the original |pkt| and |subpkt| are not modified.
+ */
+__owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_get_length_prefixed_3(PACKET *pkt,
+                                                           PACKET *subpkt)
+{
+    unsigned long length;
+    const unsigned char *data;
+    PACKET tmp = *pkt;
+    if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&tmp, &length) ||
+        !PACKET_get_bytes(&tmp, &data, (size_t)length)) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    *pkt = tmp;
+    subpkt->curr = data;
+    subpkt->remaining = length;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+# ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+# endif
+
+#endif                          /* HEADER_PACKET_LOCL_H */
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/pqueue.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/pqueue.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b447e1d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/pqueue.c
@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+struct pqueue_st {
+    pitem *items;
+    int count;
+};
+
+pitem *pitem_new(unsigned char *prio64be, void *data)
+{
+    pitem *item = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*item));
+    if (item == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+
+    memcpy(item->priority, prio64be, sizeof(item->priority));
+
+    item->data = data;
+    item->next = NULL;
+
+    return item;
+}
+
+void pitem_free(pitem *item)
+{
+    OPENSSL_free(item);
+}
+
+pqueue *pqueue_new()
+{
+    pqueue *pq = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*pq));
+
+    return pq;
+}
+
+void pqueue_free(pqueue *pq)
+{
+    OPENSSL_free(pq);
+}
+
+pitem *pqueue_insert(pqueue *pq, pitem *item)
+{
+    pitem *curr, *next;
+
+    if (pq->items == NULL) {
+        pq->items = item;
+        return item;
+    }
+
+    for (curr = NULL, next = pq->items;
+         next != NULL; curr = next, next = next->next) {
+        /*
+         * we can compare 64-bit value in big-endian encoding with memcmp:-)
+         */
+        int cmp = memcmp(next->priority, item->priority, 8);
+        if (cmp > 0) {          /* next > item */
+            item->next = next;
+
+            if (curr == NULL)
+                pq->items = item;
+            else
+                curr->next = item;
+
+            return item;
+        }
+
+        else if (cmp == 0)      /* duplicates not allowed */
+            return NULL;
+    }
+
+    item->next = NULL;
+    curr->next = item;
+
+    return item;
+}
+
+pitem *pqueue_peek(pqueue *pq)
+{
+    return pq->items;
+}
+
+pitem *pqueue_pop(pqueue *pq)
+{
+    pitem *item = pq->items;
+
+    if (pq->items != NULL)
+        pq->items = pq->items->next;
+
+    return item;
+}
+
+pitem *pqueue_find(pqueue *pq, unsigned char *prio64be)
+{
+    pitem *next;
+    pitem *found = NULL;
+
+    if (pq->items == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+
+    for (next = pq->items; next->next != NULL; next = next->next) {
+        if (memcmp(next->priority, prio64be, 8) == 0) {
+            found = next;
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* check the one last node */
+    if (memcmp(next->priority, prio64be, 8) == 0)
+        found = next;
+
+    if (!found)
+        return NULL;
+
+    return found;
+}
+
+pitem *pqueue_iterator(pqueue *pq)
+{
+    return pqueue_peek(pq);
+}
+
+pitem *pqueue_next(pitem **item)
+{
+    pitem *ret;
+
+    if (item == NULL || *item == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+
+    /* *item != NULL */
+    ret = *item;
+    *item = (*item)->next;
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int pqueue_size(pqueue *pq)
+{
+    pitem *item = pq->items;
+    int count = 0;
+
+    while (item != NULL) {
+        count++;
+        item = item->next;
+    }
+    return count;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/record/README b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/record/README
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..987e9fd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/record/README
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+Record Layer Design
+===================
+
+This file provides some guidance on the thinking behind the design of the
+record layer code to aid future maintenance.
+
+The record layer is divided into a number of components. At the time of writing
+there are four: SSL3_RECORD, SSL3_BUFFER, DLTS1_BITMAP and RECORD_LAYER. Each
+of these components is defined by:
+1) A struct definition of the same name as the component
+2) A set of source files that define the functions for that component
+3) A set of accessor macros
+
+All struct definitions are in record.h. The functions and macros are either
+defined in record.h or record_locl.h dependent on whether they are intended to
+be private to the record layer, or whether they form part of the API to the rest
+of libssl.
+
+The source files map to components as follows:
+
+dtls1_bitmap.c                                   -> DTLS1_BITMAP component
+ssl3_buffer.c                                    -> SSL3_BUFFER component
+ssl3_record.c                                    -> SSL3_RECORD component
+rec_layer_s3.c, rec_layer_d1.c                   -> RECORD_LAYER component
+
+The RECORD_LAYER component is a facade pattern, i.e. it provides a simplified
+interface to the record layer for the rest of libssl. The other 3 components are
+entirely private to the record layer and therefore should never be accessed
+directly by libssl.
+
+Any component can directly access its own members - they are private to that
+component, e.g. ssl3_buffer.c can access members of the SSL3_BUFFER struct
+without using a macro. No component can directly access the members of another
+component, e.g. ssl3_buffer cannot reach inside the RECORD_LAYER component to
+directly access its members. Instead components use accessor macros, so if code
+in ssl3_buffer.c wants to access the members of the RECORD_LAYER it uses the
+RECORD_LAYER_* macros.
+
+Conceptually it looks like this:
+
+                        libssl
+                           |
+---------------------------|-----record.h--------------------------------------
+                           |
+                    _______V______________
+                   |                      |
+                   |    RECORD_LAYER      |
+                   |                      |
+                   |    rec_layer_s3.c    |
+                   |          ^           |
+                   | _________|__________ |
+                   ||                    ||
+                   || DTLS1_RECORD_LAYER ||
+                   ||                    ||
+                   || rec_layer_d1.c     ||
+                   ||____________________||
+                   |______________________|
+        record_locl.h     ^   ^   ^
+         _________________|   |   |_________________
+        |                     |                     |
+   _____V_________      ______V________      _______V________
+  |               |    |               |    |                |
+  | SSL3_BUFFER   |    | SSL3_RECORD   |    | DTLS1_BITMAP   |
+  |               |--->|               |    |                |
+  | ssl3_buffer.c |    | ssl3_record.c |    | dtls1_bitmap.c |
+  |_______________|    |_______________|    |________________|
+
+
+The two RECORD_LAYER source files build on each other, i.e.
+the main one is rec_layer_s3.c which provides the core SSL/TLS layer. The second
+one is rec_layer_d1.c which builds off of the SSL/TLS code to provide DTLS
+specific capabilities. It uses some DTLS specific RECORD_LAYER component members
+which should only be accessed from rec_layer_d1.c. These are held in the
+DTLS1_RECORD_LAYER struct.
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/record/dtls1_bitmap.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/record/dtls1_bitmap.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5923c53
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/record/dtls1_bitmap.c
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "../ssl_locl.h"
+#include "record_locl.h"
+
+/* mod 128 saturating subtract of two 64-bit values in big-endian order */
+static int satsub64be(const unsigned char *v1, const unsigned char *v2)
+{
+    int64_t ret;
+    uint64_t l1, l2;
+
+    n2l8(v1, l1);
+    n2l8(v2, l2);
+
+    ret = l1 - l2;
+
+    /* We do not permit wrap-around */
+    if (l1 > l2 && ret < 0)
+        return 128;
+    else if (l2 > l1 && ret > 0)
+        return -128;
+
+    if (ret > 128)
+        return 128;
+    else if (ret < -128)
+        return -128;
+    else
+        return (int)ret;
+}
+
+int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
+{
+    int cmp;
+    unsigned int shift;
+    const unsigned char *seq = s->rlayer.read_sequence;
+
+    cmp = satsub64be(seq, bitmap->max_seq_num);
+    if (cmp > 0) {
+        SSL3_RECORD_set_seq_num(RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer), seq);
+        return 1;               /* this record in new */
+    }
+    shift = -cmp;
+    if (shift >= sizeof(bitmap->map) * 8)
+        return 0;               /* stale, outside the window */
+    else if (bitmap->map & (1UL << shift))
+        return 0;               /* record previously received */
+
+    SSL3_RECORD_set_seq_num(RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer), seq);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
+{
+    int cmp;
+    unsigned int shift;
+    const unsigned char *seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
+
+    cmp = satsub64be(seq, bitmap->max_seq_num);
+    if (cmp > 0) {
+        shift = cmp;
+        if (shift < sizeof(bitmap->map) * 8)
+            bitmap->map <<= shift, bitmap->map |= 1UL;
+        else
+            bitmap->map = 1UL;
+        memcpy(bitmap->max_seq_num, seq, SEQ_NUM_SIZE);
+    } else {
+        shift = -cmp;
+        if (shift < sizeof(bitmap->map) * 8)
+            bitmap->map |= 1UL << shift;
+    }
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/record/rec_layer_d1.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/record/rec_layer_d1.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b3ff5f1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/record/rec_layer_d1.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1229 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2005-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#define USE_SOCKETS
+#include "../ssl_locl.h"
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include "record_locl.h"
+
+int DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_new(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
+{
+    DTLS_RECORD_LAYER *d;
+
+    if ((d = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*d))) == NULL)
+        return (0);
+
+    rl->d = d;
+
+    d->unprocessed_rcds.q = pqueue_new();
+    d->processed_rcds.q = pqueue_new();
+    d->buffered_app_data.q = pqueue_new();
+
+    if (d->unprocessed_rcds.q == NULL || d->processed_rcds.q == NULL
+        || d->buffered_app_data.q == NULL) {
+        pqueue_free(d->unprocessed_rcds.q);
+        pqueue_free(d->processed_rcds.q);
+        pqueue_free(d->buffered_app_data.q);
+        OPENSSL_free(d);
+        rl->d = NULL;
+        return (0);
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_free(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
+{
+    DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl);
+    pqueue_free(rl->d->unprocessed_rcds.q);
+    pqueue_free(rl->d->processed_rcds.q);
+    pqueue_free(rl->d->buffered_app_data.q);
+    OPENSSL_free(rl->d);
+    rl->d = NULL;
+}
+
+void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
+{
+    DTLS_RECORD_LAYER *d;
+    pitem *item = NULL;
+    DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
+    pqueue *unprocessed_rcds;
+    pqueue *processed_rcds;
+    pqueue *buffered_app_data;
+
+    d = rl->d;
+
+    while ((item = pqueue_pop(d->unprocessed_rcds.q)) != NULL) {
+        rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
+        OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
+        OPENSSL_free(item->data);
+        pitem_free(item);
+    }
+
+    while ((item = pqueue_pop(d->processed_rcds.q)) != NULL) {
+        rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
+        OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
+        OPENSSL_free(item->data);
+        pitem_free(item);
+    }
+
+    while ((item = pqueue_pop(d->buffered_app_data.q)) != NULL) {
+        rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
+        OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
+        OPENSSL_free(item->data);
+        pitem_free(item);
+    }
+
+    unprocessed_rcds = d->unprocessed_rcds.q;
+    processed_rcds = d->processed_rcds.q;
+    buffered_app_data = d->buffered_app_data.q;
+    memset(d, 0, sizeof(*d));
+    d->unprocessed_rcds.q = unprocessed_rcds;
+    d->processed_rcds.q = processed_rcds;
+    d->buffered_app_data.q = buffered_app_data;
+}
+
+void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_set_saved_w_epoch(RECORD_LAYER *rl, unsigned short e)
+{
+    if (e == rl->d->w_epoch - 1) {
+        memcpy(rl->d->curr_write_sequence,
+               rl->write_sequence, sizeof(rl->write_sequence));
+        memcpy(rl->write_sequence,
+               rl->d->last_write_sequence, sizeof(rl->write_sequence));
+    } else if (e == rl->d->w_epoch + 1) {
+        memcpy(rl->d->last_write_sequence,
+               rl->write_sequence, sizeof(unsigned char[8]));
+        memcpy(rl->write_sequence,
+               rl->d->curr_write_sequence, sizeof(rl->write_sequence));
+    }
+    rl->d->w_epoch = e;
+}
+
+void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_resync_write(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
+{
+    memcpy(rl->write_sequence, rl->read_sequence, sizeof(rl->write_sequence));
+}
+
+void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_set_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl, unsigned char *seq)
+{
+    memcpy(rl->write_sequence, seq, SEQ_NUM_SIZE);
+}
+
+static int have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf,
+                                   int len);
+
+/* copy buffered record into SSL structure */
+static int dtls1_copy_record(SSL *s, pitem *item)
+{
+    DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
+
+    rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
+
+    SSL3_BUFFER_release(&s->rlayer.rbuf);
+
+    s->rlayer.packet = rdata->packet;
+    s->rlayer.packet_length = rdata->packet_length;
+    memcpy(&s->rlayer.rbuf, &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
+    memcpy(&s->rlayer.rrec, &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
+
+    /* Set proper sequence number for mac calculation */
+    memcpy(&(s->rlayer.read_sequence[2]), &(rdata->packet[5]), 6);
+
+    return (1);
+}
+
+int dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue, unsigned char *priority)
+{
+    DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
+    pitem *item;
+
+    /* Limit the size of the queue to prevent DOS attacks */
+    if (pqueue_size(queue->q) >= 100)
+        return 0;
+
+    rdata = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*rdata));
+    item = pitem_new(priority, rdata);
+    if (rdata == NULL || item == NULL) {
+        OPENSSL_free(rdata);
+        pitem_free(item);
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    rdata->packet = s->rlayer.packet;
+    rdata->packet_length = s->rlayer.packet_length;
+    memcpy(&(rdata->rbuf), &s->rlayer.rbuf, sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
+    memcpy(&(rdata->rrec), &s->rlayer.rrec, sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
+
+    item->data = rdata;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+    /* Store bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo struct */
+    if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
+        (SSL_get_state(s) == TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
+         || SSL_get_state(s) == TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED)) {
+        BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_GET_RCVINFO,
+                 sizeof(rdata->recordinfo), &rdata->recordinfo);
+    }
+#endif
+
+    s->rlayer.packet = NULL;
+    s->rlayer.packet_length = 0;
+    memset(&s->rlayer.rbuf, 0, sizeof(s->rlayer.rbuf));
+    memset(&s->rlayer.rrec, 0, sizeof(s->rlayer.rrec));
+
+    if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
+        OPENSSL_free(rdata);
+        pitem_free(item);
+        return (-1);
+    }
+
+    /* insert should not fail, since duplicates are dropped */
+    if (pqueue_insert(queue->q, item) == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
+        OPENSSL_free(rdata);
+        pitem_free(item);
+        return (-1);
+    }
+
+    return (1);
+}
+
+int dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue)
+{
+    pitem *item;
+
+    item = pqueue_pop(queue->q);
+    if (item) {
+        dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
+
+        OPENSSL_free(item->data);
+        pitem_free(item);
+
+        return (1);
+    }
+
+    return (0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the new epoch, i.e., not
+ * processed yet
+ */
+#define dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s) \
+                   dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
+                   &((s)->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds))
+
+int dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s)
+{
+    pitem *item;
+    SSL3_BUFFER *rb;
+    SSL3_RECORD *rr;
+    DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap;
+    unsigned int is_next_epoch;
+    int replayok = 1;
+
+    item = pqueue_peek(s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.q);
+    if (item) {
+        /* Check if epoch is current. */
+        if (s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->rlayer.d->r_epoch)
+            return 1;         /* Nothing to do. */
+
+        rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer);
+
+        rb = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer);
+
+        if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rb) > 0) {
+            /*
+             * We've still got data from the current packet to read. There could
+             * be a record from the new epoch in it - so don't overwrite it
+             * with the unprocessed records yet (we'll do it when we've
+             * finished reading the current packet).
+             */
+            return 1;
+        }
+
+        /* Process all the records. */
+        while (pqueue_peek(s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.q)) {
+            dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s);
+            bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch);
+            if (bitmap == NULL) {
+                /*
+                 * Should not happen. This will only ever be NULL when the
+                 * current record is from a different epoch. But that cannot
+                 * be the case because we already checked the epoch above
+                 */
+                 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_BUFFERED_RECORDS,
+                        ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                 return 0;
+            }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+            /* Only do replay check if no SCTP bio */
+            if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)))
+#endif
+            {
+                /*
+                 * Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record. We did this
+                 * check once already when we first received the record - but
+                 * we might have updated the window since then due to
+                 * records we subsequently processed.
+                 */
+                replayok = dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap);
+            }
+
+            if (!replayok || !dtls1_process_record(s, bitmap)) {
+                /* dump this record */
+                rr->length = 0;
+                RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
+                continue;
+            }
+
+            if (dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->rlayer.d->processed_rcds),
+                    SSL3_RECORD_get_seq_num(s->rlayer.rrec)) < 0)
+                return 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * sync epoch numbers once all the unprocessed records have been
+     * processed
+     */
+    s->rlayer.d->processed_rcds.epoch = s->rlayer.d->r_epoch;
+    s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.epoch = s->rlayer.d->r_epoch + 1;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
+ * 'type' is one of the following:
+ *
+ *   -  SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
+ *   -  SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
+ *   -  0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
+ *
+ * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
+ * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
+ *
+ * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
+ * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec
+ * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recd_type|
+ * argument is non NULL.
+ * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
+ * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
+ * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
+ *     Change cipher spec protocol
+ *             just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
+ *     Alert protocol
+ *             2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
+ *     Handshake protocol
+ *             4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
+ *             to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
+ *             here, anything else is handled by higher layers
+ *     Application data protocol
+ *             none of our business
+ */
+int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf,
+                     int len, int peek)
+{
+    int al, i, j, ret;
+    unsigned int n;
+    SSL3_RECORD *rr;
+    void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
+
+    if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&s->rlayer.rbuf)) {
+        /* Not initialized yet */
+        if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
+            return (-1);
+    }
+
+    if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
+         (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) ||
+        (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * check whether there's a handshake message (client hello?) waiting
+     */
+    if ((ret = have_handshake_fragment(s, type, buf, len))) {
+        *recvd_type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Now s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if
+     * type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
+     */
+
+    if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) && SSL_in_init(s))
+    {
+        /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
+        i = s->handshake_func(s);
+        if (i < 0)
+            return (i);
+        if (i == 0) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+            return (-1);
+        }
+    }
+
+ start:
+    s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+
+    /*-
+     * s->s3->rrec.type         - is the type of record
+     * s->s3->rrec.data,    - data
+     * s->s3->rrec.off,     - offset into 'data' for next read
+     * s->s3->rrec.length,  - number of bytes.
+     */
+    rr = s->rlayer.rrec;
+
+    /*
+     * We are not handshaking and have no data yet, so process data buffered
+     * during the last handshake in advance, if any.
+     */
+    if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) && SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) {
+        pitem *item;
+        item = pqueue_pop(s->rlayer.d->buffered_app_data.q);
+        if (item) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+            /* Restore bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo struct */
+            if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
+                DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
+                BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_RCVINFO,
+                         sizeof(rdata->recordinfo), &rdata->recordinfo);
+            }
+#endif
+
+            dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
+
+            OPENSSL_free(item->data);
+            pitem_free(item);
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* Check for timeout */
+    if (dtls1_handle_timeout(s) > 0)
+        goto start;
+
+    /* get new packet if necessary */
+    if ((SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0)
+        || (s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)) {
+        ret = dtls1_get_record(s);
+        if (ret <= 0) {
+            ret = dtls1_read_failed(s, ret);
+            /* anything other than a timeout is an error */
+            if (ret <= 0)
+                return (ret);
+            else
+                goto start;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty
+     * record that isn't an alert.
+     */
+    if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_ALERT
+            && SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) != 0)
+        s->rlayer.alert_count = 0;
+
+    /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
+
+    if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
+                                   * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
+        && (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) {
+        /*
+         * We now have application data between CCS and Finished. Most likely
+         * the packets were reordered on their way, so buffer the application
+         * data for later processing rather than dropping the connection.
+         */
+        if (dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->rlayer.d->buffered_app_data),
+                                SSL3_RECORD_get_seq_num(rr)) < 0) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            return -1;
+        }
+        SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
+        goto start;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
+     * 'peek' mode)
+     */
+    if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
+        SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
+        s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+        return (0);
+    }
+
+    if (type == SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)
+        || (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
+            && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && recvd_type != NULL)) {
+        /*
+         * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
+         * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
+         * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
+         */
+        /*
+         * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
+         * doing a handshake for the first time
+         */
+        if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
+            (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) {
+            al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+
+        if (recvd_type != NULL)
+            *recvd_type = SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr);
+
+        if (len <= 0)
+            return (len);
+
+        if ((unsigned int)len > SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))
+            n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr);
+        else
+            n = (unsigned int)len;
+
+        memcpy(buf, &(SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr)[SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr)]), n);
+        if (!peek) {
+            SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr, n);
+            SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, n);
+            if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) {
+                s->rlayer.rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
+                SSL3_RECORD_set_off(rr, 0);
+            }
+        }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+        /*
+         * We might had to delay a close_notify alert because of reordered
+         * app data. If there was an alert and there is no message to read
+         * anymore, finally set shutdown.
+         */
+        if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
+            s->d1->shutdown_received
+            && !BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
+            s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
+            return (0);
+        }
+#endif
+        return (n);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
+     * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello).
+     */
+
+    /*
+     * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill
+     * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
+     */
+    {
+        unsigned int k, dest_maxlen = 0;
+        unsigned char *dest = NULL;
+        unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
+
+        if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
+            dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment);
+            dest = s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment;
+            dest_len = &s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len;
+        } else if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
+            dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment);
+            dest = s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment;
+            dest_len = &s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment_len;
+        }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+        else if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == DTLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT) {
+            /* We allow a 0 return */
+            if (dtls1_process_heartbeat(s, SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr),
+                                        SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr)) < 0) {
+                return -1;
+            }
+            /* Exit and notify application to read again */
+            SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
+            s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
+            BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
+            BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
+            return (-1);
+        }
+#endif
+        /* else it's a CCS message, or application data or wrong */
+        else if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
+            /*
+             * Application data while renegotiating is allowed. Try again
+             * reading.
+             */
+            if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
+                BIO *bio;
+                s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
+                bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
+                s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
+                BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
+                BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
+                return (-1);
+            }
+
+            /* Not certain if this is the right error handling */
+            al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+
+        if (dest_maxlen > 0) {
+            /*
+             * XDTLS: In a pathological case, the Client Hello may be
+             * fragmented--don't always expect dest_maxlen bytes
+             */
+            if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) < dest_maxlen) {
+#ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
+                /*
+                 * for normal alerts rr->length is 2, while
+                 * dest_maxlen is 7 if we were to handle this
+                 * non-existing alert...
+                 */
+                FIX ME;
+#endif
+                s->rlayer.rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
+                SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
+                goto start;
+            }
+
+            /* now move 'n' bytes: */
+            for (k = 0; k < dest_maxlen; k++) {
+                dest[k] = SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr)[SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr)];
+                SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, 1);
+                SSL3_RECORD_add_length(rr, -1);
+            }
+            *dest_len = dest_maxlen;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /*-
+     * s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len == 12  iff  rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
+     * s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment_len == 7      iff  rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
+     * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
+     */
+
+    /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
+    if ((!s->server) &&
+        (s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) &&
+        (s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
+        (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) {
+        s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
+
+        if ((s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
+            (s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
+            (s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) {
+            al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+
+        /*
+         * no need to check sequence number on HELLO REQUEST messages
+         */
+
+        if (s->msg_callback)
+            s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
+                            s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment, 4, s,
+                            s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+        if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
+            (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION) == 0 &&
+            !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
+            !s->s3->renegotiate) {
+            s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
+            s->new_session = 1;
+            ssl3_renegotiate(s);
+            if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) {
+                i = s->handshake_func(s);
+                if (i < 0)
+                    return (i);
+                if (i == 0) {
+                    SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+                    return (-1);
+                }
+
+                if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
+                    if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&s->rlayer.rbuf) == 0) {
+                        /* no read-ahead left? */
+                        BIO *bio;
+                        /*
+                         * In the case where we try to read application data,
+                         * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
+                         * the retry option set.  Otherwise renegotiation may
+                         * cause nasty problems in the blocking world
+                         */
+                        s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
+                        bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
+                        BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
+                        BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
+                        return (-1);
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+        } else {
+            SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
+            ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
+        }
+        /*
+         * we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, now try
+         * again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for
+         */
+        goto start;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
+     * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on.
+     */
+    if (s->server
+            && SSL_is_init_finished(s)
+            && s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
+            && s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
+            && s->s3->previous_client_finished_len != 0
+            && ((!s->s3->send_connection_binding
+                    && (s->options
+                        & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION) == 0)
+                || (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION) != 0)) {
+        s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
+        SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
+        ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
+        goto start;
+    }
+
+    if (s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment_len >= DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH) {
+        int alert_level = s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment[0];
+        int alert_descr = s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment[1];
+
+        s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment_len = 0;
+
+        if (s->msg_callback)
+            s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
+                            s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment, 2, s,
+                            s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+        if (s->info_callback != NULL)
+            cb = s->info_callback;
+        else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
+            cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
+
+        if (cb != NULL) {
+            j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
+            cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
+        }
+
+        if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
+            s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
+
+            s->rlayer.alert_count++;
+            if (s->rlayer.alert_count == MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT) {
+                al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS);
+                goto f_err;
+            }
+
+            if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+                /*
+                 * With SCTP and streams the socket may deliver app data
+                 * after a close_notify alert. We have to check this first so
+                 * that nothing gets discarded.
+                 */
+                if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
+                    BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
+                    s->d1->shutdown_received = 1;
+                    s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
+                    BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
+                    BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
+                    return -1;
+                }
+#endif
+                s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
+                return (0);
+            }
+#if 0
+            /* XXX: this is a possible improvement in the future */
+            /* now check if it's a missing record */
+            if (alert_descr == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE) {
+                unsigned short seq;
+                unsigned int frag_off;
+                unsigned char *p = &(s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment[2]);
+
+                n2s(p, seq);
+                n2l3(p, frag_off);
+
+                dtls1_retransmit_message(s,
+                                         dtls1_get_queue_priority
+                                         (frag->msg_header.seq, 0), frag_off,
+                                         &found);
+                if (!found && SSL_in_init(s)) {
+                    /*
+                     * fprintf( stderr,"in init = %d\n", SSL_in_init(s));
+                     */
+                    /*
+                     * requested a message not yet sent, send an alert
+                     * ourselves
+                     */
+                    ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING,
+                                    DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE);
+                }
+            }
+#endif
+        } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
+            char tmp[16];
+
+            s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+            s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
+            BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof(tmp), "%d", alert_descr);
+            ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp);
+            s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
+            SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
+            return (0);
+        } else {
+            al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+
+        goto start;
+    }
+
+    if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { /* but we have not received a
+                                            * shutdown */
+        s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+        SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
+        return (0);
+    }
+
+    if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
+        /*
+         * We can't process a CCS now, because previous handshake messages
+         * are still missing, so just drop it.
+         */
+        SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
+        goto start;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation)
+     */
+    if ((s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) &&
+        !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
+        struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
+
+        /* this may just be a stale retransmit */
+        dtls1_get_message_header(rr->data, &msg_hdr);
+        if (SSL3_RECORD_get_epoch(rr) != s->rlayer.d->r_epoch) {
+            SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
+            goto start;
+        }
+
+        /*
+         * If we are server, we may have a repeated FINISHED of the client
+         * here, then retransmit our CCS and FINISHED.
+         */
+        if (msg_hdr.type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
+            if (dtls1_check_timeout_num(s) < 0)
+                return -1;
+
+            dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(s);
+            SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
+            goto start;
+        }
+
+        if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
+            !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) {
+            ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
+            s->renegotiate = 1;
+            s->new_session = 1;
+        }
+        i = s->handshake_func(s);
+        if (i < 0)
+            return (i);
+        if (i == 0) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+            return (-1);
+        }
+
+        if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
+            if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&s->rlayer.rbuf) == 0) {
+                /* no read-ahead left? */
+                BIO *bio;
+                /*
+                 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
+                 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
+                 * option set.  Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
+                 * problems in the blocking world
+                 */
+                s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
+                bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
+                BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
+                BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
+                return (-1);
+            }
+        }
+        goto start;
+    }
+
+    switch (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)) {
+    default:
+        /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */
+        if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION) {
+            SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
+            goto start;
+        }
+        al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
+        goto f_err;
+    case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
+    case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
+    case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
+        /*
+         * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
+         * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but
+         * that should not happen when type != rr->type
+         */
+        al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        goto f_err;
+    case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
+        /*
+         * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
+         * application data.  If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
+         * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
+         * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
+         * started), we will indulge it.
+         */
+        if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
+            (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
+            ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s)) {
+            s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
+            return (-1);
+        } else {
+            al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+    }
+    /* not reached */
+
+ f_err:
+    ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+    return (-1);
+}
+
+        /*
+         * this only happens when a client hello is received and a handshake
+         * is started.
+         */
+static int have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf,
+                                   int len)
+{
+
+    if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
+        && (s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
+        /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
+    {
+        unsigned char *src = s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment;
+        unsigned char *dst = buf;
+        unsigned int k, n;
+
+        /* peek == 0 */
+        n = 0;
+        while ((len > 0) && (s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) {
+            *dst++ = *src++;
+            len--;
+            s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len--;
+            n++;
+        }
+        /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
+        for (k = 0; k < s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
+            s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
+        return n;
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
+ * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
+ */
+int dtls1_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    OPENSSL_assert(len <= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH);
+    s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+    i = do_dtls1_write(s, type, buf, len, 0);
+    return i;
+}
+
+int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
+                   unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
+{
+    unsigned char *p, *pseq;
+    int i, mac_size, clear = 0;
+    int prefix_len = 0;
+    int eivlen;
+    SSL3_RECORD wr;
+    SSL3_BUFFER *wb;
+    SSL_SESSION *sess;
+
+    wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
+
+    /*
+     * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out.  This
+     * will happen with non blocking IO
+     */
+    if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(wb) != 0) {
+        OPENSSL_assert(0);      /* XDTLS: want to see if we ever get here */
+        return (ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len));
+    }
+
+    /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
+    if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
+        i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
+        if (i <= 0)
+            return (i);
+        /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
+    }
+
+    if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
+        return 0;
+
+    if (len > s->max_send_fragment) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE, SSL_R_EXCEEDS_MAX_FRAGMENT_SIZE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    sess = s->session;
+
+    if ((sess == NULL) ||
+        (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL))
+        clear = 1;
+
+    if (clear)
+        mac_size = 0;
+    else {
+        mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
+        if (mac_size < 0)
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    p = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + prefix_len;
+
+    /* write the header */
+
+    *(p++) = type & 0xff;
+    SSL3_RECORD_set_type(&wr, type);
+    /*
+     * Special case: for hello verify request, client version 1.0 and we
+     * haven't decided which version to use yet send back using version 1.0
+     * header: otherwise some clients will ignore it.
+     */
+    if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION &&
+        s->max_proto_version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
+        *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION >> 8;
+        *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff;
+    } else {
+        *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
+        *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
+    }
+
+    /* field where we are to write out packet epoch, seq num and len */
+    pseq = p;
+    p += 10;
+
+    /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
+    if (s->enc_write_ctx) {
+        int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
+        if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
+            eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
+            if (eivlen <= 1)
+                eivlen = 0;
+        }
+        /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
+        else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
+            eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+        else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE)
+            eivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+        else
+            eivlen = 0;
+    } else
+        eivlen = 0;
+
+    /* lets setup the record stuff. */
+    SSL3_RECORD_set_data(&wr, p + eivlen); /* make room for IV in case of CBC */
+    SSL3_RECORD_set_length(&wr, (int)len);
+    SSL3_RECORD_set_input(&wr, (unsigned char *)buf);
+
+    /*
+     * we now 'read' from wr.input, wr.length bytes into wr.data
+     */
+
+    /* first we compress */
+    if (s->compress != NULL) {
+        if (!ssl3_do_compress(s, &wr)) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    } else {
+        memcpy(SSL3_RECORD_get_data(&wr), SSL3_RECORD_get_input(&wr),
+               SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr));
+        SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * we should still have the output to wr.data and the input from
+     * wr.input.  Length should be wr.length. wr.data still points in the
+     * wb->buf
+     */
+
+    if (mac_size != 0) {
+        if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &wr,
+                                     &(p[SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr) + eivlen]),
+                                     1) < 0)
+            goto err;
+        SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr, mac_size);
+    }
+
+    /* this is true regardless of mac size */
+    SSL3_RECORD_set_data(&wr, p);
+    SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr);
+
+    if (eivlen)
+        SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr, eivlen);
+
+    if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, &wr, 1, 1) < 1)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* record length after mac and block padding */
+    /*
+     * if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA || (type == SSL3_RT_ALERT && !
+     * SSL_in_init(s)))
+     */
+
+    /* there's only one epoch between handshake and app data */
+
+    s2n(s->rlayer.d->w_epoch, pseq);
+
+    /* XDTLS: ?? */
+    /*
+     * else s2n(s->d1->handshake_epoch, pseq);
+     */
+
+    memcpy(pseq, &(s->rlayer.write_sequence[2]), 6);
+    pseq += 6;
+    s2n(SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr), pseq);
+
+    if (s->msg_callback)
+        s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, pseq - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH,
+                        DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+    /*
+     * we should now have wr.data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
+     * wr->length long
+     */
+    SSL3_RECORD_set_type(&wr, type); /* not needed but helps for debugging */
+    SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
+
+    ssl3_record_sequence_update(&(s->rlayer.write_sequence[0]));
+
+    if (create_empty_fragment) {
+        /*
+         * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
+         * out anything here
+         */
+        return wr.length;
+    }
+
+    /* now let's set up wb */
+    SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(wb, prefix_len + SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr));
+    SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, 0);
+
+    /*
+     * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
+     * retries later
+     */
+    s->rlayer.wpend_tot = len;
+    s->rlayer.wpend_buf = buf;
+    s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
+    s->rlayer.wpend_ret = len;
+
+    /* we now just need to write the buffer */
+    return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len);
+ err:
+    return -1;
+}
+
+DTLS1_BITMAP *dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
+                               unsigned int *is_next_epoch)
+{
+
+    *is_next_epoch = 0;
+
+    /* In current epoch, accept HM, CCS, DATA, & ALERT */
+    if (rr->epoch == s->rlayer.d->r_epoch)
+        return &s->rlayer.d->bitmap;
+
+    /*
+     * Only HM and ALERT messages can be from the next epoch and only if we
+     * have already processed all of the unprocessed records from the last
+     * epoch
+     */
+    else if (rr->epoch == (unsigned long)(s->rlayer.d->r_epoch + 1) &&
+             s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->rlayer.d->r_epoch &&
+             (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)) {
+        *is_next_epoch = 1;
+        return &s->rlayer.d->next_bitmap;
+    }
+
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+void dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(SSL *s, int rw)
+{
+    unsigned char *seq;
+    unsigned int seq_bytes = sizeof(s->rlayer.read_sequence);
+
+    if (rw & SSL3_CC_READ) {
+        seq = s->rlayer.read_sequence;
+        s->rlayer.d->r_epoch++;
+        memcpy(&s->rlayer.d->bitmap, &s->rlayer.d->next_bitmap,
+               sizeof(s->rlayer.d->bitmap));
+        memset(&s->rlayer.d->next_bitmap, 0, sizeof(s->rlayer.d->next_bitmap));
+
+        /*
+         * We must not use any buffered messages received from the previous
+         * epoch
+         */
+        dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s);
+    } else {
+        seq = s->rlayer.write_sequence;
+        memcpy(s->rlayer.d->last_write_sequence, seq,
+               sizeof(s->rlayer.write_sequence));
+        s->rlayer.d->w_epoch++;
+    }
+
+    memset(seq, 0, seq_bytes);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/record/rec_layer_s3.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/record/rec_layer_s3.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1ffc120
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/record/rec_layer_s3.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1549 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#define USE_SOCKETS
+#include "../ssl_locl.h"
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include "record_locl.h"
+
+#if     defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \
+        !(      defined(AES_ASM) &&     ( \
+                defined(__x86_64)       || defined(__x86_64__)  || \
+                defined(_M_AMD64)       || defined(_M_X64)      ) \
+        )
+# undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
+# define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
+#endif
+
+void RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL *s)
+{
+    rl->s = s;
+    RECORD_LAYER_set_first_record(&s->rlayer);
+    SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
+}
+
+void RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
+{
+    rl->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
+
+    /*
+     * Do I need to clear read_ahead? As far as I can tell read_ahead did not
+     * previously get reset by SSL_clear...so I'll keep it that way..but is
+     * that right?
+     */
+
+    rl->packet = NULL;
+    rl->packet_length = 0;
+    rl->wnum = 0;
+    memset(rl->alert_fragment, 0, sizeof(rl->alert_fragment));
+    rl->alert_fragment_len = 0;
+    memset(rl->handshake_fragment, 0, sizeof(rl->handshake_fragment));
+    rl->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
+    rl->wpend_tot = 0;
+    rl->wpend_type = 0;
+    rl->wpend_ret = 0;
+    rl->wpend_buf = NULL;
+
+    SSL3_BUFFER_clear(&rl->rbuf);
+    ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s);
+    rl->numrpipes = 0;
+    SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
+
+    RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(rl);
+    RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(rl);
+
+    if (rl->d)
+        DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl);
+}
+
+void RECORD_LAYER_release(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
+{
+    if (SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl->rbuf))
+        ssl3_release_read_buffer(rl->s);
+    if (rl->numwpipes > 0)
+        ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s);
+    SSL3_RECORD_release(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
+}
+
+/* Checks if we have unprocessed read ahead data pending */
+int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
+{
+    return SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->rbuf) != 0;
+}
+
+/* Checks if we have decrypted unread record data pending */
+int RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
+{
+    size_t curr_rec = 0, num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(rl);
+    const SSL3_RECORD *rr = rl->rrec;
+
+    while (curr_rec < num_recs && SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr[curr_rec]))
+        curr_rec++;
+
+    return curr_rec < num_recs;
+}
+
+int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
+{
+    return (rl->numwpipes > 0)
+        && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->wbuf[rl->numwpipes - 1]) != 0;
+}
+
+int RECORD_LAYER_set_data(RECORD_LAYER *rl, const unsigned char *buf, int len)
+{
+    rl->packet_length = len;
+    if (len != 0) {
+        rl->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
+        if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl->rbuf))
+            if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(rl->s))
+                return 0;
+    }
+
+    rl->packet = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&rl->rbuf);
+    SSL3_BUFFER_set_data(&rl->rbuf, buf, len);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+void RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
+{
+    memset(rl->read_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->read_sequence));
+}
+
+void RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
+{
+    memset(rl->write_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->write_sequence));
+}
+
+int ssl3_pending(const SSL *s)
+{
+    unsigned int i;
+    int num = 0;
+
+    if (s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)
+        return 0;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer); i++) {
+        if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(&s->rlayer.rrec[i])
+            != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
+            return 0;
+        num += SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&s->rlayer.rrec[i]);
+    }
+
+    return num;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t len)
+{
+    ctx->default_read_buf_len = len;
+}
+
+void SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL *s, size_t len)
+{
+    SSL3_BUFFER_set_default_len(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer), len);
+}
+
+const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL *s)
+{
+    switch (s->rlayer.rstate) {
+    case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER:
+        return "read header";
+    case SSL_ST_READ_BODY:
+        return "read body";
+    case SSL_ST_READ_DONE:
+        return "read done";
+    default:
+        return "unknown";
+    }
+}
+
+const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL *s)
+{
+    switch (s->rlayer.rstate) {
+    case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER:
+        return "RH";
+    case SSL_ST_READ_BODY:
+        return "RB";
+    case SSL_ST_READ_DONE:
+        return "RD";
+    default:
+        return "unknown";
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return values are as per SSL_read()
+ */
+int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend, int clearold)
+{
+    /*
+     * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
+     * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of
+     * s->s3->rbuf.buf specified by s->packet and s->packet_length. (If
+     * s->rlayer.read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf [plus
+     * s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
+     * if clearold == 1, move the packet to the start of the buffer; if
+     * clearold == 0 then leave any old packets where they were
+     */
+    int i, len, left;
+    size_t align = 0;
+    unsigned char *pkt;
+    SSL3_BUFFER *rb;
+
+    if (n <= 0)
+        return n;
+
+    rb = &s->rlayer.rbuf;
+    if (rb->buf == NULL)
+        if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
+            return -1;
+
+    left = rb->left;
+#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
+    align = (size_t)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+    align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
+#endif
+
+    if (!extend) {
+        /* start with empty packet ... */
+        if (left == 0)
+            rb->offset = align;
+        else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
+            /*
+             * check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload
+             * alignment...
+             */
+            pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
+            if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
+                && (pkt[3] << 8 | pkt[4]) >= 128) {
+                /*
+                 * Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field
+                 * is insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about
+                 * whether memmove will occur or not. Header values has no
+                 * effect on memmove arguments and therefore no buffer
+                 * overrun can be triggered.
+                 */
+                memmove(rb->buf + align, pkt, left);
+                rb->offset = align;
+            }
+        }
+        s->rlayer.packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
+        s->rlayer.packet_length = 0;
+        /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
+    }
+
+    len = s->rlayer.packet_length;
+    pkt = rb->buf + align;
+    /*
+     * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already
+     * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end
+     */
+    if (s->rlayer.packet != pkt && clearold == 1) {
+        memmove(pkt, s->rlayer.packet, len + left);
+        s->rlayer.packet = pkt;
+        rb->offset = len + align;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read
+     * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into
+     * the buffer).
+     */
+    if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+        if (left == 0 && extend)
+            return 0;
+        if (left > 0 && n > left)
+            n = left;
+    }
+
+    /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
+    if (left >= n) {
+        s->rlayer.packet_length += n;
+        rb->left = left - n;
+        rb->offset += n;
+        return (n);
+    }
+
+    /* else we need to read more data */
+
+    if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) { /* does not happen */
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    /* We always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS */
+    if (!s->rlayer.read_ahead && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
+        /* ignore max parameter */
+        max = n;
+    else {
+        if (max < n)
+            max = n;
+        if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset))
+            max = rb->len - rb->offset;
+    }
+
+    while (left < n) {
+        /*
+         * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and
+         * need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if
+         * possible)
+         */
+
+        clear_sys_error();
+        if (s->rbio != NULL) {
+            s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
+            i = BIO_read(s->rbio, pkt + len + left, max - left);
+        } else {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
+            i = -1;
+        }
+
+        if (i <= 0) {
+            rb->left = left;
+            if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
+                if (len + left == 0)
+                    ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
+            return i;
+        }
+        left += i;
+        /*
+         * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the
+         * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to
+         * byte oriented as in the TLS case.
+         */
+        if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+            if (n > left)
+                n = left;       /* makes the while condition false */
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
+    rb->offset += n;
+    rb->left = left - n;
+    s->rlayer.packet_length += n;
+    s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+    return (n);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
+ * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
+ */
+int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
+{
+    const unsigned char *buf = buf_;
+    int tot;
+    unsigned int n, split_send_fragment, maxpipes;
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
+    unsigned int max_send_fragment, nw;
+    unsigned int u_len = (unsigned int)len;
+#endif
+    SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
+    int i;
+
+    if (len < 0) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_NEGATIVE_LENGTH);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+    tot = s->rlayer.wnum;
+    /*
+     * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out
+     * than the the original len from a write which didn't complete for
+     * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for
+     * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be
+     * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then
+     * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and
+     * report the error in a way the user will notice
+     */
+    if (((unsigned int)len < s->rlayer.wnum) 
+        || ((wb->left != 0) && ((unsigned int)len < (s->rlayer.wnum + s->rlayer.wpend_tot)))) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    s->rlayer.wnum = 0;
+
+    if (SSL_in_init(s) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
+        i = s->handshake_func(s);
+        if (i < 0)
+            return (i);
+        if (i == 0) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+            return -1;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out.  This
+     * will happen with non blocking IO
+     */
+    if (wb->left != 0) {
+        i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], s->rlayer.wpend_tot);
+        if (i <= 0) {
+            /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
+            s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
+            return i;
+        }
+        tot += i;               /* this might be last fragment */
+    }
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
+    /*
+     * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times*
+     * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate
+     * jumbo buffer to accommodate up to 8 records, but the
+     * compromise is considered worthy.
+     */
+    if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
+        u_len >= 4 * (max_send_fragment = s->max_send_fragment) &&
+        s->compress == NULL && s->msg_callback == NULL &&
+        !SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) &&
+        EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx)) &
+        EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK) {
+        unsigned char aad[13];
+        EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param;
+        int packlen;
+
+        /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */
+        if ((max_send_fragment & 0xfff) == 0)
+            max_send_fragment -= 512;
+
+        if (tot == 0 || wb->buf == NULL) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */
+            ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
+
+            packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
+                                          EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE,
+                                          max_send_fragment, NULL);
+
+            if (u_len >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
+                packlen *= 8;
+            else
+                packlen *= 4;
+
+            if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, 1, packlen)) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                return -1;
+            }
+        } else if (tot == len) { /* done? */
+            /* free jumbo buffer */
+            ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
+            return tot;
+        }
+
+        n = (len - tot);
+        for (;;) {
+            if (n < 4 * max_send_fragment) {
+                /* free jumbo buffer */
+                ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
+                break;
+            }
+
+            if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
+                i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
+                if (i <= 0) {
+                    s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
+                    return i;
+                }
+            }
+
+            if (n >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
+                nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 8);
+            else
+                nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 4);
+
+            memcpy(aad, s->rlayer.write_sequence, 8);
+            aad[8] = type;
+            aad[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8);
+            aad[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version);
+            aad[11] = 0;
+            aad[12] = 0;
+            mb_param.out = NULL;
+            mb_param.inp = aad;
+            mb_param.len = nw;
+
+            packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
+                                          EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD,
+                                          sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param);
+
+            if (packlen <= 0 || packlen > (int)wb->len) { /* never happens */
+                /* free jumbo buffer */
+                ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
+                break;
+            }
+
+            mb_param.out = wb->buf;
+            mb_param.inp = &buf[tot];
+            mb_param.len = nw;
+
+            if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
+                                    EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT,
+                                    sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param) <= 0)
+                return -1;
+
+            s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave;
+            if (s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave) {
+                int j = 6;
+                while (j >= 0 && (++s->rlayer.write_sequence[j--]) == 0) ;
+            }
+
+            wb->offset = 0;
+            wb->left = packlen;
+
+            s->rlayer.wpend_tot = nw;
+            s->rlayer.wpend_buf = &buf[tot];
+            s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
+            s->rlayer.wpend_ret = nw;
+
+            i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], nw);
+            if (i <= 0) {
+                if (i < 0 && (!s->wbio || !BIO_should_retry(s->wbio))) {
+                    /* free jumbo buffer */
+                    ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
+                }
+                s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
+                return i;
+            }
+            if (i == (int)n) {
+                /* free jumbo buffer */
+                ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
+                return tot + i;
+            }
+            n -= i;
+            tot += i;
+        }
+    } else
+#endif
+    if (tot == len) {           /* done? */
+        if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
+            ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
+
+        return tot;
+    }
+
+    n = (len - tot);
+
+    split_send_fragment = s->split_send_fragment;
+    /*
+     * If max_pipelines is 0 then this means "undefined" and we default to
+     * 1 pipeline. Similarly if the cipher does not support pipelined
+     * processing then we also only use 1 pipeline, or if we're not using
+     * explicit IVs
+     */
+    maxpipes = s->max_pipelines;
+    if (maxpipes > SSL_MAX_PIPELINES) {
+        /*
+         * We should have prevented this when we set max_pipelines so we
+         * shouldn't get here
+         */
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return -1;
+    }
+    if (maxpipes == 0
+        || s->enc_write_ctx == NULL
+        || !(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx))
+             & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE)
+        || !SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s))
+        maxpipes = 1;
+    if (s->max_send_fragment == 0 || split_send_fragment > s->max_send_fragment
+        || split_send_fragment == 0) {
+        /*
+         * We should have prevented this when we set the split and max send
+         * fragments so we shouldn't get here
+         */
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    for (;;) {
+        unsigned int pipelens[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES], tmppipelen, remain;
+        unsigned int numpipes, j;
+
+        if (n == 0)
+            numpipes = 1;
+        else
+            numpipes = ((n - 1) / split_send_fragment) + 1;
+        if (numpipes > maxpipes)
+            numpipes = maxpipes;
+
+        if (n / numpipes >= s->max_send_fragment) {
+            /*
+             * We have enough data to completely fill all available
+             * pipelines
+             */
+            for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
+                pipelens[j] = s->max_send_fragment;
+            }
+        } else {
+            /* We can partially fill all available pipelines */
+            tmppipelen = n / numpipes;
+            remain = n % numpipes;
+            for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
+                pipelens[j] = tmppipelen;
+                if (j < remain)
+                    pipelens[j]++;
+            }
+        }
+
+        i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), pipelens, numpipes, 0);
+        if (i <= 0) {
+            /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
+            s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
+            return i;
+        }
+
+        if ((i == (int)n) ||
+            (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
+             (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) {
+            /*
+             * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
+             * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness:
+             */
+            s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
+
+            if ((i == (int)n) && s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
+                !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
+                ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
+
+            return tot + i;
+        }
+
+        n -= i;
+        tot += i;
+    }
+}
+
+int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
+                  unsigned int *pipelens, unsigned int numpipes,
+                  int create_empty_fragment)
+{
+    unsigned char *outbuf[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES], *plen[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
+    SSL3_RECORD wr[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
+    int i, mac_size, clear = 0;
+    int prefix_len = 0;
+    int eivlen;
+    size_t align = 0;
+    SSL3_BUFFER *wb;
+    SSL_SESSION *sess;
+    unsigned int totlen = 0;
+    unsigned int j;
+
+    for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++)
+        totlen += pipelens[j];
+    /*
+     * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out.  This
+     * will happen with non blocking IO
+     */
+    if (RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(&s->rlayer))
+        return (ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen));
+
+    /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
+    if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
+        i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
+        if (i <= 0)
+            return (i);
+        /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
+    }
+
+    if (s->rlayer.numwpipes < numpipes)
+        if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, numpipes, 0))
+            return -1;
+
+    if (totlen == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
+        return 0;
+
+    sess = s->session;
+
+    if ((sess == NULL) ||
+        (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) {
+        clear = s->enc_write_ctx ? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
+        mac_size = 0;
+    } else {
+        mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
+        if (mac_size < 0)
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself
+     */
+    if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done) {
+        /*
+         * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see
+         * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
+         */
+
+        if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
+            /*
+             * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this
+             * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these
+             * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual
+             * payload)
+             */
+            unsigned int tmppipelen = 0;
+
+            prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, &tmppipelen, 1, 1);
+            if (prefix_len <= 0)
+                goto err;
+
+            if (prefix_len >
+                (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD)) {
+                /* insufficient space */
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                goto err;
+            }
+        }
+
+        s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
+    }
+
+    if (create_empty_fragment) {
+        wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
+#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
+        /*
+         * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be
+         * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real
+         * payload, then we can just pretend we simply have two headers.
+         */
+        align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+        align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
+#endif
+        outbuf[0] = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + align;
+        SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align);
+    } else if (prefix_len) {
+        wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
+        outbuf[0] = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(wb)
+            + prefix_len;
+    } else {
+        for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
+            wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[j];
+#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
+            align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+            align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
+#endif
+            outbuf[j] = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + align;
+            SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align);
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
+    if (s->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) {
+        int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
+        if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
+            eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
+            if (eivlen <= 1)
+                eivlen = 0;
+        }
+        /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
+        else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
+            eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+        else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE)
+            eivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+        else
+            eivlen = 0;
+    } else
+        eivlen = 0;
+
+    totlen = 0;
+    /* Clear our SSL3_RECORD structures */
+    memset(wr, 0, sizeof(wr));
+    for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
+        /* write the header */
+        *(outbuf[j]++) = type & 0xff;
+        SSL3_RECORD_set_type(&wr[j], type);
+
+        *(outbuf[j]++) = (s->version >> 8);
+        /*
+         * Some servers hang if initial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
+         * and record version number > TLS 1.0
+         */
+        if (SSL_get_state(s) == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
+            && !s->renegotiate && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION)
+            *(outbuf[j]++) = 0x1;
+        else
+            *(outbuf[j]++) = s->version & 0xff;
+
+        /* field where we are to write out packet length */
+        plen[j] = outbuf[j];
+        outbuf[j] += 2;
+
+        /* lets setup the record stuff. */
+        SSL3_RECORD_set_data(&wr[j], outbuf[j] + eivlen);
+        SSL3_RECORD_set_length(&wr[j], (int)pipelens[j]);
+        SSL3_RECORD_set_input(&wr[j], (unsigned char *)&buf[totlen]);
+        totlen += pipelens[j];
+
+        /*
+         * we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into wr->data
+         */
+
+        /* first we compress */
+        if (s->compress != NULL) {
+            if (!ssl3_do_compress(s, &wr[j])) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
+                goto err;
+            }
+        } else {
+            memcpy(wr[j].data, wr[j].input, wr[j].length);
+            SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr[j]);
+        }
+
+        /*
+         * we should still have the output to wr->data and the input from
+         * wr->input.  Length should be wr->length. wr->data still points in the
+         * wb->buf
+         */
+
+        if (!SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
+            if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &wr[j],
+                                         &(outbuf[j][wr[j].length + eivlen]),
+                                         1) < 0)
+                goto err;
+            SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr[j], mac_size);
+        }
+
+        SSL3_RECORD_set_data(&wr[j], outbuf[j]);
+        SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr[j]);
+
+        if (eivlen) {
+            /*
+             * if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0) goto err;
+             */
+            SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr[j], eivlen);
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, wr, numpipes, 1) < 1)
+        goto err;
+
+    for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
+        if (SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
+            if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &wr[j],
+                                         outbuf[j] + wr[j].length, 1) < 0)
+                goto err;
+            SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr[j], mac_size);
+        }
+
+        /* record length after mac and block padding */
+        s2n(SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr[j]), plen[j]);
+
+        if (s->msg_callback)
+            s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, plen[j] - 5, 5, s,
+                            s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+        /*
+         * we should now have wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
+         * wr->length long
+         */
+        SSL3_RECORD_set_type(&wr[j], type); /* not needed but helps for
+                                             * debugging */
+        SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr[j], SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
+
+        if (create_empty_fragment) {
+            /*
+             * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
+             * out anything here
+             */
+            if (j > 0) {
+                /* We should never be pipelining an empty fragment!! */
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            return SSL3_RECORD_get_length(wr);
+        }
+
+        /* now let's set up wb */
+        SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&s->rlayer.wbuf[j],
+                             prefix_len + SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr[j]));
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
+     * retries later
+     */
+    s->rlayer.wpend_tot = totlen;
+    s->rlayer.wpend_buf = buf;
+    s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
+    s->rlayer.wpend_ret = totlen;
+
+    /* we now just need to write the buffer */
+    return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen);
+ err:
+    return -1;
+}
+
+/* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this
+ *
+ * Return values are as per SSL_write()
+ */
+int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
+                       unsigned int len)
+{
+    int i;
+    SSL3_BUFFER *wb = s->rlayer.wbuf;
+    unsigned int currbuf = 0;
+
+    if ((s->rlayer.wpend_tot > (int)len)
+        || (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER)
+            && (s->rlayer.wpend_buf != buf))
+        || (s->rlayer.wpend_type != type)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
+        return (-1);
+    }
+
+    for (;;) {
+        /* Loop until we find a buffer we haven't written out yet */
+        if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf]) == 0
+            && currbuf < s->rlayer.numwpipes - 1) {
+            currbuf++;
+            continue;
+        }
+        clear_sys_error();
+        if (s->wbio != NULL) {
+            s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
+            i = BIO_write(s->wbio, (char *)
+                          &(SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&wb[currbuf])
+                            [SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(&wb[currbuf])]),
+                          (unsigned int)SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf]));
+        } else {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
+            i = -1;
+        }
+        if (i == SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf])) {
+            SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0);
+            SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], i);
+            if (currbuf + 1 < s->rlayer.numwpipes)
+                continue;
+            s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+            return (s->rlayer.wpend_ret);
+        } else if (i <= 0) {
+            if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+                /*
+                 * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in
+                 * using a datagram service
+                 */
+                SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0);
+            }
+            return i;
+        }
+        SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], i);
+        SSL3_BUFFER_add_left(&wb[currbuf], -i);
+    }
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
+ * 'type' is one of the following:
+ *
+ *   -  SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
+ *   -  SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
+ *   -  0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
+ *
+ * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
+ * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
+ *
+ * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
+ * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec
+ * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recd_type|
+ * argument is non NULL.
+ * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
+ * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
+ * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
+ *     Change cipher spec protocol
+ *             just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
+ *     Alert protocol
+ *             2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
+ *     Handshake protocol
+ *             4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
+ *             to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
+ *             here, anything else is handled by higher layers
+ *     Application data protocol
+ *             none of our business
+ */
+int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf,
+                    int len, int peek)
+{
+    int al, i, j, ret;
+    unsigned int n, curr_rec, num_recs, read_bytes;
+    SSL3_RECORD *rr;
+    SSL3_BUFFER *rbuf;
+    void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
+
+    rbuf = &s->rlayer.rbuf;
+
+    if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(rbuf)) {
+        /* Not initialized yet */
+        if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
+            return (-1);
+    }
+
+    if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
+         && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) || (peek
+                                             && (type !=
+                                                 SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0))
+        /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
+    {
+        unsigned char *src = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
+        unsigned char *dst = buf;
+        unsigned int k;
+
+        /* peek == 0 */
+        n = 0;
+        while ((len > 0) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0)) {
+            *dst++ = *src++;
+            len--;
+            s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len--;
+            n++;
+        }
+        /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
+        for (k = 0; k < s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len; k++)
+            s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
+
+        if (recvd_type != NULL)
+            *recvd_type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
+
+        return n;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Now s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
+     */
+
+    if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) && SSL_in_init(s)) {
+        /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
+        i = s->handshake_func(s);
+        if (i < 0)
+            return (i);
+        if (i == 0) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+            return (-1);
+        }
+    }
+ start:
+    s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+
+    /*-
+     * For each record 'i' up to |num_recs]
+     * rr[i].type     - is the type of record
+     * rr[i].data,    - data
+     * rr[i].off,     - offset into 'data' for next read
+     * rr[i].length,  - number of bytes.
+     */
+    rr = s->rlayer.rrec;
+    num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer);
+
+    do {
+        /* get new records if necessary */
+        if (num_recs == 0) {
+            ret = ssl3_get_record(s);
+            if (ret <= 0)
+                return (ret);
+            num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer);
+            if (num_recs == 0) {
+                /* Shouldn't happen */
+                al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                goto f_err;
+            }
+        }
+        /* Skip over any records we have already read */
+        for (curr_rec = 0;
+             curr_rec < num_recs && SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr[curr_rec]);
+             curr_rec++) ;
+        if (curr_rec == num_recs) {
+            RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, 0);
+            num_recs = 0;
+            curr_rec = 0;
+        }
+    } while (num_recs == 0);
+    rr = &rr[curr_rec];
+
+    /*
+     * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty
+     * record that isn't an alert.
+     */
+    if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_ALERT
+            && SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) != 0)
+        s->rlayer.alert_count = 0;
+
+    /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
+
+    if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
+                                   * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
+        && (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) {
+        al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
+     * 'peek' mode)
+     */
+    if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
+        SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
+        s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+        return (0);
+    }
+
+    if (type == SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)
+        || (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
+            && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && recvd_type != NULL)) {
+        /*
+         * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
+         * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
+         * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
+         */
+        /*
+         * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
+         * doing a handshake for the first time
+         */
+        if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
+            (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) {
+            al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+
+        if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
+            && SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
+            && s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0) {
+            al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+
+        if (recvd_type != NULL)
+            *recvd_type = SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr);
+
+        if (len <= 0) {
+            /*
+             * Mark a zero length record as read. This ensures multiple calls to
+             * SSL_read() with a zero length buffer will eventually cause
+             * SSL_pending() to report data as being available.
+             */
+            if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0)
+                SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
+            return len;
+        }
+
+        read_bytes = 0;
+        do {
+            if ((unsigned int)len - read_bytes > SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))
+                n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr);
+            else
+                n = (unsigned int)len - read_bytes;
+
+            memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n);
+            buf += n;
+            if (peek) {
+                /* Mark any zero length record as consumed CVE-2016-6305 */
+                if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0)
+                    SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
+            } else {
+                SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr, n);
+                SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, n);
+                if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) {
+                    s->rlayer.rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
+                    SSL3_RECORD_set_off(rr, 0);
+                    SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
+                }
+            }
+            if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0
+                || (peek && n == SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))) {
+                curr_rec++;
+                rr++;
+            }
+            read_bytes += n;
+        } while (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && curr_rec < num_recs
+                 && read_bytes < (unsigned int)len);
+        if (read_bytes == 0) {
+            /* We must have read empty records. Get more data */
+            goto start;
+        }
+        if (!peek && curr_rec == num_recs
+            && (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS)
+            && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0)
+            ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
+        return read_bytes;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
+     * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello) or invalid (we
+     * were actually expecting a CCS).
+     */
+
+    /*
+     * Lets just double check that we've not got an SSLv2 record
+     */
+    if (rr->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) {
+        /*
+         * Should never happen. ssl3_get_record() should only give us an SSLv2
+         * record back if this is the first packet and we are looking for an
+         * initial ClientHello. Therefore |type| should always be equal to
+         * |rr->type|. If not then something has gone horribly wrong
+         */
+        al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION
+        && (s->server || rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) {
+        /*
+         * If we've got this far and still haven't decided on what version
+         * we're using then this must be a client side alert we're dealing with
+         * (we don't allow heartbeats yet). We shouldn't be receiving anything
+         * other than a ClientHello if we are a server.
+         */
+        s->version = rr->rec_version;
+        al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill
+     * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
+     */
+    {
+        unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0;
+        unsigned char *dest = NULL;
+        unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
+
+        if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
+            dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->rlayer.handshake_fragment);
+            dest = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
+            dest_len = &s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len;
+        } else if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
+            dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->rlayer.alert_fragment);
+            dest = s->rlayer.alert_fragment;
+            dest_len = &s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len;
+        }
+
+        if (dest_maxlen > 0) {
+            n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
+            if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) < n)
+                n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr); /* available bytes */
+
+            /* now move 'n' bytes: */
+            while (n-- > 0) {
+                dest[(*dest_len)++] =
+                    SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr)[SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr)];
+                SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, 1);
+                SSL3_RECORD_add_length(rr, -1);
+            }
+
+            if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen) {
+                SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
+                goto start;     /* fragment was too small */
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    /*-
+     * s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 4  iff  rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
+     * s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len == 2      iff  rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
+     * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
+     */
+
+    /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
+    if ((!s->server) &&
+        (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
+        (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
+        (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) {
+        s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len = 0;
+
+        if ((s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
+            (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
+            (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) {
+            al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+
+        if (s->msg_callback)
+            s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
+                            s->rlayer.handshake_fragment, 4, s,
+                            s->msg_callback_arg);
+        if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
+            (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION) == 0 &&
+            !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
+            !s->s3->renegotiate) {
+            ssl3_renegotiate(s);
+            if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) {
+                i = s->handshake_func(s);
+                if (i < 0)
+                    return (i);
+                if (i == 0) {
+                    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+                    return (-1);
+                }
+
+                if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
+                    if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0) {
+                        /* no read-ahead left? */
+                        BIO *bio;
+                        /*
+                         * In the case where we try to read application data,
+                         * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
+                         * the retry option set.  Otherwise renegotiation may
+                         * cause nasty problems in the blocking world
+                         */
+                        s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
+                        bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
+                        BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
+                        BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
+                        return (-1);
+                    }
+                }
+            } else {
+                SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
+            }
+        } else {
+            ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
+            SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
+        }
+        /*
+         * we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, now try
+         * again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for
+         */
+        goto start;
+    }
+    /*
+     * If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
+     * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on.
+     */
+    if (s->server
+            && SSL_is_init_finished(s)
+            && s->version > SSL3_VERSION
+            && s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
+            && s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
+            && s->s3->previous_client_finished_len != 0
+            && ((!s->s3->send_connection_binding
+                    && (s->options
+                        & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION) == 0)
+                || (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION) != 0)) {
+        SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
+        SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
+        ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
+        goto start;
+    }
+    if (s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len >= 2) {
+        int alert_level = s->rlayer.alert_fragment[0];
+        int alert_descr = s->rlayer.alert_fragment[1];
+
+        s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len = 0;
+
+        if (s->msg_callback)
+            s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
+                            s->rlayer.alert_fragment, 2, s,
+                            s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+        if (s->info_callback != NULL)
+            cb = s->info_callback;
+        else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
+            cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
+
+        if (cb != NULL) {
+            j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
+            cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
+        }
+
+        if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
+            s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
+            SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
+
+            s->rlayer.alert_count++;
+            if (s->rlayer.alert_count == MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT) {
+                al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS);
+                goto f_err;
+            }
+
+            if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
+                s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
+                return (0);
+            }
+            /*
+             * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
+             * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
+             * alert because if application tried to renegotiate it
+             * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
+             * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
+             * the peer refused it where we carry on.
+             */
+            else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) {
+                al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
+                goto f_err;
+            }
+#ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
+            else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME)
+                return (0);
+#endif
+        } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
+            char tmp[16];
+
+            s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+            s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
+            BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof(tmp), "%d", alert_descr);
+            ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp);
+            s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
+            SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
+            SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
+            return (0);
+        } else {
+            al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+
+        goto start;
+    }
+
+    if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { /* but we have not received a
+                                            * shutdown */
+        s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+        SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
+        SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
+        return (0);
+    }
+
+    if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
+        al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation)
+     */
+    if ((s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4)
+        && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
+        if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
+            !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) {
+            ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
+            s->renegotiate = 1;
+            s->new_session = 1;
+        }
+        i = s->handshake_func(s);
+        if (i < 0)
+            return (i);
+        if (i == 0) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+            return (-1);
+        }
+
+        if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
+            if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0) {
+                /* no read-ahead left? */
+                BIO *bio;
+                /*
+                 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
+                 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
+                 * option set.  Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
+                 * problems in the blocking world
+                 */
+                s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
+                bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
+                BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
+                BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
+                return (-1);
+            }
+        }
+        goto start;
+    }
+
+    switch (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)) {
+    default:
+        /*
+         * TLS 1.0 and 1.1 say you SHOULD ignore unrecognised record types, but
+         * TLS 1.2 says you MUST send an unexpected message alert. We use the
+         * TLS 1.2 behaviour for all protocol versions to prevent issues where
+         * no progress is being made and the peer continually sends unrecognised
+         * record types, using up resources processing them.
+         */
+        al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
+        goto f_err;
+    case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
+    case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
+    case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
+        /*
+         * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
+         * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but
+         * that should not happen when type != rr->type
+         */
+        al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        goto f_err;
+    case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
+        /*
+         * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
+         * application data.  If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
+         * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
+         * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
+         * started), we will indulge it.
+         */
+        if (ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s)) {
+            s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
+            return (-1);
+        } else {
+            al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+    }
+    /* not reached */
+
+ f_err:
+    ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+    return (-1);
+}
+
+void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) {
+        ++seq[i];
+        if (seq[i] != 0)
+            break;
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns true if the current rrec was sent in SSLv2 backwards compatible
+ * format and false otherwise.
+ */
+int RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
+{
+    return SSL3_RECORD_is_sslv2_record(&rl->rrec[0]);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length in bytes of the current rrec
+ */
+unsigned int RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
+{
+    return SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&rl->rrec[0]);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/record/record.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/record/record.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9bb2431
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/record/record.h
@@ -0,0 +1,243 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*****************************************************************************
+ *                                                                           *
+ * These structures should be considered PRIVATE to the record layer. No     *
+ * non-record layer code should be using these structures in any way.        *
+ *                                                                           *
+ *****************************************************************************/
+
+typedef struct ssl3_buffer_st {
+    /* at least SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE bytes, see ssl3_setup_buffers() */
+    unsigned char *buf;
+    /* default buffer size (or 0 if no default set) */
+    size_t default_len;
+    /* buffer size */
+    size_t len;
+    /* where to 'copy from' */
+    int offset;
+    /* how many bytes left */
+    int left;
+} SSL3_BUFFER;
+
+#define SEQ_NUM_SIZE                            8
+
+typedef struct ssl3_record_st {
+    /* Record layer version */
+    /* r */
+    int rec_version;
+    /* type of record */
+    /* r */
+    int type;
+    /* How many bytes available */
+    /* rw */
+    unsigned int length;
+    /*
+     * How many bytes were available before padding was removed? This is used
+     * to implement the MAC check in constant time for CBC records.
+     */
+    /* rw */
+    unsigned int orig_len;
+    /* read/write offset into 'buf' */
+    /* r */
+    unsigned int off;
+    /* pointer to the record data */
+    /* rw */
+    unsigned char *data;
+    /* where the decode bytes are */
+    /* rw */
+    unsigned char *input;
+    /* only used with decompression - malloc()ed */
+    /* r */
+    unsigned char *comp;
+    /* Whether the data from this record has already been read or not */
+    /* r */
+    unsigned int read;
+    /* epoch number, needed by DTLS1 */
+    /* r */
+    unsigned long epoch;
+    /* sequence number, needed by DTLS1 */
+    /* r */
+    unsigned char seq_num[SEQ_NUM_SIZE];
+} SSL3_RECORD;
+
+typedef struct dtls1_bitmap_st {
+    /* Track 32 packets on 32-bit systems and 64 - on 64-bit systems */
+    unsigned long map;
+    /* Max record number seen so far, 64-bit value in big-endian encoding */
+    unsigned char max_seq_num[SEQ_NUM_SIZE];
+} DTLS1_BITMAP;
+
+typedef struct record_pqueue_st {
+    unsigned short epoch;
+    struct pqueue_st *q;
+} record_pqueue;
+
+typedef struct dtls1_record_data_st {
+    unsigned char *packet;
+    unsigned int packet_length;
+    SSL3_BUFFER rbuf;
+    SSL3_RECORD rrec;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+    struct bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo recordinfo;
+#endif
+} DTLS1_RECORD_DATA;
+
+typedef struct dtls_record_layer_st {
+    /*
+     * The current data and handshake epoch.  This is initially
+     * undefined, and starts at zero once the initial handshake is
+     * completed
+     */
+    unsigned short r_epoch;
+    unsigned short w_epoch;
+    /* records being received in the current epoch */
+    DTLS1_BITMAP bitmap;
+    /* renegotiation starts a new set of sequence numbers */
+    DTLS1_BITMAP next_bitmap;
+    /* Received handshake records (processed and unprocessed) */
+    record_pqueue unprocessed_rcds;
+    record_pqueue processed_rcds;
+    /*
+     * Buffered application records. Only for records between CCS and
+     * Finished to prevent either protocol violation or unnecessary message
+     * loss.
+     */
+    record_pqueue buffered_app_data;
+    /*
+     * storage for Alert/Handshake protocol data received but not yet
+     * processed by ssl3_read_bytes:
+     */
+    unsigned char alert_fragment[DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH];
+    unsigned int alert_fragment_len;
+    unsigned char handshake_fragment[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH];
+    unsigned int handshake_fragment_len;
+    /* save last and current sequence numbers for retransmissions */
+    unsigned char last_write_sequence[8];
+    unsigned char curr_write_sequence[8];
+} DTLS_RECORD_LAYER;
+
+/*****************************************************************************
+ *                                                                           *
+ * This structure should be considered "opaque" to anything outside of the   *
+ * record layer. No non-record layer code should be accessing the members of *
+ * this structure.                                                           *
+ *                                                                           *
+ *****************************************************************************/
+
+typedef struct record_layer_st {
+    /* The parent SSL structure */
+    SSL *s;
+    /*
+     * Read as many input bytes as possible (for
+     * non-blocking reads)
+     */
+    int read_ahead;
+    /* where we are when reading */
+    int rstate;
+    /* How many pipelines can be used to read data */
+    unsigned int numrpipes;
+    /* How many pipelines can be used to write data */
+    unsigned int numwpipes;
+    /* read IO goes into here */
+    SSL3_BUFFER rbuf;
+    /* write IO goes into here */
+    SSL3_BUFFER wbuf[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
+    /* each decoded record goes in here */
+    SSL3_RECORD rrec[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
+    /* used internally to point at a raw packet */
+    unsigned char *packet;
+    unsigned int packet_length;
+    /* number of bytes sent so far */
+    unsigned int wnum;
+    /*
+     * storage for Alert/Handshake protocol data received but not yet
+     * processed by ssl3_read_bytes:
+     */
+    unsigned char alert_fragment[2];
+    unsigned int alert_fragment_len;
+    unsigned char handshake_fragment[4];
+    unsigned int handshake_fragment_len;
+    /* The number of consecutive empty records we have received */
+    unsigned int empty_record_count;
+    /* partial write - check the numbers match */
+    /* number bytes written */
+    int wpend_tot;
+    int wpend_type;
+    /* number of bytes submitted */
+    int wpend_ret;
+    const unsigned char *wpend_buf;
+    unsigned char read_sequence[SEQ_NUM_SIZE];
+    unsigned char write_sequence[SEQ_NUM_SIZE];
+    /* Set to true if this is the first record in a connection */
+    unsigned int is_first_record;
+    /* Count of the number of consecutive warning alerts received */
+    unsigned int alert_count;
+    DTLS_RECORD_LAYER *d;
+} RECORD_LAYER;
+
+/*****************************************************************************
+ *                                                                           *
+ * The following macros/functions represent the libssl internal API to the   *
+ * record layer. Any libssl code may call these functions/macros             *
+ *                                                                           *
+ *****************************************************************************/
+
+#define MIN_SSL2_RECORD_LEN     9
+
+#define RECORD_LAYER_set_read_ahead(rl, ra)     ((rl)->read_ahead = (ra))
+#define RECORD_LAYER_get_read_ahead(rl)         ((rl)->read_ahead)
+#define RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(rl)             ((rl)->packet)
+#define RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(rl)      ((rl)->packet_length)
+#define RECORD_LAYER_add_packet_length(rl, inc) ((rl)->packet_length += (inc))
+#define DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_w_epoch(rl)       ((rl)->d->w_epoch)
+#define DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_processed_rcds(rl) \
+                                                ((rl)->d->processed_rcds)
+#define DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_unprocessed_rcds(rl) \
+                                                ((rl)->d->unprocessed_rcds)
+
+void RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL *s);
+void RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl);
+void RECORD_LAYER_release(RECORD_LAYER *rl);
+int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl);
+int RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl);
+int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl);
+int RECORD_LAYER_set_data(RECORD_LAYER *rl, const unsigned char *buf, int len);
+void RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl);
+void RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl);
+int RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER *rl);
+unsigned int RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(RECORD_LAYER *rl);
+__owur int ssl3_pending(const SSL *s);
+__owur int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len);
+__owur int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
+                         unsigned int *pipelens, unsigned int numpipes,
+                         int create_empty_fragment);
+__owur int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type,
+                           unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek);
+__owur int ssl3_setup_buffers(SSL *s);
+__owur int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *inrecs, unsigned int n_recs, int send);
+__owur int n_ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int send);
+__owur int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
+                              unsigned int len);
+__owur int tls1_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *recs, unsigned int n_recs, int send);
+__owur int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int send);
+int DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_new(RECORD_LAYER *rl);
+void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_free(RECORD_LAYER *rl);
+void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl);
+void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_set_saved_w_epoch(RECORD_LAYER *rl, unsigned short e);
+void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl);
+void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_resync_write(RECORD_LAYER *rl);
+void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_set_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl, unsigned char *seq);
+__owur int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type,
+                            unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek);
+__owur int dtls1_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len);
+__owur int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
+                          unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragement);
+void dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(SSL *s, int rw);
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/record/record_locl.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/record/record_locl.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b69afd8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/record/record_locl.h
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*****************************************************************************
+ *                                                                           *
+ * The following macros/functions are PRIVATE to the record layer. They      *
+ * should NOT be used outside of the record layer.                           *
+ *                                                                           *
+ *****************************************************************************/
+
+#define MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT    5
+
+/* Functions/macros provided by the RECORD_LAYER component */
+
+#define RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(rl)               (&(rl)->rbuf)
+#define RECORD_LAYER_get_wbuf(rl)               ((rl)->wbuf)
+#define RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(rl)               ((rl)->rrec)
+#define RECORD_LAYER_set_packet(rl, p)          ((rl)->packet = (p))
+#define RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(rl)    ((rl)->packet_length = 0)
+#define RECORD_LAYER_get_rstate(rl)             ((rl)->rstate)
+#define RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(rl, st)         ((rl)->rstate = (st))
+#define RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(rl)      ((rl)->read_sequence)
+#define RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(rl)     ((rl)->write_sequence)
+#define RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(rl)          ((rl)->numrpipes)
+#define RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(rl, n)       ((rl)->numrpipes = (n))
+#define RECORD_LAYER_inc_empty_record_count(rl) ((rl)->empty_record_count++)
+#define RECORD_LAYER_reset_empty_record_count(rl) \
+                                                ((rl)->empty_record_count = 0)
+#define RECORD_LAYER_get_empty_record_count(rl) ((rl)->empty_record_count)
+#define RECORD_LAYER_is_first_record(rl)        ((rl)->is_first_record)
+#define RECORD_LAYER_set_first_record(rl)       ((rl)->is_first_record = 1)
+#define RECORD_LAYER_clear_first_record(rl)     ((rl)->is_first_record = 0)
+#define DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_r_epoch(rl)       ((rl)->d->r_epoch)
+
+__owur int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend, int clearold);
+
+void RECORD_LAYER_set_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl, const unsigned char *ws);
+DTLS1_BITMAP *dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
+                               unsigned int *is_next_epoch);
+int dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s);
+int dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue);
+int dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *q, unsigned char *priority);
+void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq);
+
+/* Functions provided by the DTLS1_BITMAP component */
+
+int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap);
+void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap);
+
+/* Macros/functions provided by the SSL3_BUFFER component */
+
+#define SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(b)              ((b)->buf)
+#define SSL3_BUFFER_set_buf(b, n)           ((b)->buf = (n))
+#define SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(b)              ((b)->len)
+#define SSL3_BUFFER_set_len(b, l)           ((b)->len = (l))
+#define SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(b)             ((b)->left)
+#define SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(b, l)          ((b)->left = (l))
+#define SSL3_BUFFER_add_left(b, l)          ((b)->left += (l))
+#define SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(b)           ((b)->offset)
+#define SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(b, o)        ((b)->offset = (o))
+#define SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(b, o)        ((b)->offset += (o))
+#define SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(b)       ((b)->buf != NULL)
+#define SSL3_BUFFER_set_default_len(b, l)   ((b)->default_len = (l))
+
+void SSL3_BUFFER_clear(SSL3_BUFFER *b);
+void SSL3_BUFFER_set_data(SSL3_BUFFER *b, const unsigned char *d, int n);
+void SSL3_BUFFER_release(SSL3_BUFFER *b);
+__owur int ssl3_setup_read_buffer(SSL *s);
+__owur int ssl3_setup_write_buffer(SSL *s, unsigned int numwpipes, size_t len);
+int ssl3_release_read_buffer(SSL *s);
+int ssl3_release_write_buffer(SSL *s);
+
+/* Macros/functions provided by the SSL3_RECORD component */
+
+#define SSL3_RECORD_get_type(r)                 ((r)->type)
+#define SSL3_RECORD_set_type(r, t)              ((r)->type = (t))
+#define SSL3_RECORD_get_length(r)               ((r)->length)
+#define SSL3_RECORD_set_length(r, l)            ((r)->length = (l))
+#define SSL3_RECORD_add_length(r, l)            ((r)->length += (l))
+#define SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(r, l)            ((r)->length -= (l))
+#define SSL3_RECORD_get_data(r)                 ((r)->data)
+#define SSL3_RECORD_set_data(r, d)              ((r)->data = (d))
+#define SSL3_RECORD_get_input(r)                ((r)->input)
+#define SSL3_RECORD_set_input(r, i)             ((r)->input = (i))
+#define SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(r)              ((r)->input = (r)->data)
+#define SSL3_RECORD_get_seq_num(r)              ((r)->seq_num)
+#define SSL3_RECORD_get_off(r)                  ((r)->off)
+#define SSL3_RECORD_set_off(r, o)               ((r)->off = (o))
+#define SSL3_RECORD_add_off(r, o)               ((r)->off += (o))
+#define SSL3_RECORD_get_epoch(r)                ((r)->epoch)
+#define SSL3_RECORD_is_sslv2_record(r) \
+            ((r)->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION)
+#define SSL3_RECORD_is_read(r)                  ((r)->read)
+#define SSL3_RECORD_set_read(r)                 ((r)->read = 1)
+
+void SSL3_RECORD_clear(SSL3_RECORD *r, unsigned int num_recs);
+void SSL3_RECORD_release(SSL3_RECORD *r, unsigned int num_recs);
+void SSL3_RECORD_set_seq_num(SSL3_RECORD *r, const unsigned char *seq_num);
+int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s);
+__owur int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *wr);
+__owur int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rr);
+void ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char *out,
+                       const SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned md_size);
+__owur int ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(SSL3_RECORD *rec,
+                                   unsigned block_size, unsigned mac_size);
+__owur int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL *s,
+                                   SSL3_RECORD *rec,
+                                   unsigned block_size, unsigned mac_size);
+int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap);
+__owur int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s);
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/record/ssl3_buffer.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/record/ssl3_buffer.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b6ed771
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/record/ssl3_buffer.c
@@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "../ssl_locl.h"
+#include "record_locl.h"
+
+void SSL3_BUFFER_set_data(SSL3_BUFFER *b, const unsigned char *d, int n)
+{
+    if (d != NULL)
+        memcpy(b->buf, d, n);
+    b->left = n;
+    b->offset = 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Clear the contents of an SSL3_BUFFER but retain any memory allocated. Also
+ * retains the default_len setting
+ */
+void SSL3_BUFFER_clear(SSL3_BUFFER *b)
+{
+    b->offset = 0;
+    b->left = 0;
+}
+
+void SSL3_BUFFER_release(SSL3_BUFFER *b)
+{
+    OPENSSL_free(b->buf);
+    b->buf = NULL;
+}
+
+int ssl3_setup_read_buffer(SSL *s)
+{
+    unsigned char *p;
+    size_t len, align = 0, headerlen;
+    SSL3_BUFFER *b;
+
+    b = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer);
+
+    if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
+        headerlen = DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+    else
+        headerlen = SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+
+#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
+    align = (-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
+#endif
+
+    if (b->buf == NULL) {
+        len = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
+            + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD + headerlen + align;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+        if (ssl_allow_compression(s))
+            len += SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD;
+#endif
+        if (b->default_len > len)
+            len = b->default_len;
+        if ((p = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        b->buf = p;
+        b->len = len;
+    }
+
+    RECORD_LAYER_set_packet(&s->rlayer, &(b->buf[0]));
+    return 1;
+
+ err:
+    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_READ_BUFFER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int ssl3_setup_write_buffer(SSL *s, unsigned int numwpipes, size_t len)
+{
+    unsigned char *p;
+    size_t align = 0, headerlen;
+    SSL3_BUFFER *wb;
+    unsigned int currpipe;
+
+    s->rlayer.numwpipes = numwpipes;
+
+    if (len == 0) {
+        if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
+            headerlen = DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + 1;
+        else
+            headerlen = SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+
+#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
+        align = (-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
+#endif
+
+        len = s->max_send_fragment
+            + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD + headerlen + align;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+        if (ssl_allow_compression(s))
+            len += SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD;
+#endif
+        if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS))
+            len += headerlen + align + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD;
+    }
+
+    wb = RECORD_LAYER_get_wbuf(&s->rlayer);
+    for (currpipe = 0; currpipe < numwpipes; currpipe++) {
+        SSL3_BUFFER *thiswb = &wb[currpipe];
+
+        if (thiswb->buf == NULL) {
+            p = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
+            if (p == NULL) {
+                s->rlayer.numwpipes = currpipe;
+                goto err;
+            }
+            memset(thiswb, 0, sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
+            thiswb->buf = p;
+            thiswb->len = len;
+        }
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+
+ err:
+    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_WRITE_BUFFER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int ssl3_setup_buffers(SSL *s)
+{
+    if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
+        return 0;
+    if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, 1, 0))
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl3_release_write_buffer(SSL *s)
+{
+    SSL3_BUFFER *wb;
+    unsigned int pipes;
+
+    pipes = s->rlayer.numwpipes;
+    while (pipes > 0) {
+        wb = &RECORD_LAYER_get_wbuf(&s->rlayer)[pipes - 1];
+
+        OPENSSL_free(wb->buf);
+        wb->buf = NULL;
+        pipes--;
+    }
+    s->rlayer.numwpipes = 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl3_release_read_buffer(SSL *s)
+{
+    SSL3_BUFFER *b;
+
+    b = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer);
+    OPENSSL_free(b->buf);
+    b->buf = NULL;
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c7a54fe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1641 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include "../ssl_locl.h"
+#include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include "record_locl.h"
+
+static const unsigned char ssl3_pad_1[48] = {
+    0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
+    0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
+    0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
+    0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
+    0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
+    0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36
+};
+
+static const unsigned char ssl3_pad_2[48] = {
+    0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
+    0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
+    0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
+    0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
+    0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
+    0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c
+};
+
+/*
+ * Clear the contents of an SSL3_RECORD but retain any memory allocated
+ */
+void SSL3_RECORD_clear(SSL3_RECORD *r, unsigned int num_recs)
+{
+    unsigned char *comp;
+    unsigned int i;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < num_recs; i++) {
+        comp = r[i].comp;
+
+        memset(&r[i], 0, sizeof(*r));
+        r[i].comp = comp;
+    }
+}
+
+void SSL3_RECORD_release(SSL3_RECORD *r, unsigned int num_recs)
+{
+    unsigned int i;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < num_recs; i++) {
+        OPENSSL_free(r[i].comp);
+        r[i].comp = NULL;
+    }
+}
+
+void SSL3_RECORD_set_seq_num(SSL3_RECORD *r, const unsigned char *seq_num)
+{
+    memcpy(r->seq_num, seq_num, SEQ_NUM_SIZE);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Peeks ahead into "read_ahead" data to see if we have a whole record waiting
+ * for us in the buffer.
+ */
+static int ssl3_record_app_data_waiting(SSL *s)
+{
+    SSL3_BUFFER *rbuf;
+    int left, len;
+    unsigned char *p;
+
+    rbuf = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer);
+
+    p = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(rbuf);
+    if (p == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    left = SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf);
+
+    if (left < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
+        return 0;
+
+    p += SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(rbuf);
+
+    /*
+     * We only check the type and record length, we will sanity check version
+     * etc later
+     */
+    if (*p != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
+        return 0;
+
+    p += 3;
+    n2s(p, len);
+
+    if (left < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + len)
+        return 0;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS defines the number of consecutive, empty records that
+ * will be processed per call to ssl3_get_record. Without this limit an
+ * attacker could send empty records at a faster rate than we can process and
+ * cause ssl3_get_record to loop forever.
+ */
+#define MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS 32
+
+#define SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH   2
+/*-
+ * Call this to get new input records.
+ * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
+ * or non-blocking IO.
+ * When it finishes, |numrpipes| records have been decoded. For each record 'i':
+ * rr[i].type    - is the type of record
+ * rr[i].data,   - data
+ * rr[i].length, - number of bytes
+ * Multiple records will only be returned if the record types are all
+ * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA. The number of records returned will always be <=
+ * |max_pipelines|
+ */
+/* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
+int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
+{
+    int ssl_major, ssl_minor, al;
+    int enc_err, n, i, ret = -1;
+    SSL3_RECORD *rr;
+    SSL3_BUFFER *rbuf;
+    SSL_SESSION *sess;
+    unsigned char *p;
+    unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+    short version;
+    unsigned mac_size;
+    int imac_size;
+    unsigned int num_recs = 0;
+    unsigned int max_recs;
+    unsigned int j;
+
+    rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer);
+    rbuf = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer);
+    max_recs = s->max_pipelines;
+    if (max_recs == 0)
+        max_recs = 1;
+    sess = s->session;
+
+    do {
+        /* check if we have the header */
+        if ((RECORD_LAYER_get_rstate(&s->rlayer) != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
+            (RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer)
+             < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
+            n = ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH,
+                            SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(rbuf), 0,
+                            num_recs == 0 ? 1 : 0);
+            if (n <= 0)
+                return (n);     /* error or non-blocking */
+            RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(&s->rlayer, SSL_ST_READ_BODY);
+
+            p = RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer);
+
+            /*
+             * The first record received by the server may be a V2ClientHello.
+             */
+            if (s->server && RECORD_LAYER_is_first_record(&s->rlayer)
+                && (p[0] & 0x80) && (p[2] == SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)) {
+                /*
+                 *  SSLv2 style record
+                 *
+                 * |num_recs| here will actually always be 0 because
+                 * |num_recs > 0| only ever occurs when we are processing
+                 * multiple app data records - which we know isn't the case here
+                 * because it is an SSLv2ClientHello. We keep it using
+                 * |num_recs| for the sake of consistency
+                 */
+                rr[num_recs].type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
+                rr[num_recs].rec_version = SSL2_VERSION;
+
+                rr[num_recs].length = ((p[0] & 0x7f) << 8) | p[1];
+
+                if (rr[num_recs].length > SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(rbuf)
+                    - SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
+                    al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
+                    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+                    goto f_err;
+                }
+
+                if (rr[num_recs].length < MIN_SSL2_RECORD_LEN) {
+                    al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+                    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+                    goto f_err;
+                }
+            } else {
+                /* SSLv3+ style record */
+                if (s->msg_callback)
+                    s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, 5, s,
+                                    s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+                /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
+                rr[num_recs].type = *(p++);
+                ssl_major = *(p++);
+                ssl_minor = *(p++);
+                version = (ssl_major << 8) | ssl_minor;
+                rr[num_recs].rec_version = version;
+                n2s(p, rr[num_recs].length);
+
+                /* Lets check version */
+                if (!s->first_packet && version != s->version) {
+                    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
+                    if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00)
+                        && !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) {
+                        if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
+                            /*
+                             * The record is using an incorrect version number,
+                             * but what we've got appears to be an alert. We
+                             * haven't read the body yet to check whether its a
+                             * fatal or not - but chances are it is. We probably
+                             * shouldn't send a fatal alert back. We'll just
+                             * end.
+                             */
+                            goto err;
+                        }
+                        /*
+                         * Send back error using their minor version number :-)
+                         */
+                        s->version = (unsigned short)version;
+                    }
+                    al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+                    goto f_err;
+                }
+
+                if ((version >> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) {
+                    if (RECORD_LAYER_is_first_record(&s->rlayer)) {
+                        /* Go back to start of packet, look at the five bytes
+                         * that we have. */
+                        p = RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer);
+                        if (strncmp((char *)p, "GET ", 4) == 0 ||
+                            strncmp((char *)p, "POST ", 5) == 0 ||
+                            strncmp((char *)p, "HEAD ", 5) == 0 ||
+                            strncmp((char *)p, "PUT ", 4) == 0) {
+                            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST);
+                            goto err;
+                        } else if (strncmp((char *)p, "CONNE", 5) == 0) {
+                            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
+                                   SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST);
+                            goto err;
+                        }
+
+                        /* Doesn't look like TLS - don't send an alert */
+                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
+                               SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
+                        goto err;
+                    } else {
+                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
+                               SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
+                        al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+                        goto f_err;
+                    }
+                }
+
+                if (rr[num_recs].length >
+                    SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(rbuf) - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
+                    al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
+                    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+                    goto f_err;
+                }
+            }
+
+            /* now s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
+        }
+
+        /*
+         * s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data.
+         * Calculate how much more data we need to read for the rest of the
+         * record
+         */
+        if (rr[num_recs].rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) {
+            i = rr[num_recs].length + SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
+                - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+        } else {
+            i = rr[num_recs].length;
+        }
+        if (i > 0) {
+            /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
+
+            n = ssl3_read_n(s, i, i, 1, 0);
+            if (n <= 0)
+                return (n);     /* error or non-blocking io */
+        }
+
+        /* set state for later operations */
+        RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(&s->rlayer, SSL_ST_READ_HEADER);
+
+        /*
+         * At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length,
+         * or s->packet_length == SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length
+         * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
+         */
+        if (rr[num_recs].rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) {
+            rr[num_recs].input =
+                &(RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer)[SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
+        } else {
+            rr[num_recs].input =
+                &(RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer)[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
+        }
+
+        /*
+         * ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr' rr->input points
+         * at rr->length bytes, which need to be copied into rr->data by either
+         * the decryption or by the decompression When the data is 'copied' into
+         * the rr->data buffer, rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer
+         */
+
+        /*
+         * We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] rr->length
+         * bytes of encrypted compressed stuff.
+         */
+
+        /* check is not needed I believe */
+        if (rr[num_recs].length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) {
+            al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+
+        /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
+        rr[num_recs].data = rr[num_recs].input;
+        rr[num_recs].orig_len = rr[num_recs].length;
+
+        /* Mark this record as not read by upper layers yet */
+        rr[num_recs].read = 0;
+
+        num_recs++;
+
+        /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
+        RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
+        RECORD_LAYER_clear_first_record(&s->rlayer);
+    } while (num_recs < max_recs
+             && rr[num_recs - 1].type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
+             && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)
+             && s->enc_read_ctx != NULL
+             && (EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx))
+                 & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE)
+             && ssl3_record_app_data_waiting(s));
+
+    /*
+     * If in encrypt-then-mac mode calculate mac from encrypted record. All
+     * the details below are public so no timing details can leak.
+     */
+    if (SSL_READ_ETM(s) && s->read_hash) {
+        unsigned char *mac;
+
+        imac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
+        assert(imac_size >= 0 && imac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+        if (imac_size < 0 || imac_size > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE) {
+                al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_LIB_EVP);
+                goto f_err;
+        }
+        mac_size = (unsigned)imac_size;
+
+        for (j = 0; j < num_recs; j++) {
+            if (rr[j].length < mac_size) {
+                al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+                goto f_err;
+            }
+            rr[j].length -= mac_size;
+            mac = rr[j].data + rr[j].length;
+            i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &rr[j], md, 0 /* not send */ );
+            if (i < 0 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) {
+                al = SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
+                       SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
+                goto f_err;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, rr, num_recs, 0);
+    /*-
+     * enc_err is:
+     *    0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
+     *    1: if the padding is valid
+     *    -1: if the padding is invalid
+     */
+    if (enc_err == 0) {
+        al = SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
+    printf("dec %d\n", rr->length);
+    {
+        unsigned int z;
+        for (z = 0; z < rr->length; z++)
+            printf("%02X%c", rr->data[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
+    }
+    printf("\n");
+#endif
+
+    /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
+    if ((sess != NULL) &&
+        (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) &&
+        (!SSL_READ_ETM(s) && EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)) {
+        /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
+        unsigned char *mac = NULL;
+        unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+
+        mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
+        OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+
+        for (j = 0; j < num_recs; j++) {
+            /*
+             * orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
+             * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
+             * therefore we can safely process the record in a different amount
+             * of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
+             */
+            if (rr[j].orig_len < mac_size ||
+                /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
+                (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
+                 rr[j].orig_len < mac_size + 1)) {
+                al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+                goto f_err;
+            }
+
+            if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
+                /*
+                 * We update the length so that the TLS header bytes can be
+                 * constructed correctly but we need to extract the MAC in
+                 * constant time from within the record, without leaking the
+                 * contents of the padding bytes.
+                 */
+                mac = mac_tmp;
+                ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, &rr[j], mac_size);
+                rr[j].length -= mac_size;
+            } else {
+                /*
+                 * In this case there's no padding, so |rec->orig_len| equals
+                 * |rec->length| and we checked that there's enough bytes for
+                 * |mac_size| above.
+                 */
+                rr[j].length -= mac_size;
+                mac = &rr[j].data[rr[j].length];
+            }
+
+            i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &rr[j], md, 0 /* not send */ );
+            if (i < 0 || mac == NULL
+                || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
+                enc_err = -1;
+            if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + mac_size)
+                enc_err = -1;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (enc_err < 0) {
+        /*
+         * A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
+         * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'.  But unless a decryption
+         * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway, we should
+         * not reveal which kind of error occurred -- this might become
+         * visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile)
+         */
+        al = SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
+               SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    for (j = 0; j < num_recs; j++) {
+        /* rr[j].length is now just compressed */
+        if (s->expand != NULL) {
+            if (rr[j].length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH) {
+                al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+                goto f_err;
+            }
+            if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s, &rr[j])) {
+                al = SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
+                goto f_err;
+            }
+        }
+
+        if (rr[j].length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) {
+            al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+
+        rr[j].off = 0;
+        /*-
+         * So at this point the following is true
+         * rr[j].type   is the type of record
+         * rr[j].length == number of bytes in record
+         * rr[j].off    == offset to first valid byte
+         * rr[j].data   == where to take bytes from, increment after use :-).
+         */
+
+        /* just read a 0 length packet */
+        if (rr[j].length == 0) {
+            RECORD_LAYER_inc_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer);
+            if (RECORD_LAYER_get_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer)
+                > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS) {
+                al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL);
+                goto f_err;
+            }
+        } else {
+            RECORD_LAYER_reset_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer);
+        }
+    }
+
+    RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, num_recs);
+    return 1;
+
+ f_err:
+    ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ err:
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rr)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+    int i;
+
+    if (rr->comp == NULL) {
+        rr->comp = (unsigned char *)
+            OPENSSL_malloc(SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH);
+    }
+    if (rr->comp == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    i = COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand, rr->comp,
+                          SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, rr->data, (int)rr->length);
+    if (i < 0)
+        return 0;
+    else
+        rr->length = i;
+    rr->data = rr->comp;
+#endif
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *wr)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+    int i;
+
+    i = COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress, wr->data,
+                            SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH,
+                            wr->input, (int)wr->length);
+    if (i < 0)
+        return (0);
+    else
+        wr->length = i;
+
+    wr->input = wr->data;
+#endif
+    return (1);
+}
+
+/*-
+ * ssl3_enc encrypts/decrypts |n_recs| records in |inrecs|
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *   0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too
+ *       short etc).
+ *   1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful.
+ *   -1: if the record's padding is invalid or, if sending, an internal error
+ *       occurred.
+ */
+int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *inrecs, unsigned int n_recs, int sending)
+{
+    SSL3_RECORD *rec;
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
+    unsigned long l;
+    int bs, i, mac_size = 0;
+    const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
+
+    rec = inrecs;
+    /*
+     * We shouldn't ever be called with more than one record in the SSLv3 case
+     */
+    if (n_recs != 1)
+        return 0;
+    if (sending) {
+        ds = s->enc_write_ctx;
+        if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL)
+            enc = NULL;
+        else
+            enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx);
+    } else {
+        ds = s->enc_read_ctx;
+        if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)
+            enc = NULL;
+        else
+            enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx);
+    }
+
+    if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || (enc == NULL)) {
+        memmove(rec->data, rec->input, rec->length);
+        rec->input = rec->data;
+    } else {
+        l = rec->length;
+        bs = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(ds);
+
+        /* COMPRESS */
+
+        if ((bs != 1) && sending) {
+            i = bs - ((int)l % bs);
+
+            /* we need to add 'i-1' padding bytes */
+            l += i;
+            /*
+             * the last of these zero bytes will be overwritten with the
+             * padding length.
+             */
+            memset(&rec->input[rec->length], 0, i);
+            rec->length += i;
+            rec->input[l - 1] = (i - 1);
+        }
+
+        if (!sending) {
+            if (l == 0 || l % bs != 0)
+                return 0;
+            /* otherwise, rec->length >= bs */
+        }
+
+        if (EVP_Cipher(ds, rec->data, rec->input, l) < 1)
+            return -1;
+
+        if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)
+            mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
+        if ((bs != 1) && !sending)
+            return ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(rec, bs, mac_size);
+    }
+    return (1);
+}
+
+/*-
+ * tls1_enc encrypts/decrypts |n_recs| in |recs|.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *   0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too
+ *       short etc).
+ *   1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful.
+ *   -1: if the record's padding/AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending,
+ *       an internal error occurred.
+ */
+int tls1_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *recs, unsigned int n_recs, int sending)
+{
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
+    size_t reclen[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
+    unsigned char buf[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES][EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN];
+    int bs, i, j, k, pad = 0, ret, mac_size = 0;
+    const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
+    unsigned int ctr;
+
+    if (n_recs == 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    if (sending) {
+        if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash)) {
+            int n = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
+            OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0);
+        }
+        ds = s->enc_write_ctx;
+        if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL)
+            enc = NULL;
+        else {
+            int ivlen;
+            enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx);
+            /* For TLSv1.1 and later explicit IV */
+            if (SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)
+                && EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
+                ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc);
+            else
+                ivlen = 0;
+            if (ivlen > 1) {
+                for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
+                    if (recs[ctr].data != recs[ctr].input) {
+                        /*
+                         * we can't write into the input stream: Can this ever
+                         * happen?? (steve)
+                         */
+                        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                        return -1;
+                    } else if (RAND_bytes(recs[ctr].input, ivlen) <= 0) {
+                        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                        return -1;
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    } else {
+        if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash)) {
+            int n = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
+            OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0);
+        }
+        ds = s->enc_read_ctx;
+        if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)
+            enc = NULL;
+        else
+            enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx);
+    }
+
+    if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || (enc == NULL)) {
+        for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
+            memmove(recs[ctr].data, recs[ctr].input, recs[ctr].length);
+            recs[ctr].input = recs[ctr].data;
+        }
+        ret = 1;
+    } else {
+        bs = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ds));
+
+        if (n_recs > 1) {
+            if (!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ds))
+                  & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE)) {
+                /*
+                 * We shouldn't have been called with pipeline data if the
+                 * cipher doesn't support pipelining
+                 */
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE);
+                return -1;
+            }
+        }
+        for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
+            reclen[ctr] = recs[ctr].length;
+
+            if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ds))
+                & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) {
+                unsigned char *seq;
+
+                seq = sending ? RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&s->rlayer)
+                    : RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
+
+                if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+                    /* DTLS does not support pipelining */
+                    unsigned char dtlsseq[9], *p = dtlsseq;
+
+                    s2n(sending ? DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_w_epoch(&s->rlayer) :
+                        DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_r_epoch(&s->rlayer), p);
+                    memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6);
+                    memcpy(buf[ctr], dtlsseq, 8);
+                } else {
+                    memcpy(buf[ctr], seq, 8);
+                    for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) { /* increment */
+                        ++seq[i];
+                        if (seq[i] != 0)
+                            break;
+                    }
+                }
+
+                buf[ctr][8] = recs[ctr].type;
+                buf[ctr][9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8);
+                buf[ctr][10] = (unsigned char)(s->version);
+                buf[ctr][11] = recs[ctr].length >> 8;
+                buf[ctr][12] = recs[ctr].length & 0xff;
+                pad = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD,
+                                          EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN, buf[ctr]);
+                if (pad <= 0)
+                    return -1;
+
+                if (sending) {
+                    reclen[ctr] += pad;
+                    recs[ctr].length += pad;
+                }
+
+            } else if ((bs != 1) && sending) {
+                i = bs - ((int)reclen[ctr] % bs);
+
+                /* Add weird padding of upto 256 bytes */
+
+                /* we need to add 'i' padding bytes of value j */
+                j = i - 1;
+                for (k = (int)reclen[ctr]; k < (int)(reclen[ctr] + i); k++)
+                    recs[ctr].input[k] = j;
+                reclen[ctr] += i;
+                recs[ctr].length += i;
+            }
+
+            if (!sending) {
+                if (reclen[ctr] == 0 || reclen[ctr] % bs != 0)
+                    return 0;
+            }
+        }
+        if (n_recs > 1) {
+            unsigned char *data[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
+
+            /* Set the output buffers */
+            for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
+                data[ctr] = recs[ctr].data;
+            }
+            if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_OUTPUT_BUFS,
+                                    n_recs, data) <= 0) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE);
+            }
+            /* Set the input buffers */
+            for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
+                data[ctr] = recs[ctr].input;
+            }
+            if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_INPUT_BUFS,
+                                    n_recs, data) <= 0
+                || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_INPUT_LENS,
+                                       n_recs, reclen) <= 0) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE);
+                return -1;
+            }
+        }
+
+        i = EVP_Cipher(ds, recs[0].data, recs[0].input, reclen[0]);
+        if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ds))
+             & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER)
+            ? (i < 0)
+            : (i == 0))
+            return -1;          /* AEAD can fail to verify MAC */
+        if (sending == 0) {
+            if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
+                for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
+                    recs[ctr].data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+                    recs[ctr].input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+                    recs[ctr].length -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+                }
+            } else if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
+                for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
+                    recs[ctr].data += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+                    recs[ctr].input += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+                    recs[ctr].length -= EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
+        ret = 1;
+        if (!SSL_READ_ETM(s) && EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)
+            mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
+        if ((bs != 1) && !sending) {
+            int tmpret;
+            for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
+                tmpret = tls1_cbc_remove_padding(s, &recs[ctr], bs, mac_size);
+                /*
+                 * If tmpret == 0 then this means publicly invalid so we can
+                 * short circuit things here. Otherwise we must respect constant
+                 * time behaviour.
+                 */
+                if (tmpret == 0)
+                    return 0;
+                ret = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_eq_int(tmpret, 1),
+                                               ret, -1);
+            }
+        }
+        if (pad && !sending) {
+            for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
+                recs[ctr].length -= pad;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int n_ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int sending)
+{
+    unsigned char *mac_sec, *seq;
+    const EVP_MD_CTX *hash;
+    unsigned char *p, rec_char;
+    size_t md_size;
+    int npad;
+    int t;
+
+    if (sending) {
+        mac_sec = &(ssl->s3->write_mac_secret[0]);
+        seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&ssl->rlayer);
+        hash = ssl->write_hash;
+    } else {
+        mac_sec = &(ssl->s3->read_mac_secret[0]);
+        seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&ssl->rlayer);
+        hash = ssl->read_hash;
+    }
+
+    t = EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash);
+    if (t < 0)
+        return -1;
+    md_size = t;
+    npad = (48 / md_size) * md_size;
+
+    if (!sending &&
+        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
+        ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(hash)) {
+        /*
+         * This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any
+         * timing-side channel information about how many blocks of data we
+         * are hashing because that gives an attacker a timing-oracle.
+         */
+
+        /*-
+         * npad is, at most, 48 bytes and that's with MD5:
+         *   16 + 48 + 8 (sequence bytes) + 1 + 2 = 75.
+         *
+         * With SHA-1 (the largest hash speced for SSLv3) the hash size
+         * goes up 4, but npad goes down by 8, resulting in a smaller
+         * total size.
+         */
+        unsigned char header[75];
+        unsigned j = 0;
+        memcpy(header + j, mac_sec, md_size);
+        j += md_size;
+        memcpy(header + j, ssl3_pad_1, npad);
+        j += npad;
+        memcpy(header + j, seq, 8);
+        j += 8;
+        header[j++] = rec->type;
+        header[j++] = rec->length >> 8;
+        header[j++] = rec->length & 0xff;
+
+        /* Final param == is SSLv3 */
+        if (ssl3_cbc_digest_record(hash,
+                                   md, &md_size,
+                                   header, rec->input,
+                                   rec->length + md_size, rec->orig_len,
+                                   mac_sec, md_size, 1) <= 0)
+            return -1;
+    } else {
+        unsigned int md_size_u;
+        /* Chop the digest off the end :-) */
+        EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+
+        if (md_ctx == NULL)
+            return -1;
+
+        rec_char = rec->type;
+        p = md;
+        s2n(rec->length, p);
+        if (EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(md_ctx, hash) <= 0
+            || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size) <= 0
+            || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, ssl3_pad_1, npad) <= 0
+            || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, seq, 8) <= 0
+            || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, &rec_char, 1) <= 0
+            || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, md, 2) <= 0
+            || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0
+            || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
+            || EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(md_ctx, hash) <= 0
+            || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size) <= 0
+            || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, ssl3_pad_2, npad) <= 0
+            || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, md, md_size) <= 0
+            || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, &md_size_u) <= 0) {
+            EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
+            return -1;
+        }
+        md_size = md_size_u;
+
+        EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
+    }
+
+    ssl3_record_sequence_update(seq);
+    return (md_size);
+}
+
+int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int sending)
+{
+    unsigned char *seq;
+    EVP_MD_CTX *hash;
+    size_t md_size;
+    int i;
+    EVP_MD_CTX *hmac = NULL, *mac_ctx;
+    unsigned char header[13];
+    int stream_mac = (sending ? (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM)
+                      : (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM));
+    int t;
+
+    if (sending) {
+        seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&ssl->rlayer);
+        hash = ssl->write_hash;
+    } else {
+        seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&ssl->rlayer);
+        hash = ssl->read_hash;
+    }
+
+    t = EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash);
+    OPENSSL_assert(t >= 0);
+    md_size = t;
+
+    /* I should fix this up TLS TLS TLS TLS TLS XXXXXXXX */
+    if (stream_mac) {
+        mac_ctx = hash;
+    } else {
+        hmac = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+        if (hmac == NULL || !EVP_MD_CTX_copy(hmac, hash)) {
+            EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac);
+            return -1;
+        }
+        mac_ctx = hmac;
+    }
+
+    if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) {
+        unsigned char dtlsseq[8], *p = dtlsseq;
+
+        s2n(sending ? DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_w_epoch(&ssl->rlayer) :
+            DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_r_epoch(&ssl->rlayer), p);
+        memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6);
+
+        memcpy(header, dtlsseq, 8);
+    } else
+        memcpy(header, seq, 8);
+
+    header[8] = rec->type;
+    header[9] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version >> 8);
+    header[10] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version);
+    header[11] = (rec->length) >> 8;
+    header[12] = (rec->length) & 0xff;
+
+    if (!sending && !SSL_READ_ETM(ssl) &&
+        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
+        ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(mac_ctx)) {
+        /*
+         * This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any
+         * timing-side channel information about how many blocks of data we
+         * are hashing because that gives an attacker a timing-oracle.
+         */
+        /* Final param == not SSLv3 */
+        if (ssl3_cbc_digest_record(mac_ctx,
+                                   md, &md_size,
+                                   header, rec->input,
+                                   rec->length + md_size, rec->orig_len,
+                                   ssl->s3->read_mac_secret,
+                                   ssl->s3->read_mac_secret_size, 0) <= 0) {
+            EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac);
+            return -1;
+        }
+    } else {
+        if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, header, sizeof(header)) <= 0
+            || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0
+            || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx, md, &md_size) <= 0) {
+            EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac);
+            return -1;
+        }
+        if (!sending && !SSL_READ_ETM(ssl) && FIPS_mode())
+            if (!tls_fips_digest_extra(ssl->enc_read_ctx,
+                                       mac_ctx, rec->input,
+                                       rec->length, rec->orig_len)) {
+                EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac);
+                return -1;
+            }
+    }
+
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac);
+
+#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
+    fprintf(stderr, "seq=");
+    {
+        int z;
+        for (z = 0; z < 8; z++)
+            fprintf(stderr, "%02X ", seq[z]);
+        fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+    }
+    fprintf(stderr, "rec=");
+    {
+        unsigned int z;
+        for (z = 0; z < rec->length; z++)
+            fprintf(stderr, "%02X ", rec->data[z]);
+        fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+    }
+#endif
+
+    if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) {
+        for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) {
+            ++seq[i];
+            if (seq[i] != 0)
+                break;
+        }
+    }
+#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
+    {
+        unsigned int z;
+        for (z = 0; z < md_size; z++)
+            fprintf(stderr, "%02X ", md[z]);
+        fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+    }
+#endif
+    return (md_size);
+}
+
+/*-
+ * ssl3_cbc_remove_padding removes padding from the decrypted, SSLv3, CBC
+ * record in |rec| by updating |rec->length| in constant time.
+ *
+ * block_size: the block size of the cipher used to encrypt the record.
+ * returns:
+ *   0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publicly invalid.
+ *   1: if the padding was valid
+ *  -1: otherwise.
+ */
+int ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(SSL3_RECORD *rec,
+                            unsigned block_size, unsigned mac_size)
+{
+    unsigned padding_length, good;
+    const unsigned overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */  + mac_size;
+
+    /*
+     * These lengths are all public so we can test them in non-constant time.
+     */
+    if (overhead > rec->length)
+        return 0;
+
+    padding_length = rec->data[rec->length - 1];
+    good = constant_time_ge(rec->length, padding_length + overhead);
+    /* SSLv3 requires that the padding is minimal. */
+    good &= constant_time_ge(block_size, padding_length + 1);
+    rec->length -= good & (padding_length + 1);
+    return constant_time_select_int(good, 1, -1);
+}
+
+/*-
+ * tls1_cbc_remove_padding removes the CBC padding from the decrypted, TLS, CBC
+ * record in |rec| in constant time and returns 1 if the padding is valid and
+ * -1 otherwise. It also removes any explicit IV from the start of the record
+ * without leaking any timing about whether there was enough space after the
+ * padding was removed.
+ *
+ * block_size: the block size of the cipher used to encrypt the record.
+ * returns:
+ *   0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publicly invalid.
+ *   1: if the padding was valid
+ *  -1: otherwise.
+ */
+int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL *s,
+                            SSL3_RECORD *rec,
+                            unsigned block_size, unsigned mac_size)
+{
+    unsigned padding_length, good, to_check, i;
+    const unsigned overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */  + mac_size;
+    /* Check if version requires explicit IV */
+    if (SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) {
+        /*
+         * These lengths are all public so we can test them in non-constant
+         * time.
+         */
+        if (overhead + block_size > rec->length)
+            return 0;
+        /* We can now safely skip explicit IV */
+        rec->data += block_size;
+        rec->input += block_size;
+        rec->length -= block_size;
+        rec->orig_len -= block_size;
+    } else if (overhead > rec->length)
+        return 0;
+
+    padding_length = rec->data[rec->length - 1];
+
+    if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx)) &
+        EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) {
+        /* padding is already verified */
+        rec->length -= padding_length + 1;
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    good = constant_time_ge(rec->length, overhead + padding_length);
+    /*
+     * The padding consists of a length byte at the end of the record and
+     * then that many bytes of padding, all with the same value as the length
+     * byte. Thus, with the length byte included, there are i+1 bytes of
+     * padding. We can't check just |padding_length+1| bytes because that
+     * leaks decrypted information. Therefore we always have to check the
+     * maximum amount of padding possible. (Again, the length of the record
+     * is public information so we can use it.)
+     */
+    to_check = 256;            /* maximum amount of padding, inc length byte. */
+    if (to_check > rec->length)
+        to_check = rec->length;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < to_check; i++) {
+        unsigned char mask = constant_time_ge_8(padding_length, i);
+        unsigned char b = rec->data[rec->length - 1 - i];
+        /*
+         * The final |padding_length+1| bytes should all have the value
+         * |padding_length|. Therefore the XOR should be zero.
+         */
+        good &= ~(mask & (padding_length ^ b));
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * If any of the final |padding_length+1| bytes had the wrong value, one
+     * or more of the lower eight bits of |good| will be cleared.
+     */
+    good = constant_time_eq(0xff, good & 0xff);
+    rec->length -= good & (padding_length + 1);
+
+    return constant_time_select_int(good, 1, -1);
+}
+
+/*-
+ * ssl3_cbc_copy_mac copies |md_size| bytes from the end of |rec| to |out| in
+ * constant time (independent of the concrete value of rec->length, which may
+ * vary within a 256-byte window).
+ *
+ * ssl3_cbc_remove_padding or tls1_cbc_remove_padding must be called prior to
+ * this function.
+ *
+ * On entry:
+ *   rec->orig_len >= md_size
+ *   md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
+ *
+ * If CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE is defined then the rotation is performed with
+ * variable accesses in a 64-byte-aligned buffer. Assuming that this fits into
+ * a single or pair of cache-lines, then the variable memory accesses don't
+ * actually affect the timing. CPUs with smaller cache-lines [if any] are
+ * not multi-core and are not considered vulnerable to cache-timing attacks.
+ */
+#define CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE
+
+void ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char *out,
+                       const SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned md_size)
+{
+#if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE)
+    unsigned char rotated_mac_buf[64 + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+    unsigned char *rotated_mac;
+#else
+    unsigned char rotated_mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+#endif
+
+    /*
+     * mac_end is the index of |rec->data| just after the end of the MAC.
+     */
+    unsigned mac_end = rec->length;
+    unsigned mac_start = mac_end - md_size;
+    unsigned in_mac;
+    /*
+     * scan_start contains the number of bytes that we can ignore because the
+     * MAC's position can only vary by 255 bytes.
+     */
+    unsigned scan_start = 0;
+    unsigned i, j;
+    unsigned rotate_offset;
+
+    OPENSSL_assert(rec->orig_len >= md_size);
+    OPENSSL_assert(md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+
+#if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE)
+    rotated_mac = rotated_mac_buf + ((0 - (size_t)rotated_mac_buf) & 63);
+#endif
+
+    /* This information is public so it's safe to branch based on it. */
+    if (rec->orig_len > md_size + 255 + 1)
+        scan_start = rec->orig_len - (md_size + 255 + 1);
+
+    in_mac = 0;
+    rotate_offset = 0;
+    memset(rotated_mac, 0, md_size);
+    for (i = scan_start, j = 0; i < rec->orig_len; i++) {
+        unsigned mac_started = constant_time_eq(i, mac_start);
+        unsigned mac_ended = constant_time_lt(i, mac_end);
+        unsigned char b = rec->data[i];
+
+        in_mac |= mac_started;
+        in_mac &= mac_ended;
+        rotate_offset |= j & mac_started;
+        rotated_mac[j++] |= b & in_mac;
+        j &= constant_time_lt(j, md_size);
+    }
+
+    /* Now rotate the MAC */
+#if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE)
+    j = 0;
+    for (i = 0; i < md_size; i++) {
+        /* in case cache-line is 32 bytes, touch second line */
+        ((volatile unsigned char *)rotated_mac)[rotate_offset ^ 32];
+        out[j++] = rotated_mac[rotate_offset++];
+        rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt(rotate_offset, md_size);
+    }
+#else
+    memset(out, 0, md_size);
+    rotate_offset = md_size - rotate_offset;
+    rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt(rotate_offset, md_size);
+    for (i = 0; i < md_size; i++) {
+        for (j = 0; j < md_size; j++)
+            out[j] |= rotated_mac[i] & constant_time_eq_8(j, rotate_offset);
+        rotate_offset++;
+        rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt(rotate_offset, md_size);
+    }
+#endif
+}
+
+int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
+{
+    int i, al;
+    int enc_err;
+    SSL_SESSION *sess;
+    SSL3_RECORD *rr;
+    unsigned int mac_size;
+    unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+
+    rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer);
+    sess = s->session;
+
+    /*
+     * At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
+     * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
+     */
+    rr->input = &(RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer)[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
+
+    /*
+     * ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr' rr->input points
+     * at rr->length bytes, which need to be copied into rr->data by either
+     * the decryption or by the decompression When the data is 'copied' into
+     * the rr->data buffer, rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer
+     */
+
+    /*
+     * We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] rr->length
+     * bytes of encrypted compressed stuff.
+     */
+
+    /* check is not needed I believe */
+    if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) {
+        al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
+    rr->data = rr->input;
+    rr->orig_len = rr->length;
+
+    enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, rr, 1, 0);
+    /*-
+     * enc_err is:
+     *    0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
+     *    1: if the padding is valid
+     *   -1: if the padding is invalid
+     */
+    if (enc_err == 0) {
+        /* For DTLS we simply ignore bad packets. */
+        rr->length = 0;
+        RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
+        goto err;
+    }
+#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
+    printf("dec %d\n", rr->length);
+    {
+        unsigned int z;
+        for (z = 0; z < rr->length; z++)
+            printf("%02X%c", rr->data[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
+    }
+    printf("\n");
+#endif
+
+    /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
+    if ((sess != NULL) &&
+        (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) && (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)) {
+        /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
+        unsigned char *mac = NULL;
+        unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+        mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
+        OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+
+        /*
+         * orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
+         * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
+         * therefore we can safely process the record in a different amount
+         * of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
+         */
+        if (rr->orig_len < mac_size ||
+            /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
+            (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
+             rr->orig_len < mac_size + 1)) {
+            al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+
+        if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
+            /*
+             * We update the length so that the TLS header bytes can be
+             * constructed correctly but we need to extract the MAC in
+             * constant time from within the record, without leaking the
+             * contents of the padding bytes.
+             */
+            mac = mac_tmp;
+            ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size);
+            rr->length -= mac_size;
+        } else {
+            /*
+             * In this case there's no padding, so |rec->orig_len| equals
+             * |rec->length| and we checked that there's enough bytes for
+             * |mac_size| above.
+             */
+            rr->length -= mac_size;
+            mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
+        }
+
+        i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, rr, md, 0 /* not send */ );
+        if (i < 0 || mac == NULL
+            || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
+            enc_err = -1;
+        if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + mac_size)
+            enc_err = -1;
+    }
+
+    if (enc_err < 0) {
+        /* decryption failed, silently discard message */
+        rr->length = 0;
+        RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* r->length is now just compressed */
+    if (s->expand != NULL) {
+        if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH) {
+            al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,
+                   SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+        if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s, rr)) {
+            al = SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) {
+        al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    rr->off = 0;
+    /*-
+     * So at this point the following is true
+     * ssl->s3->rrec.type   is the type of record
+     * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
+     * ssl->s3->rrec.off    == offset to first valid byte
+     * ssl->s3->rrec.data   == where to take bytes from, increment
+     *                         after use :-).
+     */
+
+    /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
+    RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
+
+    /* Mark receipt of record. */
+    dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap);
+
+    return (1);
+
+ f_err:
+    ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ err:
+    return (0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the current epoch, i.e. processed
+ */
+#define dtls1_get_processed_record(s) \
+                   dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
+                   &(DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_processed_rcds(&s->rlayer)))
+
+/*-
+ * Call this to get a new input record.
+ * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
+ * or non-blocking IO.
+ * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
+ * ssl->s3->rrec.type    - is the type of record
+ * ssl->s3->rrec.data,   - data
+ * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
+ */
+/* used only by dtls1_read_bytes */
+int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
+{
+    int ssl_major, ssl_minor;
+    int i, n;
+    SSL3_RECORD *rr;
+    unsigned char *p = NULL;
+    unsigned short version;
+    DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap;
+    unsigned int is_next_epoch;
+
+    rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer);
+
+ again:
+    /*
+     * The epoch may have changed.  If so, process all the pending records.
+     * This is a non-blocking operation.
+     */
+    if (!dtls1_process_buffered_records(s))
+        return -1;
+
+    /* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */
+    if (dtls1_get_processed_record(s))
+        return 1;
+
+    /* get something from the wire */
+
+    /* check if we have the header */
+    if ((RECORD_LAYER_get_rstate(&s->rlayer) != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
+        (RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
+        n = ssl3_read_n(s, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH,
+                        SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(&s->rlayer.rbuf), 0, 1);
+        /* read timeout is handled by dtls1_read_bytes */
+        if (n <= 0)
+            return (n);         /* error or non-blocking */
+
+        /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
+        if (RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) !=
+            DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
+            RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
+            goto again;
+        }
+
+        RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(&s->rlayer, SSL_ST_READ_BODY);
+
+        p = RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer);
+
+        if (s->msg_callback)
+            s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH,
+                            s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+        /* Pull apart the header into the DTLS1_RECORD */
+        rr->type = *(p++);
+        ssl_major = *(p++);
+        ssl_minor = *(p++);
+        version = (ssl_major << 8) | ssl_minor;
+
+        /* sequence number is 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */
+        n2s(p, rr->epoch);
+
+        memcpy(&(RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&s->rlayer)[2]), p, 6);
+        p += 6;
+
+        n2s(p, rr->length);
+
+        /*
+         * Lets check the version. We tolerate alerts that don't have the exact
+         * version number (e.g. because of protocol version errors)
+         */
+        if (!s->first_packet && rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
+            if (version != s->version) {
+                /* unexpected version, silently discard */
+                rr->length = 0;
+                RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
+                goto again;
+            }
+        }
+
+        if ((version & 0xff00) != (s->version & 0xff00)) {
+            /* wrong version, silently discard record */
+            rr->length = 0;
+            RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
+            goto again;
+        }
+
+        if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) {
+            /* record too long, silently discard it */
+            rr->length = 0;
+            RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
+            goto again;
+        }
+
+        /* now s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
+    }
+
+    /* s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
+
+    if (rr->length >
+        RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
+        /* now s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
+        i = rr->length;
+        n = ssl3_read_n(s, i, i, 1, 1);
+        /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
+        if (n != i) {
+            rr->length = 0;
+            RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
+            goto again;
+        }
+
+        /*
+         * now n == rr->length, and s->packet_length ==
+         * DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length
+         */
+    }
+    /* set state for later operations */
+    RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(&s->rlayer, SSL_ST_READ_HEADER);
+
+    /* match epochs.  NULL means the packet is dropped on the floor */
+    bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch);
+    if (bitmap == NULL) {
+        rr->length = 0;
+        RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); /* dump this record */
+        goto again;             /* get another record */
+    }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+    /* Only do replay check if no SCTP bio */
+    if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
+#endif
+        /* Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record. */
+        /*
+         * TODO: Does it make sense to have replay protection in epoch 0 where
+         * we have no integrity negotiated yet?
+         */
+        if (!dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap)) {
+            rr->length = 0;
+            RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); /* dump this record */
+            goto again;         /* get another record */
+        }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+    }
+#endif
+
+    /* just read a 0 length packet */
+    if (rr->length == 0)
+        goto again;
+
+    /*
+     * If this record is from the next epoch (either HM or ALERT), and a
+     * handshake is currently in progress, buffer it since it cannot be
+     * processed at this time.
+     */
+    if (is_next_epoch) {
+        if ((SSL_in_init(s) || ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s))) {
+            if (dtls1_buffer_record
+                (s, &(DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_unprocessed_rcds(&s->rlayer)),
+                 rr->seq_num) < 0)
+                return -1;
+        }
+        rr->length = 0;
+        RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
+        goto again;
+    }
+
+    if (!dtls1_process_record(s, bitmap)) {
+        rr->length = 0;
+        RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); /* dump this record */
+        goto again;             /* get another record */
+    }
+
+    return (1);
+
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/s3_cbc.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/s3_cbc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9a228f7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/s3_cbc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,529 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2012-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
+
+/*
+ * MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES is the maximum number of bytes in the hash's
+ * length field. (SHA-384/512 have 128-bit length.)
+ */
+#define MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES 16
+
+/*
+ * MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE is the maximum hash block size that we'll support.
+ * Currently SHA-384/512 has a 128-byte block size and that's the largest
+ * supported by TLS.)
+ */
+#define MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 128
+
+/*
+ * u32toLE serialises an unsigned, 32-bit number (n) as four bytes at (p) in
+ * little-endian order. The value of p is advanced by four.
+ */
+#define u32toLE(n, p) \
+        (*((p)++)=(unsigned char)(n), \
+         *((p)++)=(unsigned char)(n>>8), \
+         *((p)++)=(unsigned char)(n>>16), \
+         *((p)++)=(unsigned char)(n>>24))
+
+/*
+ * These functions serialize the state of a hash and thus perform the
+ * standard "final" operation without adding the padding and length that such
+ * a function typically does.
+ */
+static void tls1_md5_final_raw(void *ctx, unsigned char *md_out)
+{
+    MD5_CTX *md5 = ctx;
+    u32toLE(md5->A, md_out);
+    u32toLE(md5->B, md_out);
+    u32toLE(md5->C, md_out);
+    u32toLE(md5->D, md_out);
+}
+
+static void tls1_sha1_final_raw(void *ctx, unsigned char *md_out)
+{
+    SHA_CTX *sha1 = ctx;
+    l2n(sha1->h0, md_out);
+    l2n(sha1->h1, md_out);
+    l2n(sha1->h2, md_out);
+    l2n(sha1->h3, md_out);
+    l2n(sha1->h4, md_out);
+}
+
+static void tls1_sha256_final_raw(void *ctx, unsigned char *md_out)
+{
+    SHA256_CTX *sha256 = ctx;
+    unsigned i;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+        l2n(sha256->h[i], md_out);
+    }
+}
+
+static void tls1_sha512_final_raw(void *ctx, unsigned char *md_out)
+{
+    SHA512_CTX *sha512 = ctx;
+    unsigned i;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+        l2n8(sha512->h[i], md_out);
+    }
+}
+
+#undef  LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX
+#define LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX SHA512_CTX
+
+/*
+ * ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported returns 1 iff |ctx| uses a hash function
+ * which ssl3_cbc_digest_record supports.
+ */
+char ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    if (FIPS_mode())
+        return 0;
+    switch (EVP_MD_CTX_type(ctx)) {
+    case NID_md5:
+    case NID_sha1:
+    case NID_sha224:
+    case NID_sha256:
+    case NID_sha384:
+    case NID_sha512:
+        return 1;
+    default:
+        return 0;
+    }
+}
+
+/*-
+ * ssl3_cbc_digest_record computes the MAC of a decrypted, padded SSLv3/TLS
+ * record.
+ *
+ *   ctx: the EVP_MD_CTX from which we take the hash function.
+ *     ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported must return true for this EVP_MD_CTX.
+ *   md_out: the digest output. At most EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE bytes will be written.
+ *   md_out_size: if non-NULL, the number of output bytes is written here.
+ *   header: the 13-byte, TLS record header.
+ *   data: the record data itself, less any preceding explicit IV.
+ *   data_plus_mac_size: the secret, reported length of the data and MAC
+ *     once the padding has been removed.
+ *   data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size: the public length of the whole
+ *     record, including padding.
+ *   is_sslv3: non-zero if we are to use SSLv3. Otherwise, TLS.
+ *
+ * On entry: by virtue of having been through one of the remove_padding
+ * functions, above, we know that data_plus_mac_size is large enough to contain
+ * a padding byte and MAC. (If the padding was invalid, it might contain the
+ * padding too. )
+ * Returns 1 on success or 0 on error
+ */
+int ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
+                           unsigned char *md_out,
+                           size_t *md_out_size,
+                           const unsigned char header[13],
+                           const unsigned char *data,
+                           size_t data_plus_mac_size,
+                           size_t data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size,
+                           const unsigned char *mac_secret,
+                           unsigned mac_secret_length, char is_sslv3)
+{
+    union {
+        double align;
+        unsigned char c[sizeof(LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX)];
+    } md_state;
+    void (*md_final_raw) (void *ctx, unsigned char *md_out);
+    void (*md_transform) (void *ctx, const unsigned char *block);
+    unsigned md_size, md_block_size = 64;
+    unsigned sslv3_pad_length = 40, header_length, variance_blocks,
+        len, max_mac_bytes, num_blocks,
+        num_starting_blocks, k, mac_end_offset, c, index_a, index_b;
+    unsigned int bits;          /* at most 18 bits */
+    unsigned char length_bytes[MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES];
+    /* hmac_pad is the masked HMAC key. */
+    unsigned char hmac_pad[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
+    unsigned char first_block[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
+    unsigned char mac_out[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+    unsigned i, j, md_out_size_u;
+    EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL;
+    /*
+     * mdLengthSize is the number of bytes in the length field that
+     * terminates * the hash.
+     */
+    unsigned md_length_size = 8;
+    char length_is_big_endian = 1;
+    int ret;
+
+    /*
+     * This is a, hopefully redundant, check that allows us to forget about
+     * many possible overflows later in this function.
+     */
+    OPENSSL_assert(data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size < 1024 * 1024);
+
+    switch (EVP_MD_CTX_type(ctx)) {
+    case NID_md5:
+        if (MD5_Init((MD5_CTX *)md_state.c) <= 0)
+            return 0;
+        md_final_raw = tls1_md5_final_raw;
+        md_transform =
+            (void (*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block))MD5_Transform;
+        md_size = 16;
+        sslv3_pad_length = 48;
+        length_is_big_endian = 0;
+        break;
+    case NID_sha1:
+        if (SHA1_Init((SHA_CTX *)md_state.c) <= 0)
+            return 0;
+        md_final_raw = tls1_sha1_final_raw;
+        md_transform =
+            (void (*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block))SHA1_Transform;
+        md_size = 20;
+        break;
+    case NID_sha224:
+        if (SHA224_Init((SHA256_CTX *)md_state.c) <= 0)
+            return 0;
+        md_final_raw = tls1_sha256_final_raw;
+        md_transform =
+            (void (*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block))SHA256_Transform;
+        md_size = 224 / 8;
+        break;
+    case NID_sha256:
+        if (SHA256_Init((SHA256_CTX *)md_state.c) <= 0)
+            return 0;
+        md_final_raw = tls1_sha256_final_raw;
+        md_transform =
+            (void (*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block))SHA256_Transform;
+        md_size = 32;
+        break;
+    case NID_sha384:
+        if (SHA384_Init((SHA512_CTX *)md_state.c) <= 0)
+            return 0;
+        md_final_raw = tls1_sha512_final_raw;
+        md_transform =
+            (void (*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block))SHA512_Transform;
+        md_size = 384 / 8;
+        md_block_size = 128;
+        md_length_size = 16;
+        break;
+    case NID_sha512:
+        if (SHA512_Init((SHA512_CTX *)md_state.c) <= 0)
+            return 0;
+        md_final_raw = tls1_sha512_final_raw;
+        md_transform =
+            (void (*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block))SHA512_Transform;
+        md_size = 64;
+        md_block_size = 128;
+        md_length_size = 16;
+        break;
+    default:
+        /*
+         * ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported should have been called first to
+         * check that the hash function is supported.
+         */
+        OPENSSL_assert(0);
+        if (md_out_size)
+            *md_out_size = 0;
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    OPENSSL_assert(md_length_size <= MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES);
+    OPENSSL_assert(md_block_size <= MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE);
+    OPENSSL_assert(md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+
+    header_length = 13;
+    if (is_sslv3) {
+        header_length = mac_secret_length + sslv3_pad_length + 8 /* sequence
+                                                                  * number */  +
+            1 /* record type */  +
+            2 /* record length */ ;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * variance_blocks is the number of blocks of the hash that we have to
+     * calculate in constant time because they could be altered by the
+     * padding value. In SSLv3, the padding must be minimal so the end of
+     * the plaintext varies by, at most, 15+20 = 35 bytes. (We conservatively
+     * assume that the MAC size varies from 0..20 bytes.) In case the 9 bytes
+     * of hash termination (0x80 + 64-bit length) don't fit in the final
+     * block, we say that the final two blocks can vary based on the padding.
+     * TLSv1 has MACs up to 48 bytes long (SHA-384) and the padding is not
+     * required to be minimal. Therefore we say that the final six blocks can
+     * vary based on the padding. Later in the function, if the message is
+     * short and there obviously cannot be this many blocks then
+     * variance_blocks can be reduced.
+     */
+    variance_blocks = is_sslv3 ? 2 : 6;
+    /*
+     * From now on we're dealing with the MAC, which conceptually has 13
+     * bytes of `header' before the start of the data (TLS) or 71/75 bytes
+     * (SSLv3)
+     */
+    len = data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size + header_length;
+    /*
+     * max_mac_bytes contains the maximum bytes of bytes in the MAC,
+     * including * |header|, assuming that there's no padding.
+     */
+    max_mac_bytes = len - md_size - 1;
+    /* num_blocks is the maximum number of hash blocks. */
+    num_blocks =
+        (max_mac_bytes + 1 + md_length_size + md_block_size -
+         1) / md_block_size;
+    /*
+     * In order to calculate the MAC in constant time we have to handle the
+     * final blocks specially because the padding value could cause the end
+     * to appear somewhere in the final |variance_blocks| blocks and we can't
+     * leak where. However, |num_starting_blocks| worth of data can be hashed
+     * right away because no padding value can affect whether they are
+     * plaintext.
+     */
+    num_starting_blocks = 0;
+    /*
+     * k is the starting byte offset into the conceptual header||data where
+     * we start processing.
+     */
+    k = 0;
+    /*
+     * mac_end_offset is the index just past the end of the data to be MACed.
+     */
+    mac_end_offset = data_plus_mac_size + header_length - md_size;
+    /*
+     * c is the index of the 0x80 byte in the final hash block that contains
+     * application data.
+     */
+    c = mac_end_offset % md_block_size;
+    /*
+     * index_a is the hash block number that contains the 0x80 terminating
+     * value.
+     */
+    index_a = mac_end_offset / md_block_size;
+    /*
+     * index_b is the hash block number that contains the 64-bit hash length,
+     * in bits.
+     */
+    index_b = (mac_end_offset + md_length_size) / md_block_size;
+    /*
+     * bits is the hash-length in bits. It includes the additional hash block
+     * for the masked HMAC key, or whole of |header| in the case of SSLv3.
+     */
+
+    /*
+     * For SSLv3, if we're going to have any starting blocks then we need at
+     * least two because the header is larger than a single block.
+     */
+    if (num_blocks > variance_blocks + (is_sslv3 ? 1 : 0)) {
+        num_starting_blocks = num_blocks - variance_blocks;
+        k = md_block_size * num_starting_blocks;
+    }
+
+    bits = 8 * mac_end_offset;
+    if (!is_sslv3) {
+        /*
+         * Compute the initial HMAC block. For SSLv3, the padding and secret
+         * bytes are included in |header| because they take more than a
+         * single block.
+         */
+        bits += 8 * md_block_size;
+        memset(hmac_pad, 0, md_block_size);
+        OPENSSL_assert(mac_secret_length <= sizeof(hmac_pad));
+        memcpy(hmac_pad, mac_secret, mac_secret_length);
+        for (i = 0; i < md_block_size; i++)
+            hmac_pad[i] ^= 0x36;
+
+        md_transform(md_state.c, hmac_pad);
+    }
+
+    if (length_is_big_endian) {
+        memset(length_bytes, 0, md_length_size - 4);
+        length_bytes[md_length_size - 4] = (unsigned char)(bits >> 24);
+        length_bytes[md_length_size - 3] = (unsigned char)(bits >> 16);
+        length_bytes[md_length_size - 2] = (unsigned char)(bits >> 8);
+        length_bytes[md_length_size - 1] = (unsigned char)bits;
+    } else {
+        memset(length_bytes, 0, md_length_size);
+        length_bytes[md_length_size - 5] = (unsigned char)(bits >> 24);
+        length_bytes[md_length_size - 6] = (unsigned char)(bits >> 16);
+        length_bytes[md_length_size - 7] = (unsigned char)(bits >> 8);
+        length_bytes[md_length_size - 8] = (unsigned char)bits;
+    }
+
+    if (k > 0) {
+        if (is_sslv3) {
+            unsigned overhang;
+
+            /*
+             * The SSLv3 header is larger than a single block. overhang is
+             * the number of bytes beyond a single block that the header
+             * consumes: either 7 bytes (SHA1) or 11 bytes (MD5). There are no
+             * ciphersuites in SSLv3 that are not SHA1 or MD5 based and
+             * therefore we can be confident that the header_length will be
+             * greater than |md_block_size|. However we add a sanity check just
+             * in case
+             */
+            if (header_length <= md_block_size) {
+                /* Should never happen */
+                return 0;
+            }
+            overhang = header_length - md_block_size;
+            md_transform(md_state.c, header);
+            memcpy(first_block, header + md_block_size, overhang);
+            memcpy(first_block + overhang, data, md_block_size - overhang);
+            md_transform(md_state.c, first_block);
+            for (i = 1; i < k / md_block_size - 1; i++)
+                md_transform(md_state.c, data + md_block_size * i - overhang);
+        } else {
+            /* k is a multiple of md_block_size. */
+            memcpy(first_block, header, 13);
+            memcpy(first_block + 13, data, md_block_size - 13);
+            md_transform(md_state.c, first_block);
+            for (i = 1; i < k / md_block_size; i++)
+                md_transform(md_state.c, data + md_block_size * i - 13);
+        }
+    }
+
+    memset(mac_out, 0, sizeof(mac_out));
+
+    /*
+     * We now process the final hash blocks. For each block, we construct it
+     * in constant time. If the |i==index_a| then we'll include the 0x80
+     * bytes and zero pad etc. For each block we selectively copy it, in
+     * constant time, to |mac_out|.
+     */
+    for (i = num_starting_blocks; i <= num_starting_blocks + variance_blocks;
+         i++) {
+        unsigned char block[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
+        unsigned char is_block_a = constant_time_eq_8(i, index_a);
+        unsigned char is_block_b = constant_time_eq_8(i, index_b);
+        for (j = 0; j < md_block_size; j++) {
+            unsigned char b = 0, is_past_c, is_past_cp1;
+            if (k < header_length)
+                b = header[k];
+            else if (k < data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size + header_length)
+                b = data[k - header_length];
+            k++;
+
+            is_past_c = is_block_a & constant_time_ge_8(j, c);
+            is_past_cp1 = is_block_a & constant_time_ge_8(j, c + 1);
+            /*
+             * If this is the block containing the end of the application
+             * data, and we are at the offset for the 0x80 value, then
+             * overwrite b with 0x80.
+             */
+            b = constant_time_select_8(is_past_c, 0x80, b);
+            /*
+             * If this the the block containing the end of the application
+             * data and we're past the 0x80 value then just write zero.
+             */
+            b = b & ~is_past_cp1;
+            /*
+             * If this is index_b (the final block), but not index_a (the end
+             * of the data), then the 64-bit length didn't fit into index_a
+             * and we're having to add an extra block of zeros.
+             */
+            b &= ~is_block_b | is_block_a;
+
+            /*
+             * The final bytes of one of the blocks contains the length.
+             */
+            if (j >= md_block_size - md_length_size) {
+                /* If this is index_b, write a length byte. */
+                b = constant_time_select_8(is_block_b,
+                                           length_bytes[j -
+                                                        (md_block_size -
+                                                         md_length_size)], b);
+            }
+            block[j] = b;
+        }
+
+        md_transform(md_state.c, block);
+        md_final_raw(md_state.c, block);
+        /* If this is index_b, copy the hash value to |mac_out|. */
+        for (j = 0; j < md_size; j++)
+            mac_out[j] |= block[j] & is_block_b;
+    }
+
+    md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+    if (md_ctx == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_md(ctx), NULL /* engine */ ) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    if (is_sslv3) {
+        /* We repurpose |hmac_pad| to contain the SSLv3 pad2 block. */
+        memset(hmac_pad, 0x5c, sslv3_pad_length);
+
+        if (EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_secret, mac_secret_length) <= 0
+            || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, hmac_pad, sslv3_pad_length) <= 0
+            || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_out, md_size) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+    } else {
+        /* Complete the HMAC in the standard manner. */
+        for (i = 0; i < md_block_size; i++)
+            hmac_pad[i] ^= 0x6a;
+
+        if (EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, hmac_pad, md_block_size) <= 0
+            || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_out, md_size) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+    }
+    ret = EVP_DigestFinal(md_ctx, md_out, &md_out_size_u);
+    if (ret && md_out_size)
+        *md_out_size = md_out_size_u;
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
+
+    return 1;
+ err:
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Due to the need to use EVP in FIPS mode we can't reimplement digests but
+ * we can ensure the number of blocks processed is equal for all cases by
+ * digesting additional data.
+ */
+
+int tls_fips_digest_extra(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cipher_ctx,
+                          EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx, const unsigned char *data,
+                          size_t data_len, size_t orig_len)
+{
+    size_t block_size, digest_pad, blocks_data, blocks_orig;
+    if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(cipher_ctx) != EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
+        return 1;
+    block_size = EVP_MD_CTX_block_size(mac_ctx);
+    /*-
+     * We are in FIPS mode if we get this far so we know we have only SHA*
+     * digests and TLS to deal with.
+     * Minimum digest padding length is 17 for SHA384/SHA512 and 9
+     * otherwise.
+     * Additional header is 13 bytes. To get the number of digest blocks
+     * processed round up the amount of data plus padding to the nearest
+     * block length. Block length is 128 for SHA384/SHA512 and 64 otherwise.
+     * So we have:
+     * blocks = (payload_len + digest_pad + 13 + block_size - 1)/block_size
+     * equivalently:
+     * blocks = (payload_len + digest_pad + 12)/block_size + 1
+     * HMAC adds a constant overhead.
+     * We're ultimately only interested in differences so this becomes
+     * blocks = (payload_len + 29)/128
+     * for SHA384/SHA512 and
+     * blocks = (payload_len + 21)/64
+     * otherwise.
+     */
+    digest_pad = block_size == 64 ? 21 : 29;
+    blocks_orig = (orig_len + digest_pad) / block_size;
+    blocks_data = (data_len + digest_pad) / block_size;
+    /*
+     * MAC enough blocks to make up the difference between the original and
+     * actual lengths plus one extra block to ensure this is never a no op.
+     * The "data" pointer should always have enough space to perform this
+     * operation as it is large enough for a maximum length TLS buffer.
+     */
+    return EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, data,
+                                (blocks_orig - blocks_data + 1) * block_size);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/s3_enc.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/s3_enc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e08857d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/s3_enc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,550 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+
+static int ssl3_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km, int num)
+{
+    EVP_MD_CTX *m5;
+    EVP_MD_CTX *s1;
+    unsigned char buf[16], smd[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+    unsigned char c = 'A';
+    unsigned int i, j, k;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+    c = os_toascii[c];          /* 'A' in ASCII */
+#endif
+    k = 0;
+    m5 = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+    s1 = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+    if (m5 == NULL || s1 == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GENERATE_KEY_BLOCK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(m5, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
+    for (i = 0; (int)i < num; i += MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH) {
+        k++;
+        if (k > sizeof(buf)) {
+            /* bug: 'buf' is too small for this ciphersuite */
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GENERATE_KEY_BLOCK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        for (j = 0; j < k; j++)
+            buf[j] = c;
+        c++;
+        if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(s1, EVP_sha1(), NULL)
+            || !EVP_DigestUpdate(s1, buf, k)
+            || !EVP_DigestUpdate(s1, s->session->master_key,
+                                 s->session->master_key_length)
+            || !EVP_DigestUpdate(s1, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
+            || !EVP_DigestUpdate(s1, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
+            || !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(s1, smd, NULL)
+            || !EVP_DigestInit_ex(m5, EVP_md5(), NULL)
+            || !EVP_DigestUpdate(m5, s->session->master_key,
+                                 s->session->master_key_length)
+            || !EVP_DigestUpdate(m5, smd, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH))
+            goto err;
+        if ((int)(i + MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH) > num) {
+            if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(m5, smd, NULL))
+                goto err;
+            memcpy(km, smd, (num - i));
+        } else {
+            if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(m5, km, NULL))
+                goto err;
+        }
+
+        km += MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+    }
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(smd, sizeof(smd));
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(m5);
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(s1);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int ssl3_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
+{
+    unsigned char *p, *mac_secret;
+    unsigned char exp_key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
+    unsigned char exp_iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+    unsigned char *ms, *key, *iv;
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dd;
+    const EVP_CIPHER *c;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+    COMP_METHOD *comp;
+#endif
+    const EVP_MD *m;
+    int n, i, j, k, cl;
+    int reuse_dd = 0;
+
+    c = s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc;
+    m = s->s3->tmp.new_hash;
+    /* m == NULL will lead to a crash later */
+    OPENSSL_assert(m);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+    if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
+        comp = NULL;
+    else
+        comp = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->method;
+#endif
+
+    if (which & SSL3_CC_READ) {
+        if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL)
+            reuse_dd = 1;
+        else if ((s->enc_read_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        else
+            /*
+             * make sure it's initialised in case we exit later with an error
+             */
+            EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(s->enc_read_ctx);
+        dd = s->enc_read_ctx;
+
+        if (ssl_replace_hash(&s->read_hash, m) == NULL) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto err2;
+        }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+        /* COMPRESS */
+        COMP_CTX_free(s->expand);
+        s->expand = NULL;
+        if (comp != NULL) {
+            s->expand = COMP_CTX_new(comp);
+            if (s->expand == NULL) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
+                       SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
+                goto err2;
+            }
+        }
+#endif
+        RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
+        mac_secret = &(s->s3->read_mac_secret[0]);
+    } else {
+        if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL)
+            reuse_dd = 1;
+        else if ((s->enc_write_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        else
+            /*
+             * make sure it's initialised in case we exit later with an error
+             */
+            EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(s->enc_write_ctx);
+        dd = s->enc_write_ctx;
+        if (ssl_replace_hash(&s->write_hash, m) == NULL) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto err2;
+        }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+        /* COMPRESS */
+        COMP_CTX_free(s->compress);
+        s->compress = NULL;
+        if (comp != NULL) {
+            s->compress = COMP_CTX_new(comp);
+            if (s->compress == NULL) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
+                       SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
+                goto err2;
+            }
+        }
+#endif
+        RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(&s->rlayer);
+        mac_secret = &(s->s3->write_mac_secret[0]);
+    }
+
+    if (reuse_dd)
+        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(dd);
+
+    p = s->s3->tmp.key_block;
+    i = EVP_MD_size(m);
+    if (i < 0)
+        goto err2;
+    cl = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c);
+    j = cl;
+    k = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
+    if ((which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE) ||
+        (which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
+        ms = &(p[0]);
+        n = i + i;
+        key = &(p[n]);
+        n += j + j;
+        iv = &(p[n]);
+        n += k + k;
+    } else {
+        n = i;
+        ms = &(p[n]);
+        n += i + j;
+        key = &(p[n]);
+        n += j + k;
+        iv = &(p[n]);
+        n += k;
+    }
+
+    if (n > s->s3->tmp.key_block_length) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        goto err2;
+    }
+
+    memcpy(mac_secret, ms, i);
+
+    if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, c, NULL, key, iv, (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE)))
+        goto err2;
+
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(exp_key, sizeof(exp_key));
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(exp_iv, sizeof(exp_iv));
+    return (1);
+ err:
+    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ err2:
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(exp_key, sizeof(exp_key));
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(exp_iv, sizeof(exp_iv));
+    return (0);
+}
+
+int ssl3_setup_key_block(SSL *s)
+{
+    unsigned char *p;
+    const EVP_CIPHER *c;
+    const EVP_MD *hash;
+    int num;
+    int ret = 0;
+    SSL_COMP *comp;
+
+    if (s->s3->tmp.key_block_length != 0)
+        return (1);
+
+    if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session, &c, &hash, NULL, NULL, &comp, 0)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE);
+        return (0);
+    }
+
+    s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc = c;
+    s->s3->tmp.new_hash = hash;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+    s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
+#else
+    s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
+#endif
+
+    num = EVP_MD_size(hash);
+    if (num < 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    num = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c) + num + EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
+    num *= 2;
+
+    ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
+
+    if ((p = OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    s->s3->tmp.key_block_length = num;
+    s->s3->tmp.key_block = p;
+
+    ret = ssl3_generate_key_block(s, p, num);
+
+    if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS)) {
+        /*
+         * enable vulnerability countermeasure for CBC ciphers with known-IV
+         * problem (http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
+         */
+        s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 1;
+
+        if (s->session->cipher != NULL) {
+            if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eNULL)
+                s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
+            if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
+                s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0;
+#endif
+        }
+    }
+
+    return ret;
+
+ err:
+    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return (0);
+}
+
+void ssl3_cleanup_key_block(SSL *s)
+{
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.key_block, s->s3->tmp.key_block_length);
+    s->s3->tmp.key_block = NULL;
+    s->s3->tmp.key_block_length = 0;
+}
+
+int ssl3_init_finished_mac(SSL *s)
+{
+    BIO *buf = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+
+    if (buf == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_INIT_FINISHED_MAC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    ssl3_free_digest_list(s);
+    s->s3->handshake_buffer = buf;
+    (void)BIO_set_close(s->s3->handshake_buffer, BIO_CLOSE);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Free digest list. Also frees handshake buffer since they are always freed
+ * together.
+ */
+
+void ssl3_free_digest_list(SSL *s)
+{
+    BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
+    s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(s->s3->handshake_dgst);
+    s->s3->handshake_dgst = NULL;
+}
+
+int ssl3_finish_mac(SSL *s, const unsigned char *buf, int len)
+{
+    if (s->s3->handshake_dgst == NULL)
+        /* Note: this writes to a memory BIO so a failure is a fatal error */
+        return BIO_write(s->s3->handshake_buffer, (void *)buf, len) == len;
+    else
+        return EVP_DigestUpdate(s->s3->handshake_dgst, buf, len);
+}
+
+int ssl3_digest_cached_records(SSL *s, int keep)
+{
+    const EVP_MD *md;
+    long hdatalen;
+    void *hdata;
+
+    if (s->s3->handshake_dgst == NULL) {
+        hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
+        if (hdatalen <= 0) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DIGEST_CACHED_RECORDS,
+                   SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_LENGTH);
+            return 0;
+        }
+
+        s->s3->handshake_dgst = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+        if (s->s3->handshake_dgst == NULL) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DIGEST_CACHED_RECORDS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            return 0;
+        }
+
+        md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
+        if (md == NULL || !EVP_DigestInit_ex(s->s3->handshake_dgst, md, NULL)
+            || !EVP_DigestUpdate(s->s3->handshake_dgst, hdata, hdatalen)) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DIGEST_CACHED_RECORDS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+    if (keep == 0) {
+        BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
+        s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl3_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, const char *sender, int len, unsigned char *p)
+{
+    int ret;
+    EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+
+    if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst) != NID_md5_sha1) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_FINAL_FINISH_MAC, SSL_R_NO_REQUIRED_DIGEST);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_FINAL_FINISH_MAC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(ctx, s->s3->handshake_dgst)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_FINAL_FINISH_MAC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    ret = EVP_MD_CTX_size(ctx);
+    if (ret < 0) {
+        EVP_MD_CTX_reset(ctx);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if ((sender != NULL && EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, sender, len) <= 0)
+        || EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
+                           s->session->master_key_length,
+                           s->session->master_key) <= 0
+        || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, p, NULL) <= 0) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_FINAL_FINISH_MAC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        ret = 0;
+    }
+
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int ssl3_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p,
+                                int len)
+{
+    static const unsigned char *salt[3] = {
+#ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+        (const unsigned char *)"A",
+        (const unsigned char *)"BB",
+        (const unsigned char *)"CCC",
+#else
+        (const unsigned char *)"\x41",
+        (const unsigned char *)"\x42\x42",
+        (const unsigned char *)"\x43\x43\x43",
+#endif
+    };
+    unsigned char buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+    EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+    int i, ret = 0;
+    unsigned int n;
+
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GENERATE_MASTER_SECRET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
+        if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, s->ctx->sha1, NULL) <= 0
+            || EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, salt[i],
+                                strlen((const char *)salt[i])) <= 0
+            || EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, p, len) <= 0
+            || EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
+                                SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+            || EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
+                                SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+            || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, buf, &n) <= 0
+            || EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, s->ctx->md5, NULL) <= 0
+            || EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, p, len) <= 0
+            || EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, buf, n) <= 0
+            || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, out, &n) <= 0) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GENERATE_MASTER_SECRET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            ret = 0;
+            break;
+        }
+        out += n;
+        ret += n;
+    }
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
+
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, sizeof(buf));
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+int ssl3_alert_code(int code)
+{
+    switch (code) {
+    case SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY:
+        return (SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY);
+    case SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE:
+        return (SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+    case SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC:
+        return (SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
+    case SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED:
+        return (SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
+    case SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW:
+        return (SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
+    case SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE:
+        return (SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE);
+    case SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:
+        return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+    case SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE:
+        return (SSL3_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
+    case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE:
+        return (SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
+    case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE:
+        return (SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE);
+    case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED:
+        return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED);
+    case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED:
+        return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED);
+    case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN:
+        return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN);
+    case SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER:
+        return (SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+    case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA:
+        return (SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
+    case SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED:
+        return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+    case SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR:
+        return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+    case SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR:
+        return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+    case SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION:
+        return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+    case SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION:
+        return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+    case SSL_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY:
+        return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+    case SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR:
+        return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+    case SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED:
+        return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+    case SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION:
+        return (-1);            /* Don't send it :-) */
+    case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION:
+        return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+    case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE:
+        return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+    case SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME:
+        return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+    case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE:
+        return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+    case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE:
+        return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+    case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY:
+        return (TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY);
+    case SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK:
+        return (TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
+    case SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL:
+        return (TLS1_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL);
+    default:
+        return (-1);
+    }
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/s3_lib.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/s3_lib.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ad7532b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/s3_lib.c
@@ -0,0 +1,4140 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ *
+ * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ *
+ * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license provided above.
+ *
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
+ * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+#define SSL3_NUM_CIPHERS        OSSL_NELEM(ssl3_ciphers)
+
+/*
+ * The list of available ciphers, mostly organized into the following
+ * groups:
+ *      Always there
+ *      EC
+ *      PSK
+ *      SRP (within that: RSA EC PSK)
+ *      Cipher families: Chacha/poly, Camellila, Gost, IDEA, SEED
+ *      Weak ciphers
+ */
+static SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
+    {
+     1,
+     SSL3_TXT_RSA_NULL_MD5,
+     SSL3_CK_RSA_NULL_MD5,
+     SSL_kRSA,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_eNULL,
+     SSL_MD5,
+     SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_STRONG_NONE,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     0,
+     0,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     SSL3_TXT_RSA_NULL_SHA,
+     SSL3_CK_RSA_NULL_SHA,
+     SSL_kRSA,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_eNULL,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     0,
+     0,
+     },
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
+    {
+     1,
+     SSL3_TXT_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
+     SSL3_CK_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
+     SSL_kRSA,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_3DES,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     112,
+     168,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     SSL3_TXT_DHE_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
+     SSL3_CK_DHE_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
+     SSL_kDHE,
+     SSL_aDSS,
+     SSL_3DES,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     112,
+     168,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     SSL3_TXT_DHE_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
+     SSL3_CK_DHE_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
+     SSL_kDHE,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_3DES,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     112,
+     168,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     SSL3_TXT_ADH_DES_192_CBC_SHA,
+     SSL3_CK_ADH_DES_192_CBC_SHA,
+     SSL_kDHE,
+     SSL_aNULL,
+     SSL_3DES,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     112,
+     168,
+     },
+#endif
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA,
+     SSL_kRSA,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_AES128,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA,
+     SSL_kDHE,
+     SSL_aDSS,
+     SSL_AES128,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA,
+     SSL_kDHE,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_AES128,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_128_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_128_SHA,
+     SSL_kDHE,
+     SSL_aNULL,
+     SSL_AES128,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA,
+     SSL_kRSA,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_AES256,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     256,
+     256,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA,
+     SSL_kDHE,
+     SSL_aDSS,
+     SSL_AES256,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     256,
+     256,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA,
+     SSL_kDHE,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_AES256,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     256,
+     256,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_256_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_256_SHA,
+     SSL_kDHE,
+     SSL_aNULL,
+     SSL_AES256,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     256,
+     256,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256,
+     TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256,
+     SSL_kRSA,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_eNULL,
+     SSL_SHA256,
+     TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     0,
+     0,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
+     TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
+     SSL_kRSA,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_AES128,
+     SSL_SHA256,
+     TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256,
+     TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256,
+     SSL_kRSA,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_AES256,
+     SSL_SHA256,
+     TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     256,
+     256,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
+     TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
+     SSL_kDHE,
+     SSL_aDSS,
+     SSL_AES128,
+     SSL_SHA256,
+     TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
+     TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
+     SSL_kDHE,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_AES128,
+     SSL_SHA256,
+     TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA256,
+     TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA256,
+     SSL_kDHE,
+     SSL_aDSS,
+     SSL_AES256,
+     SSL_SHA256,
+     TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     256,
+     256,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256,
+     TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256,
+     SSL_kDHE,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_AES256,
+     SSL_SHA256,
+     TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     256,
+     256,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
+     TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
+     SSL_kDHE,
+     SSL_aNULL,
+     SSL_AES128,
+     SSL_SHA256,
+     TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_256_SHA256,
+     TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_256_SHA256,
+     SSL_kDHE,
+     SSL_aNULL,
+     SSL_AES256,
+     SSL_SHA256,
+     TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     256,
+     256,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+     TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+     SSL_kRSA,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_AES128GCM,
+     SSL_AEAD,
+     TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+     TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+     SSL_kRSA,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_AES256GCM,
+     SSL_AEAD,
+     TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
+     256,
+     256,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+     TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+     SSL_kDHE,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_AES128GCM,
+     SSL_AEAD,
+     TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+     TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+     SSL_kDHE,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_AES256GCM,
+     SSL_AEAD,
+     TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
+     256,
+     256,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+     TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+     SSL_kDHE,
+     SSL_aDSS,
+     SSL_AES128GCM,
+     SSL_AEAD,
+     TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+     TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+     SSL_kDHE,
+     SSL_aDSS,
+     SSL_AES256GCM,
+     SSL_AEAD,
+     TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
+     256,
+     256,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+     TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+     SSL_kDHE,
+     SSL_aNULL,
+     SSL_AES128GCM,
+     SSL_AEAD,
+     TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+     TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+     SSL_kDHE,
+     SSL_aNULL,
+     SSL_AES256GCM,
+     SSL_AEAD,
+     TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
+     256,
+     256,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM,
+     TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM,
+     SSL_kRSA,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_AES128CCM,
+     SSL_AEAD,
+     TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM,
+     TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM,
+     SSL_kRSA,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_AES256CCM,
+     SSL_AEAD,
+     TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
+     256,
+     256,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM,
+     TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM,
+     SSL_kDHE,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_AES128CCM,
+     SSL_AEAD,
+     TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM,
+     TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM,
+     SSL_kDHE,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_AES256CCM,
+     SSL_AEAD,
+     TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
+     256,
+     256,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8,
+     TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8,
+     SSL_kRSA,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_AES128CCM8,
+     SSL_AEAD,
+     TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8,
+     TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8,
+     SSL_kRSA,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_AES256CCM8,
+     SSL_AEAD,
+     TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
+     256,
+     256,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8,
+     TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8,
+     SSL_kDHE,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_AES128CCM8,
+     SSL_AEAD,
+     TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8,
+     TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8,
+     SSL_kDHE,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_AES256CCM8,
+     SSL_AEAD,
+     TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
+     256,
+     256,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM,
+     TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM,
+     SSL_kPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_AES128CCM,
+     SSL_AEAD,
+     TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM,
+     TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM,
+     SSL_kPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_AES256CCM,
+     SSL_AEAD,
+     TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
+     256,
+     256,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM,
+     TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM,
+     SSL_kDHEPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_AES128CCM,
+     SSL_AEAD,
+     TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM,
+     TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM,
+     SSL_kDHEPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_AES256CCM,
+     SSL_AEAD,
+     TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
+     256,
+     256,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8,
+     TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8,
+     SSL_kPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_AES128CCM8,
+     SSL_AEAD,
+     TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8,
+     TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8,
+     SSL_kPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_AES256CCM8,
+     SSL_AEAD,
+     TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
+     256,
+     256,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8,
+     TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8,
+     SSL_kDHEPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_AES128CCM8,
+     SSL_AEAD,
+     TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8,
+     TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8,
+     SSL_kDHEPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_AES256CCM8,
+     SSL_AEAD,
+     TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
+     256,
+     256,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM,
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM,
+     SSL_kECDHE,
+     SSL_aECDSA,
+     SSL_AES128CCM,
+     SSL_AEAD,
+     TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM,
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM,
+     SSL_kECDHE,
+     SSL_aECDSA,
+     SSL_AES256CCM,
+     SSL_AEAD,
+     TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
+     256,
+     256,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8,
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8,
+     SSL_kECDHE,
+     SSL_aECDSA,
+     SSL_AES128CCM8,
+     SSL_AEAD,
+     TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8,
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8,
+     SSL_kECDHE,
+     SSL_aECDSA,
+     SSL_AES256CCM8,
+     SSL_AEAD,
+     TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
+     256,
+     256,
+     },
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,
+     SSL_kECDHE,
+     SSL_aECDSA,
+     SSL_eNULL,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     0,
+     0,
+     },
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
+     SSL_kECDHE,
+     SSL_aECDSA,
+     SSL_3DES,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     112,
+     168,
+     },
+# endif
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+     SSL_kECDHE,
+     SSL_aECDSA,
+     SSL_AES128,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+     SSL_kECDHE,
+     SSL_aECDSA,
+     SSL_AES256,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     256,
+     256,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,
+     SSL_kECDHE,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_eNULL,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     0,
+     0,
+     },
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
+     SSL_kECDHE,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_3DES,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     112,
+     168,
+     },
+# endif
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+     SSL_kECDHE,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_AES128,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+     SSL_kECDHE,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_AES256,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     256,
+     256,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA,
+     SSL_kECDHE,
+     SSL_aNULL,
+     SSL_eNULL,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     0,
+     0,
+     },
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDH_anon_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_ECDH_anon_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
+     SSL_kECDHE,
+     SSL_aNULL,
+     SSL_3DES,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     112,
+     168,
+     },
+# endif
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+     SSL_kECDHE,
+     SSL_aNULL,
+     SSL_AES128,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+     SSL_kECDHE,
+     SSL_aNULL,
+     SSL_AES256,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     256,
+     256,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
+     SSL_kECDHE,
+     SSL_aECDSA,
+     SSL_AES128,
+     SSL_SHA256,
+     TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384,
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384,
+     SSL_kECDHE,
+     SSL_aECDSA,
+     SSL_AES256,
+     SSL_SHA384,
+     TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
+     256,
+     256,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
+     SSL_kECDHE,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_AES128,
+     SSL_SHA256,
+     TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384,
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384,
+     SSL_kECDHE,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_AES256,
+     SSL_SHA384,
+     TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
+     256,
+     256,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+     SSL_kECDHE,
+     SSL_aECDSA,
+     SSL_AES128GCM,
+     SSL_AEAD,
+     TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+     SSL_kECDHE,
+     SSL_aECDSA,
+     SSL_AES256GCM,
+     SSL_AEAD,
+     TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
+     256,
+     256,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+     SSL_kECDHE,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_AES128GCM,
+     SSL_AEAD,
+     TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+     SSL_kECDHE,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_AES256GCM,
+     SSL_AEAD,
+     TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
+     256,
+     256,
+     },
+#endif                          /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA,
+     SSL_kPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_eNULL,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     0,
+     0,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA,
+     SSL_kDHEPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_eNULL,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     0,
+     0,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA,
+     SSL_kRSAPSK,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_eNULL,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     0,
+     0,
+     },
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+     SSL_kPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_3DES,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     112,
+     168,
+     },
+# endif
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+     SSL_kPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_AES128,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+     SSL_kPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_AES256,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     256,
+     256,
+     },
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+     SSL_kDHEPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_3DES,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     112,
+     168,
+     },
+# endif
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+     SSL_kDHEPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_AES128,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+     SSL_kDHEPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_AES256,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     256,
+     256,
+     },
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+     SSL_kRSAPSK,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_3DES,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     112,
+     168,
+     },
+# endif
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+     SSL_kRSAPSK,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_AES128,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+     SSL_kRSAPSK,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_AES256,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     256,
+     256,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+     TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+     SSL_kPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_AES128GCM,
+     SSL_AEAD,
+     TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+     TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+     SSL_kPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_AES256GCM,
+     SSL_AEAD,
+     TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
+     256,
+     256,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+     TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+     SSL_kDHEPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_AES128GCM,
+     SSL_AEAD,
+     TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+     TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+     SSL_kDHEPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_AES256GCM,
+     SSL_AEAD,
+     TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
+     256,
+     256,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+     TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+     SSL_kRSAPSK,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_AES128GCM,
+     SSL_AEAD,
+     TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+     TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+     SSL_kRSAPSK,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_AES256GCM,
+     SSL_AEAD,
+     TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
+     256,
+     256,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
+     TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
+     SSL_kPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_AES128,
+     SSL_SHA256,
+     TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
+     TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
+     SSL_kPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_AES256,
+     SSL_SHA384,
+     TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
+     256,
+     256,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256,
+     TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256,
+     SSL_kPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_eNULL,
+     SSL_SHA256,
+     TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     0,
+     0,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384,
+     TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384,
+     SSL_kPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_eNULL,
+     SSL_SHA384,
+     TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
+     0,
+     0,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
+     TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
+     SSL_kDHEPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_AES128,
+     SSL_SHA256,
+     TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
+     TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
+     SSL_kDHEPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_AES256,
+     SSL_SHA384,
+     TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
+     256,
+     256,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256,
+     TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256,
+     SSL_kDHEPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_eNULL,
+     SSL_SHA256,
+     TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     0,
+     0,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384,
+     TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384,
+     SSL_kDHEPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_eNULL,
+     SSL_SHA384,
+     TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
+     0,
+     0,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
+     TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
+     SSL_kRSAPSK,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_AES128,
+     SSL_SHA256,
+     TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
+     TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
+     SSL_kRSAPSK,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_AES256,
+     SSL_SHA384,
+     TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
+     256,
+     256,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256,
+     TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256,
+     SSL_kRSAPSK,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_eNULL,
+     SSL_SHA256,
+     TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     0,
+     0,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384,
+     TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384,
+     SSL_kRSAPSK,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_eNULL,
+     SSL_SHA384,
+     TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
+     0,
+     0,
+     },
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+#  ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+     SSL_kECDHEPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_3DES,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     112,
+     168,
+     },
+#  endif
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+     SSL_kECDHEPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_AES128,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+     SSL_kECDHEPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_AES256,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     256,
+     256,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
+     SSL_kECDHEPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_AES128,
+     SSL_SHA256,
+     TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
+     SSL_kECDHEPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_AES256,
+     SSL_SHA384,
+     TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
+     256,
+     256,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA,
+     SSL_kECDHEPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_eNULL,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     0,
+     0,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256,
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256,
+     SSL_kECDHEPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_eNULL,
+     SSL_SHA256,
+     TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     0,
+     0,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384,
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384,
+     SSL_kECDHEPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_eNULL,
+     SSL_SHA384,
+     TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
+     0,
+     0,
+     },
+# endif                         /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+#endif                          /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+     SSL_kSRP,
+     SSL_aSRP,
+     SSL_3DES,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     112,
+     168,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+     SSL_kSRP,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_3DES,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     112,
+     168,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+     SSL_kSRP,
+     SSL_aDSS,
+     SSL_3DES,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     112,
+     168,
+     },
+# endif
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+     SSL_kSRP,
+     SSL_aSRP,
+     SSL_AES128,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_HIGH,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+     SSL_kSRP,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_AES128,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_HIGH,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+     SSL_kSRP,
+     SSL_aDSS,
+     SSL_AES128,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+     SSL_kSRP,
+     SSL_aSRP,
+     SSL_AES256,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_HIGH,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     256,
+     256,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+     SSL_kSRP,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_AES256,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_HIGH,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     256,
+     256,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+     SSL_kSRP,
+     SSL_aDSS,
+     SSL_AES256,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     256,
+     256,
+     },
+#endif                          /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_CHACHA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_POLY1305)
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305,
+     TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305,
+     SSL_kDHE,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305,
+     SSL_AEAD,
+     TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_HIGH,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
+     256,
+     256,
+     },
+# endif                         /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305,
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305,
+     SSL_kECDHE,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305,
+     SSL_AEAD,
+     TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_HIGH,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
+     256,
+     256,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305,
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305,
+     SSL_kECDHE,
+     SSL_aECDSA,
+     SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305,
+     SSL_AEAD,
+     TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_HIGH,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
+     256,
+     256,
+     },
+# endif                         /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305,
+     TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305,
+     SSL_kPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305,
+     SSL_AEAD,
+     TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_HIGH,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
+     256,
+     256,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305,
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305,
+     SSL_kECDHEPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305,
+     SSL_AEAD,
+     TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_HIGH,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
+     256,
+     256,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305,
+     TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305,
+     SSL_kDHEPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305,
+     SSL_AEAD,
+     TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_HIGH,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
+     256,
+     256,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305,
+     TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305,
+     SSL_kRSAPSK,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305,
+     SSL_AEAD,
+     TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_HIGH,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
+     256,
+     256,
+     },
+# endif                         /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
+#endif                          /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_CHACHA) &&
+                                 * !defined(OPENSSL_NO_POLY1305) */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
+     TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
+     SSL_kRSA,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_CAMELLIA128,
+     SSL_SHA256,
+     TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
+     TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
+     SSL_kEDH,
+     SSL_aDSS,
+     SSL_CAMELLIA128,
+     SSL_SHA256,
+     TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
+     TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
+     SSL_kEDH,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_CAMELLIA128,
+     SSL_SHA256,
+     TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
+     TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
+     SSL_kEDH,
+     SSL_aNULL,
+     SSL_CAMELLIA128,
+     SSL_SHA256,
+     TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256,
+     TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256,
+     SSL_kRSA,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_CAMELLIA256,
+     SSL_SHA256,
+     TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
+     256,
+     256,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256,
+     TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256,
+     SSL_kEDH,
+     SSL_aDSS,
+     SSL_CAMELLIA256,
+     SSL_SHA256,
+     TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
+     256,
+     256,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256,
+     TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256,
+     SSL_kEDH,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_CAMELLIA256,
+     SSL_SHA256,
+     TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
+     256,
+     256,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256,
+     TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256,
+     SSL_kEDH,
+     SSL_aNULL,
+     SSL_CAMELLIA256,
+     SSL_SHA256,
+     TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
+     256,
+     256,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
+     SSL_kRSA,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_CAMELLIA256,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     256,
+     256,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
+     SSL_kDHE,
+     SSL_aDSS,
+     SSL_CAMELLIA256,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     256,
+     256,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
+     SSL_kDHE,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_CAMELLIA256,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     256,
+     256,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
+     SSL_kDHE,
+     SSL_aNULL,
+     SSL_CAMELLIA256,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     256,
+     256,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
+     SSL_kRSA,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_CAMELLIA128,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
+     SSL_kDHE,
+     SSL_aDSS,
+     SSL_CAMELLIA128,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
+     SSL_kDHE,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_CAMELLIA128,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
+     SSL_kDHE,
+     SSL_aNULL,
+     SSL_CAMELLIA128,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
+     SSL_kECDHE,
+     SSL_aECDSA,
+     SSL_CAMELLIA128,
+     SSL_SHA256,
+     TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
+     SSL_kECDHE,
+     SSL_aECDSA,
+     SSL_CAMELLIA256,
+     SSL_SHA384,
+     TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
+     256,
+     256,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
+     SSL_kECDHE,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_CAMELLIA128,
+     SSL_SHA256,
+     TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
+     SSL_kECDHE,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_CAMELLIA256,
+     SSL_SHA384,
+     TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
+     256,
+     256,
+     },
+# endif                         /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
+     TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
+     SSL_kPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_CAMELLIA128,
+     SSL_SHA256,
+     TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
+     TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
+     SSL_kPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_CAMELLIA256,
+     SSL_SHA384,
+     TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
+     256,
+     256,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
+     TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
+     SSL_kDHEPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_CAMELLIA128,
+     SSL_SHA256,
+     TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
+     TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
+     SSL_kDHEPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_CAMELLIA256,
+     SSL_SHA384,
+     TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
+     256,
+     256,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
+     TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
+     SSL_kRSAPSK,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_CAMELLIA128,
+     SSL_SHA256,
+     TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
+     TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
+     SSL_kRSAPSK,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_CAMELLIA256,
+     SSL_SHA384,
+     TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
+     256,
+     256,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
+     SSL_kECDHEPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_CAMELLIA128,
+     SSL_SHA256,
+     TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
+     SSL_kECDHEPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_CAMELLIA256,
+     SSL_SHA384,
+     TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
+     256,
+     256,
+     },
+# endif                         /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
+
+#endif                          /* OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
+    {
+     1,
+     "GOST2001-GOST89-GOST89",
+     0x3000081,
+     SSL_kGOST,
+     SSL_aGOST01,
+     SSL_eGOST2814789CNT,
+     SSL_GOST89MAC,
+     TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     0, 0,
+     SSL_HIGH,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST94 | TLS1_PRF_GOST94 | TLS1_STREAM_MAC,
+     256,
+     256,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     "GOST2001-NULL-GOST94",
+     0x3000083,
+     SSL_kGOST,
+     SSL_aGOST01,
+     SSL_eNULL,
+     SSL_GOST94,
+     TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     0, 0,
+     SSL_STRONG_NONE,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST94 | TLS1_PRF_GOST94,
+     0,
+     0,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     "GOST2012-GOST8912-GOST8912",
+     0x0300ff85,
+     SSL_kGOST,
+     SSL_aGOST12 | SSL_aGOST01,
+     SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12,
+     SSL_GOST89MAC12,
+     TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     0, 0,
+     SSL_HIGH,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST12_256 | TLS1_PRF_GOST12_256 | TLS1_STREAM_MAC,
+     256,
+     256,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     "GOST2012-NULL-GOST12",
+     0x0300ff87,
+     SSL_kGOST,
+     SSL_aGOST12 | SSL_aGOST01,
+     SSL_eNULL,
+     SSL_GOST12_256,
+     TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     0, 0,
+     SSL_STRONG_NONE,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST12_256 | TLS1_PRF_GOST12_256 | TLS1_STREAM_MAC,
+     0,
+     0,
+     },
+#endif                          /* OPENSSL_NO_GOST */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_IDEA
+    {
+     1,
+     SSL3_TXT_RSA_IDEA_128_SHA,
+     SSL3_CK_RSA_IDEA_128_SHA,
+     SSL_kRSA,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_IDEA,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_1_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SEED
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA,
+     SSL_kRSA,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_SEED,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_SHA,
+     SSL_kDHE,
+     SSL_aDSS,
+     SSL_SEED,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA,
+     SSL_kDHE,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_SEED,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_SEED_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_SEED_SHA,
+     SSL_kDHE,
+     SSL_aNULL,
+     SSL_SEED,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+#endif                          /* OPENSSL_NO_SEED */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
+    {
+     1,
+     SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC4_128_MD5,
+     SSL3_CK_RSA_RC4_128_MD5,
+     SSL_kRSA,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_RC4,
+     SSL_MD5,
+     SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     0, 0,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC4_128_SHA,
+     SSL3_CK_RSA_RC4_128_SHA,
+     SSL_kRSA,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_RC4,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     0, 0,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     SSL3_TXT_ADH_RC4_128_MD5,
+     SSL3_CK_ADH_RC4_128_MD5,
+     SSL_kDHE,
+     SSL_aNULL,
+     SSL_RC4,
+     SSL_MD5,
+     SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     0, 0,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+     SSL_kECDHEPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_RC4,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     0, 0,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+     SSL_kECDHE,
+     SSL_aNULL,
+     SSL_RC4,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     0, 0,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+     SSL_kECDHE,
+     SSL_aECDSA,
+     SSL_RC4,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     0, 0,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+     SSL_kECDHE,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_RC4,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     0, 0,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+# endif                         /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+     SSL_kPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_RC4,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     0, 0,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+     SSL_kRSAPSK,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_RC4,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     0, 0,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+     SSL_kDHEPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_RC4,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+     0, 0,
+     SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+# endif                         /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
+
+#endif                          /* OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS */
+
+};
+
+static int cipher_compare(const void *a, const void *b)
+{
+    const SSL_CIPHER *ap = (const SSL_CIPHER *)a;
+    const SSL_CIPHER *bp = (const SSL_CIPHER *)b;
+
+    if (ap->id == bp->id)
+        return 0;
+    return ap->id < bp->id ? -1 : 1;
+}
+
+void ssl_sort_cipher_list(void)
+{
+    qsort(ssl3_ciphers, OSSL_NELEM(ssl3_ciphers), sizeof(ssl3_ciphers[0]),
+          cipher_compare);
+}
+
+static int ssl_undefined_function_1(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *r, size_t s,
+                                    const char * t, size_t u,
+                                    const unsigned char * v, size_t w, int x)
+{
+    (void)r;
+    (void)s;
+    (void)t;
+    (void)u;
+    (void)v;
+    (void)w;
+    (void)x;
+    return ssl_undefined_function(ssl);
+}
+
+const SSL3_ENC_METHOD SSLv3_enc_data = {
+    ssl3_enc,
+    n_ssl3_mac,
+    ssl3_setup_key_block,
+    ssl3_generate_master_secret,
+    ssl3_change_cipher_state,
+    ssl3_final_finish_mac,
+    MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+    SSL3_MD_CLIENT_FINISHED_CONST, 4,
+    SSL3_MD_SERVER_FINISHED_CONST, 4,
+    ssl3_alert_code,
+    ssl_undefined_function_1,
+    0,
+    SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
+    ssl3_set_handshake_header,
+    ssl3_handshake_write
+};
+
+long ssl3_default_timeout(void)
+{
+    /*
+     * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the SSLv3 spec is way too long for
+     * http, the cache would over fill
+     */
+    return (60 * 60 * 2);
+}
+
+int ssl3_num_ciphers(void)
+{
+    return (SSL3_NUM_CIPHERS);
+}
+
+const SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_get_cipher(unsigned int u)
+{
+    if (u < SSL3_NUM_CIPHERS)
+        return (&(ssl3_ciphers[SSL3_NUM_CIPHERS - 1 - u]));
+    else
+        return (NULL);
+}
+
+int ssl3_set_handshake_header(SSL *s, int htype, unsigned long len)
+{
+    unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+    *(p++) = htype;
+    l2n3(len, p);
+    s->init_num = (int)len + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+    s->init_off = 0;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl3_handshake_write(SSL *s)
+{
+    return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
+}
+
+int ssl3_new(SSL *s)
+{
+    SSL3_STATE *s3;
+
+    if ((s3 = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*s3))) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    s->s3 = s3;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+    if (!SSL_SRP_CTX_init(s))
+        goto err;
+#endif
+    s->method->ssl_clear(s);
+    return (1);
+ err:
+    return (0);
+}
+
+void ssl3_free(SSL *s)
+{
+    if (s == NULL || s->s3 == NULL)
+        return;
+
+    ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
+    EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->peer_tmp);
+    s->s3->peer_tmp = NULL;
+    EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
+    s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
+#endif
+
+    sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
+    OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw);
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.pms, s->s3->tmp.pmslen);
+    OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
+    ssl3_free_digest_list(s);
+    OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
+    OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+    SSL_SRP_CTX_free(s);
+#endif
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3, sizeof(*s->s3));
+    s->s3 = NULL;
+}
+
+void ssl3_clear(SSL *s)
+{
+    ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
+    sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
+    OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw);
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.pms, s->s3->tmp.pmslen);
+    OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
+    EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->peer_tmp);
+#endif                          /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
+    ssl3_free_digest_list(s);
+
+    OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
+    OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed);
+
+    /* NULL/zero-out everything in the s3 struct */
+    memset(s->s3, 0, sizeof(*s->s3));
+
+    ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
+
+    s->version = SSL3_VERSION;
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
+    OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated);
+    s->next_proto_negotiated = NULL;
+    s->next_proto_negotiated_len = 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+static char *srp_password_from_info_cb(SSL *s, void *arg)
+{
+    return OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.info);
+}
+#endif
+
+static int ssl3_set_req_cert_type(CERT *c, const unsigned char *p, size_t len);
+
+long ssl3_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    switch (cmd) {
+    case SSL_CTRL_GET_CLIENT_CERT_REQUEST:
+        break;
+    case SSL_CTRL_GET_NUM_RENEGOTIATIONS:
+        ret = s->s3->num_renegotiations;
+        break;
+    case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_NUM_RENEGOTIATIONS:
+        ret = s->s3->num_renegotiations;
+        s->s3->num_renegotiations = 0;
+        break;
+    case SSL_CTRL_GET_TOTAL_RENEGOTIATIONS:
+        ret = s->s3->total_renegotiations;
+        break;
+    case SSL_CTRL_GET_FLAGS:
+        ret = (int)(s->s3->flags);
+        break;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH:
+        {
+            DH *dh = (DH *)parg;
+            EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL;
+            if (dh == NULL) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+                return (ret);
+            }
+            pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dh);
+            if (pkdh == NULL) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                return 0;
+            }
+            if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
+                              EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdh), 0, pkdh)) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
+                EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
+                return ret;
+            }
+            EVP_PKEY_free(s->cert->dh_tmp);
+            s->cert->dh_tmp = pkdh;
+            ret = 1;
+        }
+        break;
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB:
+        {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+            return (ret);
+        }
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_DH_AUTO:
+        s->cert->dh_tmp_auto = larg;
+        return 1;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH:
+        {
+            const EC_GROUP *group = NULL;
+            int nid;
+
+            if (parg == NULL) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+                return 0;
+            }
+            group = EC_KEY_get0_group((const EC_KEY *)parg);
+            if (group == NULL) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, EC_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
+                return 0;
+            }
+            nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group);
+            if (nid == NID_undef)
+                return 0;
+            return tls1_set_curves(&s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
+                                   &s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length,
+                                   &nid, 1);
+        }
+        break;
+#endif                          /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME:
+        if (larg == TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name) {
+            size_t len;
+
+            OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_hostname);
+            s->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
+
+            ret = 1;
+            if (parg == NULL)
+                break;
+            len = strlen((char *)parg);
+            if (len == 0 || len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_SERVERNAME);
+                return 0;
+            }
+            if ((s->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_strdup((char *)parg)) == NULL) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                return 0;
+            }
+        } else {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_SERVERNAME_TYPE);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        break;
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_DEBUG_ARG:
+        s->tlsext_debug_arg = parg;
+        ret = 1;
+        break;
+
+    case SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_TYPE:
+        ret = s->tlsext_status_type;
+        break;
+
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_TYPE:
+        s->tlsext_status_type = larg;
+        ret = 1;
+        break;
+
+    case SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_EXTS:
+        *(STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) **)parg = s->tlsext_ocsp_exts;
+        ret = 1;
+        break;
+
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_EXTS:
+        s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = parg;
+        ret = 1;
+        break;
+
+    case SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_IDS:
+        *(STACK_OF(OCSP_RESPID) **)parg = s->tlsext_ocsp_ids;
+        ret = 1;
+        break;
+
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_IDS:
+        s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = parg;
+        ret = 1;
+        break;
+
+    case SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_OCSP_RESP:
+        *(unsigned char **)parg = s->tlsext_ocsp_resp;
+        return s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
+
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_OCSP_RESP:
+        OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
+        s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = parg;
+        s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = larg;
+        ret = 1;
+        break;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+    case SSL_CTRL_DTLS_EXT_SEND_HEARTBEAT:
+        if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
+            ret = dtls1_heartbeat(s);
+        break;
+
+    case SSL_CTRL_GET_DTLS_EXT_HEARTBEAT_PENDING:
+        if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
+            ret = s->tlsext_hb_pending;
+        break;
+
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_DTLS_EXT_HEARTBEAT_NO_REQUESTS:
+        if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+            if (larg)
+                s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS;
+            else
+                s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS;
+            ret = 1;
+        }
+        break;
+#endif
+
+    case SSL_CTRL_CHAIN:
+        if (larg)
+            return ssl_cert_set1_chain(s, NULL, (STACK_OF(X509) *)parg);
+        else
+            return ssl_cert_set0_chain(s, NULL, (STACK_OF(X509) *)parg);
+
+    case SSL_CTRL_CHAIN_CERT:
+        if (larg)
+            return ssl_cert_add1_chain_cert(s, NULL, (X509 *)parg);
+        else
+            return ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(s, NULL, (X509 *)parg);
+
+    case SSL_CTRL_GET_CHAIN_CERTS:
+        *(STACK_OF(X509) **)parg = s->cert->key->chain;
+        break;
+
+    case SSL_CTRL_SELECT_CURRENT_CERT:
+        return ssl_cert_select_current(s->cert, (X509 *)parg);
+
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_CURRENT_CERT:
+        if (larg == SSL_CERT_SET_SERVER) {
+            CERT_PKEY *cpk;
+            const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
+            if (!s->server)
+                return 0;
+            cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
+            if (!cipher)
+                return 0;
+            /*
+             * No certificate for unauthenticated ciphersuites or using SRP
+             * authentication
+             */
+            if (cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
+                return 2;
+            cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
+            if (!cpk)
+                return 0;
+            s->cert->key = cpk;
+            return 1;
+        }
+        return ssl_cert_set_current(s->cert, larg);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    case SSL_CTRL_GET_CURVES:
+        {
+            unsigned char *clist;
+            size_t clistlen;
+            if (!s->session)
+                return 0;
+            clist = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
+            clistlen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length / 2;
+            if (parg) {
+                size_t i;
+                int *cptr = parg;
+                unsigned int cid, nid;
+                for (i = 0; i < clistlen; i++) {
+                    n2s(clist, cid);
+                    nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(cid, NULL);
+                    if (nid != 0)
+                        cptr[i] = nid;
+                    else
+                        cptr[i] = TLSEXT_nid_unknown | cid;
+                }
+            }
+            return (int)clistlen;
+        }
+
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_CURVES:
+        return tls1_set_curves(&s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
+                               &s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length, parg, larg);
+
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_CURVES_LIST:
+        return tls1_set_curves_list(&s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
+                                    &s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length, parg);
+
+    case SSL_CTRL_GET_SHARED_CURVE:
+        return tls1_shared_curve(s, larg);
+
+#endif
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_SIGALGS:
+        return tls1_set_sigalgs(s->cert, parg, larg, 0);
+
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_SIGALGS_LIST:
+        return tls1_set_sigalgs_list(s->cert, parg, 0);
+
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_CLIENT_SIGALGS:
+        return tls1_set_sigalgs(s->cert, parg, larg, 1);
+
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_CLIENT_SIGALGS_LIST:
+        return tls1_set_sigalgs_list(s->cert, parg, 1);
+
+    case SSL_CTRL_GET_CLIENT_CERT_TYPES:
+        {
+            const unsigned char **pctype = parg;
+            if (s->server || !s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
+                return 0;
+            if (s->cert->ctypes) {
+                if (pctype)
+                    *pctype = s->cert->ctypes;
+                return (int)s->cert->ctype_num;
+            }
+            if (pctype)
+                *pctype = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
+            return s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
+        }
+
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_CLIENT_CERT_TYPES:
+        if (!s->server)
+            return 0;
+        return ssl3_set_req_cert_type(s->cert, parg, larg);
+
+    case SSL_CTRL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN:
+        return ssl_build_cert_chain(s, NULL, larg);
+
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_VERIFY_CERT_STORE:
+        return ssl_cert_set_cert_store(s->cert, parg, 0, larg);
+
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_CHAIN_CERT_STORE:
+        return ssl_cert_set_cert_store(s->cert, parg, 1, larg);
+
+    case SSL_CTRL_GET_PEER_SIGNATURE_NID:
+        if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
+            if (s->session) {
+                const EVP_MD *sig;
+                sig = s->s3->tmp.peer_md;
+                if (sig) {
+                    *(int *)parg = EVP_MD_type(sig);
+                    return 1;
+                }
+            }
+            return 0;
+        }
+        /* Might want to do something here for other versions */
+        else
+            return 0;
+
+    case SSL_CTRL_GET_SERVER_TMP_KEY:
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
+        if (s->server || s->session == NULL || s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL) {
+            return 0;
+        } else {
+            EVP_PKEY_up_ref(s->s3->peer_tmp);
+            *(EVP_PKEY **)parg = s->s3->peer_tmp;
+            return 1;
+        }
+#else
+        return 0;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    case SSL_CTRL_GET_EC_POINT_FORMATS:
+        {
+            SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
+            const unsigned char **pformat = parg;
+            if (!sess || !sess->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
+                return 0;
+            *pformat = sess->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
+            return (int)sess->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
+        }
+#endif
+
+    default:
+        break;
+    }
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+long ssl3_callback_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, void (*fp) (void))
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    switch (cmd) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB:
+        {
+            s->cert->dh_tmp_cb = (DH *(*)(SSL *, int, int))fp;
+        }
+        break;
+#endif
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_DEBUG_CB:
+        s->tlsext_debug_cb = (void (*)(SSL *, int, int,
+                                       const unsigned char *, int, void *))fp;
+        break;
+
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_NOT_RESUMABLE_SESS_CB:
+        {
+            s->not_resumable_session_cb = (int (*)(SSL *, int))fp;
+        }
+        break;
+    default:
+        break;
+    }
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+long ssl3_ctx_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
+{
+    switch (cmd) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH:
+        {
+            DH *dh = (DH *)parg;
+            EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL;
+            if (dh == NULL) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+                return 0;
+            }
+            pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dh);
+            if (pkdh == NULL) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                return 0;
+            }
+            if (!ssl_ctx_security(ctx, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
+                                  EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdh), 0, pkdh)) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
+                EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
+                return 1;
+            }
+            EVP_PKEY_free(ctx->cert->dh_tmp);
+            ctx->cert->dh_tmp = pkdh;
+            return 1;
+        }
+        /*
+         * break;
+         */
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB:
+        {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+            return (0);
+        }
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_DH_AUTO:
+        ctx->cert->dh_tmp_auto = larg;
+        return 1;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH:
+        {
+            const EC_GROUP *group = NULL;
+            int nid;
+
+            if (parg == NULL) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+                return 0;
+            }
+            group = EC_KEY_get0_group((const EC_KEY *)parg);
+            if (group == NULL) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, EC_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
+                return 0;
+            }
+            nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group);
+            if (nid == NID_undef)
+                return 0;
+            return tls1_set_curves(&ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
+                                   &ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length,
+                                   &nid, 1);
+        }
+        /* break; */
+#endif                          /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_ARG:
+        ctx->tlsext_servername_arg = parg;
+        break;
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEYS:
+    case SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEYS:
+        {
+            unsigned char *keys = parg;
+            long tlsext_tick_keylen = (sizeof(ctx->tlsext_tick_key_name) +
+                                       sizeof(ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key) +
+                                       sizeof(ctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key));
+            if (keys == NULL)
+                return tlsext_tick_keylen;
+            if (larg != tlsext_tick_keylen) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, SSL_R_INVALID_TICKET_KEYS_LENGTH);
+                return 0;
+            }
+            if (cmd == SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEYS) {
+                memcpy(ctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, keys,
+                       sizeof(ctx->tlsext_tick_key_name));
+                memcpy(ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
+                       keys + sizeof(ctx->tlsext_tick_key_name),
+                       sizeof(ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key));
+                memcpy(ctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
+                       keys + sizeof(ctx->tlsext_tick_key_name) +
+                       sizeof(ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key),
+                       sizeof(ctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key));
+            } else {
+                memcpy(keys, ctx->tlsext_tick_key_name,
+                       sizeof(ctx->tlsext_tick_key_name));
+                memcpy(keys + sizeof(ctx->tlsext_tick_key_name),
+                       ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
+                       sizeof(ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key));
+                memcpy(keys + sizeof(ctx->tlsext_tick_key_name) +
+                       sizeof(ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key),
+                       ctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
+                       sizeof(ctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key));
+            }
+            return 1;
+        }
+
+    case SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_TYPE:
+        return ctx->tlsext_status_type;
+
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_TYPE:
+        ctx->tlsext_status_type = larg;
+        break;
+
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB_ARG:
+        ctx->tlsext_status_arg = parg;
+        return 1;
+
+    case SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB_ARG:
+        *(void**)parg = ctx->tlsext_status_arg;
+        break;
+
+    case SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB:
+        *(int (**)(SSL*, void*))parg = ctx->tlsext_status_cb;
+        break;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_USERNAME:
+        ctx->srp_ctx.srp_Mask |= SSL_kSRP;
+        OPENSSL_free(ctx->srp_ctx.login);
+        ctx->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
+        if (parg == NULL)
+            break;
+        if (strlen((const char *)parg) > 255 || strlen((const char *)parg) < 1) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, SSL_R_INVALID_SRP_USERNAME);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        if ((ctx->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_strdup((char *)parg)) == NULL) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        break;
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_PASSWORD:
+        ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_give_srp_client_pwd_callback =
+            srp_password_from_info_cb;
+        if (ctx->srp_ctx.info != NULL)
+            OPENSSL_free(ctx->srp_ctx.info);
+        if ((ctx->srp_ctx.info = BUF_strdup((char *)parg)) == NULL) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        break;
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_ARG:
+        ctx->srp_ctx.srp_Mask |= SSL_kSRP;
+        ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_cb_arg = parg;
+        break;
+
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_STRENGTH:
+        ctx->srp_ctx.strength = larg;
+        break;
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_CURVES:
+        return tls1_set_curves(&ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
+                               &ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length,
+                               parg, larg);
+
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_CURVES_LIST:
+        return tls1_set_curves_list(&ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
+                                    &ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length,
+                                    parg);
+#endif
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_SIGALGS:
+        return tls1_set_sigalgs(ctx->cert, parg, larg, 0);
+
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_SIGALGS_LIST:
+        return tls1_set_sigalgs_list(ctx->cert, parg, 0);
+
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_CLIENT_SIGALGS:
+        return tls1_set_sigalgs(ctx->cert, parg, larg, 1);
+
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_CLIENT_SIGALGS_LIST:
+        return tls1_set_sigalgs_list(ctx->cert, parg, 1);
+
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_CLIENT_CERT_TYPES:
+        return ssl3_set_req_cert_type(ctx->cert, parg, larg);
+
+    case SSL_CTRL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN:
+        return ssl_build_cert_chain(NULL, ctx, larg);
+
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_VERIFY_CERT_STORE:
+        return ssl_cert_set_cert_store(ctx->cert, parg, 0, larg);
+
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_CHAIN_CERT_STORE:
+        return ssl_cert_set_cert_store(ctx->cert, parg, 1, larg);
+
+        /* A Thawte special :-) */
+    case SSL_CTRL_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERT:
+        if (ctx->extra_certs == NULL) {
+            if ((ctx->extra_certs = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                return 0;
+            }
+        }
+        if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->extra_certs, (X509 *)parg)) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        break;
+
+    case SSL_CTRL_GET_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERTS:
+        if (ctx->extra_certs == NULL && larg == 0)
+            *(STACK_OF(X509) **)parg = ctx->cert->key->chain;
+        else
+            *(STACK_OF(X509) **)parg = ctx->extra_certs;
+        break;
+
+    case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERTS:
+        sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->extra_certs, X509_free);
+        ctx->extra_certs = NULL;
+        break;
+
+    case SSL_CTRL_CHAIN:
+        if (larg)
+            return ssl_cert_set1_chain(NULL, ctx, (STACK_OF(X509) *)parg);
+        else
+            return ssl_cert_set0_chain(NULL, ctx, (STACK_OF(X509) *)parg);
+
+    case SSL_CTRL_CHAIN_CERT:
+        if (larg)
+            return ssl_cert_add1_chain_cert(NULL, ctx, (X509 *)parg);
+        else
+            return ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(NULL, ctx, (X509 *)parg);
+
+    case SSL_CTRL_GET_CHAIN_CERTS:
+        *(STACK_OF(X509) **)parg = ctx->cert->key->chain;
+        break;
+
+    case SSL_CTRL_SELECT_CURRENT_CERT:
+        return ssl_cert_select_current(ctx->cert, (X509 *)parg);
+
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_CURRENT_CERT:
+        return ssl_cert_set_current(ctx->cert, larg);
+
+    default:
+        return (0);
+    }
+    return (1);
+}
+
+long ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, void (*fp) (void))
+{
+    switch (cmd) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB:
+        {
+            ctx->cert->dh_tmp_cb = (DH *(*)(SSL *, int, int))fp;
+        }
+        break;
+#endif
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_CB:
+        ctx->tlsext_servername_callback = (int (*)(SSL *, int *, void *))fp;
+        break;
+
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB:
+        ctx->tlsext_status_cb = (int (*)(SSL *, void *))fp;
+        break;
+
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEY_CB:
+        ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb = (int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *,
+                                             unsigned char *,
+                                             EVP_CIPHER_CTX *,
+                                             HMAC_CTX *, int))fp;
+        break;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_VERIFY_PARAM_CB:
+        ctx->srp_ctx.srp_Mask |= SSL_kSRP;
+        ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_verify_param_callback = (int (*)(SSL *, void *))fp;
+        break;
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_USERNAME_CB:
+        ctx->srp_ctx.srp_Mask |= SSL_kSRP;
+        ctx->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback =
+            (int (*)(SSL *, int *, void *))fp;
+        break;
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_GIVE_CLIENT_PWD_CB:
+        ctx->srp_ctx.srp_Mask |= SSL_kSRP;
+        ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_give_srp_client_pwd_callback =
+            (char *(*)(SSL *, void *))fp;
+        break;
+#endif
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_NOT_RESUMABLE_SESS_CB:
+        {
+            ctx->not_resumable_session_cb = (int (*)(SSL *, int))fp;
+        }
+        break;
+    default:
+        return (0);
+    }
+    return (1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function needs to check if the ciphers required are actually
+ * available
+ */
+const SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_get_cipher_by_char(const unsigned char *p)
+{
+    SSL_CIPHER c;
+    const SSL_CIPHER *cp;
+    uint32_t id;
+
+    id = 0x03000000 | ((uint32_t)p[0] << 8L) | (uint32_t)p[1];
+    c.id = id;
+    cp = OBJ_bsearch_ssl_cipher_id(&c, ssl3_ciphers, SSL3_NUM_CIPHERS);
+    return cp;
+}
+
+int ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(const SSL_CIPHER *c, unsigned char *p)
+{
+    long l;
+
+    if (p != NULL) {
+        l = c->id;
+        if ((l & 0xff000000) != 0x03000000)
+            return (0);
+        p[0] = ((unsigned char)(l >> 8L)) & 0xFF;
+        p[1] = ((unsigned char)(l)) & 0xFF;
+    }
+    return (2);
+}
+
+/*
+ * ssl3_choose_cipher - choose a cipher from those offered by the client
+ * @s: SSL connection
+ * @clnt: ciphers offered by the client
+ * @srvr: ciphers enabled on the server?
+ *
+ * Returns the selected cipher or NULL when no common ciphers.
+ */
+const SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_choose_cipher(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *clnt,
+                                     STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *srvr)
+{
+    const SSL_CIPHER *c, *ret = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *prio, *allow;
+    int i, ii, ok;
+    unsigned long alg_k, alg_a, mask_k, mask_a;
+
+    /* Let's see which ciphers we can support */
+
+#if 0
+    /*
+     * Do not set the compare functions, because this may lead to a
+     * reordering by "id". We want to keep the original ordering. We may pay
+     * a price in performance during sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(), but would have to
+     * pay with the price of sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup().
+     */
+    sk_SSL_CIPHER_set_cmp_func(srvr, ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp);
+    sk_SSL_CIPHER_set_cmp_func(clnt, ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
+    fprintf(stderr, "Server has %d from %p:\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(srvr),
+            (void *)srvr);
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(srvr); ++i) {
+        c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(srvr, i);
+        fprintf(stderr, "%p:%s\n", (void *)c, c->name);
+    }
+    fprintf(stderr, "Client sent %d from %p:\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(clnt),
+            (void *)clnt);
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(clnt); ++i) {
+        c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(clnt, i);
+        fprintf(stderr, "%p:%s\n", (void *)c, c->name);
+    }
+#endif
+
+    if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || tls1_suiteb(s)) {
+        prio = srvr;
+        allow = clnt;
+    } else {
+        prio = clnt;
+        allow = srvr;
+    }
+
+    tls1_set_cert_validity(s);
+    ssl_set_masks(s);
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(prio); i++) {
+        c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(prio, i);
+
+        /* Skip ciphers not supported by the protocol version */
+        if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) &&
+            ((s->version < c->min_tls) || (s->version > c->max_tls)))
+            continue;
+        if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) &&
+            (DTLS_VERSION_LT(s->version, c->min_dtls) ||
+             DTLS_VERSION_GT(s->version, c->max_dtls)))
+            continue;
+
+        mask_k = s->s3->tmp.mask_k;
+        mask_a = s->s3->tmp.mask_a;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+        if (s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP) {
+            mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
+            mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
+        }
+#endif
+
+        alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
+        alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+        /* with PSK there must be server callback set */
+        if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
+            continue;
+#endif                          /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
+
+        ok = (alg_k & mask_k) && (alg_a & mask_a);
+#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
+        fprintf(stderr, "%d:[%08lX:%08lX:%08lX:%08lX]%p:%s\n", ok, alg_k,
+                alg_a, mask_k, mask_a, (void *)c, c->name);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+        /*
+         * if we are considering an ECC cipher suite that uses an ephemeral
+         * EC key check it
+         */
+        if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE)
+            ok = ok && tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(s, c->id);
+#endif                          /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
+        if (!ok)
+            continue;
+        ii = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(allow, c);
+        if (ii >= 0) {
+            /* Check security callback permits this cipher */
+            if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SHARED,
+                              c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c))
+                continue;
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
+            if ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) && (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
+                && s->s3->is_probably_safari) {
+                if (!ret)
+                    ret = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(allow, ii);
+                continue;
+            }
+#endif
+            ret = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(allow, ii);
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+int ssl3_get_req_cert_type(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    uint32_t alg_k, alg_a = 0;
+
+    /* If we have custom certificate types set, use them */
+    if (s->cert->ctypes) {
+        memcpy(p, s->cert->ctypes, s->cert->ctype_num);
+        return (int)s->cert->ctype_num;
+    }
+    /* Get mask of algorithms disabled by signature list */
+    ssl_set_sig_mask(&alg_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
+
+    alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
+    if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION) {
+        if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
+            p[ret++] = TLS_CT_GOST01_SIGN;
+            p[ret++] = TLS_CT_GOST12_SIGN;
+            p[ret++] = TLS_CT_GOST12_512_SIGN;
+            return (ret);
+        }
+    }
+#endif
+
+    if ((s->version == SSL3_VERSION) && (alg_k & SSL_kDHE)) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+        p[ret++] = SSL3_CT_RSA_EPHEMERAL_DH;
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+        p[ret++] = SSL3_CT_DSS_EPHEMERAL_DH;
+# endif
+#endif                          /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+    }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+    if (!(alg_a & SSL_aRSA))
+        p[ret++] = SSL3_CT_RSA_SIGN;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+    if (!(alg_a & SSL_aDSS))
+        p[ret++] = SSL3_CT_DSS_SIGN;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    /*
+     * ECDSA certs can be used with RSA cipher suites too so we don't
+     * need to check for SSL_kECDH or SSL_kECDHE
+     */
+    if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION) {
+        if (!(alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))
+            p[ret++] = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
+    }
+#endif
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static int ssl3_set_req_cert_type(CERT *c, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
+{
+    OPENSSL_free(c->ctypes);
+    c->ctypes = NULL;
+    if (!p || !len)
+        return 1;
+    if (len > 0xff)
+        return 0;
+    c->ctypes = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
+    if (c->ctypes == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    memcpy(c->ctypes, p, len);
+    c->ctype_num = len;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl3_shutdown(SSL *s)
+{
+    int ret;
+
+    /*
+     * Don't do anything much if we have not done the handshake or we don't
+     * want to send messages :-)
+     */
+    if (s->quiet_shutdown || SSL_in_before(s)) {
+        s->shutdown = (SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN | SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN);
+        return (1);
+    }
+
+    if (!(s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN)) {
+        s->shutdown |= SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN;
+        ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY);
+        /*
+         * our shutdown alert has been sent now, and if it still needs to be
+         * written, s->s3->alert_dispatch will be true
+         */
+        if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
+            return (-1);        /* return WANT_WRITE */
+    } else if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
+        /* resend it if not sent */
+        ret = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
+        if (ret == -1) {
+            /*
+             * we only get to return -1 here the 2nd/Nth invocation, we must
+             * have already signalled return 0 upon a previous invocation,
+             * return WANT_WRITE
+             */
+            return (ret);
+        }
+    } else if (!(s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)) {
+        /*
+         * If we are waiting for a close from our peer, we are closed
+         */
+        s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, 0, NULL, NULL, 0, 0);
+        if (!(s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)) {
+            return (-1);        /* return WANT_READ */
+        }
+    }
+
+    if ((s->shutdown == (SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN | SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)) &&
+        !s->s3->alert_dispatch)
+        return (1);
+    else
+        return (0);
+}
+
+int ssl3_write(SSL *s, const void *buf, int len)
+{
+    clear_sys_error();
+    if (s->s3->renegotiate)
+        ssl3_renegotiate_check(s);
+
+    return s->method->ssl_write_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA, buf, len);
+}
+
+static int ssl3_read_internal(SSL *s, void *buf, int len, int peek)
+{
+    int ret;
+
+    clear_sys_error();
+    if (s->s3->renegotiate)
+        ssl3_renegotiate_check(s);
+    s->s3->in_read_app_data = 1;
+    ret =
+        s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA, NULL, buf, len,
+                                  peek);
+    if ((ret == -1) && (s->s3->in_read_app_data == 2)) {
+        /*
+         * ssl3_read_bytes decided to call s->handshake_func, which called
+         * ssl3_read_bytes to read handshake data. However, ssl3_read_bytes
+         * actually found application data and thinks that application data
+         * makes sense here; so disable handshake processing and try to read
+         * application data again.
+         */
+        ossl_statem_set_in_handshake(s, 1);
+        ret =
+            s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA, NULL, buf,
+                                      len, peek);
+        ossl_statem_set_in_handshake(s, 0);
+    } else
+        s->s3->in_read_app_data = 0;
+
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+int ssl3_read(SSL *s, void *buf, int len)
+{
+    return ssl3_read_internal(s, buf, len, 0);
+}
+
+int ssl3_peek(SSL *s, void *buf, int len)
+{
+    return ssl3_read_internal(s, buf, len, 1);
+}
+
+int ssl3_renegotiate(SSL *s)
+{
+    if (s->handshake_func == NULL)
+        return (1);
+
+    if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)
+        return (0);
+
+    s->s3->renegotiate = 1;
+    return (1);
+}
+
+int ssl3_renegotiate_check(SSL *s)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    if (s->s3->renegotiate) {
+        if (!RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(&s->rlayer)
+            && !RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(&s->rlayer)
+            && !SSL_in_init(s)) {
+            /*
+             * if we are the server, and we have sent a 'RENEGOTIATE'
+             * message, we need to set the state machine into the renegotiate
+             * state.
+             */
+            ossl_statem_set_renegotiate(s);
+            s->s3->renegotiate = 0;
+            s->s3->num_renegotiations++;
+            s->s3->total_renegotiations++;
+            ret = 1;
+        }
+    }
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+/*
+ * If we are using default SHA1+MD5 algorithms switch to new SHA256 PRF and
+ * handshake macs if required.
+ *
+ * If PSK and using SHA384 for TLS < 1.2 switch to default.
+ */
+long ssl_get_algorithm2(SSL *s)
+{
+    long alg2;
+    if (s->s3 == NULL || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
+        return -1;
+    alg2 = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2;
+    if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF) {
+        if (alg2 == (SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF))
+            return SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256;
+    } else if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK) {
+        if (alg2 == (SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384))
+            return SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF;
+    }
+    return alg2;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Fill a ClientRandom or ServerRandom field of length len. Returns <= 0 on
+ * failure, 1 on success.
+ */
+int ssl_fill_hello_random(SSL *s, int server, unsigned char *result, int len)
+{
+    int send_time = 0;
+
+    if (len < 4)
+        return 0;
+    if (server)
+        send_time = (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_SERVERHELLO_TIME) != 0;
+    else
+        send_time = (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_CLIENTHELLO_TIME) != 0;
+    if (send_time) {
+        unsigned long Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
+        unsigned char *p = result;
+        l2n(Time, p);
+        return RAND_bytes(p, len - 4);
+    } else
+        return RAND_bytes(result, len);
+}
+
+int ssl_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *pms, size_t pmslen,
+                               int free_pms)
+{
+    unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+    if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+        unsigned char *pskpms, *t;
+        size_t psklen = s->s3->tmp.psklen;
+        size_t pskpmslen;
+
+        /* create PSK premaster_secret */
+
+        /* For plain PSK "other_secret" is psklen zeroes */
+        if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
+            pmslen = psklen;
+
+        pskpmslen = 4 + pmslen + psklen;
+        pskpms = OPENSSL_malloc(pskpmslen);
+        if (pskpms == NULL) {
+            s->session->master_key_length = 0;
+            goto err;
+        }
+        t = pskpms;
+        s2n(pmslen, t);
+        if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
+            memset(t, 0, pmslen);
+        else
+            memcpy(t, pms, pmslen);
+        t += pmslen;
+        s2n(psklen, t);
+        memcpy(t, s->s3->tmp.psk, psklen);
+
+        OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, psklen);
+        s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
+        s->session->master_key_length =
+            s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+                                                        s->session->master_key,
+                                                        pskpms, pskpmslen);
+        OPENSSL_clear_free(pskpms, pskpmslen);
+#else
+        /* Should never happen */
+        s->session->master_key_length = 0;
+        goto err;
+#endif
+    } else {
+        s->session->master_key_length =
+            s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+                                                        s->session->master_key,
+                                                        pms, pmslen);
+    }
+
+ err:
+    if (pms) {
+        if (free_pms)
+            OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
+        else
+            OPENSSL_cleanse(pms, pmslen);
+    }
+    if (s->server == 0)
+        s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
+    return s->session->master_key_length >= 0;
+}
+
+/* Generate a private key from parameters */
+EVP_PKEY *ssl_generate_pkey(EVP_PKEY *pm)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+
+    if (pm == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pm, NULL);
+    if (pctx == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(pctx) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    if (EVP_PKEY_keygen(pctx, &pkey) <= 0) {
+        EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+        pkey = NULL;
+    }
+
+    err:
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+    return pkey;
+}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+/* Generate a private key a curve ID */
+EVP_PKEY *ssl_generate_pkey_curve(int id)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+    unsigned int curve_flags;
+    int nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id, &curve_flags);
+
+    if (nid == 0)
+        goto err;
+    if ((curve_flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM) {
+        pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(nid, NULL);
+        nid = 0;
+    } else {
+        pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL);
+    }
+    if (pctx == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(pctx) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    if (nid != 0 && EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx, nid) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    if (EVP_PKEY_keygen(pctx, &pkey) <= 0) {
+        EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+        pkey = NULL;
+    }
+
+ err:
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+    return pkey;
+}
+#endif
+
+/* Derive premaster or master secret for ECDH/DH */
+int ssl_derive(SSL *s, EVP_PKEY *privkey, EVP_PKEY *pubkey)
+{
+    int rv = 0;
+    unsigned char *pms = NULL;
+    size_t pmslen = 0;
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx;
+
+    if (privkey == NULL || pubkey == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(privkey, NULL);
+
+    if (EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx) <= 0
+        || EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pctx, pubkey) <= 0
+        || EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx, NULL, &pmslen) <= 0) {
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
+    if (pms == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx, pms, &pmslen) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (s->server) {
+        /* For server generate master secret and discard premaster */
+        rv = ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1);
+        pms = NULL;
+    } else {
+        /* For client just save premaster secret */
+        s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
+        s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
+        pms = NULL;
+        rv = 1;
+    }
+
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+    return rv;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+EVP_PKEY *ssl_dh_to_pkey(DH *dh)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY *ret;
+    if (dh == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    ret = EVP_PKEY_new();
+    if (EVP_PKEY_set1_DH(ret, dh) <= 0) {
+        EVP_PKEY_free(ret);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/s3_msg.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/s3_msg.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4961cc8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/s3_msg.c
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#define USE_SOCKETS
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+
+int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    if (s->server)
+        i = SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;
+    else
+        i = SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ;
+
+    if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL) {
+        if (s->session == NULL || s->session->master_key_length == 0) {
+            /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
+            return (0);
+        }
+
+        s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
+        if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
+            return (0);
+    }
+
+    if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, i))
+        return (0);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc)
+{
+    /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
+    desc = s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc);
+    if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION)
+        desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have
+                                          * protocol_version alerts */
+    if (desc < 0)
+        return -1;
+    /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
+    if ((level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) && (s->session != NULL))
+        SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
+
+    s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1;
+    s->s3->send_alert[0] = level;
+    s->s3->send_alert[1] = desc;
+    if (!RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
+        /* data still being written out? */
+        return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
+    }
+    /*
+     * else data is still being written out, we will get written some time in
+     * the future
+     */
+    return -1;
+}
+
+int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
+{
+    int i, j;
+    unsigned int alertlen;
+    void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
+
+    s->s3->alert_dispatch = 0;
+    alertlen = 2;
+    i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], &alertlen, 1, 0);
+    if (i <= 0) {
+        s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1;
+    } else {
+        /*
+         * Alert sent to BIO.  If it is important, flush it now. If the
+         * message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO, we will not
+         * worry too much.
+         */
+        if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL)
+            (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
+
+        if (s->msg_callback)
+            s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert,
+                            2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+        if (s->info_callback != NULL)
+            cb = s->info_callback;
+        else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
+            cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
+
+        if (cb != NULL) {
+            j = (s->s3->send_alert[0] << 8) | s->s3->send_alert[1];
+            cb(s, SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT, j);
+        }
+    }
+    return (i);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/ssl_asn1.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/ssl_asn1.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3e9c1c4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/ssl_asn1.c
@@ -0,0 +1,367 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#include "internal/asn1t.h"
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+typedef struct {
+    uint32_t version;
+    int32_t ssl_version;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *cipher;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *comp_id;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *master_key;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *session_id;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *key_arg;
+    int64_t time;
+    int64_t timeout;
+    X509 *peer;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *session_id_context;
+    int32_t verify_result;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *tlsext_hostname;
+    int64_t tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *tlsext_tick;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *psk_identity_hint;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *psk_identity;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *srp_username;
+#endif
+    uint64_t flags;
+} SSL_SESSION_ASN1;
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(SSL_SESSION_ASN1) = {
+    ASN1_EMBED(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, version, UINT32),
+    ASN1_EMBED(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, ssl_version, INT32),
+    ASN1_SIMPLE(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, cipher, ASN1_OCTET_STRING),
+    ASN1_SIMPLE(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, session_id, ASN1_OCTET_STRING),
+    ASN1_SIMPLE(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, master_key, ASN1_OCTET_STRING),
+    ASN1_IMP_OPT(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, key_arg, ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 0),
+    ASN1_EXP_OPT_EMBED(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, time, ZINT64, 1),
+    ASN1_EXP_OPT_EMBED(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, timeout, ZINT64, 2),
+    ASN1_EXP_OPT(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, peer, X509, 3),
+    ASN1_EXP_OPT(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, session_id_context, ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 4),
+    ASN1_EXP_OPT_EMBED(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, verify_result, ZINT32, 5),
+    ASN1_EXP_OPT(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, tlsext_hostname, ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 6),
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+    ASN1_EXP_OPT(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, psk_identity_hint, ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 7),
+    ASN1_EXP_OPT(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, psk_identity, ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 8),
+#endif
+    ASN1_EXP_OPT_EMBED(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint, ZUINT64, 9),
+    ASN1_EXP_OPT(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, tlsext_tick, ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 10),
+    ASN1_EXP_OPT(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, comp_id, ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 11),
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+    ASN1_EXP_OPT(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, srp_username, ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 12),
+#endif
+    ASN1_EXP_OPT_EMBED(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, flags, ZUINT64, 13)
+} static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(SSL_SESSION_ASN1)
+
+IMPLEMENT_STATIC_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS(SSL_SESSION_ASN1)
+
+/* Utility functions for i2d_SSL_SESSION */
+
+/* Initialise OCTET STRING from buffer and length */
+
+static void ssl_session_oinit(ASN1_OCTET_STRING **dest, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os,
+                              unsigned char *data, size_t len)
+{
+    os->data = data;
+    os->length = len;
+    os->flags = 0;
+    *dest = os;
+}
+
+/* Initialise OCTET STRING from string */
+static void ssl_session_sinit(ASN1_OCTET_STRING **dest, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os,
+                              char *data)
+{
+    if (data != NULL)
+        ssl_session_oinit(dest, os, (unsigned char *)data, strlen(data));
+    else
+        *dest = NULL;
+}
+
+int i2d_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION *in, unsigned char **pp)
+{
+
+    SSL_SESSION_ASN1 as;
+
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING cipher;
+    unsigned char cipher_data[2];
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING master_key, session_id, sid_ctx;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING comp_id;
+    unsigned char comp_id_data;
+#endif
+
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING tlsext_hostname, tlsext_tick;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING srp_username;
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING psk_identity, psk_identity_hint;
+#endif
+
+    long l;
+
+    if ((in == NULL) || ((in->cipher == NULL) && (in->cipher_id == 0)))
+        return 0;
+
+    memset(&as, 0, sizeof(as));
+
+    as.version = SSL_SESSION_ASN1_VERSION;
+    as.ssl_version = in->ssl_version;
+
+    if (in->cipher == NULL)
+        l = in->cipher_id;
+    else
+        l = in->cipher->id;
+    cipher_data[0] = ((unsigned char)(l >> 8L)) & 0xff;
+    cipher_data[1] = ((unsigned char)(l)) & 0xff;
+
+    ssl_session_oinit(&as.cipher, &cipher, cipher_data, 2);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+    if (in->compress_meth) {
+        comp_id_data = (unsigned char)in->compress_meth;
+        ssl_session_oinit(&as.comp_id, &comp_id, &comp_id_data, 1);
+    }
+#endif
+
+    ssl_session_oinit(&as.master_key, &master_key,
+                      in->master_key, in->master_key_length);
+
+    ssl_session_oinit(&as.session_id, &session_id,
+                      in->session_id, in->session_id_length);
+
+    ssl_session_oinit(&as.session_id_context, &sid_ctx,
+                      in->sid_ctx, in->sid_ctx_length);
+
+    as.time = in->time;
+    as.timeout = in->timeout;
+    as.verify_result = in->verify_result;
+
+    as.peer = in->peer;
+
+    ssl_session_sinit(&as.tlsext_hostname, &tlsext_hostname,
+                      in->tlsext_hostname);
+    if (in->tlsext_tick) {
+        ssl_session_oinit(&as.tlsext_tick, &tlsext_tick,
+                          in->tlsext_tick, in->tlsext_ticklen);
+    }
+    if (in->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint > 0)
+        as.tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = in->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+    ssl_session_sinit(&as.psk_identity_hint, &psk_identity_hint,
+                      in->psk_identity_hint);
+    ssl_session_sinit(&as.psk_identity, &psk_identity, in->psk_identity);
+#endif                          /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+    ssl_session_sinit(&as.srp_username, &srp_username, in->srp_username);
+#endif                          /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
+
+    as.flags = in->flags;
+
+    return i2d_SSL_SESSION_ASN1(&as, pp);
+
+}
+
+/* Utility functions for d2i_SSL_SESSION */
+
+/* OPENSSL_strndup an OCTET STRING */
+
+static int ssl_session_strndup(char **pdst, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *src)
+{
+    OPENSSL_free(*pdst);
+    *pdst = NULL;
+    if (src == NULL)
+        return 1;
+    *pdst = OPENSSL_strndup((char *)src->data, src->length);
+    if (*pdst == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Copy an OCTET STRING, return error if it exceeds maximum length */
+
+static int ssl_session_memcpy(unsigned char *dst, unsigned int *pdstlen,
+                              ASN1_OCTET_STRING *src, int maxlen)
+{
+    if (src == NULL) {
+        *pdstlen = 0;
+        return 1;
+    }
+    if (src->length > maxlen)
+        return 0;
+    memcpy(dst, src->data, src->length);
+    *pdstlen = src->length;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+SSL_SESSION *d2i_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION **a, const unsigned char **pp,
+                             long length)
+{
+    long id;
+    unsigned int tmpl;
+    const unsigned char *p = *pp;
+    SSL_SESSION_ASN1 *as = NULL;
+    SSL_SESSION *ret = NULL;
+
+    as = d2i_SSL_SESSION_ASN1(NULL, &p, length);
+    /* ASN.1 code returns suitable error */
+    if (as == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!a || !*a) {
+        ret = SSL_SESSION_new();
+        if (ret == NULL)
+            goto err;
+    } else {
+        ret = *a;
+    }
+
+    if (as->version != SSL_SESSION_ASN1_VERSION) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_D2I_SSL_SESSION, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_SSL_VERSION);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if ((as->ssl_version >> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR
+        && (as->ssl_version >> 8) != DTLS1_VERSION_MAJOR
+        && as->ssl_version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_D2I_SSL_SESSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_SSL_VERSION);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    ret->ssl_version = (int)as->ssl_version;
+
+    if (as->cipher->length != 2) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_D2I_SSL_SESSION, SSL_R_CIPHER_CODE_WRONG_LENGTH);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    id = 0x03000000L | ((unsigned long)as->cipher->data[0] << 8L)
+                     | (unsigned long)as->cipher->data[1];
+
+    ret->cipher = NULL;
+    ret->cipher_id = id;
+
+    if (!ssl_session_memcpy(ret->session_id, &ret->session_id_length,
+                            as->session_id, SSL3_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!ssl_session_memcpy(ret->master_key, &tmpl,
+                            as->master_key, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH))
+        goto err;
+
+    ret->master_key_length = tmpl;
+
+    if (as->time != 0)
+        ret->time = as->time;
+    else
+        ret->time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
+
+    if (as->timeout != 0)
+        ret->timeout = as->timeout;
+    else
+        ret->timeout = 3;
+
+    X509_free(ret->peer);
+    ret->peer = as->peer;
+    as->peer = NULL;
+
+    if (!ssl_session_memcpy(ret->sid_ctx, &ret->sid_ctx_length,
+                            as->session_id_context, SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH))
+        goto err;
+
+    /* NB: this defaults to zero which is X509_V_OK */
+    ret->verify_result = as->verify_result;
+
+    if (!ssl_session_strndup(&ret->tlsext_hostname, as->tlsext_hostname))
+        goto err;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+    if (!ssl_session_strndup(&ret->psk_identity_hint, as->psk_identity_hint))
+        goto err;
+    if (!ssl_session_strndup(&ret->psk_identity, as->psk_identity))
+        goto err;
+#endif
+
+    ret->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = as->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint;
+    if (as->tlsext_tick) {
+        ret->tlsext_tick = as->tlsext_tick->data;
+        ret->tlsext_ticklen = as->tlsext_tick->length;
+        as->tlsext_tick->data = NULL;
+    } else {
+        ret->tlsext_tick = NULL;
+    }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+    if (as->comp_id) {
+        if (as->comp_id->length != 1) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_D2I_SSL_SESSION, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        ret->compress_meth = as->comp_id->data[0];
+    } else {
+        ret->compress_meth = 0;
+    }
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+    if (!ssl_session_strndup(&ret->srp_username, as->srp_username))
+        goto err;
+#endif                          /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
+    /* Flags defaults to zero which is fine */
+    ret->flags = as->flags;
+
+    M_ASN1_free_of(as, SSL_SESSION_ASN1);
+
+    if ((a != NULL) && (*a == NULL))
+        *a = ret;
+    *pp = p;
+    return ret;
+
+ err:
+    M_ASN1_free_of(as, SSL_SESSION_ASN1);
+    if ((a == NULL) || (*a != ret))
+        SSL_SESSION_free(ret);
+    return NULL;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/ssl_cert.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/ssl_cert.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..deaaeb0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/ssl_cert.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1087 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include "e_os.h"
+#include "internal/o_dir.h"
+#include <openssl/lhash.h>
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#include "internal/thread_once.h"
+
+static int ssl_security_default_callback(const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                         int op, int bits, int nid, void *other,
+                                         void *ex);
+
+static CRYPTO_ONCE ssl_x509_store_ctx_once = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
+static volatile int ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx = -1;
+
+DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(ssl_x509_store_ctx_init)
+{
+    ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(0,
+                                                             "SSL for verify callback",
+                                                             NULL, NULL, NULL);
+    return ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx >= 0;
+}
+
+int SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(void)
+{
+
+    if (!RUN_ONCE(&ssl_x509_store_ctx_once, ssl_x509_store_ctx_init))
+        return -1;
+    return ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx;
+}
+
+CERT *ssl_cert_new(void)
+{
+    CERT *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
+
+    if (ret == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    ret->key = &(ret->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]);
+    ret->references = 1;
+    ret->sec_cb = ssl_security_default_callback;
+    ret->sec_level = OPENSSL_TLS_SECURITY_LEVEL;
+    ret->sec_ex = NULL;
+    ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
+    if (ret->lock == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        OPENSSL_free(ret);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert)
+{
+    CERT *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
+    int i;
+
+    if (ret == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    ret->references = 1;
+    ret->key = &ret->pkeys[cert->key - cert->pkeys];
+    ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
+    if (ret->lock == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        OPENSSL_free(ret);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+    if (cert->dh_tmp != NULL) {
+        ret->dh_tmp = cert->dh_tmp;
+        EVP_PKEY_up_ref(ret->dh_tmp);
+    }
+    ret->dh_tmp_cb = cert->dh_tmp_cb;
+    ret->dh_tmp_auto = cert->dh_tmp_auto;
+#endif
+
+    for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
+        CERT_PKEY *cpk = cert->pkeys + i;
+        CERT_PKEY *rpk = ret->pkeys + i;
+        if (cpk->x509 != NULL) {
+            rpk->x509 = cpk->x509;
+            X509_up_ref(rpk->x509);
+        }
+
+        if (cpk->privatekey != NULL) {
+            rpk->privatekey = cpk->privatekey;
+            EVP_PKEY_up_ref(cpk->privatekey);
+        }
+
+        if (cpk->chain) {
+            rpk->chain = X509_chain_up_ref(cpk->chain);
+            if (!rpk->chain) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                goto err;
+            }
+        }
+        if (cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo != NULL) {
+            /* Just copy everything. */
+            ret->pkeys[i].serverinfo =
+                OPENSSL_malloc(cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo_length);
+            if (ret->pkeys[i].serverinfo == NULL) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            ret->pkeys[i].serverinfo_length = cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo_length;
+            memcpy(ret->pkeys[i].serverinfo,
+                   cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo, cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo_length);
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* Configured sigalgs copied across */
+    if (cert->conf_sigalgs) {
+        ret->conf_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(cert->conf_sigalgslen);
+        if (ret->conf_sigalgs == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        memcpy(ret->conf_sigalgs, cert->conf_sigalgs, cert->conf_sigalgslen);
+        ret->conf_sigalgslen = cert->conf_sigalgslen;
+    } else
+        ret->conf_sigalgs = NULL;
+
+    if (cert->client_sigalgs) {
+        ret->client_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(cert->client_sigalgslen);
+        if (ret->client_sigalgs == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        memcpy(ret->client_sigalgs, cert->client_sigalgs,
+               cert->client_sigalgslen);
+        ret->client_sigalgslen = cert->client_sigalgslen;
+    } else
+        ret->client_sigalgs = NULL;
+    /* Shared sigalgs also NULL */
+    ret->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
+    /* Copy any custom client certificate types */
+    if (cert->ctypes) {
+        ret->ctypes = OPENSSL_malloc(cert->ctype_num);
+        if (ret->ctypes == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        memcpy(ret->ctypes, cert->ctypes, cert->ctype_num);
+        ret->ctype_num = cert->ctype_num;
+    }
+
+    ret->cert_flags = cert->cert_flags;
+
+    ret->cert_cb = cert->cert_cb;
+    ret->cert_cb_arg = cert->cert_cb_arg;
+
+    if (cert->verify_store) {
+        X509_STORE_up_ref(cert->verify_store);
+        ret->verify_store = cert->verify_store;
+    }
+
+    if (cert->chain_store) {
+        X509_STORE_up_ref(cert->chain_store);
+        ret->chain_store = cert->chain_store;
+    }
+
+    ret->sec_cb = cert->sec_cb;
+    ret->sec_level = cert->sec_level;
+    ret->sec_ex = cert->sec_ex;
+
+    if (!custom_exts_copy(&ret->cli_ext, &cert->cli_ext))
+        goto err;
+    if (!custom_exts_copy(&ret->srv_ext, &cert->srv_ext))
+        goto err;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+    if (cert->psk_identity_hint) {
+        ret->psk_identity_hint = OPENSSL_strdup(cert->psk_identity_hint);
+        if (ret->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
+            goto err;
+    }
+#endif
+    return ret;
+
+ err:
+    ssl_cert_free(ret);
+
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+/* Free up and clear all certificates and chains */
+
+void ssl_cert_clear_certs(CERT *c)
+{
+    int i;
+    if (c == NULL)
+        return;
+    for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
+        CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->pkeys + i;
+        X509_free(cpk->x509);
+        cpk->x509 = NULL;
+        EVP_PKEY_free(cpk->privatekey);
+        cpk->privatekey = NULL;
+        sk_X509_pop_free(cpk->chain, X509_free);
+        cpk->chain = NULL;
+        OPENSSL_free(cpk->serverinfo);
+        cpk->serverinfo = NULL;
+        cpk->serverinfo_length = 0;
+    }
+}
+
+void ssl_cert_free(CERT *c)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    if (c == NULL)
+        return;
+
+    CRYPTO_atomic_add(&c->references, -1, &i, c->lock);
+    REF_PRINT_COUNT("CERT", c);
+    if (i > 0)
+        return;
+    REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+    EVP_PKEY_free(c->dh_tmp);
+#endif
+
+    ssl_cert_clear_certs(c);
+    OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
+    OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
+    OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
+    OPENSSL_free(c->ctypes);
+    X509_STORE_free(c->verify_store);
+    X509_STORE_free(c->chain_store);
+    custom_exts_free(&c->cli_ext);
+    custom_exts_free(&c->srv_ext);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+    OPENSSL_free(c->psk_identity_hint);
+#endif
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(c->lock);
+    OPENSSL_free(c);
+}
+
+int ssl_cert_set0_chain(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
+{
+    int i, r;
+    CERT_PKEY *cpk = s ? s->cert->key : ctx->cert->key;
+    if (!cpk)
+        return 0;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
+        r = ssl_security_cert(s, ctx, sk_X509_value(chain, i), 0, 0);
+        if (r != 1) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_SET0_CHAIN, r);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+    sk_X509_pop_free(cpk->chain, X509_free);
+    cpk->chain = chain;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_cert_set1_chain(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
+{
+    STACK_OF(X509) *dchain;
+    if (!chain)
+        return ssl_cert_set0_chain(s, ctx, NULL);
+    dchain = X509_chain_up_ref(chain);
+    if (!dchain)
+        return 0;
+    if (!ssl_cert_set0_chain(s, ctx, dchain)) {
+        sk_X509_pop_free(dchain, X509_free);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
+{
+    int r;
+    CERT_PKEY *cpk = s ? s->cert->key : ctx->cert->key;
+    if (!cpk)
+        return 0;
+    r = ssl_security_cert(s, ctx, x, 0, 0);
+    if (r != 1) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_ADD0_CHAIN_CERT, r);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (!cpk->chain)
+        cpk->chain = sk_X509_new_null();
+    if (!cpk->chain || !sk_X509_push(cpk->chain, x))
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_cert_add1_chain_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
+{
+    if (!ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(s, ctx, x))
+        return 0;
+    X509_up_ref(x);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_cert_select_current(CERT *c, X509 *x)
+{
+    int i;
+    if (x == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
+        CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->pkeys + i;
+        if (cpk->x509 == x && cpk->privatekey) {
+            c->key = cpk;
+            return 1;
+        }
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
+        CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->pkeys + i;
+        if (cpk->privatekey && cpk->x509 && !X509_cmp(cpk->x509, x)) {
+            c->key = cpk;
+            return 1;
+        }
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int ssl_cert_set_current(CERT *c, long op)
+{
+    int i, idx;
+    if (!c)
+        return 0;
+    if (op == SSL_CERT_SET_FIRST)
+        idx = 0;
+    else if (op == SSL_CERT_SET_NEXT) {
+        idx = (int)(c->key - c->pkeys + 1);
+        if (idx >= SSL_PKEY_NUM)
+            return 0;
+    } else
+        return 0;
+    for (i = idx; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
+        CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->pkeys + i;
+        if (cpk->x509 && cpk->privatekey) {
+            c->key = cpk;
+            return 1;
+        }
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+void ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(CERT *c, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg)
+{
+    c->cert_cb = cb;
+    c->cert_cb_arg = arg;
+}
+
+int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
+{
+    X509 *x;
+    int i = 0;
+    X509_STORE *verify_store;
+    X509_STORE_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+    X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
+
+    if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_X509_num(sk) == 0))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (s->cert->verify_store)
+        verify_store = s->cert->verify_store;
+    else
+        verify_store = s->ctx->cert_store;
+
+    ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
+    if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, verify_store, x, sk)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
+        goto end;
+    }
+    param = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(ctx);
+    /*
+     * XXX: Separate @AUTHSECLEVEL and @TLSSECLEVEL would be useful at some
+     * point, for now a single @SECLEVEL sets the same policy for TLS crypto
+     * and PKI authentication.
+     */
+    X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_auth_level(param, SSL_get_security_level(s));
+
+    /* Set suite B flags if needed */
+    X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(ctx, tls1_suiteb(s));
+    if (!X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data
+        (ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(), s)) {
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    /* Verify via DANE if enabled */
+    if (DANETLS_ENABLED(&s->dane))
+        X509_STORE_CTX_set0_dane(ctx, &s->dane);
+
+    /*
+     * We need to inherit the verify parameters. These can be determined by
+     * the context: if its a server it will verify SSL client certificates or
+     * vice versa.
+     */
+
+    X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(ctx, s->server ? "ssl_client" : "ssl_server");
+    /*
+     * Anything non-default in "s->param" should overwrite anything in the ctx.
+     */
+    X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(param, s->param);
+
+    if (s->verify_callback)
+        X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(ctx, s->verify_callback);
+
+    if (s->ctx->app_verify_callback != NULL)
+        i = s->ctx->app_verify_callback(ctx, s->ctx->app_verify_arg);
+    else
+        i = X509_verify_cert(ctx);
+
+    s->verify_result = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
+    sk_X509_pop_free(s->verified_chain, X509_free);
+    s->verified_chain = NULL;
+    if (X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(ctx) != NULL) {
+        s->verified_chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(ctx);
+        if (s->verified_chain == NULL) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            i = 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* Move peername from the store context params to the SSL handle's */
+    X509_VERIFY_PARAM_move_peername(s->param, param);
+
+ end:
+    X509_STORE_CTX_free(ctx);
+    return i;
+}
+
+static void set_client_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **ca_list,
+                               STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list)
+{
+    sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(*ca_list, X509_NAME_free);
+    *ca_list = name_list;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_dup_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk)
+{
+    int i;
+    STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret;
+    X509_NAME *name;
+
+    ret = sk_X509_NAME_new_null();
+    if (ret == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DUP_CA_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
+        name = X509_NAME_dup(sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i));
+        if (name == NULL || !sk_X509_NAME_push(ret, name)) {
+            sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret, X509_NAME_free);
+            X509_NAME_free(name);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+    }
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+void SSL_set_client_CA_list(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list)
+{
+    set_client_CA_list(&(s->client_CA), name_list);
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list)
+{
+    set_client_CA_list(&(ctx->client_CA), name_list);
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_CTX_get_client_CA_list(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return (ctx->client_CA);
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_get_client_CA_list(const SSL *s)
+{
+    if (!s->server) {           /* we are in the client */
+        if (((s->version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) && (s->s3 != NULL))
+            return (s->s3->tmp.ca_names);
+        else
+            return (NULL);
+    } else {
+        if (s->client_CA != NULL)
+            return (s->client_CA);
+        else
+            return (s->ctx->client_CA);
+    }
+}
+
+static int add_client_CA(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **sk, X509 *x)
+{
+    X509_NAME *name;
+
+    if (x == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    if ((*sk == NULL) && ((*sk = sk_X509_NAME_new_null()) == NULL))
+        return (0);
+
+    if ((name = X509_NAME_dup(X509_get_subject_name(x))) == NULL)
+        return (0);
+
+    if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(*sk, name)) {
+        X509_NAME_free(name);
+        return (0);
+    }
+    return (1);
+}
+
+int SSL_add_client_CA(SSL *ssl, X509 *x)
+{
+    return (add_client_CA(&(ssl->client_CA), x));
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
+{
+    return (add_client_CA(&(ctx->client_CA), x));
+}
+
+static int xname_sk_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
+{
+    return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b));
+}
+
+static int xname_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b)
+{
+    return X509_NAME_cmp(a, b);
+}
+
+static unsigned long xname_hash(const X509_NAME *a)
+{
+    return X509_NAME_hash((X509_NAME *)a);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Load CA certs from a file into a ::STACK. Note that it is somewhat misnamed;
+ * it doesn't really have anything to do with clients (except that a common use
+ * for a stack of CAs is to send it to the client). Actually, it doesn't have
+ * much to do with CAs, either, since it will load any old cert.
+ * \param file the file containing one or more certs.
+ * \return a ::STACK containing the certs.
+ */
+STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_load_client_CA_file(const char *file)
+{
+    BIO *in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
+    X509 *x = NULL;
+    X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret = NULL;
+    LHASH_OF(X509_NAME) *name_hash = lh_X509_NAME_new(xname_hash, xname_cmp);
+
+    if ((name_hash == NULL) || (in == NULL)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!BIO_read_filename(in, file))
+        goto err;
+
+    for (;;) {
+        if (PEM_read_bio_X509(in, &x, NULL, NULL) == NULL)
+            break;
+        if (ret == NULL) {
+            ret = sk_X509_NAME_new_null();
+            if (ret == NULL) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                goto err;
+            }
+        }
+        if ((xn = X509_get_subject_name(x)) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        /* check for duplicates */
+        xn = X509_NAME_dup(xn);
+        if (xn == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        if (lh_X509_NAME_retrieve(name_hash, xn) != NULL) {
+            /* Duplicate. */
+            X509_NAME_free(xn);
+            xn = NULL;
+        } else {
+            lh_X509_NAME_insert(name_hash, xn);
+            if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ret, xn))
+                goto err;
+        }
+    }
+    goto done;
+
+ err:
+    X509_NAME_free(xn);
+    sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret, X509_NAME_free);
+    ret = NULL;
+ done:
+    BIO_free(in);
+    X509_free(x);
+    lh_X509_NAME_free(name_hash);
+    if (ret != NULL)
+        ERR_clear_error();
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Add a file of certs to a stack.
+ * \param stack the stack to add to.
+ * \param file the file to add from. All certs in this file that are not
+ * already in the stack will be added.
+ * \return 1 for success, 0 for failure. Note that in the case of failure some
+ * certs may have been added to \c stack.
+ */
+
+int SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack,
+                                        const char *file)
+{
+    BIO *in;
+    X509 *x = NULL;
+    X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
+    int ret = 1;
+    int (*oldcmp) (const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b);
+
+    oldcmp = sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack, xname_sk_cmp);
+
+    in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
+
+    if (in == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_FILE_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!BIO_read_filename(in, file))
+        goto err;
+
+    for (;;) {
+        if (PEM_read_bio_X509(in, &x, NULL, NULL) == NULL)
+            break;
+        if ((xn = X509_get_subject_name(x)) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        xn = X509_NAME_dup(xn);
+        if (xn == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        if (sk_X509_NAME_find(stack, xn) >= 0) {
+            /* Duplicate. */
+            X509_NAME_free(xn);
+        } else if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(stack, xn)) {
+            X509_NAME_free(xn);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    ERR_clear_error();
+    goto done;
+
+ err:
+    ret = 0;
+ done:
+    BIO_free(in);
+    X509_free(x);
+    (void)sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack, oldcmp);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Add a directory of certs to a stack.
+ * \param stack the stack to append to.
+ * \param dir the directory to append from. All files in this directory will be
+ * examined as potential certs. Any that are acceptable to
+ * SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack() that are not already in the stack will be
+ * included.
+ * \return 1 for success, 0 for failure. Note that in the case of failure some
+ * certs may have been added to \c stack.
+ */
+
+int SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack,
+                                       const char *dir)
+{
+    OPENSSL_DIR_CTX *d = NULL;
+    const char *filename;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    /* Note that a side effect is that the CAs will be sorted by name */
+
+    while ((filename = OPENSSL_DIR_read(&d, dir))) {
+        char buf[1024];
+        int r;
+
+        if (strlen(dir) + strlen(filename) + 2 > sizeof(buf)) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK,
+                   SSL_R_PATH_TOO_LONG);
+            goto err;
+        }
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+        r = BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s%s", dir, filename);
+#else
+        r = BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s/%s", dir, filename);
+#endif
+        if (r <= 0 || r >= (int)sizeof(buf))
+            goto err;
+        if (!SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(stack, buf))
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (errno) {
+        SYSerr(SYS_F_OPENDIR, get_last_sys_error());
+        ERR_add_error_data(3, "OPENSSL_DIR_read(&ctx, '", dir, "')");
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+    if (d)
+        OPENSSL_DIR_end(&d);
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/* Add a certificate to a BUF_MEM structure */
+
+static int ssl_add_cert_to_buf(BUF_MEM *buf, unsigned long *l, X509 *x)
+{
+    int n;
+    unsigned char *p;
+
+    n = i2d_X509(x, NULL);
+    if (n < 0 || !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, (int)(n + (*l) + 3))) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[*l]);
+    l2n3(n, p);
+    n = i2d_X509(x, &p);
+    if (n < 0) {
+        /* Shouldn't happen */
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    *l += n + 3;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Add certificate chain to internal SSL BUF_MEM structure */
+int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, CERT_PKEY *cpk, unsigned long *l)
+{
+    BUF_MEM *buf = s->init_buf;
+    int i, chain_count;
+    X509 *x;
+    STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs;
+    STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
+    X509_STORE *chain_store;
+
+    /* TLSv1 sends a chain with nothing in it, instead of an alert */
+    if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, 10)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (!cpk || !cpk->x509)
+        return 1;
+
+    x = cpk->x509;
+
+    /*
+     * If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use parent ctx.
+     */
+    if (cpk->chain)
+        extra_certs = cpk->chain;
+    else
+        extra_certs = s->ctx->extra_certs;
+
+    if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || extra_certs)
+        chain_store = NULL;
+    else if (s->cert->chain_store)
+        chain_store = s->cert->chain_store;
+    else
+        chain_store = s->ctx->cert_store;
+
+    if (chain_store) {
+        X509_STORE_CTX *xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
+
+        if (xs_ctx == NULL) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            return (0);
+        }
+        if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx, chain_store, x, NULL)) {
+            X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
+            return (0);
+        }
+        /*
+         * It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we
+         * don't include the root cert in the chain). Therefore we deliberately
+         * ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying
+         * the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can
+         */
+        (void)X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx);
+        /* Don't leave errors in the queue */
+        ERR_clear_error();
+        chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(xs_ctx);
+        i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, chain, NULL, 0);
+        if (i != 1) {
+#if 0
+            /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK);
+#endif
+            X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        chain_count = sk_X509_num(chain);
+        for (i = 0; i < chain_count; i++) {
+            x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
+
+            if (!ssl_add_cert_to_buf(buf, l, x)) {
+                X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
+                return 0;
+            }
+        }
+        X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
+    } else {
+        i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, extra_certs, x, 0);
+        if (i != 1) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        if (!ssl_add_cert_to_buf(buf, l, x))
+            return 0;
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(extra_certs); i++) {
+            x = sk_X509_value(extra_certs, i);
+            if (!ssl_add_cert_to_buf(buf, l, x))
+                return 0;
+        }
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Build a certificate chain for current certificate */
+int ssl_build_cert_chain(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, int flags)
+{
+    CERT *c = s ? s->cert : ctx->cert;
+    CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->key;
+    X509_STORE *chain_store = NULL;
+    X509_STORE_CTX *xs_ctx = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL, *untrusted = NULL;
+    X509 *x;
+    int i, rv = 0;
+    unsigned long error;
+
+    if (!cpk->x509) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    /* Rearranging and check the chain: add everything to a store */
+    if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_CHECK) {
+        chain_store = X509_STORE_new();
+        if (chain_store == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(cpk->chain); i++) {
+            x = sk_X509_value(cpk->chain, i);
+            if (!X509_STORE_add_cert(chain_store, x)) {
+                error = ERR_peek_last_error();
+                if (ERR_GET_LIB(error) != ERR_LIB_X509 ||
+                    ERR_GET_REASON(error) != X509_R_CERT_ALREADY_IN_HASH_TABLE)
+                    goto err;
+                ERR_clear_error();
+            }
+        }
+        /* Add EE cert too: it might be self signed */
+        if (!X509_STORE_add_cert(chain_store, cpk->x509)) {
+            error = ERR_peek_last_error();
+            if (ERR_GET_LIB(error) != ERR_LIB_X509 ||
+                ERR_GET_REASON(error) != X509_R_CERT_ALREADY_IN_HASH_TABLE)
+                goto err;
+            ERR_clear_error();
+        }
+    } else {
+        if (c->chain_store)
+            chain_store = c->chain_store;
+        else if (s)
+            chain_store = s->ctx->cert_store;
+        else
+            chain_store = ctx->cert_store;
+
+        if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_UNTRUSTED)
+            untrusted = cpk->chain;
+    }
+
+    xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
+    if (xs_ctx == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx, chain_store, cpk->x509, untrusted)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    /* Set suite B flags if needed */
+    X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(xs_ctx,
+                             c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS);
+
+    i = X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx);
+    if (i <= 0 && flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_IGNORE_ERROR) {
+        if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_CLEAR_ERROR)
+            ERR_clear_error();
+        i = 1;
+        rv = 2;
+    }
+    if (i > 0)
+        chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(xs_ctx);
+    if (i <= 0) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
+        i = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(xs_ctx);
+        ERR_add_error_data(2, "Verify error:",
+                           X509_verify_cert_error_string(i));
+
+        goto err;
+    }
+    /* Remove EE certificate from chain */
+    x = sk_X509_shift(chain);
+    X509_free(x);
+    if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_NO_ROOT) {
+        if (sk_X509_num(chain) > 0) {
+            /* See if last cert is self signed */
+            x = sk_X509_value(chain, sk_X509_num(chain) - 1);
+            if (X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) {
+                x = sk_X509_pop(chain);
+                X509_free(x);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    /*
+     * Check security level of all CA certificates: EE will have been checked
+     * already.
+     */
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
+        x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
+        rv = ssl_security_cert(s, ctx, x, 0, 0);
+        if (rv != 1) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN, rv);
+            sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free);
+            rv = 0;
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+    sk_X509_pop_free(cpk->chain, X509_free);
+    cpk->chain = chain;
+    if (rv == 0)
+        rv = 1;
+ err:
+    if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_CHECK)
+        X509_STORE_free(chain_store);
+    X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
+
+    return rv;
+}
+
+int ssl_cert_set_cert_store(CERT *c, X509_STORE *store, int chain, int ref)
+{
+    X509_STORE **pstore;
+    if (chain)
+        pstore = &c->chain_store;
+    else
+        pstore = &c->verify_store;
+    X509_STORE_free(*pstore);
+    *pstore = store;
+    if (ref && store)
+        X509_STORE_up_ref(store);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int ssl_security_default_callback(const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                         int op, int bits, int nid, void *other,
+                                         void *ex)
+{
+    int level, minbits;
+    static const int minbits_table[5] = { 80, 112, 128, 192, 256 };
+    if (ctx)
+        level = SSL_CTX_get_security_level(ctx);
+    else
+        level = SSL_get_security_level(s);
+
+    if (level <= 0) {
+        /*
+         * No EDH keys weaker than 1024-bits even at level 0, otherwise,
+         * anything goes.
+         */
+        if (op == SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH && bits < 80)
+            return 0;
+        return 1;
+    }
+    if (level > 5)
+        level = 5;
+    minbits = minbits_table[level - 1];
+    switch (op) {
+    case SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED:
+    case SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SHARED:
+    case SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK:
+        {
+            const SSL_CIPHER *c = other;
+            /* No ciphers below security level */
+            if (bits < minbits)
+                return 0;
+            /* No unauthenticated ciphersuites */
+            if (c->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
+                return 0;
+            /* No MD5 mac ciphersuites */
+            if (c->algorithm_mac & SSL_MD5)
+                return 0;
+            /* SHA1 HMAC is 160 bits of security */
+            if (minbits > 160 && c->algorithm_mac & SSL_SHA1)
+                return 0;
+            /* Level 2: no RC4 */
+            if (level >= 2 && c->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
+                return 0;
+            /* Level 3: forward secure ciphersuites only */
+            if (level >= 3 && !(c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kEECDH)))
+                return 0;
+            break;
+        }
+    case SSL_SECOP_VERSION:
+        if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+            /* SSLv3 not allowed at level 2 */
+            if (nid <= SSL3_VERSION && level >= 2)
+                return 0;
+            /* TLS v1.1 and above only for level 3 */
+            if (nid <= TLS1_VERSION && level >= 3)
+                return 0;
+            /* TLS v1.2 only for level 4 and above */
+            if (nid <= TLS1_1_VERSION && level >= 4)
+                return 0;
+        } else {
+            /* DTLS v1.2 only for level 4 and above */
+            if (DTLS_VERSION_LT(nid, DTLS1_2_VERSION) && level >= 4)
+                return 0;
+        }
+        break;
+
+    case SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION:
+        if (level >= 2)
+            return 0;
+        break;
+    case SSL_SECOP_TICKET:
+        if (level >= 3)
+            return 0;
+        break;
+    default:
+        if (bits < minbits)
+            return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_security(const SSL *s, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other)
+{
+    return s->cert->sec_cb(s, NULL, op, bits, nid, other, s->cert->sec_ex);
+}
+
+int ssl_ctx_security(const SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other)
+{
+    return ctx->cert->sec_cb(NULL, ctx, op, bits, nid, other,
+                             ctx->cert->sec_ex);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/ssl_ciph.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7a393cb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1962 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/comp.h>
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#include "internal/thread_once.h"
+
+#define SSL_ENC_DES_IDX         0
+#define SSL_ENC_3DES_IDX        1
+#define SSL_ENC_RC4_IDX         2
+#define SSL_ENC_RC2_IDX         3
+#define SSL_ENC_IDEA_IDX        4
+#define SSL_ENC_NULL_IDX        5
+#define SSL_ENC_AES128_IDX      6
+#define SSL_ENC_AES256_IDX      7
+#define SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA128_IDX 8
+#define SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA256_IDX 9
+#define SSL_ENC_GOST89_IDX      10
+#define SSL_ENC_SEED_IDX        11
+#define SSL_ENC_AES128GCM_IDX   12
+#define SSL_ENC_AES256GCM_IDX   13
+#define SSL_ENC_AES128CCM_IDX   14
+#define SSL_ENC_AES256CCM_IDX   15
+#define SSL_ENC_AES128CCM8_IDX  16
+#define SSL_ENC_AES256CCM8_IDX  17
+#define SSL_ENC_GOST8912_IDX    18
+#define SSL_ENC_CHACHA_IDX      19
+#define SSL_ENC_NUM_IDX         20
+
+/* NB: make sure indices in these tables match values above */
+
+typedef struct {
+    uint32_t mask;
+    int nid;
+} ssl_cipher_table;
+
+/* Table of NIDs for each cipher */
+static const ssl_cipher_table ssl_cipher_table_cipher[SSL_ENC_NUM_IDX] = {
+    {SSL_DES, NID_des_cbc},     /* SSL_ENC_DES_IDX 0 */
+    {SSL_3DES, NID_des_ede3_cbc}, /* SSL_ENC_3DES_IDX 1 */
+    {SSL_RC4, NID_rc4},         /* SSL_ENC_RC4_IDX 2 */
+    {SSL_RC2, NID_rc2_cbc},     /* SSL_ENC_RC2_IDX 3 */
+    {SSL_IDEA, NID_idea_cbc},   /* SSL_ENC_IDEA_IDX 4 */
+    {SSL_eNULL, NID_undef},     /* SSL_ENC_NULL_IDX 5 */
+    {SSL_AES128, NID_aes_128_cbc}, /* SSL_ENC_AES128_IDX 6 */
+    {SSL_AES256, NID_aes_256_cbc}, /* SSL_ENC_AES256_IDX 7 */
+    {SSL_CAMELLIA128, NID_camellia_128_cbc}, /* SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA128_IDX 8 */
+    {SSL_CAMELLIA256, NID_camellia_256_cbc}, /* SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA256_IDX 9 */
+    {SSL_eGOST2814789CNT, NID_gost89_cnt}, /* SSL_ENC_GOST89_IDX 10 */
+    {SSL_SEED, NID_seed_cbc},   /* SSL_ENC_SEED_IDX 11 */
+    {SSL_AES128GCM, NID_aes_128_gcm}, /* SSL_ENC_AES128GCM_IDX 12 */
+    {SSL_AES256GCM, NID_aes_256_gcm}, /* SSL_ENC_AES256GCM_IDX 13 */
+    {SSL_AES128CCM, NID_aes_128_ccm}, /* SSL_ENC_AES128CCM_IDX 14 */
+    {SSL_AES256CCM, NID_aes_256_ccm}, /* SSL_ENC_AES256CCM_IDX 15 */
+    {SSL_AES128CCM8, NID_aes_128_ccm}, /* SSL_ENC_AES128CCM8_IDX 16 */
+    {SSL_AES256CCM8, NID_aes_256_ccm}, /* SSL_ENC_AES256CCM8_IDX 17 */
+    {SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12, NID_gost89_cnt_12}, /* SSL_ENC_GOST8912_IDX */
+    {SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305, NID_chacha20_poly1305},
+};
+
+static const EVP_CIPHER *ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_NUM_IDX] = {
+    NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
+    NULL, NULL
+};
+
+#define SSL_COMP_NULL_IDX       0
+#define SSL_COMP_ZLIB_IDX       1
+#define SSL_COMP_NUM_IDX        2
+
+static STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *ssl_comp_methods = NULL;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+static CRYPTO_ONCE ssl_load_builtin_comp_once = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Constant SSL_MAX_DIGEST equal to size of digests array should be defined
+ * in the ssl_locl.h
+ */
+
+#define SSL_MD_NUM_IDX  SSL_MAX_DIGEST
+
+/* NB: make sure indices in this table matches values above */
+static const ssl_cipher_table ssl_cipher_table_mac[SSL_MD_NUM_IDX] = {
+    {SSL_MD5, NID_md5},         /* SSL_MD_MD5_IDX 0 */
+    {SSL_SHA1, NID_sha1},       /* SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX 1 */
+    {SSL_GOST94, NID_id_GostR3411_94}, /* SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX 2 */
+    {SSL_GOST89MAC, NID_id_Gost28147_89_MAC}, /* SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX 3 */
+    {SSL_SHA256, NID_sha256},   /* SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX 4 */
+    {SSL_SHA384, NID_sha384},   /* SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX 5 */
+    {SSL_GOST12_256, NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256}, /* SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX 6 */
+    {SSL_GOST89MAC12, NID_gost_mac_12}, /* SSL_MD_GOST89MAC12_IDX 7 */
+    {SSL_GOST12_512, NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512}, /* SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX 8 */
+    {0, NID_md5_sha1},          /* SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX 9 */
+    {0, NID_sha224},            /* SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX 10 */
+    {0, NID_sha512}             /* SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX 11 */
+};
+
+static const EVP_MD *ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_NUM_IDX] = {
+    NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL
+};
+
+/* *INDENT-OFF* */
+static const ssl_cipher_table ssl_cipher_table_kx[] = {
+    {SSL_kRSA,      NID_kx_rsa},
+    {SSL_kECDHE,    NID_kx_ecdhe},
+    {SSL_kDHE,      NID_kx_dhe},
+    {SSL_kECDHEPSK, NID_kx_ecdhe_psk},
+    {SSL_kDHEPSK,   NID_kx_dhe_psk},
+    {SSL_kRSAPSK,   NID_kx_rsa_psk},
+    {SSL_kPSK,      NID_kx_psk},
+    {SSL_kSRP,      NID_kx_srp},
+    {SSL_kGOST,     NID_kx_gost}
+};
+
+static const ssl_cipher_table ssl_cipher_table_auth[] = {
+    {SSL_aRSA,    NID_auth_rsa},
+    {SSL_aECDSA,  NID_auth_ecdsa},
+    {SSL_aPSK,    NID_auth_psk},
+    {SSL_aDSS,    NID_auth_dss},
+    {SSL_aGOST01, NID_auth_gost01},
+    {SSL_aGOST12, NID_auth_gost12},
+    {SSL_aSRP,    NID_auth_srp},
+    {SSL_aNULL,   NID_auth_null}
+};
+/* *INDENT-ON* */
+
+/* Utility function for table lookup */
+static int ssl_cipher_info_find(const ssl_cipher_table * table,
+                                size_t table_cnt, uint32_t mask)
+{
+    size_t i;
+    for (i = 0; i < table_cnt; i++, table++) {
+        if (table->mask == mask)
+            return i;
+    }
+    return -1;
+}
+
+#define ssl_cipher_info_lookup(table, x) \
+    ssl_cipher_info_find(table, OSSL_NELEM(table), x)
+
+/*
+ * PKEY_TYPE for GOST89MAC is known in advance, but, because implementation
+ * is engine-provided, we'll fill it only if corresponding EVP_PKEY_METHOD is
+ * found
+ */
+static int ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_NUM_IDX] = {
+    /* MD5, SHA, GOST94, MAC89 */
+    EVP_PKEY_HMAC, EVP_PKEY_HMAC, EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NID_undef,
+    /* SHA256, SHA384, GOST2012_256, MAC89-12 */
+    EVP_PKEY_HMAC, EVP_PKEY_HMAC, EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NID_undef,
+    /* GOST2012_512 */
+    EVP_PKEY_HMAC,
+};
+
+static int ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_NUM_IDX];
+
+#define CIPHER_ADD      1
+#define CIPHER_KILL     2
+#define CIPHER_DEL      3
+#define CIPHER_ORD      4
+#define CIPHER_SPECIAL  5
+/*
+ * Bump the ciphers to the top of the list.
+ * This rule isn't currently supported by the public cipherstring API.
+ */
+#define CIPHER_BUMP     6
+
+typedef struct cipher_order_st {
+    const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
+    int active;
+    int dead;
+    struct cipher_order_st *next, *prev;
+} CIPHER_ORDER;
+
+static const SSL_CIPHER cipher_aliases[] = {
+    /* "ALL" doesn't include eNULL (must be specifically enabled) */
+    {0, SSL_TXT_ALL, 0, 0, 0, ~SSL_eNULL},
+    /* "COMPLEMENTOFALL" */
+    {0, SSL_TXT_CMPALL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_eNULL},
+
+    /*
+     * "COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT" (does *not* include ciphersuites not found in
+     * ALL!)
+     */
+    {0, SSL_TXT_CMPDEF, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT},
+
+    /*
+     * key exchange aliases (some of those using only a single bit here
+     * combine multiple key exchange algs according to the RFCs, e.g. kDHE
+     * combines DHE_DSS and DHE_RSA)
+     */
+    {0, SSL_TXT_kRSA, 0, SSL_kRSA},
+
+    {0, SSL_TXT_kEDH, 0, SSL_kDHE},
+    {0, SSL_TXT_kDHE, 0, SSL_kDHE},
+    {0, SSL_TXT_DH, 0, SSL_kDHE},
+
+    {0, SSL_TXT_kEECDH, 0, SSL_kECDHE},
+    {0, SSL_TXT_kECDHE, 0, SSL_kECDHE},
+    {0, SSL_TXT_ECDH, 0, SSL_kECDHE},
+
+    {0, SSL_TXT_kPSK, 0, SSL_kPSK},
+    {0, SSL_TXT_kRSAPSK, 0, SSL_kRSAPSK},
+    {0, SSL_TXT_kECDHEPSK, 0, SSL_kECDHEPSK},
+    {0, SSL_TXT_kDHEPSK, 0, SSL_kDHEPSK},
+    {0, SSL_TXT_kSRP, 0, SSL_kSRP},
+    {0, SSL_TXT_kGOST, 0, SSL_kGOST},
+
+    /* server authentication aliases */
+    {0, SSL_TXT_aRSA, 0, 0, SSL_aRSA},
+    {0, SSL_TXT_aDSS, 0, 0, SSL_aDSS},
+    {0, SSL_TXT_DSS, 0, 0, SSL_aDSS},
+    {0, SSL_TXT_aNULL, 0, 0, SSL_aNULL},
+    {0, SSL_TXT_aECDSA, 0, 0, SSL_aECDSA},
+    {0, SSL_TXT_ECDSA, 0, 0, SSL_aECDSA},
+    {0, SSL_TXT_aPSK, 0, 0, SSL_aPSK},
+    {0, SSL_TXT_aGOST01, 0, 0, SSL_aGOST01},
+    {0, SSL_TXT_aGOST12, 0, 0, SSL_aGOST12},
+    {0, SSL_TXT_aGOST, 0, 0, SSL_aGOST01 | SSL_aGOST12},
+    {0, SSL_TXT_aSRP, 0, 0, SSL_aSRP},
+
+    /* aliases combining key exchange and server authentication */
+    {0, SSL_TXT_EDH, 0, SSL_kDHE, ~SSL_aNULL},
+    {0, SSL_TXT_DHE, 0, SSL_kDHE, ~SSL_aNULL},
+    {0, SSL_TXT_EECDH, 0, SSL_kECDHE, ~SSL_aNULL},
+    {0, SSL_TXT_ECDHE, 0, SSL_kECDHE, ~SSL_aNULL},
+    {0, SSL_TXT_NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_eNULL},
+    {0, SSL_TXT_RSA, 0, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA},
+    {0, SSL_TXT_ADH, 0, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aNULL},
+    {0, SSL_TXT_AECDH, 0, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aNULL},
+    {0, SSL_TXT_PSK, 0, SSL_PSK},
+    {0, SSL_TXT_SRP, 0, SSL_kSRP},
+
+    /* symmetric encryption aliases */
+    {0, SSL_TXT_3DES, 0, 0, 0, SSL_3DES},
+    {0, SSL_TXT_RC4, 0, 0, 0, SSL_RC4},
+    {0, SSL_TXT_RC2, 0, 0, 0, SSL_RC2},
+    {0, SSL_TXT_IDEA, 0, 0, 0, SSL_IDEA},
+    {0, SSL_TXT_SEED, 0, 0, 0, SSL_SEED},
+    {0, SSL_TXT_eNULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_eNULL},
+    {0, SSL_TXT_GOST, 0, 0, 0, SSL_eGOST2814789CNT | SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12},
+    {0, SSL_TXT_AES128, 0, 0, 0,
+     SSL_AES128 | SSL_AES128GCM | SSL_AES128CCM | SSL_AES128CCM8},
+    {0, SSL_TXT_AES256, 0, 0, 0,
+     SSL_AES256 | SSL_AES256GCM | SSL_AES256CCM | SSL_AES256CCM8},
+    {0, SSL_TXT_AES, 0, 0, 0, SSL_AES},
+    {0, SSL_TXT_AES_GCM, 0, 0, 0, SSL_AES128GCM | SSL_AES256GCM},
+    {0, SSL_TXT_AES_CCM, 0, 0, 0,
+     SSL_AES128CCM | SSL_AES256CCM | SSL_AES128CCM8 | SSL_AES256CCM8},
+    {0, SSL_TXT_AES_CCM_8, 0, 0, 0, SSL_AES128CCM8 | SSL_AES256CCM8},
+    {0, SSL_TXT_CAMELLIA128, 0, 0, 0, SSL_CAMELLIA128},
+    {0, SSL_TXT_CAMELLIA256, 0, 0, 0, SSL_CAMELLIA256},
+    {0, SSL_TXT_CAMELLIA, 0, 0, 0, SSL_CAMELLIA},
+    {0, SSL_TXT_CHACHA20, 0, 0, 0, SSL_CHACHA20},
+
+    /* MAC aliases */
+    {0, SSL_TXT_MD5, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_MD5},
+    {0, SSL_TXT_SHA1, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_SHA1},
+    {0, SSL_TXT_SHA, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_SHA1},
+    {0, SSL_TXT_GOST94, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_GOST94},
+    {0, SSL_TXT_GOST89MAC, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_GOST89MAC | SSL_GOST89MAC12},
+    {0, SSL_TXT_SHA256, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_SHA256},
+    {0, SSL_TXT_SHA384, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_SHA384},
+    {0, SSL_TXT_GOST12, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_GOST12_256},
+
+    /* protocol version aliases */
+    {0, SSL_TXT_SSLV3, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL3_VERSION},
+    {0, SSL_TXT_TLSV1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, TLS1_VERSION},
+    {0, "TLSv1.0", 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, TLS1_VERSION},
+    {0, SSL_TXT_TLSV1_2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, TLS1_2_VERSION},
+
+    /* strength classes */
+    {0, SSL_TXT_LOW, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_LOW},
+    {0, SSL_TXT_MEDIUM, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_MEDIUM},
+    {0, SSL_TXT_HIGH, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_HIGH},
+    /* FIPS 140-2 approved ciphersuite */
+    {0, SSL_TXT_FIPS, 0, 0, 0, ~SSL_eNULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_FIPS},
+
+    /* "EDH-" aliases to "DHE-" labels (for backward compatibility) */
+    {0, SSL3_TXT_EDH_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA, 0,
+     SSL_kDHE, SSL_aDSS, SSL_3DES, SSL_SHA1, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS},
+    {0, SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA, 0,
+     SSL_kDHE, SSL_aRSA, SSL_3DES, SSL_SHA1, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS},
+
+};
+
+/*
+ * Search for public key algorithm with given name and return its pkey_id if
+ * it is available. Otherwise return 0
+ */
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+
+static int get_optional_pkey_id(const char *pkey_name)
+{
+    const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth;
+    int pkey_id = 0;
+    ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str(NULL, pkey_name, -1);
+    if (ameth && EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(&pkey_id, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
+                                         ameth) > 0) {
+        return pkey_id;
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+#else
+
+static int get_optional_pkey_id(const char *pkey_name)
+{
+    const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth;
+    ENGINE *tmpeng = NULL;
+    int pkey_id = 0;
+    ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str(&tmpeng, pkey_name, -1);
+    if (ameth) {
+        if (EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(&pkey_id, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
+                                    ameth) <= 0)
+            pkey_id = 0;
+    }
+    ENGINE_finish(tmpeng);
+    return pkey_id;
+}
+
+#endif
+
+/* masks of disabled algorithms */
+static uint32_t disabled_enc_mask;
+static uint32_t disabled_mac_mask;
+static uint32_t disabled_mkey_mask;
+static uint32_t disabled_auth_mask;
+
+void ssl_load_ciphers(void)
+{
+    size_t i;
+    const ssl_cipher_table *t;
+
+    disabled_enc_mask = 0;
+    ssl_sort_cipher_list();
+    for (i = 0, t = ssl_cipher_table_cipher; i < SSL_ENC_NUM_IDX; i++, t++) {
+        if (t->nid == NID_undef) {
+            ssl_cipher_methods[i] = NULL;
+        } else {
+            const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_get_cipherbynid(t->nid);
+            ssl_cipher_methods[i] = cipher;
+            if (cipher == NULL)
+                disabled_enc_mask |= t->mask;
+        }
+    }
+#ifdef SSL_FORBID_ENULL
+    disabled_enc_mask |= SSL_eNULL;
+#endif
+    disabled_mac_mask = 0;
+    for (i = 0, t = ssl_cipher_table_mac; i < SSL_MD_NUM_IDX; i++, t++) {
+        const EVP_MD *md = EVP_get_digestbynid(t->nid);
+        ssl_digest_methods[i] = md;
+        if (md == NULL) {
+            disabled_mac_mask |= t->mask;
+        } else {
+            ssl_mac_secret_size[i] = EVP_MD_size(md);
+            OPENSSL_assert(ssl_mac_secret_size[i] >= 0);
+        }
+    }
+    /* Make sure we can access MD5 and SHA1 */
+    OPENSSL_assert(ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_MD5_IDX] != NULL);
+    OPENSSL_assert(ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX] != NULL);
+
+    disabled_mkey_mask = 0;
+    disabled_auth_mask = 0;
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+    disabled_mkey_mask |= SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK;
+    disabled_auth_mask |= SSL_aRSA;
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+    disabled_auth_mask |= SSL_aDSS;
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+    disabled_mkey_mask |= SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK;
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    disabled_mkey_mask |= SSL_kECDHEPSK;
+    disabled_auth_mask |= SSL_aECDSA;
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+    disabled_mkey_mask |= SSL_PSK;
+    disabled_auth_mask |= SSL_aPSK;
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+    disabled_mkey_mask |= SSL_kSRP;
+#endif
+
+    /*
+     * Check for presence of GOST 34.10 algorithms, and if they are not
+     * present, disable appropriate auth and key exchange
+     */
+    ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX] = get_optional_pkey_id("gost-mac");
+    if (ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX]) {
+        ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX] = 32;
+    } else {
+        disabled_mac_mask |= SSL_GOST89MAC;
+    }
+
+    ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC12_IDX] =
+        get_optional_pkey_id("gost-mac-12");
+    if (ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC12_IDX]) {
+        ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC12_IDX] = 32;
+    } else {
+        disabled_mac_mask |= SSL_GOST89MAC12;
+    }
+
+    if (!get_optional_pkey_id("gost2001"))
+        disabled_auth_mask |= SSL_aGOST01 | SSL_aGOST12;
+    if (!get_optional_pkey_id("gost2012_256"))
+        disabled_auth_mask |= SSL_aGOST12;
+    if (!get_optional_pkey_id("gost2012_512"))
+        disabled_auth_mask |= SSL_aGOST12;
+    /*
+     * Disable GOST key exchange if no GOST signature algs are available *
+     */
+    if ((disabled_auth_mask & (SSL_aGOST01 | SSL_aGOST12)) ==
+        (SSL_aGOST01 | SSL_aGOST12))
+        disabled_mkey_mask |= SSL_kGOST;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+
+static int sk_comp_cmp(const SSL_COMP *const *a, const SSL_COMP *const *b)
+{
+    return ((*a)->id - (*b)->id);
+}
+
+DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_load_builtin_compressions)
+{
+    SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
+    COMP_METHOD *method = COMP_zlib();
+
+    CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_DISABLE);
+    ssl_comp_methods = sk_SSL_COMP_new(sk_comp_cmp);
+
+    if (COMP_get_type(method) != NID_undef && ssl_comp_methods != NULL) {
+        comp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*comp));
+        if (comp != NULL) {
+            comp->method = method;
+            comp->id = SSL_COMP_ZLIB_IDX;
+            comp->name = COMP_get_name(method);
+            sk_SSL_COMP_push(ssl_comp_methods, comp);
+            sk_SSL_COMP_sort(ssl_comp_methods);
+        }
+    }
+    CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int load_builtin_compressions(void)
+{
+    return RUN_ONCE(&ssl_load_builtin_comp_once, do_load_builtin_compressions);
+}
+#endif
+
+int ssl_cipher_get_evp(const SSL_SESSION *s, const EVP_CIPHER **enc,
+                       const EVP_MD **md, int *mac_pkey_type,
+                       int *mac_secret_size, SSL_COMP **comp, int use_etm)
+{
+    int i;
+    const SSL_CIPHER *c;
+
+    c = s->cipher;
+    if (c == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    if (comp != NULL) {
+        SSL_COMP ctmp;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+        if (!load_builtin_compressions()) {
+            /*
+             * Currently don't care, since a failure only means that
+             * ssl_comp_methods is NULL, which is perfectly OK
+             */
+        }
+#endif
+        *comp = NULL;
+        ctmp.id = s->compress_meth;
+        if (ssl_comp_methods != NULL) {
+            i = sk_SSL_COMP_find(ssl_comp_methods, &ctmp);
+            if (i >= 0)
+                *comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(ssl_comp_methods, i);
+            else
+                *comp = NULL;
+        }
+        /* If were only interested in comp then return success */
+        if ((enc == NULL) && (md == NULL))
+            return 1;
+    }
+
+    if ((enc == NULL) || (md == NULL))
+        return 0;
+
+    i = ssl_cipher_info_lookup(ssl_cipher_table_cipher, c->algorithm_enc);
+
+    if (i == -1)
+        *enc = NULL;
+    else {
+        if (i == SSL_ENC_NULL_IDX)
+            *enc = EVP_enc_null();
+        else
+            *enc = ssl_cipher_methods[i];
+    }
+
+    i = ssl_cipher_info_lookup(ssl_cipher_table_mac, c->algorithm_mac);
+    if (i == -1) {
+        *md = NULL;
+        if (mac_pkey_type != NULL)
+            *mac_pkey_type = NID_undef;
+        if (mac_secret_size != NULL)
+            *mac_secret_size = 0;
+        if (c->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD)
+            mac_pkey_type = NULL;
+    } else {
+        *md = ssl_digest_methods[i];
+        if (mac_pkey_type != NULL)
+            *mac_pkey_type = ssl_mac_pkey_id[i];
+        if (mac_secret_size != NULL)
+            *mac_secret_size = ssl_mac_secret_size[i];
+    }
+
+    if ((*enc != NULL) &&
+        (*md != NULL || (EVP_CIPHER_flags(*enc) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER))
+        && (!mac_pkey_type || *mac_pkey_type != NID_undef)) {
+        const EVP_CIPHER *evp;
+
+        if (use_etm)
+            return 1;
+
+        if (s->ssl_version >> 8 != TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR ||
+            s->ssl_version < TLS1_VERSION)
+            return 1;
+
+        if (FIPS_mode())
+            return 1;
+
+        if (c->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4 &&
+            c->algorithm_mac == SSL_MD5 &&
+            (evp = EVP_get_cipherbyname("RC4-HMAC-MD5")))
+            *enc = evp, *md = NULL;
+        else if (c->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES128 &&
+                 c->algorithm_mac == SSL_SHA1 &&
+                 (evp = EVP_get_cipherbyname("AES-128-CBC-HMAC-SHA1")))
+            *enc = evp, *md = NULL;
+        else if (c->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES256 &&
+                 c->algorithm_mac == SSL_SHA1 &&
+                 (evp = EVP_get_cipherbyname("AES-256-CBC-HMAC-SHA1")))
+            *enc = evp, *md = NULL;
+        else if (c->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES128 &&
+                 c->algorithm_mac == SSL_SHA256 &&
+                 (evp = EVP_get_cipherbyname("AES-128-CBC-HMAC-SHA256")))
+            *enc = evp, *md = NULL;
+        else if (c->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES256 &&
+                 c->algorithm_mac == SSL_SHA256 &&
+                 (evp = EVP_get_cipherbyname("AES-256-CBC-HMAC-SHA256")))
+            *enc = evp, *md = NULL;
+        return (1);
+    } else
+        return (0);
+}
+
+const EVP_MD *ssl_md(int idx)
+{
+    idx &= SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_MASK;
+    if (idx < 0 || idx >= SSL_MD_NUM_IDX)
+        return NULL;
+    return ssl_digest_methods[idx];
+}
+
+const EVP_MD *ssl_handshake_md(SSL *s)
+{
+    return ssl_md(ssl_get_algorithm2(s));
+}
+
+const EVP_MD *ssl_prf_md(SSL *s)
+{
+    return ssl_md(ssl_get_algorithm2(s) >> TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT);
+}
+
+#define ITEM_SEP(a) \
+        (((a) == ':') || ((a) == ' ') || ((a) == ';') || ((a) == ','))
+
+static void ll_append_tail(CIPHER_ORDER **head, CIPHER_ORDER *curr,
+                           CIPHER_ORDER **tail)
+{
+    if (curr == *tail)
+        return;
+    if (curr == *head)
+        *head = curr->next;
+    if (curr->prev != NULL)
+        curr->prev->next = curr->next;
+    if (curr->next != NULL)
+        curr->next->prev = curr->prev;
+    (*tail)->next = curr;
+    curr->prev = *tail;
+    curr->next = NULL;
+    *tail = curr;
+}
+
+static void ll_append_head(CIPHER_ORDER **head, CIPHER_ORDER *curr,
+                           CIPHER_ORDER **tail)
+{
+    if (curr == *head)
+        return;
+    if (curr == *tail)
+        *tail = curr->prev;
+    if (curr->next != NULL)
+        curr->next->prev = curr->prev;
+    if (curr->prev != NULL)
+        curr->prev->next = curr->next;
+    (*head)->prev = curr;
+    curr->next = *head;
+    curr->prev = NULL;
+    *head = curr;
+}
+
+static void ssl_cipher_collect_ciphers(const SSL_METHOD *ssl_method,
+                                       int num_of_ciphers,
+                                       uint32_t disabled_mkey,
+                                       uint32_t disabled_auth,
+                                       uint32_t disabled_enc,
+                                       uint32_t disabled_mac,
+                                       CIPHER_ORDER *co_list,
+                                       CIPHER_ORDER **head_p,
+                                       CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p)
+{
+    int i, co_list_num;
+    const SSL_CIPHER *c;
+
+    /*
+     * We have num_of_ciphers descriptions compiled in, depending on the
+     * method selected (SSLv3, TLSv1 etc).
+     * These will later be sorted in a linked list with at most num
+     * entries.
+     */
+
+    /* Get the initial list of ciphers */
+    co_list_num = 0;            /* actual count of ciphers */
+    for (i = 0; i < num_of_ciphers; i++) {
+        c = ssl_method->get_cipher(i);
+        /* drop those that use any of that is not available */
+        if (c == NULL || !c->valid)
+            continue;
+        if (FIPS_mode() && (c->algo_strength & SSL_FIPS))
+            continue;
+        if ((c->algorithm_mkey & disabled_mkey) ||
+            (c->algorithm_auth & disabled_auth) ||
+            (c->algorithm_enc & disabled_enc) ||
+            (c->algorithm_mac & disabled_mac))
+            continue;
+        if (((ssl_method->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & SSL_ENC_FLAG_DTLS) == 0) &&
+            c->min_tls == 0)
+            continue;
+        if (((ssl_method->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & SSL_ENC_FLAG_DTLS) != 0) &&
+            c->min_dtls == 0)
+            continue;
+
+        co_list[co_list_num].cipher = c;
+        co_list[co_list_num].next = NULL;
+        co_list[co_list_num].prev = NULL;
+        co_list[co_list_num].active = 0;
+        co_list_num++;
+        /*
+         * if (!sk_push(ca_list,(char *)c)) goto err;
+         */
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Prepare linked list from list entries
+     */
+    if (co_list_num > 0) {
+        co_list[0].prev = NULL;
+
+        if (co_list_num > 1) {
+            co_list[0].next = &co_list[1];
+
+            for (i = 1; i < co_list_num - 1; i++) {
+                co_list[i].prev = &co_list[i - 1];
+                co_list[i].next = &co_list[i + 1];
+            }
+
+            co_list[co_list_num - 1].prev = &co_list[co_list_num - 2];
+        }
+
+        co_list[co_list_num - 1].next = NULL;
+
+        *head_p = &co_list[0];
+        *tail_p = &co_list[co_list_num - 1];
+    }
+}
+
+static void ssl_cipher_collect_aliases(const SSL_CIPHER **ca_list,
+                                       int num_of_group_aliases,
+                                       uint32_t disabled_mkey,
+                                       uint32_t disabled_auth,
+                                       uint32_t disabled_enc,
+                                       uint32_t disabled_mac,
+                                       CIPHER_ORDER *head)
+{
+    CIPHER_ORDER *ciph_curr;
+    const SSL_CIPHER **ca_curr;
+    int i;
+    uint32_t mask_mkey = ~disabled_mkey;
+    uint32_t mask_auth = ~disabled_auth;
+    uint32_t mask_enc = ~disabled_enc;
+    uint32_t mask_mac = ~disabled_mac;
+
+    /*
+     * First, add the real ciphers as already collected
+     */
+    ciph_curr = head;
+    ca_curr = ca_list;
+    while (ciph_curr != NULL) {
+        *ca_curr = ciph_curr->cipher;
+        ca_curr++;
+        ciph_curr = ciph_curr->next;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Now we add the available ones from the cipher_aliases[] table.
+     * They represent either one or more algorithms, some of which
+     * in any affected category must be supported (set in enabled_mask),
+     * or represent a cipher strength value (will be added in any case because algorithms=0).
+     */
+    for (i = 0; i < num_of_group_aliases; i++) {
+        uint32_t algorithm_mkey = cipher_aliases[i].algorithm_mkey;
+        uint32_t algorithm_auth = cipher_aliases[i].algorithm_auth;
+        uint32_t algorithm_enc = cipher_aliases[i].algorithm_enc;
+        uint32_t algorithm_mac = cipher_aliases[i].algorithm_mac;
+
+        if (algorithm_mkey)
+            if ((algorithm_mkey & mask_mkey) == 0)
+                continue;
+
+        if (algorithm_auth)
+            if ((algorithm_auth & mask_auth) == 0)
+                continue;
+
+        if (algorithm_enc)
+            if ((algorithm_enc & mask_enc) == 0)
+                continue;
+
+        if (algorithm_mac)
+            if ((algorithm_mac & mask_mac) == 0)
+                continue;
+
+        *ca_curr = (SSL_CIPHER *)(cipher_aliases + i);
+        ca_curr++;
+    }
+
+    *ca_curr = NULL;            /* end of list */
+}
+
+static void ssl_cipher_apply_rule(uint32_t cipher_id, uint32_t alg_mkey,
+                                  uint32_t alg_auth, uint32_t alg_enc,
+                                  uint32_t alg_mac, int min_tls,
+                                  uint32_t algo_strength, int rule,
+                                  int32_t strength_bits, CIPHER_ORDER **head_p,
+                                  CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p)
+{
+    CIPHER_ORDER *head, *tail, *curr, *next, *last;
+    const SSL_CIPHER *cp;
+    int reverse = 0;
+
+#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
+    fprintf(stderr,
+            "Applying rule %d with %08x/%08x/%08x/%08x/%08x %08x (%d)\n",
+            rule, alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac, min_tls,
+            algo_strength, strength_bits);
+#endif
+
+    if (rule == CIPHER_DEL || rule == CIPHER_BUMP)
+        reverse = 1;            /* needed to maintain sorting between currently
+                                 * deleted ciphers */
+
+    head = *head_p;
+    tail = *tail_p;
+
+    if (reverse) {
+        next = tail;
+        last = head;
+    } else {
+        next = head;
+        last = tail;
+    }
+
+    curr = NULL;
+    for (;;) {
+        if (curr == last)
+            break;
+
+        curr = next;
+
+        if (curr == NULL)
+            break;
+
+        next = reverse ? curr->prev : curr->next;
+
+        cp = curr->cipher;
+
+        /*
+         * Selection criteria is either the value of strength_bits
+         * or the algorithms used.
+         */
+        if (strength_bits >= 0) {
+            if (strength_bits != cp->strength_bits)
+                continue;
+        } else {
+#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
+            fprintf(stderr,
+                    "\nName: %s:\nAlgo = %08x/%08x/%08x/%08x/%08x Algo_strength = %08x\n",
+                    cp->name, cp->algorithm_mkey, cp->algorithm_auth,
+                    cp->algorithm_enc, cp->algorithm_mac, cp->min_tls,
+                    cp->algo_strength);
+#endif
+            if (alg_mkey && !(alg_mkey & cp->algorithm_mkey))
+                continue;
+            if (alg_auth && !(alg_auth & cp->algorithm_auth))
+                continue;
+            if (alg_enc && !(alg_enc & cp->algorithm_enc))
+                continue;
+            if (alg_mac && !(alg_mac & cp->algorithm_mac))
+                continue;
+            if (min_tls && (min_tls != cp->min_tls))
+                continue;
+            if ((algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK)
+                && !(algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK & cp->algo_strength))
+                continue;
+            if ((algo_strength & SSL_DEFAULT_MASK)
+                && !(algo_strength & SSL_DEFAULT_MASK & cp->algo_strength))
+                continue;
+        }
+
+#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
+        fprintf(stderr, "Action = %d\n", rule);
+#endif
+
+        /* add the cipher if it has not been added yet. */
+        if (rule == CIPHER_ADD) {
+            /* reverse == 0 */
+            if (!curr->active) {
+                ll_append_tail(&head, curr, &tail);
+                curr->active = 1;
+            }
+        }
+        /* Move the added cipher to this location */
+        else if (rule == CIPHER_ORD) {
+            /* reverse == 0 */
+            if (curr->active) {
+                ll_append_tail(&head, curr, &tail);
+            }
+        } else if (rule == CIPHER_DEL) {
+            /* reverse == 1 */
+            if (curr->active) {
+                /*
+                 * most recently deleted ciphersuites get best positions for
+                 * any future CIPHER_ADD (note that the CIPHER_DEL loop works
+                 * in reverse to maintain the order)
+                 */
+                ll_append_head(&head, curr, &tail);
+                curr->active = 0;
+            }
+        } else if (rule == CIPHER_BUMP) {
+            if (curr->active)
+                ll_append_head(&head, curr, &tail);
+        } else if (rule == CIPHER_KILL) {
+            /* reverse == 0 */
+            if (head == curr)
+                head = curr->next;
+            else
+                curr->prev->next = curr->next;
+            if (tail == curr)
+                tail = curr->prev;
+            curr->active = 0;
+            if (curr->next != NULL)
+                curr->next->prev = curr->prev;
+            if (curr->prev != NULL)
+                curr->prev->next = curr->next;
+            curr->next = NULL;
+            curr->prev = NULL;
+        }
+    }
+
+    *head_p = head;
+    *tail_p = tail;
+}
+
+static int ssl_cipher_strength_sort(CIPHER_ORDER **head_p,
+                                    CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p)
+{
+    int32_t max_strength_bits;
+    int i, *number_uses;
+    CIPHER_ORDER *curr;
+
+    /*
+     * This routine sorts the ciphers with descending strength. The sorting
+     * must keep the pre-sorted sequence, so we apply the normal sorting
+     * routine as '+' movement to the end of the list.
+     */
+    max_strength_bits = 0;
+    curr = *head_p;
+    while (curr != NULL) {
+        if (curr->active && (curr->cipher->strength_bits > max_strength_bits))
+            max_strength_bits = curr->cipher->strength_bits;
+        curr = curr->next;
+    }
+
+    number_uses = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(int) * (max_strength_bits + 1));
+    if (number_uses == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_STRENGTH_SORT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return (0);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Now find the strength_bits values actually used
+     */
+    curr = *head_p;
+    while (curr != NULL) {
+        if (curr->active)
+            number_uses[curr->cipher->strength_bits]++;
+        curr = curr->next;
+    }
+    /*
+     * Go through the list of used strength_bits values in descending
+     * order.
+     */
+    for (i = max_strength_bits; i >= 0; i--)
+        if (number_uses[i] > 0)
+            ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, i, head_p,
+                                  tail_p);
+
+    OPENSSL_free(number_uses);
+    return (1);
+}
+
+static int ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(const char *rule_str,
+                                      CIPHER_ORDER **head_p,
+                                      CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p,
+                                      const SSL_CIPHER **ca_list, CERT *c)
+{
+    uint32_t alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac, algo_strength;
+    int min_tls;
+    const char *l, *buf;
+    int j, multi, found, rule, retval, ok, buflen;
+    uint32_t cipher_id = 0;
+    char ch;
+
+    retval = 1;
+    l = rule_str;
+    for (;;) {
+        ch = *l;
+
+        if (ch == '\0')
+            break;              /* done */
+        if (ch == '-') {
+            rule = CIPHER_DEL;
+            l++;
+        } else if (ch == '+') {
+            rule = CIPHER_ORD;
+            l++;
+        } else if (ch == '!') {
+            rule = CIPHER_KILL;
+            l++;
+        } else if (ch == '@') {
+            rule = CIPHER_SPECIAL;
+            l++;
+        } else {
+            rule = CIPHER_ADD;
+        }
+
+        if (ITEM_SEP(ch)) {
+            l++;
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        alg_mkey = 0;
+        alg_auth = 0;
+        alg_enc = 0;
+        alg_mac = 0;
+        min_tls = 0;
+        algo_strength = 0;
+
+        for (;;) {
+            ch = *l;
+            buf = l;
+            buflen = 0;
+#ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+            while (((ch >= 'A') && (ch <= 'Z')) ||
+                   ((ch >= '0') && (ch <= '9')) ||
+                   ((ch >= 'a') && (ch <= 'z')) ||
+                   (ch == '-') || (ch == '.') || (ch == '='))
+#else
+            while (isalnum((unsigned char)ch) || (ch == '-') || (ch == '.')
+                   || (ch == '='))
+#endif
+            {
+                ch = *(++l);
+                buflen++;
+            }
+
+            if (buflen == 0) {
+                /*
+                 * We hit something we cannot deal with,
+                 * it is no command or separator nor
+                 * alphanumeric, so we call this an error.
+                 */
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_PROCESS_RULESTR, SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND);
+                retval = found = 0;
+                l++;
+                break;
+            }
+
+            if (rule == CIPHER_SPECIAL) {
+                found = 0;      /* unused -- avoid compiler warning */
+                break;          /* special treatment */
+            }
+
+            /* check for multi-part specification */
+            if (ch == '+') {
+                multi = 1;
+                l++;
+            } else
+                multi = 0;
+
+            /*
+             * Now search for the cipher alias in the ca_list. Be careful
+             * with the strncmp, because the "buflen" limitation
+             * will make the rule "ADH:SOME" and the cipher
+             * "ADH-MY-CIPHER" look like a match for buflen=3.
+             * So additionally check whether the cipher name found
+             * has the correct length. We can save a strlen() call:
+             * just checking for the '\0' at the right place is
+             * sufficient, we have to strncmp() anyway. (We cannot
+             * use strcmp(), because buf is not '\0' terminated.)
+             */
+            j = found = 0;
+            cipher_id = 0;
+            while (ca_list[j]) {
+                if (strncmp(buf, ca_list[j]->name, buflen) == 0
+                    && (ca_list[j]->name[buflen] == '\0')) {
+                    found = 1;
+                    break;
+                } else
+                    j++;
+            }
+
+            if (!found)
+                break;          /* ignore this entry */
+
+            if (ca_list[j]->algorithm_mkey) {
+                if (alg_mkey) {
+                    alg_mkey &= ca_list[j]->algorithm_mkey;
+                    if (!alg_mkey) {
+                        found = 0;
+                        break;
+                    }
+                } else
+                    alg_mkey = ca_list[j]->algorithm_mkey;
+            }
+
+            if (ca_list[j]->algorithm_auth) {
+                if (alg_auth) {
+                    alg_auth &= ca_list[j]->algorithm_auth;
+                    if (!alg_auth) {
+                        found = 0;
+                        break;
+                    }
+                } else
+                    alg_auth = ca_list[j]->algorithm_auth;
+            }
+
+            if (ca_list[j]->algorithm_enc) {
+                if (alg_enc) {
+                    alg_enc &= ca_list[j]->algorithm_enc;
+                    if (!alg_enc) {
+                        found = 0;
+                        break;
+                    }
+                } else
+                    alg_enc = ca_list[j]->algorithm_enc;
+            }
+
+            if (ca_list[j]->algorithm_mac) {
+                if (alg_mac) {
+                    alg_mac &= ca_list[j]->algorithm_mac;
+                    if (!alg_mac) {
+                        found = 0;
+                        break;
+                    }
+                } else
+                    alg_mac = ca_list[j]->algorithm_mac;
+            }
+
+            if (ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK) {
+                if (algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK) {
+                    algo_strength &=
+                        (ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK) |
+                        ~SSL_STRONG_MASK;
+                    if (!(algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK)) {
+                        found = 0;
+                        break;
+                    }
+                } else
+                    algo_strength = ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK;
+            }
+
+            if (ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_DEFAULT_MASK) {
+                if (algo_strength & SSL_DEFAULT_MASK) {
+                    algo_strength &=
+                        (ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_DEFAULT_MASK) |
+                        ~SSL_DEFAULT_MASK;
+                    if (!(algo_strength & SSL_DEFAULT_MASK)) {
+                        found = 0;
+                        break;
+                    }
+                } else
+                    algo_strength |=
+                        ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_DEFAULT_MASK;
+            }
+
+            if (ca_list[j]->valid) {
+                /*
+                 * explicit ciphersuite found; its protocol version does not
+                 * become part of the search pattern!
+                 */
+
+                cipher_id = ca_list[j]->id;
+            } else {
+                /*
+                 * not an explicit ciphersuite; only in this case, the
+                 * protocol version is considered part of the search pattern
+                 */
+
+                if (ca_list[j]->min_tls) {
+                    if (min_tls != 0 && min_tls != ca_list[j]->min_tls) {
+                        found = 0;
+                        break;
+                    } else {
+                        min_tls = ca_list[j]->min_tls;
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+
+            if (!multi)
+                break;
+        }
+
+        /*
+         * Ok, we have the rule, now apply it
+         */
+        if (rule == CIPHER_SPECIAL) { /* special command */
+            ok = 0;
+            if ((buflen == 8) && strncmp(buf, "STRENGTH", 8) == 0)
+                ok = ssl_cipher_strength_sort(head_p, tail_p);
+            else if (buflen == 10 && strncmp(buf, "SECLEVEL=", 9) == 0) {
+                int level = buf[9] - '0';
+                if (level < 0 || level > 5) {
+                    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_PROCESS_RULESTR,
+                           SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND);
+                } else {
+                    c->sec_level = level;
+                    ok = 1;
+                }
+            } else
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_PROCESS_RULESTR, SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND);
+            if (ok == 0)
+                retval = 0;
+            /*
+             * We do not support any "multi" options
+             * together with "@", so throw away the
+             * rest of the command, if any left, until
+             * end or ':' is found.
+             */
+            while ((*l != '\0') && !ITEM_SEP(*l))
+                l++;
+        } else if (found) {
+            ssl_cipher_apply_rule(cipher_id,
+                                  alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac,
+                                  min_tls, algo_strength, rule, -1, head_p,
+                                  tail_p);
+        } else {
+            while ((*l != '\0') && !ITEM_SEP(*l))
+                l++;
+        }
+        if (*l == '\0')
+            break;              /* done */
+    }
+
+    return (retval);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+static int check_suiteb_cipher_list(const SSL_METHOD *meth, CERT *c,
+                                    const char **prule_str)
+{
+    unsigned int suiteb_flags = 0, suiteb_comb2 = 0;
+    if (strncmp(*prule_str, "SUITEB128ONLY", 13) == 0) {
+        suiteb_flags = SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY;
+    } else if (strncmp(*prule_str, "SUITEB128C2", 11) == 0) {
+        suiteb_comb2 = 1;
+        suiteb_flags = SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS;
+    } else if (strncmp(*prule_str, "SUITEB128", 9) == 0) {
+        suiteb_flags = SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS;
+    } else if (strncmp(*prule_str, "SUITEB192", 9) == 0) {
+        suiteb_flags = SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS;
+    }
+
+    if (suiteb_flags) {
+        c->cert_flags &= ~SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS;
+        c->cert_flags |= suiteb_flags;
+    } else
+        suiteb_flags = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS;
+
+    if (!suiteb_flags)
+        return 1;
+    /* Check version: if TLS 1.2 ciphers allowed we can use Suite B */
+
+    if (!(meth->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_CHECK_SUITEB_CIPHER_LIST,
+               SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    switch (suiteb_flags) {
+    case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
+        if (suiteb_comb2)
+            *prule_str = "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384";
+        else
+            *prule_str =
+                "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384";
+        break;
+    case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
+        *prule_str = "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256";
+        break;
+    case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
+        *prule_str = "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384";
+        break;
+    }
+    return 1;
+# else
+    SSLerr(SSL_F_CHECK_SUITEB_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_ECDH_REQUIRED_FOR_SUITEB_MODE);
+    return 0;
+# endif
+}
+#endif
+
+STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_list(const SSL_METHOD *ssl_method, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER)
+                                             **cipher_list, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER)
+                                             **cipher_list_by_id,
+                                             const char *rule_str, CERT *c)
+{
+    int ok, num_of_ciphers, num_of_alias_max, num_of_group_aliases;
+    uint32_t disabled_mkey, disabled_auth, disabled_enc, disabled_mac;
+    STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipherstack, *tmp_cipher_list;
+    const char *rule_p;
+    CIPHER_ORDER *co_list = NULL, *head = NULL, *tail = NULL, *curr;
+    const SSL_CIPHER **ca_list = NULL;
+
+    /*
+     * Return with error if nothing to do.
+     */
+    if (rule_str == NULL || cipher_list == NULL || cipher_list_by_id == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    if (!check_suiteb_cipher_list(ssl_method, c, &rule_str))
+        return NULL;
+#endif
+
+    /*
+     * To reduce the work to do we only want to process the compiled
+     * in algorithms, so we first get the mask of disabled ciphers.
+     */
+
+    disabled_mkey = disabled_mkey_mask;
+    disabled_auth = disabled_auth_mask;
+    disabled_enc = disabled_enc_mask;
+    disabled_mac = disabled_mac_mask;
+
+    /*
+     * Now we have to collect the available ciphers from the compiled
+     * in ciphers. We cannot get more than the number compiled in, so
+     * it is used for allocation.
+     */
+    num_of_ciphers = ssl_method->num_ciphers();
+
+    co_list = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*co_list) * num_of_ciphers);
+    if (co_list == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CREATE_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return (NULL);          /* Failure */
+    }
+
+    ssl_cipher_collect_ciphers(ssl_method, num_of_ciphers,
+                               disabled_mkey, disabled_auth, disabled_enc,
+                               disabled_mac, co_list, &head, &tail);
+
+    /* Now arrange all ciphers by preference. */
+
+    /*
+     * Everything else being equal, prefer ephemeral ECDH over other key
+     * exchange mechanisms.
+     * For consistency, prefer ECDSA over RSA (though this only matters if the
+     * server has both certificates, and is using the DEFAULT, or a client
+     * preference).
+     */
+    ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aECDSA, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD,
+                          -1, &head, &tail);
+    ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kECDHE, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, &head,
+                          &tail);
+    ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kECDHE, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_DEL, -1, &head,
+                          &tail);
+
+    /* Within each strength group, we prefer GCM over CHACHA... */
+    ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, SSL_AESGCM, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1,
+                          &head, &tail);
+    ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, SSL_CHACHA20, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1,
+                          &head, &tail);
+
+    /*
+     * ...and generally, our preferred cipher is AES.
+     * Note that AEADs will be bumped to take preference after sorting by
+     * strength.
+     */
+    ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, SSL_AES ^ SSL_AESGCM, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD,
+                          -1, &head, &tail);
+
+    /* Temporarily enable everything else for sorting */
+    ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, &head, &tail);
+
+    /* Low priority for MD5 */
+    ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_MD5, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head,
+                          &tail);
+
+    /*
+     * Move anonymous ciphers to the end.  Usually, these will remain
+     * disabled. (For applications that allow them, they aren't too bad, but
+     * we prefer authenticated ciphers.)
+     */
+    ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, SSL_aNULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head,
+                          &tail);
+
+    ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kRSA, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head,
+                          &tail);
+    ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kPSK, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head,
+                          &tail);
+
+    /* RC4 is sort-of broken -- move the the end */
+    ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, SSL_RC4, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head,
+                          &tail);
+
+    /*
+     * Now sort by symmetric encryption strength.  The above ordering remains
+     * in force within each class
+     */
+    if (!ssl_cipher_strength_sort(&head, &tail)) {
+        OPENSSL_free(co_list);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Partially overrule strength sort to prefer TLS 1.2 ciphers/PRFs.
+     * TODO(openssl-team): is there an easier way to accomplish all this?
+     */
+    ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, TLS1_2_VERSION, 0, CIPHER_BUMP, -1,
+                          &head, &tail);
+
+    /*
+     * Irrespective of strength, enforce the following order:
+     * (EC)DHE + AEAD > (EC)DHE > rest of AEAD > rest.
+     * Within each group, ciphers remain sorted by strength and previous
+     * preference, i.e.,
+     * 1) ECDHE > DHE
+     * 2) GCM > CHACHA
+     * 3) AES > rest
+     * 4) TLS 1.2 > legacy
+     *
+     * Because we now bump ciphers to the top of the list, we proceed in
+     * reverse order of preference.
+     */
+    ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_AEAD, 0, 0, CIPHER_BUMP, -1,
+                          &head, &tail);
+    ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+                          CIPHER_BUMP, -1, &head, &tail);
+    ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE, 0, 0, SSL_AEAD, 0, 0,
+                          CIPHER_BUMP, -1, &head, &tail);
+
+    /* Now disable everything (maintaining the ordering!) */
+    ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_DEL, -1, &head, &tail);
+
+    /*
+     * We also need cipher aliases for selecting based on the rule_str.
+     * There might be two types of entries in the rule_str: 1) names
+     * of ciphers themselves 2) aliases for groups of ciphers.
+     * For 1) we need the available ciphers and for 2) the cipher
+     * groups of cipher_aliases added together in one list (otherwise
+     * we would be happy with just the cipher_aliases table).
+     */
+    num_of_group_aliases = OSSL_NELEM(cipher_aliases);
+    num_of_alias_max = num_of_ciphers + num_of_group_aliases + 1;
+    ca_list = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ca_list) * num_of_alias_max);
+    if (ca_list == NULL) {
+        OPENSSL_free(co_list);
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CREATE_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return (NULL);          /* Failure */
+    }
+    ssl_cipher_collect_aliases(ca_list, num_of_group_aliases,
+                               disabled_mkey, disabled_auth, disabled_enc,
+                               disabled_mac, head);
+
+    /*
+     * If the rule_string begins with DEFAULT, apply the default rule
+     * before using the (possibly available) additional rules.
+     */
+    ok = 1;
+    rule_p = rule_str;
+    if (strncmp(rule_str, "DEFAULT", 7) == 0) {
+        ok = ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST,
+                                        &head, &tail, ca_list, c);
+        rule_p += 7;
+        if (*rule_p == ':')
+            rule_p++;
+    }
+
+    if (ok && (strlen(rule_p) > 0))
+        ok = ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(rule_p, &head, &tail, ca_list, c);
+
+    OPENSSL_free(ca_list);      /* Not needed anymore */
+
+    if (!ok) {                  /* Rule processing failure */
+        OPENSSL_free(co_list);
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Allocate new "cipherstack" for the result, return with error
+     * if we cannot get one.
+     */
+    if ((cipherstack = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null()) == NULL) {
+        OPENSSL_free(co_list);
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * The cipher selection for the list is done. The ciphers are added
+     * to the resulting precedence to the STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER).
+     */
+    for (curr = head; curr != NULL; curr = curr->next) {
+        if (curr->active
+            && (!FIPS_mode() || curr->cipher->algo_strength & SSL_FIPS)) {
+            if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(cipherstack, curr->cipher)) {
+                OPENSSL_free(co_list);
+                sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(cipherstack);
+                return NULL;
+            }
+#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
+            fprintf(stderr, "<%s>\n", curr->cipher->name);
+#endif
+        }
+    }
+    OPENSSL_free(co_list);      /* Not needed any longer */
+
+    tmp_cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(cipherstack);
+    if (tmp_cipher_list == NULL) {
+        sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(cipherstack);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(*cipher_list);
+    *cipher_list = cipherstack;
+    if (*cipher_list_by_id != NULL)
+        sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(*cipher_list_by_id);
+    *cipher_list_by_id = tmp_cipher_list;
+    (void)sk_SSL_CIPHER_set_cmp_func(*cipher_list_by_id, ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp);
+
+    sk_SSL_CIPHER_sort(*cipher_list_by_id);
+    return (cipherstack);
+}
+
+char *SSL_CIPHER_description(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, char *buf, int len)
+{
+    const char *ver;
+    const char *kx, *au, *enc, *mac;
+    uint32_t alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac;
+    static const char *format = "%-23s %s Kx=%-8s Au=%-4s Enc=%-9s Mac=%-4s\n";
+
+    if (buf == NULL) {
+        len = 128;
+        buf = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
+        if (buf == NULL)
+            return NULL;
+    } else if (len < 128)
+        return NULL;
+
+    alg_mkey = cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+    alg_auth = cipher->algorithm_auth;
+    alg_enc = cipher->algorithm_enc;
+    alg_mac = cipher->algorithm_mac;
+
+    ver = ssl_protocol_to_string(cipher->min_tls);
+
+    switch (alg_mkey) {
+    case SSL_kRSA:
+        kx = "RSA";
+        break;
+    case SSL_kDHE:
+        kx = "DH";
+        break;
+    case SSL_kECDHE:
+        kx = "ECDH";
+        break;
+    case SSL_kPSK:
+        kx = "PSK";
+        break;
+    case SSL_kRSAPSK:
+        kx = "RSAPSK";
+        break;
+    case SSL_kECDHEPSK:
+        kx = "ECDHEPSK";
+        break;
+    case SSL_kDHEPSK:
+        kx = "DHEPSK";
+        break;
+    case SSL_kSRP:
+        kx = "SRP";
+        break;
+    case SSL_kGOST:
+        kx = "GOST";
+        break;
+    default:
+        kx = "unknown";
+    }
+
+    switch (alg_auth) {
+    case SSL_aRSA:
+        au = "RSA";
+        break;
+    case SSL_aDSS:
+        au = "DSS";
+        break;
+    case SSL_aNULL:
+        au = "None";
+        break;
+    case SSL_aECDSA:
+        au = "ECDSA";
+        break;
+    case SSL_aPSK:
+        au = "PSK";
+        break;
+    case SSL_aSRP:
+        au = "SRP";
+        break;
+    case SSL_aGOST01:
+        au = "GOST01";
+        break;
+        /* New GOST ciphersuites have both SSL_aGOST12 and SSL_aGOST01 bits */
+    case (SSL_aGOST12 | SSL_aGOST01):
+        au = "GOST12";
+        break;
+    default:
+        au = "unknown";
+        break;
+    }
+
+    switch (alg_enc) {
+    case SSL_DES:
+        enc = "DES(56)";
+        break;
+    case SSL_3DES:
+        enc = "3DES(168)";
+        break;
+    case SSL_RC4:
+        enc = "RC4(128)";
+        break;
+    case SSL_RC2:
+        enc = "RC2(128)";
+        break;
+    case SSL_IDEA:
+        enc = "IDEA(128)";
+        break;
+    case SSL_eNULL:
+        enc = "None";
+        break;
+    case SSL_AES128:
+        enc = "AES(128)";
+        break;
+    case SSL_AES256:
+        enc = "AES(256)";
+        break;
+    case SSL_AES128GCM:
+        enc = "AESGCM(128)";
+        break;
+    case SSL_AES256GCM:
+        enc = "AESGCM(256)";
+        break;
+    case SSL_AES128CCM:
+        enc = "AESCCM(128)";
+        break;
+    case SSL_AES256CCM:
+        enc = "AESCCM(256)";
+        break;
+    case SSL_AES128CCM8:
+        enc = "AESCCM8(128)";
+        break;
+    case SSL_AES256CCM8:
+        enc = "AESCCM8(256)";
+        break;
+    case SSL_CAMELLIA128:
+        enc = "Camellia(128)";
+        break;
+    case SSL_CAMELLIA256:
+        enc = "Camellia(256)";
+        break;
+    case SSL_SEED:
+        enc = "SEED(128)";
+        break;
+    case SSL_eGOST2814789CNT:
+    case SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12:
+        enc = "GOST89(256)";
+        break;
+    case SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305:
+        enc = "CHACHA20/POLY1305(256)";
+        break;
+    default:
+        enc = "unknown";
+        break;
+    }
+
+    switch (alg_mac) {
+    case SSL_MD5:
+        mac = "MD5";
+        break;
+    case SSL_SHA1:
+        mac = "SHA1";
+        break;
+    case SSL_SHA256:
+        mac = "SHA256";
+        break;
+    case SSL_SHA384:
+        mac = "SHA384";
+        break;
+    case SSL_AEAD:
+        mac = "AEAD";
+        break;
+    case SSL_GOST89MAC:
+    case SSL_GOST89MAC12:
+        mac = "GOST89";
+        break;
+    case SSL_GOST94:
+        mac = "GOST94";
+        break;
+    case SSL_GOST12_256:
+    case SSL_GOST12_512:
+        mac = "GOST2012";
+        break;
+    default:
+        mac = "unknown";
+        break;
+    }
+
+    BIO_snprintf(buf, len, format, cipher->name, ver, kx, au, enc, mac);
+
+    return (buf);
+}
+
+const char *SSL_CIPHER_get_version(const SSL_CIPHER *c)
+{
+    if (c == NULL)
+        return "(NONE)";
+
+    /*
+     * Backwards-compatibility crutch.  In almost all contexts we report TLS
+     * 1.0 as "TLSv1", but for ciphers we report "TLSv1.0".
+     */
+    if (c->min_tls == TLS1_VERSION)
+        return "TLSv1.0";
+    return ssl_protocol_to_string(c->min_tls);
+}
+
+/* return the actual cipher being used */
+const char *SSL_CIPHER_get_name(const SSL_CIPHER *c)
+{
+    if (c != NULL)
+        return (c->name);
+    return ("(NONE)");
+}
+
+/* number of bits for symmetric cipher */
+int SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(const SSL_CIPHER *c, int *alg_bits)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    if (c != NULL) {
+        if (alg_bits != NULL)
+            *alg_bits = (int)c->alg_bits;
+        ret = (int)c->strength_bits;
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+uint32_t SSL_CIPHER_get_id(const SSL_CIPHER *c)
+{
+    return c->id;
+}
+
+SSL_COMP *ssl3_comp_find(STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *sk, int n)
+{
+    SSL_COMP *ctmp;
+    int i, nn;
+
+    if ((n == 0) || (sk == NULL))
+        return (NULL);
+    nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(sk);
+    for (i = 0; i < nn; i++) {
+        ctmp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(sk, i);
+        if (ctmp->id == n)
+            return (ctmp);
+    }
+    return (NULL);
+}
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(void)
+{
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *SSL_COMP_set0_compression_methods(STACK_OF(SSL_COMP)
+                                                      *meths)
+{
+    return meths;
+}
+
+int SSL_COMP_add_compression_method(int id, COMP_METHOD *cm)
+{
+    return 1;
+}
+
+#else
+STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(void)
+{
+    load_builtin_compressions();
+    return (ssl_comp_methods);
+}
+
+STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *SSL_COMP_set0_compression_methods(STACK_OF(SSL_COMP)
+                                                      *meths)
+{
+    STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *old_meths = ssl_comp_methods;
+    ssl_comp_methods = meths;
+    return old_meths;
+}
+
+static void cmeth_free(SSL_COMP *cm)
+{
+    OPENSSL_free(cm);
+}
+
+void ssl_comp_free_compression_methods_int(void)
+{
+    STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *old_meths = ssl_comp_methods;
+    ssl_comp_methods = NULL;
+    sk_SSL_COMP_pop_free(old_meths, cmeth_free);
+}
+
+int SSL_COMP_add_compression_method(int id, COMP_METHOD *cm)
+{
+    SSL_COMP *comp;
+
+    if (cm == NULL || COMP_get_type(cm) == NID_undef)
+        return 1;
+
+    /*-
+     * According to draft-ietf-tls-compression-04.txt, the
+     * compression number ranges should be the following:
+     *
+     *   0 to  63:  methods defined by the IETF
+     *  64 to 192:  external party methods assigned by IANA
+     * 193 to 255:  reserved for private use
+     */
+    if (id < 193 || id > 255) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_COMP_ADD_COMPRESSION_METHOD,
+               SSL_R_COMPRESSION_ID_NOT_WITHIN_PRIVATE_RANGE);
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_DISABLE);
+    comp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*comp));
+    if (comp == NULL) {
+        CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE);
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_COMP_ADD_COMPRESSION_METHOD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return (1);
+    }
+
+    comp->id = id;
+    comp->method = cm;
+    load_builtin_compressions();
+    if (ssl_comp_methods && sk_SSL_COMP_find(ssl_comp_methods, comp) >= 0) {
+        OPENSSL_free(comp);
+        CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE);
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_COMP_ADD_COMPRESSION_METHOD,
+               SSL_R_DUPLICATE_COMPRESSION_ID);
+        return (1);
+    }
+    if (ssl_comp_methods == NULL || !sk_SSL_COMP_push(ssl_comp_methods, comp)) {
+        OPENSSL_free(comp);
+        CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE);
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_COMP_ADD_COMPRESSION_METHOD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return (1);
+    }
+    CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE);
+    return (0);
+}
+#endif
+
+const char *SSL_COMP_get_name(const COMP_METHOD *comp)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+    return comp ? COMP_get_name(comp) : NULL;
+#else
+    return NULL;
+#endif
+}
+
+const char *SSL_COMP_get0_name(const SSL_COMP *comp)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+    return comp->name;
+#else
+    return NULL;
+#endif
+}
+
+int SSL_COMP_get_id(const SSL_COMP *comp)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+    return comp->id;
+#else
+    return -1;
+#endif
+}
+
+/* For a cipher return the index corresponding to the certificate type */
+int ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(const SSL_CIPHER *c)
+{
+    uint32_t alg_a;
+
+    alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
+
+    if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
+        return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
+    else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS)
+        return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
+    else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
+        return SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC;
+    else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12)
+        return SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC;
+    else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
+        return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
+
+    return -1;
+}
+
+const SSL_CIPHER *ssl_get_cipher_by_char(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *ptr)
+{
+    const SSL_CIPHER *c = ssl->method->get_cipher_by_char(ptr);
+
+    if (c == NULL || c->valid == 0)
+        return NULL;
+    return c;
+}
+
+const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *ptr)
+{
+    return ssl->method->get_cipher_by_char(ptr);
+}
+
+int SSL_CIPHER_get_cipher_nid(const SSL_CIPHER *c)
+{
+    int i;
+    if (c == NULL)
+        return NID_undef;
+    i = ssl_cipher_info_lookup(ssl_cipher_table_cipher, c->algorithm_enc);
+    if (i == -1)
+        return NID_undef;
+    return ssl_cipher_table_cipher[i].nid;
+}
+
+int SSL_CIPHER_get_digest_nid(const SSL_CIPHER *c)
+{
+    int i = ssl_cipher_info_lookup(ssl_cipher_table_mac, c->algorithm_mac);
+
+    if (i == -1)
+        return NID_undef;
+    return ssl_cipher_table_mac[i].nid;
+}
+
+int SSL_CIPHER_get_kx_nid(const SSL_CIPHER *c)
+{
+    int i = ssl_cipher_info_lookup(ssl_cipher_table_kx, c->algorithm_mkey);
+
+    if (i == -1)
+        return NID_undef;
+    return ssl_cipher_table_kx[i].nid;
+}
+
+int SSL_CIPHER_get_auth_nid(const SSL_CIPHER *c)
+{
+    int i = ssl_cipher_info_lookup(ssl_cipher_table_auth, c->algorithm_auth);
+
+    if (i == -1)
+        return NID_undef;
+    return ssl_cipher_table_auth[i].nid;
+}
+
+int SSL_CIPHER_is_aead(const SSL_CIPHER *c)
+{
+    return (c->algorithm_mac & SSL_AEAD) ? 1 : 0;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/ssl_conf.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/ssl_conf.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7f89488
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/ssl_conf.c
@@ -0,0 +1,893 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2012-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#include <openssl/conf.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+
+/*
+ * structure holding name tables. This is used for permitted elements in lists
+ * such as TLSv1.
+ */
+
+typedef struct {
+    const char *name;
+    int namelen;
+    unsigned int name_flags;
+    unsigned long option_value;
+} ssl_flag_tbl;
+
+/* Switch table: use for single command line switches like no_tls2 */
+typedef struct {
+    unsigned long option_value;
+    unsigned int name_flags;
+} ssl_switch_tbl;
+
+/* Sense of name is inverted e.g. "TLSv1" will clear SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1 */
+#define SSL_TFLAG_INV   0x1
+/* Mask for type of flag referred to */
+#define SSL_TFLAG_TYPE_MASK 0xf00
+/* Flag is for options */
+#define SSL_TFLAG_OPTION    0x000
+/* Flag is for cert_flags */
+#define SSL_TFLAG_CERT      0x100
+/* Flag is for verify mode */
+#define SSL_TFLAG_VFY       0x200
+/* Option can only be used for clients */
+#define SSL_TFLAG_CLIENT SSL_CONF_FLAG_CLIENT
+/* Option can only be used for servers */
+#define SSL_TFLAG_SERVER SSL_CONF_FLAG_SERVER
+#define SSL_TFLAG_BOTH (SSL_TFLAG_CLIENT|SSL_TFLAG_SERVER)
+
+#define SSL_FLAG_TBL(str, flag) \
+        {str, (int)(sizeof(str) - 1), SSL_TFLAG_BOTH, flag}
+#define SSL_FLAG_TBL_SRV(str, flag) \
+        {str, (int)(sizeof(str) - 1), SSL_TFLAG_SERVER, flag}
+#define SSL_FLAG_TBL_CLI(str, flag) \
+        {str, (int)(sizeof(str) - 1), SSL_TFLAG_CLIENT, flag}
+#define SSL_FLAG_TBL_INV(str, flag) \
+        {str, (int)(sizeof(str) - 1), SSL_TFLAG_INV|SSL_TFLAG_BOTH, flag}
+#define SSL_FLAG_TBL_SRV_INV(str, flag) \
+        {str, (int)(sizeof(str) - 1), SSL_TFLAG_INV|SSL_TFLAG_SERVER, flag}
+#define SSL_FLAG_TBL_CERT(str, flag) \
+        {str, (int)(sizeof(str) - 1), SSL_TFLAG_CERT|SSL_TFLAG_BOTH, flag}
+
+#define SSL_FLAG_VFY_CLI(str, flag) \
+        {str, (int)(sizeof(str) - 1), SSL_TFLAG_VFY | SSL_TFLAG_CLIENT, flag}
+#define SSL_FLAG_VFY_SRV(str, flag) \
+        {str, (int)(sizeof(str) - 1), SSL_TFLAG_VFY | SSL_TFLAG_SERVER, flag}
+
+/*
+ * Opaque structure containing SSL configuration context.
+ */
+
+struct ssl_conf_ctx_st {
+    /*
+     * Various flags indicating (among other things) which options we will
+     * recognise.
+     */
+    unsigned int flags;
+    /* Prefix and length of commands */
+    char *prefix;
+    size_t prefixlen;
+    /* SSL_CTX or SSL structure to perform operations on */
+    SSL_CTX *ctx;
+    SSL *ssl;
+    /* Pointer to SSL or SSL_CTX options field or NULL if none */
+    uint32_t *poptions;
+    /* Certificate filenames for each type */
+    char *cert_filename[SSL_PKEY_NUM];
+    /* Pointer to SSL or SSL_CTX cert_flags or NULL if none */
+    uint32_t *pcert_flags;
+    /* Pointer to SSL or SSL_CTX verify_mode or NULL if none */
+    uint32_t *pvfy_flags;
+    /* Pointer to SSL or SSL_CTX min_version field or NULL if none */
+    int *min_version;
+    /* Pointer to SSL or SSL_CTX max_version field or NULL if none */
+    int *max_version;
+    /* Current flag table being worked on */
+    const ssl_flag_tbl *tbl;
+    /* Size of table */
+    size_t ntbl;
+    /* Client CA names */
+    STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *canames;
+};
+
+static void ssl_set_option(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, unsigned int name_flags,
+                           unsigned long option_value, int onoff)
+{
+    uint32_t *pflags;
+    if (cctx->poptions == NULL)
+        return;
+    if (name_flags & SSL_TFLAG_INV)
+        onoff ^= 1;
+    switch (name_flags & SSL_TFLAG_TYPE_MASK) {
+
+    case SSL_TFLAG_CERT:
+        pflags = cctx->pcert_flags;
+        break;
+
+    case SSL_TFLAG_VFY:
+        pflags = cctx->pvfy_flags;
+        break;
+
+    case SSL_TFLAG_OPTION:
+        pflags = cctx->poptions;
+        break;
+
+    default:
+        return;
+
+    }
+    if (onoff)
+        *pflags |= option_value;
+    else
+        *pflags &= ~option_value;
+}
+
+static int ssl_match_option(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const ssl_flag_tbl *tbl,
+                            const char *name, int namelen, int onoff)
+{
+    /* If name not relevant for context skip */
+    if (!(cctx->flags & tbl->name_flags & SSL_TFLAG_BOTH))
+        return 0;
+    if (namelen == -1) {
+        if (strcmp(tbl->name, name))
+            return 0;
+    } else if (tbl->namelen != namelen || strncasecmp(tbl->name, name, namelen))
+        return 0;
+    ssl_set_option(cctx, tbl->name_flags, tbl->option_value, onoff);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int ssl_set_option_list(const char *elem, int len, void *usr)
+{
+    SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx = usr;
+    size_t i;
+    const ssl_flag_tbl *tbl;
+    int onoff = 1;
+    /*
+     * len == -1 indicates not being called in list context, just for single
+     * command line switches, so don't allow +, -.
+     */
+    if (elem == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    if (len != -1) {
+        if (*elem == '+') {
+            elem++;
+            len--;
+            onoff = 1;
+        } else if (*elem == '-') {
+            elem++;
+            len--;
+            onoff = 0;
+        }
+    }
+    for (i = 0, tbl = cctx->tbl; i < cctx->ntbl; i++, tbl++) {
+        if (ssl_match_option(cctx, tbl, elem, len, onoff))
+            return 1;
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/* Set supported signature algorithms */
+static int cmd_SignatureAlgorithms(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value)
+{
+    int rv;
+    if (cctx->ssl)
+        rv = SSL_set1_sigalgs_list(cctx->ssl, value);
+    /* NB: ctx == NULL performs syntax checking only */
+    else
+        rv = SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs_list(cctx->ctx, value);
+    return rv > 0;
+}
+
+/* Set supported client signature algorithms */
+static int cmd_ClientSignatureAlgorithms(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value)
+{
+    int rv;
+    if (cctx->ssl)
+        rv = SSL_set1_client_sigalgs_list(cctx->ssl, value);
+    /* NB: ctx == NULL performs syntax checking only */
+    else
+        rv = SSL_CTX_set1_client_sigalgs_list(cctx->ctx, value);
+    return rv > 0;
+}
+
+static int cmd_Curves(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value)
+{
+    int rv;
+    if (cctx->ssl)
+        rv = SSL_set1_curves_list(cctx->ssl, value);
+    /* NB: ctx == NULL performs syntax checking only */
+    else
+        rv = SSL_CTX_set1_curves_list(cctx->ctx, value);
+    return rv > 0;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+/* ECDH temporary parameters */
+static int cmd_ECDHParameters(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value)
+{
+    int rv = 1;
+    EC_KEY *ecdh;
+    int nid;
+
+    /* Ignore values supported by 1.0.2 for the automatic selection */
+    if ((cctx->flags & SSL_CONF_FLAG_FILE) &&
+        strcasecmp(value, "+automatic") == 0)
+        return 1;
+    if ((cctx->flags & SSL_CONF_FLAG_CMDLINE) &&
+        strcmp(value, "auto") == 0)
+        return 1;
+
+    nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(value);
+    if (nid == NID_undef)
+        nid = OBJ_sn2nid(value);
+    if (nid == 0)
+        return 0;
+    ecdh = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
+    if (!ecdh)
+        return 0;
+    if (cctx->ctx)
+        rv = SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh(cctx->ctx, ecdh);
+    else if (cctx->ssl)
+        rv = SSL_set_tmp_ecdh(cctx->ssl, ecdh);
+    EC_KEY_free(ecdh);
+
+    return rv > 0;
+}
+#endif
+static int cmd_CipherString(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value)
+{
+    int rv = 1;
+    if (cctx->ctx)
+        rv = SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(cctx->ctx, value);
+    if (cctx->ssl)
+        rv = SSL_set_cipher_list(cctx->ssl, value);
+    return rv > 0;
+}
+
+static int cmd_Protocol(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value)
+{
+    static const ssl_flag_tbl ssl_protocol_list[] = {
+        SSL_FLAG_TBL_INV("ALL", SSL_OP_NO_SSL_MASK),
+        SSL_FLAG_TBL_INV("SSLv2", SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2),
+        SSL_FLAG_TBL_INV("SSLv3", SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3),
+        SSL_FLAG_TBL_INV("TLSv1", SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1),
+        SSL_FLAG_TBL_INV("TLSv1.1", SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1),
+        SSL_FLAG_TBL_INV("TLSv1.2", SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2),
+        SSL_FLAG_TBL_INV("DTLSv1", SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1),
+        SSL_FLAG_TBL_INV("DTLSv1.2", SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2)
+    };
+    cctx->tbl = ssl_protocol_list;
+    cctx->ntbl = OSSL_NELEM(ssl_protocol_list);
+    return CONF_parse_list(value, ',', 1, ssl_set_option_list, cctx);
+}
+
+/*
+ * protocol_from_string - converts a protocol version string to a number
+ *
+ * Returns -1 on failure or the version on success
+ */
+static int protocol_from_string(const char *value)
+{
+    struct protocol_versions {
+        const char *name;
+        int version;
+    };
+    static const struct protocol_versions versions[] = {
+        {"None", 0},
+        {"SSLv3", SSL3_VERSION},
+        {"TLSv1", TLS1_VERSION},
+        {"TLSv1.1", TLS1_1_VERSION},
+        {"TLSv1.2", TLS1_2_VERSION},
+        {"DTLSv1", DTLS1_VERSION},
+        {"DTLSv1.2", DTLS1_2_VERSION}
+    };
+    size_t i;
+    size_t n = OSSL_NELEM(versions);
+
+    for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
+        if (strcmp(versions[i].name, value) == 0)
+            return versions[i].version;
+    return -1;
+}
+
+static int min_max_proto(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value, int *bound)
+{
+    int method_version;
+    int new_version;
+
+    if (cctx->ctx != NULL)
+        method_version = cctx->ctx->method->version;
+    else if (cctx->ssl != NULL)
+        method_version = cctx->ssl->ctx->method->version;
+    else
+        return 0;
+    if ((new_version = protocol_from_string(value)) < 0)
+        return 0;
+    return ssl_set_version_bound(method_version, new_version, bound);
+}
+
+/*
+ * cmd_MinProtocol - Set min protocol version
+ * @cctx: config structure to save settings in
+ * @value: The min protocol version in string form
+ *
+ * Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure.
+ */
+static int cmd_MinProtocol(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value)
+{
+    return min_max_proto(cctx, value, cctx->min_version);
+}
+
+/*
+ * cmd_MaxProtocol - Set max protocol version
+ * @cctx: config structure to save settings in
+ * @value: The max protocol version in string form
+ *
+ * Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure.
+ */
+static int cmd_MaxProtocol(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value)
+{
+    return min_max_proto(cctx, value, cctx->max_version);
+}
+
+static int cmd_Options(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value)
+{
+    static const ssl_flag_tbl ssl_option_list[] = {
+        SSL_FLAG_TBL_INV("SessionTicket", SSL_OP_NO_TICKET),
+        SSL_FLAG_TBL_INV("EmptyFragments",
+                         SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS),
+        SSL_FLAG_TBL("Bugs", SSL_OP_ALL),
+        SSL_FLAG_TBL_INV("Compression", SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION),
+        SSL_FLAG_TBL_SRV("ServerPreference", SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
+        SSL_FLAG_TBL_SRV("NoResumptionOnRenegotiation",
+                         SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION),
+        SSL_FLAG_TBL_SRV("DHSingle", SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE),
+        SSL_FLAG_TBL_SRV("ECDHSingle", SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE),
+        SSL_FLAG_TBL("UnsafeLegacyRenegotiation",
+                     SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION),
+        SSL_FLAG_TBL_INV("EncryptThenMac", SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC),
+        SSL_FLAG_TBL("NoRenegotiation", SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION),
+    };
+    if (value == NULL)
+        return -3;
+    cctx->tbl = ssl_option_list;
+    cctx->ntbl = OSSL_NELEM(ssl_option_list);
+    return CONF_parse_list(value, ',', 1, ssl_set_option_list, cctx);
+}
+
+static int cmd_VerifyMode(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value)
+{
+    static const ssl_flag_tbl ssl_vfy_list[] = {
+        SSL_FLAG_VFY_CLI("Peer", SSL_VERIFY_PEER),
+        SSL_FLAG_VFY_SRV("Request", SSL_VERIFY_PEER),
+        SSL_FLAG_VFY_SRV("Require",
+                         SSL_VERIFY_PEER | SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT),
+        SSL_FLAG_VFY_SRV("Once", SSL_VERIFY_PEER | SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)
+    };
+    if (value == NULL)
+        return -3;
+    cctx->tbl = ssl_vfy_list;
+    cctx->ntbl = OSSL_NELEM(ssl_vfy_list);
+    return CONF_parse_list(value, ',', 1, ssl_set_option_list, cctx);
+}
+
+static int cmd_Certificate(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value)
+{
+    int rv = 1;
+    CERT *c = NULL;
+    if (cctx->ctx) {
+        rv = SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(cctx->ctx, value);
+        c = cctx->ctx->cert;
+    }
+    if (cctx->ssl) {
+        rv = SSL_use_certificate_chain_file(cctx->ssl, value);
+        c = cctx->ssl->cert;
+    }
+    if (rv > 0 && c && cctx->flags & SSL_CONF_FLAG_REQUIRE_PRIVATE) {
+        char **pfilename = &cctx->cert_filename[c->key - c->pkeys];
+        OPENSSL_free(*pfilename);
+        *pfilename = OPENSSL_strdup(value);
+        if (!*pfilename)
+            rv = 0;
+    }
+
+    return rv > 0;
+}
+
+static int cmd_PrivateKey(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value)
+{
+    int rv = 1;
+    if (!(cctx->flags & SSL_CONF_FLAG_CERTIFICATE))
+        return -2;
+    if (cctx->ctx)
+        rv = SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(cctx->ctx, value, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM);
+    if (cctx->ssl)
+        rv = SSL_use_PrivateKey_file(cctx->ssl, value, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM);
+    return rv > 0;
+}
+
+static int cmd_ServerInfoFile(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value)
+{
+    int rv = 1;
+    if (cctx->ctx)
+        rv = SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo_file(cctx->ctx, value);
+    return rv > 0;
+}
+
+static int do_store(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx,
+                    const char *CAfile, const char *CApath, int verify_store)
+{
+    CERT *cert;
+    X509_STORE **st;
+    if (cctx->ctx)
+        cert = cctx->ctx->cert;
+    else if (cctx->ssl)
+        cert = cctx->ssl->cert;
+    else
+        return 1;
+    st = verify_store ? &cert->verify_store : &cert->chain_store;
+    if (*st == NULL) {
+        *st = X509_STORE_new();
+        if (*st == NULL)
+            return 0;
+    }
+    return X509_STORE_load_locations(*st, CAfile, CApath) > 0;
+}
+
+static int cmd_ChainCAPath(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value)
+{
+    return do_store(cctx, NULL, value, 0);
+}
+
+static int cmd_ChainCAFile(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value)
+{
+    return do_store(cctx, value, NULL, 0);
+}
+
+static int cmd_VerifyCAPath(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value)
+{
+    return do_store(cctx, NULL, value, 1);
+}
+
+static int cmd_VerifyCAFile(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value)
+{
+    return do_store(cctx, value, NULL, 1);
+}
+
+static int cmd_ClientCAFile(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value)
+{
+    if (cctx->canames == NULL)
+        cctx->canames = sk_X509_NAME_new_null();
+    if (cctx->canames == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    return SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(cctx->canames, value);
+}
+
+static int cmd_ClientCAPath(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value)
+{
+    if (cctx->canames == NULL)
+        cctx->canames = sk_X509_NAME_new_null();
+    if (cctx->canames == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    return SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack(cctx->canames, value);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+static int cmd_DHParameters(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value)
+{
+    int rv = 0;
+    DH *dh = NULL;
+    BIO *in = NULL;
+    if (cctx->ctx || cctx->ssl) {
+        in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
+        if (in == NULL)
+            goto end;
+        if (BIO_read_filename(in, value) <= 0)
+            goto end;
+        dh = PEM_read_bio_DHparams(in, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+        if (dh == NULL)
+            goto end;
+    } else
+        return 1;
+    if (cctx->ctx)
+        rv = SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(cctx->ctx, dh);
+    if (cctx->ssl)
+        rv = SSL_set_tmp_dh(cctx->ssl, dh);
+ end:
+    DH_free(dh);
+    BIO_free(in);
+    return rv > 0;
+}
+#endif
+typedef struct {
+    int (*cmd) (SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value);
+    const char *str_file;
+    const char *str_cmdline;
+    unsigned short flags;
+    unsigned short value_type;
+} ssl_conf_cmd_tbl;
+
+/* Table of supported parameters */
+
+#define SSL_CONF_CMD(name, cmdopt, flags, type) \
+        {cmd_##name, #name, cmdopt, flags, type}
+
+#define SSL_CONF_CMD_STRING(name, cmdopt, flags) \
+        SSL_CONF_CMD(name, cmdopt, flags, SSL_CONF_TYPE_STRING)
+
+#define SSL_CONF_CMD_SWITCH(name, flags) \
+        {0, NULL, name, flags, SSL_CONF_TYPE_NONE}
+
+/* See apps/apps.h if you change this table. */
+static const ssl_conf_cmd_tbl ssl_conf_cmds[] = {
+    SSL_CONF_CMD_SWITCH("no_ssl3", 0),
+    SSL_CONF_CMD_SWITCH("no_tls1", 0),
+    SSL_CONF_CMD_SWITCH("no_tls1_1", 0),
+    SSL_CONF_CMD_SWITCH("no_tls1_2", 0),
+    SSL_CONF_CMD_SWITCH("bugs", 0),
+    SSL_CONF_CMD_SWITCH("no_comp", 0),
+    SSL_CONF_CMD_SWITCH("comp", 0),
+    SSL_CONF_CMD_SWITCH("ecdh_single", SSL_CONF_FLAG_SERVER),
+    SSL_CONF_CMD_SWITCH("no_ticket", 0),
+    SSL_CONF_CMD_SWITCH("serverpref", SSL_CONF_FLAG_SERVER),
+    SSL_CONF_CMD_SWITCH("legacy_renegotiation", 0),
+    SSL_CONF_CMD_SWITCH("legacy_server_connect", SSL_CONF_FLAG_SERVER),
+    SSL_CONF_CMD_SWITCH("no_renegotiation", 0),
+    SSL_CONF_CMD_SWITCH("no_resumption_on_reneg", SSL_CONF_FLAG_SERVER),
+    SSL_CONF_CMD_SWITCH("no_legacy_server_connect", SSL_CONF_FLAG_SERVER),
+    SSL_CONF_CMD_SWITCH("strict", 0),
+    SSL_CONF_CMD_STRING(SignatureAlgorithms, "sigalgs", 0),
+    SSL_CONF_CMD_STRING(ClientSignatureAlgorithms, "client_sigalgs", 0),
+    SSL_CONF_CMD_STRING(Curves, "curves", 0),
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    SSL_CONF_CMD_STRING(ECDHParameters, "named_curve", SSL_CONF_FLAG_SERVER),
+#endif
+    SSL_CONF_CMD_STRING(CipherString, "cipher", 0),
+    SSL_CONF_CMD_STRING(Protocol, NULL, 0),
+    SSL_CONF_CMD_STRING(MinProtocol, "min_protocol", 0),
+    SSL_CONF_CMD_STRING(MaxProtocol, "max_protocol", 0),
+    SSL_CONF_CMD_STRING(Options, NULL, 0),
+    SSL_CONF_CMD_STRING(VerifyMode, NULL, 0),
+    SSL_CONF_CMD(Certificate, "cert", SSL_CONF_FLAG_CERTIFICATE,
+                 SSL_CONF_TYPE_FILE),
+    SSL_CONF_CMD(PrivateKey, "key", SSL_CONF_FLAG_CERTIFICATE,
+                 SSL_CONF_TYPE_FILE),
+    SSL_CONF_CMD(ServerInfoFile, NULL,
+                 SSL_CONF_FLAG_SERVER | SSL_CONF_FLAG_CERTIFICATE,
+                 SSL_CONF_TYPE_FILE),
+    SSL_CONF_CMD(ChainCAPath, "chainCApath", SSL_CONF_FLAG_CERTIFICATE,
+                 SSL_CONF_TYPE_DIR),
+    SSL_CONF_CMD(ChainCAFile, "chainCAfile", SSL_CONF_FLAG_CERTIFICATE,
+                 SSL_CONF_TYPE_FILE),
+    SSL_CONF_CMD(VerifyCAPath, "verifyCApath", SSL_CONF_FLAG_CERTIFICATE,
+                 SSL_CONF_TYPE_DIR),
+    SSL_CONF_CMD(VerifyCAFile, "verifyCAfile", SSL_CONF_FLAG_CERTIFICATE,
+                 SSL_CONF_TYPE_FILE),
+    SSL_CONF_CMD(ClientCAFile, NULL,
+                 SSL_CONF_FLAG_SERVER | SSL_CONF_FLAG_CERTIFICATE,
+                 SSL_CONF_TYPE_FILE),
+    SSL_CONF_CMD(ClientCAPath, NULL,
+                 SSL_CONF_FLAG_SERVER | SSL_CONF_FLAG_CERTIFICATE,
+                 SSL_CONF_TYPE_DIR),
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+    SSL_CONF_CMD(DHParameters, "dhparam",
+                 SSL_CONF_FLAG_SERVER | SSL_CONF_FLAG_CERTIFICATE,
+                 SSL_CONF_TYPE_FILE)
+#endif
+};
+
+/* Supported switches: must match order of switches in ssl_conf_cmds */
+static const ssl_switch_tbl ssl_cmd_switches[] = {
+    {SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3, 0},       /* no_ssl3 */
+    {SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1, 0},       /* no_tls1 */
+    {SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1, 0},     /* no_tls1_1 */
+    {SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2, 0},     /* no_tls1_2 */
+    {SSL_OP_ALL, 0},            /* bugs */
+    {SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION, 0}, /* no_comp */
+    {SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION, SSL_TFLAG_INV}, /* comp */
+    {SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE, 0}, /* ecdh_single */
+    {SSL_OP_NO_TICKET, 0},      /* no_ticket */
+    {SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE, 0}, /* serverpref */
+    /* legacy_renegotiation */
+    {SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION, 0},
+    /* legacy_server_connect */
+    {SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT, 0},
+    /* no_renegotiation */
+    {SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION, 0},
+    /* no_resumption_on_reneg */
+    {SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION, 0},
+    /* no_legacy_server_connect */
+    {SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT, SSL_TFLAG_INV},
+    {SSL_CERT_FLAG_TLS_STRICT, SSL_TFLAG_CERT}, /* strict */
+};
+
+static int ssl_conf_cmd_skip_prefix(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char **pcmd)
+{
+    if (!pcmd || !*pcmd)
+        return 0;
+    /* If a prefix is set, check and skip */
+    if (cctx->prefix) {
+        if (strlen(*pcmd) <= cctx->prefixlen)
+            return 0;
+        if (cctx->flags & SSL_CONF_FLAG_CMDLINE &&
+            strncmp(*pcmd, cctx->prefix, cctx->prefixlen))
+            return 0;
+        if (cctx->flags & SSL_CONF_FLAG_FILE &&
+            strncasecmp(*pcmd, cctx->prefix, cctx->prefixlen))
+            return 0;
+        *pcmd += cctx->prefixlen;
+    } else if (cctx->flags & SSL_CONF_FLAG_CMDLINE) {
+        if (**pcmd != '-' || !(*pcmd)[1])
+            return 0;
+        *pcmd += 1;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Determine if a command is allowed according to cctx flags */
+static int ssl_conf_cmd_allowed(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const ssl_conf_cmd_tbl * t)
+{
+    unsigned int tfl = t->flags;
+    unsigned int cfl = cctx->flags;
+    if ((tfl & SSL_CONF_FLAG_SERVER) && !(cfl & SSL_CONF_FLAG_SERVER))
+        return 0;
+    if ((tfl & SSL_CONF_FLAG_CLIENT) && !(cfl & SSL_CONF_FLAG_CLIENT))
+        return 0;
+    if ((tfl & SSL_CONF_FLAG_CERTIFICATE)
+        && !(cfl & SSL_CONF_FLAG_CERTIFICATE))
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static const ssl_conf_cmd_tbl *ssl_conf_cmd_lookup(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx,
+                                                   const char *cmd)
+{
+    const ssl_conf_cmd_tbl *t;
+    size_t i;
+    if (cmd == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+
+    /* Look for matching parameter name in table */
+    for (i = 0, t = ssl_conf_cmds; i < OSSL_NELEM(ssl_conf_cmds); i++, t++) {
+        if (ssl_conf_cmd_allowed(cctx, t)) {
+            if (cctx->flags & SSL_CONF_FLAG_CMDLINE) {
+                if (t->str_cmdline && strcmp(t->str_cmdline, cmd) == 0)
+                    return t;
+            }
+            if (cctx->flags & SSL_CONF_FLAG_FILE) {
+                if (t->str_file && strcasecmp(t->str_file, cmd) == 0)
+                    return t;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+static int ctrl_switch_option(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const ssl_conf_cmd_tbl * cmd)
+{
+    /* Find index of command in table */
+    size_t idx = cmd - ssl_conf_cmds;
+    const ssl_switch_tbl *scmd;
+    /* Sanity check index */
+    if (idx >= OSSL_NELEM(ssl_cmd_switches))
+        return 0;
+    /* Obtain switches entry with same index */
+    scmd = ssl_cmd_switches + idx;
+    ssl_set_option(cctx, scmd->name_flags, scmd->option_value, 1);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_CONF_cmd(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *cmd, const char *value)
+{
+    const ssl_conf_cmd_tbl *runcmd;
+    if (cmd == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CONF_CMD, SSL_R_INVALID_NULL_CMD_NAME);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (!ssl_conf_cmd_skip_prefix(cctx, &cmd))
+        return -2;
+
+    runcmd = ssl_conf_cmd_lookup(cctx, cmd);
+
+    if (runcmd) {
+        int rv;
+        if (runcmd->value_type == SSL_CONF_TYPE_NONE) {
+            return ctrl_switch_option(cctx, runcmd);
+        }
+        if (value == NULL)
+            return -3;
+        rv = runcmd->cmd(cctx, value);
+        if (rv > 0)
+            return 2;
+        if (rv == -2)
+            return -2;
+        if (cctx->flags & SSL_CONF_FLAG_SHOW_ERRORS) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CONF_CMD, SSL_R_BAD_VALUE);
+            ERR_add_error_data(4, "cmd=", cmd, ", value=", value);
+        }
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (cctx->flags & SSL_CONF_FLAG_SHOW_ERRORS) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CONF_CMD, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CMD_NAME);
+        ERR_add_error_data(2, "cmd=", cmd);
+    }
+
+    return -2;
+}
+
+int SSL_CONF_cmd_argv(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, int *pargc, char ***pargv)
+{
+    int rv;
+    const char *arg = NULL, *argn;
+    if (pargc && *pargc == 0)
+        return 0;
+    if (!pargc || *pargc > 0)
+        arg = **pargv;
+    if (arg == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    if (!pargc || *pargc > 1)
+        argn = (*pargv)[1];
+    else
+        argn = NULL;
+    cctx->flags &= ~SSL_CONF_FLAG_FILE;
+    cctx->flags |= SSL_CONF_FLAG_CMDLINE;
+    rv = SSL_CONF_cmd(cctx, arg, argn);
+    if (rv > 0) {
+        /* Success: update pargc, pargv */
+        (*pargv) += rv;
+        if (pargc)
+            (*pargc) -= rv;
+        return rv;
+    }
+    /* Unknown switch: indicate no arguments processed */
+    if (rv == -2)
+        return 0;
+    /* Some error occurred processing command, return fatal error */
+    if (rv == 0)
+        return -1;
+    return rv;
+}
+
+int SSL_CONF_cmd_value_type(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *cmd)
+{
+    if (ssl_conf_cmd_skip_prefix(cctx, &cmd)) {
+        const ssl_conf_cmd_tbl *runcmd;
+        runcmd = ssl_conf_cmd_lookup(cctx, cmd);
+        if (runcmd)
+            return runcmd->value_type;
+    }
+    return SSL_CONF_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
+}
+
+SSL_CONF_CTX *SSL_CONF_CTX_new(void)
+{
+    SSL_CONF_CTX *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int SSL_CONF_CTX_finish(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx)
+{
+    /* See if any certificates are missing private keys */
+    size_t i;
+    CERT *c = NULL;
+    if (cctx->ctx)
+        c = cctx->ctx->cert;
+    else if (cctx->ssl)
+        c = cctx->ssl->cert;
+    if (c && cctx->flags & SSL_CONF_FLAG_REQUIRE_PRIVATE) {
+        for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
+            const char *p = cctx->cert_filename[i];
+            /*
+             * If missing private key try to load one from certificate file
+             */
+            if (p && !c->pkeys[i].privatekey) {
+                if (!cmd_PrivateKey(cctx, p))
+                    return 0;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    if (cctx->canames) {
+        if (cctx->ssl)
+            SSL_set_client_CA_list(cctx->ssl, cctx->canames);
+        else if (cctx->ctx)
+            SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(cctx->ctx, cctx->canames);
+        else
+            sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(cctx->canames, X509_NAME_free);
+        cctx->canames = NULL;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+void SSL_CONF_CTX_free(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx)
+{
+    if (cctx) {
+        size_t i;
+        for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
+            OPENSSL_free(cctx->cert_filename[i]);
+        OPENSSL_free(cctx->prefix);
+        sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(cctx->canames, X509_NAME_free);
+        OPENSSL_free(cctx);
+    }
+}
+
+unsigned int SSL_CONF_CTX_set_flags(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, unsigned int flags)
+{
+    cctx->flags |= flags;
+    return cctx->flags;
+}
+
+unsigned int SSL_CONF_CTX_clear_flags(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, unsigned int flags)
+{
+    cctx->flags &= ~flags;
+    return cctx->flags;
+}
+
+int SSL_CONF_CTX_set1_prefix(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *pre)
+{
+    char *tmp = NULL;
+    if (pre) {
+        tmp = OPENSSL_strdup(pre);
+        if (tmp == NULL)
+            return 0;
+    }
+    OPENSSL_free(cctx->prefix);
+    cctx->prefix = tmp;
+    if (tmp)
+        cctx->prefixlen = strlen(tmp);
+    else
+        cctx->prefixlen = 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+void SSL_CONF_CTX_set_ssl(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, SSL *ssl)
+{
+    cctx->ssl = ssl;
+    cctx->ctx = NULL;
+    if (ssl) {
+        cctx->poptions = &ssl->options;
+        cctx->min_version = &ssl->min_proto_version;
+        cctx->max_version = &ssl->max_proto_version;
+        cctx->pcert_flags = &ssl->cert->cert_flags;
+        cctx->pvfy_flags = &ssl->verify_mode;
+    } else {
+        cctx->poptions = NULL;
+        cctx->min_version = NULL;
+        cctx->max_version = NULL;
+        cctx->pcert_flags = NULL;
+        cctx->pvfy_flags = NULL;
+    }
+}
+
+void SSL_CONF_CTX_set_ssl_ctx(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    cctx->ctx = ctx;
+    cctx->ssl = NULL;
+    if (ctx) {
+        cctx->poptions = &ctx->options;
+        cctx->min_version = &ctx->min_proto_version;
+        cctx->max_version = &ctx->max_proto_version;
+        cctx->pcert_flags = &ctx->cert->cert_flags;
+        cctx->pvfy_flags = &ctx->verify_mode;
+    } else {
+        cctx->poptions = NULL;
+        cctx->min_version = NULL;
+        cctx->max_version = NULL;
+        cctx->pcert_flags = NULL;
+        cctx->pvfy_flags = NULL;
+    }
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/ssl_err.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/ssl_err.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..580861e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/ssl_err.c
@@ -0,0 +1,689 @@
+/*
+ * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
+ * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+
+# define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL,func,0)
+# define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL,0,reason)
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[] = {
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_CHECK_SUITEB_CIPHER_LIST), "check_suiteb_cipher_list"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_CT_MOVE_SCTS), "ct_move_scts"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_CT_STRICT), "ct_strict"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_D2I_SSL_SESSION), "d2i_SSL_SESSION"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DANE_CTX_ENABLE), "dane_ctx_enable"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DANE_MTYPE_SET), "dane_mtype_set"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD), "dane_tlsa_add"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE), "do_dtls1_write"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE), "do_ssl3_write"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD), "dtls1_buffer_record"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_CHECK_TIMEOUT_NUM), "dtls1_check_timeout_num"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT), "dtls1_heartbeat"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT), "dtls1_preprocess_fragment"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_BUFFERED_RECORDS),
+     "dtls1_process_buffered_records"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD), "dtls1_process_record"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES), "dtls1_read_bytes"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_FAILED), "dtls1_read_failed"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_RETRANSMIT_MESSAGE), "dtls1_retransmit_message"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES),
+     "dtls1_write_app_data_bytes"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN), "DTLSv1_listen"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC),
+     "dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST),
+     "dtls_construct_hello_verify_request"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS_GET_REASSEMBLED_MESSAGE),
+     "dtls_get_reassembled_message"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY), "dtls_process_hello_verify"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS_WAIT_FOR_DRY), "dtls_wait_for_dry"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_OPENSSL_INIT_SSL), "OPENSSL_init_ssl"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION),
+     "ossl_statem_client_read_transition"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION),
+     "ossl_statem_server_read_transition"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_READ_STATE_MACHINE), "read_state_machine"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE), "ssl3_change_cipher_state"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM),
+     "ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL), "ssl3_ctrl"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL), "ssl3_ctx_ctrl"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_DIGEST_CACHED_RECORDS),
+     "ssl3_digest_cached_records"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC),
+     "ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_FINAL_FINISH_MAC), "ssl3_final_finish_mac"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GENERATE_KEY_BLOCK), "ssl3_generate_key_block"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GENERATE_MASTER_SECRET),
+     "ssl3_generate_master_secret"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD), "ssl3_get_record"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_INIT_FINISHED_MAC), "ssl3_init_finished_mac"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN), "ssl3_output_cert_chain"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES), "ssl3_read_bytes"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N), "ssl3_read_n"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK), "ssl3_setup_key_block"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_READ_BUFFER), "ssl3_setup_read_buffer"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_WRITE_BUFFER), "ssl3_setup_write_buffer"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_TAKE_MAC), "ssl3_take_mac"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES), "ssl3_write_bytes"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING), "ssl3_write_pending"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN), "ssl_add_cert_chain"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF), "ssl_add_cert_to_buf"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT),
+     "ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT),
+     "ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT),
+     "ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK),
+     "SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_FILE_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK),
+     "SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT),
+     "ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT),
+     "ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT),
+     "ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_BAD_METHOD), "ssl_bad_method"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN), "ssl_build_cert_chain"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST), "ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_ADD0_CHAIN_CERT), "ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP), "ssl_cert_dup"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_NEW), "ssl_cert_new"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_SET0_CHAIN), "ssl_cert_set0_chain"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY), "SSL_check_private_key"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT),
+     "ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG),
+     "ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_PROCESS_RULESTR),
+     "ssl_cipher_process_rulestr"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_STRENGTH_SORT), "ssl_cipher_strength_sort"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR), "SSL_clear"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_COMP_ADD_COMPRESSION_METHOD),
+     "SSL_COMP_add_compression_method"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CONF_CMD), "SSL_CONF_cmd"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CREATE_CIPHER_LIST), "ssl_create_cipher_list"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTRL), "SSL_ctrl"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY), "SSL_CTX_check_private_key"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_ENABLE_CT), "SSL_CTX_enable_ct"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_MAKE_PROFILES), "ssl_ctx_make_profiles"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW), "SSL_CTX_new"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_ALPN_PROTOS), "SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CIPHER_LIST), "SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CLIENT_CERT_ENGINE),
+     "SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CT_VALIDATION_CALLBACK),
+     "SSL_CTX_set_ct_validation_callback"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT),
+     "SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SSL_VERSION), "SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE), "SSL_CTX_use_certificate"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_ASN1),
+     "SSL_CTX_use_certificate_ASN1"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE),
+     "SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY), "SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY_ASN1),
+     "SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_ASN1"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE),
+     "SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT),
+     "SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY), "SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_ASN1),
+     "SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE),
+     "SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_file"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_SERVERINFO), "SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_SERVERINFO_FILE),
+     "SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo_file"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_DANE_DUP), "ssl_dane_dup"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_DANE_ENABLE), "SSL_dane_enable"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_DO_CONFIG), "ssl_do_config"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_DO_HANDSHAKE), "SSL_do_handshake"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_DUP_CA_LIST), "SSL_dup_CA_list"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_ENABLE_CT), "SSL_enable_ct"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION), "ssl_get_new_session"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION), "ssl_get_prev_session"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_CERT_INDEX), "ssl_get_server_cert_index"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SIGN_PKEY), "ssl_get_sign_pkey"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_INIT_WBIO_BUFFER), "ssl_init_wbio_buffer"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE), "SSL_load_client_CA_file"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_MODULE_INIT), "ssl_module_init"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_NEW), "SSL_new"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT),
+     "ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT),
+     "ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT),
+     "ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT),
+     "ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT),
+     "ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT),
+     "ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PEEK), "SSL_peek"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_READ), "SSL_read"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_RENEGOTIATE), "SSL_renegotiate"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_RENEGOTIATE_ABBREVIATED),
+     "SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT),
+     "ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT),
+     "ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_DUP), "ssl_session_dup"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_NEW), "SSL_SESSION_new"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_PRINT_FP), "SSL_SESSION_print_fp"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_SET1_ID), "SSL_SESSION_set1_id"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_SET1_ID_CONTEXT),
+     "SSL_SESSION_set1_id_context"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SET_ALPN_PROTOS), "SSL_set_alpn_protos"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SET_CERT), "ssl_set_cert"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SET_CIPHER_LIST), "SSL_set_cipher_list"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SET_CT_VALIDATION_CALLBACK),
+     "SSL_set_ct_validation_callback"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SET_FD), "SSL_set_fd"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SET_PKEY), "ssl_set_pkey"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SET_RFD), "SSL_set_rfd"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION), "SSL_set_session"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT),
+     "SSL_set_session_id_context"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION_TICKET_EXT),
+     "SSL_set_session_ticket_ext"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SET_WFD), "SSL_set_wfd"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SHUTDOWN), "SSL_shutdown"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SRP_CTX_INIT), "SSL_SRP_CTX_init"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_START_ASYNC_JOB), "ssl_start_async_job"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_FUNCTION), "ssl_undefined_function"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_VOID_FUNCTION),
+     "ssl_undefined_void_function"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE), "SSL_use_certificate"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_ASN1), "SSL_use_certificate_ASN1"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE), "SSL_use_certificate_file"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY), "SSL_use_PrivateKey"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY_ASN1), "SSL_use_PrivateKey_ASN1"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE), "SSL_use_PrivateKey_file"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT), "SSL_use_psk_identity_hint"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY), "SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_ASN1),
+     "SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE),
+     "SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_file"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_VALIDATE_CT), "ssl_validate_ct"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN), "ssl_verify_cert_chain"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_WRITE), "SSL_write"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_STATE_MACHINE), "state_machine"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG), "tls12_check_peer_sigalg"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE), "tls1_change_cipher_state"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS),
+     "tls1_check_duplicate_extensions"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC), "tls1_enc"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL),
+     "tls1_export_keying_material"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST), "tls1_get_curvelist"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS1_PRF), "tls1_PRF"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK), "tls1_setup_key_block"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS), "tls1_set_server_sigalgs"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK),
+     "tls_client_key_exchange_post_work"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST),
+     "tls_construct_certificate_request"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE), "tls_construct_cke_dhe"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE), "tls_construct_cke_ecdhe"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST), "tls_construct_cke_gost"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE),
+     "tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA), "tls_construct_cke_rsa"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP), "tls_construct_cke_srp"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE),
+     "tls_construct_client_certificate"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO),
+     "tls_construct_client_hello"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE),
+     "tls_construct_client_key_exchange"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY),
+     "tls_construct_client_verify"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED), "tls_construct_finished"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_REQUEST),
+     "tls_construct_hello_request"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET),
+     "tls_construct_new_session_ticket"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE),
+     "tls_construct_server_certificate"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_DONE), "tls_construct_server_done"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO),
+     "tls_construct_server_hello"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE),
+     "tls_construct_server_key_exchange"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY), "tls_get_message_body"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER), "tls_get_message_header"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO),
+     "tls_post_process_client_hello"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE),
+     "tls_post_process_client_key_exchange"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE),
+     "tls_prepare_client_certificate"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST),
+     "tls_process_certificate_request"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS), "tls_process_cert_status"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY), "tls_process_cert_verify"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC),
+     "tls_process_change_cipher_spec"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE), "tls_process_cke_dhe"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE), "tls_process_cke_ecdhe"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST), "tls_process_cke_gost"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE),
+     "tls_process_cke_psk_preamble"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA), "tls_process_cke_rsa"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP), "tls_process_cke_srp"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE),
+     "tls_process_client_certificate"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO), "tls_process_client_hello"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE),
+     "tls_process_client_key_exchange"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED), "tls_process_finished"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE), "tls_process_key_exchange"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET),
+     "tls_process_new_session_ticket"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO), "tls_process_next_proto"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE),
+     "tls_process_server_certificate"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE), "tls_process_server_done"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO), "tls_process_server_hello"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE), "tls_process_ske_dhe"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE), "tls_process_ske_ecdhe"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE),
+     "tls_process_ske_psk_preamble"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP), "tls_process_ske_srp"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_USE_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN_FILE),
+     "use_certificate_chain_file"},
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[] = {
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE), "app data in handshake"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT),
+     "attempt to reuse session in different context"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_0_NEEDED_IN_FIPS_MODE),
+     "at least TLS 1.0 needed in FIPS mode"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE),
+     "at least (D)TLS 1.2 needed in Suite B mode"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC), "bad change cipher spec"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_DATA), "bad data"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK),
+     "bad data returned by callback"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION), "bad decompression"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE), "bad dh value"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH), "bad digest length"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT), "bad ecc cert"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT), "bad ecpoint"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_LENGTH), "bad handshake length"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST), "bad hello request"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH), "bad length"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH), "bad packet length"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER),
+     "bad protocol version number"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT), "bad rsa encrypt"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE), "bad signature"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH), "bad srp a length"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS), "bad srp parameters"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE), "bad srtp mki value"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST),
+     "bad srtp protection profile list"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SSL_FILETYPE), "bad ssl filetype"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_VALUE), "bad value"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY), "bad write retry"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET), "bio not set"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG),
+     "block cipher pad is wrong"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BN_LIB), "bn lib"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH), "ca dn length mismatch"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL), "ca key too small"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK), "ca md too weak"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY), "ccs received early"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED),
+     "certificate verify failed"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR), "cert cb error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH), "cert length mismatch"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CIPHER_CODE_WRONG_LENGTH), "cipher code wrong length"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE),
+     "cipher or hash unavailable"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT), "clienthello tlsext"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG),
+     "compressed length too long"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED), "compression disabled"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE), "compression failure"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_COMPRESSION_ID_NOT_WITHIN_PRIVATE_RANGE),
+     "compression id not within private range"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR),
+     "compression library error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CONNECTION_TYPE_NOT_SET), "connection type not set"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CONTEXT_NOT_DANE_ENABLED), "context not dane enabled"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE),
+     "cookie gen callback failure"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH), "cookie mismatch"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CUSTOM_EXT_HANDLER_ALREADY_INSTALLED),
+     "custom ext handler already installed"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DANE_ALREADY_ENABLED), "dane already enabled"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DANE_CANNOT_OVERRIDE_MTYPE_FULL),
+     "dane cannot override mtype full"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DANE_NOT_ENABLED), "dane not enabled"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_CERTIFICATE),
+     "dane tlsa bad certificate"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_CERTIFICATE_USAGE),
+     "dane tlsa bad certificate usage"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_DATA_LENGTH),
+     "dane tlsa bad data length"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH),
+     "dane tlsa bad digest length"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_MATCHING_TYPE),
+     "dane tlsa bad matching type"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_PUBLIC_KEY), "dane tlsa bad public key"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_SELECTOR), "dane tlsa bad selector"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_NULL_DATA), "dane tlsa null data"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED),
+     "data between ccs and finished"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG), "data length too long"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED), "decryption failed"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC),
+     "decryption failed or bad record mac"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL), "dh key too small"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG),
+     "dh public value length is wrong"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED), "digest check failed"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DTLS_MESSAGE_TOO_BIG), "dtls message too big"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DUPLICATE_COMPRESSION_ID), "duplicate compression id"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_SIGNING), "ecc cert not for signing"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ECDH_REQUIRED_FOR_SUITEB_MODE),
+     "ecdh required for suiteb mode"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL), "ee key too small"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_EMPTY_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST),
+     "empty srtp protection profile list"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG),
+     "encrypted length too long"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST),
+     "error in received cipher list"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ERROR_SETTING_TLSA_BASE_DOMAIN),
+     "error setting tlsa base domain"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_EXCEEDS_MAX_FRAGMENT_SIZE),
+     "exceeds max fragment size"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE), "excessive message size"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE), "extra data in message"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_FAILED_TO_INIT_ASYNC), "failed to init async"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_FRAGMENTED_CLIENT_HELLO), "fragmented client hello"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS), "got a fin before a ccs"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST), "https proxy request"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST), "http request"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST), "illegal Suite B digest"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK), "inappropriate fallback"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION), "inconsistent compression"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS), "inconsistent extms"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND), "invalid command"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM),
+     "invalid compression algorithm"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_CONFIGURATION_NAME),
+     "invalid configuration name"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_CT_VALIDATION_TYPE),
+     "invalid ct validation type"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_NULL_CMD_NAME), "invalid null cmd name"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_SEQUENCE_NUMBER), "invalid sequence number"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_SERVERINFO_DATA), "invalid serverinfo data"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_SRP_USERNAME), "invalid srp username"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE), "invalid status response"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_TICKET_KEYS_LENGTH),
+     "invalid ticket keys length"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH), "length mismatch"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG), "length too long"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT), "length too short"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG), "library bug"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS), "library has no ciphers"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT), "missing dsa signing cert"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT),
+     "missing ecdsa signing cert"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE), "missing rsa certificate"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT),
+     "missing rsa encrypting cert"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT), "missing rsa signing cert"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM), "can't find SRP server param"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY), "missing tmp dh key"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY), "missing tmp ecdh key"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED), "no certificates returned"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED), "no certificate assigned"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET), "no certificate set"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE), "no ciphers available"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED), "no ciphers specified"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH), "no cipher match"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_METHOD), "no client cert method"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED), "no compression specified"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER),
+     "Peer haven't sent GOST certificate, required for selected ciphersuite"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_METHOD_SPECIFIED), "no method specified"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_PEM_EXTENSIONS), "no pem extensions"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED), "no private key assigned"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE), "no protocols available"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION), "no renegotiation"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_REQUIRED_DIGEST), "no required digest"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER), "no shared cipher"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS),
+     "no shared signature algorithms"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_SRTP_PROFILES), "no srtp profiles"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_VALID_SCTS), "no valid scts"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_VERIFY_COOKIE_CALLBACK),
+     "no verify cookie callback"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NULL_SSL_CTX), "null ssl ctx"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NULL_SSL_METHOD_PASSED), "null ssl method passed"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED),
+     "old session cipher not returned"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED),
+     "old session compression algorithm not returned"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG), "packet length too long"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT), "parse tlsext"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PATH_TOO_LONG), "path too long"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE),
+     "peer did not return a certificate"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PEM_NAME_BAD_PREFIX), "pem name bad prefix"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PEM_NAME_TOO_SHORT), "pem name too short"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE), "pipeline failure"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN), "protocol is shutdown"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND), "psk identity not found"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB), "psk no client cb"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB), "psk no server cb"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET), "read bio not set"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_READ_TIMEOUT_EXPIRED), "read timeout expired"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH), "record length mismatch"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL), "record too small"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_RENEGOTIATE_EXT_TOO_LONG), "renegotiate ext too long"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR),
+     "renegotiation encoding err"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH), "renegotiation mismatch"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING), "required cipher missing"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING),
+     "required compression algorithm missing"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING),
+     "scsv received when renegotiating"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SCT_VERIFICATION_FAILED), "sct verification failed"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT), "serverhello tlsext"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED),
+     "session id context uninitialized"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SHUTDOWN_WHILE_IN_INIT), "shutdown while in init"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR),
+     "signature algorithms error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE),
+     "signature for non signing certificate"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC), "error with the srp params"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SRTP_COULD_NOT_ALLOCATE_PROFILES),
+     "srtp could not allocate profiles"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST_TOO_LONG),
+     "srtp protection profile list too long"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SRTP_UNKNOWN_PROTECTION_PROFILE),
+     "srtp unknown protection profile"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_SERVERNAME),
+     "ssl3 ext invalid servername"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_SERVERNAME_TYPE),
+     "ssl3 ext invalid servername type"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG), "ssl3 session id too long"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_BAD_CERTIFICATE),
+     "sslv3 alert bad certificate"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_BAD_RECORD_MAC),
+     "sslv3 alert bad record mac"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED),
+     "sslv3 alert certificate expired"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED),
+     "sslv3 alert certificate revoked"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN),
+     "sslv3 alert certificate unknown"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE),
+     "sslv3 alert decompression failure"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE),
+     "sslv3 alert handshake failure"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER),
+     "sslv3 alert illegal parameter"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_NO_CERTIFICATE),
+     "sslv3 alert no certificate"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE),
+     "sslv3 alert unexpected message"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE),
+     "sslv3 alert unsupported certificate"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL_COMMAND_SECTION_EMPTY),
+     "ssl command section empty"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL_COMMAND_SECTION_NOT_FOUND),
+     "ssl command section not found"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL_CTX_HAS_NO_DEFAULT_SSL_VERSION),
+     "ssl ctx has no default ssl version"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE), "ssl handshake failure"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS),
+     "ssl library has no ciphers"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL_NEGATIVE_LENGTH), "ssl negative length"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL_SECTION_EMPTY), "ssl section empty"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL_SECTION_NOT_FOUND), "ssl section not found"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CALLBACK_FAILED),
+     "ssl session id callback failed"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONFLICT), "ssl session id conflict"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG),
+     "ssl session id context too long"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG),
+     "ssl session id too long"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_HAS_BAD_LENGTH),
+     "ssl session id has bad length"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH),
+     "ssl session version mismatch"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_ACCESS_DENIED),
+     "tlsv1 alert access denied"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECODE_ERROR), "tlsv1 alert decode error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPTION_FAILED),
+     "tlsv1 alert decryption failed"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPT_ERROR),
+     "tlsv1 alert decrypt error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_EXPORT_RESTRICTION),
+     "tlsv1 alert export restriction"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK),
+     "tlsv1 alert inappropriate fallback"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY),
+     "tlsv1 alert insufficient security"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INTERNAL_ERROR),
+     "tlsv1 alert internal error"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_NO_RENEGOTIATION),
+     "tlsv1 alert no renegotiation"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_PROTOCOL_VERSION),
+     "tlsv1 alert protocol version"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_RECORD_OVERFLOW),
+     "tlsv1 alert record overflow"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_UNKNOWN_CA), "tlsv1 alert unknown ca"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_USER_CANCELLED),
+     "tlsv1 alert user cancelled"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE),
+     "tlsv1 bad certificate hash value"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE),
+     "tlsv1 bad certificate status response"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE),
+     "tlsv1 certificate unobtainable"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME), "tlsv1 unrecognized name"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION),
+     "tlsv1 unsupported extension"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT),
+     "peer does not accept heartbeats"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING),
+     "heartbeat request already pending"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL),
+     "tls illegal exporter label"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST),
+     "tls invalid ecpointformat list"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS), "too many warn alerts"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS),
+     "unable to find ecdh parameters"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS),
+     "unable to find public key parameters"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_MD5_ROUTINES),
+     "unable to load ssl3 md5 routines"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_SHA1_ROUTINES),
+     "unable to load ssl3 sha1 routines"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE), "unexpected message"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD), "unexpected record"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED), "uninitialized"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE), "unknown alert type"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE), "unknown certificate type"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED), "unknown cipher returned"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE), "unknown cipher type"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CMD_NAME), "unknown cmd name"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_COMMAND), "unknown command"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST), "unknown digest"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE),
+     "unknown key exchange type"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE), "unknown pkey type"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL), "unknown protocol"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_SSL_VERSION), "unknown ssl version"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE), "unknown state"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED),
+     "unsafe legacy renegotiation disabled"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM),
+     "unsupported compression algorithm"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE),
+     "unsupported elliptic curve"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL), "unsupported protocol"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_SSL_VERSION), "unsupported ssl version"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE), "unsupported status type"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_USE_SRTP_NOT_NEGOTIATED), "use srtp not negotiated"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH), "version too high"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW), "version too low"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE), "wrong certificate type"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED), "wrong cipher returned"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE), "wrong curve"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH), "wrong signature length"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE), "wrong signature size"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE), "wrong signature type"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION), "wrong ssl version"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER), "wrong version number"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_X509_LIB), "x509 lib"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_X509_VERIFICATION_SETUP_PROBLEMS),
+     "x509 verification setup problems"},
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+
+#endif
+
+int ERR_load_SSL_strings(void)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+
+    if (ERR_func_error_string(SSL_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) {
+        ERR_load_strings(0, SSL_str_functs);
+        ERR_load_strings(0, SSL_str_reasons);
+    }
+#endif
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/ssl_init.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/ssl_init.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3e62d48
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/ssl_init.c
@@ -0,0 +1,210 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "e_os.h"
+
+#include "internal/err.h"
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#include "internal/thread_once.h"
+
+static int stopped;
+
+static void ssl_library_stop(void);
+
+static CRYPTO_ONCE ssl_base = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
+static int ssl_base_inited = 0;
+DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(ossl_init_ssl_base)
+{
+#ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG
+    fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: ossl_init_ssl_base: "
+            "Adding SSL ciphers and digests\n");
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_des_cbc());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_des_ede3_cbc());
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_IDEA
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_idea_cbc());
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_rc4());
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_rc4_hmac_md5());
+# endif
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC2
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_rc2_cbc());
+    /*
+     * Not actually used for SSL/TLS but this makes PKCS#12 work if an
+     * application only calls SSL_library_init().
+     */
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_rc2_40_cbc());
+#endif
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_128_cbc());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_192_cbc());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_256_cbc());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_128_gcm());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_256_gcm());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_128_ccm());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_256_ccm());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha1());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha256());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha256());
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_camellia_128_cbc());
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_camellia_256_cbc());
+#endif
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_CHACHA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_POLY1305)
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_chacha20_poly1305());
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SEED
+    EVP_add_cipher(EVP_seed_cbc());
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+    EVP_add_digest(EVP_md5());
+    EVP_add_digest_alias(SN_md5, "ssl3-md5");
+    EVP_add_digest(EVP_md5_sha1());
+#endif
+    EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha1()); /* RSA with sha1 */
+    EVP_add_digest_alias(SN_sha1, "ssl3-sha1");
+    EVP_add_digest_alias(SN_sha1WithRSAEncryption, SN_sha1WithRSA);
+    EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha224());
+    EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha256());
+    EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha384());
+    EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha512());
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+# ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG
+    fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: ossl_init_ssl_base: "
+            "SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods()\n");
+# endif
+    /*
+     * This will initialise the built-in compression algorithms. The value
+     * returned is a STACK_OF(SSL_COMP), but that can be discarded safely
+     */
+    SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods();
+#endif
+    /* initialize cipher/digest methods table */
+    ssl_load_ciphers();
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG
+    fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: ossl_init_ssl_base: "
+            "SSL_add_ssl_module()\n");
+#endif
+    SSL_add_ssl_module();
+    /*
+     * We ignore an error return here. Not much we can do - but not that bad
+     * either. We can still safely continue.
+     */
+    OPENSSL_atexit(ssl_library_stop);
+    ssl_base_inited = 1;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static CRYPTO_ONCE ssl_strings = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
+static int ssl_strings_inited = 0;
+DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(ossl_init_load_ssl_strings)
+{
+    /*
+     * OPENSSL_NO_AUTOERRINIT is provided here to prevent at compile time
+     * pulling in all the error strings during static linking
+     */
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ERR) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_AUTOERRINIT)
+# ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG
+    fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: ossl_init_load_ssl_strings: "
+            "ERR_load_SSL_strings()\n");
+# endif
+    ERR_load_SSL_strings();
+#endif
+    ssl_strings_inited = 1;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(ossl_init_no_load_ssl_strings)
+{
+    /* Do nothing in this case */
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static void ssl_library_stop(void)
+{
+    /* Might be explicitly called and also by atexit */
+    if (stopped)
+        return;
+    stopped = 1;
+
+    if (ssl_base_inited) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+# ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG
+        fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: ssl_library_stop: "
+                "ssl_comp_free_compression_methods_int()\n");
+# endif
+        ssl_comp_free_compression_methods_int();
+#endif
+    }
+
+    if (ssl_strings_inited) {
+#ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG
+        fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: ssl_library_stop: "
+                "err_free_strings_int()\n");
+#endif
+        /*
+         * If both crypto and ssl error strings are inited we will end up
+         * calling err_free_strings_int() twice - but that's ok. The second
+         * time will be a no-op. It's easier to do that than to try and track
+         * between the two libraries whether they have both been inited.
+         */
+        err_free_strings_int();
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * If this function is called with a non NULL settings value then it must be
+ * called prior to any threads making calls to any OpenSSL functions,
+ * i.e. passing a non-null settings value is assumed to be single-threaded.
+ */
+int OPENSSL_init_ssl(uint64_t opts, const OPENSSL_INIT_SETTINGS * settings)
+{
+    static int stoperrset = 0;
+
+    if (stopped) {
+        if (!stoperrset) {
+            /*
+             * We only ever set this once to avoid getting into an infinite
+             * loop where the error system keeps trying to init and fails so
+             * sets an error etc
+             */
+            stoperrset = 1;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_OPENSSL_INIT_SSL, ERR_R_INIT_FAIL);
+        }
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (!RUN_ONCE(&ssl_base, ossl_init_ssl_base))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (!OPENSSL_init_crypto(opts | OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_CIPHERS
+                             | OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_DIGESTS, settings))
+        return 0;
+
+    if ((opts & OPENSSL_INIT_NO_LOAD_SSL_STRINGS)
+        && !RUN_ONCE(&ssl_strings, ossl_init_no_load_ssl_strings))
+        return 0;
+
+    if ((opts & OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_SSL_STRINGS)
+        && !RUN_ONCE(&ssl_strings, ossl_init_load_ssl_strings))
+        return 0;
+
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/ssl_lib.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8a190d2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/ssl_lib.c
@@ -0,0 +1,4476 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE.
+ */
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/lhash.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#include <openssl/async.h>
+#include <openssl/ct.h>
+
+const char SSL_version_str[] = OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT;
+
+static int ssl_undefined_function_1(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *r, unsigned int s,
+                                    int t)
+{
+    (void)r;
+    (void)s;
+    (void)t;
+    return ssl_undefined_function(ssl);
+}
+
+static int ssl_undefined_function_2(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *r, unsigned char *s,
+                                    int t)
+{
+    (void)r;
+    (void)s;
+    (void)t;
+    return ssl_undefined_function(ssl);
+}
+
+static int ssl_undefined_function_3(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *r,
+                                    unsigned char *s, int t)
+{
+    (void)r;
+    (void)s;
+    (void)t;
+    return ssl_undefined_function(ssl);
+}
+
+static int ssl_undefined_function_4(SSL *ssl, int r)
+{
+    (void)r;
+    return ssl_undefined_function(ssl);
+}
+
+static int ssl_undefined_function_5(SSL *ssl, const char *r, int s,
+                                    unsigned char *t)
+{
+    (void)r;
+    (void)s;
+    (void)t;
+    return ssl_undefined_function(ssl);
+}
+
+static int ssl_undefined_function_6(int r)
+{
+    (void)r;
+    return ssl_undefined_function(NULL);
+}
+
+static int ssl_undefined_function_7(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *r, size_t s,
+                                    const char *t, size_t u,
+                                    const unsigned char *v, size_t w, int x)
+{
+    (void)r;
+    (void)s;
+    (void)t;
+    (void)u;
+    (void)v;
+    (void)w;
+    (void)x;
+    return ssl_undefined_function(ssl);
+}
+
+SSL3_ENC_METHOD ssl3_undef_enc_method = {
+    ssl_undefined_function_1,
+    ssl_undefined_function_2,
+    ssl_undefined_function,
+    ssl_undefined_function_3,
+    ssl_undefined_function_4,
+    ssl_undefined_function_5,
+    0,                          /* finish_mac_length */
+    NULL,                       /* client_finished_label */
+    0,                          /* client_finished_label_len */
+    NULL,                       /* server_finished_label */
+    0,                          /* server_finished_label_len */
+    ssl_undefined_function_6,
+    ssl_undefined_function_7,
+};
+
+struct ssl_async_args {
+    SSL *s;
+    void *buf;
+    int num;
+    enum { READFUNC, WRITEFUNC, OTHERFUNC } type;
+    union {
+        int (*func_read) (SSL *, void *, int);
+        int (*func_write) (SSL *, const void *, int);
+        int (*func_other) (SSL *);
+    } f;
+};
+
+static const struct {
+    uint8_t mtype;
+    uint8_t ord;
+    int nid;
+} dane_mds[] = {
+    {
+        DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL, 0, NID_undef
+    },
+    {
+        DANETLS_MATCHING_2256, 1, NID_sha256
+    },
+    {
+        DANETLS_MATCHING_2512, 2, NID_sha512
+    },
+};
+
+static int dane_ctx_enable(struct dane_ctx_st *dctx)
+{
+    const EVP_MD **mdevp;
+    uint8_t *mdord;
+    uint8_t mdmax = DANETLS_MATCHING_LAST;
+    int n = ((int)mdmax) + 1;   /* int to handle PrivMatch(255) */
+    size_t i;
+
+    if (dctx->mdevp != NULL)
+        return 1;
+
+    mdevp = OPENSSL_zalloc(n * sizeof(*mdevp));
+    mdord = OPENSSL_zalloc(n * sizeof(*mdord));
+
+    if (mdord == NULL || mdevp == NULL) {
+        OPENSSL_free(mdord);
+        OPENSSL_free(mdevp);
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_CTX_ENABLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* Install default entries */
+    for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(dane_mds); ++i) {
+        const EVP_MD *md;
+
+        if (dane_mds[i].nid == NID_undef ||
+            (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(dane_mds[i].nid)) == NULL)
+            continue;
+        mdevp[dane_mds[i].mtype] = md;
+        mdord[dane_mds[i].mtype] = dane_mds[i].ord;
+    }
+
+    dctx->mdevp = mdevp;
+    dctx->mdord = mdord;
+    dctx->mdmax = mdmax;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static void dane_ctx_final(struct dane_ctx_st *dctx)
+{
+    OPENSSL_free(dctx->mdevp);
+    dctx->mdevp = NULL;
+
+    OPENSSL_free(dctx->mdord);
+    dctx->mdord = NULL;
+    dctx->mdmax = 0;
+}
+
+static void tlsa_free(danetls_record *t)
+{
+    if (t == NULL)
+        return;
+    OPENSSL_free(t->data);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(t->spki);
+    OPENSSL_free(t);
+}
+
+static void dane_final(SSL_DANE *dane)
+{
+    sk_danetls_record_pop_free(dane->trecs, tlsa_free);
+    dane->trecs = NULL;
+
+    sk_X509_pop_free(dane->certs, X509_free);
+    dane->certs = NULL;
+
+    X509_free(dane->mcert);
+    dane->mcert = NULL;
+    dane->mtlsa = NULL;
+    dane->mdpth = -1;
+    dane->pdpth = -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * dane_copy - Copy dane configuration, sans verification state.
+ */
+static int ssl_dane_dup(SSL *to, SSL *from)
+{
+    int num;
+    int i;
+
+    if (!DANETLS_ENABLED(&from->dane))
+        return 1;
+
+    dane_final(&to->dane);
+    to->dane.flags = from->dane.flags;
+    to->dane.dctx = &to->ctx->dane;
+    to->dane.trecs = sk_danetls_record_new_null();
+
+    if (to->dane.trecs == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DANE_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    num = sk_danetls_record_num(from->dane.trecs);
+    for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) {
+        danetls_record *t = sk_danetls_record_value(from->dane.trecs, i);
+
+        if (SSL_dane_tlsa_add(to, t->usage, t->selector, t->mtype,
+                              t->data, t->dlen) <= 0)
+            return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int dane_mtype_set(struct dane_ctx_st *dctx,
+                          const EVP_MD *md, uint8_t mtype, uint8_t ord)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    if (mtype == DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL && md != NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_MTYPE_SET, SSL_R_DANE_CANNOT_OVERRIDE_MTYPE_FULL);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (mtype > dctx->mdmax) {
+        const EVP_MD **mdevp;
+        uint8_t *mdord;
+        int n = ((int)mtype) + 1;
+
+        mdevp = OPENSSL_realloc(dctx->mdevp, n * sizeof(*mdevp));
+        if (mdevp == NULL) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_MTYPE_SET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            return -1;
+        }
+        dctx->mdevp = mdevp;
+
+        mdord = OPENSSL_realloc(dctx->mdord, n * sizeof(*mdord));
+        if (mdord == NULL) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_MTYPE_SET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            return -1;
+        }
+        dctx->mdord = mdord;
+
+        /* Zero-fill any gaps */
+        for (i = dctx->mdmax + 1; i < mtype; ++i) {
+            mdevp[i] = NULL;
+            mdord[i] = 0;
+        }
+
+        dctx->mdmax = mtype;
+    }
+
+    dctx->mdevp[mtype] = md;
+    /* Coerce ordinal of disabled matching types to 0 */
+    dctx->mdord[mtype] = (md == NULL) ? 0 : ord;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static const EVP_MD *tlsa_md_get(SSL_DANE *dane, uint8_t mtype)
+{
+    if (mtype > dane->dctx->mdmax)
+        return NULL;
+    return dane->dctx->mdevp[mtype];
+}
+
+static int dane_tlsa_add(SSL_DANE *dane,
+                         uint8_t usage,
+                         uint8_t selector,
+                         uint8_t mtype, unsigned const char *data, size_t dlen)
+{
+    danetls_record *t;
+    const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
+    int ilen = (int)dlen;
+    int i;
+    int num;
+
+    if (dane->trecs == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, SSL_R_DANE_NOT_ENABLED);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (ilen < 0 || dlen != (size_t)ilen) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_DATA_LENGTH);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (usage > DANETLS_USAGE_LAST) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_CERTIFICATE_USAGE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (selector > DANETLS_SELECTOR_LAST) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_SELECTOR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (mtype != DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL) {
+        md = tlsa_md_get(dane, mtype);
+        if (md == NULL) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_MATCHING_TYPE);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (md != NULL && dlen != (size_t)EVP_MD_size(md)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (!data) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_NULL_DATA);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if ((t = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*t))) == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    t->usage = usage;
+    t->selector = selector;
+    t->mtype = mtype;
+    t->data = OPENSSL_malloc(ilen);
+    if (t->data == NULL) {
+        tlsa_free(t);
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return -1;
+    }
+    memcpy(t->data, data, ilen);
+    t->dlen = ilen;
+
+    /* Validate and cache full certificate or public key */
+    if (mtype == DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL) {
+        const unsigned char *p = data;
+        X509 *cert = NULL;
+        EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+
+        switch (selector) {
+        case DANETLS_SELECTOR_CERT:
+            if (!d2i_X509(&cert, &p, dlen) || p < data ||
+                dlen != (size_t)(p - data)) {
+                tlsa_free(t);
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
+                return 0;
+            }
+            if (X509_get0_pubkey(cert) == NULL) {
+                tlsa_free(t);
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
+                return 0;
+            }
+
+            if ((DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(usage) & DANETLS_TA_MASK) == 0) {
+                X509_free(cert);
+                break;
+            }
+
+            /*
+             * For usage DANE-TA(2), we support authentication via "2 0 0" TLSA
+             * records that contain full certificates of trust-anchors that are
+             * not present in the wire chain.  For usage PKIX-TA(0), we augment
+             * the chain with untrusted Full(0) certificates from DNS, in case
+             * they are missing from the chain.
+             */
+            if ((dane->certs == NULL &&
+                 (dane->certs = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
+                !sk_X509_push(dane->certs, cert)) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                X509_free(cert);
+                tlsa_free(t);
+                return -1;
+            }
+            break;
+
+        case DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI:
+            if (!d2i_PUBKEY(&pkey, &p, dlen) || p < data ||
+                dlen != (size_t)(p - data)) {
+                tlsa_free(t);
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_PUBLIC_KEY);
+                return 0;
+            }
+
+            /*
+             * For usage DANE-TA(2), we support authentication via "2 1 0" TLSA
+             * records that contain full bare keys of trust-anchors that are
+             * not present in the wire chain.
+             */
+            if (usage == DANETLS_USAGE_DANE_TA)
+                t->spki = pkey;
+            else
+                EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /*-
+     * Find the right insertion point for the new record.
+     *
+     * See crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c.  We sort DANE-EE(3) records first, so that
+     * they can be processed first, as they require no chain building, and no
+     * expiration or hostname checks.  Because DANE-EE(3) is numerically
+     * largest, this is accomplished via descending sort by "usage".
+     *
+     * We also sort in descending order by matching ordinal to simplify
+     * the implementation of digest agility in the verification code.
+     *
+     * The choice of order for the selector is not significant, so we
+     * use the same descending order for consistency.
+     */
+    num = sk_danetls_record_num(dane->trecs);
+    for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) {
+        danetls_record *rec = sk_danetls_record_value(dane->trecs, i);
+
+        if (rec->usage > usage)
+            continue;
+        if (rec->usage < usage)
+            break;
+        if (rec->selector > selector)
+            continue;
+        if (rec->selector < selector)
+            break;
+        if (dane->dctx->mdord[rec->mtype] > dane->dctx->mdord[mtype])
+            continue;
+        break;
+    }
+
+    if (!sk_danetls_record_insert(dane->trecs, t, i)) {
+        tlsa_free(t);
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return -1;
+    }
+    dane->umask |= DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(usage);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return 0 if there is only one version configured and it was disabled
+ * at configure time.  Return 1 otherwise.
+ */
+static int ssl_check_allowed_versions(int min_version, int max_version)
+{
+    int minisdtls = 0, maxisdtls = 0;
+
+    /* Figure out if we're doing DTLS versions or TLS versions */
+    if (min_version == DTLS1_BAD_VER
+        || min_version >> 8 == DTLS1_VERSION_MAJOR)
+        minisdtls = 1;
+    if (max_version == DTLS1_BAD_VER
+        || max_version >> 8 == DTLS1_VERSION_MAJOR)
+        maxisdtls = 1;
+    /* A wildcard version of 0 could be DTLS or TLS. */
+    if ((minisdtls && !maxisdtls && max_version != 0)
+        || (maxisdtls && !minisdtls && min_version != 0)) {
+        /* Mixing DTLS and TLS versions will lead to sadness; deny it. */
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (minisdtls || maxisdtls) {
+        /* Do DTLS version checks. */
+        if (min_version == 0)
+            /* Ignore DTLS1_BAD_VER */
+            min_version = DTLS1_VERSION;
+        if (max_version == 0)
+            max_version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2
+        if (max_version == DTLS1_2_VERSION)
+            max_version = DTLS1_VERSION;
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
+        if (min_version == DTLS1_VERSION)
+            min_version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
+#endif
+	/* Done massaging versions; do the check. */
+	if (0
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
+            || (DTLS_VERSION_GE(min_version, DTLS1_VERSION)
+                && DTLS_VERSION_GE(DTLS1_VERSION, max_version))
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2
+            || (DTLS_VERSION_GE(min_version, DTLS1_2_VERSION)
+                && DTLS_VERSION_GE(DTLS1_2_VERSION, max_version))
+#endif
+            )
+            return 0;
+    } else {
+        /* Regular TLS version checks. */
+	if (min_version == 0)
+	    min_version = SSL3_VERSION;
+	if (max_version == 0)
+	    max_version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2
+	if (max_version == TLS1_2_VERSION)
+	    max_version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1
+	if (max_version == TLS1_1_VERSION)
+	    max_version = TLS1_VERSION;
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
+	if (max_version == TLS1_VERSION)
+	    max_version = SSL3_VERSION;
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
+	if (min_version == SSL3_VERSION)
+	    min_version = TLS1_VERSION;
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
+	if (min_version == TLS1_VERSION)
+	    min_version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1
+	if (min_version == TLS1_1_VERSION)
+	    min_version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
+#endif
+	/* Done massaging versions; do the check. */
+	if (0
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
+            || (min_version <= SSL3_VERSION && SSL3_VERSION <= max_version)
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
+            || (min_version <= TLS1_VERSION && TLS1_VERSION <= max_version)
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1
+            || (min_version <= TLS1_1_VERSION && TLS1_1_VERSION <= max_version)
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2
+            || (min_version <= TLS1_2_VERSION && TLS1_2_VERSION <= max_version)
+#endif
+            )
+            return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static void clear_ciphers(SSL *s)
+{
+    /* clear the current cipher */
+    ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s);
+    ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash);
+    ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash);
+}
+
+int SSL_clear(SSL *s)
+{
+    if (s->method == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR, SSL_R_NO_METHOD_SPECIFIED);
+        return (0);
+    }
+
+    if (ssl_clear_bad_session(s)) {
+        SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+        s->session = NULL;
+    }
+
+    s->error = 0;
+    s->hit = 0;
+    s->shutdown = 0;
+
+    if (s->renegotiate) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    ossl_statem_clear(s);
+
+    s->version = s->method->version;
+    s->client_version = s->version;
+    s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+
+    BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
+    s->init_buf = NULL;
+    clear_ciphers(s);
+    s->first_packet = 0;
+
+    /* Reset DANE verification result state */
+    s->dane.mdpth = -1;
+    s->dane.pdpth = -1;
+    X509_free(s->dane.mcert);
+    s->dane.mcert = NULL;
+    s->dane.mtlsa = NULL;
+
+    /* Clear the verification result peername */
+    X509_VERIFY_PARAM_move_peername(s->param, NULL);
+
+    /*
+     * Check to see if we were changed into a different method, if so, revert
+     * back if we are not doing session-id reuse.
+     */
+    if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) && (s->session == NULL)
+        && (s->method != s->ctx->method)) {
+        s->method->ssl_free(s);
+        s->method = s->ctx->method;
+        if (!s->method->ssl_new(s))
+            return (0);
+    } else
+        s->method->ssl_clear(s);
+
+    RECORD_LAYER_clear(&s->rlayer);
+
+    return (1);
+}
+
+/** Used to change an SSL_CTXs default SSL method type */
+int SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SSL_METHOD *meth)
+{
+    STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
+
+    ctx->method = meth;
+
+    sk = ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx->method, &(ctx->cipher_list),
+                                &(ctx->cipher_list_by_id),
+                                SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST, ctx->cert);
+    if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) <= 0)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SSL_VERSION, SSL_R_SSL_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS);
+        return (0);
+    }
+    return (1);
+}
+
+SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    SSL *s;
+
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW, SSL_R_NULL_SSL_CTX);
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+    if (ctx->method == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW, SSL_R_SSL_CTX_HAS_NO_DEFAULT_SSL_VERSION);
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+
+    s = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*s));
+    if (s == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    s->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
+    if (s->lock == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        OPENSSL_free(s);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    RECORD_LAYER_init(&s->rlayer, s);
+
+    s->options = ctx->options;
+    s->dane.flags = ctx->dane.flags;
+    s->min_proto_version = ctx->min_proto_version;
+    s->max_proto_version = ctx->max_proto_version;
+    s->mode = ctx->mode;
+    s->max_cert_list = ctx->max_cert_list;
+    s->references = 1;
+
+    /*
+     * Earlier library versions used to copy the pointer to the CERT, not
+     * its contents; only when setting new parameters for the per-SSL
+     * copy, ssl_cert_new would be called (and the direct reference to
+     * the per-SSL_CTX settings would be lost, but those still were
+     * indirectly accessed for various purposes, and for that reason they
+     * used to be known as s->ctx->default_cert). Now we don't look at the
+     * SSL_CTX's CERT after having duplicated it once.
+     */
+    s->cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert);
+    if (s->cert == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    RECORD_LAYER_set_read_ahead(&s->rlayer, ctx->read_ahead);
+    s->msg_callback = ctx->msg_callback;
+    s->msg_callback_arg = ctx->msg_callback_arg;
+    s->verify_mode = ctx->verify_mode;
+    s->not_resumable_session_cb = ctx->not_resumable_session_cb;
+    s->sid_ctx_length = ctx->sid_ctx_length;
+    OPENSSL_assert(s->sid_ctx_length <= sizeof(s->sid_ctx));
+    memcpy(&s->sid_ctx, &ctx->sid_ctx, sizeof(s->sid_ctx));
+    s->verify_callback = ctx->default_verify_callback;
+    s->generate_session_id = ctx->generate_session_id;
+
+    s->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
+    if (s->param == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(s->param, ctx->param);
+    s->quiet_shutdown = ctx->quiet_shutdown;
+    s->max_send_fragment = ctx->max_send_fragment;
+    s->split_send_fragment = ctx->split_send_fragment;
+    s->max_pipelines = ctx->max_pipelines;
+    if (s->max_pipelines > 1)
+        RECORD_LAYER_set_read_ahead(&s->rlayer, 1);
+    if (ctx->default_read_buf_len > 0)
+        SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(s, ctx->default_read_buf_len);
+
+    SSL_CTX_up_ref(ctx);
+    s->ctx = ctx;
+    s->tlsext_debug_cb = 0;
+    s->tlsext_debug_arg = NULL;
+    s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
+    s->tlsext_status_type = ctx->tlsext_status_type;
+    s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
+    s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL;
+    s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = NULL;
+    s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
+    s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
+    SSL_CTX_up_ref(ctx);
+    s->session_ctx = ctx;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    if (ctx->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
+        s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
+            OPENSSL_memdup(ctx->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
+                           ctx->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
+        if (!s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
+            goto err;
+        s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
+            ctx->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
+    }
+    if (ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) {
+        s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
+            OPENSSL_memdup(ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
+                           ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
+        if (!s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
+            goto err;
+        s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length =
+            ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
+    }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+    s->next_proto_negotiated = NULL;
+#endif
+
+    if (s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list) {
+        s->alpn_client_proto_list =
+            OPENSSL_malloc(s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
+        if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        memcpy(s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list,
+               s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
+        s->alpn_client_proto_list_len = s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
+    }
+
+    s->verified_chain = NULL;
+    s->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
+
+    s->default_passwd_callback = ctx->default_passwd_callback;
+    s->default_passwd_callback_userdata = ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata;
+
+    s->method = ctx->method;
+
+    if (!s->method->ssl_new(s))
+        goto err;
+
+    s->server = (ctx->method->ssl_accept == ssl_undefined_function) ? 0 : 1;
+
+    if (!SSL_clear(s))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, s, &s->ex_data))
+        goto err;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+    s->psk_client_callback = ctx->psk_client_callback;
+    s->psk_server_callback = ctx->psk_server_callback;
+#endif
+
+    s->job = NULL;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
+    if (!SSL_set_ct_validation_callback(s, ctx->ct_validation_callback,
+                                        ctx->ct_validation_callback_arg))
+        goto err;
+#endif
+
+    return s;
+ err:
+    SSL_free(s);
+    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+int SSL_is_dtls(const SSL *s)
+{
+    return SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? 1 : 0;
+}
+
+int SSL_up_ref(SSL *s)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    if (CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->references, 1, &i, s->lock) <= 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    REF_PRINT_COUNT("SSL", s);
+    REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 2);
+    return ((i > 1) ? 1 : 0);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sid_ctx,
+                                   unsigned int sid_ctx_len)
+{
+    if (sid_ctx_len > sizeof(ctx->sid_ctx)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT,
+               SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    ctx->sid_ctx_length = sid_ctx_len;
+    memcpy(ctx->sid_ctx, sid_ctx, sid_ctx_len);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_set_session_id_context(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *sid_ctx,
+                               unsigned int sid_ctx_len)
+{
+    if (sid_ctx_len > SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT,
+               SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    ssl->sid_ctx_length = sid_ctx_len;
+    memcpy(ssl->sid_ctx, sid_ctx, sid_ctx_len);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id(SSL_CTX *ctx, GEN_SESSION_CB cb)
+{
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(ctx->lock);
+    ctx->generate_session_id = cb;
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ctx->lock);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_set_generate_session_id(SSL *ssl, GEN_SESSION_CB cb)
+{
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(ssl->lock);
+    ssl->generate_session_id = cb;
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ssl->lock);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_has_matching_session_id(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *id,
+                                unsigned int id_len)
+{
+    /*
+     * A quick examination of SSL_SESSION_hash and SSL_SESSION_cmp shows how
+     * we can "construct" a session to give us the desired check - i.e. to
+     * find if there's a session in the hash table that would conflict with
+     * any new session built out of this id/id_len and the ssl_version in use
+     * by this SSL.
+     */
+    SSL_SESSION r, *p;
+
+    if (id_len > sizeof(r.session_id))
+        return 0;
+
+    r.ssl_version = ssl->version;
+    r.session_id_length = id_len;
+    memcpy(r.session_id, id, id_len);
+
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(ssl->session_ctx->lock);
+    p = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(ssl->session_ctx->sessions, &r);
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ssl->session_ctx->lock);
+    return (p != NULL);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_purpose(SSL_CTX *s, int purpose)
+{
+    return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(s->param, purpose);
+}
+
+int SSL_set_purpose(SSL *s, int purpose)
+{
+    return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(s->param, purpose);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_trust(SSL_CTX *s, int trust)
+{
+    return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(s->param, trust);
+}
+
+int SSL_set_trust(SSL *s, int trust)
+{
+    return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(s->param, trust);
+}
+
+int SSL_set1_host(SSL *s, const char *hostname)
+{
+    return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host(s->param, hostname, 0);
+}
+
+int SSL_add1_host(SSL *s, const char *hostname)
+{
+    return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add1_host(s->param, hostname, 0);
+}
+
+void SSL_set_hostflags(SSL *s, unsigned int flags)
+{
+    X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_hostflags(s->param, flags);
+}
+
+const char *SSL_get0_peername(SSL *s)
+{
+    return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_peername(s->param);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_dane_enable(SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return dane_ctx_enable(&ctx->dane);
+}
+
+unsigned long SSL_CTX_dane_set_flags(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
+{
+    unsigned long orig = ctx->dane.flags;
+
+    ctx->dane.flags |= flags;
+    return orig;
+}
+
+unsigned long SSL_CTX_dane_clear_flags(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
+{
+    unsigned long orig = ctx->dane.flags;
+
+    ctx->dane.flags &= ~flags;
+    return orig;
+}
+
+int SSL_dane_enable(SSL *s, const char *basedomain)
+{
+    SSL_DANE *dane = &s->dane;
+
+    if (s->ctx->dane.mdmax == 0) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DANE_ENABLE, SSL_R_CONTEXT_NOT_DANE_ENABLED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (dane->trecs != NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DANE_ENABLE, SSL_R_DANE_ALREADY_ENABLED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Default SNI name.  This rejects empty names, while set1_host below
+     * accepts them and disables host name checks.  To avoid side-effects with
+     * invalid input, set the SNI name first.
+     */
+    if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
+        if (!SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(s, basedomain)) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DANE_ENABLE, SSL_R_ERROR_SETTING_TLSA_BASE_DOMAIN);
+            return -1;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* Primary RFC6125 reference identifier */
+    if (!X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host(s->param, basedomain, 0)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DANE_ENABLE, SSL_R_ERROR_SETTING_TLSA_BASE_DOMAIN);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    dane->mdpth = -1;
+    dane->pdpth = -1;
+    dane->dctx = &s->ctx->dane;
+    dane->trecs = sk_danetls_record_new_null();
+
+    if (dane->trecs == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DANE_ENABLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return -1;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+unsigned long SSL_dane_set_flags(SSL *ssl, unsigned long flags)
+{
+    unsigned long orig = ssl->dane.flags;
+
+    ssl->dane.flags |= flags;
+    return orig;
+}
+
+unsigned long SSL_dane_clear_flags(SSL *ssl, unsigned long flags)
+{
+    unsigned long orig = ssl->dane.flags;
+
+    ssl->dane.flags &= ~flags;
+    return orig;
+}
+
+int SSL_get0_dane_authority(SSL *s, X509 **mcert, EVP_PKEY **mspki)
+{
+    SSL_DANE *dane = &s->dane;
+
+    if (!DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) || s->verify_result != X509_V_OK)
+        return -1;
+    if (dane->mtlsa) {
+        if (mcert)
+            *mcert = dane->mcert;
+        if (mspki)
+            *mspki = (dane->mcert == NULL) ? dane->mtlsa->spki : NULL;
+    }
+    return dane->mdpth;
+}
+
+int SSL_get0_dane_tlsa(SSL *s, uint8_t *usage, uint8_t *selector,
+                       uint8_t *mtype, unsigned const char **data, size_t *dlen)
+{
+    SSL_DANE *dane = &s->dane;
+
+    if (!DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) || s->verify_result != X509_V_OK)
+        return -1;
+    if (dane->mtlsa) {
+        if (usage)
+            *usage = dane->mtlsa->usage;
+        if (selector)
+            *selector = dane->mtlsa->selector;
+        if (mtype)
+            *mtype = dane->mtlsa->mtype;
+        if (data)
+            *data = dane->mtlsa->data;
+        if (dlen)
+            *dlen = dane->mtlsa->dlen;
+    }
+    return dane->mdpth;
+}
+
+SSL_DANE *SSL_get0_dane(SSL *s)
+{
+    return &s->dane;
+}
+
+int SSL_dane_tlsa_add(SSL *s, uint8_t usage, uint8_t selector,
+                      uint8_t mtype, unsigned const char *data, size_t dlen)
+{
+    return dane_tlsa_add(&s->dane, usage, selector, mtype, data, dlen);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_dane_mtype_set(SSL_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md, uint8_t mtype,
+                           uint8_t ord)
+{
+    return dane_mtype_set(&ctx->dane, md, mtype, ord);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set1_param(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm)
+{
+    return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ctx->param, vpm);
+}
+
+int SSL_set1_param(SSL *ssl, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm)
+{
+    return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ssl->param, vpm);
+}
+
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM *SSL_CTX_get0_param(SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->param;
+}
+
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM *SSL_get0_param(SSL *ssl)
+{
+    return ssl->param;
+}
+
+void SSL_certs_clear(SSL *s)
+{
+    ssl_cert_clear_certs(s->cert);
+}
+
+void SSL_free(SSL *s)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    if (s == NULL)
+        return;
+
+    CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->references, -1, &i, s->lock);
+    REF_PRINT_COUNT("SSL", s);
+    if (i > 0)
+        return;
+    REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0);
+
+    X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(s->param);
+    dane_final(&s->dane);
+    CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, s, &s->ex_data);
+
+    ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
+
+    BIO_free_all(s->wbio);
+    BIO_free_all(s->rbio);
+
+    BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
+
+    /* add extra stuff */
+    sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
+    sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
+
+    /* Make the next call work :-) */
+    if (s->session != NULL) {
+        ssl_clear_bad_session(s);
+        SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+    }
+
+    clear_ciphers(s);
+
+    ssl_cert_free(s->cert);
+    /* Free up if allocated */
+
+    OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_hostname);
+    SSL_CTX_free(s->session_ctx);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
+    OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
+#endif                          /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+    sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, X509_EXTENSION_free);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+    sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, OCSP_RESPID_free);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
+    SCT_LIST_free(s->scts);
+    OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_scts);
+#endif
+    OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
+    OPENSSL_free(s->alpn_client_proto_list);
+
+    sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->client_CA, X509_NAME_free);
+
+    sk_X509_pop_free(s->verified_chain, X509_free);
+
+    if (s->method != NULL)
+        s->method->ssl_free(s);
+
+    RECORD_LAYER_release(&s->rlayer);
+
+    SSL_CTX_free(s->ctx);
+
+    ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_free(s->waitctx);
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
+    OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
+    sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(s->srtp_profiles);
+#endif
+
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(s->lock);
+
+    OPENSSL_free(s);
+}
+
+void SSL_set0_rbio(SSL *s, BIO *rbio)
+{
+    BIO_free_all(s->rbio);
+    s->rbio = rbio;
+}
+
+void SSL_set0_wbio(SSL *s, BIO *wbio)
+{
+    /*
+     * If the output buffering BIO is still in place, remove it
+     */
+    if (s->bbio != NULL)
+        s->wbio = BIO_pop(s->wbio);
+
+    BIO_free_all(s->wbio);
+    s->wbio = wbio;
+
+    /* Re-attach |bbio| to the new |wbio|. */
+    if (s->bbio != NULL)
+        s->wbio = BIO_push(s->bbio, s->wbio);
+}
+
+void SSL_set_bio(SSL *s, BIO *rbio, BIO *wbio)
+{
+    /*
+     * For historical reasons, this function has many different cases in
+     * ownership handling.
+     */
+
+    /* If nothing has changed, do nothing */
+    if (rbio == SSL_get_rbio(s) && wbio == SSL_get_wbio(s))
+        return;
+
+    /*
+     * If the two arguments are equal then one fewer reference is granted by the
+     * caller than we want to take
+     */
+    if (rbio != NULL && rbio == wbio)
+        BIO_up_ref(rbio);
+
+    /*
+     * If only the wbio is changed only adopt one reference.
+     */
+    if (rbio == SSL_get_rbio(s)) {
+        SSL_set0_wbio(s, wbio);
+        return;
+    }
+    /*
+     * There is an asymmetry here for historical reasons. If only the rbio is
+     * changed AND the rbio and wbio were originally different, then we only
+     * adopt one reference.
+     */
+    if (wbio == SSL_get_wbio(s) && SSL_get_rbio(s) != SSL_get_wbio(s)) {
+        SSL_set0_rbio(s, rbio);
+        return;
+    }
+
+    /* Otherwise, adopt both references. */
+    SSL_set0_rbio(s, rbio);
+    SSL_set0_wbio(s, wbio);
+}
+
+BIO *SSL_get_rbio(const SSL *s)
+{
+    return s->rbio;
+}
+
+BIO *SSL_get_wbio(const SSL *s)
+{
+    if (s->bbio != NULL) {
+        /*
+         * If |bbio| is active, the true caller-configured BIO is its
+         * |next_bio|.
+         */
+        return BIO_next(s->bbio);
+    }
+    return s->wbio;
+}
+
+int SSL_get_fd(const SSL *s)
+{
+    return SSL_get_rfd(s);
+}
+
+int SSL_get_rfd(const SSL *s)
+{
+    int ret = -1;
+    BIO *b, *r;
+
+    b = SSL_get_rbio(s);
+    r = BIO_find_type(b, BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR);
+    if (r != NULL)
+        BIO_get_fd(r, &ret);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+int SSL_get_wfd(const SSL *s)
+{
+    int ret = -1;
+    BIO *b, *r;
+
+    b = SSL_get_wbio(s);
+    r = BIO_find_type(b, BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR);
+    if (r != NULL)
+        BIO_get_fd(r, &ret);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
+int SSL_set_fd(SSL *s, int fd)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    BIO *bio = NULL;
+
+    bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_socket());
+
+    if (bio == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_FD, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+    SSL_set_bio(s, bio, bio);
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+int SSL_set_wfd(SSL *s, int fd)
+{
+    BIO *rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
+
+    if (rbio == NULL || BIO_method_type(rbio) != BIO_TYPE_SOCKET
+        || (int)BIO_get_fd(rbio, NULL) != fd) {
+        BIO *bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_socket());
+
+        if (bio == NULL) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_WFD, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+        SSL_set0_wbio(s, bio);
+    } else {
+        BIO_up_ref(rbio);
+        SSL_set0_wbio(s, rbio);
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_set_rfd(SSL *s, int fd)
+{
+    BIO *wbio = SSL_get_wbio(s);
+
+    if (wbio == NULL || BIO_method_type(wbio) != BIO_TYPE_SOCKET
+        || ((int)BIO_get_fd(wbio, NULL) != fd)) {
+        BIO *bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_socket());
+
+        if (bio == NULL) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_RFD, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+        SSL_set0_rbio(s, bio);
+    } else {
+        BIO_up_ref(wbio);
+        SSL_set0_rbio(s, wbio);
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+#endif
+
+/* return length of latest Finished message we sent, copy to 'buf' */
+size_t SSL_get_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count)
+{
+    size_t ret = 0;
+
+    if (s->s3 != NULL) {
+        ret = s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len;
+        if (count > ret)
+            count = ret;
+        memcpy(buf, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, count);
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/* return length of latest Finished message we expected, copy to 'buf' */
+size_t SSL_get_peer_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count)
+{
+    size_t ret = 0;
+
+    if (s->s3 != NULL) {
+        ret = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len;
+        if (count > ret)
+            count = ret;
+        memcpy(buf, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, count);
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int SSL_get_verify_mode(const SSL *s)
+{
+    return (s->verify_mode);
+}
+
+int SSL_get_verify_depth(const SSL *s)
+{
+    return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(s->param);
+}
+
+int (*SSL_get_verify_callback(const SSL *s)) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *) {
+    return (s->verify_callback);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return (ctx->verify_mode);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_get_verify_depth(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(ctx->param);
+}
+
+int (*SSL_CTX_get_verify_callback(const SSL_CTX *ctx)) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *) {
+    return (ctx->default_verify_callback);
+}
+
+void SSL_set_verify(SSL *s, int mode,
+                    int (*callback) (int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx))
+{
+    s->verify_mode = mode;
+    if (callback != NULL)
+        s->verify_callback = callback;
+}
+
+void SSL_set_verify_depth(SSL *s, int depth)
+{
+    X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(s->param, depth);
+}
+
+void SSL_set_read_ahead(SSL *s, int yes)
+{
+    RECORD_LAYER_set_read_ahead(&s->rlayer, yes);
+}
+
+int SSL_get_read_ahead(const SSL *s)
+{
+    return RECORD_LAYER_get_read_ahead(&s->rlayer);
+}
+
+int SSL_pending(const SSL *s)
+{
+    /*
+     * SSL_pending cannot work properly if read-ahead is enabled
+     * (SSL_[CTX_]ctrl(..., SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD, 1, NULL)), and it is
+     * impossible to fix since SSL_pending cannot report errors that may be
+     * observed while scanning the new data. (Note that SSL_pending() is
+     * often used as a boolean value, so we'd better not return -1.)
+     */
+    return (s->method->ssl_pending(s));
+}
+
+int SSL_has_pending(const SSL *s)
+{
+    /*
+     * Similar to SSL_pending() but returns a 1 to indicate that we have
+     * unprocessed data available or 0 otherwise (as opposed to the number of
+     * bytes available). Unlike SSL_pending() this will take into account
+     * read_ahead data. A 1 return simply indicates that we have unprocessed
+     * data. That data may not result in any application data, or we may fail
+     * to parse the records for some reason.
+     */
+    if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer))
+        return 1;
+
+    return RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(&s->rlayer);
+}
+
+X509 *SSL_get_peer_certificate(const SSL *s)
+{
+    X509 *r;
+
+    if ((s == NULL) || (s->session == NULL))
+        r = NULL;
+    else
+        r = s->session->peer;
+
+    if (r == NULL)
+        return (r);
+
+    X509_up_ref(r);
+
+    return (r);
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509) *SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(const SSL *s)
+{
+    STACK_OF(X509) *r;
+
+    if ((s == NULL) || (s->session == NULL))
+        r = NULL;
+    else
+        r = s->session->peer_chain;
+
+    /*
+     * If we are a client, cert_chain includes the peer's own certificate; if
+     * we are a server, it does not.
+     */
+
+    return (r);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Now in theory, since the calling process own 't' it should be safe to
+ * modify.  We need to be able to read f without being hassled
+ */
+int SSL_copy_session_id(SSL *t, const SSL *f)
+{
+    int i;
+    /* Do we need to to SSL locking? */
+    if (!SSL_set_session(t, SSL_get_session(f))) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * what if we are setup for one protocol version but want to talk another
+     */
+    if (t->method != f->method) {
+        t->method->ssl_free(t);
+        t->method = f->method;
+        if (t->method->ssl_new(t) == 0)
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    CRYPTO_atomic_add(&f->cert->references, 1, &i, f->cert->lock);
+    ssl_cert_free(t->cert);
+    t->cert = f->cert;
+    if (!SSL_set_session_id_context(t, f->sid_ctx, f->sid_ctx_length)) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Fix this so it checks all the valid key/cert options */
+int SSL_CTX_check_private_key(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    if ((ctx == NULL) || (ctx->cert->key->x509 == NULL)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED);
+        return (0);
+    }
+    if (ctx->cert->key->privatekey == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED);
+        return (0);
+    }
+    return (X509_check_private_key
+            (ctx->cert->key->x509, ctx->cert->key->privatekey));
+}
+
+/* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */
+int SSL_check_private_key(const SSL *ssl)
+{
+    if (ssl == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+        return (0);
+    }
+    if (ssl->cert->key->x509 == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED);
+        return (0);
+    }
+    if (ssl->cert->key->privatekey == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED);
+        return (0);
+    }
+    return (X509_check_private_key(ssl->cert->key->x509,
+                                   ssl->cert->key->privatekey));
+}
+
+int SSL_waiting_for_async(SSL *s)
+{
+    if (s->job)
+        return 1;
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int SSL_get_all_async_fds(SSL *s, OSSL_ASYNC_FD *fds, size_t *numfds)
+{
+    ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *ctx = s->waitctx;
+
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    return ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_all_fds(ctx, fds, numfds);
+}
+
+int SSL_get_changed_async_fds(SSL *s, OSSL_ASYNC_FD *addfd, size_t *numaddfds,
+                              OSSL_ASYNC_FD *delfd, size_t *numdelfds)
+{
+    ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *ctx = s->waitctx;
+
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    return ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_changed_fds(ctx, addfd, numaddfds, delfd,
+                                          numdelfds);
+}
+
+int SSL_accept(SSL *s)
+{
+    if (s->handshake_func == NULL) {
+        /* Not properly initialized yet */
+        SSL_set_accept_state(s);
+    }
+
+    return SSL_do_handshake(s);
+}
+
+int SSL_connect(SSL *s)
+{
+    if (s->handshake_func == NULL) {
+        /* Not properly initialized yet */
+        SSL_set_connect_state(s);
+    }
+
+    return SSL_do_handshake(s);
+}
+
+long SSL_get_default_timeout(const SSL *s)
+{
+    return (s->method->get_timeout());
+}
+
+static int ssl_start_async_job(SSL *s, struct ssl_async_args *args,
+                               int (*func) (void *))
+{
+    int ret;
+    if (s->waitctx == NULL) {
+        s->waitctx = ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_new();
+        if (s->waitctx == NULL)
+            return -1;
+    }
+    switch (ASYNC_start_job(&s->job, s->waitctx, &ret, func, args,
+                            sizeof(struct ssl_async_args))) {
+    case ASYNC_ERR:
+        s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_START_ASYNC_JOB, SSL_R_FAILED_TO_INIT_ASYNC);
+        return -1;
+    case ASYNC_PAUSE:
+        s->rwstate = SSL_ASYNC_PAUSED;
+        return -1;
+    case ASYNC_NO_JOBS:
+        s->rwstate = SSL_ASYNC_NO_JOBS;
+        return -1;
+    case ASYNC_FINISH:
+        s->job = NULL;
+        return ret;
+    default:
+        s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_START_ASYNC_JOB, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        /* Shouldn't happen */
+        return -1;
+    }
+}
+
+static int ssl_io_intern(void *vargs)
+{
+    struct ssl_async_args *args;
+    SSL *s;
+    void *buf;
+    int num;
+
+    args = (struct ssl_async_args *)vargs;
+    s = args->s;
+    buf = args->buf;
+    num = args->num;
+    switch (args->type) {
+    case READFUNC:
+        return args->f.func_read(s, buf, num);
+    case WRITEFUNC:
+        return args->f.func_write(s, buf, num);
+    case OTHERFUNC:
+        return args->f.func_other(s);
+    }
+    return -1;
+}
+
+int SSL_read(SSL *s, void *buf, int num)
+{
+    if (s->handshake_func == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_READ, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
+        s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+        return (0);
+    }
+
+    if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_ASYNC) && ASYNC_get_current_job() == NULL) {
+        struct ssl_async_args args;
+
+        args.s = s;
+        args.buf = buf;
+        args.num = num;
+        args.type = READFUNC;
+        args.f.func_read = s->method->ssl_read;
+
+        return ssl_start_async_job(s, &args, ssl_io_intern);
+    } else {
+        return s->method->ssl_read(s, buf, num);
+    }
+}
+
+int SSL_peek(SSL *s, void *buf, int num)
+{
+    if (s->handshake_func == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PEEK, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
+        return (0);
+    }
+    if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_ASYNC) && ASYNC_get_current_job() == NULL) {
+        struct ssl_async_args args;
+
+        args.s = s;
+        args.buf = buf;
+        args.num = num;
+        args.type = READFUNC;
+        args.f.func_read = s->method->ssl_peek;
+
+        return ssl_start_async_job(s, &args, ssl_io_intern);
+    } else {
+        return s->method->ssl_peek(s, buf, num);
+    }
+}
+
+int SSL_write(SSL *s, const void *buf, int num)
+{
+    if (s->handshake_func == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_WRITE, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) {
+        s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_WRITE, SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN);
+        return (-1);
+    }
+
+    if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_ASYNC) && ASYNC_get_current_job() == NULL) {
+        struct ssl_async_args args;
+
+        args.s = s;
+        args.buf = (void *)buf;
+        args.num = num;
+        args.type = WRITEFUNC;
+        args.f.func_write = s->method->ssl_write;
+
+        return ssl_start_async_job(s, &args, ssl_io_intern);
+    } else {
+        return s->method->ssl_write(s, buf, num);
+    }
+}
+
+int SSL_shutdown(SSL *s)
+{
+    /*
+     * Note that this function behaves differently from what one might
+     * expect.  Return values are 0 for no success (yet), 1 for success; but
+     * calling it once is usually not enough, even if blocking I/O is used
+     * (see ssl3_shutdown).
+     */
+
+    if (s->handshake_func == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SHUTDOWN, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (!SSL_in_init(s)) {
+        if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_ASYNC) && ASYNC_get_current_job() == NULL) {
+            struct ssl_async_args args;
+
+            args.s = s;
+            args.type = OTHERFUNC;
+            args.f.func_other = s->method->ssl_shutdown;
+
+            return ssl_start_async_job(s, &args, ssl_io_intern);
+        } else {
+            return s->method->ssl_shutdown(s);
+        }
+    } else {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SHUTDOWN, SSL_R_SHUTDOWN_WHILE_IN_INIT);
+        return -1;
+    }
+}
+
+int SSL_renegotiate(SSL *s)
+{
+    if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_RENEGOTIATE, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (s->renegotiate == 0)
+        s->renegotiate = 1;
+
+    s->new_session = 1;
+
+    return (s->method->ssl_renegotiate(s));
+}
+
+int SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(SSL *s)
+{
+    if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_RENEGOTIATE_ABBREVIATED, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (s->renegotiate == 0)
+        s->renegotiate = 1;
+
+    s->new_session = 0;
+
+    return (s->method->ssl_renegotiate(s));
+}
+
+int SSL_renegotiate_pending(SSL *s)
+{
+    /*
+     * becomes true when negotiation is requested; false again once a
+     * handshake has finished
+     */
+    return (s->renegotiate != 0);
+}
+
+long SSL_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
+{
+    long l;
+
+    switch (cmd) {
+    case SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD:
+        return (RECORD_LAYER_get_read_ahead(&s->rlayer));
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD:
+        l = RECORD_LAYER_get_read_ahead(&s->rlayer);
+        RECORD_LAYER_set_read_ahead(&s->rlayer, larg);
+        return (l);
+
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG:
+        s->msg_callback_arg = parg;
+        return 1;
+
+    case SSL_CTRL_MODE:
+        return (s->mode |= larg);
+    case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE:
+        return (s->mode &= ~larg);
+    case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
+        return (s->max_cert_list);
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
+        l = s->max_cert_list;
+        s->max_cert_list = larg;
+        return (l);
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT:
+        if (larg < 512 || larg > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
+            return 0;
+        s->max_send_fragment = larg;
+        if (s->max_send_fragment < s->split_send_fragment)
+            s->split_send_fragment = s->max_send_fragment;
+        return 1;
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_SPLIT_SEND_FRAGMENT:
+        if ((unsigned int)larg > s->max_send_fragment || larg == 0)
+            return 0;
+        s->split_send_fragment = larg;
+        return 1;
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_PIPELINES:
+        if (larg < 1 || larg > SSL_MAX_PIPELINES)
+            return 0;
+        s->max_pipelines = larg;
+        if (larg > 1)
+            RECORD_LAYER_set_read_ahead(&s->rlayer, 1);
+        return 1;
+    case SSL_CTRL_GET_RI_SUPPORT:
+        if (s->s3)
+            return s->s3->send_connection_binding;
+        else
+            return 0;
+    case SSL_CTRL_CERT_FLAGS:
+        return (s->cert->cert_flags |= larg);
+    case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_CERT_FLAGS:
+        return (s->cert->cert_flags &= ~larg);
+
+    case SSL_CTRL_GET_RAW_CIPHERLIST:
+        if (parg) {
+            if (s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw == NULL)
+                return 0;
+            *(unsigned char **)parg = s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw;
+            return (int)s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen;
+        } else {
+            return TLS_CIPHER_LEN;
+        }
+    case SSL_CTRL_GET_EXTMS_SUPPORT:
+        if (!s->session || SSL_in_init(s) || ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s))
+            return -1;
+        if (s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)
+            return 1;
+        else
+            return 0;
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_MIN_PROTO_VERSION:
+        return ssl_check_allowed_versions(larg, s->max_proto_version)
+               && ssl_set_version_bound(s->ctx->method->version, (int)larg,
+                                        &s->min_proto_version);
+    case SSL_CTRL_GET_MIN_PROTO_VERSION:
+        return s->min_proto_version;
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_PROTO_VERSION:
+        return ssl_check_allowed_versions(s->min_proto_version, larg)
+               && ssl_set_version_bound(s->ctx->method->version, (int)larg,
+                                        &s->max_proto_version);
+    case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_PROTO_VERSION:
+        return s->max_proto_version;
+    default:
+        return (s->method->ssl_ctrl(s, cmd, larg, parg));
+    }
+}
+
+long SSL_callback_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, void (*fp) (void))
+{
+    switch (cmd) {
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK:
+        s->msg_callback = (void (*)
+                           (int write_p, int version, int content_type,
+                            const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl,
+                            void *arg))(fp);
+        return 1;
+
+    default:
+        return (s->method->ssl_callback_ctrl(s, cmd, fp));
+    }
+}
+
+LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION) *SSL_CTX_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->sessions;
+}
+
+long SSL_CTX_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
+{
+    long l;
+    /* For some cases with ctx == NULL perform syntax checks */
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+        switch (cmd) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+        case SSL_CTRL_SET_CURVES_LIST:
+            return tls1_set_curves_list(NULL, NULL, parg);
+#endif
+        case SSL_CTRL_SET_SIGALGS_LIST:
+        case SSL_CTRL_SET_CLIENT_SIGALGS_LIST:
+            return tls1_set_sigalgs_list(NULL, parg, 0);
+        default:
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    switch (cmd) {
+    case SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD:
+        return (ctx->read_ahead);
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD:
+        l = ctx->read_ahead;
+        ctx->read_ahead = larg;
+        return (l);
+
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG:
+        ctx->msg_callback_arg = parg;
+        return 1;
+
+    case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
+        return (ctx->max_cert_list);
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
+        l = ctx->max_cert_list;
+        ctx->max_cert_list = larg;
+        return (l);
+
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE:
+        l = ctx->session_cache_size;
+        ctx->session_cache_size = larg;
+        return (l);
+    case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE:
+        return (ctx->session_cache_size);
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_MODE:
+        l = ctx->session_cache_mode;
+        ctx->session_cache_mode = larg;
+        return (l);
+    case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_MODE:
+        return (ctx->session_cache_mode);
+
+    case SSL_CTRL_SESS_NUMBER:
+        return (lh_SSL_SESSION_num_items(ctx->sessions));
+    case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT:
+        return (ctx->stats.sess_connect);
+    case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_GOOD:
+        return (ctx->stats.sess_connect_good);
+    case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_RENEGOTIATE:
+        return (ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate);
+    case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT:
+        return (ctx->stats.sess_accept);
+    case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_GOOD:
+        return (ctx->stats.sess_accept_good);
+    case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_RENEGOTIATE:
+        return (ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate);
+    case SSL_CTRL_SESS_HIT:
+        return (ctx->stats.sess_hit);
+    case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CB_HIT:
+        return (ctx->stats.sess_cb_hit);
+    case SSL_CTRL_SESS_MISSES:
+        return (ctx->stats.sess_miss);
+    case SSL_CTRL_SESS_TIMEOUTS:
+        return (ctx->stats.sess_timeout);
+    case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CACHE_FULL:
+        return (ctx->stats.sess_cache_full);
+    case SSL_CTRL_MODE:
+        return (ctx->mode |= larg);
+    case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE:
+        return (ctx->mode &= ~larg);
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT:
+        if (larg < 512 || larg > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
+            return 0;
+        ctx->max_send_fragment = larg;
+        if (ctx->max_send_fragment < ctx->split_send_fragment)
+            ctx->split_send_fragment = ctx->max_send_fragment;
+        return 1;
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_SPLIT_SEND_FRAGMENT:
+        if ((unsigned int)larg > ctx->max_send_fragment || larg == 0)
+            return 0;
+        ctx->split_send_fragment = larg;
+        return 1;
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_PIPELINES:
+        if (larg < 1 || larg > SSL_MAX_PIPELINES)
+            return 0;
+        ctx->max_pipelines = larg;
+        return 1;
+    case SSL_CTRL_CERT_FLAGS:
+        return (ctx->cert->cert_flags |= larg);
+    case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_CERT_FLAGS:
+        return (ctx->cert->cert_flags &= ~larg);
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_MIN_PROTO_VERSION:
+        return ssl_check_allowed_versions(larg, ctx->max_proto_version)
+               && ssl_set_version_bound(ctx->method->version, (int)larg,
+                                        &ctx->min_proto_version);
+    case SSL_CTRL_GET_MIN_PROTO_VERSION:
+        return ctx->min_proto_version;
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_PROTO_VERSION:
+        return ssl_check_allowed_versions(ctx->min_proto_version, larg)
+               && ssl_set_version_bound(ctx->method->version, (int)larg,
+                                        &ctx->max_proto_version);
+    case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_PROTO_VERSION:
+        return ctx->max_proto_version;
+    default:
+        return (ctx->method->ssl_ctx_ctrl(ctx, cmd, larg, parg));
+    }
+}
+
+long SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, void (*fp) (void))
+{
+    switch (cmd) {
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK:
+        ctx->msg_callback = (void (*)
+                             (int write_p, int version, int content_type,
+                              const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl,
+                              void *arg))(fp);
+        return 1;
+
+    default:
+        return (ctx->method->ssl_ctx_callback_ctrl(ctx, cmd, fp));
+    }
+}
+
+int ssl_cipher_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *a, const SSL_CIPHER *b)
+{
+    if (a->id > b->id)
+        return 1;
+    if (a->id < b->id)
+        return -1;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *const *ap,
+                          const SSL_CIPHER *const *bp)
+{
+    if ((*ap)->id > (*bp)->id)
+        return 1;
+    if ((*ap)->id < (*bp)->id)
+        return -1;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/** return a STACK of the ciphers available for the SSL and in order of
+ * preference */
+STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get_ciphers(const SSL *s)
+{
+    if (s != NULL) {
+        if (s->cipher_list != NULL) {
+            return (s->cipher_list);
+        } else if ((s->ctx != NULL) && (s->ctx->cipher_list != NULL)) {
+            return (s->ctx->cipher_list);
+        }
+    }
+    return (NULL);
+}
+
+STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get_client_ciphers(const SSL *s)
+{
+    if ((s == NULL) || (s->session == NULL) || !s->server)
+        return NULL;
+    return s->session->ciphers;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get1_supported_ciphers(SSL *s)
+{
+    STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk = NULL, *ciphers;
+    int i;
+    ciphers = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
+    if (!ciphers)
+        return NULL;
+    ssl_set_client_disabled(s);
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
+        const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
+        if (!ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0)) {
+            if (!sk)
+                sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null();
+            if (!sk)
+                return NULL;
+            if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk, c)) {
+                sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk);
+                return NULL;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    return sk;
+}
+
+/** return a STACK of the ciphers available for the SSL and in order of
+ * algorithm id */
+STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(SSL *s)
+{
+    if (s != NULL) {
+        if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL) {
+            return (s->cipher_list_by_id);
+        } else if ((s->ctx != NULL) && (s->ctx->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)) {
+            return (s->ctx->cipher_list_by_id);
+        }
+    }
+    return (NULL);
+}
+
+/** The old interface to get the same thing as SSL_get_ciphers() */
+const char *SSL_get_cipher_list(const SSL *s, int n)
+{
+    const SSL_CIPHER *c;
+    STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
+
+    if (s == NULL)
+        return (NULL);
+    sk = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
+    if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) <= n))
+        return (NULL);
+    c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, n);
+    if (c == NULL)
+        return (NULL);
+    return (c->name);
+}
+
+/** return a STACK of the ciphers available for the SSL_CTX and in order of
+ * preference */
+STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_CTX_get_ciphers(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    if (ctx != NULL)
+        return ctx->cipher_list;
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+/** specify the ciphers to be used by default by the SSL_CTX */
+int SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *str)
+{
+    STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
+
+    sk = ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx->method, &ctx->cipher_list,
+                                &ctx->cipher_list_by_id, str, ctx->cert);
+    /*
+     * ssl_create_cipher_list may return an empty stack if it was unable to
+     * find a cipher matching the given rule string (for example if the rule
+     * string specifies a cipher which has been disabled). This is not an
+     * error as far as ssl_create_cipher_list is concerned, and hence
+     * ctx->cipher_list and ctx->cipher_list_by_id has been updated.
+     */
+    if (sk == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    else if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/** specify the ciphers to be used by the SSL */
+int SSL_set_cipher_list(SSL *s, const char *str)
+{
+    STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
+
+    sk = ssl_create_cipher_list(s->ctx->method, &s->cipher_list,
+                                &s->cipher_list_by_id, str, s->cert);
+    /* see comment in SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list */
+    if (sk == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    else if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+char *SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *s, char *buf, int len)
+{
+    char *p;
+    STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
+    const SSL_CIPHER *c;
+    int i;
+
+    if ((s->session == NULL) || (s->session->ciphers == NULL) || (len < 2))
+        return (NULL);
+
+    p = buf;
+    sk = s->session->ciphers;
+
+    if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0)
+        return NULL;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) {
+        int n;
+
+        c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
+        n = strlen(c->name);
+        if (n + 1 > len) {
+            if (p != buf)
+                --p;
+            *p = '\0';
+            return buf;
+        }
+        memcpy(p, c->name, n + 1);
+        p += n;
+        *(p++) = ':';
+        len -= n + 1;
+    }
+    p[-1] = '\0';
+    return (buf);
+}
+
+/** return a servername extension value if provided in Client Hello, or NULL.
+ * So far, only host_name types are defined (RFC 3546).
+ */
+
+const char *SSL_get_servername(const SSL *s, const int type)
+{
+    if (type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name)
+        return NULL;
+
+    return s->session && !s->tlsext_hostname ?
+        s->session->tlsext_hostname : s->tlsext_hostname;
+}
+
+int SSL_get_servername_type(const SSL *s)
+{
+    if (s->session
+        && (!s->tlsext_hostname ? s->session->
+            tlsext_hostname : s->tlsext_hostname))
+        return TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
+    return -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * SSL_select_next_proto implements the standard protocol selection. It is
+ * expected that this function is called from the callback set by
+ * SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb. The protocol data is assumed to be a
+ * vector of 8-bit, length prefixed byte strings. The length byte itself is
+ * not included in the length. A byte string of length 0 is invalid. No byte
+ * string may be truncated. The current, but experimental algorithm for
+ * selecting the protocol is: 1) If the server doesn't support NPN then this
+ * is indicated to the callback. In this case, the client application has to
+ * abort the connection or have a default application level protocol. 2) If
+ * the server supports NPN, but advertises an empty list then the client
+ * selects the first protocol in its list, but indicates via the API that this
+ * fallback case was enacted. 3) Otherwise, the client finds the first
+ * protocol in the server's list that it supports and selects this protocol.
+ * This is because it's assumed that the server has better information about
+ * which protocol a client should use. 4) If the client doesn't support any
+ * of the server's advertised protocols, then this is treated the same as
+ * case 2. It returns either OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED if a common protocol was
+ * found, or OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP if the fallback case was reached.
+ */
+int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen,
+                          const unsigned char *server,
+                          unsigned int server_len,
+                          const unsigned char *client, unsigned int client_len)
+{
+    unsigned int i, j;
+    const unsigned char *result;
+    int status = OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED;
+
+    /*
+     * For each protocol in server preference order, see if we support it.
+     */
+    for (i = 0; i < server_len;) {
+        for (j = 0; j < client_len;) {
+            if (server[i] == client[j] &&
+                memcmp(&server[i + 1], &client[j + 1], server[i]) == 0) {
+                /* We found a match */
+                result = &server[i];
+                status = OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED;
+                goto found;
+            }
+            j += client[j];
+            j++;
+        }
+        i += server[i];
+        i++;
+    }
+
+    /* There's no overlap between our protocols and the server's list. */
+    result = client;
+    status = OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
+
+ found:
+    *out = (unsigned char *)result + 1;
+    *outlen = result[0];
+    return status;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+/*
+ * SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated sets *data and *len to point to the
+ * client's requested protocol for this connection and returns 0. If the
+ * client didn't request any protocol, then *data is set to NULL. Note that
+ * the client can request any protocol it chooses. The value returned from
+ * this function need not be a member of the list of supported protocols
+ * provided by the callback.
+ */
+void SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(const SSL *s, const unsigned char **data,
+                                    unsigned *len)
+{
+    *data = s->next_proto_negotiated;
+    if (!*data) {
+        *len = 0;
+    } else {
+        *len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len;
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb sets a callback that is called when
+ * a TLS server needs a list of supported protocols for Next Protocol
+ * Negotiation. The returned list must be in wire format.  The list is
+ * returned by setting |out| to point to it and |outlen| to its length. This
+ * memory will not be modified, but one should assume that the SSL* keeps a
+ * reference to it. The callback should return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK if it
+ * wishes to advertise. Otherwise, no such extension will be included in the
+ * ServerHello.
+ */
+void SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                           int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
+                                                      const unsigned char
+                                                      **out,
+                                                      unsigned int *outlen,
+                                                      void *arg), void *arg)
+{
+    ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb = cb;
+    ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg = arg;
+}
+
+/*
+ * SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb sets a callback that is called when a
+ * client needs to select a protocol from the server's provided list. |out|
+ * must be set to point to the selected protocol (which may be within |in|).
+ * The length of the protocol name must be written into |outlen|. The
+ * server's advertised protocols are provided in |in| and |inlen|. The
+ * callback can assume that |in| is syntactically valid. The client must
+ * select a protocol. It is fatal to the connection if this callback returns
+ * a value other than SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK.
+ */
+void SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                      int (*cb) (SSL *s, unsigned char **out,
+                                                 unsigned char *outlen,
+                                                 const unsigned char *in,
+                                                 unsigned int inlen,
+                                                 void *arg), void *arg)
+{
+    ctx->next_proto_select_cb = cb;
+    ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg = arg;
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos sets the ALPN protocol list on |ctx| to |protos|.
+ * |protos| must be in wire-format (i.e. a series of non-empty, 8-bit
+ * length-prefixed strings). Returns 0 on success.
+ */
+int SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *protos,
+                            unsigned int protos_len)
+{
+    OPENSSL_free(ctx->alpn_client_proto_list);
+    ctx->alpn_client_proto_list = OPENSSL_memdup(protos, protos_len);
+    if (ctx->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_ALPN_PROTOS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 1;
+    }
+    ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len = protos_len;
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * SSL_set_alpn_protos sets the ALPN protocol list on |ssl| to |protos|.
+ * |protos| must be in wire-format (i.e. a series of non-empty, 8-bit
+ * length-prefixed strings). Returns 0 on success.
+ */
+int SSL_set_alpn_protos(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *protos,
+                        unsigned int protos_len)
+{
+    OPENSSL_free(ssl->alpn_client_proto_list);
+    ssl->alpn_client_proto_list = OPENSSL_memdup(protos, protos_len);
+    if (ssl->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_ALPN_PROTOS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 1;
+    }
+    ssl->alpn_client_proto_list_len = protos_len;
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb sets a callback function on |ctx| that is
+ * called during ClientHello processing in order to select an ALPN protocol
+ * from the client's list of offered protocols.
+ */
+void SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
+                                           const unsigned char **out,
+                                           unsigned char *outlen,
+                                           const unsigned char *in,
+                                           unsigned int inlen,
+                                           void *arg), void *arg)
+{
+    ctx->alpn_select_cb = cb;
+    ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg = arg;
+}
+
+/*
+ * SSL_get0_alpn_selected gets the selected ALPN protocol (if any) from |ssl|.
+ * On return it sets |*data| to point to |*len| bytes of protocol name
+ * (not including the leading length-prefix byte). If the server didn't
+ * respond with a negotiated protocol then |*len| will be zero.
+ */
+void SSL_get0_alpn_selected(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **data,
+                            unsigned int *len)
+{
+    *data = NULL;
+    if (ssl->s3)
+        *data = ssl->s3->alpn_selected;
+    if (*data == NULL)
+        *len = 0;
+    else
+        *len = ssl->s3->alpn_selected_len;
+}
+
+int SSL_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
+                               const char *label, size_t llen,
+                               const unsigned char *context, size_t contextlen,
+                               int use_context)
+{
+    if (s->version < TLS1_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+        return -1;
+
+    return s->method->ssl3_enc->export_keying_material(s, out, olen, label,
+                                                       llen, context,
+                                                       contextlen, use_context);
+}
+
+static unsigned long ssl_session_hash(const SSL_SESSION *a)
+{
+    const unsigned char *session_id = a->session_id;
+    unsigned long l;
+    unsigned char tmp_storage[4];
+
+    if (a->session_id_length < sizeof(tmp_storage)) {
+        memset(tmp_storage, 0, sizeof(tmp_storage));
+        memcpy(tmp_storage, a->session_id, a->session_id_length);
+        session_id = tmp_storage;
+    }
+
+    l = (unsigned long)
+        ((unsigned long)session_id[0]) |
+        ((unsigned long)session_id[1] << 8L) |
+        ((unsigned long)session_id[2] << 16L) |
+        ((unsigned long)session_id[3] << 24L);
+    return (l);
+}
+
+/*
+ * NB: If this function (or indeed the hash function which uses a sort of
+ * coarser function than this one) is changed, ensure
+ * SSL_CTX_has_matching_session_id() is checked accordingly. It relies on
+ * being able to construct an SSL_SESSION that will collide with any existing
+ * session with a matching session ID.
+ */
+static int ssl_session_cmp(const SSL_SESSION *a, const SSL_SESSION *b)
+{
+    if (a->ssl_version != b->ssl_version)
+        return (1);
+    if (a->session_id_length != b->session_id_length)
+        return (1);
+    return (memcmp(a->session_id, b->session_id, a->session_id_length));
+}
+
+/*
+ * These wrapper functions should remain rather than redeclaring
+ * SSL_SESSION_hash and SSL_SESSION_cmp for void* types and casting each
+ * variable. The reason is that the functions aren't static, they're exposed
+ * via ssl.h.
+ */
+
+SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *meth)
+{
+    SSL_CTX *ret = NULL;
+
+    if (meth == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_NULL_SSL_METHOD_PASSED);
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+
+    if (!OPENSSL_init_ssl(OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_SSL_STRINGS, NULL))
+        return NULL;
+
+    if (FIPS_mode() && (meth->version < TLS1_VERSION)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_0_NEEDED_IN_FIPS_MODE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    if (SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx() < 0) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_X509_VERIFICATION_SETUP_PROBLEMS);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
+    if (ret == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    ret->method = meth;
+    ret->min_proto_version = 0;
+    ret->max_proto_version = 0;
+    ret->session_cache_mode = SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER;
+    ret->session_cache_size = SSL_SESSION_CACHE_MAX_SIZE_DEFAULT;
+    /* We take the system default. */
+    ret->session_timeout = meth->get_timeout();
+    ret->references = 1;
+    ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
+    if (ret->lock == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        OPENSSL_free(ret);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    ret->max_cert_list = SSL_MAX_CERT_LIST_DEFAULT;
+    ret->verify_mode = SSL_VERIFY_NONE;
+    if ((ret->cert = ssl_cert_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    ret->sessions = lh_SSL_SESSION_new(ssl_session_hash, ssl_session_cmp);
+    if (ret->sessions == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    ret->cert_store = X509_STORE_new();
+    if (ret->cert_store == NULL)
+        goto err;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
+    ret->ctlog_store = CTLOG_STORE_new();
+    if (ret->ctlog_store == NULL)
+        goto err;
+#endif
+    if (!ssl_create_cipher_list(ret->method,
+                                &ret->cipher_list, &ret->cipher_list_by_id,
+                                SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST, ret->cert)
+        || sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ret->cipher_list) <= 0) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS);
+        goto err2;
+    }
+
+    ret->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
+    if (ret->param == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if ((ret->md5 = EVP_get_digestbyname("ssl3-md5")) == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_MD5_ROUTINES);
+        goto err2;
+    }
+    if ((ret->sha1 = EVP_get_digestbyname("ssl3-sha1")) == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_SHA1_ROUTINES);
+        goto err2;
+    }
+
+    if ((ret->client_CA = sk_X509_NAME_new_null()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, ret, &ret->ex_data))
+        goto err;
+
+    /* No compression for DTLS */
+    if (!(meth->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & SSL_ENC_FLAG_DTLS))
+        ret->comp_methods = SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods();
+
+    ret->max_send_fragment = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
+    ret->split_send_fragment = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
+
+    /* Setup RFC5077 ticket keys */
+    if ((RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_key_name,
+                    sizeof(ret->tlsext_tick_key_name)) <= 0)
+        || (RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
+                       sizeof(ret->tlsext_tick_hmac_key)) <= 0)
+        || (RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
+                       sizeof(ret->tlsext_tick_aes_key)) <= 0))
+        ret->options |= SSL_OP_NO_TICKET;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+    if (!SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_init(ret))
+        goto err;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+# ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO
+#  define eng_strx(x)     #x
+#  define eng_str(x)      eng_strx(x)
+    /* Use specific client engine automatically... ignore errors */
+    {
+        ENGINE *eng;
+        eng = ENGINE_by_id(eng_str(OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO));
+        if (!eng) {
+            ERR_clear_error();
+            ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
+            eng = ENGINE_by_id(eng_str(OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO));
+        }
+        if (!eng || !SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine(ret, eng))
+            ERR_clear_error();
+    }
+# endif
+#endif
+    /*
+     * Default is to connect to non-RI servers. When RI is more widely
+     * deployed might change this.
+     */
+    ret->options |= SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT;
+    /*
+     * Disable compression by default to prevent CRIME. Applications can
+     * re-enable compression by configuring
+     * SSL_CTX_clear_options(ctx, SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION);
+     * or by using the SSL_CONF library.
+     */
+    ret->options |= SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION;
+
+    ret->tlsext_status_type = -1;
+
+    return ret;
+ err:
+    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ err2:
+    SSL_CTX_free(ret);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_up_ref(SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    if (CRYPTO_atomic_add(&ctx->references, 1, &i, ctx->lock) <= 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    REF_PRINT_COUNT("SSL_CTX", ctx);
+    REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 2);
+    return ((i > 1) ? 1 : 0);
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *a)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    if (a == NULL)
+        return;
+
+    CRYPTO_atomic_add(&a->references, -1, &i, a->lock);
+    REF_PRINT_COUNT("SSL_CTX", a);
+    if (i > 0)
+        return;
+    REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0);
+
+    X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(a->param);
+    dane_ctx_final(&a->dane);
+
+    /*
+     * Free internal session cache. However: the remove_cb() may reference
+     * the ex_data of SSL_CTX, thus the ex_data store can only be removed
+     * after the sessions were flushed.
+     * As the ex_data handling routines might also touch the session cache,
+     * the most secure solution seems to be: empty (flush) the cache, then
+     * free ex_data, then finally free the cache.
+     * (See ticket [openssl.org #212].)
+     */
+    if (a->sessions != NULL)
+        SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(a, 0);
+
+    CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, a, &a->ex_data);
+    lh_SSL_SESSION_free(a->sessions);
+    X509_STORE_free(a->cert_store);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
+    CTLOG_STORE_free(a->ctlog_store);
+#endif
+    sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(a->cipher_list);
+    sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(a->cipher_list_by_id);
+    ssl_cert_free(a->cert);
+    sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(a->client_CA, X509_NAME_free);
+    sk_X509_pop_free(a->extra_certs, X509_free);
+    a->comp_methods = NULL;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
+    sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(a->srtp_profiles);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+    SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_free(a);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    ENGINE_finish(a->client_cert_engine);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    OPENSSL_free(a->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
+    OPENSSL_free(a->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
+#endif
+    OPENSSL_free(a->alpn_client_proto_list);
+
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(a->lock);
+
+    OPENSSL_free(a);
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, pem_password_cb *cb)
+{
+    ctx->default_passwd_callback = cb;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *u)
+{
+    ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata = u;
+}
+
+pem_password_cb *SSL_CTX_get_default_passwd_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->default_passwd_callback;
+}
+
+void *SSL_CTX_get_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata;
+}
+
+void SSL_set_default_passwd_cb(SSL *s, pem_password_cb *cb)
+{
+    s->default_passwd_callback = cb;
+}
+
+void SSL_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL *s, void *u)
+{
+    s->default_passwd_callback_userdata = u;
+}
+
+pem_password_cb *SSL_get_default_passwd_cb(SSL *s)
+{
+    return s->default_passwd_callback;
+}
+
+void *SSL_get_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL *s)
+{
+    return s->default_passwd_callback_userdata;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                      int (*cb) (X509_STORE_CTX *, void *),
+                                      void *arg)
+{
+    ctx->app_verify_callback = cb;
+    ctx->app_verify_arg = arg;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_verify(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode,
+                        int (*cb) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
+{
+    ctx->verify_mode = mode;
+    ctx->default_verify_callback = cb;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(SSL_CTX *ctx, int depth)
+{
+    X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *c, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg)
+{
+    ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(c->cert, cb, arg);
+}
+
+void SSL_set_cert_cb(SSL *s, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg)
+{
+    ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(s->cert, cb, arg);
+}
+
+void ssl_set_masks(SSL *s)
+{
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_GOST)
+    CERT_PKEY *cpk;
+#endif
+    CERT *c = s->cert;
+    uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
+    int rsa_enc, rsa_sign, dh_tmp, dsa_sign;
+    unsigned long mask_k, mask_a;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    int have_ecc_cert, ecdsa_ok;
+    X509 *x = NULL;
+#endif
+    if (c == NULL)
+        return;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+    dh_tmp = (c->dh_tmp != NULL || c->dh_tmp_cb != NULL || c->dh_tmp_auto);
+#else
+    dh_tmp = 0;
+#endif
+
+    rsa_enc = pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] & CERT_PKEY_VALID;
+    rsa_sign = pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] & CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
+    dsa_sign = pvalid[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] & CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    have_ecc_cert = pvalid[SSL_PKEY_ECC] & CERT_PKEY_VALID;
+#endif
+    mask_k = 0;
+    mask_a = 0;
+
+#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
+    fprintf(stderr, "dht=%d re=%d rs=%d ds=%d\n",
+            dh_tmp, rsa_enc, rsa_sign, dsa_sign);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
+    cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512]);
+    if (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL) {
+        mask_k |= SSL_kGOST;
+        mask_a |= SSL_aGOST12;
+    }
+    cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256]);
+    if (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL) {
+        mask_k |= SSL_kGOST;
+        mask_a |= SSL_aGOST12;
+    }
+    cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01]);
+    if (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL) {
+        mask_k |= SSL_kGOST;
+        mask_a |= SSL_aGOST01;
+    }
+#endif
+
+    if (rsa_enc)
+        mask_k |= SSL_kRSA;
+
+    if (dh_tmp)
+        mask_k |= SSL_kDHE;
+
+    if (rsa_enc || rsa_sign) {
+        mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
+    }
+
+    if (dsa_sign) {
+        mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
+    }
+
+    mask_a |= SSL_aNULL;
+
+    /*
+     * An ECC certificate may be usable for ECDH and/or ECDSA cipher suites
+     * depending on the key usage extension.
+     */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    if (have_ecc_cert) {
+        uint32_t ex_kusage;
+        cpk = &c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC];
+        x = cpk->x509;
+        ex_kusage = X509_get_key_usage(x);
+        ecdsa_ok = ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE;
+        if (!(pvalid[SSL_PKEY_ECC] & CERT_PKEY_SIGN))
+            ecdsa_ok = 0;
+        if (ecdsa_ok)
+            mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
+    }
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    mask_k |= SSL_kECDHE;
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+    mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
+    mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
+    if (mask_k & SSL_kRSA)
+        mask_k |= SSL_kRSAPSK;
+    if (mask_k & SSL_kDHE)
+        mask_k |= SSL_kDHEPSK;
+    if (mask_k & SSL_kECDHE)
+        mask_k |= SSL_kECDHEPSK;
+#endif
+
+    s->s3->tmp.mask_k = mask_k;
+    s->s3->tmp.mask_a = mask_a;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+
+int ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, SSL *s)
+{
+    if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA) {
+        /* key usage, if present, must allow signing */
+        if (!(X509_get_key_usage(x) & X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG,
+                   SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_SIGNING);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+    return 1;                   /* all checks are ok */
+}
+
+#endif
+
+static int ssl_get_server_cert_index(const SSL *s)
+{
+    int idx;
+    idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
+    if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC && !s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509)
+        idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
+    if (idx == SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC) {
+        if (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].x509)
+            idx = SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
+        else if (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].x509)
+            idx = SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
+        else if (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].x509)
+            idx = SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
+        else
+            idx = -1;
+    }
+    if (idx == -1)
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_CERT_INDEX, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return idx;
+}
+
+CERT_PKEY *ssl_get_server_send_pkey(SSL *s)
+{
+    CERT *c;
+    int i;
+
+    c = s->cert;
+    if (!s->s3 || !s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
+        return NULL;
+    ssl_set_masks(s);
+
+    i = ssl_get_server_cert_index(s);
+
+    /* This may or may not be an error. */
+    if (i < 0)
+        return NULL;
+
+    /* May be NULL. */
+    return &c->pkeys[i];
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_sign_pkey(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher,
+                            const EVP_MD **pmd)
+{
+    unsigned long alg_a;
+    CERT *c;
+    int idx = -1;
+
+    alg_a = cipher->algorithm_auth;
+    c = s->cert;
+
+    if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].privatekey != NULL))
+        idx = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
+    else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) {
+        if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].privatekey != NULL)
+            idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
+        else if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey != NULL)
+            idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC;
+    } else if ((alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) &&
+               (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey != NULL))
+        idx = SSL_PKEY_ECC;
+    if (idx == -1) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SIGN_PKEY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+    if (pmd)
+        *pmd = s->s3->tmp.md[idx];
+    return c->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
+}
+
+int ssl_get_server_cert_serverinfo(SSL *s, const unsigned char **serverinfo,
+                                   size_t *serverinfo_length)
+{
+    CERT *c = NULL;
+    int i = 0;
+    *serverinfo_length = 0;
+
+    c = s->cert;
+    i = ssl_get_server_cert_index(s);
+
+    if (i == -1)
+        return 0;
+    if (c->pkeys[i].serverinfo == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    *serverinfo = c->pkeys[i].serverinfo;
+    *serverinfo_length = c->pkeys[i].serverinfo_length;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+void ssl_update_cache(SSL *s, int mode)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    /*
+     * If the session_id_length is 0, we are not supposed to cache it, and it
+     * would be rather hard to do anyway :-)
+     */
+    if (s->session->session_id_length == 0)
+        return;
+
+    /*
+     * If sid_ctx_length is 0 there is no specific application context
+     * associated with this session, so when we try to resume it and
+     * SSL_VERIFY_PEER is requested, we have no indication that this is
+     * actually a session for the proper application context, and the
+     * *handshake* will fail, not just the resumption attempt.
+     * Do not cache these sessions that are not resumable.
+     */
+    if (s->session->sid_ctx_length == 0
+            && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) != 0)
+        return;
+
+    i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
+    if ((i & mode) && (!s->hit)
+        && ((i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE)
+            || SSL_CTX_add_session(s->session_ctx, s->session))
+        && (s->session_ctx->new_session_cb != NULL)) {
+        SSL_SESSION_up_ref(s->session);
+        if (!s->session_ctx->new_session_cb(s, s->session))
+            SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+    }
+
+    /* auto flush every 255 connections */
+    if ((!(i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR)) && ((i & mode) == mode)) {
+        if ((((mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT)
+              ? s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_good
+              : s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept_good) & 0xff) == 0xff) {
+            SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(s->session_ctx, (unsigned long)time(NULL));
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+const SSL_METHOD *SSL_CTX_get_ssl_method(SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->method;
+}
+
+const SSL_METHOD *SSL_get_ssl_method(SSL *s)
+{
+    return (s->method);
+}
+
+int SSL_set_ssl_method(SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *meth)
+{
+    int ret = 1;
+
+    if (s->method != meth) {
+        const SSL_METHOD *sm = s->method;
+        int (*hf) (SSL *) = s->handshake_func;
+
+        if (sm->version == meth->version)
+            s->method = meth;
+        else {
+            sm->ssl_free(s);
+            s->method = meth;
+            ret = s->method->ssl_new(s);
+        }
+
+        if (hf == sm->ssl_connect)
+            s->handshake_func = meth->ssl_connect;
+        else if (hf == sm->ssl_accept)
+            s->handshake_func = meth->ssl_accept;
+    }
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+int SSL_get_error(const SSL *s, int i)
+{
+    int reason;
+    unsigned long l;
+    BIO *bio;
+
+    if (i > 0)
+        return (SSL_ERROR_NONE);
+
+    /*
+     * Make things return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL when doing SSL_do_handshake etc,
+     * where we do encode the error
+     */
+    if ((l = ERR_peek_error()) != 0) {
+        if (ERR_GET_LIB(l) == ERR_LIB_SYS)
+            return (SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL);
+        else
+            return (SSL_ERROR_SSL);
+    }
+
+    if (i < 0) {
+        if (SSL_want_read(s)) {
+            bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
+            if (BIO_should_read(bio))
+                return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ);
+            else if (BIO_should_write(bio))
+                /*
+                 * This one doesn't make too much sense ... We never try to write
+                 * to the rbio, and an application program where rbio and wbio
+                 * are separate couldn't even know what it should wait for.
+                 * However if we ever set s->rwstate incorrectly (so that we have
+                 * SSL_want_read(s) instead of SSL_want_write(s)) and rbio and
+                 * wbio *are* the same, this test works around that bug; so it
+                 * might be safer to keep it.
+                 */
+                return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE);
+            else if (BIO_should_io_special(bio)) {
+                reason = BIO_get_retry_reason(bio);
+                if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT)
+                    return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT);
+                else if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT)
+                    return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT);
+                else
+                    return (SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL); /* unknown */
+            }
+        }
+
+        if (SSL_want_write(s)) {
+            /*
+             * Access wbio directly - in order to use the buffered bio if
+             * present
+             */
+            bio = s->wbio;
+            if (BIO_should_write(bio))
+                return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE);
+            else if (BIO_should_read(bio))
+                /*
+                 * See above (SSL_want_read(s) with BIO_should_write(bio))
+                 */
+                return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ);
+            else if (BIO_should_io_special(bio)) {
+                reason = BIO_get_retry_reason(bio);
+                if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT)
+                    return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT);
+                else if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT)
+                    return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT);
+                else
+                    return (SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL);
+            }
+        }
+        if (SSL_want_x509_lookup(s)) {
+            return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP);
+        }
+        if (SSL_want_async(s)) {
+            return SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC;
+        }
+        if (SSL_want_async_job(s)) {
+            return SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC_JOB;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (i == 0) {
+        if ((s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) &&
+            (s->s3->warn_alert == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY))
+            return (SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN);
+    }
+    return (SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL);
+}
+
+static int ssl_do_handshake_intern(void *vargs)
+{
+    struct ssl_async_args *args;
+    SSL *s;
+
+    args = (struct ssl_async_args *)vargs;
+    s = args->s;
+
+    return s->handshake_func(s);
+}
+
+int SSL_do_handshake(SSL *s)
+{
+    int ret = 1;
+
+    if (s->handshake_func == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DO_HANDSHAKE, SSL_R_CONNECTION_TYPE_NOT_SET);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    s->method->ssl_renegotiate_check(s);
+
+    if (SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) {
+        if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_ASYNC) && ASYNC_get_current_job() == NULL) {
+            struct ssl_async_args args;
+
+            args.s = s;
+
+            ret = ssl_start_async_job(s, &args, ssl_do_handshake_intern);
+        } else {
+            ret = s->handshake_func(s);
+        }
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+void SSL_set_accept_state(SSL *s)
+{
+    s->server = 1;
+    s->shutdown = 0;
+    ossl_statem_clear(s);
+    s->handshake_func = s->method->ssl_accept;
+    clear_ciphers(s);
+}
+
+void SSL_set_connect_state(SSL *s)
+{
+    s->server = 0;
+    s->shutdown = 0;
+    ossl_statem_clear(s);
+    s->handshake_func = s->method->ssl_connect;
+    clear_ciphers(s);
+}
+
+int ssl_undefined_function(SSL *s)
+{
+    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_FUNCTION, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+    return (0);
+}
+
+int ssl_undefined_void_function(void)
+{
+    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_VOID_FUNCTION,
+           ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+    return (0);
+}
+
+int ssl_undefined_const_function(const SSL *s)
+{
+    return (0);
+}
+
+const SSL_METHOD *ssl_bad_method(int ver)
+{
+    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BAD_METHOD, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+    return (NULL);
+}
+
+const char *ssl_protocol_to_string(int version)
+{
+    if (version == TLS1_2_VERSION)
+        return "TLSv1.2";
+    else if (version == TLS1_1_VERSION)
+        return "TLSv1.1";
+    else if (version == TLS1_VERSION)
+        return "TLSv1";
+    else if (version == SSL3_VERSION)
+        return "SSLv3";
+    else if (version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+        return "DTLSv0.9";
+    else if (version == DTLS1_VERSION)
+        return "DTLSv1";
+    else if (version == DTLS1_2_VERSION)
+        return "DTLSv1.2";
+    else
+        return ("unknown");
+}
+
+const char *SSL_get_version(const SSL *s)
+{
+    return ssl_protocol_to_string(s->version);
+}
+
+SSL *SSL_dup(SSL *s)
+{
+    STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk;
+    X509_NAME *xn;
+    SSL *ret;
+    int i;
+
+    /* If we're not quiescent, just up_ref! */
+    if (!SSL_in_init(s) || !SSL_in_before(s)) {
+        CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->references, 1, &i, s->lock);
+        return s;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Otherwise, copy configuration state, and session if set.
+     */
+    if ((ret = SSL_new(SSL_get_SSL_CTX(s))) == NULL)
+        return (NULL);
+
+    if (s->session != NULL) {
+        /*
+         * Arranges to share the same session via up_ref.  This "copies"
+         * session-id, SSL_METHOD, sid_ctx, and 'cert'
+         */
+        if (!SSL_copy_session_id(ret, s))
+            goto err;
+    } else {
+        /*
+         * No session has been established yet, so we have to expect that
+         * s->cert or ret->cert will be changed later -- they should not both
+         * point to the same object, and thus we can't use
+         * SSL_copy_session_id.
+         */
+        if (!SSL_set_ssl_method(ret, s->method))
+            goto err;
+
+        if (s->cert != NULL) {
+            ssl_cert_free(ret->cert);
+            ret->cert = ssl_cert_dup(s->cert);
+            if (ret->cert == NULL)
+                goto err;
+        }
+
+        if (!SSL_set_session_id_context(ret, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length))
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!ssl_dane_dup(ret, s))
+        goto err;
+    ret->version = s->version;
+    ret->options = s->options;
+    ret->mode = s->mode;
+    SSL_set_max_cert_list(ret, SSL_get_max_cert_list(s));
+    SSL_set_read_ahead(ret, SSL_get_read_ahead(s));
+    ret->msg_callback = s->msg_callback;
+    ret->msg_callback_arg = s->msg_callback_arg;
+    SSL_set_verify(ret, SSL_get_verify_mode(s), SSL_get_verify_callback(s));
+    SSL_set_verify_depth(ret, SSL_get_verify_depth(s));
+    ret->generate_session_id = s->generate_session_id;
+
+    SSL_set_info_callback(ret, SSL_get_info_callback(s));
+
+    /* copy app data, a little dangerous perhaps */
+    if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, &ret->ex_data, &s->ex_data))
+        goto err;
+
+    /* setup rbio, and wbio */
+    if (s->rbio != NULL) {
+        if (!BIO_dup_state(s->rbio, (char *)&ret->rbio))
+            goto err;
+    }
+    if (s->wbio != NULL) {
+        if (s->wbio != s->rbio) {
+            if (!BIO_dup_state(s->wbio, (char *)&ret->wbio))
+                goto err;
+        } else {
+            BIO_up_ref(ret->rbio);
+            ret->wbio = ret->rbio;
+        }
+    }
+
+    ret->server = s->server;
+    if (s->handshake_func) {
+        if (s->server)
+            SSL_set_accept_state(ret);
+        else
+            SSL_set_connect_state(ret);
+    }
+    ret->shutdown = s->shutdown;
+    ret->hit = s->hit;
+
+    ret->default_passwd_callback = s->default_passwd_callback;
+    ret->default_passwd_callback_userdata = s->default_passwd_callback_userdata;
+
+    X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ret->param, s->param);
+
+    /* dup the cipher_list and cipher_list_by_id stacks */
+    if (s->cipher_list != NULL) {
+        if ((ret->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->cipher_list)) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+    }
+    if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)
+        if ((ret->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->cipher_list_by_id))
+            == NULL)
+            goto err;
+
+    /* Dup the client_CA list */
+    if (s->client_CA != NULL) {
+        if ((sk = sk_X509_NAME_dup(s->client_CA)) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        ret->client_CA = sk;
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
+            xn = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
+            if (sk_X509_NAME_set(sk, i, X509_NAME_dup(xn)) == NULL) {
+                X509_NAME_free(xn);
+                goto err;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    return ret;
+
+ err:
+    SSL_free(ret);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+void ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(SSL *s)
+{
+    if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) {
+        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_read_ctx);
+        s->enc_read_ctx = NULL;
+    }
+    if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL) {
+        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
+        s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
+    }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+    COMP_CTX_free(s->expand);
+    s->expand = NULL;
+    COMP_CTX_free(s->compress);
+    s->compress = NULL;
+#endif
+}
+
+X509 *SSL_get_certificate(const SSL *s)
+{
+    if (s->cert != NULL)
+        return (s->cert->key->x509);
+    else
+        return (NULL);
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY *SSL_get_privatekey(const SSL *s)
+{
+    if (s->cert != NULL)
+        return (s->cert->key->privatekey);
+    else
+        return (NULL);
+}
+
+X509 *SSL_CTX_get0_certificate(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    if (ctx->cert != NULL)
+        return ctx->cert->key->x509;
+    else
+        return NULL;
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY *SSL_CTX_get0_privatekey(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    if (ctx->cert != NULL)
+        return ctx->cert->key->privatekey;
+    else
+        return NULL;
+}
+
+const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_current_cipher(const SSL *s)
+{
+    if ((s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
+        return (s->session->cipher);
+    return (NULL);
+}
+
+const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_compression(SSL *s)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+    return s->compress ? COMP_CTX_get_method(s->compress) : NULL;
+#else
+    return NULL;
+#endif
+}
+
+const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_expansion(SSL *s)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+    return s->expand ? COMP_CTX_get_method(s->expand) : NULL;
+#else
+    return NULL;
+#endif
+}
+
+int ssl_init_wbio_buffer(SSL *s)
+{
+    BIO *bbio;
+
+    if (s->bbio != NULL) {
+        /* Already buffered. */
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    bbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer());
+    if (bbio == NULL || !BIO_set_read_buffer_size(bbio, 1)) {
+        BIO_free(bbio);
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_INIT_WBIO_BUFFER, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    s->bbio = bbio;
+    s->wbio = BIO_push(bbio, s->wbio);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+void ssl_free_wbio_buffer(SSL *s)
+{
+    /* callers ensure s is never null */
+    if (s->bbio == NULL)
+        return;
+
+    s->wbio = BIO_pop(s->wbio);
+    assert(s->wbio != NULL);
+    BIO_free(s->bbio);
+    s->bbio = NULL;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode)
+{
+    ctx->quiet_shutdown = mode;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return (ctx->quiet_shutdown);
+}
+
+void SSL_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL *s, int mode)
+{
+    s->quiet_shutdown = mode;
+}
+
+int SSL_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL *s)
+{
+    return (s->quiet_shutdown);
+}
+
+void SSL_set_shutdown(SSL *s, int mode)
+{
+    s->shutdown = mode;
+}
+
+int SSL_get_shutdown(const SSL *s)
+{
+    return s->shutdown;
+}
+
+int SSL_version(const SSL *s)
+{
+    return s->version;
+}
+
+int SSL_client_version(const SSL *s)
+{
+    return s->client_version;
+}
+
+SSL_CTX *SSL_get_SSL_CTX(const SSL *ssl)
+{
+    return ssl->ctx;
+}
+
+SSL_CTX *SSL_set_SSL_CTX(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    CERT *new_cert;
+    if (ssl->ctx == ctx)
+        return ssl->ctx;
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        ctx = ssl->session_ctx;
+    new_cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert);
+    if (new_cert == NULL) {
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    if (!custom_exts_copy_flags(&new_cert->srv_ext, &ssl->cert->srv_ext)) {
+        ssl_cert_free(new_cert);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    ssl_cert_free(ssl->cert);
+    ssl->cert = new_cert;
+
+    /*
+     * Program invariant: |sid_ctx| has fixed size (SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH),
+     * so setter APIs must prevent invalid lengths from entering the system.
+     */
+    OPENSSL_assert(ssl->sid_ctx_length <= sizeof(ssl->sid_ctx));
+
+    /*
+     * If the session ID context matches that of the parent SSL_CTX,
+     * inherit it from the new SSL_CTX as well. If however the context does
+     * not match (i.e., it was set per-ssl with SSL_set_session_id_context),
+     * leave it unchanged.
+     */
+    if ((ssl->ctx != NULL) &&
+        (ssl->sid_ctx_length == ssl->ctx->sid_ctx_length) &&
+        (memcmp(ssl->sid_ctx, ssl->ctx->sid_ctx, ssl->sid_ctx_length) == 0)) {
+        ssl->sid_ctx_length = ctx->sid_ctx_length;
+        memcpy(&ssl->sid_ctx, &ctx->sid_ctx, sizeof(ssl->sid_ctx));
+    }
+
+    SSL_CTX_up_ref(ctx);
+    SSL_CTX_free(ssl->ctx);     /* decrement reference count */
+    ssl->ctx = ctx;
+
+    return ssl->ctx;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return (X509_STORE_set_default_paths(ctx->cert_store));
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_dir(SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    X509_LOOKUP *lookup;
+
+    lookup = X509_STORE_add_lookup(ctx->cert_store, X509_LOOKUP_hash_dir());
+    if (lookup == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    X509_LOOKUP_add_dir(lookup, NULL, X509_FILETYPE_DEFAULT);
+
+    /* Clear any errors if the default directory does not exist */
+    ERR_clear_error();
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_file(SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    X509_LOOKUP *lookup;
+
+    lookup = X509_STORE_add_lookup(ctx->cert_store, X509_LOOKUP_file());
+    if (lookup == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    X509_LOOKUP_load_file(lookup, NULL, X509_FILETYPE_DEFAULT);
+
+    /* Clear any errors if the default file does not exist */
+    ERR_clear_error();
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *CAfile,
+                                  const char *CApath)
+{
+    return (X509_STORE_load_locations(ctx->cert_store, CAfile, CApath));
+}
+
+void SSL_set_info_callback(SSL *ssl,
+                           void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val))
+{
+    ssl->info_callback = cb;
+}
+
+/*
+ * One compiler (Diab DCC) doesn't like argument names in returned function
+ * pointer.
+ */
+void (*SSL_get_info_callback(const SSL *ssl)) (const SSL * /* ssl */ ,
+                                               int /* type */ ,
+                                               int /* val */ ) {
+    return ssl->info_callback;
+}
+
+void SSL_set_verify_result(SSL *ssl, long arg)
+{
+    ssl->verify_result = arg;
+}
+
+long SSL_get_verify_result(const SSL *ssl)
+{
+    return (ssl->verify_result);
+}
+
+size_t SSL_get_client_random(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
+{
+    if (outlen == 0)
+        return sizeof(ssl->s3->client_random);
+    if (outlen > sizeof(ssl->s3->client_random))
+        outlen = sizeof(ssl->s3->client_random);
+    memcpy(out, ssl->s3->client_random, outlen);
+    return outlen;
+}
+
+size_t SSL_get_server_random(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
+{
+    if (outlen == 0)
+        return sizeof(ssl->s3->server_random);
+    if (outlen > sizeof(ssl->s3->server_random))
+        outlen = sizeof(ssl->s3->server_random);
+    memcpy(out, ssl->s3->server_random, outlen);
+    return outlen;
+}
+
+size_t SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(const SSL_SESSION *session,
+                                  unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
+{
+    if (session->master_key_length < 0) {
+        /* Should never happen */
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (outlen == 0)
+        return session->master_key_length;
+    if (outlen > (size_t)session->master_key_length)
+        outlen = session->master_key_length;
+    memcpy(out, session->master_key, outlen);
+    return outlen;
+}
+
+int SSL_set_ex_data(SSL *s, int idx, void *arg)
+{
+    return (CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx, arg));
+}
+
+void *SSL_get_ex_data(const SSL *s, int idx)
+{
+    return (CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx));
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(SSL_CTX *s, int idx, void *arg)
+{
+    return (CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx, arg));
+}
+
+void *SSL_CTX_get_ex_data(const SSL_CTX *s, int idx)
+{
+    return (CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx));
+}
+
+int ssl_ok(SSL *s)
+{
+    return (1);
+}
+
+X509_STORE *SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return (ctx->cert_store);
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store)
+{
+    X509_STORE_free(ctx->cert_store);
+    ctx->cert_store = store;
+}
+
+int SSL_want(const SSL *s)
+{
+    return (s->rwstate);
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the callback for generating temporary DH keys.
+ * \param ctx the SSL context.
+ * \param dh the callback
+ */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                 DH *(*dh) (SSL *ssl, int is_export,
+                                            int keylength))
+{
+    SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB, (void (*)(void))dh);
+}
+
+void SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL *ssl, DH *(*dh) (SSL *ssl, int is_export,
+                                                  int keylength))
+{
+    SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB, (void (*)(void))dh);
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+int SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *identity_hint)
+{
+    if (identity_hint != NULL && strlen(identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    OPENSSL_free(ctx->cert->psk_identity_hint);
+    if (identity_hint != NULL) {
+        ctx->cert->psk_identity_hint = OPENSSL_strdup(identity_hint);
+        if (ctx->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
+            return 0;
+    } else
+        ctx->cert->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL *s, const char *identity_hint)
+{
+    if (s == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    if (identity_hint != NULL && strlen(identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    OPENSSL_free(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
+    if (identity_hint != NULL) {
+        s->cert->psk_identity_hint = OPENSSL_strdup(identity_hint);
+        if (s->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
+            return 0;
+    } else
+        s->cert->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+const char *SSL_get_psk_identity_hint(const SSL *s)
+{
+    if (s == NULL || s->session == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    return (s->session->psk_identity_hint);
+}
+
+const char *SSL_get_psk_identity(const SSL *s)
+{
+    if (s == NULL || s->session == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    return (s->session->psk_identity);
+}
+
+void SSL_set_psk_client_callback(SSL *s,
+                                 unsigned int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
+                                                     const char *hint,
+                                                     char *identity,
+                                                     unsigned int
+                                                     max_identity_len,
+                                                     unsigned char *psk,
+                                                     unsigned int max_psk_len))
+{
+    s->psk_client_callback = cb;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                     unsigned int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
+                                                         const char *hint,
+                                                         char *identity,
+                                                         unsigned int
+                                                         max_identity_len,
+                                                         unsigned char *psk,
+                                                         unsigned int
+                                                         max_psk_len))
+{
+    ctx->psk_client_callback = cb;
+}
+
+void SSL_set_psk_server_callback(SSL *s,
+                                 unsigned int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
+                                                     const char *identity,
+                                                     unsigned char *psk,
+                                                     unsigned int max_psk_len))
+{
+    s->psk_server_callback = cb;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_psk_server_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                     unsigned int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
+                                                         const char *identity,
+                                                         unsigned char *psk,
+                                                         unsigned int
+                                                         max_psk_len))
+{
+    ctx->psk_server_callback = cb;
+}
+#endif
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                              void (*cb) (int write_p, int version,
+                                          int content_type, const void *buf,
+                                          size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))
+{
+    SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))cb);
+}
+
+void SSL_set_msg_callback(SSL *ssl,
+                          void (*cb) (int write_p, int version,
+                                      int content_type, const void *buf,
+                                      size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))
+{
+    SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))cb);
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_not_resumable_session_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                                int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
+                                                           int
+                                                           is_forward_secure))
+{
+    SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_NOT_RESUMABLE_SESS_CB,
+                          (void (*)(void))cb);
+}
+
+void SSL_set_not_resumable_session_callback(SSL *ssl,
+                                            int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
+                                                       int is_forward_secure))
+{
+    SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_NOT_RESUMABLE_SESS_CB,
+                      (void (*)(void))cb);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Allocates new EVP_MD_CTX and sets pointer to it into given pointer
+ * variable, freeing EVP_MD_CTX previously stored in that variable, if any.
+ * If EVP_MD pointer is passed, initializes ctx with this |md|.
+ * Returns the newly allocated ctx;
+ */
+
+EVP_MD_CTX *ssl_replace_hash(EVP_MD_CTX **hash, const EVP_MD *md)
+{
+    ssl_clear_hash_ctx(hash);
+    *hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+    if (*hash == NULL || (md && EVP_DigestInit_ex(*hash, md, NULL) <= 0)) {
+        EVP_MD_CTX_free(*hash);
+        *hash = NULL;
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    return *hash;
+}
+
+void ssl_clear_hash_ctx(EVP_MD_CTX **hash)
+{
+
+    if (*hash)
+        EVP_MD_CTX_free(*hash);
+    *hash = NULL;
+}
+
+/* Retrieve handshake hashes */
+int ssl_handshake_hash(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, int outlen)
+{
+    EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+    EVP_MD_CTX *hdgst = s->s3->handshake_dgst;
+    int ret = EVP_MD_CTX_size(hdgst);
+    if (ret < 0 || ret > outlen) {
+        ret = 0;
+        goto err;
+    }
+    ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+        ret = 0;
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(ctx, hdgst)
+        || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, out, NULL) <= 0)
+        ret = 0;
+ err:
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int SSL_session_reused(SSL *s)
+{
+    return s->hit;
+}
+
+int SSL_is_server(const SSL *s)
+{
+    return s->server;
+}
+
+#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+void SSL_set_debug(SSL *s, int debug)
+{
+    /* Old function was do-nothing anyway... */
+    (void)s;
+    (void)debug;
+}
+#endif
+
+void SSL_set_security_level(SSL *s, int level)
+{
+    s->cert->sec_level = level;
+}
+
+int SSL_get_security_level(const SSL *s)
+{
+    return s->cert->sec_level;
+}
+
+void SSL_set_security_callback(SSL *s,
+                               int (*cb) (const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                          int op, int bits, int nid,
+                                          void *other, void *ex))
+{
+    s->cert->sec_cb = cb;
+}
+
+int (*SSL_get_security_callback(const SSL *s)) (const SSL *s,
+                                                const SSL_CTX *ctx, int op,
+                                                int bits, int nid, void *other,
+                                                void *ex) {
+    return s->cert->sec_cb;
+}
+
+void SSL_set0_security_ex_data(SSL *s, void *ex)
+{
+    s->cert->sec_ex = ex;
+}
+
+void *SSL_get0_security_ex_data(const SSL *s)
+{
+    return s->cert->sec_ex;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_security_level(SSL_CTX *ctx, int level)
+{
+    ctx->cert->sec_level = level;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_get_security_level(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->cert->sec_level;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_security_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                   int (*cb) (const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                              int op, int bits, int nid,
+                                              void *other, void *ex))
+{
+    ctx->cert->sec_cb = cb;
+}
+
+int (*SSL_CTX_get_security_callback(const SSL_CTX *ctx)) (const SSL *s,
+                                                          const SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                                          int op, int bits,
+                                                          int nid,
+                                                          void *other,
+                                                          void *ex) {
+    return ctx->cert->sec_cb;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set0_security_ex_data(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *ex)
+{
+    ctx->cert->sec_ex = ex;
+}
+
+void *SSL_CTX_get0_security_ex_data(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->cert->sec_ex;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get/Set/Clear options in SSL_CTX or SSL, formerly macros, now functions that
+ * can return unsigned long, instead of the generic long return value from the
+ * control interface.
+ */
+unsigned long SSL_CTX_get_options(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->options;
+}
+
+unsigned long SSL_get_options(const SSL *s)
+{
+    return s->options;
+}
+
+unsigned long SSL_CTX_set_options(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned long op)
+{
+    return ctx->options |= op;
+}
+
+unsigned long SSL_set_options(SSL *s, unsigned long op)
+{
+    return s->options |= op;
+}
+
+unsigned long SSL_CTX_clear_options(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned long op)
+{
+    return ctx->options &= ~op;
+}
+
+unsigned long SSL_clear_options(SSL *s, unsigned long op)
+{
+    return s->options &= ~op;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509) *SSL_get0_verified_chain(const SSL *s)
+{
+    return s->verified_chain;
+}
+
+IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_GLOBAL_CMP_FN(SSL_CIPHER, SSL_CIPHER, ssl_cipher_id);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
+
+/*
+ * Moves SCTs from the |src| stack to the |dst| stack.
+ * The source of each SCT will be set to |origin|.
+ * If |dst| points to a NULL pointer, a new stack will be created and owned by
+ * the caller.
+ * Returns the number of SCTs moved, or a negative integer if an error occurs.
+ */
+static int ct_move_scts(STACK_OF(SCT) **dst, STACK_OF(SCT) *src,
+                        sct_source_t origin)
+{
+    int scts_moved = 0;
+    SCT *sct = NULL;
+
+    if (*dst == NULL) {
+        *dst = sk_SCT_new_null();
+        if (*dst == NULL) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_CT_MOVE_SCTS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    while ((sct = sk_SCT_pop(src)) != NULL) {
+        if (SCT_set_source(sct, origin) != 1)
+            goto err;
+
+        if (sk_SCT_push(*dst, sct) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+        scts_moved += 1;
+    }
+
+    return scts_moved;
+ err:
+    if (sct != NULL)
+        sk_SCT_push(src, sct);  /* Put the SCT back */
+    return -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Look for data collected during ServerHello and parse if found.
+ * Returns the number of SCTs extracted.
+ */
+static int ct_extract_tls_extension_scts(SSL *s)
+{
+    int scts_extracted = 0;
+
+    if (s->tlsext_scts != NULL) {
+        const unsigned char *p = s->tlsext_scts;
+        STACK_OF(SCT) *scts = o2i_SCT_LIST(NULL, &p, s->tlsext_scts_len);
+
+        scts_extracted = ct_move_scts(&s->scts, scts, SCT_SOURCE_TLS_EXTENSION);
+
+        SCT_LIST_free(scts);
+    }
+
+    return scts_extracted;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Checks for an OCSP response and then attempts to extract any SCTs found if it
+ * contains an SCT X509 extension. They will be stored in |s->scts|.
+ * Returns:
+ * - The number of SCTs extracted, assuming an OCSP response exists.
+ * - 0 if no OCSP response exists or it contains no SCTs.
+ * - A negative integer if an error occurs.
+ */
+static int ct_extract_ocsp_response_scts(SSL *s)
+{
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+    int scts_extracted = 0;
+    const unsigned char *p;
+    OCSP_BASICRESP *br = NULL;
+    OCSP_RESPONSE *rsp = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(SCT) *scts = NULL;
+    int i;
+
+    if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp == NULL || s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen == 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    p = s->tlsext_ocsp_resp;
+    rsp = d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE(NULL, &p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
+    if (rsp == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    br = OCSP_response_get1_basic(rsp);
+    if (br == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < OCSP_resp_count(br); ++i) {
+        OCSP_SINGLERESP *single = OCSP_resp_get0(br, i);
+
+        if (single == NULL)
+            continue;
+
+        scts =
+            OCSP_SINGLERESP_get1_ext_d2i(single, NID_ct_cert_scts, NULL, NULL);
+        scts_extracted =
+            ct_move_scts(&s->scts, scts, SCT_SOURCE_OCSP_STAPLED_RESPONSE);
+        if (scts_extracted < 0)
+            goto err;
+    }
+ err:
+    SCT_LIST_free(scts);
+    OCSP_BASICRESP_free(br);
+    OCSP_RESPONSE_free(rsp);
+    return scts_extracted;
+# else
+    /* Behave as if no OCSP response exists */
+    return 0;
+# endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * Attempts to extract SCTs from the peer certificate.
+ * Return the number of SCTs extracted, or a negative integer if an error
+ * occurs.
+ */
+static int ct_extract_x509v3_extension_scts(SSL *s)
+{
+    int scts_extracted = 0;
+    X509 *cert = s->session != NULL ? s->session->peer : NULL;
+
+    if (cert != NULL) {
+        STACK_OF(SCT) *scts =
+            X509_get_ext_d2i(cert, NID_ct_precert_scts, NULL, NULL);
+
+        scts_extracted =
+            ct_move_scts(&s->scts, scts, SCT_SOURCE_X509V3_EXTENSION);
+
+        SCT_LIST_free(scts);
+    }
+
+    return scts_extracted;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Attempts to find all received SCTs by checking TLS extensions, the OCSP
+ * response (if it exists) and X509v3 extensions in the certificate.
+ * Returns NULL if an error occurs.
+ */
+const STACK_OF(SCT) *SSL_get0_peer_scts(SSL *s)
+{
+    if (!s->scts_parsed) {
+        if (ct_extract_tls_extension_scts(s) < 0 ||
+            ct_extract_ocsp_response_scts(s) < 0 ||
+            ct_extract_x509v3_extension_scts(s) < 0)
+            goto err;
+
+        s->scts_parsed = 1;
+    }
+    return s->scts;
+ err:
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+static int ct_permissive(const CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX * ctx,
+                         const STACK_OF(SCT) *scts, void *unused_arg)
+{
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int ct_strict(const CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX * ctx,
+                     const STACK_OF(SCT) *scts, void *unused_arg)
+{
+    int count = scts != NULL ? sk_SCT_num(scts) : 0;
+    int i;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < count; ++i) {
+        SCT *sct = sk_SCT_value(scts, i);
+        int status = SCT_get_validation_status(sct);
+
+        if (status == SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_VALID)
+            return 1;
+    }
+    SSLerr(SSL_F_CT_STRICT, SSL_R_NO_VALID_SCTS);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int SSL_set_ct_validation_callback(SSL *s, ssl_ct_validation_cb callback,
+                                   void *arg)
+{
+    /*
+     * Since code exists that uses the custom extension handler for CT, look
+     * for this and throw an error if they have already registered to use CT.
+     */
+    if (callback != NULL && SSL_CTX_has_client_custom_ext(s->ctx,
+                                                          TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp))
+    {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_CT_VALIDATION_CALLBACK,
+               SSL_R_CUSTOM_EXT_HANDLER_ALREADY_INSTALLED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (callback != NULL) {
+        /*
+         * If we are validating CT, then we MUST accept SCTs served via OCSP
+         */
+        if (!SSL_set_tlsext_status_type(s, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp))
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    s->ct_validation_callback = callback;
+    s->ct_validation_callback_arg = arg;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_ct_validation_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                       ssl_ct_validation_cb callback, void *arg)
+{
+    /*
+     * Since code exists that uses the custom extension handler for CT, look for
+     * this and throw an error if they have already registered to use CT.
+     */
+    if (callback != NULL && SSL_CTX_has_client_custom_ext(ctx,
+                                                          TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp))
+    {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CT_VALIDATION_CALLBACK,
+               SSL_R_CUSTOM_EXT_HANDLER_ALREADY_INSTALLED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    ctx->ct_validation_callback = callback;
+    ctx->ct_validation_callback_arg = arg;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_ct_is_enabled(const SSL *s)
+{
+    return s->ct_validation_callback != NULL;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_ct_is_enabled(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->ct_validation_callback != NULL;
+}
+
+int ssl_validate_ct(SSL *s)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    X509 *cert = s->session != NULL ? s->session->peer : NULL;
+    X509 *issuer;
+    SSL_DANE *dane = &s->dane;
+    CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+    const STACK_OF(SCT) *scts;
+
+    /*
+     * If no callback is set, the peer is anonymous, or its chain is invalid,
+     * skip SCT validation - just return success.  Applications that continue
+     * handshakes without certificates, with unverified chains, or pinned leaf
+     * certificates are outside the scope of the WebPKI and CT.
+     *
+     * The above exclusions notwithstanding the vast majority of peers will
+     * have rather ordinary certificate chains validated by typical
+     * applications that perform certificate verification and therefore will
+     * process SCTs when enabled.
+     */
+    if (s->ct_validation_callback == NULL || cert == NULL ||
+        s->verify_result != X509_V_OK ||
+        s->verified_chain == NULL || sk_X509_num(s->verified_chain) <= 1)
+        return 1;
+
+    /*
+     * CT not applicable for chains validated via DANE-TA(2) or DANE-EE(3)
+     * trust-anchors.  See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-4.2
+     */
+    if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) && dane->mtlsa != NULL) {
+        switch (dane->mtlsa->usage) {
+        case DANETLS_USAGE_DANE_TA:
+        case DANETLS_USAGE_DANE_EE:
+            return 1;
+        }
+    }
+
+    ctx = CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_new();
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VALIDATE_CT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    issuer = sk_X509_value(s->verified_chain, 1);
+    CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set1_cert(ctx, cert);
+    CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set1_issuer(ctx, issuer);
+    CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set_shared_CTLOG_STORE(ctx, s->ctx->ctlog_store);
+    CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set_time(
+            ctx, (uint64_t)SSL_SESSION_get_time(SSL_get0_session(s)) * 1000);
+
+    scts = SSL_get0_peer_scts(s);
+
+    /*
+     * This function returns success (> 0) only when all the SCTs are valid, 0
+     * when some are invalid, and < 0 on various internal errors (out of
+     * memory, etc.).  Having some, or even all, invalid SCTs is not sufficient
+     * reason to abort the handshake, that decision is up to the callback.
+     * Therefore, we error out only in the unexpected case that the return
+     * value is negative.
+     *
+     * XXX: One might well argue that the return value of this function is an
+     * unfortunate design choice.  Its job is only to determine the validation
+     * status of each of the provided SCTs.  So long as it correctly separates
+     * the wheat from the chaff it should return success.  Failure in this case
+     * ought to correspond to an inability to carry out its duties.
+     */
+    if (SCT_LIST_validate(scts, ctx) < 0) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VALIDATE_CT, SSL_R_SCT_VERIFICATION_FAILED);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    ret = s->ct_validation_callback(ctx, scts, s->ct_validation_callback_arg);
+    if (ret < 0)
+        ret = 0;                /* This function returns 0 on failure */
+
+ end:
+    CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_free(ctx);
+    /*
+     * With SSL_VERIFY_NONE the session may be cached and re-used despite a
+     * failure return code here.  Also the application may wish the complete
+     * the handshake, and then disconnect cleanly at a higher layer, after
+     * checking the verification status of the completed connection.
+     *
+     * We therefore force a certificate verification failure which will be
+     * visible via SSL_get_verify_result() and cached as part of any resumed
+     * session.
+     *
+     * Note: the permissive callback is for information gathering only, always
+     * returns success, and does not affect verification status.  Only the
+     * strict callback or a custom application-specified callback can trigger
+     * connection failure or record a verification error.
+     */
+    if (ret <= 0)
+        s->verify_result = X509_V_ERR_NO_VALID_SCTS;
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_enable_ct(SSL_CTX *ctx, int validation_mode)
+{
+    switch (validation_mode) {
+    default:
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_ENABLE_CT, SSL_R_INVALID_CT_VALIDATION_TYPE);
+        return 0;
+    case SSL_CT_VALIDATION_PERMISSIVE:
+        return SSL_CTX_set_ct_validation_callback(ctx, ct_permissive, NULL);
+    case SSL_CT_VALIDATION_STRICT:
+        return SSL_CTX_set_ct_validation_callback(ctx, ct_strict, NULL);
+    }
+}
+
+int SSL_enable_ct(SSL *s, int validation_mode)
+{
+    switch (validation_mode) {
+    default:
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ENABLE_CT, SSL_R_INVALID_CT_VALIDATION_TYPE);
+        return 0;
+    case SSL_CT_VALIDATION_PERMISSIVE:
+        return SSL_set_ct_validation_callback(s, ct_permissive, NULL);
+    case SSL_CT_VALIDATION_STRICT:
+        return SSL_set_ct_validation_callback(s, ct_strict, NULL);
+    }
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_default_ctlog_list_file(SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return CTLOG_STORE_load_default_file(ctx->ctlog_store);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_ctlog_list_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *path)
+{
+    return CTLOG_STORE_load_file(ctx->ctlog_store, path);
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set0_ctlog_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, CTLOG_STORE * logs)
+{
+    CTLOG_STORE_free(ctx->ctlog_store);
+    ctx->ctlog_store = logs;
+}
+
+const CTLOG_STORE *SSL_CTX_get0_ctlog_store(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->ctlog_store;
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/ssl_locl.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/ssl_locl.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d86bd7e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/ssl_locl.h
@@ -0,0 +1,2133 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_SSL_LOCL_H
+# define HEADER_SSL_LOCL_H
+# include <stdlib.h>
+# include <time.h>
+# include <string.h>
+# include <errno.h>
+
+# include "e_os.h"
+# if defined(__unix) || defined(__unix__)
+#  include <sys/time.h>         /* struct timeval for DTLS */
+# endif
+
+# include <openssl/buffer.h>
+# include <openssl/comp.h>
+# include <openssl/bio.h>
+# include <openssl/stack.h>
+# include <openssl/rsa.h>
+# include <openssl/dsa.h>
+# include <openssl/err.h>
+# include <openssl/ssl.h>
+# include <openssl/async.h>
+# include <openssl/symhacks.h>
+# include <openssl/ct.h>
+# include "record/record.h"
+# include "statem/statem.h"
+# include "packet_locl.h"
+# include "internal/dane.h"
+
+# ifdef OPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL
+#  undef OPENSSL_EXTERN
+#  define OPENSSL_EXTERN OPENSSL_EXPORT
+# endif
+
+# undef PKCS1_CHECK
+
+# define c2l(c,l)        (l = ((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))     , \
+                         l|=(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<< 8), \
+                         l|=(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<16), \
+                         l|=(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<24))
+
+/* NOTE - c is not incremented as per c2l */
+# define c2ln(c,l1,l2,n) { \
+                        c+=n; \
+                        l1=l2=0; \
+                        switch (n) { \
+                        case 8: l2 =((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<24; \
+                        case 7: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<16; \
+                        case 6: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<< 8; \
+                        case 5: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))));     \
+                        case 4: l1 =((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<24; \
+                        case 3: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<16; \
+                        case 2: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<< 8; \
+                        case 1: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))));     \
+                                } \
+                        }
+
+# define l2c(l,c)        (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)    )&0xff), \
+                         *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \
+                         *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \
+                         *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24)&0xff))
+
+# define n2l(c,l)        (l =((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<24, \
+                         l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<16, \
+                         l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<< 8, \
+                         l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++))))
+
+# define n2l8(c,l)       (l =((uint64_t)(*((c)++)))<<56, \
+                         l|=((uint64_t)(*((c)++)))<<48, \
+                         l|=((uint64_t)(*((c)++)))<<40, \
+                         l|=((uint64_t)(*((c)++)))<<32, \
+                         l|=((uint64_t)(*((c)++)))<<24, \
+                         l|=((uint64_t)(*((c)++)))<<16, \
+                         l|=((uint64_t)(*((c)++)))<< 8, \
+                         l|=((uint64_t)(*((c)++))))
+
+
+# define l2n(l,c)        (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24)&0xff), \
+                         *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \
+                         *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \
+                         *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)    )&0xff))
+
+# define l2n6(l,c)       (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>40)&0xff), \
+                         *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>32)&0xff), \
+                         *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24)&0xff), \
+                         *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \
+                         *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \
+                         *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)    )&0xff))
+
+# define l2n8(l,c)       (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>56)&0xff), \
+                         *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>48)&0xff), \
+                         *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>40)&0xff), \
+                         *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>32)&0xff), \
+                         *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24)&0xff), \
+                         *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \
+                         *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \
+                         *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)    )&0xff))
+
+/* NOTE - c is not incremented as per l2c */
+# define l2cn(l1,l2,c,n) { \
+                        c+=n; \
+                        switch (n) { \
+                        case 8: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>>24)&0xff); \
+                        case 7: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>>16)&0xff); \
+                        case 6: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>> 8)&0xff); \
+                        case 5: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)    )&0xff); \
+                        case 4: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>>24)&0xff); \
+                        case 3: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>>16)&0xff); \
+                        case 2: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>> 8)&0xff); \
+                        case 1: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)    )&0xff); \
+                                } \
+                        }
+
+# define n2s(c,s)        ((s=(((unsigned int)((c)[0]))<< 8)| \
+                             (((unsigned int)((c)[1]))    )),(c)+=2)
+# define s2n(s,c)        (((c)[0]=(unsigned char)(((s)>> 8)&0xff), \
+                           (c)[1]=(unsigned char)(((s)    )&0xff)),(c)+=2)
+
+# define n2l3(c,l)       ((l =(((unsigned long)((c)[0]))<<16)| \
+                              (((unsigned long)((c)[1]))<< 8)| \
+                              (((unsigned long)((c)[2]))    )),(c)+=3)
+
+# define l2n3(l,c)       (((c)[0]=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \
+                           (c)[1]=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \
+                           (c)[2]=(unsigned char)(((l)    )&0xff)),(c)+=3)
+
+/*
+ * DTLS version numbers are strange because they're inverted. Except for
+ * DTLS1_BAD_VER, which should be considered "lower" than the rest.
+ */
+# define dtls_ver_ordinal(v1) (((v1) == DTLS1_BAD_VER) ? 0xff00 : (v1))
+# define DTLS_VERSION_GT(v1, v2) (dtls_ver_ordinal(v1) < dtls_ver_ordinal(v2))
+# define DTLS_VERSION_GE(v1, v2) (dtls_ver_ordinal(v1) <= dtls_ver_ordinal(v2))
+# define DTLS_VERSION_LT(v1, v2) (dtls_ver_ordinal(v1) > dtls_ver_ordinal(v2))
+# define DTLS_VERSION_LE(v1, v2) (dtls_ver_ordinal(v1) >= dtls_ver_ordinal(v2))
+
+/* LOCAL STUFF */
+
+# define SSL_DECRYPT     0
+# define SSL_ENCRYPT     1
+
+# define TWO_BYTE_BIT    0x80
+# define SEC_ESC_BIT     0x40
+# define TWO_BYTE_MASK   0x7fff
+# define THREE_BYTE_MASK 0x3fff
+
+# define INC32(a)        ((a)=((a)+1)&0xffffffffL)
+# define DEC32(a)        ((a)=((a)-1)&0xffffffffL)
+# define MAX_MAC_SIZE    20     /* up from 16 for SSLv3 */
+
+/*
+ * Define the Bitmasks for SSL_CIPHER.algorithms.
+ * This bits are used packed as dense as possible. If new methods/ciphers
+ * etc will be added, the bits a likely to change, so this information
+ * is for internal library use only, even though SSL_CIPHER.algorithms
+ * can be publicly accessed.
+ * Use the according functions for cipher management instead.
+ *
+ * The bit mask handling in the selection and sorting scheme in
+ * ssl_create_cipher_list() has only limited capabilities, reflecting
+ * that the different entities within are mutually exclusive:
+ * ONLY ONE BIT PER MASK CAN BE SET AT A TIME.
+ */
+
+/* Bits for algorithm_mkey (key exchange algorithm) */
+/* RSA key exchange */
+# define SSL_kRSA                0x00000001U
+/* tmp DH key no DH cert */
+# define SSL_kDHE                0x00000002U
+/* synonym */
+# define SSL_kEDH                SSL_kDHE
+/* ephemeral ECDH */
+# define SSL_kECDHE              0x00000004U
+/* synonym */
+# define SSL_kEECDH              SSL_kECDHE
+/* PSK */
+# define SSL_kPSK                0x00000008U
+/* GOST key exchange */
+# define SSL_kGOST               0x00000010U
+/* SRP */
+# define SSL_kSRP                0x00000020U
+
+# define SSL_kRSAPSK             0x00000040U
+# define SSL_kECDHEPSK           0x00000080U
+# define SSL_kDHEPSK             0x00000100U
+
+/* all PSK */
+
+# define SSL_PSK     (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK | SSL_kDHEPSK)
+
+/* Bits for algorithm_auth (server authentication) */
+/* RSA auth */
+# define SSL_aRSA                0x00000001U
+/* DSS auth */
+# define SSL_aDSS                0x00000002U
+/* no auth (i.e. use ADH or AECDH) */
+# define SSL_aNULL               0x00000004U
+/* ECDSA auth*/
+# define SSL_aECDSA              0x00000008U
+/* PSK auth */
+# define SSL_aPSK                0x00000010U
+/* GOST R 34.10-2001 signature auth */
+# define SSL_aGOST01             0x00000020U
+/* SRP auth */
+# define SSL_aSRP                0x00000040U
+/* GOST R 34.10-2012 signature auth */
+# define SSL_aGOST12             0x00000080U
+
+/* Bits for algorithm_enc (symmetric encryption) */
+# define SSL_DES                 0x00000001U
+# define SSL_3DES                0x00000002U
+# define SSL_RC4                 0x00000004U
+# define SSL_RC2                 0x00000008U
+# define SSL_IDEA                0x00000010U
+# define SSL_eNULL               0x00000020U
+# define SSL_AES128              0x00000040U
+# define SSL_AES256              0x00000080U
+# define SSL_CAMELLIA128         0x00000100U
+# define SSL_CAMELLIA256         0x00000200U
+# define SSL_eGOST2814789CNT     0x00000400U
+# define SSL_SEED                0x00000800U
+# define SSL_AES128GCM           0x00001000U
+# define SSL_AES256GCM           0x00002000U
+# define SSL_AES128CCM           0x00004000U
+# define SSL_AES256CCM           0x00008000U
+# define SSL_AES128CCM8          0x00010000U
+# define SSL_AES256CCM8          0x00020000U
+# define SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12   0x00040000U
+# define SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305    0x00080000U
+
+# define SSL_AESGCM              (SSL_AES128GCM | SSL_AES256GCM)
+# define SSL_AESCCM              (SSL_AES128CCM | SSL_AES256CCM | SSL_AES128CCM8 | SSL_AES256CCM8)
+# define SSL_AES                 (SSL_AES128|SSL_AES256|SSL_AESGCM|SSL_AESCCM)
+# define SSL_CAMELLIA            (SSL_CAMELLIA128|SSL_CAMELLIA256)
+# define SSL_CHACHA20            (SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305)
+
+/* Bits for algorithm_mac (symmetric authentication) */
+
+# define SSL_MD5                 0x00000001U
+# define SSL_SHA1                0x00000002U
+# define SSL_GOST94      0x00000004U
+# define SSL_GOST89MAC   0x00000008U
+# define SSL_SHA256              0x00000010U
+# define SSL_SHA384              0x00000020U
+/* Not a real MAC, just an indication it is part of cipher */
+# define SSL_AEAD                0x00000040U
+# define SSL_GOST12_256          0x00000080U
+# define SSL_GOST89MAC12         0x00000100U
+# define SSL_GOST12_512          0x00000200U
+
+/*
+ * When adding new digest in the ssl_ciph.c and increment SSL_MD_NUM_IDX make
+ * sure to update this constant too
+ */
+
+# define SSL_MD_MD5_IDX  0
+# define SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX 1
+# define SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX 2
+# define SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX 3
+# define SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX 4
+# define SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX 5
+# define SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX  6
+# define SSL_MD_GOST89MAC12_IDX 7
+# define SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX  8
+# define SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX 9
+# define SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX 10
+# define SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX 11
+# define SSL_MAX_DIGEST 12
+
+/* Bits for algorithm2 (handshake digests and other extra flags) */
+
+/* Bits 0-7 are handshake MAC */
+# define SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_MASK  0xFF
+# define SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_MD5_SHA1 SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX
+# define SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256   SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
+# define SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384   SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
+# define SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST94 SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX
+# define SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST12_256 SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX
+# define SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST12_512 SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX
+# define SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT  SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_MD5_SHA1
+
+/* Bits 8-15 bits are PRF */
+# define TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT 8
+# define TLS1_PRF_SHA1_MD5 (SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT)
+# define TLS1_PRF_SHA256 (SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT)
+# define TLS1_PRF_SHA384 (SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT)
+# define TLS1_PRF_GOST94 (SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT)
+# define TLS1_PRF_GOST12_256 (SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT)
+# define TLS1_PRF_GOST12_512 (SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT)
+# define TLS1_PRF            (SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT)
+
+/*
+ * Stream MAC for GOST ciphersuites from cryptopro draft (currently this also
+ * goes into algorithm2)
+ */
+# define TLS1_STREAM_MAC 0x10000
+
+# define SSL_STRONG_MASK         0x0000001FU
+# define SSL_DEFAULT_MASK        0X00000020U
+
+# define SSL_STRONG_NONE         0x00000001U
+# define SSL_LOW                 0x00000002U
+# define SSL_MEDIUM              0x00000004U
+# define SSL_HIGH                0x00000008U
+# define SSL_FIPS                0x00000010U
+# define SSL_NOT_DEFAULT         0x00000020U
+
+/* we have used 0000003f - 26 bits left to go */
+
+/* Check if an SSL structure is using DTLS */
+# define SSL_IS_DTLS(s)  (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & SSL_ENC_FLAG_DTLS)
+/* See if we need explicit IV */
+# define SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)  \
+                (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV)
+/*
+ * See if we use signature algorithms extension and signature algorithm
+ * before signatures.
+ */
+# define SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)      \
+                        (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS)
+/*
+ * Allow TLS 1.2 ciphersuites: applies to DTLS 1.2 as well as TLS 1.2: may
+ * apply to others in future.
+ */
+# define SSL_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s)       \
+                (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS)
+/*
+ * Determine if a client can use TLS 1.2 ciphersuites: can't rely on method
+ * flags because it may not be set to correct version yet.
+ */
+# define SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s)        \
+    ((!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->client_version >= TLS1_2_VERSION) || \
+     (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && DTLS_VERSION_GE(s->client_version, DTLS1_2_VERSION)))
+/*
+ * Determine if a client should send signature algorithms extension:
+ * as with TLS1.2 cipher we can't rely on method flags.
+ */
+# define SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s)        \
+    SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s)
+
+# define SSL_READ_ETM(s) (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_READ)
+# define SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_WRITE)
+
+/* Mostly for SSLv3 */
+# define SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC        0
+# define SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN       1
+# define SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN       2
+# define SSL_PKEY_ECC            3
+# define SSL_PKEY_GOST01         4
+# define SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256     5
+# define SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512     6
+# define SSL_PKEY_NUM            7
+/*
+ * Pseudo-constant. GOST cipher suites can use different certs for 1
+ * SSL_CIPHER. So let's see which one we have in fact.
+ */
+# define SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC SSL_PKEY_NUM+1
+
+/*-
+ * SSL_kRSA <- RSA_ENC
+ * SSL_kDH  <- DH_ENC & (RSA_ENC | RSA_SIGN | DSA_SIGN)
+ * SSL_kDHE <- RSA_ENC | RSA_SIGN | DSA_SIGN
+ * SSL_aRSA <- RSA_ENC | RSA_SIGN
+ * SSL_aDSS <- DSA_SIGN
+ */
+
+/*-
+#define CERT_INVALID            0
+#define CERT_PUBLIC_KEY         1
+#define CERT_PRIVATE_KEY        2
+*/
+
+/* CipherSuite length. SSLv3 and all TLS versions. */
+# define TLS_CIPHER_LEN 2
+/* used to hold info on the particular ciphers used */
+struct ssl_cipher_st {
+    uint32_t valid;
+    const char *name;           /* text name */
+    uint32_t id;                /* id, 4 bytes, first is version */
+    /*
+     * changed in 1.0.0: these four used to be portions of a single value
+     * 'algorithms'
+     */
+    uint32_t algorithm_mkey;    /* key exchange algorithm */
+    uint32_t algorithm_auth;    /* server authentication */
+    uint32_t algorithm_enc;     /* symmetric encryption */
+    uint32_t algorithm_mac;     /* symmetric authentication */
+    int min_tls;                /* minimum SSL/TLS protocol version */
+    int max_tls;                /* maximum SSL/TLS protocol version */
+    int min_dtls;               /* minimum DTLS protocol version */
+    int max_dtls;               /* maximum DTLS protocol version */
+    uint32_t algo_strength;     /* strength and export flags */
+    uint32_t algorithm2;        /* Extra flags */
+    int32_t strength_bits;      /* Number of bits really used */
+    uint32_t alg_bits;          /* Number of bits for algorithm */
+};
+
+/* Used to hold SSL/TLS functions */
+struct ssl_method_st {
+    int version;
+    unsigned flags;
+    unsigned long mask;
+    int (*ssl_new) (SSL *s);
+    void (*ssl_clear) (SSL *s);
+    void (*ssl_free) (SSL *s);
+    int (*ssl_accept) (SSL *s);
+    int (*ssl_connect) (SSL *s);
+    int (*ssl_read) (SSL *s, void *buf, int len);
+    int (*ssl_peek) (SSL *s, void *buf, int len);
+    int (*ssl_write) (SSL *s, const void *buf, int len);
+    int (*ssl_shutdown) (SSL *s);
+    int (*ssl_renegotiate) (SSL *s);
+    int (*ssl_renegotiate_check) (SSL *s);
+    int (*ssl_read_bytes) (SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type,
+                           unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek);
+    int (*ssl_write_bytes) (SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len);
+    int (*ssl_dispatch_alert) (SSL *s);
+    long (*ssl_ctrl) (SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg);
+    long (*ssl_ctx_ctrl) (SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, void *parg);
+    const SSL_CIPHER *(*get_cipher_by_char) (const unsigned char *ptr);
+    int (*put_cipher_by_char) (const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, unsigned char *ptr);
+    int (*ssl_pending) (const SSL *s);
+    int (*num_ciphers) (void);
+    const SSL_CIPHER *(*get_cipher) (unsigned ncipher);
+    long (*get_timeout) (void);
+    const struct ssl3_enc_method *ssl3_enc; /* Extra SSLv3/TLS stuff */
+    int (*ssl_version) (void);
+    long (*ssl_callback_ctrl) (SSL *s, int cb_id, void (*fp) (void));
+    long (*ssl_ctx_callback_ctrl) (SSL_CTX *s, int cb_id, void (*fp) (void));
+};
+
+/*-
+ * Lets make this into an ASN.1 type structure as follows
+ * SSL_SESSION_ID ::= SEQUENCE {
+ *      version                 INTEGER,        -- structure version number
+ *      SSLversion              INTEGER,        -- SSL version number
+ *      Cipher                  OCTET STRING,   -- the 3 byte cipher ID
+ *      Session_ID              OCTET STRING,   -- the Session ID
+ *      Master_key              OCTET STRING,   -- the master key
+ *      Key_Arg [ 0 ] IMPLICIT  OCTET STRING,   -- the optional Key argument
+ *      Time [ 1 ] EXPLICIT     INTEGER,        -- optional Start Time
+ *      Timeout [ 2 ] EXPLICIT  INTEGER,        -- optional Timeout ins seconds
+ *      Peer [ 3 ] EXPLICIT     X509,           -- optional Peer Certificate
+ *      Session_ID_context [ 4 ] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING,   -- the Session ID context
+ *      Verify_result [ 5 ] EXPLICIT INTEGER,   -- X509_V_... code for `Peer'
+ *      HostName [ 6 ] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING,   -- optional HostName from servername TLS extension
+ *      PSK_identity_hint [ 7 ] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING, -- optional PSK identity hint
+ *      PSK_identity [ 8 ] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING,  -- optional PSK identity
+ *      Ticket_lifetime_hint [9] EXPLICIT INTEGER, -- server's lifetime hint for session ticket
+ *      Ticket [10]             EXPLICIT OCTET STRING, -- session ticket (clients only)
+ *      Compression_meth [11]   EXPLICIT OCTET STRING, -- optional compression method
+ *      SRP_username [ 12 ] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING -- optional SRP username
+ *      flags [ 13 ] EXPLICIT INTEGER -- optional flags
+ *      }
+ * Look in ssl/ssl_asn1.c for more details
+ * I'm using EXPLICIT tags so I can read the damn things using asn1parse :-).
+ */
+struct ssl_session_st {
+    int ssl_version;            /* what ssl version session info is being kept
+                                 * in here? */
+    int master_key_length;
+    unsigned char master_key[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
+    /* session_id - valid? */
+    unsigned int session_id_length;
+    unsigned char session_id[SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH];
+    /*
+     * this is used to determine whether the session is being reused in the
+     * appropriate context. It is up to the application to set this, via
+     * SSL_new
+     */
+    unsigned int sid_ctx_length;
+    unsigned char sid_ctx[SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH];
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+    char *psk_identity_hint;
+    char *psk_identity;
+# endif
+    /*
+     * Used to indicate that session resumption is not allowed. Applications
+     * can also set this bit for a new session via not_resumable_session_cb
+     * to disable session caching and tickets.
+     */
+    int not_resumable;
+    /* This is the cert and type for the other end. */
+    X509 *peer;
+    int peer_type;
+    /* Certificate chain peer sent */
+    STACK_OF(X509) *peer_chain;
+    /*
+     * when app_verify_callback accepts a session where the peer's
+     * certificate is not ok, we must remember the error for session reuse:
+     */
+    long verify_result;         /* only for servers */
+    int references;
+    long timeout;
+    long time;
+    unsigned int compress_meth; /* Need to lookup the method */
+    const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
+    unsigned long cipher_id;    /* when ASN.1 loaded, this needs to be used to
+                                 * load the 'cipher' structure */
+    STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers; /* shared ciphers? */
+    CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data;     /* application specific data */
+    /*
+     * These are used to make removal of session-ids more efficient and to
+     * implement a maximum cache size.
+     */
+    struct ssl_session_st *prev, *next;
+    char *tlsext_hostname;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    size_t tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
+    unsigned char *tlsext_ecpointformatlist; /* peer's list */
+    size_t tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
+    unsigned char *tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; /* peer's list */
+# endif                         /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+    /* RFC4507 info */
+    unsigned char *tlsext_tick; /* Session ticket */
+    size_t tlsext_ticklen;      /* Session ticket length */
+    unsigned long tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint; /* Session lifetime hint in
+                                              * seconds */
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+    char *srp_username;
+# endif
+    uint32_t flags;
+    CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock;
+};
+
+/* Extended master secret support */
+# define SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS             0x1
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+
+typedef struct srp_ctx_st {
+    /* param for all the callbacks */
+    void *SRP_cb_arg;
+    /* set client Hello login callback */
+    int (*TLS_ext_srp_username_callback) (SSL *, int *, void *);
+    /* set SRP N/g param callback for verification */
+    int (*SRP_verify_param_callback) (SSL *, void *);
+    /* set SRP client passwd callback */
+    char *(*SRP_give_srp_client_pwd_callback) (SSL *, void *);
+    char *login;
+    BIGNUM *N, *g, *s, *B, *A;
+    BIGNUM *a, *b, *v;
+    char *info;
+    int strength;
+    unsigned long srp_Mask;
+} SRP_CTX;
+
+# endif
+
+struct ssl_comp_st {
+    int id;
+    const char *name;
+    COMP_METHOD *method;
+};
+
+DEFINE_LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION);
+/* Needed in ssl_cert.c */
+DEFINE_LHASH_OF(X509_NAME);
+
+# define TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH 16
+
+struct ssl_ctx_st {
+    const SSL_METHOD *method;
+    STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_list;
+    /* same as above but sorted for lookup */
+    STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_list_by_id;
+    struct x509_store_st /* X509_STORE */ *cert_store;
+    LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION) *sessions;
+    /*
+     * Most session-ids that will be cached, default is
+     * SSL_SESSION_CACHE_MAX_SIZE_DEFAULT. 0 is unlimited.
+     */
+    unsigned long session_cache_size;
+    struct ssl_session_st *session_cache_head;
+    struct ssl_session_st *session_cache_tail;
+    /*
+     * This can have one of 2 values, ored together, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT,
+     * SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER, Default is SSL_SESSION_CACHE_SERVER, which
+     * means only SSL_accept will cache SSL_SESSIONS.
+     */
+    uint32_t session_cache_mode;
+    /*
+     * If timeout is not 0, it is the default timeout value set when
+     * SSL_new() is called.  This has been put in to make life easier to set
+     * things up
+     */
+    long session_timeout;
+    /*
+     * If this callback is not null, it will be called each time a session id
+     * is added to the cache.  If this function returns 1, it means that the
+     * callback will do a SSL_SESSION_free() when it has finished using it.
+     * Otherwise, on 0, it means the callback has finished with it. If
+     * remove_session_cb is not null, it will be called when a session-id is
+     * removed from the cache.  After the call, OpenSSL will
+     * SSL_SESSION_free() it.
+     */
+    int (*new_session_cb) (struct ssl_st *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess);
+    void (*remove_session_cb) (struct ssl_ctx_st *ctx, SSL_SESSION *sess);
+    SSL_SESSION *(*get_session_cb) (struct ssl_st *ssl,
+                                    const unsigned char *data, int len,
+                                    int *copy);
+    struct {
+        int sess_connect;       /* SSL new conn - started */
+        int sess_connect_renegotiate; /* SSL reneg - requested */
+        int sess_connect_good;  /* SSL new conne/reneg - finished */
+        int sess_accept;        /* SSL new accept - started */
+        int sess_accept_renegotiate; /* SSL reneg - requested */
+        int sess_accept_good;   /* SSL accept/reneg - finished */
+        int sess_miss;          /* session lookup misses */
+        int sess_timeout;       /* reuse attempt on timeouted session */
+        int sess_cache_full;    /* session removed due to full cache */
+        int sess_hit;           /* session reuse actually done */
+        int sess_cb_hit;        /* session-id that was not in the cache was
+                                 * passed back via the callback.  This
+                                 * indicates that the application is supplying
+                                 * session-id's from other processes - spooky
+                                 * :-) */
+    } stats;
+
+    int references;
+
+    /* if defined, these override the X509_verify_cert() calls */
+    int (*app_verify_callback) (X509_STORE_CTX *, void *);
+    void *app_verify_arg;
+    /*
+     * before OpenSSL 0.9.7, 'app_verify_arg' was ignored
+     * ('app_verify_callback' was called with just one argument)
+     */
+
+    /* Default password callback. */
+    pem_password_cb *default_passwd_callback;
+
+    /* Default password callback user data. */
+    void *default_passwd_callback_userdata;
+
+    /* get client cert callback */
+    int (*client_cert_cb) (SSL *ssl, X509 **x509, EVP_PKEY **pkey);
+
+    /* cookie generate callback */
+    int (*app_gen_cookie_cb) (SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie,
+                              unsigned int *cookie_len);
+
+    /* verify cookie callback */
+    int (*app_verify_cookie_cb) (SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *cookie,
+                                 unsigned int cookie_len);
+
+    CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data;
+
+    const EVP_MD *md5;          /* For SSLv3/TLSv1 'ssl3-md5' */
+    const EVP_MD *sha1;         /* For SSLv3/TLSv1 'ssl3->sha1' */
+
+    STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs;
+    STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *comp_methods; /* stack of SSL_COMP, SSLv3/TLSv1 */
+
+    /* Default values used when no per-SSL value is defined follow */
+
+    /* used if SSL's info_callback is NULL */
+    void (*info_callback) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val);
+
+    /* what we put in client cert requests */
+    STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *client_CA;
+
+    /*
+     * Default values to use in SSL structures follow (these are copied by
+     * SSL_new)
+     */
+
+    uint32_t options;
+    uint32_t mode;
+    int min_proto_version;
+    int max_proto_version;
+    long max_cert_list;
+
+    struct cert_st /* CERT */ *cert;
+    int read_ahead;
+
+    /* callback that allows applications to peek at protocol messages */
+    void (*msg_callback) (int write_p, int version, int content_type,
+                          const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg);
+    void *msg_callback_arg;
+
+    uint32_t verify_mode;
+    unsigned int sid_ctx_length;
+    unsigned char sid_ctx[SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH];
+    /* called 'verify_callback' in the SSL */
+    int (*default_verify_callback) (int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+
+    /* Default generate session ID callback. */
+    GEN_SESSION_CB generate_session_id;
+
+    X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
+
+    int quiet_shutdown;
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
+    CTLOG_STORE *ctlog_store;   /* CT Log Store */
+    /*
+     * Validates that the SCTs (Signed Certificate Timestamps) are sufficient.
+     * If they are not, the connection should be aborted.
+     */
+    ssl_ct_validation_cb ct_validation_callback;
+    void *ct_validation_callback_arg;
+# endif
+
+    /*
+     * If we're using more than one pipeline how should we divide the data
+     * up between the pipes?
+     */
+    unsigned int split_send_fragment;
+    /*
+     * Maximum amount of data to send in one fragment. actual record size can
+     * be more than this due to padding and MAC overheads.
+     */
+    unsigned int max_send_fragment;
+
+    /* Up to how many pipelines should we use? If 0 then 1 is assumed */
+    unsigned int max_pipelines;
+
+    /* The default read buffer length to use (0 means not set) */
+    size_t default_read_buf_len;
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    /*
+     * Engine to pass requests for client certs to
+     */
+    ENGINE *client_cert_engine;
+# endif
+
+    /* TLS extensions servername callback */
+    int (*tlsext_servername_callback) (SSL *, int *, void *);
+    void *tlsext_servername_arg;
+    /* RFC 4507 session ticket keys */
+    unsigned char tlsext_tick_key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
+    unsigned char tlsext_tick_hmac_key[32];
+    unsigned char tlsext_tick_aes_key[32];
+    /* Callback to support customisation of ticket key setting */
+    int (*tlsext_ticket_key_cb) (SSL *ssl,
+                                 unsigned char *name, unsigned char *iv,
+                                 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ectx, HMAC_CTX *hctx, int enc);
+
+    /* certificate status request info */
+    /* Callback for status request */
+    int (*tlsext_status_cb) (SSL *ssl, void *arg);
+    void *tlsext_status_arg;
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+    unsigned int (*psk_client_callback) (SSL *ssl, const char *hint,
+                                         char *identity,
+                                         unsigned int max_identity_len,
+                                         unsigned char *psk,
+                                         unsigned int max_psk_len);
+    unsigned int (*psk_server_callback) (SSL *ssl, const char *identity,
+                                         unsigned char *psk,
+                                         unsigned int max_psk_len);
+# endif
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+    SRP_CTX srp_ctx;            /* ctx for SRP authentication */
+# endif
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+    /* Next protocol negotiation information */
+
+    /*
+     * For a server, this contains a callback function by which the set of
+     * advertised protocols can be provided.
+     */
+    int (*next_protos_advertised_cb) (SSL *s, const unsigned char **buf,
+                                      unsigned int *len, void *arg);
+    void *next_protos_advertised_cb_arg;
+    /*
+     * For a client, this contains a callback function that selects the next
+     * protocol from the list provided by the server.
+     */
+    int (*next_proto_select_cb) (SSL *s, unsigned char **out,
+                                 unsigned char *outlen,
+                                 const unsigned char *in,
+                                 unsigned int inlen, void *arg);
+    void *next_proto_select_cb_arg;
+# endif
+
+    /*
+     * ALPN information (we are in the process of transitioning from NPN to
+     * ALPN.)
+     */
+
+        /*-
+         * For a server, this contains a callback function that allows the
+         * server to select the protocol for the connection.
+         *   out: on successful return, this must point to the raw protocol
+         *        name (without the length prefix).
+         *   outlen: on successful return, this contains the length of |*out|.
+         *   in: points to the client's list of supported protocols in
+         *       wire-format.
+         *   inlen: the length of |in|.
+         */
+    int (*alpn_select_cb) (SSL *s,
+                           const unsigned char **out,
+                           unsigned char *outlen,
+                           const unsigned char *in,
+                           unsigned int inlen, void *arg);
+    void *alpn_select_cb_arg;
+
+    /*
+     * For a client, this contains the list of supported protocols in wire
+     * format.
+     */
+    unsigned char *alpn_client_proto_list;
+    unsigned alpn_client_proto_list_len;
+
+    /* Shared DANE context */
+    struct dane_ctx_st dane;
+
+    /* SRTP profiles we are willing to do from RFC 5764 */
+    STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *srtp_profiles;
+    /*
+     * Callback for disabling session caching and ticket support on a session
+     * basis, depending on the chosen cipher.
+     */
+    int (*not_resumable_session_cb) (SSL *ssl, int is_forward_secure);
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    /* EC extension values inherited by SSL structure */
+    size_t tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
+    unsigned char *tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
+    size_t tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
+    unsigned char *tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
+# endif                         /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
+    /* ext status type used for CSR extension (OCSP Stapling) */
+    int tlsext_status_type;
+
+    CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock;
+};
+
+struct ssl_st {
+    /*
+     * protocol version (one of SSL2_VERSION, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_VERSION,
+     * DTLS1_VERSION)
+     */
+    int version;
+    /* SSLv3 */
+    const SSL_METHOD *method;
+    /*
+     * There are 2 BIO's even though they are normally both the same.  This
+     * is so data can be read and written to different handlers
+     */
+    /* used by SSL_read */
+    BIO *rbio;
+    /* used by SSL_write */
+    BIO *wbio;
+    /* used during session-id reuse to concatenate messages */
+    BIO *bbio;
+    /*
+     * This holds a variable that indicates what we were doing when a 0 or -1
+     * is returned.  This is needed for non-blocking IO so we know what
+     * request needs re-doing when in SSL_accept or SSL_connect
+     */
+    int rwstate;
+    int (*handshake_func) (SSL *);
+    /*
+     * Imagine that here's a boolean member "init" that is switched as soon
+     * as SSL_set_{accept/connect}_state is called for the first time, so
+     * that "state" and "handshake_func" are properly initialized.  But as
+     * handshake_func is == 0 until then, we use this test instead of an
+     * "init" member.
+     */
+    /* are we the server side? */
+    int server;
+    /*
+     * Generate a new session or reuse an old one.
+     * NB: For servers, the 'new' session may actually be a previously
+     * cached session or even the previous session unless
+     * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set
+     */
+    int new_session;
+    /* don't send shutdown packets */
+    int quiet_shutdown;
+    /* we have shut things down, 0x01 sent, 0x02 for received */
+    int shutdown;
+    /* where we are */
+    OSSL_STATEM statem;
+    BUF_MEM *init_buf;          /* buffer used during init */
+    void *init_msg;             /* pointer to handshake message body, set by
+                                 * ssl3_get_message() */
+    int init_num;               /* amount read/written */
+    int init_off;               /* amount read/written */
+    struct ssl3_state_st *s3;   /* SSLv3 variables */
+    struct dtls1_state_st *d1;  /* DTLSv1 variables */
+    /* callback that allows applications to peek at protocol messages */
+    void (*msg_callback) (int write_p, int version, int content_type,
+                          const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg);
+    void *msg_callback_arg;
+    int hit;                    /* reusing a previous session */
+    X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
+    /* Per connection DANE state */
+    SSL_DANE dane;
+    /* crypto */
+    STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_list;
+    STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_list_by_id;
+    /*
+     * These are the ones being used, the ones in SSL_SESSION are the ones to
+     * be 'copied' into these ones
+     */
+    uint32_t mac_flags;
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *enc_read_ctx; /* cryptographic state */
+    EVP_MD_CTX *read_hash;      /* used for mac generation */
+    COMP_CTX *compress;         /* compression */
+    COMP_CTX *expand;           /* uncompress */
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *enc_write_ctx; /* cryptographic state */
+    EVP_MD_CTX *write_hash;     /* used for mac generation */
+    /* session info */
+    /* client cert? */
+    /* This is used to hold the server certificate used */
+    struct cert_st /* CERT */ *cert;
+    /*
+     * the session_id_context is used to ensure sessions are only reused in
+     * the appropriate context
+     */
+    unsigned int sid_ctx_length;
+    unsigned char sid_ctx[SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH];
+    /* This can also be in the session once a session is established */
+    SSL_SESSION *session;
+    /* Default generate session ID callback. */
+    GEN_SESSION_CB generate_session_id;
+    /* Used in SSL3 */
+    /*
+     * 0 don't care about verify failure.
+     * 1 fail if verify fails
+     */
+    uint32_t verify_mode;
+    /* fail if callback returns 0 */
+    int (*verify_callback) (int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+    /* optional informational callback */
+    void (*info_callback) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val);
+    /* error bytes to be written */
+    int error;
+    /* actual code */
+    int error_code;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+    unsigned int (*psk_client_callback) (SSL *ssl, const char *hint,
+                                         char *identity,
+                                         unsigned int max_identity_len,
+                                         unsigned char *psk,
+                                         unsigned int max_psk_len);
+    unsigned int (*psk_server_callback) (SSL *ssl, const char *identity,
+                                         unsigned char *psk,
+                                         unsigned int max_psk_len);
+# endif
+    SSL_CTX *ctx;
+    /* Verified chain of peer */
+    STACK_OF(X509) *verified_chain;
+    long verify_result;
+    /* extra application data */
+    CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data;
+    /* for server side, keep the list of CA_dn we can use */
+    STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *client_CA;
+    int references;
+    /* protocol behaviour */
+    uint32_t options;
+    /* API behaviour */
+    uint32_t mode;
+    int min_proto_version;
+    int max_proto_version;
+    long max_cert_list;
+    int first_packet;
+    /* what was passed, used for SSLv3/TLS rollback check */
+    int client_version;
+    /*
+     * If we're using more than one pipeline how should we divide the data
+     * up between the pipes?
+     */
+    unsigned int split_send_fragment;
+    /*
+     * Maximum amount of data to send in one fragment. actual record size can
+     * be more than this due to padding and MAC overheads.
+     */
+    unsigned int max_send_fragment;
+    /* Up to how many pipelines should we use? If 0 then 1 is assumed */
+    unsigned int max_pipelines;
+    /* TLS extension debug callback */
+    void (*tlsext_debug_cb) (SSL *s, int client_server, int type,
+                             const unsigned char *data, int len, void *arg);
+    void *tlsext_debug_arg;
+    char *tlsext_hostname;
+    /*-
+     * no further mod of servername
+     * 0 : call the servername extension callback.
+     * 1 : prepare 2, allow last ack just after in server callback.
+     * 2 : don't call servername callback, no ack in server hello
+     */
+    int servername_done;
+    /* certificate status request info */
+    /* Status type or -1 if no status type */
+    int tlsext_status_type;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
+    /*
+     * Validates that the SCTs (Signed Certificate Timestamps) are sufficient.
+     * If they are not, the connection should be aborted.
+     */
+    ssl_ct_validation_cb ct_validation_callback;
+    /* User-supplied argument tha tis passed to the ct_validation_callback */
+    void *ct_validation_callback_arg;
+    /*
+     * Consolidated stack of SCTs from all sources.
+     * Lazily populated by CT_get_peer_scts(SSL*)
+     */
+    STACK_OF(SCT) *scts;
+    /* Raw extension data, if seen */
+    unsigned char *tlsext_scts;
+    /* Length of raw extension data, if seen */
+    uint16_t tlsext_scts_len;
+    /* Have we attempted to find/parse SCTs yet? */
+    int scts_parsed;
+# endif
+    /* Expect OCSP CertificateStatus message */
+    int tlsext_status_expected;
+    /* OCSP status request only */
+    STACK_OF(OCSP_RESPID) *tlsext_ocsp_ids;
+    X509_EXTENSIONS *tlsext_ocsp_exts;
+    /* OCSP response received or to be sent */
+    unsigned char *tlsext_ocsp_resp;
+    int tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
+    /* RFC4507 session ticket expected to be received or sent */
+    int tlsext_ticket_expected;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    size_t tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
+    /* our list */
+    unsigned char *tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
+    size_t tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
+    /* our list */
+    unsigned char *tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
+# endif                         /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+    /* TLS Session Ticket extension override */
+    TLS_SESSION_TICKET_EXT *tlsext_session_ticket;
+    /* TLS Session Ticket extension callback */
+    tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_fn tls_session_ticket_ext_cb;
+    void *tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg;
+    /* TLS pre-shared secret session resumption */
+    tls_session_secret_cb_fn tls_session_secret_cb;
+    void *tls_session_secret_cb_arg;
+    SSL_CTX *session_ctx;       /* initial ctx, used to store sessions */
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+    /*
+     * Next protocol negotiation. For the client, this is the protocol that
+     * we sent in NextProtocol and is set when handling ServerHello
+     * extensions. For a server, this is the client's selected_protocol from
+     * NextProtocol and is set when handling the NextProtocol message, before
+     * the Finished message.
+     */
+    unsigned char *next_proto_negotiated;
+    unsigned char next_proto_negotiated_len;
+# endif
+    /* What we'll do */
+    STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *srtp_profiles;
+    /* What's been chosen */
+    SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *srtp_profile;
+        /*-
+         * Is use of the Heartbeat extension negotiated?
+         *  0: disabled
+         *  1: enabled
+         *  2: enabled, but not allowed to send Requests
+         */
+    unsigned int tlsext_heartbeat;
+    /* Indicates if a HeartbeatRequest is in flight */
+    unsigned int tlsext_hb_pending;
+    /* HeartbeatRequest sequence number */
+    unsigned int tlsext_hb_seq;
+    /*
+     * For a client, this contains the list of supported protocols in wire
+     * format.
+     */
+    unsigned char *alpn_client_proto_list;
+    unsigned alpn_client_proto_list_len;
+
+    /* Set to one if we have negotiated ETM */
+    int tlsext_use_etm;
+
+    /*-
+     * 1 if we are renegotiating.
+     * 2 if we are a server and are inside a handshake
+     * (i.e. not just sending a HelloRequest)
+     */
+    int renegotiate;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+    /* ctx for SRP authentication */
+    SRP_CTX srp_ctx;
+# endif
+    /*
+     * Callback for disabling session caching and ticket support on a session
+     * basis, depending on the chosen cipher.
+     */
+    int (*not_resumable_session_cb) (SSL *ssl, int is_forward_secure);
+    RECORD_LAYER rlayer;
+    /* Default password callback. */
+    pem_password_cb *default_passwd_callback;
+    /* Default password callback user data. */
+    void *default_passwd_callback_userdata;
+    /* Async Job info */
+    ASYNC_JOB *job;
+    ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *waitctx;
+    CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock;
+};
+
+typedef struct ssl3_state_st {
+    long flags;
+    int read_mac_secret_size;
+    unsigned char read_mac_secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+    int write_mac_secret_size;
+    unsigned char write_mac_secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+    unsigned char server_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE];
+    unsigned char client_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE];
+    /* flags for countermeasure against known-IV weakness */
+    int need_empty_fragments;
+    int empty_fragment_done;
+    /* used during startup, digest all incoming/outgoing packets */
+    BIO *handshake_buffer;
+    /*
+     * When handshake digest is determined, buffer is hashed and
+     * freed and MD_CTX for the required digest is stored here.
+     */
+    EVP_MD_CTX *handshake_dgst;
+    /*
+     * Set whenever an expected ChangeCipherSpec message is processed.
+     * Unset when the peer's Finished message is received.
+     * Unexpected ChangeCipherSpec messages trigger a fatal alert.
+     */
+    int change_cipher_spec;
+    int warn_alert;
+    int fatal_alert;
+    /*
+     * we allow one fatal and one warning alert to be outstanding, send close
+     * alert via the warning alert
+     */
+    int alert_dispatch;
+    unsigned char send_alert[2];
+    /*
+     * This flag is set when we should renegotiate ASAP, basically when there
+     * is no more data in the read or write buffers
+     */
+    int renegotiate;
+    int total_renegotiations;
+    int num_renegotiations;
+    int in_read_app_data;
+    struct {
+        /* actually only need to be 16+20 for SSLv3 and 12 for TLS */
+        unsigned char finish_md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2];
+        int finish_md_len;
+        unsigned char peer_finish_md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2];
+        int peer_finish_md_len;
+        unsigned long message_size;
+        int message_type;
+        /* used to hold the new cipher we are going to use */
+        const SSL_CIPHER *new_cipher;
+# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
+        EVP_PKEY *pkey;         /* holds short lived DH/ECDH key */
+# endif
+        /* used for certificate requests */
+        int cert_req;
+        int ctype_num;
+        char ctype[SSL3_CT_NUMBER];
+        STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_names;
+        int key_block_length;
+        unsigned char *key_block;
+        const EVP_CIPHER *new_sym_enc;
+        const EVP_MD *new_hash;
+        int new_mac_pkey_type;
+        int new_mac_secret_size;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+        const SSL_COMP *new_compression;
+# else
+        char *new_compression;
+# endif
+        int cert_request;
+        /* Raw values of the cipher list from a client */
+        unsigned char *ciphers_raw;
+        size_t ciphers_rawlen;
+        /* Temporary storage for premaster secret */
+        unsigned char *pms;
+        size_t pmslen;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+        /* Temporary storage for PSK key */
+        unsigned char *psk;
+        size_t psklen;
+# endif
+        /*
+         * signature algorithms peer reports: e.g. supported signature
+         * algorithms extension for server or as part of a certificate
+         * request for client.
+         */
+        unsigned char *peer_sigalgs;
+        /* Size of above array */
+        size_t peer_sigalgslen;
+        /* Digest peer uses for signing */
+        const EVP_MD *peer_md;
+        /* Array of digests used for signing */
+        const EVP_MD *md[SSL_PKEY_NUM];
+        /*
+         * Set if corresponding CERT_PKEY can be used with current
+         * SSL session: e.g. appropriate curve, signature algorithms etc.
+         * If zero it can't be used at all.
+         */
+        uint32_t valid_flags[SSL_PKEY_NUM];
+        /*
+         * For servers the following masks are for the key and auth algorithms
+         * that are supported by the certs below. For clients they are masks of
+         * *disabled* algorithms based on the current session.
+         */
+        uint32_t mask_k;
+        uint32_t mask_a;
+        /*
+         * The following are used by the client to see if a cipher is allowed or
+         * not.  It contains the minimum and maximum version the client's using
+         * based on what it knows so far.
+         */
+        int min_ver;
+        int max_ver;
+    } tmp;
+
+    /* Connection binding to prevent renegotiation attacks */
+    unsigned char previous_client_finished[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+    unsigned char previous_client_finished_len;
+    unsigned char previous_server_finished[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+    unsigned char previous_server_finished_len;
+    int send_connection_binding; /* TODOEKR */
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+    /*
+     * Set if we saw the Next Protocol Negotiation extension from our peer.
+     */
+    int next_proto_neg_seen;
+# endif
+
+    /*
+     * ALPN information (we are in the process of transitioning from NPN to
+     * ALPN.)
+     */
+
+    /*
+     * In a server these point to the selected ALPN protocol after the
+     * ClientHello has been processed. In a client these contain the protocol
+     * that the server selected once the ServerHello has been processed.
+     */
+    unsigned char *alpn_selected;
+    size_t alpn_selected_len;
+    /* used by the server to know what options were proposed */
+    unsigned char *alpn_proposed;
+    size_t alpn_proposed_len;
+    /* used by the client to know if it actually sent alpn */
+    int alpn_sent;
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    /*
+     * This is set to true if we believe that this is a version of Safari
+     * running on OS X 10.6 or newer. We wish to know this because Safari on
+     * 10.8 .. 10.8.3 has broken ECDHE-ECDSA support.
+     */
+    char is_probably_safari;
+# endif                         /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
+    /* For clients: peer temporary key */
+# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
+    EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp;
+# endif
+
+} SSL3_STATE;
+
+/* DTLS structures */
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+#  define DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL   "EXPORTER_DTLS_OVER_SCTP"
+# endif
+
+/* Max MTU overhead we know about so far is 40 for IPv6 + 8 for UDP */
+# define DTLS1_MAX_MTU_OVERHEAD                   48
+
+/*
+ * Flag used in message reuse to indicate the buffer contains the record
+ * header as well as the the handshake message header.
+ */
+# define DTLS1_SKIP_RECORD_HEADER                 2
+
+struct dtls1_retransmit_state {
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *enc_write_ctx; /* cryptographic state */
+    EVP_MD_CTX *write_hash;     /* used for mac generation */
+    COMP_CTX *compress;         /* compression */
+    SSL_SESSION *session;
+    unsigned short epoch;
+};
+
+struct hm_header_st {
+    unsigned char type;
+    unsigned long msg_len;
+    unsigned short seq;
+    unsigned long frag_off;
+    unsigned long frag_len;
+    unsigned int is_ccs;
+    struct dtls1_retransmit_state saved_retransmit_state;
+};
+
+struct dtls1_timeout_st {
+    /* Number of read timeouts so far */
+    unsigned int read_timeouts;
+    /* Number of write timeouts so far */
+    unsigned int write_timeouts;
+    /* Number of alerts received so far */
+    unsigned int num_alerts;
+};
+
+typedef struct hm_fragment_st {
+    struct hm_header_st msg_header;
+    unsigned char *fragment;
+    unsigned char *reassembly;
+} hm_fragment;
+
+typedef struct pqueue_st pqueue;
+typedef struct pitem_st pitem;
+
+struct pitem_st {
+    unsigned char priority[8];  /* 64-bit value in big-endian encoding */
+    void *data;
+    pitem *next;
+};
+
+typedef struct pitem_st *piterator;
+
+pitem *pitem_new(unsigned char *prio64be, void *data);
+void pitem_free(pitem *item);
+pqueue *pqueue_new(void);
+void pqueue_free(pqueue *pq);
+pitem *pqueue_insert(pqueue *pq, pitem *item);
+pitem *pqueue_peek(pqueue *pq);
+pitem *pqueue_pop(pqueue *pq);
+pitem *pqueue_find(pqueue *pq, unsigned char *prio64be);
+pitem *pqueue_iterator(pqueue *pq);
+pitem *pqueue_next(piterator *iter);
+int pqueue_size(pqueue *pq);
+
+typedef struct dtls1_state_st {
+    unsigned char cookie[DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH];
+    unsigned int cookie_len;
+    unsigned int cookie_verified;
+    /* handshake message numbers */
+    unsigned short handshake_write_seq;
+    unsigned short next_handshake_write_seq;
+    unsigned short handshake_read_seq;
+    /* Buffered handshake messages */
+    pqueue *buffered_messages;
+    /* Buffered (sent) handshake records */
+    pqueue *sent_messages;
+    unsigned int link_mtu;      /* max on-the-wire DTLS packet size */
+    unsigned int mtu;           /* max DTLS packet size */
+    struct hm_header_st w_msg_hdr;
+    struct hm_header_st r_msg_hdr;
+    struct dtls1_timeout_st timeout;
+    /*
+     * Indicates when the last handshake msg or heartbeat sent will timeout
+     */
+    struct timeval next_timeout;
+    /* Timeout duration */
+    unsigned short timeout_duration;
+    unsigned int retransmitting;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+    int shutdown_received;
+# endif
+} DTLS1_STATE;
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+/*
+ * From ECC-TLS draft, used in encoding the curve type in ECParameters
+ */
+#  define EXPLICIT_PRIME_CURVE_TYPE  1
+#  define EXPLICIT_CHAR2_CURVE_TYPE  2
+#  define NAMED_CURVE_TYPE           3
+# endif                         /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
+typedef struct cert_pkey_st {
+    X509 *x509;
+    EVP_PKEY *privatekey;
+    /* Chain for this certificate */
+    STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
+    /*-
+     * serverinfo data for this certificate.  The data is in TLS Extension
+     * wire format, specifically it's a series of records like:
+     *   uint16_t extension_type; // (RFC 5246, 7.4.1.4, Extension)
+     *   uint16_t length;
+     *   uint8_t data[length];
+     */
+    unsigned char *serverinfo;
+    size_t serverinfo_length;
+} CERT_PKEY;
+/* Retrieve Suite B flags */
+# define tls1_suiteb(s)  (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS)
+/* Uses to check strict mode: suite B modes are always strict */
+# define SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT \
+        (SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS|SSL_CERT_FLAG_TLS_STRICT)
+
+typedef struct {
+    unsigned short ext_type;
+    /*
+     * Per-connection flags relating to this extension type: not used if
+     * part of an SSL_CTX structure.
+     */
+    uint32_t ext_flags;
+    custom_ext_add_cb add_cb;
+    custom_ext_free_cb free_cb;
+    void *add_arg;
+    custom_ext_parse_cb parse_cb;
+    void *parse_arg;
+} custom_ext_method;
+
+/* ext_flags values */
+
+/*
+ * Indicates an extension has been received. Used to check for unsolicited or
+ * duplicate extensions.
+ */
+# define SSL_EXT_FLAG_RECEIVED   0x1
+/*
+ * Indicates an extension has been sent: used to enable sending of
+ * corresponding ServerHello extension.
+ */
+# define SSL_EXT_FLAG_SENT       0x2
+
+typedef struct {
+    custom_ext_method *meths;
+    size_t meths_count;
+} custom_ext_methods;
+
+typedef struct cert_st {
+    /* Current active set */
+    /*
+     * ALWAYS points to an element of the pkeys array
+     * Probably it would make more sense to store
+     * an index, not a pointer.
+     */
+    CERT_PKEY *key;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+    EVP_PKEY *dh_tmp;
+    DH *(*dh_tmp_cb) (SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keysize);
+    int dh_tmp_auto;
+# endif
+    /* Flags related to certificates */
+    uint32_t cert_flags;
+    CERT_PKEY pkeys[SSL_PKEY_NUM];
+    /*
+     * Certificate types (received or sent) in certificate request message.
+     * On receive this is only set if number of certificate types exceeds
+     * SSL3_CT_NUMBER.
+     */
+    unsigned char *ctypes;
+    size_t ctype_num;
+    /*
+     * supported signature algorithms. When set on a client this is sent in
+     * the client hello as the supported signature algorithms extension. For
+     * servers it represents the signature algorithms we are willing to use.
+     */
+    unsigned char *conf_sigalgs;
+    /* Size of above array */
+    size_t conf_sigalgslen;
+    /*
+     * Client authentication signature algorithms, if not set then uses
+     * conf_sigalgs. On servers these will be the signature algorithms sent
+     * to the client in a cerificate request for TLS 1.2. On a client this
+     * represents the signature algortithms we are willing to use for client
+     * authentication.
+     */
+    unsigned char *client_sigalgs;
+    /* Size of above array */
+    size_t client_sigalgslen;
+    /*
+     * Signature algorithms shared by client and server: cached because these
+     * are used most often.
+     */
+    TLS_SIGALGS *shared_sigalgs;
+    size_t shared_sigalgslen;
+    /*
+     * Certificate setup callback: if set is called whenever a certificate
+     * may be required (client or server). the callback can then examine any
+     * appropriate parameters and setup any certificates required. This
+     * allows advanced applications to select certificates on the fly: for
+     * example based on supported signature algorithms or curves.
+     */
+    int (*cert_cb) (SSL *ssl, void *arg);
+    void *cert_cb_arg;
+    /*
+     * Optional X509_STORE for chain building or certificate validation If
+     * NULL the parent SSL_CTX store is used instead.
+     */
+    X509_STORE *chain_store;
+    X509_STORE *verify_store;
+    /* Custom extension methods for server and client */
+    custom_ext_methods cli_ext;
+    custom_ext_methods srv_ext;
+    /* Security callback */
+    int (*sec_cb) (const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, int bits, int nid,
+                   void *other, void *ex);
+    /* Security level */
+    int sec_level;
+    void *sec_ex;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+    /* If not NULL psk identity hint to use for servers */
+    char *psk_identity_hint;
+# endif
+    int references;             /* >1 only if SSL_copy_session_id is used */
+    CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock;
+} CERT;
+
+/* Structure containing decoded values of signature algorithms extension */
+struct tls_sigalgs_st {
+    /* NID of hash algorithm */
+    int hash_nid;
+    /* NID of signature algorithm */
+    int sign_nid;
+    /* Combined hash and signature NID */
+    int signandhash_nid;
+    /* Raw values used in extension */
+    unsigned char rsign;
+    unsigned char rhash;
+};
+
+# define FP_ICC  (int (*)(const void *,const void *))
+
+/*
+ * This is for the SSLv3/TLSv1.0 differences in crypto/hash stuff It is a bit
+ * of a mess of functions, but hell, think of it as an opaque structure :-)
+ */
+typedef struct ssl3_enc_method {
+    int (*enc) (SSL *, SSL3_RECORD *, unsigned int, int);
+    int (*mac) (SSL *, SSL3_RECORD *, unsigned char *, int);
+    int (*setup_key_block) (SSL *);
+    int (*generate_master_secret) (SSL *, unsigned char *, unsigned char *,
+                                   int);
+    int (*change_cipher_state) (SSL *, int);
+    int (*final_finish_mac) (SSL *, const char *, int, unsigned char *);
+    int finish_mac_length;
+    const char *client_finished_label;
+    int client_finished_label_len;
+    const char *server_finished_label;
+    int server_finished_label_len;
+    int (*alert_value) (int);
+    int (*export_keying_material) (SSL *, unsigned char *, size_t,
+                                   const char *, size_t,
+                                   const unsigned char *, size_t,
+                                   int use_context);
+    /* Various flags indicating protocol version requirements */
+    uint32_t enc_flags;
+    /* Handshake header length */
+    unsigned int hhlen;
+    /* Set the handshake header */
+    int (*set_handshake_header) (SSL *s, int type, unsigned long len);
+    /* Write out handshake message */
+    int (*do_write) (SSL *s);
+} SSL3_ENC_METHOD;
+
+# define SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) s->method->ssl3_enc->hhlen
+# define ssl_handshake_start(s) \
+        (((unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data) + s->method->ssl3_enc->hhlen)
+# define ssl_set_handshake_header(s, htype, len) \
+        s->method->ssl3_enc->set_handshake_header(s, htype, len)
+# define ssl_do_write(s)  s->method->ssl3_enc->do_write(s)
+
+/* Values for enc_flags */
+
+/* Uses explicit IV for CBC mode */
+# define SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV        0x1
+/* Uses signature algorithms extension */
+# define SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS            0x2
+/* Uses SHA256 default PRF */
+# define SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF         0x4
+/* Is DTLS */
+# define SSL_ENC_FLAG_DTLS               0x8
+/*
+ * Allow TLS 1.2 ciphersuites: applies to DTLS 1.2 as well as TLS 1.2: may
+ * apply to others in future.
+ */
+# define SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS     0x10
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+/* Used for holding the relevant compression methods loaded into SSL_CTX */
+typedef struct ssl3_comp_st {
+    int comp_id;                /* The identifier byte for this compression
+                                 * type */
+    char *name;                 /* Text name used for the compression type */
+    COMP_METHOD *method;        /* The method :-) */
+} SSL3_COMP;
+# endif
+
+extern SSL3_ENC_METHOD ssl3_undef_enc_method;
+
+__owur const SSL_METHOD *ssl_bad_method(int ver);
+__owur const SSL_METHOD *sslv3_method(void);
+__owur const SSL_METHOD *sslv3_server_method(void);
+__owur const SSL_METHOD *sslv3_client_method(void);
+__owur const SSL_METHOD *tlsv1_method(void);
+__owur const SSL_METHOD *tlsv1_server_method(void);
+__owur const SSL_METHOD *tlsv1_client_method(void);
+__owur const SSL_METHOD *tlsv1_1_method(void);
+__owur const SSL_METHOD *tlsv1_1_server_method(void);
+__owur const SSL_METHOD *tlsv1_1_client_method(void);
+__owur const SSL_METHOD *tlsv1_2_method(void);
+__owur const SSL_METHOD *tlsv1_2_server_method(void);
+__owur const SSL_METHOD *tlsv1_2_client_method(void);
+__owur const SSL_METHOD *dtlsv1_method(void);
+__owur const SSL_METHOD *dtlsv1_server_method(void);
+__owur const SSL_METHOD *dtlsv1_client_method(void);
+__owur const SSL_METHOD *dtls_bad_ver_client_method(void);
+__owur const SSL_METHOD *dtlsv1_2_method(void);
+__owur const SSL_METHOD *dtlsv1_2_server_method(void);
+__owur const SSL_METHOD *dtlsv1_2_client_method(void);
+
+extern const SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data;
+extern const SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data;
+extern const SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data;
+extern const SSL3_ENC_METHOD SSLv3_enc_data;
+extern const SSL3_ENC_METHOD DTLSv1_enc_data;
+extern const SSL3_ENC_METHOD DTLSv1_2_enc_data;
+
+/*
+ * Flags for SSL methods
+ */
+# define SSL_METHOD_NO_FIPS      (1U<<0)
+# define SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB    (1U<<1)
+
+# define IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(version, flags, mask, func_name, s_accept, \
+                                 s_connect, enc_data) \
+const SSL_METHOD *func_name(void)  \
+        { \
+        static const SSL_METHOD func_name##_data= { \
+                version, \
+                flags, \
+                mask, \
+                tls1_new, \
+                tls1_clear, \
+                tls1_free, \
+                s_accept, \
+                s_connect, \
+                ssl3_read, \
+                ssl3_peek, \
+                ssl3_write, \
+                ssl3_shutdown, \
+                ssl3_renegotiate, \
+                ssl3_renegotiate_check, \
+                ssl3_read_bytes, \
+                ssl3_write_bytes, \
+                ssl3_dispatch_alert, \
+                ssl3_ctrl, \
+                ssl3_ctx_ctrl, \
+                ssl3_get_cipher_by_char, \
+                ssl3_put_cipher_by_char, \
+                ssl3_pending, \
+                ssl3_num_ciphers, \
+                ssl3_get_cipher, \
+                tls1_default_timeout, \
+                &enc_data, \
+                ssl_undefined_void_function, \
+                ssl3_callback_ctrl, \
+                ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl, \
+        }; \
+        return &func_name##_data; \
+        }
+
+# define IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(func_name, s_accept, s_connect) \
+const SSL_METHOD *func_name(void)  \
+        { \
+        static const SSL_METHOD func_name##_data= { \
+                SSL3_VERSION, \
+                SSL_METHOD_NO_FIPS | SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB, \
+                SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3, \
+                ssl3_new, \
+                ssl3_clear, \
+                ssl3_free, \
+                s_accept, \
+                s_connect, \
+                ssl3_read, \
+                ssl3_peek, \
+                ssl3_write, \
+                ssl3_shutdown, \
+                ssl3_renegotiate, \
+                ssl3_renegotiate_check, \
+                ssl3_read_bytes, \
+                ssl3_write_bytes, \
+                ssl3_dispatch_alert, \
+                ssl3_ctrl, \
+                ssl3_ctx_ctrl, \
+                ssl3_get_cipher_by_char, \
+                ssl3_put_cipher_by_char, \
+                ssl3_pending, \
+                ssl3_num_ciphers, \
+                ssl3_get_cipher, \
+                ssl3_default_timeout, \
+                &SSLv3_enc_data, \
+                ssl_undefined_void_function, \
+                ssl3_callback_ctrl, \
+                ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl, \
+        }; \
+        return &func_name##_data; \
+        }
+
+# define IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(version, flags, mask, func_name, s_accept, \
+                                        s_connect, enc_data) \
+const SSL_METHOD *func_name(void)  \
+        { \
+        static const SSL_METHOD func_name##_data= { \
+                version, \
+                flags, \
+                mask, \
+                dtls1_new, \
+                dtls1_clear, \
+                dtls1_free, \
+                s_accept, \
+                s_connect, \
+                ssl3_read, \
+                ssl3_peek, \
+                ssl3_write, \
+                dtls1_shutdown, \
+                ssl3_renegotiate, \
+                ssl3_renegotiate_check, \
+                dtls1_read_bytes, \
+                dtls1_write_app_data_bytes, \
+                dtls1_dispatch_alert, \
+                dtls1_ctrl, \
+                ssl3_ctx_ctrl, \
+                ssl3_get_cipher_by_char, \
+                ssl3_put_cipher_by_char, \
+                ssl3_pending, \
+                ssl3_num_ciphers, \
+                ssl3_get_cipher, \
+                dtls1_default_timeout, \
+                &enc_data, \
+                ssl_undefined_void_function, \
+                ssl3_callback_ctrl, \
+                ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl, \
+        }; \
+        return &func_name##_data; \
+        }
+
+struct openssl_ssl_test_functions {
+    int (*p_ssl_init_wbio_buffer) (SSL *s);
+    int (*p_ssl3_setup_buffers) (SSL *s);
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+    int (*p_dtls1_process_heartbeat) (SSL *s,
+                                      unsigned char *p, unsigned int length);
+# endif
+};
+
+const char *ssl_protocol_to_string(int version);
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_UNIT_TEST
+
+void ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(SSL *s);
+int ssl_clear_bad_session(SSL *s);
+__owur CERT *ssl_cert_new(void);
+__owur CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert);
+void ssl_cert_clear_certs(CERT *c);
+void ssl_cert_free(CERT *c);
+__owur int ssl_get_new_session(SSL *s, int session);
+__owur int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, const PACKET *ext,
+                                const PACKET *session_id);
+__owur SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket);
+__owur int ssl_cipher_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *a, const SSL_CIPHER *b);
+DECLARE_OBJ_BSEARCH_GLOBAL_CMP_FN(SSL_CIPHER, SSL_CIPHER, ssl_cipher_id);
+__owur int ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *const *ap,
+                                 const SSL_CIPHER *const *bp);
+__owur STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_list(const SSL_METHOD *meth,
+                                                    STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **pref,
+                                                    STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER)
+                                                    **sorted,
+                                                    const char *rule_str,
+                                                    CERT *c);
+void ssl_update_cache(SSL *s, int mode);
+__owur int ssl_cipher_get_evp(const SSL_SESSION *s, const EVP_CIPHER **enc,
+                              const EVP_MD **md, int *mac_pkey_type,
+                              int *mac_secret_size, SSL_COMP **comp,
+                              int use_etm);
+__owur int ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(const SSL_CIPHER *c);
+__owur const SSL_CIPHER *ssl_get_cipher_by_char(SSL *ssl,
+                                                const unsigned char *ptr);
+__owur int ssl_cert_set0_chain(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *chain);
+__owur int ssl_cert_set1_chain(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *chain);
+__owur int ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
+__owur int ssl_cert_add1_chain_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
+__owur int ssl_cert_select_current(CERT *c, X509 *x);
+__owur int ssl_cert_set_current(CERT *c, long arg);
+__owur X509 *ssl_cert_get0_next_certificate(CERT *c, int first);
+void ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(CERT *c, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg);
+
+__owur int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk);
+__owur int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, CERT_PKEY *cpk, unsigned long *l);
+__owur int ssl_build_cert_chain(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, int flags);
+__owur int ssl_cert_set_cert_store(CERT *c, X509_STORE *store, int chain,
+                                   int ref);
+
+__owur int ssl_security(const SSL *s, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other);
+__owur int ssl_ctx_security(const SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, int bits, int nid,
+                            void *other);
+
+int ssl_undefined_function(SSL *s);
+__owur int ssl_undefined_void_function(void);
+__owur int ssl_undefined_const_function(const SSL *s);
+__owur CERT_PKEY *ssl_get_server_send_pkey(SSL *s);
+__owur int ssl_get_server_cert_serverinfo(SSL *s,
+                                          const unsigned char **serverinfo,
+                                          size_t *serverinfo_length);
+__owur EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_sign_pkey(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c,
+                                   const EVP_MD **pmd);
+__owur int ssl_cert_type(const X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+void ssl_set_masks(SSL *s);
+__owur STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(SSL *s);
+__owur int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type);
+void ssl_sort_cipher_list(void);
+void ssl_load_ciphers(void);
+__owur int ssl_fill_hello_random(SSL *s, int server, unsigned char *field,
+                                 int len);
+__owur int ssl_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *pms, size_t pmslen,
+                                      int free_pms);
+__owur EVP_PKEY *ssl_generate_pkey(EVP_PKEY *pm);
+__owur int ssl_derive(SSL *s, EVP_PKEY *privkey, EVP_PKEY *pubkey);
+__owur EVP_PKEY *ssl_dh_to_pkey(DH *dh);
+
+__owur const SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_get_cipher_by_char(const unsigned char *p);
+__owur int ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(const SSL_CIPHER *c, unsigned char *p);
+int ssl3_init_finished_mac(SSL *s);
+__owur int ssl3_setup_key_block(SSL *s);
+__owur int ssl3_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which);
+void ssl3_cleanup_key_block(SSL *s);
+__owur int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type);
+int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc);
+__owur int ssl3_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
+                                       unsigned char *p, int len);
+__owur int ssl3_get_req_cert_type(SSL *s, unsigned char *p);
+__owur int ssl3_num_ciphers(void);
+__owur const SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_get_cipher(unsigned int u);
+int ssl3_renegotiate(SSL *ssl);
+int ssl3_renegotiate_check(SSL *ssl);
+__owur int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s);
+__owur int ssl3_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, const char *sender, int slen,
+                                 unsigned char *p);
+__owur int ssl3_finish_mac(SSL *s, const unsigned char *buf, int len);
+void ssl3_free_digest_list(SSL *s);
+__owur unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, CERT_PKEY *cpk);
+__owur const SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_choose_cipher(SSL *ssl,
+                                            STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *clnt,
+                                            STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *srvr);
+__owur int ssl3_digest_cached_records(SSL *s, int keep);
+__owur int ssl3_new(SSL *s);
+void ssl3_free(SSL *s);
+__owur int ssl3_read(SSL *s, void *buf, int len);
+__owur int ssl3_peek(SSL *s, void *buf, int len);
+__owur int ssl3_write(SSL *s, const void *buf, int len);
+__owur int ssl3_shutdown(SSL *s);
+void ssl3_clear(SSL *s);
+__owur long ssl3_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg);
+__owur long ssl3_ctx_ctrl(SSL_CTX *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg);
+__owur long ssl3_callback_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, void (*fp) (void));
+__owur long ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *s, int cmd, void (*fp) (void));
+
+__owur int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *ssl);
+__owur long ssl3_default_timeout(void);
+
+__owur int ssl3_set_handshake_header(SSL *s, int htype, unsigned long len);
+__owur int ssl3_handshake_write(SSL *s);
+
+__owur int ssl_allow_compression(SSL *s);
+
+__owur int ssl_version_supported(const SSL *s, int version);
+
+__owur int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL *s);
+__owur int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL *s);
+__owur int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound);
+__owur int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s);
+__owur int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version);
+int ssl_get_client_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version,
+                                   int *max_version);
+
+__owur long tls1_default_timeout(void);
+__owur int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type);
+void dtls1_set_message_header(SSL *s,
+                              unsigned char mt,
+                              unsigned long len,
+                              unsigned long frag_off, unsigned long frag_len);
+
+__owur int dtls1_write_app_data_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf,
+                                      int len);
+
+__owur int dtls1_read_failed(SSL *s, int code);
+__owur int dtls1_buffer_message(SSL *s, int ccs);
+__owur int dtls1_retransmit_message(SSL *s, unsigned short seq, int *found);
+__owur int dtls1_get_queue_priority(unsigned short seq, int is_ccs);
+int dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(SSL *s);
+void dtls1_clear_received_buffer(SSL *s);
+void dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(SSL *s);
+void dtls1_get_message_header(unsigned char *data,
+                              struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr);
+__owur long dtls1_default_timeout(void);
+__owur struct timeval *dtls1_get_timeout(SSL *s, struct timeval *timeleft);
+__owur int dtls1_check_timeout_num(SSL *s);
+__owur int dtls1_handle_timeout(SSL *s);
+void dtls1_start_timer(SSL *s);
+void dtls1_stop_timer(SSL *s);
+__owur int dtls1_is_timer_expired(SSL *s);
+void dtls1_double_timeout(SSL *s);
+__owur unsigned int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(unsigned char *buf,
+                                                  unsigned char *cookie,
+                                                  unsigned char cookie_len);
+__owur int dtls1_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s);
+__owur unsigned int dtls1_min_mtu(SSL *s);
+void dtls1_hm_fragment_free(hm_fragment *frag);
+__owur int dtls1_query_mtu(SSL *s);
+
+__owur int tls1_new(SSL *s);
+void tls1_free(SSL *s);
+void tls1_clear(SSL *s);
+long tls1_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg);
+long tls1_callback_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, void (*fp) (void));
+
+__owur int dtls1_new(SSL *s);
+void dtls1_free(SSL *s);
+void dtls1_clear(SSL *s);
+long dtls1_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg);
+__owur int dtls1_shutdown(SSL *s);
+
+__owur int dtls1_dispatch_alert(SSL *s);
+
+__owur int ssl_init_wbio_buffer(SSL *s);
+void ssl_free_wbio_buffer(SSL *s);
+
+__owur int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which);
+__owur int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s);
+__owur int tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s,
+                                 const char *str, int slen, unsigned char *p);
+__owur int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
+                                       unsigned char *p, int len);
+__owur int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
+                                       const char *label, size_t llen,
+                                       const unsigned char *p, size_t plen,
+                                       int use_context);
+__owur int tls1_alert_code(int code);
+__owur int ssl3_alert_code(int code);
+__owur int ssl_ok(SSL *s);
+
+#  ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+__owur int ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, SSL *s);
+#  endif
+
+SSL_COMP *ssl3_comp_find(STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *sk, int n);
+
+#  ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+/* Flags values from tls1_ec_curve_id2nid() */
+/* Mask for curve type */
+# define TLS_CURVE_TYPE          0x3
+# define TLS_CURVE_PRIME         0x0
+# define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2         0x1
+# define TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM        0x2
+__owur int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id, unsigned int *pflags);
+__owur int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid);
+__owur int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len);
+__owur int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch);
+__owur int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
+                           int *curves, size_t ncurves);
+__owur int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
+                                const char *str);
+__owur int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long id);
+__owur EVP_PKEY *ssl_generate_pkey_curve(int id);
+#  endif                        /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
+__owur int tls1_shared_list(SSL *s,
+                            const unsigned char *l1, size_t l1len,
+                            const unsigned char *l2, size_t l2len, int nmatch);
+__owur unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
+                                                 unsigned char *limit, int *al);
+__owur unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
+                                                 unsigned char *limit, int *al);
+__owur int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
+void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s);
+__owur int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s);
+__owur int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s, int *al);
+__owur int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
+__owur int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s);
+__owur int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
+
+#  ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+__owur int dtls1_heartbeat(SSL *s);
+__owur int dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s, unsigned char *p,
+                                   unsigned int length);
+#  endif
+
+__owur int tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early(SSL *s, const PACKET *ext,
+                                              const PACKET *session_id,
+                                              SSL_SESSION **ret);
+
+__owur int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
+                                const EVP_MD *md);
+__owur int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk);
+__owur const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg);
+void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op);
+
+__owur int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client);
+__owur int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *salg, size_t salglen,
+                            int client);
+int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
+                     int idx);
+void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s);
+
+#  ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
+__owur int ssl_validate_ct(SSL *s);
+#  endif
+
+#  ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+__owur DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s);
+#  endif
+
+__owur int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee);
+__owur int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *ex,
+                                   int vfy);
+
+__owur EVP_MD_CTX *ssl_replace_hash(EVP_MD_CTX **hash, const EVP_MD *md);
+void ssl_clear_hash_ctx(EVP_MD_CTX **hash);
+__owur int ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p,
+                                               int *len, int maxlen);
+__owur int ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al);
+__owur int ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p,
+                                               int *len, int maxlen);
+__owur int ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al);
+__owur long ssl_get_algorithm2(SSL *s);
+__owur size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
+                                 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen);
+__owur int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize);
+__owur int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s);
+__owur size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, int sent, const unsigned char **psigs);
+__owur int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
+                                   const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s);
+__owur int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op, int echde);
+
+__owur int ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len,
+                                            int maxlen);
+__owur int ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al);
+__owur int ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len,
+                                            int maxlen);
+__owur int ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al);
+
+__owur int ssl_handshake_hash(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, int outlen);
+__owur const EVP_MD *ssl_md(int idx);
+__owur const EVP_MD *ssl_handshake_md(SSL *s);
+__owur const EVP_MD *ssl_prf_md(SSL *s);
+
+/* s3_cbc.c */
+__owur char ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
+__owur int ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
+                                  unsigned char *md_out,
+                                  size_t *md_out_size,
+                                  const unsigned char header[13],
+                                  const unsigned char *data,
+                                  size_t data_plus_mac_size,
+                                  size_t data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size,
+                                  const unsigned char *mac_secret,
+                                  unsigned mac_secret_length, char is_sslv3);
+
+__owur int tls_fips_digest_extra(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cipher_ctx,
+                                 EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx, const unsigned char *data,
+                                 size_t data_len, size_t orig_len);
+
+__owur int srp_generate_server_master_secret(SSL *s);
+__owur int srp_generate_client_master_secret(SSL *s);
+__owur int srp_verify_server_param(SSL *s, int *al);
+
+/* t1_ext.c */
+
+void custom_ext_init(custom_ext_methods *meths);
+
+__owur int custom_ext_parse(SSL *s, int server,
+                            unsigned int ext_type,
+                            const unsigned char *ext_data, size_t ext_size,
+                            int *al);
+__owur int custom_ext_add(SSL *s, int server, unsigned char **pret,
+                          unsigned char *limit, int *al);
+
+__owur int custom_exts_copy(custom_ext_methods *dst,
+                            const custom_ext_methods *src);
+__owur int custom_exts_copy_flags(custom_ext_methods *dst,
+                                  const custom_ext_methods *src);
+void custom_exts_free(custom_ext_methods *exts);
+
+void ssl_comp_free_compression_methods_int(void);
+
+# else
+
+#  define ssl_init_wbio_buffer SSL_test_functions()->p_ssl_init_wbio_buffer
+#  define ssl3_setup_buffers SSL_test_functions()->p_ssl3_setup_buffers
+#  define dtls1_process_heartbeat SSL_test_functions()->p_dtls1_process_heartbeat
+
+# endif
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/ssl_mcnf.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/ssl_mcnf.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c2d9dba
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/ssl_mcnf.c
@@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/conf.h>
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+
+/* SSL library configuration module. */
+
+struct ssl_conf_name {
+    /* Name of this set of commands */
+    char *name;
+    /* List of commands */
+    struct ssl_conf_cmd *cmds;
+    /* Number of commands */
+    size_t cmd_count;
+};
+
+struct ssl_conf_cmd {
+    /* Command */
+    char *cmd;
+    /* Argument */
+    char *arg;
+};
+
+static struct ssl_conf_name *ssl_names;
+static size_t ssl_names_count;
+
+static void ssl_module_free(CONF_IMODULE *md)
+{
+    size_t i, j;
+    if (ssl_names == NULL)
+        return;
+    for (i = 0; i < ssl_names_count; i++) {
+        struct ssl_conf_name *tname = ssl_names + i;
+        OPENSSL_free(tname->name);
+        for (j = 0; j < tname->cmd_count; j++) {
+            OPENSSL_free(tname->cmds[j].cmd);
+            OPENSSL_free(tname->cmds[j].arg);
+        }
+        OPENSSL_free(tname->cmds);
+    }
+    OPENSSL_free(ssl_names);
+    ssl_names = NULL;
+    ssl_names_count = 0;
+}
+
+static int ssl_module_init(CONF_IMODULE *md, const CONF *cnf)
+{
+    size_t i, j, cnt;
+    int rv = 0;
+    const char *ssl_conf_section;
+    STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *cmd_lists;
+    ssl_conf_section = CONF_imodule_get_value(md);
+    cmd_lists = NCONF_get_section(cnf, ssl_conf_section);
+    if (sk_CONF_VALUE_num(cmd_lists) <= 0) {
+        if (cmd_lists == NULL)
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_MODULE_INIT, SSL_R_SSL_SECTION_NOT_FOUND);
+        else
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_MODULE_INIT, SSL_R_SSL_SECTION_EMPTY);
+        ERR_add_error_data(2, "section=", ssl_conf_section);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    cnt = sk_CONF_VALUE_num(cmd_lists);
+    ssl_names = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ssl_names) * cnt);
+    ssl_names_count = cnt;
+    for (i = 0; i < ssl_names_count; i++) {
+        struct ssl_conf_name *ssl_name = ssl_names + i;
+        CONF_VALUE *sect = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(cmd_lists, i);
+        STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *cmds = NCONF_get_section(cnf, sect->value);
+        if (sk_CONF_VALUE_num(cmds) <= 0) {
+            if (cmds == NULL)
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_MODULE_INIT,
+                       SSL_R_SSL_COMMAND_SECTION_NOT_FOUND);
+            else
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_MODULE_INIT, SSL_R_SSL_COMMAND_SECTION_EMPTY);
+            ERR_add_error_data(4, "name=", sect->name, ", value=", sect->value);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        ssl_name->name = BUF_strdup(sect->name);
+        if (ssl_name->name == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        cnt = sk_CONF_VALUE_num(cmds);
+        ssl_name->cmds = OPENSSL_zalloc(cnt * sizeof(struct ssl_conf_cmd));
+        if (ssl_name->cmds == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        ssl_name->cmd_count = cnt;
+        for (j = 0; j < cnt; j++) {
+            const char *name;
+            CONF_VALUE *cmd_conf = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(cmds, j);
+            struct ssl_conf_cmd *cmd = ssl_name->cmds + j;
+            /* Skip any initial dot in name */
+            name = strchr(cmd_conf->name, '.');
+            if (name != NULL)
+                name++;
+            else
+                name = cmd_conf->name;
+            cmd->cmd = BUF_strdup(name);
+            cmd->arg = BUF_strdup(cmd_conf->value);
+            if (cmd->cmd == NULL || cmd->arg == NULL)
+                goto err;
+        }
+
+    }
+    rv = 1;
+ err:
+    if (rv == 0)
+        ssl_module_free(md);
+    return rv;
+}
+
+void SSL_add_ssl_module(void)
+{
+    CONF_module_add("ssl_conf", ssl_module_init, ssl_module_free);
+}
+
+static const struct ssl_conf_name *ssl_name_find(const char *name)
+{
+    size_t i;
+    const struct ssl_conf_name *nm;
+    if (name == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    for (i = 0, nm = ssl_names; i < ssl_names_count; i++, nm++) {
+        if (strcmp(nm->name, name) == 0)
+            return nm;
+    }
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+static int ssl_do_config(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
+{
+    SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx = NULL;
+    size_t i;
+    int rv = 0;
+    unsigned int flags;
+    const SSL_METHOD *meth;
+    const struct ssl_conf_name *nm;
+    struct ssl_conf_cmd *cmd;
+    if (s == NULL && ctx == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DO_CONFIG, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    nm = ssl_name_find(name);
+    if (nm == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DO_CONFIG, SSL_R_INVALID_CONFIGURATION_NAME);
+        ERR_add_error_data(2, "name=", name);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    cctx = SSL_CONF_CTX_new();
+    if (cctx == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    flags = SSL_CONF_FLAG_FILE;
+    flags |= SSL_CONF_FLAG_CERTIFICATE | SSL_CONF_FLAG_REQUIRE_PRIVATE;
+    if (s != NULL) {
+        meth = s->method;
+        SSL_CONF_CTX_set_ssl(cctx, s);
+    } else {
+        meth = ctx->method;
+        SSL_CONF_CTX_set_ssl_ctx(cctx, ctx);
+    }
+    if (meth->ssl_accept != ssl_undefined_function)
+        flags |= SSL_CONF_FLAG_SERVER;
+    if (meth->ssl_connect != ssl_undefined_function)
+        flags |= SSL_CONF_FLAG_CLIENT;
+    SSL_CONF_CTX_set_flags(cctx, flags);
+    for (i = 0, cmd = nm->cmds; i < nm->cmd_count; i++, cmd++) {
+        rv = SSL_CONF_cmd(cctx, cmd->cmd, cmd->arg);
+        if (rv <= 0) {
+            if (rv == -2)
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DO_CONFIG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_COMMAND);
+            else
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DO_CONFIG, SSL_R_BAD_VALUE);
+            ERR_add_error_data(6, "section=", name, ", cmd=", cmd->cmd,
+                               ", arg=", cmd->arg);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+    rv = SSL_CONF_CTX_finish(cctx);
+ err:
+    SSL_CONF_CTX_free(cctx);
+    return rv <= 0 ? 0 : 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_config(SSL *s, const char *name)
+{
+    return ssl_do_config(s, NULL, name);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_config(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
+{
+    return ssl_do_config(NULL, ctx, name);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/ssl_rsa.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/ssl_rsa.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a94fb13
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/ssl_rsa.c
@@ -0,0 +1,964 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+
+static int ssl_set_cert(CERT *c, X509 *x509);
+static int ssl_set_pkey(CERT *c, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+int SSL_use_certificate(SSL *ssl, X509 *x)
+{
+    int rv;
+    if (x == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+        return (0);
+    }
+    rv = ssl_security_cert(ssl, NULL, x, 0, 1);
+    if (rv != 1) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE, rv);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return (ssl_set_cert(ssl->cert, x));
+}
+
+int SSL_use_certificate_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file, int type)
+{
+    int j;
+    BIO *in;
+    int ret = 0;
+    X509 *x = NULL;
+
+    in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
+    if (in == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (BIO_read_filename(in, file) <= 0) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
+        goto end;
+    }
+    if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1) {
+        j = ERR_R_ASN1_LIB;
+        x = d2i_X509_bio(in, NULL);
+    } else if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) {
+        j = ERR_R_PEM_LIB;
+        x = PEM_read_bio_X509(in, NULL, ssl->default_passwd_callback,
+                              ssl->default_passwd_callback_userdata);
+    } else {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE, SSL_R_BAD_SSL_FILETYPE);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (x == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE, j);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    ret = SSL_use_certificate(ssl, x);
+ end:
+    X509_free(x);
+    BIO_free(in);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+int SSL_use_certificate_ASN1(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *d, int len)
+{
+    X509 *x;
+    int ret;
+
+    x = d2i_X509(NULL, &d, (long)len);
+    if (x == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_ASN1, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+        return (0);
+    }
+
+    ret = SSL_use_certificate(ssl, x);
+    X509_free(x);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+int SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey(SSL *ssl, RSA *rsa)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+    int ret;
+
+    if (rsa == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+        return (0);
+    }
+    if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+        return (0);
+    }
+
+    RSA_up_ref(rsa);
+    if (EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa) <= 0) {
+        RSA_free(rsa);
+        EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    ret = ssl_set_pkey(ssl->cert, pkey);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+    return (ret);
+}
+#endif
+
+static int ssl_set_pkey(CERT *c, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    int i;
+    i = ssl_cert_type(NULL, pkey);
+    if (i < 0) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_PKEY, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
+        return (0);
+    }
+
+    if (c->pkeys[i].x509 != NULL) {
+        EVP_PKEY *pktmp;
+        pktmp = X509_get0_pubkey(c->pkeys[i].x509);
+        if (pktmp == NULL) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_PKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        /*
+         * The return code from EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters is deliberately
+         * ignored. Some EVP_PKEY types cannot do this.
+         */
+        EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pktmp, pkey);
+        ERR_clear_error();
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+        /*
+         * Don't check the public/private key, this is mostly for smart
+         * cards.
+         */
+        if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_RSA
+            && RSA_flags(EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey)) & RSA_METHOD_FLAG_NO_CHECK) ;
+        else
+#endif
+        if (!X509_check_private_key(c->pkeys[i].x509, pkey)) {
+            X509_free(c->pkeys[i].x509);
+            c->pkeys[i].x509 = NULL;
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    EVP_PKEY_free(c->pkeys[i].privatekey);
+    EVP_PKEY_up_ref(pkey);
+    c->pkeys[i].privatekey = pkey;
+    c->key = &(c->pkeys[i]);
+    return (1);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+int SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file, int type)
+{
+    int j, ret = 0;
+    BIO *in;
+    RSA *rsa = NULL;
+
+    in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
+    if (in == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (BIO_read_filename(in, file) <= 0) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
+        goto end;
+    }
+    if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1) {
+        j = ERR_R_ASN1_LIB;
+        rsa = d2i_RSAPrivateKey_bio(in, NULL);
+    } else if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) {
+        j = ERR_R_PEM_LIB;
+        rsa = PEM_read_bio_RSAPrivateKey(in, NULL,
+                                         ssl->default_passwd_callback,
+                                         ssl->default_passwd_callback_userdata);
+    } else {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE, SSL_R_BAD_SSL_FILETYPE);
+        goto end;
+    }
+    if (rsa == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE, j);
+        goto end;
+    }
+    ret = SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey(ssl, rsa);
+    RSA_free(rsa);
+ end:
+    BIO_free(in);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+int SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *d, long len)
+{
+    int ret;
+    const unsigned char *p;
+    RSA *rsa;
+
+    p = d;
+    if ((rsa = d2i_RSAPrivateKey(NULL, &p, (long)len)) == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_ASN1, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+        return (0);
+    }
+
+    ret = SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey(ssl, rsa);
+    RSA_free(rsa);
+    return (ret);
+}
+#endif                          /* !OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+
+int SSL_use_PrivateKey(SSL *ssl, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    int ret;
+
+    if (pkey == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+        return (0);
+    }
+    ret = ssl_set_pkey(ssl->cert, pkey);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+int SSL_use_PrivateKey_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file, int type)
+{
+    int j, ret = 0;
+    BIO *in;
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+
+    in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
+    if (in == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (BIO_read_filename(in, file) <= 0) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
+        goto end;
+    }
+    if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) {
+        j = ERR_R_PEM_LIB;
+        pkey = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(in, NULL,
+                                       ssl->default_passwd_callback,
+                                       ssl->default_passwd_callback_userdata);
+    } else if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1) {
+        j = ERR_R_ASN1_LIB;
+        pkey = d2i_PrivateKey_bio(in, NULL);
+    } else {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE, SSL_R_BAD_SSL_FILETYPE);
+        goto end;
+    }
+    if (pkey == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE, j);
+        goto end;
+    }
+    ret = SSL_use_PrivateKey(ssl, pkey);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ end:
+    BIO_free(in);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+int SSL_use_PrivateKey_ASN1(int type, SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *d,
+                            long len)
+{
+    int ret;
+    const unsigned char *p;
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+
+    p = d;
+    if ((pkey = d2i_PrivateKey(type, NULL, &p, (long)len)) == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY_ASN1, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+        return (0);
+    }
+
+    ret = SSL_use_PrivateKey(ssl, pkey);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_use_certificate(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
+{
+    int rv;
+    if (x == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+        return (0);
+    }
+    rv = ssl_security_cert(NULL, ctx, x, 0, 1);
+    if (rv != 1) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE, rv);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return (ssl_set_cert(ctx->cert, x));
+}
+
+static int ssl_set_cert(CERT *c, X509 *x)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+    int i;
+
+    pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
+    if (pkey == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_CERT, SSL_R_X509_LIB);
+        return (0);
+    }
+
+    i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey);
+    if (i < 0) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_CERT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    if (i == SSL_PKEY_ECC && !EC_KEY_can_sign(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey))) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_CERT, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_SIGNING);
+        return 0;
+    }
+#endif
+    if (c->pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL) {
+        /*
+         * The return code from EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters is deliberately
+         * ignored. Some EVP_PKEY types cannot do this.
+         */
+        EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, c->pkeys[i].privatekey);
+        ERR_clear_error();
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+        /*
+         * Don't check the public/private key, this is mostly for smart
+         * cards.
+         */
+        if (EVP_PKEY_id(c->pkeys[i].privatekey) == EVP_PKEY_RSA
+            && RSA_flags(EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(c->pkeys[i].privatekey)) &
+            RSA_METHOD_FLAG_NO_CHECK) ;
+        else
+#endif                          /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+        if (!X509_check_private_key(x, c->pkeys[i].privatekey)) {
+            /*
+             * don't fail for a cert/key mismatch, just free current private
+             * key (when switching to a different cert & key, first this
+             * function should be used, then ssl_set_pkey
+             */
+            EVP_PKEY_free(c->pkeys[i].privatekey);
+            c->pkeys[i].privatekey = NULL;
+            /* clear error queue */
+            ERR_clear_error();
+        }
+    }
+
+    X509_free(c->pkeys[i].x509);
+    X509_up_ref(x);
+    c->pkeys[i].x509 = x;
+    c->key = &(c->pkeys[i]);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file, int type)
+{
+    int j;
+    BIO *in;
+    int ret = 0;
+    X509 *x = NULL;
+
+    in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
+    if (in == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (BIO_read_filename(in, file) <= 0) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
+        goto end;
+    }
+    if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1) {
+        j = ERR_R_ASN1_LIB;
+        x = d2i_X509_bio(in, NULL);
+    } else if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) {
+        j = ERR_R_PEM_LIB;
+        x = PEM_read_bio_X509(in, NULL, ctx->default_passwd_callback,
+                              ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata);
+    } else {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE, SSL_R_BAD_SSL_FILETYPE);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (x == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE, j);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    ret = SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx, x);
+ end:
+    X509_free(x);
+    BIO_free(in);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_ASN1(SSL_CTX *ctx, int len, const unsigned char *d)
+{
+    X509 *x;
+    int ret;
+
+    x = d2i_X509(NULL, &d, (long)len);
+    if (x == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_ASN1, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+        return (0);
+    }
+
+    ret = SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx, x);
+    X509_free(x);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey(SSL_CTX *ctx, RSA *rsa)
+{
+    int ret;
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+
+    if (rsa == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+        return (0);
+    }
+    if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+        return (0);
+    }
+
+    RSA_up_ref(rsa);
+    if (EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa) <= 0) {
+        RSA_free(rsa);
+        EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    ret = ssl_set_pkey(ctx->cert, pkey);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file, int type)
+{
+    int j, ret = 0;
+    BIO *in;
+    RSA *rsa = NULL;
+
+    in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
+    if (in == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (BIO_read_filename(in, file) <= 0) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
+        goto end;
+    }
+    if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1) {
+        j = ERR_R_ASN1_LIB;
+        rsa = d2i_RSAPrivateKey_bio(in, NULL);
+    } else if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) {
+        j = ERR_R_PEM_LIB;
+        rsa = PEM_read_bio_RSAPrivateKey(in, NULL,
+                                         ctx->default_passwd_callback,
+                                         ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata);
+    } else {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE, SSL_R_BAD_SSL_FILETYPE);
+        goto end;
+    }
+    if (rsa == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE, j);
+        goto end;
+    }
+    ret = SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey(ctx, rsa);
+    RSA_free(rsa);
+ end:
+    BIO_free(in);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *d,
+                                   long len)
+{
+    int ret;
+    const unsigned char *p;
+    RSA *rsa;
+
+    p = d;
+    if ((rsa = d2i_RSAPrivateKey(NULL, &p, (long)len)) == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_ASN1, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+        return (0);
+    }
+
+    ret = SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey(ctx, rsa);
+    RSA_free(rsa);
+    return (ret);
+}
+#endif                          /* !OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+
+int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(SSL_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    if (pkey == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+        return (0);
+    }
+    return (ssl_set_pkey(ctx->cert, pkey));
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file, int type)
+{
+    int j, ret = 0;
+    BIO *in;
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+
+    in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
+    if (in == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (BIO_read_filename(in, file) <= 0) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
+        goto end;
+    }
+    if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) {
+        j = ERR_R_PEM_LIB;
+        pkey = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(in, NULL,
+                                       ctx->default_passwd_callback,
+                                       ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata);
+    } else if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1) {
+        j = ERR_R_ASN1_LIB;
+        pkey = d2i_PrivateKey_bio(in, NULL);
+    } else {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE, SSL_R_BAD_SSL_FILETYPE);
+        goto end;
+    }
+    if (pkey == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE, j);
+        goto end;
+    }
+    ret = SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(ctx, pkey);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ end:
+    BIO_free(in);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_ASN1(int type, SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                const unsigned char *d, long len)
+{
+    int ret;
+    const unsigned char *p;
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+
+    p = d;
+    if ((pkey = d2i_PrivateKey(type, NULL, &p, (long)len)) == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY_ASN1, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+        return (0);
+    }
+
+    ret = SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(ctx, pkey);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read a file that contains our certificate in "PEM" format, possibly
+ * followed by a sequence of CA certificates that should be sent to the peer
+ * in the Certificate message.
+ */
+static int use_certificate_chain_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL *ssl, const char *file)
+{
+    BIO *in;
+    int ret = 0;
+    X509 *x = NULL;
+    pem_password_cb *passwd_callback;
+    void *passwd_callback_userdata;
+
+    ERR_clear_error();          /* clear error stack for
+                                 * SSL_CTX_use_certificate() */
+
+    if (ctx != NULL) {
+        passwd_callback = ctx->default_passwd_callback;
+        passwd_callback_userdata = ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata;
+    } else {
+        passwd_callback = ssl->default_passwd_callback;
+        passwd_callback_userdata = ssl->default_passwd_callback_userdata;
+    }
+
+    in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
+    if (in == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_USE_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN_FILE, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (BIO_read_filename(in, file) <= 0) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_USE_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN_FILE, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    x = PEM_read_bio_X509_AUX(in, NULL, passwd_callback,
+                              passwd_callback_userdata);
+    if (x == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_USE_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN_FILE, ERR_R_PEM_LIB);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (ctx)
+        ret = SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx, x);
+    else
+        ret = SSL_use_certificate(ssl, x);
+
+    if (ERR_peek_error() != 0)
+        ret = 0;                /* Key/certificate mismatch doesn't imply
+                                 * ret==0 ... */
+    if (ret) {
+        /*
+         * If we could set up our certificate, now proceed to the CA
+         * certificates.
+         */
+        X509 *ca;
+        int r;
+        unsigned long err;
+
+        if (ctx)
+            r = SSL_CTX_clear_chain_certs(ctx);
+        else
+            r = SSL_clear_chain_certs(ssl);
+
+        if (r == 0) {
+            ret = 0;
+            goto end;
+        }
+
+        while ((ca = PEM_read_bio_X509(in, NULL, passwd_callback,
+                                       passwd_callback_userdata))
+               != NULL) {
+            if (ctx)
+                r = SSL_CTX_add0_chain_cert(ctx, ca);
+            else
+                r = SSL_add0_chain_cert(ssl, ca);
+            /*
+             * Note that we must not free ca if it was successfully added to
+             * the chain (while we must free the main certificate, since its
+             * reference count is increased by SSL_CTX_use_certificate).
+             */
+            if (!r) {
+                X509_free(ca);
+                ret = 0;
+                goto end;
+            }
+        }
+        /* When the while loop ends, it's usually just EOF. */
+        err = ERR_peek_last_error();
+        if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_PEM
+            && ERR_GET_REASON(err) == PEM_R_NO_START_LINE)
+            ERR_clear_error();
+        else
+            ret = 0;            /* some real error */
+    }
+
+ end:
+    X509_free(x);
+    BIO_free(in);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file)
+{
+    return use_certificate_chain_file(ctx, NULL, file);
+}
+
+int SSL_use_certificate_chain_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file)
+{
+    return use_certificate_chain_file(NULL, ssl, file);
+}
+
+static int serverinfo_find_extension(const unsigned char *serverinfo,
+                                     size_t serverinfo_length,
+                                     unsigned int extension_type,
+                                     const unsigned char **extension_data,
+                                     size_t *extension_length)
+{
+    *extension_data = NULL;
+    *extension_length = 0;
+    if (serverinfo == NULL || serverinfo_length == 0)
+        return -1;
+    for (;;) {
+        unsigned int type = 0;
+        size_t len = 0;
+
+        /* end of serverinfo */
+        if (serverinfo_length == 0)
+            return 0;           /* Extension not found */
+
+        /* read 2-byte type field */
+        if (serverinfo_length < 2)
+            return -1;          /* Error */
+        type = (serverinfo[0] << 8) + serverinfo[1];
+        serverinfo += 2;
+        serverinfo_length -= 2;
+
+        /* read 2-byte len field */
+        if (serverinfo_length < 2)
+            return -1;          /* Error */
+        len = (serverinfo[0] << 8) + serverinfo[1];
+        serverinfo += 2;
+        serverinfo_length -= 2;
+
+        if (len > serverinfo_length)
+            return -1;          /* Error */
+
+        if (type == extension_type) {
+            *extension_data = serverinfo;
+            *extension_length = len;
+            return 1;           /* Success */
+        }
+
+        serverinfo += len;
+        serverinfo_length -= len;
+    }
+    /* Unreachable */
+}
+
+static int serverinfo_srv_parse_cb(SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type,
+                                   const unsigned char *in,
+                                   size_t inlen, int *al, void *arg)
+{
+
+    if (inlen != 0) {
+        *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int serverinfo_srv_add_cb(SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type,
+                                 const unsigned char **out, size_t *outlen,
+                                 int *al, void *arg)
+{
+    const unsigned char *serverinfo = NULL;
+    size_t serverinfo_length = 0;
+
+    /* Is there serverinfo data for the chosen server cert? */
+    if ((ssl_get_server_cert_serverinfo(s, &serverinfo,
+                                        &serverinfo_length)) != 0) {
+        /* Find the relevant extension from the serverinfo */
+        int retval = serverinfo_find_extension(serverinfo, serverinfo_length,
+                                               ext_type, out, outlen);
+        if (retval == -1) {
+            *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+            return -1;          /* Error */
+        }
+        if (retval == 0)
+            return 0;           /* No extension found, don't send extension */
+        return 1;               /* Send extension */
+    }
+    return 0;                   /* No serverinfo data found, don't send
+                                 * extension */
+}
+
+/*
+ * With a NULL context, this function just checks that the serverinfo data
+ * parses correctly.  With a non-NULL context, it registers callbacks for
+ * the included extensions.
+ */
+static int serverinfo_process_buffer(const unsigned char *serverinfo,
+                                     size_t serverinfo_length, SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    if (serverinfo == NULL || serverinfo_length == 0)
+        return 0;
+    for (;;) {
+        unsigned int ext_type = 0;
+        size_t len = 0;
+
+        /* end of serverinfo */
+        if (serverinfo_length == 0)
+            return 1;
+
+        /* read 2-byte type field */
+        if (serverinfo_length < 2)
+            return 0;
+        /* FIXME: check for types we understand explicitly? */
+
+        /* Register callbacks for extensions */
+        ext_type = (serverinfo[0] << 8) + serverinfo[1];
+        if (ctx) {
+            int have_ext_cbs = 0;
+            size_t i;
+            custom_ext_methods *exts = &ctx->cert->srv_ext;
+            custom_ext_method *meth = exts->meths;
+
+            for (i = 0; i < exts->meths_count; i++, meth++) {
+                if (ext_type == meth->ext_type) {
+                    have_ext_cbs = 1;
+                    break;
+                }
+            }
+
+            if (!have_ext_cbs && !SSL_CTX_add_server_custom_ext(ctx, ext_type,
+                                                                serverinfo_srv_add_cb,
+                                                                NULL, NULL,
+                                                                serverinfo_srv_parse_cb,
+                                                                NULL))
+                return 0;
+        }
+
+        serverinfo += 2;
+        serverinfo_length -= 2;
+
+        /* read 2-byte len field */
+        if (serverinfo_length < 2)
+            return 0;
+        len = (serverinfo[0] << 8) + serverinfo[1];
+        serverinfo += 2;
+        serverinfo_length -= 2;
+
+        if (len > serverinfo_length)
+            return 0;
+
+        serverinfo += len;
+        serverinfo_length -= len;
+    }
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *serverinfo,
+                           size_t serverinfo_length)
+{
+    unsigned char *new_serverinfo;
+
+    if (ctx == NULL || serverinfo == NULL || serverinfo_length == 0) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_SERVERINFO, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (!serverinfo_process_buffer(serverinfo, serverinfo_length, NULL)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_SERVERINFO, SSL_R_INVALID_SERVERINFO_DATA);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (ctx->cert->key == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_SERVERINFO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    new_serverinfo = OPENSSL_realloc(ctx->cert->key->serverinfo,
+                                     serverinfo_length);
+    if (new_serverinfo == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_SERVERINFO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    ctx->cert->key->serverinfo = new_serverinfo;
+    memcpy(ctx->cert->key->serverinfo, serverinfo, serverinfo_length);
+    ctx->cert->key->serverinfo_length = serverinfo_length;
+
+    /*
+     * Now that the serverinfo is validated and stored, go ahead and
+     * register callbacks.
+     */
+    if (!serverinfo_process_buffer(serverinfo, serverinfo_length, ctx)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_SERVERINFO, SSL_R_INVALID_SERVERINFO_DATA);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file)
+{
+    unsigned char *serverinfo = NULL;
+    unsigned char *tmp;
+    size_t serverinfo_length = 0;
+    unsigned char *extension = 0;
+    long extension_length = 0;
+    char *name = NULL;
+    char *header = NULL;
+    char namePrefix[] = "SERVERINFO FOR ";
+    int ret = 0;
+    BIO *bin = NULL;
+    size_t num_extensions = 0;
+
+    if (ctx == NULL || file == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_SERVERINFO_FILE, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    bin = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
+    if (bin == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_SERVERINFO_FILE, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+        goto end;
+    }
+    if (BIO_read_filename(bin, file) <= 0) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_SERVERINFO_FILE, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    for (num_extensions = 0;; num_extensions++) {
+        if (PEM_read_bio(bin, &name, &header, &extension, &extension_length)
+            == 0) {
+            /*
+             * There must be at least one extension in this file
+             */
+            if (num_extensions == 0) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_SERVERINFO_FILE,
+                       SSL_R_NO_PEM_EXTENSIONS);
+                goto end;
+            } else              /* End of file, we're done */
+                break;
+        }
+        /* Check that PEM name starts with "BEGIN SERVERINFO FOR " */
+        if (strlen(name) < strlen(namePrefix)) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_SERVERINFO_FILE, SSL_R_PEM_NAME_TOO_SHORT);
+            goto end;
+        }
+        if (strncmp(name, namePrefix, strlen(namePrefix)) != 0) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_SERVERINFO_FILE,
+                   SSL_R_PEM_NAME_BAD_PREFIX);
+            goto end;
+        }
+        /*
+         * Check that the decoded PEM data is plausible (valid length field)
+         */
+        if (extension_length < 4
+            || (extension[2] << 8) + extension[3] != extension_length - 4) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_SERVERINFO_FILE, SSL_R_BAD_DATA);
+            goto end;
+        }
+        /* Append the decoded extension to the serverinfo buffer */
+        tmp = OPENSSL_realloc(serverinfo, serverinfo_length + extension_length);
+        if (tmp == NULL) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_SERVERINFO_FILE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto end;
+        }
+        serverinfo = tmp;
+        memcpy(serverinfo + serverinfo_length, extension, extension_length);
+        serverinfo_length += extension_length;
+
+        OPENSSL_free(name);
+        name = NULL;
+        OPENSSL_free(header);
+        header = NULL;
+        OPENSSL_free(extension);
+        extension = NULL;
+    }
+
+    ret = SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo(ctx, serverinfo, serverinfo_length);
+ end:
+    /* SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo makes a local copy of the serverinfo. */
+    OPENSSL_free(name);
+    OPENSSL_free(header);
+    OPENSSL_free(extension);
+    OPENSSL_free(serverinfo);
+    BIO_free(bin);
+    return ret;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/ssl_sess.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/ssl_sess.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0dea8b5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/ssl_sess.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1179 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/lhash.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+
+static void SSL_SESSION_list_remove(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s);
+static void SSL_SESSION_list_add(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s);
+static int remove_session_lock(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c, int lck);
+
+SSL_SESSION *SSL_get_session(const SSL *ssl)
+/* aka SSL_get0_session; gets 0 objects, just returns a copy of the pointer */
+{
+    return (ssl->session);
+}
+
+SSL_SESSION *SSL_get1_session(SSL *ssl)
+/* variant of SSL_get_session: caller really gets something */
+{
+    SSL_SESSION *sess;
+    /*
+     * Need to lock this all up rather than just use CRYPTO_add so that
+     * somebody doesn't free ssl->session between when we check it's non-null
+     * and when we up the reference count.
+     */
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(ssl->lock);
+    sess = ssl->session;
+    if (sess)
+        SSL_SESSION_up_ref(sess);
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ssl->lock);
+    return sess;
+}
+
+int SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data(SSL_SESSION *s, int idx, void *arg)
+{
+    return (CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx, arg));
+}
+
+void *SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(const SSL_SESSION *s, int idx)
+{
+    return (CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx));
+}
+
+SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_new(void)
+{
+    SSL_SESSION *ss;
+
+    ss = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ss));
+    if (ss == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    ss->verify_result = 1;      /* avoid 0 (= X509_V_OK) just in case */
+    ss->references = 1;
+    ss->timeout = 60 * 5 + 4;   /* 5 minute timeout by default */
+    ss->time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
+    ss->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
+    if (ss->lock == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        OPENSSL_free(ss);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, ss, &ss->ex_data)) {
+        CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(ss->lock);
+        OPENSSL_free(ss);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    return ss;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Create a new SSL_SESSION and duplicate the contents of |src| into it. If
+ * ticket == 0 then no ticket information is duplicated, otherwise it is.
+ */
+SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket)
+{
+    SSL_SESSION *dest;
+
+    dest = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*src));
+    if (dest == NULL) {
+        goto err;
+    }
+    memcpy(dest, src, sizeof(*dest));
+
+    /*
+     * Set the various pointers to NULL so that we can call SSL_SESSION_free in
+     * the case of an error whilst halfway through constructing dest
+     */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+    dest->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
+    dest->psk_identity = NULL;
+#endif
+    dest->ciphers = NULL;
+    dest->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    dest->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
+    dest->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = NULL;
+#endif
+    dest->tlsext_tick = NULL;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+    dest->srp_username = NULL;
+#endif
+    dest->peer_chain = NULL;
+    dest->peer = NULL;
+    memset(&dest->ex_data, 0, sizeof(dest->ex_data));
+
+    /* We deliberately don't copy the prev and next pointers */
+    dest->prev = NULL;
+    dest->next = NULL;
+
+    dest->references = 1;
+
+    dest->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
+    if (dest->lock == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, dest, &dest->ex_data))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (src->peer != NULL) {
+        if (!X509_up_ref(src->peer))
+            goto err;
+        dest->peer = src->peer;
+    }
+
+    if (src->peer_chain != NULL) {
+        dest->peer_chain = X509_chain_up_ref(src->peer_chain);
+        if (dest->peer_chain == NULL)
+            goto err;
+    }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+    if (src->psk_identity_hint) {
+        dest->psk_identity_hint = OPENSSL_strdup(src->psk_identity_hint);
+        if (dest->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+    if (src->psk_identity) {
+        dest->psk_identity = OPENSSL_strdup(src->psk_identity);
+        if (dest->psk_identity == NULL) {
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+#endif
+
+    if (src->ciphers != NULL) {
+        dest->ciphers = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(src->ciphers);
+        if (dest->ciphers == NULL)
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION,
+                            &dest->ex_data, &src->ex_data)) {
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (src->tlsext_hostname) {
+        dest->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(src->tlsext_hostname);
+        if (dest->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    if (src->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
+        dest->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
+            OPENSSL_memdup(src->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
+                           src->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
+        if (dest->tlsext_ecpointformatlist == NULL)
+            goto err;
+    }
+    if (src->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) {
+        dest->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
+            OPENSSL_memdup(src->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
+                           src->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
+        if (dest->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist == NULL)
+            goto err;
+    }
+#endif
+
+    if (ticket != 0 && src->tlsext_tick != NULL) {
+        dest->tlsext_tick =
+            OPENSSL_memdup(src->tlsext_tick, src->tlsext_ticklen);
+        if (dest->tlsext_tick == NULL)
+            goto err;
+    } else {
+        dest->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = 0;
+        dest->tlsext_ticklen = 0;
+    }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+    if (src->srp_username) {
+        dest->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(src->srp_username);
+        if (dest->srp_username == NULL) {
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+#endif
+
+    return dest;
+ err:
+    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    SSL_SESSION_free(dest);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+const unsigned char *SSL_SESSION_get_id(const SSL_SESSION *s, unsigned int *len)
+{
+    if (len)
+        *len = s->session_id_length;
+    return s->session_id;
+}
+const unsigned char *SSL_SESSION_get0_id_context(const SSL_SESSION *s,
+                                                unsigned int *len)
+{
+    if (len != NULL)
+        *len = s->sid_ctx_length;
+    return s->sid_ctx;
+}
+
+unsigned int SSL_SESSION_get_compress_id(const SSL_SESSION *s)
+{
+    return s->compress_meth;
+}
+
+/*
+ * SSLv3/TLSv1 has 32 bytes (256 bits) of session ID space. As such, filling
+ * the ID with random junk repeatedly until we have no conflict is going to
+ * complete in one iteration pretty much "most" of the time (btw:
+ * understatement). So, if it takes us 10 iterations and we still can't avoid
+ * a conflict - well that's a reasonable point to call it quits. Either the
+ * RAND code is broken or someone is trying to open roughly very close to
+ * 2^256 SSL sessions to our server. How you might store that many sessions
+ * is perhaps a more interesting question ...
+ */
+
+#define MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS 10
+static int def_generate_session_id(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *id,
+                                   unsigned int *id_len)
+{
+    unsigned int retry = 0;
+    do
+        if (RAND_bytes(id, *id_len) <= 0)
+            return 0;
+    while (SSL_has_matching_session_id(ssl, id, *id_len) &&
+           (++retry < MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS)) ;
+    if (retry < MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS)
+        return 1;
+    /* else - woops a session_id match */
+    /*
+     * XXX We should also check the external cache -- but the probability of
+     * a collision is negligible, and we could not prevent the concurrent
+     * creation of sessions with identical IDs since we currently don't have
+     * means to atomically check whether a session ID already exists and make
+     * a reservation for it if it does not (this problem applies to the
+     * internal cache as well).
+     */
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int ssl_get_new_session(SSL *s, int session)
+{
+    /* This gets used by clients and servers. */
+
+    unsigned int tmp;
+    SSL_SESSION *ss = NULL;
+    GEN_SESSION_CB cb = def_generate_session_id;
+
+    if ((ss = SSL_SESSION_new()) == NULL)
+        return (0);
+
+    /* If the context has a default timeout, use it */
+    if (s->session_ctx->session_timeout == 0)
+        ss->timeout = SSL_get_default_timeout(s);
+    else
+        ss->timeout = s->session_ctx->session_timeout;
+
+    SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+    s->session = NULL;
+
+    if (session) {
+        if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
+            ss->ssl_version = SSL3_VERSION;
+            ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
+        } else if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION) {
+            ss->ssl_version = TLS1_VERSION;
+            ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
+        } else if (s->version == TLS1_1_VERSION) {
+            ss->ssl_version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
+            ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
+        } else if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+            ss->ssl_version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
+            ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
+        } else if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
+            ss->ssl_version = DTLS1_BAD_VER;
+            ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
+        } else if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION) {
+            ss->ssl_version = DTLS1_VERSION;
+            ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
+        } else if (s->version == DTLS1_2_VERSION) {
+            ss->ssl_version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
+            ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
+        } else {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_SSL_VERSION);
+            SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
+            return (0);
+        }
+
+        /*-
+         * If RFC5077 ticket, use empty session ID (as server).
+         * Note that:
+         * (a) ssl_get_prev_session() does lookahead into the
+         *     ClientHello extensions to find the session ticket.
+         *     When ssl_get_prev_session() fails, statem_srvr.c calls
+         *     ssl_get_new_session() in tls_process_client_hello().
+         *     At that point, it has not yet parsed the extensions,
+         *     however, because of the lookahead, it already knows
+         *     whether a ticket is expected or not.
+         *
+         * (b) statem_clnt.c calls ssl_get_new_session() before parsing
+         *     ServerHello extensions, and before recording the session
+         *     ID received from the server, so this block is a noop.
+         */
+        if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
+            ss->session_id_length = 0;
+            goto sess_id_done;
+        }
+
+        /* Choose which callback will set the session ID */
+        CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(s->lock);
+        CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(s->session_ctx->lock);
+        if (s->generate_session_id)
+            cb = s->generate_session_id;
+        else if (s->session_ctx->generate_session_id)
+            cb = s->session_ctx->generate_session_id;
+        CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(s->session_ctx->lock);
+        CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(s->lock);
+        /* Choose a session ID */
+        memset(ss->session_id, 0, ss->session_id_length);
+        tmp = ss->session_id_length;
+        if (!cb(s, ss->session_id, &tmp)) {
+            /* The callback failed */
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION,
+                   SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CALLBACK_FAILED);
+            SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
+            return (0);
+        }
+        /*
+         * Don't allow the callback to set the session length to zero. nor
+         * set it higher than it was.
+         */
+        if (tmp == 0 || tmp > ss->session_id_length) {
+            /* The callback set an illegal length */
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION,
+                   SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_HAS_BAD_LENGTH);
+            SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
+            return (0);
+        }
+        ss->session_id_length = tmp;
+        /* Finally, check for a conflict */
+        if (SSL_has_matching_session_id(s, ss->session_id,
+                                        ss->session_id_length)) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONFLICT);
+            SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
+            return (0);
+        }
+
+ sess_id_done:
+        if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
+            ss->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
+            if (ss->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
+                return 0;
+            }
+        }
+    } else {
+        ss->session_id_length = 0;
+    }
+
+    if (s->sid_ctx_length > sizeof(ss->sid_ctx)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    memcpy(ss->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length);
+    ss->sid_ctx_length = s->sid_ctx_length;
+    s->session = ss;
+    ss->ssl_version = s->version;
+    ss->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
+
+    /* If client supports extended master secret set it in session */
+    if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS)
+        ss->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
+
+    return (1);
+}
+
+/*-
+ * ssl_get_prev attempts to find an SSL_SESSION to be used to resume this
+ * connection. It is only called by servers.
+ *
+ *   ext: ClientHello extensions (including length prefix)
+ *   session_id: ClientHello session ID.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *   -1: error
+ *    0: a session may have been found.
+ *
+ * Side effects:
+ *   - If a session is found then s->session is pointed at it (after freeing an
+ *     existing session if need be) and s->verify_result is set from the session.
+ *   - Both for new and resumed sessions, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 1
+ *     if the server should issue a new session ticket (to 0 otherwise).
+ */
+int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, const PACKET *ext, const PACKET *session_id)
+{
+    /* This is used only by servers. */
+
+    SSL_SESSION *ret = NULL;
+    int fatal = 0;
+    int try_session_cache = 1;
+    int r;
+
+    if (PACKET_remaining(session_id) == 0)
+        try_session_cache = 0;
+
+    /* sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected and extended master secret flag */
+    r = tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early(s, ext, session_id, &ret);
+    switch (r) {
+    case -1:                   /* Error during processing */
+        fatal = 1;
+        goto err;
+    case 0:                    /* No ticket found */
+    case 1:                    /* Zero length ticket found */
+        break;                  /* Ok to carry on processing session id. */
+    case 2:                    /* Ticket found but not decrypted. */
+    case 3:                    /* Ticket decrypted, *ret has been set. */
+        try_session_cache = 0;
+        break;
+    default:
+        abort();
+    }
+
+    if (try_session_cache &&
+        ret == NULL &&
+        !(s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode &
+          SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP)) {
+        SSL_SESSION data;
+        size_t local_len;
+        data.ssl_version = s->version;
+        memset(data.session_id, 0, sizeof(data.session_id));
+        if (!PACKET_copy_all(session_id, data.session_id,
+                             sizeof(data.session_id), &local_len)) {
+            goto err;
+        }
+        data.session_id_length = local_len;
+        CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(s->session_ctx->lock);
+        ret = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(s->session_ctx->sessions, &data);
+        if (ret != NULL) {
+            /* don't allow other threads to steal it: */
+            SSL_SESSION_up_ref(ret);
+        }
+        CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(s->session_ctx->lock);
+        if (ret == NULL)
+            s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss++;
+    }
+
+    if (try_session_cache &&
+        ret == NULL && s->session_ctx->get_session_cb != NULL) {
+        int copy = 1;
+        ret = s->session_ctx->get_session_cb(s, PACKET_data(session_id),
+                                             PACKET_remaining(session_id),
+                                             &copy);
+
+        if (ret != NULL) {
+            s->session_ctx->stats.sess_cb_hit++;
+
+            /*
+             * Increment reference count now if the session callback asks us
+             * to do so (note that if the session structures returned by the
+             * callback are shared between threads, it must handle the
+             * reference count itself [i.e. copy == 0], or things won't be
+             * thread-safe).
+             */
+            if (copy)
+                SSL_SESSION_up_ref(ret);
+
+            /*
+             * Add the externally cached session to the internal cache as
+             * well if and only if we are supposed to.
+             */
+            if (!
+                (s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode &
+                 SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE)) {
+                /*
+                 * Either return value of SSL_CTX_add_session should not
+                 * interrupt the session resumption process. The return
+                 * value is intentionally ignored.
+                 */
+                SSL_CTX_add_session(s->session_ctx, ret);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (ret == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* Now ret is non-NULL and we own one of its reference counts. */
+
+    if (ret->sid_ctx_length != s->sid_ctx_length
+        || memcmp(ret->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, ret->sid_ctx_length)) {
+        /*
+         * We have the session requested by the client, but we don't want to
+         * use it in this context.
+         */
+        goto err;               /* treat like cache miss */
+    }
+
+    if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && s->sid_ctx_length == 0) {
+        /*
+         * We can't be sure if this session is being used out of context,
+         * which is especially important for SSL_VERIFY_PEER. The application
+         * should have used SSL[_CTX]_set_session_id_context. For this error
+         * case, we generate an error instead of treating the event like a
+         * cache miss (otherwise it would be easy for applications to
+         * effectively disable the session cache by accident without anyone
+         * noticing).
+         */
+
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION,
+               SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED);
+        fatal = 1;
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (ret->cipher == NULL) {
+        unsigned char buf[5], *p;
+        unsigned long l;
+
+        p = buf;
+        l = ret->cipher_id;
+        l2n(l, p);
+        if ((ret->ssl_version >> 8) >= SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
+            ret->cipher = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, &(buf[2]));
+        else
+            ret->cipher = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, &(buf[1]));
+        if (ret->cipher == NULL)
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (ret->timeout < (long)(time(NULL) - ret->time)) { /* timeout */
+        s->session_ctx->stats.sess_timeout++;
+        if (try_session_cache) {
+            /* session was from the cache, so remove it */
+            SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, ret);
+        }
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* Check extended master secret extension consistency */
+    if (ret->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS) {
+        /* If old session includes extms, but new does not: abort handshake */
+        if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS)) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
+            ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+            fatal = 1;
+            goto err;
+        }
+    } else if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) {
+        /* If new session includes extms, but old does not: do not resume */
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    s->session_ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
+
+    SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+    s->session = ret;
+    s->verify_result = s->session->verify_result;
+    return 1;
+
+ err:
+    if (ret != NULL) {
+        SSL_SESSION_free(ret);
+
+        if (!try_session_cache) {
+            /*
+             * The session was from a ticket, so we should issue a ticket for
+             * the new session
+             */
+            s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
+        }
+    }
+    if (fatal)
+        return -1;
+    else
+        return 0;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_add_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    SSL_SESSION *s;
+
+    /*
+     * add just 1 reference count for the SSL_CTX's session cache even though
+     * it has two ways of access: each session is in a doubly linked list and
+     * an lhash
+     */
+    SSL_SESSION_up_ref(c);
+    /*
+     * if session c is in already in cache, we take back the increment later
+     */
+
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(ctx->lock);
+    s = lh_SSL_SESSION_insert(ctx->sessions, c);
+
+    /*
+     * s != NULL iff we already had a session with the given PID. In this
+     * case, s == c should hold (then we did not really modify
+     * ctx->sessions), or we're in trouble.
+     */
+    if (s != NULL && s != c) {
+        /* We *are* in trouble ... */
+        SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx, s);
+        SSL_SESSION_free(s);
+        /*
+         * ... so pretend the other session did not exist in cache (we cannot
+         * handle two SSL_SESSION structures with identical session ID in the
+         * same cache, which could happen e.g. when two threads concurrently
+         * obtain the same session from an external cache)
+         */
+        s = NULL;
+    } else if (s == NULL &&
+               lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(ctx->sessions, c) == NULL) {
+        /* s == NULL can also mean OOM error in lh_SSL_SESSION_insert ... */
+
+        /*
+         * ... so take back the extra reference and also don't add
+         * the session to the SSL_SESSION_list at this time
+         */
+        s = c;
+    }
+
+    /* Put at the head of the queue unless it is already in the cache */
+    if (s == NULL)
+        SSL_SESSION_list_add(ctx, c);
+
+    if (s != NULL) {
+        /*
+         * existing cache entry -- decrement previously incremented reference
+         * count because it already takes into account the cache
+         */
+
+        SSL_SESSION_free(s);    /* s == c */
+        ret = 0;
+    } else {
+        /*
+         * new cache entry -- remove old ones if cache has become too large
+         */
+
+        ret = 1;
+
+        if (SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx) > 0) {
+            while (SSL_CTX_sess_number(ctx) > SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx)) {
+                if (!remove_session_lock(ctx, ctx->session_cache_tail, 0))
+                    break;
+                else
+                    ctx->stats.sess_cache_full++;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ctx->lock);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_remove_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c)
+{
+    return remove_session_lock(ctx, c, 1);
+}
+
+static int remove_session_lock(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c, int lck)
+{
+    SSL_SESSION *r;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    if ((c != NULL) && (c->session_id_length != 0)) {
+        if (lck)
+            CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(ctx->lock);
+        if ((r = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(ctx->sessions, c)) == c) {
+            ret = 1;
+            r = lh_SSL_SESSION_delete(ctx->sessions, c);
+            SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx, c);
+        }
+        c->not_resumable = 1;
+
+        if (lck)
+            CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ctx->lock);
+
+        if (ret)
+            SSL_SESSION_free(r);
+
+        if (ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL)
+            ctx->remove_session_cb(ctx, c);
+    } else
+        ret = 0;
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+void SSL_SESSION_free(SSL_SESSION *ss)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    if (ss == NULL)
+        return;
+
+    CRYPTO_atomic_add(&ss->references, -1, &i, ss->lock);
+    REF_PRINT_COUNT("SSL_SESSION", ss);
+    if (i > 0)
+        return;
+    REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0);
+
+    CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, ss, &ss->ex_data);
+
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(ss->master_key, sizeof(ss->master_key));
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(ss->session_id, sizeof(ss->session_id));
+    X509_free(ss->peer);
+    sk_X509_pop_free(ss->peer_chain, X509_free);
+    sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ss->ciphers);
+    OPENSSL_free(ss->tlsext_hostname);
+    OPENSSL_free(ss->tlsext_tick);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
+    OPENSSL_free(ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
+    ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
+    OPENSSL_free(ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
+#endif                          /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+    OPENSSL_free(ss->psk_identity_hint);
+    OPENSSL_free(ss->psk_identity);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+    OPENSSL_free(ss->srp_username);
+#endif
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(ss->lock);
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(ss, sizeof(*ss));
+}
+
+int SSL_SESSION_up_ref(SSL_SESSION *ss)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    if (CRYPTO_atomic_add(&ss->references, 1, &i, ss->lock) <= 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    REF_PRINT_COUNT("SSL_SESSION", ss);
+    REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 2);
+    return ((i > 1) ? 1 : 0);
+}
+
+int SSL_set_session(SSL *s, SSL_SESSION *session)
+{
+    ssl_clear_bad_session(s);
+    if (s->ctx->method != s->method) {
+        if (!SSL_set_ssl_method(s, s->ctx->method))
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (session != NULL) {
+        SSL_SESSION_up_ref(session);
+        s->verify_result = session->verify_result;
+    }
+    SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+    s->session = session;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_SESSION_set1_id(SSL_SESSION *s, const unsigned char *sid,
+                        unsigned int sid_len)
+{
+    if (sid_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
+      SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_SET1_ID,
+             SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
+      return 0;
+    }
+    s->session_id_length = sid_len;
+    if (sid != s->session_id)
+        memcpy(s->session_id, sid, sid_len);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+long SSL_SESSION_set_timeout(SSL_SESSION *s, long t)
+{
+    if (s == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    s->timeout = t;
+    return (1);
+}
+
+long SSL_SESSION_get_timeout(const SSL_SESSION *s)
+{
+    if (s == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    return (s->timeout);
+}
+
+long SSL_SESSION_get_time(const SSL_SESSION *s)
+{
+    if (s == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    return (s->time);
+}
+
+long SSL_SESSION_set_time(SSL_SESSION *s, long t)
+{
+    if (s == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    s->time = t;
+    return (t);
+}
+
+int SSL_SESSION_get_protocol_version(const SSL_SESSION *s)
+{
+    return s->ssl_version;
+}
+
+const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher(const SSL_SESSION *s)
+{
+    return s->cipher;
+}
+
+const char *SSL_SESSION_get0_hostname(const SSL_SESSION *s)
+{
+    return s->tlsext_hostname;
+}
+
+int SSL_SESSION_has_ticket(const SSL_SESSION *s)
+{
+    return (s->tlsext_ticklen > 0) ? 1 : 0;
+}
+
+unsigned long SSL_SESSION_get_ticket_lifetime_hint(const SSL_SESSION *s)
+{
+    return s->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint;
+}
+
+void SSL_SESSION_get0_ticket(const SSL_SESSION *s, const unsigned char **tick,
+                             size_t *len)
+{
+    *len = s->tlsext_ticklen;
+    if (tick != NULL)
+        *tick = s->tlsext_tick;
+}
+
+X509 *SSL_SESSION_get0_peer(SSL_SESSION *s)
+{
+    return s->peer;
+}
+
+int SSL_SESSION_set1_id_context(SSL_SESSION *s, const unsigned char *sid_ctx,
+                                unsigned int sid_ctx_len)
+{
+    if (sid_ctx_len > SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_SET1_ID_CONTEXT,
+               SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    s->sid_ctx_length = sid_ctx_len;
+    if (sid_ctx != s->sid_ctx)
+        memcpy(s->sid_ctx, sid_ctx, sid_ctx_len);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+long SSL_CTX_set_timeout(SSL_CTX *s, long t)
+{
+    long l;
+    if (s == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    l = s->session_timeout;
+    s->session_timeout = t;
+    return (l);
+}
+
+long SSL_CTX_get_timeout(const SSL_CTX *s)
+{
+    if (s == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    return (s->session_timeout);
+}
+
+int SSL_set_session_secret_cb(SSL *s,
+                              int (*tls_session_secret_cb) (SSL *s,
+                                                            void *secret,
+                                                            int *secret_len,
+                                                            STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER)
+                                                            *peer_ciphers,
+                                                            const SSL_CIPHER
+                                                            **cipher,
+                                                            void *arg),
+                              void *arg)
+{
+    if (s == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    s->tls_session_secret_cb = tls_session_secret_cb;
+    s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg = arg;
+    return (1);
+}
+
+int SSL_set_session_ticket_ext_cb(SSL *s, tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_fn cb,
+                                  void *arg)
+{
+    if (s == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb = cb;
+    s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg = arg;
+    return (1);
+}
+
+int SSL_set_session_ticket_ext(SSL *s, void *ext_data, int ext_len)
+{
+    if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION) {
+        OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
+        s->tlsext_session_ticket = NULL;
+        s->tlsext_session_ticket =
+            OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(TLS_SESSION_TICKET_EXT) + ext_len);
+        if (s->tlsext_session_ticket == NULL) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION_TICKET_EXT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            return 0;
+        }
+
+        if (ext_data) {
+            s->tlsext_session_ticket->length = ext_len;
+            s->tlsext_session_ticket->data = s->tlsext_session_ticket + 1;
+            memcpy(s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ext_data, ext_len);
+        } else {
+            s->tlsext_session_ticket->length = 0;
+            s->tlsext_session_ticket->data = NULL;
+        }
+
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+typedef struct timeout_param_st {
+    SSL_CTX *ctx;
+    long time;
+    LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION) *cache;
+} TIMEOUT_PARAM;
+
+static void timeout_cb(SSL_SESSION *s, TIMEOUT_PARAM *p)
+{
+    if ((p->time == 0) || (p->time > (s->time + s->timeout))) { /* timeout */
+        /*
+         * The reason we don't call SSL_CTX_remove_session() is to save on
+         * locking overhead
+         */
+        (void)lh_SSL_SESSION_delete(p->cache, s);
+        SSL_SESSION_list_remove(p->ctx, s);
+        s->not_resumable = 1;
+        if (p->ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL)
+            p->ctx->remove_session_cb(p->ctx, s);
+        SSL_SESSION_free(s);
+    }
+}
+
+IMPLEMENT_LHASH_DOALL_ARG(SSL_SESSION, TIMEOUT_PARAM);
+
+void SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(SSL_CTX *s, long t)
+{
+    unsigned long i;
+    TIMEOUT_PARAM tp;
+
+    tp.ctx = s;
+    tp.cache = s->sessions;
+    if (tp.cache == NULL)
+        return;
+    tp.time = t;
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(s->lock);
+    i = lh_SSL_SESSION_get_down_load(s->sessions);
+    lh_SSL_SESSION_set_down_load(s->sessions, 0);
+    lh_SSL_SESSION_doall_TIMEOUT_PARAM(tp.cache, timeout_cb, &tp);
+    lh_SSL_SESSION_set_down_load(s->sessions, i);
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(s->lock);
+}
+
+int ssl_clear_bad_session(SSL *s)
+{
+    if ((s->session != NULL) &&
+        !(s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) &&
+        !(SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))) {
+        SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
+        return (1);
+    } else
+        return (0);
+}
+
+/* locked by SSL_CTX in the calling function */
+static void SSL_SESSION_list_remove(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s)
+{
+    if ((s->next == NULL) || (s->prev == NULL))
+        return;
+
+    if (s->next == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail)) {
+        /* last element in list */
+        if (s->prev == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head)) {
+            /* only one element in list */
+            ctx->session_cache_head = NULL;
+            ctx->session_cache_tail = NULL;
+        } else {
+            ctx->session_cache_tail = s->prev;
+            s->prev->next = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail);
+        }
+    } else {
+        if (s->prev == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head)) {
+            /* first element in list */
+            ctx->session_cache_head = s->next;
+            s->next->prev = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head);
+        } else {
+            /* middle of list */
+            s->next->prev = s->prev;
+            s->prev->next = s->next;
+        }
+    }
+    s->prev = s->next = NULL;
+}
+
+static void SSL_SESSION_list_add(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s)
+{
+    if ((s->next != NULL) && (s->prev != NULL))
+        SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx, s);
+
+    if (ctx->session_cache_head == NULL) {
+        ctx->session_cache_head = s;
+        ctx->session_cache_tail = s;
+        s->prev = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head);
+        s->next = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail);
+    } else {
+        s->next = ctx->session_cache_head;
+        s->next->prev = s;
+        s->prev = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head);
+        ctx->session_cache_head = s;
+    }
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                             int (*cb) (struct ssl_st *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess))
+{
+    ctx->new_session_cb = cb;
+}
+
+int (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess) {
+    return ctx->new_session_cb;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                void (*cb) (SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *sess))
+{
+    ctx->remove_session_cb = cb;
+}
+
+void (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                                  SSL_SESSION *sess) {
+    return ctx->remove_session_cb;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                             SSL_SESSION *(*cb) (struct ssl_st *ssl,
+                                                 const unsigned char *data,
+                                                 int len, int *copy))
+{
+    ctx->get_session_cb = cb;
+}
+
+SSL_SESSION *(*SSL_CTX_sess_get_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (SSL *ssl,
+                                                       const unsigned char
+                                                       *data, int len,
+                                                       int *copy) {
+    return ctx->get_session_cb;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                               void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val))
+{
+    ctx->info_callback = cb;
+}
+
+void (*SSL_CTX_get_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (const SSL *ssl, int type,
+                                                 int val) {
+    return ctx->info_callback;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, X509 **x509,
+                                           EVP_PKEY **pkey))
+{
+    ctx->client_cert_cb = cb;
+}
+
+int (*SSL_CTX_get_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (SSL *ssl, X509 **x509,
+                                                 EVP_PKEY **pkey) {
+    return ctx->client_cert_cb;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+int SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine(SSL_CTX *ctx, ENGINE *e)
+{
+    if (!ENGINE_init(e)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CLIENT_CERT_ENGINE, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (!ENGINE_get_ssl_client_cert_function(e)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CLIENT_CERT_ENGINE,
+               SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_METHOD);
+        ENGINE_finish(e);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    ctx->client_cert_engine = e;
+    return 1;
+}
+#endif
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_cookie_generate_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                    int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
+                                               unsigned char *cookie,
+                                               unsigned int *cookie_len))
+{
+    ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb = cb;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_cookie_verify_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                  int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
+                                             const unsigned char *cookie,
+                                             unsigned int cookie_len))
+{
+    ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb = cb;
+}
+
+IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw(SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION, PEM_STRING_SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION)
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/ssl_stat.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/ssl_stat.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ad7a019
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/ssl_stat.c
@@ -0,0 +1,362 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+
+const char *SSL_state_string_long(const SSL *s)
+{
+    if (ossl_statem_in_error(s))
+        return "error";
+
+    switch (SSL_get_state(s)) {
+    case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
+        return "SSLv3/TLS read certificate status";
+    case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
+        return "SSLv3/TLS write next proto";
+    case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
+        return "SSLv3/TLS read next proto";
+    case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
+        return "SSLv3/TLS write certificate status";
+    case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
+        return "before SSL initialization";
+    case TLS_ST_OK:
+        return "SSL negotiation finished successfully";
+    case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
+        return "SSLv3/TLS write client hello";
+    case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
+        return "SSLv3/TLS read server hello";
+    case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
+        return "SSLv3/TLS read server certificate";
+    case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
+        return "SSLv3/TLS read server key exchange";
+    case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
+        return "SSLv3/TLS read server certificate request";
+    case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
+        return "SSLv3/TLS read server session ticket";
+    case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
+        return "SSLv3/TLS read server done";
+    case TLS_ST_CW_CERT:
+        return "SSLv3/TLS write client certificate";
+    case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
+        return "SSLv3/TLS write client key exchange";
+    case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
+        return "SSLv3/TLS write certificate verify";
+    case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
+    case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
+        return "SSLv3/TLS write change cipher spec";
+    case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
+    case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
+        return "SSLv3/TLS write finished";
+    case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
+    case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
+        return "SSLv3/TLS read change cipher spec";
+    case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
+    case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
+        return "SSLv3/TLS read finished";
+    case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
+        return "SSLv3/TLS read client hello";
+    case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
+        return "SSLv3/TLS write hello request";
+    case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
+        return "SSLv3/TLS write server hello";
+    case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
+        return "SSLv3/TLS write certificate";
+    case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
+        return "SSLv3/TLS write key exchange";
+    case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
+        return "SSLv3/TLS write certificate request";
+    case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
+        return "SSLv3/TLS write session ticket";
+    case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
+        return "SSLv3/TLS write server done";
+    case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
+        return "SSLv3/TLS read client certificate";
+    case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
+        return "SSLv3/TLS read client key exchange";
+    case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
+        return "SSLv3/TLS read certificate verify";
+    case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
+        return "DTLS1 read hello verify request";
+    case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
+        return "DTLS1 write hello verify request";
+    default:
+        return "unknown state";
+    }
+}
+
+const char *SSL_state_string(const SSL *s)
+{
+    if (ossl_statem_in_error(s))
+        return "SSLERR";
+
+    switch (SSL_get_state(s)) {
+    case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
+        return "TRNP";
+    case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
+        return "TWST";
+    case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
+        return "TWCS";
+    case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
+        return "TRCS";
+    case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
+        return "TRST";
+    case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
+        return "TWNP";
+    case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
+        return "PINIT ";
+    case TLS_ST_OK:
+        return "SSLOK ";
+    case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
+        return "TWCH";
+    case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
+        return "TRSH";
+    case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
+        return "TRSC";
+    case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
+        return "TRSKE";
+    case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
+        return "TRCR";
+    case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
+        return "TRSD";
+    case TLS_ST_CW_CERT:
+        return "TWCC";
+    case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
+        return "TWCKE";
+    case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
+        return "TWCV";
+    case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
+    case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
+        return "TWCCS";
+    case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
+    case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
+        return "TWFIN";
+    case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
+    case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
+        return "TRCCS";
+    case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
+    case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
+        return "TRFIN";
+    case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
+        return "TWHR";
+    case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
+        return "TRCH";
+    case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
+        return "TWSH";
+    case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
+        return "TWSC";
+    case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
+        return "TWSKE";
+    case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
+        return "TWCR";
+    case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
+        return "TWSD";
+    case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
+        return "TRCC";
+    case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
+        return "TRCKE";
+    case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
+        return "TRCV";
+    case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
+        return "DRCHV";
+    case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
+        return "DWCHV";
+    default:
+        return "UNKWN ";
+    }
+}
+
+const char *SSL_alert_type_string_long(int value)
+{
+    switch (value >> 8) {
+    case SSL3_AL_WARNING:
+        return "warning";
+    case SSL3_AL_FATAL:
+        return "fatal";
+    default:
+        return "unknown";
+    }
+}
+
+const char *SSL_alert_type_string(int value)
+{
+    switch (value >> 8) {
+    case SSL3_AL_WARNING:
+        return "W";
+    case SSL3_AL_FATAL:
+        return "F";
+    default:
+        return "U";
+    }
+}
+
+const char *SSL_alert_desc_string(int value)
+{
+    switch (value & 0xff) {
+    case SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY:
+        return "CN";
+    case SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE:
+        return "UM";
+    case SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC:
+        return "BM";
+    case SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE:
+        return "DF";
+    case SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:
+        return "HF";
+    case SSL3_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE:
+        return "NC";
+    case SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE:
+        return "BC";
+    case SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE:
+        return "UC";
+    case SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED:
+        return "CR";
+    case SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED:
+        return "CE";
+    case SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN:
+        return "CU";
+    case SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER:
+        return "IP";
+    case TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED:
+        return "DC";
+    case TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW:
+        return "RO";
+    case TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA:
+        return "CA";
+    case TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED:
+        return "AD";
+    case TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR:
+        return "DE";
+    case TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR:
+        return "CY";
+    case TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION:
+        return "ER";
+    case TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION:
+        return "PV";
+    case TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY:
+        return "IS";
+    case TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR:
+        return "IE";
+    case TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED:
+        return "US";
+    case TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION:
+        return "NR";
+    case TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION:
+        return "UE";
+    case TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE:
+        return "CO";
+    case TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME:
+        return "UN";
+    case TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE:
+        return "BR";
+    case TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE:
+        return "BH";
+    case TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY:
+        return "UP";
+    default:
+        return "UK";
+    }
+}
+
+const char *SSL_alert_desc_string_long(int value)
+{
+    switch (value & 0xff) {
+    case SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY:
+        return "close notify";
+    case SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE:
+        return "unexpected_message";
+    case SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC:
+        return "bad record mac";
+    case SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE:
+        return "decompression failure";
+    case SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:
+        return "handshake failure";
+    case SSL3_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE:
+        return "no certificate";
+    case SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE:
+        return "bad certificate";
+    case SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE:
+        return "unsupported certificate";
+    case SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED:
+        return "certificate revoked";
+    case SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED:
+        return "certificate expired";
+    case SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN:
+        return "certificate unknown";
+    case SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER:
+        return "illegal parameter";
+    case TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED:
+        return "decryption failed";
+    case TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW:
+        return "record overflow";
+    case TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA:
+        return "unknown CA";
+    case TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED:
+        return "access denied";
+    case TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR:
+        return "decode error";
+    case TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR:
+        return "decrypt error";
+    case TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION:
+        return "export restriction";
+    case TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION:
+        return "protocol version";
+    case TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY:
+        return "insufficient security";
+    case TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR:
+        return "internal error";
+    case TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED:
+        return "user canceled";
+    case TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION:
+        return "no renegotiation";
+    case TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION:
+        return "unsupported extension";
+    case TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE:
+        return "certificate unobtainable";
+    case TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME:
+        return "unrecognized name";
+    case TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE:
+        return "bad certificate status response";
+    case TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE:
+        return "bad certificate hash value";
+    case TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY:
+        return "unknown PSK identity";
+    case TLS1_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL:
+        return "no application protocol";
+    default:
+        return "unknown";
+    }
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/ssl_txt.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/ssl_txt.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dbbf9d9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/ssl_txt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,217 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+int SSL_SESSION_print_fp(FILE *fp, const SSL_SESSION *x)
+{
+    BIO *b;
+    int ret;
+
+    if ((b = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_PRINT_FP, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+        return (0);
+    }
+    BIO_set_fp(b, fp, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+    ret = SSL_SESSION_print(b, x);
+    BIO_free(b);
+    return (ret);
+}
+#endif
+
+int SSL_SESSION_print(BIO *bp, const SSL_SESSION *x)
+{
+    unsigned int i;
+    const char *s;
+
+    if (x == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (BIO_puts(bp, "SSL-Session:\n") <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    s = ssl_protocol_to_string(x->ssl_version);
+    if (BIO_printf(bp, "    Protocol  : %s\n", s) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (x->cipher == NULL) {
+        if (((x->cipher_id) & 0xff000000) == 0x02000000) {
+            if (BIO_printf
+                (bp, "    Cipher    : %06lX\n", x->cipher_id & 0xffffff) <= 0)
+                goto err;
+        } else {
+            if (BIO_printf
+                (bp, "    Cipher    : %04lX\n", x->cipher_id & 0xffff) <= 0)
+                goto err;
+        }
+    } else {
+        if (BIO_printf
+            (bp, "    Cipher    : %s\n",
+             ((x->cipher == NULL) ? "unknown" : x->cipher->name)) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+    }
+    if (BIO_puts(bp, "    Session-ID: ") <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    for (i = 0; i < x->session_id_length; i++) {
+        if (BIO_printf(bp, "%02X", x->session_id[i]) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+    }
+    if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n    Session-ID-ctx: ") <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    for (i = 0; i < x->sid_ctx_length; i++) {
+        if (BIO_printf(bp, "%02X", x->sid_ctx[i]) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+    }
+    if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n    Master-Key: ") <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    for (i = 0; i < (unsigned int)x->master_key_length; i++) {
+        if (BIO_printf(bp, "%02X", x->master_key[i]) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+    }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+    if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n    PSK identity: ") <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    if (BIO_printf(bp, "%s", x->psk_identity ? x->psk_identity : "None") <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n    PSK identity hint: ") <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    if (BIO_printf
+        (bp, "%s", x->psk_identity_hint ? x->psk_identity_hint : "None") <= 0)
+        goto err;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+    if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n    SRP username: ") <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    if (BIO_printf(bp, "%s", x->srp_username ? x->srp_username : "None") <= 0)
+        goto err;
+#endif
+    if (x->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint) {
+        if (BIO_printf(bp,
+                       "\n    TLS session ticket lifetime hint: %ld (seconds)",
+                       x->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+    }
+    if (x->tlsext_tick) {
+        if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n    TLS session ticket:\n") <= 0)
+            goto err;
+        if (BIO_dump_indent
+            (bp, (const char *)x->tlsext_tick, x->tlsext_ticklen, 4)
+            <= 0)
+            goto err;
+    }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+    if (x->compress_meth != 0) {
+        SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
+
+        if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(x, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, &comp, 0))
+            goto err;
+        if (comp == NULL) {
+            if (BIO_printf(bp, "\n    Compression: %d", x->compress_meth) <= 0)
+                goto err;
+        } else {
+            if (BIO_printf(bp, "\n    Compression: %d (%s)", comp->id,
+                           comp->name) <= 0)
+                goto err;
+        }
+    }
+#endif
+    if (x->time != 0L) {
+        if (BIO_printf(bp, "\n    Start Time: %ld", x->time) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+    }
+    if (x->timeout != 0L) {
+        if (BIO_printf(bp, "\n    Timeout   : %ld (sec)", x->timeout) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+    }
+    if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n") <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (BIO_puts(bp, "    Verify return code: ") <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    if (BIO_printf(bp, "%ld (%s)\n", x->verify_result,
+                   X509_verify_cert_error_string(x->verify_result)) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (BIO_printf(bp, "    Extended master secret: %s\n",
+                   x->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS ? "yes" : "no") <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    return (1);
+ err:
+    return (0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * print session id and master key in NSS keylog format (RSA
+ * Session-ID:<session id> Master-Key:<master key>)
+ */
+int SSL_SESSION_print_keylog(BIO *bp, const SSL_SESSION *x)
+{
+    unsigned int i;
+
+    if (x == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (x->session_id_length == 0 || x->master_key_length == 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    /*
+     * the RSA prefix is required by the format's definition although there's
+     * nothing RSA-specific in the output, therefore, we don't have to check if
+     * the cipher suite is based on RSA
+     */
+    if (BIO_puts(bp, "RSA ") <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (BIO_puts(bp, "Session-ID:") <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    for (i = 0; i < x->session_id_length; i++) {
+        if (BIO_printf(bp, "%02X", x->session_id[i]) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+    }
+    if (BIO_puts(bp, " Master-Key:") <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    for (i = 0; i < (unsigned int)x->master_key_length; i++) {
+        if (BIO_printf(bp, "%02X", x->master_key[i]) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+    }
+    if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n") <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    return (1);
+ err:
+    return (0);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/ssl_utst.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/ssl_utst.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..09e76d1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/ssl_utst.c
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2014-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_UNIT_TEST
+
+static const struct openssl_ssl_test_functions ssl_test_functions = {
+    ssl_init_wbio_buffer,
+    ssl3_setup_buffers,
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+#  undef dtls1_process_heartbeat
+    dtls1_process_heartbeat
+# endif
+};
+
+const struct openssl_ssl_test_functions *SSL_test_functions(void)
+{
+    return &ssl_test_functions;
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/statem/README b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/statem/README
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..145c69d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/statem/README
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+State Machine Design
+====================
+
+This file provides some guidance on the thinking behind the design of the
+state machine code to aid future maintenance.
+
+The state machine code replaces an older state machine present in OpenSSL
+versions 1.0.2 and below. The new state machine has the following objectives:
+    - Remove duplication of state code between client and server
+    - Remove duplication of state code between TLS and DTLS
+    - Simplify transitions and bring the logic together in a single location
+      so that it is easier to validate
+    - Remove duplication of code between each of the message handling functions
+    - Receive a message first and then work out whether that is a valid
+      transition - not the other way around (the other way causes lots of issues
+      where we are expecting one type of message next but actually get something
+      else)
+    - Separate message flow state from handshake state (in order to better
+      understand each)
+      - message flow state = when to flush buffers; handling restarts in the
+        event of NBIO events; handling the common flow of steps for reading a
+        message and the common flow of steps for writing a message etc
+      - handshake state = what handshake message are we working on now
+    - Control complexity: only the state machine can change state: keep all
+      the state changes local to the state machine component
+
+The message flow state machine is divided into a reading sub-state machine and a
+writing sub-state machine. See the source comments in statem.c for a more
+detailed description of the various states and transitions possible.
+
+Conceptually the state machine component is designed as follows:
+
+                        libssl
+                           |
+---------------------------|-----statem.h--------------------------------------
+                           |
+                    _______V____________________
+                   |                            |
+                   |    statem.c                |
+                   |                            |
+                   |    Core state machine code |
+                   |____________________________|
+        statem_locl.h     ^          ^
+                 _________|          |_______
+                |                            |
+   _____________|____________   _____________|____________
+  |                          | |                          |
+  | statem_clnt.c            | | statem_srvr.c            |
+  |                          | |                          |
+  | TLS/DTLS client specific | | TLS/DTLS server specific |
+  | state machine code       | | state machine code       |
+  |__________________________| |__________________________|
+               |        |_______________|__       |
+               |        ________________|  |      |
+               |       |                   |      |
+   ____________V_______V________   ________V______V_______________
+  |                             | |                               |
+  | statem_both.c               | | statem_dtls.c                 |
+  |                             | |                               |
+  | Non core functions common   | | Non core functions common to  |
+  | to both servers and clients | | both DTLS servers and clients |
+  |_____________________________| |_______________________________|
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/statem/statem.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/statem/statem.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b91ec0a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/statem/statem.c
@@ -0,0 +1,860 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2015-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include "../ssl_locl.h"
+#include "statem_locl.h"
+
+/*
+ * This file implements the SSL/TLS/DTLS state machines.
+ *
+ * There are two primary state machines:
+ *
+ * 1) Message flow state machine
+ * 2) Handshake state machine
+ *
+ * The Message flow state machine controls the reading and sending of messages
+ * including handling of non-blocking IO events, flushing of the underlying
+ * write BIO, handling unexpected messages, etc. It is itself broken into two
+ * separate sub-state machines which control reading and writing respectively.
+ *
+ * The Handshake state machine keeps track of the current SSL/TLS handshake
+ * state. Transitions of the handshake state are the result of events that
+ * occur within the Message flow state machine.
+ *
+ * Overall it looks like this:
+ *
+ * ---------------------------------------------            -------------------
+ * |                                           |            |                 |
+ * | Message flow state machine                |            |                 |
+ * |                                           |            |                 |
+ * | -------------------- -------------------- | Transition | Handshake state |
+ * | | MSG_FLOW_READING | | MSG_FLOW_WRITING | | Event      | machine         |
+ * | | sub-state        | | sub-state        | |----------->|                 |
+ * | | machine for      | | machine for      | |            |                 |
+ * | | reading messages | | writing messages | |            |                 |
+ * | -------------------- -------------------- |            |                 |
+ * |                                           |            |                 |
+ * ---------------------------------------------            -------------------
+ *
+ */
+
+/* Sub state machine return values */
+typedef enum {
+    /* Something bad happened or NBIO */
+    SUB_STATE_ERROR,
+    /* Sub state finished go to the next sub state */
+    SUB_STATE_FINISHED,
+    /* Sub state finished and handshake was completed */
+    SUB_STATE_END_HANDSHAKE
+} SUB_STATE_RETURN;
+
+static int state_machine(SSL *s, int server);
+static void init_read_state_machine(SSL *s);
+static SUB_STATE_RETURN read_state_machine(SSL *s);
+static void init_write_state_machine(SSL *s);
+static SUB_STATE_RETURN write_state_machine(SSL *s);
+
+OSSL_HANDSHAKE_STATE SSL_get_state(const SSL *ssl)
+{
+    return ssl->statem.hand_state;
+}
+
+int SSL_in_init(SSL *s)
+{
+    return s->statem.in_init;
+}
+
+int SSL_is_init_finished(SSL *s)
+{
+    return !(s->statem.in_init) && (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_OK);
+}
+
+int SSL_in_before(SSL *s)
+{
+    /*
+     * Historically being "in before" meant before anything had happened. In the
+     * current code though we remain in the "before" state for a while after we
+     * have started the handshake process (e.g. as a server waiting for the
+     * first message to arrive). There "in before" is taken to mean "in before"
+     * and not started any handshake process yet.
+     */
+    return (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_BEFORE)
+        && (s->statem.state == MSG_FLOW_UNINITED);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Clear the state machine state and reset back to MSG_FLOW_UNINITED
+ */
+void ossl_statem_clear(SSL *s)
+{
+    s->statem.state = MSG_FLOW_UNINITED;
+    s->statem.hand_state = TLS_ST_BEFORE;
+    s->statem.in_init = 1;
+    s->statem.no_cert_verify = 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set the state machine up ready for a renegotiation handshake
+ */
+void ossl_statem_set_renegotiate(SSL *s)
+{
+    s->statem.state = MSG_FLOW_RENEGOTIATE;
+    s->statem.in_init = 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Put the state machine into an error state. This is a permanent error for
+ * the current connection.
+ */
+void ossl_statem_set_error(SSL *s)
+{
+    s->statem.state = MSG_FLOW_ERROR;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Discover whether the current connection is in the error state.
+ *
+ * Valid return values are:
+ *   1: Yes
+ *   0: No
+ */
+int ossl_statem_in_error(const SSL *s)
+{
+    if (s->statem.state == MSG_FLOW_ERROR)
+        return 1;
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+void ossl_statem_set_in_init(SSL *s, int init)
+{
+    s->statem.in_init = init;
+}
+
+int ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(SSL *s)
+{
+    return s->statem.in_handshake;
+}
+
+void ossl_statem_set_in_handshake(SSL *s, int inhand)
+{
+    if (inhand)
+        s->statem.in_handshake++;
+    else
+        s->statem.in_handshake--;
+}
+
+void ossl_statem_set_hello_verify_done(SSL *s)
+{
+    s->statem.state = MSG_FLOW_UNINITED;
+    s->statem.in_init = 1;
+    /*
+     * This will get reset (briefly) back to TLS_ST_BEFORE when we enter
+     * state_machine() because |state| is MSG_FLOW_UNINITED, but until then any
+     * calls to SSL_in_before() will return false. Also calls to
+     * SSL_state_string() and SSL_state_string_long() will return something
+     * sensible.
+     */
+    s->statem.hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
+}
+
+int ossl_statem_connect(SSL *s)
+{
+    return state_machine(s, 0);
+}
+
+int ossl_statem_accept(SSL *s)
+{
+    return state_machine(s, 1);
+}
+
+typedef void (*info_cb) (const SSL *, int, int);
+
+static info_cb get_callback(SSL *s)
+{
+    if (s->info_callback != NULL)
+        return s->info_callback;
+    else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
+        return s->ctx->info_callback;
+
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The main message flow state machine. We start in the MSG_FLOW_UNINITED or
+ * MSG_FLOW_RENEGOTIATE state and finish in MSG_FLOW_FINISHED. Valid states and
+ * transitions are as follows:
+ *
+ * MSG_FLOW_UNINITED     MSG_FLOW_RENEGOTIATE
+ *        |                       |
+ *        +-----------------------+
+ *        v
+ * MSG_FLOW_WRITING <---> MSG_FLOW_READING
+ *        |
+ *        V
+ * MSG_FLOW_FINISHED
+ *        |
+ *        V
+ *    [SUCCESS]
+ *
+ * We may exit at any point due to an error or NBIO event. If an NBIO event
+ * occurs then we restart at the point we left off when we are recalled.
+ * MSG_FLOW_WRITING and MSG_FLOW_READING have sub-state machines associated with them.
+ *
+ * In addition to the above there is also the MSG_FLOW_ERROR state. We can move
+ * into that state at any point in the event that an irrecoverable error occurs.
+ *
+ * Valid return values are:
+ *   1: Success
+ * <=0: NBIO or error
+ */
+static int state_machine(SSL *s, int server)
+{
+    BUF_MEM *buf = NULL;
+    unsigned long Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
+    void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
+    OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
+    int ret = -1;
+    int ssret;
+
+    if (st->state == MSG_FLOW_ERROR) {
+        /* Shouldn't have been called if we're already in the error state */
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0);
+    ERR_clear_error();
+    clear_sys_error();
+
+    cb = get_callback(s);
+
+    st->in_handshake++;
+    if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) {
+        if (!SSL_clear(s))
+            return -1;
+    }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+    if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
+        /*
+         * Notify SCTP BIO socket to enter handshake mode and prevent stream
+         * identifier other than 0.
+         */
+        BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_IN_HANDSHAKE,
+                 st->in_handshake, NULL);
+    }
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+    /*
+     * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and
+     * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during
+     * handshakes anyway.
+     */
+    if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
+        if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
+            dtls1_stop_timer(s);
+        s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
+        s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
+    }
+#endif
+
+    /* Initialise state machine */
+
+    if (st->state == MSG_FLOW_RENEGOTIATE) {
+        s->renegotiate = 1;
+        if (!server)
+            s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate++;
+    }
+
+    if (st->state == MSG_FLOW_UNINITED || st->state == MSG_FLOW_RENEGOTIATE) {
+        if (st->state == MSG_FLOW_UNINITED) {
+            st->hand_state = TLS_ST_BEFORE;
+        }
+
+        s->server = server;
+        if (cb != NULL)
+            cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
+
+        if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+            if ((s->version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff00) &&
+                (server || (s->version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_BAD_VER & 0xff00))) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_STATE_MACHINE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                goto end;
+            }
+        } else {
+            if ((s->version >> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_STATE_MACHINE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                goto end;
+            }
+        }
+
+        if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, s->version, NULL)) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_STATE_MACHINE, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW);
+            goto end;
+        }
+
+        if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
+            if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
+                goto end;
+            }
+            if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
+                goto end;
+            }
+            s->init_buf = buf;
+            buf = NULL;
+        }
+
+        if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
+            goto end;
+        }
+        s->init_num = 0;
+
+        /*
+         * Should have been reset by tls_process_finished, too.
+         */
+        s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
+
+        /*
+         * Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO ...but not with
+         * SCTP
+         */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+        if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || !BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
+#endif
+            if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s)) {
+                goto end;
+            }
+
+        if (!server || st->state != MSG_FLOW_RENEGOTIATE) {
+            if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
+                ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+                goto end;
+            }
+        }
+
+        if (server) {
+            if (st->state != MSG_FLOW_RENEGOTIATE) {
+                s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
+            } else if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) {
+                /*
+                 * Shouldn't happen? The record layer should have prevented this
+                 */
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_STATE_MACHINE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+                goto end;
+            } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
+                       !(s->options &
+                         SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
+                /*
+                 * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't
+                 * support secure renegotiation.
+                 */
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_STATE_MACHINE,
+                       SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
+                ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+                ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+                goto end;
+            } else {
+                /*
+                 * st->state == MSG_FLOW_RENEGOTIATE, we will just send a
+                 * HelloRequest
+                 */
+                s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
+            }
+
+            s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0;
+        } else {
+            s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++;
+
+            /* mark client_random uninitialized */
+            memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, sizeof(s->s3->client_random));
+            s->hit = 0;
+
+            s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
+
+            if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+                st->use_timer = 1;
+            }
+        }
+
+        st->state = MSG_FLOW_WRITING;
+        init_write_state_machine(s);
+        st->read_state_first_init = 1;
+    }
+
+    while (st->state != MSG_FLOW_FINISHED) {
+        if (st->state == MSG_FLOW_READING) {
+            ssret = read_state_machine(s);
+            if (ssret == SUB_STATE_FINISHED) {
+                st->state = MSG_FLOW_WRITING;
+                init_write_state_machine(s);
+            } else {
+                /* NBIO or error */
+                goto end;
+            }
+        } else if (st->state == MSG_FLOW_WRITING) {
+            ssret = write_state_machine(s);
+            if (ssret == SUB_STATE_FINISHED) {
+                st->state = MSG_FLOW_READING;
+                init_read_state_machine(s);
+            } else if (ssret == SUB_STATE_END_HANDSHAKE) {
+                st->state = MSG_FLOW_FINISHED;
+            } else {
+                /* NBIO or error */
+                goto end;
+            }
+        } else {
+            /* Error */
+            ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+
+    st->state = MSG_FLOW_UNINITED;
+    ret = 1;
+
+ end:
+    st->in_handshake--;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+    if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
+        /*
+         * Notify SCTP BIO socket to leave handshake mode and allow stream
+         * identifier other than 0.
+         */
+        BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_IN_HANDSHAKE,
+                 st->in_handshake, NULL);
+    }
+#endif
+
+    BUF_MEM_free(buf);
+    if (cb != NULL) {
+        if (server)
+            cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret);
+        else
+            cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT, ret);
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initialise the MSG_FLOW_READING sub-state machine
+ */
+static void init_read_state_machine(SSL *s)
+{
+    OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
+
+    st->read_state = READ_STATE_HEADER;
+}
+
+static int grow_init_buf(SSL *s, size_t size) {
+
+    size_t msg_offset = (char *)s->init_msg - s->init_buf->data;
+
+    if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf, (int)size))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (size < msg_offset)
+        return 0;
+
+    s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + msg_offset;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function implements the sub-state machine when the message flow is in
+ * MSG_FLOW_READING. The valid sub-states and transitions are:
+ *
+ * READ_STATE_HEADER <--+<-------------+
+ *        |             |              |
+ *        v             |              |
+ * READ_STATE_BODY -----+-->READ_STATE_POST_PROCESS
+ *        |                            |
+ *        +----------------------------+
+ *        v
+ * [SUB_STATE_FINISHED]
+ *
+ * READ_STATE_HEADER has the responsibility for reading in the message header
+ * and transitioning the state of the handshake state machine.
+ *
+ * READ_STATE_BODY reads in the rest of the message and then subsequently
+ * processes it.
+ *
+ * READ_STATE_POST_PROCESS is an optional step that may occur if some post
+ * processing activity performed on the message may block.
+ *
+ * Any of the above states could result in an NBIO event occurring in which case
+ * control returns to the calling application. When this function is recalled we
+ * will resume in the same state where we left off.
+ */
+static SUB_STATE_RETURN read_state_machine(SSL *s)
+{
+    OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
+    int ret, mt;
+    unsigned long len = 0;
+    int (*transition) (SSL *s, int mt);
+    PACKET pkt;
+    MSG_PROCESS_RETURN(*process_message) (SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
+    WORK_STATE(*post_process_message) (SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst);
+    unsigned long (*max_message_size) (SSL *s);
+    void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
+
+    cb = get_callback(s);
+
+    if (s->server) {
+        transition = ossl_statem_server_read_transition;
+        process_message = ossl_statem_server_process_message;
+        max_message_size = ossl_statem_server_max_message_size;
+        post_process_message = ossl_statem_server_post_process_message;
+    } else {
+        transition = ossl_statem_client_read_transition;
+        process_message = ossl_statem_client_process_message;
+        max_message_size = ossl_statem_client_max_message_size;
+        post_process_message = ossl_statem_client_post_process_message;
+    }
+
+    if (st->read_state_first_init) {
+        s->first_packet = 1;
+        st->read_state_first_init = 0;
+    }
+
+    while (1) {
+        switch (st->read_state) {
+        case READ_STATE_HEADER:
+            /* Get the state the peer wants to move to */
+            if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+                /*
+                 * In DTLS we get the whole message in one go - header and body
+                 */
+                ret = dtls_get_message(s, &mt, &len);
+            } else {
+                ret = tls_get_message_header(s, &mt);
+            }
+
+            if (ret == 0) {
+                /* Could be non-blocking IO */
+                return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
+            }
+
+            if (cb != NULL) {
+                /* Notify callback of an impending state change */
+                if (s->server)
+                    cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1);
+                else
+                    cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP, 1);
+            }
+            /*
+             * Validate that we are allowed to move to the new state and move
+             * to that state if so
+             */
+            if (!transition(s, mt)) {
+                ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+                return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
+            }
+
+            if (s->s3->tmp.message_size > max_message_size(s)) {
+                ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_READ_STATE_MACHINE, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
+                return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
+            }
+
+            /* dtls_get_message already did this */
+            if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)
+                    && s->s3->tmp.message_size > 0
+                    && !grow_init_buf(s, s->s3->tmp.message_size
+                                         + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
+                ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_READ_STATE_MACHINE, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+                return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
+            }
+
+            st->read_state = READ_STATE_BODY;
+            /* Fall through */
+
+        case READ_STATE_BODY:
+            if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+                /* We already got this above for DTLS */
+                ret = tls_get_message_body(s, &len);
+                if (ret == 0) {
+                    /* Could be non-blocking IO */
+                    return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
+                }
+            }
+
+            s->first_packet = 0;
+            if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, s->init_msg, len)) {
+                ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_READ_STATE_MACHINE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
+            }
+            ret = process_message(s, &pkt);
+
+            /* Discard the packet data */
+            s->init_num = 0;
+
+            switch (ret) {
+            case MSG_PROCESS_ERROR:
+                return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
+
+            case MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING:
+                if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+                    dtls1_stop_timer(s);
+                }
+                return SUB_STATE_FINISHED;
+
+            case MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING:
+                st->read_state = READ_STATE_POST_PROCESS;
+                st->read_state_work = WORK_MORE_A;
+                break;
+
+            default:
+                st->read_state = READ_STATE_HEADER;
+                break;
+            }
+            break;
+
+        case READ_STATE_POST_PROCESS:
+            st->read_state_work = post_process_message(s, st->read_state_work);
+            switch (st->read_state_work) {
+            default:
+                return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
+
+            case WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE:
+                st->read_state = READ_STATE_HEADER;
+                break;
+
+            case WORK_FINISHED_STOP:
+                if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+                    dtls1_stop_timer(s);
+                }
+                return SUB_STATE_FINISHED;
+            }
+            break;
+
+        default:
+            /* Shouldn't happen */
+            ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_READ_STATE_MACHINE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+            return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Send a previously constructed message to the peer.
+ */
+static int statem_do_write(SSL *s)
+{
+    OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
+
+    if (st->hand_state == TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
+        || st->hand_state == TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE) {
+        if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
+            return dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
+        else
+            return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
+    } else {
+        return ssl_do_write(s);
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initialise the MSG_FLOW_WRITING sub-state machine
+ */
+static void init_write_state_machine(SSL *s)
+{
+    OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
+
+    st->write_state = WRITE_STATE_TRANSITION;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function implements the sub-state machine when the message flow is in
+ * MSG_FLOW_WRITING. The valid sub-states and transitions are:
+ *
+ * +-> WRITE_STATE_TRANSITION ------> [SUB_STATE_FINISHED]
+ * |             |
+ * |             v
+ * |      WRITE_STATE_PRE_WORK -----> [SUB_STATE_END_HANDSHAKE]
+ * |             |
+ * |             v
+ * |       WRITE_STATE_SEND
+ * |             |
+ * |             v
+ * |     WRITE_STATE_POST_WORK
+ * |             |
+ * +-------------+
+ *
+ * WRITE_STATE_TRANSITION transitions the state of the handshake state machine
+
+ * WRITE_STATE_PRE_WORK performs any work necessary to prepare the later
+ * sending of the message. This could result in an NBIO event occurring in
+ * which case control returns to the calling application. When this function
+ * is recalled we will resume in the same state where we left off.
+ *
+ * WRITE_STATE_SEND sends the message and performs any work to be done after
+ * sending.
+ *
+ * WRITE_STATE_POST_WORK performs any work necessary after the sending of the
+ * message has been completed. As for WRITE_STATE_PRE_WORK this could also
+ * result in an NBIO event.
+ */
+static SUB_STATE_RETURN write_state_machine(SSL *s)
+{
+    OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
+    int ret;
+    WRITE_TRAN(*transition) (SSL *s);
+    WORK_STATE(*pre_work) (SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst);
+    WORK_STATE(*post_work) (SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst);
+    int (*construct_message) (SSL *s);
+    void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
+
+    cb = get_callback(s);
+
+    if (s->server) {
+        transition = ossl_statem_server_write_transition;
+        pre_work = ossl_statem_server_pre_work;
+        post_work = ossl_statem_server_post_work;
+        construct_message = ossl_statem_server_construct_message;
+    } else {
+        transition = ossl_statem_client_write_transition;
+        pre_work = ossl_statem_client_pre_work;
+        post_work = ossl_statem_client_post_work;
+        construct_message = ossl_statem_client_construct_message;
+    }
+
+    while (1) {
+        switch (st->write_state) {
+        case WRITE_STATE_TRANSITION:
+            if (cb != NULL) {
+                /* Notify callback of an impending state change */
+                if (s->server)
+                    cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1);
+                else
+                    cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP, 1);
+            }
+            switch (transition(s)) {
+            case WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE:
+                st->write_state = WRITE_STATE_PRE_WORK;
+                st->write_state_work = WORK_MORE_A;
+                break;
+
+            case WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED:
+                return SUB_STATE_FINISHED;
+                break;
+
+            default:
+                return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
+            }
+            break;
+
+        case WRITE_STATE_PRE_WORK:
+            switch (st->write_state_work = pre_work(s, st->write_state_work)) {
+            default:
+                return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
+
+            case WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE:
+                st->write_state = WRITE_STATE_SEND;
+                break;
+
+            case WORK_FINISHED_STOP:
+                return SUB_STATE_END_HANDSHAKE;
+            }
+            if (construct_message(s) == 0)
+                return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
+
+            /* Fall through */
+
+        case WRITE_STATE_SEND:
+            if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && st->use_timer) {
+                dtls1_start_timer(s);
+            }
+            ret = statem_do_write(s);
+            if (ret <= 0) {
+                return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
+            }
+            st->write_state = WRITE_STATE_POST_WORK;
+            st->write_state_work = WORK_MORE_A;
+            /* Fall through */
+
+        case WRITE_STATE_POST_WORK:
+            switch (st->write_state_work = post_work(s, st->write_state_work)) {
+            default:
+                return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
+
+            case WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE:
+                st->write_state = WRITE_STATE_TRANSITION;
+                break;
+
+            case WORK_FINISHED_STOP:
+                return SUB_STATE_END_HANDSHAKE;
+            }
+            break;
+
+        default:
+            return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Flush the write BIO
+ */
+int statem_flush(SSL *s)
+{
+    s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
+    if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+    s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called by the record layer to determine whether application data is
+ * allowed to be sent in the current handshake state or not.
+ *
+ * Return values are:
+ *   1: Yes (application data allowed)
+ *   0: No (application data not allowed)
+ */
+int ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(SSL *s)
+{
+    OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
+
+    if (st->state == MSG_FLOW_UNINITED || st->state == MSG_FLOW_RENEGOTIATE)
+        return 0;
+
+    if (!s->s3->in_read_app_data || (s->s3->total_renegotiations == 0))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (s->server) {
+        /*
+         * If we're a server and we haven't got as far as writing our
+         * ServerHello yet then we allow app data
+         */
+        if (st->hand_state == TLS_ST_BEFORE
+            || st->hand_state == TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO)
+            return 1;
+    } else {
+        /*
+         * If we're a client and we haven't read the ServerHello yet then we
+         * allow app data
+         */
+        if (st->hand_state == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO)
+            return 1;
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/statem/statem.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/statem/statem.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c669ee9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/statem/statem.h
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*****************************************************************************
+ *                                                                           *
+ * These enums should be considered PRIVATE to the state machine. No         *
+ * non-state machine code should need to use these                           *
+ *                                                                           *
+ *****************************************************************************/
+/*
+ * Valid return codes used for functions performing work prior to or after
+ * sending or receiving a message
+ */
+typedef enum {
+    /* Something went wrong */
+    WORK_ERROR,
+    /* We're done working and there shouldn't be anything else to do after */
+    WORK_FINISHED_STOP,
+    /* We're done working move onto the next thing */
+    WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE,
+    /* We're working on phase A */
+    WORK_MORE_A,
+    /* We're working on phase B */
+    WORK_MORE_B
+} WORK_STATE;
+
+/* Write transition return codes */
+typedef enum {
+    /* Something went wrong */
+    WRITE_TRAN_ERROR,
+    /* A transition was successfully completed and we should continue */
+    WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE,
+    /* There is no more write work to be done */
+    WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
+} WRITE_TRAN;
+
+/* Message flow states */
+typedef enum {
+    /* No handshake in progress */
+    MSG_FLOW_UNINITED,
+    /* A permanent error with this connection */
+    MSG_FLOW_ERROR,
+    /* We are about to renegotiate */
+    MSG_FLOW_RENEGOTIATE,
+    /* We are reading messages */
+    MSG_FLOW_READING,
+    /* We are writing messages */
+    MSG_FLOW_WRITING,
+    /* Handshake has finished */
+    MSG_FLOW_FINISHED
+} MSG_FLOW_STATE;
+
+/* Read states */
+typedef enum {
+    READ_STATE_HEADER,
+    READ_STATE_BODY,
+    READ_STATE_POST_PROCESS
+} READ_STATE;
+
+/* Write states */
+typedef enum {
+    WRITE_STATE_TRANSITION,
+    WRITE_STATE_PRE_WORK,
+    WRITE_STATE_SEND,
+    WRITE_STATE_POST_WORK
+} WRITE_STATE;
+
+/*****************************************************************************
+ *                                                                           *
+ * This structure should be considered "opaque" to anything outside of the   *
+ * state machine. No non-state machine code should be accessing the members  *
+ * of this structure.                                                        *
+ *                                                                           *
+ *****************************************************************************/
+
+struct ossl_statem_st {
+    MSG_FLOW_STATE state;
+    WRITE_STATE write_state;
+    WORK_STATE write_state_work;
+    READ_STATE read_state;
+    WORK_STATE read_state_work;
+    OSSL_HANDSHAKE_STATE hand_state;
+    int in_init;
+    int read_state_first_init;
+    /* true when we are actually in SSL_accept() or SSL_connect() */
+    int in_handshake;
+    /* Should we skip the CertificateVerify message? */
+    unsigned int no_cert_verify;
+    int use_timer;
+};
+typedef struct ossl_statem_st OSSL_STATEM;
+
+/*****************************************************************************
+ *                                                                           *
+ * The following macros/functions represent the libssl internal API to the   *
+ * state machine. Any libssl code may call these functions/macros            *
+ *                                                                           *
+ *****************************************************************************/
+
+__owur int ossl_statem_accept(SSL *s);
+__owur int ossl_statem_connect(SSL *s);
+void ossl_statem_clear(SSL *s);
+void ossl_statem_set_renegotiate(SSL *s);
+void ossl_statem_set_error(SSL *s);
+int ossl_statem_in_error(const SSL *s);
+void ossl_statem_set_in_init(SSL *s, int init);
+int ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(SSL *s);
+void ossl_statem_set_in_handshake(SSL *s, int inhand);
+void ossl_statem_set_hello_verify_done(SSL *s);
+__owur int ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(SSL *s);
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6fa3f1d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2946 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ *
+ * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ *
+ * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license provided above.
+ *
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
+ * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "../ssl_locl.h"
+#include "statem_locl.h"
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+
+static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s);
+static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s);
+static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b);
+static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
+                                    unsigned char *p);
+
+/*
+ * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
+ *
+ *  Return values are:
+ *  1: Yes
+ *  0: No
+ */
+static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s)
+{
+    /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
+    if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
+         && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
+        || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
+        return 0;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
+ *
+ *  Return values are:
+ *  1: Yes
+ *  0: No
+ */
+static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s)
+{
+    long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+
+    /*
+     * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
+     * ciphersuite or for SRP
+     */
+    if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK
+                 | SSL_kSRP)) {
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
+ * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
+ * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
+ * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
+ *
+ *  Return values are:
+ *  1: Success (transition allowed)
+ *  0: Error (transition not allowed)
+ */
+int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
+{
+    OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
+    int ske_expected;
+
+    switch (st->hand_state) {
+    case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
+        if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
+            st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
+            return 1;
+        }
+
+        if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+            if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
+                st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
+                return 1;
+            }
+        }
+        break;
+
+    case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
+        if (s->hit) {
+            if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
+                if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
+                    st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
+                    return 1;
+                }
+            } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
+                st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
+                return 1;
+            }
+        } else {
+            if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
+                st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
+                return 1;
+            } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
+                       && s->tls_session_secret_cb != NULL
+                       && s->session->tlsext_tick != NULL
+                       && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
+                /*
+                 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
+                 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
+                 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
+                 * the server is resuming.
+                 */
+                s->hit = 1;
+                st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
+                return 1;
+            } else if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
+                         & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
+                if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
+                    st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
+                    return 1;
+                }
+            } else {
+                ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
+                /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
+                if (ske_expected
+                    || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
+                        && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
+                    if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
+                        st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
+                        return 1;
+                    }
+                } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
+                           && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
+                    st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
+                    return 1;
+                } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
+                    st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
+                    return 1;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        break;
+
+    case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
+        /*
+         * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
+         * |tlsext_status_expected| is set
+         */
+        if (s->tlsext_status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
+            st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
+            return 1;
+        }
+        /* Fall through */
+
+    case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
+        ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
+        /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
+        if (ske_expected || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
+                             && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
+            if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
+                st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
+                return 1;
+            }
+            goto err;
+        }
+        /* Fall through */
+
+    case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
+        if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
+            if (cert_req_allowed(s)) {
+                st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
+                return 1;
+            }
+            goto err;
+        }
+        /* Fall through */
+
+    case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
+        if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
+            st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
+            return 1;
+        }
+        break;
+
+    case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
+        if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
+            if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
+                st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
+                return 1;
+            }
+        } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
+            st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
+            return 1;
+        }
+        break;
+
+    case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
+        if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
+            st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
+            return 1;
+        }
+        break;
+
+    case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
+        if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
+            st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
+            return 1;
+        }
+        break;
+
+    default:
+        break;
+    }
+
+ err:
+    /* No valid transition found */
+    ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+    SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move to next
+ * when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
+ */
+WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s)
+{
+    OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
+
+    switch (st->hand_state) {
+    case TLS_ST_OK:
+        /* Renegotiation - fall through */
+    case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
+        st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
+        return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+    case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
+        /*
+         * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
+         * we will be sent
+         */
+        return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
+
+    case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
+        st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
+        return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+    case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
+        if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
+            st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
+        else
+            st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
+        return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+    case TLS_ST_CW_CERT:
+        st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
+        return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+    case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
+        /*
+         * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
+         * sent, but no verify packet is sent
+         */
+        /*
+         * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
+         * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
+         * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
+         * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
+         */
+        if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
+            st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
+        } else {
+            st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
+        }
+        if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
+            st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
+        }
+        return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+    case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
+        st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
+        return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+    case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
+#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
+        st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
+#else
+        if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
+            st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
+        else
+            st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
+#endif
+        return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
+    case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
+        st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
+        return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+#endif
+
+    case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
+        if (s->hit) {
+            st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
+            ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
+            return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+        } else {
+            return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
+        }
+
+    case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
+        if (s->hit) {
+            st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
+            return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+        } else {
+            st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
+            ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
+            return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+        }
+
+    default:
+        /* Shouldn't happen */
+        return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
+ * the client to the server.
+ */
+WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
+{
+    OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
+
+    switch (st->hand_state) {
+    case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
+        s->shutdown = 0;
+        if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+            /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
+            if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
+                ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+                return WORK_ERROR;
+            }
+        }
+        break;
+
+    case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
+        if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+            if (s->hit) {
+                /*
+                 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
+                 * messages unless we need to.
+                 */
+                st->use_timer = 0;
+            }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+            if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
+                return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
+#endif
+        }
+        return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
+
+    case TLS_ST_OK:
+        return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst);
+
+    default:
+        /* No pre work to be done */
+        break;
+    }
+
+    return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
+ * client to the server.
+ */
+WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
+{
+    OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
+
+    s->init_num = 0;
+
+    switch (st->hand_state) {
+    case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
+        if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && statem_flush(s) != 1)
+            return WORK_MORE_A;
+
+        if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+            /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
+            s->first_packet = 1;
+        }
+        break;
+
+    case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
+        if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0)
+            return WORK_ERROR;
+        break;
+
+    case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
+        s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+        s->session->compress_meth = 0;
+#else
+        if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
+            s->session->compress_meth = 0;
+        else
+            s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
+#endif
+        if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
+            return WORK_ERROR;
+
+        if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
+                                                      SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
+            return WORK_ERROR;
+
+        if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+            if (s->hit) {
+                /*
+                 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
+                 * no SCTP used.
+                 */
+                BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
+                         0, NULL);
+            }
+#endif
+
+            dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
+        }
+        break;
+
+    case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+        if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
+            /*
+             * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
+             * no SCTP used.
+             */
+            BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
+                     0, NULL);
+        }
+#endif
+        if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
+            return WORK_MORE_B;
+        break;
+
+    default:
+        /* No post work to be done */
+        break;
+    }
+
+    return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Construct a message to be sent from the client to the server.
+ *
+ * Valid return values are:
+ *   1: Success
+ *   0: Error
+ */
+int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s)
+{
+    OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
+
+    switch (st->hand_state) {
+    case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
+        return tls_construct_client_hello(s);
+
+    case TLS_ST_CW_CERT:
+        return tls_construct_client_certificate(s);
+
+    case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
+        return tls_construct_client_key_exchange(s);
+
+    case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
+        return tls_construct_client_verify(s);
+
+    case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
+        if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
+            return dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s);
+        else
+            return tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s);
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
+    case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
+        return tls_construct_next_proto(s);
+#endif
+    case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
+        return tls_construct_finished(s,
+                                      s->method->
+                                      ssl3_enc->client_finished_label,
+                                      s->method->
+                                      ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len);
+
+    default:
+        /* Shouldn't happen */
+        break;
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
+ * reading. Excludes the message header.
+ */
+unsigned long ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s)
+{
+    OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
+
+    switch (st->hand_state) {
+    case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
+        return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
+
+    case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
+        return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
+
+    case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
+        return s->max_cert_list;
+
+    case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
+        return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
+
+    case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
+        return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
+
+    case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
+        /*
+         * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
+         * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
+         * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
+         */
+        return s->max_cert_list;
+
+    case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
+        return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
+
+    case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
+        if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+            return 3;
+        return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
+
+    case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
+        return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
+
+    case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
+        return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
+
+    default:
+        /* Shouldn't happen */
+        break;
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
+ */
+MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+    OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
+
+    switch (st->hand_state) {
+    case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
+        return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
+
+    case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
+        return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
+
+    case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
+        return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
+
+    case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
+        return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
+
+    case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
+        return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
+
+    case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
+        return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
+
+    case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
+        return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
+
+    case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
+        return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
+
+    case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
+        return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
+
+    case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
+        return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
+
+    default:
+        /* Shouldn't happen */
+        break;
+    }
+
+    return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
+ * from the server
+ */
+WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
+{
+    OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
+
+    switch (st->hand_state) {
+    case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
+        return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
+
+    default:
+        break;
+    }
+
+    /* Shouldn't happen */
+    return WORK_ERROR;
+}
+
+int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s)
+{
+    unsigned char *buf;
+    unsigned char *p, *d;
+    int i;
+    int protverr;
+    unsigned long l;
+    int al = 0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+    int j;
+    SSL_COMP *comp;
+#endif
+    SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
+
+    buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+
+    /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
+    protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s);
+    if (protverr != 0) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if ((sess == NULL) || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version) ||
+        /*
+         * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared
+         * "ticket" without a session ID.
+         */
+        (!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) ||
+        (sess->not_resumable)) {
+        if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0))
+            goto err;
+    }
+    /* else use the pre-loaded session */
+
+    p = s->s3->client_random;
+
+    /*
+     * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
+     * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
+     */
+    if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+        size_t idx;
+        i = 1;
+        for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) {
+            if (p[idx]) {
+                i = 0;
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+    } else
+        i = 1;
+
+    if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random)) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* Do the message type and length last */
+    d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
+
+    /*-
+     * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
+     * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
+     * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
+     * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
+     * choke if we initially report a higher version then
+     * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
+     * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
+     * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
+     * 1.0.
+     *
+     * Possible scenario with previous logic:
+     *      1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
+     *      2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
+     *      3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
+     *      4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
+     *      5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
+     *      6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
+     *         know that is maximum server supports.
+     *      7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
+     *         containing version 1.0.
+     *
+     * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
+     * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
+     * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
+     * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
+     * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
+     * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
+     * the negotiated version.
+     */
+    *(p++) = s->client_version >> 8;
+    *(p++) = s->client_version & 0xff;
+
+    /* Random stuff */
+    memcpy(p, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+    p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+
+    /* Session ID */
+    if (s->new_session)
+        i = 0;
+    else
+        i = s->session->session_id_length;
+    *(p++) = i;
+    if (i != 0) {
+        if (i > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, i);
+        p += i;
+    }
+
+    /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
+    if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+        if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        *(p++) = s->d1->cookie_len;
+        memcpy(p, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len);
+        p += s->d1->cookie_len;
+    }
+
+    /* Ciphers supported */
+    i = ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), &(p[2]));
+    if (i == 0) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+#ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
+    /*
+     * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
+     * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
+     * use TLS v1.2
+     */
+    if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
+        && i > OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH)
+        i = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
+#endif
+    s2n(i, p);
+    p += i;
+
+    /* COMPRESSION */
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+    *(p++) = 1;
+#else
+
+    if (!ssl_allow_compression(s) || !s->ctx->comp_methods)
+        j = 0;
+    else
+        j = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
+    *(p++) = 1 + j;
+    for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
+        comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
+        *(p++) = comp->id;
+    }
+#endif
+    *(p++) = 0;                 /* Add the NULL method */
+
+    /* TLS extensions */
+    if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if ((p =
+         ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
+                                    &al)) == NULL) {
+        ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    l = p - d;
+    if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, l)) {
+        ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+ err:
+    ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+    int al;
+    unsigned int cookie_len;
+    PACKET cookiepkt;
+
+    if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
+        || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
+        al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);
+    if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
+        al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {
+        al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+    s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
+
+    return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
+ f_err:
+    ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+    ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+    return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+}
+
+MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+    STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
+    const SSL_CIPHER *c;
+    PACKET session_id;
+    size_t session_id_len;
+    const unsigned char *cipherchars;
+    int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    unsigned int compression;
+    unsigned int sversion;
+    int protverr;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+    SSL_COMP *comp;
+#endif
+
+    if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
+        al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    protverr = ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion);
+    if (protverr != 0) {
+        al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, protverr);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    /* load the server hello data */
+    /* load the server random */
+    if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
+        al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    s->hit = 0;
+
+    /* Get the session-id. */
+    if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
+        al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+    session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
+    if (session_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id)
+        || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
+        al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+        al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared secret.
+     * EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
+     * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
+     * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
+     * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
+     * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether EAP-FAST
+     * servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session ID alone
+     * is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we first check if
+     * we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake message to see if the
+     * server wants to resume.
+     */
+    if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb &&
+        s->session->tlsext_tick) {
+        const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
+        s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
+        if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
+                                     &s->session->master_key_length,
+                                     NULL, &pref_cipher,
+                                     s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
+            s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
+                pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars);
+        } else {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (session_id_len != 0 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
+        && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
+                  session_id_len) == 0) {
+        if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
+            || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
+            /* actually a client application bug */
+            al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
+                   SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+        s->hit = 1;
+    } else {
+        /*
+         * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
+         * didn't echo the ID, make a new SSL_SESSION.
+         * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
+         * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
+         * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
+         */
+        if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
+            s->ctx->stats.sess_miss++;
+            if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
+                goto f_err;
+            }
+        }
+
+        s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
+        s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
+        /* session_id_len could be 0 */
+        if (session_id_len > 0)
+            memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
+                   session_id_len);
+    }
+
+    /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
+    if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) {
+        al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
+               SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars);
+    if (c == NULL) {
+        /* unknown cipher */
+        al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+    /*
+     * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
+     * version.
+     */
+    s->s3->tmp.min_ver = s->version;
+    s->s3->tmp.max_ver = s->version;
+    /*
+     * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
+     * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
+     */
+    if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK, 1)) {
+        al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
+    i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
+    if (i < 0) {
+        /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
+        al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
+     * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
+     * set and use it for comparison.
+     */
+    if (s->session->cipher)
+        s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
+    if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
+        al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
+               SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+    s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
+    /* lets get the compression algorithm */
+    /* COMPRESSION */
+    if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+        al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+    if (compression != 0) {
+        al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
+               SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+    /*
+     * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
+     * using compression.
+     */
+    if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+#else
+    if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
+        al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
+               SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+    if (compression == 0)
+        comp = NULL;
+    else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
+        al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
+        goto f_err;
+    } else {
+        comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression);
+    }
+
+    if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
+        al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
+               SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
+        goto f_err;
+    } else {
+        s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
+    }
+#endif
+
+    /* TLS extensions */
+    if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
+        /* wrong packet length */
+        al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+    if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
+        unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
+        char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
+
+        /*
+         * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
+         * no SCTP used.
+         */
+        memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
+               sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
+
+        if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
+                                       sizeof(sctpauthkey),
+                                       labelbuffer,
+                                       sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+
+        BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
+                 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
+                 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
+    }
+#endif
+
+    return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
+ f_err:
+    ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ err:
+    ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+    return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+}
+
+MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+    int al, i, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR, exp_idx;
+    unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
+    X509 *x = NULL;
+    const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
+    STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+
+    if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
+        || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len) {
+        al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+    while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
+        if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
+            || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
+            al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
+                   SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+
+        certstart = certbytes;
+        x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, cert_len);
+        if (x == NULL) {
+            al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+        if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
+            al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
+                   SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+        if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        x = NULL;
+    }
+
+    i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
+    /*
+     * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
+     * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
+     * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
+     * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
+     * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
+     * reverted because at least one application *only* set
+     * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
+     * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
+     * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
+     * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
+     * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
+     * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
+     */
+    if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
+        al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
+               SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+    ERR_clear_error();          /* but we keep s->verify_result */
+    if (i > 1) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i);
+        al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    s->session->peer_chain = sk;
+    /*
+     * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
+     * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
+     */
+    x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
+    sk = NULL;
+
+    pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
+
+    if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
+        x = NULL;
+        al = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
+               SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey);
+    if (i < 0) {
+        x = NULL;
+        al = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
+               SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
+    if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx
+        && (exp_idx != SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC ||
+            (i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
+             && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST01))) {
+        x = NULL;
+        al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
+               SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+    s->session->peer_type = i;
+
+    X509_free(s->session->peer);
+    X509_up_ref(x);
+    s->session->peer = x;
+    s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
+
+    x = NULL;
+    ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
+    goto done;
+
+ f_err:
+    ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ err:
+    ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+ done:
+    X509_free(x);
+    sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+    PACKET psk_identity_hint;
+
+    /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
+
+    if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
+        *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
+     * tls_construct_client_key_exchange.  Assume that the maximum length of
+     * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
+     * identity.
+     */
+    if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
+        *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
+        OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
+        s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
+    } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
+                               &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
+        *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+#else
+    SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+    PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
+
+    if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
+        || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
+        || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
+        || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
+        *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if ((s->srp_ctx.N =
+         BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
+                   PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
+        || (s->srp_ctx.g =
+            BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
+                      PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
+        || (s->srp_ctx.s =
+            BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
+                      PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
+        || (s->srp_ctx.B =
+            BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
+                      PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
+        *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, al)) {
+        *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* We must check if there is a certificate */
+    if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
+        *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
+
+    return 1;
+#else
+    SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+    PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
+    EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL;
+
+    DH *dh = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL;
+
+    int check_bits = 0;
+
+    if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
+        || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
+        || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
+        *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    peer_tmp = EVP_PKEY_new();
+    dh = DH_new();
+
+    if (peer_tmp == NULL || dh == NULL) {
+        *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);
+    g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL);
+    bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key), PACKET_remaining(&pub_key),
+                          NULL);
+    if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) {
+        *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* test non-zero pubkey */
+    if (BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) {
+        *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) {
+        *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    p = g = NULL;
+
+    if (DH_check_params(dh, &check_bits) == 0 || check_bits != 0) {
+        *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!DH_set0_key(dh, bnpub_key, NULL)) {
+        *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    bnpub_key = NULL;
+
+    if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) {
+        *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp, dh) == 0) {
+        *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    s->s3->peer_tmp = peer_tmp;
+
+    /*
+     * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
+     * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
+     */
+    if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
+        *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
+    /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
+
+    return 1;
+
+ err:
+    BN_free(p);
+    BN_free(g);
+    BN_free(bnpub_key);
+    DH_free(dh);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp);
+
+    return 0;
+#else
+    SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    PACKET encoded_pt;
+    const unsigned char *ecparams;
+    int curve_nid;
+    unsigned int curve_flags;
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
+
+    /*
+     * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
+     * public key. For now we only support named (not generic) curves and
+     * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
+     */
+    if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &ecparams, 3)) {
+        *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    /*
+     * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
+     * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
+     */
+    if (!tls1_check_curve(s, ecparams, 3)) {
+        *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(ecparams + 2), &curve_flags);
+
+    if (curve_nid == 0) {
+        *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
+               SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if ((curve_flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM) {
+        EVP_PKEY *key = EVP_PKEY_new();
+
+        if (key == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key, curve_nid)) {
+            *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+            EVP_PKEY_free(key);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        s->s3->peer_tmp = key;
+    } else {
+        /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
+        pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL);
+        if (pctx == NULL
+            || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0
+            || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx, curve_nid) <= 0
+            || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) {
+            *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+            EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+        pctx = NULL;
+    }
+
+    if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
+        *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
+                                        PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
+                                        PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
+        *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
+     * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
+     * and ECDSA.
+     */
+    if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA)
+        *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
+    else if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA)
+        *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
+    /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
+
+    return 1;
+#else
+    SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+    int al = -1;
+    long alg_k;
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+    PACKET save_param_start, signature;
+
+    alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+
+    save_param_start = *pkt;
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
+    EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->peer_tmp);
+    s->s3->peer_tmp = NULL;
+#endif
+
+    if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
+        if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
+    if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
+    } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
+        if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
+            goto err;
+    } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
+        if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
+            goto err;
+    } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
+        if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
+            goto err;
+    } else if (alg_k) {
+        al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* if it was signed, check the signature */
+    if (pkey != NULL) {
+        PACKET params;
+        int maxsig;
+        const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
+        EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx;
+
+        /*
+         * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
+         * equals the length of the parameters.
+         */
+        if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, &params,
+                                   PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -
+                                   PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
+            al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
+            const unsigned char *sigalgs;
+            int rv;
+            if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &sigalgs, 2)) {
+                al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sigalgs, pkey);
+            if (rv == -1) {
+                al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                goto err;
+            } else if (rv == 0) {
+                al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+                goto err;
+            }
+#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
+            fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
+#endif
+        } else if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
+            md = EVP_md5_sha1();
+        } else {
+            md = EVP_sha1();
+        }
+
+        if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
+            || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
+            al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        maxsig = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
+        if (maxsig < 0) {
+            al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        /*
+         * Check signature length
+         */
+        if (PACKET_remaining(&signature) > (size_t)maxsig) {
+            /* wrong packet length */
+            al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                   SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+        if (md_ctx == NULL) {
+            al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        if (EVP_VerifyInit_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
+            || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
+                                SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+            || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
+                                SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+            || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&params),
+                                PACKET_remaining(&params)) <= 0) {
+            EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
+            al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (EVP_VerifyFinal(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
+                            PACKET_remaining(&signature), pkey) <= 0) {
+            /* bad signature */
+            EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
+            al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
+    } else {
+        /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
+        if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
+            && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
+            /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
+            if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
+                /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
+                al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            } else {
+                al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+            }
+            goto err;
+        }
+        /* still data left over */
+        if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
+            al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
+ err:
+    if (al != -1)
+        ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+    ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+    return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+}
+
+MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+    int ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+    unsigned int list_len, ctype_num, i, name_len;
+    X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
+    const unsigned char *data;
+    const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes;
+    STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;
+
+    if ((ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* get the certificate types */
+    if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &ctype_num)
+        || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, ctype_num)) {
+        ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    OPENSSL_free(s->cert->ctypes);
+    s->cert->ctypes = NULL;
+    if (ctype_num > SSL3_CT_NUMBER) {
+        /* If we exceed static buffer copy all to cert structure */
+        s->cert->ctypes = OPENSSL_malloc(ctype_num);
+        if (s->cert->ctypes == NULL) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        memcpy(s->cert->ctypes, data, ctype_num);
+        s->cert->ctype_num = (size_t)ctype_num;
+        ctype_num = SSL3_CT_NUMBER;
+    }
+    for (i = 0; i < ctype_num; i++)
+        s->s3->tmp.ctype[i] = data[i];
+
+    if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
+        if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &list_len)
+            || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, list_len)) {
+            ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
+                   SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
+        for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
+            s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
+            s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
+        }
+        if ((list_len & 1) || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, list_len)) {
+            ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
+                   SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
+            ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    } else {
+        ssl_set_default_md(s);
+    }
+
+    /* get the CA RDNs */
+    if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &list_len)
+        || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != list_len) {
+        ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
+        if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &name_len)
+            || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &namebytes, name_len)) {
+            ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
+                   SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        namestart = namebytes;
+
+        if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&namebytes,
+                                name_len)) == NULL) {
+            ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) {
+            ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
+                   SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        xn = NULL;
+    }
+
+    /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
+    s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
+    s->s3->tmp.ctype_num = ctype_num;
+    sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
+    s->s3->tmp.ca_names = ca_sk;
+    ca_sk = NULL;
+
+    ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
+    goto done;
+ err:
+    ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+ done:
+    X509_NAME_free(xn);
+    sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
+{
+    return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b));
+}
+
+MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+    int al;
+    unsigned int ticklen;
+    unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint;
+
+    if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
+        || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
+        || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen) {
+        al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    /* Server is allowed to change its mind and send an empty ticket. */
+    if (ticklen == 0)
+        return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
+
+    if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
+        int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
+        SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
+        /*
+         * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
+         * one
+         */
+        if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) {
+            /*
+             * Remove the old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
+             */
+            SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
+        }
+
+        if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
+            al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+
+        SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+        s->session = new_sess;
+    }
+
+    OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_tick);
+    s->session->tlsext_ticklen = 0;
+
+    s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
+    if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen)) {
+        al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
+    s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
+    /*
+     * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
+     * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
+     * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
+     * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
+     * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
+     * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
+     * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
+     * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
+     * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
+     */
+    if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen,
+                    s->session->session_id, &s->session->session_id_length,
+                    EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
+ f_err:
+    ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ err:
+    ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+    return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+}
+
+MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+    int al;
+    unsigned long resplen;
+    unsigned int type;
+
+    if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
+        || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
+        al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+    if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &resplen)
+        || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
+        al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+    s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
+    if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp == NULL) {
+        al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+    if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, resplen)) {
+        al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+    s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = resplen;
+    return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
+ f_err:
+    ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+    ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+    return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+}
+
+MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+    if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
+        /* should contain no data */
+        ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+        ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+        return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+    }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+    if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
+        if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
+            ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+            return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+        }
+    }
+#endif
+
+    /*
+     * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
+     * the server
+     */
+    if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
+        ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+        ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+        return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |tlsext_ocsp_resp| and
+     * |tlsext_ocsp_resplen| values will be set if we actually received a status
+     * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
+     */
+    if (s->tlsext_status_type != -1 && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb != NULL) {
+        int ret;
+        ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
+        if (ret == 0) {
+            ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
+                            SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE);
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE,
+                   SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
+            return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+        }
+        if (ret < 0) {
+            ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+        }
+    }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
+    if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
+        /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
+        if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
+            ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+            return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+        }
+    }
+#endif
+
+    return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
+}
+
+static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
+                                          size_t *pskhdrlen, int *al)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+    int ret = 0;
+    /*
+     * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
+     * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
+     * strnlen.
+     */
+    char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
+    size_t identitylen = 0;
+    unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
+    unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL;
+    char *tmpidentity = NULL;
+    size_t psklen = 0;
+
+    if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
+        *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
+
+    psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
+                                    identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
+                                    psk, sizeof(psk));
+
+    if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+        goto err;
+    } else if (psklen == 0) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
+               SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
+        *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    identitylen = strlen(identity);
+    if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
+    tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);
+    if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
+    s->s3->tmp.psk = tmppsk;
+    s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
+    tmppsk = NULL;
+    OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
+    s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity;
+    tmpidentity = NULL;
+    s2n(identitylen, *p);
+    memcpy(*p, identity, identitylen);
+    *pskhdrlen = 2 + identitylen;
+    *p += identitylen;
+
+    ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen);
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen);
+
+    return ret;
+#else
+    SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, int *len, int *al)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+    unsigned char *q;
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
+    size_t enclen;
+    unsigned char *pms = NULL;
+    size_t pmslen = 0;
+
+    if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
+        /*
+         * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
+         */
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
+    if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey) == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
+    pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
+    if (pms == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
+    pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
+    if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, pmslen - 2) <= 0) {
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    q = *p;
+    /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
+    if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
+        *p += 2;
+    pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
+    if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
+        || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, *p, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    *len = enclen;
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+    pctx = NULL;
+# ifdef PKCS1_CHECK
+    if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1)
+        (*p)[1]++;
+    if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2)
+        tmp_buf[0] = 0x70;
+# endif
+
+    /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
+    if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) {
+        s2n(*len, q);
+        *len += 2;
+    }
+
+    s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
+    s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
+
+    return 1;
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+
+    return 0;
+#else
+    SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, int *len, int *al)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+    DH *dh_clnt = NULL;
+    const BIGNUM *pub_key;
+    EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
+
+    skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
+    if (skey == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
+    if (ckey == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
+
+    if (dh_clnt == NULL || ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey) == 0) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* send off the data */
+    DH_get0_key(dh_clnt, &pub_key, NULL);
+    *len = BN_num_bytes(pub_key);
+    s2n(*len, *p);
+    BN_bn2bin(pub_key, *p);
+    *len += 2;
+    EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
+
+    return 1;
+#else
+    SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, int *len, int *al)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
+    int encoded_pt_len = 0;
+    EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
+
+    skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
+    if (skey == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
+    if (ckey == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey) == 0) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* Generate encoding of client key */
+    encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, &encodedPoint);
+
+    if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
+    ckey = NULL;
+
+    *len = encoded_pt_len;
+
+    /* length of encoded point */
+    **p = *len;
+    *p += 1;
+    /* copy the point */
+    memcpy(*p, encodedPoint, *len);
+    /* increment len to account for length field */
+    *len += 1;
+
+    OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
+
+    return 1;
+ err:
+    EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
+    return 0;
+#else
+    SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, int *len, int *al)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
+    /* GOST key exchange message creation */
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
+    X509 *peer_cert;
+    size_t msglen;
+    unsigned int md_len;
+    unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
+    EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL;
+    int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
+    unsigned char *pms = NULL;
+    size_t pmslen = 0;
+
+    if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
+        dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
+
+    /*
+     * Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it
+     */
+    peer_cert = s->session->peer;
+    if (!peer_cert) {
+        *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
+               SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
+    if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
+        *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    /*
+     * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
+     * parameters match those of server certificate, use
+     * certificate key for key exchange
+     */
+
+    /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
+    pmslen = 32;
+    pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
+    if (pms == NULL) {
+        *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
+        /* Generate session key */
+        || RAND_bytes(pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
+        *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    };
+    /*
+     * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
+     * data
+     */
+    ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+    if (ukm_hash == NULL
+        || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
+        || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
+                            SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+        || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
+                            SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+        || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
+        *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
+    ukm_hash = NULL;
+    if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
+                          EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) < 0) {
+        *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
+    /*
+     * Encapsulate it into sequence
+     */
+    *((*p)++) = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED;
+    msglen = 255;
+    if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
+        *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (msglen >= 0x80) {
+        *((*p)++) = 0x81;
+        *((*p)++) = msglen & 0xff;
+        *len = msglen + 3;
+    } else {
+        *((*p)++) = msglen & 0xff;
+        *len = msglen + 2;
+    }
+    memcpy(*p, tmp, msglen);
+
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
+    s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
+    s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
+
+    return 1;
+ err:
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
+    return 0;
+#else
+    SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, int *len, int *al)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+    if (s->srp_ctx.A != NULL) {
+        /* send off the data */
+        *len = BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A);
+        s2n(*len, *p);
+        BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, *p);
+        *len += 2;
+    } else {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
+    s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
+    if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+#else
+    SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+{
+    unsigned char *p;
+    int len;
+    size_t pskhdrlen = 0;
+    unsigned long alg_k;
+    int al = -1;
+
+    alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+
+    p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
+
+    if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK)
+        && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, &p, &pskhdrlen, &al))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
+        len = 0;
+    } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
+        if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, &p, &len, &al))
+            goto err;
+    } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
+        if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, &p, &len, &al))
+            goto err;
+    } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
+        if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, &p, &len, &al))
+            goto err;
+    } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
+        if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, &p, &len, &al))
+            goto err;
+    } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
+        if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, &p, &len, &al))
+            goto err;
+    } else {
+        ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    len += pskhdrlen;
+
+    if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, len)) {
+        ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+ err:
+    if (al != -1)
+        ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.pms, s->s3->tmp.pmslen);
+    s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
+    s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
+#endif
+    ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s)
+{
+    unsigned char *pms = NULL;
+    size_t pmslen = 0;
+
+    pms = s->s3->tmp.pms;
+    pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+    /* Check for SRP */
+    if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
+        if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK,
+                   ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        return 1;
+    }
+#endif
+
+    if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
+        ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
+        ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
+        pms = NULL;
+        pmslen = 0;
+        goto err;
+    }
+    pms = NULL;
+    pmslen = 0;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+    if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+        unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
+        char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
+
+        /*
+         * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
+         * used.
+         */
+        memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
+               sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
+
+        if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
+                                       sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
+                                       sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+
+        BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
+                 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
+    }
+#endif
+
+    return 1;
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
+    s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int tls_construct_client_verify(SSL *s)
+{
+    unsigned char *p;
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+    const EVP_MD *md = s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys];
+    EVP_MD_CTX *mctx;
+    unsigned u = 0;
+    unsigned long n = 0;
+    long hdatalen = 0;
+    void *hdata;
+
+    mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+    if (mctx == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
+    pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
+
+    hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
+    if (hdatalen <= 0) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
+        if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        p += 2;
+        n = 2;
+    }
+#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
+    fprintf(stderr, "Using client alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
+#endif
+    if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL)
+        || !EVP_SignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen)
+        || (s->version == SSL3_VERSION
+            && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
+                                s->session->master_key_length,
+                                s->session->master_key))
+        || !EVP_SignFinal(mctx, p + 2, &u, pkey)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
+    {
+        int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
+        if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
+            || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
+            || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512)
+            BUF_reverse(p + 2, NULL, u);
+    }
+#endif
+
+    s2n(u, p);
+    n += u + 2;
+    /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */
+    if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0))
+        goto err;
+    if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, n)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
+    return 1;
+ err:
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
+ * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
+ * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
+ */
+static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
+{
+    if (!s->cert || !s->cert->key->x509 || !s->cert->key->privatekey)
+        return 0;
+    /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
+    if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys])
+        return 0;
+    /*
+     * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
+     * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
+     */
+    if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
+        !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
+{
+    X509 *x509 = NULL;
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+    int i;
+
+    if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
+        /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
+        if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
+            i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
+            if (i < 0) {
+                s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
+                return WORK_MORE_A;
+            }
+            if (i == 0) {
+                ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+                return 0;
+            }
+            s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+        }
+        if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
+            return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
+
+        /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
+        wst = WORK_MORE_B;
+    }
+
+    /* We need to get a client cert */
+    if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
+        /*
+         * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
+         * return(-1); We then get retied later
+         */
+        i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
+        if (i < 0) {
+            s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
+            return WORK_MORE_B;
+        }
+        s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+        if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
+            if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
+                i = 0;
+        } else if (i == 1) {
+            i = 0;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
+                   SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
+        }
+
+        X509_free(x509);
+        EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+        if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
+            i = 0;
+        if (i == 0) {
+            if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
+                s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
+                ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
+                return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
+            } else {
+                s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
+                if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
+                    ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                    ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+                    return 0;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
+        return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
+    }
+
+    /* Shouldn't ever get here */
+    return WORK_ERROR;
+}
+
+int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s)
+{
+    if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,
+                                (s->s3->tmp.cert_req ==
+                                 2) ? NULL : s->cert->key)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+#define has_bits(i,m)   (((i)&(m)) == (m))
+
+int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
+{
+    int i;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    int idx;
+#endif
+    long alg_k, alg_a;
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+    int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+
+    alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+    alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
+
+    /* we don't have a certificate */
+    if ((alg_a & SSL_aNULL) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
+        return (1);
+
+    /* This is the passed certificate */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    idx = s->session->peer_type;
+    if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) {
+        if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s) == 0) {
+            /* check failed */
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
+            goto f_err;
+        } else {
+            return 1;
+        }
+    } else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
+               SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+#endif
+    pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
+    i = X509_certificate_type(s->session->peer, pkey);
+
+    /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
+    if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
+               SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+    else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
+               SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+    if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) &&
+        !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
+               SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+    if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL)) {
+        al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+#endif
+
+    return (1);
+ f_err:
+    ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+    return (0);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s)
+{
+    unsigned int len, padding_len;
+    unsigned char *d;
+
+    len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len;
+    padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
+    d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+    d[4] = len;
+    memcpy(d + 5, s->next_proto_negotiated, len);
+    d[5 + len] = padding_len;
+    memset(d + 6 + len, 0, padding_len);
+    *(d++) = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
+    l2n3(2 + len + padding_len, d);
+    s->init_num = 4 + 2 + len + padding_len;
+    s->init_off = 0;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+#endif
+
+int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
+{
+    int i = 0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
+        i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
+                                        SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
+                                        px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+        if (i != 0)
+            return i;
+    }
+#endif
+    if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
+        i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
+    return i;
+}
+
+int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, unsigned char *p)
+{
+    int i, j = 0;
+    const SSL_CIPHER *c;
+    unsigned char *q;
+    int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
+    /* Set disabled masks for this session */
+    ssl_set_client_disabled(s);
+
+    if (sk == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    q = p;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) {
+        c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
+        /* Skip disabled ciphers */
+        if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0))
+            continue;
+        j = s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, p);
+        p += j;
+    }
+    /*
+     * If p == q, no ciphers; caller indicates an error. Otherwise, add
+     * applicable SCSVs.
+     */
+    if (p != q) {
+        if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
+            static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
+                0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
+            };
+            j = s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, p);
+            p += j;
+        }
+        if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
+            static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
+                0, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
+            };
+            j = s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, p);
+            p += j;
+        }
+    }
+
+    return (p - q);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/statem/statem_dtls.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/statem/statem_dtls.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6b80620
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/statem/statem_dtls.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1220 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2005-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "../ssl_locl.h"
+#include "statem_locl.h"
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+#define RSMBLY_BITMASK_SIZE(msg_len) (((msg_len) + 7) / 8)
+
+#define RSMBLY_BITMASK_MARK(bitmask, start, end) { \
+                        if ((end) - (start) <= 8) { \
+                                long ii; \
+                                for (ii = (start); ii < (end); ii++) bitmask[((ii) >> 3)] |= (1 << ((ii) & 7)); \
+                        } else { \
+                                long ii; \
+                                bitmask[((start) >> 3)] |= bitmask_start_values[((start) & 7)]; \
+                                for (ii = (((start) >> 3) + 1); ii < ((((end) - 1)) >> 3); ii++) bitmask[ii] = 0xff; \
+                                bitmask[(((end) - 1) >> 3)] |= bitmask_end_values[((end) & 7)]; \
+                        } }
+
+#define RSMBLY_BITMASK_IS_COMPLETE(bitmask, msg_len, is_complete) { \
+                        long ii; \
+                        OPENSSL_assert((msg_len) > 0); \
+                        is_complete = 1; \
+                        if (bitmask[(((msg_len) - 1) >> 3)] != bitmask_end_values[((msg_len) & 7)]) is_complete = 0; \
+                        if (is_complete) for (ii = (((msg_len) - 1) >> 3) - 1; ii >= 0 ; ii--) \
+                                if (bitmask[ii] != 0xff) { is_complete = 0; break; } }
+
+static unsigned char bitmask_start_values[] =
+    { 0xff, 0xfe, 0xfc, 0xf8, 0xf0, 0xe0, 0xc0, 0x80 };
+static unsigned char bitmask_end_values[] =
+    { 0xff, 0x01, 0x03, 0x07, 0x0f, 0x1f, 0x3f, 0x7f };
+
+static void dtls1_fix_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned long frag_off,
+                                     unsigned long frag_len);
+static unsigned char *dtls1_write_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned char *p);
+static void dtls1_set_message_header_int(SSL *s, unsigned char mt,
+                                         unsigned long len,
+                                         unsigned short seq_num,
+                                         unsigned long frag_off,
+                                         unsigned long frag_len);
+static int dtls_get_reassembled_message(SSL *s, long *len);
+
+static hm_fragment *dtls1_hm_fragment_new(unsigned long frag_len,
+                                          int reassembly)
+{
+    hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
+    unsigned char *buf = NULL;
+    unsigned char *bitmask = NULL;
+
+    frag = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*frag));
+    if (frag == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+
+    if (frag_len) {
+        buf = OPENSSL_malloc(frag_len);
+        if (buf == NULL) {
+            OPENSSL_free(frag);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* zero length fragment gets zero frag->fragment */
+    frag->fragment = buf;
+
+    /* Initialize reassembly bitmask if necessary */
+    if (reassembly) {
+        bitmask = OPENSSL_zalloc(RSMBLY_BITMASK_SIZE(frag_len));
+        if (bitmask == NULL) {
+            OPENSSL_free(buf);
+            OPENSSL_free(frag);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+    }
+
+    frag->reassembly = bitmask;
+
+    return frag;
+}
+
+void dtls1_hm_fragment_free(hm_fragment *frag)
+{
+    if (!frag)
+        return;
+    if (frag->msg_header.is_ccs) {
+        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(frag->msg_header.
+                            saved_retransmit_state.enc_write_ctx);
+        EVP_MD_CTX_free(frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.write_hash);
+    }
+    OPENSSL_free(frag->fragment);
+    OPENSSL_free(frag->reassembly);
+    OPENSSL_free(frag);
+}
+
+/*
+ * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
+ * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
+ */
+int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
+{
+    int ret;
+    unsigned int curr_mtu;
+    int retry = 1;
+    unsigned int len, frag_off, mac_size, blocksize, used_len;
+
+    if (!dtls1_query_mtu(s))
+        return -1;
+
+    if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu(s))
+        /* should have something reasonable now */
+        return -1;
+
+    if (s->init_off == 0 && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
+        OPENSSL_assert(s->init_num ==
+                       (int)s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
+
+    if (s->write_hash) {
+        if (s->enc_write_ctx
+            && (EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx)) &
+                EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) != 0)
+            mac_size = 0;
+        else
+            mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
+    } else
+        mac_size = 0;
+
+    if (s->enc_write_ctx &&
+        (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE))
+        blocksize = 2 * EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(s->enc_write_ctx);
+    else
+        blocksize = 0;
+
+    frag_off = 0;
+    s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+
+    /* s->init_num shouldn't ever be < 0...but just in case */
+    while (s->init_num > 0) {
+        if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && s->init_off != 0) {
+            /* We must be writing a fragment other than the first one */
+
+            if (frag_off > 0) {
+                /* This is the first attempt at writing out this fragment */
+
+                if (s->init_off <= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
+                    /*
+                     * Each fragment that was already sent must at least have
+                     * contained the message header plus one other byte.
+                     * Therefore |init_off| must have progressed by at least
+                     * |DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 1| bytes. If not something went
+                     * wrong.
+                     */
+                    return -1;
+                }
+
+                /*
+                 * Adjust |init_off| and |init_num| to allow room for a new
+                 * message header for this fragment.
+                 */
+                s->init_off -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+                s->init_num += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+            } else {
+                /*
+                 * We must have been called again after a retry so use the
+                 * fragment offset from our last attempt. We do not need
+                 * to adjust |init_off| and |init_num| as above, because
+                 * that should already have been done before the retry.
+                 */
+                frag_off = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.frag_off;
+            }
+        }
+
+        used_len = BIO_wpending(s->wbio) + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
+            + mac_size + blocksize;
+        if (s->d1->mtu > used_len)
+            curr_mtu = s->d1->mtu - used_len;
+        else
+            curr_mtu = 0;
+
+        if (curr_mtu <= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
+            /*
+             * grr.. we could get an error if MTU picked was wrong
+             */
+            ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio);
+            if (ret <= 0) {
+                s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
+                return ret;
+            }
+            used_len = DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + mac_size + blocksize;
+            if (s->d1->mtu > used_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
+                curr_mtu = s->d1->mtu - used_len;
+            } else {
+                /* Shouldn't happen */
+                return -1;
+            }
+        }
+
+        /*
+         * We just checked that s->init_num > 0 so this cast should be safe
+         */
+        if (((unsigned int)s->init_num) > curr_mtu)
+            len = curr_mtu;
+        else
+            len = s->init_num;
+
+        if (len > s->max_send_fragment)
+            len = s->max_send_fragment;
+
+        /*
+         * XDTLS: this function is too long.  split out the CCS part
+         */
+        if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
+            if (len < DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
+                /*
+                 * len is so small that we really can't do anything sensible
+                 * so fail
+                 */
+                return -1;
+            }
+            dtls1_fix_message_header(s, frag_off, len - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
+
+            dtls1_write_message_header(s,
+                                       (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->
+                                       data[s->init_off]);
+        }
+
+        ret = dtls1_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], len);
+        if (ret < 0) {
+            /*
+             * might need to update MTU here, but we don't know which
+             * previous packet caused the failure -- so can't really
+             * retransmit anything.  continue as if everything is fine and
+             * wait for an alert to handle the retransmit
+             */
+            if (retry && BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
+                                  BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_MTU_EXCEEDED, 0, NULL) > 0) {
+                if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU)) {
+                    if (!dtls1_query_mtu(s))
+                        return -1;
+                    /* Have one more go */
+                    retry = 0;
+                } else
+                    return -1;
+            } else {
+                return (-1);
+            }
+        } else {
+
+            /*
+             * bad if this assert fails, only part of the handshake message
+             * got sent.  but why would this happen?
+             */
+            OPENSSL_assert(len == (unsigned int)ret);
+
+            if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && !s->d1->retransmitting) {
+                /*
+                 * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case
+                 * we'll ignore the result anyway
+                 */
+                unsigned char *p =
+                    (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off];
+                const struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
+                int xlen;
+
+                if (frag_off == 0 && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
+                    /*
+                     * reconstruct message header is if it is being sent in
+                     * single fragment
+                     */
+                    *p++ = msg_hdr->type;
+                    l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len, p);
+                    s2n(msg_hdr->seq, p);
+                    l2n3(0, p);
+                    l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len, p);
+                    p -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+                    xlen = ret;
+                } else {
+                    p += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+                    xlen = ret - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+                }
+
+                if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, p, xlen))
+                    return -1;
+            }
+
+            if (ret == s->init_num) {
+                if (s->msg_callback)
+                    s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data,
+                                    (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s,
+                                    s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+                s->init_off = 0; /* done writing this message */
+                s->init_num = 0;
+
+                return (1);
+            }
+            s->init_off += ret;
+            s->init_num -= ret;
+            ret -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+            frag_off += ret;
+
+            /*
+             * We save the fragment offset for the next fragment so we have it
+             * available in case of an IO retry. We don't know the length of the
+             * next fragment yet so just set that to 0 for now. It will be
+             * updated again later.
+             */
+            dtls1_fix_message_header(s, frag_off, 0);
+        }
+    }
+    return (0);
+}
+
+int dtls_get_message(SSL *s, int *mt, unsigned long *len)
+{
+    struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr;
+    unsigned char *p;
+    unsigned long msg_len;
+    int ok;
+    long tmplen;
+
+    msg_hdr = &s->d1->r_msg_hdr;
+    memset(msg_hdr, 0, sizeof(*msg_hdr));
+
+ again:
+    ok = dtls_get_reassembled_message(s, &tmplen);
+    if (tmplen == DTLS1_HM_BAD_FRAGMENT || tmplen == DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY) {
+        /* bad fragment received */
+        goto again;
+    } else if (tmplen <= 0 && !ok) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    *mt = s->s3->tmp.message_type;
+
+    p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+
+    if (*mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
+        if (s->msg_callback) {
+            s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
+                            p, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+        }
+        /*
+         * This isn't a real handshake message so skip the processing below.
+         */
+        *len = (unsigned long)tmplen;
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    msg_len = msg_hdr->msg_len;
+
+    /* reconstruct message header */
+    *(p++) = msg_hdr->type;
+    l2n3(msg_len, p);
+    s2n(msg_hdr->seq, p);
+    l2n3(0, p);
+    l2n3(msg_len, p);
+    if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
+        p -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+        msg_len += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for
+     * Finished verification.
+     */
+    if (*mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED && !ssl3_take_mac(s)) {
+        /* SSLfatal() already called */
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, p, msg_len))
+        return 0;
+    if (s->msg_callback)
+        s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
+                        p, msg_len, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+    memset(msg_hdr, 0, sizeof(*msg_hdr));
+
+    s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
+
+    s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+    *len = s->init_num;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * dtls1_max_handshake_message_len returns the maximum number of bytes
+ * permitted in a DTLS handshake message for |s|. The minimum is 16KB, but
+ * may be greater if the maximum certificate list size requires it.
+ */
+static unsigned long dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(const SSL *s)
+{
+    unsigned long max_len =
+        DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH;
+    if (max_len < (unsigned long)s->max_cert_list)
+        return s->max_cert_list;
+    return max_len;
+}
+
+static int dtls1_preprocess_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr)
+{
+    size_t frag_off, frag_len, msg_len;
+
+    msg_len = msg_hdr->msg_len;
+    frag_off = msg_hdr->frag_off;
+    frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len;
+
+    /* sanity checking */
+    if ((frag_off + frag_len) > msg_len
+            || msg_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
+        return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+    }
+
+    if (s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0) { /* first fragment */
+        /*
+         * msg_len is limited to 2^24, but is effectively checked against
+         * dtls_max_handshake_message_len(s) above
+         */
+        if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf, msg_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+            return SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        }
+
+        s->s3->tmp.message_size = msg_len;
+        s->d1->r_msg_hdr.msg_len = msg_len;
+        s->s3->tmp.message_type = msg_hdr->type;
+        s->d1->r_msg_hdr.type = msg_hdr->type;
+        s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq = msg_hdr->seq;
+    } else if (msg_len != s->d1->r_msg_hdr.msg_len) {
+        /*
+         * They must be playing with us! BTW, failure to enforce upper limit
+         * would open possibility for buffer overrun.
+         */
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
+        return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+    }
+
+    return 0;                   /* no error */
+}
+
+static int dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(SSL *s, int *ok)
+{
+    /*-
+     * (0) check whether the desired fragment is available
+     * if so:
+     * (1) copy over the fragment to s->init_buf->data[]
+     * (2) update s->init_num
+     */
+    pitem *item;
+    hm_fragment *frag;
+    int al;
+
+    *ok = 0;
+
+    do {
+        item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->buffered_messages);
+        if (item == NULL)
+            return 0;
+
+        frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
+
+        if (frag->msg_header.seq < s->d1->handshake_read_seq) {
+            /* This is a stale message that has been buffered so clear it */
+            pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_messages);
+            dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
+            pitem_free(item);
+            item = NULL;
+            frag = NULL;
+        }
+    } while (item == NULL);
+
+    /* Don't return if reassembly still in progress */
+    if (frag->reassembly != NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    if (s->d1->handshake_read_seq == frag->msg_header.seq) {
+        unsigned long frag_len = frag->msg_header.frag_len;
+        pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_messages);
+
+        al = dtls1_preprocess_fragment(s, &frag->msg_header);
+
+        if (al == 0) {          /* no alert */
+            unsigned char *p =
+                (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+            memcpy(&p[frag->msg_header.frag_off], frag->fragment,
+                   frag->msg_header.frag_len);
+        }
+
+        dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
+        pitem_free(item);
+
+        if (al == 0) {
+            *ok = 1;
+            return frag_len;
+        }
+
+        ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+        s->init_num = 0;
+        *ok = 0;
+        return -1;
+    } else
+        return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, const struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr, int *ok)
+{
+    hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
+    pitem *item = NULL;
+    int i = -1, is_complete;
+    unsigned char seq64be[8];
+    unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len;
+
+    if ((msg_hdr->frag_off + frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len ||
+        msg_hdr->msg_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (frag_len == 0)
+        return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
+
+    /* Try to find item in queue */
+    memset(seq64be, 0, sizeof(seq64be));
+    seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(msg_hdr->seq >> 8);
+    seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)msg_hdr->seq;
+    item = pqueue_find(s->d1->buffered_messages, seq64be);
+
+    if (item == NULL) {
+        frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(msg_hdr->msg_len, 1);
+        if (frag == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        memcpy(&(frag->msg_header), msg_hdr, sizeof(*msg_hdr));
+        frag->msg_header.frag_len = frag->msg_header.msg_len;
+        frag->msg_header.frag_off = 0;
+    } else {
+        frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
+        if (frag->msg_header.msg_len != msg_hdr->msg_len) {
+            item = NULL;
+            frag = NULL;
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * If message is already reassembled, this must be a retransmit and can
+     * be dropped. In this case item != NULL and so frag does not need to be
+     * freed.
+     */
+    if (frag->reassembly == NULL) {
+        unsigned char devnull[256];
+
+        while (frag_len) {
+            i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL,
+                                          devnull,
+                                          frag_len >
+                                          sizeof(devnull) ? sizeof(devnull) :
+                                          frag_len, 0);
+            if (i <= 0)
+                goto err;
+            frag_len -= i;
+        }
+        return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
+    }
+
+    /* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */
+    i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL,
+                                  frag->fragment + msg_hdr->frag_off,
+                                  frag_len, 0);
+    if ((unsigned long)i != frag_len)
+        i = -1;
+    if (i <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    RSMBLY_BITMASK_MARK(frag->reassembly, (long)msg_hdr->frag_off,
+                        (long)(msg_hdr->frag_off + frag_len));
+
+    RSMBLY_BITMASK_IS_COMPLETE(frag->reassembly, (long)msg_hdr->msg_len,
+                               is_complete);
+
+    if (is_complete) {
+        OPENSSL_free(frag->reassembly);
+        frag->reassembly = NULL;
+    }
+
+    if (item == NULL) {
+        item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag);
+        if (item == NULL) {
+            i = -1;
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        item = pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
+        /*
+         * pqueue_insert fails iff a duplicate item is inserted. However,
+         * |item| cannot be a duplicate. If it were, |pqueue_find|, above,
+         * would have returned it and control would never have reached this
+         * branch.
+         */
+        OPENSSL_assert(item != NULL);
+    }
+
+    return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
+
+ err:
+    if (item == NULL)
+        dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
+    *ok = 0;
+    return i;
+}
+
+static int
+dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, const struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr,
+                                 int *ok)
+{
+    int i = -1;
+    hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
+    pitem *item = NULL;
+    unsigned char seq64be[8];
+    unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len;
+
+    if ((msg_hdr->frag_off + frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* Try to find item in queue, to prevent duplicate entries */
+    memset(seq64be, 0, sizeof(seq64be));
+    seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(msg_hdr->seq >> 8);
+    seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)msg_hdr->seq;
+    item = pqueue_find(s->d1->buffered_messages, seq64be);
+
+    /*
+     * If we already have an entry and this one is a fragment, don't discard
+     * it and rather try to reassemble it.
+     */
+    if (item != NULL && frag_len != msg_hdr->msg_len)
+        item = NULL;
+
+    /*
+     * Discard the message if sequence number was already there, is too far
+     * in the future, already in the queue or if we received a FINISHED
+     * before the SERVER_HELLO, which then must be a stale retransmit.
+     */
+    if (msg_hdr->seq <= s->d1->handshake_read_seq ||
+        msg_hdr->seq > s->d1->handshake_read_seq + 10 || item != NULL ||
+        (s->d1->handshake_read_seq == 0 && msg_hdr->type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)) {
+        unsigned char devnull[256];
+
+        while (frag_len) {
+            i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL,
+                                          devnull,
+                                          frag_len >
+                                          sizeof(devnull) ? sizeof(devnull) :
+                                          frag_len, 0);
+            if (i <= 0)
+                goto err;
+            frag_len -= i;
+        }
+    } else {
+        if (frag_len != msg_hdr->msg_len)
+            return dtls1_reassemble_fragment(s, msg_hdr, ok);
+
+        if (frag_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s))
+            goto err;
+
+        frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(frag_len, 0);
+        if (frag == NULL)
+            goto err;
+
+        memcpy(&(frag->msg_header), msg_hdr, sizeof(*msg_hdr));
+
+        if (frag_len) {
+            /*
+             * read the body of the fragment (header has already been read
+             */
+            i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL,
+                                          frag->fragment, frag_len, 0);
+            if ((unsigned long)i != frag_len)
+                i = -1;
+            if (i <= 0)
+                goto err;
+        }
+
+        item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag);
+        if (item == NULL)
+            goto err;
+
+        item = pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
+        /*
+         * pqueue_insert fails iff a duplicate item is inserted. However,
+         * |item| cannot be a duplicate. If it were, |pqueue_find|, above,
+         * would have returned it. Then, either |frag_len| !=
+         * |msg_hdr->msg_len| in which case |item| is set to NULL and it will
+         * have been processed with |dtls1_reassemble_fragment|, above, or
+         * the record will have been discarded.
+         */
+        OPENSSL_assert(item != NULL);
+    }
+
+    return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
+
+ err:
+    if (item == NULL)
+        dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
+    *ok = 0;
+    return i;
+}
+
+static int dtls_get_reassembled_message(SSL *s, long *len)
+{
+    unsigned char wire[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH];
+    unsigned long mlen, frag_off, frag_len;
+    int i, al, recvd_type;
+    struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
+    int ok;
+
+ redo:
+    /* see if we have the required fragment already */
+    if ((frag_len = dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(s, &ok)) || ok) {
+        if (ok)
+            s->init_num = frag_len;
+        *len = frag_len;
+        return ok;
+    }
+
+    /* read handshake message header */
+    i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &recvd_type, wire,
+                                  DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, 0);
+    if (i <= 0) {               /* nbio, or an error */
+        s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
+        *len = i;
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (recvd_type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
+        if (wire[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) {
+            al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_GET_REASSEMBLED_MESSAGE,
+                   SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+
+        memcpy(s->init_buf->data, wire, i);
+        s->init_num = i - 1;
+        s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + 1;
+        s->s3->tmp.message_type = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
+        s->s3->tmp.message_size = i - 1;
+        *len = i - 1;
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    /* Handshake fails if message header is incomplete */
+    if (i != DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
+        al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_GET_REASSEMBLED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    /* parse the message fragment header */
+    dtls1_get_message_header(wire, &msg_hdr);
+
+    mlen = msg_hdr.msg_len;
+    frag_off = msg_hdr.frag_off;
+    frag_len = msg_hdr.frag_len;
+
+    /*
+     * We must have at least frag_len bytes left in the record to be read.
+     * Fragments must not span records.
+     */
+    if (frag_len > RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s->rlayer)) {
+        al = SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_GET_REASSEMBLED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * if this is a future (or stale) message it gets buffered
+     * (or dropped)--no further processing at this time
+     * While listening, we accept seq 1 (ClientHello with cookie)
+     * although we're still expecting seq 0 (ClientHello)
+     */
+    if (msg_hdr.seq != s->d1->handshake_read_seq) {
+        *len = dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(s, &msg_hdr, &ok);
+        return ok;
+    }
+
+    if (frag_len && frag_len < mlen) {
+        *len = dtls1_reassemble_fragment(s, &msg_hdr, &ok);
+        return ok;
+    }
+
+    if (!s->server && s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0 &&
+        wire[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) {
+        /*
+         * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages -- we are
+         * doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if their format is
+         * correct. Does not count for 'Finished' MAC.
+         */
+        if (wire[1] == 0 && wire[2] == 0 && wire[3] == 0) {
+            if (s->msg_callback)
+                s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
+                                wire, DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
+                                s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+            s->init_num = 0;
+            goto redo;
+        } else {                /* Incorrectly formatted Hello request */
+
+            al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_GET_REASSEMBLED_MESSAGE,
+                   SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if ((al = dtls1_preprocess_fragment(s, &msg_hdr)))
+        goto f_err;
+
+    if (frag_len > 0) {
+        unsigned char *p =
+            (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+
+        i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL,
+                                      &p[frag_off], frag_len, 0);
+
+        /*
+         * This shouldn't ever fail due to NBIO because we already checked
+         * that we have enough data in the record
+         */
+        if (i <= 0) {
+            s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
+            *len = i;
+            return 0;
+        }
+    } else
+        i = 0;
+
+    /*
+     * XDTLS: an incorrectly formatted fragment should cause the handshake
+     * to fail
+     */
+    if (i != (int)frag_len) {
+        al = SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_GET_REASSEMBLED_MESSAGE, SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Note that s->init_num is *not* used as current offset in
+     * s->init_buf->data, but as a counter summing up fragments' lengths: as
+     * soon as they sum up to handshake packet length, we assume we have got
+     * all the fragments.
+     */
+    *len = s->init_num = frag_len;
+    return 1;
+
+ f_err:
+    ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+    s->init_num = 0;
+    *len = -1;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * for these 2 messages, we need to
+ * ssl->enc_read_ctx                    re-init
+ * ssl->rlayer.read_sequence            zero
+ * ssl->s3->read_mac_secret             re-init
+ * ssl->session->read_sym_enc           assign
+ * ssl->session->read_compression       assign
+ * ssl->session->read_hash              assign
+ */
+int dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
+{
+    unsigned char *p;
+
+    p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+    *p++ = SSL3_MT_CCS;
+    s->d1->handshake_write_seq = s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq;
+    s->init_num = DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH;
+
+    if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
+        s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq++;
+        s2n(s->d1->handshake_write_seq, p);
+        s->init_num += 2;
+    }
+
+    s->init_off = 0;
+
+    dtls1_set_message_header_int(s, SSL3_MT_CCS, 0,
+                                 s->d1->handshake_write_seq, 0, 0);
+
+    /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
+    if (!dtls1_buffer_message(s, 1)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+/*
+ * Wait for a dry event. Should only be called at a point in the handshake
+ * where we are not expecting any data from the peer (except possibly an alert).
+ */
+WORK_STATE dtls_wait_for_dry(SSL *s)
+{
+    int ret;
+    long len;
+
+    /* read app data until dry event */
+    ret = BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry(SSL_get_wbio(s));
+    if (ret < 0)
+        return WORK_ERROR;
+
+    if (ret == 0) {
+        /*
+         * We're not expecting any more messages from the peer at this point -
+         * but we could get an alert. If an alert is waiting then we will never
+         * return successfully. Therefore we attempt to read a message. This
+         * should never succeed but will process any waiting alerts.
+         */
+        if (dtls_get_reassembled_message(s, &len)) {
+            /* The call succeeded! This should never happen */
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_WAIT_FOR_DRY, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+            ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+            ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+            return WORK_ERROR;
+        }
+
+        s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
+        s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
+        BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
+        BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
+        return WORK_MORE_A;
+    }
+    return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
+}
+#endif
+
+int dtls1_read_failed(SSL *s, int code)
+{
+    if (code > 0) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_FAILED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    if (!dtls1_is_timer_expired(s)) {
+        /*
+         * not a timeout, none of our business, let higher layers handle
+         * this.  in fact it's probably an error
+         */
+        return code;
+    }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+    /* done, no need to send a retransmit */
+    if (!SSL_in_init(s) && !s->tlsext_hb_pending)
+#else
+    /* done, no need to send a retransmit */
+    if (!SSL_in_init(s))
+#endif
+    {
+        BIO_set_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_FLAGS_READ);
+        return code;
+    }
+
+    return dtls1_handle_timeout(s);
+}
+
+int dtls1_get_queue_priority(unsigned short seq, int is_ccs)
+{
+    /*
+     * The index of the retransmission queue actually is the message sequence
+     * number, since the queue only contains messages of a single handshake.
+     * However, the ChangeCipherSpec has no message sequence number and so
+     * using only the sequence will result in the CCS and Finished having the
+     * same index. To prevent this, the sequence number is multiplied by 2.
+     * In case of a CCS 1 is subtracted. This does not only differ CSS and
+     * Finished, it also maintains the order of the index (important for
+     * priority queues) and fits in the unsigned short variable.
+     */
+    return seq * 2 - is_ccs;
+}
+
+int dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(SSL *s)
+{
+    pqueue *sent = s->d1->sent_messages;
+    piterator iter;
+    pitem *item;
+    hm_fragment *frag;
+    int found = 0;
+
+    iter = pqueue_iterator(sent);
+
+    for (item = pqueue_next(&iter); item != NULL; item = pqueue_next(&iter)) {
+        frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
+        if (dtls1_retransmit_message(s, (unsigned short)
+                                     dtls1_get_queue_priority
+                                     (frag->msg_header.seq,
+                                      frag->msg_header.is_ccs), &found) <= 0)
+            return -1;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int dtls1_buffer_message(SSL *s, int is_ccs)
+{
+    pitem *item;
+    hm_fragment *frag;
+    unsigned char seq64be[8];
+
+    /*
+     * this function is called immediately after a message has been
+     * serialized
+     */
+    OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off == 0);
+
+    frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(s->init_num, 0);
+    if (frag == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    memcpy(frag->fragment, s->init_buf->data, s->init_num);
+
+    if (is_ccs) {
+        /* For DTLS1_BAD_VER the header length is non-standard */
+        OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len +
+                       ((s->version ==
+                         DTLS1_BAD_VER) ? 3 : DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH)
+                       == (unsigned int)s->init_num);
+    } else {
+        OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len +
+                       DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH == (unsigned int)s->init_num);
+    }
+
+    frag->msg_header.msg_len = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len;
+    frag->msg_header.seq = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.seq;
+    frag->msg_header.type = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.type;
+    frag->msg_header.frag_off = 0;
+    frag->msg_header.frag_len = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len;
+    frag->msg_header.is_ccs = is_ccs;
+
+    /* save current state */
+    frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.enc_write_ctx = s->enc_write_ctx;
+    frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.write_hash = s->write_hash;
+    frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.compress = s->compress;
+    frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.session = s->session;
+    frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.epoch =
+        DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_w_epoch(&s->rlayer);
+
+    memset(seq64be, 0, sizeof(seq64be));
+    seq64be[6] =
+        (unsigned
+         char)(dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag->msg_header.seq,
+                                        frag->msg_header.is_ccs) >> 8);
+    seq64be[7] =
+        (unsigned
+         char)(dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag->msg_header.seq,
+                                        frag->msg_header.is_ccs));
+
+    item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag);
+    if (item == NULL) {
+        dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    pqueue_insert(s->d1->sent_messages, item);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int dtls1_retransmit_message(SSL *s, unsigned short seq, int *found)
+{
+    int ret;
+    /* XDTLS: for now assuming that read/writes are blocking */
+    pitem *item;
+    hm_fragment *frag;
+    unsigned long header_length;
+    unsigned char seq64be[8];
+    struct dtls1_retransmit_state saved_state;
+
+    /*-
+      OPENSSL_assert(s->init_num == 0);
+      OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off == 0);
+     */
+
+    /* XDTLS:  the requested message ought to be found, otherwise error */
+    memset(seq64be, 0, sizeof(seq64be));
+    seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(seq >> 8);
+    seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)seq;
+
+    item = pqueue_find(s->d1->sent_messages, seq64be);
+    if (item == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_RETRANSMIT_MESSAGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        *found = 0;
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    *found = 1;
+    frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
+
+    if (frag->msg_header.is_ccs)
+        header_length = DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH;
+    else
+        header_length = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+
+    memcpy(s->init_buf->data, frag->fragment,
+           frag->msg_header.msg_len + header_length);
+    s->init_num = frag->msg_header.msg_len + header_length;
+
+    dtls1_set_message_header_int(s, frag->msg_header.type,
+                                 frag->msg_header.msg_len,
+                                 frag->msg_header.seq, 0,
+                                 frag->msg_header.frag_len);
+
+    /* save current state */
+    saved_state.enc_write_ctx = s->enc_write_ctx;
+    saved_state.write_hash = s->write_hash;
+    saved_state.compress = s->compress;
+    saved_state.session = s->session;
+    saved_state.epoch = DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_w_epoch(&s->rlayer);
+
+    s->d1->retransmitting = 1;
+
+    /* restore state in which the message was originally sent */
+    s->enc_write_ctx = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.enc_write_ctx;
+    s->write_hash = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.write_hash;
+    s->compress = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.compress;
+    s->session = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.session;
+    DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_set_saved_w_epoch(&s->rlayer,
+                                        frag->msg_header.
+                                        saved_retransmit_state.epoch);
+
+    ret = dtls1_do_write(s, frag->msg_header.is_ccs ?
+                         SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC : SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
+
+    /* restore current state */
+    s->enc_write_ctx = saved_state.enc_write_ctx;
+    s->write_hash = saved_state.write_hash;
+    s->compress = saved_state.compress;
+    s->session = saved_state.session;
+    DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_set_saved_w_epoch(&s->rlayer, saved_state.epoch);
+
+    s->d1->retransmitting = 0;
+
+    (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+void dtls1_set_message_header(SSL *s,
+                              unsigned char mt, unsigned long len,
+                              unsigned long frag_off, unsigned long frag_len)
+{
+    if (frag_off == 0) {
+        s->d1->handshake_write_seq = s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq;
+        s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq++;
+    }
+
+    dtls1_set_message_header_int(s, mt, len, s->d1->handshake_write_seq,
+                                 frag_off, frag_len);
+}
+
+/* don't actually do the writing, wait till the MTU has been retrieved */
+static void
+dtls1_set_message_header_int(SSL *s, unsigned char mt,
+                             unsigned long len, unsigned short seq_num,
+                             unsigned long frag_off, unsigned long frag_len)
+{
+    struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
+
+    msg_hdr->type = mt;
+    msg_hdr->msg_len = len;
+    msg_hdr->seq = seq_num;
+    msg_hdr->frag_off = frag_off;
+    msg_hdr->frag_len = frag_len;
+}
+
+static void
+dtls1_fix_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned long frag_off, unsigned long frag_len)
+{
+    struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
+
+    msg_hdr->frag_off = frag_off;
+    msg_hdr->frag_len = frag_len;
+}
+
+static unsigned char *dtls1_write_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
+{
+    struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
+
+    *p++ = msg_hdr->type;
+    l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len, p);
+
+    s2n(msg_hdr->seq, p);
+    l2n3(msg_hdr->frag_off, p);
+    l2n3(msg_hdr->frag_len, p);
+
+    return p;
+}
+
+void dtls1_get_message_header(unsigned char *data, struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr)
+{
+    memset(msg_hdr, 0, sizeof(*msg_hdr));
+    msg_hdr->type = *(data++);
+    n2l3(data, msg_hdr->msg_len);
+
+    n2s(data, msg_hdr->seq);
+    n2l3(data, msg_hdr->frag_off);
+    n2l3(data, msg_hdr->frag_len);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..36d410b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1083 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ */
+
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "../ssl_locl.h"
+#include "statem_locl.h"
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+/*
+ * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
+ * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
+ */
+int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
+{
+    int ret;
+
+    ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
+                           s->init_num);
+    if (ret < 0)
+        return (-1);
+    if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
+        /*
+         * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll
+         * ignore the result anyway
+         */
+        if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s,
+                             (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
+                             ret))
+            return -1;
+
+    if (ret == s->init_num) {
+        if (s->msg_callback)
+            s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data,
+                            (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s,
+                            s->msg_callback_arg);
+        return (1);
+    }
+    s->init_off += ret;
+    s->init_num -= ret;
+    return (0);
+}
+
+int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, const char *sender, int slen)
+{
+    unsigned char *p;
+    int i;
+    unsigned long l;
+
+    p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
+
+    i = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
+                                              sender, slen,
+                                              s->s3->tmp.finish_md);
+    if (i <= 0)
+        return 0;
+    s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = i;
+    memcpy(p, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
+    l = i;
+
+    /*
+     * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
+     */
+    if (!s->server) {
+        OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+        memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
+        s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = i;
+    } else {
+        OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+        memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
+        s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = i;
+    }
+
+    if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_FINISHED, l)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen
+ * to far.
+ */
+int ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s)
+{
+    const char *sender;
+    int slen;
+
+    if (!s->server) {
+        sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
+        slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
+    } else {
+        sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
+        slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
+    }
+
+    s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len =
+        s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, sender, slen,
+                                              s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
+
+    if (s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len == 0) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_TAKE_MAC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+    int al;
+    long remain;
+
+    remain = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
+    /*
+     * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have
+     * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left,
+     * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes
+     */
+    if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+        if ((s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER
+             && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH + 1)
+            || (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER
+                && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH - 1)) {
+            al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
+                   SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+    } else {
+        if (remain != 0) {
+            al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
+                   SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
+    if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) {
+        al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1;
+    if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) {
+        al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+        dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ);
+
+        if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+            s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+        /*
+         * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of
+         * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no
+         * SCTP is used
+         */
+        BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL);
+#endif
+    }
+
+    return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
+ f_err:
+    ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+    ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+    return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+}
+
+MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+    int al, i;
+
+    /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */
+    if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
+        al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+    s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
+
+    i = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len;
+
+    if ((unsigned long)i != PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
+        al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i) != 0) {
+        al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
+     */
+    if (s->server) {
+        OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+        memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i);
+        s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = i;
+    } else {
+        OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+        memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i);
+        s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = i;
+    }
+
+    return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
+ f_err:
+    ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+    ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+    return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+}
+
+int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
+{
+    unsigned char *p;
+
+    p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+    *p = SSL3_MT_CCS;
+    s->init_num = 1;
+    s->init_off = 0;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, CERT_PKEY *cpk)
+{
+    unsigned char *p;
+    unsigned long l = 3 + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s);
+
+    if (!ssl_add_cert_chain(s, cpk, &l))
+        return 0;
+
+    l -= 3 + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s);
+    p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
+    l2n3(l, p);
+    l += 3;
+
+    if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE, l)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return l + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s);
+}
+
+WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
+{
+    void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
+
+    /* clean a few things up */
+    ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
+
+    if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+        /*
+         * We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf
+         * in case there are any unexpected retransmits
+         */
+        BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
+        s->init_buf = NULL;
+    }
+
+    ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
+
+    s->init_num = 0;
+
+    if (!s->server || s->renegotiate == 2) {
+        /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
+        s->renegotiate = 0;
+        s->new_session = 0;
+
+        if (s->server) {
+            ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
+
+            s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
+            s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept;
+        } else {
+            ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
+            if (s->hit)
+                s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
+
+            s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect;
+            s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++;
+        }
+
+        if (s->info_callback != NULL)
+            cb = s->info_callback;
+        else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
+            cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
+
+        if (cb != NULL)
+            cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
+
+        if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+            /* done with handshaking */
+            s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0;
+            s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0;
+            s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0;
+            dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s);
+        }
+    }
+
+    return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
+}
+
+int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt)
+{
+    /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
+    int skip_message, i, recvd_type, al;
+    unsigned char *p;
+    unsigned long l;
+
+    p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+
+    do {
+        while (s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
+            i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &recvd_type,
+                                          &p[s->init_num],
+                                          SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - s->init_num,
+                                          0);
+            if (i <= 0) {
+                s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
+                return 0;
+            }
+            if (recvd_type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
+                /*
+                 * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur
+                 * in the middle of a handshake message.
+                 */
+                if (s->init_num != 0 || i != 1 || p[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) {
+                    al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+                    SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER,
+                           SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
+                    goto f_err;
+                }
+                s->s3->tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
+                s->init_num = i - 1;
+                s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data;
+                s->s3->tmp.message_size = i;
+                return 1;
+            } else if (recvd_type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
+                al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
+                goto f_err;
+            }
+            s->init_num += i;
+        }
+
+        skip_message = 0;
+        if (!s->server)
+            if (p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST)
+                /*
+                 * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
+                 * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if
+                 * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished'
+                 * MAC.
+                 */
+                if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 && p[3] == 0) {
+                    s->init_num = 0;
+                    skip_message = 1;
+
+                    if (s->msg_callback)
+                        s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
+                                        p, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
+                                        s->msg_callback_arg);
+                }
+    } while (skip_message);
+    /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
+
+    *mt = *p;
+    s->s3->tmp.message_type = *(p++);
+
+    if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
+        /*
+         * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible
+         * ClientHello
+         *
+         * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read
+         * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read
+         */
+        l = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s->rlayer)
+            + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+        s->s3->tmp.message_size = l;
+
+        s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data;
+        s->init_num = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+    } else {
+        n2l3(p, l);
+        /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */
+        if (l > (INT_MAX - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
+            al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+        s->s3->tmp.message_size = l;
+
+        s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+        s->init_num = 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+ f_err:
+    ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, unsigned long *len)
+{
+    long n;
+    unsigned char *p;
+    int i;
+
+    if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
+        /* We've already read everything in */
+        *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num;
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    p = s->init_msg;
+    n = s->s3->tmp.message_size - s->init_num;
+    while (n > 0) {
+        i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL,
+                                      &p[s->init_num], n, 0);
+        if (i <= 0) {
+            s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
+            *len = 0;
+            return 0;
+        }
+        s->init_num += i;
+        n -= i;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for
+     * Finished verification.
+     */
+    if (*(s->init_buf->data) == SSL3_MT_FINISHED && !ssl3_take_mac(s)) {
+        /* SSLfatal() already called */
+        *len = 0;
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
+    if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
+        if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
+                             s->init_num)) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+            ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            *len = 0;
+            return 0;
+        }
+        if (s->msg_callback)
+            s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data,
+                            (size_t)s->init_num, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+    } else {
+        if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
+                             s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+            ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            *len = 0;
+            return 0;
+        }
+        if (s->msg_callback)
+            s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data,
+                            (size_t)s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
+                            s->msg_callback_arg);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * init_num should never be negative...should probably be declared
+     * unsigned
+     */
+    if (s->init_num < 0) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        *len = 0;
+        return 0;
+    }
+    *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_cert_type(const X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *pk)
+{
+    if (pk == NULL && (pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x)) == NULL)
+        return -1;
+
+    switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
+    default:
+        return -1;
+    case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
+        return SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC;
+    case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
+        return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    case EVP_PKEY_EC:
+        return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
+    case NID_id_GostR3410_2001:
+        return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
+    case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256:
+        return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
+    case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512:
+        return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
+#endif
+    }
+}
+
+int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type)
+{
+    int al;
+
+    switch (type) {
+    case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
+    case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL:
+    case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER:
+        al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
+        break;
+    case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE:
+    case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE:
+    case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY:
+    case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD:
+    case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD:
+    case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD:
+    case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD:
+    case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID:
+    case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID:
+    case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED:
+    case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED:
+    case X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH:
+    case X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH:
+    case X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH:
+    case X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH:
+    case X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL:
+    case X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL:
+    case X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK:
+        al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
+        break;
+    case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
+    case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
+        al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+        break;
+    case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
+    case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED:
+        al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED;
+        break;
+    case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED:
+        al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED;
+        break;
+    case X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED:
+    case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
+    case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL:
+    case X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP:
+        al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        break;
+    case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT:
+    case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN:
+    case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY:
+    case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE:
+    case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG:
+    case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED:
+    case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA:
+        al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
+        break;
+    case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION:
+        al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+        break;
+    case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE:
+        al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
+        break;
+    default:
+        al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN;
+        break;
+    }
+    return (al);
+}
+
+int ssl_allow_compression(SSL *s)
+{
+    if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
+        return 0;
+    return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION, 0, 0, NULL);
+}
+
+static int version_cmp(const SSL *s, int a, int b)
+{
+    int dtls = SSL_IS_DTLS(s);
+
+    if (a == b)
+        return 0;
+    if (!dtls)
+        return a < b ? -1 : 1;
+    return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a, b) ? -1 : 1;
+}
+
+typedef struct {
+    int version;
+    const SSL_METHOD *(*cmeth) (void);
+    const SSL_METHOD *(*smeth) (void);
+} version_info;
+
+#if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_2_VERSION
+# error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_2_VERSION.
+#endif
+
+static const version_info tls_version_table[] = {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2
+    {TLS1_2_VERSION, tlsv1_2_client_method, tlsv1_2_server_method},
+#else
+    {TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1
+    {TLS1_1_VERSION, tlsv1_1_client_method, tlsv1_1_server_method},
+#else
+    {TLS1_1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
+    {TLS1_VERSION, tlsv1_client_method, tlsv1_server_method},
+#else
+    {TLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
+    {SSL3_VERSION, sslv3_client_method, sslv3_server_method},
+#else
+    {SSL3_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
+#endif
+    {0, NULL, NULL},
+};
+
+#if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION
+# error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION.
+#endif
+
+static const version_info dtls_version_table[] = {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2
+    {DTLS1_2_VERSION, dtlsv1_2_client_method, dtlsv1_2_server_method},
+#else
+    {DTLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
+    {DTLS1_VERSION, dtlsv1_client_method, dtlsv1_server_method},
+    {DTLS1_BAD_VER, dtls_bad_ver_client_method, NULL},
+#else
+    {DTLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
+    {DTLS1_BAD_VER, NULL, NULL},
+#endif
+    {0, NULL, NULL},
+};
+
+/*
+ * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled.
+ *
+ * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
+ * @method: the intended method.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure.
+ */
+static int ssl_method_error(const SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *method)
+{
+    int version = method->version;
+
+    if ((s->min_proto_version != 0 &&
+         version_cmp(s, version, s->min_proto_version) < 0) ||
+        ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, version, NULL) == 0)
+        return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
+
+    if (s->max_proto_version != 0 &&
+        version_cmp(s, version, s->max_proto_version) > 0)
+        return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH;
+
+    if ((s->options & method->mask) != 0)
+        return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
+    if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s))
+        return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE;
+    else if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_FIPS) != 0 && FIPS_mode())
+        return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_0_NEEDED_IN_FIPS_MODE;
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by
+ * `SSL *` instance
+ *
+ * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
+ * @version: Protocol version to test against
+ *
+ * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0
+ */
+int ssl_version_supported(const SSL *s, int version)
+{
+    const version_info *vent;
+    const version_info *table;
+
+    switch (s->method->version) {
+    default:
+        /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */
+        return version_cmp(s, version, s->version) == 0;
+    case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
+        table = tls_version_table;
+        break;
+    case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
+        table = dtls_version_table;
+        break;
+    }
+
+    for (vent = table;
+         vent->version != 0 && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) <= 0;
+         ++vent) {
+        if (vent->cmeth != NULL &&
+            version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) == 0 &&
+            ssl_method_error(s, vent->cmeth()) == 0) {
+            return 1;
+        }
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version
+ * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest
+ * supported protocol version.
+ *
+ * @s server SSL handle.
+ *
+ * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL *s)
+{
+    const version_info *vent;
+    const version_info *table;
+
+    /*
+     * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version
+     * (according to s->ctx->method, as version negotiation may have changed
+     * s->method).
+     */
+    if (s->version == s->ctx->method->version)
+        return 1;
+
+    /*
+     * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its
+     * highest protocol version).
+     */
+    if (s->ctx->method->version == TLS_method()->version)
+        table = tls_version_table;
+    else if (s->ctx->method->version == DTLS_method()->version)
+        table = dtls_version_table;
+    else {
+        /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
+        if (vent->smeth != NULL && ssl_method_error(s, vent->smeth()) == 0)
+            return s->version == vent->version;
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS
+ * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible.  This
+ * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is
+ * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well.
+ *
+ * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD.
+ * @version: the intended limit.
+ * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated.
+ *
+ * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
+ */
+int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound)
+{
+    if (version == 0) {
+        *bound = version;
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    /*-
+     * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions.
+     * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions.
+     * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros.
+     *
+     * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not
+     * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION.  This is because we don't want to break user
+     * configurations.  If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's
+     * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available.  We don't expect the
+     * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense.
+     */
+    switch (method_version) {
+    default:
+        /*
+         * XXX For fixed version methods, should we always fail and not set any
+         * bounds, always succeed and not set any bounds, or set the bounds and
+         * arrange to fail later if they are not met?  At present fixed-version
+         * methods are not subject to controls that disable individual protocol
+         * versions.
+         */
+        return 0;
+
+    case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
+        if (version < SSL3_VERSION || version > TLS_MAX_VERSION)
+            return 0;
+        break;
+
+    case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
+        if (DTLS_VERSION_GT(version, DTLS_MAX_VERSION) ||
+            DTLS_VERSION_LT(version, DTLS1_BAD_VER))
+            return 0;
+        break;
+    }
+
+    *bound = version;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version.  Called when the
+ * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and
+ * the version specific method.
+ *
+ * @s: server SSL handle.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
+ */
+int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s)
+{
+    /*-
+     * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with:
+     *
+     *   s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION,
+     *   s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION.
+     *
+     * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the
+     * handle version.
+     */
+    int server_version = s->method->version;
+    int client_version = s->client_version;
+    const version_info *vent;
+    const version_info *table;
+    int disabled = 0;
+
+    switch (server_version) {
+    default:
+        if (version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0)
+            return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION;
+        /*
+         * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
+         * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints.  Hope
+         * that's OK.  It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
+         * versions they don't want.  If not, then easy to fix, just return
+         * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
+         */
+        return 0;
+    case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
+        table = tls_version_table;
+        break;
+    case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
+        table = dtls_version_table;
+        break;
+    }
+
+    for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
+        const SSL_METHOD *method;
+
+        if (vent->smeth == NULL ||
+            version_cmp(s, client_version, vent->version) < 0)
+            continue;
+        method = vent->smeth();
+        if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) {
+            s->version = vent->version;
+            s->method = method;
+            return 0;
+        }
+        disabled = 1;
+    }
+    return disabled ? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL : SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version.  Called when the
+ * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and
+ * the version specific method.
+ *
+ * @s: client SSL handle.
+ * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
+ */
+int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version)
+{
+    const version_info *vent;
+    const version_info *table;
+
+    switch (s->method->version) {
+    default:
+        if (version != s->version)
+            return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION;
+        /*
+         * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
+         * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints.  Hope
+         * that's OK.  It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
+         * versions they don't want.  If not, then easy to fix, just return
+         * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
+         */
+        return 0;
+    case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
+        table = tls_version_table;
+        break;
+    case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
+        table = dtls_version_table;
+        break;
+    }
+
+    for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
+        const SSL_METHOD *method;
+        int err;
+
+        if (version != vent->version)
+            continue;
+        if (vent->cmeth == NULL)
+            break;
+        method = vent->cmeth();
+        err = ssl_method_error(s, method);
+        if (err != 0)
+            return err;
+        s->method = method;
+        s->version = version;
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ssl_get_client_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum client version
+ * @s: The SSL connection
+ * @min_version: The minimum supported version
+ * @max_version: The maximum supported version
+ *
+ * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the
+ * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION.  We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx
+ * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B
+ * or FIPS_mode() constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here,
+ * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later.
+ *
+ * Computing the right floor matters.  If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled,
+ * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B  and/or MinProtocol
+ * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.  On failure
+ * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0.
+ */
+int ssl_get_client_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version,
+                                   int *max_version)
+{
+    int version;
+    int hole;
+    const SSL_METHOD *single = NULL;
+    const SSL_METHOD *method;
+    const version_info *table;
+    const version_info *vent;
+
+    switch (s->method->version) {
+    default:
+        /*
+         * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
+         * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints.  Hope
+         * that's OK.  It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
+         * versions they don't want.  If not, then easy to fix, just return
+         * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
+         */
+        *min_version = *max_version = s->version;
+        return 0;
+    case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
+        table = tls_version_table;
+        break;
+    case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
+        table = dtls_version_table;
+        break;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols
+     * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version
+     * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method
+     * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole".
+     *
+     * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0.  That is, versions above
+     * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above
+     * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet.
+     *
+     * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes
+     * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single"
+     * method.  We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0.
+     *
+     * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared,
+     * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods.  If we hit
+     * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else
+     * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too.
+     * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes
+     * selected, as we start from scratch.
+     */
+    *min_version = version = 0;
+    hole = 1;
+    for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
+        /*
+         * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the
+         * "version capability" vector.
+         */
+        if (vent->cmeth == NULL) {
+            hole = 1;
+            continue;
+        }
+        method = vent->cmeth();
+        if (ssl_method_error(s, method) != 0) {
+            hole = 1;
+        } else if (!hole) {
+            single = NULL;
+            *min_version = method->version;
+        } else {
+            version = (single = method)->version;
+            *min_version = version;
+            hole = 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    *max_version = version;
+
+    /* Fail if everything is disabled */
+    if (version == 0)
+        return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE;
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for
+ * the initial ClientHello.
+ *
+ * @s: client SSL handle.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
+ */
+int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL *s)
+{
+    int ver_min, ver_max, ret;
+
+    ret = ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max);
+
+    if (ret != 0)
+        return ret;
+
+    s->client_version = s->version = ver_max;
+    return 0;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/statem/statem_locl.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/statem/statem_locl.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5dbc62b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/statem/statem_locl.h
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2015-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*****************************************************************************
+ *                                                                           *
+ * The following definitions are PRIVATE to the state machine. They should   *
+ * NOT be used outside of the state machine.                                 *
+ *                                                                           *
+ *****************************************************************************/
+
+/* Max message length definitions */
+
+/* The spec allows for a longer length than this, but we limit it */
+#define HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH 258
+#define SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH         20000
+#define SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH      102400
+#define SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH    0
+#define CCS_MAX_LENGTH                  1
+/* Max should actually be 36 but we are generous */
+#define FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH             64
+
+/* Message processing return codes */
+typedef enum {
+    /* Something bad happened */
+    MSG_PROCESS_ERROR,
+    /* We've finished reading - swap to writing */
+    MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING,
+    /*
+     * We've completed the main processing of this message but there is some
+     * post processing to be done.
+     */
+    MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING,
+    /* We've finished this message - read the next message */
+    MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
+} MSG_PROCESS_RETURN;
+
+/* Flush the write BIO */
+int statem_flush(SSL *s);
+int ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s);
+
+/*
+ * TLS/DTLS client state machine functions
+ */
+int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt);
+WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s);
+WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst);
+WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst);
+int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s);
+unsigned long ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s);
+MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
+WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst);
+
+/*
+ * TLS/DTLS server state machine functions
+ */
+int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt);
+WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s);
+WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst);
+WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst);
+int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s);
+unsigned long ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s);
+MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
+WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst);
+
+/* Functions for getting new message data */
+__owur int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt);
+__owur int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, unsigned long *len);
+__owur int dtls_get_message(SSL *s, int *mt, unsigned long *len);
+
+/* Message construction and processing functions */
+__owur MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
+__owur MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
+__owur int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s);
+__owur int dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s);
+
+__owur int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, const char *sender, int slen);
+__owur WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst);
+__owur WORK_STATE dtls_wait_for_dry(SSL *s);
+
+/* some client-only functions */
+__owur int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s);
+__owur MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
+__owur MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
+__owur MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
+__owur MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
+__owur MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
+__owur int tls_construct_client_verify(SSL *s);
+__owur WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst);
+__owur int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s);
+__owur int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey);
+__owur int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s);
+__owur int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s);
+__owur int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s);
+__owur MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
+__owur MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
+__owur int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+__owur int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s);
+#endif
+__owur MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
+
+/* some server-only functions */
+__owur MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
+__owur WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst);
+__owur int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s);
+__owur int tls_construct_hello_request(SSL *s);
+__owur int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s);
+__owur int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s);
+__owur int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s);
+__owur int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s);
+__owur int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s);
+__owur MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
+__owur MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
+__owur WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst);
+__owur MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+__owur MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
+#endif
+__owur int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s);
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c7cd9eb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,3341 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ *
+ * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ *
+ * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license provided above.
+ *
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
+ * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "../ssl_locl.h"
+#include "statem_locl.h"
+#include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+
+static STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,
+                                                      PACKET *cipher_suites,
+                                                      STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER)
+                                                      **skp, int sslv2format,
+                                                      int *al);
+
+/*
+ * server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed handshake
+ * state transitions when the server is reading messages from the client. The
+ * message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The current state
+ * is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
+ *
+ *  Valid return values are:
+ *  1: Success (transition allowed)
+ *  0: Error (transition not allowed)
+ */
+int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
+{
+    OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
+
+    switch (st->hand_state) {
+    case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
+    case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
+        if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
+            st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
+            return 1;
+        }
+        break;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
+        /*
+         * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
+         * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
+         * OR
+         * 2) If we did request one then
+         *      a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
+         *      AND
+         *      b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
+         *         list if we requested a certificate)
+         */
+        if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
+            if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
+                if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
+                    if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
+                        && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
+                        /*
+                         * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
+                         * not going to accept it because we require a client
+                         * cert.
+                         */
+                        ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
+                                        SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+                        SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
+                               SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
+                        return 0;
+                    }
+                    st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
+                    return 1;
+                }
+            } else {
+                st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
+                return 1;
+            }
+        } else if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
+            if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
+                st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
+                return 1;
+            }
+        }
+        break;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
+        if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
+            st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
+            return 1;
+        }
+        break;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
+        /*
+         * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
+         * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
+         * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
+         * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
+         * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
+         * set.
+         */
+        if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) {
+            if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
+                /*
+                 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
+                 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
+                 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
+                 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
+                 */
+                st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
+                return 1;
+            }
+        } else {
+            if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
+                st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
+                return 1;
+            }
+        }
+        break;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
+        if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
+            st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
+            return 1;
+        }
+        break;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+        if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
+            if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
+                st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
+                return 1;
+            }
+        } else {
+#endif
+            if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
+                st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
+                return 1;
+            }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+        }
+#endif
+        break;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+    case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
+        if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
+            st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
+            return 1;
+        }
+        break;
+#endif
+
+    case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
+        if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
+            st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
+            return 1;
+        }
+        break;
+
+    default:
+        break;
+    }
+
+    /* No valid transition found */
+    ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+    SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
+ *
+ * Valid return values are:
+ *   1: Yes
+ *   0: No
+ */
+static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+{
+    unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+
+    /*
+     * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
+     * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
+     * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
+     * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
+     * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
+     * key exchange.
+     */
+    if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)
+        /*
+         * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
+         * provided
+         */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+        /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
+        || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK))
+            && s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
+        /* For other PSK always send SKE */
+        || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+        /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
+        || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
+#endif
+        ) {
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
+ *
+ * Valid return values are:
+ *   1: Yes
+ *   0: No
+ */
+static int send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
+{
+    if (
+           /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
+           s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER
+           /*
+            * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
+            * during re-negotiation:
+            */
+           && (s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 ||
+               !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
+           /*
+            * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
+            * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
+            * RFC 2246):
+            */
+           && (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
+               /*
+                * ... except when the application insists on
+                * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
+                * this for SSL 3)
+                */
+               || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
+           /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
+           && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
+           /*
+            * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
+            * are omitted
+            */
+           && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) {
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move to next
+ * when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
+ */
+WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s)
+{
+    OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
+
+    switch (st->hand_state) {
+    case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
+        /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
+        return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
+
+    case TLS_ST_OK:
+        /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
+        st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
+        return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
+        st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
+        ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
+        return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
+        if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified
+            && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE))
+            st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
+        else
+            st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
+        return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+    case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
+        return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
+        if (s->hit) {
+            if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
+                st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
+            else
+                st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
+        } else {
+            /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
+            /* normal PSK or SRP */
+            if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
+                  (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
+                st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
+            } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
+                st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
+            } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
+                st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
+            } else {
+                st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
+            }
+        }
+        return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
+        if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
+            st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
+            return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+        }
+        /* Fall through */
+
+    case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
+        if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
+            st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
+            return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+        }
+        /* Fall through */
+
+    case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
+        if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
+            st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
+            return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+        }
+        /* Fall through */
+
+    case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
+        st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
+        return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
+        return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
+        if (s->hit) {
+            st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
+            ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
+            return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+        } else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
+            st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
+        } else {
+            st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
+        }
+        return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
+        st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
+        return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
+        st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
+        return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
+        if (s->hit) {
+            return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
+        }
+        st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
+        ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
+        return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+    default:
+        /* Shouldn't happen */
+        return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
+ * the server to the client.
+ */
+WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
+{
+    OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
+
+    switch (st->hand_state) {
+    case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
+        s->shutdown = 0;
+        if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
+            dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
+        break;
+
+    case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
+        s->shutdown = 0;
+        if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+            dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
+            /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
+            st->use_timer = 0;
+        }
+        break;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
+        if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+            /*
+             * Messages we write from now on should be buffered and
+             * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
+             */
+            st->use_timer = 1;
+        }
+        break;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+        if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
+            return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
+#endif
+        return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
+        if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+            /*
+             * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
+             * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
+             */
+            st->use_timer = 0;
+        }
+        break;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
+        s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
+        if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
+            ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+            return WORK_ERROR;
+        }
+        if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+            /*
+             * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
+             * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
+             * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
+             * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
+             */
+            st->use_timer = 0;
+        }
+        return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
+
+    case TLS_ST_OK:
+        return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst);
+
+    default:
+        /* No pre work to be done */
+        break;
+    }
+
+    return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
+ * server to the client.
+ */
+WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
+{
+    OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
+
+    s->init_num = 0;
+
+    switch (st->hand_state) {
+    case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
+        if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
+            return WORK_MORE_A;
+        if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
+            ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+            return WORK_ERROR;
+        }
+        break;
+
+    case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
+        if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
+            return WORK_MORE_A;
+        /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
+        if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
+            ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+            return WORK_ERROR;
+        }
+        /*
+         * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
+         * treat like it was the first packet
+         */
+        s->first_packet = 1;
+        break;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+        if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
+            unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
+            char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
+
+            /*
+             * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
+             * SCTP used.
+             */
+            memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
+                   sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
+
+            if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
+                                           sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
+                                           sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
+                                           0) <= 0) {
+                ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+                return WORK_ERROR;
+            }
+
+            BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
+                     sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
+        }
+#endif
+        break;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+        if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) {
+            /*
+             * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
+             * no SCTP used.
+             */
+            BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
+                     0, NULL);
+        }
+#endif
+        if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
+                                                      SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
+        {
+            ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+            return WORK_ERROR;
+        }
+
+        if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
+            dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
+        break;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
+        if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
+            return WORK_MORE_A;
+        break;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
+        if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
+            return WORK_MORE_A;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+        if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
+            /*
+             * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
+             * no SCTP used.
+             */
+            BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
+                     0, NULL);
+        }
+#endif
+        break;
+
+    default:
+        /* No post work to be done */
+        break;
+    }
+
+    return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Construct a message to be sent from the server to the client.
+ *
+ * Valid return values are:
+ *   1: Success
+ *   0: Error
+ */
+int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s)
+{
+    OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
+
+    switch (st->hand_state) {
+    case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
+        return dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(s);
+
+    case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
+        return tls_construct_hello_request(s);
+
+    case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
+        return tls_construct_server_hello(s);
+
+    case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
+        return tls_construct_server_certificate(s);
+
+    case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
+        return tls_construct_server_key_exchange(s);
+
+    case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
+        return tls_construct_certificate_request(s);
+
+    case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
+        return tls_construct_server_done(s);
+
+    case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
+        return tls_construct_new_session_ticket(s);
+
+    case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
+        return tls_construct_cert_status(s);
+
+    case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
+        if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
+            return dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s);
+        else
+            return tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s);
+
+    case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
+        return tls_construct_finished(s,
+                                      s->method->
+                                      ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
+                                      s->method->
+                                      ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
+
+    default:
+        /* Shouldn't happen */
+        break;
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
+ * calculated as follows:
+ *
+ *  2 + # client_version
+ *  32 + # only valid length for random
+ *  1 + # length of session_id
+ *  32 + # maximum size for session_id
+ *  2 + # length of cipher suites
+ *  2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
+ *  1 + # length of compression_methods
+ *  2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
+ *  2 + # length of extensions
+ *  2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
+ */
+#define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH         131396
+
+#define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH      2048
+#define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH           514
+
+/*
+ * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
+ * reading. Excludes the message header.
+ */
+unsigned long ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s)
+{
+    OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
+
+    switch (st->hand_state) {
+    case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
+        return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
+        return s->max_cert_list;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
+        return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
+        return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+    case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
+        return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH;
+#endif
+
+    case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
+        return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
+        return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
+
+    default:
+        /* Shouldn't happen */
+        break;
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
+ */
+MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+    OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
+
+    switch (st->hand_state) {
+    case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
+        return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt);
+
+    case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
+        return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt);
+
+    case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
+        return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt);
+
+    case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
+        return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+    case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
+        return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt);
+#endif
+
+    case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
+        return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
+
+    case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
+        return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
+
+    default:
+        /* Shouldn't happen */
+        break;
+    }
+
+    return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
+ * from the client
+ */
+WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
+{
+    OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
+
+    switch (st->hand_state) {
+    case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
+        return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst);
+
+    case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
+        return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst);
+
+    default:
+        break;
+    }
+
+    /* Shouldn't happen */
+    return WORK_ERROR;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
+{
+    int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
+
+    *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
+
+    if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
+        (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
+        if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
+            /*
+             * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
+             * login name
+             */
+            ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
+            *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
+        } else {
+            ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al);
+        }
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+#endif
+
+int tls_construct_hello_request(SSL *s)
+{
+    if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+unsigned int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(unsigned char *buf,
+                                           unsigned char *cookie,
+                                           unsigned char cookie_len)
+{
+    unsigned int msg_len;
+    unsigned char *p;
+
+    p = buf;
+    /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
+    *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION >> 8;
+    *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION & 0xFF;
+
+    *(p++) = (unsigned char)cookie_len;
+    memcpy(p, cookie, cookie_len);
+    p += cookie_len;
+    msg_len = p - buf;
+
+    return msg_len;
+}
+
+int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s)
+{
+    unsigned int len;
+    unsigned char *buf;
+
+    buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+
+    if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
+        s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
+                                  &(s->d1->cookie_len)) == 0 ||
+        s->d1->cookie_len > 255) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
+               SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
+        ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    len = dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(&buf[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH],
+                                        s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len);
+
+    dtls1_set_message_header(s, DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, len, 0, len);
+    len += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+
+    /* number of bytes to write */
+    s->init_num = len;
+    s->init_off = 0;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+    int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    unsigned int j, complen = 0;
+    unsigned long id;
+    const SSL_CIPHER *c;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+    SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
+#endif
+    STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
+    int protverr;
+    /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
+    PACKET session_id, cipher_suites, compression, extensions, cookie;
+    int is_v2_record;
+    static const unsigned char null_compression = 0;
+
+    is_v2_record = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
+
+    PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
+    /* First lets get s->client_version set correctly */
+    if (is_v2_record) {
+        unsigned int version;
+        unsigned int mt;
+        /*-
+         * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
+         * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
+         * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
+         * the rest right through. Its format is:
+         * Byte  Content
+         * 0-1   msg_length - decoded by the record layer
+         * 2     msg_type - s->init_msg points here
+         * 3-4   version
+         * 5-6   cipher_spec_length
+         * 7-8   session_id_length
+         * 9-10  challenge_length
+         * ...   ...
+         */
+
+        if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt)
+            || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
+            /*
+             * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
+             * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
+             * in the first place
+             */
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &version)) {
+            /* No protocol version supplied! */
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (version == 0x0002) {
+            /* This is real SSLv2. We don't support it. */
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
+            goto err;
+        } else if ((version & 0xff00) == (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
+            /* SSLv3/TLS */
+            s->client_version = version;
+        } else {
+            /* No idea what protocol this is */
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    } else {
+        /*
+         * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may
+         * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
+         */
+        if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, (unsigned int *)&s->client_version)) {
+            al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
+     * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
+     */
+    if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+        protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s);
+    } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION &&
+               DTLS_VERSION_LT(s->client_version, s->version)) {
+        protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
+    } else {
+        protverr = 0;
+    }
+
+    if (protverr) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
+        if ((!s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)) {
+            /*
+             * similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version
+             * number
+             */
+            s->version = s->client_version;
+        }
+        al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    /* Parse the message and load client random. */
+    if (is_v2_record) {
+        /*
+         * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
+         * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
+         * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected above.
+         */
+        unsigned int cipher_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
+        PACKET challenge;
+
+        if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &cipher_len)
+            || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len)
+            || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
+                   SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+            al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+
+        if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
+            al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+
+        if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &cipher_suites, cipher_len)
+            || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &session_id, session_id_len)
+            || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
+            /* No extensions. */
+            || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
+                   SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+            al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+
+        /* Load the client random and compression list. */
+        challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE :
+            challenge_len;
+        memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+        if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
+                               s->s3->client_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
+                               challenge_len, challenge_len)
+            /* Advertise only null compression. */
+            || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+
+        PACKET_null_init(&extensions);
+    } else {
+        /* Regular ClientHello. */
+        if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
+            || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
+            al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+
+        if (PACKET_remaining(&session_id) > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
+            al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+
+        if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+            if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) {
+                al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+                goto f_err;
+            }
+            /*
+             * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
+             * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
+             * So check cookie length...
+             */
+            if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
+                if (PACKET_remaining(&cookie) == 0)
+                    return 1;
+            }
+        }
+
+        if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cipher_suites)
+            || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) {
+            al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+        /* Could be empty. */
+        extensions = *pkt;
+    }
+
+    if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+        /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
+        if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
+            if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
+                if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, PACKET_data(&cookie),
+                                                 PACKET_remaining(&cookie)) ==
+                    0) {
+                    al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+                    SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
+                           SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
+                    goto f_err;
+                    /* else cookie verification succeeded */
+                }
+                /* default verification */
+            } else if (!PACKET_equal(&cookie, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len)) {
+                al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
+                goto f_err;
+            }
+            s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;
+        }
+        if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
+            protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s);
+            if (protverr != 0) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
+                s->version = s->client_version;
+                al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+                goto f_err;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    s->hit = 0;
+
+    /*
+     * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
+     * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
+     *
+     * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
+     * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
+     * ignore resumption requests with flag
+     * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
+     * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
+     * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
+     * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
+     * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
+     * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
+     * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
+     * ignored.
+     */
+    if (is_v2_record ||
+        (s->new_session &&
+         (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
+        if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
+            goto err;
+    } else {
+        i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, &extensions, &session_id);
+        /*
+         * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
+         * version.
+         * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
+         * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
+         * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
+         * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
+         * will abort the handshake with an error.
+         */
+        if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) {
+            /* previous session */
+            s->hit = 1;
+        } else if (i == -1) {
+            goto err;
+        } else {
+            /* i == 0 */
+            if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
+                goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &cipher_suites, &(ciphers),
+                                 is_v2_record, &al) == NULL) {
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
+    if (s->hit) {
+        j = 0;
+        id = s->session->cipher->id;
+
+#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
+        fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
+#endif
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
+            c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
+#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
+            fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
+                    i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
+#endif
+            if (c->id == id) {
+                j = 1;
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+        if (j == 0) {
+            /*
+             * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
+             * to reuse it
+             */
+            al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
+                   SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    complen = PACKET_remaining(&compression);
+    for (j = 0; j < complen; j++) {
+        if (PACKET_data(&compression)[j] == 0)
+            break;
+    }
+
+    if (j >= complen) {
+        /* no compress */
+        al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    /* TLS extensions */
+    if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
+        if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &extensions)) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
+     * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
+     * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
+     * processing to use it in key derivation.
+     */
+    {
+        unsigned char *pos;
+        pos = s->s3->server_random;
+        if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
+        const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
+
+        s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
+        if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
+                                     &s->session->master_key_length, ciphers,
+                                     &pref_cipher,
+                                     s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
+            s->hit = 1;
+            s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
+            s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
+
+            ciphers = NULL;
+
+            /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
+            pref_cipher =
+                pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s,
+                                                               s->
+                                                               session->ciphers,
+                                                               SSL_get_ciphers
+                                                               (s));
+            if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
+                al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
+                goto f_err;
+            }
+
+            s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
+            sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
+            s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
+            sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
+            s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
+        }
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
+     * options, we will now look for them.  We have complen-1 compression
+     * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
+     */
+    s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+    /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
+    if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
+        int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
+        unsigned int k;
+        /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
+        /* Can't disable compression */
+        if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
+                   SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+        /* Look for resumed compression method */
+        for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
+            comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
+            if (comp_id == comp->id) {
+                s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+        if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
+                   SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+        /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
+        for (k = 0; k < complen; k++) {
+            if (PACKET_data(&compression)[k] == comp_id)
+                break;
+        }
+        if (k >= complen) {
+            al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
+                   SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+    } else if (s->hit)
+        comp = NULL;
+    else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
+        /* See if we have a match */
+        int m, nn, v, done = 0;
+        unsigned int o;
+
+        nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
+        for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
+            comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
+            v = comp->id;
+            for (o = 0; o < complen; o++) {
+                if (v == PACKET_data(&compression)[o]) {
+                    done = 1;
+                    break;
+                }
+            }
+            if (done)
+                break;
+        }
+        if (done)
+            s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
+        else
+            comp = NULL;
+    }
+#else
+    /*
+     * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
+     * using compression.
+     */
+    if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+#endif
+
+    /*
+     * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
+     */
+
+    if (!s->hit) {
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+        s->session->compress_meth = 0;
+#else
+        s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
+#endif
+        sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
+        s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
+        if (ciphers == NULL) {
+            al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+        ciphers = NULL;
+        if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
+    return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
+ f_err:
+    ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ err:
+    ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+
+    sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
+    return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+
+}
+
+WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
+{
+    int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+    const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
+
+    if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
+        if (!s->hit) {
+            /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
+            if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
+                int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
+                if (rv == 0) {
+                    al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                    SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
+                           SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
+                    goto f_err;
+                }
+                if (rv < 0) {
+                    s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
+                    return WORK_MORE_A;
+                }
+                s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+            }
+            cipher =
+                ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
+
+            if (cipher == NULL) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
+                       SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
+                goto f_err;
+            }
+            s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
+            /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
+            if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
+                s->session->not_resumable = s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
+                                                                        ((cipher->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0));
+            if (s->session->not_resumable)
+                /* do not send a session ticket */
+                s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
+        } else {
+            /* Session-id reuse */
+            s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
+        }
+
+        if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
+            if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
+                al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                goto f_err;
+            }
+        }
+
+        /*-
+         * we now have the following setup.
+         * client_random
+         * cipher_list          - our preferred list of ciphers
+         * ciphers              - the clients preferred list of ciphers
+         * compression          - basically ignored right now
+         * ssl version is set   - sslv3
+         * s->session           - The ssl session has been setup.
+         * s->hit               - session reuse flag
+         * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
+         */
+
+        /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
+        if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
+            if (!ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s, &al)) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
+                       SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
+                goto f_err;
+            }
+        }
+
+        wst = WORK_MORE_B;
+    }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+    if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
+        int ret;
+        if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) {
+            /*
+             * callback indicates further work to be done
+             */
+            s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
+            return WORK_MORE_B;
+        }
+        if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
+            /*
+             * This is not really an error but the only means to for
+             * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
+             */
+            if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
+                       SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
+            else
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
+                       SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+    }
+#endif
+    s->renegotiate = 2;
+
+    return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
+ f_err:
+    ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+    ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+    return WORK_ERROR;
+}
+
+int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s)
+{
+    unsigned char *buf;
+    unsigned char *p, *d;
+    int i, sl;
+    int al = 0;
+    unsigned long l;
+
+    buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+
+    /* Do the message type and length last */
+    d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
+
+    *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
+    *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
+
+    /*
+     * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
+     * tls_process_client_hello()
+     */
+    memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+    p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+
+    /*-
+     * There are several cases for the session ID to send
+     * back in the server hello:
+     * - For session reuse from the session cache,
+     *   we send back the old session ID.
+     * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
+     *   is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
+     *   (which doesn't actually identify the session).
+     * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
+     *   session ID.
+     * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
+     *   we send back a 0-length session ID.
+     * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
+     * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
+     * to send back.
+     */
+    if (s->session->not_resumable ||
+        (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
+         && !s->hit))
+        s->session->session_id_length = 0;
+
+    sl = s->session->session_id_length;
+    if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    *(p++) = sl;
+    memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, sl);
+    p += sl;
+
+    /* put the cipher */
+    i = ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, p);
+    p += i;
+
+    /* put the compression method */
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+    *(p++) = 0;
+#else
+    if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
+        *(p++) = 0;
+    else
+        *(p++) = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
+#endif
+
+    if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
+        ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if ((p =
+         ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
+                                    &al)) == NULL) {
+        ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* do the header */
+    l = (p - d);
+    if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s)
+{
+    if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_DONE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
+        if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
+            ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+        }
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+    EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL;
+    int j;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
+    int encodedlen = 0;
+    int curve_id = 0;
+#endif
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+    const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
+    unsigned char *p, *d;
+    int al, i;
+    unsigned long type;
+    int n;
+    const BIGNUM *r[4];
+    int nr[4], kn;
+    BUF_MEM *buf;
+    EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+
+    if (md_ctx == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+
+    buf = s->init_buf;
+
+    r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
+    n = 0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+    if (type & SSL_PSK) {
+        /*
+         * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint
+         */
+        n += 2;
+        if (s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
+            n += strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
+    }
+    /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
+    if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
+    } else
+#endif                          /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+    if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
+        CERT *cert = s->cert;
+
+        EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL;
+        DH *dh;
+
+        if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
+            DH *dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
+            pkdh = EVP_PKEY_new();
+            if (pkdh == NULL || dhp == NULL) {
+                DH_free(dhp);
+                al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                       ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                goto f_err;
+            }
+            EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh, dhp);
+            pkdhp = pkdh;
+        } else {
+            pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp;
+        }
+        if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
+            DH *dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024);
+            pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp);
+            if (pkdh == NULL) {
+                al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                       ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                goto f_err;
+            }
+            pkdhp = pkdh;
+        }
+        if (pkdhp == NULL) {
+            al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                   SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+        if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
+                          EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) {
+            al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                   SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+        if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                   ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp);
+
+        if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
+
+        EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
+        pkdh = NULL;
+
+        DH_get0_pqg(dh, &r[0], NULL, &r[1]);
+        DH_get0_key(dh, &r[2], NULL);
+    } else
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
+        int nid;
+
+        if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                   ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
+        nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
+        curve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid);
+        if (curve_id == 0) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                   SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id);
+        /* Generate a new key for this curve */
+        if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
+            al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+
+        /* Encode the public key. */
+        encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->tmp.pkey,
+                                                    &encodedPoint);
+        if (encodedlen == 0) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        /*
+         * We only support named (not generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key
+         * exchanges. In this situation, we need four additional bytes to
+         * encode the entire ServerECDHParams structure.
+         */
+        n += 4 + encodedlen;
+
+        /*
+         * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
+         * can set these to NULLs
+         */
+        r[0] = NULL;
+        r[1] = NULL;
+        r[2] = NULL;
+        r[3] = NULL;
+    } else
+#endif                          /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+    if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
+        if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
+            (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
+            (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                   SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
+        r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
+        r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
+        r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
+    } else
+#endif
+    {
+        al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+               SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+    for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
+        nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+        if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
+            n += 1 + nr[i];
+        else
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+        /*-
+         * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
+         * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
+         * as the prime, so use the length of the prime here
+         */
+        if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)))
+            n += 2 + nr[0];
+        else
+#endif
+            n += 2 + nr[i];
+    }
+
+    if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
+        && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) {
+        if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md))
+            == NULL) {
+            al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+        kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
+        /* Allow space for signature algorithm */
+        if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
+            kn += 2;
+        /* Allow space for signature length */
+        kn += 2;
+    } else {
+        pkey = NULL;
+        kn = 0;
+    }
+
+    if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, n + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + kn)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_BUF);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+    if (type & SSL_PSK) {
+        /* copy PSK identity hint */
+        if (s->cert->psk_identity_hint) {
+            size_t len = strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
+            if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
+                /*
+                 * Should not happen - we already checked this when we set
+                 * the identity hint
+                 */
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                       ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            s2n(len, p);
+            memcpy(p, s->cert->psk_identity_hint, len);
+            p += len;
+        } else {
+            s2n(0, p);
+        }
+    }
+#endif
+
+    for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+        if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
+            *p = nr[i];
+            p++;
+        } else
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+        /*-
+         * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
+         * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
+         * as the prime
+         */
+        if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) {
+            s2n(nr[0], p);
+            for (j = 0; j < (nr[0] - nr[2]); ++j) {
+                *p = 0;
+                ++p;
+            }
+        } else
+#endif
+            s2n(nr[i], p);
+        BN_bn2bin(r[i], p);
+        p += nr[i];
+    }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
+        /*
+         * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In
+         * this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte
+         * CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded
+         * point], followed by the actual encoded point itself
+         */
+        *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
+        p += 1;
+        *p = 0;
+        p += 1;
+        *p = curve_id;
+        p += 1;
+        *p = encodedlen;
+        p += 1;
+        memcpy(p, encodedPoint, encodedlen);
+        OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
+        encodedPoint = NULL;
+        p += encodedlen;
+    }
+#endif
+
+    /* not anonymous */
+    if (pkey != NULL) {
+        /*
+         * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
+         * points to the space at the end.
+         */
+        if (md) {
+            /* send signature algorithm */
+            if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
+                if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
+                    /* Should never happen */
+                    al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                    SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                           ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                    goto f_err;
+                }
+                p += 2;
+            }
+#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
+            fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
+#endif
+            if (EVP_SignInit_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
+                || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
+                                  SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+                || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
+                                  SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+                || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, d, n) <= 0
+                || EVP_SignFinal(md_ctx, &(p[2]),
+                                 (unsigned int *)&i, pkey) <= 0) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_EVP);
+                al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                goto f_err;
+            }
+            s2n(i, p);
+            n += i + 2;
+            if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
+                n += 2;
+        } else {
+            /* Is this error check actually needed? */
+            al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                   SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n)) {
+        al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
+    return 1;
+ f_err:
+    ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ err:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+    EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
+#endif
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
+    ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s)
+{
+    unsigned char *p, *d;
+    int i, j, nl, off, n;
+    STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
+    X509_NAME *name;
+    BUF_MEM *buf;
+
+    buf = s->init_buf;
+
+    d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
+
+    /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
+    p++;
+    n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p);
+    d[0] = n;
+    p += n;
+    n++;
+
+    if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
+        const unsigned char *psigs;
+        unsigned char *etmp = p;
+        nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &psigs);
+        /* Skip over length for now */
+        p += 2;
+        nl = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, p, psigs, nl);
+        /* Now fill in length */
+        s2n(nl, etmp);
+        p += nl;
+        n += nl + 2;
+    }
+
+    off = n;
+    p += 2;
+    n += 2;
+
+    sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
+    nl = 0;
+    if (sk != NULL) {
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
+            name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
+            j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL);
+            if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + n + j + 2)) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n;
+            s2n(j, p);
+            i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
+            n += 2 + j;
+            nl += 2 + j;
+        }
+    }
+    /* else no CA names */
+    p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;
+    s2n(nl, p);
+
+    if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
+
+    return 1;
+ err:
+    ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+    unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
+    size_t psklen;
+    PACKET psk_identity;
+
+    if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) {
+        *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
+        *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
+        *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
+        *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity,
+                                    psk, sizeof(psk));
+
+    if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
+        *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    } else if (psklen == 0) {
+        /*
+         * PSK related to the given identity not found
+         */
+        *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
+               SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
+    s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
+
+    if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
+        *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
+
+    return 1;
+#else
+    /* Should never happen */
+    *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+    unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
+    int decrypt_len;
+    unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
+    size_t j, padding_len;
+    PACKET enc_premaster;
+    RSA *rsa = NULL;
+    unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey);
+    if (rsa == NULL) {
+        *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
+    if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
+        enc_premaster = *pkt;
+    } else {
+        if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster)
+            || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
+            *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
+     * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
+     * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
+     * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
+     */
+    if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
+        *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa));
+    if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
+        *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
+     * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
+     * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
+     * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
+     * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
+     */
+
+    if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    /*
+     * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of
+     * the timing-sensitive code below.
+     */
+    decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt(PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster),
+                                      PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
+                                      rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
+    if (decrypt_len < 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */
+
+    /*
+     * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys
+     * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures
+     * PS is at least 8 bytes.
+     */
+    if (decrypt_len < 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
+        *al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    padding_len = decrypt_len - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
+    decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[0], 0) &
+        constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[1], 2);
+    for (j = 2; j < padding_len - 1; j++) {
+        decrypt_good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[j]);
+    }
+    decrypt_good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len - 1]);
+
+    /*
+     * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
+     * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
+     * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
+     * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
+     * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
+     * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
+     */
+    version_good =
+        constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
+                           (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
+    version_good &=
+        constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
+                           (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
+
+    /*
+     * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
+     * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
+     * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
+     * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
+     * version instead if the server does not support the requested
+     * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
+     * clients.
+     */
+    if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
+        unsigned char workaround_good;
+        workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
+                                             (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
+        workaround_good &=
+            constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
+                               (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
+        version_good |= workaround_good;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
+     * remain non-zero (0xff).
+     */
+    decrypt_good &= version_good;
+
+    /*
+     * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
+     * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
+     * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
+     * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
+     */
+    for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
+        rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j] =
+            constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good,
+                                   rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j],
+                                   rand_premaster_secret[j]);
+    }
+
+    if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt + padding_len,
+                                    sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) {
+        *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
+    return ret;
+#else
+    /* Should never happen */
+    *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+    EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
+    DH *cdh;
+    unsigned int i;
+    BIGNUM *pub_key;
+    const unsigned char *data;
+    EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) {
+        *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
+               SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
+    if (skey == NULL) {
+        *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
+        *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
+        /* We already checked we have enough data */
+        *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
+    if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
+    pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL);
+
+    if (pub_key == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        if (pub_key != NULL)
+            BN_free(pub_key);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey) == 0) {
+        *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    ret = 1;
+    EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
+    s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
+ err:
+    EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
+    return ret;
+#else
+    /* Should never happen */
+    *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
+    EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
+        /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
+        *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
+        goto err;
+    } else {
+        unsigned int i;
+        const unsigned char *data;
+
+        /*
+         * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
+         * ClientKeyExchange message.
+         */
+
+        /* Get encoded point length */
+        if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)
+            || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
+            *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
+        if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, data, i) == 0) {
+            *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey) == 0) {
+        *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    ret = 1;
+    EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
+    s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
+ err:
+    EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
+
+    return ret;
+#else
+    /* Should never happen */
+    *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+    unsigned int i;
+    const unsigned char *data;
+
+    if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)
+        || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
+        *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
+        *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
+    s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
+    if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+#else
+    /* Should never happen */
+    *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
+    EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
+    unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
+    const unsigned char *start;
+    size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
+    unsigned long alg_a;
+    int Ttag, Tclass;
+    long Tlen;
+    long sess_key_len;
+    const unsigned char *data;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    /* Get our certificate private key */
+    alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
+    if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) {
+        /*
+         * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
+         */
+        pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey;
+        if (pk == NULL) {
+            pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
+        }
+        if (pk == NULL) {
+            pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
+        }
+    } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) {
+        pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
+    }
+
+    pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
+    if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
+        *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
+        *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    /*
+     * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
+     * use it for key exchange.  Don't mind errors from
+     * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
+     * client certificate for authorization only.
+     */
+    client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
+    if (client_pub_pkey) {
+        if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
+            ERR_clear_error();
+    }
+    /* Decrypt session key */
+    sess_key_len = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
+    if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, sess_key_len)) {
+        *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&data, &Tlen, &Ttag,
+                        &Tclass, sess_key_len) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
+        || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
+        *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    start = data;
+    inlen = Tlen;
+    if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
+        (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
+        *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    /* Generate master secret */
+    if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
+                                    sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
+        *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
+    if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
+        (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
+        s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
+
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
+    return ret;
+#else
+    /* Should never happen */
+    *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+    int al = -1;
+    unsigned long alg_k;
+
+    alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+
+    /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
+    if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
+        /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
+        if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
+            al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                   SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
+        if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
+            al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
+        if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt, &al))
+            goto err;
+    } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
+        if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt, &al))
+            goto err;
+    } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
+        if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt, &al))
+            goto err;
+    } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
+        if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt, &al))
+            goto err;
+    } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
+        if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt, &al))
+            goto err;
+    } else {
+        al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+               SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
+ err:
+    if (al != -1)
+        ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
+    s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
+#endif
+    ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+    return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+}
+
+WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+    if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
+        if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+            unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
+            char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
+            /*
+             * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
+             * used.
+             */
+            memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
+                   sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
+
+            if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
+                                           sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
+                                           sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
+                                           0) <= 0) {
+                ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+                return WORK_ERROR;;
+            }
+
+            BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
+                     sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
+        }
+    }
+#endif
+
+    if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !s->session->peer) {
+        /*
+         * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need
+         * the handshake_buffer
+         */
+        if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
+            ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+            return WORK_ERROR;
+        }
+        return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
+    } else {
+        if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                   ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+            return WORK_ERROR;
+        }
+        /*
+         * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
+         * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
+         */
+        if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
+            ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+            return WORK_ERROR;
+        }
+    }
+
+    return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+    const unsigned char *sig, *data;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
+    unsigned char *gost_data = NULL;
+#endif
+    int al, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+    int type = 0, j;
+    unsigned int len;
+    X509 *peer;
+    const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
+    long hdatalen = 0;
+    void *hdata;
+
+    EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+
+    if (mctx == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    peer = s->session->peer;
+    pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer);
+    if (pkey == NULL) {
+        al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
+
+    if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
+               SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
+        al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
+        int rv;
+
+        if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &sig, 2)) {
+            al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+        rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sig, pkey);
+        if (rv == -1) {
+            al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+            goto f_err;
+        } else if (rv == 0) {
+            al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
+        fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
+#endif
+    } else {
+        /* Use default digest for this key type */
+        int idx = ssl_cert_type(NULL, pkey);
+        if (idx >= 0)
+            md = s->s3->tmp.md[idx];
+        if (md == NULL) {
+            al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
+    /*
+     * If key is GOST and len is exactly 64 or 128, it is signature without
+     * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till TLS 1.2)
+     */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
+    if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)
+        && ((PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64
+             && (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
+                 || EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256))
+            || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 128
+                && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512))) {
+        len = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
+    } else
+#endif
+    if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+        al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
+    if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt) > j)
+        || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
+        al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+    if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+        al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
+    if (hdatalen <= 0) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
+    fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
+#endif
+    if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL)
+        || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+        al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
+    {
+        int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
+        if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
+            || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
+            || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) {
+            if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                goto f_err;
+            }
+            BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len);
+            data = gost_data;
+        }
+    }
+#endif
+
+    if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION
+        && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
+                            s->session->master_key_length,
+                            s->session->master_key)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+        al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    if (EVP_VerifyFinal(mctx, data, len, pkey) <= 0) {
+        al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
+    if (0) {
+ f_err:
+        ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+        ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+    }
+    BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
+    s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
+    OPENSSL_free(gost_data);
+#endif
+    return ret;
+}
+
+MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+    int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+    X509 *x = NULL;
+    unsigned long l, llen;
+    const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
+    STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
+    PACKET spkt;
+
+    if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &llen)
+        || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, llen)
+        || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
+        al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    while (PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0) {
+        if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
+            || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
+            al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
+                   SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+
+        certstart = certbytes;
+        x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l);
+        if (x == NULL) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+        if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
+            al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
+                   SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+        if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+        x = NULL;
+    }
+
+    if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
+        /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
+        if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
+            al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
+                   SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+        /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
+        else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
+                 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
+                   SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
+            al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+        /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
+        if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+    } else {
+        EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+        i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
+        if (i <= 0) {
+            al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
+                   SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+        if (i > 1) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
+            al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+        pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
+        if (pkey == NULL) {
+            al = SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
+                   SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    X509_free(s->session->peer);
+    s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
+    s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
+
+    sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
+    s->session->peer_chain = sk;
+    /*
+     * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
+     * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
+     */
+    sk = NULL;
+    ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
+    goto done;
+
+ f_err:
+    ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+    ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+ done:
+    X509_free(x);
+    sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s)
+{
+    CERT_PKEY *cpk;
+
+    cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
+    if (cpk == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, cpk)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
+{
+    unsigned char *senc = NULL;
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+    HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
+    unsigned char *p, *macstart;
+    const unsigned char *const_p;
+    int len, slen_full, slen;
+    SSL_SESSION *sess;
+    unsigned int hlen;
+    SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
+    unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+    unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
+    int iv_len;
+
+    /* get session encoding length */
+    slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
+    /*
+     * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
+     * long
+     */
+    if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
+        ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
+    if (senc == NULL) {
+        ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+    hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
+    if (ctx == NULL || hctx == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    p = senc;
+    if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p))
+        goto err;
+
+    /*
+     * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
+     */
+    const_p = senc;
+    sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
+    if (sess == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
+
+    slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
+    if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
+        SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    p = senc;
+    if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
+        SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
+
+    /*-
+     * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
+     * follows handshake_header_length +
+     * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
+     * sizeof(keyname) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
+     * max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session * length) +
+     * max_md_size (HMAC) + session_length.
+     */
+    if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
+                      SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 6 + sizeof(key_name) +
+                      EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
+                      EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
+        goto err;
+
+    p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
+    /*
+     * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
+     * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
+     */
+    if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
+        /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
+        int ret = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
+                                             hctx, 1);
+
+        if (ret == 0) {
+            l2n(0, p);          /* timeout */
+            s2n(0, p);          /* length */
+            if (!ssl_set_handshake_header
+                (s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, p - ssl_handshake_start(s)))
+                goto err;
+            OPENSSL_free(senc);
+            EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
+            HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
+            return 1;
+        }
+        if (ret < 0)
+            goto err;
+        iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
+    } else {
+        const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc();
+
+        iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
+        if (RAND_bytes(iv, iv_len) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+        if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL,
+                                tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv))
+            goto err;
+        if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
+                          sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key),
+                          EVP_sha256(), NULL))
+            goto err;
+        memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name,
+               sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name));
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
+     * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
+     * new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
+     */
+    l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
+
+    /* Skip ticket length for now */
+    p += 2;
+    /* Output key name */
+    macstart = p;
+    memcpy(p, key_name, sizeof(key_name));
+    p += sizeof(key_name);
+    /* output IV */
+    memcpy(p, iv, iv_len);
+    p += iv_len;
+    /* Encrypt session data */
+    if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, p, &len, senc, slen))
+        goto err;
+    p += len;
+    if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, p, &len))
+        goto err;
+    p += len;
+
+    if (!HMAC_Update(hctx, macstart, p - macstart))
+        goto err;
+    if (!HMAC_Final(hctx, p, &hlen))
+        goto err;
+
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
+    HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
+    ctx = NULL;
+    hctx = NULL;
+
+    p += hlen;
+    /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
+    /* Total length */
+    len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
+    /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
+    p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
+    s2n(len - 6, p);
+    if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len))
+        goto err;
+    OPENSSL_free(senc);
+
+    return 1;
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_free(senc);
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
+    HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
+    ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s)
+{
+    unsigned char *p;
+    size_t msglen;
+
+    /*-
+     * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
+     * follows handshake_header_length +
+     * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
+     * + (ocsp response)
+     */
+    msglen = 4 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
+    if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + msglen))
+        goto err;
+
+    p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
+
+    /* status type */
+    *(p++) = s->tlsext_status_type;
+    /* length of OCSP response */
+    l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
+    /* actual response */
+    memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
+
+    if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS, msglen))
+        goto err;
+
+    return 1;
+
+ err:
+    ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+/*
+ * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
+ * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
+ */
+MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+    PACKET next_proto, padding;
+    size_t next_proto_len;
+
+    /*-
+     * The payload looks like:
+     *   uint8 proto_len;
+     *   uint8 proto[proto_len];
+     *   uint8 padding_len;
+     *   uint8 padding[padding_len];
+     */
+    if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto)
+        || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding)
+        || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->next_proto_negotiated, &next_proto_len)) {
+        s->next_proto_negotiated_len = 0;
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    s->next_proto_negotiated_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
+
+    return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
+ err:
+    ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+    return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+}
+#endif
+
+#define SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN    3
+
+STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,
+                                               PACKET *cipher_suites,
+                                               STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp,
+                                               int sslv2format, int *al)
+{
+    const SSL_CIPHER *c;
+    STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
+    int n;
+    /* 3 = SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN > TLS_CIPHER_LEN = 2. */
+    unsigned char cipher[SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN];
+
+    s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
+
+    n = sslv2format ? SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN : TLS_CIPHER_LEN;
+
+    if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) == 0) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
+        *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) % n != 0) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
+               SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST);
+        *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null();
+    if (sk == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    if (sslv2format) {
+        size_t numciphers = PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) / n;
+        PACKET sslv2ciphers = *cipher_suites;
+        unsigned int leadbyte;
+        unsigned char *raw;
+
+        /*
+         * We store the raw ciphers list in SSLv3+ format so we need to do some
+         * preprocessing to convert the list first. If there are any SSLv2 only
+         * ciphersuites with a non-zero leading byte then we are going to
+         * slightly over allocate because we won't store those. But that isn't a
+         * problem.
+         */
+        raw = OPENSSL_malloc(numciphers * TLS_CIPHER_LEN);
+        s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw = raw;
+        if (raw == NULL) {
+            *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+            goto err;
+        }
+        for (s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen = 0;
+             PACKET_remaining(&sslv2ciphers) > 0;
+             raw += TLS_CIPHER_LEN) {
+            if (!PACKET_get_1(&sslv2ciphers, &leadbyte)
+                    || (leadbyte == 0
+                        && !PACKET_copy_bytes(&sslv2ciphers, raw,
+                                              TLS_CIPHER_LEN))
+                    || (leadbyte != 0
+                        && !PACKET_forward(&sslv2ciphers, TLS_CIPHER_LEN))) {
+                *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw);
+                s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw = NULL;
+                s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen = 0;
+                goto err;
+            }
+            if (leadbyte == 0)
+                s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen += TLS_CIPHER_LEN;
+        }
+    } else if (!PACKET_memdup(cipher_suites, &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw,
+                           &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen)) {
+        *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    while (PACKET_copy_bytes(cipher_suites, cipher, n)) {
+        /*
+         * SSLv3 ciphers wrapped in an SSLv2-compatible ClientHello have the
+         * first byte set to zero, while true SSLv2 ciphers have a non-zero
+         * first byte. We don't support any true SSLv2 ciphers, so skip them.
+         */
+        if (sslv2format && cipher[0] != '\0')
+            continue;
+
+        /* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */
+        if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
+            (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
+            /* SCSV fatal if renegotiating */
+            if (s->renegotiate) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
+                       SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
+                *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+                goto err;
+            }
+            s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        /* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */
+        if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
+            (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
+            /*
+             * The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher
+             * version. Fail if the current version is an unexpected
+             * downgrade.
+             */
+            if (!ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
+                       SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
+                *al = SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK;
+                goto err;
+            }
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        /* For SSLv2-compat, ignore leading 0-byte. */
+        c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, sslv2format ? &cipher[1] : cipher);
+        if (c != NULL) {
+            if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk, c)) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                goto err;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) > 0) {
+        *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    *skp = sk;
+    return sk;
+ err:
+    sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk);
+    return NULL;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/t1_enc.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/t1_enc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..235c5e4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/t1_enc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,668 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#include <openssl/comp.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/kdf.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+/* seed1 through seed5 are concatenated */
+static int tls1_PRF(SSL *s,
+                    const void *seed1, int seed1_len,
+                    const void *seed2, int seed2_len,
+                    const void *seed3, int seed3_len,
+                    const void *seed4, int seed4_len,
+                    const void *seed5, int seed5_len,
+                    const unsigned char *sec, int slen,
+                    unsigned char *out, int olen)
+{
+    const EVP_MD *md = ssl_prf_md(s);
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
+
+    int ret = 0;
+    size_t outlen = olen;
+
+    if (md == NULL) {
+        /* Should never happen */
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PRF, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_TLS1_PRF, NULL);
+    if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx) <= 0
+        || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_tls1_prf_md(pctx, md) <= 0
+        || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_tls1_prf_secret(pctx, sec, slen) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_tls1_prf_seed(pctx, seed1, seed1_len) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_tls1_prf_seed(pctx, seed2, seed2_len) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_tls1_prf_seed(pctx, seed3, seed3_len) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_tls1_prf_seed(pctx, seed4, seed4_len) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_tls1_prf_seed(pctx, seed5, seed5_len) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx, out, &outlen) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int tls1_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km, int num)
+{
+    int ret;
+    ret = tls1_PRF(s,
+                   TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,
+                   TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE, s->s3->server_random,
+                   SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+                   NULL, 0, NULL, 0, s->session->master_key,
+                   s->session->master_key_length, km, num);
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
+{
+    unsigned char *p, *mac_secret;
+    unsigned char tmp1[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
+    unsigned char tmp2[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
+    unsigned char iv1[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH * 2];
+    unsigned char iv2[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH * 2];
+    unsigned char *ms, *key, *iv;
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dd;
+    const EVP_CIPHER *c;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+    const SSL_COMP *comp;
+#endif
+    const EVP_MD *m;
+    int mac_type;
+    int *mac_secret_size;
+    EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx;
+    EVP_PKEY *mac_key;
+    int n, i, j, k, cl;
+    int reuse_dd = 0;
+
+    c = s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc;
+    m = s->s3->tmp.new_hash;
+    mac_type = s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+    comp = s->s3->tmp.new_compression;
+#endif
+
+    if (which & SSL3_CC_READ) {
+        if (s->tlsext_use_etm)
+            s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_READ;
+        else
+            s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_READ;
+
+        if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC)
+            s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM;
+        else
+            s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM;
+
+        if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL)
+            reuse_dd = 1;
+        else if ((s->enc_read_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        else
+            /*
+             * make sure it's initialised in case we exit later with an error
+             */
+            EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(s->enc_read_ctx);
+        dd = s->enc_read_ctx;
+        mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->read_hash, NULL);
+        if (mac_ctx == NULL)
+            goto err;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+        COMP_CTX_free(s->expand);
+        s->expand = NULL;
+        if (comp != NULL) {
+            s->expand = COMP_CTX_new(comp->method);
+            if (s->expand == NULL) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
+                       SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
+                goto err2;
+            }
+        }
+#endif
+        /*
+         * this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS
+         */
+        if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
+            RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
+        mac_secret = &(s->s3->read_mac_secret[0]);
+        mac_secret_size = &(s->s3->read_mac_secret_size);
+    } else {
+        if (s->tlsext_use_etm)
+            s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_WRITE;
+        else
+            s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_WRITE;
+
+        if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC)
+            s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM;
+        else
+            s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM;
+        if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
+            reuse_dd = 1;
+        else if ((s->enc_write_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        dd = s->enc_write_ctx;
+        if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+            mac_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+            if (mac_ctx == NULL)
+                goto err;
+            s->write_hash = mac_ctx;
+        } else {
+            mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->write_hash, NULL);
+            if (mac_ctx == NULL)
+                goto err;
+        }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+        COMP_CTX_free(s->compress);
+        s->compress = NULL;
+        if (comp != NULL) {
+            s->compress = COMP_CTX_new(comp->method);
+            if (s->compress == NULL) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
+                       SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
+                goto err2;
+            }
+        }
+#endif
+        /*
+         * this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS
+         */
+        if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
+            RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(&s->rlayer);
+        mac_secret = &(s->s3->write_mac_secret[0]);
+        mac_secret_size = &(s->s3->write_mac_secret_size);
+    }
+
+    if (reuse_dd)
+        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(dd);
+
+    p = s->s3->tmp.key_block;
+    i = *mac_secret_size = s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size;
+
+    cl = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c);
+    j = cl;
+    /* Was j=(exp)?5:EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); */
+    /* If GCM/CCM mode only part of IV comes from PRF */
+    if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
+        k = EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN;
+    else if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE)
+        k = EVP_CCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN;
+    else
+        k = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
+    if ((which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE) ||
+        (which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
+        ms = &(p[0]);
+        n = i + i;
+        key = &(p[n]);
+        n += j + j;
+        iv = &(p[n]);
+        n += k + k;
+    } else {
+        n = i;
+        ms = &(p[n]);
+        n += i + j;
+        key = &(p[n]);
+        n += j + k;
+        iv = &(p[n]);
+        n += k;
+    }
+
+    if (n > s->s3->tmp.key_block_length) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        goto err2;
+    }
+
+    memcpy(mac_secret, ms, i);
+
+    if (!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(c) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)) {
+        mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(mac_type, NULL,
+                                       mac_secret, *mac_secret_size);
+        if (mac_key == NULL
+            || EVP_DigestSignInit(mac_ctx, NULL, m, NULL, mac_key) <= 0) {
+            EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto err2;
+        }
+        EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
+    }
+#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
+    printf("which = %04X\nmac key=", which);
+    {
+        int z;
+        for (z = 0; z < i; z++)
+            printf("%02X%c", ms[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
+    }
+#endif
+
+    if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
+        if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, c, NULL, key, NULL, (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE))
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, k, iv)) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto err2;
+        }
+    } else if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
+        int taglen;
+        if (s->s3->tmp.
+            new_cipher->algorithm_enc & (SSL_AES128CCM8 | SSL_AES256CCM8))
+            taglen = 8;
+        else
+            taglen = 16;
+        if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, c, NULL, NULL, NULL, (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE))
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN, 12, NULL)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG, taglen, NULL)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_IV_FIXED, k, iv)
+            || !EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, NULL, NULL, key, NULL, -1)) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto err2;
+        }
+    } else {
+        if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, c, NULL, key, iv, (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE))) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto err2;
+        }
+    }
+    /* Needed for "composite" AEADs, such as RC4-HMAC-MD5 */
+    if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(c) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) && *mac_secret_size
+        && !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY,
+                                *mac_secret_size, mac_secret)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        goto err2;
+    }
+
+#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
+    printf("which = %04X\nkey=", which);
+    {
+        int z;
+        for (z = 0; z < EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); z++)
+            printf("%02X%c", key[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
+    }
+    printf("\niv=");
+    {
+        int z;
+        for (z = 0; z < k; z++)
+            printf("%02X%c", iv[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
+    }
+    printf("\n");
+#endif
+
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp1, sizeof(tmp1));
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp2, sizeof(tmp1));
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(iv1, sizeof(iv1));
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(iv2, sizeof(iv2));
+    return (1);
+ err:
+    SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ err2:
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp1, sizeof(tmp1));
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp2, sizeof(tmp1));
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(iv1, sizeof(iv1));
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(iv2, sizeof(iv2));
+    return (0);
+}
+
+int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s)
+{
+    unsigned char *p;
+    const EVP_CIPHER *c;
+    const EVP_MD *hash;
+    int num;
+    SSL_COMP *comp;
+    int mac_type = NID_undef, mac_secret_size = 0;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    if (s->s3->tmp.key_block_length != 0)
+        return (1);
+
+    if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session, &c, &hash, &mac_type, &mac_secret_size,
+                            &comp, s->tlsext_use_etm)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE);
+        return (0);
+    }
+
+    s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc = c;
+    s->s3->tmp.new_hash = hash;
+    s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type = mac_type;
+    s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_size;
+    num = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c) + mac_secret_size + EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
+    num *= 2;
+
+    ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
+
+    if ((p = OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    s->s3->tmp.key_block_length = num;
+    s->s3->tmp.key_block = p;
+
+#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
+    printf("client random\n");
+    {
+        int z;
+        for (z = 0; z < SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; z++)
+            printf("%02X%c", s->s3->client_random[z],
+                   ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
+    }
+    printf("server random\n");
+    {
+        int z;
+        for (z = 0; z < SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; z++)
+            printf("%02X%c", s->s3->server_random[z],
+                   ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
+    }
+    printf("master key\n");
+    {
+        int z;
+        for (z = 0; z < s->session->master_key_length; z++)
+            printf("%02X%c", s->session->master_key[z],
+                   ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
+    }
+#endif
+    if (!tls1_generate_key_block(s, p, num))
+        goto err;
+#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
+    printf("\nkey block\n");
+    {
+        int z;
+        for (z = 0; z < num; z++)
+            printf("%02X%c", p[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
+    }
+#endif
+
+    if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS)
+        && s->method->version <= TLS1_VERSION) {
+        /*
+         * enable vulnerability countermeasure for CBC ciphers with known-IV
+         * problem (http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
+         */
+        s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 1;
+
+        if (s->session->cipher != NULL) {
+            if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eNULL)
+                s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
+            if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
+                s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0;
+#endif
+        }
+    }
+
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+int tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, const char *str, int slen, unsigned char *out)
+{
+    int hashlen;
+    unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+
+    if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0))
+        return 0;
+
+    hashlen = ssl_handshake_hash(s, hash, sizeof(hash));
+
+    if (hashlen == 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    if (!tls1_PRF(s, str, slen, hash, hashlen, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
+                  s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length,
+                  out, TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH))
+        return 0;
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(hash, hashlen);
+    return TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH;
+}
+
+int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p,
+                                int len)
+{
+    if (s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS) {
+        unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2];
+        int hashlen;
+        /*
+         * Digest cached records keeping record buffer (if present): this wont
+         * affect client auth because we're freezing the buffer at the same
+         * point (after client key exchange and before certificate verify)
+         */
+        if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1))
+            return -1;
+        hashlen = ssl_handshake_hash(s, hash, sizeof(hash));
+#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
+        fprintf(stderr, "Handshake hashes:\n");
+        BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)hash, hashlen);
+#endif
+        tls1_PRF(s,
+                 TLS_MD_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
+                 TLS_MD_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE,
+                 hash, hashlen,
+                 NULL, 0,
+                 NULL, 0,
+                 NULL, 0, p, len, s->session->master_key,
+                 SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE);
+        OPENSSL_cleanse(hash, hashlen);
+    } else {
+        tls1_PRF(s,
+                 TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
+                 TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE,
+                 s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+                 NULL, 0,
+                 s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+                 NULL, 0, p, len, s->session->master_key,
+                 SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE);
+    }
+#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
+    fprintf(stderr, "Premaster Secret:\n");
+    BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)p, len);
+    fprintf(stderr, "Client Random:\n");
+    BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+    fprintf(stderr, "Server Random:\n");
+    BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+    fprintf(stderr, "Master Secret:\n");
+    BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->session->master_key,
+                SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE);
+#endif
+
+    return (SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE);
+}
+
+int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
+                                const char *label, size_t llen,
+                                const unsigned char *context,
+                                size_t contextlen, int use_context)
+{
+    unsigned char *val = NULL;
+    size_t vallen = 0, currentvalpos;
+    int rv;
+
+    /*
+     * construct PRF arguments we construct the PRF argument ourself rather
+     * than passing separate values into the TLS PRF to ensure that the
+     * concatenation of values does not create a prohibited label.
+     */
+    vallen = llen + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2;
+    if (use_context) {
+        vallen += 2 + contextlen;
+    }
+
+    val = OPENSSL_malloc(vallen);
+    if (val == NULL)
+        goto err2;
+    currentvalpos = 0;
+    memcpy(val + currentvalpos, (unsigned char *)label, llen);
+    currentvalpos += llen;
+    memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+    currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+    memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+    currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+
+    if (use_context) {
+        val[currentvalpos] = (contextlen >> 8) & 0xff;
+        currentvalpos++;
+        val[currentvalpos] = contextlen & 0xff;
+        currentvalpos++;
+        if ((contextlen > 0) || (context != NULL)) {
+            memcpy(val + currentvalpos, context, contextlen);
+        }
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * disallow prohibited labels note that SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE > max(prohibited
+     * label len) = 15, so size of val > max(prohibited label len) = 15 and
+     * the comparisons won't have buffer overflow
+     */
+    if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,
+               TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0)
+        goto err1;
+    if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,
+               TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0)
+        goto err1;
+    if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
+               TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE) == 0)
+        goto err1;
+    if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
+               TLS_MD_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE) == 0)
+        goto err1;
+    if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,
+               TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE) == 0)
+        goto err1;
+
+    rv = tls1_PRF(s,
+                  val, vallen,
+                  NULL, 0,
+                  NULL, 0,
+                  NULL, 0,
+                  NULL, 0,
+                  s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length,
+                  out, olen);
+
+    goto ret;
+ err1:
+    SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL, SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL);
+    rv = 0;
+    goto ret;
+ err2:
+    SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    rv = 0;
+ ret:
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(val, vallen);
+    return (rv);
+}
+
+int tls1_alert_code(int code)
+{
+    switch (code) {
+    case SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY:
+        return (SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY);
+    case SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE:
+        return (SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+    case SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC:
+        return (SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
+    case SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED:
+        return (TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+    case SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW:
+        return (TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW);
+    case SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE:
+        return (SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE);
+    case SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:
+        return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+    case SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE:
+        return (-1);
+    case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE:
+        return (SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
+    case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE:
+        return (SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE);
+    case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED:
+        return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED);
+    case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED:
+        return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED);
+    case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN:
+        return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN);
+    case SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER:
+        return (SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+    case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA:
+        return (TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA);
+    case SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED:
+        return (TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED);
+    case SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR:
+        return (TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+    case SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR:
+        return (TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR);
+    case SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION:
+        return (TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION);
+    case SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION:
+        return (TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION);
+    case SSL_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY:
+        return (TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY);
+    case SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR:
+        return (TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    case SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED:
+        return (TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED);
+    case SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION:
+        return (TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
+    case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION:
+        return (TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION);
+    case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE:
+        return (TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE);
+    case SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME:
+        return (TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME);
+    case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE:
+        return (TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE);
+    case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE:
+        return (TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE);
+    case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY:
+        return (TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY);
+    case SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK:
+        return (TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
+    case SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL:
+        return (TLS1_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL);
+    default:
+        return (-1);
+    }
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/t1_ext.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/t1_ext.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a996a20
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/t1_ext.c
@@ -0,0 +1,283 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2014-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* Custom extension utility functions */
+
+#include <openssl/ct.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+
+/* Find a custom extension from the list. */
+static custom_ext_method *custom_ext_find(const custom_ext_methods *exts,
+                                          unsigned int ext_type)
+{
+    size_t i;
+    custom_ext_method *meth = exts->meths;
+    for (i = 0; i < exts->meths_count; i++, meth++) {
+        if (ext_type == meth->ext_type)
+            return meth;
+    }
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initialise custom extensions flags to indicate neither sent nor received.
+ */
+void custom_ext_init(custom_ext_methods *exts)
+{
+    size_t i;
+    custom_ext_method *meth = exts->meths;
+    for (i = 0; i < exts->meths_count; i++, meth++)
+        meth->ext_flags = 0;
+}
+
+/* Pass received custom extension data to the application for parsing. */
+int custom_ext_parse(SSL *s, int server,
+                     unsigned int ext_type,
+                     const unsigned char *ext_data, size_t ext_size, int *al)
+{
+    custom_ext_methods *exts = server ? &s->cert->srv_ext : &s->cert->cli_ext;
+    custom_ext_method *meth;
+    meth = custom_ext_find(exts, ext_type);
+    /* If not found return success */
+    if (!meth)
+        return 1;
+    if (!server) {
+        /*
+         * If it's ServerHello we can't have any extensions not sent in
+         * ClientHello.
+         */
+        if (!(meth->ext_flags & SSL_EXT_FLAG_SENT)) {
+            *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+    /* If already present it's a duplicate */
+    if (meth->ext_flags & SSL_EXT_FLAG_RECEIVED) {
+        *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+        return 0;
+    }
+    meth->ext_flags |= SSL_EXT_FLAG_RECEIVED;
+    /* If no parse function set return success */
+    if (!meth->parse_cb)
+        return 1;
+
+    return meth->parse_cb(s, ext_type, ext_data, ext_size, al, meth->parse_arg);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Request custom extension data from the application and add to the return
+ * buffer.
+ */
+int custom_ext_add(SSL *s, int server,
+                   unsigned char **pret, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
+{
+    custom_ext_methods *exts = server ? &s->cert->srv_ext : &s->cert->cli_ext;
+    custom_ext_method *meth;
+    unsigned char *ret = *pret;
+    size_t i;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < exts->meths_count; i++) {
+        const unsigned char *out = NULL;
+        size_t outlen = 0;
+        meth = exts->meths + i;
+
+        if (server) {
+            /*
+             * For ServerHello only send extensions present in ClientHello.
+             */
+            if (!(meth->ext_flags & SSL_EXT_FLAG_RECEIVED))
+                continue;
+            /* If callback absent for server skip it */
+            if (!meth->add_cb)
+                continue;
+        }
+        if (meth->add_cb) {
+            int cb_retval = 0;
+            cb_retval = meth->add_cb(s, meth->ext_type,
+                                     &out, &outlen, al, meth->add_arg);
+            if (cb_retval < 0)
+                return 0;       /* error */
+            if (cb_retval == 0)
+                continue;       /* skip this extension */
+        }
+        if (4 > limit - ret || outlen > (size_t)(limit - ret - 4))
+            return 0;
+        s2n(meth->ext_type, ret);
+        s2n(outlen, ret);
+        if (outlen) {
+            memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
+            ret += outlen;
+        }
+        /*
+         * We can't send duplicates: code logic should prevent this.
+         */
+        OPENSSL_assert(!(meth->ext_flags & SSL_EXT_FLAG_SENT));
+        /*
+         * Indicate extension has been sent: this is both a sanity check to
+         * ensure we don't send duplicate extensions and indicates that it is
+         * not an error if the extension is present in ServerHello.
+         */
+        meth->ext_flags |= SSL_EXT_FLAG_SENT;
+        if (meth->free_cb)
+            meth->free_cb(s, meth->ext_type, out, meth->add_arg);
+    }
+    *pret = ret;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Copy the flags from src to dst for any extensions that exist in both */
+int custom_exts_copy_flags(custom_ext_methods *dst,
+                           const custom_ext_methods *src)
+{
+    size_t i;
+    custom_ext_method *methsrc = src->meths;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < src->meths_count; i++, methsrc++) {
+        custom_ext_method *methdst = custom_ext_find(dst, methsrc->ext_type);
+
+        if (methdst == NULL)
+            continue;
+
+        methdst->ext_flags = methsrc->ext_flags;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Copy table of custom extensions */
+int custom_exts_copy(custom_ext_methods *dst, const custom_ext_methods *src)
+{
+    if (src->meths_count) {
+        dst->meths =
+            OPENSSL_memdup(src->meths,
+                           sizeof(custom_ext_method) * src->meths_count);
+        if (dst->meths == NULL)
+            return 0;
+        dst->meths_count = src->meths_count;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+void custom_exts_free(custom_ext_methods *exts)
+{
+    OPENSSL_free(exts->meths);
+}
+
+/* Set callbacks for a custom extension. */
+static int custom_ext_meth_add(custom_ext_methods *exts,
+                               unsigned int ext_type,
+                               custom_ext_add_cb add_cb,
+                               custom_ext_free_cb free_cb,
+                               void *add_arg,
+                               custom_ext_parse_cb parse_cb, void *parse_arg)
+{
+    custom_ext_method *meth, *tmp;
+    /*
+     * Check application error: if add_cb is not set free_cb will never be
+     * called.
+     */
+    if (!add_cb && free_cb)
+        return 0;
+    /*
+     * Don't add if extension supported internally, but make exception
+     * for extension types that previously were not supported, but now are.
+     */
+    if (SSL_extension_supported(ext_type) &&
+        ext_type != TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp)
+        return 0;
+    /* Extension type must fit in 16 bits */
+    if (ext_type > 0xffff)
+        return 0;
+    /* Search for duplicate */
+    if (custom_ext_find(exts, ext_type))
+        return 0;
+    tmp = OPENSSL_realloc(exts->meths,
+                          (exts->meths_count + 1) * sizeof(custom_ext_method));
+
+    if (tmp == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    exts->meths = tmp;
+    meth = exts->meths + exts->meths_count;
+    memset(meth, 0, sizeof(*meth));
+    meth->parse_cb = parse_cb;
+    meth->add_cb = add_cb;
+    meth->free_cb = free_cb;
+    meth->ext_type = ext_type;
+    meth->add_arg = add_arg;
+    meth->parse_arg = parse_arg;
+    exts->meths_count++;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Return true if a client custom extension exists, false otherwise */
+int SSL_CTX_has_client_custom_ext(const SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned int ext_type)
+{
+    return custom_ext_find(&ctx->cert->cli_ext, ext_type) != NULL;
+}
+
+/* Application level functions to add custom extension callbacks */
+int SSL_CTX_add_client_custom_ext(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned int ext_type,
+                                  custom_ext_add_cb add_cb,
+                                  custom_ext_free_cb free_cb,
+                                  void *add_arg,
+                                  custom_ext_parse_cb parse_cb, void *parse_arg)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
+    /*
+     * We don't want applications registering callbacks for SCT extensions
+     * whilst simultaneously using the built-in SCT validation features, as
+     * these two things may not play well together.
+     */
+    if (ext_type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp &&
+        SSL_CTX_ct_is_enabled(ctx))
+        return 0;
+#endif
+    return custom_ext_meth_add(&ctx->cert->cli_ext, ext_type, add_cb,
+                               free_cb, add_arg, parse_cb, parse_arg);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_add_server_custom_ext(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned int ext_type,
+                                  custom_ext_add_cb add_cb,
+                                  custom_ext_free_cb free_cb,
+                                  void *add_arg,
+                                  custom_ext_parse_cb parse_cb, void *parse_arg)
+{
+    return custom_ext_meth_add(&ctx->cert->srv_ext, ext_type,
+                               add_cb, free_cb, add_arg, parse_cb, parse_arg);
+}
+
+int SSL_extension_supported(unsigned int ext_type)
+{
+    switch (ext_type) {
+        /* Internally supported extensions. */
+    case TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation:
+    case TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats:
+    case TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves:
+    case TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+    case TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg:
+#endif
+    case TLSEXT_TYPE_padding:
+    case TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate:
+    case TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name:
+    case TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket:
+    case TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms:
+    case TLSEXT_TYPE_srp:
+    case TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request:
+    case TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp:
+    case TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp:
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
+    case TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac:
+#endif
+        return 1;
+    default:
+        return 0;
+    }
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/t1_lib.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/t1_lib.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7a5721a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -0,0 +1,4228 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
+#include <openssl/conf.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#include <openssl/ct.h>
+
+
+#define CHECKLEN(curr, val, limit) \
+    (((curr) >= (limit)) || (size_t)((limit) - (curr)) < (size_t)(val))
+
+static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
+                              const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
+                              SSL_SESSION **psess);
+static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
+static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
+
+SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
+    tls1_enc,
+    tls1_mac,
+    tls1_setup_key_block,
+    tls1_generate_master_secret,
+    tls1_change_cipher_state,
+    tls1_final_finish_mac,
+    TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
+    TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
+    TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
+    tls1_alert_code,
+    tls1_export_keying_material,
+    0,
+    SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
+    ssl3_set_handshake_header,
+    ssl3_handshake_write
+};
+
+SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
+    tls1_enc,
+    tls1_mac,
+    tls1_setup_key_block,
+    tls1_generate_master_secret,
+    tls1_change_cipher_state,
+    tls1_final_finish_mac,
+    TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
+    TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
+    TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
+    tls1_alert_code,
+    tls1_export_keying_material,
+    SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
+    SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
+    ssl3_set_handshake_header,
+    ssl3_handshake_write
+};
+
+SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
+    tls1_enc,
+    tls1_mac,
+    tls1_setup_key_block,
+    tls1_generate_master_secret,
+    tls1_change_cipher_state,
+    tls1_final_finish_mac,
+    TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
+    TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
+    TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
+    tls1_alert_code,
+    tls1_export_keying_material,
+    SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
+        | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
+    SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
+    ssl3_set_handshake_header,
+    ssl3_handshake_write
+};
+
+long tls1_default_timeout(void)
+{
+    /*
+     * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
+     * http, the cache would over fill
+     */
+    return (60 * 60 * 2);
+}
+
+int tls1_new(SSL *s)
+{
+    if (!ssl3_new(s))
+        return (0);
+    s->method->ssl_clear(s);
+    return (1);
+}
+
+void tls1_free(SSL *s)
+{
+    OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
+    ssl3_free(s);
+}
+
+void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
+{
+    ssl3_clear(s);
+    if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
+        s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
+    else
+        s->version = s->method->version;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+
+typedef struct {
+    int nid;                    /* Curve NID */
+    int secbits;                /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
+    unsigned int flags;         /* Flags: currently just field type */
+} tls_curve_info;
+
+/*
+ * Table of curve information.
+ * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
+ * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
+ */
+static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
+    {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
+    {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
+    {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
+    {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
+    {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
+    {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
+    {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
+    {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
+    {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
+    {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
+    {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
+    {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
+    {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
+    {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
+    {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
+    {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
+    {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
+    {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
+    {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
+    {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
+    {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
+    {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
+    {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
+    {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
+    {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
+    {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
+    {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
+    {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
+    {NID_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X25519 (29) */
+};
+
+static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
+    TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
+    TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
+    TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
+};
+
+/* The default curves */
+static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
+    0, 29,                      /* X25519 (29) */
+    0, 23,                      /* secp256r1 (23) */
+    0, 25,                      /* secp521r1 (25) */
+    0, 24,                      /* secp384r1 (24) */
+};
+
+static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
+    0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
+    0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
+};
+
+int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id, unsigned int *pflags)
+{
+    const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
+    /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
+    if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
+        return 0;
+    cinfo = nid_list + curve_id - 1;
+    if (pflags)
+        *pflags = cinfo->flags;
+    return cinfo->nid;
+}
+
+int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
+{
+    size_t i;
+    for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
+        if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
+            return i + 1;
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
+ * preferred list.
+ * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
+ * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
+ * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
+ * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
+ * lists in the first place.
+ * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
+ * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
+ * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
+ */
+static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
+                              const unsigned char **pcurves, size_t *num_curves)
+{
+    size_t pcurveslen = 0;
+
+    if (sess) {
+        *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
+        pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
+    } else {
+        /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
+        switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
+        case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
+            *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
+            pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
+            break;
+
+        case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
+            *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
+            pcurveslen = 2;
+            break;
+
+        case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
+            *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
+            pcurveslen = 2;
+            break;
+        default:
+            *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
+            pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
+        }
+        if (!*pcurves) {
+            *pcurves = eccurves_default;
+            pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
+    if (pcurveslen & 1) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        *num_curves = 0;
+        return 0;
+    }
+    *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
+static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
+{
+    const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
+    if (curve[0])
+        return 1;
+    if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
+        return 0;
+    cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
+# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+    if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
+        return 0;
+# endif
+    return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
+}
+
+/* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
+int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
+{
+    const unsigned char *curves;
+    size_t num_curves, i;
+    unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
+    if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
+        return 0;
+    /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
+    if (suiteb_flags) {
+        unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
+        if (p[1])
+            return 0;
+        if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
+            if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
+                return 0;
+        } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
+            if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
+                return 0;
+        } else                  /* Should never happen */
+            return 0;
+    }
+    if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
+        return 0;
+    for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
+        if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
+            return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef
+ * if there is no match.
+ * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
+ * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
+ * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
+ */
+int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
+{
+    const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
+    size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
+    int k;
+
+    /* Can't do anything on client side */
+    if (s->server == 0)
+        return -1;
+    if (nmatch == -2) {
+        if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
+            /*
+             * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
+             * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
+             */
+            unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
+
+            if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
+                return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
+            if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
+                return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
+            /* Should never happen */
+            return NID_undef;
+        }
+        /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
+        nmatch = 0;
+    }
+    /*
+     * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
+     * but s->options is a long...
+     */
+    if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s,
+            (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0,
+            &supp, &num_supp))
+        /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
+        return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
+    if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s,
+            (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0,
+            &pref, &num_pref))
+        return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
+
+    for (k = 0, i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
+        const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
+
+        for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
+            if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
+                if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
+                    continue;
+                if (nmatch == k) {
+                    int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
+
+                    return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id, NULL);
+                }
+                k++;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    if (nmatch == -1)
+        return k;
+    /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
+    return NID_undef;
+}
+
+int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
+                    int *curves, size_t ncurves)
+{
+    unsigned char *clist, *p;
+    size_t i;
+    /*
+     * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
+     * ids < 32
+     */
+    unsigned long dup_list = 0;
+    clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
+    if (clist == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
+        unsigned long idmask;
+        int id;
+        id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
+        idmask = 1L << id;
+        if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
+            OPENSSL_free(clist);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        dup_list |= idmask;
+        s2n(id, p);
+    }
+    OPENSSL_free(*pext);
+    *pext = clist;
+    *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+# define MAX_CURVELIST   28
+
+typedef struct {
+    size_t nidcnt;
+    int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
+} nid_cb_st;
+
+static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
+{
+    nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
+    size_t i;
+    int nid;
+    char etmp[20];
+    if (elem == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
+        return 0;
+    if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
+        return 0;
+    memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
+    etmp[len] = 0;
+    nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
+    if (nid == NID_undef)
+        nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
+    if (nid == NID_undef)
+        nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
+    if (nid == NID_undef)
+        return 0;
+    for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
+        if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
+            return 0;
+    narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
+int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str)
+{
+    nid_cb_st ncb;
+    ncb.nidcnt = 0;
+    if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
+        return 0;
+    if (pext == NULL)
+        return 1;
+    return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
+}
+
+/* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
+static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
+                          EC_KEY *ec)
+{
+    int id;
+    const EC_GROUP *grp;
+    if (!ec)
+        return 0;
+    /* Determine if it is a prime field */
+    grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
+    if (!grp)
+        return 0;
+    /* Determine curve ID */
+    id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
+    id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
+    /* If no id return error: we don't support arbitrary explicit curves */
+    if (id == 0)
+        return 0;
+    curve_id[0] = 0;
+    curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
+    if (comp_id) {
+        if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
+            return 0;
+        if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
+            *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
+        } else {
+            if ((nid_list[id - 1].flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_PRIME)
+                *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
+            else
+                *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
+        }
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
+static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
+                             unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
+{
+    const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
+    size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
+    int j;
+    /*
+     * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
+     * supported (see RFC4492).
+     */
+    if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
+        pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
+        num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
+        for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
+            if (*comp_id == *pformats)
+                break;
+        }
+        if (i == num_formats)
+            return 0;
+    }
+    if (!curve_id)
+        return 1;
+    /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
+    for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
+        if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
+            return 0;
+        if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
+            /*
+             * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
+             * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
+             * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
+             * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
+             * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
+             */
+            break;
+        }
+        for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
+            if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
+                break;
+        }
+        if (i == num_curves)
+            return 0;
+        /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
+        if (!s->server)
+            break;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
+                                size_t *num_formats)
+{
+    /*
+     * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
+     */
+    if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
+        *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
+        *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
+    } else {
+        *pformats = ecformats_default;
+        /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
+        if (tls1_suiteb(s))
+            *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
+        else
+            *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
+ * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
+ */
+static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
+{
+    unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+    int rv;
+    pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
+    if (!pkey)
+        return 0;
+    /* If not EC nothing to do */
+    if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
+        return 1;
+    rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
+    if (!rv)
+        return 0;
+    /*
+     * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
+     * curves extension.
+     */
+    rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
+    if (!rv)
+        return 0;
+    /*
+     * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
+     * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
+     */
+    if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
+        int check_md;
+        size_t i;
+        CERT *c = s->cert;
+        if (curve_id[0])
+            return 0;
+        /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
+        if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
+            check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
+        else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
+            check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
+        else
+            return 0;           /* Should never happen */
+        for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
+            if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
+                break;
+        if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
+            return 0;
+        if (set_ee_md == 2) {
+            if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
+                s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256();
+            else
+                s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384();
+        }
+    }
+    return rv;
+}
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+/*
+ * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
+ * @s: SSL connection
+ * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
+ *
+ * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
+ * is compatible with the client extensions.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
+ */
+int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
+{
+    /*
+     * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
+     * curves permitted.
+     */
+    if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
+        unsigned char curve_id[2];
+        /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
+        if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
+            curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
+        else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
+            curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
+        else
+            return 0;
+        curve_id[0] = 0;
+        /* Check this curve is acceptable */
+        if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
+            return 0;
+        return 1;
+    }
+    /* Need a shared curve */
+    if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
+        return 1;
+    return 0;
+}
+# endif                         /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
+#else
+
+static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
+{
+    return 1;
+}
+
+#endif                          /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
+/*
+ * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
+ * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
+ */
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+# define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md)  /* */
+#else
+# define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
+#endif
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+# define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md)  /* */
+#else
+# define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
+#endif
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+# define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)/* */
+#else
+# define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
+#endif
+
+#define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
+                tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
+                tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
+                tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
+
+static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
+    tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
+        tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
+        tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
+        tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
+        tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
+        TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001,
+    TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256,
+    TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
+#endif
+};
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
+    tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
+        tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
+};
+#endif
+size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, int sent, const unsigned char **psigs)
+{
+    /*
+     * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
+     * preferences.
+     */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
+    case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
+        *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
+        return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
+
+    case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
+        *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
+        return 2;
+
+    case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
+        *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
+        return 2;
+    }
+#endif
+    /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
+    if (s->server == sent && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
+        *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
+        return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
+    } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
+        *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
+        return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
+    } else {
+        *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
+        return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
+ * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
+ */
+int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
+                            const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
+    size_t sent_sigslen, i;
+    int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
+    /* Should never happen */
+    if (sigalg == -1)
+        return -1;
+    /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
+    if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
+        unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
+        /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
+        if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)))
+            return 0;
+        if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
+        if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
+            if (curve_id[0])
+                return 0;
+            if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
+                if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
+                    SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
+                           SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
+                    return 0;
+                }
+            } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
+                if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
+                    SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
+                           SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
+                    return 0;
+                }
+            } else
+                return 0;
+        }
+    } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
+        return 0;
+#endif
+
+    /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
+    sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
+    for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
+        if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
+            break;
+    }
+    /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
+    if (i == sent_sigslen
+        && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
+            || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
+    if (*pmd == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
+    if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
+                      EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd), (void *)sig)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    /*
+     * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
+     */
+    s->s3->tmp.peer_md = *pmd;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
+ * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
+ * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
+ *
+ * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
+ * by the client.
+ *
+ * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
+ */
+void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
+{
+    s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
+    s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
+    ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
+    ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver, &s->s3->tmp.max_ver);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+    /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
+    if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
+        s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
+        s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
+    }
+#endif                          /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+    if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
+        s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
+        s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
+    }
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
+ * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
+ * @c: cipher to check
+ * @op: Security check that you want to do
+ * @ecdhe: If set to 1 then TLSv1 ECDHE ciphers are also allowed in SSLv3
+ *
+ * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
+ */
+int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op, int ecdhe)
+{
+    if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
+        || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
+        return 1;
+    if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0)
+        return 1;
+    if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+        int min_tls = c->min_tls;
+
+        /*
+         * For historical reasons we will allow ECHDE to be selected by a server
+         * in SSLv3 if we are a client
+         */
+        if (min_tls == TLS1_VERSION && ecdhe
+                && (c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) != 0)
+            min_tls = SSL3_VERSION;
+
+        if ((min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver) || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver))
+            return 1;
+    }
+    if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
+                           || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
+        return 1;
+
+    return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
+}
+
+static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
+{
+    if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
+        return 0;
+    return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
+}
+
+static int compare_uint(const void *p1, const void *p2)
+{
+    unsigned int u1 = *((const unsigned int *)p1);
+    unsigned int u2 = *((const unsigned int *)p2);
+    if (u1 < u2)
+        return -1;
+    else if (u1 > u2)
+        return 1;
+    else
+        return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be
+ * more than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello.
+ * This function does an initial scan over the extensions block to filter those
+ * out. It returns 1 if all extensions are unique, and 0 if the extensions
+ * contain duplicates, could not be successfully parsed, or an internal error
+ * occurred.
+ */
+static int tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(const PACKET *packet)
+{
+    PACKET extensions = *packet;
+    size_t num_extensions = 0, i = 0;
+    unsigned int *extension_types = NULL;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    /* First pass: count the extensions. */
+    while (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) > 0) {
+        unsigned int type;
+        PACKET extension;
+        if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type) ||
+            !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
+            goto done;
+        }
+        num_extensions++;
+    }
+
+    if (num_extensions <= 1)
+        return 1;
+
+    extension_types = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * num_extensions);
+    if (extension_types == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto done;
+    }
+
+    /* Second pass: gather the extension types. */
+    extensions = *packet;
+    for (i = 0; i < num_extensions; i++) {
+        PACKET extension;
+        if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &extension_types[i]) ||
+            !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
+            /* This should not happen. */
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto done;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) != 0) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        goto done;
+    }
+    /* Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates. */
+    qsort(extension_types, num_extensions, sizeof(unsigned int), compare_uint);
+    for (i = 1; i < num_extensions; i++) {
+        if (extension_types[i - 1] == extension_types[i])
+            goto done;
+    }
+    ret = 1;
+ done:
+    OPENSSL_free(extension_types);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
+                                          unsigned char *limit, int *al)
+{
+    int extdatalen = 0;
+    unsigned char *orig = buf;
+    unsigned char *ret = buf;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
+    int using_ecc = 0;
+    if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+        int i;
+        unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
+        STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
+
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
+            const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
+
+            alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
+            alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
+            if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK))
+                || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) {
+                using_ecc = 1;
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+#endif
+
+    ret += 2;
+
+    if (ret >= limit)
+        return NULL;            /* this really never occurs, but ... */
+
+    /* Add RI if renegotiating */
+    if (s->renegotiate) {
+        int el;
+
+        if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+
+        if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + el, limit))
+            return NULL;
+
+        s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
+        s2n(el, ret);
+
+        if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+
+        ret += el;
+    }
+    /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
+    if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
+        goto done;
+
+    if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
+        /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
+        size_t size_str;
+
+        /*-
+         * check for enough space.
+         * 4 for the servername type and extension length
+         * 2 for servernamelist length
+         * 1 for the hostname type
+         * 2 for hostname length
+         * + hostname length
+         */
+        size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname);
+        if (CHECKLEN(ret, 9 + size_str, limit))
+            return NULL;
+
+        /* extension type and length */
+        s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
+        s2n(size_str + 5, ret);
+
+        /* length of servername list */
+        s2n(size_str + 3, ret);
+
+        /* hostname type, length and hostname */
+        *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
+        s2n(size_str, ret);
+        memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
+        ret += size_str;
+    }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+    /* Add SRP username if there is one */
+    if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the
+                                     * Client Hello message */
+
+        size_t login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
+        if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+
+        /*-
+         * check for enough space.
+         * 4 for the srp type type and extension length
+         * 1 for the srp user identity
+         * + srp user identity length
+         */
+        if (CHECKLEN(ret, 5 + login_len, limit))
+            return NULL;
+
+        /* fill in the extension */
+        s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret);
+        s2n(login_len + 1, ret);
+        (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len;
+        memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
+        ret += login_len;
+    }
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    if (using_ecc) {
+        /*
+         * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
+         */
+        const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
+        size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len;
+        size_t i;
+        unsigned char *etmp;
+
+        tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
+
+        if (num_formats > 255) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+        /*-
+         * check for enough space.
+         * 4 bytes for the ec point formats type and extension length
+         * 1 byte for the length of the formats
+         * + formats length
+         */
+        if (CHECKLEN(ret, 5 + num_formats, limit))
+            return NULL;
+
+        s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
+        /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
+        s2n(num_formats + 1, ret);
+        *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats;
+        memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats);
+        ret += num_formats;
+
+        /*
+         * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
+         */
+        pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
+        if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves))
+            return NULL;
+
+        if (num_curves > 65532 / 2) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+        /*-
+         * check for enough space.
+         * 4 bytes for the ec curves type and extension length
+         * 2 bytes for the curve list length
+         * + curve list length
+         */
+        if (CHECKLEN(ret, 6 + (num_curves * 2), limit))
+            return NULL;
+
+        s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret);
+        etmp = ret + 4;
+        /* Copy curve ID if supported */
+        for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
+            if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
+                *etmp++ = pcurves[0];
+                *etmp++ = pcurves[1];
+            }
+        }
+
+        curves_list_len = etmp - ret - 4;
+
+        s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret);
+        s2n(curves_list_len, ret);
+        ret += curves_list_len;
+    }
+#endif                          /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
+    if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
+        size_t ticklen;
+        if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
+            ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
+        else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
+                 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
+            ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
+            s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
+            if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL)
+                return NULL;
+            memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
+                   s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
+            s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
+        } else
+            ticklen = 0;
+        if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
+            s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
+            goto skip_ext;
+        /*
+         * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for
+         * ticket
+         */
+        if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + ticklen, limit))
+            return NULL;
+        s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
+        s2n(ticklen, ret);
+        if (ticklen > 0) {
+            memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
+            ret += ticklen;
+        }
+    }
+ skip_ext:
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+    if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
+        int i;
+        size_t extlen, idlen;
+        int lentmp;
+        OCSP_RESPID *id;
+
+        idlen = 0;
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
+            id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
+            lentmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
+            if (lentmp <= 0)
+                return NULL;
+            idlen += (size_t)lentmp + 2;
+        }
+
+        if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
+            lentmp = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
+            if (lentmp < 0)
+                return NULL;
+            extlen = (size_t)lentmp;
+        } else
+            extlen = 0;
+
+        if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
+            return NULL;
+        /*
+         * 2 bytes for status request type
+         * 2 bytes for status request len
+         * 1 byte for OCSP request type
+         * 2 bytes for length of ids
+         * 2 bytes for length of extensions
+         * + length of ids
+         * + length of extensions
+         */
+        if (CHECKLEN(ret, 9 + idlen + extlen, limit))
+            return NULL;
+
+        s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
+        s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
+        *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
+        s2n(idlen, ret);
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
+            /* save position of id len */
+            unsigned char *q = ret;
+            id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
+            /* skip over id len */
+            ret += 2;
+            lentmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
+            /* write id len */
+            s2n(lentmp, q);
+        }
+        s2n(extlen, ret);
+        if (extlen > 0)
+            i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
+    }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+    if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+        /* Add Heartbeat extension */
+
+        /*-
+         * check for enough space.
+         * 4 bytes for the heartbeat ext type and extension length
+         * 1 byte for the mode
+         */
+        if (CHECKLEN(ret, 5, limit))
+            return NULL;
+
+        s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
+        s2n(1, ret);
+        /*-
+         * Set mode:
+         * 1: peer may send requests
+         * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
+         */
+        if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
+            *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
+        else
+            *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
+    }
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+    if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
+        /*
+         * The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support
+         * for Next Protocol Negotiation
+         */
+
+        /*-
+         * check for enough space.
+         * 4 bytes for the NPN ext type and extension length
+         */
+        if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit))
+            return NULL;
+        s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
+        s2n(0, ret);
+    }
+#endif
+
+    /*
+     * finish_md_len is non-zero during a renegotiation, so
+     * this avoids sending ALPN during the renegotiation
+     * (see longer comment below)
+     */
+    if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
+        /*-
+         * check for enough space.
+         * 4 bytes for the ALPN type and extension length
+         * 2 bytes for the ALPN protocol list length
+         * + ALPN protocol list length
+         */
+        if (CHECKLEN(ret, 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, limit))
+            return NULL;
+        s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
+        s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
+        s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
+        memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
+        ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
+        s->s3->alpn_sent = 1;
+    }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
+    if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
+        int el;
+
+        /* Returns 0 on success!! */
+        if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+
+        /*-
+         * check for enough space.
+         * 4 bytes for the SRTP type and extension length
+         * + SRTP profiles length
+         */
+        if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + el, limit))
+            return NULL;
+
+        s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
+        s2n(el, ret);
+
+        if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+        ret += el;
+    }
+#endif
+    custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
+    /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
+    if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
+        return NULL;
+    /*
+     * In 1.1.0 before 1.1.0c we negotiated EtM with DTLS, then just
+     * silently failed to actually do it. It is fixed in 1.1.1 but to
+     * ease the transition especially from 1.1.0b to 1.1.0c, we just
+     * disable it in 1.1.0.
+     * Also skip if SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC is set.
+     */
+    if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)) {
+        /*-
+         * check for enough space.
+         * 4 bytes for the ETM type and extension length
+         */
+        if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit))
+            return NULL;
+        s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
+        s2n(0, ret);
+    }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
+    if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
+        /*-
+         * check for enough space.
+         * 4 bytes for the SCT type and extension length
+         */
+        if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit))
+            return NULL;
+
+        s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp, ret);
+        s2n(0, ret);
+    }
+#endif
+
+    /*-
+     * check for enough space.
+     * 4 bytes for the EMS type and extension length
+     */
+    if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit))
+        return NULL;
+    s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
+    s2n(0, ret);
+
+    /*
+     * WebSphere application server can not handle having the
+     * last extension be 0-length (e.g. EMS, EtM), so keep those
+     * before SigAlgs
+     */
+    if (SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
+        size_t salglen;
+        const unsigned char *salg;
+        unsigned char *etmp;
+        salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &salg);
+
+        /*-
+         * check for enough space.
+         * 4 bytes for the sigalgs type and extension length
+         * 2 bytes for the sigalg list length
+         * + sigalg list length
+         */
+        if (CHECKLEN(ret, salglen + 6, limit))
+            return NULL;
+        s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret);
+        etmp = ret;
+        /* Skip over lengths for now */
+        ret += 4;
+        salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
+        /* Fill in lengths */
+        s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
+        s2n(salglen, etmp);
+        ret += salglen;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
+     * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
+     * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
+     * appear last. WebSphere 7.x/8.x is intolerant of empty extensions
+     * being last, so minimum length of 1.
+     */
+    if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
+        int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+
+        if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
+            hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
+            if (hlen >= 4)
+                hlen -= 4;
+            else
+                hlen = 1;
+
+            /*-
+             * check for enough space. Strictly speaking we know we've already
+             * got enough space because to get here the message size is < 0x200,
+             * but we know that we've allocated far more than that in the buffer
+             * - but for consistency and robustness we're going to check anyway.
+             *
+             * 4 bytes for the padding type and extension length
+             * + padding length
+             */
+            if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + hlen, limit))
+                return NULL;
+            s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
+            s2n(hlen, ret);
+            memset(ret, 0, hlen);
+            ret += hlen;
+        }
+    }
+
+ done:
+
+    if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
+        return orig;
+
+    s2n(extdatalen, orig);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
+                                          unsigned char *limit, int *al)
+{
+    int extdatalen = 0;
+    unsigned char *orig = buf;
+    unsigned char *ret = buf;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+    int next_proto_neg_seen;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+    unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
+    int using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
+    using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
+#endif
+
+    ret += 2;
+    if (ret >= limit)
+        return NULL;            /* this really never occurs, but ... */
+
+    if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
+        int el;
+
+        /* Still add this even if SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION is set */
+        if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+
+        /*-
+         * check for enough space.
+         * 4 bytes for the reneg type and extension length
+         * + reneg data length
+         */
+        if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + el, limit))
+            return NULL;
+
+        s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
+        s2n(el, ret);
+
+        if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+
+        ret += el;
+    }
+
+    /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
+    if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
+        goto done;
+
+    if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
+        && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
+        /*-
+         * check for enough space.
+         * 4 bytes for the server name type and extension length
+         */
+        if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit))
+            return NULL;
+
+        s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
+        s2n(0, ret);
+    }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    if (using_ecc) {
+        const unsigned char *plist;
+        size_t plistlen;
+        /*
+         * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
+         */
+
+        tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
+
+        if (plistlen > 255) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+
+        /*-
+         * check for enough space.
+         * 4 bytes for the ec points format type and extension length
+         * 1 byte for the points format list length
+         * + length of points format list
+         */
+        if (CHECKLEN(ret, 5 + plistlen, limit))
+            return NULL;
+
+        s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
+        s2n(plistlen + 1, ret);
+        *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen;
+        memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
+        ret += plistlen;
+
+    }
+    /*
+     * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
+     * extension
+     */
+#endif                          /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
+    if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
+        /*-
+         * check for enough space.
+         * 4 bytes for the Ticket type and extension length
+         */
+        if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit))
+            return NULL;
+        s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
+        s2n(0, ret);
+    } else {
+        /*
+         * if we don't add the above TLSEXT, we can't add a session ticket
+         * later
+         */
+        s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
+    }
+
+    if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
+        /*-
+         * check for enough space.
+         * 4 bytes for the Status request type and extension length
+         */
+        if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit))
+            return NULL;
+        s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
+        s2n(0, ret);
+    }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
+    if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
+        int el;
+
+        /* Returns 0 on success!! */
+        if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+        /*-
+         * check for enough space.
+         * 4 bytes for the SRTP profiles type and extension length
+         * + length of the SRTP profiles list
+         */
+        if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + el, limit))
+            return NULL;
+
+        s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
+        s2n(el, ret);
+
+        if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+        ret += el;
+    }
+#endif
+
+    if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
+         || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
+        && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
+        const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
+            0xfd, 0xe8,         /* 65000 */
+            0x00, 0x20,         /* 32 bytes length */
+            0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
+            0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
+            0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
+            0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
+        };
+
+        /* check for enough space. */
+        if (CHECKLEN(ret, sizeof(cryptopro_ext), limit))
+            return NULL;
+        memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, sizeof(cryptopro_ext));
+        ret += sizeof(cryptopro_ext);
+
+    }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+    /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
+    if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)) {
+        /*-
+         * check for enough space.
+         * 4 bytes for the Heartbeat type and extension length
+         * 1 byte for the mode
+         */
+        if (CHECKLEN(ret, 5, limit))
+            return NULL;
+        s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
+        s2n(1, ret);
+        /*-
+         * Set mode:
+         * 1: peer may send requests
+         * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
+         */
+        if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
+            *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
+        else
+            *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
+
+    }
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+    next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
+    s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
+    if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
+        const unsigned char *npa;
+        unsigned int npalen;
+        int r;
+
+        r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
+                                              s->
+                                              ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
+        if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
+            /*-
+             * check for enough space.
+             * 4 bytes for the NPN type and extension length
+             * + length of protocols list
+             */
+            if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + npalen, limit))
+                return NULL;
+            s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
+            s2n(npalen, ret);
+            memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
+            ret += npalen;
+            s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
+        }
+    }
+#endif
+    if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
+        return NULL;
+    if (s->tlsext_use_etm) {
+        /*
+         * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
+         * for other cases too.
+         */
+        if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
+            || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
+            || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
+            || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12)
+            s->tlsext_use_etm = 0;
+        else {
+            /*-
+             * check for enough space.
+             * 4 bytes for the ETM type and extension length
+             */
+            if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit))
+                return NULL;
+            s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
+            s2n(0, ret);
+        }
+    }
+    if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) {
+        /*-
+         * check for enough space.
+         * 4 bytes for the EMS type and extension length
+         */
+        if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit))
+            return NULL;
+        s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
+        s2n(0, ret);
+    }
+
+    if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
+        const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
+        size_t len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
+
+        /*-
+         * check for enough space.
+         * 4 bytes for the ALPN type and extension length
+         * 2 bytes for ALPN data length
+         * 1 byte for selected protocol length
+         * + length of the selected protocol
+         */
+        if (CHECKLEN(ret, 7 + len, limit))
+            return NULL;
+        s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
+        s2n(3 + len, ret);
+        s2n(1 + len, ret);
+        *ret++ = len;
+        memcpy(ret, selected, len);
+        ret += len;
+    }
+
+ done:
+
+    if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
+        return orig;
+
+    s2n(extdatalen, orig);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
+ * pkt: the contents of the ALPN extension, not including type and length.
+ * al: a pointer to the  alert value to send in the event of a failure.
+ * returns: 1 on success, 0 on error.
+ */
+static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
+{
+    PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol;
+
+    *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+
+    if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list)
+        || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    save_protocol_list = protocol_list;
+    do {
+        /* Protocol names can't be empty. */
+        if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol)
+            || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) {
+            return 0;
+        }
+    } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0);
+
+    if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list,
+                       &s->s3->alpn_proposed, &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) {
+        *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Process the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
+ * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
+ * returns 1 on success, 0 on error.
+ */
+static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(SSL *s, int *al)
+{
+    const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
+    unsigned char selected_len = 0;
+
+    if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
+        int r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
+                                       s->s3->alpn_proposed,
+                                       s->s3->alpn_proposed_len,
+                                       s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
+
+        if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
+            OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
+            s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
+            if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
+                *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                return 0;
+            }
+            s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+            /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
+            s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
+#endif
+        } else if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK) {
+            /* Behave as if no callback was present. */
+            return 1;
+        } else {
+            *al = SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL;
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+/*-
+ * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
+ * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |pkt|.
+ * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
+ *   SNI,
+ *   elliptic_curves
+ *   ec_point_formats
+ *
+ * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
+ * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
+ * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
+ * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
+ */
+static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const PACKET *pkt)
+{
+    unsigned int type;
+    PACKET sni, tmppkt;
+    size_t ext_len;
+
+    static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
+        0x00, 0x0a,             /* elliptic_curves extension */
+        0x00, 0x08,             /* 8 bytes */
+        0x00, 0x06,             /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
+        0x00, 0x17,             /* P-256 */
+        0x00, 0x18,             /* P-384 */
+        0x00, 0x19,             /* P-521 */
+
+        0x00, 0x0b,             /* ec_point_formats */
+        0x00, 0x02,             /* 2 bytes */
+        0x01,                   /* 1 point format */
+        0x00,                   /* uncompressed */
+        /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
+        0x00, 0x0d,             /* signature_algorithms */
+        0x00, 0x0c,             /* 12 bytes */
+        0x00, 0x0a,             /* 10 bytes */
+        0x05, 0x01,             /* SHA-384/RSA */
+        0x04, 0x01,             /* SHA-256/RSA */
+        0x02, 0x01,             /* SHA-1/RSA */
+        0x04, 0x03,             /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
+        0x02, 0x03,             /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
+    };
+
+    /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
+    static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
+
+    tmppkt = *pkt;
+
+    if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
+        || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
+        || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
+        return;
+    }
+
+    if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
+        return;
+
+    ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
+        sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
+
+    s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
+                                             ext_len);
+}
+#endif                          /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
+/*
+ * Parse ClientHello extensions and stash extension info in various parts of
+ * the SSL object. Verify that there are no duplicate extensions.
+ *
+ * Behaviour upon resumption is extension-specific. If the extension has no
+ * effect during resumption, it is parsed (to verify its format) but otherwise
+ * ignored.
+ *
+ * Consumes the entire packet in |pkt|. Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure.
+ * Upon failure, sets |al| to the appropriate alert.
+ */
+static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
+{
+    unsigned int type;
+    int renegotiate_seen = 0;
+    PACKET extensions;
+
+    *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+    s->servername_done = 0;
+    s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+    s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
+#endif
+
+    OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
+    s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
+    s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0;
+    OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed);
+    s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL;
+    s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+    s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
+                             SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
+        ssl_check_for_safari(s, pkt);
+#endif                          /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
+    /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
+    OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
+    s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
+    s->tlsext_use_etm = 0;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+    OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
+    s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
+#endif
+
+    s->srtp_profile = NULL;
+
+    if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)
+        goto ri_check;
+
+    if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions))
+        return 0;
+
+    /*
+     * We parse all extensions to ensure the ClientHello is well-formed but,
+     * unless an extension specifies otherwise, we ignore extensions upon
+     * resumption.
+     */
+    while (PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type)) {
+        PACKET extension;
+        if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension))
+            return 0;
+
+        if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
+            s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, PACKET_data(&extension),
+                               PACKET_remaining(&extension),
+                               s->tlsext_debug_arg);
+
+        if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
+            if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, &extension, al))
+                return 0;
+            renegotiate_seen = 1;
+        } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
+        }
+/*-
+ * The servername extension is treated as follows:
+ *
+ * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
+ * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
+ *   in which case an fatal alert is generated.
+ * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
+ * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
+ *   to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
+ * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
+ *   it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
+ *   Applications can control the behaviour.  They can at any time
+ *   set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
+ *   case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
+ *   a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
+ *   presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
+ *   the value of the Host: field.
+ * - Applications must  use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
+ *   if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
+ *   session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
+ *   extension.
+ * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
+ *
+ */
+
+        else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
+            unsigned int servname_type;
+            PACKET sni, hostname;
+
+            if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &sni)
+                /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */
+                || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) {
+                return 0;
+            }
+
+            /*
+             * Although the server_name extension was intended to be
+             * extensible to new name types, RFC 4366 defined the
+             * syntax inextensibility and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as
+             * such.
+             * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types
+             * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other
+             * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing.
+             *
+             * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type,
+             * i.e., we can only have a single hostname.
+             */
+            if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type)
+                || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
+                || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) {
+                return 0;
+            }
+
+            if (!s->hit) {
+                if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
+                    *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
+                    return 0;
+                }
+
+                if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) {
+                    *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
+                    return 0;
+                }
+
+                if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->session->tlsext_hostname)) {
+                    *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                    return 0;
+                }
+
+                s->servername_done = 1;
+            } else {
+                /*
+                 * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST
+                 * fall back to a full handshake.
+                 */
+                s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
+                    && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->tlsext_hostname,
+                                    strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname));
+            }
+        }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+        else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
+            PACKET srp_I;
+
+            if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension, &srp_I))
+                return 0;
+
+            if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I))
+                return 0;
+
+            /*
+             * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user
+             * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login.
+             */
+            if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) {
+                *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                return 0;
+            }
+        }
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+        else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
+            PACKET ec_point_format_list;
+
+            if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension, &ec_point_format_list)
+                || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) {
+                return 0;
+            }
+
+            if (!s->hit) {
+                if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list,
+                                   &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
+                                   &s->
+                                   session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length)) {
+                    *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                    return 0;
+                }
+            }
+        } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
+            PACKET elliptic_curve_list;
+
+            /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */
+            if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &elliptic_curve_list)
+                || PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) == 0
+                || (PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) % 2) != 0) {
+                return 0;
+            }
+
+            if (!s->hit) {
+                if (!PACKET_memdup(&elliptic_curve_list,
+                                   &s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
+                                   &s->
+                                   session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) {
+                    *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                    return 0;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+#endif                          /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+        else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
+            if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
+                !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, PACKET_data(&extension),
+                                              PACKET_remaining(&extension),
+                                              s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
+            {
+                *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                return 0;
+            }
+        } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
+            PACKET supported_sig_algs;
+
+            if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &supported_sig_algs)
+                || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) % 2) != 0
+                || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
+                return 0;
+            }
+
+            if (!s->hit) {
+                if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, PACKET_data(&supported_sig_algs),
+                                       PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs))) {
+                    return 0;
+                }
+            }
+        } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
+            if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension,
+                              (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type)) {
+                return 0;
+            }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+            if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
+                const unsigned char *ext_data;
+                PACKET responder_id_list, exts;
+                if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2
+                    (&extension, &responder_id_list))
+                    return 0;
+
+                /*
+                 * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake
+                 * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304
+                 */
+                sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids,
+                                        OCSP_RESPID_free);
+                if (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
+                    s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null();
+                    if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL) {
+                        *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                        return 0;
+                    }
+                } else {
+                    s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL;
+                }
+
+                while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
+                    OCSP_RESPID *id;
+                    PACKET responder_id;
+                    const unsigned char *id_data;
+
+                    if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list,
+                                                      &responder_id)
+                        || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) {
+                        return 0;
+                    }
+
+                    id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id);
+                    id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data,
+                                         PACKET_remaining(&responder_id));
+                    if (id == NULL)
+                        return 0;
+
+                    if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) {
+                        OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
+                        return 0;
+                    }
+
+                    if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
+                        OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
+                        *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                        return 0;
+                    }
+                }
+
+                /* Read in request_extensions */
+                if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &exts))
+                    return 0;
+
+                if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) {
+                    ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts);
+                    sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
+                                               X509_EXTENSION_free);
+                    s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
+                        d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data,
+                                            PACKET_remaining(&exts));
+                    if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts == NULL
+                        || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) {
+                        return 0;
+                    }
+                }
+            } else
+#endif
+            {
+                /*
+                 * We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it.
+                 */
+                s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
+            }
+        }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+        else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
+            unsigned int hbtype;
+
+            if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension, &hbtype)
+                || PACKET_remaining(&extension)) {
+                *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+                return 0;
+            }
+            switch (hbtype) {
+            case 0x01:         /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
+                s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
+                break;
+            case 0x02:         /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
+                s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
+                s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
+                break;
+            default:
+                *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+                return 0;
+            }
+        }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+        else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
+                 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
+            /*-
+             * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
+             * renegotiation.
+             *
+             * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
+             * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
+             * the initial renegotiation too in certain cases (when
+             * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
+             * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
+             * anything like that, but this might change).
+             *
+             * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
+             * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
+             * 0.  (We are talking about a check that will happen
+             * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
+             * Finished message could have been computed.)
+             */
+            s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
+        }
+#endif
+
+        else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
+                 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
+            if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, &extension, al))
+                return 0;
+        }
+
+        /* session ticket processed earlier */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
+        else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
+                 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
+            if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, &extension, al))
+                return 0;
+        }
+#endif
+        else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac &&
+                 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC))
+            s->tlsext_use_etm = 1;
+        /*
+         * Note: extended master secret extension handled in
+         * tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early()
+         */
+
+        /*
+         * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
+         * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
+         * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
+         * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
+         * ServerHello may be later returned.
+         */
+        else if (!s->hit) {
+            if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, PACKET_data(&extension),
+                                 PACKET_remaining(&extension), al) <= 0)
+                return 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
+        /*
+         * tls1_check_duplicate_extensions should ensure this never happens.
+         */
+        *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+ ri_check:
+
+    /* Need RI if renegotiating */
+
+    if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
+        !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
+        *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
+               SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * This function currently has no state to clean up, so it returns directly.
+     * If parsing fails at any point, the function returns early.
+     * The SSL object may be left with partial data from extensions, but it must
+     * then no longer be used, and clearing it up will free the leftovers.
+     */
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+    int al = -1;
+    custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
+    if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
+        ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+/*
+ * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
+ * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
+ * fill the length of the block.
+ */
+static char ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt)
+{
+    PACKET tmp_protocol;
+
+    while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
+        if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &tmp_protocol)
+            || PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol) == 0)
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+#endif
+
+static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
+{
+    unsigned int length, type, size;
+    int tlsext_servername = 0;
+    int renegotiate_seen = 0;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+    s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
+#endif
+    s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
+
+    OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
+    s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+    s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
+                             SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
+#endif
+
+    s->tlsext_use_etm = 0;
+
+    s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
+
+    if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &length))
+        goto ri_check;
+
+    if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != length) {
+        *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(pkt)) {
+        *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
+        const unsigned char *data;
+        PACKET spkt;
+
+        if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, size)
+            || !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt, &data, size))
+            goto ri_check;
+
+        if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
+            s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
+
+        if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
+            if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &spkt, al))
+                return 0;
+            renegotiate_seen = 1;
+        } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
+        } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
+            if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
+                *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
+                return 0;
+            }
+            tlsext_servername = 1;
+        }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+        else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
+            unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
+            if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
+                || ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
+                *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+                return 0;
+            }
+            if (!s->hit) {
+                s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
+                OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
+                if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
+                     OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
+                    *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                    return 0;
+                }
+                s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
+                    ecpointformatlist_length;
+                if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt,
+                                       s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
+                                       ecpointformatlist_length)) {
+                    *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+                    return 0;
+                }
+
+            }
+        }
+#endif                          /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
+        else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
+            if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
+                !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
+                                              s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
+            {
+                *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                return 0;
+            }
+            if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
+                *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
+                return 0;
+            }
+            s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
+        } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
+            /*
+             * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
+             * request message.
+             */
+            if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
+                *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
+                return 0;
+            }
+            /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
+            s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
+        }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
+        /*
+         * Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation
+         * callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we
+         * need to let control continue to flow to that.
+         */
+        else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp &&
+                 s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
+            /* Simply copy it off for later processing */
+            if (s->tlsext_scts != NULL) {
+                OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_scts);
+                s->tlsext_scts = NULL;
+            }
+            s->tlsext_scts_len = size;
+            if (size > 0) {
+                s->tlsext_scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size);
+                if (s->tlsext_scts == NULL) {
+                    *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                    return 0;
+                }
+                memcpy(s->tlsext_scts, data, size);
+            }
+        }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+        else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
+                 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
+            unsigned char *selected;
+            unsigned char selected_len;
+            /* We must have requested it. */
+            if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
+                *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
+                return 0;
+            }
+            /* The data must be valid */
+            if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&spkt)) {
+                *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+                return 0;
+            }
+            if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
+                                             size,
+                                             s->
+                                             ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
+                SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
+                *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                return 0;
+            }
+            /*
+             * Could be non-NULL if server has sent multiple NPN extensions in
+             * a single Serverhello
+             */
+            OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated);
+            s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
+            if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) {
+                *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                return 0;
+            }
+            memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
+            s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
+            s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
+        }
+#endif
+
+        else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
+            unsigned len;
+            /* We must have requested it. */
+            if (!s->s3->alpn_sent) {
+                *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
+                return 0;
+            }
+            /*-
+             * The extension data consists of:
+             *   uint16 list_length
+             *   uint8 proto_length;
+             *   uint8 proto[proto_length];
+             */
+            if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &len)
+                || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &len)
+                || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len) {
+                *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+                return 0;
+            }
+            OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
+            s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
+            if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
+                *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                return 0;
+            }
+            if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) {
+                *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+                return 0;
+            }
+            s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
+        }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+        else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
+            unsigned int hbtype;
+            if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &hbtype)) {
+                *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+                return 0;
+            }
+            switch (hbtype) {
+            case 0x01:         /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
+                s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
+                break;
+            case 0x02:         /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
+                s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
+                s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
+                break;
+            default:
+                *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+                return 0;
+            }
+        }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
+        else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
+            if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &spkt, al))
+                return 0;
+        }
+#endif
+        else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
+            /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
+            if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) &&
+                s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
+                && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
+                s->tlsext_use_etm = 1;
+        } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
+            s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
+            if (!s->hit)
+                s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
+        }
+        /*
+         * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
+         * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
+         */
+        else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
+        *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
+        if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
+            if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
+                s->session->tlsext_hostname =
+                    OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
+                if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
+                    *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
+                    return 0;
+                }
+            } else {
+                *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+                return 0;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+ ri_check:
+
+    /*
+     * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
+     * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
+     * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
+     * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
+     * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence
+     */
+    if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
+        && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
+        *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
+               SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (s->hit) {
+        /*
+         * Check extended master secret extension is consistent with
+         * original session.
+         */
+        if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) !=
+            !(s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) {
+            *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
+{
+    s->s3->alpn_sent = 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
+{
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
+{
+    int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
+    int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    /*
+     * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
+     * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
+     */
+    /*
+     * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
+     * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
+     */
+#endif
+
+    if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
+        ret =
+            s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
+                                               s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
+    else if (s->session_ctx != NULL
+             && s->session_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
+        ret =
+            s->session_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
+                                                       s->
+                                                       session_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
+
+    switch (ret) {
+    case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
+        ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+        return -1;
+
+    case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
+        ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
+        return 1;
+
+    case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
+        s->servername_done = 0;
+        /* fall thru */
+    default:
+        return 1;
+    }
+}
+
+/* Initialise digests to default values */
+void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
+{
+    const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+    pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+    if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
+        pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
+    else
+        pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX);
+    pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN];
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
+    pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX);
+    pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX);
+    pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX);
+#endif
+}
+
+int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
+{
+    int al;
+    size_t i;
+
+    /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
+    OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
+    s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
+    s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
+    /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
+    for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
+        s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
+        s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
+    }
+
+    /* If sigalgs received process it. */
+    if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) {
+        if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+            goto err;
+        }
+        /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
+        if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
+                   SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
+            al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+            goto err;
+        }
+    } else {
+        ssl_set_default_md(s);
+    }
+    return 1;
+ err:
+    ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Upon success, returns 1.
+ * Upon failure, returns 0 and sets |al| to the appropriate fatal alert.
+ */
+int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s, int *al)
+{
+    s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
+
+    /*
+     * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
+     * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
+     * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
+     * influence which certificate is sent
+     */
+    if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
+        int ret;
+        CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
+        certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
+        /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
+        if (certpkey != NULL) {
+            /*
+             * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
+             * et al can pick it up.
+             */
+            s->cert->key = certpkey;
+            ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
+            switch (ret) {
+                /* We don't want to send a status request response */
+            case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
+                s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
+                break;
+                /* status request response should be sent */
+            case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
+                if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
+                    s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
+                break;
+                /* something bad happened */
+            case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
+            default:
+                *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                return 0;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(s, al)) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
+{
+    int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
+    int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    /*
+     * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
+     * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
+     * must contain uncompressed.
+     */
+    unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+    unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
+    if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
+        && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
+        && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
+        && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
+        && ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
+        /* we are using an ECC cipher */
+        size_t i;
+        unsigned char *list;
+        int found_uncompressed = 0;
+        list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
+        for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
+            if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
+                found_uncompressed = 1;
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+        if (!found_uncompressed) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
+                   SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
+            return -1;
+        }
+    }
+    ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+#endif                          /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
+    if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
+        ret =
+            s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
+                                               s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
+    else if (s->session_ctx != NULL
+             && s->session_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
+        ret =
+            s->session_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
+                                                       s->
+                                                       session_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
+
+    /*
+     * Ensure we get sensible values passed to tlsext_status_cb in the event
+     * that we don't receive a status message
+     */
+    OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
+    s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
+    s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
+
+    switch (ret) {
+    case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
+        ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+        return -1;
+
+    case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
+        ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
+        return 1;
+
+    case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
+        s->servername_done = 0;
+        /* fall thru */
+    default:
+        return 1;
+    }
+}
+
+int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+    int al = -1;
+    if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
+        return 1;
+    if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
+        ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
+ * ClientHello and other operations depend on the result some extensions
+ * need to be handled at the same time.
+ *
+ * Two extensions are currently handled, session ticket and extended master
+ * secret.
+ *
+ *   session_id: ClientHello session ID.
+ *   ext: ClientHello extensions (including length prefix)
+ *   ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
+ *       point to the resulting session.
+ *
+ * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
+ * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
+ * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *   -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
+ *    0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
+ *    1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
+ *       session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
+ *    2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
+ *       couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
+ *    3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
+ *
+ * Side effects:
+ *   Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
+ *   a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
+ *   (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
+ *   a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
+ *   s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
+ *   Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
+ *
+ *   For extended master secret flag is set if the extension is present.
+ *
+ */
+int tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early(SSL *s, const PACKET *ext,
+                                       const PACKET *session_id,
+                                       SSL_SESSION **ret)
+{
+    unsigned int i;
+    PACKET local_ext = *ext;
+    int retv = -1;
+
+    int have_ticket = 0;
+    int use_ticket = tls_use_ticket(s);
+
+    *ret = NULL;
+    s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
+    s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
+
+    /*
+     * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
+     * resumption.
+     */
+    if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &i)) {
+        retv = 0;
+        goto end;
+    }
+    while (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) >= 4) {
+        unsigned int type, size;
+
+        if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &type)
+            || !PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &size)) {
+            /* Shouldn't ever happen */
+            retv = -1;
+            goto end;
+        }
+        if (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) < size) {
+            retv = 0;
+            goto end;
+        }
+        if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket && use_ticket) {
+            int r;
+            const unsigned char *etick;
+
+            /* Duplicate extension */
+            if (have_ticket != 0) {
+                retv = -1;
+                goto end;
+            }
+            have_ticket = 1;
+
+            if (size == 0) {
+                /*
+                 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
+                 * one.
+                 */
+                s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
+                retv = 1;
+                continue;
+            }
+            if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
+                /*
+                 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
+                 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
+                 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
+                 * calculate the master secret later.
+                 */
+                retv = 2;
+                continue;
+            }
+            if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&local_ext, &etick, size)) {
+                /* Shouldn't ever happen */
+                retv = -1;
+                goto end;
+            }
+            r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, etick, size, PACKET_data(session_id),
+                                   PACKET_remaining(session_id), ret);
+            switch (r) {
+            case 2:            /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
+                s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
+                retv = 2;
+                break;
+            case 3:            /* ticket was decrypted */
+                retv = r;
+                break;
+            case 4:            /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
+                s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
+                retv = 3;
+                break;
+            default:           /* fatal error */
+                retv = -1;
+                break;
+            }
+            continue;
+        } else {
+            if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
+                s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
+            if (!PACKET_forward(&local_ext, size)) {
+                retv = -1;
+                goto end;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    if (have_ticket == 0)
+        retv = 0;
+ end:
+    return retv;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
+ *
+ *   etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
+ *   eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
+ *   sess_id: points at the session ID.
+ *   sesslen: the length of the session ID.
+ *   psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
+ *       point to the resulting session.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *   -2: fatal error, malloc failure.
+ *   -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
+ *    2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
+ *    3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
+ *    4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
+ */
+static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
+                              int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
+                              int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
+{
+    SSL_SESSION *sess;
+    unsigned char *sdec;
+    const unsigned char *p;
+    int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0, ret = -1;
+    unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+    HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+    SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
+
+    /* Need at least keyname + iv */
+    if (eticklen < TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) {
+        ret = 2;
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
+    hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
+    if (hctx == NULL)
+        return -2;
+    ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+        ret = -2;
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
+        unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
+        int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick,
+                                            nctick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH,
+                                            ctx, hctx, 0);
+        if (rv < 0)
+            goto err;
+        if (rv == 0) {
+            ret = 2;
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (rv == 2)
+            renew_ticket = 1;
+    } else {
+        /* Check key name matches */
+        if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name,
+                   TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH) != 0) {
+            ret = 2;
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
+                         sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key),
+                         EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
+            || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
+                                  tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
+                                  etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH) <= 0) {
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+    /*
+     * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
+     * checks on ticket.
+     */
+    mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
+    if (mlen < 0) {
+        goto err;
+    }
+    /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
+    if (eticklen <=
+        TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
+        ret = 2;
+        goto err;
+    }
+    eticklen -= mlen;
+    /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
+    if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
+        || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
+        goto err;
+    }
+    HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
+    if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
+        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
+        return 2;
+    }
+    /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
+    /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
+    p = etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
+    eticklen -= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
+    sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
+    if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) {
+        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
+        OPENSSL_free(sdec);
+        return -1;
+    }
+    if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
+        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
+        OPENSSL_free(sdec);
+        return 2;
+    }
+    slen += mlen;
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
+    ctx = NULL;
+    p = sdec;
+
+    sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
+    slen -= p - sdec;
+    OPENSSL_free(sdec);
+    if (sess) {
+        /* Some additional consistency checks */
+        if (slen != 0 || sess->session_id_length != 0) {
+            SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
+            return 2;
+        }
+        /*
+         * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
+         * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
+         * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
+         * standard.
+         */
+        if (sesslen)
+            memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
+        sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
+        *psess = sess;
+        if (renew_ticket)
+            return 4;
+        else
+            return 3;
+    }
+    ERR_clear_error();
+    /*
+     * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
+     */
+    return 2;
+ err:
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
+    HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
+
+typedef struct {
+    int nid;
+    int id;
+} tls12_lookup;
+
+static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
+    {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
+    {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
+    {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
+    {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
+    {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
+    {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
+    {NID_id_GostR3411_94, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
+    {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
+    {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
+};
+
+static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
+    {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
+    {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
+    {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa},
+    {NID_id_GostR3410_2001, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001},
+    {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256},
+    {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512}
+};
+
+static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
+{
+    size_t i;
+    for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
+        if (table[i].nid == nid)
+            return table[i].id;
+    }
+    return -1;
+}
+
+static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
+{
+    size_t i;
+    for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
+        if ((table[i].id) == id)
+            return table[i].nid;
+    }
+    return NID_undef;
+}
+
+int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
+{
+    int sig_id, md_id;
+    if (!md)
+        return 0;
+    md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
+    if (md_id == -1)
+        return 0;
+    sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
+    if (sig_id == -1)
+        return 0;
+    p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
+    p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
+{
+    return tls12_find_id(EVP_PKEY_id(pk), tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
+}
+
+typedef struct {
+    int nid;
+    int secbits;
+    int md_idx;
+    unsigned char tlsext_hash;
+} tls12_hash_info;
+
+static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
+    {NID_md5, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
+    {NID_sha1, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
+    {NID_sha224, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
+    {NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
+    {NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
+    {NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
+    {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
+    {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
+     TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
+    {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
+     TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
+};
+
+static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
+{
+    unsigned int i;
+    if (hash_alg == 0)
+        return NULL;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++) {
+        if (tls12_md_info[i].tlsext_hash == hash_alg)
+            return tls12_md_info + i;
+    }
+
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
+{
+    const tls12_hash_info *inf;
+    if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
+        return NULL;
+    inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
+    if (!inf)
+        return NULL;
+    return ssl_md(inf->md_idx);
+}
+
+static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
+{
+    switch (sig_alg) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+    case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
+        return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+    case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
+        return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
+        return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
+    case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001:
+        return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
+
+    case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256:
+        return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
+
+    case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512:
+        return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
+#endif
+    }
+    return -1;
+}
+
+/* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
+static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
+                               int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
+{
+    int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef;
+    if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
+        return;
+    if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
+        hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
+        if (phash_nid)
+            *phash_nid = hash_nid;
+    }
+    if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
+        sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
+        if (psign_nid)
+            *psign_nid = sign_nid;
+    }
+    if (psignhash_nid) {
+        if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef
+            || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid) <= 0)
+            *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
+    }
+}
+
+/* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
+static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
+{
+    /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
+    const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
+    if (hinf == NULL || ssl_md(hinf->md_idx) == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
+    if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
+        return 0;
+    /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
+    return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
+ * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
+ * disabled.
+ */
+
+void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
+{
+    const unsigned char *sigalgs;
+    size_t i, sigalgslen;
+    int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
+    /*
+     * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
+     * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
+     * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
+     */
+    sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sigalgs);
+    for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
+        switch (sigalgs[1]) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+        case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
+            if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
+                have_rsa = 1;
+            break;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+        case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
+            if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
+                have_dsa = 1;
+            break;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+        case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
+            if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
+                have_ecdsa = 1;
+            break;
+#endif
+        }
+    }
+    if (!have_rsa)
+        *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
+    if (!have_dsa)
+        *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
+    if (!have_ecdsa)
+        *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
+}
+
+size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
+                          const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
+{
+    unsigned char *tmpout = out;
+    size_t i;
+    for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
+        if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
+            *tmpout++ = psig[0];
+            *tmpout++ = psig[1];
+        }
+    }
+    return tmpout - out;
+}
+
+/* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
+static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
+                                const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
+                                const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
+{
+    const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
+    size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
+    for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
+        /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
+        if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
+            continue;
+        for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
+            if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
+                nmatch++;
+                if (shsig) {
+                    shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
+                    shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
+                    tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
+                                       &shsig->sign_nid,
+                                       &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
+                    shsig++;
+                }
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    return nmatch;
+}
+
+/* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
+static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
+{
+    const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
+    size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
+    size_t nmatch;
+    TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
+    CERT *c = s->cert;
+    unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
+
+    OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
+    c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
+    c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
+    /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
+    if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
+        conf = c->client_sigalgs;
+        conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
+    } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
+        conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
+        conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
+    } else
+        conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 0, &conf);
+    if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
+        pref = conf;
+        preflen = conflen;
+        allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
+        allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
+    } else {
+        allow = conf;
+        allowlen = conflen;
+        pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
+        preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
+    }
+    nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
+    if (nmatch) {
+        salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
+        if (salgs == NULL)
+            return 0;
+        nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
+    } else {
+        salgs = NULL;
+    }
+    c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
+    c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Set preferred digest for each key type */
+
+int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
+{
+    CERT *c = s->cert;
+    /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
+    if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
+        return 1;
+    /* Should never happen */
+    if (!c)
+        return 0;
+
+    OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
+    s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
+    if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
+    memcpy(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
+{
+    int idx;
+    size_t i;
+    const EVP_MD *md;
+    const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
+    uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
+    CERT *c = s->cert;
+    TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
+    if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
+        return 0;
+
+    for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
+         i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
+        idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
+        if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) {
+            md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
+            pmd[idx] = md;
+            pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
+            if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
+                pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
+                pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
+            }
+        }
+
+    }
+    /*
+     * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
+     * the certificate for signing.
+     */
+    if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
+        /*
+         * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
+         * supported it stays as NULL.
+         */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+        if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL)
+            pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+        if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] == NULL) {
+            pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
+            pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
+        }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+        if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
+            pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
+        if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] == NULL)
+            pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94);
+        if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] == NULL)
+            pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] =
+                EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256);
+        if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] == NULL)
+            pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] =
+                EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512);
+#endif
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
+                    int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
+                    unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
+{
+    const unsigned char *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
+    if (psig == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    if (idx >= 0) {
+        idx <<= 1;
+        if (idx >= (int)s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen)
+            return 0;
+        psig += idx;
+        if (rhash)
+            *rhash = psig[0];
+        if (rsig)
+            *rsig = psig[1];
+        tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
+    }
+    return s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen / 2;
+}
+
+int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
+                           int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
+                           unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
+{
+    TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
+    if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
+        return 0;
+    shsigalgs += idx;
+    if (phash)
+        *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
+    if (psign)
+        *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
+    if (psignhash)
+        *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
+    if (rsig)
+        *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
+    if (rhash)
+        *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
+    return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
+}
+
+#define MAX_SIGALGLEN   (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
+
+typedef struct {
+    size_t sigalgcnt;
+    int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
+} sig_cb_st;
+
+static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
+{
+    if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
+        *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
+    } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
+        *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
+    } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
+        *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
+    } else {
+        *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
+        if (*phash == NID_undef)
+            *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
+    }
+}
+
+static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
+{
+    sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
+    size_t i;
+    char etmp[20], *p;
+    int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
+    if (elem == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
+        return 0;
+    if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
+        return 0;
+    memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
+    etmp[len] = 0;
+    p = strchr(etmp, '+');
+    if (!p)
+        return 0;
+    *p = 0;
+    p++;
+    if (!*p)
+        return 0;
+
+    get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
+    get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
+
+    if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
+        return 0;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
+        if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
+            return 0;
+    }
+    sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
+    sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
+ * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
+ */
+int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
+{
+    sig_cb_st sig;
+    sig.sigalgcnt = 0;
+    if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
+        return 0;
+    if (c == NULL)
+        return 1;
+    return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
+}
+
+int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
+{
+    unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
+    int rhash, rsign;
+    size_t i;
+    if (salglen & 1)
+        return 0;
+    sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
+    if (sigalgs == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
+        rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
+        rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
+
+        if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
+            goto err;
+        *sptr++ = rhash;
+        *sptr++ = rsign;
+    }
+
+    if (client) {
+        OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
+        c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
+        c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
+    } else {
+        OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
+        c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
+        c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
+{
+    int sig_nid;
+    size_t i;
+    if (default_nid == -1)
+        return 1;
+    sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
+    if (default_nid)
+        return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
+    for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
+        if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
+            return 1;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
+static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
+{
+    X509_NAME *nm;
+    int i;
+    nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
+        if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
+            return 1;
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
+ * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
+ * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
+ * attempting to use them.
+ */
+
+/* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when strict mode not set */
+
+#define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
+        (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
+/* Strict mode flags */
+#define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
+         (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
+         | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
+
+int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
+                     int idx)
+{
+    int i;
+    int rv = 0;
+    int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
+    CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
+    CERT *c = s->cert;
+    uint32_t *pvalid;
+    unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
+    /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
+    if (idx != -1) {
+        /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
+        if (idx == -2) {
+            cpk = c->key;
+            idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
+        } else
+            cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
+        pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
+        x = cpk->x509;
+        pk = cpk->privatekey;
+        chain = cpk->chain;
+        strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
+        /* If no cert or key, forget it */
+        if (!x || !pk)
+            goto end;
+    } else {
+        if (!x || !pk)
+            return 0;
+        idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
+        if (idx == -1)
+            return 0;
+        pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
+
+        if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
+            check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
+        else
+            check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
+        strict_mode = 1;
+    }
+
+    if (suiteb_flags) {
+        int ok;
+        if (check_flags)
+            check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
+        ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
+        if (ok == X509_V_OK)
+            rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
+        else if (!check_flags)
+            goto end;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
+     * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
+     */
+    if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
+        int default_nid;
+        unsigned char rsign = 0;
+        if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
+            default_nid = 0;
+        /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
+        else {
+            switch (idx) {
+            case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
+            case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
+                rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
+                default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
+                break;
+
+            case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
+                rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
+                default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
+                break;
+
+            case SSL_PKEY_ECC:
+                rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
+                default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
+                break;
+
+            case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
+                rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001;
+                default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
+                break;
+
+            case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
+                rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256;
+                default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
+                break;
+
+            case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
+                rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512;
+                default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
+                break;
+
+            default:
+                default_nid = -1;
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+        /*
+         * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
+         * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
+         */
+        if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
+            size_t j;
+            const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
+            for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
+                if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
+                    break;
+            }
+            if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
+                if (check_flags)
+                    goto skip_sigs;
+                else
+                    goto end;
+            }
+        }
+        /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
+        if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
+            if (!check_flags)
+                goto end;
+        } else
+            rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
+        rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
+            if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
+                if (check_flags) {
+                    rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
+                    break;
+                } else
+                    goto end;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
+    else if (check_flags)
+        rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
+ skip_sigs:
+    /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
+    if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
+        rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
+    else if (!check_flags)
+        goto end;
+    if (!s->server)
+        rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
+    /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
+    else if (strict_mode) {
+        rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
+            X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
+            if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
+                if (check_flags) {
+                    rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
+                    break;
+                } else
+                    goto end;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
+        STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
+        int check_type = 0;
+        switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
+        case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
+            check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
+            break;
+        case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
+            check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
+            break;
+        case EVP_PKEY_EC:
+            check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
+            break;
+        }
+        if (check_type) {
+            const unsigned char *ctypes;
+            int ctypelen;
+            if (c->ctypes) {
+                ctypes = c->ctypes;
+                ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
+            } else {
+                ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
+                ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
+            }
+            for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
+                if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
+                    rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
+                    break;
+                }
+            }
+            if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
+                goto end;
+        } else
+            rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
+
+        ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
+
+        if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
+            rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
+
+        if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
+            if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
+                rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
+        }
+        if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
+            for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
+                X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
+                if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
+                    rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
+                    break;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
+            goto end;
+    } else
+        rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
+
+    if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
+        rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
+
+ end:
+
+    if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+        if (*pvalid & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
+            rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
+        else if (s->s3->tmp.md[idx] != NULL)
+            rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
+    } else
+        rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
+
+    /*
+     * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
+     * chain is invalid.
+     */
+    if (!check_flags) {
+        if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
+            *pvalid = rv;
+        else {
+            /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
+            *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+    return rv;
+}
+
+/* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
+void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
+{
+    tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
+    tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
+    tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
+    tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
+    tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
+    tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
+    tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
+}
+
+/* User level utility function to check a chain is suitable */
+int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
+{
+    return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
+{
+    int dh_secbits = 80;
+    if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
+        return DH_get_1024_160();
+    if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
+        if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
+            dh_secbits = 128;
+        else
+            dh_secbits = 80;
+    } else {
+        CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
+        dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
+    }
+
+    if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
+        DH *dhp = DH_new();
+        BIGNUM *p, *g;
+        if (dhp == NULL)
+            return NULL;
+        g = BN_new();
+        if (g != NULL)
+            BN_set_word(g, 2);
+        if (dh_secbits >= 192)
+            p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
+        else
+            p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
+        if (p == NULL || g == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
+            DH_free(dhp);
+            BN_free(p);
+            BN_free(g);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+        return dhp;
+    }
+    if (dh_secbits >= 112)
+        return DH_get_2048_224();
+    return DH_get_1024_160();
+}
+#endif
+
+static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
+{
+    int secbits = -1;
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
+    if (pkey) {
+        /*
+         * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
+         * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
+         * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
+         * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
+         */
+        secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
+    }
+    if (s)
+        return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
+    else
+        return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
+}
+
+static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
+{
+    /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
+    int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
+    /* Don't check signature if self signed */
+    if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
+        return 1;
+    sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
+    if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
+        const EVP_MD *md;
+        if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
+            secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
+    }
+    if (s)
+        return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
+    else
+        return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
+}
+
+int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
+{
+    if (vfy)
+        vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
+    if (is_ee) {
+        if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
+            return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
+    } else {
+        if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
+            return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
+    }
+    if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
+        return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check security of a chain, if |sk| includes the end entity certificate then
+ * |x| is NULL. If |vfy| is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
+ * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
+ */
+
+int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
+{
+    int rv, start_idx, i;
+    if (x == NULL) {
+        x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
+        start_idx = 1;
+    } else
+        start_idx = 0;
+
+    rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
+    if (rv != 1)
+        return rv;
+
+    for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
+        x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
+        rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);
+        if (rv != 1)
+            return rv;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/t1_reneg.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/t1_reneg.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..01dc403
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/t1_reneg.c
@@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+
+/* Add the client's renegotiation binding */
+int ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len,
+                                        int maxlen)
+{
+    if (p) {
+        if ((s->s3->previous_client_finished_len + 1) > maxlen) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT,
+                   SSL_R_RENEGOTIATE_EXT_TOO_LONG);
+            return 0;
+        }
+
+        /* Length byte */
+        *p = s->s3->previous_client_finished_len;
+        p++;
+
+        memcpy(p, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
+               s->s3->previous_client_finished_len);
+    }
+
+    *len = s->s3->previous_client_finished_len + 1;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Parse the client's renegotiation binding and abort if it's not right
+ */
+int ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
+{
+    unsigned int ilen;
+    const unsigned char *d;
+
+    /* Parse the length byte */
+    if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &ilen)
+        || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &d, ilen)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT,
+               SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
+        *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* Check that the extension matches */
+    if (ilen != s->s3->previous_client_finished_len) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT,
+               SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
+        *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (memcmp(d, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
+               s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT,
+               SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
+        *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Add the server's renegotiation binding */
+int ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len,
+                                        int maxlen)
+{
+    if (p) {
+        if ((s->s3->previous_client_finished_len +
+             s->s3->previous_server_finished_len + 1) > maxlen) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT,
+                   SSL_R_RENEGOTIATE_EXT_TOO_LONG);
+            return 0;
+        }
+
+        /* Length byte */
+        *p = s->s3->previous_client_finished_len +
+            s->s3->previous_server_finished_len;
+        p++;
+
+        memcpy(p, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
+               s->s3->previous_client_finished_len);
+        p += s->s3->previous_client_finished_len;
+
+        memcpy(p, s->s3->previous_server_finished,
+               s->s3->previous_server_finished_len);
+    }
+
+    *len = s->s3->previous_client_finished_len
+        + s->s3->previous_server_finished_len + 1;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Parse the server's renegotiation binding and abort if it's not right
+ */
+int ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
+{
+    unsigned int expected_len = s->s3->previous_client_finished_len
+        + s->s3->previous_server_finished_len;
+    unsigned int ilen;
+    const unsigned char *data;
+
+    /* Check for logic errors */
+    OPENSSL_assert(!expected_len || s->s3->previous_client_finished_len);
+    OPENSSL_assert(!expected_len || s->s3->previous_server_finished_len);
+
+    /* Parse the length byte */
+    if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &ilen)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT,
+               SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
+        *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* Consistency check */
+    if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ilen) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT,
+               SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
+        *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* Check that the extension matches */
+    if (ilen != expected_len) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT,
+               SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
+        *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)
+        || memcmp(data, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
+                  s->s3->previous_client_finished_len) != 0) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT,
+               SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
+        *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, s->s3->previous_server_finished_len)
+        || memcmp(data, s->s3->previous_server_finished,
+                  s->s3->previous_server_finished_len) != 0) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT,
+               SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
+        *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+        return 0;
+    }
+    s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
+
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/t1_trce.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/t1_trce.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..76bdf79
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/t1_trce.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1322 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2012-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE
+
+/* Packet trace support for OpenSSL */
+
+typedef struct {
+    int num;
+    const char *name;
+} ssl_trace_tbl;
+
+# define ssl_trace_str(val, tbl) \
+        do_ssl_trace_str(val, tbl, OSSL_NELEM(tbl))
+
+# define ssl_trace_list(bio, indent, msg, msglen, value, table) \
+        do_ssl_trace_list(bio, indent, msg, msglen, value, \
+         table, OSSL_NELEM(table))
+
+static const char *do_ssl_trace_str(int val, ssl_trace_tbl *tbl, size_t ntbl)
+{
+    size_t i;
+    for (i = 0; i < ntbl; i++, tbl++) {
+        if (tbl->num == val)
+            return tbl->name;
+    }
+    return "UNKNOWN";
+}
+
+static int do_ssl_trace_list(BIO *bio, int indent,
+                             const unsigned char *msg, size_t msglen,
+                             size_t vlen, ssl_trace_tbl *tbl, size_t ntbl)
+{
+    int val;
+    if (msglen % vlen)
+        return 0;
+    while (msglen) {
+        val = msg[0];
+        if (vlen == 2)
+            val = (val << 8) | msg[1];
+        BIO_indent(bio, indent, 80);
+        BIO_printf(bio, "%s (%d)\n", do_ssl_trace_str(val, tbl, ntbl), val);
+        msg += vlen;
+        msglen -= vlen;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Version number */
+
+static ssl_trace_tbl ssl_version_tbl[] = {
+    {SSL3_VERSION, "SSL 3.0"},
+    {TLS1_VERSION, "TLS 1.0"},
+    {TLS1_1_VERSION, "TLS 1.1"},
+    {TLS1_2_VERSION, "TLS 1.2"},
+    {DTLS1_VERSION, "DTLS 1.0"},
+    {DTLS1_2_VERSION, "DTLS 1.2"},
+    {DTLS1_BAD_VER, "DTLS 1.0 (bad)"}
+};
+
+static ssl_trace_tbl ssl_content_tbl[] = {
+    {SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, "ChangeCipherSpec"},
+    {SSL3_RT_ALERT, "Alert"},
+    {SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, "Handshake"},
+    {SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA, "ApplicationData"},
+    {DTLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, "HeartBeat"}
+};
+
+/* Handshake types */
+static ssl_trace_tbl ssl_handshake_tbl[] = {
+    {SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, "HelloRequest"},
+    {SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, "ClientHello"},
+    {SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, "ServerHello"},
+    {DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, "HelloVerifyRequest"},
+    {SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, "NewSessionTicket"},
+    {SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE, "Certificate"},
+    {SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, "ServerKeyExchange"},
+    {SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, "CertificateRequest"},
+    {SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, "ClientKeyExchange"},
+    {SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS, "CertificateStatus"},
+    {SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, "ServerHelloDone"},
+    {SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, "CertificateVerify"},
+    {SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, "ClientKeyExchange"},
+    {SSL3_MT_FINISHED, "Finished"},
+    {SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS, "CertificateStatus"}
+};
+
+/* Cipher suites */
+static ssl_trace_tbl ssl_ciphers_tbl[] = {
+    {0x0000, "SSL_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL"},
+    {0x0001, "SSL_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5"},
+    {0x0002, "SSL_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA"},
+    {0x0003, "SSL_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5"},
+    {0x0004, "SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5"},
+    {0x0005, "SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA"},
+    {0x0006, "SSL_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5"},
+    {0x0007, "SSL_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0x0008, "SSL_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0x0009, "SSL_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0x000A, "SSL_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0x000B, "SSL_DH_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0x000C, "SSL_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0x000D, "SSL_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0x000E, "SSL_DH_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0x000F, "SSL_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0x0010, "SSL_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0x0011, "SSL_DHE_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0x0012, "SSL_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0x0013, "SSL_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0x0014, "SSL_DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0x0015, "SSL_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0x0016, "SSL_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0x0017, "SSL_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5"},
+    {0x0018, "SSL_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5"},
+    {0x0019, "SSL_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0x001A, "SSL_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0x001B, "SSL_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0x001D, "SSL_FORTEZZA_KEA_WITH_FORTEZZA_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0x001E, "SSL_FORTEZZA_KEA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA"},
+    {0x001F, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0x0020, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_RC4_128_SHA"},
+    {0x0021, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0x0022, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_DES_CBC_MD5"},
+    {0x0023, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_MD5"},
+    {0x0024, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_RC4_128_MD5"},
+    {0x0025, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_IDEA_CBC_MD5"},
+    {0x0026, "TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_DES_CBC_40_SHA"},
+    {0x0027, "TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_SHA"},
+    {0x0028, "TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_SHA"},
+    {0x0029, "TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_DES_CBC_40_MD5"},
+    {0x002A, "TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5"},
+    {0x002B, "TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5"},
+    {0x002C, "TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA"},
+    {0x002D, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA"},
+    {0x002E, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA"},
+    {0x002F, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0x0030, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0x0031, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0x0032, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0x0033, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0x0034, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0x0035, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0x0036, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0x0037, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0x0038, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0x0039, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0x003A, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0x003B, "TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256"},
+    {0x003C, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256"},
+    {0x003D, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256"},
+    {0x003E, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256"},
+    {0x003F, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256"},
+    {0x0040, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256"},
+    {0x0041, "TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0x0042, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0x0043, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0x0044, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0x0045, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0x0046, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0x0067, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256"},
+    {0x0068, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256"},
+    {0x0069, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256"},
+    {0x006A, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256"},
+    {0x006B, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256"},
+    {0x006C, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256"},
+    {0x006D, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256"},
+    {0x0084, "TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0x0085, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0x0086, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0x0087, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0x0088, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0x0089, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0x008A, "TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA"},
+    {0x008B, "TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0x008C, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0x008D, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0x008E, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA"},
+    {0x008F, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0x0090, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0x0091, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0x0092, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA"},
+    {0x0093, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0x0094, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0x0095, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0x0096, "TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0x0097, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0x0098, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0x0099, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0x009A, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0x009B, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0x009C, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256"},
+    {0x009D, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384"},
+    {0x009E, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256"},
+    {0x009F, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384"},
+    {0x00A0, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256"},
+    {0x00A1, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384"},
+    {0x00A2, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256"},
+    {0x00A3, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384"},
+    {0x00A4, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256"},
+    {0x00A5, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384"},
+    {0x00A6, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256"},
+    {0x00A7, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384"},
+    {0x00A8, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256"},
+    {0x00A9, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384"},
+    {0x00AA, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256"},
+    {0x00AB, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384"},
+    {0x00AC, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256"},
+    {0x00AD, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384"},
+    {0x00AE, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256"},
+    {0x00AF, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384"},
+    {0x00B0, "TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256"},
+    {0x00B1, "TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384"},
+    {0x00B2, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256"},
+    {0x00B3, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384"},
+    {0x00B4, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256"},
+    {0x00B5, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384"},
+    {0x00B6, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256"},
+    {0x00B7, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384"},
+    {0x00B8, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256"},
+    {0x00B9, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384"},
+    {0x00BA, "TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256"},
+    {0x00BB, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256"},
+    {0x00BC, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256"},
+    {0x00BD, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256"},
+    {0x00BE, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256"},
+    {0x00BF, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256"},
+    {0x00C0, "TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256"},
+    {0x00C1, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256"},
+    {0x00C2, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256"},
+    {0x00C3, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256"},
+    {0x00C4, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256"},
+    {0x00C5, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256"},
+    {0x00FF, "TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV"},
+    {0x5600, "TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV"},
+    {0xC001, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA"},
+    {0xC002, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA"},
+    {0xC003, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0xC004, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0xC005, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0xC006, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA"},
+    {0xC007, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA"},
+    {0xC008, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0xC009, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0xC00A, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0xC00B, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA"},
+    {0xC00C, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA"},
+    {0xC00D, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0xC00E, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0xC00F, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0xC010, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA"},
+    {0xC011, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA"},
+    {0xC012, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0xC013, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0xC014, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0xC015, "TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA"},
+    {0xC016, "TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA"},
+    {0xC017, "TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0xC018, "TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0xC019, "TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0xC01A, "TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0xC01B, "TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0xC01C, "TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0xC01D, "TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0xC01E, "TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0xC01F, "TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0xC020, "TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0xC021, "TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0xC022, "TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0xC023, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256"},
+    {0xC024, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384"},
+    {0xC025, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256"},
+    {0xC026, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384"},
+    {0xC027, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256"},
+    {0xC028, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384"},
+    {0xC029, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256"},
+    {0xC02A, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384"},
+    {0xC02B, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256"},
+    {0xC02C, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384"},
+    {0xC02D, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256"},
+    {0xC02E, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384"},
+    {0xC02F, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256"},
+    {0xC030, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384"},
+    {0xC031, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256"},
+    {0xC032, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384"},
+    {0xC033, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA"},
+    {0xC034, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0xC035, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0xC036, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0xC037, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256"},
+    {0xC038, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384"},
+    {0xC039, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA"},
+    {0xC03A, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256"},
+    {0xC03B, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384"},
+    {0xC03C, "TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256"},
+    {0xC03D, "TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384"},
+    {0xC03E, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256"},
+    {0xC03F, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384"},
+    {0xC040, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256"},
+    {0xC041, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384"},
+    {0xC042, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256"},
+    {0xC043, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384"},
+    {0xC044, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256"},
+    {0xC045, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384"},
+    {0xC046, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256"},
+    {0xC047, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384"},
+    {0xC048, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256"},
+    {0xC049, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384"},
+    {0xC04A, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256"},
+    {0xC04B, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384"},
+    {0xC04C, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256"},
+    {0xC04D, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384"},
+    {0xC04E, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256"},
+    {0xC04F, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384"},
+    {0xC050, "TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256"},
+    {0xC051, "TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384"},
+    {0xC052, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256"},
+    {0xC053, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384"},
+    {0xC054, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256"},
+    {0xC055, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384"},
+    {0xC056, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256"},
+    {0xC057, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384"},
+    {0xC058, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256"},
+    {0xC059, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384"},
+    {0xC05A, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256"},
+    {0xC05B, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384"},
+    {0xC05C, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256"},
+    {0xC05D, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384"},
+    {0xC05E, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256"},
+    {0xC05F, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384"},
+    {0xC060, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256"},
+    {0xC061, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384"},
+    {0xC062, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256"},
+    {0xC063, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384"},
+    {0xC064, "TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256"},
+    {0xC065, "TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384"},
+    {0xC066, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256"},
+    {0xC067, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384"},
+    {0xC068, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256"},
+    {0xC069, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384"},
+    {0xC06A, "TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256"},
+    {0xC06B, "TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384"},
+    {0xC06C, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256"},
+    {0xC06D, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384"},
+    {0xC06E, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256"},
+    {0xC06F, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384"},
+    {0xC070, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256"},
+    {0xC071, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384"},
+    {0xC072, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256"},
+    {0xC073, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384"},
+    {0xC074, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256"},
+    {0xC075, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384"},
+    {0xC076, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256"},
+    {0xC077, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384"},
+    {0xC078, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256"},
+    {0xC079, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384"},
+    {0xC07A, "TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256"},
+    {0xC07B, "TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384"},
+    {0xC07C, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256"},
+    {0xC07D, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384"},
+    {0xC07E, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256"},
+    {0xC07F, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384"},
+    {0xC080, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256"},
+    {0xC081, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384"},
+    {0xC082, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256"},
+    {0xC083, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384"},
+    {0xC084, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256"},
+    {0xC085, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384"},
+    {0xC086, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256"},
+    {0xC087, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384"},
+    {0xC088, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256"},
+    {0xC089, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384"},
+    {0xC08A, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256"},
+    {0xC08B, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384"},
+    {0xC08C, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256"},
+    {0xC08D, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384"},
+    {0xC08E, "TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256"},
+    {0xC08F, "TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384"},
+    {0xC090, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256"},
+    {0xC091, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384"},
+    {0xC092, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256"},
+    {0xC093, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384"},
+    {0xC094, "TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256"},
+    {0xC095, "TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384"},
+    {0xC096, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256"},
+    {0xC097, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384"},
+    {0xC098, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256"},
+    {0xC099, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384"},
+    {0xC09A, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256"},
+    {0xC09B, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384"},
+    {0xC09C, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM"},
+    {0xC09D, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM"},
+    {0xC09E, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM"},
+    {0xC09F, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM"},
+    {0xC0A0, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8"},
+    {0xC0A1, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8"},
+    {0xC0A2, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8"},
+    {0xC0A3, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8"},
+    {0xC0A4, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM"},
+    {0xC0A5, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM"},
+    {0xC0A6, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM"},
+    {0xC0A7, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM"},
+    {0xC0A8, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8"},
+    {0xC0A9, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8"},
+    {0xC0AA, "TLS_PSK_DHE_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8"},
+    {0xC0AB, "TLS_PSK_DHE_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8"},
+    {0xC0AC, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM"},
+    {0xC0AD, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM"},
+    {0xC0AE, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8"},
+    {0xC0AF, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8"},
+    {0xCCA8, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256"},
+    {0xCCA9, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256"},
+    {0xCCAA, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256"},
+    {0xCCAB, "TLS_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256"},
+    {0xCCAC, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256"},
+    {0xCCAD, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256"},
+    {0xCCAE, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256"},
+    {0xFEFE, "SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA"},
+    {0xFEFF, "SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA"},
+};
+
+/* Compression methods */
+static ssl_trace_tbl ssl_comp_tbl[] = {
+    {0x0000, "No Compression"},
+    {0x0001, "Zlib Compression"}
+};
+
+/* Extensions */
+static ssl_trace_tbl ssl_exts_tbl[] = {
+    {TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, "server_name"},
+    {TLSEXT_TYPE_max_fragment_length, "max_fragment_length"},
+    {TLSEXT_TYPE_client_certificate_url, "client_certificate_url"},
+    {TLSEXT_TYPE_trusted_ca_keys, "trusted_ca_keys"},
+    {TLSEXT_TYPE_truncated_hmac, "truncated_hmac"},
+    {TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, "status_request"},
+    {TLSEXT_TYPE_user_mapping, "user_mapping"},
+    {TLSEXT_TYPE_client_authz, "client_authz"},
+    {TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, "server_authz"},
+    {TLSEXT_TYPE_cert_type, "cert_type"},
+    {TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, "elliptic_curves"},
+    {TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, "ec_point_formats"},
+    {TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, "srp"},
+    {TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, "signature_algorithms"},
+    {TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, "use_srtp"},
+    {TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, "heartbeat"},
+    {TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, "session_ticket"},
+    {TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, "renegotiate"},
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+    {TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, "next_proto_neg"},
+# endif
+    {TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp, "signed_certificate_timestamps"},
+    {TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, "padding"},
+    {TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, "encrypt_then_mac"},
+    {TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, "extended_master_secret"}
+};
+
+static ssl_trace_tbl ssl_curve_tbl[] = {
+    {1, "sect163k1 (K-163)"},
+    {2, "sect163r1"},
+    {3, "sect163r2 (B-163)"},
+    {4, "sect193r1"},
+    {5, "sect193r2"},
+    {6, "sect233k1 (K-233)"},
+    {7, "sect233r1 (B-233)"},
+    {8, "sect239k1"},
+    {9, "sect283k1 (K-283)"},
+    {10, "sect283r1 (B-283)"},
+    {11, "sect409k1 (K-409)"},
+    {12, "sect409r1 (B-409)"},
+    {13, "sect571k1 (K-571)"},
+    {14, "sect571r1 (B-571)"},
+    {15, "secp160k1"},
+    {16, "secp160r1"},
+    {17, "secp160r2"},
+    {18, "secp192k1"},
+    {19, "secp192r1 (P-192)"},
+    {20, "secp224k1"},
+    {21, "secp224r1 (P-224)"},
+    {22, "secp256k1"},
+    {23, "secp256r1 (P-256)"},
+    {24, "secp384r1 (P-384)"},
+    {25, "secp521r1 (P-521)"},
+    {26, "brainpoolP256r1"},
+    {27, "brainpoolP384r1"},
+    {28, "brainpoolP512r1"},
+    {29, "ecdh_x25519"},
+    {0xFF01, "arbitrary_explicit_prime_curves"},
+    {0xFF02, "arbitrary_explicit_char2_curves"}
+};
+
+static ssl_trace_tbl ssl_point_tbl[] = {
+    {0, "uncompressed"},
+    {1, "ansiX962_compressed_prime"},
+    {2, "ansiX962_compressed_char2"}
+};
+
+static ssl_trace_tbl ssl_md_tbl[] = {
+    {TLSEXT_hash_none, "none"},
+    {TLSEXT_hash_md5, "md5"},
+    {TLSEXT_hash_sha1, "sha1"},
+    {TLSEXT_hash_sha224, "sha224"},
+    {TLSEXT_hash_sha256, "sha256"},
+    {TLSEXT_hash_sha384, "sha384"},
+    {TLSEXT_hash_sha512, "sha512"},
+    {TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411, "md_gost94"},
+    {TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, "md_gost2012_256"},
+    {TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, "md_gost2012_512"}
+};
+
+static ssl_trace_tbl ssl_sig_tbl[] = {
+    {TLSEXT_signature_anonymous, "anonymous"},
+    {TLSEXT_signature_rsa, "rsa"},
+    {TLSEXT_signature_dsa, "dsa"},
+    {TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa, "ecdsa"},
+    {TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001, "gost2001"},
+    {TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256, "gost2012_256"},
+    {TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512, "gost2012_512"}
+};
+
+static ssl_trace_tbl ssl_hb_tbl[] = {
+    {1, "peer_allowed_to_send"},
+    {2, "peer_not_allowed_to_send"}
+};
+
+static ssl_trace_tbl ssl_hb_type_tbl[] = {
+    {1, "heartbeat_request"},
+    {2, "heartbeat_response"}
+};
+
+static ssl_trace_tbl ssl_ctype_tbl[] = {
+    {1, "rsa_sign"},
+    {2, "dss_sign"},
+    {3, "rsa_fixed_dh"},
+    {4, "dss_fixed_dh"},
+    {5, "rsa_ephemeral_dh"},
+    {6, "dss_ephemeral_dh"},
+    {20, "fortezza_dms"},
+    {64, "ecdsa_sign"},
+    {65, "rsa_fixed_ecdh"},
+    {66, "ecdsa_fixed_ecdh"}
+};
+
+static void ssl_print_hex(BIO *bio, int indent, const char *name,
+                          const unsigned char *msg, size_t msglen)
+{
+    size_t i;
+    BIO_indent(bio, indent, 80);
+    BIO_printf(bio, "%s (len=%d): ", name, (int)msglen);
+    for (i = 0; i < msglen; i++)
+        BIO_printf(bio, "%02X", msg[i]);
+    BIO_puts(bio, "\n");
+}
+
+static int ssl_print_hexbuf(BIO *bio, int indent,
+                            const char *name, size_t nlen,
+                            const unsigned char **pmsg, size_t *pmsglen)
+{
+    size_t blen;
+    const unsigned char *p = *pmsg;
+    if (*pmsglen < nlen)
+        return 0;
+    blen = p[0];
+    if (nlen > 1)
+        blen = (blen << 8) | p[1];
+    if (*pmsglen < nlen + blen)
+        return 0;
+    p += nlen;
+    ssl_print_hex(bio, indent, name, p, blen);
+    *pmsg += blen + nlen;
+    *pmsglen -= blen + nlen;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int ssl_print_version(BIO *bio, int indent, const char *name,
+                             const unsigned char **pmsg, size_t *pmsglen)
+{
+    int vers;
+    if (*pmsglen < 2)
+        return 0;
+    vers = ((*pmsg)[0] << 8) | (*pmsg)[1];
+    BIO_indent(bio, indent, 80);
+    BIO_printf(bio, "%s=0x%x (%s)\n",
+               name, vers, ssl_trace_str(vers, ssl_version_tbl));
+    *pmsg += 2;
+    *pmsglen -= 2;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int ssl_print_random(BIO *bio, int indent,
+                            const unsigned char **pmsg, size_t *pmsglen)
+{
+    unsigned int tm;
+    const unsigned char *p = *pmsg;
+    if (*pmsglen < 32)
+        return 0;
+    tm = (p[0] << 24) | (p[1] << 16) | (p[2] << 8) | p[3];
+    p += 4;
+    BIO_indent(bio, indent, 80);
+    BIO_puts(bio, "Random:\n");
+    BIO_indent(bio, indent + 2, 80);
+    BIO_printf(bio, "gmt_unix_time=0x%08X\n", tm);
+    ssl_print_hex(bio, indent + 2, "random_bytes", p, 28);
+    *pmsg += 32;
+    *pmsglen -= 32;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int ssl_print_signature(BIO *bio, int indent, SSL *s,
+                               const unsigned char **pmsg, size_t *pmsglen)
+{
+    if (*pmsglen < 2)
+        return 0;
+    if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
+        const unsigned char *p = *pmsg;
+        BIO_indent(bio, indent, 80);
+        BIO_printf(bio, "Signature Algorithm %s+%s (%d+%d)\n",
+                   ssl_trace_str(p[0], ssl_md_tbl),
+                   ssl_trace_str(p[1], ssl_sig_tbl), p[0], p[1]);
+        *pmsg += 2;
+        *pmsglen -= 2;
+    }
+    return ssl_print_hexbuf(bio, indent, "Signature", 2, pmsg, pmsglen);
+}
+
+static int ssl_print_extension(BIO *bio, int indent, int server, int extype,
+                               const unsigned char *ext, size_t extlen)
+{
+    size_t xlen;
+    BIO_indent(bio, indent, 80);
+    BIO_printf(bio, "extension_type=%s(%d), length=%d\n",
+               ssl_trace_str(extype, ssl_exts_tbl), extype, (int)extlen);
+    switch (extype) {
+    case TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats:
+        if (extlen < 1)
+            return 0;
+        xlen = ext[0];
+        if (extlen != xlen + 1)
+            return 0;
+        return ssl_trace_list(bio, indent + 2, ext + 1, xlen, 1, ssl_point_tbl);
+
+    case TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves:
+        if (extlen < 2)
+            return 0;
+        xlen = (ext[0] << 8) | ext[1];
+        if (extlen != xlen + 2)
+            return 0;
+        return ssl_trace_list(bio, indent + 2, ext + 2, xlen, 2, ssl_curve_tbl);
+
+    case TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms:
+
+        if (extlen < 2)
+            return 0;
+        xlen = (ext[0] << 8) | ext[1];
+        if (extlen != xlen + 2)
+            return 0;
+        if (xlen & 1)
+            return 0;
+        ext += 2;
+        while (xlen > 0) {
+            BIO_indent(bio, indent + 2, 80);
+            BIO_printf(bio, "%s+%s (%d+%d)\n",
+                       ssl_trace_str(ext[0], ssl_md_tbl),
+                       ssl_trace_str(ext[1], ssl_sig_tbl), ext[0], ext[1]);
+            xlen -= 2;
+            ext += 2;
+        }
+        break;
+
+    case TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate:
+        if (extlen < 1)
+            return 0;
+        xlen = ext[0];
+        if (xlen + 1 != extlen)
+            return 0;
+        ext++;
+        if (xlen) {
+            if (server) {
+                if (xlen & 1)
+                    return 0;
+                xlen >>= 1;
+            }
+            ssl_print_hex(bio, indent + 4, "client_verify_data", ext, xlen);
+            if (server) {
+                ext += xlen;
+                ssl_print_hex(bio, indent + 4, "server_verify_data", ext, xlen);
+            }
+        } else {
+            BIO_indent(bio, indent + 4, 80);
+            BIO_puts(bio, "<EMPTY>\n");
+        }
+        break;
+
+    case TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat:
+        if (extlen != 1)
+            return 0;
+        BIO_indent(bio, indent + 2, 80);
+        BIO_printf(bio, "HeartbeatMode: %s\n",
+                   ssl_trace_str(ext[0], ssl_hb_tbl));
+        break;
+
+    case TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket:
+        if (extlen != 0)
+            ssl_print_hex(bio, indent + 4, "ticket", ext, extlen);
+        break;
+
+    default:
+        BIO_dump_indent(bio, (const char *)ext, extlen, indent + 2);
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int ssl_print_extensions(BIO *bio, int indent, int server,
+                                const unsigned char *msg, size_t msglen)
+{
+    size_t extslen;
+    BIO_indent(bio, indent, 80);
+    if (msglen == 0) {
+        BIO_puts(bio, "No Extensions\n");
+        return 1;
+    }
+    extslen = (msg[0] << 8) | msg[1];
+    if (extslen != msglen - 2)
+        return 0;
+    msg += 2;
+    msglen = extslen;
+    BIO_printf(bio, "extensions, length = %d\n", (int)msglen);
+    while (msglen > 0) {
+        int extype;
+        size_t extlen;
+        if (msglen < 4)
+            return 0;
+        extype = (msg[0] << 8) | msg[1];
+        extlen = (msg[2] << 8) | msg[3];
+        if (msglen < extlen + 4)
+            return 0;
+        msg += 4;
+        if (!ssl_print_extension(bio, indent + 2, server, extype, msg, extlen))
+            return 0;
+        msg += extlen;
+        msglen -= extlen + 4;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int ssl_print_client_hello(BIO *bio, SSL *ssl, int indent,
+                                  const unsigned char *msg, size_t msglen)
+{
+    size_t len;
+    unsigned int cs;
+    if (!ssl_print_version(bio, indent, "client_version", &msg, &msglen))
+        return 0;
+    if (!ssl_print_random(bio, indent, &msg, &msglen))
+        return 0;
+    if (!ssl_print_hexbuf(bio, indent, "session_id", 1, &msg, &msglen))
+        return 0;
+    if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) {
+        if (!ssl_print_hexbuf(bio, indent, "cookie", 1, &msg, &msglen))
+            return 0;
+    }
+    if (msglen < 2)
+        return 0;
+    len = (msg[0] << 8) | msg[1];
+    msg += 2;
+    msglen -= 2;
+    BIO_indent(bio, indent, 80);
+    BIO_printf(bio, "cipher_suites (len=%d)\n", (int)len);
+    if (msglen < len || len & 1)
+        return 0;
+    while (len > 0) {
+        cs = (msg[0] << 8) | msg[1];
+        BIO_indent(bio, indent + 2, 80);
+        BIO_printf(bio, "{0x%02X, 0x%02X} %s\n",
+                   msg[0], msg[1], ssl_trace_str(cs, ssl_ciphers_tbl));
+        msg += 2;
+        msglen -= 2;
+        len -= 2;
+    }
+    if (msglen < 1)
+        return 0;
+    len = msg[0];
+    msg++;
+    msglen--;
+    if (msglen < len)
+        return 0;
+    BIO_indent(bio, indent, 80);
+    BIO_printf(bio, "compression_methods (len=%d)\n", (int)len);
+    while (len > 0) {
+        BIO_indent(bio, indent + 2, 80);
+        BIO_printf(bio, "%s (0x%02X)\n",
+                   ssl_trace_str(msg[0], ssl_comp_tbl), msg[0]);
+        msg++;
+        msglen--;
+        len--;
+    }
+    if (!ssl_print_extensions(bio, indent, 0, msg, msglen))
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int dtls_print_hello_vfyrequest(BIO *bio, int indent,
+                                       const unsigned char *msg, size_t msglen)
+{
+    if (!ssl_print_version(bio, indent, "server_version", &msg, &msglen))
+        return 0;
+    if (!ssl_print_hexbuf(bio, indent, "cookie", 1, &msg, &msglen))
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int ssl_print_server_hello(BIO *bio, int indent,
+                                  const unsigned char *msg, size_t msglen)
+{
+    unsigned int cs;
+    if (!ssl_print_version(bio, indent, "server_version", &msg, &msglen))
+        return 0;
+    if (!ssl_print_random(bio, indent, &msg, &msglen))
+        return 0;
+    if (!ssl_print_hexbuf(bio, indent, "session_id", 1, &msg, &msglen))
+        return 0;
+    if (msglen < 2)
+        return 0;
+    cs = (msg[0] << 8) | msg[1];
+    BIO_indent(bio, indent, 80);
+    BIO_printf(bio, "cipher_suite {0x%02X, 0x%02X} %s\n",
+               msg[0], msg[1], ssl_trace_str(cs, ssl_ciphers_tbl));
+    msg += 2;
+    msglen -= 2;
+    if (msglen < 1)
+        return 0;
+    BIO_indent(bio, indent, 80);
+    BIO_printf(bio, "compression_method: %s (0x%02X)\n",
+               ssl_trace_str(msg[0], ssl_comp_tbl), msg[0]);
+    msg++;
+    msglen--;
+    if (!ssl_print_extensions(bio, indent, 1, msg, msglen))
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int ssl_get_keyex(const char **pname, SSL *ssl)
+{
+    unsigned long alg_k = ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+    if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
+        *pname = "rsa";
+        return SSL_kRSA;
+    }
+    if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) {
+        *pname = "DHE";
+        return SSL_kDHE;
+    }
+    if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) {
+        *pname = "ECDHE";
+        return SSL_kECDHE;
+    }
+    if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
+        *pname = "PSK";
+        return SSL_kPSK;
+    }
+    if (alg_k & SSL_kRSAPSK) {
+        *pname = "RSAPSK";
+        return SSL_kRSAPSK;
+    }
+    if (alg_k & SSL_kDHEPSK) {
+        *pname = "DHEPSK";
+        return SSL_kDHEPSK;
+    }
+    if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHEPSK) {
+        *pname = "ECDHEPSK";
+        return SSL_kECDHEPSK;
+    }
+    if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
+        *pname = "SRP";
+        return SSL_kSRP;
+    }
+    if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
+        *pname = "GOST";
+        return SSL_kGOST;
+    }
+    *pname = "UNKNOWN";
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int ssl_print_client_keyex(BIO *bio, int indent, SSL *ssl,
+                                  const unsigned char *msg, size_t msglen)
+{
+    const char *algname;
+    int id;
+    id = ssl_get_keyex(&algname, ssl);
+    BIO_indent(bio, indent, 80);
+    BIO_printf(bio, "KeyExchangeAlgorithm=%s\n", algname);
+    if (id & SSL_PSK) {
+        if (!ssl_print_hexbuf(bio, indent + 2,
+                              "psk_identity", 2, &msg, &msglen))
+            return 0;
+    }
+    switch (id) {
+
+    case SSL_kRSA:
+    case SSL_kRSAPSK:
+        if (TLS1_get_version(ssl) == SSL3_VERSION) {
+            ssl_print_hex(bio, indent + 2,
+                          "EncyptedPreMasterSecret", msg, msglen);
+        } else {
+            if (!ssl_print_hexbuf(bio, indent + 2,
+                                  "EncyptedPreMasterSecret", 2, &msg, &msglen))
+                return 0;
+        }
+        break;
+
+    case SSL_kDHE:
+    case SSL_kDHEPSK:
+        if (!ssl_print_hexbuf(bio, indent + 2, "dh_Yc", 2, &msg, &msglen))
+            return 0;
+        break;
+
+    case SSL_kECDHE:
+    case SSL_kECDHEPSK:
+        if (!ssl_print_hexbuf(bio, indent + 2, "ecdh_Yc", 1, &msg, &msglen))
+            return 0;
+        break;
+
+    }
+
+    return !msglen;
+}
+
+static int ssl_print_server_keyex(BIO *bio, int indent, SSL *ssl,
+                                  const unsigned char *msg, size_t msglen)
+{
+    const char *algname;
+    int id;
+    id = ssl_get_keyex(&algname, ssl);
+    BIO_indent(bio, indent, 80);
+    BIO_printf(bio, "KeyExchangeAlgorithm=%s\n", algname);
+    if (id & SSL_PSK) {
+        if (!ssl_print_hexbuf(bio, indent + 2,
+                              "psk_identity_hint", 2, &msg, &msglen))
+            return 0;
+    }
+    switch (id) {
+    case SSL_kRSA:
+
+        if (!ssl_print_hexbuf(bio, indent + 2, "rsa_modulus", 2, &msg, &msglen))
+            return 0;
+        if (!ssl_print_hexbuf(bio, indent + 2, "rsa_exponent", 2,
+                              &msg, &msglen))
+            return 0;
+        break;
+
+    case SSL_kDHE:
+    case SSL_kDHEPSK:
+        if (!ssl_print_hexbuf(bio, indent + 2, "dh_p", 2, &msg, &msglen))
+            return 0;
+        if (!ssl_print_hexbuf(bio, indent + 2, "dh_g", 2, &msg, &msglen))
+            return 0;
+        if (!ssl_print_hexbuf(bio, indent + 2, "dh_Ys", 2, &msg, &msglen))
+            return 0;
+        break;
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    case SSL_kECDHE:
+    case SSL_kECDHEPSK:
+        if (msglen < 1)
+            return 0;
+        BIO_indent(bio, indent + 2, 80);
+        if (msg[0] == EXPLICIT_PRIME_CURVE_TYPE)
+            BIO_puts(bio, "explicit_prime\n");
+        else if (msg[0] == EXPLICIT_CHAR2_CURVE_TYPE)
+            BIO_puts(bio, "explicit_char2\n");
+        else if (msg[0] == NAMED_CURVE_TYPE) {
+            int curve;
+            if (msglen < 3)
+                return 0;
+            curve = (msg[1] << 8) | msg[2];
+            BIO_printf(bio, "named_curve: %s (%d)\n",
+                       ssl_trace_str(curve, ssl_curve_tbl), curve);
+            msg += 3;
+            msglen -= 3;
+            if (!ssl_print_hexbuf(bio, indent + 2, "point", 1, &msg, &msglen))
+                return 0;
+        } else {
+            BIO_printf(bio, "UNKNOWN CURVE PARAMETER TYPE %d\n", msg[0]);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        break;
+# endif
+
+    case SSL_kPSK:
+    case SSL_kRSAPSK:
+        break;
+    }
+    if (!(id & SSL_PSK))
+        ssl_print_signature(bio, indent, ssl, &msg, &msglen);
+    return !msglen;
+}
+
+static int ssl_print_certificate(BIO *bio, int indent,
+                                 const unsigned char **pmsg, size_t *pmsglen)
+{
+    size_t msglen = *pmsglen;
+    size_t clen;
+    X509 *x;
+    const unsigned char *p = *pmsg, *q;
+    if (msglen < 3)
+        return 0;
+    clen = (p[0] << 16) | (p[1] << 8) | p[2];
+    if (msglen < clen + 3)
+        return 0;
+    q = p + 3;
+    BIO_indent(bio, indent, 80);
+    BIO_printf(bio, "ASN.1Cert, length=%d", (int)clen);
+    x = d2i_X509(NULL, &q, clen);
+    if (!x)
+        BIO_puts(bio, "<UNPARSEABLE CERTIFICATE>\n");
+    else {
+        BIO_puts(bio, "\n------details-----\n");
+        X509_print_ex(bio, x, XN_FLAG_ONELINE, 0);
+        PEM_write_bio_X509(bio, x);
+        /* Print certificate stuff */
+        BIO_puts(bio, "------------------\n");
+        X509_free(x);
+    }
+    if (q != p + 3 + clen) {
+        BIO_puts(bio, "<TRAILING GARBAGE AFTER CERTIFICATE>\n");
+    }
+    *pmsg += clen + 3;
+    *pmsglen -= clen + 3;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int ssl_print_certificates(BIO *bio, int indent,
+                                  const unsigned char *msg, size_t msglen)
+{
+    size_t clen;
+    if (msglen < 3)
+        return 0;
+    clen = (msg[0] << 16) | (msg[1] << 8) | msg[2];
+    if (msglen != clen + 3)
+        return 0;
+    msg += 3;
+    BIO_indent(bio, indent, 80);
+    BIO_printf(bio, "certificate_list, length=%d\n", (int)clen);
+    while (clen > 0) {
+        if (!ssl_print_certificate(bio, indent + 2, &msg, &clen))
+            return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int ssl_print_cert_request(BIO *bio, int indent, SSL *s,
+                                  const unsigned char *msg, size_t msglen)
+{
+    size_t xlen;
+    if (msglen < 1)
+        return 0;
+    xlen = msg[0];
+    if (msglen < xlen + 1)
+        return 0;
+    msg++;
+    BIO_indent(bio, indent, 80);
+    BIO_printf(bio, "certificate_types (len=%d)\n", (int)xlen);
+    if (!ssl_trace_list(bio, indent + 2, msg, xlen, 1, ssl_ctype_tbl))
+        return 0;
+    msg += xlen;
+    msglen -= xlen + 1;
+    if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
+        goto skip_sig;
+    if (msglen < 2)
+        return 0;
+    xlen = (msg[0] << 8) | msg[1];
+    if (msglen < xlen + 2 || (xlen & 1))
+        return 0;
+    msg += 2;
+    BIO_indent(bio, indent, 80);
+    BIO_printf(bio, "signature_algorithms (len=%d)\n", (int)xlen);
+    while (xlen > 0) {
+        BIO_indent(bio, indent + 2, 80);
+        BIO_printf(bio, "%s+%s (%d+%d)\n",
+                   ssl_trace_str(msg[0], ssl_md_tbl),
+                   ssl_trace_str(msg[1], ssl_sig_tbl), msg[0], msg[1]);
+        xlen -= 2;
+        msg += 2;
+    }
+    msg += xlen;
+    msglen -= xlen + 2;
+
+ skip_sig:
+    xlen = (msg[0] << 8) | msg[1];
+    BIO_indent(bio, indent, 80);
+    if (msglen < xlen + 2)
+        return 0;
+    msg += 2;
+    msglen -= 2;
+    BIO_printf(bio, "certificate_authorities (len=%d)\n", (int)xlen);
+    while (xlen > 0) {
+        size_t dlen;
+        X509_NAME *nm;
+        const unsigned char *p;
+        if (xlen < 2)
+            return 0;
+        dlen = (msg[0] << 8) | msg[1];
+        if (xlen < dlen + 2)
+            return 0;
+        msg += 2;
+        BIO_indent(bio, indent + 2, 80);
+        BIO_printf(bio, "DistinguishedName (len=%d): ", (int)dlen);
+        p = msg;
+        nm = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &p, dlen);
+        if (!nm) {
+            BIO_puts(bio, "<UNPARSEABLE DN>\n");
+        } else {
+            X509_NAME_print_ex(bio, nm, 0, XN_FLAG_ONELINE);
+            BIO_puts(bio, "\n");
+            X509_NAME_free(nm);
+        }
+        xlen -= dlen + 2;
+        msg += dlen;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int ssl_print_ticket(BIO *bio, int indent,
+                            const unsigned char *msg, size_t msglen)
+{
+    unsigned int tick_life;
+    if (msglen == 0) {
+        BIO_indent(bio, indent + 2, 80);
+        BIO_puts(bio, "No Ticket\n");
+        return 1;
+    }
+    if (msglen < 4)
+        return 0;
+    tick_life = (msg[0] << 24) | (msg[1] << 16) | (msg[2] << 8) | msg[3];
+    msglen -= 4;
+    msg += 4;
+    BIO_indent(bio, indent + 2, 80);
+    BIO_printf(bio, "ticket_lifetime_hint=%u\n", tick_life);
+    if (!ssl_print_hexbuf(bio, indent + 2, "ticket", 2, &msg, &msglen))
+        return 0;
+    if (msglen)
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int ssl_print_handshake(BIO *bio, SSL *ssl,
+                               const unsigned char *msg, size_t msglen,
+                               int indent)
+{
+    size_t hlen;
+    unsigned char htype;
+    if (msglen < 4)
+        return 0;
+    htype = msg[0];
+    hlen = (msg[1] << 16) | (msg[2] << 8) | msg[3];
+    BIO_indent(bio, indent, 80);
+    BIO_printf(bio, "%s, Length=%d\n",
+               ssl_trace_str(htype, ssl_handshake_tbl), (int)hlen);
+    msg += 4;
+    msglen -= 4;
+    if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) {
+        if (msglen < 8)
+            return 0;
+        BIO_indent(bio, indent, 80);
+        BIO_printf(bio, "message_seq=%d, fragment_offset=%d, "
+                   "fragment_length=%d\n",
+                   (msg[0] << 8) | msg[1],
+                   (msg[2] << 16) | (msg[3] << 8) | msg[4],
+                   (msg[5] << 16) | (msg[6] << 8) | msg[7]);
+        msg += 8;
+        msglen -= 8;
+    }
+    if (msglen < hlen)
+        return 0;
+    switch (htype) {
+    case SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO:
+        if (!ssl_print_client_hello(bio, ssl, indent + 2, msg, msglen))
+            return 0;
+        break;
+
+    case DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
+        if (!dtls_print_hello_vfyrequest(bio, indent + 2, msg, msglen))
+            return 0;
+        break;
+
+    case SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO:
+        if (!ssl_print_server_hello(bio, indent + 2, msg, msglen))
+            return 0;
+        break;
+
+    case SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE:
+        if (!ssl_print_server_keyex(bio, indent + 2, ssl, msg, msglen))
+            return 0;
+        break;
+
+    case SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE:
+        if (!ssl_print_client_keyex(bio, indent + 2, ssl, msg, msglen))
+            return 0;
+        break;
+
+    case SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE:
+        if (!ssl_print_certificates(bio, indent + 2, msg, msglen))
+            return 0;
+        break;
+
+    case SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY:
+        if (!ssl_print_signature(bio, indent + 2, ssl, &msg, &msglen))
+            return 0;
+        break;
+
+    case SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST:
+        if (!ssl_print_cert_request(bio, indent + 2, ssl, msg, msglen))
+            return 0;
+        break;
+
+    case SSL3_MT_FINISHED:
+        ssl_print_hex(bio, indent + 2, "verify_data", msg, msglen);
+        break;
+
+    case SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE:
+        if (msglen != 0)
+            ssl_print_hex(bio, indent + 2, "unexpected value", msg, msglen);
+        break;
+
+    case SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET:
+        if (!ssl_print_ticket(bio, indent + 2, msg, msglen))
+            return 0;
+        break;
+
+    default:
+        BIO_indent(bio, indent + 2, 80);
+        BIO_puts(bio, "Unsupported, hex dump follows:\n");
+        BIO_dump_indent(bio, (const char *)msg, msglen, indent + 4);
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int ssl_print_heartbeat(BIO *bio, int indent,
+                               const unsigned char *msg, size_t msglen)
+{
+    if (msglen < 3)
+        return 0;
+    BIO_indent(bio, indent, 80);
+    BIO_printf(bio, "HeartBeatMessageType: %s\n",
+               ssl_trace_str(msg[0], ssl_hb_type_tbl));
+    msg++;
+    msglen--;
+    if (!ssl_print_hexbuf(bio, indent, "payload", 2, &msg, &msglen))
+        return 0;
+    ssl_print_hex(bio, indent, "padding", msg, msglen);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+const char *SSL_CIPHER_standard_name(const SSL_CIPHER *c)
+{
+    return ssl_trace_str(c->id & 0xFFFF, ssl_ciphers_tbl);
+}
+
+void SSL_trace(int write_p, int version, int content_type,
+               const void *buf, size_t msglen, SSL *ssl, void *arg)
+{
+    const unsigned char *msg = buf;
+    BIO *bio = arg;
+
+    switch (content_type) {
+    case SSL3_RT_HEADER:
+        {
+            int hvers = msg[1] << 8 | msg[2];
+            BIO_puts(bio, write_p ? "Sent" : "Received");
+            BIO_printf(bio, " Record\nHeader:\n  Version = %s (0x%x)\n",
+                       ssl_trace_str(hvers, ssl_version_tbl), hvers);
+            if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) {
+                BIO_printf(bio,
+                           "  epoch=%d, sequence_number=%04x%04x%04x\n",
+                           (msg[3] << 8 | msg[4]),
+                           (msg[5] << 8 | msg[6]),
+                           (msg[7] << 8 | msg[8]), (msg[9] << 8 | msg[10]));
+            }
+
+            BIO_printf(bio, "  Content Type = %s (%d)\n  Length = %d",
+                       ssl_trace_str(msg[0], ssl_content_tbl), msg[0],
+                       msg[msglen - 2] << 8 | msg[msglen - 1]);
+        }
+        break;
+    case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
+        if (!ssl_print_handshake(bio, ssl, msg, msglen, 4))
+            BIO_printf(bio, "Message length parse error!\n");
+        break;
+
+    case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
+        if (msglen == 1 && msg[0] == 1)
+            BIO_puts(bio, "    change_cipher_spec (1)\n");
+        else
+            ssl_print_hex(bio, 4, "unknown value", msg, msglen);
+        break;
+
+    case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
+        if (msglen != 2) {
+            BIO_puts(bio, "    Illegal Alert Length\n");
+        } else {
+            BIO_printf(bio, "    Level=%s(%d), description=%s(%d)\n",
+                       SSL_alert_type_string_long(msg[0] << 8),
+                       msg[0], SSL_alert_desc_string_long(msg[1]), msg[1]);
+        }
+        break;
+
+    case DTLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT:
+        ssl_print_heartbeat(bio, 4, msg, msglen);
+        break;
+
+    }
+
+    BIO_puts(bio, "\n");
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/tls_srp.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/tls_srp.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bfdbdf5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/tls_srp.c
@@ -0,0 +1,430 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+# include <openssl/srp.h>
+
+int SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_free(struct ssl_ctx_st *ctx)
+{
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    OPENSSL_free(ctx->srp_ctx.login);
+    OPENSSL_free(ctx->srp_ctx.info);
+    BN_free(ctx->srp_ctx.N);
+    BN_free(ctx->srp_ctx.g);
+    BN_free(ctx->srp_ctx.s);
+    BN_free(ctx->srp_ctx.B);
+    BN_free(ctx->srp_ctx.A);
+    BN_free(ctx->srp_ctx.a);
+    BN_free(ctx->srp_ctx.b);
+    BN_free(ctx->srp_ctx.v);
+    memset(&ctx->srp_ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx->srp_ctx));
+    ctx->srp_ctx.strength = SRP_MINIMAL_N;
+    return (1);
+}
+
+int SSL_SRP_CTX_free(struct ssl_st *s)
+{
+    if (s == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
+    OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.info);
+    BN_free(s->srp_ctx.N);
+    BN_free(s->srp_ctx.g);
+    BN_free(s->srp_ctx.s);
+    BN_free(s->srp_ctx.B);
+    BN_free(s->srp_ctx.A);
+    BN_free(s->srp_ctx.a);
+    BN_free(s->srp_ctx.b);
+    BN_free(s->srp_ctx.v);
+    memset(&s->srp_ctx, 0, sizeof(s->srp_ctx));
+    s->srp_ctx.strength = SRP_MINIMAL_N;
+    return (1);
+}
+
+int SSL_SRP_CTX_init(struct ssl_st *s)
+{
+    SSL_CTX *ctx;
+
+    if ((s == NULL) || ((ctx = s->ctx) == NULL))
+        return 0;
+
+    memset(&s->srp_ctx, 0, sizeof(s->srp_ctx));
+
+    s->srp_ctx.SRP_cb_arg = ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_cb_arg;
+    /* set client Hello login callback */
+    s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback =
+        ctx->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback;
+    /* set SRP N/g param callback for verification */
+    s->srp_ctx.SRP_verify_param_callback =
+        ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_verify_param_callback;
+    /* set SRP client passwd callback */
+    s->srp_ctx.SRP_give_srp_client_pwd_callback =
+        ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_give_srp_client_pwd_callback;
+
+    s->srp_ctx.strength = ctx->srp_ctx.strength;
+
+    if (((ctx->srp_ctx.N != NULL) &&
+         ((s->srp_ctx.N = BN_dup(ctx->srp_ctx.N)) == NULL)) ||
+        ((ctx->srp_ctx.g != NULL) &&
+         ((s->srp_ctx.g = BN_dup(ctx->srp_ctx.g)) == NULL)) ||
+        ((ctx->srp_ctx.s != NULL) &&
+         ((s->srp_ctx.s = BN_dup(ctx->srp_ctx.s)) == NULL)) ||
+        ((ctx->srp_ctx.B != NULL) &&
+         ((s->srp_ctx.B = BN_dup(ctx->srp_ctx.B)) == NULL)) ||
+        ((ctx->srp_ctx.A != NULL) &&
+         ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_dup(ctx->srp_ctx.A)) == NULL)) ||
+        ((ctx->srp_ctx.a != NULL) &&
+         ((s->srp_ctx.a = BN_dup(ctx->srp_ctx.a)) == NULL)) ||
+        ((ctx->srp_ctx.v != NULL) &&
+         ((s->srp_ctx.v = BN_dup(ctx->srp_ctx.v)) == NULL)) ||
+        ((ctx->srp_ctx.b != NULL) &&
+         ((s->srp_ctx.b = BN_dup(ctx->srp_ctx.b)) == NULL))) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SRP_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if ((ctx->srp_ctx.login != NULL) &&
+        ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_strdup(ctx->srp_ctx.login)) == NULL)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SRP_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if ((ctx->srp_ctx.info != NULL) &&
+        ((s->srp_ctx.info = BUF_strdup(ctx->srp_ctx.info)) == NULL)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SRP_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask = ctx->srp_ctx.srp_Mask;
+
+    return (1);
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
+    OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.info);
+    BN_free(s->srp_ctx.N);
+    BN_free(s->srp_ctx.g);
+    BN_free(s->srp_ctx.s);
+    BN_free(s->srp_ctx.B);
+    BN_free(s->srp_ctx.A);
+    BN_free(s->srp_ctx.a);
+    BN_free(s->srp_ctx.b);
+    BN_free(s->srp_ctx.v);
+    memset(&s->srp_ctx, 0, sizeof(s->srp_ctx));
+    return (0);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_init(struct ssl_ctx_st *ctx)
+{
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    memset(&ctx->srp_ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx->srp_ctx));
+    ctx->srp_ctx.strength = SRP_MINIMAL_N;
+
+    return (1);
+}
+
+/* server side */
+int SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(SSL *s, int *ad)
+{
+    unsigned char b[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
+    int al;
+
+    *ad = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
+    if ((s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL) &&
+        ((al =
+          s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback(s, ad,
+                                                   s->srp_ctx.SRP_cb_arg)) !=
+         SSL_ERROR_NONE))
+        return al;
+
+    *ad = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
+        (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
+        (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.v == NULL))
+        return SSL3_AL_FATAL;
+
+    if (RAND_bytes(b, sizeof(b)) <= 0)
+        return SSL3_AL_FATAL;
+    s->srp_ctx.b = BN_bin2bn(b, sizeof(b), NULL);
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(b, sizeof(b));
+
+    /* Calculate:  B = (kv + g^b) % N  */
+
+    return ((s->srp_ctx.B =
+             SRP_Calc_B(s->srp_ctx.b, s->srp_ctx.N, s->srp_ctx.g,
+                        s->srp_ctx.v)) !=
+            NULL) ? SSL_ERROR_NONE : SSL3_AL_FATAL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * If the server just has the raw password, make up a verifier entry on the
+ * fly
+ */
+int SSL_set_srp_server_param_pw(SSL *s, const char *user, const char *pass,
+                                const char *grp)
+{
+    SRP_gN *GN = SRP_get_default_gN(grp);
+    if (GN == NULL)
+        return -1;
+    s->srp_ctx.N = BN_dup(GN->N);
+    s->srp_ctx.g = BN_dup(GN->g);
+    BN_clear_free(s->srp_ctx.v);
+    s->srp_ctx.v = NULL;
+    BN_clear_free(s->srp_ctx.s);
+    s->srp_ctx.s = NULL;
+    if (!SRP_create_verifier_BN
+        (user, pass, &s->srp_ctx.s, &s->srp_ctx.v, GN->N, GN->g))
+        return -1;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_set_srp_server_param(SSL *s, const BIGNUM *N, const BIGNUM *g,
+                             BIGNUM *sa, BIGNUM *v, char *info)
+{
+    if (N != NULL) {
+        if (s->srp_ctx.N != NULL) {
+            if (!BN_copy(s->srp_ctx.N, N)) {
+                BN_free(s->srp_ctx.N);
+                s->srp_ctx.N = NULL;
+            }
+        } else
+            s->srp_ctx.N = BN_dup(N);
+    }
+    if (g != NULL) {
+        if (s->srp_ctx.g != NULL) {
+            if (!BN_copy(s->srp_ctx.g, g)) {
+                BN_free(s->srp_ctx.g);
+                s->srp_ctx.g = NULL;
+            }
+        } else
+            s->srp_ctx.g = BN_dup(g);
+    }
+    if (sa != NULL) {
+        if (s->srp_ctx.s != NULL) {
+            if (!BN_copy(s->srp_ctx.s, sa)) {
+                BN_free(s->srp_ctx.s);
+                s->srp_ctx.s = NULL;
+            }
+        } else
+            s->srp_ctx.s = BN_dup(sa);
+    }
+    if (v != NULL) {
+        if (s->srp_ctx.v != NULL) {
+            if (!BN_copy(s->srp_ctx.v, v)) {
+                BN_free(s->srp_ctx.v);
+                s->srp_ctx.v = NULL;
+            }
+        } else
+            s->srp_ctx.v = BN_dup(v);
+    }
+    if (info != NULL) {
+        if (s->srp_ctx.info)
+            OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.info);
+        if ((s->srp_ctx.info = BUF_strdup(info)) == NULL)
+            return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (!(s->srp_ctx.N) ||
+        !(s->srp_ctx.g) || !(s->srp_ctx.s) || !(s->srp_ctx.v))
+        return -1;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int srp_generate_server_master_secret(SSL *s)
+{
+    BIGNUM *K = NULL, *u = NULL;
+    int ret = -1, tmp_len = 0;
+    unsigned char *tmp = NULL;
+
+    if (!SRP_Verify_A_mod_N(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N))
+        goto err;
+    if ((u = SRP_Calc_u(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.B, s->srp_ctx.N)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if ((K = SRP_Calc_server_key(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.v, u, s->srp_ctx.b,
+                                 s->srp_ctx.N)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    tmp_len = BN_num_bytes(K);
+    if ((tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(tmp_len)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    BN_bn2bin(K, tmp);
+    ret = ssl_generate_master_secret(s, tmp, tmp_len, 1);
+ err:
+    BN_clear_free(K);
+    BN_clear_free(u);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/* client side */
+int srp_generate_client_master_secret(SSL *s)
+{
+    BIGNUM *x = NULL, *u = NULL, *K = NULL;
+    int ret = -1, tmp_len = 0;
+    char *passwd = NULL;
+    unsigned char *tmp = NULL;
+
+    /*
+     * Checks if b % n == 0
+     */
+    if (SRP_Verify_B_mod_N(s->srp_ctx.B, s->srp_ctx.N) == 0)
+        goto err;
+    if ((u = SRP_Calc_u(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.B, s->srp_ctx.N)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (s->srp_ctx.SRP_give_srp_client_pwd_callback == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (!
+        (passwd =
+         s->srp_ctx.SRP_give_srp_client_pwd_callback(s, s->srp_ctx.SRP_cb_arg)))
+        goto err;
+    if ((x = SRP_Calc_x(s->srp_ctx.s, s->srp_ctx.login, passwd)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if ((K = SRP_Calc_client_key(s->srp_ctx.N, s->srp_ctx.B, s->srp_ctx.g, x,
+                                 s->srp_ctx.a, u)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    tmp_len = BN_num_bytes(K);
+    if ((tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(tmp_len)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    BN_bn2bin(K, tmp);
+    ret = ssl_generate_master_secret(s, tmp, tmp_len, 1);
+ err:
+    BN_clear_free(K);
+    BN_clear_free(x);
+    if (passwd != NULL)
+        OPENSSL_clear_free(passwd, strlen(passwd));
+    BN_clear_free(u);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int srp_verify_server_param(SSL *s, int *al)
+{
+    SRP_CTX *srp = &s->srp_ctx;
+    /*
+     * Sanity check parameters: we can quickly check B % N == 0 by checking B
+     * != 0 since B < N
+     */
+    if (BN_ucmp(srp->g, srp->N) >= 0 || BN_ucmp(srp->B, srp->N) >= 0
+        || BN_is_zero(srp->B)) {
+        *al = SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (BN_num_bits(srp->N) < srp->strength) {
+        *al = TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY;
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (srp->SRP_verify_param_callback) {
+        if (srp->SRP_verify_param_callback(s, srp->SRP_cb_arg) <= 0) {
+            *al = TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY;
+            return 0;
+        }
+    } else if (!SRP_check_known_gN_param(srp->g, srp->N)) {
+        *al = TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY;
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int SRP_Calc_A_param(SSL *s)
+{
+    unsigned char rnd[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
+
+    if (RAND_bytes(rnd, sizeof(rnd)) <= 0)
+        return 0;
+    s->srp_ctx.a = BN_bin2bn(rnd, sizeof(rnd), s->srp_ctx.a);
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
+
+    if (!(s->srp_ctx.A = SRP_Calc_A(s->srp_ctx.a, s->srp_ctx.N, s->srp_ctx.g)))
+        return 0;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+BIGNUM *SSL_get_srp_g(SSL *s)
+{
+    if (s->srp_ctx.g != NULL)
+        return s->srp_ctx.g;
+    return s->ctx->srp_ctx.g;
+}
+
+BIGNUM *SSL_get_srp_N(SSL *s)
+{
+    if (s->srp_ctx.N != NULL)
+        return s->srp_ctx.N;
+    return s->ctx->srp_ctx.N;
+}
+
+char *SSL_get_srp_username(SSL *s)
+{
+    if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
+        return s->srp_ctx.login;
+    return s->ctx->srp_ctx.login;
+}
+
+char *SSL_get_srp_userinfo(SSL *s)
+{
+    if (s->srp_ctx.info != NULL)
+        return s->srp_ctx.info;
+    return s->ctx->srp_ctx.info;
+}
+
+# define tls1_ctx_ctrl ssl3_ctx_ctrl
+# define tls1_ctx_callback_ctrl ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_srp_username(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *name)
+{
+    return tls1_ctx_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_USERNAME, 0, name);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_srp_password(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *password)
+{
+    return tls1_ctx_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_PASSWORD, 0, password);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_srp_strength(SSL_CTX *ctx, int strength)
+{
+    return tls1_ctx_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_STRENGTH, strength,
+                         NULL);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_srp_verify_param_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                          int (*cb) (SSL *, void *))
+{
+    return tls1_ctx_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_VERIFY_PARAM_CB,
+                                  (void (*)(void))cb);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_srp_cb_arg(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *arg)
+{
+    return tls1_ctx_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_ARG, 0, arg);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_srp_username_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                      int (*cb) (SSL *, int *, void *))
+{
+    return tls1_ctx_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_USERNAME_CB,
+                                  (void (*)(void))cb);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_srp_client_pwd_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                        char *(*cb) (SSL *, void *))
+{
+    return tls1_ctx_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_GIVE_CLIENT_PWD_CB,
+                                  (void (*)(void))cb);
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/CAss.cnf b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/CAss.cnf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b20a242
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/CAss.cnf
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+#
+# SSLeay example configuration file.
+# This is mostly being used for generation of certificate requests.
+#
+
+RANDFILE		= ./.rnd
+
+####################################################################
+[ req ]
+default_bits		= 2048
+default_keyfile 	= keySS.pem
+distinguished_name	= req_distinguished_name
+encrypt_rsa_key		= no
+default_md		= sha1
+
+[ req_distinguished_name ]
+countryName			= Country Name (2 letter code)
+countryName_default		= AU
+countryName_value		= AU
+
+organizationName		= Organization Name (eg, company)
+organizationName_value		= Dodgy Brothers
+
+commonName			= Common Name (eg, YOUR name)
+commonName_value		= Dodgy CA
+
+####################################################################
+[ ca ]
+default_ca	= CA_default		# The default ca section
+
+####################################################################
+[ CA_default ]
+
+dir		= ./demoCA		# Where everything is kept
+certs		= $dir/certs		# Where the issued certs are kept
+crl_dir		= $dir/crl		# Where the issued crl are kept
+database	= $dir/index.txt	# database index file.
+#unique_subject	= no			# Set to 'no' to allow creation of
+					# several certificates with same subject.
+new_certs_dir	= $dir/newcerts		# default place for new certs.
+
+certificate	= $dir/cacert.pem 	# The CA certificate
+serial		= $dir/serial 		# The current serial number
+crl		= $dir/crl.pem 		# The current CRL
+private_key	= $dir/private/cakey.pem# The private key
+RANDFILE	= $dir/private/.rand	# private random number file
+
+x509_extensions	= v3_ca			# The extensions to add to the cert
+
+name_opt 	= ca_default		# Subject Name options
+cert_opt 	= ca_default		# Certificate field options
+
+default_days	= 365			# how long to certify for
+default_crl_days= 30			# how long before next CRL
+default_md	= md5			# which md to use.
+preserve	= no			# keep passed DN ordering
+
+policy		= policy_anything
+
+[ policy_anything ]
+countryName		= optional
+stateOrProvinceName	= optional
+localityName		= optional
+organizationName	= optional
+organizationalUnitName	= optional
+commonName		= supplied
+emailAddress		= optional
+
+
+
+[ v3_ca ]
+subjectKeyIdentifier=hash
+authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid:always,issuer:always
+basicConstraints = critical,CA:true,pathlen:1
+keyUsage = cRLSign, keyCertSign
+issuerAltName=issuer:copy
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/CAssdh.cnf b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/CAssdh.cnf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4e0a908
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/CAssdh.cnf
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+#
+# SSLeay example configuration file.
+# This is mostly being used for generation of certificate requests.
+#
+# hacked by iang to do DH certs - CA
+
+RANDFILE              = ./.rnd
+
+####################################################################
+[ req ]
+distinguished_name    = req_distinguished_name
+encrypt_rsa_key               = no
+
+[ req_distinguished_name ]
+countryName                   = Country Name (2 letter code)
+countryName_default           = CU
+countryName_value             = CU
+
+organizationName              = Organization Name (eg, company)
+organizationName_value                = La Junta de la Revolucion
+
+commonName                    = Common Name (eg, YOUR name)
+commonName_value              = Junta
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/CAssdsa.cnf b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/CAssdsa.cnf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a6b4d18
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/CAssdsa.cnf
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+#
+# SSLeay example configuration file.
+# This is mostly being used for generation of certificate requests.
+#
+# hacked by iang to do DSA certs - CA
+
+RANDFILE              = ./.rnd
+
+####################################################################
+[ req ]
+distinguished_name    = req_distinguished_name
+encrypt_rsa_key               = no
+
+[ req_distinguished_name ]
+countryName                   = Country Name (2 letter code)
+countryName_default           = ES
+countryName_value             = ES
+
+organizationName              = Organization Name (eg, company)
+organizationName_value                = Hermanos Locos
+
+commonName                    = Common Name (eg, YOUR name)
+commonName_value              = Hermanos Locos CA
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/CAssrsa.cnf b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/CAssrsa.cnf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..eb24a6d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/CAssrsa.cnf
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+#
+# SSLeay example configuration file.
+# This is mostly being used for generation of certificate requests.
+#
+# create RSA certs - CA
+
+RANDFILE              = ./.rnd
+
+####################################################################
+[ req ]
+distinguished_name    = req_distinguished_name
+encrypt_key           = no
+
+[ req_distinguished_name ]
+countryName                   = Country Name (2 letter code)
+countryName_default           = ES
+countryName_value             = ES
+
+organizationName              = Organization Name (eg, company)
+organizationName_value                = Hermanos Locos
+
+commonName                    = Common Name (eg, YOUR name)
+commonName_value              = Hermanos Locos CA
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/CAtsa.cnf b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/CAtsa.cnf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ab2f84a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/CAtsa.cnf
@@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
+
+#
+# This config is used by the Time Stamp Authority tests.
+#
+
+RANDFILE		= ./.rnd
+
+# Extra OBJECT IDENTIFIER info:
+oid_section		= new_oids
+
+TSDNSECT		= ts_cert_dn
+INDEX			= 1
+
+[ new_oids ]
+
+# Policies used by the TSA tests.
+tsa_policy1 = 1.2.3.4.1
+tsa_policy2 = 1.2.3.4.5.6
+tsa_policy3 = 1.2.3.4.5.7
+
+#----------------------------------------------------------------------
+[ ca ]
+default_ca	= CA_default		# The default ca section
+
+[ CA_default ]
+
+dir		= ./demoCA
+certs		= $dir/certs		# Where the issued certs are kept
+database	= $dir/index.txt	# database index file.
+new_certs_dir	= $dir/newcerts		# default place for new certs.
+
+certificate	= $dir/cacert.pem 	# The CA certificate
+serial		= $dir/serial 		# The current serial number
+private_key	= $dir/private/cakey.pem# The private key
+RANDFILE	= $dir/private/.rand	# private random number file
+
+default_days	= 365			# how long to certify for
+default_md	= sha256			# which md to use.
+preserve	= no			# keep passed DN ordering
+
+policy		= policy_match
+
+# For the CA policy
+[ policy_match ]
+countryName		= supplied
+stateOrProvinceName	= supplied
+organizationName	= supplied
+organizationalUnitName	= optional
+commonName		= supplied
+emailAddress		= optional
+
+#----------------------------------------------------------------------
+[ req ]
+default_bits		= 2048
+default_md		= sha1
+distinguished_name	= $ENV::TSDNSECT
+encrypt_rsa_key		= no
+prompt 			= no
+# attributes		= req_attributes
+x509_extensions	= v3_ca	# The extensions to add to the self signed cert
+
+string_mask = nombstr
+
+[ ts_ca_dn ]
+countryName			= HU
+stateOrProvinceName		= Budapest
+localityName			= Budapest
+organizationName		= Gov-CA Ltd.
+commonName			= ca1
+
+[ ts_cert_dn ]
+countryName			= HU
+stateOrProvinceName		= Budapest
+localityName			= Buda
+organizationName		= Hun-TSA Ltd.
+commonName			= tsa$ENV::INDEX
+
+[ tsa_cert ]
+
+# TSA server cert is not a CA cert.
+basicConstraints=CA:FALSE
+
+# The following key usage flags are needed for TSA server certificates.
+keyUsage = nonRepudiation, digitalSignature
+extendedKeyUsage = critical,timeStamping
+
+# PKIX recommendations harmless if included in all certificates.
+subjectKeyIdentifier=hash
+authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid,issuer:always
+
+[ non_tsa_cert ]
+
+# This is not a CA cert and not a TSA cert, either (timeStamping usage missing)
+basicConstraints=CA:FALSE
+
+# The following key usage flags are needed for TSA server certificates.
+keyUsage = nonRepudiation, digitalSignature
+# timeStamping is not supported by this certificate
+# extendedKeyUsage = critical,timeStamping
+
+# PKIX recommendations harmless if included in all certificates.
+subjectKeyIdentifier=hash
+authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid,issuer:always
+
+[ v3_req ]
+
+# Extensions to add to a certificate request
+basicConstraints = CA:FALSE
+keyUsage = nonRepudiation, digitalSignature
+
+[ v3_ca ]
+
+# Extensions for a typical CA
+
+subjectKeyIdentifier=hash
+authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid:always,issuer:always
+basicConstraints = critical,CA:true
+keyUsage = cRLSign, keyCertSign
+
+#----------------------------------------------------------------------
+[ tsa ]
+
+default_tsa = tsa_config1	# the default TSA section
+
+[ tsa_config1 ]
+
+# These are used by the TSA reply generation only.
+dir		= .			# TSA root directory
+serial		= $dir/tsa_serial	# The current serial number (mandatory)
+signer_cert	= $dir/tsa_cert1.pem 	# The TSA signing certificate
+					# (optional)
+certs		= $dir/tsaca.pem	# Certificate chain to include in reply
+					# (optional)
+signer_key	= $dir/tsa_key1.pem	# The TSA private key (optional)
+signer_digest  = sha256             # Signing digest to use. (Optional)
+default_policy	= tsa_policy1		# Policy if request did not specify it
+					# (optional)
+other_policies	= tsa_policy2, tsa_policy3	# acceptable policies (optional)
+digests     = sha1, sha256, sha384, sha512  # Acceptable message digests (mandatory)
+accuracy	= secs:1, millisecs:500, microsecs:100	# (optional)
+ordering		= yes	# Is ordering defined for timestamps?
+				# (optional, default: no)
+tsa_name		= yes	# Must the TSA name be included in the reply?
+				# (optional, default: no)
+ess_cert_id_chain	= yes	# Must the ESS cert id chain be included?
+				# (optional, default: no)
+
+[ tsa_config2 ]
+
+# This configuration uses a certificate which doesn't have timeStamping usage.
+# These are used by the TSA reply generation only.
+dir		= .			# TSA root directory
+serial		= $dir/tsa_serial	# The current serial number (mandatory)
+signer_cert	= $dir/tsa_cert2.pem 	# The TSA signing certificate
+					# (optional)
+certs		= $dir/demoCA/cacert.pem# Certificate chain to include in reply
+					# (optional)
+signer_key	= $dir/tsa_key2.pem	# The TSA private key (optional)
+signer_digest  = sha256             # Signing digest to use. (Optional)
+default_policy	= tsa_policy1		# Policy if request did not specify it
+					# (optional)
+other_policies	= tsa_policy2, tsa_policy3	# acceptable policies (optional)
+digests     = sha1, sha256, sha384, sha512  # Acceptable message digests (mandatory)
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/P1ss.cnf b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/P1ss.cnf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e6118dc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/P1ss.cnf
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+#
+# SSLeay example configuration file.
+# This is mostly being used for generation of certificate requests.
+#
+
+RANDFILE		= ./.rnd
+
+####################################################################
+[ req ]
+default_bits		= 2048
+default_keyfile 	= keySS.pem
+distinguished_name	= req_distinguished_name
+encrypt_rsa_key		= no
+default_md		= sha256
+
+[ req_distinguished_name ]
+countryName			= Country Name (2 letter code)
+countryName_default		= AU
+countryName_value		= AU
+
+organizationName                = Organization Name (eg, company)
+organizationName_value          = Dodgy Brothers
+
+0.commonName			= Common Name (eg, YOUR name)
+0.commonName_value		= Brother 1
+
+1.commonName			= Common Name (eg, YOUR name)
+1.commonName_value		= Brother 2
+
+2.commonName			= Common Name (eg, YOUR name)
+2.commonName_value		= Proxy 1
+
+[ v3_proxy ]
+basicConstraints=CA:FALSE
+subjectKeyIdentifier=hash
+authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid,issuer:always
+proxyCertInfo=critical,language:id-ppl-anyLanguage,pathlen:1,policy:text:AB
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/P2ss.cnf b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/P2ss.cnf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d530e31
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/P2ss.cnf
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+#
+# SSLeay example configuration file.
+# This is mostly being used for generation of certificate requests.
+#
+
+RANDFILE		= ./.rnd
+
+####################################################################
+[ req ]
+default_bits		= 2048
+default_keyfile 	= keySS.pem
+distinguished_name	= req_distinguished_name
+encrypt_rsa_key		= no
+default_md		= sha256
+
+[ req_distinguished_name ]
+countryName			= Country Name (2 letter code)
+countryName_default		= AU
+countryName_value		= AU
+
+organizationName                = Organization Name (eg, company)
+organizationName_value          = Dodgy Brothers
+
+0.commonName			= Common Name (eg, YOUR name)
+0.commonName_value		= Brother 1
+
+1.commonName			= Common Name (eg, YOUR name)
+1.commonName_value		= Brother 2
+
+2.commonName			= Common Name (eg, YOUR name)
+2.commonName_value		= Proxy 1
+
+3.commonName			= Common Name (eg, YOUR name)
+3.commonName_value		= Proxy 2
+
+[ v3_proxy ]
+basicConstraints=CA:FALSE
+subjectKeyIdentifier=hash
+authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid,issuer:always
+proxyCertInfo=critical,@proxy_ext
+
+[ proxy_ext ]
+language=id-ppl-anyLanguage
+pathlen=0
+policy=text:BC
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/README b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/README
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ef39d38
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/README
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+How to add recipes
+==================
+
+For any test that you want to perform, you write a script located in
+test/recipes/, named {nn}-test_{name}.t, where {nn} is a two digit number and
+{name} is a unique name of your choice.
+
+Please note that if a test involves a new testing executable, you will need to
+do some additions in test/Makefile.  More on this later.
+
+
+Naming conventions
+=================
+
+A test executable is named test/{name}test.c
+
+A test recipe is named test/recipes/{nn}-test_{name}.t, where {nn} is a two
+digit number and {name} is a unique name of your choice.
+
+The number {nn} is (somewhat loosely) grouped as follows:
+
+00-04  sanity, internal and essential API tests
+05-09  individual symmetric cipher algorithms
+10-14  math (bignum)
+15-19  individual asymmetric cipher algorithms
+20-24  openssl commands (some otherwise not tested)
+25-29  certificate forms, generation and verification
+30-35  engine and evp
+60-79  APIs
+   70  PACKET layer
+80-89  "larger" protocols (CA, CMS, OCSP, SSL, TSA)
+90-99  misc
+
+
+A recipe that just runs a test executable
+=========================================
+
+A script that just runs a program looks like this:
+
+    #! /usr/bin/perl
+    
+    use OpenSSL::Test::Simple;
+    
+    simple_test("test_{name}", "{name}test", "{name}");
+
+{name} is the unique name you have chosen for your test.
+
+The second argument to `simple_test' is the test executable, and `simple_test'
+expects it to be located in test/
+
+For documentation on OpenSSL::Test::Simple, do
+`perldoc test/testlib/OpenSSL/Test/Simple.pm'.
+
+
+A recipe that runs a more complex test
+======================================
+
+For more complex tests, you will need to read up on Test::More and
+OpenSSL::Test.  Test::More is normally preinstalled, do `man Test::More' for
+documentation.  For OpenSSL::Test, do `perldoc test/testlib/OpenSSL/Test.pm'.
+
+A script to start from could be this:
+
+    #! /usr/bin/perl
+    
+    use strict;
+    use warnings;
+    use OpenSSL::Test;
+    
+    setup("test_{name}");
+    
+    plan tests => 2;                # The number of tests being performed
+    
+    ok(test1, "test1");
+    ok(test2, "test1");
+    
+    sub test1
+    {
+        # test feature 1
+    }
+    
+    sub test2
+    {
+        # test feature 2
+    }
+    
+
+Changes to test/Makefile
+========================
+
+Whenever a new test involves a new test executable you need to do the
+following (at all times, replace {NAME} and {name} with the name of your
+test):
+
+* among the variables for test executables at the beginning, add a line like
+  this:
+
+    {NAME}TEST= {name}test
+
+* add `$({NAME}TEST)$(EXE_EXT)' to the assignment of EXE:
+
+* add `$({NAME}TEST).o' to the assignment of OBJ:
+
+* add `$({NAME}TEST).c' to the assignment of SRC:
+
+* add the following lines for building the executable:
+
+    $({NAME}TEST)$(EXE_EXT): $({NAME}TEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
+           @target=$({NAME}TEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/README.ssltest.md b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/README.ssltest.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c1edda5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/README.ssltest.md
@@ -0,0 +1,274 @@
+# SSL tests
+
+SSL testcases are configured in the `ssl-tests` directory.
+
+Each `ssl_*.conf.in` file contains a number of test configurations. These files
+are used to generate testcases in the OpenSSL CONF format.
+
+The precise test output can be dependent on the library configuration. The test
+harness generates the output files on the fly.
+
+However, for verification, we also include checked-in configuration outputs
+corresponding to the default configuration. These testcases live in
+`test/ssl-tests/*.conf` files.
+
+For more details, see `ssl-tests/01-simple.conf.in` for an example.
+
+## Configuring the test
+
+First, give your test a name. The names do not have to be unique.
+
+An example test input looks like this:
+
+```
+    {
+        name => "test-default",
+        server => { "CipherString" => "DEFAULT" },
+        client => { "CipherString" => "DEFAULT" },
+        test   => { "ExpectedResult" => "Success" },
+    }
+```
+
+The test section supports the following options
+
+### Test mode
+
+* Method - the method to test. One of DTLS or TLS.
+
+* HandshakeMode - which handshake flavour to test:
+  - Simple - plain handshake (default)
+  - Resume - test resumption
+  - RenegotiateServer - test server initiated renegotiation
+  - RenegotiateClient - test client initiated renegotiation
+
+When HandshakeMode is Resume or Renegotiate, the original handshake is expected
+to succeed. All configured test expectations are verified against the second
+handshake.
+
+* ApplicationData - amount of application data bytes to send (integer, defaults
+  to 256 bytes). Applies to both client and server. Application data is sent in
+  64kB chunks (but limited by MaxFragmentSize and available parallelization, see
+  below).
+
+* MaxFragmentSize - maximum send fragment size (integer, defaults to 512 in
+  tests - see `SSL_CTX_set_max_send_fragment` for documentation). Applies to
+  both client and server. Lowering the fragment size will split handshake and
+  application data up between more `SSL_write` calls, thus allowing to exercise
+  different code paths. In particular, if the buffer size (64kB) is at least
+  four times as large as the maximum fragment, interleaved multi-buffer crypto
+  implementations may be used on some platforms.
+
+### Test expectations
+
+* ExpectedResult - expected handshake outcome. One of
+  - Success - handshake success
+  - ServerFail - serverside handshake failure
+  - ClientFail - clientside handshake failure
+  - InternalError - some other error
+
+* ExpectedClientAlert, ExpectedServerAlert - expected alert. See
+  `ssl_test_ctx.c` for known values. Note: the expected alert is currently
+  matched against the _last_ received alert (i.e., a fatal alert or a
+  `close_notify`). Warning alert expectations are not yet supported. (A warning
+  alert will not be correctly matched, if followed by a `close_notify` or
+  another alert.)
+
+* ExpectedProtocol - expected negotiated protocol. One of
+  SSLv3, TLSv1, TLSv1.1, TLSv1.2.
+
+* SessionTicketExpected - whether or not a session ticket is expected
+  - Ignore - do not check for a session ticket (default)
+  - Yes - a session ticket is expected
+  - No - a session ticket is not expected
+
+* ResumptionExpected - whether or not resumption is expected (Resume mode only)
+  - Yes - resumed handshake
+  - No - full handshake (default)
+
+* ExpectedNPNProtocol, ExpectedALPNProtocol - NPN and ALPN expectations.
+
+* ExpectedTmpKeyType - the expected algorithm or curve of server temp key
+
+## Configuring the client and server
+
+The client and server configurations can be any valid `SSL_CTX`
+configurations. For details, see the manpages for `SSL_CONF_cmd`.
+
+Give your configurations as a dictionary of CONF commands, e.g.
+
+```
+server => {
+    "CipherString" => "DEFAULT",
+    "MinProtocol" => "TLSv1",
+}
+```
+
+The following sections may optionally be defined:
+
+* server2 - this section configures a secondary context that is selected via the
+  ServerName test option. This context is used whenever a ServerNameCallback is
+  specified. If the server2 section is not present, then the configuration
+  matches server.
+* resume_server - this section configures the client to resume its session
+  against a different server. This context is used whenever HandshakeMode is
+  Resume. If the resume_server section is not present, then the configuration
+  matches server.
+* resume_client - this section configures the client to resume its session with
+  a different configuration. In practice this may occur when, for example,
+  upgraded clients reuse sessions persisted on disk.  This context is used
+  whenever HandshakeMode is Resume. If the resume_client section is not present,
+  then the configuration matches client.
+
+### Configuring callbacks and additional options
+
+Additional handshake settings can be configured in the `extra` section of each
+client and server:
+
+```
+client => {
+    "CipherString" => "DEFAULT",
+    extra => {
+        "ServerName" => "server2",
+    }
+}
+```
+
+#### Supported client-side options
+
+* ClientVerifyCallback - the client's custom certificate verify callback.
+  Used to test callback behaviour. One of
+  - None - no custom callback (default)
+  - AcceptAll - accepts all certificates.
+  - RejectAll - rejects all certificates.
+
+* ServerName - the server the client should attempt to connect to. One of
+  - None - do not use SNI (default)
+  - server1 - the initial context
+  - server2 - the secondary context
+  - invalid - an unknown context
+
+* CTValidation - Certificate Transparency validation strategy. One of
+  - None - no validation (default)
+  - Permissive - SSL_CT_VALIDATION_PERMISSIVE
+  - Strict - SSL_CT_VALIDATION_STRICT
+
+#### Supported server-side options
+
+* ServerNameCallback - the SNI switching callback to use
+  - None - no callback (default)
+  - IgnoreMismatch - continue the handshake on SNI mismatch
+  - RejectMismatch - abort the handshake on SNI mismatch
+
+* BrokenSessionTicket - a special test case where the session ticket callback
+  does not initialize crypto.
+  - No (default)
+  - Yes
+
+#### Mutually supported options
+
+* NPNProtocols, ALPNProtocols - NPN and ALPN settings. Server and client
+  protocols can be specified as a comma-separated list, and a callback with the
+  recommended behaviour will be installed automatically.
+
+### Default server and client configurations
+
+The default server certificate and CA files are added to the configurations
+automatically. Server certificate verification is requested by default.
+
+You can override these options by redefining them:
+
+```
+client => {
+    "VerifyCAFile" => "/path/to/custom/file"
+}
+```
+
+or by deleting them
+
+```
+client => {
+    "VerifyCAFile" => undef
+}
+```
+
+## Adding a test to the test harness
+
+1. Add a new test configuration to `test/ssl-tests`, following the examples of
+   existing `*.conf.in` files (for example, `01-simple.conf.in`).
+
+2. Generate the generated `*.conf` test input file. You can do so by running
+   `generate_ssl_tests.pl`:
+
+```
+$ ./config
+$ cd test
+$ TOP=.. perl -I testlib/ generate_ssl_tests.pl ssl-tests/my.conf.in \
+  > ssl-tests/my.conf
+```
+
+where `my.conf.in` is your test input file.
+
+For example, to generate the test cases in `ssl-tests/01-simple.conf.in`, do
+
+```
+$ TOP=.. perl -I testlib/ generate_ssl_tests.pl ssl-tests/01-simple.conf.in > ssl-tests/01-simple.conf
+```
+
+Alternatively (hackish but simple), you can comment out
+
+```
+unlink glob $tmp_file;
+```
+
+in `test/recipes/80-test_ssl_new.t` and run
+
+```
+$ make TESTS=test_ssl_new test
+```
+
+This will save the generated output in a `*.tmp` file in the build directory.
+
+3. Update the number of tests planned in `test/recipes/80-test_ssl_new.t`. If
+   the test suite has any skip conditions, update those too (see
+   `test/recipes/80-test_ssl_new.t` for details).
+
+## Running the tests with the test harness
+
+```
+HARNESS_VERBOSE=yes make TESTS=test_ssl_new test
+```
+
+## Running a test manually
+
+These steps are only needed during development. End users should run `make test`
+or follow the instructions above to run the SSL test suite.
+
+To run an SSL test manually from the command line, the `TEST_CERTS_DIR`
+environment variable to point to the location of the certs. E.g., from the root
+OpenSSL directory, do
+
+```
+$ CTLOG_FILE=test/ct/log_list.conf TEST_CERTS_DIR=test/certs test/ssl_test \
+  test/ssl-tests/01-simple.conf
+```
+
+or for shared builds
+
+```
+$ CTLOG_FILE=test/ct/log_list.conf  TEST_CERTS_DIR=test/certs \
+  util/shlib_wrap.sh test/ssl_test test/ssl-tests/01-simple.conf
+```
+
+Note that the test expectations sometimes depend on the Configure settings. For
+example, the negotiated protocol depends on the set of available (enabled)
+protocols: a build with `enable-ssl3` has different test expectations than a
+build with `no-ssl3`.
+
+The Perl test harness automatically generates expected outputs, so users who
+just run `make test` do not need any extra steps.
+
+However, when running a test manually, keep in mind that the repository version
+of the generated `test/ssl-tests/*.conf` correspond to expected outputs in with
+the default Configure options. To run `ssl_test` manually from the command line
+in a build with a different configuration, you may need to generate the right
+`*.conf` file from the `*.conf.in` input first.
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/Sssdsa.cnf b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/Sssdsa.cnf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8e170a2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/Sssdsa.cnf
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+#
+# SSLeay example configuration file.
+# This is mostly being used for generation of certificate requests.
+#
+# hacked by iang to do DSA certs - Server
+
+RANDFILE              = ./.rnd
+
+####################################################################
+[ req ]
+distinguished_name    = req_distinguished_name
+encrypt_rsa_key               = no
+
+[ req_distinguished_name ]
+countryName                   = Country Name (2 letter code)
+countryName_default           = ES
+countryName_value             = ES
+
+organizationName                = Organization Name (eg, company)
+organizationName_value          = Tortilleras S.A.
+
+0.commonName                  = Common Name (eg, YOUR name)
+0.commonName_value            = Torti
+
+1.commonName                  = Common Name (eg, YOUR name)
+1.commonName_value            = Gordita
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/Sssrsa.cnf b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/Sssrsa.cnf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8c79a03
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/Sssrsa.cnf
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+#
+# SSLeay example configuration file.
+# This is mostly being used for generation of certificate requests.
+#
+# create RSA certs - Server
+
+RANDFILE              = ./.rnd
+
+####################################################################
+[ req ]
+distinguished_name    = req_distinguished_name
+encrypt_key           = no
+
+[ req_distinguished_name ]
+countryName                   = Country Name (2 letter code)
+countryName_default           = ES
+countryName_value             = ES
+
+organizationName                = Organization Name (eg, company)
+organizationName_value          = Tortilleras S.A.
+
+0.commonName                  = Common Name (eg, YOUR name)
+0.commonName_value            = Torti
+
+1.commonName                  = Common Name (eg, YOUR name)
+1.commonName_value            = Gordita
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/Uss.cnf b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/Uss.cnf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f655e74
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/Uss.cnf
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+#
+# SSLeay example configuration file.
+# This is mostly being used for generation of certificate requests.
+#
+
+RANDFILE		= ./.rnd
+CN2 = Brother 2
+
+####################################################################
+[ req ]
+default_bits		= 2048
+default_keyfile 	= keySS.pem
+distinguished_name	= req_distinguished_name
+encrypt_rsa_key		= no
+default_md		    = sha256
+prompt              = no
+
+[ req_distinguished_name ]
+countryName         = AU
+organizationName    = Dodgy Brothers
+0.commonName        = Brother 1
+1.commonName		= $ENV::CN2
+
+[ v3_ee ]
+subjectKeyIdentifier=hash
+authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid,issuer:always
+basicConstraints = CA:false
+keyUsage = nonRepudiation, digitalSignature, keyEncipherment
+
+[ v3_ee_dsa ]
+subjectKeyIdentifier=hash
+authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid:always
+basicConstraints = CA:false
+keyUsage = nonRepudiation, digitalSignature
+
+[ v3_ee_ec ]
+subjectKeyIdentifier=hash
+authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid:always
+basicConstraints = CA:false
+keyUsage = nonRepudiation, digitalSignature, keyAgreement
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/aborttest.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/aborttest.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ba5055e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/aborttest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    OPENSSL_die("Voluntary abort", __FILE__, __LINE__);
+    return 0;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/afalgtest.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/afalgtest.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e6e02f0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/afalgtest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_AFALGENG
+# include <linux/version.h>
+# define K_MAJ   4
+# define K_MIN1  1
+# define K_MIN2  0
+# if LINUX_VERSION_CODE < KERNEL_VERSION(K_MAJ, K_MIN1, K_MIN2)
+/*
+ * If we get here then it looks like there is a mismatch between the linux
+ * headers and the actual kernel version, so we have tried to compile with
+ * afalg support, but then skipped it in e_afalg.c. As far as this test is
+ * concerned we behave as if we had been configured without support
+ */
+#  define OPENSSL_NO_AFALGENG
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_AFALGENG
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+/* Use a buffer size which is not aligned to block size */
+#define BUFFER_SIZE     (8 * 1024) - 13
+
+static int test_afalg_aes_128_cbc(ENGINE *e)
+{
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
+    const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_aes_128_cbc();
+    unsigned char key[] = "\x5F\x4D\xCC\x3B\x5A\xA7\x65\xD6\
+                           \x1D\x83\x27\xDE\xB8\x82\xCF\x99";
+    unsigned char iv[] = "\x2B\x95\x99\x0A\x91\x51\x37\x4A\
+                          \xBD\x8F\xF8\xC5\xA7\xA0\xFE\x08";
+
+    unsigned char in[BUFFER_SIZE];
+    unsigned char ebuf[BUFFER_SIZE + 32];
+    unsigned char dbuf[BUFFER_SIZE + 32];
+    int encl, encf, decl, decf;
+    unsigned int status = 0;
+
+    ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "%s() failed to allocate ctx\n", __func__);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    RAND_bytes(in, BUFFER_SIZE);
+
+    if (       !EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, cipher, e, key, iv, 1)
+            || !EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx, ebuf, &encl, in, BUFFER_SIZE)
+            || !EVP_CipherFinal_ex(ctx, ebuf+encl, &encf)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "%s() failed encryption\n", __func__);
+        goto end;
+    }
+    encl += encf;
+
+    if (       !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(ctx)
+            || !EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, cipher, e, key, iv, 0)
+            || !EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx, dbuf, &decl, ebuf, encl)
+            || !EVP_CipherFinal_ex(ctx, dbuf+decl, &decf)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "%s() failed decryption\n", __func__);
+        goto end;
+    }
+    decl += decf;
+
+    if (       decl != BUFFER_SIZE
+            || memcmp(dbuf, in, BUFFER_SIZE)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "%s() failed Dec(Enc(P)) != P\n", __func__);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    status = 1;
+
+ end:
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
+    return status;
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    ENGINE *e;
+
+    CRYPTO_set_mem_debug(1);
+    CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON);
+
+    ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STATIC_ENGINE
+    OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_AFALG, NULL);
+# endif
+
+    e = ENGINE_by_id("afalg");
+    if (e == NULL) {
+        /*
+         * A failure to load is probably a platform environment problem so we
+         * don't treat this as an OpenSSL test failure, i.e. we return 0
+         */
+        fprintf(stderr,
+                "AFALG Test: Failed to load AFALG Engine - skipping test\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (test_afalg_aes_128_cbc(e) == 0) {
+        ENGINE_free(e);
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    ENGINE_free(e);
+    printf("PASS\n");
+    return 0;
+}
+
+#else  /* OPENSSL_NO_AFALGENG */
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    fprintf(stderr, "AFALG not supported - skipping AFALG tests\n");
+    printf("PASS\n");
+    return 0;
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/asynciotest.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/asynciotest.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7e51efb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/asynciotest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,382 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL licenses, (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ * or in the file LICENSE in the source distribution.
+ */
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+#include "../ssl/packet_locl.h"
+
+#include "ssltestlib.h"
+
+/* Should we fragment records or not? 0 = no, !0 = yes*/
+static int fragment = 0;
+
+static int async_new(BIO *bi);
+static int async_free(BIO *a);
+static int async_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl);
+static int async_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl);
+static long async_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr);
+static int async_gets(BIO *bp, char *buf, int size);
+static int async_puts(BIO *bp, const char *str);
+
+/* Choose a sufficiently large type likely to be unused for this custom BIO */
+# define BIO_TYPE_ASYNC_FILTER  (0x80 | BIO_TYPE_FILTER)
+
+static BIO_METHOD *methods_async = NULL;
+
+struct async_ctrs {
+    unsigned int rctr;
+    unsigned int wctr;
+};
+
+static const BIO_METHOD *bio_f_async_filter()
+{
+    if (methods_async == NULL) {
+        methods_async = BIO_meth_new(BIO_TYPE_ASYNC_FILTER, "Async filter");
+        if (   methods_async == NULL
+            || !BIO_meth_set_write(methods_async, async_write)
+            || !BIO_meth_set_read(methods_async, async_read)
+            || !BIO_meth_set_puts(methods_async, async_puts)
+            || !BIO_meth_set_gets(methods_async, async_gets)
+            || !BIO_meth_set_ctrl(methods_async, async_ctrl)
+            || !BIO_meth_set_create(methods_async, async_new)
+            || !BIO_meth_set_destroy(methods_async, async_free))
+            return NULL;
+    }
+    return methods_async;
+}
+
+static int async_new(BIO *bio)
+{
+    struct async_ctrs *ctrs;
+
+    ctrs = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(struct async_ctrs));
+    if (ctrs == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    BIO_set_data(bio, ctrs);
+    BIO_set_init(bio, 1);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int async_free(BIO *bio)
+{
+    struct async_ctrs *ctrs;
+
+    if (bio == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    ctrs = BIO_get_data(bio);
+    OPENSSL_free(ctrs);
+    BIO_set_data(bio, NULL);
+    BIO_set_init(bio, 0);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int async_read(BIO *bio, char *out, int outl)
+{
+    struct async_ctrs *ctrs;
+    int ret = -1;
+    BIO *next = BIO_next(bio);
+
+    if (outl <= 0)
+        return 0;
+    if (next == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    ctrs = BIO_get_data(bio);
+
+    BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
+
+    if (ctrs->rctr > 0) {
+        ret = BIO_read(next, out, 1);
+        if (ret <= 0 && BIO_should_read(next))
+            BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
+        ctrs->rctr = 0;
+    } else {
+        ctrs->rctr++;
+        BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
+    }
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+#define MIN_RECORD_LEN  6
+
+#define CONTENTTYPEPOS  0
+#define VERSIONHIPOS    1
+#define VERSIONLOPOS    2
+#define DATAPOS         5
+
+static int async_write(BIO *bio, const char *in, int inl)
+{
+    struct async_ctrs *ctrs;
+    int ret = -1;
+    size_t written = 0;
+    BIO *next = BIO_next(bio);
+
+    if (inl <= 0)
+        return 0;
+    if (next == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    ctrs = BIO_get_data(bio);
+
+    BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
+
+    if (ctrs->wctr > 0) {
+        ctrs->wctr = 0;
+        if (fragment) {
+            PACKET pkt;
+
+            if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, (const unsigned char *)in, inl))
+                abort();
+
+            while (PACKET_remaining(&pkt) > 0) {
+                PACKET payload;
+                unsigned int contenttype, versionhi, versionlo, data;
+
+                if (   !PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &contenttype)
+                    || !PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &versionhi)
+                    || !PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &versionlo)
+                    || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&pkt, &payload))
+                    abort();
+
+                /* Pretend we wrote out the record header */
+                written += SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+
+                while (PACKET_get_1(&payload, &data)) {
+                    /* Create a new one byte long record for each byte in the
+                     * record in the input buffer
+                     */
+                    char smallrec[MIN_RECORD_LEN] = {
+                        0, /* Content type */
+                        0, /* Version hi */
+                        0, /* Version lo */
+                        0, /* Length hi */
+                        1, /* Length lo */
+                        0  /* Data */
+                    };
+
+                    smallrec[CONTENTTYPEPOS] = contenttype;
+                    smallrec[VERSIONHIPOS] = versionhi;
+                    smallrec[VERSIONLOPOS] = versionlo;
+                    smallrec[DATAPOS] = data;
+                    ret = BIO_write(next, smallrec, MIN_RECORD_LEN);
+                    if (ret <= 0)
+                        abort();
+                    written++;
+                }
+                /*
+                 * We can't fragment anything after the CCS, otherwise we
+                 * get a bad record MAC
+                 */
+                if (contenttype == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
+                    fragment = 0;
+                    break;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        /* Write any data we have left after fragmenting */
+        ret = 0;
+        if ((int)written < inl) {
+            ret = BIO_write(next, in + written , inl - written);
+        }
+
+        if (ret <= 0 && BIO_should_write(next))
+            BIO_set_retry_write(bio);
+        else
+            ret += written;
+    } else {
+        ctrs->wctr++;
+        BIO_set_retry_write(bio);
+    }
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static long async_ctrl(BIO *bio, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
+{
+    long ret;
+    BIO *next = BIO_next(bio);
+
+    if (next == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    switch (cmd) {
+    case BIO_CTRL_DUP:
+        ret = 0L;
+        break;
+    default:
+        ret = BIO_ctrl(next, cmd, num, ptr);
+        break;
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int async_gets(BIO *bio, char *buf, int size)
+{
+    /* We don't support this - not needed anyway */
+    return -1;
+}
+
+static int async_puts(BIO *bio, const char *str)
+{
+    return async_write(bio, str, strlen(str));
+}
+
+#define MAX_ATTEMPTS    100
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+    SSL_CTX *serverctx = NULL, *clientctx = NULL;
+    SSL *serverssl = NULL, *clientssl = NULL;
+    BIO *s_to_c_fbio = NULL, *c_to_s_fbio = NULL;
+    int test, err = 1, ret;
+    size_t i, j;
+    const char testdata[] = "Test data";
+    char buf[sizeof(testdata)];
+
+    CRYPTO_set_mem_debug(1);
+    CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON);
+
+    if (argc != 3) {
+        printf("Invalid argument count\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (!create_ssl_ctx_pair(TLS_server_method(), TLS_client_method(),
+                             TLS1_VERSION, TLS_MAX_VERSION,
+                             &serverctx, &clientctx, argv[1], argv[2])) {
+        printf("Failed to create SSL_CTX pair\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * We do 2 test runs. The first time around we just do a normal handshake
+     * with lots of async io going on. The second time around we also break up
+     * all records so that the content is only one byte length (up until the
+     * CCS)
+     */
+    for (test = 1; test < 3; test++) {
+        if (test == 2)
+            fragment = 1;
+
+
+        s_to_c_fbio = BIO_new(bio_f_async_filter());
+        c_to_s_fbio = BIO_new(bio_f_async_filter());
+        if (s_to_c_fbio == NULL || c_to_s_fbio == NULL) {
+            printf("Failed to create filter BIOs\n");
+            BIO_free(s_to_c_fbio);
+            BIO_free(c_to_s_fbio);
+            goto end;
+        }
+
+        /* BIOs get freed on error */
+        if (!create_ssl_objects(serverctx, clientctx, &serverssl, &clientssl,
+                                s_to_c_fbio, c_to_s_fbio)) {
+            printf("Test %d failed: Create SSL objects failed\n", test);
+            goto end;
+        }
+
+        if (!create_ssl_connection(serverssl, clientssl)) {
+            printf("Test %d failed: Create SSL connection failed\n", test);
+            goto end;
+        }
+
+        /*
+         * Send and receive some test data. Do the whole thing twice to ensure
+         * we hit at least one async event in both reading and writing
+         */
+        for (j = 0; j < 2; j++) {
+            int len;
+
+            /*
+             * Write some test data. It should never take more than 2 attempts
+             * (the first one might be a retryable fail).
+             */
+            for (ret = -1, i = 0, len = 0; len != sizeof(testdata) && i < 2;
+                i++) {
+                ret = SSL_write(clientssl, testdata + len,
+                    sizeof(testdata) - len);
+                if (ret > 0) {
+                    len += ret;
+                } else {
+                    int ssl_error = SSL_get_error(clientssl, ret);
+
+                    if (ssl_error == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL ||
+                        ssl_error == SSL_ERROR_SSL) {
+                        printf("Test %d failed: Failed to write app data\n", test);
+                        err = -1;
+                        goto end;
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+            if (len != sizeof(testdata)) {
+                err = -1;
+                printf("Test %d failed: Failed to write all app data\n", test);
+                goto end;
+            }
+            /*
+             * Now read the test data. It may take more attempts here because
+             * it could fail once for each byte read, including all overhead
+             * bytes from the record header/padding etc.
+             */
+            for (ret = -1, i = 0, len = 0; len != sizeof(testdata) &&
+                i < MAX_ATTEMPTS; i++)
+            {
+                ret = SSL_read(serverssl, buf + len, sizeof(buf) - len);
+                if (ret > 0) {
+                    len += ret;
+                } else {
+                    int ssl_error = SSL_get_error(serverssl, ret);
+
+                    if (ssl_error == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL ||
+                        ssl_error == SSL_ERROR_SSL) {
+                        printf("Test %d failed: Failed to read app data\n", test);
+                        err = -1;
+                        goto end;
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+            if (len != sizeof(testdata)
+                    || memcmp(buf, testdata, sizeof(testdata)) != 0) {
+                err = -1;
+                printf("Test %d failed: Unexpected app data received\n", test);
+                goto end;
+            }
+        }
+
+        /* Also frees the BIOs */
+        SSL_free(clientssl);
+        SSL_free(serverssl);
+        clientssl = serverssl = NULL;
+    }
+
+    printf("Test success\n");
+
+    err = 0;
+ end:
+    if (err)
+        ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+
+    SSL_free(clientssl);
+    SSL_free(serverssl);
+    SSL_CTX_free(clientctx);
+    SSL_CTX_free(serverctx);
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG
+    CRYPTO_mem_leaks_fp(stderr);
+# endif
+
+    return err;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/asynctest.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/asynctest.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..eef3c32
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/asynctest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,291 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifdef _WIN32
+# include <windows.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/async.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+
+static int ctr = 0;
+static ASYNC_JOB *currjob = NULL;
+
+static int only_pause(void *args)
+{
+    ASYNC_pause_job();
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int add_two(void *args)
+{
+    ctr++;
+    ASYNC_pause_job();
+    ctr++;
+
+    return 2;
+}
+
+static int save_current(void *args)
+{
+    currjob = ASYNC_get_current_job();
+    ASYNC_pause_job();
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+#define MAGIC_WAIT_FD   ((OSSL_ASYNC_FD)99)
+static int waitfd(void *args)
+{
+    ASYNC_JOB *job;
+    ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *waitctx;
+    job = ASYNC_get_current_job();
+    if (job == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    waitctx = ASYNC_get_wait_ctx(job);
+    if (waitctx == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    /* First case: no fd added or removed */
+    ASYNC_pause_job();
+
+    /* Second case: one fd added */
+    if (!ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_set_wait_fd(waitctx, waitctx, MAGIC_WAIT_FD, NULL, NULL))
+        return 0;
+    ASYNC_pause_job();
+
+    /* Third case: all fd removed */
+    if (!ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_clear_fd(waitctx, waitctx))
+        return 0;
+    ASYNC_pause_job();
+
+    /* Last case: fd added and immediately removed */
+    if (!ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_set_wait_fd(waitctx, waitctx, MAGIC_WAIT_FD, NULL, NULL))
+        return 0;
+    if (!ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_clear_fd(waitctx, waitctx))
+        return 0;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int blockpause(void *args)
+{
+    ASYNC_block_pause();
+    ASYNC_pause_job();
+    ASYNC_unblock_pause();
+    ASYNC_pause_job();
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int test_ASYNC_init_thread()
+{
+    ASYNC_JOB *job1 = NULL, *job2 = NULL, *job3 = NULL;
+    int funcret1, funcret2, funcret3;
+    ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *waitctx = NULL;
+
+    if (       !ASYNC_init_thread(2, 0)
+            || (waitctx = ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_new()) == NULL
+            || ASYNC_start_job(&job1, waitctx, &funcret1, only_pause, NULL, 0)
+                != ASYNC_PAUSE
+            || ASYNC_start_job(&job2, waitctx, &funcret2, only_pause, NULL, 0)
+                != ASYNC_PAUSE
+            || ASYNC_start_job(&job3, waitctx, &funcret3, only_pause, NULL, 0)
+                != ASYNC_NO_JOBS
+            || ASYNC_start_job(&job1, waitctx, &funcret1, only_pause, NULL, 0)
+                != ASYNC_FINISH
+            || ASYNC_start_job(&job3, waitctx, &funcret3, only_pause, NULL, 0)
+                != ASYNC_PAUSE
+            || ASYNC_start_job(&job2, waitctx, &funcret2, only_pause, NULL, 0)
+                != ASYNC_FINISH
+            || ASYNC_start_job(&job3, waitctx, &funcret3, only_pause, NULL, 0)
+                != ASYNC_FINISH
+            || funcret1 != 1
+            || funcret2 != 1
+            || funcret3 != 1) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "test_ASYNC_init_thread() failed\n");
+        ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_free(waitctx);
+        ASYNC_cleanup_thread();
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_free(waitctx);
+    ASYNC_cleanup_thread();
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int test_ASYNC_start_job()
+{
+    ASYNC_JOB *job = NULL;
+    int funcret;
+    ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *waitctx = NULL;
+
+    ctr = 0;
+
+    if (       !ASYNC_init_thread(1, 0)
+            || (waitctx = ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_new()) == NULL
+            || ASYNC_start_job(&job, waitctx, &funcret, add_two, NULL, 0)
+               != ASYNC_PAUSE
+            || ctr != 1
+            || ASYNC_start_job(&job, waitctx, &funcret, add_two, NULL, 0)
+               != ASYNC_FINISH
+            || ctr != 2
+            || funcret != 2) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "test_ASYNC_start_job() failed\n");
+        ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_free(waitctx);
+        ASYNC_cleanup_thread();
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_free(waitctx);
+    ASYNC_cleanup_thread();
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int test_ASYNC_get_current_job()
+{
+    ASYNC_JOB *job = NULL;
+    int funcret;
+    ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *waitctx = NULL;
+
+    currjob = NULL;
+
+    if (       !ASYNC_init_thread(1, 0)
+            || (waitctx = ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_new()) == NULL
+            || ASYNC_start_job(&job, waitctx, &funcret, save_current, NULL, 0)
+                != ASYNC_PAUSE
+            || currjob != job
+            || ASYNC_start_job(&job, waitctx, &funcret, save_current, NULL, 0)
+                != ASYNC_FINISH
+            || funcret != 1) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "test_ASYNC_get_current_job() failed\n");
+        ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_free(waitctx);
+        ASYNC_cleanup_thread();
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_free(waitctx);
+    ASYNC_cleanup_thread();
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int test_ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_all_fds()
+{
+    ASYNC_JOB *job = NULL;
+    int funcret;
+    ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *waitctx = NULL;
+    OSSL_ASYNC_FD fd = OSSL_BAD_ASYNC_FD, delfd = OSSL_BAD_ASYNC_FD;
+    size_t numfds, numdelfds;
+
+    if (       !ASYNC_init_thread(1, 0)
+            || (waitctx = ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_new()) == NULL
+               /* On first run we're not expecting any wait fds */
+            || ASYNC_start_job(&job, waitctx, &funcret, waitfd, NULL, 0)
+                != ASYNC_PAUSE
+            || !ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_all_fds(waitctx, NULL, &numfds)
+            || numfds != 0
+            || !ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_changed_fds(waitctx, NULL, &numfds, NULL,
+                                               &numdelfds)
+            || numfds != 0
+            || numdelfds != 0
+               /* On second run we're expecting one added fd */
+            || ASYNC_start_job(&job, waitctx, &funcret, waitfd, NULL, 0)
+                != ASYNC_PAUSE
+            || !ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_all_fds(waitctx, NULL, &numfds)
+            || numfds != 1
+            || !ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_all_fds(waitctx, &fd, &numfds)
+            || fd != MAGIC_WAIT_FD
+            || (fd = OSSL_BAD_ASYNC_FD, 0) /* Assign to something else */
+            || !ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_changed_fds(waitctx, NULL, &numfds, NULL,
+                                               &numdelfds)
+            || numfds != 1
+            || numdelfds != 0
+            || !ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_changed_fds(waitctx, &fd, &numfds, NULL,
+                                               &numdelfds)
+            || fd != MAGIC_WAIT_FD
+               /* On third run we expect one deleted fd */
+            || ASYNC_start_job(&job, waitctx, &funcret, waitfd, NULL, 0)
+                != ASYNC_PAUSE
+            || !ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_all_fds(waitctx, NULL, &numfds)
+            || numfds != 0
+            || !ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_changed_fds(waitctx, NULL, &numfds, NULL,
+                                               &numdelfds)
+            || numfds != 0
+            || numdelfds != 1
+            || !ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_changed_fds(waitctx, NULL, &numfds, &delfd,
+                                               &numdelfds)
+            || delfd != MAGIC_WAIT_FD
+            /* On last run we are not expecting any wait fd */
+            || ASYNC_start_job(&job, waitctx, &funcret, waitfd, NULL, 0)
+                != ASYNC_FINISH
+            || !ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_all_fds(waitctx, NULL, &numfds)
+            || numfds != 0
+            || !ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_changed_fds(waitctx, NULL, &numfds, NULL,
+                                               &numdelfds)
+            || numfds != 0
+            || numdelfds != 0
+            || funcret != 1) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "test_ASYNC_get_wait_fd() failed\n");
+        ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_free(waitctx);
+        ASYNC_cleanup_thread();
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_free(waitctx);
+    ASYNC_cleanup_thread();
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int test_ASYNC_block_pause()
+{
+    ASYNC_JOB *job = NULL;
+    int funcret;
+    ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *waitctx = NULL;
+
+    if (       !ASYNC_init_thread(1, 0)
+            || (waitctx = ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_new()) == NULL
+            || ASYNC_start_job(&job, waitctx, &funcret, blockpause, NULL, 0)
+                != ASYNC_PAUSE
+            || ASYNC_start_job(&job, waitctx, &funcret, blockpause, NULL, 0)
+                != ASYNC_FINISH
+            || funcret != 1) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "test_ASYNC_block_pause() failed\n");
+        ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_free(waitctx);
+        ASYNC_cleanup_thread();
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_free(waitctx);
+    ASYNC_cleanup_thread();
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    if (!ASYNC_is_capable()) {
+        fprintf(stderr,
+                "OpenSSL build is not ASYNC capable - skipping async tests\n");
+    } else {
+        CRYPTO_set_mem_debug(1);
+        CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON);
+
+        if (       !test_ASYNC_init_thread()
+                || !test_ASYNC_start_job()
+                || !test_ASYNC_get_current_job()
+                || !test_ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_all_fds()
+                || !test_ASYNC_block_pause()) {
+            return 1;
+        }
+    }
+    printf("PASS\n");
+    return 0;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/bad_dtls_test.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/bad_dtls_test.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2e33010
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/bad_dtls_test.c
@@ -0,0 +1,624 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Unit test for Cisco DTLS1_BAD_VER session resume, as used by
+ * AnyConnect VPN protocol.
+ *
+ * This is designed to exercise the code paths in
+ * http://git.infradead.org/users/dwmw2/openconnect.git/blob/HEAD:/dtls.c
+ * which have frequently been affected by regressions in DTLS1_BAD_VER
+ * support.
+ *
+ * Note that unlike other SSL tests, we don't test against our own SSL
+ * server method. Firstly because we don't have one; we *only* support
+ * DTLS1_BAD_VER as a client. And secondly because even if that were
+ * fixed up it's the wrong thing to test against - because if changes
+ * are made in generic DTLS code which don't take DTLS1_BAD_VER into
+ * account, there's plenty of scope for making those changes such that
+ * they break *both* the client and the server in the same way.
+ *
+ * So we handle the server side manually. In a session resume there isn't
+ * much to be done anyway.
+ */
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/kdf.h>
+
+#include "../ssl/packet_locl.h"
+#include "../e_os.h" /* for OSSL_NELEM() */
+
+/* For DTLS1_BAD_VER packets the MAC doesn't include the handshake header */
+#define MAC_OFFSET (DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
+
+static unsigned char client_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE];
+static unsigned char server_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE];
+
+/* These are all generated locally, sized purely according to our own whim */
+static unsigned char session_id[32];
+static unsigned char master_secret[48];
+static unsigned char cookie[20];
+
+/* We've hard-coded the cipher suite; we know it's 104 bytes */
+static unsigned char key_block[104];
+#define mac_key (key_block + 20)
+#define dec_key (key_block + 40)
+#define enc_key (key_block + 56)
+
+static EVP_MD_CTX *handshake_md;
+
+static int do_PRF(const void *seed1, int seed1_len,
+                  const void *seed2, int seed2_len,
+                  const void *seed3, int seed3_len,
+                  unsigned char *out, int olen)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_TLS1_PRF, NULL);
+    size_t outlen = olen;
+
+    /* No error handling. If it all screws up, the test will fail anyway */
+    EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx);
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_tls1_prf_md(pctx, EVP_md5_sha1());
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_tls1_prf_secret(pctx, master_secret, sizeof(master_secret));
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_tls1_prf_seed(pctx, seed1, seed1_len);
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_tls1_prf_seed(pctx, seed2, seed2_len);
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_tls1_prf_seed(pctx, seed3, seed3_len);
+    EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx, out, &outlen);
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static SSL_SESSION *client_session(void)
+{
+    static unsigned char session_asn1[] = {
+        0x30, 0x5F,              /* SEQUENCE, length 0x5F */
+        0x02, 0x01, 0x01,        /* INTEGER, SSL_SESSION_ASN1_VERSION */
+        0x02, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00,  /* INTEGER, DTLS1_BAD_VER */
+        0x04, 0x02, 0x00, 0x2F,  /* OCTET_STRING, AES128-SHA */
+        0x04, 0x20,              /* OCTET_STRING, session id */
+#define SS_SESSID_OFS 15 /* Session ID goes here */
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x04, 0x30,              /* OCTET_STRING, master secret */
+#define SS_SECRET_OFS 49 /* Master secret goes here */
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+    };
+    const unsigned char *p = session_asn1;
+
+    /* Copy the randomly-generated fields into the above ASN1 */
+    memcpy(session_asn1 + SS_SESSID_OFS, session_id, sizeof(session_id));
+    memcpy(session_asn1 + SS_SECRET_OFS, master_secret, sizeof(master_secret));
+
+    return d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, sizeof(session_asn1));
+}
+
+/* Returns 1 for initial ClientHello, 2 for ClientHello with cookie */
+static int validate_client_hello(BIO *wbio)
+{
+    PACKET pkt, pkt2;
+    long len;
+    unsigned char *data;
+    int cookie_found = 0;
+    unsigned int u;
+
+    len = BIO_get_mem_data(wbio, (char **)&data);
+    if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, data, len))
+        return 0;
+
+    /* Check record header type */
+    if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &u) || u != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
+        return 0;
+    /* Version */
+    if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &u) || u != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+        return 0;
+    /* Skip the rest of the record header */
+    if (!PACKET_forward(&pkt, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH - 3))
+        return 0;
+
+    /* Check it's a ClientHello */
+    if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &u) || u != SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
+        return 0;
+    /* Skip the rest of the handshake message header */
+    if (!PACKET_forward(&pkt, DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - 1))
+        return 0;
+
+    /* Check client version */
+    if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &u) || u != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+        return 0;
+
+    /* Store random */
+    if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&pkt, client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE))
+        return 0;
+
+    /* Check session id length and content */
+    if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&pkt, &pkt2) ||
+        !PACKET_equal(&pkt2, session_id, sizeof(session_id)))
+        return 0;
+
+    /* Check cookie */
+    if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&pkt, &pkt2))
+        return 0;
+    if (PACKET_remaining(&pkt2)) {
+        if (!PACKET_equal(&pkt2, cookie, sizeof(cookie)))
+            return 0;
+        cookie_found = 1;
+    }
+
+    /* Skip ciphers */
+    if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &u) || !PACKET_forward(&pkt, u))
+        return 0;
+
+    /* Skip compression */
+    if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &u) || !PACKET_forward(&pkt, u))
+        return 0;
+
+    /* Skip extensions */
+    if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &u) || !PACKET_forward(&pkt, u))
+        return 0;
+
+    /* Now we are at the end */
+    if (PACKET_remaining(&pkt))
+        return 0;
+
+    /* Update handshake MAC for second ClientHello (with cookie) */
+    if (cookie_found && !EVP_DigestUpdate(handshake_md, data + MAC_OFFSET,
+                                          len - MAC_OFFSET))
+            printf("EVP_DigestUpdate() failed\n");
+
+    (void)BIO_reset(wbio);
+
+    return 1 + cookie_found;
+}
+
+static int send_hello_verify(BIO *rbio)
+{
+    static unsigned char hello_verify[] = {
+        0x16, /* Handshake */
+        0x01, 0x00, /* DTLS1_BAD_VER */
+        0x00, 0x00, /* Epoch 0 */
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Seq# 0 */
+        0x00, 0x23, /* Length */
+        0x03, /* Hello Verify */
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x17, /* Length */
+        0x00, 0x00, /* Seq# 0 */
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Fragment offset */
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x17, /* Fragment length */
+        0x01, 0x00, /* DTLS1_BAD_VER */
+        0x14, /* Cookie length */
+#define HV_COOKIE_OFS 28 /* Cookie goes here */
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+    };
+
+    memcpy(hello_verify + HV_COOKIE_OFS, cookie, sizeof(cookie));
+
+    BIO_write(rbio, hello_verify, sizeof(hello_verify));
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int send_server_hello(BIO *rbio)
+{
+    static unsigned char server_hello[] = {
+        0x16, /* Handshake */
+        0x01, 0x00, /* DTLS1_BAD_VER */
+        0x00, 0x00, /* Epoch 0 */
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, /* Seq# 1 */
+        0x00, 0x52, /* Length */
+        0x02, /* Server Hello */
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x46, /* Length */
+        0x00, 0x01, /* Seq# */
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Fragment offset */
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x46, /* Fragment length */
+        0x01, 0x00, /* DTLS1_BAD_VER */
+#define SH_RANDOM_OFS 27 /* Server random goes here */
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x20, /* Session ID length */
+#define SH_SESSID_OFS 60 /* Session ID goes here */
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x2f, /* Cipher suite AES128-SHA */
+        0x00, /* Compression null */
+    };
+    static unsigned char change_cipher_spec[] = {
+        0x14, /* Change Cipher Spec */
+        0x01, 0x00, /* DTLS1_BAD_VER */
+        0x00, 0x00, /* Epoch 0 */
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, /* Seq# 2 */
+        0x00, 0x03, /* Length */
+        0x01, 0x00, 0x02, /* Message */
+    };
+
+    memcpy(server_hello + SH_RANDOM_OFS, server_random, sizeof(server_random));
+    memcpy(server_hello + SH_SESSID_OFS, session_id, sizeof(session_id));
+
+    if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(handshake_md, server_hello + MAC_OFFSET,
+                          sizeof(server_hello) - MAC_OFFSET))
+        printf("EVP_DigestUpdate() failed\n");
+
+    BIO_write(rbio, server_hello, sizeof(server_hello));
+    BIO_write(rbio, change_cipher_spec, sizeof(change_cipher_spec));
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Create header, HMAC, pad, encrypt and send a record */
+static int send_record(BIO *rbio, unsigned char type, unsigned long seqnr,
+                       const void *msg, size_t len)
+{
+    /* Note that the order of the record header fields on the wire,
+     * and in the HMAC, is different. So we just keep them in separate
+     * variables and handle them individually. */
+    static unsigned char epoch[2] = { 0x00, 0x01 };
+    static unsigned char seq[6] = { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 };
+    static unsigned char ver[2] = { 0x01, 0x00 }; /* DTLS1_BAD_VER */
+    unsigned char lenbytes[2];
+    HMAC_CTX *ctx;
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *enc_ctx;
+    unsigned char iv[16];
+    unsigned char pad;
+    unsigned char *enc;
+
+#ifdef SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG
+    seq[0] = (seqnr >> 40) & 0xff;
+    seq[1] = (seqnr >> 32) & 0xff;
+#endif
+    seq[2] = (seqnr >> 24) & 0xff;
+    seq[3] = (seqnr >> 16) & 0xff;
+    seq[4] = (seqnr >> 8) & 0xff;
+    seq[5] = seqnr & 0xff;
+
+    pad = 15 - ((len + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) % 16);
+    enc = OPENSSL_malloc(len + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 1 + pad);
+    if (enc == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    /* Copy record to encryption buffer */
+    memcpy(enc, msg, len);
+
+    /* Append HMAC to data */
+    ctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
+    HMAC_Init_ex(ctx, mac_key, 20, EVP_sha1(), NULL);
+    HMAC_Update(ctx, epoch, 2);
+    HMAC_Update(ctx, seq, 6);
+    HMAC_Update(ctx, &type, 1);
+    HMAC_Update(ctx, ver, 2); /* Version */
+    lenbytes[0] = len >> 8;
+    lenbytes[1] = len & 0xff;
+    HMAC_Update(ctx, lenbytes, 2); /* Length */
+    HMAC_Update(ctx, enc, len); /* Finally the data itself */
+    HMAC_Final(ctx, enc + len, NULL);
+    HMAC_CTX_free(ctx);
+
+    /* Append padding bytes */
+    len += SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+    do {
+        enc[len++] = pad;
+    } while (len % 16);
+
+    /* Generate IV, and encrypt */
+    RAND_bytes(iv, sizeof(iv));
+    enc_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+    EVP_CipherInit_ex(enc_ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, enc_key, iv, 1);
+    EVP_Cipher(enc_ctx, enc, enc, len);
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(enc_ctx);
+
+    /* Finally write header (from fragmented variables), IV and encrypted record */
+    BIO_write(rbio, &type, 1);
+    BIO_write(rbio, ver, 2);
+    BIO_write(rbio, epoch, 2);
+    BIO_write(rbio, seq, 6);
+    lenbytes[0] = (len + sizeof(iv)) >> 8;
+    lenbytes[1] = (len + sizeof(iv)) & 0xff;
+    BIO_write(rbio, lenbytes, 2);
+
+    BIO_write(rbio, iv, sizeof(iv));
+    BIO_write(rbio, enc, len);
+
+    OPENSSL_free(enc);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int send_finished(SSL *s, BIO *rbio)
+{
+    static unsigned char finished_msg[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH +
+                                      TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH] = {
+        0x14, /* Finished */
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x0c, /* Length */
+        0x00, 0x03, /* Seq# 3 */
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Fragment offset */
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x0c, /* Fragment length */
+        /* Finished MAC (12 bytes) */
+    };
+    unsigned char handshake_hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+
+    /* Derive key material */
+    do_PRF(TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE,
+           server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+           client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+           key_block, sizeof(key_block));
+
+    /* Generate Finished MAC */
+    if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(handshake_md, handshake_hash, NULL))
+        printf("EVP_DigestFinal_ex() failed\n");
+
+    do_PRF(TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
+           handshake_hash, EVP_MD_CTX_size(handshake_md),
+           NULL, 0,
+           finished_msg + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH);
+
+    return send_record(rbio, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, 0,
+                       finished_msg, sizeof(finished_msg));
+}
+
+static int validate_ccs(BIO *wbio)
+{
+    PACKET pkt;
+    long len;
+    unsigned char *data;
+    unsigned int u;
+
+    len = BIO_get_mem_data(wbio, (char **)&data);
+    if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, data, len))
+        return 0;
+
+    /* Check record header type */
+    if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &u) || u != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
+        return 0;
+    /* Version */
+    if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &u) || u != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+        return 0;
+    /* Skip the rest of the record header */
+    if (!PACKET_forward(&pkt, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH - 3))
+        return 0;
+
+    /* Check ChangeCipherSpec message */
+    if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &u) || u != SSL3_MT_CCS)
+        return 0;
+    /* A DTLS1_BAD_VER ChangeCipherSpec also contains the
+     * handshake sequence number (which is 2 here) */
+    if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &u) || u != 0x0002)
+        return 0;
+
+    /* Now check the Finished packet */
+    if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &u) || u != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
+        return 0;
+    if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &u) || u != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+        return 0;
+
+    /* Check epoch is now 1 */
+    if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &u) || u != 0x0001)
+        return 0;
+
+    /* That'll do for now. If OpenSSL accepted *our* Finished packet
+     * then it's evidently remembered that DTLS1_BAD_VER doesn't
+     * include the handshake header in the MAC. There's not a lot of
+     * point in implementing decryption here, just to check that it
+     * continues to get it right for one more packet. */
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+#define NODROP(x) { x##UL, 0 }
+#define DROP(x)   { x##UL, 1 }
+
+static struct {
+    unsigned long seq;
+    int drop;
+} tests[] = {
+    NODROP(1), NODROP(3), NODROP(2),
+    NODROP(0x1234), NODROP(0x1230), NODROP(0x1235),
+    NODROP(0xffff), NODROP(0x10001), NODROP(0xfffe), NODROP(0x10000),
+    DROP(0x10001), DROP(0xff), NODROP(0x100000), NODROP(0x800000), NODROP(0x7fffe1),
+    NODROP(0xffffff), NODROP(0x1000000), NODROP(0xfffffe), DROP(0xffffff), NODROP(0x1000010),
+    NODROP(0xfffffd), NODROP(0x1000011), DROP(0x12), NODROP(0x1000012),
+    NODROP(0x1ffffff), NODROP(0x2000000), DROP(0x1ff00fe), NODROP(0x2000001),
+    NODROP(0x20fffff), NODROP(0x2105500), DROP(0x20ffffe), NODROP(0x21054ff),
+    NODROP(0x211ffff), DROP(0x2110000), NODROP(0x2120000)
+    /* The last test should be NODROP, because a DROP wouldn't get tested. */
+};
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+    SSL_SESSION *sess;
+    SSL_CTX *ctx;
+    SSL *con;
+    BIO *rbio;
+    BIO *wbio;
+    BIO *err;
+    time_t now = 0;
+    int testresult = 0;
+    int ret;
+    int i;
+
+    err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT);
+
+    CRYPTO_set_mem_debug(1);
+    CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON);
+
+    RAND_bytes(session_id, sizeof(session_id));
+    RAND_bytes(master_secret, sizeof(master_secret));
+    RAND_bytes(cookie, sizeof(cookie));
+    RAND_bytes(server_random + 4, sizeof(server_random) - 4);
+
+    now = time(NULL);
+    memcpy(server_random, &now, sizeof(now));
+
+    sess = client_session();
+    if (sess == NULL) {
+        printf("Failed to generate SSL_SESSION\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    handshake_md = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+    if (handshake_md == NULL ||
+        !EVP_DigestInit_ex(handshake_md, EVP_md5_sha1(), NULL)) {
+        printf("Failed to initialise handshake_md\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    ctx = SSL_CTX_new(DTLS_client_method());
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+        printf("Failed to allocate SSL_CTX\n");
+        goto end_md;
+    }
+    if (!SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(ctx, DTLS1_BAD_VER)) {
+        printf("SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version() failed\n");
+        goto end_ctx;
+    }
+    if (!SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(ctx, DTLS1_BAD_VER)) {
+        printf("SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version() failed\n");
+        goto end_ctx;
+    }
+
+    if (!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(ctx, "AES128-SHA")) {
+        printf("SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list() failed\n");
+        goto end_ctx;
+    }
+
+    con = SSL_new(ctx);
+    if (!SSL_set_session(con, sess)) {
+        printf("SSL_set_session() failed\n");
+        goto end_con;
+    }
+    SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
+
+    rbio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+    wbio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+
+    BIO_set_nbio(rbio, 1);
+    BIO_set_nbio(wbio, 1);
+
+    SSL_set_bio(con, rbio, wbio);
+    SSL_set_connect_state(con);
+
+    /* Send initial ClientHello */
+    ret = SSL_do_handshake(con);
+    if (ret > 0 || SSL_get_error(con, ret) != SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ) {
+        printf("Unexpected handshake result at initial call!\n");
+        goto end_con;
+    }
+
+    if (validate_client_hello(wbio) != 1) {
+        printf("Initial ClientHello failed validation\n");
+        goto end_con;
+    }
+    if (send_hello_verify(rbio) != 1) {
+        printf("Failed to send HelloVerify\n");
+        goto end_con;
+    }
+    ret = SSL_do_handshake(con);
+    if (ret > 0 || SSL_get_error(con, ret) != SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ) {
+        printf("Unexpected handshake result after HelloVerify!\n");
+        goto end_con;
+    }
+    if (validate_client_hello(wbio) != 2) {
+        printf("Second ClientHello failed validation\n");
+        goto end_con;
+    }
+    if (send_server_hello(rbio) != 1) {
+        printf("Failed to send ServerHello\n");
+        goto end_con;
+    }
+    ret = SSL_do_handshake(con);
+    if (ret > 0 || SSL_get_error(con, ret) != SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ) {
+        printf("Unexpected handshake result after ServerHello!\n");
+        goto end_con;
+    }
+    if (send_finished(con, rbio) != 1) {
+        printf("Failed to send Finished\n");
+        goto end_con;
+    }
+    ret = SSL_do_handshake(con);
+    if (ret < 1) {
+        printf("Handshake not successful after Finished!\n");
+        goto end_con;
+    }
+    if (validate_ccs(wbio) != 1) {
+        printf("Failed to validate client CCS/Finished\n");
+        goto end_con;
+    }
+
+    /* While we're here and crafting packets by hand, we might as well do a
+       bit of a stress test on the DTLS record replay handling. Not Cisco-DTLS
+       specific but useful anyway for the general case. It's been broken
+       before, and in fact was broken even for a basic 0, 2, 1 test case
+       when this test was first added.... */
+    for (i = 0; i < (int)OSSL_NELEM(tests); i++) {
+        unsigned long recv_buf[2];
+
+        if (send_record(rbio, SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA, tests[i].seq,
+                        &tests[i].seq, sizeof(unsigned long)) != 1) {
+            printf("Failed to send data seq #0x%lx (%d)\n",
+                   tests[i].seq, i);
+            goto end_con;
+        }
+
+        if (tests[i].drop)
+            continue;
+
+        ret = SSL_read(con, recv_buf, 2 * sizeof(unsigned long));
+        if (ret != sizeof(unsigned long)) {
+            printf("SSL_read failed or wrong size on seq#0x%lx (%d)\n",
+                   tests[i].seq, i);
+            goto end_con;
+        }
+        if (recv_buf[0] != tests[i].seq) {
+            printf("Wrong data packet received (0x%lx not 0x%lx) at packet %d\n",
+                   recv_buf[0], tests[i].seq, i);
+            goto end_con;
+        }
+    }
+    if (tests[i-1].drop) {
+        printf("Error: last test cannot be DROP()\n");
+        goto end_con;
+    }
+    testresult=1;
+
+ end_con:
+    SSL_free(con);
+ end_ctx:
+    SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
+ end_md:
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(handshake_md);
+ end:
+    ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+
+    if (!testresult) {
+        printf("Cisco BadDTLS test: FAILED\n");
+    }
+
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG
+    if (CRYPTO_mem_leaks(err) <= 0)
+        testresult = 0;
+#endif
+    BIO_free(err);
+
+    return testresult?0:1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/bftest.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/bftest.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a513660
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/bftest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,484 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * This has been a quickly hacked 'ideatest.c'.  When I add tests for other
+ * RC2 modes, more of the code will be uncommented.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h> /* To see if OPENSSL_NO_BF is defined */
+
+#include "../e_os.h"
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_BF
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+    printf("No BF support\n");
+    return (0);
+}
+#else
+# include <openssl/blowfish.h>
+
+# ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+#  include <openssl/ebcdic.h>
+# endif
+
+static char bf_key[2][30] = {
+    "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz",
+    "Who is John Galt?"
+};
+
+/* big endian */
+static BF_LONG bf_plain[2][2] = {
+    {0x424c4f57L, 0x46495348L},
+    {0xfedcba98L, 0x76543210L}
+};
+
+static BF_LONG bf_cipher[2][2] = {
+    {0x324ed0feL, 0xf413a203L},
+    {0xcc91732bL, 0x8022f684L}
+};
+
+/************/
+
+/* Lets use the DES test vectors :-) */
+# define NUM_TESTS 34
+static unsigned char ecb_data[NUM_TESTS][8] = {
+    {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+    {0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF},
+    {0x30, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+    {0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11},
+    {0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF},
+    {0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11},
+    {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+    {0xFE, 0xDC, 0xBA, 0x98, 0x76, 0x54, 0x32, 0x10},
+    {0x7C, 0xA1, 0x10, 0x45, 0x4A, 0x1A, 0x6E, 0x57},
+    {0x01, 0x31, 0xD9, 0x61, 0x9D, 0xC1, 0x37, 0x6E},
+    {0x07, 0xA1, 0x13, 0x3E, 0x4A, 0x0B, 0x26, 0x86},
+    {0x38, 0x49, 0x67, 0x4C, 0x26, 0x02, 0x31, 0x9E},
+    {0x04, 0xB9, 0x15, 0xBA, 0x43, 0xFE, 0xB5, 0xB6},
+    {0x01, 0x13, 0xB9, 0x70, 0xFD, 0x34, 0xF2, 0xCE},
+    {0x01, 0x70, 0xF1, 0x75, 0x46, 0x8F, 0xB5, 0xE6},
+    {0x43, 0x29, 0x7F, 0xAD, 0x38, 0xE3, 0x73, 0xFE},
+    {0x07, 0xA7, 0x13, 0x70, 0x45, 0xDA, 0x2A, 0x16},
+    {0x04, 0x68, 0x91, 0x04, 0xC2, 0xFD, 0x3B, 0x2F},
+    {0x37, 0xD0, 0x6B, 0xB5, 0x16, 0xCB, 0x75, 0x46},
+    {0x1F, 0x08, 0x26, 0x0D, 0x1A, 0xC2, 0x46, 0x5E},
+    {0x58, 0x40, 0x23, 0x64, 0x1A, 0xBA, 0x61, 0x76},
+    {0x02, 0x58, 0x16, 0x16, 0x46, 0x29, 0xB0, 0x07},
+    {0x49, 0x79, 0x3E, 0xBC, 0x79, 0xB3, 0x25, 0x8F},
+    {0x4F, 0xB0, 0x5E, 0x15, 0x15, 0xAB, 0x73, 0xA7},
+    {0x49, 0xE9, 0x5D, 0x6D, 0x4C, 0xA2, 0x29, 0xBF},
+    {0x01, 0x83, 0x10, 0xDC, 0x40, 0x9B, 0x26, 0xD6},
+    {0x1C, 0x58, 0x7F, 0x1C, 0x13, 0x92, 0x4F, 0xEF},
+    {0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01},
+    {0x1F, 0x1F, 0x1F, 0x1F, 0x0E, 0x0E, 0x0E, 0x0E},
+    {0xE0, 0xFE, 0xE0, 0xFE, 0xF1, 0xFE, 0xF1, 0xFE},
+    {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+    {0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF},
+    {0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF},
+    {0xFE, 0xDC, 0xBA, 0x98, 0x76, 0x54, 0x32, 0x10}
+};
+
+static unsigned char plain_data[NUM_TESTS][8] = {
+    {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+    {0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF},
+    {0x10, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01},
+    {0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11},
+    {0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11},
+    {0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF},
+    {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+    {0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF},
+    {0x01, 0xA1, 0xD6, 0xD0, 0x39, 0x77, 0x67, 0x42},
+    {0x5C, 0xD5, 0x4C, 0xA8, 0x3D, 0xEF, 0x57, 0xDA},
+    {0x02, 0x48, 0xD4, 0x38, 0x06, 0xF6, 0x71, 0x72},
+    {0x51, 0x45, 0x4B, 0x58, 0x2D, 0xDF, 0x44, 0x0A},
+    {0x42, 0xFD, 0x44, 0x30, 0x59, 0x57, 0x7F, 0xA2},
+    {0x05, 0x9B, 0x5E, 0x08, 0x51, 0xCF, 0x14, 0x3A},
+    {0x07, 0x56, 0xD8, 0xE0, 0x77, 0x47, 0x61, 0xD2},
+    {0x76, 0x25, 0x14, 0xB8, 0x29, 0xBF, 0x48, 0x6A},
+    {0x3B, 0xDD, 0x11, 0x90, 0x49, 0x37, 0x28, 0x02},
+    {0x26, 0x95, 0x5F, 0x68, 0x35, 0xAF, 0x60, 0x9A},
+    {0x16, 0x4D, 0x5E, 0x40, 0x4F, 0x27, 0x52, 0x32},
+    {0x6B, 0x05, 0x6E, 0x18, 0x75, 0x9F, 0x5C, 0xCA},
+    {0x00, 0x4B, 0xD6, 0xEF, 0x09, 0x17, 0x60, 0x62},
+    {0x48, 0x0D, 0x39, 0x00, 0x6E, 0xE7, 0x62, 0xF2},
+    {0x43, 0x75, 0x40, 0xC8, 0x69, 0x8F, 0x3C, 0xFA},
+    {0x07, 0x2D, 0x43, 0xA0, 0x77, 0x07, 0x52, 0x92},
+    {0x02, 0xFE, 0x55, 0x77, 0x81, 0x17, 0xF1, 0x2A},
+    {0x1D, 0x9D, 0x5C, 0x50, 0x18, 0xF7, 0x28, 0xC2},
+    {0x30, 0x55, 0x32, 0x28, 0x6D, 0x6F, 0x29, 0x5A},
+    {0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF},
+    {0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF},
+    {0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF},
+    {0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF},
+    {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+    {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+    {0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF}
+};
+
+static unsigned char cipher_data[NUM_TESTS][8] = {
+    {0x4E, 0xF9, 0x97, 0x45, 0x61, 0x98, 0xDD, 0x78},
+    {0x51, 0x86, 0x6F, 0xD5, 0xB8, 0x5E, 0xCB, 0x8A},
+    {0x7D, 0x85, 0x6F, 0x9A, 0x61, 0x30, 0x63, 0xF2},
+    {0x24, 0x66, 0xDD, 0x87, 0x8B, 0x96, 0x3C, 0x9D},
+    {0x61, 0xF9, 0xC3, 0x80, 0x22, 0x81, 0xB0, 0x96},
+    {0x7D, 0x0C, 0xC6, 0x30, 0xAF, 0xDA, 0x1E, 0xC7},
+    {0x4E, 0xF9, 0x97, 0x45, 0x61, 0x98, 0xDD, 0x78},
+    {0x0A, 0xCE, 0xAB, 0x0F, 0xC6, 0xA0, 0xA2, 0x8D},
+    {0x59, 0xC6, 0x82, 0x45, 0xEB, 0x05, 0x28, 0x2B},
+    {0xB1, 0xB8, 0xCC, 0x0B, 0x25, 0x0F, 0x09, 0xA0},
+    {0x17, 0x30, 0xE5, 0x77, 0x8B, 0xEA, 0x1D, 0xA4},
+    {0xA2, 0x5E, 0x78, 0x56, 0xCF, 0x26, 0x51, 0xEB},
+    {0x35, 0x38, 0x82, 0xB1, 0x09, 0xCE, 0x8F, 0x1A},
+    {0x48, 0xF4, 0xD0, 0x88, 0x4C, 0x37, 0x99, 0x18},
+    {0x43, 0x21, 0x93, 0xB7, 0x89, 0x51, 0xFC, 0x98},
+    {0x13, 0xF0, 0x41, 0x54, 0xD6, 0x9D, 0x1A, 0xE5},
+    {0x2E, 0xED, 0xDA, 0x93, 0xFF, 0xD3, 0x9C, 0x79},
+    {0xD8, 0x87, 0xE0, 0x39, 0x3C, 0x2D, 0xA6, 0xE3},
+    {0x5F, 0x99, 0xD0, 0x4F, 0x5B, 0x16, 0x39, 0x69},
+    {0x4A, 0x05, 0x7A, 0x3B, 0x24, 0xD3, 0x97, 0x7B},
+    {0x45, 0x20, 0x31, 0xC1, 0xE4, 0xFA, 0xDA, 0x8E},
+    {0x75, 0x55, 0xAE, 0x39, 0xF5, 0x9B, 0x87, 0xBD},
+    {0x53, 0xC5, 0x5F, 0x9C, 0xB4, 0x9F, 0xC0, 0x19},
+    {0x7A, 0x8E, 0x7B, 0xFA, 0x93, 0x7E, 0x89, 0xA3},
+    {0xCF, 0x9C, 0x5D, 0x7A, 0x49, 0x86, 0xAD, 0xB5},
+    {0xD1, 0xAB, 0xB2, 0x90, 0x65, 0x8B, 0xC7, 0x78},
+    {0x55, 0xCB, 0x37, 0x74, 0xD1, 0x3E, 0xF2, 0x01},
+    {0xFA, 0x34, 0xEC, 0x48, 0x47, 0xB2, 0x68, 0xB2},
+    {0xA7, 0x90, 0x79, 0x51, 0x08, 0xEA, 0x3C, 0xAE},
+    {0xC3, 0x9E, 0x07, 0x2D, 0x9F, 0xAC, 0x63, 0x1D},
+    {0x01, 0x49, 0x33, 0xE0, 0xCD, 0xAF, 0xF6, 0xE4},
+    {0xF2, 0x1E, 0x9A, 0x77, 0xB7, 0x1C, 0x49, 0xBC},
+    {0x24, 0x59, 0x46, 0x88, 0x57, 0x54, 0x36, 0x9A},
+    {0x6B, 0x5C, 0x5A, 0x9C, 0x5D, 0x9E, 0x0A, 0x5A},
+};
+
+static unsigned char cbc_key[16] = {
+    0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xef,
+    0xf0, 0xe1, 0xd2, 0xc3, 0xb4, 0xa5, 0x96, 0x87
+};
+static unsigned char cbc_iv[8] =
+    { 0xfe, 0xdc, 0xba, 0x98, 0x76, 0x54, 0x32, 0x10 };
+static char cbc_data[40] = "7654321 Now is the time for ";
+static unsigned char cbc_ok[32] = {
+    0x6B, 0x77, 0xB4, 0xD6, 0x30, 0x06, 0xDE, 0xE6,
+    0x05, 0xB1, 0x56, 0xE2, 0x74, 0x03, 0x97, 0x93,
+    0x58, 0xDE, 0xB9, 0xE7, 0x15, 0x46, 0x16, 0xD9,
+    0x59, 0xF1, 0x65, 0x2B, 0xD5, 0xFF, 0x92, 0xCC
+};
+
+static unsigned char cfb64_ok[] = {
+    0xE7, 0x32, 0x14, 0xA2, 0x82, 0x21, 0x39, 0xCA,
+    0xF2, 0x6E, 0xCF, 0x6D, 0x2E, 0xB9, 0xE7, 0x6E,
+    0x3D, 0xA3, 0xDE, 0x04, 0xD1, 0x51, 0x72, 0x00,
+    0x51, 0x9D, 0x57, 0xA6, 0xC3
+};
+
+static unsigned char ofb64_ok[] = {
+    0xE7, 0x32, 0x14, 0xA2, 0x82, 0x21, 0x39, 0xCA,
+    0x62, 0xB3, 0x43, 0xCC, 0x5B, 0x65, 0x58, 0x73,
+    0x10, 0xDD, 0x90, 0x8D, 0x0C, 0x24, 0x1B, 0x22,
+    0x63, 0xC2, 0xCF, 0x80, 0xDA
+};
+
+# define KEY_TEST_NUM    25
+static unsigned char key_test[KEY_TEST_NUM] = {
+    0xf0, 0xe1, 0xd2, 0xc3, 0xb4, 0xa5, 0x96, 0x87,
+    0x78, 0x69, 0x5a, 0x4b, 0x3c, 0x2d, 0x1e, 0x0f,
+    0x00, 0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44, 0x55, 0x66, 0x77,
+    0x88
+};
+
+static unsigned char key_data[8] =
+    { 0xFE, 0xDC, 0xBA, 0x98, 0x76, 0x54, 0x32, 0x10 };
+
+static unsigned char key_out[KEY_TEST_NUM][8] = {
+    {0xF9, 0xAD, 0x59, 0x7C, 0x49, 0xDB, 0x00, 0x5E},
+    {0xE9, 0x1D, 0x21, 0xC1, 0xD9, 0x61, 0xA6, 0xD6},
+    {0xE9, 0xC2, 0xB7, 0x0A, 0x1B, 0xC6, 0x5C, 0xF3},
+    {0xBE, 0x1E, 0x63, 0x94, 0x08, 0x64, 0x0F, 0x05},
+    {0xB3, 0x9E, 0x44, 0x48, 0x1B, 0xDB, 0x1E, 0x6E},
+    {0x94, 0x57, 0xAA, 0x83, 0xB1, 0x92, 0x8C, 0x0D},
+    {0x8B, 0xB7, 0x70, 0x32, 0xF9, 0x60, 0x62, 0x9D},
+    {0xE8, 0x7A, 0x24, 0x4E, 0x2C, 0xC8, 0x5E, 0x82},
+    {0x15, 0x75, 0x0E, 0x7A, 0x4F, 0x4E, 0xC5, 0x77},
+    {0x12, 0x2B, 0xA7, 0x0B, 0x3A, 0xB6, 0x4A, 0xE0},
+    {0x3A, 0x83, 0x3C, 0x9A, 0xFF, 0xC5, 0x37, 0xF6},
+    {0x94, 0x09, 0xDA, 0x87, 0xA9, 0x0F, 0x6B, 0xF2},
+    {0x88, 0x4F, 0x80, 0x62, 0x50, 0x60, 0xB8, 0xB4},
+    {0x1F, 0x85, 0x03, 0x1C, 0x19, 0xE1, 0x19, 0x68},
+    {0x79, 0xD9, 0x37, 0x3A, 0x71, 0x4C, 0xA3, 0x4F},
+    {0x93, 0x14, 0x28, 0x87, 0xEE, 0x3B, 0xE1, 0x5C},
+    {0x03, 0x42, 0x9E, 0x83, 0x8C, 0xE2, 0xD1, 0x4B},
+    {0xA4, 0x29, 0x9E, 0x27, 0x46, 0x9F, 0xF6, 0x7B},
+    {0xAF, 0xD5, 0xAE, 0xD1, 0xC1, 0xBC, 0x96, 0xA8},
+    {0x10, 0x85, 0x1C, 0x0E, 0x38, 0x58, 0xDA, 0x9F},
+    {0xE6, 0xF5, 0x1E, 0xD7, 0x9B, 0x9D, 0xB2, 0x1F},
+    {0x64, 0xA6, 0xE1, 0x4A, 0xFD, 0x36, 0xB4, 0x6F},
+    {0x80, 0xC7, 0xD7, 0xD4, 0x5A, 0x54, 0x79, 0xAD},
+    {0x05, 0x04, 0x4B, 0x62, 0xFA, 0x52, 0xD0, 0x80},
+};
+
+static int test(void);
+static int print_test_data(void);
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+    int ret;
+
+    if (argc > 1)
+        ret = print_test_data();
+    else
+        ret = test();
+
+    EXIT(ret);
+}
+
+static int print_test_data(void)
+{
+    unsigned int i, j;
+
+    printf("ecb test data\n");
+    printf("key bytes\t\tclear bytes\t\tcipher bytes\n");
+    for (i = 0; i < NUM_TESTS; i++) {
+        for (j = 0; j < 8; j++)
+            printf("%02X", ecb_data[i][j]);
+        printf("\t");
+        for (j = 0; j < 8; j++)
+            printf("%02X", plain_data[i][j]);
+        printf("\t");
+        for (j = 0; j < 8; j++)
+            printf("%02X", cipher_data[i][j]);
+        printf("\n");
+    }
+
+    printf("set_key test data\n");
+    printf("data[8]= ");
+    for (j = 0; j < 8; j++)
+        printf("%02X", key_data[j]);
+    printf("\n");
+    for (i = 0; i < KEY_TEST_NUM - 1; i++) {
+        printf("c=");
+        for (j = 0; j < 8; j++)
+            printf("%02X", key_out[i][j]);
+        printf(" k[%2u]=", i + 1);
+        for (j = 0; j < i + 1; j++)
+            printf("%02X", key_test[j]);
+        printf("\n");
+    }
+
+    printf("\nchaining mode test data\n");
+    printf("key[16]   = ");
+    for (j = 0; j < 16; j++)
+        printf("%02X", cbc_key[j]);
+    printf("\niv[8]     = ");
+    for (j = 0; j < 8; j++)
+        printf("%02X", cbc_iv[j]);
+    printf("\ndata[%d]  = '%s'", (int)strlen(cbc_data) + 1, cbc_data);
+    printf("\ndata[%d]  = ", (int)strlen(cbc_data) + 1);
+    for (j = 0; j < strlen(cbc_data) + 1; j++)
+        printf("%02X", cbc_data[j]);
+    printf("\n");
+    printf("cbc cipher text\n");
+    printf("cipher[%d]= ", 32);
+    for (j = 0; j < 32; j++)
+        printf("%02X", cbc_ok[j]);
+    printf("\n");
+
+    printf("cfb64 cipher text\n");
+    printf("cipher[%d]= ", (int)strlen(cbc_data) + 1);
+    for (j = 0; j < strlen(cbc_data) + 1; j++)
+        printf("%02X", cfb64_ok[j]);
+    printf("\n");
+
+    printf("ofb64 cipher text\n");
+    printf("cipher[%d]= ", (int)strlen(cbc_data) + 1);
+    for (j = 0; j < strlen(cbc_data) + 1; j++)
+        printf("%02X", ofb64_ok[j]);
+    printf("\n");
+    return (0);
+}
+
+static int test(void)
+{
+    unsigned char cbc_in[40], cbc_out[40], iv[8];
+    int i, n, err = 0;
+    BF_KEY key;
+    BF_LONG data[2];
+    unsigned char out[8];
+    BF_LONG len;
+
+# ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+    ebcdic2ascii(cbc_data, cbc_data, strlen(cbc_data));
+# endif
+
+    printf("testing blowfish in raw ecb mode\n");
+    for (n = 0; n < 2; n++) {
+# ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+        ebcdic2ascii(bf_key[n], bf_key[n], strlen(bf_key[n]));
+# endif
+        BF_set_key(&key, strlen(bf_key[n]), (unsigned char *)bf_key[n]);
+
+        data[0] = bf_plain[n][0];
+        data[1] = bf_plain[n][1];
+        BF_encrypt(data, &key);
+        if (memcmp(&(bf_cipher[n][0]), &(data[0]), 8) != 0) {
+            printf("BF_encrypt error encrypting\n");
+            printf("got     :");
+            for (i = 0; i < 2; i++)
+                printf("%08lX ", (unsigned long)data[i]);
+            printf("\n");
+            printf("expected:");
+            for (i = 0; i < 2; i++)
+                printf("%08lX ", (unsigned long)bf_cipher[n][i]);
+            err = 1;
+            printf("\n");
+        }
+
+        BF_decrypt(&(data[0]), &key);
+        if (memcmp(&(bf_plain[n][0]), &(data[0]), 8) != 0) {
+            printf("BF_encrypt error decrypting\n");
+            printf("got     :");
+            for (i = 0; i < 2; i++)
+                printf("%08lX ", (unsigned long)data[i]);
+            printf("\n");
+            printf("expected:");
+            for (i = 0; i < 2; i++)
+                printf("%08lX ", (unsigned long)bf_plain[n][i]);
+            printf("\n");
+            err = 1;
+        }
+    }
+
+    printf("testing blowfish in ecb mode\n");
+
+    for (n = 0; n < NUM_TESTS; n++) {
+        BF_set_key(&key, 8, ecb_data[n]);
+
+        BF_ecb_encrypt(&(plain_data[n][0]), out, &key, BF_ENCRYPT);
+        if (memcmp(&(cipher_data[n][0]), out, 8) != 0) {
+            printf("BF_ecb_encrypt blowfish error encrypting\n");
+            printf("got     :");
+            for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
+                printf("%02X ", out[i]);
+            printf("\n");
+            printf("expected:");
+            for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
+                printf("%02X ", cipher_data[n][i]);
+            err = 1;
+            printf("\n");
+        }
+
+        BF_ecb_encrypt(out, out, &key, BF_DECRYPT);
+        if (memcmp(&(plain_data[n][0]), out, 8) != 0) {
+            printf("BF_ecb_encrypt error decrypting\n");
+            printf("got     :");
+            for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
+                printf("%02X ", out[i]);
+            printf("\n");
+            printf("expected:");
+            for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
+                printf("%02X ", plain_data[n][i]);
+            printf("\n");
+            err = 1;
+        }
+    }
+
+    printf("testing blowfish set_key\n");
+    for (n = 1; n < KEY_TEST_NUM; n++) {
+        BF_set_key(&key, n, key_test);
+        BF_ecb_encrypt(key_data, out, &key, BF_ENCRYPT);
+        /* mips-sgi-irix6.5-gcc  vv  -mabi=64 bug workaround */
+        if (memcmp(out, &(key_out[i = n - 1][0]), 8) != 0) {
+            printf("blowfish setkey error\n");
+            err = 1;
+        }
+    }
+
+    printf("testing blowfish in cbc mode\n");
+    len = strlen(cbc_data) + 1;
+
+    BF_set_key(&key, 16, cbc_key);
+    memset(cbc_in, 0, sizeof(cbc_in));
+    memset(cbc_out, 0, sizeof(cbc_out));
+    memcpy(iv, cbc_iv, sizeof(iv));
+    BF_cbc_encrypt((unsigned char *)cbc_data, cbc_out, len,
+                   &key, iv, BF_ENCRYPT);
+    if (memcmp(cbc_out, cbc_ok, 32) != 0) {
+        err = 1;
+        printf("BF_cbc_encrypt encrypt error\n");
+        for (i = 0; i < 32; i++)
+            printf("0x%02X,", cbc_out[i]);
+    }
+    memcpy(iv, cbc_iv, 8);
+    BF_cbc_encrypt(cbc_out, cbc_in, len, &key, iv, BF_DECRYPT);
+    if (memcmp(cbc_in, cbc_data, strlen(cbc_data) + 1) != 0) {
+        printf("BF_cbc_encrypt decrypt error\n");
+        err = 1;
+    }
+
+    printf("testing blowfish in cfb64 mode\n");
+
+    BF_set_key(&key, 16, cbc_key);
+    memset(cbc_in, 0, 40);
+    memset(cbc_out, 0, 40);
+    memcpy(iv, cbc_iv, 8);
+    n = 0;
+    BF_cfb64_encrypt((unsigned char *)cbc_data, cbc_out, (long)13,
+                     &key, iv, &n, BF_ENCRYPT);
+    BF_cfb64_encrypt((unsigned char *)&(cbc_data[13]), &(cbc_out[13]),
+                     len - 13, &key, iv, &n, BF_ENCRYPT);
+    if (memcmp(cbc_out, cfb64_ok, (int)len) != 0) {
+        err = 1;
+        printf("BF_cfb64_encrypt encrypt error\n");
+        for (i = 0; i < (int)len; i++)
+            printf("0x%02X,", cbc_out[i]);
+    }
+    n = 0;
+    memcpy(iv, cbc_iv, 8);
+    BF_cfb64_encrypt(cbc_out, cbc_in, 17, &key, iv, &n, BF_DECRYPT);
+    BF_cfb64_encrypt(&(cbc_out[17]), &(cbc_in[17]), len - 17,
+                     &key, iv, &n, BF_DECRYPT);
+    if (memcmp(cbc_in, cbc_data, (int)len) != 0) {
+        printf("BF_cfb64_encrypt decrypt error\n");
+        err = 1;
+    }
+
+    printf("testing blowfish in ofb64\n");
+
+    BF_set_key(&key, 16, cbc_key);
+    memset(cbc_in, 0, 40);
+    memset(cbc_out, 0, 40);
+    memcpy(iv, cbc_iv, 8);
+    n = 0;
+    BF_ofb64_encrypt((unsigned char *)cbc_data, cbc_out, (long)13, &key, iv,
+                     &n);
+    BF_ofb64_encrypt((unsigned char *)&(cbc_data[13]), &(cbc_out[13]),
+                     len - 13, &key, iv, &n);
+    if (memcmp(cbc_out, ofb64_ok, (int)len) != 0) {
+        err = 1;
+        printf("BF_ofb64_encrypt encrypt error\n");
+        for (i = 0; i < (int)len; i++)
+            printf("0x%02X,", cbc_out[i]);
+    }
+    n = 0;
+    memcpy(iv, cbc_iv, 8);
+    BF_ofb64_encrypt(cbc_out, cbc_in, 17, &key, iv, &n);
+    BF_ofb64_encrypt(&(cbc_out[17]), &(cbc_in[17]), len - 17, &key, iv, &n);
+    if (memcmp(cbc_in, cbc_data, (int)len) != 0) {
+        printf("BF_ofb64_encrypt decrypt error\n");
+        err = 1;
+    }
+
+    return (err);
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/bio_enc_test.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/bio_enc_test.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fad1a19
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/bio_enc_test.c
@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+int main()
+{
+    BIO *b;
+    static const unsigned char key[16] = { 0 };
+    static unsigned char inp[1024] = { 0 };
+    unsigned char out[1024], ref[1024];
+    int i, lref, len;
+
+    /* Fill buffer with non-zero data so that over steps can be detected */
+    if (RAND_bytes(inp, sizeof(inp)) <= 0)
+        return -1;
+
+    /*
+     * Exercise CBC cipher
+     */
+
+    /* reference output for single-chunk operation */
+    b = BIO_new(BIO_f_cipher());
+    if (!BIO_set_cipher(b, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), key, NULL, 0))
+        return -1;
+    BIO_push(b, BIO_new_mem_buf(inp, sizeof(inp)));
+    lref = BIO_read(b, ref, sizeof(ref));
+    BIO_free_all(b);
+
+    /* perform split operations and compare to reference */
+    for (i = 1; i < lref; i++) {
+        b = BIO_new(BIO_f_cipher());
+        if (!BIO_set_cipher(b, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), key, NULL, 0))
+             return -1;
+        BIO_push(b, BIO_new_mem_buf(inp, sizeof(inp)));
+        memset(out, 0, sizeof(out));
+        out[i] = ~ref[i];
+        len = BIO_read(b, out, i);
+        /* check for overstep */
+        if (out[i] != (unsigned char)~ref[i]) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "CBC output overstep@%d\n", i);
+            return 1;
+        }
+        len += BIO_read(b, out + len, sizeof(out) - len);
+        BIO_free_all(b);
+
+        if (len != lref || memcmp(out, ref, len)) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "CBC output mismatch@%d\n", i);
+            return 2;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* perform small-chunk operations and compare to reference */
+    for (i = 1; i < lref / 2; i++) {
+        int delta;
+
+        b = BIO_new(BIO_f_cipher());
+        if (!BIO_set_cipher(b, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), key, NULL, 0))
+             return -1;
+        BIO_push(b, BIO_new_mem_buf(inp, sizeof(inp)));
+        memset(out, 0, sizeof(out));
+        for (len = 0; (delta = BIO_read(b, out + len, i)); ) {
+            len += delta;
+        }
+        BIO_free_all(b);
+
+        if (len != lref || memcmp(out, ref, len)) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "CBC output mismatch@%d\n", i);
+            return 3;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Exercise CTR cipher
+     */
+
+    /* reference output for single-chunk operation */
+    b = BIO_new(BIO_f_cipher());
+    if (!BIO_set_cipher(b, EVP_aes_128_ctr(), key, NULL, 0))
+         return -1;
+    BIO_push(b, BIO_new_mem_buf(inp, sizeof(inp)));
+    lref = BIO_read(b, ref, sizeof(ref));
+    BIO_free_all(b);
+
+    /* perform split operations and compare to reference */
+    for (i = 1; i < lref; i++) {
+        b = BIO_new(BIO_f_cipher());
+        if (!BIO_set_cipher(b, EVP_aes_128_ctr(), key, NULL, 0))
+             return -1;
+        BIO_push(b, BIO_new_mem_buf(inp, sizeof(inp)));
+        memset(out, 0, sizeof(out));
+        out[i] = ~ref[i];
+        len = BIO_read(b, out, i);
+        /* check for overstep */
+        if (out[i] != (unsigned char)~ref[i]) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "CTR output overstep@%d\n", i);
+            return 4;
+        }
+        len += BIO_read(b, out + len, sizeof(out) - len);
+        BIO_free_all(b);
+
+        if (len != lref || memcmp(out, ref, len)) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "CTR output mismatch@%d\n", i);
+            return 5;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* perform small-chunk operations and compare to reference */
+    for (i = 1; i < lref / 2; i++) {
+        int delta;
+
+        b = BIO_new(BIO_f_cipher());
+        if (!BIO_set_cipher(b, EVP_aes_128_ctr(), key, NULL, 0))
+             return -1;
+        BIO_push(b, BIO_new_mem_buf(inp, sizeof(inp)));
+        memset(out, 0, sizeof(out));
+        for (len = 0; (delta = BIO_read(b, out + len, i)); ) {
+            len += delta;
+        }
+        BIO_free_all(b);
+
+        if (len != lref || memcmp(out, ref, len)) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "CTR output mismatch@%d\n", i);
+            return 6;
+        }
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/bioprinttest.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/bioprinttest.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b2d2622
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/bioprinttest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,225 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+
+static int justprint = 0;
+
+static char *fpexpected[][5] = {
+    /*   0 */ { "0.0000e+00", "0.0000", "0", "0.0000E+00", "0" },
+    /*   1 */ { "6.7000e-01", "0.6700", "0.67", "6.7000E-01", "0.67" },
+    /*   2 */ { "6.6667e-01", "0.6667", "0.6667", "6.6667E-01", "0.6667" },
+    /*   3 */ { "6.6667e-04", "0.0007", "0.0006667", "6.6667E-04", "0.0006667" },
+    /*   4 */ { "6.6667e-05", "0.0001", "6.667e-05", "6.6667E-05", "6.667E-05" },
+    /*   5 */ { "6.6667e+00", "6.6667", "6.667", "6.6667E+00", "6.667" },
+    /*   6 */ { "6.6667e+01", "66.6667", "66.67", "6.6667E+01", "66.67" },
+    /*   7 */ { "6.6667e+02", "666.6667", "666.7", "6.6667E+02", "666.7" },
+    /*   8 */ { "6.6667e+03", "6666.6667", "6667", "6.6667E+03", "6667" },
+    /*   9 */ { "6.6667e+04", "66666.6667", "6.667e+04", "6.6667E+04", "6.667E+04" },
+    /*  10 */ { "0.00000e+00", "0.00000", "0", "0.00000E+00", "0" },
+    /*  11 */ { "6.70000e-01", "0.67000", "0.67", "6.70000E-01", "0.67" },
+    /*  12 */ { "6.66667e-01", "0.66667", "0.66667", "6.66667E-01", "0.66667" },
+    /*  13 */ { "6.66667e-04", "0.00067", "0.00066667", "6.66667E-04", "0.00066667" },
+    /*  14 */ { "6.66667e-05", "0.00007", "6.6667e-05", "6.66667E-05", "6.6667E-05" },
+    /*  15 */ { "6.66667e+00", "6.66667", "6.6667", "6.66667E+00", "6.6667" },
+    /*  16 */ { "6.66667e+01", "66.66667", "66.667", "6.66667E+01", "66.667" },
+    /*  17 */ { "6.66667e+02", "666.66667", "666.67", "6.66667E+02", "666.67" },
+    /*  18 */ { "6.66667e+03", "6666.66667", "6666.7", "6.66667E+03", "6666.7" },
+    /*  19 */ { "6.66667e+04", "66666.66667", "66667", "6.66667E+04", "66667" },
+    /*  20 */ { "  0.0000e+00", "      0.0000", "           0", "  0.0000E+00", "           0" },
+    /*  21 */ { "  6.7000e-01", "      0.6700", "        0.67", "  6.7000E-01", "        0.67" },
+    /*  22 */ { "  6.6667e-01", "      0.6667", "      0.6667", "  6.6667E-01", "      0.6667" },
+    /*  23 */ { "  6.6667e-04", "      0.0007", "   0.0006667", "  6.6667E-04", "   0.0006667" },
+    /*  24 */ { "  6.6667e-05", "      0.0001", "   6.667e-05", "  6.6667E-05", "   6.667E-05" },
+    /*  25 */ { "  6.6667e+00", "      6.6667", "       6.667", "  6.6667E+00", "       6.667" },
+    /*  26 */ { "  6.6667e+01", "     66.6667", "       66.67", "  6.6667E+01", "       66.67" },
+    /*  27 */ { "  6.6667e+02", "    666.6667", "       666.7", "  6.6667E+02", "       666.7" },
+    /*  28 */ { "  6.6667e+03", "   6666.6667", "        6667", "  6.6667E+03", "        6667" },
+    /*  29 */ { "  6.6667e+04", "  66666.6667", "   6.667e+04", "  6.6667E+04", "   6.667E+04" },
+    /*  30 */ { " 0.00000e+00", "     0.00000", "           0", " 0.00000E+00", "           0" },
+    /*  31 */ { " 6.70000e-01", "     0.67000", "        0.67", " 6.70000E-01", "        0.67" },
+    /*  32 */ { " 6.66667e-01", "     0.66667", "     0.66667", " 6.66667E-01", "     0.66667" },
+    /*  33 */ { " 6.66667e-04", "     0.00067", "  0.00066667", " 6.66667E-04", "  0.00066667" },
+    /*  34 */ { " 6.66667e-05", "     0.00007", "  6.6667e-05", " 6.66667E-05", "  6.6667E-05" },
+    /*  35 */ { " 6.66667e+00", "     6.66667", "      6.6667", " 6.66667E+00", "      6.6667" },
+    /*  36 */ { " 6.66667e+01", "    66.66667", "      66.667", " 6.66667E+01", "      66.667" },
+    /*  37 */ { " 6.66667e+02", "   666.66667", "      666.67", " 6.66667E+02", "      666.67" },
+    /*  38 */ { " 6.66667e+03", "  6666.66667", "      6666.7", " 6.66667E+03", "      6666.7" },
+    /*  39 */ { " 6.66667e+04", " 66666.66667", "       66667", " 6.66667E+04", "       66667" },
+    /*  40 */ { "0e+00", "0", "0", "0E+00", "0" },
+    /*  41 */ { "7e-01", "1", "0.7", "7E-01", "0.7" },
+    /*  42 */ { "7e-01", "1", "0.7", "7E-01", "0.7" },
+    /*  43 */ { "7e-04", "0", "0.0007", "7E-04", "0.0007" },
+    /*  44 */ { "7e-05", "0", "7e-05", "7E-05", "7E-05" },
+    /*  45 */ { "7e+00", "7", "7", "7E+00", "7" },
+    /*  46 */ { "7e+01", "67", "7e+01", "7E+01", "7E+01" },
+    /*  47 */ { "7e+02", "667", "7e+02", "7E+02", "7E+02" },
+    /*  48 */ { "7e+03", "6667", "7e+03", "7E+03", "7E+03" },
+    /*  49 */ { "7e+04", "66667", "7e+04", "7E+04", "7E+04" },
+    /*  50 */ { "0.000000e+00", "0.000000", "0", "0.000000E+00", "0" },
+    /*  51 */ { "6.700000e-01", "0.670000", "0.67", "6.700000E-01", "0.67" },
+    /*  52 */ { "6.666667e-01", "0.666667", "0.666667", "6.666667E-01", "0.666667" },
+    /*  53 */ { "6.666667e-04", "0.000667", "0.000666667", "6.666667E-04", "0.000666667" },
+    /*  54 */ { "6.666667e-05", "0.000067", "6.66667e-05", "6.666667E-05", "6.66667E-05" },
+    /*  55 */ { "6.666667e+00", "6.666667", "6.66667", "6.666667E+00", "6.66667" },
+    /*  56 */ { "6.666667e+01", "66.666667", "66.6667", "6.666667E+01", "66.6667" },
+    /*  57 */ { "6.666667e+02", "666.666667", "666.667", "6.666667E+02", "666.667" },
+    /*  58 */ { "6.666667e+03", "6666.666667", "6666.67", "6.666667E+03", "6666.67" },
+    /*  59 */ { "6.666667e+04", "66666.666667", "66666.7", "6.666667E+04", "66666.7" },
+    /*  60 */ { "0.0000e+00", "000.0000", "00000000", "0.0000E+00", "00000000" },
+    /*  61 */ { "6.7000e-01", "000.6700", "00000.67", "6.7000E-01", "00000.67" },
+    /*  62 */ { "6.6667e-01", "000.6667", "000.6667", "6.6667E-01", "000.6667" },
+    /*  63 */ { "6.6667e-04", "000.0007", "0.0006667", "6.6667E-04", "0.0006667" },
+    /*  64 */ { "6.6667e-05", "000.0001", "6.667e-05", "6.6667E-05", "6.667E-05" },
+    /*  65 */ { "6.6667e+00", "006.6667", "0006.667", "6.6667E+00", "0006.667" },
+    /*  66 */ { "6.6667e+01", "066.6667", "00066.67", "6.6667E+01", "00066.67" },
+    /*  67 */ { "6.6667e+02", "666.6667", "000666.7", "6.6667E+02", "000666.7" },
+    /*  68 */ { "6.6667e+03", "6666.6667", "00006667", "6.6667E+03", "00006667" },
+    /*  69 */ { "6.6667e+04", "66666.6667", "6.667e+04", "6.6667E+04", "6.667E+04" },
+};
+
+static void dofptest(int test, double val, char *width, int prec, int *fail)
+{
+    char format[80], result[80];
+    int i;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
+        char *fspec = NULL;
+        switch (i) {
+        case 0:
+            fspec = "e";
+            break;
+        case 1:
+            fspec = "f";
+            break;
+        case 2:
+            fspec = "g";
+            break;
+        case 3:
+            fspec = "E";
+            break;
+        case 4:
+            fspec = "G";
+            break;
+        }
+
+        if (prec >= 0)
+            BIO_snprintf(format, sizeof(format), "%%%s.%d%s", width, prec,
+                         fspec);
+        else
+            BIO_snprintf(format, sizeof(format), "%%%s%s", width, fspec);
+        BIO_snprintf(result, sizeof(result), format, val);
+
+        if (justprint) {
+            if (i == 0) {
+                printf("    /* %3d */ { \"%s\"", test, result);
+            } else {
+                printf(", \"%s\"", result);
+            }
+        } else {
+            if (strcmp(fpexpected[test][i], result) != 0) {
+                printf("Test %d(%d) failed. Expected \"%s\". Got \"%s\". "
+                       "Format \"%s\"\n", test, i, fpexpected[test][i], result,
+                       format);
+                *fail = 1;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    if (justprint) {
+        printf(" },\n");
+    }
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    int test = 0;
+    int i;
+    int fail = 0;
+    int prec = -1;
+    char *width = "";
+    const double frac = 2.0/3.0;
+    char buf[80];
+
+    if (argc == 2 && strcmp(argv[1], "-expected") == 0) {
+        justprint = 1;
+    }
+
+    CRYPTO_set_mem_debug(1);
+    CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON);
+
+    /* Tests for floating point format specifiers */
+    for (i = 0; i < 7; i++) {
+        switch (i) {
+        case 0:
+            prec = 4;
+            width = "";
+            break;
+        case 1:
+            prec = 5;
+            width = "";
+            break;
+        case 2:
+            prec = 4;
+            width = "12";
+            break;
+        case 3:
+            prec = 5;
+            width = "12";
+            break;
+        case 4:
+            prec = 0;
+            width = "";
+            break;
+        case 5:
+            prec = -1;
+            width = "";
+            break;
+        case 6:
+            prec = 4;
+            width = "08";
+            break;
+        }
+
+        dofptest(test++, 0.0, width, prec, &fail);
+        dofptest(test++, 0.67, width, prec, &fail);
+        dofptest(test++, frac, width, prec, &fail);
+        dofptest(test++, frac / 1000, width, prec, &fail);
+        dofptest(test++, frac / 10000, width, prec, &fail);
+        dofptest(test++, 6.0 + frac, width, prec, &fail);
+        dofptest(test++, 66.0 + frac, width, prec, &fail);
+        dofptest(test++, 666.0 + frac, width, prec, &fail);
+        dofptest(test++, 6666.0 + frac, width, prec, &fail);
+        dofptest(test++, 66666.0 + frac, width, prec, &fail);
+    }
+
+    /* Test excessively big number. Should fail */
+    if (BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%f\n", 2 * (double)ULONG_MAX) != -1) {
+        printf("Test %d failed. Unexpected success return from "
+               "BIO_snprintf()\n", test);
+        fail = 1;
+    }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG
+    if (CRYPTO_mem_leaks_fp(stderr) <= 0)
+        return 1;
+# endif
+
+    if (!justprint) {
+        if (fail) {
+            printf("FAIL\n");
+            return 1;
+        }
+        printf ("PASS\n");
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/bntest.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/bntest.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..686eab8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/bntest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2094 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ *
+ * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ *
+ * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the Eric Young open source
+ * license provided above.
+ *
+ * The binary polynomial arithmetic software is originally written by
+ * Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "e_os.h"
+
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+/*
+ * In bn_lcl.h, bn_expand() is defined as a static ossl_inline function.
+ * This is fine in itself, it will end up as an unused static function in
+ * the worst case.  However, it referenses bn_expand2(), which is a private
+ * function in libcrypto and therefore unavailable on some systems.  This
+ * may result in a linker error because of unresolved symbols.
+ *
+ * To avoid this, we define a dummy variant of bn_expand2() here, and to
+ * avoid possible clashes with libcrypto, we rename it first, using a macro.
+ */
+#define bn_expand2 dummy_bn_expand2
+BIGNUM *bn_expand2(BIGNUM *b, int words);
+BIGNUM *bn_expand2(BIGNUM *b, int words) { return NULL; }
+
+#include "../crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h"
+
+static const int num0 = 100;           /* number of tests */
+static const int num1 = 50;            /* additional tests for some functions */
+static const int num2 = 5;             /* number of tests for slow functions */
+
+int test_add(BIO *bp);
+int test_sub(BIO *bp);
+int test_lshift1(BIO *bp);
+int test_lshift(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx, BIGNUM *a_);
+int test_rshift1(BIO *bp);
+int test_rshift(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int test_div(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int test_div_word(BIO *bp);
+int test_div_recp(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int test_mul(BIO *bp);
+int test_sqr(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int test_mont(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int test_mod(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int test_mod_mul(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int test_mod_exp(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int test_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int test_mod_exp_mont5(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int test_exp(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int test_gf2m_add(BIO *bp);
+int test_gf2m_mod(BIO *bp);
+int test_gf2m_mod_mul(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int test_gf2m_mod_sqr(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int test_gf2m_mod_inv(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int test_gf2m_mod_div(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int test_gf2m_mod_exp(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int test_gf2m_mod_sqrt(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int test_gf2m_mod_solve_quad(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int test_kron(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int test_sqrt(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int test_small_prime(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int test_bn2dec(BIO *bp);
+int rand_neg(void);
+static int results = 0;
+
+static unsigned char lst[] =
+    "\xC6\x4F\x43\x04\x2A\xEA\xCA\x6E\x58\x36\x80\x5B\xE8\xC9"
+    "\x9B\x04\x5D\x48\x36\xC2\xFD\x16\xC9\x64\xF0";
+
+static const char rnd_seed[] =
+    "string to make the random number generator think it has entropy";
+
+static void message(BIO *out, char *m)
+{
+    fprintf(stderr, "test %s\n", m);
+    BIO_puts(out, "print \"test ");
+    BIO_puts(out, m);
+    BIO_puts(out, "\\n\"\n");
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+    BN_CTX *ctx;
+    BIO *out;
+    char *outfile = NULL;
+
+    CRYPTO_set_mem_debug(1);
+    CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON);
+
+    results = 0;
+
+    RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof(rnd_seed)); /* or BN_generate_prime may fail */
+
+    argc--;
+    argv++;
+    while (argc >= 1) {
+        if (strcmp(*argv, "-results") == 0)
+            results = 1;
+        else if (strcmp(*argv, "-out") == 0) {
+            if (--argc < 1)
+                break;
+            outfile = *(++argv);
+        }
+        argc--;
+        argv++;
+    }
+
+    ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        EXIT(1);
+
+    out = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
+    if (out == NULL)
+        EXIT(1);
+    if (outfile == NULL) {
+        BIO_set_fp(out, stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT);
+    } else {
+        if (!BIO_write_filename(out, outfile)) {
+            perror(outfile);
+            EXIT(1);
+        }
+    }
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+    {
+        BIO *tmpbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_linebuffer());
+        out = BIO_push(tmpbio, out);
+    }
+#endif
+
+    if (!results)
+        BIO_puts(out, "obase=16\nibase=16\n");
+
+    message(out, "BN_add");
+    if (!test_add(out))
+        goto err;
+    (void)BIO_flush(out);
+
+    message(out, "BN_sub");
+    if (!test_sub(out))
+        goto err;
+    (void)BIO_flush(out);
+
+    message(out, "BN_lshift1");
+    if (!test_lshift1(out))
+        goto err;
+    (void)BIO_flush(out);
+
+    message(out, "BN_lshift (fixed)");
+    if (!test_lshift(out, ctx, BN_bin2bn(lst, sizeof(lst) - 1, NULL)))
+        goto err;
+    (void)BIO_flush(out);
+
+    message(out, "BN_lshift");
+    if (!test_lshift(out, ctx, NULL))
+        goto err;
+    (void)BIO_flush(out);
+
+    message(out, "BN_rshift1");
+    if (!test_rshift1(out))
+        goto err;
+    (void)BIO_flush(out);
+
+    message(out, "BN_rshift");
+    if (!test_rshift(out, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    (void)BIO_flush(out);
+
+    message(out, "BN_sqr");
+    if (!test_sqr(out, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    (void)BIO_flush(out);
+
+    message(out, "BN_mul");
+    if (!test_mul(out))
+        goto err;
+    (void)BIO_flush(out);
+
+    message(out, "BN_div");
+    if (!test_div(out, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    (void)BIO_flush(out);
+
+    message(out, "BN_div_word");
+    if (!test_div_word(out))
+        goto err;
+    (void)BIO_flush(out);
+
+    message(out, "BN_div_recp");
+    if (!test_div_recp(out, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    (void)BIO_flush(out);
+
+    message(out, "BN_mod");
+    if (!test_mod(out, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    (void)BIO_flush(out);
+
+    message(out, "BN_mod_mul");
+    if (!test_mod_mul(out, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    (void)BIO_flush(out);
+
+    message(out, "BN_mont");
+    if (!test_mont(out, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    (void)BIO_flush(out);
+
+    message(out, "BN_mod_exp");
+    if (!test_mod_exp(out, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    (void)BIO_flush(out);
+
+    message(out, "BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime");
+    if (!test_mod_exp_mont_consttime(out, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    if (!test_mod_exp_mont5(out, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    (void)BIO_flush(out);
+
+    message(out, "BN_exp");
+    if (!test_exp(out, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    (void)BIO_flush(out);
+
+    message(out, "BN_kronecker");
+    if (!test_kron(out, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    (void)BIO_flush(out);
+
+    message(out, "BN_mod_sqrt");
+    if (!test_sqrt(out, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    (void)BIO_flush(out);
+
+    message(out, "Small prime generation");
+    if (!test_small_prime(out, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    (void)BIO_flush(out);
+
+    message(out, "BN_bn2dec");
+    if (!test_bn2dec(out))
+        goto err;
+    (void)BIO_flush(out);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+    message(out, "BN_GF2m_add");
+    if (!test_gf2m_add(out))
+        goto err;
+    (void)BIO_flush(out);
+
+    message(out, "BN_GF2m_mod");
+    if (!test_gf2m_mod(out))
+        goto err;
+    (void)BIO_flush(out);
+
+    message(out, "BN_GF2m_mod_mul");
+    if (!test_gf2m_mod_mul(out, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    (void)BIO_flush(out);
+
+    message(out, "BN_GF2m_mod_sqr");
+    if (!test_gf2m_mod_sqr(out, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    (void)BIO_flush(out);
+
+    message(out, "BN_GF2m_mod_inv");
+    if (!test_gf2m_mod_inv(out, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    (void)BIO_flush(out);
+
+    message(out, "BN_GF2m_mod_div");
+    if (!test_gf2m_mod_div(out, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    (void)BIO_flush(out);
+
+    message(out, "BN_GF2m_mod_exp");
+    if (!test_gf2m_mod_exp(out, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    (void)BIO_flush(out);
+
+    message(out, "BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt");
+    if (!test_gf2m_mod_sqrt(out, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    (void)BIO_flush(out);
+
+    message(out, "BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad");
+    if (!test_gf2m_mod_solve_quad(out, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    (void)BIO_flush(out);
+#endif
+    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+    BIO_free(out);
+
+    ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG
+    if (CRYPTO_mem_leaks_fp(stderr) <= 0)
+        EXIT(1);
+#endif
+    EXIT(0);
+ err:
+    BIO_puts(out, "1\n");       /* make sure the Perl script fed by bc
+                                 * notices the failure, see test_bn in
+                                 * test/Makefile.ssl */
+    (void)BIO_flush(out);
+    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+    BIO_free(out);
+
+    ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+    EXIT(1);
+}
+
+int test_add(BIO *bp)
+{
+    BIGNUM *a, *b, *c;
+    int i;
+
+    a = BN_new();
+    b = BN_new();
+    c = BN_new();
+
+    BN_bntest_rand(a, 512, 0, 0);
+    for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) {
+        BN_bntest_rand(b, 450 + i, 0, 0);
+        a->neg = rand_neg();
+        b->neg = rand_neg();
+        BN_add(c, a, b);
+        if (bp != NULL) {
+            if (!results) {
+                BN_print(bp, a);
+                BIO_puts(bp, " + ");
+                BN_print(bp, b);
+                BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
+            }
+            BN_print(bp, c);
+            BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
+        }
+        a->neg = !a->neg;
+        b->neg = !b->neg;
+        BN_add(c, c, b);
+        BN_add(c, c, a);
+        if (!BN_is_zero(c)) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "Add test failed!\n");
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+    BN_free(a);
+    BN_free(b);
+    BN_free(c);
+    return (1);
+}
+
+int test_sub(BIO *bp)
+{
+    BIGNUM *a, *b, *c;
+    int i;
+
+    a = BN_new();
+    b = BN_new();
+    c = BN_new();
+
+    for (i = 0; i < num0 + num1; i++) {
+        if (i < num1) {
+            BN_bntest_rand(a, 512, 0, 0);
+            BN_copy(b, a);
+            if (BN_set_bit(a, i) == 0)
+                return (0);
+            BN_add_word(b, i);
+        } else {
+            BN_bntest_rand(b, 400 + i - num1, 0, 0);
+            a->neg = rand_neg();
+            b->neg = rand_neg();
+        }
+        BN_sub(c, a, b);
+        if (bp != NULL) {
+            if (!results) {
+                BN_print(bp, a);
+                BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
+                BN_print(bp, b);
+                BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
+            }
+            BN_print(bp, c);
+            BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
+        }
+        BN_add(c, c, b);
+        BN_sub(c, c, a);
+        if (!BN_is_zero(c)) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "Subtract test failed!\n");
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+    BN_free(a);
+    BN_free(b);
+    BN_free(c);
+    return (1);
+}
+
+int test_div(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    BIGNUM *a, *b, *c, *d, *e;
+    int i;
+
+    a = BN_new();
+    b = BN_new();
+    c = BN_new();
+    d = BN_new();
+    e = BN_new();
+
+    BN_one(a);
+    BN_zero(b);
+
+    if (BN_div(d, c, a, b, ctx)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Division by zero succeeded!\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0; i < num0 + num1; i++) {
+        if (i < num1) {
+            BN_bntest_rand(a, 400, 0, 0);
+            BN_copy(b, a);
+            BN_lshift(a, a, i);
+            BN_add_word(a, i);
+        } else
+            BN_bntest_rand(b, 50 + 3 * (i - num1), 0, 0);
+        a->neg = rand_neg();
+        b->neg = rand_neg();
+        BN_div(d, c, a, b, ctx);
+        if (bp != NULL) {
+            if (!results) {
+                BN_print(bp, a);
+                BIO_puts(bp, " / ");
+                BN_print(bp, b);
+                BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
+            }
+            BN_print(bp, d);
+            BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
+
+            if (!results) {
+                BN_print(bp, a);
+                BIO_puts(bp, " % ");
+                BN_print(bp, b);
+                BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
+            }
+            BN_print(bp, c);
+            BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
+        }
+        BN_mul(e, d, b, ctx);
+        BN_add(d, e, c);
+        BN_sub(d, d, a);
+        if (!BN_is_zero(d)) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "Division test failed!\n");
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+    BN_free(a);
+    BN_free(b);
+    BN_free(c);
+    BN_free(d);
+    BN_free(e);
+    return (1);
+}
+
+static void print_word(BIO *bp, BN_ULONG w)
+{
+    int i = sizeof(w) * 8;
+    char *fmt = NULL;
+    unsigned char byte;
+
+    do {
+        i -= 8;
+        byte = (unsigned char)(w >> i);
+        if (fmt == NULL)
+            fmt = byte ? "%X" : NULL;
+        else
+            fmt = "%02X";
+
+        if (fmt != NULL)
+            BIO_printf(bp, fmt, byte);
+    } while (i);
+
+    /* If we haven't printed anything, at least print a zero! */
+    if (fmt == NULL)
+        BIO_printf(bp, "0");
+}
+
+int test_div_word(BIO *bp)
+{
+    BIGNUM *a, *b;
+    BN_ULONG r, rmod, s;
+    int i;
+
+    a = BN_new();
+    b = BN_new();
+
+    for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) {
+        do {
+            BN_bntest_rand(a, 512, -1, 0);
+            BN_bntest_rand(b, BN_BITS2, -1, 0);
+        } while (BN_is_zero(b));
+
+        s = b->d[0];
+        BN_copy(b, a);
+        rmod = BN_mod_word(b, s);
+        r = BN_div_word(b, s);
+
+        if (rmod != r) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "Mod (word) test failed!\n");
+            return 0;
+        }
+
+        if (bp != NULL) {
+            if (!results) {
+                BN_print(bp, a);
+                BIO_puts(bp, " / ");
+                print_word(bp, s);
+                BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
+            }
+            BN_print(bp, b);
+            BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
+
+            if (!results) {
+                BN_print(bp, a);
+                BIO_puts(bp, " % ");
+                print_word(bp, s);
+                BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
+            }
+            print_word(bp, r);
+            BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
+        }
+        BN_mul_word(b, s);
+        BN_add_word(b, r);
+        BN_sub(b, a, b);
+        if (!BN_is_zero(b)) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "Division (word) test failed!\n");
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+    BN_free(a);
+    BN_free(b);
+    return (1);
+}
+
+int test_div_recp(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    BIGNUM *a, *b, *c, *d, *e;
+    BN_RECP_CTX *recp;
+    int i;
+
+    recp = BN_RECP_CTX_new();
+    a = BN_new();
+    b = BN_new();
+    c = BN_new();
+    d = BN_new();
+    e = BN_new();
+
+    for (i = 0; i < num0 + num1; i++) {
+        if (i < num1) {
+            BN_bntest_rand(a, 400, 0, 0);
+            BN_copy(b, a);
+            BN_lshift(a, a, i);
+            BN_add_word(a, i);
+        } else
+            BN_bntest_rand(b, 50 + 3 * (i - num1), 0, 0);
+        a->neg = rand_neg();
+        b->neg = rand_neg();
+        BN_RECP_CTX_set(recp, b, ctx);
+        BN_div_recp(d, c, a, recp, ctx);
+        if (bp != NULL) {
+            if (!results) {
+                BN_print(bp, a);
+                BIO_puts(bp, " / ");
+                BN_print(bp, b);
+                BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
+            }
+            BN_print(bp, d);
+            BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
+
+            if (!results) {
+                BN_print(bp, a);
+                BIO_puts(bp, " % ");
+                BN_print(bp, b);
+                BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
+            }
+            BN_print(bp, c);
+            BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
+        }
+        BN_mul(e, d, b, ctx);
+        BN_add(d, e, c);
+        BN_sub(d, d, a);
+        if (!BN_is_zero(d)) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "Reciprocal division test failed!\n");
+            fprintf(stderr, "a=");
+            BN_print_fp(stderr, a);
+            fprintf(stderr, "\nb=");
+            BN_print_fp(stderr, b);
+            fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+    BN_free(a);
+    BN_free(b);
+    BN_free(c);
+    BN_free(d);
+    BN_free(e);
+    BN_RECP_CTX_free(recp);
+    return (1);
+}
+
+int test_mul(BIO *bp)
+{
+    BIGNUM *a, *b, *c, *d, *e;
+    int i;
+    BN_CTX *ctx;
+
+    ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        EXIT(1);
+
+    a = BN_new();
+    b = BN_new();
+    c = BN_new();
+    d = BN_new();
+    e = BN_new();
+
+    for (i = 0; i < num0 + num1; i++) {
+        if (i <= num1) {
+            BN_bntest_rand(a, 100, 0, 0);
+            BN_bntest_rand(b, 100, 0, 0);
+        } else
+            BN_bntest_rand(b, i - num1, 0, 0);
+        a->neg = rand_neg();
+        b->neg = rand_neg();
+        BN_mul(c, a, b, ctx);
+        if (bp != NULL) {
+            if (!results) {
+                BN_print(bp, a);
+                BIO_puts(bp, " * ");
+                BN_print(bp, b);
+                BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
+            }
+            BN_print(bp, c);
+            BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
+        }
+        BN_div(d, e, c, a, ctx);
+        BN_sub(d, d, b);
+        if (!BN_is_zero(d) || !BN_is_zero(e)) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "Multiplication test failed!\n");
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+    BN_free(a);
+    BN_free(b);
+    BN_free(c);
+    BN_free(d);
+    BN_free(e);
+    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+    return (1);
+}
+
+int test_sqr(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    BIGNUM *a, *c, *d, *e;
+    int i, ret = 0;
+
+    a = BN_new();
+    c = BN_new();
+    d = BN_new();
+    e = BN_new();
+    if (a == NULL || c == NULL || d == NULL || e == NULL) {
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) {
+        BN_bntest_rand(a, 40 + i * 10, 0, 0);
+        a->neg = rand_neg();
+        BN_sqr(c, a, ctx);
+        if (bp != NULL) {
+            if (!results) {
+                BN_print(bp, a);
+                BIO_puts(bp, " * ");
+                BN_print(bp, a);
+                BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
+            }
+            BN_print(bp, c);
+            BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
+        }
+        BN_div(d, e, c, a, ctx);
+        BN_sub(d, d, a);
+        if (!BN_is_zero(d) || !BN_is_zero(e)) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "Square test failed!\n");
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* Regression test for a BN_sqr overflow bug. */
+    BN_hex2bn(&a,
+              "80000000000000008000000000000001"
+              "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE0000000000000000");
+    BN_sqr(c, a, ctx);
+    if (bp != NULL) {
+        if (!results) {
+            BN_print(bp, a);
+            BIO_puts(bp, " * ");
+            BN_print(bp, a);
+            BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
+        }
+        BN_print(bp, c);
+        BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
+    }
+    BN_mul(d, a, a, ctx);
+    if (BN_cmp(c, d)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Square test failed: BN_sqr and BN_mul produce "
+                "different results!\n");
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* Regression test for a BN_sqr overflow bug. */
+    BN_hex2bn(&a,
+              "80000000000000000000000080000001"
+              "FFFFFFFE000000000000000000000000");
+    BN_sqr(c, a, ctx);
+    if (bp != NULL) {
+        if (!results) {
+            BN_print(bp, a);
+            BIO_puts(bp, " * ");
+            BN_print(bp, a);
+            BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
+        }
+        BN_print(bp, c);
+        BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
+    }
+    BN_mul(d, a, a, ctx);
+    if (BN_cmp(c, d)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Square test failed: BN_sqr and BN_mul produce "
+                "different results!\n");
+        goto err;
+    }
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    BN_free(a);
+    BN_free(c);
+    BN_free(d);
+    BN_free(e);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int test_mont(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    BIGNUM *a, *b, *c, *d, *A, *B;
+    BIGNUM *n;
+    int i;
+    BN_MONT_CTX *mont;
+
+    a = BN_new();
+    b = BN_new();
+    c = BN_new();
+    d = BN_new();
+    A = BN_new();
+    B = BN_new();
+    n = BN_new();
+
+    mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new();
+    if (mont == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    BN_zero(n);
+    if (BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont, n, ctx)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "BN_MONT_CTX_set succeeded for zero modulus!\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    BN_set_word(n, 16);
+    if (BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont, n, ctx)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "BN_MONT_CTX_set succeeded for even modulus!\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    BN_bntest_rand(a, 100, 0, 0);
+    BN_bntest_rand(b, 100, 0, 0);
+    for (i = 0; i < num2; i++) {
+        int bits = (200 * (i + 1)) / num2;
+
+        if (bits == 0)
+            continue;
+        BN_bntest_rand(n, bits, 0, 1);
+        BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont, n, ctx);
+
+        BN_nnmod(a, a, n, ctx);
+        BN_nnmod(b, b, n, ctx);
+
+        BN_to_montgomery(A, a, mont, ctx);
+        BN_to_montgomery(B, b, mont, ctx);
+
+        BN_mod_mul_montgomery(c, A, B, mont, ctx);
+        BN_from_montgomery(A, c, mont, ctx);
+        if (bp != NULL) {
+            if (!results) {
+                BN_print(bp, a);
+                BIO_puts(bp, " * ");
+                BN_print(bp, b);
+                BIO_puts(bp, " % ");
+                BN_print(bp, &mont->N);
+                BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
+            }
+            BN_print(bp, A);
+            BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
+        }
+        BN_mod_mul(d, a, b, n, ctx);
+        BN_sub(d, d, A);
+        if (!BN_is_zero(d)) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "Montgomery multiplication test failed!\n");
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* Regression test for carry bug in mulx4x_mont */
+    BN_hex2bn(&a,
+        "7878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878"
+        "7878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878"
+        "7878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878"
+        "7878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878");
+    BN_hex2bn(&b,
+        "095D72C08C097BA488C5E439C655A192EAFB6380073D8C2664668EDDB4060744"
+        "E16E57FB4EDB9AE10A0CEFCDC28A894F689A128379DB279D48A2E20849D68593"
+        "9B7803BCF46CEBF5C533FB0DD35B080593DE5472E3FE5DB951B8BFF9B4CB8F03"
+        "9CC638A5EE8CDD703719F8000E6A9F63BEED5F2FCD52FF293EA05A251BB4AB81");
+    BN_hex2bn(&n,
+        "D78AF684E71DB0C39CFF4E64FB9DB567132CB9C50CC98009FEB820B26F2DED9B"
+        "91B9B5E2B83AE0AE4EB4E0523CA726BFBE969B89FD754F674CE99118C3F2D1C5"
+        "D81FDC7C54E02B60262B241D53C040E99E45826ECA37A804668E690E1AFC1CA4"
+        "2C9A15D84D4954425F0B7642FC0BD9D7B24E2618D2DCC9B729D944BADACFDDAF");
+    BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont, n, ctx);
+    BN_mod_mul_montgomery(c, a, b, mont, ctx);
+    BN_mod_mul_montgomery(d, b, a, mont, ctx);
+    if (BN_cmp(c, d)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Montgomery multiplication test failed:"
+                        " a*b != b*a.\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    BN_MONT_CTX_free(mont);
+    BN_free(a);
+    BN_free(b);
+    BN_free(c);
+    BN_free(d);
+    BN_free(A);
+    BN_free(B);
+    BN_free(n);
+    return (1);
+}
+
+int test_mod(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    BIGNUM *a, *b, *c, *d, *e;
+    int i;
+
+    a = BN_new();
+    b = BN_new();
+    c = BN_new();
+    d = BN_new();
+    e = BN_new();
+
+    BN_bntest_rand(a, 1024, 0, 0);
+    for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) {
+        BN_bntest_rand(b, 450 + i * 10, 0, 0);
+        a->neg = rand_neg();
+        b->neg = rand_neg();
+        BN_mod(c, a, b, ctx);
+        if (bp != NULL) {
+            if (!results) {
+                BN_print(bp, a);
+                BIO_puts(bp, " % ");
+                BN_print(bp, b);
+                BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
+            }
+            BN_print(bp, c);
+            BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
+        }
+        BN_div(d, e, a, b, ctx);
+        BN_sub(e, e, c);
+        if (!BN_is_zero(e)) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "Modulo test failed!\n");
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+    BN_free(a);
+    BN_free(b);
+    BN_free(c);
+    BN_free(d);
+    BN_free(e);
+    return (1);
+}
+
+int test_mod_mul(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    BIGNUM *a, *b, *c, *d, *e;
+    int i, j;
+
+    a = BN_new();
+    b = BN_new();
+    c = BN_new();
+    d = BN_new();
+    e = BN_new();
+
+    BN_one(a);
+    BN_one(b);
+    BN_zero(c);
+    if (BN_mod_mul(e, a, b, c, ctx)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "BN_mod_mul with zero modulus succeeded!\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    for (j = 0; j < 3; j++) {
+        BN_bntest_rand(c, 1024, 0, 0);
+        for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) {
+            BN_bntest_rand(a, 475 + i * 10, 0, 0);
+            BN_bntest_rand(b, 425 + i * 11, 0, 0);
+            a->neg = rand_neg();
+            b->neg = rand_neg();
+            if (!BN_mod_mul(e, a, b, c, ctx)) {
+                unsigned long l;
+
+                while ((l = ERR_get_error()))
+                    fprintf(stderr, "ERROR:%s\n", ERR_error_string(l, NULL));
+                EXIT(1);
+            }
+            if (bp != NULL) {
+                if (!results) {
+                    BN_print(bp, a);
+                    BIO_puts(bp, " * ");
+                    BN_print(bp, b);
+                    BIO_puts(bp, " % ");
+                    BN_print(bp, c);
+                    if ((a->neg ^ b->neg) && !BN_is_zero(e)) {
+                        /*
+                         * If (a*b) % c is negative, c must be added in order
+                         * to obtain the normalized remainder (new with
+                         * OpenSSL 0.9.7, previous versions of BN_mod_mul
+                         * could generate negative results)
+                         */
+                        BIO_puts(bp, " + ");
+                        BN_print(bp, c);
+                    }
+                    BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
+                }
+                BN_print(bp, e);
+                BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
+            }
+            BN_mul(d, a, b, ctx);
+            BN_sub(d, d, e);
+            BN_div(a, b, d, c, ctx);
+            if (!BN_is_zero(b)) {
+                fprintf(stderr, "Modulo multiply test failed!\n");
+                ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+                return 0;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    BN_free(a);
+    BN_free(b);
+    BN_free(c);
+    BN_free(d);
+    BN_free(e);
+    return (1);
+}
+
+int test_mod_exp(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    BIGNUM *a, *b, *c, *d, *e;
+    int i;
+
+    a = BN_new();
+    b = BN_new();
+    c = BN_new();
+    d = BN_new();
+    e = BN_new();
+
+    BN_one(a);
+    BN_one(b);
+    BN_zero(c);
+    if (BN_mod_exp(d, a, b, c, ctx)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "BN_mod_exp with zero modulus succeeded!\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    BN_bntest_rand(c, 30, 0, 1); /* must be odd for montgomery */
+    for (i = 0; i < num2; i++) {
+        BN_bntest_rand(a, 20 + i * 5, 0, 0);
+        BN_bntest_rand(b, 2 + i, 0, 0);
+
+        if (!BN_mod_exp(d, a, b, c, ctx))
+            return (0);
+
+        if (bp != NULL) {
+            if (!results) {
+                BN_print(bp, a);
+                BIO_puts(bp, " ^ ");
+                BN_print(bp, b);
+                BIO_puts(bp, " % ");
+                BN_print(bp, c);
+                BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
+            }
+            BN_print(bp, d);
+            BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
+        }
+        BN_exp(e, a, b, ctx);
+        BN_sub(e, e, d);
+        BN_div(a, b, e, c, ctx);
+        if (!BN_is_zero(b)) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "Modulo exponentiation test failed!\n");
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* Regression test for carry propagation bug in sqr8x_reduction */
+    BN_hex2bn(&a, "050505050505");
+    BN_hex2bn(&b, "02");
+    BN_hex2bn(&c,
+        "4141414141414141414141274141414141414141414141414141414141414141"
+        "4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141"
+        "4141414141414141414141800000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
+        "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
+        "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
+        "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001");
+    BN_mod_exp(d, a, b, c, ctx);
+    BN_mul(e, a, a, ctx);
+    if (BN_cmp(d, e)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "BN_mod_exp and BN_mul produce different results!\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    BN_free(a);
+    BN_free(b);
+    BN_free(c);
+    BN_free(d);
+    BN_free(e);
+    return (1);
+}
+
+int test_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    BIGNUM *a, *b, *c, *d, *e;
+    int i;
+
+    a = BN_new();
+    b = BN_new();
+    c = BN_new();
+    d = BN_new();
+    e = BN_new();
+
+    BN_one(a);
+    BN_one(b);
+    BN_zero(c);
+    if (BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(d, a, b, c, ctx, NULL)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime with zero modulus "
+                "succeeded\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    BN_set_word(c, 16);
+    if (BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(d, a, b, c, ctx, NULL)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime with even modulus "
+                "succeeded\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    BN_bntest_rand(c, 30, 0, 1); /* must be odd for montgomery */
+    for (i = 0; i < num2; i++) {
+        BN_bntest_rand(a, 20 + i * 5, 0, 0);
+        BN_bntest_rand(b, 2 + i, 0, 0);
+
+        if (!BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(d, a, b, c, ctx, NULL))
+            return (00);
+
+        if (bp != NULL) {
+            if (!results) {
+                BN_print(bp, a);
+                BIO_puts(bp, " ^ ");
+                BN_print(bp, b);
+                BIO_puts(bp, " % ");
+                BN_print(bp, c);
+                BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
+            }
+            BN_print(bp, d);
+            BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
+        }
+        BN_exp(e, a, b, ctx);
+        BN_sub(e, e, d);
+        BN_div(a, b, e, c, ctx);
+        if (!BN_is_zero(b)) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "Modulo exponentiation test failed!\n");
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+    BN_free(a);
+    BN_free(b);
+    BN_free(c);
+    BN_free(d);
+    BN_free(e);
+    return (1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Test constant-time modular exponentiation with 1024-bit inputs, which on
+ * x86_64 cause a different code branch to be taken.
+ */
+int test_mod_exp_mont5(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    BIGNUM *a, *p, *m, *d, *e;
+    BN_MONT_CTX *mont;
+
+    a = BN_new();
+    p = BN_new();
+    m = BN_new();
+    d = BN_new();
+    e = BN_new();
+    mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new();
+
+    BN_bntest_rand(m, 1024, 0, 1); /* must be odd for montgomery */
+    /* Zero exponent */
+    BN_bntest_rand(a, 1024, 0, 0);
+    BN_zero(p);
+    if (!BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(d, a, p, m, ctx, NULL))
+        return 0;
+    if (!BN_is_one(d)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Modular exponentiation test failed!\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+    /* Zero input */
+    BN_bntest_rand(p, 1024, 0, 0);
+    BN_zero(a);
+    if (!BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(d, a, p, m, ctx, NULL))
+        return 0;
+    if (!BN_is_zero(d)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Modular exponentiation test failed!\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+    /*
+     * Craft an input whose Montgomery representation is 1, i.e., shorter
+     * than the modulus m, in order to test the const time precomputation
+     * scattering/gathering.
+     */
+    BN_one(a);
+    BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont, m, ctx);
+    if (!BN_from_montgomery(e, a, mont, ctx))
+        return 0;
+    if (!BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(d, e, p, m, ctx, NULL))
+        return 0;
+    if (!BN_mod_exp_simple(a, e, p, m, ctx))
+        return 0;
+    if (BN_cmp(a, d) != 0) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Modular exponentiation test failed!\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+    /* Finally, some regular test vectors. */
+    BN_bntest_rand(e, 1024, 0, 0);
+    if (!BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(d, e, p, m, ctx, NULL))
+        return 0;
+    if (!BN_mod_exp_simple(a, e, p, m, ctx))
+        return 0;
+    if (BN_cmp(a, d) != 0) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Modular exponentiation test failed!\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+    BN_MONT_CTX_free(mont);
+    BN_free(a);
+    BN_free(p);
+    BN_free(m);
+    BN_free(d);
+    BN_free(e);
+    return (1);
+}
+
+int test_exp(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    BIGNUM *a, *b, *d, *e, *one;
+    int i;
+
+    a = BN_new();
+    b = BN_new();
+    d = BN_new();
+    e = BN_new();
+    one = BN_new();
+    BN_one(one);
+
+    for (i = 0; i < num2; i++) {
+        BN_bntest_rand(a, 20 + i * 5, 0, 0);
+        BN_bntest_rand(b, 2 + i, 0, 0);
+
+        if (BN_exp(d, a, b, ctx) <= 0)
+            return (0);
+
+        if (bp != NULL) {
+            if (!results) {
+                BN_print(bp, a);
+                BIO_puts(bp, " ^ ");
+                BN_print(bp, b);
+                BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
+            }
+            BN_print(bp, d);
+            BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
+        }
+        BN_one(e);
+        for (; !BN_is_zero(b); BN_sub(b, b, one))
+            BN_mul(e, e, a, ctx);
+        BN_sub(e, e, d);
+        if (!BN_is_zero(e)) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "Exponentiation test failed!\n");
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+    BN_free(a);
+    BN_free(b);
+    BN_free(d);
+    BN_free(e);
+    BN_free(one);
+    return (1);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+int test_gf2m_add(BIO *bp)
+{
+    BIGNUM *a, *b, *c;
+    int i, ret = 0;
+
+    a = BN_new();
+    b = BN_new();
+    c = BN_new();
+
+    for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) {
+        BN_rand(a, 512, BN_RAND_TOP_ONE, BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ANY);
+        BN_copy(b, BN_value_one());
+        a->neg = rand_neg();
+        b->neg = rand_neg();
+        BN_GF2m_add(c, a, b);
+        /* Test that two added values have the correct parity. */
+        if ((BN_is_odd(a) && BN_is_odd(c))
+            || (!BN_is_odd(a) && !BN_is_odd(c))) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "GF(2^m) addition test (a) failed!\n");
+            goto err;
+        }
+        BN_GF2m_add(c, c, c);
+        /* Test that c + c = 0. */
+        if (!BN_is_zero(c)) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "GF(2^m) addition test (b) failed!\n");
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    BN_free(a);
+    BN_free(b);
+    BN_free(c);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int test_gf2m_mod(BIO *bp)
+{
+    BIGNUM *a, *b[2], *c, *d, *e;
+    int i, j, ret = 0;
+    int p0[] = { 163, 7, 6, 3, 0, -1 };
+    int p1[] = { 193, 15, 0, -1 };
+
+    a = BN_new();
+    b[0] = BN_new();
+    b[1] = BN_new();
+    c = BN_new();
+    d = BN_new();
+    e = BN_new();
+
+    BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p0, b[0]);
+    BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p1, b[1]);
+
+    for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) {
+        BN_bntest_rand(a, 1024, 0, 0);
+        for (j = 0; j < 2; j++) {
+            BN_GF2m_mod(c, a, b[j]);
+            BN_GF2m_add(d, a, c);
+            BN_GF2m_mod(e, d, b[j]);
+            /* Test that a + (a mod p) mod p == 0. */
+            if (!BN_is_zero(e)) {
+                fprintf(stderr, "GF(2^m) modulo test failed!\n");
+                goto err;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    BN_free(a);
+    BN_free(b[0]);
+    BN_free(b[1]);
+    BN_free(c);
+    BN_free(d);
+    BN_free(e);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int test_gf2m_mod_mul(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    BIGNUM *a, *b[2], *c, *d, *e, *f, *g, *h;
+    int i, j, ret = 0;
+    int p0[] = { 163, 7, 6, 3, 0, -1 };
+    int p1[] = { 193, 15, 0, -1 };
+
+    a = BN_new();
+    b[0] = BN_new();
+    b[1] = BN_new();
+    c = BN_new();
+    d = BN_new();
+    e = BN_new();
+    f = BN_new();
+    g = BN_new();
+    h = BN_new();
+
+    BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p0, b[0]);
+    BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p1, b[1]);
+
+    for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) {
+        BN_bntest_rand(a, 1024, 0, 0);
+        BN_bntest_rand(c, 1024, 0, 0);
+        BN_bntest_rand(d, 1024, 0, 0);
+        for (j = 0; j < 2; j++) {
+            BN_GF2m_mod_mul(e, a, c, b[j], ctx);
+            BN_GF2m_add(f, a, d);
+            BN_GF2m_mod_mul(g, f, c, b[j], ctx);
+            BN_GF2m_mod_mul(h, d, c, b[j], ctx);
+            BN_GF2m_add(f, e, g);
+            BN_GF2m_add(f, f, h);
+            /* Test that (a+d)*c = a*c + d*c. */
+            if (!BN_is_zero(f)) {
+                fprintf(stderr,
+                        "GF(2^m) modular multiplication test failed!\n");
+                goto err;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    BN_free(a);
+    BN_free(b[0]);
+    BN_free(b[1]);
+    BN_free(c);
+    BN_free(d);
+    BN_free(e);
+    BN_free(f);
+    BN_free(g);
+    BN_free(h);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int test_gf2m_mod_sqr(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    BIGNUM *a, *b[2], *c, *d;
+    int i, j, ret = 0;
+    int p0[] = { 163, 7, 6, 3, 0, -1 };
+    int p1[] = { 193, 15, 0, -1 };
+
+    a = BN_new();
+    b[0] = BN_new();
+    b[1] = BN_new();
+    c = BN_new();
+    d = BN_new();
+
+    BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p0, b[0]);
+    BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p1, b[1]);
+
+    for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) {
+        BN_bntest_rand(a, 1024, 0, 0);
+        for (j = 0; j < 2; j++) {
+            BN_GF2m_mod_sqr(c, a, b[j], ctx);
+            BN_copy(d, a);
+            BN_GF2m_mod_mul(d, a, d, b[j], ctx);
+            BN_GF2m_add(d, c, d);
+            /* Test that a*a = a^2. */
+            if (!BN_is_zero(d)) {
+                fprintf(stderr, "GF(2^m) modular squaring test failed!\n");
+                goto err;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    BN_free(a);
+    BN_free(b[0]);
+    BN_free(b[1]);
+    BN_free(c);
+    BN_free(d);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int test_gf2m_mod_inv(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    BIGNUM *a, *b[2], *c, *d;
+    int i, j, ret = 0;
+    int p0[] = { 163, 7, 6, 3, 0, -1 };
+    int p1[] = { 193, 15, 0, -1 };
+
+    a = BN_new();
+    b[0] = BN_new();
+    b[1] = BN_new();
+    c = BN_new();
+    d = BN_new();
+
+    BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p0, b[0]);
+    BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p1, b[1]);
+
+    for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) {
+        BN_bntest_rand(a, 512, 0, 0);
+        for (j = 0; j < 2; j++) {
+            BN_GF2m_mod_inv(c, a, b[j], ctx);
+            BN_GF2m_mod_mul(d, a, c, b[j], ctx);
+            /* Test that ((1/a)*a) = 1. */
+            if (!BN_is_one(d)) {
+                fprintf(stderr, "GF(2^m) modular inversion test failed!\n");
+                goto err;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    BN_free(a);
+    BN_free(b[0]);
+    BN_free(b[1]);
+    BN_free(c);
+    BN_free(d);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int test_gf2m_mod_div(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    BIGNUM *a, *b[2], *c, *d, *e, *f;
+    int i, j, ret = 0;
+    int p0[] = { 163, 7, 6, 3, 0, -1 };
+    int p1[] = { 193, 15, 0, -1 };
+
+    a = BN_new();
+    b[0] = BN_new();
+    b[1] = BN_new();
+    c = BN_new();
+    d = BN_new();
+    e = BN_new();
+    f = BN_new();
+
+    BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p0, b[0]);
+    BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p1, b[1]);
+
+    for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) {
+        BN_bntest_rand(a, 512, 0, 0);
+        BN_bntest_rand(c, 512, 0, 0);
+        for (j = 0; j < 2; j++) {
+            BN_GF2m_mod_div(d, a, c, b[j], ctx);
+            BN_GF2m_mod_mul(e, d, c, b[j], ctx);
+            BN_GF2m_mod_div(f, a, e, b[j], ctx);
+            /* Test that ((a/c)*c)/a = 1. */
+            if (!BN_is_one(f)) {
+                fprintf(stderr, "GF(2^m) modular division test failed!\n");
+                goto err;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    BN_free(a);
+    BN_free(b[0]);
+    BN_free(b[1]);
+    BN_free(c);
+    BN_free(d);
+    BN_free(e);
+    BN_free(f);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int test_gf2m_mod_exp(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    BIGNUM *a, *b[2], *c, *d, *e, *f;
+    int i, j, ret = 0;
+    int p0[] = { 163, 7, 6, 3, 0, -1 };
+    int p1[] = { 193, 15, 0, -1 };
+
+    a = BN_new();
+    b[0] = BN_new();
+    b[1] = BN_new();
+    c = BN_new();
+    d = BN_new();
+    e = BN_new();
+    f = BN_new();
+
+    BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p0, b[0]);
+    BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p1, b[1]);
+
+    for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) {
+        BN_bntest_rand(a, 512, 0, 0);
+        BN_bntest_rand(c, 512, 0, 0);
+        BN_bntest_rand(d, 512, 0, 0);
+        for (j = 0; j < 2; j++) {
+            BN_GF2m_mod_exp(e, a, c, b[j], ctx);
+            BN_GF2m_mod_exp(f, a, d, b[j], ctx);
+            BN_GF2m_mod_mul(e, e, f, b[j], ctx);
+            BN_add(f, c, d);
+            BN_GF2m_mod_exp(f, a, f, b[j], ctx);
+            BN_GF2m_add(f, e, f);
+            /* Test that a^(c+d)=a^c*a^d. */
+            if (!BN_is_zero(f)) {
+                fprintf(stderr,
+                        "GF(2^m) modular exponentiation test failed!\n");
+                goto err;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    BN_free(a);
+    BN_free(b[0]);
+    BN_free(b[1]);
+    BN_free(c);
+    BN_free(d);
+    BN_free(e);
+    BN_free(f);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int test_gf2m_mod_sqrt(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    BIGNUM *a, *b[2], *c, *d, *e, *f;
+    int i, j, ret = 0;
+    int p0[] = { 163, 7, 6, 3, 0, -1 };
+    int p1[] = { 193, 15, 0, -1 };
+
+    a = BN_new();
+    b[0] = BN_new();
+    b[1] = BN_new();
+    c = BN_new();
+    d = BN_new();
+    e = BN_new();
+    f = BN_new();
+
+    BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p0, b[0]);
+    BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p1, b[1]);
+
+    for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) {
+        BN_bntest_rand(a, 512, 0, 0);
+        for (j = 0; j < 2; j++) {
+            BN_GF2m_mod(c, a, b[j]);
+            BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt(d, a, b[j], ctx);
+            BN_GF2m_mod_sqr(e, d, b[j], ctx);
+            BN_GF2m_add(f, c, e);
+            /* Test that d^2 = a, where d = sqrt(a). */
+            if (!BN_is_zero(f)) {
+                fprintf(stderr, "GF(2^m) modular square root test failed!\n");
+                goto err;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    BN_free(a);
+    BN_free(b[0]);
+    BN_free(b[1]);
+    BN_free(c);
+    BN_free(d);
+    BN_free(e);
+    BN_free(f);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int test_gf2m_mod_solve_quad(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    BIGNUM *a, *b[2], *c, *d, *e;
+    int i, j, s = 0, t, ret = 0;
+    int p0[] = { 163, 7, 6, 3, 0, -1 };
+    int p1[] = { 193, 15, 0, -1 };
+
+    a = BN_new();
+    b[0] = BN_new();
+    b[1] = BN_new();
+    c = BN_new();
+    d = BN_new();
+    e = BN_new();
+
+    BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p0, b[0]);
+    BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p1, b[1]);
+
+    for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) {
+        BN_bntest_rand(a, 512, 0, 0);
+        for (j = 0; j < 2; j++) {
+            t = BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad(c, a, b[j], ctx);
+            if (t) {
+                s++;
+                BN_GF2m_mod_sqr(d, c, b[j], ctx);
+                BN_GF2m_add(d, c, d);
+                BN_GF2m_mod(e, a, b[j]);
+                BN_GF2m_add(e, e, d);
+                /*
+                 * Test that solution of quadratic c satisfies c^2 + c = a.
+                 */
+                if (!BN_is_zero(e)) {
+                    fprintf(stderr,
+                            "GF(2^m) modular solve quadratic test failed!\n");
+                    goto err;
+                }
+
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    if (s == 0) {
+        fprintf(stderr,
+                "All %i tests of GF(2^m) modular solve quadratic resulted in no roots;\n",
+                num0);
+        fprintf(stderr,
+                "this is very unlikely and probably indicates an error.\n");
+        goto err;
+    }
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    BN_free(a);
+    BN_free(b[0]);
+    BN_free(b[1]);
+    BN_free(c);
+    BN_free(d);
+    BN_free(e);
+    return ret;
+}
+#endif
+static int genprime_cb(int p, int n, BN_GENCB *arg)
+{
+    char c = '*';
+
+    if (p == 0)
+        c = '.';
+    if (p == 1)
+        c = '+';
+    if (p == 2)
+        c = '*';
+    if (p == 3)
+        c = '\n';
+    putc(c, stderr);
+    fflush(stderr);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int test_kron(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    BN_GENCB cb;
+    BIGNUM *a, *b, *r, *t;
+    int i;
+    int legendre, kronecker;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    a = BN_new();
+    b = BN_new();
+    r = BN_new();
+    t = BN_new();
+    if (a == NULL || b == NULL || r == NULL || t == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    BN_GENCB_set(&cb, genprime_cb, NULL);
+
+    /*
+     * We test BN_kronecker(a, b, ctx) just for b odd (Jacobi symbol). In
+     * this case we know that if b is prime, then BN_kronecker(a, b, ctx) is
+     * congruent to $a^{(b-1)/2}$, modulo $b$ (Legendre symbol). So we
+     * generate a random prime b and compare these values for a number of
+     * random a's.  (That is, we run the Solovay-Strassen primality test to
+     * confirm that b is prime, except that we don't want to test whether b
+     * is prime but whether BN_kronecker works.)
+     */
+
+    if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(b, 512, 0, NULL, NULL, &cb))
+        goto err;
+    b->neg = rand_neg();
+    putc('\n', stderr);
+
+    for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) {
+        if (!BN_bntest_rand(a, 512, 0, 0))
+            goto err;
+        a->neg = rand_neg();
+
+        /* t := (|b|-1)/2  (note that b is odd) */
+        if (!BN_copy(t, b))
+            goto err;
+        t->neg = 0;
+        if (!BN_sub_word(t, 1))
+            goto err;
+        if (!BN_rshift1(t, t))
+            goto err;
+        /* r := a^t mod b */
+        b->neg = 0;
+
+        if (!BN_mod_exp_recp(r, a, t, b, ctx))
+            goto err;
+        b->neg = 1;
+
+        if (BN_is_word(r, 1))
+            legendre = 1;
+        else if (BN_is_zero(r))
+            legendre = 0;
+        else {
+            if (!BN_add_word(r, 1))
+                goto err;
+            if (0 != BN_ucmp(r, b)) {
+                fprintf(stderr, "Legendre symbol computation failed\n");
+                goto err;
+            }
+            legendre = -1;
+        }
+
+        kronecker = BN_kronecker(a, b, ctx);
+        if (kronecker < -1)
+            goto err;
+        /* we actually need BN_kronecker(a, |b|) */
+        if (a->neg && b->neg)
+            kronecker = -kronecker;
+
+        if (legendre != kronecker) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "legendre != kronecker; a = ");
+            BN_print_fp(stderr, a);
+            fprintf(stderr, ", b = ");
+            BN_print_fp(stderr, b);
+            fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        putc('.', stderr);
+        fflush(stderr);
+    }
+
+    putc('\n', stderr);
+    fflush(stderr);
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    BN_free(a);
+    BN_free(b);
+    BN_free(r);
+    BN_free(t);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int test_sqrt(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    BN_GENCB cb;
+    BIGNUM *a, *p, *r;
+    int i, j;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    a = BN_new();
+    p = BN_new();
+    r = BN_new();
+    if (a == NULL || p == NULL || r == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    BN_GENCB_set(&cb, genprime_cb, NULL);
+
+    for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
+        if (i < 8) {
+            unsigned primes[8] = { 2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19 };
+
+            if (!BN_set_word(p, primes[i]))
+                goto err;
+        } else {
+            if (!BN_set_word(a, 32))
+                goto err;
+            if (!BN_set_word(r, 2 * i + 1))
+                goto err;
+
+            if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(p, 256, 0, a, r, &cb))
+                goto err;
+            putc('\n', stderr);
+        }
+        p->neg = rand_neg();
+
+        for (j = 0; j < num2; j++) {
+            /*
+             * construct 'a' such that it is a square modulo p, but in
+             * general not a proper square and not reduced modulo p
+             */
+            if (!BN_bntest_rand(r, 256, 0, 3))
+                goto err;
+            if (!BN_nnmod(r, r, p, ctx))
+                goto err;
+            if (!BN_mod_sqr(r, r, p, ctx))
+                goto err;
+            if (!BN_bntest_rand(a, 256, 0, 3))
+                goto err;
+            if (!BN_nnmod(a, a, p, ctx))
+                goto err;
+            if (!BN_mod_sqr(a, a, p, ctx))
+                goto err;
+            if (!BN_mul(a, a, r, ctx))
+                goto err;
+            if (rand_neg())
+                if (!BN_sub(a, a, p))
+                    goto err;
+
+            if (!BN_mod_sqrt(r, a, p, ctx))
+                goto err;
+            if (!BN_mod_sqr(r, r, p, ctx))
+                goto err;
+
+            if (!BN_nnmod(a, a, p, ctx))
+                goto err;
+
+            if (BN_cmp(a, r) != 0) {
+                fprintf(stderr, "BN_mod_sqrt failed: a = ");
+                BN_print_fp(stderr, a);
+                fprintf(stderr, ", r = ");
+                BN_print_fp(stderr, r);
+                fprintf(stderr, ", p = ");
+                BN_print_fp(stderr, p);
+                fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+                goto err;
+            }
+
+            putc('.', stderr);
+            fflush(stderr);
+        }
+
+        putc('\n', stderr);
+        fflush(stderr);
+    }
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    BN_free(a);
+    BN_free(p);
+    BN_free(r);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int test_small_prime(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    static const int bits = 10;
+    int ret = 0;
+    BIGNUM *r;
+
+    r = BN_new();
+    if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(r, bits, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL))
+        goto err;
+    if (BN_num_bits(r) != bits) {
+        BIO_printf(bp, "Expected %d bit prime, got %d bit number\n", bits,
+                   BN_num_bits(r));
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+    BN_clear_free(r);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int test_bn2dec(BIO *bp)
+{
+    static const char *bn2dec_tests[] = {
+        "0",
+        "1",
+        "-1",
+        "100",
+        "-100",
+        "123456789012345678901234567890",
+        "-123456789012345678901234567890",
+        "123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890",
+        "-123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890",
+    };
+    int ret = 0;
+    size_t i;
+    BIGNUM *bn = NULL;
+    char *dec = NULL;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(bn2dec_tests); i++) {
+        if (!BN_dec2bn(&bn, bn2dec_tests[i]))
+            goto err;
+
+        dec = BN_bn2dec(bn);
+        if (dec == NULL) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "BN_bn2dec failed on %s.\n", bn2dec_tests[i]);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        if (strcmp(dec, bn2dec_tests[i]) != 0) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "BN_bn2dec gave %s, wanted %s.\n", dec,
+                    bn2dec_tests[i]);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        OPENSSL_free(dec);
+        dec = NULL;
+    }
+
+    ret = 1;
+
+err:
+    BN_free(bn);
+    OPENSSL_free(dec);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int test_lshift(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx, BIGNUM *a_)
+{
+    BIGNUM *a, *b, *c, *d;
+    int i;
+
+    b = BN_new();
+    c = BN_new();
+    d = BN_new();
+    BN_one(c);
+
+    if (a_)
+        a = a_;
+    else {
+        a = BN_new();
+        BN_bntest_rand(a, 200, 0, 0);
+        a->neg = rand_neg();
+    }
+    for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) {
+        BN_lshift(b, a, i + 1);
+        BN_add(c, c, c);
+        if (bp != NULL) {
+            if (!results) {
+                BN_print(bp, a);
+                BIO_puts(bp, " * ");
+                BN_print(bp, c);
+                BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
+            }
+            BN_print(bp, b);
+            BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
+        }
+        BN_mul(d, a, c, ctx);
+        BN_sub(d, d, b);
+        if (!BN_is_zero(d)) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "Left shift test failed!\n");
+            fprintf(stderr, "a=");
+            BN_print_fp(stderr, a);
+            fprintf(stderr, "\nb=");
+            BN_print_fp(stderr, b);
+            fprintf(stderr, "\nc=");
+            BN_print_fp(stderr, c);
+            fprintf(stderr, "\nd=");
+            BN_print_fp(stderr, d);
+            fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+    BN_free(a);
+    BN_free(b);
+    BN_free(c);
+    BN_free(d);
+    return (1);
+}
+
+int test_lshift1(BIO *bp)
+{
+    BIGNUM *a, *b, *c;
+    int i;
+
+    a = BN_new();
+    b = BN_new();
+    c = BN_new();
+
+    BN_bntest_rand(a, 200, 0, 0);
+    a->neg = rand_neg();
+    for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) {
+        BN_lshift1(b, a);
+        if (bp != NULL) {
+            if (!results) {
+                BN_print(bp, a);
+                BIO_puts(bp, " * 2");
+                BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
+            }
+            BN_print(bp, b);
+            BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
+        }
+        BN_add(c, a, a);
+        BN_sub(a, b, c);
+        if (!BN_is_zero(a)) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "Left shift one test failed!\n");
+            return 0;
+        }
+
+        BN_copy(a, b);
+    }
+    BN_free(a);
+    BN_free(b);
+    BN_free(c);
+    return (1);
+}
+
+int test_rshift(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    BIGNUM *a, *b, *c, *d, *e;
+    int i;
+
+    a = BN_new();
+    b = BN_new();
+    c = BN_new();
+    d = BN_new();
+    e = BN_new();
+    BN_one(c);
+
+    BN_bntest_rand(a, 200, 0, 0);
+    a->neg = rand_neg();
+    for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) {
+        BN_rshift(b, a, i + 1);
+        BN_add(c, c, c);
+        if (bp != NULL) {
+            if (!results) {
+                BN_print(bp, a);
+                BIO_puts(bp, " / ");
+                BN_print(bp, c);
+                BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
+            }
+            BN_print(bp, b);
+            BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
+        }
+        BN_div(d, e, a, c, ctx);
+        BN_sub(d, d, b);
+        if (!BN_is_zero(d)) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "Right shift test failed!\n");
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+    BN_free(a);
+    BN_free(b);
+    BN_free(c);
+    BN_free(d);
+    BN_free(e);
+    return (1);
+}
+
+int test_rshift1(BIO *bp)
+{
+    BIGNUM *a, *b, *c;
+    int i;
+
+    a = BN_new();
+    b = BN_new();
+    c = BN_new();
+
+    BN_bntest_rand(a, 200, 0, 0);
+    a->neg = rand_neg();
+    for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) {
+        BN_rshift1(b, a);
+        if (bp != NULL) {
+            if (!results) {
+                BN_print(bp, a);
+                BIO_puts(bp, " / 2");
+                BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
+            }
+            BN_print(bp, b);
+            BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
+        }
+        BN_sub(c, a, b);
+        BN_sub(c, c, b);
+        if (!BN_is_zero(c) && !BN_abs_is_word(c, 1)) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "Right shift one test failed!\n");
+            return 0;
+        }
+        BN_copy(a, b);
+    }
+    BN_free(a);
+    BN_free(b);
+    BN_free(c);
+    return (1);
+}
+
+int rand_neg(void)
+{
+    static unsigned int neg = 0;
+    static int sign[8] = { 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1 };
+
+    return (sign[(neg++) % 8]);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/build.info b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/build.info
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c262248
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/build.info
@@ -0,0 +1,326 @@
+IF[{- !$disabled{tests} -}]
+  PROGRAMS_NO_INST=\
+          aborttest \
+          sanitytest exdatatest bntest \
+          ectest ecdsatest gmdifftest pbelutest ideatest \
+          md2test md4test md5test \
+          hmactest wp_test \
+          rc2test rc4test rc5test \
+          destest sha1test sha256t sha512t \
+          mdc2test rmdtest \
+          randtest dhtest enginetest casttest \
+          bftest ssltest_old dsatest exptest rsa_test \
+          evp_test evp_extra_test igetest v3nametest v3ext \
+          crltest danetest heartbeat_test p5_crpt2_test bad_dtls_test \
+          constant_time_test verify_extra_test clienthellotest \
+          packettest asynctest secmemtest srptest memleaktest \
+          dtlsv1listentest ct_test threadstest afalgtest d2i_test \
+          ssl_test_ctx_test ssl_test x509aux cipherlist_test asynciotest \
+          bioprinttest sslapitest dtlstest sslcorrupttest bio_enc_test \
+          ocspapitest fatalerrtest
+
+  SOURCE[aborttest]=aborttest.c
+  INCLUDE[aborttest]=../include
+  DEPEND[aborttest]=../libcrypto
+
+  SOURCE[sanitytest]=sanitytest.c
+  INCLUDE[sanitytest]=../include
+  DEPEND[sanitytest]=../libcrypto
+
+  SOURCE[exdatatest]=exdatatest.c
+  INCLUDE[exdatatest]=../include
+  DEPEND[exdatatest]=../libcrypto
+
+  SOURCE[bntest]=bntest.c
+  INCLUDE[bntest]=.. ../crypto/include ../include
+  DEPEND[bntest]=../libcrypto
+
+  SOURCE[ectest]=ectest.c
+  INCLUDE[ectest]=../include
+  DEPEND[ectest]=../libcrypto
+
+  SOURCE[ecdsatest]=ecdsatest.c
+  INCLUDE[ecdsatest]=../include
+  DEPEND[ecdsatest]=../libcrypto
+
+  SOURCE[gmdifftest]=gmdifftest.c
+  INCLUDE[gmdifftest]=../include
+  DEPEND[gmdifftest]=../libcrypto
+
+  SOURCE[pbelutest]=pbelutest.c
+  INCLUDE[pbelutest]=../include
+  DEPEND[pbelutest]=../libcrypto
+
+  SOURCE[ideatest]=ideatest.c
+  INCLUDE[ideatest]=../include
+  DEPEND[ideatest]=../libcrypto
+
+  SOURCE[md2test]=md2test.c
+  INCLUDE[md2test]=../include
+  DEPEND[md2test]=../libcrypto
+
+  SOURCE[md4test]=md4test.c
+  INCLUDE[md4test]=../include
+  DEPEND[md4test]=../libcrypto
+
+  SOURCE[md5test]=md5test.c
+  INCLUDE[md5test]=../include
+  DEPEND[md5test]=../libcrypto
+
+  SOURCE[hmactest]=hmactest.c
+  INCLUDE[hmactest]=../include
+  DEPEND[hmactest]=../libcrypto
+
+  SOURCE[wp_test]=wp_test.c
+  INCLUDE[wp_test]=../include
+  DEPEND[wp_test]=../libcrypto
+
+  SOURCE[rc2test]=rc2test.c
+  INCLUDE[rc2test]=../include
+  DEPEND[rc2test]=../libcrypto
+
+  SOURCE[rc4test]=rc4test.c
+  INCLUDE[rc4test]=../include
+  DEPEND[rc4test]=../libcrypto
+
+  SOURCE[rc5test]=rc5test.c
+  INCLUDE[rc5test]=../include
+  DEPEND[rc5test]=../libcrypto
+
+  SOURCE[destest]=destest.c
+  INCLUDE[destest]=../include
+  DEPEND[destest]=../libcrypto
+
+  SOURCE[sha1test]=sha1test.c
+  INCLUDE[sha1test]=../include
+  DEPEND[sha1test]=../libcrypto
+
+  SOURCE[sha256t]=sha256t.c
+  INCLUDE[sha256t]=../include
+  DEPEND[sha256t]=../libcrypto
+
+  SOURCE[sha512t]=sha512t.c
+  INCLUDE[sha512t]=../include
+  DEPEND[sha512t]=../libcrypto
+
+  SOURCE[mdc2test]=mdc2test.c
+  INCLUDE[mdc2test]=../include
+  DEPEND[mdc2test]=../libcrypto
+
+  SOURCE[rmdtest]=rmdtest.c
+  INCLUDE[rmdtest]=../include
+  DEPEND[rmdtest]=../libcrypto
+
+  SOURCE[randtest]=randtest.c
+  INCLUDE[randtest]=../include
+  DEPEND[randtest]=../libcrypto
+
+  SOURCE[dhtest]=dhtest.c
+  INCLUDE[dhtest]=../include
+  DEPEND[dhtest]=../libcrypto
+
+  SOURCE[enginetest]=enginetest.c
+  INCLUDE[enginetest]=../include
+  DEPEND[enginetest]=../libcrypto
+
+  SOURCE[casttest]=casttest.c
+  INCLUDE[casttest]=../include
+  DEPEND[casttest]=../libcrypto
+
+  SOURCE[bftest]=bftest.c
+  INCLUDE[bftest]=../include
+  DEPEND[bftest]=../libcrypto
+
+  SOURCE[ssltest_old]=ssltest_old.c
+  INCLUDE[ssltest_old]=.. ../include
+  DEPEND[ssltest_old]=../libcrypto ../libssl
+
+  SOURCE[dsatest]=dsatest.c
+  INCLUDE[dsatest]=../include
+  DEPEND[dsatest]=../libcrypto
+
+  SOURCE[exptest]=exptest.c
+  INCLUDE[exptest]=../include
+  DEPEND[exptest]=../libcrypto
+
+  SOURCE[rsa_test]=rsa_test.c
+  INCLUDE[rsa_test]=.. ../include
+  DEPEND[rsa_test]=../libcrypto
+
+  SOURCE[fatalerrtest]=fatalerrtest.c ssltestlib.c testutil.c
+  INCLUDE[fatalerrtest]=../include ..
+  DEPEND[fatalerrtest]=../libcrypto ../libssl
+
+  SOURCE[evp_test]=evp_test.c
+  INCLUDE[evp_test]=../include
+  DEPEND[evp_test]=../libcrypto
+
+  SOURCE[evp_extra_test]=evp_extra_test.c
+  INCLUDE[evp_extra_test]=../include
+  DEPEND[evp_extra_test]=../libcrypto
+
+  SOURCE[igetest]=igetest.c
+  INCLUDE[igetest]=.. ../include
+  DEPEND[igetest]=../libcrypto
+
+  SOURCE[v3nametest]=v3nametest.c
+  INCLUDE[v3nametest]=../include
+  DEPEND[v3nametest]=../libcrypto
+
+  SOURCE[crltest]=crltest.c testutil.c
+  INCLUDE[crltest]=../include
+  DEPEND[crltest]=../libcrypto
+
+  SOURCE[v3ext]=v3ext.c
+  INCLUDE[v3ext]=../include
+  DEPEND[v3ext]=../libcrypto
+
+  SOURCE[danetest]=danetest.c
+  INCLUDE[danetest]=../include
+  DEPEND[danetest]=../libcrypto ../libssl
+
+  SOURCE[heartbeat_test]=heartbeat_test.c testutil.c
+  INCLUDE[heartbeat_test]=.. ../include
+  DEPEND[heartbeat_test]=../libcrypto ../libssl
+
+  SOURCE[p5_crpt2_test]=p5_crpt2_test.c
+  INCLUDE[p5_crpt2_test]=../include
+  DEPEND[p5_crpt2_test]=../libcrypto
+
+  SOURCE[constant_time_test]=constant_time_test.c
+  INCLUDE[constant_time_test]=.. ../include
+  DEPEND[constant_time_test]=../libcrypto
+
+  SOURCE[verify_extra_test]=verify_extra_test.c
+  INCLUDE[verify_extra_test]=../include
+  DEPEND[verify_extra_test]=../libcrypto
+
+  SOURCE[clienthellotest]=clienthellotest.c
+  INCLUDE[clienthellotest]=../include
+  DEPEND[clienthellotest]=../libcrypto ../libssl
+
+  SOURCE[bad_dtls_test]=bad_dtls_test.c
+  INCLUDE[bad_dtls_test]=../include
+  DEPEND[bad_dtls_test]=../libcrypto ../libssl
+
+  SOURCE[packettest]=packettest.c
+  INCLUDE[packettest]=../include
+  DEPEND[packettest]=../libcrypto
+
+  SOURCE[asynctest]=asynctest.c
+  INCLUDE[asynctest]=.. ../include
+  DEPEND[asynctest]=../libcrypto
+
+  SOURCE[secmemtest]=secmemtest.c
+  INCLUDE[secmemtest]=../include
+  DEPEND[secmemtest]=../libcrypto
+
+  SOURCE[srptest]=srptest.c
+  INCLUDE[srptest]=../include
+  DEPEND[srptest]=../libcrypto
+
+  SOURCE[memleaktest]=memleaktest.c
+  INCLUDE[memleaktest]=../include
+  DEPEND[memleaktest]=../libcrypto
+
+  SOURCE[dtlsv1listentest]=dtlsv1listentest.c
+  INCLUDE[dtlsv1listentest]=.. ../include
+  DEPEND[dtlsv1listentest]=../libssl
+
+  SOURCE[ct_test]=ct_test.c testutil.c
+  INCLUDE[ct_test]=../crypto/include ../include
+  DEPEND[ct_test]=../libcrypto
+
+  SOURCE[threadstest]=threadstest.c
+  INCLUDE[threadstest]=.. ../include
+  DEPEND[threadstest]=../libcrypto
+
+  SOURCE[afalgtest]=afalgtest.c
+  INCLUDE[afalgtest]=.. ../include
+  DEPEND[afalgtest]=../libcrypto
+
+  SOURCE[d2i_test]=d2i_test.c testutil.c
+  INCLUDE[d2i_test]=.. ../include
+  DEPEND[d2i_test]=../libcrypto
+
+  SOURCE[ssl_test_ctx_test]=ssl_test_ctx_test.c ssl_test_ctx.c testutil.c
+  INCLUDE[ssl_test_ctx_test]=.. ../include
+  DEPEND[ssl_test_ctx_test]=../libcrypto
+
+  SOURCE[ssl_test]=ssl_test.c ssl_test_ctx.c testutil.c handshake_helper.c
+  INCLUDE[ssl_test]=.. ../include
+  DEPEND[ssl_test]=../libcrypto ../libssl
+
+  SOURCE[cipherlist_test]=cipherlist_test.c testutil.c
+  INCLUDE[cipherlist_test]=.. ../include
+  DEPEND[cipherlist_test]=../libcrypto ../libssl
+
+  INCLUDE[testutil.o]=..
+  INCLUDE[ssl_test_ctx.o]=../include
+  INCLUDE[handshake_helper.o]=../include
+  INCLUDE[ssltestlib.o]=.. ../include
+
+  SOURCE[x509aux]=x509aux.c
+  INCLUDE[x509aux]=../include
+  DEPEND[x509aux]=../libcrypto
+
+  SOURCE[asynciotest]=asynciotest.c ssltestlib.c
+  INCLUDE[asynciotest]=../include
+  DEPEND[asynciotest]=../libcrypto ../libssl
+
+  SOURCE[bioprinttest]=bioprinttest.c
+  INCLUDE[bioprinttest]=../include
+  DEPEND[bioprinttest]=../libcrypto
+
+  SOURCE[sslapitest]=sslapitest.c ssltestlib.c testutil.c
+  INCLUDE[sslapitest]=../include ..
+  DEPEND[sslapitest]=../libcrypto ../libssl
+
+  SOURCE[ocspapitest]=ocspapitest.c testutil.c
+  INCLUDE[ocspapitest]=../include ..
+  DEPEND[ocspapitest]=../libcrypto
+
+  SOURCE[dtlstest]=dtlstest.c ssltestlib.c testutil.c
+  INCLUDE[dtlstest]=../include .
+  DEPEND[dtlstest]=../libcrypto ../libssl
+
+  SOURCE[sslcorrupttest]=sslcorrupttest.c ssltestlib.c testutil.c
+  INCLUDE[sslcorrupttest]=../include .
+  DEPEND[sslcorrupttest]=../libcrypto ../libssl
+
+  SOURCE[bio_enc_test]=bio_enc_test.c
+  INCLUDE[bio_enc_test]=../include
+  DEPEND[bio_enc_test]=../libcrypto
+
+  IF[{- !$disabled{shared} -}]
+    PROGRAMS_NO_INST=shlibloadtest
+    SOURCE[shlibloadtest]=shlibloadtest.c
+    INCLUDE[shlibloadtest]=../include
+  ENDIF
+ENDIF
+
+{-
+   use File::Spec::Functions;
+   use File::Basename;
+   use OpenSSL::Glob;
+
+   my @nogo_headers = ( "asn1_mac.h",
+                        "__decc_include_prologue.h",
+                        "__decc_include_epilogue.h" );
+   my @headerfiles = glob catfile($sourcedir,
+                                  updir(), "include", "openssl", "*.h");
+
+   foreach my $headerfile (@headerfiles) {
+       my $name = basename($headerfile, ".h");
+       next if $disabled{$name};
+       next if grep { $_ eq lc("$name.h") } @nogo_headers;
+       $OUT .= <<"_____";
+
+  PROGRAMS_NO_INST=buildtest_$name
+  GENERATE[buildtest_$name.c]=generate_buildtest.pl $name
+  SOURCE[buildtest_$name]=buildtest_$name.c
+  INCLUDE[buildtest_$name]=../include
+  DEPEND[buildtest_$name]=../libssl ../libcrypto
+_____
+   }
+-}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/casttest.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/casttest.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c2a0ab5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/casttest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h> /* To see if OPENSSL_NO_CAST is defined */
+
+#include "../e_os.h"
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CAST
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+    printf("No CAST support\n");
+    return (0);
+}
+#else
+# include <openssl/cast.h>
+
+# define FULL_TEST
+
+static unsigned char k[16] = {
+    0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78,
+    0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0x9A
+};
+
+static unsigned char in[8] =
+    { 0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF };
+
+static int k_len[3] = { 16, 10, 5 };
+
+static unsigned char c[3][8] = {
+    {0x23, 0x8B, 0x4F, 0xE5, 0x84, 0x7E, 0x44, 0xB2},
+    {0xEB, 0x6A, 0x71, 0x1A, 0x2C, 0x02, 0x27, 0x1B},
+    {0x7A, 0xC8, 0x16, 0xD1, 0x6E, 0x9B, 0x30, 0x2E},
+};
+
+static unsigned char out[80];
+
+static unsigned char in_a[16] = {
+    0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78,
+    0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0x9A
+};
+
+static unsigned char in_b[16] = {
+    0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78,
+    0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0x9A
+};
+
+static unsigned char c_a[16] = {
+    0xEE, 0xA9, 0xD0, 0xA2, 0x49, 0xFD, 0x3B, 0xA6,
+    0xB3, 0x43, 0x6F, 0xB8, 0x9D, 0x6D, 0xCA, 0x92
+};
+
+static unsigned char c_b[16] = {
+    0xB2, 0xC9, 0x5E, 0xB0, 0x0C, 0x31, 0xAD, 0x71,
+    0x80, 0xAC, 0x05, 0xB8, 0xE8, 0x3D, 0x69, 0x6E
+};
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+# ifdef FULL_TEST
+    long l;
+    CAST_KEY key_b;
+# endif
+    int i, z, err = 0;
+    CAST_KEY key;
+
+    for (z = 0; z < 3; z++) {
+        CAST_set_key(&key, k_len[z], k);
+
+        CAST_ecb_encrypt(in, out, &key, CAST_ENCRYPT);
+        if (memcmp(out, &(c[z][0]), 8) != 0) {
+            printf("ecb cast error encrypting for keysize %d\n",
+                   k_len[z] * 8);
+            printf("got     :");
+            for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
+                printf("%02X ", out[i]);
+            printf("\n");
+            printf("expected:");
+            for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
+                printf("%02X ", c[z][i]);
+            err = 20;
+            printf("\n");
+        }
+
+        CAST_ecb_encrypt(out, out, &key, CAST_DECRYPT);
+        if (memcmp(out, in, 8) != 0) {
+            printf("ecb cast error decrypting for keysize %d\n",
+                   k_len[z] * 8);
+            printf("got     :");
+            for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
+                printf("%02X ", out[i]);
+            printf("\n");
+            printf("expected:");
+            for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
+                printf("%02X ", in[i]);
+            printf("\n");
+            err = 3;
+        }
+    }
+    if (err == 0)
+        printf("ecb cast5 ok\n");
+
+# ifdef FULL_TEST
+    {
+        unsigned char out_a[16], out_b[16];
+        static char *hex = "0123456789ABCDEF";
+
+        printf("This test will take some time....");
+        fflush(stdout);
+        memcpy(out_a, in_a, sizeof(in_a));
+        memcpy(out_b, in_b, sizeof(in_b));
+        i = 1;
+
+        for (l = 0; l < 1000000L; l++) {
+            CAST_set_key(&key_b, 16, out_b);
+            CAST_ecb_encrypt(&(out_a[0]), &(out_a[0]), &key_b, CAST_ENCRYPT);
+            CAST_ecb_encrypt(&(out_a[8]), &(out_a[8]), &key_b, CAST_ENCRYPT);
+            CAST_set_key(&key, 16, out_a);
+            CAST_ecb_encrypt(&(out_b[0]), &(out_b[0]), &key, CAST_ENCRYPT);
+            CAST_ecb_encrypt(&(out_b[8]), &(out_b[8]), &key, CAST_ENCRYPT);
+            if ((l & 0xffff) == 0xffff) {
+                printf("%c", hex[i & 0x0f]);
+                fflush(stdout);
+                i++;
+            }
+        }
+
+        if ((memcmp(out_a, c_a, sizeof(c_a)) != 0) ||
+            (memcmp(out_b, c_b, sizeof(c_b)) != 0)) {
+            printf("\n");
+            printf("Error\n");
+
+            printf("A out =");
+            for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+                printf("%02X ", out_a[i]);
+            printf("\nactual=");
+            for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+                printf("%02X ", c_a[i]);
+            printf("\n");
+
+            printf("B out =");
+            for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+                printf("%02X ", out_b[i]);
+            printf("\nactual=");
+            for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+                printf("%02X ", c_b[i]);
+            printf("\n");
+        } else
+            printf(" ok\n");
+    }
+# endif
+
+    EXIT(err);
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/alt1-cert.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/alt1-cert.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b94d0ea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/alt1-cert.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/alt1-key.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/alt1-key.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b5d4d32
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/alt1-key.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/alt2-cert.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/alt2-cert.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0e0f140
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/alt2-cert.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/alt2-key.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/alt2-key.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4c12800
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/alt2-key.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/alt3-cert.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/alt3-cert.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..877734f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/alt3-cert.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/alt3-key.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/alt3-key.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cc41860
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/alt3-key.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/bad-pc3-cert.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/bad-pc3-cert.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f8e76ff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/bad-pc3-cert.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+eUmD8lyBBdfcia2UqJM=
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/bad-pc3-key.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/bad-pc3-key.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8ddee57
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/bad-pc3-key.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIIEvwIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCBKkwggSlAgEAAoIBAQDfkPXhtGaOG5MR
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+RBV8wc0Stpj+QEShPIS9gEQVNA==
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/bad-pc4-cert.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/bad-pc4-cert.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5e47992
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/bad-pc4-cert.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/bad-pc4-key.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/bad-pc4-key.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..49406bc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/bad-pc4-key.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
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+9fO6/M0yLLz4mk5z2gdrP9MA
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/bad-pc6-cert.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/bad-pc6-cert.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d529091
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/bad-pc6-cert.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIDejCCAmKgAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADArMRcwFQYDVQQDDA5zZXJ2
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/bad-pc6-key.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/bad-pc6-key.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ef7541c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/bad-pc6-key.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
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+IywUjiA/G1N3M5WBVqBl3K8=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/bad.key b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/bad.key
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4708495
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/bad.key
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIIEogIBAAKCAQEAwTqNko5vQiQ5BQohPJ3sySrjT6JedjsKtt1OZ8ndR2C1asUi
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+RJNZYbJ9G/PbYDhciEoTjVyig6Ol5BRe9stSbO7+JIxEYr7VSpA=
+-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/bad.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/bad.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8769231
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/bad.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIDdzCCAl+gAwIBAgIJAJgwOOciuxjSMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMFQxCzAJBgNV
+BAYTAkFVMRMwEQYDVQQIEwpTb21lLVN0YXRlMSEwHwYDVQQKExhJbnRlcm5ldCBX
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+O2ELtifCd8DeSYNA9Qm8/MEUYq1xXQrGJHCE
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/badalt1-cert.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/badalt1-cert.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..99f1e26
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/badalt1-cert.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIDTDCCAjSgAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAXMRUwEwYDVQQDDAxUZXN0
+IE5DIENBIDEwIBcNMTYwNzA5MTQ0ODExWhgPMjExNjA3MTAxNDQ4MTFaMCQxIjAg
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+HfiXnUmwyOm6IKzBLsbgxlByfI7fAS1Nm/hLhgtglfk=
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/badalt1-key.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/badalt1-key.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8d70885
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/badalt1-key.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIIEvAIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCBKYwggSiAgEAAoIBAQC8n4gY4wOae4Sg
+pyqOZf4bg5JDa/NvzZV/g6PawamFQJIAjf41ylZ5Cjdi9+2H9CuFZ4e3im9L6Hu4
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+RBPODQ6vGkTdrJOJr2AWCA==
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/badalt10-cert.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/badalt10-cert.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9db1768
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/badalt10-cert.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIDiTCCAnGgAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAZMRcwFQYDVQQDDA5UZXN0
+IE5DIHN1YiBDQTAgFw0xNjA3MDkxNDQ4MTJaGA8yMTE2MDcxMDE0NDgxMlowVDEj
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+PgoXCRyteMyNjwTih90SZPq4dLPx3Mf/WNG2/hXIkC1AvFXpp/u0iuwlw7AO
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/badalt10-key.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/badalt10-key.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e62c0e1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/badalt10-key.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIIEvwIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCBKkwggSlAgEAAoIBAQDNu92PoDZIXgPC
+H3f87JomwNCpnrhChmbC77+FZR1wAaDrWJYu8JH8mT3sR4FFHTXuk7vXXu52Awsf
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+o5DsYNoxX/IWq2EbB6qQ3Cys6w==
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/badalt2-cert.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/badalt2-cert.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..890c551
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/badalt2-cert.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIDSjCCAjKgAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAXMRUwEwYDVQQDDAxUZXN0
+IE5DIENBIDIwIBcNMTYwNzA5MTQ0ODExWhgPMjExNjA3MTAxNDQ4MTFaMCQxIjAg
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+JXOcEouXyLAVjj9XCWLW8ilVTkYE6EmUvKSF4aON
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/badalt2-key.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/badalt2-key.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..895900d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/badalt2-key.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIIEvwIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCBKkwggSlAgEAAoIBAQCy5dZH9k2pwH5j
+w7iWD1TwOIqtmkNBOGDDk9jKvovmVUYm7nvLOrx4amqi7OUEpYaJTroPS1UxFo1E
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+d6YkymUz7h0qMN/M5nsB5Xg4jg==
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/badalt3-cert.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/badalt3-cert.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cd44b22
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/badalt3-cert.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIDaTCCAlGgAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAXMRUwEwYDVQQDDAxUZXN0
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+ndvhdtnodLRvtBeJUg==
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/badalt3-key.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/badalt3-key.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..398b52f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/badalt3-key.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIIEvQIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCBKcwggSjAgEAAoIBAQCiqb6LYFYj1uPe
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+kEI6l4ZQL9buxDhqXH1UFbw=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/badalt4-cert.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/badalt4-cert.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3c041cf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/badalt4-cert.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIDaTCCAlGgAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAXMRUwEwYDVQQDDAxUZXN0
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+dIn/eeha7QWrqG/45A==
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/badalt4-key.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/badalt4-key.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..aad778d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/badalt4-key.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIIEvQIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCBKcwggSjAgEAAoIBAQD7yQbYxTDmAxcJ
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+++QR+xSzDrwjQ2RjiCDO6HU5k6x67x0g8tdkhS8yjT+lBIxOuU6TI3GC4vN3U9Lv
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+dlpiKXP638lF4t5jvaCy28o=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/badalt5-cert.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/badalt5-cert.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bd67898
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/badalt5-cert.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIDUTCCAjmgAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAXMRUwEwYDVQQDDAxUZXN0
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+xqwgz6kUtU6smxWv0HruLT8Pq9hIKuPz6DWG/vIpiSLwz4B25A==
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/badalt5-key.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/badalt5-key.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..89cdf25
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/badalt5-key.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIIEvgIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCBKgwggSkAgEAAoIBAQCzgx886aURB161
+wWGRp4rr45Di4KhS/wUUSaHTQo5n9jD+7glAOBTrbQYb+Gz/tusDsuHvZOGOvQ45
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++zxqw6Z2u5d3XmxIiUsGdly6xbeRBZrLq1eBVo1/CLjEx75a5VE151zbMx+egYge
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++SN+cG5tLH7HjbI9C4XBYVbxXHIvg/nSzFRxBbC2ZFetJ27xvweM1J/Clk7d1Lvq
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+a0BZeU4ZpKQJxpf8YbXbPi2Z
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/badalt6-cert.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/badalt6-cert.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fbe040b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/badalt6-cert.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIDljCCAn6gAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAXMRUwEwYDVQQDDAxUZXN0
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+GH32QmEN5o5jZQ==
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/badalt6-key.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/badalt6-key.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..203a4c7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/badalt6-key.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIIEvgIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCBKgwggSkAgEAAoIBAQDKz8F/ndKz0vuv
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+R1UfsJugW9Yetsqd9WB6q3ln
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/badalt7-cert.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/badalt7-cert.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b515ba4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/badalt7-cert.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+IL5WuKFm0XSGKTX8SzyMGErMGeriveL2
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/badalt7-key.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/badalt7-key.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..50557e8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/badalt7-key.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
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+cZtQWiEyaf026DdR8YBYn6tf
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/badalt8-cert.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/badalt8-cert.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2056060
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/badalt8-cert.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIDgjCCAmqgAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAZMRcwFQYDVQQDDA5UZXN0
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/badalt8-key.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/badalt8-key.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1b5cfbc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/badalt8-key.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
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+RxbCxTFtyUMpmWzDwgiwPbM=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/badalt9-cert.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/badalt9-cert.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f3d7820
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/badalt9-cert.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIDgTCCAmmgAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAZMRcwFQYDVQQDDA5UZXN0
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/badalt9-key.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/badalt9-key.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..873bae8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/badalt9-key.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIIEvgIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCBKgwggSkAgEAAoIBAQD1j5KCLNxIn1Mg
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+C34TbBAlm79KVANPHT+CJoR1
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ca+anyEKU.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ca+anyEKU.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..36ed837
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ca+anyEKU.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+-----BEGIN TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIC7DCCAdSgAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290
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+5HpEYY6qEir9wFMkD5MZsWrNRGRuzd5am82J+aaHz/4wCDAGBgRVHSUA
+-----END TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ca+clientAuth.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ca+clientAuth.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bb94007
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ca+clientAuth.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+-----BEGIN TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
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+5HpEYY6qEir9wFMkD5MZsWrNRGRuzd5am82J+aaHz/4wDDAKBggrBgEFBQcDAg==
+-----END TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ca+serverAuth.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ca+serverAuth.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a07c777
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ca+serverAuth.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+-----BEGIN TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ca-anyEKU.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ca-anyEKU.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..241d7b4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ca-anyEKU.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+-----BEGIN TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ca-cert-768.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ca-cert-768.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0c8ff29
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ca-cert-768.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+wwzRDnFVisM=
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ca-cert-768i.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ca-cert-768i.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..acc432f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ca-cert-768i.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+rbnl7fIop7OJX/kELbY=
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ca-cert-md5-any.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ca-cert-md5-any.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7c2b53f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ca-cert-md5-any.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+-----BEGIN TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
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+4wHz/QtlE4isInOaK2+pvXwyGar+1/s3+VxXEiPlZ7IwCDAGBgRVHSUA
+-----END TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ca-cert-md5.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ca-cert-md5.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..be564dd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ca-cert-md5.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ca-cert.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ca-cert.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f6bc233
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ca-cert.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ca-cert2.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ca-cert2.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..561ffb2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ca-cert2.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+ldYmdyOrlfOGVzkZ63GTOAC68SNVCXJg3cOmfEczkRw=
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ca-clientAuth.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ca-clientAuth.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..838c70e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ca-clientAuth.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+-----BEGIN TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIC7DCCAdSgAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290
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+5HpEYY6qEir9wFMkD5MZsWrNRGRuzd5am82J+aaHz/4wDKAKBggrBgEFBQcDAg==
+-----END TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ca-expired.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ca-expired.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5be60fa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ca-expired.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+7jDeEHIItT7V/x0NWllSqSPPZIsuyuuwFNmLZHfw
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ca-key-768.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ca-key-768.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7aea5ed
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ca-key-768.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
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+sSaluw9nM91s
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ca-key.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ca-key.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d84dcd2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ca-key.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
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+2k24wuH7oUtLlvf05p4cqfEx
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ca-key2.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ca-key2.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6ddf16f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ca-key2.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIIEvQIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCBKcwggSjAgEAAoIBAQDrAcUN0Q/UwwAX
+FFHXafq+bNqS3APyFDfDJx9j6HpsYHyVCn1pvrdFUdphasoknsptVdU5A57oc7ot
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+uchNPF6GhCMnLZC9AxZs4Fg=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ca-name2.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ca-name2.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b8bbc80
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ca-name2.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ca-nonbc.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ca-nonbc.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..013775b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ca-nonbc.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ca-nonca.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ca-nonca.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cdb2cd1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ca-nonca.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ca-root2.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ca-root2.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..28d9854
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ca-root2.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ca-serverAuth.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ca-serverAuth.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f10155d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ca-serverAuth.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+-----BEGIN TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/cca+anyEKU.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/cca+anyEKU.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..46ee9fa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/cca+anyEKU.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+-----BEGIN TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/cca+clientAuth.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/cca+clientAuth.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0b857ee
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/cca+clientAuth.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+-----BEGIN TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/cca+serverAuth.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/cca+serverAuth.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..38a0bdb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/cca+serverAuth.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+-----BEGIN TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/cca-anyEKU.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/cca-anyEKU.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cb3e708
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/cca-anyEKU.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+-----BEGIN TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
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+ap/RSXgwCKAGBgRVHSUA
+-----END TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/cca-cert.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/cca-cert.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6bccc4c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/cca-cert.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+ap/RSXg=
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/cca-clientAuth.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/cca-clientAuth.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0b857ee
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/cca-clientAuth.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+-----BEGIN TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
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+ap/RSXgwDDAKBggrBgEFBQcDAg==
+-----END TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/cca-serverAuth.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/cca-serverAuth.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..46cbce0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/cca-serverAuth.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+-----BEGIN TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
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+ap/RSXgwDKAKBggrBgEFBQcDAQ==
+-----END TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/croot+anyEKU.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/croot+anyEKU.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..88ce120
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/croot+anyEKU.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+-----BEGIN TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/croot+clientAuth.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/croot+clientAuth.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..aa45a06
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/croot+clientAuth.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+-----BEGIN TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/croot+serverAuth.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/croot+serverAuth.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3564769
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/croot+serverAuth.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+-----BEGIN TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/croot-anyEKU.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/croot-anyEKU.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..50fffbf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/croot-anyEKU.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+-----BEGIN TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/croot-cert.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/croot-cert.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f3459f4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/croot-cert.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/croot-clientAuth.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/croot-clientAuth.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7845641
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/croot-clientAuth.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+-----BEGIN TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/croot-serverAuth.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/croot-serverAuth.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7e4ffa7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/croot-serverAuth.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+-----BEGIN TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ee+clientAuth.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ee+clientAuth.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..850a868
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ee+clientAuth.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+-----BEGIN TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
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+AwI=
+-----END TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ee+serverAuth.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ee+serverAuth.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..61d03ac
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ee+serverAuth.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+-----BEGIN TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
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+AwE=
+-----END TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ee-cert-768.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ee-cert-768.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..794f93c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ee-cert-768.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ee-cert-768i.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ee-cert-768i.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d6532fb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ee-cert-768i.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ee-cert-md5.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ee-cert-md5.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8c26422
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ee-cert-md5.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ee-cert.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ee-cert.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..05d2318
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ee-cert.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ee-cert2.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ee-cert2.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b6ad976
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ee-cert2.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ee-client-chain.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ee-client-chain.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..27652fa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ee-client-chain.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ee-client.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ee-client.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a6105b2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ee-client.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIDIDCCAgigAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADANMQswCQYDVQQDDAJDQTAg
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ee-clientAuth.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ee-clientAuth.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e6b88a7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ee-clientAuth.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+-----BEGIN TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIDIDCCAgigAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADANMQswCQYDVQQDDAJDQTAg
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+AwI=
+-----END TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ee-expired.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ee-expired.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bc49002
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ee-expired.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIDHjCCAgagAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADANMQswCQYDVQQDDAJDQTAe
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+CgM8Igp1gjCLXo0a/ZhCwiyE+7uGsLkDjHoGclcGwW17YA==
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ee-key-768.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ee-key-768.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0d44f85
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ee-key-768.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIIB5QIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCAc8wggHLAgEAAmEAwCvrPAynx+7VtpFz
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+EQcYwjE7SDI7
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ee-key.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ee-key.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9bc2a84
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ee-key.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
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+rLxFTZXBDbnGZ9QtcGcJSw==
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ee-name2.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ee-name2.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..234704e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ee-name2.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIDITCCAgmgAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAOMQwwCgYDVQQDDANDQTIw
+IBcNMTYwMTE1MDgxOTQ5WhgPMjExNjAxMTYwODE5NDlaMBkxFzAVBgNVBAMMDnNl
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+O34gCkt55vyZNkOzZgCfMglkloYm7ww7pofZVfjmkmm3k/HGFw==
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ee-serverAuth.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ee-serverAuth.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fd6ab28
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ee-serverAuth.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+-----BEGIN TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIDIDCCAgigAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADANMQswCQYDVQQDDAJDQTAg
+Fw0xNjAxMTUwODE5NDlaGA8yMTE2MDExNjA4MTk0OVowGTEXMBUGA1UEAwwOc2Vy
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+YYWu3tssD9Vz++K3qBt6dWAr1H08c3a1rt6TL38kkG3JHPSKOM2fooAWVsu0LLuT
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+iIQPYf55NB9KiR+3AgMBAAGjfTB7MB0GA1UdDgQWBBTnm+IqrYpsOst2UeWOB5gi
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+MBMGA1UdJQQMMAoGCCsGAQUFBwMBMBkGA1UdEQQSMBCCDnNlcnZlci5leGFtcGxl
+MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4IBAQBBtDxPYULl5b7VFC7/U0NgV8vTJk4zpPnUMMQ4
+QF2AWDFAek8oLKrz18KQ8M/DEhDxgkaoeXEMLT6BJUEVNYuFEYHEDGarl0nMDRXL
+xOgAExfz3Tf/pjsLaha5aWH7NyCSKWC+lYkIOJ/Kb/m/6QsDJoXsEC8AhrPfqJhz
+UzsCoxIlaDWqawH4+S8bdeX0tvs2VtJk/WOJHxMqXra6kgI4fAgyvr2kIZHinQ3y
+cgX40uAC38bwpE95kJ7FhSfQlE1Rt7sOspUj098Dd0RNDn2uKyOTxEqIELHfw4AX
+O3XAzt8qDyho8nEd/xiQ6qgsQnvXa+hSRJw42g3/czVskxRxMAygCgYIKwYBBQUH
+AwE=
+-----END TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/embeddedSCTs1-key.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/embeddedSCTs1-key.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e3e66d5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/embeddedSCTs1-key.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/embeddedSCTs1.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/embeddedSCTs1.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d1e8512
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/embeddedSCTs1.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIDWTCCAsKgAwIBAgIBBzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADBVMQswCQYDVQQGEwJHQjEk
+MCIGA1UEChMbQ2VydGlmaWNhdGUgVHJhbnNwYXJlbmN5IENBMQ4wDAYDVQQIEwVX
+YWxlczEQMA4GA1UEBxMHRXJ3IFdlbjAeFw0xMjA2MDEwMDAwMDBaFw0yMjA2MDEw
+MDAwMDBaMFIxCzAJBgNVBAYTAkdCMSEwHwYDVQQKExhDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZSBUcmFu
+c3BhcmVuY3kxDjAMBgNVBAgTBVdhbGVzMRAwDgYDVQQHEwdFcncgV2VuMIGfMA0G
+CSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQC+75jnwmh3rjhfdTJaDB0ym+3xj6r015a/
+BH634c4VyVui+A7kWL19uG+KSyUhkaeb1wDDjpwDibRc1NyaEgqyHgy0HNDnKAWk
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+VQQGEwJHQjEkMCIGA1UEChMbQ2VydGlmaWNhdGUgVHJhbnNwYXJlbmN5IENBMQ4w
+DAYDVQQIEwVXYWxlczEQMA4GA1UEBxMHRXJ3IFdlboIBADAJBgNVHRMEAjAAMIGK
+BgorBgEEAdZ5AgQCBHwEegB4AHYA3xwuwRUAlFJHqWFoMl3cXHlZ6PfG04j8AC4L
+vT9012QAAAE92yffkwAABAMARzBFAiBIL2dRrzXbplQ2vh/WZA89v5pBQpSVkkUw
+KI+j5eI+BgIhAOTtwNs6xXKx4vXoq2poBlOYfc9BAn3+/6EFUZ2J7b8IMA0GCSqG
+SIb3DQEBBQUAA4GBAIoMS+8JnUeSea+goo5on5HhxEIb4tJpoupspOghXd7dyhUE
+oR58h8S3foDw6XkDUmjyfKIOFmgErlVvMWmB+Wo5Srer/T4lWsAERRP+dlcMZ5Wr
+5HAxM9MD+J86+mu8/FFzGd/ZW5NCQSEfY0A1w9B4MHpoxgdaLiDInza4kQyg
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/embeddedSCTs1.sct b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/embeddedSCTs1.sct
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..59362dc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/embeddedSCTs1.sct
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+Signed Certificate Timestamp:
+    Version   : v1 (0x0)
+    Log ID    : DF:1C:2E:C1:15:00:94:52:47:A9:61:68:32:5D:DC:5C:
+                79:59:E8:F7:C6:D3:88:FC:00:2E:0B:BD:3F:74:D7:64
+    Timestamp : Apr  5 17:04:16.275 2013 GMT
+    Extensions: none
+    Signature : ecdsa-with-SHA256
+                30:45:02:20:48:2F:67:51:AF:35:DB:A6:54:36:BE:1F:
+                D6:64:0F:3D:BF:9A:41:42:94:95:92:45:30:28:8F:A3:
+                E5:E2:3E:06:02:21:00:E4:ED:C0:DB:3A:C5:72:B1:E2:
+                F5:E8:AB:6A:68:06:53:98:7D:CF:41:02:7D:FE:FF:A1:
+                05:51:9D:89:ED:BF:08
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/embeddedSCTs1_issuer.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/embeddedSCTs1_issuer.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1fa449d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/embeddedSCTs1_issuer.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIC0DCCAjmgAwIBAgIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADBVMQswCQYDVQQGEwJHQjEk
+MCIGA1UEChMbQ2VydGlmaWNhdGUgVHJhbnNwYXJlbmN5IENBMQ4wDAYDVQQIEwVX
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+/zANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFAAOBgQAGCMxKbWTyIF4UbASydvkrDvqUpdryOvw4BmBt
+OZDQoeojPUApV2lGOwRmYef6HReZFSCa6i4Kd1F2QRIn18ADB8dHDmFYT9czQiRy
+f1HWkLxHqd81TbD26yWVXeGJPE3VICskovPkQNJ0tU4b03YmnKliibduyqQQkOFP
+OwqULg==
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/embeddedSCTs3.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/embeddedSCTs3.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bce8918
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/embeddedSCTs3.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIHvzCCBqegAwIBAgIRANSYNM/GMmLagfa+3OOk63swDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAw
+gZIxCzAJBgNVBAYTAkdCMRswGQYDVQQIExJHcmVhdGVyIE1hbmNoZXN0ZXIxEDAO
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+yNiRhSji/xxcOf5bWT158dHQoMtC1Ld1dI3lttVAvDTgXOApbmc8N0Xpjvapag3r
+b0IYW5SJio0qn1VxgeSsf0UCBTyw0N8lgbaIr3FHw2SP2rUS8PUixFRK52MYnyEp
+6Imz730Adl0RgUvp7mzRcWVDK4i6sPRqV6my68XsyaBcQr2qKALQK0Js+mE/0850
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+d6V/RWexyzZiHDGA1ToA0Y16Aw==
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/embeddedSCTs3.sct b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/embeddedSCTs3.sct
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ad1ccf0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/embeddedSCTs3.sct
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+Signed Certificate Timestamp:
+    Version   : v1 (0x0)
+    Log ID    : 68:F6:98:F8:1F:64:82:BE:3A:8C:EE:B9:28:1D:4C:FC:
+                71:51:5D:67:93:D4:44:D1:0A:67:AC:BB:4F:4F:FB:C4
+    Timestamp : Dec  1 13:31:25.961 2015 GMT
+    Extensions: none
+    Signature : ecdsa-with-SHA256
+                30:44:02:20:58:2D:0A:BE:78:41:8A:E7:89:A9:5E:66:
+                21:C5:6A:16:79:DF:33:85:8A:D3:F3:1D:71:AF:75:30:
+                FB:CC:4E:45:02:20:41:9C:89:B8:80:19:87:46:6C:1C:
+                3A:95:0B:BE:F4:98:75:D4:CA:49:97:FD:25:2E:E3:78:
+                B5:36:30:20:26:4D
+Signed Certificate Timestamp:
+    Version   : v1 (0x0)
+    Log ID    : 56:14:06:9A:2F:D7:C2:EC:D3:F5:E1:BD:44:B2:3E:C7:
+                46:76:B9:BC:99:11:5C:C0:EF:94:98:55:D6:89:D0:DD
+    Timestamp : Dec  1 13:31:25.352 2015 GMT
+    Extensions: none
+    Signature : ecdsa-with-SHA256
+                30:45:02:20:79:68:E9:70:38:5A:63:F3:A6:B1:97:0E:
+                7E:D0:C5:71:1B:76:06:CB:09:63:48:1E:E1:20:F3:A7:
+                EF:2A:4E:74:02:21:00:8E:B7:BB:ED:85:5D:85:1B:54:
+                5E:3C:C5:EC:F2:13:9C:09:D1:0A:01:C2:59:5F:7C:31:
+                19:A1:9D:E1:17:C7:1F
+Signed Certificate Timestamp:
+    Version   : v1 (0x0)
+    Log ID    : A4:B9:09:90:B4:18:58:14:87:BB:13:A2:CC:67:70:0A:
+                3C:35:98:04:F9:1B:DF:B8:E3:77:CD:0E:C8:0D:DC:10
+    Timestamp : Dec  1 13:31:25.980 2015 GMT
+    Extensions: none
+    Signature : ecdsa-with-SHA256
+                30:45:02:20:2B:06:42:0F:D9:71:BD:21:42:A5:F9:C5:
+                55:83:D2:9D:E5:A1:8D:B6:3D:A6:73:89:42:32:9C:91:
+                0F:3B:6A:74:02:21:00:86:EE:10:F9:10:E6:7B:17:65:
+                D9:2D:37:53:4A:3B:F0:AE:03:E4:21:76:37:EF:AF:B4:
+                44:2E:2B:F5:5C:C6:91
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/embeddedSCTs3_issuer.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/embeddedSCTs3_issuer.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f4bc312
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/embeddedSCTs3_issuer.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIGDjCCA/agAwIBAgIQBqdDgNTr/tQ1taP34Wq92DANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQwFADCB
+hTELMAkGA1UEBhMCR0IxGzAZBgNVBAgTEkdyZWF0ZXIgTWFuY2hlc3RlcjEQMA4G
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/interCA.key b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/interCA.key
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c32fe26
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/interCA.key
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
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+-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/interCA.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/interCA.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..35568ab
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/interCA.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/leaf.key b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/leaf.key
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a1b1721
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/leaf.key
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
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+-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/leaf.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/leaf.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bb94d12
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/leaf.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/many-constraints.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/many-constraints.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..13b8ab2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/many-constraints.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,292 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/many-names1.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/many-names1.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cf6a0df
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/many-names1.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,409 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/many-names2.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/many-names2.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..842ac60
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/many-names2.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,251 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/many-names3.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/many-names3.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dbfa042
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/many-names3.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,571 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAtMIpnGzOBkJXEBmCsRVbTrg9QgYRlGPG48+cXT2QbIutAmbj
+miF+OYg/bRsQtuqcKjnJYog+x6UCU3d34jaMEfEXfHSwF7xPQrqJm45MXhG3so4E
++el5GMAS+SKFQK3w8NPoGhGwn82sz4XV6HMG+ANUxMlCrOcx2jh5UW+7ITjdRwJd
+ReJ/JaMpneJdwGFSU9Vn+t7PFb51/pOYqO/PuEANzphovjMVcFZ6mtAQwYDkQZBJ
+Vy1/7bPoNmbKD0GAS6HpS+xaJ/DnjjD6Kal2T7GMyvRMogj5BeZ/uEkXCEhvoaBT
+os1gaqqnGpZ6JSEDctzjgpCtEPR40yiz1wv1CA==
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/mkcert.sh b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/mkcert.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..ee31bf0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/mkcert.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,254 @@
+#! /bin/bash
+#
+# Copyright (c) 2016 Viktor Dukhovni <openssl-users@dukhovni.org>.
+# All rights reserved.
+#
+# Contributed to the OpenSSL project under the terms of the OpenSSL license
+# included with the version of the OpenSSL software that includes this module.
+
+# 100 years should be enough for now
+#
+if [ -z "$DAYS" ]; then
+    DAYS=36525
+fi
+
+if [ -z "$OPENSSL_SIGALG" ]; then
+    OPENSSL_SIGALG=sha256
+fi
+
+if [ -z "$REQMASK" ]; then
+    REQMASK=utf8only
+fi
+
+stderr_onerror() {
+    (
+        err=$("$@" >&3 2>&1) || {
+            printf "%s\n" "$err" >&2
+            exit 1
+        }
+    ) 3>&1
+}
+
+key() {
+    local key=$1; shift
+
+    local alg=rsa
+    if [ -n "$OPENSSL_KEYALG" ]; then
+        alg=$OPENSSL_KEYALG
+    fi
+
+    local bits=2048
+    if [ -n "$OPENSSL_KEYBITS" ]; then
+        bits=$OPENSSL_KEYBITS
+    fi
+
+    if [ ! -f "${key}.pem" ]; then
+        args=(-algorithm "$alg")
+        case $alg in
+        rsa) args=("${args[@]}" -pkeyopt rsa_keygen_bits:$bits );;
+        ec)  args=("${args[@]}" -pkeyopt "ec_paramgen_curve:$bits")
+               args=("${args[@]}" -pkeyopt ec_param_enc:named_curve);;
+        *) printf "Unsupported key algorithm: %s\n" "$alg" >&2; return 1;;
+        esac
+        stderr_onerror \
+            openssl genpkey "${args[@]}" -out "${key}.pem"
+    fi
+}
+
+# Usage: $0 req keyname dn1 dn2 ...
+req() {
+    local key=$1; shift
+
+    key "$key"
+    local errs
+
+    stderr_onerror \
+        openssl req -new -"${OPENSSL_SIGALG}" -key "${key}.pem" \
+            -config <(printf "string_mask=%s\n[req]\n%s\n%s\n[dn]\n" \
+              "$REQMASK" "prompt = no" "distinguished_name = dn"
+                      for dn in "$@"; do echo "$dn"; done)
+}
+
+req_nocn() {
+    local key=$1; shift
+
+    key "$key"
+    stderr_onerror \
+        openssl req -new -"${OPENSSL_SIGALG}" -subj / -key "${key}.pem" \
+            -config <(printf "[req]\n%s\n[dn]\nCN_default =\n" \
+		      "distinguished_name = dn")
+}
+
+cert() {
+    local cert=$1; shift
+    local exts=$1; shift
+
+    stderr_onerror \
+        openssl x509 -req -"${OPENSSL_SIGALG}" -out "${cert}.pem" \
+            -extfile <(printf "%s\n" "$exts") "$@"
+}
+
+genroot() {
+    local cn=$1; shift
+    local key=$1; shift
+    local cert=$1; shift
+    local skid="subjectKeyIdentifier = hash"
+    local akid="authorityKeyIdentifier = keyid"
+
+    exts=$(printf "%s\n%s\n%s\n" "$skid" "$akid" "basicConstraints = critical,CA:true")
+    for eku in "$@"
+    do
+        exts=$(printf "%s\nextendedKeyUsage = %s\n" "$exts" "$eku")
+    done
+    csr=$(req "$key" "CN = $cn") || return 1
+    echo "$csr" |
+       cert "$cert" "$exts" -signkey "${key}.pem" -set_serial 1 -days "${DAYS}"
+}
+
+genca() {
+    local cn=$1; shift
+    local key=$1; shift
+    local cert=$1; shift
+    local cakey=$1; shift
+    local cacert=$1; shift
+    local skid="subjectKeyIdentifier = hash"
+    local akid="authorityKeyIdentifier = keyid"
+
+    exts=$(printf "%s\n%s\n%s\n" "$skid" "$akid" "basicConstraints = critical,CA:true")
+    for eku in "$@"
+    do
+        exts=$(printf "%s\nextendedKeyUsage = %s\n" "$exts" "$eku")
+    done
+    if [ -n "$NC" ]; then
+        exts=$(printf "%s\nnameConstraints = %s\n" "$exts" "$NC")
+    fi
+    csr=$(req "$key" "CN = $cn") || return 1
+    echo "$csr" |
+        cert "$cert" "$exts" -CA "${cacert}.pem" -CAkey "${cakey}.pem" \
+	    -set_serial 2 -days "${DAYS}"
+}
+
+gen_nonbc_ca() {
+    local cn=$1; shift
+    local key=$1; shift
+    local cert=$1; shift
+    local cakey=$1; shift
+    local cacert=$1; shift
+    local skid="subjectKeyIdentifier = hash"
+    local akid="authorityKeyIdentifier = keyid"
+
+    exts=$(printf "%s\n%s\n%s\n" "$skid" "$akid")
+    exts=$(printf "%s\nkeyUsage = %s\n" "$exts" "keyCertSign, cRLSign")
+    for eku in "$@"
+    do
+        exts=$(printf "%s\nextendedKeyUsage = %s\n" "$exts" "$eku")
+    done
+    csr=$(req "$key" "CN = $cn") || return 1
+    echo "$csr" |
+        cert "$cert" "$exts" -CA "${cacert}.pem" -CAkey "${cakey}.pem" \
+	    -set_serial 2 -days "${DAYS}"
+}
+
+# Usage: $0 genpc keyname certname eekeyname eecertname pcext1 pcext2 ...
+#
+# Note: takes csr on stdin, so must be used with $0 req like this:
+#
+# $0 req keyname dn | $0 genpc keyname certname eekeyname eecertname pcext ...
+genpc() {
+    local key=$1; shift
+    local cert=$1; shift
+    local cakey=$1; shift
+    local ca=$1; shift
+
+    exts=$(printf "%s\n%s\n%s\n%s\n" \
+	    "subjectKeyIdentifier = hash" \
+	    "authorityKeyIdentifier = keyid, issuer:always" \
+	    "basicConstraints = CA:false" \
+	    "proxyCertInfo = critical, @pcexts";
+           echo "[pcexts]";
+           for x in "$@"; do echo $x; done)
+    cert "$cert" "$exts" -CA "${ca}.pem" -CAkey "${cakey}.pem" \
+	 -set_serial 2 -days "${DAYS}"
+}
+
+# Usage: $0 genalt keyname certname eekeyname eecertname alt1 alt2 ...
+#
+# Note: takes csr on stdin, so must be used with $0 req like this:
+#
+# $0 req keyname dn | $0 genalt keyname certname eekeyname eecertname alt ...
+geneealt() {
+    local key=$1; shift
+    local cert=$1; shift
+    local cakey=$1; shift
+    local ca=$1; shift
+
+    exts=$(printf "%s\n%s\n%s\n%s\n" \
+	    "subjectKeyIdentifier = hash" \
+	    "authorityKeyIdentifier = keyid" \
+	    "basicConstraints = CA:false" \
+	    "subjectAltName = @alts";
+           echo "[alts]";
+           for x in "$@"; do echo $x; done)
+    cert "$cert" "$exts" -CA "${ca}.pem" -CAkey "${cakey}.pem" \
+	 -set_serial 2 -days "${DAYS}"
+}
+
+genee() {
+    local OPTIND=1
+    local purpose=serverAuth
+
+    while getopts p: o
+    do
+        case $o in
+        p) purpose="$OPTARG";;
+        *) echo "Usage: $0 genee [-p EKU] cn keyname certname cakeyname cacertname" >&2
+           return 1;;
+        esac
+    done
+
+    shift $((OPTIND - 1))
+    local cn=$1; shift
+    local key=$1; shift
+    local cert=$1; shift
+    local cakey=$1; shift
+    local ca=$1; shift
+
+    exts=$(printf "%s\n%s\n%s\n%s\n%s\n[alts]\n%s\n" \
+	    "subjectKeyIdentifier = hash" \
+	    "authorityKeyIdentifier = keyid, issuer" \
+	    "basicConstraints = CA:false" \
+	    "extendedKeyUsage = $purpose" \
+	    "subjectAltName = @alts" "DNS=${cn}")
+    csr=$(req "$key" "CN = $cn") || return 1
+    echo "$csr" |
+	cert "$cert" "$exts" -CA "${ca}.pem" -CAkey "${cakey}.pem" \
+	    -set_serial 2 -days "${DAYS}" "$@"
+}
+
+genss() {
+    local cn=$1; shift
+    local key=$1; shift
+    local cert=$1; shift
+
+    exts=$(printf "%s\n%s\n%s\n%s\n%s\n[alts]\n%s\n" \
+	    "subjectKeyIdentifier   = hash" \
+	    "authorityKeyIdentifier = keyid, issuer" \
+	    "basicConstraints = CA:false" \
+	    "extendedKeyUsage = serverAuth" \
+	    "subjectAltName = @alts" "DNS=${cn}")
+    csr=$(req "$key" "CN = $cn") || return 1
+    echo "$csr" |
+        cert "$cert" "$exts" -signkey "${key}.pem" \
+            -set_serial 1 -days "${DAYS}" "$@"
+}
+
+gennocn() {
+    local key=$1; shift
+    local cert=$1; shift
+
+    csr=$(req_nocn "$key") || return 1
+    echo "$csr" |
+	cert "$cert" "" -signkey "${key}.pem" -set_serial 1 -days -1 "$@"
+}
+
+"$@"
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/nca+anyEKU.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/nca+anyEKU.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b97a455
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/nca+anyEKU.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+-----BEGIN TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/nca+serverAuth.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/nca+serverAuth.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b97a455
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/nca+serverAuth.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+-----BEGIN TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ncca-cert.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ncca-cert.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a79bba6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ncca-cert.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ncca-key.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ncca-key.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d085541
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ncca-key.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ncca1-cert.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ncca1-cert.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1f7f52e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ncca1-cert.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIDWTCCAkGgAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290
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+RewAXU3TERFQi4bF+N9mmwj8z9CYClRH56uFboGGBEGSulsbF5C4DB0p7dbl
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ncca1-key.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ncca1-key.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..eef6b14
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ncca1-key.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIIEvQIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCBKcwggSjAgEAAoIBAQDCXjL5JEImsGFW
+5whlXCfDTeqjZAVb+rSXAhZQ25bP9YvhsbmPVYe8A61zwGStl2rFmChzN9/+LA40
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+UPinBI2OVma2Z+eXfQZ9/7lgfQYtkyjkHuAaLxe59fOxqUK7iIgkrpa+xDc5bvkR
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+QZ/pla7vZ4cbNPFd2cFHk84=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ncca2-cert.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ncca2-cert.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2b649a2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ncca2-cert.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIDSDCCAjCgAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290
+IENBMCAXDTE2MDcwOTE0NDgxMVoYDzIxMTYwNzEwMTQ0ODExWjAXMRUwEwYDVQQD
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+aOrnkbDctDI3zZXUADTidBVxO5HzizGlRGodSQ==
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ncca2-key.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ncca2-key.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..03eae6d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ncca2-key.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIIEvQIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCBKcwggSjAgEAAoIBAQC8Dg3FeyXgtP6M
+AYaLRCH1peDogKo0OI5dqERirJDymgg0eqUkGPD86n/ZRDFZMhqM2LATVNS9UHyb
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+dl0yHofPTNUz2lLmMOhTOw4=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ncca3-cert.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ncca3-cert.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..207c7a7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ncca3-cert.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIDQzCCAiugAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAXMRUwEwYDVQQDDAxUZXN0
+IE5DIENBIDEwIBcNMTYwNzA5MTQ0ODExWhgPMjExNjA3MTAxNDQ4MTFaMBkxFzAV
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+UhL2ht4Pmyhy3ACeEI2BTZESEzG/WBI=
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ncca3-key.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ncca3-key.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3277dd2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/ncca3-key.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIIEvQIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCBKcwggSjAgEAAoIBAQC7qA5ABw16Xc0J
+tYJy1HhjgGpE09ujpbcekXJj7bTiQaKZ01m8TbOSl+wdHo8HsAdS+r7jj403+XUn
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+N29VMjeFxgXkD4qmz6qjCZr9tmJiiu3tMJfW13D94U5RKi5OFAzlPxtBLe+sx6nq
+NXMk2XIx1ndW+uWUjtU0EQc=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/nroot+anyEKU.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/nroot+anyEKU.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..395b844
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/nroot+anyEKU.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+-----BEGIN TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIDFzCCAf+gAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290
+IENBMCAXDTE2MDExNTA4MTk0OVoYDzIxMTYwMTE2MDgxOTQ5WjASMRAwDgYDVQQD
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+m8y3rPQqNPehWzbRq75txC/sayQZXNUrteVzMAgwBgYEVR0lAA==
+-----END TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/nroot+serverAuth.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/nroot+serverAuth.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7b84f26
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/nroot+serverAuth.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+-----BEGIN TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIDFzCCAf+gAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290
+IENBMCAXDTE2MDExNTA4MTk0OVoYDzIxMTYwMTE2MDgxOTQ5WjASMRAwDgYDVQQD
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+m8y3rPQqNPehWzbRq75txC/sayQZXNUrteVzMAwwCgYIKwYBBQUHAwE=
+-----END TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/pathlen.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/pathlen.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c0ef75e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/pathlen.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIDjTCCAnWgAwIBAgIBGzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADBFMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzEf
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+CA==
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/pc1-cert.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/pc1-cert.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e0a373a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/pc1-cert.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+0Z/z5ahapEq7+wlyrw+lsZf+rBKFzwbowl1K2YJva9Q=
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/pc1-key.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/pc1-key.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d879dbc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/pc1-key.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIIEvgIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCBKgwggSkAgEAAoIBAQCeF5hc7UW6KtJ/
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+f2DAK68puLIhIySfEIjrYh4P
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/pc2-cert.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/pc2-cert.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2913b98
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/pc2-cert.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/pc2-key.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/pc2-key.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..77ab6ff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/pc2-key.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIIEvgIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCBKgwggSkAgEAAoIBAQDgpvzv40QOQxRy
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+GsR6pGtD+3qErri9pbdxDvRC
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/pc5-cert.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/pc5-cert.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8663bdf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/pc5-cert.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIDeDCCAmCgAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADArMRcwFQYDVQQDDA5zZXJ2
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+taj7Gfsp7TfLpfSgP/Y88EsKhQAWsdFt2tT3FQ==
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/pc5-key.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/pc5-key.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1ad0805
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/pc5-key.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
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+A0i6wzzrXUiXlynYm+VCKhs=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/root+anyEKU.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/root+anyEKU.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..97e0732
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/root+anyEKU.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+-----BEGIN TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/root+clientAuth.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/root+clientAuth.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8004e63
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/root+clientAuth.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+-----BEGIN TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
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+BwMC
+-----END TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/root+serverAuth.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/root+serverAuth.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..966676d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/root+serverAuth.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+-----BEGIN TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/root-anyEKU.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/root-anyEKU.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..712b1f5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/root-anyEKU.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+-----BEGIN TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/root-cert-768.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/root-cert-768.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4392ef0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/root-cert-768.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/root-cert-md5.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/root-cert-md5.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b6ed10c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/root-cert-md5.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/root-cert.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/root-cert.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..21ffa4d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/root-cert.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/root-cert2.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/root-cert2.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e47e91e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/root-cert2.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+9b6JIYDA1wxNVBXwN+D4MyALxjmjwcTsL6pXgoVc0JEJWVqQ1w==
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/root-clientAuth.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/root-clientAuth.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8d82866
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/root-clientAuth.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+-----BEGIN TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIC8TCCAdmgAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290
+IENBMCAXDTE2MDExNTA4MTk0OVoYDzIxMTYwMTE2MDgxOTQ5WjASMRAwDgYDVQQD
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+bEhZ0vm/lw63TGi88yIMtlkmcU2g0RKpeQI96G6QeqHyKF3p8DAMoAoGCCsGAQUF
+BwMC
+-----END TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/root-key-768.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/root-key-768.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4ecdcd3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/root-key-768.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIIB5AIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCAc4wggHKAgEAAmEAue2pKTZhWeE1qUCK
+QDa25I68dQpVImWqMqbOVQ8j6BAXIFbG3JB3B6kjzu2XwRbWKfYiI543j1b461U6
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+MEIpvy9pAjAzaFHKRugCN01V2dgXYYGL8+zkcwG4ehDXH1XEs4v8r3WtHBPPKED6
+AemfAQJLvh8=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/root-key.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/root-key.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0e0ee11
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/root-key.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIIEvgIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCBKgwggSkAgEAAoIBAQDh5gD1BrygRjh5
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+Jq+6oI4L87uoIoyqvltRK3hM
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/root-key2.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/root-key2.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..990b20d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/root-key2.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIIEvQIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCBKcwggSjAgEAAoIBAQDIHp0kAPnBtK1B
+/gcTQSGV20NKE1VD+OEO7qzYprfQV0/iaXX5zY/Ls4NRKNIJ6BdoEg5cID5HTNoE
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+wIPT+bHg3fjx7CemHl+rZeo=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/root-name2.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/root-name2.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ac3a4bb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/root-name2.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIC+TCCAeGgAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAWMRQwEgYDVQQDDAtSb290
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/root-nonca.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/root-nonca.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5c86abe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/root-nonca.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIDFzCCAf+gAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290
+IENBMCAXDTE2MDExNTA4MTk0OVoYDzIxMTYwMTE2MDgxOTQ5WjASMRAwDgYDVQQD
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+m8y3rPQqNPehWzbRq75txC/sayQZXNUrteVz
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/root-noserver.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/root-noserver.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0c7fb8d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/root-noserver.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+-----BEGIN TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIC8TCCAdmgAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290
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+BwMB
+-----END TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/root-serverAuth.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/root-serverAuth.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..37b49f6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/root-serverAuth.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+-----BEGIN TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIC8TCCAdmgAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290
+IENBMCAXDTE2MDExNTA4MTk0OVoYDzIxMTYwMTE2MDgxOTQ5WjASMRAwDgYDVQQD
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+bEhZ0vm/lw63TGi88yIMtlkmcU2g0RKpeQI96G6QeqHyKF3p8DAMoAoGCCsGAQUF
+BwMB
+-----END TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/root2+clientAuth.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/root2+clientAuth.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..41355b0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/root2+clientAuth.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+-----BEGIN TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIC8TCCAdmgAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290
+IENBMCAXDTE2MDExNTA4MTk0OVoYDzIxMTYwMTE2MDgxOTQ5WjASMRAwDgYDVQQD
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+BwMC
+-----END TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/root2+serverAuth.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/root2+serverAuth.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..52053f1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/root2+serverAuth.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+-----BEGIN TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIC8TCCAdmgAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290
+IENBMCAXDTE2MDExNTA4MTk0OVoYDzIxMTYwMTE2MDgxOTQ5WjASMRAwDgYDVQQD
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+9b6JIYDA1wxNVBXwN+D4MyALxjmjwcTsL6pXgoVc0JEJWVqQ1zAMMAoGCCsGAQUF
+BwMB
+-----END TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/root2-serverAuth.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/root2-serverAuth.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dae848a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/root2-serverAuth.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+-----BEGIN TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIC8TCCAdmgAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290
+IENBMCAXDTE2MDExNTA4MTk0OVoYDzIxMTYwMTE2MDgxOTQ5WjASMRAwDgYDVQQD
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+9b6JIYDA1wxNVBXwN+D4MyALxjmjwcTsL6pXgoVc0JEJWVqQ1zAMoAoGCCsGAQUF
+BwMB
+-----END TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/rootCA.key b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/rootCA.key
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..527f3ad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/rootCA.key
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIIEpAIBAAKCAQEAwPFrd4isNd/7c1MvkoAvdBYyTfUQIG9sOo7R3GvhLj7DBA+/
+m8TJEtHkC0WX5QbNZjrh4OIr36LE7HvTPTyK/150oKunA2oWW16SxH5beYpp1LyD
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+AkDF34S0mSE4T34zhs2+InfohJa6ojsuiNJSQMBPBxfr6wV2C+UWMQ==
+-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/rootCA.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/rootCA.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ef73d00
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/rootCA.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIDfzCCAmegAwIBAgIJAIhDKcvC6xWaMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMFYxCzAJBgNV
+BAYTAkFVMRMwEQYDVQQIDApTb21lLVN0YXRlMSEwHwYDVQQKDBhJbnRlcm5ldCBX
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+JBQfpPZpvf9MUlACxUONFOLQdZ8SXpSJ0e93iX2J2Z52mSQ=
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/rootcert.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/rootcert.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2b90ddb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/rootcert.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIC8TCCAdmgAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290
+IENBMCAXDTE2MDExNDIyMjkwNVoYDzIxMTYwMTE1MjIyOTA1WjASMRAwDgYDVQQD
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+/zANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAuiLq2lhcOJHrwUP0txbHk2vy6rmGTPxqmcCo
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+n70e2NYihU5yYKccReP+fjLgVFsuhsDs/0hRML1u9bLp9nUbYA==
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/rootkey.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/rootkey.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d85c96f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/rootkey.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIIEvwIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCBKkwggSlAgEAAoIBAQC/mhXWzc26ztIg
+2Duia7kDG54SAr3uaHk9TeGBmmWJIVoRKYvaosZ4/rT2hez/rxcNdVbi61QsI6Mu
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+hx4fvR9TR8lg5eEHEz3Y3APVttV30Y9gVKqt2tWPX1u+jrdezFl257HlAetGRapP
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+RMp21DkvdMUCgYAIMgwjR5rbYjEtUqJnlBlTBmD0FWDEqigQpgxdRcWgjT2nA2l0
+3AbcVwwv+6M2eg1MPASqsgvfP13CQZQ2afaKY10Zo6NTrOrLPupm+MYP4hp5w6Ox
+JI3lzGWHKYLYWKvmpEr7tZwMaXtsC7R77WP2A6hMUZA7dU2dg1ra3lrSsQKBgQDA
+sPIsUtmtwOBtqzUSEXrGfQqA+larDEGNVDVaiKfVwzwg+aeyWS+rqRS5Rj64L2GG
+KW3i020EvN/fplZap9vY9lIN7UZ5avSmDdqRFl1ajiccy1HRarKrbTFRoHibItMN
+4YvYfVZQ2h2aHQe2Myb6OULv6e4qbPIRyyDo4aKmTQKBgQCadq2JfICFIP9Q1aQn
+93oD7Z4WcYs+KsLYO+/uJxWMrn0/gv90cGrSfstJqDOHnRq4WKUcgK9ErxaE4LkW
+sD0mBhRM3SMxnRJZRO+6roRdehtjHkvzKu75KjcsuwefoMs2sFa4CLQ1YU2vO3Tx
+dgzpnKS2bH/i5yLwhelRfddZ6Q==
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/roots.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/roots.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0bc6912
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/roots.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/sca+anyEKU.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/sca+anyEKU.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..459a4dc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/sca+anyEKU.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+-----BEGIN TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/sca+clientAuth.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/sca+clientAuth.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3807805
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/sca+clientAuth.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+-----BEGIN TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/sca+serverAuth.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/sca+serverAuth.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..952d288
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/sca+serverAuth.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+-----BEGIN TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/sca-anyEKU.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/sca-anyEKU.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a43c021
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/sca-anyEKU.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+-----BEGIN TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/sca-cert.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/sca-cert.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6b800b6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/sca-cert.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/sca-clientAuth.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/sca-clientAuth.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..62a98ff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/sca-clientAuth.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+-----BEGIN TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/sca-serverAuth.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/sca-serverAuth.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0620874
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/sca-serverAuth.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+-----BEGIN TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
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+n1k50DkYsBBA3mJzik6wjt/c58lBIlSEgAgpvDU8ht8w3t20JP9+YqXAeugqFj/W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+-----END TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/server-trusted.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/server-trusted.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7508cff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/server-trusted.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+-----BEGIN TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/servercert.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/servercert.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cc17d3f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/servercert.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/serverkey.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/serverkey.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0d7e404
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/serverkey.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/setup.sh b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/setup.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..7e1086a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/setup.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,346 @@
+#! /bin/sh
+
+# Primary root: root-cert
+# root cert variants: CA:false, key2, DN2
+# trust variants: +serverAuth -serverAuth +clientAuth -clientAuth +anyEKU -anyEKU
+#
+./mkcert.sh genroot "Root CA" root-key root-cert
+./mkcert.sh genss "Root CA" root-key root-nonca
+./mkcert.sh genroot "Root CA" root-key2 root-cert2
+./mkcert.sh genroot "Root Cert 2" root-key root-name2
+#
+openssl x509 -in root-cert.pem -trustout \
+    -addtrust serverAuth -out root+serverAuth.pem
+openssl x509 -in root-cert.pem -trustout \
+    -addreject serverAuth -out root-serverAuth.pem
+openssl x509 -in root-cert.pem -trustout \
+    -addtrust clientAuth -out root+clientAuth.pem
+openssl x509 -in root-cert.pem -trustout \
+    -addreject clientAuth -out root-clientAuth.pem
+openssl x509 -in root-cert.pem -trustout \
+    -addreject anyExtendedKeyUsage -out root-anyEKU.pem
+openssl x509 -in root-cert.pem -trustout \
+    -addtrust anyExtendedKeyUsage -out root+anyEKU.pem
+openssl x509 -in root-cert2.pem -trustout \
+    -addtrust serverAuth -out root2+serverAuth.pem
+openssl x509 -in root-cert2.pem -trustout \
+    -addreject serverAuth -out root2-serverAuth.pem
+openssl x509 -in root-cert2.pem -trustout \
+    -addtrust clientAuth -out root2+clientAuth.pem
+openssl x509 -in root-nonca.pem -trustout \
+    -addtrust serverAuth -out nroot+serverAuth.pem
+openssl x509 -in root-nonca.pem -trustout \
+    -addtrust anyExtendedKeyUsage -out nroot+anyEKU.pem
+
+# Root CA security level variants:
+# MD5 self-signature
+OPENSSL_SIGALG=md5 \
+./mkcert.sh genroot "Root CA" root-key root-cert-md5
+# 768-bit key
+OPENSSL_KEYBITS=768 \
+./mkcert.sh genroot "Root CA" root-key-768 root-cert-768
+
+# primary client-EKU root: croot-cert
+# trust variants: +serverAuth -serverAuth +clientAuth +anyEKU -anyEKU
+#
+./mkcert.sh genroot "Root CA" root-key croot-cert clientAuth
+#
+openssl x509 -in croot-cert.pem -trustout \
+    -addtrust serverAuth -out croot+serverAuth.pem
+openssl x509 -in croot-cert.pem -trustout \
+    -addreject serverAuth -out croot-serverAuth.pem
+openssl x509 -in croot-cert.pem -trustout \
+    -addtrust clientAuth -out croot+clientAuth.pem
+openssl x509 -in croot-cert.pem -trustout \
+    -addreject clientAuth -out croot-clientAuth.pem
+openssl x509 -in croot-cert.pem -trustout \
+    -addreject anyExtendedKeyUsage -out croot-anyEKU.pem
+openssl x509 -in croot-cert.pem -trustout \
+    -addtrust anyExtendedKeyUsage -out croot+anyEKU.pem
+
+# primary server-EKU root: sroot-cert
+# trust variants: +serverAuth -serverAuth +clientAuth +anyEKU -anyEKU
+#
+./mkcert.sh genroot "Root CA" root-key sroot-cert serverAuth
+#
+openssl x509 -in sroot-cert.pem -trustout \
+    -addtrust serverAuth -out sroot+serverAuth.pem
+openssl x509 -in sroot-cert.pem -trustout \
+    -addreject serverAuth -out sroot-serverAuth.pem
+openssl x509 -in sroot-cert.pem -trustout \
+    -addtrust clientAuth -out sroot+clientAuth.pem
+openssl x509 -in sroot-cert.pem -trustout \
+    -addreject clientAuth -out sroot-clientAuth.pem
+openssl x509 -in sroot-cert.pem -trustout \
+    -addreject anyExtendedKeyUsage -out sroot-anyEKU.pem
+openssl x509 -in sroot-cert.pem -trustout \
+    -addtrust anyExtendedKeyUsage -out sroot+anyEKU.pem
+
+# Primary intermediate ca: ca-cert
+# ca variants: CA:false, key2, DN2, issuer2, expired
+# trust variants: +serverAuth, -serverAuth, +clientAuth, -clientAuth, -anyEKU, +anyEKU
+#
+./mkcert.sh genca "CA" ca-key ca-cert root-key root-cert
+./mkcert.sh genee "CA" ca-key ca-nonca root-key root-cert
+./mkcert.sh gen_nonbc_ca "CA" ca-key ca-nonbc root-key root-cert
+./mkcert.sh genca "CA" ca-key2 ca-cert2 root-key root-cert
+./mkcert.sh genca "CA2" ca-key ca-name2 root-key root-cert
+./mkcert.sh genca "CA" ca-key ca-root2 root-key2 root-cert2
+DAYS=-1 ./mkcert.sh genca "CA" ca-key ca-expired root-key root-cert
+#
+openssl x509 -in ca-cert.pem -trustout \
+    -addtrust serverAuth -out ca+serverAuth.pem
+openssl x509 -in ca-cert.pem -trustout \
+    -addreject serverAuth -out ca-serverAuth.pem
+openssl x509 -in ca-cert.pem -trustout \
+    -addtrust clientAuth -out ca+clientAuth.pem
+openssl x509 -in ca-cert.pem -trustout \
+    -addreject clientAuth -out ca-clientAuth.pem
+openssl x509 -in ca-cert.pem -trustout \
+    -addreject anyExtendedKeyUsage -out ca-anyEKU.pem
+openssl x509 -in ca-cert.pem -trustout \
+    -addtrust anyExtendedKeyUsage -out ca+anyEKU.pem
+openssl x509 -in ca-nonca.pem -trustout \
+    -addtrust serverAuth -out nca+serverAuth.pem
+openssl x509 -in ca-nonca.pem -trustout \
+    -addtrust serverAuth -out nca+anyEKU.pem
+
+# Intermediate CA security variants:
+# MD5 issuer signature,
+OPENSSL_SIGALG=md5 \
+./mkcert.sh genca "CA" ca-key ca-cert-md5 root-key root-cert
+openssl x509 -in ca-cert-md5.pem -trustout \
+    -addtrust anyExtendedKeyUsage -out ca-cert-md5-any.pem
+# Issuer has 768-bit key
+./mkcert.sh genca "CA" ca-key ca-cert-768i root-key-768 root-cert-768
+# CA has 768-bit key
+OPENSSL_KEYBITS=768 \
+./mkcert.sh genca "CA" ca-key-768 ca-cert-768 root-key root-cert
+
+# client intermediate ca: cca-cert
+# trust variants: +serverAuth, -serverAuth, +clientAuth, -clientAuth
+#
+./mkcert.sh genca "CA" ca-key cca-cert root-key root-cert clientAuth
+#
+openssl x509 -in cca-cert.pem -trustout \
+    -addtrust serverAuth -out cca+serverAuth.pem
+openssl x509 -in cca-cert.pem -trustout \
+    -addreject serverAuth -out cca-serverAuth.pem
+openssl x509 -in cca-cert.pem -trustout \
+    -addtrust clientAuth -out cca+clientAuth.pem
+openssl x509 -in cca-cert.pem -trustout \
+    -addtrust clientAuth -out cca-clientAuth.pem
+openssl x509 -in cca-cert.pem -trustout \
+    -addreject anyExtendedKeyUsage -out cca-anyEKU.pem
+openssl x509 -in cca-cert.pem -trustout \
+    -addtrust anyExtendedKeyUsage -out cca+anyEKU.pem
+
+# server intermediate ca: sca-cert
+# trust variants: +serverAuth, -serverAuth, +clientAuth, -clientAuth, -anyEKU, +anyEKU
+#
+./mkcert.sh genca "CA" ca-key sca-cert root-key root-cert serverAuth
+#
+openssl x509 -in sca-cert.pem -trustout \
+    -addtrust serverAuth -out sca+serverAuth.pem
+openssl x509 -in sca-cert.pem -trustout \
+    -addreject serverAuth -out sca-serverAuth.pem
+openssl x509 -in sca-cert.pem -trustout \
+    -addtrust clientAuth -out sca+clientAuth.pem
+openssl x509 -in sca-cert.pem -trustout \
+    -addreject clientAuth -out sca-clientAuth.pem
+openssl x509 -in sca-cert.pem -trustout \
+    -addreject anyExtendedKeyUsage -out sca-anyEKU.pem
+openssl x509 -in sca-cert.pem -trustout \
+    -addtrust anyExtendedKeyUsage -out sca+anyEKU.pem
+
+# Primary leaf cert: ee-cert
+# ee variants: expired, issuer-key2, issuer-name2
+# trust variants: +serverAuth, -serverAuth, +clientAuth, -clientAuth
+# purpose variants: client
+#
+./mkcert.sh genee server.example ee-key ee-cert ca-key ca-cert
+./mkcert.sh genee server.example ee-key ee-expired ca-key ca-cert -days -1
+./mkcert.sh genee server.example ee-key ee-cert2 ca-key2 ca-cert2
+./mkcert.sh genee server.example ee-key ee-name2 ca-key ca-name2
+./mkcert.sh genee -p clientAuth server.example ee-key ee-client ca-key ca-cert
+#
+openssl x509 -in ee-cert.pem -trustout \
+    -addtrust serverAuth -out ee+serverAuth.pem
+openssl x509 -in ee-cert.pem -trustout \
+    -addreject serverAuth -out ee-serverAuth.pem
+openssl x509 -in ee-client.pem -trustout \
+    -addtrust clientAuth -out ee+clientAuth.pem
+openssl x509 -in ee-client.pem -trustout \
+    -addreject clientAuth -out ee-clientAuth.pem
+
+# Leaf cert security level variants
+# MD5 issuer signature
+OPENSSL_SIGALG=md5 \
+./mkcert.sh genee server.example ee-key ee-cert-md5 ca-key ca-cert
+# 768-bit issuer key
+./mkcert.sh genee server.example ee-key ee-cert-768i ca-key-768 ca-cert-768
+# 768-bit leaf key
+OPENSSL_KEYBITS=768 \
+./mkcert.sh genee server.example ee-key-768 ee-cert-768 ca-key ca-cert
+
+# Proxy certificates, off of ee-client
+# Start with some good ones
+./mkcert.sh req pc1-key "0.CN = server.example" "1.CN = proxy 1" | \
+    ./mkcert.sh genpc pc1-key pc1-cert ee-key ee-client \
+                "language = id-ppl-anyLanguage" "pathlen = 1" "policy = text:AB"
+./mkcert.sh req pc2-key "0.CN = server.example" "1.CN = proxy 1" "2.CN = proxy 2" | \
+    ./mkcert.sh genpc pc2-key pc2-cert pc1-key pc1-cert \
+                "language = id-ppl-anyLanguage" "pathlen = 0" "policy = text:AB"
+# And now a couple of bad ones
+# pc3: incorrect CN
+./mkcert.sh req bad-pc3-key "0.CN = server.example" "1.CN = proxy 3" | \
+    ./mkcert.sh genpc bad-pc3-key bad-pc3-cert pc1-key pc1-cert \
+                "language = id-ppl-anyLanguage" "pathlen = 0" "policy = text:AB"
+# pc4: incorrect pathlen
+./mkcert.sh req bad-pc4-key "0.CN = server.example" "1.CN = proxy 1" "2.CN = proxy 4" | \
+    ./mkcert.sh genpc bad-pc4-key bad-pc4-cert pc1-key pc1-cert \
+                "language = id-ppl-anyLanguage" "pathlen = 1" "policy = text:AB"
+# pc5: no policy
+./mkcert.sh req pc5-key "0.CN = server.example" "1.CN = proxy 1" "2.CN = proxy 5" | \
+    ./mkcert.sh genpc pc5-key pc5-cert pc1-key pc1-cert \
+                "language = id-ppl-anyLanguage" "pathlen = 0"
+# pc6: incorrect CN (made into a component of a multivalue RDN)
+./mkcert.sh req bad-pc6-key "0.CN = server.example" "1.CN = proxy 1" "2.+CN = proxy 6" | \
+    ./mkcert.sh genpc bad-pc6-key bad-pc6-cert pc1-key pc1-cert \
+                "language = id-ppl-anyLanguage" "pathlen = 0" "policy = text:AB"
+
+# Name constraints test certificates.
+
+# NC CA1 only permits the host www.good.org and *.good.com email address
+# good@good.org and *@good.com and IP addresses 127.0.0.1 and
+# 192.168.0.0/16
+
+NC="permitted;DNS:www.good.org, permitted;DNS:good.com,"
+NC="$NC permitted;email:good@good.org, permitted;email:good.com,"
+NC="$NC permitted;IP:127.0.0.1/255.255.255.255, permitted;IP:192.168.0.0/255.255.0.0"
+
+NC=$NC ./mkcert.sh genca "Test NC CA 1" ncca1-key ncca1-cert root-key root-cert
+
+# NC CA2 allows anything apart from hosts www.bad.org and *.bad.com
+# and email addresses bad@bad.org and *@bad.com
+
+NC="excluded;DNS:www.bad.org, excluded;DNS:bad.com,"
+NC="$NC excluded;email:bad@bad.org, excluded;email:bad.com, "
+NC="$NC excluded;IP:10.0.0.0/255.0.0.0"
+
+NC=$NC ./mkcert.sh genca "Test NC CA 2" ncca2-key ncca2-cert root-key root-cert
+
+# Name constraints subordinate CA. Adds www.good.net (which should be
+# disallowed because parent CA doesn't permit it) adds ok.good.com
+# (which should be allowed because parent allows *.good.com
+# and now excludes bad.ok.good.com (allowed in permitted subtrees
+# but explicitly excluded).
+
+NC="permitted;DNS:www.good.net, permitted;DNS:ok.good.com, "
+NC="$NC excluded;DNS:bad.ok.good.com"
+NC=$NC ./mkcert.sh genca "Test NC sub CA" ncca3-key ncca3-cert \
+        ncca1-key ncca1-cert
+
+# all subjectAltNames allowed by CA1.
+
+./mkcert.sh req alt1-key "O = Good NC Test Certificate 1" \
+    "1.CN=www.good.org" "2.CN=Joe Bloggs" "3.CN=any.good.com" | \
+    ./mkcert.sh geneealt alt1-key alt1-cert ncca1-key ncca1-cert \
+    "DNS.1 = www.good.org" "DNS.2 = any.good.com" \
+    "email.1 = good@good.org" "email.2 = any@good.com" \
+    "IP = 127.0.0.1" "IP = 192.168.0.1"
+
+# no subjectAltNames excluded by CA2.
+
+./mkcert.sh req alt2-key "O = Good NC Test Certificate 2" | \
+    ./mkcert.sh geneealt alt2-key alt2-cert ncca2-key ncca2-cert \
+    "DNS.1 = www.anything.org" "DNS.2 = any.other.com" \
+    "email.1 = other@bad.org" "email.2 = any@something.com"
+
+# hostname other.good.org which is not allowed by CA1.
+
+./mkcert.sh req badalt1-key "O = Bad NC Test Certificate 1" | \
+    ./mkcert.sh geneealt badalt1-key badalt1-cert ncca1-key ncca1-cert \
+    "DNS.1 = other.good.org" "DNS.2 = any.good.com" \
+    "email.1 = good@good.org" "email.2 = any@good.com"
+
+# any.bad.com is excluded by CA2.
+
+./mkcert.sh req badalt2-key 'O = Bad NC Test Certificate 2' | \
+    ./mkcert.sh geneealt badalt2-key badalt2-cert ncca2-key ncca2-cert \
+    "DNS.1 = www.good.org" "DNS.2 = any.bad.com" \
+    "email.1 = good@good.org" "email.2 = any@good.com"
+
+# other@good.org not permitted by CA1
+
+./mkcert.sh req badalt3-key "O = Bad NC Test Certificate 3" | \
+    ./mkcert.sh geneealt badalt3-key badalt1-cert ncca1-key ncca1-cert \
+    "DNS.1 = www.good.org" "DNS.2 = any.good.com" \
+    "email.1 = other@good.org" "email.2 = any@good.com"
+
+# all subject alt names OK but subject email address not allowed by CA1.
+
+./mkcert.sh req badalt4-key 'O = Bad NC Test Certificate 4' \
+    "emailAddress = any@other.com" | \
+    ./mkcert.sh geneealt badalt4-key badalt4-cert ncca1-key ncca1-cert \
+    "DNS.1 = www.good.org" "DNS.2 = any.good.com" \
+    "email.1 = good@good.org" "email.2 = any@good.com"
+
+# IP address not allowed by CA1
+./mkcert.sh req badalt5-key "O = Bad NC Test Certificate 5" | \
+    ./mkcert.sh geneealt badalt5-key badalt5-cert ncca1-key ncca1-cert \
+    "DNS.1 = www.good.org" "DNS.2 = any.good.com" \
+    "email.1 = good@good.org" "email.2 = any@good.com" \
+    "IP = 127.0.0.2"
+
+# all subject alt names OK but subject CN not allowed by CA1.
+./mkcert.sh req badalt6-key "O = Bad NC Test Certificate 6" \
+    "1.CN=other.good.org" "2.CN=Joe Bloggs" "3.CN=any.good.com" | \
+    ./mkcert.sh geneealt badalt6-key badalt6-cert ncca1-key ncca1-cert \
+    "DNS.1 = www.good.org" "DNS.2 = any.good.com" \
+    "email.1 = good@good.org" "email.2 = any@good.com" \
+    "IP = 127.0.0.1" "IP = 192.168.0.1"
+
+# all subject alt names OK but subject CN not allowed by CA1, BMPSTRING
+REQMASK=MASK:0x800 ./mkcert.sh req badalt7-key "O = Bad NC Test Certificate 7" \
+    "1.CN=other.good.org" "2.CN=Joe Bloggs" "3.CN=any.good.com" | \
+    ./mkcert.sh geneealt badalt7-key badalt7-cert ncca1-key ncca1-cert \
+    "DNS.1 = www.good.org" "DNS.2 = any.good.com" \
+    "email.1 = good@good.org" "email.2 = any@good.com" \
+    "IP = 127.0.0.1" "IP = 192.168.0.1"
+
+# all subjectAltNames allowed by chain
+
+./mkcert.sh req alt3-key "O = Good NC Test Certificate 3" \
+    "1.CN=www.ok.good.com" "2.CN=Joe Bloggs" | \
+    ./mkcert.sh geneealt alt3-key alt3-cert ncca3-key ncca3-cert \
+    "DNS.1 = www.ok.good.com" \
+    "email.1 = good@good.org" "email.2 = any@good.com" \
+    "IP = 127.0.0.1" "IP = 192.168.0.1"
+
+# www.good.net allowed by parent CA but not parent of parent
+
+./mkcert.sh req badalt8-key "O = Bad NC Test Certificate 8" \
+    "1.CN=www.good.com" "2.CN=Joe Bloggs" | \
+    ./mkcert.sh geneealt badalt8-key badalt8-cert ncca3-key ncca3-cert \
+    "DNS.1 = www.ok.good.com" "DNS.2 = www.good.net" \
+    "email.1 = good@good.org" "email.2 = any@good.com" \
+    "IP = 127.0.0.1" "IP = 192.168.0.1"
+
+# other.good.com not allowed by parent CA but allowed by parent of parent
+
+./mkcert.sh req badalt9-key "O = Bad NC Test Certificate 9" \
+    "1.CN=www.good.com" "2.CN=Joe Bloggs" | \
+    ./mkcert.sh geneealt badalt9-key badalt9-cert ncca3-key ncca3-cert \
+    "DNS.1 = www.good.com" "DNS.2 = other.good.com" \
+    "email.1 = good@good.org" "email.2 = any@good.com" \
+    "IP = 127.0.0.1" "IP = 192.168.0.1"
+
+# www.bad.net excluded by parent CA.
+
+./mkcert.sh req badalt10-key "O = Bad NC Test Certificate 10" \
+    "1.CN=www.ok.good.com" "2.CN=Joe Bloggs" | \
+    ./mkcert.sh geneealt badalt10-key badalt10-cert ncca3-key ncca3-cert \
+    "DNS.1 = www.ok.good.com" "DNS.2 = bad.ok.good.com" \
+    "email.1 = good@good.org" "email.2 = any@good.com" \
+    "IP = 127.0.0.1" "IP = 192.168.0.1"
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/some-names1.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/some-names1.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..21eed83
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/some-names1.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,211 @@
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/some-names2.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/some-names2.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..328e3d1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/some-names2.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/some-names3.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/some-names3.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a6d3ee7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/some-names3.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,293 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/sroot+anyEKU.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/sroot+anyEKU.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9beefa9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/sroot+anyEKU.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+-----BEGIN TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/sroot+clientAuth.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/sroot+clientAuth.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..939e3e8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/sroot+clientAuth.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+-----BEGIN TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/sroot+serverAuth.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/sroot+serverAuth.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..447d2e3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/sroot+serverAuth.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+-----BEGIN TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/sroot-anyEKU.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/sroot-anyEKU.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7f1766a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/sroot-anyEKU.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+-----BEGIN TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/sroot-cert.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/sroot-cert.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..55508d9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/sroot-cert.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/sroot-clientAuth.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/sroot-clientAuth.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e91f1d2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/sroot-clientAuth.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+-----BEGIN TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/sroot-serverAuth.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/sroot-serverAuth.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2fd78cc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/sroot-serverAuth.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+-----BEGIN TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
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+E3ODKNXOOP3jsDAMoAoGCCsGAQUFBwMB
+-----END TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/subinterCA-ss.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/subinterCA-ss.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a436b4b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/subinterCA-ss.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/subinterCA.key b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/subinterCA.key
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c867af9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/subinterCA.key
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
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+-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/subinterCA.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/subinterCA.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2cdf480
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/subinterCA.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/untrusted.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/untrusted.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d93d312
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/untrusted.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/wrongcert.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/wrongcert.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b8b3cfd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/wrongcert.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+Ww==
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/wrongkey.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/wrongkey.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..72ab17b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/certs/wrongkey.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
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+5NRuxz9afbMWlwaPEqa1eDXf9qmEjf5hBd3kqkxf4L2pNv1Rme/bhu3pXu45ht2f
+HKeMyrd6n9njwDhbViWNiU2CA+hOTZTCYjPuMiEvoQKBgQCY4styVO7gKdNc3j9c
+iPAjnMjBBqLzEJdS4de2BFdKM4xhX4OWbNsO+GcMlq4k1Tt6dMKdcLmjnHWsdsqp
+UFGEMMZDd/ez6kOAGInYajr7rmRjxAolZwK7mc1OQcDiNgjb5Qs0E5zM4TEg5r56
+sU+ewyfUH6y1dTTJhjIldEfUtw==
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/cipherlist_test.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/cipherlist_test.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d6556e0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/cipherlist_test.c
@@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL licenses, (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ * or in the file LICENSE in the source distribution.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/e_os2.h>
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+#include <openssl/ssl3.h>
+#include <openssl/tls1.h>
+
+#include "e_os.h"
+#include "testutil.h"
+
+typedef struct cipherlist_test_fixture {
+    const char *test_case_name;
+    SSL_CTX *server;
+    SSL_CTX *client;
+} CIPHERLIST_TEST_FIXTURE;
+
+
+static CIPHERLIST_TEST_FIXTURE set_up(const char *const test_case_name)
+{
+    CIPHERLIST_TEST_FIXTURE fixture;
+    fixture.test_case_name = test_case_name;
+    fixture.server = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_server_method());
+    fixture.client = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_client_method());
+    OPENSSL_assert(fixture.client != NULL && fixture.server != NULL);
+    return fixture;
+}
+
+/*
+ * All ciphers in the DEFAULT cipherlist meet the default security level.
+ * However, default supported ciphers exclude SRP and PSK ciphersuites
+ * for which no callbacks have been set up.
+ *
+ * Supported ciphers also exclude TLSv1.2 ciphers if TLSv1.2 is disabled,
+ * and individual disabled algorithms. However, NO_RSA, NO_AES and NO_SHA
+ * are currently broken and should be considered mission impossible in libssl.
+ */
+static const uint32_t default_ciphers_in_order[] = {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+    TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+    TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+# endif
+
+# if !defined OPENSSL_NO_CHACHA && !defined OPENSSL_NO_POLY1305
+#  ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305,
+    TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305,
+#  endif
+#  ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+    TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305,
+#  endif
+# endif  /* !OPENSSL_NO_CHACHA && !OPENSSL_NO_POLY1305 */
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+    TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+    TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384,
+    TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384,
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+    TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256,
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
+    TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+    TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
+# endif
+#endif  /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2 */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+    TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+    TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA,
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+    TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+    TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA,
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2
+    TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+    TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+    TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256,
+    TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
+#endif
+
+    TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA,
+    TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA,
+};
+
+static int test_default_cipherlist(SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers;
+    SSL *ssl;
+    int i, ret = 0, num_expected_ciphers, num_ciphers;
+    uint32_t expected_cipher_id, cipher_id;
+
+    ssl = SSL_new(ctx);
+    OPENSSL_assert(ssl != NULL);
+
+    ciphers = SSL_get1_supported_ciphers(ssl);
+    OPENSSL_assert(ciphers != NULL);
+    num_expected_ciphers = OSSL_NELEM(default_ciphers_in_order);
+    num_ciphers = sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers);
+    if (num_ciphers != num_expected_ciphers) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Expected %d supported ciphers, got %d.\n",
+                num_expected_ciphers, num_ciphers);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0; i < num_ciphers; i++) {
+        expected_cipher_id = default_ciphers_in_order[i];
+        cipher_id = SSL_CIPHER_get_id(sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i));
+        if (cipher_id != expected_cipher_id) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "Wrong cipher at position %d: expected %x, "
+                    "got %x\n", i, expected_cipher_id, cipher_id);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+    sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
+    SSL_free(ssl);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int execute_test(CIPHERLIST_TEST_FIXTURE fixture)
+{
+    return test_default_cipherlist(fixture.server)
+        && test_default_cipherlist(fixture.client);
+}
+
+static void tear_down(CIPHERLIST_TEST_FIXTURE fixture)
+{
+    SSL_CTX_free(fixture.server);
+    SSL_CTX_free(fixture.client);
+    ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+}
+
+#define SETUP_CIPHERLIST_TEST_FIXTURE() \
+    SETUP_TEST_FIXTURE(CIPHERLIST_TEST_FIXTURE, set_up)
+
+#define EXECUTE_CIPHERLIST_TEST() \
+    EXECUTE_TEST(execute_test, tear_down)
+
+static int test_default_cipherlist_implicit()
+{
+    SETUP_CIPHERLIST_TEST_FIXTURE();
+    EXECUTE_CIPHERLIST_TEST();
+}
+
+static int test_default_cipherlist_explicit()
+{
+    SETUP_CIPHERLIST_TEST_FIXTURE();
+    OPENSSL_assert(SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(fixture.server, "DEFAULT"));
+    OPENSSL_assert(SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(fixture.client, "DEFAULT"));
+    EXECUTE_CIPHERLIST_TEST();
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    int result = 0;
+
+    ADD_TEST(test_default_cipherlist_implicit);
+    ADD_TEST(test_default_cipherlist_explicit);
+
+    result = run_tests(argv[0]);
+
+    return result;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/clienthellotest.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/clienthellotest.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..38a7637
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/clienthellotest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2015-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+#include "../ssl/packet_locl.h"
+
+#define CLIENT_VERSION_LEN      2
+
+
+#define TOTAL_NUM_TESTS                         1
+
+/*
+ * Test that explicitly setting ticket data results in it appearing in the
+ * ClientHello for a negotiated SSL/TLS version
+ */
+#define TEST_SET_SESSION_TICK_DATA_VER_NEG      0
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+    SSL_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+    SSL *con = NULL;
+    BIO *rbio;
+    BIO *wbio;
+    BIO *err;
+    long len;
+    unsigned char *data;
+    PACKET pkt, pkt2, pkt3;
+    char *dummytick = "Hello World!";
+    unsigned int type;
+    int testresult = 0;
+    int currtest = 0;
+
+    err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT);
+
+    CRYPTO_set_mem_debug(1);
+    CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON);
+
+    /*
+     * For each test set up an SSL_CTX and SSL and see what ClientHello gets
+     * produced when we try to connect
+     */
+    for (; currtest < TOTAL_NUM_TESTS; currtest++) {
+        testresult = 0;
+        ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_method());
+        if (!SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(ctx, TLS1_2_VERSION))
+            goto end;
+        con = SSL_new(ctx);
+
+        rbio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+        wbio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+        SSL_set_bio(con, rbio, wbio);
+        SSL_set_connect_state(con);
+
+        if (currtest == TEST_SET_SESSION_TICK_DATA_VER_NEG) {
+            if (!SSL_set_session_ticket_ext(con, dummytick, strlen(dummytick)))
+                goto end;
+        }
+
+        if (SSL_connect(con) > 0) {
+            /* This shouldn't succeed because we don't have a server! */
+            goto end;
+        }
+
+        len = BIO_get_mem_data(wbio, (char **)&data);
+        if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, data, len))
+            goto end;
+
+        /* Skip the record header */
+        if (!PACKET_forward(&pkt, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH))
+            goto end;
+
+        /* Skip the handshake message header */
+        if (!PACKET_forward(&pkt, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH))
+            goto end;
+
+        /* Skip client version and random */
+        if (!PACKET_forward(&pkt, CLIENT_VERSION_LEN + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE))
+            goto end;
+
+        /* Skip session id */
+        if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&pkt, &pkt2))
+            goto end;
+
+        /* Skip ciphers */
+        if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&pkt, &pkt2))
+            goto end;
+
+        /* Skip compression */
+        if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&pkt, &pkt2))
+            goto end;
+
+        /* Extensions len */
+        if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&pkt, &pkt2))
+            goto end;
+
+        /* Loop through all extensions */
+        while (PACKET_remaining(&pkt2)) {
+
+            if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt2, &type) ||
+                !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&pkt2, &pkt3))
+                goto end;
+
+            if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
+                if (currtest == TEST_SET_SESSION_TICK_DATA_VER_NEG) {
+                    if (PACKET_equal(&pkt3, dummytick, strlen(dummytick))) {
+                        /* Ticket data is as we expected */
+                        testresult = 1;
+                    } else {
+                        printf("Received session ticket is not as expected\n");
+                    }
+                    break;
+                }
+            }
+
+        }
+
+ end:
+        SSL_free(con);
+        SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
+        if (!testresult) {
+            printf("ClientHello test: FAILED (Test %d)\n", currtest);
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG
+    if (CRYPTO_mem_leaks(err) <= 0)
+        testresult = 0;
+#endif
+    BIO_free(err);
+
+    return testresult?0:1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/cms-examples.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/cms-examples.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ec1c5fa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/cms-examples.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,365 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+# Perl script to run tests against S/MIME examples in RFC4134
+# Assumes RFC is in current directory and called "rfc4134.txt"
+
+use MIME::Base64;
+
+my $badttest = 0;
+my $verbose  = 1;
+
+my $cmscmd;
+my $exdir  = "./";
+my $exfile = "./rfc4134.txt";
+
+if (-f "../apps/openssl")
+	{
+	$cmscmd = "../util/shlib_wrap.sh ../apps/openssl cms";
+	}
+elsif (-f "..\\out32dll\\openssl.exe")
+	{
+	$cmscmd = "..\\out32dll\\openssl.exe cms";
+	}
+elsif (-f "..\\out32\\openssl.exe")
+	{
+	$cmscmd = "..\\out32\\openssl.exe cms";
+	}
+
+my @test_list = (
+    [ "3.1.bin"  => "dataout" ],
+    [ "3.2.bin"  => "encode, dataout" ],
+    [ "4.1.bin"  => "encode, verifyder, cont, dss" ],
+    [ "4.2.bin"  => "encode, verifyder, cont, rsa" ],
+    [ "4.3.bin"  => "encode, verifyder, cont_extern, dss" ],
+    [ "4.4.bin"  => "encode, verifyder, cont, dss" ],
+    [ "4.5.bin"  => "verifyder, cont, rsa" ],
+    [ "4.6.bin"  => "encode, verifyder, cont, dss" ],
+    [ "4.7.bin"  => "encode, verifyder, cont, dss" ],
+    [ "4.8.eml"  => "verifymime, dss" ],
+    [ "4.9.eml"  => "verifymime, dss" ],
+    [ "4.10.bin" => "encode, verifyder, cont, dss" ],
+    [ "4.11.bin" => "encode, certsout" ],
+    [ "5.1.bin"  => "encode, envelopeder, cont" ],
+    [ "5.2.bin"  => "encode, envelopeder, cont" ],
+    [ "5.3.eml"  => "envelopemime, cont" ],
+    [ "6.0.bin"  => "encode, digest, cont" ],
+    [ "7.1.bin"  => "encode, encrypted, cont" ],
+    [ "7.2.bin"  => "encode, encrypted, cont" ]
+);
+
+# Extract examples from RFC4134 text.
+# Base64 decode all examples, certificates and
+# private keys are converted to PEM format.
+
+my ( $filename, $data );
+
+my @cleanup = ( "cms.out", "cms.err", "tmp.der", "tmp.txt" );
+
+$data = "";
+
+open( IN, $exfile ) || die "Can't Open RFC examples file $exfile";
+
+while (<IN>) {
+    next unless (/^\|/);
+    s/^\|//;
+    next if (/^\*/);
+    if (/^>(.*)$/) {
+        $filename = $1;
+        next;
+    }
+    if (/^</) {
+        $filename = "$exdir/$filename";
+        if ( $filename =~ /\.bin$/ || $filename =~ /\.eml$/ ) {
+            $data = decode_base64($data);
+            open OUT, ">$filename";
+            binmode OUT;
+            print OUT $data;
+            close OUT;
+            push @cleanup, $filename;
+        }
+        elsif ( $filename =~ /\.cer$/ ) {
+            write_pem( $filename, "CERTIFICATE", $data );
+        }
+        elsif ( $filename =~ /\.pri$/ ) {
+            write_pem( $filename, "PRIVATE KEY", $data );
+        }
+        $data     = "";
+        $filename = "";
+    }
+    else {
+        $data .= $_;
+    }
+
+}
+
+my $secretkey =
+  "73:7c:79:1f:25:ea:d0:e0:46:29:25:43:52:f7:dc:62:91:e5:cb:26:91:7a:da:32";
+
+foreach (@test_list) {
+    my ( $file, $tlist ) = @$_;
+    print "Example file $file:\n";
+    if ( $tlist =~ /encode/ ) {
+        run_reencode_test( $exdir, $file );
+    }
+    if ( $tlist =~ /certsout/ ) {
+        run_certsout_test( $exdir, $file );
+    }
+    if ( $tlist =~ /dataout/ ) {
+        run_dataout_test( $exdir, $file );
+    }
+    if ( $tlist =~ /verify/ ) {
+        run_verify_test( $exdir, $tlist, $file );
+    }
+    if ( $tlist =~ /digest/ ) {
+        run_digest_test( $exdir, $tlist, $file );
+    }
+    if ( $tlist =~ /encrypted/ ) {
+        run_encrypted_test( $exdir, $tlist, $file, $secretkey );
+    }
+    if ( $tlist =~ /envelope/ ) {
+        run_envelope_test( $exdir, $tlist, $file );
+    }
+
+}
+
+foreach (@cleanup) {
+    unlink $_;
+}
+
+if ($badtest) {
+    print "\n$badtest TESTS FAILED!!\n";
+}
+else {
+    print "\n***All tests successful***\n";
+}
+
+sub write_pem {
+    my ( $filename, $str, $data ) = @_;
+
+    $filename =~ s/\.[^.]*$/.pem/;
+
+    push @cleanup, $filename;
+
+    open OUT, ">$filename";
+
+    print OUT "-----BEGIN $str-----\n";
+    print OUT $data;
+    print OUT "-----END $str-----\n";
+
+    close OUT;
+}
+
+sub run_reencode_test {
+    my ( $cmsdir, $tfile ) = @_;
+    unlink "tmp.der";
+
+    system( "$cmscmd -cmsout -inform DER -outform DER"
+          . " -in $cmsdir/$tfile -out tmp.der" );
+
+    if ($?) {
+        print "\tReencode command FAILED!!\n";
+        $badtest++;
+    }
+    elsif ( !cmp_files( "$cmsdir/$tfile", "tmp.der" ) ) {
+        print "\tReencode FAILED!!\n";
+        $badtest++;
+    }
+    else {
+        print "\tReencode passed\n" if $verbose;
+    }
+}
+
+sub run_certsout_test {
+    my ( $cmsdir, $tfile ) = @_;
+    unlink "tmp.der";
+    unlink "tmp.pem";
+
+    system( "$cmscmd -cmsout -inform DER -certsout tmp.pem"
+          . " -in $cmsdir/$tfile -out tmp.der" );
+
+    if ($?) {
+        print "\tCertificate output command FAILED!!\n";
+        $badtest++;
+    }
+    else {
+        print "\tCertificate output passed\n" if $verbose;
+    }
+}
+
+sub run_dataout_test {
+    my ( $cmsdir, $tfile ) = @_;
+    unlink "tmp.txt";
+
+    system(
+        "$cmscmd -data_out -inform DER" . " -in $cmsdir/$tfile -out tmp.txt" );
+
+    if ($?) {
+        print "\tDataout command FAILED!!\n";
+        $badtest++;
+    }
+    elsif ( !cmp_files( "$cmsdir/ExContent.bin", "tmp.txt" ) ) {
+        print "\tDataout compare FAILED!!\n";
+        $badtest++;
+    }
+    else {
+        print "\tDataout passed\n" if $verbose;
+    }
+}
+
+sub run_verify_test {
+    my ( $cmsdir, $tlist, $tfile ) = @_;
+    unlink "tmp.txt";
+
+    $form   = "DER"                     if $tlist =~ /verifyder/;
+    $form   = "SMIME"                   if $tlist =~ /verifymime/;
+    $cafile = "$cmsdir/CarlDSSSelf.pem" if $tlist =~ /dss/;
+    $cafile = "$cmsdir/CarlRSASelf.pem" if $tlist =~ /rsa/;
+
+    $cmd =
+        "$cmscmd -verify -inform $form"
+      . " -CAfile $cafile"
+      . " -in $cmsdir/$tfile -out tmp.txt";
+
+    $cmd .= " -content $cmsdir/ExContent.bin" if $tlist =~ /cont_extern/;
+
+    system("$cmd 2>cms.err 1>cms.out");
+
+    if ($?) {
+        print "\tVerify command FAILED!!\n";
+        $badtest++;
+    }
+    elsif ( $tlist =~ /cont/
+        && !cmp_files( "$cmsdir/ExContent.bin", "tmp.txt" ) )
+    {
+        print "\tVerify content compare FAILED!!\n";
+        $badtest++;
+    }
+    else {
+        print "\tVerify passed\n" if $verbose;
+    }
+}
+
+sub run_envelope_test {
+    my ( $cmsdir, $tlist, $tfile ) = @_;
+    unlink "tmp.txt";
+
+    $form = "DER"   if $tlist =~ /envelopeder/;
+    $form = "SMIME" if $tlist =~ /envelopemime/;
+
+    $cmd =
+        "$cmscmd -decrypt -inform $form"
+      . " -recip $cmsdir/BobRSASignByCarl.pem"
+      . " -inkey $cmsdir/BobPrivRSAEncrypt.pem"
+      . " -in $cmsdir/$tfile -out tmp.txt";
+
+    system("$cmd 2>cms.err 1>cms.out");
+
+    if ($?) {
+        print "\tDecrypt command FAILED!!\n";
+        $badtest++;
+    }
+    elsif ( $tlist =~ /cont/
+        && !cmp_files( "$cmsdir/ExContent.bin", "tmp.txt" ) )
+    {
+        print "\tDecrypt content compare FAILED!!\n";
+        $badtest++;
+    }
+    else {
+        print "\tDecrypt passed\n" if $verbose;
+    }
+}
+
+sub run_digest_test {
+    my ( $cmsdir, $tlist, $tfile ) = @_;
+    unlink "tmp.txt";
+
+    my $cmd =
+      "$cmscmd -digest_verify -inform DER" . " -in $cmsdir/$tfile -out tmp.txt";
+
+    system("$cmd 2>cms.err 1>cms.out");
+
+    if ($?) {
+        print "\tDigest verify command FAILED!!\n";
+        $badtest++;
+    }
+    elsif ( $tlist =~ /cont/
+        && !cmp_files( "$cmsdir/ExContent.bin", "tmp.txt" ) )
+    {
+        print "\tDigest verify content compare FAILED!!\n";
+        $badtest++;
+    }
+    else {
+        print "\tDigest verify passed\n" if $verbose;
+    }
+}
+
+sub run_encrypted_test {
+    my ( $cmsdir, $tlist, $tfile, $key ) = @_;
+    unlink "tmp.txt";
+
+    system( "$cmscmd -EncryptedData_decrypt -inform DER"
+          . " -secretkey $key"
+          . " -in $cmsdir/$tfile -out tmp.txt" );
+
+    if ($?) {
+        print "\tEncrypted Data command FAILED!!\n";
+        $badtest++;
+    }
+    elsif ( $tlist =~ /cont/
+        && !cmp_files( "$cmsdir/ExContent.bin", "tmp.txt" ) )
+    {
+        print "\tEncrypted Data content compare FAILED!!\n";
+        $badtest++;
+    }
+    else {
+        print "\tEncryptedData verify passed\n" if $verbose;
+    }
+}
+
+sub cmp_files {
+    my ( $f1, $f2 ) = @_;
+    my ( $fp1, $fp2 );
+
+    my ( $rd1, $rd2 );
+
+    if ( !open( $fp1, "<$f1" ) ) {
+        print STDERR "Can't Open file $f1\n";
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if ( !open( $fp2, "<$f2" ) ) {
+        print STDERR "Can't Open file $f2\n";
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    binmode $fp1;
+    binmode $fp2;
+
+    my $ret = 0;
+
+    for ( ; ; ) {
+        $n1 = sysread $fp1, $rd1, 4096;
+        $n2 = sysread $fp2, $rd2, 4096;
+        last if ( $n1 != $n2 );
+        last if ( $rd1 ne $rd2 );
+
+        if ( $n1 == 0 ) {
+            $ret = 1;
+            last;
+        }
+
+    }
+
+    close $fp1;
+    close $fp2;
+
+    return $ret;
+
+}
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/constant_time_test.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/constant_time_test.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3ee6a81
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/constant_time_test.c
@@ -0,0 +1,268 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2014-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
+#include "e_os.h"
+
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+static const unsigned int CONSTTIME_TRUE = (unsigned)(~0);
+static const unsigned int CONSTTIME_FALSE = 0;
+static const unsigned char CONSTTIME_TRUE_8 = 0xff;
+static const unsigned char CONSTTIME_FALSE_8 = 0;
+
+static int test_binary_op(unsigned int (*op) (unsigned int a, unsigned int b),
+                          const char *op_name, unsigned int a, unsigned int b,
+                          int is_true)
+{
+    unsigned c = op(a, b);
+    if (is_true && c != CONSTTIME_TRUE) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for %s(%du, %du): expected %du "
+                "(TRUE), got %du\n", op_name, a, b, CONSTTIME_TRUE, c);
+        return 1;
+    } else if (!is_true && c != CONSTTIME_FALSE) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for  %s(%du, %du): expected %du "
+                "(FALSE), got %du\n", op_name, a, b, CONSTTIME_FALSE, c);
+        return 1;
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int test_binary_op_8(unsigned
+                            char (*op) (unsigned int a, unsigned int b),
+                            const char *op_name, unsigned int a,
+                            unsigned int b, int is_true)
+{
+    unsigned char c = op(a, b);
+    if (is_true && c != CONSTTIME_TRUE_8) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for %s(%du, %du): expected %u "
+                "(TRUE), got %u\n", op_name, a, b, CONSTTIME_TRUE_8, c);
+        return 1;
+    } else if (!is_true && c != CONSTTIME_FALSE_8) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for  %s(%du, %du): expected %u "
+                "(FALSE), got %u\n", op_name, a, b, CONSTTIME_FALSE_8, c);
+        return 1;
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int test_is_zero(unsigned int a)
+{
+    unsigned int c = constant_time_is_zero(a);
+    if (a == 0 && c != CONSTTIME_TRUE) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_is_zero(%du): "
+                "expected %du (TRUE), got %du\n", a, CONSTTIME_TRUE, c);
+        return 1;
+    } else if (a != 0 && c != CONSTTIME_FALSE) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_is_zero(%du): "
+                "expected %du (FALSE), got %du\n", a, CONSTTIME_FALSE, c);
+        return 1;
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int test_is_zero_8(unsigned int a)
+{
+    unsigned char c = constant_time_is_zero_8(a);
+    if (a == 0 && c != CONSTTIME_TRUE_8) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_is_zero(%du): "
+                "expected %u (TRUE), got %u\n", a, CONSTTIME_TRUE_8, c);
+        return 1;
+    } else if (a != 0 && c != CONSTTIME_FALSE) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_is_zero(%du): "
+                "expected %u (FALSE), got %u\n", a, CONSTTIME_FALSE_8, c);
+        return 1;
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int test_select(unsigned int a, unsigned int b)
+{
+    unsigned int selected = constant_time_select(CONSTTIME_TRUE, a, b);
+    if (selected != a) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_select(%du, %du,"
+                "%du): expected %du(first value), got %du\n",
+                CONSTTIME_TRUE, a, b, a, selected);
+        return 1;
+    }
+    selected = constant_time_select(CONSTTIME_FALSE, a, b);
+    if (selected != b) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_select(%du, %du,"
+                "%du): expected %du(second value), got %du\n",
+                CONSTTIME_FALSE, a, b, b, selected);
+        return 1;
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int test_select_8(unsigned char a, unsigned char b)
+{
+    unsigned char selected = constant_time_select_8(CONSTTIME_TRUE_8, a, b);
+    if (selected != a) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_select(%u, %u,"
+                "%u): expected %u(first value), got %u\n",
+                CONSTTIME_TRUE, a, b, a, selected);
+        return 1;
+    }
+    selected = constant_time_select_8(CONSTTIME_FALSE_8, a, b);
+    if (selected != b) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_select(%u, %u,"
+                "%u): expected %u(second value), got %u\n",
+                CONSTTIME_FALSE, a, b, b, selected);
+        return 1;
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int test_select_int(int a, int b)
+{
+    int selected = constant_time_select_int(CONSTTIME_TRUE, a, b);
+    if (selected != a) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_select(%du, %d,"
+                "%d): expected %d(first value), got %d\n",
+                CONSTTIME_TRUE, a, b, a, selected);
+        return 1;
+    }
+    selected = constant_time_select_int(CONSTTIME_FALSE, a, b);
+    if (selected != b) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_select(%du, %d,"
+                "%d): expected %d(second value), got %d\n",
+                CONSTTIME_FALSE, a, b, b, selected);
+        return 1;
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int test_eq_int(int a, int b)
+{
+    unsigned int equal = constant_time_eq_int(a, b);
+    if (a == b && equal != CONSTTIME_TRUE) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_eq_int(%d, %d): "
+                "expected %du(TRUE), got %du\n", a, b, CONSTTIME_TRUE, equal);
+        return 1;
+    } else if (a != b && equal != CONSTTIME_FALSE) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_eq_int(%d, %d): "
+                "expected %du(FALSE), got %du\n",
+                a, b, CONSTTIME_FALSE, equal);
+        return 1;
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int test_eq_int_8(int a, int b)
+{
+    unsigned char equal = constant_time_eq_int_8(a, b);
+    if (a == b && equal != CONSTTIME_TRUE_8) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_eq_int_8(%d, %d): "
+                "expected %u(TRUE), got %u\n", a, b, CONSTTIME_TRUE_8, equal);
+        return 1;
+    } else if (a != b && equal != CONSTTIME_FALSE_8) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_eq_int_8(%d, %d): "
+                "expected %u(FALSE), got %u\n",
+                a, b, CONSTTIME_FALSE_8, equal);
+        return 1;
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static unsigned int test_values[] =
+    { 0, 1, 1024, 12345, 32000, UINT_MAX / 2 - 1,
+    UINT_MAX / 2, UINT_MAX / 2 + 1, UINT_MAX - 1,
+    UINT_MAX
+};
+
+static unsigned char test_values_8[] =
+    { 0, 1, 2, 20, 32, 127, 128, 129, 255 };
+
+static int signed_test_values[] = { 0, 1, -1, 1024, -1024, 12345, -12345,
+    32000, -32000, INT_MAX, INT_MIN, INT_MAX - 1,
+    INT_MIN + 1
+};
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+    unsigned int a, b, i, j;
+    int c, d;
+    unsigned char e, f;
+    int num_failed = 0, num_all = 0;
+    fprintf(stdout, "Testing constant time operations...\n");
+
+    for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(test_values); ++i) {
+        a = test_values[i];
+        num_failed += test_is_zero(a);
+        num_failed += test_is_zero_8(a);
+        num_all += 2;
+        for (j = 0; j < OSSL_NELEM(test_values); ++j) {
+            b = test_values[j];
+            num_failed += test_binary_op(&constant_time_lt,
+                                         "constant_time_lt", a, b, a < b);
+            num_failed += test_binary_op_8(&constant_time_lt_8,
+                                           "constant_time_lt_8", a, b, a < b);
+            num_failed += test_binary_op(&constant_time_lt,
+                                         "constant_time_lt_8", b, a, b < a);
+            num_failed += test_binary_op_8(&constant_time_lt_8,
+                                           "constant_time_lt_8", b, a, b < a);
+            num_failed += test_binary_op(&constant_time_ge,
+                                         "constant_time_ge", a, b, a >= b);
+            num_failed += test_binary_op_8(&constant_time_ge_8,
+                                           "constant_time_ge_8", a, b,
+                                           a >= b);
+            num_failed +=
+                test_binary_op(&constant_time_ge, "constant_time_ge", b, a,
+                               b >= a);
+            num_failed +=
+                test_binary_op_8(&constant_time_ge_8, "constant_time_ge_8", b,
+                                 a, b >= a);
+            num_failed +=
+                test_binary_op(&constant_time_eq, "constant_time_eq", a, b,
+                               a == b);
+            num_failed +=
+                test_binary_op_8(&constant_time_eq_8, "constant_time_eq_8", a,
+                                 b, a == b);
+            num_failed +=
+                test_binary_op(&constant_time_eq, "constant_time_eq", b, a,
+                               b == a);
+            num_failed +=
+                test_binary_op_8(&constant_time_eq_8, "constant_time_eq_8", b,
+                                 a, b == a);
+            num_failed += test_select(a, b);
+            num_all += 13;
+        }
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(signed_test_values); ++i) {
+        c = signed_test_values[i];
+        for (j = 0; j < OSSL_NELEM(signed_test_values); ++j) {
+            d = signed_test_values[j];
+            num_failed += test_select_int(c, d);
+            num_failed += test_eq_int(c, d);
+            num_failed += test_eq_int_8(c, d);
+            num_all += 3;
+        }
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sizeof(test_values_8); ++i) {
+        e = test_values_8[i];
+        for (j = 0; j < sizeof(test_values_8); ++j) {
+            f = test_values_8[j];
+            num_failed += test_select_8(e, f);
+            num_all += 1;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (!num_failed) {
+        fprintf(stdout, "success (ran %d tests)\n", num_all);
+        return EXIT_SUCCESS;
+    } else {
+        fprintf(stdout, "%d of %d tests failed!\n", num_failed, num_all);
+        return EXIT_FAILURE;
+    }
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/crltest.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/crltest.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..74db944
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/crltest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,378 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "../e_os.h"
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+#include "testutil.h"
+
+#define PARAM_TIME 1474934400 /* Sep 27th, 2016 */
+
+static const char *kCRLTestRoot[] = {
+    "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n",
+    "MIIDbzCCAlegAwIBAgIJAODri7v0dDUFMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAME4xCzAJBgNV\n",
+    "BAYTAlVTMRMwEQYDVQQIDApDYWxpZm9ybmlhMRYwFAYDVQQHDA1Nb3VudGFpbiBW\n",
+    "aWV3MRIwEAYDVQQKDAlCb3JpbmdTU0wwHhcNMTYwOTI2MTUwNjI2WhcNMjYwOTI0\n",
+    "MTUwNjI2WjBOMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UECAwKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTEWMBQG\n",
+    "A1UEBwwNTW91bnRhaW4gVmlldzESMBAGA1UECgwJQm9yaW5nU1NMMIIBIjANBgkq\n",
+    "hkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAo16WiLWZuaymsD8n5SKPmxV1y6jjgr3B\n",
+    "S/dUBpbrzd1aeFzNlI8l2jfAnzUyp+I21RQ+nh/MhqjGElkTtK9xMn1Y+S9GMRh+\n",
+    "5R/Du0iCb1tCZIPY07Tgrb0KMNWe0v2QKVVruuYSgxIWodBfxlKO64Z8AJ5IbnWp\n",
+    "uRqO6rctN9qUoMlTIAB6dL4G0tDJ/PGFWOJYwOMEIX54bly2wgyYJVBKiRRt4f7n\n",
+    "8H922qmvPNA9idmX9G1VAtgV6x97XXi7ULORIQvn9lVQF6nTYDBJhyuPB+mLThbL\n",
+    "P2o9orxGx7aCtnnBZUIxUvHNOI0FaSaZH7Fi0xsZ/GkG2HZe7ImPJwIDAQABo1Aw\n",
+    "TjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUWPt3N5cZ/CRvubbrkqfBnAqhq94wHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUWPt3\n",
+    "N5cZ/CRvubbrkqfBnAqhq94wDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB/zANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOC\n",
+    "AQEAORu6M0MOwXy+3VEBwNilfTxyqDfruQsc1jA4PT8Oe8zora1WxE1JB4q2FJOz\n",
+    "EAuM3H/NXvEnBuN+ITvKZAJUfm4NKX97qmjMJwLKWe1gVv+VQTr63aR7mgWJReQN\n",
+    "XdMztlVeZs2dppV6uEg3ia1X0G7LARxGpA9ETbMyCpb39XxlYuTClcbA5ftDN99B\n",
+    "3Xg9KNdd++Ew22O3HWRDvdDpTO/JkzQfzi3sYwUtzMEonENhczJhGf7bQMmvL/w5\n",
+    "24Wxj4Z7KzzWIHsNqE/RIs6RV3fcW61j/mRgW2XyoWnMVeBzvcJr9NXp4VQYmFPw\n",
+    "amd8GKMZQvP0ufGnUn7D7uartA==\n",
+    "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n",
+    NULL
+};
+
+static const char *kCRLTestLeaf[] = {
+    "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n",
+    "MIIDkDCCAnigAwIBAgICEAAwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAwTjELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMx\n",
+    "EzARBgNVBAgMCkNhbGlmb3JuaWExFjAUBgNVBAcMDU1vdW50YWluIFZpZXcxEjAQ\n",
+    "BgNVBAoMCUJvcmluZ1NTTDAeFw0xNjA5MjYxNTA4MzFaFw0xNzA5MjYxNTA4MzFa\n",
+    "MEsxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMRMwEQYDVQQIDApDYWxpZm9ybmlhMRIwEAYDVQQKDAlC\n",
+    "b3JpbmdTU0wxEzARBgNVBAMMCmJvcmluZy5zc2wwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUA\n",
+    "A4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQDc5v1S1M0W+QWM+raWfO0LH8uvqEwuJQgODqMaGnSlWUx9\n",
+    "8iQcnWfjyPja3lWg9K62hSOFDuSyEkysKHDxijz5R93CfLcfnVXjWQDJe7EJTTDP\n",
+    "ozEvxN6RjAeYv7CF000euYr3QT5iyBjg76+bon1p0jHZBJeNPP1KqGYgyxp+hzpx\n",
+    "e0gZmTlGAXd8JQK4v8kpdYwD6PPifFL/jpmQpqOtQmH/6zcLjY4ojmqpEdBqIKIX\n",
+    "+saA29hMq0+NK3K+wgg31RU+cVWxu3tLOIiesETkeDgArjWRS1Vkzbi4v9SJxtNu\n",
+    "OZuAxWiynRJw3JwH/OFHYZIvQqz68ZBoj96cepjPAgMBAAGjezB5MAkGA1UdEwQC\n",
+    "MAAwLAYJYIZIAYb4QgENBB8WHU9wZW5TU0wgR2VuZXJhdGVkIENlcnRpZmljYXRl\n",
+    "MB0GA1UdDgQWBBTGn0OVVh/aoYt0bvEKG+PIERqnDzAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBRY+3c3\n",
+    "lxn8JG+5tuuSp8GcCqGr3jANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAd2nM8gCQN2Dc8QJw\n",
+    "XSZXyuI3DBGGCHcay/3iXu0JvTC3EiQo8J6Djv7WLI0N5KH8mkm40u89fJAB2lLZ\n",
+    "ShuHVtcC182bOKnePgwp9CNwQ21p0rDEu/P3X46ZvFgdxx82E9xLa0tBB8PiPDWh\n",
+    "lV16jbaKTgX5AZqjnsyjR5o9/mbZVupZJXx5Syq+XA8qiJfstSYJs4KyKK9UOjql\n",
+    "ICkJVKpi2ahDBqX4MOH4SLfzVk8pqSpviS6yaA1RXqjpkxiN45WWaXDldVHMSkhC\n",
+    "5CNXsXi4b1nAntu89crwSLA3rEwzCWeYj+BX7e1T9rr3oJdwOU/2KQtW1js1yQUG\n",
+    "tjJMFw==\n",
+    "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n",
+    NULL
+};
+
+static const char *kBasicCRL[] = {
+    "-----BEGIN X509 CRL-----\n",
+    "MIIBpzCBkAIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADBOMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UE\n",
+    "CAwKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTEWMBQGA1UEBwwNTW91bnRhaW4gVmlldzESMBAGA1UECgwJ\n",
+    "Qm9yaW5nU1NMFw0xNjA5MjYxNTEwNTVaFw0xNjEwMjYxNTEwNTVaoA4wDDAKBgNV\n",
+    "HRQEAwIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAnrBKKgvd9x9zwK9rtUvVeFeJ7+LN\n",
+    "ZEAc+a5oxpPNEsJx6hXoApYEbzXMxuWBQoCs5iEBycSGudct21L+MVf27M38KrWo\n",
+    "eOkq0a2siqViQZO2Fb/SUFR0k9zb8xl86Zf65lgPplALun0bV/HT7MJcl04Tc4os\n",
+    "dsAReBs5nqTGNEd5AlC1iKHvQZkM//MD51DspKnDpsDiUVi54h9C1SpfZmX8H2Vv\n",
+    "diyu0fZ/bPAM3VAGawatf/SyWfBMyKpoPXEG39oAzmjjOj8en82psn7m474IGaho\n",
+    "/vBbhl1ms5qQiLYPjm4YELtnXQoFyC72tBjbdFd/ZE9k4CNKDbxFUXFbkw==\n",
+    "-----END X509 CRL-----\n",
+    NULL
+};
+
+static const char *kRevokedCRL[] = {
+    "-----BEGIN X509 CRL-----\n",
+    "MIIBvjCBpwIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADBOMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UE\n",
+    "CAwKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTEWMBQGA1UEBwwNTW91bnRhaW4gVmlldzESMBAGA1UECgwJ\n",
+    "Qm9yaW5nU1NMFw0xNjA5MjYxNTEyNDRaFw0xNjEwMjYxNTEyNDRaMBUwEwICEAAX\n",
+    "DTE2MDkyNjE1MTIyNlqgDjAMMAoGA1UdFAQDAgECMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4IB\n",
+    "AQCUGaM4DcWzlQKrcZvI8TMeR8BpsvQeo5BoI/XZu2a8h//PyRyMwYeaOM+3zl0d\n",
+    "sjgCT8b3C1FPgT+P2Lkowv7rJ+FHJRNQkogr+RuqCSPTq65ha4WKlRGWkMFybzVH\n",
+    "NloxC+aU3lgp/NlX9yUtfqYmJek1CDrOOGPrAEAwj1l/BUeYKNGqfBWYJQtPJu+5\n",
+    "OaSvIYGpETCZJscUWODmLEb/O3DM438vLvxonwGqXqS0KX37+CHpUlyhnSovxXxp\n",
+    "Pz4aF+L7OtczxL0GYtD2fR9B7TDMqsNmHXgQrixvvOY7MUdLGbd4RfJL3yA53hyO\n",
+    "xzfKY2TzxLiOmctG0hXFkH5J\n",
+    "-----END X509 CRL-----\n",
+    NULL
+};
+
+static const char *kBadIssuerCRL[] = {
+    "-----BEGIN X509 CRL-----\n",
+    "MIIBwjCBqwIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADBSMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UE\n",
+    "CAwKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTEWMBQGA1UEBwwNTW91bnRhaW4gVmlldzEWMBQGA1UECgwN\n",
+    "Tm90IEJvcmluZ1NTTBcNMTYwOTI2MTUxMjQ0WhcNMTYxMDI2MTUxMjQ0WjAVMBMC\n",
+    "AhAAFw0xNjA5MjYxNTEyMjZaoA4wDDAKBgNVHRQEAwIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsF\n",
+    "AAOCAQEAlBmjOA3Fs5UCq3GbyPEzHkfAabL0HqOQaCP12btmvIf/z8kcjMGHmjjP\n",
+    "t85dHbI4Ak/G9wtRT4E/j9i5KML+6yfhRyUTUJKIK/kbqgkj06uuYWuFipURlpDB\n",
+    "cm81RzZaMQvmlN5YKfzZV/clLX6mJiXpNQg6zjhj6wBAMI9ZfwVHmCjRqnwVmCUL\n",
+    "TybvuTmkryGBqREwmSbHFFjg5ixG/ztwzON/Ly78aJ8Bql6ktCl9+/gh6VJcoZ0q\n",
+    "L8V8aT8+Ghfi+zrXM8S9BmLQ9n0fQe0wzKrDZh14EK4sb7zmOzFHSxm3eEXyS98g\n",
+    "Od4cjsc3ymNk88S4jpnLRtIVxZB+SQ==\n",
+    "-----END X509 CRL-----\n",
+    NULL
+};
+
+/*
+ * This is kBasicCRL but with a critical issuing distribution point
+ * extension.
+ */
+static const char *kKnownCriticalCRL[] = {
+    "-----BEGIN X509 CRL-----\n",
+    "MIIBujCBowIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADBOMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UE\n",
+    "CAwKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTEWMBQGA1UEBwwNTW91bnRhaW4gVmlldzESMBAGA1UECgwJ\n",
+    "Qm9yaW5nU1NMFw0xNjA5MjYxNTEwNTVaFw0xNjEwMjYxNTEwNTVaoCEwHzAKBgNV\n",
+    "HRQEAwIBATARBgNVHRwBAf8EBzAFoQMBAf8wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBAA+3\n",
+    "i+5e5Ub8sccfgOBs6WVJFI9c8gvJjrJ8/dYfFIAuCyeocs7DFXn1n13CRZ+URR/Q\n",
+    "mVWgU28+xeusuSPYFpd9cyYTcVyNUGNTI3lwgcE/yVjPaOmzSZKdPakApRxtpKKQ\n",
+    "NN/56aQz3bnT/ZSHQNciRB8U6jiD9V30t0w+FDTpGaG+7bzzUH3UVF9xf9Ctp60A\n",
+    "3mfLe0scas7owSt4AEFuj2SPvcE7yvdOXbu+IEv21cEJUVExJAbhvIweHXh6yRW+\n",
+    "7VVeiNzdIjkZjyTmAzoXGha4+wbxXyBRbfH+XWcO/H+8nwyG8Gktdu2QB9S9nnIp\n",
+    "o/1TpfOMSGhMyMoyPrk=\n",
+    "-----END X509 CRL-----\n",
+    NULL
+};
+
+/*
+ * kUnknownCriticalCRL is kBasicCRL but with an unknown critical extension.
+ */
+static const char *kUnknownCriticalCRL[] = {
+    "-----BEGIN X509 CRL-----\n",
+    "MIIBvDCBpQIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADBOMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UE\n",
+    "CAwKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTEWMBQGA1UEBwwNTW91bnRhaW4gVmlldzESMBAGA1UECgwJ\n",
+    "Qm9yaW5nU1NMFw0xNjA5MjYxNTEwNTVaFw0xNjEwMjYxNTEwNTVaoCMwITAKBgNV\n",
+    "HRQEAwIBATATBgwqhkiG9xIEAYS3CQABAf8EADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEA\n",
+    "GvBP0xqL509InMj/3493YVRV+ldTpBv5uTD6jewzf5XdaxEQ/VjTNe5zKnxbpAib\n",
+    "Kf7cwX0PMSkZjx7k7kKdDlEucwVvDoqC+O9aJcqVmM6GDyNb9xENxd0XCXja6MZC\n",
+    "yVgP4AwLauB2vSiEprYJyI1APph3iAEeDm60lTXX/wBM/tupQDDujKh2GPyvBRfJ\n",
+    "+wEDwGg3ICwvu4gO4zeC5qnFR+bpL9t5tOMAQnVZ0NWv+k7mkd2LbHdD44dxrfXC\n",
+    "nhtfERx99SDmC/jtUAJrGhtCO8acr7exCeYcduN7KKCm91OeCJKK6OzWst0Og1DB\n",
+    "kwzzU2rL3G65CrZ7H0SZsQ==\n",
+    "-----END X509 CRL-----\n",
+    NULL
+};
+
+/*
+ * kUnknownCriticalCRL2 is kBasicCRL but with a critical issuing distribution
+ * point extension followed by an unknown critical extension
+ */
+static const char *kUnknownCriticalCRL2[] = {
+    "-----BEGIN X509 CRL-----\n",
+    "MIIBzzCBuAIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADBOMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UE\n",
+    "CAwKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTEWMBQGA1UEBwwNTW91bnRhaW4gVmlldzESMBAGA1UECgwJ\n",
+    "Qm9yaW5nU1NMFw0xNjA5MjYxNTEwNTVaFw0xNjEwMjYxNTEwNTVaoDYwNDAKBgNV\n",
+    "HRQEAwIBATARBgNVHRwBAf8EBzAFoQMBAf8wEwYMKoZIhvcSBAGEtwkAAQH/BAAw\n",
+    "DQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBACTcpQC8jXL12JN5YzOcQ64ubQIe0XxRAd30p7qB\n",
+    "BTXGpgqBjrjxRfLms7EBYodEXB2oXMsDq3km0vT1MfYdsDD05S+SQ9CDsq/pUfaC\n",
+    "E2WNI5p8WircRnroYvbN2vkjlRbMd1+yNITohXYXCJwjEOAWOx3XIM10bwPYBv4R\n",
+    "rDobuLHoMgL3yHgMHmAkP7YpkBucNqeBV8cCdeAZLuhXFWi6yfr3r/X18yWbC/r2\n",
+    "2xXdkrSqXLFo7ToyP8YKTgiXpya4x6m53biEYwa2ULlas0igL6DK7wjYZX95Uy7H\n",
+    "GKljn9weIYiMPV/BzGymwfv2EW0preLwtyJNJPaxbdin6Jc=\n",
+    "-----END X509 CRL-----\n",
+    NULL
+};
+
+
+/*
+ * Glue an array of strings together.  Return a BIO and put the string
+ * into |*out| so we can free it.
+ */
+static BIO *glue(const char **pem, char **out)
+{
+    char *dest;
+    int i;
+    size_t s = 0;
+
+    /* Glue the strings together. */
+    for (i = 0; pem[i] != NULL; ++i)
+        s += strlen(pem[i]);
+    dest = *out = OPENSSL_malloc(s + 1);
+    if (dest == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    for (i = 0; pem[i] != NULL; ++i)
+        dest += strlen(strcpy(dest, pem[i]));
+    return BIO_new_mem_buf(*out, s);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Create a CRL from an array of strings.
+ */
+static X509_CRL *CRL_from_strings(const char **pem)
+{
+    char *p;
+    BIO *b = glue(pem, &p);
+    X509_CRL *crl = PEM_read_bio_X509_CRL(b, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+
+    OPENSSL_free(p);
+    BIO_free(b);
+    return crl;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Create an X509 from an array of strings.
+ */
+static X509 *X509_from_strings(const char **pem)
+{
+    char *p;
+    BIO *b = glue(pem, &p);
+    X509 *x = PEM_read_bio_X509(b, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+
+    OPENSSL_free(p);
+    BIO_free(b);
+    return x;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify |leaf| certificate (chained up to |root|).  |crls| if
+ * not NULL, is a list of CRLs to include in the verification. It is
+ * also free'd before returning, which is kinda yucky but convenient.
+ * Returns a value from X509_V_ERR_xxx or X509_V_OK.
+ */
+static int verify(X509 *leaf, X509 *root, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls,
+                  unsigned long flags)
+{
+    X509_STORE_CTX *ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
+    X509_STORE *store = X509_STORE_new();
+    X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
+    STACK_OF(X509) *roots = sk_X509_new_null();
+    int status = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+    if (ctx == NULL || store == NULL || param == NULL || roots == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* Create a stack; upref the cert because we free it below. */
+    X509_up_ref(root);
+    if (!sk_X509_push(roots, root))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, store, leaf, NULL))
+        goto err;
+    X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(ctx, roots);
+    X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(ctx, crls);
+    X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(param, PARAM_TIME);
+    if (X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_time(param) != PARAM_TIME) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "set_time/get_time mismatch.\n");
+        goto err;
+    }
+    X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(param, 16);
+    if (flags)
+        X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(param, flags);
+    X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(ctx, param);
+
+    ERR_clear_error();
+    status = X509_verify_cert(ctx) == 1 ? X509_V_OK
+                                        : X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
+err:
+    sk_X509_pop_free(roots, X509_free);
+    sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(crls, X509_CRL_free);
+    X509_STORE_CTX_free(ctx);
+    X509_STORE_free(store);
+    return status;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Create a stack of CRL's.  Upref each one because we call pop_free on
+ * the stack and need to keep the CRL's around until the test exits.
+ * Yes this crashes on malloc failure; it forces us to debug.
+ */
+static STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *make_CRL_stack(X509_CRL *x1, X509_CRL *x2)
+{
+    STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk = sk_X509_CRL_new_null();
+
+    sk_X509_CRL_push(sk, x1);
+    X509_CRL_up_ref(x1);
+    if (x2 != NULL) {
+        sk_X509_CRL_push(sk, x2);
+        X509_CRL_up_ref(x2);
+    }
+    return sk;
+}
+
+static int test_crl()
+{
+    X509 *root = X509_from_strings(kCRLTestRoot);
+    X509 *leaf = X509_from_strings(kCRLTestLeaf);
+    X509_CRL *basic_crl = CRL_from_strings(kBasicCRL);
+    X509_CRL *revoked_crl = CRL_from_strings(kRevokedCRL);
+    X509_CRL *bad_issuer_crl = CRL_from_strings(kBadIssuerCRL);
+    X509_CRL *known_critical_crl = CRL_from_strings(kKnownCriticalCRL);
+    X509_CRL *unknown_critical_crl = CRL_from_strings(kUnknownCriticalCRL);
+    X509_CRL *unknown_critical_crl2 = CRL_from_strings(kUnknownCriticalCRL2);
+    int status = 0;
+
+    if (root == NULL || leaf == NULL || basic_crl == NULL
+            || revoked_crl == NULL || bad_issuer_crl == NULL
+            || known_critical_crl == NULL || unknown_critical_crl == NULL
+            || unknown_critical_crl2 == NULL) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Failed to parse certificates and CRLs.\n");
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (verify(leaf, root, make_CRL_stack(basic_crl, NULL),
+               X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK) != X509_V_OK) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Cert with CRL didn't verify.\n");
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (verify(leaf, root, make_CRL_stack(basic_crl, revoked_crl),
+               X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK) != X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Revoked CRL wasn't checked.\n");
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (verify(leaf, root, NULL,
+               X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK) != X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "CRLs were not required.\n");
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (verify(leaf, root, make_CRL_stack(bad_issuer_crl, NULL),
+               X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK) != X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Bad CRL issuer was unnoticed.\n");
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (verify(leaf, root, make_CRL_stack(known_critical_crl, NULL),
+               X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK) != X509_V_OK) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "CRL with known critical extension was rejected.\n");
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (verify(leaf, root, make_CRL_stack(unknown_critical_crl, NULL),
+               X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK) !=
+            X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "CRL with unknown critical extension was accepted.\n");
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (verify(leaf, root, make_CRL_stack(unknown_critical_crl2, NULL),
+               X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK) !=
+            X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "CRL with unknown critical extension (2) was accepted.\n");
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    status = 1;
+
+err:
+    X509_free(root);
+    X509_free(leaf);
+    X509_CRL_free(basic_crl);
+    X509_CRL_free(revoked_crl);
+    X509_CRL_free(bad_issuer_crl);
+    X509_CRL_free(known_critical_crl);
+    X509_CRL_free(unknown_critical_crl);
+    X509_CRL_free(unknown_critical_crl2);
+    return status;
+}
+
+int main()
+{
+    ADD_TEST(test_crl);
+    return run_tests("crltest");
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ct/log_list.conf b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ct/log_list.conf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4b68e53
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ct/log_list.conf
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+enabled_logs=test,pilot,aviator,rocketeer,digicert,certly,izempe,symantec,venafi
+
+[test]
+description = https://github.com/google/certificate-transparency/tree/99218b6445906a81f219d84e9c6d2683e13e4e58/test/testdata
+key = MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEmXg8sUUzwBYaWrRb+V0IopzQ6o3UyEJ04r5ZrRXGdpYM8K+hB0pXrGRLI0eeWz+3skXrS0IO83AhA3GpRL6s6w==
+
+[pilot]
+description = Google Pilot Log
+key = MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEfahLEimAoz2t01p3uMziiLOl/fHTDM0YDOhBRuiBARsV4UvxG2LdNgoIGLrtCzWE0J5APC2em4JlvR8EEEFMoA==
+
+[aviator]
+description = Google Aviator log
+key = MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE1/TMabLkDpCjiupacAlP7xNi0I1JYP8bQFAHDG1xhtolSY1l4QgNRzRrvSe8liE+NPWHdjGxfx3JhTsN9x8/6Q==
+
+[rocketeer]
+description = Google Rocketeer log
+key = MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEIFsYyDzBi7MxCAC/oJBXK7dHjG+1aLCOkHjpoHPqTyghLpzA9BYbqvnV16mAw04vUjyYASVGJCUoI3ctBcJAeg==
+
+[digicert]
+description = DigiCert Log Server
+key = MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEAkbFvhu7gkAW6MHSrBlpE1n4+HCFRkC5OLAjgqhkTH+/uzSfSl8ois8ZxAD2NgaTZe1M9akhYlrYkes4JECs6A==
+
+[certly]
+description = Certly.IO log
+key = MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAECyPLhWKYYUgEc+tUXfPQB4wtGS2MNvXrjwFCCnyYJifBtd2Sk7Cu+Js9DNhMTh35FftHaHu6ZrclnNBKwmbbSA==
+
+[izempe]
+description = Izempe log
+key = MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEJ2Q5DC3cUBj4IQCiDu0s6j51up+TZAkAEcQRF6tczw90rLWXkJMAW7jr9yc92bIKgV8vDXU4lDeZHvYHduDuvg==
+
+[symantec]
+description = Symantec log
+key = MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEluqsHEYMG1XcDfy1lCdGV0JwOmkY4r87xNuroPS2bMBTP01CEDPwWJePa75y9CrsHEKqAy8afig1dpkIPSEUhg==
+
+[venafi]
+description = Venafi log
+key = MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAolpIHxdSlTXLo1s6H1OCdpSj/4DyHDc8wLG9wVmLqy1lk9fz4ATVmm+/1iN2Nk8jmctUKK2MFUtlWXZBSpym97M7frGlSaQXUWyA3CqQUEuIJOmlEjKTBEiQAvpfDjCHjlV2Be4qTM6jamkJbiWtgnYPhJL6ONaGTiSPm7Byy57iaz/hbckldSOIoRhYBiMzeNoA0DiRZ9KmfSeXZ1rB8y8X5urSW+iBzf2SaOfzBvDpcoTuAaWx2DPazoOl28fP1hZ+kHUYvxbcMjttjauCFx+JII0dmuZNIwjfeG/GBb9frpSX219k1O4Wi6OEbHEr8at/XQ0y7gTikOxBn/s5wQIDAQAB
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ct/tls1.sct b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ct/tls1.sct
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..59362dc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ct/tls1.sct
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+Signed Certificate Timestamp:
+    Version   : v1 (0x0)
+    Log ID    : DF:1C:2E:C1:15:00:94:52:47:A9:61:68:32:5D:DC:5C:
+                79:59:E8:F7:C6:D3:88:FC:00:2E:0B:BD:3F:74:D7:64
+    Timestamp : Apr  5 17:04:16.275 2013 GMT
+    Extensions: none
+    Signature : ecdsa-with-SHA256
+                30:45:02:20:48:2F:67:51:AF:35:DB:A6:54:36:BE:1F:
+                D6:64:0F:3D:BF:9A:41:42:94:95:92:45:30:28:8F:A3:
+                E5:E2:3E:06:02:21:00:E4:ED:C0:DB:3A:C5:72:B1:E2:
+                F5:E8:AB:6A:68:06:53:98:7D:CF:41:02:7D:FE:FF:A1:
+                05:51:9D:89:ED:BF:08
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ct_test.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ct_test.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ea90923
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ct_test.c
@@ -0,0 +1,607 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <math.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/ct.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include "testutil.h"
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
+
+/* Used when declaring buffers to read text files into */
+#define CT_TEST_MAX_FILE_SIZE 8096
+
+static char *certs_dir = NULL;
+static char *ct_dir = NULL;
+
+typedef struct ct_test_fixture {
+    const char *test_case_name;
+    /* The current time in milliseconds */
+    uint64_t epoch_time_in_ms;
+    /* The CT log store to use during tests */
+    CTLOG_STORE* ctlog_store;
+    /* Set the following to test handling of SCTs in X509 certificates */
+    const char *certs_dir;
+    char *certificate_file;
+    char *issuer_file;
+    /* Expected number of SCTs */
+    int expected_sct_count;
+    /* Expected number of valid SCTS */
+    int expected_valid_sct_count;
+    /* Set the following to test handling of SCTs in TLS format */
+    const unsigned char *tls_sct_list;
+    size_t tls_sct_list_len;
+    STACK_OF(SCT) *sct_list;
+    /*
+     * A file to load the expected SCT text from.
+     * This text will be compared to the actual text output during the test.
+     * A maximum of |CT_TEST_MAX_FILE_SIZE| bytes will be read of this file.
+     */
+    const char *sct_dir;
+    const char *sct_text_file;
+    /* Whether to test the validity of the SCT(s) */
+    int test_validity;
+} CT_TEST_FIXTURE;
+
+static CT_TEST_FIXTURE set_up(const char *const test_case_name)
+{
+    CT_TEST_FIXTURE fixture;
+    int setup_ok = 1;
+
+    memset(&fixture, 0, sizeof(fixture));
+
+    fixture.test_case_name = test_case_name;
+    fixture.epoch_time_in_ms = 1473269626000; /* Sep 7 17:33:46 2016 GMT */
+    fixture.ctlog_store = CTLOG_STORE_new();
+
+    if (fixture.ctlog_store == NULL) {
+        setup_ok = 0;
+        fprintf(stderr, "Failed to create a new CT log store\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (CTLOG_STORE_load_default_file(fixture.ctlog_store) != 1) {
+        setup_ok = 0;
+        fprintf(stderr, "Failed to load CT log list\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+end:
+    if (!setup_ok) {
+        CTLOG_STORE_free(fixture.ctlog_store);
+        exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+    }
+    return fixture;
+}
+
+static void tear_down(CT_TEST_FIXTURE fixture)
+{
+    CTLOG_STORE_free(fixture.ctlog_store);
+    SCT_LIST_free(fixture.sct_list);
+    ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+}
+
+static char *mk_file_path(const char *dir, const char *file)
+{
+    char *full_file = NULL;
+    size_t full_file_l = 0;
+    const char *sep = "";
+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+    sep = "/";
+#endif
+
+    full_file_l = strlen(dir) + strlen(sep) + strlen(file) + 1;
+    full_file = OPENSSL_zalloc(full_file_l);
+    if (full_file != NULL) {
+        OPENSSL_strlcpy(full_file, dir, full_file_l);
+        OPENSSL_strlcat(full_file, sep, full_file_l);
+        OPENSSL_strlcat(full_file, file, full_file_l);
+    }
+
+    return full_file;
+}
+
+static X509 *load_pem_cert(const char *dir, const char *file)
+{
+    X509 *cert = NULL;
+    char *file_path = mk_file_path(dir, file);
+
+    if (file_path != NULL) {
+        BIO *cert_io = BIO_new_file(file_path, "r");
+        OPENSSL_free(file_path);
+
+        if (cert_io != NULL)
+            cert = PEM_read_bio_X509(cert_io, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+
+        BIO_free(cert_io);
+    }
+    return cert;
+}
+
+static int read_text_file(const char *dir, const char *file,
+                          char *buffer, int buffer_length)
+{
+    int result = -1;
+    char *file_path = mk_file_path(dir, file);
+
+    if (file_path != NULL) {
+        BIO *file_io = BIO_new_file(file_path, "r");
+        OPENSSL_free(file_path);
+
+        if (file_io != NULL) {
+            result = BIO_read(file_io, buffer, buffer_length);
+            BIO_free(file_io);
+        }
+    }
+
+    return result;
+}
+
+static int compare_sct_list_printout(STACK_OF(SCT) *sct,
+    const char *expected_output)
+{
+    BIO *text_buffer = NULL;
+    char *actual_output = NULL;
+    int result = 1;
+
+    text_buffer = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+    if (text_buffer == NULL) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Unable to allocate buffer\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    SCT_LIST_print(sct, text_buffer, 0, "\n", NULL);
+
+    /* Append null terminator because we're about to use the buffer contents
+    * as a string. */
+    if (BIO_write(text_buffer, "\0", 1) != 1) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Failed to append null terminator to SCT text\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    BIO_get_mem_data(text_buffer, &actual_output);
+    result = strcmp(actual_output, expected_output);
+
+    if (result != 0) {
+        fprintf(stderr,
+            "Expected SCT printout:\n%s\nActual SCT printout:\n%s\n",
+            expected_output, actual_output);
+    }
+
+end:
+    BIO_free(text_buffer);
+    return result;
+}
+
+static int compare_extension_printout(X509_EXTENSION *extension,
+                                      const char *expected_output)
+{
+    BIO *text_buffer = NULL;
+    char *actual_output = NULL;
+    int result = 1;
+
+    text_buffer = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+    if (text_buffer == NULL) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Unable to allocate buffer\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (!X509V3_EXT_print(text_buffer, extension, X509V3_EXT_DEFAULT, 0)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Failed to print extension\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    /* Append null terminator because we're about to use the buffer contents
+     * as a string. */
+    if (BIO_write(text_buffer, "\0", 1) != 1) {
+        fprintf(stderr,
+                "Failed to append null terminator to extension text\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    BIO_get_mem_data(text_buffer, &actual_output);
+    result = strcmp(actual_output, expected_output);
+
+    if (result != 0) {
+        fprintf(stderr,
+                "Expected SCT printout:\n%s\nActual SCT printout:\n%s\n",
+                expected_output, actual_output);
+    }
+
+end:
+    BIO_free(text_buffer);
+    return result;
+}
+
+static int assert_validity(CT_TEST_FIXTURE fixture,
+                           STACK_OF(SCT) *scts,
+                           CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *policy_ctx) {
+    int invalid_sct_count = 0;
+    int valid_sct_count = 0;
+    int i;
+
+    if (SCT_LIST_validate(scts, policy_ctx) < 0) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Error verifying SCTs\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_SCT_num(scts); ++i) {
+        SCT *sct_i = sk_SCT_value(scts, i);
+        switch (SCT_get_validation_status(sct_i)) {
+        case SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_VALID:
+            ++valid_sct_count;
+            break;
+        case SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_INVALID:
+            ++invalid_sct_count;
+            break;
+        default:
+            /* Ignore other validation statuses. */
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (valid_sct_count != fixture.expected_valid_sct_count) {
+        int unverified_sct_count = sk_SCT_num(scts) -
+                invalid_sct_count - valid_sct_count;
+
+        fprintf(stderr,
+                "%d SCTs failed verification\n"
+                "%d SCTs passed verification (%d expected)\n"
+                "%d SCTs were unverified\n",
+                invalid_sct_count,
+                valid_sct_count,
+                fixture.expected_valid_sct_count,
+                unverified_sct_count);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int execute_cert_test(CT_TEST_FIXTURE fixture)
+{
+    int success = 0;
+    X509 *cert = NULL, *issuer = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(SCT) *scts = NULL;
+    SCT *sct = NULL;
+    char expected_sct_text[CT_TEST_MAX_FILE_SIZE];
+    int sct_text_len = 0;
+    unsigned char *tls_sct_list = NULL;
+    size_t tls_sct_list_len = 0;
+    CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ct_policy_ctx = CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_new();
+
+    if (fixture.sct_text_file != NULL) {
+        sct_text_len = read_text_file(fixture.sct_dir, fixture.sct_text_file,
+                                      expected_sct_text,
+                                      CT_TEST_MAX_FILE_SIZE - 1);
+
+        if (sct_text_len < 0) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "Test data file not found: %s\n",
+                fixture.sct_text_file);
+            goto end;
+        }
+
+        expected_sct_text[sct_text_len] = '\0';
+    }
+
+    CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set_shared_CTLOG_STORE(
+            ct_policy_ctx, fixture.ctlog_store);
+
+    CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set_time(ct_policy_ctx, fixture.epoch_time_in_ms);
+
+    if (fixture.certificate_file != NULL) {
+        int sct_extension_index;
+        X509_EXTENSION *sct_extension = NULL;
+        cert = load_pem_cert(fixture.certs_dir, fixture.certificate_file);
+
+        if (cert == NULL) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "Unable to load certificate: %s\n",
+                fixture.certificate_file);
+            goto end;
+        }
+
+        CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set1_cert(ct_policy_ctx, cert);
+
+        if (fixture.issuer_file != NULL) {
+            issuer = load_pem_cert(fixture.certs_dir, fixture.issuer_file);
+
+            if (issuer == NULL) {
+                fprintf(stderr, "Unable to load issuer certificate: %s\n",
+                        fixture.issuer_file);
+                goto end;
+            }
+
+            CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set1_issuer(ct_policy_ctx, issuer);
+        }
+
+        sct_extension_index =
+                X509_get_ext_by_NID(cert, NID_ct_precert_scts, -1);
+        sct_extension = X509_get_ext(cert, sct_extension_index);
+        if (fixture.expected_sct_count > 0) {
+            if (sct_extension == NULL) {
+                fprintf(stderr, "SCT extension not found in: %s\n",
+                    fixture.certificate_file);
+                goto end;
+            }
+
+            if (fixture.sct_text_file
+                && compare_extension_printout(sct_extension,
+                                              expected_sct_text)) {
+                    goto end;
+            }
+
+            if (fixture.test_validity) {
+                int i;
+
+                scts = X509V3_EXT_d2i(sct_extension);
+                for (i = 0; i < sk_SCT_num(scts); ++i) {
+                    SCT *sct_i = sk_SCT_value(scts, i);
+
+                    if (!SCT_set_source(sct_i, SCT_SOURCE_X509V3_EXTENSION)) {
+                        fprintf(stderr,
+                                "Error setting SCT source to X509v3 extension\n");
+                        goto end;
+                    }
+                }
+
+                if (!assert_validity(fixture, scts, ct_policy_ctx))
+                    goto end;
+            }
+        } else if (sct_extension != NULL) {
+            fprintf(stderr,
+                    "Expected no SCTs, but found SCT extension in: %s\n",
+                    fixture.certificate_file);
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (fixture.tls_sct_list != NULL) {
+        const unsigned char *p = fixture.tls_sct_list;
+        if (o2i_SCT_LIST(&scts, &p, fixture.tls_sct_list_len) == NULL) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "Failed to decode SCTs from TLS format\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+
+        if (fixture.test_validity && cert != NULL) {
+            if (!assert_validity(fixture, scts, ct_policy_ctx))
+                goto end;
+        }
+
+        if (fixture.sct_text_file
+            && compare_sct_list_printout(scts, expected_sct_text)) {
+                goto end;
+        }
+
+        tls_sct_list_len = i2o_SCT_LIST(scts, &tls_sct_list);
+        if (tls_sct_list_len != fixture.tls_sct_list_len ||
+            memcmp(fixture.tls_sct_list, tls_sct_list, tls_sct_list_len) != 0) {
+            fprintf(stderr,
+                    "Failed to encode SCTs into TLS format correctly\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+    success = 1;
+
+end:
+    X509_free(cert);
+    X509_free(issuer);
+    SCT_LIST_free(scts);
+    SCT_free(sct);
+    CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_free(ct_policy_ctx);
+    OPENSSL_free(tls_sct_list);
+    return success;
+}
+
+#define SETUP_CT_TEST_FIXTURE() SETUP_TEST_FIXTURE(CT_TEST_FIXTURE, set_up)
+#define EXECUTE_CT_TEST() EXECUTE_TEST(execute_cert_test, tear_down)
+
+static int test_no_scts_in_certificate()
+{
+    SETUP_CT_TEST_FIXTURE();
+    fixture.certs_dir = certs_dir;
+    fixture.certificate_file = "leaf.pem";
+    fixture.issuer_file = "subinterCA.pem";
+    fixture.expected_sct_count = 0;
+    EXECUTE_CT_TEST();
+}
+
+static int test_one_sct_in_certificate()
+{
+    SETUP_CT_TEST_FIXTURE();
+    fixture.certs_dir = certs_dir;
+    fixture.certificate_file = "embeddedSCTs1.pem";
+    fixture.issuer_file = "embeddedSCTs1_issuer.pem";
+    fixture.expected_sct_count = 1;
+    fixture.sct_dir = certs_dir;
+    fixture.sct_text_file = "embeddedSCTs1.sct";
+    EXECUTE_CT_TEST();
+}
+
+static int test_multiple_scts_in_certificate()
+{
+    SETUP_CT_TEST_FIXTURE();
+    fixture.certs_dir = certs_dir;
+    fixture.certificate_file = "embeddedSCTs3.pem";
+    fixture.issuer_file = "embeddedSCTs3_issuer.pem";
+    fixture.expected_sct_count = 3;
+    fixture.sct_dir = certs_dir;
+    fixture.sct_text_file = "embeddedSCTs3.sct";
+    EXECUTE_CT_TEST();
+}
+
+static int test_verify_one_sct()
+{
+    SETUP_CT_TEST_FIXTURE();
+    fixture.certs_dir = certs_dir;
+    fixture.certificate_file = "embeddedSCTs1.pem";
+    fixture.issuer_file = "embeddedSCTs1_issuer.pem";
+    fixture.expected_sct_count = fixture.expected_valid_sct_count = 1;
+    fixture.test_validity = 1;
+    EXECUTE_CT_TEST();
+}
+
+static int test_verify_multiple_scts()
+{
+    SETUP_CT_TEST_FIXTURE();
+    fixture.certs_dir = certs_dir;
+    fixture.certificate_file = "embeddedSCTs3.pem";
+    fixture.issuer_file = "embeddedSCTs3_issuer.pem";
+    fixture.expected_sct_count = fixture.expected_valid_sct_count = 3;
+    fixture.test_validity = 1;
+    EXECUTE_CT_TEST();
+}
+
+static int test_verify_fails_for_future_sct()
+{
+    SETUP_CT_TEST_FIXTURE();
+    fixture.epoch_time_in_ms = 1365094800000; /* Apr 4 17:00:00 2013 GMT */
+    fixture.certs_dir = certs_dir;
+    fixture.certificate_file = "embeddedSCTs1.pem";
+    fixture.issuer_file = "embeddedSCTs1_issuer.pem";
+    fixture.expected_sct_count = 1;
+    fixture.expected_valid_sct_count = 0;
+    fixture.test_validity = 1;
+    EXECUTE_CT_TEST();
+}
+
+static int test_decode_tls_sct()
+{
+    const unsigned char tls_sct_list[] = "\x00\x78" /* length of list */
+        "\x00\x76"
+        "\x00" /* version */
+        /* log ID */
+        "\xDF\x1C\x2E\xC1\x15\x00\x94\x52\x47\xA9\x61\x68\x32\x5D\xDC\x5C\x79"
+        "\x59\xE8\xF7\xC6\xD3\x88\xFC\x00\x2E\x0B\xBD\x3F\x74\xD7\x64"
+        "\x00\x00\x01\x3D\xDB\x27\xDF\x93" /* timestamp */
+        "\x00\x00" /* extensions length */
+        "" /* extensions */
+        "\x04\x03" /* hash and signature algorithms */
+        "\x00\x47" /* signature length */
+        /* signature */
+        "\x30\x45\x02\x20\x48\x2F\x67\x51\xAF\x35\xDB\xA6\x54\x36\xBE\x1F\xD6"
+        "\x64\x0F\x3D\xBF\x9A\x41\x42\x94\x95\x92\x45\x30\x28\x8F\xA3\xE5\xE2"
+        "\x3E\x06\x02\x21\x00\xE4\xED\xC0\xDB\x3A\xC5\x72\xB1\xE2\xF5\xE8\xAB"
+        "\x6A\x68\x06\x53\x98\x7D\xCF\x41\x02\x7D\xFE\xFF\xA1\x05\x51\x9D\x89"
+        "\xED\xBF\x08";
+
+    SETUP_CT_TEST_FIXTURE();
+    fixture.tls_sct_list = tls_sct_list;
+    fixture.tls_sct_list_len = 0x7a;
+    fixture.sct_dir = ct_dir;
+    fixture.sct_text_file = "tls1.sct";
+    EXECUTE_CT_TEST();
+}
+
+static int test_encode_tls_sct()
+{
+    const char log_id[] = "3xwuwRUAlFJHqWFoMl3cXHlZ6PfG04j8AC4LvT9012Q=";
+    const uint64_t timestamp = 1;
+    const char extensions[] = "";
+    const char signature[] = "BAMARzBAMiBIL2dRrzXbplQ2vh/WZA89v5pBQpSVkkUwKI+j5"
+            "eI+BgIhAOTtwNs6xXKx4vXoq2poBlOYfc9BAn3+/6EFUZ2J7b8I";
+    SCT *sct = NULL;
+
+    SETUP_CT_TEST_FIXTURE();
+
+    fixture.sct_list = sk_SCT_new_null();
+    sct = SCT_new_from_base64(SCT_VERSION_V1, log_id,
+                              CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_X509, timestamp,
+                              extensions, signature);
+
+    if (sct == NULL) {
+        tear_down(fixture);
+        fprintf(stderr, "Failed to create SCT from base64-encoded test data\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    sk_SCT_push(fixture.sct_list, sct);
+    fixture.sct_dir = ct_dir;
+    fixture.sct_text_file = "tls1.sct";
+    EXECUTE_CT_TEST();
+}
+
+/*
+ * Tests that the CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX default time is approximately now.
+ * Allow +-10 minutes, as it may compensate for clock skew.
+ */
+static int test_default_ct_policy_eval_ctx_time_is_now()
+{
+    int success = 0;
+    CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ct_policy_ctx = CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_new();
+    const time_t default_time = CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_get_time(ct_policy_ctx) /
+            1000;
+    const time_t time_tolerance = 600;  /* 10 minutes */
+
+    if (fabs(difftime(time(NULL), default_time)) > time_tolerance) {
+        fprintf(stderr,
+                "Default CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX time is not approximately now.\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    success = 1;
+end:
+    CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_free(ct_policy_ctx);
+    return success;
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+    int result = 0;
+    char *tmp_env = NULL;
+
+    tmp_env = getenv("OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY");
+    if (tmp_env != NULL && strcmp(tmp_env, "on") == 0)
+        CRYPTO_set_mem_debug(1);
+    CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON);
+
+    tmp_env = getenv("CT_DIR");
+    ct_dir = OPENSSL_strdup(tmp_env != NULL ? tmp_env : "ct");
+    tmp_env = getenv("CERTS_DIR");
+    certs_dir = OPENSSL_strdup(tmp_env != NULL ? tmp_env : "certs");
+
+    ADD_TEST(test_no_scts_in_certificate);
+    ADD_TEST(test_one_sct_in_certificate);
+    ADD_TEST(test_multiple_scts_in_certificate);
+    ADD_TEST(test_verify_one_sct);
+    ADD_TEST(test_verify_multiple_scts);
+    ADD_TEST(test_verify_fails_for_future_sct);
+    ADD_TEST(test_decode_tls_sct);
+    ADD_TEST(test_encode_tls_sct);
+    ADD_TEST(test_default_ct_policy_eval_ctx_time_is_now);
+
+    result = run_tests(argv[0]);
+    ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+
+    OPENSSL_free(ct_dir);
+    OPENSSL_free(certs_dir);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG
+    if (CRYPTO_mem_leaks_fp(stderr) <= 0)
+        result = 1;
+#endif
+
+    return result;
+}
+
+#else /* OPENSSL_NO_CT */
+
+int main(int argc, char* argv[])
+{
+    return EXIT_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_CT */
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/d2i-tests/bad-cms.der b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/d2i-tests/bad-cms.der
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..19cd3cc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/d2i-tests/bad-cms.der
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+0	*†H†÷

 	0
10

\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/d2i-tests/bad-int-pad0.der b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/d2i-tests/bad-int-pad0.der
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..46f6092
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/d2i-tests/bad-int-pad0.der
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/d2i-tests/bad-int-padminus1.der b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/d2i-tests/bad-int-padminus1.der
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a4b6bb9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/d2i-tests/bad-int-padminus1.der
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ÿÿ
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/d2i-tests/bad_bio.der b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/d2i-tests/bad_bio.der
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8681f05
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/d2i-tests/bad_bio.der
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/d2i-tests/bad_cert.der b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/d2i-tests/bad_cert.der
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f75efad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/d2i-tests/bad_cert.der
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/d2i-tests/bad_generalname.der b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/d2i-tests/bad_generalname.der
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..af45855
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/d2i-tests/bad_generalname.der
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+¥€0;¶!;)''ï÷!l¿(,:µ¿(*;©:§«½:“*�*;i)*w*ë)ã;U:'):ñ;l*!'Ò£
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/d2i-tests/high_tag.der b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/d2i-tests/high_tag.der
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5c523ec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/d2i-tests/high_tag.der
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/d2i-tests/int0.der b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/d2i-tests/int0.der
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bbfb76b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/d2i-tests/int0.der
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/d2i-tests/int1.der b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/d2i-tests/int1.der
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..26dd6b1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/d2i-tests/int1.der
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+


\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/d2i-tests/intminus1.der b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/d2i-tests/intminus1.der
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e7c1cea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/d2i-tests/intminus1.der
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+
ÿ
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/d2i_test.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/d2i_test.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5274270
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/d2i_test.c
@@ -0,0 +1,222 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* Regression tests for ASN.1 parsing bugs. */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "testutil.h"
+
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
+# include <openssl/cms.h>
+#endif
+#include "e_os.h"
+
+static const ASN1_ITEM *item_type;
+static const char *test_file;
+
+typedef enum {
+    ASN1_UNKNOWN,
+    ASN1_OK,
+    ASN1_BIO,
+    ASN1_DECODE,
+    ASN1_ENCODE,
+    ASN1_COMPARE
+} expected_error_t;
+
+typedef struct {
+    const char *str;
+    expected_error_t code;
+} error_enum;
+
+static expected_error_t expected_error = ASN1_UNKNOWN;
+
+typedef struct d2i_test_fixture {
+    const char *test_case_name;
+} D2I_TEST_FIXTURE;
+
+static D2I_TEST_FIXTURE set_up(const char *const test_case_name)
+{
+    D2I_TEST_FIXTURE fixture;
+    fixture.test_case_name = test_case_name;
+    return fixture;
+}
+
+static int execute_test(D2I_TEST_FIXTURE fixture)
+{
+    BIO *bio = NULL;
+    ASN1_VALUE *value = NULL;
+    int ret = 0;
+    unsigned char buf[2048];
+    const unsigned char *buf_ptr = buf;
+    unsigned char *der = NULL;
+    int derlen;
+    int len;
+
+    if ((bio = BIO_new_file(test_file, "r")) == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    if (expected_error == ASN1_BIO) {
+        value = ASN1_item_d2i_bio(item_type, bio, NULL);
+        if (value == NULL)
+            ret = 1;
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Unless we are testing it we don't use ASN1_item_d2i_bio because it
+     * performs sanity checks on the input and can reject it before the
+     * decoder is called.
+     */
+    len = BIO_read(bio, buf, sizeof(buf));
+    if (len < 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    value = ASN1_item_d2i(NULL, &buf_ptr, len, item_type);
+    if (value == NULL) {
+        if (expected_error == ASN1_DECODE)
+            ret = 1;
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    derlen = ASN1_item_i2d(value, &der, item_type);
+
+    if (der == NULL || derlen < 0) {
+        if (expected_error == ASN1_ENCODE)
+            ret = 1;
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (derlen != len || memcmp(der, buf, derlen) != 0) {
+        if (expected_error == ASN1_COMPARE)
+            ret = 1;
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (expected_error == ASN1_OK)
+        ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+    /* Don't indicate success for memory allocation errors */
+    if (ret == 1 && ERR_GET_REASON(ERR_peek_error()) == ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE)
+        ret = 0;
+    BIO_free(bio);
+    OPENSSL_free(der);
+    ASN1_item_free(value, item_type);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static void tear_down(D2I_TEST_FIXTURE fixture)
+{
+    ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+}
+
+#define SETUP_D2I_TEST_FIXTURE() \
+    SETUP_TEST_FIXTURE(D2I_TEST_FIXTURE, set_up)
+
+#define EXECUTE_D2I_TEST() \
+    EXECUTE_TEST(execute_test, tear_down)
+
+static int test_bad_asn1()
+{
+    SETUP_D2I_TEST_FIXTURE();
+    EXECUTE_D2I_TEST();
+}
+
+/*
+ * Usage: d2i_test <type> <file>, e.g.
+ * d2i_test generalname bad_generalname.der
+ */
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    int result = 0;
+    const char *test_type_name;
+    const char *expected_error_string;
+    const char *p = getenv("OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY");
+
+    size_t i;
+    static ASN1_ITEM_EXP *items[] = {
+        ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_ANY),
+        ASN1_ITEM_ref(X509),
+        ASN1_ITEM_ref(GENERAL_NAME),
+        ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_INTEGER),
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
+        ASN1_ITEM_ref(CMS_ContentInfo)
+#endif
+    };
+
+    static error_enum expected_errors[] = {
+        {"OK", ASN1_OK},
+        {"BIO", ASN1_BIO},
+        {"decode", ASN1_DECODE},
+        {"encode", ASN1_ENCODE},
+        {"compare", ASN1_COMPARE}
+    };
+
+    if (p != NULL && strcmp(p, "on") == 0)
+        CRYPTO_set_mem_debug(1);
+    CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON);
+
+    if (argc != 4) {
+        fprintf(stderr,
+                "Usage: d2i_test item_name expected_error file.der\n");
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    test_type_name = argv[1];
+    expected_error_string = argv[2];
+    test_file = argv[3];
+
+    for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(items); i++) {
+        const ASN1_ITEM *it = ASN1_ITEM_ptr(items[i]);
+        if (strcmp(test_type_name, it->sname) == 0) {
+            item_type = it;
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    if (item_type == NULL) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Unknown type %s\n", test_type_name);
+        fprintf(stderr, "Supported types:\n");
+        for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(items); i++) {
+            const ASN1_ITEM *it = ASN1_ITEM_ptr(items[i]);
+            fprintf(stderr, "\t%s\n", it->sname);
+        }
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(expected_errors); i++) {
+        if (strcmp(expected_errors[i].str, expected_error_string) == 0) {
+            expected_error = expected_errors[i].code;
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (expected_error == ASN1_UNKNOWN) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Unknown expected error %s\n", expected_error_string);
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    ADD_TEST(test_bad_asn1);
+
+    result = run_tests(argv[0]);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG
+    if (CRYPTO_mem_leaks_fp(stderr) <= 0)
+        result = 1;
+#endif
+
+    return result;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/danetest.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/danetest.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7fa6a2f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/danetest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,504 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/conf.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "../e_os.h"
+
+#define _UC(c) ((unsigned char)(c))
+
+static const char *progname;
+
+/*
+ * Forward declaration, of function that uses internal interfaces, from headers
+ * included at the end of this module.
+ */
+static void store_ctx_dane_init(X509_STORE_CTX *, SSL *);
+
+static int saved_errno;
+
+static void save_errno(void)
+{
+    saved_errno = errno;
+}
+
+static int restore_errno(void)
+{
+    int ret = errno;
+    errno = saved_errno;
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static void test_usage(void)
+{
+    fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s: danetest basedomain CAfile tlsafile\n", progname);
+}
+
+static void print_errors(void)
+{
+    unsigned long err;
+    char buffer[1024];
+    const char *file;
+    const char *data;
+    int line;
+    int flags;
+
+    while ((err = ERR_get_error_line_data(&file, &line, &data, &flags)) != 0) {
+        ERR_error_string_n(err, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
+        if (flags & ERR_TXT_STRING)
+            fprintf(stderr, "Error: %s:%s:%d:%s\n", buffer, file, line, data);
+        else
+            fprintf(stderr, "Error: %s:%s:%d\n", buffer, file, line);
+    }
+}
+
+static int verify_chain(SSL *ssl, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
+{
+    int ret = -1;
+    X509_STORE_CTX *store_ctx;
+    SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx = SSL_get_SSL_CTX(ssl);
+    X509_STORE *store = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(ssl_ctx);
+    int store_ctx_idx = SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx();
+    X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(chain, 0);
+
+    if ((store_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+        return -1;
+
+    if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(store_ctx, store, cert, chain))
+        goto end;
+    if (!X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(store_ctx, store_ctx_idx, ssl))
+        goto end;
+
+    X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(store_ctx,
+            SSL_is_server(ssl) ? "ssl_client" : "ssl_server");
+    X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(store_ctx),
+            SSL_get0_param(ssl));
+    store_ctx_dane_init(store_ctx, ssl);
+
+    if (SSL_get_verify_callback(ssl))
+        X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(store_ctx, SSL_get_verify_callback(ssl));
+
+    ret = X509_verify_cert(store_ctx);
+
+    SSL_set_verify_result(ssl, X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(store_ctx));
+    X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(store_ctx);
+end:
+    X509_STORE_CTX_free(store_ctx);
+
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static STACK_OF(X509) *load_chain(BIO *fp, int nelem)
+{
+    int count;
+    char *name = 0;
+    char *header = 0;
+    unsigned char *data = 0;
+    long len;
+    char *errtype = 0;                /* if error: cert or pkey? */
+    STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
+    typedef X509 *(*d2i_X509_t)(X509 **, const unsigned char **, long);
+
+    if ((chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == 0) {
+        perror("malloc");
+        exit(1);
+    }
+
+    for (count = 0;
+         count < nelem && errtype == 0
+         && PEM_read_bio(fp, &name, &header, &data, &len);
+         ++count) {
+        const unsigned char *p = data;
+
+        if (strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_X509) == 0
+            || strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_X509_TRUSTED) == 0
+            || strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_X509_OLD) == 0) {
+            d2i_X509_t d = strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_X509_TRUSTED) ?
+                d2i_X509_AUX : d2i_X509;
+            X509 *cert = d(0, &p, len);
+
+            if (cert == 0 || (p - data) != len)
+                errtype = "certificate";
+            else if (sk_X509_push(chain, cert) == 0) {
+                perror("malloc");
+                goto err;
+            }
+        } else {
+            fprintf(stderr, "unexpected chain file object: %s\n", name);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        /*
+         * If any of these were null, PEM_read() would have failed.
+         */
+        OPENSSL_free(name);
+        OPENSSL_free(header);
+        OPENSSL_free(data);
+    }
+
+    if (errtype) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "error reading: malformed %s\n", errtype);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (count == nelem) {
+        ERR_clear_error();
+        return chain;
+    }
+
+err:
+    /* Some other PEM read error */
+    sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free);
+    print_errors();
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+static char *read_to_eol(BIO *f)
+{
+    static char buf[1024];
+    int n;
+
+    if (!BIO_gets(f, buf, sizeof(buf)))
+        return NULL;
+
+    n = strlen(buf);
+
+    if (buf[n-1] != '\n') {
+        if (n+1 == sizeof(buf)) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "%s: warning: input too long\n", progname);
+        } else {
+            fprintf(stderr, "%s: warning: EOF before newline\n", progname);
+        }
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    /* Trim trailing whitespace */
+    while (n > 0 && isspace(_UC(buf[n-1])))
+        buf[--n] = '\0';
+
+    return buf;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Hex decoder that tolerates optional whitespace
+ */
+static ossl_ssize_t hexdecode(const char *in, void *result)
+{
+    unsigned char **out = (unsigned char **)result;
+    unsigned char *ret = OPENSSL_malloc(strlen(in)/2);
+    unsigned char *cp = ret;
+    uint8_t byte;
+    int nibble = 0;
+
+    if (ret == NULL)
+        return -1;
+
+    for (byte = 0; *in; ++in) {
+        int x;
+
+        if (isspace(_UC(*in)))
+            continue;
+        x = OPENSSL_hexchar2int(*in);
+        if (x < 0) {
+            OPENSSL_free(ret);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        byte |= (char)x;
+        if ((nibble ^= 1) == 0) {
+            *cp++ = byte;
+            byte = 0;
+        } else {
+            byte <<= 4;
+        }
+    }
+    if (nibble != 0) {
+        OPENSSL_free(ret);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return cp - (*out = ret);
+}
+
+static ossl_ssize_t checked_uint8(const char *in, void *out)
+{
+    uint8_t *result = (uint8_t *)out;
+    const char *cp = in;
+    char *endp;
+    long v;
+    int e;
+
+    save_errno();
+    v = strtol(cp, &endp, 10);
+    e = restore_errno();
+
+    if (((v == LONG_MIN || v == LONG_MAX) && e == ERANGE) ||
+        endp == cp || !isspace(_UC(*endp)) ||
+        v != (*(uint8_t *)result = (uint8_t) v)) {
+        return -1;
+    }
+    for (cp = endp; isspace(_UC(*cp)); ++cp)
+        continue;
+    return cp - in;
+}
+
+struct tlsa_field {
+    void *var;
+    const char *name;
+    ossl_ssize_t (*parser)(const char *, void *);
+};
+
+static int tlsa_import_rr(SSL *ssl, const char *rrdata)
+{
+    static uint8_t usage;
+    static uint8_t selector;
+    static uint8_t mtype;
+    static unsigned char *data = NULL;
+    static struct tlsa_field tlsa_fields[] = {
+        { &usage, "usage", checked_uint8 },
+        { &selector, "selector", checked_uint8 },
+        { &mtype, "mtype", checked_uint8 },
+        { &data, "data", hexdecode },
+        { NULL, }
+    };
+    int ret;
+    struct tlsa_field *f;
+    const char *cp = rrdata;
+    ossl_ssize_t len = 0;
+
+    for (f = tlsa_fields; f->var; ++f) {
+        if ((len = f->parser(cp += len, f->var)) <= 0) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "%s: warning: bad TLSA %s field in: %s\n",
+                    progname, f->name, rrdata);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+    ret = SSL_dane_tlsa_add(ssl, usage, selector, mtype, data, len);
+    OPENSSL_free(data);
+
+    if (ret == 0) {
+        print_errors();
+        fprintf(stderr, "%s: warning: unusable TLSA rrdata: %s\n",
+                progname, rrdata);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (ret < 0) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "%s: warning: error loading TLSA rrdata: %s\n",
+                progname, rrdata);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int allws(const char *cp)
+{
+    while (*cp)
+        if (!isspace(_UC(*cp++)))
+            return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int test_tlsafile(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *base_name,
+                         BIO *f, const char *path)
+{
+    char *line;
+    int testno = 0;
+    int ret = 1;
+    SSL *ssl;
+
+    while (ret > 0 && (line = read_to_eol(f)) != NULL) {
+        STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
+        int ntlsa;
+        int ncert;
+        int noncheck;
+        int want;
+        int want_depth;
+        int off;
+        int i;
+        int ok;
+        int err;
+        int mdpth;
+
+        if (*line == '\0' || *line == '#')
+            continue;
+
+        ++testno;
+        if (sscanf(line, "%d %d %d %d %d%n",
+                   &ntlsa, &ncert, &noncheck, &want, &want_depth, &off) != 5
+            || !allws(line + off)) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "Expected tlsa count, cert count and result"
+                    " at test %d of %s\n", testno, path);
+            return 0;
+        }
+
+        if ((ssl = SSL_new(ctx)) == NULL)
+            return -1;
+        SSL_set_connect_state(ssl);
+        if (SSL_dane_enable(ssl, base_name) <= 0) {
+            SSL_free(ssl);
+            return -1;
+        }
+        if (noncheck)
+            SSL_dane_set_flags(ssl, DANE_FLAG_NO_DANE_EE_NAMECHECKS);
+
+        for (i = 0; i < ntlsa; ++i) {
+            if ((line = read_to_eol(f)) == NULL || !tlsa_import_rr(ssl, line)) {
+                SSL_free(ssl);
+                return 0;
+            }
+        }
+
+        /* Don't report old news */
+        ERR_clear_error();
+        chain = load_chain(f, ncert);
+        if (chain == NULL) {
+            SSL_free(ssl);
+            return -1;
+        }
+
+        ok = verify_chain(ssl, chain);
+        sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free);
+        err = SSL_get_verify_result(ssl);
+        /*
+         * Peek under the hood, normally TLSA match data is hidden when
+         * verification fails, we can obtain any suppressed data by setting the
+         * verification result to X509_V_OK before looking.
+         */
+        SSL_set_verify_result(ssl, X509_V_OK);
+        mdpth = SSL_get0_dane_authority(ssl, NULL, NULL);
+        /* Not needed any more, but lead by example and put the error back. */
+        SSL_set_verify_result(ssl, err);
+        SSL_free(ssl);
+
+        if (ok < 0) {
+            ret = 0;
+            fprintf(stderr, "verify_chain internal error in %s test %d\n",
+                    path, testno);
+            print_errors();
+            continue;
+        }
+        if (err != want || (want == 0 && !ok)) {
+            ret = 0;
+            if (err != want) {
+                if (want == X509_V_OK)
+                    fprintf(stderr, "Verification failure in %s test %d: %d: %s\n",
+                            path, testno, err, X509_verify_cert_error_string(err));
+                else
+                    fprintf(stderr, "Unexpected error in %s test %d: %d: wanted %d\n",
+                            path, testno, err, want);
+            } else {
+                fprintf(stderr, "Verification failure in %s test %d: ok=0\n",
+                        path, testno);
+            }
+            print_errors();
+            continue;
+        }
+        if (mdpth != want_depth) {
+            ret = 0;
+            fprintf(stderr, "Wrong match depth, in %s test %d: wanted %d, got: %d\n",
+                    path, testno, want_depth, mdpth);
+        }
+        fprintf(stderr, "%s: test %d successful\n", path, testno);
+    }
+    ERR_clear_error();
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+    BIO *f;
+    BIO *bio_err;
+    SSL_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+    const char *basedomain;
+    const char *CAfile;
+    const char *tlsafile;
+    const char *p;
+    int ret = 1;
+
+    progname = argv[0];
+    if (argc != 4) {
+        test_usage();
+        EXIT(ret);
+    }
+    basedomain = argv[1];
+    CAfile = argv[2];
+    tlsafile = argv[3];
+
+    bio_err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT);
+
+    p = getenv("OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY");
+    if (p != NULL && strcmp(p, "on") == 0)
+        CRYPTO_set_mem_debug(1);
+    CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON);
+
+    f = BIO_new_file(tlsafile, "r");
+    if (f == NULL) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "%s: Error opening tlsa record file: '%s': %s\n",
+                progname, tlsafile, strerror(errno));
+        EXIT(ret);
+    }
+
+    ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_client_method());
+    if (SSL_CTX_dane_enable(ctx) <= 0) {
+        print_errors();
+        goto end;
+    }
+    if (!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(ctx, CAfile, NULL)) {
+        print_errors();
+        goto end;
+    }
+    if ((SSL_CTX_dane_mtype_set(ctx, EVP_sha512(), 2, 1)) <= 0) {
+        print_errors();
+        goto end;
+    }
+    if ((SSL_CTX_dane_mtype_set(ctx, EVP_sha256(), 1, 2)) <= 0) {
+        print_errors();
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (test_tlsafile(ctx, basedomain, f, tlsafile) <= 0) {
+        print_errors();
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    ret = 0;
+
+end:
+
+    BIO_free(f);
+    SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG
+    if (CRYPTO_mem_leaks(bio_err) <= 0)
+        ret = 1;
+#endif
+    BIO_free(bio_err);
+    EXIT(ret);
+}
+
+#include <internal/dane.h>
+
+static void store_ctx_dane_init(X509_STORE_CTX *store_ctx, SSL *ssl)
+{
+    X509_STORE_CTX_set0_dane(store_ctx, SSL_get0_dane(ssl));
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/danetest.in b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/danetest.in
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0cedf10
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/danetest.in
@@ -0,0 +1,1878 @@
+# Copyright 2016-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+#
+# Blank and comment lines ignored.
+#
+# The first line in each block takes the form:
+#
+#       <TLSA-count> <cert-count> <nonamechecks> <desired-verify-result> <desired-match-depth>
+#
+# It is followed by <TLSA-count> lines of the form:
+#
+#       <usage> <selector> <mtype> <hex-data>
+#
+# and finally, by <cert-count> certificates.
+
+# Test chain matching TLSA records
+# --
+# subject= CN = example.com
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
+# 3 0 1 BEDC04764CECAE80AEE454D332758F50847DCA424216466E4012E0DEAE1F2E5F
+# 3 0 2 F756CCD61F3CA50D017653911701CA0052AF0B29E273DD263DD23643D86D4369D03686BD1369EF54BB2DC2DAE3CE4F05AF39D54648F94D54AA86B259AEAD9923
+# 3 1 0 3059301306072A8648CE3D020106082A8648CE3D03010703420004664995F47BDE35E7B4DE48B258E9E8A07ADEBBDB863B3D06F481A1946C83DA9F56CFF4D9389B855D2F364B1585B0C734FCFA263026964FF5A4308B3FC879BDB8
+# 3 1 1 3111668338043DE264D0256A702248696C9484B6221A42740F920187B4C61838
+# 3 1 2 CB861AF6DDED185EE04472A9092052CCC735120C34785E72C996C94B122EBA6F329BE630B1B4C6E2756E7A75392C21E253C6AEACC31FD45FF4595DED375FAF62
+# -- 
+# subject= CN = Issuer CA
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
+# 2 0 1 0DAA76425A1FC398C55A643D5A2485AE4CC2B64B9515A75054722B2E83C31BBD
+# 2 0 2 6BC0C0F2500320A49392910965263A3EBDD594173D3E36CCE38A003D2EC3FAFBC315EDB776CD3139637DF494FB60359601542A4F821BF0542F926E6270C9762C
+# 2 1 0 3059301306072A8648CE3D020106082A8648CE3D030107034200047D4BAE18B49F5DC69D0A3C85C66A3E2119DE92CFAD081FAD55C12D510EC97B6C00E13695A8D9713548FE60DF15573390433E2A1BD92DB4B7AA016EC6185DC5AF
+# 2 1 1 65A457617072DA3E7F1152471EB3D406526530097D0A9AA34EB47C990A1FCDA3
+# 2 1 2 1F484106F765B6F1AC483CC509CDAD36486A83D1BA115F562516F407C1109303658408B455824DA0785A252B205DBEECB1AFB5DB869E8AAC242091B63F258F05
+# --
+# subject= CN = Root CA
+# 2 0 0 308201643082010BA003020102020101300A06082A8648CE3D04030230123110300E06035504030C07526F6F742043413020170D3135313231333233313330385A180F33303135303431353233313330385A30123110300E06035504030C07526F6F742043413059301306072A8648CE3D020106082A8648CE3D03010703420004D1DA578FD18FB86456B0D91B5656BDD68D4DDBD250E337571127C75E0560F41D0AF91BFAF8805F80C28C026A14D4FE8C30A9673B9EC0C05A84AA810D1341B76CA350304E301D0603551D0E04160414E4BD405F052A820DDF9883F93D7D3F90AAEC723F301F0603551D23041830168014E4BD405F052A820DDF9883F93D7D3F90AAEC723F300C0603551D13040530030101FF300A06082A8648CE3D040302034700304402206869E6AA9F9B4D4BF308091A5A7AB2C30E3619B0D75E528819468E4BB926F4C9022017F1B8458611966FBC109CAED3582966BF25FC0598EABA6C793C58DCC3537CC5
+# 2 0 1 FE7C8E01110627A782765E468D8CB4D2CC7907EAC4BA5974CD92B540ED2AAC3C
+# 2 0 2 361029F20A3B59DAFAAF05D41811EFC1A9439B972BC6B9D7F13BC5469570E49ACAE0CB0C877C75D58346590EA950AC7A39AED6E8AA8004EA7F5DE3AB9462047E
+# 2 1 0 3059301306072A8648CE3D020106082A8648CE3D03010703420004D1DA578FD18FB86456B0D91B5656BDD68D4DDBD250E337571127C75E0560F41D0AF91BFAF8805F80C28C026A14D4FE8C30A9673B9EC0C05A84AA810D1341B76C
+# 2 1 1 91D942E4A2D4226DDAF28CADAA7F13018E4ED0D9A43A529247E51C965188576C
+# 2 1 2 5F414D4D7BFDF22E39952D9F46C51370FDD050F10C55B4CDB42E40FA98611FDE23EEE9B23315EE1ECDB198C7419E9A2D6742860E4806AF45164507799C3B452E
+
+# Renumber:
+# << 'EOF' perl -pe 'BEGIN {$t = 0; $/="\n\n"} if (s/\A\s*# \d+\s*?\n//sm) {printf "# %d\n", ++$t}'
+
+## -- Anonymous and "never valid" leaf certificate DANE-EE(3) tests
+
+# 1
+1 1 1 0 0
+3 0 1 588FD5F414E3327EAFE3169DC040AE161247D1296BF38304AB9CF464850A1365
+subject=
+issuer=
+notBefore=Dec 14 00:10:34 2015 GMT
+notAfter=Dec 13 00:10:34 2015 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIHsMIGToAMCAQICAQEwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIwADAeFw0xNTEyMTQwMDEwMzRaFw0x
+NTEyMTMwMDEwMzRaMAAwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAATFpP+gCO68
+A2m5dHmflHnLRzYFRPr8AsQgT7PfMeiKGk8YyFgx6T+YXFsjEJRUG0MWtcscnAyV
+CIb+EUPzn2EJMAoGCCqGSM49BAMCA0gAMEUCIGrnt6hw3yEIHpqYlgIKr4VgmEh1
+yBKzbWcWMavIefhyAiEAsIia0rOBTuZL3dWn9qmN6kPLQ1BJRpy1CkQEy97uH9Y=
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+
+# 2
+1 1 1 0 0
+3 1 1 05C66146D7909EAE2379825F6D0F5284146B79598DA12E403DC29C33147CF33E
+subject=
+issuer=
+notBefore=Dec 14 00:10:34 2015 GMT
+notAfter=Dec 13 00:10:34 2015 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIHsMIGToAMCAQICAQEwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIwADAeFw0xNTEyMTQwMDEwMzRaFw0x
+NTEyMTMwMDEwMzRaMAAwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAATFpP+gCO68
+A2m5dHmflHnLRzYFRPr8AsQgT7PfMeiKGk8YyFgx6T+YXFsjEJRUG0MWtcscnAyV
+CIb+EUPzn2EJMAoGCCqGSM49BAMCA0gAMEUCIGrnt6hw3yEIHpqYlgIKr4VgmEh1
+yBKzbWcWMavIefhyAiEAsIia0rOBTuZL3dWn9qmN6kPLQ1BJRpy1CkQEy97uH9Y=
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+
+# 3
+1 1 1 0 0
+3 0 2 42BEE929852C8063A0D619B53D0DD35703BBAD2FC25F2055F737C7A14DDFEA544491F8C00F50FA083BD0AD1B5C98529994FF811BBA5E5170CC6EE9F3ED5563E1
+subject=
+issuer=
+notBefore=Dec 14 00:10:34 2015 GMT
+notAfter=Dec 13 00:10:34 2015 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIHsMIGToAMCAQICAQEwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIwADAeFw0xNTEyMTQwMDEwMzRaFw0x
+NTEyMTMwMDEwMzRaMAAwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAATFpP+gCO68
+A2m5dHmflHnLRzYFRPr8AsQgT7PfMeiKGk8YyFgx6T+YXFsjEJRUG0MWtcscnAyV
+CIb+EUPzn2EJMAoGCCqGSM49BAMCA0gAMEUCIGrnt6hw3yEIHpqYlgIKr4VgmEh1
+yBKzbWcWMavIefhyAiEAsIia0rOBTuZL3dWn9qmN6kPLQ1BJRpy1CkQEy97uH9Y=
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+
+# 4
+1 1 1 0 0
+3 1 2 D91A3E5DC34879CD77AD1E989F56FA78FACADF05EF8D445EDF5652BD58EE392C87C02F84C0119D62309041F2D5128A73399DF25D1F47BCD497357EAF1A1009A3
+subject=
+issuer=
+notBefore=Dec 14 00:10:34 2015 GMT
+notAfter=Dec 13 00:10:34 2015 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIHsMIGToAMCAQICAQEwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIwADAeFw0xNTEyMTQwMDEwMzRaFw0x
+NTEyMTMwMDEwMzRaMAAwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAATFpP+gCO68
+A2m5dHmflHnLRzYFRPr8AsQgT7PfMeiKGk8YyFgx6T+YXFsjEJRUG0MWtcscnAyV
+CIb+EUPzn2EJMAoGCCqGSM49BAMCA0gAMEUCIGrnt6hw3yEIHpqYlgIKr4VgmEh1
+yBKzbWcWMavIefhyAiEAsIia0rOBTuZL3dWn9qmN6kPLQ1BJRpy1CkQEy97uH9Y=
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+
+# 5
+1 1 1 65 -1
+3 0 1 588FD5F414E3327EAFE3169DC040AE161247D1296BF38304AB9CF464850A1366
+subject=
+issuer=
+notBefore=Dec 14 00:10:34 2015 GMT
+notAfter=Dec 13 00:10:34 2015 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIHsMIGToAMCAQICAQEwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIwADAeFw0xNTEyMTQwMDEwMzRaFw0x
+NTEyMTMwMDEwMzRaMAAwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAATFpP+gCO68
+A2m5dHmflHnLRzYFRPr8AsQgT7PfMeiKGk8YyFgx6T+YXFsjEJRUG0MWtcscnAyV
+CIb+EUPzn2EJMAoGCCqGSM49BAMCA0gAMEUCIGrnt6hw3yEIHpqYlgIKr4VgmEh1
+yBKzbWcWMavIefhyAiEAsIia0rOBTuZL3dWn9qmN6kPLQ1BJRpy1CkQEy97uH9Y=
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+
+# 6
+1 1 1 65 -1
+3 1 1 05C66146D7909EAE2379825F6D0F5284146B79598DA12E403DC29C33147CF33F
+subject=
+issuer=
+notBefore=Dec 14 00:10:34 2015 GMT
+notAfter=Dec 13 00:10:34 2015 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIHsMIGToAMCAQICAQEwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIwADAeFw0xNTEyMTQwMDEwMzRaFw0x
+NTEyMTMwMDEwMzRaMAAwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAATFpP+gCO68
+A2m5dHmflHnLRzYFRPr8AsQgT7PfMeiKGk8YyFgx6T+YXFsjEJRUG0MWtcscnAyV
+CIb+EUPzn2EJMAoGCCqGSM49BAMCA0gAMEUCIGrnt6hw3yEIHpqYlgIKr4VgmEh1
+yBKzbWcWMavIefhyAiEAsIia0rOBTuZL3dWn9qmN6kPLQ1BJRpy1CkQEy97uH9Y=
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+
+# 7
+1 1 1 65 -1
+3 0 2 42BEE929852C8063A0D619B53D0DD35703BBAD2FC25F2055F737C7A14DDFEA544491F8C00F50FA083BD0AD1B5C98529994FF811BBA5E5170CC6EE9F3ED5563E2
+subject=
+issuer=
+notBefore=Dec 14 00:10:34 2015 GMT
+notAfter=Dec 13 00:10:34 2015 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIHsMIGToAMCAQICAQEwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIwADAeFw0xNTEyMTQwMDEwMzRaFw0x
+NTEyMTMwMDEwMzRaMAAwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAATFpP+gCO68
+A2m5dHmflHnLRzYFRPr8AsQgT7PfMeiKGk8YyFgx6T+YXFsjEJRUG0MWtcscnAyV
+CIb+EUPzn2EJMAoGCCqGSM49BAMCA0gAMEUCIGrnt6hw3yEIHpqYlgIKr4VgmEh1
+yBKzbWcWMavIefhyAiEAsIia0rOBTuZL3dWn9qmN6kPLQ1BJRpy1CkQEy97uH9Y=
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+
+# 8
+1 1 1 65 -1
+3 1 2 D91A3E5DC34879CD77AD1E989F56FA78FACADF05EF8D445EDF5652BD58EE392C87C02F84C0119D62309041F2D5128A73399DF25D1F47BCD497357EAF1A1009A4
+subject=
+issuer=
+notBefore=Dec 14 00:10:34 2015 GMT
+notAfter=Dec 13 00:10:34 2015 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIHsMIGToAMCAQICAQEwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIwADAeFw0xNTEyMTQwMDEwMzRaFw0x
+NTEyMTMwMDEwMzRaMAAwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAATFpP+gCO68
+A2m5dHmflHnLRzYFRPr8AsQgT7PfMeiKGk8YyFgx6T+YXFsjEJRUG0MWtcscnAyV
+CIb+EUPzn2EJMAoGCCqGSM49BAMCA0gAMEUCIGrnt6hw3yEIHpqYlgIKr4VgmEh1
+yBKzbWcWMavIefhyAiEAsIia0rOBTuZL3dWn9qmN6kPLQ1BJRpy1CkQEy97uH9Y=
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+
+## -- DANE-?? chain tests --
+
+# 9
+1 3 0 0 0
+3 0 1 BEDC04764CECAE80AEE454D332758F50847DCA424216466E4012E0DEAE1F2E5F
+subject= /CN=example.com
+issuer= /CN=Issuer CA
+notBefore=Dec 13 23:23:52 2015 GMT
+notAfter=Apr 15 23:23:52 3015 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIBlDCCATugAwIBAgIBAjAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjAUMRIwEAYDVQQDDAlJc3N1ZXIg
+Q0EwIBcNMTUxMjEzMjMyMzUyWhgPMzAxNTA0MTUyMzIzNTJaMBYxFDASBgNVBAMM
+C2V4YW1wbGUuY29tMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEZkmV9HveNee0
+3kiyWOnooHreu9uGOz0G9IGhlGyD2p9Wz/TZOJuFXS82SxWFsMc0/PomMCaWT/Wk
+MIs/yHm9uKN6MHgwHQYDVR0OBBYEFFsgykF9kIjHpMAXy2wMHHObsH2KMB8GA1Ud
+IwQYMBaAFHq3WjzSlcpd98UVCRbhj/XMN2oVMAkGA1UdEwQCMAAwEwYDVR0lBAww
+CgYIKwYBBQUHAwEwFgYDVR0RBA8wDYILZXhhbXBsZS5jb20wCgYIKoZIzj0EAwID
+RwAwRAIfIckDKlyKk4ctP0rvMhqVdN2VbUO9k8NplExy1pAoWAIhAMizKQ16835X
+GoTXBNutM50ph9QYUtxZNvISlHBjkRGB
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+subject= /CN=Issuer CA
+issuer= /CN=Root CA
+notBefore=Dec 13 23:20:09 2015 GMT
+notAfter=Apr 15 23:20:09 3015 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIBaDCCAQ2gAwIBAgIBAjAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290IENB
+MCAXDTE1MTIxMzIzMjAwOVoYDzMwMTUwNDE1MjMyMDA5WjAUMRIwEAYDVQQDDAlJ
+c3N1ZXIgQ0EwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAAR9S64YtJ9dxp0KPIXG
+aj4hGd6Sz60IH61VwS1RDsl7bADhNpWo2XE1SP5g3xVXM5BDPiob2S20t6oBbsYY
+XcWvo1AwTjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUerdaPNKVyl33xRUJFuGP9cw3ahUwHwYDVR0jBBgw
+FoAU5L1AXwUqgg3fmIP5PX0/kKrscj8wDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB/zAKBggqhkjOPQQD
+AgNJADBGAiEAgx3NiC2oeF1Q5BAgiYwCSIed3fctcB0dwd5r4IFVtD4CIQC4Sy+1
+GcTNPLx5FgPUSI93B1l9t5gNnBc+f90OzXyjCA==
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+subject= /CN=Root CA
+issuer= /CN=Root CA
+notBefore=Dec 13 23:13:08 2015 GMT
+notAfter=Apr 15 23:13:08 3015 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIBZDCCAQugAwIBAgIBATAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290IENB
+MCAXDTE1MTIxMzIzMTMwOFoYDzMwMTUwNDE1MjMxMzA4WjASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdS
+b290IENBMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE0dpXj9GPuGRWsNkbVla9
+1o1N29JQ4zdXESfHXgVg9B0K+Rv6+IBfgMKMAmoU1P6MMKlnO57AwFqEqoENE0G3
+bKNQME4wHQYDVR0OBBYEFOS9QF8FKoIN35iD+T19P5Cq7HI/MB8GA1UdIwQYMBaA
+FOS9QF8FKoIN35iD+T19P5Cq7HI/MAwGA1UdEwQFMAMBAf8wCgYIKoZIzj0EAwID
+RwAwRAIgaGnmqp+bTUvzCAkaWnqyww42GbDXXlKIGUaOS7km9MkCIBfxuEWGEZZv
+vBCcrtNYKWa/JfwFmOq6bHk8WNzDU3zF
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+
+# 10
+1 3 0 0 0
+3 1 1 3111668338043DE264D0256A702248696C9484B6221A42740F920187B4C61838
+subject= /CN=example.com
+issuer= /CN=Issuer CA
+notBefore=Dec 13 23:23:52 2015 GMT
+notAfter=Apr 15 23:23:52 3015 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIBlDCCATugAwIBAgIBAjAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjAUMRIwEAYDVQQDDAlJc3N1ZXIg
+Q0EwIBcNMTUxMjEzMjMyMzUyWhgPMzAxNTA0MTUyMzIzNTJaMBYxFDASBgNVBAMM
+C2V4YW1wbGUuY29tMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEZkmV9HveNee0
+3kiyWOnooHreu9uGOz0G9IGhlGyD2p9Wz/TZOJuFXS82SxWFsMc0/PomMCaWT/Wk
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+# 11
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+
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+subject= /CN=Root CA
+issuer= /CN=Root CA
+notBefore=Dec 13 23:13:08 2015 GMT
+notAfter=Apr 15 23:13:08 3015 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIBZDCCAQugAwIBAgIBATAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290IENB
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+
+# 16
+1 3 0 0 1
+2 1 2 1F484106F765B6F1AC483CC509CDAD36486A83D1BA115F562516F407C1109303658408B455824DA0785A252B205DBEECB1AFB5DB869E8AAC242091B63F258F05
+subject= /CN=example.com
+issuer= /CN=Issuer CA
+notBefore=Dec 13 23:23:52 2015 GMT
+notAfter=Apr 15 23:23:52 3015 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+subject= /CN=Issuer CA
+issuer= /CN=Root CA
+notBefore=Dec 13 23:20:09 2015 GMT
+notAfter=Apr 15 23:20:09 3015 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+subject= /CN=Root CA
+issuer= /CN=Root CA
+notBefore=Dec 13 23:13:08 2015 GMT
+notAfter=Apr 15 23:13:08 3015 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+
+# 17
+1 3 0 0 2
+2 0 1 FE7C8E01110627A782765E468D8CB4D2CC7907EAC4BA5974CD92B540ED2AAC3C
+subject= /CN=example.com
+issuer= /CN=Issuer CA
+notBefore=Dec 13 23:23:52 2015 GMT
+notAfter=Apr 15 23:23:52 3015 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+subject= /CN=Issuer CA
+issuer= /CN=Root CA
+notBefore=Dec 13 23:20:09 2015 GMT
+notAfter=Apr 15 23:20:09 3015 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+subject= /CN=Root CA
+issuer= /CN=Root CA
+notBefore=Dec 13 23:13:08 2015 GMT
+notAfter=Apr 15 23:13:08 3015 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+
+# 18
+1 3 0 0 2
+2 1 1 91D942E4A2D4226DDAF28CADAA7F13018E4ED0D9A43A529247E51C965188576C
+subject= /CN=example.com
+issuer= /CN=Issuer CA
+notBefore=Dec 13 23:23:52 2015 GMT
+notAfter=Apr 15 23:23:52 3015 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+subject= /CN=Issuer CA
+issuer= /CN=Root CA
+notBefore=Dec 13 23:20:09 2015 GMT
+notAfter=Apr 15 23:20:09 3015 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+subject= /CN=Root CA
+issuer= /CN=Root CA
+notBefore=Dec 13 23:13:08 2015 GMT
+notAfter=Apr 15 23:13:08 3015 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIBZDCCAQugAwIBAgIBATAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290IENB
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+
+# 19
+1 3 0 0 2
+2 0 2 361029F20A3B59DAFAAF05D41811EFC1A9439B972BC6B9D7F13BC5469570E49ACAE0CB0C877C75D58346590EA950AC7A39AED6E8AA8004EA7F5DE3AB9462047E
+subject= /CN=example.com
+issuer= /CN=Issuer CA
+notBefore=Dec 13 23:23:52 2015 GMT
+notAfter=Apr 15 23:23:52 3015 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+subject= /CN=Issuer CA
+issuer= /CN=Root CA
+notBefore=Dec 13 23:20:09 2015 GMT
+notAfter=Apr 15 23:20:09 3015 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+subject= /CN=Root CA
+issuer= /CN=Root CA
+notBefore=Dec 13 23:13:08 2015 GMT
+notAfter=Apr 15 23:13:08 3015 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+
+# 20
+1 3 0 0 2
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+subject= /CN=example.com
+issuer= /CN=Issuer CA
+notBefore=Dec 13 23:23:52 2015 GMT
+notAfter=Apr 15 23:23:52 3015 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+GoTXBNutM50ph9QYUtxZNvISlHBjkRGB
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+subject= /CN=Issuer CA
+issuer= /CN=Root CA
+notBefore=Dec 13 23:20:09 2015 GMT
+notAfter=Apr 15 23:20:09 3015 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIBaDCCAQ2gAwIBAgIBAjAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290IENB
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+subject= /CN=Root CA
+issuer= /CN=Root CA
+notBefore=Dec 13 23:13:08 2015 GMT
+notAfter=Apr 15 23:13:08 3015 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIBZDCCAQugAwIBAgIBATAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290IENB
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+vBCcrtNYKWa/JfwFmOq6bHk8WNzDU3zF
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+
+## -- PKIX-?? chain tests --
+
+# 21
+1 2 0 0 0
+1 0 1 BEDC04764CECAE80AEE454D332758F50847DCA424216466E4012E0DEAE1F2E5F
+subject= /CN=example.com
+issuer= /CN=Issuer CA
+notBefore=Dec 13 23:23:52 2015 GMT
+notAfter=Apr 15 23:23:52 3015 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+subject= /CN=Issuer CA
+issuer= /CN=Root CA
+notBefore=Dec 13 23:20:09 2015 GMT
+notAfter=Apr 15 23:20:09 3015 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+
+# 22
+1 2 0 0 0
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+subject= /CN=example.com
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+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+subject= /CN=Issuer CA
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+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+
+# 23
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+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+
+# 24
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+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+
+# 25
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+
+# 26
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+
+# 27
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+RwAwRAIgaGnmqp+bTUvzCAkaWnqyww42GbDXXlKIGUaOS7km9MkCIBfxuEWGEZZv
+vBCcrtNYKWa/JfwFmOq6bHk8WNzDU3zF
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+
+# 28
+1 3 0 0 1
+0 1 2 1F484106F765B6F1AC483CC509CDAD36486A83D1BA115F562516F407C1109303658408B455824DA0785A252B205DBEECB1AFB5DB869E8AAC242091B63F258F05
+subject= /CN=example.com
+issuer= /CN=Issuer CA
+notBefore=Dec 13 23:23:52 2015 GMT
+notAfter=Apr 15 23:23:52 3015 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+subject= /CN=Issuer CA
+issuer= /CN=Root CA
+notBefore=Dec 13 23:20:09 2015 GMT
+notAfter=Apr 15 23:20:09 3015 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIBaDCCAQ2gAwIBAgIBAjAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290IENB
+MCAXDTE1MTIxMzIzMjAwOVoYDzMwMTUwNDE1MjMyMDA5WjAUMRIwEAYDVQQDDAlJ
+c3N1ZXIgQ0EwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAAR9S64YtJ9dxp0KPIXG
+aj4hGd6Sz60IH61VwS1RDsl7bADhNpWo2XE1SP5g3xVXM5BDPiob2S20t6oBbsYY
+XcWvo1AwTjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUerdaPNKVyl33xRUJFuGP9cw3ahUwHwYDVR0jBBgw
+FoAU5L1AXwUqgg3fmIP5PX0/kKrscj8wDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB/zAKBggqhkjOPQQD
+AgNJADBGAiEAgx3NiC2oeF1Q5BAgiYwCSIed3fctcB0dwd5r4IFVtD4CIQC4Sy+1
+GcTNPLx5FgPUSI93B1l9t5gNnBc+f90OzXyjCA==
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+subject= /CN=Root CA
+issuer= /CN=Root CA
+notBefore=Dec 13 23:13:08 2015 GMT
+notAfter=Apr 15 23:13:08 3015 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIBZDCCAQugAwIBAgIBATAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290IENB
+MCAXDTE1MTIxMzIzMTMwOFoYDzMwMTUwNDE1MjMxMzA4WjASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdS
+b290IENBMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE0dpXj9GPuGRWsNkbVla9
+1o1N29JQ4zdXESfHXgVg9B0K+Rv6+IBfgMKMAmoU1P6MMKlnO57AwFqEqoENE0G3
+bKNQME4wHQYDVR0OBBYEFOS9QF8FKoIN35iD+T19P5Cq7HI/MB8GA1UdIwQYMBaA
+FOS9QF8FKoIN35iD+T19P5Cq7HI/MAwGA1UdEwQFMAMBAf8wCgYIKoZIzj0EAwID
+RwAwRAIgaGnmqp+bTUvzCAkaWnqyww42GbDXXlKIGUaOS7km9MkCIBfxuEWGEZZv
+vBCcrtNYKWa/JfwFmOq6bHk8WNzDU3zF
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+
+# 29
+1 2 0 0 2
+0 0 1 FE7C8E01110627A782765E468D8CB4D2CC7907EAC4BA5974CD92B540ED2AAC3C
+subject= /CN=example.com
+issuer= /CN=Issuer CA
+notBefore=Dec 13 23:23:52 2015 GMT
+notAfter=Apr 15 23:23:52 3015 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+subject= /CN=Issuer CA
+issuer= /CN=Root CA
+notBefore=Dec 13 23:20:09 2015 GMT
+notAfter=Apr 15 23:20:09 3015 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIBaDCCAQ2gAwIBAgIBAjAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290IENB
+MCAXDTE1MTIxMzIzMjAwOVoYDzMwMTUwNDE1MjMyMDA5WjAUMRIwEAYDVQQDDAlJ
+c3N1ZXIgQ0EwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAAR9S64YtJ9dxp0KPIXG
+aj4hGd6Sz60IH61VwS1RDsl7bADhNpWo2XE1SP5g3xVXM5BDPiob2S20t6oBbsYY
+XcWvo1AwTjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUerdaPNKVyl33xRUJFuGP9cw3ahUwHwYDVR0jBBgw
+FoAU5L1AXwUqgg3fmIP5PX0/kKrscj8wDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB/zAKBggqhkjOPQQD
+AgNJADBGAiEAgx3NiC2oeF1Q5BAgiYwCSIed3fctcB0dwd5r4IFVtD4CIQC4Sy+1
+GcTNPLx5FgPUSI93B1l9t5gNnBc+f90OzXyjCA==
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+
+# 30
+1 2 0 0 2
+0 1 1 91D942E4A2D4226DDAF28CADAA7F13018E4ED0D9A43A529247E51C965188576C
+subject= /CN=example.com
+issuer= /CN=Issuer CA
+notBefore=Dec 13 23:23:52 2015 GMT
+notAfter=Apr 15 23:23:52 3015 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+subject= /CN=Issuer CA
+issuer= /CN=Root CA
+notBefore=Dec 13 23:20:09 2015 GMT
+notAfter=Apr 15 23:20:09 3015 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIBaDCCAQ2gAwIBAgIBAjAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290IENB
+MCAXDTE1MTIxMzIzMjAwOVoYDzMwMTUwNDE1MjMyMDA5WjAUMRIwEAYDVQQDDAlJ
+c3N1ZXIgQ0EwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAAR9S64YtJ9dxp0KPIXG
+aj4hGd6Sz60IH61VwS1RDsl7bADhNpWo2XE1SP5g3xVXM5BDPiob2S20t6oBbsYY
+XcWvo1AwTjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUerdaPNKVyl33xRUJFuGP9cw3ahUwHwYDVR0jBBgw
+FoAU5L1AXwUqgg3fmIP5PX0/kKrscj8wDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB/zAKBggqhkjOPQQD
+AgNJADBGAiEAgx3NiC2oeF1Q5BAgiYwCSIed3fctcB0dwd5r4IFVtD4CIQC4Sy+1
+GcTNPLx5FgPUSI93B1l9t5gNnBc+f90OzXyjCA==
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+
+# 31
+1 3 0 0 2
+0 0 2 361029F20A3B59DAFAAF05D41811EFC1A9439B972BC6B9D7F13BC5469570E49ACAE0CB0C877C75D58346590EA950AC7A39AED6E8AA8004EA7F5DE3AB9462047E
+subject= /CN=example.com
+issuer= /CN=Issuer CA
+notBefore=Dec 13 23:23:52 2015 GMT
+notAfter=Apr 15 23:23:52 3015 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+subject= /CN=Issuer CA
+issuer= /CN=Root CA
+notBefore=Dec 13 23:20:09 2015 GMT
+notAfter=Apr 15 23:20:09 3015 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIBaDCCAQ2gAwIBAgIBAjAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290IENB
+MCAXDTE1MTIxMzIzMjAwOVoYDzMwMTUwNDE1MjMyMDA5WjAUMRIwEAYDVQQDDAlJ
+c3N1ZXIgQ0EwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAAR9S64YtJ9dxp0KPIXG
+aj4hGd6Sz60IH61VwS1RDsl7bADhNpWo2XE1SP5g3xVXM5BDPiob2S20t6oBbsYY
+XcWvo1AwTjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUerdaPNKVyl33xRUJFuGP9cw3ahUwHwYDVR0jBBgw
+FoAU5L1AXwUqgg3fmIP5PX0/kKrscj8wDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB/zAKBggqhkjOPQQD
+AgNJADBGAiEAgx3NiC2oeF1Q5BAgiYwCSIed3fctcB0dwd5r4IFVtD4CIQC4Sy+1
+GcTNPLx5FgPUSI93B1l9t5gNnBc+f90OzXyjCA==
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+subject= /CN=Root CA
+issuer= /CN=Root CA
+notBefore=Dec 13 23:13:08 2015 GMT
+notAfter=Apr 15 23:13:08 3015 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIBZDCCAQugAwIBAgIBATAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290IENB
+MCAXDTE1MTIxMzIzMTMwOFoYDzMwMTUwNDE1MjMxMzA4WjASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdS
+b290IENBMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE0dpXj9GPuGRWsNkbVla9
+1o1N29JQ4zdXESfHXgVg9B0K+Rv6+IBfgMKMAmoU1P6MMKlnO57AwFqEqoENE0G3
+bKNQME4wHQYDVR0OBBYEFOS9QF8FKoIN35iD+T19P5Cq7HI/MB8GA1UdIwQYMBaA
+FOS9QF8FKoIN35iD+T19P5Cq7HI/MAwGA1UdEwQFMAMBAf8wCgYIKoZIzj0EAwID
+RwAwRAIgaGnmqp+bTUvzCAkaWnqyww42GbDXXlKIGUaOS7km9MkCIBfxuEWGEZZv
+vBCcrtNYKWa/JfwFmOq6bHk8WNzDU3zF
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+
+# 32
+1 3 0 0 2
+0 1 2 5F414D4D7BFDF22E39952D9F46C51370FDD050F10C55B4CDB42E40FA98611FDE23EEE9B23315EE1ECDB198C7419E9A2D6742860E4806AF45164507799C3B452E
+subject= /CN=example.com
+issuer= /CN=Issuer CA
+notBefore=Dec 13 23:23:52 2015 GMT
+notAfter=Apr 15 23:23:52 3015 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+subject= /CN=Issuer CA
+issuer= /CN=Root CA
+notBefore=Dec 13 23:20:09 2015 GMT
+notAfter=Apr 15 23:20:09 3015 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIBaDCCAQ2gAwIBAgIBAjAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290IENB
+MCAXDTE1MTIxMzIzMjAwOVoYDzMwMTUwNDE1MjMyMDA5WjAUMRIwEAYDVQQDDAlJ
+c3N1ZXIgQ0EwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAAR9S64YtJ9dxp0KPIXG
+aj4hGd6Sz60IH61VwS1RDsl7bADhNpWo2XE1SP5g3xVXM5BDPiob2S20t6oBbsYY
+XcWvo1AwTjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUerdaPNKVyl33xRUJFuGP9cw3ahUwHwYDVR0jBBgw
+FoAU5L1AXwUqgg3fmIP5PX0/kKrscj8wDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB/zAKBggqhkjOPQQD
+AgNJADBGAiEAgx3NiC2oeF1Q5BAgiYwCSIed3fctcB0dwd5r4IFVtD4CIQC4Sy+1
+GcTNPLx5FgPUSI93B1l9t5gNnBc+f90OzXyjCA==
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+subject= /CN=Root CA
+issuer= /CN=Root CA
+notBefore=Dec 13 23:13:08 2015 GMT
+notAfter=Apr 15 23:13:08 3015 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIBZDCCAQugAwIBAgIBATAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290IENB
+MCAXDTE1MTIxMzIzMTMwOFoYDzMwMTUwNDE1MjMxMzA4WjASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdS
+b290IENBMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE0dpXj9GPuGRWsNkbVla9
+1o1N29JQ4zdXESfHXgVg9B0K+Rv6+IBfgMKMAmoU1P6MMKlnO57AwFqEqoENE0G3
+bKNQME4wHQYDVR0OBBYEFOS9QF8FKoIN35iD+T19P5Cq7HI/MB8GA1UdIwQYMBaA
+FOS9QF8FKoIN35iD+T19P5Cq7HI/MAwGA1UdEwQFMAMBAf8wCgYIKoZIzj0EAwID
+RwAwRAIgaGnmqp+bTUvzCAkaWnqyww42GbDXXlKIGUaOS7km9MkCIBfxuEWGEZZv
+vBCcrtNYKWa/JfwFmOq6bHk8WNzDU3zF
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+
+## -- PKIX-?? chain failures --
+
+# 33
+# Missing intermediate CA
+1 1 0 20 0
+1 0 1 BEDC04764CECAE80AEE454D332758F50847DCA424216466E4012E0DEAE1F2E5F
+subject= /CN=example.com
+issuer= /CN=Issuer CA
+notBefore=Dec 13 23:23:52 2015 GMT
+notAfter=Apr 15 23:23:52 3015 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+
+# 34
+# Missing PKIX intermediate, provided via DNS
+2 1 0 0 0
+1 1 1 3111668338043DE264D0256A702248696C9484B6221A42740F920187B4C61838
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
+subject= /CN=example.com
+issuer= /CN=Issuer CA
+notBefore=Dec 13 23:23:52 2015 GMT
+notAfter=Apr 15 23:23:52 3015 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+
+# 35
+# Wrong leaf digest
+1 3 0 65 -1
+1 0 2 F756CCD61F3CA50D017653911701CA0052AF0B29E273DD263DD23643D86D4369D03686BD1369EF54BB2DC2DAE3CE4F05AF39D54648F94D54AA86B259AEAD9924
+subject= /CN=example.com
+issuer= /CN=Issuer CA
+notBefore=Dec 13 23:23:52 2015 GMT
+notAfter=Apr 15 23:23:52 3015 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+subject= /CN=Issuer CA
+issuer= /CN=Root CA
+notBefore=Dec 13 23:20:09 2015 GMT
+notAfter=Apr 15 23:20:09 3015 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIBaDCCAQ2gAwIBAgIBAjAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290IENB
+MCAXDTE1MTIxMzIzMjAwOVoYDzMwMTUwNDE1MjMyMDA5WjAUMRIwEAYDVQQDDAlJ
+c3N1ZXIgQ0EwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAAR9S64YtJ9dxp0KPIXG
+aj4hGd6Sz60IH61VwS1RDsl7bADhNpWo2XE1SP5g3xVXM5BDPiob2S20t6oBbsYY
+XcWvo1AwTjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUerdaPNKVyl33xRUJFuGP9cw3ahUwHwYDVR0jBBgw
+FoAU5L1AXwUqgg3fmIP5PX0/kKrscj8wDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB/zAKBggqhkjOPQQD
+AgNJADBGAiEAgx3NiC2oeF1Q5BAgiYwCSIed3fctcB0dwd5r4IFVtD4CIQC4Sy+1
+GcTNPLx5FgPUSI93B1l9t5gNnBc+f90OzXyjCA==
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+subject= /CN=Root CA
+issuer= /CN=Root CA
+notBefore=Dec 13 23:13:08 2015 GMT
+notAfter=Apr 15 23:13:08 3015 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIBZDCCAQugAwIBAgIBATAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290IENB
+MCAXDTE1MTIxMzIzMTMwOFoYDzMwMTUwNDE1MjMxMzA4WjASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdS
+b290IENBMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE0dpXj9GPuGRWsNkbVla9
+1o1N29JQ4zdXESfHXgVg9B0K+Rv6+IBfgMKMAmoU1P6MMKlnO57AwFqEqoENE0G3
+bKNQME4wHQYDVR0OBBYEFOS9QF8FKoIN35iD+T19P5Cq7HI/MB8GA1UdIwQYMBaA
+FOS9QF8FKoIN35iD+T19P5Cq7HI/MAwGA1UdEwQFMAMBAf8wCgYIKoZIzj0EAwID
+RwAwRAIgaGnmqp+bTUvzCAkaWnqyww42GbDXXlKIGUaOS7km9MkCIBfxuEWGEZZv
+vBCcrtNYKWa/JfwFmOq6bHk8WNzDU3zF
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+
+# 36
+# Wrong intermediate digest
+1 2 0 65 -1
+0 0 1 0DAA76425A1FC398C55A643D5A2485AE4CC2B64B9515A75054722B2E83C31BBE
+subject= /CN=example.com
+issuer= /CN=Issuer CA
+notBefore=Dec 13 23:23:52 2015 GMT
+notAfter=Apr 15 23:23:52 3015 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+subject= /CN=Issuer CA
+issuer= /CN=Root CA
+notBefore=Dec 13 23:20:09 2015 GMT
+notAfter=Apr 15 23:20:09 3015 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIBaDCCAQ2gAwIBAgIBAjAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290IENB
+MCAXDTE1MTIxMzIzMjAwOVoYDzMwMTUwNDE1MjMyMDA5WjAUMRIwEAYDVQQDDAlJ
+c3N1ZXIgQ0EwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAAR9S64YtJ9dxp0KPIXG
+aj4hGd6Sz60IH61VwS1RDsl7bADhNpWo2XE1SP5g3xVXM5BDPiob2S20t6oBbsYY
+XcWvo1AwTjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUerdaPNKVyl33xRUJFuGP9cw3ahUwHwYDVR0jBBgw
+FoAU5L1AXwUqgg3fmIP5PX0/kKrscj8wDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB/zAKBggqhkjOPQQD
+AgNJADBGAiEAgx3NiC2oeF1Q5BAgiYwCSIed3fctcB0dwd5r4IFVtD4CIQC4Sy+1
+GcTNPLx5FgPUSI93B1l9t5gNnBc+f90OzXyjCA==
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+
+# 37
+# Wrong root digest
+1 2 0 65 -1
+0 0 1 FE7C8E01110627A782765E468D8CB4D2CC7907EAC4BA5974CD92B540ED2AAC3D
+subject= /CN=example.com
+issuer= /CN=Issuer CA
+notBefore=Dec 13 23:23:52 2015 GMT
+notAfter=Apr 15 23:23:52 3015 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+subject= /CN=Issuer CA
+issuer= /CN=Root CA
+notBefore=Dec 13 23:20:09 2015 GMT
+notAfter=Apr 15 23:20:09 3015 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIBaDCCAQ2gAwIBAgIBAjAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290IENB
+MCAXDTE1MTIxMzIzMjAwOVoYDzMwMTUwNDE1MjMyMDA5WjAUMRIwEAYDVQQDDAlJ
+c3N1ZXIgQ0EwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAAR9S64YtJ9dxp0KPIXG
+aj4hGd6Sz60IH61VwS1RDsl7bADhNpWo2XE1SP5g3xVXM5BDPiob2S20t6oBbsYY
+XcWvo1AwTjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUerdaPNKVyl33xRUJFuGP9cw3ahUwHwYDVR0jBBgw
+FoAU5L1AXwUqgg3fmIP5PX0/kKrscj8wDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB/zAKBggqhkjOPQQD
+AgNJADBGAiEAgx3NiC2oeF1Q5BAgiYwCSIed3fctcB0dwd5r4IFVtD4CIQC4Sy+1
+GcTNPLx5FgPUSI93B1l9t5gNnBc+f90OzXyjCA==
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+
+## -- Mixed usage cases
+
+# 38
+# DANE-EE(3) beats DANE-TA(2)
+1 3 0 0 0
+3 1 2 CB861AF6DDED185EE04472A9092052CCC735120C34785E72C996C94B122EBA6F329BE630B1B4C6E2756E7A75392C21E253C6AEACC31FD45FF4595DED375FAF62
+2 1 2 5F414D4D7BFDF22E39952D9F46C51370FDD050F10C55B4CDB42E40FA98611FDE23EEE9B23315EE1ECDB198C7419E9A2D6742860E4806AF45164507799C3B452E
+subject= /CN=example.com
+issuer= /CN=Issuer CA
+notBefore=Dec 13 23:23:52 2015 GMT
+notAfter=Apr 15 23:23:52 3015 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+subject= /CN=Issuer CA
+issuer= /CN=Root CA
+notBefore=Dec 13 23:20:09 2015 GMT
+notAfter=Apr 15 23:20:09 3015 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIBaDCCAQ2gAwIBAgIBAjAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290IENB
+MCAXDTE1MTIxMzIzMjAwOVoYDzMwMTUwNDE1MjMyMDA5WjAUMRIwEAYDVQQDDAlJ
+c3N1ZXIgQ0EwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAAR9S64YtJ9dxp0KPIXG
+aj4hGd6Sz60IH61VwS1RDsl7bADhNpWo2XE1SP5g3xVXM5BDPiob2S20t6oBbsYY
+XcWvo1AwTjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUerdaPNKVyl33xRUJFuGP9cw3ahUwHwYDVR0jBBgw
+FoAU5L1AXwUqgg3fmIP5PX0/kKrscj8wDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB/zAKBggqhkjOPQQD
+AgNJADBGAiEAgx3NiC2oeF1Q5BAgiYwCSIed3fctcB0dwd5r4IFVtD4CIQC4Sy+1
+GcTNPLx5FgPUSI93B1l9t5gNnBc+f90OzXyjCA==
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+subject= /CN=Root CA
+issuer= /CN=Root CA
+notBefore=Dec 13 23:13:08 2015 GMT
+notAfter=Apr 15 23:13:08 3015 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIBZDCCAQugAwIBAgIBATAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290IENB
+MCAXDTE1MTIxMzIzMTMwOFoYDzMwMTUwNDE1MjMxMzA4WjASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdS
+b290IENBMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE0dpXj9GPuGRWsNkbVla9
+1o1N29JQ4zdXESfHXgVg9B0K+Rv6+IBfgMKMAmoU1P6MMKlnO57AwFqEqoENE0G3
+bKNQME4wHQYDVR0OBBYEFOS9QF8FKoIN35iD+T19P5Cq7HI/MB8GA1UdIwQYMBaA
+FOS9QF8FKoIN35iD+T19P5Cq7HI/MAwGA1UdEwQFMAMBAf8wCgYIKoZIzj0EAwID
+RwAwRAIgaGnmqp+bTUvzCAkaWnqyww42GbDXXlKIGUaOS7km9MkCIBfxuEWGEZZv
+vBCcrtNYKWa/JfwFmOq6bHk8WNzDU3zF
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+
+# 39
+# DANE-TA(2) depth 1 beats DANE-TA(2) depth 2
+1 3 0 0 1
+2 1 2 1F484106F765B6F1AC483CC509CDAD36486A83D1BA115F562516F407C1109303658408B455824DA0785A252B205DBEECB1AFB5DB869E8AAC242091B63F258F05
+2 1 2 5F414D4D7BFDF22E39952D9F46C51370FDD050F10C55B4CDB42E40FA98611FDE23EEE9B23315EE1ECDB198C7419E9A2D6742860E4806AF45164507799C3B452E
+subject= /CN=example.com
+issuer= /CN=Issuer CA
+notBefore=Dec 13 23:23:52 2015 GMT
+notAfter=Apr 15 23:23:52 3015 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+subject= /CN=Issuer CA
+issuer= /CN=Root CA
+notBefore=Dec 13 23:20:09 2015 GMT
+notAfter=Apr 15 23:20:09 3015 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIBaDCCAQ2gAwIBAgIBAjAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290IENB
+MCAXDTE1MTIxMzIzMjAwOVoYDzMwMTUwNDE1MjMyMDA5WjAUMRIwEAYDVQQDDAlJ
+c3N1ZXIgQ0EwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAAR9S64YtJ9dxp0KPIXG
+aj4hGd6Sz60IH61VwS1RDsl7bADhNpWo2XE1SP5g3xVXM5BDPiob2S20t6oBbsYY
+XcWvo1AwTjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUerdaPNKVyl33xRUJFuGP9cw3ahUwHwYDVR0jBBgw
+FoAU5L1AXwUqgg3fmIP5PX0/kKrscj8wDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB/zAKBggqhkjOPQQD
+AgNJADBGAiEAgx3NiC2oeF1Q5BAgiYwCSIed3fctcB0dwd5r4IFVtD4CIQC4Sy+1
+GcTNPLx5FgPUSI93B1l9t5gNnBc+f90OzXyjCA==
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+subject= /CN=Root CA
+issuer= /CN=Root CA
+notBefore=Dec 13 23:13:08 2015 GMT
+notAfter=Apr 15 23:13:08 3015 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIBZDCCAQugAwIBAgIBATAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290IENB
+MCAXDTE1MTIxMzIzMTMwOFoYDzMwMTUwNDE1MjMxMzA4WjASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdS
+b290IENBMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE0dpXj9GPuGRWsNkbVla9
+1o1N29JQ4zdXESfHXgVg9B0K+Rv6+IBfgMKMAmoU1P6MMKlnO57AwFqEqoENE0G3
+bKNQME4wHQYDVR0OBBYEFOS9QF8FKoIN35iD+T19P5Cq7HI/MB8GA1UdIwQYMBaA
+FOS9QF8FKoIN35iD+T19P5Cq7HI/MAwGA1UdEwQFMAMBAf8wCgYIKoZIzj0EAwID
+RwAwRAIgaGnmqp+bTUvzCAkaWnqyww42GbDXXlKIGUaOS7km9MkCIBfxuEWGEZZv
+vBCcrtNYKWa/JfwFmOq6bHk8WNzDU3zF
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+
+# 40
+# DANE-TA(2) depth 2 beats PKIX-TA(0) depth 1
+1 3 0 0 2
+2 0 1 FE7C8E01110627A782765E468D8CB4D2CC7907EAC4BA5974CD92B540ED2AAC3C
+0 0 1 0DAA76425A1FC398C55A643D5A2485AE4CC2B64B9515A75054722B2E83C31BBD
+subject= /CN=example.com
+issuer= /CN=Issuer CA
+notBefore=Dec 13 23:23:52 2015 GMT
+notAfter=Apr 15 23:23:52 3015 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+subject= /CN=Issuer CA
+issuer= /CN=Root CA
+notBefore=Dec 13 23:20:09 2015 GMT
+notAfter=Apr 15 23:20:09 3015 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIBaDCCAQ2gAwIBAgIBAjAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290IENB
+MCAXDTE1MTIxMzIzMjAwOVoYDzMwMTUwNDE1MjMyMDA5WjAUMRIwEAYDVQQDDAlJ
+c3N1ZXIgQ0EwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAAR9S64YtJ9dxp0KPIXG
+aj4hGd6Sz60IH61VwS1RDsl7bADhNpWo2XE1SP5g3xVXM5BDPiob2S20t6oBbsYY
+XcWvo1AwTjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUerdaPNKVyl33xRUJFuGP9cw3ahUwHwYDVR0jBBgw
+FoAU5L1AXwUqgg3fmIP5PX0/kKrscj8wDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB/zAKBggqhkjOPQQD
+AgNJADBGAiEAgx3NiC2oeF1Q5BAgiYwCSIed3fctcB0dwd5r4IFVtD4CIQC4Sy+1
+GcTNPLx5FgPUSI93B1l9t5gNnBc+f90OzXyjCA==
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+subject= /CN=Root CA
+issuer= /CN=Root CA
+notBefore=Dec 13 23:13:08 2015 GMT
+notAfter=Apr 15 23:13:08 3015 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIBZDCCAQugAwIBAgIBATAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290IENB
+MCAXDTE1MTIxMzIzMTMwOFoYDzMwMTUwNDE1MjMxMzA4WjASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdS
+b290IENBMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE0dpXj9GPuGRWsNkbVla9
+1o1N29JQ4zdXESfHXgVg9B0K+Rv6+IBfgMKMAmoU1P6MMKlnO57AwFqEqoENE0G3
+bKNQME4wHQYDVR0OBBYEFOS9QF8FKoIN35iD+T19P5Cq7HI/MB8GA1UdIwQYMBaA
+FOS9QF8FKoIN35iD+T19P5Cq7HI/MAwGA1UdEwQFMAMBAf8wCgYIKoZIzj0EAwID
+RwAwRAIgaGnmqp+bTUvzCAkaWnqyww42GbDXXlKIGUaOS7km9MkCIBfxuEWGEZZv
+vBCcrtNYKWa/JfwFmOq6bHk8WNzDU3zF
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+
+# 41
+# DANE-TA(2) depth 2 beats PKIX-EE depth 0
+1 3 0 0 2
+2 0 1 FE7C8E01110627A782765E468D8CB4D2CC7907EAC4BA5974CD92B540ED2AAC3C
+0 0 1 0DAA76425A1FC398C55A643D5A2485AE4CC2B64B9515A75054722B2E83C31BBD
+subject= /CN=example.com
+issuer= /CN=Issuer CA
+notBefore=Dec 13 23:23:52 2015 GMT
+notAfter=Apr 15 23:23:52 3015 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+subject= /CN=Issuer CA
+issuer= /CN=Root CA
+notBefore=Dec 13 23:20:09 2015 GMT
+notAfter=Apr 15 23:20:09 3015 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIBaDCCAQ2gAwIBAgIBAjAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290IENB
+MCAXDTE1MTIxMzIzMjAwOVoYDzMwMTUwNDE1MjMyMDA5WjAUMRIwEAYDVQQDDAlJ
+c3N1ZXIgQ0EwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAAR9S64YtJ9dxp0KPIXG
+aj4hGd6Sz60IH61VwS1RDsl7bADhNpWo2XE1SP5g3xVXM5BDPiob2S20t6oBbsYY
+XcWvo1AwTjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUerdaPNKVyl33xRUJFuGP9cw3ahUwHwYDVR0jBBgw
+FoAU5L1AXwUqgg3fmIP5PX0/kKrscj8wDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB/zAKBggqhkjOPQQD
+AgNJADBGAiEAgx3NiC2oeF1Q5BAgiYwCSIed3fctcB0dwd5r4IFVtD4CIQC4Sy+1
+GcTNPLx5FgPUSI93B1l9t5gNnBc+f90OzXyjCA==
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+subject= /CN=Root CA
+issuer= /CN=Root CA
+notBefore=Dec 13 23:13:08 2015 GMT
+notAfter=Apr 15 23:13:08 3015 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIBZDCCAQugAwIBAgIBATAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290IENB
+MCAXDTE1MTIxMzIzMTMwOFoYDzMwMTUwNDE1MjMxMzA4WjASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdS
+b290IENBMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE0dpXj9GPuGRWsNkbVla9
+1o1N29JQ4zdXESfHXgVg9B0K+Rv6+IBfgMKMAmoU1P6MMKlnO57AwFqEqoENE0G3
+bKNQME4wHQYDVR0OBBYEFOS9QF8FKoIN35iD+T19P5Cq7HI/MB8GA1UdIwQYMBaA
+FOS9QF8FKoIN35iD+T19P5Cq7HI/MAwGA1UdEwQFMAMBAf8wCgYIKoZIzj0EAwID
+RwAwRAIgaGnmqp+bTUvzCAkaWnqyww42GbDXXlKIGUaOS7km9MkCIBfxuEWGEZZv
+vBCcrtNYKWa/JfwFmOq6bHk8WNzDU3zF
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+
+# 42
+# DANE-TA(2) Full(0) root "from DNS":
+1 2 0 0 2
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
+subject= /CN=example.com
+issuer= /CN=Issuer CA
+notBefore=Dec 13 23:23:52 2015 GMT
+notAfter=Apr 15 23:23:52 3015 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+subject= /CN=Issuer CA
+issuer= /CN=Root CA
+notBefore=Dec 13 23:20:09 2015 GMT
+notAfter=Apr 15 23:20:09 3015 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIBaDCCAQ2gAwIBAgIBAjAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290IENB
+MCAXDTE1MTIxMzIzMjAwOVoYDzMwMTUwNDE1MjMyMDA5WjAUMRIwEAYDVQQDDAlJ
+c3N1ZXIgQ0EwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAAR9S64YtJ9dxp0KPIXG
+aj4hGd6Sz60IH61VwS1RDsl7bADhNpWo2XE1SP5g3xVXM5BDPiob2S20t6oBbsYY
+XcWvo1AwTjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUerdaPNKVyl33xRUJFuGP9cw3ahUwHwYDVR0jBBgw
+FoAU5L1AXwUqgg3fmIP5PX0/kKrscj8wDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB/zAKBggqhkjOPQQD
+AgNJADBGAiEAgx3NiC2oeF1Q5BAgiYwCSIed3fctcB0dwd5r4IFVtD4CIQC4Sy+1
+GcTNPLx5FgPUSI93B1l9t5gNnBc+f90OzXyjCA==
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+
+# 43
+# DANE-TA(2) Full(0) intermediate "from DNS":
+1 1 0 0 1
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
+subject= /CN=example.com
+issuer= /CN=Issuer CA
+notBefore=Dec 13 23:23:52 2015 GMT
+notAfter=Apr 15 23:23:52 3015 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIBlDCCATugAwIBAgIBAjAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjAUMRIwEAYDVQQDDAlJc3N1ZXIg
+Q0EwIBcNMTUxMjEzMjMyMzUyWhgPMzAxNTA0MTUyMzIzNTJaMBYxFDASBgNVBAMM
+C2V4YW1wbGUuY29tMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEZkmV9HveNee0
+3kiyWOnooHreu9uGOz0G9IGhlGyD2p9Wz/TZOJuFXS82SxWFsMc0/PomMCaWT/Wk
+MIs/yHm9uKN6MHgwHQYDVR0OBBYEFFsgykF9kIjHpMAXy2wMHHObsH2KMB8GA1Ud
+IwQYMBaAFHq3WjzSlcpd98UVCRbhj/XMN2oVMAkGA1UdEwQCMAAwEwYDVR0lBAww
+CgYIKwYBBQUHAwEwFgYDVR0RBA8wDYILZXhhbXBsZS5jb20wCgYIKoZIzj0EAwID
+RwAwRAIfIckDKlyKk4ctP0rvMhqVdN2VbUO9k8NplExy1pAoWAIhAMizKQ16835X
+GoTXBNutM50ph9QYUtxZNvISlHBjkRGB
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+
+# 44
+# DANE-TA(2) SPKI(1) Full(0) intermediate "from DNS":
+1 1 0 0 0
+2 1 0 3059301306072A8648CE3D020106082A8648CE3D030107034200047D4BAE18B49F5DC69D0A3C85C66A3E2119DE92CFAD081FAD55C12D510EC97B6C00E13695A8D9713548FE60DF15573390433E2A1BD92DB4B7AA016EC6185DC5AF
+subject= /CN=example.com
+issuer= /CN=Issuer CA
+notBefore=Dec 13 23:23:52 2015 GMT
+notAfter=Apr 15 23:23:52 3015 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+
+# 45
+# DANE-TA(2) SPKI(1) Full(0) root "from DNS":
+1 2 0 0 1
+2 1 0 3059301306072A8648CE3D020106082A8648CE3D03010703420004D1DA578FD18FB86456B0D91B5656BDD68D4DDBD250E337571127C75E0560F41D0AF91BFAF8805F80C28C026A14D4FE8C30A9673B9EC0C05A84AA810D1341B76C
+subject= /CN=example.com
+issuer= /CN=Issuer CA
+notBefore=Dec 13 23:23:52 2015 GMT
+notAfter=Apr 15 23:23:52 3015 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+subject= /CN=Issuer CA
+issuer= /CN=Root CA
+notBefore=Dec 13 23:20:09 2015 GMT
+notAfter=Apr 15 23:20:09 3015 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIBaDCCAQ2gAwIBAgIBAjAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290IENB
+MCAXDTE1MTIxMzIzMjAwOVoYDzMwMTUwNDE1MjMyMDA5WjAUMRIwEAYDVQQDDAlJ
+c3N1ZXIgQ0EwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAAR9S64YtJ9dxp0KPIXG
+aj4hGd6Sz60IH61VwS1RDsl7bADhNpWo2XE1SP5g3xVXM5BDPiob2S20t6oBbsYY
+XcWvo1AwTjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUerdaPNKVyl33xRUJFuGP9cw3ahUwHwYDVR0jBBgw
+FoAU5L1AXwUqgg3fmIP5PX0/kKrscj8wDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB/zAKBggqhkjOPQQD
+AgNJADBGAiEAgx3NiC2oeF1Q5BAgiYwCSIed3fctcB0dwd5r4IFVtD4CIQC4Sy+1
+GcTNPLx5FgPUSI93B1l9t5gNnBc+f90OzXyjCA==
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+
+# 46
+# Mismatched name "example.org", should still succeed given a
+# DANE-EE(3) match.
+1 3 1 0 0
+3 1 1 ee1477190203f5d8b4767f4451b89e7367cdec7f6965a4988227983562ac8270
+subject= CN = example.org
+issuer= CN = CA2
+notBefore=Feb  6 22:39:47 2016 GMT
+notAfter=Feb  7 22:39:47 2116 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+subject= CN = CA2
+issuer= CN = Root CA2
+notBefore=Feb  6 22:39:13 2016 GMT
+notAfter=Feb  7 22:39:13 2116 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIBYjCCAQigAwIBAgIBAjAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjATMREwDwYDVQQDDAhSb290IENB
+MjAgFw0xNjAyMDYyMjM5MTNaGA8yMTE2MDIwNzIyMzkxM1owDjEMMAoGA1UEAwwD
+Q0EyMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEYr6zgBxpsxA31IFiGyb6uaGC
+CQdNMyJfDgqCihsU1eOEuauzXO7tydCbjfRmhqQK1EGd254IjcGY+37tZEbvPKNQ
+ME4wHQYDVR0OBBYEFLTY4vqgjcQ01aCcB8AYVbUhEU7VMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFBRb
++/qrntsksembakoZTwTZk8AXMAwGA1UdEwQFMAMBAf8wCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIDSAAw
+RQIgX2fmMykyiuryf1AeKyc1j8HgmM8u/nyQfJnTCwvYUcECIQC6JHd3ybV9eJQo
+7sfr/jV+rRlZY2iaRv160BWYd82L7g==
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+subject= CN = Root CA2
+issuer= CN = Root CA2
+notBefore=Feb  6 22:38:48 2016 GMT
+notAfter=Feb  7 22:38:48 2116 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIBaDCCAQ2gAwIBAgIBATAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjATMREwDwYDVQQDDAhSb290IENB
+MjAgFw0xNjAyMDYyMjM4NDhaGA8yMTE2MDIwNzIyMzg0OFowEzERMA8GA1UEAwwI
+Um9vdCBDQTIwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAATlTxAPKteg+L1LmxMl
+sbAFMxj6/322nR5RRGeF07KZRBFPaFZLgwZ1DuNrwM3wxxNdUyoZ6iAyDmwNf3K1
+42/Uo1AwTjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUFFv7+que2ySx6ZtqShlPBNmTwBcwHwYDVR0jBBgw
+FoAUFFv7+que2ySx6ZtqShlPBNmTwBcwDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB/zAKBggqhkjOPQQD
+AgNJADBGAiEAumhPWZ37swl10awM/amX+jv0UlUyJBf8RGA6QMG5bwICIQDbinER
+fEevg+GOsr1P6nNMCAsQd9NwsvTQ+jm+TBArWQ==
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+
+# 47
+# Mismatched name "example.org", should fail despite a DANE-TA(2)
+# match for the intermediate CA.
+1 3 0 62 1
+2 1 1 946af0956378efaba7ee1bbedc17af110ea8de19c079a98e77398724a3708a1f
+subject= CN = example.org
+issuer= CN = CA2
+notBefore=Feb  6 22:39:47 2016 GMT
+notAfter=Feb  7 22:39:47 2116 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+subject= CN = CA2
+issuer= CN = Root CA2
+notBefore=Feb  6 22:39:13 2016 GMT
+notAfter=Feb  7 22:39:13 2116 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIBYjCCAQigAwIBAgIBAjAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjATMREwDwYDVQQDDAhSb290IENB
+MjAgFw0xNjAyMDYyMjM5MTNaGA8yMTE2MDIwNzIyMzkxM1owDjEMMAoGA1UEAwwD
+Q0EyMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEYr6zgBxpsxA31IFiGyb6uaGC
+CQdNMyJfDgqCihsU1eOEuauzXO7tydCbjfRmhqQK1EGd254IjcGY+37tZEbvPKNQ
+ME4wHQYDVR0OBBYEFLTY4vqgjcQ01aCcB8AYVbUhEU7VMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFBRb
++/qrntsksembakoZTwTZk8AXMAwGA1UdEwQFMAMBAf8wCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIDSAAw
+RQIgX2fmMykyiuryf1AeKyc1j8HgmM8u/nyQfJnTCwvYUcECIQC6JHd3ybV9eJQo
+7sfr/jV+rRlZY2iaRv160BWYd82L7g==
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+subject= CN = Root CA2
+issuer= CN = Root CA2
+notBefore=Feb  6 22:38:48 2016 GMT
+notAfter=Feb  7 22:38:48 2116 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIBaDCCAQ2gAwIBAgIBATAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjATMREwDwYDVQQDDAhSb290IENB
+MjAgFw0xNjAyMDYyMjM4NDhaGA8yMTE2MDIwNzIyMzg0OFowEzERMA8GA1UEAwwI
+Um9vdCBDQTIwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAATlTxAPKteg+L1LmxMl
+sbAFMxj6/322nR5RRGeF07KZRBFPaFZLgwZ1DuNrwM3wxxNdUyoZ6iAyDmwNf3K1
+42/Uo1AwTjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUFFv7+que2ySx6ZtqShlPBNmTwBcwHwYDVR0jBBgw
+FoAUFFv7+que2ySx6ZtqShlPBNmTwBcwDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB/zAKBggqhkjOPQQD
+AgNJADBGAiEAumhPWZ37swl10awM/amX+jv0UlUyJBf8RGA6QMG5bwICIQDbinER
+fEevg+GOsr1P6nNMCAsQd9NwsvTQ+jm+TBArWQ==
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+
+# 48
+# Mismatched name "example.org", should fail despite a DANE-TA(2)
+# match for the root CA.
+1 3 0 62 2
+2 1 1 34474f2fbc39da44dfbd11215bdafadf9507406c04de1f65dbd2a1bc4f2165cc
+subject= CN = example.org
+issuer= CN = CA2
+notBefore=Feb  6 22:39:47 2016 GMT
+notAfter=Feb  7 22:39:47 2116 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+subject= CN = CA2
+issuer= CN = Root CA2
+notBefore=Feb  6 22:39:13 2016 GMT
+notAfter=Feb  7 22:39:13 2116 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIBYjCCAQigAwIBAgIBAjAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjATMREwDwYDVQQDDAhSb290IENB
+MjAgFw0xNjAyMDYyMjM5MTNaGA8yMTE2MDIwNzIyMzkxM1owDjEMMAoGA1UEAwwD
+Q0EyMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEYr6zgBxpsxA31IFiGyb6uaGC
+CQdNMyJfDgqCihsU1eOEuauzXO7tydCbjfRmhqQK1EGd254IjcGY+37tZEbvPKNQ
+ME4wHQYDVR0OBBYEFLTY4vqgjcQ01aCcB8AYVbUhEU7VMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFBRb
++/qrntsksembakoZTwTZk8AXMAwGA1UdEwQFMAMBAf8wCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIDSAAw
+RQIgX2fmMykyiuryf1AeKyc1j8HgmM8u/nyQfJnTCwvYUcECIQC6JHd3ybV9eJQo
+7sfr/jV+rRlZY2iaRv160BWYd82L7g==
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+subject= CN = Root CA2
+issuer= CN = Root CA2
+notBefore=Feb  6 22:38:48 2016 GMT
+notAfter=Feb  7 22:38:48 2116 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIBaDCCAQ2gAwIBAgIBATAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjATMREwDwYDVQQDDAhSb290IENB
+MjAgFw0xNjAyMDYyMjM4NDhaGA8yMTE2MDIwNzIyMzg0OFowEzERMA8GA1UEAwwI
+Um9vdCBDQTIwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAATlTxAPKteg+L1LmxMl
+sbAFMxj6/322nR5RRGeF07KZRBFPaFZLgwZ1DuNrwM3wxxNdUyoZ6iAyDmwNf3K1
+42/Uo1AwTjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUFFv7+que2ySx6ZtqShlPBNmTwBcwHwYDVR0jBBgw
+FoAUFFv7+que2ySx6ZtqShlPBNmTwBcwDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB/zAKBggqhkjOPQQD
+AgNJADBGAiEAumhPWZ37swl10awM/amX+jv0UlUyJBf8RGA6QMG5bwICIQDbinER
+fEevg+GOsr1P6nNMCAsQd9NwsvTQ+jm+TBArWQ==
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+
+# 49
+# Mismatched name "example.org", should fail when name checks
+# are not disabled for DANE-EE(3).
+1 3 0 62 0
+3 1 1 ee1477190203f5d8b4767f4451b89e7367cdec7f6965a4988227983562ac8270
+subject= CN = example.org
+issuer= CN = CA2
+notBefore=Feb  6 22:39:47 2016 GMT
+notAfter=Feb  7 22:39:47 2116 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+subject= CN = CA2
+issuer= CN = Root CA2
+notBefore=Feb  6 22:39:13 2016 GMT
+notAfter=Feb  7 22:39:13 2116 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIBYjCCAQigAwIBAgIBAjAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjATMREwDwYDVQQDDAhSb290IENB
+MjAgFw0xNjAyMDYyMjM5MTNaGA8yMTE2MDIwNzIyMzkxM1owDjEMMAoGA1UEAwwD
+Q0EyMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEYr6zgBxpsxA31IFiGyb6uaGC
+CQdNMyJfDgqCihsU1eOEuauzXO7tydCbjfRmhqQK1EGd254IjcGY+37tZEbvPKNQ
+ME4wHQYDVR0OBBYEFLTY4vqgjcQ01aCcB8AYVbUhEU7VMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFBRb
++/qrntsksembakoZTwTZk8AXMAwGA1UdEwQFMAMBAf8wCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIDSAAw
+RQIgX2fmMykyiuryf1AeKyc1j8HgmM8u/nyQfJnTCwvYUcECIQC6JHd3ybV9eJQo
+7sfr/jV+rRlZY2iaRv160BWYd82L7g==
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+subject= CN = Root CA2
+issuer= CN = Root CA2
+notBefore=Feb  6 22:38:48 2016 GMT
+notAfter=Feb  7 22:38:48 2116 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIBaDCCAQ2gAwIBAgIBATAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjATMREwDwYDVQQDDAhSb290IENB
+MjAgFw0xNjAyMDYyMjM4NDhaGA8yMTE2MDIwNzIyMzg0OFowEzERMA8GA1UEAwwI
+Um9vdCBDQTIwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAATlTxAPKteg+L1LmxMl
+sbAFMxj6/322nR5RRGeF07KZRBFPaFZLgwZ1DuNrwM3wxxNdUyoZ6iAyDmwNf3K1
+42/Uo1AwTjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUFFv7+que2ySx6ZtqShlPBNmTwBcwHwYDVR0jBBgw
+FoAUFFv7+que2ySx6ZtqShlPBNmTwBcwDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB/zAKBggqhkjOPQQD
+AgNJADBGAiEAumhPWZ37swl10awM/amX+jv0UlUyJBf8RGA6QMG5bwICIQDbinER
+fEevg+GOsr1P6nNMCAsQd9NwsvTQ+jm+TBArWQ==
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/danetest.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/danetest.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..68d4f44
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/danetest.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+subject= /CN=Root CA
+issuer= /CN=Root CA
+notBefore=Dec 13 23:13:08 2015 GMT
+notAfter=Apr 15 23:13:08 3015 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIBZDCCAQugAwIBAgIBATAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290IENB
+MCAXDTE1MTIxMzIzMTMwOFoYDzMwMTUwNDE1MjMxMzA4WjASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdS
+b290IENBMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE0dpXj9GPuGRWsNkbVla9
+1o1N29JQ4zdXESfHXgVg9B0K+Rv6+IBfgMKMAmoU1P6MMKlnO57AwFqEqoENE0G3
+bKNQME4wHQYDVR0OBBYEFOS9QF8FKoIN35iD+T19P5Cq7HI/MB8GA1UdIwQYMBaA
+FOS9QF8FKoIN35iD+T19P5Cq7HI/MAwGA1UdEwQFMAMBAf8wCgYIKoZIzj0EAwID
+RwAwRAIgaGnmqp+bTUvzCAkaWnqyww42GbDXXlKIGUaOS7km9MkCIBfxuEWGEZZv
+vBCcrtNYKWa/JfwFmOq6bHk8WNzDU3zF
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/destest.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/destest.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..84d753d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/destest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,804 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+#include <openssl/e_os2.h>
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS)
+# ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS
+#  define OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS
+# if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS_DECC)
+#  include OPENSSL_UNISTD
+# endif
+#else
+# include <io.h>
+#endif
+#include <string.h>
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DES
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+    printf("No DES support\n");
+    return (0);
+}
+#else
+# include <openssl/des.h>
+
+/* tisk tisk - the test keys don't all have odd parity :-( */
+/* test data */
+# define NUM_TESTS 34
+static unsigned char key_data[NUM_TESTS][8] = {
+    {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+    {0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF},
+    {0x30, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+    {0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11},
+    {0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF},
+    {0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11},
+    {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+    {0xFE, 0xDC, 0xBA, 0x98, 0x76, 0x54, 0x32, 0x10},
+    {0x7C, 0xA1, 0x10, 0x45, 0x4A, 0x1A, 0x6E, 0x57},
+    {0x01, 0x31, 0xD9, 0x61, 0x9D, 0xC1, 0x37, 0x6E},
+    {0x07, 0xA1, 0x13, 0x3E, 0x4A, 0x0B, 0x26, 0x86},
+    {0x38, 0x49, 0x67, 0x4C, 0x26, 0x02, 0x31, 0x9E},
+    {0x04, 0xB9, 0x15, 0xBA, 0x43, 0xFE, 0xB5, 0xB6},
+    {0x01, 0x13, 0xB9, 0x70, 0xFD, 0x34, 0xF2, 0xCE},
+    {0x01, 0x70, 0xF1, 0x75, 0x46, 0x8F, 0xB5, 0xE6},
+    {0x43, 0x29, 0x7F, 0xAD, 0x38, 0xE3, 0x73, 0xFE},
+    {0x07, 0xA7, 0x13, 0x70, 0x45, 0xDA, 0x2A, 0x16},
+    {0x04, 0x68, 0x91, 0x04, 0xC2, 0xFD, 0x3B, 0x2F},
+    {0x37, 0xD0, 0x6B, 0xB5, 0x16, 0xCB, 0x75, 0x46},
+    {0x1F, 0x08, 0x26, 0x0D, 0x1A, 0xC2, 0x46, 0x5E},
+    {0x58, 0x40, 0x23, 0x64, 0x1A, 0xBA, 0x61, 0x76},
+    {0x02, 0x58, 0x16, 0x16, 0x46, 0x29, 0xB0, 0x07},
+    {0x49, 0x79, 0x3E, 0xBC, 0x79, 0xB3, 0x25, 0x8F},
+    {0x4F, 0xB0, 0x5E, 0x15, 0x15, 0xAB, 0x73, 0xA7},
+    {0x49, 0xE9, 0x5D, 0x6D, 0x4C, 0xA2, 0x29, 0xBF},
+    {0x01, 0x83, 0x10, 0xDC, 0x40, 0x9B, 0x26, 0xD6},
+    {0x1C, 0x58, 0x7F, 0x1C, 0x13, 0x92, 0x4F, 0xEF},
+    {0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01},
+    {0x1F, 0x1F, 0x1F, 0x1F, 0x0E, 0x0E, 0x0E, 0x0E},
+    {0xE0, 0xFE, 0xE0, 0xFE, 0xF1, 0xFE, 0xF1, 0xFE},
+    {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+    {0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF},
+    {0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF},
+    {0xFE, 0xDC, 0xBA, 0x98, 0x76, 0x54, 0x32, 0x10}
+};
+
+static unsigned char plain_data[NUM_TESTS][8] = {
+    {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+    {0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF},
+    {0x10, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01},
+    {0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11},
+    {0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11},
+    {0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF},
+    {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+    {0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF},
+    {0x01, 0xA1, 0xD6, 0xD0, 0x39, 0x77, 0x67, 0x42},
+    {0x5C, 0xD5, 0x4C, 0xA8, 0x3D, 0xEF, 0x57, 0xDA},
+    {0x02, 0x48, 0xD4, 0x38, 0x06, 0xF6, 0x71, 0x72},
+    {0x51, 0x45, 0x4B, 0x58, 0x2D, 0xDF, 0x44, 0x0A},
+    {0x42, 0xFD, 0x44, 0x30, 0x59, 0x57, 0x7F, 0xA2},
+    {0x05, 0x9B, 0x5E, 0x08, 0x51, 0xCF, 0x14, 0x3A},
+    {0x07, 0x56, 0xD8, 0xE0, 0x77, 0x47, 0x61, 0xD2},
+    {0x76, 0x25, 0x14, 0xB8, 0x29, 0xBF, 0x48, 0x6A},
+    {0x3B, 0xDD, 0x11, 0x90, 0x49, 0x37, 0x28, 0x02},
+    {0x26, 0x95, 0x5F, 0x68, 0x35, 0xAF, 0x60, 0x9A},
+    {0x16, 0x4D, 0x5E, 0x40, 0x4F, 0x27, 0x52, 0x32},
+    {0x6B, 0x05, 0x6E, 0x18, 0x75, 0x9F, 0x5C, 0xCA},
+    {0x00, 0x4B, 0xD6, 0xEF, 0x09, 0x17, 0x60, 0x62},
+    {0x48, 0x0D, 0x39, 0x00, 0x6E, 0xE7, 0x62, 0xF2},
+    {0x43, 0x75, 0x40, 0xC8, 0x69, 0x8F, 0x3C, 0xFA},
+    {0x07, 0x2D, 0x43, 0xA0, 0x77, 0x07, 0x52, 0x92},
+    {0x02, 0xFE, 0x55, 0x77, 0x81, 0x17, 0xF1, 0x2A},
+    {0x1D, 0x9D, 0x5C, 0x50, 0x18, 0xF7, 0x28, 0xC2},
+    {0x30, 0x55, 0x32, 0x28, 0x6D, 0x6F, 0x29, 0x5A},
+    {0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF},
+    {0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF},
+    {0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF},
+    {0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF},
+    {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+    {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+    {0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF}
+};
+
+static unsigned char cipher_data[NUM_TESTS][8] = {
+    {0x8C, 0xA6, 0x4D, 0xE9, 0xC1, 0xB1, 0x23, 0xA7},
+    {0x73, 0x59, 0xB2, 0x16, 0x3E, 0x4E, 0xDC, 0x58},
+    {0x95, 0x8E, 0x6E, 0x62, 0x7A, 0x05, 0x55, 0x7B},
+    {0xF4, 0x03, 0x79, 0xAB, 0x9E, 0x0E, 0xC5, 0x33},
+    {0x17, 0x66, 0x8D, 0xFC, 0x72, 0x92, 0x53, 0x2D},
+    {0x8A, 0x5A, 0xE1, 0xF8, 0x1A, 0xB8, 0xF2, 0xDD},
+    {0x8C, 0xA6, 0x4D, 0xE9, 0xC1, 0xB1, 0x23, 0xA7},
+    {0xED, 0x39, 0xD9, 0x50, 0xFA, 0x74, 0xBC, 0xC4},
+    {0x69, 0x0F, 0x5B, 0x0D, 0x9A, 0x26, 0x93, 0x9B},
+    {0x7A, 0x38, 0x9D, 0x10, 0x35, 0x4B, 0xD2, 0x71},
+    {0x86, 0x8E, 0xBB, 0x51, 0xCA, 0xB4, 0x59, 0x9A},
+    {0x71, 0x78, 0x87, 0x6E, 0x01, 0xF1, 0x9B, 0x2A},
+    {0xAF, 0x37, 0xFB, 0x42, 0x1F, 0x8C, 0x40, 0x95},
+    {0x86, 0xA5, 0x60, 0xF1, 0x0E, 0xC6, 0xD8, 0x5B},
+    {0x0C, 0xD3, 0xDA, 0x02, 0x00, 0x21, 0xDC, 0x09},
+    {0xEA, 0x67, 0x6B, 0x2C, 0xB7, 0xDB, 0x2B, 0x7A},
+    {0xDF, 0xD6, 0x4A, 0x81, 0x5C, 0xAF, 0x1A, 0x0F},
+    {0x5C, 0x51, 0x3C, 0x9C, 0x48, 0x86, 0xC0, 0x88},
+    {0x0A, 0x2A, 0xEE, 0xAE, 0x3F, 0xF4, 0xAB, 0x77},
+    {0xEF, 0x1B, 0xF0, 0x3E, 0x5D, 0xFA, 0x57, 0x5A},
+    {0x88, 0xBF, 0x0D, 0xB6, 0xD7, 0x0D, 0xEE, 0x56},
+    {0xA1, 0xF9, 0x91, 0x55, 0x41, 0x02, 0x0B, 0x56},
+    {0x6F, 0xBF, 0x1C, 0xAF, 0xCF, 0xFD, 0x05, 0x56},
+    {0x2F, 0x22, 0xE4, 0x9B, 0xAB, 0x7C, 0xA1, 0xAC},
+    {0x5A, 0x6B, 0x61, 0x2C, 0xC2, 0x6C, 0xCE, 0x4A},
+    {0x5F, 0x4C, 0x03, 0x8E, 0xD1, 0x2B, 0x2E, 0x41},
+    {0x63, 0xFA, 0xC0, 0xD0, 0x34, 0xD9, 0xF7, 0x93},
+    {0x61, 0x7B, 0x3A, 0x0C, 0xE8, 0xF0, 0x71, 0x00},
+    {0xDB, 0x95, 0x86, 0x05, 0xF8, 0xC8, 0xC6, 0x06},
+    {0xED, 0xBF, 0xD1, 0xC6, 0x6C, 0x29, 0xCC, 0xC7},
+    {0x35, 0x55, 0x50, 0xB2, 0x15, 0x0E, 0x24, 0x51},
+    {0xCA, 0xAA, 0xAF, 0x4D, 0xEA, 0xF1, 0xDB, 0xAE},
+    {0xD5, 0xD4, 0x4F, 0xF7, 0x20, 0x68, 0x3D, 0x0D},
+    {0x2A, 0x2B, 0xB0, 0x08, 0xDF, 0x97, 0xC2, 0xF2}
+};
+
+static unsigned char cipher_ecb2[NUM_TESTS - 1][8] = {
+    {0x92, 0x95, 0xB5, 0x9B, 0xB3, 0x84, 0x73, 0x6E},
+    {0x19, 0x9E, 0x9D, 0x6D, 0xF3, 0x9A, 0xA8, 0x16},
+    {0x2A, 0x4B, 0x4D, 0x24, 0x52, 0x43, 0x84, 0x27},
+    {0x35, 0x84, 0x3C, 0x01, 0x9D, 0x18, 0xC5, 0xB6},
+    {0x4A, 0x5B, 0x2F, 0x42, 0xAA, 0x77, 0x19, 0x25},
+    {0xA0, 0x6B, 0xA9, 0xB8, 0xCA, 0x5B, 0x17, 0x8A},
+    {0xAB, 0x9D, 0xB7, 0xFB, 0xED, 0x95, 0xF2, 0x74},
+    {0x3D, 0x25, 0x6C, 0x23, 0xA7, 0x25, 0x2F, 0xD6},
+    {0xB7, 0x6F, 0xAB, 0x4F, 0xBD, 0xBD, 0xB7, 0x67},
+    {0x8F, 0x68, 0x27, 0xD6, 0x9C, 0xF4, 0x1A, 0x10},
+    {0x82, 0x57, 0xA1, 0xD6, 0x50, 0x5E, 0x81, 0x85},
+    {0xA2, 0x0F, 0x0A, 0xCD, 0x80, 0x89, 0x7D, 0xFA},
+    {0xCD, 0x2A, 0x53, 0x3A, 0xDB, 0x0D, 0x7E, 0xF3},
+    {0xD2, 0xC2, 0xBE, 0x27, 0xE8, 0x1B, 0x68, 0xE3},
+    {0xE9, 0x24, 0xCF, 0x4F, 0x89, 0x3C, 0x5B, 0x0A},
+    {0xA7, 0x18, 0xC3, 0x9F, 0xFA, 0x9F, 0xD7, 0x69},
+    {0x77, 0x2C, 0x79, 0xB1, 0xD2, 0x31, 0x7E, 0xB1},
+    {0x49, 0xAB, 0x92, 0x7F, 0xD0, 0x22, 0x00, 0xB7},
+    {0xCE, 0x1C, 0x6C, 0x7D, 0x85, 0xE3, 0x4A, 0x6F},
+    {0xBE, 0x91, 0xD6, 0xE1, 0x27, 0xB2, 0xE9, 0x87},
+    {0x70, 0x28, 0xAE, 0x8F, 0xD1, 0xF5, 0x74, 0x1A},
+    {0xAA, 0x37, 0x80, 0xBB, 0xF3, 0x22, 0x1D, 0xDE},
+    {0xA6, 0xC4, 0xD2, 0x5E, 0x28, 0x93, 0xAC, 0xB3},
+    {0x22, 0x07, 0x81, 0x5A, 0xE4, 0xB7, 0x1A, 0xAD},
+    {0xDC, 0xCE, 0x05, 0xE7, 0x07, 0xBD, 0xF5, 0x84},
+    {0x26, 0x1D, 0x39, 0x2C, 0xB3, 0xBA, 0xA5, 0x85},
+    {0xB4, 0xF7, 0x0F, 0x72, 0xFB, 0x04, 0xF0, 0xDC},
+    {0x95, 0xBA, 0xA9, 0x4E, 0x87, 0x36, 0xF2, 0x89},
+    {0xD4, 0x07, 0x3A, 0xF1, 0x5A, 0x17, 0x82, 0x0E},
+    {0xEF, 0x6F, 0xAF, 0xA7, 0x66, 0x1A, 0x7E, 0x89},
+    {0xC1, 0x97, 0xF5, 0x58, 0x74, 0x8A, 0x20, 0xE7},
+    {0x43, 0x34, 0xCF, 0xDA, 0x22, 0xC4, 0x86, 0xC8},
+    {0x08, 0xD7, 0xB4, 0xFB, 0x62, 0x9D, 0x08, 0x85}
+};
+
+static unsigned char cbc_key[8] =
+    { 0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xef };
+static unsigned char cbc2_key[8] =
+    { 0xf1, 0xe0, 0xd3, 0xc2, 0xb5, 0xa4, 0x97, 0x86 };
+static unsigned char cbc3_key[8] =
+    { 0xfe, 0xdc, 0xba, 0x98, 0x76, 0x54, 0x32, 0x10 };
+static unsigned char cbc_iv[8] =
+    { 0xfe, 0xdc, 0xba, 0x98, 0x76, 0x54, 0x32, 0x10 };
+/*
+ * Changed the following text constant to binary so it will work on ebcdic
+ * machines :-)
+ */
+/* static char cbc_data[40]="7654321 Now is the time for \0001"; */
+static unsigned char cbc_data[40] = {
+    0x37, 0x36, 0x35, 0x34, 0x33, 0x32, 0x31, 0x20,
+    0x4E, 0x6F, 0x77, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x74,
+    0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x74, 0x69, 0x6D, 0x65, 0x20,
+    0x66, 0x6F, 0x72, 0x20, 0x00, 0x31, 0x00, 0x00,
+    0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+};
+
+static unsigned char cbc_ok[32] = {
+    0xcc, 0xd1, 0x73, 0xff, 0xab, 0x20, 0x39, 0xf4,
+    0xac, 0xd8, 0xae, 0xfd, 0xdf, 0xd8, 0xa1, 0xeb,
+    0x46, 0x8e, 0x91, 0x15, 0x78, 0x88, 0xba, 0x68,
+    0x1d, 0x26, 0x93, 0x97, 0xf7, 0xfe, 0x62, 0xb4
+};
+
+# ifdef SCREW_THE_PARITY
+#  error "SCREW_THE_PARITY is not meant to be defined."
+#  error "Original vectors are preserved for reference only."
+static unsigned char cbc2_key[8] =
+    { 0xf0, 0xe1, 0xd2, 0xc3, 0xb4, 0xa5, 0x96, 0x87 };
+static unsigned char xcbc_ok[32] = {
+    0x86, 0x74, 0x81, 0x0D, 0x61, 0xA4, 0xA5, 0x48,
+    0xB9, 0x93, 0x03, 0xE1, 0xB8, 0xBB, 0xBD, 0xBD,
+    0x64, 0x30, 0x0B, 0xB9, 0x06, 0x65, 0x81, 0x76,
+    0x04, 0x1D, 0x77, 0x62, 0x17, 0xCA, 0x2B, 0xD2,
+};
+# else
+static unsigned char xcbc_ok[32] = {
+    0x84, 0x6B, 0x29, 0x14, 0x85, 0x1E, 0x9A, 0x29,
+    0x54, 0x73, 0x2F, 0x8A, 0xA0, 0xA6, 0x11, 0xC1,
+    0x15, 0xCD, 0xC2, 0xD7, 0x95, 0x1B, 0x10, 0x53,
+    0xA6, 0x3C, 0x5E, 0x03, 0xB2, 0x1A, 0xA3, 0xC4,
+};
+# endif
+
+static unsigned char cbc3_ok[32] = {
+    0x3F, 0xE3, 0x01, 0xC9, 0x62, 0xAC, 0x01, 0xD0,
+    0x22, 0x13, 0x76, 0x3C, 0x1C, 0xBD, 0x4C, 0xDC,
+    0x79, 0x96, 0x57, 0xC0, 0x64, 0xEC, 0xF5, 0xD4,
+    0x1C, 0x67, 0x38, 0x12, 0xCF, 0xDE, 0x96, 0x75
+};
+
+static unsigned char pcbc_ok[32] = {
+    0xcc, 0xd1, 0x73, 0xff, 0xab, 0x20, 0x39, 0xf4,
+    0x6d, 0xec, 0xb4, 0x70, 0xa0, 0xe5, 0x6b, 0x15,
+    0xae, 0xa6, 0xbf, 0x61, 0xed, 0x7d, 0x9c, 0x9f,
+    0xf7, 0x17, 0x46, 0x3b, 0x8a, 0xb3, 0xcc, 0x88
+};
+
+static unsigned char cfb_key[8] =
+    { 0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xef };
+static unsigned char cfb_iv[8] =
+    { 0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0x90, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xef };
+static unsigned char cfb_buf1[40], cfb_buf2[40], cfb_tmp[8];
+static unsigned char plain[24] = {
+    0x4e, 0x6f, 0x77, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73,
+    0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x74,
+    0x69, 0x6d, 0x65, 0x20, 0x66, 0x6f,
+    0x72, 0x20, 0x61, 0x6c, 0x6c, 0x20
+};
+
+static unsigned char cfb_cipher8[24] = {
+    0xf3, 0x1f, 0xda, 0x07, 0x01, 0x14, 0x62, 0xee, 0x18, 0x7f, 0x43, 0xd8,
+    0x0a, 0x7c, 0xd9, 0xb5, 0xb0, 0xd2, 0x90, 0xda, 0x6e, 0x5b, 0x9a, 0x87
+};
+
+static unsigned char cfb_cipher16[24] = {
+    0xF3, 0x09, 0x87, 0x87, 0x7F, 0x57, 0xF7, 0x3C, 0x36, 0xB6, 0xDB, 0x70,
+    0xD8, 0xD5, 0x34, 0x19, 0xD3, 0x86, 0xB2, 0x23, 0xB7, 0xB2, 0xAD, 0x1B
+};
+
+static unsigned char cfb_cipher32[24] = {
+    0xF3, 0x09, 0x62, 0x49, 0xA4, 0xDF, 0xA4, 0x9F, 0x33, 0xDC, 0x7B, 0xAD,
+    0x4C, 0xC8, 0x9F, 0x64, 0xE4, 0x53, 0xE5, 0xEC, 0x67, 0x20, 0xDA, 0xB6
+};
+
+static unsigned char cfb_cipher48[24] = {
+    0xF3, 0x09, 0x62, 0x49, 0xC7, 0xF4, 0x30, 0xB5, 0x15, 0xEC, 0xBB, 0x85,
+    0x97, 0x5A, 0x13, 0x8C, 0x68, 0x60, 0xE2, 0x38, 0x34, 0x3C, 0xDC, 0x1F
+};
+
+static unsigned char cfb_cipher64[24] = {
+    0xF3, 0x09, 0x62, 0x49, 0xC7, 0xF4, 0x6E, 0x51, 0xA6, 0x9E, 0x83, 0x9B,
+    0x1A, 0x92, 0xF7, 0x84, 0x03, 0x46, 0x71, 0x33, 0x89, 0x8E, 0xA6, 0x22
+};
+
+static unsigned char ofb_key[8] =
+    { 0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xef };
+static unsigned char ofb_iv[8] =
+    { 0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0x90, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xef };
+static unsigned char ofb_buf1[24], ofb_buf2[24], ofb_tmp[8];
+static unsigned char ofb_cipher[24] = {
+    0xf3, 0x09, 0x62, 0x49, 0xc7, 0xf4, 0x6e, 0x51,
+    0x35, 0xf2, 0x4a, 0x24, 0x2e, 0xeb, 0x3d, 0x3f,
+    0x3d, 0x6d, 0x5b, 0xe3, 0x25, 0x5a, 0xf8, 0xc3
+};
+static DES_LONG cbc_cksum_ret = 0xF7FE62B4L;
+static unsigned char cbc_cksum_data[8] =
+    { 0x1D, 0x26, 0x93, 0x97, 0xf7, 0xfe, 0x62, 0xb4 };
+
+static char *pt(unsigned char *p);
+static int cfb_test(int bits, unsigned char *cfb_cipher);
+static int cfb64_test(unsigned char *cfb_cipher);
+static int ede_cfb64_test(unsigned char *cfb_cipher);
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+    int j, err = 0;
+    unsigned int i;
+    DES_cblock in, out, outin, iv3;
+    DES_key_schedule ks, ks2, ks3;
+    unsigned char cbc_in[40];
+    unsigned char cbc_out[40];
+    DES_LONG cs;
+    unsigned char cret[8];
+    DES_LONG lqret[4];
+    int num;
+    char *str;
+
+    printf("Doing ecb\n");
+    for (i = 0; i < NUM_TESTS; i++) {
+        DES_set_key_unchecked(&key_data[i], &ks);
+        memcpy(in, plain_data[i], 8);
+        memset(out, 0, 8);
+        memset(outin, 0, 8);
+        DES_ecb_encrypt(&in, &out, &ks, DES_ENCRYPT);
+        DES_ecb_encrypt(&out, &outin, &ks, DES_DECRYPT);
+
+        if (memcmp(out, cipher_data[i], 8) != 0) {
+            printf("Encryption error %2d\nk=%s p=%s o=%s act=%s\n",
+                   i + 1, pt(key_data[i]), pt(in), pt(cipher_data[i]),
+                   pt(out));
+            err = 1;
+        }
+        if (memcmp(in, outin, 8) != 0) {
+            printf("Decryption error %2d\nk=%s p=%s o=%s act=%s\n",
+                   i + 1, pt(key_data[i]), pt(out), pt(in), pt(outin));
+            err = 1;
+        }
+    }
+
+# ifndef LIBDES_LIT
+    printf("Doing ede ecb\n");
+    for (i = 0; i < (NUM_TESTS - 2); i++) {
+        DES_set_key_unchecked(&key_data[i], &ks);
+        DES_set_key_unchecked(&key_data[i + 1], &ks2);
+        DES_set_key_unchecked(&key_data[i + 2], &ks3);
+        memcpy(in, plain_data[i], 8);
+        memset(out, 0, 8);
+        memset(outin, 0, 8);
+        DES_ecb3_encrypt(&in,&out,&ks,&ks2,&ks,DES_ENCRYPT);
+        DES_ecb3_encrypt(&out,&outin,&ks,&ks2,&ks,DES_DECRYPT);
+
+        if (memcmp(out, cipher_ecb2[i], 8) != 0) {
+            printf("Encryption error %2d\nk=%s p=%s o=%s act=%s\n",
+                   i + 1, pt(key_data[i]), pt(in), pt(cipher_ecb2[i]),
+                   pt(out));
+            err = 1;
+        }
+        if (memcmp(in, outin, 8) != 0) {
+            printf("Decryption error %2d\nk=%s p=%s o=%s act=%s\n",
+                   i + 1, pt(key_data[i]), pt(out), pt(in), pt(outin));
+            err = 1;
+        }
+    }
+# endif
+
+    printf("Doing cbc\n");
+    if ((j = DES_set_key_checked(&cbc_key, &ks)) != 0) {
+        printf("Key error %d\n", j);
+        err = 1;
+    }
+    memset(cbc_out, 0, 40);
+    memset(cbc_in, 0, 40);
+    memcpy(iv3, cbc_iv, sizeof(cbc_iv));
+    DES_ncbc_encrypt(cbc_data, cbc_out, strlen((char *)cbc_data) + 1, &ks,
+                     &iv3, DES_ENCRYPT);
+    if (memcmp(cbc_out, cbc_ok, 32) != 0) {
+        printf("cbc_encrypt encrypt error\n");
+        err = 1;
+    }
+
+    memcpy(iv3, cbc_iv, sizeof(cbc_iv));
+    DES_ncbc_encrypt(cbc_out, cbc_in, strlen((char *)cbc_data) + 1, &ks,
+                     &iv3, DES_DECRYPT);
+    if (memcmp(cbc_in, cbc_data, strlen((char *)cbc_data)) != 0) {
+        printf("cbc_encrypt decrypt error\n");
+        err = 1;
+    }
+# ifndef LIBDES_LIT
+    printf("Doing desx cbc\n");
+    if ((j = DES_set_key_checked(&cbc_key, &ks)) != 0) {
+        printf("Key error %d\n", j);
+        err = 1;
+    }
+    memset(cbc_out, 0, 40);
+    memset(cbc_in, 0, 40);
+    memcpy(iv3, cbc_iv, sizeof(cbc_iv));
+    DES_xcbc_encrypt(cbc_data, cbc_out, strlen((char *)cbc_data) + 1, &ks,
+                     &iv3, &cbc2_key, &cbc3_key, DES_ENCRYPT);
+    if (memcmp(cbc_out, xcbc_ok, 32) != 0) {
+        printf("des_xcbc_encrypt encrypt error\n");
+        err = 1;
+    }
+    memcpy(iv3, cbc_iv, sizeof(cbc_iv));
+    DES_xcbc_encrypt(cbc_out, cbc_in, strlen((char *)cbc_data) + 1, &ks,
+                     &iv3, &cbc2_key, &cbc3_key, DES_DECRYPT);
+    if (memcmp(cbc_in, cbc_data, strlen((char *)cbc_data) + 1) != 0) {
+        printf("des_xcbc_encrypt decrypt error\n");
+        err = 1;
+    }
+# endif
+
+    printf("Doing ede cbc\n");
+    if ((j = DES_set_key_checked(&cbc_key, &ks)) != 0) {
+        printf("Key error %d\n", j);
+        err = 1;
+    }
+    if ((j = DES_set_key_checked(&cbc2_key, &ks2)) != 0) {
+        printf("Key error %d\n", j);
+        err = 1;
+    }
+    if ((j = DES_set_key_checked(&cbc3_key, &ks3)) != 0) {
+        printf("Key error %d\n", j);
+        err = 1;
+    }
+    memset(cbc_out, 0, 40);
+    memset(cbc_in, 0, 40);
+    i = strlen((char *)cbc_data) + 1;
+    /* i=((i+7)/8)*8; */
+    memcpy(iv3, cbc_iv, sizeof(cbc_iv));
+
+    DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt(cbc_data, cbc_out, 16L, &ks, &ks2, &ks3, &iv3,
+                         DES_ENCRYPT);
+    DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt(&(cbc_data[16]), &(cbc_out[16]), i - 16, &ks, &ks2,
+                         &ks3, &iv3, DES_ENCRYPT);
+    if (memcmp
+        (cbc_out, cbc3_ok,
+         (unsigned int)(strlen((char *)cbc_data) + 1 + 7) / 8 * 8) != 0) {
+        unsigned int n;
+
+        printf("des_ede3_cbc_encrypt encrypt error\n");
+        for (n = 0; n < i; ++n)
+            printf(" %02x", cbc_out[n]);
+        printf("\n");
+        for (n = 0; n < i; ++n)
+            printf(" %02x", cbc3_ok[n]);
+        printf("\n");
+        err = 1;
+    }
+
+    memcpy(iv3, cbc_iv, sizeof(cbc_iv));
+    DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt(cbc_out, cbc_in, i, &ks, &ks2, &ks3, &iv3, DES_DECRYPT);
+    if (memcmp(cbc_in, cbc_data, strlen((char *)cbc_data) + 1) != 0) {
+        unsigned int n;
+
+        printf("DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt decrypt error\n");
+        for (n = 0; n < i; ++n)
+            printf(" %02x", cbc_data[n]);
+        printf("\n");
+        for (n = 0; n < i; ++n)
+            printf(" %02x", cbc_in[n]);
+        printf("\n");
+        err = 1;
+    }
+# ifndef LIBDES_LIT
+    printf("Doing pcbc\n");
+    if ((j = DES_set_key_checked(&cbc_key, &ks)) != 0) {
+        printf("Key error %d\n", j);
+        err = 1;
+    }
+    memset(cbc_out, 0, 40);
+    memset(cbc_in, 0, 40);
+    DES_pcbc_encrypt(cbc_data, cbc_out, strlen((char *)cbc_data) + 1, &ks,
+                     &cbc_iv, DES_ENCRYPT);
+    if (memcmp(cbc_out, pcbc_ok, 32) != 0) {
+        printf("pcbc_encrypt encrypt error\n");
+        err = 1;
+    }
+    DES_pcbc_encrypt(cbc_out, cbc_in, strlen((char *)cbc_data) + 1, &ks,
+                     &cbc_iv, DES_DECRYPT);
+    if (memcmp(cbc_in, cbc_data, strlen((char *)cbc_data) + 1) != 0) {
+        printf("pcbc_encrypt decrypt error\n");
+        err = 1;
+    }
+
+    printf("Doing ");
+    printf("cfb8 ");
+    err += cfb_test(8, cfb_cipher8);
+    printf("cfb16 ");
+    err += cfb_test(16, cfb_cipher16);
+    printf("cfb32 ");
+    err += cfb_test(32, cfb_cipher32);
+    printf("cfb48 ");
+    err += cfb_test(48, cfb_cipher48);
+    printf("cfb64 ");
+    err += cfb_test(64, cfb_cipher64);
+
+    printf("cfb64() ");
+    err += cfb64_test(cfb_cipher64);
+
+    memcpy(cfb_tmp, cfb_iv, sizeof(cfb_iv));
+    for (i = 0; i < sizeof(plain); i++)
+        DES_cfb_encrypt(&(plain[i]), &(cfb_buf1[i]),
+                        8, 1, &ks, &cfb_tmp, DES_ENCRYPT);
+    if (memcmp(cfb_cipher8, cfb_buf1, sizeof(plain)) != 0) {
+        printf("cfb_encrypt small encrypt error\n");
+        err = 1;
+    }
+
+    memcpy(cfb_tmp, cfb_iv, sizeof(cfb_iv));
+    for (i = 0; i < sizeof(plain); i++)
+        DES_cfb_encrypt(&(cfb_buf1[i]), &(cfb_buf2[i]),
+                        8, 1, &ks, &cfb_tmp, DES_DECRYPT);
+    if (memcmp(plain, cfb_buf2, sizeof(plain)) != 0) {
+        printf("cfb_encrypt small decrypt error\n");
+        err = 1;
+    }
+
+    printf("ede_cfb64() ");
+    err += ede_cfb64_test(cfb_cipher64);
+
+    printf("done\n");
+
+    printf("Doing ofb\n");
+    DES_set_key_checked(&ofb_key, &ks);
+    memcpy(ofb_tmp, ofb_iv, sizeof(ofb_iv));
+    DES_ofb_encrypt(plain, ofb_buf1, 64, sizeof(plain) / 8, &ks, &ofb_tmp);
+    if (memcmp(ofb_cipher, ofb_buf1, sizeof(ofb_buf1)) != 0) {
+        printf("ofb_encrypt encrypt error\n");
+        printf("%02X %02X %02X %02X %02X %02X %02X %02X\n",
+               ofb_buf1[8 + 0], ofb_buf1[8 + 1], ofb_buf1[8 + 2],
+               ofb_buf1[8 + 3], ofb_buf1[8 + 4], ofb_buf1[8 + 5],
+               ofb_buf1[8 + 6], ofb_buf1[8 + 7]);
+        printf("%02X %02X %02X %02X %02X %02X %02X %02X\n", ofb_buf1[8 + 0],
+               ofb_cipher[8 + 1], ofb_cipher[8 + 2], ofb_cipher[8 + 3],
+               ofb_buf1[8 + 4], ofb_cipher[8 + 5], ofb_cipher[8 + 6],
+               ofb_cipher[8 + 7]);
+        err = 1;
+    }
+    memcpy(ofb_tmp, ofb_iv, sizeof(ofb_iv));
+    DES_ofb_encrypt(ofb_buf1, ofb_buf2, 64, sizeof(ofb_buf1) / 8, &ks,
+                    &ofb_tmp);
+    if (memcmp(plain, ofb_buf2, sizeof(ofb_buf2)) != 0) {
+        printf("ofb_encrypt decrypt error\n");
+        printf("%02X %02X %02X %02X %02X %02X %02X %02X\n",
+               ofb_buf2[8 + 0], ofb_buf2[8 + 1], ofb_buf2[8 + 2],
+               ofb_buf2[8 + 3], ofb_buf2[8 + 4], ofb_buf2[8 + 5],
+               ofb_buf2[8 + 6], ofb_buf2[8 + 7]);
+        printf("%02X %02X %02X %02X %02X %02X %02X %02X\n", plain[8 + 0],
+               plain[8 + 1], plain[8 + 2], plain[8 + 3], plain[8 + 4],
+               plain[8 + 5], plain[8 + 6], plain[8 + 7]);
+        err = 1;
+    }
+
+    printf("Doing ofb64\n");
+    DES_set_key_checked(&ofb_key, &ks);
+    memcpy(ofb_tmp, ofb_iv, sizeof(ofb_iv));
+    memset(ofb_buf1, 0, sizeof(ofb_buf1));
+    memset(ofb_buf2, 0, sizeof(ofb_buf1));
+    num = 0;
+    for (i = 0; i < sizeof(plain); i++) {
+        DES_ofb64_encrypt(&(plain[i]), &(ofb_buf1[i]), 1, &ks, &ofb_tmp, &num);
+    }
+    if (memcmp(ofb_cipher, ofb_buf1, sizeof(ofb_buf1)) != 0) {
+        printf("ofb64_encrypt encrypt error\n");
+        err = 1;
+    }
+    memcpy(ofb_tmp, ofb_iv, sizeof(ofb_iv));
+    num = 0;
+    DES_ofb64_encrypt(ofb_buf1, ofb_buf2, sizeof(ofb_buf1), &ks, &ofb_tmp,
+                      &num);
+    if (memcmp(plain, ofb_buf2, sizeof(ofb_buf2)) != 0) {
+        printf("ofb64_encrypt decrypt error\n");
+        err = 1;
+    }
+
+    printf("Doing ede_ofb64\n");
+    DES_set_key_checked(&ofb_key, &ks);
+    memcpy(ofb_tmp, ofb_iv, sizeof(ofb_iv));
+    memset(ofb_buf1, 0, sizeof(ofb_buf1));
+    memset(ofb_buf2, 0, sizeof(ofb_buf1));
+    num = 0;
+    for (i = 0; i < sizeof(plain); i++) {
+        DES_ede3_ofb64_encrypt(&(plain[i]), &(ofb_buf1[i]), 1, &ks, &ks,
+                               &ks, &ofb_tmp, &num);
+    }
+    if (memcmp(ofb_cipher, ofb_buf1, sizeof(ofb_buf1)) != 0) {
+        printf("ede_ofb64_encrypt encrypt error\n");
+        err = 1;
+    }
+    memcpy(ofb_tmp, ofb_iv, sizeof(ofb_iv));
+    num = 0;
+    DES_ede3_ofb64_encrypt(ofb_buf1, ofb_buf2, sizeof(ofb_buf1), &ks, &ks, &ks,
+                           &ofb_tmp, &num);
+    if (memcmp(plain, ofb_buf2, sizeof(ofb_buf2)) != 0) {
+        printf("ede_ofb64_encrypt decrypt error\n");
+        err = 1;
+    }
+
+    printf("Doing cbc_cksum\n");
+    DES_set_key_checked(&cbc_key, &ks);
+    cs = DES_cbc_cksum(cbc_data, &cret, strlen((char *)cbc_data), &ks,
+                       &cbc_iv);
+    if (cs != cbc_cksum_ret) {
+        printf("bad return value (%08lX), should be %08lX\n",
+               (unsigned long)cs, (unsigned long)cbc_cksum_ret);
+        err = 1;
+    }
+    if (memcmp(cret, cbc_cksum_data, 8) != 0) {
+        printf("bad cbc_cksum block returned\n");
+        err = 1;
+    }
+
+    printf("Doing quad_cksum\n");
+    cs = DES_quad_cksum(cbc_data, (DES_cblock *)lqret,
+                        (long)strlen((char *)cbc_data), 2,
+                        (DES_cblock *)cbc_iv);
+    if (cs != 0x70d7a63aL) {
+        printf("quad_cksum error, ret %08lx should be 70d7a63a\n",
+               (unsigned long)cs);
+        err = 1;
+    }
+    if (lqret[0] != 0x327eba8dL) {
+        printf("quad_cksum error, out[0] %08lx is not %08lx\n",
+               (unsigned long)lqret[0], 0x327eba8dUL);
+        err = 1;
+    }
+    if (lqret[1] != 0x201a49ccL) {
+        printf("quad_cksum error, out[1] %08lx is not %08lx\n",
+               (unsigned long)lqret[1], 0x201a49ccUL);
+        err = 1;
+    }
+    if (lqret[2] != 0x70d7a63aL) {
+        printf("quad_cksum error, out[2] %08lx is not %08lx\n",
+               (unsigned long)lqret[2], 0x70d7a63aUL);
+        err = 1;
+    }
+    if (lqret[3] != 0x501c2c26L) {
+        printf("quad_cksum error, out[3] %08lx is not %08lx\n",
+               (unsigned long)lqret[3], 0x501c2c26UL);
+        err = 1;
+    }
+# endif
+
+    printf("input word alignment test");
+    for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
+        printf(" %d", i);
+        DES_ncbc_encrypt(&(cbc_out[i]), cbc_in,
+                         strlen((char *)cbc_data) + 1, &ks,
+                         &cbc_iv, DES_ENCRYPT);
+    }
+    printf("\noutput word alignment test");
+    for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
+        printf(" %d", i);
+        DES_ncbc_encrypt(cbc_out, &(cbc_in[i]),
+                         strlen((char *)cbc_data) + 1, &ks,
+                         &cbc_iv, DES_ENCRYPT);
+    }
+    printf("\n");
+    printf("fast crypt test ");
+    str = DES_crypt("testing", "ef");
+    if (strcmp("efGnQx2725bI2", str) != 0) {
+        printf("fast crypt error, %s should be efGnQx2725bI2\n", str);
+        err = 1;
+    }
+    str = DES_crypt("bca76;23", "yA");
+    if (strcmp("yA1Rp/1hZXIJk", str) != 0) {
+        printf("fast crypt error, %s should be yA1Rp/1hZXIJk\n", str);
+        err = 1;
+    }
+    str = DES_crypt("testing", "y\202");
+    if (str != NULL) {
+        printf("salt error only usascii are accepted\n");
+        err = 1;
+    }
+    str = DES_crypt("testing", "\0A");
+    if (str != NULL) {
+        printf("salt error cannot contain null terminator\n");
+        err = 1;
+    }
+    str = DES_crypt("testing", "A");
+    if (str != NULL) {
+        printf("salt error must be at least 2\n");
+        err = 1;
+    }
+    printf("\n");
+    return (err);
+}
+
+static char *pt(unsigned char *p)
+{
+    static char bufs[10][20];
+    static int bnum = 0;
+    char *ret;
+    int i;
+    static char *f = "0123456789ABCDEF";
+
+    ret = &(bufs[bnum++][0]);
+    bnum %= 10;
+    for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+        ret[i * 2] = f[(p[i] >> 4) & 0xf];
+        ret[i * 2 + 1] = f[p[i] & 0xf];
+    }
+    ret[16] = '\0';
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+# ifndef LIBDES_LIT
+
+static int cfb_test(int bits, unsigned char *cfb_cipher)
+{
+    DES_key_schedule ks;
+    int i, err = 0;
+
+    DES_set_key_checked(&cfb_key, &ks);
+    memcpy(cfb_tmp, cfb_iv, sizeof(cfb_iv));
+    DES_cfb_encrypt(plain, cfb_buf1, bits, sizeof(plain), &ks, &cfb_tmp,
+                    DES_ENCRYPT);
+    if (memcmp(cfb_cipher, cfb_buf1, sizeof(plain)) != 0) {
+        err = 1;
+        printf("cfb_encrypt encrypt error\n");
+        for (i = 0; i < 24; i += 8)
+            printf("%s\n", pt(&(cfb_buf1[i])));
+    }
+    memcpy(cfb_tmp, cfb_iv, sizeof(cfb_iv));
+    DES_cfb_encrypt(cfb_buf1, cfb_buf2, bits, sizeof(plain), &ks, &cfb_tmp,
+                    DES_DECRYPT);
+    if (memcmp(plain, cfb_buf2, sizeof(plain)) != 0) {
+        err = 1;
+        printf("cfb_encrypt decrypt error\n");
+        for (i = 0; i < 24; i += 8)
+            printf("%s\n", pt(&(cfb_buf1[i])));
+    }
+    return (err);
+}
+
+static int cfb64_test(unsigned char *cfb_cipher)
+{
+    DES_key_schedule ks;
+    int err = 0, i, n;
+
+    DES_set_key_checked(&cfb_key, &ks);
+    memcpy(cfb_tmp, cfb_iv, sizeof(cfb_iv));
+    n = 0;
+    DES_cfb64_encrypt(plain, cfb_buf1, 12, &ks, &cfb_tmp, &n, DES_ENCRYPT);
+    DES_cfb64_encrypt(&(plain[12]), &(cfb_buf1[12]), sizeof(plain) - 12, &ks,
+                      &cfb_tmp, &n, DES_ENCRYPT);
+    if (memcmp(cfb_cipher, cfb_buf1, sizeof(plain)) != 0) {
+        err = 1;
+        printf("cfb_encrypt encrypt error\n");
+        for (i = 0; i < 24; i += 8)
+            printf("%s\n", pt(&(cfb_buf1[i])));
+    }
+    memcpy(cfb_tmp, cfb_iv, sizeof(cfb_iv));
+    n = 0;
+    DES_cfb64_encrypt(cfb_buf1, cfb_buf2, 17, &ks, &cfb_tmp, &n, DES_DECRYPT);
+    DES_cfb64_encrypt(&(cfb_buf1[17]), &(cfb_buf2[17]),
+                      sizeof(plain) - 17, &ks, &cfb_tmp, &n, DES_DECRYPT);
+    if (memcmp(plain, cfb_buf2, sizeof(plain)) != 0) {
+        err = 1;
+        printf("cfb_encrypt decrypt error\n");
+        for (i = 0; i < 24; i += 8)
+            printf("%s\n", pt(&(cfb_buf2[i])));
+    }
+    return (err);
+}
+
+static int ede_cfb64_test(unsigned char *cfb_cipher)
+{
+    DES_key_schedule ks;
+    int err = 0, i, n;
+
+    DES_set_key_checked(&cfb_key, &ks);
+    memcpy(cfb_tmp, cfb_iv, sizeof(cfb_iv));
+    n = 0;
+    DES_ede3_cfb64_encrypt(plain, cfb_buf1, 12, &ks, &ks, &ks, &cfb_tmp, &n,
+                           DES_ENCRYPT);
+    DES_ede3_cfb64_encrypt(&(plain[12]), &(cfb_buf1[12]),
+                           sizeof(plain) - 12, &ks, &ks, &ks,
+                           &cfb_tmp, &n, DES_ENCRYPT);
+    if (memcmp(cfb_cipher, cfb_buf1, sizeof(plain)) != 0) {
+        err = 1;
+        printf("ede_cfb_encrypt encrypt error\n");
+        for (i = 0; i < 24; i += 8)
+            printf("%s\n", pt(&(cfb_buf1[i])));
+    }
+    memcpy(cfb_tmp, cfb_iv, sizeof(cfb_iv));
+    n = 0;
+    DES_ede3_cfb64_encrypt(cfb_buf1, cfb_buf2, (long)17, &ks, &ks, &ks,
+                           &cfb_tmp, &n, DES_DECRYPT);
+    DES_ede3_cfb64_encrypt(&(cfb_buf1[17]), &(cfb_buf2[17]),
+                           sizeof(plain) - 17, &ks, &ks, &ks,
+                           &cfb_tmp, &n, DES_DECRYPT);
+    if (memcmp(plain, cfb_buf2, sizeof(plain)) != 0) {
+        err = 1;
+        printf("ede_cfb_encrypt decrypt error\n");
+        for (i = 0; i < 24; i += 8)
+            printf("%s\n", pt(&(cfb_buf2[i])));
+    }
+    return (err);
+}
+
+# endif
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/dhtest.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/dhtest.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ecf2d9d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/dhtest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,626 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "../e_os.h"
+
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+    printf("No DH support\n");
+    return (0);
+}
+#else
+# include <openssl/dh.h>
+
+static int cb(int p, int n, BN_GENCB *arg);
+
+static const char rnd_seed[] =
+    "string to make the random number generator think it has entropy";
+
+static int run_rfc5114_tests(void);
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+    BN_GENCB *_cb = NULL;
+    DH *a = NULL;
+    DH *b = NULL;
+    DH *c = NULL;
+    const BIGNUM *ap = NULL, *ag = NULL, *apub_key = NULL, *priv_key = NULL;
+    const BIGNUM *bpub_key = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *bp = NULL, *bg = NULL, *cpriv_key = NULL;
+    char buf[12] = {0};
+    unsigned char *abuf = NULL;
+    unsigned char *bbuf = NULL;
+    unsigned char *cbuf = NULL;
+    int i, alen, blen, clen, aout, bout, cout;
+    int ret = 1;
+    BIO *out = NULL;
+
+    CRYPTO_set_mem_debug(1);
+    CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON);
+
+    RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof(rnd_seed));
+
+    out = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
+    if (out == NULL)
+        EXIT(1);
+    BIO_set_fp(out, stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT);
+
+    _cb = BN_GENCB_new();
+    if (_cb == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    BN_GENCB_set(_cb, &cb, out);
+    if (((a = DH_new()) == NULL)
+        || (!DH_generate_parameters_ex(a, 64, DH_GENERATOR_5, _cb)))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!DH_check(a, &i))
+        goto err;
+    if (i & DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME)
+        BIO_puts(out, "p value is not prime\n");
+    if (i & DH_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME)
+        BIO_puts(out, "p value is not a safe prime\n");
+    if (i & DH_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR)
+        BIO_puts(out, "unable to check the generator value\n");
+    if (i & DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR)
+        BIO_puts(out, "the g value is not a generator\n");
+
+    DH_get0_pqg(a, &ap, NULL, &ag);
+    BIO_puts(out, "\np    =");
+    BN_print(out, ap);
+    BIO_puts(out, "\ng    =");
+    BN_print(out, ag);
+    BIO_puts(out, "\n");
+
+    b = DH_new();
+    if (b == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    bp = BN_dup(ap);
+    bg = BN_dup(ag);
+    if ((bp == NULL) || (bg == NULL) || !DH_set0_pqg(b, bp, NULL, bg))
+        goto err;
+    bp = bg = NULL;
+
+    if (!DH_generate_key(a))
+        goto err;
+    DH_get0_key(a, &apub_key, &priv_key);
+    BIO_puts(out, "pri 1=");
+    BN_print(out, priv_key);
+    BIO_puts(out, "\npub 1=");
+    BN_print(out, apub_key);
+    BIO_puts(out, "\n");
+
+    if (!DH_generate_key(b))
+        goto err;
+    DH_get0_key(b, &bpub_key, &priv_key);
+    BIO_puts(out, "pri 2=");
+    BN_print(out, priv_key);
+    BIO_puts(out, "\npub 2=");
+    BN_print(out, bpub_key);
+    BIO_puts(out, "\n");
+
+    /* Also test with a private-key-only copy of |b|. */
+    if ((c = DHparams_dup(b)) == NULL
+            || (cpriv_key = BN_dup(priv_key)) == NULL
+            || !DH_set0_key(c, NULL, cpriv_key))
+        goto err;
+    cpriv_key = NULL;
+
+    alen = DH_size(a);
+    abuf = OPENSSL_malloc(alen);
+    if (abuf == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    aout = DH_compute_key(abuf, bpub_key, a);
+
+    BIO_puts(out, "key1 =");
+    for (i = 0; i < aout; i++) {
+        sprintf(buf, "%02X", abuf[i]);
+        BIO_puts(out, buf);
+    }
+    BIO_puts(out, "\n");
+
+    blen = DH_size(b);
+    bbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(blen);
+    if (bbuf == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    bout = DH_compute_key(bbuf, apub_key, b);
+
+    BIO_puts(out, "key2 =");
+    for (i = 0; i < bout; i++) {
+        sprintf(buf, "%02X", bbuf[i]);
+        BIO_puts(out, buf);
+    }
+    BIO_puts(out, "\n");
+
+    clen = DH_size(c);
+    cbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(clen);
+    if (cbuf == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    cout = DH_compute_key(cbuf, apub_key, c);
+
+    BIO_puts(out, "key3 =");
+    for (i = 0; i < cout; i++) {
+        sprintf(buf, "%02X", cbuf[i]);
+        BIO_puts(out, buf);
+    }
+    BIO_puts(out, "\n");
+
+    if ((aout < 4) || (bout != aout) || (memcmp(abuf, bbuf, aout) != 0)
+        || (cout != aout) || (memcmp(abuf, cbuf, aout) != 0)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Error in DH routines\n");
+        ret = 1;
+    } else
+        ret = 0;
+    if (!run_rfc5114_tests())
+        ret = 1;
+ err:
+    (void)BIO_flush(out);
+    ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+
+    OPENSSL_free(abuf);
+    OPENSSL_free(bbuf);
+    OPENSSL_free(cbuf);
+    DH_free(b);
+    DH_free(a);
+    DH_free(c);
+    BN_free(bp);
+    BN_free(bg);
+    BN_free(cpriv_key);
+    BN_GENCB_free(_cb);
+    BIO_free(out);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG
+    if (CRYPTO_mem_leaks_fp(stderr) <= 0)
+        ret = 1;
+#endif
+
+    EXIT(ret);
+}
+
+static int cb(int p, int n, BN_GENCB *arg)
+{
+    char c = '*';
+
+    if (p == 0)
+        c = '.';
+    if (p == 1)
+        c = '+';
+    if (p == 2)
+        c = '*';
+    if (p == 3)
+        c = '\n';
+    BIO_write(BN_GENCB_get_arg(arg), &c, 1);
+    (void)BIO_flush(BN_GENCB_get_arg(arg));
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Test data from RFC 5114 */
+
+static const unsigned char dhtest_1024_160_xA[] = {
+    0xB9, 0xA3, 0xB3, 0xAE, 0x8F, 0xEF, 0xC1, 0xA2, 0x93, 0x04, 0x96, 0x50,
+    0x70, 0x86, 0xF8, 0x45, 0x5D, 0x48, 0x94, 0x3E
+};
+
+static const unsigned char dhtest_1024_160_yA[] = {
+    0x2A, 0x85, 0x3B, 0x3D, 0x92, 0x19, 0x75, 0x01, 0xB9, 0x01, 0x5B, 0x2D,
+    0xEB, 0x3E, 0xD8, 0x4F, 0x5E, 0x02, 0x1D, 0xCC, 0x3E, 0x52, 0xF1, 0x09,
+    0xD3, 0x27, 0x3D, 0x2B, 0x75, 0x21, 0x28, 0x1C, 0xBA, 0xBE, 0x0E, 0x76,
+    0xFF, 0x57, 0x27, 0xFA, 0x8A, 0xCC, 0xE2, 0x69, 0x56, 0xBA, 0x9A, 0x1F,
+    0xCA, 0x26, 0xF2, 0x02, 0x28, 0xD8, 0x69, 0x3F, 0xEB, 0x10, 0x84, 0x1D,
+    0x84, 0xA7, 0x36, 0x00, 0x54, 0xEC, 0xE5, 0xA7, 0xF5, 0xB7, 0xA6, 0x1A,
+    0xD3, 0xDF, 0xB3, 0xC6, 0x0D, 0x2E, 0x43, 0x10, 0x6D, 0x87, 0x27, 0xDA,
+    0x37, 0xDF, 0x9C, 0xCE, 0x95, 0xB4, 0x78, 0x75, 0x5D, 0x06, 0xBC, 0xEA,
+    0x8F, 0x9D, 0x45, 0x96, 0x5F, 0x75, 0xA5, 0xF3, 0xD1, 0xDF, 0x37, 0x01,
+    0x16, 0x5F, 0xC9, 0xE5, 0x0C, 0x42, 0x79, 0xCE, 0xB0, 0x7F, 0x98, 0x95,
+    0x40, 0xAE, 0x96, 0xD5, 0xD8, 0x8E, 0xD7, 0x76
+};
+
+static const unsigned char dhtest_1024_160_xB[] = {
+    0x93, 0x92, 0xC9, 0xF9, 0xEB, 0x6A, 0x7A, 0x6A, 0x90, 0x22, 0xF7, 0xD8,
+    0x3E, 0x72, 0x23, 0xC6, 0x83, 0x5B, 0xBD, 0xDA
+};
+
+static const unsigned char dhtest_1024_160_yB[] = {
+    0x71, 0x7A, 0x6C, 0xB0, 0x53, 0x37, 0x1F, 0xF4, 0xA3, 0xB9, 0x32, 0x94,
+    0x1C, 0x1E, 0x56, 0x63, 0xF8, 0x61, 0xA1, 0xD6, 0xAD, 0x34, 0xAE, 0x66,
+    0x57, 0x6D, 0xFB, 0x98, 0xF6, 0xC6, 0xCB, 0xF9, 0xDD, 0xD5, 0xA5, 0x6C,
+    0x78, 0x33, 0xF6, 0xBC, 0xFD, 0xFF, 0x09, 0x55, 0x82, 0xAD, 0x86, 0x8E,
+    0x44, 0x0E, 0x8D, 0x09, 0xFD, 0x76, 0x9E, 0x3C, 0xEC, 0xCD, 0xC3, 0xD3,
+    0xB1, 0xE4, 0xCF, 0xA0, 0x57, 0x77, 0x6C, 0xAA, 0xF9, 0x73, 0x9B, 0x6A,
+    0x9F, 0xEE, 0x8E, 0x74, 0x11, 0xF8, 0xD6, 0xDA, 0xC0, 0x9D, 0x6A, 0x4E,
+    0xDB, 0x46, 0xCC, 0x2B, 0x5D, 0x52, 0x03, 0x09, 0x0E, 0xAE, 0x61, 0x26,
+    0x31, 0x1E, 0x53, 0xFD, 0x2C, 0x14, 0xB5, 0x74, 0xE6, 0xA3, 0x10, 0x9A,
+    0x3D, 0xA1, 0xBE, 0x41, 0xBD, 0xCE, 0xAA, 0x18, 0x6F, 0x5C, 0xE0, 0x67,
+    0x16, 0xA2, 0xB6, 0xA0, 0x7B, 0x3C, 0x33, 0xFE
+};
+
+static const unsigned char dhtest_1024_160_Z[] = {
+    0x5C, 0x80, 0x4F, 0x45, 0x4D, 0x30, 0xD9, 0xC4, 0xDF, 0x85, 0x27, 0x1F,
+    0x93, 0x52, 0x8C, 0x91, 0xDF, 0x6B, 0x48, 0xAB, 0x5F, 0x80, 0xB3, 0xB5,
+    0x9C, 0xAA, 0xC1, 0xB2, 0x8F, 0x8A, 0xCB, 0xA9, 0xCD, 0x3E, 0x39, 0xF3,
+    0xCB, 0x61, 0x45, 0x25, 0xD9, 0x52, 0x1D, 0x2E, 0x64, 0x4C, 0x53, 0xB8,
+    0x07, 0xB8, 0x10, 0xF3, 0x40, 0x06, 0x2F, 0x25, 0x7D, 0x7D, 0x6F, 0xBF,
+    0xE8, 0xD5, 0xE8, 0xF0, 0x72, 0xE9, 0xB6, 0xE9, 0xAF, 0xDA, 0x94, 0x13,
+    0xEA, 0xFB, 0x2E, 0x8B, 0x06, 0x99, 0xB1, 0xFB, 0x5A, 0x0C, 0xAC, 0xED,
+    0xDE, 0xAE, 0xAD, 0x7E, 0x9C, 0xFB, 0xB3, 0x6A, 0xE2, 0xB4, 0x20, 0x83,
+    0x5B, 0xD8, 0x3A, 0x19, 0xFB, 0x0B, 0x5E, 0x96, 0xBF, 0x8F, 0xA4, 0xD0,
+    0x9E, 0x34, 0x55, 0x25, 0x16, 0x7E, 0xCD, 0x91, 0x55, 0x41, 0x6F, 0x46,
+    0xF4, 0x08, 0xED, 0x31, 0xB6, 0x3C, 0x6E, 0x6D
+};
+
+static const unsigned char dhtest_2048_224_xA[] = {
+    0x22, 0xE6, 0x26, 0x01, 0xDB, 0xFF, 0xD0, 0x67, 0x08, 0xA6, 0x80, 0xF7,
+    0x47, 0xF3, 0x61, 0xF7, 0x6D, 0x8F, 0x4F, 0x72, 0x1A, 0x05, 0x48, 0xE4,
+    0x83, 0x29, 0x4B, 0x0C
+};
+
+static const unsigned char dhtest_2048_224_yA[] = {
+    0x1B, 0x3A, 0x63, 0x45, 0x1B, 0xD8, 0x86, 0xE6, 0x99, 0xE6, 0x7B, 0x49,
+    0x4E, 0x28, 0x8B, 0xD7, 0xF8, 0xE0, 0xD3, 0x70, 0xBA, 0xDD, 0xA7, 0xA0,
+    0xEF, 0xD2, 0xFD, 0xE7, 0xD8, 0xF6, 0x61, 0x45, 0xCC, 0x9F, 0x28, 0x04,
+    0x19, 0x97, 0x5E, 0xB8, 0x08, 0x87, 0x7C, 0x8A, 0x4C, 0x0C, 0x8E, 0x0B,
+    0xD4, 0x8D, 0x4A, 0x54, 0x01, 0xEB, 0x1E, 0x87, 0x76, 0xBF, 0xEE, 0xE1,
+    0x34, 0xC0, 0x38, 0x31, 0xAC, 0x27, 0x3C, 0xD9, 0xD6, 0x35, 0xAB, 0x0C,
+    0xE0, 0x06, 0xA4, 0x2A, 0x88, 0x7E, 0x3F, 0x52, 0xFB, 0x87, 0x66, 0xB6,
+    0x50, 0xF3, 0x80, 0x78, 0xBC, 0x8E, 0xE8, 0x58, 0x0C, 0xEF, 0xE2, 0x43,
+    0x96, 0x8C, 0xFC, 0x4F, 0x8D, 0xC3, 0xDB, 0x08, 0x45, 0x54, 0x17, 0x1D,
+    0x41, 0xBF, 0x2E, 0x86, 0x1B, 0x7B, 0xB4, 0xD6, 0x9D, 0xD0, 0xE0, 0x1E,
+    0xA3, 0x87, 0xCB, 0xAA, 0x5C, 0xA6, 0x72, 0xAF, 0xCB, 0xE8, 0xBD, 0xB9,
+    0xD6, 0x2D, 0x4C, 0xE1, 0x5F, 0x17, 0xDD, 0x36, 0xF9, 0x1E, 0xD1, 0xEE,
+    0xDD, 0x65, 0xCA, 0x4A, 0x06, 0x45, 0x5C, 0xB9, 0x4C, 0xD4, 0x0A, 0x52,
+    0xEC, 0x36, 0x0E, 0x84, 0xB3, 0xC9, 0x26, 0xE2, 0x2C, 0x43, 0x80, 0xA3,
+    0xBF, 0x30, 0x9D, 0x56, 0x84, 0x97, 0x68, 0xB7, 0xF5, 0x2C, 0xFD, 0xF6,
+    0x55, 0xFD, 0x05, 0x3A, 0x7E, 0xF7, 0x06, 0x97, 0x9E, 0x7E, 0x58, 0x06,
+    0xB1, 0x7D, 0xFA, 0xE5, 0x3A, 0xD2, 0xA5, 0xBC, 0x56, 0x8E, 0xBB, 0x52,
+    0x9A, 0x7A, 0x61, 0xD6, 0x8D, 0x25, 0x6F, 0x8F, 0xC9, 0x7C, 0x07, 0x4A,
+    0x86, 0x1D, 0x82, 0x7E, 0x2E, 0xBC, 0x8C, 0x61, 0x34, 0x55, 0x31, 0x15,
+    0xB7, 0x0E, 0x71, 0x03, 0x92, 0x0A, 0xA1, 0x6D, 0x85, 0xE5, 0x2B, 0xCB,
+    0xAB, 0x8D, 0x78, 0x6A, 0x68, 0x17, 0x8F, 0xA8, 0xFF, 0x7C, 0x2F, 0x5C,
+    0x71, 0x64, 0x8D, 0x6F
+};
+
+static const unsigned char dhtest_2048_224_xB[] = {
+    0x4F, 0xF3, 0xBC, 0x96, 0xC7, 0xFC, 0x6A, 0x6D, 0x71, 0xD3, 0xB3, 0x63,
+    0x80, 0x0A, 0x7C, 0xDF, 0xEF, 0x6F, 0xC4, 0x1B, 0x44, 0x17, 0xEA, 0x15,
+    0x35, 0x3B, 0x75, 0x90
+};
+
+static const unsigned char dhtest_2048_224_yB[] = {
+    0x4D, 0xCE, 0xE9, 0x92, 0xA9, 0x76, 0x2A, 0x13, 0xF2, 0xF8, 0x38, 0x44,
+    0xAD, 0x3D, 0x77, 0xEE, 0x0E, 0x31, 0xC9, 0x71, 0x8B, 0x3D, 0xB6, 0xC2,
+    0x03, 0x5D, 0x39, 0x61, 0x18, 0x2C, 0x3E, 0x0B, 0xA2, 0x47, 0xEC, 0x41,
+    0x82, 0xD7, 0x60, 0xCD, 0x48, 0xD9, 0x95, 0x99, 0x97, 0x06, 0x22, 0xA1,
+    0x88, 0x1B, 0xBA, 0x2D, 0xC8, 0x22, 0x93, 0x9C, 0x78, 0xC3, 0x91, 0x2C,
+    0x66, 0x61, 0xFA, 0x54, 0x38, 0xB2, 0x07, 0x66, 0x22, 0x2B, 0x75, 0xE2,
+    0x4C, 0x2E, 0x3A, 0xD0, 0xC7, 0x28, 0x72, 0x36, 0x12, 0x95, 0x25, 0xEE,
+    0x15, 0xB5, 0xDD, 0x79, 0x98, 0xAA, 0x04, 0xC4, 0xA9, 0x69, 0x6C, 0xAC,
+    0xD7, 0x17, 0x20, 0x83, 0xA9, 0x7A, 0x81, 0x66, 0x4E, 0xAD, 0x2C, 0x47,
+    0x9E, 0x44, 0x4E, 0x4C, 0x06, 0x54, 0xCC, 0x19, 0xE2, 0x8D, 0x77, 0x03,
+    0xCE, 0xE8, 0xDA, 0xCD, 0x61, 0x26, 0xF5, 0xD6, 0x65, 0xEC, 0x52, 0xC6,
+    0x72, 0x55, 0xDB, 0x92, 0x01, 0x4B, 0x03, 0x7E, 0xB6, 0x21, 0xA2, 0xAC,
+    0x8E, 0x36, 0x5D, 0xE0, 0x71, 0xFF, 0xC1, 0x40, 0x0A, 0xCF, 0x07, 0x7A,
+    0x12, 0x91, 0x3D, 0xD8, 0xDE, 0x89, 0x47, 0x34, 0x37, 0xAB, 0x7B, 0xA3,
+    0x46, 0x74, 0x3C, 0x1B, 0x21, 0x5D, 0xD9, 0xC1, 0x21, 0x64, 0xA7, 0xE4,
+    0x05, 0x31, 0x18, 0xD1, 0x99, 0xBE, 0xC8, 0xEF, 0x6F, 0xC5, 0x61, 0x17,
+    0x0C, 0x84, 0xC8, 0x7D, 0x10, 0xEE, 0x9A, 0x67, 0x4A, 0x1F, 0xA8, 0xFF,
+    0xE1, 0x3B, 0xDF, 0xBA, 0x1D, 0x44, 0xDE, 0x48, 0x94, 0x6D, 0x68, 0xDC,
+    0x0C, 0xDD, 0x77, 0x76, 0x35, 0xA7, 0xAB, 0x5B, 0xFB, 0x1E, 0x4B, 0xB7,
+    0xB8, 0x56, 0xF9, 0x68, 0x27, 0x73, 0x4C, 0x18, 0x41, 0x38, 0xE9, 0x15,
+    0xD9, 0xC3, 0x00, 0x2E, 0xBC, 0xE5, 0x31, 0x20, 0x54, 0x6A, 0x7E, 0x20,
+    0x02, 0x14, 0x2B, 0x6C
+};
+
+static const unsigned char dhtest_2048_224_Z[] = {
+    0x34, 0xD9, 0xBD, 0xDC, 0x1B, 0x42, 0x17, 0x6C, 0x31, 0x3F, 0xEA, 0x03,
+    0x4C, 0x21, 0x03, 0x4D, 0x07, 0x4A, 0x63, 0x13, 0xBB, 0x4E, 0xCD, 0xB3,
+    0x70, 0x3F, 0xFF, 0x42, 0x45, 0x67, 0xA4, 0x6B, 0xDF, 0x75, 0x53, 0x0E,
+    0xDE, 0x0A, 0x9D, 0xA5, 0x22, 0x9D, 0xE7, 0xD7, 0x67, 0x32, 0x28, 0x6C,
+    0xBC, 0x0F, 0x91, 0xDA, 0x4C, 0x3C, 0x85, 0x2F, 0xC0, 0x99, 0xC6, 0x79,
+    0x53, 0x1D, 0x94, 0xC7, 0x8A, 0xB0, 0x3D, 0x9D, 0xEC, 0xB0, 0xA4, 0xE4,
+    0xCA, 0x8B, 0x2B, 0xB4, 0x59, 0x1C, 0x40, 0x21, 0xCF, 0x8C, 0xE3, 0xA2,
+    0x0A, 0x54, 0x1D, 0x33, 0x99, 0x40, 0x17, 0xD0, 0x20, 0x0A, 0xE2, 0xC9,
+    0x51, 0x6E, 0x2F, 0xF5, 0x14, 0x57, 0x79, 0x26, 0x9E, 0x86, 0x2B, 0x0F,
+    0xB4, 0x74, 0xA2, 0xD5, 0x6D, 0xC3, 0x1E, 0xD5, 0x69, 0xA7, 0x70, 0x0B,
+    0x4C, 0x4A, 0xB1, 0x6B, 0x22, 0xA4, 0x55, 0x13, 0x53, 0x1E, 0xF5, 0x23,
+    0xD7, 0x12, 0x12, 0x07, 0x7B, 0x5A, 0x16, 0x9B, 0xDE, 0xFF, 0xAD, 0x7A,
+    0xD9, 0x60, 0x82, 0x84, 0xC7, 0x79, 0x5B, 0x6D, 0x5A, 0x51, 0x83, 0xB8,
+    0x70, 0x66, 0xDE, 0x17, 0xD8, 0xD6, 0x71, 0xC9, 0xEB, 0xD8, 0xEC, 0x89,
+    0x54, 0x4D, 0x45, 0xEC, 0x06, 0x15, 0x93, 0xD4, 0x42, 0xC6, 0x2A, 0xB9,
+    0xCE, 0x3B, 0x1C, 0xB9, 0x94, 0x3A, 0x1D, 0x23, 0xA5, 0xEA, 0x3B, 0xCF,
+    0x21, 0xA0, 0x14, 0x71, 0xE6, 0x7E, 0x00, 0x3E, 0x7F, 0x8A, 0x69, 0xC7,
+    0x28, 0xBE, 0x49, 0x0B, 0x2F, 0xC8, 0x8C, 0xFE, 0xB9, 0x2D, 0xB6, 0xA2,
+    0x15, 0xE5, 0xD0, 0x3C, 0x17, 0xC4, 0x64, 0xC9, 0xAC, 0x1A, 0x46, 0xE2,
+    0x03, 0xE1, 0x3F, 0x95, 0x29, 0x95, 0xFB, 0x03, 0xC6, 0x9D, 0x3C, 0xC4,
+    0x7F, 0xCB, 0x51, 0x0B, 0x69, 0x98, 0xFF, 0xD3, 0xAA, 0x6D, 0xE7, 0x3C,
+    0xF9, 0xF6, 0x38, 0x69
+};
+
+static const unsigned char dhtest_2048_256_xA[] = {
+    0x08, 0x81, 0x38, 0x2C, 0xDB, 0x87, 0x66, 0x0C, 0x6D, 0xC1, 0x3E, 0x61,
+    0x49, 0x38, 0xD5, 0xB9, 0xC8, 0xB2, 0xF2, 0x48, 0x58, 0x1C, 0xC5, 0xE3,
+    0x1B, 0x35, 0x45, 0x43, 0x97, 0xFC, 0xE5, 0x0E
+};
+
+static const unsigned char dhtest_2048_256_yA[] = {
+    0x2E, 0x93, 0x80, 0xC8, 0x32, 0x3A, 0xF9, 0x75, 0x45, 0xBC, 0x49, 0x41,
+    0xDE, 0xB0, 0xEC, 0x37, 0x42, 0xC6, 0x2F, 0xE0, 0xEC, 0xE8, 0x24, 0xA6,
+    0xAB, 0xDB, 0xE6, 0x6C, 0x59, 0xBE, 0xE0, 0x24, 0x29, 0x11, 0xBF, 0xB9,
+    0x67, 0x23, 0x5C, 0xEB, 0xA3, 0x5A, 0xE1, 0x3E, 0x4E, 0xC7, 0x52, 0xBE,
+    0x63, 0x0B, 0x92, 0xDC, 0x4B, 0xDE, 0x28, 0x47, 0xA9, 0xC6, 0x2C, 0xB8,
+    0x15, 0x27, 0x45, 0x42, 0x1F, 0xB7, 0xEB, 0x60, 0xA6, 0x3C, 0x0F, 0xE9,
+    0x15, 0x9F, 0xCC, 0xE7, 0x26, 0xCE, 0x7C, 0xD8, 0x52, 0x3D, 0x74, 0x50,
+    0x66, 0x7E, 0xF8, 0x40, 0xE4, 0x91, 0x91, 0x21, 0xEB, 0x5F, 0x01, 0xC8,
+    0xC9, 0xB0, 0xD3, 0xD6, 0x48, 0xA9, 0x3B, 0xFB, 0x75, 0x68, 0x9E, 0x82,
+    0x44, 0xAC, 0x13, 0x4A, 0xF5, 0x44, 0x71, 0x1C, 0xE7, 0x9A, 0x02, 0xDC,
+    0xC3, 0x42, 0x26, 0x68, 0x47, 0x80, 0xDD, 0xDC, 0xB4, 0x98, 0x59, 0x41,
+    0x06, 0xC3, 0x7F, 0x5B, 0xC7, 0x98, 0x56, 0x48, 0x7A, 0xF5, 0xAB, 0x02,
+    0x2A, 0x2E, 0x5E, 0x42, 0xF0, 0x98, 0x97, 0xC1, 0xA8, 0x5A, 0x11, 0xEA,
+    0x02, 0x12, 0xAF, 0x04, 0xD9, 0xB4, 0xCE, 0xBC, 0x93, 0x7C, 0x3C, 0x1A,
+    0x3E, 0x15, 0xA8, 0xA0, 0x34, 0x2E, 0x33, 0x76, 0x15, 0xC8, 0x4E, 0x7F,
+    0xE3, 0xB8, 0xB9, 0xB8, 0x7F, 0xB1, 0xE7, 0x3A, 0x15, 0xAF, 0x12, 0xA3,
+    0x0D, 0x74, 0x6E, 0x06, 0xDF, 0xC3, 0x4F, 0x29, 0x0D, 0x79, 0x7C, 0xE5,
+    0x1A, 0xA1, 0x3A, 0xA7, 0x85, 0xBF, 0x66, 0x58, 0xAF, 0xF5, 0xE4, 0xB0,
+    0x93, 0x00, 0x3C, 0xBE, 0xAF, 0x66, 0x5B, 0x3C, 0x2E, 0x11, 0x3A, 0x3A,
+    0x4E, 0x90, 0x52, 0x69, 0x34, 0x1D, 0xC0, 0x71, 0x14, 0x26, 0x68, 0x5F,
+    0x4E, 0xF3, 0x7E, 0x86, 0x8A, 0x81, 0x26, 0xFF, 0x3F, 0x22, 0x79, 0xB5,
+    0x7C, 0xA6, 0x7E, 0x29
+};
+
+static const unsigned char dhtest_2048_256_xB[] = {
+    0x7D, 0x62, 0xA7, 0xE3, 0xEF, 0x36, 0xDE, 0x61, 0x7B, 0x13, 0xD1, 0xAF,
+    0xB8, 0x2C, 0x78, 0x0D, 0x83, 0xA2, 0x3B, 0xD4, 0xEE, 0x67, 0x05, 0x64,
+    0x51, 0x21, 0xF3, 0x71, 0xF5, 0x46, 0xA5, 0x3D
+};
+
+static const unsigned char dhtest_2048_256_yB[] = {
+    0x57, 0x5F, 0x03, 0x51, 0xBD, 0x2B, 0x1B, 0x81, 0x74, 0x48, 0xBD, 0xF8,
+    0x7A, 0x6C, 0x36, 0x2C, 0x1E, 0x28, 0x9D, 0x39, 0x03, 0xA3, 0x0B, 0x98,
+    0x32, 0xC5, 0x74, 0x1F, 0xA2, 0x50, 0x36, 0x3E, 0x7A, 0xCB, 0xC7, 0xF7,
+    0x7F, 0x3D, 0xAC, 0xBC, 0x1F, 0x13, 0x1A, 0xDD, 0x8E, 0x03, 0x36, 0x7E,
+    0xFF, 0x8F, 0xBB, 0xB3, 0xE1, 0xC5, 0x78, 0x44, 0x24, 0x80, 0x9B, 0x25,
+    0xAF, 0xE4, 0xD2, 0x26, 0x2A, 0x1A, 0x6F, 0xD2, 0xFA, 0xB6, 0x41, 0x05,
+    0xCA, 0x30, 0xA6, 0x74, 0xE0, 0x7F, 0x78, 0x09, 0x85, 0x20, 0x88, 0x63,
+    0x2F, 0xC0, 0x49, 0x23, 0x37, 0x91, 0xAD, 0x4E, 0xDD, 0x08, 0x3A, 0x97,
+    0x8B, 0x88, 0x3E, 0xE6, 0x18, 0xBC, 0x5E, 0x0D, 0xD0, 0x47, 0x41, 0x5F,
+    0x2D, 0x95, 0xE6, 0x83, 0xCF, 0x14, 0x82, 0x6B, 0x5F, 0xBE, 0x10, 0xD3,
+    0xCE, 0x41, 0xC6, 0xC1, 0x20, 0xC7, 0x8A, 0xB2, 0x00, 0x08, 0xC6, 0x98,
+    0xBF, 0x7F, 0x0B, 0xCA, 0xB9, 0xD7, 0xF4, 0x07, 0xBE, 0xD0, 0xF4, 0x3A,
+    0xFB, 0x29, 0x70, 0xF5, 0x7F, 0x8D, 0x12, 0x04, 0x39, 0x63, 0xE6, 0x6D,
+    0xDD, 0x32, 0x0D, 0x59, 0x9A, 0xD9, 0x93, 0x6C, 0x8F, 0x44, 0x13, 0x7C,
+    0x08, 0xB1, 0x80, 0xEC, 0x5E, 0x98, 0x5C, 0xEB, 0xE1, 0x86, 0xF3, 0xD5,
+    0x49, 0x67, 0x7E, 0x80, 0x60, 0x73, 0x31, 0xEE, 0x17, 0xAF, 0x33, 0x80,
+    0xA7, 0x25, 0xB0, 0x78, 0x23, 0x17, 0xD7, 0xDD, 0x43, 0xF5, 0x9D, 0x7A,
+    0xF9, 0x56, 0x8A, 0x9B, 0xB6, 0x3A, 0x84, 0xD3, 0x65, 0xF9, 0x22, 0x44,
+    0xED, 0x12, 0x09, 0x88, 0x21, 0x93, 0x02, 0xF4, 0x29, 0x24, 0xC7, 0xCA,
+    0x90, 0xB8, 0x9D, 0x24, 0xF7, 0x1B, 0x0A, 0xB6, 0x97, 0x82, 0x3D, 0x7D,
+    0xEB, 0x1A, 0xFF, 0x5B, 0x0E, 0x8E, 0x4A, 0x45, 0xD4, 0x9F, 0x7F, 0x53,
+    0x75, 0x7E, 0x19, 0x13
+};
+
+static const unsigned char dhtest_2048_256_Z[] = {
+    0x86, 0xC7, 0x0B, 0xF8, 0xD0, 0xBB, 0x81, 0xBB, 0x01, 0x07, 0x8A, 0x17,
+    0x21, 0x9C, 0xB7, 0xD2, 0x72, 0x03, 0xDB, 0x2A, 0x19, 0xC8, 0x77, 0xF1,
+    0xD1, 0xF1, 0x9F, 0xD7, 0xD7, 0x7E, 0xF2, 0x25, 0x46, 0xA6, 0x8F, 0x00,
+    0x5A, 0xD5, 0x2D, 0xC8, 0x45, 0x53, 0xB7, 0x8F, 0xC6, 0x03, 0x30, 0xBE,
+    0x51, 0xEA, 0x7C, 0x06, 0x72, 0xCA, 0xC1, 0x51, 0x5E, 0x4B, 0x35, 0xC0,
+    0x47, 0xB9, 0xA5, 0x51, 0xB8, 0x8F, 0x39, 0xDC, 0x26, 0xDA, 0x14, 0xA0,
+    0x9E, 0xF7, 0x47, 0x74, 0xD4, 0x7C, 0x76, 0x2D, 0xD1, 0x77, 0xF9, 0xED,
+    0x5B, 0xC2, 0xF1, 0x1E, 0x52, 0xC8, 0x79, 0xBD, 0x95, 0x09, 0x85, 0x04,
+    0xCD, 0x9E, 0xEC, 0xD8, 0xA8, 0xF9, 0xB3, 0xEF, 0xBD, 0x1F, 0x00, 0x8A,
+    0xC5, 0x85, 0x30, 0x97, 0xD9, 0xD1, 0x83, 0x7F, 0x2B, 0x18, 0xF7, 0x7C,
+    0xD7, 0xBE, 0x01, 0xAF, 0x80, 0xA7, 0xC7, 0xB5, 0xEA, 0x3C, 0xA5, 0x4C,
+    0xC0, 0x2D, 0x0C, 0x11, 0x6F, 0xEE, 0x3F, 0x95, 0xBB, 0x87, 0x39, 0x93,
+    0x85, 0x87, 0x5D, 0x7E, 0x86, 0x74, 0x7E, 0x67, 0x6E, 0x72, 0x89, 0x38,
+    0xAC, 0xBF, 0xF7, 0x09, 0x8E, 0x05, 0xBE, 0x4D, 0xCF, 0xB2, 0x40, 0x52,
+    0xB8, 0x3A, 0xEF, 0xFB, 0x14, 0x78, 0x3F, 0x02, 0x9A, 0xDB, 0xDE, 0x7F,
+    0x53, 0xFA, 0xE9, 0x20, 0x84, 0x22, 0x40, 0x90, 0xE0, 0x07, 0xCE, 0xE9,
+    0x4D, 0x4B, 0xF2, 0xBA, 0xCE, 0x9F, 0xFD, 0x4B, 0x57, 0xD2, 0xAF, 0x7C,
+    0x72, 0x4D, 0x0C, 0xAA, 0x19, 0xBF, 0x05, 0x01, 0xF6, 0xF1, 0x7B, 0x4A,
+    0xA1, 0x0F, 0x42, 0x5E, 0x3E, 0xA7, 0x60, 0x80, 0xB4, 0xB9, 0xD6, 0xB3,
+    0xCE, 0xFE, 0xA1, 0x15, 0xB2, 0xCE, 0xB8, 0x78, 0x9B, 0xB8, 0xA3, 0xB0,
+    0xEA, 0x87, 0xFE, 0xBE, 0x63, 0xB6, 0xC8, 0xF8, 0x46, 0xEC, 0x6D, 0xB0,
+    0xC2, 0x6C, 0x5D, 0x7C
+};
+
+static const unsigned char dhtest_rfc5114_2048_224_bad_y[] = {
+    0x45, 0x32, 0x5F, 0x51, 0x07, 0xE5, 0xDF, 0x1C, 0xD6, 0x02, 0x82, 0xB3,
+    0x32, 0x8F, 0xA4, 0x0F, 0x87, 0xB8, 0x41, 0xFE, 0xB9, 0x35, 0xDE, 0xAD,
+    0xC6, 0x26, 0x85, 0xB4, 0xFF, 0x94, 0x8C, 0x12, 0x4C, 0xBF, 0x5B, 0x20,
+    0xC4, 0x46, 0xA3, 0x26, 0xEB, 0xA4, 0x25, 0xB7, 0x68, 0x8E, 0xCC, 0x67,
+    0xBA, 0xEA, 0x58, 0xD0, 0xF2, 0xE9, 0xD2, 0x24, 0x72, 0x60, 0xDA, 0x88,
+    0x18, 0x9C, 0xE0, 0x31, 0x6A, 0xAD, 0x50, 0x6D, 0x94, 0x35, 0x8B, 0x83,
+    0x4A, 0x6E, 0xFA, 0x48, 0x73, 0x0F, 0x83, 0x87, 0xFF, 0x6B, 0x66, 0x1F,
+    0xA8, 0x82, 0xC6, 0x01, 0xE5, 0x80, 0xB5, 0xB0, 0x52, 0xD0, 0xE9, 0xD8,
+    0x72, 0xF9, 0x7D, 0x5B, 0x8B, 0xA5, 0x4C, 0xA5, 0x25, 0x95, 0x74, 0xE2,
+    0x7A, 0x61, 0x4E, 0xA7, 0x8F, 0x12, 0xE2, 0xD2, 0x9D, 0x8C, 0x02, 0x70,
+    0x34, 0x44, 0x32, 0xC7, 0xB2, 0xF3, 0xB9, 0xFE, 0x17, 0x2B, 0xD6, 0x1F,
+    0x8B, 0x7E, 0x4A, 0xFA, 0xA3, 0xB5, 0x3E, 0x7A, 0x81, 0x9A, 0x33, 0x66,
+    0x62, 0xA4, 0x50, 0x18, 0x3E, 0xA2, 0x5F, 0x00, 0x07, 0xD8, 0x9B, 0x22,
+    0xE4, 0xEC, 0x84, 0xD5, 0xEB, 0x5A, 0xF3, 0x2A, 0x31, 0x23, 0xD8, 0x44,
+    0x22, 0x2A, 0x8B, 0x37, 0x44, 0xCC, 0xC6, 0x87, 0x4B, 0xBE, 0x50, 0x9D,
+    0x4A, 0xC4, 0x8E, 0x45, 0xCF, 0x72, 0x4D, 0xC0, 0x89, 0xB3, 0x72, 0xED,
+    0x33, 0x2C, 0xBC, 0x7F, 0x16, 0x39, 0x3B, 0xEB, 0xD2, 0xDD, 0xA8, 0x01,
+    0x73, 0x84, 0x62, 0xB9, 0x29, 0xD2, 0xC9, 0x51, 0x32, 0x9E, 0x7A, 0x6A,
+    0xCF, 0xC1, 0x0A, 0xDB, 0x0E, 0xE0, 0x62, 0x77, 0x6F, 0x59, 0x62, 0x72,
+    0x5A, 0x69, 0xA6, 0x5B, 0x70, 0xCA, 0x65, 0xC4, 0x95, 0x6F, 0x9A, 0xC2,
+    0xDF, 0x72, 0x6D, 0xB1, 0x1E, 0x54, 0x7B, 0x51, 0xB4, 0xEF, 0x7F, 0x89,
+    0x93, 0x74, 0x89, 0x59
+};
+
+typedef struct {
+    DH *(*get_param) (void);
+    const unsigned char *xA;
+    size_t xA_len;
+    const unsigned char *yA;
+    size_t yA_len;
+    const unsigned char *xB;
+    size_t xB_len;
+    const unsigned char *yB;
+    size_t yB_len;
+    const unsigned char *Z;
+    size_t Z_len;
+} rfc5114_td;
+
+# define make_rfc5114_td(pre) { \
+        DH_get_##pre, \
+        dhtest_##pre##_xA, sizeof(dhtest_##pre##_xA), \
+        dhtest_##pre##_yA, sizeof(dhtest_##pre##_yA), \
+        dhtest_##pre##_xB, sizeof(dhtest_##pre##_xB), \
+        dhtest_##pre##_yB, sizeof(dhtest_##pre##_yB), \
+        dhtest_##pre##_Z, sizeof(dhtest_##pre##_Z) \
+        }
+
+static const rfc5114_td rfctd[] = {
+        make_rfc5114_td(1024_160),
+        make_rfc5114_td(2048_224),
+        make_rfc5114_td(2048_256)
+};
+
+static int run_rfc5114_tests(void)
+{
+    int i;
+    DH *dhA = NULL;
+    DH *dhB = NULL;
+    unsigned char *Z1 = NULL;
+    unsigned char *Z2 = NULL;
+    const rfc5114_td *td = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *bady = NULL, *priv_key = NULL, *pub_key = NULL;
+    const BIGNUM *pub_key_tmp;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < (int)OSSL_NELEM(rfctd); i++) {
+        td = rfctd + i;
+        /* Set up DH structures setting key components */
+        dhA = td->get_param();
+        dhB = td->get_param();
+        if ((dhA == NULL) || (dhB == NULL))
+            goto bad_err;
+
+        priv_key = BN_bin2bn(td->xA, td->xA_len, NULL);
+        pub_key = BN_bin2bn(td->yA, td->yA_len, NULL);
+        if (priv_key == NULL || pub_key == NULL
+                || !DH_set0_key(dhA, pub_key, priv_key))
+            goto bad_err;
+
+        priv_key = BN_bin2bn(td->xB, td->xB_len, NULL);
+        pub_key = BN_bin2bn(td->yB, td->yB_len, NULL);
+
+        if (priv_key == NULL || pub_key == NULL
+                || !DH_set0_key(dhB, pub_key, priv_key))
+            goto bad_err;
+        priv_key = pub_key = NULL;
+
+        if ((td->Z_len != (size_t)DH_size(dhA))
+            || (td->Z_len != (size_t)DH_size(dhB)))
+            goto err;
+
+        Z1 = OPENSSL_malloc(DH_size(dhA));
+        Z2 = OPENSSL_malloc(DH_size(dhB));
+        if ((Z1 == NULL) || (Z2 == NULL))
+            goto bad_err;
+        /*
+         * Work out shared secrets using both sides and compare with expected
+         * values.
+         */
+        DH_get0_key(dhB, &pub_key_tmp, NULL);
+        if (DH_compute_key(Z1, pub_key_tmp, dhA) == -1)
+            goto bad_err;
+
+        DH_get0_key(dhA, &pub_key_tmp, NULL);
+        if (DH_compute_key(Z2, pub_key_tmp, dhB) == -1)
+            goto bad_err;
+
+        if (memcmp(Z1, td->Z, td->Z_len))
+            goto err;
+        if (memcmp(Z2, td->Z, td->Z_len))
+            goto err;
+
+        printf("RFC5114 parameter test %d OK\n", i + 1);
+
+        DH_free(dhA);
+        DH_free(dhB);
+        OPENSSL_free(Z1);
+        OPENSSL_free(Z2);
+        dhA = NULL;
+        dhB = NULL;
+        Z1 = NULL;
+        Z2 = NULL;
+    }
+
+    /* Now i == OSSL_NELEM(rfctd) */
+    /* RFC5114 uses unsafe primes, so now test an invalid y value */
+    dhA = DH_get_2048_224();
+    if (dhA == NULL)
+        goto bad_err;
+    Z1 = OPENSSL_malloc(DH_size(dhA));
+    if (Z1 == NULL)
+        goto bad_err;
+
+    bady = BN_bin2bn(dhtest_rfc5114_2048_224_bad_y,
+                     sizeof(dhtest_rfc5114_2048_224_bad_y), NULL);
+    if (bady == NULL)
+        goto bad_err;
+
+    if (!DH_generate_key(dhA))
+        goto bad_err;
+
+    if (DH_compute_key(Z1, bady, dhA) != -1) {
+        /*
+         * DH_compute_key should fail with -1. If we get here we unexpectedly
+         * allowed an invalid y value
+         */
+        goto err;
+    }
+    /* We'll have a stale error on the queue from the above test so clear it */
+    ERR_clear_error();
+
+    printf("RFC5114 parameter test %d OK\n", i + 1);
+
+    BN_free(bady);
+    DH_free(dhA);
+    OPENSSL_free(Z1);
+
+    return 1;
+ bad_err:
+    BN_free(bady);
+    DH_free(dhA);
+    DH_free(dhB);
+    BN_free(pub_key);
+    BN_free(priv_key);
+    OPENSSL_free(Z1);
+    OPENSSL_free(Z2);
+
+    fprintf(stderr, "Initialisation error RFC5114 set %d\n", i + 1);
+    ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+    return 0;
+ err:
+    BN_free(bady);
+    DH_free(dhA);
+    DH_free(dhB);
+    OPENSSL_free(Z1);
+    OPENSSL_free(Z2);
+
+    fprintf(stderr, "Test failed RFC5114 set %d\n", i + 1);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/dsatest.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/dsatest.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3a62eb6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/dsatest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,196 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+#include "../e_os.h"
+
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+    printf("No DSA support\n");
+    return (0);
+}
+#else
+# include <openssl/dsa.h>
+
+static int dsa_cb(int p, int n, BN_GENCB *arg);
+
+/*
+ * seed, out_p, out_q, out_g are taken from the updated Appendix 5 to FIPS
+ * PUB 186 and also appear in Appendix 5 to FIPS PIB 186-1
+ */
+static unsigned char seed[20] = {
+    0xd5, 0x01, 0x4e, 0x4b, 0x60, 0xef, 0x2b, 0xa8, 0xb6, 0x21, 0x1b, 0x40,
+    0x62, 0xba, 0x32, 0x24, 0xe0, 0x42, 0x7d, 0xd3,
+};
+
+static unsigned char out_p[] = {
+    0x8d, 0xf2, 0xa4, 0x94, 0x49, 0x22, 0x76, 0xaa,
+    0x3d, 0x25, 0x75, 0x9b, 0xb0, 0x68, 0x69, 0xcb,
+    0xea, 0xc0, 0xd8, 0x3a, 0xfb, 0x8d, 0x0c, 0xf7,
+    0xcb, 0xb8, 0x32, 0x4f, 0x0d, 0x78, 0x82, 0xe5,
+    0xd0, 0x76, 0x2f, 0xc5, 0xb7, 0x21, 0x0e, 0xaf,
+    0xc2, 0xe9, 0xad, 0xac, 0x32, 0xab, 0x7a, 0xac,
+    0x49, 0x69, 0x3d, 0xfb, 0xf8, 0x37, 0x24, 0xc2,
+    0xec, 0x07, 0x36, 0xee, 0x31, 0xc8, 0x02, 0x91,
+};
+
+static unsigned char out_q[] = {
+    0xc7, 0x73, 0x21, 0x8c, 0x73, 0x7e, 0xc8, 0xee,
+    0x99, 0x3b, 0x4f, 0x2d, 0xed, 0x30, 0xf4, 0x8e,
+    0xda, 0xce, 0x91, 0x5f,
+};
+
+static unsigned char out_g[] = {
+    0x62, 0x6d, 0x02, 0x78, 0x39, 0xea, 0x0a, 0x13,
+    0x41, 0x31, 0x63, 0xa5, 0x5b, 0x4c, 0xb5, 0x00,
+    0x29, 0x9d, 0x55, 0x22, 0x95, 0x6c, 0xef, 0xcb,
+    0x3b, 0xff, 0x10, 0xf3, 0x99, 0xce, 0x2c, 0x2e,
+    0x71, 0xcb, 0x9d, 0xe5, 0xfa, 0x24, 0xba, 0xbf,
+    0x58, 0xe5, 0xb7, 0x95, 0x21, 0x92, 0x5c, 0x9c,
+    0xc4, 0x2e, 0x9f, 0x6f, 0x46, 0x4b, 0x08, 0x8c,
+    0xc5, 0x72, 0xaf, 0x53, 0xe6, 0xd7, 0x88, 0x02,
+};
+
+static const unsigned char str1[] = "12345678901234567890";
+
+static const char rnd_seed[] =
+    "string to make the random number generator think it has entropy";
+
+static BIO *bio_err = NULL;
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    BN_GENCB *cb;
+    DSA *dsa = NULL;
+    int counter, ret = 0, i, j;
+    unsigned char buf[256];
+    unsigned long h;
+    unsigned char sig[256];
+    unsigned int siglen;
+    const BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL, *g = NULL;
+
+    if (bio_err == NULL)
+        bio_err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT);
+
+    CRYPTO_set_mem_debug(1);
+    CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON);
+
+    RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof(rnd_seed));
+
+    BIO_printf(bio_err, "test generation of DSA parameters\n");
+
+    cb = BN_GENCB_new();
+    if (!cb)
+        goto end;
+
+    BN_GENCB_set(cb, dsa_cb, bio_err);
+    if (((dsa = DSA_new()) == NULL) || !DSA_generate_parameters_ex(dsa, 512,
+                                                                   seed, 20,
+                                                                   &counter,
+                                                                   &h, cb))
+        goto end;
+
+    BIO_printf(bio_err, "seed\n");
+    for (i = 0; i < 20; i += 4) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "%02X%02X%02X%02X ",
+                   seed[i], seed[i + 1], seed[i + 2], seed[i + 3]);
+    }
+    BIO_printf(bio_err, "\ncounter=%d h=%ld\n", counter, h);
+
+    DSA_print(bio_err, dsa, 0);
+    if (counter != 105) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "counter should be 105\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+    if (h != 2) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "h should be 2\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    DSA_get0_pqg(dsa, &p, &q, &g);
+    i = BN_bn2bin(q, buf);
+    j = sizeof(out_q);
+    if ((i != j) || (memcmp(buf, out_q, i) != 0)) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "q value is wrong\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    i = BN_bn2bin(p, buf);
+    j = sizeof(out_p);
+    if ((i != j) || (memcmp(buf, out_p, i) != 0)) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "p value is wrong\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    i = BN_bn2bin(g, buf);
+    j = sizeof(out_g);
+    if ((i != j) || (memcmp(buf, out_g, i) != 0)) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "g value is wrong\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    DSA_generate_key(dsa);
+    DSA_sign(0, str1, 20, sig, &siglen, dsa);
+    if (DSA_verify(0, str1, 20, sig, siglen, dsa) == 1)
+        ret = 1;
+
+ end:
+    if (!ret)
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+    DSA_free(dsa);
+    BN_GENCB_free(cb);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG
+    if (CRYPTO_mem_leaks(bio_err) <= 0)
+        ret = 0;
+#endif
+    BIO_free(bio_err);
+    bio_err = NULL;
+    EXIT(!ret);
+}
+
+static int dsa_cb(int p, int n, BN_GENCB *arg)
+{
+    char c = '*';
+    static int ok = 0, num = 0;
+
+    if (p == 0) {
+        c = '.';
+        num++;
+    };
+    if (p == 1)
+        c = '+';
+    if (p == 2) {
+        c = '*';
+        ok++;
+    }
+    if (p == 3)
+        c = '\n';
+    BIO_write(BN_GENCB_get_arg(arg), &c, 1);
+    (void)BIO_flush(BN_GENCB_get_arg(arg));
+
+    if (!ok && (p == 0) && (num > 1)) {
+        BIO_printf(BN_GENCB_get_arg(arg), "error in dsatest\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/dtlstest.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/dtlstest.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8200fac
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/dtlstest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+#include "ssltestlib.h"
+#include "testutil.h"
+
+static char *cert = NULL;
+static char *privkey = NULL;
+
+#define NUM_TESTS   2
+
+
+#define DUMMY_CERT_STATUS_LEN  12
+
+static unsigned char certstatus[] = {
+    SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, /* Content type */
+    0xfe, 0xfd, /* Record version */
+    0, 1, /* Epoch */
+    0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0x0f, /* Record sequence number */
+    0, DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + DUMMY_CERT_STATUS_LEN - 2,
+    SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS, /* Cert Status handshake message type */
+    0, 0, DUMMY_CERT_STATUS_LEN, /* Message len */
+    0, 5, /* Message sequence */
+    0, 0, 0, /* Fragment offset */
+    0, 0, DUMMY_CERT_STATUS_LEN - 2, /* Fragment len */
+    0x80, 0x80, 0x80, 0x80, 0x80,
+    0x80, 0x80, 0x80, 0x80, 0x80 /* Dummy data */
+};
+
+#define RECORD_SEQUENCE 10
+
+static int test_dtls_unprocessed(int testidx)
+{
+    SSL_CTX *sctx = NULL, *cctx = NULL;
+    SSL *serverssl1 = NULL, *clientssl1 = NULL;
+    BIO *c_to_s_fbio, *c_to_s_mempacket;
+    int testresult = 0;
+
+    printf("Starting Test %d\n", testidx);
+
+    if (!create_ssl_ctx_pair(DTLS_server_method(), DTLS_client_method(),
+                             DTLS1_VERSION, DTLS_MAX_VERSION, &sctx, &cctx,
+                             cert, privkey)) {
+        printf("Unable to create SSL_CTX pair\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(cctx, "AES128-SHA")) {
+        printf("Failed setting cipher list\n");
+    }
+
+    c_to_s_fbio = BIO_new(bio_f_tls_dump_filter());
+    if (c_to_s_fbio == NULL) {
+        printf("Failed to create filter BIO\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    /* BIO is freed by create_ssl_connection on error */
+    if (!create_ssl_objects(sctx, cctx, &serverssl1, &clientssl1, NULL,
+                               c_to_s_fbio)) {
+        printf("Unable to create SSL objects\n");
+        ERR_print_errors_fp(stdout);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (testidx == 1)
+        certstatus[RECORD_SEQUENCE] = 0xff;
+
+    /*
+     * Inject a dummy record from the next epoch. In test 0, this should never
+     * get used because the message sequence number is too big. In test 1 we set
+     * the record sequence number to be way off in the future. This should not
+     * have an impact on the record replay protection because the record should
+     * be dropped before it is marked as arrived
+     */
+    c_to_s_mempacket = SSL_get_wbio(clientssl1);
+    c_to_s_mempacket = BIO_next(c_to_s_mempacket);
+    mempacket_test_inject(c_to_s_mempacket, (char *)certstatus,
+                          sizeof(certstatus), 1, INJECT_PACKET_IGNORE_REC_SEQ);
+
+    if (!create_ssl_connection(serverssl1, clientssl1)) {
+        printf("Unable to create SSL connection\n");
+        ERR_print_errors_fp(stdout);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    testresult = 1;
+ end:
+    SSL_free(serverssl1);
+    SSL_free(clientssl1);
+    SSL_CTX_free(sctx);
+    SSL_CTX_free(cctx);
+
+    return testresult;
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+    BIO *err = NULL;
+    int testresult = 1;
+
+    if (argc != 3) {
+        printf("Invalid argument count\n");
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    cert = argv[1];
+    privkey = argv[2];
+
+    err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT);
+
+    CRYPTO_set_mem_debug(1);
+    CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON);
+
+    ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_dtls_unprocessed, NUM_TESTS);
+
+    testresult = run_tests(argv[0]);
+
+    bio_f_tls_dump_filter_free();
+    bio_s_mempacket_test_free();
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG
+    if (CRYPTO_mem_leaks(err) <= 0)
+        testresult = 1;
+#endif
+    BIO_free(err);
+
+    if (!testresult)
+        printf("PASS\n");
+
+    return testresult;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/dtlsv1listentest.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/dtlsv1listentest.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..91d78e1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/dtlsv1listentest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,426 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/conf.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+ #include <openssl/engine.h>
+#endif
+#include "e_os.h"
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
+
+/* Just a ClientHello without a cookie */
+static const unsigned char clienthello_nocookie[] = {
+    0x16, /* Handshake */
+    0xFE, 0xFF, /* DTLSv1.0 */
+    0x00, 0x00, /* Epoch */
+    0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Record sequence number */
+    0x00, 0x3A, /* Record Length */
+    0x01, /* ClientHello */
+    0x00, 0x00, 0x2E, /* Message length */
+    0x00, 0x00, /* Message sequence */
+    0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Fragment offset */
+    0x00, 0x00, 0x2E, /* Fragment length */
+    0xFE, 0xFD, /* DTLSv1.2 */
+    0xCA, 0x18, 0x9F, 0x76, 0xEC, 0x57, 0xCE, 0xE5, 0xB3, 0xAB, 0x79, 0x90,
+    0xAD, 0xAC, 0x6E, 0xD1, 0x58, 0x35, 0x03, 0x97, 0x16, 0x10, 0x82, 0x56,
+    0xD8, 0x55, 0xFF, 0xE1, 0x8A, 0xA3, 0x2E, 0xF6, /* Random */
+    0x00, /* Session id len */
+    0x00, /* Cookie len */
+    0x00, 0x04, /* Ciphersuites len */
+    0x00, 0x2f, /* AES128-SHA */
+    0x00, 0xff, /* Empty reneg info SCSV */
+    0x01, /* Compression methods len */
+    0x00, /* Null compression */
+    0x00, 0x00 /* Extensions len */
+};
+
+/* First fragment of a ClientHello without a cookie */
+static const unsigned char clienthello_nocookie_frag[] = {
+    0x16, /* Handshake */
+    0xFE, 0xFF, /* DTLSv1.0 */
+    0x00, 0x00, /* Epoch */
+    0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Record sequence number */
+    0x00, 0x30, /* Record Length */
+    0x01, /* ClientHello */
+    0x00, 0x00, 0x2E, /* Message length */
+    0x00, 0x00, /* Message sequence */
+    0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Fragment offset */
+    0x00, 0x00, 0x24, /* Fragment length */
+    0xFE, 0xFD, /* DTLSv1.2 */
+    0xCA, 0x18, 0x9F, 0x76, 0xEC, 0x57, 0xCE, 0xE5, 0xB3, 0xAB, 0x79, 0x90,
+    0xAD, 0xAC, 0x6E, 0xD1, 0x58, 0x35, 0x03, 0x97, 0x16, 0x10, 0x82, 0x56,
+    0xD8, 0x55, 0xFF, 0xE1, 0x8A, 0xA3, 0x2E, 0xF6, /* Random */
+    0x00, /* Session id len */
+    0x00 /* Cookie len */
+};
+
+/* First fragment of a ClientHello which is too short */
+static const unsigned char clienthello_nocookie_short[] = {
+    0x16, /* Handshake */
+    0xFE, 0xFF, /* DTLSv1.0 */
+    0x00, 0x00, /* Epoch */
+    0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Record sequence number */
+    0x00, 0x2F, /* Record Length */
+    0x01, /* ClientHello */
+    0x00, 0x00, 0x2E, /* Message length */
+    0x00, 0x00, /* Message sequence */
+    0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Fragment offset */
+    0x00, 0x00, 0x23, /* Fragment length */
+    0xFE, 0xFD, /* DTLSv1.2 */
+    0xCA, 0x18, 0x9F, 0x76, 0xEC, 0x57, 0xCE, 0xE5, 0xB3, 0xAB, 0x79, 0x90,
+    0xAD, 0xAC, 0x6E, 0xD1, 0x58, 0x35, 0x03, 0x97, 0x16, 0x10, 0x82, 0x56,
+    0xD8, 0x55, 0xFF, 0xE1, 0x8A, 0xA3, 0x2E, 0xF6, /* Random */
+    0x00 /* Session id len */
+};
+
+/* Second fragment of a ClientHello */
+static const unsigned char clienthello_2ndfrag[] = {
+    0x16, /* Handshake */
+    0xFE, 0xFF, /* DTLSv1.0 */
+    0x00, 0x00, /* Epoch */
+    0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Record sequence number */
+    0x00, 0x38, /* Record Length */
+    0x01, /* ClientHello */
+    0x00, 0x00, 0x2E, /* Message length */
+    0x00, 0x00, /* Message sequence */
+    0x00, 0x00, 0x02, /* Fragment offset */
+    0x00, 0x00, 0x2C, /* Fragment length */
+    /* Version skipped - sent in first fragment */
+    0xCA, 0x18, 0x9F, 0x76, 0xEC, 0x57, 0xCE, 0xE5, 0xB3, 0xAB, 0x79, 0x90,
+    0xAD, 0xAC, 0x6E, 0xD1, 0x58, 0x35, 0x03, 0x97, 0x16, 0x10, 0x82, 0x56,
+    0xD8, 0x55, 0xFF, 0xE1, 0x8A, 0xA3, 0x2E, 0xF6, /* Random */
+    0x00, /* Session id len */
+    0x00, /* Cookie len */
+    0x00, 0x04, /* Ciphersuites len */
+    0x00, 0x2f, /* AES128-SHA */
+    0x00, 0xff, /* Empty reneg info SCSV */
+    0x01, /* Compression methods len */
+    0x00, /* Null compression */
+    0x00, 0x00 /* Extensions len */
+};
+
+/* A ClientHello with a good cookie */
+static const unsigned char clienthello_cookie[] = {
+    0x16, /* Handshake */
+    0xFE, 0xFF, /* DTLSv1.0 */
+    0x00, 0x00, /* Epoch */
+    0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Record sequence number */
+    0x00, 0x4E, /* Record Length */
+    0x01, /* ClientHello */
+    0x00, 0x00, 0x42, /* Message length */
+    0x00, 0x00, /* Message sequence */
+    0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Fragment offset */
+    0x00, 0x00, 0x42, /* Fragment length */
+    0xFE, 0xFD, /* DTLSv1.2 */
+    0xCA, 0x18, 0x9F, 0x76, 0xEC, 0x57, 0xCE, 0xE5, 0xB3, 0xAB, 0x79, 0x90,
+    0xAD, 0xAC, 0x6E, 0xD1, 0x58, 0x35, 0x03, 0x97, 0x16, 0x10, 0x82, 0x56,
+    0xD8, 0x55, 0xFF, 0xE1, 0x8A, 0xA3, 0x2E, 0xF6, /* Random */
+    0x00, /* Session id len */
+    0x14, /* Cookie len */
+    0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 005, 0x06, 007, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0x0C,
+    0x0D, 0x0E, 0x0F, 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, /* Cookie */
+    0x00, 0x04, /* Ciphersuites len */
+    0x00, 0x2f, /* AES128-SHA */
+    0x00, 0xff, /* Empty reneg info SCSV */
+    0x01, /* Compression methods len */
+    0x00, /* Null compression */
+    0x00, 0x00 /* Extensions len */
+};
+
+/* A fragmented ClientHello with a good cookie */
+static const unsigned char clienthello_cookie_frag[] = {
+    0x16, /* Handshake */
+    0xFE, 0xFF, /* DTLSv1.0 */
+    0x00, 0x00, /* Epoch */
+    0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Record sequence number */
+    0x00, 0x44, /* Record Length */
+    0x01, /* ClientHello */
+    0x00, 0x00, 0x42, /* Message length */
+    0x00, 0x00, /* Message sequence */
+    0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Fragment offset */
+    0x00, 0x00, 0x38, /* Fragment length */
+    0xFE, 0xFD, /* DTLSv1.2 */
+    0xCA, 0x18, 0x9F, 0x76, 0xEC, 0x57, 0xCE, 0xE5, 0xB3, 0xAB, 0x79, 0x90,
+    0xAD, 0xAC, 0x6E, 0xD1, 0x58, 0x35, 0x03, 0x97, 0x16, 0x10, 0x82, 0x56,
+    0xD8, 0x55, 0xFF, 0xE1, 0x8A, 0xA3, 0x2E, 0xF6, /* Random */
+    0x00, /* Session id len */
+    0x14, /* Cookie len */
+    0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 005, 0x06, 007, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0x0C,
+    0x0D, 0x0E, 0x0F, 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13 /* Cookie */
+};
+
+
+/* A ClientHello with a bad cookie */
+static const unsigned char clienthello_badcookie[] = {
+    0x16, /* Handshake */
+    0xFE, 0xFF, /* DTLSv1.0 */
+    0x00, 0x00, /* Epoch */
+    0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Record sequence number */
+    0x00, 0x4E, /* Record Length */
+    0x01, /* ClientHello */
+    0x00, 0x00, 0x42, /* Message length */
+    0x00, 0x00, /* Message sequence */
+    0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Fragment offset */
+    0x00, 0x00, 0x42, /* Fragment length */
+    0xFE, 0xFD, /* DTLSv1.2 */
+    0xCA, 0x18, 0x9F, 0x76, 0xEC, 0x57, 0xCE, 0xE5, 0xB3, 0xAB, 0x79, 0x90,
+    0xAD, 0xAC, 0x6E, 0xD1, 0x58, 0x35, 0x03, 0x97, 0x16, 0x10, 0x82, 0x56,
+    0xD8, 0x55, 0xFF, 0xE1, 0x8A, 0xA3, 0x2E, 0xF6, /* Random */
+    0x00, /* Session id len */
+    0x14, /* Cookie len */
+    0x01, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 005, 0x06, 007, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0x0C,
+    0x0D, 0x0E, 0x0F, 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, /* Cookie */
+    0x00, 0x04, /* Ciphersuites len */
+    0x00, 0x2f, /* AES128-SHA */
+    0x00, 0xff, /* Empty reneg info SCSV */
+    0x01, /* Compression methods len */
+    0x00, /* Null compression */
+    0x00, 0x00 /* Extensions len */
+};
+
+/* A fragmented ClientHello with the fragment boundary mid cookie */
+static const unsigned char clienthello_cookie_short[] = {
+    0x16, /* Handshake */
+    0xFE, 0xFF, /* DTLSv1.0 */
+    0x00, 0x00, /* Epoch */
+    0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Record sequence number */
+    0x00, 0x43, /* Record Length */
+    0x01, /* ClientHello */
+    0x00, 0x00, 0x42, /* Message length */
+    0x00, 0x00, /* Message sequence */
+    0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Fragment offset */
+    0x00, 0x00, 0x37, /* Fragment length */
+    0xFE, 0xFD, /* DTLSv1.2 */
+    0xCA, 0x18, 0x9F, 0x76, 0xEC, 0x57, 0xCE, 0xE5, 0xB3, 0xAB, 0x79, 0x90,
+    0xAD, 0xAC, 0x6E, 0xD1, 0x58, 0x35, 0x03, 0x97, 0x16, 0x10, 0x82, 0x56,
+    0xD8, 0x55, 0xFF, 0xE1, 0x8A, 0xA3, 0x2E, 0xF6, /* Random */
+    0x00, /* Session id len */
+    0x14, /* Cookie len */
+    0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 005, 0x06, 007, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0x0C,
+    0x0D, 0x0E, 0x0F, 0x10, 0x11, 0x12 /* Cookie */
+};
+
+/* Bad record - too short */
+static const unsigned char record_short[] = {
+    0x16, /* Handshake */
+    0xFE, 0xFF, /* DTLSv1.0 */
+    0x00, 0x00, /* Epoch */
+    0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 /* Record sequence number */
+};
+
+static const unsigned char verify[] = {
+    0x16, /* Handshake */
+    0xFE, 0xFF, /* DTLSv1.0 */
+    0x00, 0x00, /* Epoch */
+    0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Record sequence number */
+    0x00, 0x23, /* Record Length */
+    0x03, /* HelloVerifyRequest */
+    0x00, 0x00, 0x17, /* Message length */
+    0x00, 0x00, /* Message sequence */
+    0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Fragment offset */
+    0x00, 0x00, 0x17, /* Fragment length */
+    0xFE, 0xFF, /* DTLSv1.0 */
+    0x14, /* Cookie len */
+    0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 005, 0x06, 007, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0x0C,
+    0x0D, 0x0E, 0x0F, 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13 /* Cookie */
+};
+
+static struct {
+    const unsigned char *in;
+    unsigned int inlen;
+    /*
+     * GOOD == positive return value from DTLSv1_listen, no output yet
+     * VERIFY == 0 return value, HelloVerifyRequest sent
+     * DROP == 0 return value, no output
+     */
+    enum {GOOD, VERIFY, DROP} outtype;
+} testpackets[9] = {
+    {
+        clienthello_nocookie,
+        sizeof(clienthello_nocookie),
+        VERIFY
+    },
+    {
+        clienthello_nocookie_frag,
+        sizeof(clienthello_nocookie_frag),
+        VERIFY
+    },
+    {
+        clienthello_nocookie_short,
+        sizeof(clienthello_nocookie_short),
+        DROP
+    },
+    {
+        clienthello_2ndfrag,
+        sizeof(clienthello_2ndfrag),
+        DROP
+    },
+    {
+        clienthello_cookie,
+        sizeof(clienthello_cookie),
+        GOOD
+    },
+    {
+        clienthello_cookie_frag,
+        sizeof(clienthello_cookie_frag),
+        GOOD
+    },
+    {
+        clienthello_badcookie,
+        sizeof(clienthello_badcookie),
+        VERIFY
+    },
+    {
+        clienthello_cookie_short,
+        sizeof(clienthello_cookie_short),
+        DROP
+    },
+    {
+        record_short,
+        sizeof(record_short),
+        DROP
+    }
+};
+
+# define COOKIE_LEN  20
+
+static int cookie_gen(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int *cookie_len)
+{
+    unsigned int i;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < COOKIE_LEN; i++, cookie++) {
+        *cookie = i;
+    }
+    *cookie_len = COOKIE_LEN;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int cookie_verify(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *cookie,
+                         unsigned int cookie_len)
+{
+    unsigned int i;
+
+    if (cookie_len != COOKIE_LEN)
+        return 0;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < COOKIE_LEN; i++, cookie++) {
+        if (*cookie != i)
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+#endif
+
+int main(void)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
+    SSL_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+    SSL *ssl = NULL;
+    BIO *outbio = NULL;
+    BIO *inbio = NULL;
+    BIO_ADDR *peer = BIO_ADDR_new();
+    char *data;
+    long datalen;
+    int ret, success = 0;
+    long i;
+
+    ctx = SSL_CTX_new(DTLS_server_method());
+    if (ctx == NULL || peer == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    SSL_CTX_set_cookie_generate_cb(ctx, cookie_gen);
+    SSL_CTX_set_cookie_verify_cb(ctx, cookie_verify);
+
+    /* Create an SSL object for the connection */
+    ssl = SSL_new(ctx);
+    if (ssl == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    outbio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+    if (outbio == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    SSL_set0_wbio(ssl, outbio);
+
+    success = 1;
+    for (i = 0; i < (long)OSSL_NELEM(testpackets) && success; i++) {
+        inbio = BIO_new_mem_buf((char *)testpackets[i].in,
+                                testpackets[i].inlen);
+        if (inbio == NULL) {
+            success = 0;
+            goto err;
+        }
+        /* Set Non-blocking IO behaviour */
+        BIO_set_mem_eof_return(inbio, -1);
+
+        SSL_set0_rbio(ssl, inbio);
+
+        /* Process the incoming packet */
+        ret = DTLSv1_listen(ssl, peer);
+        if (ret < 0) {
+            success = 0;
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        datalen = BIO_get_mem_data(outbio, &data);
+
+        if (testpackets[i].outtype == VERIFY) {
+            if (ret == 0) {
+                if (datalen != sizeof(verify)
+                        || (memcmp(data, verify, sizeof(verify)) != 0)) {
+                    printf("Test %ld failure: incorrect HelloVerifyRequest\n", i);
+                    success = 0;
+                } else {
+                    printf("Test %ld success\n", i);
+                }
+            } else {
+                printf ("Test %ld failure: should not have succeeded\n", i);
+                success = 0;
+            }
+        } else if (datalen == 0) {
+            if ((ret == 0 && testpackets[i].outtype == DROP)
+                    || (ret == 1 && testpackets[i].outtype == GOOD)) {
+                printf("Test %ld success\n", i);
+            } else {
+                printf("Test %ld failure: wrong return value\n", i);
+                success = 0;
+            }
+        } else {
+            printf("Test %ld failure: Unexpected data output\n", i);
+            success = 0;
+        }
+        (void)BIO_reset(outbio);
+        inbio = NULL;
+        /* Frees up inbio */
+        SSL_set0_rbio(ssl, NULL);
+    }
+
+ err:
+    if (!success)
+        ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+    /* Also frees up outbio */
+    SSL_free(ssl);
+    SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
+    BIO_free(inbio);
+    OPENSSL_free(peer);
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG
+    CRYPTO_mem_leaks_fp(stderr);
+# endif
+    return success ? 0 : 1;
+#else
+    printf("DTLSv1_listen() is not supported by this build - skipping\n");
+    return 0;
+#endif
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ecdsatest.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ecdsatest.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ce73778
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ecdsatest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,519 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ *
+ * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ *
+ * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license provided above.
+ *
+ * The elliptic curve binary polynomial software is originally written by
+ * Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h> /* To see if OPENSSL_NO_EC is defined */
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+    puts("Elliptic curves are disabled.");
+    return 0;
+}
+#else
+
+# include <openssl/crypto.h>
+# include <openssl/bio.h>
+# include <openssl/evp.h>
+# include <openssl/bn.h>
+# include <openssl/ec.h>
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+#  include <openssl/engine.h>
+# endif
+# include <openssl/err.h>
+# include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+static const char rnd_seed[] = "string to make the random number generator "
+    "think it has entropy";
+
+/* declaration of the test functions */
+int x9_62_tests(BIO *);
+int x9_62_test_internal(BIO *out, int nid, const char *r, const char *s);
+int test_builtin(BIO *);
+
+/* functions to change the RAND_METHOD */
+int change_rand(void);
+int restore_rand(void);
+int fbytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
+
+static RAND_METHOD fake_rand;
+static const RAND_METHOD *old_rand;
+
+int change_rand(void)
+{
+    /* save old rand method */
+    if ((old_rand = RAND_get_rand_method()) == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    fake_rand.seed = old_rand->seed;
+    fake_rand.cleanup = old_rand->cleanup;
+    fake_rand.add = old_rand->add;
+    fake_rand.status = old_rand->status;
+    /* use own random function */
+    fake_rand.bytes = fbytes;
+    fake_rand.pseudorand = old_rand->bytes;
+    /* set new RAND_METHOD */
+    if (!RAND_set_rand_method(&fake_rand))
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int restore_rand(void)
+{
+    if (!RAND_set_rand_method(old_rand))
+        return 0;
+    else
+        return 1;
+}
+
+static int fbytes_counter = 0, use_fake = 0;
+static const char *numbers[8] = {
+    "651056770906015076056810763456358567190100156695615665659",
+    "6140507067065001063065065565667405560006161556565665656654",
+    "8763001015071075675010661307616710783570106710677817767166"
+        "71676178726717",
+    "7000000175690566466555057817571571075705015757757057795755"
+        "55657156756655",
+    "1275552191113212300012030439187146164646146646466749494799",
+    "1542725565216523985789236956265265265235675811949404040041",
+    "1456427555219115346513212300075341203043918714616464614664"
+        "64667494947990",
+    "1712787255652165239672857892369562652652652356758119494040"
+        "40041670216363"
+};
+
+int fbytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
+{
+    int ret;
+    BIGNUM *tmp = NULL;
+
+    if (use_fake == 0)
+        return old_rand->bytes(buf, num);
+
+    use_fake = 0;
+
+    if (fbytes_counter >= 8)
+        return 0;
+    tmp = BN_new();
+    if (!tmp)
+        return 0;
+    if (!BN_dec2bn(&tmp, numbers[fbytes_counter])) {
+        BN_free(tmp);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    fbytes_counter++;
+    if (num != BN_num_bytes(tmp) || !BN_bn2bin(tmp, buf))
+        ret = 0;
+    else
+        ret = 1;
+    BN_free(tmp);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/* some tests from the X9.62 draft */
+int x9_62_test_internal(BIO *out, int nid, const char *r_in, const char *s_in)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    const char message[] = "abc";
+    unsigned char digest[20];
+    unsigned int dgst_len = 0;
+    EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+    EC_KEY *key = NULL;
+    ECDSA_SIG *signature = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *r = NULL, *s = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *kinv = NULL, *rp = NULL;
+    const BIGNUM *sig_r, *sig_s;
+
+    if (md_ctx == NULL)
+        goto x962_int_err;
+
+    /* get the message digest */
+    if (!EVP_DigestInit(md_ctx, EVP_sha1())
+        || !EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, (const void *)message, 3)
+        || !EVP_DigestFinal(md_ctx, digest, &dgst_len))
+        goto x962_int_err;
+
+    BIO_printf(out, "testing %s: ", OBJ_nid2sn(nid));
+    /* create the key */
+    if ((key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid)) == NULL)
+        goto x962_int_err;
+    use_fake = 1;
+    if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(key))
+        goto x962_int_err;
+    BIO_printf(out, ".");
+    (void)BIO_flush(out);
+    /* create the signature */
+    use_fake = 1;
+    /* Use ECDSA_sign_setup to avoid use of ECDSA nonces */
+    if (!ECDSA_sign_setup(key, NULL, &kinv, &rp))
+        goto x962_int_err;
+    signature = ECDSA_do_sign_ex(digest, 20, kinv, rp, key);
+    if (signature == NULL)
+        goto x962_int_err;
+    BIO_printf(out, ".");
+    (void)BIO_flush(out);
+    /* compare the created signature with the expected signature */
+    if ((r = BN_new()) == NULL || (s = BN_new()) == NULL)
+        goto x962_int_err;
+    if (!BN_dec2bn(&r, r_in) || !BN_dec2bn(&s, s_in))
+        goto x962_int_err;
+    ECDSA_SIG_get0(signature, &sig_r, &sig_s);
+    if (BN_cmp(sig_r, r) || BN_cmp(sig_s, s))
+        goto x962_int_err;
+    BIO_printf(out, ".");
+    (void)BIO_flush(out);
+    /* verify the signature */
+    if (ECDSA_do_verify(digest, 20, signature, key) != 1)
+        goto x962_int_err;
+    BIO_printf(out, ".");
+    (void)BIO_flush(out);
+
+    BIO_printf(out, " ok\n");
+    ret = 1;
+ x962_int_err:
+    if (!ret)
+        BIO_printf(out, " failed\n");
+    EC_KEY_free(key);
+    ECDSA_SIG_free(signature);
+    BN_free(r);
+    BN_free(s);
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
+    BN_clear_free(kinv);
+    BN_clear_free(rp);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int x9_62_tests(BIO *out)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    BIO_printf(out, "some tests from X9.62:\n");
+
+    /* set own rand method */
+    if (!change_rand())
+        goto x962_err;
+
+    if (!x9_62_test_internal(out, NID_X9_62_prime192v1,
+                             "3342403536405981729393488334694600415596881826869351677613",
+                             "5735822328888155254683894997897571951568553642892029982342"))
+        goto x962_err;
+    if (!x9_62_test_internal(out, NID_X9_62_prime239v1,
+                             "3086361431751678114926225473006680188549593787585317781474"
+                             "62058306432176",
+                             "3238135532097973577080787768312505059318910517550078427819"
+                             "78505179448783"))
+        goto x962_err;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+    if (!x9_62_test_internal(out, NID_X9_62_c2tnb191v1,
+                             "87194383164871543355722284926904419997237591535066528048",
+                             "308992691965804947361541664549085895292153777025772063598"))
+        goto x962_err;
+    if (!x9_62_test_internal(out, NID_X9_62_c2tnb239v1,
+                             "2159633321041961198501834003903461262881815148684178964245"
+                             "5876922391552",
+                             "1970303740007316867383349976549972270528498040721988191026"
+                             "49413465737174"))
+        goto x962_err;
+# endif
+    ret = 1;
+ x962_err:
+    if (!restore_rand())
+        ret = 0;
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int test_builtin(BIO *out)
+{
+    EC_builtin_curve *curves = NULL;
+    size_t crv_len = 0, n = 0;
+    EC_KEY *eckey = NULL, *wrong_eckey = NULL;
+    EC_GROUP *group;
+    ECDSA_SIG *ecdsa_sig = NULL, *modified_sig = NULL;
+    unsigned char digest[20], wrong_digest[20];
+    unsigned char *signature = NULL;
+    const unsigned char *sig_ptr;
+    unsigned char *sig_ptr2;
+    unsigned char *raw_buf = NULL;
+    const BIGNUM *sig_r, *sig_s;
+    BIGNUM *modified_r = NULL, *modified_s = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *unmodified_r = NULL, *unmodified_s = NULL;
+    unsigned int sig_len, degree, r_len, s_len, bn_len, buf_len;
+    int nid, ret = 0;
+
+    /* fill digest values with some random data */
+    if (RAND_bytes(digest, 20) <= 0 || RAND_bytes(wrong_digest, 20) <= 0) {
+        BIO_printf(out, "ERROR: unable to get random data\n");
+        goto builtin_err;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * create and verify a ecdsa signature with every available curve (with )
+     */
+    BIO_printf(out, "\ntesting ECDSA_sign() and ECDSA_verify() "
+               "with some internal curves:\n");
+
+    /* get a list of all internal curves */
+    crv_len = EC_get_builtin_curves(NULL, 0);
+    curves = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*curves) * crv_len);
+    if (curves == NULL) {
+        BIO_printf(out, "malloc error\n");
+        goto builtin_err;
+    }
+
+    if (!EC_get_builtin_curves(curves, crv_len)) {
+        BIO_printf(out, "unable to get internal curves\n");
+        goto builtin_err;
+    }
+
+    /* now create and verify a signature for every curve */
+    for (n = 0; n < crv_len; n++) {
+        unsigned char dirt, offset;
+
+        nid = curves[n].nid;
+        if (nid == NID_ipsec4 || nid == NID_X25519)
+            continue;
+        /* create new ecdsa key (== EC_KEY) */
+        if ((eckey = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
+            goto builtin_err;
+        group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(nid);
+        if (group == NULL)
+            goto builtin_err;
+        if (EC_KEY_set_group(eckey, group) == 0)
+            goto builtin_err;
+        EC_GROUP_free(group);
+        degree = EC_GROUP_get_degree(EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey));
+        if (degree < 160) {
+            /* drop the curve */
+            EC_KEY_free(eckey);
+            eckey = NULL;
+            continue;
+        }
+        BIO_printf(out, "%s: ", OBJ_nid2sn(nid));
+        /* create key */
+        if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(eckey)) {
+            BIO_printf(out, " failed\n");
+            goto builtin_err;
+        }
+        /* create second key */
+        if ((wrong_eckey = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
+            goto builtin_err;
+        group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(nid);
+        if (group == NULL)
+            goto builtin_err;
+        if (EC_KEY_set_group(wrong_eckey, group) == 0)
+            goto builtin_err;
+        EC_GROUP_free(group);
+        if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(wrong_eckey)) {
+            BIO_printf(out, " failed\n");
+            goto builtin_err;
+        }
+
+        BIO_printf(out, ".");
+        (void)BIO_flush(out);
+        /* check key */
+        if (!EC_KEY_check_key(eckey)) {
+            BIO_printf(out, " failed\n");
+            goto builtin_err;
+        }
+        BIO_printf(out, ".");
+        (void)BIO_flush(out);
+        /* create signature */
+        sig_len = ECDSA_size(eckey);
+        if ((signature = OPENSSL_malloc(sig_len)) == NULL)
+            goto builtin_err;
+        if (!ECDSA_sign(0, digest, 20, signature, &sig_len, eckey)) {
+            BIO_printf(out, " failed\n");
+            goto builtin_err;
+        }
+        BIO_printf(out, ".");
+        (void)BIO_flush(out);
+        /* verify signature */
+        if (ECDSA_verify(0, digest, 20, signature, sig_len, eckey) != 1) {
+            BIO_printf(out, " failed\n");
+            goto builtin_err;
+        }
+        BIO_printf(out, ".");
+        (void)BIO_flush(out);
+        /* verify signature with the wrong key */
+        if (ECDSA_verify(0, digest, 20, signature, sig_len, wrong_eckey) == 1) {
+            BIO_printf(out, " failed\n");
+            goto builtin_err;
+        }
+        BIO_printf(out, ".");
+        (void)BIO_flush(out);
+        /* wrong digest */
+        if (ECDSA_verify(0, wrong_digest, 20, signature, sig_len, eckey) == 1) {
+            BIO_printf(out, " failed\n");
+            goto builtin_err;
+        }
+        BIO_printf(out, ".");
+        (void)BIO_flush(out);
+        /* wrong length */
+        if (ECDSA_verify(0, digest, 20, signature, sig_len - 1, eckey) == 1) {
+            BIO_printf(out, " failed\n");
+            goto builtin_err;
+        }
+        BIO_printf(out, ".");
+        (void)BIO_flush(out);
+
+        /*
+         * Modify a single byte of the signature: to ensure we don't garble
+         * the ASN1 structure, we read the raw signature and modify a byte in
+         * one of the bignums directly.
+         */
+        sig_ptr = signature;
+        if ((ecdsa_sig = d2i_ECDSA_SIG(NULL, &sig_ptr, sig_len)) == NULL) {
+            BIO_printf(out, " failed\n");
+            goto builtin_err;
+        }
+
+        ECDSA_SIG_get0(ecdsa_sig, &sig_r, &sig_s);
+
+        /* Store the two BIGNUMs in raw_buf. */
+        r_len = BN_num_bytes(sig_r);
+        s_len = BN_num_bytes(sig_s);
+        bn_len = (degree + 7) / 8;
+        if ((r_len > bn_len) || (s_len > bn_len)) {
+            BIO_printf(out, " failed\n");
+            goto builtin_err;
+        }
+        buf_len = 2 * bn_len;
+        if ((raw_buf = OPENSSL_zalloc(buf_len)) == NULL)
+            goto builtin_err;
+        BN_bn2bin(sig_r, raw_buf + bn_len - r_len);
+        BN_bn2bin(sig_s, raw_buf + buf_len - s_len);
+
+        /* Modify a single byte in the buffer. */
+        offset = raw_buf[10] % buf_len;
+        dirt = raw_buf[11] ? raw_buf[11] : 1;
+        raw_buf[offset] ^= dirt;
+        /* Now read the BIGNUMs back in from raw_buf. */
+        modified_sig = ECDSA_SIG_new();
+        if (modified_sig == NULL)
+            goto builtin_err;
+        if (((modified_r = BN_bin2bn(raw_buf, bn_len, NULL)) == NULL)
+            || ((modified_s = BN_bin2bn(raw_buf + bn_len, bn_len, NULL)) == NULL)
+            || !ECDSA_SIG_set0(modified_sig, modified_r, modified_s)) {
+            BN_free(modified_r);
+            BN_free(modified_s);
+            goto builtin_err;
+        }
+        sig_ptr2 = signature;
+        sig_len = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(modified_sig, &sig_ptr2);
+        if (ECDSA_verify(0, digest, 20, signature, sig_len, eckey) == 1) {
+            BIO_printf(out, " failed\n");
+            goto builtin_err;
+        }
+        /*
+         * Sanity check: undo the modification and verify signature.
+         */
+        raw_buf[offset] ^= dirt;
+        if (((unmodified_r = BN_bin2bn(raw_buf, bn_len, NULL)) == NULL)
+            || ((unmodified_s = BN_bin2bn(raw_buf + bn_len, bn_len, NULL)) == NULL)
+            || !ECDSA_SIG_set0(modified_sig, unmodified_r, unmodified_s)) {
+            BN_free(unmodified_r);
+            BN_free(unmodified_s);
+            goto builtin_err;
+        }
+
+        sig_ptr2 = signature;
+        sig_len = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(modified_sig, &sig_ptr2);
+        if (ECDSA_verify(0, digest, 20, signature, sig_len, eckey) != 1) {
+            BIO_printf(out, " failed\n");
+            goto builtin_err;
+        }
+        BIO_printf(out, ".");
+        (void)BIO_flush(out);
+
+        BIO_printf(out, " ok\n");
+        /* cleanup */
+        /* clean bogus errors */
+        ERR_clear_error();
+        OPENSSL_free(signature);
+        signature = NULL;
+        EC_KEY_free(eckey);
+        eckey = NULL;
+        EC_KEY_free(wrong_eckey);
+        wrong_eckey = NULL;
+        ECDSA_SIG_free(ecdsa_sig);
+        ecdsa_sig = NULL;
+        ECDSA_SIG_free(modified_sig);
+        modified_sig = NULL;
+        OPENSSL_free(raw_buf);
+        raw_buf = NULL;
+    }
+
+    ret = 1;
+ builtin_err:
+    EC_KEY_free(eckey);
+    EC_KEY_free(wrong_eckey);
+    ECDSA_SIG_free(ecdsa_sig);
+    ECDSA_SIG_free(modified_sig);
+    OPENSSL_free(signature);
+    OPENSSL_free(raw_buf);
+    OPENSSL_free(curves);
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int main(void)
+{
+    int ret = 1;
+    BIO *out;
+    char *p;
+
+    out = BIO_new_fp(stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT);
+
+    p = getenv("OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY");
+    if (p != NULL && strcmp(p, "on") == 0)
+        CRYPTO_set_mem_debug(1);
+
+    /* initialize the prng */
+    RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof(rnd_seed));
+
+    /* the tests */
+    if (!x9_62_tests(out))
+        goto err;
+    if (!test_builtin(out))
+        goto err;
+
+    ret = 0;
+ err:
+    if (ret)
+        BIO_printf(out, "\nECDSA test failed\n");
+    else
+        BIO_printf(out, "\nECDSA test passed\n");
+    if (ret)
+        ERR_print_errors(out);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG
+    if (CRYPTO_mem_leaks(out) <= 0)
+        ret = 1;
+#endif
+    BIO_free(out);
+    return ret;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ectest.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ectest.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d7b1432
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ectest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1776 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ *
+ * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ *
+ * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license provided above.
+ *
+ * The elliptic curve binary polynomial software is originally written by
+ * Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#ifdef FLAT_INC
+# include "e_os.h"
+#else
+# include "../e_os.h"
+#endif
+#include <string.h>
+#include <time.h>
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+    puts("Elliptic curves are disabled.");
+    return 0;
+}
+#else
+
+# include <openssl/ec.h>
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+#  include <openssl/engine.h>
+# endif
+# include <openssl/err.h>
+# include <openssl/obj_mac.h>
+# include <openssl/objects.h>
+# include <openssl/rand.h>
+# include <openssl/bn.h>
+# include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+
+# if defined(_MSC_VER) && defined(_MIPS_) && (_MSC_VER/100==12)
+/* suppress "too big too optimize" warning */
+#  pragma warning(disable:4959)
+# endif
+
+# define ABORT do { \
+        fflush(stdout); \
+        fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: ABORT\n", __FILE__, __LINE__); \
+        ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); \
+        EXIT(1); \
+} while (0)
+
+# define TIMING_BASE_PT 0
+# define TIMING_RAND_PT 1
+# define TIMING_SIMUL 2
+
+/* test multiplication with group order, long and negative scalars */
+static void group_order_tests(EC_GROUP *group)
+{
+    BIGNUM *n1, *n2, *order;
+    EC_POINT *P = EC_POINT_new(group);
+    EC_POINT *Q = EC_POINT_new(group);
+    EC_POINT *R = EC_POINT_new(group);
+    EC_POINT *S = EC_POINT_new(group);
+    BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+    int i;
+
+    n1 = BN_new();
+    n2 = BN_new();
+    order = BN_new();
+    fprintf(stdout, "verify group order ...");
+    fflush(stdout);
+    if (!EC_GROUP_get_order(group, order, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+    if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, Q, order, NULL, NULL, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+    if (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, Q))
+        ABORT;
+    fprintf(stdout, ".");
+    fflush(stdout);
+    if (!EC_GROUP_precompute_mult(group, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+    if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, Q, order, NULL, NULL, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+    if (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, Q))
+        ABORT;
+    fprintf(stdout, " ok\n");
+    fprintf(stdout, "long/negative scalar tests ");
+    for (i = 1; i <= 2; i++) {
+        const BIGNUM *scalars[6];
+        const EC_POINT *points[6];
+
+        fprintf(stdout, i == 1 ?
+                "allowing precomputation ... " :
+                "without precomputation ... ");
+        if (!BN_set_word(n1, i))
+            ABORT;
+        /*
+         * If i == 1, P will be the predefined generator for which
+         * EC_GROUP_precompute_mult has set up precomputation.
+         */
+        if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, P, n1, NULL, NULL, ctx))
+            ABORT;
+
+        if (!BN_one(n1))
+            ABORT;
+        /* n1 = 1 - order */
+        if (!BN_sub(n1, n1, order))
+            ABORT;
+        if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, Q, NULL, P, n1, ctx))
+            ABORT;
+        if (0 != EC_POINT_cmp(group, Q, P, ctx))
+            ABORT;
+
+        /* n2 = 1 + order */
+        if (!BN_add(n2, order, BN_value_one()))
+            ABORT;
+        if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, Q, NULL, P, n2, ctx))
+            ABORT;
+        if (0 != EC_POINT_cmp(group, Q, P, ctx))
+            ABORT;
+
+        /* n2 = (1 - order) * (1 + order) = 1 - order^2 */
+        if (!BN_mul(n2, n1, n2, ctx))
+            ABORT;
+        if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, Q, NULL, P, n2, ctx))
+            ABORT;
+        if (0 != EC_POINT_cmp(group, Q, P, ctx))
+            ABORT;
+
+        /* n2 = order^2 - 1 */
+        BN_set_negative(n2, 0);
+        if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, Q, NULL, P, n2, ctx))
+            ABORT;
+        /* Add P to verify the result. */
+        if (!EC_POINT_add(group, Q, Q, P, ctx))
+            ABORT;
+        if (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, Q))
+            ABORT;
+
+        /* Exercise EC_POINTs_mul, including corner cases. */
+        if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, P))
+            ABORT;
+
+        scalars[0] = scalars[1] = BN_value_one();
+        points[0]  = points[1]  = P;
+
+        if (!EC_POINTs_mul(group, R, NULL, 2, points, scalars, ctx))
+            ABORT;
+        if (!EC_POINT_dbl(group, S, points[0], ctx))
+            ABORT;
+        if (0 != EC_POINT_cmp(group, R, S, ctx))
+            ABORT;
+
+        scalars[0] = n1;
+        points[0] = Q;          /* => infinity */
+        scalars[1] = n2;
+        points[1] = P;          /* => -P */
+        scalars[2] = n1;
+        points[2] = Q;          /* => infinity */
+        scalars[3] = n2;
+        points[3] = Q;          /* => infinity */
+        scalars[4] = n1;
+        points[4] = P;          /* => P */
+        scalars[5] = n2;
+        points[5] = Q;          /* => infinity */
+        if (!EC_POINTs_mul(group, P, NULL, 6, points, scalars, ctx))
+            ABORT;
+        if (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, P))
+            ABORT;
+    }
+    fprintf(stdout, "ok\n");
+
+    EC_POINT_free(P);
+    EC_POINT_free(Q);
+    EC_POINT_free(R);
+    EC_POINT_free(S);
+    BN_free(n1);
+    BN_free(n2);
+    BN_free(order);
+    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+}
+
+static void prime_field_tests(void)
+{
+    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *p, *a, *b;
+    EC_GROUP *group;
+    EC_GROUP *P_160 = NULL, *P_192 = NULL, *P_224 = NULL, *P_256 =
+        NULL, *P_384 = NULL, *P_521 = NULL;
+    EC_POINT *P, *Q, *R;
+    BIGNUM *x, *y, *z, *yplusone;
+    unsigned char buf[100];
+    size_t i, len;
+    int k;
+
+    ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+    if (!ctx)
+        ABORT;
+
+    p = BN_new();
+    a = BN_new();
+    b = BN_new();
+    if (!p || !a || !b)
+        ABORT;
+
+    if (!BN_hex2bn(&p, "17"))
+        ABORT;
+    if (!BN_hex2bn(&a, "1"))
+        ABORT;
+    if (!BN_hex2bn(&b, "1"))
+        ABORT;
+
+    group = EC_GROUP_new(EC_GFp_mont_method()); /* applications should use
+                                                 * EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp so
+                                                 * that the library gets to
+                                                 * choose the EC_METHOD */
+    if (!group)
+        ABORT;
+
+    if (!EC_GROUP_set_curve_GFp(group, p, a, b, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+
+    {
+        EC_GROUP *tmp;
+        tmp = EC_GROUP_new(EC_GROUP_method_of(group));
+        if (!tmp)
+            ABORT;
+        if (!EC_GROUP_copy(tmp, group))
+            ABORT;
+        EC_GROUP_free(group);
+        group = tmp;
+    }
+
+    if (!EC_GROUP_get_curve_GFp(group, p, a, b, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+
+    fprintf(stdout,
+            "Curve defined by Weierstrass equation\n     y^2 = x^3 + a*x + b  (mod 0x");
+    BN_print_fp(stdout, p);
+    fprintf(stdout, ")\n     a = 0x");
+    BN_print_fp(stdout, a);
+    fprintf(stdout, "\n     b = 0x");
+    BN_print_fp(stdout, b);
+    fprintf(stdout, "\n");
+
+    P = EC_POINT_new(group);
+    Q = EC_POINT_new(group);
+    R = EC_POINT_new(group);
+    if (!P || !Q || !R)
+        ABORT;
+
+    if (!EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(group, P))
+        ABORT;
+    if (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, P))
+        ABORT;
+
+    buf[0] = 0;
+    if (!EC_POINT_oct2point(group, Q, buf, 1, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+
+    if (!EC_POINT_add(group, P, P, Q, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+    if (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, P))
+        ABORT;
+
+    x = BN_new();
+    y = BN_new();
+    z = BN_new();
+    yplusone = BN_new();
+    if (x == NULL || y == NULL || z == NULL || yplusone == NULL)
+        ABORT;
+
+    if (!BN_hex2bn(&x, "D"))
+        ABORT;
+    if (!EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp(group, Q, x, 1, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+    if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, Q, ctx) <= 0) {
+        if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, Q, x, y, ctx))
+            ABORT;
+        fprintf(stderr, "Point is not on curve: x = 0x");
+        BN_print_fp(stderr, x);
+        fprintf(stderr, ", y = 0x");
+        BN_print_fp(stderr, y);
+        fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+        ABORT;
+    }
+
+    fprintf(stdout, "A cyclic subgroup:\n");
+    k = 100;
+    do {
+        if (k-- == 0)
+            ABORT;
+
+        if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, P))
+            fprintf(stdout, "     point at infinity\n");
+        else {
+            if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, y, ctx))
+                ABORT;
+
+            fprintf(stdout, "     x = 0x");
+            BN_print_fp(stdout, x);
+            fprintf(stdout, ", y = 0x");
+            BN_print_fp(stdout, y);
+            fprintf(stdout, "\n");
+        }
+
+        if (!EC_POINT_copy(R, P))
+            ABORT;
+        if (!EC_POINT_add(group, P, P, Q, ctx))
+            ABORT;
+
+    }
+    while (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, P));
+
+    if (!EC_POINT_add(group, P, Q, R, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+    if (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, P))
+        ABORT;
+
+    len =
+        EC_POINT_point2oct(group, Q, POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED, buf,
+                           sizeof(buf), ctx);
+    if (len == 0)
+        ABORT;
+    if (!EC_POINT_oct2point(group, P, buf, len, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+    if (0 != EC_POINT_cmp(group, P, Q, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+    fprintf(stdout, "Generator as octet string, compressed form:\n     ");
+    for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
+        fprintf(stdout, "%02X", buf[i]);
+
+    len =
+        EC_POINT_point2oct(group, Q, POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, buf,
+                           sizeof(buf), ctx);
+    if (len == 0)
+        ABORT;
+    if (!EC_POINT_oct2point(group, P, buf, len, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+    if (0 != EC_POINT_cmp(group, P, Q, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+    fprintf(stdout, "\nGenerator as octet string, uncompressed form:\n     ");
+    for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
+        fprintf(stdout, "%02X", buf[i]);
+
+    len =
+        EC_POINT_point2oct(group, Q, POINT_CONVERSION_HYBRID, buf, sizeof(buf),
+                           ctx);
+    if (len == 0)
+        ABORT;
+    if (!EC_POINT_oct2point(group, P, buf, len, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+    if (0 != EC_POINT_cmp(group, P, Q, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+    fprintf(stdout, "\nGenerator as octet string, hybrid form:\n     ");
+    for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
+        fprintf(stdout, "%02X", buf[i]);
+
+    if (!EC_POINT_get_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(group, R, x, y, z, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+    fprintf(stdout,
+            "\nA representation of the inverse of that generator in\nJacobian projective coordinates:\n     X = 0x");
+    BN_print_fp(stdout, x);
+    fprintf(stdout, ", Y = 0x");
+    BN_print_fp(stdout, y);
+    fprintf(stdout, ", Z = 0x");
+    BN_print_fp(stdout, z);
+    fprintf(stdout, "\n");
+
+    if (!EC_POINT_invert(group, P, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+    if (0 != EC_POINT_cmp(group, P, R, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+
+    /*
+     * Curve secp160r1 (Certicom Research SEC 2 Version 1.0, section 2.4.2,
+     * 2000) -- not a NIST curve, but commonly used
+     */
+
+    if (!BN_hex2bn(&p, "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF7FFFFFFF"))
+        ABORT;
+    if (1 != BN_is_prime_ex(p, BN_prime_checks, ctx, NULL))
+        ABORT;
+    if (!BN_hex2bn(&a, "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF7FFFFFFC"))
+        ABORT;
+    if (!BN_hex2bn(&b, "1C97BEFC54BD7A8B65ACF89F81D4D4ADC565FA45"))
+        ABORT;
+    if (!EC_GROUP_set_curve_GFp(group, p, a, b, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+
+    if (!BN_hex2bn(&x, "4A96B5688EF573284664698968C38BB913CBFC82"))
+        ABORT;
+    if (!BN_hex2bn(&y, "23a628553168947d59dcc912042351377ac5fb32"))
+        ABORT;
+    if (!BN_add(yplusone, y, BN_value_one()))
+        ABORT;
+    /*
+     * When (x, y) is on the curve, (x, y + 1) is, as it happens, not,
+     * and therefore setting the coordinates should fail.
+     */
+    if (EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, yplusone, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+    if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, y, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+    if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx) <= 0)
+        ABORT;
+    if (!BN_hex2bn(&z, "0100000000000000000001F4C8F927AED3CA752257"))
+        ABORT;
+    if (!EC_GROUP_set_generator(group, P, z, BN_value_one()))
+        ABORT;
+
+    if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, y, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+    fprintf(stdout, "\nSEC2 curve secp160r1 -- Generator:\n     x = 0x");
+    BN_print_fp(stdout, x);
+    fprintf(stdout, "\n     y = 0x");
+    BN_print_fp(stdout, y);
+    fprintf(stdout, "\n");
+    /* G_y value taken from the standard: */
+    if (!BN_hex2bn(&z, "23a628553168947d59dcc912042351377ac5fb32"))
+        ABORT;
+    if (0 != BN_cmp(y, z))
+        ABORT;
+
+    fprintf(stdout, "verify degree ...");
+    if (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) != 160)
+        ABORT;
+    fprintf(stdout, " ok\n");
+
+    group_order_tests(group);
+
+    if ((P_160 = EC_GROUP_new(EC_GROUP_method_of(group))) == NULL)
+        ABORT;
+    if (!EC_GROUP_copy(P_160, group))
+        ABORT;
+
+    /* Curve P-192 (FIPS PUB 186-2, App. 6) */
+
+    if (!BN_hex2bn(&p, "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFEFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF"))
+        ABORT;
+    if (1 != BN_is_prime_ex(p, BN_prime_checks, ctx, NULL))
+        ABORT;
+    if (!BN_hex2bn(&a, "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFEFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC"))
+        ABORT;
+    if (!BN_hex2bn(&b, "64210519E59C80E70FA7E9AB72243049FEB8DEECC146B9B1"))
+        ABORT;
+    if (!EC_GROUP_set_curve_GFp(group, p, a, b, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+
+    if (!BN_hex2bn(&x, "188DA80EB03090F67CBF20EB43A18800F4FF0AFD82FF1012"))
+        ABORT;
+    if (!EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, 1, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+    if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx) <= 0)
+        ABORT;
+    if (!BN_hex2bn(&z, "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF99DEF836146BC9B1B4D22831"))
+        ABORT;
+    if (!EC_GROUP_set_generator(group, P, z, BN_value_one()))
+        ABORT;
+
+    if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, y, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+    fprintf(stdout, "\nNIST curve P-192 -- Generator:\n     x = 0x");
+    BN_print_fp(stdout, x);
+    fprintf(stdout, "\n     y = 0x");
+    BN_print_fp(stdout, y);
+    fprintf(stdout, "\n");
+    /* G_y value taken from the standard: */
+    if (!BN_hex2bn(&z, "07192B95FFC8DA78631011ED6B24CDD573F977A11E794811"))
+        ABORT;
+    if (0 != BN_cmp(y, z))
+        ABORT;
+
+    if (!BN_add(yplusone, y, BN_value_one()))
+        ABORT;
+    /*
+     * When (x, y) is on the curve, (x, y + 1) is, as it happens, not,
+     * and therefore setting the coordinates should fail.
+     */
+    if (EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, yplusone, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+
+    fprintf(stdout, "verify degree ...");
+    if (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) != 192)
+        ABORT;
+    fprintf(stdout, " ok\n");
+
+    group_order_tests(group);
+
+    if ((P_192 = EC_GROUP_new(EC_GROUP_method_of(group))) == NULL)
+        ABORT;
+    if (!EC_GROUP_copy(P_192, group))
+        ABORT;
+
+    /* Curve P-224 (FIPS PUB 186-2, App. 6) */
+
+    if (!BN_hex2bn
+        (&p, "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF000000000000000000000001"))
+        ABORT;
+    if (1 != BN_is_prime_ex(p, BN_prime_checks, ctx, NULL))
+        ABORT;
+    if (!BN_hex2bn
+        (&a, "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFEFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE"))
+        ABORT;
+    if (!BN_hex2bn
+        (&b, "B4050A850C04B3ABF54132565044B0B7D7BFD8BA270B39432355FFB4"))
+        ABORT;
+    if (!EC_GROUP_set_curve_GFp(group, p, a, b, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+
+    if (!BN_hex2bn
+        (&x, "B70E0CBD6BB4BF7F321390B94A03C1D356C21122343280D6115C1D21"))
+        ABORT;
+    if (!EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, 0, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+    if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx) <= 0)
+        ABORT;
+    if (!BN_hex2bn
+        (&z, "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF16A2E0B8F03E13DD29455C5C2A3D"))
+        ABORT;
+    if (!EC_GROUP_set_generator(group, P, z, BN_value_one()))
+        ABORT;
+
+    if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, y, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+    fprintf(stdout, "\nNIST curve P-224 -- Generator:\n     x = 0x");
+    BN_print_fp(stdout, x);
+    fprintf(stdout, "\n     y = 0x");
+    BN_print_fp(stdout, y);
+    fprintf(stdout, "\n");
+    /* G_y value taken from the standard: */
+    if (!BN_hex2bn
+        (&z, "BD376388B5F723FB4C22DFE6CD4375A05A07476444D5819985007E34"))
+        ABORT;
+    if (0 != BN_cmp(y, z))
+        ABORT;
+
+    if (!BN_add(yplusone, y, BN_value_one()))
+        ABORT;
+    /*
+     * When (x, y) is on the curve, (x, y + 1) is, as it happens, not,
+     * and therefore setting the coordinates should fail.
+     */
+    if (EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, yplusone, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+
+    fprintf(stdout, "verify degree ...");
+    if (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) != 224)
+        ABORT;
+    fprintf(stdout, " ok\n");
+
+    group_order_tests(group);
+
+    if ((P_224 = EC_GROUP_new(EC_GROUP_method_of(group))) == NULL)
+        ABORT;
+    if (!EC_GROUP_copy(P_224, group))
+        ABORT;
+
+    /* Curve P-256 (FIPS PUB 186-2, App. 6) */
+
+    if (!BN_hex2bn
+        (&p,
+         "FFFFFFFF00000001000000000000000000000000FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF"))
+        ABORT;
+    if (1 != BN_is_prime_ex(p, BN_prime_checks, ctx, NULL))
+        ABORT;
+    if (!BN_hex2bn
+        (&a,
+         "FFFFFFFF00000001000000000000000000000000FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC"))
+        ABORT;
+    if (!BN_hex2bn
+        (&b,
+         "5AC635D8AA3A93E7B3EBBD55769886BC651D06B0CC53B0F63BCE3C3E27D2604B"))
+        ABORT;
+    if (!EC_GROUP_set_curve_GFp(group, p, a, b, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+
+    if (!BN_hex2bn
+        (&x,
+         "6B17D1F2E12C4247F8BCE6E563A440F277037D812DEB33A0F4A13945D898C296"))
+        ABORT;
+    if (!EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, 1, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+    if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx) <= 0)
+        ABORT;
+    if (!BN_hex2bn(&z, "FFFFFFFF00000000FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFBCE6FAADA7179E"
+                   "84F3B9CAC2FC632551"))
+        ABORT;
+    if (!EC_GROUP_set_generator(group, P, z, BN_value_one()))
+        ABORT;
+
+    if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, y, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+    fprintf(stdout, "\nNIST curve P-256 -- Generator:\n     x = 0x");
+    BN_print_fp(stdout, x);
+    fprintf(stdout, "\n     y = 0x");
+    BN_print_fp(stdout, y);
+    fprintf(stdout, "\n");
+    /* G_y value taken from the standard: */
+    if (!BN_hex2bn
+        (&z,
+         "4FE342E2FE1A7F9B8EE7EB4A7C0F9E162BCE33576B315ECECBB6406837BF51F5"))
+        ABORT;
+    if (0 != BN_cmp(y, z))
+        ABORT;
+
+    if (!BN_add(yplusone, y, BN_value_one()))
+        ABORT;
+    /*
+     * When (x, y) is on the curve, (x, y + 1) is, as it happens, not,
+     * and therefore setting the coordinates should fail.
+     */
+    if (EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, yplusone, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+
+    fprintf(stdout, "verify degree ...");
+    if (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) != 256)
+        ABORT;
+    fprintf(stdout, " ok\n");
+
+    group_order_tests(group);
+
+    if ((P_256 = EC_GROUP_new(EC_GROUP_method_of(group))) == NULL)
+        ABORT;
+    if (!EC_GROUP_copy(P_256, group))
+        ABORT;
+
+    /* Curve P-384 (FIPS PUB 186-2, App. 6) */
+
+    if (!BN_hex2bn(&p, "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF"
+                   "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFEFFFFFFFF0000000000000000FFFFFFFF"))
+        ABORT;
+    if (1 != BN_is_prime_ex(p, BN_prime_checks, ctx, NULL))
+        ABORT;
+    if (!BN_hex2bn(&a, "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF"
+                   "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFEFFFFFFFF0000000000000000FFFFFFFC"))
+        ABORT;
+    if (!BN_hex2bn(&b, "B3312FA7E23EE7E4988E056BE3F82D19181D9C6EFE8141"
+                   "120314088F5013875AC656398D8A2ED19D2A85C8EDD3EC2AEF"))
+        ABORT;
+    if (!EC_GROUP_set_curve_GFp(group, p, a, b, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+
+    if (!BN_hex2bn(&x, "AA87CA22BE8B05378EB1C71EF320AD746E1D3B628BA79B"
+                   "9859F741E082542A385502F25DBF55296C3A545E3872760AB7"))
+        ABORT;
+    if (!EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, 1, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+    if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx) <= 0)
+        ABORT;
+    if (!BN_hex2bn(&z, "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF"
+                   "FFC7634D81F4372DDF581A0DB248B0A77AECEC196ACCC52973"))
+        ABORT;
+    if (!EC_GROUP_set_generator(group, P, z, BN_value_one()))
+        ABORT;
+
+    if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, y, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+    fprintf(stdout, "\nNIST curve P-384 -- Generator:\n     x = 0x");
+    BN_print_fp(stdout, x);
+    fprintf(stdout, "\n     y = 0x");
+    BN_print_fp(stdout, y);
+    fprintf(stdout, "\n");
+    /* G_y value taken from the standard: */
+    if (!BN_hex2bn(&z, "3617DE4A96262C6F5D9E98BF9292DC29F8F41DBD289A14"
+                   "7CE9DA3113B5F0B8C00A60B1CE1D7E819D7A431D7C90EA0E5F"))
+        ABORT;
+    if (0 != BN_cmp(y, z))
+        ABORT;
+
+    if (!BN_add(yplusone, y, BN_value_one()))
+        ABORT;
+    /*
+     * When (x, y) is on the curve, (x, y + 1) is, as it happens, not,
+     * and therefore setting the coordinates should fail.
+     */
+    if (EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, yplusone, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+
+    fprintf(stdout, "verify degree ...");
+    if (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) != 384)
+        ABORT;
+    fprintf(stdout, " ok\n");
+
+    group_order_tests(group);
+
+    if ((P_384 = EC_GROUP_new(EC_GROUP_method_of(group))) == NULL)
+        ABORT;
+    if (!EC_GROUP_copy(P_384, group))
+        ABORT;
+
+    /* Curve P-521 (FIPS PUB 186-2, App. 6) */
+
+    if (!BN_hex2bn(&p, "1FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF"
+                   "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF"
+                   "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF"))
+        ABORT;
+    if (1 != BN_is_prime_ex(p, BN_prime_checks, ctx, NULL))
+        ABORT;
+    if (!BN_hex2bn(&a, "1FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF"
+                   "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF"
+                   "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC"))
+        ABORT;
+    if (!BN_hex2bn(&b, "051953EB9618E1C9A1F929A21A0B68540EEA2DA725B99B"
+                   "315F3B8B489918EF109E156193951EC7E937B1652C0BD3BB1BF073573"
+                   "DF883D2C34F1EF451FD46B503F00"))
+        ABORT;
+    if (!EC_GROUP_set_curve_GFp(group, p, a, b, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+
+    if (!BN_hex2bn(&x, "C6858E06B70404E9CD9E3ECB662395B4429C648139053F"
+                   "B521F828AF606B4D3DBAA14B5E77EFE75928FE1DC127A2FFA8DE3348B"
+                   "3C1856A429BF97E7E31C2E5BD66"))
+        ABORT;
+    if (!EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, 0, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+    if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx) <= 0)
+        ABORT;
+    if (!BN_hex2bn(&z, "1FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF"
+                   "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFA51868783BF2F966B7FCC0148F709A5D03BB5"
+                   "C9B8899C47AEBB6FB71E91386409"))
+        ABORT;
+    if (!EC_GROUP_set_generator(group, P, z, BN_value_one()))
+        ABORT;
+
+    if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, y, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+    fprintf(stdout, "\nNIST curve P-521 -- Generator:\n     x = 0x");
+    BN_print_fp(stdout, x);
+    fprintf(stdout, "\n     y = 0x");
+    BN_print_fp(stdout, y);
+    fprintf(stdout, "\n");
+    /* G_y value taken from the standard: */
+    if (!BN_hex2bn(&z, "11839296A789A3BC0045C8A5FB42C7D1BD998F54449579"
+                   "B446817AFBD17273E662C97EE72995EF42640C550B9013FAD0761353C"
+                   "7086A272C24088BE94769FD16650"))
+        ABORT;
+    if (0 != BN_cmp(y, z))
+        ABORT;
+
+    if (!BN_add(yplusone, y, BN_value_one()))
+        ABORT;
+    /*
+     * When (x, y) is on the curve, (x, y + 1) is, as it happens, not,
+     * and therefore setting the coordinates should fail.
+     */
+    if (EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, yplusone, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+
+    fprintf(stdout, "verify degree ...");
+    if (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) != 521)
+        ABORT;
+    fprintf(stdout, " ok\n");
+
+    group_order_tests(group);
+
+    if ((P_521 = EC_GROUP_new(EC_GROUP_method_of(group))) == NULL)
+        ABORT;
+    if (!EC_GROUP_copy(P_521, group))
+        ABORT;
+
+    /* more tests using the last curve */
+
+    /* Restore the point that got mangled in the (x, y + 1) test. */
+    if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, y, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+
+    if (!EC_POINT_copy(Q, P))
+        ABORT;
+    if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, Q))
+        ABORT;
+    if (!EC_POINT_dbl(group, P, P, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+    if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx) <= 0)
+        ABORT;
+    if (!EC_POINT_invert(group, Q, ctx))
+        ABORT;                  /* P = -2Q */
+
+    if (!EC_POINT_add(group, R, P, Q, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+    if (!EC_POINT_add(group, R, R, Q, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+    if (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, R))
+        ABORT;                  /* R = P + 2Q */
+
+    {
+        const EC_POINT *points[4];
+        const BIGNUM *scalars[4];
+        BIGNUM *scalar3;
+
+        if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, Q))
+            ABORT;
+        points[0] = Q;
+        points[1] = Q;
+        points[2] = Q;
+        points[3] = Q;
+
+        if (!EC_GROUP_get_order(group, z, ctx))
+            ABORT;
+        if (!BN_add(y, z, BN_value_one()))
+            ABORT;
+        if (BN_is_odd(y))
+            ABORT;
+        if (!BN_rshift1(y, y))
+            ABORT;
+        scalars[0] = y;         /* (group order + 1)/2, so y*Q + y*Q = Q */
+        scalars[1] = y;
+
+        fprintf(stdout, "combined multiplication ...");
+        fflush(stdout);
+
+        /* z is still the group order */
+        if (!EC_POINTs_mul(group, P, NULL, 2, points, scalars, ctx))
+            ABORT;
+        if (!EC_POINTs_mul(group, R, z, 2, points, scalars, ctx))
+            ABORT;
+        if (0 != EC_POINT_cmp(group, P, R, ctx))
+            ABORT;
+        if (0 != EC_POINT_cmp(group, R, Q, ctx))
+            ABORT;
+
+        fprintf(stdout, ".");
+        fflush(stdout);
+
+        if (!BN_pseudo_rand(y, BN_num_bits(y), 0, 0))
+            ABORT;
+        if (!BN_add(z, z, y))
+            ABORT;
+        BN_set_negative(z, 1);
+        scalars[0] = y;
+        scalars[1] = z;         /* z = -(order + y) */
+
+        if (!EC_POINTs_mul(group, P, NULL, 2, points, scalars, ctx))
+            ABORT;
+        if (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, P))
+            ABORT;
+
+        fprintf(stdout, ".");
+        fflush(stdout);
+
+        if (!BN_pseudo_rand(x, BN_num_bits(y) - 1, 0, 0))
+            ABORT;
+        if (!BN_add(z, x, y))
+            ABORT;
+        BN_set_negative(z, 1);
+        scalars[0] = x;
+        scalars[1] = y;
+        scalars[2] = z;         /* z = -(x+y) */
+
+        scalar3 = BN_new();
+        if (!scalar3)
+            ABORT;
+        BN_zero(scalar3);
+        scalars[3] = scalar3;
+
+        if (!EC_POINTs_mul(group, P, NULL, 4, points, scalars, ctx))
+            ABORT;
+        if (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, P))
+            ABORT;
+
+        fprintf(stdout, " ok\n\n");
+
+        BN_free(scalar3);
+    }
+
+    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+    BN_free(p);
+    BN_free(a);
+    BN_free(b);
+    EC_GROUP_free(group);
+    EC_POINT_free(P);
+    EC_POINT_free(Q);
+    EC_POINT_free(R);
+    BN_free(x);
+    BN_free(y);
+    BN_free(z);
+    BN_free(yplusone);
+
+    EC_GROUP_free(P_160);
+    EC_GROUP_free(P_192);
+    EC_GROUP_free(P_224);
+    EC_GROUP_free(P_256);
+    EC_GROUP_free(P_384);
+    EC_GROUP_free(P_521);
+
+}
+
+/* Change test based on whether binary point compression is enabled or not. */
+# ifdef OPENSSL_EC_BIN_PT_COMP
+#  define CHAR2_CURVE_TEST_INTERNAL(_name, _p, _a, _b, _x, _y, _y_bit, _order, _cof, _degree, _variable) \
+        if (!BN_hex2bn(&x, _x)) ABORT; \
+        if (!BN_hex2bn(&y, _y)) ABORT; \
+        if (!BN_add(yplusone, y, BN_value_one())) ABORT;        \
+        /* \
+         * When (x, y) is on the curve, (x, y + 1) is, as it happens, not, \
+         * and therefore setting the coordinates should fail. \
+         */ \
+        if (EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group, P, x, yplusone, ctx)) ABORT; \
+        if (!EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GF2m(group, P, x, _y_bit, ctx)) ABORT; \
+        if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx) <= 0) ABORT; \
+        if (!BN_hex2bn(&z, _order)) ABORT; \
+        if (!BN_hex2bn(&cof, _cof)) ABORT; \
+        if (!EC_GROUP_set_generator(group, P, z, cof)) ABORT; \
+        if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group, P, x, y, ctx)) ABORT; \
+        fprintf(stdout, "\n%s -- Generator:\n     x = 0x", _name); \
+        BN_print_fp(stdout, x); \
+        fprintf(stdout, "\n     y = 0x"); \
+        BN_print_fp(stdout, y); \
+        fprintf(stdout, "\n"); \
+        /* G_y value taken from the standard: */ \
+        if (!BN_hex2bn(&z, _y)) ABORT; \
+        if (0 != BN_cmp(y, z)) ABORT;
+# else
+#  define CHAR2_CURVE_TEST_INTERNAL(_name, _p, _a, _b, _x, _y, _y_bit, _order, _cof, _degree, _variable) \
+        if (!BN_hex2bn(&x, _x)) ABORT; \
+        if (!BN_hex2bn(&y, _y)) ABORT; \
+        if (!BN_add(yplusone, y, BN_value_one())) ABORT;        \
+        /* \
+         * When (x, y) is on the curve, (x, y + 1) is, as it happens, not, \
+         * and therefore setting the coordinates should fail. \
+         */ \
+        if (EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group, P, x, yplusone, ctx)) ABORT; \
+        if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group, P, x, y, ctx)) ABORT; \
+        if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx) <= 0) ABORT; \
+        if (!BN_hex2bn(&z, _order)) ABORT; \
+        if (!BN_hex2bn(&cof, _cof)) ABORT; \
+        if (!EC_GROUP_set_generator(group, P, z, cof)) ABORT; \
+        fprintf(stdout, "\n%s -- Generator:\n     x = 0x", _name); \
+        BN_print_fp(stdout, x); \
+        fprintf(stdout, "\n     y = 0x"); \
+        BN_print_fp(stdout, y); \
+        fprintf(stdout, "\n");
+# endif
+
+# define CHAR2_CURVE_TEST(_name, _p, _a, _b, _x, _y, _y_bit, _order, _cof, _degree, _variable) \
+        if (!BN_hex2bn(&p, _p)) ABORT; \
+        if (!BN_hex2bn(&a, _a)) ABORT; \
+        if (!BN_hex2bn(&b, _b)) ABORT; \
+        if (!EC_GROUP_set_curve_GF2m(group, p, a, b, ctx)) ABORT; \
+        CHAR2_CURVE_TEST_INTERNAL(_name, _p, _a, _b, _x, _y, _y_bit, _order, _cof, _degree, _variable) \
+        fprintf(stdout, "verify degree ..."); \
+        if (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) != _degree) ABORT; \
+        fprintf(stdout, " ok\n"); \
+        group_order_tests(group); \
+        if ((_variable = EC_GROUP_new(EC_GROUP_method_of(group))) == NULL) ABORT; \
+        if (!EC_GROUP_copy(_variable, group)) ABORT; \
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+
+static void char2_field_tests(void)
+{
+    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *p, *a, *b;
+    EC_GROUP *group;
+    EC_GROUP *C2_K163 = NULL, *C2_K233 = NULL, *C2_K283 = NULL, *C2_K409 =
+        NULL, *C2_K571 = NULL;
+    EC_GROUP *C2_B163 = NULL, *C2_B233 = NULL, *C2_B283 = NULL, *C2_B409 =
+        NULL, *C2_B571 = NULL;
+    EC_POINT *P, *Q, *R;
+    BIGNUM *x, *y, *z, *cof, *yplusone;
+    unsigned char buf[100];
+    size_t i, len;
+    int k;
+
+    ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+    if (!ctx)
+        ABORT;
+
+    p = BN_new();
+    a = BN_new();
+    b = BN_new();
+    if (p == NULL || a == NULL || b == NULL)
+        ABORT;
+
+    if (!BN_hex2bn(&p, "13"))
+        ABORT;
+    if (!BN_hex2bn(&a, "3"))
+        ABORT;
+    if (!BN_hex2bn(&b, "1"))
+        ABORT;
+
+    group = EC_GROUP_new(EC_GF2m_simple_method()); /* applications should use
+                                                    * EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m
+                                                    * so that the library gets
+                                                    * to choose the EC_METHOD */
+    if (!group)
+        ABORT;
+    if (!EC_GROUP_set_curve_GF2m(group, p, a, b, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+
+    {
+        EC_GROUP *tmp;
+        tmp = EC_GROUP_new(EC_GROUP_method_of(group));
+        if (!tmp)
+            ABORT;
+        if (!EC_GROUP_copy(tmp, group))
+            ABORT;
+        EC_GROUP_free(group);
+        group = tmp;
+    }
+
+    if (!EC_GROUP_get_curve_GF2m(group, p, a, b, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+
+    fprintf(stdout,
+            "Curve defined by Weierstrass equation\n     y^2 + x*y = x^3 + a*x^2 + b  (mod 0x");
+    BN_print_fp(stdout, p);
+    fprintf(stdout, ")\n     a = 0x");
+    BN_print_fp(stdout, a);
+    fprintf(stdout, "\n     b = 0x");
+    BN_print_fp(stdout, b);
+    fprintf(stdout, "\n(0x... means binary polynomial)\n");
+
+    P = EC_POINT_new(group);
+    Q = EC_POINT_new(group);
+    R = EC_POINT_new(group);
+    if (!P || !Q || !R)
+        ABORT;
+
+    if (!EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(group, P))
+        ABORT;
+    if (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, P))
+        ABORT;
+
+    buf[0] = 0;
+    if (!EC_POINT_oct2point(group, Q, buf, 1, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+
+    if (!EC_POINT_add(group, P, P, Q, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+    if (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, P))
+        ABORT;
+
+    x = BN_new();
+    y = BN_new();
+    z = BN_new();
+    cof = BN_new();
+    yplusone = BN_new();
+    if (x == NULL || y == NULL || z == NULL || cof == NULL || yplusone == NULL)
+        ABORT;
+
+    if (!BN_hex2bn(&x, "6"))
+        ABORT;
+/* Change test based on whether binary point compression is enabled or not. */
+#  ifdef OPENSSL_EC_BIN_PT_COMP
+    if (!EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GF2m(group, Q, x, 1, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+#  else
+    if (!BN_hex2bn(&y, "8"))
+        ABORT;
+    if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group, Q, x, y, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+#  endif
+    if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, Q, ctx) <= 0) {
+/* Change test based on whether binary point compression is enabled or not. */
+#  ifdef OPENSSL_EC_BIN_PT_COMP
+        if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group, Q, x, y, ctx))
+            ABORT;
+#  endif
+        fprintf(stderr, "Point is not on curve: x = 0x");
+        BN_print_fp(stderr, x);
+        fprintf(stderr, ", y = 0x");
+        BN_print_fp(stderr, y);
+        fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+        ABORT;
+    }
+
+    fprintf(stdout, "A cyclic subgroup:\n");
+    k = 100;
+    do {
+        if (k-- == 0)
+            ABORT;
+
+        if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, P))
+            fprintf(stdout, "     point at infinity\n");
+        else {
+            if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group, P, x, y, ctx))
+                ABORT;
+
+            fprintf(stdout, "     x = 0x");
+            BN_print_fp(stdout, x);
+            fprintf(stdout, ", y = 0x");
+            BN_print_fp(stdout, y);
+            fprintf(stdout, "\n");
+        }
+
+        if (!EC_POINT_copy(R, P))
+            ABORT;
+        if (!EC_POINT_add(group, P, P, Q, ctx))
+            ABORT;
+    }
+    while (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, P));
+
+    if (!EC_POINT_add(group, P, Q, R, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+    if (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, P))
+        ABORT;
+
+/* Change test based on whether binary point compression is enabled or not. */
+#  ifdef OPENSSL_EC_BIN_PT_COMP
+    len =
+        EC_POINT_point2oct(group, Q, POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED, buf,
+                           sizeof(buf), ctx);
+    if (len == 0)
+        ABORT;
+    if (!EC_POINT_oct2point(group, P, buf, len, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+    if (0 != EC_POINT_cmp(group, P, Q, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+    fprintf(stdout, "Generator as octet string, compressed form:\n     ");
+    for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
+        fprintf(stdout, "%02X", buf[i]);
+#  endif
+
+    len =
+        EC_POINT_point2oct(group, Q, POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, buf,
+                           sizeof(buf), ctx);
+    if (len == 0)
+        ABORT;
+    if (!EC_POINT_oct2point(group, P, buf, len, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+    if (0 != EC_POINT_cmp(group, P, Q, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+    fprintf(stdout, "\nGenerator as octet string, uncompressed form:\n     ");
+    for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
+        fprintf(stdout, "%02X", buf[i]);
+
+/* Change test based on whether binary point compression is enabled or not. */
+#  ifdef OPENSSL_EC_BIN_PT_COMP
+    len =
+        EC_POINT_point2oct(group, Q, POINT_CONVERSION_HYBRID, buf, sizeof(buf),
+                           ctx);
+    if (len == 0)
+        ABORT;
+    if (!EC_POINT_oct2point(group, P, buf, len, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+    if (0 != EC_POINT_cmp(group, P, Q, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+    fprintf(stdout, "\nGenerator as octet string, hybrid form:\n     ");
+    for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
+        fprintf(stdout, "%02X", buf[i]);
+#  endif
+
+    fprintf(stdout, "\n");
+
+    if (!EC_POINT_invert(group, P, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+    if (0 != EC_POINT_cmp(group, P, R, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+
+    /* Curve K-163 (FIPS PUB 186-2, App. 6) */
+    CHAR2_CURVE_TEST
+        ("NIST curve K-163",
+         "0800000000000000000000000000000000000000C9",
+         "1",
+         "1",
+         "02FE13C0537BBC11ACAA07D793DE4E6D5E5C94EEE8",
+         "0289070FB05D38FF58321F2E800536D538CCDAA3D9",
+         1, "04000000000000000000020108A2E0CC0D99F8A5EF", "2", 163, C2_K163);
+
+    /* Curve B-163 (FIPS PUB 186-2, App. 6) */
+    CHAR2_CURVE_TEST
+        ("NIST curve B-163",
+         "0800000000000000000000000000000000000000C9",
+         "1",
+         "020A601907B8C953CA1481EB10512F78744A3205FD",
+         "03F0EBA16286A2D57EA0991168D4994637E8343E36",
+         "00D51FBC6C71A0094FA2CDD545B11C5C0C797324F1",
+         1, "040000000000000000000292FE77E70C12A4234C33", "2", 163, C2_B163);
+
+    /* Curve K-233 (FIPS PUB 186-2, App. 6) */
+    CHAR2_CURVE_TEST
+        ("NIST curve K-233",
+         "020000000000000000000000000000000000000004000000000000000001",
+         "0",
+         "1",
+         "017232BA853A7E731AF129F22FF4149563A419C26BF50A4C9D6EEFAD6126",
+         "01DB537DECE819B7F70F555A67C427A8CD9BF18AEB9B56E0C11056FAE6A3",
+         0,
+         "008000000000000000000000000000069D5BB915BCD46EFB1AD5F173ABDF",
+         "4", 233, C2_K233);
+
+    /* Curve B-233 (FIPS PUB 186-2, App. 6) */
+    CHAR2_CURVE_TEST
+        ("NIST curve B-233",
+         "020000000000000000000000000000000000000004000000000000000001",
+         "000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001",
+         "0066647EDE6C332C7F8C0923BB58213B333B20E9CE4281FE115F7D8F90AD",
+         "00FAC9DFCBAC8313BB2139F1BB755FEF65BC391F8B36F8F8EB7371FD558B",
+         "01006A08A41903350678E58528BEBF8A0BEFF867A7CA36716F7E01F81052",
+         1,
+         "01000000000000000000000000000013E974E72F8A6922031D2603CFE0D7",
+         "2", 233, C2_B233);
+
+    /* Curve K-283 (FIPS PUB 186-2, App. 6) */
+    CHAR2_CURVE_TEST
+        ("NIST curve K-283",
+         "0800000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000010A1",
+         "0",
+         "1",
+         "0503213F78CA44883F1A3B8162F188E553CD265F23C1567A16876913B0C2AC2458492836",
+         "01CCDA380F1C9E318D90F95D07E5426FE87E45C0E8184698E45962364E34116177DD2259",
+         0,
+         "01FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE9AE2ED07577265DFF7F94451E061E163C61",
+         "4", 283, C2_K283);
+
+    /* Curve B-283 (FIPS PUB 186-2, App. 6) */
+    CHAR2_CURVE_TEST
+        ("NIST curve B-283",
+         "0800000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000010A1",
+         "000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001",
+         "027B680AC8B8596DA5A4AF8A19A0303FCA97FD7645309FA2A581485AF6263E313B79A2F5",
+         "05F939258DB7DD90E1934F8C70B0DFEC2EED25B8557EAC9C80E2E198F8CDBECD86B12053",
+         "03676854FE24141CB98FE6D4B20D02B4516FF702350EDDB0826779C813F0DF45BE8112F4",
+         1,
+         "03FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFEF90399660FC938A90165B042A7CEFADB307",
+         "2", 283, C2_B283);
+
+    /* Curve K-409 (FIPS PUB 186-2, App. 6) */
+    CHAR2_CURVE_TEST
+        ("NIST curve K-409",
+         "02000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000008000000000000000000001",
+         "0",
+         "1",
+         "0060F05F658F49C1AD3AB1890F7184210EFD0987E307C84C27ACCFB8F9F67CC2C460189EB5AAAA62EE222EB1B35540CFE9023746",
+         "01E369050B7C4E42ACBA1DACBF04299C3460782F918EA427E6325165E9EA10E3DA5F6C42E9C55215AA9CA27A5863EC48D8E0286B",
+         1,
+         "007FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE5F83B2D4EA20400EC4557D5ED3E3E7CA5B4B5C83B8E01E5FCF",
+         "4", 409, C2_K409);
+
+    /* Curve B-409 (FIPS PUB 186-2, App. 6) */
+    CHAR2_CURVE_TEST
+        ("NIST curve B-409",
+         "02000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000008000000000000000000001",
+         "00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001",
+         "0021A5C2C8EE9FEB5C4B9A753B7B476B7FD6422EF1F3DD674761FA99D6AC27C8A9A197B272822F6CD57A55AA4F50AE317B13545F",
+         "015D4860D088DDB3496B0C6064756260441CDE4AF1771D4DB01FFE5B34E59703DC255A868A1180515603AEAB60794E54BB7996A7",
+         "0061B1CFAB6BE5F32BBFA78324ED106A7636B9C5A7BD198D0158AA4F5488D08F38514F1FDF4B4F40D2181B3681C364BA0273C706",
+         1,
+         "010000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001E2AAD6A612F33307BE5FA47C3C9E052F838164CD37D9A21173",
+         "2", 409, C2_B409);
+
+    /* Curve K-571 (FIPS PUB 186-2, App. 6) */
+    CHAR2_CURVE_TEST
+        ("NIST curve K-571",
+         "80000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000425",
+         "0",
+         "1",
+         "026EB7A859923FBC82189631F8103FE4AC9CA2970012D5D46024804801841CA44370958493B205E647DA304DB4CEB08CBBD1BA39494776FB988B47174DCA88C7E2945283A01C8972",
+         "0349DC807F4FBF374F4AEADE3BCA95314DD58CEC9F307A54FFC61EFC006D8A2C9D4979C0AC44AEA74FBEBBB9F772AEDCB620B01A7BA7AF1B320430C8591984F601CD4C143EF1C7A3",
+         0,
+         "020000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000131850E1F19A63E4B391A8DB917F4138B630D84BE5D639381E91DEB45CFE778F637C1001",
+         "4", 571, C2_K571);
+
+    /* Curve B-571 (FIPS PUB 186-2, App. 6) */
+    CHAR2_CURVE_TEST
+        ("NIST curve B-571",
+         "80000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000425",
+         "000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001",
+         "02F40E7E2221F295DE297117B7F3D62F5C6A97FFCB8CEFF1CD6BA8CE4A9A18AD84FFABBD8EFA59332BE7AD6756A66E294AFD185A78FF12AA520E4DE739BACA0C7FFEFF7F2955727A",
+         "0303001D34B856296C16C0D40D3CD7750A93D1D2955FA80AA5F40FC8DB7B2ABDBDE53950F4C0D293CDD711A35B67FB1499AE60038614F1394ABFA3B4C850D927E1E7769C8EEC2D19",
+         "037BF27342DA639B6DCCFFFEB73D69D78C6C27A6009CBBCA1980F8533921E8A684423E43BAB08A576291AF8F461BB2A8B3531D2F0485C19B16E2F1516E23DD3C1A4827AF1B8AC15B",
+         1,
+         "03FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE661CE18FF55987308059B186823851EC7DD9CA1161DE93D5174D66E8382E9BB2FE84E47",
+         "2", 571, C2_B571);
+
+    /* more tests using the last curve */
+
+    if (!EC_POINT_copy(Q, P))
+        ABORT;
+    if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, Q))
+        ABORT;
+    if (!EC_POINT_dbl(group, P, P, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+    if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx) <= 0)
+        ABORT;
+    if (!EC_POINT_invert(group, Q, ctx))
+        ABORT;                  /* P = -2Q */
+
+    if (!EC_POINT_add(group, R, P, Q, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+    if (!EC_POINT_add(group, R, R, Q, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+    if (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, R))
+        ABORT;                  /* R = P + 2Q */
+
+    {
+        const EC_POINT *points[3];
+        const BIGNUM *scalars[3];
+
+        if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, Q))
+            ABORT;
+        points[0] = Q;
+        points[1] = Q;
+        points[2] = Q;
+
+        if (!BN_add(y, z, BN_value_one()))
+            ABORT;
+        if (BN_is_odd(y))
+            ABORT;
+        if (!BN_rshift1(y, y))
+            ABORT;
+        scalars[0] = y;         /* (group order + 1)/2, so y*Q + y*Q = Q */
+        scalars[1] = y;
+
+        fprintf(stdout, "combined multiplication ...");
+        fflush(stdout);
+
+        /* z is still the group order */
+        if (!EC_POINTs_mul(group, P, NULL, 2, points, scalars, ctx))
+            ABORT;
+        if (!EC_POINTs_mul(group, R, z, 2, points, scalars, ctx))
+            ABORT;
+        if (0 != EC_POINT_cmp(group, P, R, ctx))
+            ABORT;
+        if (0 != EC_POINT_cmp(group, R, Q, ctx))
+            ABORT;
+
+        fprintf(stdout, ".");
+        fflush(stdout);
+
+        if (!BN_pseudo_rand(y, BN_num_bits(y), 0, 0))
+            ABORT;
+        if (!BN_add(z, z, y))
+            ABORT;
+        BN_set_negative(z, 1);
+        scalars[0] = y;
+        scalars[1] = z;         /* z = -(order + y) */
+
+        if (!EC_POINTs_mul(group, P, NULL, 2, points, scalars, ctx))
+            ABORT;
+        if (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, P))
+            ABORT;
+
+        fprintf(stdout, ".");
+        fflush(stdout);
+
+        if (!BN_pseudo_rand(x, BN_num_bits(y) - 1, 0, 0))
+            ABORT;
+        if (!BN_add(z, x, y))
+            ABORT;
+        BN_set_negative(z, 1);
+        scalars[0] = x;
+        scalars[1] = y;
+        scalars[2] = z;         /* z = -(x+y) */
+
+        if (!EC_POINTs_mul(group, P, NULL, 3, points, scalars, ctx))
+            ABORT;
+        if (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, P))
+            ABORT;
+
+        fprintf(stdout, " ok\n\n");
+    }
+
+    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+    BN_free(p);
+    BN_free(a);
+    BN_free(b);
+    EC_GROUP_free(group);
+    EC_POINT_free(P);
+    EC_POINT_free(Q);
+    EC_POINT_free(R);
+    BN_free(x);
+    BN_free(y);
+    BN_free(z);
+    BN_free(cof);
+    BN_free(yplusone);
+
+    EC_GROUP_free(C2_K163);
+    EC_GROUP_free(C2_B163);
+    EC_GROUP_free(C2_K233);
+    EC_GROUP_free(C2_B233);
+    EC_GROUP_free(C2_K283);
+    EC_GROUP_free(C2_B283);
+    EC_GROUP_free(C2_K409);
+    EC_GROUP_free(C2_B409);
+    EC_GROUP_free(C2_K571);
+    EC_GROUP_free(C2_B571);
+
+}
+# endif
+
+static void internal_curve_test(void)
+{
+    EC_builtin_curve *curves = NULL;
+    size_t crv_len = 0, n = 0;
+    int ok = 1;
+
+    crv_len = EC_get_builtin_curves(NULL, 0);
+    curves = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*curves) * crv_len);
+    if (curves == NULL)
+        return;
+
+    if (!EC_get_builtin_curves(curves, crv_len)) {
+        OPENSSL_free(curves);
+        return;
+    }
+
+    fprintf(stdout, "testing internal curves: ");
+
+    for (n = 0; n < crv_len; n++) {
+        EC_GROUP *group = NULL;
+        int nid = curves[n].nid;
+        if ((group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(nid)) == NULL) {
+            ok = 0;
+            fprintf(stdout, "\nEC_GROUP_new_curve_name() failed with"
+                    " curve %s\n", OBJ_nid2sn(nid));
+            /* try next curve */
+            continue;
+        }
+        if (!EC_GROUP_check(group, NULL)) {
+            ok = 0;
+            fprintf(stdout, "\nEC_GROUP_check() failed with"
+                    " curve %s\n", OBJ_nid2sn(nid));
+            EC_GROUP_free(group);
+            /* try the next curve */
+            continue;
+        }
+        fprintf(stdout, ".");
+        fflush(stdout);
+        EC_GROUP_free(group);
+    }
+    if (ok)
+        fprintf(stdout, " ok\n\n");
+    else {
+        fprintf(stdout, " failed\n\n");
+        ABORT;
+    }
+
+    /* Test all built-in curves and let the library choose the EC_METHOD */
+    for (n = 0; n < crv_len; n++) {
+        EC_GROUP *group = NULL;
+        int nid = curves[n].nid;
+        /*
+         * Skip for X25519 because low level operations such as EC_POINT_mul()
+         * are not supported for this curve
+         */
+        if (nid == NID_X25519)
+            continue;
+        fprintf(stdout, "%s:\n", OBJ_nid2sn(nid));
+        fflush(stdout);
+        if ((group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(nid)) == NULL) {
+            ABORT;
+        }
+        group_order_tests(group);
+        EC_GROUP_free(group);
+    }
+
+    OPENSSL_free(curves);
+    return;
+}
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128
+/*
+ * nistp_test_params contains magic numbers for testing our optimized
+ * implementations of several NIST curves with characteristic > 3.
+ */
+struct nistp_test_params {
+    const EC_METHOD *(*meth) ();
+    int degree;
+    /*
+     * Qx, Qy and D are taken from
+     * http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/documents/Examples/ECDSA_Prime.pdf
+     * Otherwise, values are standard curve parameters from FIPS 180-3
+     */
+    const char *p, *a, *b, *Qx, *Qy, *Gx, *Gy, *order, *d;
+};
+
+static const struct nistp_test_params nistp_tests_params[] = {
+    {
+     /* P-224 */
+     EC_GFp_nistp224_method,
+     224,
+     /* p */
+     "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF000000000000000000000001",
+     /* a */
+     "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFEFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE",
+     /* b */
+     "B4050A850C04B3ABF54132565044B0B7D7BFD8BA270B39432355FFB4",
+     /* Qx */
+     "E84FB0B8E7000CB657D7973CF6B42ED78B301674276DF744AF130B3E",
+     /* Qy */
+     "4376675C6FC5612C21A0FF2D2A89D2987DF7A2BC52183B5982298555",
+     /* Gx */
+     "B70E0CBD6BB4BF7F321390B94A03C1D356C21122343280D6115C1D21",
+     /* Gy */
+     "BD376388B5F723FB4C22DFE6CD4375A05A07476444D5819985007E34",
+     /* order */
+     "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF16A2E0B8F03E13DD29455C5C2A3D",
+     /* d */
+     "3F0C488E987C80BE0FEE521F8D90BE6034EC69AE11CA72AA777481E8",
+     },
+    {
+     /* P-256 */
+     EC_GFp_nistp256_method,
+     256,
+     /* p */
+     "ffffffff00000001000000000000000000000000ffffffffffffffffffffffff",
+     /* a */
+     "ffffffff00000001000000000000000000000000fffffffffffffffffffffffc",
+     /* b */
+     "5ac635d8aa3a93e7b3ebbd55769886bc651d06b0cc53b0f63bce3c3e27d2604b",
+     /* Qx */
+     "b7e08afdfe94bad3f1dc8c734798ba1c62b3a0ad1e9ea2a38201cd0889bc7a19",
+     /* Qy */
+     "3603f747959dbf7a4bb226e41928729063adc7ae43529e61b563bbc606cc5e09",
+     /* Gx */
+     "6b17d1f2e12c4247f8bce6e563a440f277037d812deb33a0f4a13945d898c296",
+     /* Gy */
+     "4fe342e2fe1a7f9b8ee7eb4a7c0f9e162bce33576b315ececbb6406837bf51f5",
+     /* order */
+     "ffffffff00000000ffffffffffffffffbce6faada7179e84f3b9cac2fc632551",
+     /* d */
+     "c477f9f65c22cce20657faa5b2d1d8122336f851a508a1ed04e479c34985bf96",
+     },
+    {
+     /* P-521 */
+     EC_GFp_nistp521_method,
+     521,
+     /* p */
+     "1ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff",
+     /* a */
+     "1fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffc",
+     /* b */
+     "051953eb9618e1c9a1f929a21a0b68540eea2da725b99b315f3b8b489918ef109e156193951ec7e937b1652c0bd3bb1bf073573df883d2c34f1ef451fd46b503f00",
+     /* Qx */
+     "0098e91eef9a68452822309c52fab453f5f117c1da8ed796b255e9ab8f6410cca16e59df403a6bdc6ca467a37056b1e54b3005d8ac030decfeb68df18b171885d5c4",
+     /* Qy */
+     "0164350c321aecfc1cca1ba4364c9b15656150b4b78d6a48d7d28e7f31985ef17be8554376b72900712c4b83ad668327231526e313f5f092999a4632fd50d946bc2e",
+     /* Gx */
+     "c6858e06b70404e9cd9e3ecb662395b4429c648139053fb521f828af606b4d3dbaa14b5e77efe75928fe1dc127a2ffa8de3348b3c1856a429bf97e7e31c2e5bd66",
+     /* Gy */
+     "11839296a789a3bc0045c8a5fb42c7d1bd998f54449579b446817afbd17273e662c97ee72995ef42640c550b9013fad0761353c7086a272c24088be94769fd16650",
+     /* order */
+     "1fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffa51868783bf2f966b7fcc0148f709a5d03bb5c9b8899c47aebb6fb71e91386409",
+     /* d */
+     "0100085f47b8e1b8b11b7eb33028c0b2888e304bfc98501955b45bba1478dc184eeedf09b86a5f7c21994406072787205e69a63709fe35aa93ba333514b24f961722",
+     },
+};
+
+static void nistp_single_test(const struct nistp_test_params *test)
+{
+    BN_CTX *ctx;
+    BIGNUM *p, *a, *b, *x, *y, *n, *m, *order, *yplusone;
+    EC_GROUP *NISTP;
+    EC_POINT *G, *P, *Q, *Q_CHECK;
+
+    fprintf(stdout, "\nNIST curve P-%d (optimised implementation):\n",
+            test->degree);
+    ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+    p = BN_new();
+    a = BN_new();
+    b = BN_new();
+    x = BN_new();
+    y = BN_new();
+    m = BN_new();
+    n = BN_new();
+    order = BN_new();
+    yplusone = BN_new();
+
+    NISTP = EC_GROUP_new(test->meth());
+    if (!NISTP)
+        ABORT;
+    if (!BN_hex2bn(&p, test->p))
+        ABORT;
+    if (1 != BN_is_prime_ex(p, BN_prime_checks, ctx, NULL))
+        ABORT;
+    if (!BN_hex2bn(&a, test->a))
+        ABORT;
+    if (!BN_hex2bn(&b, test->b))
+        ABORT;
+    if (!EC_GROUP_set_curve_GFp(NISTP, p, a, b, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+    G = EC_POINT_new(NISTP);
+    P = EC_POINT_new(NISTP);
+    Q = EC_POINT_new(NISTP);
+    Q_CHECK = EC_POINT_new(NISTP);
+    if (!BN_hex2bn(&x, test->Qx))
+        ABORT;
+    if (!BN_hex2bn(&y, test->Qy))
+        ABORT;
+    if (!BN_add(yplusone, y, BN_value_one()))
+        ABORT;
+    /*
+     * When (x, y) is on the curve, (x, y + 1) is, as it happens, not,
+     * and therefore setting the coordinates should fail.
+     */
+    if (EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(NISTP, Q_CHECK, x, yplusone, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+    if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(NISTP, Q_CHECK, x, y, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+    if (!BN_hex2bn(&x, test->Gx))
+        ABORT;
+    if (!BN_hex2bn(&y, test->Gy))
+        ABORT;
+    if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(NISTP, G, x, y, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+    if (!BN_hex2bn(&order, test->order))
+        ABORT;
+    if (!EC_GROUP_set_generator(NISTP, G, order, BN_value_one()))
+        ABORT;
+
+    fprintf(stdout, "verify degree ... ");
+    if (EC_GROUP_get_degree(NISTP) != test->degree)
+        ABORT;
+    fprintf(stdout, "ok\n");
+
+    fprintf(stdout, "NIST test vectors ... ");
+    if (!BN_hex2bn(&n, test->d))
+        ABORT;
+    /* fixed point multiplication */
+    EC_POINT_mul(NISTP, Q, n, NULL, NULL, ctx);
+    if (0 != EC_POINT_cmp(NISTP, Q, Q_CHECK, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+    /* random point multiplication */
+    EC_POINT_mul(NISTP, Q, NULL, G, n, ctx);
+    if (0 != EC_POINT_cmp(NISTP, Q, Q_CHECK, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+
+    /* set generator to P = 2*G, where G is the standard generator */
+    if (!EC_POINT_dbl(NISTP, P, G, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+    if (!EC_GROUP_set_generator(NISTP, P, order, BN_value_one()))
+        ABORT;
+    /* set the scalar to m=n/2, where n is the NIST test scalar */
+    if (!BN_rshift(m, n, 1))
+        ABORT;
+
+    /* test the non-standard generator */
+    /* fixed point multiplication */
+    EC_POINT_mul(NISTP, Q, m, NULL, NULL, ctx);
+    if (0 != EC_POINT_cmp(NISTP, Q, Q_CHECK, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+    /* random point multiplication */
+    EC_POINT_mul(NISTP, Q, NULL, P, m, ctx);
+    if (0 != EC_POINT_cmp(NISTP, Q, Q_CHECK, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+
+    /*
+     * We have not performed precomputation so have_precompute mult should be
+     * false
+     */
+    if (EC_GROUP_have_precompute_mult(NISTP))
+        ABORT;
+
+    /* now repeat all tests with precomputation */
+    if (!EC_GROUP_precompute_mult(NISTP, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+    if (!EC_GROUP_have_precompute_mult(NISTP))
+        ABORT;
+
+    /* fixed point multiplication */
+    EC_POINT_mul(NISTP, Q, m, NULL, NULL, ctx);
+    if (0 != EC_POINT_cmp(NISTP, Q, Q_CHECK, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+    /* random point multiplication */
+    EC_POINT_mul(NISTP, Q, NULL, P, m, ctx);
+    if (0 != EC_POINT_cmp(NISTP, Q, Q_CHECK, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+
+    /* reset generator */
+    if (!EC_GROUP_set_generator(NISTP, G, order, BN_value_one()))
+        ABORT;
+    /* fixed point multiplication */
+    EC_POINT_mul(NISTP, Q, n, NULL, NULL, ctx);
+    if (0 != EC_POINT_cmp(NISTP, Q, Q_CHECK, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+    /* random point multiplication */
+    EC_POINT_mul(NISTP, Q, NULL, G, n, ctx);
+    if (0 != EC_POINT_cmp(NISTP, Q, Q_CHECK, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+
+    fprintf(stdout, "ok\n");
+    group_order_tests(NISTP);
+    EC_GROUP_free(NISTP);
+    EC_POINT_free(G);
+    EC_POINT_free(P);
+    EC_POINT_free(Q);
+    EC_POINT_free(Q_CHECK);
+    BN_free(n);
+    BN_free(m);
+    BN_free(p);
+    BN_free(a);
+    BN_free(b);
+    BN_free(x);
+    BN_free(y);
+    BN_free(order);
+    BN_free(yplusone);
+    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+}
+
+static void nistp_tests()
+{
+    unsigned i;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nistp_tests_params); i++) {
+        nistp_single_test(&nistp_tests_params[i]);
+    }
+}
+# endif
+
+static void parameter_test(void)
+{
+    EC_GROUP *group, *group2;
+    ECPARAMETERS *ecparameters;
+
+    fprintf(stderr, "\ntesting ecparameters conversion ...");
+
+    group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp112r1);
+    if (!group)
+        ABORT;
+
+    ecparameters = EC_GROUP_get_ecparameters(group, NULL);
+    if (!ecparameters)
+        ABORT;
+    group2 = EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters(ecparameters);
+    if (!group2)
+        ABORT;
+    if (EC_GROUP_cmp(group, group2, NULL))
+        ABORT;
+
+    fprintf(stderr, " ok\n");
+
+    EC_GROUP_free(group);
+    EC_GROUP_free(group2);
+    ECPARAMETERS_free(ecparameters);
+}
+
+static const char rnd_seed[] =
+    "string to make the random number generator think it has entropy";
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+    char *p;
+
+    p = getenv("OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY");
+    if (p != NULL && strcmp(p, "on") == 0)
+        CRYPTO_set_mem_debug(1);
+    CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON);
+
+    RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof(rnd_seed)); /* or BN_generate_prime may fail */
+
+    prime_field_tests();
+    puts("");
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+    char2_field_tests();
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128
+    nistp_tests();
+# endif
+    /* test the internal curves */
+    internal_curve_test();
+
+    parameter_test();
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG
+    if (CRYPTO_mem_leaks_fp(stderr) <= 0)
+        return 1;
+#endif
+
+    return 0;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/enginetest.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/enginetest.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0a8c185
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/enginetest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,408 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/e_os2.h>
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+    printf("No ENGINE support\n");
+    return (0);
+}
+#else
+# include <openssl/buffer.h>
+# include <openssl/crypto.h>
+# include <openssl/engine.h>
+# include <openssl/err.h>
+# include <openssl/rsa.h>
+# include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+static void display_engine_list(void)
+{
+    ENGINE *h;
+    int loop;
+
+    h = ENGINE_get_first();
+    loop = 0;
+    printf("listing available engine types\n");
+    while (h) {
+        printf("engine %i, id = \"%s\", name = \"%s\"\n",
+               loop++, ENGINE_get_id(h), ENGINE_get_name(h));
+        h = ENGINE_get_next(h);
+    }
+    printf("end of list\n");
+    /*
+     * ENGINE_get_first() increases the struct_ref counter, so we must call
+     * ENGINE_free() to decrease it again
+     */
+    ENGINE_free(h);
+}
+
+/* Test EVP_PKEY method */
+static EVP_PKEY_METHOD *test_rsa = NULL;
+
+static int called_encrypt = 0;
+
+/* Test function to check operation has been redirected */
+static int test_encrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig,
+                        size_t *siglen, const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)
+{
+    called_encrypt = 1;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int test_pkey_meths(ENGINE *e, EVP_PKEY_METHOD **pmeth,
+                           const int **pnids, int nid)
+{
+    static const int rnid = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
+    if (pmeth == NULL) {
+        *pnids = &rnid;
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    if (nid == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
+        *pmeth = test_rsa;
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    *pmeth = NULL;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/* Return a test EVP_PKEY value */
+
+static EVP_PKEY *get_test_pkey(void)
+{
+    static unsigned char n[] =
+        "\x00\xAA\x36\xAB\xCE\x88\xAC\xFD\xFF\x55\x52\x3C\x7F\xC4\x52\x3F"
+        "\x90\xEF\xA0\x0D\xF3\x77\x4A\x25\x9F\x2E\x62\xB4\xC5\xD9\x9C\xB5"
+        "\xAD\xB3\x00\xA0\x28\x5E\x53\x01\x93\x0E\x0C\x70\xFB\x68\x76\x93"
+        "\x9C\xE6\x16\xCE\x62\x4A\x11\xE0\x08\x6D\x34\x1E\xBC\xAC\xA0\xA1"
+        "\xF5";
+    static unsigned char e[] = "\x11";
+
+    RSA *rsa = RSA_new();
+    EVP_PKEY *pk = EVP_PKEY_new();
+
+    if (rsa == NULL || pk == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pk, rsa)) {
+        RSA_free(rsa);
+        EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    if (!RSA_set0_key(rsa, BN_bin2bn(n, sizeof(n)-1, NULL),
+                      BN_bin2bn(e, sizeof(e)-1, NULL), NULL)) {
+        EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    return pk;
+}
+
+static int test_redirect(void)
+{
+    const unsigned char pt[] = "Hello World\n";
+    unsigned char *tmp = NULL;
+    size_t len;
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+    ENGINE *e = NULL;
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+
+    int to_return = 0;
+
+    printf("\nRedirection test\n");
+
+    if ((pkey = get_test_pkey()) == NULL) {
+        printf("Get test key failed\n");
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    len = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
+    if ((tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) {
+        printf("Buffer alloc failed\n");
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL)) == NULL) {
+        printf("Key context allocation failure\n");
+        goto err;
+    }
+    printf("EVP_PKEY_encrypt test: no redirection\n");
+    /* Encrypt some data: should succeed but not be redirected */
+    if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(ctx) <= 0
+            || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(ctx, tmp, &len, pt, sizeof(pt)) <= 0
+            || called_encrypt) {
+        printf("Test encryption failure\n");
+        goto err;
+    }
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
+    ctx = NULL;
+
+    /* Create a test ENGINE */
+    if ((e = ENGINE_new()) == NULL
+            || !ENGINE_set_id(e, "Test redirect engine")
+            || !ENGINE_set_name(e, "Test redirect engine")) {
+        printf("Redirection engine setup failure\n");
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Try to create a context for this engine and test key.
+     * Try setting test key engine. Both should fail because the
+     * engine has no public key methods.
+     */
+    if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, e) != NULL
+            || EVP_PKEY_set1_engine(pkey, e) > 0) {
+        printf("Unexpected redirection success\n");
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* Setup an empty test EVP_PKEY_METHOD and set callback to return it */
+    if ((test_rsa = EVP_PKEY_meth_new(EVP_PKEY_RSA, 0)) == NULL) {
+        printf("Test RSA algorithm setup failure\n");
+        goto err;
+    }
+    ENGINE_set_pkey_meths(e, test_pkey_meths);
+
+    /* Getting a context for test ENGINE should now succeed */
+    if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, e)) == NULL) {
+        printf("Redirected context allocation failed\n");
+        goto err;
+    }
+    /* Encrypt should fail because operation is not supported */
+    if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(ctx) > 0) {
+        printf("Encryption redirect unexpected success\n");
+        goto err;
+    }
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
+    ctx = NULL;
+
+    /* Add test encrypt operation to method */
+    EVP_PKEY_meth_set_encrypt(test_rsa, 0, test_encrypt);
+
+    printf("EVP_PKEY_encrypt test: redirection via EVP_PKEY_CTX_new()\n");
+    if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, e)) == NULL) {
+        printf("Redirected context allocation failed\n");
+        goto err;
+    }
+    /* Encrypt some data: should succeed and be redirected */
+    if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(ctx) <= 0
+            || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(ctx, tmp, &len, pt, sizeof(pt)) <= 0
+            || !called_encrypt) {
+        printf("Redirected key context encryption failed\n");
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
+    ctx = NULL;
+    called_encrypt = 0;
+
+    printf("EVP_PKEY_encrypt test: check default operation not redirected\n");
+
+    /* Create context with default engine: should not be redirected */
+    if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL)) == NULL
+            || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(ctx) <= 0
+            || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(ctx, tmp, &len, pt, sizeof(pt)) <= 0
+            || called_encrypt) {
+        printf("Unredirected key context encryption failed\n");
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
+    ctx = NULL;
+
+    /* Set engine explicitly for test key */
+    if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_engine(pkey, e)) {
+        printf("Key engine set failed\n");
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    printf("EVP_PKEY_encrypt test: redirection via EVP_PKEY_set1_engine()\n");
+
+    /* Create context with default engine: should be redirected now */
+    if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL)) == NULL
+            || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(ctx) <= 0
+            || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(ctx, tmp, &len, pt, sizeof(pt)) <= 0
+            || !called_encrypt) {
+        printf("Key redirection failure\n");
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    to_return = 1;
+
+ err:
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+    ENGINE_free(e);
+    OPENSSL_free(tmp);
+    return to_return;
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+    ENGINE *block[512];
+    char buf[256];
+    const char *id, *name, *p;
+    ENGINE *ptr;
+    int loop;
+    int to_return = 1;
+    ENGINE *new_h1 = NULL;
+    ENGINE *new_h2 = NULL;
+    ENGINE *new_h3 = NULL;
+    ENGINE *new_h4 = NULL;
+
+    p = getenv("OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY");
+    if (p != NULL && strcmp(p, "on") == 0)
+        CRYPTO_set_mem_debug(1);
+
+    memset(block, 0, sizeof(block));
+    if (((new_h1 = ENGINE_new()) == NULL) ||
+        !ENGINE_set_id(new_h1, "test_id0") ||
+        !ENGINE_set_name(new_h1, "First test item") ||
+        ((new_h2 = ENGINE_new()) == NULL) ||
+        !ENGINE_set_id(new_h2, "test_id1") ||
+        !ENGINE_set_name(new_h2, "Second test item") ||
+        ((new_h3 = ENGINE_new()) == NULL) ||
+        !ENGINE_set_id(new_h3, "test_id2") ||
+        !ENGINE_set_name(new_h3, "Third test item") ||
+        ((new_h4 = ENGINE_new()) == NULL) ||
+        !ENGINE_set_id(new_h4, "test_id3") ||
+        !ENGINE_set_name(new_h4, "Fourth test item")) {
+        printf("Couldn't set up test ENGINE structures\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+    printf("\nenginetest beginning\n\n");
+    display_engine_list();
+    if (!ENGINE_add(new_h1)) {
+        printf("Add failed!\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+    display_engine_list();
+    ptr = ENGINE_get_first();
+    if (!ENGINE_remove(ptr)) {
+        printf("Remove failed!\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+    ENGINE_free(ptr);
+    display_engine_list();
+    if (!ENGINE_add(new_h3) || !ENGINE_add(new_h2)) {
+        printf("Add failed!\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+    display_engine_list();
+    if (!ENGINE_remove(new_h2)) {
+        printf("Remove failed!\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+    display_engine_list();
+    if (!ENGINE_add(new_h4)) {
+        printf("Add failed!\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+    display_engine_list();
+    if (ENGINE_add(new_h3)) {
+        printf("Add *should* have failed but didn't!\n");
+        goto end;
+    } else
+        printf("Add that should fail did.\n");
+    ERR_clear_error();
+    if (ENGINE_remove(new_h2)) {
+        printf("Remove *should* have failed but didn't!\n");
+        goto end;
+    } else
+        printf("Remove that should fail did.\n");
+    ERR_clear_error();
+    if (!ENGINE_remove(new_h3)) {
+        printf("Remove failed!\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+    display_engine_list();
+    if (!ENGINE_remove(new_h4)) {
+        printf("Remove failed!\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+    display_engine_list();
+    /*
+     * Depending on whether there's any hardware support compiled in, this
+     * remove may be destined to fail.
+     */
+    ptr = ENGINE_get_first();
+    if (ptr)
+        if (!ENGINE_remove(ptr))
+            printf("Remove failed!i - probably no hardware "
+                   "support present.\n");
+    ENGINE_free(ptr);
+    display_engine_list();
+    if (!ENGINE_add(new_h1) || !ENGINE_remove(new_h1)) {
+        printf("Couldn't add and remove to an empty list!\n");
+        goto end;
+    } else
+        printf("Successfully added and removed to an empty list!\n");
+    printf("About to beef up the engine-type list\n");
+    for (loop = 0; loop < 512; loop++) {
+        sprintf(buf, "id%i", loop);
+        id = OPENSSL_strdup(buf);
+        sprintf(buf, "Fake engine type %i", loop);
+        name = OPENSSL_strdup(buf);
+        if (((block[loop] = ENGINE_new()) == NULL) ||
+            !ENGINE_set_id(block[loop], id) ||
+            !ENGINE_set_name(block[loop], name)) {
+            printf("Couldn't create block of ENGINE structures.\n"
+                   "I'll probably also core-dump now, damn.\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+    for (loop = 0; loop < 512; loop++) {
+        if (!ENGINE_add(block[loop])) {
+            printf("\nAdding stopped at %i, (%s,%s)\n",
+                   loop, ENGINE_get_id(block[loop]),
+                   ENGINE_get_name(block[loop]));
+            goto cleanup_loop;
+        } else
+            printf(".");
+        fflush(stdout);
+    }
+ cleanup_loop:
+    printf("\nAbout to empty the engine-type list\n");
+    while ((ptr = ENGINE_get_first()) != NULL) {
+        if (!ENGINE_remove(ptr)) {
+            printf("\nRemove failed!\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+        ENGINE_free(ptr);
+        printf(".");
+        fflush(stdout);
+    }
+    for (loop = 0; loop < 512; loop++) {
+        OPENSSL_free((void *)ENGINE_get_id(block[loop]));
+        OPENSSL_free((void *)ENGINE_get_name(block[loop]));
+    }
+    if (!test_redirect())
+        goto end;
+    printf("\nTests completed happily\n");
+    to_return = 0;
+ end:
+    if (to_return)
+        ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+    ENGINE_free(new_h1);
+    ENGINE_free(new_h2);
+    ENGINE_free(new_h3);
+    ENGINE_free(new_h4);
+    for (loop = 0; loop < 512; loop++)
+        ENGINE_free(block[loop]);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG
+    if (CRYPTO_mem_leaks_fp(stderr) <= 0)
+        to_return = 1;
+#endif
+    return to_return;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/evp_extra_test.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/evp_extra_test.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9217f3a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/evp_extra_test.c
@@ -0,0 +1,409 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+/*
+ * kExampleRSAKeyDER is an RSA private key in ASN.1, DER format. Of course, you
+ * should never use this key anywhere but in an example.
+ */
+static const unsigned char kExampleRSAKeyDER[] = {
+    0x30, 0x82, 0x02, 0x5c, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, 0x02, 0x81, 0x81, 0x00, 0xf8,
+    0xb8, 0x6c, 0x83, 0xb4, 0xbc, 0xd9, 0xa8, 0x57, 0xc0, 0xa5, 0xb4, 0x59,
+    0x76, 0x8c, 0x54, 0x1d, 0x79, 0xeb, 0x22, 0x52, 0x04, 0x7e, 0xd3, 0x37,
+    0xeb, 0x41, 0xfd, 0x83, 0xf9, 0xf0, 0xa6, 0x85, 0x15, 0x34, 0x75, 0x71,
+    0x5a, 0x84, 0xa8, 0x3c, 0xd2, 0xef, 0x5a, 0x4e, 0xd3, 0xde, 0x97, 0x8a,
+    0xdd, 0xff, 0xbb, 0xcf, 0x0a, 0xaa, 0x86, 0x92, 0xbe, 0xb8, 0x50, 0xe4,
+    0xcd, 0x6f, 0x80, 0x33, 0x30, 0x76, 0x13, 0x8f, 0xca, 0x7b, 0xdc, 0xec,
+    0x5a, 0xca, 0x63, 0xc7, 0x03, 0x25, 0xef, 0xa8, 0x8a, 0x83, 0x58, 0x76,
+    0x20, 0xfa, 0x16, 0x77, 0xd7, 0x79, 0x92, 0x63, 0x01, 0x48, 0x1a, 0xd8,
+    0x7b, 0x67, 0xf1, 0x52, 0x55, 0x49, 0x4e, 0xd6, 0x6e, 0x4a, 0x5c, 0xd7,
+    0x7a, 0x37, 0x36, 0x0c, 0xde, 0xdd, 0x8f, 0x44, 0xe8, 0xc2, 0xa7, 0x2c,
+    0x2b, 0xb5, 0xaf, 0x64, 0x4b, 0x61, 0x07, 0x02, 0x03, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01,
+    0x02, 0x81, 0x80, 0x74, 0x88, 0x64, 0x3f, 0x69, 0x45, 0x3a, 0x6d, 0xc7,
+    0x7f, 0xb9, 0xa3, 0xc0, 0x6e, 0xec, 0xdc, 0xd4, 0x5a, 0xb5, 0x32, 0x85,
+    0x5f, 0x19, 0xd4, 0xf8, 0xd4, 0x3f, 0x3c, 0xfa, 0xc2, 0xf6, 0x5f, 0xee,
+    0xe6, 0xba, 0x87, 0x74, 0x2e, 0xc7, 0x0c, 0xd4, 0x42, 0xb8, 0x66, 0x85,
+    0x9c, 0x7b, 0x24, 0x61, 0xaa, 0x16, 0x11, 0xf6, 0xb5, 0xb6, 0xa4, 0x0a,
+    0xc9, 0x55, 0x2e, 0x81, 0xa5, 0x47, 0x61, 0xcb, 0x25, 0x8f, 0xc2, 0x15,
+    0x7b, 0x0e, 0x7c, 0x36, 0x9f, 0x3a, 0xda, 0x58, 0x86, 0x1c, 0x5b, 0x83,
+    0x79, 0xe6, 0x2b, 0xcc, 0xe6, 0xfa, 0x2c, 0x61, 0xf2, 0x78, 0x80, 0x1b,
+    0xe2, 0xf3, 0x9d, 0x39, 0x2b, 0x65, 0x57, 0x91, 0x3d, 0x71, 0x99, 0x73,
+    0xa5, 0xc2, 0x79, 0x20, 0x8c, 0x07, 0x4f, 0xe5, 0xb4, 0x60, 0x1f, 0x99,
+    0xa2, 0xb1, 0x4f, 0x0c, 0xef, 0xbc, 0x59, 0x53, 0x00, 0x7d, 0xb1, 0x02,
+    0x41, 0x00, 0xfc, 0x7e, 0x23, 0x65, 0x70, 0xf8, 0xce, 0xd3, 0x40, 0x41,
+    0x80, 0x6a, 0x1d, 0x01, 0xd6, 0x01, 0xff, 0xb6, 0x1b, 0x3d, 0x3d, 0x59,
+    0x09, 0x33, 0x79, 0xc0, 0x4f, 0xde, 0x96, 0x27, 0x4b, 0x18, 0xc6, 0xd9,
+    0x78, 0xf1, 0xf4, 0x35, 0x46, 0xe9, 0x7c, 0x42, 0x7a, 0x5d, 0x9f, 0xef,
+    0x54, 0xb8, 0xf7, 0x9f, 0xc4, 0x33, 0x6c, 0xf3, 0x8c, 0x32, 0x46, 0x87,
+    0x67, 0x30, 0x7b, 0xa7, 0xac, 0xe3, 0x02, 0x41, 0x00, 0xfc, 0x2c, 0xdf,
+    0x0c, 0x0d, 0x88, 0xf5, 0xb1, 0x92, 0xa8, 0x93, 0x47, 0x63, 0x55, 0xf5,
+    0xca, 0x58, 0x43, 0xba, 0x1c, 0xe5, 0x9e, 0xb6, 0x95, 0x05, 0xcd, 0xb5,
+    0x82, 0xdf, 0xeb, 0x04, 0x53, 0x9d, 0xbd, 0xc2, 0x38, 0x16, 0xb3, 0x62,
+    0xdd, 0xa1, 0x46, 0xdb, 0x6d, 0x97, 0x93, 0x9f, 0x8a, 0xc3, 0x9b, 0x64,
+    0x7e, 0x42, 0xe3, 0x32, 0x57, 0x19, 0x1b, 0xd5, 0x6e, 0x85, 0xfa, 0xb8,
+    0x8d, 0x02, 0x41, 0x00, 0xbc, 0x3d, 0xde, 0x6d, 0xd6, 0x97, 0xe8, 0xba,
+    0x9e, 0x81, 0x37, 0x17, 0xe5, 0xa0, 0x64, 0xc9, 0x00, 0xb7, 0xe7, 0xfe,
+    0xf4, 0x29, 0xd9, 0x2e, 0x43, 0x6b, 0x19, 0x20, 0xbd, 0x99, 0x75, 0xe7,
+    0x76, 0xf8, 0xd3, 0xae, 0xaf, 0x7e, 0xb8, 0xeb, 0x81, 0xf4, 0x9d, 0xfe,
+    0x07, 0x2b, 0x0b, 0x63, 0x0b, 0x5a, 0x55, 0x90, 0x71, 0x7d, 0xf1, 0xdb,
+    0xd9, 0xb1, 0x41, 0x41, 0x68, 0x2f, 0x4e, 0x39, 0x02, 0x40, 0x5a, 0x34,
+    0x66, 0xd8, 0xf5, 0xe2, 0x7f, 0x18, 0xb5, 0x00, 0x6e, 0x26, 0x84, 0x27,
+    0x14, 0x93, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0xc6, 0x0f, 0x5e, 0x27, 0xe6, 0xe1, 0xe9, 0xc0,
+    0x8a, 0xe4, 0x34, 0xda, 0xe9, 0xa2, 0x4b, 0x73, 0xbc, 0x8c, 0xb9, 0xba,
+    0x13, 0x6c, 0x7a, 0x2b, 0x51, 0x84, 0xa3, 0x4a, 0xe0, 0x30, 0x10, 0x06,
+    0x7e, 0xed, 0x17, 0x5a, 0x14, 0x00, 0xc9, 0xef, 0x85, 0xea, 0x52, 0x2c,
+    0xbc, 0x65, 0x02, 0x40, 0x51, 0xe3, 0xf2, 0x83, 0x19, 0x9b, 0xc4, 0x1e,
+    0x2f, 0x50, 0x3d, 0xdf, 0x5a, 0xa2, 0x18, 0xca, 0x5f, 0x2e, 0x49, 0xaf,
+    0x6f, 0xcc, 0xfa, 0x65, 0x77, 0x94, 0xb5, 0xa1, 0x0a, 0xa9, 0xd1, 0x8a,
+    0x39, 0x37, 0xf4, 0x0b, 0xa0, 0xd7, 0x82, 0x27, 0x5e, 0xae, 0x17, 0x17,
+    0xa1, 0x1e, 0x54, 0x34, 0xbf, 0x6e, 0xc4, 0x8e, 0x99, 0x5d, 0x08, 0xf1,
+    0x2d, 0x86, 0x9d, 0xa5, 0x20, 0x1b, 0xe5, 0xdf,
+};
+
+static const unsigned char kMsg[] = { 1, 2, 3, 4 };
+
+static const unsigned char kSignature[] = {
+    0xa5, 0xf0, 0x8a, 0x47, 0x5d, 0x3c, 0xb3, 0xcc, 0xa9, 0x79, 0xaf, 0x4d,
+    0x8c, 0xae, 0x4c, 0x14, 0xef, 0xc2, 0x0b, 0x34, 0x36, 0xde, 0xf4, 0x3e,
+    0x3d, 0xbb, 0x4a, 0x60, 0x5c, 0xc8, 0x91, 0x28, 0xda, 0xfb, 0x7e, 0x04,
+    0x96, 0x7e, 0x63, 0x13, 0x90, 0xce, 0xb9, 0xb4, 0x62, 0x7a, 0xfd, 0x09,
+    0x3d, 0xc7, 0x67, 0x78, 0x54, 0x04, 0xeb, 0x52, 0x62, 0x6e, 0x24, 0x67,
+    0xb4, 0x40, 0xfc, 0x57, 0x62, 0xc6, 0xf1, 0x67, 0xc1, 0x97, 0x8f, 0x6a,
+    0xa8, 0xae, 0x44, 0x46, 0x5e, 0xab, 0x67, 0x17, 0x53, 0x19, 0x3a, 0xda,
+    0x5a, 0xc8, 0x16, 0x3e, 0x86, 0xd5, 0xc5, 0x71, 0x2f, 0xfc, 0x23, 0x48,
+    0xd9, 0x0b, 0x13, 0xdd, 0x7b, 0x5a, 0x25, 0x79, 0xef, 0xa5, 0x7b, 0x04,
+    0xed, 0x44, 0xf6, 0x18, 0x55, 0xe4, 0x0a, 0xe9, 0x57, 0x79, 0x5d, 0xd7,
+    0x55, 0xa7, 0xab, 0x45, 0x02, 0x97, 0x60, 0x42,
+};
+
+/*
+ * kExampleRSAKeyPKCS8 is kExampleRSAKeyDER encoded in a PKCS #8
+ * PrivateKeyInfo.
+ */
+static const unsigned char kExampleRSAKeyPKCS8[] = {
+    0x30, 0x82, 0x02, 0x76, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a,
+    0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x82,
+    0x02, 0x60, 0x30, 0x82, 0x02, 0x5c, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, 0x02, 0x81, 0x81,
+    0x00, 0xf8, 0xb8, 0x6c, 0x83, 0xb4, 0xbc, 0xd9, 0xa8, 0x57, 0xc0, 0xa5,
+    0xb4, 0x59, 0x76, 0x8c, 0x54, 0x1d, 0x79, 0xeb, 0x22, 0x52, 0x04, 0x7e,
+    0xd3, 0x37, 0xeb, 0x41, 0xfd, 0x83, 0xf9, 0xf0, 0xa6, 0x85, 0x15, 0x34,
+    0x75, 0x71, 0x5a, 0x84, 0xa8, 0x3c, 0xd2, 0xef, 0x5a, 0x4e, 0xd3, 0xde,
+    0x97, 0x8a, 0xdd, 0xff, 0xbb, 0xcf, 0x0a, 0xaa, 0x86, 0x92, 0xbe, 0xb8,
+    0x50, 0xe4, 0xcd, 0x6f, 0x80, 0x33, 0x30, 0x76, 0x13, 0x8f, 0xca, 0x7b,
+    0xdc, 0xec, 0x5a, 0xca, 0x63, 0xc7, 0x03, 0x25, 0xef, 0xa8, 0x8a, 0x83,
+    0x58, 0x76, 0x20, 0xfa, 0x16, 0x77, 0xd7, 0x79, 0x92, 0x63, 0x01, 0x48,
+    0x1a, 0xd8, 0x7b, 0x67, 0xf1, 0x52, 0x55, 0x49, 0x4e, 0xd6, 0x6e, 0x4a,
+    0x5c, 0xd7, 0x7a, 0x37, 0x36, 0x0c, 0xde, 0xdd, 0x8f, 0x44, 0xe8, 0xc2,
+    0xa7, 0x2c, 0x2b, 0xb5, 0xaf, 0x64, 0x4b, 0x61, 0x07, 0x02, 0x03, 0x01,
+    0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x81, 0x80, 0x74, 0x88, 0x64, 0x3f, 0x69, 0x45, 0x3a,
+    0x6d, 0xc7, 0x7f, 0xb9, 0xa3, 0xc0, 0x6e, 0xec, 0xdc, 0xd4, 0x5a, 0xb5,
+    0x32, 0x85, 0x5f, 0x19, 0xd4, 0xf8, 0xd4, 0x3f, 0x3c, 0xfa, 0xc2, 0xf6,
+    0x5f, 0xee, 0xe6, 0xba, 0x87, 0x74, 0x2e, 0xc7, 0x0c, 0xd4, 0x42, 0xb8,
+    0x66, 0x85, 0x9c, 0x7b, 0x24, 0x61, 0xaa, 0x16, 0x11, 0xf6, 0xb5, 0xb6,
+    0xa4, 0x0a, 0xc9, 0x55, 0x2e, 0x81, 0xa5, 0x47, 0x61, 0xcb, 0x25, 0x8f,
+    0xc2, 0x15, 0x7b, 0x0e, 0x7c, 0x36, 0x9f, 0x3a, 0xda, 0x58, 0x86, 0x1c,
+    0x5b, 0x83, 0x79, 0xe6, 0x2b, 0xcc, 0xe6, 0xfa, 0x2c, 0x61, 0xf2, 0x78,
+    0x80, 0x1b, 0xe2, 0xf3, 0x9d, 0x39, 0x2b, 0x65, 0x57, 0x91, 0x3d, 0x71,
+    0x99, 0x73, 0xa5, 0xc2, 0x79, 0x20, 0x8c, 0x07, 0x4f, 0xe5, 0xb4, 0x60,
+    0x1f, 0x99, 0xa2, 0xb1, 0x4f, 0x0c, 0xef, 0xbc, 0x59, 0x53, 0x00, 0x7d,
+    0xb1, 0x02, 0x41, 0x00, 0xfc, 0x7e, 0x23, 0x65, 0x70, 0xf8, 0xce, 0xd3,
+    0x40, 0x41, 0x80, 0x6a, 0x1d, 0x01, 0xd6, 0x01, 0xff, 0xb6, 0x1b, 0x3d,
+    0x3d, 0x59, 0x09, 0x33, 0x79, 0xc0, 0x4f, 0xde, 0x96, 0x27, 0x4b, 0x18,
+    0xc6, 0xd9, 0x78, 0xf1, 0xf4, 0x35, 0x46, 0xe9, 0x7c, 0x42, 0x7a, 0x5d,
+    0x9f, 0xef, 0x54, 0xb8, 0xf7, 0x9f, 0xc4, 0x33, 0x6c, 0xf3, 0x8c, 0x32,
+    0x46, 0x87, 0x67, 0x30, 0x7b, 0xa7, 0xac, 0xe3, 0x02, 0x41, 0x00, 0xfc,
+    0x2c, 0xdf, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x88, 0xf5, 0xb1, 0x92, 0xa8, 0x93, 0x47, 0x63,
+    0x55, 0xf5, 0xca, 0x58, 0x43, 0xba, 0x1c, 0xe5, 0x9e, 0xb6, 0x95, 0x05,
+    0xcd, 0xb5, 0x82, 0xdf, 0xeb, 0x04, 0x53, 0x9d, 0xbd, 0xc2, 0x38, 0x16,
+    0xb3, 0x62, 0xdd, 0xa1, 0x46, 0xdb, 0x6d, 0x97, 0x93, 0x9f, 0x8a, 0xc3,
+    0x9b, 0x64, 0x7e, 0x42, 0xe3, 0x32, 0x57, 0x19, 0x1b, 0xd5, 0x6e, 0x85,
+    0xfa, 0xb8, 0x8d, 0x02, 0x41, 0x00, 0xbc, 0x3d, 0xde, 0x6d, 0xd6, 0x97,
+    0xe8, 0xba, 0x9e, 0x81, 0x37, 0x17, 0xe5, 0xa0, 0x64, 0xc9, 0x00, 0xb7,
+    0xe7, 0xfe, 0xf4, 0x29, 0xd9, 0x2e, 0x43, 0x6b, 0x19, 0x20, 0xbd, 0x99,
+    0x75, 0xe7, 0x76, 0xf8, 0xd3, 0xae, 0xaf, 0x7e, 0xb8, 0xeb, 0x81, 0xf4,
+    0x9d, 0xfe, 0x07, 0x2b, 0x0b, 0x63, 0x0b, 0x5a, 0x55, 0x90, 0x71, 0x7d,
+    0xf1, 0xdb, 0xd9, 0xb1, 0x41, 0x41, 0x68, 0x2f, 0x4e, 0x39, 0x02, 0x40,
+    0x5a, 0x34, 0x66, 0xd8, 0xf5, 0xe2, 0x7f, 0x18, 0xb5, 0x00, 0x6e, 0x26,
+    0x84, 0x27, 0x14, 0x93, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0xc6, 0x0f, 0x5e, 0x27, 0xe6, 0xe1,
+    0xe9, 0xc0, 0x8a, 0xe4, 0x34, 0xda, 0xe9, 0xa2, 0x4b, 0x73, 0xbc, 0x8c,
+    0xb9, 0xba, 0x13, 0x6c, 0x7a, 0x2b, 0x51, 0x84, 0xa3, 0x4a, 0xe0, 0x30,
+    0x10, 0x06, 0x7e, 0xed, 0x17, 0x5a, 0x14, 0x00, 0xc9, 0xef, 0x85, 0xea,
+    0x52, 0x2c, 0xbc, 0x65, 0x02, 0x40, 0x51, 0xe3, 0xf2, 0x83, 0x19, 0x9b,
+    0xc4, 0x1e, 0x2f, 0x50, 0x3d, 0xdf, 0x5a, 0xa2, 0x18, 0xca, 0x5f, 0x2e,
+    0x49, 0xaf, 0x6f, 0xcc, 0xfa, 0x65, 0x77, 0x94, 0xb5, 0xa1, 0x0a, 0xa9,
+    0xd1, 0x8a, 0x39, 0x37, 0xf4, 0x0b, 0xa0, 0xd7, 0x82, 0x27, 0x5e, 0xae,
+    0x17, 0x17, 0xa1, 0x1e, 0x54, 0x34, 0xbf, 0x6e, 0xc4, 0x8e, 0x99, 0x5d,
+    0x08, 0xf1, 0x2d, 0x86, 0x9d, 0xa5, 0x20, 0x1b, 0xe5, 0xdf,
+};
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+/*
+ * kExampleECKeyDER is a sample EC private key encoded as an ECPrivateKey
+ * structure.
+ */
+static const unsigned char kExampleECKeyDER[] = {
+    0x30, 0x77, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x04, 0x20, 0x07, 0x0f, 0x08, 0x72, 0x7a,
+    0xd4, 0xa0, 0x4a, 0x9c, 0xdd, 0x59, 0xc9, 0x4d, 0x89, 0x68, 0x77, 0x08,
+    0xb5, 0x6f, 0xc9, 0x5d, 0x30, 0x77, 0x0e, 0xe8, 0xd1, 0xc9, 0xce, 0x0a,
+    0x8b, 0xb4, 0x6a, 0xa0, 0x0a, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d,
+    0x03, 0x01, 0x07, 0xa1, 0x44, 0x03, 0x42, 0x00, 0x04, 0xe6, 0x2b, 0x69,
+    0xe2, 0xbf, 0x65, 0x9f, 0x97, 0xbe, 0x2f, 0x1e, 0x0d, 0x94, 0x8a, 0x4c,
+    0xd5, 0x97, 0x6b, 0xb7, 0xa9, 0x1e, 0x0d, 0x46, 0xfb, 0xdd, 0xa9, 0xa9,
+    0x1e, 0x9d, 0xdc, 0xba, 0x5a, 0x01, 0xe7, 0xd6, 0x97, 0xa8, 0x0a, 0x18,
+    0xf9, 0xc3, 0xc4, 0xa3, 0x1e, 0x56, 0xe2, 0x7c, 0x83, 0x48, 0xdb, 0x16,
+    0x1a, 0x1c, 0xf5, 0x1d, 0x7e, 0xf1, 0x94, 0x2d, 0x4b, 0xcf, 0x72, 0x22,
+    0xc1,
+};
+
+/*
+ * kExampleBadECKeyDER is a sample EC private key encoded as an ECPrivateKey
+ * structure. The private key is equal to the order and will fail to import
+ */
+static const unsigned char kExampleBadECKeyDER[] = {
+    0x30, 0x66, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, 0x30, 0x13, 0x06, 0x07, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48,
+    0xCE, 0x3D, 0x02, 0x01, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0xCE, 0x3D, 0x03,
+    0x01, 0x07, 0x04, 0x4C, 0x30, 0x4A, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x04, 0x20, 0xFF,
+    0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+    0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xBC, 0xE6, 0xFA, 0xAD, 0xA7, 0x17, 0x9E, 0x84, 0xF3,
+    0xB9, 0xCA, 0xC2, 0xFC, 0x63, 0x25, 0x51, 0xA1, 0x23, 0x03, 0x21, 0x00,
+    0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+    0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xBC, 0xE6, 0xFA, 0xAD, 0xA7, 0x17, 0x9E, 0x84,
+    0xF3, 0xB9, 0xCA, 0xC2, 0xFC, 0x63, 0x25, 0x51
+};
+#endif
+
+static EVP_PKEY *load_example_rsa_key(void)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY *ret = NULL;
+    const unsigned char *derp = kExampleRSAKeyDER;
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+    RSA *rsa = NULL;
+
+    if (!d2i_RSAPrivateKey(&rsa, &derp, sizeof(kExampleRSAKeyDER))) {
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    pkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
+    if (pkey == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, rsa)) {
+        goto out;
+    }
+
+    ret = pkey;
+    pkey = NULL;
+
+ out:
+    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+    RSA_free(rsa);
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int test_EVP_DigestSignInit(void)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+    unsigned char *sig = NULL;
+    size_t sig_len = 0;
+    EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx, *md_ctx_verify;
+
+    md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+    md_ctx_verify = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+    if (md_ctx == NULL || md_ctx_verify == NULL)
+        goto out;
+
+    pkey = load_example_rsa_key();
+    if (pkey == NULL ||
+        !EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx, NULL, EVP_sha256(), NULL, pkey) ||
+        !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx, kMsg, sizeof(kMsg))) {
+        goto out;
+    }
+    /* Determine the size of the signature. */
+    if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(md_ctx, NULL, &sig_len)) {
+        goto out;
+    }
+    /* Sanity check for testing. */
+    if (sig_len != (size_t)EVP_PKEY_size(pkey)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "sig_len mismatch\n");
+        goto out;
+    }
+
+    sig = OPENSSL_malloc(sig_len);
+    if (sig == NULL || !EVP_DigestSignFinal(md_ctx, sig, &sig_len)) {
+        goto out;
+    }
+
+    /* Ensure that the signature round-trips. */
+    if (!EVP_DigestVerifyInit(md_ctx_verify, NULL, EVP_sha256(), NULL, pkey)
+        || !EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx_verify, kMsg, sizeof(kMsg))
+        || !EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(md_ctx_verify, sig, sig_len)) {
+        goto out;
+    }
+
+    ret = 1;
+
+ out:
+    if (!ret) {
+        ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+    }
+
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx_verify);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+    OPENSSL_free(sig);
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int test_EVP_DigestVerifyInit(void)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+    EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx;
+
+    md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+
+    pkey = load_example_rsa_key();
+    if (pkey == NULL ||
+        !EVP_DigestVerifyInit(md_ctx, NULL, EVP_sha256(), NULL, pkey) ||
+        !EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx, kMsg, sizeof(kMsg)) ||
+        !EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(md_ctx, kSignature, sizeof(kSignature))) {
+        goto out;
+    }
+    ret = 1;
+
+ out:
+    if (!ret) {
+        ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+    }
+
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int test_d2i_AutoPrivateKey(const unsigned char *input,
+                                   size_t input_len, int expected_id)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    const unsigned char *p;
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+
+    p = input;
+    pkey = d2i_AutoPrivateKey(NULL, &p, input_len);
+    if (pkey == NULL || p != input + input_len) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "d2i_AutoPrivateKey failed\n");
+        goto done;
+    }
+
+    if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != expected_id) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Did not decode expected type\n");
+        goto done;
+    }
+
+    ret = 1;
+
+ done:
+    if (!ret) {
+        ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+    }
+
+    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+/* Tests loading a bad key in PKCS8 format */
+static int test_EVP_PKCS82PKEY(void)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    const unsigned char *derp = kExampleBadECKeyDER;
+    PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf = NULL;
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+
+    p8inf = d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO(NULL, &derp, sizeof(kExampleBadECKeyDER));
+
+    if (!p8inf || derp != kExampleBadECKeyDER + sizeof(kExampleBadECKeyDER)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Failed to parse key\n");
+        goto done;
+    }
+
+    pkey = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(p8inf);
+    if (pkey) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Imported invalid EC key\n");
+        goto done;
+    }
+
+    ret = 1;
+
+ done:
+    PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8inf);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+
+    return ret;
+}
+#endif
+
+int main(void)
+{
+    CRYPTO_set_mem_debug(1);
+    CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON);
+
+
+    if (!test_EVP_DigestSignInit()) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "EVP_DigestSignInit failed\n");
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    if (!test_EVP_DigestVerifyInit()) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "EVP_DigestVerifyInit failed\n");
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    if (!test_d2i_AutoPrivateKey(kExampleRSAKeyDER, sizeof(kExampleRSAKeyDER),
+                                 EVP_PKEY_RSA)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "d2i_AutoPrivateKey(kExampleRSAKeyDER) failed\n");
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    if (!test_d2i_AutoPrivateKey
+        (kExampleRSAKeyPKCS8, sizeof(kExampleRSAKeyPKCS8), EVP_PKEY_RSA)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "d2i_AutoPrivateKey(kExampleRSAKeyPKCS8) failed\n");
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    if (!test_d2i_AutoPrivateKey(kExampleECKeyDER, sizeof(kExampleECKeyDER),
+                                 EVP_PKEY_EC)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "d2i_AutoPrivateKey(kExampleECKeyDER) failed\n");
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    if (!test_EVP_PKCS82PKEY()) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "test_EVP_PKCS82PKEY failed\n");
+        return 1;
+    }
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG
+    if (CRYPTO_mem_leaks_fp(stderr) <= 0)
+        return 1;
+#endif
+
+    printf("PASS\n");
+    return 0;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/evp_test.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/evp_test.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fb2ca27
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/evp_test.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2172 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
+#include <openssl/kdf.h>
+#include "internal/numbers.h"
+
+/* Remove spaces from beginning and end of a string */
+
+static void remove_space(char **pval)
+{
+    unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)*pval;
+
+    while (isspace(*p))
+        p++;
+
+    *pval = (char *)p;
+
+    p = p + strlen(*pval) - 1;
+
+    /* Remove trailing space */
+    while (isspace(*p))
+        *p-- = 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Given a line of the form:
+ *      name = value # comment
+ * extract name and value. NB: modifies passed buffer.
+ */
+
+static int parse_line(char **pkw, char **pval, char *linebuf)
+{
+    char *p;
+
+    p = linebuf + strlen(linebuf) - 1;
+
+    if (*p != '\n') {
+        fprintf(stderr, "FATAL: missing EOL\n");
+        exit(1);
+    }
+
+    /* Look for # */
+
+    p = strchr(linebuf, '#');
+
+    if (p)
+        *p = '\0';
+
+    /* Look for = sign */
+    p = strchr(linebuf, '=');
+
+    /* If no '=' exit */
+    if (!p)
+        return 0;
+
+    *p++ = '\0';
+
+    *pkw = linebuf;
+    *pval = p;
+
+    /* Remove spaces from keyword and value */
+    remove_space(pkw);
+    remove_space(pval);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Unescape some escape sequences in string literals.
+ * Return the result in a newly allocated buffer.
+ * Currently only supports '\n'.
+ * If the input length is 0, returns a valid 1-byte buffer, but sets
+ * the length to 0.
+ */
+static unsigned char* unescape(const char *input, size_t input_len,
+                               size_t *out_len)
+{
+    unsigned char *ret, *p;
+    size_t i;
+    if (input_len == 0) {
+        *out_len = 0;
+        return OPENSSL_zalloc(1);
+    }
+
+    /* Escaping is non-expanding; over-allocate original size for simplicity. */
+    ret = p = OPENSSL_malloc(input_len);
+    if (ret == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < input_len; i++) {
+        if (input[i] == '\\') {
+            if (i == input_len - 1 || input[i+1] != 'n')
+                goto err;
+            *p++ = '\n';
+            i++;
+        } else {
+            *p++ = input[i];
+        }
+    }
+
+    *out_len = p - ret;
+    return ret;
+
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_free(ret);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+/* For a hex string "value" convert to a binary allocated buffer */
+static int test_bin(const char *value, unsigned char **buf, size_t *buflen)
+{
+    long len;
+
+    *buflen = 0;
+
+    /* Check for empty value */
+    if (!*value) {
+        /*
+         * Don't return NULL for zero length buffer.
+         * This is needed for some tests with empty keys: HMAC_Init_ex() expects
+         * a non-NULL key buffer even if the key length is 0, in order to detect
+         * key reset.
+         */
+        *buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
+        if (!*buf)
+            return 0;
+        **buf = 0;
+        *buflen = 0;
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    /* Check for NULL literal */
+    if (strcmp(value, "NULL") == 0) {
+        *buf = NULL;
+        *buflen = 0;
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    /* Check for string literal */
+    if (value[0] == '"') {
+        size_t vlen;
+        value++;
+        vlen = strlen(value);
+        if (value[vlen - 1] != '"')
+            return 0;
+        vlen--;
+        *buf = unescape(value, vlen, buflen);
+        if (*buf == NULL)
+            return 0;
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    /* Otherwise assume as hex literal and convert it to binary buffer */
+    *buf = OPENSSL_hexstr2buf(value, &len);
+    if (!*buf) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Value=%s\n", value);
+        ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+        return -1;
+    }
+    /* Size of input buffer means we'll never overflow */
+    *buflen = len;
+    return 1;
+}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCRYPT
+/* Currently only used by scrypt tests */
+/* Parse unsigned decimal 64 bit integer value */
+static int test_uint64(const char *value, uint64_t *pr)
+{
+    const char *p = value;
+    if (!*p) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Invalid empty integer value\n");
+        return -1;
+    }
+    *pr = 0;
+    while (*p) {
+        if (*pr > UINT64_MAX/10) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "Integer string overflow value=%s\n", value);
+            return -1;
+        }
+        *pr *= 10;
+        if (*p < '0' || *p > '9') {
+            fprintf(stderr, "Invalid integer string value=%s\n", value);
+            return -1;
+        }
+        *pr += *p - '0';
+        p++;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+#endif
+
+/* Structure holding test information */
+struct evp_test {
+    /* file being read */
+    BIO *in;
+    /* temp memory BIO for reading in keys */
+    BIO *key;
+    /* List of public and private keys */
+    struct key_list *private;
+    struct key_list *public;
+    /* method for this test */
+    const struct evp_test_method *meth;
+    /* current line being processed */
+    unsigned int line;
+    /* start line of current test */
+    unsigned int start_line;
+    /* Error string for test */
+    const char *err, *aux_err;
+    /* Expected error value of test */
+    char *expected_err;
+    /* Expected error function string */
+    char *func;
+    /* Expected error reason string */
+    char *reason;
+    /* Number of tests */
+    int ntests;
+    /* Error count */
+    int errors;
+    /* Number of tests skipped */
+    int nskip;
+    /* If output mismatch expected and got value */
+    unsigned char *out_received;
+    size_t out_received_len;
+    unsigned char *out_expected;
+    size_t out_expected_len;
+    /* test specific data */
+    void *data;
+    /* Current test should be skipped */
+    int skip;
+};
+
+struct key_list {
+    char *name;
+    EVP_PKEY *key;
+    struct key_list *next;
+};
+
+/* Test method structure */
+struct evp_test_method {
+    /* Name of test as it appears in file */
+    const char *name;
+    /* Initialise test for "alg" */
+    int (*init) (struct evp_test * t, const char *alg);
+    /* Clean up method */
+    void (*cleanup) (struct evp_test * t);
+    /* Test specific name value pair processing */
+    int (*parse) (struct evp_test * t, const char *name, const char *value);
+    /* Run the test itself */
+    int (*run_test) (struct evp_test * t);
+};
+
+static const struct evp_test_method digest_test_method, cipher_test_method;
+static const struct evp_test_method mac_test_method;
+static const struct evp_test_method psign_test_method, pverify_test_method;
+static const struct evp_test_method pdecrypt_test_method;
+static const struct evp_test_method pverify_recover_test_method;
+static const struct evp_test_method pderive_test_method;
+static const struct evp_test_method pbe_test_method;
+static const struct evp_test_method encode_test_method;
+static const struct evp_test_method kdf_test_method;
+static const struct evp_test_method keypair_test_method;
+
+static const struct evp_test_method *evp_test_list[] = {
+    &digest_test_method,
+    &cipher_test_method,
+    &mac_test_method,
+    &psign_test_method,
+    &pverify_test_method,
+    &pdecrypt_test_method,
+    &pverify_recover_test_method,
+    &pderive_test_method,
+    &pbe_test_method,
+    &encode_test_method,
+    &kdf_test_method,
+    &keypair_test_method,
+    NULL
+};
+
+static const struct evp_test_method *evp_find_test(const char *name)
+{
+    const struct evp_test_method **tt;
+
+    for (tt = evp_test_list; *tt; tt++) {
+        if (strcmp(name, (*tt)->name) == 0)
+            return *tt;
+    }
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+static void hex_print(const char *name, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
+{
+    size_t i;
+    fprintf(stderr, "%s ", name);
+    for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
+        fprintf(stderr, "%02X", buf[i]);
+    fputs("\n", stderr);
+}
+
+static void free_expected(struct evp_test *t)
+{
+    OPENSSL_free(t->expected_err);
+    t->expected_err = NULL;
+    OPENSSL_free(t->func);
+    t->func = NULL;
+    OPENSSL_free(t->reason);
+    t->reason = NULL;
+    OPENSSL_free(t->out_expected);
+    OPENSSL_free(t->out_received);
+    t->out_expected = NULL;
+    t->out_received = NULL;
+    t->out_expected_len = 0;
+    t->out_received_len = 0;
+    /* Literals. */
+    t->err = NULL;
+}
+
+static void print_expected(struct evp_test *t)
+{
+    if (t->out_expected == NULL && t->out_received == NULL)
+        return;
+    hex_print("Expected:", t->out_expected, t->out_expected_len);
+    hex_print("Got:     ", t->out_received, t->out_received_len);
+    free_expected(t);
+}
+
+static int check_test_error(struct evp_test *t)
+{
+    unsigned long err;
+    const char *func;
+    const char *reason;
+    if (!t->err && !t->expected_err)
+        return 1;
+    if (t->err && !t->expected_err) {
+        if (t->aux_err != NULL) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "Test line %d(%s): unexpected error %s\n",
+                    t->start_line, t->aux_err, t->err);
+        } else {
+            fprintf(stderr, "Test line %d: unexpected error %s\n",
+                    t->start_line, t->err);
+        }
+        print_expected(t);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (!t->err && t->expected_err) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Test line %d: succeeded expecting %s\n",
+                t->start_line, t->expected_err);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (strcmp(t->err, t->expected_err) != 0) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Test line %d: expecting %s got %s\n",
+                t->start_line, t->expected_err, t->err);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (t->func == NULL && t->reason == NULL)
+        return 1;
+
+    if (t->func == NULL || t->reason == NULL) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Test line %d: missing function or reason code\n",
+                t->start_line);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    err = ERR_peek_error();
+    if (err == 0) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Test line %d, expected error \"%s:%s\" not set\n",
+                t->start_line, t->func, t->reason);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    func = ERR_func_error_string(err);
+    reason = ERR_reason_error_string(err);
+
+    if (func == NULL && reason == NULL) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Test line %d: expected error \"%s:%s\", no strings available.  Skipping...\n",
+                t->start_line, t->func, t->reason);
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    if (strcmp(func, t->func) == 0 && strcmp(reason, t->reason) == 0)
+        return 1;
+
+    fprintf(stderr, "Test line %d: expected error \"%s:%s\", got \"%s:%s\"\n",
+            t->start_line, t->func, t->reason, func, reason);
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/* Setup a new test, run any existing test */
+
+static int setup_test(struct evp_test *t, const struct evp_test_method *tmeth)
+{
+    /* If we already have a test set up run it */
+    if (t->meth) {
+        t->ntests++;
+        if (t->skip) {
+            t->nskip++;
+        } else {
+            /* run the test */
+            if (t->err == NULL && t->meth->run_test(t) != 1) {
+                fprintf(stderr, "%s test error line %d\n",
+                        t->meth->name, t->start_line);
+                return 0;
+            }
+            if (!check_test_error(t)) {
+                if (t->err)
+                    ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+                t->errors++;
+            }
+        }
+        /* clean it up */
+        ERR_clear_error();
+        if (t->data != NULL) {
+            t->meth->cleanup(t);
+            OPENSSL_free(t->data);
+            t->data = NULL;
+        }
+        OPENSSL_free(t->expected_err);
+        t->expected_err = NULL;
+        free_expected(t);
+    }
+    t->meth = tmeth;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int find_key(EVP_PKEY **ppk, const char *name, struct key_list *lst)
+{
+    for (; lst; lst = lst->next) {
+        if (strcmp(lst->name, name) == 0) {
+            if (ppk)
+                *ppk = lst->key;
+            return 1;
+        }
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static void free_key_list(struct key_list *lst)
+{
+    while (lst != NULL) {
+        struct key_list *ltmp;
+        EVP_PKEY_free(lst->key);
+        OPENSSL_free(lst->name);
+        ltmp = lst->next;
+        OPENSSL_free(lst);
+        lst = ltmp;
+    }
+}
+
+static int check_unsupported()
+{
+    long err = ERR_peek_error();
+    if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_EVP
+        && ERR_GET_REASON(err) == EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM) {
+        ERR_clear_error();
+        return 1;
+    }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    /*
+     * If EC support is enabled we should catch also EC_R_UNKNOWN_GROUP as an
+     * hint to an unsupported algorithm/curve (e.g. if binary EC support is
+     * disabled).
+     */
+    if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_EC
+        && ERR_GET_REASON(err) == EC_R_UNKNOWN_GROUP) {
+        ERR_clear_error();
+        return 1;
+    }
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+    return 0;
+}
+
+
+static int read_key(struct evp_test *t)
+{
+    char tmpbuf[80];
+    if (t->key == NULL)
+        t->key = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+    else if (BIO_reset(t->key) <= 0)
+        return 0;
+    if (t->key == NULL) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Error allocating key memory BIO\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+    /* Read to PEM end line and place content in memory BIO */
+    while (BIO_gets(t->in, tmpbuf, sizeof(tmpbuf))) {
+        t->line++;
+        if (BIO_puts(t->key, tmpbuf) <= 0) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "Error writing to key memory BIO\n");
+            return 0;
+        }
+        if (strncmp(tmpbuf, "-----END", 8) == 0)
+            return 1;
+    }
+    fprintf(stderr, "Can't find key end\n");
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int process_test(struct evp_test *t, char *buf, int verbose)
+{
+    char *keyword = NULL, *value = NULL;
+    int rv = 0, add_key = 0;
+    struct key_list **lst = NULL, *key = NULL;
+    EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL;
+    const struct evp_test_method *tmeth = NULL;
+    if (verbose)
+        fputs(buf, stdout);
+    if (!parse_line(&keyword, &value, buf))
+        return 1;
+    if (strcmp(keyword, "PrivateKey") == 0) {
+        if (!read_key(t))
+            return 0;
+        pk = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(t->key, NULL, 0, NULL);
+        if (pk == NULL && !check_unsupported()) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "Error reading private key %s\n", value);
+            ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        lst = &t->private;
+        add_key = 1;
+    }
+    if (strcmp(keyword, "PublicKey") == 0) {
+        if (!read_key(t))
+            return 0;
+        pk = PEM_read_bio_PUBKEY(t->key, NULL, 0, NULL);
+        if (pk == NULL && !check_unsupported()) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "Error reading public key %s\n", value);
+            ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        lst = &t->public;
+        add_key = 1;
+    }
+    /* If we have a key add to list */
+    if (add_key) {
+        if (find_key(NULL, value, *lst)) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "Duplicate key %s\n", value);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        key = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*key));
+        if (!key)
+            return 0;
+        key->name = OPENSSL_strdup(value);
+        key->key = pk;
+        key->next = *lst;
+        *lst = key;
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    /* See if keyword corresponds to a test start */
+    tmeth = evp_find_test(keyword);
+    if (tmeth) {
+        if (!setup_test(t, tmeth))
+            return 0;
+        t->start_line = t->line;
+        t->skip = 0;
+        if (!tmeth->init(t, value)) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "Unknown %s: %s\n", keyword, value);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        return 1;
+    } else if (t->skip) {
+        return 1;
+    } else if (strcmp(keyword, "Result") == 0) {
+        if (t->expected_err) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "Line %d: multiple result lines\n", t->line);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        t->expected_err = OPENSSL_strdup(value);
+        if (t->expected_err == NULL)
+            return 0;
+    } else if (strcmp(keyword, "Function") == 0) {
+        if (t->func != NULL) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "Line %d: multiple function lines\n", t->line);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        t->func = OPENSSL_strdup(value);
+        if (t->func == NULL)
+            return 0;
+    } else if (strcmp(keyword, "Reason") == 0) {
+        if (t->reason != NULL) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "Line %d: multiple reason lines\n", t->line);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        t->reason = OPENSSL_strdup(value);
+        if (t->reason == NULL)
+            return 0;
+    } else {
+        /* Must be test specific line: try to parse it */
+        if (t->meth)
+            rv = t->meth->parse(t, keyword, value);
+
+        if (rv == 0)
+            fprintf(stderr, "line %d: unexpected keyword %s\n",
+                    t->line, keyword);
+
+        if (rv < 0)
+            fprintf(stderr, "line %d: error processing keyword %s\n",
+                    t->line, keyword);
+        if (rv <= 0)
+            return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int check_var_length_output(struct evp_test *t,
+                                   const unsigned char *expected,
+                                   size_t expected_len,
+                                   const unsigned char *received,
+                                   size_t received_len)
+{
+    if (expected_len == received_len &&
+        memcmp(expected, received, expected_len) == 0) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* The result printing code expects a non-NULL buffer. */
+    t->out_expected = OPENSSL_memdup(expected, expected_len ? expected_len : 1);
+    t->out_expected_len = expected_len;
+    t->out_received = OPENSSL_memdup(received, received_len ? received_len : 1);
+    t->out_received_len = received_len;
+    if (t->out_expected == NULL || t->out_received == NULL) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Memory allocation error!\n");
+        exit(1);
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int check_output(struct evp_test *t,
+                        const unsigned char *expected,
+                        const unsigned char *received,
+                        size_t len)
+{
+    return check_var_length_output(t, expected, len, received, len);
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    BIO *in = NULL;
+    char buf[10240];
+    struct evp_test t;
+
+    if (argc != 2) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "usage: evp_test testfile.txt\n");
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON);
+
+    memset(&t, 0, sizeof(t));
+    t.start_line = -1;
+    in = BIO_new_file(argv[1], "rb");
+    if (in == NULL) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Can't open %s for reading\n", argv[1]);
+        return 1;
+    }
+    t.in = in;
+    t.err = NULL;
+    while (BIO_gets(in, buf, sizeof(buf))) {
+        t.line++;
+        if (!process_test(&t, buf, 0))
+            exit(1);
+    }
+    /* Run any final test we have */
+    if (!setup_test(&t, NULL))
+        exit(1);
+    fprintf(stderr, "%d tests completed with %d errors, %d skipped\n",
+            t.ntests, t.errors, t.nskip);
+    free_key_list(t.public);
+    free_key_list(t.private);
+    BIO_free(t.key);
+    BIO_free(in);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG
+    if (CRYPTO_mem_leaks_fp(stderr) <= 0)
+        return 1;
+#endif
+    if (t.errors)
+        return 1;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static void test_free(void *d)
+{
+    OPENSSL_free(d);
+}
+
+/* Message digest tests */
+
+struct digest_data {
+    /* Digest this test is for */
+    const EVP_MD *digest;
+    /* Input to digest */
+    unsigned char *input;
+    size_t input_len;
+    /* Repeat count for input */
+    size_t nrpt;
+    /* Expected output */
+    unsigned char *output;
+    size_t output_len;
+};
+
+static int digest_test_init(struct evp_test *t, const char *alg)
+{
+    const EVP_MD *digest;
+    struct digest_data *mdat;
+    digest = EVP_get_digestbyname(alg);
+    if (!digest) {
+        /* If alg has an OID assume disabled algorithm */
+        if (OBJ_sn2nid(alg) != NID_undef || OBJ_ln2nid(alg) != NID_undef) {
+            t->skip = 1;
+            return 1;
+        }
+        return 0;
+    }
+    mdat = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*mdat));
+    mdat->digest = digest;
+    mdat->input = NULL;
+    mdat->output = NULL;
+    mdat->nrpt = 1;
+    t->data = mdat;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static void digest_test_cleanup(struct evp_test *t)
+{
+    struct digest_data *mdat = t->data;
+    test_free(mdat->input);
+    test_free(mdat->output);
+}
+
+static int digest_test_parse(struct evp_test *t,
+                             const char *keyword, const char *value)
+{
+    struct digest_data *mdata = t->data;
+    if (strcmp(keyword, "Input") == 0)
+        return test_bin(value, &mdata->input, &mdata->input_len);
+    if (strcmp(keyword, "Output") == 0)
+        return test_bin(value, &mdata->output, &mdata->output_len);
+    if (strcmp(keyword, "Count") == 0) {
+        long nrpt = atoi(value);
+        if (nrpt <= 0)
+            return 0;
+        mdata->nrpt = (size_t)nrpt;
+        return 1;
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int digest_test_run(struct evp_test *t)
+{
+    struct digest_data *mdata = t->data;
+    size_t i;
+    const char *err = "INTERNAL_ERROR";
+    EVP_MD_CTX *mctx;
+    unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+    unsigned int md_len;
+    mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+    if (!mctx)
+        goto err;
+    err = "DIGESTINIT_ERROR";
+    if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(mctx, mdata->digest, NULL))
+        goto err;
+    err = "DIGESTUPDATE_ERROR";
+    for (i = 0; i < mdata->nrpt; i++) {
+        if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(mctx, mdata->input, mdata->input_len))
+            goto err;
+    }
+    err = "DIGESTFINAL_ERROR";
+    if (!EVP_DigestFinal(mctx, md, &md_len))
+        goto err;
+    err = "DIGEST_LENGTH_MISMATCH";
+    if (md_len != mdata->output_len)
+        goto err;
+    err = "DIGEST_MISMATCH";
+    if (check_output(t, mdata->output, md, md_len))
+        goto err;
+    err = NULL;
+ err:
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
+    t->err = err;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static const struct evp_test_method digest_test_method = {
+    "Digest",
+    digest_test_init,
+    digest_test_cleanup,
+    digest_test_parse,
+    digest_test_run
+};
+
+/* Cipher tests */
+struct cipher_data {
+    const EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
+    int enc;
+    /* EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE, EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE or EVP_CIPH_OCB_MODE if AEAD */
+    int aead;
+    unsigned char *key;
+    size_t key_len;
+    unsigned char *iv;
+    size_t iv_len;
+    unsigned char *plaintext;
+    size_t plaintext_len;
+    unsigned char *ciphertext;
+    size_t ciphertext_len;
+    /* GCM, CCM only */
+    unsigned char *aad;
+    size_t aad_len;
+    unsigned char *tag;
+    size_t tag_len;
+};
+
+static int cipher_test_init(struct evp_test *t, const char *alg)
+{
+    const EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
+    struct cipher_data *cdat = t->data;
+    cipher = EVP_get_cipherbyname(alg);
+    if (!cipher) {
+        /* If alg has an OID assume disabled algorithm */
+        if (OBJ_sn2nid(alg) != NID_undef || OBJ_ln2nid(alg) != NID_undef) {
+            t->skip = 1;
+            return 1;
+        }
+        return 0;
+    }
+    cdat = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*cdat));
+    cdat->cipher = cipher;
+    cdat->enc = -1;
+    cdat->key = NULL;
+    cdat->iv = NULL;
+    cdat->ciphertext = NULL;
+    cdat->plaintext = NULL;
+    cdat->aad = NULL;
+    cdat->tag = NULL;
+    t->data = cdat;
+    if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(cipher) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE
+        || EVP_CIPHER_mode(cipher) == EVP_CIPH_OCB_MODE
+        || EVP_CIPHER_mode(cipher) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE)
+        cdat->aead = EVP_CIPHER_mode(cipher);
+    else if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)
+        cdat->aead = -1;
+    else
+        cdat->aead = 0;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static void cipher_test_cleanup(struct evp_test *t)
+{
+    struct cipher_data *cdat = t->data;
+    test_free(cdat->key);
+    test_free(cdat->iv);
+    test_free(cdat->ciphertext);
+    test_free(cdat->plaintext);
+    test_free(cdat->aad);
+    test_free(cdat->tag);
+}
+
+static int cipher_test_parse(struct evp_test *t, const char *keyword,
+                             const char *value)
+{
+    struct cipher_data *cdat = t->data;
+    if (strcmp(keyword, "Key") == 0)
+        return test_bin(value, &cdat->key, &cdat->key_len);
+    if (strcmp(keyword, "IV") == 0)
+        return test_bin(value, &cdat->iv, &cdat->iv_len);
+    if (strcmp(keyword, "Plaintext") == 0)
+        return test_bin(value, &cdat->plaintext, &cdat->plaintext_len);
+    if (strcmp(keyword, "Ciphertext") == 0)
+        return test_bin(value, &cdat->ciphertext, &cdat->ciphertext_len);
+    if (cdat->aead) {
+        if (strcmp(keyword, "AAD") == 0)
+            return test_bin(value, &cdat->aad, &cdat->aad_len);
+        if (strcmp(keyword, "Tag") == 0)
+            return test_bin(value, &cdat->tag, &cdat->tag_len);
+    }
+
+    if (strcmp(keyword, "Operation") == 0) {
+        if (strcmp(value, "ENCRYPT") == 0)
+            cdat->enc = 1;
+        else if (strcmp(value, "DECRYPT") == 0)
+            cdat->enc = 0;
+        else
+            return 0;
+        return 1;
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int cipher_test_enc(struct evp_test *t, int enc,
+                           size_t out_misalign, size_t inp_misalign, int frag)
+{
+    struct cipher_data *cdat = t->data;
+    unsigned char *in, *out, *tmp = NULL;
+    size_t in_len, out_len, donelen = 0;
+    int tmplen, chunklen, tmpflen;
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+    const char *err;
+    err = "INTERNAL_ERROR";
+    ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+    if (!ctx)
+        goto err;
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_flags(ctx, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_FLAG_WRAP_ALLOW);
+    if (enc) {
+        in = cdat->plaintext;
+        in_len = cdat->plaintext_len;
+        out = cdat->ciphertext;
+        out_len = cdat->ciphertext_len;
+    } else {
+        in = cdat->ciphertext;
+        in_len = cdat->ciphertext_len;
+        out = cdat->plaintext;
+        out_len = cdat->plaintext_len;
+    }
+    if (inp_misalign == (size_t)-1) {
+        /*
+         * Exercise in-place encryption
+         */
+        tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(out_misalign + in_len + 2 * EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH);
+        if (!tmp)
+            goto err;
+        in = memcpy(tmp + out_misalign, in, in_len);
+    } else {
+        inp_misalign += 16 - ((out_misalign + in_len) & 15);
+        /*
+         * 'tmp' will store both output and copy of input. We make the copy
+         * of input to specifically aligned part of 'tmp'. So we just
+         * figured out how much padding would ensure the required alignment,
+         * now we allocate extended buffer and finally copy the input just
+         * past inp_misalign in expression below. Output will be written
+         * past out_misalign...
+         */
+        tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(out_misalign + in_len + 2 * EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
+                             inp_misalign + in_len);
+        if (!tmp)
+            goto err;
+        in = memcpy(tmp + out_misalign + in_len + 2 * EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
+                    inp_misalign, in, in_len);
+    }
+    err = "CIPHERINIT_ERROR";
+    if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, cdat->cipher, NULL, NULL, NULL, enc))
+        goto err;
+    err = "INVALID_IV_LENGTH";
+    if (cdat->iv) {
+        if (cdat->aead) {
+            if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN,
+                                     cdat->iv_len, 0))
+                goto err;
+        } else if (cdat->iv_len != (size_t)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx))
+            goto err;
+    }
+    if (cdat->aead) {
+        unsigned char *tag;
+        /*
+         * If encrypting or OCB just set tag length initially, otherwise
+         * set tag length and value.
+         */
+        if (enc || cdat->aead == EVP_CIPH_OCB_MODE) {
+            err = "TAG_LENGTH_SET_ERROR";
+            tag = NULL;
+        } else {
+            err = "TAG_SET_ERROR";
+            tag = cdat->tag;
+        }
+        if (tag || cdat->aead != EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
+            if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG,
+                                     cdat->tag_len, tag))
+                goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    err = "INVALID_KEY_LENGTH";
+    if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(ctx, cdat->key_len))
+        goto err;
+    err = "KEY_SET_ERROR";
+    if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, cdat->key, cdat->iv, -1))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!enc && cdat->aead == EVP_CIPH_OCB_MODE) {
+        if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG,
+                                 cdat->tag_len, cdat->tag)) {
+            err = "TAG_SET_ERROR";
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (cdat->aead == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
+        if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx, NULL, &tmplen, NULL, out_len)) {
+            err = "CCM_PLAINTEXT_LENGTH_SET_ERROR";
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+    if (cdat->aad) {
+        err = "AAD_SET_ERROR";
+        if (!frag) {
+            if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx, NULL, &chunklen, cdat->aad,
+                                  cdat->aad_len))
+                goto err;
+        } else {
+            /*
+             * Supply the AAD in chunks less than the block size where possible
+             */
+            if (cdat->aad_len > 0) {
+                if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx, NULL, &chunklen, cdat->aad, 1))
+                    goto err;
+                donelen++;
+            }
+            if (cdat->aad_len > 2) {
+                if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx, NULL, &chunklen, cdat->aad + donelen,
+                                      cdat->aad_len - 2))
+                    goto err;
+                donelen += cdat->aad_len - 2;
+            }
+            if (cdat->aad_len > 1
+                    && !EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx, NULL, &chunklen,
+                                         cdat->aad + donelen, 1))
+                goto err;
+        }
+    }
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0);
+    err = "CIPHERUPDATE_ERROR";
+    tmplen = 0;
+    if (!frag) {
+        /* We supply the data all in one go */
+        if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx, tmp + out_misalign, &tmplen, in, in_len))
+            goto err;
+    } else {
+        /* Supply the data in chunks less than the block size where possible */
+        if (in_len > 0) {
+            if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx, tmp + out_misalign, &chunklen, in, 1))
+                goto err;
+            tmplen += chunklen;
+            in++;
+            in_len--;
+        }
+        if (in_len > 1) {
+            if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx, tmp + out_misalign + tmplen, &chunklen,
+                                  in, in_len - 1))
+                goto err;
+            tmplen += chunklen;
+            in += in_len - 1;
+            in_len = 1;
+        }
+        if (in_len > 0 ) {
+            if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx, tmp + out_misalign + tmplen, &chunklen,
+                                  in, 1))
+                goto err;
+            tmplen += chunklen;
+        }
+    }
+    if (cdat->aead == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE)
+        tmpflen = 0;
+    else {
+        err = "CIPHERFINAL_ERROR";
+        if (!EVP_CipherFinal_ex(ctx, tmp + out_misalign + tmplen, &tmpflen))
+            goto err;
+    }
+    err = "LENGTH_MISMATCH";
+    if (out_len != (size_t)(tmplen + tmpflen))
+        goto err;
+    err = "VALUE_MISMATCH";
+    if (check_output(t, out, tmp + out_misalign, out_len))
+        goto err;
+    if (enc && cdat->aead) {
+        unsigned char rtag[16];
+        if (cdat->tag_len > sizeof(rtag)) {
+            err = "TAG_LENGTH_INTERNAL_ERROR";
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG,
+                                 cdat->tag_len, rtag)) {
+            err = "TAG_RETRIEVE_ERROR";
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (check_output(t, cdat->tag, rtag, cdat->tag_len)) {
+            err = "TAG_VALUE_MISMATCH";
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+    err = NULL;
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_free(tmp);
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
+    t->err = err;
+    return err ? 0 : 1;
+}
+
+static int cipher_test_run(struct evp_test *t)
+{
+    struct cipher_data *cdat = t->data;
+    int rv, frag = 0;
+    size_t out_misalign, inp_misalign;
+
+    if (!cdat->key) {
+        t->err = "NO_KEY";
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (!cdat->iv && EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cdat->cipher)) {
+        /* IV is optional and usually omitted in wrap mode */
+        if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(cdat->cipher) != EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE) {
+            t->err = "NO_IV";
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+    if (cdat->aead && !cdat->tag) {
+        t->err = "NO_TAG";
+        return 0;
+    }
+    for (out_misalign = 0; out_misalign <= 1;) {
+        static char aux_err[64];
+        t->aux_err = aux_err;
+        for (inp_misalign = (size_t)-1; inp_misalign != 2; inp_misalign++) {
+            if (inp_misalign == (size_t)-1) {
+                /* kludge: inp_misalign == -1 means "exercise in-place" */
+                BIO_snprintf(aux_err, sizeof(aux_err),
+                             "%s in-place, %sfragmented",
+                             out_misalign ? "misaligned" : "aligned",
+                             frag ? "" : "not ");
+            } else {
+                BIO_snprintf(aux_err, sizeof(aux_err),
+                             "%s output and %s input, %sfragmented",
+                             out_misalign ? "misaligned" : "aligned",
+                             inp_misalign ? "misaligned" : "aligned",
+                             frag ? "" : "not ");
+            }
+            if (cdat->enc) {
+                rv = cipher_test_enc(t, 1, out_misalign, inp_misalign, frag);
+                /* Not fatal errors: return */
+                if (rv != 1) {
+                    if (rv < 0)
+                        return 0;
+                    return 1;
+                }
+            }
+            if (cdat->enc != 1) {
+                rv = cipher_test_enc(t, 0, out_misalign, inp_misalign, frag);
+                /* Not fatal errors: return */
+                if (rv != 1) {
+                    if (rv < 0)
+                        return 0;
+                    return 1;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
+        if (out_misalign == 1 && frag == 0) {
+            /*
+             * XTS, CCM and Wrap modes have special requirements about input
+             * lengths so we don't fragment for those
+             */
+            if (cdat->aead == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE
+                    || EVP_CIPHER_mode(cdat->cipher) == EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE
+                     || EVP_CIPHER_mode(cdat->cipher) == EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE)
+                break;
+            out_misalign = 0;
+            frag++;
+        } else {
+            out_misalign++;
+        }
+    }
+    t->aux_err = NULL;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static const struct evp_test_method cipher_test_method = {
+    "Cipher",
+    cipher_test_init,
+    cipher_test_cleanup,
+    cipher_test_parse,
+    cipher_test_run
+};
+
+struct mac_data {
+    /* MAC type */
+    int type;
+    /* Algorithm string for this MAC */
+    char *alg;
+    /* MAC key */
+    unsigned char *key;
+    size_t key_len;
+    /* Input to MAC */
+    unsigned char *input;
+    size_t input_len;
+    /* Expected output */
+    unsigned char *output;
+    size_t output_len;
+};
+
+static int mac_test_init(struct evp_test *t, const char *alg)
+{
+    int type;
+    struct mac_data *mdat;
+    if (strcmp(alg, "HMAC") == 0) {
+        type = EVP_PKEY_HMAC;
+    } else if (strcmp(alg, "CMAC") == 0) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMAC
+        type = EVP_PKEY_CMAC;
+#else
+        t->skip = 1;
+        return 1;
+#endif
+    } else
+        return 0;
+
+    mdat = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*mdat));
+    mdat->type = type;
+    mdat->alg = NULL;
+    mdat->key = NULL;
+    mdat->input = NULL;
+    mdat->output = NULL;
+    t->data = mdat;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static void mac_test_cleanup(struct evp_test *t)
+{
+    struct mac_data *mdat = t->data;
+    test_free(mdat->alg);
+    test_free(mdat->key);
+    test_free(mdat->input);
+    test_free(mdat->output);
+}
+
+static int mac_test_parse(struct evp_test *t,
+                          const char *keyword, const char *value)
+{
+    struct mac_data *mdata = t->data;
+    if (strcmp(keyword, "Key") == 0)
+        return test_bin(value, &mdata->key, &mdata->key_len);
+    if (strcmp(keyword, "Algorithm") == 0) {
+        mdata->alg = OPENSSL_strdup(value);
+        if (!mdata->alg)
+            return 0;
+        return 1;
+    }
+    if (strcmp(keyword, "Input") == 0)
+        return test_bin(value, &mdata->input, &mdata->input_len);
+    if (strcmp(keyword, "Output") == 0)
+        return test_bin(value, &mdata->output, &mdata->output_len);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int mac_test_run(struct evp_test *t)
+{
+    struct mac_data *mdata = t->data;
+    const char *err = "INTERNAL_ERROR";
+    EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL;
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL, *genctx = NULL;
+    EVP_PKEY *key = NULL;
+    const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
+    unsigned char *mac = NULL;
+    size_t mac_len;
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DES
+    if (mdata->alg != NULL && strstr(mdata->alg, "DES") != NULL) {
+        /* Skip DES */
+        err = NULL;
+        goto err;
+    }
+#endif
+
+    err = "MAC_PKEY_CTX_ERROR";
+    genctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(mdata->type, NULL);
+    if (!genctx)
+        goto err;
+
+    err = "MAC_KEYGEN_INIT_ERROR";
+    if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(genctx) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    if (mdata->type == EVP_PKEY_CMAC) {
+        err = "MAC_ALGORITHM_SET_ERROR";
+        if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl_str(genctx, "cipher", mdata->alg) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    err = "MAC_KEY_SET_ERROR";
+    if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_mac_key(genctx, mdata->key, mdata->key_len) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    err = "MAC_KEY_GENERATE_ERROR";
+    if (EVP_PKEY_keygen(genctx, &key) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    if (mdata->type == EVP_PKEY_HMAC) {
+        err = "MAC_ALGORITHM_SET_ERROR";
+        md = EVP_get_digestbyname(mdata->alg);
+        if (!md)
+            goto err;
+    }
+    mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+    if (!mctx)
+        goto err;
+    err = "DIGESTSIGNINIT_ERROR";
+    if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, key))
+        goto err;
+
+    err = "DIGESTSIGNUPDATE_ERROR";
+    if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx, mdata->input, mdata->input_len))
+        goto err;
+    err = "DIGESTSIGNFINAL_LENGTH_ERROR";
+    if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, NULL, &mac_len))
+        goto err;
+    mac = OPENSSL_malloc(mac_len);
+    if (!mac) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Error allocating mac buffer!\n");
+        exit(1);
+    }
+    if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, mac, &mac_len))
+        goto err;
+    err = "MAC_LENGTH_MISMATCH";
+    if (mac_len != mdata->output_len)
+        goto err;
+    err = "MAC_MISMATCH";
+    if (check_output(t, mdata->output, mac, mac_len))
+        goto err;
+    err = NULL;
+ err:
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
+    OPENSSL_free(mac);
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(genctx);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(key);
+    t->err = err;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static const struct evp_test_method mac_test_method = {
+    "MAC",
+    mac_test_init,
+    mac_test_cleanup,
+    mac_test_parse,
+    mac_test_run
+};
+
+/*
+ * Public key operations. These are all very similar and can share
+ * a lot of common code.
+ */
+
+struct pkey_data {
+    /* Context for this operation */
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx;
+    /* Key operation to perform */
+    int (*keyop) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                  unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen,
+                  const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen);
+    /* Input to MAC */
+    unsigned char *input;
+    size_t input_len;
+    /* Expected output */
+    unsigned char *output;
+    size_t output_len;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Perform public key operation setup: lookup key, allocated ctx and call
+ * the appropriate initialisation function
+ */
+static int pkey_test_init(struct evp_test *t, const char *name,
+                          int use_public,
+                          int (*keyopinit) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx),
+                          int (*keyop) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                        unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen,
+                                        const unsigned char *tbs,
+                                        size_t tbslen)
+    )
+{
+    struct pkey_data *kdata;
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+    int rv = 0;
+    if (use_public)
+        rv = find_key(&pkey, name, t->public);
+    if (!rv)
+        rv = find_key(&pkey, name, t->private);
+    if (!rv || pkey == NULL) {
+        t->skip = 1;
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    kdata = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*kdata));
+    if (!kdata) {
+        EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    kdata->ctx = NULL;
+    kdata->input = NULL;
+    kdata->output = NULL;
+    kdata->keyop = keyop;
+    t->data = kdata;
+    kdata->ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
+    if (!kdata->ctx)
+        return 0;
+    if (keyopinit(kdata->ctx) <= 0)
+        t->err = "KEYOP_INIT_ERROR";
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static void pkey_test_cleanup(struct evp_test *t)
+{
+    struct pkey_data *kdata = t->data;
+
+    OPENSSL_free(kdata->input);
+    OPENSSL_free(kdata->output);
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(kdata->ctx);
+}
+
+static int pkey_test_ctrl(struct evp_test *t, EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx,
+                          const char *value)
+{
+    int rv;
+    char *p, *tmpval;
+
+    tmpval = OPENSSL_strdup(value);
+    if (tmpval == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    p = strchr(tmpval, ':');
+    if (p != NULL)
+        *p++ = 0;
+    rv = EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl_str(pctx, tmpval, p);
+    if (rv == -2) {
+        t->err = "PKEY_CTRL_INVALID";
+        rv = 1;
+    } else if (p != NULL && rv <= 0) {
+        /* If p has an OID and lookup fails assume disabled algorithm */
+        int nid = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
+        if (nid == NID_undef)
+             nid = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
+        if ((nid != NID_undef) && EVP_get_digestbynid(nid) == NULL &&
+            EVP_get_cipherbynid(nid) == NULL) {
+            t->skip = 1;
+            rv = 1;
+        } else {
+            t->err = "PKEY_CTRL_ERROR";
+            rv = 1;
+        }
+    }
+    OPENSSL_free(tmpval);
+    return rv > 0;
+}
+
+static int pkey_test_parse(struct evp_test *t,
+                           const char *keyword, const char *value)
+{
+    struct pkey_data *kdata = t->data;
+    if (strcmp(keyword, "Input") == 0)
+        return test_bin(value, &kdata->input, &kdata->input_len);
+    if (strcmp(keyword, "Output") == 0)
+        return test_bin(value, &kdata->output, &kdata->output_len);
+    if (strcmp(keyword, "Ctrl") == 0)
+        return pkey_test_ctrl(t, kdata->ctx, value);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int pkey_test_run(struct evp_test *t)
+{
+    struct pkey_data *kdata = t->data;
+    unsigned char *out = NULL;
+    size_t out_len;
+    const char *err = "KEYOP_LENGTH_ERROR";
+    if (kdata->keyop(kdata->ctx, NULL, &out_len, kdata->input,
+                     kdata->input_len) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    out = OPENSSL_malloc(out_len);
+    if (!out) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Error allocating output buffer!\n");
+        exit(1);
+    }
+    err = "KEYOP_ERROR";
+    if (kdata->keyop
+        (kdata->ctx, out, &out_len, kdata->input, kdata->input_len) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    err = "KEYOP_LENGTH_MISMATCH";
+    if (out_len != kdata->output_len)
+        goto err;
+    err = "KEYOP_MISMATCH";
+    if (check_output(t, kdata->output, out, out_len))
+        goto err;
+    err = NULL;
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_free(out);
+    t->err = err;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int sign_test_init(struct evp_test *t, const char *name)
+{
+    return pkey_test_init(t, name, 0, EVP_PKEY_sign_init, EVP_PKEY_sign);
+}
+
+static const struct evp_test_method psign_test_method = {
+    "Sign",
+    sign_test_init,
+    pkey_test_cleanup,
+    pkey_test_parse,
+    pkey_test_run
+};
+
+static int verify_recover_test_init(struct evp_test *t, const char *name)
+{
+    return pkey_test_init(t, name, 1, EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init,
+                          EVP_PKEY_verify_recover);
+}
+
+static const struct evp_test_method pverify_recover_test_method = {
+    "VerifyRecover",
+    verify_recover_test_init,
+    pkey_test_cleanup,
+    pkey_test_parse,
+    pkey_test_run
+};
+
+static int decrypt_test_init(struct evp_test *t, const char *name)
+{
+    return pkey_test_init(t, name, 0, EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init,
+                          EVP_PKEY_decrypt);
+}
+
+static const struct evp_test_method pdecrypt_test_method = {
+    "Decrypt",
+    decrypt_test_init,
+    pkey_test_cleanup,
+    pkey_test_parse,
+    pkey_test_run
+};
+
+static int verify_test_init(struct evp_test *t, const char *name)
+{
+    return pkey_test_init(t, name, 1, EVP_PKEY_verify_init, 0);
+}
+
+static int verify_test_run(struct evp_test *t)
+{
+    struct pkey_data *kdata = t->data;
+    if (EVP_PKEY_verify(kdata->ctx, kdata->output, kdata->output_len,
+                        kdata->input, kdata->input_len) <= 0)
+        t->err = "VERIFY_ERROR";
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static const struct evp_test_method pverify_test_method = {
+    "Verify",
+    verify_test_init,
+    pkey_test_cleanup,
+    pkey_test_parse,
+    verify_test_run
+};
+
+
+static int pderive_test_init(struct evp_test *t, const char *name)
+{
+    return pkey_test_init(t, name, 0, EVP_PKEY_derive_init, 0);
+}
+
+static int pderive_test_parse(struct evp_test *t,
+                              const char *keyword, const char *value)
+{
+    struct pkey_data *kdata = t->data;
+
+    if (strcmp(keyword, "PeerKey") == 0) {
+        EVP_PKEY *peer;
+        if (find_key(&peer, value, t->public) == 0)
+            return 0;
+        if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(kdata->ctx, peer) <= 0)
+            return 0;
+        return 1;
+    }
+    if (strcmp(keyword, "SharedSecret") == 0)
+        return test_bin(value, &kdata->output, &kdata->output_len);
+    if (strcmp(keyword, "Ctrl") == 0)
+        return pkey_test_ctrl(t, kdata->ctx, value);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int pderive_test_run(struct evp_test *t)
+{
+    struct pkey_data *kdata = t->data;
+    unsigned char *out = NULL;
+    size_t out_len;
+    const char *err = "INTERNAL_ERROR";
+
+    out_len = kdata->output_len;
+    out = OPENSSL_malloc(out_len);
+    if (!out) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Error allocating output buffer!\n");
+        exit(1);
+    }
+    err = "DERIVE_ERROR";
+    if (EVP_PKEY_derive(kdata->ctx, out, &out_len) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    err = "SHARED_SECRET_LENGTH_MISMATCH";
+    if (out_len != kdata->output_len)
+        goto err;
+    err = "SHARED_SECRET_MISMATCH";
+    if (check_output(t, kdata->output, out, out_len))
+        goto err;
+    err = NULL;
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_free(out);
+    t->err = err;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static const struct evp_test_method pderive_test_method = {
+    "Derive",
+    pderive_test_init,
+    pkey_test_cleanup,
+    pderive_test_parse,
+    pderive_test_run
+};
+
+/* PBE tests */
+
+#define PBE_TYPE_SCRYPT 1
+#define PBE_TYPE_PBKDF2 2
+#define PBE_TYPE_PKCS12 3
+
+struct pbe_data {
+
+    int pbe_type;
+
+    /* scrypt parameters */
+    uint64_t N, r, p, maxmem;
+
+    /* PKCS#12 parameters */
+    int id, iter;
+    const EVP_MD *md;
+
+    /* password */
+    unsigned char *pass;
+    size_t pass_len;
+
+    /* salt */
+    unsigned char *salt;
+    size_t salt_len;
+
+    /* Expected output */
+    unsigned char *key;
+    size_t key_len;
+};
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCRYPT
+static int scrypt_test_parse(struct evp_test *t,
+                             const char *keyword, const char *value)
+{
+    struct pbe_data *pdata = t->data;
+
+    if (strcmp(keyword, "N") == 0)
+        return test_uint64(value, &pdata->N);
+    if (strcmp(keyword, "p") == 0)
+        return test_uint64(value, &pdata->p);
+    if (strcmp(keyword, "r") == 0)
+        return test_uint64(value, &pdata->r);
+    if (strcmp(keyword, "maxmem") == 0)
+        return test_uint64(value, &pdata->maxmem);
+    return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+static int pbkdf2_test_parse(struct evp_test *t,
+                             const char *keyword, const char *value)
+{
+    struct pbe_data *pdata = t->data;
+
+    if (strcmp(keyword, "iter") == 0) {
+        pdata->iter = atoi(value);
+        if (pdata->iter <= 0)
+            return 0;
+        return 1;
+    }
+    if (strcmp(keyword, "MD") == 0) {
+        pdata->md = EVP_get_digestbyname(value);
+        if (pdata->md == NULL)
+            return 0;
+        return 1;
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int pkcs12_test_parse(struct evp_test *t,
+                             const char *keyword, const char *value)
+{
+    struct pbe_data *pdata = t->data;
+
+    if (strcmp(keyword, "id") == 0) {
+        pdata->id = atoi(value);
+        if (pdata->id <= 0)
+            return 0;
+        return 1;
+    }
+    return pbkdf2_test_parse(t, keyword, value);
+}
+
+static int pbe_test_init(struct evp_test *t, const char *alg)
+{
+    struct pbe_data *pdat;
+    int pbe_type = 0;
+
+    if (strcmp(alg, "scrypt") == 0) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCRYPT
+        pbe_type = PBE_TYPE_SCRYPT;
+#else
+        t->skip = 1;
+        return 1;
+#endif
+    } else if (strcmp(alg, "pbkdf2") == 0) {
+        pbe_type = PBE_TYPE_PBKDF2;
+    } else if (strcmp(alg, "pkcs12") == 0) {
+        pbe_type = PBE_TYPE_PKCS12;
+    } else {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Unknown pbe algorithm %s\n", alg);
+    }
+    pdat = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*pdat));
+    pdat->pbe_type = pbe_type;
+    pdat->pass = NULL;
+    pdat->salt = NULL;
+    pdat->N = 0;
+    pdat->r = 0;
+    pdat->p = 0;
+    pdat->maxmem = 0;
+    pdat->id = 0;
+    pdat->iter = 0;
+    pdat->md = NULL;
+    t->data = pdat;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static void pbe_test_cleanup(struct evp_test *t)
+{
+    struct pbe_data *pdat = t->data;
+    test_free(pdat->pass);
+    test_free(pdat->salt);
+    test_free(pdat->key);
+}
+
+static int pbe_test_parse(struct evp_test *t,
+                             const char *keyword, const char *value)
+{
+    struct pbe_data *pdata = t->data;
+
+    if (strcmp(keyword, "Password") == 0)
+        return test_bin(value, &pdata->pass, &pdata->pass_len);
+    if (strcmp(keyword, "Salt") == 0)
+        return test_bin(value, &pdata->salt, &pdata->salt_len);
+    if (strcmp(keyword, "Key") == 0)
+        return test_bin(value, &pdata->key, &pdata->key_len);
+    if (pdata->pbe_type == PBE_TYPE_PBKDF2)
+        return pbkdf2_test_parse(t, keyword, value);
+    else if (pdata->pbe_type == PBE_TYPE_PKCS12)
+        return pkcs12_test_parse(t, keyword, value);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCRYPT
+    else if (pdata->pbe_type == PBE_TYPE_SCRYPT)
+        return scrypt_test_parse(t, keyword, value);
+#endif
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int pbe_test_run(struct evp_test *t)
+{
+    struct pbe_data *pdata = t->data;
+    const char *err = "INTERNAL_ERROR";
+    unsigned char *key;
+
+    key = OPENSSL_malloc(pdata->key_len);
+    if (!key)
+        goto err;
+    if (pdata->pbe_type == PBE_TYPE_PBKDF2) {
+        err = "PBKDF2_ERROR";
+        if (PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC((char *)pdata->pass, pdata->pass_len,
+                              pdata->salt, pdata->salt_len,
+                              pdata->iter, pdata->md,
+                              pdata->key_len, key) == 0)
+            goto err;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCRYPT
+    } else if (pdata->pbe_type == PBE_TYPE_SCRYPT) {
+        err = "SCRYPT_ERROR";
+        if (EVP_PBE_scrypt((const char *)pdata->pass, pdata->pass_len,
+                           pdata->salt, pdata->salt_len,
+                           pdata->N, pdata->r, pdata->p, pdata->maxmem,
+                           key, pdata->key_len) == 0)
+            goto err;
+#endif
+    } else if (pdata->pbe_type == PBE_TYPE_PKCS12) {
+        err = "PKCS12_ERROR";
+        if (PKCS12_key_gen_uni(pdata->pass, pdata->pass_len,
+                               pdata->salt, pdata->salt_len,
+                               pdata->id, pdata->iter, pdata->key_len,
+                               key, pdata->md) == 0)
+            goto err;
+    }
+    err = "KEY_MISMATCH";
+    if (check_output(t, pdata->key, key, pdata->key_len))
+        goto err;
+    err = NULL;
+    err:
+    OPENSSL_free(key);
+    t->err = err;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static const struct evp_test_method pbe_test_method = {
+    "PBE",
+    pbe_test_init,
+    pbe_test_cleanup,
+    pbe_test_parse,
+    pbe_test_run
+};
+
+/* Base64 tests */
+
+typedef enum {
+    BASE64_CANONICAL_ENCODING = 0,
+    BASE64_VALID_ENCODING = 1,
+    BASE64_INVALID_ENCODING = 2
+} base64_encoding_type;
+
+struct encode_data {
+    /* Input to encoding */
+    unsigned char *input;
+    size_t input_len;
+    /* Expected output */
+    unsigned char *output;
+    size_t output_len;
+    base64_encoding_type encoding;
+};
+
+static int encode_test_init(struct evp_test *t, const char *encoding)
+{
+    struct encode_data *edata = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*edata));
+
+    if (strcmp(encoding, "canonical") == 0) {
+        edata->encoding = BASE64_CANONICAL_ENCODING;
+    } else if (strcmp(encoding, "valid") == 0) {
+        edata->encoding = BASE64_VALID_ENCODING;
+    } else if (strcmp(encoding, "invalid") == 0) {
+        edata->encoding = BASE64_INVALID_ENCODING;
+        t->expected_err = OPENSSL_strdup("DECODE_ERROR");
+        if (t->expected_err == NULL)
+            return 0;
+    } else {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Bad encoding: %s. Should be one of "
+                "{canonical, valid, invalid}\n", encoding);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    t->data = edata;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static void encode_test_cleanup(struct evp_test *t)
+{
+    struct encode_data *edata = t->data;
+    test_free(edata->input);
+    test_free(edata->output);
+    memset(edata, 0, sizeof(*edata));
+}
+
+static int encode_test_parse(struct evp_test *t,
+                             const char *keyword, const char *value)
+{
+    struct encode_data *edata = t->data;
+    if (strcmp(keyword, "Input") == 0)
+        return test_bin(value, &edata->input, &edata->input_len);
+    if (strcmp(keyword, "Output") == 0)
+        return test_bin(value, &edata->output, &edata->output_len);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int encode_test_run(struct evp_test *t)
+{
+    struct encode_data *edata = t->data;
+    unsigned char *encode_out = NULL, *decode_out = NULL;
+    int output_len, chunk_len;
+    const char *err = "INTERNAL_ERROR";
+    EVP_ENCODE_CTX *decode_ctx = EVP_ENCODE_CTX_new();
+
+    if (decode_ctx == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (edata->encoding == BASE64_CANONICAL_ENCODING) {
+        EVP_ENCODE_CTX *encode_ctx = EVP_ENCODE_CTX_new();
+        if (encode_ctx == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        encode_out = OPENSSL_malloc(EVP_ENCODE_LENGTH(edata->input_len));
+        if (encode_out == NULL)
+            goto err;
+
+        EVP_EncodeInit(encode_ctx);
+        EVP_EncodeUpdate(encode_ctx, encode_out, &chunk_len,
+                         edata->input, edata->input_len);
+        output_len = chunk_len;
+
+        EVP_EncodeFinal(encode_ctx, encode_out + chunk_len, &chunk_len);
+        output_len += chunk_len;
+
+        EVP_ENCODE_CTX_free(encode_ctx);
+
+        if (check_var_length_output(t, edata->output, edata->output_len,
+                                    encode_out, output_len)) {
+            err = "BAD_ENCODING";
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    decode_out = OPENSSL_malloc(EVP_DECODE_LENGTH(edata->output_len));
+    if (decode_out == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    EVP_DecodeInit(decode_ctx);
+    if (EVP_DecodeUpdate(decode_ctx, decode_out, &chunk_len, edata->output,
+                         edata->output_len) < 0) {
+        err = "DECODE_ERROR";
+        goto err;
+    }
+    output_len = chunk_len;
+
+    if (EVP_DecodeFinal(decode_ctx, decode_out + chunk_len, &chunk_len) != 1) {
+        err = "DECODE_ERROR";
+        goto err;
+    }
+    output_len += chunk_len;
+
+    if (edata->encoding != BASE64_INVALID_ENCODING &&
+        check_var_length_output(t, edata->input, edata->input_len,
+                                decode_out, output_len)) {
+        err = "BAD_DECODING";
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    err = NULL;
+ err:
+    t->err = err;
+    OPENSSL_free(encode_out);
+    OPENSSL_free(decode_out);
+    EVP_ENCODE_CTX_free(decode_ctx);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static const struct evp_test_method encode_test_method = {
+    "Encoding",
+    encode_test_init,
+    encode_test_cleanup,
+    encode_test_parse,
+    encode_test_run,
+};
+
+/* KDF operations */
+
+struct kdf_data {
+    /* Context for this operation */
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx;
+    /* Expected output */
+    unsigned char *output;
+    size_t output_len;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Perform public key operation setup: lookup key, allocated ctx and call
+ * the appropriate initialisation function
+ */
+static int kdf_test_init(struct evp_test *t, const char *name)
+{
+    struct kdf_data *kdata;
+
+    kdata = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*kdata));
+    if (kdata == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    kdata->ctx = NULL;
+    kdata->output = NULL;
+    t->data = kdata;
+    kdata->ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(OBJ_sn2nid(name), NULL);
+    if (kdata->ctx == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    if (EVP_PKEY_derive_init(kdata->ctx) <= 0)
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static void kdf_test_cleanup(struct evp_test *t)
+{
+    struct kdf_data *kdata = t->data;
+    OPENSSL_free(kdata->output);
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(kdata->ctx);
+}
+
+static int kdf_test_parse(struct evp_test *t,
+                          const char *keyword, const char *value)
+{
+    struct kdf_data *kdata = t->data;
+    if (strcmp(keyword, "Output") == 0)
+        return test_bin(value, &kdata->output, &kdata->output_len);
+    if (strncmp(keyword, "Ctrl", 4) == 0)
+        return pkey_test_ctrl(t, kdata->ctx, value);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int kdf_test_run(struct evp_test *t)
+{
+    struct kdf_data *kdata = t->data;
+    unsigned char *out = NULL;
+    size_t out_len = kdata->output_len;
+    const char *err = "INTERNAL_ERROR";
+    out = OPENSSL_malloc(out_len);
+    if (!out) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Error allocating output buffer!\n");
+        exit(1);
+    }
+    err = "KDF_DERIVE_ERROR";
+    if (EVP_PKEY_derive(kdata->ctx, out, &out_len) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    err = "KDF_LENGTH_MISMATCH";
+    if (out_len != kdata->output_len)
+        goto err;
+    err = "KDF_MISMATCH";
+    if (check_output(t, kdata->output, out, out_len))
+        goto err;
+    err = NULL;
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_free(out);
+    t->err = err;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static const struct evp_test_method kdf_test_method = {
+    "KDF",
+    kdf_test_init,
+    kdf_test_cleanup,
+    kdf_test_parse,
+    kdf_test_run
+};
+
+struct keypair_test_data {
+    EVP_PKEY *privk;
+    EVP_PKEY *pubk;
+};
+
+static int keypair_test_init(struct evp_test *t, const char *pair)
+{
+    int rv = 0;
+    EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL, *pubk = NULL;
+    char *pub, *priv = NULL;
+    const char *err = "INTERNAL_ERROR";
+    struct keypair_test_data *data;
+
+    priv = OPENSSL_strdup(pair);
+    if (priv == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    pub = strchr(priv, ':');
+    if ( pub == NULL ) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Wrong syntax \"%s\"\n", pair);
+        goto end;
+    }
+    *pub++ = 0; /* split priv and pub strings */
+
+    if (find_key(&pk, priv, t->private) == 0) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Cannot find private key: %s\n", priv);
+        err = "MISSING_PRIVATE_KEY";
+        goto end;
+    }
+    if (find_key(&pubk, pub, t->public) == 0) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Cannot find public key: %s\n", pub);
+        err = "MISSING_PUBLIC_KEY";
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (pk == NULL && pubk == NULL) {
+        /* Both keys are listed but unsupported: skip this test */
+        t->skip = 1;
+        rv = 1;
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    data = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*data));
+    if (data == NULL )
+        goto end;
+
+    data->privk = pk;
+    data->pubk = pubk;
+    t->data = data;
+
+    rv = 1;
+    err = NULL;
+
+end:
+    if (priv)
+        OPENSSL_free(priv);
+    t->err = err;
+    return rv;
+}
+
+static void keypair_test_cleanup(struct evp_test *t)
+{
+    struct keypair_test_data *data = t->data;
+    t->data = NULL;
+    if (data)
+        test_free(data);
+    return;
+}
+
+/* For test that do not accept any custom keyword:
+ *      return 0 if called
+ */
+static int void_test_parse(struct evp_test *t, const char *keyword, const char *value)
+{
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int keypair_test_run(struct evp_test *t)
+{
+    int rv = 0;
+    const struct keypair_test_data *pair = t->data;
+    const char *err = "INTERNAL_ERROR";
+
+    if (pair == NULL)
+        goto end;
+
+    if (pair->privk == NULL || pair->pubk == NULL) {
+        /* this can only happen if only one of the keys is not set
+         * which means that one of them was unsupported while the
+         * other isn't: hence a key type mismatch.
+         */
+        err = "KEYPAIR_TYPE_MISMATCH";
+        rv = 1;
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if ((rv = EVP_PKEY_cmp(pair->privk, pair->pubk)) != 1 ) {
+        if ( 0 == rv ) {
+            err = "KEYPAIR_MISMATCH";
+        } else if ( -1 == rv ) {
+            err = "KEYPAIR_TYPE_MISMATCH";
+        } else if ( -2 == rv ) {
+            err = "UNSUPPORTED_KEY_COMPARISON";
+        } else {
+            fprintf(stderr, "Unexpected error in key comparison\n");
+            rv = 0;
+            goto end;
+        }
+        rv = 1;
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    rv = 1;
+    err = NULL;
+
+end:
+    t->err = err;
+    return rv;
+}
+
+static const struct evp_test_method keypair_test_method = {
+    "PrivPubKeyPair",
+    keypair_test_init,
+    keypair_test_cleanup,
+    void_test_parse,
+    keypair_test_run
+};
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/evptests.txt b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/evptests.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fd8d98d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/evptests.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,19244 @@
+#
+# Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+#cipher:key:iv:plaintext:ciphertext:0/1(decrypt/encrypt)
+#aadcipher:key:iv:plaintext:ciphertext:aad:tag:0/1(decrypt/encrypt)
+#digest:::input:output
+
+# BLAKE2 tests, using same inputs as MD5
+# There are no official BLAKE2 test vectors we can use since they all use a key
+# Which is currently unsupported by OpenSSL.  They were generated using the
+# reference implementation.  RFC7693 also mentions the 616263 / "abc" values.
+Digest = BLAKE2s256
+Input = 
+Output = 69217a3079908094e11121d042354a7c1f55b6482ca1a51e1b250dfd1ed0eef9
+
+Digest = BLAKE2s256
+Input = 61
+Output = 4a0d129873403037c2cd9b9048203687f6233fb6738956e0349bd4320fec3e90
+
+Digest = BLAKE2s256
+Input = 616263
+Output = 508c5e8c327c14e2e1a72ba34eeb452f37458b209ed63a294d999b4c86675982
+
+Digest = BLAKE2s256
+Input = 6d65737361676520646967657374
+Output = fa10ab775acf89b7d3c8a6e823d586f6b67bdbac4ce207fe145b7d3ac25cd28c
+
+Digest = BLAKE2s256
+Input = 6162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a
+Output = bdf88eb1f86a0cdf0e840ba88fa118508369df186c7355b4b16cf79fa2710a12
+
+Digest = BLAKE2s256
+Input = 4142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f505152535455565758595a6162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a30313233343536373839
+Output = c75439ea17e1de6fa4510c335dc3d3f343e6f9e1ce2773e25b4174f1df8b119b
+
+Digest = BLAKE2s256
+Input = 3132333435363738393031323334353637383930313233343536373839303132333435363738393031323334353637383930313233343536373839303132333435363738393031323334353637383930
+Output = fdaedb290a0d5af9870864fec2e090200989dc9cd53a3c092129e8535e8b4f66
+
+Digest = BLAKE2s256
+Input = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767778797A7B7C7D7E7F
+Output = 1FA877DE67259D19863A2A34BCC6962A2B25FCBF5CBECD7EDE8F1FA36688A796
+
+Digest = BLAKE2s256
+Input = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767778797A7B7C7D7E7F8081
+Output = C80ABEEBB669AD5DEEB5F5EC8EA6B7A05DDF7D31EC4C0A2EE20B0B98CAEC6746
+
+Digest = BLAKE2b512
+Input = 
+Output = 786a02f742015903c6c6fd852552d272912f4740e15847618a86e217f71f5419d25e1031afee585313896444934eb04b903a685b1448b755d56f701afe9be2ce
+
+Digest = BLAKE2b512
+Input = 61
+Output = 333fcb4ee1aa7c115355ec66ceac917c8bfd815bf7587d325aec1864edd24e34d5abe2c6b1b5ee3face62fed78dbef802f2a85cb91d455a8f5249d330853cb3c
+
+Digest = BLAKE2b512
+Input = 616263
+Output = ba80a53f981c4d0d6a2797b69f12f6e94c212f14685ac4b74b12bb6fdbffa2d17d87c5392aab792dc252d5de4533cc9518d38aa8dbf1925ab92386edd4009923
+
+Digest = BLAKE2b512
+Input = 6d65737361676520646967657374
+Output = 3c26ce487b1c0f062363afa3c675ebdbf5f4ef9bdc022cfbef91e3111cdc283840d8331fc30a8a0906cff4bcdbcd230c61aaec60fdfad457ed96b709a382359a
+
+Digest = BLAKE2b512
+Input = 6162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a
+Output = c68ede143e416eb7b4aaae0d8e48e55dd529eafed10b1df1a61416953a2b0a5666c761e7d412e6709e31ffe221b7a7a73908cb95a4d120b8b090a87d1fbedb4c
+
+Digest = BLAKE2b512
+Input = 4142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f505152535455565758595a6162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a30313233343536373839
+Output = 99964802e5c25e703722905d3fb80046b6bca698ca9e2cc7e49b4fe1fa087c2edf0312dfbb275cf250a1e542fd5dc2edd313f9c491127c2e8c0c9b24168e2d50
+
+Digest = BLAKE2b512
+Input = 3132333435363738393031323334353637383930313233343536373839303132333435363738393031323334353637383930313233343536373839303132333435363738393031323334353637383930
+Output = 686f41ec5afff6e87e1f076f542aa466466ff5fbde162c48481ba48a748d842799f5b30f5b67fc684771b33b994206d05cc310f31914edd7b97e41860d77d282
+
+Digest = BLAKE2b512
+Input = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767778797A7B7C7D7E7F
+Output = 2319E3789C47E2DAA5FE807F61BEC2A1A6537FA03F19FF32E87EECBFD64B7E0E8CCFF439AC333B040F19B0C4DDD11A61E24AC1FE0F10A039806C5DCC0DA3D115
+
+Digest = BLAKE2b512
+Input = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767778797A7B7C7D7E7F8081
+Output = DF0A9D0C212843A6A934E3902B2DD30D17FBA5F969D2030B12A546D8A6A45E80CF5635F071F0452E9C919275DA99BED51EB1173C1AF0518726B75B0EC3BAE2B5
+
+# SHA(1) tests (from shatest.c)
+Digest = SHA1
+Input = 616263
+Output = a9993e364706816aba3e25717850c26c9cd0d89d
+
+
+# MD5 tests (from md5test.c)
+Digest = MD5
+Input =
+Output = d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e
+
+Digest = MD5
+Input = 61
+Output = 0cc175b9c0f1b6a831c399e269772661
+
+Digest = MD5
+Input = 616263
+Output = 900150983cd24fb0d6963f7d28e17f72
+
+Digest = MD5
+Input = 6d65737361676520646967657374
+Output = f96b697d7cb7938d525a2f31aaf161d0
+
+Digest = MD5
+Input = 6162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a
+Output = c3fcd3d76192e4007dfb496cca67e13b
+
+Digest = MD5
+Input = 4142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f505152535455565758595a6162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a30313233343536373839
+Output = d174ab98d277d9f5a5611c2c9f419d9f
+
+Digest = MD5
+Input = 3132333435363738393031323334353637383930313233343536373839303132333435363738393031323334353637383930313233343536373839303132333435363738393031323334353637383930
+Output = 57edf4a22be3c955ac49da2e2107b67a
+
+# MD4 tests from md4test.c
+Digest = MD4
+Input = ""
+Output = 31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0
+
+Digest = MD4
+Input = "a"
+Output = bde52cb31de33e46245e05fbdbd6fb24
+
+Digest = MD4
+Input = "abc"
+Output = a448017aaf21d8525fc10ae87aa6729d
+
+Digest = MD4
+Input = "message digest"
+Output = d9130a8164549fe818874806e1c7014b
+
+Digest = MD4
+Input = "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz"
+Output = d79e1c308aa5bbcdeea8ed63df412da9
+
+Digest = MD4
+Input = "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789"
+Output = 043f8582f241db351ce627e153e7f0e4
+
+Digest = MD4
+Input = "12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890"
+Output = e33b4ddc9c38f2199c3e7b164fcc0536
+
+# RIPEMD160 tests from rmdtest.c
+Digest = RIPEMD160
+Input = ""
+Output = 9c1185a5c5e9fc54612808977ee8f548b2258d31
+
+Digest = RIPEMD160
+Input = "a"
+Output = 0bdc9d2d256b3ee9daae347be6f4dc835a467ffe
+
+Digest = RIPEMD160
+Input = "abc"
+Output = 8eb208f7e05d987a9b044a8e98c6b087f15a0bfc
+
+Digest = RIPEMD160
+Input = "message digest"
+Output = 5d0689ef49d2fae572b881b123a85ffa21595f36
+
+Digest = RIPEMD160
+Input = "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz"
+Output = f71c27109c692c1b56bbdceb5b9d2865b3708dbc
+
+Digest = RIPEMD160
+Input = "abcdbcdecdefdefgefghfghighijhijkijkljklmklmnlmnomnopnopq"
+Output = 12a053384a9c0c88e405a06c27dcf49ada62eb2b
+
+Digest = RIPEMD160
+Input = "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789"
+Output = b0e20b6e3116640286ed3a87a5713079b21f5189
+
+Digest = RIPEMD160
+Input = "12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890"
+Output = 9b752e45573d4b39f4dbd3323cab82bf63326bfb
+
+# whirlpool tests from wp_test.c
+Digest = whirlpool
+Input = ""
+Output = 19FA61D75522A4669B44E39C1D2E1726C530232130D407F89AFEE0964997F7A73E83BE698B288FEBCF88E3E03C4F0757EA8964E59B63D93708B138CC42A66EB3
+
+Digest = whirlpool
+Input = "a"
+Output = 8ACA2602792AEC6F11A67206531FB7D7F0DFF59413145E6973C45001D0087B42D11BC645413AEFF63A42391A39145A591A92200D560195E53B478584FDAE231A
+
+Digest = whirlpool
+Input = "abc"
+Output = 4E2448A4C6F486BB16B6562C73B4020BF3043E3A731BCE721AE1B303D97E6D4C7181EEBDB6C57E277D0E34957114CBD6C797FC9D95D8B582D225292076D4EEF5
+
+Digest = whirlpool
+Input = "message digest"
+Output = 378C84A4126E2DC6E56DCC7458377AAC838D00032230F53CE1F5700C0FFB4D3B8421557659EF55C106B4B52AC5A4AAA692ED920052838F3362E86DBD37A8903E
+
+Digest = whirlpool
+Input = "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz"
+Output = F1D754662636FFE92C82EBB9212A484A8D38631EAD4238F5442EE13B8054E41B08BF2A9251C30B6A0B8AAE86177AB4A6F68F673E7207865D5D9819A3DBA4EB3B
+
+Digest = whirlpool
+Input = "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789"
+Output = DC37E008CF9EE69BF11F00ED9ABA26901DD7C28CDEC066CC6AF42E40F82F3A1E08EBA26629129D8FB7CB57211B9281A65517CC879D7B962142C65F5A7AF01467
+
+Digest = whirlpool
+Input = "12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890"
+Output = 466EF18BABB0154D25B9D38A6414F5C08784372BCCB204D6549C4AFADB6014294D5BD8DF2A6C44E538CD047B2681A51A2C60481E88C5A20B2C2A80CF3A9A083B
+
+Digest = whirlpool
+Input = "abcdbcdecdefdefgefghfghighijhijk"
+Output = 2A987EA40F917061F5D6F0A0E4644F488A7A5A52DEEE656207C562F988E95C6916BDC8031BC5BE1B7B947639FE050B56939BAAA0ADFF9AE6745B7B181C3BE3FD
+
+Digest = whirlpool
+Input = "aaaaaaaaaa"
+Count = 100000
+Output = 0C99005BEB57EFF50A7CF005560DDF5D29057FD86B20BFD62DECA0F1CCEA4AF51FC15490EDDC47AF32BB2B66C34FF9AD8C6008AD677F77126953B226E4ED8B01
+
+# DES EDE3 CFB1
+# echo -n "Hello World" |
+#  apps/openssl enc -des-ede3-cfb1 \
+#   -K 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F1011121314151617 -iv 0001020304050607 |
+#  xxd -ps -u
+
+Cipher = DES-EDE3-CFB1
+Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F1011121314151617
+IV = 0001020304050607
+Plaintext = "Hello World"
+Ciphertext = 3CF55D656E9C0664513358
+
+Cipher = DES-EDE3-CFB1
+Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F1011121314151617
+IV = 0001020304050607
+Operation = DECRYPT
+Plaintext = "Hello World"
+Ciphertext = 3CF55D656E9C0664513358
+
+# AES 128 ECB tests (from FIPS-197 test vectors, encrypt)
+
+Cipher = AES-128-ECB
+Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = 00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF
+Ciphertext = 69C4E0D86A7B0430D8CDB78070B4C55A
+
+# AES 192 ECB tests (from FIPS-197 test vectors, encrypt)
+
+Cipher = AES-192-ECB
+Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F1011121314151617
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = 00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF
+Ciphertext = DDA97CA4864CDFE06EAF70A0EC0D7191
+
+
+# AES 256 ECB tests (from FIPS-197 test vectors, encrypt)
+
+Cipher = AES-256-ECB
+Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = 00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF
+Ciphertext = 8EA2B7CA516745BFEAFC49904B496089
+
+
+# AES 128 ECB tests (from NIST test vectors, encrypt)
+
+#AES-128-ECB:00000000000000000000000000000000::00000000000000000000000000000000:C34C052CC0DA8D73451AFE5F03BE297F:1
+
+# AES 128 ECB tests (from NIST test vectors, decrypt)
+
+#AES-128-ECB:00000000000000000000000000000000::44416AC2D1F53C583303917E6BE9EBE0:00000000000000000000000000000000:0
+
+# AES 192 ECB tests (from NIST test vectors, decrypt)
+
+#AES-192-ECB:000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000::48E31E9E256718F29229319C19F15BA4:00000000000000000000000000000000:0
+
+# AES 256 ECB tests (from NIST test vectors, decrypt)
+
+#AES-256-ECB:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000::058CCFFDBBCB382D1F6F56585D8A4ADE:00000000000000000000000000000000:0
+
+# AES 128 CBC tests (from NIST test vectors, encrypt)
+
+#AES-128-CBC:00000000000000000000000000000000:00000000000000000000000000000000:00000000000000000000000000000000:8A05FC5E095AF4848A08D328D3688E3D:1
+
+# AES 192 CBC tests (from NIST test vectors, encrypt)
+
+#AES-192-CBC:000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000:00000000000000000000000000000000:00000000000000000000000000000000:7BD966D53AD8C1BB85D2ADFAE87BB104:1
+
+# AES 256 CBC tests (from NIST test vectors, encrypt)
+
+#AES-256-CBC:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000:00000000000000000000000000000000:00000000000000000000000000000000:FE3C53653E2F45B56FCD88B2CC898FF0:1
+
+# AES 128 CBC tests (from NIST test vectors, decrypt)
+
+#AES-128-CBC:00000000000000000000000000000000:00000000000000000000000000000000:FACA37E0B0C85373DF706E73F7C9AF86:00000000000000000000000000000000:0
+
+# AES tests from NIST document SP800-38A
+# For all ECB encrypts and decrypts, the transformed sequence is
+#   AES-bits-ECB:key::plaintext:ciphertext:encdec
+# ECB-AES128.Encrypt and ECB-AES128.Decrypt
+Cipher = AES-128-ECB
+Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C
+Plaintext = 6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A
+Ciphertext = 3AD77BB40D7A3660A89ECAF32466EF97
+
+Cipher = AES-128-ECB
+Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C
+Plaintext = AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51
+Ciphertext = F5D3D58503B9699DE785895A96FDBAAF
+
+Cipher = AES-128-ECB
+Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C
+Plaintext = 30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF
+Ciphertext = 43B1CD7F598ECE23881B00E3ED030688
+
+Cipher = AES-128-ECB
+Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C
+Plaintext = F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710
+Ciphertext = 7B0C785E27E8AD3F8223207104725DD4
+
+# ECB-AES192.Encrypt and ECB-AES192.Decrypt
+Cipher = AES-192-ECB
+Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B
+Plaintext = 6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A
+Ciphertext = BD334F1D6E45F25FF712A214571FA5CC
+
+Cipher = AES-192-ECB
+Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B
+Plaintext = AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51
+Ciphertext = 974104846D0AD3AD7734ECB3ECEE4EEF
+
+Cipher = AES-192-ECB
+Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B
+Plaintext = 30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF
+Ciphertext = EF7AFD2270E2E60ADCE0BA2FACE6444E
+
+Cipher = AES-192-ECB
+Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B
+Plaintext = F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710
+Ciphertext = 9A4B41BA738D6C72FB16691603C18E0E
+
+# ECB-AES256.Encrypt and ECB-AES256.Decrypt
+Cipher = AES-256-ECB
+Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4
+Plaintext = 6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A
+Ciphertext = F3EED1BDB5D2A03C064B5A7E3DB181F8
+
+Cipher = AES-256-ECB
+Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4
+Plaintext = AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51
+Ciphertext = 591CCB10D410ED26DC5BA74A31362870
+
+Cipher = AES-256-ECB
+Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4
+Plaintext = 30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF
+Ciphertext = B6ED21B99CA6F4F9F153E7B1BEAFED1D
+
+Cipher = AES-256-ECB
+Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4
+Plaintext = F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710
+Ciphertext = 23304B7A39F9F3FF067D8D8F9E24ECC7
+
+# For all CBC encrypts and decrypts, the transformed sequence is
+#   AES-bits-CBC:key:IV/ciphertext':plaintext:ciphertext:encdec
+# CBC-AES128.Encrypt and CBC-AES128.Decrypt
+Cipher = AES-128-CBC
+Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C
+IV = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
+Plaintext = 6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A
+Ciphertext = 7649ABAC8119B246CEE98E9B12E9197D
+
+Cipher = AES-128-CBC
+Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C
+IV = 7649ABAC8119B246CEE98E9B12E9197D
+Plaintext = AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51
+Ciphertext = 5086CB9B507219EE95DB113A917678B2
+
+Cipher = AES-128-CBC
+Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C
+IV = 5086CB9B507219EE95DB113A917678B2
+Plaintext = 30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF
+Ciphertext = 73BED6B8E3C1743B7116E69E22229516
+
+Cipher = AES-128-CBC
+Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C
+IV = 73BED6B8E3C1743B7116E69E22229516
+Plaintext = F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710
+Ciphertext = 3FF1CAA1681FAC09120ECA307586E1A7
+
+# CBC-AES192.Encrypt and CBC-AES192.Decrypt
+Cipher = AES-192-CBC
+Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B
+IV = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
+Plaintext = 6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A
+Ciphertext = 4F021DB243BC633D7178183A9FA071E8
+
+Cipher = AES-192-CBC
+Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B
+IV = 4F021DB243BC633D7178183A9FA071E8
+Plaintext = AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51
+Ciphertext = B4D9ADA9AD7DEDF4E5E738763F69145A
+
+Cipher = AES-192-CBC
+Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B
+IV = B4D9ADA9AD7DEDF4E5E738763F69145A
+Plaintext = 30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF
+Ciphertext = 571B242012FB7AE07FA9BAAC3DF102E0
+
+Cipher = AES-192-CBC
+Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B
+IV = 571B242012FB7AE07FA9BAAC3DF102E0
+Plaintext = F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710
+Ciphertext = 08B0E27988598881D920A9E64F5615CD
+
+# CBC-AES256.Encrypt and CBC-AES256.Decrypt
+Cipher = AES-256-CBC
+Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4
+IV = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
+Plaintext = 6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A
+Ciphertext = F58C4C04D6E5F1BA779EABFB5F7BFBD6
+
+Cipher = AES-256-CBC
+Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4
+IV = F58C4C04D6E5F1BA779EABFB5F7BFBD6
+Plaintext = AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51
+Ciphertext = 9CFC4E967EDB808D679F777BC6702C7D
+
+Cipher = AES-256-CBC
+Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4
+IV = 9CFC4E967EDB808D679F777BC6702C7D
+Plaintext = 30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF
+Ciphertext = 39F23369A9D9BACFA530E26304231461
+
+Cipher = AES-256-CBC
+Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4
+IV = 39F23369A9D9BACFA530E26304231461
+Plaintext = F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710
+Ciphertext = B2EB05E2C39BE9FCDA6C19078C6A9D1B
+
+# We don't support CFB{1,8}-AESxxx.{En,De}crypt
+# For all CFB128 encrypts and decrypts, the transformed sequence is
+#   AES-bits-CFB:key:IV/ciphertext':plaintext:ciphertext:encdec
+# CFB128-AES128.Encrypt
+Cipher = AES-128-CFB
+Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C
+IV = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = 6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A
+Ciphertext = 3B3FD92EB72DAD20333449F8E83CFB4A
+
+Cipher = AES-128-CFB
+Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C
+IV = 3B3FD92EB72DAD20333449F8E83CFB4A
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51
+Ciphertext = C8A64537A0B3A93FCDE3CDAD9F1CE58B
+
+Cipher = AES-128-CFB
+Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C
+IV = C8A64537A0B3A93FCDE3CDAD9F1CE58B
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = 30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF
+Ciphertext = 26751F67A3CBB140B1808CF187A4F4DF
+
+Cipher = AES-128-CFB
+Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C
+IV = 26751F67A3CBB140B1808CF187A4F4DF
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710
+Ciphertext = C04B05357C5D1C0EEAC4C66F9FF7F2E6
+
+# CFB128-AES128.Decrypt
+Cipher = AES-128-CFB
+Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C
+IV = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
+Operation = DECRYPT
+Plaintext = 6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A
+Ciphertext = 3B3FD92EB72DAD20333449F8E83CFB4A
+
+Cipher = AES-128-CFB
+Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C
+IV = 3B3FD92EB72DAD20333449F8E83CFB4A
+Operation = DECRYPT
+Plaintext = AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51
+Ciphertext = C8A64537A0B3A93FCDE3CDAD9F1CE58B
+
+Cipher = AES-128-CFB
+Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C
+IV = C8A64537A0B3A93FCDE3CDAD9F1CE58B
+Operation = DECRYPT
+Plaintext = 30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF
+Ciphertext = 26751F67A3CBB140B1808CF187A4F4DF
+
+Cipher = AES-128-CFB
+Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C
+IV = 26751F67A3CBB140B1808CF187A4F4DF
+Operation = DECRYPT
+Plaintext = F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710
+Ciphertext = C04B05357C5D1C0EEAC4C66F9FF7F2E6
+
+# CFB128-AES192.Encrypt
+Cipher = AES-192-CFB
+Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B
+IV = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = 6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A
+Ciphertext = CDC80D6FDDF18CAB34C25909C99A4174
+
+Cipher = AES-192-CFB
+Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B
+IV = CDC80D6FDDF18CAB34C25909C99A4174
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51
+Ciphertext = 67CE7F7F81173621961A2B70171D3D7A
+
+Cipher = AES-192-CFB
+Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B
+IV = 67CE7F7F81173621961A2B70171D3D7A
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = 30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF
+Ciphertext = 2E1E8A1DD59B88B1C8E60FED1EFAC4C9
+
+Cipher = AES-192-CFB
+Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B
+IV = 2E1E8A1DD59B88B1C8E60FED1EFAC4C9
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710
+Ciphertext = C05F9F9CA9834FA042AE8FBA584B09FF
+
+# CFB128-AES192.Decrypt
+Cipher = AES-192-CFB
+Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B
+IV = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
+Operation = DECRYPT
+Plaintext = 6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A
+Ciphertext = CDC80D6FDDF18CAB34C25909C99A4174
+
+Cipher = AES-192-CFB
+Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B
+IV = CDC80D6FDDF18CAB34C25909C99A4174
+Operation = DECRYPT
+Plaintext = AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51
+Ciphertext = 67CE7F7F81173621961A2B70171D3D7A
+
+Cipher = AES-192-CFB
+Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B
+IV = 67CE7F7F81173621961A2B70171D3D7A
+Operation = DECRYPT
+Plaintext = 30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF
+Ciphertext = 2E1E8A1DD59B88B1C8E60FED1EFAC4C9
+
+Cipher = AES-192-CFB
+Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B
+IV = 2E1E8A1DD59B88B1C8E60FED1EFAC4C9
+Operation = DECRYPT
+Plaintext = F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710
+Ciphertext = C05F9F9CA9834FA042AE8FBA584B09FF
+
+# CFB128-AES256.Encrypt
+Cipher = AES-256-CFB
+Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4
+IV = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = 6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A
+Ciphertext = DC7E84BFDA79164B7ECD8486985D3860
+
+Cipher = AES-256-CFB
+Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4
+IV = DC7E84BFDA79164B7ECD8486985D3860
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51
+Ciphertext = 39FFED143B28B1C832113C6331E5407B
+
+Cipher = AES-256-CFB
+Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4
+IV = 39FFED143B28B1C832113C6331E5407B
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = 30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF
+Ciphertext = DF10132415E54B92A13ED0A8267AE2F9
+
+Cipher = AES-256-CFB
+Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4
+IV = DF10132415E54B92A13ED0A8267AE2F9
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710
+Ciphertext = 75A385741AB9CEF82031623D55B1E471
+
+# CFB128-AES256.Decrypt
+Cipher = AES-256-CFB
+Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4
+IV = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
+Operation = DECRYPT
+Plaintext = 6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A
+Ciphertext = DC7E84BFDA79164B7ECD8486985D3860
+
+Cipher = AES-256-CFB
+Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4
+IV = DC7E84BFDA79164B7ECD8486985D3860
+Operation = DECRYPT
+Plaintext = AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51
+Ciphertext = 39FFED143B28B1C832113C6331E5407B
+
+Cipher = AES-256-CFB
+Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4
+IV = 39FFED143B28B1C832113C6331E5407B
+Operation = DECRYPT
+Plaintext = 30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF
+Ciphertext = DF10132415E54B92A13ED0A8267AE2F9
+
+Cipher = AES-256-CFB
+Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4
+IV = DF10132415E54B92A13ED0A8267AE2F9
+Operation = DECRYPT
+Plaintext = F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710
+Ciphertext = 75A385741AB9CEF82031623D55B1E471
+
+# For all OFB encrypts and decrypts, the transformed sequence is
+#   AES-bits-CFB:key:IV/output':plaintext:ciphertext:encdec
+# OFB-AES128.Encrypt
+Cipher = AES-128-OFB
+Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C
+IV = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = 6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A
+Ciphertext = 3B3FD92EB72DAD20333449F8E83CFB4A
+
+Cipher = AES-128-OFB
+Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C
+IV = 50FE67CC996D32B6DA0937E99BAFEC60
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51
+Ciphertext = 7789508D16918F03F53C52DAC54ED825
+
+Cipher = AES-128-OFB
+Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C
+IV = D9A4DADA0892239F6B8B3D7680E15674
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = 30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF
+Ciphertext = 9740051E9C5FECF64344F7A82260EDCC
+
+Cipher = AES-128-OFB
+Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C
+IV = A78819583F0308E7A6BF36B1386ABF23
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710
+Ciphertext = 304C6528F659C77866A510D9C1D6AE5E
+
+# OFB-AES128.Decrypt
+Cipher = AES-128-OFB
+Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C
+IV = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
+Operation = DECRYPT
+Plaintext = 6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A
+Ciphertext = 3B3FD92EB72DAD20333449F8E83CFB4A
+
+Cipher = AES-128-OFB
+Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C
+IV = 50FE67CC996D32B6DA0937E99BAFEC60
+Operation = DECRYPT
+Plaintext = AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51
+Ciphertext = 7789508D16918F03F53C52DAC54ED825
+
+Cipher = AES-128-OFB
+Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C
+IV = D9A4DADA0892239F6B8B3D7680E15674
+Operation = DECRYPT
+Plaintext = 30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF
+Ciphertext = 9740051E9C5FECF64344F7A82260EDCC
+
+Cipher = AES-128-OFB
+Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C
+IV = A78819583F0308E7A6BF36B1386ABF23
+Operation = DECRYPT
+Plaintext = F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710
+Ciphertext = 304C6528F659C77866A510D9C1D6AE5E
+
+# OFB-AES192.Encrypt
+Cipher = AES-192-OFB
+Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B
+IV = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = 6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A
+Ciphertext = CDC80D6FDDF18CAB34C25909C99A4174
+
+Cipher = AES-192-OFB
+Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B
+IV = A609B38DF3B1133DDDFF2718BA09565E
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51
+Ciphertext = FCC28B8D4C63837C09E81700C1100401
+
+Cipher = AES-192-OFB
+Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B
+IV = 52EF01DA52602FE0975F78AC84BF8A50
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = 30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF
+Ciphertext = 8D9A9AEAC0F6596F559C6D4DAF59A5F2
+
+Cipher = AES-192-OFB
+Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B
+IV = BD5286AC63AABD7EB067AC54B553F71D
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710
+Ciphertext = 6D9F200857CA6C3E9CAC524BD9ACC92A
+
+# OFB-AES192.Decrypt
+Cipher = AES-192-OFB
+Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B
+IV = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = 6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A
+Ciphertext = CDC80D6FDDF18CAB34C25909C99A4174
+
+Cipher = AES-192-OFB
+Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B
+IV = A609B38DF3B1133DDDFF2718BA09565E
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51
+Ciphertext = FCC28B8D4C63837C09E81700C1100401
+
+Cipher = AES-192-OFB
+Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B
+IV = 52EF01DA52602FE0975F78AC84BF8A50
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = 30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF
+Ciphertext = 8D9A9AEAC0F6596F559C6D4DAF59A5F2
+
+Cipher = AES-192-OFB
+Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B
+IV = BD5286AC63AABD7EB067AC54B553F71D
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710
+Ciphertext = 6D9F200857CA6C3E9CAC524BD9ACC92A
+
+# OFB-AES256.Encrypt
+Cipher = AES-256-OFB
+Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4
+IV = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = 6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A
+Ciphertext = DC7E84BFDA79164B7ECD8486985D3860
+
+Cipher = AES-256-OFB
+Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4
+IV = B7BF3A5DF43989DD97F0FA97EBCE2F4A
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51
+Ciphertext = 4FEBDC6740D20B3AC88F6AD82A4FB08D
+
+Cipher = AES-256-OFB
+Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4
+IV = E1C656305ED1A7A6563805746FE03EDC
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = 30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF
+Ciphertext = 71AB47A086E86EEDF39D1C5BBA97C408
+
+Cipher = AES-256-OFB
+Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4
+IV = 41635BE625B48AFC1666DD42A09D96E7
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710
+Ciphertext = 0126141D67F37BE8538F5A8BE740E484
+
+# OFB-AES256.Decrypt
+Cipher = AES-256-OFB
+Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4
+IV = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
+Operation = DECRYPT
+Plaintext = 6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A
+Ciphertext = DC7E84BFDA79164B7ECD8486985D3860
+
+Cipher = AES-256-OFB
+Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4
+IV = B7BF3A5DF43989DD97F0FA97EBCE2F4A
+Operation = DECRYPT
+Plaintext = AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51
+Ciphertext = 4FEBDC6740D20B3AC88F6AD82A4FB08D
+
+Cipher = AES-256-OFB
+Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4
+IV = E1C656305ED1A7A6563805746FE03EDC
+Operation = DECRYPT
+Plaintext = 30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF
+Ciphertext = 71AB47A086E86EEDF39D1C5BBA97C408
+
+Cipher = AES-256-OFB
+Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4
+IV = 41635BE625B48AFC1666DD42A09D96E7
+Operation = DECRYPT
+Plaintext = F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710
+Ciphertext = 0126141D67F37BE8538F5A8BE740E484
+
+
+# AES Counter test vectors from RFC3686
+Cipher = aes-128-ctr
+Key = AE6852F8121067CC4BF7A5765577F39E
+IV = 00000030000000000000000000000001
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = 53696E676C6520626C6F636B206D7367
+Ciphertext = E4095D4FB7A7B3792D6175A3261311B8
+
+Cipher = aes-128-ctr
+Key = 7E24067817FAE0D743D6CE1F32539163
+IV = 006CB6DBC0543B59DA48D90B00000001
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F
+Ciphertext = 5104A106168A72D9790D41EE8EDAD388EB2E1EFC46DA57C8FCE630DF9141BE28
+
+Cipher = aes-128-ctr
+Key = 7691BE035E5020A8AC6E618529F9A0DC
+IV = 00E0017B27777F3F4A1786F000000001
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F20212223
+Ciphertext = C1CF48A89F2FFDD9CF4652E9EFDB72D74540A42BDE6D7836D59A5CEAAEF3105325B2072F
+
+
+Cipher = aes-192-ctr
+Key = 16AF5B145FC9F579C175F93E3BFB0EED863D06CCFDB78515
+IV = 0000004836733C147D6D93CB00000001
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = 53696E676C6520626C6F636B206D7367
+Ciphertext = 4B55384FE259C9C84E7935A003CBE928
+
+Cipher = aes-192-ctr
+Key = 7C5CB2401B3DC33C19E7340819E0F69C678C3DB8E6F6A91A
+IV = 0096B03B020C6EADC2CB500D00000001
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F
+Ciphertext = 453243FC609B23327EDFAAFA7131CD9F8490701C5AD4A79CFC1FE0FF42F4FB00
+
+Cipher = aes-192-ctr
+Key = 02BF391EE8ECB159B959617B0965279BF59B60A786D3E0FE
+IV = 0007BDFD5CBD60278DCC091200000001
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F20212223
+Ciphertext = 96893FC55E5C722F540B7DD1DDF7E758D288BC95C69165884536C811662F2188ABEE0935
+
+
+Cipher = aes-256-ctr
+Key = 776BEFF2851DB06F4C8A0542C8696F6C6A81AF1EEC96B4D37FC1D689E6C1C104
+IV = 00000060DB5672C97AA8F0B200000001
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = 53696E676C6520626C6F636B206D7367
+Ciphertext = 145AD01DBF824EC7560863DC71E3E0C0
+
+Cipher = aes-256-ctr
+Key = F6D66D6BD52D59BB0796365879EFF886C66DD51A5B6A99744B50590C87A23884
+IV = 00FAAC24C1585EF15A43D87500000001
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F
+Ciphertext = F05E231B3894612C49EE000B804EB2A9B8306B508F839D6A5530831D9344AF1C
+
+Cipher = aes-256-ctr
+Key = FF7A617CE69148E4F1726E2F43581DE2AA62D9F805532EDFF1EED687FB54153D
+IV = 001CC5B751A51D70A1C1114800000001
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F20212223
+Ciphertext = EB6C52821D0BBBF7CE7594462ACA4FAAB407DF866569FD07F48CC0B583D6071F1EC0E6B8
+
+
+# Self-generated vector to trigger false carry on big-endian platforms
+Cipher = aes-128-ctr
+Key = 7E24067817FAE0D743D6CE1F32539163
+IV = 00000000000000007FFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F
+Ciphertext = A2D459477E6432BD74184B1B5370D2243CDC202BC43583B2A55D288CDBBD1E03
+
+# DES ECB tests (from destest)
+
+Cipher = DES-ECB
+Key = 0000000000000000
+Plaintext = 0000000000000000
+Ciphertext = 8CA64DE9C1B123A7
+
+Cipher = DES-ECB
+Key = FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
+Plaintext = FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
+Ciphertext = 7359B2163E4EDC58
+
+Cipher = DES-ECB
+Key = 3000000000000000
+Plaintext = 1000000000000001
+Ciphertext = 958E6E627A05557B
+
+Cipher = DES-ECB
+Key = 1111111111111111
+Plaintext = 1111111111111111
+Ciphertext = F40379AB9E0EC533
+
+Cipher = DES-ECB
+Key = 0123456789ABCDEF
+Plaintext = 1111111111111111
+Ciphertext = 17668DFC7292532D
+
+Cipher = DES-ECB
+Key = 1111111111111111
+Plaintext = 0123456789ABCDEF
+Ciphertext = 8A5AE1F81AB8F2DD
+
+Cipher = DES-ECB
+Key = FEDCBA9876543210
+Plaintext = 0123456789ABCDEF
+Ciphertext = ED39D950FA74BCC4
+
+
+# DESX-CBC tests (from destest)
+Cipher = DESX-CBC
+Key = 0123456789abcdeff1e0d3c2b5a49786fedcba9876543210
+IV = fedcba9876543210
+Plaintext = 37363534333231204E6F77206973207468652074696D6520666F722000000000
+Ciphertext = 846B2914851E9A2954732F8AA0A611C115CDC2D7951B1053A63C5E03B21AA3C4
+
+
+# DES EDE3 CBC tests (from destest)
+Cipher = DES-EDE3-CBC
+Key = 0123456789abcdeff1e0d3c2b5a49786fedcba9876543210
+IV = fedcba9876543210
+Plaintext = 37363534333231204E6F77206973207468652074696D6520666F722000000000
+Ciphertext = 3FE301C962AC01D02213763C1CBD4CDC799657C064ECF5D41C673812CFDE9675
+
+
+# RC4 tests (from rc4test)
+Cipher = RC4
+Key = 0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef
+Plaintext = 0123456789abcdef
+Ciphertext = 75b7878099e0c596
+
+Cipher = RC4
+Key = 0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef
+Plaintext = 0000000000000000
+Ciphertext = 7494c2e7104b0879
+
+Cipher = RC4
+Key = 00000000000000000000000000000000
+Plaintext = 0000000000000000
+Ciphertext = de188941a3375d3a
+
+Cipher = RC4
+Key = ef012345ef012345ef012345ef012345
+Plaintext = 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
+Ciphertext = d6a141a7ec3c38dfbd615a1162e1c7ba36b67858
+
+Cipher = RC4
+Key = 0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef
+Plaintext = 123456789ABCDEF0123456789ABCDEF0123456789ABCDEF012345678
+Ciphertext = 66a0949f8af7d6891f7f832ba833c00c892ebe30143ce28740011ecf
+
+Cipher = RC4
+Key = ef012345ef012345ef012345ef012345
+Plaintext = 00000000000000000000
+Ciphertext = d6a141a7ec3c38dfbd61
+
+
+
+# Camellia tests from RFC3713
+# For all ECB encrypts and decrypts, the transformed sequence is
+#   CAMELLIA-bits-ECB:key::plaintext:ciphertext:encdec
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-128-ECB
+Key = 0123456789abcdeffedcba9876543210
+Plaintext = 0123456789abcdeffedcba9876543210
+Ciphertext = 67673138549669730857065648eabe43
+
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-192-ECB
+Key = 0123456789abcdeffedcba98765432100011223344556677
+Plaintext = 0123456789abcdeffedcba9876543210
+Ciphertext = b4993401b3e996f84ee5cee7d79b09b9
+
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-256-ECB
+Key = 0123456789abcdeffedcba987654321000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff
+Plaintext = 0123456789abcdeffedcba9876543210
+Ciphertext = 9acc237dff16d76c20ef7c919e3a7509
+
+
+# ECB-CAMELLIA128.Encrypt
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-128-ECB
+Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = 00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF
+Ciphertext = 77CF412067AF8270613529149919546F
+
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-192-ECB
+Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F1011121314151617
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = 00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF
+Ciphertext = B22F3C36B72D31329EEE8ADDC2906C68
+
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-256-ECB
+Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = 00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF
+Ciphertext = 2EDF1F3418D53B88841FC8985FB1ECF2
+
+
+# ECB-CAMELLIA128.Encrypt and ECB-CAMELLIA128.Decrypt
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-128-ECB
+Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C
+Plaintext = 6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A
+Ciphertext = 432FC5DCD628115B7C388D770B270C96
+
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-128-ECB
+Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C
+Plaintext = AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51
+Ciphertext = 0BE1F14023782A22E8384C5ABB7FAB2B
+
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-128-ECB
+Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C
+Plaintext = 30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF
+Ciphertext = A0A1ABCD1893AB6FE0FE5B65DF5F8636
+
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-128-ECB
+Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C
+Plaintext = F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710
+Ciphertext = E61925E0D5DFAA9BB29F815B3076E51A
+
+
+# ECB-CAMELLIA192.Encrypt and ECB-CAMELLIA192.Decrypt
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-192-ECB
+Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B
+Plaintext = 6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A
+Ciphertext = CCCC6C4E138B45848514D48D0D3439D3
+
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-192-ECB
+Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B
+Plaintext = AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51
+Ciphertext = 5713C62C14B2EC0F8393B6AFD6F5785A
+
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-192-ECB
+Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B
+Plaintext = 30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF
+Ciphertext = B40ED2B60EB54D09D030CF511FEEF366
+
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-192-ECB
+Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B
+Plaintext = F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710
+Ciphertext = 909DBD95799096748CB27357E73E1D26
+
+
+# ECB-CAMELLIA256.Encrypt and ECB-CAMELLIA256.Decrypt
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-256-ECB
+Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4
+Plaintext = 6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A
+Ciphertext = BEFD219B112FA00098919CD101C9CCFA
+
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-256-ECB
+Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4
+Plaintext = AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51
+Ciphertext = C91D3A8F1AEA08A9386CF4B66C0169EA
+
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-256-ECB
+Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4
+Plaintext = 30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF
+Ciphertext = A623D711DC5F25A51BB8A80D56397D28
+
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-256-ECB
+Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4
+Plaintext = F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710
+Ciphertext = 7960109FB6DC42947FCFE59EA3C5EB6B
+
+
+# For all CBC encrypts and decrypts, the transformed sequence is
+#   CAMELLIA-bits-CBC:key:IV/ciphertext':plaintext:ciphertext:encdec
+# CBC-CAMELLIA128.Encrypt and CBC-CAMELLIA128.Decrypt
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-128-CBC
+Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C
+IV = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
+Plaintext = 6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A
+Ciphertext = 1607CF494B36BBF00DAEB0B503C831AB
+
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-128-CBC
+Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C
+IV = 1607CF494B36BBF00DAEB0B503C831AB
+Plaintext = AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51
+Ciphertext = A2F2CF671629EF7840C5A5DFB5074887
+
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-128-CBC
+Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C
+IV = A2F2CF671629EF7840C5A5DFB5074887
+Plaintext = 30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF
+Ciphertext = 0F06165008CF8B8B5A63586362543E54
+
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-128-CBC
+Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C
+IV = 36A84CDAFD5F9A85ADA0F0A993D6D577
+Plaintext = F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710
+Ciphertext = 74C64268CDB8B8FAF5B34E8AF3732980
+
+
+# CBC-CAMELLIA192.Encrypt and CBC-CAMELLIA192.Decrypt
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-192-CBC
+Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B
+IV = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
+Plaintext = 6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A
+Ciphertext = 2A4830AB5AC4A1A2405955FD2195CF93
+
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-192-CBC
+Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B
+IV = 2A4830AB5AC4A1A2405955FD2195CF93
+Plaintext = AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51
+Ciphertext = 5D5A869BD14CE54264F892A6DD2EC3D5
+
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-192-CBC
+Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B
+IV = 5D5A869BD14CE54264F892A6DD2EC3D5
+Plaintext = 30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF
+Ciphertext = 37D359C3349836D884E310ADDF68C449
+
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-192-CBC
+Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B
+IV = 37D359C3349836D884E310ADDF68C449
+Plaintext = F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710
+Ciphertext = 01FAAA930B4AB9916E9668E1428C6B08
+
+
+# CBC-CAMELLIA256.Encrypt and CBC-CAMELLIA256.Decrypt
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-256-CBC
+Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4
+IV = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
+Plaintext = 6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A
+Ciphertext = E6CFA35FC02B134A4D2C0B6737AC3EDA
+
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-256-CBC
+Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4
+IV = E6CFA35FC02B134A4D2C0B6737AC3EDA
+Plaintext = AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51
+Ciphertext = 36CBEB73BD504B4070B1B7DE2B21EB50
+
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-256-CBC
+Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4
+IV = 36CBEB73BD504B4070B1B7DE2B21EB50
+Plaintext = 30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF
+Ciphertext = E31A6055297D96CA3330CDF1B1860A83
+
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-256-CBC
+Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4
+IV = E31A6055297D96CA3330CDF1B1860A83
+Plaintext = F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710
+Ciphertext = 5D563F6D1CCCF236051C0C5C1C58F28F
+
+
+# We don't support CFB{1,8}-CAMELLIAxxx.{En,De}crypt
+# For all CFB128 encrypts and decrypts, the transformed sequence is
+#   CAMELLIA-bits-CFB:key:IV/ciphertext':plaintext:ciphertext:encdec
+# CFB128-CAMELLIA128.Encrypt
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-128-CFB
+Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C
+IV = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = 6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A
+Ciphertext = 14F7646187817EB586599146B82BD719
+
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-128-CFB
+Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C
+IV = 14F7646187817EB586599146B82BD719
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51
+Ciphertext = A53D28BB82DF741103EA4F921A44880B
+
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-128-CFB
+Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C
+IV = A53D28BB82DF741103EA4F921A44880B
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = 30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF
+Ciphertext = 9C2157A664626D1DEF9EA420FDE69B96
+
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-128-CFB
+Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C
+IV = 9C2157A664626D1DEF9EA420FDE69B96
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710
+Ciphertext = 742A25F0542340C7BAEF24CA8482BB09
+
+
+# CFB128-CAMELLIA128.Decrypt
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-128-CFB
+Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C
+IV = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
+Operation = DECRYPT
+Plaintext = 6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A
+Ciphertext = 14F7646187817EB586599146B82BD719
+
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-128-CFB
+Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C
+IV = 14F7646187817EB586599146B82BD719
+Operation = DECRYPT
+Plaintext = AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51
+Ciphertext = A53D28BB82DF741103EA4F921A44880B
+
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-128-CFB
+Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C
+IV = A53D28BB82DF741103EA4F921A44880B
+Operation = DECRYPT
+Plaintext = 30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF
+Ciphertext = 9C2157A664626D1DEF9EA420FDE69B96
+
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-128-CFB
+Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C
+IV = 9C2157A664626D1DEF9EA420FDE69B96
+Operation = DECRYPT
+Plaintext = F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710
+Ciphertext = 742A25F0542340C7BAEF24CA8482BB09
+
+
+# CFB128-CAMELLIA192.Encrypt
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-192-CFB
+Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B
+IV = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = 6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A
+Ciphertext = C832BB9780677DAA82D9B6860DCD565E
+
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-192-CFB
+Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B
+IV = C832BB9780677DAA82D9B6860DCD565E
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51
+Ciphertext = 86F8491627906D780C7A6D46EA331F98
+
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-192-CFB
+Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B
+IV = 86F8491627906D780C7A6D46EA331F98
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = 30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF
+Ciphertext = 69511CCE594CF710CB98BB63D7221F01
+
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-192-CFB
+Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B
+IV = 69511CCE594CF710CB98BB63D7221F01
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710
+Ciphertext = D5B5378A3ABED55803F25565D8907B84
+
+
+# CFB128-CAMELLIA192.Decrypt
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-192-CFB
+Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B
+IV = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
+Operation = DECRYPT
+Plaintext = 6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A
+Ciphertext = C832BB9780677DAA82D9B6860DCD565E
+
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-192-CFB
+Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B
+IV = C832BB9780677DAA82D9B6860DCD565E
+Operation = DECRYPT
+Plaintext = AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51
+Ciphertext = 86F8491627906D780C7A6D46EA331F98
+
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-192-CFB
+Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B
+IV = 86F8491627906D780C7A6D46EA331F98
+Operation = DECRYPT
+Plaintext = 30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF
+Ciphertext = 69511CCE594CF710CB98BB63D7221F01
+
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-192-CFB
+Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B
+IV = 69511CCE594CF710CB98BB63D7221F01
+Operation = DECRYPT
+Plaintext = F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710
+Ciphertext = D5B5378A3ABED55803F25565D8907B84
+
+
+# CFB128-CAMELLIA256.Encrypt
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-256-CFB
+Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4
+IV = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = 6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A
+Ciphertext = CF6107BB0CEA7D7FB1BD31F5E7B06C93
+
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-256-CFB
+Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4
+IV = CF6107BB0CEA7D7FB1BD31F5E7B06C93
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51
+Ciphertext = 89BEDB4CCDD864EA11BA4CBE849B5E2B
+
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-256-CFB
+Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4
+IV = 89BEDB4CCDD864EA11BA4CBE849B5E2B
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = 30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF
+Ciphertext = 555FC3F34BDD2D54C62D9E3BF338C1C4
+
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-256-CFB
+Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4
+IV = 555FC3F34BDD2D54C62D9E3BF338C1C4
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710
+Ciphertext = 5953ADCE14DB8C7F39F1BD39F359BFFA
+
+
+# CFB128-CAMELLIA256.Decrypt
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-256-CFB
+Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4
+IV = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
+Operation = DECRYPT
+Plaintext = 6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A
+Ciphertext = CF6107BB0CEA7D7FB1BD31F5E7B06C93
+
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-256-CFB
+Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4
+IV = CF6107BB0CEA7D7FB1BD31F5E7B06C93
+Operation = DECRYPT
+Plaintext = AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51
+Ciphertext = 89BEDB4CCDD864EA11BA4CBE849B5E2B
+
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-256-CFB
+Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4
+IV = 89BEDB4CCDD864EA11BA4CBE849B5E2B
+Operation = DECRYPT
+Plaintext = 30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF
+Ciphertext = 555FC3F34BDD2D54C62D9E3BF338C1C4
+
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-256-CFB
+Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4
+IV = 555FC3F34BDD2D54C62D9E3BF338C1C4
+Operation = DECRYPT
+Plaintext = F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710
+Ciphertext = 5953ADCE14DB8C7F39F1BD39F359BFFA
+
+
+# For all OFB encrypts and decrypts, the transformed sequence is
+#   CAMELLIA-bits-OFB:key:IV/output':plaintext:ciphertext:encdec
+# OFB-CAMELLIA128.Encrypt
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-128-OFB
+Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C
+IV = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = 6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A
+Ciphertext = 14F7646187817EB586599146B82BD719
+
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-128-OFB
+Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C
+IV = 50FE67CC996D32B6DA0937E99BAFEC60
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51
+Ciphertext = 25623DB569CA51E01482649977E28D84
+
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-128-OFB
+Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C
+IV = D9A4DADA0892239F6B8B3D7680E15674
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = 30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF
+Ciphertext = C776634A60729DC657D12B9FCA801E98
+
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-128-OFB
+Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C
+IV = A78819583F0308E7A6BF36B1386ABF23
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710
+Ciphertext = D776379BE0E50825E681DA1A4C980E8E
+
+
+# OFB-CAMELLIA128.Decrypt
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-128-OFB
+Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C
+IV = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
+Operation = DECRYPT
+Plaintext = 6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A
+Ciphertext = 14F7646187817EB586599146B82BD719
+
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-128-OFB
+Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C
+IV = 50FE67CC996D32B6DA0937E99BAFEC60
+Operation = DECRYPT
+Plaintext = AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51
+Ciphertext = 25623DB569CA51E01482649977E28D84
+
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-128-OFB
+Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C
+IV = D9A4DADA0892239F6B8B3D7680E15674
+Operation = DECRYPT
+Plaintext = 30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF
+Ciphertext = C776634A60729DC657D12B9FCA801E98
+
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-128-OFB
+Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C
+IV = A78819583F0308E7A6BF36B1386ABF23
+Operation = DECRYPT
+Plaintext = F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710
+Ciphertext = D776379BE0E50825E681DA1A4C980E8E
+
+
+# OFB-CAMELLIA192.Encrypt
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-192-OFB
+Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B
+IV = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = 6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A
+Ciphertext = C832BB9780677DAA82D9B6860DCD565E
+
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-192-OFB
+Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B
+IV = A609B38DF3B1133DDDFF2718BA09565E
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51
+Ciphertext = 8ECEB7D0350D72C7F78562AEBDF99339
+
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-192-OFB
+Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B
+IV = 52EF01DA52602FE0975F78AC84BF8A50
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = 30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF
+Ciphertext = BDD62DBBB9700846C53B507F544696F0
+
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-192-OFB
+Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B
+IV = BD5286AC63AABD7EB067AC54B553F71D
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710
+Ciphertext = E28014E046B802F385C4C2E13EAD4A72
+
+
+# OFB-CAMELLIA192.Decrypt
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-192-OFB
+Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B
+IV = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
+Operation = DECRYPT
+Plaintext = 6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A
+Ciphertext = C832BB9780677DAA82D9B6860DCD565E
+
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-192-OFB
+Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B
+IV = A609B38DF3B1133DDDFF2718BA09565E
+Operation = DECRYPT
+Plaintext = AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51
+Ciphertext = 8ECEB7D0350D72C7F78562AEBDF99339
+
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-192-OFB
+Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B
+IV = 52EF01DA52602FE0975F78AC84BF8A50
+Operation = DECRYPT
+Plaintext = 30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF
+Ciphertext = BDD62DBBB9700846C53B507F544696F0
+
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-192-OFB
+Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B
+IV = BD5286AC63AABD7EB067AC54B553F71D
+Operation = DECRYPT
+Plaintext = F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710
+Ciphertext = E28014E046B802F385C4C2E13EAD4A72
+
+
+# OFB-CAMELLIA256.Encrypt
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-256-OFB
+Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4
+IV = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = 6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A
+Ciphertext = CF6107BB0CEA7D7FB1BD31F5E7B06C93
+
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-256-OFB
+Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4
+IV = B7BF3A5DF43989DD97F0FA97EBCE2F4A
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51
+Ciphertext = 127AD97E8E3994E4820027D7BA109368
+
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-256-OFB
+Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4
+IV = E1C656305ED1A7A6563805746FE03EDC
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = 30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF
+Ciphertext = 6BFF6265A6A6B7A535BC65A80B17214E
+
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-256-OFB
+Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4
+IV = 41635BE625B48AFC1666DD42A09D96E7
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710
+Ciphertext = 0A4A0404E26AA78A27CB271E8BF3CF20
+
+
+# OFB-CAMELLIA256.Decrypt
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-256-OFB
+Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4
+IV = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
+Operation = DECRYPT
+Plaintext = 6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A
+Ciphertext = CF6107BB0CEA7D7FB1BD31F5E7B06C93
+
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-256-OFB
+Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4
+IV = B7BF3A5DF43989DD97F0FA97EBCE2F4A
+Operation = DECRYPT
+Plaintext = AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51
+Ciphertext = 127AD97E8E3994E4820027D7BA109368
+
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-256-OFB
+Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4
+IV = E1C656305ED1A7A6563805746FE03EDC
+Operation = DECRYPT
+Plaintext = 30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF
+Ciphertext = 6BFF6265A6A6B7A535BC65A80B17214E
+
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-256-OFB
+Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4
+IV = 41635BE625B48AFC1666DD42A09D96E7
+Operation = DECRYPT
+Plaintext = F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710
+Ciphertext = 0A4A0404E26AA78A27CB271E8BF3CF20
+
+
+# Camellia test vectors from RFC5528
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-128-CTR
+Key = AE6852F8121067CC4BF7A5765577F39E
+IV = 00000030000000000000000000000001
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = 53696E676C6520626C6F636B206D7367
+Ciphertext = D09DC29A8214619A20877C76DB1F0B3F
+
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-128-CTR
+Key = 7E24067817FAE0D743D6CE1F32539163
+IV = 006CB6DBC0543B59DA48D90B00000001
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F
+Ciphertext = DBF3C78DC08396D4DA7C907765BBCB442B8E8E0F31F0DCA72C7417E35360E048
+
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-128-CTR
+Key = 7691BE035E5020A8AC6E618529F9A0DC
+IV = 00E0017B27777F3F4A1786F000000001
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F20212223
+Ciphertext = B19D1FCDCB75EB882F849CE24D85CF739CE64B2B5C9D73F14F2D5D9DCE9889CDDF508696
+
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-192-CTR
+Key = 16AF5B145FC9F579C175F93E3BFB0EED863D06CCFDB78515
+IV = 0000004836733C147D6D93CB00000001
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = 53696E676C6520626C6F636B206D7367
+Ciphertext = 2379399E8A8D2B2B16702FC78B9E9696
+
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-192-CTR
+Key = 7C5CB2401B3DC33C19E7340819E0F69C678C3DB8E6F6A91A
+IV = 0096B03B020C6EADC2CB500D00000001
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F
+Ciphertext = 7DEF34F7A5D0E415674B7FFCAE67C75DD018B86FF23051E056392A99F35A4CED
+
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-192-CTR
+Key = 02BF391EE8ECB159B959617B0965279BF59B60A786D3E0FE
+IV = 0007BDFD5CBD60278DCC091200000001
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F20212223
+Ciphertext = 5710E556E1487A20B5AC0E73F19E4E7876F37FDC91B1EF4D4DADE8E666A64D0ED557AB57
+
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-256-CTR
+Key = 776BEFF2851DB06F4C8A0542C8696F6C6A81AF1EEC96B4D37FC1D689E6C1C104
+IV = 00000060DB5672C97AA8F0B200000001
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = 53696E676C6520626C6F636B206D7367
+Ciphertext = 3401F9C8247EFFCEBD6994714C1BBB11
+
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-256-CTR
+Key = F6D66D6BD52D59BB0796365879EFF886C66DD51A5B6A99744B50590C87A23884
+IV = 00FAAC24C1585EF15A43D87500000001
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F
+Ciphertext = D6C30392246F7808A83C2B22A8839E45E51CD48A1CDF406EBC9CC2D3AB834108
+
+Cipher = CAMELLIA-256-CTR
+Key = FF7A617CE69148E4F1726E2F43581DE2AA62D9F805532EDFF1EED687FB54153D
+IV = 001CC5B751A51D70A1C1114800000001
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F20212223
+Ciphertext = A4DA23FCE6A5FFAA6D64AE9A0652A42CD161A34B65F9679F75C01F101F71276F15EF0D8D
+
+# SEED test vectors from RFC4269
+Cipher = SEED-ECB
+Key = 00000000000000000000000000000000
+Operation = DECRYPT
+Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
+Ciphertext = 5EBAC6E0054E166819AFF1CC6D346CDB
+
+Cipher = SEED-ECB
+Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
+Operation = DECRYPT
+Plaintext = 00000000000000000000000000000000
+Ciphertext = C11F22F20140505084483597E4370F43
+
+Cipher = SEED-ECB
+Key = 4706480851E61BE85D74BFB3FD956185
+Operation = DECRYPT
+Plaintext = 83A2F8A288641FB9A4E9A5CC2F131C7D
+Ciphertext = EE54D13EBCAE706D226BC3142CD40D4A
+
+Cipher = SEED-ECB
+Key = 28DBC3BC49FFD87DCFA509B11D422BE7
+Operation = DECRYPT
+Plaintext = B41E6BE2EBA84A148E2EED84593C5EC7
+Ciphertext = 9B9B7BFCD1813CB95D0B3618F40F5122
+
+Cipher = SEED-ECB
+Key = 00000000000000000000000000000000
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
+Ciphertext = 5EBAC6E0054E166819AFF1CC6D346CDB
+
+Cipher = SEED-ECB
+Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = 00000000000000000000000000000000
+Ciphertext = C11F22F20140505084483597E4370F43
+
+Cipher = SEED-ECB
+Key = 4706480851E61BE85D74BFB3FD956185
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = 83A2F8A288641FB9A4E9A5CC2F131C7D
+Ciphertext = EE54D13EBCAE706D226BC3142CD40D4A
+
+Cipher = SEED-ECB
+Key = 28DBC3BC49FFD87DCFA509B11D422BE7
+Operation = ENCRYPT
+Plaintext = B41E6BE2EBA84A148E2EED84593C5EC7
+Ciphertext = 9B9B7BFCD1813CB95D0B3618F40F5122
+
+
+# AES CCM 256 bit key
+Cipher = aes-256-ccm
+Key = 1bde3251d41a8b5ea013c195ae128b218b3e0306376357077ef1c1c78548b92e
+IV = 5b8e40746f6b98e00f1d13ff41
+AAD = c17a32514eb6103f3249e076d4c871dc97e04b286699e54491dc18f6d734d4c0
+Tag = 2024931d73bca480c24a24ece6b6c2bf
+Plaintext = 53bd72a97089e312422bf72e242377b3c6ee3e2075389b999c4ef7f28bd2b80a
+Ciphertext = 9a5fcccdb4cf04e7293d2775cc76a488f042382d949b43b7d6bb2b9864786726
+
+Cipher = aes-256-ccm
+Key = 1bde3251d41a8b5ea013c195ae128b218b3e0306376357077ef1c1c78548b92e
+IV = 5b8e40746f6b98e00f1d13ff41
+AAD = c17a32514eb6103f3249e076d4c871dc97e04b286699e54491dc18f6d734d4c0
+Tag = 2024931d73bca480c24a24ece6b6c2be
+Plaintext = 53bd72a97089e312422bf72e242377b3c6ee3e2075389b999c4ef7f28bd2b80a
+Ciphertext = 9a5fcccdb4cf04e7293d2775cc76a488f042382d949b43b7d6bb2b9864786726
+Operation = DECRYPT
+Result = CIPHERUPDATE_ERROR
+
+# AES GCM test vectors from http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/BCM/documents/proposedmodes/gcm/gcm-spec.pdf
+Cipher = aes-128-gcm
+Key = 00000000000000000000000000000000
+IV = 000000000000000000000000
+AAD =
+Tag = 58e2fccefa7e3061367f1d57a4e7455a
+Plaintext =
+Ciphertext =
+
+Cipher = aes-128-gcm
+Key = 00000000000000000000000000000000
+IV = 000000000000000000000000
+AAD =
+Tag = ab6e47d42cec13bdf53a67b21257bddf
+Plaintext = 00000000000000000000000000000000
+Ciphertext = 0388dace60b6a392f328c2b971b2fe78
+
+Cipher = aes-128-gcm
+Key = feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308
+IV = cafebabefacedbaddecaf888
+AAD =
+Tag = 4d5c2af327cd64a62cf35abd2ba6fab4
+Plaintext = d9313225f88406e5a55909c5aff5269a86a7a9531534f7da2e4c303d8a318a721c3c0c95956809532fcf0e2449a6b525b16aedf5aa0de657ba637b391aafd255
+Ciphertext = 42831ec2217774244b7221b784d0d49ce3aa212f2c02a4e035c17e2329aca12e21d514b25466931c7d8f6a5aac84aa051ba30b396a0aac973d58e091473f5985
+
+Cipher = aes-128-gcm
+Key = feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308
+IV = cafebabefacedbaddecaf888
+AAD = feedfacedeadbeeffeedfacedeadbeefabaddad2
+Tag = 5bc94fbc3221a5db94fae95ae7121a47
+Plaintext = d9313225f88406e5a55909c5aff5269a86a7a9531534f7da2e4c303d8a318a721c3c0c95956809532fcf0e2449a6b525b16aedf5aa0de657ba637b39
+Ciphertext = 42831ec2217774244b7221b784d0d49ce3aa212f2c02a4e035c17e2329aca12e21d514b25466931c7d8f6a5aac84aa051ba30b396a0aac973d58e091
+
+Cipher = aes-128-gcm
+Key = feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308
+IV = cafebabefacedbad
+AAD = feedfacedeadbeeffeedfacedeadbeefabaddad2
+Tag = 3612d2e79e3b0785561be14aaca2fccb
+Plaintext = d9313225f88406e5a55909c5aff5269a86a7a9531534f7da2e4c303d8a318a721c3c0c95956809532fcf0e2449a6b525b16aedf5aa0de657ba637b39
+Ciphertext = 61353b4c2806934a777ff51fa22a4755699b2a714fcdc6f83766e5f97b6c742373806900e49f24b22b097544d4896b424989b5e1ebac0f07c23f4598
+
+Cipher = aes-128-gcm
+Key = feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308
+IV = 9313225df88406e555909c5aff5269aa6a7a9538534f7da1e4c303d2a318a728c3c0c95156809539fcf0e2429a6b525416aedbf5a0de6a57a637b39b
+AAD = feedfacedeadbeeffeedfacedeadbeefabaddad2
+Tag = 619cc5aefffe0bfa462af43c1699d050
+Plaintext = d9313225f88406e5a55909c5aff5269a86a7a9531534f7da2e4c303d8a318a721c3c0c95956809532fcf0e2449a6b525b16aedf5aa0de657ba637b39
+Ciphertext = 8ce24998625615b603a033aca13fb894be9112a5c3a211a8ba262a3cca7e2ca701e4a9a4fba43c90ccdcb281d48c7c6fd62875d2aca417034c34aee5
+
+Cipher = aes-128-gcm
+Key = feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308
+IV = 9313225df88406e555909c5aff5269aa6a7a9538534f7da1e4c303d2a318a728c3c0c95156809539fcf0e2429a6b525416aedbf5a0de6a57a637b39b
+AAD = feedfacedeadbeeffeedfacedeadbeefabaddad2
+Tag = 619cc5aefffe0bfa462af43c1699d051
+Plaintext = d9313225f88406e5a55909c5aff5269a86a7a9531534f7da2e4c303d8a318a721c3c0c95956809532fcf0e2449a6b525b16aedf5aa0de657ba637b39
+Ciphertext = 8ce24998625615b603a033aca13fb894be9112a5c3a211a8ba262a3cca7e2ca701e4a9a4fba43c90ccdcb281d48c7c6fd62875d2aca417034c34aee5
+Operation = DECRYPT
+Result = CIPHERFINAL_ERROR
+
+Cipher = aes-192-gcm
+Key = 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
+IV = 000000000000000000000000
+AAD =
+Tag = cd33b28ac773f74ba00ed1f312572435
+Plaintext =
+Ciphertext =
+
+Cipher = aes-192-gcm
+Key = 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
+IV = 000000000000000000000000
+AAD =
+Tag = 2ff58d80033927ab8ef4d4587514f0fb
+Plaintext = 00000000000000000000000000000000
+Ciphertext = 98e7247c07f0fe411c267e4384b0f600
+
+Cipher = aes-192-gcm
+Key = feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308feffe9928665731c
+IV = cafebabefacedbaddecaf888
+AAD =
+Tag = 9924a7c8587336bfb118024db8674a14
+Plaintext = d9313225f88406e5a55909c5aff5269a86a7a9531534f7da2e4c303d8a318a721c3c0c95956809532fcf0e2449a6b525b16aedf5aa0de657ba637b391aafd255
+Ciphertext = 3980ca0b3c00e841eb06fac4872a2757859e1ceaa6efd984628593b40ca1e19c7d773d00c144c525ac619d18c84a3f4718e2448b2fe324d9ccda2710acade256
+
+Cipher = aes-192-gcm
+Key = feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308feffe9928665731c
+IV = cafebabefacedbaddecaf888
+AAD = feedfacedeadbeeffeedfacedeadbeefabaddad2
+Tag = 2519498e80f1478f37ba55bd6d27618c
+Plaintext = d9313225f88406e5a55909c5aff5269a86a7a9531534f7da2e4c303d8a318a721c3c0c95956809532fcf0e2449a6b525b16aedf5aa0de657ba637b39
+Ciphertext = 3980ca0b3c00e841eb06fac4872a2757859e1ceaa6efd984628593b40ca1e19c7d773d00c144c525ac619d18c84a3f4718e2448b2fe324d9ccda2710
+
+Cipher = aes-192-gcm
+Key = feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308feffe9928665731c
+IV = cafebabefacedbad
+AAD = feedfacedeadbeeffeedfacedeadbeefabaddad2
+Tag = 65dcc57fcf623a24094fcca40d3533f8
+Plaintext = d9313225f88406e5a55909c5aff5269a86a7a9531534f7da2e4c303d8a318a721c3c0c95956809532fcf0e2449a6b525b16aedf5aa0de657ba637b39
+Ciphertext = 0f10f599ae14a154ed24b36e25324db8c566632ef2bbb34f8347280fc4507057fddc29df9a471f75c66541d4d4dad1c9e93a19a58e8b473fa0f062f7
+
+Cipher = aes-192-gcm
+Key = feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308feffe9928665731c
+IV = 9313225df88406e555909c5aff5269aa6a7a9538534f7da1e4c303d2a318a728c3c0c95156809539fcf0e2429a6b525416aedbf5a0de6a57a637b39b
+AAD = feedfacedeadbeeffeedfacedeadbeefabaddad2
+Tag = dcf566ff291c25bbb8568fc3d376a6d9
+Plaintext = d9313225f88406e5a55909c5aff5269a86a7a9531534f7da2e4c303d8a318a721c3c0c95956809532fcf0e2449a6b525b16aedf5aa0de657ba637b39
+Ciphertext = d27e88681ce3243c4830165a8fdcf9ff1de9a1d8e6b447ef6ef7b79828666e4581e79012af34ddd9e2f037589b292db3e67c036745fa22e7e9b7373b
+
+Cipher = aes-192-gcm
+Key = feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308feffe9928665731c
+IV = 9313225df88406e555909c5aff5269aa6a7a9538534f7da1e4c303d2a318a728c3c0c95156809539fcf0e2429a6b525416aedbf5a0de6a57a637b39b
+AAD = feedfacedeadbeeffeedfacedeadbeefabaddad2
+Tag = dcf566ff291c25bbb8568fc3d376a6d8
+Plaintext = d9313225f88406e5a55909c5aff5269a86a7a9531534f7da2e4c303d8a318a721c3c0c95956809532fcf0e2449a6b525b16aedf5aa0de657ba637b39
+Ciphertext = d27e88681ce3243c4830165a8fdcf9ff1de9a1d8e6b447ef6ef7b79828666e4581e79012af34ddd9e2f037589b292db3e67c036745fa22e7e9b7373b
+Operation = DECRYPT
+Result = CIPHERFINAL_ERROR
+
+Cipher = aes-256-gcm
+Key = 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
+IV = 000000000000000000000000
+AAD =
+Tag = 530f8afbc74536b9a963b4f1c4cb738b
+Plaintext =
+Ciphertext =
+
+Cipher = aes-256-gcm
+Key = 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
+IV = 000000000000000000000000
+AAD =
+Tag = d0d1c8a799996bf0265b98b5d48ab919
+Plaintext = 00000000000000000000000000000000
+Ciphertext = cea7403d4d606b6e074ec5d3baf39d18
+
+Cipher = aes-256-gcm
+Key = feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308
+IV = cafebabefacedbaddecaf888
+AAD =
+Tag = b094dac5d93471bdec1a502270e3cc6c
+Plaintext = d9313225f88406e5a55909c5aff5269a86a7a9531534f7da2e4c303d8a318a721c3c0c95956809532fcf0e2449a6b525b16aedf5aa0de657ba637b391aafd255
+Ciphertext = 522dc1f099567d07f47f37a32a84427d643a8cdcbfe5c0c97598a2bd2555d1aa8cb08e48590dbb3da7b08b1056828838c5f61e6393ba7a0abcc9f662898015ad
+
+Cipher = aes-256-gcm
+Key = feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308
+IV = cafebabefacedbaddecaf888
+AAD = feedfacedeadbeeffeedfacedeadbeefabaddad2
+Tag = 76fc6ece0f4e1768cddf8853bb2d551b
+Plaintext = d9313225f88406e5a55909c5aff5269a86a7a9531534f7da2e4c303d8a318a721c3c0c95956809532fcf0e2449a6b525b16aedf5aa0de657ba637b39
+Ciphertext = 522dc1f099567d07f47f37a32a84427d643a8cdcbfe5c0c97598a2bd2555d1aa8cb08e48590dbb3da7b08b1056828838c5f61e6393ba7a0abcc9f662
+
+Cipher = aes-256-gcm
+Key = feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308
+IV = cafebabefacedbad
+AAD = feedfacedeadbeeffeedfacedeadbeefabaddad2
+Tag = 3a337dbf46a792c45e454913fe2ea8f2
+Plaintext = d9313225f88406e5a55909c5aff5269a86a7a9531534f7da2e4c303d8a318a721c3c0c95956809532fcf0e2449a6b525b16aedf5aa0de657ba637b39
+Ciphertext = c3762df1ca787d32ae47c13bf19844cbaf1ae14d0b976afac52ff7d79bba9de0feb582d33934a4f0954cc2363bc73f7862ac430e64abe499f47c9b1f
+
+Cipher = aes-256-gcm
+Key = feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308
+IV = 9313225df88406e555909c5aff5269aa6a7a9538534f7da1e4c303d2a318a728c3c0c95156809539fcf0e2429a6b525416aedbf5a0de6a57a637b39b
+AAD = feedfacedeadbeeffeedfacedeadbeefabaddad2
+Tag = a44a8266ee1c8eb0c8b5d4cf5ae9f19a
+Plaintext = d9313225f88406e5a55909c5aff5269a86a7a9531534f7da2e4c303d8a318a721c3c0c95956809532fcf0e2449a6b525b16aedf5aa0de657ba637b39
+Ciphertext = 5a8def2f0c9e53f1f75d7853659e2a20eeb2b22aafde6419a058ab4f6f746bf40fc0c3b780f244452da3ebf1c5d82cdea2418997200ef82e44ae7e3f
+
+Cipher = aes-256-gcm
+Key = feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308
+IV = 9313225df88406e555909c5aff5269aa6a7a9538534f7da1e4c303d2a318a728c3c0c95156809539fcf0e2429a6b525416aedbf5a0de6a57a637b39b
+AAD = feedfacedeadbeeffeedfacedeadbeefabaddad2
+Tag = a44a8266ee1c8eb0c8b5d4cf5ae9f19b
+Plaintext = d9313225f88406e5a55909c5aff5269a86a7a9531534f7da2e4c303d8a318a721c3c0c95956809532fcf0e2449a6b525b16aedf5aa0de657ba637b39
+Ciphertext = 5a8def2f0c9e53f1f75d7853659e2a20eeb2b22aafde6419a058ab4f6f746bf40fc0c3b780f244452da3ebf1c5d82cdea2418997200ef82e44ae7e3f
+Operation = DECRYPT
+Result = CIPHERFINAL_ERROR
+
+# local add-ons, primarily streaming ghash tests
+# 128 bytes aad
+Cipher = aes-128-gcm
+Key = 00000000000000000000000000000000
+IV = 000000000000000000000000
+AAD = d9313225f88406e5a55909c5aff5269a86a7a9531534f7da2e4c303d8a318a721c3c0c95956809532fcf0e2449a6b525b16aedf5aa0de657ba637b391aafd255522dc1f099567d07f47f37a32a84427d643a8cdcbfe5c0c97598a2bd2555d1aa8cb08e48590dbb3da7b08b1056828838c5f61e6393ba7a0abcc9f662898015ad
+Tag = 5fea793a2d6f974d37e68e0cb8ff9492
+Plaintext =
+Ciphertext =
+
+# 48 bytes plaintext
+Cipher = aes-128-gcm
+Key = 00000000000000000000000000000000
+IV = 000000000000000000000000
+AAD =
+Tag = 9dd0a376b08e40eb00c35f29f9ea61a4
+Plaintext = 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
+Ciphertext = 0388dace60b6a392f328c2b971b2fe78f795aaab494b5923f7fd89ff948bc1e0200211214e7394da2089b6acd093abe0
+
+# 80 bytes plaintext
+Cipher = aes-128-gcm
+Key = 00000000000000000000000000000000
+IV = 000000000000000000000000
+AAD =
+Tag = 98885a3a22bd4742fe7b72172193b163
+Plaintext = 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
+Ciphertext = 0388dace60b6a392f328c2b971b2fe78f795aaab494b5923f7fd89ff948bc1e0200211214e7394da2089b6acd093abe0c94da219118e297d7b7ebcbcc9c388f28ade7d85a8ee35616f7124a9d5270291
+
+# 128 bytes plaintext
+Cipher = aes-128-gcm
+Key = 00000000000000000000000000000000
+IV = 000000000000000000000000
+AAD =
+Tag = cac45f60e31efd3b5a43b98a22ce1aa1
+Plaintext = 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
+Ciphertext = 0388dace60b6a392f328c2b971b2fe78f795aaab494b5923f7fd89ff948bc1e0200211214e7394da2089b6acd093abe0c94da219118e297d7b7ebcbcc9c388f28ade7d85a8ee35616f7124a9d527029195b84d1b96c690ff2f2de30bf2ec89e00253786e126504f0dab90c48a30321de3345e6b0461e7c9e6c6b7afedde83f40
+
+# 192 bytes plaintext, iv is chosen so that initial counter LSB is 0xFF
+Cipher = aes-128-gcm
+Key = 00000000000000000000000000000000
+IV = ffffffff000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
+AAD =
+Tag = 566f8ef683078bfdeeffa869d751a017
+Plaintext = 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
+Ciphertext = 56b3373ca9ef6e4a2b64fe1e9a17b61425f10d47a75a5fce13efc6bc784af24f4141bdd48cf7c770887afd573cca5418a9aeffcd7c5ceddfc6a78397b9a85b499da558257267caab2ad0b23ca476a53cb17fb41c4b8b475cb4f3f7165094c229c9e8c4dc0a2a5ff1903e501511221376a1cdb8364c5061a20cae74bc4acd76ceb0abc9fd3217ef9f8c90be402ddf6d8697f4f880dff15bfb7a6b28241ec8fe183c2d59e3f9dfff653c7126f0acb9e64211f42bae12af462b1070bef1ab5e3606
+
+# 240 bytes plaintext, iv is chosen so that initial counter LSB is 0xFF
+Cipher = aes-128-gcm
+Key = 00000000000000000000000000000000
+IV = ffffffff000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
+AAD =
+Tag = fd0c7011ff07f0071324bdfb2d0f3a29
+Plaintext = 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
+Ciphertext = 56b3373ca9ef6e4a2b64fe1e9a17b61425f10d47a75a5fce13efc6bc784af24f4141bdd48cf7c770887afd573cca5418a9aeffcd7c5ceddfc6a78397b9a85b499da558257267caab2ad0b23ca476a53cb17fb41c4b8b475cb4f3f7165094c229c9e8c4dc0a2a5ff1903e501511221376a1cdb8364c5061a20cae74bc4acd76ceb0abc9fd3217ef9f8c90be402ddf6d8697f4f880dff15bfb7a6b28241ec8fe183c2d59e3f9dfff653c7126f0acb9e64211f42bae12af462b1070bef1ab5e3606872ca10dee15b3249b1a1b958f23134c4bccb7d03200bce420a2f8eb66dcf3644d1423c1b5699003c13ecef4bf38a3b6
+
+# 288 bytes plaintext, iv is chosen so that initial counter LSB is 0xFF
+Cipher = aes-128-gcm
+Key = 00000000000000000000000000000000
+IV = ffffffff000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
+AAD =
+Tag = 8b307f6b33286d0ab026a9ed3fe1e85f
+Plaintext = 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
+Ciphertext = 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
+
+# 80 bytes plaintext, submitted by Intel
+Cipher = aes-128-gcm
+Key = 843ffcf5d2b72694d19ed01d01249412
+IV = dbcca32ebf9b804617c3aa9e
+AAD = 00000000000000000000000000000000101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f
+Tag = 3b629ccfbc1119b7319e1dce2cd6fd6d
+Plaintext = 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f
+Ciphertext = 6268c6fa2a80b2d137467f092f657ac04d89be2beaa623d61b5a868c8f03ff95d3dcee23ad2f1ab3a6c80eaf4b140eb05de3457f0fbc111a6b43d0763aa422a3013cf1dc37fe417d1fbfc449b75d4cc5
+
+#AES OCB Test vectors
+Cipher = aes-128-ocb
+Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
+IV = 000102030405060708090A0B
+AAD =
+Tag = 197B9C3C441D3C83EAFB2BEF633B9182
+Plaintext =
+Ciphertext =
+
+Cipher = aes-128-ocb
+Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
+IV = 000102030405060708090A0B
+AAD = 0001020304050607
+Tag = 16DC76A46D47E1EAD537209E8A96D14E
+Plaintext = 0001020304050607
+Ciphertext = 92B657130A74B85A
+
+Cipher = aes-128-ocb
+Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
+IV = 000102030405060708090A0B
+AAD = 0001020304050607
+Tag = 98B91552C8C009185044E30A6EB2FE21
+Plaintext =
+Ciphertext =
+
+Cipher = aes-128-ocb
+Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
+IV = 000102030405060708090A0B
+AAD =
+Tag = 971EFFCAE19AD4716F88E87B871FBEED
+Plaintext = 0001020304050607
+Ciphertext = 92B657130A74B85A
+
+Cipher = aes-128-ocb
+Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
+IV = 000102030405060708090A0B
+AAD = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
+Tag = 776C9924D6723A1FC4524532AC3E5BEB
+Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
+Ciphertext = BEA5E8798DBE7110031C144DA0B26122
+
+Cipher = aes-128-ocb
+Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
+IV = 000102030405060708090A0B
+AAD = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
+Tag = 7DDB8E6CEA6814866212509619B19CC6
+Plaintext =
+Ciphertext =
+
+Cipher = aes-128-ocb
+Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
+IV = 000102030405060708090A0B
+AAD =
+Tag = 13CC8B747807121A4CBB3E4BD6B456AF
+Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
+Ciphertext = BEA5E8798DBE7110031C144DA0B26122
+
+Cipher = aes-128-ocb
+Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
+IV = 000102030405060708090A0B
+AAD = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F1011121314151617
+Tag = 5FA94FC3F38820F1DC3F3D1FD4E55E1C
+Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F1011121314151617
+Ciphertext = BEA5E8798DBE7110031C144DA0B26122FCFCEE7A2A8D4D48
+
+Cipher = aes-128-ocb
+Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
+IV = 000102030405060708090A0B
+AAD = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F1011121314151617
+Tag = 282026DA3068BC9FA118681D559F10F6
+Plaintext =
+Ciphertext =
+
+Cipher = aes-128-ocb
+Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
+IV = 000102030405060708090A0B
+AAD =
+Tag = 6EF2F52587FDA0ED97DC7EEDE241DF68
+Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F1011121314151617
+Ciphertext = BEA5E8798DBE7110031C144DA0B26122FCFCEE7A2A8D4D48
+
+Cipher = aes-128-ocb
+Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
+IV = 000102030405060708090A0B
+AAD = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F
+Tag = B2A040DD3BD5164372D76D7BB6824240
+Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F
+Ciphertext = BEA5E8798DBE7110031C144DA0B26122CEAAB9B05DF771A657149D53773463CB
+
+Cipher = aes-128-ocb
+Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
+IV = 000102030405060708090A0B
+AAD = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F
+Tag = E1E072633BADE51A60E85951D9C42A1B
+Plaintext =
+Ciphertext =
+
+Cipher = aes-128-ocb
+Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
+IV = 000102030405060708090A0B
+AAD =
+Tag = 4A3BAE824465CFDAF8C41FC50C7DF9D9
+Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F
+Ciphertext = BEA5E8798DBE7110031C144DA0B26122CEAAB9B05DF771A657149D53773463CB
+
+Cipher = aes-128-ocb
+Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
+IV = 000102030405060708090A0B
+AAD = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F2021222324252627
+Tag = 659C623211DEEA0DE30D2C381879F4C8
+Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F2021222324252627
+Ciphertext = BEA5E8798DBE7110031C144DA0B26122CEAAB9B05DF771A657149D53773463CB68C65778B058A635
+
+Cipher = aes-128-ocb
+Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
+IV = 000102030405060708090A0B
+AAD = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F2021222324252627
+Tag = 7AEB7A69A1687DD082CA27B0D9A37096
+Plaintext =
+Ciphertext =
+
+Cipher = aes-128-ocb
+Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
+IV = 000102030405060708090A0B
+AAD =
+Tag = 060C8467F4ABAB5E8B3C2067A2E115DC
+Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F2021222324252627
+Ciphertext = BEA5E8798DBE7110031C144DA0B26122CEAAB9B05DF771A657149D53773463CB68C65778B058A635
+
+#AES OCB Non standard test vectors - generated from reference implementation
+Cipher = aes-128-ocb
+Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
+IV = 000102030405060708090A0B
+AAD = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F2021222324252627
+Tag = 1b6c44f34e3abb3cbf8976e7
+Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F2021222324252627
+Ciphertext = 09a4fd29de949d9a9aa9924248422097ad4883b4713e6c214ff6567ada08a96766fc4e2ee3e3a5a1
+
+Cipher = aes-128-ocb
+Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
+IV = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E
+AAD = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F2021222324252627
+Tag = 1ad62009901f40cba7cd7156f94a7324
+Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F2021222324252627
+Ciphertext = 5e2fa7367ffbdb3938845cfd415fcc71ec79634eb31451609d27505f5e2978f43c44213d8fa441ee
+
+Cipher = aes-128-ocb
+Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
+IV = 000102030405060708090A0B
+AAD = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F2021222324252627
+Tag = C203F98CE28F7DAD3F31C021
+Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F3031
+Ciphertext = 09A4FD29DE949D9A9AA9924248422097AD4883B4713E6C214FF6567ADA08A967B2176C12F110DD441B7CAA3A509B13C822D6
+
+Cipher = aes-128-ocb
+Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
+IV = 000102030405060708090A0B
+AAD = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F2021222324252627
+Tag = 8346D7D47C5D893ED472F5AB
+Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F4041
+Ciphertext = 09A4FD29DE949D9A9AA9924248422097AD4883B4713E6C214FF6567ADA08A967B2176C12F110DD441B7CAA3A509B13C86A023AFCEE998BEE42028D44507B15F714FF
+
+Cipher = aes-128-ocb
+Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
+IV = 000102030405060708090A0B
+AAD = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F2021222324252627
+Tag = 5822A9A70FDF55D29D2984A6
+Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F5051
+Ciphertext = 09A4FD29DE949D9A9AA9924248422097AD4883B4713E6C214FF6567ADA08A967B2176C12F110DD441B7CAA3A509B13C86A023AFCEE998BEE42028D44507B15F77C528A1DE6406B519BCEE8FCB8294170634D
+
+Cipher = aes-128-ocb
+Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
+IV = 000102030405060708090A0B
+AAD = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F2021222324252627
+Tag = 81772B6741ABB4ECA9D2DEB2
+Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F6061
+Ciphertext = 09A4FD29DE949D9A9AA9924248422097AD4883B4713E6C214FF6567ADA08A967B2176C12F110DD441B7CAA3A509B13C86A023AFCEE998BEE42028D44507B15F77C528A1DE6406B519BCEE8FCB829417001E54E15A7576C4DF32366E0F439C7050FAA
+
+Cipher = aes-128-ocb
+Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
+IV = 000102030405060708090A0B
+AAD = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F2021222324252627
+Tag = 3E52A01D068DE85456DB03B7
+Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F7071
+Ciphertext = 09A4FD29DE949D9A9AA9924248422097AD4883B4713E6C214FF6567ADA08A967B2176C12F110DD441B7CAA3A509B13C86A023AFCEE998BEE42028D44507B15F77C528A1DE6406B519BCEE8FCB829417001E54E15A7576C4DF32366E0F439C7051CB4824B8114E9A720CBC1CE0185B156B486
+
+Cipher = aes-128-ocb
+Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
+IV = 000102030405060708090A0B
+AAD = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F2021222324252627
+Tag = 3E52A01D068DE85456DB03B6
+Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F7071
+Ciphertext = 09A4FD29DE949D9A9AA9924248422097AD4883B4713E6C214FF6567ADA08A967B2176C12F110DD441B7CAA3A509B13C86A023AFCEE998BEE42028D44507B15F77C528A1DE6406B519BCEE8FCB829417001E54E15A7576C4DF32366E0F439C7051CB4824B8114E9A720CBC1CE0185B156B486
+Operation = DECRYPT
+Result = CIPHERFINAL_ERROR
+
+# AES XTS test vectors from IEEE Std 1619-2007
+Cipher = aes-128-xts
+Key = 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
+IV = 00000000000000000000000000000000
+Plaintext = 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
+Ciphertext = 917cf69ebd68b2ec9b9fe9a3eadda692cd43d2f59598ed858c02c2652fbf922e
+
+Cipher = aes-128-xts
+Key = 1111111111111111111111111111111122222222222222222222222222222222
+IV = 33333333330000000000000000000000
+Plaintext = 4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444
+Ciphertext = c454185e6a16936e39334038acef838bfb186fff7480adc4289382ecd6d394f0
+
+Cipher = aes-128-xts
+Key = fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f022222222222222222222222222222222
+IV = 33333333330000000000000000000000
+Plaintext = 4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444
+Ciphertext = af85336b597afc1a900b2eb21ec949d292df4c047e0b21532186a5971a227a89
+
+Cipher = aes-128-xts
+Key = 2718281828459045235360287471352631415926535897932384626433832795
+IV = 00000000000000000000000000000000
+Plaintext = 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
+Ciphertext = 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
+
+Cipher = aes-128-xts
+Key = 2718281828459045235360287471352631415926535897932384626433832795
+IV = 01000000000000000000000000000000
+Plaintext = 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
+Ciphertext = 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
+
+Cipher = aes-128-xts
+Key = 2718281828459045235360287471352631415926535897932384626433832795
+IV = 02000000000000000000000000000000
+Plaintext = 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
+Ciphertext = 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
+
+Cipher = aes-128-xts
+Key = 2718281828459045235360287471352631415926535897932384626433832795
+IV = fd000000000000000000000000000000
+Plaintext = 8e41b78c390b5af9d758bb214a67e9f6bf7727b09ac6124084c37611398fa45daad94868600ed391fb1acd4857a95b466e62ef9f4b377244d1c152e7b30d731aad30c716d214b707aed99eb5b5e580b3e887cf7497465651d4b60e6042051da3693c3b78c14489543be8b6ad0ba629565bba202313ba7b0d0c94a3252b676f46cc02ce0f8a7d34c0ed229129673c1f61aed579d08a9203a25aac3a77e9db60267996db38df637356d9dcd1632e369939f2a29d89345c66e05066f1a3677aef18dea4113faeb629e46721a66d0a7e785d3e29af2594eb67dfa982affe0aac058f6e15864269b135418261fc3afb089472cf68c45dd7f231c6249ba0255e1e033833fc4d00a3fe02132d7bc3873614b8aee34273581ea0325c81f0270affa13641d052d36f0757d484014354d02d6883ca15c24d8c3956b1bd027bcf41f151fd8023c5340e5606f37e90fdb87c86fb4fa634b3718a30bace06a66eaf8f63c4aa3b637826a87fe8cfa44282e92cb1615af3a28e53bc74c7cba1a0977be9065d0c1a5dec6c54ae38d37f37aa35283e048e5530a85c4e7a29d7b92ec0c3169cdf2a805c7604bce60049b9fb7b8eaac10f51ae23794ceba68bb58112e293b9b692ca721b37c662f8574ed4dba6f88e170881c82cddc1034a0ca7e284bf0962b6b26292d836fa9f73c1ac770eef0f2d3a1eaf61d3e03555fd424eedd67e18a18094f888
+Ciphertext = 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
+
+Cipher = aes-128-xts
+Key = 2718281828459045235360287471352631415926535897932384626433832795
+IV = fe000000000000000000000000000000
+Plaintext = 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
+Ciphertext = 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
+
+Cipher = aes-128-xts
+Key = 2718281828459045235360287471352631415926535897932384626433832795
+IV = ff000000000000000000000000000000
+Plaintext = 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
+Ciphertext = 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
+
+
+Cipher = aes-256-xts
+Key = 27182818284590452353602874713526624977572470936999595749669676273141592653589793238462643383279502884197169399375105820974944592
+IV = ff000000000000000000000000000000
+Plaintext = 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
+Ciphertext = 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
+
+Cipher = aes-256-xts
+Key = 27182818284590452353602874713526624977572470936999595749669676273141592653589793238462643383279502884197169399375105820974944592
+IV = ffff0000000000000000000000000000
+Plaintext = 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
+Ciphertext = 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
+
+Cipher = aes-256-xts
+Key = 27182818284590452353602874713526624977572470936999595749669676273141592653589793238462643383279502884197169399375105820974944592
+IV = ffffff00000000000000000000000000
+Plaintext = 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
+Ciphertext = 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
+
+Cipher = aes-256-xts
+Key = 27182818284590452353602874713526624977572470936999595749669676273141592653589793238462643383279502884197169399375105820974944592
+IV = ffffffff000000000000000000000000
+Plaintext = 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
+Ciphertext = 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
+
+Cipher = aes-256-xts
+Key = 27182818284590452353602874713526624977572470936999595749669676273141592653589793238462643383279502884197169399375105820974944592
+IV = ffffffffff0000000000000000000000
+Plaintext = 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
+Ciphertext = 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
+
+
+Cipher = aes-128-xts
+Key = fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f0bfbebdbcbbbab9b8b7b6b5b4b3b2b1b0
+IV = 9a785634120000000000000000000000
+Plaintext = 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10
+Ciphertext = 6c1625db4671522d3d7599601de7ca09ed
+
+Cipher = aes-128-xts
+Key = fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f0bfbebdbcbbbab9b8b7b6b5b4b3b2b1b0
+IV = 9a785634120000000000000000000000
+Plaintext = 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f1011
+Ciphertext = d069444b7a7e0cab09e24447d24deb1fedbf
+
+Cipher = aes-128-xts
+Key = fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f0bfbebdbcbbbab9b8b7b6b5b4b3b2b1b0
+IV = 9a785634120000000000000000000000
+Plaintext = 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112
+Ciphertext = e5df1351c0544ba1350b3363cd8ef4beedbf9d
+
+Cipher = aes-128-xts
+Key = fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f0bfbebdbcbbbab9b8b7b6b5b4b3b2b1b0
+IV = 9a785634120000000000000000000000
+Plaintext = 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10111213
+Ciphertext = 9d84c813f719aa2c7be3f66171c7c5c2edbf9dac
+
+Cipher = aes-128-xts
+Key = e0e1e2e3e4e5e6e7e8e9eaebecedeeefc0c1c2c3c4c5c6c7c8c9cacbcccdcecf
+IV = 21436587a90000000000000000000000
+Plaintext = 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
+Ciphertext = 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
+
+# Exercise different lengths covering even ciphertext stealing cases
+Cipher = aes-128-xts
+Key = 2718281828459045235360287471352631415926535897932384626433832795
+IV = 00000000000000000000000000000000
+Plaintext = 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f505152535455565758595a5b5c5d5e5f
+Ciphertext = 27a7479befa1d476489f308cd4cfa6e2a96e4bbe3208ff25287dd3819616e89cc78cf7f5e543445f8333d8fa7f56000005279fa5d8b5e4ad40e736ddb4d35412328063fd2aab53e5ea1e0a9f332500a5df9487d07a5c92cc512c8866c7e860ce
+
+Cipher = aes-128-xts
+Key = 2718281828459045235360287471352631415926535897932384626433832795
+IV = 00000000000000000000000000000000
+Plaintext = 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f505152535455565758595a5b5c5d5e5f6061
+Ciphertext = 27A7479BEFA1D476489F308CD4CFA6E2A96E4BBE3208FF25287DD3819616E89CC78CF7F5E543445F8333D8FA7F56000005279FA5D8B5E4AD40E736DDB4D35412328063FD2AAB53E5EA1E0A9F332500A5B079C6307EA0914559C6D2FB6384F8AADF94
+
+Cipher = aes-128-xts
+Key = 2718281828459045235360287471352631415926535897932384626433832795
+IV = 00000000000000000000000000000000
+Plaintext = 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f505152535455565758595a5b5c5d5e5f606162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f
+Ciphertext = 27a7479befa1d476489f308cd4cfa6e2a96e4bbe3208ff25287dd3819616e89cc78cf7f5e543445f8333d8fa7f56000005279fa5d8b5e4ad40e736ddb4d35412328063fd2aab53e5ea1e0a9f332500a5df9487d07a5c92cc512c8866c7e860ce93fdf166a24912b422976146ae20ce84
+
+Cipher = aes-128-xts
+Key = 2718281828459045235360287471352631415926535897932384626433832795
+IV = 00000000000000000000000000000000
+Plaintext = 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f505152535455565758595a5b5c5d5e5f606162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f7071
+Ciphertext = 27A7479BEFA1D476489F308CD4CFA6E2A96E4BBE3208FF25287DD3819616E89CC78CF7F5E543445F8333D8FA7F56000005279FA5D8B5E4AD40E736DDB4D35412328063FD2AAB53E5EA1E0A9F332500A5DF9487D07A5C92CC512C8866C7E860CEF4F253466EF4953ADC8FE2F5BC1FF57593FD
+
+Cipher = aes-128-xts
+Key = 2718281828459045235360287471352631415926535897932384626433832795
+IV = 00000000000000000000000000000000
+Plaintext = 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f505152535455565758595a5b5c5d5e5f606162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a7b7c7d7e7f
+Ciphertext = 27a7479befa1d476489f308cd4cfa6e2a96e4bbe3208ff25287dd3819616e89cc78cf7f5e543445f8333d8fa7f56000005279fa5d8b5e4ad40e736ddb4d35412328063fd2aab53e5ea1e0a9f332500a5df9487d07a5c92cc512c8866c7e860ce93fdf166a24912b422976146ae20ce846bb7dc9ba94a767aaef20c0d61ad0265
+
+Cipher = aes-128-xts
+Key = 2718281828459045235360287471352631415926535897932384626433832795
+IV = 00000000000000000000000000000000
+Plaintext = 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f505152535455565758595a5b5c5d5e5f606162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a7b7c7d7e7f8081
+Ciphertext = 27A7479BEFA1D476489F308CD4CFA6E2A96E4BBE3208FF25287DD3819616E89CC78CF7F5E543445F8333D8FA7F56000005279FA5D8B5E4AD40E736DDB4D35412328063FD2AAB53E5EA1E0A9F332500A5DF9487D07A5C92CC512C8866C7E860CE93FDF166A24912B422976146AE20CE842973C68248EDDFE26FB9B096659C8A5D6BB7
+
+Cipher = aes-128-xts
+Key = 2718281828459045235360287471352631415926535897932384626433832795
+IV = 00000000000000000000000000000000
+Plaintext = 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f505152535455565758595a5b5c5d5e5f606162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a7b7c7d7e7f808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f
+Ciphertext = 27a7479befa1d476489f308cd4cfa6e2a96e4bbe3208ff25287dd3819616e89cc78cf7f5e543445f8333d8fa7f56000005279fa5d8b5e4ad40e736ddb4d35412328063fd2aab53e5ea1e0a9f332500a5df9487d07a5c92cc512c8866c7e860ce93fdf166a24912b422976146ae20ce846bb7dc9ba94a767aaef20c0d61ad02655ea92dc4c4e41a8952c651d33174be51
+
+Cipher = aes-128-xts
+Key = 2718281828459045235360287471352631415926535897932384626433832795
+IV = 00000000000000000000000000000000
+Plaintext = 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f505152535455565758595a5b5c5d5e5f606162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a7b7c7d7e7f808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f9091
+Ciphertext = 27A7479BEFA1D476489F308CD4CFA6E2A96E4BBE3208FF25287DD3819616E89CC78CF7F5E543445F8333D8FA7F56000005279FA5D8B5E4AD40E736DDB4D35412328063FD2AAB53E5EA1E0A9F332500A5DF9487D07A5C92CC512C8866C7E860CE93FDF166A24912B422976146AE20CE846BB7DC9BA94A767AAEF20C0D61AD0265C4DD16E65A24575A709F174593F19FF85EA9
+
+Cipher = aes-128-xts
+Key = 2718281828459045235360287471352631415926535897932384626433832795
+IV = 00000000000000000000000000000000
+Plaintext = 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f505152535455565758595a5b5c5d5e5f606162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a7b7c7d7e7f808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9f
+Ciphertext = 27a7479befa1d476489f308cd4cfa6e2a96e4bbe3208ff25287dd3819616e89cc78cf7f5e543445f8333d8fa7f56000005279fa5d8b5e4ad40e736ddb4d35412328063fd2aab53e5ea1e0a9f332500a5df9487d07a5c92cc512c8866c7e860ce93fdf166a24912b422976146ae20ce846bb7dc9ba94a767aaef20c0d61ad02655ea92dc4c4e41a8952c651d33174be51a10c421110e6d81588ede82103a252d8
+
+Cipher = aes-128-xts
+Key = 2718281828459045235360287471352631415926535897932384626433832795
+IV = 00000000000000000000000000000000
+Plaintext = 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f505152535455565758595a5b5c5d5e5f606162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a7b7c7d7e7f808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9fa0a1
+Ciphertext = 27A7479BEFA1D476489F308CD4CFA6E2A96E4BBE3208FF25287DD3819616E89CC78CF7F5E543445F8333D8FA7F56000005279FA5D8B5E4AD40E736DDB4D35412328063FD2AAB53E5EA1E0A9F332500A5DF9487D07A5C92CC512C8866C7E860CE93FDF166A24912B422976146AE20CE846BB7DC9BA94A767AAEF20C0D61AD02655EA92DC4C4E41A8952C651D33174BE519215FA160C664D4B07D757A034AB3B35A10C
+
+Cipher = aes-128-xts
+Key = 2718281828459045235360287471352631415926535897932384626433832795
+IV = 00000000000000000000000000000000
+Plaintext = 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f505152535455565758595a5b5c5d5e5f606162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a7b7c7d7e7f808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9fa0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeaf
+Ciphertext = 27a7479befa1d476489f308cd4cfa6e2a96e4bbe3208ff25287dd3819616e89cc78cf7f5e543445f8333d8fa7f56000005279fa5d8b5e4ad40e736ddb4d35412328063fd2aab53e5ea1e0a9f332500a5df9487d07a5c92cc512c8866c7e860ce93fdf166a24912b422976146ae20ce846bb7dc9ba94a767aaef20c0d61ad02655ea92dc4c4e41a8952c651d33174be51a10c421110e6d81588ede82103a252d8a750e8768defffed9122810aaeb99f91
+
+Cipher = aes-128-xts
+Key = 2718281828459045235360287471352631415926535897932384626433832795
+IV = 00000000000000000000000000000000
+Plaintext = 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f505152535455565758595a5b5c5d5e5f606162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a7b7c7d7e7f808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9fa0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeafb0b1
+Ciphertext = 27A7479BEFA1D476489F308CD4CFA6E2A96E4BBE3208FF25287DD3819616E89CC78CF7F5E543445F8333D8FA7F56000005279FA5D8B5E4AD40E736DDB4D35412328063FD2AAB53E5EA1E0A9F332500A5DF9487D07A5C92CC512C8866C7E860CE93FDF166A24912B422976146AE20CE846BB7DC9BA94A767AAEF20C0D61AD02655EA92DC4C4E41A8952C651D33174BE51A10C421110E6D81588EDE82103A252D82C6CBC24F9357BD1FB882AA4B2CC2E7FA750
+
+Cipher = aes-128-xts
+Key = 2718281828459045235360287471352631415926535897932384626433832795
+IV = 00000000000000000000000000000000
+Plaintext = 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f505152535455565758595a5b5c5d5e5f606162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a7b7c7d7e7f808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9fa0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeafb0b1b2b3b4b5b6b7b8b9babbbcbdbebf
+Ciphertext = 27a7479befa1d476489f308cd4cfa6e2a96e4bbe3208ff25287dd3819616e89cc78cf7f5e543445f8333d8fa7f56000005279fa5d8b5e4ad40e736ddb4d35412328063fd2aab53e5ea1e0a9f332500a5df9487d07a5c92cc512c8866c7e860ce93fdf166a24912b422976146ae20ce846bb7dc9ba94a767aaef20c0d61ad02655ea92dc4c4e41a8952c651d33174be51a10c421110e6d81588ede82103a252d8a750e8768defffed9122810aaeb99f9172af82b604dc4b8e51bcb08235a6f434
+
+Cipher = aes-128-xts
+Key = 2718281828459045235360287471352631415926535897932384626433832795
+IV = 00000000000000000000000000000000
+Plaintext = 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f505152535455565758595a5b5c5d5e5f606162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a7b7c7d7e7f808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9fa0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeafb0b1b2b3b4b5b6b7b8b9babbbcbdbebfc0c1
+Ciphertext = 27A7479BEFA1D476489F308CD4CFA6E2A96E4BBE3208FF25287DD3819616E89CC78CF7F5E543445F8333D8FA7F56000005279FA5D8B5E4AD40E736DDB4D35412328063FD2AAB53E5EA1E0A9F332500A5DF9487D07A5C92CC512C8866C7E860CE93FDF166A24912B422976146AE20CE846BB7DC9BA94A767AAEF20C0D61AD02655EA92DC4C4E41A8952C651D33174BE51A10C421110E6D81588EDE82103A252D8A750E8768DEFFFED9122810AAEB99F910409B03D164E727C31290FD4E039500872AF
+
+# AES wrap tests from RFC3394
+Cipher = id-aes128-wrap
+Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
+Plaintext = 00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF
+Ciphertext = 1FA68B0A8112B447AEF34BD8FB5A7B829D3E862371D2CFE5
+
+Cipher = id-aes192-wrap
+Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F1011121314151617
+Plaintext = 00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF
+Ciphertext = 96778B25AE6CA435F92B5B97C050AED2468AB8A17AD84E5D
+
+Cipher = id-aes256-wrap
+Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F
+Plaintext = 00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF
+Ciphertext = 64E8C3F9CE0F5BA263E9777905818A2A93C8191E7D6E8AE7
+
+Cipher = id-aes192-wrap
+Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F1011121314151617
+Plaintext = 00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF0001020304050607
+Ciphertext = 031D33264E15D33268F24EC260743EDCE1C6C7DDEE725A936BA814915C6762D2
+
+Cipher = id-aes256-wrap
+Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F
+Plaintext = 00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF0001020304050607
+Ciphertext = A8F9BC1612C68B3FF6E6F4FBE30E71E4769C8B80A32CB8958CD5D17D6B254DA1
+
+Cipher = id-aes256-wrap
+Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F
+Plaintext = 00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
+Ciphertext = 28C9F404C4B810F4CBCCB35CFB87F8263F5786E2D80ED326CBC7F0E71A99F43BFB988B9B7A02DD21
+
+# Same as previous example but with invalid unwrap key: should be rejected
+# without returning any plaintext
+Cipher = id-aes256-wrap
+Operation = DECRYPT
+Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E00
+Plaintext = 00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
+Ciphertext = 28C9F404C4B810F4CBCCB35CFB87F8263F5786E2D80ED326CBC7F0E71A99F43BFB988B9B7A02DD21
+Result = CIPHERUPDATE_ERROR
+
+# AES wrap tests from RFC5649
+Cipher = id-aes192-wrap-pad
+Key = 5840df6e29b02af1ab493b705bf16ea1ae8338f4dcc176a8
+Plaintext = c37b7e6492584340bed12207808941155068f738
+Ciphertext = 138bdeaa9b8fa7fc61f97742e72248ee5ae6ae5360d1ae6a5f54f373fa543b6a
+
+Cipher = id-aes192-wrap-pad
+Key = 5840df6e29b02af1ab493b705bf16ea1ae8338f4dcc176a8
+Plaintext = 466f7250617369
+Ciphertext = afbeb0f07dfbf5419200f2ccb50bb24f
+
+# HMAC tests from RFC2104
+MAC = HMAC
+Algorithm = MD5
+Key = 0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b
+Input = "Hi There"
+Output = 9294727a3638bb1c13f48ef8158bfc9d
+
+MAC = HMAC
+Algorithm = MD5
+Key = "Jefe"
+Input = "what do ya want for nothing?"
+Output = 750c783e6ab0b503eaa86e310a5db738
+
+MAC = HMAC
+Algorithm = MD5
+Key = AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
+Input = DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD
+Output = 56be34521d144c88dbb8c733f0e8b3f6
+
+# HMAC tests from NIST test data
+
+MAC = HMAC
+Algorithm = SHA1
+Input = "Sample message for keylen=blocklen"
+Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F
+Output = 5FD596EE78D5553C8FF4E72D266DFD192366DA29
+
+MAC = HMAC
+Algorithm = SHA1
+Input = "Sample message for keylen<blocklen"
+Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F10111213
+Output = 4C99FF0CB1B31BD33F8431DBAF4D17FCD356A807
+
+MAC = HMAC
+Algorithm = SHA1
+Input = "Sample message for keylen=blocklen"
+Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F60616263
+Output = 2D51B2F7750E410584662E38F133435F4C4FD42A
+
+MAC = HMAC
+Algorithm = SHA224
+Input = "Sample message for keylen=blocklen"
+Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F
+Output = C7405E3AE058E8CD30B08B4140248581ED174CB34E1224BCC1EFC81B
+
+MAC = HMAC
+Algorithm = SHA224
+Input = "Sample message for keylen<blocklen"
+Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B
+Output = E3D249A8CFB67EF8B7A169E9A0A599714A2CECBA65999A51BEB8FBBE
+
+MAC = HMAC
+Algorithm = SHA224
+Input = "Sample message for keylen=blocklen"
+Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F60616263
+Output = 91C52509E5AF8531601AE6230099D90BEF88AAEFB961F4080ABC014D
+
+MAC = HMAC
+Algorithm = SHA256
+Input = "Sample message for keylen=blocklen"
+Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F
+Output = 8BB9A1DB9806F20DF7F77B82138C7914D174D59E13DC4D0169C9057B133E1D62
+
+MAC = HMAC
+Algorithm = SHA256
+Input = "Sample message for keylen<blocklen"
+Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F
+Output = A28CF43130EE696A98F14A37678B56BCFCBDD9E5CF69717FECF5480F0EBDF790
+
+MAC = HMAC
+Algorithm = SHA256
+Input = "Sample message for keylen=blocklen"
+Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F60616263
+Output = BDCCB6C72DDEADB500AE768386CB38CC41C63DBB0878DDB9C7A38A431B78378D
+
+MAC = HMAC
+Algorithm = SHA384
+Input = "Sample message for keylen=blocklen"
+Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767778797A7B7C7D7E7F
+Output = 63C5DAA5E651847CA897C95814AB830BEDEDC7D25E83EEF9195CD45857A37F448947858F5AF50CC2B1B730DDF29671A9
+
+MAC = HMAC
+Algorithm = SHA384
+Input = "Sample message for keylen<blocklen"
+Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F
+Output = 6EB242BDBB582CA17BEBFA481B1E23211464D2B7F8C20B9FF2201637B93646AF5AE9AC316E98DB45D9CAE773675EEED0
+
+MAC = HMAC
+Algorithm = SHA384
+Input = "Sample message for keylen=blocklen"
+Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767778797A7B7C7D7E7F808182838485868788898A8B8C8D8E8F909192939495969798999A9B9C9D9E9FA0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAFB0B1B2B3B4B5B6B7B8B9BABBBCBDBEBFC0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7
+Output = 5B664436DF69B0CA22551231A3F0A3D5B4F97991713CFA84BFF4D0792EFF96C27DCCBBB6F79B65D548B40E8564CEF594
+
+MAC = HMAC
+Algorithm = SHA512
+Input = "Sample message for keylen=blocklen"
+Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767778797A7B7C7D7E7F
+Output = FC25E240658CA785B7A811A8D3F7B4CA48CFA26A8A366BF2CD1F836B05FCB024BD36853081811D6CEA4216EBAD79DA1CFCB95EA4586B8A0CE356596A55FB1347
+
+MAC = HMAC
+Algorithm = SHA512
+Input = "Sample message for keylen<blocklen"
+Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F
+Output = FD44C18BDA0BB0A6CE0E82B031BF2818F6539BD56EC00BDC10A8A2D730B3634DE2545D639B0F2CF710D0692C72A1896F1F211C2B922D1A96C392E07E7EA9FEDC
+
+MAC = HMAC
+Algorithm = SHA512
+Input = "Sample message for keylen=blocklen"
+Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767778797A7B7C7D7E7F808182838485868788898A8B8C8D8E8F909192939495969798999A9B9C9D9E9FA0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAFB0B1B2B3B4B5B6B7B8B9BABBBCBDBEBFC0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7
+Output = D93EC8D2DE1AD2A9957CB9B83F14E76AD6B5E0CCE285079A127D3B14BCCB7AA7286D4AC0D4CE64215F2BC9E6870B33D97438BE4AAA20CDA5C5A912B48B8E27F3
+
+# CMAC tests from FIPS module
+
+MAC = CMAC
+Algorithm = AES-128-CBC
+Key = 77A77FAF290C1FA30C683DF16BA7A77B
+Input = 020683E1F0392F4CAC54318B6029259E9C553DBC4B6AD998E64D58E4E7DC2E13
+Output = FBFEA41BF9740CB501F1292C21CEBB40
+
+MAC = CMAC
+Algorithm = AES-192-CBC
+Key = 7B32391369AA4CA97558095BE3C3EC862BD057CEF1E32D62
+Input =
+Output = E4D9340B03E67DEFD4969CC1ED3735E6
+
+MAC = CMAC
+Algorithm = AES-256-CBC
+Key = 0B122AC8F34ED1FE082A3625D157561454167AC145A10BBF77C6A70596D574F1
+Input = 498B53FDEC87EDCBF07097DCCDE93A084BAD7501A224E388DF349CE18959FE8485F8AD1537F0D896EA73BEDC7214713F
+Output = F62C46329B41085625669BAF51DEA66A
+
+MAC = CMAC
+Algorithm = DES-EDE3-CBC
+Key = 89BCD952A8C8AB371AF48AC7D07085D5EFF702E6D62CDC23
+Input = FA620C1BBE97319E9A0CF0492121F7A20EB08A6A709DCBD00AAF38E4F99E754E
+Output = 8F49A1B7D6AA2258
+
+# Public key algorithm tests
+
+# Private keys used for PKEY operations.
+
+# RSA 2048 bit key.
+
+PrivateKey = RSA-2048
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+# Corresponding public key
+
+PublicKey = RSA-2048-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAzQCB6nsq4eoG1Z98c9n/
+uUoJYVwuS6fGNs7wjdNTPsMYVSWwFcdpuZp31nJb+cNTKptuX2Yn1fuFFgdo092p
+y9NZdFEXF9w9MJ0vxH7kH5fjKtt/ndhkocR2emZuzXG8Gqz151F/SzhZT+qbBeQt
+WtqZEgCAE+RTFqTZu47QhriNKHWLrK+SLUaoaLSF0jnJuusOK2RZJxD0Ky0eoKS0
+gCwL7Ksyj4posAc721Rv7qmAnShJkSs5DBUyvH4px2WPgXX65G80My/4e8qz5AZJ
+uYV3hp2g6nGDU/ByJ1SIaRNkh2DRIr5nbg/Eg90g/8Mb2pajGWbJqi51rQPeR+HE
+TwIDAQAB
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = RSA-2048:RSA-2048-PUBLIC
+
+
+# EC P-256 key
+
+PrivateKey=P-256
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIGHAgEAMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHBG0wawIBAQQgiocvtiiTxNH/xbnw
++RdYBp+DUuCPoFpJ+NuSbLVyhyWhRANCAAQsFQ9CnOcPIWwlLPXgYs4fY5zV0WXH
++JQkBywnGX14szuSDpXNtmTpkNzwz+oNlOKo5q+dDlgFbmUxBJJbn+bJ
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+# EC public key for above
+
+PublicKey=P-256-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAELBUPQpznDyFsJSz14GLOH2Oc1dFl
+x/iUJAcsJxl9eLM7kg6VzbZk6ZDc8M/qDZTiqOavnQ5YBW5lMQSSW5/myQ==
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = P-256:P-256-PUBLIC
+
+
+# Additional EC key for ECDH
+PrivateKey=P-256-Peer
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIGHAgEAMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHBG0wawIBAQQg/URzu1TDNwUFWZ3i
+dLISAZpEY0vfJ2pLB7f+Xnjyl2OhRANCAAQgBuXhSgeKpz+4piXlYSVLvy0NT+wK
+uZWUI3LqUUCV07wg+RLLMY8yNK9kjqcgZDs/cB+bet64nQq+dNnvtpxG
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=P-256-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEIAbl4UoHiqc/uKYl5WElS78tDU/s
+CrmVlCNy6lFAldO8IPkSyzGPMjSvZI6nIGQ7P3Afm3reuJ0KvnTZ77acRg==
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = P-256-Peer:P-256-Peer-PUBLIC
+
+
+# DSA key
+PrivateKey=DSA-1024
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIIBSwIBADCCASwGByqGSM44BAEwggEfAoGBAO0SwRpkAeM21qSM5ch4CLEHpFk4
+19R5ve1UUr421y3HEUURsrVpxYKvyx8aOBQC/akz95cYxNN3y1JnJJMxPklhdJrJ
+f/WDYPxjMk8BqNJmeZtLuCVLKGwQomuo7ZkG955WRyLHYEdQ6uC7K2QTPKpW6psF
+YFaDYjAjSEKk2MFxAhUAykDkKLZdhPWzwM8/qYaE31VmWz0CgYEApNVF8oFK41ez
+Qci9XbSZJHyPB+3jML1YQkHxiiInaIz6GEFtjUbIUEYA/ovY+6ECNI1aIDHTd7CH
+woS0mp33oQYs43nt29B6UwbtMmbzCOQ9vGGwWVho+JtHyyPWrDuLmkvLtoQPaxYt
+6PVa3gncr2v3njcVuH+EQ6DuFR93zksEFgIUbyv6pqH+UQurernJn/7sUm2U2i0=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=DSA-1024-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = DSA-1024:DSA-1024-PUBLIC
+
+
+# RSA tests
+
+Sign = RSA-2048
+Ctrl = digest:SHA1
+Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
+Output = 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
+
+Verify = RSA-2048
+Ctrl = digest:SHA1
+Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
+Output = 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
+
+VerifyRecover = RSA-2048
+Ctrl = digest:SHA1
+Input = 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
+Output = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
+
+# Leading zero in the signature
+Verify = RSA-2048
+Ctrl = digest:SHA1
+Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
+Output = 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
+Result = VERIFY_ERROR
+
+VerifyRecover = RSA-2048
+Ctrl = digest:SHA1
+Input = 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
+Result = KEYOP_ERROR
+
+# Digest too long
+Sign = RSA-2048
+Ctrl = digest:SHA1
+Input = "0123456789ABCDEF12345"
+Output = 00
+Result = KEYOP_ERROR
+
+# Digest too short
+Sign = RSA-2048
+Ctrl = digest:SHA1
+Input = "0123456789ABCDEF12345"
+Output = 00
+Result = KEYOP_ERROR
+
+# Mismatched digest
+Verify = RSA-2048
+Ctrl = digest:SHA1
+Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1233"
+Output = c09d402423cbf233d26cae21f954547bc43fe80fd41360a0336cfdbe9aedad05bef6fd2eaee6cd60089a52482d4809a238149520df3bdde4cb9e23d9307b05c0a6f327052325a29adf2cc95b66523be7024e2a585c3d4db15dfbe146efe0ecdc0402e33fe5d40324ee96c5c3edd374a15cdc0f5d84aa243c0f07e188c6518fbfceae158a9943be398e31097da81b62074f626eff738be6160741d5a26957a482b3251fd85d8df78b98148459de10aa93305dbb4a5230aa1da291a9b0e481918f99b7638d72bb687f97661d304ae145d64a474437a4ef39d7b8059332ddeb07e92bf6e0e3acaf8afedc93795e4511737ec1e7aab6d5bc9466afc950c1c17b48ad
+Result = VERIFY_ERROR
+
+# Corrupted signature
+Verify = RSA-2048
+Ctrl = digest:SHA1
+Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1233"
+Output = 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
+Result = VERIFY_ERROR
+
+# parameter is not NULL
+Verify = RSA-2048
+Ctrl = digest:sha1
+Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
+Output = 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
+Result = VERIFY_ERROR
+
+# embedded digest too long
+Verify = RSA-2048
+Ctrl = digest:sha1
+Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
+Output = 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
+Result = VERIFY_ERROR
+
+VerifyRecover = RSA-2048
+Ctrl = digest:sha1
+Input = 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
+Result = KEYOP_ERROR
+
+# embedded digest too short
+Verify = RSA-2048
+Ctrl = digest:sha1
+Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
+Output = 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
+Result = VERIFY_ERROR
+
+VerifyRecover = RSA-2048
+Ctrl = digest:sha1
+Input = 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
+Result = KEYOP_ERROR
+
+# Garbage after DigestInfo
+Verify = RSA-2048
+Ctrl = digest:sha1
+Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
+Output = 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
+Result = VERIFY_ERROR
+
+VerifyRecover = RSA-2048
+Ctrl = digest:sha1
+Input = 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
+Result = KEYOP_ERROR
+
+# invalid tag for parameter
+Verify = RSA-2048
+Ctrl = digest:sha1
+Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
+Output = 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
+Result = VERIFY_ERROR
+
+VerifyRecover = RSA-2048
+Ctrl = digest:sha1
+Input = 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
+Result = KEYOP_ERROR
+
+# MD5/SHA-1 combination
+Verify = RSA-2048
+Ctrl = digest:MD5-SHA1
+Input = "0123456789ABCDEF0123456789ABCDEF0123"
+Output = 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
+
+VerifyRecover = RSA-2048
+Ctrl = digest:MD5-SHA1
+Input = 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
+Output = "0123456789ABCDEF0123456789ABCDEF0123"
+
+# MD5/SHA-1 combination, digest mismatch
+Verify = RSA-2048
+Ctrl = digest:MD5-SHA1
+Input = "000000000000000000000000000000000000"
+Output = 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
+Result = VERIFY_ERROR
+
+# MD5/SHA-1 combination, wrong signature digest length
+Verify = RSA-2048
+Ctrl = digest:MD5-SHA1
+Input = "0123456789ABCDEF0123456789ABCDEF0123"
+Output = 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
+Result = VERIFY_ERROR
+
+VerifyRecover = RSA-2048
+Ctrl = digest:MD5-SHA1
+Input = 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
+Result = KEYOP_ERROR
+
+# MD5/SHA-1 combination, wrong input digest length
+Verify = RSA-2048
+Ctrl = digest:MD5-SHA1
+Input = "0123456789ABCDEF0123456789ABCDEF012"
+Output = 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
+Result = VERIFY_ERROR
+
+# MD5/SHA-1 combination, wrong input and signature digest length
+Verify = RSA-2048
+Ctrl = digest:MD5-SHA1
+Input = "0123456789ABCDEF0123456789ABCDEF012"
+Output = 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
+Result = VERIFY_ERROR
+
+# DigestInfo-wrapped MDC-2 signature
+Verify = RSA-2048
+Ctrl = digest:MDC2
+Input = "0123456789ABCDEF"
+Output = 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
+
+VerifyRecover = RSA-2048
+Ctrl = digest:MDC2
+Input = 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
+Output = "0123456789ABCDEF"
+
+# Legacy OCTET STRING MDC-2 signature
+Verify = RSA-2048
+Ctrl = digest:MDC2
+Input = "0123456789ABCDEF"
+Output = 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
+
+VerifyRecover = RSA-2048
+Ctrl = digest:MDC2
+Input = 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
+Output = "0123456789ABCDEF"
+
+# Legacy OCTET STRING MDC-2 signature, digest mismatch
+Verify = RSA-2048
+Ctrl = digest:MDC2
+Input = "0000000000000000"
+Output = 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
+Result = VERIFY_ERROR
+
+# Legacy OCTET STRING MDC-2 signature, wrong input digest length
+Verify = RSA-2048
+Ctrl = digest:MDC2
+Input = "0123456789ABCDE"
+Output = 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
+Result = VERIFY_ERROR
+
+# Legacy OCTET STRING MDC-2 signature, wrong signature digest length
+Verify = RSA-2048
+Ctrl = digest:MDC2
+Input = "0123456789ABCDEF"
+Output = 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
+Result = VERIFY_ERROR
+
+VerifyRecover = RSA-2048
+Ctrl = digest:MDC2
+Input = 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
+Result = KEYOP_ERROR
+
+# Legacy OCTET STRING MDC-2 signature, wrong input and signature digest length
+Verify = RSA-2048
+Ctrl = digest:MDC2
+Input = "0123456789ABCDE"
+Output = 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
+Result = VERIFY_ERROR
+
+# Verify using public key
+
+Verify = RSA-2048-PUBLIC
+Ctrl = digest:SHA1
+Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
+Output = 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
+
+# RSA decrypt
+
+Decrypt = RSA-2048
+Input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
+Output = "Hello World"
+
+# Corrupted ciphertext
+Decrypt = RSA-2048
+Input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
+Output = "Hello World"
+Result = KEYOP_ERROR
+
+# OAEP padding
+Decrypt = RSA-2048
+Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+Input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
+Output = "Hello World"
+
+# OAEP padding, corrupted ciphertext
+Decrypt = RSA-2048
+Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+Input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
+Output = "Hello World"
+Result = KEYOP_ERROR
+
+# Illegal RSA key derivation
+Derive = RSA-2048
+Result = KEYOP_INIT_ERROR
+Function = EVP_PKEY_derive_init
+Reason = operation not supported for this keytype
+
+# Invalid ctrl
+Sign = RSA-2048
+Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+Result = PKEY_CTRL_INVALID
+Function = pkey_rsa_ctrl
+Reason = invalid mgf1 md
+
+# EC tests
+
+Verify = P-256
+Ctrl = digest:SHA1
+Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
+Output = 3045022100b1d1cb1a577035bccdd5a86c6148c2cc7c633cd42b7234139b593076d041e15202201898cdd52b41ca502098184b409cf83a21bc945006746e3b7cea52234e043ec8
+
+# Digest too long
+Verify = P-256
+Ctrl = digest:SHA1
+Input = "0123456789ABCDEF12345"
+Output = 3045022100b1d1cb1a577035bccdd5a86c6148c2cc7c633cd42b7234139b593076d041e15202201898cdd52b41ca502098184b409cf83a21bc945006746e3b7cea52234e043ec8
+Result = VERIFY_ERROR
+
+# Digest too short
+Verify = P-256
+Ctrl = digest:SHA1
+Input = "0123456789ABCDEF123"
+Output = 3045022100b1d1cb1a577035bccdd5a86c6148c2cc7c633cd42b7234139b593076d041e15202201898cdd52b41ca502098184b409cf83a21bc945006746e3b7cea52234e043ec8
+Result = VERIFY_ERROR
+
+# Digest invalid
+Verify = P-256
+Ctrl = digest:SHA1
+Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1235"
+Output = 3045022100b1d1cb1a577035bccdd5a86c6148c2cc7c633cd42b7234139b593076d041e15202201898cdd52b41ca502098184b409cf83a21bc945006746e3b7cea52234e043ec8
+Result = VERIFY_ERROR
+
+# Invalid signature
+Verify = P-256
+Ctrl = digest:SHA1
+Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
+Output = 3045022100b1d1cb1a577035bccdd5a86c6148c2cc7c633cd42b7234139b593076d041e15202201898cdd52b41ca502098184b409cf83a21bc945006746e3b7cea52234e043ec7
+Result = VERIFY_ERROR
+
+# Garbage after signature
+Verify = P-256
+Ctrl = digest:SHA1
+Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
+Output = 3045022100b1d1cb1a577035bccdd5a86c6148c2cc7c633cd42b7234139b593076d041e15202201898cdd52b41ca502098184b409cf83a21bc945006746e3b7cea52234e043ec800
+Result = VERIFY_ERROR
+
+# BER signature
+Verify = P-256
+Ctrl = digest:SHA1
+Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
+Output = 3080022100b1d1cb1a577035bccdd5a86c6148c2cc7c633cd42b7234139b593076d041e15202201898cdd52b41ca502098184b409cf83a21bc945006746e3b7cea52234e043ec80000
+Result = VERIFY_ERROR
+
+Verify = P-256-PUBLIC
+Ctrl = digest:SHA1
+Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
+Output = 3045022100b1d1cb1a577035bccdd5a86c6148c2cc7c633cd42b7234139b593076d041e15202201898cdd52b41ca502098184b409cf83a21bc945006746e3b7cea52234e043ec8
+
+# DSA tests
+Verify = DSA-1024
+Ctrl = digest:SHA1
+Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
+Output = 302d021500942b8c5850e05b59e24495116b1e8559e51b610e0214237aedf272d91f2397f63c9fc8790e1a6cde5d87
+
+Verify = DSA-1024-PUBLIC
+Ctrl = digest:SHA1
+Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
+Output = 302d021500942b8c5850e05b59e24495116b1e8559e51b610e0214237aedf272d91f2397f63c9fc8790e1a6cde5d87
+
+# Modified signature
+Verify = DSA-1024-PUBLIC
+Ctrl = digest:SHA1
+Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
+Output = 302d021500942b8c5850e05b59e24495116b1e8559e51b610e0214237aedf272d91f2397f63c9fc8790e1a6cde5d88
+Result = VERIFY_ERROR
+
+# Digest too short
+Verify = DSA-1024-PUBLIC
+Ctrl = digest:SHA1
+Input = "0123456789ABCDEF123"
+Output = 302d021500942b8c5850e05b59e24495116b1e8559e51b610e0214237aedf272d91f2397f63c9fc8790e1a6cde5d87
+Result = VERIFY_ERROR
+
+# Digest too long
+Verify = DSA-1024-PUBLIC
+Ctrl = digest:SHA1
+Input = "0123456789ABCDEF12345"
+Output = 302d021500942b8c5850e05b59e24495116b1e8559e51b610e0214237aedf272d91f2397f63c9fc8790e1a6cde5d87
+Result = VERIFY_ERROR
+
+# Garbage after signature
+Verify = DSA-1024-PUBLIC
+Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
+Output = 302d021500942b8c5850e05b59e24495116b1e8559e51b610e0214237aedf272d91f2397f63c9fc8790e1a6cde5d8700
+Result = VERIFY_ERROR
+
+# Invalid tag
+Verify = DSA-1024-PUBLIC
+Ctrl = digest:SHA1
+Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
+Output = 312d021500942b8c5850e05b59e24495116b1e8559e51b610e0214237aedf272d91f2397f63c9fc8790e1a6cde5d87
+Result = VERIFY_ERROR
+
+# BER signature
+Verify = DSA-1024-PUBLIC
+Ctrl = digest:SHA1
+Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
+Output = 3080021500942b8c5850e05b59e24495116b1e8559e51b610e0214237aedf272d91f2397f63c9fc8790e1a6cde5d870000
+Result = VERIFY_ERROR
+
+# RSA PSS padding tests.
+
+# Zero salt length makes output deterministic
+Sign = RSA-2048
+Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
+Ctrl = rsa_pss_saltlen:0
+Ctrl = digest:sha256
+Input="0123456789ABCDEF0123456789ABCDEF"
+Output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
+
+# Verify of above signature
+Verify = RSA-2048-PUBLIC
+Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
+Ctrl = rsa_pss_saltlen:0
+Ctrl = digest:sha256
+Input="0123456789ABCDEF0123456789ABCDEF"
+Output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
+
+# Digest too short
+Verify = RSA-2048-PUBLIC
+Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
+Ctrl = rsa_pss_saltlen:0
+Ctrl = digest:sha256
+Input="0123456789ABCDEF0123456789ABCDE"
+Output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
+Result = VERIFY_ERROR
+
+# Digest too long
+Verify = RSA-2048-PUBLIC
+Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
+Ctrl = rsa_pss_saltlen:0
+Ctrl = digest:sha256
+Input="0123456789ABCDEF0123456789ABCDEF0"
+Output=4DE433D5844043EF08D354DA03CB29068780D52706D7D1E4D50EFB7D58C9D547D83A747DDD0635A96B28F854E50145518482CB49E963054621B53C60C498D07C16E9C2789C893CF38D4D86900DE71BDE463BD2761D1271E358C7480A1AC0BAB930DDF39602AD1BC165B5D7436B516B7A7858E8EB7AB1C420EEB482F4D207F0E462B1724959320A084E13848D11D10FB593E66BF680BF6D3F345FC3E9C3DE60ABBAC37E1C6EC80A268C8D9FC49626C679097AA690BC1AA662B95EB8DB70390861AA0898229F9349B4B5FDD030D4928C47084708A933144BE23BD3C6E661B85B2C0EF9ED36D498D5B7320E8194D363D4AD478C059BAE804181965E0B81B663158A
+Result = VERIFY_ERROR
+
+# Wrong salt length
+Verify = RSA-2048
+Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
+Ctrl = rsa_pss_saltlen:2
+Ctrl = digest:sha256
+Input="0123456789ABCDEF0123456789ABCDEF"
+Output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
+Result = VERIFY_ERROR
+
+# Wrong MGF1 digest
+Verify = RSA-2048
+Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
+Ctrl = rsa_pss_saltlen:0
+Ctrl = digest:sha256
+Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+Input="0123456789ABCDEF0123456789ABCDEF"
+Output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
+Result = VERIFY_ERROR
+
+# scrypt tests from draft-josefsson-scrypt-kdf-03
+PBE = scrypt
+Password = ""
+Salt = ""
+N = 16
+r = 1
+p = 1
+Key = 77d6576238657b203b19ca42c18a0497f16b4844e3074ae8dfdffa3fede21442fcd0069ded0948f8326a753a0fc81f17e8d3e0fb2e0d3628cf35e20c38d18906
+
+PBE = scrypt
+Password = "password"
+Salt = "NaCl"
+N = 1024
+r = 8
+p = 16
+Key = fdbabe1c9d3472007856e7190d01e9fe7c6ad7cbc8237830e77376634b3731622eaf30d92e22a3886ff109279d9830dac727afb94a83ee6d8360cbdfa2cc0640
+
+PBE = scrypt
+Password = "pleaseletmein"
+Salt = "SodiumChloride"
+N = 16384
+r = 8
+p = 1
+Key = 7023bdcb3afd7348461c06cd81fd38ebfda8fbba904f8e3ea9b543f6545da1f2d5432955613f0fcf62d49705242a9af9e61e85dc0d651e40dfcf017b45575887
+
+# NB: this test requires more than 1GB of memory to run so it will hit the
+# scrypt memory limit and return an error. To run this test without error
+# uncomment out the "maxmem" line and comment out the "Result"
+# line
+PBE = scrypt
+Password = "pleaseletmein"
+Salt = "SodiumChloride"
+N = 1048576
+r = 8
+p = 1
+Key = 2101cb9b6a511aaeaddbbe09cf70f881ec568d574a2ffd4dabe5ee9820adaa478e56fd8f4ba5d09ffa1c6d927c40f4c337304049e8a952fbcbf45c6fa77a41a4
+#maxmem = 10000000000
+Result = SCRYPT_ERROR
+
+# PKCS#12 tests
+
+PBE = pkcs12
+id = 1
+iter = 1
+MD = SHA1
+Password = 0073006D006500670000
+Salt = 0A58CF64530D823F
+Key = 8AAAE6297B6CB04642AB5B077851284EB7128F1A2A7FBCA3
+
+PBE = pkcs12
+id = 2
+iter = 1
+MD = SHA1
+Password = 0073006D006500670000
+Salt = 0A58CF64530D823F
+Key = 79993DFE048D3B76
+
+PBE = pkcs12
+id = 3
+iter 1
+MD = SHA1
+Password = 0073006D006500670000
+Salt = 3D83C0E4546AC140
+Key = 8D967D88F6CAA9D714800AB3D48051D63F73A312
+
+PBE = pkcs12
+id = 1
+iter = 1000
+MD = SHA1
+Password = 007100750065006500670000
+Salt = 1682C0FC5B3F7EC5
+Key = 483DD6E919D7DE2E8E648BA8F862F3FBFBDC2BCB2C02957F
+
+PBE = pkcs12
+id = 2
+iter = 1000
+MD = SHA1
+Password = 007100750065006500670000
+Salt = 1682C0FC5B3F7EC5
+Key = 9D461D1B00355C50
+
+PBE = pkcs12
+id = 3
+iter = 1000
+MD = SHA1
+Password = 007100750065006500670000
+Salt = 263216FCC2FAB31C
+Key = 5EC4C7A80DF652294C3925B6489A7AB857C83476
+
+# PBKDF2 tests from p5_crpt2_test.c
+PBE = pbkdf2
+Password = "password"
+Salt = "salt"
+iter = 1
+MD = sha1
+Key = 0c60c80f961f0e71f3a9b524af6012062fe037a6
+
+PBE = pbkdf2
+Password = "password"
+Salt = "salt"
+iter = 1
+MD = sha256
+Key = 120fb6cffcf8b32c43e7225256c4f837a86548c92ccc35480805987cb70be17b
+
+PBE = pbkdf2
+Password = "password"
+Salt = "salt"
+iter = 1
+MD = sha512
+Key = 867f70cf1ade02cff3752599a3a53dc4af34c7a669815ae5d513554e1c8cf252c02d470a285a0501bad999bfe943c08f050235d7d68b1da55e63f73b60a57fce
+
+PBE = pbkdf2
+Password = "password"
+Salt = "salt"
+iter = 2
+MD = sha1
+Key = ea6c014dc72d6f8ccd1ed92ace1d41f0d8de8957
+
+PBE = pbkdf2
+Password = "password"
+Salt = "salt"
+iter = 2
+MD = sha256
+Key = ae4d0c95af6b46d32d0adff928f06dd02a303f8ef3c251dfd6e2d85a95474c43
+
+PBE = pbkdf2
+Password = "password"
+Salt = "salt"
+iter = 2
+MD = sha512
+Key = e1d9c16aa681708a45f5c7c4e215ceb66e011a2e9f0040713f18aefdb866d53cf76cab2868a39b9f7840edce4fef5a82be67335c77a6068e04112754f27ccf4e
+
+PBE = pbkdf2
+Password = "password"
+Salt = "salt"
+iter = 4096
+MD = sha1
+Key = 4b007901b765489abead49d926f721d065a429c1
+
+PBE = pbkdf2
+Password = "password"
+Salt = "salt"
+iter = 4096
+MD = sha256
+Key = c5e478d59288c841aa530db6845c4c8d962893a001ce4e11a4963873aa98134a
+
+PBE = pbkdf2
+Password = "password"
+Salt = "salt"
+iter = 4096
+MD = sha512
+Key = d197b1b33db0143e018b12f3d1d1479e6cdebdcc97c5c0f87f6902e072f457b5143f30602641b3d55cd335988cb36b84376060ecd532e039b742a239434af2d5
+
+PBE = pbkdf2
+Password = "passwordPASSWORDpassword"
+Salt = "saltSALTsaltSALTsaltSALTsaltSALTsalt"
+iter = 4096
+MD = sha1
+Key = 3d2eec4fe41c849b80c8d83662c0e44a8b291a964cf2f07038
+
+PBE = pbkdf2
+Password = "passwordPASSWORDpassword"
+Salt = "saltSALTsaltSALTsaltSALTsaltSALTsalt"
+iter = 4096
+MD = sha256
+Key = 348c89dbcbd32b2f32d814b8116e84cf2b17347ebc1800181c4e2a1fb8dd53e1c635518c7dac47e9
+
+PBE = pbkdf2
+Password = "passwordPASSWORDpassword"
+Salt = "saltSALTsaltSALTsaltSALTsaltSALTsalt"
+iter = 4096
+MD = sha512
+Key = 8c0511f4c6e597c6ac6315d8f0362e225f3c501495ba23b868c005174dc4ee71115b59f9e60cd9532fa33e0f75aefe30225c583a186cd82bd4daea9724a3d3b8
+
+PBE = pbkdf2
+Password = 7061737300776f7264
+Salt = 7361006c74
+iter = 4096
+MD = sha1
+Key = 56fa6aa75548099dcc37d7f03425e0c3
+
+PBE = pbkdf2
+Password = 7061737300776f7264
+Salt = 7361006c74
+iter = 4096
+MD = sha256
+Key = 89b69d0516f829893c696226650a8687
+
+PBE = pbkdf2
+Password = 7061737300776f7264
+Salt = 7361006c74
+iter = 4096
+MD = sha512
+Key = 9d9e9c4cd21fe4be24d5b8244c759665
+
+# PBKDF2 tests for empty and NULL inputs
+PBE = pbkdf2
+Password = ""
+Salt = "salt"
+iter = 1
+MD = sha1
+Key = a33dddc30478185515311f8752895d36ea4363a2
+
+PBE = pbkdf2
+Password = ""
+Salt = "salt"
+iter = 1
+MD = sha256
+Key = f135c27993baf98773c5cdb40a5706ce6a345cde
+
+PBE = pbkdf2
+Password = ""
+Salt = "salt"
+iter = 1
+MD = sha512
+Key = 00ef42cdbfc98d29db20976608e455567fdddf14
+
+PBE = pbkdf2
+Password = NULL
+Salt = "salt"
+iter = 1
+MD = sha1
+Key = a33dddc30478185515311f8752895d36ea4363a2
+
+PBE = pbkdf2
+Password = NULL
+Salt = "salt"
+iter = 1
+MD = sha256
+Key = f135c27993baf98773c5cdb40a5706ce6a345cde
+
+PBE = pbkdf2
+Password = NULL
+Salt = "salt"
+iter = 1
+MD = sha512
+Key = 00ef42cdbfc98d29db20976608e455567fdddf14
+
+# Base64 tests
+
+Encoding = canonical
+Input = ""
+Output = ""
+
+Encoding = canonical
+Input = "h"
+Output = "aA==\n"
+
+Encoding = canonical
+Input = "hello"
+Output = "aGVsbG8=\n"
+
+Encoding = canonical
+Input = "hello world!"
+Output = "aGVsbG8gd29ybGQh\n"
+
+Encoding = canonical
+Input = 00010203040506070809a0b0c0d0e0f000
+Output = "AAECAwQFBgcICaCwwNDg8AA=\n"
+
+# Missing padding
+Encoding = invalid
+Output = "aGVsbG8"
+
+Encoding = invalid
+Output = "aGVsbG8\n"
+
+# Tolerate missing newline
+Encoding = valid
+Input = "hello"
+Output = "aGVsbG8="
+
+# Don't tolerate extra trailing '='
+Encoding = invalid
+Input = "hello"
+Output = "aGVsbG8==\n"
+
+Encoding = invalid
+Output = "aGVsbG8===\n"
+
+# Don't tolerate data after '='
+Encoding = invalid
+Output = "aGV=sbG8=\n"
+
+# Newlines are ignored
+Encoding = valid
+Input = "hello"
+Output = "aGV\nsbG8=\n"
+
+Encoding = canonical
+Input = "hello"
+Output = 614756736247383d0a
+
+# Invalid characters
+Encoding = invalid
+Output = 614756736247383d0a00
+
+Encoding = invalid
+Output = 61475600736247383d0a
+
+Encoding = invalid
+Output = 61475601736247383d0a
+
+Encoding = invalid
+Output = 61475680736247383d0a
+
+Encoding = invalid
+Output = e14756736247383d0a
+
+Encoding = canonical
+Input = "OpenSSLOpenSSL\n"
+Output = "T3BlblNTTE9wZW5TU0wK\n"
+
+Encoding = valid
+Input = "OpenSSLOpenSSL\n"
+Output = "T3BlblNTTE9wZW5TU0wK"
+
+# Truncate 1-3 chars
+Encoding = invalid
+Output = "T3BlblNTTE9wZW5TU0w"
+
+Encoding = invalid
+Output = "T3BlblNTTE9wZW5TU0"
+
+Encoding = invalid
+Output = "T3BlblNTTE9wZW5TU"
+
+Encoding = invalid
+Output = "T3BlblNTTE9wZW5TU0wK===="
+
+Encoding = invalid
+Output = "T3BlblNTTE9wZW5TU0wK============================================\n"
+
+Encoding = invalid
+Output = "YQ==YQ==YQ==\n"
+
+Encoding = invalid
+Output = "A"
+
+Encoding = invalid
+Output = "A\n"
+
+Encoding = invalid
+Output = "A="
+
+Encoding = invalid
+Output = "A==\n"
+
+Encoding = invalid
+Output = "A===\n"
+
+Encoding = invalid
+Output = "A====\n"
+
+Encoding = valid
+Input = "OpenSSLOpenSSL\n"
+Output = "T3BlblNTTE9wZW5TU0wK\n\n"
+
+Encoding = valid
+Input = "OpenSSLOpenSSL\n"
+Output = "T3BlblNTTE\n9wZW5TU0wK"
+
+# CVE 2015-0292
+Encoding = invalid
+Output = "ZW5jb2RlIG1lCg==================================================================\n"
+
+Encoding = canonical
+Input = "xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx"
+Output = "eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eA==\n"
+
+Encoding = valid
+Input = "xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx"
+Output = "eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eA\n==\n"
+
+Encoding = valid
+Input = "xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx"
+Output = "eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eA=\n=\n"
+
+Encoding = invalid
+Output = "eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eA====\n"
+
+# Multiline output without padding
+Encoding = canonical
+Input = "xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx"
+Output = "eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4\neHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4\n"
+
+# Multiline output with padding
+Encoding = canonical
+Input = "xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx"
+Output = "eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4\neHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eA==\n"
+
+# Multiline output with line break in the middle of a b64 block is accepted
+Encoding = valid
+Input = "xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx"
+Output = "eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh\n4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eA==\n"
+
+# Long lines are accepted
+Encoding = valid
+Input = "xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx"
+Output = "eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eA==\n"
+
+# Multiline input with data after '='.
+Encoding = invalid
+Output = "eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eA==\neHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4\n"
+
+Encoding = invalid
+Output = "eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4\neA==eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4eHh4\n"
+
+# B64_EOF ('-') terminates input and trailing bytes are ignored
+Encoding = valid
+Input = "OpenSSLOpenSSL\n"
+Output = "T3BlblNTTE9wZW5TU0wK\n-abcd"
+
+Encoding = valid
+Input = "OpenSSLOpenSSL\n"
+Output = "T3BlblNTTE9wZW5TU0wK-abcd"
+
+Cipher = chacha20
+Key = 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
+IV = 00000000000000000000000000000000
+Plaintext = 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
+Ciphertext = 76b8e0ada0f13d90405d6ae55386bd28bdd219b8a08ded1aa836efcc8b770dc7da41597c5157488d7724e03fb8d84a376a43b8f41518a11cc387b669b2ee6586
+
+Cipher = chacha20
+Key = 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001
+IV = 00000000000000000000000000000000
+Plaintext = 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
+Ciphertext = 4540f05a9f1fb296d7736e7b208e3c96eb4fe1834688d2604f450952ed432d41bbe2a0b6ea7566d2a5d1e7e20d42af2c53d792b1c43fea817e9ad275ae546963
+
+Cipher = chacha20
+Key = 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
+IV = 00000000000000000000000000000001
+Plaintext = 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
+Ciphertext = de9cba7bf3d69ef5e786dc63973f653a0b49e015adbff7134fcb7df137821031e85a050278a7084527214f73efc7fa5b5277062eb7a0433e445f41e31afab757
+
+Cipher = chacha20
+Key = 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
+IV = 00000000000000000100000000000000
+Plaintext = 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
+Ciphertext = ef3fdfd6c61578fbf5cf35bd3dd33b8009631634d21e42ac33960bd138e50d32111e4caf237ee53ca8ad6426194a88545ddc497a0b466e7d6bbdb0041b2f586b
+
+Cipher = chacha20
+Key = 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f
+IV = 00000000000000000001020304050607
+Plaintext = 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
+Ciphertext = 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
+
+Cipher = chacha20
+Key = 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f
+IV = 00000000000000000001020304050607
+Plaintext = 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
+Ciphertext = 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
+
+Cipher = chacha20
+Key = 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f
+IV = 00000000000000000001020304050607
+Plaintext = 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
+Ciphertext = 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
+
+Cipher = chacha20
+Key = 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f
+IV = 00000000000000000001020304050607
+Plaintext = 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
+Ciphertext = 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
+
+Cipher = chacha20
+Key = 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f
+IV = 00000000000000000001020304050607
+Plaintext = 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
+Ciphertext = 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
+
+Cipher = chacha20
+Key = 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f
+IV = 00000000000000000001020304050607
+Plaintext = 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
+Ciphertext = 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
+
+Cipher = chacha20
+Key = 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f
+IV = 00000000000000000001020304050607
+Plaintext = 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
+Ciphertext = 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
+
+Cipher = chacha20
+Key = 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f
+IV = 00000000000000000001020304050607
+Plaintext = 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
+Ciphertext = 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
+
+Cipher = chacha20
+Key = 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f
+IV = 00000000000000000001020304050607
+Plaintext = 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
+Ciphertext = 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
+
+Cipher = chacha20
+Key = 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f
+IV = 00000000000000000001020304050607
+Plaintext = 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
+Ciphertext = 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
+
+Cipher = chacha20
+Key = 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f
+IV = 00000000000000000001020304050607
+Plaintext = 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
+Ciphertext = f798a189f195e66982105ffb640bb7757f579da31602fc93ec01ac56f85ac3c134a4547b733b46413042c9440049176905d3be59ea1c53f15916155c2be8241a38008b9a26bc35941e2444177c8ade6689de95264986d95889fb60e84629c9bd9a5acb1cc118be563eb9b3a4a472f82e09a7e778492b562ef7130e88dfe031c79db9d4f7c7a899151b9a475032b63fc385245fe054e3dd5a97a5f576fe064025d3ce042c566ab2c507b138db853e3d6959660996546cc9c4a6eafdc777c040d70eaf46f76dad3979e5c5360c3317166a1c894c94a371876a94df7628fe4eaaf2ccb27d5aaae0ad7ad0f9d4b6ad3b54098746d4524d38407a6deb3ab78fab78c94213668bbbd394c5de93b853178addd6b97f9fa1ec3e56c00c9ddff0a44a204241175a4cab0f961ba53ede9bdf960b94f9829b1f3414726429b362c5b538e391520f489b7ed8d20ae3fd49e9e259e44397514d618c96c4846be3c680bdc11c71dcbbe29ccf80d62a0938fa549391e6ea57ecbe2606790ec15d2224ae307c144226b7c4e8c2f97d2a1d67852d29beba110edd445197012062a393a9c92803ad3b4f31d7bc6033ccf7932cfed3f019044d25905916777286f82f9a4cc1ffe430ffd1dcfc27deed327b9f9630d2fa969fb6f0603cd19dd9a9519e673bcfcd9014125291a44669ef7285e74ed3729b677f801c3cdf058c50963168b496043716c7307cd9e0cdd137fccb0f05b47cdbb95c5f54831622c3652a32b2531fe326bcd6e2bbf56a194fa196fbd1a54952110f51c73433865f7664b836685e3664b3d8444aF89A242805E18C975F1146324996FDE17007CF3E6E8F4E764022533EDBFE07D4733E48BB372D75B0EF48EC983EB78532161CC529E5ABB89837DFCCA6261DBB37C7C5E6A87478BF41EE85A518C0F4EFA9BDE828C5A71B8E46597B634AFD204D3C501334239C3414285ED72D3A9169EABBD4DC25D52BB7516D3BA712D75AD8C0AE5D493C19E38A77939E7A058D713E9CCCCA58045F436B434B1C80D365472406E392951987DB6905C80D431DA18451135BE7E82BCAB358CB3971E61405B2FF17980D6E7E67E861E28201C1EE30B441040FD06878D65042C95582A4318207BFC700BE0CE32889AEC2FFE5085E8967910D879FA0E8C0FF85FDC510B9FF2FBF87CFCB29577D68099E04FFA05F752A73D377C70D3A8BC2DA80E6E780EC057182C33AD1DE387252258A1E18E6FAD910327CE7F42FD1E1E0515F9586E2F2EFCB9F472B1DBDBAC354A4162151E9D92C79FB08BB4DDC56F19448C0175A46E2E6C491FEC71419AA43A349BEA768A92C75DE68FD9591E68067F3197094D3FB87ED81785EA075E4B65E3E4C78F81DA9B751C5EFE024152301C48E63245B556C4C67AFF857E5EA15A908D83A1D9704F8E55E7352B20B694BF9970298E6B5AAD33EA2155D105D4E
+
+Cipher = chacha20
+Key = 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f
+IV = 00000000000000000001020304050607
+Plaintext = 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
+Ciphertext = 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
+
+# RFC7539
+Cipher = chacha20-poly1305
+Key = 808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9f
+IV = 070000004041424344454647
+AAD = 50515253c0c1c2c3c4c5c6c7
+Tag = 1ae10b594f09e26a7e902ecbd0600691
+Plaintext = 4c616469657320616e642047656e746c656d656e206f662074686520636c617373206f66202739393a204966204920636f756c64206f6666657220796f75206f6e6c79206f6e652074697020666f7220746865206675747572652c2073756e73637265656e20776f756c642062652069742e
+Ciphertext = d31a8d34648e60db7b86afbc53ef7ec2a4aded51296e08fea9e2b5a736ee62d63dbea45e8ca9671282fafb69da92728b1a71de0a9e060b2905d6a5b67ecd3b3692ddbd7f2d778b8c9803aee328091b58fab324e4fad675945585808b4831d7bc3ff4def08e4b7a9de576d26586cec64b6116
+
+Cipher = chacha20-poly1305
+Key = 1c9240a5eb55d38af333888604f6b5f0473917c1402b80099dca5cbc207075c0
+IV = 000000000102030405060708
+AAD = f33388860000000000004e91
+Tag = eead9d67890cbb22392336fea1851f38
+Plaintext = 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
+Ciphertext = 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
+
+Cipher = chacha20-poly1305
+Key = 1c9240a5eb55d38af333888604f6b5f0473917c1402b80099dca5cbc207075c0
+IV = 000000000102030405060708
+AAD = f33388860000000000004e91
+Tag = eead9d67890cbb22392336fea1851f39
+Plaintext = 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
+Ciphertext = 64a0861575861af460f062c79be643bd5e805cfd345cf389f108670ac76c8cb24c6cfc18755d43eea09ee94e382d26b0bdb7b73c321b0100d4f03b7f355894cf332f830e710b97ce98c8a84abd0b948114ad176e008d33bd60f982b1ff37c8559797a06ef4f0ef61c186324e2b3506383606907b6a7c02b0f9f6157b53c867e4b9166c767b804d46a59b5216cde7a4e99040c5a40433225ee282a1b0a06c523eaf4534d7f83fa1155b0047718cbc546a0d072b04b3564eea1b422273f548271a0bb2316053fa76991955ebd63159434ecebb4e466dae5a1073a6727627097a1049e617d91d361094fa68f0ff77987130305beaba2eda04df997b714d6c6f2c29a6ad5cb4022b02709b
+Operation = DECRYPT
+Result = CIPHERFINAL_ERROR
+
+# TLS1 PRF tests, from NIST test vectors
+
+KDF=TLS1-PRF
+Ctrl.md = md:MD5-SHA1
+Ctrl.Secret = hexsecret:bded7fa5c1699c010be23dd06ada3a48349f21e5f86263d512c0c5cc379f0e780ec55d9844b2f1db02a96453513568d0
+Ctrl.label = seed:master secret
+Ctrl.client_random = hexseed:e5acaf549cd25c22d964c0d930fa4b5261d2507fad84c33715b7b9a864020693
+Ctrl.server_random = hexseed:135e4d557fdf3aa6406d82975d5c606a9734c9334b42136e96990fbd5358cdb2
+Output = 2f6962dfbc744c4b2138bb6b3d33054c5ecc14f24851d9896395a44ab3964efc2090c5bf51a0891209f46c1e1e998f62
+
+KDF=TLS1-PRF
+Ctrl.md = md:MD5-SHA1
+Ctrl.Secret = hexsecret:2f6962dfbc744c4b2138bb6b3d33054c5ecc14f24851d9896395a44ab3964efc2090c5bf51a0891209f46c1e1e998f62
+Ctrl.label = seed:key expansion
+Ctrl.server_random = hexseed:67267e650eb32444119d222a368c191af3082888dc35afe8368e638c828874be
+Ctrl.client_random = hexseed:d58a7b1cd4fedaa232159df652ce188f9d997e061b9bf48e83b62990440931f6
+Output = 3088825988e77fce68d19f756e18e43eb7fe672433504feaf99b3c503d9091b164f166db301d70c9fc0870b4a94563907bee1a61fb786cb717576890bcc51cb9ead97e01d0a2fea99c953377b195205ff07b369589178796edc963fd80fdbe518a2fc1c35c18ae8d
+
+KDF=TLS1-PRF
+Ctrl.md = md:SHA256
+Ctrl.Secret = hexsecret:f8938ecc9edebc5030c0c6a441e213cd24e6f770a50dda07876f8d55da062bcadb386b411fd4fe4313a604fce6c17fbc
+Ctrl.label = seed:master secret
+Ctrl.client_random = hexseed:36c129d01a3200894b9179faac589d9835d58775f9b5ea3587cb8fd0364cae8c
+Ctrl.server_random = hexseed:f6c9575ed7ddd73e1f7d16eca115415812a43c2b747daaaae043abfb50053fce
+Output = 202c88c00f84a17a20027079604787461176455539e705be730890602c289a5001e34eeb3a043e5d52a65e66125188bf
+
+KDF=TLS1-PRF
+Ctrl.md = md:SHA256
+Ctrl.Secret = hexsecret:202c88c00f84a17a20027079604787461176455539e705be730890602c289a5001e34eeb3a043e5d52a65e66125188bf
+Ctrl.label = seed:key expansion
+Ctrl.server_random = hexseed:ae6c806f8ad4d80784549dff28a4b58fd837681a51d928c3e30ee5ff14f39868
+Ctrl.client_random = hexseed:62e1fd91f23f558a605f28478c58cf72637b89784d959df7e946d3f07bd1b616
+Output = d06139889fffac1e3a71865f504aa5d0d2a2e89506c6f2279b670c3e1b74f531016a2530c51a3a0f7e1d6590d0f0566b2f387f8d11fd4f731cdd572d2eae927f6f2f81410b25e6960be68985add6c38445ad9f8c64bf8068bf9a6679485d966f1ad6f68b43495b10a683755ea2b858d70ccac7ec8b053c6bd41ca299d4e51928
+
+# Missing digest.
+KDF=TLS1-PRF
+Ctrl.Secret = hexsecret:01
+Ctrl.Seed = hexseed:02
+Output = 03
+Result = KDF_DERIVE_ERROR
+
+# Missing secret.
+KDF=TLS1-PRF
+Ctrl.md = md:MD5-SHA1
+Ctrl.Seed = hexseed:02
+Output = 03
+Result = KDF_DERIVE_ERROR
+
+# HKDF tests, from RFC5869 test vectors
+
+KDF = HKDF
+Ctrl.md = md:SHA256
+Ctrl.IKM = hexkey:0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b
+Ctrl.salt = hexsalt:000102030405060708090a0b0c
+Ctrl.info = hexinfo:f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9
+Output = 3cb25f25faacd57a90434f64d0362f2a2d2d0a90cf1a5a4c5db02d56ecc4c5bf34007208d5b887185865
+
+KDF = HKDF
+Ctrl.md = md:SHA256
+Ctrl.IKM = hexkey:000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f
+Ctrl.salt = hexsalt:606162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a7b7c7d7e7f808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9fa0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeaf
+Ctrl.info = hexinfo:b0b1b2b3b4b5b6b7b8b9babbbcbdbebfc0c1c2c3c4c5c6c7c8c9cacbcccdcecfd0d1d2d3d4d5d6d7d8d9dadbdcdddedfe0e1e2e3e4e5e6e7e8e9eaebecedeeeff0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff
+Output = b11e398dc80327a1c8e7f78c596a49344f012eda2d4efad8a050cc4c19afa97c59045a99cac7827271cb41c65e590e09da3275600c2f09b8367793a9aca3db71cc30c58179ec3e87c14c01d5c1f3434f1d87
+
+KDF = HKDF
+Ctrl.md = md:SHA256
+Ctrl.IKM = hexkey:0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b
+Ctrl.salt = salt:
+Ctrl.info = info:
+Output = 8da4e775a563c18f715f802a063c5a31b8a11f5c5ee1879ec3454e5f3c738d2d9d201395faa4b61a96c8
+
+KDF = HKDF
+Ctrl.md = md:SHA1
+Ctrl.IKM = hexkey:0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b
+Ctrl.salt = hexsalt:000102030405060708090a0b0c
+Ctrl.info = hexinfo:f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9
+Output = 085a01ea1b10f36933068b56efa5ad81a4f14b822f5b091568a9cdd4f155fda2c22e422478d305f3f896
+
+KDF = HKDF
+Ctrl.md = md:SHA1
+Ctrl.IKM = hexkey:000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f
+Ctrl.salt = hexsalt:606162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a7b7c7d7e7f808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9fa0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeaf
+Ctrl.info = hexinfo:b0b1b2b3b4b5b6b7b8b9babbbcbdbebfc0c1c2c3c4c5c6c7c8c9cacbcccdcecfd0d1d2d3d4d5d6d7d8d9dadbdcdddedfe0e1e2e3e4e5e6e7e8e9eaebecedeeeff0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff
+Output = 0bd770a74d1160f7c9f12cd5912a06ebff6adcae899d92191fe4305673ba2ffe8fa3f1a4e5ad79f3f334b3b202b2173c486ea37ce3d397ed034c7f9dfeb15c5e927336d0441f4c4300e2cff0d0900b52d3b4
+
+KDF = HKDF
+Ctrl.md = md:SHA1
+Ctrl.IKM = hexkey:0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b
+Ctrl.salt = salt:
+Ctrl.info = info:
+Output = 0ac1af7002b3d761d1e55298da9d0506b9ae52057220a306e07b6b87e8df21d0ea00033de03984d34918
+
+KDF = HKDF
+Ctrl.md = md:SHA1
+Ctrl.IKM = hexkey:0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c
+Ctrl.salt = salt:
+Ctrl.info = info:
+Output = 2c91117204d745f3500d636a62f64f0ab3bae548aa53d423b0d1f27ebba6f5e5673a081d70cce7acfc48
+
+KDF = HKDF
+Ctrl.IKM = hexkey:0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c
+Ctrl.salt = salt:
+Ctrl.info = info:
+Output = 00
+Result = KDF_DERIVE_ERROR
+
+KDF = HKDF
+Ctrl.md = md:SHA1
+Ctrl.salt = salt:
+Ctrl.info = info:
+Output = 00
+Result = KDF_DERIVE_ERROR
+
+KDF = HKDF
+Ctrl.md = md:SHA1
+Ctrl.IKM = hexkey:0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c
+Ctrl.info = info:
+Output = 2c91117204d745f3500d636a62f64f0ab3bae548aa53d423b0d1f27ebba6f5e5673a081d70cce7acfc48
+
+KDF = HKDF
+Ctrl.md = md:SHA1
+Ctrl.IKM = hexkey:0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c
+Ctrl.salt = salt:
+Output = 2c91117204d745f3500d636a62f64f0ab3bae548aa53d423b0d1f27ebba6f5e5673a081d70cce7acfc48
+
+# ECDH tests
+
+Derive=P-256
+PeerKey=P-256-Peer-PUBLIC
+SharedSecret=E3CC07DFBDDE76A1139811DB9FF5FAF9D17EF39944F1E77D1F6A208524BF7B1B
+
+Derive=P-256-Peer
+PeerKey=P-256-PUBLIC
+SharedSecret=E3CC07DFBDDE76A1139811DB9FF5FAF9D17EF39944F1E77D1F6A208524BF7B1B
+
+# X25519 test vectors from RFC7748 6.1
+PrivateKey=Alice-25519
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MC4CAQAwBQYDK2VuBCIEIHcHbQpzGKV9PBbBclGyZkXfTC+H68CZKrF3+6UduSwq
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+PublicKey=Alice-25519-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MCowBQYDK2VuAyEAhSDwCYkwp1R0i33ctD73Wg2/Og0mOBr066SpjqqbTmo=
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = Alice-25519:Alice-25519-PUBLIC
+
+PrivateKey=Bob-25519
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MC4CAQAwBQYDK2VuBCIEIF2rCH5iSopLeeF/i4OADuZvO7EpJhi2/Rwviyf/iODr
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+PublicKey=Bob-25519-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MCowBQYDK2VuAyEA3p7bfXt9wbTTW2HC7OQ1Nz+DQ8hbeGdNrfx+FG+IK08=
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = Bob-25519:Bob-25519-PUBLIC
+
+Derive=Alice-25519
+PeerKey=Bob-25519-PUBLIC
+SharedSecret=4A5D9D5BA4CE2DE1728E3BF480350F25E07E21C947D19E3376F09B3C1E161742
+
+Derive=Bob-25519
+PeerKey=Alice-25519-PUBLIC
+SharedSecret=4A5D9D5BA4CE2DE1728E3BF480350F25E07E21C947D19E3376F09B3C1E161742
+
+# Illegal sign/verify operations with X25519 key
+
+Sign=Alice-25519
+Result = KEYOP_INIT_ERROR
+Function = EVP_PKEY_sign_init
+Reason = operation not supported for this keytype
+
+Verify=Alice-25519
+Result = KEYOP_INIT_ERROR
+Function = EVP_PKEY_verify_init
+Reason = operation not supported for this keytype
+
+## ECDH Tests: test with randomly generated keys for all the listed curves
+
+
+# TEST CURVE secp112r1
+
+PrivateKey=ALICE_secp112r1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+ME4CAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEAAYENzA1AgEBBA6sqKp39AWLClus2ha5rqEg
+Ax4ABJ4NTgOR1xQAr3M6eM46WqXW2zA6FnsUMKFFwcw=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=ALICE_secp112r1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MDIwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEAAYDHgAEng1OA5HXFACvczp4zjpapdbbMDoWexQw
+oUXBzA==
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = ALICE_secp112r1:ALICE_secp112r1_PUB
+
+
+PrivateKey=BOB_secp112r1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+ME4CAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEAAYENzA1AgEBBA5pIbX+hEq49mFPjUl4/6Eg
+Ax4ABBsPNZHm1pcdw104ibwIycCe+r5voeRfQUZRZ3c=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BOB_secp112r1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MDIwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEAAYDHgAEGw81kebWlx3DXTiJvAjJwJ76vm+h5F9B
+RlFndw==
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BOB_secp112r1:BOB_secp112r1_PUB
+
+
+# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
+Derive=ALICE_secp112r1
+PeerKey=BOB_secp112r1_PUB
+SharedSecret=a6cefb5aa7a352afe818749eb401
+
+# ECDH Bob with Alice peer
+Derive=BOB_secp112r1
+PeerKey=ALICE_secp112r1_PUB
+SharedSecret=a6cefb5aa7a352afe818749eb401
+
+# TEST CURVE secp112r2
+
+PrivateKey=ALICE_secp112r2
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+ME4CAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEAAcENzA1AgEBBA4gzzblKfE6ZwoUW0FQmaEg
+Ax4ABJJ4L7Vo50NZ5VGZ4nNkxFNcjJQwDIQb1/9IkLE=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=ALICE_secp112r2_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MDIwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEAAcDHgAEkngvtWjnQ1nlUZnic2TEU1yMlDAMhBvX
+/0iQsQ==
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = ALICE_secp112r2:ALICE_secp112r2_PUB
+
+
+PrivateKey=BOB_secp112r2
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+ME4CAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEAAcENzA1AgEBBA4D9oGGj+O8vjZz3OZNaqEg
+Ax4ABNZOv5gUzvVbgAHpTgu3hUhTQtB8LamTEIfaRWE=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BOB_secp112r2_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MDIwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEAAcDHgAE1k6/mBTO9VuAAelOC7eFSFNC0HwtqZMQ
+h9pFYQ==
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BOB_secp112r2:BOB_secp112r2_PUB
+
+
+# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
+Derive=ALICE_secp112r2
+PeerKey=BOB_secp112r2_PUB
+SharedSecret=6bed2c55e233e9214d5898c4c12a
+
+# ECDH Bob with Alice peer
+Derive=BOB_secp112r2
+PeerKey=ALICE_secp112r2_PUB
+SharedSecret=6bed2c55e233e9214d5898c4c12a
+
+# TEST CURVE secp128r1
+
+PrivateKey=ALICE_secp128r1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MFQCAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEABwEPTA7AgEBBBCP1c+lxfRT+MZWZ8uGCYYl
+oSQDIgAEH2n0icp87inv7kUYrEFjpZuHJ4DqArhHS+Zfp2XXO1A=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=ALICE_secp128r1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MDYwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEABwDIgAEH2n0icp87inv7kUYrEFjpZuHJ4DqArhH
+S+Zfp2XXO1A=
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = ALICE_secp128r1:ALICE_secp128r1_PUB
+
+
+PrivateKey=BOB_secp128r1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MFQCAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEABwEPTA7AgEBBBCGbEd3Hhwr76XbQekhIrDT
+oSQDIgAENKjS0HNx/gEKYQNNab9v8zlW/D4zSjv3Ny3Ep0GVYms=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BOB_secp128r1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MDYwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEABwDIgAENKjS0HNx/gEKYQNNab9v8zlW/D4zSjv3
+Ny3Ep0GVYms=
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BOB_secp128r1:BOB_secp128r1_PUB
+
+
+# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
+Derive=ALICE_secp128r1
+PeerKey=BOB_secp128r1_PUB
+SharedSecret=91ded46ac404afdbd708fdcc1cac6842
+
+# ECDH Bob with Alice peer
+Derive=BOB_secp128r1
+PeerKey=ALICE_secp128r1_PUB
+SharedSecret=91ded46ac404afdbd708fdcc1cac6842
+
+# TEST CURVE secp128r2
+
+PrivateKey=ALICE_secp128r2
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MFQCAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEAB0EPTA7AgEBBBAgRKSjPsZ76LDGIA2it5SC
+oSQDIgAEBVdjcUpR+b6LRPm6R8fAD/6kBxV0Kl3939Wn0+nUpf8=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=ALICE_secp128r2_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MDYwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEAB0DIgAEBVdjcUpR+b6LRPm6R8fAD/6kBxV0Kl39
+39Wn0+nUpf8=
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = ALICE_secp128r2:ALICE_secp128r2_PUB
+
+
+PrivateKey=BOB_secp128r2
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MFQCAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEAB0EPTA7AgEBBBACp00jw5D7obvDmJp7wDuA
+oSQDIgAEBO3BbVrc5SvhvN+fmWShu2tWIFQap5ys5RHMCLLl098=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BOB_secp128r2_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MDYwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEAB0DIgAEBO3BbVrc5SvhvN+fmWShu2tWIFQap5ys
+5RHMCLLl098=
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BOB_secp128r2:BOB_secp128r2_PUB
+
+
+# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
+Derive=ALICE_secp128r2
+PeerKey=BOB_secp128r2_PUB
+SharedSecret=dc32faa978008a694672076b756a1e4b
+
+# ECDH Bob with Alice peer
+Derive=BOB_secp128r2
+PeerKey=ALICE_secp128r2_PUB
+SharedSecret=dc32faa978008a694672076b756a1e4b
+
+# TEST CURVE secp160k1
+
+PrivateKey=ALICE_secp160k1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MGECAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEAAkESjBIAgEBBBUAudN3YOXN0uu0CL2TGZdP
+YeNU/72hLAMqAAR3Du0dK28tSyWxYSz/Es2Wqr4C+bNfJ1uiK4J3BFS5Udc48nsx
+xfjj
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=ALICE_secp160k1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MD4wEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEAAkDKgAEdw7tHStvLUslsWEs/xLNlqq+AvmzXydb
+oiuCdwRUuVHXOPJ7McX44w==
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = ALICE_secp160k1:ALICE_secp160k1_PUB
+
+
+PrivateKey=BOB_secp160k1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MGECAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEAAkESjBIAgEBBBUA5fNiCFVGPM1aHuwXUvuh
+xoY2yU+hLAMqAAQHlM6otmapt0/0sc+5bcPoYT6cfyARv4VUOOo6I2eBGXLIm812
+1ric
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BOB_secp160k1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MD4wEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEAAkDKgAEB5TOqLZmqbdP9LHPuW3D6GE+nH8gEb+F
+VDjqOiNngRlyyJvNdta4nA==
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BOB_secp160k1:BOB_secp160k1_PUB
+
+
+# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
+Derive=ALICE_secp160k1
+PeerKey=BOB_secp160k1_PUB
+SharedSecret=5457d367346cc3e82031784f95ebcd856de0c735
+
+# ECDH Bob with Alice peer
+Derive=BOB_secp160k1
+PeerKey=ALICE_secp160k1_PUB
+SharedSecret=5457d367346cc3e82031784f95ebcd856de0c735
+
+# TEST CURVE secp160r1
+
+PrivateKey=ALICE_secp160r1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MGECAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEAAgESjBIAgEBBBUA0KDtaiFUWd8NG0lO9TLu
+zjLWXJehLAMqAASHQN1DGBXtdyF3+BjfIfbWg403dUqXbIXzZoctDyOPTQaGVblm
+SwXC
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=ALICE_secp160r1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MD4wEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEAAgDKgAEh0DdQxgV7Xchd/gY3yH21oONN3VKl2yF
+82aHLQ8jj00GhlW5ZksFwg==
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = ALICE_secp160r1:ALICE_secp160r1_PUB
+
+
+PrivateKey=BOB_secp160r1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MGECAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEAAgESjBIAgEBBBUAsBIwvx6ZABinhsi+bGai
+CvetiuWhLAMqAAQJ2+RhpGedkUYXUiPZ/plHXFBy6R3XzMUGIKiXFGSBpwF8hGRN
+qUDy
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BOB_secp160r1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MD4wEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEAAgDKgAECdvkYaRnnZFGF1Ij2f6ZR1xQcukd18zF
+BiColxRkgacBfIRkTalA8g==
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BOB_secp160r1:BOB_secp160r1_PUB
+
+
+# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
+Derive=ALICE_secp160r1
+PeerKey=BOB_secp160r1_PUB
+SharedSecret=87856536b6a295ea94d3e483d69c6212d5c7afcf
+
+# ECDH Bob with Alice peer
+Derive=BOB_secp160r1
+PeerKey=ALICE_secp160r1_PUB
+SharedSecret=87856536b6a295ea94d3e483d69c6212d5c7afcf
+
+# TEST CURVE secp160r2
+
+PrivateKey=ALICE_secp160r2
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MGECAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEAB4ESjBIAgEBBBUAhmLOAJGNuSoZUCN4f0On
+LZ6rRSShLAMqAAQPSNvhJQohMEfijXq+Jlq7a9lzosQfPvuIyOg6shyzUVS43R+7
+Lgr5
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=ALICE_secp160r2_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MD4wEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEAB4DKgAED0jb4SUKITBH4o16viZau2vZc6LEHz77
+iMjoOrIcs1FUuN0fuy4K+Q==
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = ALICE_secp160r2:ALICE_secp160r2_PUB
+
+
+PrivateKey=BOB_secp160r2
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MGECAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEAB4ESjBIAgEBBBUA10mjzR2Dy0CLmm/MTAHT
+b5CBenOhLAMqAARqzYAcSijzAo2vzmMuK8ta8sl/bguuCpRwFD93ACP64TzgI3re
+FhsX
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BOB_secp160r2_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MD4wEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEAB4DKgAEas2AHEoo8wKNr85jLivLWvLJf24LrgqU
+cBQ/dwAj+uE84CN63hYbFw==
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BOB_secp160r2:BOB_secp160r2_PUB
+
+
+# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
+Derive=ALICE_secp160r2
+PeerKey=BOB_secp160r2_PUB
+SharedSecret=5481e282c47cbd37c84873847c4fc2f31fc15a1a
+
+# ECDH Bob with Alice peer
+Derive=BOB_secp160r2
+PeerKey=ALICE_secp160r2_PUB
+SharedSecret=5481e282c47cbd37c84873847c4fc2f31fc15a1a
+
+# TEST CURVE secp192k1
+
+PrivateKey=ALICE_secp192k1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MGwCAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEAB8EVTBTAgEBBBizF3KeHMsaV/KOR/otCmdL
+QT2qGNq3HhWhNAMyAATP+L9SGl3K6wmevkLwJnkMNHp0I5RfXulSfHuHZPp4CGrh
+i6eKNQLkpZ2OQaPIExA=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=ALICE_secp192k1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MEYwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEAB8DMgAEz/i/UhpdyusJnr5C8CZ5DDR6dCOUX17p
+Unx7h2T6eAhq4YunijUC5KWdjkGjyBMQ
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = ALICE_secp192k1:ALICE_secp192k1_PUB
+
+
+PrivateKey=BOB_secp192k1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MGwCAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEAB8EVTBTAgEBBBh8BXPVGQKYCw0v7DY3wZVa
+cyhyUjIbUymhNAMyAATgI7hw2LSj6uN3yL5nvHOOkMiPtalKr+BGsFac39RYmp64
+mr+w66bDIWN3VllO6LY=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BOB_secp192k1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MEYwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEAB8DMgAE4CO4cNi0o+rjd8i+Z7xzjpDIj7WpSq/g
+RrBWnN/UWJqeuJq/sOumwyFjd1ZZTui2
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BOB_secp192k1:BOB_secp192k1_PUB
+
+
+# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
+Derive=ALICE_secp192k1
+PeerKey=BOB_secp192k1_PUB
+SharedSecret=6a4daca0412284172e8fcaafa0d9df76257d899752bf0f23
+
+# ECDH Bob with Alice peer
+Derive=BOB_secp192k1
+PeerKey=ALICE_secp192k1_PUB
+SharedSecret=6a4daca0412284172e8fcaafa0d9df76257d899752bf0f23
+
+# TEST CURVE secp224k1
+
+PrivateKey=ALICE_secp224k1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MHkCAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEACAEYjBgAgEBBB0AhXKGJFqOI4P1PLFR3M6M
+kepT/2Dtd27I1Awzx6E8AzoABPVN/1b6VHbq7U6pWaOrUeqJ5vSgWL49u/uuD48D
+4FRf7oFdixN9VWIrxr0PRByeEYmlHw4MOEQK
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=ALICE_secp224k1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+ME4wEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEACADOgAE9U3/VvpUdurtTqlZo6tR6onm9KBYvj27
++64PjwPgVF/ugV2LE31VYivGvQ9EHJ4RiaUfDgw4RAo=
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = ALICE_secp224k1:ALICE_secp224k1_PUB
+
+
+PrivateKey=BOB_secp224k1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MHkCAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEACAEYjBgAgEBBB0AOjEXYoz8YcWokSf4U5gX
+HbjDfILPdPejlE0T/KE8AzoABGXAQ+AntX7On4cKwP+f4KzZGaJZwjBq3jCjymsr
+9A3c8VCoRXXBg+VPoKg7fDkMIgI8qPmrC95Q
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BOB_secp224k1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+ME4wEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEACADOgAEZcBD4Ce1fs6fhwrA/5/grNkZolnCMGre
+MKPKayv0DdzxUKhFdcGD5U+gqDt8OQwiAjyo+asL3lA=
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BOB_secp224k1:BOB_secp224k1_PUB
+
+
+# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
+Derive=ALICE_secp224k1
+PeerKey=BOB_secp224k1_PUB
+SharedSecret=80b65e65fe29c779213dd31189d371ff57b0b2bf08c6458ed142399a
+
+# ECDH Bob with Alice peer
+Derive=BOB_secp224k1
+PeerKey=ALICE_secp224k1_PUB
+SharedSecret=80b65e65fe29c779213dd31189d371ff57b0b2bf08c6458ed142399a
+
+# TEST CURVE secp224r1
+
+PrivateKey=ALICE_secp224r1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MHgCAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEACEEYTBfAgEBBBxLKkXFJXYqGUlTsmgjlesi
+kwqejrekrkSTbehyoTwDOgAEUcEh0Ggy/rD+Nj9JQozzI+qzPtiU7b2D2HtdCa4h
+fbVPXngcRH2B2xN8W+dcHoIxrxO2UFXy4xo=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=ALICE_secp224r1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+ME4wEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEACEDOgAEUcEh0Ggy/rD+Nj9JQozzI+qzPtiU7b2D
+2HtdCa4hfbVPXngcRH2B2xN8W+dcHoIxrxO2UFXy4xo=
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = ALICE_secp224r1:ALICE_secp224r1_PUB
+
+
+PrivateKey=BOB_secp224r1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MHgCAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEACEEYTBfAgEBBBzOHGGUR3fZYg3GSaUN6pxo
+NQtAlOzM3UclEhMzoTwDOgAEdwFklK/YoDRU6bM7X2ulNLwqx9TUETMFUM6VV9DB
+4YcvAzv6pQgVwYEU7IahmSKpX19chbPt2I0=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BOB_secp224r1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+ME4wEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEACEDOgAEdwFklK/YoDRU6bM7X2ulNLwqx9TUETMF
+UM6VV9DB4YcvAzv6pQgVwYEU7IahmSKpX19chbPt2I0=
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BOB_secp224r1:BOB_secp224r1_PUB
+
+
+# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
+Derive=ALICE_secp224r1
+PeerKey=BOB_secp224r1_PUB
+SharedSecret=34ea06d16d82f0d1725de47f3639ac0c23db7d7ed68f01488539a2a5
+
+# ECDH Bob with Alice peer
+Derive=BOB_secp224r1
+PeerKey=ALICE_secp224r1_PUB
+SharedSecret=34ea06d16d82f0d1725de47f3639ac0c23db7d7ed68f01488539a2a5
+
+# TEST CURVE secp256k1
+
+PrivateKey=ALICE_secp256k1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIGEAgEAMBAGByqGSM49AgEGBSuBBAAKBG0wawIBAQQgHCRzy0IcEx6CeA6ogNNK
+SOfuTlHy4fE/LNxkANUS4k+hRANCAASDBmwKklX4OcbZSJJX9mxm1Wr7TPTLpbyp
+xKcKRm0XKNxVlrZU8WQCl66GtX2DDyX+0+XiC3hbaRWcYtg7P6WO
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=ALICE_secp256k1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MFYwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEAAoDQgAEgwZsCpJV+DnG2UiSV/ZsZtVq+0z0y6W8
+qcSnCkZtFyjcVZa2VPFkApeuhrV9gw8l/tPl4gt4W2kVnGLYOz+ljg==
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = ALICE_secp256k1:ALICE_secp256k1_PUB
+
+
+PrivateKey=BOB_secp256k1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIGEAgEAMBAGByqGSM49AgEGBSuBBAAKBG0wawIBAQQgChCkFvWtOcrXLmXVGqkR
+0gdntyytjGzEKue5t+IL2lihRANCAAQFQoIckey+Vyh3QwJWUUfKXNbbjWe94yZE
+AWGvI2BfqtWqigZF5VSb5aIXtTPRmwiN0cp30cd77YE5Z+e5bJHU
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BOB_secp256k1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MFYwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEAAoDQgAEBUKCHJHsvlcod0MCVlFHylzW241nveMm
+RAFhryNgX6rVqooGReVUm+WiF7Uz0ZsIjdHKd9HHe+2BOWfnuWyR1A==
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BOB_secp256k1:BOB_secp256k1_PUB
+
+
+# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
+Derive=ALICE_secp256k1
+PeerKey=BOB_secp256k1_PUB
+SharedSecret=af43b52790082fd87afb1d14b883c12d12bb9e554080d1f8e527920676e31f3e
+
+# ECDH Bob with Alice peer
+Derive=BOB_secp256k1
+PeerKey=ALICE_secp256k1_PUB
+SharedSecret=af43b52790082fd87afb1d14b883c12d12bb9e554080d1f8e527920676e31f3e
+
+# TEST CURVE secp384r1
+
+PrivateKey=ALICE_secp384r1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIG2AgEAMBAGByqGSM49AgEGBSuBBAAiBIGeMIGbAgEBBDCxE7Q4m1dsK7M3Otxo
+cgY/ejX9JOKKdAtSnRiU4bnK3eFmALkMN7XIveQnWLB1PEKhZANiAAQaUsvUFr/u
+ISpAmYqYZIme4VassCtb0tNGU97s3qt4ozcogZ4z+fIzXZ4YXqfGoEa57+uQDgqr
++jNOTji7Gxopt6AqZ9EvwuVaCuunUi0pcx6cc8IuUfrwMwSFovV/7sM=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=ALICE_secp384r1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MHYwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEACIDYgAEGlLL1Ba/7iEqQJmKmGSJnuFWrLArW9LT
+RlPe7N6reKM3KIGeM/nyM12eGF6nxqBGue/rkA4Kq/ozTk44uxsaKbegKmfRL8Ll
+Wgrrp1ItKXMenHPCLlH68DMEhaL1f+7D
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = ALICE_secp384r1:ALICE_secp384r1_PUB
+
+
+PrivateKey=BOB_secp384r1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIG2AgEAMBAGByqGSM49AgEGBSuBBAAiBIGeMIGbAgEBBDBRiGXRsb5sUq0b3/dg
+Z+pA9kbrSivBMCUCXVwxno1d/30hI/Yy0Z5PWwbBgwTFprWhZANiAASp1FeUOBJF
+mzQCNbGiOz8He0kF+KIf24UGYVO5MC7u5rV9hpoYsbcgmwxALskPN18os2ygK1Pn
+f/h+WALIsG2RknSTbiyvBYkoIhJV9cflvEDpMeaWSLF7qJ5YjEIf9PM=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BOB_secp384r1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MHYwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEACIDYgAEqdRXlDgSRZs0AjWxojs/B3tJBfiiH9uF
+BmFTuTAu7ua1fYaaGLG3IJsMQC7JDzdfKLNsoCtT53/4flgCyLBtkZJ0k24srwWJ
+KCISVfXH5bxA6THmlkixe6ieWIxCH/Tz
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BOB_secp384r1:BOB_secp384r1_PUB
+
+
+# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
+Derive=ALICE_secp384r1
+PeerKey=BOB_secp384r1_PUB
+SharedSecret=2006ed49acbb991b8fbf8a15c3f263542496eaefe1e2952591b72fb929463eac7a403a5419cebbfb73734918eaed59fd
+
+# ECDH Bob with Alice peer
+Derive=BOB_secp384r1
+PeerKey=ALICE_secp384r1_PUB
+SharedSecret=2006ed49acbb991b8fbf8a15c3f263542496eaefe1e2952591b72fb929463eac7a403a5419cebbfb73734918eaed59fd
+
+# TEST CURVE secp521r1
+
+PrivateKey=ALICE_secp521r1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIHuAgEAMBAGByqGSM49AgEGBSuBBAAjBIHWMIHTAgEBBEIAFBIz3FLAuX8VCWzM
+wu1f/tm8pf1QqnsdLqaIWCQAJa2W5ldpJTYfkj1gGxM44AD3qHnkXISvNLwwuxI1
+hr2+pOGhgYkDgYYABACWlOOFYk/p3AS2LxEQWBuMm6uIjo3XArjh1QrsLcUc5hhi
+82CIz6kKwKjCnYRDHq4iv1x63rVEzGGhQOM1g+cRVwHSpfbBpaxK7bMLkVFOOavv
+OdcdyRHaHsvxw2pREmdS/GwtfgT8odQrG06KMIwVeL+H08fGJSbPX0Zock0DOPCp
+aw==
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=ALICE_secp521r1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MIGbMBAGByqGSM49AgEGBSuBBAAjA4GGAAQAlpTjhWJP6dwEti8REFgbjJuriI6N
+1wK44dUK7C3FHOYYYvNgiM+pCsCowp2EQx6uIr9cet61RMxhoUDjNYPnEVcB0qX2
+waWsSu2zC5FRTjmr7znXHckR2h7L8cNqURJnUvxsLX4E/KHUKxtOijCMFXi/h9PH
+xiUmz19GaHJNAzjwqWs=
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = ALICE_secp521r1:ALICE_secp521r1_PUB
+
+
+PrivateKey=BOB_secp521r1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIHuAgEAMBAGByqGSM49AgEGBSuBBAAjBIHWMIHTAgEBBEIA9C/sMWveRlHPr9P5
+cc3U+1L2/zB0VtHewKSQRWZ67SmS4+m7uXTqUVSLRHiQEgQid0cg77gSxXPlmV+z
+y0f3zd+hgYkDgYYABAE18N3SwDGtea3IOqUdh3j0JtnMeP41i/agEBlxK8/iEBXc
+Q61mkIrQIKcabRhoylEugXHiyNnqNQOD4DUa0bTKzAHtJ4UqqbEVno6byRmcUQwb
+mvG89eS8GLEmk5X/O2atHU4yIGTuTRQWn/BTJUCS+OgJz4FZdadscc5Z640EZqSD
+iw==
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BOB_secp521r1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MIGbMBAGByqGSM49AgEGBSuBBAAjA4GGAAQBNfDd0sAxrXmtyDqlHYd49CbZzHj+
+NYv2oBAZcSvP4hAV3EOtZpCK0CCnGm0YaMpRLoFx4sjZ6jUDg+A1GtG0yswB7SeF
+KqmxFZ6Om8kZnFEMG5rxvPXkvBixJpOV/ztmrR1OMiBk7k0UFp/wUyVAkvjoCc+B
+WXWnbHHOWeuNBGakg4s=
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BOB_secp521r1:BOB_secp521r1_PUB
+
+
+# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
+Derive=ALICE_secp521r1
+PeerKey=BOB_secp521r1_PUB
+SharedSecret=018c8f33e544a0fa8854dcd96bdba75b7687d1c42b2ff1bf0a06d49c424fee96d8a7f3af3119dcbfabc1c147477c50f7c72971956f9bb17ddec6d02b2187f06cf4be
+
+# ECDH Bob with Alice peer
+Derive=BOB_secp521r1
+PeerKey=ALICE_secp521r1_PUB
+SharedSecret=018c8f33e544a0fa8854dcd96bdba75b7687d1c42b2ff1bf0a06d49c424fee96d8a7f3af3119dcbfabc1c147477c50f7c72971956f9bb17ddec6d02b2187f06cf4be
+
+# TEST CURVE prime192v1
+
+PrivateKey=ALICE_prime192v1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MG8CAQAwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQEEVTBTAgEBBBjxfXvSFNqD2UzFVN1L
+bQrPlzop7dxQq/ehNAMyAATibpGuYzCjkT1tWLYEogpKz74WqhvbQtZPkCYQCin1
+cmZuNW+BZ0jyVEpGlpnZPMg=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=ALICE_prime192v1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MEkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQEDMgAE4m6RrmMwo5E9bVi2BKIKSs++Fqob
+20LWT5AmEAop9XJmbjVvgWdI8lRKRpaZ2TzI
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = ALICE_prime192v1:ALICE_prime192v1_PUB
+
+
+PrivateKey=BOB_prime192v1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MG8CAQAwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQEEVTBTAgEBBBhewaqXNZlYyqnmuEEE
+Y/oUXe3/jpzhmyGhNAMyAASkpwNJEP/1FuuWKCDDUm26iyqrs+zKwayZnaF77YC6
+qCtgia7yNcSl9tlWHh3gQgw=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BOB_prime192v1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MEkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQEDMgAEpKcDSRD/9Rbrliggw1Jtuosqq7Ps
+ysGsmZ2he+2AuqgrYImu8jXEpfbZVh4d4EIM
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BOB_prime192v1:BOB_prime192v1_PUB
+
+
+# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
+Derive=ALICE_prime192v1
+PeerKey=BOB_prime192v1_PUB
+SharedSecret=be2a779b587f8f5d7c9d8f006e0a6d0e996c9c63c255f861
+
+# ECDH Bob with Alice peer
+Derive=BOB_prime192v1
+PeerKey=ALICE_prime192v1_PUB
+SharedSecret=be2a779b587f8f5d7c9d8f006e0a6d0e996c9c63c255f861
+
+# TEST CURVE prime192v2
+
+PrivateKey=ALICE_prime192v2
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MG8CAQAwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQIEVTBTAgEBBBgtIuKqpRc7rEYuGx1a
+dDxcvso0NAZw+fWhNAMyAATMSHwJPq761VawpRbKLB3uuDSng4WeFPjhvubL6g8V
+8UqFaKRED5PUIQ0lYStVCao=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=ALICE_prime192v2_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MEkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQIDMgAEzEh8CT6u+tVWsKUWyiwd7rg0p4OF
+nhT44b7my+oPFfFKhWikRA+T1CENJWErVQmq
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = ALICE_prime192v2:ALICE_prime192v2_PUB
+
+
+PrivateKey=BOB_prime192v2
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MG8CAQAwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQIEVTBTAgEBBBggTjqWC1/iHrvKR9/u
+1gxpL2tWJkkAMYuhNAMyAASa4nG+wLPTHxfkqiTII5PBLAKXmXUf5dMtpmApcjrj
+XjnwJIJEQr80MK9+g1raqN8=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BOB_prime192v2_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MEkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQIDMgAEmuJxvsCz0x8X5KokyCOTwSwCl5l1
+H+XTLaZgKXI641458CSCREK/NDCvfoNa2qjf
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BOB_prime192v2:BOB_prime192v2_PUB
+
+
+# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
+Derive=ALICE_prime192v2
+PeerKey=BOB_prime192v2_PUB
+SharedSecret=9b37033a48af7fe1825c062625f8b57d4b3ac48c12bec69c
+
+# ECDH Bob with Alice peer
+Derive=BOB_prime192v2
+PeerKey=ALICE_prime192v2_PUB
+SharedSecret=9b37033a48af7fe1825c062625f8b57d4b3ac48c12bec69c
+
+# TEST CURVE prime192v3
+
+PrivateKey=ALICE_prime192v3
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MG8CAQAwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQMEVTBTAgEBBBg0iDdcgise1/v2k6js
+UkgKwXPqx/uJJTehNAMyAAQ6/i0pSNHk824XO6Mv0irQfSv2yzGQy+DwWo/klZco
+kPDcXKEdU8ZmnAABH7j6UV8=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=ALICE_prime192v3_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MEkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQMDMgAEOv4tKUjR5PNuFzujL9Iq0H0r9ssx
+kMvg8FqP5JWXKJDw3FyhHVPGZpwAAR+4+lFf
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = ALICE_prime192v3:ALICE_prime192v3_PUB
+
+
+PrivateKey=BOB_prime192v3
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MG8CAQAwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQMEVTBTAgEBBBieW1huqwVU3ev7qgpT
+LFjYEMRPONOAcaKhNAMyAASXaTjBIQX686BZJAidX+hFuvDyxbN1vBQvp40OVl0L
+CG4hoZ+5McLtPATL+osKvX8=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BOB_prime192v3_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MEkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQMDMgAEl2k4wSEF+vOgWSQInV/oRbrw8sWz
+dbwUL6eNDlZdCwhuIaGfuTHC7TwEy/qLCr1/
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BOB_prime192v3:BOB_prime192v3_PUB
+
+
+# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
+Derive=ALICE_prime192v3
+PeerKey=BOB_prime192v3_PUB
+SharedSecret=7133f1d99b0e03ed9c4d78d3be40598cf419cd588283ac29
+
+# ECDH Bob with Alice peer
+Derive=BOB_prime192v3
+PeerKey=ALICE_prime192v3_PUB
+SharedSecret=7133f1d99b0e03ed9c4d78d3be40598cf419cd588283ac29
+
+# TEST CURVE prime239v1
+
+PrivateKey=ALICE_prime239v1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIGBAgEAMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEEBGcwZQIBAQQeRmiZXaqr3u11hiGK
+1cH75U/rKc1+8YMqxcXhACRkoUADPgAEfIJpVggCXUROHgX4h5h66/0Pgr/aMtMq
+ExHQP7zxWYzf3cYAP4V/t9OCT582WjMLnCmdlFnYUPD50dyU
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=ALICE_prime239v1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MFUwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQQDPgAEfIJpVggCXUROHgX4h5h66/0Pgr/a
+MtMqExHQP7zxWYzf3cYAP4V/t9OCT582WjMLnCmdlFnYUPD50dyU
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = ALICE_prime239v1:ALICE_prime239v1_PUB
+
+
+PrivateKey=BOB_prime239v1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIGBAgEAMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEEBGcwZQIBAQQeAbGRRoBgqHVUBFot
+5m9Ytm8RU+ISkA33VgQrHGM/oUADPgAEdRgPsL/Mi3ucJcYibvFJQxDDyLqgUH3i
+Mk266RAHFqoioiGT72TOidBhi+VrUn6NOIyna8foww2M45vR
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BOB_prime239v1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MFUwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQQDPgAEdRgPsL/Mi3ucJcYibvFJQxDDyLqg
+UH3iMk266RAHFqoioiGT72TOidBhi+VrUn6NOIyna8foww2M45vR
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BOB_prime239v1:BOB_prime239v1_PUB
+
+
+# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
+Derive=ALICE_prime239v1
+PeerKey=BOB_prime239v1_PUB
+SharedSecret=2ef92070f7a5fa14c8a67a8aa3080b4c4a597eafaa81d3f698599ac0be1e
+
+# ECDH Bob with Alice peer
+Derive=BOB_prime239v1
+PeerKey=ALICE_prime239v1_PUB
+SharedSecret=2ef92070f7a5fa14c8a67a8aa3080b4c4a597eafaa81d3f698599ac0be1e
+
+# TEST CURVE prime239v2
+
+PrivateKey=ALICE_prime239v2
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIGBAgEAMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEFBGcwZQIBAQQeemq6S5puHF94ZW/W
+6BMRim+HFFM0zxVZQpWG+bf2oUADPgAELukUodCQsmwzGVR3lLEGKQ6quGd6kDXN
+DjjcMrDabBtWKDuuUrgjBGsI7NRbCQ0a5NWTo+EnWe0LXbYN
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=ALICE_prime239v2_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MFUwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQUDPgAELukUodCQsmwzGVR3lLEGKQ6quGd6
+kDXNDjjcMrDabBtWKDuuUrgjBGsI7NRbCQ0a5NWTo+EnWe0LXbYN
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = ALICE_prime239v2:ALICE_prime239v2_PUB
+
+
+PrivateKey=BOB_prime239v2
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIGBAgEAMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEFBGcwZQIBAQQeAEaCw7ulF8GZcmbj
+aDmcrw8Gex+hX0rNvwzoC7+6oUADPgAEKh0EmYUpj6XbuEGxMBaPmECT8L++ihUW
+ms4xau0RUYij4HgS1gjSMDfyvvCBUy10RIkw+goxVdUhfW2u
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BOB_prime239v2_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MFUwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQUDPgAEKh0EmYUpj6XbuEGxMBaPmECT8L++
+ihUWms4xau0RUYij4HgS1gjSMDfyvvCBUy10RIkw+goxVdUhfW2u
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BOB_prime239v2:BOB_prime239v2_PUB
+
+
+# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
+Derive=ALICE_prime239v2
+PeerKey=BOB_prime239v2_PUB
+SharedSecret=5bdab282dc371ee88ade318a6aad2b329ec3ea957e0df18b7a691c1bf703
+
+# ECDH Bob with Alice peer
+Derive=BOB_prime239v2
+PeerKey=ALICE_prime239v2_PUB
+SharedSecret=5bdab282dc371ee88ade318a6aad2b329ec3ea957e0df18b7a691c1bf703
+
+# TEST CURVE prime239v3
+
+PrivateKey=ALICE_prime239v3
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIGBAgEAMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEGBGcwZQIBAQQeGlwSPAYfmiP9r2nA
+SD52VqKyZpEnU+Jmynlf2DI7oUADPgAEFlIB4Yl+5J2u4JLYv8z+itwf+XnOL/BD
+qNK3uRoYPKHYdYWJkgXxkQ1QDZwNppAQRcxSgTKnJ6V8crbp
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=ALICE_prime239v3_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MFUwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQYDPgAEFlIB4Yl+5J2u4JLYv8z+itwf+XnO
+L/BDqNK3uRoYPKHYdYWJkgXxkQ1QDZwNppAQRcxSgTKnJ6V8crbp
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = ALICE_prime239v3:ALICE_prime239v3_PUB
+
+
+PrivateKey=BOB_prime239v3
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIGBAgEAMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEGBGcwZQIBAQQeU1KIfJBGvItr8//g
+kW1zoPkveo9lvXBlnUV5/5rDoUADPgAEepc03AEEgOnI+ivpjGV4ypvn8sRQaVAb
+3QAeIEYDQLUBFOdb3kF2MvlnLKV3OCdB3GQgNfZtEHbdn0bq
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BOB_prime239v3_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MFUwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQYDPgAEepc03AEEgOnI+ivpjGV4ypvn8sRQ
+aVAb3QAeIEYDQLUBFOdb3kF2MvlnLKV3OCdB3GQgNfZtEHbdn0bq
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BOB_prime239v3:BOB_prime239v3_PUB
+
+
+# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
+Derive=ALICE_prime239v3
+PeerKey=BOB_prime239v3_PUB
+SharedSecret=78e80ae760061178bd005e9e3634333971468bc6d3f82baee238c5ed32f9
+
+# ECDH Bob with Alice peer
+Derive=BOB_prime239v3
+PeerKey=ALICE_prime239v3_PUB
+SharedSecret=78e80ae760061178bd005e9e3634333971468bc6d3f82baee238c5ed32f9
+
+# TEST CURVE prime256v1
+
+PrivateKey=ALICE_prime256v1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIGHAgEAMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHBG0wawIBAQQglUPDk8gQ8lMj38V7
+0jPBZDfQUx5pNOVSKOMTqlh04POhRANCAARq87w+K0q9b1mzJGh309kjNvYTS02m
+YkHKxAewiZwmt/5w+5uywz/+0130SdAWbXtECjaHUK94YEHzp0G/PCl5
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=ALICE_prime256v1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEavO8PitKvW9ZsyRod9PZIzb2E0tN
+pmJBysQHsImcJrf+cPubssM//tNd9EnQFm17RAo2h1CveGBB86dBvzwpeQ==
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = ALICE_prime256v1:ALICE_prime256v1_PUB
+
+
+PrivateKey=BOB_prime256v1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIGHAgEAMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHBG0wawIBAQQgNsLfn/sRZfm9ZcM7
+xURiUHT7+w8Jgk9SbwTVDjpLYYmhRANCAASRmyKNgUbADGxkIOAVh9T7IXv2ZDT6
+I5YMW6wOs27VMOAD0AiNLrv7sW1TdqxkUtF17/GFpLvFOuZcbdX4p3i/
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BOB_prime256v1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEkZsijYFGwAxsZCDgFYfU+yF79mQ0
++iOWDFusDrNu1TDgA9AIjS67+7FtU3asZFLRde/xhaS7xTrmXG3V+Kd4vw==
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BOB_prime256v1:BOB_prime256v1_PUB
+
+
+# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
+Derive=ALICE_prime256v1
+PeerKey=BOB_prime256v1_PUB
+SharedSecret=390021fbca00d959c1adaf7e9cedef0e65a582489eab9adbe739ef66bf82adb4
+
+# ECDH Bob with Alice peer
+Derive=BOB_prime256v1
+PeerKey=ALICE_prime256v1_PUB
+SharedSecret=390021fbca00d959c1adaf7e9cedef0e65a582489eab9adbe739ef66bf82adb4
+
+# TEST CURVE sect113r1
+
+PrivateKey=ALICE_sect113r1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MFECAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEAAQEOjA4AgEBBA8AcrP9u8BlWb4knkGVZmSh
+IgMgAAQBviTf62+1V4etJb2D9LkBadAFmdmRS+rVI3spTYs=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=ALICE_sect113r1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MDQwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEAAQDIAAEAb4k3+tvtVeHrSW9g/S5AWnQBZnZkUvq
+1SN7KU2L
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = ALICE_sect113r1:ALICE_sect113r1_PUB
+
+
+PrivateKey=BOB_sect113r1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MFECAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEAAQEOjA4AgEBBA8AmhEq3A9KdbKQUz1F/Myh
+IgMgAAQAuSRBNxXjIjezwrGF8VkBxWR69g0UJaBIIArpdNo=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BOB_sect113r1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MDQwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEAAQDIAAEALkkQTcV4yI3s8KxhfFZAcVkevYNFCWg
+SCAK6XTa
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BOB_sect113r1:BOB_sect113r1_PUB
+
+
+# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
+Derive=ALICE_sect113r1
+PeerKey=BOB_sect113r1_PUB
+SharedSecret=015405437add26b8841c62a9016c85
+
+# ECDH Bob with Alice peer
+Derive=BOB_sect113r1
+PeerKey=ALICE_sect113r1_PUB
+SharedSecret=015405437add26b8841c62a9016c85
+
+# TEST CURVE sect113r2
+
+PrivateKey=ALICE_sect113r2
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MFECAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEAAUEOjA4AgEBBA8ABqFZ6Z7BKKjvrzXh99Wh
+IgMgAAQBTQTHA9uSxcZ8kvsSVUUBcLQ4m45U10VwVCQ+oGQ=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=ALICE_sect113r2_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MDQwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEAAUDIAAEAU0ExwPbksXGfJL7ElVFAXC0OJuOVNdF
+cFQkPqBk
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = ALICE_sect113r2:ALICE_sect113r2_PUB
+
+
+PrivateKey=BOB_sect113r2
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MFECAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEAAUEOjA4AgEBBA8ABPHhZ0kCp0TocQJIuiuh
+IgMgAAQBSi7u+Ur776iGyg0Ij6UAN70IzPVZxGK5zPxp6wo=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BOB_sect113r2_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MDQwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEAAUDIAAEAUou7vlK+++ohsoNCI+lADe9CMz1WcRi
+ucz8aesK
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BOB_sect113r2:BOB_sect113r2_PUB
+
+
+# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
+Derive=ALICE_sect113r2
+PeerKey=BOB_sect113r2_PUB
+SharedSecret=014231c5e9e28d451aa44a755407e1
+
+# ECDH Bob with Alice peer
+Derive=BOB_sect113r2
+PeerKey=ALICE_sect113r2_PUB
+SharedSecret=014231c5e9e28d451aa44a755407e1
+
+# TEST CURVE sect131r1
+
+PrivateKey=ALICE_sect131r1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MFcCAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEABYEQDA+AgEBBBEAUCFDwJLLThLHiDlw/Qcn
+8aEmAyQABAAU+ywF9iPv6LDldKOLhLgXBRI7EpZnbXPXhUmkQWPhHAQ=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=ALICE_sect131r1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MDgwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEABYDJAAEABT7LAX2I+/osOV0o4uEuBcFEjsSlmdt
+c9eFSaRBY+EcBA==
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = ALICE_sect131r1:ALICE_sect131r1_PUB
+
+
+PrivateKey=BOB_sect131r1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MFcCAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEABYEQDA+AgEBBBEDxxMzxjxJmYfSZvWJKq+V
+vKEmAyQABAFHQ2a+h+Yn5N4Lt0IoJcVVBrf9xkZNS0xxblh+0wndq9s=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BOB_sect131r1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MDgwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEABYDJAAEAUdDZr6H5ifk3gu3QiglxVUGt/3GRk1L
+THFuWH7TCd2r2w==
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BOB_sect131r1:BOB_sect131r1_PUB
+
+
+# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
+Derive=ALICE_sect131r1
+PeerKey=BOB_sect131r1_PUB
+SharedSecret=009e4acc8c1ba3a129a9ad83a733d7d702
+
+# ECDH Bob with Alice peer
+Derive=BOB_sect131r1
+PeerKey=ALICE_sect131r1_PUB
+SharedSecret=009e4acc8c1ba3a129a9ad83a733d7d702
+
+# TEST CURVE sect131r2
+
+PrivateKey=ALICE_sect131r2
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MFcCAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEABcEQDA+AgEBBBEDHPPtQCKJB8g01rMkT8Sk
+9aEmAyQABAcWl2Z/1kIc4mWCbRH4+c/2B47RC31JyifKvkxkHt05x3g=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=ALICE_sect131r2_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MDgwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEABcDJAAEBxaXZn/WQhziZYJtEfj5z/YHjtELfUnK
+J8q+TGQe3TnHeA==
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = ALICE_sect131r2:ALICE_sect131r2_PUB
+
+
+PrivateKey=BOB_sect131r2
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MFcCAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEABcEQDA+AgEBBBEDR9ez/YtS29S7/R5+rUiX
+VKEmAyQABALZHNBITDoigpOwTzczlaN9AsRk5JzMUJXYkvBEqj+YILQ=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BOB_sect131r2_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MDgwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEABcDJAAEAtkc0EhMOiKCk7BPNzOVo30CxGTknMxQ
+ldiS8ESqP5ggtA==
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BOB_sect131r2:BOB_sect131r2_PUB
+
+
+# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
+Derive=ALICE_sect131r2
+PeerKey=BOB_sect131r2_PUB
+SharedSecret=03cbec3a3050c7f13d4801ad692d61c417
+
+# ECDH Bob with Alice peer
+Derive=BOB_sect131r2
+PeerKey=ALICE_sect131r2_PUB
+SharedSecret=03cbec3a3050c7f13d4801ad692d61c417
+
+# TEST CURVE sect163k1
+
+PrivateKey=ALICE_sect163k1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MGMCAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEAAEETDBKAgEBBBUBxkeGOXE86PAijpk8trN/
+f3kl4UmhLgMsAAQD1hrDCJ2MSFKZ6Q11cTllX/l5HY0Hg5XZCxMFC84AaczwPtNJ
+YNCxfCk=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=ALICE_sect163k1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MEAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEAAEDLAAEA9YawwidjEhSmekNdXE5ZV/5eR2NB4OV
+2QsTBQvOAGnM8D7TSWDQsXwp
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = ALICE_sect163k1:ALICE_sect163k1_PUB
+
+
+PrivateKey=BOB_sect163k1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MGMCAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEAAEETDBKAgEBBBUCUJ5kItSfXidHXsgokcS7
+nzPFbOShLgMsAAQGrYNJ1qgdb3A9ISOmTujfS+WYFKwBXXrJEluAkeNh3jXnDq8X
++XBB0k8=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BOB_sect163k1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MEAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEAAEDLAAEBq2DSdaoHW9wPSEjpk7o30vlmBSsAV16
+yRJbgJHjYd415w6vF/lwQdJP
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BOB_sect163k1:BOB_sect163k1_PUB
+
+
+# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
+Derive=ALICE_sect163k1
+PeerKey=BOB_sect163k1_PUB
+SharedSecret=07bfdf00759b383aa7741ae4634400f8ddf2047092
+
+# ECDH Bob with Alice peer
+Derive=BOB_sect163k1
+PeerKey=ALICE_sect163k1_PUB
+SharedSecret=07bfdf00759b383aa7741ae4634400f8ddf2047092
+
+# TEST CURVE sect163r1
+
+PrivateKey=ALICE_sect163r1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MGMCAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEAAIETDBKAgEBBBUBl9zmlPmFF5v9h1IIENAx
+1b8tj0+hLgMsAAQE3j8Jn58CCtEDwvOZ5DwgYGBYvIECz1zN8UwPfTFSdXjTWQcr
+9gWxNMA=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=ALICE_sect163r1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MEAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEAAIDLAAEBN4/CZ+fAgrRA8LzmeQ8IGBgWLyBAs9c
+zfFMD30xUnV401kHK/YFsTTA
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = ALICE_sect163r1:ALICE_sect163r1_PUB
+
+
+PrivateKey=BOB_sect163r1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MGMCAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEAAIETDBKAgEBBBUA/nzN5yCavvZlXyDGEihW
+rwG360+hLgMsAAQDt6XZHfzXABSTnGhzfoPtfdLZgaoGhBdeWz+318vNmC6AMJP+
+PntHzsA=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BOB_sect163r1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MEAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEAAIDLAAEA7el2R381wAUk5xoc36D7X3S2YGqBoQX
+Xls/t9fLzZgugDCT/j57R87A
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BOB_sect163r1:BOB_sect163r1_PUB
+
+
+# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
+Derive=ALICE_sect163r1
+PeerKey=BOB_sect163r1_PUB
+SharedSecret=02355c765bbc07fcc44bb1496e490912f6df56e6d4
+
+# ECDH Bob with Alice peer
+Derive=BOB_sect163r1
+PeerKey=ALICE_sect163r1_PUB
+SharedSecret=02355c765bbc07fcc44bb1496e490912f6df56e6d4
+
+# TEST CURVE sect163r2
+
+PrivateKey=ALICE_sect163r2
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MGMCAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEAA8ETDBKAgEBBBUDjH2G7BkPTBM4VtljaQr8
+sXVLNOqhLgMsAAQHHqWxJWR2KrHCPp/PSjZIdK88ET0A323/UOTxhYHwsLpR7rp3
+ahq1lQ8=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=ALICE_sect163r2_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MEAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEAA8DLAAEBx6lsSVkdiqxwj6fz0o2SHSvPBE9AN9t
+/1Dk8YWB8LC6Ue66d2oatZUP
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = ALICE_sect163r2:ALICE_sect163r2_PUB
+
+
+PrivateKey=BOB_sect163r2
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MGMCAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEAA8ETDBKAgEBBBUBXOM9Tm6sKXUlRLlW0HgC
+NTDxW2ihLgMsAAQGxa8xRcC+TIcDgGtehDVEV1PoBokBwtILj16NPYC0aBZI8/nF
+F4jhgmc=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BOB_sect163r2_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MEAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEAA8DLAAEBsWvMUXAvkyHA4BrXoQ1RFdT6AaJAcLS
+C49ejT2AtGgWSPP5xReI4YJn
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BOB_sect163r2:BOB_sect163r2_PUB
+
+
+# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
+Derive=ALICE_sect163r2
+PeerKey=BOB_sect163r2_PUB
+SharedSecret=040df54e6df412790ef5c0fafbbfcba5136b872951
+
+# ECDH Bob with Alice peer
+Derive=BOB_sect163r2
+PeerKey=ALICE_sect163r2_PUB
+SharedSecret=040df54e6df412790ef5c0fafbbfcba5136b872951
+
+# TEST CURVE sect193r1
+
+PrivateKey=ALICE_sect193r1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MG8CAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEABgEWDBWAgEBBBkAEQlofBlvj8zDK5o4CCfA
+aOQOmlAyTimBoTYDNAAEAKBcyRBxQDZTvpPM39ZVXYQS5aJwZfUnNwBn5T26m15R
+M4MLnYGdklcAM8oMOML999w=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=ALICE_sect193r1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MEgwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEABgDNAAEAKBcyRBxQDZTvpPM39ZVXYQS5aJwZfUn
+NwBn5T26m15RM4MLnYGdklcAM8oMOML999w=
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = ALICE_sect193r1:ALICE_sect193r1_PUB
+
+
+PrivateKey=BOB_sect193r1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MG8CAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEABgEWDBWAgEBBBkAnxvYLKZaw4Rj24WTRBfg
+iar5vp3R3pCJoTYDNAAEAXw0PWt3PtZT5v9aH0o6WnFtFGOBNEUpYQE/jBjzUHIC
+qMNZTHy9gT2R9yc0GBZ/Dic=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BOB_sect193r1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MEgwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEABgDNAAEAXw0PWt3PtZT5v9aH0o6WnFtFGOBNEUp
+YQE/jBjzUHICqMNZTHy9gT2R9yc0GBZ/Dic=
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BOB_sect193r1:BOB_sect193r1_PUB
+
+
+# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
+Derive=ALICE_sect193r1
+PeerKey=BOB_sect193r1_PUB
+SharedSecret=00458b4c5ad122de5a377bea0adf1ab87bcb961b24ed764f47
+
+# ECDH Bob with Alice peer
+Derive=BOB_sect193r1
+PeerKey=ALICE_sect193r1_PUB
+SharedSecret=00458b4c5ad122de5a377bea0adf1ab87bcb961b24ed764f47
+
+# TEST CURVE sect193r2
+
+PrivateKey=ALICE_sect193r2
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MG8CAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEABkEWDBWAgEBBBkAj54XQW+b3bnX9duvqaa+
+lPTNcvOlxRAvoTYDNAAEAHhW6xjH4TNPs/e12tsZcsGD+a92kAWkwQFc4m1ISx4o
+mtNyCVI7FXV5zNnaGWVACT4=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=ALICE_sect193r2_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MEgwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEABkDNAAEAHhW6xjH4TNPs/e12tsZcsGD+a92kAWk
+wQFc4m1ISx4omtNyCVI7FXV5zNnaGWVACT4=
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = ALICE_sect193r2:ALICE_sect193r2_PUB
+
+
+PrivateKey=BOB_sect193r2
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MG8CAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEABkEWDBWAgEBBBkAvMiVR0abk6pHoeOIBESL
+fB9B4gsZJjLsoTYDNAAEADtKDcwL660+Mm11Vl254GI3TnD+fragdwF+wY5qlMu5
+VtrUDMHuAP0q3eGQUsrzNo0=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BOB_sect193r2_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MEgwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEABkDNAAEADtKDcwL660+Mm11Vl254GI3TnD+frag
+dwF+wY5qlMu5VtrUDMHuAP0q3eGQUsrzNo0=
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BOB_sect193r2:BOB_sect193r2_PUB
+
+
+# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
+Derive=ALICE_sect193r2
+PeerKey=BOB_sect193r2_PUB
+SharedSecret=019d1f316d204a9cd1b9632cebb4accddb204158be3e435891
+
+# ECDH Bob with Alice peer
+Derive=BOB_sect193r2
+PeerKey=ALICE_sect193r2_PUB
+SharedSecret=019d1f316d204a9cd1b9632cebb4accddb204158be3e435891
+
+# TEST CURVE sect233k1
+
+PrivateKey=ALICE_sect233k1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MH0CAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEABoEZjBkAgEBBB1aR7qaKm1vmZWK2bGsJ1rX
+mH6BpTkW4t1L4zSf/KFAAz4ABADcDiv+bTvPVViqYLNz06VO5wodry+sGi6fnJIr
+QQCTfZ9d5whiIsbY5Thlcm7I0A/cIGoShA/6LumOVA==
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=ALICE_sect233k1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MFIwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEABoDPgAEANwOK/5tO89VWKpgs3PTpU7nCh2vL6wa
+Lp+ckitBAJN9n13nCGIixtjlOGVybsjQD9wgahKED/ou6Y5U
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = ALICE_sect233k1:ALICE_sect233k1_PUB
+
+
+PrivateKey=BOB_sect233k1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MH0CAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEABoEZjBkAgEBBB0oa5BrzYxm6mn51Xyphn6X
+OUjKc9oMDHCowAyHTaFAAz4ABAGKiFuFJVQeymHYRVnt2LNF2MSaTMcL9JGSPn2z
+OwBis5MS4kgEFakWQl7KpGiy3vS89wmpblvHLJ/+IQ==
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BOB_sect233k1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MFIwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEABoDPgAEAYqIW4UlVB7KYdhFWe3Ys0XYxJpMxwv0
+kZI+fbM7AGKzkxLiSAQVqRZCXsqkaLLe9Lz3CaluW8csn/4h
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BOB_sect233k1:BOB_sect233k1_PUB
+
+
+# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
+Derive=ALICE_sect233k1
+PeerKey=BOB_sect233k1_PUB
+SharedSecret=00a5e5f2e992f4360d530dd365d14f5c6013212e14f4ea258c91c71f1512
+
+# ECDH Bob with Alice peer
+Derive=BOB_sect233k1
+PeerKey=ALICE_sect233k1_PUB
+SharedSecret=00a5e5f2e992f4360d530dd365d14f5c6013212e14f4ea258c91c71f1512
+
+# TEST CURVE sect233r1
+
+PrivateKey=ALICE_sect233r1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MH4CAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEABsEZzBlAgEBBB4AEN6fePR2gizyXzU6kIgU
+Gijp5+IQAXoNBfKnVeChQAM+AAQB0kEwu2fwQWo1v1j7XQ8uJT3iMwRC8w+cxgxx
+GQ4B/FyjrhIUpEDWaMqfV23McZ6WdbIUe3MZ7K5pG38=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=ALICE_sect233r1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MFIwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEABsDPgAEAdJBMLtn8EFqNb9Y+10PLiU94jMEQvMP
+nMYMcRkOAfxco64SFKRA1mjKn1dtzHGelnWyFHtzGeyuaRt/
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = ALICE_sect233r1:ALICE_sect233r1_PUB
+
+
+PrivateKey=BOB_sect233r1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MH4CAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEABsEZzBlAgEBBB4AXHWOeS6fG0XCH3FnHDuS
+IcELUeDG+AYNNeLVZd6hQAM+AAQAYRRYH017uxcaMPF3GOsL4bvodW1yZLEtL3pm
+CkcAfqJI/4niCr8uHKh0gBa2JBjBWMV1u8Mpf60uvok=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BOB_sect233r1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MFIwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEABsDPgAEAGEUWB9Ne7sXGjDxdxjrC+G76HVtcmSx
+LS96ZgpHAH6iSP+J4gq/LhyodIAWtiQYwVjFdbvDKX+tLr6J
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BOB_sect233r1:BOB_sect233r1_PUB
+
+
+# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
+Derive=ALICE_sect233r1
+PeerKey=BOB_sect233r1_PUB
+SharedSecret=01625f3fcd367ee7cd74c67cca02dccfce6c3b19ef07e358ed943d17a8e2
+
+# ECDH Bob with Alice peer
+Derive=BOB_sect233r1
+PeerKey=ALICE_sect233r1_PUB
+SharedSecret=01625f3fcd367ee7cd74c67cca02dccfce6c3b19ef07e358ed943d17a8e2
+
+# TEST CURVE sect239k1
+
+PrivateKey=ALICE_sect239k1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MH4CAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEAAMEZzBlAgEBBB4MhpuQTtDeLBboZgiW11d/
+KBlgUL4YvTjZ8zg4HR2hQAM+AAQafRD6X3L/7c/FN69KuA04a4bhxHZezmz1G15m
+tltwl8zlWsR5+GNToxV0OBLbStAQbXxqBa2Gg83B0oc=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=ALICE_sect239k1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MFIwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEAAMDPgAEGn0Q+l9y/+3PxTevSrgNOGuG4cR2Xs5s
+9RteZrZbcJfM5VrEefhjU6MVdDgS20rQEG18agWthoPNwdKH
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = ALICE_sect239k1:ALICE_sect239k1_PUB
+
+
+PrivateKey=BOB_sect239k1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MH4CAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEAAMEZzBlAgEBBB4FBG477KvylisppUFwbDl/
+SRGnX5FFmfw/xWIiEMehQAM+AAQFii094UX6F5m8Dk0eI/DhF3+IDUu7h81hTdyZ
+xxET0IokxFkTUf/re9WPA7LxPOCuiIPZUNVCRxRWSuU=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BOB_sect239k1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MFIwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEAAMDPgAEBYotPeFF+heZvA5NHiPw4Rd/iA1Lu4fN
+YU3cmccRE9CKJMRZE1H/63vVjwOy8TzgroiD2VDVQkcUVkrl
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BOB_sect239k1:BOB_sect239k1_PUB
+
+
+# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
+Derive=ALICE_sect239k1
+PeerKey=BOB_sect239k1_PUB
+SharedSecret=4d1c9a8ae73f754d0a593d6e426114f4f67d7c8082ccc4e04a72b0d2aff8
+
+# ECDH Bob with Alice peer
+Derive=BOB_sect239k1
+PeerKey=ALICE_sect239k1_PUB
+SharedSecret=4d1c9a8ae73f754d0a593d6e426114f4f67d7c8082ccc4e04a72b0d2aff8
+
+# TEST CURVE sect283k1
+
+PrivateKey=ALICE_sect283k1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIGQAgEAMBAGByqGSM49AgEGBSuBBAAQBHkwdwIBAQQkAGhnsmZ2UDKV3QKmq3k+
+33LQ6n5aCYvKXcMgiZlBS/RrVgIRoUwDSgAEBSgpOw5TMTc4O8HHhw5atJl5mrnW
+uC6oWVYRYpD1IMvPNTRsAYo4SYRmPIfgzVv/ESVcHVaD1lPNo+eq0HN1qhvRX+4r
+mGO7
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=ALICE_sect283k1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MF4wEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEABADSgAEBSgpOw5TMTc4O8HHhw5atJl5mrnWuC6o
+WVYRYpD1IMvPNTRsAYo4SYRmPIfgzVv/ESVcHVaD1lPNo+eq0HN1qhvRX+4rmGO7
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = ALICE_sect283k1:ALICE_sect283k1_PUB
+
+
+PrivateKey=BOB_sect283k1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIGQAgEAMBAGByqGSM49AgEGBSuBBAAQBHkwdwIBAQQkAAJXIwfWjYbiM5jEcNw8
+8/1kbEnhVjWGivO7zDPts7AuKSMkoUwDSgAEA5Ause5pdH6ks7PdyPeoPbYAkz6V
+D5v8KTV1b97PiYmZNDeoBY78FQyHRSvdSo+oRew2RacpaCAntRoiWHyN1nAdDSzj
+CN/m
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BOB_sect283k1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MF4wEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEABADSgAEA5Ause5pdH6ks7PdyPeoPbYAkz6VD5v8
+KTV1b97PiYmZNDeoBY78FQyHRSvdSo+oRew2RacpaCAntRoiWHyN1nAdDSzjCN/m
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BOB_sect283k1:BOB_sect283k1_PUB
+
+
+# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
+Derive=ALICE_sect283k1
+PeerKey=BOB_sect283k1_PUB
+SharedSecret=02f2e682c2f60d7261624f3661a5e85fca920443b72aa4dd5a540082e65e552302d8f825
+
+# ECDH Bob with Alice peer
+Derive=BOB_sect283k1
+PeerKey=ALICE_sect283k1_PUB
+SharedSecret=02f2e682c2f60d7261624f3661a5e85fca920443b72aa4dd5a540082e65e552302d8f825
+
+# TEST CURVE sect283r1
+
+PrivateKey=ALICE_sect283r1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIGQAgEAMBAGByqGSM49AgEGBSuBBAARBHkwdwIBAQQkAi4Jrhu19kt7H8jw1FO7
+VzCxh6p0pI0ogl3q9ev5NFkufZkZoUwDSgAEAHx6cwnWw+9l3oZHpx+R8nu7SLqU
+S40TU2uL0W6VTNANIvcJB1b++3okH0FJgFAahbaotafYTyfqCoY11VaxnVqU5/aE
+7jsD
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=ALICE_sect283r1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MF4wEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEABEDSgAEAHx6cwnWw+9l3oZHpx+R8nu7SLqUS40T
+U2uL0W6VTNANIvcJB1b++3okH0FJgFAahbaotafYTyfqCoY11VaxnVqU5/aE7jsD
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = ALICE_sect283r1:ALICE_sect283r1_PUB
+
+
+PrivateKey=BOB_sect283r1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIGQAgEAMBAGByqGSM49AgEGBSuBBAARBHkwdwIBAQQkACD04gJaVfVxK/Dpbxjq
+rzZWc6B76a23MK/IQD1jMlGPQzzxoUwDSgAEA13mIYMvik12DBp8JkdETMB1ewOw
+22C/xhnzLEHmgrG0ewxeANVAoIZy2uv5t0VUJIp4PYdLNaqIguN+9v6U78O4lass
+Iq5I
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BOB_sect283r1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MF4wEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEABEDSgAEA13mIYMvik12DBp8JkdETMB1ewOw22C/
+xhnzLEHmgrG0ewxeANVAoIZy2uv5t0VUJIp4PYdLNaqIguN+9v6U78O4lassIq5I
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BOB_sect283r1:BOB_sect283r1_PUB
+
+
+# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
+Derive=ALICE_sect283r1
+PeerKey=BOB_sect283r1_PUB
+SharedSecret=05778bc1afcf38d7dddb2150cacbfe4d38dc588968fd8b2e859c28ae2629d3435f89f6cc
+
+# ECDH Bob with Alice peer
+Derive=BOB_sect283r1
+PeerKey=ALICE_sect283r1_PUB
+SharedSecret=05778bc1afcf38d7dddb2150cacbfe4d38dc588968fd8b2e859c28ae2629d3435f89f6cc
+
+# TEST CURVE sect409k1
+
+PrivateKey=ALICE_sect409k1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIHBAgEAMBAGByqGSM49AgEGBSuBBAAkBIGpMIGmAgEBBDMg1vV7wiPe1ovX+ukz
+VfwPZoqvyj/vdif04Opi9PcjV5mPBEZgSFBg8hbutNxZJdVLrxShbANqAAQACe1I
+J5ilSk1pPLvbcjEZIE6abC9LZ9WmHuNJxM9LAW1OuLvJGi72AsGYUOGpX0WGmK6C
+AYaqZb2Qeedq/yUIljDHYi66J+26owYl7lOMpRzZ9U2QDJrZ7TYuxeMUui6re0B+
+JuZdYw==
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=ALICE_sect409k1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MH4wEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEACQDagAEAAntSCeYpUpNaTy723IxGSBOmmwvS2fV
+ph7jScTPSwFtTri7yRou9gLBmFDhqV9FhpiuggGGqmW9kHnnav8lCJYwx2Iuuift
+uqMGJe5TjKUc2fVNkAya2e02LsXjFLouq3tAfibmXWM=
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = ALICE_sect409k1:ALICE_sect409k1_PUB
+
+
+PrivateKey=BOB_sect409k1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIHBAgEAMBAGByqGSM49AgEGBSuBBAAkBIGpMIGmAgEBBDMIYBGZZcZz4qCdhAV9
+vqpfe8vV+vJEhjawR52JUV1rumWEBPAx0o6E+gaxHBr5hzVGkIKhbANqAAQAAQKK
+s60CTUUkltsT+lIBukjz850pkGGLltJ4eaZn4k9AtN/lFTCq6Vgqe2sDrjA3b45q
+AdWjf1vRaP0wawJ13SjApJmyXg5hQks6d0Zqz2OHYhGEGiM159VtTlStK067dVe1
+fGVDeg==
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BOB_sect409k1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MH4wEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEACQDagAEAAECirOtAk1FJJbbE/pSAbpI8/OdKZBh
+i5bSeHmmZ+JPQLTf5RUwqulYKntrA64wN2+OagHVo39b0Wj9MGsCdd0owKSZsl4O
+YUJLOndGas9jh2IRhBojNefVbU5UrStOu3VXtXxlQ3o=
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BOB_sect409k1:BOB_sect409k1_PUB
+
+
+# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
+Derive=ALICE_sect409k1
+PeerKey=BOB_sect409k1_PUB
+SharedSecret=01523ec40ad40226a57281a4c423801ae9495dcf736eddd667023b1390977d018ce79313fb99c503f39cbee80f5c1968f3bd02e0
+
+# ECDH Bob with Alice peer
+Derive=BOB_sect409k1
+PeerKey=ALICE_sect409k1_PUB
+SharedSecret=01523ec40ad40226a57281a4c423801ae9495dcf736eddd667023b1390977d018ce79313fb99c503f39cbee80f5c1968f3bd02e0
+
+# TEST CURVE sect409r1
+
+PrivateKey=ALICE_sect409r1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIHCAgEAMBAGByqGSM49AgEGBSuBBAAlBIGqMIGnAgEBBDQAYTMsTpey51D2ULnd
+pN+AAWnJLy9pTerziakhjii8OyWKpUVfpDFNneCCd2oQTDcPX5vdoWwDagAEAYfk
+3ZejxpVYCG7dYHTVhhcqILEyTYoQa4YehGPxKcbmgpqW4Wev1tEDVI3JIowICYGU
+owHXXzgDXoJeR79wgb7ySAlXJXgQ8Ficr7i0CaqyAuIpFw9FWJT3jheFwnbpDTvI
+eIozlf4=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=ALICE_sect409r1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MH4wEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEACUDagAEAYfk3ZejxpVYCG7dYHTVhhcqILEyTYoQ
+a4YehGPxKcbmgpqW4Wev1tEDVI3JIowICYGUowHXXzgDXoJeR79wgb7ySAlXJXgQ
+8Ficr7i0CaqyAuIpFw9FWJT3jheFwnbpDTvIeIozlf4=
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = ALICE_sect409r1:ALICE_sect409r1_PUB
+
+
+PrivateKey=BOB_sect409r1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIHCAgEAMBAGByqGSM49AgEGBSuBBAAlBIGqMIGnAgEBBDQAsCs1nRgwW97TdKIH
+PRcsqmK1e8TIZ00e6rqLb3nD4sIe+Gw/fGhSUER9akQ7lAluEUnfoWwDagAEAfM2
+fvBEic+7jV4oC+v8GfsunD9Zp9rzNgMp3dJ+ZU7r6Bp+ZH3dL9Uvv8kUiB89UlDl
+LwBm/W6TlzGuh1FnzXYKVnhnXpzSlRZQsPCceKukbV46Asl8O23b2+DPJgQBGbMf
+WsgK+KA=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BOB_sect409r1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MH4wEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEACUDagAEAfM2fvBEic+7jV4oC+v8GfsunD9Zp9rz
+NgMp3dJ+ZU7r6Bp+ZH3dL9Uvv8kUiB89UlDlLwBm/W6TlzGuh1FnzXYKVnhnXpzS
+lRZQsPCceKukbV46Asl8O23b2+DPJgQBGbMfWsgK+KA=
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BOB_sect409r1:BOB_sect409r1_PUB
+
+
+# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
+Derive=ALICE_sect409r1
+PeerKey=BOB_sect409r1_PUB
+SharedSecret=019dc849870dc6f79978aca8e1fc6aa6836c8fcb25bbfe3d5ab41ea53eae2c7329952280efb30f9097a31a774191e476dbd842d5
+
+# ECDH Bob with Alice peer
+Derive=BOB_sect409r1
+PeerKey=ALICE_sect409r1_PUB
+SharedSecret=019dc849870dc6f79978aca8e1fc6aa6836c8fcb25bbfe3d5ab41ea53eae2c7329952280efb30f9097a31a774191e476dbd842d5
+
+# TEST CURVE sect571k1
+
+PrivateKey=ALICE_sect571k1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIIBAAIBADAQBgcqhkjOPQIBBgUrgQQAJgSB6DCB5QIBAQRIARO8hI8j6TZ556/d
+RcdGYvdblnALD2XZCKu2c3C5yQIeA8Tidi+f8n6cCnb5FtJNTYKqP8tRfHlwAZtW
+/giXi/4yF5K2twS3oYGVA4GSAAQAtiuUbz7v6njhujnDhanD4iV84K0LQd9wP1+k
+v0Bn833nKtFrZComgrip2SwUaEYOE6IcPyCJ48vWOKvIR6fU11tWwsFRPU0Cct0S
+qVbANAJzwL1umwuKNPblJ6ZEwcBdgw7hWFL6sh+0ayAQ3a8zOizhViJPCnaKR/Oo
+AtaUpCWLSTHDF1gK4/kmlwEx+8o=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=ALICE_sect571k1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MIGnMBAGByqGSM49AgEGBSuBBAAmA4GSAAQAtiuUbz7v6njhujnDhanD4iV84K0L
+Qd9wP1+kv0Bn833nKtFrZComgrip2SwUaEYOE6IcPyCJ48vWOKvIR6fU11tWwsFR
+PU0Cct0SqVbANAJzwL1umwuKNPblJ6ZEwcBdgw7hWFL6sh+0ayAQ3a8zOizhViJP
+CnaKR/OoAtaUpCWLSTHDF1gK4/kmlwEx+8o=
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = ALICE_sect571k1:ALICE_sect571k1_PUB
+
+
+PrivateKey=BOB_sect571k1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIIBAAIBADAQBgcqhkjOPQIBBgUrgQQAJgSB6DCB5QIBAQRIAVZT4tnX9dMWS6Vd
+YCoYRl9o/j/Hz7KGqF4Ujk9n9b4+mXbJ37tobpjnpNqKlJfI04w80JPp+NxpoBR3
+8p1bcc9iL4Smh48YoYGVA4GSAAQARzAx9yVkHL8pbe1myosILIhhLLURYRDHmopO
+IijLQmTATV9pYO7CrFBPBjaKNRjPpw/cVOs89X9Jdzx/bolkGqVAsjLN1tsCrqET
+31F4mpnfsPwcM6zbp6lE4N2gL5cakKMmyPNM4d3m8xl1f6e56LBYfaxOaqcYzbXC
+Q/Aiij13H06qKhuFM4iiB/0D164=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BOB_sect571k1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MIGnMBAGByqGSM49AgEGBSuBBAAmA4GSAAQARzAx9yVkHL8pbe1myosILIhhLLUR
+YRDHmopOIijLQmTATV9pYO7CrFBPBjaKNRjPpw/cVOs89X9Jdzx/bolkGqVAsjLN
+1tsCrqET31F4mpnfsPwcM6zbp6lE4N2gL5cakKMmyPNM4d3m8xl1f6e56LBYfaxO
+aqcYzbXCQ/Aiij13H06qKhuFM4iiB/0D164=
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BOB_sect571k1:BOB_sect571k1_PUB
+
+
+# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
+Derive=ALICE_sect571k1
+PeerKey=BOB_sect571k1_PUB
+SharedSecret=05a423515fcc91b3171c83edd5c4085ff729a8ff0a3fa1578ebf769523ded0f5c1e387cf63109f2fbd95e117345b788b4577fdc6b6e727230bfc73eae0d4e851cb6f6e616eddb13e
+
+# ECDH Bob with Alice peer
+Derive=BOB_sect571k1
+PeerKey=ALICE_sect571k1_PUB
+SharedSecret=05a423515fcc91b3171c83edd5c4085ff729a8ff0a3fa1578ebf769523ded0f5c1e387cf63109f2fbd95e117345b788b4577fdc6b6e727230bfc73eae0d4e851cb6f6e616eddb13e
+
+# TEST CURVE sect571r1
+
+PrivateKey=ALICE_sect571r1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIIBAAIBADAQBgcqhkjOPQIBBgUrgQQAJwSB6DCB5QIBAQRIArsi//Zp9veeURYV
+zGYHn4MlNIxNt6U6vtmTPS/NaoiaavxbOimpHgxYPCjpoPYhM33Z2VBh7pl2aoRW
+3GBepLFLoF8oiQaLoYGVA4GSAAQDRG2b7KCUKbGDTWVgW0qqNC3oYcz4f/AwTHmo
+US1mzdRZj/Sf6IU+7mITGnQ6lg1EkTas/X6TK1hNMV7tAjSeowdN75wzd8YF32SF
+HMIcWew5g56oF961qv3IvICZnRAOmWyGHeHdYwHxMBSBPNgua42QGoJz6J6dYAUe
+vE+F3N29p/tRBGNzMFIqoDdW+NA=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=ALICE_sect571r1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MIGnMBAGByqGSM49AgEGBSuBBAAnA4GSAAQDRG2b7KCUKbGDTWVgW0qqNC3oYcz4
+f/AwTHmoUS1mzdRZj/Sf6IU+7mITGnQ6lg1EkTas/X6TK1hNMV7tAjSeowdN75wz
+d8YF32SFHMIcWew5g56oF961qv3IvICZnRAOmWyGHeHdYwHxMBSBPNgua42QGoJz
+6J6dYAUevE+F3N29p/tRBGNzMFIqoDdW+NA=
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = ALICE_sect571r1:ALICE_sect571r1_PUB
+
+
+PrivateKey=BOB_sect571r1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIIBAAIBADAQBgcqhkjOPQIBBgUrgQQAJwSB6DCB5QIBAQRIAYj65N5XJTQusn+h
+Z9xj/dgZ4qR1GDC1Ij7jYuow+TvGrG2wz/WT76/lLNtlCLfDW2kODDUmDAJeK/e+
+VMO7suJTXGnrGFHioYGVA4GSAAQGxykYFxqz7jZxcBbiPLYfJEhXlf2SYmMKve74
+trOT+qjIm35+uUAcg2krOzH7X/8wH6bVSn/UKG/k27wZrAnWzZ5XKd8QI70H8aHv
+LgrCoMoqOno+h6J4TgvlDq7FIGZ8fvDaM7YJ8dHPX5FC8Vyphu82TcNdnNATBqom
+6WDWc7RTFZ4sijL5ywVhovwJ1gA=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BOB_sect571r1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MIGnMBAGByqGSM49AgEGBSuBBAAnA4GSAAQGxykYFxqz7jZxcBbiPLYfJEhXlf2S
+YmMKve74trOT+qjIm35+uUAcg2krOzH7X/8wH6bVSn/UKG/k27wZrAnWzZ5XKd8Q
+I70H8aHvLgrCoMoqOno+h6J4TgvlDq7FIGZ8fvDaM7YJ8dHPX5FC8Vyphu82TcNd
+nNATBqom6WDWc7RTFZ4sijL5ywVhovwJ1gA=
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BOB_sect571r1:BOB_sect571r1_PUB
+
+
+# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
+Derive=ALICE_sect571r1
+PeerKey=BOB_sect571r1_PUB
+SharedSecret=004b397e564055e2c7d87648183c948655ccb0ebb20bd441f9b11635cf461cb5815ff060eab33091b9f7aed67bec8ba1bb7b22437ece3c92c7cf76124408fb951595dfb4a512b2ae
+
+# ECDH Bob with Alice peer
+Derive=BOB_sect571r1
+PeerKey=ALICE_sect571r1_PUB
+SharedSecret=004b397e564055e2c7d87648183c948655ccb0ebb20bd441f9b11635cf461cb5815ff060eab33091b9f7aed67bec8ba1bb7b22437ece3c92c7cf76124408fb951595dfb4a512b2ae
+
+# TEST CURVE c2pnb163v1
+
+PrivateKey=ALICE_c2pnb163v1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MGYCAQAwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAAEETDBKAgEBBBUDTVBXDIdMMg5JIb6y
+ZHLpkONauzuhLgMsAAQC/TaMi2YGY4SmYVCrIVVommDnOyMHJZ1VZ4+fT+hE/qRp
+WHMMW5gOZO4=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=ALICE_c2pnb163v1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MEMwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAAEDLAAEAv02jItmBmOEpmFQqyFVaJpg5zsj
+ByWdVWePn0/oRP6kaVhzDFuYDmTu
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = ALICE_c2pnb163v1:ALICE_c2pnb163v1_PUB
+
+
+PrivateKey=BOB_c2pnb163v1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MGYCAQAwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAAEETDBKAgEBBBUC3uEAfGc3+a0FOrFh
+ftdUBtZ5BPOhLgMsAAQGojKkhnOduUQY6XT0GwQbDe1YM1wFkj3vZGkhO5OzsqG1
+QqQLkFeMwKo=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BOB_c2pnb163v1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MEMwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAAEDLAAEBqIypIZznblEGOl09BsEGw3tWDNc
+BZI972RpITuTs7KhtUKkC5BXjMCq
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BOB_c2pnb163v1:BOB_c2pnb163v1_PUB
+
+
+# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
+Derive=ALICE_c2pnb163v1
+PeerKey=BOB_c2pnb163v1_PUB
+SharedSecret=05939a47cb503656e684f433001e45776c7620e13b
+
+# ECDH Bob with Alice peer
+Derive=BOB_c2pnb163v1
+PeerKey=ALICE_c2pnb163v1_PUB
+SharedSecret=05939a47cb503656e684f433001e45776c7620e13b
+
+# TEST CURVE c2pnb163v2
+
+PrivateKey=ALICE_c2pnb163v2
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MGYCAQAwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAAIETDBKAgEBBBUC3m3meJNbhDwwFH3C
+//L2EyOQNruhLgMsAAQBaATOiPV6c8icBYWczLXM6k+t8U4FIN57iiC8RsmIS3+V
+yM/rN3UBZaw=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=ALICE_c2pnb163v2_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MEMwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAAIDLAAEAWgEzoj1enPInAWFnMy1zOpPrfFO
+BSDee4ogvEbJiEt/lcjP6zd1AWWs
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = ALICE_c2pnb163v2:ALICE_c2pnb163v2_PUB
+
+
+PrivateKey=BOB_c2pnb163v2
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MGYCAQAwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAAIETDBKAgEBBBUBvd/DvKharywckSaW
+aAniKByXBwihLgMsAAQH0+FWe4mb13QrEZCPwfIS+gChEXoGhyBVubt6+SSgS5nS
+eDGgjW/36Qw=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BOB_c2pnb163v2_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MEMwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAAIDLAAEB9PhVnuJm9d0KxGQj8HyEvoAoRF6
+BocgVbm7evkkoEuZ0ngxoI1v9+kM
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BOB_c2pnb163v2:BOB_c2pnb163v2_PUB
+
+
+# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
+Derive=ALICE_c2pnb163v2
+PeerKey=BOB_c2pnb163v2_PUB
+SharedSecret=0779fb5f6ac7892f2f342b785d71244e0b03ca562d
+
+# ECDH Bob with Alice peer
+Derive=BOB_c2pnb163v2
+PeerKey=ALICE_c2pnb163v2_PUB
+SharedSecret=0779fb5f6ac7892f2f342b785d71244e0b03ca562d
+
+# TEST CURVE c2pnb163v3
+
+PrivateKey=ALICE_c2pnb163v3
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MGYCAQAwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAAMETDBKAgEBBBUCtJ0ZQMD5T6Ym/jZx
+Fzb9tQkLOhuhLgMsAAQE26YD7hG+CY02+nBDFKIBnMvHWUQGfkiIfG9yxV+LptOM
+CdU4y9RhM+w=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=ALICE_c2pnb163v3_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MEMwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAAMDLAAEBNumA+4RvgmNNvpwQxSiAZzLx1lE
+Bn5IiHxvcsVfi6bTjAnVOMvUYTPs
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = ALICE_c2pnb163v3:ALICE_c2pnb163v3_PUB
+
+
+PrivateKey=BOB_c2pnb163v3
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MGYCAQAwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAAMETDBKAgEBBBUB9MnYR9NXM8OoCraO
+orQz1LXIZJChLgMsAAQH15R/xAGyrtmg+hrdAaGn9rVEfWQA7yUCn4vKR2eIy/qN
+YfbeHTIaTBY=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BOB_c2pnb163v3_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MEMwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAAMDLAAEB9eUf8QBsq7ZoPoa3QGhp/a1RH1k
+AO8lAp+LykdniMv6jWH23h0yGkwW
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BOB_c2pnb163v3:BOB_c2pnb163v3_PUB
+
+
+# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
+Derive=ALICE_c2pnb163v3
+PeerKey=BOB_c2pnb163v3_PUB
+SharedSecret=02bf68863a8798e72cdc9cd3b9ce731f12654bfa81
+
+# ECDH Bob with Alice peer
+Derive=BOB_c2pnb163v3
+PeerKey=ALICE_c2pnb163v3_PUB
+SharedSecret=02bf68863a8798e72cdc9cd3b9ce731f12654bfa81
+
+# TEST CURVE c2pnb176v1
+
+PrivateKey=ALICE_c2pnb176v1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MGgCAQAwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAAQETjBMAgEBBBUAxXEz1PjthqsI664l
+N5LRLN8C2uyhMAMuAARD1qVJHbL5A7BhEKeHSuDeT6XeZ3ODFn9ef67qdF+tS7p3
+zgXGKt4pKMoYcg==
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=ALICE_c2pnb176v1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MEUwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAAQDLgAEQ9alSR2y+QOwYRCnh0rg3k+l3mdz
+gxZ/Xn+u6nRfrUu6d84FxireKSjKGHI=
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = ALICE_c2pnb176v1:ALICE_c2pnb176v1_PUB
+
+
+PrivateKey=BOB_c2pnb176v1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MGgCAQAwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAAQETjBMAgEBBBUAJvHHFW0v+/cjaLd7
+Xgt6FtSga5+hMAMuAASUs7rUAlv1qhppI82ikLvZ8Y0DApC356nhs7SyQYdLtHRM
++qUHBB3IzrLKdQ==
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BOB_c2pnb176v1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MEUwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAAQDLgAElLO61AJb9aoaaSPNopC72fGNAwKQ
+t+ep4bO0skGHS7R0TPqlBwQdyM6yynU=
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BOB_c2pnb176v1:BOB_c2pnb176v1_PUB
+
+
+# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
+Derive=ALICE_c2pnb176v1
+PeerKey=BOB_c2pnb176v1_PUB
+SharedSecret=b204734417542df762e09013d6ba958940837a2aa25a
+
+# ECDH Bob with Alice peer
+Derive=BOB_c2pnb176v1
+PeerKey=ALICE_c2pnb176v1_PUB
+SharedSecret=b204734417542df762e09013d6ba958940837a2aa25a
+
+# TEST CURVE c2tnb191v1
+
+PrivateKey=ALICE_c2tnb191v1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MG8CAQAwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAAUEVTBTAgEBBBgYgpO+wgirUtuqHF00
+2o02Vc7xQjKgSzChNAMyAAQ2ae+5tDQ2CDaV5XPdC+RtLgcHS5lTOclTClr/WSpP
+TlMt2TGh/KRrD859oXg6KYY=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=ALICE_c2tnb191v1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MEkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAAUDMgAENmnvubQ0Ngg2leVz3QvkbS4HB0uZ
+UznJUwpa/1kqT05TLdkxofykaw/OfaF4OimG
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = ALICE_c2tnb191v1:ALICE_c2tnb191v1_PUB
+
+
+PrivateKey=BOB_c2tnb191v1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MG8CAQAwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAAUEVTBTAgEBBBguzm5uFNRy/lX3OKuJ
+j8i/vH/+viMd48yhNAMyAARka5rhdTmtbqQVRMWZQjUqsHUMX43siRt5f2WQSZfg
++IQ2l/8veayyX9erUSt3gK4=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BOB_c2tnb191v1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MEkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAAUDMgAEZGua4XU5rW6kFUTFmUI1KrB1DF+N
+7IkbeX9lkEmX4PiENpf/L3mssl/Xq1Erd4Cu
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BOB_c2tnb191v1:BOB_c2tnb191v1_PUB
+
+
+# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
+Derive=ALICE_c2tnb191v1
+PeerKey=BOB_c2tnb191v1_PUB
+SharedSecret=7a30d30acd3b067f38bb3be9e8cdef739483df26455e36e1
+
+# ECDH Bob with Alice peer
+Derive=BOB_c2tnb191v1
+PeerKey=ALICE_c2tnb191v1_PUB
+SharedSecret=7a30d30acd3b067f38bb3be9e8cdef739483df26455e36e1
+
+# TEST CURVE c2tnb191v2
+
+PrivateKey=ALICE_c2tnb191v2
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MG8CAQAwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAAYEVTBTAgEBBBgOlslgJ0XSK3vKC5Ls
+QmYxZfr8OEKXRQ2hNAMyAAQAHivLhSwW2SJZtUPhuV1p9fQSfz7w9SJY8dJOpVf8
+9DevPUlJMPcaSGyjX+3nJZc=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=ALICE_c2tnb191v2_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MEkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAAYDMgAEAB4ry4UsFtkiWbVD4bldafX0En8+
+8PUiWPHSTqVX/PQ3rz1JSTD3Gkhso1/t5yWX
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = ALICE_c2tnb191v2:ALICE_c2tnb191v2_PUB
+
+
+PrivateKey=BOB_c2tnb191v2
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MG8CAQAwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAAYEVTBTAgEBBBgK9QaS2SDU6yz7uXqO
++/+C+baTTVMAGVGhNAMyAAQiR0t9plm77ezfXvJzDNdlyYC0pWX+QmJ8EavgEElk
+ky/M+YXb5ufkFzFXIEfU9pM=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BOB_c2tnb191v2_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MEkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAAYDMgAEIkdLfaZZu+3s317ycwzXZcmAtKVl
+/kJifBGr4BBJZJMvzPmF2+bn5BcxVyBH1PaT
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BOB_c2tnb191v2:BOB_c2tnb191v2_PUB
+
+
+# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
+Derive=ALICE_c2tnb191v2
+PeerKey=BOB_c2tnb191v2_PUB
+SharedSecret=5ec2b6ccd193620dbad302c4ad8f8909a40698bf454d7534
+
+# ECDH Bob with Alice peer
+Derive=BOB_c2tnb191v2
+PeerKey=ALICE_c2tnb191v2_PUB
+SharedSecret=5ec2b6ccd193620dbad302c4ad8f8909a40698bf454d7534
+
+# TEST CURVE c2tnb191v3
+
+PrivateKey=ALICE_c2tnb191v3
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MG8CAQAwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAAcEVTBTAgEBBBgSaBOQyq6XX3hZVVgV
+FlRrxTuvgtv33C6hNAMyAARL+Fup8jOnixQYPx8pU/b066PHrhTXfiNerFEYA/5O
+XCKCEkdRCpuDJnyqpmaC2vw=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=ALICE_c2tnb191v3_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MEkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAAcDMgAES/hbqfIzp4sUGD8fKVP29Oujx64U
+134jXqxRGAP+TlwighJHUQqbgyZ8qqZmgtr8
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = ALICE_c2tnb191v3:ALICE_c2tnb191v3_PUB
+
+
+PrivateKey=BOB_c2tnb191v3
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MG8CAQAwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAAcEVTBTAgEBBBgEE8Ls7pc1/q3/0ruR
+gMrWGhGIr4VLt4uhNAMyAAQHAZsjkAXanwGbXR3SKkoKli6rSfSiu0lU2XHDiZdt
+LaPN+Eihz4KeG2YM/p3m1do=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BOB_c2tnb191v3_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MEkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAAcDMgAEBwGbI5AF2p8Bm10d0ipKCpYuq0n0
+ortJVNlxw4mXbS2jzfhIoc+CnhtmDP6d5tXa
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BOB_c2tnb191v3:BOB_c2tnb191v3_PUB
+
+
+# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
+Derive=ALICE_c2tnb191v3
+PeerKey=BOB_c2tnb191v3_PUB
+SharedSecret=39093dc8a2e6724a6206ed41bb99490d527d80c902c41891
+
+# ECDH Bob with Alice peer
+Derive=BOB_c2tnb191v3
+PeerKey=ALICE_c2tnb191v3_PUB
+SharedSecret=39093dc8a2e6724a6206ed41bb99490d527d80c902c41891
+
+# TEST CURVE c2pnb208w1
+
+PrivateKey=ALICE_c2pnb208w1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MHQCAQAwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAAoEWjBYAgEBBBkAbfnNboX6Dk+NLoBO
+6qBB2aE1srmTgS96oTgDNgAEFLHciAu4excYB0mty8rF442ULXZfqL90IkgP5G2z
+wzY1mAlEBFMg83izeRaCJ/vRihZDJw==
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=ALICE_c2pnb208w1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+ME0wEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAAoDNgAEFLHciAu4excYB0mty8rF442ULXZf
+qL90IkgP5G2zwzY1mAlEBFMg83izeRaCJ/vRihZDJw==
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = ALICE_c2pnb208w1:ALICE_c2pnb208w1_PUB
+
+
+PrivateKey=BOB_c2pnb208w1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MHQCAQAwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAAoEWjBYAgEBBBkAwjGFJOPkZqQPZ+mI
+Ae3G12zpUia40tRjoTgDNgAEDxaP6u0phDLfM4RsZhgIfZy8CurR4/IPtqMGxbfz
+pPKPMZXV12F6MrWrorSFDZ8KFd58Ww==
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BOB_c2pnb208w1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+ME0wEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAAoDNgAEDxaP6u0phDLfM4RsZhgIfZy8CurR
+4/IPtqMGxbfzpPKPMZXV12F6MrWrorSFDZ8KFd58Ww==
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BOB_c2pnb208w1:BOB_c2pnb208w1_PUB
+
+
+# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
+Derive=ALICE_c2pnb208w1
+PeerKey=BOB_c2pnb208w1_PUB
+SharedSecret=59bf3c91bd168d4d4d900d9ce155933045e0fd16dcf0511bb5af
+
+# ECDH Bob with Alice peer
+Derive=BOB_c2pnb208w1
+PeerKey=ALICE_c2pnb208w1_PUB
+SharedSecret=59bf3c91bd168d4d4d900d9ce155933045e0fd16dcf0511bb5af
+
+# TEST CURVE c2tnb239v1
+
+PrivateKey=ALICE_c2tnb239v1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIGBAgEAMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwALBGcwZQIBAQQeE4CCwXEKsP3CfLC/
+DLSSF9lfyOaNSuQXmq9rzLqwoUADPgAEM6oQIsXJs+ANKQpF3DzBdG4FdS5DS+qp
+c5fVTsZiI4FAWCXUvzzPTRAex3wwvF/4JrYK6cKVh8i1EOrN
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=ALICE_c2tnb239v1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MFUwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAAsDPgAEM6oQIsXJs+ANKQpF3DzBdG4FdS5D
+S+qpc5fVTsZiI4FAWCXUvzzPTRAex3wwvF/4JrYK6cKVh8i1EOrN
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = ALICE_c2tnb239v1:ALICE_c2tnb239v1_PUB
+
+
+PrivateKey=BOB_c2tnb239v1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIGBAgEAMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwALBGcwZQIBAQQeAGDYCGAXqD03x510
+h35JSzlgReW6W/T8lYPEA42doUADPgAECk6Uyh8ULkOVOxZSNZYGwtko/oy7ZLDP
+F8dbsEZTeYIBpQ6hWqZ/4Nz3RyzfoukyfCb3b8OMtpq+Qgio
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BOB_c2tnb239v1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MFUwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAAsDPgAECk6Uyh8ULkOVOxZSNZYGwtko/oy7
+ZLDPF8dbsEZTeYIBpQ6hWqZ/4Nz3RyzfoukyfCb3b8OMtpq+Qgio
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BOB_c2tnb239v1:BOB_c2tnb239v1_PUB
+
+
+# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
+Derive=ALICE_c2tnb239v1
+PeerKey=BOB_c2tnb239v1_PUB
+SharedSecret=78c42256900725df9a47bb042cef7dad9f639b32e3010738a144e7472d1a
+
+# ECDH Bob with Alice peer
+Derive=BOB_c2tnb239v1
+PeerKey=ALICE_c2tnb239v1_PUB
+SharedSecret=78c42256900725df9a47bb042cef7dad9f639b32e3010738a144e7472d1a
+
+# TEST CURVE c2tnb239v2
+
+PrivateKey=ALICE_c2tnb239v2
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIGBAgEAMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwAMBGcwZQIBAQQeE8kBjHLjFeC+Z2gZ
+q0snwR3UgEgWMW0xilhJNjW2oUADPgAEQ+ubIYhh82VohwKSVz70PkHsjmYWDvDU
+/SBRk8AiP71CM9D7XEKK5tnU94MtK2Kscx5nWZFc+oIh1+sY
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=ALICE_c2tnb239v2_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MFUwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAAwDPgAEQ+ubIYhh82VohwKSVz70PkHsjmYW
+DvDU/SBRk8AiP71CM9D7XEKK5tnU94MtK2Kscx5nWZFc+oIh1+sY
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = ALICE_c2tnb239v2:ALICE_c2tnb239v2_PUB
+
+
+PrivateKey=BOB_c2tnb239v2
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIGBAgEAMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwAMBGcwZQIBAQQeE7bhzKZZUm780c0e
+3EBWY1GxD90Mzu7zrQMi7bAzoUADPgAEYgV7bokY6iLMzZTG10c6NDaW11plAm0T
+NKVVwzPqe3ylhsQmmm02LHKX0gN4E1dUS0uClBbMGNq2mhln
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BOB_c2tnb239v2_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MFUwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAAwDPgAEYgV7bokY6iLMzZTG10c6NDaW11pl
+Am0TNKVVwzPqe3ylhsQmmm02LHKX0gN4E1dUS0uClBbMGNq2mhln
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BOB_c2tnb239v2:BOB_c2tnb239v2_PUB
+
+
+# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
+Derive=ALICE_c2tnb239v2
+PeerKey=BOB_c2tnb239v2_PUB
+SharedSecret=4ba2ecfa8ec7a375594d1673886cccf96d7763c55611b3c9008a35160192
+
+# ECDH Bob with Alice peer
+Derive=BOB_c2tnb239v2
+PeerKey=ALICE_c2tnb239v2_PUB
+SharedSecret=4ba2ecfa8ec7a375594d1673886cccf96d7763c55611b3c9008a35160192
+
+# TEST CURVE c2tnb239v3
+
+PrivateKey=ALICE_c2tnb239v3
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIGBAgEAMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwANBGcwZQIBAQQeCxiC5lbHYL1QYbb2
+izZiSoLPnWCZIds811J1N7KtoUADPgAEdHMz+tsuO7VcO9IFgsSWTweLoB1ah5WI
+g6cWrtcUfmO7EGfPwNni4Bf8No7rGGMwbisW0v6Jv2pkTSM8
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=ALICE_c2tnb239v3_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MFUwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAA0DPgAEdHMz+tsuO7VcO9IFgsSWTweLoB1a
+h5WIg6cWrtcUfmO7EGfPwNni4Bf8No7rGGMwbisW0v6Jv2pkTSM8
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = ALICE_c2tnb239v3:ALICE_c2tnb239v3_PUB
+
+
+PrivateKey=BOB_c2tnb239v3
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIGBAgEAMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwANBGcwZQIBAQQeBBPxdeU3MohZc5Jx
+7WadLuPSeXeOg75rXC1ElexsoUADPgAEaHwiwQmoqbPij8+l6hLHVQz0AZLBT5uX
+hAh8fhTABKqI7qYShICAAX0tvu3EvQ8BQLP14grxUsSoEqAF
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BOB_c2tnb239v3_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MFUwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAA0DPgAEaHwiwQmoqbPij8+l6hLHVQz0AZLB
+T5uXhAh8fhTABKqI7qYShICAAX0tvu3EvQ8BQLP14grxUsSoEqAF
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BOB_c2tnb239v3:BOB_c2tnb239v3_PUB
+
+
+# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
+Derive=ALICE_c2tnb239v3
+PeerKey=BOB_c2tnb239v3_PUB
+SharedSecret=47ad60e5480375fccd9246c93ab04da8e5da83e1dbf5f177f10a47cb54a0
+
+# ECDH Bob with Alice peer
+Derive=BOB_c2tnb239v3
+PeerKey=ALICE_c2tnb239v3_PUB
+SharedSecret=47ad60e5480375fccd9246c93ab04da8e5da83e1dbf5f177f10a47cb54a0
+
+# TEST CURVE c2pnb272w1
+
+PrivateKey=ALICE_c2pnb272w1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIGMAgEAMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwAQBHIwcAIBAQQhAKMtKddENVGjzTU4
+w+hW0SgDOtIElcs52wb40S08j6gMoUgDRgAEfGvSzQo+00VXIDXV7iiGXpI16kzs
+6C8rkchA5sVBBY56nSCp0n4FpIXRzafiFQklJD9OrJzA6PXc7tp2n2XhIwvuOmI=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=ALICE_c2pnb272w1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MF0wEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DABADRgAEfGvSzQo+00VXIDXV7iiGXpI16kzs
+6C8rkchA5sVBBY56nSCp0n4FpIXRzafiFQklJD9OrJzA6PXc7tp2n2XhIwvuOmI=
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = ALICE_c2pnb272w1:ALICE_c2pnb272w1_PUB
+
+
+PrivateKey=BOB_c2pnb272w1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIGMAgEAMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwAQBHIwcAIBAQQhAFAKPByX1wlYUpU4
+mECDAxg+VM5aFo4JPlqEzR0b9hI6oUgDRgAEL8+863IU4uxbEY8jVBjhsrG4W6AF
+MF6t+aGvoiKHtEMLQa6U158TRapDWp4eRurm6Idvv7hepCPqOMEGySDUwMECiQM=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BOB_c2pnb272w1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MF0wEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DABADRgAEL8+863IU4uxbEY8jVBjhsrG4W6AF
+MF6t+aGvoiKHtEMLQa6U158TRapDWp4eRurm6Idvv7hepCPqOMEGySDUwMECiQM=
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BOB_c2pnb272w1:BOB_c2pnb272w1_PUB
+
+
+# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
+Derive=ALICE_c2pnb272w1
+PeerKey=BOB_c2pnb272w1_PUB
+SharedSecret=3ae063b2bed6ba8aa28ff35e9bd2673f22ee8087860c86b89429a5b52538216632a3
+
+# ECDH Bob with Alice peer
+Derive=BOB_c2pnb272w1
+PeerKey=ALICE_c2pnb272w1_PUB
+SharedSecret=3ae063b2bed6ba8aa28ff35e9bd2673f22ee8087860c86b89429a5b52538216632a3
+
+# TEST CURVE c2pnb304w1
+
+PrivateKey=ALICE_c2pnb304w1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIGYAgEAMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwARBH4wfAIBAQQlAOKzfcV2XOvVsSUh
+oVz3SHGzSCf0q9i+ilz5ZfBxc+5ssjK7jKFQA04ABDc4zQNFaZukj9iz3iXTYdza
+tCOYZvrfOjrbgzl/8PoFxt5q6yJTu35Vu9XVp5pTCtjpDEpywBj0xb07RRuVDEk8
+TthFP5vGeTIWLD4=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=ALICE_c2pnb304w1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MGUwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DABEDTgAENzjNA0Vpm6SP2LPeJdNh3Nq0I5hm
++t86OtuDOX/w+gXG3mrrIlO7flW71dWnmlMK2OkMSnLAGPTFvTtFG5UMSTxO2EU/
+m8Z5MhYsPg==
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = ALICE_c2pnb304w1:ALICE_c2pnb304w1_PUB
+
+
+PrivateKey=BOB_c2pnb304w1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIGYAgEAMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwARBH4wfAIBAQQlAPP4hz6sa+KdTJ4h
+fBeCUiJBfshcZoapkZMFrhI1vdcRY7MeAaFQA04ABMHRUzLiUY7O4nEBdmex31U4
+l6TO/dD+5MV/tVNizVsWjkTvi2fs772lZ9MeNp6QnGMZ5n5subHsa0QOJL1LpmXX
+K0UIWGbW0nQb52g=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BOB_c2pnb304w1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MGUwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DABEDTgAEwdFTMuJRjs7icQF2Z7HfVTiXpM79
+0P7kxX+1U2LNWxaORO+LZ+zvvaVn0x42npCcYxnmfmy5sexrRA4kvUumZdcrRQhY
+ZtbSdBvnaA==
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BOB_c2pnb304w1:BOB_c2pnb304w1_PUB
+
+
+# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
+Derive=ALICE_c2pnb304w1
+PeerKey=BOB_c2pnb304w1_PUB
+SharedSecret=6df88b20de9f095c7632234291ea4658a9265cd2293424e11ed56705b09a069f09dc4e055eb7
+
+# ECDH Bob with Alice peer
+Derive=BOB_c2pnb304w1
+PeerKey=ALICE_c2pnb304w1_PUB
+SharedSecret=6df88b20de9f095c7632234291ea4658a9265cd2293424e11ed56705b09a069f09dc4e055eb7
+
+# TEST CURVE c2tnb359v1
+
+PrivateKey=ALICE_c2tnb359v1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIGwAgEAMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwASBIGVMIGSAgEBBC0BeMU97SvjsIvQ
+1v+Ztf56OCL8JXHxRJDQZ5gWEa4c2b3FZXFVC4CwEPd7cB+hXgNcAAQOBgLp0TzS
+4Hf/VYbJCFuj3OlRC5JMzFV7ox41ubhl5Ij+gHIodu1bQ6cqd0YAb2/30PxwX++N
+NpFvq8u8435zhPYXsut6txOPNU5ZzCeagy2xsKacXSZc7D0=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=ALICE_c2tnb359v1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MHMwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DABIDXAAEDgYC6dE80uB3/1WGyQhbo9zpUQuS
+TMxVe6MeNbm4ZeSI/oByKHbtW0OnKndGAG9v99D8cF/vjTaRb6vLvON+c4T2F7Lr
+ercTjzVOWcwnmoMtsbCmnF0mXOw9
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = ALICE_c2tnb359v1:ALICE_c2tnb359v1_PUB
+
+
+PrivateKey=BOB_c2tnb359v1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIGwAgEAMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwASBIGVMIGSAgEBBC0BRZ3IIh3mrLIX
+KBbh6Vj7TXNY5bzRuD5/ayHPlHQkJcd8K66dOqu7hgaN91GhXgNcAAQ7njbTQ2xY
+YZtkKswYr8E6P/R3Dg/XEZgQQ72B4qXnqbK/SgYsZAntFg7CRztcTkHjKAgdSz6f
+TRIc4///gwXN3Oi6D8PeswhzPJi/uLmCAHMm3GT6SUO3aTY=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BOB_c2tnb359v1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MHMwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DABIDXAAEO54200NsWGGbZCrMGK/BOj/0dw4P
+1xGYEEO9geKl56myv0oGLGQJ7RYOwkc7XE5B4ygIHUs+n00SHOP//4MFzdzoug/D
+3rMIczyYv7i5ggBzJtxk+klDt2k2
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BOB_c2tnb359v1:BOB_c2tnb359v1_PUB
+
+
+# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
+Derive=ALICE_c2tnb359v1
+PeerKey=BOB_c2tnb359v1_PUB
+SharedSecret=1d3f3396492d130caea54233c79833e90a072fe883071bb08cec671ce0319f0bc39c68dda0199952152a5c3563
+
+# ECDH Bob with Alice peer
+Derive=BOB_c2tnb359v1
+PeerKey=ALICE_c2tnb359v1_PUB
+SharedSecret=1d3f3396492d130caea54233c79833e90a072fe883071bb08cec671ce0319f0bc39c68dda0199952152a5c3563
+
+# TEST CURVE c2pnb368w1
+
+PrivateKey=ALICE_c2pnb368w1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIGyAgEAMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwATBIGXMIGUAgEBBC0AFagbth/4/M2s
+b1G4FpxbFEVLIulioS34v0hrClpZ38/Z+PHmIhOfEFminyehYANeAAQAU42w7mII
+jkyAdnCC4qoEPdH42fh3oVyCtnaRtKUmdhUdXm0IgSM4T4SYEOsx+aQZLGIjnhHJ
+CabcaKPQ0sai3dirUr2YsNXNDJiU93T7buUr+DnRPGsfBy/nEg==
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=ALICE_c2pnb368w1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MHUwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DABMDXgAEAFONsO5iCI5MgHZwguKqBD3R+Nn4
+d6FcgrZ2kbSlJnYVHV5tCIEjOE+EmBDrMfmkGSxiI54RyQmm3Gij0NLGot3Yq1K9
+mLDVzQyYlPd0+27lK/g50TxrHwcv5xI=
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = ALICE_c2pnb368w1:ALICE_c2pnb368w1_PUB
+
+
+PrivateKey=BOB_c2pnb368w1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIGyAgEAMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwATBIGXMIGUAgEBBC0AA/woMzOFy8k2
+zBqBkubhkOIwc7sx0u+JadM9f7V45L4P8nK7bjJasOqrHRahYANeAATKE6jcstac
+H8yWzg/qBgvGoGan2PVwTN/U+68K4WxHO7+oPHviUh1OVF7ZxYjsVSdyno83iHE3
+3sq2Ej6j26f+uVs/fuWk19t8NpAQ6+sVETZszuMDm5adqtVZRQ==
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BOB_c2pnb368w1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MHUwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DABMDXgAEyhOo3LLWnB/Mls4P6gYLxqBmp9j1
+cEzf1PuvCuFsRzu/qDx74lIdTlRe2cWI7FUncp6PN4hxN97KthI+o9un/rlbP37l
+pNfbfDaQEOvrFRE2bM7jA5uWnarVWUU=
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BOB_c2pnb368w1:BOB_c2pnb368w1_PUB
+
+
+# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
+Derive=ALICE_c2pnb368w1
+PeerKey=BOB_c2pnb368w1_PUB
+SharedSecret=d191710b156d1b1d14242843a7f0abf28060bbb9e655655b53852a8b0f250ef1eee37d59364d9791c8e1bc526cbb
+
+# ECDH Bob with Alice peer
+Derive=BOB_c2pnb368w1
+PeerKey=ALICE_c2pnb368w1_PUB
+SharedSecret=d191710b156d1b1d14242843a7f0abf28060bbb9e655655b53852a8b0f250ef1eee37d59364d9791c8e1bc526cbb
+
+# TEST CURVE c2tnb431r1
+
+PrivateKey=ALICE_c2tnb431r1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIHKAgEAMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwAUBIGvMIGsAgEBBDUC18JhUt+NCIZ/
+q6kdjNZ7zX72UqpW4K6Uc2bAWu2PXK1aL573LNzu4oUlHfbvuE1BUrxNpaFwA24A
+BDrG8SG4lckR1rrvLRpXYf7Wspmh/fbql+Zpulyl896XtwQK2BkLVRkZ5ixTG4PU
+yb64OiffdSnvIaM++cb7LgJLBBgT3d5le8V1gtxWFFm0NggUyF6glmUqHQL0LuhX
+WS468O6w05KS0AL6vQ==
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=ALICE_c2tnb431r1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MIGFMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwAUA24ABDrG8SG4lckR1rrvLRpXYf7Wspmh
+/fbql+Zpulyl896XtwQK2BkLVRkZ5ixTG4PUyb64OiffdSnvIaM++cb7LgJLBBgT
+3d5le8V1gtxWFFm0NggUyF6glmUqHQL0LuhXWS468O6w05KS0AL6vQ==
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = ALICE_c2tnb431r1:ALICE_c2tnb431r1_PUB
+
+
+PrivateKey=BOB_c2tnb431r1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIHKAgEAMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwAUBIGvMIGsAgEBBDUApanyPgvpfrAu
+1jNAKGpctH71v0+P/kFF9JxdFYarpWEwBBd4tz6CxoYKmvDZ9ukOOqBbX6FwA24A
+BGh3JXuYmh6dGGEmbRhoR2T5pVD/5Mq2ZKKzfzY2NOoKiIs6rVzv2SW7S6BScYlR
+qRWiXCeZVFvT0crDY/5uodkHbcRw6B/Yo/iMN8wLI257Tjm9/C5G+JPCLopCcLIL
+gTwAJM2ZhtPnc08LyQ==
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BOB_c2tnb431r1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MIGFMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwAUA24ABGh3JXuYmh6dGGEmbRhoR2T5pVD/
+5Mq2ZKKzfzY2NOoKiIs6rVzv2SW7S6BScYlRqRWiXCeZVFvT0crDY/5uodkHbcRw
+6B/Yo/iMN8wLI257Tjm9/C5G+JPCLopCcLILgTwAJM2ZhtPnc08LyQ==
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BOB_c2tnb431r1:BOB_c2tnb431r1_PUB
+
+
+# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
+Derive=ALICE_c2tnb431r1
+PeerKey=BOB_c2tnb431r1_PUB
+SharedSecret=4c4d7d387843ff5152f22f101b0609238819357fae2ccc9097b818e383ef6809cb46671fb514009d4d1d3d0119fba265107302e95748
+
+# ECDH Bob with Alice peer
+Derive=BOB_c2tnb431r1
+PeerKey=ALICE_c2tnb431r1_PUB
+SharedSecret=4c4d7d387843ff5152f22f101b0609238819357fae2ccc9097b818e383ef6809cb46671fb514009d4d1d3d0119fba265107302e95748
+
+# TEST CURVE wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls1
+
+PrivateKey=ALICE_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MFACAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFZysBBAEEOTA3AgEBBA5Xu91qBwxTDmhD/30Kf6Ei
+AyAABAFQSZ0G+afa1x4KwUzBjQEWFNdZoF6UNYGkCRINyg==
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=ALICE_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MDQwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFZysBBAEDIAAEAVBJnQb5p9rXHgrBTMGNARYU11mgXpQ1
+gaQJEg3K
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = ALICE_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls1:ALICE_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls1_PUB
+
+
+PrivateKey=BOB_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MFACAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFZysBBAEEOTA3AgEBBA5aU6CQ474Z1fH3xAtn/6Ei
+AyAABAFpb4GTc+5vf5nkt4zLxwGZQ6qSbYlH8pUbpvwcqA==
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BOB_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MDQwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFZysBBAEDIAAEAWlvgZNz7m9/meS3jMvHAZlDqpJtiUfy
+lRum/Byo
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BOB_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls1:BOB_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls1_PUB
+
+
+# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
+Derive=ALICE_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls1
+PeerKey=BOB_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls1_PUB
+SharedSecret=0000fc6e280987e8b9bf6e3c7fa003
+
+# ECDH Bob with Alice peer
+Derive=BOB_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls1
+PeerKey=ALICE_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls1_PUB
+SharedSecret=0000fc6e280987e8b9bf6e3c7fa003
+
+# TEST CURVE wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls3
+
+PrivateKey=ALICE_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls3
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MGMCAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFZysBBAMETDBKAgEBBBUBN2FFgQiz4KPJ9GEsrj5B
+m908ifuhLgMsAAQBV21Tx3v8+1wFKq7PiloR1CxzmlUDvnyXrs4mNmc5Ns38mzPe
+NueQNo0=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=ALICE_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls3_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MEAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFZysBBAMDLAAEAVdtU8d7/PtcBSquz4paEdQsc5pVA758
+l67OJjZnOTbN/Jsz3jbnkDaN
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = ALICE_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls3:ALICE_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls3_PUB
+
+
+PrivateKey=BOB_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls3
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MGMCAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFZysBBAMETDBKAgEBBBUA/0Ust7IoJ526zn2wiWBu
+rR5NeSWhLgMsAAQB7d+/zMMti4djhlVnaGqaqonbmo4Cv+iKT1cF3nzXV/KXHSJI
+p9iZeas=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BOB_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls3_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MEAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFZysBBAMDLAAEAe3fv8zDLYuHY4ZVZ2hqmqqJ25qOAr/o
+ik9XBd5811fylx0iSKfYmXmr
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BOB_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls3:BOB_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls3_PUB
+
+
+# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
+Derive=ALICE_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls3
+PeerKey=BOB_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls3_PUB
+SharedSecret=00cf1d850f396436be68f1e5502935853ed054511f
+
+# ECDH Bob with Alice peer
+Derive=BOB_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls3
+PeerKey=ALICE_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls3_PUB
+SharedSecret=00cf1d850f396436be68f1e5502935853ed054511f
+
+# TEST CURVE wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls4
+
+PrivateKey=ALICE_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls4
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MFECAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFZysBBAQEOjA4AgEBBA8AsuEGufSNSrDPu3Y1Namh
+IgMgAAQAcvPRbArskeBs6W2oOesAHMQo8Lk/FHcYKUfMOKY=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=ALICE_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls4_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MDQwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFZysBBAQDIAAEAHLz0WwK7JHgbOltqDnrABzEKPC5PxR3
+GClHzDim
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = ALICE_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls4:ALICE_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls4_PUB
+
+
+PrivateKey=BOB_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls4
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MFECAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFZysBBAQEOjA4AgEBBA8AFJwmUkKbWdmzvqv+AbWh
+IgMgAAQBriOJSyRL4ro55CbCwekBluEKwIfP64OfJCEfWTU=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BOB_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls4_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MDQwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFZysBBAQDIAAEAa4jiUskS+K6OeQmwsHpAZbhCsCHz+uD
+nyQhH1k1
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BOB_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls4:BOB_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls4_PUB
+
+
+# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
+Derive=ALICE_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls4
+PeerKey=BOB_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls4_PUB
+SharedSecret=01076232302ca32b5f3daf075e5213
+
+# ECDH Bob with Alice peer
+Derive=BOB_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls4
+PeerKey=ALICE_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls4_PUB
+SharedSecret=01076232302ca32b5f3daf075e5213
+
+# TEST CURVE wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls5
+
+PrivateKey=ALICE_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls5
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MGMCAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFZysBBAUETDBKAgEBBBUCmngbaO2S//Ta0ZUhn/nb
+ZydTKD+hLgMsAAQA1792id3hLIu2z0KECkBCUbTSP9UFLu2FTJkLa8qP4ZIrBt5F
+XKJo2Dw=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=ALICE_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls5_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MEAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFZysBBAUDLAAEANe/dond4SyLts9ChApAQlG00j/VBS7t
+hUyZC2vKj+GSKwbeRVyiaNg8
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = ALICE_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls5:ALICE_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls5_PUB
+
+
+PrivateKey=BOB_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls5
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MGMCAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFZysBBAUETDBKAgEBBBUBraa4aeYxHd9HJ0vLIoCw
+auGKd9yhLgMsAAQHzc2FgfJGasNlMcJNDDrNQElhA1cHD4izqEedmC3ueMu72/Sp
+VF2Ppig=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BOB_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls5_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MEAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFZysBBAUDLAAEB83NhYHyRmrDZTHCTQw6zUBJYQNXBw+I
+s6hHnZgt7njLu9v0qVRdj6Yo
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BOB_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls5:BOB_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls5_PUB
+
+
+# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
+Derive=ALICE_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls5
+PeerKey=BOB_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls5_PUB
+SharedSecret=066091c591278f5b949106052b2546aacc20917c20
+
+# ECDH Bob with Alice peer
+Derive=BOB_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls5
+PeerKey=ALICE_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls5_PUB
+SharedSecret=066091c591278f5b949106052b2546aacc20917c20
+
+# TEST CURVE wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls6
+
+PrivateKey=ALICE_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls6
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+ME4CAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFZysBBAYENzA1AgEBBA5LJwRNrPNMwGyoBP95a6Eg
+Ax4ABMZxFi711Wl5r7tb1XJ9fJ3H1W1MKvVrYvfmNFo=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=ALICE_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls6_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MDIwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFZysBBAYDHgAExnEWLvXVaXmvu1vVcn18ncfVbUwq9Wti
+9+Y0Wg==
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = ALICE_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls6:ALICE_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls6_PUB
+
+
+PrivateKey=BOB_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls6
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+ME4CAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFZysBBAYENzA1AgEBBA63i1z4Kl8BEE1I3CYU9KEg
+Ax4ABG3Ft5F8wvnGimUAmGQrfqAlVJKdzhNSa3v47Kc=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BOB_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls6_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MDIwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFZysBBAYDHgAEbcW3kXzC+caKZQCYZCt+oCVUkp3OE1Jr
+e/jspw==
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BOB_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls6:BOB_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls6_PUB
+
+
+# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
+Derive=ALICE_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls6
+PeerKey=BOB_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls6_PUB
+SharedSecret=8d184455748c56115ba2183070b0
+
+# ECDH Bob with Alice peer
+Derive=BOB_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls6
+PeerKey=ALICE_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls6_PUB
+SharedSecret=8d184455748c56115ba2183070b0
+
+# TEST CURVE wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls7
+
+PrivateKey=ALICE_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls7
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MGECAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFZysBBAcESjBIAgEBBBUAueoisiN+luJEy0wdiI7j
+cALlTqChLAMqAAQ/FWsGxD8vuvEFWXfWReOqvBzqWrF9mdMeTeOE1y9r9POOIUVJ
+PNtL
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=ALICE_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls7_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MD4wEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFZysBBAcDKgAEPxVrBsQ/L7rxBVl31kXjqrwc6lqxfZnT
+Hk3jhNcva/TzjiFFSTzbSw==
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = ALICE_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls7:ALICE_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls7_PUB
+
+
+PrivateKey=BOB_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls7
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MGECAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFZysBBAcESjBIAgEBBBUAr42vKjbUXFak2mVzFYpu
+yhN/cDyhLAMqAASJZpuFg+n8vscuq+pqfFFPYemnfLdhdAB4JodfR3J5Bzu67hEm
+bIKQ
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BOB_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls7_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MD4wEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFZysBBAcDKgAEiWabhYPp/L7HLqvqanxRT2Hpp3y3YXQA
+eCaHX0dyeQc7uu4RJmyCkA==
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BOB_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls7:BOB_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls7_PUB
+
+
+# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
+Derive=ALICE_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls7
+PeerKey=BOB_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls7_PUB
+SharedSecret=990eda6a0406caef965018b97c94d0faa200f6e4
+
+# ECDH Bob with Alice peer
+Derive=BOB_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls7
+PeerKey=ALICE_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls7_PUB
+SharedSecret=990eda6a0406caef965018b97c94d0faa200f6e4
+
+# TEST CURVE wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls8
+
+PrivateKey=ALICE_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls8
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+ME8CAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFZysBBAgEODA2AgEBBA8A1m62ffl6niuM46XOUyih
+IAMeAAT4mqYAoe7NEtKfEMQs2ofInhZRZCFrFU5cjEWi
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=ALICE_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls8_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MDIwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFZysBBAgDHgAE+JqmAKHuzRLSnxDELNqHyJ4WUWQhaxVO
+XIxFog==
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = ALICE_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls8:ALICE_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls8_PUB
+
+
+PrivateKey=BOB_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls8
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+ME8CAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFZysBBAgEODA2AgEBBA8AegTrLoMRyPl4U4xOdg6h
+IAMeAATQKkyQ3jL2Eku6C+vSQazbjjSkzNe67Occqj2P
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BOB_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls8_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MDIwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFZysBBAgDHgAE0CpMkN4y9hJLugvr0kGs2440pMzXuuzn
+HKo9jw==
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BOB_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls8:BOB_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls8_PUB
+
+
+# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
+Derive=ALICE_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls8
+PeerKey=BOB_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls8_PUB
+SharedSecret=7524c547bd6b26644ce70571cb06
+
+# ECDH Bob with Alice peer
+Derive=BOB_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls8
+PeerKey=ALICE_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls8_PUB
+SharedSecret=7524c547bd6b26644ce70571cb06
+
+# TEST CURVE wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls9
+
+PrivateKey=ALICE_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls9
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MGECAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFZysBBAkESjBIAgEBBBUAE0376NvzsIXi6XadrVn4
+06obTRChLAMqAARbC1yw9f1uBOVlMf5ZFQewTgyc81Aqh2TFMSRfujCIhdvGTYgR
+tu6F
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=ALICE_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls9_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MD4wEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFZysBBAkDKgAEWwtcsPX9bgTlZTH+WRUHsE4MnPNQKodk
+xTEkX7owiIXbxk2IEbbuhQ==
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = ALICE_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls9:ALICE_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls9_PUB
+
+
+PrivateKey=BOB_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls9
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MGECAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFZysBBAkESjBIAgEBBBUAd2kfMclaJU2bg8ayTrjZ
+oolI82yhLAMqAAQ0NeW9TKhQeFrrTyMR9Gb55+BneCQSByAShM8Dn3V1FFYz7n0y
+bvBX
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BOB_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls9_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MD4wEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFZysBBAkDKgAENDXlvUyoUHha608jEfRm+efgZ3gkEgcg
+EoTPA591dRRWM+59Mm7wVw==
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BOB_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls9:BOB_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls9_PUB
+
+
+# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
+Derive=ALICE_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls9
+PeerKey=BOB_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls9_PUB
+SharedSecret=5ca1d9eed44def2c390fd5bbb16ca2c3a09eb7b1
+
+# ECDH Bob with Alice peer
+Derive=BOB_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls9
+PeerKey=ALICE_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls9_PUB
+SharedSecret=5ca1d9eed44def2c390fd5bbb16ca2c3a09eb7b1
+
+# TEST CURVE wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls10
+
+PrivateKey=ALICE_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls10
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MH0CAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFZysBBAoEZjBkAgEBBB01TDgjIGd+gXPZ4esQnWzz
+/y1vzJniUBM5XNyPq6FAAz4ABAHVs5gYpbJzqyO8Lk3nkTwhu4BuXb4wtrgGcY2L
+TwGxkC4Zq4aqLowsexGjVa0IjGKdWz5/TfwLwGpN4A==
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=ALICE_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls10_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MFIwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFZysBBAoDPgAEAdWzmBilsnOrI7wuTeeRPCG7gG5dvjC2
+uAZxjYtPAbGQLhmrhqoujCx7EaNVrQiMYp1bPn9N/AvAak3g
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = ALICE_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls10:ALICE_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls10_PUB
+
+
+PrivateKey=BOB_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls10
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MH0CAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFZysBBAoEZjBkAgEBBB0mTqwYwByRuu4zcU1QLKcG
+m8wewuaoKqVSpp8xQaFAAz4ABAEF4xTrWAIF1EacNMqTG3kwxwartAKFFqyOle+w
+BwDi6gra7cFVedD1p5RwD4gZU4QzgCLSwa7xZbBzgg==
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BOB_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls10_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MFIwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFZysBBAoDPgAEAQXjFOtYAgXURpw0ypMbeTDHBqu0AoUW
+rI6V77AHAOLqCtrtwVV50PWnlHAPiBlThDOAItLBrvFlsHOC
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BOB_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls10:BOB_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls10_PUB
+
+
+# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
+Derive=ALICE_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls10
+PeerKey=BOB_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls10_PUB
+SharedSecret=0199de137bc263e25b543994d6315b5a3f1e38e7e1f60662cb5cbaab5f98
+
+# ECDH Bob with Alice peer
+Derive=BOB_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls10
+PeerKey=ALICE_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls10_PUB
+SharedSecret=0199de137bc263e25b543994d6315b5a3f1e38e7e1f60662cb5cbaab5f98
+
+# TEST CURVE wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls11
+
+PrivateKey=ALICE_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls11
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MH4CAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFZysBBAsEZzBlAgEBBB4Au6lrzC3RIk3jXmtbeOAp
+LZPR0NUrr6dTf1lSCGqhQAM+AAQBl73V2TEZ8BO4QC+YiBlJ0GmW8WLc3RtS3iIr
+/oUAaDQQAGVJFD3GghjBPfI9KVBcZ2P8tUXUv5ifrWc=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=ALICE_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls11_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MFIwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFZysBBAsDPgAEAZe91dkxGfATuEAvmIgZSdBplvFi3N0b
+Ut4iK/6FAGg0EABlSRQ9xoIYwT3yPSlQXGdj/LVF1L+Yn61n
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = ALICE_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls11:ALICE_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls11_PUB
+
+
+PrivateKey=BOB_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls11
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MH4CAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFZysBBAsEZzBlAgEBBB4AGJuGtQI1FvHfp2AsdKb3
+NVWawjpZQuyM1aelws2hQAM+AAQAdTW3xU6Ijf/Y835Z2hS4fOn6Xmp3O6iblXHr
+nKoBORuxHVRfXkfdL5TqfFpuDghzCyAS6ZMSWhjGV5o=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BOB_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls11_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MFIwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFZysBBAsDPgAEAHU1t8VOiI3/2PN+WdoUuHzp+l5qdzuo
+m5Vx65yqATkbsR1UX15H3S+U6nxabg4IcwsgEumTEloYxlea
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BOB_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls11:BOB_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls11_PUB
+
+
+# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
+Derive=ALICE_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls11
+PeerKey=BOB_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls11_PUB
+SharedSecret=01ee4b517d8a64be5ee32e10152c7bbcb8cde73a3da8e9643bce173011f7
+
+# ECDH Bob with Alice peer
+Derive=BOB_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls11
+PeerKey=ALICE_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls11_PUB
+SharedSecret=01ee4b517d8a64be5ee32e10152c7bbcb8cde73a3da8e9643bce173011f7
+
+# TEST CURVE wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls12
+
+PrivateKey=ALICE_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls12
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MHgCAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFZysBBAwEYTBfAgEBBByAnUvQZhZr1lgTRixSMIx0
+KHuV4t8cbXCW415soTwDOgAE3G8wIl9SJ0mAmuIMWbJpFjf9wO8gKNu6nApye39Y
+hpXeYRL/nm7G6HmiiA5O1iudWC3hDbBH0cc=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=ALICE_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls12_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+ME4wEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFZysBBAwDOgAE3G8wIl9SJ0mAmuIMWbJpFjf9wO8gKNu6
+nApye39YhpXeYRL/nm7G6HmiiA5O1iudWC3hDbBH0cc=
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = ALICE_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls12:ALICE_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls12_PUB
+
+
+PrivateKey=BOB_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls12
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MHgCAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFZysBBAwEYTBfAgEBBBzZ7nt4CrPrk2m5iR64vpkj
+95JHOmzWf4VhRZqdoTwDOgAEukz40I4gWpUmXCM+PLmWGd0IO0XIPQa9KXzXvhbL
+dJH0yFkJ+ClSboOC26gtMTICiPhEgYjeKEQ=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BOB_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls12_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+ME4wEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFZysBBAwDOgAEukz40I4gWpUmXCM+PLmWGd0IO0XIPQa9
+KXzXvhbLdJH0yFkJ+ClSboOC26gtMTICiPhEgYjeKEQ=
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BOB_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls12:BOB_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls12_PUB
+
+
+# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
+Derive=ALICE_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls12
+PeerKey=BOB_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls12_PUB
+SharedSecret=c75a8283a73312de82c8f99d41a9173a43b8f921e8161dd140131b36
+
+# ECDH Bob with Alice peer
+Derive=BOB_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls12
+PeerKey=ALICE_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls12_PUB
+SharedSecret=c75a8283a73312de82c8f99d41a9173a43b8f921e8161dd140131b36
+
+# TEST CURVE brainpoolP160r1
+
+PrivateKey=ALICE_brainpoolP160r1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MGQCAQAwFAYHKoZIzj0CAQYJKyQDAwIIAQEBBEkwRwIBAQQUZTQYt6IOsZUUgr36
+WYGKTj10erShLAMqAAQkMf73t3Cov2cdezPSUt9Wn0ydhpk9+2HwZ13YufUyfcvP
+ijdJ/zFO
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=ALICE_brainpoolP160r1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MEIwFAYHKoZIzj0CAQYJKyQDAwIIAQEBAyoABCQx/ve3cKi/Zx17M9JS31afTJ2G
+mT37YfBnXdi59TJ9y8+KN0n/MU4=
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = ALICE_brainpoolP160r1:ALICE_brainpoolP160r1_PUB
+
+
+PrivateKey=BOB_brainpoolP160r1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MGQCAQAwFAYHKoZIzj0CAQYJKyQDAwIIAQEBBEkwRwIBAQQUb/ulIRG4yoOOihWD
+AV4l78I2GLWhLAMqAARPjEMetPWS4FlgFCHvVfK1nTK/TLsYScHregeZAZqn8gaF
+vgq4bE8v
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BOB_brainpoolP160r1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MEIwFAYHKoZIzj0CAQYJKyQDAwIIAQEBAyoABE+MQx609ZLgWWAUIe9V8rWdMr9M
+uxhJwet6B5kBmqfyBoW+CrhsTy8=
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BOB_brainpoolP160r1:BOB_brainpoolP160r1_PUB
+
+
+# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
+Derive=ALICE_brainpoolP160r1
+PeerKey=BOB_brainpoolP160r1_PUB
+SharedSecret=e4fe5ae99a60d17b597f5705a719cea6709c63b9
+
+# ECDH Bob with Alice peer
+Derive=BOB_brainpoolP160r1
+PeerKey=ALICE_brainpoolP160r1_PUB
+SharedSecret=e4fe5ae99a60d17b597f5705a719cea6709c63b9
+
+# TEST CURVE brainpoolP160t1
+
+PrivateKey=ALICE_brainpoolP160t1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MGQCAQAwFAYHKoZIzj0CAQYJKyQDAwIIAQECBEkwRwIBAQQUWWAyUnMvmQyeKeHE
+bIjyrW0JzVqhLAMqAAQ/h1VSPKvn2cTPmfMq0FZ3mxypjCIWtCMav7GH9Fby+kCr
+WKA0lFVw
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=ALICE_brainpoolP160t1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MEIwFAYHKoZIzj0CAQYJKyQDAwIIAQECAyoABD+HVVI8q+fZxM+Z8yrQVnebHKmM
+Iha0Ixq/sYf0VvL6QKtYoDSUVXA=
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = ALICE_brainpoolP160t1:ALICE_brainpoolP160t1_PUB
+
+
+PrivateKey=BOB_brainpoolP160t1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MGQCAQAwFAYHKoZIzj0CAQYJKyQDAwIIAQECBEkwRwIBAQQUDFpUx8SZ718X0cwv
++oQaTXSK0zyhLAMqAAQIgDYhuy9cj04IFE0LforgJPt9rgcjuO81V6WR+E3LNETJ
+rYsy1X9k
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BOB_brainpoolP160t1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MEIwFAYHKoZIzj0CAQYJKyQDAwIIAQECAyoABAiANiG7L1yPTggUTQt+iuAk+32u
+ByO47zVXpZH4Tcs0RMmtizLVf2Q=
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BOB_brainpoolP160t1:BOB_brainpoolP160t1_PUB
+
+
+# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
+Derive=ALICE_brainpoolP160t1
+PeerKey=BOB_brainpoolP160t1_PUB
+SharedSecret=199a218458b71a4e13f05a599fc17bc76f30ea2f
+
+# ECDH Bob with Alice peer
+Derive=BOB_brainpoolP160t1
+PeerKey=ALICE_brainpoolP160t1_PUB
+SharedSecret=199a218458b71a4e13f05a599fc17bc76f30ea2f
+
+# TEST CURVE brainpoolP192r1
+
+PrivateKey=ALICE_brainpoolP192r1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MHACAQAwFAYHKoZIzj0CAQYJKyQDAwIIAQEDBFUwUwIBAQQYGiIpZVR71C31b9AE
+lLiEiEyzdhRsvTbkoTQDMgAEHAovVZJfm52KWqJr9IKz7w7Ta+7HUN5Bjy+qR87k
+Oo3nP+439TLOs4iDhIvzP8j1
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=ALICE_brainpoolP192r1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MEowFAYHKoZIzj0CAQYJKyQDAwIIAQEDAzIABBwKL1WSX5udilqia/SCs+8O02vu
+x1DeQY8vqkfO5DqN5z/uN/UyzrOIg4SL8z/I9Q==
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = ALICE_brainpoolP192r1:ALICE_brainpoolP192r1_PUB
+
+
+PrivateKey=BOB_brainpoolP192r1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MHACAQAwFAYHKoZIzj0CAQYJKyQDAwIIAQEDBFUwUwIBAQQYkut8HljwyzxOArKA
+azilboA8yY6oy4svoTQDMgAEv/3NhrdVEA+PMFCm+muXhrC0wxX5UHvCUd/OAyda
+c2Jl7XVw2gS4hfXkTeT7MQMu
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BOB_brainpoolP192r1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MEowFAYHKoZIzj0CAQYJKyQDAwIIAQEDAzIABL/9zYa3VRAPjzBQpvprl4awtMMV
++VB7wlHfzgMnWnNiZe11cNoEuIX15E3k+zEDLg==
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BOB_brainpoolP192r1:BOB_brainpoolP192r1_PUB
+
+
+# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
+Derive=ALICE_brainpoolP192r1
+PeerKey=BOB_brainpoolP192r1_PUB
+SharedSecret=7ce122b49afdfd1adde6cdfaa13dc7180d6d4e70322c8773
+
+# ECDH Bob with Alice peer
+Derive=BOB_brainpoolP192r1
+PeerKey=ALICE_brainpoolP192r1_PUB
+SharedSecret=7ce122b49afdfd1adde6cdfaa13dc7180d6d4e70322c8773
+
+# TEST CURVE brainpoolP192t1
+
+PrivateKey=ALICE_brainpoolP192t1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MHACAQAwFAYHKoZIzj0CAQYJKyQDAwIIAQEEBFUwUwIBAQQYCV1NuYw7DwOawqgY
+kALfFpEzFE2rjXqYoTQDMgAEmBmJ220/ZJVdxfSgHFTz3FOC2PHql2ItbG0LXs/v
+7n/qkWGWz9B7R2FBqFaLBk0L
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=ALICE_brainpoolP192t1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MEowFAYHKoZIzj0CAQYJKyQDAwIIAQEEAzIABJgZidttP2SVXcX0oBxU89xTgtjx
+6pdiLWxtC17P7+5/6pFhls/Qe0dhQahWiwZNCw==
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = ALICE_brainpoolP192t1:ALICE_brainpoolP192t1_PUB
+
+
+PrivateKey=BOB_brainpoolP192t1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MHACAQAwFAYHKoZIzj0CAQYJKyQDAwIIAQEEBFUwUwIBAQQYmZP2vmYpfJvSnqEl
+4K0Yj0iMCr4ds9bboTQDMgAEcSuLSED2s4SIuEdomZbdDMSmNrpnezJRv/W+bCQp
+4bcnQAb20tp47ISw/yXoQSA0
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BOB_brainpoolP192t1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MEowFAYHKoZIzj0CAQYJKyQDAwIIAQEEAzIABHEri0hA9rOEiLhHaJmW3QzEpja6
+Z3syUb/1vmwkKeG3J0AG9tLaeOyEsP8l6EEgNA==
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BOB_brainpoolP192t1:BOB_brainpoolP192t1_PUB
+
+
+# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
+Derive=ALICE_brainpoolP192t1
+PeerKey=BOB_brainpoolP192t1_PUB
+SharedSecret=1a5444c2600d9d21d6a450d158fd25272ade262ab519790b
+
+# ECDH Bob with Alice peer
+Derive=BOB_brainpoolP192t1
+PeerKey=ALICE_brainpoolP192t1_PUB
+SharedSecret=1a5444c2600d9d21d6a450d158fd25272ade262ab519790b
+
+# TEST CURVE brainpoolP224r1
+
+PrivateKey=ALICE_brainpoolP224r1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MHwCAQAwFAYHKoZIzj0CAQYJKyQDAwIIAQEFBGEwXwIBAQQch91FmOz9tJ9Wfdyw
+krOM6UXinTuYBxjUWtU0HKE8AzoABIq0T5AJJzdDl9wbYqyxExMfTbNDt6W/ound
+ZTS6qXYvMegJ+nBcXeCi+FBI0pu6lHv8tF1ZjWLS
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=ALICE_brainpoolP224r1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MFIwFAYHKoZIzj0CAQYJKyQDAwIIAQEFAzoABIq0T5AJJzdDl9wbYqyxExMfTbND
+t6W/oundZTS6qXYvMegJ+nBcXeCi+FBI0pu6lHv8tF1ZjWLS
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = ALICE_brainpoolP224r1:ALICE_brainpoolP224r1_PUB
+
+
+PrivateKey=BOB_brainpoolP224r1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MHwCAQAwFAYHKoZIzj0CAQYJKyQDAwIIAQEFBGEwXwIBAQQcvabkJWnrR4LuGUxf
+LO8DqDBcL4eix/a0qRWxm6E8AzoABM6qgBI9bmZwyYE0QFBJf5NpXe2phgcObKrG
+4URjdsORl4UJwlq7eLwINJLP9dPl0Qlb0Fv/gNVo
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BOB_brainpoolP224r1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MFIwFAYHKoZIzj0CAQYJKyQDAwIIAQEFAzoABM6qgBI9bmZwyYE0QFBJf5NpXe2p
+hgcObKrG4URjdsORl4UJwlq7eLwINJLP9dPl0Qlb0Fv/gNVo
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BOB_brainpoolP224r1:BOB_brainpoolP224r1_PUB
+
+
+# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
+Derive=ALICE_brainpoolP224r1
+PeerKey=BOB_brainpoolP224r1_PUB
+SharedSecret=419e446a66968fcc372126cff4d637505c848c3a9b82503f2d441215
+
+# ECDH Bob with Alice peer
+Derive=BOB_brainpoolP224r1
+PeerKey=ALICE_brainpoolP224r1_PUB
+SharedSecret=419e446a66968fcc372126cff4d637505c848c3a9b82503f2d441215
+
+# TEST CURVE brainpoolP224t1
+
+PrivateKey=ALICE_brainpoolP224t1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MHwCAQAwFAYHKoZIzj0CAQYJKyQDAwIIAQEGBGEwXwIBAQQcSwWCcqYuiNyxR0gY
+VCMBQ17ykfaxEgMMyByZoqE8AzoABJiVhwIZAqy+OKj8RewjsdXPPCODfm+4RGV8
+2bYLW8SqiDeEDB+RvJirYwz/a5Ri+EL5Xk9QVkQF
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=ALICE_brainpoolP224t1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MFIwFAYHKoZIzj0CAQYJKyQDAwIIAQEGAzoABJiVhwIZAqy+OKj8RewjsdXPPCOD
+fm+4RGV82bYLW8SqiDeEDB+RvJirYwz/a5Ri+EL5Xk9QVkQF
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = ALICE_brainpoolP224t1:ALICE_brainpoolP224t1_PUB
+
+
+PrivateKey=BOB_brainpoolP224t1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MHwCAQAwFAYHKoZIzj0CAQYJKyQDAwIIAQEGBGEwXwIBAQQcLK5R+idvzqC1a28G
+e9m6Eh5up82atVSTRWeXwKE8AzoABBg6ar3lkYSv0AcOM542SbPhAqxny/anS+Do
+ELViM0rofxlcvkywZiBY0T40xUvXBILDsY/0he22
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BOB_brainpoolP224t1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MFIwFAYHKoZIzj0CAQYJKyQDAwIIAQEGAzoABBg6ar3lkYSv0AcOM542SbPhAqxn
+y/anS+DoELViM0rofxlcvkywZiBY0T40xUvXBILDsY/0he22
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BOB_brainpoolP224t1:BOB_brainpoolP224t1_PUB
+
+
+# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
+Derive=ALICE_brainpoolP224t1
+PeerKey=BOB_brainpoolP224t1_PUB
+SharedSecret=8f83465fb6353912a51c2809ea30b19b73b3e391c0422650e0f20b58
+
+# ECDH Bob with Alice peer
+Derive=BOB_brainpoolP224t1
+PeerKey=ALICE_brainpoolP224t1_PUB
+SharedSecret=8f83465fb6353912a51c2809ea30b19b73b3e391c0422650e0f20b58
+
+# TEST CURVE brainpoolP256r1
+
+PrivateKey=ALICE_brainpoolP256r1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIGIAgEAMBQGByqGSM49AgEGCSskAwMCCAEBBwRtMGsCAQEEIBMmEFKb8UQb4oCu
+k226EiMpk/omRsx/rrRNuh9WGB/zoUQDQgAEeIYdJpIpkxneKbL9qP/vSJ2/d7cH
+Cs2ZXggcRif7KKN55Ioit7Q1sVEeGzEDFbxpRWK6A+Kgu8sFkE+LHr5BGQ==
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=ALICE_brainpoolP256r1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MFowFAYHKoZIzj0CAQYJKyQDAwIIAQEHA0IABHiGHSaSKZMZ3imy/aj/70idv3e3
+BwrNmV4IHEYn+yijeeSKIre0NbFRHhsxAxW8aUViugPioLvLBZBPix6+QRk=
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = ALICE_brainpoolP256r1:ALICE_brainpoolP256r1_PUB
+
+
+PrivateKey=BOB_brainpoolP256r1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIGIAgEAMBQGByqGSM49AgEGCSskAwMCCAEBBwRtMGsCAQEEIKXsf2pxFfTQiwbW
+2SKwZq50UOGhJYJZYO/xY33RHuQaoUQDQgAEC/FCNhyxZ4VcHY8zBehFbg3M54AU
+w6ixJ69gI2+xoyAXBn5d+pf8tAG0D0TUqtxRtwBgPWkt6pY4YYBQMY+NOA==
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BOB_brainpoolP256r1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MFowFAYHKoZIzj0CAQYJKyQDAwIIAQEHA0IABAvxQjYcsWeFXB2PMwXoRW4NzOeA
+FMOosSevYCNvsaMgFwZ+XfqX/LQBtA9E1KrcUbcAYD1pLeqWOGGAUDGPjTg=
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BOB_brainpoolP256r1:BOB_brainpoolP256r1_PUB
+
+
+# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
+Derive=ALICE_brainpoolP256r1
+PeerKey=BOB_brainpoolP256r1_PUB
+SharedSecret=78ed4b7bb4ed808813f8c27132fe04f5d805365549b754994d83b002416b6ba0
+
+# ECDH Bob with Alice peer
+Derive=BOB_brainpoolP256r1
+PeerKey=ALICE_brainpoolP256r1_PUB
+SharedSecret=78ed4b7bb4ed808813f8c27132fe04f5d805365549b754994d83b002416b6ba0
+
+# TEST CURVE brainpoolP256t1
+
+PrivateKey=ALICE_brainpoolP256t1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIGIAgEAMBQGByqGSM49AgEGCSskAwMCCAEBCARtMGsCAQEEIC4yFvVLhvRyF9wu
+yYJbncxLagsMCD+Sxt2vAJiKFpKdoUQDQgAEiGxl8E0yj3gE4iOyFDVe0tUYS9fN
+cNzkxEx2CiZwm09jbSNQF2pKAoCmLZQa8VBz+UZqdeXZy9Sc8UpJU3Fghg==
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=ALICE_brainpoolP256t1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MFowFAYHKoZIzj0CAQYJKyQDAwIIAQEIA0IABIhsZfBNMo94BOIjshQ1XtLVGEvX
+zXDc5MRMdgomcJtPY20jUBdqSgKApi2UGvFQc/lGanXl2cvUnPFKSVNxYIY=
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = ALICE_brainpoolP256t1:ALICE_brainpoolP256t1_PUB
+
+
+PrivateKey=BOB_brainpoolP256t1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIGIAgEAMBQGByqGSM49AgEGCSskAwMCCAEBCARtMGsCAQEEIIfXus/y+3RdwUZ0
+0db3boxPCzzRcI3CgIC8ggdGDPqPoUQDQgAEdlZ2yOiBsmREPaw8TsrGNmTLL6q1
+lVz8+OQ780Xxfo9VIFeR0Qbk8CgqX0lWt5hbEbbzEbF6I2nZCJndQ9VIoA==
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BOB_brainpoolP256t1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MFowFAYHKoZIzj0CAQYJKyQDAwIIAQEIA0IABHZWdsjogbJkRD2sPE7KxjZkyy+q
+tZVc/PjkO/NF8X6PVSBXkdEG5PAoKl9JVreYWxG28xGxeiNp2QiZ3UPVSKA=
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BOB_brainpoolP256t1:BOB_brainpoolP256t1_PUB
+
+
+# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
+Derive=ALICE_brainpoolP256t1
+PeerKey=BOB_brainpoolP256t1_PUB
+SharedSecret=287a8f19e6f06476b222805eb11907c536fa6ea02b8877ea6d5323f9fabccdd8
+
+# ECDH Bob with Alice peer
+Derive=BOB_brainpoolP256t1
+PeerKey=ALICE_brainpoolP256t1_PUB
+SharedSecret=287a8f19e6f06476b222805eb11907c536fa6ea02b8877ea6d5323f9fabccdd8
+
+# TEST CURVE brainpoolP320r1
+
+PrivateKey=ALICE_brainpoolP320r1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIGiAgEAMBQGByqGSM49AgEGCSskAwMCCAEBCQSBhjCBgwIBAQQoRBvhspL4HZA6
+YcfouziNWFuE1e1RcN69xlsJ8OGZEMobV29pntQlSaFUA1IABFDmVKAu6UDU1doe
+67Fzp3WeLAKNcaLjX13W0X704bqNvSU7q747RCCbd46miRYsiqYejnsX0A/A5bOi
+I1LJixCGcAgm1pnGajKeok/ecsl+
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=ALICE_brainpoolP320r1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MGowFAYHKoZIzj0CAQYJKyQDAwIIAQEJA1IABFDmVKAu6UDU1doe67Fzp3WeLAKN
+caLjX13W0X704bqNvSU7q747RCCbd46miRYsiqYejnsX0A/A5bOiI1LJixCGcAgm
+1pnGajKeok/ecsl+
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = ALICE_brainpoolP320r1:ALICE_brainpoolP320r1_PUB
+
+
+PrivateKey=BOB_brainpoolP320r1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIGiAgEAMBQGByqGSM49AgEGCSskAwMCCAEBCQSBhjCBgwIBAQQoi9ghqMQp8Zdx
+xVXuOMC66tVIvTQ9EX6taWLDy82eBRAt7MItb5LaMqFUA1IABHFexsmyGSMPdLCm
+a5vzaFlbk/gAkq6yfpE+BMokI+7GXx4dJz9+sKOi8h++T4SnocW03M7I5zOQVfK+
+82Kkq/vXCzEdkVRUPU4HVls7nil0
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BOB_brainpoolP320r1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MGowFAYHKoZIzj0CAQYJKyQDAwIIAQEJA1IABHFexsmyGSMPdLCma5vzaFlbk/gA
+kq6yfpE+BMokI+7GXx4dJz9+sKOi8h++T4SnocW03M7I5zOQVfK+82Kkq/vXCzEd
+kVRUPU4HVls7nil0
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BOB_brainpoolP320r1:BOB_brainpoolP320r1_PUB
+
+
+# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
+Derive=ALICE_brainpoolP320r1
+PeerKey=BOB_brainpoolP320r1_PUB
+SharedSecret=13a56c63c2dafe3e053534d5bf32c7eb4a0733bf356510725d378c5cbcf6974240719e3e53b352bb
+
+# ECDH Bob with Alice peer
+Derive=BOB_brainpoolP320r1
+PeerKey=ALICE_brainpoolP320r1_PUB
+SharedSecret=13a56c63c2dafe3e053534d5bf32c7eb4a0733bf356510725d378c5cbcf6974240719e3e53b352bb
+
+# TEST CURVE brainpoolP320t1
+
+PrivateKey=ALICE_brainpoolP320t1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIGiAgEAMBQGByqGSM49AgEGCSskAwMCCAEBCgSBhjCBgwIBAQQoxl+OeILawo65
+M4YbtLSARXYJsFJi4F8cUF6vfo1swRoCL6sAnV0QSaFUA1IABFN48RBqcd0PyU7N
+TRjaJsUaYXBlectX7JwhB/X/bbuNUK1YW9tZJZSZ/bBUfVfEgUhC+0qrvomc3xhy
+YBJIQeGWODwC1rHjO2H7GGvx1HmF
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=ALICE_brainpoolP320t1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MGowFAYHKoZIzj0CAQYJKyQDAwIIAQEKA1IABFN48RBqcd0PyU7NTRjaJsUaYXBl
+ectX7JwhB/X/bbuNUK1YW9tZJZSZ/bBUfVfEgUhC+0qrvomc3xhyYBJIQeGWODwC
+1rHjO2H7GGvx1HmF
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = ALICE_brainpoolP320t1:ALICE_brainpoolP320t1_PUB
+
+
+PrivateKey=BOB_brainpoolP320t1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIGiAgEAMBQGByqGSM49AgEGCSskAwMCCAEBCgSBhjCBgwIBAQQoMlTiH2CM3XGa
+VXPOQ5tdm+GJmnP03gbNK4POt5yQpnW8HoaHc+SS56FUA1IABLXO5ngGf17dU+ae
+QetDyXqlTTxtTrav1/NGb+i9BQUAsbIMQkdY0zWWbhksoMn56F2DBTSFwBlb1hBt
+p9fNIGUbgKqOlvtBpQHIoKXYEq3l
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BOB_brainpoolP320t1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MGowFAYHKoZIzj0CAQYJKyQDAwIIAQEKA1IABLXO5ngGf17dU+aeQetDyXqlTTxt
+Trav1/NGb+i9BQUAsbIMQkdY0zWWbhksoMn56F2DBTSFwBlb1hBtp9fNIGUbgKqO
+lvtBpQHIoKXYEq3l
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BOB_brainpoolP320t1:BOB_brainpoolP320t1_PUB
+
+
+# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
+Derive=ALICE_brainpoolP320t1
+PeerKey=BOB_brainpoolP320t1_PUB
+SharedSecret=170d1f5fc4248700be75499eac813fac642df1311ab005e10796cc2ef43b82f8d788eb232d580243
+
+# ECDH Bob with Alice peer
+Derive=BOB_brainpoolP320t1
+PeerKey=ALICE_brainpoolP320t1_PUB
+SharedSecret=170d1f5fc4248700be75499eac813fac642df1311ab005e10796cc2ef43b82f8d788eb232d580243
+
+# TEST CURVE brainpoolP384r1
+
+PrivateKey=ALICE_brainpoolP384r1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIG6AgEAMBQGByqGSM49AgEGCSskAwMCCAEBCwSBnjCBmwIBAQQweTbLDp3fPbIL
+8w7I+aQzU8edVXXiFtt8Ulx7HSuAvHu/uaeedCKA+sXKXe33/aoDoWQDYgAEgQEp
+8Mrclp7hd1kkTnaXCEzAyhlMUtBIXQGI8ALS3FaMoL4mjIlhAU+vNdIcI9NGBx7Q
+FRUzFIy3IAyF+VPq8fM7Yyjk0x4P8UB1N+d2odKvKFqFBQBQmd6S5h+0ijis
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=ALICE_brainpoolP384r1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MHowFAYHKoZIzj0CAQYJKyQDAwIIAQELA2IABIEBKfDK3Jae4XdZJE52lwhMwMoZ
+TFLQSF0BiPAC0txWjKC+JoyJYQFPrzXSHCPTRgce0BUVMxSMtyAMhflT6vHzO2Mo
+5NMeD/FAdTfndqHSryhahQUAUJnekuYftIo4rA==
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = ALICE_brainpoolP384r1:ALICE_brainpoolP384r1_PUB
+
+
+PrivateKey=BOB_brainpoolP384r1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIG6AgEAMBQGByqGSM49AgEGCSskAwMCCAEBCwSBnjCBmwIBAQQwF6ERsBKPIs2v
+YHNnkyb15eHfTIQ58qsFlF90qztOdGzhytiWZXPvOh4khzujFfdZoWQDYgAEDxy4
+ddTAt+nTw0F16nhHhmmNbns3bX3rKEcY+686v58dAvx4VWOC7vHsiwek9ZYbZSkm
+Ky6H78ndkBrmU3BBR7hFGyU7CWSDFoH5Oybk0+JzkNa0qAm8+MpAIcFqb+IY
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BOB_brainpoolP384r1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MHowFAYHKoZIzj0CAQYJKyQDAwIIAQELA2IABA8cuHXUwLfp08NBdep4R4ZpjW57
+N2196yhHGPuvOr+fHQL8eFVjgu7x7IsHpPWWG2UpJisuh+/J3ZAa5lNwQUe4RRsl
+OwlkgxaB+Tsm5NPic5DWtKgJvPjKQCHBam/iGA==
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BOB_brainpoolP384r1:BOB_brainpoolP384r1_PUB
+
+
+# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
+Derive=ALICE_brainpoolP384r1
+PeerKey=BOB_brainpoolP384r1_PUB
+SharedSecret=0b3ad57e83759760d94904d9ea266b538120c6db2b5046217aa1ecd924828b949d335c8ce8a5b36bac7556bf6058c40a
+
+# ECDH Bob with Alice peer
+Derive=BOB_brainpoolP384r1
+PeerKey=ALICE_brainpoolP384r1_PUB
+SharedSecret=0b3ad57e83759760d94904d9ea266b538120c6db2b5046217aa1ecd924828b949d335c8ce8a5b36bac7556bf6058c40a
+
+# TEST CURVE brainpoolP384t1
+
+PrivateKey=ALICE_brainpoolP384t1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIG6AgEAMBQGByqGSM49AgEGCSskAwMCCAEBDASBnjCBmwIBAQQwYb/xX9O8mxEu
+tbOQwQ/pB862keq/eWxj8GW41m2OroEtOJZL1SsK/8ZwAL3BdNoyoWQDYgAENpcX
+DPQYBhU8zi4G6mQtjdgVmpdn4Iuwb0/VVmopmFAL0ISDB0qk9Hn2Lt9rmE8Nathq
+kKKlVHd/Y5FRqf06PZj8jaYHAxvz5E1J8ykrbT7rUpbj9Df2t+eop9YBbSxc
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=ALICE_brainpoolP384t1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MHowFAYHKoZIzj0CAQYJKyQDAwIIAQEMA2IABDaXFwz0GAYVPM4uBupkLY3YFZqX
+Z+CLsG9P1VZqKZhQC9CEgwdKpPR59i7fa5hPDWrYapCipVR3f2ORUan9Oj2Y/I2m
+BwMb8+RNSfMpK20+61KW4/Q39rfnqKfWAW0sXA==
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = ALICE_brainpoolP384t1:ALICE_brainpoolP384t1_PUB
+
+
+PrivateKey=BOB_brainpoolP384t1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIG6AgEAMBQGByqGSM49AgEGCSskAwMCCAEBDASBnjCBmwIBAQQwbFHOFMHlMXRY
+d29dF6HzKMh09dw7OAyxEeROTqOjFsI+whaqtL4GWH5P0UgFPDAHoWQDYgAER24u
+XKoWWnFFusbCPtDzz7n9zDIWzFqMeP6YE3MOseyfRFcKIVz/omWBVwpUbd3ca6Or
+d/Mh8hThIV4tZbPUwlyzzEW2NMJtd2t5JKdja0aT7fbp7NS9IJzNIRDl7r8z
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BOB_brainpoolP384t1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MHowFAYHKoZIzj0CAQYJKyQDAwIIAQEMA2IABEduLlyqFlpxRbrGwj7Q88+5/cwy
+FsxajHj+mBNzDrHsn0RXCiFc/6JlgVcKVG3d3Gujq3fzIfIU4SFeLWWz1MJcs8xF
+tjTCbXdreSSnY2tGk+326ezUvSCczSEQ5e6/Mw==
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BOB_brainpoolP384t1:BOB_brainpoolP384t1_PUB
+
+
+# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
+Derive=ALICE_brainpoolP384t1
+PeerKey=BOB_brainpoolP384t1_PUB
+SharedSecret=0fde85a61157cdd898196f291802ebd57bb2e39d98c4e6ad9bb3e2e0375e1df9bf7dadb8df7db1fea32818ef2c88babc
+
+# ECDH Bob with Alice peer
+Derive=BOB_brainpoolP384t1
+PeerKey=ALICE_brainpoolP384t1_PUB
+SharedSecret=0fde85a61157cdd898196f291802ebd57bb2e39d98c4e6ad9bb3e2e0375e1df9bf7dadb8df7db1fea32818ef2c88babc
+
+# TEST CURVE brainpoolP512r1
+
+PrivateKey=ALICE_brainpoolP512r1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIHsAgEAMBQGByqGSM49AgEGCSskAwMCCAEBDQSB0DCBzQIBAQRAjMVK5PA5xYk8
+5gNs28Yo0erQSkgmildL7WwMVeT66algoISleFKT+fQkDRlfSKPXCZjK0NnKX5K9
+rkMm8w9ywKGBhQOBggAEHlj4gsnR2wN53k/hSIcAtbgHwbld5uS1/gR8RtoyaEDi
+t4Ti59/I9kRkZFEHJemhpTP2xY03j3M5rHP7vzk1NVKgYHJQ9MvMtPd6G+Fj5D0Y
+N1nnyqP3IJ8PyXmOdXBMoMHu+H50QbYZpcUFOqJhKp1T0+58xTXJdP8axl1IjtI=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=ALICE_brainpoolP512r1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MIGbMBQGByqGSM49AgEGCSskAwMCCAEBDQOBggAEHlj4gsnR2wN53k/hSIcAtbgH
+wbld5uS1/gR8RtoyaEDit4Ti59/I9kRkZFEHJemhpTP2xY03j3M5rHP7vzk1NVKg
+YHJQ9MvMtPd6G+Fj5D0YN1nnyqP3IJ8PyXmOdXBMoMHu+H50QbYZpcUFOqJhKp1T
+0+58xTXJdP8axl1IjtI=
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = ALICE_brainpoolP512r1:ALICE_brainpoolP512r1_PUB
+
+
+PrivateKey=BOB_brainpoolP512r1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIHsAgEAMBQGByqGSM49AgEGCSskAwMCCAEBDQSB0DCBzQIBAQRAZA10+k4+Esme
+vjkT9LdSX07amRwXrT7CBnEskZpHkZEoYVQa6FuE7Fai0kjL86lUCC4xoTjFbH3t
+LLrD0v7vwqGBhQOBggAEo3NAMIGp0rJxReih4nbEiTegA4pSEk84CUHHBLGuLsek
+Vo1vmj1LTnu4dVuILLf+MSZh9jjNmsWuEGSHIaZx6hniFHGdaRQ3GFODGvkE6z2d
+2kwv3Fmsq9+gu4By2OhSCfP+hpFhobXAYwWXzgaBFH+TqlF31Dyr2fuPnkL7tK4=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BOB_brainpoolP512r1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MIGbMBQGByqGSM49AgEGCSskAwMCCAEBDQOBggAEo3NAMIGp0rJxReih4nbEiTeg
+A4pSEk84CUHHBLGuLsekVo1vmj1LTnu4dVuILLf+MSZh9jjNmsWuEGSHIaZx6hni
+FHGdaRQ3GFODGvkE6z2d2kwv3Fmsq9+gu4By2OhSCfP+hpFhobXAYwWXzgaBFH+T
+qlF31Dyr2fuPnkL7tK4=
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BOB_brainpoolP512r1:BOB_brainpoolP512r1_PUB
+
+
+# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
+Derive=ALICE_brainpoolP512r1
+PeerKey=BOB_brainpoolP512r1_PUB
+SharedSecret=80751feb09215a9da32f9f8c97133f53f0286a89969bd00d7f365da7f7736f45e634a35012d71b22f09bd89760ab0d2b0d426133cd9a379da9739d0f5f2e0360
+
+# ECDH Bob with Alice peer
+Derive=BOB_brainpoolP512r1
+PeerKey=ALICE_brainpoolP512r1_PUB
+SharedSecret=80751feb09215a9da32f9f8c97133f53f0286a89969bd00d7f365da7f7736f45e634a35012d71b22f09bd89760ab0d2b0d426133cd9a379da9739d0f5f2e0360
+
+# TEST CURVE brainpoolP512t1
+
+PrivateKey=ALICE_brainpoolP512t1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIHsAgEAMBQGByqGSM49AgEGCSskAwMCCAEBDgSB0DCBzQIBAQRAm8Dt1nWguxK5
+iqhf6mig/Y7ctmMgbRCWSJMMd3lw5/iM4mtP9achhaEWGImIWV6Fbryi6Jv3nitC
+BUxpqREpcqGBhQOBggAEH/z+dOHhLfxI0GLpmUjYaSlC2H380nBhe6P4GSrnpya/
+Yew0IRyDfo0p99vwgOaLh8wJIH3Joy4NMtHthg8IAFmoctAoWkQ21E0HjPjwqZbx
+mvBD0S9opVycFR8XUSaK0EHyHO7hfuVsdyYzIIjpKViP7uOOtrggsTepWzBQt9I=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=ALICE_brainpoolP512t1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MIGbMBQGByqGSM49AgEGCSskAwMCCAEBDgOBggAEH/z+dOHhLfxI0GLpmUjYaSlC
+2H380nBhe6P4GSrnpya/Yew0IRyDfo0p99vwgOaLh8wJIH3Joy4NMtHthg8IAFmo
+ctAoWkQ21E0HjPjwqZbxmvBD0S9opVycFR8XUSaK0EHyHO7hfuVsdyYzIIjpKViP
+7uOOtrggsTepWzBQt9I=
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = ALICE_brainpoolP512t1:ALICE_brainpoolP512t1_PUB
+
+
+PrivateKey=BOB_brainpoolP512t1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIHsAgEAMBQGByqGSM49AgEGCSskAwMCCAEBDgSB0DCBzQIBAQRAFStrWBwOtTlY
+/pBeT2ncjTHcNzKm+ocTiIvr0RUEuX8ITd+L5x9H+ZLk44T85/8yqTPlk6cZSHby
+TG5UkPGVvaGBhQOBggAEE6EYYwpBA3NBflj/HYwxzbaxuALefTsTr5O0bLqh4J6S
+xkAwsQnlkU8PCnzEuvdBNxSwW7276VGfwDO7kFKEdZq3cnT+P41yi/XBVK7xgaL1
+R2U+vCxWsje6JLixWEdJkJ+6TqPKICdriNge1zbjvfhb01zP58E/Xsgh5/deJco=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BOB_brainpoolP512t1_PUB
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MIGbMBQGByqGSM49AgEGCSskAwMCCAEBDgOBggAEE6EYYwpBA3NBflj/HYwxzbax
+uALefTsTr5O0bLqh4J6SxkAwsQnlkU8PCnzEuvdBNxSwW7276VGfwDO7kFKEdZq3
+cnT+P41yi/XBVK7xgaL1R2U+vCxWsje6JLixWEdJkJ+6TqPKICdriNge1zbjvfhb
+01zP58E/Xsgh5/deJco=
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BOB_brainpoolP512t1:BOB_brainpoolP512t1_PUB
+
+
+# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
+Derive=ALICE_brainpoolP512t1
+PeerKey=BOB_brainpoolP512t1_PUB
+SharedSecret=0afecb44d108c9bf2bc159fcc613a1429e3906d5d201d579adc2167058e972ef85fc13d837f3566a2ff3a881e47bfe36b722baf4a9f865097fe11e171189a944
+
+# ECDH Bob with Alice peer
+Derive=BOB_brainpoolP512t1
+PeerKey=ALICE_brainpoolP512t1_PUB
+SharedSecret=0afecb44d108c9bf2bc159fcc613a1429e3906d5d201d579adc2167058e972ef85fc13d837f3566a2ff3a881e47bfe36b722baf4a9f865097fe11e171189a944
+
+
+## ECDH Tests: KATs from RFC 5114, RFC 5903 and RFC 7027
+
+
+# Keys and shared secrets from RFC 5114
+PrivateKey=PRIME192V1_RFC5114
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MG8CAQAwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQEEVTBTAgEBBBgyP6MWnY6cZZP1lHa8
+FCAAq1vg4knENCahNAMyAATNRkiez9bBBeez0yVm4rEi4kmrqt2HBhJoiHtId99R
+3U3D1v0R8KJvj9OEQxeRbpo=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=PRIME192V1_RFC5114-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MEkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQEDMgAEzUZIns/WwQXns9MlZuKxIuJJq6rd
+hwYSaIh7SHffUd1Nw9b9EfCib4/ThEMXkW6a
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = PRIME192V1_RFC5114:PRIME192V1_RFC5114-PUBLIC
+
+
+PrivateKey=PRIME192V1_RFC5114-Peer
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MG8CAQAwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQEEVTBTAgEBBBhjH5W7SmdjLJxHbu6a
+tpWrJAoEmTB/z2KhNAMyAARRmhIWgOAEVGa6Id8u7kf1lztQBXfvE9X/YTq01kzu
+OiCHW9sQ+VP2swygcsYKpX8=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=PRIME192V1_RFC5114-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MEkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQEDMgAEUZoSFoDgBFRmuiHfLu5H9Zc7UAV3
+7xPV/2E6tNZM7jogh1vbEPlT9rMMoHLGCqV/
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = PRIME192V1_RFC5114-Peer:PRIME192V1_RFC5114-Peer-PUBLIC
+
+
+
+Derive=PRIME192V1_RFC5114
+PeerKey=PRIME192V1_RFC5114-Peer-PUBLIC
+SharedSecret=AD420182633F8526BFE954ACDA376F05E5FF4F837F54FEBE
+
+Derive=PRIME192V1_RFC5114-Peer
+PeerKey=PRIME192V1_RFC5114-PUBLIC
+SharedSecret=AD420182633F8526BFE954ACDA376F05E5FF4F837F54FEBE
+
+PrivateKey=SECP224R1_RFC5114
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MHgCAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEACEEYTBfAgEBBBy1WOtsKI2nB7u0+PuuKrnp
+y2LjvFx1c+IuJtN/oTwDOgAESd/vMJ+BSIwwTP9as+5aIVQ2fceDMVDgpR8+608r
+XuRXYsT2VMGgxn9Uz4iwFrUbzj18Io1XrbQ=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=SECP224R1_RFC5114-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+ME4wEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEACEDOgAESd/vMJ+BSIwwTP9as+5aIVQ2fceDMVDg
+pR8+608rXuRXYsT2VMGgxn9Uz4iwFrUbzj18Io1XrbQ=
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = SECP224R1_RFC5114:SECP224R1_RFC5114-PUBLIC
+
+
+PrivateKey=SECP224R1_RFC5114-Peer
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MHgCAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEACEEYTBfAgEBBBysOxrdPZdw5vanCO6fO44K
+s7SA6fJ/hciLXm0YoTwDOgAEazrJao0M3mpVmb6AMu3xDBYtCorSGVBtzUKiB9SR
+vpnCE6fRyjcG3r/jBfNhr8uzPiYJyLFhitU=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=SECP224R1_RFC5114-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+ME4wEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEACEDOgAEazrJao0M3mpVmb6AMu3xDBYtCorSGVBt
+zUKiB9SRvpnCE6fRyjcG3r/jBfNhr8uzPiYJyLFhitU=
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = SECP224R1_RFC5114-Peer:SECP224R1_RFC5114-Peer-PUBLIC
+
+
+
+Derive=SECP224R1_RFC5114
+PeerKey=SECP224R1_RFC5114-Peer-PUBLIC
+SharedSecret=52272F50F46F4EDC9151569092F46DF2D96ECC3B6DC1714A4EA949FA
+
+Derive=SECP224R1_RFC5114-Peer
+PeerKey=SECP224R1_RFC5114-PUBLIC
+SharedSecret=52272F50F46F4EDC9151569092F46DF2D96ECC3B6DC1714A4EA949FA
+
+PrivateKey=PRIME256V1_RFC5114
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIGHAgEAMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHBG0wawIBAQQggUJkFF8vVvLpao4z
+ehKEmT+vQypavOWehntykdUHo6+hRANCAAQq9QLzvolS8sm1qNQWDQnpcWW+ULxC
+rkpejTtLqDrrFesPr0yphsTThoGg+YctedVnlb1L/25t48D1AV7OXv2F
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=PRIME256V1_RFC5114-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEKvUC876JUvLJtajUFg0J6XFlvlC8
+Qq5KXo07S6g66xXrD69MqYbE04aBoPmHLXnVZ5W9S/9ubePA9QFezl79hQ==
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = PRIME256V1_RFC5114:PRIME256V1_RFC5114-PUBLIC
+
+
+PrivateKey=PRIME256V1_RFC5114-Peer
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIGHAgEAMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHBG0wawIBAQQgLOF4jsGX4JbblaIA
+zAqyahnOa8ytViuO7htZN2HPf0GhRANCAASxIN5Ko2SSeVNG6N5sLIZGrgaq6ief
+p3WzqwcV9s5RsJ8bfuziDXte2OxoX6Pwcdg3JwJwkqhBE4XDTd5XCLK2
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=PRIME256V1_RFC5114-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEsSDeSqNkknlTRujebCyGRq4Gquon
+n6d1s6sHFfbOUbCfG37s4g17XtjsaF+j8HHYNycCcJKoQROFw03eVwiytg==
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = PRIME256V1_RFC5114-Peer:PRIME256V1_RFC5114-Peer-PUBLIC
+
+
+
+Derive=PRIME256V1_RFC5114
+PeerKey=PRIME256V1_RFC5114-Peer-PUBLIC
+SharedSecret=DD0F5396219D1EA393310412D19A08F1F5811E9DC8EC8EEA7F80D21C820C2788
+
+Derive=PRIME256V1_RFC5114-Peer
+PeerKey=PRIME256V1_RFC5114-PUBLIC
+SharedSecret=DD0F5396219D1EA393310412D19A08F1F5811E9DC8EC8EEA7F80D21C820C2788
+
+PrivateKey=SECP384R1_RFC5114
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIG2AgEAMBAGByqGSM49AgEGBSuBBAAiBIGeMIGbAgEBBDDSczXqcWZK8kTdFOn9
+EmBxXf2KeWVXHEjXCe56eWKhVtcGqQy8td8phvBf6tuTdvGhZANiAAR5MUjxeHY0
+1dpMbZB0QX0F4FerYvggVNEO5rBAPWJ5VH5qjqnR/XdCfQFv4nqLjGbGxBKUMx0j
+5vSA9PtM1AUEyUc5LpT0w/BrjzmLsp5CNo96aFkj3jtnus7SFKGh0Sg=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=SECP384R1_RFC5114-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MHYwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEACIDYgAEeTFI8Xh2NNXaTG2QdEF9BeBXq2L4IFTR
+DuawQD1ieVR+ao6p0f13Qn0Bb+J6i4xmxsQSlDMdI+b0gPT7TNQFBMlHOS6U9MPw
+a485i7KeQjaPemhZI947Z7rO0hShodEo
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = SECP384R1_RFC5114:SECP384R1_RFC5114-PUBLIC
+
+
+PrivateKey=SECP384R1_RFC5114-Peer
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIG2AgEAMBAGByqGSM49AgEGBSuBBAAiBIGeMIGbAgEBBDBS0Xkf20tw+JwPANRW
+wvcCO2ElJiw2p98fgCMRIczj05vlLgDBlKQTLEpsdovNlNKhZANiAARc1Cq5xBtT
+R/dLjU77cIs9WzbbZZFTWbRKvBdke2uZmXidcqhIZa4vIj8StaGrwSDhcUWP6qk5
+qqOov6xGtAS9j21bNIwPpNgM7KFjVsqTMkC96HI0Fajs4DWw7fNnVd4=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=SECP384R1_RFC5114-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MHYwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEACIDYgAEXNQqucQbU0f3S41O+3CLPVs222WRU1m0
+SrwXZHtrmZl4nXKoSGWuLyI/ErWhq8Eg4XFFj+qpOaqjqL+sRrQEvY9tWzSMD6TY
+DOyhY1bKkzJAvehyNBWo7OA1sO3zZ1Xe
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = SECP384R1_RFC5114-Peer:SECP384R1_RFC5114-Peer-PUBLIC
+
+
+
+Derive=SECP384R1_RFC5114
+PeerKey=SECP384R1_RFC5114-Peer-PUBLIC
+SharedSecret=5EA1FC4AF7256D2055981B110575E0A8CAE53160137D904C59D926EB1B8456E427AA8A4540884C37DE159A58028ABC0E
+
+Derive=SECP384R1_RFC5114-Peer
+PeerKey=SECP384R1_RFC5114-PUBLIC
+SharedSecret=5EA1FC4AF7256D2055981B110575E0A8CAE53160137D904C59D926EB1B8456E427AA8A4540884C37DE159A58028ABC0E
+
+PrivateKey=SECP521R1_RFC5114
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIHuAgEAMBAGByqGSM49AgEGBSuBBAAjBIHWMIHTAgEBBEIBE/gtqCVzXj2XJ2aD
+srdCd7rSczXqcWZK8kMMxPM0WblmnueLP/ubhoMBXTRNy/72+5r0xsRwviVFFs08
+Gh+0c2KhgYkDgYYABAHrs03XVyGr+K3J2+0XiJy7l2XZCnxg8s7wB7sPKybhSIH9
+RELmidYcst0EbuMOP/0g+aRbvfZBPVg6Lb9Zkk/TXAD2tjLRlMA4jiLYQ35VjFUq
+4ZWt/RU/ktdJCDUbL4xO2pTtsJFtG1PAILXuyu0aX8OKIz5IMFh7su40ibO0KlqG
+pA==
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=SECP521R1_RFC5114-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MIGbMBAGByqGSM49AgEGBSuBBAAjA4GGAAQB67NN11chq/itydvtF4icu5dl2Qp8
+YPLO8Ae7Dysm4UiB/URC5onWHLLdBG7jDj/9IPmkW732QT1YOi2/WZJP01wA9rYy
+0ZTAOI4i2EN+VYxVKuGVrf0VP5LXSQg1Gy+MTtqU7bCRbRtTwCC17srtGl/DiiM+
+SDBYe7LuNImztCpahqQ=
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = SECP521R1_RFC5114:SECP521R1_RFC5114-PUBLIC
+
+
+PrivateKey=SECP521R1_RFC5114-Peer
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIHuAgEAMBAGByqGSM49AgEGBSuBBAAjBIHWMIHTAgEBBEIAzuNIDYZFoX0knyd2
+0ouuYWlS0Xkf20tw98M3hzKqGyKShEi80dwkltQ1sBBIBm6+T3KQPDYbGp3BGT3C
+ydCJG5ahgYkDgYYABAEOv6/G6F4I0kv//MGkUR2w5jS+6xtt7IxZOa5EdmIBr2IA
+QwupfIrGoOnwizPOfp/utbpO5eDYFRDCQpW4oI0CNQCkpuwwDfniV7A3K156v+8J
+NDZxmneIfrsLGM+Ambn0IStuMKFBnBjgKdNoY8ydRI9Nuk0qDmBxG+VykV+9T+8m
+lQ==
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=SECP521R1_RFC5114-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MIGbMBAGByqGSM49AgEGBSuBBAAjA4GGAAQBDr+vxuheCNJL//zBpFEdsOY0vusb
+beyMWTmuRHZiAa9iAEMLqXyKxqDp8Iszzn6f7rW6TuXg2BUQwkKVuKCNAjUApKbs
+MA354lewNyteer/vCTQ2cZp3iH67CxjPgJm59CErbjChQZwY4CnTaGPMnUSPTbpN
+Kg5gcRvlcpFfvU/vJpU=
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = SECP521R1_RFC5114-Peer:SECP521R1_RFC5114-Peer-PUBLIC
+
+
+
+Derive=SECP521R1_RFC5114
+PeerKey=SECP521R1_RFC5114-Peer-PUBLIC
+SharedSecret=00CDEA89621CFA46B132F9E4CFE2261CDE2D4368EB5656634C7CC98C7A00CDE54ED1866A0DD3E6126C9D2F845DAFF82CEB1DA08F5D87521BB0EBECA77911169C20CC
+
+Derive=SECP521R1_RFC5114-Peer
+PeerKey=SECP521R1_RFC5114-PUBLIC
+SharedSecret=00CDEA89621CFA46B132F9E4CFE2261CDE2D4368EB5656634C7CC98C7A00CDE54ED1866A0DD3E6126C9D2F845DAFF82CEB1DA08F5D87521BB0EBECA77911169C20CC
+
+# Keys and shared secrets from RFC 5903
+PrivateKey=PRIME256V1_RFC5903
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIGHAgEAMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHBG0wawIBAQQgyI8B9RDZrD9wopLa
+ojFt5UTpqriv6EBJxiqcV4YtFDOhRANCAATa0LZTlCIc+bBR4f7KV4fQmN/mN/yQ
+ue+UXQw3clgRgFJxoEYc24JS1h8cRW+j5Zqx9FszrM9fWDieBXe4mQuz
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=PRIME256V1_RFC5903-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE2tC2U5QiHPmwUeH+yleH0Jjf5jf8
+kLnvlF0MN3JYEYBScaBGHNuCUtYfHEVvo+WasfRbM6zPX1g4ngV3uJkLsw==
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = PRIME256V1_RFC5903:PRIME256V1_RFC5903-PUBLIC
+
+
+PrivateKey=PRIME256V1_RFC5903-Peer
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIGHAgEAMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHBG0wawIBAQQgxu+cXXiuASoBEWSs
+s5fOIIhoXY8Gv5vgsoOrRkdr7lOhRANCAATRLftSicjU+BIItwJwOYw0IpaXCgvM
+t0xzb8dVRJS/Y1b788o2bMI+gVeFTBPFjWqsI/BGraMPg1PnTzMDmHKr
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=PRIME256V1_RFC5903-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE0S37UonI1PgSCLcCcDmMNCKWlwoL
+zLdMc2/HVUSUv2NW+/PKNmzCPoFXhUwTxY1qrCPwRq2jD4NT508zA5hyqw==
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = PRIME256V1_RFC5903-Peer:PRIME256V1_RFC5903-Peer-PUBLIC
+
+
+
+Derive=PRIME256V1_RFC5903
+PeerKey=PRIME256V1_RFC5903-Peer-PUBLIC
+SharedSecret=D6840F6B42F6EDAFD13116E0E12565202FEF8E9ECE7DCE03812464D04B9442DE
+
+Derive=PRIME256V1_RFC5903-Peer
+PeerKey=PRIME256V1_RFC5903-PUBLIC
+SharedSecret=D6840F6B42F6EDAFD13116E0E12565202FEF8E9ECE7DCE03812464D04B9442DE
+
+PrivateKey=SECP384R1_RFC5903
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIG2AgEAMBAGByqGSM49AgEGBSuBBAAiBIGeMIGbAgEBBDAJnzxwNNSixpmITXOj
+daZ/diTvfGs8DxYGR7Z0FNzmVeNbU4BB5knuP674lng6sZShZANiAARmeELX0YCs
+LN5vdPN1UfVXVcdkXCDvc+MWNP5ytMVe5t46yAistL20yIcyrulfQaqUgu0fwO65
+yvxJhGJcz8I/ZQMhSeDhRK2gJBgVNaDzjuufz/PCyUfa5ptMY0VzqBw=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=SECP384R1_RFC5903-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MHYwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEACIDYgAEZnhC19GArCzeb3TzdVH1V1XHZFwg73Pj
+FjT+crTFXubeOsgIrLS9tMiHMq7pX0GqlILtH8Duucr8SYRiXM/CP2UDIUng4USt
+oCQYFTWg847rn8/zwslH2uabTGNFc6gc
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = SECP384R1_RFC5903:SECP384R1_RFC5903-PUBLIC
+
+
+PrivateKey=SECP384R1_RFC5903-Peer
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIG2AgEAMBAGByqGSM49AgEGBSuBBAAiBIGeMIGbAgEBBDBBywd5tL24XUeEZyX7
+7DyUMPq0bMjcUGCFXMm9oKopQuAwgxKRa47Slg5L1Vp0SPyhZANiAATlWNvvU+7N
+49P8z8GuoIqJqYdHXRL9lQ2Dz6QXMrxQnQ0axDoDNt75b9pB0HdKNXHc++x6rPMZ
+ZHIWnoOEMDZ/Zu6+PG5wxBbdXwxodZ3R//g/pAFCIJ3/XqrZbbnmOGw=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=SECP384R1_RFC5903-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MHYwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEACIDYgAE5Vjb71PuzePT/M/BrqCKiamHR10S/ZUN
+g8+kFzK8UJ0NGsQ6Azbe+W/aQdB3SjVx3PvseqzzGWRyFp6DhDA2f2buvjxucMQW
+3V8MaHWd0f/4P6QBQiCd/16q2W255jhs
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = SECP384R1_RFC5903-Peer:SECP384R1_RFC5903-Peer-PUBLIC
+
+
+
+Derive=SECP384R1_RFC5903
+PeerKey=SECP384R1_RFC5903-Peer-PUBLIC
+SharedSecret=11187331C279962D93D604243FD592CB9D0A926F422E47187521287E7156C5C4D603135569B9E9D09CF5D4A270F59746
+
+Derive=SECP384R1_RFC5903-Peer
+PeerKey=SECP384R1_RFC5903-PUBLIC
+SharedSecret=11187331C279962D93D604243FD592CB9D0A926F422E47187521287E7156C5C4D603135569B9E9D09CF5D4A270F59746
+
+PrivateKey=SECP521R1_RFC5903
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIHuAgEAMBAGByqGSM49AgEGBSuBBAAjBIHWMIHTAgEBBEIAN63pMZqJ9Nq9s+9B
+GqzMpRI8YayrV7U5Pc5HYIFyoJWqhaMP4cKVLGdx2Te6l3f1lXsmObqwckYvaMJ6
+VzgtSlKhgYkDgYYABAAVQX6E2/KMCtPCeHEzSdx98VPIl6GJG9mLq0NXyey+4eO/
+QuALjjgK6uV8LRB1ZJQYhZQq9af0YBcjxBldF2ztPgF8riC2ZB0u62lXhtjJRhRi
+OdCZ4Y4dWlFMc518tKEK2KeIAVrEBdd5ncdee31bbPImGmp/FQdDi/Ab62yjkm+V
+gg==
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=SECP521R1_RFC5903-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MIGbMBAGByqGSM49AgEGBSuBBAAjA4GGAAQAFUF+hNvyjArTwnhxM0ncffFTyJeh
+iRvZi6tDV8nsvuHjv0LgC444CurlfC0QdWSUGIWUKvWn9GAXI8QZXRds7T4BfK4g
+tmQdLutpV4bYyUYUYjnQmeGOHVpRTHOdfLShCtiniAFaxAXXeZ3HXnt9W2zyJhpq
+fxUHQ4vwG+tso5JvlYI=
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = SECP521R1_RFC5903:SECP521R1_RFC5903-PUBLIC
+
+
+PrivateKey=SECP521R1_RFC5903-Peer
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIHuAgEAMBAGByqGSM49AgEGBSuBBAAjBIHWMIHTAgEBBEIBRbqZqEevQ3k/3Q6H
+LnzfoWvjD9x4D5e8zD8Hg4AgHpxnfWALNDdXo72/KjFj5ML4acynRYqkpO/8MR9c
+sVFoXrmhgYkDgYYABADQs5daxLeZ9b6hbV4T6a+XHV6bmEyfOXKLXlc5c1ohm5fD
+VkNq3G6VuwNS9r5kpsKRLU7y0EM87SthcWQAEtlGDwFcaCJjg5VuO9Bm55e2I8J8
+4OrC9VGhDCxyTZhSB3uHIgtlNsXECKHSrruOhtZ4rknLVwkfRzIpZXmrRPzRfw/F
+ag==
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=SECP521R1_RFC5903-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MIGbMBAGByqGSM49AgEGBSuBBAAjA4GGAAQA0LOXWsS3mfW+oW1eE+mvlx1em5hM
+nzlyi15XOXNaIZuXw1ZDatxulbsDUva+ZKbCkS1O8tBDPO0rYXFkABLZRg8BXGgi
+Y4OVbjvQZueXtiPCfODqwvVRoQwsck2YUgd7hyILZTbFxAih0q67jobWeK5Jy1cJ
+H0cyKWV5q0T80X8PxWo=
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = SECP521R1_RFC5903-Peer:SECP521R1_RFC5903-Peer-PUBLIC
+
+
+
+Derive=SECP521R1_RFC5903
+PeerKey=SECP521R1_RFC5903-Peer-PUBLIC
+SharedSecret=01144C7D79AE6956BC8EDB8E7C787C4521CB086FA64407F97894E5E6B2D79B04D1427E73CA4BAA240A34786859810C06B3C715A3A8CC3151F2BEE417996D19F3DDEA
+
+Derive=SECP521R1_RFC5903-Peer
+PeerKey=SECP521R1_RFC5903-PUBLIC
+SharedSecret=01144C7D79AE6956BC8EDB8E7C787C4521CB086FA64407F97894E5E6B2D79B04D1427E73CA4BAA240A34786859810C06B3C715A3A8CC3151F2BEE417996D19F3DDEA
+
+# Keys and shared secrets from RFC 7027
+PrivateKey=BRAINPOOLP256R1_RFC7027
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIGIAgEAMBQGByqGSM49AgEGCSskAwMCCAEBBwRtMGsCAQEEIIHbHuEAFQ/y6jON
+cIJxvjgwDLVCQdeZUPd7BjA5gE8doUQDQgAERBBukT+SvAKhcF2ZU6hBTbleGqpJ
+6B2ehfkpqOMQC+WKtIRvEcrMtzzknL3RIPWpAKaf0ywnIiP3ie8Q6wib3A==
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BRAINPOOLP256R1_RFC7027-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MFowFAYHKoZIzj0CAQYJKyQDAwIIAQEHA0IABEQQbpE/krwCoXBdmVOoQU25Xhqq
+SegdnoX5KajjEAvlirSEbxHKzLc85Jy90SD1qQCmn9MsJyIj94nvEOsIm9w=
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BRAINPOOLP256R1_RFC7027:BRAINPOOLP256R1_RFC7027-PUBLIC
+
+
+PrivateKey=BRAINPOOLP256R1_RFC7027-Peer
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIGIAgEAMBQGByqGSM49AgEGCSskAwMCCAEBBwRtMGsCAQEEIFXkC8QeN+PirSXD
+xmVFEf+oR0qRoAMgh1k4UtPn12vToUQDQgAEjS1ojGz5PhFgrQTMRCkRfcLEGCXh
+6fygrd005vGzn3uZDFdSCBK+USZB5HA0gyEGvH0+jdDkx/ETbXAGVHzsag==
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BRAINPOOLP256R1_RFC7027-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MFowFAYHKoZIzj0CAQYJKyQDAwIIAQEHA0IABI0taIxs+T4RYK0EzEQpEX3CxBgl
+4en8oK3dNObxs597mQxXUggSvlEmQeRwNIMhBrx9Po3Q5MfxE21wBlR87Go=
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BRAINPOOLP256R1_RFC7027-Peer:BRAINPOOLP256R1_RFC7027-Peer-PUBLIC
+
+
+
+Derive=BRAINPOOLP256R1_RFC7027
+PeerKey=BRAINPOOLP256R1_RFC7027-Peer-PUBLIC
+SharedSecret=89AFC39D41D3B327814B80940B042590F96556EC91E6AE7939BCE31F3A18BF2B
+
+Derive=BRAINPOOLP256R1_RFC7027-Peer
+PeerKey=BRAINPOOLP256R1_RFC7027-PUBLIC
+SharedSecret=89AFC39D41D3B327814B80940B042590F96556EC91E6AE7939BCE31F3A18BF2B
+
+PrivateKey=BRAINPOOLP384R1_RFC7027
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIG6AgEAMBQGByqGSM49AgEGCSskAwMCCAEBCwSBnjCBmwIBAQQwHiD14EiliG8f
+FXx06RveK5jItS1Y5QA9VwU/xLC9ZdbxXrXR7hYQ34cHlRQ2J9BCoWQDYgAEaLZl
+3ZHBlYAGUM3TY8Yl9OdC6BNGZ7dnsbR2eTWI+IWraYyFLUpud6JS1jgPyvBoVbyR
+o5yewB3uNgF7fWc6kxI20vH1yDlC0Enj+iBgdJPg0Dj/L9MMKrZ9Fchff6pZ
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BRAINPOOLP384R1_RFC7027-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MHowFAYHKoZIzj0CAQYJKyQDAwIIAQELA2IABGi2Zd2RwZWABlDN02PGJfTnQugT
+Rme3Z7G0dnk1iPiFq2mMhS1KbneiUtY4D8rwaFW8kaOcnsAd7jYBe31nOpMSNtLx
+9cg5QtBJ4/ogYHST4NA4/y/TDCq2fRXIX3+qWQ==
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BRAINPOOLP384R1_RFC7027:BRAINPOOLP384R1_RFC7027-PUBLIC
+
+
+PrivateKey=BRAINPOOLP384R1_RFC7027-Peer
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIG6AgEAMBQGByqGSM49AgEGCSskAwMCCAEBCwSBnjCBmwIBAQQwAyZAvGADxZJg
+9yUMPbWM5kf5jhJgrM5KzaPdhp904B+LpeAyQwnbapgxSXq6yWZwoWQDYgAETUQy
+byaaWXpbWLulZdpVVu1/2aip63bCX0bbadGdyM5q0Y5ASxVziyCG3zfnHR60YtaS
+E23lbL6Tv1+jGI71i8ijoOxsHhUaIQOKQukYUym1snWQPRkvjU4fMv6cx4xI
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BRAINPOOLP384R1_RFC7027-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MHowFAYHKoZIzj0CAQYJKyQDAwIIAQELA2IABE1EMm8mmll6W1i7pWXaVVbtf9mo
+qet2wl9G22nRncjOatGOQEsVc4sght835x0etGLWkhNt5Wy+k79foxiO9YvIo6Ds
+bB4VGiEDikLpGFMptbJ1kD0ZL41OHzL+nMeMSA==
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BRAINPOOLP384R1_RFC7027-Peer:BRAINPOOLP384R1_RFC7027-Peer-PUBLIC
+
+
+
+Derive=BRAINPOOLP384R1_RFC7027
+PeerKey=BRAINPOOLP384R1_RFC7027-Peer-PUBLIC
+SharedSecret=0BD9D3A7EA0B3D519D09D8E48D0785FB744A6B355E6304BC51C229FBBCE239BBADF6403715C35D4FB2A5444F575D4F42
+
+Derive=BRAINPOOLP384R1_RFC7027-Peer
+PeerKey=BRAINPOOLP384R1_RFC7027-PUBLIC
+SharedSecret=0BD9D3A7EA0B3D519D09D8E48D0785FB744A6B355E6304BC51C229FBBCE239BBADF6403715C35D4FB2A5444F575D4F42
+
+PrivateKey=BRAINPOOLP512R1_RFC7027
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIHsAgEAMBQGByqGSM49AgEGCSskAwMCCAEBDQSB0DCBzQIBAQRAFjAv8Nu7Wo1z
+PatxQcG0WsvIcVk5Z39qVoUKOL2HvVmwnoAnlgn/Mz651MBhIx+yb5LusEmCpfHR
+dkytV2ZUIqGBhQOBggAECkIFF+QGqsCs3OkPzXFIdxjTuVPv1/vsX38n4oxhSZmT
+l+keAp4GRX2y0+ZAZos5LCp+c3p/C/BENtEWQP0J/XLmiC6NsoqtNiN80l1YDbI3
+g5YcjcUt+i7BOK1HKg/O84h89itiOyqH3lxYgwHqPl/CabNztgck9egqatFH/ec=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BRAINPOOLP512R1_RFC7027-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MIGbMBQGByqGSM49AgEGCSskAwMCCAEBDQOBggAECkIFF+QGqsCs3OkPzXFIdxjT
+uVPv1/vsX38n4oxhSZmTl+keAp4GRX2y0+ZAZos5LCp+c3p/C/BENtEWQP0J/XLm
+iC6NsoqtNiN80l1YDbI3g5YcjcUt+i7BOK1HKg/O84h89itiOyqH3lxYgwHqPl/C
+abNztgck9egqatFH/ec=
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BRAINPOOLP512R1_RFC7027:BRAINPOOLP512R1_RFC7027-PUBLIC
+
+
+PrivateKey=BRAINPOOLP512R1_RFC7027-Peer
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIHsAgEAMBQGByqGSM49AgEGCSskAwMCCAEBDQSB0DCBzQIBAQRAIw4Y4bzIijYv
+pU5Oo5AgCSkvf4AzYk/UcbXYrOSdEs+rvBmWPauOLx66AL/7KeTXLRPyIkVi9AXL
+gFA2ZrJUKaGBhQOBggAEnUX2beXWfi5ttuk6Wc4LtIEGCX/3iggd54HNsx/OjMuq
+6o3UMgxBGfHpzUN6Lqs3MfqWaKsmjYcd7aVaVHMZny/cMTCVvN1fs6kWNvB6lZyO
+hrVjah6TDoOWBJy0gZYdNlzBFFOgbHGYNUdbEstS/Dw4O8414n7xlFErcYdihfo=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=BRAINPOOLP512R1_RFC7027-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MIGbMBQGByqGSM49AgEGCSskAwMCCAEBDQOBggAEnUX2beXWfi5ttuk6Wc4LtIEG
+CX/3iggd54HNsx/OjMuq6o3UMgxBGfHpzUN6Lqs3MfqWaKsmjYcd7aVaVHMZny/c
+MTCVvN1fs6kWNvB6lZyOhrVjah6TDoOWBJy0gZYdNlzBFFOgbHGYNUdbEstS/Dw4
+O8414n7xlFErcYdihfo=
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = BRAINPOOLP512R1_RFC7027-Peer:BRAINPOOLP512R1_RFC7027-Peer-PUBLIC
+
+
+
+Derive=BRAINPOOLP512R1_RFC7027
+PeerKey=BRAINPOOLP512R1_RFC7027-Peer-PUBLIC
+SharedSecret=A7927098655F1F9976FA50A9D566865DC530331846381C87256BAF3226244B76D36403C024D7BBF0AA0803EAFF405D3D24F11A9B5C0BEF679FE1454B21C4CD1F
+
+Derive=BRAINPOOLP512R1_RFC7027-Peer
+PeerKey=BRAINPOOLP512R1_RFC7027-PUBLIC
+SharedSecret=A7927098655F1F9976FA50A9D566865DC530331846381C87256BAF3226244B76D36403C024D7BBF0AA0803EAFF405D3D24F11A9B5C0BEF679FE1454B21C4CD1F
+
+
+########################################################################
+#                                                                      #
+#                NIST SP800-56A co-factor ECDH KATs                    #
+#                                                                      #
+#                                                                      #
+# http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cavp/component-testing.html#ECCCDH   #
+#                                                                      #
+# sha256sum(KAS_ECC_CDH_PrimitiveTest.txt) =                           #
+#     456068d3f8aad8ac62a03d19ed3173f00ad51f42b51aeab4753c20f30c01cf23 #
+#                                                                      #
+########################################################################
+
+
+PrivateKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-192_C0
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MG8CAQAwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQEEVTBTAgEBBBjxfT/qNnt000CFHKQn
+DcskwnH0Rb7Z1SehNAMyAASxUFNAH1coVjfsMkwc0hOeOmfeNzkjSzfyacFYY3SC
+qtZEzWkt0dPvLIp8SeOJ9/Y=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-192_C0-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MEkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQEDMgAEsVBTQB9XKFY37DJMHNITnjpn3jc5
+I0s38mnBWGN0gqrWRM1pLdHT7yyKfEnjiff2
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_P-192_C0:KAS-ECC-CDH_P-192_C0-PUBLIC
+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-192_C0-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MEkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQEDMgAEQupt2Zad0qYf6hqsf46Y7cyJbG5V
+hXzA375dfGH6yIsRgRveMo6KDRK/AanSBLUj
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+
+Derive=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-192_C0
+PeerKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-192_C0-Peer-PUBLIC
+Ctrl=ecdh_cofactor_mode:1
+SharedSecret=803d8ab2e5b6e6fca715737c3a82f7ce3c783124f6d51cd0
+
+PrivateKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-192_C1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MG8CAQAwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQEEVTBTAgEBBBhW6FM0nZb+TEQkSNrL
+fPkrt6ldz1dKm9WhNAMyAATADUNXFv/qU/2MFieSQUw3ZlGH5YJxZTmrcRxiqnGl
+oY6KPEj4ncb6UvrAEI5SqKA=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-192_C1-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MEkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQEDMgAEwA1DVxb/6lP9jBYnkkFMN2ZRh+WC
+cWU5q3EcYqpxpaGOijxI+J3G+lL6wBCOUqig
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_P-192_C1:KAS-ECC-CDH_P-192_C1-PUBLIC
+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-192_C1-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MEkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQEDMgAE3rVxL6AnrI0vIsRVzLc6keF7ZRK1
+4DDnfiaQoCzJsocIQxop+1S4ex8MFOARrCEl
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+
+Derive=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-192_C1
+PeerKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-192_C1-Peer-PUBLIC
+Ctrl=ecdh_cofactor_mode:1
+SharedSecret=c208847568b98835d7312cef1f97f7aa298283152313c29d
+
+PrivateKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-192_C2
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MG8CAQAwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQEEVTBTAgEBBBjG72H+EugL9W8tP30L
+t1c5RRmQbVVQCUmhNAMyAAThhLwYJILzQDyHh7g4Qkd0Z/zQEdsPbGT50cFBQvQN
+6GOduX1Rpj0szhAHzPdzzcs=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-192_C2-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MEkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQEDMgAE4YS8GCSC80A8h4e4OEJHdGf80BHb
+D2xk+dHBQUL0Dehjnbl9UaY9LM4QB8z3c83L
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_P-192_C2:KAS-ECC-CDH_P-192_C2-PUBLIC
+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-192_C2-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MEkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQEDMgAETtqo78Wg9A+ENmPsWBXndi3dwAjm
+Y8IPCp+Nxno+YO9tZLUiGF0D3x/Arf1CR4J5
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+
+Derive=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-192_C2
+PeerKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-192_C2-Peer-PUBLIC
+Ctrl=ecdh_cofactor_mode:1
+SharedSecret=87229107047a3b611920d6e3b2c0c89bea4f49412260b8dd
+
+PrivateKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-192_C3
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MG8CAQAwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQEEVTBTAgEBBBjmdHucI7pwRPOP9+Ys
+NeQDiSD1oBY9PNqhNAMyAAQrg42+c3NfN6OaeNMZV4PSaZHob/TZLRpg00SUInRI
+n5iQOy5/k/jRl/ya5goO1To=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-192_C3-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MEkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQEDMgAEK4ONvnNzXzejmnjTGVeD0mmR6G/0
+2S0aYNNElCJ0SJ+YkDsuf5P40Zf8muYKDtU6
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_P-192_C3:KAS-ECC-CDH_P-192_C3-PUBLIC
+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-192_C3-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MEkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQEDMgAEiIfCdu3u0+noZrRtWNiVxz+9gLY+
+OC6IBMUJe6ZkXhYgbPtw9wUmVZR91EoX8fnV
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+
+Derive=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-192_C3
+PeerKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-192_C3-Peer-PUBLIC
+Ctrl=ecdh_cofactor_mode:1
+SharedSecret=eec0bed8fc55e1feddc82158fd6dc0d48a4d796aaf47d46c
+
+PrivateKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-192_C4
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MG8CAQAwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQEEVTBTAgEBBBi+q+3QFUoa/PyF1SGB
+wQ9etHrcUfZVBH2hNAMyAAQfZc9uiXjhwbwQu2Gn2zEd4xAIjIz5dov31DgWjn9C
+qxSxavU6ei9kb/QLU9dMvMc=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-192_C4-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MEkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQEDMgAEH2XPbol44cG8ELthp9sxHeMQCIyM
++XaL99Q4Fo5/QqsUsWr1OnovZG/0C1PXTLzH
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_P-192_C4:KAS-ECC-CDH_P-192_C4-PUBLIC
+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-192_C4-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MEkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQEDMgAEDQRfMCVK3B/O+opbHzG/TnOd0yfN
+GNWUVCwxTkFCfAgnigjOjXMF87W4Scctiv9z
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+
+Derive=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-192_C4
+PeerKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-192_C4-Peer-PUBLIC
+Ctrl=ecdh_cofactor_mode:1
+SharedSecret=716e743b1b37a2cd8479f0a3d5a74c10ba2599be18d7e2f4
+
+PrivateKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-192_C5
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MG8CAQAwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQEEVTBTAgEBBBjPcDVCJmZzIdbiuvQJ
+meL9dMeg95P6hpmhNAMyAARfSET/zOYQBdJPc325hnXpL3tlQ662EGxUJPWYE5IV
+04m2sSuG1YAUhX8t2ttUD1E=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-192_C5-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MEkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQEDMgAEX0hE/8zmEAXST3N9uYZ16S97ZUOu
+thBsVCT1mBOSFdOJtrErhtWAFIV/LdrbVA9R
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_P-192_C5:KAS-ECC-CDH_P-192_C5-PUBLIC
+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-192_C5-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MEkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQEDMgAE+zXKINLpZmXFG5jo9us9eRE1CNi8
+zUUWNo7sDVv7hHch32qv8OXUjERPdL+c2KWn
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+
+Derive=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-192_C5
+PeerKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-192_C5-Peer-PUBLIC
+Ctrl=ecdh_cofactor_mode:1
+SharedSecret=f67053b934459985a315cb017bf0302891798d45d0e19508
+
+PrivateKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-192_C6
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MG8CAQAwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQEEVTBTAgEBBBj+lCUVI3//3XtOtcZJ
+Ce7khWoHbN8SuuKhNAMyAATmNp33myB7i4Z598hpz8JkhZ0atVqkAegfmccfgBow
+tS902m5ebbti7kxdoQkMwCA=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-192_C6-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MEkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQEDMgAE5jad95sge4uGeffIac/CZIWdGrVa
+pAHoH5nHH4AaMLUvdNpuXm27Yu5MXaEJDMAg
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_P-192_C6:KAS-ECC-CDH_P-192_C6-PUBLIC
+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-192_C6-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MEkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQEDMgAEgkdSlgwTB+XxOoPaIceZjKi1sAuV
+SfbQvFLZHiNDY7wy7gtnePJc2MGEdRD0NIuU
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+
+Derive=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-192_C6
+PeerKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-192_C6-Peer-PUBLIC
+Ctrl=ecdh_cofactor_mode:1
+SharedSecret=75822971193edd472bf30151a782619c55ad0b279c9303dd
+
+PrivateKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-192_C7
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MG8CAQAwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQEEVTBTAgEBBBgz/tEEkq+lvqAzPArx
+LKyUDE0iJFW80P6hNAMyAATvCyivxBY31zf0LkyKrOrchLouC4ScoYxXeXlC5VIX
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_P-192_C21:KAS-ECC-CDH_P-192_C21-PUBLIC
+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-192_C21-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
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+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-192_C22-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+
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+
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+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+
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+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-224_C1-Peer-PUBLIC
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+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-224_C2-Peer-PUBLIC
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+
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+
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+
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+
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+
+
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+
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+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_P-224_C9:KAS-ECC-CDH_P-224_C9-PUBLIC
+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-224_C9-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+
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+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
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+
+
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+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-224_C11-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-224_C12-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-224_C13-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-224_C14-Peer-PUBLIC
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+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-224_C15-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-224_C16-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+
+
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+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+
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+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+
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+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_P-224_C20:KAS-ECC-CDH_P-224_C20-PUBLIC
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+
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+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_P-224_C21:KAS-ECC-CDH_P-224_C21-PUBLIC
+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-224_C21-Peer-PUBLIC
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+
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+PrivateKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-224_C22
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+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_P-224_C22:KAS-ECC-CDH_P-224_C22-PUBLIC
+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-224_C22-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+
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+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_P-224_C23:KAS-ECC-CDH_P-224_C23-PUBLIC
+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-224_C23-Peer-PUBLIC
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+
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
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+
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+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C0:KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C0-PUBLIC
+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C0-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+
+Derive=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C0
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+Ctrl=ecdh_cofactor_mode:1
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+PrivateKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C1-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C1:KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C1-PUBLIC
+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C1-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+
+Derive=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C1
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+Ctrl=ecdh_cofactor_mode:1
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+PrivateKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C2
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C2-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C2:KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C2-PUBLIC
+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C2-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+
+Derive=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C2
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+Ctrl=ecdh_cofactor_mode:1
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+PrivateKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C3
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C3-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C3:KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C3-PUBLIC
+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C3-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+
+Derive=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C3
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+Ctrl=ecdh_cofactor_mode:1
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+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C4-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C4:KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C4-PUBLIC
+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C4-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+
+Derive=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C4
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+Ctrl=ecdh_cofactor_mode:1
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+PrivateKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C5
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C5-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C5:KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C5-PUBLIC
+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C5-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+
+Derive=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C5
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+Ctrl=ecdh_cofactor_mode:1
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+PrivateKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C6
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C6-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C6:KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C6-PUBLIC
+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C6-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+
+Derive=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C6
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+PrivateKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C7
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C7-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C7:KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C7-PUBLIC
+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C7-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+
+Derive=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C7
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+Ctrl=ecdh_cofactor_mode:1
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+PrivateKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C8
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C8-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C8:KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C8-PUBLIC
+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C8-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+
+Derive=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C8
+PeerKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C8-Peer-PUBLIC
+Ctrl=ecdh_cofactor_mode:1
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+PrivateKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C9
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C9-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C9:KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C9-PUBLIC
+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C9-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+
+Derive=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C9
+PeerKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C9-Peer-PUBLIC
+Ctrl=ecdh_cofactor_mode:1
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+PrivateKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C10
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C10-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C10:KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C10-PUBLIC
+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C10-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+
+Derive=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C10
+PeerKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C10-Peer-PUBLIC
+Ctrl=ecdh_cofactor_mode:1
+SharedSecret=1023478840e54775bfc69293a3cf97f5bc914726455c66538eb5623e218feef7df4befa23e09d77145ad577db32b41f9
+
+PrivateKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C11
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C11-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C11:KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C11-PUBLIC
+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C11-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+
+Derive=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C11
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+Ctrl=ecdh_cofactor_mode:1
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+PrivateKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C12
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C12-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C12:KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C12-PUBLIC
+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C12-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+
+Derive=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C12
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+Ctrl=ecdh_cofactor_mode:1
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+PrivateKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C13
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C13-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C13:KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C13-PUBLIC
+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C13-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+
+Derive=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C13
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+Ctrl=ecdh_cofactor_mode:1
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+PrivateKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C14
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C14-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C14:KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C14-PUBLIC
+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C14-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+
+Derive=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C14
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+Ctrl=ecdh_cofactor_mode:1
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+PrivateKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C15
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C15-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C15:KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C15-PUBLIC
+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C15-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
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+
+Derive=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C15
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+PrivateKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C16
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C16-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C16:KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C16-PUBLIC
+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C16-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+
+Derive=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C16
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+PrivateKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C17
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
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+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C17-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C17:KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C17-PUBLIC
+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C17-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+
+Derive=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C17
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+PrivateKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C18
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
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+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C18-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C18:KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C18-PUBLIC
+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C18-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+
+Derive=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C18
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+Ctrl=ecdh_cofactor_mode:1
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+PrivateKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C19
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C19-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C19:KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C19-PUBLIC
+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C19-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+
+Derive=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C19
+PeerKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C19-Peer-PUBLIC
+Ctrl=ecdh_cofactor_mode:1
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+
+PrivateKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C20
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C20-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C20:KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C20-PUBLIC
+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C20-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+
+Derive=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C20
+PeerKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C20-Peer-PUBLIC
+Ctrl=ecdh_cofactor_mode:1
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+
+PrivateKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C21
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C21-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C21:KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C21-PUBLIC
+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C21-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+
+Derive=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-384_C21
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
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+
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+
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+
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+PrivateKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-521_C24
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
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+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
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+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_P-521_C24:KAS-ECC-CDH_P-521_C24-PUBLIC
+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_P-521_C24-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
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+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
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+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+
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+
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
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+
+
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+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+
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+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
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+
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+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+
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+
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+
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+
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+
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+
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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
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+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-233_C17-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
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+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-233_C18-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
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+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-233_C19-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
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+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-233_C20-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_K-233_C20:KAS-ECC-CDH_K-233_C20-PUBLIC
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+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-233_C20-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
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+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_K-233_C21:KAS-ECC-CDH_K-233_C21-PUBLIC
+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-233_C21-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_K-233_C22:KAS-ECC-CDH_K-233_C22-PUBLIC
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+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-233_C22-Peer-PUBLIC
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+
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+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-283_C0-Peer-PUBLIC
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+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_K-283_C1:KAS-ECC-CDH_K-283_C1-PUBLIC
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+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-283_C1-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
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+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_K-283_C2:KAS-ECC-CDH_K-283_C2-PUBLIC
+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-283_C2-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+
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+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_K-283_C3:KAS-ECC-CDH_K-283_C3-PUBLIC
+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-283_C3-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+
+Derive=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-283_C3
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+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
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+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_K-283_C4:KAS-ECC-CDH_K-283_C4-PUBLIC
+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-283_C4-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
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+
+Derive=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-283_C4
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+PrivateKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-283_C5
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
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+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-283_C5-PUBLIC
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
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+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_K-283_C5:KAS-ECC-CDH_K-283_C5-PUBLIC
+
+
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+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+
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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
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+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-283_C6-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
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+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-283_C7-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+
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+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+
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+
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+
+
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+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_K-283_C17:KAS-ECC-CDH_K-283_C17-PUBLIC
+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-283_C17-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+PrivateKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-283_C18
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-283_C18-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_K-283_C18:KAS-ECC-CDH_K-283_C18-PUBLIC
+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-283_C18-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+
+Derive=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-283_C18
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+Ctrl=ecdh_cofactor_mode:1
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+PrivateKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-283_C19
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-283_C19-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_K-283_C19:KAS-ECC-CDH_K-283_C19-PUBLIC
+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-283_C19-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+
+Derive=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-283_C19
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+Ctrl=ecdh_cofactor_mode:1
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+PrivateKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-283_C20
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-283_C20-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_K-283_C20:KAS-ECC-CDH_K-283_C20-PUBLIC
+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-283_C20-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+
+Derive=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-283_C20
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+Ctrl=ecdh_cofactor_mode:1
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+PrivateKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-283_C21
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-283_C21-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_K-283_C21:KAS-ECC-CDH_K-283_C21-PUBLIC
+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-283_C21-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+
+Derive=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-283_C21
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+Ctrl=ecdh_cofactor_mode:1
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+PrivateKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-283_C22
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-283_C22-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_K-283_C22:KAS-ECC-CDH_K-283_C22-PUBLIC
+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-283_C22-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+
+Derive=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-283_C22
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+PrivateKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-283_C23
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
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+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-283_C23-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_K-283_C23:KAS-ECC-CDH_K-283_C23-PUBLIC
+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-283_C23-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+
+Derive=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-283_C23
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+PrivateKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-283_C24
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
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+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-283_C24-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_K-283_C24:KAS-ECC-CDH_K-283_C24-PUBLIC
+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-283_C24-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
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+
+Derive=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-283_C24
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+PrivateKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-409_C0
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
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+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-409_C0-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_K-409_C0:KAS-ECC-CDH_K-409_C0-PUBLIC
+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-409_C0-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+
+Derive=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-409_C0
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+PrivateKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-409_C1
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
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+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-409_C1-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_K-409_C1:KAS-ECC-CDH_K-409_C1-PUBLIC
+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-409_C1-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+
+Derive=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-409_C1
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+Ctrl=ecdh_cofactor_mode:1
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+PrivateKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-409_C2
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-409_C2-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_K-409_C2:KAS-ECC-CDH_K-409_C2-PUBLIC
+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-409_C2-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+
+Derive=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-409_C2
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+Ctrl=ecdh_cofactor_mode:1
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+PrivateKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-409_C3
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-409_C3-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_K-409_C3:KAS-ECC-CDH_K-409_C3-PUBLIC
+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-409_C3-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+
+Derive=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-409_C3
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+Ctrl=ecdh_cofactor_mode:1
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+PrivateKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-409_C4
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-409_C4-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
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+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-409_C4-Peer-PUBLIC
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+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-409_C5-Peer-PUBLIC
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+
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+
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+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-409_C12-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-409_C13-Peer-PUBLIC
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+
+
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+Derive=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-409_C14
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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
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+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-409_C15-Peer-PUBLIC
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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
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+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_K-409_C16:KAS-ECC-CDH_K-409_C16-PUBLIC
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+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-409_C16-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
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+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_K-409_C17:KAS-ECC-CDH_K-409_C17-PUBLIC
+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-409_C17-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_K-409_C18:KAS-ECC-CDH_K-409_C18-PUBLIC
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+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-409_C18-Peer-PUBLIC
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+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-409_C19-Peer-PUBLIC
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+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-409_C20-Peer-PUBLIC
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+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-409_C21-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
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+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_K-409_C22:KAS-ECC-CDH_K-409_C22-PUBLIC
+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-409_C22-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+
+Derive=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-409_C22
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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
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+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_K-409_C23:KAS-ECC-CDH_K-409_C23-PUBLIC
+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-409_C23-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
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+
+Derive=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-409_C23
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+PrivateKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-409_C24
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-409_C24-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
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+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_K-409_C24:KAS-ECC-CDH_K-409_C24-PUBLIC
+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-409_C24-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
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+
+Derive=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-409_C24
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+PrivateKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_K-571_C0
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+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
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+
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+
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+
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+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
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+
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+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
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+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
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+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_B-233_C6-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
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+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
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+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_B-233_C7-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
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+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
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+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_B-233_C8:KAS-ECC-CDH_B-233_C8-PUBLIC
+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_B-233_C8-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
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+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
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+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_B-233_C9-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_B-233_C10-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
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+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_B-233_C11:KAS-ECC-CDH_B-233_C11-PUBLIC
+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_B-233_C11-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
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+
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+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
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+
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+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+
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+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+
+
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+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
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+
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
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+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_B-233_C16:KAS-ECC-CDH_B-233_C16-PUBLIC
+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_B-233_C16-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
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+
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+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
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+
+
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+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
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+
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+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
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+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_B-233_C18:KAS-ECC-CDH_B-233_C18-PUBLIC
+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_B-233_C18-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
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+
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+PrivateKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_B-233_C19
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
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+PrivateKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_B-283_C20
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_B-283_C20-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
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+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_B-283_C20:KAS-ECC-CDH_B-283_C20-PUBLIC
+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_B-283_C20-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+
+Derive=KAS-ECC-CDH_B-283_C20
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+PrivateKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_B-283_C21
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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
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+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_B-283_C21:KAS-ECC-CDH_B-283_C21-PUBLIC
+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_B-283_C21-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+PrivateKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_B-283_C22
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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
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+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_B-283_C22-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+
+Derive=KAS-ECC-CDH_B-283_C22
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+PrivateKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_B-283_C23
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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
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+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_B-283_C23:KAS-ECC-CDH_B-283_C23-PUBLIC
+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_B-283_C23-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+Derive=KAS-ECC-CDH_B-283_C23
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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
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+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_B-283_C24-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_B-283_C24:KAS-ECC-CDH_B-283_C24-PUBLIC
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+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_B-283_C24-Peer-PUBLIC
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+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_B-409_C0:KAS-ECC-CDH_B-409_C0-PUBLIC
+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_B-409_C0-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
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+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_B-409_C1:KAS-ECC-CDH_B-409_C1-PUBLIC
+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_B-409_C1-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
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+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_B-409_C2:KAS-ECC-CDH_B-409_C2-PUBLIC
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+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_B-409_C2-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
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+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_B-409_C3:KAS-ECC-CDH_B-409_C3-PUBLIC
+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_B-409_C3-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
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+
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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
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+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_B-409_C4-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
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+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_B-409_C4:KAS-ECC-CDH_B-409_C4-PUBLIC
+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_B-409_C4-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
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+
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+PrivateKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_B-409_C5
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
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+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
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+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_B-409_C5:KAS-ECC-CDH_B-409_C5-PUBLIC
+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_B-409_C5-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+
+Derive=KAS-ECC-CDH_B-409_C5
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+PrivateKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_B-409_C6
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+
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+
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+
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+hon41flvZS4BTg3ooYGVA4GSAAQEYI3AUSvFXHNM1WKsWCX3yji3k/js6bmBzBxA
+Mt3YA5Fk0MZGtCsv1FO1odOnSuI8MsfVhAB948004zEhuQ+rOtpmIbOsl4UGqp/7
+/WXFCTcIRnB2dKxyPawkpvM6Hgu834skujLPe97I/ckjO3V7wHPWTe30hMb6Ae8o
+6HT7DTT1iw4ysYZFwwvctRbuOEE=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_B-571_C18-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MIGnMBAGByqGSM49AgEGBSuBBAAnA4GSAAQEYI3AUSvFXHNM1WKsWCX3yji3k/js
+6bmBzBxAMt3YA5Fk0MZGtCsv1FO1odOnSuI8MsfVhAB948004zEhuQ+rOtpmIbOs
+l4UGqp/7/WXFCTcIRnB2dKxyPawkpvM6Hgu834skujLPe97I/ckjO3V7wHPWTe30
+hMb6Ae8o6HT7DTT1iw4ysYZFwwvctRbuOEE=
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_B-571_C18:KAS-ECC-CDH_B-571_C18-PUBLIC
+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_B-571_C18-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MIGnMBAGByqGSM49AgEGBSuBBAAnA4GSAAQCza8TmgzaKADWESj/5NcyOzSg/PSM
+lABHn/TIKRy/RvFsQeRAmq7fFLxgpkKy17qs3o4AUd2K4Bv1rS5uZJDHfNQGqZnF
+ZeYHjt0p22o7h6EVBbV8VD/7dGpbQPuD1yBhgPOun8siLFQRp3R2Zgx7MRtkYxCQ
+WImpWg8v3DXTD8YcxVYKKRQjLWKtNjhrkXk=
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+
+Derive=KAS-ECC-CDH_B-571_C18
+PeerKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_B-571_C18-Peer-PUBLIC
+Ctrl=ecdh_cofactor_mode:1
+SharedSecret=07a47bdc7d54ecd391672f131b3214d0efc4d40195db1ec993a62fe9da875efff5403bd708fa491a01a94f4bddc7d516baffff9fbdd213ca1a4905f9aa679d65da25c0f1fd2afb0a
+
+PrivateKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_B-571_C19
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIIBAAIBADAQBgcqhkjOPQIBBgUrgQQAJwSB6DCB5QIBAQRIAGuo8SzG4OeN+Mxi
+mISKdAAl5yxi0JnpJYSsdvWVrB/HJMsGqFoH8NRED6893qLyZfIBXdBZoWoDopkV
+uHMdYEUSzu8iuEHzoYGVA4GSAAQGNvQ16AYAZmEIc3MAdzqO1v+o6/gwfIH/X0Q1
+PpG60IYzG4/v8/HNuG4GG95fccX7k48RfiImqX0rZrCY6f9SUYLIFucCxqkBwb2K
++uapQQj8LHVdXeP6Kks0cfwqXN9K3aaFKb8YD/KNsVSrQxEkezkuk6M1u+h5Zgi7
+1gE/Q83MhG7CImdCPDz9os6KPZY=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_B-571_C19-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MIGnMBAGByqGSM49AgEGBSuBBAAnA4GSAAQGNvQ16AYAZmEIc3MAdzqO1v+o6/gw
+fIH/X0Q1PpG60IYzG4/v8/HNuG4GG95fccX7k48RfiImqX0rZrCY6f9SUYLIFucC
+xqkBwb2K+uapQQj8LHVdXeP6Kks0cfwqXN9K3aaFKb8YD/KNsVSrQxEkezkuk6M1
+u+h5Zgi71gE/Q83MhG7CImdCPDz9os6KPZY=
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_B-571_C19:KAS-ECC-CDH_B-571_C19-PUBLIC
+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_B-571_C19-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MIGnMBAGByqGSM49AgEGBSuBBAAnA4GSAAQABRUS5KDbxTXJe+EP+nQldYOCiDBA
+RmYB1TkbyzWCwRUlKTJJ8kSXzIByFrNMksHgdXgcg5HD9tPRT4ih1Q6p/HX/jVHM
++TMDnaRsrIZqs0dhesWotPFlcDTjuN22a8QnPi4c4BZB7OY2l53oskktxp6IU3w2
+scOtDTUif4Z+Q9+ciRfc6fjB7zujy1youlI=
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+
+Derive=KAS-ECC-CDH_B-571_C19
+PeerKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_B-571_C19-Peer-PUBLIC
+Ctrl=ecdh_cofactor_mode:1
+SharedSecret=07326196a7decc92c81ae5a0779c9a42f53d94cfa4c3a13f19dbb554138e0e864eee6bc93e39214e2f74705a4b172aab510444c93b5b3e62517bbb7279337102db1c61de349d9747
+
+PrivateKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_B-571_C20
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIIBAAIBADAQBgcqhkjOPQIBBgUrgQQAJwSB6DCB5QIBAQRIAQcW8ud08n9C3j9s
+lpTY7KIXmCMJHSAvK6FikZOhyYcAaTOY/8gxV/fOSFjnU145kNIZvCSd4WRVjKyA
+fuFZd4oBLaGeUBK/oYGVA4GSAAQBULOt3hYqfwk1Daz0YEGf6GuZ3NlPRCg/uj5D
+0oG5O7VCgoEs5SJlqUg4lo1nqdbs3BtstkzxWUUhxHSepD2OTsBF5kX/I4sHtDMh
+thGLh8Rse1IojfXdHPfaYYPs5WM7TBfK42LYIRkffVeSOSgzmq332F9/Gd6UhnCe
+TS3e9CxVu012o8tQytKgmOrVlSo=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_B-571_C20-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MIGnMBAGByqGSM49AgEGBSuBBAAnA4GSAAQBULOt3hYqfwk1Daz0YEGf6GuZ3NlP
+RCg/uj5D0oG5O7VCgoEs5SJlqUg4lo1nqdbs3BtstkzxWUUhxHSepD2OTsBF5kX/
+I4sHtDMhthGLh8Rse1IojfXdHPfaYYPs5WM7TBfK42LYIRkffVeSOSgzmq332F9/
+Gd6UhnCeTS3e9CxVu012o8tQytKgmOrVlSo=
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_B-571_C20:KAS-ECC-CDH_B-571_C20-PUBLIC
+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_B-571_C20-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MIGnMBAGByqGSM49AgEGBSuBBAAnA4GSAAQATC3lZCQxvMbrgu/UNVVAqLXSOxKw
+330xrWlCW5RUmHdEPujdfAnPu+2G8TZlkx1LKiF1nDPhC0rPxjuh72GsqqGMlOPP
+yTMBdlt6N+uAbUMZbSkx2hoZU3QtPg2nzLZ+Df26XgNJFMzj7mOTv95AZw9AYZYG
+faiyk8aENZPdIhyJv5eWNna9BE6MirjnF60=
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+
+Derive=KAS-ECC-CDH_B-571_C20
+PeerKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_B-571_C20-Peer-PUBLIC
+Ctrl=ecdh_cofactor_mode:1
+SharedSecret=059052d3e1c66efa4b7dd39e74299e886367d8fe49d7cab90e4f051bec10316438fb29b1290dfdaec169decd622a1010cf0a0275008814f4861b4d83ba78515a8768d978be430011
+
+PrivateKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_B-571_C21
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIIBAAIBADAQBgcqhkjOPQIBBgUrgQQAJwSB6DCB5QIBAQRIAdAQP8eUivEH5R9N
+LMA5K2aAgFnR8my6Bb5qOB9SLUy4VBN5NKzNHOozYJSOQG0xCMlDdp3HALTJzAzB
+2EurWKNeJ+skBHXwoYGVA4GSAAQBK9qN7T7X6LbTm1hVpY1yW2XjhXwqZ0mW6zk6
+Pj+RWVu/qHJTpW66wrEO1Aavnb/1OyImX761p2nKzitgtF2/l87tKwoE21ACZFSC
+fv4psySuPy1MDco6OpVJFRHFMWRaz1RbRe9qxKUMCdPSHyE8p2uW+xgkLsvgivaH
+Vd5OEHcXNHWCbqq+0mp1w2nNew8=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_B-571_C21-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MIGnMBAGByqGSM49AgEGBSuBBAAnA4GSAAQBK9qN7T7X6LbTm1hVpY1yW2XjhXwq
+Z0mW6zk6Pj+RWVu/qHJTpW66wrEO1Aavnb/1OyImX761p2nKzitgtF2/l87tKwoE
+21ACZFSCfv4psySuPy1MDco6OpVJFRHFMWRaz1RbRe9qxKUMCdPSHyE8p2uW+xgk
+LsvgivaHVd5OEHcXNHWCbqq+0mp1w2nNew8=
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_B-571_C21:KAS-ECC-CDH_B-571_C21-PUBLIC
+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_B-571_C21-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MIGnMBAGByqGSM49AgEGBSuBBAAnA4GSAAQCUDig5yrowW424+O1BO1zQe9wm5/s
+i+kBdzRtdsp7xxM9DsKArPBmAFxcwQtSqmVDNf6CCmYX5WDicJA/8cLMivE5jyTf
+4rADEHTKOTGAGmrLdltukUQXLtgdmZ7Z6DW9NVJrA+8qE/eDdgMrDrgUbCMTI2X8
+4Xany9ykSzWqN5hZ9oisJtxkyBSaQyLQg9E=
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+
+Derive=KAS-ECC-CDH_B-571_C21
+PeerKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_B-571_C21-Peer-PUBLIC
+Ctrl=ecdh_cofactor_mode:1
+SharedSecret=03acfa4b3d1c2a6b62af23bdff6a215a416d4437ce6cc114d17dc4201195987a5d7301da11b913254702d7172e31d64e59b24deaa3270f20445e51dc484f7a2b8c3cbeb0bb9efb28
+
+PrivateKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_B-571_C22
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIIBAAIBADAQBgcqhkjOPQIBBgUrgQQAJwSB6DCB5QIBAQRIAy0vVX/ke40oD2gu
+JP2mJ916WOmwCCKjqvbregFPR2wXlBrcXiI4owgNcG8eFqRRt+kpQneZMMVnCkcy
+gcrHi4WNHxzJmwr/oYGVA4GSAAQEDzEw50scjrJl58TmkhQR65cUGCZ+jeqHnC6L
+Vjhk8jphsjQiyaBvoXiooVXj54RXWXWH8+NbefGdDC4YWu9G25WBnL4SexAByR0n
+wq5xE+sDvpjpTTrW3seR+sL+DSyMmLcTcbBYpkn6nD+jzNu6kyOVwnr/og2VrAQb
+yZeOP1MIKaLGTImxvM6sBoVPuQM=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_B-571_C22-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MIGnMBAGByqGSM49AgEGBSuBBAAnA4GSAAQEDzEw50scjrJl58TmkhQR65cUGCZ+
+jeqHnC6LVjhk8jphsjQiyaBvoXiooVXj54RXWXWH8+NbefGdDC4YWu9G25WBnL4S
+exAByR0nwq5xE+sDvpjpTTrW3seR+sL+DSyMmLcTcbBYpkn6nD+jzNu6kyOVwnr/
+og2VrAQbyZeOP1MIKaLGTImxvM6sBoVPuQM=
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_B-571_C22:KAS-ECC-CDH_B-571_C22-PUBLIC
+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_B-571_C22-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MIGnMBAGByqGSM49AgEGBSuBBAAnA4GSAAQBvf/9acLgj7A8hT7y69CI5o0jP9uV
+8LJG3nlV1hUHff0LD/AsZNAd55M1kJa4XgV7G3+fWSYtwnV/GCQ+GC4aC/6dy7An
+1osCGL59lWAp8TnBnS2jRnc7FtevyFirjctg1+SErs7DCcs/6pavOQNjfl2022eL
+tdubCxjYPPnrwbGq8k9DZ+xTNoTOnVZYLUM=
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+
+Derive=KAS-ECC-CDH_B-571_C22
+PeerKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_B-571_C22-Peer-PUBLIC
+Ctrl=ecdh_cofactor_mode:1
+SharedSecret=067a58e5b3287bb9aa83ed9ca2d718cf7165fb574b6a446c3019849cd1584673d561b574bc8f68419437c5e8113e060847cad3b5ddc2f67ad75bc1e3f04554e63a5e4945cfcb65f5
+
+PrivateKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_B-571_C23
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIIBAAIBADAQBgcqhkjOPQIBBgUrgQQAJwSB6DCB5QIBAQRIA+7ikZaovnDrOjEE
+ZAWcwMTELxNIerGgdiwsvjBOvmNQPmxwaKf0vBl/gfZbQpXBSyEPPLI3i2dAH89S
+vsAsE7YbbeFOG35boYGVA4GSAAQBd6zF/p9C9N4tJ6ub9vfg6s4wPCZv+LNGkIKr
+qTZ+ZkQL1rG9i24a7JK2XjWuqPAH8J1M1n7qXWAAc2yru53MyUPrtWVqBYYHFvGJ
+jiqMJzGd56JpjyHV3likuLjdArXkMxENOXf+6OxcCJ0XCvAqStPB+rRLDR4qO+up
+4HGc2L+DZEeNaGxONfdFfSTQIdY=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_B-571_C23-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MIGnMBAGByqGSM49AgEGBSuBBAAnA4GSAAQBd6zF/p9C9N4tJ6ub9vfg6s4wPCZv
++LNGkIKrqTZ+ZkQL1rG9i24a7JK2XjWuqPAH8J1M1n7qXWAAc2yru53MyUPrtWVq
+BYYHFvGJjiqMJzGd56JpjyHV3likuLjdArXkMxENOXf+6OxcCJ0XCvAqStPB+rRL
+DR4qO+up4HGc2L+DZEeNaGxONfdFfSTQIdY=
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_B-571_C23:KAS-ECC-CDH_B-571_C23-PUBLIC
+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_B-571_C23-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MIGnMBAGByqGSM49AgEGBSuBBAAnA4GSAAQAj8O0FPNBK0A/AcJTvSImFQIl3aqz
+TSAQifSdeeXcwuO2ghb6pm2sRFKcf+O6TSjYFbCII1lVcTu3chODUztdlCIbTtHh
+YrgCsyIB3icrGzK2pqWOoiQRxI9dxc8PlYcuZ1HtYizuzqIqVWl13mADhpriCvOb
+QrqIcXicgujzrTz2AG9DvEx9QQIDLEP495c=
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+
+Derive=KAS-ECC-CDH_B-571_C23
+PeerKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_B-571_C23-Peer-PUBLIC
+Ctrl=ecdh_cofactor_mode:1
+SharedSecret=06b272ca3330c0cdfbe60a1746bc0ddea6257536cdd8e976f2517eb541460a3f0e6ea7fec2b495e0f57712c8cac35e8a7d64d876c29851bbfeb6fe726d57e0be43dc76a584ef9c93
+
+PrivateKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_B-571_C24
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIIBAAIBADAQBgcqhkjOPQIBBgUrgQQAJwSB6DCB5QIBAQRIAWmi2HWGlEwxc7+a
+InXjCAAD22SMLR4cVuLDfODXzZ+Bjqa3u6ND93TvDzNOpcEu8L51k9BO2UVFjXHh
+cRLrAdkEHSEzsTRzoYGVA4GSAAQFHlIXZCZa9/AbzZw/0CLf2y1KLFizsj0uVQMC
+xCqt1X0d9vwY5GW9mEQkle7SLz/WcAKEyfp4M7UWUUm44akeDgmaClcy1cIBmOfn
+0JTiB1KMWDhl0mKpGPwqOSYelcB9y9BE79OYGJkHivPrlzmCAaRlDw3Mvxn5Isjb
+w4Ob9r4AU/hFMccYQ6nmoQKrWNY=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_B-571_C24-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MIGnMBAGByqGSM49AgEGBSuBBAAnA4GSAAQFHlIXZCZa9/AbzZw/0CLf2y1KLFiz
+sj0uVQMCxCqt1X0d9vwY5GW9mEQkle7SLz/WcAKEyfp4M7UWUUm44akeDgmaClcy
+1cIBmOfn0JTiB1KMWDhl0mKpGPwqOSYelcB9y9BE79OYGJkHivPrlzmCAaRlDw3M
+vxn5Isjbw4Ob9r4AU/hFMccYQ6nmoQKrWNY=
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = KAS-ECC-CDH_B-571_C24:KAS-ECC-CDH_B-571_C24-PUBLIC
+
+
+PublicKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_B-571_C24-Peer-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MIGnMBAGByqGSM49AgEGBSuBBAAnA4GSAAQFZagplNfm9T7ra/Z1I+5oD/t3ARhn
+PD4VwyAObI0fJsq68AwdpI5jdDFkl8ul8Z8XQg8mdjP0DlsGNieJv/Ea31ltWxz3
+aO8Bay1Nqsqca+2XayBk71Q1KliuNDZ4NaYhDhV4KRwd6NZ8ILw9b/piDIezCYor
+nzq7jSys1bLuK2g5nqxOj2XOvdZjAP0Em1s=
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+
+Derive=KAS-ECC-CDH_B-571_C24
+PeerKey=KAS-ECC-CDH_B-571_C24-Peer-PUBLIC
+Ctrl=ecdh_cofactor_mode:1
+SharedSecret=02da266a269bdc8d8b2a0c6bb5762f102fc801c8d5394a9271539136bd81d4b69cfbb7525cd0a983fb7f7e9deec583b8f8e574c6184b2d79831ec770649e484dc006fa35b0bffd0b
+
+
+# Test mismatches
+PrivPubKeyPair = Alice-25519:Bob-25519-PUBLIC
+Result = KEYPAIR_MISMATCH
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = Bob-25519:Alice-25519-PUBLIC
+Result = KEYPAIR_MISMATCH
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = Alice-25519:P-256-PUBLIC
+Result = KEYPAIR_TYPE_MISMATCH
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = RSA-2048:P-256-PUBLIC
+Result = KEYPAIR_TYPE_MISMATCH
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = RSA-2048:KAS-ECC-CDH_K-163_C0-PUBLIC
+Result = KEYPAIR_TYPE_MISMATCH
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = Alice-25519:KAS-ECC-CDH_K-163_C0-PUBLIC
+Result = KEYPAIR_TYPE_MISMATCH
+
+PrivateKey = RSA-2048-BIS
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey = RSA-2048-BIS-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAsrRB4OKs3ga6rtYWkn9M
+TrbUHsm7q0SguDeCiSG7UG6KGEujOwvZr13c+LwOz7YF0ui+IA0x9gaWuar2wGEO
+wm5rLJpHIjf26sTKnnLLjePbjERdmMuNFGAir/sL+nxmwrK3Mw3OZH0btl8yh3sA
+ChfRGWJCizXy40/o0AKIHX5p0oQ0D1rrO7fvUW7mT64P4s/7q0Bn0xGq1vMhZeoy
+XfPHIwEqxggsUwi9gS7opi60mrhfzWvStSZsbLfpalyoX+GGLX+QEYAwZ6Dn2Zdu
+LbPbcAVw+oY34VYd8DjyS9/hCjjkQXJR4sUOOysfXq5m+oUA79AMkaF8qeicu4JC
+8QIDAQAB
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = RSA-2048-BIS:RSA-2048-BIS-PUBLIC
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = RSA-2048-BIS:RSA-2048-PUBLIC
+Result = KEYPAIR_MISMATCH
+
+PrivateKey = DSA-1024-BIS
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIIBSwIBADCCASwGByqGSM44BAEwggEfAoGBAO0SwRpkAeM21qSM5ch4CLEHpFk419R5ve1UUr42
+1y3HEUURsrVpxYKvyx8aOBQC/akz95cYxNN3y1JnJJMxPklhdJrJf/WDYPxjMk8BqNJmeZtLuCVL
+KGwQomuo7ZkG955WRyLHYEdQ6uC7K2QTPKpW6psFYFaDYjAjSEKk2MFxAhUAykDkKLZdhPWzwM8/
+qYaE31VmWz0CgYEApNVF8oFK41ezQci9XbSZJHyPB+3jML1YQkHxiiInaIz6GEFtjUbIUEYA/ovY
++6ECNI1aIDHTd7CHwoS0mp33oQYs43nt29B6UwbtMmbzCOQ9vGGwWVho+JtHyyPWrDuLmkvLtoQP
+axYt6PVa3gncr2v3njcVuH+EQ6DuFR93zksEFgIUFQFshP0hj7i6ClXkSPYoFW6KrIY=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+PublicKey = DSA-1024-BIS-PUBLIC
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MIIBtzCCASwGByqGSM44BAEwggEfAoGBAO0SwRpkAeM21qSM5ch4CLEHpFk419R5
+ve1UUr421y3HEUURsrVpxYKvyx8aOBQC/akz95cYxNN3y1JnJJMxPklhdJrJf/WD
+YPxjMk8BqNJmeZtLuCVLKGwQomuo7ZkG955WRyLHYEdQ6uC7K2QTPKpW6psFYFaD
+YjAjSEKk2MFxAhUAykDkKLZdhPWzwM8/qYaE31VmWz0CgYEApNVF8oFK41ezQci9
+XbSZJHyPB+3jML1YQkHxiiInaIz6GEFtjUbIUEYA/ovY+6ECNI1aIDHTd7CHwoS0
+mp33oQYs43nt29B6UwbtMmbzCOQ9vGGwWVho+JtHyyPWrDuLmkvLtoQPaxYt6PVa
+3gncr2v3njcVuH+EQ6DuFR93zksDgYQAAoGAdZCPYZ9WvtKW7dFvbEjl0HHBxLNX
+8kV1/FAxsDrQd+c8mWdruNzcmwsZJklJuTK9czKnXgLmkRHR20I4oNrJ/bptV8lV
+iDvJBJlmZ1aGh6yLIHzYBbgbgia3lBrFlO5qUxNmbNeiC+HIqUvlVBmQOLN6+Xjn
+Q4A0wDK8dmF2dFI=
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = DSA-1024-BIS:DSA-1024-BIS-PUBLIC
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = DSA-1024:DSA-1024-BIS-PUBLIC
+Result = KEYPAIR_MISMATCH
+
+PrivPubKeyPair = DSA-1024-BIS:DSA-1024-PUBLIC
+Result = KEYPAIR_MISMATCH
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/exdatatest.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/exdatatest.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7998622
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/exdatatest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,234 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2015-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+
+static long saved_argl;
+static void *saved_argp;
+static int saved_idx;
+static int saved_idx2;
+
+/*
+ * SIMPLE EX_DATA IMPLEMENTATION
+ * Apps explicitly set/get ex_data as needed
+ */
+
+static void exnew(void *parent, void *ptr, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad,
+          int idx, long argl, void *argp)
+{
+    OPENSSL_assert(idx == saved_idx);
+    OPENSSL_assert(argl == saved_argl);
+    OPENSSL_assert(argp == saved_argp);
+    OPENSSL_assert(ptr == NULL);
+}
+
+static int exdup(CRYPTO_EX_DATA *to, const CRYPTO_EX_DATA *from,
+          void *from_d, int idx, long argl, void *argp)
+{
+    OPENSSL_assert(idx == saved_idx);
+    OPENSSL_assert(argl == saved_argl);
+    OPENSSL_assert(argp == saved_argp);
+    OPENSSL_assert(from_d != NULL);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static void exfree(void *parent, void *ptr, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad,
+            int idx, long argl, void *argp)
+{
+    OPENSSL_assert(idx == saved_idx);
+    OPENSSL_assert(argl == saved_argl);
+    OPENSSL_assert(argp == saved_argp);
+}
+
+/*
+ * PRE-ALLOCATED EX_DATA IMPLEMENTATION
+ * Extended data structure is allocated in exnew2/freed in exfree2
+ * Data is stored inside extended data structure
+ */
+
+typedef struct myobj_ex_data_st {
+    char *hello;
+    int new;
+    int dup;
+} MYOBJ_EX_DATA;
+
+static void exnew2(void *parent, void *ptr, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad,
+          int idx, long argl, void *argp)
+{
+    int ret;
+    MYOBJ_EX_DATA *ex_data;
+
+    OPENSSL_assert(idx == saved_idx2);
+    OPENSSL_assert(argl == saved_argl);
+    OPENSSL_assert(argp == saved_argp);
+    OPENSSL_assert(ptr == NULL);
+
+    ex_data = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ex_data));
+    OPENSSL_assert(ex_data != NULL);
+    ret = CRYPTO_set_ex_data(ad, saved_idx2, ex_data);
+    OPENSSL_assert(ret);
+
+    ex_data->new = 1;
+}
+
+static int exdup2(CRYPTO_EX_DATA *to, const CRYPTO_EX_DATA *from,
+          void *from_d, int idx, long argl, void *argp)
+{
+    MYOBJ_EX_DATA **update_ex_data = (MYOBJ_EX_DATA**)from_d;
+    MYOBJ_EX_DATA *ex_data = CRYPTO_get_ex_data(to, saved_idx2);
+
+    OPENSSL_assert(idx == saved_idx2);
+    OPENSSL_assert(argl == saved_argl);
+    OPENSSL_assert(argp == saved_argp);
+    OPENSSL_assert(from_d != NULL);
+    OPENSSL_assert(*update_ex_data != NULL);
+    OPENSSL_assert(ex_data != NULL);
+    OPENSSL_assert(ex_data->new);
+
+    /* Copy hello over */
+    ex_data->hello = (*update_ex_data)->hello;
+    /* indicate this is a dup */
+    ex_data->dup = 1;
+    /* Keep my original ex_data */
+    *update_ex_data = ex_data;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static void exfree2(void *parent, void *ptr, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad,
+            int idx, long argl, void *argp)
+{
+    MYOBJ_EX_DATA *ex_data = CRYPTO_get_ex_data(ad, saved_idx2);
+    int ret;
+
+    OPENSSL_assert(ex_data != NULL);
+    OPENSSL_free(ex_data);
+    OPENSSL_assert(idx == saved_idx2);
+    OPENSSL_assert(argl == saved_argl);
+    OPENSSL_assert(argp == saved_argp);
+    ret = CRYPTO_set_ex_data(ad, saved_idx2, NULL);
+    OPENSSL_assert(ret);
+}
+
+typedef struct myobj_st {
+    CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data;
+    int id;
+    int st;
+} MYOBJ;
+
+static MYOBJ *MYOBJ_new()
+{
+    static int count = 0;
+    MYOBJ *obj = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*obj));
+
+    obj->id = ++count;
+    obj->st = CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_APP, obj, &obj->ex_data);
+    OPENSSL_assert(obj->st != 0);
+    return obj;
+}
+
+static void MYOBJ_sethello(MYOBJ *obj, char *cp)
+{
+    obj->st = CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&obj->ex_data, saved_idx, cp);
+    OPENSSL_assert(obj->st != 0);
+}
+
+static char *MYOBJ_gethello(MYOBJ *obj)
+{
+    return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&obj->ex_data, saved_idx);
+}
+
+static void MYOBJ_sethello2(MYOBJ *obj, char *cp)
+{
+    MYOBJ_EX_DATA* ex_data = CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&obj->ex_data, saved_idx2);
+    if (ex_data != NULL)
+        ex_data->hello = cp;
+    else
+        obj->st = 0;
+}
+
+static char *MYOBJ_gethello2(MYOBJ *obj)
+{
+    MYOBJ_EX_DATA* ex_data = CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&obj->ex_data, saved_idx2);
+    if (ex_data != NULL)
+        return ex_data->hello;
+
+    obj->st = 0;
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+static void MYOBJ_free(MYOBJ *obj)
+{
+    CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_APP, obj, &obj->ex_data);
+    OPENSSL_free(obj);
+}
+
+static MYOBJ *MYOBJ_dup(MYOBJ *in)
+{
+    MYOBJ *obj = MYOBJ_new();
+
+    obj->st = CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_APP, &obj->ex_data,
+                                 &in->ex_data);
+    OPENSSL_assert(obj->st != 0);
+    return obj;
+}
+
+int main()
+{
+    MYOBJ *t1, *t2, *t3;
+    MYOBJ_EX_DATA *ex_data;
+    const char *cp;
+    char *p;
+
+    p = OPENSSL_strdup("hello world");
+    saved_argl = 21;
+    saved_argp = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
+    saved_idx = CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_APP,
+                                        saved_argl, saved_argp,
+                                        exnew, exdup, exfree);
+    saved_idx2 = CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_APP,
+                                         saved_argl, saved_argp,
+                                         exnew2, exdup2, exfree2);
+    t1 = MYOBJ_new();
+    t2 = MYOBJ_new();
+    OPENSSL_assert(t1->st && t2->st);
+    ex_data = CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&t1->ex_data, saved_idx2);
+    OPENSSL_assert(ex_data != NULL);
+    ex_data = CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&t2->ex_data, saved_idx2);
+    OPENSSL_assert(ex_data != NULL);
+    MYOBJ_sethello(t1, p);
+    cp = MYOBJ_gethello(t1);
+    OPENSSL_assert(cp == p);
+    cp = MYOBJ_gethello(t2);
+    OPENSSL_assert(cp == NULL);
+    MYOBJ_sethello2(t1, p);
+    cp = MYOBJ_gethello2(t1);
+    OPENSSL_assert(cp == p);
+    OPENSSL_assert(t1->st);
+    cp = MYOBJ_gethello2(t2);
+    OPENSSL_assert(cp == NULL);
+    OPENSSL_assert(t2->st);
+    t3 = MYOBJ_dup(t1);
+    ex_data = CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&t3->ex_data, saved_idx2);
+    OPENSSL_assert(ex_data != NULL);
+    OPENSSL_assert(ex_data->dup);
+    cp = MYOBJ_gethello(t3);
+    OPENSSL_assert(cp == p);
+    cp = MYOBJ_gethello2(t3);
+    OPENSSL_assert(cp == p);
+    OPENSSL_assert(t3->st);
+    MYOBJ_free(t1);
+    MYOBJ_free(t2);
+    MYOBJ_free(t3);
+    OPENSSL_free(saved_argp);
+    OPENSSL_free(p);
+    return 0;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/exptest.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/exptest.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9bc6e75
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/exptest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,270 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "../e_os.h"
+
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+#define NUM_BITS        (BN_BITS2 * 4)
+
+static const char rnd_seed[] =
+    "string to make the random number generator think it has entropy";
+
+/*
+ * Test that r == 0 in test_exp_mod_zero(). Returns one on success,
+ * returns zero and prints debug output otherwise.
+ */
+static int a_is_zero_mod_one(const char *method, const BIGNUM *r,
+                             const BIGNUM *a) {
+    if (!BN_is_zero(r)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "%s failed:\n", method);
+        fprintf(stderr, "a ** 0 mod 1 = r (should be 0)\n");
+        fprintf(stderr, "a = ");
+        BN_print_fp(stderr, a);
+        fprintf(stderr, "\nr = ");
+        BN_print_fp(stderr, r);
+        fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * test_exp_mod_zero tests that x**0 mod 1 == 0. It returns zero on success.
+ */
+static int test_exp_mod_zero()
+{
+    BIGNUM *a = NULL, *p = NULL, *m = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *r = NULL;
+    BN_ULONG one_word = 1;
+    BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+    int ret = 1, failed = 0;
+
+    m = BN_new();
+    if (!m)
+        goto err;
+    BN_one(m);
+
+    a = BN_new();
+    if (!a)
+        goto err;
+    BN_one(a);
+
+    p = BN_new();
+    if (!p)
+        goto err;
+    BN_zero(p);
+
+    r = BN_new();
+    if (!r)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!BN_rand(a, 1024, BN_RAND_TOP_ONE, BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ANY))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!BN_mod_exp(r, a, p, m, ctx))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!a_is_zero_mod_one("BN_mod_exp", r, a))
+        failed = 1;
+
+    if (!BN_mod_exp_recp(r, a, p, m, ctx))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!a_is_zero_mod_one("BN_mod_exp_recp", r, a))
+        failed = 1;
+
+    if (!BN_mod_exp_simple(r, a, p, m, ctx))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!a_is_zero_mod_one("BN_mod_exp_simple", r, a))
+        failed = 1;
+
+    if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(r, a, p, m, ctx, NULL))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!a_is_zero_mod_one("BN_mod_exp_mont", r, a))
+        failed = 1;
+
+    if (!BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(r, a, p, m, ctx, NULL)) {
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!a_is_zero_mod_one("BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime", r, a))
+        failed = 1;
+
+    /*
+     * A different codepath exists for single word multiplication
+     * in non-constant-time only.
+     */
+    if (!BN_mod_exp_mont_word(r, one_word, p, m, ctx, NULL))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!BN_is_zero(r)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "BN_mod_exp_mont_word failed:\n");
+        fprintf(stderr, "1 ** 0 mod 1 = r (should be 0)\n");
+        fprintf(stderr, "r = ");
+        BN_print_fp(stderr, r);
+        fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    ret = failed;
+
+ err:
+    BN_free(r);
+    BN_free(a);
+    BN_free(p);
+    BN_free(m);
+    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+    BN_CTX *ctx;
+    BIO *out = NULL;
+    int i, ret;
+    unsigned char c;
+    BIGNUM *r_mont, *r_mont_const, *r_recp, *r_simple, *a, *b, *m;
+
+    /*
+     * Seed or BN_rand may fail, and we don't even check its return
+     * value (which we should)
+     */
+    RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof(rnd_seed));
+
+    ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        EXIT(1);
+    r_mont = BN_new();
+    r_mont_const = BN_new();
+    r_recp = BN_new();
+    r_simple = BN_new();
+    a = BN_new();
+    b = BN_new();
+    m = BN_new();
+    if ((r_mont == NULL) || (r_recp == NULL) || (a == NULL) || (b == NULL))
+        goto err;
+
+    out = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
+
+    if (out == NULL)
+        EXIT(1);
+    BIO_set_fp(out, stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT);
+
+    for (i = 0; i < 200; i++) {
+        RAND_bytes(&c, 1);
+        c = (c % BN_BITS) - BN_BITS2;
+        BN_rand(a, NUM_BITS + c, BN_RAND_TOP_ONE, BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ANY);
+
+        RAND_bytes(&c, 1);
+        c = (c % BN_BITS) - BN_BITS2;
+        BN_rand(b, NUM_BITS + c, BN_RAND_TOP_ONE, BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ANY);
+
+        RAND_bytes(&c, 1);
+        c = (c % BN_BITS) - BN_BITS2;
+        BN_rand(m, NUM_BITS + c, BN_RAND_TOP_ONE, BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ODD);
+
+        BN_mod(a, a, m, ctx);
+        BN_mod(b, b, m, ctx);
+
+        ret = BN_mod_exp_mont(r_mont, a, b, m, ctx, NULL);
+        if (ret <= 0) {
+            printf("BN_mod_exp_mont() problems\n");
+            ERR_print_errors(out);
+            EXIT(1);
+        }
+
+        ret = BN_mod_exp_recp(r_recp, a, b, m, ctx);
+        if (ret <= 0) {
+            printf("BN_mod_exp_recp() problems\n");
+            ERR_print_errors(out);
+            EXIT(1);
+        }
+
+        ret = BN_mod_exp_simple(r_simple, a, b, m, ctx);
+        if (ret <= 0) {
+            printf("BN_mod_exp_simple() problems\n");
+            ERR_print_errors(out);
+            EXIT(1);
+        }
+
+        ret = BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(r_mont_const, a, b, m, ctx, NULL);
+        if (ret <= 0) {
+            printf("BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime() problems\n");
+            ERR_print_errors(out);
+            EXIT(1);
+        }
+
+        if (BN_cmp(r_simple, r_mont) == 0
+            && BN_cmp(r_simple, r_recp) == 0
+            && BN_cmp(r_simple, r_mont_const) == 0) {
+            printf(".");
+            fflush(stdout);
+        } else {
+            if (BN_cmp(r_simple, r_mont) != 0)
+                printf("\nsimple and mont results differ\n");
+            if (BN_cmp(r_simple, r_mont_const) != 0)
+                printf("\nsimple and mont const time results differ\n");
+            if (BN_cmp(r_simple, r_recp) != 0)
+                printf("\nsimple and recp results differ\n");
+
+            printf("a (%3d) = ", BN_num_bits(a));
+            BN_print(out, a);
+            printf("\nb (%3d) = ", BN_num_bits(b));
+            BN_print(out, b);
+            printf("\nm (%3d) = ", BN_num_bits(m));
+            BN_print(out, m);
+            printf("\nsimple   =");
+            BN_print(out, r_simple);
+            printf("\nrecp     =");
+            BN_print(out, r_recp);
+            printf("\nmont     =");
+            BN_print(out, r_mont);
+            printf("\nmont_ct  =");
+            BN_print(out, r_mont_const);
+            printf("\n");
+            EXIT(1);
+        }
+    }
+    BN_free(r_mont);
+    BN_free(r_mont_const);
+    BN_free(r_recp);
+    BN_free(r_simple);
+    BN_free(a);
+    BN_free(b);
+    BN_free(m);
+    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+
+    if (test_exp_mod_zero() != 0)
+        goto err;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG
+    if (CRYPTO_mem_leaks(out) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+#endif
+    BIO_free(out);
+    printf("\n");
+
+    printf("done\n");
+
+    EXIT(0);
+ err:
+    ERR_print_errors(out);
+    EXIT(1);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/fatalerrtest.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/fatalerrtest.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d52daa2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/fatalerrtest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2017-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include "ssltestlib.h"
+#include "testutil.h"
+#include <string.h>
+
+static char *cert = NULL;
+static char *privkey = NULL;
+
+static int test_fatalerr(void)
+{
+    SSL_CTX *sctx = NULL, *cctx = NULL;
+    SSL *sssl = NULL, *cssl = NULL;
+    const char *msg = "Dummy";
+    BIO *wbio = NULL;
+    int ret = 0, len;
+    char buf[80];
+    unsigned char dummyrec[] = {
+        0x17, 0x03, 0x03, 0x00, 0x05, 'D', 'u', 'm', 'm', 'y'
+    };
+
+    if (!create_ssl_ctx_pair(SSLv23_method(), SSLv23_method(),
+                             SSL3_VERSION, TLS_MAX_VERSION, &sctx, &cctx,
+                             cert, privkey)) {
+        printf("Failed to create SSL_CTX pair\n");
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Deliberately set the cipher lists for client and server to be different
+     * to force a handshake failure.
+     */
+    if (!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(sctx, "AES128-SHA")
+            || !SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(cctx, "AES256-SHA")) {
+        printf("Failed to set cipher lists\n");
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!create_ssl_objects(sctx, cctx, &sssl, &cssl, NULL, NULL)) {
+        printf("Failed to create SSL objectx\n");
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    wbio = SSL_get_wbio(cssl);
+    if (wbio == NULL) {
+        printf("Unexpected NULL bio received\n");
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (create_ssl_connection(sssl, cssl)) {
+        printf("Unexpected success creating a connection\n");
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    ERR_clear_error();
+
+    /* Inject a plaintext record from client to server */
+    if (BIO_write(wbio, dummyrec, sizeof(dummyrec)) <= 0) {
+        printf("Unexpected failure injecting dummy record\n");
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* SSL_read()/SSL_write should fail because of a previous fatal error */
+    if ((len = SSL_read(sssl, buf, sizeof(buf) - 1)) > 0) {
+        buf[len] = '\0';
+        printf("Unexpected success reading data: %s\n", buf);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (SSL_write(sssl, msg, strlen(msg)) > 0) {
+        printf("Unexpected success writing data\n");
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    SSL_free(sssl);
+    SSL_free(cssl);
+    SSL_CTX_free(sctx);
+    SSL_CTX_free(cctx);
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+    BIO *err = NULL;
+    int testresult = 1;
+
+    if (argc != 3) {
+        printf("Invalid argument count\n");
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    cert = argv[1];
+    privkey = argv[2];
+
+    err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT);
+
+    CRYPTO_set_mem_debug(1);
+    CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON);
+
+    ADD_TEST(test_fatalerr);
+
+    testresult = run_tests(argv[0]);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG
+    if (CRYPTO_mem_leaks(err) <= 0)
+        testresult = 1;
+#endif
+    BIO_free(err);
+
+    if (!testresult)
+        printf("PASS\n");
+
+    return testresult;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/generate_buildtest.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/generate_buildtest.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0a9d879
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/generate_buildtest.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+
+# First argument is name;
+my $name = shift @ARGV;
+my $name_uc = uc $name;
+# All other arguments are ignored for now
+
+print <<"_____";
+/*
+ * Generated with test/generate_buildtest.pl, to check that such a simple
+ * program builds.
+ */
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+# include <stdio.h>
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_${name_uc}
+# include <openssl/$name.h>
+#endif
+
+int main()
+{
+    return 0;
+}
+_____
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/generate_ssl_tests.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/generate_ssl_tests.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..47a328c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/generate_ssl_tests.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+## SSL testcase generator
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+
+use File::Basename;
+use File::Spec::Functions;
+
+use OpenSSL::Test qw/srctop_dir srctop_file/;
+use OpenSSL::Test::Utils;
+
+# This block needs to run before 'use lib srctop_dir' directives.
+BEGIN {
+    OpenSSL::Test::setup("no_test_here");
+}
+
+use lib srctop_dir("util", "perl");  # for with_fallback
+use lib srctop_dir("test", "ssl-tests");  # for ssltests_base
+
+use with_fallback qw(Text::Template);
+
+use vars qw/@ISA/;
+push (@ISA, qw/Text::Template/);
+
+use ssltests_base;
+
+sub print_templates {
+    my $source = srctop_file("test", "ssl_test.tmpl");
+    my $template = Text::Template->new(TYPE => 'FILE', SOURCE => $source);
+
+    print "# Generated with generate_ssl_tests.pl\n\n";
+
+    my $num = scalar @ssltests::tests;
+
+    # Add the implicit base configuration.
+    foreach my $test (@ssltests::tests) {
+        $test->{"server"} = { (%ssltests::base_server, %{$test->{"server"}}) };
+        if (defined $test->{"server2"}) {
+            $test->{"server2"} = { (%ssltests::base_server, %{$test->{"server2"}}) };
+        } else {
+            if ($test->{"server"}->{"extra"} &&
+                defined $test->{"server"}->{"extra"}->{"ServerNameCallback"}) {
+                # Default is the same as server.
+                $test->{"reuse_server2"} = 1;
+            }
+            # Do not emit an empty/duplicate "server2" section.
+            $test->{"server2"} = { };
+        }
+        if (defined $test->{"resume_server"}) {
+            $test->{"resume_server"} = { (%ssltests::base_server, %{$test->{"resume_server"}}) };
+        } else {
+            if (defined $test->{"test"}->{"HandshakeMode"} &&
+                 $test->{"test"}->{"HandshakeMode"} eq "Resume") {
+                # Default is the same as server.
+                $test->{"reuse_resume_server"} = 1;
+            }
+            # Do not emit an empty/duplicate "resume-server" section.
+            $test->{"resume_server"} = { };
+        }
+        $test->{"client"} = { (%ssltests::base_client, %{$test->{"client"}}) };
+        if (defined $test->{"resume_client"}) {
+            $test->{"resume_client"} = { (%ssltests::base_client, %{$test->{"resume_client"}}) };
+        } else {
+            if (defined $test->{"test"}->{"HandshakeMode"} &&
+                 $test->{"test"}->{"HandshakeMode"} eq "Resume") {
+                # Default is the same as client.
+                $test->{"reuse_resume_client"} = 1;
+            }
+            # Do not emit an empty/duplicate "resume-client" section.
+            $test->{"resume_client"} = { };
+        }
+    }
+
+    # ssl_test expects to find a
+    #
+    # num_tests = n
+    #
+    # directive in the file. It'll then look for configuration directives
+    # for n tests, that each look like this:
+    #
+    # test-n = test-section
+    #
+    # [test-section]
+    # (SSL modules for client and server configuration go here.)
+    #
+    # [test-n]
+    # (Test configuration goes here.)
+    print "num_tests = $num\n\n";
+
+    # The conf module locations must come before everything else, because
+    # they look like
+    #
+    # test-n = test-section
+    #
+    # and you can't mix and match them with sections.
+    my $idx = 0;
+
+    foreach my $test (@ssltests::tests) {
+        my $testname = "${idx}-" . $test->{'name'};
+        print "test-$idx = $testname\n";
+        $idx++;
+    }
+
+    $idx = 0;
+
+    foreach my $test (@ssltests::tests) {
+        my $testname = "${idx}-" . $test->{'name'};
+        my $text = $template->fill_in(
+            HASH => [{ idx => $idx, testname => $testname } , $test],
+            DELIMITERS => [ "{-", "-}" ]);
+        print "# ===========================================================\n\n";
+        print "$text\n";
+        $idx++;
+    }
+}
+
+# Shamelessly copied from Configure.
+sub read_config {
+    my $fname = shift;
+    open(INPUT, "< $fname") or die "Can't open input file '$fname'!\n";
+    local $/ = undef;
+    my $content = <INPUT>;
+    close(INPUT);
+    eval $content;
+    warn $@ if $@;
+}
+
+my $input_file = shift;
+# Reads the tests into ssltests::tests.
+read_config($input_file);
+print_templates();
+
+1;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/gmdifftest.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/gmdifftest.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..73c910d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/gmdifftest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+#define SECS_PER_DAY (24 * 60 * 60)
+
+/*
+ * Time checking test code. Check times are identical for a wide range of
+ * offsets. This should be run on a machine with 64 bit time_t or it will
+ * trigger the very errors the routines fix.
+ */
+
+static int check_time(long offset)
+{
+    struct tm tm1, tm2, o1;
+    int off_day, off_sec;
+    long toffset;
+    time_t t1, t2;
+    time(&t1);
+
+    t2 = t1 + offset;
+    OPENSSL_gmtime(&t2, &tm2);
+    OPENSSL_gmtime(&t1, &tm1);
+    o1 = tm1;
+    OPENSSL_gmtime_adj(&tm1, 0, offset);
+    if ((tm1.tm_year != tm2.tm_year) ||
+        (tm1.tm_mon != tm2.tm_mon) ||
+        (tm1.tm_mday != tm2.tm_mday) ||
+        (tm1.tm_hour != tm2.tm_hour) ||
+        (tm1.tm_min != tm2.tm_min) || (tm1.tm_sec != tm2.tm_sec)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "TIME ERROR!!\n");
+        fprintf(stderr, "Time1: %d/%d/%d, %d:%02d:%02d\n",
+                tm2.tm_mday, tm2.tm_mon + 1, tm2.tm_year + 1900,
+                tm2.tm_hour, tm2.tm_min, tm2.tm_sec);
+        fprintf(stderr, "Time2: %d/%d/%d, %d:%02d:%02d\n",
+                tm1.tm_mday, tm1.tm_mon + 1, tm1.tm_year + 1900,
+                tm1.tm_hour, tm1.tm_min, tm1.tm_sec);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (!OPENSSL_gmtime_diff(&off_day, &off_sec, &o1, &tm1))
+        return 0;
+    toffset = (long)off_day *SECS_PER_DAY + off_sec;
+    if (offset != toffset) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "TIME OFFSET ERROR!!\n");
+        fprintf(stderr, "Expected %ld, Got %ld (%d:%d)\n",
+                offset, toffset, off_day, off_sec);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    long offset;
+    int fails;
+
+    if (sizeof(time_t) < 8) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Skipping; time_t is less than 64-bits\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+    for (fails = 0, offset = 0; offset < 1000000; offset++) {
+        if (!check_time(offset))
+            fails++;
+        if (!check_time(-offset))
+            fails++;
+        if (!check_time(offset * 1000))
+            fails++;
+        if (!check_time(-offset * 1000))
+            fails++;
+    }
+
+    return fails ? 1 : 0;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/handshake_helper.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/handshake_helper.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..41a2c00
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/handshake_helper.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1106 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/x509_vfy.h>
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+#include "handshake_helper.h"
+#include "testutil.h"
+
+HANDSHAKE_RESULT *HANDSHAKE_RESULT_new()
+{
+    HANDSHAKE_RESULT *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
+    TEST_check(ret != NULL);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+void HANDSHAKE_RESULT_free(HANDSHAKE_RESULT *result)
+{
+    if (result == NULL)
+        return;
+    OPENSSL_free(result->client_npn_negotiated);
+    OPENSSL_free(result->server_npn_negotiated);
+    OPENSSL_free(result->client_alpn_negotiated);
+    OPENSSL_free(result->server_alpn_negotiated);
+    OPENSSL_free(result);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Since there appears to be no way to extract the sent/received alert
+ * from the SSL object directly, we use the info callback and stash
+ * the result in ex_data.
+ */
+typedef struct handshake_ex_data_st {
+    int alert_sent;
+    int num_fatal_alerts_sent;
+    int alert_received;
+    int session_ticket_do_not_call;
+    ssl_servername_t servername;
+} HANDSHAKE_EX_DATA;
+
+typedef struct ctx_data_st {
+    unsigned char *npn_protocols;
+    size_t npn_protocols_len;
+    unsigned char *alpn_protocols;
+    size_t alpn_protocols_len;
+} CTX_DATA;
+
+/* |ctx_data| itself is stack-allocated. */
+static void ctx_data_free_data(CTX_DATA *ctx_data)
+{
+    OPENSSL_free(ctx_data->npn_protocols);
+    ctx_data->npn_protocols = NULL;
+    OPENSSL_free(ctx_data->alpn_protocols);
+    ctx_data->alpn_protocols = NULL;
+}
+
+static int ex_data_idx;
+
+static void info_cb(const SSL *s, int where, int ret)
+{
+    if (where & SSL_CB_ALERT) {
+        HANDSHAKE_EX_DATA *ex_data =
+            (HANDSHAKE_EX_DATA*)(SSL_get_ex_data(s, ex_data_idx));
+        if (where & SSL_CB_WRITE) {
+            ex_data->alert_sent = ret;
+            if (strcmp(SSL_alert_type_string(ret), "F") == 0
+                || strcmp(SSL_alert_desc_string(ret), "CN") == 0)
+                ex_data->num_fatal_alerts_sent++;
+        } else {
+            ex_data->alert_received = ret;
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/* Select the appropriate server CTX.
+ * Returns SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK if a match was found.
+ * If |ignore| is 1, returns SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK on mismatch.
+ * Otherwise, returns SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL on mismatch.
+ * An empty SNI extension also returns SSL_TSLEXT_ERR_NOACK.
+ */
+static int select_server_ctx(SSL *s, void *arg, int ignore)
+{
+    const char *servername = SSL_get_servername(s, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name);
+    HANDSHAKE_EX_DATA *ex_data =
+        (HANDSHAKE_EX_DATA*)(SSL_get_ex_data(s, ex_data_idx));
+
+    if (servername == NULL) {
+        ex_data->servername = SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_SERVER1;
+        return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
+    }
+
+    if (strcmp(servername, "server2") == 0) {
+        SSL_CTX *new_ctx = (SSL_CTX*)arg;
+        SSL_set_SSL_CTX(s, new_ctx);
+        /*
+         * Copy over all the SSL_CTX options - reasonable behavior
+         * allows testing of cases where the options between two
+         * contexts differ/conflict
+         */
+        SSL_clear_options(s, 0xFFFFFFFFL);
+        SSL_set_options(s, SSL_CTX_get_options(new_ctx));
+
+        ex_data->servername = SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_SERVER2;
+        return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+    } else if (strcmp(servername, "server1") == 0) {
+        ex_data->servername = SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_SERVER1;
+        return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+    } else if (ignore) {
+        ex_data->servername = SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_SERVER1;
+        return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
+    } else {
+        /* Don't set an explicit alert, to test library defaults. */
+        return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * (RFC 6066):
+ *  If the server understood the ClientHello extension but
+ *  does not recognize the server name, the server SHOULD take one of two
+ *  actions: either abort the handshake by sending a fatal-level
+ *  unrecognized_name(112) alert or continue the handshake.
+ *
+ * This behaviour is up to the application to configure; we test both
+ * configurations to ensure the state machine propagates the result
+ * correctly.
+ */
+static int servername_ignore_cb(SSL *s, int *ad, void *arg)
+{
+    return select_server_ctx(s, arg, 1);
+}
+
+static int servername_reject_cb(SSL *s, int *ad, void *arg)
+{
+    return select_server_ctx(s, arg, 0);
+}
+
+static unsigned char dummy_ocsp_resp_good_val = 0xff;
+static unsigned char dummy_ocsp_resp_bad_val = 0xfe;
+
+static int server_ocsp_cb(SSL *s, void *arg)
+{
+    unsigned char *resp;
+
+    resp = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
+    if (resp == NULL)
+        return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+    /*
+     * For the purposes of testing we just send back a dummy OCSP response
+     */
+    *resp = *(unsigned char *)arg;
+    if (!SSL_set_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(s, resp, 1))
+        return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+
+    return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+}
+
+static int client_ocsp_cb(SSL *s, void *arg)
+{
+    const unsigned char *resp;
+    int len;
+
+    len = SSL_get_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(s, &resp);
+    if (len != 1 || *resp != dummy_ocsp_resp_good_val)
+        return 0;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int verify_reject_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, void *arg) {
+    X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int verify_accept_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, void *arg) {
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int broken_session_ticket_cb(SSL *s, unsigned char *key_name, unsigned char *iv,
+                                    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, HMAC_CTX *hctx, int enc)
+{
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int do_not_call_session_ticket_cb(SSL *s, unsigned char *key_name,
+                                         unsigned char *iv,
+                                         EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+                                         HMAC_CTX *hctx, int enc)
+{
+    HANDSHAKE_EX_DATA *ex_data =
+        (HANDSHAKE_EX_DATA*)(SSL_get_ex_data(s, ex_data_idx));
+    ex_data->session_ticket_do_not_call = 1;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/* Parse the comma-separated list into TLS format. */
+static void parse_protos(const char *protos, unsigned char **out, size_t *outlen)
+{
+    size_t len, i, prefix;
+
+    len = strlen(protos);
+
+    /* Should never have reuse. */
+    TEST_check(*out == NULL);
+
+    /* Test values are small, so we omit length limit checks. */
+    *out = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1);
+    TEST_check(*out != NULL);
+    *outlen = len + 1;
+
+    /*
+     * foo => '3', 'f', 'o', 'o'
+     * foo,bar => '3', 'f', 'o', 'o', '3', 'b', 'a', 'r'
+     */
+    memcpy(*out + 1, protos, len);
+
+    prefix = 0;
+    i = prefix + 1;
+    while (i <= len) {
+        if ((*out)[i] == ',') {
+            TEST_check(i - 1 - prefix > 0);
+            (*out)[prefix] = i - 1 - prefix;
+            prefix = i;
+        }
+        i++;
+    }
+    TEST_check(len - prefix > 0);
+    (*out)[prefix] = len - prefix;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+/*
+ * The client SHOULD select the first protocol advertised by the server that it
+ * also supports.  In the event that the client doesn't support any of server's
+ * protocols, or the server doesn't advertise any, it SHOULD select the first
+ * protocol that it supports.
+ */
+static int client_npn_cb(SSL *s, unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen,
+                         const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen,
+                         void *arg)
+{
+    CTX_DATA *ctx_data = (CTX_DATA*)(arg);
+    int ret;
+
+    ret = SSL_select_next_proto(out, outlen, in, inlen,
+                                ctx_data->npn_protocols,
+                                ctx_data->npn_protocols_len);
+    /* Accept both OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED and OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP. */
+    TEST_check(ret == OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED || ret == OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP);
+    return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+}
+
+static int server_npn_cb(SSL *s, const unsigned char **data,
+                         unsigned int *len, void *arg)
+{
+    CTX_DATA *ctx_data = (CTX_DATA*)(arg);
+    *data = ctx_data->npn_protocols;
+    *len = ctx_data->npn_protocols_len;
+    return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * The server SHOULD select the most highly preferred protocol that it supports
+ * and that is also advertised by the client.  In the event that the server
+ * supports no protocols that the client advertises, then the server SHALL
+ * respond with a fatal "no_application_protocol" alert.
+ */
+static int server_alpn_cb(SSL *s, const unsigned char **out,
+                          unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in,
+                          unsigned int inlen, void *arg)
+{
+    CTX_DATA *ctx_data = (CTX_DATA*)(arg);
+    int ret;
+
+    /* SSL_select_next_proto isn't const-correct... */
+    unsigned char *tmp_out;
+
+    /*
+     * The result points either to |in| or to |ctx_data->alpn_protocols|.
+     * The callback is allowed to point to |in| or to a long-lived buffer,
+     * so we can return directly without storing a copy.
+     */
+    ret = SSL_select_next_proto(&tmp_out, outlen,
+                                ctx_data->alpn_protocols,
+                                ctx_data->alpn_protocols_len, in, inlen);
+
+    *out = tmp_out;
+    /* Unlike NPN, we don't tolerate a mismatch. */
+    return ret == OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED ? SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK
+        : SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Configure callbacks and other properties that can't be set directly
+ * in the server/client CONF.
+ */
+static void configure_handshake_ctx(SSL_CTX *server_ctx, SSL_CTX *server2_ctx,
+                                    SSL_CTX *client_ctx,
+                                    const SSL_TEST_CTX *test,
+                                    const SSL_TEST_EXTRA_CONF *extra,
+                                    CTX_DATA *server_ctx_data,
+                                    CTX_DATA *server2_ctx_data,
+                                    CTX_DATA *client_ctx_data)
+{
+    unsigned char *ticket_keys;
+    size_t ticket_key_len;
+
+    TEST_check(SSL_CTX_set_max_send_fragment(server_ctx,
+                                             test->max_fragment_size) == 1);
+    if (server2_ctx != NULL) {
+        TEST_check(SSL_CTX_set_max_send_fragment(server2_ctx,
+                                                 test->max_fragment_size) == 1);
+    }
+    TEST_check(SSL_CTX_set_max_send_fragment(client_ctx,
+                                             test->max_fragment_size) == 1);
+
+    switch (extra->client.verify_callback) {
+    case SSL_TEST_VERIFY_ACCEPT_ALL:
+        SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(client_ctx, &verify_accept_cb,
+                                         NULL);
+        break;
+    case SSL_TEST_VERIFY_REJECT_ALL:
+        SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(client_ctx, &verify_reject_cb,
+                                         NULL);
+        break;
+    default:
+        break;
+    }
+
+    /* link the two contexts for SNI purposes */
+    switch (extra->server.servername_callback) {
+    case SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_IGNORE_MISMATCH:
+        SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(server_ctx, servername_ignore_cb);
+        SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(server_ctx, server2_ctx);
+        break;
+    case SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_REJECT_MISMATCH:
+        SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(server_ctx, servername_reject_cb);
+        SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(server_ctx, server2_ctx);
+        break;
+    default:
+        break;
+    }
+
+    if (extra->server.cert_status != SSL_TEST_CERT_STATUS_NONE) {
+        SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_type(client_ctx, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp);
+        SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(client_ctx, client_ocsp_cb);
+        SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(client_ctx, NULL);
+        SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(server_ctx, server_ocsp_cb);
+        SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(server_ctx,
+            ((extra->server.cert_status == SSL_TEST_CERT_STATUS_GOOD_RESPONSE)
+            ? &dummy_ocsp_resp_good_val : &dummy_ocsp_resp_bad_val));
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * The initial_ctx/session_ctx always handles the encrypt/decrypt of the
+     * session ticket. This ticket_key callback is assigned to the second
+     * session (assigned via SNI), and should never be invoked
+     */
+    if (server2_ctx != NULL)
+        SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb(server2_ctx,
+                                         do_not_call_session_ticket_cb);
+
+    if (extra->server.broken_session_ticket) {
+        SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb(server_ctx, broken_session_ticket_cb);
+    }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+    if (extra->server.npn_protocols != NULL) {
+        parse_protos(extra->server.npn_protocols,
+                     &server_ctx_data->npn_protocols,
+                     &server_ctx_data->npn_protocols_len);
+        SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(server_ctx, server_npn_cb,
+                                              server_ctx_data);
+    }
+    if (extra->server2.npn_protocols != NULL) {
+        parse_protos(extra->server2.npn_protocols,
+                     &server2_ctx_data->npn_protocols,
+                     &server2_ctx_data->npn_protocols_len);
+        TEST_check(server2_ctx != NULL);
+        SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(server2_ctx, server_npn_cb,
+                                              server2_ctx_data);
+    }
+    if (extra->client.npn_protocols != NULL) {
+        parse_protos(extra->client.npn_protocols,
+                     &client_ctx_data->npn_protocols,
+                     &client_ctx_data->npn_protocols_len);
+        SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(client_ctx, client_npn_cb,
+                                         client_ctx_data);
+    }
+#endif
+    if (extra->server.alpn_protocols != NULL) {
+        parse_protos(extra->server.alpn_protocols,
+                     &server_ctx_data->alpn_protocols,
+                     &server_ctx_data->alpn_protocols_len);
+        SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb(server_ctx, server_alpn_cb, server_ctx_data);
+    }
+    if (extra->server2.alpn_protocols != NULL) {
+        TEST_check(server2_ctx != NULL);
+        parse_protos(extra->server2.alpn_protocols,
+                     &server2_ctx_data->alpn_protocols,
+                     &server2_ctx_data->alpn_protocols_len);
+        SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb(server2_ctx, server_alpn_cb, server2_ctx_data);
+    }
+    if (extra->client.alpn_protocols != NULL) {
+        unsigned char *alpn_protos = NULL;
+        size_t alpn_protos_len;
+        parse_protos(extra->client.alpn_protocols,
+                     &alpn_protos, &alpn_protos_len);
+        /* Reversed return value convention... */
+        TEST_check(SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos(client_ctx, alpn_protos,
+                                           alpn_protos_len) == 0);
+        OPENSSL_free(alpn_protos);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Use fixed session ticket keys so that we can decrypt a ticket created with
+     * one CTX in another CTX. Don't address server2 for the moment.
+     */
+    ticket_key_len = SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_keys(server_ctx, NULL, 0);
+    ticket_keys = OPENSSL_zalloc(ticket_key_len);
+    TEST_check(ticket_keys != NULL);
+    TEST_check(SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_keys(server_ctx, ticket_keys,
+                                              ticket_key_len) == 1);
+    OPENSSL_free(ticket_keys);
+
+    /* The default log list includes EC keys, so CT can't work without EC. */
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_CT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
+    TEST_check(SSL_CTX_set_default_ctlog_list_file(client_ctx));
+    switch (extra->client.ct_validation) {
+    case SSL_TEST_CT_VALIDATION_PERMISSIVE:
+        TEST_check(SSL_CTX_enable_ct(client_ctx, SSL_CT_VALIDATION_PERMISSIVE));
+        break;
+    case SSL_TEST_CT_VALIDATION_STRICT:
+        TEST_check(SSL_CTX_enable_ct(client_ctx, SSL_CT_VALIDATION_STRICT));
+        break;
+    case SSL_TEST_CT_VALIDATION_NONE:
+        break;
+    }
+#endif
+}
+
+/* Configure per-SSL callbacks and other properties. */
+static void configure_handshake_ssl(SSL *server, SSL *client,
+                                    const SSL_TEST_EXTRA_CONF *extra)
+{
+    if (extra->client.servername != SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_NONE)
+        SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(client,
+                                 ssl_servername_name(extra->client.servername));
+}
+
+/* The status for each connection phase. */
+typedef enum {
+    PEER_SUCCESS,
+    PEER_RETRY,
+    PEER_ERROR
+} peer_status_t;
+
+/* An SSL object and associated read-write buffers. */
+typedef struct peer_st {
+    SSL *ssl;
+    /* Buffer lengths are int to match the SSL read/write API. */
+    unsigned char *write_buf;
+    int write_buf_len;
+    unsigned char *read_buf;
+    int read_buf_len;
+    int bytes_to_write;
+    int bytes_to_read;
+    peer_status_t status;
+} PEER;
+
+static void create_peer(PEER *peer, SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    static const int peer_buffer_size = 64 * 1024;
+
+    peer->ssl = SSL_new(ctx);
+    TEST_check(peer->ssl != NULL);
+    peer->write_buf = OPENSSL_zalloc(peer_buffer_size);
+    TEST_check(peer->write_buf != NULL);
+    peer->read_buf = OPENSSL_zalloc(peer_buffer_size);
+    TEST_check(peer->read_buf != NULL);
+    peer->write_buf_len = peer->read_buf_len = peer_buffer_size;
+}
+
+static void peer_free_data(PEER *peer)
+{
+    SSL_free(peer->ssl);
+    OPENSSL_free(peer->write_buf);
+    OPENSSL_free(peer->read_buf);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note that we could do the handshake transparently under an SSL_write,
+ * but separating the steps is more helpful for debugging test failures.
+ */
+static void do_handshake_step(PEER *peer)
+{
+    int ret;
+
+    if (peer->status != PEER_RETRY) {
+        peer->status = PEER_ERROR;
+        return;
+    }
+
+    ret = SSL_do_handshake(peer->ssl);
+
+    if (ret == 1) {
+        peer->status = PEER_SUCCESS;
+    } else if (ret == 0) {
+        peer->status = PEER_ERROR;
+    } else {
+        int error = SSL_get_error(peer->ssl, ret);
+        /* Memory bios should never block with SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE. */
+        if (error != SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ)
+            peer->status = PEER_ERROR;
+    }
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Send/receive some application data. The read-write sequence is
+ * Peer A: (R) W - first read will yield no data
+ * Peer B:  R  W
+ * ...
+ * Peer A:  R  W
+ * Peer B:  R  W
+ * Peer A:  R
+ */
+static void do_app_data_step(PEER *peer)
+{
+    int ret = 1, write_bytes;
+
+    TEST_check(peer->status == PEER_RETRY);
+
+    /* We read everything available... */
+    while (ret > 0 && peer->bytes_to_read) {
+        ret = SSL_read(peer->ssl, peer->read_buf, peer->read_buf_len);
+        if (ret > 0) {
+            TEST_check(ret <= peer->bytes_to_read);
+            peer->bytes_to_read -= ret;
+        } else if (ret == 0) {
+            peer->status = PEER_ERROR;
+            return;
+        } else {
+            int error = SSL_get_error(peer->ssl, ret);
+            if (error != SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ) {
+                peer->status = PEER_ERROR;
+                return;
+            } /* Else continue with write. */
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* ... but we only write one write-buffer-full of data. */
+    write_bytes = peer->bytes_to_write < peer->write_buf_len ? peer->bytes_to_write :
+        peer->write_buf_len;
+    if (write_bytes) {
+        ret = SSL_write(peer->ssl, peer->write_buf, write_bytes);
+        if (ret > 0) {
+            /* SSL_write will only succeed with a complete write. */
+            TEST_check(ret == write_bytes);
+            peer->bytes_to_write -= ret;
+        } else {
+            /*
+             * We should perhaps check for SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ/WRITE here
+             * but this doesn't yet occur with current app data sizes.
+             */
+            peer->status = PEER_ERROR;
+            return;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * We could simply finish when there was nothing to read, and we have
+     * nothing left to write. But keeping track of the expected number of bytes
+     * to read gives us somewhat better guarantees that all data sent is in fact
+     * received.
+     */
+    if (!peer->bytes_to_write && !peer->bytes_to_read) {
+        peer->status = PEER_SUCCESS;
+    }
+}
+
+static void do_reneg_setup_step(const SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx, PEER *peer)
+{
+    int ret;
+    char buf;
+
+    if (peer->status == PEER_SUCCESS) {
+        /*
+         * We are a client that succeeded this step previously, but the server
+         * wanted to retry. Probably there is a no_renegotiation warning alert
+         * waiting for us. Attempt to continue the handshake.
+         */
+        peer->status = PEER_RETRY;
+        do_handshake_step(peer);
+        return;
+    }
+
+    TEST_check(peer->status == PEER_RETRY);
+    TEST_check(test_ctx->handshake_mode == SSL_TEST_HANDSHAKE_RENEG_SERVER
+                || test_ctx->handshake_mode == SSL_TEST_HANDSHAKE_RENEG_CLIENT);
+
+    /* Check if we are the peer that is going to initiate */
+    if ((test_ctx->handshake_mode == SSL_TEST_HANDSHAKE_RENEG_SERVER
+                && SSL_is_server(peer->ssl))
+            || (test_ctx->handshake_mode == SSL_TEST_HANDSHAKE_RENEG_CLIENT
+                && !SSL_is_server(peer->ssl))) {
+        /*
+         * If we already asked for a renegotiation then fall through to the
+         * SSL_read() below.
+         */
+        if (!SSL_renegotiate_pending(peer->ssl)) {
+            /*
+             * If we are the client we will always attempt to resume the
+             * session. The server may or may not resume dependant on the
+             * setting of SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
+             */
+            if (SSL_is_server(peer->ssl)) {
+                ret = SSL_renegotiate(peer->ssl);
+            } else {
+                if (test_ctx->extra.client.reneg_ciphers != NULL) {
+                    if (!SSL_set_cipher_list(peer->ssl,
+                                test_ctx->extra.client.reneg_ciphers)) {
+                        peer->status = PEER_ERROR;
+                        return;
+                    }
+                    ret = SSL_renegotiate(peer->ssl);
+                } else {
+                    ret = SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(peer->ssl);
+                }
+            }
+            if (!ret) {
+                peer->status = PEER_ERROR;
+                return;
+            }
+            do_handshake_step(peer);
+            /*
+             * If status is PEER_RETRY it means we're waiting on the peer to
+             * continue the handshake. As far as setting up the renegotiation is
+             * concerned that is a success. The next step will continue the
+             * handshake to its conclusion.
+             *
+             * If status is PEER_SUCCESS then we are the server and we have
+             * successfully sent the HelloRequest. We need to continue to wait
+             * until the handshake arrives from the client.
+             */
+            if (peer->status == PEER_RETRY)
+                peer->status = PEER_SUCCESS;
+            else if (peer->status == PEER_SUCCESS)
+                peer->status = PEER_RETRY;
+            return;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * The SSL object is still expecting app data, even though it's going to
+     * get a handshake message. We try to read, and it should fail - after which
+     * we should be in a handshake
+     */
+    ret = SSL_read(peer->ssl, &buf, sizeof(buf));
+    if (ret >= 0) {
+        /*
+         * We're not actually expecting data - we're expecting a reneg to
+         * start
+         */
+        peer->status = PEER_ERROR;
+        return;
+    } else {
+        int error = SSL_get_error(peer->ssl, ret);
+        if (error != SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ) {
+            peer->status = PEER_ERROR;
+            return;
+        }
+        /* If we're no in init yet then we're not done with setup yet */
+        if (!SSL_in_init(peer->ssl))
+            return;
+    }
+
+    peer->status = PEER_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * RFC 5246 says:
+ *
+ * Note that as of TLS 1.1,
+ *     failure to properly close a connection no longer requires that a
+ *     session not be resumed.  This is a change from TLS 1.0 to conform
+ *     with widespread implementation practice.
+ *
+ * However,
+ * (a) OpenSSL requires that a connection be shutdown for all protocol versions.
+ * (b) We test lower versions, too.
+ * So we just implement shutdown. We do a full bidirectional shutdown so that we
+ * can compare sent and received close_notify alerts and get some test coverage
+ * for SSL_shutdown as a bonus.
+ */
+static void do_shutdown_step(PEER *peer)
+{
+    int ret;
+
+    TEST_check(peer->status == PEER_RETRY);
+    ret = SSL_shutdown(peer->ssl);
+
+    if (ret == 1) {
+        peer->status = PEER_SUCCESS;
+    } else if (ret < 0) { /* On 0, we retry. */
+        int error = SSL_get_error(peer->ssl, ret);
+        /* Memory bios should never block with SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE. */
+        if (error != SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ)
+            peer->status = PEER_ERROR;
+    }
+}
+
+typedef enum {
+    HANDSHAKE,
+    RENEG_APPLICATION_DATA,
+    RENEG_SETUP,
+    RENEG_HANDSHAKE,
+    APPLICATION_DATA,
+    SHUTDOWN,
+    CONNECTION_DONE
+} connect_phase_t;
+
+static connect_phase_t next_phase(const SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx,
+                                  connect_phase_t phase)
+{
+    switch (phase) {
+    case HANDSHAKE:
+        if (test_ctx->handshake_mode == SSL_TEST_HANDSHAKE_RENEG_SERVER
+                || test_ctx->handshake_mode == SSL_TEST_HANDSHAKE_RENEG_CLIENT)
+            return RENEG_APPLICATION_DATA;
+        return APPLICATION_DATA;
+    case RENEG_APPLICATION_DATA:
+        return RENEG_SETUP;
+    case RENEG_SETUP:
+        return RENEG_HANDSHAKE;
+    case RENEG_HANDSHAKE:
+        return APPLICATION_DATA;
+    case APPLICATION_DATA:
+        return SHUTDOWN;
+    case SHUTDOWN:
+        return CONNECTION_DONE;
+    default:
+        TEST_check(0); /* Should never call next_phase when done. */
+    }
+}
+
+static void do_connect_step(const SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx, PEER *peer,
+                            connect_phase_t phase)
+{
+    switch (phase) {
+    case HANDSHAKE:
+        do_handshake_step(peer);
+        break;
+    case RENEG_APPLICATION_DATA:
+        do_app_data_step(peer);
+        break;
+    case RENEG_SETUP:
+        do_reneg_setup_step(test_ctx, peer);
+        break;
+    case RENEG_HANDSHAKE:
+        do_handshake_step(peer);
+        break;
+    case APPLICATION_DATA:
+        do_app_data_step(peer);
+        break;
+    case SHUTDOWN:
+        do_shutdown_step(peer);
+        break;
+    default:
+        TEST_check(0);
+    }
+}
+
+typedef enum {
+    /* Both parties succeeded. */
+    HANDSHAKE_SUCCESS,
+    /* Client errored. */
+    CLIENT_ERROR,
+    /* Server errored. */
+    SERVER_ERROR,
+    /* Peers are in inconsistent state. */
+    INTERNAL_ERROR,
+    /* One or both peers not done. */
+    HANDSHAKE_RETRY
+} handshake_status_t;
+
+/*
+ * Determine the handshake outcome.
+ * last_status: the status of the peer to have acted last.
+ * previous_status: the status of the peer that didn't act last.
+ * client_spoke_last: 1 if the client went last.
+ */
+static handshake_status_t handshake_status(peer_status_t last_status,
+                                           peer_status_t previous_status,
+                                           int client_spoke_last)
+{
+    switch (last_status) {
+    case PEER_SUCCESS:
+        switch (previous_status) {
+        case PEER_SUCCESS:
+            /* Both succeeded. */
+            return HANDSHAKE_SUCCESS;
+        case PEER_RETRY:
+            /* Let the first peer finish. */
+            return HANDSHAKE_RETRY;
+        case PEER_ERROR:
+            /*
+             * Second peer succeeded despite the fact that the first peer
+             * already errored. This shouldn't happen.
+             */
+            return INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        }
+        break;
+
+    case PEER_RETRY:
+        return HANDSHAKE_RETRY;
+
+    case PEER_ERROR:
+        switch (previous_status) {
+        case PEER_SUCCESS:
+            /*
+             * First peer succeeded but second peer errored.
+             * TODO(emilia): we should be able to continue here (with some
+             * application data?) to ensure the first peer receives the
+             * alert / close_notify.
+             * (No tests currently exercise this branch.)
+             */
+            return client_spoke_last ? CLIENT_ERROR : SERVER_ERROR;
+        case PEER_RETRY:
+            /* We errored; let the peer finish. */
+            return HANDSHAKE_RETRY;
+        case PEER_ERROR:
+            /* Both peers errored. Return the one that errored first. */
+            return client_spoke_last ? SERVER_ERROR : CLIENT_ERROR;
+        }
+    }
+    /* Control should never reach here. */
+    return INTERNAL_ERROR;
+}
+
+/* Convert unsigned char buf's that shouldn't contain any NUL-bytes to char. */
+static char *dup_str(const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
+{
+    char *ret;
+
+    if(len == 0)
+        return NULL;
+
+    /* Assert that the string does not contain NUL-bytes. */
+    TEST_check(OPENSSL_strnlen((const char*)(in), len) == len);
+    ret = OPENSSL_strndup((const char*)(in), len);
+    TEST_check(ret != NULL);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note that |extra| points to the correct client/server configuration
+ * within |test_ctx|. When configuring the handshake, general mode settings
+ * are taken from |test_ctx|, and client/server-specific settings should be
+ * taken from |extra|.
+ *
+ * The configuration code should never reach into |test_ctx->extra| or
+ * |test_ctx->resume_extra| directly.
+ *
+ * (We could refactor test mode settings into a substructure. This would result
+ * in cleaner argument passing but would complicate the test configuration
+ * parsing.)
+ */
+static HANDSHAKE_RESULT *do_handshake_internal(
+    SSL_CTX *server_ctx, SSL_CTX *server2_ctx, SSL_CTX *client_ctx,
+    const SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx, const SSL_TEST_EXTRA_CONF *extra,
+    SSL_SESSION *session_in, SSL_SESSION **session_out)
+{
+    PEER server, client;
+    BIO *client_to_server, *server_to_client;
+    HANDSHAKE_EX_DATA server_ex_data, client_ex_data;
+    CTX_DATA client_ctx_data, server_ctx_data, server2_ctx_data;
+    HANDSHAKE_RESULT *ret = HANDSHAKE_RESULT_new();
+    int client_turn = 1, client_turn_count = 0;
+    connect_phase_t phase = HANDSHAKE;
+    handshake_status_t status = HANDSHAKE_RETRY;
+    const unsigned char* tick = NULL;
+    size_t tick_len = 0;
+    SSL_SESSION* sess = NULL;
+    const unsigned char *proto = NULL;
+    /* API dictates unsigned int rather than size_t. */
+    unsigned int proto_len = 0;
+    EVP_PKEY *tmp_key;
+
+    memset(&server_ctx_data, 0, sizeof(server_ctx_data));
+    memset(&server2_ctx_data, 0, sizeof(server2_ctx_data));
+    memset(&client_ctx_data, 0, sizeof(client_ctx_data));
+    memset(&server, 0, sizeof(server));
+    memset(&client, 0, sizeof(client));
+
+    configure_handshake_ctx(server_ctx, server2_ctx, client_ctx, test_ctx, extra,
+                            &server_ctx_data, &server2_ctx_data, &client_ctx_data);
+
+    /* Setup SSL and buffers; additional configuration happens below. */
+    create_peer(&server, server_ctx);
+    create_peer(&client, client_ctx);
+
+    server.bytes_to_write = client.bytes_to_read = test_ctx->app_data_size;
+    client.bytes_to_write = server.bytes_to_read = test_ctx->app_data_size;
+
+    configure_handshake_ssl(server.ssl, client.ssl, extra);
+    if (session_in != NULL) {
+        /* In case we're testing resumption without tickets. */
+        TEST_check(SSL_CTX_add_session(server_ctx, session_in));
+        TEST_check(SSL_set_session(client.ssl, session_in));
+    }
+
+    memset(&server_ex_data, 0, sizeof(server_ex_data));
+    memset(&client_ex_data, 0, sizeof(client_ex_data));
+
+    ret->result = SSL_TEST_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+    client_to_server = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+    server_to_client = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+
+    TEST_check(client_to_server != NULL);
+    TEST_check(server_to_client != NULL);
+
+    /* Non-blocking bio. */
+    BIO_set_nbio(client_to_server, 1);
+    BIO_set_nbio(server_to_client, 1);
+
+    SSL_set_connect_state(client.ssl);
+    SSL_set_accept_state(server.ssl);
+
+    /* The bios are now owned by the SSL object. */
+    SSL_set_bio(client.ssl, server_to_client, client_to_server);
+    TEST_check(BIO_up_ref(server_to_client) > 0);
+    TEST_check(BIO_up_ref(client_to_server) > 0);
+    SSL_set_bio(server.ssl, client_to_server, server_to_client);
+
+    ex_data_idx = SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, "ex data", NULL, NULL, NULL);
+    TEST_check(ex_data_idx >= 0);
+
+    TEST_check(SSL_set_ex_data(server.ssl, ex_data_idx, &server_ex_data) == 1);
+    TEST_check(SSL_set_ex_data(client.ssl, ex_data_idx, &client_ex_data) == 1);
+
+    SSL_set_info_callback(server.ssl, &info_cb);
+    SSL_set_info_callback(client.ssl, &info_cb);
+
+    client.status = server.status = PEER_RETRY;
+
+    /*
+     * Half-duplex handshake loop.
+     * Client and server speak to each other synchronously in the same process.
+     * We use non-blocking BIOs, so whenever one peer blocks for read, it
+     * returns PEER_RETRY to indicate that it's the other peer's turn to write.
+     * The handshake succeeds once both peers have succeeded. If one peer
+     * errors out, we also let the other peer retry (and presumably fail).
+     */
+    for(;;) {
+        if (client_turn) {
+            do_connect_step(test_ctx, &client, phase);
+            status = handshake_status(client.status, server.status,
+                                      1 /* client went last */);
+        } else {
+            do_connect_step(test_ctx, &server, phase);
+            status = handshake_status(server.status, client.status,
+                                      0 /* server went last */);
+        }
+
+        switch (status) {
+        case HANDSHAKE_SUCCESS:
+            client_turn_count = 0;
+            phase = next_phase(test_ctx, phase);
+            if (phase == CONNECTION_DONE) {
+                ret->result = SSL_TEST_SUCCESS;
+                goto err;
+            } else {
+                client.status = server.status = PEER_RETRY;
+                /*
+                 * For now, client starts each phase. Since each phase is
+                 * started separately, we can later control this more
+                 * precisely, for example, to test client-initiated and
+                 * server-initiated shutdown.
+                 */
+                client_turn = 1;
+                break;
+            }
+        case CLIENT_ERROR:
+            ret->result = SSL_TEST_CLIENT_FAIL;
+            goto err;
+        case SERVER_ERROR:
+            ret->result = SSL_TEST_SERVER_FAIL;
+            goto err;
+        case INTERNAL_ERROR:
+            ret->result = SSL_TEST_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+            goto err;
+        case HANDSHAKE_RETRY:
+            if (client_turn_count++ >= 2000) {
+                /*
+                 * At this point, there's been so many PEER_RETRY in a row
+                 * that it's likely both sides are stuck waiting for a read.
+                 * It's time to give up.
+                 */
+                ret->result = SSL_TEST_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                goto err;
+            }
+
+            /* Continue. */
+            client_turn ^= 1;
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+ err:
+    ret->server_alert_sent = server_ex_data.alert_sent;
+    ret->server_num_fatal_alerts_sent = server_ex_data.num_fatal_alerts_sent;
+    ret->server_alert_received = client_ex_data.alert_received;
+    ret->client_alert_sent = client_ex_data.alert_sent;
+    ret->client_num_fatal_alerts_sent = client_ex_data.num_fatal_alerts_sent;
+    ret->client_alert_received = server_ex_data.alert_received;
+    ret->server_protocol = SSL_version(server.ssl);
+    ret->client_protocol = SSL_version(client.ssl);
+    ret->servername = server_ex_data.servername;
+    if ((sess = SSL_get0_session(client.ssl)) != NULL)
+        SSL_SESSION_get0_ticket(sess, &tick, &tick_len);
+    if (tick == NULL || tick_len == 0)
+        ret->session_ticket = SSL_TEST_SESSION_TICKET_NO;
+    else
+        ret->session_ticket = SSL_TEST_SESSION_TICKET_YES;
+    ret->session_ticket_do_not_call = server_ex_data.session_ticket_do_not_call;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+    SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(client.ssl, &proto, &proto_len);
+    ret->client_npn_negotiated = dup_str(proto, proto_len);
+
+    SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(server.ssl, &proto, &proto_len);
+    ret->server_npn_negotiated = dup_str(proto, proto_len);
+#endif
+
+    SSL_get0_alpn_selected(client.ssl, &proto, &proto_len);
+    ret->client_alpn_negotiated = dup_str(proto, proto_len);
+
+    SSL_get0_alpn_selected(server.ssl, &proto, &proto_len);
+    ret->server_alpn_negotiated = dup_str(proto, proto_len);
+
+    ret->client_resumed = SSL_session_reused(client.ssl);
+    ret->server_resumed = SSL_session_reused(server.ssl);
+
+    if (session_out != NULL)
+        *session_out = SSL_get1_session(client.ssl);
+
+    if (SSL_get_server_tmp_key(client.ssl, &tmp_key)) {
+        int nid = EVP_PKEY_id(tmp_key);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+        if (nid == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
+            EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(tmp_key);
+            nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
+        }
+#endif
+        EVP_PKEY_free(tmp_key);
+        ret->tmp_key_type = nid;
+    }
+
+    ctx_data_free_data(&server_ctx_data);
+    ctx_data_free_data(&server2_ctx_data);
+    ctx_data_free_data(&client_ctx_data);
+
+    peer_free_data(&server);
+    peer_free_data(&client);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+HANDSHAKE_RESULT *do_handshake(SSL_CTX *server_ctx, SSL_CTX *server2_ctx,
+                               SSL_CTX *client_ctx, SSL_CTX *resume_server_ctx,
+                               SSL_CTX *resume_client_ctx,
+                               const SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx)
+{
+    HANDSHAKE_RESULT *result;
+    SSL_SESSION *session = NULL;
+
+    result = do_handshake_internal(server_ctx, server2_ctx, client_ctx,
+                                   test_ctx, &test_ctx->extra,
+                                   NULL, &session);
+    if (test_ctx->handshake_mode != SSL_TEST_HANDSHAKE_RESUME)
+        goto end;
+
+    if (result->result != SSL_TEST_SUCCESS) {
+        result->result = SSL_TEST_FIRST_HANDSHAKE_FAILED;
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    HANDSHAKE_RESULT_free(result);
+    /* We don't support SNI on second handshake yet, so server2_ctx is NULL. */
+    result = do_handshake_internal(resume_server_ctx, NULL, resume_client_ctx,
+                                   test_ctx, &test_ctx->resume_extra,
+                                   session, NULL);
+ end:
+    SSL_SESSION_free(session);
+    return result;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/handshake_helper.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/handshake_helper.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4f70592
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/handshake_helper.h
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_HANDSHAKE_HELPER_H
+#define HEADER_HANDSHAKE_HELPER_H
+
+#include "ssl_test_ctx.h"
+
+typedef struct handshake_result {
+    ssl_test_result_t result;
+    /* These alerts are in the 2-byte format returned by the info_callback. */
+    /* (Latest) alert sent by the client; 0 if no alert. */
+    int client_alert_sent;
+    /* Number of fatal or close_notify alerts sent. */
+    int client_num_fatal_alerts_sent;
+    /* (Latest) alert received by the server; 0 if no alert. */
+    int client_alert_received;
+    /* (Latest) alert sent by the server; 0 if no alert. */
+    int server_alert_sent;
+    /* Number of fatal or close_notify alerts sent. */
+    int server_num_fatal_alerts_sent;
+    /* (Latest) alert received by the client; 0 if no alert. */
+    int server_alert_received;
+    /* Negotiated protocol. On success, these should always match. */
+    int server_protocol;
+    int client_protocol;
+    /* Server connection */
+    ssl_servername_t servername;
+    /* Session ticket status */
+    ssl_session_ticket_t session_ticket;
+    /* Was this called on the second context? */
+    int session_ticket_do_not_call;
+    char *client_npn_negotiated;
+    char *server_npn_negotiated;
+    char *client_alpn_negotiated;
+    char *server_alpn_negotiated;
+    /* Was the handshake resumed? */
+    int client_resumed;
+    int server_resumed;
+    /* Temporary key type */
+    int tmp_key_type;
+} HANDSHAKE_RESULT;
+
+HANDSHAKE_RESULT *HANDSHAKE_RESULT_new(void);
+void HANDSHAKE_RESULT_free(HANDSHAKE_RESULT *result);
+
+/* Do a handshake and report some information about the result. */
+HANDSHAKE_RESULT *do_handshake(SSL_CTX *server_ctx, SSL_CTX *server2_ctx,
+                               SSL_CTX *client_ctx, SSL_CTX *resume_server_ctx,
+                               SSL_CTX *resume_client_ctx,
+                               const SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx);
+
+#endif  /* HEADER_HANDSHAKE_HELPER_H */
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/heartbeat_test.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/heartbeat_test.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..906736c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/heartbeat_test.c
@@ -0,0 +1,378 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2014-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*-
+ * Unit test for TLS heartbeats.
+ *
+ * Acts as a regression test against the Heartbleed bug (CVE-2014-0160).
+ *
+ * Author:  Mike Bland (mbland@acm.org, http://mike-bland.com/)
+ * Date:    2014-04-12
+ * License: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC By 4.0)
+ *          http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.en_US
+ *
+ * OUTPUT
+ * ------
+ * The program returns zero on success. It will print a message with a count
+ * of the number of failed tests and return nonzero if any tests fail.
+ *
+ * It will print the contents of the request and response buffers for each
+ * failing test. In a "fixed" version, all the tests should pass and there
+ * should be no output.
+ *
+ * In a "bleeding" version, you'll see:
+ *
+ *   test_dtls1_heartbleed failed:
+ *     expected payload len: 0
+ *     received: 1024
+ *   sent 26 characters
+ *     "HEARTBLEED                "
+ *   received 1024 characters
+ *     "HEARTBLEED                \xde\xad\xbe\xef..."
+ *   ** test_dtls1_heartbleed failed **
+ *
+ * The contents of the returned buffer in the failing test will depend on the
+ * contents of memory on your machine.
+ *
+ * MORE INFORMATION
+ * ----------------
+ * http://mike-bland.com/2014/04/12/heartbleed.html
+ * http://mike-bland.com/tags/heartbleed.html
+ */
+
+#define OPENSSL_UNIT_TEST
+
+#include "../ssl/ssl_locl.h"
+
+#include "testutil.h"
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_UNIT_TEST)
+
+/* As per https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6520#section-4 */
+# define MIN_PADDING_SIZE        16
+
+/* Maximum number of payload characters to print as test output */
+# define MAX_PRINTABLE_CHARACTERS        1024
+
+typedef struct heartbeat_test_fixture {
+    SSL_CTX *ctx;
+    SSL *s;
+    const char *test_case_name;
+    int (*process_heartbeat) (SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned int length);
+    unsigned char *payload;
+    int sent_payload_len;
+    int expected_return_value;
+    int return_payload_offset;
+    int expected_payload_len;
+    const char *expected_return_payload;
+} HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE;
+
+static HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE set_up(const char *const test_case_name,
+                                     const SSL_METHOD *meth)
+{
+    HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE fixture;
+    int setup_ok = 1;
+    memset(&fixture, 0, sizeof(fixture));
+    fixture.test_case_name = test_case_name;
+
+    fixture.ctx = SSL_CTX_new(meth);
+    if (!fixture.ctx) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Failed to allocate SSL_CTX for test: %s\n",
+                test_case_name);
+        setup_ok = 0;
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    fixture.s = SSL_new(fixture.ctx);
+    if (!fixture.s) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Failed to allocate SSL for test: %s\n",
+                test_case_name);
+        setup_ok = 0;
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(fixture.s)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Failed to set up wbio buffer for test: %s\n",
+                test_case_name);
+        setup_ok = 0;
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(fixture.s)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Failed to setup buffers for test: %s\n",
+                test_case_name);
+        setup_ok = 0;
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Clear the memory for the return buffer, since this isn't automatically
+     * zeroed in opt mode and will cause spurious test failures that will
+     * change with each execution.
+     */
+    memset(fixture.s->rlayer.wbuf.buf, 0, fixture.s->rlayer.wbuf.len);
+
+ fail:
+    if (!setup_ok) {
+        ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+        exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+    }
+    return fixture;
+}
+
+static HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE set_up_dtls(const char *const test_case_name)
+{
+    HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE fixture = set_up(test_case_name,
+                                            DTLS_server_method());
+    fixture.process_heartbeat = dtls1_process_heartbeat;
+
+    /*
+     * As per dtls1_get_record(), skipping the following from the beginning
+     * of the returned heartbeat message: type-1 byte; version-2 bytes;
+     * sequence number-8 bytes; length-2 bytes And then skipping the 1-byte
+     * type encoded by process_heartbeat for a total of 14 bytes, at which
+     * point we can grab the length and the payload we seek.
+     */
+    fixture.return_payload_offset = 14;
+    return fixture;
+}
+
+/* Needed by ssl3_write_bytes() */
+static int dummy_handshake(SSL *s)
+{
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static void tear_down(HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE fixture)
+{
+    ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+    SSL_free(fixture.s);
+    SSL_CTX_free(fixture.ctx);
+}
+
+static void print_payload(const char *const prefix,
+                          const unsigned char *payload, const int n)
+{
+    const int end = n < MAX_PRINTABLE_CHARACTERS ? n
+        : MAX_PRINTABLE_CHARACTERS;
+    int i = 0;
+
+    printf("%s %d character%s", prefix, n, n == 1 ? "" : "s");
+    if (end != n)
+        printf(" (first %d shown)", end);
+    printf("\n  \"");
+
+    for (; i != end; ++i) {
+        const unsigned char c = payload[i];
+        if (isprint(c))
+            fputc(c, stdout);
+        else
+            printf("\\x%02x", c);
+    }
+    printf("\"\n");
+}
+
+static int execute_heartbeat(HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE fixture)
+{
+    int result = 0;
+    SSL *s = fixture.s;
+    unsigned char *payload = fixture.payload;
+    unsigned char sent_buf[MAX_PRINTABLE_CHARACTERS + 1];
+    int return_value;
+    unsigned const char *p;
+    int actual_payload_len;
+
+    s->rlayer.rrec.data = payload;
+    s->rlayer.rrec.length = strlen((const char *)payload);
+    *payload++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
+    s2n(fixture.sent_payload_len, payload);
+
+    /*
+     * Make a local copy of the request, since it gets overwritten at some
+     * point
+     */
+    memcpy(sent_buf, payload, sizeof(sent_buf));
+
+    return_value = fixture.process_heartbeat(s, s->rlayer.rrec.data,
+        s->rlayer.rrec.length);
+
+    if (return_value != fixture.expected_return_value) {
+        printf("%s failed: expected return value %d, received %d\n",
+               fixture.test_case_name, fixture.expected_return_value,
+               return_value);
+        result = 1;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * If there is any byte alignment, it will be stored in wbuf.offset.
+     */
+    p = &(s->rlayer.
+          wbuf.buf[fixture.return_payload_offset + s->rlayer.wbuf.offset]);
+    actual_payload_len = 0;
+    n2s(p, actual_payload_len);
+
+    if (actual_payload_len != fixture.expected_payload_len) {
+        printf("%s failed:\n  expected payload len: %d\n  received: %d\n",
+               fixture.test_case_name, fixture.expected_payload_len,
+               actual_payload_len);
+        print_payload("sent", sent_buf, strlen((const char *)sent_buf));
+        print_payload("received", p, actual_payload_len);
+        result = 1;
+    } else {
+        char *actual_payload =
+            OPENSSL_strndup((const char *)p, actual_payload_len);
+        if (strcmp(actual_payload, fixture.expected_return_payload) != 0) {
+            printf
+                ("%s failed:\n  expected payload: \"%s\"\n  received: \"%s\"\n",
+                 fixture.test_case_name, fixture.expected_return_payload,
+                 actual_payload);
+            result = 1;
+        }
+        OPENSSL_free(actual_payload);
+    }
+
+    if (result != 0) {
+        printf("** %s failed **\n--------\n", fixture.test_case_name);
+    }
+    return result;
+}
+
+static int honest_payload_size(unsigned char payload_buf[])
+{
+    /* Omit three-byte pad at the beginning for type and payload length */
+    return strlen((const char *)&payload_buf[3]) - MIN_PADDING_SIZE;
+}
+
+# define SETUP_HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE(type)\
+  SETUP_TEST_FIXTURE(HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE, set_up_##type)
+
+# define EXECUTE_HEARTBEAT_TEST()\
+  EXECUTE_TEST(execute_heartbeat, tear_down)
+
+static int test_dtls1_not_bleeding()
+{
+    SETUP_HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE(dtls);
+    /* Three-byte pad at the beginning for type and payload length */
+    unsigned char payload_buf[MAX_PRINTABLE_CHARACTERS + 4] =
+        "   Not bleeding, sixteen spaces of padding" "                ";
+    const int payload_buf_len = honest_payload_size(payload_buf);
+
+    fixture.payload = &payload_buf[0];
+    fixture.sent_payload_len = payload_buf_len;
+    fixture.expected_return_value = 0;
+    fixture.expected_payload_len = payload_buf_len;
+    fixture.expected_return_payload =
+        "Not bleeding, sixteen spaces of padding";
+    EXECUTE_HEARTBEAT_TEST();
+}
+
+static int test_dtls1_not_bleeding_empty_payload()
+{
+    int payload_buf_len;
+
+    SETUP_HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE(dtls);
+    /*
+     * Three-byte pad at the beginning for type and payload length, plus a
+     * NUL at the end
+     */
+    unsigned char payload_buf[4 + MAX_PRINTABLE_CHARACTERS];
+    memset(payload_buf, ' ', MIN_PADDING_SIZE + 3);
+    payload_buf[MIN_PADDING_SIZE + 3] = '\0';
+    payload_buf_len = honest_payload_size(payload_buf);
+
+    fixture.payload = &payload_buf[0];
+    fixture.sent_payload_len = payload_buf_len;
+    fixture.expected_return_value = 0;
+    fixture.expected_payload_len = payload_buf_len;
+    fixture.expected_return_payload = "";
+    EXECUTE_HEARTBEAT_TEST();
+}
+
+static int test_dtls1_heartbleed()
+{
+    SETUP_HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE(dtls);
+    /* Three-byte pad at the beginning for type and payload length */
+    unsigned char payload_buf[4 + MAX_PRINTABLE_CHARACTERS] =
+        "   HEARTBLEED                ";
+
+    fixture.payload = &payload_buf[0];
+    fixture.sent_payload_len = MAX_PRINTABLE_CHARACTERS;
+    fixture.expected_return_value = 0;
+    fixture.expected_payload_len = 0;
+    fixture.expected_return_payload = "";
+    EXECUTE_HEARTBEAT_TEST();
+}
+
+static int test_dtls1_heartbleed_empty_payload()
+{
+    SETUP_HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE(dtls);
+    /*
+     * Excluding the NUL at the end, one byte short of type + payload length
+     * + minimum padding
+     */
+    unsigned char payload_buf[MAX_PRINTABLE_CHARACTERS + 4];
+    memset(payload_buf, ' ', MIN_PADDING_SIZE + 2);
+    payload_buf[MIN_PADDING_SIZE + 2] = '\0';
+
+    fixture.payload = &payload_buf[0];
+    fixture.sent_payload_len = MAX_PRINTABLE_CHARACTERS;
+    fixture.expected_return_value = 0;
+    fixture.expected_payload_len = 0;
+    fixture.expected_return_payload = "";
+    EXECUTE_HEARTBEAT_TEST();
+}
+
+static int test_dtls1_heartbleed_excessive_plaintext_length()
+{
+    SETUP_HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE(dtls);
+    /*
+     * Excluding the NUL at the end, one byte in excess of maximum allowed
+     * heartbeat message length
+     */
+    unsigned char payload_buf[SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH + 2];
+    memset(payload_buf, ' ', sizeof(payload_buf));
+    payload_buf[sizeof(payload_buf) - 1] = '\0';
+
+    fixture.payload = &payload_buf[0];
+    fixture.sent_payload_len = honest_payload_size(payload_buf);
+    fixture.expected_return_value = 0;
+    fixture.expected_payload_len = 0;
+    fixture.expected_return_payload = "";
+    EXECUTE_HEARTBEAT_TEST();
+}
+
+# undef EXECUTE_HEARTBEAT_TEST
+# undef SETUP_HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+    int result = 0;
+
+    ADD_TEST(test_dtls1_not_bleeding);
+    ADD_TEST(test_dtls1_not_bleeding_empty_payload);
+    ADD_TEST(test_dtls1_heartbleed);
+    ADD_TEST(test_dtls1_heartbleed_empty_payload);
+    ADD_TEST(test_dtls1_heartbleed_excessive_plaintext_length);
+
+    result = run_tests(argv[0]);
+    ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+    return result;
+}
+
+#else                           /* OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS */
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+    return EXIT_SUCCESS;
+}
+#endif                          /* OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS */
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/hmactest.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/hmactest.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a5c6e74
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/hmactest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,312 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+#include "../e_os.h"
+
+# include <openssl/hmac.h>
+# include <openssl/sha.h>
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+#  include <openssl/md5.h>
+# endif
+
+# ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+#  include <openssl/ebcdic.h>
+# endif
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+static struct test_st {
+    unsigned char key[16];
+    int key_len;
+    unsigned char data[64];
+    int data_len;
+    unsigned char *digest;
+} test[8] = {
+    {
+        "", 0, "More text test vectors to stuff up EBCDIC machines :-)", 54,
+        (unsigned char *)"e9139d1e6ee064ef8cf514fc7dc83e86",
+    },
+    {
+        {
+            0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b,
+            0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b,
+        }, 16, "Hi There", 8,
+        (unsigned char *)"9294727a3638bb1c13f48ef8158bfc9d",
+    },
+    {
+        "Jefe", 4, "what do ya want for nothing?", 28,
+        (unsigned char *)"750c783e6ab0b503eaa86e310a5db738",
+    },
+    {
+        {
+            0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa,
+            0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa,
+        }, 16, {
+            0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd,
+            0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd,
+            0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd,
+            0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd,
+            0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd
+        }, 50, (unsigned char *)"56be34521d144c88dbb8c733f0e8b3f6",
+    },
+    {
+        "", 0, "My test data", 12,
+        (unsigned char *)"61afdecb95429ef494d61fdee15990cabf0826fc"
+    },
+    {
+        "", 0, "My test data", 12,
+        (unsigned char *)"2274b195d90ce8e03406f4b526a47e0787a88a65479938f1a5baa3ce0f079776"
+    },
+    {
+        "123456", 6, "My test data", 12,
+        (unsigned char *)"bab53058ae861a7f191abe2d0145cbb123776a6369ee3f9d79ce455667e411dd"
+    },
+    {
+        "12345", 5, "My test data again", 18,
+        (unsigned char *)"a12396ceddd2a85f4c656bc1e0aa50c78cffde3e"
+    }
+};
+# endif
+
+static char *pt(unsigned char *md, unsigned int len);
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+    int i;
+    char *p;
+# endif
+    int err = 0;
+    HMAC_CTX *ctx = NULL, *ctx2 = NULL;
+    unsigned char buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+    unsigned int len;
+
+# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+    printf("test skipped: MD5 disabled\n");
+# else
+
+#  ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+    ebcdic2ascii(test[0].data, test[0].data, test[0].data_len);
+    ebcdic2ascii(test[1].data, test[1].data, test[1].data_len);
+    ebcdic2ascii(test[2].key, test[2].key, test[2].key_len);
+    ebcdic2ascii(test[2].data, test[2].data, test[2].data_len);
+#  endif
+
+    for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
+        p = pt(HMAC(EVP_md5(),
+                    test[i].key, test[i].key_len,
+                    test[i].data, test[i].data_len, NULL, NULL),
+                    MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+
+        if (strcmp(p, (char *)test[i].digest) != 0) {
+            printf("Error calculating HMAC on %d entry'\n", i);
+            printf("got %s instead of %s\n", p, test[i].digest);
+            err++;
+        } else
+            printf("test %d ok\n", i);
+    }
+# endif                         /* OPENSSL_NO_MD5 */
+
+/* test4 */
+    ctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+        printf("HMAC malloc failure (test 4)\n");
+        err++;
+        goto end;
+    }
+    if (HMAC_CTX_get_md(ctx) != NULL) {
+        printf("Message digest not NULL for HMAC (test 4)\n");
+        err++;
+        goto test5;
+    }
+    if (HMAC_Init_ex(ctx, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL)) {
+        printf("Should fail to initialise HMAC with empty MD and key (test 4)\n");
+        err++;
+        goto test5;
+    }
+    if (HMAC_Update(ctx, test[4].data, test[4].data_len)) {
+        printf("Should fail HMAC_Update with ctx not set up (test 4)\n");
+        err++;
+        goto test5;
+    }
+    if (HMAC_Init_ex(ctx, NULL, 0, EVP_sha1(), NULL)) {
+        printf("Should fail to initialise HMAC with empty key (test 4)\n");
+        err++;
+        goto test5;
+    }
+    if (HMAC_Update(ctx, test[4].data, test[4].data_len)) {
+        printf("Should fail HMAC_Update with ctx not set up (test 4)\n");
+        err++;
+        goto test5;
+    }
+    printf("test 4 ok\n");
+test5:
+    /* Test 5 has empty key; test that single-shot accepts a NULL key. */
+    p = pt(HMAC(EVP_sha1(), NULL, 0, test[4].data, test[4].data_len,
+                NULL, NULL), SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+    if (strcmp(p, (char *)test[4].digest) != 0) {
+        printf("Error calculating HMAC on %d entry'\n", i);
+        printf("got %s instead of %s\n", p, test[4].digest);
+        err++;
+    }
+
+    HMAC_CTX_reset(ctx);
+    if (HMAC_CTX_get_md(ctx) != NULL) {
+        printf("Message digest not NULL for HMAC (test 5)\n");
+        err++;
+        goto test6;
+    }
+    if (HMAC_Init_ex(ctx, test[4].key, test[4].key_len, NULL, NULL)) {
+        printf("Should fail to initialise HMAC with empty MD (test 5)\n");
+        err++;
+        goto test6;
+    }
+    if (HMAC_Update(ctx, test[4].data, test[4].data_len)) {
+        printf("Should fail HMAC_Update with ctx not set up (test 5)\n");
+        err++;
+        goto test6;
+    }
+    if (HMAC_Init_ex(ctx, test[4].key, -1, EVP_sha1(), NULL)) {
+        printf("Should fail to initialise HMAC with invalid key len(test 5)\n");
+        err++;
+        goto test6;
+    }
+    if (!HMAC_Init_ex(ctx, test[4].key, test[4].key_len, EVP_sha1(), NULL)) {
+        printf("Failed to initialise HMAC (test 5)\n");
+        err++;
+        goto test6;
+    }
+    if (!HMAC_Update(ctx, test[4].data, test[4].data_len)) {
+        printf("Error updating HMAC with data (test 5)\n");
+        err++;
+        goto test6;
+    }
+    if (!HMAC_Final(ctx, buf, &len)) {
+        printf("Error finalising data (test 5)\n");
+        err++;
+        goto test6;
+    }
+    p = pt(buf, len);
+    if (strcmp(p, (char *)test[4].digest) != 0) {
+        printf("Error calculating interim HMAC on test 5\n");
+        printf("got %s instead of %s\n", p, test[4].digest);
+        err++;
+        goto test6;
+    }
+    if (HMAC_Init_ex(ctx, NULL, 0, EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
+        printf("Should disallow changing MD without a new key (test 5)\n");
+        err++;
+        goto test6;
+    }
+    if (!HMAC_Init_ex(ctx, test[5].key, test[5].key_len, EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
+        printf("Failed to reinitialise HMAC (test 5)\n");
+        err++;
+        goto test6;
+    }
+    if (HMAC_CTX_get_md(ctx) != EVP_sha256()) {
+        printf("Unexpected message digest for HMAC (test 5)\n");
+        err++;
+        goto test6;
+    }
+    if (!HMAC_Update(ctx, test[5].data, test[5].data_len)) {
+        printf("Error updating HMAC with data (sha256) (test 5)\n");
+        err++;
+        goto test6;
+    }
+    if (!HMAC_Final(ctx, buf, &len)) {
+        printf("Error finalising data (sha256) (test 5)\n");
+        err++;
+        goto test6;
+    }
+    p = pt(buf, len);
+    if (strcmp(p, (char *)test[5].digest) != 0) {
+        printf("Error calculating 2nd interim HMAC on test 5\n");
+        printf("got %s instead of %s\n", p, test[5].digest);
+        err++;
+        goto test6;
+    }
+    if (!HMAC_Init_ex(ctx, test[6].key, test[6].key_len, NULL, NULL)) {
+        printf("Failed to reinitialise HMAC with key (test 5)\n");
+        err++;
+        goto test6;
+    }
+    if (!HMAC_Update(ctx, test[6].data, test[6].data_len)) {
+        printf("Error updating HMAC with data (new key) (test 5)\n");
+        err++;
+        goto test6;
+    }
+    if (!HMAC_Final(ctx, buf, &len)) {
+        printf("Error finalising data (new key) (test 5)\n");
+        err++;
+        goto test6;
+    }
+    p = pt(buf, len);
+    if (strcmp(p, (char *)test[6].digest) != 0) {
+        printf("error calculating HMAC on test 5\n");
+        printf("got %s instead of %s\n", p, test[6].digest);
+        err++;
+    } else {
+        printf("test 5 ok\n");
+    }
+test6:
+    HMAC_CTX_reset(ctx);
+    ctx2 = HMAC_CTX_new();
+    if (ctx2 == NULL) {
+        printf("HMAC malloc failure (test 6)\n");
+        err++;
+        goto end;
+    }
+    if (!HMAC_Init_ex(ctx, test[7].key, test[7].key_len, EVP_sha1(), NULL)) {
+        printf("Failed to initialise HMAC (test 6)\n");
+        err++;
+        goto end;
+    }
+    if (!HMAC_Update(ctx, test[7].data, test[7].data_len)) {
+        printf("Error updating HMAC with data (test 6)\n");
+        err++;
+        goto end;
+    }
+    if (!HMAC_CTX_copy(ctx2, ctx)) {
+        printf("Failed to copy HMAC_CTX (test 6)\n");
+        err++;
+        goto end;
+    }
+    if (!HMAC_Final(ctx2, buf, &len)) {
+        printf("Error finalising data (test 6)\n");
+        err++;
+        goto end;
+    }
+    p = pt(buf, len);
+    if (strcmp(p, (char *)test[7].digest) != 0) {
+        printf("Error calculating HMAC on test 6\n");
+        printf("got %s instead of %s\n", p, test[7].digest);
+        err++;
+    } else {
+        printf("test 6 ok\n");
+    }
+end:
+    HMAC_CTX_free(ctx2);
+    HMAC_CTX_free(ctx);
+    EXIT(err);
+}
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+static char *pt(unsigned char *md, unsigned int len)
+{
+    unsigned int i;
+    static char buf[80];
+
+    for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
+        sprintf(&(buf[i * 2]), "%02x", md[i]);
+    return (buf);
+}
+# endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ideatest.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ideatest.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3849670
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ideatest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+#include "../e_os.h"
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_IDEA
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+    printf("No IDEA support\n");
+    return (0);
+}
+#else
+# include <openssl/idea.h>
+
+static const unsigned char k[16] = {
+    0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x03, 0x00, 0x04,
+    0x00, 0x05, 0x00, 0x06, 0x00, 0x07, 0x00, 0x08
+};
+
+static const  unsigned char in[8] = { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x03 };
+static const unsigned char c[8] = { 0x11, 0xFB, 0xED, 0x2B, 0x01, 0x98, 0x6D, 0xE5 };
+
+static unsigned char out[80];
+
+static const char text[] = "Hello to all people out there";
+
+static const unsigned char cfb_key[16] = {
+    0xe1, 0xf0, 0xc3, 0xd2, 0xa5, 0xb4, 0x87, 0x96,
+    0x69, 0x78, 0x4b, 0x5a, 0x2d, 0x3c, 0x0f, 0x1e,
+};
+static const unsigned char cfb_iv[80] =
+    { 0x34, 0x12, 0x78, 0x56, 0xab, 0x90, 0xef, 0xcd };
+static unsigned char cfb_buf1[40], cfb_buf2[40], cfb_tmp[8];
+# define CFB_TEST_SIZE 24
+static const unsigned char plain[CFB_TEST_SIZE] = {
+    0x4e, 0x6f, 0x77, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73,
+    0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x74,
+    0x69, 0x6d, 0x65, 0x20, 0x66, 0x6f,
+    0x72, 0x20, 0x61, 0x6c, 0x6c, 0x20
+};
+
+static const unsigned char cfb_cipher64[CFB_TEST_SIZE] = {
+    0x59, 0xD8, 0xE2, 0x65, 0x00, 0x58, 0x6C, 0x3F,
+    0x2C, 0x17, 0x25, 0xD0, 0x1A, 0x38, 0xB7, 0x2A,
+    0x39, 0x61, 0x37, 0xDC, 0x79, 0xFB, 0x9F, 0x45
+/*- 0xF9,0x78,0x32,0xB5,0x42,0x1A,0x6B,0x38,
+    0x9A,0x44,0xD6,0x04,0x19,0x43,0xC4,0xD9,
+    0x3D,0x1E,0xAE,0x47,0xFC,0xCF,0x29,0x0B,*/
+};
+
+static int cfb64_test(const unsigned char *cfb_cipher);
+static char *pt(unsigned char *p);
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+    int i, err = 0;
+    IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE key, dkey;
+    unsigned char iv[8];
+
+    IDEA_set_encrypt_key(k, &key);
+    IDEA_ecb_encrypt(in, out, &key);
+    if (memcmp(out, c, 8) != 0) {
+        printf("ecb idea error encrypting\n");
+        printf("got     :");
+        for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
+            printf("%02X ", out[i]);
+        printf("\n");
+        printf("expected:");
+        for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
+            printf("%02X ", c[i]);
+        err = 20;
+        printf("\n");
+    }
+
+    IDEA_set_decrypt_key(&key, &dkey);
+    IDEA_ecb_encrypt(c, out, &dkey);
+    if (memcmp(out, in, 8) != 0) {
+        printf("ecb idea error decrypting\n");
+        printf("got     :");
+        for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
+            printf("%02X ", out[i]);
+        printf("\n");
+        printf("expected:");
+        for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
+            printf("%02X ", in[i]);
+        printf("\n");
+        err = 3;
+    }
+
+    if (err == 0)
+        printf("ecb idea ok\n");
+
+    memcpy(iv, k, 8);
+    IDEA_cbc_encrypt((unsigned char *)text, out, strlen(text) + 1, &key, iv,
+                     1);
+    memcpy(iv, k, 8);
+    IDEA_cbc_encrypt(out, out, 8, &dkey, iv, 0);
+    IDEA_cbc_encrypt(&(out[8]), &(out[8]), strlen(text) + 1 - 8, &dkey, iv,
+                     0);
+    if (memcmp(text, out, strlen(text) + 1) != 0) {
+        printf("cbc idea bad\n");
+        err = 4;
+    } else
+        printf("cbc idea ok\n");
+
+    printf("cfb64 idea ");
+    if (cfb64_test(cfb_cipher64)) {
+        printf("bad\n");
+        err = 5;
+    } else
+        printf("ok\n");
+
+    EXIT(err);
+}
+
+static int cfb64_test(const unsigned char *cfb_cipher)
+{
+    IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE eks, dks;
+    int err = 0, i, n;
+
+    IDEA_set_encrypt_key(cfb_key, &eks);
+    IDEA_set_decrypt_key(&eks, &dks);
+    memcpy(cfb_tmp, cfb_iv, 8);
+    n = 0;
+    IDEA_cfb64_encrypt(plain, cfb_buf1, (long)12, &eks,
+                       cfb_tmp, &n, IDEA_ENCRYPT);
+    IDEA_cfb64_encrypt(&(plain[12]), &(cfb_buf1[12]),
+                       (long)CFB_TEST_SIZE - 12, &eks,
+                       cfb_tmp, &n, IDEA_ENCRYPT);
+    if (memcmp(cfb_cipher, cfb_buf1, CFB_TEST_SIZE) != 0) {
+        err = 1;
+        printf("IDEA_cfb64_encrypt encrypt error\n");
+        for (i = 0; i < CFB_TEST_SIZE; i += 8)
+            printf("%s\n", pt(&(cfb_buf1[i])));
+    }
+    memcpy(cfb_tmp, cfb_iv, 8);
+    n = 0;
+    IDEA_cfb64_encrypt(cfb_buf1, cfb_buf2, (long)13, &eks,
+                       cfb_tmp, &n, IDEA_DECRYPT);
+    IDEA_cfb64_encrypt(&(cfb_buf1[13]), &(cfb_buf2[13]),
+                       (long)CFB_TEST_SIZE - 13, &eks,
+                       cfb_tmp, &n, IDEA_DECRYPT);
+    if (memcmp(plain, cfb_buf2, CFB_TEST_SIZE) != 0) {
+        err = 1;
+        printf("IDEA_cfb_encrypt decrypt error\n");
+        for (i = 0; i < 24; i += 8)
+            printf("%s\n", pt(&(cfb_buf2[i])));
+    }
+    return (err);
+}
+
+static char *pt(unsigned char *p)
+{
+    static char bufs[10][20];
+    static int bnum = 0;
+    char *ret;
+    int i;
+    static char *f = "0123456789ABCDEF";
+
+    ret = &(bufs[bnum++][0]);
+    bnum %= 10;
+    for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+        ret[i * 2] = f[(p[i] >> 4) & 0xf];
+        ret[i * 2 + 1] = f[p[i] & 0xf];
+    }
+    ret[16] = '\0';
+    return (ret);
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/igetest.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/igetest.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fe5bbf1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/igetest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,441 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/aes.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include "e_os.h"
+
+#define TEST_SIZE       128
+#define BIG_TEST_SIZE 10240
+
+static void hexdump(FILE *f, const char *title, const unsigned char *s, int l)
+{
+    int n = 0;
+
+    fprintf(f, "%s", title);
+    for (; n < l; ++n) {
+        if ((n % 16) == 0)
+            fprintf(f, "\n%04x", n);
+        fprintf(f, " %02x", s[n]);
+    }
+    fprintf(f, "\n");
+}
+
+#define MAX_VECTOR_SIZE 64
+
+struct ige_test {
+    const unsigned char key[16];
+    const unsigned char iv[32];
+    const unsigned char in[MAX_VECTOR_SIZE];
+    const unsigned char out[MAX_VECTOR_SIZE];
+    const size_t length;
+    const int encrypt;
+};
+
+static struct ige_test const ige_test_vectors[] = {
+    {{0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07,
+      0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f}, /* key */
+     {0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07,
+      0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f,
+      0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17,
+      0x18, 0x19, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x1c, 0x1d, 0x1e, 0x1f}, /* iv */
+     {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+      0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+      0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+      0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}, /* in */
+     {0x1a, 0x85, 0x19, 0xa6, 0x55, 0x7b, 0xe6, 0x52,
+      0xe9, 0xda, 0x8e, 0x43, 0xda, 0x4e, 0xf4, 0x45,
+      0x3c, 0xf4, 0x56, 0xb4, 0xca, 0x48, 0x8a, 0xa3,
+      0x83, 0xc7, 0x9c, 0x98, 0xb3, 0x47, 0x97, 0xcb}, /* out */
+     32, AES_ENCRYPT},          /* test vector 0 */
+
+    {{0x54, 0x68, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20,
+      0x61, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x69, 0x6d, 0x70, 0x6c, 0x65}, /* key */
+     {0x6d, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x61, 0x74, 0x69, 0x6f,
+      0x6e, 0x20, 0x6f, 0x66, 0x20, 0x49, 0x47, 0x45,
+      0x20, 0x6d, 0x6f, 0x64, 0x65, 0x20, 0x66, 0x6f,
+      0x72, 0x20, 0x4f, 0x70, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x53, 0x53}, /* iv */
+     {0x4c, 0x2e, 0x20, 0x4c, 0x65, 0x74, 0x27, 0x73,
+      0x20, 0x68, 0x6f, 0x70, 0x65, 0x20, 0x42, 0x65,
+      0x6e, 0x20, 0x67, 0x6f, 0x74, 0x20, 0x69, 0x74,
+      0x20, 0x72, 0x69, 0x67, 0x68, 0x74, 0x21, 0x0a}, /* in */
+     {0x99, 0x70, 0x64, 0x87, 0xa1, 0xcd, 0xe6, 0x13,
+      0xbc, 0x6d, 0xe0, 0xb6, 0xf2, 0x4b, 0x1c, 0x7a,
+      0xa4, 0x48, 0xc8, 0xb9, 0xc3, 0x40, 0x3e, 0x34,
+      0x67, 0xa8, 0xca, 0xd8, 0x93, 0x40, 0xf5, 0x3b}, /* out */
+     32, AES_DECRYPT},          /* test vector 1 */
+};
+
+struct bi_ige_test {
+    const unsigned char key1[32];
+    const unsigned char key2[32];
+    const unsigned char iv[64];
+    const unsigned char in[MAX_VECTOR_SIZE];
+    const unsigned char out[MAX_VECTOR_SIZE];
+    const size_t keysize;
+    const size_t length;
+    const int encrypt;
+};
+
+static struct bi_ige_test const bi_ige_test_vectors[] = {
+    {{0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07,
+      0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f}, /* key1 */
+     {0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17,
+      0x18, 0x19, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x1c, 0x1d, 0x1e, 0x1f}, /* key2 */
+     {0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07,
+      0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f,
+      0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17,
+      0x18, 0x19, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x1c, 0x1d, 0x1e, 0x1f,
+      0x20, 0x21, 0x22, 0x23, 0x24, 0x25, 0x26, 0x27,
+      0x28, 0x29, 0x2a, 0x2b, 0x2c, 0x2d, 0x2e, 0x2f,
+      0x30, 0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0x34, 0x35, 0x36, 0x37,
+      0x38, 0x39, 0x3a, 0x3b, 0x3c, 0x3d, 0x3e, 0x3f}, /* iv */
+     {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+      0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+      0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+      0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}, /* in */
+     {0x14, 0x40, 0x6f, 0xae, 0xa2, 0x79, 0xf2, 0x56,
+      0x1f, 0x86, 0xeb, 0x3b, 0x7d, 0xff, 0x53, 0xdc,
+      0x4e, 0x27, 0x0c, 0x03, 0xde, 0x7c, 0xe5, 0x16,
+      0x6a, 0x9c, 0x20, 0x33, 0x9d, 0x33, 0xfe, 0x12}, /* out */
+     16, 32, AES_ENCRYPT},      /* test vector 0 */
+    {{0x58, 0x0a, 0x06, 0xe9, 0x97, 0x07, 0x59, 0x5c,
+      0x9e, 0x19, 0xd2, 0xa7, 0xbb, 0x40, 0x2b, 0x7a,
+      0xc7, 0xd8, 0x11, 0x9e, 0x4c, 0x51, 0x35, 0x75,
+      0x64, 0x28, 0x0f, 0x23, 0xad, 0x74, 0xac, 0x37}, /* key1 */
+     {0xd1, 0x80, 0xa0, 0x31, 0x47, 0xa3, 0x11, 0x13,
+      0x86, 0x26, 0x9e, 0x6d, 0xff, 0xaf, 0x72, 0x74,
+      0x5b, 0xa2, 0x35, 0x81, 0xd2, 0xa6, 0x3d, 0x21,
+      0x67, 0x7b, 0x58, 0xa8, 0x18, 0xf9, 0x72, 0xe4}, /* key2 */
+     {0x80, 0x3d, 0xbd, 0x4c, 0xe6, 0x7b, 0x06, 0xa9,
+      0x53, 0x35, 0xd5, 0x7e, 0x71, 0xc1, 0x70, 0x70,
+      0x74, 0x9a, 0x00, 0x28, 0x0c, 0xbf, 0x6c, 0x42,
+      0x9b, 0xa4, 0xdd, 0x65, 0x11, 0x77, 0x7c, 0x67,
+      0xfe, 0x76, 0x0a, 0xf0, 0xd5, 0xc6, 0x6e, 0x6a,
+      0xe7, 0x5e, 0x4c, 0xf2, 0x7e, 0x9e, 0xf9, 0x20,
+      0x0e, 0x54, 0x6f, 0x2d, 0x8a, 0x8d, 0x7e, 0xbd,
+      0x48, 0x79, 0x37, 0x99, 0xff, 0x27, 0x93, 0xa3}, /* iv */
+     {0xf1, 0x54, 0x3d, 0xca, 0xfe, 0xb5, 0xef, 0x1c,
+      0x4f, 0xa6, 0x43, 0xf6, 0xe6, 0x48, 0x57, 0xf0,
+      0xee, 0x15, 0x7f, 0xe3, 0xe7, 0x2f, 0xd0, 0x2f,
+      0x11, 0x95, 0x7a, 0x17, 0x00, 0xab, 0xa7, 0x0b,
+      0xbe, 0x44, 0x09, 0x9c, 0xcd, 0xac, 0xa8, 0x52,
+      0xa1, 0x8e, 0x7b, 0x75, 0xbc, 0xa4, 0x92, 0x5a,
+      0xab, 0x46, 0xd3, 0x3a, 0xa0, 0xd5, 0x35, 0x1c,
+      0x55, 0xa4, 0xb3, 0xa8, 0x40, 0x81, 0xa5, 0x0b}, /* in */
+     {0x42, 0xe5, 0x28, 0x30, 0x31, 0xc2, 0xa0, 0x23,
+      0x68, 0x49, 0x4e, 0xb3, 0x24, 0x59, 0x92, 0x79,
+      0xc1, 0xa5, 0xcc, 0xe6, 0x76, 0x53, 0xb1, 0xcf,
+      0x20, 0x86, 0x23, 0xe8, 0x72, 0x55, 0x99, 0x92,
+      0x0d, 0x16, 0x1c, 0x5a, 0x2f, 0xce, 0xcb, 0x51,
+      0xe2, 0x67, 0xfa, 0x10, 0xec, 0xcd, 0x3d, 0x67,
+      0xa5, 0xe6, 0xf7, 0x31, 0x26, 0xb0, 0x0d, 0x76,
+      0x5e, 0x28, 0xdc, 0x7f, 0x01, 0xc5, 0xa5, 0x4c}, /* out */
+     32, 64, AES_ENCRYPT},      /* test vector 1 */
+
+};
+
+static int run_test_vectors(void)
+{
+    unsigned int n;
+    int errs = 0;
+
+    for (n = 0; n < OSSL_NELEM(ige_test_vectors); ++n) {
+        const struct ige_test *const v = &ige_test_vectors[n];
+        AES_KEY key;
+        unsigned char buf[MAX_VECTOR_SIZE];
+        unsigned char iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 2];
+
+        assert(v->length <= MAX_VECTOR_SIZE);
+
+        if (v->encrypt == AES_ENCRYPT)
+            AES_set_encrypt_key(v->key, 8 * sizeof(v->key), &key);
+        else
+            AES_set_decrypt_key(v->key, 8 * sizeof(v->key), &key);
+        memcpy(iv, v->iv, sizeof(iv));
+        AES_ige_encrypt(v->in, buf, v->length, &key, iv, v->encrypt);
+
+        if (memcmp(v->out, buf, v->length)) {
+            printf("IGE test vector %d failed\n", n);
+            hexdump(stdout, "key", v->key, sizeof(v->key));
+            hexdump(stdout, "iv", v->iv, sizeof(v->iv));
+            hexdump(stdout, "in", v->in, v->length);
+            hexdump(stdout, "expected", v->out, v->length);
+            hexdump(stdout, "got", buf, v->length);
+
+            ++errs;
+        }
+
+        /* try with in == out */
+        memcpy(iv, v->iv, sizeof(iv));
+        memcpy(buf, v->in, v->length);
+        AES_ige_encrypt(buf, buf, v->length, &key, iv, v->encrypt);
+
+        if (memcmp(v->out, buf, v->length)) {
+            printf("IGE test vector %d failed (with in == out)\n", n);
+            hexdump(stdout, "key", v->key, sizeof(v->key));
+            hexdump(stdout, "iv", v->iv, sizeof(v->iv));
+            hexdump(stdout, "in", v->in, v->length);
+            hexdump(stdout, "expected", v->out, v->length);
+            hexdump(stdout, "got", buf, v->length);
+
+            ++errs;
+        }
+    }
+
+    for (n = 0; n < OSSL_NELEM(bi_ige_test_vectors); ++n) {
+        const struct bi_ige_test *const v = &bi_ige_test_vectors[n];
+        AES_KEY key1;
+        AES_KEY key2;
+        unsigned char buf[MAX_VECTOR_SIZE];
+
+        assert(v->length <= MAX_VECTOR_SIZE);
+
+        if (v->encrypt == AES_ENCRYPT) {
+            AES_set_encrypt_key(v->key1, 8 * v->keysize, &key1);
+            AES_set_encrypt_key(v->key2, 8 * v->keysize, &key2);
+        } else {
+            AES_set_decrypt_key(v->key1, 8 * v->keysize, &key1);
+            AES_set_decrypt_key(v->key2, 8 * v->keysize, &key2);
+        }
+
+        AES_bi_ige_encrypt(v->in, buf, v->length, &key1, &key2, v->iv,
+                           v->encrypt);
+
+        if (memcmp(v->out, buf, v->length)) {
+            printf("Bidirectional IGE test vector %d failed\n", n);
+            hexdump(stdout, "key 1", v->key1, sizeof(v->key1));
+            hexdump(stdout, "key 2", v->key2, sizeof(v->key2));
+            hexdump(stdout, "iv", v->iv, sizeof(v->iv));
+            hexdump(stdout, "in", v->in, v->length);
+            hexdump(stdout, "expected", v->out, v->length);
+            hexdump(stdout, "got", buf, v->length);
+
+            ++errs;
+        }
+    }
+
+    return errs;
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    unsigned char rkey[16];
+    unsigned char rkey2[16];
+    AES_KEY key;
+    AES_KEY key2;
+    unsigned char plaintext[BIG_TEST_SIZE];
+    unsigned char ciphertext[BIG_TEST_SIZE];
+    unsigned char checktext[BIG_TEST_SIZE];
+    unsigned char iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 4];
+    unsigned char saved_iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 4];
+    int err = 0;
+    unsigned int n;
+    unsigned matches;
+
+    assert(BIG_TEST_SIZE >= TEST_SIZE);
+
+    RAND_bytes(rkey, sizeof(rkey));
+    RAND_bytes(plaintext, sizeof(plaintext));
+    RAND_bytes(iv, sizeof(iv));
+    memcpy(saved_iv, iv, sizeof(saved_iv));
+
+    /* Forward IGE only... */
+
+    /* Straight encrypt/decrypt */
+    AES_set_encrypt_key(rkey, 8 * sizeof(rkey), &key);
+    AES_ige_encrypt(plaintext, ciphertext, TEST_SIZE, &key, iv, AES_ENCRYPT);
+
+    AES_set_decrypt_key(rkey, 8 * sizeof(rkey), &key);
+    memcpy(iv, saved_iv, sizeof(iv));
+    AES_ige_encrypt(ciphertext, checktext, TEST_SIZE, &key, iv, AES_DECRYPT);
+
+    if (memcmp(checktext, plaintext, TEST_SIZE)) {
+        printf("Encrypt+decrypt doesn't match\n");
+        hexdump(stdout, "Plaintext", plaintext, TEST_SIZE);
+        hexdump(stdout, "Checktext", checktext, TEST_SIZE);
+        ++err;
+    }
+
+    /* Now check encrypt chaining works */
+    AES_set_encrypt_key(rkey, 8 * sizeof(rkey), &key);
+    memcpy(iv, saved_iv, sizeof(iv));
+    AES_ige_encrypt(plaintext, ciphertext, TEST_SIZE / 2, &key, iv,
+                    AES_ENCRYPT);
+    AES_ige_encrypt(plaintext + TEST_SIZE / 2,
+                    ciphertext + TEST_SIZE / 2, TEST_SIZE / 2,
+                    &key, iv, AES_ENCRYPT);
+
+    AES_set_decrypt_key(rkey, 8 * sizeof(rkey), &key);
+    memcpy(iv, saved_iv, sizeof(iv));
+    AES_ige_encrypt(ciphertext, checktext, TEST_SIZE, &key, iv, AES_DECRYPT);
+
+    if (memcmp(checktext, plaintext, TEST_SIZE)) {
+        printf("Chained encrypt+decrypt doesn't match\n");
+        hexdump(stdout, "Plaintext", plaintext, TEST_SIZE);
+        hexdump(stdout, "Checktext", checktext, TEST_SIZE);
+        ++err;
+    }
+
+    /* And check decrypt chaining */
+    AES_set_encrypt_key(rkey, 8 * sizeof(rkey), &key);
+    memcpy(iv, saved_iv, sizeof(iv));
+    AES_ige_encrypt(plaintext, ciphertext, TEST_SIZE / 2, &key, iv,
+                    AES_ENCRYPT);
+    AES_ige_encrypt(plaintext + TEST_SIZE / 2,
+                    ciphertext + TEST_SIZE / 2, TEST_SIZE / 2,
+                    &key, iv, AES_ENCRYPT);
+
+    AES_set_decrypt_key(rkey, 8 * sizeof(rkey), &key);
+    memcpy(iv, saved_iv, sizeof(iv));
+    AES_ige_encrypt(ciphertext, checktext, TEST_SIZE / 2, &key, iv,
+                    AES_DECRYPT);
+    AES_ige_encrypt(ciphertext + TEST_SIZE / 2,
+                    checktext + TEST_SIZE / 2, TEST_SIZE / 2, &key, iv,
+                    AES_DECRYPT);
+
+    if (memcmp(checktext, plaintext, TEST_SIZE)) {
+        printf("Chained encrypt+chained decrypt doesn't match\n");
+        hexdump(stdout, "Plaintext", plaintext, TEST_SIZE);
+        hexdump(stdout, "Checktext", checktext, TEST_SIZE);
+        ++err;
+    }
+
+    /* make sure garble extends forwards only */
+    AES_set_encrypt_key(rkey, 8 * sizeof(rkey),&key);
+    memcpy(iv, saved_iv, sizeof(iv));
+    AES_ige_encrypt(plaintext, ciphertext, sizeof(plaintext), &key, iv,
+                    AES_ENCRYPT);
+
+    /* corrupt halfway through */
+    ++ciphertext[sizeof(ciphertext) / 2];
+    AES_set_decrypt_key(rkey, 8 * sizeof(rkey), &key);
+    memcpy(iv, saved_iv, sizeof(iv));
+    AES_ige_encrypt(ciphertext, checktext, sizeof(checktext), &key, iv,
+                    AES_DECRYPT);
+
+    matches = 0;
+    for (n = 0; n < sizeof(checktext); ++n)
+        if (checktext[n] == plaintext[n])
+            ++matches;
+
+    if (matches > sizeof(checktext) / 2 + sizeof(checktext) / 100) {
+        printf("More than 51%% matches after garbling\n");
+        ++err;
+    }
+
+    if (matches < sizeof(checktext) / 2) {
+        printf("Garble extends backwards!\n");
+        ++err;
+    }
+
+    /* Bi-directional IGE */
+
+    /*
+     * Note that we don't have to recover the IV, because chaining isn't
+     */
+    /* possible with biIGE, so the IV is not updated. */
+
+    RAND_bytes(rkey2, sizeof(rkey2));
+
+    /* Straight encrypt/decrypt */
+    AES_set_encrypt_key(rkey, 8 * sizeof(rkey), &key);
+    AES_set_encrypt_key(rkey2, 8 * sizeof(rkey2), &key2);
+    AES_bi_ige_encrypt(plaintext, ciphertext, TEST_SIZE, &key, &key2, iv,
+                       AES_ENCRYPT);
+
+    AES_set_decrypt_key(rkey, 8 * sizeof(rkey), &key);
+    AES_set_decrypt_key(rkey2, 8 * sizeof(rkey2), &key2);
+    AES_bi_ige_encrypt(ciphertext, checktext, TEST_SIZE, &key, &key2, iv,
+                       AES_DECRYPT);
+
+    if (memcmp(checktext, plaintext, TEST_SIZE)) {
+        printf("Encrypt+decrypt doesn't match\n");
+        hexdump(stdout, "Plaintext", plaintext, TEST_SIZE);
+        hexdump(stdout, "Checktext", checktext, TEST_SIZE);
+        ++err;
+    }
+
+    /* make sure garble extends both ways */
+    AES_set_encrypt_key(rkey, 8 * sizeof(rkey), &key);
+    AES_set_encrypt_key(rkey2, 8 * sizeof(rkey2), &key2);
+    AES_ige_encrypt(plaintext, ciphertext, sizeof(plaintext), &key, iv,
+                    AES_ENCRYPT);
+
+    /* corrupt halfway through */
+    ++ciphertext[sizeof(ciphertext) / 2];
+    AES_set_decrypt_key(rkey, 8 * sizeof(rkey), &key);
+    AES_set_decrypt_key(rkey2, 8 * sizeof(rkey2), &key2);
+    AES_ige_encrypt(ciphertext, checktext, sizeof(checktext), &key, iv,
+                    AES_DECRYPT);
+
+    matches = 0;
+    for (n = 0; n < sizeof(checktext); ++n)
+        if (checktext[n] == plaintext[n])
+            ++matches;
+
+    if (matches > sizeof(checktext) / 100) {
+        printf("More than 1%% matches after bidirectional garbling\n");
+        ++err;
+    }
+
+    /* make sure garble extends both ways (2) */
+    AES_set_encrypt_key(rkey, 8 * sizeof(rkey), &key);
+    AES_set_encrypt_key(rkey2, 8 * sizeof(rkey2), &key2);
+    AES_ige_encrypt(plaintext, ciphertext, sizeof(plaintext), &key, iv,
+                    AES_ENCRYPT);
+
+    /* corrupt right at the end */
+    ++ciphertext[sizeof(ciphertext) - 1];
+    AES_set_decrypt_key(rkey, 8 * sizeof(rkey), &key);
+    AES_set_decrypt_key(rkey2, 8 * sizeof(rkey2), &key2);
+    AES_ige_encrypt(ciphertext, checktext, sizeof(checktext), &key, iv,
+                    AES_DECRYPT);
+
+    matches = 0;
+    for (n = 0; n < sizeof(checktext); ++n)
+        if (checktext[n] == plaintext[n])
+            ++matches;
+
+    if (matches > sizeof(checktext) / 100) {
+        printf("More than 1%% matches after bidirectional garbling (2)\n");
+        ++err;
+    }
+
+    /* make sure garble extends both ways (3) */
+    AES_set_encrypt_key(rkey, 8 * sizeof(rkey), &key);
+    AES_set_encrypt_key(rkey2, 8 * sizeof(rkey2), &key2);
+    AES_ige_encrypt(plaintext, ciphertext, sizeof(plaintext), &key, iv,
+                    AES_ENCRYPT);
+
+    /* corrupt right at the start */
+    ++ciphertext[0];
+    AES_set_decrypt_key(rkey, 8 * sizeof(rkey), &key);
+    AES_set_decrypt_key(rkey2, 8 * sizeof(rkey2), &key2);
+    AES_ige_encrypt(ciphertext, checktext, sizeof(checktext), &key, iv,
+                    AES_DECRYPT);
+
+    matches = 0;
+    for (n = 0; n < sizeof(checktext); ++n)
+        if (checktext[n] == plaintext[n])
+            ++matches;
+
+    if (matches > sizeof(checktext) / 100) {
+        printf("More than 1%% matches after bidirectional garbling (3)\n");
+        ++err;
+    }
+
+    err += run_test_vectors();
+
+    return err;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/md2test.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/md2test.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cb667cb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/md2test.c
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "../e_os.h"
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MD2
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+    printf("No MD2 support\n");
+    return (0);
+}
+#else
+# include <openssl/evp.h>
+# include <openssl/md2.h>
+
+# ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+#  include <openssl/ebcdic.h>
+# endif
+
+static char *test[] = {
+    "",
+    "a",
+    "abc",
+    "message digest",
+    "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz",
+    "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789",
+    "12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890",
+    NULL,
+};
+
+static char *ret[] = {
+    "8350e5a3e24c153df2275c9f80692773",
+    "32ec01ec4a6dac72c0ab96fb34c0b5d1",
+    "da853b0d3f88d99b30283a69e6ded6bb",
+    "ab4f496bfb2a530b219ff33031fe06b0",
+    "4e8ddff3650292ab5a4108c3aa47940b",
+    "da33def2a42df13975352846c30338cd",
+    "d5976f79d83d3a0dc9806c3c66f3efd8",
+};
+
+static char *pt(unsigned char *md);
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+    int i, err = 0;
+    char **P, **R;
+    char *p;
+    unsigned char md[MD2_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+
+    P = test;
+    R = ret;
+    i = 1;
+    while (*P != NULL) {
+        if (!EVP_Digest((unsigned char *)*P, strlen(*P), md, NULL, EVP_md2(),
+                        NULL)) {
+            printf("EVP Digest error.\n");
+            EXIT(1);
+        }
+        p = pt(md);
+        if (strcmp(p, *R) != 0) {
+            printf("error calculating MD2 on '%s'\n", *P);
+            printf("got %s instead of %s\n", p, *R);
+            err++;
+        } else
+            printf("test %d ok\n", i);
+        i++;
+        R++;
+        P++;
+    }
+    EXIT(err);
+    return err;
+}
+
+static char *pt(unsigned char *md)
+{
+    int i;
+    static char buf[80];
+
+    for (i = 0; i < MD2_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++)
+        sprintf(&(buf[i * 2]), "%02x", md[i]);
+    return (buf);
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/md4test.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/md4test.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..448f9b7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/md4test.c
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+#include "../e_os.h"
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MD4
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+    printf("No MD4 support\n");
+    return (0);
+}
+#else
+# include <openssl/evp.h>
+# include <openssl/md4.h>
+
+static char *test[] = {
+    "",
+    "a",
+    "abc",
+    "message digest",
+    "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz",
+    "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789",
+    "12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890",
+    NULL,
+};
+
+static char *ret[] = {
+    "31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0",
+    "bde52cb31de33e46245e05fbdbd6fb24",
+    "a448017aaf21d8525fc10ae87aa6729d",
+    "d9130a8164549fe818874806e1c7014b",
+    "d79e1c308aa5bbcdeea8ed63df412da9",
+    "043f8582f241db351ce627e153e7f0e4",
+    "e33b4ddc9c38f2199c3e7b164fcc0536",
+};
+
+static char *pt(unsigned char *md);
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+    int i, err = 0;
+    char **P, **R;
+    char *p;
+    unsigned char md[MD4_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+
+    P = test;
+    R = ret;
+    i = 1;
+    while (*P != NULL) {
+        if (!EVP_Digest(&(P[0][0]), strlen((char *)*P), md, NULL, EVP_md4(),
+            NULL)) {
+            printf("EVP Digest error.\n");
+            EXIT(1);
+        }
+        p = pt(md);
+        if (strcmp(p, (char *)*R) != 0) {
+            printf("error calculating MD4 on '%s'\n", *P);
+            printf("got %s instead of %s\n", p, *R);
+            err++;
+        } else
+            printf("test %d ok\n", i);
+        i++;
+        R++;
+        P++;
+    }
+    EXIT(err);
+}
+
+static char *pt(unsigned char *md)
+{
+    int i;
+    static char buf[80];
+
+    for (i = 0; i < MD4_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++)
+        sprintf(&(buf[i * 2]), "%02x", md[i]);
+    return (buf);
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/md5test.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/md5test.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ec6c692
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/md5test.c
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+#include "../e_os.h"
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+    printf("No MD5 support\n");
+    return (0);
+}
+#else
+# include <openssl/evp.h>
+# include <openssl/md5.h>
+
+static char *test[] = {
+    "",
+    "a",
+    "abc",
+    "message digest",
+    "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz",
+    "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789",
+    "12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890",
+    NULL,
+};
+
+static char *ret[] = {
+    "d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e",
+    "0cc175b9c0f1b6a831c399e269772661",
+    "900150983cd24fb0d6963f7d28e17f72",
+    "f96b697d7cb7938d525a2f31aaf161d0",
+    "c3fcd3d76192e4007dfb496cca67e13b",
+    "d174ab98d277d9f5a5611c2c9f419d9f",
+    "57edf4a22be3c955ac49da2e2107b67a",
+};
+
+static char *pt(unsigned char *md);
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+    int i, err = 0;
+    char **P, **R;
+    char *p;
+    unsigned char md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+
+    P = test;
+    R = ret;
+    i = 1;
+    while (*P != NULL) {
+        if (!EVP_Digest(&(P[0][0]), strlen((char *)*P), md, NULL, EVP_md5(),
+            NULL)) {
+            printf("EVP Digest error.\n");
+            EXIT(1);
+        }
+        p = pt(md);
+        if (strcmp(p, (char *)*R) != 0) {
+            printf("error calculating MD5 on '%s'\n", *P);
+            printf("got %s instead of %s\n", p, *R);
+            err++;
+        } else
+            printf("test %d ok\n", i);
+        i++;
+        R++;
+        P++;
+    }
+
+    EXIT(err);
+}
+
+static char *pt(unsigned char *md)
+{
+    int i;
+    static char buf[80];
+
+    for (i = 0; i < MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++)
+        sprintf(&(buf[i * 2]), "%02x", md[i]);
+    return (buf);
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/mdc2test.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/mdc2test.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d56bdcd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/mdc2test.c
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "../e_os.h"
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_DES) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MDC2)
+# define OPENSSL_NO_MDC2
+#endif
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MDC2
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+    printf("No MDC2 support\n");
+    return (0);
+}
+#else
+# include <openssl/evp.h>
+# include <openssl/mdc2.h>
+
+# ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+#  include <openssl/ebcdic.h>
+# endif
+
+static unsigned char pad1[16] = {
+    0x42, 0xE5, 0x0C, 0xD2, 0x24, 0xBA, 0xCE, 0xBA,
+    0x76, 0x0B, 0xDD, 0x2B, 0xD4, 0x09, 0x28, 0x1A
+};
+
+static unsigned char pad2[16] = {
+    0x2E, 0x46, 0x79, 0xB5, 0xAD, 0xD9, 0xCA, 0x75,
+    0x35, 0xD8, 0x7A, 0xFE, 0xAB, 0x33, 0xBE, 0xE2
+};
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+    int ret = 1;
+    unsigned char md[MDC2_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+    int i;
+    EVP_MD_CTX *c;
+    static char text[] = "Now is the time for all ";
+
+# ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+    ebcdic2ascii(text, text, strlen(text));
+# endif
+
+    c = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+    if (c == NULL
+        || !EVP_DigestInit_ex(c, EVP_mdc2(), NULL)
+        || !EVP_DigestUpdate(c, (unsigned char *)text, strlen(text))
+        || !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(c, &(md[0]), NULL))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (memcmp(md, pad1, MDC2_DIGEST_LENGTH) != 0) {
+        for (i = 0; i < MDC2_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++)
+            printf("%02X", md[i]);
+        printf(" <- generated\n");
+        for (i = 0; i < MDC2_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++)
+            printf("%02X", pad1[i]);
+        printf(" <- correct\n");
+        goto err;
+    } else {
+        printf("pad1 - ok\n");
+    }
+
+    if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(c, EVP_mdc2(), NULL))
+        goto err;
+    /* FIXME: use a ctl function? */
+    ((MDC2_CTX *)EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(c))->pad_type = 2;
+    if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(c, (unsigned char *)text, strlen(text))
+        || !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(c, &(md[0]), NULL))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (memcmp(md, pad2, MDC2_DIGEST_LENGTH) != 0) {
+        for (i = 0; i < MDC2_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++)
+            printf("%02X", md[i]);
+        printf(" <- generated\n");
+        for (i = 0; i < MDC2_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++)
+            printf("%02X", pad2[i]);
+        printf(" <- correct\n");
+    } else {
+        printf("pad2 - ok\n");
+        ret = 0;
+    }
+
+ err:
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(c);
+    EXIT(ret);
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/memleaktest.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/memleaktest.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2b23df7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/memleaktest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG
+    char *p;
+    char *lost;
+    int noleak;
+
+    p = getenv("OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY");
+    if (p != NULL && strcmp(p, "on") == 0)
+        CRYPTO_set_mem_debug(1);
+    CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON);
+
+    lost = OPENSSL_malloc(3);
+    if (lost == NULL) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_malloc failed\n");
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    if (argv[1] && strcmp(argv[1], "freeit") == 0) {
+        OPENSSL_free(lost);
+        lost = NULL;
+    }
+
+    noleak = CRYPTO_mem_leaks_fp(stderr);
+    /* If -1 return value something bad happened */
+    if (noleak == -1)
+        return 1;
+    return ((lost != NULL) ^ (noleak == 0));
+#else
+    return 0;
+#endif
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/methtest.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/methtest.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..11aa233
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/methtest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include "meth.h"
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+int main(argc, argv)
+int argc;
+char *argv[];
+{
+    METHOD_CTX *top, *tmp1, *tmp2;
+
+    top = METH_new(x509_lookup()); /* get a top level context */
+    if (top == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    tmp1 = METH_new(x509_by_file());
+    if (top == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    METH_arg(tmp1, METH_TYPE_FILE, "cafile1");
+    METH_arg(tmp1, METH_TYPE_FILE, "cafile2");
+    METH_push(top, METH_X509_CA_BY_SUBJECT, tmp1);
+
+    tmp2 = METH_new(x509_by_dir());
+    METH_arg(tmp2, METH_TYPE_DIR, "/home/eay/.CAcerts");
+    METH_arg(tmp2, METH_TYPE_DIR, "/home/eay/SSLeay/certs");
+    METH_arg(tmp2, METH_TYPE_DIR, "/usr/local/ssl/certs");
+    METH_push(top, METH_X509_CA_BY_SUBJECT, tmp2);
+
+/*- tmp=METH_new(x509_by_issuer_dir);
+    METH_arg(tmp,METH_TYPE_DIR,"/home/eay/.mycerts");
+    METH_push(top,METH_X509_BY_ISSUER,tmp);
+
+    tmp=METH_new(x509_by_issuer_primary);
+    METH_arg(tmp,METH_TYPE_FILE,"/home/eay/.mycerts/primary.pem");
+    METH_push(top,METH_X509_BY_ISSUER,tmp);
+*/
+
+    METH_init(top);
+    METH_control(tmp1, METH_CONTROL_DUMP, stdout);
+    METH_control(tmp2, METH_CONTROL_DUMP, stdout);
+    EXIT(0);
+ err:
+    ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+    EXIT(1);
+    return (0);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/D1.ors b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/D1.ors
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3fa4a11
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/D1.ors
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@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+AQEAnCgMsBO+IxIqCnXCOfXJoIC3wj+f0s4DV9h2gJBzisWXkaJD2DfNrd0kHUXK
+qVVPUxnA4G5iZu0Z385/KiOt1/P6vQ/Z2/AsEh/8Z/hIyeZCHL31wrSZW4yLeZwi
+M76wPiBHJxPun681HQlVs/OGKSHnbHc1XJAIeA/M8u+lLWqIKB+AJ82TrOqUMj1s
+LjGhQNs84xPliONN5K7DrEy+Y65X/rFxN77Smw+UtcH1GgH2NgaHH8dpt1m25sgm
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+9mquB9cv/96SuEJl8BcUWU/1LwIDAQABo4GEMIGBMAkGA1UdEwQCMAAwDgYDVR0P
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+HQYDVR0OBBYEFF/a5AMWkaBjCHg/XLYf1tnb8FA0MB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFLCwSv0c
+dSj4HGGqE/b6wZA9axajMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAA4IBAQCKRl1iXFmOQtLseDWP
+Y5icDDBGiRi17CGgvIzGJi/ha0PhbO+X0TmQIEnRX3Mu0Er/Mm4RZSjMtJ2iZRh3
+tGf4Dn+jKgKOmgXC3oOG/l8RPHLf0yaPSdn/z0TXtA30vTFBLlFeWnhbfhovea4+
+snPdBxLqWZdtxmiwojgqA7YATCWwavizrBr09YRyDwzgtpZ2BwMruGuFuV9FsEwL
+PCM53yFlrM32oFghyfyE5kYjgnnueKM+pw1kA0jgb1CnVJRrMEN1TXuXDAZLtHKG
+5X/drah1JtkoZhCzxzZ3bYdVDQJ90OHFqM58lwGD6z3XuPKrHDKZKt+CPIsl5g7p
+4J2l
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/D1_Cert_EE.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/D1_Cert_EE.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c5b993c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/D1_Cert_EE.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIGujCCBaKgAwIBAgISESG8vx4IzALnkqQG05AvM+2bMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUA
+MFkxCzAJBgNVBAYTAkJFMRkwFwYDVQQKExBHbG9iYWxTaWduIG52LXNhMS8wLQYD
+VQQDEyZHbG9iYWxTaWduIEV4dGVuZGVkIFZhbGlkYXRpb24gQ0EgLSBHMjAeFw0x
+MjA4MTQxMjM1MDJaFw0xMzA4MTUxMDMxMjlaMIIBCjEdMBsGA1UEDwwUUHJpdmF0
+ZSBPcmdhbml6YXRpb24xDzANBgNVBAUTBjU3ODYxMTETMBEGCysGAQQBgjc8AgED
+EwJVUzEeMBwGCysGAQQBgjc8AgECEw1OZXcgSGFtcHNoaXJlMQswCQYDVQQGEwJV
+UzEWMBQGA1UECAwNTmV3IEhhbXBzaGlyZTETMBEGA1UEBwwKUG9ydHNtb3V0aDEg
+MB4GA1UECRMXVHdvIEludGVybmF0aW9uYWwgRHJpdmUxDTALBgNVBAsMBC5DT00x
+GzAZBgNVBAoMEkdNTyBHbG9iYWxTaWduIEluYzEbMBkGA1UEAwwSd3d3Lmdsb2Jh
+bHNpZ24uY29tMIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAqx/nHBP4
+6s5KKMDlfZS4qFDiAWsoPSRn6WO4nrUF/G2S3I/AdJ0IcSDOHb48/3APj5alqbgo
+o4IzdG6KLAbENpHMl0L3pHBq/5tJPTi02SbiYUHfp2fhueMauRo8spfEk6fNRnDn
+QpyMFRkYd7Jz+KMerTO1xAcOH+xp0KkcP0i2jFTEuM3LwR0yTms1rry+RryjDDt5
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+bHNpZ24uY29tL3JlcG9zaXRvcnkvMIIBKwYDVR0RBIIBIjCCAR6CEnd3dy5nbG9i
+YWxzaWduLmNvbYIVc3RhdHVzLmdsb2JhbHNpZ24uY29tghF0aC5nbG9iYWxzaWdu
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+aGVjay5nbG9iYWxzaWduLmNvbYIVc3lzdGVtLmdsb2JhbHNpZ24uY29tghhvcGVy
+YXRpb24uZ2xvYmFsc2lnbi5jb22CDmdsb2JhbHNpZ24uY29tMAkGA1UdEwQCMAAw
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+Lmh0dHA6Ly9jcmwuZ2xvYmFsc2lnbi5jb20vZ3MvZ3NleHRlbmR2YWxnMi5jcmww
+gYgGCCsGAQUFBwEBBHwwejBBBggrBgEFBQcwAoY1aHR0cDovL3NlY3VyZS5nbG9i
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diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/D1_Issuer_ICA.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/D1_Issuer_ICA.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b650f38
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/D1_Issuer_ICA.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/D2.ors b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/D2.ors
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dcbd4d4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/D2.ors
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
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diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/D2_Cert_ICA.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/D2_Cert_ICA.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..459f98e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/D2_Cert_ICA.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/D2_Issuer_Root.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/D2_Issuer_Root.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f4ce4ca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/D2_Issuer_Root.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/D3.ors b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/D3.ors
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d66439b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/D3.ors
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
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diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/D3_Cert_EE.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/D3_Cert_EE.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f371ed1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/D3_Cert_EE.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+6bqmpRAZcbPtvEom0RyqPLM+AOgySWiYbg1Nl8nKx25C2AuXk63NN4CVwkXpdFF3                                                                                                               
+q5qk1izPruvJ68jNW0pG7nrMQsiY2BCesfGyEzY8vfrMjeR5MLNv5r+obeYFnC1j                                                                                                               
+uYp6JBt+thW+xPFzHYLjohKPwo/NbMOjIUM9gv/Pq3rVRPgWru4/8yYWhrmEK370                                                                                                               
+rtlYBUSGRUdR8xed1Jvs+4qJ3s9t41mLSXvUfwyPsT7eoloUAfw3RhdwOzXoC2P6                                                                                                               
+ftmniyu/b/HuYH1AWK+HFtFi9CHiMIqOJMhj/LnzL9udrQOpir7bVej/mlb3kSRo                                                                                                               
+2lZymKOvuMymMpJkvBvUU/QEbCxWZAkTyqL2qlcQhHv7W366DOFjxDqpthaTRD69                                                                                                               
+T8i/2AnsBDjYFxa47DisIvR57rLmE+fILjSvd94N/IpGs3lSOS5JeA==                                                                                                                       
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/D3_Issuer_Root.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/D3_Issuer_Root.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3ccc18e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/D3_Issuer_Root.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/ISDOSC_D1.ors b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/ISDOSC_D1.ors
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..66a60a2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/ISDOSC_D1.ors
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
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diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/ISDOSC_D2.ors b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/ISDOSC_D2.ors
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..664c8d2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/ISDOSC_D2.ors
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
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diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/ISDOSC_D3.ors b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/ISDOSC_D3.ors
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ac2bb25
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/ISDOSC_D3.ors
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
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diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/ISIC_D1_Issuer_ICA.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/ISIC_D1_Issuer_ICA.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b884775
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/ISIC_D1_Issuer_ICA.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/ISIC_D2_Issuer_Root.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/ISIC_D2_Issuer_Root.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..22f34cb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/ISIC_D2_Issuer_Root.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/ISIC_D3_Issuer_Root.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/ISIC_D3_Issuer_Root.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c1752e6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/ISIC_D3_Issuer_Root.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/ISIC_ND1_Issuer_ICA.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/ISIC_ND1_Issuer_ICA.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..25bb90f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/ISIC_ND1_Issuer_ICA.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/ISIC_ND2_Issuer_Root.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/ISIC_ND2_Issuer_Root.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..129eb4b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/ISIC_ND2_Issuer_Root.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/ISIC_ND3_Issuer_Root.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/ISIC_ND3_Issuer_Root.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4904a32
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/ISIC_ND3_Issuer_Root.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/ISOP_D1.ors b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/ISOP_D1.ors
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d28c9ec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/ISOP_D1.ors
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
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diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/ISOP_D2.ors b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/ISOP_D2.ors
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b6c541d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/ISOP_D2.ors
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
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diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/ISOP_D3.ors b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/ISOP_D3.ors
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a8a2f91
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/ISOP_D3.ors
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
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diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/ISOP_ND1.ors b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/ISOP_ND1.ors
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b230622
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/ISOP_ND1.ors
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
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diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/ISOP_ND2.ors b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/ISOP_ND2.ors
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d14efb9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/ISOP_ND2.ors
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diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/ISOP_ND3.ors b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/ISOP_ND3.ors
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3ee7158
--- /dev/null
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diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/ND1.ors b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/ND1.ors
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7452741
--- /dev/null
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diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/ND1_Cert_EE.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/ND1_Cert_EE.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e646162
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/ND1_Cert_EE.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/ND1_Cross_Root.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/ND1_Cross_Root.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..20585f1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/ND1_Cross_Root.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/ND1_Issuer_ICA-Cross.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/ND1_Issuer_ICA-Cross.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..08f04f6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/ND1_Issuer_ICA-Cross.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/ND1_Issuer_ICA.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/ND1_Issuer_ICA.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3260db3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/ND1_Issuer_ICA.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/ND2.ors b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/ND2.ors
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..24c1cb2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/ND2.ors
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
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diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/ND2_Cert_ICA.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/ND2_Cert_ICA.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3260db3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/ND2_Cert_ICA.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/ND2_Issuer_Root.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/ND2_Issuer_Root.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dc99810
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/ND2_Issuer_Root.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/ND3.ors b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/ND3.ors
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2008418
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/ND3.ors
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
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diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/ND3_Cert_EE.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/ND3_Cert_EE.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c6a76d6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/ND3_Cert_EE.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/ND3_Issuer_Root.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/ND3_Issuer_Root.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..20585f1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/ND3_Issuer_Root.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WIKH_D1.ors b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WIKH_D1.ors
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c8ce8d8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WIKH_D1.ors
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diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WIKH_D2.ors b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WIKH_D2.ors
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1d562fa
--- /dev/null
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diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WIKH_D3.ors b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WIKH_D3.ors
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cbac8e8
--- /dev/null
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diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WIKH_ND1.ors b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WIKH_ND1.ors
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a16476f
--- /dev/null
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diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WIKH_ND2.ors b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WIKH_ND2.ors
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5aff2ab
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diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WIKH_ND3.ors b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WIKH_ND3.ors
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4f8a6ea
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diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WINH_D1.ors b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WINH_D1.ors
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ed627ba
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diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WINH_D2.ors b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WINH_D2.ors
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b89fcf8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WINH_D2.ors
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diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WINH_D3.ors b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WINH_D3.ors
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c3d7c94
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WINH_D3.ors
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diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WINH_ND1.ors b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WINH_ND1.ors
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..af47552
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WINH_ND1.ors
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
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diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WINH_ND2.ors b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WINH_ND2.ors
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..99417f7
--- /dev/null
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diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WINH_ND3.ors b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WINH_ND3.ors
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..73dc42d
--- /dev/null
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diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WKDOSC_D1.ors b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WKDOSC_D1.ors
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d7566cf
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diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WKDOSC_D2.ors b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WKDOSC_D2.ors
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..757db75
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WKDOSC_D2.ors
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
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diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WKDOSC_D3.ors b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WKDOSC_D3.ors
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c33179c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WKDOSC_D3.ors
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
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diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WKIC_D1_Issuer_ICA.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WKIC_D1_Issuer_ICA.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..93fb70d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WKIC_D1_Issuer_ICA.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WKIC_D2_Issuer_Root.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WKIC_D2_Issuer_Root.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..61db7ae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WKIC_D2_Issuer_Root.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WKIC_D3_Issuer_Root.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WKIC_D3_Issuer_Root.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f03432b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WKIC_D3_Issuer_Root.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WKIC_ND1_Issuer_ICA.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WKIC_ND1_Issuer_ICA.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f0d9811
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WKIC_ND1_Issuer_ICA.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WKIC_ND2_Issuer_Root.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WKIC_ND2_Issuer_Root.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..14d35cf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WKIC_ND2_Issuer_Root.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WKIC_ND3_Issuer_Root.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WKIC_ND3_Issuer_Root.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ba7fb8d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WKIC_ND3_Issuer_Root.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WRID_D1.ors b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WRID_D1.ors
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6589782
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WRID_D1.ors
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
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diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WRID_D2.ors b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WRID_D2.ors
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4e11e4b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WRID_D2.ors
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
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diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WRID_D3.ors b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WRID_D3.ors
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..61e2d09
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WRID_D3.ors
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
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diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WRID_ND1.ors b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WRID_ND1.ors
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b6fadc5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WRID_ND1.ors
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
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diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WRID_ND2.ors b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WRID_ND2.ors
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..251f0df
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WRID_ND2.ors
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
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diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WRID_ND3.ors b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WRID_ND3.ors
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..19641f5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WRID_ND3.ors
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
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diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WSNIC_D1_Issuer_ICA.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WSNIC_D1_Issuer_ICA.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3f1c053
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WSNIC_D1_Issuer_ICA.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WSNIC_D2_Issuer_Root.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WSNIC_D2_Issuer_Root.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..af1b8b0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WSNIC_D2_Issuer_Root.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WSNIC_D3_Issuer_Root.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WSNIC_D3_Issuer_Root.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..764797a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WSNIC_D3_Issuer_Root.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WSNIC_ND1_Issuer_ICA.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WSNIC_ND1_Issuer_ICA.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..06b6908
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WSNIC_ND1_Issuer_ICA.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WSNIC_ND2_Issuer_Root.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WSNIC_ND2_Issuer_Root.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1b46fcf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WSNIC_ND2_Issuer_Root.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WSNIC_ND3_Issuer_Root.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WSNIC_ND3_Issuer_Root.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4d1f454
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocsp-tests/WSNIC_ND3_Issuer_Root.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocspapitest.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocspapitest.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..42befe7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ocspapitest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+
+#include "testutil.h"
+
+static const char *certstr;
+static const char *privkeystr;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+static int get_cert_and_key(X509 **cert_out, EVP_PKEY **key_out)
+{
+    BIO *certbio, *keybio;
+    X509 *cert = NULL;
+    EVP_PKEY *key = NULL;
+
+    if ((certbio = BIO_new_file(certstr, "r")) == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    cert = PEM_read_bio_X509(certbio, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+    BIO_free(certbio);
+    if ((keybio = BIO_new_file(privkeystr, "r")) == NULL)
+        goto end;
+    key = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(keybio, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+    BIO_free(keybio);
+    if (cert == NULL || key == NULL)
+        goto end;
+    *cert_out = cert;
+    *key_out = key;
+    return 1;
+ end:
+    X509_free(cert);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(key);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static OCSP_BASICRESP *make_dummy_resp(void)
+{
+    const unsigned char namestr[] = "openssl.example.com";
+    unsigned char keybytes[128] = {7};
+    OCSP_BASICRESP *bs = OCSP_BASICRESP_new();
+    OCSP_BASICRESP *bs_out = NULL;
+    OCSP_CERTID *cid = NULL;
+    ASN1_TIME *thisupd = ASN1_TIME_set(NULL, time(NULL));
+    ASN1_TIME *nextupd = ASN1_TIME_set(NULL, time(NULL) + 200);
+    X509_NAME *name = X509_NAME_new();
+    ASN1_BIT_STRING *key = ASN1_BIT_STRING_new();
+    ASN1_INTEGER *serial = ASN1_INTEGER_new();
+
+    if (!X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID(name, NID_commonName, MBSTRING_ASC,
+                                   namestr, -1, -1, 1)
+        || !ASN1_BIT_STRING_set(key, keybytes, sizeof(keybytes))
+        || !ASN1_INTEGER_set_uint64(serial, (uint64_t)1))
+        goto err;
+    cid = OCSP_cert_id_new(EVP_sha256(), name, key, serial);
+    if (bs == NULL
+        || thisupd == NULL
+        || nextupd == NULL
+        || cid == NULL
+        || !OCSP_basic_add1_status(bs, cid,
+                                   V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_UNKNOWN,
+                                   0, NULL, thisupd, nextupd))
+        goto err;
+    bs_out = bs;
+    bs = NULL;
+ err:
+    ASN1_TIME_free(thisupd);
+    ASN1_TIME_free(nextupd);
+    ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(key);
+    ASN1_INTEGER_free(serial);
+    OCSP_CERTID_free(cid);
+    OCSP_BASICRESP_free(bs);
+    X509_NAME_free(name);
+    return bs_out;
+}
+
+static int test_resp_signer(void)
+{
+    OCSP_BASICRESP *bs = NULL;
+    X509 *signer = NULL, *tmp;
+    EVP_PKEY *key = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs = NULL;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    /*
+     * Test a response with no certs at all; get the signer from the
+     * extra certs given to OCSP_resp_get0_signer().
+     */
+    bs = make_dummy_resp();
+    extra_certs = sk_X509_new_null();
+    if (bs == NULL
+        || extra_certs == NULL
+        || !get_cert_and_key(&signer, &key)
+        || !sk_X509_push(extra_certs, signer)
+        || !OCSP_basic_sign(bs, signer, key, EVP_sha1(),
+                                      NULL, OCSP_NOCERTS))
+        goto err;
+    if (!OCSP_resp_get0_signer(bs, &tmp, extra_certs)
+        || X509_cmp(tmp, signer) != 0)
+        goto err;
+    OCSP_BASICRESP_free(bs);
+
+    /* Do it again but include the signer cert */
+    bs = make_dummy_resp();
+    tmp = NULL;
+    if (bs == NULL
+        || !OCSP_basic_sign(bs, signer, key, EVP_sha1(),
+                            NULL, 0))
+        goto err;
+    if (!OCSP_resp_get0_signer(bs, &tmp, NULL)
+        || X509_cmp(tmp, signer) != 0)
+        goto err;
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    OCSP_BASICRESP_free(bs);
+    sk_X509_free(extra_certs);
+    X509_free(signer);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(key);
+    return ret;
+}
+#endif
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+    int testresult = 1;
+    BIO *err = NULL;
+
+    if (argc != 3) {
+        printf("Invalid argument count\n");
+        return 1;
+    }
+    if ((certstr = argv[1]) == NULL
+        || (privkeystr = argv[2]) == NULL)
+        return 1;
+    err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT);
+
+    CRYPTO_set_mem_debug(1);
+    CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+    ADD_TEST(test_resp_signer);
+#endif
+    testresult = run_tests(argv[0]);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG
+    if (CRYPTO_mem_leaks(err) <= 0)
+        testresult = 1;
+#endif
+    BIO_free(err);
+
+    if (!testresult)
+        printf("PASS\n");
+
+    return testresult;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/p5_crpt2_test.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/p5_crpt2_test.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4a40c26
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/p5_crpt2_test.c
@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2013-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "../e_os.h"
+
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/conf.h>
+
+typedef struct {
+    const char *pass;
+    int passlen;
+    const char *salt;
+    int saltlen;
+    int iter;
+} testdata;
+
+static testdata test_cases[] = {
+    {"password", 8, "salt", 4, 1},
+    {"password", 8, "salt", 4, 2},
+    {"password", 8, "salt", 4, 4096},
+    {"passwordPASSWORDpassword", 24,
+     "saltSALTsaltSALTsaltSALTsaltSALTsalt", 36, 4096},
+    {"pass\0word", 9, "sa\0lt", 5, 4096},
+    {NULL},
+};
+
+static const char *sha1_results[] = {
+    "0c60c80f961f0e71f3a9b524af6012062fe037a6",
+    "ea6c014dc72d6f8ccd1ed92ace1d41f0d8de8957",
+    "4b007901b765489abead49d926f721d065a429c1",
+    "3d2eec4fe41c849b80c8d83662c0e44a8b291a964cf2f07038",
+    "56fa6aa75548099dcc37d7f03425e0c3",
+};
+
+static const char *sha256_results[] = {
+    "120fb6cffcf8b32c43e7225256c4f837a86548c92ccc35480805987cb70be17b",
+    "ae4d0c95af6b46d32d0adff928f06dd02a303f8ef3c251dfd6e2d85a95474c43",
+    "c5e478d59288c841aa530db6845c4c8d962893a001ce4e11a4963873aa98134a",
+    "348c89dbcbd32b2f32d814b8116e84cf2b17347ebc1800181c4e2a1fb8dd53e1c63551"
+        "8c7dac47e9",
+    "89b69d0516f829893c696226650a8687",
+};
+
+static const char *sha512_results[] = {
+    "867f70cf1ade02cff3752599a3a53dc4af34c7a669815ae5d513554e1c8cf252c02d47"
+        "0a285a0501bad999bfe943c08f050235d7d68b1da55e63f73b60a57fce",
+    "e1d9c16aa681708a45f5c7c4e215ceb66e011a2e9f0040713f18aefdb866d53cf76cab"
+        "2868a39b9f7840edce4fef5a82be67335c77a6068e04112754f27ccf4e",
+    "d197b1b33db0143e018b12f3d1d1479e6cdebdcc97c5c0f87f6902e072f457b5143f30"
+        "602641b3d55cd335988cb36b84376060ecd532e039b742a239434af2d5",
+    "8c0511f4c6e597c6ac6315d8f0362e225f3c501495ba23b868c005174dc4ee71115b59"
+        "f9e60cd9532fa33e0f75aefe30225c583a186cd82bd4daea9724a3d3b8",
+    "9d9e9c4cd21fe4be24d5b8244c759665",
+};
+
+static void hexdump(FILE *f, const char *title, const unsigned char *s, int l)
+{
+    int i;
+    fprintf(f, "%s", title);
+    for (i = 0; i < l; i++) {
+        fprintf(f, "%02x", s[i]);
+    }
+    fprintf(f, "\n");
+}
+
+static void convert(unsigned char *dst, const unsigned char *src, int len)
+{
+    int i;
+    for (i = 0; i < len; i++, dst++, src += 2) {
+        unsigned int n;
+        sscanf((char *)src, "%2x", &n);
+        *dst = (unsigned char)n;
+    }
+    *dst = 0;
+}
+
+static void
+test_p5_pbkdf2(int i, char *digestname, testdata *test, const char *hex)
+{
+    const EVP_MD *digest;
+    unsigned char *out;
+    unsigned char *expected;
+    int keylen, r;
+
+    digest = EVP_get_digestbyname(digestname);
+    if (digest == NULL) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "unknown digest %s\n", digestname);
+        EXIT(5);
+    }
+
+    if ((strlen(hex) % 2) != 0) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "odd hex digest %s %i\n", digestname, i);
+        EXIT(5);
+    }
+    keylen = strlen(hex) / 2;
+    expected = OPENSSL_malloc(keylen + 1);
+    out = OPENSSL_malloc(keylen + 1);
+    if ((expected == NULL) || (out == NULL)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "malloc() failed\n");
+        EXIT(5);
+    }
+    convert(expected, (const unsigned char *)hex, keylen);
+
+    r = PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(test->pass, test->passlen,
+                          (const unsigned char *)test->salt, test->saltlen,
+                          test->iter, digest, keylen, out);
+
+    if (r == 0) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(%s) failure test %i\n",
+                digestname, i);
+        EXIT(3);
+    }
+    if (memcmp(expected, out, keylen) != 0) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Wrong result for PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(%s) test %i\n",
+                digestname, i);
+        hexdump(stderr, "expected: ", expected, keylen);
+        hexdump(stderr, "result:   ", out, keylen);
+        EXIT(2);
+    }
+    OPENSSL_free(expected);
+    OPENSSL_free(out);
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    int i;
+    testdata *test = test_cases;
+
+    CRYPTO_set_mem_debug(1);
+    CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON);
+
+    OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_ALL_BUILTIN, NULL);
+
+    printf("PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC() tests ");
+    for (i = 0; test->pass != NULL; i++, test++) {
+        test_p5_pbkdf2(i, "sha1", test, sha1_results[i]);
+        test_p5_pbkdf2(i, "sha256", test, sha256_results[i]);
+        test_p5_pbkdf2(i, "sha512", test, sha512_results[i]);
+        printf(".");
+    }
+    printf(" done\n");
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG
+    if (CRYPTO_mem_leaks_fp(stderr) <= 0)
+        return 1;
+# endif
+    return 0;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/packettest.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/packettest.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..58fc752
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/packettest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,537 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "../ssl/packet_locl.h"
+
+#define BUF_LEN 255
+
+static int test_PACKET_remaining(unsigned char buf[BUF_LEN])
+{
+    PACKET pkt;
+
+    if (       !PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, buf, BUF_LEN)
+            ||  PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != BUF_LEN
+            || !PACKET_forward(&pkt, BUF_LEN - 1)
+            ||  PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != 1
+            || !PACKET_forward(&pkt, 1)
+            ||  PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != 0) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "test_PACKET_remaining() failed\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int test_PACKET_end(unsigned char buf[BUF_LEN])
+{
+    PACKET pkt;
+
+    if (       !PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, buf, BUF_LEN)
+            ||  PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != BUF_LEN
+            ||  PACKET_end(&pkt) != buf + BUF_LEN
+            || !PACKET_forward(&pkt, BUF_LEN - 1)
+            || PACKET_end(&pkt) != buf + BUF_LEN
+            || !PACKET_forward(&pkt, 1)
+            || PACKET_end(&pkt) != buf + BUF_LEN) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "test_PACKET_end() failed\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int test_PACKET_get_1(unsigned char buf[BUF_LEN])
+{
+    unsigned int i;
+    PACKET pkt;
+
+    if (       !PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, buf, BUF_LEN)
+            || !PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &i)
+            ||  i != 0x02
+            || !PACKET_forward(&pkt, BUF_LEN - 2)
+            || !PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &i)
+            ||  i != 0xfe
+            ||  PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &i)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "test_PACKET_get_1() failed\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int test_PACKET_get_4(unsigned char buf[BUF_LEN])
+{
+    unsigned long i;
+    PACKET pkt;
+
+    if (       !PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, buf, BUF_LEN)
+            || !PACKET_get_4(&pkt, &i)
+            ||  i != 0x08060402UL
+            || !PACKET_forward(&pkt, BUF_LEN - 8)
+            || !PACKET_get_4(&pkt, &i)
+            ||  i != 0xfefcfaf8UL
+            ||  PACKET_get_4(&pkt, &i)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "test_PACKET_get_4() failed\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int test_PACKET_get_net_2(unsigned char buf[BUF_LEN])
+{
+    unsigned int i;
+    PACKET pkt;
+
+    if (       !PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, buf, BUF_LEN)
+            || !PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &i)
+            ||  i != 0x0204
+            || !PACKET_forward(&pkt, BUF_LEN - 4)
+            || !PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &i)
+            ||  i != 0xfcfe
+            ||  PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &i)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "test_PACKET_get_net_2() failed\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int test_PACKET_get_net_3(unsigned char buf[BUF_LEN])
+{
+    unsigned long i;
+    PACKET pkt;
+
+    if (       !PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, buf, BUF_LEN)
+            || !PACKET_get_net_3(&pkt, &i)
+            ||  i != 0x020406UL
+            || !PACKET_forward(&pkt, BUF_LEN - 6)
+            || !PACKET_get_net_3(&pkt, &i)
+            ||  i != 0xfafcfeUL
+            ||  PACKET_get_net_3(&pkt, &i)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "test_PACKET_get_net_3() failed\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int test_PACKET_get_net_4(unsigned char buf[BUF_LEN])
+{
+    unsigned long i;
+    PACKET pkt;
+
+    if (       !PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, buf, BUF_LEN)
+            || !PACKET_get_net_4(&pkt, &i)
+            ||  i != 0x02040608UL
+            || !PACKET_forward(&pkt, BUF_LEN - 8)
+            || !PACKET_get_net_4(&pkt, &i)
+            ||  i != 0xf8fafcfeUL
+            ||  PACKET_get_net_4(&pkt, &i)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "test_PACKET_get_net_4() failed\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int test_PACKET_get_sub_packet(unsigned char buf[BUF_LEN])
+{
+    PACKET pkt, subpkt;
+    unsigned long i;
+
+    if (       !PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, buf, BUF_LEN)
+            || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&pkt, &subpkt, 4)
+            || !PACKET_get_net_4(&subpkt, &i)
+            ||  i != 0x02040608UL
+            ||  PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)
+            || !PACKET_forward(&pkt, BUF_LEN - 8)
+            || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&pkt, &subpkt, 4)
+            || !PACKET_get_net_4(&subpkt, &i)
+            ||  i != 0xf8fafcfeUL
+            ||  PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)
+            ||  PACKET_get_sub_packet(&pkt, &subpkt, 4)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "test_PACKET_get_sub_packet() failed\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int test_PACKET_get_bytes(unsigned char buf[BUF_LEN])
+{
+    const unsigned char *bytes;
+    PACKET pkt;
+
+    if (       !PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, buf, BUF_LEN)
+            || !PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt, &bytes, 4)
+            ||  bytes[0] != 2 || bytes[1] != 4
+            ||  bytes[2] != 6 || bytes[3] != 8
+            ||  PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != BUF_LEN -4
+            || !PACKET_forward(&pkt, BUF_LEN - 8)
+            || !PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt, &bytes, 4)
+            ||  bytes[0] != 0xf8 || bytes[1] != 0xfa
+            ||  bytes[2] != 0xfc || bytes[3] != 0xfe
+            ||  PACKET_remaining(&pkt)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "test_PACKET_get_bytes() failed\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int test_PACKET_copy_bytes(unsigned char buf[BUF_LEN])
+{
+    unsigned char bytes[4];
+    PACKET pkt;
+
+    if (       !PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, buf, BUF_LEN)
+            || !PACKET_copy_bytes(&pkt, bytes, 4)
+            ||  bytes[0] != 2 || bytes[1] != 4
+            ||  bytes[2] != 6 || bytes[3] != 8
+            ||  PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != BUF_LEN - 4
+            || !PACKET_forward(&pkt, BUF_LEN - 8)
+            || !PACKET_copy_bytes(&pkt, bytes, 4)
+            ||  bytes[0] != 0xf8 || bytes[1] != 0xfa
+            ||  bytes[2] != 0xfc || bytes[3] != 0xfe
+            ||  PACKET_remaining(&pkt)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "test_PACKET_copy_bytes() failed\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int test_PACKET_copy_all(unsigned char buf[BUF_LEN])
+{
+    unsigned char tmp[BUF_LEN];
+    PACKET pkt;
+    size_t len;
+
+    if (       !PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, buf, BUF_LEN)
+               || !PACKET_copy_all(&pkt, tmp, BUF_LEN, &len)
+               || len != BUF_LEN
+               || memcmp(buf, tmp, BUF_LEN) != 0
+               || PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != BUF_LEN
+               || PACKET_copy_all(&pkt, tmp, BUF_LEN - 1, &len)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "test_PACKET_copy_bytes() failed\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int test_PACKET_memdup(unsigned char buf[BUF_LEN])
+{
+    unsigned char *data = NULL;
+    size_t len;
+    PACKET pkt;
+
+    if (       !PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, buf, BUF_LEN)
+            || !PACKET_memdup(&pkt, &data, &len)
+            ||  len != BUF_LEN
+            ||  memcmp(data, PACKET_data(&pkt), len)
+            || !PACKET_forward(&pkt, 10)
+            || !PACKET_memdup(&pkt, &data, &len)
+            ||  len != BUF_LEN - 10
+            ||  memcmp(data, PACKET_data(&pkt), len)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "test_PACKET_memdup() failed\n");
+        OPENSSL_free(data);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    OPENSSL_free(data);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int test_PACKET_strndup()
+{
+    char buf[10], buf2[10];
+    char *data = NULL;
+    PACKET pkt;
+
+    memset(buf, 'x', 10);
+    memset(buf2, 'y', 10);
+    buf2[5] = '\0';
+
+    if (       !PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, (unsigned char*)buf, 10)
+            || !PACKET_strndup(&pkt, &data)
+            ||  strlen(data) != 10
+            ||  strncmp(data, buf, 10)
+            || !PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, (unsigned char*)buf2, 10)
+            || !PACKET_strndup(&pkt, &data)
+            ||  strlen(data) != 5
+            ||  strcmp(data, buf2)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "test_PACKET_strndup failed\n");
+        OPENSSL_free(data);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    OPENSSL_free(data);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int test_PACKET_contains_zero_byte()
+{
+    char buf[10], buf2[10];
+    PACKET pkt;
+
+    memset(buf, 'x', 10);
+    memset(buf2, 'y', 10);
+    buf2[5] = '\0';
+
+    if (       !PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, (unsigned char*)buf, 10)
+            ||  PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&pkt)
+            || !PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, (unsigned char*)buf2, 10)
+            || !PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&pkt)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "test_PACKET_contains_zero_byte failed\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int test_PACKET_forward(unsigned char buf[BUF_LEN])
+{
+    const unsigned char *byte;
+    PACKET pkt;
+
+    if (       !PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, buf, BUF_LEN)
+            || !PACKET_forward(&pkt, 1)
+            || !PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt, &byte, 1)
+            ||  byte[0] != 4
+            || !PACKET_forward(&pkt, BUF_LEN - 3)
+            || !PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt, &byte, 1)
+            ||  byte[0] != 0xfe) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "test_PACKET_forward() failed\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int test_PACKET_buf_init()
+{
+    unsigned char buf[BUF_LEN];
+    PACKET pkt;
+
+    /* Also tests PACKET_remaining() */
+    if (       !PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, buf, 4)
+            ||  PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != 4
+            || !PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, buf, BUF_LEN)
+            ||  PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != BUF_LEN
+            ||  PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, buf, -1)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "test_PACKET_buf_init() failed\n");
+        return 0;
+        }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int test_PACKET_null_init()
+{
+    PACKET pkt;
+
+    PACKET_null_init(&pkt);
+    if (       PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != 0
+            || PACKET_forward(&pkt, 1)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "test_PACKET_null_init() failed\n");
+        return 0;
+        }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int test_PACKET_equal(unsigned char buf[BUF_LEN])
+{
+    PACKET pkt;
+
+    if (       !PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, buf, 4)
+            || !PACKET_equal(&pkt, buf, 4)
+            ||  PACKET_equal(&pkt, buf + 1, 4)
+            || !PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, buf, BUF_LEN)
+            || !PACKET_equal(&pkt, buf, BUF_LEN)
+            ||  PACKET_equal(&pkt, buf, BUF_LEN - 1)
+            ||  PACKET_equal(&pkt, buf, BUF_LEN + 1)
+            ||  PACKET_equal(&pkt, buf, 0)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "test_PACKET_equal() failed\n");
+        return 0;
+        }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int test_PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1()
+{
+    unsigned char buf[BUF_LEN];
+    const size_t len = 16;
+    unsigned int i;
+    PACKET pkt, short_pkt, subpkt;
+
+    buf[0] = len;
+    for (i = 1; i < BUF_LEN; i++) {
+        buf[i] = (i * 2) & 0xff;
+    }
+
+    if (       !PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, buf, BUF_LEN)
+            || !PACKET_buf_init(&short_pkt, buf, len)
+            || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&pkt, &subpkt)
+            ||  PACKET_remaining(&subpkt) != len
+            || !PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &i)
+            ||  i != 0x0204
+            ||  PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&short_pkt, &subpkt)
+            ||  PACKET_remaining(&short_pkt) != len) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "test_PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1() failed\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int test_PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2()
+{
+    unsigned char buf[1024];
+    const size_t len = 516;  /* 0x0204 */
+    unsigned int i;
+    PACKET pkt, short_pkt, subpkt;
+
+    for (i = 1; i <= 1024; i++) {
+        buf[i-1] = (i * 2) & 0xff;
+    }
+
+    if (       !PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, buf, 1024)
+            || !PACKET_buf_init(&short_pkt, buf, len)
+            || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&pkt, &subpkt)
+            ||  PACKET_remaining(&subpkt) != len
+            || !PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &i)
+            ||  i != 0x0608
+            ||  PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&short_pkt, &subpkt)
+            ||  PACKET_remaining(&short_pkt) != len) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "test_PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2() failed\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int test_PACKET_get_length_prefixed_3()
+{
+    unsigned char buf[1024];
+    const size_t len = 516;  /* 0x000204 */
+    unsigned int i;
+    PACKET pkt, short_pkt, subpkt;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < 1024; i++) {
+        buf[i] = (i * 2) & 0xff;
+    }
+
+    if (       !PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, buf, 1024)
+            || !PACKET_buf_init(&short_pkt, buf, len)
+            || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_3(&pkt, &subpkt)
+            ||  PACKET_remaining(&subpkt) != len
+            || !PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &i)
+            ||  i != 0x0608
+            ||  PACKET_get_length_prefixed_3(&short_pkt, &subpkt)
+            ||  PACKET_remaining(&short_pkt) != len) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "test_PACKET_get_length_prefixed_3() failed\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int test_PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1()
+{
+    unsigned char buf[BUF_LEN];
+    const size_t len = 16;
+    unsigned int i;
+    PACKET pkt, exact_pkt, subpkt;
+
+    buf[0] = len;
+    for (i = 1; i < BUF_LEN; i++) {
+        buf[i] = (i * 2) & 0xff;
+    }
+
+    if (       !PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, buf, BUF_LEN)
+            || !PACKET_buf_init(&exact_pkt, buf, len + 1)
+            ||  PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&pkt, &subpkt)
+            ||  PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != BUF_LEN
+            || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&exact_pkt, &subpkt)
+            ||  PACKET_remaining(&exact_pkt) != 0
+            ||  PACKET_remaining(&subpkt) != len) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "test_PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1() failed\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int test_PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2()
+{
+    unsigned char buf[1024];
+    const size_t len = 516;  /* 0x0204 */
+    unsigned int i;
+    PACKET pkt, exact_pkt, subpkt;
+
+    for (i = 1; i <= 1024; i++) {
+        buf[i-1] = (i * 2) & 0xff;
+    }
+
+    if (       !PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, buf, 1024)
+            || !PACKET_buf_init(&exact_pkt, buf, len + 2)
+            ||  PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&pkt, &subpkt)
+            ||  PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != 1024
+            || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&exact_pkt, &subpkt)
+            ||  PACKET_remaining(&exact_pkt) != 0
+            ||  PACKET_remaining(&subpkt) != len) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "test_PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2() failed\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    unsigned char buf[BUF_LEN];
+    unsigned int i;
+
+    for (i=1; i<=BUF_LEN; i++) {
+        buf[i-1] = (i * 2) & 0xff;
+    }
+    i = 0;
+
+    if (       !test_PACKET_buf_init()
+            || !test_PACKET_null_init()
+            || !test_PACKET_remaining(buf)
+            || !test_PACKET_end(buf)
+            || !test_PACKET_equal(buf)
+            || !test_PACKET_get_1(buf)
+            || !test_PACKET_get_4(buf)
+            || !test_PACKET_get_net_2(buf)
+            || !test_PACKET_get_net_3(buf)
+            || !test_PACKET_get_net_4(buf)
+            || !test_PACKET_get_sub_packet(buf)
+            || !test_PACKET_get_bytes(buf)
+            || !test_PACKET_copy_bytes(buf)
+            || !test_PACKET_copy_all(buf)
+            || !test_PACKET_memdup(buf)
+            || !test_PACKET_strndup()
+            || !test_PACKET_contains_zero_byte()
+            || !test_PACKET_forward(buf)
+            || !test_PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1()
+            || !test_PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2()
+            || !test_PACKET_get_length_prefixed_3()
+            || !test_PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1()
+            || !test_PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2()) {
+        return 1;
+    }
+    printf("PASS\n");
+    return 0;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/pbelutest.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/pbelutest.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e226d43
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/pbelutest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+/*
+ * Password based encryption (PBE) table ordering test.
+ * Attempt to look up all supported algorithms.
+ */
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    size_t i;
+    int rv = 0;
+    int pbe_type, pbe_nid;
+    int last_type = -1, last_nid = -1;
+    for (i = 0; EVP_PBE_get(&pbe_type, &pbe_nid, i) != 0; i++) {
+        if (EVP_PBE_find(pbe_type, pbe_nid, NULL, NULL, 0) == 0) {
+            rv = 1;
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    if (rv == 0)
+        return 0;
+    /* Error: print out whole table */
+    for (i = 0; EVP_PBE_get(&pbe_type, &pbe_nid, i) != 0; i++) {
+        if (pbe_type > last_type)
+            rv = 0;
+        else if (pbe_type < last_type || pbe_nid < last_nid)
+            rv = 1;
+        else
+            rv = 0;
+        fprintf(stderr, "PBE type=%d %d (%s): %s\n", pbe_type, pbe_nid,
+                OBJ_nid2sn(pbe_nid), rv ? "ERROR" : "OK");
+        last_type = pbe_type;
+        last_nid = pbe_nid;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/pkcs7-1.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/pkcs7-1.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c47b27a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/pkcs7-1.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+-----BEGIN PKCS7-----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+-----END PKCS7-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/pkcs7.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/pkcs7.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d55c60b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/pkcs7.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+     MIAGCSqGSIb3DQEHAqCAMIACAQExADCABgkqhkiG9w0BBwEAAKCAMIIE+DCCBGGg
+     AwIBAgIQaGSF/JpbS1C223+yrc+N1DANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQQFADBiMREwDwYDVQQH
+     EwhJbnRlcm5ldDEXMBUGA1UEChMOVmVyaVNpZ24sIEluYy4xNDAyBgNVBAsTK1Zl
+     cmlTaWduIENsYXNzIDEgQ0EgLSBJbmRpdmlkdWFsIFN1YnNjcmliZXIwHhcNOTYw
+     ODEyMDAwMDAwWhcNOTYwODE3MjM1OTU5WjCCASAxETAPBgNVBAcTCEludGVybmV0
+     MRcwFQYDVQQKEw5WZXJpU2lnbiwgSW5jLjE0MDIGA1UECxMrVmVyaVNpZ24gQ2xh
+     c3MgMSBDQSAtIEluZGl2aWR1YWwgU3Vic2NyaWJlcjE3MDUGA1UECxMuRGlnaXRh
+     bCBJRCBDbGFzcyAxIC0gU01JTUUgVmVyaVNpZ24sIEluYy4gVEVTVDFGMEQGA1UE
+     CxM9d3d3LnZlcmlzaWduLmNvbS9yZXBvc2l0b3J5L0NQUyBJbmNvcnAuIGJ5IFJl
+     Zi4sTElBQi5MVEQoYyk5NjEZMBcGA1UEAxMQQWxleGFuZHJlIERlYWNvbjEgMB4G
+     CSqGSIb3DQEJARYRYWxleEB2ZXJpc2lnbi5jb20wWzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAANK
+     ADBHAkAOy7xxCAIkOfuIA2LyRpxgKlDORl8htdXYhF5iBGUx1GYaK6KF+bK/CCI0
+     l4j2OfWGFBUrwGoWqxTNcWgTfMzRAgMBAAGjggIyMIICLjAJBgNVHRMEAjAAMIIC
+     HwYDVR0DBIICFjCCAhIwggIOMIICCgYLYIZIAYb4RQEHAQEwggH5FoIBp1RoaXMg
+     Y2VydGlmaWNhdGUgaW5jb3Jwb3JhdGVzIGJ5IHJlZmVyZW5jZSwgYW5kIGl0cyB1
+     c2UgaXMgc3RyaWN0bHkgc3ViamVjdCB0bywgdGhlIFZlcmlTaWduIENlcnRpZmlj
+     YXRpb24gUHJhY3RpY2UgU3RhdGVtZW50IChDUFMpLCBhdmFpbGFibGUgYXQ6IGh0
+     dHBzOi8vd3d3LnZlcmlzaWduLmNvbS9DUFM7IGJ5IEUtbWFpbCBhdCBDUFMtcmVx
+     dWVzdHNAdmVyaXNpZ24uY29tOyBvciBieSBtYWlsIGF0IFZlcmlTaWduLCBJbmMu
+     LCAyNTkzIENvYXN0IEF2ZS4sIE1vdW50YWluIFZpZXcsIENBIDk0MDQzIFVTQSBU
+     ZWwuICsxICg0MTUpIDk2MS04ODMwIENvcHlyaWdodCAoYykgMTk5NiBWZXJpU2ln
+     biwgSW5jLiAgQWxsIFJpZ2h0cyBSZXNlcnZlZC4gQ0VSVEFJTiBXQVJSQU5USUVT
+     IERJU0NMQUlNRUQgYW5kIExJQUJJTElUWSBMSU1JVEVELqAOBgxghkgBhvhFAQcB
+     AQGhDgYMYIZIAYb4RQEHAQECMCwwKhYoaHR0cHM6Ly93d3cudmVyaXNpZ24uY29t
+     L3JlcG9zaXRvcnkvQ1BTIDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQQFAAOBgQAimWMGQwwwxk+b3KAL
+     HlSWXtU7LWHe29CEG8XeVNTvrqs6SBqT7OoENOkGxpfdpVgZ3Qw2SKjxDvbvpfSF
+     slsqcxWSgB/hWuaVuZCkvTw/dYGGOxkTJGxvDCfl1PZjX4dKbatslsi9Z9HpGWT7
+     ttItRwKqcBKgmCJvKi1pGWED0zCCAnkwggHioAMCAQICEDURpVKQb+fQKaRAGdQR
+     /D4wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQECBQAwXzELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxFzAVBgNVBAoTDlZlcmlT
+     aWduLCBJbmMuMTcwNQYDVQQLEy5DbGFzcyAxIFB1YmxpYyBQcmltYXJ5IENlcnRp
+     ZmljYXRpb24gQXV0aG9yaXR5MB4XDTk2MDYyNzAwMDAwMFoXDTk3MDYyNzIzNTk1
+     OVowYjERMA8GA1UEBxMISW50ZXJuZXQxFzAVBgNVBAoTDlZlcmlTaWduLCBJbmMu
+     MTQwMgYDVQQLEytWZXJpU2lnbiBDbGFzcyAxIENBIC0gSW5kaXZpZHVhbCBTdWJz
+     Y3JpYmVyMIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQC2FKbPTdAFDdjKI9Bv
+     qrQpkmOOLPhvltcunXZLEbE2jVfJw/0cxrr+Hgi6M8qV6r7jW80GqLd5HUQq7XPy
+     sVKDaBBwZJHXPmv5912dFEObbpdFmIFH0S3L3bty10w/cariQPJUObwW7s987Lrb
+     P2wqsxaxhhKdrpM01bjV0Pc+qQIDAQABozMwMTAPBgNVHRMECDAGAQH/AgEBMAsG
+     A1UdDwQEAwIBBjARBglghkgBhvhCAQEEBAMCAgQwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQECBQADgYEA
+     KeXHoBmnbxRCgk0jM9e9mDppdxpsipIna/J8DOHEUuD4nONAr4+xOg73SBl026n7
+     Bk55A2wvAMGo7+kKTZ+rHaFDDcmq4O+rzFri2RIOeGAncj1IcGptAQhvXoIhFMG4
+     Jlzg1KlHZHqy7D3jex78zcSU7kKOu8f5tAX1jC3+sToAAKGAMIIBJzCBkTANBgkq
+     hkiG9w0BAQIFADBiMREwDwYDVQQHEwhJbnRlcm5ldDEXMBUGA1UEChMOVmVyaVNp
+     Z24sIEluYy4xNDAyBgNVBAsTK1ZlcmlTaWduIENsYXNzIDEgQ0EgLSBJbmRpdmlk
+     dWFsIFN1YnNjcmliZXIXDTk2MDcwMTE3MzA0MFoXDTk3MDcwMTAwMDAwMFowDQYJ
+     KoZIhvcNAQECBQADgYEAGLuQ6PX8A7AiqBEtWzYtl6lZNSDI0bR5YUo+D2Jzkw30
+     dxQnJSbKXEc6XYuzAW5HvrzATXu5c19WWPT4cRDwmjH71i9QcDysWwf/wE0qGTiW
+     I3tQT0I5VGh7jIJD07nlBw3R4Xl8dH9kr85JsWinqDH5YKpIo9o8knY5n7+qjOow
+     ggEkMIGOMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAgUAMF8xCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMRcwFQYDVQQKEw5W
+     ZXJpU2lnbiwgSW5jLjE3MDUGA1UECxMuQ2xhc3MgMSBQdWJsaWMgUHJpbWFyeSBD
+     ZXJ0aWZpY2F0aW9uIEF1dGhvcml0eRcNOTYwNzE2MjMxMTI5WhcNOTYwODE1MDAw
+     MDAwWjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQIFAAOBgQAXsLE4vnsY6sY67QrmWec7iaU2ehzxanEK
+     /9wKHZNuhlNzk+qGZZw2evxfUe2OaRbYpl8zuZvhK9BHD3ad14OSe9/zx5hOPgP/
+     DQXt6R4R8Q/1JheBrolrgbavjvI2wKS8/Psp2prBrkF4T48+AKRmS8Zzh1guxgvP
+     b+xSu/jH0gAAMYAAAAAAAAAAAA==
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/pkits-test.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/pkits-test.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ae7279c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/pkits-test.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,905 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+# Perl utility to run PKITS tests for RFC3280 compliance. 
+
+my $ossl_path;
+
+if ( -f "../apps/openssl" ) {
+    $ossl_path = "../util/shlib_wrap.sh ../apps/openssl";
+}
+elsif ( -f "..\\out32dll\\openssl.exe" ) {
+    $ossl_path = "..\\out32dll\\openssl.exe";
+}
+elsif ( -f "..\\out32\\openssl.exe" ) {
+    $ossl_path = "..\\out32\\openssl.exe";
+}
+else {
+    die "Can't find OpenSSL executable";
+}
+
+my $pkitsdir = "pkits/smime";
+my $pkitsta = "pkits/certs/TrustAnchorRootCertificate.crt";
+
+die "Can't find PKITS test data" if !-d $pkitsdir;
+
+my $nist1 = "2.16.840.1.101.3.2.1.48.1";
+my $nist2 = "2.16.840.1.101.3.2.1.48.2";
+my $nist3 = "2.16.840.1.101.3.2.1.48.3";
+my $nist4 = "2.16.840.1.101.3.2.1.48.4";
+my $nist5 = "2.16.840.1.101.3.2.1.48.5";
+my $nist6 = "2.16.840.1.101.3.2.1.48.6";
+
+my $apolicy = "X509v3 Any Policy";
+
+# This table contains the chapter headings of the accompanying PKITS
+# document. They provide useful informational output and their names
+# can be converted into the filename to test.
+
+my @testlists = (
+    [ "4.1", "Signature Verification" ],
+    [ "4.1.1", "Valid Signatures Test1",                        0 ],
+    [ "4.1.2", "Invalid CA Signature Test2",                    7 ],
+    [ "4.1.3", "Invalid EE Signature Test3",                    7 ],
+    [ "4.1.4", "Valid DSA Signatures Test4",                    0 ],
+    [ "4.1.5", "Valid DSA Parameter Inheritance Test5",         0 ],
+    [ "4.1.6", "Invalid DSA Signature Test6",                   7 ],
+    [ "4.2",   "Validity Periods" ],
+    [ "4.2.1", "Invalid CA notBefore Date Test1",               9 ],
+    [ "4.2.2", "Invalid EE notBefore Date Test2",               9 ],
+    [ "4.2.3", "Valid pre2000 UTC notBefore Date Test3",        0 ],
+    [ "4.2.4", "Valid GeneralizedTime notBefore Date Test4",    0 ],
+    [ "4.2.5", "Invalid CA notAfter Date Test5",                10 ],
+    [ "4.2.6", "Invalid EE notAfter Date Test6",                10 ],
+    [ "4.2.7", "Invalid pre2000 UTC EE notAfter Date Test7",    10 ],
+    [ "4.2.8", "Valid GeneralizedTime notAfter Date Test8",     0 ],
+    [ "4.3",   "Verifying Name Chaining" ],
+    [ "4.3.1", "Invalid Name Chaining EE Test1",                20 ],
+    [ "4.3.2", "Invalid Name Chaining Order Test2",             20 ],
+    [ "4.3.3", "Valid Name Chaining Whitespace Test3",          0 ],
+    [ "4.3.4", "Valid Name Chaining Whitespace Test4",          0 ],
+    [ "4.3.5", "Valid Name Chaining Capitalization Test5",      0 ],
+    [ "4.3.6", "Valid Name Chaining UIDs Test6",                0 ],
+    [ "4.3.7", "Valid RFC3280 Mandatory Attribute Types Test7", 0 ],
+    [ "4.3.8", "Valid RFC3280 Optional Attribute Types Test8",  0 ],
+    [ "4.3.9", "Valid UTF8String Encoded Names Test9",          0 ],
+    [ "4.3.10", "Valid Rollover from PrintableString to UTF8String Test10", 0 ],
+    [ "4.3.11", "Valid UTF8String Case Insensitive Match Test11",           0 ],
+    [ "4.4",    "Basic Certificate Revocation Tests" ],
+    [ "4.4.1",  "Missing CRL Test1",                                        3 ],
+    [ "4.4.2", "Invalid Revoked CA Test2",          23 ],
+    [ "4.4.3", "Invalid Revoked EE Test3",          23 ],
+    [ "4.4.4", "Invalid Bad CRL Signature Test4",   8 ],
+    [ "4.4.5", "Invalid Bad CRL Issuer Name Test5", 3 ],
+    [ "4.4.6", "Invalid Wrong CRL Test6",           3 ],
+    [ "4.4.7", "Valid Two CRLs Test7",              0 ],
+
+    # The test document suggests these should return certificate revoked...
+    # Subsquent discussion has concluded they should not due to unhandle
+    # critical CRL extensions.
+    [ "4.4.8", "Invalid Unknown CRL Entry Extension Test8", 36 ],
+    [ "4.4.9", "Invalid Unknown CRL Extension Test9",       36 ],
+
+    [ "4.4.10", "Invalid Unknown CRL Extension Test10",             36 ],
+    [ "4.4.11", "Invalid Old CRL nextUpdate Test11",                12 ],
+    [ "4.4.12", "Invalid pre2000 CRL nextUpdate Test12",            12 ],
+    [ "4.4.13", "Valid GeneralizedTime CRL nextUpdate Test13",      0 ],
+    [ "4.4.14", "Valid Negative Serial Number Test14",              0 ],
+    [ "4.4.15", "Invalid Negative Serial Number Test15",            23 ],
+    [ "4.4.16", "Valid Long Serial Number Test16",                  0 ],
+    [ "4.4.17", "Valid Long Serial Number Test17",                  0 ],
+    [ "4.4.18", "Invalid Long Serial Number Test18",                23 ],
+    [ "4.4.19", "Valid Separate Certificate and CRL Keys Test19",   0 ],
+    [ "4.4.20", "Invalid Separate Certificate and CRL Keys Test20", 23 ],
+
+    # CRL path is revoked so get a CRL path validation error
+    [ "4.4.21", "Invalid Separate Certificate and CRL Keys Test21",      54 ],
+    [ "4.5",    "Verifying Paths with Self-Issued Certificates" ],
+    [ "4.5.1",  "Valid Basic Self-Issued Old With New Test1",            0 ],
+    [ "4.5.2",  "Invalid Basic Self-Issued Old With New Test2",          23 ],
+    [ "4.5.3",  "Valid Basic Self-Issued New With Old Test3",            0 ],
+    [ "4.5.4",  "Valid Basic Self-Issued New With Old Test4",            0 ],
+    [ "4.5.5",  "Invalid Basic Self-Issued New With Old Test5",          23 ],
+    [ "4.5.6",  "Valid Basic Self-Issued CRL Signing Key Test6",         0 ],
+    [ "4.5.7",  "Invalid Basic Self-Issued CRL Signing Key Test7",       23 ],
+    [ "4.5.8",  "Invalid Basic Self-Issued CRL Signing Key Test8",       20 ],
+    [ "4.6",    "Verifying Basic Constraints" ],
+    [ "4.6.1",  "Invalid Missing basicConstraints Test1",                24 ],
+    [ "4.6.2",  "Invalid cA False Test2",                                24 ],
+    [ "4.6.3",  "Invalid cA False Test3",                                24 ],
+    [ "4.6.4",  "Valid basicConstraints Not Critical Test4",             0 ],
+    [ "4.6.5",  "Invalid pathLenConstraint Test5",                       25 ],
+    [ "4.6.6",  "Invalid pathLenConstraint Test6",                       25 ],
+    [ "4.6.7",  "Valid pathLenConstraint Test7",                         0 ],
+    [ "4.6.8",  "Valid pathLenConstraint Test8",                         0 ],
+    [ "4.6.9",  "Invalid pathLenConstraint Test9",                       25 ],
+    [ "4.6.10", "Invalid pathLenConstraint Test10",                      25 ],
+    [ "4.6.11", "Invalid pathLenConstraint Test11",                      25 ],
+    [ "4.6.12", "Invalid pathLenConstraint Test12",                      25 ],
+    [ "4.6.13", "Valid pathLenConstraint Test13",                        0 ],
+    [ "4.6.14", "Valid pathLenConstraint Test14",                        0 ],
+    [ "4.6.15", "Valid Self-Issued pathLenConstraint Test15",            0 ],
+    [ "4.6.16", "Invalid Self-Issued pathLenConstraint Test16",          25 ],
+    [ "4.6.17", "Valid Self-Issued pathLenConstraint Test17",            0 ],
+    [ "4.7",    "Key Usage" ],
+    [ "4.7.1",  "Invalid keyUsage Critical keyCertSign False Test1",     20 ],
+    [ "4.7.2",  "Invalid keyUsage Not Critical keyCertSign False Test2", 20 ],
+    [ "4.7.3",  "Valid keyUsage Not Critical Test3",                     0 ],
+    [ "4.7.4",  "Invalid keyUsage Critical cRLSign False Test4",         35 ],
+    [ "4.7.5",  "Invalid keyUsage Not Critical cRLSign False Test5",     35 ],
+
+    # Certificate policy tests need special handling. They can have several
+    # sub tests and we need to check the outputs are correct.
+
+    [ "4.8", "Certificate Policies" ],
+    [
+        "4.8.1.1",
+        "All Certificates Same Policy Test1",
+        "-policy anyPolicy -explicit_policy",
+        "True", $nist1, $nist1, 0
+    ],
+    [
+        "4.8.1.2",
+        "All Certificates Same Policy Test1",
+        "-policy $nist1 -explicit_policy",
+        "True", $nist1, $nist1, 0
+    ],
+    [
+        "4.8.1.3",
+        "All Certificates Same Policy Test1",
+        "-policy $nist2 -explicit_policy",
+        "True", $nist1, "<empty>", 43
+    ],
+    [
+        "4.8.1.4",
+        "All Certificates Same Policy Test1",
+        "-policy $nist1 -policy $nist2 -explicit_policy",
+        "True", $nist1, $nist1, 0
+    ],
+    [
+        "4.8.2.1",
+        "All Certificates No Policies Test2",
+        "-policy anyPolicy",
+        "False", "<empty>", "<empty>", 0
+    ],
+    [
+        "4.8.2.2",
+        "All Certificates No Policies Test2",
+        "-policy anyPolicy -explicit_policy",
+        "True", "<empty>", "<empty>", 43
+    ],
+    [
+        "4.8.3.1",
+        "Different Policies Test3",
+        "-policy anyPolicy",
+        "False", "<empty>", "<empty>", 0
+    ],
+    [
+        "4.8.3.2",
+        "Different Policies Test3",
+        "-policy anyPolicy -explicit_policy",
+        "True", "<empty>", "<empty>", 43
+    ],
+    [
+        "4.8.3.3",
+        "Different Policies Test3",
+        "-policy $nist1 -policy $nist2 -explicit_policy",
+        "True", "<empty>", "<empty>", 43
+    ],
+
+    [
+        "4.8.4",
+        "Different Policies Test4",
+        "-policy anyPolicy",
+        "True", "<empty>", "<empty>", 43
+    ],
+    [
+        "4.8.5",
+        "Different Policies Test5",
+        "-policy anyPolicy",
+        "True", "<empty>", "<empty>", 43
+    ],
+    [
+        "4.8.6.1",
+        "Overlapping Policies Test6",
+        "-policy anyPolicy",
+        "True", $nist1, $nist1, 0
+    ],
+    [
+        "4.8.6.2",
+        "Overlapping Policies Test6",
+        "-policy $nist1",
+        "True", $nist1, $nist1, 0
+    ],
+    [
+        "4.8.6.3",
+        "Overlapping Policies Test6",
+        "-policy $nist2",
+        "True", $nist1, "<empty>", 43
+    ],
+    [
+        "4.8.7",
+        "Different Policies Test7",
+        "-policy anyPolicy",
+        "True", "<empty>", "<empty>", 43
+    ],
+    [
+        "4.8.8",
+        "Different Policies Test8",
+        "-policy anyPolicy",
+        "True", "<empty>", "<empty>", 43
+    ],
+    [
+        "4.8.9",
+        "Different Policies Test9",
+        "-policy anyPolicy",
+        "True", "<empty>", "<empty>", 43
+    ],
+    [
+        "4.8.10.1",
+        "All Certificates Same Policies Test10",
+        "-policy $nist1",
+        "True", "$nist1:$nist2", "$nist1", 0
+    ],
+    [
+        "4.8.10.2",
+        "All Certificates Same Policies Test10",
+        "-policy $nist2",
+        "True", "$nist1:$nist2", "$nist2", 0
+    ],
+    [
+        "4.8.10.3",
+        "All Certificates Same Policies Test10",
+        "-policy anyPolicy",
+        "True", "$nist1:$nist2", "$nist1:$nist2", 0
+    ],
+    [
+        "4.8.11.1",
+        "All Certificates AnyPolicy Test11",
+        "-policy anyPolicy",
+        "True", "$apolicy", "$apolicy", 0
+    ],
+    [
+        "4.8.11.2",
+        "All Certificates AnyPolicy Test11",
+        "-policy $nist1",
+        "True", "$apolicy", "$nist1", 0
+    ],
+    [
+        "4.8.12",
+        "Different Policies Test12",
+        "-policy anyPolicy",
+        "True", "<empty>", "<empty>", 43
+    ],
+    [
+        "4.8.13.1",
+        "All Certificates Same Policies Test13",
+        "-policy $nist1",
+        "True", "$nist1:$nist2:$nist3", "$nist1", 0
+    ],
+    [
+        "4.8.13.2",
+        "All Certificates Same Policies Test13",
+        "-policy $nist2",
+        "True", "$nist1:$nist2:$nist3", "$nist2", 0
+    ],
+    [
+        "4.8.13.3",
+        "All Certificates Same Policies Test13",
+        "-policy $nist3",
+        "True", "$nist1:$nist2:$nist3", "$nist3", 0
+    ],
+    [
+        "4.8.14.1",       "AnyPolicy Test14",
+        "-policy $nist1", "True",
+        "$nist1",         "$nist1",
+        0
+    ],
+    [
+        "4.8.14.2",       "AnyPolicy Test14",
+        "-policy $nist2", "True",
+        "$nist1",         "<empty>",
+        43
+    ],
+    [
+        "4.8.15",
+        "User Notice Qualifier Test15",
+        "-policy anyPolicy",
+        "False", "$nist1", "$nist1", 0
+    ],
+    [
+        "4.8.16",
+        "User Notice Qualifier Test16",
+        "-policy anyPolicy",
+        "False", "$nist1", "$nist1", 0
+    ],
+    [
+        "4.8.17",
+        "User Notice Qualifier Test17",
+        "-policy anyPolicy",
+        "False", "$nist1", "$nist1", 0
+    ],
+    [
+        "4.8.18.1",
+        "User Notice Qualifier Test18",
+        "-policy $nist1",
+        "True", "$nist1:$nist2", "$nist1", 0
+    ],
+    [
+        "4.8.18.2",
+        "User Notice Qualifier Test18",
+        "-policy $nist2",
+        "True", "$nist1:$nist2", "$nist2", 0
+    ],
+    [
+        "4.8.19",
+        "User Notice Qualifier Test19",
+        "-policy anyPolicy",
+        "False", "$nist1", "$nist1", 0
+    ],
+    [
+        "4.8.20",
+        "CPS Pointer Qualifier Test20",
+        "-policy anyPolicy -explicit_policy",
+        "True", "$nist1", "$nist1", 0
+    ],
+    [ "4.9", "Require Explicit Policy" ],
+    [
+        "4.9.1",
+        "Valid RequireExplicitPolicy Test1",
+        "-policy anyPolicy",
+        "False", "<empty>", "<empty>", 0
+    ],
+    [
+        "4.9.2",
+        "Valid RequireExplicitPolicy Test2",
+        "-policy anyPolicy",
+        "False", "<empty>", "<empty>", 0
+    ],
+    [
+        "4.9.3",
+        "Invalid RequireExplicitPolicy Test3",
+        "-policy anyPolicy",
+        "True", "<empty>", "<empty>", 43
+    ],
+    [
+        "4.9.4",
+        "Valid RequireExplicitPolicy Test4",
+        "-policy anyPolicy",
+        "True", "$nist1", "$nist1", 0
+    ],
+    [
+        "4.9.5",
+        "Invalid RequireExplicitPolicy Test5",
+        "-policy anyPolicy",
+        "True", "<empty>", "<empty>", 43
+    ],
+    [
+        "4.9.6",
+        "Valid Self-Issued requireExplicitPolicy Test6",
+        "-policy anyPolicy",
+        "False", "<empty>", "<empty>", 0
+    ],
+    [
+        "4.9.7",
+        "Invalid Self-Issued requireExplicitPolicy Test7",
+        "-policy anyPolicy",
+        "True", "<empty>", "<empty>", 43
+    ],
+    [
+        "4.9.8",
+        "Invalid Self-Issued requireExplicitPolicy Test8",
+        "-policy anyPolicy",
+        "True", "<empty>", "<empty>", 43
+    ],
+    [ "4.10", "Policy Mappings" ],
+    [
+        "4.10.1.1",
+        "Valid Policy Mapping Test1",
+        "-policy $nist1",
+        "True", "$nist1", "$nist1", 0
+    ],
+    [
+        "4.10.1.2",
+        "Valid Policy Mapping Test1",
+        "-policy $nist2",
+        "True", "$nist1", "<empty>", 43
+    ],
+    [
+        "4.10.1.3",
+        "Valid Policy Mapping Test1",
+        "-policy anyPolicy -inhibit_map",
+        "True", "<empty>", "<empty>", 43
+    ],
+    [
+        "4.10.2.1",
+        "Invalid Policy Mapping Test2",
+        "-policy anyPolicy",
+        "True", "<empty>", "<empty>", 43
+    ],
+    [
+        "4.10.2.2",
+        "Invalid Policy Mapping Test2",
+        "-policy anyPolicy -inhibit_map",
+        "True", "<empty>", "<empty>", 43
+    ],
+    [
+        "4.10.3.1",
+        "Valid Policy Mapping Test3",
+        "-policy $nist1",
+        "True", "$nist2", "<empty>", 43
+    ],
+    [
+        "4.10.3.2",
+        "Valid Policy Mapping Test3",
+        "-policy $nist2",
+        "True", "$nist2", "$nist2", 0
+    ],
+    [
+        "4.10.4",
+        "Invalid Policy Mapping Test4",
+        "-policy anyPolicy",
+        "True", "<empty>", "<empty>", 43
+    ],
+    [
+        "4.10.5.1",
+        "Valid Policy Mapping Test5",
+        "-policy $nist1",
+        "True", "$nist1", "$nist1", 0
+    ],
+    [
+        "4.10.5.2",
+        "Valid Policy Mapping Test5",
+        "-policy $nist6",
+        "True", "$nist1", "<empty>", 43
+    ],
+    [
+        "4.10.6.1",
+        "Valid Policy Mapping Test6",
+        "-policy $nist1",
+        "True", "$nist1", "$nist1", 0
+    ],
+    [
+        "4.10.6.2",
+        "Valid Policy Mapping Test6",
+        "-policy $nist6",
+        "True", "$nist1", "<empty>", 43
+    ],
+    [ "4.10.7", "Invalid Mapping From anyPolicy Test7", 42 ],
+    [ "4.10.8", "Invalid Mapping To anyPolicy Test8",   42 ],
+    [
+        "4.10.9",
+        "Valid Policy Mapping Test9",
+        "-policy anyPolicy",
+        "True", "$nist1", "$nist1", 0
+    ],
+    [
+        "4.10.10",
+        "Invalid Policy Mapping Test10",
+        "-policy anyPolicy",
+        "True", "<empty>", "<empty>", 43
+    ],
+    [
+        "4.10.11",
+        "Valid Policy Mapping Test11",
+        "-policy anyPolicy",
+        "True", "$nist1", "$nist1", 0
+    ],
+
+    # TODO: check notice display
+    [
+        "4.10.12.1",
+        "Valid Policy Mapping Test12",
+        "-policy $nist1",
+        "True", "$nist1:$nist2", "$nist1", 0
+    ],
+
+    # TODO: check notice display
+    [
+        "4.10.12.2",
+        "Valid Policy Mapping Test12",
+        "-policy $nist2",
+        "True", "$nist1:$nist2", "$nist2", 0
+    ],
+    [
+        "4.10.13",
+        "Valid Policy Mapping Test13",
+        "-policy anyPolicy",
+        "True", "$nist1", "$nist1", 0
+    ],
+
+    # TODO: check notice display
+    [
+        "4.10.14",
+        "Valid Policy Mapping Test14",
+        "-policy anyPolicy",
+        "True", "$nist1", "$nist1", 0
+    ],
+    [ "4.11", "Inhibit Policy Mapping" ],
+    [
+        "4.11.1",
+        "Invalid inhibitPolicyMapping Test1",
+        "-policy anyPolicy",
+        "True", "<empty>", "<empty>", 43
+    ],
+    [
+        "4.11.2",
+        "Valid inhibitPolicyMapping Test2",
+        "-policy anyPolicy",
+        "True", "$nist1", "$nist1", 0
+    ],
+    [
+        "4.11.3",
+        "Invalid inhibitPolicyMapping Test3",
+        "-policy anyPolicy",
+        "True", "<empty>", "<empty>", 43
+    ],
+    [
+        "4.11.4",
+        "Valid inhibitPolicyMapping Test4",
+        "-policy anyPolicy",
+        "True", "$nist2", "$nist2", 0
+    ],
+    [
+        "4.11.5",
+        "Invalid inhibitPolicyMapping Test5",
+        "-policy anyPolicy",
+        "True", "<empty>", "<empty>", 43
+    ],
+    [
+        "4.11.6",
+        "Invalid inhibitPolicyMapping Test6",
+        "-policy anyPolicy",
+        "True", "<empty>", "<empty>", 43
+    ],
+    [
+        "4.11.7",
+        "Valid Self-Issued inhibitPolicyMapping Test7",
+        "-policy anyPolicy",
+        "True", "$nist1", "$nist1", 0
+    ],
+    [
+        "4.11.8",
+        "Invalid Self-Issued inhibitPolicyMapping Test8",
+        "-policy anyPolicy",
+        "True", "<empty>", "<empty>", 43
+    ],
+    [
+        "4.11.9",
+        "Invalid Self-Issued inhibitPolicyMapping Test9",
+        "-policy anyPolicy",
+        "True", "<empty>", "<empty>", 43
+    ],
+    [
+        "4.11.10",
+        "Invalid Self-Issued inhibitPolicyMapping Test10",
+        "-policy anyPolicy",
+        "True", "<empty>", "<empty>", 43
+    ],
+    [
+        "4.11.11",
+        "Invalid Self-Issued inhibitPolicyMapping Test11",
+        "-policy anyPolicy",
+        "True", "<empty>", "<empty>", 43
+    ],
+    [ "4.12", "Inhibit Any Policy" ],
+    [
+        "4.12.1",
+        "Invalid inhibitAnyPolicy Test1",
+        "-policy anyPolicy",
+        "True", "<empty>", "<empty>", 43
+    ],
+    [
+        "4.12.2",
+        "Valid inhibitAnyPolicy Test2",
+        "-policy anyPolicy",
+        "True", "$nist1", "$nist1", 0
+    ],
+    [
+        "4.12.3.1",
+        "inhibitAnyPolicy Test3",
+        "-policy anyPolicy",
+        "True", "$nist1", "$nist1", 0
+    ],
+    [
+        "4.12.3.2",
+        "inhibitAnyPolicy Test3",
+        "-policy anyPolicy -inhibit_any",
+        "True", "<empty>", "<empty>", 43
+    ],
+    [
+        "4.12.4",
+        "Invalid inhibitAnyPolicy Test4",
+        "-policy anyPolicy",
+        "True", "<empty>", "<empty>", 43
+    ],
+    [
+        "4.12.5",
+        "Invalid inhibitAnyPolicy Test5",
+        "-policy anyPolicy",
+        "True", "<empty>", "<empty>", 43
+    ],
+    [
+        "4.12.6",
+        "Invalid inhibitAnyPolicy Test6",
+        "-policy anyPolicy",
+        "True", "<empty>", "<empty>", 43
+    ],
+    [ "4.12.7",  "Valid Self-Issued inhibitAnyPolicy Test7",      0 ],
+    [ "4.12.8",  "Invalid Self-Issued inhibitAnyPolicy Test8",    43 ],
+    [ "4.12.9",  "Valid Self-Issued inhibitAnyPolicy Test9",      0 ],
+    [ "4.12.10", "Invalid Self-Issued inhibitAnyPolicy Test10",   43 ],
+    [ "4.13",    "Name Constraints" ],
+    [ "4.13.1",  "Valid DN nameConstraints Test1",                0 ],
+    [ "4.13.2",  "Invalid DN nameConstraints Test2",              47 ],
+    [ "4.13.3",  "Invalid DN nameConstraints Test3",              47 ],
+    [ "4.13.4",  "Valid DN nameConstraints Test4",                0 ],
+    [ "4.13.5",  "Valid DN nameConstraints Test5",                0 ],
+    [ "4.13.6",  "Valid DN nameConstraints Test6",                0 ],
+    [ "4.13.7",  "Invalid DN nameConstraints Test7",              48 ],
+    [ "4.13.8",  "Invalid DN nameConstraints Test8",              48 ],
+    [ "4.13.9",  "Invalid DN nameConstraints Test9",              48 ],
+    [ "4.13.10", "Invalid DN nameConstraints Test10",             48 ],
+    [ "4.13.11", "Valid DN nameConstraints Test11",               0 ],
+    [ "4.13.12", "Invalid DN nameConstraints Test12",             47 ],
+    [ "4.13.13", "Invalid DN nameConstraints Test13",             47 ],
+    [ "4.13.14", "Valid DN nameConstraints Test14",               0 ],
+    [ "4.13.15", "Invalid DN nameConstraints Test15",             48 ],
+    [ "4.13.16", "Invalid DN nameConstraints Test16",             48 ],
+    [ "4.13.17", "Invalid DN nameConstraints Test17",             48 ],
+    [ "4.13.18", "Valid DN nameConstraints Test18",               0 ],
+    [ "4.13.19", "Valid Self-Issued DN nameConstraints Test19",   0 ],
+    [ "4.13.20", "Invalid Self-Issued DN nameConstraints Test20", 47 ],
+    [ "4.13.21", "Valid RFC822 nameConstraints Test21",           0 ],
+    [ "4.13.22", "Invalid RFC822 nameConstraints Test22",         47 ],
+    [ "4.13.23", "Valid RFC822 nameConstraints Test23",           0 ],
+    [ "4.13.24", "Invalid RFC822 nameConstraints Test24",         47 ],
+    [ "4.13.25", "Valid RFC822 nameConstraints Test25",           0 ],
+    [ "4.13.26", "Invalid RFC822 nameConstraints Test26",         48 ],
+    [ "4.13.27", "Valid DN and RFC822 nameConstraints Test27",    0 ],
+    [ "4.13.28", "Invalid DN and RFC822 nameConstraints Test28",  47 ],
+    [ "4.13.29", "Invalid DN and RFC822 nameConstraints Test29",  47 ],
+    [ "4.13.30", "Valid DNS nameConstraints Test30",              0 ],
+    [ "4.13.31", "Invalid DNS nameConstraints Test31",            47 ],
+    [ "4.13.32", "Valid DNS nameConstraints Test32",              0 ],
+    [ "4.13.33", "Invalid DNS nameConstraints Test33",            48 ],
+    [ "4.13.34", "Valid URI nameConstraints Test34",              0 ],
+    [ "4.13.35", "Invalid URI nameConstraints Test35",            47 ],
+    [ "4.13.36", "Valid URI nameConstraints Test36",              0 ],
+    [ "4.13.37", "Invalid URI nameConstraints Test37",            48 ],
+    [ "4.13.38", "Invalid DNS nameConstraints Test38",            47 ],
+    [ "4.14",    "Distribution Points" ],
+    [ "4.14.1",  "Valid distributionPoint Test1",                 0 ],
+    [ "4.14.2",  "Invalid distributionPoint Test2",               23 ],
+    [ "4.14.3",  "Invalid distributionPoint Test3",               44 ],
+    [ "4.14.4",  "Valid distributionPoint Test4",                 0 ],
+    [ "4.14.5",  "Valid distributionPoint Test5",                 0 ],
+    [ "4.14.6",  "Invalid distributionPoint Test6",               23 ],
+    [ "4.14.7",  "Valid distributionPoint Test7",                 0 ],
+    [ "4.14.8",  "Invalid distributionPoint Test8",               44 ],
+    [ "4.14.9",  "Invalid distributionPoint Test9",               44 ],
+    [ "4.14.10", "Valid No issuingDistributionPoint Test10",      0 ],
+    [ "4.14.11", "Invalid onlyContainsUserCerts CRL Test11",      44 ],
+    [ "4.14.12", "Invalid onlyContainsCACerts CRL Test12",        44 ],
+    [ "4.14.13", "Valid onlyContainsCACerts CRL Test13",          0 ],
+    [ "4.14.14", "Invalid onlyContainsAttributeCerts Test14",     44 ],
+    [ "4.14.15", "Invalid onlySomeReasons Test15",                23 ],
+    [ "4.14.16", "Invalid onlySomeReasons Test16",                23 ],
+    [ "4.14.17", "Invalid onlySomeReasons Test17",                3 ],
+    [ "4.14.18", "Valid onlySomeReasons Test18",                  0 ],
+    [ "4.14.19", "Valid onlySomeReasons Test19",                  0 ],
+    [ "4.14.20", "Invalid onlySomeReasons Test20",                23 ],
+    [ "4.14.21", "Invalid onlySomeReasons Test21",                23 ],
+    [ "4.14.22", "Valid IDP with indirectCRL Test22",             0 ],
+    [ "4.14.23", "Invalid IDP with indirectCRL Test23",           23 ],
+    [ "4.14.24", "Valid IDP with indirectCRL Test24",             0 ],
+    [ "4.14.25", "Valid IDP with indirectCRL Test25",             0 ],
+    [ "4.14.26", "Invalid IDP with indirectCRL Test26",           44 ],
+    [ "4.14.27", "Invalid cRLIssuer Test27",                      3 ],
+    [ "4.14.28", "Valid cRLIssuer Test28",                        0 ],
+    [ "4.14.29", "Valid cRLIssuer Test29",                        0 ],
+
+    # Although this test is valid it has a circular dependency. As a result
+    # an attempt is made to reursively checks a CRL path and rejected due to
+    # a CRL path validation error. PKITS notes suggest this test does not
+    # need to be run due to this issue.
+    [ "4.14.30", "Valid cRLIssuer Test30",                                 54 ],
+    [ "4.14.31", "Invalid cRLIssuer Test31",                               23 ],
+    [ "4.14.32", "Invalid cRLIssuer Test32",                               23 ],
+    [ "4.14.33", "Valid cRLIssuer Test33",                                 0 ],
+    [ "4.14.34", "Invalid cRLIssuer Test34",                               23 ],
+    [ "4.14.35", "Invalid cRLIssuer Test35",                               44 ],
+    [ "4.15",    "Delta-CRLs" ],
+    [ "4.15.1",  "Invalid deltaCRLIndicator No Base Test1",                3 ],
+    [ "4.15.2",  "Valid delta-CRL Test2",                                  0 ],
+    [ "4.15.3",  "Invalid delta-CRL Test3",                                23 ],
+    [ "4.15.4",  "Invalid delta-CRL Test4",                                23 ],
+    [ "4.15.5",  "Valid delta-CRL Test5",                                  0 ],
+    [ "4.15.6",  "Invalid delta-CRL Test6",                                23 ],
+    [ "4.15.7",  "Valid delta-CRL Test7",                                  0 ],
+    [ "4.15.8",  "Valid delta-CRL Test8",                                  0 ],
+    [ "4.15.9",  "Invalid delta-CRL Test9",                                23 ],
+    [ "4.15.10", "Invalid delta-CRL Test10",                               12 ],
+    [ "4.16",    "Private Certificate Extensions" ],
+    [ "4.16.1",  "Valid Unknown Not Critical Certificate Extension Test1", 0 ],
+    [ "4.16.2",  "Invalid Unknown Critical Certificate Extension Test2",   34 ],
+);
+
+
+my $verbose = 1;
+
+my $numtest = 0;
+my $numfail = 0;
+
+my $ossl = "ossl/apps/openssl";
+
+my $ossl_cmd = "$ossl_path cms -verify -verify_retcode ";
+$ossl_cmd .= "-CAfile pkitsta.pem -crl_check_all -x509_strict ";
+
+# Check for expiry of trust anchor
+system "$ossl_path x509 -inform DER -in $pkitsta -checkend 0";
+if ($? == 256)
+	{
+	print STDERR "WARNING: using older expired data\n";
+	$ossl_cmd .= "-attime 1291940972 ";
+	}
+
+$ossl_cmd .= "-policy_check -extended_crl -use_deltas -out /dev/null 2>&1 ";
+
+system "$ossl_path x509 -inform DER -in $pkitsta -out pkitsta.pem";
+
+die "Can't create trust anchor file" if $?;
+
+print "Running PKITS tests:\n" if $verbose;
+
+foreach (@testlists) {
+    my $argnum = @$_;
+    if ( $argnum == 2 ) {
+        my ( $tnum, $title ) = @$_;
+        print "$tnum $title\n" if $verbose;
+    }
+    elsif ( $argnum == 3 ) {
+        my ( $tnum, $title, $exp_ret ) = @$_;
+        my $filename = $title;
+        $exp_ret += 32 if $exp_ret;
+        $filename =~ tr/ -//d;
+        $filename = "Signed${filename}.eml";
+        if ( !-f "$pkitsdir/$filename" ) {
+            print "\"$filename\" not found\n";
+        }
+        else {
+            my $ret;
+            my $test_fail = 0;
+            my $errmsg    = "";
+            my $cmd       = $ossl_cmd;
+            $cmd .= "-in $pkitsdir/$filename -policy anyPolicy";
+            my $cmdout = `$cmd`;
+            $ret = $? >> 8;
+            if ( $? & 0xff ) {
+                $errmsg .= "Abnormal OpenSSL termination\n";
+                $test_fail = 1;
+            }
+            if ( $exp_ret != $ret ) {
+                $errmsg .= "Return code:$ret, ";
+                $errmsg .= "expected $exp_ret\n";
+                $test_fail = 1;
+            }
+            if ($test_fail) {
+                print "$tnum $title : Failed!\n";
+                print "Filename: $pkitsdir/$filename\n";
+                print $errmsg;
+                print "Command output:\n$cmdout\n";
+                $numfail++;
+            }
+            $numtest++;
+        }
+    }
+    elsif ( $argnum == 7 ) {
+        my ( $tnum, $title, $exargs, $exp_epol, $exp_aset, $exp_uset, $exp_ret )
+          = @$_;
+        my $filename = $title;
+        $exp_ret += 32 if $exp_ret;
+        $filename =~ tr/ -//d;
+        $filename = "Signed${filename}.eml";
+        if ( !-f "$pkitsdir/$filename" ) {
+            print "\"$filename\" not found\n";
+        }
+        else {
+            my $ret;
+            my $cmdout    = "";
+            my $errmsg    = "";
+            my $epol      = "";
+            my $aset      = "";
+            my $uset      = "";
+            my $pol       = -1;
+            my $test_fail = 0;
+            my $cmd       = $ossl_cmd;
+            $cmd .= "-in $pkitsdir/$filename $exargs -policy_print";
+            @oparr = `$cmd`;
+            $ret   = $? >> 8;
+
+            if ( $? & 0xff ) {
+                $errmsg .= "Abnormal OpenSSL termination\n";
+                $test_fail = 1;
+            }
+            foreach (@oparr) {
+                my $test_failed = 0;
+                $cmdout .= $_;
+                if (/^Require explicit Policy: (.*)$/) {
+                    $epol = $1;
+                }
+                if (/^Authority Policies/) {
+                    if (/empty/) {
+                        $aset = "<empty>";
+                    }
+                    else {
+                        $pol = 1;
+                    }
+                }
+                $test_fail = 1 if (/leak/i);
+                if (/^User Policies/) {
+                    if (/empty/) {
+                        $uset = "<empty>";
+                    }
+                    else {
+                        $pol = 2;
+                    }
+                }
+                if (/\s+Policy: (.*)$/) {
+                    if ( $pol == 1 ) {
+                        $aset .= ":" if $aset ne "";
+                        $aset .= $1;
+                    }
+                    elsif ( $pol == 2 ) {
+                        $uset .= ":" if $uset ne "";
+                        $uset .= $1;
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+
+            if ( $epol ne $exp_epol ) {
+                $errmsg .= "Explicit policy:$epol, ";
+                $errmsg .= "expected $exp_epol\n";
+                $test_fail = 1;
+            }
+            if ( $aset ne $exp_aset ) {
+                $errmsg .= "Authority policy set :$aset, ";
+                $errmsg .= "expected $exp_aset\n";
+                $test_fail = 1;
+            }
+            if ( $uset ne $exp_uset ) {
+                $errmsg .= "User policy set :$uset, ";
+                $errmsg .= "expected $exp_uset\n";
+                $test_fail = 1;
+            }
+
+            if ( $exp_ret != $ret ) {
+                print "Return code:$ret, expected $exp_ret\n";
+                $test_fail = 1;
+            }
+
+            if ($test_fail) {
+                print "$tnum $title : Failed!\n";
+                print "Filename: $pkitsdir/$filename\n";
+                print "Command output:\n$cmdout\n";
+                $numfail++;
+            }
+            $numtest++;
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+if ($numfail) {
+    print "$numfail tests failed out of $numtest\n";
+}
+else {
+    print "All Tests Successful.\n";
+}
+
+unlink "pkitsta.pem";
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/r160test.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/r160test.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..06033eb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/r160test.c
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/randtest.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/randtest.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9f7a037
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/randtest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+#include "../e_os.h"
+
+/* some FIPS 140-1 random number test */
+/* some simple tests */
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    unsigned char buf[2500];
+    int i, j, k, s, sign, nsign, err = 0;
+    unsigned long n1;
+    unsigned long n2[16];
+    unsigned long runs[2][34];
+    /*
+     * double d;
+     */
+    long d;
+
+    i = RAND_bytes(buf, 2500);
+    if (i <= 0) {
+        printf("init failed, the rand method is not properly installed\n");
+        err++;
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    n1 = 0;
+    for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+        n2[i] = 0;
+    for (i = 0; i < 34; i++)
+        runs[0][i] = runs[1][i] = 0;
+
+    /* test 1 and 2 */
+    sign = 0;
+    nsign = 0;
+    for (i = 0; i < 2500; i++) {
+        j = buf[i];
+
+        n2[j & 0x0f]++;
+        n2[(j >> 4) & 0x0f]++;
+
+        for (k = 0; k < 8; k++) {
+            s = (j & 0x01);
+            if (s == sign)
+                nsign++;
+            else {
+                if (nsign > 34)
+                    nsign = 34;
+                if (nsign != 0) {
+                    runs[sign][nsign - 1]++;
+                    if (nsign > 6)
+                        runs[sign][5]++;
+                }
+                sign = s;
+                nsign = 1;
+            }
+
+            if (s)
+                n1++;
+            j >>= 1;
+        }
+    }
+    if (nsign > 34)
+        nsign = 34;
+    if (nsign != 0)
+        runs[sign][nsign - 1]++;
+
+    /* test 1 */
+    if (!((9654 < n1) && (n1 < 10346))) {
+        printf("test 1 failed, X=%lu\n", n1);
+        err++;
+    }
+    printf("test 1 done\n");
+
+    /* test 2 */
+    d = 0;
+    for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+        d += n2[i] * n2[i];
+    d = (d * 8) / 25 - 500000;
+    if (!((103 < d) && (d < 5740))) {
+        printf("test 2 failed, X=%ld.%02ld\n", d / 100L, d % 100L);
+        err++;
+    }
+    printf("test 2 done\n");
+
+    /* test 3 */
+    for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
+        if (!((2267 < runs[i][0]) && (runs[i][0] < 2733))) {
+            printf("test 3 failed, bit=%d run=%d num=%lu\n",
+                   i, 1, runs[i][0]);
+            err++;
+        }
+        if (!((1079 < runs[i][1]) && (runs[i][1] < 1421))) {
+            printf("test 3 failed, bit=%d run=%d num=%lu\n",
+                   i, 2, runs[i][1]);
+            err++;
+        }
+        if (!((502 < runs[i][2]) && (runs[i][2] < 748))) {
+            printf("test 3 failed, bit=%d run=%d num=%lu\n",
+                   i, 3, runs[i][2]);
+            err++;
+        }
+        if (!((223 < runs[i][3]) && (runs[i][3] < 402))) {
+            printf("test 3 failed, bit=%d run=%d num=%lu\n",
+                   i, 4, runs[i][3]);
+            err++;
+        }
+        if (!((90 < runs[i][4]) && (runs[i][4] < 223))) {
+            printf("test 3 failed, bit=%d run=%d num=%lu\n",
+                   i, 5, runs[i][4]);
+            err++;
+        }
+        if (!((90 < runs[i][5]) && (runs[i][5] < 223))) {
+            printf("test 3 failed, bit=%d run=%d num=%lu\n",
+                   i, 6, runs[i][5]);
+            err++;
+        }
+    }
+    printf("test 3 done\n");
+
+    /* test 4 */
+    if (runs[0][33] != 0) {
+        printf("test 4 failed, bit=%d run=%d num=%lu\n", 0, 34, runs[0][33]);
+        err++;
+    }
+    if (runs[1][33] != 0) {
+        printf("test 4 failed, bit=%d run=%d num=%lu\n", 1, 34, runs[1][33]);
+        err++;
+    }
+    printf("test 4 done\n");
+ err:
+    err = ((err) ? 1 : 0);
+    EXIT(err);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/rc2test.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/rc2test.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2d0a01d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/rc2test.c
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * This has been a quickly hacked 'ideatest.c'.  When I add tests for other
+ * RC2 modes, more of the code will be uncommented.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+#include "../e_os.h"
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RC2
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+    printf("No RC2 support\n");
+    return (0);
+}
+#else
+# include <openssl/rc2.h>
+
+static unsigned char RC2key[4][16] = {
+    {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+     0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+    {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+     0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01},
+    {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+     0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+    {0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07,
+     0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0x0C, 0x0D, 0x0E, 0x0F},
+};
+
+static unsigned char RC2plain[4][8] = {
+    {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+    {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+    {0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF},
+    {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+};
+
+static unsigned char RC2cipher[4][8] = {
+    {0x1C, 0x19, 0x8A, 0x83, 0x8D, 0xF0, 0x28, 0xB7},
+    {0x21, 0x82, 0x9C, 0x78, 0xA9, 0xF9, 0xC0, 0x74},
+    {0x13, 0xDB, 0x35, 0x17, 0xD3, 0x21, 0x86, 0x9E},
+    {0x50, 0xDC, 0x01, 0x62, 0xBD, 0x75, 0x7F, 0x31},
+};
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+    int i, n, err = 0;
+    RC2_KEY key;
+    unsigned char buf[8], buf2[8];
+
+    for (n = 0; n < 4; n++) {
+        RC2_set_key(&key, 16, &(RC2key[n][0]), 0 /* or 1024 */ );
+
+        RC2_ecb_encrypt(&(RC2plain[n][0]), buf, &key, RC2_ENCRYPT);
+        if (memcmp(&(RC2cipher[n][0]), buf, 8) != 0) {
+            printf("ecb rc2 error encrypting\n");
+            printf("got     :");
+            for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
+                printf("%02X ", buf[i]);
+            printf("\n");
+            printf("expected:");
+            for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
+                printf("%02X ", RC2cipher[n][i]);
+            err = 20;
+            printf("\n");
+        }
+
+        RC2_ecb_encrypt(buf, buf2, &key, RC2_DECRYPT);
+        if (memcmp(&(RC2plain[n][0]), buf2, 8) != 0) {
+            printf("ecb RC2 error decrypting\n");
+            printf("got     :");
+            for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
+                printf("%02X ", buf[i]);
+            printf("\n");
+            printf("expected:");
+            for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
+                printf("%02X ", RC2plain[n][i]);
+            printf("\n");
+            err = 3;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (err == 0)
+        printf("ecb RC2 ok\n");
+
+    EXIT(err);
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/rc4test.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/rc4test.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7a77b82
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/rc4test.c
@@ -0,0 +1,175 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "../e_os.h"
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+    printf("No RC4 support\n");
+    return (0);
+}
+#else
+# include <openssl/rc4.h>
+# include <openssl/sha.h>
+
+static unsigned char keys[7][30] = {
+    {8, 0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xef},
+    {8, 0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xef},
+    {8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+    {4, 0xef, 0x01, 0x23, 0x45},
+    {8, 0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xef},
+    {4, 0xef, 0x01, 0x23, 0x45},
+};
+
+static unsigned char data_len[7] = { 8, 8, 8, 20, 28, 10 };
+
+static unsigned char data[7][30] = {
+    {0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xef, 0xff},
+    {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff},
+    {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff},
+    {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+     0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+     0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff},
+    {0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0x9A, 0xBC, 0xDE, 0xF0,
+     0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0x9A, 0xBC, 0xDE, 0xF0,
+     0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0x9A, 0xBC, 0xDE, 0xF0,
+     0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0xff},
+    {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff},
+    {0},
+};
+
+static unsigned char output[7][30] = {
+    {0x75, 0xb7, 0x87, 0x80, 0x99, 0xe0, 0xc5, 0x96, 0x00},
+    {0x74, 0x94, 0xc2, 0xe7, 0x10, 0x4b, 0x08, 0x79, 0x00},
+    {0xde, 0x18, 0x89, 0x41, 0xa3, 0x37, 0x5d, 0x3a, 0x00},
+    {0xd6, 0xa1, 0x41, 0xa7, 0xec, 0x3c, 0x38, 0xdf,
+     0xbd, 0x61, 0x5a, 0x11, 0x62, 0xe1, 0xc7, 0xba,
+     0x36, 0xb6, 0x78, 0x58, 0x00},
+    {0x66, 0xa0, 0x94, 0x9f, 0x8a, 0xf7, 0xd6, 0x89,
+     0x1f, 0x7f, 0x83, 0x2b, 0xa8, 0x33, 0xc0, 0x0c,
+     0x89, 0x2e, 0xbe, 0x30, 0x14, 0x3c, 0xe2, 0x87,
+     0x40, 0x01, 0x1e, 0xcf, 0x00},
+    {0xd6, 0xa1, 0x41, 0xa7, 0xec, 0x3c, 0x38, 0xdf, 0xbd, 0x61, 0x00},
+    {0},
+};
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+    int i, err = 0;
+    int j;
+    unsigned char *p;
+    RC4_KEY key;
+    unsigned char obuf[512];
+
+    for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
+        RC4_set_key(&key, keys[i][0], &(keys[i][1]));
+        memset(obuf, 0, sizeof(obuf));
+        RC4(&key, data_len[i], &(data[i][0]), obuf);
+        if (memcmp(obuf, output[i], data_len[i] + 1) != 0) {
+            printf("error calculating RC4\n");
+            printf("output:");
+            for (j = 0; j < data_len[i] + 1; j++)
+                printf(" %02x", obuf[j]);
+            printf("\n");
+            printf("expect:");
+            p = &(output[i][0]);
+            for (j = 0; j < data_len[i] + 1; j++)
+                printf(" %02x", *(p++));
+            printf("\n");
+            err++;
+        } else
+            printf("test %d ok\n", i);
+    }
+    printf("test end processing ");
+    for (i = 0; i < data_len[3]; i++) {
+        RC4_set_key(&key, keys[3][0], &(keys[3][1]));
+        memset(obuf, 0, sizeof(obuf));
+        RC4(&key, i, &(data[3][0]), obuf);
+        if ((memcmp(obuf, output[3], i) != 0) || (obuf[i] != 0)) {
+            printf("error in RC4 length processing\n");
+            printf("output:");
+            for (j = 0; j < i + 1; j++)
+                printf(" %02x", obuf[j]);
+            printf("\n");
+            printf("expect:");
+            p = &(output[3][0]);
+            for (j = 0; j < i; j++)
+                printf(" %02x", *(p++));
+            printf(" 00\n");
+            err++;
+        } else {
+            printf(".");
+            fflush(stdout);
+        }
+    }
+    printf("done\n");
+    printf("test multi-call ");
+    for (i = 0; i < data_len[3]; i++) {
+        RC4_set_key(&key, keys[3][0], &(keys[3][1]));
+        memset(obuf, 0, sizeof(obuf));
+        RC4(&key, i, &(data[3][0]), obuf);
+        RC4(&key, data_len[3] - i, &(data[3][i]), &(obuf[i]));
+        if (memcmp(obuf, output[3], data_len[3] + 1) != 0) {
+            printf("error in RC4 multi-call processing\n");
+            printf("output:");
+            for (j = 0; j < data_len[3] + 1; j++)
+                printf(" %02x", obuf[j]);
+            printf("\n");
+            printf("expect:");
+            p = &(output[3][0]);
+            for (j = 0; j < data_len[3] + 1; j++)
+                printf(" %02x", *(p++));
+            err++;
+        } else {
+            printf(".");
+            fflush(stdout);
+        }
+    }
+    printf("done\n");
+    printf("bulk test ");
+    {
+        unsigned char buf[513];
+        SHA_CTX c;
+        unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+        static unsigned char expected[] = {
+            0xa4, 0x7b, 0xcc, 0x00, 0x3d, 0xd0, 0xbd, 0xe1, 0xac, 0x5f,
+            0x12, 0x1e, 0x45, 0xbc, 0xfb, 0x1a, 0xa1, 0xf2, 0x7f, 0xc5
+        };
+
+        RC4_set_key(&key, keys[0][0], &(keys[3][1]));
+        memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+        SHA1_Init(&c);
+        for (i = 0; i < 2571; i++) {
+            RC4(&key, sizeof(buf), buf, buf);
+            SHA1_Update(&c, buf, sizeof(buf));
+        }
+        SHA1_Final(md, &c);
+
+        if (memcmp(md, expected, sizeof(md))) {
+            printf("error in RC4 bulk test\n");
+            printf("output:");
+            for (j = 0; j < (int)sizeof(md); j++)
+                printf(" %02x", md[j]);
+            printf("\n");
+            printf("expect:");
+            for (j = 0; j < (int)sizeof(md); j++)
+                printf(" %02x", expected[j]);
+            printf("\n");
+            err++;
+        } else
+            printf("ok\n");
+    }
+    EXIT(err);
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/rc5test.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/rc5test.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6567bcb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/rc5test.c
@@ -0,0 +1,276 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * This has been a quickly hacked 'ideatest.c'.  When I add tests for other
+ * RC5 modes, more of the code will be uncommented.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+#include "../e_os.h"
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RC5
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+    printf("No RC5 support\n");
+    return (0);
+}
+#else
+# include <openssl/rc5.h>
+
+static unsigned char RC5key[5][16] = {
+    {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+     0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+    {0x91, 0x5f, 0x46, 0x19, 0xbe, 0x41, 0xb2, 0x51,
+     0x63, 0x55, 0xa5, 0x01, 0x10, 0xa9, 0xce, 0x91},
+    {0x78, 0x33, 0x48, 0xe7, 0x5a, 0xeb, 0x0f, 0x2f,
+     0xd7, 0xb1, 0x69, 0xbb, 0x8d, 0xc1, 0x67, 0x87},
+    {0xdc, 0x49, 0xdb, 0x13, 0x75, 0xa5, 0x58, 0x4f,
+     0x64, 0x85, 0xb4, 0x13, 0xb5, 0xf1, 0x2b, 0xaf},
+    {0x52, 0x69, 0xf1, 0x49, 0xd4, 0x1b, 0xa0, 0x15,
+     0x24, 0x97, 0x57, 0x4d, 0x7f, 0x15, 0x31, 0x25},
+};
+
+static unsigned char RC5plain[5][8] = {
+    {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+    {0x21, 0xA5, 0xDB, 0xEE, 0x15, 0x4B, 0x8F, 0x6D},
+    {0xF7, 0xC0, 0x13, 0xAC, 0x5B, 0x2B, 0x89, 0x52},
+    {0x2F, 0x42, 0xB3, 0xB7, 0x03, 0x69, 0xFC, 0x92},
+    {0x65, 0xC1, 0x78, 0xB2, 0x84, 0xD1, 0x97, 0xCC},
+};
+
+static unsigned char RC5cipher[5][8] = {
+    {0x21, 0xA5, 0xDB, 0xEE, 0x15, 0x4B, 0x8F, 0x6D},
+    {0xF7, 0xC0, 0x13, 0xAC, 0x5B, 0x2B, 0x89, 0x52},
+    {0x2F, 0x42, 0xB3, 0xB7, 0x03, 0x69, 0xFC, 0x92},
+    {0x65, 0xC1, 0x78, 0xB2, 0x84, 0xD1, 0x97, 0xCC},
+    {0xEB, 0x44, 0xE4, 0x15, 0xDA, 0x31, 0x98, 0x24},
+};
+
+# define RC5_CBC_NUM 27
+static unsigned char rc5_cbc_cipher[RC5_CBC_NUM][8] = {
+    {0x7a, 0x7b, 0xba, 0x4d, 0x79, 0x11, 0x1d, 0x1e},
+    {0x79, 0x7b, 0xba, 0x4d, 0x78, 0x11, 0x1d, 0x1e},
+    {0x7a, 0x7b, 0xba, 0x4d, 0x79, 0x11, 0x1d, 0x1f},
+    {0x7a, 0x7b, 0xba, 0x4d, 0x79, 0x11, 0x1d, 0x1f},
+    {0x8b, 0x9d, 0xed, 0x91, 0xce, 0x77, 0x94, 0xa6},
+    {0x2f, 0x75, 0x9f, 0xe7, 0xad, 0x86, 0xa3, 0x78},
+    {0xdc, 0xa2, 0x69, 0x4b, 0xf4, 0x0e, 0x07, 0x88},
+    {0xdc, 0xa2, 0x69, 0x4b, 0xf4, 0x0e, 0x07, 0x88},
+    {0xdc, 0xfe, 0x09, 0x85, 0x77, 0xec, 0xa5, 0xff},
+    {0x96, 0x46, 0xfb, 0x77, 0x63, 0x8f, 0x9c, 0xa8},
+    {0xb2, 0xb3, 0x20, 0x9d, 0xb6, 0x59, 0x4d, 0xa4},
+    {0x54, 0x5f, 0x7f, 0x32, 0xa5, 0xfc, 0x38, 0x36},
+    {0x82, 0x85, 0xe7, 0xc1, 0xb5, 0xbc, 0x74, 0x02},
+    {0xfc, 0x58, 0x6f, 0x92, 0xf7, 0x08, 0x09, 0x34},
+    {0xcf, 0x27, 0x0e, 0xf9, 0x71, 0x7f, 0xf7, 0xc4},
+    {0xe4, 0x93, 0xf1, 0xc1, 0xbb, 0x4d, 0x6e, 0x8c},
+    {0x5c, 0x4c, 0x04, 0x1e, 0x0f, 0x21, 0x7a, 0xc3},
+    {0x92, 0x1f, 0x12, 0x48, 0x53, 0x73, 0xb4, 0xf7},
+    {0x5b, 0xa0, 0xca, 0x6b, 0xbe, 0x7f, 0x5f, 0xad},
+    {0xc5, 0x33, 0x77, 0x1c, 0xd0, 0x11, 0x0e, 0x63},
+    {0x29, 0x4d, 0xdb, 0x46, 0xb3, 0x27, 0x8d, 0x60},
+    {0xda, 0xd6, 0xbd, 0xa9, 0xdf, 0xe8, 0xf7, 0xe8},
+    {0x97, 0xe0, 0x78, 0x78, 0x37, 0xed, 0x31, 0x7f},
+    {0x78, 0x75, 0xdb, 0xf6, 0x73, 0x8c, 0x64, 0x78},
+    {0x8f, 0x34, 0xc3, 0xc6, 0x81, 0xc9, 0x96, 0x95},
+    {0x7c, 0xb3, 0xf1, 0xdf, 0x34, 0xf9, 0x48, 0x11},
+    {0x7f, 0xd1, 0xa0, 0x23, 0xa5, 0xbb, 0xa2, 0x17},
+};
+
+static unsigned char rc5_cbc_key[RC5_CBC_NUM][17] = {
+    {1, 0x00},
+    {1, 0x00},
+    {1, 0x00},
+    {1, 0x00},
+    {1, 0x00},
+    {1, 0x11},
+    {1, 0x00},
+    {4, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+    {1, 0x00},
+    {1, 0x00},
+    {1, 0x00},
+    {1, 0x00},
+    {4, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04},
+    {4, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04},
+    {4, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04},
+    {8, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08},
+    {8, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08},
+    {8, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08},
+    {8, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08},
+    {16, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08,
+     0x10, 0x20, 0x30, 0x40, 0x50, 0x60, 0x70, 0x80},
+    {16, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08,
+     0x10, 0x20, 0x30, 0x40, 0x50, 0x60, 0x70, 0x80},
+    {16, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08,
+     0x10, 0x20, 0x30, 0x40, 0x50, 0x60, 0x70, 0x80},
+    {5, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05},
+    {5, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05},
+    {5, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05},
+    {5, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05},
+    {5, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05},
+};
+
+static unsigned char rc5_cbc_plain[RC5_CBC_NUM][8] = {
+    {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+    {0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff},
+    {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+    {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01},
+    {0x10, 0x20, 0x30, 0x40, 0x50, 0x60, 0x70, 0x80},
+    {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+    {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+    {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+    {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+    {0x10, 0x20, 0x30, 0x40, 0x50, 0x60, 0x70, 0x80},
+    {0x10, 0x20, 0x30, 0x40, 0x50, 0x60, 0x70, 0x80},
+    {0x10, 0x20, 0x30, 0x40, 0x50, 0x60, 0x70, 0x80},
+    {0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff},
+    {0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff},
+    {0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff},
+    {0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff},
+    {0x10, 0x20, 0x30, 0x40, 0x50, 0x60, 0x70, 0x80},
+    {0x10, 0x20, 0x30, 0x40, 0x50, 0x60, 0x70, 0x80},
+    {0x10, 0x20, 0x30, 0x40, 0x50, 0x60, 0x70, 0x80},
+    {0x10, 0x20, 0x30, 0x40, 0x50, 0x60, 0x70, 0x80},
+    {0x10, 0x20, 0x30, 0x40, 0x50, 0x60, 0x70, 0x80},
+    {0x10, 0x20, 0x30, 0x40, 0x50, 0x60, 0x70, 0x80},
+    {0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff},
+    {0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff},
+    {0x08, 0x08, 0x08, 0x08, 0x08, 0x08, 0x08, 0x08},
+    {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+    {0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44, 0x55, 0x66, 0x77, 0x01},
+};
+
+static int rc5_cbc_rounds[RC5_CBC_NUM] = {
+    0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 2, 2,
+    8, 8, 12, 16, 8, 12, 16, 12,
+    8, 12, 16, 8, 12, 16, 12, 8,
+    8, 8, 8,
+};
+
+static unsigned char rc5_cbc_iv[RC5_CBC_NUM][8] = {
+    {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+    {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+    {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01},
+    {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+    {0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08},
+    {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+    {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+    {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+    {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+    {0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08},
+    {0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08},
+    {0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08},
+    {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+    {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+    {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+    {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+    {0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08},
+    {0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08},
+    {0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08},
+    {0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08},
+    {0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08},
+    {0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08},
+    {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+    {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+    {0x78, 0x75, 0xdb, 0xf6, 0x73, 0x8c, 0x64, 0x78},
+    {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+    {0x7c, 0xb3, 0xf1, 0xdf, 0x34, 0xf9, 0x48, 0x11},
+};
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+    int i, n, err = 0;
+    RC5_32_KEY key;
+    unsigned char buf[8], buf2[8], ivb[8];
+
+    for (n = 0; n < 5; n++) {
+        RC5_32_set_key(&key, 16, &(RC5key[n][0]), 12);
+
+        RC5_32_ecb_encrypt(&(RC5plain[n][0]), buf, &key, RC5_ENCRYPT);
+        if (memcmp(&(RC5cipher[n][0]), buf, 8) != 0) {
+            printf("ecb RC5 error encrypting (%d)\n", n + 1);
+            printf("got     :");
+            for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
+                printf("%02X ", buf[i]);
+            printf("\n");
+            printf("expected:");
+            for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
+                printf("%02X ", RC5cipher[n][i]);
+            err = 20;
+            printf("\n");
+        }
+
+        RC5_32_ecb_encrypt(buf, buf2, &key, RC5_DECRYPT);
+        if (memcmp(&(RC5plain[n][0]), buf2, 8) != 0) {
+            printf("ecb RC5 error decrypting (%d)\n", n + 1);
+            printf("got     :");
+            for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
+                printf("%02X ", buf2[i]);
+            printf("\n");
+            printf("expected:");
+            for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
+                printf("%02X ", RC5plain[n][i]);
+            printf("\n");
+            err = 3;
+        }
+    }
+    if (err == 0)
+        printf("ecb RC5 ok\n");
+
+    for (n = 0; n < RC5_CBC_NUM; n++) {
+        i = rc5_cbc_rounds[n];
+        if (i < 8)
+            continue;
+
+        RC5_32_set_key(&key, rc5_cbc_key[n][0], &(rc5_cbc_key[n][1]), i);
+
+        memcpy(ivb, &(rc5_cbc_iv[n][0]), 8);
+        RC5_32_cbc_encrypt(&(rc5_cbc_plain[n][0]), buf, 8,
+                           &key, &(ivb[0]), RC5_ENCRYPT);
+
+        if (memcmp(&(rc5_cbc_cipher[n][0]), buf, 8) != 0) {
+            printf("cbc RC5 error encrypting (%d)\n", n + 1);
+            printf("got     :");
+            for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
+                printf("%02X ", buf[i]);
+            printf("\n");
+            printf("expected:");
+            for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
+                printf("%02X ", rc5_cbc_cipher[n][i]);
+            err = 30;
+            printf("\n");
+        }
+
+        memcpy(ivb, &(rc5_cbc_iv[n][0]), 8);
+        RC5_32_cbc_encrypt(buf, buf2, 8, &key, &(ivb[0]), RC5_DECRYPT);
+        if (memcmp(&(rc5_cbc_plain[n][0]), buf2, 8) != 0) {
+            printf("cbc RC5 error decrypting (%d)\n", n + 1);
+            printf("got     :");
+            for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
+                printf("%02X ", buf2[i]);
+            printf("\n");
+            printf("expected:");
+            for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
+                printf("%02X ", rc5_cbc_plain[n][i]);
+            printf("\n");
+            err = 3;
+        }
+    }
+    if (err == 0)
+        printf("cbc RC5 ok\n");
+
+    EXIT(err);
+    return (err);
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/01-test_abort.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/01-test_abort.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2f121e2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/01-test_abort.t
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use OpenSSL::Test;
+
+setup("test_abort");
+
+plan tests => 1;
+
+is(run(test(["aborttest"])), 0, "Testing that abort is caught correctly");
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/01-test_sanity.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/01-test_sanity.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f01466d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/01-test_sanity.t
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use OpenSSL::Test::Simple;
+
+simple_test("test_sanity", "sanitytest");
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/01-test_symbol_presence.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/01-test_symbol_presence.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7f2a2d7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/01-test_symbol_presence.t
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# -*- mode: Perl -*-
+# Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+use strict;
+use File::Spec::Functions qw(devnull);
+use OpenSSL::Test qw(:DEFAULT srctop_file bldtop_dir bldtop_file);
+use OpenSSL::Test::Utils;
+
+setup("test_symbol_presence");
+
+plan skip_all => "Only useful when building shared libraries"
+    if disabled("shared");
+
+my @libnames = ("crypto", "ssl");
+my $testcount = scalar @libnames;
+
+plan tests => $testcount * 2;
+
+note
+    "NOTE: developer test!  It's possible that it won't run on your\n",
+    "platform, and that's perfectly fine.  This is mainly for developers\n",
+    "on Unix to check that our shared libraries are consistent with the\n",
+    "ordinals (util/*.num in the source tree), something that should be\n",
+    "good enough a check for the other platforms as well.\n";
+
+foreach my $libname (@libnames) {
+ SKIP:
+    {
+        my $shlibpath = bldtop_file("lib" . $libname . ".so");
+        *OSTDERR = *STDERR;
+        *OSTDOUT = *STDOUT;
+        open STDERR, ">", devnull();
+        open STDOUT, ">", devnull();
+        my @nm_lines = map { s|\R$||; $_ } `nm -Pg $shlibpath 2> /dev/null`;
+        close STDERR;
+        close STDOUT;
+        *STDERR = *OSTDERR;
+        *STDOUT = *OSTDOUT;
+        skip "Can't run 'nm -Pg $shlibpath' => $?...  ignoring", 2
+            unless $? == 0;
+
+        my $bldtop = bldtop_dir();
+        my @def_lines;
+        indir $bldtop => sub {
+            my $mkdefpath = srctop_file("util", "mkdef.pl");
+            @def_lines = map { s|\R$||; $_ } `$^X $mkdefpath $libname linux 2> /dev/null`;
+            ok($? == 0, "running 'cd $bldtop; $^X $mkdefpath $libname linux' => $?");
+        }, create => 0, cleanup => 0;
+
+        note "Number of lines in \@nm_lines before massaging: ", scalar @nm_lines;
+        note "Number of lines in \@def_lines before massaging: ", scalar @def_lines;
+
+        # Massage the nm output to only contain defined symbols
+        @nm_lines = sort map { s| .*||; $_ } grep(m|.* [BCDST] .*|, @nm_lines);
+
+        # Massage the mkdef.pl output to only contain global symbols
+        # The output we got is in Unix .map format, which has a global
+        # and a local section.  We're only interested in the global
+        # section.
+        my $in_global = 0;
+        @def_lines =
+            sort
+            map { s|;||; s|\s+||g; $_ }
+            grep { $in_global = 1 if m|global:|;
+                   $in_global = 0 if m|local:|;
+                   $in_global = 0 if m|\}|;
+                   $in_global && m|;|; } @def_lines;
+
+        note "Number of lines in \@nm_lines after massaging: ", scalar @nm_lines;
+        note "Number of lines in \@def_lines after massaging: ", scalar @def_lines;
+
+        # Maintain lists of symbols that are missing in the shared library,
+        # or that are extra.
+        my @missing = ();
+        my @extra = ();
+
+        while (scalar @nm_lines || scalar @def_lines) {
+            my $nm_first = $nm_lines[0];
+            my $def_first = $def_lines[0];
+
+            if (!defined($nm_first)) {
+                push @missing, shift @def_lines;
+            } elsif (!defined($def_first)) {
+                push @extra, shift @nm_lines;
+            } elsif ($nm_first gt $def_first) {
+                push @missing, shift @def_lines;
+            } elsif ($nm_first lt $def_first) {
+                push @extra, shift @nm_lines;
+            } else {
+                shift @def_lines;
+                shift @nm_lines;
+            }
+        }
+
+        if (scalar @missing) {
+            note "The following symbols are missing in lib$libname.so:";
+            foreach (@missing) {
+                note "  $_";
+            }
+        }
+        if (scalar @extra) {
+            note "The following symbols are extra in lib$libname.so:";
+            foreach (@extra) {
+                note "  $_";
+            }
+        }
+        ok(scalar @missing == 0,
+           "check that there are no missing symbols in lib$libname.so");
+    }
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/02-test_ordinals.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/02-test_ordinals.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..473d05b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/02-test_ordinals.t
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+use strict;
+use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_file/;
+
+setup("test_ordinals");
+
+plan tests => 2;
+
+ok(testordinals(srctop_file("util", "libcrypto.num")), "Test libcrypto.num");
+ok(testordinals(srctop_file("util", "libssl.num")), "Test libssl.num");
+
+sub testordinals
+{
+    my $filename = shift;
+    my $cnt = 0;
+    my $ret = 1;
+    my $qualifier = "";
+    my $newqual;
+    my $lastfunc = "";
+
+    open(my $fh, '<', $filename);
+    while (my $line = <$fh>) {
+        my @tokens = split(/(?:\s+|\s*:\s*)/, $line);
+        #Check the line looks sane
+        if ($#tokens < 5 || $#tokens > 6) {
+            print STDERR "Invalid line:\n$line\n";
+            $ret = 0;
+            last;
+        }
+        if ($tokens[3] eq "NOEXIST") {
+            #Ignore this line
+            next;
+        }
+        #Some ordinals can be repeated, e.g. if one is VMS and another is !VMS
+        $newqual = $tokens[4];
+        $newqual =~ s/!//g;
+        if ($cnt > $tokens[1]
+                || ($cnt == $tokens[1] && ($qualifier ne $newqual
+                                           || $qualifier eq ""))) {
+            print STDERR "Invalid ordinal detected: ".$tokens[1]."\n";
+            $ret = 0;
+            last;
+        }
+        $cnt = $tokens[1];
+        $qualifier = $newqual;
+        $lastfunc = $tokens[0];
+    }
+    close($fh);
+
+    return $ret;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/03-test_exdata.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/03-test_exdata.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..da66f95
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/03-test_exdata.t
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use OpenSSL::Test::Simple;
+
+simple_test("test_exdata", "exdatatest");
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/03-test_ui.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/03-test_ui.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b1065d1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/03-test_ui.t
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+use OpenSSL::Test;
+
+setup("test_ui");
+
+plan tests => 1;
+
+note <<"EOF";
+The best way to test the UI interface is currently by using an openssl
+command that uses password_callback.  The only one that does this is
+'genrsa'.
+Since password_callback uses a UI method derived from UI_OpenSSL(), it
+ensures that one gets tested well enough as well.
+EOF
+
+my $outfile = "rsa_$$.pem";
+ok(run(app(["openssl", "genrsa", "-passout", "pass:password", "-aes128",
+            "-out", $outfile])),
+   "Checking that genrsa with a password works properly");
+
+unlink $outfile;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..48f62ff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem.t
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+#
+# ======================================================================
+
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+
+use File::Compare qw/compare_text/;
+use File::Basename;
+use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_file data_file/;
+use OpenSSL::Test::Utils;
+
+setup("test_pem_reading");
+
+my $testsrc = srctop_file("test", "recipes", basename($0));
+
+my $cmd = "openssl";
+
+# map input PEM file to 1 if it should be accepted; 0 when should be rejected
+my %cert_expected = (
+    "cert-1023line.pem" => 1,
+    "cert-1024line.pem" => 1,
+    "cert-1025line.pem" => 1,
+    "cert-255line.pem" => 1,
+    "cert-256line.pem" => 1,
+    "cert-257line.pem" => 1,
+    "cert-blankline.pem" => 0,
+    "cert-comment.pem" => 0,
+    "cert-earlypad.pem" => 0,
+    "cert-extrapad.pem" => 0,
+    "cert-infixwhitespace.pem" => 1,
+    "cert-junk.pem" => 0,
+    "cert-leadingwhitespace.pem" => 1,
+    "cert-longline.pem" => 1,
+    "cert-misalignedpad.pem" => 0,
+    "cert-onecolumn.pem" => 1,
+    "cert-oneline.pem" => 1,
+    "cert-shortandlongline.pem" => 1,
+    "cert-shortline.pem" => 1,
+    "cert-threecolumn.pem" => 1,
+    "cert-trailingwhitespace.pem" => 1,
+    "cert.pem" => 1
+);
+my %dsa_expected = (
+    "dsa-1023line.pem" => 0,
+    "dsa-1024line.pem" => 0,
+    "dsa-1025line.pem" => 0,
+    "dsa-255line.pem" => 0,
+    "dsa-256line.pem" => 0,
+    "dsa-257line.pem" => 0,
+    "dsa-blankline.pem" => 0,
+    "dsa-comment.pem" => 0,
+    "dsa-corruptedheader.pem" => 0,
+    "dsa-corruptiv.pem" => 0,
+    "dsa-earlypad.pem" => 0,
+    "dsa-extrapad.pem" => 0,
+    "dsa-infixwhitespace.pem" => 0,
+    "dsa-junk.pem" => 0,
+    "dsa-leadingwhitespace.pem" => 0,
+    "dsa-longline.pem" => 0,
+    "dsa-misalignedpad.pem" => 0,
+    "dsa-onecolumn.pem" => 0,
+    "dsa-oneline.pem" => 0,
+    "dsa-onelineheader.pem" => 0,
+    "dsa-shortandlongline.pem" => 0,
+    "dsa-shortline.pem" => 0,
+    "dsa-threecolumn.pem" => 0,
+    "dsa-trailingwhitespace.pem" => 1,
+    "dsa.pem" => 1
+);
+
+plan tests =>  scalar keys(%cert_expected) + scalar keys(%dsa_expected) + 1;
+
+foreach my $input (keys %cert_expected) {
+    my @common = ($cmd, "x509", "-text", "-noout", "-inform", "PEM", "-in");
+    my @data = run(app([@common, data_file($input)], stderr => undef), capture => 1);
+    my @match = grep /The Great State of Long-Winded Certificate Field Names Whereby to Increase the Output Size/, @data;
+    is((scalar @match > 0 ? 1 : 0), $cert_expected{$input});
+}
+SKIP: {
+    skip "DSA support disabled, skipping...", (scalar keys %dsa_expected) unless !disabled("dsa");
+    foreach my $input (keys %dsa_expected) {
+        my @common = ($cmd, "pkey", "-inform", "PEM", "-passin", "file:" . data_file("wellknown"), "-noout", "-text", "-in");
+        my @data;
+        {
+            local $ENV{MSYS2_ARG_CONV_EXCL} = "file:";
+            @data = run(app([@common, data_file($input)], stderr => undef), capture => 1);
+        }
+        my @match = grep /68:42:02:16:63:54:16:eb:06:5c:ab:06:72:3b:78:/, @data;
+        is((scalar @match > 0 ? 1 : 0), $dsa_expected{$input});
+    }
+}
+SKIP: {
+    skip "RSA support disabled, skipping...", 1 unless !disabled("rsa");
+    my @common = ($cmd, "pkey", "-inform", "PEM", "-noout", "-text", "-in");
+    my @data = run(app([@common, data_file("beermug.pem")], stderr => undef), capture => 1);
+    my @match = grep /00:a0:3a:21:14:5d:cd:b6:d5:a0:3e:49:23:c1:3a:/, @data;
+    ok(scalar @match > 0 ? 1 : 0);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/NOTES b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/NOTES
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..baafd15
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/NOTES
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+The cert-*.pem and dsa-*.pem files are generated as manipulation of the
+ASCII text of cert.pem and dsa.pem, respectively -- they should decode to the
+same data.
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/beermug.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/beermug.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..98b04b7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/beermug.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIICXQIBAAKBgQC+qeXl4ZUfQZFmcGAPwdt7Mza4NQ6mJHehc4V/hVYc6eepvL/5
+uyyflzuhVy5ufctdi92FlXcIct5nNPdqK0PPdWH5Uzw0t/OjI5y/SJh8ur20krqw
+j/N1IOs63AcGLIVSkwx89iQbxj+2tV+YxFpGunUYyR/bJJWczuDMA/CujQIDAQAB
+AoGBAKA6IRRdzbbVoD5JI8E6NZtEP7DwDZ57uPk6Hq86u1JTEzcmguJ4dJitPBRr
+Mn7yQgwcNQ5EvCKifdqXvXBAaZuiiPFuCS/gfUw04jVHXWvG8ZvBQC3dutUYnFW7
+hdun8QU/Z6a1BethvESi1J1vgY2+XC4cBIvbutTc9HhMhbQ1AkEA8YTKGsVEYoKE
+d7sSx4qjeN4bgzeVgIwRt01wJ1EJN62LhwO+pYSXvTt14aHxiascejJqUhtuWvzR
+nuwydqiDpwJBAMoYgUoWdgW4O/C5ZXjiSia54jzrt7upxSq88njTRo/MCQfuJVbc
+3GUD+15V0zNhx9D7lcI+1uxhfcD7jWbJEqsCQBrE/SG6e7nvfX9H3O0BEN10wNfq
+cUeuPshybNvuv3bMZYqxf5AZAjiXPpmjuYHo1V8191Lid3jeTN2wkGdWhkECQQCI
+Rj3oV3z+Hl1M1bc27GBT/MQxkEE0qiXpy780+kJ6dHsifdNv3z4+X5EA656e5zB2
+Gy/A697BRnwlxXpz9OJBAkAUe7Ap0yU8aO6g5g+gsH+18bF0MftWh81VLOo09rRp
+SOHxNGGJLE5As5XkCGUZVIass1r8Q4N22Wip0QzeSWDi
+-
+-          .   *   ..  . *  *
+-        *  * @()Ooc()*   o  .
+-            (Q@*0CG*O()  ___
+-           |\_________/|/ _ \
+-           |  |  |  |  | / | |
+-           |  |  |  |  | | | |
+-           |  |  |  |  | | | |
+-           |  |  |  |  | | | |
+-           |  |  |  |  | | | |
+-           |  |  |  |  | \_| |
+-           |  |  |  |  |\___/
+-           |\_|__|__|_/|
+-            \_________/
+-
+-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-1023line.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-1023line.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7ad3103
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-1023line.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIEzDCCA7QCCQCgxkRox+YljjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADCCASYxYzBhBgNVBAgM
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+JywlJ4qnAB48tgPx0q+ZB+EdMYRqCwyvXJxEdZ7PsCdUeU6xI2ybkhSdUUfQbYem
+3aYRG+yukGzazySQJs8lGqxBlRMFl/FGCg+oSQ/I32eGf8micDskj2zkAJtCkUPH
+X30YrWMfOwW1r2xYr2mBNXbNWXJhW/sIg5u8aa9fcALeuQcMXkbsbVoPmC5aLdiV
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+AA8S89gRjGk2hnkeagWas3dxqTTpgJDhprgWzyKa9hII=
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-1024line.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-1024line.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fd501c2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-1024line.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIEzDCCA7QCCQCgxkRox+YljjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADCCASYxYzBhBgNVBAgM
+WlRoZSBHcmVhdCBTdGF0ZSBvZiBMb25nLVdpbmRlZCBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZSBGaWVsZCBOYW1lcyBXaGVyZWJ5IHRvIEluY3JlYXNlIHRoZSBPdXRwdXQgU2l6ZTEfMB0GA1UEBwwWVG9vbWFueWNoYXJhY3RlcnN2aWxsZTFIMEYGA1UECgw/VGhlIEJlbmV2b2xlbnQgU29jaWV0eSBvZiBMb3F1YWNpb3VzIGFuZCBQbGVvbmFzdGljIFBlcmlwaHJhc2lzMT0wOwYDVQQLDDRFbmRvcnNlbWVudCBvZiBWb3VjaHNhZmUnZCBFdmlkZW50aWFyeSBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0aW9uMRUwEwYDVQQDDAxjZXJ0LmV4YW1wbGUwHhcNMTcwMjIzMjAyNTM2WhcNMTcwMzI1MjAyNTM2WjCCASYxYzBhBgNVBAgMWlRoZSBHcmVhdCBTdGF0ZSBvZiBMb25nLVdpbmRlZCBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZSBGaWVsZCBOYW1lcyBXaGVyZWJ5IHRvIEluY3JlYXNlIHRoZSBPdXRwdXQgU2l6ZTEfMB0GA1UEBwwWVG9vbWFueWNoYXJhY3RlcnN2aWxsZTFIMEYGA1UECgw/VGhlIEJlbmV2b2xlbnQgU29jaWV0eSBvZiBMb3F1YWNpb3VzIGFuZCBQbGVvbmFzdGljIFBlcmlwaHJhc2lzMT0wOwYDVQQLDDRFbmRvcnNlbWVudCBvZiBWb3VjaHNhZmUnZCBFdmlkZW50aWFyeSBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0aW9uMRUwEwYDVQQDDAxjZXJ0LmV4YW1wbGUwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQC7MOIrqH+ZIJiZdroKMrelKMSvvRKg2MEgj/sx9TaHHqrKys4AiL4Rq/ybQEigFC6G8mpZWbBrU+vN2SLr1ZsPftCHIY12LF560WLYTYNqDgF5BdCZCrjJ2hhN+XwML2tgYdWioV/Eey8SJSqUskf03MpcwnLbVfSp
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+A8S89gRjGk2hnkeagWas3dxqTTpgJDhprgWzyKa9hII=
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-1025line.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-1025line.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2369229
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-1025line.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIEzDCCA7QCCQCgxkRox+YljjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADCCASYxYzBhBgNVBAgM
+WlRoZSBHcmVhdCBTdGF0ZSBvZiBMb25nLVdpbmRlZCBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZSBGaWVs
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+8S89gRjGk2hnkeagWas3dxqTTpgJDhprgWzyKa9hII=
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-255line.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-255line.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d7fd1f1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-255line.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIEzDCCA7QCCQCgxkRox+YljjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADCCASYxYzBhBgNVBAgM
+WlRoZSBHcmVhdCBTdGF0ZSBvZiBMb25nLVdpbmRlZCBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZSBGaWVsZCBOYW1lcyBXaGVyZWJ5IHRvIEluY3JlYXNlIHRoZSBPdXRwdXQgU2l6ZTEfMB0GA1UEBwwWVG9vbWFueWNoYXJhY3RlcnN2aWxsZTFIMEYGA1UECgw/VGhlIEJlbmV2b2xlbnQgU29jaWV0eSBvZiBMb3F1YWNpb3VzIGFuZCBQbGVvbmFzdGljIFBlcml
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-256line.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-256line.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..225bdb6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-256line.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-257line.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-257line.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..414b036
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-257line.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-blankline.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-blankline.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3f25288
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-blankline.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-comment.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-comment.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a1a493e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-comment.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-earlypad.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-earlypad.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..adb445e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-earlypad.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-extrapad.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-extrapad.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0b89aa2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-extrapad.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-infixwhitespace.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-infixwhitespace.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f7e912a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-infixwhitespace.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-junk.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-junk.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5377e26
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-junk.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-leadingwhitespace.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-leadingwhitespace.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6de4d48
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-leadingwhitespace.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-longline.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-longline.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7304481
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-longline.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-misalignedpad.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-misalignedpad.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..caca6e5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-misalignedpad.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-onecolumn.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-onecolumn.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..77eebbf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-onecolumn.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,1646 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-oneline.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-oneline.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..70121fb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-oneline.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-shortandlongline.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-shortandlongline.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1681e24
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-shortandlongline.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-shortline.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-shortline.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3c5d2e5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-shortline.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-threecolumn.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-threecolumn.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..eb5503c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-threecolumn.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,550 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-trailingwhitespace.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-trailingwhitespace.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ab0dfe8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-trailingwhitespace.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+A8S89gRjGk2hnkeagWas3dxqTTpgJDhprgWzyKa9hII=        
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..99ddf07
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+A8S89gRjGk2hnkeagWas3dxqTTpgJDhprgWzyKa9hII=
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/csr.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/csr.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..02a966d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/csr.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----
+MIIDbTCCAlUCAQAwggEmMWMwYQYDVQQIDFpUaGUgR3JlYXQgU3RhdGUgb2YgTG9u
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+vRMcwsXoc5VthqU/E8fc9ls=
+-----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-1023line.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-1023line.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0e5c01a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-1023line.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED
+DEK-Info: AES-256-CBC,A2A7FA3E5E454B59C8777564E7AF3CD6
+
+EBDWX0Qfarl+QNsHgCUudLyb6DkC4zyaDU/vUqWyHX0m+8W2bbmT5TexlL3hsM5U
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
+Io15qB3jYbx1oktbcQPo0hzaNv+PJ5wtT47JLNcbMeMSnwKM8MB4CXlM43RUtKws
+6
+-----END DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-1024line.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-1024line.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..185a029
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-1024line.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED
+DEK-Info: AES-256-CBC,A2A7FA3E5E454B59C8777564E7AF3CD6
+
+EBDWX0Qfarl+QNsHgCUudLyb6DkC4zyaDU/vUqWyHX0m+8W2bbmT5TexlL3hsM5U
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+o15qB3jYbx1oktbcQPo0hzaNv+PJ5wtT47JLNcbMeMSnwKM8MB4CXlM43RUtKws6
+-----END DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-1025line.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-1025line.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fa449c9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-1025line.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED
+DEK-Info: AES-256-CBC,A2A7FA3E5E454B59C8777564E7AF3CD6
+
+EBDWX0Qfarl+QNsHgCUudLyb6DkC4zyaDU/vUqWyHX0m+8W2bbmT5TexlL3hsM5U
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+15qB3jYbx1oktbcQPo0hzaNv+PJ5wtT47JLNcbMeMSnwKM8MB4CXlM43RUtKws6
+-----END DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-255line.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-255line.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..36a5b12
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-255line.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED
+DEK-Info: AES-256-CBC,A2A7FA3E5E454B59C8777564E7AF3CD6
+
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+Io15qB3jYbx1oktbcQPo0hzaNv+PJ5wtT47JLNcbMeMSnwKM8MB4CXlM43RUtKws
+6
+-----END DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-256line.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-256line.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6ba6c39
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-256line.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED
+DEK-Info: AES-256-CBC,A2A7FA3E5E454B59C8777564E7AF3CD6
+
+EBDWX0Qfarl+QNsHgCUudLyb6DkC4zyaDU/vUqWyHX0m+8W2bbmT5TexlL3hsM5U
+gz7KsGqyjeOuK9QT5LOM4VyK6BgmhqpQaJ1MgCWA/gbBPTgBp2jfp3oS0WC5D6GM
+wcsdqoeIpD/wce3k0H2Gfu6+rINBmbITtn4DTf3PkOcDIwdDceN2qkZanloFVriS
+3kABUIh1ehYIXQibLRFY5rXdQnhY2CZNrQFIMwl64hK5P5hQbcyJKGDHAYzXV7ou
+pdXy5F9oyEd6eA5ix+n1jKFRB7PmApZmuiQjzfExVKmBPGxRzOGT0qR5vLylQhei
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+q2TMLyexQARJapabBf/ST9zWP7wxzWfrEbX3OEZCuRDVkwWf18BH/Eh6Lqnqg5QM
+4GuX708NiFpiwQt9p/DAuQdhBrP67BxL64CbI7CgW4Lv3z3qnKfFV9zY5/mxCERn
+9mPOig2r8WvvXt7ch6nhzBPfCwq0BoPqLKUFgDpeXsNdJ9sW5IV3yi/3Bh98ZBYX
+zj8g/7XMo6v998fct+EiHPscuqeYUaoJZ6+Zj7W45nGA9DGsnEmZ0Wux2tTj70mD
+oH//21TiRAx6ypPP+Iq2YDzqh7VXc/gssOn/vU1Aj19gzL+MRn1Z55SMrA7nO90m
+OgOyEP+uGrXyahfZGPbmpgIx+MTbtfvRtZBsG3EcXyW9NnHJfk4O8xN3hYPWXaBI
+o15qB3jYbx1oktbcQPo0hzaNv+PJ5wtT47JLNcbMeMSnwKM8MB4CXlM43RUtKws6
+-----END DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-257line.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-257line.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a73d700
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-257line.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED
+DEK-Info: AES-256-CBC,A2A7FA3E5E454B59C8777564E7AF3CD6
+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998fct+EiHPscuqeYUaoJZ6+Zj7W45nGA9DGsnEmZ0Wux2tTj70mDoH//21TiRAx6ypPP+Iq2YDzqh7VXc/gssOn/vU1Aj19gzL+MRn1Z55SMrA7nO90mOgOyEP+uGrXyahfZGPbmpgIx+MTbtfvRtZBsG3EcXyW9NnHJfk4O8xN3hYPWXaBIo
+15qB3jYbx1oktbcQPo0hzaNv+PJ5wtT47JLNcbMeMSnwKM8MB4CXlM43RUtKws6
+-----END DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-blankline.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-blankline.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6f46e27
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-blankline.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED
+DEK-Info: AES-256-CBC,A2A7FA3E5E454B59C8777564E7AF3CD6
+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+oH//21TiRAx6ypPP+Iq2YDzqh7VXc/gssOn/vU1Aj19gzL+MRn1Z55SMrA7nO90m
+OgOyEP+uGrXyahfZGPbmpgIx+MTbtfvRtZBsG3EcXyW9NnHJfk4O8xN3hYPWXaBI
+o15qB3jYbx1oktbcQPo0hzaNv+PJ5wtT47JLNcbMeMSnwKM8MB4CXlM43RUtKws6
+-----END DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-comment.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-comment.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bb96ec4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-comment.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED
+DEK-Info: AES-256-CBC,A2A7FA3E5E454B59C8777564E7AF3CD6
+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-vcPXDPUHTkj1XmoZ4f1mUF17OtCohsJT7O4oMBBMBwqCkC7enrLaALi9jiKym47g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-----END DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-corruptedheader.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-corruptedheader.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7ed4261
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-corruptedheader.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+Proc-Type: 4,ENCARPTED
+DEK-Info: AES-256-CBC,A2A7FA3E5E454B59C8777564E7AF3CD6
+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-----END DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-corruptiv.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-corruptiv.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..233e201
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-corruptiv.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED
+DEK-Info: AES-256-CBC,A2A7FA3E5E464B59C8777564E7AF3CD6
+
+EBDWX0Qfarl+QNsHgCUudLyb6DkC4zyaDU/vUqWyHX0m+8W2bbmT5TexlL3hsM5U
+gz7KsGqyjeOuK9QT5LOM4VyK6BgmhqpQaJ1MgCWA/gbBPTgBp2jfp3oS0WC5D6GM
+wcsdqoeIpD/wce3k0H2Gfu6+rINBmbITtn4DTf3PkOcDIwdDceN2qkZanloFVriS
+3kABUIh1ehYIXQibLRFY5rXdQnhY2CZNrQFIMwl64hK5P5hQbcyJKGDHAYzXV7ou
+pdXy5F9oyEd6eA5ix+n1jKFRB7PmApZmuiQjzfExVKmBPGxRzOGT0qR5vLylQhei
+SC77nkerawUyjA2QlIa/SmNzXEYkN3goDzHSFKBauB0o5qFc1b1x7dXPCFL0atG5
+UxoRr/Ep7tiab4DZmYEnOGkL2dVN8jA04F+HQGBeP6nDOSKhXRjbUODUpDpDvj+F
+Jf77Rv0p48l9ip8i/bquwukXlMed3O4d6rnEwkggdySS5itiShwaVLPf+icI/Yd4
+vcPXDPUHTkj1XmoZ4f1mUF17OtCohsJT7O4oMBBMBwqCkC7enrLaALi9jiKym47g
+2bZH05xJPpWXS/kSEkwt/jI+a+o4CuDPly3XhIcYRtsaWBJWiam1OT7sGQ+zkjTG
+Aa6NfwbR8ScQC8MzDfVnkJ3VnXjT345bz+F7HTAveQ8a7KGxNntPhE0KVjpl369K
+q2TMLyexQARJapabBf/ST9zWP7wxzWfrEbX3OEZCuRDVkwWf18BH/Eh6Lqnqg5QM
+4GuX708NiFpiwQt9p/DAuQdhBrP67BxL64CbI7CgW4Lv3z3qnKfFV9zY5/mxCERn
+9mPOig2r8WvvXt7ch6nhzBPfCwq0BoPqLKUFgDpeXsNdJ9sW5IV3yi/3Bh98ZBYX
+zj8g/7XMo6v998fct+EiHPscuqeYUaoJZ6+Zj7W45nGA9DGsnEmZ0Wux2tTj70mD
+oH//21TiRAx6ypPP+Iq2YDzqh7VXc/gssOn/vU1Aj19gzL+MRn1Z55SMrA7nO90m
+OgOyEP+uGrXyahfZGPbmpgIx+MTbtfvRtZBsG3EcXyW9NnHJfk4O8xN3hYPWXaBI
+o15qB3jYbx1oktbcQPo0hzaNv+PJ5wtT47JLNcbMeMSnwKM8MB4CXlM43RUtKws6
+-----END DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-earlypad.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-earlypad.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9f14e3b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-earlypad.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED
+DEK-Info: AES-256-CBC,A2A7FA3E5E454B59C8777564E7AF3CD6
+
+EBDWX0Qfarl+QNsHgCUudLyb6DkC4zyaDU/vUqWyHX0m+8W2bbmT5TexlL3hsM5U
+====gz7KsGqyjeOuK9QT5LOM4VyK6BgmhqpQaJ1MgCWA/gbBPTgBp2jfp3oS0WC5D6GM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-----END DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-extrapad.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-extrapad.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1823973
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-extrapad.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED
+DEK-Info: AES-256-CBC,A2A7FA3E5E454B59C8777564E7AF3CD6
+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==
+-----END DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-infixwhitespace.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-infixwhitespace.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5755265
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-infixwhitespace.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED
+DEK-Info: AES-256-CBC,A2A7FA3E5E454B59C8777564E7AF3CD6
+
+EBDWX0Qfarl+QNsHgCUudLyb6DkC4zyaDU/vUqWyHX0m+8W2bbmT5TexlL3hsM5U
+gz7KsGqyjeOuK9QT5LOM4VyK6BgmhqpQaJ1MgCWA/gbBPTgBp2jfp3oS0WC5D6GM
+wcsdqoeIpD/wce3k0H2Gfu6+rINBmbITtn4DTf3PkOcDIwdDceN2qkZanloFVriS
+3kABUIh1ehYIXQibLRFY5rXdQnhY2CZNrQFIMwl64hK5P5hQbcyJKGDHAYzXV7ou
+pdXy5F9oyEd6eA5ix+n1jKFRB7PmApZmuiQjzfExVKmBPGxRzOGT0qR5vLylQhei
+SC77nkerawUyjA2QlIa/SmNzXEYkN3goDzHSFKBauB0o5qFc1b1x7dXPCFL0atG5
+UxoRr/Ep7tiab4DZmYEnOGkL2dVN8jA04F+HQGBeP6nDOSKhXRjbUODUpDpDvj+F
+Jf77Rv0p48l9ip8i/bqu     wukXlMed3O4d6rnEwkggdySS5itiShwaVLPf+icI/Yd4
+vcPXDPUHTkj1XmoZ4f1mUF17OtCohsJT7O4oMBBMBwqCkC7enrLaALi9jiKym47g
+2bZH05xJPpWXS/kSEkwt/jI+a+o4CuDPly3XhIcYRtsaWBJWiam1OT7sGQ+zkjTG
+Aa6NfwbR8ScQC8MzDfVnkJ3VnXjT345bz+F7HTAveQ8a7KGxNntPhE0KVjpl369K
+q2TMLyexQARJapabBf/ST9zWP7wxz   WfrEbX3OEZCuRDVkwWf18BH/Eh6Lqnqg5QM
+4GuX708NiFpiwQt9p/DAuQdhBrP67BxL64CbI7CgW4Lv3z3qnKfFV9zY5/mxCERn
+9mPOig2r8WvvXt7ch6nhzBPfCwq0BoPqLKUFgDpeXsNdJ9sW5IV3yi/3Bh98ZBYX
+zj8g/7XMo6v998fct+EiHPscuqeYUaoJZ6+Zj7W45nGA9DGsnEmZ0Wux2tTj70mD
+oH//21TiRAx6ypPP+Iq2YDzqh7VXc/gssOn/vU1Aj19gzL+MRn1Z55SMrA7nO90m
+OgOyEP+uGrXyahfZGPbmpgIx+MTbtfvRtZBsG3EcXyW9NnHJfk4O8xN3hYPWXaBI
+o15qB3jYbx1oktbcQPo0hzaNv+PJ5wtT47JLNcbMeMSnwKM8MB4CXlM43RUtKws6
+-----END DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-junk.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-junk.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0836c45
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-junk.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED
+DEK-Info: AES-256-CBC,A2A7FA3E5E454B59C8777564E7AF3CD6
+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!"#$%&()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-----END DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-leadingwhitespace.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-leadingwhitespace.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8bbf261
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-leadingwhitespace.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED
+DEK-Info: AES-256-CBC,A2A7FA3E5E454B59C8777564E7AF3CD6
+
+      EBDWX0Qfarl+QNsHgCUudLyb6DkC4zyaDU/vUqWyHX0m+8W2bbmT5TexlL3hsM5U
+        gz7KsGqyjeOuK9QT5LOM4VyK6BgmhqpQaJ1MgCWA/gbBPTgBp2jfp3oS0WC5D6GM
+        wcsdqoeIpD/wce3k0H2Gfu6+rINBmbITtn4DTf3PkOcDIwdDceN2qkZanloFVriS
+        3kABUIh1ehYIXQibLRFY5rXdQnhY2CZNrQFIMwl64hK5P5hQbcyJKGDHAYzXV7ou
+        pdXy5F9oyEd6eA5ix+n1jKFRB7PmApZmuiQjzfExVKmBPGxRzOGT0qR5vLylQhei
+        SC77nkerawUyjA2QlIa/SmNzXEYkN3goDzHSFKBauB0o5qFc1b1x7dXPCFL0atG5
+        UxoRr/Ep7tiab4DZmYEnOGkL2dVN8jA04F+HQGBeP6nDOSKhXRjbUODUpDpDvj+F
+        Jf77Rv0p48l9ip8i/bquwukXlMed3O4d6rnEwkggdySS5itiShwaVLPf+icI/Yd4
+        vcPXDPUHTkj1XmoZ4f1mUF17OtCohsJT7O4oMBBMBwqCkC7enrLaALi9jiKym47g
+        2bZH05xJPpWXS/kSEkwt/jI+a+o4CuDPly3XhIcYRtsaWBJWiam1OT7sGQ+zkjTG
+        Aa6NfwbR8ScQC8MzDfVnkJ3VnXjT345bz+F7HTAveQ8a7KGxNntPhE0KVjpl369K
+        q2TMLyexQARJapabBf/ST9zWP7wxzWfrEbX3OEZCuRDVkwWf18BH/Eh6Lqnqg5QM
+        4GuX708NiFpiwQt9p/DAuQdhBrP67BxL64CbI7CgW4Lv3z3qnKfFV9zY5/mxCERn
+        9mPOig2r8WvvXt7ch6nhzBPfCwq0BoPqLKUFgDpeXsNdJ9sW5IV3yi/3Bh98ZBYX
+        zj8g/7XMo6v998fct+EiHPscuqeYUaoJZ6+Zj7W45nGA9DGsnEmZ0Wux2tTj70mD
+                oH//21TiRAx6ypPP+Iq2YDzqh7VXc/gssOn/vU1Aj19gzL+MRn1Z55SMrA7nO90m
+        OgOyEP+uGrXyahfZGPbmpgIx+MTbtfvRtZBsG3EcXyW9NnHJfk4O8xN3hYPWXaBI
+        o15qB3jYbx1oktbcQPo0hzaNv+PJ5wtT47JLNcbMeMSnwKM8MB4CXlM43RUtKws6
+-----END DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-longline.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-longline.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..75973ef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-longline.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED
+DEK-Info: AES-256-CBC,A2A7FA3E5E454B59C8777564E7AF3CD6
+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-----END DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-misalignedpad.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-misalignedpad.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ad8c366
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-misalignedpad.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED
+DEK-Info: AES-256-CBC,A2A7FA3E5E454B59C8777564E7AF3CD6
+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+-----END DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-onecolumn.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-onecolumn.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..61b8ed5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-onecolumn.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,1157 @@
+-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED
+DEK-Info: AES-256-CBC,A2A7FA3E5E454B59C8777564E7AF3CD6
+
+E
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+6
+-----END DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-oneline.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-oneline.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..176f1e8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-oneline.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED
+DEK-Info: AES-256-CBC,A2A7FA3E5E454B59C8777564E7AF3CD6
+
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
+-----END DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-onelineheader.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-onelineheader.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d07095b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-onelineheader.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED DEK-Info: AES-256-CBC,A2A7FA3E5E454B59C8777564E7AF3CD6
+
+EBDWX0Qfarl+QNsHgCUudLyb6DkC4zyaDU/vUqWyHX0m+8W2bbmT5TexlL3hsM5U
+gz7KsGqyjeOuK9QT5LOM4VyK6BgmhqpQaJ1MgCWA/gbBPTgBp2jfp3oS0WC5D6GM
+wcsdqoeIpD/wce3k0H2Gfu6+rINBmbITtn4DTf3PkOcDIwdDceN2qkZanloFVriS
+3kABUIh1ehYIXQibLRFY5rXdQnhY2CZNrQFIMwl64hK5P5hQbcyJKGDHAYzXV7ou
+pdXy5F9oyEd6eA5ix+n1jKFRB7PmApZmuiQjzfExVKmBPGxRzOGT0qR5vLylQhei
+SC77nkerawUyjA2QlIa/SmNzXEYkN3goDzHSFKBauB0o5qFc1b1x7dXPCFL0atG5
+UxoRr/Ep7tiab4DZmYEnOGkL2dVN8jA04F+HQGBeP6nDOSKhXRjbUODUpDpDvj+F
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+q2TMLyexQARJapabBf/ST9zWP7wxzWfrEbX3OEZCuRDVkwWf18BH/Eh6Lqnqg5QM
+4GuX708NiFpiwQt9p/DAuQdhBrP67BxL64CbI7CgW4Lv3z3qnKfFV9zY5/mxCERn
+9mPOig2r8WvvXt7ch6nhzBPfCwq0BoPqLKUFgDpeXsNdJ9sW5IV3yi/3Bh98ZBYX
+zj8g/7XMo6v998fct+EiHPscuqeYUaoJZ6+Zj7W45nGA9DGsnEmZ0Wux2tTj70mD
+oH//21TiRAx6ypPP+Iq2YDzqh7VXc/gssOn/vU1Aj19gzL+MRn1Z55SMrA7nO90m
+OgOyEP+uGrXyahfZGPbmpgIx+MTbtfvRtZBsG3EcXyW9NnHJfk4O8xN3hYPWXaBI
+o15qB3jYbx1oktbcQPo0hzaNv+PJ5wtT47JLNcbMeMSnwKM8MB4CXlM43RUtKws6
+-----END DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-shortandlongline.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-shortandlongline.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b9a8333
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-shortandlongline.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED
+DEK-Info: AES-256-CBC,A2A7FA3E5E454B59C8777564E7AF3CD6
+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-----END DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-shortline.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-shortline.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6da1ab7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-shortline.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED
+DEK-Info: AES-256-CBC,A2A7FA3E5E454B59C8777564E7AF3CD6
+
+EBDWX0Qfarl+QNsHgCUudLyb6DkC4zyaDU/vUqWyHX0m+8W2bbmT5TexlL3hsM5U
+gz7KsGqyjeOuK9QT5LOM4VyK6BgmhqpQaJ1MgCWA/gbBPTgBp2jfp3oS0WC5D6GM
+wcsdqoeIpD/wce3k0H2Gfu6+rINBmbITtn4DTf3PkOcDIwdDceN2qkZanloFVriS
+3kABUIh1ehYIXQibLRFY5rXdQnhY2CZNrQFIMwl64hK5P5hQbcyJKGDHAYzXV7ou
+pdXy5F9oyEd6eA5ix+n1jKFRB7PmApZmuiQjzfExVKmBPGxRzOGT0qR5vLylQhei
+SC77nkerawUyjA2QlIa/SmNzXEYkN3goDzHSFKBauB0o5qFc1b1x7dXPCFL0atG5
+UxoRr/Ep7tiab4DZmYEnOGkL2dVN8jA04F+HQGBeP6nDOSKhXRjbUODUpDpDvj+F
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+Aa6NfwbR8ScQC8MzDfVnkJ3VnXjT345bz+F7HTAveQ8a7KGxNntPhE0KVjpl369K
+q2TMLyexQARJapabBf/ST9zWP7wxzWfrEbX3OEZCuRDVkwWf18BH/Eh6Lqnqg5QM
+4GuX708NiFpiwQt9p/DAuQdhBrP67BxL64CbI7CgW4Lv3z3qnKfFV9zY5/mxCERn
+9mPOig2r8WvvXt7ch6nhzBPfCwq0BoPqLKUFgDpeXsNdJ9sW5IV3yi/3Bh98ZBYX
+zj8g/7XMo6v998fct+EiHPscuqeYUaoJZ6+Zj7W45nGA9DGsnEmZ0Wux2tTj70mD
+oH//21TiRAx6ypPP+Iq2YDzqh7VXc/gssOn/vU1Aj19gzL+MRn1Z55SMrA7nO90m
+OgOyEP+uGrXyahfZGPbmpgIx+MTbtfvRtZBsG3EcXyW9NnHJfk4O8xN3hYPWXaB
+Io15qB3jYbx1oktbcQPo0hzaNv+PJ5wtT47JLNcbMeMSnwKM8MB4CXlM43RUtKws
+6
+-----END DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-threecolumn.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-threecolumn.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e6fcc53
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-threecolumn.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,389 @@
+-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED
+DEK-Info: AES-256-CBC,A2A7FA3E5E454B59C8777564E7AF3CD6
+
+EBD
+WX0
+Qfa
+rl+
+QNs
+HgC
+Uud
+Lyb
+6Dk
+C4z
+yaD
+U/v
+UqW
+yHX
+0m+
+8W2
+bbm
+T5T
+exl
+L3h
+sM5
+Ugz
+7Ks
+Gqy
+jeO
+uK9
+QT5
+LOM
+4Vy
+K6B
+gmh
+qpQ
+aJ1
+MgC
+WA/
+gbB
+PTg
+Bp2
+jfp
+3oS
+0WC
+5D6
+GMw
+csd
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+B4C
+XlM
+43R
+UtK
+ws6
+-----END DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-trailingwhitespace.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-trailingwhitespace.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0b5de58
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-trailingwhitespace.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED
+DEK-Info: AES-256-CBC,A2A7FA3E5E454B59C8777564E7AF3CD6
+
+EBDWX0Qfarl+QNsHgCUudLyb6DkC4zyaDU/vUqWyHX0m+8W2bbmT5TexlL3hsM5U        
+gz7KsGqyjeOuK9QT5LOM4VyK6BgmhqpQaJ1MgCWA/gbBPTgBp2jfp3oS0WC5D6GM        
+wcsdqoeIpD/wce3k0H2Gfu6+rINBmbITtn4DTf3PkOcDIwdDceN2qkZanloFVriS        
+3kABUIh1ehYIXQibLRFY5rXdQnhY2CZNrQFIMwl64hK5P5hQbcyJKGDHAYzXV7ou        
+pdXy5F9oyEd6eA5ix+n1jKFRB7PmApZmuiQjzfExVKmBPGxRzOGT0qR5vLylQhei        
+SC77nkerawUyjA2QlIa/SmNzXEYkN3goDzHSFKBauB0o5qFc1b1x7dXPCFL0atG5        
+UxoRr/Ep7tiab4DZmYEnOGkL2dVN8jA04F+HQGBeP6nDOSKhXRjbUODUpDpDvj+F        
+Jf77Rv0p48l9ip8i/bquwukXlMed3O4d6rnEwkggdySS5itiShwaVLPf+icI/Yd4        
+vcPXDPUHTkj1XmoZ4f1mUF17OtCohsJT7O4oMBBMBwqCkC7enrLaALi9jiKym47g        
+2bZH05xJPpWXS/kSEkwt/jI+a+o4CuDPly3XhIcYRtsaWBJWiam1OT7sGQ+zkjTG        
+Aa6NfwbR8ScQC8MzDfVnkJ3VnXjT345bz+F7HTAveQ8a7KGxNntPhE0KVjpl369K        
+q2TMLyexQARJapabBf/ST9zWP7wxzWfrEbX3OEZCuRDVkwWf18BH/Eh6Lqnqg5QM        
+4GuX708NiFpiwQt9p/DAuQdhBrP67BxL64CbI7CgW4Lv3z3qnKfFV9zY5/mxCERn        
+9mPOig2r8WvvXt7ch6nhzBPfCwq0BoPqLKUFgDpeXsNdJ9sW5IV3yi/3Bh98ZBYX                
+zj8g/7XMo6v998fct+EiHPscuqeYUaoJZ6+Zj7W45nGA9DGsnEmZ0Wux2tTj70mD        
+oH//21TiRAx6ypPP+Iq2YDzqh7VXc/gssOn/vU1Aj19gzL+MRn1Z55SMrA7nO90m        
+OgOyEP+uGrXyahfZGPbmpgIx+MTbtfvRtZBsG3EcXyW9NnHJfk4O8xN3hYPWXaBI        
+o15qB3jYbx1oktbcQPo0hzaNv+PJ5wtT47JLNcbMeMSnwKM8MB4CXlM43RUtKws6        
+-----END DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..78ebd1b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED
+DEK-Info: AES-256-CBC,A2A7FA3E5E454B59C8777564E7AF3CD6
+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-----END DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsaparam.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsaparam.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..60563cb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsaparam.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+-----BEGIN DSA PARAMETERS-----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+-----END DSA PARAMETERS-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/key.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/key.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8de7e65
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/key.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/wellknown b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/wellknown
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..632e28f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/wellknown
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+wellknown
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/05-test_bf.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/05-test_bf.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..64c9609
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/05-test_bf.t
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use OpenSSL::Test::Simple;
+
+simple_test("test_bf", "bftest", "bf");
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/05-test_cast.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/05-test_cast.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..46c61da
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/05-test_cast.t
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use OpenSSL::Test::Simple;
+
+simple_test("test_cast", "casttest", "cast");
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/05-test_des.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/05-test_des.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2e6a32b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/05-test_des.t
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use OpenSSL::Test::Simple;
+
+simple_test("test_des", "destest", "des");
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/05-test_hmac.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/05-test_hmac.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2059bcc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/05-test_hmac.t
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use OpenSSL::Test::Simple;
+
+simple_test("test_hmac", "hmactest");
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/05-test_idea.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/05-test_idea.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ca2b767
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/05-test_idea.t
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use OpenSSL::Test::Simple;
+
+simple_test("test_idea", "ideatest", "idea");
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/05-test_md2.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/05-test_md2.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8781af0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/05-test_md2.t
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use OpenSSL::Test::Simple;
+
+simple_test("test_md2", "md2test", "md2");
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/05-test_md4.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/05-test_md4.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..59a815b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/05-test_md4.t
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use OpenSSL::Test::Simple;
+
+simple_test("test_md4", "md4test", "md4");
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/05-test_md5.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/05-test_md5.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3af4d55
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/05-test_md5.t
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use OpenSSL::Test::Simple;
+
+simple_test("test_md5", "md5test", "md5");
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/05-test_mdc2.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/05-test_mdc2.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..181c90f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/05-test_mdc2.t
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use OpenSSL::Test::Simple;
+
+simple_test("test_mdc2", "mdc2test", "mdc2");
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/05-test_rand.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/05-test_rand.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3b175fa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/05-test_rand.t
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use OpenSSL::Test::Simple;
+
+simple_test("test_rand", "randtest", "rand");
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/05-test_rc2.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/05-test_rc2.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..77d9382
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/05-test_rc2.t
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+use OpenSSL::Test::Simple;
+
+simple_test("test_rc2", "rc2test", "rc2");
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/05-test_rc4.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/05-test_rc4.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a26c9b8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/05-test_rc4.t
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+use OpenSSL::Test::Simple;
+
+simple_test("test_rc4", "rc4test", "rc4");
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/05-test_rc5.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/05-test_rc5.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fda0cd2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/05-test_rc5.t
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use OpenSSL::Test::Simple;
+
+simple_test("test_rc5", "rc5test", "rc5");
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/05-test_rmd.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/05-test_rmd.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b1112e1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/05-test_rmd.t
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use OpenSSL::Test::Simple;
+
+simple_test("test_rmd", "rmdtest", "rmd");
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/05-test_sha1.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/05-test_sha1.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..21bb74e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/05-test_sha1.t
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use OpenSSL::Test::Simple;
+
+simple_test("test_sha1", "sha1test", "sha");
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/05-test_sha256.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/05-test_sha256.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..071a45c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/05-test_sha256.t
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use OpenSSL::Test::Simple;
+
+simple_test("test_sha256", "sha256t", "sha");
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/05-test_sha512.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/05-test_sha512.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4ce585c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/05-test_sha512.t
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use OpenSSL::Test::Simple;
+
+simple_test("test_sha512", "sha512t", "sha");
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/05-test_wp.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/05-test_wp.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a042898
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/05-test_wp.t
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use OpenSSL::Test::Simple;
+
+simple_test("test_wp", "wp_test", "whirlpool");
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/10-test_bn.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/10-test_bn.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..13f278e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/10-test_bn.t
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+
+use Math::BigInt;
+
+use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_file/;
+
+setup("test_bn");
+
+plan tests => 3;
+
+require_ok(srctop_file("test","recipes","bc.pl"));
+
+my $testresults = "tmp.bntest";
+my $init = ok(run(test(["bntest"], stdout => $testresults)), 'initialize');
+
+ SKIP: {
+     skip "Initializing failed, skipping", 1 if !$init;
+
+     subtest 'Checking the bn results' => sub {
+	 my @lines = ();
+	 if (open DATA, $testresults) {
+	     @lines = <DATA>;
+	     close DATA;
+	 }
+	 map { s/\R//; } @lines;	# chomp(@lines);
+
+	 plan tests => scalar grep(/^print /, @lines);
+
+	 my $l = "";
+
+	 while (scalar @lines) {
+	     $l = shift @lines;
+
+	     last if $l =~ /^print /;
+	 }
+
+	 while (1) {
+	     $l =~ s/^print "//;
+	     $l =~ s/\\n"//;
+	     my $t = $l;
+	     my @operations = ();
+
+	     $l = undef;
+	     while (scalar @lines) {
+		 $l = shift @lines;
+
+		 last if $l =~ /^print /;
+		 push @operations, $l;
+		 $l = undef;
+	     }
+
+	     ok(check_operations(@operations), "verify $t");
+
+	     last unless $l;
+	 }
+     };
+ }
+
+unlink $testresults;
+
+sub check_operations {
+    my $failcount = 0;
+
+    foreach my $line (@_) {
+	my $result = calc(split /\s+/, $line);
+
+	if ($result ne "0" && $result ne "0x0") {
+	    $failcount++;
+	    print STDERR "Failed! $line => $result\n";
+	}
+    }
+
+    return $failcount == 0;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/10-test_exp.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/10-test_exp.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7e999c4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/10-test_exp.t
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use OpenSSL::Test::Simple;
+
+simple_test("test_exp", "exptest");
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/15-test_dh.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/15-test_dh.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..60cb54c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/15-test_dh.t
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use OpenSSL::Test::Simple;
+
+simple_test("test_dh", "dhtest", "dh");
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/15-test_dsa.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/15-test_dsa.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2fd236e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/15-test_dsa.t
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+
+use File::Spec;
+use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_file/;
+use OpenSSL::Test::Utils;
+
+setup("test_dsa");
+
+plan tests => 6;
+
+require_ok(srctop_file('test','recipes','tconversion.pl'));
+
+ok(run(test(["dsatest"])), "running dsatest");
+ok(run(test(["dsatest", "-app2_1"])), "running dsatest -app2_1");
+
+ SKIP: {
+     skip "Skipping dsa conversion test", 3
+	 if disabled("dsa");
+
+     subtest 'dsa conversions -- private key' => sub {
+	 tconversion("dsa", srctop_file("test","testdsa.pem"));
+     };
+     subtest 'dsa conversions -- private key PKCS#8' => sub {
+	 tconversion("dsa", srctop_file("test","testdsa.pem"), "pkey");
+     };
+     subtest 'dsa conversions -- public key' => sub {
+	 tconversion("msb", srctop_file("test","testdsapub.pem"), "dsa",
+		         "-pubin", "-pubout");
+     };
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/15-test_ec.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/15-test_ec.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a1c704a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/15-test_ec.t
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+
+use File::Spec;
+use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_file/;
+use OpenSSL::Test::Utils;
+
+setup("test_ec");
+
+plan tests => 5;
+
+require_ok(srctop_file('test','recipes','tconversion.pl'));
+
+ok(run(test(["ectest"])), "running ectest");
+
+ SKIP: {
+     skip "Skipping ec conversion test", 3
+	 if disabled("ec");
+
+     subtest 'ec conversions -- private key' => sub {
+	 tconversion("ec", srctop_file("test","testec-p256.pem"));
+     };
+     subtest 'ec conversions -- private key PKCS#8' => sub {
+	 tconversion("ec", srctop_file("test","testec-p256.pem"), "pkey");
+     };
+     subtest 'ec conversions -- public key' => sub {
+	 tconversion("ec", srctop_file("test","testecpub-p256.pem"), "ec", "-pubin", "-pubout");
+     };
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/15-test_ecdsa.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/15-test_ecdsa.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..82a8559
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/15-test_ecdsa.t
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use OpenSSL::Test::Simple;
+
+simple_test("test_ecdsa", "ecdsatest", "ec");
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/15-test_genrsa.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/15-test_genrsa.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cc74e30
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/15-test_genrsa.t
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+
+use File::Spec;
+use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_file/;
+use OpenSSL::Test::Utils;
+
+setup("test_genrsa");
+
+plan tests => 5;
+
+is(run(app([ 'openssl', 'genrsa', '-3', '-out', 'genrsatest.pem', '8'])), 0, "genrsa -3 8");
+ok(run(app([ 'openssl', 'genrsa', '-3', '-out', 'genrsatest.pem', '16'])), "genrsa -3 16");
+ok(run(app([ 'openssl', 'rsa', '-check', '-in', 'genrsatest.pem', '-noout'])), "rsa -check");
+ok(run(app([ 'openssl', 'genrsa', '-f4', '-out', 'genrsatest.pem', '16'])), "genrsa -f4 16");
+ok(run(app([ 'openssl', 'rsa', '-check', '-in', 'genrsatest.pem', '-noout'])), "rsa -check");
+unlink 'genrsatest.pem';
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/15-test_rsa.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/15-test_rsa.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5988821
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/15-test_rsa.t
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+
+use File::Spec;
+use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_file/;
+use OpenSSL::Test::Utils;
+
+setup("test_rsa");
+
+plan tests => 6;
+
+require_ok(srctop_file('test','recipes','tconversion.pl'));
+
+ok(run(test(["rsa_test"])), "running rsatest");
+
+ok(run(app([ 'openssl', 'rsa', '-check', '-in', srctop_file('test', 'testrsa.pem'), '-noout'])), "rsa -check");
+
+ SKIP: {
+     skip "Skipping rsa conversion test", 3
+	 if disabled("rsa");
+
+     subtest 'rsa conversions -- private key' => sub {
+	 tconversion("rsa", srctop_file("test","testrsa.pem"));
+     };
+     subtest 'rsa conversions -- private key PKCS#8' => sub {
+	 tconversion("rsa", srctop_file("test","testrsa.pem"), "pkey");
+     };
+}
+
+ SKIP: {
+     skip "Skipping msblob conversion test", 1
+	 if disabled("rsa") || disabled("dsa");
+
+     subtest 'rsa conversions -- public key' => sub {
+	 tconversion("msb", srctop_file("test","testrsapub.pem"), "rsa",
+		     "-pubin", "-pubout");
+     };
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/15-test_rsapss.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/15-test_rsapss.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..34accaa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/15-test_rsapss.t
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+
+use File::Spec;
+use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT with srctop_file/;
+use OpenSSL::Test::Utils;
+
+setup("test_rsapss");
+
+plan tests => 5;
+
+#using test/testrsa.pem which happens to be a 512 bit RSA
+ok(run(app(['openssl', 'dgst', '-sign', srctop_file('test', 'testrsa.pem'), '-sha1',
+            '-sigopt', 'rsa_padding_mode:pss', '-sigopt', 'rsa_pss_saltlen:-2',
+            '-sigopt', 'rsa_mgf1_md:sha512', '-out', 'testrsapss.sig',
+            srctop_file('test', 'testrsa.pem')])),
+   "openssl dgst -sign");
+
+with({ exit_checker => sub { return shift == 1; } },
+     sub { ok(run(app(['openssl', 'dgst', '-sign', srctop_file('test', 'testrsa.pem'), '-sha512',
+                       '-sigopt', 'rsa_padding_mode:pss', '-sigopt', 'rsa_pss_saltlen:-2',
+                       '-sigopt', 'rsa_mgf1_md:sha512', srctop_file('test', 'testrsa.pem')])),
+              "openssl dgst -sign, expect to fail gracefully");
+           ok(run(app(['openssl', 'dgst', '-sign', srctop_file('test', 'testrsa.pem'), '-sha512',
+                       '-sigopt', 'rsa_padding_mode:pss', '-sigopt', 'rsa_pss_saltlen:2147483647',
+                       '-sigopt', 'rsa_mgf1_md:sha1', srctop_file('test', 'testrsa.pem')])),
+              "openssl dgst -sign, expect to fail gracefully");
+           ok(run(app(['openssl', 'dgst', '-prverify', srctop_file('test', 'testrsa.pem'), '-sha512',
+                       '-sigopt', 'rsa_padding_mode:pss', '-sigopt', 'rsa_pss_saltlen:-2',
+                       '-sigopt', 'rsa_mgf1_md:sha512', '-signature', 'testrsapss.sig',
+                       srctop_file('test', 'testrsa.pem')])),
+              "openssl dgst -prverify, expect to fail gracefully");
+         });
+
+ok(run(app(['openssl', 'dgst', '-prverify', srctop_file('test', 'testrsa.pem'), '-sha1',
+            '-sigopt', 'rsa_padding_mode:pss', '-sigopt', 'rsa_pss_saltlen:-2',
+            '-sigopt', 'rsa_mgf1_md:sha512', '-signature', 'testrsapss.sig',
+            srctop_file('test', 'testrsa.pem')])),
+   "openssl dgst -prverify");
+unlink 'testrsapss.sig';
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/20-test_enc.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/20-test_enc.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..88a5890
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/20-test_enc.t
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+
+use File::Spec::Functions qw/catfile/;
+use File::Copy;
+use File::Compare qw/compare_text/;
+use File::Basename;
+use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_file/;
+
+setup("test_enc");
+
+# We do it this way, because setup() may have moved us around,
+# so the directory portion of $0 might not be correct any more.
+# However, the name hasn't changed.
+my $testsrc = srctop_file("test","recipes",basename($0));
+
+my $test = catfile(".", "p");
+
+my $cmd = "openssl";
+
+my @ciphers =
+    map { s/^\s+//; s/\s+$//; split /\s+/ }
+    run(app([$cmd, "list", "-cipher-commands"]), capture => 1);
+
+plan tests => 1 + (scalar @ciphers)*2;
+
+my $init = ok(copy($testsrc,$test));
+
+if (!$init) {
+    diag("Trying to copy $testsrc to $test : $!");
+}
+
+ SKIP: {
+     skip "Not initialized, skipping...", 11 unless $init;
+
+     foreach my $c (@ciphers) {
+	 my %variant = ("$c" => [],
+			"$c base64" => [ "-a" ]);
+
+	 foreach my $t (sort keys %variant) {
+	     my $cipherfile = "$test.$c.cipher";
+	     my $clearfile = "$test.$c.clear";
+	     my @e = ( "$c", "-bufsize", "113", @{$variant{$t}}, "-e", "-k", "test" );
+	     my @d = ( "$c", "-bufsize", "157", @{$variant{$t}}, "-d", "-k", "test" );
+	     if ($c eq "cat") {
+		 $cipherfile = "$test.cipher";
+		 $clearfile = "$test.clear";
+		 @e = ( "enc", @{$variant{$t}}, "-e" );
+		 @d = ( "enc", @{$variant{$t}}, "-d" );
+	     }
+
+	     ok(run(app([$cmd, @e, "-in", $test, "-out", $cipherfile]))
+		&& run(app([$cmd, @d, "-in", $cipherfile, "-out", $clearfile]))
+		&& compare_text($test,$clearfile) == 0, $t);
+	     unlink $cipherfile, $clearfile;
+	 }
+     }
+}
+
+unlink $test;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/20-test_passwd.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/20-test_passwd.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cf9c2cc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/20-test_passwd.t
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+
+use OpenSSL::Test;
+use OpenSSL::Test::Utils;
+
+setup("test_passwd");
+
+plan tests => disabled("des") ? 4 : 6;
+
+ok(compare1stline([qw{openssl passwd password}], '^.{13}\R$'),
+   'crypt password with random salt') if !disabled("des");
+ok(compare1stline([qw{openssl passwd -1 password}], '^\$1\$.{8}\$.{22}\R$'),
+   'BSD style MD5 password with random salt');
+ok(compare1stline([qw{openssl passwd -apr1 password}], '^\$apr1\$.{8}\$.{22}\R$'),
+   'Apache style MD5 password with random salt');
+ok(compare1stline([qw{openssl passwd -salt xx password}], '^xxj31ZMTZzkVA\R$'),
+   'crypt password with salt xx') if !disabled("des");
+ok(compare1stline([qw{openssl passwd -salt xxxxxxxx -1 password}], '^\$1\$xxxxxxxx\$UYCIxa628\.9qXjpQCjM4a\.\R$'),
+   'BSD style MD5 password with salt xxxxxxxx');
+ok(compare1stline([qw{openssl passwd -salt xxxxxxxx -apr1 password}], '^\$apr1\$xxxxxxxx\$dxHfLAsjHkDRmG83UXe8K0\R$'),
+   'Apache style MD5 password with salt xxxxxxxx');
+
+
+sub compare1stline {
+    my ($cmdarray, $regexp) = @_;
+    my @lines = run(app($cmdarray), capture => 1);
+
+    return $lines[0] =~ m|$regexp|;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/25-test_crl.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/25-test_crl.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e8ce5f8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/25-test_crl.t
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+
+use File::Spec;
+use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_file/;
+
+setup("test_crl");
+
+plan tests => 5;
+
+require_ok(srctop_file('test','recipes','tconversion.pl'));
+
+subtest 'crl conversions' => sub {
+    tconversion("crl", srctop_file("test","testcrl.pem"));
+};
+
+ok(run(test(['crltest'])));
+
+ok(compare1stline([qw{openssl crl -noout -fingerprint -in},
+                   srctop_file('test', 'testcrl.pem')],
+                  'SHA1 Fingerprint=BA:F4:1B:AD:7A:9B:2F:09:16:BC:60:A7:0E:CE:79:2E:36:00:E7:B2'));
+ok(compare1stline([qw{openssl crl -noout -fingerprint -sha256 -in},
+                   srctop_file('test', 'testcrl.pem')],
+                  'SHA256 Fingerprint=B3:A9:FD:A7:2E:8C:3D:DF:D0:F1:C3:1A:96:60:B5:FD:B0:99:7C:7F:0E:E4:34:F5:DB:87:62:36:BC:F1:BC:1B'));
+
+sub compare1stline {
+    my ($cmdarray, $str) = @_;
+    my @lines = run(app($cmdarray), capture => 1);
+
+    return 1 if $lines[0] =~ m|^\Q${str}\E\R$|;
+    note "Got      ", $lines[0];
+    note "Expected ", $str;
+    return 0;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/25-test_d2i.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/25-test_d2i.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..688c8ed
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/25-test_d2i.t
@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+
+use File::Spec;
+use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_file/;
+use OpenSSL::Test::Utils;
+
+setup("test_d2i");
+
+plan tests => 14;
+
+ok(run(test(["d2i_test", "X509", "decode",
+             srctop_file('test','d2i-tests','bad_cert.der')])),
+   "Running d2i_test bad_cert.der");
+
+ok(run(test(["d2i_test", "GENERAL_NAME", "decode",
+             srctop_file('test','d2i-tests','bad_generalname.der')])),
+   "Running d2i_test bad_generalname.der");
+
+ok(run(test(["d2i_test", "ASN1_ANY", "BIO",
+             srctop_file('test','d2i-tests','bad_bio.der')])),
+   "Running d2i_test bad_bio.der");
+# This test checks CVE-2016-2108. The data consists of an tag 258 and
+# two zero content octets. This is parsed as an ASN1_ANY type. If the
+# type is incorrectly interpreted as an ASN.1 INTEGER the two zero content
+# octets will be reject as invalid padding and this test will fail.
+# If the type is correctly interpreted it will by treated as an ASN1_STRING
+# type and the content octets copied verbatim.
+ok(run(test(["d2i_test", "ASN1_ANY", "OK",
+             srctop_file('test','d2i-tests','high_tag.der')])),
+   "Running d2i_test high_tag.der");
+
+# Above test data but interpreted as ASN.1 INTEGER: this will be rejected
+# because the tag is invalid.
+ok(run(test(["d2i_test", "ASN1_INTEGER", "decode",
+             srctop_file('test','d2i-tests','high_tag.der')])),
+   "Running d2i_test high_tag.der INTEGER");
+
+# Parse valid 0, 1 and -1 ASN.1 INTEGER as INTEGER or ANY.
+
+ok(run(test(["d2i_test", "ASN1_INTEGER", "OK",
+             srctop_file('test','d2i-tests','int0.der')])),
+   "Running d2i_test int0.der INTEGER");
+
+ok(run(test(["d2i_test", "ASN1_INTEGER", "OK",
+             srctop_file('test','d2i-tests','int1.der')])),
+   "Running d2i_test int1.der INTEGER");
+
+ok(run(test(["d2i_test", "ASN1_INTEGER", "OK",
+             srctop_file('test','d2i-tests','intminus1.der')])),
+   "Running d2i_test intminus1.der INTEGER");
+
+ok(run(test(["d2i_test", "ASN1_ANY", "OK",
+             srctop_file('test','d2i-tests','int0.der')])),
+   "Running d2i_test int0.der ANY");
+
+ok(run(test(["d2i_test", "ASN1_ANY", "OK",
+             srctop_file('test','d2i-tests','int1.der')])),
+   "Running d2i_test int1.der ANY");
+
+ok(run(test(["d2i_test", "ASN1_ANY", "OK",
+             srctop_file('test','d2i-tests','intminus1.der')])),
+   "Running d2i_test intminus1.der ANY");
+
+# Integers with illegal additional padding.
+
+ok(run(test(["d2i_test", "ASN1_INTEGER", "decode",
+             srctop_file('test','d2i-tests','bad-int-pad0.der')])),
+   "Running d2i_test bad-int-pad0.der INTEGER");
+
+ok(run(test(["d2i_test", "ASN1_INTEGER", "decode",
+             srctop_file('test','d2i-tests','bad-int-padminus1.der')])),
+   "Running d2i_test bad-int-padminus1.der INTEGER");
+
+SKIP: {
+  skip "No CMS support in this configuration", 1 if disabled("cms");
+
+  # Invalid CMS structure with decode error in CHOICE value.
+  # Test for CVE-2016-7053
+
+  ok(run(test(["d2i_test", "CMS_ContentInfo", "decode",
+               srctop_file('test','d2i-tests','bad-cms.der')])),
+     "Running d2i_test bad-cms.der CMS ContentInfo");
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/25-test_pkcs7.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/25-test_pkcs7.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..724326b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/25-test_pkcs7.t
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+
+use File::Spec;
+use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_file/;
+
+setup("test_pkcs7");
+
+plan tests => 3;
+
+require_ok(srctop_file('test','recipes','tconversion.pl'));
+
+subtest 'pkcs7 conversions -- pkcs7' => sub {
+    tconversion("p7", srctop_file("test", "testp7.pem"), "pkcs7");
+};
+subtest 'pkcs7 conversions -- pkcs7d' => sub {
+    tconversion("p7d", srctop_file("test", "pkcs7-1.pem"), "pkcs7");
+};
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/25-test_req.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/25-test_req.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bcc1025
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/25-test_req.t
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+
+use OpenSSL::Test::Utils;
+use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_file/;
+
+setup("test_req");
+
+plan tests => 4;
+
+require_ok(srctop_file('test','recipes','tconversion.pl'));
+
+open RND, ">>", ".rnd";
+print RND "string to make the random number generator think it has entropy";
+close RND;
+subtest "generating certificate requests" => sub {
+    my @req_new;
+    if (disabled("rsa")) {
+	@req_new = ("-newkey", "dsa:".srctop_file("apps", "dsa512.pem"));
+    } else {
+	@req_new = ("-new");
+	note("There should be a 2 sequences of .'s and some +'s.");
+	note("There should not be more that at most 80 per line");
+    }
+
+    plan tests => 2;
+
+    ok(run(app(["openssl", "req", "-config", srctop_file("test", "test.cnf"),
+		@req_new, "-out", "testreq.pem"])),
+       "Generating request");
+
+    ok(run(app(["openssl", "req", "-config", srctop_file("test", "test.cnf"),
+		"-verify", "-in", "testreq.pem", "-noout"])),
+       "Verifying signature on request");
+};
+
+my @openssl_args = ("req", "-config", srctop_file("apps", "openssl.cnf"));
+
+run_conversion('req conversions',
+	       "testreq.pem");
+run_conversion('req conversions -- testreq2',
+	       srctop_file("test", "testreq2.pem"));
+
+unlink "testkey.pem", "testreq.pem";
+
+sub run_conversion {
+    my $title = shift;
+    my $reqfile = shift;
+
+    subtest $title => sub {
+	run(app(["openssl", @openssl_args,
+		 "-in", $reqfile, "-inform", "p",
+		 "-noout", "-text"],
+		stderr => "req-check.err", stdout => undef));
+	open DATA, "req-check.err";
+      SKIP: {
+	  plan skip_all => "skipping req conversion test for $reqfile"
+	      if grep /Unknown Public Key/, map { s/\R//; } <DATA>;
+
+	  tconversion("req", $reqfile, @openssl_args);
+	}
+	close DATA;
+	unlink "req-check.err";
+
+	done_testing();
+    };
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/25-test_sid.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/25-test_sid.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b13cb5c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/25-test_sid.t
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+
+use File::Spec;
+use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_file/;
+
+setup("test_sid");
+
+plan tests => 2;
+
+require_ok(srctop_file('test','recipes','tconversion.pl'));
+
+subtest 'sid conversions' => sub {
+    tconversion("sid", srctop_file("test","testsid.pem"), "sess_id");
+};
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..11bd430
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t
@@ -0,0 +1,380 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+
+use File::Spec::Functions qw/canonpath/;
+use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_file/;
+
+setup("test_verify");
+
+sub verify {
+    my ($cert, $purpose, $trusted, $untrusted, @opts) = @_;
+    my @args = qw(openssl verify -auth_level 1 -purpose);
+    my @path = qw(test certs);
+    push(@args, "$purpose", @opts);
+    for (@$trusted) {
+        push(@args, "-trusted", srctop_file(@path, "$_.pem"))
+    }
+    for (@$untrusted) {
+        push(@args, "-untrusted", srctop_file(@path, "$_.pem"))
+    }
+    push(@args, srctop_file(@path, "$cert.pem"));
+    run(app([@args]));
+}
+
+plan tests => 127;
+
+# Canonical success
+ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"]),
+   "accept compat trust");
+
+# Root CA variants
+ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-nonca)], [qw(ca-cert)]),
+   "fail trusted non-ca root");
+ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(nroot+serverAuth)], [qw(ca-cert)]),
+   "fail server trust non-ca root");
+ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(nroot+anyEKU)], [qw(ca-cert)]),
+   "fail wildcard trust non-ca root");
+ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert2)], [qw(ca-cert)]),
+   "fail wrong root key");
+ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-name2)], [qw(ca-cert)]),
+   "fail wrong root DN");
+
+# Explicit trust/purpose combinations
+#
+ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(sroot-cert)], [qw(ca-cert)]),
+   "accept server purpose");
+ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(croot-cert)], [qw(ca-cert)]),
+   "fail client purpose");
+ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root+serverAuth)], [qw(ca-cert)]),
+   "accept server trust");
+ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(sroot+serverAuth)], [qw(ca-cert)]),
+   "accept server trust with server purpose");
+ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(croot+serverAuth)], [qw(ca-cert)]),
+   "accept server trust with client purpose");
+# Wildcard trust
+ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root+anyEKU)], [qw(ca-cert)]),
+   "accept wildcard trust");
+ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(sroot+anyEKU)], [qw(ca-cert)]),
+   "accept wildcard trust with server purpose");
+ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(croot+anyEKU)], [qw(ca-cert)]),
+   "accept wildcard trust with client purpose");
+# Inapplicable mistrust
+ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-clientAuth)], [qw(ca-cert)]),
+   "accept client mistrust");
+ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(sroot-clientAuth)], [qw(ca-cert)]),
+   "accept client mistrust with server purpose");
+ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(croot-clientAuth)], [qw(ca-cert)]),
+   "fail client mistrust with client purpose");
+# Inapplicable trust
+ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root+clientAuth)], [qw(ca-cert)]),
+   "fail client trust");
+ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(sroot+clientAuth)], [qw(ca-cert)]),
+   "fail client trust with server purpose");
+ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(croot+clientAuth)], [qw(ca-cert)]),
+   "fail client trust with client purpose");
+# Server mistrust
+ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-serverAuth)], [qw(ca-cert)]),
+   "fail rejected EKU");
+ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(sroot-serverAuth)], [qw(ca-cert)]),
+   "fail server mistrust with server purpose");
+ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(croot-serverAuth)], [qw(ca-cert)]),
+   "fail server mistrust with client purpose");
+# Wildcard mistrust
+ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-anyEKU)], [qw(ca-cert)]),
+   "fail wildcard mistrust");
+ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(sroot-anyEKU)], [qw(ca-cert)]),
+   "fail wildcard mistrust with server purpose");
+ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(croot-anyEKU)], [qw(ca-cert)]),
+   "fail wildcard mistrust with client purpose");
+
+# Check that trusted-first is on by setting up paths to different roots
+# depending on whether the intermediate is the trusted or untrusted one.
+#
+ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-serverAuth root-cert2 ca-root2)],
+          [qw(ca-cert)]),
+   "accept trusted-first path");
+ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert root2+serverAuth ca-root2)],
+          [qw(ca-cert)]),
+   "accept trusted-first path with server trust");
+ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert root2-serverAuth ca-root2)],
+           [qw(ca-cert)]),
+   "fail trusted-first path with server mistrust");
+ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert root2+clientAuth ca-root2)],
+           [qw(ca-cert)]),
+   "fail trusted-first path with client trust");
+
+# CA variants
+ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert)], [qw(ca-nonca)]),
+   "fail non-CA untrusted intermediate");
+ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert)], [qw(ca-nonbc)]),
+   "fail non-CA untrusted intermediate");
+ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert ca-nonca)], []),
+   "fail non-CA trust-store intermediate");
+ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert ca-nonbc)], []),
+   "fail non-CA trust-store intermediate");
+ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert nca+serverAuth)], []),
+   "fail non-CA server trust intermediate");
+ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert nca+anyEKU)], []),
+   "fail non-CA wildcard trust intermediate");
+ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert)], [qw(ca-cert2)]),
+   "fail wrong intermediate CA key");
+ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert)], [qw(ca-name2)]),
+   "fail wrong intermediate CA DN");
+ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert)], [qw(ca-root2)]),
+   "fail wrong intermediate CA issuer");
+ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [], [qw(ca-cert)], "-partial_chain"),
+   "fail untrusted partial chain");
+ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(ca-cert)], [], "-partial_chain"),
+   "accept trusted partial chain");
+ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(sca-cert)], [], "-partial_chain"),
+   "accept partial chain with server purpose");
+ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(cca-cert)], [], "-partial_chain"),
+   "fail partial chain with client purpose");
+ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(ca+serverAuth)], [], "-partial_chain"),
+   "accept server trust partial chain");
+ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(cca+serverAuth)], [], "-partial_chain"),
+   "accept server trust client purpose partial chain");
+ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(ca-clientAuth)], [], "-partial_chain"),
+   "accept client mistrust partial chain");
+ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(ca+anyEKU)], [], "-partial_chain"),
+   "accept wildcard trust partial chain");
+ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [], [qw(ca+serverAuth)], "-partial_chain"),
+   "fail untrusted partial issuer with ignored server trust");
+ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(ca-serverAuth)], [], "-partial_chain"),
+   "fail server mistrust partial chain");
+ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(ca+clientAuth)], [], "-partial_chain"),
+   "fail client trust partial chain");
+ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(ca-anyEKU)], [], "-partial_chain"),
+   "fail wildcard mistrust partial chain");
+
+# We now test auxiliary trust even for intermediate trusted certs without
+# -partial_chain.  Note that "-trusted_first" is now always on and cannot
+# be disabled.
+ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert ca+serverAuth)], [qw(ca-cert)]),
+   "accept server trust");
+ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert ca+anyEKU)], [qw(ca-cert)]),
+   "accept wildcard trust");
+ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert sca-cert)], [qw(ca-cert)]),
+   "accept server purpose");
+ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert sca+serverAuth)],
+          [qw(ca-cert)]),
+   "accept server trust and purpose");
+ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert sca+anyEKU)], [qw(ca-cert)]),
+   "accept wildcard trust and server purpose");
+ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert sca-clientAuth)],
+          [qw(ca-cert)]),
+   "accept client mistrust and server purpose");
+ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert cca+serverAuth)],
+          [qw(ca-cert)]),
+   "accept server trust and client purpose");
+ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert cca+anyEKU)], [qw(ca-cert)]),
+   "accept wildcard trust and client purpose");
+ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert cca-cert)], [qw(ca-cert)]),
+   "fail client purpose");
+ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert ca-anyEKU)], [qw(ca-cert)]),
+   "fail wildcard mistrust");
+ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert ca-serverAuth)],
+           [qw(ca-cert)]),
+   "fail server mistrust");
+ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert ca+clientAuth)],
+           [qw(ca-cert)]),
+   "fail client trust");
+ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert sca+clientAuth)],
+           [qw(ca-cert)]),
+   "fail client trust and server purpose");
+ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert cca+clientAuth)],
+           [qw(ca-cert)]),
+   "fail client trust and client purpose");
+ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert cca-serverAuth)],
+           [qw(ca-cert)]),
+   "fail server mistrust and client purpose");
+ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert cca-clientAuth)],
+           [qw(ca-cert)]),
+   "fail client mistrust and client purpose");
+ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert sca-serverAuth)],
+           [qw(ca-cert)]),
+   "fail server mistrust and server purpose");
+ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert sca-anyEKU)], [qw(ca-cert)]),
+   "fail wildcard mistrust and server purpose");
+ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert cca-anyEKU)], [qw(ca-cert)]),
+   "fail wildcard mistrust and client purpose");
+
+# EE variants
+ok(verify("ee-client", "sslclient", [qw(root-cert)], [qw(ca-cert)]),
+   "accept client chain");
+ok(!verify("ee-client", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert)], [qw(ca-cert)]),
+   "fail server leaf purpose");
+ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslclient", [qw(root-cert)], [qw(ca-cert)]),
+   "fail client leaf purpose");
+ok(!verify("ee-cert2", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert)], [qw(ca-cert)]),
+   "fail wrong intermediate CA key");
+ok(!verify("ee-name2", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert)], [qw(ca-cert)]),
+   "fail wrong intermediate CA DN");
+ok(!verify("ee-expired", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert)], [qw(ca-cert)]),
+   "fail expired leaf");
+ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(ee-cert)], [], "-partial_chain"),
+   "accept last-resort direct leaf match");
+ok(verify("ee-client", "sslclient", [qw(ee-client)], [], "-partial_chain"),
+   "accept last-resort direct leaf match");
+ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(ee-client)], [], "-partial_chain"),
+   "fail last-resort direct leaf non-match");
+ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(ee+serverAuth)], [], "-partial_chain"),
+   "accept direct match with server trust");
+ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(ee-serverAuth)], [], "-partial_chain"),
+   "fail direct match with server mistrust");
+ok(verify("ee-client", "sslclient", [qw(ee+clientAuth)], [], "-partial_chain"),
+   "accept direct match with client trust");
+ok(!verify("ee-client", "sslclient", [qw(ee-clientAuth)], [], "-partial_chain"),
+   "reject direct match with client mistrust");
+
+# Proxy certificates
+ok(!verify("pc1-cert", "sslclient", [qw(root-cert)], [qw(ee-client ca-cert)]),
+   "fail to accept proxy cert without -allow_proxy_certs");
+ok(verify("pc1-cert", "sslclient", [qw(root-cert)], [qw(ee-client ca-cert)],
+          "-allow_proxy_certs"),
+   "accept proxy cert 1");
+ok(verify("pc2-cert", "sslclient", [qw(root-cert)],
+          [qw(pc1-cert ee-client ca-cert)], "-allow_proxy_certs"),
+   "accept proxy cert 2");
+ok(!verify("bad-pc3-cert", "sslclient", [qw(root-cert)],
+           [qw(pc1-cert ee-client ca-cert)], "-allow_proxy_certs"),
+   "fail proxy cert with incorrect subject");
+ok(!verify("bad-pc4-cert", "sslclient", [qw(root-cert)],
+           [qw(pc1-cert ee-client ca-cert)], "-allow_proxy_certs"),
+   "fail proxy cert with incorrect pathlen");
+ok(verify("pc5-cert", "sslclient", [qw(root-cert)],
+          [qw(pc1-cert ee-client ca-cert)], "-allow_proxy_certs"),
+   "accept proxy cert missing proxy policy");
+ok(!verify("pc6-cert", "sslclient", [qw(root-cert)],
+           [qw(pc1-cert ee-client ca-cert)], "-allow_proxy_certs"),
+   "failed proxy cert where last CN was added as a multivalue RDN component");
+
+# Security level tests
+ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"],
+          "-auth_level", "2"),
+   "accept RSA 2048 chain at auth level 2");
+ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"],
+           "-auth_level", "3"),
+   "reject RSA 2048 root at auth level 3");
+ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert-768"], ["ca-cert-768i"],
+          "-auth_level", "0"),
+   "accept RSA 768 root at auth level 0");
+ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert-768"], ["ca-cert-768i"]),
+   "reject RSA 768 root at auth level 1");
+ok(verify("ee-cert-768i", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert-768"],
+          "-auth_level", "0"),
+   "accept RSA 768 intermediate at auth level 0");
+ok(!verify("ee-cert-768i", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert-768"]),
+   "reject RSA 768 intermediate at auth level 1");
+ok(verify("ee-cert-768", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"],
+          "-auth_level", "0"),
+   "accept RSA 768 leaf at auth level 0");
+ok(!verify("ee-cert-768", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"]),
+   "reject RSA 768 leaf at auth level 1");
+#
+ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert-md5"], ["ca-cert"],
+          "-auth_level", "2"),
+   "accept md5 self-signed TA at auth level 2");
+ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", ["ca-cert-md5-any"], [],
+          "-auth_level", "2"),
+   "accept md5 intermediate TA at auth level 2");
+ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert-md5"],
+          "-auth_level", "0"),
+   "accept md5 intermediate at auth level 0");
+ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert-md5"]),
+   "reject md5 intermediate at auth level 1");
+ok(verify("ee-cert-md5", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"],
+          "-auth_level", "0"),
+   "accept md5 leaf at auth level 0");
+ok(!verify("ee-cert-md5", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"]),
+   "reject md5 leaf at auth level 1");
+
+# Depth tests, note the depth limit bounds the number of CA certificates
+# between the trust-anchor and the leaf, so, for example, with a root->ca->leaf
+# chain, depth = 1 is sufficient, but depth == 0 is not.
+#
+ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"],
+          "-verify_depth", "2"),
+   "accept chain with verify_depth 2");
+ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"],
+          "-verify_depth", "1"),
+   "accept chain with verify_depth 1");
+ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"],
+           "-verify_depth", "0"),
+   "accept chain with verify_depth 0");
+ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", ["ca-cert-md5-any"], [],
+          "-verify_depth", "0"),
+   "accept md5 intermediate TA with verify_depth 0");
+
+# Name Constraints tests.
+
+ok(verify("alt1-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ncca1-cert"], ),
+   "Name Constraints everything permitted");
+
+ok(verify("alt2-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ncca2-cert"], ),
+   "Name Constraints nothing excluded");
+
+ok(verify("alt3-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ncca1-cert", "ncca3-cert"], ),
+   "Name Constraints nested test all permitted");
+
+ok(!verify("badalt1-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ncca1-cert"], ),
+   "Name Constraints hostname not permitted");
+
+ok(!verify("badalt2-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ncca2-cert"], ),
+   "Name Constraints hostname excluded");
+
+ok(!verify("badalt3-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ncca1-cert"], ),
+   "Name Constraints email address not permitted");
+
+ok(!verify("badalt4-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ncca1-cert"], ),
+   "Name Constraints subject email address not permitted");
+
+ok(!verify("badalt5-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ncca1-cert"], ),
+   "Name Constraints IP address not permitted");
+
+ok(!verify("badalt6-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ncca1-cert"], ),
+   "Name Constraints CN hostname not permitted");
+
+ok(!verify("badalt7-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ncca1-cert"], ),
+   "Name Constraints CN BMPSTRING hostname not permitted");
+
+ok(!verify("badalt8-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"],
+           ["ncca1-cert", "ncca3-cert"], ),
+   "Name constaints nested DNS name not permitted 1");
+
+ok(!verify("badalt9-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"],
+           ["ncca1-cert", "ncca3-cert"], ),
+   "Name constaints nested DNS name not permitted 2");
+
+ok(!verify("badalt10-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"],
+           ["ncca1-cert", "ncca3-cert"], ),
+   "Name constaints nested DNS name excluded");
+
+ok(!verify("many-names1", "sslserver", ["many-constraints"],
+           ["many-constraints"], ),
+   "Too many names and constraints to check (1)");
+ok(!verify("many-names2", "sslserver", ["many-constraints"],
+           ["many-constraints"], ),
+   "Too many names and constraints to check (2)");
+ok(!verify("many-names3", "sslserver", ["many-constraints"],
+           ["many-constraints"], ),
+   "Too many names and constraints to check (3)");
+
+ok(verify("some-names1", "sslserver", ["many-constraints"],
+          ["many-constraints"], ),
+   "Not too many names and constraints to check (1)");
+ok(verify("some-names2", "sslserver", ["many-constraints"],
+          ["many-constraints"], ),
+   "Not too many names and constraints to check (2)");
+ok(verify("some-names2", "sslserver", ["many-constraints"],
+          ["many-constraints"], ),
+   "Not too many names and constraints to check (3)");
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/25-test_x509.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/25-test_x509.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..98a8d32
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/25-test_x509.t
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+
+use File::Spec;
+use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_file/;
+
+setup("test_x509");
+
+plan tests => 5;
+
+require_ok(srctop_file('test','recipes','tconversion.pl'));
+
+subtest 'x509 -- x.509 v1 certificate' => sub {
+    tconversion("x509", srctop_file("test","testx509.pem"));
+};
+subtest 'x509 -- first x.509 v3 certificate' => sub {
+    tconversion("x509", srctop_file("test","v3-cert1.pem"));
+};
+subtest 'x509 -- second x.509 v3 certificate' => sub {
+    tconversion("x509", srctop_file("test","v3-cert2.pem"));
+};
+
+subtest 'x509 -- pathlen' => sub {
+    ok(run(test(["v3ext", srctop_file("test/certs", "pathlen.pem")])));
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/30-test_afalg.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/30-test_afalg.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c8cb67b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/30-test_afalg.t
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+use strict;
+use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT bldtop_dir/;
+use OpenSSL::Test::Utils;
+
+my $test_name = "test_afalg";
+setup($test_name);
+
+plan skip_all => "$test_name not supported for this build"
+    if disabled("afalgeng");
+
+plan tests => 1;
+
+$ENV{OPENSSL_ENGINES} = bldtop_dir("engines/afalg");
+
+ok(run(test(["afalgtest"])), "running afalgtest");
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/30-test_engine.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/30-test_engine.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..03c96cd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/30-test_engine.t
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+
+use OpenSSL::Test;
+
+setup("test_engine");
+
+plan tests => 1;
+ok(run(test(["enginetest"])), "running enginetest");
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/30-test_evp.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/30-test_evp.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c277fcd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/30-test_evp.t
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+
+use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_file/;
+
+setup("test_evp");
+
+plan tests => 1;
+ok(run(test(["evp_test", srctop_file("test", "evptests.txt")])),
+   "running evp_test evptests.txt");
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/30-test_evp_extra.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/30-test_evp_extra.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9a656b0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/30-test_evp_extra.t
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+
+use OpenSSL::Test;
+
+setup("test_evp_extra");
+
+plan tests => 1;
+ok(run(test(["evp_extra_test"])), "running evp_extra_test");
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/30-test_pbelu.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/30-test_pbelu.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..38b2d48
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/30-test_pbelu.t
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use OpenSSL::Test::Simple;
+
+simple_test("test_pbelu", "pbelutest");
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/40-test_rehash.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/40-test_rehash.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..191897e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/40-test_rehash.t
@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+
+use File::Spec::Functions;
+use File::Copy;
+use File::Basename;
+use OpenSSL::Glob;
+use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_file/;
+
+setup("test_rehash");
+
+#If "openssl rehash -help" fails it's most likely because we're on a platform
+#that doesn't support the rehash command (e.g. Windows)
+plan skip_all => "test_rehash is not available on this platform"
+    unless run(app(["openssl", "rehash", "-help"]));
+
+plan tests => 4;
+
+indir "rehash.$$" => sub {
+    prepare();
+    ok(run(app(["openssl", "rehash", curdir()])),
+       'Testing normal rehash operations');
+}, create => 1, cleanup => 1;
+
+indir "rehash.$$" => sub {
+    prepare(sub { chmod 400, $_ foreach (@_); });
+    ok(run(app(["openssl", "rehash", curdir()])),
+       'Testing rehash operations on readonly files');
+}, create => 1, cleanup => 1;
+
+indir "rehash.$$" => sub {
+    ok(run(app(["openssl", "rehash", curdir()])),
+       'Testing rehash operations on empty directory');
+}, create => 1, cleanup => 1;
+
+indir "rehash.$$" => sub {
+    prepare();
+    chmod 0500, curdir();
+  SKIP: {
+      if (open(FOO, ">unwritable.txt")) {
+          close FOO;
+          skip "It's pointless to run the next test as root", 1;
+      }
+      isnt(run(app(["openssl", "rehash", curdir()])), 1,
+           'Testing rehash operations on readonly directory');
+    }
+    chmod 0700, curdir();       # make it writable again, so cleanup works
+}, create => 1, cleanup => 1;
+
+sub prepare {
+    my @pemsourcefiles = sort glob(srctop_file('test', "*.pem"));
+    my @destfiles = ();
+
+    die "There are no source files\n" if scalar @pemsourcefiles == 0;
+
+    my $cnt = 0;
+    foreach (@pemsourcefiles) {
+        my $basename = basename($_, ".pem");
+        my $writing = 0;
+
+        open PEM, $_ or die "Can't read $_: $!\n";
+        while (my $line = <PEM>) {
+            if ($line =~ m{^-----BEGIN (?:CERTIFICATE|X509 CRL)-----}) {
+                die "New start in a PEM blob?\n" if $writing;
+                $cnt++;
+                my $destfile =
+                    catfile(curdir(),
+                            $basename . sprintf("-%02d", $cnt) . ".pem");
+                push @destfiles, $destfile;
+                open OUT, '>', $destfile
+                    or die "Can't write $destfile\n";
+                $writing = 1;
+            }
+            print OUT $line if $writing;
+            if ($line =~ m|^-----END |) {
+                close OUT if $writing;
+                $writing = 0;
+            }
+        }
+        die "No end marker in $basename\n" if $writing;
+    }
+    die "No test PEM files produced\n" if $cnt == 0;
+
+    foreach (@_) {
+        die "Internal error, argument is not CODE"
+            unless (ref($_) eq 'CODE');
+        $_->(@destfiles);
+    }
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/60-test_x509_store.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/60-test_x509_store.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..041aa09
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/60-test_x509_store.t
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+
+use File::Copy;
+use File::Spec::Functions qw/:DEFAULT canonpath/;
+use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_file/;
+
+setup("test_x509_store");
+
+#If "openssl rehash -help" fails it's most likely because we're on a platform
+#that doesn't support the rehash command (e.g. Windows)
+plan skip_all => "test_rehash is not available on this platform"
+    unless run(app(["openssl", "rehash", "-help"]));
+
+# We use 'openssl verify' for these tests, as it contains everything
+# we need to conduct these tests.  The tests here are a subset of the
+# ones found in 25-test_verify.t
+
+sub verify {
+    my ($cert, $purpose, $trustedpath, $untrusted, @opts) = @_;
+    my @args = qw(openssl verify -auth_level 1 -purpose);
+    my @path = qw(test certs);
+    push(@args, "$purpose", @opts);
+    push(@args, "-CApath", $trustedpath);
+    for (@$untrusted) { push(@args, "-untrusted", srctop_file(@path, "$_.pem")) }
+    push(@args, srctop_file(@path, "$cert.pem"));
+    run(app([@args]));
+}
+
+plan tests => 3;
+
+indir "60-test_x509_store" => sub {
+    for (("root-cert")) {
+        copy(srctop_file("test", "certs", "$_.pem"), curdir());
+    }
+    ok(run(app([qw(openssl rehash), curdir()])), "Rehashing");
+
+    # Canonical success
+    ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", curdir(), ["ca-cert"], "-show_chain"),
+       "verify ee-cert");
+
+    # Failure because root cert not present in CApath
+    ok(!verify("ca-root2", "any", curdir(), [], "-show_chain"));
+}, create => 1, cleanup => 1;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/70-test_asyncio.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/70-test_asyncio.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3c15c3d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/70-test_asyncio.t
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use OpenSSL::Test::Utils;
+use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_file/;
+
+setup("test_asyncio");
+
+plan skip_all => "No TLS/SSL protocols are supported by this OpenSSL build"
+    if alldisabled(grep { $_ ne "ssl3" } available_protocols("tls"));
+
+plan tests => 1;
+
+ok(run(test(["asynciotest", srctop_file("apps", "server.pem"),
+             srctop_file("apps", "server.pem")])), "running asynciotest");
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/70-test_bad_dtls.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/70-test_bad_dtls.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a20db77
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/70-test_bad_dtls.t
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use OpenSSL::Test;
+use OpenSSL::Test::Utils;
+
+setup("test_bad_dtls");
+
+plan skip_all => "DTLSv1 is not supported by this OpenSSL build"
+    if disabled("dtls1");
+
+plan tests => 1;
+
+ok(run(test(["bad_dtls_test"])), "running bad_dtls_test");
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/70-test_clienthello.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/70-test_clienthello.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ef0868f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/70-test_clienthello.t
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use OpenSSL::Test;
+use OpenSSL::Test::Utils;
+
+setup("test_clienthello");
+
+plan skip_all => "No TLS/SSL protocols are supported by this OpenSSL build"
+    if alldisabled(grep { $_ ne "ssl3" } available_protocols("tls"));
+
+plan tests => 1;
+
+ok(run(test(["clienthellotest"])), "running clienthellotest");
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/70-test_packet.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/70-test_packet.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9bc6515
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/70-test_packet.t
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use OpenSSL::Test::Simple;
+
+simple_test("test_packet", "packettest");
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/70-test_sslcbcpadding.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/70-test_sslcbcpadding.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6d296db
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/70-test_sslcbcpadding.t
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+use strict;
+use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT cmdstr srctop_file bldtop_dir/;
+use OpenSSL::Test::Utils;
+use TLSProxy::Proxy;
+
+my $test_name = "test_sslcbcpadding";
+setup($test_name);
+
+plan skip_all => "TLSProxy isn't usable on $^O"
+    if $^O =~ /^(VMS)$/;
+
+plan skip_all => "$test_name needs the dynamic engine feature enabled"
+    if disabled("engine") || disabled("dynamic-engine");
+
+plan skip_all => "$test_name needs the sock feature enabled"
+    if disabled("sock");
+
+plan skip_all => "$test_name needs TLSv1.2 enabled"
+    if disabled("tls1_2");
+
+$ENV{OPENSSL_ia32cap} = '~0x200000200000000';
+my $proxy = TLSProxy::Proxy->new(
+    \&add_maximal_padding_filter,
+    cmdstr(app(["openssl"]), display => 1),
+    srctop_file("apps", "server.pem"),
+    (!$ENV{HARNESS_ACTIVE} || $ENV{HARNESS_VERBOSE})
+);
+
+# TODO: We could test all 256 values, but then the log file gets too large for
+# CI. See https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/1440.
+my @test_offsets = (0, 128, 254, 255);
+
+# Test that maximally-padded records are accepted.
+my $bad_padding_offset = -1;
+$proxy->start() or plan skip_all => "Unable to start up Proxy for tests";
+plan tests => 1 + scalar(@test_offsets);
+ok(TLSProxy::Message->success(), "Maximally-padded record test");
+
+# Test that invalid padding is rejected.
+foreach my $offset (@test_offsets) {
+    $proxy->clear();
+    $bad_padding_offset = $offset;
+    $proxy->start();
+    ok(TLSProxy::Message->fail(), "Invalid padding byte $bad_padding_offset");
+}
+
+sub add_maximal_padding_filter
+{
+    my $proxy = shift;
+
+    if ($proxy->flight == 0) {
+        # Disable Encrypt-then-MAC.
+        foreach my $message (@{$proxy->message_list}) {
+            if ($message->mt != TLSProxy::Message::MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
+                next;
+            }
+
+            $message->delete_extension(TLSProxy::Message::EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC);
+            $message->process_extensions();
+            $message->repack();
+        }
+    }
+
+    if ($proxy->flight == 3) {
+        # Insert a maximally-padded record. Assume a block size of 16 (AES) and
+        # a MAC length of 20 (SHA-1).
+        my $block_size = 16;
+        my $mac_len = 20;
+
+        # Size the plaintext so that 256 is a valid padding.
+        my $plaintext_len = $block_size - ($mac_len % $block_size);
+        my $plaintext = "A" x $plaintext_len;
+
+        my $data = "B" x $block_size; # Explicit IV.
+        $data .= $plaintext;
+        $data .= TLSProxy::Proxy::fill_known_data($mac_len); # MAC.
+
+        # Add padding.
+        for (my $i = 0; $i < 256; $i++) {
+            if ($i == $bad_padding_offset) {
+                $data .= "\xfe";
+            } else {
+                $data .= "\xff";
+            }
+        }
+
+        my $record = TLSProxy::Record->new(
+            $proxy->flight,
+            TLSProxy::Record::RT_APPLICATION_DATA,
+            TLSProxy::Record::VERS_TLS_1_2,
+            length($data),
+            0,
+            length($data),
+            $plaintext_len,
+            $data,
+            $plaintext,
+        );
+
+        # Send the record immediately after the server Finished.
+        push @{$proxy->record_list}, $record;
+    }
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/70-test_sslcertstatus.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/70-test_sslcertstatus.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..104ee9c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/70-test_sslcertstatus.t
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+use strict;
+use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT cmdstr srctop_file bldtop_dir/;
+use OpenSSL::Test::Utils;
+use TLSProxy::Proxy;
+
+my $test_name = "test_sslcertstatus";
+setup($test_name);
+
+plan skip_all => "TLSProxy isn't usable on $^O"
+    if $^O =~ /^(VMS)$/;
+
+plan skip_all => "$test_name needs the dynamic engine feature enabled"
+    if disabled("engine") || disabled("dynamic-engine");
+
+plan skip_all => "$test_name needs the sock feature enabled"
+    if disabled("sock");
+
+plan skip_all => "$test_name needs the ocsp feature enabled"
+    if disabled("ocsp");
+
+plan skip_all => "$test_name needs TLS enabled"
+    if alldisabled(available_protocols("tls"));
+
+$ENV{OPENSSL_ia32cap} = '~0x200000200000000';
+my $proxy = TLSProxy::Proxy->new(
+    \&certstatus_filter,
+    cmdstr(app(["openssl"]), display => 1),
+    srctop_file("apps", "server.pem"),
+    (!$ENV{HARNESS_ACTIVE} || $ENV{HARNESS_VERBOSE})
+);
+
+#Test 1: Sending a status_request extension in both ClientHello and
+#ServerHello but then omitting the CertificateStatus message is valid
+$proxy->clientflags("-status");
+$proxy->start() or plan skip_all => "Unable to start up Proxy for tests";
+plan tests => 1;
+ok(TLSProxy::Message->success, "Missing CertificateStatus message");
+
+sub certstatus_filter
+{
+    my $proxy = shift;
+
+    # We're only interested in the initial ServerHello
+    if ($proxy->flight != 1) {
+        return;
+    }
+
+    foreach my $message (@{$proxy->message_list}) {
+        if ($message->mt == TLSProxy::Message::MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
+            #Add the status_request to the ServerHello even though we are not
+            #going to send a CertificateStatus message
+            $message->set_extension(TLSProxy::Message::EXT_STATUS_REQUEST,
+                                    "");
+
+            $message->repack();
+        }
+    }
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/70-test_sslextension.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/70-test_sslextension.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8d6ccc6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/70-test_sslextension.t
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+use strict;
+use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT cmdstr srctop_file bldtop_dir/;
+use OpenSSL::Test::Utils;
+use TLSProxy::Proxy;
+
+my $test_name = "test_sslextension";
+setup($test_name);
+
+plan skip_all => "TLSProxy isn't usable on $^O"
+    if $^O =~ /^(VMS)$/;
+
+plan skip_all => "$test_name needs the dynamic engine feature enabled"
+    if disabled("engine") || disabled("dynamic-engine");
+
+plan skip_all => "$test_name needs the sock feature enabled"
+    if disabled("sock");
+
+plan skip_all => "$test_name needs TLS enabled"
+    if alldisabled(available_protocols("tls"));
+
+$ENV{OPENSSL_ia32cap} = '~0x200000200000000';
+my $proxy = TLSProxy::Proxy->new(
+    \&extension_filter,
+    cmdstr(app(["openssl"]), display => 1),
+    srctop_file("apps", "server.pem"),
+    (!$ENV{HARNESS_ACTIVE} || $ENV{HARNESS_VERBOSE})
+);
+
+# Test 1: Sending a zero length extension block should pass
+$proxy->start() or plan skip_all => "Unable to start up Proxy for tests";
+plan tests => 3;
+ok(TLSProxy::Message->success, "Zero extension length test");
+
+sub extension_filter
+{
+    my $proxy = shift;
+
+    # We're only interested in the initial ClientHello
+    if ($proxy->flight != 0) {
+        return;
+    }
+
+    foreach my $message (@{$proxy->message_list}) {
+        if ($message->mt == TLSProxy::Message::MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
+            # Remove all extensions and set the extension len to zero
+            $message->extension_data({});
+            $message->extensions_len(0);
+            # Extensions have been removed so make sure we don't try to use them
+            $message->process_extensions();
+
+            $message->repack();
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+# Test 2-3: Sending a duplicate extension should fail.
+sub inject_duplicate_extension
+{
+  my ($proxy, $message_type) = @_;
+
+    foreach my $message (@{$proxy->message_list}) {
+        if ($message->mt == $message_type) {
+          my %extensions = %{$message->extension_data};
+            # Add a duplicate (unknown) extension.
+            $message->set_extension(TLSProxy::Message::EXT_DUPLICATE_EXTENSION, "");
+            $message->set_extension(TLSProxy::Message::EXT_DUPLICATE_EXTENSION, "");
+            $message->repack();
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+sub inject_duplicate_extension_clienthello
+{
+    my $proxy = shift;
+
+    # We're only interested in the initial ClientHello
+    if ($proxy->flight != 0) {
+        return;
+    }
+
+    inject_duplicate_extension($proxy, TLSProxy::Message::MT_CLIENT_HELLO);
+}
+
+sub inject_duplicate_extension_serverhello
+{
+    my $proxy = shift;
+
+    # We're only interested in the initial ServerHello
+    if ($proxy->flight != 1) {
+        return;
+    }
+
+    inject_duplicate_extension($proxy, TLSProxy::Message::MT_SERVER_HELLO);
+}
+
+$proxy->clear();
+$proxy->filter(\&inject_duplicate_extension_clienthello);
+$proxy->start();
+ok(TLSProxy::Message->fail(), "Duplicate ClientHello extension");
+
+$proxy->clear();
+$proxy->filter(\&inject_duplicate_extension_serverhello);
+$proxy->start();
+ok(TLSProxy::Message->fail(), "Duplicate ServerHello extension");
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/70-test_sslmessages.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/70-test_sslmessages.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b4631ea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/70-test_sslmessages.t
@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+use strict;
+use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT cmdstr srctop_file bldtop_dir/;
+use OpenSSL::Test::Utils;
+use File::Temp qw(tempfile);
+use TLSProxy::Proxy;
+my $test_name = "test_tls13messages";
+setup($test_name);
+
+plan skip_all => "TLSProxy isn't usable on $^O"
+    if $^O =~ /^(VMS)$/;
+
+plan skip_all => "$test_name needs the dynamic engine feature enabled"
+    if disabled("engine") || disabled("dynamic-engine");
+
+plan skip_all => "$test_name needs the sock feature enabled"
+    if disabled("sock");
+
+plan skip_all => "$test_name needs TLS enabled"
+    if alldisabled(available_protocols("tls"));
+
+$ENV{OPENSSL_ia32cap} = '~0x200000200000000';
+
+use constant {
+    DEFAULT_HANDSHAKE => 1,
+    OCSP_HANDSHAKE => 2,
+    RESUME_HANDSHAKE => 4,
+    CLIENT_AUTH_HANDSHAKE => 8,
+    RENEG_HANDSHAKE => 16,
+
+    ALL_HANDSHAKES => 31
+};
+
+my @handmessages = (
+    [TLSProxy::Message::MT_CLIENT_HELLO, ALL_HANDSHAKES],
+    [TLSProxy::Message::MT_SERVER_HELLO, ALL_HANDSHAKES],
+    [TLSProxy::Message::MT_CERTIFICATE, ALL_HANDSHAKES & ~RESUME_HANDSHAKE],
+    [TLSProxy::Message::MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS, OCSP_HANDSHAKE],
+    #ServerKeyExchange handshakes not currently supported by TLSProxy
+    [TLSProxy::Message::MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, CLIENT_AUTH_HANDSHAKE],
+    [TLSProxy::Message::MT_SERVER_HELLO_DONE, ALL_HANDSHAKES & ~RESUME_HANDSHAKE],
+    [TLSProxy::Message::MT_CERTIFICATE, CLIENT_AUTH_HANDSHAKE],
+    [TLSProxy::Message::MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ALL_HANDSHAKES & ~RESUME_HANDSHAKE],
+    [TLSProxy::Message::MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, CLIENT_AUTH_HANDSHAKE],
+    [TLSProxy::Message::MT_FINISHED, ALL_HANDSHAKES],
+    [TLSProxy::Message::MT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ALL_HANDSHAKES & ~RESUME_HANDSHAKE],
+    [TLSProxy::Message::MT_FINISHED, ALL_HANDSHAKES],
+    [TLSProxy::Message::MT_CLIENT_HELLO, RENEG_HANDSHAKE],
+    [TLSProxy::Message::MT_SERVER_HELLO, RENEG_HANDSHAKE],
+    [TLSProxy::Message::MT_CERTIFICATE, RENEG_HANDSHAKE],
+    [TLSProxy::Message::MT_SERVER_HELLO_DONE, RENEG_HANDSHAKE],
+    [TLSProxy::Message::MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, RENEG_HANDSHAKE],
+    [TLSProxy::Message::MT_FINISHED, RENEG_HANDSHAKE],
+    [TLSProxy::Message::MT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, RENEG_HANDSHAKE],
+    [TLSProxy::Message::MT_FINISHED, RENEG_HANDSHAKE],
+    [0, 0]
+);
+
+my $proxy = TLSProxy::Proxy->new(
+    undef,
+    cmdstr(app(["openssl"]), display => 1),
+    srctop_file("apps", "server.pem"),
+    (!$ENV{HARNESS_ACTIVE} || $ENV{HARNESS_VERBOSE})
+);
+
+sub checkmessages($$);
+
+#Test 1: Check we get all the right messages for a default handshake
+(undef, my $session) = tempfile();
+$proxy->serverconnects(2);
+$proxy->clientflags("-sess_out ".$session);
+$proxy->start() or plan skip_all => "Unable to start up Proxy for tests";
+plan tests => 5;
+checkmessages(DEFAULT_HANDSHAKE, "Default handshake test");
+
+#Test 2: Resumption handshake
+$proxy->clearClient();
+$proxy->clientflags("-sess_in ".$session);
+$proxy->clientstart();
+checkmessages(RESUME_HANDSHAKE, "Resumption handshake test");
+unlink $session;
+
+#Test 3: A client auth handshake
+$proxy->clear();
+$proxy->clientflags("-cert ".srctop_file("apps", "server.pem"));
+$proxy->serverflags("-Verify 5");
+$proxy->start();
+checkmessages(CLIENT_AUTH_HANDSHAKE, "Client auth handshake test");
+
+#Test 4: A handshake with a renegotiation
+$proxy->clear();
+$proxy->reneg(1);
+$proxy->start();
+checkmessages(RENEG_HANDSHAKE, "Renegotiation handshake test");
+
+#Test 5: A handshake with a renegotiation and client auth
+$proxy->clear();
+$proxy->clientflags("-cert ".srctop_file("apps", "server.pem"));
+$proxy->serverflags("-Verify 5");
+$proxy->reneg(1);
+$proxy->start();
+checkmessages(RENEG_HANDSHAKE | CLIENT_AUTH_HANDSHAKE,
+              "Renogitation and client auth handshake test");
+
+sub checkmessages($$)
+{
+    my ($handtype, $testname) = @_;
+
+    subtest $testname => sub {
+        my $loop = 0;
+        my $numtests;
+
+        #First count the number of tests
+        for ($numtests = 0; $handmessages[$loop][1] != 0; $loop++) {
+            $numtests++ if (($handmessages[$loop][1] & $handtype) != 0);
+        }
+
+        plan tests => $numtests;
+
+        my $nextmess = 0;
+        my $message = undef;
+        for ($loop = 0; $handmessages[$loop][1] != 0; $loop++) {
+            next if (($handmessages[$loop][1] & $handtype) == 0);
+            if (scalar @{$proxy->message_list} > $nextmess) {
+                $message = ${$proxy->message_list}[$nextmess];
+                $nextmess++;
+            } else {
+                $message = undef;
+            }
+            if (!defined $message) {
+                fail("Message type check. Got nothing, expected "
+                     .$handmessages[$loop][0]);
+            } else {
+                ok($message->mt == $handmessages[$loop][0],
+                   "Message type check. Got ".$message->mt
+                   .", expected ".$handmessages[$loop][0]);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/70-test_sslrecords.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/70-test_sslrecords.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ef3f509
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/70-test_sslrecords.t
@@ -0,0 +1,381 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+use strict;
+use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT cmdstr srctop_file bldtop_dir/;
+use OpenSSL::Test::Utils;
+use TLSProxy::Proxy;
+
+my $test_name = "test_sslrecords";
+setup($test_name);
+
+plan skip_all => "TLSProxy isn't usable on $^O"
+    if $^O =~ /^(VMS)$/;
+
+plan skip_all => "$test_name needs the dynamic engine feature enabled"
+    if disabled("engine") || disabled("dynamic-engine");
+
+plan skip_all => "$test_name needs the sock feature enabled"
+    if disabled("sock");
+
+plan skip_all => "$test_name needs TLSv1.2 enabled"
+    if disabled("tls1_2");
+
+$ENV{OPENSSL_ia32cap} = '~0x200000200000000';
+my $proxy = TLSProxy::Proxy->new(
+    \&add_empty_recs_filter,
+    cmdstr(app(["openssl"]), display => 1),
+    srctop_file("apps", "server.pem"),
+    (!$ENV{HARNESS_ACTIVE} || $ENV{HARNESS_VERBOSE})
+);
+
+#Test 1: Injecting out of context empty records should fail
+my $content_type = TLSProxy::Record::RT_APPLICATION_DATA;
+my $inject_recs_num = 1;
+$proxy->start() or plan skip_all => "Unable to start up Proxy for tests";
+my $num_tests = 10;
+if (!disabled("tls1_1")) {
+    $num_tests++;
+}
+plan tests => $num_tests;
+ok(TLSProxy::Message->fail(), "Out of context empty records test");
+
+#Test 2: Injecting in context empty records should succeed
+$proxy->clear();
+$content_type = TLSProxy::Record::RT_HANDSHAKE;
+$proxy->start();
+ok(TLSProxy::Message->success(), "In context empty records test");
+
+#Test 3: Injecting too many in context empty records should fail
+$proxy->clear();
+#We allow 32 consecutive in context empty records
+$inject_recs_num = 33;
+$proxy->start();
+ok(TLSProxy::Message->fail(), "Too many in context empty records test");
+
+#Test 4: Injecting a fragmented fatal alert should fail. We actually expect no
+#        alerts to be sent from either side because *we* injected the fatal
+#        alert, i.e. this will look like a disorderly close
+$proxy->clear();
+$proxy->filter(\&add_frag_alert_filter);
+$proxy->start();
+ok(!TLSProxy::Message->end(), "Fragmented alert records test");
+
+#Run some SSLv2 ClientHello tests
+
+use constant {
+    TLSV1_2_IN_SSLV2 => 0,
+    SSLV2_IN_SSLV2 => 1,
+    FRAGMENTED_IN_TLSV1_2 => 2,
+    FRAGMENTED_IN_SSLV2 => 3,
+    ALERT_BEFORE_SSLV2 => 4
+};
+#Test 5: Inject an SSLv2 style record format for a TLSv1.2 ClientHello
+my $sslv2testtype = TLSV1_2_IN_SSLV2;
+$proxy->clear();
+$proxy->filter(\&add_sslv2_filter);
+$proxy->start();
+ok(TLSProxy::Message->success(), "TLSv1.2 in SSLv2 ClientHello test");
+
+#Test 6: Inject an SSLv2 style record format for an SSLv2 ClientHello. We don't
+#        support this so it should fail. We actually treat it as an unknown
+#        protocol so we don't even send an alert in this case.
+$sslv2testtype = SSLV2_IN_SSLV2;
+$proxy->clear();
+$proxy->start();
+ok(!TLSProxy::Message->end(), "SSLv2 in SSLv2 ClientHello test");
+
+#Test 7: Sanity check ClientHello fragmentation. This isn't really an SSLv2 test
+#        at all, but it gives us confidence that Test 8 fails for the right
+#        reasons
+$sslv2testtype = FRAGMENTED_IN_TLSV1_2;
+$proxy->clear();
+$proxy->start();
+ok(TLSProxy::Message->success(), "Fragmented ClientHello in TLSv1.2 test");
+
+#Test 8: Fragment a TLSv1.2 ClientHello across a TLS1.2 record; an SSLv2
+#        record; and another TLS1.2 record. This isn't allowed so should fail
+$sslv2testtype = FRAGMENTED_IN_SSLV2;
+$proxy->clear();
+$proxy->start();
+ok(TLSProxy::Message->fail(), "Fragmented ClientHello in TLSv1.2/SSLv2 test");
+
+#Test 9: Send a TLS warning alert before an SSLv2 ClientHello. This should
+#        fail because an SSLv2 ClientHello must be the first record.
+$sslv2testtype = ALERT_BEFORE_SSLV2;
+$proxy->clear();
+$proxy->start();
+ok(TLSProxy::Message->fail(), "Alert before SSLv2 ClientHello test");
+
+#Unrecognised record type tests
+
+#Test 10: Sending an unrecognised record type in TLS1.2 should fail
+$proxy->clear();
+$proxy->filter(\&add_unknown_record_type);
+$proxy->start();
+ok(TLSProxy::Message->fail(), "Unrecognised record type in TLS1.2");
+
+#Test 11: Sending an unrecognised record type in TLS1.1 should fail
+if (!disabled("tls1_1")) {
+    $proxy->clear();
+    $proxy->clientflags("-tls1_1");
+    $proxy->start();
+    ok(TLSProxy::Message->fail(), "Unrecognised record type in TLS1.1");
+}
+
+sub add_empty_recs_filter
+{
+    my $proxy = shift;
+
+    # We're only interested in the initial ClientHello
+    if ($proxy->flight != 0) {
+        return;
+    }
+
+    for (my $i = 0; $i < $inject_recs_num; $i++) {
+        my $record = TLSProxy::Record->new(
+            0,
+            $content_type,
+            TLSProxy::Record::VERS_TLS_1_2,
+            0,
+            0,
+            0,
+            0,
+            "",
+            ""
+        );
+
+        push @{$proxy->record_list}, $record;
+    }
+}
+
+sub add_frag_alert_filter
+{
+    my $proxy = shift;
+    my $byte;
+
+    # We're only interested in the initial ClientHello
+    if ($proxy->flight != 0) {
+        return;
+    }
+
+    # Add a zero length fragment first
+    #my $record = TLSProxy::Record->new(
+    #    0,
+    #    TLSProxy::Record::RT_ALERT,
+    #    TLSProxy::Record::VERS_TLS_1_2,
+    #    0,
+    #    0,
+    #    0,
+    #    "",
+    #    ""
+    #);
+    #push @{$proxy->record_list}, $record;
+
+    # Now add the alert level (Fatal) as a separate record
+    $byte = pack('C', TLSProxy::Message::AL_LEVEL_FATAL);
+    my $record = TLSProxy::Record->new(
+        0,
+        TLSProxy::Record::RT_ALERT,
+        TLSProxy::Record::VERS_TLS_1_2,
+        1,
+        0,
+        1,
+        1,
+        $byte,
+        $byte
+    );
+    push @{$proxy->record_list}, $record;
+
+    # And finally the description (Unexpected message) in a third record
+    $byte = pack('C', TLSProxy::Message::AL_DESC_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+    $record = TLSProxy::Record->new(
+        0,
+        TLSProxy::Record::RT_ALERT,
+        TLSProxy::Record::VERS_TLS_1_2,
+        1,
+        0,
+        1,
+        1,
+        $byte,
+        $byte
+    );
+    push @{$proxy->record_list}, $record;
+}
+
+sub add_sslv2_filter
+{
+    my $proxy = shift;
+    my $clienthello;
+    my $record;
+
+    # We're only interested in the initial ClientHello
+    if ($proxy->flight != 0) {
+        return;
+    }
+
+    # Ditch the real ClientHello - we're going to replace it with our own
+    shift @{$proxy->record_list};
+
+    if ($sslv2testtype == ALERT_BEFORE_SSLV2) {
+        my $alert = pack('CC', TLSProxy::Message::AL_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                               TLSProxy::Message::AL_DESC_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
+        my $alertlen = length $alert;
+        $record = TLSProxy::Record->new(
+            0,
+            TLSProxy::Record::RT_ALERT,
+            TLSProxy::Record::VERS_TLS_1_2,
+            $alertlen,
+            0,
+            $alertlen,
+            $alertlen,
+            $alert,
+            $alert
+        );
+
+        push @{$proxy->record_list}, $record;
+    }
+
+    if ($sslv2testtype == ALERT_BEFORE_SSLV2
+            || $sslv2testtype == TLSV1_2_IN_SSLV2
+            || $sslv2testtype == SSLV2_IN_SSLV2) {
+        # This is an SSLv2 format ClientHello
+        $clienthello =
+            pack "C44",
+            0x01, # ClientHello
+            0x03, 0x03, #TLSv1.2
+            0x00, 0x03, # Ciphersuites len
+            0x00, 0x00, # Session id len
+            0x00, 0x20, # Challenge len
+            0x00, 0x00, 0x2f, #AES128-SHA
+            0x01, 0x18, 0x9F, 0x76, 0xEC, 0x57, 0xCE, 0xE5, 0xB3, 0xAB, 0x79, 0x90,
+            0xAD, 0xAC, 0x6E, 0xD1, 0x58, 0x35, 0x03, 0x97, 0x16, 0x10, 0x82, 0x56,
+            0xD8, 0x55, 0xFF, 0xE1, 0x8A, 0xA3, 0x2E, 0xF6; # Challenge
+
+        if ($sslv2testtype == SSLV2_IN_SSLV2) {
+            # Set the version to "real" SSLv2
+            vec($clienthello, 1, 8) = 0x00;
+            vec($clienthello, 2, 8) = 0x02;
+        }
+
+        my $chlen = length $clienthello;
+
+        $record = TLSProxy::Record->new(
+            0,
+            TLSProxy::Record::RT_HANDSHAKE,
+            TLSProxy::Record::VERS_TLS_1_2,
+            $chlen,
+            1, #SSLv2
+            $chlen,
+            $chlen,
+            $clienthello,
+            $clienthello
+        );
+
+        push @{$proxy->record_list}, $record;
+    } else {
+        # For this test we're using a real TLS ClientHello
+        $clienthello =
+            pack "C49",
+            0x01, # ClientHello
+            0x00, 0x00, 0x2D, # Message length
+            0x03, 0x03, # TLSv1.2
+            0x01, 0x18, 0x9F, 0x76, 0xEC, 0x57, 0xCE, 0xE5, 0xB3, 0xAB, 0x79, 0x90,
+            0xAD, 0xAC, 0x6E, 0xD1, 0x58, 0x35, 0x03, 0x97, 0x16, 0x10, 0x82, 0x56,
+            0xD8, 0x55, 0xFF, 0xE1, 0x8A, 0xA3, 0x2E, 0xF6, # Random
+            0x00, # Session id len
+            0x00, 0x04, # Ciphersuites len
+            0x00, 0x2f, # AES128-SHA
+            0x00, 0xff, # Empty reneg info SCSV
+            0x01, # Compression methods len
+            0x00, # Null compression
+            0x00, 0x00; # Extensions len
+
+        # Split this into 3: A TLS record; a SSLv2 record and a TLS record.
+        # We deliberately split the second record prior to the Challenge/Random
+        # and set the first byte of the random to 1. This makes the second SSLv2
+        # record look like an SSLv2 ClientHello
+        my $frag1 = substr $clienthello, 0, 6;
+        my $frag2 = substr $clienthello, 6, 32;
+        my $frag3 = substr $clienthello, 38;
+
+        my $fraglen = length $frag1;
+        $record = TLSProxy::Record->new(
+            0,
+            TLSProxy::Record::RT_HANDSHAKE,
+            TLSProxy::Record::VERS_TLS_1_2,
+            $fraglen,
+            0,
+            $fraglen,
+            $fraglen,
+            $frag1,
+            $frag1
+        );
+        push @{$proxy->record_list}, $record;
+
+        $fraglen = length $frag2;
+        my $recvers;
+        if ($sslv2testtype == FRAGMENTED_IN_SSLV2) {
+            $recvers = 1;
+        } else {
+            $recvers = 0;
+        }
+        $record = TLSProxy::Record->new(
+            0,
+            TLSProxy::Record::RT_HANDSHAKE,
+            TLSProxy::Record::VERS_TLS_1_2,
+            $fraglen,
+            $recvers,
+            $fraglen,
+            $fraglen,
+            $frag2,
+            $frag2
+        );
+        push @{$proxy->record_list}, $record;
+
+        $fraglen = length $frag3;
+        $record = TLSProxy::Record->new(
+            0,
+            TLSProxy::Record::RT_HANDSHAKE,
+            TLSProxy::Record::VERS_TLS_1_2,
+            $fraglen,
+            0,
+            $fraglen,
+            $fraglen,
+            $frag3,
+            $frag3
+        );
+        push @{$proxy->record_list}, $record;
+    }
+
+}
+
+sub add_unknown_record_type
+{
+    my $proxy = shift;
+
+    # We'll change a record after the initial version neg has taken place
+    if ($proxy->flight != 2) {
+        return;
+    }
+
+    my $lastrec = ${$proxy->record_list}[-1];
+    my $record = TLSProxy::Record->new(
+        2,
+        TLSProxy::Record::RT_UNKNOWN,
+        $lastrec->version(),
+        1,
+        0,
+        1,
+        1,
+        "X",
+        "X"
+    );
+
+    unshift @{$proxy->record_list}, $record;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/70-test_sslsessiontick.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/70-test_sslsessiontick.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4a8636e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/70-test_sslsessiontick.t
@@ -0,0 +1,268 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+use strict;
+use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT cmdstr srctop_file bldtop_dir/;
+use OpenSSL::Test::Utils;
+use TLSProxy::Proxy;
+use File::Temp qw(tempfile);
+
+my $test_name = "test_sslsessiontick";
+setup($test_name);
+
+plan skip_all => "TLSProxy isn't usable on $^O"
+    if $^O =~ /^(VMS)$/;
+
+plan skip_all => "$test_name needs the dynamic engine feature enabled"
+    if disabled("engine") || disabled("dynamic-engine");
+
+plan skip_all => "$test_name needs the sock feature enabled"
+    if disabled("sock");
+
+plan skip_all => "$test_name needs TLS enabled"
+    if alldisabled(available_protocols("tls"));
+
+$ENV{OPENSSL_ia32cap} = '~0x200000200000000';
+
+sub checkmessages($$$$$$);
+sub clearclient();
+sub clearall();
+
+my $chellotickext = 0;
+my $shellotickext = 0;
+my $fullhand = 0;
+my $ticketseen = 0;
+
+my $proxy = TLSProxy::Proxy->new(
+    undef,
+    cmdstr(app(["openssl"]), display => 1),
+    srctop_file("apps", "server.pem"),
+    (!$ENV{HARNESS_ACTIVE} || $ENV{HARNESS_VERBOSE})
+);
+
+#Test 1: By default with no existing session we should get a session ticket
+#Expected result: ClientHello extension seen; ServerHello extension seen
+#                 NewSessionTicket message seen; Full handshake
+$proxy->start() or plan skip_all => "Unable to start up Proxy for tests";
+plan tests => 10;
+checkmessages(1, "Default session ticket test", 1, 1, 1, 1);
+
+#Test 2: If the server does not accept tickets we should get a normal handshake
+#with no session tickets
+#Expected result: ClientHello extension seen; ServerHello extension not seen
+#                 NewSessionTicket message not seen; Full handshake
+clearall();
+$proxy->serverflags("-no_ticket");
+$proxy->start();
+checkmessages(2, "No server support session ticket test", 1, 0, 0, 1);
+
+#Test 3: If the client does not accept tickets we should get a normal handshake
+#with no session tickets
+#Expected result: ClientHello extension not seen; ServerHello extension not seen
+#                 NewSessionTicket message not seen; Full handshake
+clearall();
+$proxy->clientflags("-no_ticket");
+$proxy->start();
+checkmessages(3, "No client support session ticket test", 0, 0, 0, 1);
+
+#Test 4: Test session resumption with session ticket
+#Expected result: ClientHello extension seen; ServerHello extension not seen
+#                 NewSessionTicket message not seen; Abbreviated handshake
+clearall();
+(undef, my $session) = tempfile();
+$proxy->serverconnects(2);
+$proxy->clientflags("-sess_out ".$session);
+$proxy->start();
+$proxy->clearClient();
+$proxy->clientflags("-sess_in ".$session);
+$proxy->clientstart();
+checkmessages(4, "Session resumption session ticket test", 1, 0, 0, 0);
+unlink $session;
+
+#Test 5: Test session resumption with ticket capable client without a ticket
+#Expected result: ClientHello extension seen; ServerHello extension seen
+#                 NewSessionTicket message seen; Abbreviated handshake
+clearall();
+(undef, $session) = tempfile();
+$proxy->serverconnects(2);
+$proxy->clientflags("-sess_out ".$session." -no_ticket");
+$proxy->start();
+$proxy->clearClient();
+$proxy->clientflags("-sess_in ".$session);
+$proxy->clientstart();
+checkmessages(5, "Session resumption with ticket capable client without a "
+                 ."ticket", 1, 1, 1, 0);
+unlink $session;
+
+#Test 6: Client accepts empty ticket.
+#Expected result: ClientHello extension seen; ServerHello extension seen;
+#                 NewSessionTicket message seen; Full handshake.
+clearall();
+$proxy->filter(\&ticket_filter);
+$proxy->start();
+checkmessages(6, "Empty ticket test",  1, 1, 1, 1);
+
+#Test 7-8: Client keeps existing ticket on empty ticket.
+clearall();
+(undef, $session) = tempfile();
+$proxy->serverconnects(3);
+$proxy->filter(undef);
+$proxy->clientflags("-sess_out ".$session);
+$proxy->start();
+$proxy->clearClient();
+$proxy->clientflags("-sess_in ".$session." -sess_out ".$session);
+$proxy->filter(\&inject_empty_ticket_filter);
+$proxy->clientstart();
+#Expected result: ClientHello extension seen; ServerHello extension seen;
+#                 NewSessionTicket message seen; Abbreviated handshake.
+checkmessages(7, "Empty ticket resumption test",  1, 1, 1, 0);
+clearclient();
+$proxy->clientflags("-sess_in ".$session);
+$proxy->filter(undef);
+$proxy->clientstart();
+#Expected result: ClientHello extension seen; ServerHello extension not seen;
+#                 NewSessionTicket message not seen; Abbreviated handshake.
+checkmessages(8, "Empty ticket resumption test",  1, 0, 0, 0);
+unlink $session;
+
+#Test 9: Bad server sends the ServerHello extension but does not send a
+#NewSessionTicket
+#Expected result: Connection failure
+clearall();
+$proxy->serverflags("-no_ticket");
+$proxy->filter(\&inject_ticket_extension_filter);
+$proxy->start();
+ok(TLSProxy::Message->fail, "Server sends ticket extension but no ticket test");
+
+#Test10: Bad server does not send the ServerHello extension but does send a
+#NewSessionTicket
+#Expected result: Connection failure
+clearall();
+$proxy->serverflags("-no_ticket");
+$proxy->filter(\&inject_empty_ticket_filter);
+$proxy->start();
+ok(TLSProxy::Message->fail, "No server ticket extension but ticket sent test");
+
+sub ticket_filter
+{
+    my $proxy = shift;
+
+    foreach my $message (@{$proxy->message_list}) {
+        if ($message->mt == TLSProxy::Message::MT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) {
+            $message->ticket("");
+            $message->repack();
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+sub inject_empty_ticket_filter {
+    my $proxy = shift;
+
+    foreach my $message (@{$proxy->message_list}) {
+        if ($message->mt == TLSProxy::Message::MT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) {
+            # Only inject the message first time we're called.
+            return;
+        }
+    }
+
+    my @new_message_list = ();
+    foreach my $message (@{$proxy->message_list}) {
+        push @new_message_list, $message;
+        if ($message->mt == TLSProxy::Message::MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
+            $message->set_extension(TLSProxy::Message::EXT_SESSION_TICKET, "");
+            $message->repack();
+            # Tack NewSessionTicket onto the ServerHello record.
+            # This only works if the ServerHello is exactly one record.
+            my $record = ${$message->records}[0];
+
+            my $offset = $message->startoffset + $message->encoded_length;
+            my $newsessionticket = TLSProxy::NewSessionTicket->new(
+                1, "", [$record], $offset, []);
+            $newsessionticket->repack();
+            push @new_message_list, $newsessionticket;
+        }
+    }
+    $proxy->message_list([@new_message_list]);
+}
+
+sub inject_ticket_extension_filter
+{
+    my $proxy = shift;
+
+    # We're only interested in the initial ServerHello
+    if ($proxy->flight != 1) {
+        return;
+    }
+
+    foreach my $message (@{$proxy->message_list}) {
+        if ($message->mt == TLSProxy::Message::MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
+            #Add the session ticket extension to the ServerHello even though
+            #we are not going to send a NewSessionTicket message
+            $message->set_extension(TLSProxy::Message::EXT_SESSION_TICKET, "");
+
+            $message->repack();
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+sub checkmessages($$$$$$)
+{
+    my ($testno, $testname, $testch, $testsh, $testtickseen, $testhand) = @_;
+
+    subtest $testname => sub {
+
+	foreach my $message (@{$proxy->message_list}) {
+	    if ($message->mt == TLSProxy::Message::MT_CLIENT_HELLO
+                || $message->mt == TLSProxy::Message::MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
+		#Get the extensions data
+		my %extensions = %{$message->extension_data};
+		if (defined
+                    $extensions{TLSProxy::Message::EXT_SESSION_TICKET}) {
+		    if ($message->mt == TLSProxy::Message::MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
+			$chellotickext = 1;
+		    } else {
+			$shellotickext = 1;
+		    }
+		}
+	    } elsif ($message->mt == TLSProxy::Message::MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
+		#Must be doing a full handshake
+		$fullhand = 1;
+	    } elsif ($message->mt == TLSProxy::Message::MT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) {
+		$ticketseen = 1;
+	    }
+	}
+
+	plan tests => 5;
+
+	ok(TLSProxy::Message->success, "Handshake");
+	ok(($testch && $chellotickext) || (!$testch && !$chellotickext),
+	   "ClientHello extension Session Ticket check");
+	ok(($testsh && $shellotickext) || (!$testsh && !$shellotickext),
+	   "ServerHello extension Session Ticket check");
+	ok(($testtickseen && $ticketseen) || (!$testtickseen && !$ticketseen),
+	   "Session Ticket message presence check");
+	ok(($testhand && $fullhand) || (!$testhand && !$fullhand),
+	   "Session Ticket full handshake check");
+    }
+}
+
+
+sub clearclient()
+{
+    $chellotickext = 0;
+    $shellotickext = 0;
+    $fullhand = 0;
+    $ticketseen = 0;
+    $proxy->clearClient();
+}
+
+sub clearall()
+{
+    clearclient();
+    $proxy->clear();
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/70-test_sslskewith0p.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/70-test_sslskewith0p.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..af87739
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/70-test_sslskewith0p.t
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+use strict;
+use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT cmdstr srctop_file bldtop_dir/;
+use OpenSSL::Test::Utils;
+use TLSProxy::Proxy;
+
+my $test_name = "test_sslskewith0p";
+setup($test_name);
+
+plan skip_all => "TLSProxy isn't usable on $^O"
+    if $^O =~ /^(VMS)$/;
+
+plan skip_all => "$test_name needs the dynamic engine feature enabled"
+    if disabled("engine") || disabled("dynamic-engine");
+
+plan skip_all => "dh is not supported by this OpenSSL build"
+    if disabled("dh");
+
+plan skip_all => "$test_name needs the sock feature enabled"
+    if disabled("sock");
+
+plan skip_all => "$test_name needs TLS enabled"
+    if alldisabled(available_protocols("tls"));
+
+$ENV{OPENSSL_ia32cap} = '~0x200000200000000';
+my $proxy = TLSProxy::Proxy->new(
+    \&ske_0_p_filter,
+    cmdstr(app(["openssl"]), display => 1),
+    srctop_file("apps", "server.pem"),
+    (!$ENV{HARNESS_ACTIVE} || $ENV{HARNESS_VERBOSE})
+);
+
+#We must use an anon DHE cipher for this test
+$proxy->cipherc('ADH-AES128-SHA:@SECLEVEL=0');
+$proxy->ciphers('ADH-AES128-SHA:@SECLEVEL=0');
+
+$proxy->start() or plan skip_all => "Unable to start up Proxy for tests";
+plan tests => 1;
+ok(TLSProxy::Message->fail, "ServerKeyExchange with 0 p");
+
+sub ske_0_p_filter
+{
+    my $proxy = shift;
+
+    # We're only interested in the SKE - always in flight 1
+    if ($proxy->flight != 1) {
+        return;
+    }
+
+    foreach my $message (@{$proxy->message_list}) {
+        if ($message->mt == TLSProxy::Message::MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
+            #Set p to a value of 0
+            $message->p(pack('C', 0));
+
+            $message->repack();
+        }
+    }
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/70-test_sslvertol.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/70-test_sslvertol.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..59c2cdd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/70-test_sslvertol.t
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+use strict;
+use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT cmdstr srctop_file bldtop_dir/;
+use OpenSSL::Test::Utils;
+use TLSProxy::Proxy;
+
+my $test_name = "test_sslextension";
+setup($test_name);
+
+plan skip_all => "TLSProxy isn't usable on $^O"
+    if $^O =~ /^(VMS)$/;
+
+plan skip_all => "$test_name needs the dynamic engine feature enabled"
+    if disabled("engine") || disabled("dynamic-engine");
+
+plan skip_all => "$test_name needs the sock feature enabled"
+    if disabled("sock");
+
+plan skip_all => "$test_name needs TLS enabled"
+    if alldisabled(available_protocols("tls"));
+
+$ENV{OPENSSL_ia32cap} = '~0x200000200000000';
+my $proxy = TLSProxy::Proxy->new(
+    \&vers_tolerance_filter,
+    cmdstr(app(["openssl"]), display => 1),
+    srctop_file("apps", "server.pem"),
+    (!$ENV{HARNESS_ACTIVE} || $ENV{HARNESS_VERBOSE})
+);
+
+#Test 1: Asking for TLS1.3 should pass
+my $client_version = TLSProxy::Record::VERS_TLS_1_3;
+$proxy->start() or plan skip_all => "Unable to start up Proxy for tests";
+plan tests => 2;
+ok(TLSProxy::Message->success(), "Version tolerance test, TLS 1.3");
+
+#Test 2: Testing something below SSLv3 should fail
+$client_version = TLSProxy::Record::VERS_SSL_3_0 - 1;
+$proxy->clear();
+$proxy->start();
+ok(TLSProxy::Message->fail(), "Version tolerance test, SSL < 3.0");
+
+sub vers_tolerance_filter
+{
+    my $proxy = shift;
+
+    # We're only interested in the initial ClientHello
+    if ($proxy->flight != 0) {
+        return;
+    }
+
+    foreach my $message (@{$proxy->message_list}) {
+        if ($message->mt == TLSProxy::Message::MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
+            #Set the client version
+            #Anything above the max supported version (TLS1.2) should succeed
+            #Anything below SSLv3 should fail
+            $message->client_version($client_version);
+            $message->repack();
+        }
+    }
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/70-test_tlsextms.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/70-test_tlsextms.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d39acf4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/70-test_tlsextms.t
@@ -0,0 +1,238 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+use strict;
+use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT cmdstr srctop_file bldtop_dir/;
+use OpenSSL::Test::Utils;
+use TLSProxy::Proxy;
+use File::Temp qw(tempfile);
+
+my $test_name = "test_tlsextms";
+setup($test_name);
+
+plan skip_all => "TLSProxy isn't usable on $^O"
+    if $^O =~ /^(VMS)$/;
+
+plan skip_all => "$test_name needs the dynamic engine feature enabled"
+    if disabled("engine") || disabled("dynamic-engine");
+
+plan skip_all => "$test_name needs the sock feature enabled"
+    if disabled("sock");
+
+plan skip_all => "$test_name needs TLS enabled"
+    if alldisabled(available_protocols("tls"));
+
+$ENV{OPENSSL_ia32cap} = '~0x200000200000000';
+
+sub checkmessages($$$$$);
+sub setrmextms($$);
+sub clearall();
+
+my $crmextms = 0;
+my $srmextms = 0;
+my $cextms = 0;
+my $sextms = 0;
+my $fullhand = 0;
+
+my $proxy = TLSProxy::Proxy->new(
+    \&extms_filter,
+    cmdstr(app(["openssl"]), display => 1),
+    srctop_file("apps", "server.pem"),
+    (!$ENV{HARNESS_ACTIVE} || $ENV{HARNESS_VERBOSE})
+);
+
+#Test 1: By default server and client should send extended master secret
+# extension.
+#Expected result: ClientHello extension seen; ServerHello extension seen
+#                 Full handshake
+
+setrmextms(0, 0);
+$proxy->start() or plan skip_all => "Unable to start up Proxy for tests";
+plan tests => 9;
+checkmessages(1, "Default extended master secret test", 1, 1, 1);
+
+#Test 2: If client omits extended master secret extension, server should too.
+#Expected result: ClientHello extension not seen; ServerHello extension not seen
+#                 Full handshake
+
+clearall();
+setrmextms(1, 0);
+$proxy->start();
+checkmessages(2, "No client extension extended master secret test", 0, 0, 1);
+
+# Test 3: same as 1 but with session tickets disabled.
+# Expected result: same as test 1.
+
+clearall();
+$proxy->clientflags("-no_ticket");
+setrmextms(0, 0);
+$proxy->start();
+checkmessages(3, "No ticket extended master secret test", 1, 1, 1);
+
+# Test 4: same as 2 but with session tickets disabled.
+# Expected result: same as test 2.
+
+clearall();
+$proxy->clientflags("-no_ticket");
+setrmextms(1, 0);
+$proxy->start();
+checkmessages(2, "No ticket, no client extension extended master secret test", 0, 0, 1);
+
+#Test 5: Session resumption extended master secret test
+#
+#Expected result: ClientHello extension seen; ServerHello extension seen
+#                 Abbreviated handshake
+
+clearall();
+setrmextms(0, 0);
+(undef, my $session) = tempfile();
+$proxy->serverconnects(2);
+$proxy->clientflags("-sess_out ".$session);
+$proxy->start();
+$proxy->clearClient();
+$proxy->clientflags("-sess_in ".$session);
+$proxy->clientstart();
+checkmessages(5, "Session resumption extended master secret test", 1, 1, 0);
+unlink $session;
+
+#Test 6: Session resumption extended master secret test original session
+# omits extension. Server must not resume session.
+#Expected result: ClientHello extension seen; ServerHello extension seen
+#                 Full handshake
+
+clearall();
+setrmextms(1, 0);
+(undef, $session) = tempfile();
+$proxy->serverconnects(2);
+$proxy->clientflags("-sess_out ".$session);
+$proxy->start();
+$proxy->clearClient();
+$proxy->clientflags("-sess_in ".$session);
+setrmextms(0, 0);
+$proxy->clientstart();
+checkmessages(6, "Session resumption extended master secret test", 1, 1, 1);
+unlink $session;
+
+#Test 7: Session resumption extended master secret test resumed session
+# omits client extension. Server must abort connection.
+#Expected result: aborted connection.
+
+clearall();
+setrmextms(0, 0);
+(undef, $session) = tempfile();
+$proxy->serverconnects(2);
+$proxy->clientflags("-sess_out ".$session);
+$proxy->start();
+$proxy->clearClient();
+$proxy->clientflags("-sess_in ".$session);
+setrmextms(1, 0);
+$proxy->clientstart();
+ok(TLSProxy::Message->fail(), "Client inconsistent session resumption");
+unlink $session;
+
+#Test 8: Session resumption extended master secret test resumed session
+# omits server extension. Client must abort connection.
+#Expected result: aborted connection.
+
+clearall();
+setrmextms(0, 0);
+(undef, $session) = tempfile();
+$proxy->serverconnects(2);
+$proxy->clientflags("-sess_out ".$session);
+$proxy->start();
+$proxy->clearClient();
+$proxy->clientflags("-sess_in ".$session);
+setrmextms(0, 1);
+$proxy->clientstart();
+ok(TLSProxy::Message->fail(), "Server inconsistent session resumption 1");
+unlink $session;
+
+#Test 9: Session resumption extended master secret test initial session
+# omits server extension. Client must abort connection.
+#Expected result: aborted connection.
+
+clearall();
+setrmextms(0, 1);
+(undef, $session) = tempfile();
+$proxy->serverconnects(2);
+$proxy->clientflags("-sess_out ".$session);
+$proxy->start();
+$proxy->clearClient();
+$proxy->clientflags("-sess_in ".$session);
+setrmextms(0, 0);
+$proxy->clientstart();
+ok(TLSProxy::Message->fail(), "Server inconsistent session resumption 2");
+unlink $session;
+
+sub extms_filter
+{
+    my $proxy = shift;
+
+    foreach my $message (@{$proxy->message_list}) {
+        if ($crmextms && $message->mt == TLSProxy::Message::MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
+            $message->delete_extension(TLSProxy::Message::EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET);
+            $message->repack();
+        }
+        if ($srmextms && $message->mt == TLSProxy::Message::MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
+            $message->delete_extension(TLSProxy::Message::EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET);
+            $message->repack();
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+sub checkmessages($$$$$)
+{
+    my ($testno, $testname, $testcextms, $testsextms, $testhand) = @_;
+
+    subtest $testname => sub {
+
+    foreach my $message (@{$proxy->message_list}) {
+        if ($message->mt == TLSProxy::Message::MT_CLIENT_HELLO
+            || $message->mt == TLSProxy::Message::MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
+        #Get the extensions data
+        my %extensions = %{$message->extension_data};
+        if (defined
+            $extensions{TLSProxy::Message::EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET}) {
+            if ($message->mt == TLSProxy::Message::MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
+                $cextms = 1;
+            } else {
+                $sextms = 1;
+            }
+        }
+        } elsif ($message->mt == TLSProxy::Message::MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
+            #Must be doing a full handshake
+            $fullhand = 1;
+        }
+    }
+
+    plan tests => 4;
+
+    ok(TLSProxy::Message->success, "Handshake");
+
+    ok($testcextms == $cextms,
+       "ClientHello extension extended master secret check");
+    ok($testsextms == $sextms,
+       "ServerHello extension extended master secret check");
+    ok($testhand == $fullhand,
+       "Extended master secret full handshake check");
+
+    }
+}
+
+sub setrmextms($$)
+{
+    ($crmextms, $srmextms) = @_;
+}
+
+sub clearall()
+{
+    $cextms = 0;
+    $sextms = 0;
+    $fullhand = 0;
+    $proxy->clear();
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/70-test_verify_extra.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/70-test_verify_extra.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..79a33cd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/70-test_verify_extra.t
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_file/;
+
+setup("test_verify_extra");
+
+plan tests => 1;
+
+ok(run(test(["verify_extra_test",
+             srctop_file("test", "certs", "roots.pem"),
+             srctop_file("test", "certs", "untrusted.pem"),
+             srctop_file("test", "certs", "bad.pem")])));
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/80-test_ca.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/80-test_ca.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..28a090e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/80-test_ca.t
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+
+use POSIX;
+use File::Path 2.00 qw/rmtree/;
+use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT cmdstr srctop_file/;
+
+setup("test_ca");
+
+$ENV{OPENSSL} = cmdstr(app(["openssl"]), display => 1);
+my $std_openssl_cnf =
+    srctop_file("apps", $^O eq "VMS" ? "openssl-vms.cnf" : "openssl.cnf");
+
+rmtree("demoCA", { safe => 0 });
+
+plan tests => 4;
+ SKIP: {
+     $ENV{OPENSSL_CONFIG} = '-config "'.srctop_file("test", "CAss.cnf").'"';
+     skip "failed creating CA structure", 3
+	 if !ok(run(perlapp(["CA.pl","-newca"], stdin => undef)),
+		'creating CA structure');
+
+     $ENV{OPENSSL_CONFIG} = '-config "'.srctop_file("test", "Uss.cnf").'"';
+     skip "failed creating new certificate request", 2
+	 if !ok(run(perlapp(["CA.pl","-newreq"])),
+		'creating certificate request');
+
+     $ENV{OPENSSL_CONFIG} = '-config "'.$std_openssl_cnf.'"';
+     skip "failed to sign certificate request", 1
+	 if !is(yes(cmdstr(perlapp(["CA.pl", "-sign"]))), 0,
+		'signing certificate request');
+
+     ok(run(perlapp(["CA.pl", "-verify", "newcert.pem"])),
+        'verifying new certificate');
+}
+
+
+rmtree("demoCA", { safe => 0 });
+unlink "newcert.pem", "newreq.pem", "newkey.pem";
+
+
+sub yes {
+    my $cntr = 10;
+    open(PIPE, "|-", join(" ",@_));
+    local $SIG{PIPE} = "IGNORE";
+    1 while $cntr-- > 0 && print PIPE "y\n";
+    close PIPE;
+    return 0;
+}
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/80-test_cipherlist.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/80-test_cipherlist.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..98d537e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/80-test_cipherlist.t
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+#! /usr/bin/perl
+#
+# Copyright 2016-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+
+use OpenSSL::Test::Simple;
+use OpenSSL::Test;
+use OpenSSL::Test::Utils qw(alldisabled available_protocols);
+
+setup("test_cipherlist");
+
+my $no_anytls = alldisabled(available_protocols("tls"));
+
+# If we have no protocols, then we also have no supported ciphers.
+plan skip_all => "No SSL/TLS protocol is supported by this OpenSSL build."
+    if $no_anytls;
+
+simple_test("test_cipherlist", "cipherlist_test", "cipherlist");
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f038bea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
@@ -0,0 +1,511 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+
+use POSIX;
+use File::Spec::Functions qw/catfile/;
+use File::Compare qw/compare_text/;
+use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_dir srctop_file/;
+use OpenSSL::Test::Utils;
+
+setup("test_cms");
+
+plan skip_all => "CMS is not supported by this OpenSSL build"
+    if disabled("cms");
+
+my $smdir    = srctop_dir("test", "smime-certs");
+my $smcont   = srctop_file("test", "smcont.txt");
+my ($no_des, $no_dh, $no_dsa, $no_ec, $no_ec2m, $no_rc2, $no_zlib)
+    = disabled qw/des dh dsa ec ec2m rc2 zlib/;
+
+plan tests => 4;
+
+my @smime_pkcs7_tests = (
+
+    [ "signed content DER format, RSA key",
+      [ "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "DER", "-nodetach",
+	"-certfile", catfile($smdir, "smroot.pem"),
+	"-signer", catfile($smdir, "smrsa1.pem"), "-out", "test.cms" ],
+      [ "-verify", "-in", "test.cms", "-inform", "DER",
+	"-CAfile", catfile($smdir, "smroot.pem"), "-out", "smtst.txt" ]
+    ],
+
+    [ "signed detached content DER format, RSA key",
+      [ "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "DER",
+	"-signer", catfile($smdir, "smrsa1.pem"), "-out", "test.cms" ],
+      [ "-verify", "-in", "test.cms", "-inform", "DER",
+	"-CAfile", catfile($smdir, "smroot.pem"), "-out", "smtst.txt",
+	"-content", $smcont ]
+    ],
+
+    [ "signed content test streaming BER format, RSA",
+      [ "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "DER", "-nodetach",
+	"-stream",
+	"-signer", catfile($smdir, "smrsa1.pem"), "-out", "test.cms" ],
+      [ "-verify", "-in", "test.cms", "-inform", "DER",
+	"-CAfile", catfile($smdir, "smroot.pem"), "-out", "smtst.txt" ]
+    ],
+
+    [ "signed content DER format, DSA key",
+      [ "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "DER", "-nodetach",
+	"-signer", catfile($smdir, "smdsa1.pem"), "-out", "test.cms" ],
+      [ "-verify", "-in", "test.cms", "-inform", "DER",
+	"-CAfile", catfile($smdir, "smroot.pem"), "-out", "smtst.txt" ]
+    ],
+
+    [ "signed detached content DER format, DSA key",
+      [ "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "DER",
+	"-signer", catfile($smdir, "smdsa1.pem"), "-out", "test.cms" ],
+      [ "-verify", "-in", "test.cms", "-inform", "DER",
+	"-CAfile", catfile($smdir, "smroot.pem"), "-out", "smtst.txt",
+	"-content", $smcont ]
+    ],
+
+    [ "signed detached content DER format, add RSA signer (with DSA existing)",
+      [ "-resign", "-inform", "DER", "-in", "test.cms", "-outform", "DER",
+	"-signer", catfile($smdir, "smrsa1.pem"), "-out", "test2.cms" ],
+      [ "-verify", "-in", "test2.cms", "-inform", "DER",
+	"-CAfile", catfile($smdir, "smroot.pem"), "-out", "smtst.txt",
+	"-content", $smcont ]
+    ],
+
+    [ "signed content test streaming BER format, DSA key",
+      [ "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "DER", "-nodetach",
+	"-stream",
+	"-signer", catfile($smdir, "smdsa1.pem"), "-out", "test.cms" ],
+      [ "-verify", "-in", "test.cms", "-inform", "DER",
+	"-CAfile", catfile($smdir, "smroot.pem"), "-out", "smtst.txt" ]
+    ],
+
+    [ "signed content test streaming BER format, 2 DSA and 2 RSA keys",
+      [ "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "DER", "-nodetach",
+	"-signer", catfile($smdir, "smrsa1.pem"),
+	"-signer", catfile($smdir, "smrsa2.pem"),
+	"-signer", catfile($smdir, "smdsa1.pem"),
+	"-signer", catfile($smdir, "smdsa2.pem"),
+	"-stream", "-out", "test.cms" ],
+      [ "-verify", "-in", "test.cms", "-inform", "DER",
+	"-CAfile", catfile($smdir, "smroot.pem"), "-out", "smtst.txt" ]
+    ],
+
+    [ "signed content test streaming BER format, 2 DSA and 2 RSA keys, no attributes",
+      [ "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "DER", "-noattr", "-nodetach",
+	"-signer", catfile($smdir, "smrsa1.pem"),
+	"-signer", catfile($smdir, "smrsa2.pem"),
+	"-signer", catfile($smdir, "smdsa1.pem"),
+	"-signer", catfile($smdir, "smdsa2.pem"),
+	"-stream", "-out", "test.cms" ],
+      [ "-verify", "-in", "test.cms", "-inform", "DER",
+	"-CAfile", catfile($smdir, "smroot.pem"), "-out", "smtst.txt" ]
+    ],
+
+    [ "signed content S/MIME format, RSA key SHA1",
+      [ "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-md", "sha1",
+	"-certfile", catfile($smdir, "smroot.pem"),
+	"-signer", catfile($smdir, "smrsa1.pem"), "-out", "test.cms" ],
+      [ "-verify", "-in", "test.cms",
+	"-CAfile", catfile($smdir, "smroot.pem"), "-out", "smtst.txt" ]
+    ],
+
+    [ "signed content test streaming S/MIME format, 2 DSA and 2 RSA keys",
+      [ "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-nodetach",
+	"-signer", catfile($smdir, "smrsa1.pem"),
+	"-signer", catfile($smdir, "smrsa2.pem"),
+	"-signer", catfile($smdir, "smdsa1.pem"),
+	"-signer", catfile($smdir, "smdsa2.pem"),
+	"-stream", "-out", "test.cms" ],
+      [ "-verify", "-in", "test.cms",
+	"-CAfile", catfile($smdir, "smroot.pem"), "-out", "smtst.txt" ]
+    ],
+
+    [ "signed content test streaming multipart S/MIME format, 2 DSA and 2 RSA keys",
+      [ "-sign", "-in", $smcont,
+	"-signer", catfile($smdir, "smrsa1.pem"),
+	"-signer", catfile($smdir, "smrsa2.pem"),
+	"-signer", catfile($smdir, "smdsa1.pem"),
+	"-signer", catfile($smdir, "smdsa2.pem"),
+	"-stream", "-out", "test.cms" ],
+      [ "-verify", "-in", "test.cms",
+	"-CAfile", catfile($smdir, "smroot.pem"), "-out", "smtst.txt" ]
+    ],
+
+    [ "enveloped content test streaming S/MIME format, DES, 3 recipients",
+      [ "-encrypt", "-in", $smcont,
+	"-stream", "-out", "test.cms",
+	catfile($smdir, "smrsa1.pem"),
+	catfile($smdir, "smrsa2.pem"),
+	catfile($smdir, "smrsa3.pem") ],
+      [ "-decrypt", "-recip", catfile($smdir, "smrsa1.pem"),
+	"-in", "test.cms", "-out", "smtst.txt" ]
+    ],
+
+    [ "enveloped content test streaming S/MIME format, DES, 3 recipients, 3rd used",
+      [ "-encrypt", "-in", $smcont,
+	"-stream", "-out", "test.cms",
+	catfile($smdir, "smrsa1.pem"),
+	catfile($smdir, "smrsa2.pem"),
+	catfile($smdir, "smrsa3.pem") ],
+      [ "-decrypt", "-recip", catfile($smdir, "smrsa3.pem"),
+	"-in", "test.cms", "-out", "smtst.txt" ]
+    ],
+
+    [ "enveloped content test streaming S/MIME format, DES, 3 recipients, key only used",
+      [ "-encrypt", "-in", $smcont,
+	"-stream", "-out", "test.cms",
+	catfile($smdir, "smrsa1.pem"),
+	catfile($smdir, "smrsa2.pem"),
+	catfile($smdir, "smrsa3.pem") ],
+      [ "-decrypt", "-inkey", catfile($smdir, "smrsa3.pem"),
+	"-in", "test.cms", "-out", "smtst.txt" ]
+    ],
+
+    [ "enveloped content test streaming S/MIME format, AES-256 cipher, 3 recipients",
+      [ "-encrypt", "-in", $smcont,
+	"-aes256", "-stream", "-out", "test.cms",
+	catfile($smdir, "smrsa1.pem"),
+	catfile($smdir, "smrsa2.pem"),
+	catfile($smdir, "smrsa3.pem") ],
+      [ "-decrypt", "-recip", catfile($smdir, "smrsa1.pem"),
+	"-in", "test.cms", "-out", "smtst.txt" ]
+    ],
+
+);
+
+my @smime_cms_tests = (
+
+    [ "signed content test streaming BER format, 2 DSA and 2 RSA keys, keyid",
+      [ "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "DER", "-nodetach", "-keyid",
+	"-signer", catfile($smdir, "smrsa1.pem"),
+	"-signer", catfile($smdir, "smrsa2.pem"),
+	"-signer", catfile($smdir, "smdsa1.pem"),
+	"-signer", catfile($smdir, "smdsa2.pem"),
+	"-stream", "-out", "test.cms" ],
+      [ "-verify", "-in", "test.cms", "-inform", "DER",
+	"-CAfile", catfile($smdir, "smroot.pem"), "-out", "smtst.txt" ]
+    ],
+
+    [ "signed content test streaming PEM format, 2 DSA and 2 RSA keys",
+      [ "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "PEM", "-nodetach",
+	"-signer", catfile($smdir, "smrsa1.pem"),
+	"-signer", catfile($smdir, "smrsa2.pem"),
+	"-signer", catfile($smdir, "smdsa1.pem"),
+	"-signer", catfile($smdir, "smdsa2.pem"),
+	"-stream", "-out", "test.cms" ],
+      [ "-verify", "-in", "test.cms", "-inform", "PEM",
+	"-CAfile", catfile($smdir, "smroot.pem"), "-out", "smtst.txt" ]
+    ],
+
+    [ "signed content MIME format, RSA key, signed receipt request",
+      [ "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-signer", catfile($smdir, "smrsa1.pem"), "-nodetach",
+	"-receipt_request_to", "test\@openssl.org", "-receipt_request_all",
+	"-out", "test.cms" ],
+      [ "-verify", "-in", "test.cms",
+	"-CAfile", catfile($smdir, "smroot.pem"), "-out", "smtst.txt" ]
+    ],
+
+    [ "signed receipt MIME format, RSA key",
+      [ "-sign_receipt", "-in", "test.cms",
+	"-signer", catfile($smdir, "smrsa2.pem"),
+	"-out", "test2.cms" ],
+      [ "-verify_receipt", "test2.cms", "-in", "test.cms",
+	"-CAfile", catfile($smdir, "smroot.pem") ]
+    ],
+
+    [ "enveloped content test streaming S/MIME format, DES, 3 recipients, keyid",
+      [ "-encrypt", "-in", $smcont,
+	"-stream", "-out", "test.cms", "-keyid",
+	catfile($smdir, "smrsa1.pem"),
+	catfile($smdir, "smrsa2.pem"),
+	catfile($smdir, "smrsa3.pem") ],
+      [ "-decrypt", "-recip", catfile($smdir, "smrsa1.pem"),
+	"-in", "test.cms", "-out", "smtst.txt" ]
+    ],
+
+    [ "enveloped content test streaming PEM format, KEK",
+      [ "-encrypt", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "PEM", "-aes128",
+	"-stream", "-out", "test.cms",
+	"-secretkey", "000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F",
+	"-secretkeyid", "C0FEE0" ],
+      [ "-decrypt", "-in", "test.cms", "-out", "smtst.txt", "-inform", "PEM",
+	"-secretkey", "000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F",
+	"-secretkeyid", "C0FEE0" ]
+    ],
+
+    [ "enveloped content test streaming PEM format, KEK, key only",
+      [ "-encrypt", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "PEM", "-aes128",
+	"-stream", "-out", "test.cms",
+	"-secretkey", "000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F",
+	"-secretkeyid", "C0FEE0" ],
+      [ "-decrypt", "-in", "test.cms", "-out", "smtst.txt", "-inform", "PEM",
+	"-secretkey", "000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F" ]
+    ],
+
+    [ "data content test streaming PEM format",
+      [ "-data_create", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "PEM", "-nodetach",
+	"-stream", "-out", "test.cms" ],
+      [ "-data_out", "-in", "test.cms", "-inform", "PEM", "-out", "smtst.txt" ]
+    ],
+
+    [ "encrypted content test streaming PEM format, 128 bit RC2 key",
+      [ "-EncryptedData_encrypt", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "PEM",
+	"-rc2", "-secretkey", "000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F",
+	"-stream", "-out", "test.cms" ],
+      [ "-EncryptedData_decrypt", "-in", "test.cms", "-inform", "PEM",
+	"-secretkey", "000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F", "-out", "smtst.txt" ]
+    ],
+
+    [ "encrypted content test streaming PEM format, 40 bit RC2 key",
+      [ "-EncryptedData_encrypt", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "PEM",
+	"-rc2", "-secretkey", "0001020304",
+	"-stream", "-out", "test.cms" ],
+      [ "-EncryptedData_decrypt", "-in", "test.cms", "-inform", "PEM",
+	"-secretkey", "0001020304", "-out", "smtst.txt" ]
+    ],
+
+    [ "encrypted content test streaming PEM format, triple DES key",
+      [ "-EncryptedData_encrypt", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "PEM",
+	"-des3", "-secretkey", "000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F1011121314151617",
+	"-stream", "-out", "test.cms" ],
+      [ "-EncryptedData_decrypt", "-in", "test.cms", "-inform", "PEM",
+	"-secretkey", "000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F1011121314151617",
+	"-out", "smtst.txt" ]
+    ],
+
+    [ "encrypted content test streaming PEM format, 128 bit AES key",
+      [ "-EncryptedData_encrypt", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "PEM",
+	"-aes128", "-secretkey", "000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F",
+	"-stream", "-out", "test.cms" ],
+      [ "-EncryptedData_decrypt", "-in", "test.cms", "-inform", "PEM",
+	"-secretkey", "000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F", "-out", "smtst.txt" ]
+    ],
+
+);
+
+my @smime_cms_comp_tests = (
+
+    [ "compressed content test streaming PEM format",
+      [ "-compress", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "PEM", "-nodetach",
+	"-stream", "-out", "test.cms" ],
+      [ "-uncompress", "-in", "test.cms", "-inform", "PEM", "-out", "smtst.txt" ]
+    ]
+
+);
+
+my @smime_cms_param_tests = (
+    [ "signed content test streaming PEM format, RSA keys, PSS signature",
+      [ "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "PEM", "-nodetach",
+	"-signer", catfile($smdir, "smrsa1.pem"), "-keyopt", "rsa_padding_mode:pss",
+	"-out", "test.cms" ],
+      [ "-verify", "-in", "test.cms", "-inform", "PEM",
+	"-CAfile", catfile($smdir, "smroot.pem"), "-out", "smtst.txt" ]
+    ],
+
+    [ "signed content test streaming PEM format, RSA keys, PSS signature, no attributes",
+      [ "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "PEM", "-nodetach", "-noattr",
+	"-signer", catfile($smdir, "smrsa1.pem"), "-keyopt", "rsa_padding_mode:pss",
+	"-out", "test.cms" ],
+      [ "-verify", "-in", "test.cms", "-inform", "PEM",
+	"-CAfile", catfile($smdir, "smroot.pem"), "-out", "smtst.txt" ]
+    ],
+
+    [ "signed content test streaming PEM format, RSA keys, PSS signature, SHA384 MGF1",
+      [ "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "PEM", "-nodetach",
+	"-signer", catfile($smdir, "smrsa1.pem"), "-keyopt", "rsa_padding_mode:pss",
+	"-keyopt", "rsa_mgf1_md:sha384", "-out", "test.cms" ],
+      [ "-verify", "-in", "test.cms", "-inform", "PEM",
+	"-CAfile", catfile($smdir, "smroot.pem"), "-out", "smtst.txt" ]
+    ],
+
+    [ "enveloped content test streaming S/MIME format, DES, OAEP default parameters",
+      [ "-encrypt", "-in", $smcont,
+	"-stream", "-out", "test.cms",
+	"-recip", catfile($smdir, "smrsa1.pem"), "-keyopt", "rsa_padding_mode:oaep" ],
+      [ "-decrypt", "-recip", catfile($smdir, "smrsa1.pem"),
+	"-in", "test.cms", "-out", "smtst.txt" ]
+    ],
+
+    [ "enveloped content test streaming S/MIME format, DES, OAEP SHA256",
+      [ "-encrypt", "-in", $smcont,
+	"-stream", "-out", "test.cms",
+	"-recip", catfile($smdir, "smrsa1.pem"), "-keyopt", "rsa_padding_mode:oaep",
+	"-keyopt", "rsa_oaep_md:sha256" ],
+      [ "-decrypt", "-recip", catfile($smdir, "smrsa1.pem"),
+	"-in", "test.cms", "-out", "smtst.txt" ]
+    ],
+
+    [ "enveloped content test streaming S/MIME format, DES, ECDH",
+      [ "-encrypt", "-in", $smcont,
+	"-stream", "-out", "test.cms",
+	"-recip", catfile($smdir, "smec1.pem") ],
+      [ "-decrypt", "-recip", catfile($smdir, "smec1.pem"),
+	"-in", "test.cms", "-out", "smtst.txt" ]
+    ],
+
+    [ "enveloped content test streaming S/MIME format, DES, ECDH, 2 recipients, key only used",
+      [ "-encrypt", "-in", $smcont,
+	"-stream", "-out", "test.cms",
+	catfile($smdir, "smec1.pem"),
+	catfile($smdir, "smec3.pem") ],
+      [ "-decrypt", "-inkey", catfile($smdir, "smec3.pem"),
+	"-in", "test.cms", "-out", "smtst.txt" ]
+    ],
+
+    [ "enveloped content test streaming S/MIME format, ECDH, DES, key identifier",
+      [ "-encrypt", "-keyid", "-in", $smcont,
+	"-stream", "-out", "test.cms",
+	"-recip", catfile($smdir, "smec1.pem") ],
+      [ "-decrypt", "-recip", catfile($smdir, "smec1.pem"),
+	"-in", "test.cms", "-out", "smtst.txt" ]
+    ],
+
+    [ "enveloped content test streaming S/MIME format, ECDH, AES128, SHA256 KDF",
+      [ "-encrypt", "-in", $smcont,
+	"-stream", "-out", "test.cms",
+	"-recip", catfile($smdir, "smec1.pem"), "-aes128", "-keyopt", "ecdh_kdf_md:sha256" ],
+      [ "-decrypt", "-recip", catfile($smdir, "smec1.pem"),
+	"-in", "test.cms", "-out", "smtst.txt" ]
+    ],
+
+    [ "enveloped content test streaming S/MIME format, ECDH, K-283, cofactor DH",
+      [ "-encrypt", "-in", $smcont,
+	"-stream", "-out", "test.cms",
+	"-recip", catfile($smdir, "smec2.pem"), "-aes128",
+	"-keyopt", "ecdh_kdf_md:sha256", "-keyopt", "ecdh_cofactor_mode:1" ],
+      [ "-decrypt", "-recip", catfile($smdir, "smec2.pem"),
+	"-in", "test.cms", "-out", "smtst.txt" ]
+    ],
+
+    [ "enveloped content test streaming S/MIME format, X9.42 DH",
+      [ "-encrypt", "-in", $smcont,
+	"-stream", "-out", "test.cms",
+	"-recip", catfile($smdir, "smdh.pem"), "-aes128" ],
+      [ "-decrypt", "-recip", catfile($smdir, "smdh.pem"),
+	"-in", "test.cms", "-out", "smtst.txt" ]
+    ]
+    );
+
+subtest "CMS => PKCS#7 compatibility tests\n" => sub {
+    plan tests => scalar @smime_pkcs7_tests;
+
+    foreach (@smime_pkcs7_tests) {
+      SKIP: {
+	  my $skip_reason = check_availability($$_[0]);
+	  skip $skip_reason, 1 if $skip_reason;
+
+	  ok(run(app(["openssl", "cms", @{$$_[1]}]))
+	     && run(app(["openssl", "smime", @{$$_[2]}]))
+	     && compare_text($smcont, "smtst.txt") == 0,
+	     $$_[0]);
+	}
+    }
+};
+subtest "CMS <= PKCS#7 compatibility tests\n" => sub {
+    plan tests => scalar @smime_pkcs7_tests;
+
+    foreach (@smime_pkcs7_tests) {
+      SKIP: {
+	  my $skip_reason = check_availability($$_[0]);
+	  skip $skip_reason, 1 if $skip_reason;
+
+	  ok(run(app(["openssl", "smime", @{$$_[1]}]))
+	     && run(app(["openssl", "cms", @{$$_[2]}]))
+	     && compare_text($smcont, "smtst.txt") == 0,
+	     $$_[0]);
+	}
+    }
+};
+
+subtest "CMS <=> CMS consistency tests\n" => sub {
+    plan tests => (scalar @smime_pkcs7_tests) + (scalar @smime_cms_tests);
+
+    foreach (@smime_pkcs7_tests) {
+      SKIP: {
+	  my $skip_reason = check_availability($$_[0]);
+	  skip $skip_reason, 1 if $skip_reason;
+
+	  ok(run(app(["openssl", "cms", @{$$_[1]}]))
+	     && run(app(["openssl", "cms", @{$$_[2]}]))
+	     && compare_text($smcont, "smtst.txt") == 0,
+	     $$_[0]);
+	}
+    }
+    foreach (@smime_cms_tests) {
+      SKIP: {
+	  my $skip_reason = check_availability($$_[0]);
+	  skip $skip_reason, 1 if $skip_reason;
+
+	  ok(run(app(["openssl", "cms", @{$$_[1]}]))
+	     && run(app(["openssl", "cms", @{$$_[2]}]))
+	     && compare_text($smcont, "smtst.txt") == 0,
+	     $$_[0]);
+	}
+    }
+};
+
+subtest "CMS <=> CMS consistency tests, modified key parameters\n" => sub {
+    plan tests =>
+	(scalar @smime_cms_param_tests) + (scalar @smime_cms_comp_tests);
+
+    foreach (@smime_cms_param_tests) {
+      SKIP: {
+	  my $skip_reason = check_availability($$_[0]);
+	  skip $skip_reason, 1 if $skip_reason;
+
+	  ok(run(app(["openssl", "cms", @{$$_[1]}]))
+	     && run(app(["openssl", "cms", @{$$_[2]}]))
+	     && compare_text($smcont, "smtst.txt") == 0,
+	     $$_[0]);
+	}
+    }
+
+  SKIP: {
+      skip("Zlib not supported: compression tests skipped",
+	   scalar @smime_cms_comp_tests)
+	  if $no_zlib;
+
+      foreach (@smime_cms_comp_tests) {
+	SKIP: {
+	    my $skip_reason = check_availability($$_[0]);
+	    skip $skip_reason, 1 if $skip_reason;
+
+	    ok(run(app(["openssl", "cms", @{$$_[1]}]))
+	       && run(app(["openssl", "cms", @{$$_[2]}]))
+	       && compare_text($smcont, "smtst.txt") == 0,
+	       $$_[0]);
+	  }
+      }
+    }
+};
+
+unlink "test.cms";
+unlink "test2.cms";
+unlink "smtst.txt";
+
+sub check_availability {
+    my $tnam = shift;
+
+    return "$tnam: skipped, EC disabled\n"
+        if ($no_ec && $tnam =~ /ECDH/);
+    return "$tnam: skipped, ECDH disabled\n"
+        if ($no_ec && $tnam =~ /ECDH/);
+    return "$tnam: skipped, EC2M disabled\n"
+        if ($no_ec2m && $tnam =~ /K-283/);
+    return "$tnam: skipped, DH disabled\n"
+        if ($no_dh && $tnam =~ /X9\.42/);
+    return "$tnam: skipped, RC2 disabled\n"
+        if ($no_rc2 && $tnam =~ /RC2/);
+    return "$tnam: skipped, DES disabled\n"
+        if ($no_des && $tnam =~ /DES/);
+    return "$tnam: skipped, DSA disabled\n"
+        if ($no_dsa && $tnam =~ / DSA/);
+
+    return "";
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/80-test_ct.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/80-test_ct.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9c717b2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/80-test_ct.t
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_file srctop_dir/;
+use OpenSSL::Test::Simple;
+
+setup("test_ct");
+$ENV{CTLOG_FILE} = srctop_file("test", "ct", "log_list.conf");
+$ENV{CT_DIR} = srctop_dir("test", "ct");
+$ENV{CERTS_DIR} = srctop_dir("test", "certs");
+simple_test("test_ct", "ct_test", "ct", "ec");
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/80-test_dane.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/80-test_dane.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..527e663
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/80-test_dane.t
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_file/;
+use OpenSSL::Test::Utils;
+
+setup("test_dane");
+
+plan skip_all => "test_dane uses ec which is not supported by this OpenSSL build"
+    if disabled("ec");
+
+plan tests => 1;                # The number of tests being performed
+
+ok(run(test(["danetest", "example.com",
+             srctop_file("test", "danetest.pem"),
+             srctop_file("test", "danetest.in")])), "dane tests");
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/80-test_dtls.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/80-test_dtls.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f4a2dc0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/80-test_dtls.t
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+use OpenSSL::Test::Utils;
+use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_file/;
+
+setup("test_dtls");
+
+plan skip_all => "No DTLS protocols are supported by this OpenSSL build"
+    if alldisabled(available_protocols("dtls"));
+
+plan tests => 1;
+
+ok(run(test(["dtlstest", srctop_file("apps", "server.pem"),
+             srctop_file("apps", "server.pem")])), "running dtlstest");
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/80-test_dtlsv1listen.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/80-test_dtlsv1listen.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dd1bb35
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/80-test_dtlsv1listen.t
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use OpenSSL::Test::Simple;
+
+simple_test("test_dtlsv1listen", "dtlsv1listentest", "dh");
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/80-test_ocsp.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/80-test_ocsp.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e9ed7b4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/80-test_ocsp.t
@@ -0,0 +1,219 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+
+use POSIX;
+use File::Spec::Functions qw/devnull catfile/;
+use File::Copy;
+use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT with pipe srctop_dir data_file/;
+use OpenSSL::Test::Utils;
+
+setup("test_ocsp");
+
+plan skip_all => "OCSP is not supported by this OpenSSL build"
+    if disabled("ocsp");
+
+my $ocspdir=srctop_dir("test", "ocsp-tests");
+# 17 December 2012 so we don't get certificate expiry errors.
+my @check_time=("-attime", "1355875200");
+
+sub test_ocsp {
+    my $title = shift;
+    my $inputfile = shift;
+    my $CAfile = shift;
+    my $untrusted = shift;
+    if ($untrusted eq "") {
+        $untrusted = $CAfile;
+    }
+    my $expected_exit = shift;
+
+    run(app(["openssl", "base64", "-d",
+             "-in", catfile($ocspdir,$inputfile),
+             "-out", "ocsp-resp-fff.dat"]));
+    with({ exit_checker => sub { return shift == $expected_exit; } },
+         sub { ok(run(app(["openssl", "ocsp", "-respin", "ocsp-resp-fff.dat",
+                           "-partial_chain", @check_time,
+                           "-CAfile", catfile($ocspdir, $CAfile),
+                           "-verify_other", catfile($ocspdir, $untrusted),
+                           "-no-CApath"])),
+                  $title); });
+    unlink "ocsp-resp-fff.dat";
+}
+
+plan tests => 11;
+
+subtest "=== VALID OCSP RESPONSES ===" => sub {
+    plan tests => 7;
+
+    test_ocsp("NON-DELEGATED; Intermediate CA -> EE",
+	      "ND1.ors", "ND1_Issuer_ICA.pem", "", 0);
+    test_ocsp("NON-DELEGATED; Root CA -> Intermediate CA",
+	      "ND2.ors", "ND2_Issuer_Root.pem", "", 0);
+    test_ocsp("NON-DELEGATED; Root CA -> EE",
+	      "ND3.ors", "ND3_Issuer_Root.pem", "", 0);
+    test_ocsp("NON-DELEGATED; 3-level CA hierarchy",
+	      "ND1.ors", "ND1_Cross_Root.pem", "ND1_Issuer_ICA-Cross.pem", 0);
+    test_ocsp("DELEGATED; Intermediate CA -> EE",
+	      "D1.ors", "D1_Issuer_ICA.pem", "", 0);
+    test_ocsp("DELEGATED; Root CA -> Intermediate CA",
+	      "D2.ors", "D2_Issuer_Root.pem", "", 0);
+    test_ocsp("DELEGATED; Root CA -> EE",
+	      "D3.ors", "D3_Issuer_Root.pem", "", 0);
+};
+
+subtest "=== INVALID SIGNATURE on the OCSP RESPONSE ===" => sub {
+    plan tests => 6;
+
+    test_ocsp("NON-DELEGATED; Intermediate CA -> EE",
+	      "ISOP_ND1.ors", "ND1_Issuer_ICA.pem", "", 1);
+    test_ocsp("NON-DELEGATED; Root CA -> Intermediate CA",
+	      "ISOP_ND2.ors", "ND2_Issuer_Root.pem", "", 1);
+    test_ocsp("NON-DELEGATED; Root CA -> EE",
+	      "ISOP_ND3.ors", "ND3_Issuer_Root.pem", "", 1);
+    test_ocsp("DELEGATED; Intermediate CA -> EE",
+	      "ISOP_D1.ors", "D1_Issuer_ICA.pem", "", 1);
+    test_ocsp("DELEGATED; Root CA -> Intermediate CA",
+	      "ISOP_D2.ors", "D2_Issuer_Root.pem", "", 1);
+    test_ocsp("DELEGATED; Root CA -> EE",
+	      "ISOP_D3.ors", "D3_Issuer_Root.pem", "", 1);
+};
+
+subtest "=== WRONG RESPONDERID in the OCSP RESPONSE ===" => sub {
+    plan tests => 6;
+
+    test_ocsp("NON-DELEGATED; Intermediate CA -> EE",
+	      "WRID_ND1.ors", "ND1_Issuer_ICA.pem", "", 1);
+    test_ocsp("NON-DELEGATED; Root CA -> Intermediate CA",
+	      "WRID_ND2.ors", "ND2_Issuer_Root.pem", "", 1);
+    test_ocsp("NON-DELEGATED; Root CA -> EE",
+	      "WRID_ND3.ors", "ND3_Issuer_Root.pem", "", 1);
+    test_ocsp("DELEGATED; Intermediate CA -> EE",
+	      "WRID_D1.ors", "D1_Issuer_ICA.pem", "", 1);
+    test_ocsp("DELEGATED; Root CA -> Intermediate CA",
+	      "WRID_D2.ors", "D2_Issuer_Root.pem", "", 1);
+    test_ocsp("DELEGATED; Root CA -> EE",
+	      "WRID_D3.ors", "D3_Issuer_Root.pem", "", 1);
+};
+
+subtest "=== WRONG ISSUERNAMEHASH in the OCSP RESPONSE ===" => sub {
+    plan tests => 6;
+
+    test_ocsp("NON-DELEGATED; Intermediate CA -> EE",
+	      "WINH_ND1.ors", "ND1_Issuer_ICA.pem", "", 1);
+    test_ocsp("NON-DELEGATED; Root CA -> Intermediate CA",
+	      "WINH_ND2.ors", "ND2_Issuer_Root.pem", "", 1);
+    test_ocsp("NON-DELEGATED; Root CA -> EE",
+	      "WINH_ND3.ors", "ND3_Issuer_Root.pem", "", 1);
+    test_ocsp("DELEGATED; Intermediate CA -> EE",
+	      "WINH_D1.ors", "D1_Issuer_ICA.pem", "", 1);
+    test_ocsp("DELEGATED; Root CA -> Intermediate CA",
+	      "WINH_D2.ors", "D2_Issuer_Root.pem", "", 1);
+    test_ocsp("DELEGATED; Root CA -> EE",
+	      "WINH_D3.ors", "D3_Issuer_Root.pem", "", 1);
+};
+
+subtest "=== WRONG ISSUERKEYHASH in the OCSP RESPONSE ===" => sub {
+    plan tests => 6;
+
+    test_ocsp("NON-DELEGATED; Intermediate CA -> EE",
+	      "WIKH_ND1.ors", "ND1_Issuer_ICA.pem", "", 1);
+    test_ocsp("NON-DELEGATED; Root CA -> Intermediate CA",
+	      "WIKH_ND2.ors", "ND2_Issuer_Root.pem", "", 1);
+    test_ocsp("NON-DELEGATED; Root CA -> EE",
+	      "WIKH_ND3.ors", "ND3_Issuer_Root.pem", "", 1);
+    test_ocsp("DELEGATED; Intermediate CA -> EE",
+	      "WIKH_D1.ors", "D1_Issuer_ICA.pem", "", 1);
+    test_ocsp("DELEGATED; Root CA -> Intermediate CA",
+	      "WIKH_D2.ors", "D2_Issuer_Root.pem", "", 1);
+    test_ocsp("DELEGATED; Root CA -> EE",
+	      "WIKH_D3.ors", "D3_Issuer_Root.pem", "", 1);
+};
+
+subtest "=== WRONG KEY in the DELEGATED OCSP SIGNING CERTIFICATE ===" => sub {
+    plan tests => 3;
+
+    test_ocsp("DELEGATED; Intermediate CA -> EE",
+	      "WKDOSC_D1.ors", "D1_Issuer_ICA.pem", "", 1);
+    test_ocsp("DELEGATED; Root CA -> Intermediate CA",
+	      "WKDOSC_D2.ors", "D2_Issuer_Root.pem", "", 1);
+    test_ocsp("DELEGATED; Root CA -> EE",
+	      "WKDOSC_D3.ors", "D3_Issuer_Root.pem", "", 1);
+};
+
+subtest "=== INVALID SIGNATURE on the DELEGATED OCSP SIGNING CERTIFICATE ===" => sub {
+    plan tests => 3;
+
+    test_ocsp("DELEGATED; Intermediate CA -> EE",
+	      "ISDOSC_D1.ors", "D1_Issuer_ICA.pem", "", 1);
+    test_ocsp("DELEGATED; Root CA -> Intermediate CA",
+	      "ISDOSC_D2.ors", "D2_Issuer_Root.pem", "", 1);
+    test_ocsp("DELEGATED; Root CA -> EE",
+	      "ISDOSC_D3.ors", "D3_Issuer_Root.pem", "", 1);
+};
+
+subtest "=== WRONG SUBJECT NAME in the ISSUER CERTIFICATE ===" => sub {
+    plan tests => 6;
+
+    test_ocsp("NON-DELEGATED; Intermediate CA -> EE",
+	      "ND1.ors", "WSNIC_ND1_Issuer_ICA.pem", "", 1);
+    test_ocsp("NON-DELEGATED; Root CA -> Intermediate CA",
+	      "ND2.ors", "WSNIC_ND2_Issuer_Root.pem", "", 1);
+    test_ocsp("NON-DELEGATED; Root CA -> EE",
+	      "ND3.ors", "WSNIC_ND3_Issuer_Root.pem", "", 1);
+    test_ocsp("DELEGATED; Intermediate CA -> EE",
+	      "D1.ors", "WSNIC_D1_Issuer_ICA.pem", "", 1);
+    test_ocsp("DELEGATED; Root CA -> Intermediate CA",
+	      "D2.ors", "WSNIC_D2_Issuer_Root.pem", "", 1);
+    test_ocsp("DELEGATED; Root CA -> EE",
+	      "D3.ors", "WSNIC_D3_Issuer_Root.pem", "", 1);
+};
+
+subtest "=== WRONG KEY in the ISSUER CERTIFICATE ===" => sub {
+    plan tests => 6;
+
+    test_ocsp("NON-DELEGATED; Intermediate CA -> EE",
+	      "ND1.ors", "WKIC_ND1_Issuer_ICA.pem", "", 1);
+    test_ocsp("NON-DELEGATED; Root CA -> Intermediate CA",
+	      "ND2.ors", "WKIC_ND2_Issuer_Root.pem", "", 1);
+    test_ocsp("NON-DELEGATED; Root CA -> EE",
+	      "ND3.ors", "WKIC_ND3_Issuer_Root.pem", "", 1);
+    test_ocsp("DELEGATED; Intermediate CA -> EE",
+	      "D1.ors", "WKIC_D1_Issuer_ICA.pem", "", 1);
+    test_ocsp("DELEGATED; Root CA -> Intermediate CA",
+	      "D2.ors", "WKIC_D2_Issuer_Root.pem", "", 1);
+    test_ocsp("DELEGATED; Root CA -> EE",
+	      "D3.ors", "WKIC_D3_Issuer_Root.pem", "", 1);
+};
+
+subtest "=== INVALID SIGNATURE on the ISSUER CERTIFICATE ===" => sub {
+    plan tests => 6;
+
+    # Expect success, because we're explicitly trusting the issuer certificate.
+    test_ocsp("NON-DELEGATED; Intermediate CA -> EE",
+	      "ND1.ors", "ISIC_ND1_Issuer_ICA.pem", "", 0);
+    test_ocsp("NON-DELEGATED; Root CA -> Intermediate CA",
+	      "ND2.ors", "ISIC_ND2_Issuer_Root.pem", "", 0);
+    test_ocsp("NON-DELEGATED; Root CA -> EE",
+	      "ND3.ors", "ISIC_ND3_Issuer_Root.pem", "", 0);
+    test_ocsp("DELEGATED; Intermediate CA -> EE",
+	      "D1.ors", "ISIC_D1_Issuer_ICA.pem", "", 0);
+    test_ocsp("DELEGATED; Root CA -> Intermediate CA",
+	      "D2.ors", "ISIC_D2_Issuer_Root.pem", "", 0);
+    test_ocsp("DELEGATED; Root CA -> EE",
+	      "D3.ors", "ISIC_D3_Issuer_Root.pem", "", 0);
+};
+
+subtest "=== OCSP API TESTS===" => sub {
+    plan tests => 1;
+
+    ok(run(test(["ocspapitest", data_file("cert.pem"), data_file("key.pem")])),
+                 "running ocspapitest");
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/80-test_ocsp_data/cert.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/80-test_ocsp_data/cert.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f70e792
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/80-test_ocsp_data/cert.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/80-test_ocsp_data/key.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/80-test_ocsp_data/key.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cd211dc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/80-test_ocsp_data/key.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/80-test_pkcs12.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/80-test_pkcs12.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..430df67
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/80-test_pkcs12.t
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+
+use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_file/;
+use OpenSSL::Test::Utils;
+
+use Encode;
+
+setup("test_pkcs12");
+
+plan skip_all => "The PKCS12 command line utility is not supported by this OpenSSL build"
+    if disabled("des");
+
+my $pass = "σ�νθημα γνώ�ισμα";
+
+my $savedcp;
+if (eval { require Win32::API; 1; }) {
+    # Trouble is that Win32 perl uses CreateProcessA, which
+    # makes it problematic to pass non-ASCII arguments, from perl[!]
+    # that is. This is because CreateProcessA is just a wrapper for
+    # CreateProcessW and will call MultiByteToWideChar and use
+    # system default locale. Since we attempt Greek pass-phrase
+    # conversion can be done only with Greek locale.
+
+    Win32::API->Import("kernel32","UINT GetSystemDefaultLCID()");
+    if (GetSystemDefaultLCID() != 0x408) {
+        plan skip_all => "Non-Greek system locale";
+    } else {
+        # Ensure correct code page so that VERBOSE output is right.
+        Win32::API->Import("kernel32","UINT GetConsoleOutputCP()");
+        Win32::API->Import("kernel32","BOOL SetConsoleOutputCP(UINT cp)");
+        $savedcp = GetConsoleOutputCP();
+        SetConsoleOutputCP(1253);
+        $pass = Encode::encode("cp1253",Encode::decode("utf-8",$pass));
+    }
+} elsif ($^O eq "MSWin32") {
+    plan skip_all => "Win32::API unavailable";
+} else {
+    # Running MinGW tests transparently under Wine apparently requires
+    # UTF-8 locale...
+
+    foreach(`locale -a`) {
+        s/\R$//;
+        if ($_ =~ m/^C\.UTF\-?8/i) {
+            $ENV{LC_ALL} = $_;
+            last;
+        }
+    }
+}
+$ENV{OPENSSL_WIN32_UTF8}=1;
+
+plan tests => 1;
+
+# just see that we can read shibboleth.pfx protected with $pass
+ok(run(app(["openssl", "pkcs12", "-noout",
+            "-password", "pass:$pass",
+            "-in", srctop_file("test", "shibboleth.pfx")])),
+   "test_pkcs12");
+
+SetConsoleOutputCP($savedcp) if (defined($savedcp));
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_new.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_new.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..287defe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_new.t
@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+
+use File::Basename;
+use File::Compare qw/compare_text/;
+use OpenSSL::Glob;
+use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_dir srctop_file/;
+use OpenSSL::Test::Utils qw/disabled alldisabled available_protocols/;
+
+setup("test_ssl_new");
+
+$ENV{TEST_CERTS_DIR} = srctop_dir("test", "certs");
+$ENV{CTLOG_FILE} = srctop_file("test", "ct", "log_list.conf");
+
+my @conf_srcs =  glob(srctop_file("test", "ssl-tests", "*.conf.in"));
+map { s/;.*// } @conf_srcs if $^O eq "VMS";
+my @conf_files = map { basename($_, ".in") } @conf_srcs;
+map { s/\^// } @conf_files if $^O eq "VMS";
+
+# We hard-code the number of tests to double-check that the globbing above
+# finds all files as expected.
+plan tests => 19;  # = scalar @conf_srcs
+
+# Some test results depend on the configuration of enabled protocols. We only
+# verify generated sources in the default configuration.
+my $is_default_tls = (disabled("ssl3") && !disabled("tls1") &&
+                      !disabled("tls1_1") && !disabled("tls1_2"));
+
+my $is_default_dtls = (!disabled("dtls1") && !disabled("dtls1_2"));
+
+my $no_tls = alldisabled(available_protocols("tls"));
+my $no_dtls = alldisabled(available_protocols("dtls"));
+my $no_npn = disabled("nextprotoneg");
+my $no_ct = disabled("ct");
+my $no_ec = disabled("ec");
+my $no_ec2m = disabled("ec2m");
+my $no_ocsp = disabled("ocsp");
+
+# Add your test here if the test conf.in generates test cases and/or
+# expectations dynamically based on the OpenSSL compile-time config.
+my %conf_dependent_tests = (
+  "02-protocol-version.conf" => !$is_default_tls,
+  "04-client_auth.conf" => !$is_default_tls,
+  "07-dtls-protocol-version.conf" => !$is_default_dtls,
+  "10-resumption.conf" => !$is_default_tls,
+  "11-dtls_resumption.conf" => !$is_default_dtls,
+  "17-renegotiate.conf" => disabled("tls1_2"),
+  "18-dtls-renegotiate.conf" => disabled("dtls1_2"),
+);
+
+# Add your test here if it should be skipped for some compile-time
+# configurations. Default is $no_tls but some tests have different skip
+# conditions.
+my %skip = (
+  "07-dtls-protocol-version.conf" => $no_dtls,
+  "08-npn.conf" => $no_tls || $no_npn,
+  "10-resumption.conf" => disabled("tls1_1") || disabled("tls1_2"),
+  "11-dtls_resumption.conf" => disabled("dtls1") || disabled("dtls1_2"),
+  "12-ct.conf" => $no_tls || $no_ct || $no_ec,
+  # We could run some of these tests without TLS 1.2 if we had a per-test
+  # disable instruction but that's a bizarre configuration not worth
+  # special-casing for.
+  # We should review this once we have TLS 1.3.
+  "13-fragmentation.conf" => disabled("tls1_2"),
+  "14-curves.conf" => disabled("tls1_2") || $no_ec || $no_ec2m,
+  "15-certstatus.conf" => $no_tls || $no_ocsp,
+  "16-dtls-certstatus.conf" => $no_dtls || $no_ocsp,
+  "18-dtls-renegotiate.conf" => $no_dtls,
+  "19-mac-then-encrypt.conf" => disabled("tls1_2"),
+);
+
+foreach my $conf (@conf_files) {
+    subtest "Test configuration $conf" => sub {
+        test_conf($conf,
+                  $conf_dependent_tests{$conf} || $^O eq "VMS" ?  0 : 1,
+                  defined($skip{$conf}) ? $skip{$conf} : $no_tls);
+    }
+}
+
+sub test_conf {
+    plan tests => 3;
+
+    my ($conf, $check_source, $skip) = @_;
+
+    my $conf_file = srctop_file("test", "ssl-tests", $conf);
+    my $tmp_file = "${conf}.$$.tmp";
+    my $run_test = 1;
+
+  SKIP: {
+      # "Test" 1. Generate the source.
+      my $input_file = $conf_file . ".in";
+
+      skip 'failure', 2 unless
+        ok(run(perltest(["generate_ssl_tests.pl", $input_file],
+                        interpreter_args => [ "-I", srctop_dir("util", "perl")],
+                        stdout => $tmp_file)),
+           "Getting output from generate_ssl_tests.pl.");
+
+    SKIP: {
+        # Test 2. Compare against existing output in test/ssl_tests.conf.
+        skip "Skipping generated source test for $conf", 1
+          if !$check_source;
+
+        $run_test = is(cmp_text($tmp_file, $conf_file), 0,
+                       "Comparing generated sources.");
+      }
+
+      # Test 3. Run the test.
+      skip "No tests available; skipping tests", 1 if $skip;
+      skip "Stale sources; skipping tests", 1 if !$run_test;
+
+      ok(run(test(["ssl_test", $tmp_file])), "running ssl_test $conf");
+    }
+
+    unlink glob $tmp_file;
+}
+
+sub cmp_text {
+    return compare_text(@_, sub {
+        $_[0] =~ s/\R//g;
+        $_[1] =~ s/\R//g;
+        return $_[0] ne $_[1];
+    });
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6468bd6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t
@@ -0,0 +1,629 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+
+use POSIX;
+use File::Basename;
+use File::Copy;
+use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT with bldtop_file srctop_file cmdstr/;
+use OpenSSL::Test::Utils;
+
+setup("test_ssl");
+
+$ENV{CTLOG_FILE} = srctop_file("test", "ct", "log_list.conf");
+
+my ($no_rsa, $no_dsa, $no_dh, $no_ec, $no_srp, $no_psk,
+    $no_ssl3, $no_tls1, $no_tls1_1, $no_tls1_2,
+    $no_dtls, $no_dtls1, $no_dtls1_2, $no_ct) =
+    anydisabled qw/rsa dsa dh ec srp psk
+                   ssl3 tls1 tls1_1 tls1_2
+                   dtls dtls1 dtls1_2 ct/;
+my $no_anytls = alldisabled(available_protocols("tls"));
+my $no_anydtls = alldisabled(available_protocols("dtls"));
+
+plan skip_all => "No SSL/TLS/DTLS protocol is support by this OpenSSL build"
+    if $no_anytls && $no_anydtls;
+
+my $digest = "-sha1";
+my @reqcmd = ("openssl", "req");
+my @x509cmd = ("openssl", "x509", $digest);
+my @verifycmd = ("openssl", "verify");
+my @gendsacmd = ("openssl", "gendsa");
+my $dummycnf = srctop_file("apps", "openssl.cnf");
+
+my $CAkey = "keyCA.ss";
+my $CAcert="certCA.ss";
+my $CAserial="certCA.srl";
+my $CAreq="reqCA.ss";
+my $CAconf=srctop_file("test","CAss.cnf");
+my $CAreq2="req2CA.ss";	# temp
+
+my $Uconf=srctop_file("test","Uss.cnf");
+my $Ukey="keyU.ss";
+my $Ureq="reqU.ss";
+my $Ucert="certU.ss";
+
+my $Dkey="keyD.ss";
+my $Dreq="reqD.ss";
+my $Dcert="certD.ss";
+
+my $Ekey="keyE.ss";
+my $Ereq="reqE.ss";
+my $Ecert="certE.ss";
+
+my $P1conf=srctop_file("test","P1ss.cnf");
+my $P1key="keyP1.ss";
+my $P1req="reqP1.ss";
+my $P1cert="certP1.ss";
+my $P1intermediate="tmp_intP1.ss";
+
+my $P2conf=srctop_file("test","P2ss.cnf");
+my $P2key="keyP2.ss";
+my $P2req="reqP2.ss";
+my $P2cert="certP2.ss";
+my $P2intermediate="tmp_intP2.ss";
+
+my $server_sess="server.ss";
+my $client_sess="client.ss";
+
+# ssltest_old.c is deprecated in favour of the new framework in ssl_test.c
+# If you're adding tests here, you probably want to convert them to the
+# new format in ssl_test.c and add recipes to 80-test_ssl_new.t instead.
+plan tests =>
+    1				# For testss
+    +6  			# For the first testssl
+    ;
+
+subtest 'test_ss' => sub {
+    if (testss()) {
+	open OUT, ">", "intP1.ss";
+	copy($CAcert, \*OUT); copy($Ucert, \*OUT);
+	close OUT;
+
+	open OUT, ">", "intP2.ss";
+	copy($CAcert, \*OUT); copy($Ucert, \*OUT); copy($P1cert, \*OUT);
+	close OUT;
+    }
+};
+
+note('test_ssl -- key U');
+testssl("keyU.ss", $Ucert, $CAcert);
+
+# -----------
+# subtest functions
+sub testss {
+    open RND, ">>", ".rnd";
+    print RND "string to make the random number generator think it has entropy";
+    close RND;
+
+    my @req_dsa = ("-newkey",
+                   "dsa:".srctop_file("apps", "dsa1024.pem"));
+    my $dsaparams = srctop_file("apps", "dsa1024.pem");
+    my @req_new;
+    if ($no_rsa) {
+	@req_new = @req_dsa;
+    } else {
+	@req_new = ("-new");
+    }
+
+    plan tests => 17;
+
+  SKIP: {
+      skip 'failure', 16 unless
+	  ok(run(app([@reqcmd, "-config", $CAconf,
+		      "-out", $CAreq, "-keyout", $CAkey,
+		      @req_new])),
+	     'make cert request');
+
+      skip 'failure', 15 unless
+	  ok(run(app([@x509cmd, "-CAcreateserial", "-in", $CAreq, "-days", "30",
+		      "-req", "-out", $CAcert, "-signkey", $CAkey,
+		      "-extfile", $CAconf, "-extensions", "v3_ca"],
+		     stdout => "err.ss")),
+	     'convert request into self-signed cert');
+
+      skip 'failure', 14 unless
+	  ok(run(app([@x509cmd, "-in", $CAcert,
+		      "-x509toreq", "-signkey", $CAkey, "-out", $CAreq2],
+		     stdout => "err.ss")),
+	     'convert cert into a cert request');
+
+      skip 'failure', 13 unless
+	  ok(run(app([@reqcmd, "-config", $dummycnf,
+		      "-verify", "-in", $CAreq, "-noout"])),
+	     'verify request 1');
+
+
+      skip 'failure', 12 unless
+	  ok(run(app([@reqcmd, "-config", $dummycnf,
+		      "-verify", "-in", $CAreq2, "-noout"])),
+	     'verify request 2');
+
+      skip 'failure', 11 unless
+	  ok(run(app([@verifycmd, "-CAfile", $CAcert, $CAcert])),
+	     'verify signature');
+
+      skip 'failure', 10 unless
+	  ok(run(app([@reqcmd, "-config", $Uconf,
+		      "-out", $Ureq, "-keyout", $Ukey, @req_new],
+		     stdout => "err.ss")),
+	     'make a user cert request');
+
+      skip 'failure', 9 unless
+	  ok(run(app([@x509cmd, "-CAcreateserial", "-in", $Ureq, "-days", "30",
+		      "-req", "-out", $Ucert,
+		      "-CA", $CAcert, "-CAkey", $CAkey, "-CAserial", $CAserial,
+		      "-extfile", $Uconf, "-extensions", "v3_ee"],
+		     stdout => "err.ss"))
+	     && run(app([@verifycmd, "-CAfile", $CAcert, $Ucert])),
+	     'sign user cert request');
+
+      skip 'failure', 8 unless
+	  ok(run(app([@x509cmd,
+		      "-subject", "-issuer", "-startdate", "-enddate",
+		      "-noout", "-in", $Ucert])),
+	     'Certificate details');
+
+      skip 'failure', 7 unless
+          subtest 'DSA certificate creation' => sub {
+              plan skip_all => "skipping DSA certificate creation"
+                  if $no_dsa;
+
+              plan tests => 5;
+
+            SKIP: {
+                $ENV{CN2} = "DSA Certificate";
+                skip 'failure', 4 unless
+                    ok(run(app([@gendsacmd, "-out", $Dkey,
+                                $dsaparams],
+                               stdout => "err.ss")),
+                       "make a DSA key");
+                skip 'failure', 3 unless
+                    ok(run(app([@reqcmd, "-new", "-config", $Uconf,
+                                "-out", $Dreq, "-key", $Dkey],
+                               stdout => "err.ss")),
+                       "make a DSA user cert request");
+                skip 'failure', 2 unless
+                    ok(run(app([@x509cmd, "-CAcreateserial",
+                                "-in", $Dreq,
+                                "-days", "30",
+                                "-req",
+                                "-out", $Dcert,
+                                "-CA", $CAcert, "-CAkey", $CAkey,
+                                "-CAserial", $CAserial,
+                                "-extfile", $Uconf,
+                                "-extensions", "v3_ee_dsa"],
+                               stdout => "err.ss")),
+                       "sign DSA user cert request");
+                skip 'failure', 1 unless
+                    ok(run(app([@verifycmd, "-CAfile", $CAcert, $Dcert])),
+                       "verify DSA user cert");
+                skip 'failure', 0 unless
+                    ok(run(app([@x509cmd,
+                                "-subject", "-issuer",
+                                "-startdate", "-enddate", "-noout",
+                                "-in", $Dcert])),
+                       "DSA Certificate details");
+              }
+      };
+
+      skip 'failure', 6 unless
+          subtest 'ECDSA/ECDH certificate creation' => sub {
+              plan skip_all => "skipping ECDSA/ECDH certificate creation"
+                  if $no_ec;
+
+              plan tests => 5;
+
+            SKIP: {
+                $ENV{CN2} = "ECDSA Certificate";
+                skip 'failure', 4 unless
+                    ok(run(app(["openssl", "ecparam", "-name", "P-256",
+                                "-out", "ecp.ss"])),
+                       "make EC parameters");
+                skip 'failure', 3 unless
+                    ok(run(app([@reqcmd, "-config", $Uconf,
+                                "-out", $Ereq, "-keyout", $Ekey,
+                                "-newkey", "ec:ecp.ss"],
+                               stdout => "err.ss")),
+                       "make a ECDSA/ECDH user cert request");
+                skip 'failure', 2 unless
+                    ok(run(app([@x509cmd, "-CAcreateserial",
+                                "-in", $Ereq,
+                                "-days", "30",
+                                "-req",
+                                "-out", $Ecert,
+                                "-CA", $CAcert, "-CAkey", $CAkey,
+                                "-CAserial", $CAserial,
+                                "-extfile", $Uconf,
+                                "-extensions", "v3_ee_ec"],
+                               stdout => "err.ss")),
+                       "sign ECDSA/ECDH user cert request");
+                skip 'failure', 1 unless
+                    ok(run(app([@verifycmd, "-CAfile", $CAcert, $Ecert])),
+                       "verify ECDSA/ECDH user cert");
+                skip 'failure', 0 unless
+                    ok(run(app([@x509cmd,
+                                "-subject", "-issuer",
+                                "-startdate", "-enddate", "-noout",
+                                "-in", $Ecert])),
+                       "ECDSA Certificate details");
+              }
+      };
+
+      skip 'failure', 5 unless
+	  ok(run(app([@reqcmd, "-config", $P1conf,
+		      "-out", $P1req, "-keyout", $P1key, @req_new],
+		     stdout => "err.ss")),
+	     'make a proxy cert request');
+
+
+      skip 'failure', 4 unless
+	  ok(run(app([@x509cmd, "-CAcreateserial", "-in", $P1req, "-days", "30",
+		      "-req", "-out", $P1cert,
+		      "-CA", $Ucert, "-CAkey", $Ukey,
+		      "-extfile", $P1conf, "-extensions", "v3_proxy"],
+		     stdout => "err.ss")),
+	     'sign proxy with user cert');
+
+      copy($Ucert, $P1intermediate);
+      run(app([@verifycmd, "-CAfile", $CAcert,
+	       "-untrusted", $P1intermediate, $P1cert]));
+      ok(run(app([@x509cmd,
+		  "-subject", "-issuer", "-startdate", "-enddate",
+		  "-noout", "-in", $P1cert])),
+	 'Certificate details');
+
+      skip 'failure', 2 unless
+	  ok(run(app([@reqcmd, "-config", $P2conf,
+		      "-out", $P2req, "-keyout", $P2key,
+		      @req_new],
+		     stdout => "err.ss")),
+	     'make another proxy cert request');
+
+
+      skip 'failure', 1 unless
+	  ok(run(app([@x509cmd, "-CAcreateserial", "-in", $P2req, "-days", "30",
+		      "-req", "-out", $P2cert,
+		      "-CA", $P1cert, "-CAkey", $P1key,
+		      "-extfile", $P2conf, "-extensions", "v3_proxy"],
+		     stdout => "err.ss")),
+	     'sign second proxy cert request with the first proxy cert');
+
+
+      open OUT, ">", $P2intermediate;
+      copy($Ucert, \*OUT); copy($P1cert, \*OUT);
+      close OUT;
+      run(app([@verifycmd, "-CAfile", $CAcert,
+	       "-untrusted", $P2intermediate, $P2cert]));
+      ok(run(app([@x509cmd,
+		  "-subject", "-issuer", "-startdate", "-enddate",
+		  "-noout", "-in", $P2cert])),
+	 'Certificate details');
+    }
+}
+
+sub testssl {
+    my ($key, $cert, $CAtmp) = @_;
+    my @CA = $CAtmp ? ("-CAfile", $CAtmp) : ("-CApath", bldtop_dir("certs"));
+
+    my @ssltest = ("ssltest_old",
+		   "-s_key", $key, "-s_cert", $cert,
+		   "-c_key", $key, "-c_cert", $cert);
+
+    my $serverinfo = srctop_file("test","serverinfo.pem");
+
+    my $dsa_cert = 0;
+    if (grep /DSA Public Key/, run(app(["openssl", "x509", "-in", $cert,
+					"-text", "-noout"]), capture => 1)) {
+	$dsa_cert = 1;
+    }
+
+
+    # plan tests => 11;
+
+    subtest 'standard SSL tests' => sub {
+	######################################################################
+      plan tests => 21;
+
+      SKIP: {
+	  skip "SSLv3 is not supported by this OpenSSL build", 4
+	      if disabled("ssl3");
+
+	  ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-bio_pair", "-ssl3"])),
+	     'test sslv3 via BIO pair');
+	  ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-bio_pair", "-ssl3", "-server_auth", @CA])),
+	     'test sslv3 with server authentication via BIO pair');
+	  ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-bio_pair", "-ssl3", "-client_auth", @CA])),
+	     'test sslv3 with client authentication via BIO pair');
+	  ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-bio_pair", "-ssl3", "-server_auth", "-client_auth", @CA])),
+	     'test sslv3 with both server and client authentication via BIO pair');
+	}
+
+      SKIP: {
+	  skip "Neither SSLv3 nor any TLS version are supported by this OpenSSL build", 1
+	      if $no_anytls;
+
+	  ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-bio_pair"])),
+	     'test sslv2/sslv3 via BIO pair');
+	}
+
+      SKIP: {
+	  skip "DTLSv1 is not supported by this OpenSSL build", 4
+	      if disabled("dtls1");
+
+	  ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-dtls1"])),
+	     'test dtlsv1');
+	  ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-dtls1", "-server_auth", @CA])),
+	   'test dtlsv1 with server authentication');
+	  ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-dtls1", "-client_auth", @CA])),
+	     'test dtlsv1 with client authentication');
+	  ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-dtls1", "-server_auth", "-client_auth", @CA])),
+	     'test dtlsv1 with both server and client authentication');
+	}
+
+      SKIP: {
+	  skip "DTLSv1.2 is not supported by this OpenSSL build", 4
+	      if disabled("dtls1_2");
+
+	  ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-dtls12"])),
+	     'test dtlsv1.2');
+	  ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-dtls12", "-server_auth", @CA])),
+	     'test dtlsv1.2 with server authentication');
+	  ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-dtls12", "-client_auth", @CA])),
+	     'test dtlsv1.2 with client authentication');
+	  ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-dtls12", "-server_auth", "-client_auth", @CA])),
+	     'test dtlsv1.2 with both server and client authentication');
+	}
+
+      SKIP: {
+	  skip "Neither SSLv3 nor any TLS version are supported by this OpenSSL build", 8
+	      if $no_anytls;
+
+	SKIP: {
+	    skip "skipping test of sslv2/sslv3 w/o (EC)DHE test", 1 if $dsa_cert;
+
+	    ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-bio_pair", "-no_dhe", "-no_ecdhe"])),
+	       'test sslv2/sslv3 w/o (EC)DHE via BIO pair');
+	  }
+
+	  ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-bio_pair", "-dhe1024dsa", "-v"])),
+	     'test sslv2/sslv3 with 1024bit DHE via BIO pair');
+	  ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-bio_pair", "-server_auth", @CA])),
+	     'test sslv2/sslv3 with server authentication');
+	  ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-bio_pair", "-client_auth", @CA])),
+	     'test sslv2/sslv3 with client authentication via BIO pair');
+	  ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-bio_pair", "-server_auth", "-client_auth", @CA])),
+	     'test sslv2/sslv3 with both client and server authentication via BIO pair');
+	  ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-bio_pair", "-server_auth", "-client_auth", "-app_verify", @CA])),
+	     'test sslv2/sslv3 with both client and server authentication via BIO pair and app verify');
+
+        SKIP: {
+            skip "No IPv4 available on this machine", 1
+                unless !disabled("sock") && have_IPv4();
+            ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-ipv4"])),
+               'test TLS via IPv4');
+          }
+
+        SKIP: {
+            skip "No IPv6 available on this machine", 1
+                unless !disabled("sock") && have_IPv6();
+            ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-ipv6"])),
+               'test TLS via IPv6');
+          }
+        }
+    };
+
+    subtest "Testing ciphersuites" => sub {
+
+        my @exkeys = ();
+        my $ciphers = "-PSK:-SRP";
+
+        if ($no_dh) {
+            note "skipping DHE tests\n";
+            $ciphers .= ":-kDHE";
+        }
+        if ($no_dsa) {
+            note "skipping DSA tests\n";
+            $ciphers .= ":-aDSA";
+        } else {
+            push @exkeys, "-s_cert", "certD.ss", "-s_key", "keyD.ss";
+        }
+
+        if ($no_ec) {
+            note "skipping EC tests\n";
+            $ciphers .= ":!aECDSA:!kECDH";
+        } else {
+            push @exkeys, "-s_cert", "certE.ss", "-s_key", "keyE.ss";
+        }
+
+	my @protocols = ();
+	# We only use the flags that ssltest_old understands
+	push @protocols, "-tls1_2" unless $no_tls1_2;
+	push @protocols, "-tls1" unless $no_tls1;
+	push @protocols, "-ssl3" unless $no_ssl3;
+	my $protocolciphersuitecount = 0;
+	my %ciphersuites = ();
+	foreach my $protocol (@protocols) {
+	    $ciphersuites{$protocol} =
+		[ map { s|\R||; split(/:/, $_) }
+		  run(app(["openssl", "ciphers", "-s", $protocol,
+			   "ALL:$ciphers"]), capture => 1) ];
+	    $protocolciphersuitecount += scalar @{$ciphersuites{$protocol}};
+	}
+
+        plan skip_all => "None of the ciphersuites to test are available in this OpenSSL build"
+            if $protocolciphersuitecount + scalar(keys %ciphersuites) == 0;
+
+        # The count of protocols is because in addition to the ciphersuits
+        # we got above, we're running a weak DH test for each protocol
+	plan tests => $protocolciphersuitecount + scalar(keys %ciphersuites);
+
+	foreach my $protocol (sort keys %ciphersuites) {
+	    note "Testing ciphersuites for $protocol";
+	    # ssltest_old doesn't know -tls1_2, but that's fine, since that's
+	    # the default choice if TLSv1.2 enabled
+	    my $flag = $protocol eq "-tls1_2" ? "" : $protocol;
+	    foreach my $cipher (@{$ciphersuites{$protocol}}) {
+                if ($protocol eq "-ssl3" && $cipher =~ /ECDH/ ) {
+                    note "*****SKIPPING $protocol $cipher";
+                    ok(1);
+                } else {
+                    ok(run(test([@ssltest, @exkeys, "-cipher", $cipher,
+                                 $flag || ()])),
+                       "Testing $cipher");
+               }
+	    }
+            is(run(test([@ssltest,
+                         "-s_cipher", "EDH",
+                         "-c_cipher", 'EDH:@SECLEVEL=1',
+                         "-dhe512",
+                         $protocol eq "SSLv3" ? ("-ssl3") : ()])), 0,
+               "testing connection with weak DH, expecting failure");
+	}
+    };
+
+    subtest 'RSA/(EC)DHE/PSK tests' => sub {
+	######################################################################
+
+	plan tests => 5;
+
+      SKIP: {
+	  skip "TLSv1.0 is not supported by this OpenSSL build", 5
+	      if $no_tls1;
+
+	SKIP: {
+	    skip "skipping anonymous DH tests", 1
+	      if ($no_dh);
+
+	    ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-v", "-bio_pair", "-tls1", "-cipher", "ADH", "-dhe1024dsa", "-num", "10", "-f", "-time"])),
+	       'test tlsv1 with 1024bit anonymous DH, multiple handshakes');
+	  }
+
+	SKIP: {
+	    skip "skipping RSA tests", 2
+		if $no_rsa;
+
+	    ok(run(test(["ssltest_old", "-v", "-bio_pair", "-tls1", "-s_cert", srctop_file("apps","server2.pem"), "-no_dhe", "-no_ecdhe", "-num", "10", "-f", "-time"])),
+	       'test tlsv1 with 1024bit RSA, no (EC)DHE, multiple handshakes');
+
+	    skip "skipping RSA+DHE tests", 1
+		if $no_dh;
+
+	    ok(run(test(["ssltest_old", "-v", "-bio_pair", "-tls1", "-s_cert", srctop_file("apps","server2.pem"), "-dhe1024dsa", "-num", "10", "-f", "-time"])),
+	       'test tlsv1 with 1024bit RSA, 1024bit DHE, multiple handshakes');
+	  }
+
+	SKIP: {
+	    skip "skipping PSK tests", 2
+	        if ($no_psk);
+
+	    ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-tls1", "-cipher", "PSK", "-psk", "abc123"])),
+	       'test tls1 with PSK');
+
+	    ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-bio_pair", "-tls1", "-cipher", "PSK", "-psk", "abc123"])),
+	       'test tls1 with PSK via BIO pair');
+	  }
+	}
+
+    };
+
+    subtest 'Custom Extension tests' => sub {
+	######################################################################
+
+	plan tests => 1;
+
+      SKIP: {
+	  skip "TLSv1.0 is not supported by this OpenSSL build", 1
+	      if $no_tls1;
+
+	  ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-bio_pair", "-tls1", "-custom_ext"])),
+	     'test tls1 with custom extensions');
+	}
+    };
+
+    subtest 'Serverinfo tests' => sub {
+	######################################################################
+
+	plan tests => 5;
+
+      SKIP: {
+	  skip "TLSv1.0 is not supported by this OpenSSL build", 5
+	      if $no_tls1;
+
+	  note('echo test tls1 with serverinfo');
+	  ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-bio_pair", "-tls1", "-serverinfo_file", $serverinfo])));
+	  ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-bio_pair", "-tls1", "-serverinfo_file", $serverinfo, "-serverinfo_sct"])));
+	  ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-bio_pair", "-tls1", "-serverinfo_file", $serverinfo, "-serverinfo_tack"])));
+	  ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-bio_pair", "-tls1", "-serverinfo_file", $serverinfo, "-serverinfo_sct", "-serverinfo_tack"])));
+	  ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-bio_pair", "-tls1", "-custom_ext", "-serverinfo_file", $serverinfo, "-serverinfo_sct", "-serverinfo_tack"])));
+	}
+    };
+
+    subtest 'SRP tests' => sub {
+
+	plan tests => 4;
+
+      SKIP: {
+	  skip "skipping SRP tests", 4
+	      if $no_srp || alldisabled(grep !/^ssl3/, available_protocols("tls"));
+
+	  ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-tls1", "-cipher", "SRP", "-srpuser", "test", "-srppass", "abc123"])),
+	     'test tls1 with SRP');
+
+	  ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-bio_pair", "-tls1", "-cipher", "SRP", "-srpuser", "test", "-srppass", "abc123"])),
+	     'test tls1 with SRP via BIO pair');
+
+	  ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-tls1", "-cipher", "aSRP", "-srpuser", "test", "-srppass", "abc123"])),
+	     'test tls1 with SRP auth');
+
+	  ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-bio_pair", "-tls1", "-cipher", "aSRP", "-srpuser", "test", "-srppass", "abc123"])),
+	     'test tls1 with SRP auth via BIO pair');
+	}
+    };
+}
+
+unlink $CAkey;
+unlink $CAcert;
+unlink $CAserial;
+unlink $CAreq;
+unlink $CAreq2;
+
+unlink $Ukey;
+unlink $Ureq;
+unlink $Ucert;
+unlink basename($Ucert, '.ss').'.srl';
+
+unlink $Dkey;
+unlink $Dreq;
+unlink $Dcert;
+
+unlink $Ekey;
+unlink $Ereq;
+unlink $Ecert;
+
+unlink $P1key;
+unlink $P1req;
+unlink $P1cert;
+unlink basename($P1cert, '.ss').'.srl';
+unlink $P1intermediate;
+unlink "intP1.ss";
+
+unlink $P2key;
+unlink $P2req;
+unlink $P2cert;
+unlink $P2intermediate;
+unlink "intP2.ss";
+
+unlink "ecp.ss";
+unlink "err.ss";
+
+unlink $server_sess;
+unlink $client_sess;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_test_ctx.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_test_ctx.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c593491
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_test_ctx.t
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+
+use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_file/;
+
+setup("test_ssl_test_ctx");
+
+plan tests => 1;
+ok(run(test(["ssl_test_ctx_test", srctop_file("test", "ssl_test_ctx_test.conf")])),
+   "running ssl_test_ctx_test ssl_test_ctx_test.conf");
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/80-test_sslcorrupt.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/80-test_sslcorrupt.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..53f8a82
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/80-test_sslcorrupt.t
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+use OpenSSL::Test::Utils;
+use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_file/;
+
+setup("test_sslcorrupt");
+
+plan skip_all => "No TLS protocols are supported by this OpenSSL build"
+    if alldisabled(available_protocols("tls"));
+
+plan tests => 1;
+
+ok(run(test(["sslcorrupttest", srctop_file("apps", "server.pem"),
+             srctop_file("apps", "server.pem")])), "running sslcorrupttest");
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/80-test_tsa.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/80-test_tsa.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3ba14d4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/80-test_tsa.t
@@ -0,0 +1,207 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+
+use POSIX;
+use File::Spec::Functions qw/splitdir curdir catfile/;
+use File::Compare;
+use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT cmdstr srctop_file/;
+use OpenSSL::Test::Utils;
+
+setup("test_tsa");
+
+plan skip_all => "TS is not supported by this OpenSSL build"
+    if disabled("ts");
+
+# All these are modified inside indir further down. They need to exist
+# here, however, to be available in all subroutines.
+my $openssl_conf;
+my $testtsa;
+my $CAtsa;
+my @RUN;
+
+sub create_tsa_cert {
+    my $INDEX = shift;
+    my $EXT = shift;
+    my $r = 1;
+    $ENV{TSDNSECT} = "ts_cert_dn";
+
+    ok(run(app(["openssl", "req", "-config", $openssl_conf, "-new",
+                "-out", "tsa_req${INDEX}.pem",
+                "-keyout", "tsa_key${INDEX}.pem"])));
+    note "using extension $EXT";
+    ok(run(app(["openssl", "x509", "-req",
+                "-in", "tsa_req${INDEX}.pem",
+                "-out", "tsa_cert${INDEX}.pem",
+                "-CA", "tsaca.pem", "-CAkey", "tsacakey.pem",
+                "-CAcreateserial",
+                "-extfile", $openssl_conf, "-extensions", $EXT])));
+}
+
+sub create_time_stamp_response {
+    my $queryfile = shift;
+    my $outputfile = shift;
+    my $datafile = shift;
+
+    ok(run(app([@RUN, "-reply", "-section", "$datafile",
+                "-queryfile", "$queryfile", "-out", "$outputfile"])));
+}
+
+sub verify_time_stamp_response {
+    my $queryfile = shift;
+    my $inputfile = shift;
+    my $datafile = shift;
+
+    ok(run(app([@RUN, "-verify", "-queryfile", "$queryfile",
+                "-in", "$inputfile", "-CAfile", "tsaca.pem",
+                "-untrusted", "tsa_cert1.pem"])));
+    ok(run(app([@RUN, "-verify", "-data", "$datafile",
+                "-in", "$inputfile", "-CAfile", "tsaca.pem",
+                "-untrusted", "tsa_cert1.pem"])));
+}
+
+sub verify_time_stamp_response_fail {
+    my $queryfile = shift;
+    my $inputfile = shift;
+
+    ok(!run(app([@RUN, "-verify", "-queryfile", "$queryfile",
+                 "-in", "$inputfile", "-CAfile", "tsaca.pem",
+                 "-untrusted", "tsa_cert1.pem"])));
+}
+
+# main functions
+
+plan tests => 20;
+
+note "setting up TSA test directory";
+indir "tsa" => sub
+{
+    $openssl_conf = srctop_file("test", "CAtsa.cnf");
+    $testtsa = srctop_file("test", "recipes", "80-test_tsa.t");
+    $CAtsa = srctop_file("test", "CAtsa.cnf");
+    @RUN = ("openssl", "ts", "-config", $openssl_conf);
+
+    # ../apps/CA.pl needs these
+    $ENV{OPENSSL_CONFIG} = "-config $openssl_conf";
+    $ENV{OPENSSL} = cmdstr(app(["openssl"]), display => 1);
+
+ SKIP: {
+     $ENV{TSDNSECT} = "ts_ca_dn";
+     skip "failed", 19
+         unless ok(run(app(["openssl", "req", "-config", $openssl_conf,
+                            "-new", "-x509", "-nodes",
+                            "-out", "tsaca.pem", "-keyout", "tsacakey.pem"])),
+                   'creating a new CA for the TSA tests');
+
+     skip "failed", 18
+         unless subtest 'creating tsa_cert1.pem TSA server cert' => sub {
+             create_tsa_cert("1", "tsa_cert")
+     };
+
+     skip "failed", 17
+         unless subtest 'creating tsa_cert2.pem non-TSA server cert' => sub {
+             create_tsa_cert("2", "non_tsa_cert")
+     };
+
+     skip "failed", 16
+         unless ok(run(app([@RUN, "-query", "-data", $testtsa,
+                            "-tspolicy", "tsa_policy1", "-cert",
+                            "-out", "req1.tsq"])),
+                   'creating req1.req time stamp request for file testtsa');
+
+     ok(run(app([@RUN, "-query", "-in", "req1.tsq", "-text"])),
+        'printing req1.req');
+
+     subtest 'generating valid response for req1.req' => sub {
+         create_time_stamp_response("req1.tsq", "resp1.tsr", "tsa_config1")
+     };
+
+     ok(run(app([@RUN, "-reply", "-in", "resp1.tsr", "-text"])),
+        'printing response');
+
+     subtest 'verifying valid response' => sub {
+         verify_time_stamp_response("req1.tsq", "resp1.tsr", $testtsa)
+     };
+
+     skip "failed", 11
+         unless subtest 'verifying valid token' => sub {
+             ok(run(app([@RUN, "-reply", "-in", "resp1.tsr",
+                         "-out", "resp1.tsr.token", "-token_out"])));
+             ok(run(app([@RUN, "-verify", "-queryfile", "req1.tsq",
+                         "-in", "resp1.tsr.token", "-token_in",
+                         "-CAfile", "tsaca.pem",
+                         "-untrusted", "tsa_cert1.pem"])));
+             ok(run(app([@RUN, "-verify", "-data", $testtsa,
+                         "-in", "resp1.tsr.token", "-token_in",
+                         "-CAfile", "tsaca.pem",
+                         "-untrusted", "tsa_cert1.pem"])));
+     };
+
+     skip "failed", 10
+         unless ok(run(app([@RUN, "-query", "-data", $testtsa,
+                            "-tspolicy", "tsa_policy2", "-no_nonce",
+                            "-out", "req2.tsq"])),
+                   'creating req2.req time stamp request for file testtsa');
+
+     ok(run(app([@RUN, "-query", "-in", "req2.tsq", "-text"])),
+        'printing req2.req');
+
+     skip "failed", 8
+         unless subtest 'generating valid response for req2.req' => sub {
+             create_time_stamp_response("req2.tsq", "resp2.tsr", "tsa_config1")
+     };
+
+     skip "failed", 7
+         unless subtest 'checking -token_in and -token_out options with -reply' => sub {
+             my $RESPONSE2="resp2.tsr.copy.tsr";
+             my $TOKEN_DER="resp2.tsr.token.der";
+
+             ok(run(app([@RUN, "-reply", "-in", "resp2.tsr",
+                         "-out", "$TOKEN_DER", "-token_out"])));
+             ok(run(app([@RUN, "-reply", "-in", "$TOKEN_DER",
+                         "-token_in", "-out", "$RESPONSE2"])));
+             is(compare($RESPONSE2, "resp2.tsr"), 0);
+             ok(run(app([@RUN, "-reply", "-in", "resp2.tsr",
+                         "-text", "-token_out"])));
+             ok(run(app([@RUN, "-reply", "-in", "$TOKEN_DER",
+                         "-token_in", "-text", "-token_out"])));
+             ok(run(app([@RUN, "-reply", "-queryfile", "req2.tsq",
+                         "-text", "-token_out"])));
+     };
+
+     ok(run(app([@RUN, "-reply", "-in", "resp2.tsr", "-text"])),
+        'printing response');
+
+     subtest 'verifying valid response' => sub {
+         verify_time_stamp_response("req2.tsq", "resp2.tsr", $testtsa)
+     };
+
+     subtest 'verifying response against wrong request, it should fail' => sub {
+         verify_time_stamp_response_fail("req1.tsq", "resp2.tsr")
+     };
+
+     subtest 'verifying response against wrong request, it should fail' => sub {
+         verify_time_stamp_response_fail("req2.tsq", "resp1.tsr")
+     };
+
+     skip "failure", 2
+         unless ok(run(app([@RUN, "-query", "-data", $CAtsa,
+                            "-no_nonce", "-out", "req3.tsq"])),
+                   "creating req3.req time stamp request for file CAtsa.cnf");
+
+     ok(run(app([@RUN, "-query", "-in", "req3.tsq", "-text"])),
+        'printing req3.req');
+
+     subtest 'verifying response against wrong request, it should fail' => sub {
+         verify_time_stamp_response_fail("req3.tsq", "resp1.tsr")
+     };
+    }
+}, create => 1, cleanup => 1
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/80-test_x509aux.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/80-test_x509aux.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..65ba5fc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/80-test_x509aux.t
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_file/;
+use OpenSSL::Test::Utils;
+
+setup("test_x509aux");
+
+plan skip_all => "test_dane uses ec which is not supported by this OpenSSL build"
+    if disabled("ec");
+
+plan tests => 1;                # The number of tests being performed
+
+ok(run(test(["x509aux", 
+                srctop_file("test", "certs", "roots.pem"),
+                srctop_file("test", "certs", "root+anyEKU.pem"),
+                srctop_file("test", "certs", "root-anyEKU.pem"),
+                srctop_file("test", "certs", "root-cert.pem")]
+        )), "x509aux tests");
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/90-test_async.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/90-test_async.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e0f1870
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/90-test_async.t
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use OpenSSL::Test::Simple;
+
+simple_test("test_async", "asynctest", "async");
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/90-test_bio_enc.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/90-test_bio_enc.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..aa7e42a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/90-test_bio_enc.t
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use OpenSSL::Test::Simple;
+
+simple_test("test_bio_enc", "bio_enc_test", "bio_enc");
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/90-test_bioprint.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/90-test_bioprint.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b86e828
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/90-test_bioprint.t
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use OpenSSL::Test::Simple;
+
+simple_test("test_bioprint", "bioprinttest");
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/90-test_constant_time.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/90-test_constant_time.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6fa73bf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/90-test_constant_time.t
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use OpenSSL::Test::Simple;
+
+simple_test("test_constant_time", "constant_time_test");
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/90-test_fatalerr.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/90-test_fatalerr.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..361bc1f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/90-test_fatalerr.t
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use OpenSSL::Test::Utils;
+use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_file/;
+
+setup("test_fatalerr");
+
+plan skip_all => "No TLS/SSL protocols are supported by this OpenSSL build"
+    if alldisabled(grep { $_ ne "ssl3" } available_protocols("tls"));
+
+plan tests => 1;
+
+ok(run(test(["fatalerrtest", srctop_file("apps", "server.pem"),
+             srctop_file("apps", "server.pem")])), "running fatalerrtest");
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/90-test_fuzz.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/90-test_fuzz.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d152925
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/90-test_fuzz.t
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+
+use if $^O ne "VMS", 'File::Glob' => qw/glob/;
+use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_file/;
+use OpenSSL::Test::Utils;
+
+setup("test_fuzz");
+
+my @fuzzers = ('asn1', 'asn1parse', 'bignum', 'bndiv', 'conf', 'crl', 'server', 'x509');
+if (!disabled("cms")) {
+    push @fuzzers, 'cms';
+}
+if (!disabled("ct")) {
+    push @fuzzers, 'ct';
+}
+plan tests => scalar @fuzzers;
+
+foreach my $f (@fuzzers) {
+    subtest "Fuzzing $f" => sub {
+        my @files = glob(srctop_file('fuzz', 'corpora', $f, '*'));
+        push @files, glob(srctop_file('fuzz', 'corpora', "$f-*", '*'));
+
+        plan skip_all => "No corpora for $f-test" unless @files;
+
+        plan tests => scalar @files;
+
+        foreach (@files) {
+            ok(run(fuzz(["$f-test", $_])));
+        }
+    }
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/90-test_gmdiff.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/90-test_gmdiff.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f2cce41
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/90-test_gmdiff.t
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use OpenSSL::Test::Simple;
+
+simple_test("test_gmdiff", "gmdifftest");
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/90-test_heartbeat.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/90-test_heartbeat.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..90d6a67
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/90-test_heartbeat.t
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use OpenSSL::Test::Simple;
+
+simple_test("test_heartbeat", "heartbeat_test", "heartbeats");
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/90-test_ige.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/90-test_ige.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2ab4bd2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/90-test_ige.t
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use OpenSSL::Test::Simple;
+
+simple_test("test_ige", "igetest");
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/90-test_memleak.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/90-test_memleak.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..52357c7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/90-test_memleak.t
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use OpenSSL::Test;
+
+setup("test_memleak");
+plan tests => 2;
+ok(run(test(["memleaktest"])), "running leak test");
+ok(run(test(["memleaktest", "freeit"])), "running no leak test");
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/90-test_p5_crpt2.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/90-test_p5_crpt2.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..710dc8b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/90-test_p5_crpt2.t
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use OpenSSL::Test::Simple;
+
+simple_test("test_p5_crpt2", "p5_crpt2_test");
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/90-test_secmem.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/90-test_secmem.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d197c48
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/90-test_secmem.t
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use OpenSSL::Test::Simple;
+
+simple_test("test_secmem", "secmemtest");
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/90-test_shlibload.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/90-test_shlibload.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..aa8d98d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/90-test_shlibload.t
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT bldtop_dir/;
+use OpenSSL::Test::Utils;
+
+#Load configdata.pm
+
+BEGIN {
+    setup("test_shlibload");
+}
+use lib bldtop_dir('.');
+use configdata;
+
+plan skip_all => "Test only supported in a shared build" if disabled("shared");
+
+plan tests => 3;
+
+my $libcrypto_idx = $unified_info{rename}->{libcrypto} // "libcrypto";
+my $libssl_idx = $unified_info{rename}->{libssl} // "libssl";
+my $libcrypto =
+    $unified_info{sharednames}->{$libcrypto_idx}.$target{shared_extension_simple};
+my $libssl =
+    $unified_info{sharednames}->{$libssl_idx}.$target{shared_extension_simple};
+
+ok(run(test(["shlibloadtest", "-crypto_first", $libcrypto, $libssl])),
+   "running shlibloadtest -crypto_first");
+ok(run(test(["shlibloadtest", "-ssl_first", $libcrypto, $libssl])),
+   "running shlibloadtest -ssl_first");
+ok(run(test(["shlibloadtest", "-just_crypto", $libcrypto, $libssl])),
+   "running shlibloadtest -just_crypto");
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/90-test_srp.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/90-test_srp.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7026c35
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/90-test_srp.t
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use OpenSSL::Test::Simple;
+
+simple_test("test_srp", "srptest", "srp");
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/90-test_sslapi.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/90-test_sslapi.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..efaae3b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/90-test_sslapi.t
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use OpenSSL::Test::Utils;
+use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_file/;
+
+setup("test_sslapi");
+
+plan skip_all => "No TLS/SSL protocols are supported by this OpenSSL build"
+    if alldisabled(grep { $_ ne "ssl3" } available_protocols("tls"));
+
+plan tests => 1;
+
+ok(run(test(["sslapitest", srctop_file("apps", "server.pem"),
+             srctop_file("apps", "server.pem")])), "running sslapitest");
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/90-test_threads.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/90-test_threads.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..56d5338
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/90-test_threads.t
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use OpenSSL::Test::Simple;
+
+simple_test("test_threads", "threadstest");
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/90-test_v3name.t b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/90-test_v3name.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2e144e5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/90-test_v3name.t
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use OpenSSL::Test::Simple;
+
+simple_test("test_v3name", "v3nametest");
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/bc.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/bc.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dbb5842
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/bc.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+
+use Math::BigInt;
+
+sub calc {
+    @_ = __adder(@_);
+    if (scalar @_ != 1) { return "NaN"; }
+    return shift;
+}
+
+sub __canonhex {
+    my ($sign, $hex) = (shift =~ /^([+\-]?)(.*)$/);
+    $hex = "0x".$hex if $hex !~ /^0x/;
+    return $sign.$hex;
+}
+
+sub __adder {
+    @_ = __multiplier(@_);
+    while (scalar @_ > 1 && $_[1] =~ /^[\+\-]$/) {
+	my $operand1 = Math::BigInt->from_hex(__canonhex(shift));
+	my $operator = shift;
+	@_ = __multiplier(@_);
+	my $operand2 = Math::BigInt->from_hex(__canonhex(shift));
+	if ($operator eq "+") {
+	    $operand1->badd($operand2);
+	} elsif ($operator eq "-") {
+	    $operand1->bsub($operand2);
+	} else {
+	    die "SOMETHING WENT AWFULLY WRONG";
+	}
+	unshift @_, $operand1->as_hex();
+    }
+    return @_;
+}
+
+sub __multiplier {
+    @_ = __power(@_);
+    while (scalar @_ > 1 && $_[1] =~ /^[\*\/%]$/) {
+	my $operand1 = Math::BigInt->from_hex(__canonhex(shift));
+	my $operator = shift;
+	@_ = __power(@_);
+	my $operand2 = Math::BigInt->from_hex(__canonhex(shift));
+	if ($operator eq "*") {
+	    $operand1->bmul($operand2);
+	} elsif ($operator eq "/") {
+	    # Math::BigInt->bdiv() is documented to do floored division,
+	    # i.e. 1 / -4 = -1, while bc and OpenSSL BN_div do truncated
+	    # division, i.e. 1 / -4 = 0.  We need to make the operation
+	    # work like OpenSSL's BN_div to be able to verify.
+	    my $neg = ($operand1->is_neg()
+		       ? !$operand2->is_neg() : $operand2->is_neg());
+	    $operand1->babs();
+	    $operand2->babs();
+	    $operand1->bdiv($operand2);
+	    if ($neg) { $operand1->bneg(); }
+	} elsif ($operator eq "%") {
+	    # Here's a bit of a quirk...
+	    # With OpenSSL's BN, as well as bc, the result of -10 % 3 is -1
+	    # while Math::BigInt, the result is 2.
+	    # The latter is mathematically more correct, but...
+	    my $o1isneg = $operand1->is_neg();
+	    $operand1->babs();
+	    # Math::BigInt does something different with a negative modulus,
+	    # while OpenSSL's BN and bc treat it like a positive number...
+	    $operand2->babs();
+	    $operand1->bmod($operand2);
+	    if ($o1isneg) { $operand1->bneg(); }
+	} else {
+	    die "SOMETHING WENT AWFULLY WRONG";
+	}
+	unshift @_, $operand1->as_hex();
+    }
+    return @_;
+}
+
+sub __power {
+    @_ = __paren(@_);
+    while (scalar @_ > 1 && $_[1] eq "^") {
+	my $operand1 = Math::BigInt->from_hex(__canonhex(shift));
+	shift;
+	@_ = __paren(@_);
+	my $operand2 = Math::BigInt->from_hex(__canonhex(shift));
+	$operand1->bpow($operand2);
+	unshift @_, $operand1->as_hex();
+    }
+    return @_;
+}
+
+# returns array ( $result, @remaining )
+sub __paren {
+    if (scalar @_ > 0 && $_[0] eq "(") {
+	shift;
+	my @result = __adder(@_);
+	if (scalar @_ == 0 || $_[0] ne ")") {
+	    return ("NaN");
+	}
+	shift;
+	return @result;
+    }
+    return @_;
+}
+
+1;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/tconversion.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/tconversion.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1cf68dc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/recipes/tconversion.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+
+use File::Compare qw/compare_text/;
+use File::Copy;
+use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT/;
+
+my %conversionforms = (
+    # Default conversion forms.  Other series may be added with
+    # specific test types as key.
+    "*"		=> [ "d", "p" ],
+    "msb"	=> [ "d", "p", "msblob" ],
+    );
+sub tconversion {
+    my $testtype = shift;
+    my $t = shift;
+    my @conversionforms = 
+	defined($conversionforms{$testtype}) ?
+	@{$conversionforms{$testtype}} :
+	@{$conversionforms{"*"}};
+    my @openssl_args = @_;
+    if (!@openssl_args) { @openssl_args = ($testtype); }
+
+    my $n = scalar @conversionforms;
+    my $totaltests =
+	1			# for initializing
+	+ $n			# initial conversions from p to all forms (A)
+	+ $n*$n			# conversion from result of A to all forms (B)
+	+ 1			# comparing original test file to p form of A
+	+ $n*($n-1);		# comparing first conversion to each form in A with B
+    $totaltests-- if ($testtype eq "p7d"); # no comparison of original test file
+    plan tests => $totaltests;
+
+    my @cmd = ("openssl", @openssl_args);
+
+    my $init;
+    if (scalar @openssl_args > 0 && $openssl_args[0] eq "pkey") {
+	$init = ok(run(app([@cmd, "-in", $t, "-out", "$testtype-fff.p"])),
+		   'initializing');
+    } else {
+	$init = ok(copy($t, "$testtype-fff.p"), 'initializing');
+    }
+    if (!$init) {
+	diag("Trying to copy $t to $testtype-fff.p : $!");
+    }
+
+  SKIP: {
+      skip "Not initialized, skipping...", 22 unless $init;
+
+      foreach my $to (@conversionforms) {
+	  ok(run(app([@cmd,
+		      "-in", "$testtype-fff.p",
+		      "-inform", "p",
+		      "-out", "$testtype-f.$to",
+		      "-outform", $to])),
+	     "p -> $to");
+      }
+
+      foreach my $to (@conversionforms) {
+	  foreach my $from (@conversionforms) {
+	      ok(run(app([@cmd,
+			  "-in", "$testtype-f.$from",
+			  "-inform", $from,
+			  "-out", "$testtype-ff.$from$to",
+			  "-outform", $to])),
+		 "$from -> $to");
+	  }
+      }
+
+      if ($testtype ne "p7d") {
+	  is(cmp_text("$testtype-fff.p", "$testtype-f.p"), 0,
+	     'comparing orig to p');
+      }
+
+      foreach my $to (@conversionforms) {
+	  next if $to eq "d";
+	  foreach my $from (@conversionforms) {
+	      is(cmp_text("$testtype-f.$to", "$testtype-ff.$from$to"), 0,
+		 "comparing $to to $from$to");
+	  }
+      }
+    }
+    unlink glob "$testtype-f.*";
+    unlink glob "$testtype-ff.*";
+    unlink glob "$testtype-fff.*";
+}
+
+sub cmp_text {
+    return compare_text(@_, sub {
+        $_[0] =~ s/\R//g;
+        $_[1] =~ s/\R//g;
+        return $_[0] ne $_[1];
+    });
+}
+
+1;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/rmdtest.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/rmdtest.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b6deaaa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/rmdtest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+#include "../e_os.h"
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RMD160
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+    printf("No ripemd support\n");
+    return (0);
+}
+#else
+# include <openssl/ripemd.h>
+# include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+# ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+#  include <openssl/ebcdic.h>
+# endif
+
+static char test[][100] = {
+    { "" },
+    { "a" },
+    { "abc" },
+    { "message digest" },
+    { "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz" },
+    { "abcdbcdecdefdefgefghfghighijhijkijkljklmklmnlmnomnopnopq" },
+    { "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789" },
+    { "12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890" }
+};
+
+static char *ret[] = {
+    "9c1185a5c5e9fc54612808977ee8f548b2258d31",
+    "0bdc9d2d256b3ee9daae347be6f4dc835a467ffe",
+    "8eb208f7e05d987a9b044a8e98c6b087f15a0bfc",
+    "5d0689ef49d2fae572b881b123a85ffa21595f36",
+    "f71c27109c692c1b56bbdceb5b9d2865b3708dbc",
+    "12a053384a9c0c88e405a06c27dcf49ada62eb2b",
+    "b0e20b6e3116640286ed3a87a5713079b21f5189",
+    "9b752e45573d4b39f4dbd3323cab82bf63326bfb",
+};
+
+static char *pt(unsigned char *md);
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+    unsigned int i;
+    int err = 0;
+    char **R;
+    char *p;
+    unsigned char md[RIPEMD160_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+
+    R = ret;
+    for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(test); i++) {
+# ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+        ebcdic2ascii(test[i], test[i], strlen(test[i]));
+# endif
+        if (!EVP_Digest(test[i], strlen(test[i]), md, NULL, EVP_ripemd160(),
+                        NULL)) {
+            printf("EVP Digest error.\n");
+            EXIT(1);
+        }
+        p = pt(md);
+        if (strcmp(p, (char *)*R) != 0) {
+            printf("error calculating RIPEMD160 on '%s'\n", test[i]);
+            printf("got %s instead of %s\n", p, *R);
+            err++;
+        } else
+            printf("test %d ok\n", i + 1);
+        R++;
+    }
+    EXIT(err);
+}
+
+static char *pt(unsigned char *md)
+{
+    int i;
+    static char buf[80];
+
+    for (i = 0; i < RIPEMD160_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++)
+        sprintf(&(buf[i * 2]), "%02x", md[i]);
+    return (buf);
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/rsa_test.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/rsa_test.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..01e8374
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/rsa_test.c
@@ -0,0 +1,344 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* test vectors from p1ovect1.txt */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "e_os.h"
+
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+    printf("No RSA support\n");
+    return (0);
+}
+#else
+# include <openssl/rsa.h>
+
+# define SetKey \
+    RSA_set0_key(key,                                           \
+                 BN_bin2bn(n, sizeof(n)-1, NULL),               \
+                 BN_bin2bn(e, sizeof(e)-1, NULL),               \
+                 BN_bin2bn(d, sizeof(d)-1, NULL));              \
+    RSA_set0_factors(key,                                       \
+                     BN_bin2bn(p, sizeof(p)-1, NULL),           \
+                     BN_bin2bn(q, sizeof(q)-1, NULL));          \
+    RSA_set0_crt_params(key,                                    \
+                        BN_bin2bn(dmp1, sizeof(dmp1)-1, NULL),  \
+                        BN_bin2bn(dmq1, sizeof(dmq1)-1, NULL),  \
+                        BN_bin2bn(iqmp, sizeof(iqmp)-1, NULL)); \
+    memcpy(c, ctext_ex, sizeof(ctext_ex) - 1);                  \
+    return (sizeof(ctext_ex) - 1);
+
+static int key1(RSA *key, unsigned char *c)
+{
+    static unsigned char n[] =
+        "\x00\xAA\x36\xAB\xCE\x88\xAC\xFD\xFF\x55\x52\x3C\x7F\xC4\x52\x3F"
+        "\x90\xEF\xA0\x0D\xF3\x77\x4A\x25\x9F\x2E\x62\xB4\xC5\xD9\x9C\xB5"
+        "\xAD\xB3\x00\xA0\x28\x5E\x53\x01\x93\x0E\x0C\x70\xFB\x68\x76\x93"
+        "\x9C\xE6\x16\xCE\x62\x4A\x11\xE0\x08\x6D\x34\x1E\xBC\xAC\xA0\xA1"
+        "\xF5";
+
+    static unsigned char e[] = "\x11";
+
+    static unsigned char d[] =
+        "\x0A\x03\x37\x48\x62\x64\x87\x69\x5F\x5F\x30\xBC\x38\xB9\x8B\x44"
+        "\xC2\xCD\x2D\xFF\x43\x40\x98\xCD\x20\xD8\xA1\x38\xD0\x90\xBF\x64"
+        "\x79\x7C\x3F\xA7\xA2\xCD\xCB\x3C\xD1\xE0\xBD\xBA\x26\x54\xB4\xF9"
+        "\xDF\x8E\x8A\xE5\x9D\x73\x3D\x9F\x33\xB3\x01\x62\x4A\xFD\x1D\x51";
+
+    static unsigned char p[] =
+        "\x00\xD8\x40\xB4\x16\x66\xB4\x2E\x92\xEA\x0D\xA3\xB4\x32\x04\xB5"
+        "\xCF\xCE\x33\x52\x52\x4D\x04\x16\xA5\xA4\x41\xE7\x00\xAF\x46\x12"
+        "\x0D";
+
+    static unsigned char q[] =
+        "\x00\xC9\x7F\xB1\xF0\x27\xF4\x53\xF6\x34\x12\x33\xEA\xAA\xD1\xD9"
+        "\x35\x3F\x6C\x42\xD0\x88\x66\xB1\xD0\x5A\x0F\x20\x35\x02\x8B\x9D"
+        "\x89";
+
+    static unsigned char dmp1[] =
+        "\x59\x0B\x95\x72\xA2\xC2\xA9\xC4\x06\x05\x9D\xC2\xAB\x2F\x1D\xAF"
+        "\xEB\x7E\x8B\x4F\x10\xA7\x54\x9E\x8E\xED\xF5\xB4\xFC\xE0\x9E\x05";
+
+    static unsigned char dmq1[] =
+        "\x00\x8E\x3C\x05\x21\xFE\x15\xE0\xEA\x06\xA3\x6F\xF0\xF1\x0C\x99"
+        "\x52\xC3\x5B\x7A\x75\x14\xFD\x32\x38\xB8\x0A\xAD\x52\x98\x62\x8D"
+        "\x51";
+
+    static unsigned char iqmp[] =
+        "\x36\x3F\xF7\x18\x9D\xA8\xE9\x0B\x1D\x34\x1F\x71\xD0\x9B\x76\xA8"
+        "\xA9\x43\xE1\x1D\x10\xB2\x4D\x24\x9F\x2D\xEA\xFE\xF8\x0C\x18\x26";
+
+    static unsigned char ctext_ex[] =
+        "\x1b\x8f\x05\xf9\xca\x1a\x79\x52\x6e\x53\xf3\xcc\x51\x4f\xdb\x89"
+        "\x2b\xfb\x91\x93\x23\x1e\x78\xb9\x92\xe6\x8d\x50\xa4\x80\xcb\x52"
+        "\x33\x89\x5c\x74\x95\x8d\x5d\x02\xab\x8c\x0f\xd0\x40\xeb\x58\x44"
+        "\xb0\x05\xc3\x9e\xd8\x27\x4a\x9d\xbf\xa8\x06\x71\x40\x94\x39\xd2";
+
+    SetKey;
+}
+
+static int key2(RSA *key, unsigned char *c)
+{
+    static unsigned char n[] =
+        "\x00\xA3\x07\x9A\x90\xDF\x0D\xFD\x72\xAC\x09\x0C\xCC\x2A\x78\xB8"
+        "\x74\x13\x13\x3E\x40\x75\x9C\x98\xFA\xF8\x20\x4F\x35\x8A\x0B\x26"
+        "\x3C\x67\x70\xE7\x83\xA9\x3B\x69\x71\xB7\x37\x79\xD2\x71\x7B\xE8"
+        "\x34\x77\xCF";
+
+    static unsigned char e[] = "\x3";
+
+    static unsigned char d[] =
+        "\x6C\xAF\xBC\x60\x94\xB3\xFE\x4C\x72\xB0\xB3\x32\xC6\xFB\x25\xA2"
+        "\xB7\x62\x29\x80\x4E\x68\x65\xFC\xA4\x5A\x74\xDF\x0F\x8F\xB8\x41"
+        "\x3B\x52\xC0\xD0\xE5\x3D\x9B\x59\x0F\xF1\x9B\xE7\x9F\x49\xDD\x21"
+        "\xE5\xEB";
+
+    static unsigned char p[] =
+        "\x00\xCF\x20\x35\x02\x8B\x9D\x86\x98\x40\xB4\x16\x66\xB4\x2E\x92"
+        "\xEA\x0D\xA3\xB4\x32\x04\xB5\xCF\xCE\x91";
+
+    static unsigned char q[] =
+        "\x00\xC9\x7F\xB1\xF0\x27\xF4\x53\xF6\x34\x12\x33\xEA\xAA\xD1\xD9"
+        "\x35\x3F\x6C\x42\xD0\x88\x66\xB1\xD0\x5F";
+
+    static unsigned char dmp1[] =
+        "\x00\x8A\x15\x78\xAC\x5D\x13\xAF\x10\x2B\x22\xB9\x99\xCD\x74\x61"
+        "\xF1\x5E\x6D\x22\xCC\x03\x23\xDF\xDF\x0B";
+
+    static unsigned char dmq1[] =
+        "\x00\x86\x55\x21\x4A\xC5\x4D\x8D\x4E\xCD\x61\x77\xF1\xC7\x36\x90"
+        "\xCE\x2A\x48\x2C\x8B\x05\x99\xCB\xE0\x3F";
+
+    static unsigned char iqmp[] =
+        "\x00\x83\xEF\xEF\xB8\xA9\xA4\x0D\x1D\xB6\xED\x98\xAD\x84\xED\x13"
+        "\x35\xDC\xC1\x08\xF3\x22\xD0\x57\xCF\x8D";
+
+    static unsigned char ctext_ex[] =
+        "\x14\xbd\xdd\x28\xc9\x83\x35\x19\x23\x80\xe8\xe5\x49\xb1\x58\x2a"
+        "\x8b\x40\xb4\x48\x6d\x03\xa6\xa5\x31\x1f\x1f\xd5\xf0\xa1\x80\xe4"
+        "\x17\x53\x03\x29\xa9\x34\x90\x74\xb1\x52\x13\x54\x29\x08\x24\x52"
+        "\x62\x51";
+
+    SetKey;
+}
+
+static int key3(RSA *key, unsigned char *c)
+{
+    static unsigned char n[] =
+        "\x00\xBB\xF8\x2F\x09\x06\x82\xCE\x9C\x23\x38\xAC\x2B\x9D\xA8\x71"
+        "\xF7\x36\x8D\x07\xEE\xD4\x10\x43\xA4\x40\xD6\xB6\xF0\x74\x54\xF5"
+        "\x1F\xB8\xDF\xBA\xAF\x03\x5C\x02\xAB\x61\xEA\x48\xCE\xEB\x6F\xCD"
+        "\x48\x76\xED\x52\x0D\x60\xE1\xEC\x46\x19\x71\x9D\x8A\x5B\x8B\x80"
+        "\x7F\xAF\xB8\xE0\xA3\xDF\xC7\x37\x72\x3E\xE6\xB4\xB7\xD9\x3A\x25"
+        "\x84\xEE\x6A\x64\x9D\x06\x09\x53\x74\x88\x34\xB2\x45\x45\x98\x39"
+        "\x4E\xE0\xAA\xB1\x2D\x7B\x61\xA5\x1F\x52\x7A\x9A\x41\xF6\xC1\x68"
+        "\x7F\xE2\x53\x72\x98\xCA\x2A\x8F\x59\x46\xF8\xE5\xFD\x09\x1D\xBD"
+        "\xCB";
+
+    static unsigned char e[] = "\x11";
+
+    static unsigned char d[] =
+        "\x00\xA5\xDA\xFC\x53\x41\xFA\xF2\x89\xC4\xB9\x88\xDB\x30\xC1\xCD"
+        "\xF8\x3F\x31\x25\x1E\x06\x68\xB4\x27\x84\x81\x38\x01\x57\x96\x41"
+        "\xB2\x94\x10\xB3\xC7\x99\x8D\x6B\xC4\x65\x74\x5E\x5C\x39\x26\x69"
+        "\xD6\x87\x0D\xA2\xC0\x82\xA9\x39\xE3\x7F\xDC\xB8\x2E\xC9\x3E\xDA"
+        "\xC9\x7F\xF3\xAD\x59\x50\xAC\xCF\xBC\x11\x1C\x76\xF1\xA9\x52\x94"
+        "\x44\xE5\x6A\xAF\x68\xC5\x6C\x09\x2C\xD3\x8D\xC3\xBE\xF5\xD2\x0A"
+        "\x93\x99\x26\xED\x4F\x74\xA1\x3E\xDD\xFB\xE1\xA1\xCE\xCC\x48\x94"
+        "\xAF\x94\x28\xC2\xB7\xB8\x88\x3F\xE4\x46\x3A\x4B\xC8\x5B\x1C\xB3"
+        "\xC1";
+
+    static unsigned char p[] =
+        "\x00\xEE\xCF\xAE\x81\xB1\xB9\xB3\xC9\x08\x81\x0B\x10\xA1\xB5\x60"
+        "\x01\x99\xEB\x9F\x44\xAE\xF4\xFD\xA4\x93\xB8\x1A\x9E\x3D\x84\xF6"
+        "\x32\x12\x4E\xF0\x23\x6E\x5D\x1E\x3B\x7E\x28\xFA\xE7\xAA\x04\x0A"
+        "\x2D\x5B\x25\x21\x76\x45\x9D\x1F\x39\x75\x41\xBA\x2A\x58\xFB\x65"
+        "\x99";
+
+    static unsigned char q[] =
+        "\x00\xC9\x7F\xB1\xF0\x27\xF4\x53\xF6\x34\x12\x33\xEA\xAA\xD1\xD9"
+        "\x35\x3F\x6C\x42\xD0\x88\x66\xB1\xD0\x5A\x0F\x20\x35\x02\x8B\x9D"
+        "\x86\x98\x40\xB4\x16\x66\xB4\x2E\x92\xEA\x0D\xA3\xB4\x32\x04\xB5"
+        "\xCF\xCE\x33\x52\x52\x4D\x04\x16\xA5\xA4\x41\xE7\x00\xAF\x46\x15"
+        "\x03";
+
+    static unsigned char dmp1[] =
+        "\x54\x49\x4C\xA6\x3E\xBA\x03\x37\xE4\xE2\x40\x23\xFC\xD6\x9A\x5A"
+        "\xEB\x07\xDD\xDC\x01\x83\xA4\xD0\xAC\x9B\x54\xB0\x51\xF2\xB1\x3E"
+        "\xD9\x49\x09\x75\xEA\xB7\x74\x14\xFF\x59\xC1\xF7\x69\x2E\x9A\x2E"
+        "\x20\x2B\x38\xFC\x91\x0A\x47\x41\x74\xAD\xC9\x3C\x1F\x67\xC9\x81";
+
+    static unsigned char dmq1[] =
+        "\x47\x1E\x02\x90\xFF\x0A\xF0\x75\x03\x51\xB7\xF8\x78\x86\x4C\xA9"
+        "\x61\xAD\xBD\x3A\x8A\x7E\x99\x1C\x5C\x05\x56\xA9\x4C\x31\x46\xA7"
+        "\xF9\x80\x3F\x8F\x6F\x8A\xE3\x42\xE9\x31\xFD\x8A\xE4\x7A\x22\x0D"
+        "\x1B\x99\xA4\x95\x84\x98\x07\xFE\x39\xF9\x24\x5A\x98\x36\xDA\x3D";
+
+    static unsigned char iqmp[] =
+        "\x00\xB0\x6C\x4F\xDA\xBB\x63\x01\x19\x8D\x26\x5B\xDB\xAE\x94\x23"
+        "\xB3\x80\xF2\x71\xF7\x34\x53\x88\x50\x93\x07\x7F\xCD\x39\xE2\x11"
+        "\x9F\xC9\x86\x32\x15\x4F\x58\x83\xB1\x67\xA9\x67\xBF\x40\x2B\x4E"
+        "\x9E\x2E\x0F\x96\x56\xE6\x98\xEA\x36\x66\xED\xFB\x25\x79\x80\x39"
+        "\xF7";
+
+    static unsigned char ctext_ex[] =
+        "\xb8\x24\x6b\x56\xa6\xed\x58\x81\xae\xb5\x85\xd9\xa2\x5b\x2a\xd7"
+        "\x90\xc4\x17\xe0\x80\x68\x1b\xf1\xac\x2b\xc3\xde\xb6\x9d\x8b\xce"
+        "\xf0\xc4\x36\x6f\xec\x40\x0a\xf0\x52\xa7\x2e\x9b\x0e\xff\xb5\xb3"
+        "\xf2\xf1\x92\xdb\xea\xca\x03\xc1\x27\x40\x05\x71\x13\xbf\x1f\x06"
+        "\x69\xac\x22\xe9\xf3\xa7\x85\x2e\x3c\x15\xd9\x13\xca\xb0\xb8\x86"
+        "\x3a\x95\xc9\x92\x94\xce\x86\x74\x21\x49\x54\x61\x03\x46\xf4\xd4"
+        "\x74\xb2\x6f\x7c\x48\xb4\x2e\xe6\x8e\x1f\x57\x2a\x1f\xc4\x02\x6a"
+        "\xc4\x56\xb4\xf5\x9f\x7b\x62\x1e\xa1\xb9\xd8\x8f\x64\x20\x2f\xb1";
+
+    SetKey;
+}
+
+static int pad_unknown(void)
+{
+    unsigned long l;
+    while ((l = ERR_get_error()) != 0)
+        if (ERR_GET_REASON(l) == RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE)
+            return (1);
+    return (0);
+}
+
+static const char rnd_seed[] =
+    "string to make the random number generator think it has entropy";
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+    int err = 0;
+    int v;
+    RSA *key;
+    unsigned char ptext[256];
+    unsigned char ctext[256];
+    static unsigned char ptext_ex[] = "\x54\x85\x9b\x34\x2c\x49\xea\x2a";
+    unsigned char ctext_ex[256];
+    int plen;
+    int clen = 0;
+    int num;
+    int n;
+
+    CRYPTO_set_mem_debug(1);
+    CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON);
+
+    RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof(rnd_seed)); /* or OAEP may fail */
+
+    plen = sizeof(ptext_ex) - 1;
+
+    for (v = 0; v < 3; v++) {
+        key = RSA_new();
+        switch (v) {
+        case 0:
+            clen = key1(key, ctext_ex);
+            break;
+        case 1:
+            clen = key2(key, ctext_ex);
+            break;
+        case 2:
+            clen = key3(key, ctext_ex);
+            break;
+        }
+
+        num = RSA_public_encrypt(plen, ptext_ex, ctext, key,
+                                 RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+        if (num != clen) {
+            printf("PKCS#1 v1.5 encryption failed!\n");
+            err = 1;
+            goto oaep;
+        }
+
+        num = RSA_private_decrypt(num, ctext, ptext, key, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+        if (num != plen || memcmp(ptext, ptext_ex, num) != 0) {
+            printf("PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption failed!\n");
+            err = 1;
+        } else
+            printf("PKCS #1 v1.5 encryption/decryption ok\n");
+
+ oaep:
+        ERR_clear_error();
+        num = RSA_public_encrypt(plen, ptext_ex, ctext, key,
+                                 RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING);
+        if (num == -1 && pad_unknown()) {
+            printf("No OAEP support\n");
+            goto next;
+        }
+        if (num != clen) {
+            printf("OAEP encryption failed!\n");
+            err = 1;
+            goto next;
+        }
+
+        num = RSA_private_decrypt(num, ctext, ptext, key,
+                                  RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING);
+        if (num != plen || memcmp(ptext, ptext_ex, num) != 0) {
+            printf("OAEP decryption (encrypted data) failed!\n");
+            err = 1;
+        } else if (memcmp(ctext, ctext_ex, num) == 0)
+            printf("OAEP test vector %d passed!\n", v);
+
+        /*
+         * Different ciphertexts (rsa_oaep.c without -DPKCS_TESTVECT). Try
+         * decrypting ctext_ex
+         */
+
+        num = RSA_private_decrypt(clen, ctext_ex, ptext, key,
+                                  RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING);
+
+        if (num != plen || memcmp(ptext, ptext_ex, num) != 0) {
+            printf("OAEP decryption (test vector data) failed!\n");
+            err = 1;
+        } else
+            printf("OAEP encryption/decryption ok\n");
+
+        /* Try decrypting corrupted ciphertexts. */
+        for (n = 0; n < clen; ++n) {
+            ctext[n] ^= 1;
+            num = RSA_private_decrypt(clen, ctext, ptext, key,
+                                          RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING);
+            if (num > 0) {
+                printf("Corrupt data decrypted!\n");
+                err = 1;
+                break;
+            }
+            ctext[n] ^= 1;
+        }
+
+        /* Test truncated ciphertexts, as well as negative length. */
+        for (n = -1; n < clen; ++n) {
+            num = RSA_private_decrypt(n, ctext, ptext, key,
+                                      RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING);
+            if (num > 0) {
+                printf("Truncated data decrypted!\n");
+                err = 1;
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+
+ next:
+        RSA_free(key);
+    }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG
+    if (CRYPTO_mem_leaks_fp(stderr) <= 0)
+        err = 1;
+#endif
+
+    return err;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/run_tests.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/run_tests.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..77dffb3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/run_tests.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+
+# Recognise VERBOSE and V which is common on other projects.
+BEGIN {
+    $ENV{HARNESS_VERBOSE} = "yes" if $ENV{VERBOSE} || $ENV{V};
+}
+
+use File::Spec::Functions qw/catdir catfile curdir abs2rel rel2abs/;
+use File::Basename;
+use FindBin;
+use lib "$FindBin::Bin/../util/perl";
+use OpenSSL::Glob;
+use Module::Load::Conditional qw(can_load);
+
+my $TAP_Harness = can_load(modules => { 'TAP::Harness' => undef }) 
+    ? 'TAP::Harness' : 'OpenSSL::TAP::Harness';
+
+my $srctop = $ENV{SRCTOP} || $ENV{TOP};
+my $bldtop = $ENV{BLDTOP} || $ENV{TOP};
+my $recipesdir = catdir($srctop, "test", "recipes");
+my $libdir = rel2abs(catdir($srctop, "util", "perl"));
+
+my %tapargs =
+    ( verbosity => $ENV{VERBOSE} || $ENV{V} || $ENV{HARNESS_VERBOSE} ? 1 : 0,
+      lib       => [ $libdir ],
+      switches  => '-w',
+      merge     => 1
+    );
+
+my @tests = ( "alltests" );
+if (@ARGV) {
+    @tests = @ARGV;
+}
+my $list_mode = scalar(grep /^list$/, @tests) != 0;
+if (grep /^(alltests|list)$/, @tests) {
+    @tests = grep {
+	basename($_) =~ /^[0-9][0-9]-[^\.]*\.t$/
+    } glob(catfile($recipesdir,"*.t"));
+} else {
+    my @t = ();
+    foreach (@tests) {
+	push @t, grep {
+	    basename($_) =~ /^[0-9][0-9]-[^\.]*\.t$/
+	} glob(catfile($recipesdir,"*-$_.t"));
+    }
+    @tests = @t;
+}
+
+if ($list_mode) {
+    @tests = map { $_ = basename($_); $_ =~ s/^[0-9][0-9]-//; $_ =~ s/\.t$//;
+                   $_ } @tests;
+    print join("\n", @tests), "\n";
+} else {
+    @tests = map { abs2rel($_, rel2abs(curdir())); } @tests;
+
+    my $harness = $TAP_Harness->new(\%tapargs);
+    my $ret = $harness->runtests(sort @tests);
+
+    # $ret->has_errors may be any number, not just 0 or 1.  On VMS, numbers
+    # from 2 and on are used as is as VMS statuses, which has severity encoded
+    # in the lower 3 bits.  0 and 1, on the other hand, generate SUCCESS and
+    # FAILURE, so for currect reporting on all platforms, we make sure the only
+    # exit codes are 0 and 1.  Double-bang is the trick to do so.
+    exit !!$ret->has_errors if (ref($ret) eq "TAP::Parser::Aggregator");
+
+    # If this isn't a TAP::Parser::Aggregator, it's the pre-TAP test harness,
+    # which simply dies at the end if any test failed, so we don't need to
+    # bother with any exit code in that case.
+}
+
+
+# Fake TAP::Harness in case it's not loaded
+use Test::Harness;
+package OpenSSL::TAP::Harness;
+
+sub new {
+    my $class = shift;
+    my %args = %{ shift() };
+
+    return bless { %args }, $class;
+}
+
+sub runtests {
+    my $self = shift;
+
+    my @switches = ();
+    if ($self->{switches}) {
+	push @switches, $self->{switches};
+    }
+    if ($self->{lib}) {
+	foreach (@{$self->{lib}}) {
+	    my $l = $_;
+
+	    # It seems that $switches is getting interpreted with 'eval' or
+	    # something like that, and that we need to take care of backslashes
+	    # or they will disappear along the way.
+	    $l =~ s|\\|\\\\|g if $^O eq "MSWin32";
+	    push @switches, "-I$l";
+	}
+    }
+
+    $Test::Harness::switches = join(' ', @switches);
+    Test::Harness::runtests(@_);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/sanitytest.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/sanitytest.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f1228f1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/sanitytest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <internal/numbers.h>
+
+
+#define TEST(e) \
+    do { \
+        if (!(e)) { \
+            fprintf(stderr, "Failed " #e "\n"); \
+            failures++; \
+        } \
+    } while (0)
+
+
+enum smallchoices { sa, sb, sc };
+enum medchoices { ma, mb, mc, md, me, mf, mg, mh, mi, mj, mk, ml };
+enum largechoices {
+    a01, b01, c01, d01, e01, f01, g01, h01, i01, j01,
+    a02, b02, c02, d02, e02, f02, g02, h02, i02, j02,
+    a03, b03, c03, d03, e03, f03, g03, h03, i03, j03,
+    a04, b04, c04, d04, e04, f04, g04, h04, i04, j04,
+    a05, b05, c05, d05, e05, f05, g05, h05, i05, j05,
+    a06, b06, c06, d06, e06, f06, g06, h06, i06, j06,
+    a07, b07, c07, d07, e07, f07, g07, h07, i07, j07,
+    a08, b08, c08, d08, e08, f08, g08, h08, i08, j08,
+    a09, b09, c09, d09, e09, f09, g09, h09, i09, j09,
+    a10, b10, c10, d10, e10, f10, g10, h10, i10, j10,
+    xxx };
+
+int main()
+{
+    char *p;
+    char bytes[sizeof(p)];
+    int failures = 0;
+
+    /* Is NULL equivalent to all-bytes-zero? */
+    p = NULL;
+    memset(bytes, 0, sizeof(bytes));
+    TEST(memcmp(&p, bytes, sizeof(bytes)) == 0);
+
+    /* Enum size */
+    TEST(sizeof(enum smallchoices) == sizeof(int));
+    TEST(sizeof(enum medchoices) == sizeof(int));
+    TEST(sizeof(enum largechoices) == sizeof(int));
+    /* Basic two's complement checks. */
+    TEST(~(-1) == 0);
+    TEST(~(-1L) == 0L);
+
+    /* Check that values with sign bit 1 and value bits 0 are valid */
+    TEST(-(INT_MIN + 1) == INT_MAX);
+    TEST(-(LONG_MIN + 1) == LONG_MAX);
+
+    /* Check that unsigned-to-signed conversions preserve bit patterns */
+    TEST((int)((unsigned int)INT_MAX + 1) == INT_MIN);
+    TEST((long)((unsigned long)LONG_MAX + 1) == LONG_MIN);
+
+    return failures;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/secmemtest.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/secmemtest.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9405f34
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/secmemtest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,176 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+
+#define perror_line()    perror_line1(__LINE__)
+#define perror_line1(l)  perror_line2(l)
+#define perror_line2(l)  perror("failed " #l)
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_LINUX) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX)
+    char *p = NULL, *q = NULL, *r = NULL, *s = NULL;
+
+    s = OPENSSL_secure_malloc(20);
+    /* s = non-secure 20 */
+    if (s == NULL) {
+        perror_line();
+        return 1;
+    }
+    if (CRYPTO_secure_allocated(s)) {
+        perror_line();
+        return 1;
+    }
+    r = OPENSSL_secure_malloc(20);
+    /* r = non-secure 20, s = non-secure 20 */
+    if (r == NULL) {
+        perror_line();
+        return 1;
+    }
+    if (!CRYPTO_secure_malloc_init(4096, 32)) {
+        perror_line();
+        return 1;
+    }
+    if (CRYPTO_secure_allocated(r)) {
+        perror_line();
+        return 1;
+    }
+    p = OPENSSL_secure_malloc(20);
+    /* r = non-secure 20, p = secure 20, s = non-secure 20 */
+    if (!CRYPTO_secure_allocated(p)) {
+        perror_line();
+        return 1;
+    }
+    /* 20 secure -> 32-byte minimum allocaton unit */
+    if (CRYPTO_secure_used() != 32) {
+        perror_line();
+        return 1;
+    }
+    q = OPENSSL_malloc(20);
+    /* r = non-secure 20, p = secure 20, q = non-secure 20, s = non-secure 20 */
+    if (CRYPTO_secure_allocated(q)) {
+        perror_line();
+        return 1;
+    }
+    OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(s, 20);
+    s = OPENSSL_secure_malloc(20);
+    /* r = non-secure 20, p = secure 20, q = non-secure 20, s = secure 20 */
+    if (!CRYPTO_secure_allocated(s)) {
+        perror_line();
+        return 1;
+    }
+    /* 2 * 20 secure -> 64 bytes allocated */
+    if (CRYPTO_secure_used() != 64) {
+        perror_line();
+        return 1;
+    }
+    OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(p, 20);
+    /* 20 secure -> 32 bytes allocated */
+    if (CRYPTO_secure_used() != 32) {
+        perror_line();
+        return 1;
+    }
+    OPENSSL_free(q);
+    /* should not complete, as secure memory is still allocated */
+    if (CRYPTO_secure_malloc_done()) {
+        perror_line();
+        return 1;
+    }
+    if (!CRYPTO_secure_malloc_initialized()) {
+        perror_line();
+        return 1;
+    }
+    OPENSSL_secure_free(s);
+    /* secure memory should now be 0, so done should complete */
+    if (CRYPTO_secure_used() != 0) {
+        perror_line();
+        return 1;
+    }
+    if (!CRYPTO_secure_malloc_done()) {
+        perror_line();
+        return 1;
+    }
+    if (CRYPTO_secure_malloc_initialized()) {
+        perror_line();
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    fprintf(stderr, "Possible infinite loop: allocate more than available\n");
+    if (!CRYPTO_secure_malloc_init(32768, 16)) {
+        perror_line();
+        return 1;
+    }
+    if (OPENSSL_secure_malloc((size_t)-1) != NULL) {
+        perror_line();
+        return 1;
+    }
+    if (!CRYPTO_secure_malloc_done()) {
+        perror_line();
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * If init fails, then initialized should be false, if not, this
+     * could cause an infinite loop secure_malloc, but we don't test it
+     */
+    if (!CRYPTO_secure_malloc_init(16, 16) &&
+        CRYPTO_secure_malloc_initialized()) {
+        CRYPTO_secure_malloc_done();
+        perror_line();
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    /*-
+     * There was also a possible infinite loop when the number of
+     * elements was 1<<31, as |int i| was set to that, which is a
+     * negative number. However, it requires minimum input values:
+     *
+     * CRYPTO_secure_malloc_init((size_t)1<<34, (size_t)1<<4);
+     *
+     * Which really only works on 64-bit systems, since it took 16 GB
+     * secure memory arena to trigger the problem. It naturally takes
+     * corresponding amount of available virtual and physical memory
+     * for test to be feasible/representative. Since we can't assume
+     * that every system is equipped with that much memory, the test
+     * remains disabled. If the reader of this comment really wants
+     * to make sure that infinite loop is fixed, they can enable the
+     * code below.
+     */
+# if 0
+    /*-
+     * On Linux and BSD this test has a chance to complete in minimal
+     * time and with minimum side effects, because mlock is likely to
+     * fail because of RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, which is customarily [much]
+     * smaller than 16GB. In other words Linux and BSD users can be
+     * limited by virtual space alone...
+     */
+    if (sizeof(size_t) > 4) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Possible infinite loop: 1<<31 limit\n");
+        if (CRYPTO_secure_malloc_init((size_t)1<<34, (size_t)1<<4) == 0) {
+            perror_line();
+        } else if (!CRYPTO_secure_malloc_done()) {
+            perror_line();
+            return 1;
+        }
+    }
+# endif
+
+    /* this can complete - it was not really secure */
+    OPENSSL_secure_free(r);
+#else
+    /* Should fail. */
+    if (CRYPTO_secure_malloc_init(4096, 32)) {
+        perror_line();
+        return 1;
+    }
+#endif
+    return 0;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/serverinfo.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/serverinfo.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cd3020e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/serverinfo.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+-----BEGIN SERVERINFO FOR CT-----
+ABIAZMevsj4TC5rgwjZNciLGwh15YXoIK9t5aypGJIG4QzyMowmwwDdqxudkUcGa
+DvuqlYL7psO5j4/BIHTe677CAZBBH3Ho2NOM5q1zub4AbfUMlKeufuQgeQ2Tj1oe
+LJLRzrwDnPs=
+-----END SERVERINFO FOR CT-----
+
+-----BEGIN SERVERINFO FOR TACK-----
+8wABTwFMh1Dz+3W6zULWJKjav5TNaFEXL1h98YtCXeyZnORYg4mbKpxH5CMbjpgx
+To3amSqUPF4Ntjc/i9+poutxebYkbgAAAkMcxb8+RaM9YEywaJEGViKJJmpYG/gJ
+HgfGaefI9kKbXSDmP9ntg8dLvDzuyYw14ktM2850Q9WvBiltpekilZxVuT2bFtfs
+cmS++SAK9YOM8RrKhL1TLmrktoBEJZ6z5GTukYdQ8/t1us1C1iSo2r+UzWhRFy9Y
+ffGLQl3smZzkWIOJmyqcR+QjG46YMU6N2pkqlDxeDbY3P4vfqaLrcXm2JG4AAAGN
+xXQJPbdniI9rEydVXb1Cu1yT/t7FBEx6hLxuoypXjCI1wCGpXsd8zEnloR0Ank5h
+VO/874E/BZlItzSPpcmDKl5Def6BrAJTErQlE9npo52S05YWORxJw1+VYBdqQ09A
+x3wA
+-----END SERVERINFO FOR TACK-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/sha1test.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/sha1test.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..80ab122
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/sha1test.c
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+#include "../e_os.h"
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
+
+#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+# include <openssl/ebcdic.h>
+#endif
+
+static char test[][80] = {
+    { "abc" },
+    { "abcdbcdecdefdefgefghfghighijhijkijkljklmklmnlmnomnopnopq" }
+};
+
+static char *ret[] = {
+    "a9993e364706816aba3e25717850c26c9cd0d89d",
+    "84983e441c3bd26ebaae4aa1f95129e5e54670f1",
+};
+
+static char *bigret = "34aa973cd4c4daa4f61eeb2bdbad27316534016f";
+
+static char *pt(unsigned char *md);
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+    unsigned int i;
+    int err = 0;
+    char **R;
+    static unsigned char buf[1000];
+    char *p, *r;
+    EVP_MD_CTX *c;
+    unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+
+    c = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+    R = ret;
+    for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(test); i++) {
+# ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+        ebcdic2ascii(test[i], test[i], strlen(test[i]));
+# endif
+        if (!EVP_Digest(test[i], strlen(test[i]), md, NULL, EVP_sha1(),
+            NULL)) {
+            printf("EVP_Digest() error\n");
+            err++;
+            goto err;
+        }
+        p = pt(md);
+        if (strcmp(p, (char *)*R) != 0) {
+            printf("error calculating SHA1 on '%s'\n", test[i]);
+            printf("got %s instead of %s\n", p, *R);
+            err++;
+        } else
+            printf("test %d ok\n", i + 1);
+        R++;
+    }
+
+    memset(buf, 'a', 1000);
+#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+    ebcdic2ascii(buf, buf, 1000);
+#endif                         /* CHARSET_EBCDIC */
+    if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(c, EVP_sha1(), NULL)) {
+        printf("EVP_DigestInit_ex() error\n");
+        err++;
+        goto err;
+    }
+    for (i = 0; i < 1000; i++) {
+        if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(c, buf, 1000)) {
+            printf("EVP_DigestUpdate() error\n");
+            err++;
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+    if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(c, md, NULL)) {
+            printf("EVP_DigestFinal() error\n");
+            err++;
+            goto err;
+    }
+    p = pt(md);
+
+    r = bigret;
+    if (strcmp(p, r) != 0) {
+        printf("error calculating SHA1 on 'a' * 1000\n");
+        printf("got %s instead of %s\n", p, r);
+        err++;
+    } else
+        printf("test 3 ok\n");
+ err:
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(c);
+    EXIT(err);
+    return (0);
+}
+
+static char *pt(unsigned char *md)
+{
+    int i;
+    static char buf[80];
+
+    for (i = 0; i < SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++)
+        sprintf(&(buf[i * 2]), "%02x", md[i]);
+    return (buf);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/sha256t.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/sha256t.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..90262d9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/sha256t.c
@@ -0,0 +1,177 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+static const unsigned char app_b1[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH] = {
+    0xba, 0x78, 0x16, 0xbf, 0x8f, 0x01, 0xcf, 0xea,
+    0x41, 0x41, 0x40, 0xde, 0x5d, 0xae, 0x22, 0x23,
+    0xb0, 0x03, 0x61, 0xa3, 0x96, 0x17, 0x7a, 0x9c,
+    0xb4, 0x10, 0xff, 0x61, 0xf2, 0x00, 0x15, 0xad
+};
+
+static const unsigned char app_b2[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH] = {
+    0x24, 0x8d, 0x6a, 0x61, 0xd2, 0x06, 0x38, 0xb8,
+    0xe5, 0xc0, 0x26, 0x93, 0x0c, 0x3e, 0x60, 0x39,
+    0xa3, 0x3c, 0xe4, 0x59, 0x64, 0xff, 0x21, 0x67,
+    0xf6, 0xec, 0xed, 0xd4, 0x19, 0xdb, 0x06, 0xc1
+};
+
+static const unsigned char app_b3[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH] = {
+    0xcd, 0xc7, 0x6e, 0x5c, 0x99, 0x14, 0xfb, 0x92,
+    0x81, 0xa1, 0xc7, 0xe2, 0x84, 0xd7, 0x3e, 0x67,
+    0xf1, 0x80, 0x9a, 0x48, 0xa4, 0x97, 0x20, 0x0e,
+    0x04, 0x6d, 0x39, 0xcc, 0xc7, 0x11, 0x2c, 0xd0
+};
+
+static const unsigned char addenum_1[SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH] = {
+    0x23, 0x09, 0x7d, 0x22, 0x34, 0x05, 0xd8, 0x22,
+    0x86, 0x42, 0xa4, 0x77, 0xbd, 0xa2, 0x55, 0xb3,
+    0x2a, 0xad, 0xbc, 0xe4, 0xbd, 0xa0, 0xb3, 0xf7,
+    0xe3, 0x6c, 0x9d, 0xa7
+};
+
+static const unsigned char addenum_2[SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH] = {
+    0x75, 0x38, 0x8b, 0x16, 0x51, 0x27, 0x76, 0xcc,
+    0x5d, 0xba, 0x5d, 0xa1, 0xfd, 0x89, 0x01, 0x50,
+    0xb0, 0xc6, 0x45, 0x5c, 0xb4, 0xf5, 0x8b, 0x19,
+    0x52, 0x52, 0x25, 0x25
+};
+
+static const unsigned char addenum_3[SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH] = {
+    0x20, 0x79, 0x46, 0x55, 0x98, 0x0c, 0x91, 0xd8,
+    0xbb, 0xb4, 0xc1, 0xea, 0x97, 0x61, 0x8a, 0x4b,
+    0xf0, 0x3f, 0x42, 0x58, 0x19, 0x48, 0xb2, 0xee,
+    0x4e, 0xe7, 0xad, 0x67
+};
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    unsigned char md[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+    int i;
+    EVP_MD_CTX *evp;
+
+    fprintf(stdout, "Testing SHA-256 ");
+
+    if (!EVP_Digest("abc", 3, md, NULL, EVP_sha256(), NULL))
+        goto err;
+    if (memcmp(md, app_b1, sizeof(app_b1))) {
+        fflush(stdout);
+        fprintf(stderr, "\nTEST 1 of 3 failed.\n");
+        return 1;
+    } else
+        fprintf(stdout, ".");
+    fflush(stdout);
+
+    if (!EVP_Digest("abcdbcde" "cdefdefg" "efghfghi" "ghijhijk"
+                    "ijkljklm" "klmnlmno" "mnopnopq", 56, md,
+                     NULL, EVP_sha256(), NULL))
+        goto err;
+    if (memcmp(md, app_b2, sizeof(app_b2))) {
+        fflush(stdout);
+        fprintf(stderr, "\nTEST 2 of 3 failed.\n");
+        return 1;
+    } else
+        fprintf(stdout, ".");
+    fflush(stdout);
+
+    evp = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+    if (evp == NULL) {
+        fflush(stdout);
+        fprintf(stderr, "\nTEST 3 of 3 failed. (malloc failure)\n");
+        return 1;
+    }
+    if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(evp, EVP_sha256(), NULL))
+        goto err;
+    for (i = 0; i < 1000000; i += 288) {
+        if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(evp, "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa"
+                              "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa"
+                              "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa"
+                              "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa"
+                              "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa"
+                              "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa"
+                              "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa"
+                              "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa"
+                              "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa",
+                              (1000000 - i) < 288 ? 1000000 - i : 288))
+            goto err;
+    }
+    if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(evp, md, NULL))
+            goto err;
+
+    if (memcmp(md, app_b3, sizeof(app_b3))) {
+        fflush(stdout);
+        fprintf(stderr, "\nTEST 3 of 3 failed.\n");
+        return 1;
+    } else
+        fprintf(stdout, ".");
+    fflush(stdout);
+
+    fprintf(stdout, " passed.\n");
+    fflush(stdout);
+
+    fprintf(stdout, "Testing SHA-224 ");
+
+    if (!EVP_Digest("abc", 3, md, NULL, EVP_sha224(), NULL))
+        goto err;
+    if (memcmp(md, addenum_1, sizeof(addenum_1))) {
+        fflush(stdout);
+        fprintf(stderr, "\nTEST 1 of 3 failed.\n");
+        return 1;
+    } else
+        fprintf(stdout, ".");
+    fflush(stdout);
+
+    if (!EVP_Digest("abcdbcde" "cdefdefg" "efghfghi" "ghijhijk"
+                    "ijkljklm" "klmnlmno" "mnopnopq", 56, md,
+                    NULL, EVP_sha224(), NULL))
+        goto err;
+    if (memcmp(md, addenum_2, sizeof(addenum_2))) {
+        fflush(stdout);
+        fprintf(stderr, "\nTEST 2 of 3 failed.\n");
+        return 1;
+    } else
+        fprintf(stdout, ".");
+    fflush(stdout);
+
+    EVP_MD_CTX_reset(evp);
+    if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(evp, EVP_sha224(), NULL))
+        goto err;
+    for (i = 0; i < 1000000; i += 64) {
+        if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(evp, "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa"
+                              "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa",
+                              (1000000 - i) < 64 ? 1000000 - i : 64))
+            goto err;
+    }
+    if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(evp, md, NULL))
+            goto err;
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(evp);
+
+    if (memcmp(md, addenum_3, sizeof(addenum_3))) {
+        fflush(stdout);
+        fprintf(stderr, "\nTEST 3 of 3 failed.\n");
+        return 1;
+    } else
+        fprintf(stdout, ".");
+    fflush(stdout);
+
+    fprintf(stdout, " passed.\n");
+    fflush(stdout);
+
+    return 0;
+
+ err:
+    fprintf(stderr, "Fatal EVP error!\n");
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/sha512t.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/sha512t.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..18cdf39
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/sha512t.c
@@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+
+static const unsigned char app_c1[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH] = {
+    0xdd, 0xaf, 0x35, 0xa1, 0x93, 0x61, 0x7a, 0xba,
+    0xcc, 0x41, 0x73, 0x49, 0xae, 0x20, 0x41, 0x31,
+    0x12, 0xe6, 0xfa, 0x4e, 0x89, 0xa9, 0x7e, 0xa2,
+    0x0a, 0x9e, 0xee, 0xe6, 0x4b, 0x55, 0xd3, 0x9a,
+    0x21, 0x92, 0x99, 0x2a, 0x27, 0x4f, 0xc1, 0xa8,
+    0x36, 0xba, 0x3c, 0x23, 0xa3, 0xfe, 0xeb, 0xbd,
+    0x45, 0x4d, 0x44, 0x23, 0x64, 0x3c, 0xe8, 0x0e,
+    0x2a, 0x9a, 0xc9, 0x4f, 0xa5, 0x4c, 0xa4, 0x9f
+};
+
+static const unsigned char app_c2[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH] = {
+    0x8e, 0x95, 0x9b, 0x75, 0xda, 0xe3, 0x13, 0xda,
+    0x8c, 0xf4, 0xf7, 0x28, 0x14, 0xfc, 0x14, 0x3f,
+    0x8f, 0x77, 0x79, 0xc6, 0xeb, 0x9f, 0x7f, 0xa1,
+    0x72, 0x99, 0xae, 0xad, 0xb6, 0x88, 0x90, 0x18,
+    0x50, 0x1d, 0x28, 0x9e, 0x49, 0x00, 0xf7, 0xe4,
+    0x33, 0x1b, 0x99, 0xde, 0xc4, 0xb5, 0x43, 0x3a,
+    0xc7, 0xd3, 0x29, 0xee, 0xb6, 0xdd, 0x26, 0x54,
+    0x5e, 0x96, 0xe5, 0x5b, 0x87, 0x4b, 0xe9, 0x09
+};
+
+static const unsigned char app_c3[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH] = {
+    0xe7, 0x18, 0x48, 0x3d, 0x0c, 0xe7, 0x69, 0x64,
+    0x4e, 0x2e, 0x42, 0xc7, 0xbc, 0x15, 0xb4, 0x63,
+    0x8e, 0x1f, 0x98, 0xb1, 0x3b, 0x20, 0x44, 0x28,
+    0x56, 0x32, 0xa8, 0x03, 0xaf, 0xa9, 0x73, 0xeb,
+    0xde, 0x0f, 0xf2, 0x44, 0x87, 0x7e, 0xa6, 0x0a,
+    0x4c, 0xb0, 0x43, 0x2c, 0xe5, 0x77, 0xc3, 0x1b,
+    0xeb, 0x00, 0x9c, 0x5c, 0x2c, 0x49, 0xaa, 0x2e,
+    0x4e, 0xad, 0xb2, 0x17, 0xad, 0x8c, 0xc0, 0x9b
+};
+
+static const unsigned char app_d1[SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH] = {
+    0xcb, 0x00, 0x75, 0x3f, 0x45, 0xa3, 0x5e, 0x8b,
+    0xb5, 0xa0, 0x3d, 0x69, 0x9a, 0xc6, 0x50, 0x07,
+    0x27, 0x2c, 0x32, 0xab, 0x0e, 0xde, 0xd1, 0x63,
+    0x1a, 0x8b, 0x60, 0x5a, 0x43, 0xff, 0x5b, 0xed,
+    0x80, 0x86, 0x07, 0x2b, 0xa1, 0xe7, 0xcc, 0x23,
+    0x58, 0xba, 0xec, 0xa1, 0x34, 0xc8, 0x25, 0xa7
+};
+
+static const unsigned char app_d2[SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH] = {
+    0x09, 0x33, 0x0c, 0x33, 0xf7, 0x11, 0x47, 0xe8,
+    0x3d, 0x19, 0x2f, 0xc7, 0x82, 0xcd, 0x1b, 0x47,
+    0x53, 0x11, 0x1b, 0x17, 0x3b, 0x3b, 0x05, 0xd2,
+    0x2f, 0xa0, 0x80, 0x86, 0xe3, 0xb0, 0xf7, 0x12,
+    0xfc, 0xc7, 0xc7, 0x1a, 0x55, 0x7e, 0x2d, 0xb9,
+    0x66, 0xc3, 0xe9, 0xfa, 0x91, 0x74, 0x60, 0x39
+};
+
+static const unsigned char app_d3[SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH] = {
+    0x9d, 0x0e, 0x18, 0x09, 0x71, 0x64, 0x74, 0xcb,
+    0x08, 0x6e, 0x83, 0x4e, 0x31, 0x0a, 0x4a, 0x1c,
+    0xed, 0x14, 0x9e, 0x9c, 0x00, 0xf2, 0x48, 0x52,
+    0x79, 0x72, 0xce, 0xc5, 0x70, 0x4c, 0x2a, 0x5b,
+    0x07, 0xb8, 0xb3, 0xdc, 0x38, 0xec, 0xc4, 0xeb,
+    0xae, 0x97, 0xdd, 0xd8, 0x7f, 0x3d, 0x89, 0x85
+};
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    unsigned char md[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+    int i;
+    EVP_MD_CTX *evp;
+
+    fprintf(stdout, "Testing SHA-512 ");
+
+    if (!EVP_Digest("abc", 3, md, NULL, EVP_sha512(), NULL))
+        goto err;
+    if (memcmp(md, app_c1, sizeof(app_c1))) {
+        fflush(stdout);
+        fprintf(stderr, "\nTEST 1 of 3 failed.\n");
+        return 1;
+    } else
+        fprintf(stdout, ".");
+    fflush(stdout);
+
+    if (!EVP_Digest("abcdefgh" "bcdefghi" "cdefghij" "defghijk"
+                    "efghijkl" "fghijklm" "ghijklmn" "hijklmno"
+                    "ijklmnop" "jklmnopq" "klmnopqr" "lmnopqrs"
+                    "mnopqrst" "nopqrstu", 112, md, NULL, EVP_sha512(), NULL))
+        goto err;
+    if (memcmp(md, app_c2, sizeof(app_c2))) {
+        fflush(stdout);
+        fprintf(stderr, "\nTEST 2 of 3 failed.\n");
+        return 1;
+    } else
+        fprintf(stdout, ".");
+    fflush(stdout);
+
+    evp = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+    if (evp == NULL) {
+        fflush(stdout);
+        fprintf(stderr, "\nTEST 3 of 3 failed. (malloc failure)\n");
+        return 1;
+    }
+    if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(evp, EVP_sha512(), NULL))
+        goto err;
+    for (i = 0; i < 1000000; i += 288) {
+        if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(evp, "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa"
+                              "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa"
+                              "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa"
+                              "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa"
+                              "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa"
+                              "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa"
+                              "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa"
+                              "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa"
+                              "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa",
+                              (1000000 - i) < 288 ? 1000000 - i : 288))
+            goto err;
+    }
+    if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(evp, md, NULL))
+            goto err;
+    EVP_MD_CTX_reset(evp);
+
+    if (memcmp(md, app_c3, sizeof(app_c3))) {
+        fflush(stdout);
+        fprintf(stderr, "\nTEST 3 of 3 failed.\n");
+        return 1;
+    } else
+        fprintf(stdout, ".");
+    fflush(stdout);
+
+    fprintf(stdout, " passed.\n");
+    fflush(stdout);
+
+    fprintf(stdout, "Testing SHA-384 ");
+
+    if (!EVP_Digest("abc", 3, md, NULL, EVP_sha384(), NULL))
+        goto err;
+    if (memcmp(md, app_d1, sizeof(app_d1))) {
+        fflush(stdout);
+        fprintf(stderr, "\nTEST 1 of 3 failed.\n");
+        return 1;
+    } else
+        fprintf(stdout, ".");
+    fflush(stdout);
+
+    if (!EVP_Digest("abcdefgh" "bcdefghi" "cdefghij" "defghijk"
+                    "efghijkl" "fghijklm" "ghijklmn" "hijklmno"
+                    "ijklmnop" "jklmnopq" "klmnopqr" "lmnopqrs"
+                    "mnopqrst" "nopqrstu", 112, md, NULL, EVP_sha384(), NULL))
+        goto err;
+    if (memcmp(md, app_d2, sizeof(app_d2))) {
+        fflush(stdout);
+        fprintf(stderr, "\nTEST 2 of 3 failed.\n");
+        return 1;
+    } else
+        fprintf(stdout, ".");
+    fflush(stdout);
+
+    if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(evp, EVP_sha384(), NULL))
+        goto err;
+    for (i = 0; i < 1000000; i += 64) {
+        if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(evp, "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa"
+                              "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa",
+                              (1000000 - i) < 64 ? 1000000 - i : 64))
+            goto err;
+    }
+    if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(evp, md, NULL))
+        goto err;
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(evp);
+
+    if (memcmp(md, app_d3, sizeof(app_d3))) {
+        fflush(stdout);
+        fprintf(stderr, "\nTEST 3 of 3 failed.\n");
+        return 1;
+    } else
+        fprintf(stdout, ".");
+    fflush(stdout);
+
+    fprintf(stdout, " passed.\n");
+    fflush(stdout);
+
+    return 0;
+
+ err:
+    fflush(stdout);
+    fprintf(stderr, "\nFatal EVP error!\n");
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/shibboleth.pfx b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/shibboleth.pfx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9c5cc54
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/shibboleth.pfx
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/shlibloadtest.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/shlibloadtest.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..25df363
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/shlibloadtest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,245 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+
+/* The test is only currently implemented for DSO_DLFCN and DSO_WIN32 */
+#if defined(DSO_DLFCN) || defined(DSO_WIN32)
+
+#define SSL_CTX_NEW "SSL_CTX_new"
+#define SSL_CTX_FREE "SSL_CTX_free"
+#define TLS_METHOD "TLS_method"
+
+#define ERR_GET_ERROR "ERR_get_error"
+#define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUM_FUNC "OpenSSL_version_num"
+
+typedef struct ssl_ctx_st SSL_CTX;
+typedef struct ssl_method_st SSL_METHOD;
+typedef const SSL_METHOD * (*TLS_method_t)(void);
+typedef SSL_CTX * (*SSL_CTX_new_t)(const SSL_METHOD *meth);
+typedef void (*SSL_CTX_free_t)(SSL_CTX *);
+
+typedef unsigned long (*ERR_get_error_t)(void);
+typedef unsigned long (*OpenSSL_version_num_t)(void);
+
+static TLS_method_t TLS_method;
+static SSL_CTX_new_t SSL_CTX_new;
+static SSL_CTX_free_t SSL_CTX_free;
+
+static ERR_get_error_t ERR_get_error;
+static OpenSSL_version_num_t OpenSSL_version_num;
+
+#ifdef DSO_DLFCN
+
+# include <dlfcn.h>
+
+typedef void * SHLIB;
+typedef void * SHLIB_SYM;
+# define SHLIB_INIT NULL
+
+static int shlib_load(const char *filename, SHLIB *lib)
+{
+    *lib = dlopen(filename, RTLD_GLOBAL | RTLD_LAZY);
+
+    if (*lib == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int shlib_sym(SHLIB lib, const char *symname, SHLIB_SYM *sym)
+{
+    *sym = dlsym(lib, symname);
+
+    return *sym != NULL;
+}
+
+static int shlib_close(SHLIB lib)
+{
+    if (dlclose(lib) != 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+#elif defined(DSO_WIN32)
+
+# include <windows.h>
+
+typedef HINSTANCE SHLIB;
+typedef void * SHLIB_SYM;
+# define SHLIB_INIT 0
+
+static int shlib_load(const char *filename, SHLIB *lib)
+{
+    *lib = LoadLibraryA(filename);
+    if (*lib == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int shlib_sym(SHLIB lib, const char *symname, SHLIB_SYM *sym)
+{
+    *sym = (SHLIB_SYM)GetProcAddress(lib, symname);
+
+    return *sym != NULL;
+}
+
+static int shlib_close(SHLIB lib)
+{
+    if (FreeLibrary(lib) == 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+#endif
+
+# define CRYPTO_FIRST_OPT    "-crypto_first"
+# define SSL_FIRST_OPT       "-ssl_first"
+# define JUST_CRYPTO_OPT     "-just_crypto"
+
+enum test_types_en {
+    CRYPTO_FIRST,
+    SSL_FIRST,
+    JUST_CRYPTO
+};
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    SHLIB ssllib = SHLIB_INIT, cryptolib = SHLIB_INIT;
+    SSL_CTX *ctx;
+    union {
+        void (*func) (void);
+        SHLIB_SYM sym;
+    } tls_method_sym, ssl_ctx_new_sym, ssl_ctx_free_sym, err_get_error_sym,
+    openssl_version_num_sym;
+    enum test_types_en test_type;
+    int i;
+
+    if (argc != 4) {
+        printf("Unexpected number of arguments\n");
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    if (strcmp(argv[1], CRYPTO_FIRST_OPT) == 0) {
+        test_type = CRYPTO_FIRST;
+    } else if (strcmp(argv[1], SSL_FIRST_OPT) == 0) {
+            test_type = SSL_FIRST;
+    } else if (strcmp(argv[1], JUST_CRYPTO_OPT) == 0) {
+            test_type = JUST_CRYPTO;
+    } else {
+        printf("Unrecognised argument\n");
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
+        if ((i == 0 && (test_type == CRYPTO_FIRST
+                       || test_type == JUST_CRYPTO))
+               || (i == 1 && test_type == SSL_FIRST)) {
+            if (!shlib_load(argv[2], &cryptolib)) {
+                printf("Unable to load libcrypto\n");
+                return 1;
+            }
+        }
+        if ((i == 0 && test_type == SSL_FIRST)
+                || (i == 1 && test_type == CRYPTO_FIRST)) {
+            if (!shlib_load(argv[3], &ssllib)) {
+                printf("Unable to load libssl\n");
+                return 1;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (test_type != JUST_CRYPTO) {
+        if (!shlib_sym(ssllib, TLS_METHOD, &tls_method_sym.sym)
+                || !shlib_sym(ssllib, SSL_CTX_NEW, &ssl_ctx_new_sym.sym)
+                || !shlib_sym(ssllib, SSL_CTX_FREE, &ssl_ctx_free_sym.sym)) {
+            printf("Unable to load ssl symbols\n");
+            return 1;
+        }
+
+        TLS_method = (TLS_method_t)tls_method_sym.func;
+        SSL_CTX_new = (SSL_CTX_new_t)ssl_ctx_new_sym.func;
+        SSL_CTX_free = (SSL_CTX_free_t)ssl_ctx_free_sym.func;
+
+        ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_method());
+        if (ctx == NULL) {
+            printf("Unable to create SSL_CTX\n");
+            return 1;
+        }
+        SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
+    }
+
+    if (!shlib_sym(cryptolib, ERR_GET_ERROR, &err_get_error_sym.sym)
+            || !shlib_sym(cryptolib, OPENSSL_VERSION_NUM_FUNC,
+                          &openssl_version_num_sym.sym)) {
+        printf("Unable to load crypto symbols\n");
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    ERR_get_error = (ERR_get_error_t)err_get_error_sym.func;
+    OpenSSL_version_num = (OpenSSL_version_num_t)openssl_version_num_sym.func;
+
+    if (ERR_get_error() != 0) {
+        printf("Unexpected error in error queue\n");
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * The bits that COMPATIBILITY_MASK lets through MUST be the same in
+     * the library and in the application.
+     * The bits that are masked away MUST be a larger or equal number in
+     * the library compared to the application.
+     */
+# define COMPATIBILITY_MASK 0xfff00000L
+    if ((OpenSSL_version_num() & COMPATIBILITY_MASK)
+        != (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER & COMPATIBILITY_MASK)) {
+        printf("Unexpected library version loaded\n");
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    if ((OpenSSL_version_num() & ~COMPATIBILITY_MASK)
+        < (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER & ~COMPATIBILITY_MASK)) {
+        printf("Unexpected library version loaded\n");
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
+        if ((i == 0 && test_type == CRYPTO_FIRST)
+                || (i == 1 && test_type == SSL_FIRST)) {
+            if (!shlib_close(ssllib)) {
+                printf("Unable to close libssl\n");
+                return 1;
+            }
+        }
+        if ((i == 0 && (test_type == SSL_FIRST
+                       || test_type == JUST_CRYPTO))
+                || (i == 1 && test_type == CRYPTO_FIRST)) {
+            if (!shlib_close(cryptolib)) {
+                printf("Unable to close libcrypto\n");
+                return 1;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    printf("Success\n");
+    return 0;
+}
+#else
+int main(void)
+{
+    printf("Test not implemented on this platform\n");
+    return 0;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/smcont.txt b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/smcont.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9b09746
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/smcont.txt
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Somewhat longer test content for OpenSSL CMS utility to handle, and a bit longer...
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/smime-certs/ca.cnf b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/smime-certs/ca.cnf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..835b2c6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/smime-certs/ca.cnf
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+#
+# OpenSSL example configuration file for automated certificate creation.
+#
+
+# This definition stops the following lines choking if HOME or CN
+# is undefined.
+HOME			= .
+RANDFILE		= $ENV::HOME/.rnd
+CN			= "Not Defined"
+default_ca		= ca
+
+####################################################################
+[ req ]
+default_bits		= 2048
+default_keyfile 	= privkey.pem
+# Don't prompt for fields: use those in section directly
+prompt			= no
+distinguished_name	= req_distinguished_name
+x509_extensions	= v3_ca	# The extensions to add to the self signed cert
+string_mask = utf8only
+
+# req_extensions = v3_req # The extensions to add to a certificate request
+
+[ req_distinguished_name ]
+countryName			= UK
+
+organizationName		= OpenSSL Group
+# Take CN from environment so it can come from a script.
+commonName			= $ENV::CN
+
+[ usr_cert ]
+
+# These extensions are added when 'ca' signs a request for an end entity
+# certificate
+
+basicConstraints=critical, CA:FALSE
+keyUsage=critical, nonRepudiation, digitalSignature, keyEncipherment
+
+# PKIX recommendations harmless if included in all certificates.
+subjectKeyIdentifier=hash
+authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid
+
+[ dh_cert ]
+
+# These extensions are added when 'ca' signs a request for an end entity
+# DH certificate
+
+basicConstraints=critical, CA:FALSE
+keyUsage=critical, keyAgreement
+
+# PKIX recommendations harmless if included in all certificates.
+subjectKeyIdentifier=hash
+authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid
+
+[ v3_ca ]
+
+
+# Extensions for a typical CA
+
+# PKIX recommendation.
+
+subjectKeyIdentifier=hash
+authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid:always
+basicConstraints = critical,CA:true
+keyUsage = critical, cRLSign, keyCertSign
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/smime-certs/mksmime-certs.sh b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/smime-certs/mksmime-certs.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c98e164
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/smime-certs/mksmime-certs.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# Copyright 2013-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+# Utility to recreate S/MIME certificates
+
+OPENSSL=../../apps/openssl
+OPENSSL_CONF=./ca.cnf
+export OPENSSL_CONF
+
+# Root CA: create certificate directly
+CN="Test S/MIME RSA Root" $OPENSSL req -config ca.cnf -x509 -nodes \
+	-keyout smroot.pem -out smroot.pem -newkey rsa:2048 -days 3650
+
+# EE RSA certificates: create request first
+CN="Test S/MIME EE RSA #1" $OPENSSL req -config ca.cnf -nodes \
+	-keyout smrsa1.pem -out req.pem -newkey rsa:2048
+# Sign request: end entity extensions
+$OPENSSL x509 -req -in req.pem -CA smroot.pem -days 3600 \
+	-extfile ca.cnf -extensions usr_cert -CAcreateserial >>smrsa1.pem
+
+CN="Test S/MIME EE RSA #2" $OPENSSL req -config ca.cnf -nodes \
+	-keyout smrsa2.pem -out req.pem -newkey rsa:2048
+$OPENSSL x509 -req -in req.pem -CA smroot.pem -days 3600 \
+	-extfile ca.cnf -extensions usr_cert -CAcreateserial >>smrsa2.pem
+
+CN="Test S/MIME EE RSA #3" $OPENSSL req -config ca.cnf -nodes \
+	-keyout smrsa3.pem -out req.pem -newkey rsa:2048
+$OPENSSL x509 -req -in req.pem -CA smroot.pem -days 3600 \
+	-extfile ca.cnf -extensions usr_cert -CAcreateserial >>smrsa3.pem
+
+# Create DSA parameters
+
+$OPENSSL dsaparam -out dsap.pem 2048
+
+CN="Test S/MIME EE DSA #1" $OPENSSL req -config ca.cnf -nodes \
+	-keyout smdsa1.pem -out req.pem -newkey dsa:dsap.pem
+$OPENSSL x509 -req -in req.pem -CA smroot.pem -days 3600 \
+	-extfile ca.cnf -extensions usr_cert -CAcreateserial >>smdsa1.pem
+CN="Test S/MIME EE DSA #2" $OPENSSL req -config ca.cnf -nodes \
+	-keyout smdsa2.pem -out req.pem -newkey dsa:dsap.pem
+$OPENSSL x509 -req -in req.pem -CA smroot.pem -days 3600 \
+	-extfile ca.cnf -extensions usr_cert -CAcreateserial >>smdsa2.pem
+CN="Test S/MIME EE DSA #3" $OPENSSL req -config ca.cnf -nodes \
+	-keyout smdsa3.pem -out req.pem -newkey dsa:dsap.pem
+$OPENSSL x509 -req -in req.pem -CA smroot.pem -days 3600 \
+	-extfile ca.cnf -extensions usr_cert -CAcreateserial >>smdsa3.pem
+
+# Create EC parameters
+
+$OPENSSL ecparam -out ecp.pem -name P-256
+$OPENSSL ecparam -out ecp2.pem -name K-283
+
+CN="Test S/MIME EE EC #1" $OPENSSL req -config ca.cnf -nodes \
+	-keyout smec1.pem -out req.pem -newkey ec:ecp.pem
+$OPENSSL x509 -req -in req.pem -CA smroot.pem -days 3600 \
+	-extfile ca.cnf -extensions usr_cert -CAcreateserial >>smec1.pem
+CN="Test S/MIME EE EC #2" $OPENSSL req -config ca.cnf -nodes \
+	-keyout smec2.pem -out req.pem -newkey ec:ecp2.pem
+$OPENSSL x509 -req -in req.pem -CA smroot.pem -days 3600 \
+	-extfile ca.cnf -extensions usr_cert -CAcreateserial >>smec2.pem
+CN="Test S/MIME EE EC #3" $OPENSSL req -config ca.cnf -nodes \
+	-keyout smec3.pem -out req.pem -newkey ec:ecp.pem
+$OPENSSL x509 -req -in req.pem -CA smroot.pem -days 3600 \
+	-extfile ca.cnf -extensions usr_cert -CAcreateserial >>smec3.pem
+# Create X9.42 DH parameters.
+$OPENSSL genpkey -genparam -algorithm DH -pkeyopt dh_paramgen_type:2 \
+	-out dhp.pem
+# Generate X9.42 DH key.
+$OPENSSL genpkey -paramfile dhp.pem -out smdh.pem
+$OPENSSL pkey -pubout -in smdh.pem -out dhpub.pem
+# Generate dummy request.
+CN="Test S/MIME EE DH #1" $OPENSSL req -config ca.cnf -nodes \
+	-keyout smtmp.pem -out req.pem -newkey rsa:2048
+# Sign request but force public key to DH
+$OPENSSL x509 -req -in req.pem -CA smroot.pem -days 3600 \
+	-force_pubkey dhpub.pem \
+	-extfile ca.cnf -extensions usr_cert -CAcreateserial >>smdh.pem
+# Remove temp files.
+rm -f req.pem ecp.pem ecp2.pem dsap.pem dhp.pem dhpub.pem smtmp.pem smroot.srl
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/smime-certs/smdh.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/smime-certs/smdh.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f831b07
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/smime-certs/smdh.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIIBSgIBADCCASsGByqGSM4+AgEwggEeAoGBANQMSgwEcnEZ31kZxa9Ef8qOK/AJ
+9dMlsXMWVYnf/QevGdN/0Aei/j9a8QHG+CvvTm0DOEKhN9QUtABKsYZag865CA7B
+mSdHjQuFqILtzA25sDJ+3+jk9vbss+56ETRll/wasJVLGbmmHNkBMvc1fC1d/sGF
+cEn4zJnQvvFaeMgDAoGAaQD9ZvL8FYsJuNxN6qp5VfnfRqYvyi2PWSqtRKPGGC+V
+thYg49PRjwPOcXzvOsdEOQ7iH9jTiSvnUdwSSEwYTZkSBuQXAgOMJAWOpoXyaRvh
+atziBDoBnWS+/kX5RBhxvS0+em9yfRqAQleuGG+R1mEDihyJc8dWQQPT+O1l4oUC
+FQCJlKsQZ0VBrWPGcUCNa54ZW6TH9QQWAhRR2NMZrQSfWthXDO8Lj5WZ34zQrA==
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/smime-certs/smdsa1.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/smime-certs/smdsa1.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b424f67
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/smime-certs/smdsa1.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIFkDCCBHigAwIBAgIJANk5lu6mSyBDMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMEQxCzAJBgNV
+BAYTAlVLMRYwFAYDVQQKDA1PcGVuU1NMIEdyb3VwMR0wGwYDVQQDDBRUZXN0IFMv
+TUlNRSBSU0EgUm9vdDAeFw0xMzA3MTcxNzI4MzFaFw0yMzA1MjYxNzI4MzFaMEUx
+CzAJBgNVBAYTAlVLMRYwFAYDVQQKDA1PcGVuU1NMIEdyb3VwMR4wHAYDVQQDDBVU
+ZXN0IFMvTUlNRSBFRSBEU0EgIzEwggNGMIICOQYHKoZIzjgEATCCAiwCggEBAJB8
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+7TBneB0+v3PQjriGclcgai7MhqdnudhEiYe1fkkwVtd7LGjU7B3ZmzegST2dBShS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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/smime-certs/smdsa2.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/smime-certs/smdsa2.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..648447f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/smime-certs/smdsa2.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIFkDCCBHigAwIBAgIJANk5lu6mSyBEMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMEQxCzAJBgNV
+BAYTAlVLMRYwFAYDVQQKDA1PcGVuU1NMIEdyb3VwMR0wGwYDVQQDDBRUZXN0IFMv
+TUlNRSBSU0EgUm9vdDAeFw0xMzA3MTcxNzI4MzFaFw0yMzA1MjYxNzI4MzFaMEUx
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+g0Pl6x5mGWEDZM7lkkHqcbEM4T2VVDFhWaX75xCPp+geHVNUkCAaXiZa695b9HP4
+0SGkrjNV4Sx8ytuQHKk8HLLHMXVnj23nrzF0ij57yMsjwWMR1c4hSDh6EHc1jpIv
+yvignj2P+wlZ8dwOhYf8sr1loEXw2l+Ul7cXjRLxEO8zyPYcL7LZDhDIqTUNcaIf
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+MF4wDAYDVR0TAQH/BAIwADAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCBeAwHQYDVR0OBBYEFGaxw04k
+qpufeGZC+TTBq8oMnXyrMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFMmRUwpjexZbi71E8HaIqSTm5bZs
+MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAA4IBAQCk2Xob1ICsdHYx/YsBzY6E1eEwcI4RZbZ3hEXp
+VA72/Mbz60gjv1OwE5Ay4j+xG7IpTio6y2A9ZNepGpzidYcsL/Lx9Sv1LlN0Ukzb
+uk6Czd2sZJp+PFMTTrgCd5rXKnZs/0D84Vci611vGMA1hnUnbAnBBmgLXe9pDNRV
+6mhmCLLjJ4GOr5Wxt/hhknr7V2e1VMx3Q47GZhc0o/gExfhxXA8+gicM0nEYNakD
+2A1F0qDhQGakjuofANHhjdUDqKJ1sxurAy80fqb0ddzJt2el89iXKN+aXx/zEX96
+GI5ON7z/bkVwIi549lUOpWb2Mved61NBzCLKVP7HSuEIsC/I
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/smime-certs/smdsa3.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/smime-certs/smdsa3.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..77acc5e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/smime-certs/smdsa3.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIFkDCCBHigAwIBAgIJANk5lu6mSyBFMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMEQxCzAJBgNV
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/smime-certs/smdsap.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/smime-certs/smdsap.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..249706c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/smime-certs/smdsap.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+-----BEGIN DSA PARAMETERS-----
+MIIBHwKBgQDFJfsIPOIawMO5biw+AoYUhNVxReBOLQosU3Qv4B8krac0BNr3OjSG
+Lh1wZxHqhlAE0QmasTaKojuk20nNWeFnczSz6vDl0IVJEhS8VYor5kt9gLqtGcoA
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+GnOqvZ8eNTE2n4PGTo5puZ63LBm+QYrQsrNiUY4vakLFQ2rEK/SLwdsDFK4ZSJCB
+Qw5z
+-----END DSA PARAMETERS-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/smime-certs/smec1.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/smime-certs/smec1.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..75a8626
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/smime-certs/smec1.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIGHAgEAMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHBG0wawIBAQQgXzBRX9Z5Ib4LAVAS
+DMlYvkj0SmLmYvWULe2LfyXRmpWhRANCAAS+SIj2FY2DouPRuNDp9WVpsqef58tV
+3gIwV0EOV/xyYTzZhufZi/aBcXugWR1x758x4nHus2uEuEFi3Mr3K3+x
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIICoDCCAYigAwIBAgIJANk5lu6mSyBGMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMEQxCzAJBgNV
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+qtcHJA==
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/smime-certs/smec2.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/smime-certs/smec2.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..457297a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/smime-certs/smec2.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIGPAgEAMBAGByqGSM49AgEGBSuBBAAQBHgwdgIBAQQjhHaq507MOBznelrLG/pl
+brnnJi/iEJUUp+Pm3PEiteXqckmhTANKAAQF2zs6vobmoT+M+P2+9LZ7asvFBNi7
+uCzLYF/8j1Scn/spczoC9vNzVhNw+Lg7dnjNL4EDIyYZLl7E0v69luzbvy+q44/8
+6bQ=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIICpTCCAY2gAwIBAgIJANk5lu6mSyBHMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMEQxCzAJBgNV
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+4ZdCllHZkhop
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/smime-certs/smec3.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/smime-certs/smec3.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..90eac86
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/smime-certs/smec3.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIGHAgEAMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHBG0wawIBAQQga03Rl+2K38wgwVyJ
+zSy+knGorGWZBGG5p//ke0WUSbqhRANCAARH8uHBHkuOfuyXgJj7V3lNqUEPiQNo
+xG8ntGjVmKRHfywdUoQJ1PgfbkCEsBk334rRFmja1r+MYyqn/A9ARiGB
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIICoDCCAYigAwIBAgIJAPaEOllWs/pjMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMEQxCzAJBgNV
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+Ci1l4Q==
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/smime-certs/smroot.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/smime-certs/smroot.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d1a253f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/smime-certs/smroot.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIIEvQIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCBKcwggSjAgEAAoIBAQCyyQXED5HyVWwq
+nXyzmY317yMUJrIfsKvREG2C691dJNHgNg+oq5sjt/fzkyS84AvdOiicAsao4cYL
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+yWimtmde46Lrl33922w+T5OW5qBZllo9GWkUrDn3s5qClcuQjJIdmxYTSfbSCJiK
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+bSEpAAULBHntiqDEOu3lVColHuZIucml/gbTpQDruE4ww4wE7dOhY8Q4wEBVYbRI
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+KfvPCYimQwBjVrEnSntLPR0=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIDbjCCAlagAwIBAgIJAMc+8VKBJ/S9MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMEQxCzAJBgNV
+BAYTAlVLMRYwFAYDVQQKDA1PcGVuU1NMIEdyb3VwMR0wGwYDVQQDDBRUZXN0IFMv
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+7/OqcDoFqORTquLeycg1At/9GqhDEgxNrqA+YEsPbLGAfsNuXUsXs2ubpGsOZxKt
+Emsny2ah6fU2z7PztrUy/A80
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/smime-certs/smrsa1.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/smime-certs/smrsa1.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d0d0b9e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/smime-certs/smrsa1.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIIEvAIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCBKYwggSiAgEAAoIBAQDXr9uzB/20QXKC
+xhkfNnJvl2xl1hzdOcrQmAqo+AAAcA/D49ImuJDVQRaK2bcj54XB26i1kXuOrxID
+3/etUb8yudfx8OAVwh8G0xVA4zhr8uXW85W2tBr4v0Lt+W6lSd6Hmfrk4GmE9LTU
+/vzl9HUPW6SZShN1G0nY6oeUXvLi0vasEUKv3a51T6JFYg4c7qt5RCk/w8kwrQ0D
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+XxpJstxZAgMBAAECggEASY4xsJaTEPwY3zxLqPdag2/yibBBW7ivz/9p80HQTlXp
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+j6c2+8/+B4Bt5oqCKoOCIndH68jl65+oUxFkcHYxa3zYKGC9Uvb+x2BtBmYgvDRG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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIDbDCCAlSgAwIBAgIJANk5lu6mSyBAMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMEQxCzAJBgNV
+BAYTAlVLMRYwFAYDVQQKDA1PcGVuU1NMIEdyb3VwMR0wGwYDVQQDDBRUZXN0IFMv
+TUlNRSBSU0EgUm9vdDAeFw0xMzA3MTcxNzI4MzBaFw0yMzA1MjYxNzI4MzBaMEUx
+CzAJBgNVBAYTAlVLMRYwFAYDVQQKDA1PcGVuU1NMIEdyb3VwMR4wHAYDVQQDDBVU
+ZXN0IFMvTUlNRSBFRSBSU0EgIzEwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEK
+AoIBAQDXr9uzB/20QXKCxhkfNnJvl2xl1hzdOcrQmAqo+AAAcA/D49ImuJDVQRaK
+2bcj54XB26i1kXuOrxID3/etUb8yudfx8OAVwh8G0xVA4zhr8uXW85W2tBr4v0Lt
++W6lSd6Hmfrk4GmE9LTU/vzl9HUPW6SZShN1G0nY6oeUXvLi0vasEUKv3a51T6JF
+Yg4c7qt5RCk/w8kwrQ0DorQwCdkOPEIiC4b+nPStF12SVm5bx8rbYzioxuY/PdSe
+bvt0APeqgRxSpCxqYnHsCoNeHzSrGXcP0COzFeUOz2tdrhmH09JLbGZs4nbojPxM
+kjpJSv3/ekDG2CHYxXSHXxpJstxZAgMBAAGjYDBeMAwGA1UdEwEB/wQCMAAwDgYD
+VR0PAQH/BAQDAgXgMB0GA1UdDgQWBBTmjc+lrTQuYx/VBOBGjMvufajvhDAfBgNV
+HSMEGDAWgBTJkVMKY3sWW4u9RPB2iKkk5uW2bDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFAAOCAQEA
+dr2IRXcFtlF16kKWs1VTaFIHHNQrfSVHBkhKblPX3f/0s/i3eXgwKUu7Hnb6T3/o
+E8L+e4ioQNhahTLt9ruJNHWA/QDwOfkqM3tshCs2xOD1Cpy7Bd3Dn0YBrHKyNXRK
+WelGp+HetSXJGW4IZJP7iES7Um0DGktLabhZbe25EnthRDBjNnaAmcofHECWESZp
+lEHczGZfS9tRbzOCofxvgLbF64H7wYSyjAe6R8aain0VRbIusiD4tCHX/lOMh9xT
+GNBW8zTL+tV9H1unjPMORLnT0YQ3oAyEND0jCu0ACA1qGl+rzxhF6bQcTUNEbRMu
+9Hjq6s316fk4Ne0EUF3PbA==
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/smime-certs/smrsa2.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/smime-certs/smrsa2.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2f17cb2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/smime-certs/smrsa2.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/smime-certs/smrsa3.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/smime-certs/smrsa3.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..14c27f6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/smime-certs/smrsa3.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/srptest.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/srptest.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..73b3881
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/srptest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,312 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+
+# include <stdio.h>
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+    printf("No SRP support\n");
+    return (0);
+}
+
+#else
+
+# include <openssl/srp.h>
+# include <openssl/rand.h>
+# include <openssl/err.h>
+
+static void showbn(const char *name, const BIGNUM *bn)
+{
+    fputs(name, stdout);
+    fputs(" = ", stdout);
+    BN_print_fp(stdout, bn);
+    putc('\n', stdout);
+}
+
+# define RANDOM_SIZE 32         /* use 256 bits on each side */
+
+static int run_srp(const char *username, const char *client_pass,
+                   const char *server_pass)
+{
+    int ret = -1;
+    BIGNUM *s = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *v = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *a = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *b = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *u = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *x = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *Apub = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *Bpub = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *Kclient = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *Kserver = NULL;
+    unsigned char rand_tmp[RANDOM_SIZE];
+    /* use builtin 1024-bit params */
+    const SRP_gN *GN = SRP_get_default_gN("1024");
+
+    if (GN == NULL) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Failed to get SRP parameters\n");
+        return -1;
+    }
+    /* Set up server's password entry */
+    if (!SRP_create_verifier_BN(username, server_pass, &s, &v, GN->N, GN->g)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Failed to create SRP verifier\n");
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    showbn("N", GN->N);
+    showbn("g", GN->g);
+    showbn("Salt", s);
+    showbn("Verifier", v);
+
+    /* Server random */
+    RAND_bytes(rand_tmp, sizeof(rand_tmp));
+    b = BN_bin2bn(rand_tmp, sizeof(rand_tmp), NULL);
+    /* TODO - check b != 0 */
+    showbn("b", b);
+
+    /* Server's first message */
+    Bpub = SRP_Calc_B(b, GN->N, GN->g, v);
+    showbn("B", Bpub);
+
+    if (!SRP_Verify_B_mod_N(Bpub, GN->N)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Invalid B\n");
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    /* Client random */
+    RAND_bytes(rand_tmp, sizeof(rand_tmp));
+    a = BN_bin2bn(rand_tmp, sizeof(rand_tmp), NULL);
+    /* TODO - check a != 0 */
+    showbn("a", a);
+
+    /* Client's response */
+    Apub = SRP_Calc_A(a, GN->N, GN->g);
+    showbn("A", Apub);
+
+    if (!SRP_Verify_A_mod_N(Apub, GN->N)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Invalid A\n");
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    /* Both sides calculate u */
+    u = SRP_Calc_u(Apub, Bpub, GN->N);
+
+    /* Client's key */
+    x = SRP_Calc_x(s, username, client_pass);
+    Kclient = SRP_Calc_client_key(GN->N, Bpub, GN->g, x, a, u);
+    showbn("Client's key", Kclient);
+
+    /* Server's key */
+    Kserver = SRP_Calc_server_key(Apub, v, u, b, GN->N);
+    showbn("Server's key", Kserver);
+
+    if (BN_cmp(Kclient, Kserver) == 0) {
+        ret = 0;
+    } else {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Keys mismatch\n");
+        ret = 1;
+    }
+
+    BN_clear_free(Kclient);
+    BN_clear_free(Kserver);
+    BN_clear_free(x);
+    BN_free(u);
+    BN_free(Apub);
+    BN_clear_free(a);
+    BN_free(Bpub);
+    BN_clear_free(b);
+    BN_free(s);
+    BN_clear_free(v);
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int check_bn(const char *name, const BIGNUM *bn, const char *hexbn)
+{
+    BIGNUM *tmp = NULL;
+    int rv;
+    if (BN_hex2bn(&tmp, hexbn) == 0)
+        return 0;
+    rv = BN_cmp(bn, tmp);
+    if (rv == 0) {
+        printf("%s = ", name);
+        BN_print_fp(stdout, bn);
+        printf("\n");
+        BN_free(tmp);
+        return 1;
+    }
+    printf("Unexpected %s value\n", name);
+    printf("Expecting: ");
+    BN_print_fp(stdout, tmp);
+    printf("\nReceived: ");
+    BN_print_fp(stdout, bn);
+    printf("\n");
+    BN_free(tmp);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/* SRP test vectors from RFC5054 */
+static int run_srp_kat(void)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    BIGNUM *s = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *v = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *a = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *b = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *u = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *x = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *Apub = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *Bpub = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *Kclient = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *Kserver = NULL;
+    /* use builtin 1024-bit params */
+    const SRP_gN *GN = SRP_get_default_gN("1024");
+
+    if (GN == NULL) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Failed to get SRP parameters\n");
+        goto err;
+    }
+    BN_hex2bn(&s, "BEB25379D1A8581EB5A727673A2441EE");
+    /* Set up server's password entry */
+    if (!SRP_create_verifier_BN("alice", "password123", &s, &v, GN->N,
+                                GN->g)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Failed to create SRP verifier\n");
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!check_bn("v", v,
+                 "7E273DE8696FFC4F4E337D05B4B375BEB0DDE1569E8FA00A9886D812"
+                 "9BADA1F1822223CA1A605B530E379BA4729FDC59F105B4787E5186F5"
+                 "C671085A1447B52A48CF1970B4FB6F8400BBF4CEBFBB168152E08AB5"
+                 "EA53D15C1AFF87B2B9DA6E04E058AD51CC72BFC9033B564E26480D78"
+                 "E955A5E29E7AB245DB2BE315E2099AFB"))
+        goto err;
+
+    /* Server random */
+    BN_hex2bn(&b, "E487CB59D31AC550471E81F00F6928E01DDA08E974A004F49E61F5D1"
+                  "05284D20");
+
+    /* Server's first message */
+    Bpub = SRP_Calc_B(b, GN->N, GN->g, v);
+
+    if (!SRP_Verify_B_mod_N(Bpub, GN->N)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Invalid B\n");
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!check_bn("B", Bpub,
+                  "BD0C61512C692C0CB6D041FA01BB152D4916A1E77AF46AE105393011"
+                  "BAF38964DC46A0670DD125B95A981652236F99D9B681CBF87837EC99"
+                  "6C6DA04453728610D0C6DDB58B318885D7D82C7F8DEB75CE7BD4FBAA"
+                  "37089E6F9C6059F388838E7A00030B331EB76840910440B1B27AAEAE"
+                  "EB4012B7D7665238A8E3FB004B117B58"))
+        goto err;
+
+    /* Client random */
+    BN_hex2bn(&a, "60975527035CF2AD1989806F0407210BC81EDC04E2762A56AFD529DD"
+                  "DA2D4393");
+
+    /* Client's response */
+    Apub = SRP_Calc_A(a, GN->N, GN->g);
+
+    if (!SRP_Verify_A_mod_N(Apub, GN->N)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Invalid A\n");
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (!check_bn("A", Apub,
+                  "61D5E490F6F1B79547B0704C436F523DD0E560F0C64115BB72557EC4"
+                  "4352E8903211C04692272D8B2D1A5358A2CF1B6E0BFCF99F921530EC"
+                  "8E39356179EAE45E42BA92AEACED825171E1E8B9AF6D9C03E1327F44"
+                  "BE087EF06530E69F66615261EEF54073CA11CF5858F0EDFDFE15EFEA"
+                  "B349EF5D76988A3672FAC47B0769447B"))
+        goto err;
+
+    /* Both sides calculate u */
+    u = SRP_Calc_u(Apub, Bpub, GN->N);
+
+    if (!check_bn("u", u, "CE38B9593487DA98554ED47D70A7AE5F462EF019"))
+        goto err;
+
+    /* Client's key */
+    x = SRP_Calc_x(s, "alice", "password123");
+    Kclient = SRP_Calc_client_key(GN->N, Bpub, GN->g, x, a, u);
+    if (!check_bn("Client's key", Kclient,
+                  "B0DC82BABCF30674AE450C0287745E7990A3381F63B387AAF271A10D"
+                  "233861E359B48220F7C4693C9AE12B0A6F67809F0876E2D013800D6C"
+                  "41BB59B6D5979B5C00A172B4A2A5903A0BDCAF8A709585EB2AFAFA8F"
+                  "3499B200210DCC1F10EB33943CD67FC88A2F39A4BE5BEC4EC0A3212D"
+                  "C346D7E474B29EDE8A469FFECA686E5A"))
+        goto err;
+    /* Server's key */
+    Kserver = SRP_Calc_server_key(Apub, v, u, b, GN->N);
+    if (!check_bn("Server's key", Kserver,
+                  "B0DC82BABCF30674AE450C0287745E7990A3381F63B387AAF271A10D"
+                  "233861E359B48220F7C4693C9AE12B0A6F67809F0876E2D013800D6C"
+                  "41BB59B6D5979B5C00A172B4A2A5903A0BDCAF8A709585EB2AFAFA8F"
+                  "3499B200210DCC1F10EB33943CD67FC88A2F39A4BE5BEC4EC0A3212D"
+                  "C346D7E474B29EDE8A469FFECA686E5A"))
+        goto err;
+
+    ret = 1;
+
+    err:
+    BN_clear_free(Kclient);
+    BN_clear_free(Kserver);
+    BN_clear_free(x);
+    BN_free(u);
+    BN_free(Apub);
+    BN_clear_free(a);
+    BN_free(Bpub);
+    BN_clear_free(b);
+    BN_free(s);
+    BN_clear_free(v);
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    BIO *bio_err;
+    bio_err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT);
+
+    CRYPTO_set_mem_debug(1);
+    CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON);
+
+
+    /* "Negative" test, expect a mismatch */
+    if (run_srp("alice", "password1", "password2") == 0) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Mismatched SRP run failed\n");
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    /* "Positive" test, should pass */
+    if (run_srp("alice", "password", "password") != 0) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Plain SRP run failed\n");
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    /* KAT from RFC5054: should pass */
+    if (run_srp_kat() != 1) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "SRP KAT failed\n");
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG
+    if (CRYPTO_mem_leaks(bio_err) <= 0)
+        return 1;
+#endif
+    BIO_free(bio_err);
+
+    return 0;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/01-simple.conf b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/01-simple.conf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5f4dd84
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/01-simple.conf
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+# Generated with generate_ssl_tests.pl
+
+num_tests = 3
+
+test-0 = 0-default
+test-1 = 1-Server signature algorithms bug
+test-2 = 2-verify-cert
+# ===========================================================
+
+[0-default]
+ssl_conf = 0-default-ssl
+
+[0-default-ssl]
+server = 0-default-server
+client = 0-default-client
+
+[0-default-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[0-default-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-0]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[1-Server signature algorithms bug]
+ssl_conf = 1-Server signature algorithms bug-ssl
+
+[1-Server signature algorithms bug-ssl]
+server = 1-Server signature algorithms bug-server
+client = 1-Server signature algorithms bug-client
+
+[1-Server signature algorithms bug-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+ClientSignatureAlgorithms = ECDSA+SHA256
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[1-Server signature algorithms bug-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+SignatureAlgorithms = RSA+SHA256
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-1]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[2-verify-cert]
+ssl_conf = 2-verify-cert-ssl
+
+[2-verify-cert-ssl]
+server = 2-verify-cert-server
+client = 2-verify-cert-client
+
+[2-verify-cert-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[2-verify-cert-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-2]
+ExpectedClientAlert = UnknownCA
+ExpectedResult = ClientFail
+
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/01-simple.conf.in b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/01-simple.conf.in
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..086d66d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/01-simple.conf.in
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+# -*- mode: perl; -*-
+# Copyright 2016-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+## SSL test configurations
+
+package ssltests;
+
+our @tests = (
+    {
+        name => "default",
+        server => { },
+        client => { },
+        test   => { "ExpectedResult" => "Success" },
+    },
+
+    {
+        name => "Server signature algorithms bug",
+        # Should have no effect as we aren't doing client auth
+        server => { "ClientSignatureAlgorithms" => "ECDSA+SHA256" },
+        client => { "SignatureAlgorithms" => "RSA+SHA256" },
+        test   => { "ExpectedResult" => "Success" },
+    },
+
+    {
+        name => "verify-cert",
+        server => { },
+        client => {
+            # Don't set up the client root file.
+            "VerifyCAFile" => undef,
+        },
+        test   => {
+          "ExpectedResult" => "ClientFail",
+          "ExpectedClientAlert" => "UnknownCA",
+        },
+    },
+);
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/02-protocol-version.conf b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/02-protocol-version.conf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cb89dbc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/02-protocol-version.conf
@@ -0,0 +1,9975 @@
+# Generated with generate_ssl_tests.pl
+
+num_tests = 361
+
+test-0 = 0-version-negotiation
+test-1 = 1-version-negotiation
+test-2 = 2-version-negotiation
+test-3 = 3-version-negotiation
+test-4 = 4-version-negotiation
+test-5 = 5-version-negotiation
+test-6 = 6-version-negotiation
+test-7 = 7-version-negotiation
+test-8 = 8-version-negotiation
+test-9 = 9-version-negotiation
+test-10 = 10-version-negotiation
+test-11 = 11-version-negotiation
+test-12 = 12-version-negotiation
+test-13 = 13-version-negotiation
+test-14 = 14-version-negotiation
+test-15 = 15-version-negotiation
+test-16 = 16-version-negotiation
+test-17 = 17-version-negotiation
+test-18 = 18-version-negotiation
+test-19 = 19-version-negotiation
+test-20 = 20-version-negotiation
+test-21 = 21-version-negotiation
+test-22 = 22-version-negotiation
+test-23 = 23-version-negotiation
+test-24 = 24-version-negotiation
+test-25 = 25-version-negotiation
+test-26 = 26-version-negotiation
+test-27 = 27-version-negotiation
+test-28 = 28-version-negotiation
+test-29 = 29-version-negotiation
+test-30 = 30-version-negotiation
+test-31 = 31-version-negotiation
+test-32 = 32-version-negotiation
+test-33 = 33-version-negotiation
+test-34 = 34-version-negotiation
+test-35 = 35-version-negotiation
+test-36 = 36-version-negotiation
+test-37 = 37-version-negotiation
+test-38 = 38-version-negotiation
+test-39 = 39-version-negotiation
+test-40 = 40-version-negotiation
+test-41 = 41-version-negotiation
+test-42 = 42-version-negotiation
+test-43 = 43-version-negotiation
+test-44 = 44-version-negotiation
+test-45 = 45-version-negotiation
+test-46 = 46-version-negotiation
+test-47 = 47-version-negotiation
+test-48 = 48-version-negotiation
+test-49 = 49-version-negotiation
+test-50 = 50-version-negotiation
+test-51 = 51-version-negotiation
+test-52 = 52-version-negotiation
+test-53 = 53-version-negotiation
+test-54 = 54-version-negotiation
+test-55 = 55-version-negotiation
+test-56 = 56-version-negotiation
+test-57 = 57-version-negotiation
+test-58 = 58-version-negotiation
+test-59 = 59-version-negotiation
+test-60 = 60-version-negotiation
+test-61 = 61-version-negotiation
+test-62 = 62-version-negotiation
+test-63 = 63-version-negotiation
+test-64 = 64-version-negotiation
+test-65 = 65-version-negotiation
+test-66 = 66-version-negotiation
+test-67 = 67-version-negotiation
+test-68 = 68-version-negotiation
+test-69 = 69-version-negotiation
+test-70 = 70-version-negotiation
+test-71 = 71-version-negotiation
+test-72 = 72-version-negotiation
+test-73 = 73-version-negotiation
+test-74 = 74-version-negotiation
+test-75 = 75-version-negotiation
+test-76 = 76-version-negotiation
+test-77 = 77-version-negotiation
+test-78 = 78-version-negotiation
+test-79 = 79-version-negotiation
+test-80 = 80-version-negotiation
+test-81 = 81-version-negotiation
+test-82 = 82-version-negotiation
+test-83 = 83-version-negotiation
+test-84 = 84-version-negotiation
+test-85 = 85-version-negotiation
+test-86 = 86-version-negotiation
+test-87 = 87-version-negotiation
+test-88 = 88-version-negotiation
+test-89 = 89-version-negotiation
+test-90 = 90-version-negotiation
+test-91 = 91-version-negotiation
+test-92 = 92-version-negotiation
+test-93 = 93-version-negotiation
+test-94 = 94-version-negotiation
+test-95 = 95-version-negotiation
+test-96 = 96-version-negotiation
+test-97 = 97-version-negotiation
+test-98 = 98-version-negotiation
+test-99 = 99-version-negotiation
+test-100 = 100-version-negotiation
+test-101 = 101-version-negotiation
+test-102 = 102-version-negotiation
+test-103 = 103-version-negotiation
+test-104 = 104-version-negotiation
+test-105 = 105-version-negotiation
+test-106 = 106-version-negotiation
+test-107 = 107-version-negotiation
+test-108 = 108-version-negotiation
+test-109 = 109-version-negotiation
+test-110 = 110-version-negotiation
+test-111 = 111-version-negotiation
+test-112 = 112-version-negotiation
+test-113 = 113-version-negotiation
+test-114 = 114-version-negotiation
+test-115 = 115-version-negotiation
+test-116 = 116-version-negotiation
+test-117 = 117-version-negotiation
+test-118 = 118-version-negotiation
+test-119 = 119-version-negotiation
+test-120 = 120-version-negotiation
+test-121 = 121-version-negotiation
+test-122 = 122-version-negotiation
+test-123 = 123-version-negotiation
+test-124 = 124-version-negotiation
+test-125 = 125-version-negotiation
+test-126 = 126-version-negotiation
+test-127 = 127-version-negotiation
+test-128 = 128-version-negotiation
+test-129 = 129-version-negotiation
+test-130 = 130-version-negotiation
+test-131 = 131-version-negotiation
+test-132 = 132-version-negotiation
+test-133 = 133-version-negotiation
+test-134 = 134-version-negotiation
+test-135 = 135-version-negotiation
+test-136 = 136-version-negotiation
+test-137 = 137-version-negotiation
+test-138 = 138-version-negotiation
+test-139 = 139-version-negotiation
+test-140 = 140-version-negotiation
+test-141 = 141-version-negotiation
+test-142 = 142-version-negotiation
+test-143 = 143-version-negotiation
+test-144 = 144-version-negotiation
+test-145 = 145-version-negotiation
+test-146 = 146-version-negotiation
+test-147 = 147-version-negotiation
+test-148 = 148-version-negotiation
+test-149 = 149-version-negotiation
+test-150 = 150-version-negotiation
+test-151 = 151-version-negotiation
+test-152 = 152-version-negotiation
+test-153 = 153-version-negotiation
+test-154 = 154-version-negotiation
+test-155 = 155-version-negotiation
+test-156 = 156-version-negotiation
+test-157 = 157-version-negotiation
+test-158 = 158-version-negotiation
+test-159 = 159-version-negotiation
+test-160 = 160-version-negotiation
+test-161 = 161-version-negotiation
+test-162 = 162-version-negotiation
+test-163 = 163-version-negotiation
+test-164 = 164-version-negotiation
+test-165 = 165-version-negotiation
+test-166 = 166-version-negotiation
+test-167 = 167-version-negotiation
+test-168 = 168-version-negotiation
+test-169 = 169-version-negotiation
+test-170 = 170-version-negotiation
+test-171 = 171-version-negotiation
+test-172 = 172-version-negotiation
+test-173 = 173-version-negotiation
+test-174 = 174-version-negotiation
+test-175 = 175-version-negotiation
+test-176 = 176-version-negotiation
+test-177 = 177-version-negotiation
+test-178 = 178-version-negotiation
+test-179 = 179-version-negotiation
+test-180 = 180-version-negotiation
+test-181 = 181-version-negotiation
+test-182 = 182-version-negotiation
+test-183 = 183-version-negotiation
+test-184 = 184-version-negotiation
+test-185 = 185-version-negotiation
+test-186 = 186-version-negotiation
+test-187 = 187-version-negotiation
+test-188 = 188-version-negotiation
+test-189 = 189-version-negotiation
+test-190 = 190-version-negotiation
+test-191 = 191-version-negotiation
+test-192 = 192-version-negotiation
+test-193 = 193-version-negotiation
+test-194 = 194-version-negotiation
+test-195 = 195-version-negotiation
+test-196 = 196-version-negotiation
+test-197 = 197-version-negotiation
+test-198 = 198-version-negotiation
+test-199 = 199-version-negotiation
+test-200 = 200-version-negotiation
+test-201 = 201-version-negotiation
+test-202 = 202-version-negotiation
+test-203 = 203-version-negotiation
+test-204 = 204-version-negotiation
+test-205 = 205-version-negotiation
+test-206 = 206-version-negotiation
+test-207 = 207-version-negotiation
+test-208 = 208-version-negotiation
+test-209 = 209-version-negotiation
+test-210 = 210-version-negotiation
+test-211 = 211-version-negotiation
+test-212 = 212-version-negotiation
+test-213 = 213-version-negotiation
+test-214 = 214-version-negotiation
+test-215 = 215-version-negotiation
+test-216 = 216-version-negotiation
+test-217 = 217-version-negotiation
+test-218 = 218-version-negotiation
+test-219 = 219-version-negotiation
+test-220 = 220-version-negotiation
+test-221 = 221-version-negotiation
+test-222 = 222-version-negotiation
+test-223 = 223-version-negotiation
+test-224 = 224-version-negotiation
+test-225 = 225-version-negotiation
+test-226 = 226-version-negotiation
+test-227 = 227-version-negotiation
+test-228 = 228-version-negotiation
+test-229 = 229-version-negotiation
+test-230 = 230-version-negotiation
+test-231 = 231-version-negotiation
+test-232 = 232-version-negotiation
+test-233 = 233-version-negotiation
+test-234 = 234-version-negotiation
+test-235 = 235-version-negotiation
+test-236 = 236-version-negotiation
+test-237 = 237-version-negotiation
+test-238 = 238-version-negotiation
+test-239 = 239-version-negotiation
+test-240 = 240-version-negotiation
+test-241 = 241-version-negotiation
+test-242 = 242-version-negotiation
+test-243 = 243-version-negotiation
+test-244 = 244-version-negotiation
+test-245 = 245-version-negotiation
+test-246 = 246-version-negotiation
+test-247 = 247-version-negotiation
+test-248 = 248-version-negotiation
+test-249 = 249-version-negotiation
+test-250 = 250-version-negotiation
+test-251 = 251-version-negotiation
+test-252 = 252-version-negotiation
+test-253 = 253-version-negotiation
+test-254 = 254-version-negotiation
+test-255 = 255-version-negotiation
+test-256 = 256-version-negotiation
+test-257 = 257-version-negotiation
+test-258 = 258-version-negotiation
+test-259 = 259-version-negotiation
+test-260 = 260-version-negotiation
+test-261 = 261-version-negotiation
+test-262 = 262-version-negotiation
+test-263 = 263-version-negotiation
+test-264 = 264-version-negotiation
+test-265 = 265-version-negotiation
+test-266 = 266-version-negotiation
+test-267 = 267-version-negotiation
+test-268 = 268-version-negotiation
+test-269 = 269-version-negotiation
+test-270 = 270-version-negotiation
+test-271 = 271-version-negotiation
+test-272 = 272-version-negotiation
+test-273 = 273-version-negotiation
+test-274 = 274-version-negotiation
+test-275 = 275-version-negotiation
+test-276 = 276-version-negotiation
+test-277 = 277-version-negotiation
+test-278 = 278-version-negotiation
+test-279 = 279-version-negotiation
+test-280 = 280-version-negotiation
+test-281 = 281-version-negotiation
+test-282 = 282-version-negotiation
+test-283 = 283-version-negotiation
+test-284 = 284-version-negotiation
+test-285 = 285-version-negotiation
+test-286 = 286-version-negotiation
+test-287 = 287-version-negotiation
+test-288 = 288-version-negotiation
+test-289 = 289-version-negotiation
+test-290 = 290-version-negotiation
+test-291 = 291-version-negotiation
+test-292 = 292-version-negotiation
+test-293 = 293-version-negotiation
+test-294 = 294-version-negotiation
+test-295 = 295-version-negotiation
+test-296 = 296-version-negotiation
+test-297 = 297-version-negotiation
+test-298 = 298-version-negotiation
+test-299 = 299-version-negotiation
+test-300 = 300-version-negotiation
+test-301 = 301-version-negotiation
+test-302 = 302-version-negotiation
+test-303 = 303-version-negotiation
+test-304 = 304-version-negotiation
+test-305 = 305-version-negotiation
+test-306 = 306-version-negotiation
+test-307 = 307-version-negotiation
+test-308 = 308-version-negotiation
+test-309 = 309-version-negotiation
+test-310 = 310-version-negotiation
+test-311 = 311-version-negotiation
+test-312 = 312-version-negotiation
+test-313 = 313-version-negotiation
+test-314 = 314-version-negotiation
+test-315 = 315-version-negotiation
+test-316 = 316-version-negotiation
+test-317 = 317-version-negotiation
+test-318 = 318-version-negotiation
+test-319 = 319-version-negotiation
+test-320 = 320-version-negotiation
+test-321 = 321-version-negotiation
+test-322 = 322-version-negotiation
+test-323 = 323-version-negotiation
+test-324 = 324-version-negotiation
+test-325 = 325-version-negotiation
+test-326 = 326-version-negotiation
+test-327 = 327-version-negotiation
+test-328 = 328-version-negotiation
+test-329 = 329-version-negotiation
+test-330 = 330-version-negotiation
+test-331 = 331-version-negotiation
+test-332 = 332-version-negotiation
+test-333 = 333-version-negotiation
+test-334 = 334-version-negotiation
+test-335 = 335-version-negotiation
+test-336 = 336-version-negotiation
+test-337 = 337-version-negotiation
+test-338 = 338-version-negotiation
+test-339 = 339-version-negotiation
+test-340 = 340-version-negotiation
+test-341 = 341-version-negotiation
+test-342 = 342-version-negotiation
+test-343 = 343-version-negotiation
+test-344 = 344-version-negotiation
+test-345 = 345-version-negotiation
+test-346 = 346-version-negotiation
+test-347 = 347-version-negotiation
+test-348 = 348-version-negotiation
+test-349 = 349-version-negotiation
+test-350 = 350-version-negotiation
+test-351 = 351-version-negotiation
+test-352 = 352-version-negotiation
+test-353 = 353-version-negotiation
+test-354 = 354-version-negotiation
+test-355 = 355-version-negotiation
+test-356 = 356-version-negotiation
+test-357 = 357-version-negotiation
+test-358 = 358-version-negotiation
+test-359 = 359-version-negotiation
+test-360 = 360-version-negotiation
+# ===========================================================
+
+[0-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 0-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[0-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 0-version-negotiation-server
+client = 0-version-negotiation-client
+
+[0-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[0-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-0]
+ExpectedResult = InternalError
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[1-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 1-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[1-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 1-version-negotiation-server
+client = 1-version-negotiation-client
+
+[1-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[1-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-1]
+ExpectedResult = InternalError
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[2-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 2-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[2-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 2-version-negotiation-server
+client = 2-version-negotiation-client
+
+[2-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[2-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-2]
+ExpectedResult = InternalError
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[3-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 3-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[3-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 3-version-negotiation-server
+client = 3-version-negotiation-client
+
+[3-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[3-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-3]
+ExpectedResult = InternalError
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[4-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 4-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[4-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 4-version-negotiation-server
+client = 4-version-negotiation-client
+
+[4-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[4-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-4]
+ExpectedResult = InternalError
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[5-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 5-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[5-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 5-version-negotiation-server
+client = 5-version-negotiation-client
+
+[5-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = SSLv3
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[5-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-5]
+ExpectedResult = InternalError
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[6-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 6-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[6-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 6-version-negotiation-server
+client = 6-version-negotiation-client
+
+[6-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[6-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-6]
+ExpectedResult = InternalError
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[7-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 7-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[7-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 7-version-negotiation-server
+client = 7-version-negotiation-client
+
+[7-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[7-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-7]
+ExpectedResult = InternalError
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[8-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 8-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[8-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 8-version-negotiation-server
+client = 8-version-negotiation-client
+
+[8-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[8-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-8]
+ExpectedResult = InternalError
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[9-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 9-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[9-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 9-version-negotiation-server
+client = 9-version-negotiation-client
+
+[9-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[9-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-9]
+ExpectedResult = InternalError
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[10-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 10-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[10-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 10-version-negotiation-server
+client = 10-version-negotiation-client
+
+[10-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[10-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-10]
+ExpectedResult = InternalError
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[11-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 11-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[11-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 11-version-negotiation-server
+client = 11-version-negotiation-client
+
+[11-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[11-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-11]
+ExpectedResult = InternalError
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[12-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 12-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[12-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 12-version-negotiation-server
+client = 12-version-negotiation-client
+
+[12-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[12-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-12]
+ExpectedResult = InternalError
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[13-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 13-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[13-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 13-version-negotiation-server
+client = 13-version-negotiation-client
+
+[13-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[13-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-13]
+ExpectedResult = InternalError
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[14-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 14-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[14-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 14-version-negotiation-server
+client = 14-version-negotiation-client
+
+[14-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[14-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-14]
+ExpectedResult = InternalError
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[15-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 15-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[15-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 15-version-negotiation-server
+client = 15-version-negotiation-client
+
+[15-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[15-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-15]
+ExpectedResult = InternalError
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[16-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 16-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[16-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 16-version-negotiation-server
+client = 16-version-negotiation-client
+
+[16-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[16-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-16]
+ExpectedResult = InternalError
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[17-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 17-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[17-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 17-version-negotiation-server
+client = 17-version-negotiation-client
+
+[17-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[17-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-17]
+ExpectedResult = InternalError
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[18-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 18-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[18-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 18-version-negotiation-server
+client = 18-version-negotiation-client
+
+[18-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[18-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-18]
+ExpectedResult = InternalError
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[19-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 19-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[19-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 19-version-negotiation-server
+client = 19-version-negotiation-client
+
+[19-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[19-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-19]
+ExpectedResult = ServerFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[20-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 20-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[20-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 20-version-negotiation-server
+client = 20-version-negotiation-client
+
+[20-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[20-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-20]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[21-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 21-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[21-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 21-version-negotiation-server
+client = 21-version-negotiation-client
+
+[21-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[21-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-21]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[22-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 22-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[22-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 22-version-negotiation-server
+client = 22-version-negotiation-client
+
+[22-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[22-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-22]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[23-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 23-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[23-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 23-version-negotiation-server
+client = 23-version-negotiation-client
+
+[23-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[23-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-23]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[24-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 24-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[24-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 24-version-negotiation-server
+client = 24-version-negotiation-client
+
+[24-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = SSLv3
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[24-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-24]
+ExpectedResult = ServerFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[25-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 25-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[25-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 25-version-negotiation-server
+client = 25-version-negotiation-client
+
+[25-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[25-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-25]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[26-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 26-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[26-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 26-version-negotiation-server
+client = 26-version-negotiation-client
+
+[26-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[26-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-26]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[27-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 27-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[27-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 27-version-negotiation-server
+client = 27-version-negotiation-client
+
+[27-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[27-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-27]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[28-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 28-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[28-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 28-version-negotiation-server
+client = 28-version-negotiation-client
+
+[28-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[28-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-28]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[29-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 29-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[29-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 29-version-negotiation-server
+client = 29-version-negotiation-client
+
+[29-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[29-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-29]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[30-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 30-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[30-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 30-version-negotiation-server
+client = 30-version-negotiation-client
+
+[30-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[30-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-30]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[31-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 31-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[31-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 31-version-negotiation-server
+client = 31-version-negotiation-client
+
+[31-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[31-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-31]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[32-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 32-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[32-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 32-version-negotiation-server
+client = 32-version-negotiation-client
+
+[32-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[32-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-32]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[33-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 33-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[33-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 33-version-negotiation-server
+client = 33-version-negotiation-client
+
+[33-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[33-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-33]
+ExpectedResult = ServerFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[34-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 34-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[34-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 34-version-negotiation-server
+client = 34-version-negotiation-client
+
+[34-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[34-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-34]
+ExpectedResult = ServerFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[35-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 35-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[35-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 35-version-negotiation-server
+client = 35-version-negotiation-client
+
+[35-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[35-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-35]
+ExpectedResult = ServerFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[36-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 36-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[36-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 36-version-negotiation-server
+client = 36-version-negotiation-client
+
+[36-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[36-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-36]
+ExpectedResult = ServerFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[37-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 37-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[37-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 37-version-negotiation-server
+client = 37-version-negotiation-client
+
+[37-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[37-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-37]
+ExpectedResult = ServerFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[38-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 38-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[38-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 38-version-negotiation-server
+client = 38-version-negotiation-client
+
+[38-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[38-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-38]
+ExpectedResult = ServerFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[39-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 39-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[39-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 39-version-negotiation-server
+client = 39-version-negotiation-client
+
+[39-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[39-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-39]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[40-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 40-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[40-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 40-version-negotiation-server
+client = 40-version-negotiation-client
+
+[40-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[40-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-40]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[41-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 41-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[41-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 41-version-negotiation-server
+client = 41-version-negotiation-client
+
+[41-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[41-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-41]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[42-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 42-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[42-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 42-version-negotiation-server
+client = 42-version-negotiation-client
+
+[42-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[42-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-42]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[43-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 43-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[43-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 43-version-negotiation-server
+client = 43-version-negotiation-client
+
+[43-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = SSLv3
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[43-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-43]
+ExpectedResult = ServerFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[44-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 44-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[44-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 44-version-negotiation-server
+client = 44-version-negotiation-client
+
+[44-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[44-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-44]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[45-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 45-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[45-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 45-version-negotiation-server
+client = 45-version-negotiation-client
+
+[45-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[45-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-45]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[46-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 46-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[46-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 46-version-negotiation-server
+client = 46-version-negotiation-client
+
+[46-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[46-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-46]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[47-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 47-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[47-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 47-version-negotiation-server
+client = 47-version-negotiation-client
+
+[47-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[47-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-47]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[48-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 48-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[48-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 48-version-negotiation-server
+client = 48-version-negotiation-client
+
+[48-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[48-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-48]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[49-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 49-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[49-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 49-version-negotiation-server
+client = 49-version-negotiation-client
+
+[49-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[49-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-49]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[50-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 50-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[50-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 50-version-negotiation-server
+client = 50-version-negotiation-client
+
+[50-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[50-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-50]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[51-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 51-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[51-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 51-version-negotiation-server
+client = 51-version-negotiation-client
+
+[51-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[51-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-51]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[52-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 52-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[52-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 52-version-negotiation-server
+client = 52-version-negotiation-client
+
+[52-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[52-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-52]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[53-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 53-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[53-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 53-version-negotiation-server
+client = 53-version-negotiation-client
+
+[53-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[53-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-53]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[54-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 54-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[54-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 54-version-negotiation-server
+client = 54-version-negotiation-client
+
+[54-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[54-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-54]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[55-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 55-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[55-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 55-version-negotiation-server
+client = 55-version-negotiation-client
+
+[55-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[55-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-55]
+ExpectedResult = ServerFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[56-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 56-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[56-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 56-version-negotiation-server
+client = 56-version-negotiation-client
+
+[56-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[56-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-56]
+ExpectedResult = ServerFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[57-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 57-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[57-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 57-version-negotiation-server
+client = 57-version-negotiation-client
+
+[57-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[57-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-57]
+ExpectedResult = ServerFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[58-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 58-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[58-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 58-version-negotiation-server
+client = 58-version-negotiation-client
+
+[58-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[58-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-58]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[59-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 59-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[59-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 59-version-negotiation-server
+client = 59-version-negotiation-client
+
+[59-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[59-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-59]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[60-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 60-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[60-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 60-version-negotiation-server
+client = 60-version-negotiation-client
+
+[60-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[60-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-60]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[61-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 61-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[61-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 61-version-negotiation-server
+client = 61-version-negotiation-client
+
+[61-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[61-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-61]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[62-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 62-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[62-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 62-version-negotiation-server
+client = 62-version-negotiation-client
+
+[62-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = SSLv3
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[62-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-62]
+ExpectedResult = ServerFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[63-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 63-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[63-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 63-version-negotiation-server
+client = 63-version-negotiation-client
+
+[63-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[63-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-63]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[64-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 64-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[64-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 64-version-negotiation-server
+client = 64-version-negotiation-client
+
+[64-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[64-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-64]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[65-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 65-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[65-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 65-version-negotiation-server
+client = 65-version-negotiation-client
+
+[65-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[65-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-65]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[66-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 66-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[66-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 66-version-negotiation-server
+client = 66-version-negotiation-client
+
+[66-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[66-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-66]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[67-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 67-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[67-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 67-version-negotiation-server
+client = 67-version-negotiation-client
+
+[67-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[67-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-67]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[68-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 68-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[68-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 68-version-negotiation-server
+client = 68-version-negotiation-client
+
+[68-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[68-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-68]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[69-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 69-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[69-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 69-version-negotiation-server
+client = 69-version-negotiation-client
+
+[69-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[69-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-69]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[70-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 70-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[70-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 70-version-negotiation-server
+client = 70-version-negotiation-client
+
+[70-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[70-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-70]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[71-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 71-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[71-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 71-version-negotiation-server
+client = 71-version-negotiation-client
+
+[71-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[71-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-71]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[72-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 72-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[72-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 72-version-negotiation-server
+client = 72-version-negotiation-client
+
+[72-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[72-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-72]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[73-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 73-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[73-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 73-version-negotiation-server
+client = 73-version-negotiation-client
+
+[73-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[73-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-73]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[74-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 74-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[74-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 74-version-negotiation-server
+client = 74-version-negotiation-client
+
+[74-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[74-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-74]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[75-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 75-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[75-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 75-version-negotiation-server
+client = 75-version-negotiation-client
+
+[75-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[75-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-75]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[76-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 76-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[76-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 76-version-negotiation-server
+client = 76-version-negotiation-client
+
+[76-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[76-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-76]
+ExpectedResult = ServerFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[77-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 77-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[77-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 77-version-negotiation-server
+client = 77-version-negotiation-client
+
+[77-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[77-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-77]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[78-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 78-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[78-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 78-version-negotiation-server
+client = 78-version-negotiation-client
+
+[78-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[78-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-78]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[79-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 79-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[79-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 79-version-negotiation-server
+client = 79-version-negotiation-client
+
+[79-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[79-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-79]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[80-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 80-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[80-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 80-version-negotiation-server
+client = 80-version-negotiation-client
+
+[80-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[80-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-80]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[81-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 81-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[81-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 81-version-negotiation-server
+client = 81-version-negotiation-client
+
+[81-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = SSLv3
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[81-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-81]
+ExpectedResult = ServerFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[82-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 82-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[82-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 82-version-negotiation-server
+client = 82-version-negotiation-client
+
+[82-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[82-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-82]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[83-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 83-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[83-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 83-version-negotiation-server
+client = 83-version-negotiation-client
+
+[83-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[83-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-83]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[84-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 84-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[84-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 84-version-negotiation-server
+client = 84-version-negotiation-client
+
+[84-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[84-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-84]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[85-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 85-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[85-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 85-version-negotiation-server
+client = 85-version-negotiation-client
+
+[85-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[85-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-85]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[86-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 86-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[86-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 86-version-negotiation-server
+client = 86-version-negotiation-client
+
+[86-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[86-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-86]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[87-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 87-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[87-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 87-version-negotiation-server
+client = 87-version-negotiation-client
+
+[87-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[87-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-87]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[88-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 88-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[88-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 88-version-negotiation-server
+client = 88-version-negotiation-client
+
+[88-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[88-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-88]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[89-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 89-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[89-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 89-version-negotiation-server
+client = 89-version-negotiation-client
+
+[89-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[89-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-89]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[90-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 90-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[90-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 90-version-negotiation-server
+client = 90-version-negotiation-client
+
+[90-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[90-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-90]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[91-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 91-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[91-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 91-version-negotiation-server
+client = 91-version-negotiation-client
+
+[91-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[91-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-91]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[92-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 92-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[92-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 92-version-negotiation-server
+client = 92-version-negotiation-client
+
+[92-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[92-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-92]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[93-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 93-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[93-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 93-version-negotiation-server
+client = 93-version-negotiation-client
+
+[93-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[93-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-93]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[94-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 94-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[94-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 94-version-negotiation-server
+client = 94-version-negotiation-client
+
+[94-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[94-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-94]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[95-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 95-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[95-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 95-version-negotiation-server
+client = 95-version-negotiation-client
+
+[95-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[95-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = SSLv3
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-95]
+ExpectedResult = InternalError
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[96-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 96-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[96-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 96-version-negotiation-server
+client = 96-version-negotiation-client
+
+[96-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[96-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = SSLv3
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-96]
+ExpectedResult = InternalError
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[97-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 97-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[97-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 97-version-negotiation-server
+client = 97-version-negotiation-client
+
+[97-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[97-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = SSLv3
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-97]
+ExpectedResult = InternalError
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[98-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 98-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[98-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 98-version-negotiation-server
+client = 98-version-negotiation-client
+
+[98-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[98-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = SSLv3
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-98]
+ExpectedResult = InternalError
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[99-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 99-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[99-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 99-version-negotiation-server
+client = 99-version-negotiation-client
+
+[99-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[99-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = SSLv3
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-99]
+ExpectedResult = InternalError
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[100-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 100-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[100-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 100-version-negotiation-server
+client = 100-version-negotiation-client
+
+[100-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = SSLv3
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[100-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = SSLv3
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-100]
+ExpectedResult = InternalError
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[101-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 101-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[101-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 101-version-negotiation-server
+client = 101-version-negotiation-client
+
+[101-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[101-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = SSLv3
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-101]
+ExpectedResult = InternalError
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[102-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 102-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[102-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 102-version-negotiation-server
+client = 102-version-negotiation-client
+
+[102-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[102-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = SSLv3
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-102]
+ExpectedResult = InternalError
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[103-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 103-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[103-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 103-version-negotiation-server
+client = 103-version-negotiation-client
+
+[103-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[103-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = SSLv3
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-103]
+ExpectedResult = InternalError
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[104-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 104-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[104-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 104-version-negotiation-server
+client = 104-version-negotiation-client
+
+[104-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[104-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = SSLv3
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-104]
+ExpectedResult = InternalError
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[105-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 105-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[105-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 105-version-negotiation-server
+client = 105-version-negotiation-client
+
+[105-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[105-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = SSLv3
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-105]
+ExpectedResult = InternalError
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[106-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 106-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[106-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 106-version-negotiation-server
+client = 106-version-negotiation-client
+
+[106-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[106-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = SSLv3
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-106]
+ExpectedResult = InternalError
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[107-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 107-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[107-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 107-version-negotiation-server
+client = 107-version-negotiation-client
+
+[107-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[107-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = SSLv3
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-107]
+ExpectedResult = InternalError
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[108-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 108-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[108-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 108-version-negotiation-server
+client = 108-version-negotiation-client
+
+[108-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[108-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = SSLv3
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-108]
+ExpectedResult = InternalError
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[109-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 109-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[109-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 109-version-negotiation-server
+client = 109-version-negotiation-client
+
+[109-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[109-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = SSLv3
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-109]
+ExpectedResult = InternalError
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[110-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 110-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[110-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 110-version-negotiation-server
+client = 110-version-negotiation-client
+
+[110-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[110-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = SSLv3
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-110]
+ExpectedResult = InternalError
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[111-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 111-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[111-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 111-version-negotiation-server
+client = 111-version-negotiation-client
+
+[111-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[111-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = SSLv3
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-111]
+ExpectedResult = InternalError
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[112-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 112-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[112-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 112-version-negotiation-server
+client = 112-version-negotiation-client
+
+[112-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[112-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = SSLv3
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-112]
+ExpectedResult = InternalError
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[113-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 113-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[113-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 113-version-negotiation-server
+client = 113-version-negotiation-client
+
+[113-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[113-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = SSLv3
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-113]
+ExpectedResult = InternalError
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[114-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 114-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[114-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 114-version-negotiation-server
+client = 114-version-negotiation-client
+
+[114-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[114-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-114]
+ExpectedResult = ServerFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[115-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 115-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[115-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 115-version-negotiation-server
+client = 115-version-negotiation-client
+
+[115-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[115-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-115]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[116-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 116-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[116-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 116-version-negotiation-server
+client = 116-version-negotiation-client
+
+[116-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[116-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-116]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[117-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 117-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[117-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 117-version-negotiation-server
+client = 117-version-negotiation-client
+
+[117-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[117-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-117]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[118-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 118-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[118-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 118-version-negotiation-server
+client = 118-version-negotiation-client
+
+[118-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[118-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-118]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[119-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 119-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[119-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 119-version-negotiation-server
+client = 119-version-negotiation-client
+
+[119-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = SSLv3
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[119-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-119]
+ExpectedResult = ServerFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[120-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 120-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[120-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 120-version-negotiation-server
+client = 120-version-negotiation-client
+
+[120-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[120-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-120]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[121-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 121-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[121-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 121-version-negotiation-server
+client = 121-version-negotiation-client
+
+[121-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[121-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-121]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[122-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 122-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[122-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 122-version-negotiation-server
+client = 122-version-negotiation-client
+
+[122-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[122-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-122]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[123-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 123-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[123-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 123-version-negotiation-server
+client = 123-version-negotiation-client
+
+[123-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[123-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-123]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[124-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 124-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[124-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 124-version-negotiation-server
+client = 124-version-negotiation-client
+
+[124-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[124-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-124]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[125-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 125-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[125-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 125-version-negotiation-server
+client = 125-version-negotiation-client
+
+[125-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[125-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-125]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[126-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 126-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[126-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 126-version-negotiation-server
+client = 126-version-negotiation-client
+
+[126-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[126-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-126]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[127-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 127-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[127-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 127-version-negotiation-server
+client = 127-version-negotiation-client
+
+[127-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[127-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-127]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[128-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 128-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[128-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 128-version-negotiation-server
+client = 128-version-negotiation-client
+
+[128-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[128-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-128]
+ExpectedResult = ServerFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[129-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 129-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[129-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 129-version-negotiation-server
+client = 129-version-negotiation-client
+
+[129-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[129-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-129]
+ExpectedResult = ServerFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[130-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 130-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[130-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 130-version-negotiation-server
+client = 130-version-negotiation-client
+
+[130-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[130-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-130]
+ExpectedResult = ServerFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[131-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 131-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[131-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 131-version-negotiation-server
+client = 131-version-negotiation-client
+
+[131-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[131-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-131]
+ExpectedResult = ServerFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[132-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 132-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[132-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 132-version-negotiation-server
+client = 132-version-negotiation-client
+
+[132-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[132-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-132]
+ExpectedResult = ServerFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[133-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 133-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[133-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 133-version-negotiation-server
+client = 133-version-negotiation-client
+
+[133-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[133-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-133]
+ExpectedResult = ServerFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[134-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 134-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[134-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 134-version-negotiation-server
+client = 134-version-negotiation-client
+
+[134-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[134-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-134]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[135-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 135-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[135-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 135-version-negotiation-server
+client = 135-version-negotiation-client
+
+[135-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[135-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-135]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[136-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 136-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[136-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 136-version-negotiation-server
+client = 136-version-negotiation-client
+
+[136-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[136-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-136]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[137-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 137-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[137-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 137-version-negotiation-server
+client = 137-version-negotiation-client
+
+[137-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[137-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-137]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[138-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 138-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[138-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 138-version-negotiation-server
+client = 138-version-negotiation-client
+
+[138-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = SSLv3
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[138-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-138]
+ExpectedResult = ServerFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[139-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 139-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[139-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 139-version-negotiation-server
+client = 139-version-negotiation-client
+
+[139-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[139-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-139]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[140-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 140-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[140-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 140-version-negotiation-server
+client = 140-version-negotiation-client
+
+[140-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[140-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-140]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[141-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 141-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[141-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 141-version-negotiation-server
+client = 141-version-negotiation-client
+
+[141-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[141-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-141]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[142-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 142-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[142-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 142-version-negotiation-server
+client = 142-version-negotiation-client
+
+[142-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[142-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-142]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[143-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 143-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[143-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 143-version-negotiation-server
+client = 143-version-negotiation-client
+
+[143-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[143-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-143]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[144-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 144-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[144-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 144-version-negotiation-server
+client = 144-version-negotiation-client
+
+[144-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[144-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-144]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[145-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 145-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[145-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 145-version-negotiation-server
+client = 145-version-negotiation-client
+
+[145-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[145-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-145]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[146-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 146-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[146-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 146-version-negotiation-server
+client = 146-version-negotiation-client
+
+[146-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[146-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-146]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[147-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 147-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[147-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 147-version-negotiation-server
+client = 147-version-negotiation-client
+
+[147-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[147-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-147]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[148-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 148-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[148-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 148-version-negotiation-server
+client = 148-version-negotiation-client
+
+[148-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[148-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-148]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[149-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 149-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[149-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 149-version-negotiation-server
+client = 149-version-negotiation-client
+
+[149-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[149-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-149]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[150-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 150-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[150-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 150-version-negotiation-server
+client = 150-version-negotiation-client
+
+[150-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[150-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-150]
+ExpectedResult = ServerFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[151-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 151-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[151-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 151-version-negotiation-server
+client = 151-version-negotiation-client
+
+[151-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[151-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-151]
+ExpectedResult = ServerFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[152-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 152-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[152-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 152-version-negotiation-server
+client = 152-version-negotiation-client
+
+[152-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[152-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-152]
+ExpectedResult = ServerFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[153-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 153-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[153-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 153-version-negotiation-server
+client = 153-version-negotiation-client
+
+[153-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[153-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-153]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[154-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 154-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[154-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 154-version-negotiation-server
+client = 154-version-negotiation-client
+
+[154-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[154-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-154]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[155-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 155-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[155-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 155-version-negotiation-server
+client = 155-version-negotiation-client
+
+[155-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[155-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-155]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[156-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 156-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[156-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 156-version-negotiation-server
+client = 156-version-negotiation-client
+
+[156-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[156-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-156]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[157-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 157-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[157-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 157-version-negotiation-server
+client = 157-version-negotiation-client
+
+[157-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = SSLv3
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[157-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-157]
+ExpectedResult = ServerFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[158-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 158-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[158-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 158-version-negotiation-server
+client = 158-version-negotiation-client
+
+[158-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[158-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-158]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[159-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 159-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[159-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 159-version-negotiation-server
+client = 159-version-negotiation-client
+
+[159-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[159-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-159]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[160-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 160-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[160-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 160-version-negotiation-server
+client = 160-version-negotiation-client
+
+[160-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[160-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-160]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[161-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 161-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[161-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 161-version-negotiation-server
+client = 161-version-negotiation-client
+
+[161-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[161-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-161]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[162-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 162-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[162-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 162-version-negotiation-server
+client = 162-version-negotiation-client
+
+[162-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[162-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-162]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[163-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 163-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[163-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 163-version-negotiation-server
+client = 163-version-negotiation-client
+
+[163-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[163-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-163]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[164-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 164-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[164-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 164-version-negotiation-server
+client = 164-version-negotiation-client
+
+[164-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[164-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-164]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[165-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 165-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[165-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 165-version-negotiation-server
+client = 165-version-negotiation-client
+
+[165-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[165-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-165]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[166-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 166-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[166-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 166-version-negotiation-server
+client = 166-version-negotiation-client
+
+[166-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[166-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-166]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[167-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 167-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[167-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 167-version-negotiation-server
+client = 167-version-negotiation-client
+
+[167-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[167-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-167]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[168-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 168-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[168-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 168-version-negotiation-server
+client = 168-version-negotiation-client
+
+[168-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[168-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-168]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[169-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 169-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[169-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 169-version-negotiation-server
+client = 169-version-negotiation-client
+
+[169-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[169-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-169]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[170-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 170-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[170-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 170-version-negotiation-server
+client = 170-version-negotiation-client
+
+[170-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[170-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-170]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[171-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 171-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[171-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 171-version-negotiation-server
+client = 171-version-negotiation-client
+
+[171-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[171-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-171]
+ExpectedResult = ServerFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[172-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 172-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[172-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 172-version-negotiation-server
+client = 172-version-negotiation-client
+
+[172-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[172-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-172]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[173-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 173-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[173-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 173-version-negotiation-server
+client = 173-version-negotiation-client
+
+[173-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[173-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-173]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[174-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 174-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[174-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 174-version-negotiation-server
+client = 174-version-negotiation-client
+
+[174-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[174-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-174]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[175-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 175-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[175-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 175-version-negotiation-server
+client = 175-version-negotiation-client
+
+[175-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[175-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-175]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[176-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 176-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[176-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 176-version-negotiation-server
+client = 176-version-negotiation-client
+
+[176-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = SSLv3
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[176-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-176]
+ExpectedResult = ServerFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[177-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 177-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[177-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 177-version-negotiation-server
+client = 177-version-negotiation-client
+
+[177-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[177-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-177]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[178-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 178-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[178-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 178-version-negotiation-server
+client = 178-version-negotiation-client
+
+[178-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[178-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-178]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[179-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 179-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[179-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 179-version-negotiation-server
+client = 179-version-negotiation-client
+
+[179-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[179-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-179]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[180-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 180-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[180-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 180-version-negotiation-server
+client = 180-version-negotiation-client
+
+[180-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[180-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-180]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[181-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 181-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[181-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 181-version-negotiation-server
+client = 181-version-negotiation-client
+
+[181-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[181-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-181]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[182-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 182-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[182-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 182-version-negotiation-server
+client = 182-version-negotiation-client
+
+[182-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[182-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-182]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[183-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 183-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[183-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 183-version-negotiation-server
+client = 183-version-negotiation-client
+
+[183-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[183-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-183]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[184-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 184-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[184-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 184-version-negotiation-server
+client = 184-version-negotiation-client
+
+[184-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[184-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-184]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[185-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 185-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[185-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 185-version-negotiation-server
+client = 185-version-negotiation-client
+
+[185-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[185-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-185]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[186-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 186-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[186-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 186-version-negotiation-server
+client = 186-version-negotiation-client
+
+[186-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[186-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-186]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[187-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 187-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[187-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 187-version-negotiation-server
+client = 187-version-negotiation-client
+
+[187-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[187-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-187]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[188-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 188-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[188-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 188-version-negotiation-server
+client = 188-version-negotiation-client
+
+[188-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[188-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-188]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[189-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 189-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[189-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 189-version-negotiation-server
+client = 189-version-negotiation-client
+
+[189-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[189-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-189]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[190-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 190-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[190-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 190-version-negotiation-server
+client = 190-version-negotiation-client
+
+[190-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[190-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-190]
+ExpectedResult = ServerFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[191-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 191-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[191-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 191-version-negotiation-server
+client = 191-version-negotiation-client
+
+[191-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[191-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-191]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[192-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 192-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[192-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 192-version-negotiation-server
+client = 192-version-negotiation-client
+
+[192-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[192-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-192]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[193-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 193-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[193-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 193-version-negotiation-server
+client = 193-version-negotiation-client
+
+[193-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[193-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-193]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[194-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 194-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[194-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 194-version-negotiation-server
+client = 194-version-negotiation-client
+
+[194-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[194-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-194]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[195-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 195-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[195-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 195-version-negotiation-server
+client = 195-version-negotiation-client
+
+[195-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = SSLv3
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[195-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-195]
+ExpectedResult = ServerFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[196-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 196-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[196-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 196-version-negotiation-server
+client = 196-version-negotiation-client
+
+[196-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[196-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-196]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[197-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 197-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[197-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 197-version-negotiation-server
+client = 197-version-negotiation-client
+
+[197-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[197-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-197]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[198-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 198-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[198-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 198-version-negotiation-server
+client = 198-version-negotiation-client
+
+[198-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[198-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-198]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[199-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 199-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[199-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 199-version-negotiation-server
+client = 199-version-negotiation-client
+
+[199-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[199-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-199]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[200-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 200-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[200-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 200-version-negotiation-server
+client = 200-version-negotiation-client
+
+[200-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[200-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-200]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[201-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 201-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[201-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 201-version-negotiation-server
+client = 201-version-negotiation-client
+
+[201-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[201-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-201]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[202-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 202-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[202-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 202-version-negotiation-server
+client = 202-version-negotiation-client
+
+[202-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[202-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-202]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[203-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 203-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[203-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 203-version-negotiation-server
+client = 203-version-negotiation-client
+
+[203-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[203-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-203]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[204-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 204-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[204-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 204-version-negotiation-server
+client = 204-version-negotiation-client
+
+[204-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[204-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-204]
+ExpectedResult = ServerFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[205-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 205-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[205-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 205-version-negotiation-server
+client = 205-version-negotiation-client
+
+[205-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[205-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-205]
+ExpectedResult = ServerFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[206-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 206-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[206-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 206-version-negotiation-server
+client = 206-version-negotiation-client
+
+[206-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[206-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-206]
+ExpectedResult = ServerFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[207-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 207-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[207-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 207-version-negotiation-server
+client = 207-version-negotiation-client
+
+[207-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[207-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-207]
+ExpectedResult = ServerFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[208-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 208-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[208-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 208-version-negotiation-server
+client = 208-version-negotiation-client
+
+[208-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[208-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-208]
+ExpectedResult = ServerFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[209-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 209-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[209-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 209-version-negotiation-server
+client = 209-version-negotiation-client
+
+[209-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[209-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-209]
+ExpectedResult = ServerFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[210-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 210-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[210-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 210-version-negotiation-server
+client = 210-version-negotiation-client
+
+[210-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[210-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-210]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[211-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 211-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[211-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 211-version-negotiation-server
+client = 211-version-negotiation-client
+
+[211-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[211-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-211]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[212-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 212-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[212-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 212-version-negotiation-server
+client = 212-version-negotiation-client
+
+[212-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[212-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-212]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[213-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 213-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[213-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 213-version-negotiation-server
+client = 213-version-negotiation-client
+
+[213-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[213-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-213]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[214-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 214-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[214-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 214-version-negotiation-server
+client = 214-version-negotiation-client
+
+[214-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = SSLv3
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[214-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-214]
+ExpectedResult = ServerFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[215-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 215-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[215-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 215-version-negotiation-server
+client = 215-version-negotiation-client
+
+[215-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[215-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-215]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[216-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 216-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[216-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 216-version-negotiation-server
+client = 216-version-negotiation-client
+
+[216-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[216-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-216]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[217-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 217-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[217-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 217-version-negotiation-server
+client = 217-version-negotiation-client
+
+[217-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[217-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-217]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[218-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 218-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[218-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 218-version-negotiation-server
+client = 218-version-negotiation-client
+
+[218-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[218-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-218]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[219-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 219-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[219-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 219-version-negotiation-server
+client = 219-version-negotiation-client
+
+[219-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[219-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-219]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[220-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 220-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[220-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 220-version-negotiation-server
+client = 220-version-negotiation-client
+
+[220-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[220-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-220]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[221-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 221-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[221-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 221-version-negotiation-server
+client = 221-version-negotiation-client
+
+[221-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[221-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-221]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[222-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 222-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[222-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 222-version-negotiation-server
+client = 222-version-negotiation-client
+
+[222-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[222-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-222]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[223-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 223-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[223-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 223-version-negotiation-server
+client = 223-version-negotiation-client
+
+[223-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[223-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-223]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[224-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 224-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[224-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 224-version-negotiation-server
+client = 224-version-negotiation-client
+
+[224-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[224-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-224]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[225-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 225-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[225-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 225-version-negotiation-server
+client = 225-version-negotiation-client
+
+[225-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[225-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-225]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[226-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 226-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[226-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 226-version-negotiation-server
+client = 226-version-negotiation-client
+
+[226-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[226-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-226]
+ExpectedResult = ServerFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[227-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 227-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[227-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 227-version-negotiation-server
+client = 227-version-negotiation-client
+
+[227-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[227-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-227]
+ExpectedResult = ServerFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[228-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 228-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[228-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 228-version-negotiation-server
+client = 228-version-negotiation-client
+
+[228-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[228-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-228]
+ExpectedResult = ServerFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[229-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 229-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[229-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 229-version-negotiation-server
+client = 229-version-negotiation-client
+
+[229-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[229-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-229]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[230-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 230-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[230-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 230-version-negotiation-server
+client = 230-version-negotiation-client
+
+[230-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[230-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-230]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[231-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 231-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[231-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 231-version-negotiation-server
+client = 231-version-negotiation-client
+
+[231-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[231-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-231]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[232-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 232-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[232-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 232-version-negotiation-server
+client = 232-version-negotiation-client
+
+[232-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[232-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-232]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[233-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 233-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[233-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 233-version-negotiation-server
+client = 233-version-negotiation-client
+
+[233-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = SSLv3
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[233-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-233]
+ExpectedResult = ServerFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[234-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 234-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[234-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 234-version-negotiation-server
+client = 234-version-negotiation-client
+
+[234-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[234-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-234]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[235-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 235-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[235-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 235-version-negotiation-server
+client = 235-version-negotiation-client
+
+[235-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[235-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-235]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[236-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 236-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[236-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 236-version-negotiation-server
+client = 236-version-negotiation-client
+
+[236-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[236-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-236]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[237-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 237-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[237-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 237-version-negotiation-server
+client = 237-version-negotiation-client
+
+[237-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[237-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-237]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[238-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 238-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[238-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 238-version-negotiation-server
+client = 238-version-negotiation-client
+
+[238-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[238-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-238]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[239-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 239-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[239-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 239-version-negotiation-server
+client = 239-version-negotiation-client
+
+[239-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[239-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-239]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[240-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 240-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[240-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 240-version-negotiation-server
+client = 240-version-negotiation-client
+
+[240-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[240-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-240]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[241-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 241-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[241-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 241-version-negotiation-server
+client = 241-version-negotiation-client
+
+[241-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[241-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-241]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[242-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 242-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[242-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 242-version-negotiation-server
+client = 242-version-negotiation-client
+
+[242-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[242-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-242]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[243-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 243-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[243-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 243-version-negotiation-server
+client = 243-version-negotiation-client
+
+[243-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[243-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-243]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[244-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 244-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[244-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 244-version-negotiation-server
+client = 244-version-negotiation-client
+
+[244-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[244-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-244]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[245-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 245-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[245-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 245-version-negotiation-server
+client = 245-version-negotiation-client
+
+[245-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[245-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-245]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[246-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 246-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[246-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 246-version-negotiation-server
+client = 246-version-negotiation-client
+
+[246-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[246-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-246]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[247-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 247-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[247-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 247-version-negotiation-server
+client = 247-version-negotiation-client
+
+[247-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[247-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-247]
+ExpectedResult = ServerFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[248-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 248-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[248-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 248-version-negotiation-server
+client = 248-version-negotiation-client
+
+[248-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[248-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-248]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[249-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 249-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[249-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 249-version-negotiation-server
+client = 249-version-negotiation-client
+
+[249-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[249-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-249]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[250-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 250-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[250-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 250-version-negotiation-server
+client = 250-version-negotiation-client
+
+[250-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[250-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-250]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[251-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 251-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[251-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 251-version-negotiation-server
+client = 251-version-negotiation-client
+
+[251-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[251-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-251]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[252-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 252-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[252-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 252-version-negotiation-server
+client = 252-version-negotiation-client
+
+[252-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = SSLv3
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[252-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-252]
+ExpectedResult = ServerFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[253-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 253-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[253-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 253-version-negotiation-server
+client = 253-version-negotiation-client
+
+[253-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[253-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-253]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[254-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 254-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[254-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 254-version-negotiation-server
+client = 254-version-negotiation-client
+
+[254-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[254-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-254]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[255-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 255-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[255-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 255-version-negotiation-server
+client = 255-version-negotiation-client
+
+[255-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[255-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-255]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[256-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 256-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[256-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 256-version-negotiation-server
+client = 256-version-negotiation-client
+
+[256-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[256-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-256]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[257-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 257-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[257-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 257-version-negotiation-server
+client = 257-version-negotiation-client
+
+[257-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[257-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-257]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[258-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 258-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[258-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 258-version-negotiation-server
+client = 258-version-negotiation-client
+
+[258-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[258-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-258]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[259-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 259-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[259-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 259-version-negotiation-server
+client = 259-version-negotiation-client
+
+[259-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[259-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-259]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[260-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 260-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[260-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 260-version-negotiation-server
+client = 260-version-negotiation-client
+
+[260-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[260-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-260]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[261-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 261-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[261-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 261-version-negotiation-server
+client = 261-version-negotiation-client
+
+[261-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[261-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-261]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[262-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 262-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[262-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 262-version-negotiation-server
+client = 262-version-negotiation-client
+
+[262-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[262-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-262]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[263-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 263-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[263-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 263-version-negotiation-server
+client = 263-version-negotiation-client
+
+[263-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[263-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-263]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[264-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 264-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[264-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 264-version-negotiation-server
+client = 264-version-negotiation-client
+
+[264-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[264-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-264]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[265-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 265-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[265-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 265-version-negotiation-server
+client = 265-version-negotiation-client
+
+[265-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[265-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-265]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[266-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 266-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[266-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 266-version-negotiation-server
+client = 266-version-negotiation-client
+
+[266-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[266-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-266]
+ExpectedResult = ServerFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[267-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 267-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[267-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 267-version-negotiation-server
+client = 267-version-negotiation-client
+
+[267-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[267-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-267]
+ExpectedResult = ClientFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[268-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 268-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[268-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 268-version-negotiation-server
+client = 268-version-negotiation-client
+
+[268-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[268-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-268]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[269-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 269-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[269-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 269-version-negotiation-server
+client = 269-version-negotiation-client
+
+[269-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[269-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-269]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[270-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 270-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[270-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 270-version-negotiation-server
+client = 270-version-negotiation-client
+
+[270-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[270-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-270]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[271-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 271-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[271-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 271-version-negotiation-server
+client = 271-version-negotiation-client
+
+[271-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = SSLv3
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[271-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-271]
+ExpectedResult = ServerFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[272-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 272-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[272-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 272-version-negotiation-server
+client = 272-version-negotiation-client
+
+[272-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[272-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-272]
+ExpectedResult = ClientFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[273-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 273-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[273-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 273-version-negotiation-server
+client = 273-version-negotiation-client
+
+[273-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[273-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-273]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[274-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 274-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[274-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 274-version-negotiation-server
+client = 274-version-negotiation-client
+
+[274-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[274-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-274]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[275-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 275-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[275-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 275-version-negotiation-server
+client = 275-version-negotiation-client
+
+[275-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[275-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-275]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[276-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 276-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[276-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 276-version-negotiation-server
+client = 276-version-negotiation-client
+
+[276-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[276-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-276]
+ExpectedResult = ClientFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[277-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 277-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[277-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 277-version-negotiation-server
+client = 277-version-negotiation-client
+
+[277-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[277-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-277]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[278-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 278-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[278-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 278-version-negotiation-server
+client = 278-version-negotiation-client
+
+[278-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[278-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-278]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[279-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 279-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[279-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 279-version-negotiation-server
+client = 279-version-negotiation-client
+
+[279-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[279-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-279]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[280-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 280-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[280-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 280-version-negotiation-server
+client = 280-version-negotiation-client
+
+[280-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[280-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-280]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[281-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 281-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[281-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 281-version-negotiation-server
+client = 281-version-negotiation-client
+
+[281-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[281-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-281]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[282-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 282-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[282-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 282-version-negotiation-server
+client = 282-version-negotiation-client
+
+[282-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[282-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-282]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[283-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 283-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[283-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 283-version-negotiation-server
+client = 283-version-negotiation-client
+
+[283-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[283-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-283]
+ExpectedResult = ServerFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[284-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 284-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[284-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 284-version-negotiation-server
+client = 284-version-negotiation-client
+
+[284-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[284-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-284]
+ExpectedResult = ServerFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[285-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 285-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[285-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 285-version-negotiation-server
+client = 285-version-negotiation-client
+
+[285-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[285-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-285]
+ExpectedResult = ServerFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[286-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 286-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[286-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 286-version-negotiation-server
+client = 286-version-negotiation-client
+
+[286-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[286-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-286]
+ExpectedResult = ClientFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[287-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 287-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[287-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 287-version-negotiation-server
+client = 287-version-negotiation-client
+
+[287-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[287-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-287]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[288-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 288-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[288-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 288-version-negotiation-server
+client = 288-version-negotiation-client
+
+[288-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[288-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-288]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[289-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 289-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[289-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 289-version-negotiation-server
+client = 289-version-negotiation-client
+
+[289-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[289-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-289]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[290-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 290-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[290-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 290-version-negotiation-server
+client = 290-version-negotiation-client
+
+[290-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = SSLv3
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[290-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-290]
+ExpectedResult = ServerFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[291-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 291-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[291-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 291-version-negotiation-server
+client = 291-version-negotiation-client
+
+[291-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[291-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-291]
+ExpectedResult = ClientFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[292-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 292-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[292-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 292-version-negotiation-server
+client = 292-version-negotiation-client
+
+[292-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[292-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-292]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[293-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 293-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[293-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 293-version-negotiation-server
+client = 293-version-negotiation-client
+
+[293-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[293-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-293]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[294-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 294-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[294-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 294-version-negotiation-server
+client = 294-version-negotiation-client
+
+[294-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[294-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-294]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[295-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 295-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[295-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 295-version-negotiation-server
+client = 295-version-negotiation-client
+
+[295-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[295-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-295]
+ExpectedResult = ClientFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[296-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 296-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[296-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 296-version-negotiation-server
+client = 296-version-negotiation-client
+
+[296-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[296-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-296]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[297-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 297-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[297-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 297-version-negotiation-server
+client = 297-version-negotiation-client
+
+[297-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[297-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-297]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[298-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 298-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[298-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 298-version-negotiation-server
+client = 298-version-negotiation-client
+
+[298-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[298-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-298]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[299-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 299-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[299-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 299-version-negotiation-server
+client = 299-version-negotiation-client
+
+[299-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[299-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-299]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[300-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 300-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[300-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 300-version-negotiation-server
+client = 300-version-negotiation-client
+
+[300-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[300-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-300]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[301-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 301-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[301-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 301-version-negotiation-server
+client = 301-version-negotiation-client
+
+[301-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[301-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-301]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[302-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 302-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[302-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 302-version-negotiation-server
+client = 302-version-negotiation-client
+
+[302-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[302-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-302]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[303-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 303-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[303-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 303-version-negotiation-server
+client = 303-version-negotiation-client
+
+[303-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[303-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-303]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[304-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 304-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[304-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 304-version-negotiation-server
+client = 304-version-negotiation-client
+
+[304-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[304-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-304]
+ExpectedResult = ServerFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[305-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 305-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[305-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 305-version-negotiation-server
+client = 305-version-negotiation-client
+
+[305-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[305-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-305]
+ExpectedResult = ClientFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[306-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 306-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[306-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 306-version-negotiation-server
+client = 306-version-negotiation-client
+
+[306-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[306-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-306]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[307-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 307-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[307-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 307-version-negotiation-server
+client = 307-version-negotiation-client
+
+[307-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[307-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-307]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[308-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 308-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[308-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 308-version-negotiation-server
+client = 308-version-negotiation-client
+
+[308-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[308-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-308]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[309-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 309-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[309-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 309-version-negotiation-server
+client = 309-version-negotiation-client
+
+[309-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = SSLv3
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[309-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-309]
+ExpectedResult = ServerFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[310-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 310-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[310-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 310-version-negotiation-server
+client = 310-version-negotiation-client
+
+[310-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[310-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-310]
+ExpectedResult = ClientFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[311-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 311-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[311-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 311-version-negotiation-server
+client = 311-version-negotiation-client
+
+[311-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[311-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-311]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[312-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 312-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[312-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 312-version-negotiation-server
+client = 312-version-negotiation-client
+
+[312-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[312-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-312]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[313-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 313-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[313-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 313-version-negotiation-server
+client = 313-version-negotiation-client
+
+[313-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[313-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-313]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[314-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 314-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[314-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 314-version-negotiation-server
+client = 314-version-negotiation-client
+
+[314-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[314-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-314]
+ExpectedResult = ClientFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[315-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 315-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[315-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 315-version-negotiation-server
+client = 315-version-negotiation-client
+
+[315-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[315-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-315]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[316-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 316-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[316-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 316-version-negotiation-server
+client = 316-version-negotiation-client
+
+[316-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[316-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-316]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[317-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 317-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[317-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 317-version-negotiation-server
+client = 317-version-negotiation-client
+
+[317-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[317-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-317]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[318-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 318-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[318-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 318-version-negotiation-server
+client = 318-version-negotiation-client
+
+[318-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[318-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-318]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[319-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 319-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[319-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 319-version-negotiation-server
+client = 319-version-negotiation-client
+
+[319-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[319-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-319]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[320-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 320-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[320-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 320-version-negotiation-server
+client = 320-version-negotiation-client
+
+[320-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[320-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-320]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[321-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 321-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[321-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 321-version-negotiation-server
+client = 321-version-negotiation-client
+
+[321-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[321-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-321]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[322-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 322-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[322-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 322-version-negotiation-server
+client = 322-version-negotiation-client
+
+[322-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[322-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-322]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[323-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 323-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[323-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 323-version-negotiation-server
+client = 323-version-negotiation-client
+
+[323-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[323-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-323]
+ExpectedResult = ServerFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[324-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 324-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[324-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 324-version-negotiation-server
+client = 324-version-negotiation-client
+
+[324-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[324-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-324]
+ExpectedResult = ClientFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[325-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 325-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[325-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 325-version-negotiation-server
+client = 325-version-negotiation-client
+
+[325-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[325-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-325]
+ExpectedResult = ClientFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[326-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 326-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[326-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 326-version-negotiation-server
+client = 326-version-negotiation-client
+
+[326-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[326-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-326]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[327-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 327-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[327-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 327-version-negotiation-server
+client = 327-version-negotiation-client
+
+[327-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[327-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-327]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[328-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 328-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[328-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 328-version-negotiation-server
+client = 328-version-negotiation-client
+
+[328-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = SSLv3
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[328-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-328]
+ExpectedResult = ServerFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[329-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 329-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[329-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 329-version-negotiation-server
+client = 329-version-negotiation-client
+
+[329-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[329-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-329]
+ExpectedResult = ClientFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[330-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 330-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[330-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 330-version-negotiation-server
+client = 330-version-negotiation-client
+
+[330-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[330-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-330]
+ExpectedResult = ClientFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[331-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 331-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[331-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 331-version-negotiation-server
+client = 331-version-negotiation-client
+
+[331-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[331-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-331]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[332-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 332-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[332-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 332-version-negotiation-server
+client = 332-version-negotiation-client
+
+[332-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[332-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-332]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[333-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 333-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[333-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 333-version-negotiation-server
+client = 333-version-negotiation-client
+
+[333-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[333-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-333]
+ExpectedResult = ClientFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[334-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 334-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[334-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 334-version-negotiation-server
+client = 334-version-negotiation-client
+
+[334-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[334-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-334]
+ExpectedResult = ClientFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[335-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 335-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[335-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 335-version-negotiation-server
+client = 335-version-negotiation-client
+
+[335-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[335-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-335]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[336-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 336-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[336-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 336-version-negotiation-server
+client = 336-version-negotiation-client
+
+[336-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[336-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-336]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[337-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 337-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[337-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 337-version-negotiation-server
+client = 337-version-negotiation-client
+
+[337-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[337-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-337]
+ExpectedResult = ClientFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[338-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 338-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[338-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 338-version-negotiation-server
+client = 338-version-negotiation-client
+
+[338-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[338-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-338]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[339-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 339-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[339-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 339-version-negotiation-server
+client = 339-version-negotiation-client
+
+[339-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[339-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-339]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[340-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 340-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[340-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 340-version-negotiation-server
+client = 340-version-negotiation-client
+
+[340-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[340-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-340]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[341-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 341-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[341-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 341-version-negotiation-server
+client = 341-version-negotiation-client
+
+[341-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[341-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-341]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[342-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 342-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[342-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 342-version-negotiation-server
+client = 342-version-negotiation-client
+
+[342-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[342-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-342]
+ExpectedResult = ServerFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[343-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 343-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[343-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 343-version-negotiation-server
+client = 343-version-negotiation-client
+
+[343-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[343-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-343]
+ExpectedResult = ClientFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[344-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 344-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[344-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 344-version-negotiation-server
+client = 344-version-negotiation-client
+
+[344-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[344-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-344]
+ExpectedResult = ClientFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[345-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 345-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[345-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 345-version-negotiation-server
+client = 345-version-negotiation-client
+
+[345-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[345-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-345]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[346-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 346-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[346-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 346-version-negotiation-server
+client = 346-version-negotiation-client
+
+[346-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[346-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-346]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[347-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 347-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[347-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 347-version-negotiation-server
+client = 347-version-negotiation-client
+
+[347-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = SSLv3
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[347-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-347]
+ExpectedResult = ServerFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[348-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 348-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[348-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 348-version-negotiation-server
+client = 348-version-negotiation-client
+
+[348-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[348-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-348]
+ExpectedResult = ClientFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[349-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 349-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[349-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 349-version-negotiation-server
+client = 349-version-negotiation-client
+
+[349-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[349-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-349]
+ExpectedResult = ClientFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[350-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 350-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[350-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 350-version-negotiation-server
+client = 350-version-negotiation-client
+
+[350-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[350-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-350]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[351-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 351-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[351-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 351-version-negotiation-server
+client = 351-version-negotiation-client
+
+[351-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = SSLv3
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[351-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-351]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[352-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 352-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[352-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 352-version-negotiation-server
+client = 352-version-negotiation-client
+
+[352-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[352-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-352]
+ExpectedResult = ClientFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[353-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 353-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[353-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 353-version-negotiation-server
+client = 353-version-negotiation-client
+
+[353-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[353-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-353]
+ExpectedResult = ClientFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[354-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 354-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[354-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 354-version-negotiation-server
+client = 354-version-negotiation-client
+
+[354-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[354-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-354]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[355-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 355-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[355-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 355-version-negotiation-server
+client = 355-version-negotiation-client
+
+[355-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[355-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-355]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[356-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 356-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[356-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 356-version-negotiation-server
+client = 356-version-negotiation-client
+
+[356-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[356-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-356]
+ExpectedResult = ClientFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[357-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 357-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[357-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 357-version-negotiation-server
+client = 357-version-negotiation-client
+
+[357-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[357-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-357]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[358-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 358-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[358-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 358-version-negotiation-server
+client = 358-version-negotiation-client
+
+[358-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[358-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-358]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[359-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 359-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[359-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 359-version-negotiation-server
+client = 359-version-negotiation-client
+
+[359-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[359-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-359]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[360-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 360-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[360-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 360-version-negotiation-server
+client = 360-version-negotiation-client
+
+[360-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[360-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-360]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/02-protocol-version.conf.in b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/02-protocol-version.conf.in
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..26d64b5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/02-protocol-version.conf.in
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+# -*- mode: perl; -*-
+# Copyright 2016-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+## Test TLS version negotiation
+
+package ssltests;
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+
+use protocol_version;
+
+our @tests = generate_version_tests("TLS");
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/03-custom_verify.conf b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/03-custom_verify.conf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8dca715
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/03-custom_verify.conf
@@ -0,0 +1,238 @@
+# Generated with generate_ssl_tests.pl
+
+num_tests = 9
+
+test-0 = 0-verify-success
+test-1 = 1-verify-custom-reject
+test-2 = 2-verify-custom-allow
+test-3 = 3-noverify-success
+test-4 = 4-noverify-ignore-custom-reject
+test-5 = 5-noverify-accept-custom-allow
+test-6 = 6-verify-fail-no-root
+test-7 = 7-verify-custom-success-no-root
+test-8 = 8-verify-custom-fail-no-root
+# ===========================================================
+
+[0-verify-success]
+ssl_conf = 0-verify-success-ssl
+
+[0-verify-success-ssl]
+server = 0-verify-success-server
+client = 0-verify-success-client
+
+[0-verify-success-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[0-verify-success-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-0]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[1-verify-custom-reject]
+ssl_conf = 1-verify-custom-reject-ssl
+
+[1-verify-custom-reject-ssl]
+server = 1-verify-custom-reject-server
+client = 1-verify-custom-reject-client
+
+[1-verify-custom-reject-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[1-verify-custom-reject-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-1]
+ExpectedClientAlert = HandshakeFailure
+ExpectedResult = ClientFail
+client = 1-verify-custom-reject-client-extra
+
+[1-verify-custom-reject-client-extra]
+VerifyCallback = RejectAll
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[2-verify-custom-allow]
+ssl_conf = 2-verify-custom-allow-ssl
+
+[2-verify-custom-allow-ssl]
+server = 2-verify-custom-allow-server
+client = 2-verify-custom-allow-client
+
+[2-verify-custom-allow-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[2-verify-custom-allow-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-2]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+client = 2-verify-custom-allow-client-extra
+
+[2-verify-custom-allow-client-extra]
+VerifyCallback = AcceptAll
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[3-noverify-success]
+ssl_conf = 3-noverify-success-ssl
+
+[3-noverify-success-ssl]
+server = 3-noverify-success-server
+client = 3-noverify-success-client
+
+[3-noverify-success-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[3-noverify-success-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+
+[test-3]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[4-noverify-ignore-custom-reject]
+ssl_conf = 4-noverify-ignore-custom-reject-ssl
+
+[4-noverify-ignore-custom-reject-ssl]
+server = 4-noverify-ignore-custom-reject-server
+client = 4-noverify-ignore-custom-reject-client
+
+[4-noverify-ignore-custom-reject-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[4-noverify-ignore-custom-reject-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+
+[test-4]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+client = 4-noverify-ignore-custom-reject-client-extra
+
+[4-noverify-ignore-custom-reject-client-extra]
+VerifyCallback = RejectAll
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[5-noverify-accept-custom-allow]
+ssl_conf = 5-noverify-accept-custom-allow-ssl
+
+[5-noverify-accept-custom-allow-ssl]
+server = 5-noverify-accept-custom-allow-server
+client = 5-noverify-accept-custom-allow-client
+
+[5-noverify-accept-custom-allow-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[5-noverify-accept-custom-allow-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+
+[test-5]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+client = 5-noverify-accept-custom-allow-client-extra
+
+[5-noverify-accept-custom-allow-client-extra]
+VerifyCallback = AcceptAll
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[6-verify-fail-no-root]
+ssl_conf = 6-verify-fail-no-root-ssl
+
+[6-verify-fail-no-root-ssl]
+server = 6-verify-fail-no-root-server
+client = 6-verify-fail-no-root-client
+
+[6-verify-fail-no-root-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[6-verify-fail-no-root-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-6]
+ExpectedClientAlert = UnknownCA
+ExpectedResult = ClientFail
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[7-verify-custom-success-no-root]
+ssl_conf = 7-verify-custom-success-no-root-ssl
+
+[7-verify-custom-success-no-root-ssl]
+server = 7-verify-custom-success-no-root-server
+client = 7-verify-custom-success-no-root-client
+
+[7-verify-custom-success-no-root-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[7-verify-custom-success-no-root-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-7]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+client = 7-verify-custom-success-no-root-client-extra
+
+[7-verify-custom-success-no-root-client-extra]
+VerifyCallback = AcceptAll
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[8-verify-custom-fail-no-root]
+ssl_conf = 8-verify-custom-fail-no-root-ssl
+
+[8-verify-custom-fail-no-root-ssl]
+server = 8-verify-custom-fail-no-root-server
+client = 8-verify-custom-fail-no-root-client
+
+[8-verify-custom-fail-no-root-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[8-verify-custom-fail-no-root-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-8]
+ExpectedClientAlert = HandshakeFailure
+ExpectedResult = ClientFail
+client = 8-verify-custom-fail-no-root-client-extra
+
+[8-verify-custom-fail-no-root-client-extra]
+VerifyCallback = RejectAll
+
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/03-custom_verify.conf.in b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/03-custom_verify.conf.in
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..287ca9b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/03-custom_verify.conf.in
@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
+# -*- mode: perl; -*-
+# Copyright 2016-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+## SSL test configurations
+
+package ssltests;
+
+our @tests = (
+
+    # Sanity-check that verification indeed succeeds without the
+    # restrictive callback.
+    {
+        name => "verify-success",
+        server => { },
+        client => { },
+        test   => { "ExpectedResult" => "Success" },
+    },
+
+    # Same test as above but with a custom callback that always fails.
+    {
+        name => "verify-custom-reject",
+        server => { },
+        client => {
+            extra => {
+                "VerifyCallback" => "RejectAll",
+            },
+        },
+        test   => {
+            "ExpectedResult" => "ClientFail",
+            "ExpectedClientAlert" => "HandshakeFailure",
+        },
+    },
+
+    # Same test as above but with a custom callback that always succeeds.
+    {
+        name => "verify-custom-allow",
+        server => { },
+        client => {
+            extra => {
+                "VerifyCallback" => "AcceptAll",
+            },
+        },
+        test   => {
+            "ExpectedResult" => "Success",
+        },
+    },
+
+    # Sanity-check that verification indeed succeeds if peer verification
+    # is not requested.
+    {
+        name => "noverify-success",
+        server => { },
+        client => {
+            "VerifyMode" => undef,
+            "VerifyCAFile" => undef,
+        },
+        test   => { "ExpectedResult" => "Success" },
+    },
+
+    # Same test as above but with a custom callback that always fails.
+    # The callback return has no impact on handshake success in this mode.
+    {
+        name => "noverify-ignore-custom-reject",
+        server => { },
+        client => {
+            "VerifyMode" => undef,
+            "VerifyCAFile" => undef,
+            extra => {
+                "VerifyCallback" => "RejectAll",
+            },
+        },
+        test   => {
+            "ExpectedResult" => "Success",
+        },
+    },
+
+    # Same test as above but with a custom callback that always succeeds.
+    # The callback return has no impact on handshake success in this mode.
+    {
+        name => "noverify-accept-custom-allow",
+        server => { },
+        client => {
+            "VerifyMode" => undef,
+            "VerifyCAFile" => undef,
+            extra => {
+                "VerifyCallback" => "AcceptAll",
+            },
+        },
+        test   => {
+            "ExpectedResult" => "Success",
+        },
+    },
+
+    # Sanity-check that verification indeed fails without the
+    # permissive callback.
+    {
+        name => "verify-fail-no-root",
+        server => { },
+        client => {
+            # Don't set up the client root file.
+            "VerifyCAFile" => undef,
+        },
+        test   => {
+          "ExpectedResult" => "ClientFail",
+          "ExpectedClientAlert" => "UnknownCA",
+        },
+    },
+
+    # Same test as above but with a custom callback that always succeeds.
+    {
+        name => "verify-custom-success-no-root",
+        server => { },
+        client => {
+            "VerifyCAFile" => undef,
+            extra => {
+                "VerifyCallback" => "AcceptAll",
+            },
+        },
+        test   => {
+            "ExpectedResult" => "Success"
+        },
+    },
+
+    # Same test as above but with a custom callback that always fails.
+    {
+        name => "verify-custom-fail-no-root",
+        server => { },
+        client => {
+            "VerifyCAFile" => undef,
+            extra => {
+                "VerifyCallback" => "RejectAll",
+            },
+        },
+        test   => {
+            "ExpectedResult" => "ClientFail",
+            "ExpectedClientAlert" => "HandshakeFailure",
+        },
+    },
+);
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/04-client_auth.conf b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/04-client_auth.conf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0e91bed
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/04-client_auth.conf
@@ -0,0 +1,592 @@
+# Generated with generate_ssl_tests.pl
+
+num_tests = 20
+
+test-0 = 0-server-auth-flex
+test-1 = 1-client-auth-flex-request
+test-2 = 2-client-auth-flex-require-fail
+test-3 = 3-client-auth-flex-require
+test-4 = 4-client-auth-flex-noroot
+test-5 = 5-server-auth-TLSv1
+test-6 = 6-client-auth-TLSv1-request
+test-7 = 7-client-auth-TLSv1-require-fail
+test-8 = 8-client-auth-TLSv1-require
+test-9 = 9-client-auth-TLSv1-noroot
+test-10 = 10-server-auth-TLSv1.1
+test-11 = 11-client-auth-TLSv1.1-request
+test-12 = 12-client-auth-TLSv1.1-require-fail
+test-13 = 13-client-auth-TLSv1.1-require
+test-14 = 14-client-auth-TLSv1.1-noroot
+test-15 = 15-server-auth-TLSv1.2
+test-16 = 16-client-auth-TLSv1.2-request
+test-17 = 17-client-auth-TLSv1.2-require-fail
+test-18 = 18-client-auth-TLSv1.2-require
+test-19 = 19-client-auth-TLSv1.2-noroot
+# ===========================================================
+
+[0-server-auth-flex]
+ssl_conf = 0-server-auth-flex-ssl
+
+[0-server-auth-flex-ssl]
+server = 0-server-auth-flex-server
+client = 0-server-auth-flex-client
+
+[0-server-auth-flex-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[0-server-auth-flex-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-0]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[1-client-auth-flex-request]
+ssl_conf = 1-client-auth-flex-request-ssl
+
+[1-client-auth-flex-request-ssl]
+server = 1-client-auth-flex-request-server
+client = 1-client-auth-flex-request-client
+
+[1-client-auth-flex-request-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+VerifyMode = Request
+
+[1-client-auth-flex-request-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-1]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[2-client-auth-flex-require-fail]
+ssl_conf = 2-client-auth-flex-require-fail-ssl
+
+[2-client-auth-flex-require-fail-ssl]
+server = 2-client-auth-flex-require-fail-server
+client = 2-client-auth-flex-require-fail-client
+
+[2-client-auth-flex-require-fail-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/root-cert.pem
+VerifyMode = Require
+
+[2-client-auth-flex-require-fail-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-2]
+ExpectedResult = ServerFail
+ExpectedServerAlert = HandshakeFailure
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[3-client-auth-flex-require]
+ssl_conf = 3-client-auth-flex-require-ssl
+
+[3-client-auth-flex-require-ssl]
+server = 3-client-auth-flex-require-server
+client = 3-client-auth-flex-require-client
+
+[3-client-auth-flex-require-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/root-cert.pem
+VerifyMode = Request
+
+[3-client-auth-flex-require-client]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/ee-client-chain.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/ee-key.pem
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-3]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[4-client-auth-flex-noroot]
+ssl_conf = 4-client-auth-flex-noroot-ssl
+
+[4-client-auth-flex-noroot-ssl]
+server = 4-client-auth-flex-noroot-server
+client = 4-client-auth-flex-noroot-client
+
+[4-client-auth-flex-noroot-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+VerifyMode = Require
+
+[4-client-auth-flex-noroot-client]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/ee-client-chain.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/ee-key.pem
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-4]
+ExpectedResult = ServerFail
+ExpectedServerAlert = UnknownCA
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[5-server-auth-TLSv1]
+ssl_conf = 5-server-auth-TLSv1-ssl
+
+[5-server-auth-TLSv1-ssl]
+server = 5-server-auth-TLSv1-server
+client = 5-server-auth-TLSv1-client
+
+[5-server-auth-TLSv1-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[5-server-auth-TLSv1-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-5]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[6-client-auth-TLSv1-request]
+ssl_conf = 6-client-auth-TLSv1-request-ssl
+
+[6-client-auth-TLSv1-request-ssl]
+server = 6-client-auth-TLSv1-request-server
+client = 6-client-auth-TLSv1-request-client
+
+[6-client-auth-TLSv1-request-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+VerifyMode = Request
+
+[6-client-auth-TLSv1-request-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-6]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[7-client-auth-TLSv1-require-fail]
+ssl_conf = 7-client-auth-TLSv1-require-fail-ssl
+
+[7-client-auth-TLSv1-require-fail-ssl]
+server = 7-client-auth-TLSv1-require-fail-server
+client = 7-client-auth-TLSv1-require-fail-client
+
+[7-client-auth-TLSv1-require-fail-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/root-cert.pem
+VerifyMode = Require
+
+[7-client-auth-TLSv1-require-fail-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-7]
+ExpectedResult = ServerFail
+ExpectedServerAlert = HandshakeFailure
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[8-client-auth-TLSv1-require]
+ssl_conf = 8-client-auth-TLSv1-require-ssl
+
+[8-client-auth-TLSv1-require-ssl]
+server = 8-client-auth-TLSv1-require-server
+client = 8-client-auth-TLSv1-require-client
+
+[8-client-auth-TLSv1-require-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/root-cert.pem
+VerifyMode = Request
+
+[8-client-auth-TLSv1-require-client]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/ee-client-chain.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/ee-key.pem
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-8]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[9-client-auth-TLSv1-noroot]
+ssl_conf = 9-client-auth-TLSv1-noroot-ssl
+
+[9-client-auth-TLSv1-noroot-ssl]
+server = 9-client-auth-TLSv1-noroot-server
+client = 9-client-auth-TLSv1-noroot-client
+
+[9-client-auth-TLSv1-noroot-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+VerifyMode = Require
+
+[9-client-auth-TLSv1-noroot-client]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/ee-client-chain.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/ee-key.pem
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-9]
+ExpectedResult = ServerFail
+ExpectedServerAlert = UnknownCA
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[10-server-auth-TLSv1.1]
+ssl_conf = 10-server-auth-TLSv1.1-ssl
+
+[10-server-auth-TLSv1.1-ssl]
+server = 10-server-auth-TLSv1.1-server
+client = 10-server-auth-TLSv1.1-client
+
+[10-server-auth-TLSv1.1-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[10-server-auth-TLSv1.1-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-10]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[11-client-auth-TLSv1.1-request]
+ssl_conf = 11-client-auth-TLSv1.1-request-ssl
+
+[11-client-auth-TLSv1.1-request-ssl]
+server = 11-client-auth-TLSv1.1-request-server
+client = 11-client-auth-TLSv1.1-request-client
+
+[11-client-auth-TLSv1.1-request-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+VerifyMode = Request
+
+[11-client-auth-TLSv1.1-request-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-11]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[12-client-auth-TLSv1.1-require-fail]
+ssl_conf = 12-client-auth-TLSv1.1-require-fail-ssl
+
+[12-client-auth-TLSv1.1-require-fail-ssl]
+server = 12-client-auth-TLSv1.1-require-fail-server
+client = 12-client-auth-TLSv1.1-require-fail-client
+
+[12-client-auth-TLSv1.1-require-fail-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/root-cert.pem
+VerifyMode = Require
+
+[12-client-auth-TLSv1.1-require-fail-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-12]
+ExpectedResult = ServerFail
+ExpectedServerAlert = HandshakeFailure
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[13-client-auth-TLSv1.1-require]
+ssl_conf = 13-client-auth-TLSv1.1-require-ssl
+
+[13-client-auth-TLSv1.1-require-ssl]
+server = 13-client-auth-TLSv1.1-require-server
+client = 13-client-auth-TLSv1.1-require-client
+
+[13-client-auth-TLSv1.1-require-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/root-cert.pem
+VerifyMode = Request
+
+[13-client-auth-TLSv1.1-require-client]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/ee-client-chain.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/ee-key.pem
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-13]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[14-client-auth-TLSv1.1-noroot]
+ssl_conf = 14-client-auth-TLSv1.1-noroot-ssl
+
+[14-client-auth-TLSv1.1-noroot-ssl]
+server = 14-client-auth-TLSv1.1-noroot-server
+client = 14-client-auth-TLSv1.1-noroot-client
+
+[14-client-auth-TLSv1.1-noroot-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+VerifyMode = Require
+
+[14-client-auth-TLSv1.1-noroot-client]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/ee-client-chain.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/ee-key.pem
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-14]
+ExpectedResult = ServerFail
+ExpectedServerAlert = UnknownCA
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[15-server-auth-TLSv1.2]
+ssl_conf = 15-server-auth-TLSv1.2-ssl
+
+[15-server-auth-TLSv1.2-ssl]
+server = 15-server-auth-TLSv1.2-server
+client = 15-server-auth-TLSv1.2-client
+
+[15-server-auth-TLSv1.2-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[15-server-auth-TLSv1.2-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-15]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[16-client-auth-TLSv1.2-request]
+ssl_conf = 16-client-auth-TLSv1.2-request-ssl
+
+[16-client-auth-TLSv1.2-request-ssl]
+server = 16-client-auth-TLSv1.2-request-server
+client = 16-client-auth-TLSv1.2-request-client
+
+[16-client-auth-TLSv1.2-request-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+VerifyMode = Request
+
+[16-client-auth-TLSv1.2-request-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-16]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[17-client-auth-TLSv1.2-require-fail]
+ssl_conf = 17-client-auth-TLSv1.2-require-fail-ssl
+
+[17-client-auth-TLSv1.2-require-fail-ssl]
+server = 17-client-auth-TLSv1.2-require-fail-server
+client = 17-client-auth-TLSv1.2-require-fail-client
+
+[17-client-auth-TLSv1.2-require-fail-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/root-cert.pem
+VerifyMode = Require
+
+[17-client-auth-TLSv1.2-require-fail-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-17]
+ExpectedResult = ServerFail
+ExpectedServerAlert = HandshakeFailure
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[18-client-auth-TLSv1.2-require]
+ssl_conf = 18-client-auth-TLSv1.2-require-ssl
+
+[18-client-auth-TLSv1.2-require-ssl]
+server = 18-client-auth-TLSv1.2-require-server
+client = 18-client-auth-TLSv1.2-require-client
+
+[18-client-auth-TLSv1.2-require-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/root-cert.pem
+VerifyMode = Request
+
+[18-client-auth-TLSv1.2-require-client]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/ee-client-chain.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/ee-key.pem
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-18]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[19-client-auth-TLSv1.2-noroot]
+ssl_conf = 19-client-auth-TLSv1.2-noroot-ssl
+
+[19-client-auth-TLSv1.2-noroot-ssl]
+server = 19-client-auth-TLSv1.2-noroot-server
+client = 19-client-auth-TLSv1.2-noroot-client
+
+[19-client-auth-TLSv1.2-noroot-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+VerifyMode = Require
+
+[19-client-auth-TLSv1.2-noroot-client]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/ee-client-chain.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/ee-key.pem
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-19]
+ExpectedResult = ServerFail
+ExpectedServerAlert = UnknownCA
+
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/04-client_auth.conf.in b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/04-client_auth.conf.in
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8738aaa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/04-client_auth.conf.in
@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+# -*- mode: perl; -*-
+
+## SSL test configurations
+
+package ssltests;
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+
+use OpenSSL::Test;
+use OpenSSL::Test::Utils qw(anydisabled);
+setup("no_test_here");
+
+# We test version-flexible negotiation (undef) and each protocol version.
+my @protocols = (undef, "SSLv3", "TLSv1", "TLSv1.1", "TLSv1.2");
+
+my @is_disabled = (0);
+push @is_disabled, anydisabled("ssl3", "tls1", "tls1_1", "tls1_2");
+
+our @tests = ();
+
+sub generate_tests() {
+
+    foreach (0..$#protocols) {
+        my $protocol = $protocols[$_];
+        my $protocol_name = $protocol || "flex";
+        my $caalert;
+        if (!$is_disabled[$_]) {
+            if ($protocol_name eq "SSLv3") {
+                $caalert = "BadCertificate";
+            } else {
+                $caalert = "UnknownCA";
+            }
+            # Sanity-check simple handshake.
+            push @tests, {
+                name => "server-auth-${protocol_name}",
+                server => {
+                    "MinProtocol" => $protocol,
+                    "MaxProtocol" => $protocol
+                },
+                client => {
+                    "MinProtocol" => $protocol,
+                    "MaxProtocol" => $protocol
+                },
+                test   => { "ExpectedResult" => "Success" },
+            };
+
+            # Handshake with client cert requested but not required or received.
+            push @tests, {
+                name => "client-auth-${protocol_name}-request",
+                server => {
+                    "MinProtocol" => $protocol,
+                    "MaxProtocol" => $protocol,
+                    "VerifyMode" => "Request"
+                },
+                client => {
+                    "MinProtocol" => $protocol,
+                    "MaxProtocol" => $protocol
+                },
+                test   => { "ExpectedResult" => "Success" },
+            };
+
+            # Handshake with client cert required but not present.
+            push @tests, {
+                name => "client-auth-${protocol_name}-require-fail",
+                server => {
+                    "MinProtocol" => $protocol,
+                    "MaxProtocol" => $protocol,
+                    "VerifyCAFile" => test_pem("root-cert.pem"),
+                    "VerifyMode" => "Require",
+                },
+                client => {
+                    "MinProtocol" => $protocol,
+                    "MaxProtocol" => $protocol
+                },
+                test   => {
+                    "ExpectedResult" => "ServerFail",
+                    "ExpectedServerAlert" => "HandshakeFailure",
+                },
+            };
+
+            # Successful handshake with client authentication.
+            push @tests, {
+                name => "client-auth-${protocol_name}-require",
+                server => {
+                    "MinProtocol" => $protocol,
+                    "MaxProtocol" => $protocol,
+                    "VerifyCAFile" => test_pem("root-cert.pem"),
+                    "VerifyMode" => "Request",
+                },
+                client => {
+                    "MinProtocol" => $protocol,
+                    "MaxProtocol" => $protocol,
+                    "Certificate" => test_pem("ee-client-chain.pem"),
+                    "PrivateKey"  => test_pem("ee-key.pem"),
+                },
+                test   => { "ExpectedResult" => "Success" },
+            };
+
+            # Handshake with client authentication but without the root certificate.
+            push @tests, {
+                name => "client-auth-${protocol_name}-noroot",
+                server => {
+                    "MinProtocol" => $protocol,
+                    "MaxProtocol" => $protocol,
+                    "VerifyMode" => "Require",
+                },
+                client => {
+                    "MinProtocol" => $protocol,
+                    "MaxProtocol" => $protocol,
+                    "Certificate" => test_pem("ee-client-chain.pem"),
+                    "PrivateKey"  => test_pem("ee-key.pem"),
+                },
+                test   => {
+                    "ExpectedResult" => "ServerFail",
+                    "ExpectedServerAlert" => $caalert,
+                },
+            };
+        }
+    }
+}
+ 
+generate_tests();
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/05-sni.conf b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/05-sni.conf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e1fb3d9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/05-sni.conf
@@ -0,0 +1,203 @@
+# Generated with generate_ssl_tests.pl
+
+num_tests = 6
+
+test-0 = 0-SNI-switch-context
+test-1 = 1-SNI-keep-context
+test-2 = 2-SNI-no-server-support
+test-3 = 3-SNI-no-client-support
+test-4 = 4-SNI-bad-sni-ignore-mismatch
+test-5 = 5-SNI-bad-sni-reject-mismatch
+# ===========================================================
+
+[0-SNI-switch-context]
+ssl_conf = 0-SNI-switch-context-ssl
+
+[0-SNI-switch-context-ssl]
+server = 0-SNI-switch-context-server
+client = 0-SNI-switch-context-client
+server2 = 0-SNI-switch-context-server
+
+[0-SNI-switch-context-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[0-SNI-switch-context-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-0]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+ExpectedServerName = server2
+server = 0-SNI-switch-context-server-extra
+server2 = 0-SNI-switch-context-server-extra
+client = 0-SNI-switch-context-client-extra
+
+[0-SNI-switch-context-server-extra]
+ServerNameCallback = IgnoreMismatch
+
+[0-SNI-switch-context-client-extra]
+ServerName = server2
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[1-SNI-keep-context]
+ssl_conf = 1-SNI-keep-context-ssl
+
+[1-SNI-keep-context-ssl]
+server = 1-SNI-keep-context-server
+client = 1-SNI-keep-context-client
+server2 = 1-SNI-keep-context-server
+
+[1-SNI-keep-context-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[1-SNI-keep-context-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-1]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+ExpectedServerName = server1
+server = 1-SNI-keep-context-server-extra
+server2 = 1-SNI-keep-context-server-extra
+client = 1-SNI-keep-context-client-extra
+
+[1-SNI-keep-context-server-extra]
+ServerNameCallback = IgnoreMismatch
+
+[1-SNI-keep-context-client-extra]
+ServerName = server1
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[2-SNI-no-server-support]
+ssl_conf = 2-SNI-no-server-support-ssl
+
+[2-SNI-no-server-support-ssl]
+server = 2-SNI-no-server-support-server
+client = 2-SNI-no-server-support-client
+
+[2-SNI-no-server-support-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[2-SNI-no-server-support-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-2]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+client = 2-SNI-no-server-support-client-extra
+
+[2-SNI-no-server-support-client-extra]
+ServerName = server1
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[3-SNI-no-client-support]
+ssl_conf = 3-SNI-no-client-support-ssl
+
+[3-SNI-no-client-support-ssl]
+server = 3-SNI-no-client-support-server
+client = 3-SNI-no-client-support-client
+server2 = 3-SNI-no-client-support-server
+
+[3-SNI-no-client-support-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[3-SNI-no-client-support-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-3]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+ExpectedServerName = server1
+server = 3-SNI-no-client-support-server-extra
+server2 = 3-SNI-no-client-support-server-extra
+
+[3-SNI-no-client-support-server-extra]
+ServerNameCallback = IgnoreMismatch
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[4-SNI-bad-sni-ignore-mismatch]
+ssl_conf = 4-SNI-bad-sni-ignore-mismatch-ssl
+
+[4-SNI-bad-sni-ignore-mismatch-ssl]
+server = 4-SNI-bad-sni-ignore-mismatch-server
+client = 4-SNI-bad-sni-ignore-mismatch-client
+server2 = 4-SNI-bad-sni-ignore-mismatch-server
+
+[4-SNI-bad-sni-ignore-mismatch-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[4-SNI-bad-sni-ignore-mismatch-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-4]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+ExpectedServerName = server1
+server = 4-SNI-bad-sni-ignore-mismatch-server-extra
+server2 = 4-SNI-bad-sni-ignore-mismatch-server-extra
+client = 4-SNI-bad-sni-ignore-mismatch-client-extra
+
+[4-SNI-bad-sni-ignore-mismatch-server-extra]
+ServerNameCallback = IgnoreMismatch
+
+[4-SNI-bad-sni-ignore-mismatch-client-extra]
+ServerName = invalid
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[5-SNI-bad-sni-reject-mismatch]
+ssl_conf = 5-SNI-bad-sni-reject-mismatch-ssl
+
+[5-SNI-bad-sni-reject-mismatch-ssl]
+server = 5-SNI-bad-sni-reject-mismatch-server
+client = 5-SNI-bad-sni-reject-mismatch-client
+server2 = 5-SNI-bad-sni-reject-mismatch-server
+
+[5-SNI-bad-sni-reject-mismatch-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[5-SNI-bad-sni-reject-mismatch-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-5]
+ExpectedResult = ServerFail
+ExpectedServerAlert = UnrecognizedName
+server = 5-SNI-bad-sni-reject-mismatch-server-extra
+server2 = 5-SNI-bad-sni-reject-mismatch-server-extra
+client = 5-SNI-bad-sni-reject-mismatch-client-extra
+
+[5-SNI-bad-sni-reject-mismatch-server-extra]
+ServerNameCallback = RejectMismatch
+
+[5-SNI-bad-sni-reject-mismatch-client-extra]
+ServerName = invalid
+
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/05-sni.conf.in b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/05-sni.conf.in
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..76003e7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/05-sni.conf.in
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+# -*- mode: perl; -*-
+# Copyright 2016-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+## SSL test configurations
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+
+package ssltests;
+
+our @tests = (
+    {
+        name => "SNI-switch-context",
+        server => {
+            extra => {
+                "ServerNameCallback" => "IgnoreMismatch",
+            },
+        },
+        client => {
+            extra => {
+                "ServerName" => "server2",
+            },
+        },
+        test   => {
+            "ExpectedServerName" => "server2",
+            "ExpectedResult" => "Success"
+        },
+    },
+    {
+        name => "SNI-keep-context",
+        server => {
+            extra => {
+                "ServerNameCallback" => "IgnoreMismatch",
+            },
+        },
+        client => {
+            extra => {
+                "ServerName" => "server1",
+            },
+        },
+        test   => {
+            "ExpectedServerName" => "server1",
+            "ExpectedResult" => "Success"
+        },
+    },
+    {
+        name => "SNI-no-server-support",
+        server => { },
+        client => {
+            extra => {
+                "ServerName" => "server1",
+            },
+        },
+        test   => { "ExpectedResult" => "Success" },
+    },
+    {
+        name => "SNI-no-client-support",
+        server => {
+            extra => {
+                "ServerNameCallback" => "IgnoreMismatch",
+            },
+        },
+        client => { },
+        test   => {
+            # We expect that the callback is still called
+            # to let the application decide whether they tolerate
+            # missing SNI (as our test callback does).
+            "ExpectedServerName" => "server1",
+            "ExpectedResult" => "Success"
+        },
+    },
+    {
+        name => "SNI-bad-sni-ignore-mismatch",
+        server => {
+            extra => {
+                "ServerNameCallback" => "IgnoreMismatch",
+            },
+        },
+        client => {
+            extra => {
+                "ServerName" => "invalid",
+            },
+        },
+        test   => {
+            "ExpectedServerName" => "server1",
+            "ExpectedResult" => "Success"
+        },
+    },
+    {
+        name => "SNI-bad-sni-reject-mismatch",
+        server => {
+            extra => {
+                "ServerNameCallback" => "RejectMismatch",
+            },
+        },
+        client => {
+            extra => {
+                "ServerName" => "invalid",
+            },
+        },
+        test   => {
+            "ExpectedResult" => "ServerFail",
+            "ExpectedServerAlert" => "UnrecognizedName"
+        },
+    },
+);
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/06-sni-ticket.conf b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/06-sni-ticket.conf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9620e01
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/06-sni-ticket.conf
@@ -0,0 +1,734 @@
+# Generated with generate_ssl_tests.pl
+
+num_tests = 17
+
+test-0 = 0-sni-session-ticket
+test-1 = 1-sni-session-ticket
+test-2 = 2-sni-session-ticket
+test-3 = 3-sni-session-ticket
+test-4 = 4-sni-session-ticket
+test-5 = 5-sni-session-ticket
+test-6 = 6-sni-session-ticket
+test-7 = 7-sni-session-ticket
+test-8 = 8-sni-session-ticket
+test-9 = 9-sni-session-ticket
+test-10 = 10-sni-session-ticket
+test-11 = 11-sni-session-ticket
+test-12 = 12-sni-session-ticket
+test-13 = 13-sni-session-ticket
+test-14 = 14-sni-session-ticket
+test-15 = 15-sni-session-ticket
+test-16 = 16-sni-session-ticket
+# ===========================================================
+
+[0-sni-session-ticket]
+ssl_conf = 0-sni-session-ticket-ssl
+
+[0-sni-session-ticket-ssl]
+server = 0-sni-session-ticket-server
+client = 0-sni-session-ticket-client
+server2 = 0-sni-session-ticket-server2
+
+[0-sni-session-ticket-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[0-sni-session-ticket-server2]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[0-sni-session-ticket-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = SessionTicket
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-0]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+SessionTicketExpected = No
+server = 0-sni-session-ticket-server-extra
+client = 0-sni-session-ticket-client-extra
+
+[0-sni-session-ticket-server-extra]
+BrokenSessionTicket = Yes
+
+[0-sni-session-ticket-client-extra]
+ServerName = server1
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[1-sni-session-ticket]
+ssl_conf = 1-sni-session-ticket-ssl
+
+[1-sni-session-ticket-ssl]
+server = 1-sni-session-ticket-server
+client = 1-sni-session-ticket-client
+server2 = 1-sni-session-ticket-server2
+
+[1-sni-session-ticket-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[1-sni-session-ticket-server2]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[1-sni-session-ticket-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = SessionTicket
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-1]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+ExpectedServerName = server1
+SessionTicketExpected = Yes
+server = 1-sni-session-ticket-server-extra
+client = 1-sni-session-ticket-client-extra
+
+[1-sni-session-ticket-server-extra]
+ServerNameCallback = IgnoreMismatch
+
+[1-sni-session-ticket-client-extra]
+ServerName = server1
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[2-sni-session-ticket]
+ssl_conf = 2-sni-session-ticket-ssl
+
+[2-sni-session-ticket-ssl]
+server = 2-sni-session-ticket-server
+client = 2-sni-session-ticket-client
+server2 = 2-sni-session-ticket-server2
+
+[2-sni-session-ticket-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[2-sni-session-ticket-server2]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[2-sni-session-ticket-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = SessionTicket
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-2]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+ExpectedServerName = server2
+SessionTicketExpected = Yes
+server = 2-sni-session-ticket-server-extra
+client = 2-sni-session-ticket-client-extra
+
+[2-sni-session-ticket-server-extra]
+ServerNameCallback = IgnoreMismatch
+
+[2-sni-session-ticket-client-extra]
+ServerName = server2
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[3-sni-session-ticket]
+ssl_conf = 3-sni-session-ticket-ssl
+
+[3-sni-session-ticket-ssl]
+server = 3-sni-session-ticket-server
+client = 3-sni-session-ticket-client
+server2 = 3-sni-session-ticket-server2
+
+[3-sni-session-ticket-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[3-sni-session-ticket-server2]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = -SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[3-sni-session-ticket-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = SessionTicket
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-3]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+ExpectedServerName = server1
+SessionTicketExpected = Yes
+server = 3-sni-session-ticket-server-extra
+client = 3-sni-session-ticket-client-extra
+
+[3-sni-session-ticket-server-extra]
+ServerNameCallback = IgnoreMismatch
+
+[3-sni-session-ticket-client-extra]
+ServerName = server1
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[4-sni-session-ticket]
+ssl_conf = 4-sni-session-ticket-ssl
+
+[4-sni-session-ticket-ssl]
+server = 4-sni-session-ticket-server
+client = 4-sni-session-ticket-client
+server2 = 4-sni-session-ticket-server2
+
+[4-sni-session-ticket-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[4-sni-session-ticket-server2]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = -SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[4-sni-session-ticket-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = SessionTicket
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-4]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+ExpectedServerName = server2
+SessionTicketExpected = No
+server = 4-sni-session-ticket-server-extra
+client = 4-sni-session-ticket-client-extra
+
+[4-sni-session-ticket-server-extra]
+ServerNameCallback = IgnoreMismatch
+
+[4-sni-session-ticket-client-extra]
+ServerName = server2
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[5-sni-session-ticket]
+ssl_conf = 5-sni-session-ticket-ssl
+
+[5-sni-session-ticket-ssl]
+server = 5-sni-session-ticket-server
+client = 5-sni-session-ticket-client
+server2 = 5-sni-session-ticket-server2
+
+[5-sni-session-ticket-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = -SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[5-sni-session-ticket-server2]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[5-sni-session-ticket-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = SessionTicket
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-5]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+ExpectedServerName = server1
+SessionTicketExpected = No
+server = 5-sni-session-ticket-server-extra
+client = 5-sni-session-ticket-client-extra
+
+[5-sni-session-ticket-server-extra]
+ServerNameCallback = IgnoreMismatch
+
+[5-sni-session-ticket-client-extra]
+ServerName = server1
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[6-sni-session-ticket]
+ssl_conf = 6-sni-session-ticket-ssl
+
+[6-sni-session-ticket-ssl]
+server = 6-sni-session-ticket-server
+client = 6-sni-session-ticket-client
+server2 = 6-sni-session-ticket-server2
+
+[6-sni-session-ticket-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = -SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[6-sni-session-ticket-server2]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[6-sni-session-ticket-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = SessionTicket
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-6]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+ExpectedServerName = server2
+SessionTicketExpected = No
+server = 6-sni-session-ticket-server-extra
+client = 6-sni-session-ticket-client-extra
+
+[6-sni-session-ticket-server-extra]
+ServerNameCallback = IgnoreMismatch
+
+[6-sni-session-ticket-client-extra]
+ServerName = server2
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[7-sni-session-ticket]
+ssl_conf = 7-sni-session-ticket-ssl
+
+[7-sni-session-ticket-ssl]
+server = 7-sni-session-ticket-server
+client = 7-sni-session-ticket-client
+server2 = 7-sni-session-ticket-server2
+
+[7-sni-session-ticket-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = -SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[7-sni-session-ticket-server2]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = -SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[7-sni-session-ticket-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = SessionTicket
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-7]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+ExpectedServerName = server1
+SessionTicketExpected = No
+server = 7-sni-session-ticket-server-extra
+client = 7-sni-session-ticket-client-extra
+
+[7-sni-session-ticket-server-extra]
+ServerNameCallback = IgnoreMismatch
+
+[7-sni-session-ticket-client-extra]
+ServerName = server1
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[8-sni-session-ticket]
+ssl_conf = 8-sni-session-ticket-ssl
+
+[8-sni-session-ticket-ssl]
+server = 8-sni-session-ticket-server
+client = 8-sni-session-ticket-client
+server2 = 8-sni-session-ticket-server2
+
+[8-sni-session-ticket-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = -SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[8-sni-session-ticket-server2]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = -SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[8-sni-session-ticket-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = SessionTicket
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-8]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+ExpectedServerName = server2
+SessionTicketExpected = No
+server = 8-sni-session-ticket-server-extra
+client = 8-sni-session-ticket-client-extra
+
+[8-sni-session-ticket-server-extra]
+ServerNameCallback = IgnoreMismatch
+
+[8-sni-session-ticket-client-extra]
+ServerName = server2
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[9-sni-session-ticket]
+ssl_conf = 9-sni-session-ticket-ssl
+
+[9-sni-session-ticket-ssl]
+server = 9-sni-session-ticket-server
+client = 9-sni-session-ticket-client
+server2 = 9-sni-session-ticket-server2
+
+[9-sni-session-ticket-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[9-sni-session-ticket-server2]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[9-sni-session-ticket-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = -SessionTicket
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-9]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+ExpectedServerName = server1
+SessionTicketExpected = No
+server = 9-sni-session-ticket-server-extra
+client = 9-sni-session-ticket-client-extra
+
+[9-sni-session-ticket-server-extra]
+ServerNameCallback = IgnoreMismatch
+
+[9-sni-session-ticket-client-extra]
+ServerName = server1
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[10-sni-session-ticket]
+ssl_conf = 10-sni-session-ticket-ssl
+
+[10-sni-session-ticket-ssl]
+server = 10-sni-session-ticket-server
+client = 10-sni-session-ticket-client
+server2 = 10-sni-session-ticket-server2
+
+[10-sni-session-ticket-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[10-sni-session-ticket-server2]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[10-sni-session-ticket-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = -SessionTicket
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-10]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+ExpectedServerName = server2
+SessionTicketExpected = No
+server = 10-sni-session-ticket-server-extra
+client = 10-sni-session-ticket-client-extra
+
+[10-sni-session-ticket-server-extra]
+ServerNameCallback = IgnoreMismatch
+
+[10-sni-session-ticket-client-extra]
+ServerName = server2
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[11-sni-session-ticket]
+ssl_conf = 11-sni-session-ticket-ssl
+
+[11-sni-session-ticket-ssl]
+server = 11-sni-session-ticket-server
+client = 11-sni-session-ticket-client
+server2 = 11-sni-session-ticket-server2
+
+[11-sni-session-ticket-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[11-sni-session-ticket-server2]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = -SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[11-sni-session-ticket-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = -SessionTicket
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-11]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+ExpectedServerName = server1
+SessionTicketExpected = No
+server = 11-sni-session-ticket-server-extra
+client = 11-sni-session-ticket-client-extra
+
+[11-sni-session-ticket-server-extra]
+ServerNameCallback = IgnoreMismatch
+
+[11-sni-session-ticket-client-extra]
+ServerName = server1
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[12-sni-session-ticket]
+ssl_conf = 12-sni-session-ticket-ssl
+
+[12-sni-session-ticket-ssl]
+server = 12-sni-session-ticket-server
+client = 12-sni-session-ticket-client
+server2 = 12-sni-session-ticket-server2
+
+[12-sni-session-ticket-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[12-sni-session-ticket-server2]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = -SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[12-sni-session-ticket-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = -SessionTicket
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-12]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+ExpectedServerName = server2
+SessionTicketExpected = No
+server = 12-sni-session-ticket-server-extra
+client = 12-sni-session-ticket-client-extra
+
+[12-sni-session-ticket-server-extra]
+ServerNameCallback = IgnoreMismatch
+
+[12-sni-session-ticket-client-extra]
+ServerName = server2
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[13-sni-session-ticket]
+ssl_conf = 13-sni-session-ticket-ssl
+
+[13-sni-session-ticket-ssl]
+server = 13-sni-session-ticket-server
+client = 13-sni-session-ticket-client
+server2 = 13-sni-session-ticket-server2
+
+[13-sni-session-ticket-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = -SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[13-sni-session-ticket-server2]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[13-sni-session-ticket-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = -SessionTicket
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-13]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+ExpectedServerName = server1
+SessionTicketExpected = No
+server = 13-sni-session-ticket-server-extra
+client = 13-sni-session-ticket-client-extra
+
+[13-sni-session-ticket-server-extra]
+ServerNameCallback = IgnoreMismatch
+
+[13-sni-session-ticket-client-extra]
+ServerName = server1
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[14-sni-session-ticket]
+ssl_conf = 14-sni-session-ticket-ssl
+
+[14-sni-session-ticket-ssl]
+server = 14-sni-session-ticket-server
+client = 14-sni-session-ticket-client
+server2 = 14-sni-session-ticket-server2
+
+[14-sni-session-ticket-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = -SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[14-sni-session-ticket-server2]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[14-sni-session-ticket-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = -SessionTicket
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-14]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+ExpectedServerName = server2
+SessionTicketExpected = No
+server = 14-sni-session-ticket-server-extra
+client = 14-sni-session-ticket-client-extra
+
+[14-sni-session-ticket-server-extra]
+ServerNameCallback = IgnoreMismatch
+
+[14-sni-session-ticket-client-extra]
+ServerName = server2
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[15-sni-session-ticket]
+ssl_conf = 15-sni-session-ticket-ssl
+
+[15-sni-session-ticket-ssl]
+server = 15-sni-session-ticket-server
+client = 15-sni-session-ticket-client
+server2 = 15-sni-session-ticket-server2
+
+[15-sni-session-ticket-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = -SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[15-sni-session-ticket-server2]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = -SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[15-sni-session-ticket-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = -SessionTicket
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-15]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+ExpectedServerName = server1
+SessionTicketExpected = No
+server = 15-sni-session-ticket-server-extra
+client = 15-sni-session-ticket-client-extra
+
+[15-sni-session-ticket-server-extra]
+ServerNameCallback = IgnoreMismatch
+
+[15-sni-session-ticket-client-extra]
+ServerName = server1
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[16-sni-session-ticket]
+ssl_conf = 16-sni-session-ticket-ssl
+
+[16-sni-session-ticket-ssl]
+server = 16-sni-session-ticket-server
+client = 16-sni-session-ticket-client
+server2 = 16-sni-session-ticket-server2
+
+[16-sni-session-ticket-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = -SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[16-sni-session-ticket-server2]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = -SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[16-sni-session-ticket-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = -SessionTicket
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-16]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+ExpectedServerName = server2
+SessionTicketExpected = No
+server = 16-sni-session-ticket-server-extra
+client = 16-sni-session-ticket-client-extra
+
+[16-sni-session-ticket-server-extra]
+ServerNameCallback = IgnoreMismatch
+
+[16-sni-session-ticket-client-extra]
+ServerName = server2
+
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/06-sni-ticket.conf.in b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/06-sni-ticket.conf.in
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ea92b62
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/06-sni-ticket.conf.in
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+# -*- mode: perl; -*-
+# Copyright 2016-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+## Test Session ticket
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+
+package ssltests;
+
+
+our @tests = ();
+
+sub generate_tests() {
+    foreach my $c ("SessionTicket", "-SessionTicket") {
+	foreach my $s1 ("SessionTicket", "-SessionTicket") {
+	    foreach my $s2 ("SessionTicket", "-SessionTicket") {
+		foreach my $n ("server1", "server2") {
+		    my $result = expected_result($c, $s1, $s2, $n);
+                    push @tests, {
+                        "name" => "sni-session-ticket",
+                        "client" => {
+                            "Options" => $c,
+                            "extra" => {
+                                "ServerName" => $n,
+                            },
+                        },
+                        "server" => {
+                            "Options" => $s1,
+                            "extra" => {
+                                # We don't test mismatch here.
+                                "ServerNameCallback" => "IgnoreMismatch",
+                            },
+                        },
+			"server2" => {
+			    "Options" => $s2,
+			},
+                        "test" => {
+                            "ExpectedServerName" => $n,
+                            "ExpectedResult" => "Success",
+			    "SessionTicketExpected" => $result,
+                        }
+                    };
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+# If the client has session tickets disabled, then No support
+# If the server initial_ctx has session tickets disabled, then No support
+# If SNI is in use, then if the "switched-to" context has session tickets disabled,
+#    then No support
+sub expected_result {
+    my ($c, $s1, $s2, $n) = @_;
+
+    return "No" if $c eq "-SessionTicket";
+    return "No" if $s1 eq "-SessionTicket";
+    return "No" if ($s2 eq "-SessionTicket" && $n eq "server2");
+
+    return "Yes";
+
+}
+
+# Add a "Broken" case.
+push @tests, {
+    "name" => "sni-session-ticket",
+    "client" => {
+	"Options" => "SessionTicket",
+        "extra" => {
+            "ServerName" => "server1",
+        }
+    },
+    "server" => {
+	"Options" => "SessionTicket",
+        "extra" => {
+              "BrokenSessionTicket" => "Yes",
+        },
+    },
+    "server2" => {
+	"Options" => "SessionTicket",
+    },
+    "test" => {
+	"ExpectedResult" => "Success",
+	"SessionTicketExpected" => "No",
+    }
+};
+
+generate_tests();
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/07-dtls-protocol-version.conf b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/07-dtls-protocol-version.conf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3304a3b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/07-dtls-protocol-version.conf
@@ -0,0 +1,1820 @@
+# Generated with generate_ssl_tests.pl
+
+num_tests = 64
+
+test-0 = 0-version-negotiation
+test-1 = 1-version-negotiation
+test-2 = 2-version-negotiation
+test-3 = 3-version-negotiation
+test-4 = 4-version-negotiation
+test-5 = 5-version-negotiation
+test-6 = 6-version-negotiation
+test-7 = 7-version-negotiation
+test-8 = 8-version-negotiation
+test-9 = 9-version-negotiation
+test-10 = 10-version-negotiation
+test-11 = 11-version-negotiation
+test-12 = 12-version-negotiation
+test-13 = 13-version-negotiation
+test-14 = 14-version-negotiation
+test-15 = 15-version-negotiation
+test-16 = 16-version-negotiation
+test-17 = 17-version-negotiation
+test-18 = 18-version-negotiation
+test-19 = 19-version-negotiation
+test-20 = 20-version-negotiation
+test-21 = 21-version-negotiation
+test-22 = 22-version-negotiation
+test-23 = 23-version-negotiation
+test-24 = 24-version-negotiation
+test-25 = 25-version-negotiation
+test-26 = 26-version-negotiation
+test-27 = 27-version-negotiation
+test-28 = 28-version-negotiation
+test-29 = 29-version-negotiation
+test-30 = 30-version-negotiation
+test-31 = 31-version-negotiation
+test-32 = 32-version-negotiation
+test-33 = 33-version-negotiation
+test-34 = 34-version-negotiation
+test-35 = 35-version-negotiation
+test-36 = 36-version-negotiation
+test-37 = 37-version-negotiation
+test-38 = 38-version-negotiation
+test-39 = 39-version-negotiation
+test-40 = 40-version-negotiation
+test-41 = 41-version-negotiation
+test-42 = 42-version-negotiation
+test-43 = 43-version-negotiation
+test-44 = 44-version-negotiation
+test-45 = 45-version-negotiation
+test-46 = 46-version-negotiation
+test-47 = 47-version-negotiation
+test-48 = 48-version-negotiation
+test-49 = 49-version-negotiation
+test-50 = 50-version-negotiation
+test-51 = 51-version-negotiation
+test-52 = 52-version-negotiation
+test-53 = 53-version-negotiation
+test-54 = 54-version-negotiation
+test-55 = 55-version-negotiation
+test-56 = 56-version-negotiation
+test-57 = 57-version-negotiation
+test-58 = 58-version-negotiation
+test-59 = 59-version-negotiation
+test-60 = 60-version-negotiation
+test-61 = 61-version-negotiation
+test-62 = 62-version-negotiation
+test-63 = 63-version-negotiation
+# ===========================================================
+
+[0-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 0-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[0-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 0-version-negotiation-server
+client = 0-version-negotiation-client
+
+[0-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[0-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-0]
+ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+Method = DTLS
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[1-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 1-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[1-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 1-version-negotiation-server
+client = 1-version-negotiation-client
+
+[1-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[1-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-1]
+ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+Method = DTLS
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[2-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 2-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[2-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 2-version-negotiation-server
+client = 2-version-negotiation-client
+
+[2-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[2-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-2]
+ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+Method = DTLS
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[3-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 3-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[3-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 3-version-negotiation-server
+client = 3-version-negotiation-client
+
+[3-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[3-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-3]
+ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+Method = DTLS
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[4-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 4-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[4-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 4-version-negotiation-server
+client = 4-version-negotiation-client
+
+[4-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[4-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-4]
+ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+Method = DTLS
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[5-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 5-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[5-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 5-version-negotiation-server
+client = 5-version-negotiation-client
+
+[5-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[5-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-5]
+ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+Method = DTLS
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[6-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 6-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[6-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 6-version-negotiation-server
+client = 6-version-negotiation-client
+
+[6-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[6-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-6]
+ExpectedResult = ServerFail
+Method = DTLS
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[7-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 7-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[7-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 7-version-negotiation-server
+client = 7-version-negotiation-client
+
+[7-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[7-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-7]
+ExpectedResult = ServerFail
+Method = DTLS
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[8-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 8-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[8-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 8-version-negotiation-server
+client = 8-version-negotiation-client
+
+[8-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[8-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-8]
+ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+Method = DTLS
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[9-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 9-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[9-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 9-version-negotiation-server
+client = 9-version-negotiation-client
+
+[9-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[9-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-9]
+ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+Method = DTLS
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[10-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 10-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[10-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 10-version-negotiation-server
+client = 10-version-negotiation-client
+
+[10-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[10-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-10]
+ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+Method = DTLS
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[11-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 11-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[11-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 11-version-negotiation-server
+client = 11-version-negotiation-client
+
+[11-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[11-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-11]
+ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+Method = DTLS
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[12-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 12-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[12-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 12-version-negotiation-server
+client = 12-version-negotiation-client
+
+[12-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[12-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-12]
+ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+Method = DTLS
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[13-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 13-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[13-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 13-version-negotiation-server
+client = 13-version-negotiation-client
+
+[13-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[13-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-13]
+ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+Method = DTLS
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[14-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 14-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[14-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 14-version-negotiation-server
+client = 14-version-negotiation-client
+
+[14-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[14-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-14]
+ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+Method = DTLS
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[15-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 15-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[15-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 15-version-negotiation-server
+client = 15-version-negotiation-client
+
+[15-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[15-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-15]
+ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+Method = DTLS
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[16-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 16-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[16-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 16-version-negotiation-server
+client = 16-version-negotiation-client
+
+[16-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[16-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-16]
+ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+Method = DTLS
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[17-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 17-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[17-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 17-version-negotiation-server
+client = 17-version-negotiation-client
+
+[17-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[17-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-17]
+ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+Method = DTLS
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[18-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 18-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[18-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 18-version-negotiation-server
+client = 18-version-negotiation-client
+
+[18-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[18-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-18]
+ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+Method = DTLS
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[19-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 19-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[19-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 19-version-negotiation-server
+client = 19-version-negotiation-client
+
+[19-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[19-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-19]
+ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+Method = DTLS
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[20-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 20-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[20-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 20-version-negotiation-server
+client = 20-version-negotiation-client
+
+[20-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[20-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-20]
+ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+Method = DTLS
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[21-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 21-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[21-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 21-version-negotiation-server
+client = 21-version-negotiation-client
+
+[21-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[21-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-21]
+ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+Method = DTLS
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[22-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 22-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[22-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 22-version-negotiation-server
+client = 22-version-negotiation-client
+
+[22-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[22-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-22]
+ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+Method = DTLS
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[23-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 23-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[23-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 23-version-negotiation-server
+client = 23-version-negotiation-client
+
+[23-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[23-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-23]
+ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+Method = DTLS
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[24-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 24-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[24-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 24-version-negotiation-server
+client = 24-version-negotiation-client
+
+[24-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[24-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-24]
+ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+Method = DTLS
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[25-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 25-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[25-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 25-version-negotiation-server
+client = 25-version-negotiation-client
+
+[25-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[25-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-25]
+ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+Method = DTLS
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[26-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 26-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[26-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 26-version-negotiation-server
+client = 26-version-negotiation-client
+
+[26-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[26-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-26]
+ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+Method = DTLS
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[27-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 27-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[27-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 27-version-negotiation-server
+client = 27-version-negotiation-client
+
+[27-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[27-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-27]
+ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+Method = DTLS
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[28-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 28-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[28-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 28-version-negotiation-server
+client = 28-version-negotiation-client
+
+[28-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[28-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-28]
+ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+Method = DTLS
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[29-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 29-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[29-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 29-version-negotiation-server
+client = 29-version-negotiation-client
+
+[29-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[29-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-29]
+ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+Method = DTLS
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[30-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 30-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[30-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 30-version-negotiation-server
+client = 30-version-negotiation-client
+
+[30-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[30-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-30]
+ExpectedResult = ServerFail
+Method = DTLS
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[31-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 31-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[31-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 31-version-negotiation-server
+client = 31-version-negotiation-client
+
+[31-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[31-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-31]
+ExpectedResult = ServerFail
+Method = DTLS
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[32-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 32-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[32-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 32-version-negotiation-server
+client = 32-version-negotiation-client
+
+[32-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[32-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-32]
+ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+Method = DTLS
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[33-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 33-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[33-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 33-version-negotiation-server
+client = 33-version-negotiation-client
+
+[33-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[33-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-33]
+ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+Method = DTLS
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[34-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 34-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[34-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 34-version-negotiation-server
+client = 34-version-negotiation-client
+
+[34-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[34-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-34]
+ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+Method = DTLS
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[35-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 35-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[35-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 35-version-negotiation-server
+client = 35-version-negotiation-client
+
+[35-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[35-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-35]
+ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+Method = DTLS
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[36-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 36-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[36-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 36-version-negotiation-server
+client = 36-version-negotiation-client
+
+[36-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[36-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-36]
+ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+Method = DTLS
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[37-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 37-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[37-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 37-version-negotiation-server
+client = 37-version-negotiation-client
+
+[37-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[37-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-37]
+ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+Method = DTLS
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[38-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 38-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[38-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 38-version-negotiation-server
+client = 38-version-negotiation-client
+
+[38-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[38-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-38]
+ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+Method = DTLS
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[39-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 39-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[39-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 39-version-negotiation-server
+client = 39-version-negotiation-client
+
+[39-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[39-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-39]
+ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+Method = DTLS
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[40-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 40-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[40-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 40-version-negotiation-server
+client = 40-version-negotiation-client
+
+[40-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[40-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-40]
+ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+Method = DTLS
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[41-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 41-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[41-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 41-version-negotiation-server
+client = 41-version-negotiation-client
+
+[41-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[41-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-41]
+ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+Method = DTLS
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[42-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 42-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[42-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 42-version-negotiation-server
+client = 42-version-negotiation-client
+
+[42-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[42-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-42]
+ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+Method = DTLS
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[43-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 43-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[43-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 43-version-negotiation-server
+client = 43-version-negotiation-client
+
+[43-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[43-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-43]
+ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1
+ExpectedResult = Success
+Method = DTLS
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[44-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 44-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[44-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 44-version-negotiation-server
+client = 44-version-negotiation-client
+
+[44-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[44-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-44]
+ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+Method = DTLS
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[45-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 45-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[45-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 45-version-negotiation-server
+client = 45-version-negotiation-client
+
+[45-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[45-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-45]
+ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+Method = DTLS
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[46-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 46-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[46-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 46-version-negotiation-server
+client = 46-version-negotiation-client
+
+[46-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[46-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-46]
+ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+Method = DTLS
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[47-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 47-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[47-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 47-version-negotiation-server
+client = 47-version-negotiation-client
+
+[47-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[47-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-47]
+ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+Method = DTLS
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[48-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 48-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[48-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 48-version-negotiation-server
+client = 48-version-negotiation-client
+
+[48-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[48-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-48]
+ExpectedResult = ClientFail
+Method = DTLS
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[49-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 49-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[49-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 49-version-negotiation-server
+client = 49-version-negotiation-client
+
+[49-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[49-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-49]
+ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+Method = DTLS
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[50-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 50-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[50-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 50-version-negotiation-server
+client = 50-version-negotiation-client
+
+[50-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[50-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-50]
+ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+Method = DTLS
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[51-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 51-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[51-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 51-version-negotiation-server
+client = 51-version-negotiation-client
+
+[51-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[51-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-51]
+ExpectedResult = ClientFail
+Method = DTLS
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[52-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 52-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[52-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 52-version-negotiation-server
+client = 52-version-negotiation-client
+
+[52-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[52-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-52]
+ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+Method = DTLS
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[53-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 53-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[53-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 53-version-negotiation-server
+client = 53-version-negotiation-client
+
+[53-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[53-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-53]
+ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+Method = DTLS
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[54-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 54-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[54-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 54-version-negotiation-server
+client = 54-version-negotiation-client
+
+[54-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[54-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-54]
+ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+Method = DTLS
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[55-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 55-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[55-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 55-version-negotiation-server
+client = 55-version-negotiation-client
+
+[55-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[55-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-55]
+ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+Method = DTLS
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[56-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 56-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[56-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 56-version-negotiation-server
+client = 56-version-negotiation-client
+
+[56-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[56-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-56]
+ExpectedResult = ClientFail
+Method = DTLS
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[57-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 57-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[57-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 57-version-negotiation-server
+client = 57-version-negotiation-client
+
+[57-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[57-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-57]
+ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+Method = DTLS
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[58-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 58-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[58-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 58-version-negotiation-server
+client = 58-version-negotiation-client
+
+[58-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[58-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-58]
+ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+Method = DTLS
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[59-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 59-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[59-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 59-version-negotiation-server
+client = 59-version-negotiation-client
+
+[59-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[59-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-59]
+ExpectedResult = ClientFail
+Method = DTLS
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[60-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 60-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[60-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 60-version-negotiation-server
+client = 60-version-negotiation-client
+
+[60-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[60-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-60]
+ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+Method = DTLS
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[61-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 61-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[61-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 61-version-negotiation-server
+client = 61-version-negotiation-client
+
+[61-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[61-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-61]
+ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+Method = DTLS
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[62-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 62-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[62-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 62-version-negotiation-server
+client = 62-version-negotiation-client
+
+[62-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[62-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-62]
+ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+Method = DTLS
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[63-version-negotiation]
+ssl_conf = 63-version-negotiation-ssl
+
+[63-version-negotiation-ssl]
+server = 63-version-negotiation-server
+client = 63-version-negotiation-client
+
+[63-version-negotiation-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[63-version-negotiation-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-63]
+ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+ExpectedResult = Success
+Method = DTLS
+
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/07-dtls-protocol-version.conf.in b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/07-dtls-protocol-version.conf.in
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fb3c44a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/07-dtls-protocol-version.conf.in
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+# -*- mode: perl; -*-
+# Copyright 2016-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+## Test DTLS version negotiation
+
+package ssltests;
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+
+use protocol_version;
+
+our @tests = generate_version_tests("DTLS");
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/08-npn.conf b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/08-npn.conf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9115ef4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/08-npn.conf
@@ -0,0 +1,794 @@
+# Generated with generate_ssl_tests.pl
+
+num_tests = 20
+
+test-0 = 0-npn-simple
+test-1 = 1-npn-client-finds-match
+test-2 = 2-npn-client-honours-server-pref
+test-3 = 3-npn-client-first-pref-on-mismatch
+test-4 = 4-npn-no-server-support
+test-5 = 5-npn-no-client-support
+test-6 = 6-npn-with-sni-no-context-switch
+test-7 = 7-npn-with-sni-context-switch
+test-8 = 8-npn-selected-sni-server-supports-npn
+test-9 = 9-npn-selected-sni-server-does-not-support-npn
+test-10 = 10-alpn-preferred-over-npn
+test-11 = 11-sni-npn-preferred-over-alpn
+test-12 = 12-npn-simple-resumption
+test-13 = 13-npn-server-switch-resumption
+test-14 = 14-npn-client-switch-resumption
+test-15 = 15-npn-client-first-pref-on-mismatch-resumption
+test-16 = 16-npn-no-server-support-resumption
+test-17 = 17-npn-no-client-support-resumption
+test-18 = 18-alpn-preferred-over-npn-resumption
+test-19 = 19-npn-used-if-alpn-not-supported-resumption
+# ===========================================================
+
+[0-npn-simple]
+ssl_conf = 0-npn-simple-ssl
+
+[0-npn-simple-ssl]
+server = 0-npn-simple-server
+client = 0-npn-simple-client
+
+[0-npn-simple-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[0-npn-simple-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-0]
+ExpectedNPNProtocol = foo
+server = 0-npn-simple-server-extra
+client = 0-npn-simple-client-extra
+
+[0-npn-simple-server-extra]
+NPNProtocols = foo
+
+[0-npn-simple-client-extra]
+NPNProtocols = foo
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[1-npn-client-finds-match]
+ssl_conf = 1-npn-client-finds-match-ssl
+
+[1-npn-client-finds-match-ssl]
+server = 1-npn-client-finds-match-server
+client = 1-npn-client-finds-match-client
+
+[1-npn-client-finds-match-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[1-npn-client-finds-match-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-1]
+ExpectedNPNProtocol = bar
+server = 1-npn-client-finds-match-server-extra
+client = 1-npn-client-finds-match-client-extra
+
+[1-npn-client-finds-match-server-extra]
+NPNProtocols = baz,bar
+
+[1-npn-client-finds-match-client-extra]
+NPNProtocols = foo,bar
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[2-npn-client-honours-server-pref]
+ssl_conf = 2-npn-client-honours-server-pref-ssl
+
+[2-npn-client-honours-server-pref-ssl]
+server = 2-npn-client-honours-server-pref-server
+client = 2-npn-client-honours-server-pref-client
+
+[2-npn-client-honours-server-pref-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[2-npn-client-honours-server-pref-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-2]
+ExpectedNPNProtocol = bar
+server = 2-npn-client-honours-server-pref-server-extra
+client = 2-npn-client-honours-server-pref-client-extra
+
+[2-npn-client-honours-server-pref-server-extra]
+NPNProtocols = bar,foo
+
+[2-npn-client-honours-server-pref-client-extra]
+NPNProtocols = foo,bar
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[3-npn-client-first-pref-on-mismatch]
+ssl_conf = 3-npn-client-first-pref-on-mismatch-ssl
+
+[3-npn-client-first-pref-on-mismatch-ssl]
+server = 3-npn-client-first-pref-on-mismatch-server
+client = 3-npn-client-first-pref-on-mismatch-client
+
+[3-npn-client-first-pref-on-mismatch-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[3-npn-client-first-pref-on-mismatch-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-3]
+ExpectedNPNProtocol = foo
+server = 3-npn-client-first-pref-on-mismatch-server-extra
+client = 3-npn-client-first-pref-on-mismatch-client-extra
+
+[3-npn-client-first-pref-on-mismatch-server-extra]
+NPNProtocols = baz
+
+[3-npn-client-first-pref-on-mismatch-client-extra]
+NPNProtocols = foo,bar
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[4-npn-no-server-support]
+ssl_conf = 4-npn-no-server-support-ssl
+
+[4-npn-no-server-support-ssl]
+server = 4-npn-no-server-support-server
+client = 4-npn-no-server-support-client
+
+[4-npn-no-server-support-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[4-npn-no-server-support-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-4]
+client = 4-npn-no-server-support-client-extra
+
+[4-npn-no-server-support-client-extra]
+NPNProtocols = foo
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[5-npn-no-client-support]
+ssl_conf = 5-npn-no-client-support-ssl
+
+[5-npn-no-client-support-ssl]
+server = 5-npn-no-client-support-server
+client = 5-npn-no-client-support-client
+
+[5-npn-no-client-support-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[5-npn-no-client-support-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-5]
+server = 5-npn-no-client-support-server-extra
+
+[5-npn-no-client-support-server-extra]
+NPNProtocols = foo
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[6-npn-with-sni-no-context-switch]
+ssl_conf = 6-npn-with-sni-no-context-switch-ssl
+
+[6-npn-with-sni-no-context-switch-ssl]
+server = 6-npn-with-sni-no-context-switch-server
+client = 6-npn-with-sni-no-context-switch-client
+server2 = 6-npn-with-sni-no-context-switch-server2
+
+[6-npn-with-sni-no-context-switch-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[6-npn-with-sni-no-context-switch-server2]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[6-npn-with-sni-no-context-switch-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-6]
+ExpectedNPNProtocol = foo
+ExpectedServerName = server1
+server = 6-npn-with-sni-no-context-switch-server-extra
+server2 = 6-npn-with-sni-no-context-switch-server2-extra
+client = 6-npn-with-sni-no-context-switch-client-extra
+
+[6-npn-with-sni-no-context-switch-server-extra]
+NPNProtocols = foo
+ServerNameCallback = IgnoreMismatch
+
+[6-npn-with-sni-no-context-switch-server2-extra]
+NPNProtocols = bar
+
+[6-npn-with-sni-no-context-switch-client-extra]
+NPNProtocols = foo,bar
+ServerName = server1
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[7-npn-with-sni-context-switch]
+ssl_conf = 7-npn-with-sni-context-switch-ssl
+
+[7-npn-with-sni-context-switch-ssl]
+server = 7-npn-with-sni-context-switch-server
+client = 7-npn-with-sni-context-switch-client
+server2 = 7-npn-with-sni-context-switch-server2
+
+[7-npn-with-sni-context-switch-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[7-npn-with-sni-context-switch-server2]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[7-npn-with-sni-context-switch-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-7]
+ExpectedNPNProtocol = bar
+ExpectedServerName = server2
+server = 7-npn-with-sni-context-switch-server-extra
+server2 = 7-npn-with-sni-context-switch-server2-extra
+client = 7-npn-with-sni-context-switch-client-extra
+
+[7-npn-with-sni-context-switch-server-extra]
+NPNProtocols = foo
+ServerNameCallback = IgnoreMismatch
+
+[7-npn-with-sni-context-switch-server2-extra]
+NPNProtocols = bar
+
+[7-npn-with-sni-context-switch-client-extra]
+NPNProtocols = foo,bar
+ServerName = server2
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[8-npn-selected-sni-server-supports-npn]
+ssl_conf = 8-npn-selected-sni-server-supports-npn-ssl
+
+[8-npn-selected-sni-server-supports-npn-ssl]
+server = 8-npn-selected-sni-server-supports-npn-server
+client = 8-npn-selected-sni-server-supports-npn-client
+server2 = 8-npn-selected-sni-server-supports-npn-server2
+
+[8-npn-selected-sni-server-supports-npn-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[8-npn-selected-sni-server-supports-npn-server2]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[8-npn-selected-sni-server-supports-npn-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-8]
+ExpectedNPNProtocol = bar
+ExpectedServerName = server2
+server = 8-npn-selected-sni-server-supports-npn-server-extra
+server2 = 8-npn-selected-sni-server-supports-npn-server2-extra
+client = 8-npn-selected-sni-server-supports-npn-client-extra
+
+[8-npn-selected-sni-server-supports-npn-server-extra]
+ServerNameCallback = IgnoreMismatch
+
+[8-npn-selected-sni-server-supports-npn-server2-extra]
+NPNProtocols = bar
+
+[8-npn-selected-sni-server-supports-npn-client-extra]
+NPNProtocols = foo,bar
+ServerName = server2
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[9-npn-selected-sni-server-does-not-support-npn]
+ssl_conf = 9-npn-selected-sni-server-does-not-support-npn-ssl
+
+[9-npn-selected-sni-server-does-not-support-npn-ssl]
+server = 9-npn-selected-sni-server-does-not-support-npn-server
+client = 9-npn-selected-sni-server-does-not-support-npn-client
+server2 = 9-npn-selected-sni-server-does-not-support-npn-server2
+
+[9-npn-selected-sni-server-does-not-support-npn-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[9-npn-selected-sni-server-does-not-support-npn-server2]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[9-npn-selected-sni-server-does-not-support-npn-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-9]
+ExpectedServerName = server2
+server = 9-npn-selected-sni-server-does-not-support-npn-server-extra
+client = 9-npn-selected-sni-server-does-not-support-npn-client-extra
+
+[9-npn-selected-sni-server-does-not-support-npn-server-extra]
+NPNProtocols = bar
+ServerNameCallback = IgnoreMismatch
+
+[9-npn-selected-sni-server-does-not-support-npn-client-extra]
+NPNProtocols = foo,bar
+ServerName = server2
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[10-alpn-preferred-over-npn]
+ssl_conf = 10-alpn-preferred-over-npn-ssl
+
+[10-alpn-preferred-over-npn-ssl]
+server = 10-alpn-preferred-over-npn-server
+client = 10-alpn-preferred-over-npn-client
+
+[10-alpn-preferred-over-npn-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[10-alpn-preferred-over-npn-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-10]
+ExpectedALPNProtocol = foo
+server = 10-alpn-preferred-over-npn-server-extra
+client = 10-alpn-preferred-over-npn-client-extra
+
+[10-alpn-preferred-over-npn-server-extra]
+ALPNProtocols = foo
+NPNProtocols = bar
+
+[10-alpn-preferred-over-npn-client-extra]
+ALPNProtocols = foo
+NPNProtocols = bar
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[11-sni-npn-preferred-over-alpn]
+ssl_conf = 11-sni-npn-preferred-over-alpn-ssl
+
+[11-sni-npn-preferred-over-alpn-ssl]
+server = 11-sni-npn-preferred-over-alpn-server
+client = 11-sni-npn-preferred-over-alpn-client
+server2 = 11-sni-npn-preferred-over-alpn-server2
+
+[11-sni-npn-preferred-over-alpn-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[11-sni-npn-preferred-over-alpn-server2]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[11-sni-npn-preferred-over-alpn-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-11]
+ExpectedNPNProtocol = bar
+ExpectedServerName = server2
+server = 11-sni-npn-preferred-over-alpn-server-extra
+server2 = 11-sni-npn-preferred-over-alpn-server2-extra
+client = 11-sni-npn-preferred-over-alpn-client-extra
+
+[11-sni-npn-preferred-over-alpn-server-extra]
+ALPNProtocols = foo
+ServerNameCallback = IgnoreMismatch
+
+[11-sni-npn-preferred-over-alpn-server2-extra]
+NPNProtocols = bar
+
+[11-sni-npn-preferred-over-alpn-client-extra]
+ALPNProtocols = foo
+NPNProtocols = bar
+ServerName = server2
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[12-npn-simple-resumption]
+ssl_conf = 12-npn-simple-resumption-ssl
+
+[12-npn-simple-resumption-ssl]
+server = 12-npn-simple-resumption-server
+client = 12-npn-simple-resumption-client
+resume-server = 12-npn-simple-resumption-server
+resume-client = 12-npn-simple-resumption-client
+
+[12-npn-simple-resumption-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[12-npn-simple-resumption-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-12]
+ExpectedNPNProtocol = foo
+HandshakeMode = Resume
+ResumptionExpected = Yes
+server = 12-npn-simple-resumption-server-extra
+resume-server = 12-npn-simple-resumption-server-extra
+client = 12-npn-simple-resumption-client-extra
+resume-client = 12-npn-simple-resumption-client-extra
+
+[12-npn-simple-resumption-server-extra]
+NPNProtocols = foo
+
+[12-npn-simple-resumption-client-extra]
+NPNProtocols = foo
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[13-npn-server-switch-resumption]
+ssl_conf = 13-npn-server-switch-resumption-ssl
+
+[13-npn-server-switch-resumption-ssl]
+server = 13-npn-server-switch-resumption-server
+client = 13-npn-server-switch-resumption-client
+resume-server = 13-npn-server-switch-resumption-resume-server
+resume-client = 13-npn-server-switch-resumption-client
+
+[13-npn-server-switch-resumption-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[13-npn-server-switch-resumption-resume-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[13-npn-server-switch-resumption-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-13]
+ExpectedNPNProtocol = baz
+HandshakeMode = Resume
+ResumptionExpected = Yes
+server = 13-npn-server-switch-resumption-server-extra
+resume-server = 13-npn-server-switch-resumption-resume-server-extra
+client = 13-npn-server-switch-resumption-client-extra
+resume-client = 13-npn-server-switch-resumption-client-extra
+
+[13-npn-server-switch-resumption-server-extra]
+NPNProtocols = bar,foo
+
+[13-npn-server-switch-resumption-resume-server-extra]
+NPNProtocols = baz,foo
+
+[13-npn-server-switch-resumption-client-extra]
+NPNProtocols = foo,bar,baz
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[14-npn-client-switch-resumption]
+ssl_conf = 14-npn-client-switch-resumption-ssl
+
+[14-npn-client-switch-resumption-ssl]
+server = 14-npn-client-switch-resumption-server
+client = 14-npn-client-switch-resumption-client
+resume-server = 14-npn-client-switch-resumption-server
+resume-client = 14-npn-client-switch-resumption-resume-client
+
+[14-npn-client-switch-resumption-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[14-npn-client-switch-resumption-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[14-npn-client-switch-resumption-resume-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-14]
+ExpectedNPNProtocol = bar
+HandshakeMode = Resume
+ResumptionExpected = Yes
+server = 14-npn-client-switch-resumption-server-extra
+resume-server = 14-npn-client-switch-resumption-server-extra
+client = 14-npn-client-switch-resumption-client-extra
+resume-client = 14-npn-client-switch-resumption-resume-client-extra
+
+[14-npn-client-switch-resumption-server-extra]
+NPNProtocols = foo,bar,baz
+
+[14-npn-client-switch-resumption-client-extra]
+NPNProtocols = foo,baz
+
+[14-npn-client-switch-resumption-resume-client-extra]
+NPNProtocols = bar,baz
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[15-npn-client-first-pref-on-mismatch-resumption]
+ssl_conf = 15-npn-client-first-pref-on-mismatch-resumption-ssl
+
+[15-npn-client-first-pref-on-mismatch-resumption-ssl]
+server = 15-npn-client-first-pref-on-mismatch-resumption-server
+client = 15-npn-client-first-pref-on-mismatch-resumption-client
+resume-server = 15-npn-client-first-pref-on-mismatch-resumption-resume-server
+resume-client = 15-npn-client-first-pref-on-mismatch-resumption-client
+
+[15-npn-client-first-pref-on-mismatch-resumption-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[15-npn-client-first-pref-on-mismatch-resumption-resume-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[15-npn-client-first-pref-on-mismatch-resumption-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-15]
+ExpectedNPNProtocol = foo
+HandshakeMode = Resume
+ResumptionExpected = Yes
+server = 15-npn-client-first-pref-on-mismatch-resumption-server-extra
+resume-server = 15-npn-client-first-pref-on-mismatch-resumption-resume-server-extra
+client = 15-npn-client-first-pref-on-mismatch-resumption-client-extra
+resume-client = 15-npn-client-first-pref-on-mismatch-resumption-client-extra
+
+[15-npn-client-first-pref-on-mismatch-resumption-server-extra]
+NPNProtocols = bar
+
+[15-npn-client-first-pref-on-mismatch-resumption-resume-server-extra]
+NPNProtocols = baz
+
+[15-npn-client-first-pref-on-mismatch-resumption-client-extra]
+NPNProtocols = foo,bar
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[16-npn-no-server-support-resumption]
+ssl_conf = 16-npn-no-server-support-resumption-ssl
+
+[16-npn-no-server-support-resumption-ssl]
+server = 16-npn-no-server-support-resumption-server
+client = 16-npn-no-server-support-resumption-client
+resume-server = 16-npn-no-server-support-resumption-resume-server
+resume-client = 16-npn-no-server-support-resumption-client
+
+[16-npn-no-server-support-resumption-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[16-npn-no-server-support-resumption-resume-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[16-npn-no-server-support-resumption-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-16]
+HandshakeMode = Resume
+ResumptionExpected = Yes
+server = 16-npn-no-server-support-resumption-server-extra
+client = 16-npn-no-server-support-resumption-client-extra
+resume-client = 16-npn-no-server-support-resumption-client-extra
+
+[16-npn-no-server-support-resumption-server-extra]
+NPNProtocols = foo
+
+[16-npn-no-server-support-resumption-client-extra]
+NPNProtocols = foo
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[17-npn-no-client-support-resumption]
+ssl_conf = 17-npn-no-client-support-resumption-ssl
+
+[17-npn-no-client-support-resumption-ssl]
+server = 17-npn-no-client-support-resumption-server
+client = 17-npn-no-client-support-resumption-client
+resume-server = 17-npn-no-client-support-resumption-server
+resume-client = 17-npn-no-client-support-resumption-resume-client
+
+[17-npn-no-client-support-resumption-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[17-npn-no-client-support-resumption-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[17-npn-no-client-support-resumption-resume-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-17]
+HandshakeMode = Resume
+ResumptionExpected = Yes
+server = 17-npn-no-client-support-resumption-server-extra
+resume-server = 17-npn-no-client-support-resumption-server-extra
+client = 17-npn-no-client-support-resumption-client-extra
+
+[17-npn-no-client-support-resumption-server-extra]
+NPNProtocols = foo
+
+[17-npn-no-client-support-resumption-client-extra]
+NPNProtocols = foo
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[18-alpn-preferred-over-npn-resumption]
+ssl_conf = 18-alpn-preferred-over-npn-resumption-ssl
+
+[18-alpn-preferred-over-npn-resumption-ssl]
+server = 18-alpn-preferred-over-npn-resumption-server
+client = 18-alpn-preferred-over-npn-resumption-client
+resume-server = 18-alpn-preferred-over-npn-resumption-resume-server
+resume-client = 18-alpn-preferred-over-npn-resumption-client
+
+[18-alpn-preferred-over-npn-resumption-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[18-alpn-preferred-over-npn-resumption-resume-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[18-alpn-preferred-over-npn-resumption-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-18]
+ExpectedALPNProtocol = foo
+HandshakeMode = Resume
+ResumptionExpected = Yes
+server = 18-alpn-preferred-over-npn-resumption-server-extra
+resume-server = 18-alpn-preferred-over-npn-resumption-resume-server-extra
+client = 18-alpn-preferred-over-npn-resumption-client-extra
+resume-client = 18-alpn-preferred-over-npn-resumption-client-extra
+
+[18-alpn-preferred-over-npn-resumption-server-extra]
+NPNProtocols = bar
+
+[18-alpn-preferred-over-npn-resumption-resume-server-extra]
+ALPNProtocols = foo
+NPNProtocols = baz
+
+[18-alpn-preferred-over-npn-resumption-client-extra]
+ALPNProtocols = foo
+NPNProtocols = bar,baz
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[19-npn-used-if-alpn-not-supported-resumption]
+ssl_conf = 19-npn-used-if-alpn-not-supported-resumption-ssl
+
+[19-npn-used-if-alpn-not-supported-resumption-ssl]
+server = 19-npn-used-if-alpn-not-supported-resumption-server
+client = 19-npn-used-if-alpn-not-supported-resumption-client
+resume-server = 19-npn-used-if-alpn-not-supported-resumption-resume-server
+resume-client = 19-npn-used-if-alpn-not-supported-resumption-client
+
+[19-npn-used-if-alpn-not-supported-resumption-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[19-npn-used-if-alpn-not-supported-resumption-resume-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[19-npn-used-if-alpn-not-supported-resumption-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-19]
+ExpectedNPNProtocol = baz
+HandshakeMode = Resume
+ResumptionExpected = Yes
+server = 19-npn-used-if-alpn-not-supported-resumption-server-extra
+resume-server = 19-npn-used-if-alpn-not-supported-resumption-resume-server-extra
+client = 19-npn-used-if-alpn-not-supported-resumption-client-extra
+resume-client = 19-npn-used-if-alpn-not-supported-resumption-client-extra
+
+[19-npn-used-if-alpn-not-supported-resumption-server-extra]
+ALPNProtocols = foo
+NPNProtocols = bar
+
+[19-npn-used-if-alpn-not-supported-resumption-resume-server-extra]
+NPNProtocols = baz
+
+[19-npn-used-if-alpn-not-supported-resumption-client-extra]
+ALPNProtocols = foo
+NPNProtocols = bar,baz
+
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/08-npn.conf.in b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/08-npn.conf.in
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bcb632f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/08-npn.conf.in
@@ -0,0 +1,420 @@
+# -*- mode: perl; -*-
+# Copyright 2016-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+## Test NPN negotiation
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+
+package ssltests;
+
+
+our @tests = (
+    {
+        name => "npn-simple",
+        server => {
+            extra => {
+                "NPNProtocols" => "foo",
+            },
+        },
+        client => {
+            extra => {
+                "NPNProtocols" => "foo",
+            },
+        },
+        test => {
+            "ExpectedNPNProtocol" => "foo",
+        },
+    },
+    {
+        name => "npn-client-finds-match",
+        server => {
+            extra => {
+                "NPNProtocols" => "baz,bar",
+            },
+        },
+        client => {
+            extra => {
+                "NPNProtocols" => "foo,bar",
+            },
+        },
+        test => {
+            "ExpectedNPNProtocol" => "bar",
+        },
+    },
+    {
+        name => "npn-client-honours-server-pref",
+        server => {
+            extra => {
+                "NPNProtocols" => "bar,foo",
+            },
+        },
+        client => {
+            extra => {
+                "NPNProtocols" => "foo,bar",
+            },
+        },
+        test => {
+            "ExpectedNPNProtocol" => "bar",
+        },
+    },
+    {
+        name => "npn-client-first-pref-on-mismatch",
+        server => {
+            extra => {
+                "NPNProtocols" => "baz",
+            },
+        },
+        client => {
+            extra => {
+                "NPNProtocols" => "foo,bar",
+            },
+        },
+        test => {
+            "ExpectedNPNProtocol" => "foo",
+        },
+    },
+    {
+        name => "npn-no-server-support",
+        server => { },
+        client => {
+            extra => {
+                "NPNProtocols" => "foo",
+            },
+        },
+        test => {
+            "ExpectedNPNProtocol" => undef,
+        },
+    },
+    {
+        name => "npn-no-client-support",
+        server => {
+            extra => {
+                "NPNProtocols" => "foo",
+            },
+        },
+        client => { },
+        test => {
+            "ExpectedNPNProtocol" => undef,
+        },
+    },
+    {
+        name => "npn-with-sni-no-context-switch",
+        server => {
+            extra => {
+                "NPNProtocols" => "foo",
+                "ServerNameCallback" => "IgnoreMismatch",
+            },
+        },
+        server2 => {
+            extra => {
+                "NPNProtocols" => "bar",
+            },
+        },
+        client => {
+            extra => {
+                "NPNProtocols" => "foo,bar",
+                "ServerName" => "server1",
+            },
+        },
+        test => {
+            "ExpectedServerName" => "server1",
+            "ExpectedNPNProtocol" => "foo",
+        },
+    },
+    {
+        name => "npn-with-sni-context-switch",
+        server => {
+            extra => {
+                "NPNProtocols" => "foo",
+                "ServerNameCallback" => "IgnoreMismatch",
+            },
+        },
+        server2 => {
+            extra => {
+                "NPNProtocols" => "bar",
+            },
+        },
+        client => {
+            extra => {
+                "NPNProtocols" => "foo,bar",
+                "ServerName" => "server2",
+            },
+        },
+        test => {
+            "ExpectedServerName" => "server2",
+            "ExpectedNPNProtocol" => "bar",
+        },
+    },
+    {
+        name => "npn-selected-sni-server-supports-npn",
+        server => {
+            extra => {
+                "ServerNameCallback" => "IgnoreMismatch",
+            },
+        },
+        server2 => {
+            extra => {
+                "NPNProtocols" => "bar",
+            },
+        },
+        client => {
+            extra => {
+                "NPNProtocols" => "foo,bar",
+                "ServerName" => "server2",
+            },
+        },
+        test => {
+            "ExpectedServerName" => "server2",
+            "ExpectedNPNProtocol" => "bar",
+        },
+    },
+    {
+        name => "npn-selected-sni-server-does-not-support-npn",
+        server => {
+            extra => {
+                "NPNProtocols" => "bar",
+                "ServerNameCallback" => "IgnoreMismatch",
+            },
+        },
+        server2 => { },
+        client => {
+            extra => {
+                "NPNProtocols" => "foo,bar",
+                "ServerName" => "server2",
+            },
+        },
+        test => {
+             "ExpectedServerName" => "server2",
+             "ExpectedNPNProtocol" => undef,
+        },
+    },
+    {
+        name => "alpn-preferred-over-npn",
+        server => {
+            extra => {
+                "ALPNProtocols" => "foo",
+                "NPNProtocols" => "bar",
+            },
+        },
+        client => {
+            extra => {
+                "ALPNProtocols" => "foo",
+                "NPNProtocols" => "bar",
+            },
+        },
+        test => {
+            "ExpectedALPNProtocol" => "foo",
+            "ExpectedNPNProtocol" => undef,
+        },
+    },
+    {
+        name => "sni-npn-preferred-over-alpn",
+        server => {
+            extra => {
+                "ServerNameCallback" => "IgnoreMismatch",
+                "ALPNProtocols" => "foo",
+            },
+        },
+        server2 => {
+            extra => {
+                "NPNProtocols" => "bar",
+            },
+        },
+        client => {
+            extra => {
+                "ServerName" => "server2",
+                "ALPNProtocols" => "foo",
+                "NPNProtocols" => "bar",
+            },
+        },
+        test => {
+            "ExpectedALPNProtocol" => undef,
+            "ExpectedNPNProtocol" => "bar",
+            "ExpectedServerName" => "server2",  
+        },
+    },
+    {
+        name => "npn-simple-resumption",
+        server => {
+            extra => {
+                "NPNProtocols" => "foo",
+            },
+        },
+        client => {
+            extra => {
+                "NPNProtocols" => "foo",
+            },
+        },
+        test => {
+            "HandshakeMode" => "Resume",
+            "ResumptionExpected" => "Yes",
+            "ExpectedNPNProtocol" => "foo",
+        },
+    },
+    {
+        name => "npn-server-switch-resumption",
+        server => {
+            extra => {
+                "NPNProtocols" => "bar,foo",
+            },
+        },
+        resume_server => {
+            extra => {
+                "NPNProtocols" => "baz,foo",
+            },
+        },
+        client => {
+            extra => {
+                "NPNProtocols" => "foo,bar,baz",
+            },
+        },
+        test => {
+            "HandshakeMode" => "Resume",
+            "ResumptionExpected" => "Yes",
+            "ExpectedNPNProtocol" => "baz",
+        },
+    },
+    {
+        name => "npn-client-switch-resumption",
+        server => {
+            extra => {
+                "NPNProtocols" => "foo,bar,baz",
+            },
+        },
+        client => {
+            extra => {
+                "NPNProtocols" => "foo,baz",
+            },
+        },
+        resume_client => {
+            extra => {
+                "NPNProtocols" => "bar,baz",
+            },
+        },
+        test => {
+            "HandshakeMode" => "Resume",
+            "ResumptionExpected" => "Yes",
+            "ExpectedNPNProtocol" => "bar",
+        },
+    },
+    {
+        name => "npn-client-first-pref-on-mismatch-resumption",
+        server => {
+            extra => {
+                "NPNProtocols" => "bar",
+            },
+        },
+        resume_server => {
+            extra => {
+                "NPNProtocols" => "baz",
+            },
+        },
+        client => {
+            extra => {
+                "NPNProtocols" => "foo,bar",
+            },
+        },
+        test => {
+            "HandshakeMode" => "Resume",
+            "ResumptionExpected" => "Yes",
+            "ExpectedNPNProtocol" => "foo",
+        },
+    },
+    {
+        name => "npn-no-server-support-resumption",
+        server => {
+            extra => {
+                "NPNProtocols" => "foo",
+            },
+        },
+        resume_server => { },
+        client => {
+            extra => {
+                "NPNProtocols" => "foo",
+            },
+        },
+        test => {
+            "HandshakeMode" => "Resume",
+            "ResumptionExpected" => "Yes",
+            "ExpectedNPNProtocol" => undef,
+        },
+    },
+    {
+        name => "npn-no-client-support-resumption",
+        server => {
+            extra => {
+                "NPNProtocols" => "foo",
+            },
+        },
+        client => {
+            extra => {
+                "NPNProtocols" => "foo",
+            },
+        },
+        resume_client => { },
+        test => {
+            "HandshakeMode" => "Resume",
+            "ResumptionExpected" => "Yes",
+            "ExpectedNPNProtocol" => undef,
+        },
+    },
+    {
+        name => "alpn-preferred-over-npn-resumption",
+        server => {
+            extra => {
+                "NPNProtocols" => "bar",
+            },
+        },
+        resume_server => {
+            extra => {
+                "ALPNProtocols" => "foo",
+                "NPNProtocols" => "baz",
+            },
+        },
+        client => {
+            extra => {
+                "ALPNProtocols" => "foo",
+                "NPNProtocols" => "bar,baz",
+            },
+        },
+        test => {
+            "HandshakeMode" => "Resume",
+            "ResumptionExpected" => "Yes",
+            "ExpectedALPNProtocol" => "foo",
+            "ExpectedNPNProtocol" => undef,
+        },
+    },
+    {
+        name => "npn-used-if-alpn-not-supported-resumption",
+        server => {
+            extra => {
+                "ALPNProtocols" => "foo",
+                "NPNProtocols" => "bar",
+            },
+        },
+        resume_server => {
+            extra => {
+                "NPNProtocols" => "baz",
+            },
+        },
+        client => {
+            extra => {
+                "ALPNProtocols" => "foo",
+                "NPNProtocols" => "bar,baz",
+            },
+        },
+        test => {
+            "HandshakeMode" => "Resume",
+            "ResumptionExpected" => "Yes",
+            "ExpectedALPNProtocol" => undef,
+            "ExpectedNPNProtocol" => "baz",
+        },
+    },
+);
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/09-alpn.conf b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/09-alpn.conf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e7e6cb9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/09-alpn.conf
@@ -0,0 +1,619 @@
+# Generated with generate_ssl_tests.pl
+
+num_tests = 16
+
+test-0 = 0-alpn-simple
+test-1 = 1-alpn-server-finds-match
+test-2 = 2-alpn-server-honours-server-pref
+test-3 = 3-alpn-alert-on-mismatch
+test-4 = 4-alpn-no-server-support
+test-5 = 5-alpn-no-client-support
+test-6 = 6-alpn-with-sni-no-context-switch
+test-7 = 7-alpn-with-sni-context-switch
+test-8 = 8-alpn-selected-sni-server-supports-alpn
+test-9 = 9-alpn-selected-sni-server-does-not-support-alpn
+test-10 = 10-alpn-simple-resumption
+test-11 = 11-alpn-server-switch-resumption
+test-12 = 12-alpn-client-switch-resumption
+test-13 = 13-alpn-alert-on-mismatch-resumption
+test-14 = 14-alpn-no-server-support-resumption
+test-15 = 15-alpn-no-client-support-resumption
+# ===========================================================
+
+[0-alpn-simple]
+ssl_conf = 0-alpn-simple-ssl
+
+[0-alpn-simple-ssl]
+server = 0-alpn-simple-server
+client = 0-alpn-simple-client
+
+[0-alpn-simple-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[0-alpn-simple-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-0]
+ExpectedALPNProtocol = foo
+server = 0-alpn-simple-server-extra
+client = 0-alpn-simple-client-extra
+
+[0-alpn-simple-server-extra]
+ALPNProtocols = foo
+
+[0-alpn-simple-client-extra]
+ALPNProtocols = foo
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[1-alpn-server-finds-match]
+ssl_conf = 1-alpn-server-finds-match-ssl
+
+[1-alpn-server-finds-match-ssl]
+server = 1-alpn-server-finds-match-server
+client = 1-alpn-server-finds-match-client
+
+[1-alpn-server-finds-match-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[1-alpn-server-finds-match-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-1]
+ExpectedALPNProtocol = bar
+server = 1-alpn-server-finds-match-server-extra
+client = 1-alpn-server-finds-match-client-extra
+
+[1-alpn-server-finds-match-server-extra]
+ALPNProtocols = baz,bar
+
+[1-alpn-server-finds-match-client-extra]
+ALPNProtocols = foo,bar
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[2-alpn-server-honours-server-pref]
+ssl_conf = 2-alpn-server-honours-server-pref-ssl
+
+[2-alpn-server-honours-server-pref-ssl]
+server = 2-alpn-server-honours-server-pref-server
+client = 2-alpn-server-honours-server-pref-client
+
+[2-alpn-server-honours-server-pref-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[2-alpn-server-honours-server-pref-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-2]
+ExpectedALPNProtocol = bar
+server = 2-alpn-server-honours-server-pref-server-extra
+client = 2-alpn-server-honours-server-pref-client-extra
+
+[2-alpn-server-honours-server-pref-server-extra]
+ALPNProtocols = bar,foo
+
+[2-alpn-server-honours-server-pref-client-extra]
+ALPNProtocols = foo,bar
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[3-alpn-alert-on-mismatch]
+ssl_conf = 3-alpn-alert-on-mismatch-ssl
+
+[3-alpn-alert-on-mismatch-ssl]
+server = 3-alpn-alert-on-mismatch-server
+client = 3-alpn-alert-on-mismatch-client
+
+[3-alpn-alert-on-mismatch-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[3-alpn-alert-on-mismatch-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-3]
+ExpectedResult = ServerFail
+ExpectedServerAlert = NoApplicationProtocol
+server = 3-alpn-alert-on-mismatch-server-extra
+client = 3-alpn-alert-on-mismatch-client-extra
+
+[3-alpn-alert-on-mismatch-server-extra]
+ALPNProtocols = baz
+
+[3-alpn-alert-on-mismatch-client-extra]
+ALPNProtocols = foo,bar
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[4-alpn-no-server-support]
+ssl_conf = 4-alpn-no-server-support-ssl
+
+[4-alpn-no-server-support-ssl]
+server = 4-alpn-no-server-support-server
+client = 4-alpn-no-server-support-client
+
+[4-alpn-no-server-support-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[4-alpn-no-server-support-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-4]
+client = 4-alpn-no-server-support-client-extra
+
+[4-alpn-no-server-support-client-extra]
+ALPNProtocols = foo
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[5-alpn-no-client-support]
+ssl_conf = 5-alpn-no-client-support-ssl
+
+[5-alpn-no-client-support-ssl]
+server = 5-alpn-no-client-support-server
+client = 5-alpn-no-client-support-client
+
+[5-alpn-no-client-support-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[5-alpn-no-client-support-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-5]
+server = 5-alpn-no-client-support-server-extra
+
+[5-alpn-no-client-support-server-extra]
+ALPNProtocols = foo
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[6-alpn-with-sni-no-context-switch]
+ssl_conf = 6-alpn-with-sni-no-context-switch-ssl
+
+[6-alpn-with-sni-no-context-switch-ssl]
+server = 6-alpn-with-sni-no-context-switch-server
+client = 6-alpn-with-sni-no-context-switch-client
+server2 = 6-alpn-with-sni-no-context-switch-server2
+
+[6-alpn-with-sni-no-context-switch-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[6-alpn-with-sni-no-context-switch-server2]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[6-alpn-with-sni-no-context-switch-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-6]
+ExpectedALPNProtocol = foo
+ExpectedServerName = server1
+server = 6-alpn-with-sni-no-context-switch-server-extra
+server2 = 6-alpn-with-sni-no-context-switch-server2-extra
+client = 6-alpn-with-sni-no-context-switch-client-extra
+
+[6-alpn-with-sni-no-context-switch-server-extra]
+ALPNProtocols = foo
+ServerNameCallback = IgnoreMismatch
+
+[6-alpn-with-sni-no-context-switch-server2-extra]
+ALPNProtocols = bar
+
+[6-alpn-with-sni-no-context-switch-client-extra]
+ALPNProtocols = foo,bar
+ServerName = server1
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[7-alpn-with-sni-context-switch]
+ssl_conf = 7-alpn-with-sni-context-switch-ssl
+
+[7-alpn-with-sni-context-switch-ssl]
+server = 7-alpn-with-sni-context-switch-server
+client = 7-alpn-with-sni-context-switch-client
+server2 = 7-alpn-with-sni-context-switch-server2
+
+[7-alpn-with-sni-context-switch-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[7-alpn-with-sni-context-switch-server2]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[7-alpn-with-sni-context-switch-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-7]
+ExpectedALPNProtocol = bar
+ExpectedServerName = server2
+server = 7-alpn-with-sni-context-switch-server-extra
+server2 = 7-alpn-with-sni-context-switch-server2-extra
+client = 7-alpn-with-sni-context-switch-client-extra
+
+[7-alpn-with-sni-context-switch-server-extra]
+ALPNProtocols = foo
+ServerNameCallback = IgnoreMismatch
+
+[7-alpn-with-sni-context-switch-server2-extra]
+ALPNProtocols = bar
+
+[7-alpn-with-sni-context-switch-client-extra]
+ALPNProtocols = foo,bar
+ServerName = server2
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[8-alpn-selected-sni-server-supports-alpn]
+ssl_conf = 8-alpn-selected-sni-server-supports-alpn-ssl
+
+[8-alpn-selected-sni-server-supports-alpn-ssl]
+server = 8-alpn-selected-sni-server-supports-alpn-server
+client = 8-alpn-selected-sni-server-supports-alpn-client
+server2 = 8-alpn-selected-sni-server-supports-alpn-server2
+
+[8-alpn-selected-sni-server-supports-alpn-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[8-alpn-selected-sni-server-supports-alpn-server2]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[8-alpn-selected-sni-server-supports-alpn-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-8]
+ExpectedALPNProtocol = bar
+ExpectedServerName = server2
+server = 8-alpn-selected-sni-server-supports-alpn-server-extra
+server2 = 8-alpn-selected-sni-server-supports-alpn-server2-extra
+client = 8-alpn-selected-sni-server-supports-alpn-client-extra
+
+[8-alpn-selected-sni-server-supports-alpn-server-extra]
+ServerNameCallback = IgnoreMismatch
+
+[8-alpn-selected-sni-server-supports-alpn-server2-extra]
+ALPNProtocols = bar
+
+[8-alpn-selected-sni-server-supports-alpn-client-extra]
+ALPNProtocols = foo,bar
+ServerName = server2
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[9-alpn-selected-sni-server-does-not-support-alpn]
+ssl_conf = 9-alpn-selected-sni-server-does-not-support-alpn-ssl
+
+[9-alpn-selected-sni-server-does-not-support-alpn-ssl]
+server = 9-alpn-selected-sni-server-does-not-support-alpn-server
+client = 9-alpn-selected-sni-server-does-not-support-alpn-client
+server2 = 9-alpn-selected-sni-server-does-not-support-alpn-server2
+
+[9-alpn-selected-sni-server-does-not-support-alpn-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[9-alpn-selected-sni-server-does-not-support-alpn-server2]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[9-alpn-selected-sni-server-does-not-support-alpn-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-9]
+ExpectedServerName = server2
+server = 9-alpn-selected-sni-server-does-not-support-alpn-server-extra
+client = 9-alpn-selected-sni-server-does-not-support-alpn-client-extra
+
+[9-alpn-selected-sni-server-does-not-support-alpn-server-extra]
+ALPNProtocols = bar
+ServerNameCallback = IgnoreMismatch
+
+[9-alpn-selected-sni-server-does-not-support-alpn-client-extra]
+ALPNProtocols = foo,bar
+ServerName = server2
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[10-alpn-simple-resumption]
+ssl_conf = 10-alpn-simple-resumption-ssl
+
+[10-alpn-simple-resumption-ssl]
+server = 10-alpn-simple-resumption-server
+client = 10-alpn-simple-resumption-client
+resume-server = 10-alpn-simple-resumption-server
+resume-client = 10-alpn-simple-resumption-client
+
+[10-alpn-simple-resumption-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[10-alpn-simple-resumption-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-10]
+ExpectedALPNProtocol = foo
+HandshakeMode = Resume
+ResumptionExpected = Yes
+server = 10-alpn-simple-resumption-server-extra
+resume-server = 10-alpn-simple-resumption-server-extra
+client = 10-alpn-simple-resumption-client-extra
+resume-client = 10-alpn-simple-resumption-client-extra
+
+[10-alpn-simple-resumption-server-extra]
+ALPNProtocols = foo
+
+[10-alpn-simple-resumption-client-extra]
+ALPNProtocols = foo
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[11-alpn-server-switch-resumption]
+ssl_conf = 11-alpn-server-switch-resumption-ssl
+
+[11-alpn-server-switch-resumption-ssl]
+server = 11-alpn-server-switch-resumption-server
+client = 11-alpn-server-switch-resumption-client
+resume-server = 11-alpn-server-switch-resumption-resume-server
+resume-client = 11-alpn-server-switch-resumption-client
+
+[11-alpn-server-switch-resumption-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[11-alpn-server-switch-resumption-resume-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[11-alpn-server-switch-resumption-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-11]
+ExpectedALPNProtocol = baz
+HandshakeMode = Resume
+ResumptionExpected = Yes
+server = 11-alpn-server-switch-resumption-server-extra
+resume-server = 11-alpn-server-switch-resumption-resume-server-extra
+client = 11-alpn-server-switch-resumption-client-extra
+resume-client = 11-alpn-server-switch-resumption-client-extra
+
+[11-alpn-server-switch-resumption-server-extra]
+ALPNProtocols = bar,foo
+
+[11-alpn-server-switch-resumption-resume-server-extra]
+ALPNProtocols = baz,foo
+
+[11-alpn-server-switch-resumption-client-extra]
+ALPNProtocols = foo,bar,baz
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[12-alpn-client-switch-resumption]
+ssl_conf = 12-alpn-client-switch-resumption-ssl
+
+[12-alpn-client-switch-resumption-ssl]
+server = 12-alpn-client-switch-resumption-server
+client = 12-alpn-client-switch-resumption-client
+resume-server = 12-alpn-client-switch-resumption-server
+resume-client = 12-alpn-client-switch-resumption-resume-client
+
+[12-alpn-client-switch-resumption-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[12-alpn-client-switch-resumption-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[12-alpn-client-switch-resumption-resume-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-12]
+ExpectedALPNProtocol = bar
+HandshakeMode = Resume
+ResumptionExpected = Yes
+server = 12-alpn-client-switch-resumption-server-extra
+resume-server = 12-alpn-client-switch-resumption-server-extra
+client = 12-alpn-client-switch-resumption-client-extra
+resume-client = 12-alpn-client-switch-resumption-resume-client-extra
+
+[12-alpn-client-switch-resumption-server-extra]
+ALPNProtocols = foo,bar,baz
+
+[12-alpn-client-switch-resumption-client-extra]
+ALPNProtocols = foo,baz
+
+[12-alpn-client-switch-resumption-resume-client-extra]
+ALPNProtocols = bar,baz
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[13-alpn-alert-on-mismatch-resumption]
+ssl_conf = 13-alpn-alert-on-mismatch-resumption-ssl
+
+[13-alpn-alert-on-mismatch-resumption-ssl]
+server = 13-alpn-alert-on-mismatch-resumption-server
+client = 13-alpn-alert-on-mismatch-resumption-client
+resume-server = 13-alpn-alert-on-mismatch-resumption-resume-server
+resume-client = 13-alpn-alert-on-mismatch-resumption-client
+
+[13-alpn-alert-on-mismatch-resumption-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[13-alpn-alert-on-mismatch-resumption-resume-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[13-alpn-alert-on-mismatch-resumption-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-13]
+ExpectedResult = ServerFail
+ExpectedServerAlert = NoApplicationProtocol
+HandshakeMode = Resume
+server = 13-alpn-alert-on-mismatch-resumption-server-extra
+resume-server = 13-alpn-alert-on-mismatch-resumption-resume-server-extra
+client = 13-alpn-alert-on-mismatch-resumption-client-extra
+resume-client = 13-alpn-alert-on-mismatch-resumption-client-extra
+
+[13-alpn-alert-on-mismatch-resumption-server-extra]
+ALPNProtocols = bar
+
+[13-alpn-alert-on-mismatch-resumption-resume-server-extra]
+ALPNProtocols = baz
+
+[13-alpn-alert-on-mismatch-resumption-client-extra]
+ALPNProtocols = foo,bar
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[14-alpn-no-server-support-resumption]
+ssl_conf = 14-alpn-no-server-support-resumption-ssl
+
+[14-alpn-no-server-support-resumption-ssl]
+server = 14-alpn-no-server-support-resumption-server
+client = 14-alpn-no-server-support-resumption-client
+resume-server = 14-alpn-no-server-support-resumption-resume-server
+resume-client = 14-alpn-no-server-support-resumption-client
+
+[14-alpn-no-server-support-resumption-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[14-alpn-no-server-support-resumption-resume-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[14-alpn-no-server-support-resumption-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-14]
+HandshakeMode = Resume
+ResumptionExpected = Yes
+server = 14-alpn-no-server-support-resumption-server-extra
+client = 14-alpn-no-server-support-resumption-client-extra
+resume-client = 14-alpn-no-server-support-resumption-client-extra
+
+[14-alpn-no-server-support-resumption-server-extra]
+ALPNProtocols = foo
+
+[14-alpn-no-server-support-resumption-client-extra]
+ALPNProtocols = foo
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[15-alpn-no-client-support-resumption]
+ssl_conf = 15-alpn-no-client-support-resumption-ssl
+
+[15-alpn-no-client-support-resumption-ssl]
+server = 15-alpn-no-client-support-resumption-server
+client = 15-alpn-no-client-support-resumption-client
+resume-server = 15-alpn-no-client-support-resumption-server
+resume-client = 15-alpn-no-client-support-resumption-resume-client
+
+[15-alpn-no-client-support-resumption-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[15-alpn-no-client-support-resumption-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[15-alpn-no-client-support-resumption-resume-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-15]
+HandshakeMode = Resume
+ResumptionExpected = Yes
+server = 15-alpn-no-client-support-resumption-server-extra
+resume-server = 15-alpn-no-client-support-resumption-server-extra
+client = 15-alpn-no-client-support-resumption-client-extra
+
+[15-alpn-no-client-support-resumption-server-extra]
+ALPNProtocols = foo
+
+[15-alpn-no-client-support-resumption-client-extra]
+ALPNProtocols = foo
+
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/09-alpn.conf.in b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/09-alpn.conf.in
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..37035f1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/09-alpn.conf.in
@@ -0,0 +1,324 @@
+# -*- mode: perl; -*-
+# Copyright 2016-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+## Test ALPN negotiation
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+
+package ssltests;
+
+
+our @tests = (
+    {
+        name => "alpn-simple",
+        server => {
+            extra => {
+                "ALPNProtocols" => "foo",
+            },
+        },
+        client => {
+            extra => {
+                "ALPNProtocols" => "foo",
+            },
+        },
+        test => {
+            "ExpectedALPNProtocol" => "foo",
+        },
+    },
+    {
+        name => "alpn-server-finds-match",
+        server => {
+            extra => {
+                "ALPNProtocols" => "baz,bar",
+            },
+        },
+        client => {
+            extra => {
+                "ALPNProtocols" => "foo,bar",
+            },
+        },
+        test => {
+            "ExpectedALPNProtocol" => "bar",
+        },
+    },
+    {
+        name => "alpn-server-honours-server-pref",
+        server => {
+            extra => {
+                "ALPNProtocols" => "bar,foo",
+            },
+        },
+        client => {
+            extra => {
+                "ALPNProtocols" => "foo,bar",
+            },
+        },
+        test => {
+            "ExpectedALPNProtocol" => "bar",
+        },
+    },
+    {
+        name => "alpn-alert-on-mismatch",
+        server => {
+            extra => {
+                "ALPNProtocols" => "baz",
+            },
+        },
+        client => {
+            extra => {
+                "ALPNProtocols" => "foo,bar",
+            },
+        },
+        test => {
+            "ExpectedResult" => "ServerFail",
+            "ExpectedServerAlert" => "NoApplicationProtocol",
+        },
+    },
+    {
+        name => "alpn-no-server-support",
+        server => { },
+        client => {
+            extra => {
+                "ALPNProtocols" => "foo",
+            },
+        },
+        test => {
+            "ExpectedALPNProtocol" => undef,
+        },
+    },
+    {
+        name => "alpn-no-client-support",
+        server => {
+            extra => {
+                "ALPNProtocols" => "foo",
+            },
+        },
+        client => { },
+        test => {
+            "ExpectedALPNProtocol" => undef,
+        },
+    },
+    {
+        name => "alpn-with-sni-no-context-switch",
+        server => {
+            extra => {
+                "ALPNProtocols" => "foo",
+                "ServerNameCallback" => "IgnoreMismatch",
+            },
+        },
+        server2 => {
+            extra => {
+                "ALPNProtocols" => "bar",
+            },
+        },
+        client => {
+            extra => {
+                "ALPNProtocols" => "foo,bar",
+                "ServerName" => "server1",
+            },
+        },
+        test => {
+            "ExpectedServerName" => "server1",
+            "ExpectedALPNProtocol" => "foo",
+        },
+    },
+    {
+        name => "alpn-with-sni-context-switch",
+        server => {
+            extra => {
+                "ALPNProtocols" => "foo",
+                "ServerNameCallback" => "IgnoreMismatch",
+            },
+        },
+        server2 => {
+            extra => {
+                "ALPNProtocols" => "bar",
+            },
+        },
+        client => {
+            extra => {
+                "ALPNProtocols" => "foo,bar",
+                "ServerName" => "server2",
+            },
+        },
+        test => {
+            "ExpectedServerName" => "server2",
+            "ExpectedALPNProtocol" => "bar",
+        },
+    },
+    {
+        name => "alpn-selected-sni-server-supports-alpn",
+        server => {
+            extra => {
+               "ServerNameCallback" => "IgnoreMismatch",
+            },
+        },
+        server2 => {
+            extra => {
+                "ALPNProtocols" => "bar",
+            },
+        },
+        client => {
+            extra => {
+                "ALPNProtocols" => "foo,bar",
+                "ServerName" => "server2",
+            },
+        },
+        test => {
+            "ExpectedServerName" => "server2",
+            "ExpectedALPNProtocol" => "bar",
+        },
+    },
+    {
+        name => "alpn-selected-sni-server-does-not-support-alpn",
+        server => {
+            extra => {
+                "ALPNProtocols" => "bar", 
+                "ServerNameCallback" => "IgnoreMismatch",
+            },
+        },
+        server2 => { },
+        client => {
+            extra => {
+                "ALPNProtocols" => "foo,bar",
+                "ServerName" => "server2",
+            },
+        },
+        test => {
+            "ExpectedServerName" => "server2",
+            "ExpectedALPNProtocol" => undef,
+        },
+    },
+    {
+        name => "alpn-simple-resumption",
+        server => {
+            extra => {
+                "ALPNProtocols" => "foo",
+            },
+        },
+        client => {
+            extra => {
+                "ALPNProtocols" => "foo",
+            },
+        },
+        test => {
+            "HandshakeMode" => "Resume",
+            "ResumptionExpected" => "Yes",
+            "ExpectedALPNProtocol" => "foo",
+        },
+    },
+    {
+        name => "alpn-server-switch-resumption",
+        server => {
+            extra => {
+                "ALPNProtocols" => "bar,foo",
+            },
+        },
+        resume_server => {
+            extra => {
+                "ALPNProtocols" => "baz,foo",
+            },
+        },
+        client => {
+            extra => {
+                "ALPNProtocols" => "foo,bar,baz",
+            },
+        },
+        test => {
+            "HandshakeMode" => "Resume",
+            "ResumptionExpected" => "Yes",
+            "ExpectedALPNProtocol" => "baz",
+        },
+    },
+    {
+        name => "alpn-client-switch-resumption",
+        server => {
+            extra => {
+                "ALPNProtocols" => "foo,bar,baz",
+            },
+        },
+        client => {
+            extra => {
+                "ALPNProtocols" => "foo,baz",
+            },
+        },
+        resume_client => {
+            extra => {
+                "ALPNProtocols" => "bar,baz",
+            },
+        },
+        test => {
+            "HandshakeMode" => "Resume",
+            "ResumptionExpected" => "Yes",
+            "ExpectedALPNProtocol" => "bar",
+        },
+    },
+    {
+        name => "alpn-alert-on-mismatch-resumption",
+        server => {
+            extra => {
+                "ALPNProtocols" => "bar",
+            },
+        },
+        resume_server => {
+            extra => {
+                "ALPNProtocols" => "baz",
+            },
+        },
+        client => {
+            extra => {
+                "ALPNProtocols" => "foo,bar",
+            },
+        },
+        test => {
+            "HandshakeMode" => "Resume",
+            "ExpectedResult" => "ServerFail",
+            "ExpectedServerAlert" => "NoApplicationProtocol",
+        },
+    },
+    {
+        name => "alpn-no-server-support-resumption",
+        server => {
+            extra => {
+                "ALPNProtocols" => "foo",
+            },
+        },
+        resume_server => { },
+        client => {
+            extra => {
+                "ALPNProtocols" => "foo",
+            },
+        },
+        test => {
+            "HandshakeMode" => "Resume",
+            "ResumptionExpected" => "Yes",
+            "ExpectedALPNProtocol" => undef,
+        },
+    },
+    {
+        name => "alpn-no-client-support-resumption",
+        server => {
+            extra => {
+                "ALPNProtocols" => "foo",
+            },
+        },
+        client => {
+            extra => {
+                "ALPNProtocols" => "foo",
+            },
+        },
+        resume_client => { },
+        test => {
+            "HandshakeMode" => "Resume",
+            "ResumptionExpected" => "Yes",
+            "ExpectedALPNProtocol" => undef,
+        },
+    },
+);
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/10-resumption.conf b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/10-resumption.conf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b2deee4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/10-resumption.conf
@@ -0,0 +1,1336 @@
+# Generated with generate_ssl_tests.pl
+
+num_tests = 36
+
+test-0 = 0-resumption
+test-1 = 1-resumption
+test-2 = 2-resumption
+test-3 = 3-resumption
+test-4 = 4-resumption
+test-5 = 5-resumption
+test-6 = 6-resumption
+test-7 = 7-resumption
+test-8 = 8-resumption
+test-9 = 9-resumption
+test-10 = 10-resumption
+test-11 = 11-resumption
+test-12 = 12-resumption
+test-13 = 13-resumption
+test-14 = 14-resumption
+test-15 = 15-resumption
+test-16 = 16-resumption
+test-17 = 17-resumption
+test-18 = 18-resumption
+test-19 = 19-resumption
+test-20 = 20-resumption
+test-21 = 21-resumption
+test-22 = 22-resumption
+test-23 = 23-resumption
+test-24 = 24-resumption
+test-25 = 25-resumption
+test-26 = 26-resumption
+test-27 = 27-resumption
+test-28 = 28-resumption
+test-29 = 29-resumption
+test-30 = 30-resumption
+test-31 = 31-resumption
+test-32 = 32-resumption
+test-33 = 33-resumption
+test-34 = 34-resumption
+test-35 = 35-resumption
+# ===========================================================
+
+[0-resumption]
+ssl_conf = 0-resumption-ssl
+
+[0-resumption-ssl]
+server = 0-resumption-server
+client = 0-resumption-client
+resume-server = 0-resumption-resume-server
+resume-client = 0-resumption-client
+
+[0-resumption-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+Options = SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[0-resumption-resume-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[0-resumption-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-0]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1
+HandshakeMode = Resume
+ResumptionExpected = Yes
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[1-resumption]
+ssl_conf = 1-resumption-ssl
+
+[1-resumption-ssl]
+server = 1-resumption-server
+client = 1-resumption-client
+resume-server = 1-resumption-resume-server
+resume-client = 1-resumption-client
+
+[1-resumption-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+Options = -SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[1-resumption-resume-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[1-resumption-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-1]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1
+HandshakeMode = Resume
+ResumptionExpected = Yes
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[2-resumption]
+ssl_conf = 2-resumption-ssl
+
+[2-resumption-ssl]
+server = 2-resumption-server
+client = 2-resumption-client
+resume-server = 2-resumption-resume-server
+resume-client = 2-resumption-client
+
+[2-resumption-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+Options = SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[2-resumption-resume-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[2-resumption-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-2]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+HandshakeMode = Resume
+ResumptionExpected = No
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[3-resumption]
+ssl_conf = 3-resumption-ssl
+
+[3-resumption-ssl]
+server = 3-resumption-server
+client = 3-resumption-client
+resume-server = 3-resumption-resume-server
+resume-client = 3-resumption-client
+
+[3-resumption-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+Options = -SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[3-resumption-resume-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[3-resumption-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-3]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+HandshakeMode = Resume
+ResumptionExpected = No
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[4-resumption]
+ssl_conf = 4-resumption-ssl
+
+[4-resumption-ssl]
+server = 4-resumption-server
+client = 4-resumption-client
+resume-server = 4-resumption-resume-server
+resume-client = 4-resumption-client
+
+[4-resumption-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+Options = SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[4-resumption-resume-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[4-resumption-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-4]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+HandshakeMode = Resume
+ResumptionExpected = No
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[5-resumption]
+ssl_conf = 5-resumption-ssl
+
+[5-resumption-ssl]
+server = 5-resumption-server
+client = 5-resumption-client
+resume-server = 5-resumption-resume-server
+resume-client = 5-resumption-client
+
+[5-resumption-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+Options = -SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[5-resumption-resume-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[5-resumption-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-5]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+HandshakeMode = Resume
+ResumptionExpected = No
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[6-resumption]
+ssl_conf = 6-resumption-ssl
+
+[6-resumption-ssl]
+server = 6-resumption-server
+client = 6-resumption-client
+resume-server = 6-resumption-resume-server
+resume-client = 6-resumption-client
+
+[6-resumption-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+Options = SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[6-resumption-resume-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[6-resumption-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-6]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1
+HandshakeMode = Resume
+ResumptionExpected = No
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[7-resumption]
+ssl_conf = 7-resumption-ssl
+
+[7-resumption-ssl]
+server = 7-resumption-server
+client = 7-resumption-client
+resume-server = 7-resumption-resume-server
+resume-client = 7-resumption-client
+
+[7-resumption-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+Options = -SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[7-resumption-resume-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[7-resumption-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-7]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1
+HandshakeMode = Resume
+ResumptionExpected = No
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[8-resumption]
+ssl_conf = 8-resumption-ssl
+
+[8-resumption-ssl]
+server = 8-resumption-server
+client = 8-resumption-client
+resume-server = 8-resumption-resume-server
+resume-client = 8-resumption-client
+
+[8-resumption-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+Options = SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[8-resumption-resume-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[8-resumption-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-8]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+HandshakeMode = Resume
+ResumptionExpected = Yes
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[9-resumption]
+ssl_conf = 9-resumption-ssl
+
+[9-resumption-ssl]
+server = 9-resumption-server
+client = 9-resumption-client
+resume-server = 9-resumption-resume-server
+resume-client = 9-resumption-client
+
+[9-resumption-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+Options = -SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[9-resumption-resume-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[9-resumption-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-9]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+HandshakeMode = Resume
+ResumptionExpected = Yes
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[10-resumption]
+ssl_conf = 10-resumption-ssl
+
+[10-resumption-ssl]
+server = 10-resumption-server
+client = 10-resumption-client
+resume-server = 10-resumption-resume-server
+resume-client = 10-resumption-client
+
+[10-resumption-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+Options = SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[10-resumption-resume-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[10-resumption-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-10]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+HandshakeMode = Resume
+ResumptionExpected = No
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[11-resumption]
+ssl_conf = 11-resumption-ssl
+
+[11-resumption-ssl]
+server = 11-resumption-server
+client = 11-resumption-client
+resume-server = 11-resumption-resume-server
+resume-client = 11-resumption-client
+
+[11-resumption-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+Options = -SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[11-resumption-resume-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[11-resumption-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-11]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+HandshakeMode = Resume
+ResumptionExpected = No
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[12-resumption]
+ssl_conf = 12-resumption-ssl
+
+[12-resumption-ssl]
+server = 12-resumption-server
+client = 12-resumption-client
+resume-server = 12-resumption-resume-server
+resume-client = 12-resumption-client
+
+[12-resumption-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+Options = SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[12-resumption-resume-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[12-resumption-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-12]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1
+HandshakeMode = Resume
+ResumptionExpected = No
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[13-resumption]
+ssl_conf = 13-resumption-ssl
+
+[13-resumption-ssl]
+server = 13-resumption-server
+client = 13-resumption-client
+resume-server = 13-resumption-resume-server
+resume-client = 13-resumption-client
+
+[13-resumption-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+Options = -SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[13-resumption-resume-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[13-resumption-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-13]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1
+HandshakeMode = Resume
+ResumptionExpected = No
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[14-resumption]
+ssl_conf = 14-resumption-ssl
+
+[14-resumption-ssl]
+server = 14-resumption-server
+client = 14-resumption-client
+resume-server = 14-resumption-resume-server
+resume-client = 14-resumption-client
+
+[14-resumption-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+Options = SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[14-resumption-resume-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[14-resumption-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-14]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+HandshakeMode = Resume
+ResumptionExpected = No
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[15-resumption]
+ssl_conf = 15-resumption-ssl
+
+[15-resumption-ssl]
+server = 15-resumption-server
+client = 15-resumption-client
+resume-server = 15-resumption-resume-server
+resume-client = 15-resumption-client
+
+[15-resumption-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+Options = -SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[15-resumption-resume-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[15-resumption-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-15]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+HandshakeMode = Resume
+ResumptionExpected = No
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[16-resumption]
+ssl_conf = 16-resumption-ssl
+
+[16-resumption-ssl]
+server = 16-resumption-server
+client = 16-resumption-client
+resume-server = 16-resumption-resume-server
+resume-client = 16-resumption-client
+
+[16-resumption-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+Options = SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[16-resumption-resume-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[16-resumption-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-16]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+HandshakeMode = Resume
+ResumptionExpected = Yes
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[17-resumption]
+ssl_conf = 17-resumption-ssl
+
+[17-resumption-ssl]
+server = 17-resumption-server
+client = 17-resumption-client
+resume-server = 17-resumption-resume-server
+resume-client = 17-resumption-client
+
+[17-resumption-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+Options = -SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[17-resumption-resume-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[17-resumption-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-17]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+HandshakeMode = Resume
+ResumptionExpected = Yes
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[18-resumption]
+ssl_conf = 18-resumption-ssl
+
+[18-resumption-ssl]
+server = 18-resumption-server
+client = 18-resumption-client
+resume-server = 18-resumption-server
+resume-client = 18-resumption-resume-client
+
+[18-resumption-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[18-resumption-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[18-resumption-resume-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-18]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1
+HandshakeMode = Resume
+ResumptionExpected = Yes
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[19-resumption]
+ssl_conf = 19-resumption-ssl
+
+[19-resumption-ssl]
+server = 19-resumption-server
+client = 19-resumption-client
+resume-server = 19-resumption-server
+resume-client = 19-resumption-resume-client
+
+[19-resumption-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = -SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[19-resumption-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[19-resumption-resume-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-19]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1
+HandshakeMode = Resume
+ResumptionExpected = Yes
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[20-resumption]
+ssl_conf = 20-resumption-ssl
+
+[20-resumption-ssl]
+server = 20-resumption-server
+client = 20-resumption-client
+resume-server = 20-resumption-server
+resume-client = 20-resumption-resume-client
+
+[20-resumption-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[20-resumption-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[20-resumption-resume-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-20]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+HandshakeMode = Resume
+ResumptionExpected = No
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[21-resumption]
+ssl_conf = 21-resumption-ssl
+
+[21-resumption-ssl]
+server = 21-resumption-server
+client = 21-resumption-client
+resume-server = 21-resumption-server
+resume-client = 21-resumption-resume-client
+
+[21-resumption-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = -SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[21-resumption-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[21-resumption-resume-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-21]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+HandshakeMode = Resume
+ResumptionExpected = No
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[22-resumption]
+ssl_conf = 22-resumption-ssl
+
+[22-resumption-ssl]
+server = 22-resumption-server
+client = 22-resumption-client
+resume-server = 22-resumption-server
+resume-client = 22-resumption-resume-client
+
+[22-resumption-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[22-resumption-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[22-resumption-resume-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-22]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+HandshakeMode = Resume
+ResumptionExpected = No
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[23-resumption]
+ssl_conf = 23-resumption-ssl
+
+[23-resumption-ssl]
+server = 23-resumption-server
+client = 23-resumption-client
+resume-server = 23-resumption-server
+resume-client = 23-resumption-resume-client
+
+[23-resumption-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = -SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[23-resumption-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[23-resumption-resume-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-23]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+HandshakeMode = Resume
+ResumptionExpected = No
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[24-resumption]
+ssl_conf = 24-resumption-ssl
+
+[24-resumption-ssl]
+server = 24-resumption-server
+client = 24-resumption-client
+resume-server = 24-resumption-server
+resume-client = 24-resumption-resume-client
+
+[24-resumption-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[24-resumption-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[24-resumption-resume-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-24]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1
+HandshakeMode = Resume
+ResumptionExpected = No
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[25-resumption]
+ssl_conf = 25-resumption-ssl
+
+[25-resumption-ssl]
+server = 25-resumption-server
+client = 25-resumption-client
+resume-server = 25-resumption-server
+resume-client = 25-resumption-resume-client
+
+[25-resumption-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = -SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[25-resumption-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[25-resumption-resume-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-25]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1
+HandshakeMode = Resume
+ResumptionExpected = No
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[26-resumption]
+ssl_conf = 26-resumption-ssl
+
+[26-resumption-ssl]
+server = 26-resumption-server
+client = 26-resumption-client
+resume-server = 26-resumption-server
+resume-client = 26-resumption-resume-client
+
+[26-resumption-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[26-resumption-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[26-resumption-resume-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-26]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+HandshakeMode = Resume
+ResumptionExpected = Yes
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[27-resumption]
+ssl_conf = 27-resumption-ssl
+
+[27-resumption-ssl]
+server = 27-resumption-server
+client = 27-resumption-client
+resume-server = 27-resumption-server
+resume-client = 27-resumption-resume-client
+
+[27-resumption-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = -SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[27-resumption-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[27-resumption-resume-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-27]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+HandshakeMode = Resume
+ResumptionExpected = Yes
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[28-resumption]
+ssl_conf = 28-resumption-ssl
+
+[28-resumption-ssl]
+server = 28-resumption-server
+client = 28-resumption-client
+resume-server = 28-resumption-server
+resume-client = 28-resumption-resume-client
+
+[28-resumption-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[28-resumption-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[28-resumption-resume-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-28]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+HandshakeMode = Resume
+ResumptionExpected = No
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[29-resumption]
+ssl_conf = 29-resumption-ssl
+
+[29-resumption-ssl]
+server = 29-resumption-server
+client = 29-resumption-client
+resume-server = 29-resumption-server
+resume-client = 29-resumption-resume-client
+
+[29-resumption-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = -SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[29-resumption-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[29-resumption-resume-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-29]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+HandshakeMode = Resume
+ResumptionExpected = No
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[30-resumption]
+ssl_conf = 30-resumption-ssl
+
+[30-resumption-ssl]
+server = 30-resumption-server
+client = 30-resumption-client
+resume-server = 30-resumption-server
+resume-client = 30-resumption-resume-client
+
+[30-resumption-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[30-resumption-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[30-resumption-resume-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-30]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1
+HandshakeMode = Resume
+ResumptionExpected = No
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[31-resumption]
+ssl_conf = 31-resumption-ssl
+
+[31-resumption-ssl]
+server = 31-resumption-server
+client = 31-resumption-client
+resume-server = 31-resumption-server
+resume-client = 31-resumption-resume-client
+
+[31-resumption-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = -SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[31-resumption-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[31-resumption-resume-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-31]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1
+HandshakeMode = Resume
+ResumptionExpected = No
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[32-resumption]
+ssl_conf = 32-resumption-ssl
+
+[32-resumption-ssl]
+server = 32-resumption-server
+client = 32-resumption-client
+resume-server = 32-resumption-server
+resume-client = 32-resumption-resume-client
+
+[32-resumption-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[32-resumption-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[32-resumption-resume-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-32]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+HandshakeMode = Resume
+ResumptionExpected = No
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[33-resumption]
+ssl_conf = 33-resumption-ssl
+
+[33-resumption-ssl]
+server = 33-resumption-server
+client = 33-resumption-client
+resume-server = 33-resumption-server
+resume-client = 33-resumption-resume-client
+
+[33-resumption-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = -SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[33-resumption-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[33-resumption-resume-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-33]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+HandshakeMode = Resume
+ResumptionExpected = No
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[34-resumption]
+ssl_conf = 34-resumption-ssl
+
+[34-resumption-ssl]
+server = 34-resumption-server
+client = 34-resumption-client
+resume-server = 34-resumption-server
+resume-client = 34-resumption-resume-client
+
+[34-resumption-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[34-resumption-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[34-resumption-resume-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-34]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+HandshakeMode = Resume
+ResumptionExpected = Yes
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[35-resumption]
+ssl_conf = 35-resumption-ssl
+
+[35-resumption-ssl]
+server = 35-resumption-server
+client = 35-resumption-client
+resume-server = 35-resumption-server
+resume-client = 35-resumption-resume-client
+
+[35-resumption-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = -SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[35-resumption-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[35-resumption-resume-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-35]
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2
+HandshakeMode = Resume
+ResumptionExpected = Yes
+
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/10-resumption.conf.in b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/10-resumption.conf.in
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..989135f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/10-resumption.conf.in
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+# -*- mode: perl; -*-
+# Copyright 2016-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+## Test version negotiation upon resumption.
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+
+package ssltests;
+
+use protocol_version;
+
+our @tests = generate_resumption_tests("TLS");
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/11-dtls_resumption.conf b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/11-dtls_resumption.conf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ceed959
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/11-dtls_resumption.conf
@@ -0,0 +1,612 @@
+# Generated with generate_ssl_tests.pl
+
+num_tests = 16
+
+test-0 = 0-resumption
+test-1 = 1-resumption
+test-2 = 2-resumption
+test-3 = 3-resumption
+test-4 = 4-resumption
+test-5 = 5-resumption
+test-6 = 6-resumption
+test-7 = 7-resumption
+test-8 = 8-resumption
+test-9 = 9-resumption
+test-10 = 10-resumption
+test-11 = 11-resumption
+test-12 = 12-resumption
+test-13 = 13-resumption
+test-14 = 14-resumption
+test-15 = 15-resumption
+# ===========================================================
+
+[0-resumption]
+ssl_conf = 0-resumption-ssl
+
+[0-resumption-ssl]
+server = 0-resumption-server
+client = 0-resumption-client
+resume-server = 0-resumption-resume-server
+resume-client = 0-resumption-client
+
+[0-resumption-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1
+Options = SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[0-resumption-resume-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[0-resumption-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-0]
+ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1
+HandshakeMode = Resume
+Method = DTLS
+ResumptionExpected = Yes
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[1-resumption]
+ssl_conf = 1-resumption-ssl
+
+[1-resumption-ssl]
+server = 1-resumption-server
+client = 1-resumption-client
+resume-server = 1-resumption-resume-server
+resume-client = 1-resumption-client
+
+[1-resumption-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1
+Options = -SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[1-resumption-resume-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[1-resumption-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-1]
+ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1
+HandshakeMode = Resume
+Method = DTLS
+ResumptionExpected = Yes
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[2-resumption]
+ssl_conf = 2-resumption-ssl
+
+[2-resumption-ssl]
+server = 2-resumption-server
+client = 2-resumption-client
+resume-server = 2-resumption-resume-server
+resume-client = 2-resumption-client
+
+[2-resumption-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1
+Options = SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[2-resumption-resume-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[2-resumption-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-2]
+ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+HandshakeMode = Resume
+Method = DTLS
+ResumptionExpected = No
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[3-resumption]
+ssl_conf = 3-resumption-ssl
+
+[3-resumption-ssl]
+server = 3-resumption-server
+client = 3-resumption-client
+resume-server = 3-resumption-resume-server
+resume-client = 3-resumption-client
+
+[3-resumption-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1
+Options = -SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[3-resumption-resume-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[3-resumption-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-3]
+ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+HandshakeMode = Resume
+Method = DTLS
+ResumptionExpected = No
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[4-resumption]
+ssl_conf = 4-resumption-ssl
+
+[4-resumption-ssl]
+server = 4-resumption-server
+client = 4-resumption-client
+resume-server = 4-resumption-resume-server
+resume-client = 4-resumption-client
+
+[4-resumption-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+Options = SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[4-resumption-resume-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[4-resumption-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-4]
+ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1
+HandshakeMode = Resume
+Method = DTLS
+ResumptionExpected = No
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[5-resumption]
+ssl_conf = 5-resumption-ssl
+
+[5-resumption-ssl]
+server = 5-resumption-server
+client = 5-resumption-client
+resume-server = 5-resumption-resume-server
+resume-client = 5-resumption-client
+
+[5-resumption-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+Options = -SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[5-resumption-resume-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[5-resumption-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-5]
+ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1
+HandshakeMode = Resume
+Method = DTLS
+ResumptionExpected = No
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[6-resumption]
+ssl_conf = 6-resumption-ssl
+
+[6-resumption-ssl]
+server = 6-resumption-server
+client = 6-resumption-client
+resume-server = 6-resumption-resume-server
+resume-client = 6-resumption-client
+
+[6-resumption-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+Options = SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[6-resumption-resume-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[6-resumption-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-6]
+ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+HandshakeMode = Resume
+Method = DTLS
+ResumptionExpected = Yes
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[7-resumption]
+ssl_conf = 7-resumption-ssl
+
+[7-resumption-ssl]
+server = 7-resumption-server
+client = 7-resumption-client
+resume-server = 7-resumption-resume-server
+resume-client = 7-resumption-client
+
+[7-resumption-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+Options = -SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[7-resumption-resume-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[7-resumption-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-7]
+ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+HandshakeMode = Resume
+Method = DTLS
+ResumptionExpected = Yes
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[8-resumption]
+ssl_conf = 8-resumption-ssl
+
+[8-resumption-ssl]
+server = 8-resumption-server
+client = 8-resumption-client
+resume-server = 8-resumption-server
+resume-client = 8-resumption-resume-client
+
+[8-resumption-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[8-resumption-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[8-resumption-resume-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-8]
+ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1
+HandshakeMode = Resume
+Method = DTLS
+ResumptionExpected = Yes
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[9-resumption]
+ssl_conf = 9-resumption-ssl
+
+[9-resumption-ssl]
+server = 9-resumption-server
+client = 9-resumption-client
+resume-server = 9-resumption-server
+resume-client = 9-resumption-resume-client
+
+[9-resumption-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = -SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[9-resumption-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[9-resumption-resume-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-9]
+ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1
+HandshakeMode = Resume
+Method = DTLS
+ResumptionExpected = Yes
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[10-resumption]
+ssl_conf = 10-resumption-ssl
+
+[10-resumption-ssl]
+server = 10-resumption-server
+client = 10-resumption-client
+resume-server = 10-resumption-server
+resume-client = 10-resumption-resume-client
+
+[10-resumption-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[10-resumption-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[10-resumption-resume-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-10]
+ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+HandshakeMode = Resume
+Method = DTLS
+ResumptionExpected = No
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[11-resumption]
+ssl_conf = 11-resumption-ssl
+
+[11-resumption-ssl]
+server = 11-resumption-server
+client = 11-resumption-client
+resume-server = 11-resumption-server
+resume-client = 11-resumption-resume-client
+
+[11-resumption-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = -SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[11-resumption-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[11-resumption-resume-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-11]
+ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+HandshakeMode = Resume
+Method = DTLS
+ResumptionExpected = No
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[12-resumption]
+ssl_conf = 12-resumption-ssl
+
+[12-resumption-ssl]
+server = 12-resumption-server
+client = 12-resumption-client
+resume-server = 12-resumption-server
+resume-client = 12-resumption-resume-client
+
+[12-resumption-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[12-resumption-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[12-resumption-resume-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-12]
+ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1
+HandshakeMode = Resume
+Method = DTLS
+ResumptionExpected = No
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[13-resumption]
+ssl_conf = 13-resumption-ssl
+
+[13-resumption-ssl]
+server = 13-resumption-server
+client = 13-resumption-client
+resume-server = 13-resumption-server
+resume-client = 13-resumption-resume-client
+
+[13-resumption-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = -SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[13-resumption-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[13-resumption-resume-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-13]
+ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1
+HandshakeMode = Resume
+Method = DTLS
+ResumptionExpected = No
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[14-resumption]
+ssl_conf = 14-resumption-ssl
+
+[14-resumption-ssl]
+server = 14-resumption-server
+client = 14-resumption-client
+resume-server = 14-resumption-server
+resume-client = 14-resumption-resume-client
+
+[14-resumption-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[14-resumption-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[14-resumption-resume-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-14]
+ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+HandshakeMode = Resume
+Method = DTLS
+ResumptionExpected = Yes
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[15-resumption]
+ssl_conf = 15-resumption-ssl
+
+[15-resumption-ssl]
+server = 15-resumption-server
+client = 15-resumption-client
+resume-server = 15-resumption-server
+resume-client = 15-resumption-resume-client
+
+[15-resumption-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = -SessionTicket
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[15-resumption-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[15-resumption-resume-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-15]
+ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2
+HandshakeMode = Resume
+Method = DTLS
+ResumptionExpected = Yes
+
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/11-dtls_resumption.conf.in b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/11-dtls_resumption.conf.in
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..16dec1d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/11-dtls_resumption.conf.in
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+# -*- mode: perl; -*-
+# Copyright 2016-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+## Test version negotiation upon resumption.
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+
+package ssltests;
+
+use protocol_version;
+
+our @tests = generate_resumption_tests("DTLS");
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/12-ct.conf b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/12-ct.conf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2e6e9de
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/12-ct.conf
@@ -0,0 +1,191 @@
+# Generated with generate_ssl_tests.pl
+
+num_tests = 6
+
+test-0 = 0-ct-permissive-without-scts
+test-1 = 1-ct-permissive-with-scts
+test-2 = 2-ct-strict-without-scts
+test-3 = 3-ct-strict-with-scts
+test-4 = 4-ct-permissive-resumption
+test-5 = 5-ct-strict-resumption
+# ===========================================================
+
+[0-ct-permissive-without-scts]
+ssl_conf = 0-ct-permissive-without-scts-ssl
+
+[0-ct-permissive-without-scts-ssl]
+server = 0-ct-permissive-without-scts-server
+client = 0-ct-permissive-without-scts-client
+
+[0-ct-permissive-without-scts-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[0-ct-permissive-without-scts-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-0]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+client = 0-ct-permissive-without-scts-client-extra
+
+[0-ct-permissive-without-scts-client-extra]
+CTValidation = Permissive
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[1-ct-permissive-with-scts]
+ssl_conf = 1-ct-permissive-with-scts-ssl
+
+[1-ct-permissive-with-scts-ssl]
+server = 1-ct-permissive-with-scts-server
+client = 1-ct-permissive-with-scts-client
+
+[1-ct-permissive-with-scts-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/embeddedSCTs1.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/embeddedSCTs1-key.pem
+
+[1-ct-permissive-with-scts-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/embeddedSCTs1_issuer.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-1]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+client = 1-ct-permissive-with-scts-client-extra
+
+[1-ct-permissive-with-scts-client-extra]
+CTValidation = Permissive
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[2-ct-strict-without-scts]
+ssl_conf = 2-ct-strict-without-scts-ssl
+
+[2-ct-strict-without-scts-ssl]
+server = 2-ct-strict-without-scts-server
+client = 2-ct-strict-without-scts-client
+
+[2-ct-strict-without-scts-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[2-ct-strict-without-scts-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-2]
+ExpectedClientAlert = HandshakeFailure
+ExpectedResult = ClientFail
+client = 2-ct-strict-without-scts-client-extra
+
+[2-ct-strict-without-scts-client-extra]
+CTValidation = Strict
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[3-ct-strict-with-scts]
+ssl_conf = 3-ct-strict-with-scts-ssl
+
+[3-ct-strict-with-scts-ssl]
+server = 3-ct-strict-with-scts-server
+client = 3-ct-strict-with-scts-client
+
+[3-ct-strict-with-scts-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/embeddedSCTs1.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/embeddedSCTs1-key.pem
+
+[3-ct-strict-with-scts-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/embeddedSCTs1_issuer.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-3]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+client = 3-ct-strict-with-scts-client-extra
+
+[3-ct-strict-with-scts-client-extra]
+CTValidation = Strict
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[4-ct-permissive-resumption]
+ssl_conf = 4-ct-permissive-resumption-ssl
+
+[4-ct-permissive-resumption-ssl]
+server = 4-ct-permissive-resumption-server
+client = 4-ct-permissive-resumption-client
+resume-server = 4-ct-permissive-resumption-server
+resume-client = 4-ct-permissive-resumption-client
+
+[4-ct-permissive-resumption-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/embeddedSCTs1.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/embeddedSCTs1-key.pem
+
+[4-ct-permissive-resumption-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/embeddedSCTs1_issuer.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-4]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+HandshakeMode = Resume
+ResumptionExpected = Yes
+client = 4-ct-permissive-resumption-client-extra
+resume-client = 4-ct-permissive-resumption-client-extra
+
+[4-ct-permissive-resumption-client-extra]
+CTValidation = Permissive
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[5-ct-strict-resumption]
+ssl_conf = 5-ct-strict-resumption-ssl
+
+[5-ct-strict-resumption-ssl]
+server = 5-ct-strict-resumption-server
+client = 5-ct-strict-resumption-client
+resume-server = 5-ct-strict-resumption-server
+resume-client = 5-ct-strict-resumption-resume-client
+
+[5-ct-strict-resumption-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/embeddedSCTs1.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/embeddedSCTs1-key.pem
+
+[5-ct-strict-resumption-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/embeddedSCTs1_issuer.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[5-ct-strict-resumption-resume-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-5]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+HandshakeMode = Resume
+ResumptionExpected = Yes
+client = 5-ct-strict-resumption-client-extra
+resume-client = 5-ct-strict-resumption-resume-client-extra
+
+[5-ct-strict-resumption-client-extra]
+CTValidation = Strict
+
+[5-ct-strict-resumption-resume-client-extra]
+CTValidation = Strict
+
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/12-ct.conf.in b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/12-ct.conf.in
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d412dfd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/12-ct.conf.in
@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+# -*- mode: perl; -*-
+# Copyright 2016-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+## Test CT support
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+
+package ssltests;
+
+
+our @tests = (
+    {
+        name => "ct-permissive-without-scts",
+        server => { },
+        client => {
+            extra => {
+                "CTValidation" => "Permissive",
+            },
+        },
+        test => {
+            "ExpectedResult" => "Success",
+        },
+    },
+    {
+        name => "ct-permissive-with-scts",
+        server => {
+            "Certificate" => test_pem("embeddedSCTs1.pem"),
+            "PrivateKey"  => test_pem("embeddedSCTs1-key.pem"),
+        },
+        client => {
+            "VerifyCAFile" => test_pem("embeddedSCTs1_issuer.pem"),
+            extra => {
+                "CTValidation" => "Permissive",
+            },
+        },
+        test => {
+            "ExpectedResult" => "Success",
+        },
+    },
+    {
+        name => "ct-strict-without-scts",
+        server => { },
+        client => {
+            extra => {
+                "CTValidation" => "Strict",
+            },
+        },
+        test => {
+            "ExpectedResult" => "ClientFail",
+            "ExpectedClientAlert" => "HandshakeFailure",
+        },
+    },
+    {
+        name => "ct-strict-with-scts",
+        server => {
+            "Certificate" => test_pem("embeddedSCTs1.pem"),
+            "PrivateKey"  => test_pem("embeddedSCTs1-key.pem"),
+        },
+        client => {
+            "VerifyCAFile" => test_pem("embeddedSCTs1_issuer.pem"),
+            extra => {
+                "CTValidation" => "Strict",
+            },
+        },
+        test => {
+            "ExpectedResult" => "Success",
+        },
+    },
+    {
+        name => "ct-permissive-resumption",
+        server => {
+            "Certificate" => test_pem("embeddedSCTs1.pem"),
+            "PrivateKey"  => test_pem("embeddedSCTs1-key.pem"),
+        },
+        client => {
+            "VerifyCAFile" => test_pem("embeddedSCTs1_issuer.pem"),
+            extra => {
+                "CTValidation" => "Permissive",
+            },
+        },
+        test => {
+            "HandshakeMode" => "Resume",
+            "ResumptionExpected" => "Yes",
+            "ExpectedResult" => "Success",
+        },
+    },
+    {
+        name => "ct-strict-resumption",
+        server => {
+            "Certificate" => test_pem("embeddedSCTs1.pem"),
+            "PrivateKey"  => test_pem("embeddedSCTs1-key.pem"),
+        },
+        client => {
+            "VerifyCAFile" => test_pem("embeddedSCTs1_issuer.pem"),
+            extra => {
+                "CTValidation" => "Strict",
+            },
+        },
+        # SCTs are not present during resumption, so the resumption
+        # should succeed.
+        resume_client => {
+            extra => {
+                "CTValidation" => "Strict",
+            },
+        },
+        test => {
+            "HandshakeMode" => "Resume",
+            "ResumptionExpected" => "Yes",
+            "ExpectedResult" => "Success",
+        },
+    },
+);
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/13-fragmentation.conf b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/13-fragmentation.conf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4c1e9e2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/13-fragmentation.conf
@@ -0,0 +1,397 @@
+# Generated with generate_ssl_tests.pl
+
+num_tests = 16
+
+test-0 = 0-one-fragment-minus-app-data
+test-1 = 1-one-fragment-app-data
+test-2 = 2-one-fragment-plus-app-data
+test-3 = 3-small-app-data
+test-4 = 4-small-app-data-large-fragment-size
+test-5 = 5-medium-app-data
+test-6 = 6-medium-plus-app-data
+test-7 = 7-large-app-data
+test-8 = 8-large-app-data-large-fragment-size
+test-9 = 9-large-app-data-odd-fragment-size
+test-10 = 10-large-app-data-aes-sha1-multibuffer
+test-11 = 11-large-app-data-aes-sha2-multibuffer
+test-12 = 12-large-app-data-aes-sha1-multibuffer-odd-fragment
+test-13 = 13-large-app-data-aes-sha2-multibuffer-odd-fragment
+test-14 = 14-small-app-data-aes-sha1-multibuffer
+test-15 = 15-small-app-data-aes-sha2-multibuffer
+# ===========================================================
+
+[0-one-fragment-minus-app-data]
+ssl_conf = 0-one-fragment-minus-app-data-ssl
+
+[0-one-fragment-minus-app-data-ssl]
+server = 0-one-fragment-minus-app-data-server
+client = 0-one-fragment-minus-app-data-client
+
+[0-one-fragment-minus-app-data-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[0-one-fragment-minus-app-data-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-0]
+ApplicationData = 511
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[1-one-fragment-app-data]
+ssl_conf = 1-one-fragment-app-data-ssl
+
+[1-one-fragment-app-data-ssl]
+server = 1-one-fragment-app-data-server
+client = 1-one-fragment-app-data-client
+
+[1-one-fragment-app-data-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[1-one-fragment-app-data-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-1]
+ApplicationData = 512
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[2-one-fragment-plus-app-data]
+ssl_conf = 2-one-fragment-plus-app-data-ssl
+
+[2-one-fragment-plus-app-data-ssl]
+server = 2-one-fragment-plus-app-data-server
+client = 2-one-fragment-plus-app-data-client
+
+[2-one-fragment-plus-app-data-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[2-one-fragment-plus-app-data-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-2]
+ApplicationData = 513
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[3-small-app-data]
+ssl_conf = 3-small-app-data-ssl
+
+[3-small-app-data-ssl]
+server = 3-small-app-data-server
+client = 3-small-app-data-client
+
+[3-small-app-data-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[3-small-app-data-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-3]
+ApplicationData = 4097
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[4-small-app-data-large-fragment-size]
+ssl_conf = 4-small-app-data-large-fragment-size-ssl
+
+[4-small-app-data-large-fragment-size-ssl]
+server = 4-small-app-data-large-fragment-size-server
+client = 4-small-app-data-large-fragment-size-client
+
+[4-small-app-data-large-fragment-size-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[4-small-app-data-large-fragment-size-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-4]
+ApplicationData = 4097
+MaxFragmentSize = 16384
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[5-medium-app-data]
+ssl_conf = 5-medium-app-data-ssl
+
+[5-medium-app-data-ssl]
+server = 5-medium-app-data-server
+client = 5-medium-app-data-client
+
+[5-medium-app-data-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[5-medium-app-data-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-5]
+ApplicationData = 32775
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[6-medium-plus-app-data]
+ssl_conf = 6-medium-plus-app-data-ssl
+
+[6-medium-plus-app-data-ssl]
+server = 6-medium-plus-app-data-server
+client = 6-medium-plus-app-data-client
+
+[6-medium-plus-app-data-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[6-medium-plus-app-data-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-6]
+ApplicationData = 131069
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[7-large-app-data]
+ssl_conf = 7-large-app-data-ssl
+
+[7-large-app-data-ssl]
+server = 7-large-app-data-server
+client = 7-large-app-data-client
+
+[7-large-app-data-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[7-large-app-data-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-7]
+ApplicationData = 1048576
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[8-large-app-data-large-fragment-size]
+ssl_conf = 8-large-app-data-large-fragment-size-ssl
+
+[8-large-app-data-large-fragment-size-ssl]
+server = 8-large-app-data-large-fragment-size-server
+client = 8-large-app-data-large-fragment-size-client
+
+[8-large-app-data-large-fragment-size-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[8-large-app-data-large-fragment-size-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-8]
+ApplicationData = 1048576
+MaxFragmentSize = 16384
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[9-large-app-data-odd-fragment-size]
+ssl_conf = 9-large-app-data-odd-fragment-size-ssl
+
+[9-large-app-data-odd-fragment-size-ssl]
+server = 9-large-app-data-odd-fragment-size-server
+client = 9-large-app-data-odd-fragment-size-client
+
+[9-large-app-data-odd-fragment-size-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[9-large-app-data-odd-fragment-size-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-9]
+ApplicationData = 1048576
+MaxFragmentSize = 5115
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[10-large-app-data-aes-sha1-multibuffer]
+ssl_conf = 10-large-app-data-aes-sha1-multibuffer-ssl
+
+[10-large-app-data-aes-sha1-multibuffer-ssl]
+server = 10-large-app-data-aes-sha1-multibuffer-server
+client = 10-large-app-data-aes-sha1-multibuffer-client
+
+[10-large-app-data-aes-sha1-multibuffer-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[10-large-app-data-aes-sha1-multibuffer-client]
+CipherString = AES128-SHA
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-10]
+ApplicationData = 1048576
+MaxFragmentSize = 4096
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[11-large-app-data-aes-sha2-multibuffer]
+ssl_conf = 11-large-app-data-aes-sha2-multibuffer-ssl
+
+[11-large-app-data-aes-sha2-multibuffer-ssl]
+server = 11-large-app-data-aes-sha2-multibuffer-server
+client = 11-large-app-data-aes-sha2-multibuffer-client
+
+[11-large-app-data-aes-sha2-multibuffer-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[11-large-app-data-aes-sha2-multibuffer-client]
+CipherString = AES128-SHA256
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-11]
+ApplicationData = 1048576
+MaxFragmentSize = 4096
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[12-large-app-data-aes-sha1-multibuffer-odd-fragment]
+ssl_conf = 12-large-app-data-aes-sha1-multibuffer-odd-fragment-ssl
+
+[12-large-app-data-aes-sha1-multibuffer-odd-fragment-ssl]
+server = 12-large-app-data-aes-sha1-multibuffer-odd-fragment-server
+client = 12-large-app-data-aes-sha1-multibuffer-odd-fragment-client
+
+[12-large-app-data-aes-sha1-multibuffer-odd-fragment-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[12-large-app-data-aes-sha1-multibuffer-odd-fragment-client]
+CipherString = AES128-SHA
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-12]
+ApplicationData = 1048579
+MaxFragmentSize = 5115
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[13-large-app-data-aes-sha2-multibuffer-odd-fragment]
+ssl_conf = 13-large-app-data-aes-sha2-multibuffer-odd-fragment-ssl
+
+[13-large-app-data-aes-sha2-multibuffer-odd-fragment-ssl]
+server = 13-large-app-data-aes-sha2-multibuffer-odd-fragment-server
+client = 13-large-app-data-aes-sha2-multibuffer-odd-fragment-client
+
+[13-large-app-data-aes-sha2-multibuffer-odd-fragment-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[13-large-app-data-aes-sha2-multibuffer-odd-fragment-client]
+CipherString = AES128-SHA256
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-13]
+ApplicationData = 1048573
+MaxFragmentSize = 5125
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[14-small-app-data-aes-sha1-multibuffer]
+ssl_conf = 14-small-app-data-aes-sha1-multibuffer-ssl
+
+[14-small-app-data-aes-sha1-multibuffer-ssl]
+server = 14-small-app-data-aes-sha1-multibuffer-server
+client = 14-small-app-data-aes-sha1-multibuffer-client
+
+[14-small-app-data-aes-sha1-multibuffer-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[14-small-app-data-aes-sha1-multibuffer-client]
+CipherString = AES128-SHA
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-14]
+ApplicationData = 4096
+MaxFragmentSize = 4096
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[15-small-app-data-aes-sha2-multibuffer]
+ssl_conf = 15-small-app-data-aes-sha2-multibuffer-ssl
+
+[15-small-app-data-aes-sha2-multibuffer-ssl]
+server = 15-small-app-data-aes-sha2-multibuffer-server
+client = 15-small-app-data-aes-sha2-multibuffer-client
+
+[15-small-app-data-aes-sha2-multibuffer-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[15-small-app-data-aes-sha2-multibuffer-client]
+CipherString = AES128-SHA256
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-15]
+ApplicationData = 4096
+MaxFragmentSize = 4096
+
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/13-fragmentation.conf.in b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/13-fragmentation.conf.in
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6c2501b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/13-fragmentation.conf.in
@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
+# -*- mode: perl; -*-
+# Copyright 2016-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+## Test packet fragmentation
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+
+package ssltests;
+
+
+our @tests = (
+    # Default fragment size is 512.
+    {
+        name => "one-fragment-minus-app-data",
+        server => { },
+        client => { },
+        test => {
+            ApplicationData => 511,
+        }
+    },
+    {
+        name => "one-fragment-app-data",
+        server => { },
+        client => { },
+        test => {
+            ApplicationData => 512,
+        }
+    },
+    {
+        name => "one-fragment-plus-app-data",
+        server => { },
+        client => { },
+        test => {
+            ApplicationData => 513,
+        }
+    },
+    {
+        name => "small-app-data",
+        server => { },
+        client => { },
+        test => {
+            ApplicationData => 4 * 1024 + 1,
+        }
+    },
+    {
+        name => "small-app-data-large-fragment-size",
+        server => { },
+        client => { },
+        test => {
+            ApplicationData => 4 * 1024 + 1,
+            MaxFragmentSize => 16384,
+        }
+    },
+    {
+        name => "medium-app-data",
+        server => { },
+        client => { },
+        test => {
+            ApplicationData => 32 * 1024 + 7,
+        }
+    },
+    # Exceeds the 64kB write buffer size.
+    {
+        name => "medium-plus-app-data",
+        server => { },
+        client => { },
+        test => {
+            ApplicationData => 128 * 1024 - 3,
+        }
+    },
+    {
+        name => "large-app-data",
+        server => { },
+        client => { },
+        test => {
+            ApplicationData => 1024 * 1024,
+        }
+    },
+    {
+        name => "large-app-data-large-fragment-size",
+        server => { },
+        client => { },
+        test => {
+            ApplicationData => 1024 * 1024,
+            MaxFragmentSize => 16384,
+        }
+    },
+    {
+        name => "large-app-data-odd-fragment-size",
+        server => { },
+        client => { },
+        test => {
+            ApplicationData => 1024 * 1024,
+            MaxFragmentSize => 5 * 1024 - 5,
+        }
+    },
+    # When the buffer / fragment size ratio is sufficiently large,
+    # multi-buffer code kicks in on some platforms for AES-SHA.  The
+    # exact minimum ratio depends on the platform, and is usually
+    # around 4. Since the the test buffer is 64kB, a 4kB fragment is
+    # easily sufficient.
+    #
+    # (We run this test on all platforms though it's only true multibuffer
+    #  on some of them.)
+    {
+        name => "large-app-data-aes-sha1-multibuffer",
+        server => { },
+        client => {
+            CipherString => "AES128-SHA",
+        },
+        test => {
+            ApplicationData => 1024 * 1024,
+            MaxFragmentSize => 4 * 1024,
+        }
+    },
+    {
+        name => "large-app-data-aes-sha2-multibuffer",
+        server => { },
+        client => {
+            CipherString => "AES128-SHA256",
+        },
+        test => {
+            ApplicationData => 1024 * 1024,
+            MaxFragmentSize => 4 * 1024,
+        }
+    },
+        {
+        name => "large-app-data-aes-sha1-multibuffer-odd-fragment",
+        server => { },
+        client => {
+            CipherString => "AES128-SHA",
+        },
+        test => {
+            ApplicationData => 1024 * 1024 + 3,
+            MaxFragmentSize => 5 * 1024 - 5,
+        }
+    },
+    {
+        name => "large-app-data-aes-sha2-multibuffer-odd-fragment",
+        server => { },
+        client => {
+            CipherString => "AES128-SHA256",
+        },
+        test => {
+            ApplicationData => 1024 * 1024 - 3,
+            MaxFragmentSize => 5 * 1024 + 5,
+        }
+    },
+    # Test that multibuffer-capable code also handles small data correctly.
+    # Here fragment size == app data size < buffer size,
+    # so no multibuffering should happen.
+    {
+        name => "small-app-data-aes-sha1-multibuffer",
+        server => { },
+        client => {
+            CipherString => "AES128-SHA",
+        },
+        test => {
+            ApplicationData => 4 * 1024,
+            MaxFragmentSize => 4 * 1024,
+        }
+    },
+    {
+        name => "small-app-data-aes-sha2-multibuffer",
+        server => { },
+        client => {
+            CipherString => "AES128-SHA256",
+        },
+        test => {
+            ApplicationData => 4 * 1024,
+            MaxFragmentSize => 4 * 1024,
+        }
+    },
+);
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/14-curves.conf b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/14-curves.conf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7f7ac4b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/14-curves.conf
@@ -0,0 +1,787 @@
+# Generated with generate_ssl_tests.pl
+
+num_tests = 29
+
+test-0 = 0-curve-sect163k1
+test-1 = 1-curve-sect163r1
+test-2 = 2-curve-sect163r2
+test-3 = 3-curve-sect193r1
+test-4 = 4-curve-sect193r2
+test-5 = 5-curve-sect233k1
+test-6 = 6-curve-sect233r1
+test-7 = 7-curve-sect239k1
+test-8 = 8-curve-sect283k1
+test-9 = 9-curve-sect283r1
+test-10 = 10-curve-sect409k1
+test-11 = 11-curve-sect409r1
+test-12 = 12-curve-sect571k1
+test-13 = 13-curve-sect571r1
+test-14 = 14-curve-secp160k1
+test-15 = 15-curve-secp160r1
+test-16 = 16-curve-secp160r2
+test-17 = 17-curve-secp192k1
+test-18 = 18-curve-prime192v1
+test-19 = 19-curve-secp224k1
+test-20 = 20-curve-secp224r1
+test-21 = 21-curve-secp256k1
+test-22 = 22-curve-prime256v1
+test-23 = 23-curve-secp384r1
+test-24 = 24-curve-secp521r1
+test-25 = 25-curve-brainpoolP256r1
+test-26 = 26-curve-brainpoolP384r1
+test-27 = 27-curve-brainpoolP512r1
+test-28 = 28-curve-X25519
+# ===========================================================
+
+[0-curve-sect163k1]
+ssl_conf = 0-curve-sect163k1-ssl
+
+[0-curve-sect163k1-ssl]
+server = 0-curve-sect163k1-server
+client = 0-curve-sect163k1-client
+
+[0-curve-sect163k1-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Curves = sect163k1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[0-curve-sect163k1-client]
+CipherString = ECDHE
+Curves = sect163k1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-0]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+ExpectedTmpKeyType = sect163k1
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[1-curve-sect163r1]
+ssl_conf = 1-curve-sect163r1-ssl
+
+[1-curve-sect163r1-ssl]
+server = 1-curve-sect163r1-server
+client = 1-curve-sect163r1-client
+
+[1-curve-sect163r1-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Curves = sect163r1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[1-curve-sect163r1-client]
+CipherString = ECDHE
+Curves = sect163r1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-1]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+ExpectedTmpKeyType = sect163r1
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[2-curve-sect163r2]
+ssl_conf = 2-curve-sect163r2-ssl
+
+[2-curve-sect163r2-ssl]
+server = 2-curve-sect163r2-server
+client = 2-curve-sect163r2-client
+
+[2-curve-sect163r2-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Curves = sect163r2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[2-curve-sect163r2-client]
+CipherString = ECDHE
+Curves = sect163r2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-2]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+ExpectedTmpKeyType = sect163r2
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[3-curve-sect193r1]
+ssl_conf = 3-curve-sect193r1-ssl
+
+[3-curve-sect193r1-ssl]
+server = 3-curve-sect193r1-server
+client = 3-curve-sect193r1-client
+
+[3-curve-sect193r1-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Curves = sect193r1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[3-curve-sect193r1-client]
+CipherString = ECDHE
+Curves = sect193r1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-3]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+ExpectedTmpKeyType = sect193r1
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[4-curve-sect193r2]
+ssl_conf = 4-curve-sect193r2-ssl
+
+[4-curve-sect193r2-ssl]
+server = 4-curve-sect193r2-server
+client = 4-curve-sect193r2-client
+
+[4-curve-sect193r2-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Curves = sect193r2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[4-curve-sect193r2-client]
+CipherString = ECDHE
+Curves = sect193r2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-4]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+ExpectedTmpKeyType = sect193r2
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[5-curve-sect233k1]
+ssl_conf = 5-curve-sect233k1-ssl
+
+[5-curve-sect233k1-ssl]
+server = 5-curve-sect233k1-server
+client = 5-curve-sect233k1-client
+
+[5-curve-sect233k1-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Curves = sect233k1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[5-curve-sect233k1-client]
+CipherString = ECDHE
+Curves = sect233k1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-5]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+ExpectedTmpKeyType = sect233k1
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[6-curve-sect233r1]
+ssl_conf = 6-curve-sect233r1-ssl
+
+[6-curve-sect233r1-ssl]
+server = 6-curve-sect233r1-server
+client = 6-curve-sect233r1-client
+
+[6-curve-sect233r1-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Curves = sect233r1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[6-curve-sect233r1-client]
+CipherString = ECDHE
+Curves = sect233r1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-6]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+ExpectedTmpKeyType = sect233r1
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[7-curve-sect239k1]
+ssl_conf = 7-curve-sect239k1-ssl
+
+[7-curve-sect239k1-ssl]
+server = 7-curve-sect239k1-server
+client = 7-curve-sect239k1-client
+
+[7-curve-sect239k1-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Curves = sect239k1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[7-curve-sect239k1-client]
+CipherString = ECDHE
+Curves = sect239k1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-7]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+ExpectedTmpKeyType = sect239k1
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[8-curve-sect283k1]
+ssl_conf = 8-curve-sect283k1-ssl
+
+[8-curve-sect283k1-ssl]
+server = 8-curve-sect283k1-server
+client = 8-curve-sect283k1-client
+
+[8-curve-sect283k1-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Curves = sect283k1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[8-curve-sect283k1-client]
+CipherString = ECDHE
+Curves = sect283k1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-8]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+ExpectedTmpKeyType = sect283k1
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[9-curve-sect283r1]
+ssl_conf = 9-curve-sect283r1-ssl
+
+[9-curve-sect283r1-ssl]
+server = 9-curve-sect283r1-server
+client = 9-curve-sect283r1-client
+
+[9-curve-sect283r1-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Curves = sect283r1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[9-curve-sect283r1-client]
+CipherString = ECDHE
+Curves = sect283r1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-9]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+ExpectedTmpKeyType = sect283r1
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[10-curve-sect409k1]
+ssl_conf = 10-curve-sect409k1-ssl
+
+[10-curve-sect409k1-ssl]
+server = 10-curve-sect409k1-server
+client = 10-curve-sect409k1-client
+
+[10-curve-sect409k1-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Curves = sect409k1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[10-curve-sect409k1-client]
+CipherString = ECDHE
+Curves = sect409k1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-10]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+ExpectedTmpKeyType = sect409k1
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[11-curve-sect409r1]
+ssl_conf = 11-curve-sect409r1-ssl
+
+[11-curve-sect409r1-ssl]
+server = 11-curve-sect409r1-server
+client = 11-curve-sect409r1-client
+
+[11-curve-sect409r1-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Curves = sect409r1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[11-curve-sect409r1-client]
+CipherString = ECDHE
+Curves = sect409r1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-11]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+ExpectedTmpKeyType = sect409r1
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[12-curve-sect571k1]
+ssl_conf = 12-curve-sect571k1-ssl
+
+[12-curve-sect571k1-ssl]
+server = 12-curve-sect571k1-server
+client = 12-curve-sect571k1-client
+
+[12-curve-sect571k1-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Curves = sect571k1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[12-curve-sect571k1-client]
+CipherString = ECDHE
+Curves = sect571k1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-12]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+ExpectedTmpKeyType = sect571k1
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[13-curve-sect571r1]
+ssl_conf = 13-curve-sect571r1-ssl
+
+[13-curve-sect571r1-ssl]
+server = 13-curve-sect571r1-server
+client = 13-curve-sect571r1-client
+
+[13-curve-sect571r1-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Curves = sect571r1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[13-curve-sect571r1-client]
+CipherString = ECDHE
+Curves = sect571r1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-13]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+ExpectedTmpKeyType = sect571r1
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[14-curve-secp160k1]
+ssl_conf = 14-curve-secp160k1-ssl
+
+[14-curve-secp160k1-ssl]
+server = 14-curve-secp160k1-server
+client = 14-curve-secp160k1-client
+
+[14-curve-secp160k1-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Curves = secp160k1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[14-curve-secp160k1-client]
+CipherString = ECDHE
+Curves = secp160k1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-14]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+ExpectedTmpKeyType = secp160k1
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[15-curve-secp160r1]
+ssl_conf = 15-curve-secp160r1-ssl
+
+[15-curve-secp160r1-ssl]
+server = 15-curve-secp160r1-server
+client = 15-curve-secp160r1-client
+
+[15-curve-secp160r1-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Curves = secp160r1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[15-curve-secp160r1-client]
+CipherString = ECDHE
+Curves = secp160r1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-15]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+ExpectedTmpKeyType = secp160r1
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[16-curve-secp160r2]
+ssl_conf = 16-curve-secp160r2-ssl
+
+[16-curve-secp160r2-ssl]
+server = 16-curve-secp160r2-server
+client = 16-curve-secp160r2-client
+
+[16-curve-secp160r2-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Curves = secp160r2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[16-curve-secp160r2-client]
+CipherString = ECDHE
+Curves = secp160r2
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-16]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+ExpectedTmpKeyType = secp160r2
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[17-curve-secp192k1]
+ssl_conf = 17-curve-secp192k1-ssl
+
+[17-curve-secp192k1-ssl]
+server = 17-curve-secp192k1-server
+client = 17-curve-secp192k1-client
+
+[17-curve-secp192k1-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Curves = secp192k1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[17-curve-secp192k1-client]
+CipherString = ECDHE
+Curves = secp192k1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-17]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+ExpectedTmpKeyType = secp192k1
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[18-curve-prime192v1]
+ssl_conf = 18-curve-prime192v1-ssl
+
+[18-curve-prime192v1-ssl]
+server = 18-curve-prime192v1-server
+client = 18-curve-prime192v1-client
+
+[18-curve-prime192v1-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Curves = prime192v1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[18-curve-prime192v1-client]
+CipherString = ECDHE
+Curves = prime192v1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-18]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+ExpectedTmpKeyType = prime192v1
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[19-curve-secp224k1]
+ssl_conf = 19-curve-secp224k1-ssl
+
+[19-curve-secp224k1-ssl]
+server = 19-curve-secp224k1-server
+client = 19-curve-secp224k1-client
+
+[19-curve-secp224k1-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Curves = secp224k1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[19-curve-secp224k1-client]
+CipherString = ECDHE
+Curves = secp224k1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-19]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+ExpectedTmpKeyType = secp224k1
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[20-curve-secp224r1]
+ssl_conf = 20-curve-secp224r1-ssl
+
+[20-curve-secp224r1-ssl]
+server = 20-curve-secp224r1-server
+client = 20-curve-secp224r1-client
+
+[20-curve-secp224r1-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Curves = secp224r1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[20-curve-secp224r1-client]
+CipherString = ECDHE
+Curves = secp224r1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-20]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+ExpectedTmpKeyType = secp224r1
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[21-curve-secp256k1]
+ssl_conf = 21-curve-secp256k1-ssl
+
+[21-curve-secp256k1-ssl]
+server = 21-curve-secp256k1-server
+client = 21-curve-secp256k1-client
+
+[21-curve-secp256k1-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Curves = secp256k1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[21-curve-secp256k1-client]
+CipherString = ECDHE
+Curves = secp256k1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-21]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+ExpectedTmpKeyType = secp256k1
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[22-curve-prime256v1]
+ssl_conf = 22-curve-prime256v1-ssl
+
+[22-curve-prime256v1-ssl]
+server = 22-curve-prime256v1-server
+client = 22-curve-prime256v1-client
+
+[22-curve-prime256v1-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Curves = prime256v1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[22-curve-prime256v1-client]
+CipherString = ECDHE
+Curves = prime256v1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-22]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+ExpectedTmpKeyType = prime256v1
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[23-curve-secp384r1]
+ssl_conf = 23-curve-secp384r1-ssl
+
+[23-curve-secp384r1-ssl]
+server = 23-curve-secp384r1-server
+client = 23-curve-secp384r1-client
+
+[23-curve-secp384r1-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Curves = secp384r1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[23-curve-secp384r1-client]
+CipherString = ECDHE
+Curves = secp384r1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-23]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+ExpectedTmpKeyType = secp384r1
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[24-curve-secp521r1]
+ssl_conf = 24-curve-secp521r1-ssl
+
+[24-curve-secp521r1-ssl]
+server = 24-curve-secp521r1-server
+client = 24-curve-secp521r1-client
+
+[24-curve-secp521r1-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Curves = secp521r1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[24-curve-secp521r1-client]
+CipherString = ECDHE
+Curves = secp521r1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-24]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+ExpectedTmpKeyType = secp521r1
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[25-curve-brainpoolP256r1]
+ssl_conf = 25-curve-brainpoolP256r1-ssl
+
+[25-curve-brainpoolP256r1-ssl]
+server = 25-curve-brainpoolP256r1-server
+client = 25-curve-brainpoolP256r1-client
+
+[25-curve-brainpoolP256r1-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Curves = brainpoolP256r1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[25-curve-brainpoolP256r1-client]
+CipherString = ECDHE
+Curves = brainpoolP256r1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-25]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+ExpectedTmpKeyType = brainpoolP256r1
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[26-curve-brainpoolP384r1]
+ssl_conf = 26-curve-brainpoolP384r1-ssl
+
+[26-curve-brainpoolP384r1-ssl]
+server = 26-curve-brainpoolP384r1-server
+client = 26-curve-brainpoolP384r1-client
+
+[26-curve-brainpoolP384r1-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Curves = brainpoolP384r1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[26-curve-brainpoolP384r1-client]
+CipherString = ECDHE
+Curves = brainpoolP384r1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-26]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+ExpectedTmpKeyType = brainpoolP384r1
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[27-curve-brainpoolP512r1]
+ssl_conf = 27-curve-brainpoolP512r1-ssl
+
+[27-curve-brainpoolP512r1-ssl]
+server = 27-curve-brainpoolP512r1-server
+client = 27-curve-brainpoolP512r1-client
+
+[27-curve-brainpoolP512r1-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Curves = brainpoolP512r1
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[27-curve-brainpoolP512r1-client]
+CipherString = ECDHE
+Curves = brainpoolP512r1
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-27]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+ExpectedTmpKeyType = brainpoolP512r1
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[28-curve-X25519]
+ssl_conf = 28-curve-X25519-ssl
+
+[28-curve-X25519-ssl]
+server = 28-curve-X25519-server
+client = 28-curve-X25519-client
+
+[28-curve-X25519-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Curves = X25519
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[28-curve-X25519-client]
+CipherString = ECDHE
+Curves = X25519
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-28]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+ExpectedTmpKeyType = X25519
+
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/14-curves.conf.in b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/14-curves.conf.in
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0b7c09c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/14-curves.conf.in
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+# -*- mode: perl; -*-
+
+## SSL test configurations
+
+package ssltests;
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+
+use OpenSSL::Test;
+use OpenSSL::Test::Utils qw(anydisabled);
+
+my @curves = ("sect163k1", "sect163r1", "sect163r2", "sect193r1",
+              "sect193r2", "sect233k1", "sect233r1", "sect239k1",
+              "sect283k1", "sect283r1", "sect409k1", "sect409r1",
+              "sect571k1", "sect571r1", "secp160k1", "secp160r1",
+              "secp160r2", "secp192k1", "prime192v1", "secp224k1",
+              "secp224r1", "secp256k1", "prime256v1", "secp384r1",
+              "secp521r1", "brainpoolP256r1", "brainpoolP384r1",
+              "brainpoolP512r1", "X25519");
+
+our @tests = ();
+
+sub generate_tests() {
+    foreach (0..$#curves) {
+        my $curve = $curves[$_];
+        push @tests, {
+	    name => "curve-${curve}",
+            server => {
+                "Curves" => $curve
+            },
+            client => {
+		"CipherString" => "ECDHE",
+                "Curves" => $curve
+            },
+            test   => {
+                "ExpectedTmpKeyType" => $curve,
+                "ExpectedResult" => "Success"
+            },
+        };
+    }
+}
+
+generate_tests();
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/15-certstatus.conf b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/15-certstatus.conf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bf6c41c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/15-certstatus.conf
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+# Generated with generate_ssl_tests.pl
+
+num_tests = 2
+
+test-0 = 0-certstatus-good
+test-1 = 1-certstatus-bad
+# ===========================================================
+
+[0-certstatus-good]
+ssl_conf = 0-certstatus-good-ssl
+
+[0-certstatus-good-ssl]
+server = 0-certstatus-good-server
+client = 0-certstatus-good-client
+
+[0-certstatus-good-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[0-certstatus-good-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-0]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+Method = TLS
+server = 0-certstatus-good-server-extra
+
+[0-certstatus-good-server-extra]
+CertStatus = GoodResponse
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[1-certstatus-bad]
+ssl_conf = 1-certstatus-bad-ssl
+
+[1-certstatus-bad-ssl]
+server = 1-certstatus-bad-server
+client = 1-certstatus-bad-client
+
+[1-certstatus-bad-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[1-certstatus-bad-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-1]
+ExpectedResult = ClientFail
+Method = TLS
+server = 1-certstatus-bad-server-extra
+
+[1-certstatus-bad-server-extra]
+CertStatus = BadResponse
+
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/15-certstatus.conf.in b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/15-certstatus.conf.in
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..074602d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/15-certstatus.conf.in
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+# -*- mode: perl; -*-
+# Copyright 2016-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+## Test CertStatus messages
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+
+package ssltests;
+
+
+our @tests = (
+    {
+        name => "certstatus-good",
+        server => {
+            extra => {
+                "CertStatus" => "GoodResponse",
+            },
+        },
+        client => {},
+        test => {
+            "Method" => "TLS",
+            "ExpectedResult" => "Success"
+        }
+    },
+    {
+        name => "certstatus-bad",
+        server => {
+            extra => {
+                "CertStatus" => "BadResponse",
+            },
+        },
+        client => {},
+        test => {
+            "Method" => "TLS",
+            "ExpectedResult" => "ClientFail"
+        }
+    },
+);
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/16-certstatus.conf b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/16-certstatus.conf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e69de29
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/16-certstatus.conf
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/16-dtls-certstatus.conf b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/16-dtls-certstatus.conf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a561803
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/16-dtls-certstatus.conf
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+# Generated with generate_ssl_tests.pl
+
+num_tests = 2
+
+test-0 = 0-certstatus-good
+test-1 = 1-certstatus-bad
+# ===========================================================
+
+[0-certstatus-good]
+ssl_conf = 0-certstatus-good-ssl
+
+[0-certstatus-good-ssl]
+server = 0-certstatus-good-server
+client = 0-certstatus-good-client
+
+[0-certstatus-good-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[0-certstatus-good-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-0]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+Method = DTLS
+server = 0-certstatus-good-server-extra
+
+[0-certstatus-good-server-extra]
+CertStatus = GoodResponse
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[1-certstatus-bad]
+ssl_conf = 1-certstatus-bad-ssl
+
+[1-certstatus-bad-ssl]
+server = 1-certstatus-bad-server
+client = 1-certstatus-bad-client
+
+[1-certstatus-bad-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[1-certstatus-bad-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-1]
+ExpectedResult = ClientFail
+Method = DTLS
+server = 1-certstatus-bad-server-extra
+
+[1-certstatus-bad-server-extra]
+CertStatus = BadResponse
+
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/16-dtls-certstatus.conf.in b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/16-dtls-certstatus.conf.in
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7280029
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/16-dtls-certstatus.conf.in
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+# -*- mode: perl; -*-
+# Copyright 2016-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+## Test DTLS CertStatus messages
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+
+package ssltests;
+
+
+our @tests = (
+    {
+        name => "certstatus-good",
+        server => {
+            extra => {
+                "CertStatus" => "GoodResponse",
+            },
+        },
+        client => {},
+        test => {
+            "Method" => "DTLS",
+            "ExpectedResult" => "Success"
+        }
+    },
+    {
+        name => "certstatus-bad",
+        server => {
+            extra => {
+                "CertStatus" => "BadResponse",
+            },
+        },
+        client => {},
+        test => {
+            "Method" => "DTLS",
+            "ExpectedResult" => "ClientFail"
+        }
+    },
+);
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/17-renegotiate.conf b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/17-renegotiate.conf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..48f569f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/17-renegotiate.conf
@@ -0,0 +1,428 @@
+# Generated with generate_ssl_tests.pl
+
+num_tests = 14
+
+test-0 = 0-renegotiate-client-no-resume
+test-1 = 1-renegotiate-client-resume
+test-2 = 2-renegotiate-server-no-resume
+test-3 = 3-renegotiate-server-resume
+test-4 = 4-renegotiate-client-auth-require
+test-5 = 5-renegotiate-client-auth-once
+test-6 = 6-renegotiate-aead-to-non-aead
+test-7 = 7-renegotiate-non-aead-to-aead
+test-8 = 8-renegotiate-non-aead-to-non-aead
+test-9 = 9-renegotiate-aead-to-aead
+test-10 = 10-no-renegotiation-server-by-client
+test-11 = 11-no-renegotiation-server-by-server
+test-12 = 12-no-renegotiation-client-by-server
+test-13 = 13-no-renegotiation-client-by-client
+# ===========================================================
+
+[0-renegotiate-client-no-resume]
+ssl_conf = 0-renegotiate-client-no-resume-ssl
+
+[0-renegotiate-client-no-resume-ssl]
+server = 0-renegotiate-client-no-resume-server
+client = 0-renegotiate-client-no-resume-client
+
+[0-renegotiate-client-no-resume-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = NoResumptionOnRenegotiation
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[0-renegotiate-client-no-resume-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-0]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+HandshakeMode = RenegotiateClient
+Method = TLS
+ResumptionExpected = No
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[1-renegotiate-client-resume]
+ssl_conf = 1-renegotiate-client-resume-ssl
+
+[1-renegotiate-client-resume-ssl]
+server = 1-renegotiate-client-resume-server
+client = 1-renegotiate-client-resume-client
+
+[1-renegotiate-client-resume-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[1-renegotiate-client-resume-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-1]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+HandshakeMode = RenegotiateClient
+Method = TLS
+ResumptionExpected = Yes
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[2-renegotiate-server-no-resume]
+ssl_conf = 2-renegotiate-server-no-resume-ssl
+
+[2-renegotiate-server-no-resume-ssl]
+server = 2-renegotiate-server-no-resume-server
+client = 2-renegotiate-server-no-resume-client
+
+[2-renegotiate-server-no-resume-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = NoResumptionOnRenegotiation
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[2-renegotiate-server-no-resume-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-2]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+HandshakeMode = RenegotiateServer
+Method = TLS
+ResumptionExpected = No
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[3-renegotiate-server-resume]
+ssl_conf = 3-renegotiate-server-resume-ssl
+
+[3-renegotiate-server-resume-ssl]
+server = 3-renegotiate-server-resume-server
+client = 3-renegotiate-server-resume-client
+
+[3-renegotiate-server-resume-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[3-renegotiate-server-resume-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-3]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+HandshakeMode = RenegotiateServer
+Method = TLS
+ResumptionExpected = Yes
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[4-renegotiate-client-auth-require]
+ssl_conf = 4-renegotiate-client-auth-require-ssl
+
+[4-renegotiate-client-auth-require-ssl]
+server = 4-renegotiate-client-auth-require-server
+client = 4-renegotiate-client-auth-require-client
+
+[4-renegotiate-client-auth-require-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+Options = NoResumptionOnRenegotiation
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/root-cert.pem
+VerifyMode = Require
+
+[4-renegotiate-client-auth-require-client]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/ee-client-chain.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/ee-key.pem
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-4]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+HandshakeMode = RenegotiateServer
+Method = TLS
+ResumptionExpected = No
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[5-renegotiate-client-auth-once]
+ssl_conf = 5-renegotiate-client-auth-once-ssl
+
+[5-renegotiate-client-auth-once-ssl]
+server = 5-renegotiate-client-auth-once-server
+client = 5-renegotiate-client-auth-once-client
+
+[5-renegotiate-client-auth-once-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+Options = NoResumptionOnRenegotiation
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/root-cert.pem
+VerifyMode = Once
+
+[5-renegotiate-client-auth-once-client]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/ee-client-chain.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/ee-key.pem
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-5]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+HandshakeMode = RenegotiateServer
+Method = TLS
+ResumptionExpected = No
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[6-renegotiate-aead-to-non-aead]
+ssl_conf = 6-renegotiate-aead-to-non-aead-ssl
+
+[6-renegotiate-aead-to-non-aead-ssl]
+server = 6-renegotiate-aead-to-non-aead-server
+client = 6-renegotiate-aead-to-non-aead-client
+
+[6-renegotiate-aead-to-non-aead-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+Options = NoResumptionOnRenegotiation
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[6-renegotiate-aead-to-non-aead-client]
+CipherString = AES128-GCM-SHA256
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-6]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+HandshakeMode = RenegotiateClient
+Method = TLS
+ResumptionExpected = No
+client = 6-renegotiate-aead-to-non-aead-client-extra
+
+[6-renegotiate-aead-to-non-aead-client-extra]
+RenegotiateCiphers = AES128-SHA
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[7-renegotiate-non-aead-to-aead]
+ssl_conf = 7-renegotiate-non-aead-to-aead-ssl
+
+[7-renegotiate-non-aead-to-aead-ssl]
+server = 7-renegotiate-non-aead-to-aead-server
+client = 7-renegotiate-non-aead-to-aead-client
+
+[7-renegotiate-non-aead-to-aead-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+Options = NoResumptionOnRenegotiation
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[7-renegotiate-non-aead-to-aead-client]
+CipherString = AES128-SHA
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-7]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+HandshakeMode = RenegotiateClient
+Method = TLS
+ResumptionExpected = No
+client = 7-renegotiate-non-aead-to-aead-client-extra
+
+[7-renegotiate-non-aead-to-aead-client-extra]
+RenegotiateCiphers = AES128-GCM-SHA256
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[8-renegotiate-non-aead-to-non-aead]
+ssl_conf = 8-renegotiate-non-aead-to-non-aead-ssl
+
+[8-renegotiate-non-aead-to-non-aead-ssl]
+server = 8-renegotiate-non-aead-to-non-aead-server
+client = 8-renegotiate-non-aead-to-non-aead-client
+
+[8-renegotiate-non-aead-to-non-aead-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+Options = NoResumptionOnRenegotiation
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[8-renegotiate-non-aead-to-non-aead-client]
+CipherString = AES128-SHA
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-8]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+HandshakeMode = RenegotiateClient
+Method = TLS
+ResumptionExpected = No
+client = 8-renegotiate-non-aead-to-non-aead-client-extra
+
+[8-renegotiate-non-aead-to-non-aead-client-extra]
+RenegotiateCiphers = AES256-SHA
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[9-renegotiate-aead-to-aead]
+ssl_conf = 9-renegotiate-aead-to-aead-ssl
+
+[9-renegotiate-aead-to-aead-ssl]
+server = 9-renegotiate-aead-to-aead-server
+client = 9-renegotiate-aead-to-aead-client
+
+[9-renegotiate-aead-to-aead-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+Options = NoResumptionOnRenegotiation
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[9-renegotiate-aead-to-aead-client]
+CipherString = AES128-GCM-SHA256
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-9]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+HandshakeMode = RenegotiateClient
+Method = TLS
+ResumptionExpected = No
+client = 9-renegotiate-aead-to-aead-client-extra
+
+[9-renegotiate-aead-to-aead-client-extra]
+RenegotiateCiphers = AES256-GCM-SHA384
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[10-no-renegotiation-server-by-client]
+ssl_conf = 10-no-renegotiation-server-by-client-ssl
+
+[10-no-renegotiation-server-by-client-ssl]
+server = 10-no-renegotiation-server-by-client-server
+client = 10-no-renegotiation-server-by-client-client
+
+[10-no-renegotiation-server-by-client-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+Options = NoRenegotiation
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[10-no-renegotiation-server-by-client-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-10]
+ExpectedResult = ClientFail
+HandshakeMode = RenegotiateClient
+Method = TLS
+ResumptionExpected = No
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[11-no-renegotiation-server-by-server]
+ssl_conf = 11-no-renegotiation-server-by-server-ssl
+
+[11-no-renegotiation-server-by-server-ssl]
+server = 11-no-renegotiation-server-by-server-server
+client = 11-no-renegotiation-server-by-server-client
+
+[11-no-renegotiation-server-by-server-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+Options = NoRenegotiation
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[11-no-renegotiation-server-by-server-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-11]
+ExpectedResult = ServerFail
+HandshakeMode = RenegotiateServer
+Method = TLS
+ResumptionExpected = No
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[12-no-renegotiation-client-by-server]
+ssl_conf = 12-no-renegotiation-client-by-server-ssl
+
+[12-no-renegotiation-client-by-server-ssl]
+server = 12-no-renegotiation-client-by-server-server
+client = 12-no-renegotiation-client-by-server-client
+
+[12-no-renegotiation-client-by-server-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[12-no-renegotiation-client-by-server-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = NoRenegotiation
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-12]
+ExpectedResult = ServerFail
+HandshakeMode = RenegotiateServer
+Method = TLS
+ResumptionExpected = No
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[13-no-renegotiation-client-by-client]
+ssl_conf = 13-no-renegotiation-client-by-client-ssl
+
+[13-no-renegotiation-client-by-client-ssl]
+server = 13-no-renegotiation-client-by-client-server
+client = 13-no-renegotiation-client-by-client-client
+
+[13-no-renegotiation-client-by-client-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[13-no-renegotiation-client-by-client-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = NoRenegotiation
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-13]
+ExpectedResult = ClientFail
+HandshakeMode = RenegotiateClient
+Method = TLS
+ResumptionExpected = No
+
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/17-renegotiate.conf.in b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/17-renegotiate.conf.in
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bd656d0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/17-renegotiate.conf.in
@@ -0,0 +1,243 @@
+# -*- mode: perl; -*-
+# Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+## Test Renegotiation
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+
+package ssltests;
+use OpenSSL::Test::Utils;
+
+our @tests = (
+    {
+        name => "renegotiate-client-no-resume",
+        server => {
+            "Options" => "NoResumptionOnRenegotiation"
+        },
+        client => {},
+        test => {
+            "Method" => "TLS",
+            "HandshakeMode" => "RenegotiateClient",
+            "ResumptionExpected" => "No",
+            "ExpectedResult" => "Success"
+        }
+    },
+    {
+        name => "renegotiate-client-resume",
+        server => {},
+        client => {},
+        test => {
+            "Method" => "TLS",
+            "HandshakeMode" => "RenegotiateClient",
+            "ResumptionExpected" => "Yes",
+            "ExpectedResult" => "Success"
+        }
+    },
+    {
+        name => "renegotiate-server-no-resume",
+        server => {
+            "Options" => "NoResumptionOnRenegotiation"
+        },
+        client => {},
+        test => {
+            "Method" => "TLS",
+            "HandshakeMode" => "RenegotiateServer",
+            "ResumptionExpected" => "No",
+            "ExpectedResult" => "Success"
+        }
+    },
+    {
+        name => "renegotiate-server-resume",
+        server => {},
+        client => {},
+        test => {
+            "Method" => "TLS",
+            "HandshakeMode" => "RenegotiateServer",
+            "ResumptionExpected" => "Yes",
+            "ExpectedResult" => "Success"
+        }
+    },
+    {
+        name => "renegotiate-client-auth-require",
+        server => {
+            "Options" => "NoResumptionOnRenegotiation",
+            "MaxProtocol" => "TLSv1.2",
+            "VerifyCAFile" => test_pem("root-cert.pem"),
+            "VerifyMode" => "Require",
+        },
+        client => {
+            "Certificate" => test_pem("ee-client-chain.pem"),
+            "PrivateKey"  => test_pem("ee-key.pem"),
+        },
+        test => {
+            "Method" => "TLS",
+            "HandshakeMode" => "RenegotiateServer",
+            "ResumptionExpected" => "No",
+            "ExpectedResult" => "Success"
+        }
+    },
+    {
+        name => "renegotiate-client-auth-once",
+        server => {
+            "Options" => "NoResumptionOnRenegotiation",
+            "MaxProtocol" => "TLSv1.2",
+            "VerifyCAFile" => test_pem("root-cert.pem"),
+            "VerifyMode" => "Once",
+        },
+        client => {
+            "Certificate" => test_pem("ee-client-chain.pem"),
+            "PrivateKey"  => test_pem("ee-key.pem"),
+        },
+        test => {
+            "Method" => "TLS",
+            "HandshakeMode" => "RenegotiateServer",
+            "ResumptionExpected" => "No",
+            "ExpectedResult" => "Success"
+        }
+    }
+);
+our @tests_tls1_2 = (
+    {
+        name => "renegotiate-aead-to-non-aead",
+        server => {
+            "Options" => "NoResumptionOnRenegotiation",
+            "MaxProtocol" => "TLSv1.2"
+        },
+        client => {
+            "CipherString" => "AES128-GCM-SHA256",
+            extra => {
+                "RenegotiateCiphers" => "AES128-SHA"
+            }
+        },
+        test => {
+            "Method" => "TLS",
+            "HandshakeMode" => "RenegotiateClient",
+            "ResumptionExpected" => "No",
+            "ExpectedResult" => "Success"
+        }
+    },
+    {
+        name => "renegotiate-non-aead-to-aead",
+        server => {
+            "Options" => "NoResumptionOnRenegotiation",
+            "MaxProtocol" => "TLSv1.2"
+        },
+        client => {
+            "CipherString" => "AES128-SHA",
+            extra => {
+                "RenegotiateCiphers" => "AES128-GCM-SHA256"
+            }
+        },
+        test => {
+            "Method" => "TLS",
+            "HandshakeMode" => "RenegotiateClient",
+            "ResumptionExpected" => "No",
+            "ExpectedResult" => "Success"
+        }
+    },
+    {
+        name => "renegotiate-non-aead-to-non-aead",
+        server => {
+            "Options" => "NoResumptionOnRenegotiation",
+            "MaxProtocol" => "TLSv1.2"
+        },
+        client => {
+            "CipherString" => "AES128-SHA",
+            extra => {
+                "RenegotiateCiphers" => "AES256-SHA"
+            }
+        },
+        test => {
+            "Method" => "TLS",
+            "HandshakeMode" => "RenegotiateClient",
+            "ResumptionExpected" => "No",
+            "ExpectedResult" => "Success"
+        }
+    },
+    {
+        name => "renegotiate-aead-to-aead",
+        server => {
+            "Options" => "NoResumptionOnRenegotiation",
+            "MaxProtocol" => "TLSv1.2"
+        },
+        client => {
+            "CipherString" => "AES128-GCM-SHA256",
+            extra => {
+                "RenegotiateCiphers" => "AES256-GCM-SHA384"
+            }
+        },
+        test => {
+            "Method" => "TLS",
+            "HandshakeMode" => "RenegotiateClient",
+            "ResumptionExpected" => "No",
+            "ExpectedResult" => "Success"
+        }
+    },
+    {
+        name => "no-renegotiation-server-by-client",
+        server => {
+            "Options" => "NoRenegotiation",
+            "MaxProtocol" => "TLSv1.2"
+        },
+        client => { },
+        test => {
+            "Method" => "TLS",
+            "HandshakeMode" => "RenegotiateClient",
+            "ResumptionExpected" => "No",
+            "ExpectedResult" => "ClientFail"
+        }
+    },
+    {
+        name => "no-renegotiation-server-by-server",
+        server => {
+            "Options" => "NoRenegotiation",
+            "MaxProtocol" => "TLSv1.2"
+        },
+        client => { },
+        test => {
+            "Method" => "TLS",
+            "HandshakeMode" => "RenegotiateServer",
+            "ResumptionExpected" => "No",
+            "ExpectedResult" => "ServerFail"
+        }
+    },
+    {
+        name => "no-renegotiation-client-by-server",
+        server => {
+            "MaxProtocol" => "TLSv1.2"
+        },
+        client => {
+            "Options" => "NoRenegotiation",
+        },
+        test => {
+            "Method" => "TLS",
+            "HandshakeMode" => "RenegotiateServer",
+            "ResumptionExpected" => "No",
+            "ExpectedResult" => "ServerFail"
+        }
+    },
+    {
+        name => "no-renegotiation-client-by-client",
+        server => {
+            "MaxProtocol" => "TLSv1.2"
+        },
+        client => {
+            "Options" => "NoRenegotiation",
+        },
+        test => {
+            "Method" => "TLS",
+            "HandshakeMode" => "RenegotiateClient",
+            "ResumptionExpected" => "No",
+            "ExpectedResult" => "ClientFail"
+        }
+    }
+);
+
+push @tests, @tests_tls1_2 unless disabled("tls1_2");
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/18-dtls-renegotiate.conf b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/18-dtls-renegotiate.conf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3d8ebd7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/18-dtls-renegotiate.conf
@@ -0,0 +1,276 @@
+# Generated with generate_ssl_tests.pl
+
+num_tests = 9
+
+test-0 = 0-renegotiate-client-no-resume
+test-1 = 1-renegotiate-client-resume
+test-2 = 2-renegotiate-server-resume
+test-3 = 3-renegotiate-client-auth-require
+test-4 = 4-renegotiate-client-auth-once
+test-5 = 5-renegotiate-aead-to-non-aead
+test-6 = 6-renegotiate-non-aead-to-aead
+test-7 = 7-renegotiate-non-aead-to-non-aead
+test-8 = 8-renegotiate-aead-to-aead
+# ===========================================================
+
+[0-renegotiate-client-no-resume]
+ssl_conf = 0-renegotiate-client-no-resume-ssl
+
+[0-renegotiate-client-no-resume-ssl]
+server = 0-renegotiate-client-no-resume-server
+client = 0-renegotiate-client-no-resume-client
+
+[0-renegotiate-client-no-resume-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = NoResumptionOnRenegotiation
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[0-renegotiate-client-no-resume-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-0]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+HandshakeMode = RenegotiateClient
+Method = DTLS
+ResumptionExpected = No
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[1-renegotiate-client-resume]
+ssl_conf = 1-renegotiate-client-resume-ssl
+
+[1-renegotiate-client-resume-ssl]
+server = 1-renegotiate-client-resume-server
+client = 1-renegotiate-client-resume-client
+
+[1-renegotiate-client-resume-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[1-renegotiate-client-resume-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-1]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+HandshakeMode = RenegotiateClient
+Method = DTLS
+ResumptionExpected = Yes
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[2-renegotiate-server-resume]
+ssl_conf = 2-renegotiate-server-resume-ssl
+
+[2-renegotiate-server-resume-ssl]
+server = 2-renegotiate-server-resume-server
+client = 2-renegotiate-server-resume-client
+
+[2-renegotiate-server-resume-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[2-renegotiate-server-resume-client]
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-2]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+HandshakeMode = RenegotiateServer
+Method = DTLS
+ResumptionExpected = No
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[3-renegotiate-client-auth-require]
+ssl_conf = 3-renegotiate-client-auth-require-ssl
+
+[3-renegotiate-client-auth-require-ssl]
+server = 3-renegotiate-client-auth-require-server
+client = 3-renegotiate-client-auth-require-client
+
+[3-renegotiate-client-auth-require-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/root-cert.pem
+VerifyMode = Require
+
+[3-renegotiate-client-auth-require-client]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/ee-client-chain.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/ee-key.pem
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-3]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+HandshakeMode = RenegotiateServer
+Method = DTLS
+ResumptionExpected = No
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[4-renegotiate-client-auth-once]
+ssl_conf = 4-renegotiate-client-auth-once-ssl
+
+[4-renegotiate-client-auth-once-ssl]
+server = 4-renegotiate-client-auth-once-server
+client = 4-renegotiate-client-auth-once-client
+
+[4-renegotiate-client-auth-once-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/root-cert.pem
+VerifyMode = Once
+
+[4-renegotiate-client-auth-once-client]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/ee-client-chain.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/ee-key.pem
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-4]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+HandshakeMode = RenegotiateServer
+Method = DTLS
+ResumptionExpected = No
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[5-renegotiate-aead-to-non-aead]
+ssl_conf = 5-renegotiate-aead-to-non-aead-ssl
+
+[5-renegotiate-aead-to-non-aead-ssl]
+server = 5-renegotiate-aead-to-non-aead-server
+client = 5-renegotiate-aead-to-non-aead-client
+
+[5-renegotiate-aead-to-non-aead-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = NoResumptionOnRenegotiation
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[5-renegotiate-aead-to-non-aead-client]
+CipherString = AES128-GCM-SHA256
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-5]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+HandshakeMode = RenegotiateClient
+Method = DTLS
+ResumptionExpected = No
+client = 5-renegotiate-aead-to-non-aead-client-extra
+
+[5-renegotiate-aead-to-non-aead-client-extra]
+RenegotiateCiphers = AES128-SHA
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[6-renegotiate-non-aead-to-aead]
+ssl_conf = 6-renegotiate-non-aead-to-aead-ssl
+
+[6-renegotiate-non-aead-to-aead-ssl]
+server = 6-renegotiate-non-aead-to-aead-server
+client = 6-renegotiate-non-aead-to-aead-client
+
+[6-renegotiate-non-aead-to-aead-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = NoResumptionOnRenegotiation
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[6-renegotiate-non-aead-to-aead-client]
+CipherString = AES128-SHA
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-6]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+HandshakeMode = RenegotiateClient
+Method = DTLS
+ResumptionExpected = No
+client = 6-renegotiate-non-aead-to-aead-client-extra
+
+[6-renegotiate-non-aead-to-aead-client-extra]
+RenegotiateCiphers = AES128-GCM-SHA256
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[7-renegotiate-non-aead-to-non-aead]
+ssl_conf = 7-renegotiate-non-aead-to-non-aead-ssl
+
+[7-renegotiate-non-aead-to-non-aead-ssl]
+server = 7-renegotiate-non-aead-to-non-aead-server
+client = 7-renegotiate-non-aead-to-non-aead-client
+
+[7-renegotiate-non-aead-to-non-aead-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = NoResumptionOnRenegotiation
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[7-renegotiate-non-aead-to-non-aead-client]
+CipherString = AES128-SHA
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-7]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+HandshakeMode = RenegotiateClient
+Method = DTLS
+ResumptionExpected = No
+client = 7-renegotiate-non-aead-to-non-aead-client-extra
+
+[7-renegotiate-non-aead-to-non-aead-client-extra]
+RenegotiateCiphers = AES256-SHA
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[8-renegotiate-aead-to-aead]
+ssl_conf = 8-renegotiate-aead-to-aead-ssl
+
+[8-renegotiate-aead-to-aead-ssl]
+server = 8-renegotiate-aead-to-aead-server
+client = 8-renegotiate-aead-to-aead-client
+
+[8-renegotiate-aead-to-aead-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = NoResumptionOnRenegotiation
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[8-renegotiate-aead-to-aead-client]
+CipherString = AES128-GCM-SHA256
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-8]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+HandshakeMode = RenegotiateClient
+Method = DTLS
+ResumptionExpected = No
+client = 8-renegotiate-aead-to-aead-client-extra
+
+[8-renegotiate-aead-to-aead-client-extra]
+RenegotiateCiphers = AES256-GCM-SHA384
+
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/18-dtls-renegotiate.conf.in b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/18-dtls-renegotiate.conf.in
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7a65a85
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/18-dtls-renegotiate.conf.in
@@ -0,0 +1,174 @@
+# -*- mode: perl; -*-
+# Copyright 2016-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+## Test Renegotiation
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+
+package ssltests;
+use OpenSSL::Test::Utils;
+
+our @tests = (
+    {
+        name => "renegotiate-client-no-resume",
+        server => {
+            "Options" => "NoResumptionOnRenegotiation"
+        },
+        client => {},
+        test => {
+            "Method" => "DTLS",
+            "HandshakeMode" => "RenegotiateClient",
+            "ResumptionExpected" => "No",
+            "ExpectedResult" => "Success"
+        }
+    },
+    {
+        name => "renegotiate-client-resume",
+        server => {},
+        client => {},
+        test => {
+            "Method" => "DTLS",
+            "HandshakeMode" => "RenegotiateClient",
+            "ResumptionExpected" => "Yes",
+            "ExpectedResult" => "Success"
+        }
+    },
+# Note: Unlike the TLS tests, we will never do resumption with server
+# initiated reneg. This is because an OpenSSL DTLS client will always do a full
+# handshake (i.e. it doesn't supply a session id) when it receives a
+# HelloRequest. This is different to the OpenSSL TLS implementation where an
+# OpenSSL client will always try an abbreviated handshake (i.e. it will supply
+# the session id). This goes all the way to commit 48ae85b6f when abbreviated
+# handshake support was first added. Neither behaviour is wrong, but the
+# discrepancy is strange. TODO: Should we harmonise the TLS and DTLS behaviour,
+# and if so, what to?
+    {
+        name => "renegotiate-server-resume",
+        server => {},
+        client => {},
+        test => {
+            "Method" => "DTLS",
+            "HandshakeMode" => "RenegotiateServer",
+            "ResumptionExpected" => "No",
+            "ExpectedResult" => "Success"
+        }
+    },
+    {
+        name => "renegotiate-client-auth-require",
+        server => {
+            "VerifyCAFile" => test_pem("root-cert.pem"),
+            "VerifyMode" => "Require",
+        },
+        client => {
+            "Certificate" => test_pem("ee-client-chain.pem"),
+            "PrivateKey"  => test_pem("ee-key.pem"),
+        },
+        test => {
+            "Method" => "DTLS",
+            "HandshakeMode" => "RenegotiateServer",
+            "ResumptionExpected" => "No",
+            "ExpectedResult" => "Success"
+        }
+    },
+    {
+        name => "renegotiate-client-auth-once",
+        server => {
+            "VerifyCAFile" => test_pem("root-cert.pem"),
+            "VerifyMode" => "Once",
+        },
+        client => {
+            "Certificate" => test_pem("ee-client-chain.pem"),
+            "PrivateKey"  => test_pem("ee-key.pem"),
+        },
+        test => {
+            "Method" => "DTLS",
+            "HandshakeMode" => "RenegotiateServer",
+            "ResumptionExpected" => "No",
+            "ExpectedResult" => "Success"
+        }
+    }
+);
+our @tests_dtls1_2 = (
+    {
+        name => "renegotiate-aead-to-non-aead",
+        server => {
+            "Options" => "NoResumptionOnRenegotiation"
+        },
+        client => {
+            "CipherString" => "AES128-GCM-SHA256",
+            extra => {
+                "RenegotiateCiphers" => "AES128-SHA"
+            }
+        },
+        test => {
+            "Method" => "DTLS",
+            "HandshakeMode" => "RenegotiateClient",
+            "ResumptionExpected" => "No",
+            "ExpectedResult" => "Success"
+        }
+    },
+    {
+        name => "renegotiate-non-aead-to-aead",
+        server => {
+            "Options" => "NoResumptionOnRenegotiation"
+        },
+        client => {
+            "CipherString" => "AES128-SHA",
+            extra => {
+                "RenegotiateCiphers" => "AES128-GCM-SHA256"
+            }
+        },
+        test => {
+            "Method" => "DTLS",
+            "HandshakeMode" => "RenegotiateClient",
+            "ResumptionExpected" => "No",
+            "ExpectedResult" => "Success"
+        }
+    },
+    {
+        name => "renegotiate-non-aead-to-non-aead",
+        server => {
+            "Options" => "NoResumptionOnRenegotiation"
+        },
+        client => {
+            "CipherString" => "AES128-SHA",
+            extra => {
+                "RenegotiateCiphers" => "AES256-SHA"
+            }
+        },
+        test => {
+            "Method" => "DTLS",
+            "HandshakeMode" => "RenegotiateClient",
+            "ResumptionExpected" => "No",
+            "ExpectedResult" => "Success"
+        }
+    },
+    {
+        name => "renegotiate-aead-to-aead",
+        server => {
+            "Options" => "NoResumptionOnRenegotiation"
+        },
+        client => {
+            "CipherString" => "AES128-GCM-SHA256",
+            extra => {
+                "RenegotiateCiphers" => "AES256-GCM-SHA384"
+            }
+        },
+        test => {
+            "Method" => "DTLS",
+            "HandshakeMode" => "RenegotiateClient",
+            "ResumptionExpected" => "No",
+            "ExpectedResult" => "Success"
+        }
+    },
+);
+
+
+push @tests, @tests_dtls1_2 unless disabled("dtls1_2");
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/19-mac-then-encrypt.conf b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/19-mac-then-encrypt.conf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..40480ed
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/19-mac-then-encrypt.conf
@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+# Generated with generate_ssl_tests.pl
+
+num_tests = 6
+
+test-0 = 0-disable-encrypt-then-mac-server-sha
+test-1 = 1-disable-encrypt-then-mac-client-sha
+test-2 = 2-disable-encrypt-then-mac-both-sha
+test-3 = 3-disable-encrypt-then-mac-server-sha2
+test-4 = 4-disable-encrypt-then-mac-client-sha2
+test-5 = 5-disable-encrypt-then-mac-both-sha2
+# ===========================================================
+
+[0-disable-encrypt-then-mac-server-sha]
+ssl_conf = 0-disable-encrypt-then-mac-server-sha-ssl
+
+[0-disable-encrypt-then-mac-server-sha-ssl]
+server = 0-disable-encrypt-then-mac-server-sha-server
+client = 0-disable-encrypt-then-mac-server-sha-client
+
+[0-disable-encrypt-then-mac-server-sha-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = -EncryptThenMac
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[0-disable-encrypt-then-mac-server-sha-client]
+CipherString = AES128-SHA
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-0]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[1-disable-encrypt-then-mac-client-sha]
+ssl_conf = 1-disable-encrypt-then-mac-client-sha-ssl
+
+[1-disable-encrypt-then-mac-client-sha-ssl]
+server = 1-disable-encrypt-then-mac-client-sha-server
+client = 1-disable-encrypt-then-mac-client-sha-client
+
+[1-disable-encrypt-then-mac-client-sha-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[1-disable-encrypt-then-mac-client-sha-client]
+CipherString = AES128-SHA
+Options = -EncryptThenMac
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-1]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[2-disable-encrypt-then-mac-both-sha]
+ssl_conf = 2-disable-encrypt-then-mac-both-sha-ssl
+
+[2-disable-encrypt-then-mac-both-sha-ssl]
+server = 2-disable-encrypt-then-mac-both-sha-server
+client = 2-disable-encrypt-then-mac-both-sha-client
+
+[2-disable-encrypt-then-mac-both-sha-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = -EncryptThenMac
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[2-disable-encrypt-then-mac-both-sha-client]
+CipherString = AES128-SHA
+Options = -EncryptThenMac
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-2]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[3-disable-encrypt-then-mac-server-sha2]
+ssl_conf = 3-disable-encrypt-then-mac-server-sha2-ssl
+
+[3-disable-encrypt-then-mac-server-sha2-ssl]
+server = 3-disable-encrypt-then-mac-server-sha2-server
+client = 3-disable-encrypt-then-mac-server-sha2-client
+
+[3-disable-encrypt-then-mac-server-sha2-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = -EncryptThenMac
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[3-disable-encrypt-then-mac-server-sha2-client]
+CipherString = AES128-SHA256
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-3]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[4-disable-encrypt-then-mac-client-sha2]
+ssl_conf = 4-disable-encrypt-then-mac-client-sha2-ssl
+
+[4-disable-encrypt-then-mac-client-sha2-ssl]
+server = 4-disable-encrypt-then-mac-client-sha2-server
+client = 4-disable-encrypt-then-mac-client-sha2-client
+
+[4-disable-encrypt-then-mac-client-sha2-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[4-disable-encrypt-then-mac-client-sha2-client]
+CipherString = AES128-SHA256
+Options = -EncryptThenMac
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-4]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
+# ===========================================================
+
+[5-disable-encrypt-then-mac-both-sha2]
+ssl_conf = 5-disable-encrypt-then-mac-both-sha2-ssl
+
+[5-disable-encrypt-then-mac-both-sha2-ssl]
+server = 5-disable-encrypt-then-mac-both-sha2-server
+client = 5-disable-encrypt-then-mac-both-sha2-client
+
+[5-disable-encrypt-then-mac-both-sha2-server]
+Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem
+CipherString = DEFAULT
+Options = -EncryptThenMac
+PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem
+
+[5-disable-encrypt-then-mac-both-sha2-client]
+CipherString = AES128-SHA256
+Options = -EncryptThenMac
+VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem
+VerifyMode = Peer
+
+[test-5]
+ExpectedResult = Success
+
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/19-mac-then-encrypt.conf.in b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/19-mac-then-encrypt.conf.in
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..01afe25
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/19-mac-then-encrypt.conf.in
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+# -*- mode: perl; -*-
+# Copyright 2016-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+## SSL test configurations
+
+package ssltests;
+
+our @tests = (
+    {
+        name => "disable-encrypt-then-mac-server-sha",
+        server => {
+          "Options" => "-EncryptThenMac",
+        },
+        client => {
+          "CipherString" => "AES128-SHA",
+        },
+        test   => {
+          "ExpectedResult" => "Success",
+        },
+    },
+    {
+        name => "disable-encrypt-then-mac-client-sha",
+        server => {
+        },
+        client => {
+          "CipherString" => "AES128-SHA",
+          "Options" => "-EncryptThenMac",
+        },
+        test   => {
+          "ExpectedResult" => "Success",
+        },
+    },
+    {
+        name => "disable-encrypt-then-mac-both-sha",
+        server => {
+          "Options" => "-EncryptThenMac",
+        },
+        client => {
+          "CipherString" => "AES128-SHA",
+          "Options" => "-EncryptThenMac",
+        },
+        test   => {
+          "ExpectedResult" => "Success",
+        },
+    },
+    {
+        name => "disable-encrypt-then-mac-server-sha2",
+        server => {
+          "Options" => "-EncryptThenMac",
+        },
+        client => {
+          "CipherString" => "AES128-SHA256",
+        },
+        test   => {
+          "ExpectedResult" => "Success",
+        },
+    },
+    {
+        name => "disable-encrypt-then-mac-client-sha2",
+        server => {
+        },
+        client => {
+          "CipherString" => "AES128-SHA256",
+          "Options" => "-EncryptThenMac",
+        },
+        test   => {
+          "ExpectedResult" => "Success",
+        },
+    },
+    {
+        name => "disable-encrypt-then-mac-both-sha2",
+        server => {
+          "Options" => "-EncryptThenMac",
+        },
+        client => {
+          "CipherString" => "AES128-SHA256",
+          "Options" => "-EncryptThenMac",
+        },
+        test   => {
+          "ExpectedResult" => "Success",
+        },
+    },
+);
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/protocol_version.pm b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/protocol_version.pm
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c711362
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/protocol_version.pm
@@ -0,0 +1,247 @@
+# -*- mode: perl; -*-
+# Copyright 2016-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+## Test version negotiation
+
+package ssltests;
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+
+use List::Util qw/max min/;
+
+use OpenSSL::Test;
+use OpenSSL::Test::Utils qw/anydisabled alldisabled/;
+setup("no_test_here");
+
+my @tls_protocols = ("SSLv3", "TLSv1", "TLSv1.1", "TLSv1.2");
+# undef stands for "no limit".
+my @min_tls_protocols = (undef, "SSLv3", "TLSv1", "TLSv1.1", "TLSv1.2");
+my @max_tls_protocols = ("SSLv3", "TLSv1", "TLSv1.1", "TLSv1.2", undef);
+
+my @is_tls_disabled = anydisabled("ssl3", "tls1", "tls1_1", "tls1_2");
+
+my $min_tls_enabled; my $max_tls_enabled;
+
+# Protocol configuration works in cascades, i.e.,
+# $no_tls1_1 disables TLSv1.1 and below.
+#
+# $min_enabled and $max_enabled will be correct if there is at least one
+# protocol enabled.
+foreach my $i (0..$#tls_protocols) {
+    if (!$is_tls_disabled[$i]) {
+        $min_tls_enabled = $i;
+        last;
+    }
+}
+
+foreach my $i (0..$#tls_protocols) {
+    if (!$is_tls_disabled[$i]) {
+        $max_tls_enabled = $i;
+    }
+}
+
+my @dtls_protocols = ("DTLSv1", "DTLSv1.2");
+# undef stands for "no limit".
+my @min_dtls_protocols = (undef, "DTLSv1", "DTLSv1.2");
+my @max_dtls_protocols = ("DTLSv1", "DTLSv1.2", undef);
+
+my @is_dtls_disabled = anydisabled("dtls1", "dtls1_2");
+
+my $min_dtls_enabled; my $max_dtls_enabled;
+
+# $min_enabled and $max_enabled will be correct if there is at least one
+# protocol enabled.
+foreach my $i (0..$#dtls_protocols) {
+    if (!$is_dtls_disabled[$i]) {
+        $min_dtls_enabled = $i;
+        last;
+    }
+}
+
+foreach my $i (0..$#dtls_protocols) {
+    if (!$is_dtls_disabled[$i]) {
+        $max_dtls_enabled = $i;
+    }
+}
+
+sub no_tests {
+    my ($dtls) = @_;
+    return $dtls ? alldisabled("dtls1", "dtls1_2") :
+      alldisabled("ssl3", "tls1", "tls1_1", "tls1_2");
+}
+
+sub generate_version_tests {
+    my ($method) = @_;
+
+    my $dtls = $method eq "DTLS";
+    # Don't write the redundant "Method = TLS" into the configuration.
+    undef $method if !$dtls;
+
+    my @protocols = $dtls ? @dtls_protocols : @tls_protocols;
+    my @min_protocols = $dtls ? @min_dtls_protocols : @min_tls_protocols;
+    my @max_protocols = $dtls ? @max_dtls_protocols : @max_tls_protocols;
+    my $min_enabled  = $dtls ? $min_dtls_enabled : $min_tls_enabled;
+    my $max_enabled  = $dtls ? $max_dtls_enabled : $max_tls_enabled;
+
+    if (no_tests($dtls)) {
+        return;
+    }
+
+    my @tests = ();
+
+    foreach my $c_min (0..$#min_protocols) {
+        my $c_max_min = $c_min == 0 ? 0 : $c_min - 1;
+        foreach my $c_max ($c_max_min..$#max_protocols) {
+            foreach my $s_min (0..$#min_protocols) {
+                my $s_max_min = $s_min == 0 ? 0 : $s_min - 1;
+                foreach my $s_max ($s_max_min..$#max_protocols) {
+                    my ($result, $protocol) =
+                        expected_result($c_min, $c_max, $s_min, $s_max,
+                                        $min_enabled, $max_enabled, \@protocols);
+                    push @tests, {
+                        "name" => "version-negotiation",
+                        "client" => {
+                            "MinProtocol" => $min_protocols[$c_min],
+                            "MaxProtocol" => $max_protocols[$c_max],
+                        },
+                        "server" => {
+                            "MinProtocol" => $min_protocols[$s_min],
+                            "MaxProtocol" => $max_protocols[$s_max],
+                        },
+                        "test" => {
+                            "ExpectedResult" => $result,
+                            "ExpectedProtocol" => $protocol,
+                            "Method" => $method,
+                        }
+                    };
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    return @tests;
+}
+
+sub generate_resumption_tests {
+    my ($method) = @_;
+
+    my $dtls = $method eq "DTLS";
+    # Don't write the redundant "Method = TLS" into the configuration.
+    undef $method if !$dtls;
+
+    my @protocols = $dtls ? @dtls_protocols : @tls_protocols;
+    my $min_enabled  = $dtls ? $min_dtls_enabled : $min_tls_enabled;
+
+    if (no_tests($dtls)) {
+        return;
+    }
+
+    my @server_tests = ();
+    my @client_tests = ();
+
+    # Obtain the first session against a fixed-version server/client.
+    foreach my $original_protocol($min_enabled..$#protocols) {
+        # Upgrade or downgrade the server/client max version support and test
+        # that it upgrades, downgrades or resumes the session as well.
+        foreach my $resume_protocol($min_enabled..$#protocols) {
+            my $resumption_expected;
+            # We should only resume on exact version match.
+            if ($original_protocol eq $resume_protocol) {
+                $resumption_expected = "Yes";
+            } else {
+                $resumption_expected = "No";
+            }
+
+            foreach my $ticket ("SessionTicket", "-SessionTicket") {
+                # Client is flexible, server upgrades/downgrades.
+                push @server_tests, {
+                    "name" => "resumption",
+                    "client" => { },
+                    "server" => {
+                        "MinProtocol" => $protocols[$original_protocol],
+                        "MaxProtocol" => $protocols[$original_protocol],
+                        "Options" => $ticket,
+                    },
+                    "resume_server" => {
+                        "MaxProtocol" => $protocols[$resume_protocol],
+                    },
+                    "test" => {
+                        "ExpectedProtocol" => $protocols[$resume_protocol],
+                        "Method" => $method,
+                        "HandshakeMode" => "Resume",
+                        "ResumptionExpected" => $resumption_expected,
+                    }
+                };
+                # Server is flexible, client upgrades/downgrades.
+                push @client_tests, {
+                    "name" => "resumption",
+                    "client" => {
+                        "MinProtocol" => $protocols[$original_protocol],
+                        "MaxProtocol" => $protocols[$original_protocol],
+                    },
+                    "server" => {
+                        "Options" => $ticket,
+                    },
+                    "resume_client" => {
+                        "MaxProtocol" => $protocols[$resume_protocol],
+                    },
+                    "test" => {
+                        "ExpectedProtocol" => $protocols[$resume_protocol],
+                        "Method" => $method,
+                        "HandshakeMode" => "Resume",
+                        "ResumptionExpected" => $resumption_expected,
+                    }
+                };
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    return (@server_tests, @client_tests);
+}
+
+sub expected_result {
+    my ($c_min, $c_max, $s_min, $s_max, $min_enabled, $max_enabled,
+        $protocols) = @_;
+
+    # Adjust for "undef" (no limit).
+    $c_min = $c_min == 0 ? 0 : $c_min - 1;
+    $c_max = $c_max == scalar @$protocols ? $c_max - 1 : $c_max;
+    $s_min = $s_min == 0 ? 0 : $s_min - 1;
+    $s_max = $s_max == scalar @$protocols ? $s_max - 1 : $s_max;
+
+    # We now have at least one protocol enabled, so $min_enabled and
+    # $max_enabled are well-defined.
+    $c_min = max $c_min, $min_enabled;
+    $s_min = max $s_min, $min_enabled;
+    $c_max = min $c_max, $max_enabled;
+    $s_max = min $s_max, $max_enabled;
+
+    if ($c_min > $c_max) {
+        # Client should fail to even send a hello.
+        # This results in an internal error since the server will be
+        # waiting for input that never arrives.
+        return ("InternalError", undef);
+    } elsif ($s_min > $s_max) {
+        # Server has no protocols, should always fail.
+        return ("ServerFail", undef);
+    } elsif ($s_min > $c_max) {
+        # Server doesn't support the client range.
+        return ("ServerFail", undef);
+    } elsif ($c_min > $s_max) {
+        # Server will try with a version that is lower than the lowest
+        # supported client version.
+        return ("ClientFail", undef);
+    } else {
+        # Server and client ranges overlap.
+        my $max_common = $s_max < $c_max ? $s_max : $c_max;
+        return ("Success", $protocols->[$max_common]);
+    }
+}
+
+1;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/ssltests_base.pm b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/ssltests_base.pm
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dc81642
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl-tests/ssltests_base.pm
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+# -*- mode: perl; -*-
+# Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+## SSL test configurations
+
+package ssltests;
+
+sub test_pem
+{
+    my ($file) = @_;
+    my $dir_sep = $^O ne "VMS" ? "/" : "";
+    return "\${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}" . $dir_sep . $file,
+}
+
+our %base_server = (
+    "Certificate" => test_pem("servercert.pem"),
+    "PrivateKey"  => test_pem("serverkey.pem"),
+    "CipherString" => "DEFAULT",
+);
+
+our %base_client = (
+    "VerifyCAFile" => test_pem("rootcert.pem"),
+    "VerifyMode" => "Peer",
+    "CipherString" => "DEFAULT",
+);
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl_test.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl_test.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2cbbddd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl_test.c
@@ -0,0 +1,371 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/conf.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+#include "handshake_helper.h"
+#include "ssl_test_ctx.h"
+#include "testutil.h"
+
+static CONF *conf = NULL;
+
+/* Currently the section names are of the form test-<number>, e.g. test-15. */
+#define MAX_TESTCASE_NAME_LENGTH 100
+
+typedef struct ssl_test_ctx_test_fixture {
+    const char *test_case_name;
+    char test_app[MAX_TESTCASE_NAME_LENGTH];
+} SSL_TEST_FIXTURE;
+
+static SSL_TEST_FIXTURE set_up(const char *const test_case_name)
+{
+    SSL_TEST_FIXTURE fixture;
+    fixture.test_case_name = test_case_name;
+    return fixture;
+}
+
+static const char *print_alert(int alert)
+{
+    return alert ? SSL_alert_desc_string_long(alert) : "no alert";
+}
+
+static int check_result(HANDSHAKE_RESULT *result, SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx)
+{
+    if (result->result != test_ctx->expected_result) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "ExpectedResult mismatch: expected %s, got %s.\n",
+                ssl_test_result_name(test_ctx->expected_result),
+                ssl_test_result_name(result->result));
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int check_alerts(HANDSHAKE_RESULT *result, SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx)
+{
+    if (result->client_alert_sent != result->client_alert_received) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Client sent alert %s but server received %s\n.",
+                print_alert(result->client_alert_sent),
+                print_alert(result->client_alert_received));
+        /*
+         * We can't bail here because the peer doesn't always get far enough
+         * to process a received alert. Specifically, in protocol version
+         * negotiation tests, we have the following scenario.
+         * Client supports TLS v1.2 only; Server supports TLS v1.1.
+         * Client proposes TLS v1.2; server responds with 1.1;
+         * Client now sends a protocol alert, using TLS v1.2 in the header.
+         * The server, however, rejects the alert because of version mismatch
+         * in the record layer; therefore, the server appears to never
+         * receive the alert.
+         */
+        /* return 0; */
+    }
+
+    if (result->server_alert_sent != result->server_alert_received) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Server sent alert %s but client received %s\n.",
+                print_alert(result->server_alert_sent),
+                print_alert(result->server_alert_received));
+        /* return 0; */
+    }
+
+    /* Tolerate an alert if one wasn't explicitly specified in the test. */
+    if (test_ctx->expected_client_alert
+        /*
+         * The info callback alert value is computed as
+         * (s->s3->send_alert[0] << 8) | s->s3->send_alert[1]
+         * where the low byte is the alert code and the high byte is other stuff.
+         */
+        && (result->client_alert_sent & 0xff) != test_ctx->expected_client_alert) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "ClientAlert mismatch: expected %s, got %s.\n",
+                print_alert(test_ctx->expected_client_alert),
+                print_alert(result->client_alert_sent));
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (test_ctx->expected_server_alert
+        && (result->server_alert_sent & 0xff) != test_ctx->expected_server_alert) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "ServerAlert mismatch: expected %s, got %s.\n",
+                print_alert(test_ctx->expected_server_alert),
+                print_alert(result->server_alert_sent));
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (result->client_num_fatal_alerts_sent > 1) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Client sent %d fatal alerts.\n",
+                result->client_num_fatal_alerts_sent);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (result->server_num_fatal_alerts_sent > 1) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Server sent %d alerts.\n",
+                result->server_num_fatal_alerts_sent);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int check_protocol(HANDSHAKE_RESULT *result, SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx)
+{
+    if (result->client_protocol != result->server_protocol) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Client has protocol %s but server has %s\n.",
+                ssl_protocol_name(result->client_protocol),
+                ssl_protocol_name(result->server_protocol));
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (test_ctx->expected_protocol) {
+        if (result->client_protocol != test_ctx->expected_protocol) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "Protocol mismatch: expected %s, got %s.\n",
+                    ssl_protocol_name(test_ctx->expected_protocol),
+                    ssl_protocol_name(result->client_protocol));
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int check_servername(HANDSHAKE_RESULT *result, SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx)
+{
+    if (result->servername != test_ctx->expected_servername) {
+      fprintf(stderr, "Client ServerName mismatch, expected %s, got %s\n.",
+              ssl_servername_name(test_ctx->expected_servername),
+              ssl_servername_name(result->servername));
+      return 0;
+    }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int check_session_ticket(HANDSHAKE_RESULT *result, SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx)
+{
+    if (test_ctx->session_ticket_expected == SSL_TEST_SESSION_TICKET_IGNORE)
+        return 1;
+    if (result->session_ticket != test_ctx->session_ticket_expected) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Client SessionTicketExpected mismatch, expected %s, got %s\n.",
+                ssl_session_ticket_name(test_ctx->session_ticket_expected),
+                ssl_session_ticket_name(result->session_ticket));
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+static int check_npn(HANDSHAKE_RESULT *result, SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx)
+{
+    int ret = 1;
+    ret &= strings_equal("NPN Negotiated (client vs server)",
+                         result->client_npn_negotiated,
+                         result->server_npn_negotiated);
+    ret &= strings_equal("ExpectedNPNProtocol",
+                         test_ctx->expected_npn_protocol,
+                         result->client_npn_negotiated);
+    return ret;
+}
+#endif
+
+static int check_alpn(HANDSHAKE_RESULT *result, SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx)
+{
+    int ret = 1;
+    ret &= strings_equal("ALPN Negotiated (client vs server)",
+                         result->client_alpn_negotiated,
+                         result->server_alpn_negotiated);
+    ret &= strings_equal("ExpectedALPNProtocol",
+                         test_ctx->expected_alpn_protocol,
+                         result->client_alpn_negotiated);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int check_resumption(HANDSHAKE_RESULT *result, SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx)
+{
+    if (result->client_resumed != result->server_resumed) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Resumption mismatch (client vs server): %d vs %d\n",
+                result->client_resumed, result->server_resumed);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (result->client_resumed != test_ctx->resumption_expected) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "ResumptionExpected mismatch: %d vs %d\n",
+                test_ctx->resumption_expected, result->client_resumed);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int check_tmp_key(HANDSHAKE_RESULT *result, SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx)
+{
+    if (test_ctx->expected_tmp_key_type == 0
+        || test_ctx->expected_tmp_key_type == result->tmp_key_type)
+        return 1;
+    fprintf(stderr, "Tmp key type mismatch, %s vs %s\n",
+            OBJ_nid2ln(test_ctx->expected_tmp_key_type),
+            OBJ_nid2ln(result->tmp_key_type));
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This could be further simplified by constructing an expected
+ * HANDSHAKE_RESULT, and implementing comparison methods for
+ * its fields.
+ */
+static int check_test(HANDSHAKE_RESULT *result, SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx)
+{
+    int ret = 1;
+    ret &= check_result(result, test_ctx);
+    ret &= check_alerts(result, test_ctx);
+    if (result->result == SSL_TEST_SUCCESS) {
+        ret &= check_protocol(result, test_ctx);
+        ret &= check_servername(result, test_ctx);
+        ret &= check_session_ticket(result, test_ctx);
+        ret &= (result->session_ticket_do_not_call == 0);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+        ret &= check_npn(result, test_ctx);
+#endif
+        ret &= check_alpn(result, test_ctx);
+        ret &= check_resumption(result, test_ctx);
+        ret &= check_tmp_key(result, test_ctx);
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int execute_test(SSL_TEST_FIXTURE fixture)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    SSL_CTX *server_ctx = NULL, *server2_ctx = NULL, *client_ctx = NULL,
+        *resume_server_ctx = NULL, *resume_client_ctx = NULL;
+    SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx = NULL;
+    HANDSHAKE_RESULT *result = NULL;
+
+    test_ctx = SSL_TEST_CTX_create(conf, fixture.test_app);
+    if (test_ctx == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS
+    if (test_ctx->method == SSL_TEST_METHOD_DTLS) {
+        server_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(DTLS_server_method());
+        TEST_check(SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(server_ctx, DTLS_MAX_VERSION));
+        if (test_ctx->extra.server.servername_callback !=
+            SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_CB_NONE) {
+            server2_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(DTLS_server_method());
+            TEST_check(server2_ctx != NULL);
+        }
+        client_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(DTLS_client_method());
+        TEST_check(SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(client_ctx, DTLS_MAX_VERSION));
+        if (test_ctx->handshake_mode == SSL_TEST_HANDSHAKE_RESUME) {
+            resume_server_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(DTLS_server_method());
+            TEST_check(SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(resume_server_ctx,
+                                                     DTLS_MAX_VERSION));
+            resume_client_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(DTLS_client_method());
+            TEST_check(SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(resume_client_ctx,
+                                                     DTLS_MAX_VERSION));
+            TEST_check(resume_server_ctx != NULL);
+            TEST_check(resume_client_ctx != NULL);
+        }
+    }
+#endif
+    if (test_ctx->method == SSL_TEST_METHOD_TLS) {
+        server_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_server_method());
+        TEST_check(SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(server_ctx, TLS_MAX_VERSION));
+        /* SNI on resumption isn't supported/tested yet. */
+        if (test_ctx->extra.server.servername_callback !=
+            SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_CB_NONE) {
+            server2_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_server_method());
+            TEST_check(server2_ctx != NULL);
+        }
+        client_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_client_method());
+        TEST_check(SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(client_ctx, TLS_MAX_VERSION));
+
+        if (test_ctx->handshake_mode == SSL_TEST_HANDSHAKE_RESUME) {
+            resume_server_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_server_method());
+            TEST_check(SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(resume_server_ctx,
+                                                     TLS_MAX_VERSION));
+            resume_client_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_client_method());
+            TEST_check(SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(resume_client_ctx,
+                                                     TLS_MAX_VERSION));
+            TEST_check(resume_server_ctx != NULL);
+            TEST_check(resume_client_ctx != NULL);
+        }
+    }
+
+    TEST_check(server_ctx != NULL);
+    TEST_check(client_ctx != NULL);
+
+    TEST_check(CONF_modules_load(conf, fixture.test_app, 0) > 0);
+
+    if (!SSL_CTX_config(server_ctx, "server")
+        || !SSL_CTX_config(client_ctx, "client")) {
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (server2_ctx != NULL && !SSL_CTX_config(server2_ctx, "server2"))
+        goto err;
+    if (resume_server_ctx != NULL
+        && !SSL_CTX_config(resume_server_ctx, "resume-server"))
+        goto err;
+    if (resume_client_ctx != NULL
+        && !SSL_CTX_config(resume_client_ctx, "resume-client"))
+        goto err;
+
+    result = do_handshake(server_ctx, server2_ctx, client_ctx,
+                          resume_server_ctx, resume_client_ctx, test_ctx);
+
+    ret = check_test(result, test_ctx);
+
+err:
+    CONF_modules_unload(0);
+    SSL_CTX_free(server_ctx);
+    SSL_CTX_free(server2_ctx);
+    SSL_CTX_free(client_ctx);
+    SSL_CTX_free(resume_server_ctx);
+    SSL_CTX_free(resume_client_ctx);
+    SSL_TEST_CTX_free(test_ctx);
+    if (ret != 1)
+        ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+    HANDSHAKE_RESULT_free(result);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static void tear_down(SSL_TEST_FIXTURE fixture)
+{
+}
+
+#define SETUP_SSL_TEST_FIXTURE()                        \
+    SETUP_TEST_FIXTURE(SSL_TEST_FIXTURE, set_up)
+#define EXECUTE_SSL_TEST()             \
+    EXECUTE_TEST(execute_test, tear_down)
+
+static int test_handshake(int idx)
+{
+    SETUP_SSL_TEST_FIXTURE();
+    BIO_snprintf(fixture.test_app, sizeof(fixture.test_app),
+                 "test-%d", idx);
+    EXECUTE_SSL_TEST();
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    int result = 0;
+    long num_tests;
+
+    if (argc != 2)
+        return 1;
+
+    conf = NCONF_new(NULL);
+    TEST_check(conf != NULL);
+
+    /* argv[1] should point to the test conf file */
+    TEST_check(NCONF_load(conf, argv[1], NULL) > 0);
+
+    TEST_check(NCONF_get_number_e(conf, NULL, "num_tests", &num_tests));
+
+    ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_handshake, (int)(num_tests));
+    result = run_tests(argv[0]);
+
+    return result;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl_test.tmpl b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl_test.tmpl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9506837
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl_test.tmpl
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+[{-$testname-}]
+ssl_conf = {-$testname-}-ssl
+
+[{-$testname-}-ssl]
+server = {-$testname-}-server
+client = {-$testname-}-client{-
+    # The following sections are optional.
+    $OUT = "";
+    if (%server2) {
+        $OUT .= "\nserver2 = $testname-server2";
+    } elsif ($reuse_server2) {
+        $OUT .= "\nserver2 = $testname-server";
+    }
+    if (%resume_server) {
+        $OUT .= "\nresume-server = $testname-resume-server";
+    } elsif ($reuse_resume_server) {
+        $OUT .= "\nresume-server = $testname-server";
+    }
+    if (%resume_client) {
+        $OUT .= "\nresume-client = $testname-resume-client";
+    } elsif ($reuse_resume_client) {
+        $OUT .= "\nresume-client = $testname-client";
+    }
+-}
+
+[{-$testname-}-server]
+{-
+    foreach my $key (sort keys %server) {
+        # Emitted in the test section.
+        next if ($key eq "extra");
+        $OUT .= qq{$key} . " = " . qq{$server{$key}\n} if defined $server{$key};
+    }
+    if (%server2) {
+        $OUT .= "\n[$testname-server2]\n";
+        foreach my $key (sort keys %server2) {
+            next if ($key eq "extra");
+            $OUT .= qq{$key} . " = " . qq{$server2{$key}\n} if defined $server2{$key};
+        }
+    }
+    if (%resume_server) {
+        $OUT .= "\n[$testname-resume-server]\n";
+        foreach my $key (sort keys %resume_server) {
+            next if ($key eq "extra");
+            $OUT .= qq{$key} . " = " . qq{$resume_server{$key}\n} if defined $resume_server{$key};
+        }
+    }
+-}
+[{-$testname-}-client]
+{-
+    foreach my $key (sort keys %client) {
+        next if ($key eq "extra");
+        $OUT .= qq{$key} . " = " . qq{$client{$key}\n} if defined $client{$key};
+    }
+    if (%resume_client) {
+        $OUT .= "\n[$testname-resume-client]\n";
+        foreach my $key (sort keys %resume_client) {
+	    next if ($key eq "extra");
+            $OUT .= qq{$key} . " = " . qq{$resume_client{$key}\n} if defined $resume_client{$key};
+        }
+    }
+-}
+[test-{-$idx-}]
+{-
+    foreach my $key (sort keys %test) {
+        $OUT .= qq{$key} ." = " . qq{$test{$key}\n} if defined $test{$key};
+    }
+
+    # The extra server/client configuration sections.
+    if ($server{"extra"}) {
+       $OUT .= "server = $testname-server-extra\n";
+    }
+    if (%server2 && $server2{"extra"}) {
+       $OUT .= "server2 = $testname-server2-extra\n";
+    } elsif ($reuse_server2 && $server{"extra"}) {
+       $OUT .= "server2 = $testname-server-extra\n";
+    }
+    if (%resume_server && $resume_server{"extra"}) {
+       $OUT .= "resume-server = $testname-resume-server-extra\n";
+    } elsif ($reuse_resume_server && $server{"extra"}) {
+       $OUT .= "resume-server = $testname-server-extra\n";
+    }
+    if ($client{"extra"}) {
+       $OUT .= "client = $testname-client-extra\n";
+    }
+    if (%resume_client && $resume_client{"extra"}) {
+       $OUT .= "resume-client = $testname-resume-client-extra\n";
+    } elsif ($reuse_resume_client && $client{"extra"}) {
+       $OUT .= "resume-client = $testname-client-extra\n";
+    }
+
+    if ($server{"extra"}) {
+        $OUT .= "\n[$testname-server-extra]\n";
+        foreach my $key (sort keys %{$server{"extra"}}) {
+            $OUT .= qq{$key} . " = " . qq{$server{"extra"}{$key}\n}
+	    	 if defined $server{"extra"}{$key};
+        }
+    }
+    if (%server2 && $server2{"extra"}) {
+        $OUT .= "\n[$testname-server2-extra]\n";
+        foreach my $key (sort keys %{$server2{"extra"}}) {
+            $OUT .= qq{$key} . " = " . qq{$server2{"extra"}{$key}\n}
+	    	 if defined $server2{"extra"}{$key};
+        }
+    }
+   if (%resume_server && $resume_server{"extra"}) {
+        $OUT .= "\n[$testname-resume-server-extra]\n";
+        foreach my $key (sort keys %{$resume_server{"extra"}}) {
+            $OUT .= qq{$key} . " = " . qq{$resume_server{"extra"}{$key}\n}
+	    	 if defined $resume_server{"extra"}{$key};
+        }
+    }
+   if ($client{"extra"}) {
+        $OUT .= "\n[$testname-client-extra]\n";
+        foreach my $key (sort keys %{$client{"extra"}}) {
+            $OUT .= qq{$key} . " = " . qq{$client{"extra"}{$key}\n}
+	    	 if defined $client{"extra"}{$key};
+        }
+   }
+   if (%resume_client && $resume_client{"extra"}) {
+        $OUT .= "\n[$testname-resume-client-extra]\n";
+        foreach my $key (sort keys %{$resume_client{"extra"}}) {
+            $OUT .= qq{$key} . " = " . qq{$resume_client{"extra"}{$key}\n}
+	    	 if defined $resume_client{"extra"}{$key};
+        }
+    }
+-}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl_test_ctx.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl_test_ctx.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..28ee5c7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl_test_ctx.c
@@ -0,0 +1,662 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/e_os2.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+
+#include "e_os.h"
+#include "ssl_test_ctx.h"
+#include "testutil.h"
+
+static const int default_app_data_size = 256;
+/* Default set to be as small as possible to exercise fragmentation. */
+static const int default_max_fragment_size = 512;
+
+static int parse_boolean(const char *value, int *result)
+{
+    if (strcasecmp(value, "Yes") == 0) {
+        *result = 1;
+        return 1;
+    }
+    else if (strcasecmp(value, "No") == 0) {
+        *result = 0;
+        return 1;
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+#define IMPLEMENT_SSL_TEST_BOOL_OPTION(struct_type, name, field)        \
+    static int parse_##name##_##field(struct_type *ctx, const char *value) \
+    {                                                                   \
+        return parse_boolean(value, &ctx->field);                       \
+    }
+
+#define IMPLEMENT_SSL_TEST_STRING_OPTION(struct_type, name, field)      \
+    static int parse_##name##_##field(struct_type *ctx, const char *value) \
+    {                                                                   \
+        OPENSSL_free(ctx->field);                                       \
+        ctx->field = OPENSSL_strdup(value);                             \
+        TEST_check(ctx->field != NULL);                                 \
+        return 1;                                                       \
+    }
+
+#define IMPLEMENT_SSL_TEST_INT_OPTION(struct_type, name, field)        \
+    static int parse_##name##_##field(struct_type *ctx, const char *value) \
+    {                                                                   \
+        ctx->field = atoi(value);                                       \
+        return 1;                                                       \
+    }
+
+/* True enums and other test configuration values that map to an int. */
+typedef struct {
+    const char *name;
+    int value;
+} test_enum;
+
+
+__owur static int parse_enum(const test_enum *enums, size_t num_enums,
+                             int *value, const char *name)
+{
+    size_t i;
+    for (i = 0; i < num_enums; i++) {
+        if (strcmp(enums[i].name, name) == 0) {
+            *value = enums[i].value;
+            return 1;
+        }
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static const char *enum_name(const test_enum *enums, size_t num_enums,
+                             int value)
+{
+    size_t i;
+    for (i = 0; i < num_enums; i++) {
+        if (enums[i].value == value) {
+            return enums[i].name;
+        }
+    }
+    return "InvalidValue";
+}
+
+
+/* ExpectedResult */
+
+static const test_enum ssl_test_results[] = {
+    {"Success", SSL_TEST_SUCCESS},
+    {"ServerFail", SSL_TEST_SERVER_FAIL},
+    {"ClientFail", SSL_TEST_CLIENT_FAIL},
+    {"InternalError", SSL_TEST_INTERNAL_ERROR},
+};
+
+__owur static int parse_expected_result(SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx, const char *value)
+{
+    int ret_value;
+    if (!parse_enum(ssl_test_results, OSSL_NELEM(ssl_test_results),
+                    &ret_value, value)) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+    test_ctx->expected_result = ret_value;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+const char *ssl_test_result_name(ssl_test_result_t result)
+{
+    return enum_name(ssl_test_results, OSSL_NELEM(ssl_test_results), result);
+}
+
+/* ExpectedClientAlert / ExpectedServerAlert */
+
+static const test_enum ssl_alerts[] = {
+    {"UnknownCA", SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
+    {"HandshakeFailure", SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE},
+    {"UnrecognizedName", SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME},
+    {"BadCertificate", SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
+    {"NoApplicationProtocol", SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL},
+};
+
+__owur static int parse_alert(int *alert, const char *value)
+{
+    return parse_enum(ssl_alerts, OSSL_NELEM(ssl_alerts), alert, value);
+}
+
+__owur static int parse_client_alert(SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx, const char *value)
+{
+    return parse_alert(&test_ctx->expected_client_alert, value);
+}
+
+__owur static int parse_server_alert(SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx, const char *value)
+{
+    return parse_alert(&test_ctx->expected_server_alert, value);
+}
+
+const char *ssl_alert_name(int alert)
+{
+    return enum_name(ssl_alerts, OSSL_NELEM(ssl_alerts), alert);
+}
+
+/* ExpectedProtocol */
+
+static const test_enum ssl_protocols[] = {
+     {"TLSv1.2", TLS1_2_VERSION},
+     {"TLSv1.1", TLS1_1_VERSION},
+     {"TLSv1", TLS1_VERSION},
+     {"SSLv3", SSL3_VERSION},
+     {"DTLSv1", DTLS1_VERSION},
+     {"DTLSv1.2", DTLS1_2_VERSION},
+};
+
+__owur static int parse_protocol(SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx, const char *value)
+{
+    return parse_enum(ssl_protocols, OSSL_NELEM(ssl_protocols),
+                      &test_ctx->expected_protocol, value);
+}
+
+const char *ssl_protocol_name(int protocol)
+{
+    return enum_name(ssl_protocols, OSSL_NELEM(ssl_protocols), protocol);
+}
+
+/* VerifyCallback */
+
+static const test_enum ssl_verify_callbacks[] = {
+    {"None", SSL_TEST_VERIFY_NONE},
+    {"AcceptAll", SSL_TEST_VERIFY_ACCEPT_ALL},
+    {"RejectAll", SSL_TEST_VERIFY_REJECT_ALL},
+};
+
+__owur static int parse_client_verify_callback(SSL_TEST_CLIENT_CONF *client_conf,
+                                               const char *value)
+{
+    int ret_value;
+    if (!parse_enum(ssl_verify_callbacks, OSSL_NELEM(ssl_verify_callbacks),
+                    &ret_value, value)) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+    client_conf->verify_callback = ret_value;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+const char *ssl_verify_callback_name(ssl_verify_callback_t callback)
+{
+    return enum_name(ssl_verify_callbacks, OSSL_NELEM(ssl_verify_callbacks),
+                     callback);
+}
+
+/* ServerName */
+
+static const test_enum ssl_servername[] = {
+    {"None", SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_NONE},
+    {"server1", SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_SERVER1},
+    {"server2", SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_SERVER2},
+    {"invalid", SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_INVALID},
+};
+
+__owur static int parse_servername(SSL_TEST_CLIENT_CONF *client_conf,
+                                   const char *value)
+{
+    int ret_value;
+    if (!parse_enum(ssl_servername, OSSL_NELEM(ssl_servername),
+                    &ret_value, value)) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+    client_conf->servername = ret_value;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+__owur static int parse_expected_servername(SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx,
+                                            const char *value)
+{
+    int ret_value;
+    if (!parse_enum(ssl_servername, OSSL_NELEM(ssl_servername),
+                    &ret_value, value)) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+    test_ctx->expected_servername = ret_value;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+const char *ssl_servername_name(ssl_servername_t server)
+{
+    return enum_name(ssl_servername, OSSL_NELEM(ssl_servername),
+                     server);
+}
+
+/* ServerNameCallback */
+
+static const test_enum ssl_servername_callbacks[] = {
+    {"None", SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_CB_NONE},
+    {"IgnoreMismatch", SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_IGNORE_MISMATCH},
+    {"RejectMismatch", SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_REJECT_MISMATCH},
+};
+
+__owur static int parse_servername_callback(SSL_TEST_SERVER_CONF *server_conf,
+                                            const char *value)
+{
+    int ret_value;
+    if (!parse_enum(ssl_servername_callbacks,
+                    OSSL_NELEM(ssl_servername_callbacks), &ret_value, value)) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+    server_conf->servername_callback = ret_value;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+const char *ssl_servername_callback_name(ssl_servername_callback_t callback)
+{
+    return enum_name(ssl_servername_callbacks,
+                     OSSL_NELEM(ssl_servername_callbacks), callback);
+}
+
+/* SessionTicketExpected */
+
+static const test_enum ssl_session_ticket[] = {
+    {"Ignore", SSL_TEST_SESSION_TICKET_IGNORE},
+    {"Yes", SSL_TEST_SESSION_TICKET_YES},
+    {"No", SSL_TEST_SESSION_TICKET_NO},
+};
+
+__owur static int parse_session_ticket(SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx, const char *value)
+{
+    int ret_value;
+    if (!parse_enum(ssl_session_ticket, OSSL_NELEM(ssl_session_ticket),
+                    &ret_value, value)) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+    test_ctx->session_ticket_expected = ret_value;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+const char *ssl_session_ticket_name(ssl_session_ticket_t server)
+{
+    return enum_name(ssl_session_ticket,
+                     OSSL_NELEM(ssl_session_ticket),
+                     server);
+}
+
+/* Method */
+
+static const test_enum ssl_test_methods[] = {
+    {"TLS", SSL_TEST_METHOD_TLS},
+    {"DTLS", SSL_TEST_METHOD_DTLS},
+};
+
+__owur static int parse_test_method(SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx, const char *value)
+{
+    int ret_value;
+    if (!parse_enum(ssl_test_methods, OSSL_NELEM(ssl_test_methods),
+                    &ret_value, value)) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+    test_ctx->method = ret_value;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+const char *ssl_test_method_name(ssl_test_method_t method)
+{
+    return enum_name(ssl_test_methods, OSSL_NELEM(ssl_test_methods), method);
+}
+
+/* NPN and ALPN options */
+
+IMPLEMENT_SSL_TEST_STRING_OPTION(SSL_TEST_CLIENT_CONF, client, npn_protocols)
+IMPLEMENT_SSL_TEST_STRING_OPTION(SSL_TEST_SERVER_CONF, server, npn_protocols)
+IMPLEMENT_SSL_TEST_STRING_OPTION(SSL_TEST_CTX, test, expected_npn_protocol)
+IMPLEMENT_SSL_TEST_STRING_OPTION(SSL_TEST_CLIENT_CONF, client, alpn_protocols)
+IMPLEMENT_SSL_TEST_STRING_OPTION(SSL_TEST_SERVER_CONF, server, alpn_protocols)
+IMPLEMENT_SSL_TEST_STRING_OPTION(SSL_TEST_CTX, test, expected_alpn_protocol)
+
+/* Handshake mode */
+
+static const test_enum ssl_handshake_modes[] = {
+    {"Simple", SSL_TEST_HANDSHAKE_SIMPLE},
+    {"Resume", SSL_TEST_HANDSHAKE_RESUME},
+    {"RenegotiateServer", SSL_TEST_HANDSHAKE_RENEG_SERVER},
+    {"RenegotiateClient", SSL_TEST_HANDSHAKE_RENEG_CLIENT},
+};
+
+__owur static int parse_handshake_mode(SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx, const char *value)
+{
+    int ret_value;
+    if (!parse_enum(ssl_handshake_modes, OSSL_NELEM(ssl_handshake_modes),
+                    &ret_value, value)) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+    test_ctx->handshake_mode = ret_value;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+const char *ssl_handshake_mode_name(ssl_handshake_mode_t mode)
+{
+    return enum_name(ssl_handshake_modes, OSSL_NELEM(ssl_handshake_modes),
+                     mode);
+}
+
+/* Renegotiation Ciphersuites */
+
+IMPLEMENT_SSL_TEST_STRING_OPTION(SSL_TEST_CLIENT_CONF, client, reneg_ciphers)
+
+/* CT Validation */
+
+static const test_enum ssl_ct_validation_modes[] = {
+    {"None", SSL_TEST_CT_VALIDATION_NONE},
+    {"Permissive", SSL_TEST_CT_VALIDATION_PERMISSIVE},
+    {"Strict", SSL_TEST_CT_VALIDATION_STRICT},
+};
+
+__owur static int parse_ct_validation(SSL_TEST_CLIENT_CONF *client_conf,
+                                      const char *value)
+{
+    int ret_value;
+    if (!parse_enum(ssl_ct_validation_modes, OSSL_NELEM(ssl_ct_validation_modes),
+                    &ret_value, value)) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+    client_conf->ct_validation = ret_value;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+const char *ssl_ct_validation_name(ssl_ct_validation_t mode)
+{
+    return enum_name(ssl_ct_validation_modes, OSSL_NELEM(ssl_ct_validation_modes),
+                     mode);
+}
+
+IMPLEMENT_SSL_TEST_BOOL_OPTION(SSL_TEST_CTX, test, resumption_expected)
+IMPLEMENT_SSL_TEST_BOOL_OPTION(SSL_TEST_SERVER_CONF, server, broken_session_ticket)
+
+/* CertStatus */
+
+static const test_enum ssl_certstatus[] = {
+    {"None", SSL_TEST_CERT_STATUS_NONE},
+    {"GoodResponse", SSL_TEST_CERT_STATUS_GOOD_RESPONSE},
+    {"BadResponse", SSL_TEST_CERT_STATUS_BAD_RESPONSE}
+};
+
+__owur static int parse_certstatus(SSL_TEST_SERVER_CONF *server_conf,
+                                            const char *value)
+{
+    int ret_value;
+    if (!parse_enum(ssl_certstatus, OSSL_NELEM(ssl_certstatus), &ret_value,
+                    value)) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+    server_conf->cert_status = ret_value;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+const char *ssl_certstatus_name(ssl_cert_status_t cert_status)
+{
+    return enum_name(ssl_certstatus,
+                     OSSL_NELEM(ssl_certstatus), cert_status);
+}
+
+/* ApplicationData */
+
+IMPLEMENT_SSL_TEST_INT_OPTION(SSL_TEST_CTX, test, app_data_size)
+
+
+/* MaxFragmentSize */
+
+IMPLEMENT_SSL_TEST_INT_OPTION(SSL_TEST_CTX, test, max_fragment_size)
+
+
+/* ExpectedTmpKeyType */
+
+__owur static int parse_expected_tmp_key_type(SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx,
+                                              const char *value)
+{
+    int nid;
+
+    if (value == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    nid = OBJ_sn2nid(value);
+    if (nid == NID_undef)
+        nid = OBJ_ln2nid(value);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    if (nid == NID_undef)
+        nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(value);
+#endif
+    if (nid == NID_undef)
+        return 0;
+    test_ctx->expected_tmp_key_type = nid;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Known test options and their corresponding parse methods. */
+
+/* Top-level options. */
+typedef struct {
+    const char *name;
+    int (*parse)(SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx, const char *value);
+} ssl_test_ctx_option;
+
+static const ssl_test_ctx_option ssl_test_ctx_options[] = {
+    { "ExpectedResult", &parse_expected_result },
+    { "ExpectedClientAlert", &parse_client_alert },
+    { "ExpectedServerAlert", &parse_server_alert },
+    { "ExpectedProtocol", &parse_protocol },
+    { "ExpectedServerName", &parse_expected_servername },
+    { "SessionTicketExpected", &parse_session_ticket },
+    { "Method", &parse_test_method },
+    { "ExpectedNPNProtocol", &parse_test_expected_npn_protocol },
+    { "ExpectedALPNProtocol", &parse_test_expected_alpn_protocol },
+    { "HandshakeMode", &parse_handshake_mode },
+    { "ResumptionExpected", &parse_test_resumption_expected },
+    { "ApplicationData", &parse_test_app_data_size },
+    { "MaxFragmentSize", &parse_test_max_fragment_size },
+    { "ExpectedTmpKeyType", &parse_expected_tmp_key_type },
+};
+
+/* Nested client options. */
+typedef struct {
+    const char *name;
+    int (*parse)(SSL_TEST_CLIENT_CONF *conf, const char *value);
+} ssl_test_client_option;
+
+static const ssl_test_client_option ssl_test_client_options[] = {
+    { "VerifyCallback", &parse_client_verify_callback },
+    { "ServerName", &parse_servername },
+    { "NPNProtocols", &parse_client_npn_protocols },
+    { "ALPNProtocols", &parse_client_alpn_protocols },
+    { "CTValidation", &parse_ct_validation },
+    { "RenegotiateCiphers", &parse_client_reneg_ciphers},
+};
+
+/* Nested server options. */
+typedef struct {
+    const char *name;
+    int (*parse)(SSL_TEST_SERVER_CONF *conf, const char *value);
+} ssl_test_server_option;
+
+static const ssl_test_server_option ssl_test_server_options[] = {
+    { "ServerNameCallback", &parse_servername_callback },
+    { "NPNProtocols", &parse_server_npn_protocols },
+    { "ALPNProtocols", &parse_server_alpn_protocols },
+    { "BrokenSessionTicket", &parse_server_broken_session_ticket },
+    { "CertStatus", &parse_certstatus },
+};
+
+/*
+ * Since these methods are used to create tests, we use TEST_check liberally
+ * for malloc failures and other internal errors.
+ */
+SSL_TEST_CTX *SSL_TEST_CTX_new()
+{
+    SSL_TEST_CTX *ret;
+    ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
+    TEST_check(ret != NULL);
+    ret->app_data_size = default_app_data_size;
+    ret->max_fragment_size = default_max_fragment_size;
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static void ssl_test_extra_conf_free_data(SSL_TEST_EXTRA_CONF *conf)
+{
+    OPENSSL_free(conf->client.npn_protocols);
+    OPENSSL_free(conf->server.npn_protocols);
+    OPENSSL_free(conf->server2.npn_protocols);
+    OPENSSL_free(conf->client.alpn_protocols);
+    OPENSSL_free(conf->server.alpn_protocols);
+    OPENSSL_free(conf->server2.alpn_protocols);
+    OPENSSL_free(conf->client.reneg_ciphers);
+}
+
+static void ssl_test_ctx_free_extra_data(SSL_TEST_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    ssl_test_extra_conf_free_data(&ctx->extra);
+    ssl_test_extra_conf_free_data(&ctx->resume_extra);
+}
+
+void SSL_TEST_CTX_free(SSL_TEST_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    ssl_test_ctx_free_extra_data(ctx);
+    OPENSSL_free(ctx->expected_npn_protocol);
+    OPENSSL_free(ctx->expected_alpn_protocol);
+    OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+}
+
+static int parse_client_options(SSL_TEST_CLIENT_CONF *client, const CONF *conf,
+                                const char *client_section)
+{
+    STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *sk_conf;
+    int i;
+    size_t j;
+
+    sk_conf = NCONF_get_section(conf, client_section);
+    TEST_check(sk_conf != NULL);
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(sk_conf); i++) {
+        int found = 0;
+        const CONF_VALUE *option = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(sk_conf, i);
+        for (j = 0; j < OSSL_NELEM(ssl_test_client_options); j++) {
+            if (strcmp(option->name, ssl_test_client_options[j].name) == 0) {
+                if (!ssl_test_client_options[j].parse(client, option->value)) {
+                    fprintf(stderr, "Bad value %s for option %s\n",
+                            option->value, option->name);
+                    return 0;
+                }
+                found = 1;
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+        if (!found) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "Unknown test option: %s\n", option->name);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int parse_server_options(SSL_TEST_SERVER_CONF *server, const CONF *conf,
+                                const char *server_section)
+{
+    STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *sk_conf;
+    int i;
+    size_t j;
+
+    sk_conf = NCONF_get_section(conf, server_section);
+    TEST_check(sk_conf != NULL);
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(sk_conf); i++) {
+        int found = 0;
+        const CONF_VALUE *option = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(sk_conf, i);
+        for (j = 0; j < OSSL_NELEM(ssl_test_server_options); j++) {
+            if (strcmp(option->name, ssl_test_server_options[j].name) == 0) {
+                if (!ssl_test_server_options[j].parse(server, option->value)) {
+                    fprintf(stderr, "Bad value %s for option %s\n",
+                            option->value, option->name);
+                    return 0;
+                }
+                found = 1;
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+        if (!found) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "Unknown test option: %s\n", option->name);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+SSL_TEST_CTX *SSL_TEST_CTX_create(const CONF *conf, const char *test_section)
+{
+    STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *sk_conf;
+    SSL_TEST_CTX *ctx;
+    int i;
+    size_t j;
+
+    sk_conf = NCONF_get_section(conf, test_section);
+    TEST_check(sk_conf != NULL);
+
+    ctx = SSL_TEST_CTX_new();
+    TEST_check(ctx != NULL);
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(sk_conf); i++) {
+        int found = 0;
+        const CONF_VALUE *option = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(sk_conf, i);
+
+        /* Subsections */
+        if (strcmp(option->name, "client") == 0) {
+            if (!parse_client_options(&ctx->extra.client, conf,
+                                      option->value))
+                goto err;
+        } else if (strcmp(option->name, "server") == 0) {
+            if (!parse_server_options(&ctx->extra.server, conf,
+                                      option->value))
+                goto err;
+        } else if (strcmp(option->name, "server2") == 0) {
+            if (!parse_server_options(&ctx->extra.server2, conf,
+                                      option->value))
+                goto err;
+        } else if (strcmp(option->name, "resume-client") == 0) {
+            if (!parse_client_options(&ctx->resume_extra.client, conf,
+                                      option->value))
+                goto err;
+        } else if (strcmp(option->name, "resume-server") == 0) {
+            if (!parse_server_options(&ctx->resume_extra.server, conf,
+                                      option->value))
+                goto err;
+        } else if (strcmp(option->name, "resume-server2") == 0) {
+            if (!parse_server_options(&ctx->resume_extra.server2, conf,
+                                      option->value))
+                goto err;
+
+        } else {
+            for (j = 0; j < OSSL_NELEM(ssl_test_ctx_options); j++) {
+                if (strcmp(option->name, ssl_test_ctx_options[j].name) == 0) {
+                    if (!ssl_test_ctx_options[j].parse(ctx, option->value)) {
+                        fprintf(stderr, "Bad value %s for option %s\n",
+                                option->value, option->name);
+                        goto err;
+                    }
+                    found = 1;
+                    break;
+                }
+            }
+            if (!found) {
+                fprintf(stderr, "Unknown test option: %s\n", option->name);
+                goto err;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    goto done;
+
+ err:
+    SSL_TEST_CTX_free(ctx);
+    ctx = NULL;
+ done:
+    return ctx;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl_test_ctx.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl_test_ctx.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..28a4566
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl_test_ctx.h
@@ -0,0 +1,191 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_SSL_TEST_CTX_H
+#define HEADER_SSL_TEST_CTX_H
+
+#include <openssl/conf.h>
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+typedef enum {
+    SSL_TEST_SUCCESS = 0,  /* Default */
+    SSL_TEST_SERVER_FAIL,
+    SSL_TEST_CLIENT_FAIL,
+    SSL_TEST_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+    /* Couldn't test resumption/renegotiation: original handshake failed. */
+    SSL_TEST_FIRST_HANDSHAKE_FAILED
+} ssl_test_result_t;
+
+typedef enum {
+    SSL_TEST_VERIFY_NONE = 0, /* Default */
+    SSL_TEST_VERIFY_ACCEPT_ALL,
+    SSL_TEST_VERIFY_REJECT_ALL
+} ssl_verify_callback_t;
+
+typedef enum {
+    SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_NONE = 0, /* Default */
+    SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_SERVER1,
+    SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_SERVER2,
+    SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_INVALID
+} ssl_servername_t;
+
+typedef enum {
+    SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_CB_NONE = 0,  /* Default */
+    SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_IGNORE_MISMATCH,
+    SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_REJECT_MISMATCH
+} ssl_servername_callback_t;
+
+typedef enum {
+    SSL_TEST_SESSION_TICKET_IGNORE = 0, /* Default */
+    SSL_TEST_SESSION_TICKET_YES,
+    SSL_TEST_SESSION_TICKET_NO,
+    SSL_TEST_SESSION_TICKET_BROKEN /* Special test */
+} ssl_session_ticket_t;
+
+typedef enum {
+    SSL_TEST_METHOD_TLS = 0, /* Default */
+    SSL_TEST_METHOD_DTLS
+} ssl_test_method_t;
+
+typedef enum {
+    SSL_TEST_HANDSHAKE_SIMPLE = 0, /* Default */
+    SSL_TEST_HANDSHAKE_RESUME,
+    SSL_TEST_HANDSHAKE_RENEG_SERVER,
+    SSL_TEST_HANDSHAKE_RENEG_CLIENT
+} ssl_handshake_mode_t;
+
+typedef enum {
+    SSL_TEST_CT_VALIDATION_NONE = 0, /* Default */
+    SSL_TEST_CT_VALIDATION_PERMISSIVE,
+    SSL_TEST_CT_VALIDATION_STRICT
+} ssl_ct_validation_t;
+
+typedef enum {
+    SSL_TEST_CERT_STATUS_NONE = 0, /* Default */
+    SSL_TEST_CERT_STATUS_GOOD_RESPONSE,
+    SSL_TEST_CERT_STATUS_BAD_RESPONSE
+} ssl_cert_status_t;
+/*
+ * Server/client settings that aren't supported by the SSL CONF library,
+ * such as callbacks.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+    /* One of a number of predefined custom callbacks. */
+    ssl_verify_callback_t verify_callback;
+    /* One of a number of predefined server names use by the client */
+    ssl_servername_t servername;
+    /* Supported NPN and ALPN protocols. A comma-separated list. */
+    char *npn_protocols;
+    char *alpn_protocols;
+    ssl_ct_validation_t ct_validation;
+    /* Ciphersuites to set on a renegotiation */
+    char *reneg_ciphers;
+} SSL_TEST_CLIENT_CONF;
+
+typedef struct {
+    /* SNI callback (server-side). */
+    ssl_servername_callback_t servername_callback;
+    /* Supported NPN and ALPN protocols. A comma-separated list. */
+    char *npn_protocols;
+    char *alpn_protocols;
+    /* Whether to set a broken session ticket callback. */
+    int broken_session_ticket;
+    /* Should we send a CertStatus message? */
+    ssl_cert_status_t cert_status;
+} SSL_TEST_SERVER_CONF;
+
+typedef struct {
+    SSL_TEST_CLIENT_CONF client;
+    SSL_TEST_SERVER_CONF server;
+    SSL_TEST_SERVER_CONF server2;
+} SSL_TEST_EXTRA_CONF;
+
+typedef struct {
+    /*
+     * Global test configuration. Does not change between handshakes.
+     */
+    /* Whether the server/client CTX should use DTLS or TLS. */
+    ssl_test_method_t method;
+    /* Whether to test a resumed/renegotiated handshake. */
+    ssl_handshake_mode_t handshake_mode;
+    /*
+     * How much application data to exchange (default is 256 bytes).
+     * Both peers will send |app_data_size| bytes interleaved.
+     */
+    int app_data_size;
+    /* Maximum send fragment size. */
+    int max_fragment_size;
+
+    /*
+     * Extra server/client configurations. Per-handshake.
+     */
+    /* First handshake. */
+    SSL_TEST_EXTRA_CONF extra;
+    /* Resumed handshake. */
+    SSL_TEST_EXTRA_CONF resume_extra;
+
+    /*
+     * Test expectations. These apply to the LAST handshake.
+     */
+    /* Defaults to SUCCESS. */
+    ssl_test_result_t expected_result;
+    /* Alerts. 0 if no expectation. */
+    /* See ssl.h for alert codes. */
+    /* Alert sent by the client / received by the server. */
+    int expected_client_alert;
+    /* Alert sent by the server / received by the client. */
+    int expected_server_alert;
+    /* Negotiated protocol version. 0 if no expectation. */
+    /* See ssl.h for protocol versions. */
+    int expected_protocol;
+    /*
+     * The expected SNI context to use.
+     * We test server-side that the server switched to the expected context.
+     * Set by the callback upon success, so if the callback wasn't called or
+     * terminated with an alert, the servername will match with
+     * SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_NONE.
+     * Note: in the event that the servername was accepted, the client should
+     * also receive an empty SNI extension back but we have no way of probing
+     * client-side via the API that this was the case.
+     */
+    ssl_servername_t expected_servername;
+    ssl_session_ticket_t session_ticket_expected;
+    /* The expected NPN/ALPN protocol to negotiate. */
+    char *expected_npn_protocol;
+    char *expected_alpn_protocol;
+    /* Whether the second handshake is resumed or a full handshake (boolean). */
+    int resumption_expected;
+    /* Expected temporary key type */
+    int expected_tmp_key_type;
+} SSL_TEST_CTX;
+
+const char *ssl_test_result_name(ssl_test_result_t result);
+const char *ssl_alert_name(int alert);
+const char *ssl_protocol_name(int protocol);
+const char *ssl_verify_callback_name(ssl_verify_callback_t verify_callback);
+const char *ssl_servername_name(ssl_servername_t server);
+const char *ssl_servername_callback_name(ssl_servername_callback_t
+                                         servername_callback);
+const char *ssl_session_ticket_name(ssl_session_ticket_t server);
+const char *ssl_test_method_name(ssl_test_method_t method);
+const char *ssl_handshake_mode_name(ssl_handshake_mode_t mode);
+const char *ssl_ct_validation_name(ssl_ct_validation_t mode);
+const char *ssl_certstatus_name(ssl_cert_status_t cert_status);
+
+/*
+ * Load the test case context from |conf|.
+ * See test/README.ssltest.md for details on the conf file format.
+ */
+SSL_TEST_CTX *SSL_TEST_CTX_create(const CONF *conf, const char *test_section);
+
+SSL_TEST_CTX *SSL_TEST_CTX_new(void);
+
+void SSL_TEST_CTX_free(SSL_TEST_CTX *ctx);
+
+#endif  /* HEADER_SSL_TEST_CTX_H */
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl_test_ctx_test.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl_test_ctx_test.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0f321c6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl_test_ctx_test.c
@@ -0,0 +1,338 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Ideally, CONF should offer standard parsing methods and cover them
+ * in tests. But since we have no CONF tests, we use a custom test for now.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "e_os.h"
+#include "ssl_test_ctx.h"
+#include "testutil.h"
+#include <openssl/e_os2.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/conf.h>
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+static CONF *conf = NULL;
+
+typedef struct ssl_test_ctx_test_fixture {
+    const char *test_case_name;
+    const char *test_section;
+    /* Expected parsed configuration. */
+    SSL_TEST_CTX *expected_ctx;
+} SSL_TEST_CTX_TEST_FIXTURE;
+
+
+static int SSL_TEST_CLIENT_CONF_equal(SSL_TEST_CLIENT_CONF *client,
+                                      SSL_TEST_CLIENT_CONF *client2)
+{
+    if (client->verify_callback != client2->verify_callback) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "ClientVerifyCallback mismatch: %s vs %s.\n",
+                ssl_verify_callback_name(client->verify_callback),
+                ssl_verify_callback_name(client2->verify_callback));
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (client->servername != client2->servername) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "ServerName mismatch: %s vs %s.\n",
+                ssl_servername_name(client->servername),
+                ssl_servername_name(client2->servername));
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (!strings_equal("Client NPNProtocols", client->npn_protocols,
+                       client2->npn_protocols))
+        return 0;
+    if (!strings_equal("Client ALPNProtocols", client->alpn_protocols,
+                       client2->alpn_protocols))
+        return 0;
+    if (client->ct_validation != client2->ct_validation) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "CTValidation mismatch: %s vs %s.\n",
+                ssl_ct_validation_name(client->ct_validation),
+                ssl_ct_validation_name(client2->ct_validation));
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int SSL_TEST_SERVER_CONF_equal(SSL_TEST_SERVER_CONF *server,
+                                      SSL_TEST_SERVER_CONF *server2)
+{
+    if (server->servername_callback != server2->servername_callback) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "ServerNameCallback mismatch: %s vs %s.\n",
+                ssl_servername_callback_name(server->servername_callback),
+                ssl_servername_callback_name(server2->servername_callback));
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (!strings_equal("Server NPNProtocols", server->npn_protocols,
+                       server2->npn_protocols))
+        return 0;
+    if (!strings_equal("Server ALPNProtocols", server->alpn_protocols,
+                       server2->alpn_protocols))
+        return 0;
+    if (server->broken_session_ticket != server2->broken_session_ticket) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Broken session ticket mismatch: %d vs %d.\n",
+                server->broken_session_ticket, server2->broken_session_ticket);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (server->cert_status != server2->cert_status) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "CertStatus mismatch: %s vs %s.\n",
+                ssl_certstatus_name(server->cert_status),
+                ssl_certstatus_name(server2->cert_status));
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int SSL_TEST_EXTRA_CONF_equal(SSL_TEST_EXTRA_CONF *extra,
+                                     SSL_TEST_EXTRA_CONF *extra2)
+{
+    return SSL_TEST_CLIENT_CONF_equal(&extra->client, &extra2->client)
+        && SSL_TEST_SERVER_CONF_equal(&extra->server, &extra2->server)
+        && SSL_TEST_SERVER_CONF_equal(&extra->server2, &extra2->server2);
+}
+
+/* Returns 1 if the contexts are equal, 0 otherwise. */
+static int SSL_TEST_CTX_equal(SSL_TEST_CTX *ctx, SSL_TEST_CTX *ctx2)
+{
+    if (ctx->method != ctx2->method) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Method mismatch: %s vs %s.\n",
+                ssl_test_method_name(ctx->method),
+                ssl_test_method_name(ctx2->method));
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (ctx->handshake_mode != ctx2->handshake_mode) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "HandshakeMode mismatch: %s vs %s.\n",
+                ssl_handshake_mode_name(ctx->handshake_mode),
+                ssl_handshake_mode_name(ctx2->handshake_mode));
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (ctx->app_data_size != ctx2->app_data_size) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "ApplicationData mismatch: %d vs %d.\n",
+                ctx->app_data_size, ctx2->app_data_size);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (ctx->max_fragment_size != ctx2->max_fragment_size) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "MaxFragmentSize mismatch: %d vs %d.\n",
+                ctx->max_fragment_size, ctx2->max_fragment_size);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (!SSL_TEST_EXTRA_CONF_equal(&ctx->extra, &ctx2->extra)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Extra conf mismatch.\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (!SSL_TEST_EXTRA_CONF_equal(&ctx->resume_extra, &ctx2->resume_extra)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Resume extra conf mismatch.\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (ctx->expected_result != ctx2->expected_result) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "ExpectedResult mismatch: %s vs %s.\n",
+                ssl_test_result_name(ctx->expected_result),
+                ssl_test_result_name(ctx2->expected_result));
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (ctx->expected_client_alert != ctx2->expected_client_alert) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "ClientAlert mismatch: %s vs %s.\n",
+                ssl_alert_name(ctx->expected_client_alert),
+                ssl_alert_name(ctx2->expected_client_alert));
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (ctx->expected_server_alert != ctx2->expected_server_alert) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "ServerAlert mismatch: %s vs %s.\n",
+                ssl_alert_name(ctx->expected_server_alert),
+                ssl_alert_name(ctx2->expected_server_alert));
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (ctx->expected_protocol != ctx2->expected_protocol) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "ClientAlert mismatch: %s vs %s.\n",
+                ssl_protocol_name(ctx->expected_protocol),
+                ssl_protocol_name(ctx2->expected_protocol));
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (ctx->expected_servername != ctx2->expected_servername) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "ExpectedServerName mismatch: %s vs %s.\n",
+                ssl_servername_name(ctx->expected_servername),
+                ssl_servername_name(ctx2->expected_servername));
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (ctx->session_ticket_expected != ctx2->session_ticket_expected) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "SessionTicketExpected mismatch: %s vs %s.\n",
+                ssl_session_ticket_name(ctx->session_ticket_expected),
+                ssl_session_ticket_name(ctx2->session_ticket_expected));
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (!strings_equal("ExpectedNPNProtocol", ctx->expected_npn_protocol,
+                       ctx2->expected_npn_protocol))
+        return 0;
+    if (!strings_equal("ExpectedALPNProtocol", ctx->expected_alpn_protocol,
+                       ctx2->expected_alpn_protocol))
+        return 0;
+    if (ctx->resumption_expected != ctx2->resumption_expected) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "ResumptionExpected mismatch: %d vs %d.\n",
+                ctx->resumption_expected, ctx2->resumption_expected);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static SSL_TEST_CTX_TEST_FIXTURE set_up(const char *const test_case_name)
+{
+    SSL_TEST_CTX_TEST_FIXTURE fixture;
+    fixture.test_case_name = test_case_name;
+    fixture.expected_ctx = SSL_TEST_CTX_new();
+    TEST_check(fixture.expected_ctx != NULL);
+    return fixture;
+}
+
+static int execute_test(SSL_TEST_CTX_TEST_FIXTURE fixture)
+{
+    int success = 0;
+
+    SSL_TEST_CTX *ctx = SSL_TEST_CTX_create(conf, fixture.test_section);
+
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Failed to parse good configuration %s.\n",
+                fixture.test_section);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!SSL_TEST_CTX_equal(ctx, fixture.expected_ctx))
+        goto err;
+
+    success = 1;
+ err:
+    SSL_TEST_CTX_free(ctx);
+    return success;
+}
+
+static int execute_failure_test(SSL_TEST_CTX_TEST_FIXTURE fixture)
+{
+    SSL_TEST_CTX *ctx = SSL_TEST_CTX_create(conf, fixture.test_section);
+
+    if (ctx != NULL) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Parsing bad configuration %s succeeded.\n",
+                fixture.test_section);
+        SSL_TEST_CTX_free(ctx);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static void tear_down(SSL_TEST_CTX_TEST_FIXTURE fixture)
+{
+    SSL_TEST_CTX_free(fixture.expected_ctx);
+    ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+}
+
+#define SETUP_SSL_TEST_CTX_TEST_FIXTURE()                       \
+    SETUP_TEST_FIXTURE(SSL_TEST_CTX_TEST_FIXTURE, set_up)
+#define EXECUTE_SSL_TEST_CTX_TEST()             \
+    EXECUTE_TEST(execute_test, tear_down)
+#define EXECUTE_SSL_TEST_CTX_FAILURE_TEST()             \
+    EXECUTE_TEST(execute_failure_test, tear_down)
+
+static int test_empty_configuration()
+{
+    SETUP_SSL_TEST_CTX_TEST_FIXTURE();
+    fixture.test_section = "ssltest_default";
+    fixture.expected_ctx->expected_result = SSL_TEST_SUCCESS;
+    EXECUTE_SSL_TEST_CTX_TEST();
+}
+
+static int test_good_configuration()
+{
+    SETUP_SSL_TEST_CTX_TEST_FIXTURE();
+    fixture.test_section = "ssltest_good";
+    fixture.expected_ctx->method = SSL_TEST_METHOD_DTLS;
+    fixture.expected_ctx->handshake_mode = SSL_TEST_HANDSHAKE_RESUME;
+    fixture.expected_ctx->app_data_size = 1024;
+    fixture.expected_ctx->max_fragment_size = 2048;
+
+    fixture.expected_ctx->expected_result = SSL_TEST_SERVER_FAIL;
+    fixture.expected_ctx->expected_client_alert = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
+    fixture.expected_ctx->expected_server_alert = 0;  /* No alert. */
+    fixture.expected_ctx->expected_protocol = TLS1_1_VERSION;
+    fixture.expected_ctx->expected_servername = SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_SERVER2;
+    fixture.expected_ctx->session_ticket_expected = SSL_TEST_SESSION_TICKET_YES;
+    fixture.expected_ctx->resumption_expected = 1;
+
+    fixture.expected_ctx->extra.client.verify_callback =
+        SSL_TEST_VERIFY_REJECT_ALL;
+    fixture.expected_ctx->extra.client.servername = SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_SERVER2;
+    fixture.expected_ctx->extra.client.npn_protocols =
+        OPENSSL_strdup("foo,bar");
+    TEST_check(fixture.expected_ctx->extra.client.npn_protocols != NULL);
+
+    fixture.expected_ctx->extra.server.servername_callback =
+        SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_IGNORE_MISMATCH;
+    fixture.expected_ctx->extra.server.broken_session_ticket = 1;
+
+    fixture.expected_ctx->resume_extra.server2.alpn_protocols =
+        OPENSSL_strdup("baz");
+    TEST_check(
+        fixture.expected_ctx->resume_extra.server2.alpn_protocols != NULL);
+
+    fixture.expected_ctx->resume_extra.client.ct_validation =
+        SSL_TEST_CT_VALIDATION_STRICT;
+
+    EXECUTE_SSL_TEST_CTX_TEST();
+}
+
+static const char *bad_configurations[] = {
+    "ssltest_unknown_option",
+    "ssltest_wrong_section",
+    "ssltest_unknown_expected_result",
+    "ssltest_unknown_alert",
+    "ssltest_unknown_protocol",
+    "ssltest_unknown_verify_callback",
+    "ssltest_unknown_servername",
+    "ssltest_unknown_servername_callback",
+    "ssltest_unknown_session_ticket_expected",
+    "ssltest_unknown_method",
+    "ssltest_unknown_handshake_mode",
+    "ssltest_unknown_resumption_expected",
+    "ssltest_unknown_ct_validation",
+};
+
+static int test_bad_configuration(int idx)
+{
+        SETUP_SSL_TEST_CTX_TEST_FIXTURE();
+        fixture.test_section = bad_configurations[idx];
+        EXECUTE_SSL_TEST_CTX_FAILURE_TEST();
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    int result = 0;
+
+    if (argc != 2)
+        return 1;
+
+    conf = NCONF_new(NULL);
+    TEST_check(conf != NULL);
+
+    /* argv[1] should point to test/ssl_test_ctx_test.conf */
+    TEST_check(NCONF_load(conf, argv[1], NULL) > 0);
+
+    ADD_TEST(test_empty_configuration);
+    ADD_TEST(test_good_configuration);
+    ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_bad_configuration, OSSL_NELEM(bad_configurations));
+
+    result = run_tests(argv[0]);
+
+    NCONF_free(conf);
+
+    return result;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl_test_ctx_test.conf b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl_test_ctx_test.conf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a062d75
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssl_test_ctx_test.conf
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+[ssltest_default]
+
+[ssltest_good]
+client = ssltest_good_client_extra
+server = ssltest_good_server_extra
+resume-server2 = ssltest_good_resume_server2_extra
+resume-client = ssltest_good_resume_client_extra
+
+Method = DTLS
+HandshakeMode = Resume
+ApplicationData = 1024
+MaxFragmentSize = 2048
+
+ExpectedResult = ServerFail
+ExpectedClientAlert = UnknownCA
+ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1
+ExpectedServerName = server2
+SessionTicketExpected = Yes
+ResumptionExpected = Yes
+
+[ssltest_good_client_extra]
+VerifyCallback = RejectAll
+ServerName = server2
+NPNProtocols = foo,bar
+
+[ssltest_good_resume_client_extra]
+CTValidation = Strict
+
+[ssltest_good_server_extra]
+ServerNameCallback = IgnoreMismatch
+BrokenSessionTicket = Yes
+
+[ssltest_good_resume_server2_extra]
+ALPNProtocols = baz
+
+[ssltest_unknown_option]
+UnknownOption = Foo
+
+[ssltest_wrong_section]
+server = ssltest_wrong_section_server
+
+[ssltest_wrong_section_server]
+VerifyCallback = RejectAll
+
+[ssltest_unknown_expected_result]
+ExpectedResult = Foo
+
+[ssltest_unknown_alert]
+ExpectedServerAlert = Foo
+
+[ssltest_unknown_protocol]
+Protocol = Foo
+
+[ssltest_unknown_verify_callback]
+client = ssltest_unknown_verify_callback_client
+
+[ssltest_unknown_verify_callback_client]
+VerifyCallback = Foo
+
+[ssltest_unknown_servername]
+client = ssltest_unknown_servername_client
+
+[ssltest_unknown_servername_client]
+ServerName = Foo
+
+[ssltest_unknown_servername_callback]
+server = ssltest_unknown_servername_server
+
+[ssltest_unknown_servername_server]
+ServerNameCallback = Foo
+
+[ssltest_unknown_session_ticket_expected]
+SessionTicketExpected = Foo
+
+[ssltest_unknown_method]
+Method = TLS2
+
+[ssltest_unknown_handshake_mode]
+HandshakeMode = Foo
+
+[ssltest_unknown_resumption_expected]
+ResumptionExpected = Foo
+
+[ssltest_unknown_ct_validation]
+client = ssltest_unknown_ct_validation_client
+
+[ssltest_unknown_ct_validation_client]
+CTCallback = Foo
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/sslapitest.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/sslapitest.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..77e8f2e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/sslapitest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1262 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
+
+#include "ssltestlib.h"
+#include "testutil.h"
+#include "e_os.h"
+
+static char *cert = NULL;
+static char *privkey = NULL;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+static const unsigned char orespder[] = "Dummy OCSP Response";
+static int ocsp_server_called = 0;
+static int ocsp_client_called = 0;
+
+static int cdummyarg = 1;
+static X509 *ocspcert = NULL;
+#endif
+
+#define NUM_EXTRA_CERTS 40
+
+static int execute_test_large_message(const SSL_METHOD *smeth,
+                                      const SSL_METHOD *cmeth,
+                                      int min_version, int max_version,
+                                      int read_ahead)
+{
+    SSL_CTX *cctx = NULL, *sctx = NULL;
+    SSL *clientssl = NULL, *serverssl = NULL;
+    int testresult = 0;
+    int i;
+    BIO *certbio = BIO_new_file(cert, "r");
+    X509 *chaincert = NULL;
+    int certlen;
+
+    if (certbio == NULL) {
+        printf("Can't load the certificate file\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+    chaincert = PEM_read_bio_X509(certbio, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+    BIO_free(certbio);
+    certbio = NULL;
+    if (chaincert == NULL) {
+        printf("Unable to load certificate for chain\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (!create_ssl_ctx_pair(smeth, cmeth, min_version, max_version, &sctx,
+                             &cctx, cert, privkey)) {
+        printf("Unable to create SSL_CTX pair\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if(read_ahead) {
+        /*
+         * Test that read_ahead works correctly when dealing with large
+         * records
+         */
+        SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead(cctx, 1);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * We assume the supplied certificate is big enough so that if we add
+     * NUM_EXTRA_CERTS it will make the overall message large enough. The
+     * default buffer size is requested to be 16k, but due to the way BUF_MEM
+     * works, it ends up allocating a little over 21k (16 * 4/3). So, in this test
+     * we need to have a message larger than that.
+     */
+    certlen = i2d_X509(chaincert, NULL);
+    OPENSSL_assert((certlen * NUM_EXTRA_CERTS)
+                   > ((SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH * 4) / 3));
+    for (i = 0; i < NUM_EXTRA_CERTS; i++) {
+        if (!X509_up_ref(chaincert)) {
+            printf("Unable to up ref cert\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+        if (!SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(sctx, chaincert)) {
+            printf("Unable to add extra chain cert %d\n", i);
+            X509_free(chaincert);
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (!create_ssl_objects(sctx, cctx, &serverssl, &clientssl, NULL, NULL)) {
+        printf("Unable to create SSL objects\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (!create_ssl_connection(serverssl, clientssl)) {
+        printf("Unable to create SSL connection\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Calling SSL_clear() first is not required but this tests that SSL_clear()
+     * doesn't leak (when using enable-crypto-mdebug).
+     */
+    if (!SSL_clear(serverssl)) {
+        printf("Unexpected failure from SSL_clear()\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    testresult = 1;
+ end:
+    X509_free(chaincert);
+    SSL_free(serverssl);
+    SSL_free(clientssl);
+    SSL_CTX_free(sctx);
+    SSL_CTX_free(cctx);
+
+    return testresult;
+}
+
+static int test_large_message_tls(void)
+{
+    return execute_test_large_message(TLS_server_method(), TLS_client_method(),
+                                      TLS1_VERSION, TLS_MAX_VERSION,
+                                      0);
+}
+
+static int test_large_message_tls_read_ahead(void)
+{
+    return execute_test_large_message(TLS_server_method(), TLS_client_method(),
+                                      TLS1_VERSION, TLS_MAX_VERSION,
+                                      1);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS
+static int test_large_message_dtls(void)
+{
+    /*
+     * read_ahead is not relevant to DTLS because DTLS always acts as if
+     * read_ahead is set.
+     */
+    return execute_test_large_message(DTLS_server_method(),
+                                      DTLS_client_method(),
+                                      DTLS1_VERSION, DTLS_MAX_VERSION,
+                                      0);
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+static int ocsp_server_cb(SSL *s, void *arg)
+{
+    int *argi = (int *)arg;
+    unsigned char *orespdercopy = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(OCSP_RESPID) *ids = NULL;
+    OCSP_RESPID *id = NULL;
+
+    if (*argi == 2) {
+        /* In this test we are expecting exactly 1 OCSP_RESPID */
+        SSL_get_tlsext_status_ids(s, &ids);
+        if (ids == NULL || sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(ids) != 1)
+            return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+
+        id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(ids, 0);
+        if (id == NULL || !OCSP_RESPID_match(id, ocspcert))
+            return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+    } else if (*argi != 1) {
+        return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+    }
+
+
+    orespdercopy = OPENSSL_memdup(orespder, sizeof(orespder));
+    if (orespdercopy == NULL)
+        return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+
+    SSL_set_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(s, orespdercopy, sizeof(orespder));
+
+    ocsp_server_called = 1;
+
+    return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+}
+
+static int ocsp_client_cb(SSL *s, void *arg)
+{
+    int *argi = (int *)arg;
+    const unsigned char *respderin;
+    size_t len;
+
+    if (*argi != 1 && *argi != 2)
+        return 0;
+
+    len = SSL_get_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(s, &respderin);
+
+    if (memcmp(orespder, respderin, len) != 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    ocsp_client_called = 1;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int test_tlsext_status_type(void)
+{
+    SSL_CTX *cctx = NULL, *sctx = NULL;
+    SSL *clientssl = NULL, *serverssl = NULL;
+    int testresult = 0;
+    STACK_OF(OCSP_RESPID) *ids = NULL;
+    OCSP_RESPID *id = NULL;
+    BIO *certbio = NULL;
+
+    if (!create_ssl_ctx_pair(TLS_server_method(), TLS_client_method(),
+                             TLS1_VERSION, TLS_MAX_VERSION, &sctx, &cctx,
+                             cert, privkey)) {
+        printf("Unable to create SSL_CTX pair\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (SSL_CTX_get_tlsext_status_type(cctx) != -1) {
+        printf("Unexpected initial value for "
+               "SSL_CTX_get_tlsext_status_type()\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    /* First just do various checks getting and setting tlsext_status_type */
+
+    clientssl = SSL_new(cctx);
+    if (SSL_get_tlsext_status_type(clientssl) != -1) {
+        printf("Unexpected initial value for SSL_get_tlsext_status_type()\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (!SSL_set_tlsext_status_type(clientssl, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)) {
+        printf("Unexpected fail for SSL_set_tlsext_status_type()\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (SSL_get_tlsext_status_type(clientssl) != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
+        printf("Unexpected result for SSL_get_tlsext_status_type()\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    SSL_free(clientssl);
+    clientssl = NULL;
+
+    if (!SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_type(cctx, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)) {
+        printf("Unexpected fail for SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_type()\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (SSL_CTX_get_tlsext_status_type(cctx) != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
+        printf("Unexpected result for SSL_CTX_get_tlsext_status_type()\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    clientssl = SSL_new(cctx);
+
+    if (SSL_get_tlsext_status_type(clientssl) != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
+        printf("Unexpected result for SSL_get_tlsext_status_type() (test 2)\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    SSL_free(clientssl);
+    clientssl = NULL;
+
+    /*
+     * Now actually do a handshake and check OCSP information is exchanged and
+     * the callbacks get called
+     */
+
+    SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(cctx, ocsp_client_cb);
+    SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(cctx, &cdummyarg);
+    SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(sctx, ocsp_server_cb);
+    SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(sctx, &cdummyarg);
+
+    if (!create_ssl_objects(sctx, cctx, &serverssl, &clientssl, NULL, NULL)) {
+        printf("Unable to create SSL objects\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (!create_ssl_connection(serverssl, clientssl)) {
+        printf("Unable to create SSL connection\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (!ocsp_client_called || !ocsp_server_called) {
+        printf("OCSP callbacks not called\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    SSL_free(serverssl);
+    SSL_free(clientssl);
+    serverssl = NULL;
+    clientssl = NULL;
+
+    /* Try again but this time force the server side callback to fail */
+    ocsp_client_called = 0;
+    ocsp_server_called = 0;
+    cdummyarg = 0;
+
+    if (!create_ssl_objects(sctx, cctx, &serverssl, &clientssl, NULL, NULL)) {
+        printf("Unable to create SSL objects\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    /* This should fail because the callback will fail */
+    if (create_ssl_connection(serverssl, clientssl)) {
+        printf("Unexpected success creating the connection\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (ocsp_client_called || ocsp_server_called) {
+        printf("OCSP callbacks successfully called unexpectedly\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    SSL_free(serverssl);
+    SSL_free(clientssl);
+    serverssl = NULL;
+    clientssl = NULL;
+
+    /*
+     * This time we'll get the client to send an OCSP_RESPID that it will
+     * accept.
+     */
+    ocsp_client_called = 0;
+    ocsp_server_called = 0;
+    cdummyarg = 2;
+
+    if (!create_ssl_objects(sctx, cctx, &serverssl, &clientssl, NULL, NULL)) {
+        printf("Unable to create SSL objects\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * We'll just use any old cert for this test - it doesn't have to be an OCSP
+     * specific one. We'll use the server cert.
+     */
+    certbio = BIO_new_file(cert, "r");
+    if (certbio == NULL) {
+        printf("Can't load the certificate file\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+    id = OCSP_RESPID_new();
+    ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null();
+    ocspcert = PEM_read_bio_X509(certbio, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+    if (id == NULL || ids == NULL || ocspcert == NULL
+            || !OCSP_RESPID_set_by_key(id, ocspcert)
+            || !sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(ids, id)) {
+        printf("Unable to set OCSP_RESPIDs\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+    id = NULL;
+    SSL_set_tlsext_status_ids(clientssl, ids);
+    /* Control has been transferred */
+    ids = NULL;
+
+    BIO_free(certbio);
+    certbio = NULL;
+
+    if (!create_ssl_connection(serverssl, clientssl)) {
+        printf("Unable to create SSL connection\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (!ocsp_client_called || !ocsp_server_called) {
+        printf("OCSP callbacks not called\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    testresult = 1;
+
+ end:
+    SSL_free(serverssl);
+    SSL_free(clientssl);
+    SSL_CTX_free(sctx);
+    SSL_CTX_free(cctx);
+    sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(ids, OCSP_RESPID_free);
+    OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
+    BIO_free(certbio);
+    X509_free(ocspcert);
+    ocspcert = NULL;
+
+    return testresult;
+}
+#endif  /* ndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP */
+
+typedef struct ssl_session_test_fixture {
+    const char *test_case_name;
+    int use_ext_cache;
+    int use_int_cache;
+} SSL_SESSION_TEST_FIXTURE;
+
+static int new_called = 0, remove_called = 0;
+
+static SSL_SESSION_TEST_FIXTURE
+ssl_session_set_up(const char *const test_case_name)
+{
+    SSL_SESSION_TEST_FIXTURE fixture;
+
+    fixture.test_case_name = test_case_name;
+    fixture.use_ext_cache = 1;
+    fixture.use_int_cache = 1;
+
+    new_called = remove_called = 0;
+
+    return fixture;
+}
+
+static void ssl_session_tear_down(SSL_SESSION_TEST_FIXTURE fixture)
+{
+}
+
+static int new_session_cb(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess)
+{
+    new_called++;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static void remove_session_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *sess)
+{
+    remove_called++;
+}
+
+static int execute_test_session(SSL_SESSION_TEST_FIXTURE fix)
+{
+    SSL_CTX *sctx = NULL, *cctx = NULL;
+    SSL *serverssl1 = NULL, *clientssl1 = NULL;
+    SSL *serverssl2 = NULL, *clientssl2 = NULL;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1
+    SSL *serverssl3 = NULL, *clientssl3 = NULL;
+#endif
+    SSL_SESSION *sess1 = NULL, *sess2 = NULL;
+    int testresult = 0;
+
+    if (!create_ssl_ctx_pair(TLS_server_method(), TLS_client_method(),
+                             TLS1_VERSION, TLS_MAX_VERSION, &sctx, &cctx,
+                             cert, privkey)) {
+        printf("Unable to create SSL_CTX pair\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2
+    /* Only allow TLS1.2 so we can force a connection failure later */
+    SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(cctx, TLS1_2_VERSION);
+#endif
+
+    /* Set up session cache */
+    if (fix.use_ext_cache) {
+        SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(cctx, new_session_cb);
+        SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb(cctx, remove_session_cb);
+    }
+    if (fix.use_int_cache) {
+        /* Also covers instance where both are set */
+        SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(cctx, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
+    } else {
+        SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(cctx,
+                                       SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
+                                       | SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE);
+    }
+
+    if (!create_ssl_objects(sctx, cctx, &serverssl1, &clientssl1, NULL,
+                               NULL)) {
+        printf("Unable to create SSL objects\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (!create_ssl_connection(serverssl1, clientssl1)) {
+        printf("Unable to create SSL connection\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+    sess1 = SSL_get1_session(clientssl1);
+    if (sess1 == NULL) {
+        printf("Unexpected NULL session\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (fix.use_int_cache && SSL_CTX_add_session(cctx, sess1)) {
+        /* Should have failed because it should already be in the cache */
+        printf("Unexpected success adding session to cache\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (fix.use_ext_cache && (new_called != 1 || remove_called != 0)) {
+        printf("Session not added to cache\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (!create_ssl_objects(sctx, cctx, &serverssl2, &clientssl2, NULL, NULL)) {
+        printf("Unable to create second SSL objects\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (!create_ssl_connection(serverssl2, clientssl2)) {
+        printf("Unable to create second SSL connection\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    sess2 = SSL_get1_session(clientssl2);
+    if (sess2 == NULL) {
+        printf("Unexpected NULL session from clientssl2\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (fix.use_ext_cache && (new_called != 2 || remove_called != 0)) {
+        printf("Remove session callback unexpectedly called\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * This should clear sess2 from the cache because it is a "bad" session. See
+     * SSL_set_session() documentation.
+     */
+    if (!SSL_set_session(clientssl2, sess1)) {
+        printf("Unexpected failure setting session\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (fix.use_ext_cache && (new_called != 2 || remove_called != 1)) {
+        printf("Failed to call callback to remove session\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+
+    if (SSL_get_session(clientssl2) != sess1) {
+        printf("Unexpected session found\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (fix.use_int_cache) {
+        if (!SSL_CTX_add_session(cctx, sess2)) {
+            /*
+             * Should have succeeded because it should not already be in the cache
+             */
+            printf("Unexpected failure adding session to cache\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+
+        if (!SSL_CTX_remove_session(cctx, sess2)) {
+            printf("Unexpected failure removing session from cache\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+
+        /* This is for the purposes of internal cache testing...ignore the
+         * counter for external cache
+         */
+        if (fix.use_ext_cache)
+            remove_called--;
+    }
+
+    /* This shouldn't be in the cache so should fail */
+    if (SSL_CTX_remove_session(cctx, sess2)) {
+        printf("Unexpected success removing session from cache\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (fix.use_ext_cache && (new_called != 2 || remove_called != 2)) {
+        printf("Failed to call callback to remove session #2\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2)
+    /* Force a connection failure */
+    SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(sctx, TLS1_1_VERSION);
+
+    if (!create_ssl_objects(sctx, cctx, &serverssl3, &clientssl3, NULL, NULL)) {
+        printf("Unable to create third SSL objects\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (!SSL_set_session(clientssl3, sess1)) {
+        printf("Unable to set session for third connection\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    /* This should fail because of the mismatched protocol versions */
+    if (create_ssl_connection(serverssl3, clientssl3)) {
+        printf("Unable to create third SSL connection\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+
+    /* We should have automatically removed the session from the cache */
+    if (fix.use_ext_cache && (new_called != 2 || remove_called != 3)) {
+        printf("Failed to call callback to remove session #2\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (fix.use_int_cache && !SSL_CTX_add_session(cctx, sess2)) {
+        /*
+         * Should have succeeded because it should not already be in the cache
+         */
+        printf("Unexpected failure adding session to cache #2\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+#endif
+
+    testresult = 1;
+
+ end:
+    SSL_free(serverssl1);
+    SSL_free(clientssl1);
+    SSL_free(serverssl2);
+    SSL_free(clientssl2);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1
+    SSL_free(serverssl3);
+    SSL_free(clientssl3);
+#endif
+    SSL_SESSION_free(sess1);
+    SSL_SESSION_free(sess2);
+    /*
+     * Check if we need to remove any sessions up-refed for the external cache
+     */
+    if (new_called >= 1)
+        SSL_SESSION_free(sess1);
+    if (new_called >= 2)
+        SSL_SESSION_free(sess2);
+    SSL_CTX_free(sctx);
+    SSL_CTX_free(cctx);
+
+    return testresult;
+}
+
+static int test_session_with_only_int_cache(void)
+{
+    SETUP_TEST_FIXTURE(SSL_SESSION_TEST_FIXTURE, ssl_session_set_up);
+
+    fixture.use_ext_cache = 0;
+
+    EXECUTE_TEST(execute_test_session, ssl_session_tear_down);
+}
+
+static int test_session_with_only_ext_cache(void)
+{
+    SETUP_TEST_FIXTURE(SSL_SESSION_TEST_FIXTURE, ssl_session_set_up);
+
+    fixture.use_int_cache = 0;
+
+    EXECUTE_TEST(execute_test_session, ssl_session_tear_down);
+}
+
+static int test_session_with_both_cache(void)
+{
+    SETUP_TEST_FIXTURE(SSL_SESSION_TEST_FIXTURE, ssl_session_set_up);
+
+    EXECUTE_TEST(execute_test_session, ssl_session_tear_down);
+}
+
+#define USE_NULL    0
+#define USE_BIO_1   1
+#define USE_BIO_2   2
+
+#define TOTAL_SSL_SET_BIO_TESTS (3 * 3 * 3 * 3)
+
+static void setupbio(BIO **res, BIO *bio1, BIO *bio2, int type)
+{
+    switch (type) {
+    case USE_NULL:
+        *res = NULL;
+        break;
+    case USE_BIO_1:
+        *res = bio1;
+        break;
+    case USE_BIO_2:
+        *res = bio2;
+        break;
+    }
+}
+
+static int test_ssl_set_bio(int idx)
+{
+    SSL_CTX *ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_method());
+    BIO *bio1 = NULL;
+    BIO *bio2 = NULL;
+    BIO *irbio = NULL, *iwbio = NULL, *nrbio = NULL, *nwbio = NULL;
+    SSL *ssl = NULL;
+    int initrbio, initwbio, newrbio, newwbio;
+    int testresult = 0;
+
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+        printf("Failed to allocate SSL_CTX\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    ssl = SSL_new(ctx);
+    if (ssl == NULL) {
+        printf("Failed to allocate SSL object\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    initrbio = idx % 3;
+    idx /= 3;
+    initwbio = idx % 3;
+    idx /= 3;
+    newrbio = idx % 3;
+    idx /= 3;
+    newwbio = idx;
+    OPENSSL_assert(newwbio <= 2);
+
+    if (initrbio == USE_BIO_1 || initwbio == USE_BIO_1 || newrbio == USE_BIO_1
+            || newwbio == USE_BIO_1) {
+        bio1 = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+        if (bio1 == NULL) {
+            printf("Failed to allocate bio1\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (initrbio == USE_BIO_2 || initwbio == USE_BIO_2 || newrbio == USE_BIO_2
+            || newwbio == USE_BIO_2) {
+        bio2 = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+        if (bio2 == NULL) {
+            printf("Failed to allocate bio2\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+
+    setupbio(&irbio, bio1, bio2, initrbio);
+    setupbio(&iwbio, bio1, bio2, initwbio);
+
+    /*
+     * We want to maintain our own refs to these BIO, so do an up ref for each
+     * BIO that will have ownership transferred in the SSL_set_bio() call
+     */
+    if (irbio != NULL)
+        BIO_up_ref(irbio);
+    if (iwbio != NULL && iwbio != irbio)
+        BIO_up_ref(iwbio);
+
+    SSL_set_bio(ssl, irbio, iwbio);
+
+    setupbio(&nrbio, bio1, bio2, newrbio);
+    setupbio(&nwbio, bio1, bio2, newwbio);
+
+    /*
+     * We will (maybe) transfer ownership again so do more up refs.
+     * SSL_set_bio() has some really complicated ownership rules where BIOs have
+     * already been set!
+     */
+    if (nrbio != NULL && nrbio != irbio && (nwbio != iwbio || nrbio != nwbio))
+        BIO_up_ref(nrbio);
+    if (nwbio != NULL && nwbio != nrbio && (nwbio != iwbio || (nwbio == iwbio && irbio == iwbio)))
+        BIO_up_ref(nwbio);
+
+    SSL_set_bio(ssl, nrbio, nwbio);
+
+    testresult = 1;
+
+ end:
+    SSL_free(ssl);
+    BIO_free(bio1);
+    BIO_free(bio2);
+    /*
+     * This test is checking that the ref counting for SSL_set_bio is correct.
+     * If we get here and we did too many frees then we will fail in the above
+     * functions. If we haven't done enough then this will only be detected in
+     * a crypto-mdebug build
+     */
+    SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
+
+    return testresult;
+}
+
+typedef struct ssl_bio_test_fixture {
+    const char *test_case_name;
+    int pop_ssl;
+    enum { NO_BIO_CHANGE, CHANGE_RBIO, CHANGE_WBIO } change_bio;
+} SSL_BIO_TEST_FIXTURE;
+
+static SSL_BIO_TEST_FIXTURE ssl_bio_set_up(const char *const test_case_name)
+{
+    SSL_BIO_TEST_FIXTURE fixture;
+
+    fixture.test_case_name = test_case_name;
+    fixture.pop_ssl = 0;
+    fixture.change_bio = NO_BIO_CHANGE;
+
+    return fixture;
+}
+
+static void ssl_bio_tear_down(SSL_BIO_TEST_FIXTURE fixture)
+{
+}
+
+static int execute_test_ssl_bio(SSL_BIO_TEST_FIXTURE fix)
+{
+    BIO *sslbio = NULL, *membio1 = NULL, *membio2 = NULL;
+    SSL_CTX *ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_method());
+    SSL *ssl = NULL;
+    int testresult = 0;
+
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+        printf("Failed to allocate SSL_CTX\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    ssl = SSL_new(ctx);
+    if (ssl == NULL) {
+        printf("Failed to allocate SSL object\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    sslbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_ssl());
+    membio1 = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+
+    if (sslbio == NULL || membio1 == NULL) {
+        printf("Malloc failure creating BIOs\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    BIO_set_ssl(sslbio, ssl, BIO_CLOSE);
+
+    /*
+     * If anything goes wrong here then we could leak memory, so this will
+     * be caught in a crypto-mdebug build
+     */
+    BIO_push(sslbio, membio1);
+
+    /* Verify changing the rbio/wbio directly does not cause leaks */
+    if (fix.change_bio != NO_BIO_CHANGE) {
+        membio2 = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+        if (membio2 == NULL) {
+            printf("Malloc failure creating membio2\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+        if (fix.change_bio == CHANGE_RBIO)
+            SSL_set0_rbio(ssl, membio2);
+        else
+            SSL_set0_wbio(ssl, membio2);
+    }
+    ssl = NULL;
+
+    if (fix.pop_ssl)
+        BIO_pop(sslbio);
+    else
+        BIO_pop(membio1);
+
+    testresult = 1;
+ end:
+    BIO_free(membio1);
+    BIO_free(sslbio);
+    SSL_free(ssl);
+    SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
+
+    return testresult;
+}
+
+static int test_ssl_bio_pop_next_bio(void)
+{
+    SETUP_TEST_FIXTURE(SSL_BIO_TEST_FIXTURE, ssl_bio_set_up);
+
+    EXECUTE_TEST(execute_test_ssl_bio, ssl_bio_tear_down);
+}
+
+static int test_ssl_bio_pop_ssl_bio(void)
+{
+    SETUP_TEST_FIXTURE(SSL_BIO_TEST_FIXTURE, ssl_bio_set_up);
+
+    fixture.pop_ssl = 1;
+
+    EXECUTE_TEST(execute_test_ssl_bio, ssl_bio_tear_down);
+}
+
+static int test_ssl_bio_change_rbio(void)
+{
+    SETUP_TEST_FIXTURE(SSL_BIO_TEST_FIXTURE, ssl_bio_set_up);
+
+    fixture.change_bio = CHANGE_RBIO;
+
+    EXECUTE_TEST(execute_test_ssl_bio, ssl_bio_tear_down);
+}
+
+static int test_ssl_bio_change_wbio(void)
+{
+    SETUP_TEST_FIXTURE(SSL_BIO_TEST_FIXTURE, ssl_bio_set_up);
+
+    fixture.change_bio = CHANGE_WBIO;
+
+    EXECUTE_TEST(execute_test_ssl_bio, ssl_bio_tear_down);
+}
+
+typedef struct {
+    /* The list of sig algs */
+    const int *list;
+    /* The length of the list */
+    size_t listlen;
+    /* A sigalgs list in string format */
+    const char *liststr;
+    /* Whether setting the list should succeed */
+    int valid;
+    /* Whether creating a connection with the list should succeed */
+    int connsuccess;
+} sigalgs_list;
+
+static const int validlist1[] = {NID_sha256, EVP_PKEY_RSA};
+static const int validlist2[] = {NID_sha256, EVP_PKEY_RSA, NID_sha512, EVP_PKEY_EC};
+static const int validlist3[] = {NID_sha512, EVP_PKEY_EC};
+static const int invalidlist1[] = {NID_undef, EVP_PKEY_RSA};
+static const int invalidlist2[] = {NID_sha256, NID_undef};
+static const int invalidlist3[] = {NID_sha256, EVP_PKEY_RSA, NID_sha256};
+static const int invalidlist4[] = {NID_sha256};
+static const sigalgs_list testsigalgs[] = {
+    {validlist1, OSSL_NELEM(validlist1), NULL, 1, 1},
+    {validlist2, OSSL_NELEM(validlist2), NULL, 1, 1},
+    {validlist3, OSSL_NELEM(validlist3), NULL, 1, 0},
+    {NULL, 0, "RSA+SHA256", 1, 1},
+    {NULL, 0, "RSA+SHA256:ECDSA+SHA512", 1, 1},
+    {NULL, 0, "ECDSA+SHA512", 1, 0},
+    {invalidlist1, OSSL_NELEM(invalidlist1), NULL, 0, 0},
+    {invalidlist2, OSSL_NELEM(invalidlist2), NULL, 0, 0},
+    {invalidlist3, OSSL_NELEM(invalidlist3), NULL, 0, 0},
+    {invalidlist4, OSSL_NELEM(invalidlist4), NULL, 0, 0},
+    {NULL, 0, "RSA", 0, 0},
+    {NULL, 0, "SHA256", 0, 0},
+    {NULL, 0, "RSA+SHA256:SHA256", 0, 0},
+    {NULL, 0, "Invalid", 0, 0}};
+
+static int test_set_sigalgs(int idx)
+{
+    SSL_CTX *cctx = NULL, *sctx = NULL;
+    SSL *clientssl = NULL, *serverssl = NULL;
+    int testresult = 0;
+    const sigalgs_list *curr;
+    int testctx;
+
+    /* Should never happen */
+    if ((size_t)idx >= OSSL_NELEM(testsigalgs) * 2)
+        return 0;
+
+    testctx = ((size_t)idx < OSSL_NELEM(testsigalgs));
+    curr = testctx ? &testsigalgs[idx]
+                   : &testsigalgs[idx - OSSL_NELEM(testsigalgs)];
+
+    if (!create_ssl_ctx_pair(TLS_server_method(), TLS_client_method(),
+                             TLS1_VERSION, TLS_MAX_VERSION, &sctx, &cctx,
+                             cert, privkey)) {
+        printf("Unable to create SSL_CTX pair\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (testctx) {
+        int ret;
+        if (curr->list != NULL)
+            ret = SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs(cctx, curr->list, curr->listlen);
+        else
+            ret = SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs_list(cctx, curr->liststr);
+
+        if (!ret) {
+            if (curr->valid)
+                printf("Unexpected failure setting sigalgs in SSL_CTX (%d)\n",
+                       idx);
+            else
+                testresult = 1;
+            goto end;
+        }
+        if (!curr->valid) {
+            printf("Unexpected success setting sigalgs in SSL_CTX (%d)\n", idx);
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (!create_ssl_objects(sctx, cctx, &serverssl, &clientssl, NULL, NULL)) {
+        printf("Unable to create SSL objects\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (!testctx) {
+        int ret;
+
+        if (curr->list != NULL)
+            ret = SSL_set1_sigalgs(clientssl, curr->list, curr->listlen);
+        else
+            ret = SSL_set1_sigalgs_list(clientssl, curr->liststr);
+        if (!ret) {
+            if (curr->valid)
+                printf("Unexpected failure setting sigalgs in SSL (%d)\n", idx);
+            else
+                testresult = 1;
+            goto end;
+        }
+        if (!curr->valid) {
+            printf("Unexpected success setting sigalgs in SSL (%d)\n", idx);
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (curr->connsuccess != create_ssl_connection(serverssl, clientssl)) {
+        printf("Unexpected return value creating SSL connection (%d)\n", idx);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    testresult = 1;
+
+ end:
+    SSL_free(serverssl);
+    SSL_free(clientssl);
+    SSL_CTX_free(sctx);
+    SSL_CTX_free(cctx);
+
+    return testresult;
+}
+
+static int clntaddcb = 0;
+static int clntparsecb = 0;
+static int srvaddcb = 0;
+static int srvparsecb = 0;
+static int snicb = 0;
+
+#define TEST_EXT_TYPE1  0xff00
+
+static int add_cb(SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type, const unsigned char **out,
+                  size_t *outlen, int *al, void *add_arg)
+{
+    int *server = (int *)add_arg;
+    unsigned char *data;
+
+    if (SSL_is_server(s))
+        srvaddcb++;
+    else
+        clntaddcb++;
+
+    if (*server != SSL_is_server(s)
+            || (data = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*data))) == NULL)
+        return -1;
+
+    *data = 1;
+    *out = data;
+    *outlen = sizeof(char);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static void free_cb(SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type, const unsigned char *out,
+                    void *add_arg)
+{
+    OPENSSL_free((unsigned char *)out);
+}
+
+static int parse_cb(SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type, const unsigned char *in,
+                    size_t inlen, int *al, void *parse_arg)
+{
+    int *server = (int *)parse_arg;
+
+    if (SSL_is_server(s))
+        srvparsecb++;
+    else
+        clntparsecb++;
+
+    if (*server != SSL_is_server(s)
+            || inlen != sizeof(char)
+            || *in != 1)
+        return -1;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int sni_cb(SSL *s, int *al, void *arg)
+{
+    SSL_CTX *ctx = (SSL_CTX *)arg;
+
+    if (SSL_set_SSL_CTX(s, ctx) == NULL) {
+        *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+    }
+    snicb++;
+    return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Custom call back tests.
+ * Test 0: callbacks in TLSv1.2
+ * Test 1: callbacks in TLSv1.2 with SNI
+ */
+static int test_custom_exts(int tst)
+{
+    SSL_CTX *cctx = NULL, *sctx = NULL, *sctx2 = NULL;
+    SSL *clientssl = NULL, *serverssl = NULL;
+    int testresult = 0;
+    static int server = 1;
+    static int client = 0;
+    SSL_SESSION *sess = NULL;
+
+    /* Reset callback counters */
+    clntaddcb = clntparsecb = srvaddcb = srvparsecb = 0;
+    snicb = 0;
+
+    if (!create_ssl_ctx_pair(TLS_server_method(),  TLS_client_method(),
+                             TLS1_VERSION, TLS_MAX_VERSION, &sctx, &cctx,
+                             cert, privkey)) {
+        printf("Unable to create SSL_CTX pair\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (tst == 1
+            && !create_ssl_ctx_pair(TLS_server_method(), NULL,
+                                    TLS1_VERSION, TLS_MAX_VERSION, &sctx2, NULL,
+                                    cert, privkey)) {
+        printf("Unable to create SSL_CTX pair (2)\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    /* Create a client side custom extension */
+    if (!SSL_CTX_add_client_custom_ext(cctx, TEST_EXT_TYPE1, add_cb, free_cb,
+                                       &client, parse_cb, &client)) {
+        printf("Unable to add client custom extension\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    /* Should not be able to add duplicates */
+    if (SSL_CTX_add_client_custom_ext(cctx, TEST_EXT_TYPE1, add_cb, free_cb,
+                                      &client, parse_cb, &client)) {
+        printf("Unexpected success adding duplicate extension\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    /* Create a server side custom extension */
+    if (!SSL_CTX_add_server_custom_ext(sctx, TEST_EXT_TYPE1, add_cb, free_cb,
+                                       &server, parse_cb, &server)) {
+        printf("Unable to add server custom extension\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+    if (sctx2 != NULL
+            && !SSL_CTX_add_server_custom_ext(sctx2, TEST_EXT_TYPE1,
+                                                        add_cb, free_cb,
+                                                        &server, parse_cb,
+                                                        &server)) {
+        printf("Unable to add server custom extension for SNI\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    /* Should not be able to add duplicates */
+    if (SSL_CTX_add_server_custom_ext(sctx, TEST_EXT_TYPE1, add_cb, free_cb,
+                                      &server, parse_cb, &server)) {
+        printf("Unexpected success adding duplicate extension (2)\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (tst == 1) {
+        /* Set up SNI */
+        if (!SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(sctx, sni_cb)
+                || !SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(sctx, sctx2)) {
+            printf("Cannot set SNI callbacks\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (!create_ssl_objects(sctx, cctx, &serverssl, &clientssl, NULL, NULL)
+            || !create_ssl_connection(serverssl, clientssl)) {
+        printf("Cannot create SSL connection\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (clntaddcb != 1
+            || clntparsecb != 1
+            || srvaddcb != 1
+            || srvparsecb != 1
+            || (tst != 1 && snicb != 0)
+            || (tst == 1 && snicb != 1)) {
+        printf("Incorrect callback counts\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    sess = SSL_get1_session(clientssl);
+    SSL_shutdown(clientssl);
+    SSL_shutdown(serverssl);
+    SSL_free(serverssl);
+    SSL_free(clientssl);
+    serverssl = clientssl = NULL;
+
+    if (tst == 1) {
+        /* We don't bother with the resumption aspects for this test */
+        testresult = 1;
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (!create_ssl_objects(sctx, cctx, &serverssl, &clientssl, NULL, NULL)
+            || !SSL_set_session(clientssl, sess)
+            || !create_ssl_connection(serverssl, clientssl)) {
+        printf("Cannot create resumption connection\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * For a resumed session we expect to add the ClientHello extension but we
+     * should ignore it on the server side.
+     */
+    if (clntaddcb != 2
+            || clntparsecb != 1
+            || srvaddcb != 1
+            || srvparsecb != 1) {
+        printf("Incorrect resumption callback counts\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    testresult = 1;
+
+end:
+    SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
+    SSL_free(serverssl);
+    SSL_free(clientssl);
+    SSL_CTX_free(sctx2);
+    SSL_CTX_free(sctx);
+    SSL_CTX_free(cctx);
+    return testresult;
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+    BIO *err = NULL;
+    int testresult = 1;
+
+    if (argc != 3) {
+        printf("Invalid argument count\n");
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    cert = argv[1];
+    privkey = argv[2];
+
+    err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT);
+
+    CRYPTO_set_mem_debug(1);
+    CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON);
+
+    ADD_TEST(test_large_message_tls);
+    ADD_TEST(test_large_message_tls_read_ahead);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS
+    ADD_TEST(test_large_message_dtls);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+    ADD_TEST(test_tlsext_status_type);
+#endif
+    ADD_TEST(test_session_with_only_int_cache);
+    ADD_TEST(test_session_with_only_ext_cache);
+    ADD_TEST(test_session_with_both_cache);
+    ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_ssl_set_bio, TOTAL_SSL_SET_BIO_TESTS);
+    ADD_TEST(test_ssl_bio_pop_next_bio);
+    ADD_TEST(test_ssl_bio_pop_ssl_bio);
+    ADD_TEST(test_ssl_bio_change_rbio);
+    ADD_TEST(test_ssl_bio_change_wbio);
+    ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_set_sigalgs, OSSL_NELEM(testsigalgs) * 2);
+    ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_custom_exts, 2);
+
+    testresult = run_tests(argv[0]);
+
+    bio_s_mempacket_test_free();
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG
+    if (CRYPTO_mem_leaks(err) <= 0)
+        testresult = 1;
+#endif
+    BIO_free(err);
+
+    if (!testresult)
+        printf("PASS\n");
+
+    return testresult;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/sslcorrupttest.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/sslcorrupttest.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d584be3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/sslcorrupttest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,283 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "ssltestlib.h"
+#include "testutil.h"
+
+static void copy_flags(BIO *bio)
+{
+    int flags;
+    BIO *next = BIO_next(bio);
+
+    flags = BIO_test_flags(next, BIO_FLAGS_SHOULD_RETRY | BIO_FLAGS_RWS);
+    BIO_clear_flags(bio, BIO_FLAGS_SHOULD_RETRY | BIO_FLAGS_RWS);
+    BIO_set_flags(bio, flags);
+}
+
+static int tls_corrupt_read(BIO *bio, char *out, int outl)
+{
+    int ret;
+    BIO *next = BIO_next(bio);
+
+    ret = BIO_read(next, out, outl);
+    copy_flags(bio);
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int tls_corrupt_write(BIO *bio, const char *in, int inl)
+{
+    int ret;
+    BIO *next = BIO_next(bio);
+    char *copy;
+
+    if (in[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
+        copy = BUF_memdup(in, inl);
+        TEST_check(copy != NULL);
+        /* corrupt last bit of application data */
+        copy[inl-1] ^= 1;
+        ret = BIO_write(next, copy, inl);
+        OPENSSL_free(copy);
+    } else {
+        ret = BIO_write(next, in, inl);
+    }
+    copy_flags(bio);
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static long tls_corrupt_ctrl(BIO *bio, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
+{
+    long ret;
+    BIO *next = BIO_next(bio);
+
+    if (next == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    switch (cmd) {
+    case BIO_CTRL_DUP:
+        ret = 0L;
+        break;
+    default:
+        ret = BIO_ctrl(next, cmd, num, ptr);
+        break;
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int tls_corrupt_gets(BIO *bio, char *buf, int size)
+{
+    /* We don't support this - not needed anyway */
+    return -1;
+}
+
+static int tls_corrupt_puts(BIO *bio, const char *str)
+{
+    /* We don't support this - not needed anyway */
+    return -1;
+}
+
+static int tls_corrupt_new(BIO *bio)
+{
+    BIO_set_init(bio, 1);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int tls_corrupt_free(BIO *bio)
+{
+    BIO_set_init(bio, 0);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+#define BIO_TYPE_CUSTOM_FILTER  (0x80 | BIO_TYPE_FILTER)
+
+static BIO_METHOD *method_tls_corrupt = NULL;
+
+/* Note: Not thread safe! */
+static const BIO_METHOD *bio_f_tls_corrupt_filter(void)
+{
+    if (method_tls_corrupt == NULL) {
+        method_tls_corrupt = BIO_meth_new(BIO_TYPE_CUSTOM_FILTER,
+                                          "TLS corrupt filter");
+        if (   method_tls_corrupt == NULL
+            || !BIO_meth_set_write(method_tls_corrupt, tls_corrupt_write)
+            || !BIO_meth_set_read(method_tls_corrupt, tls_corrupt_read)
+            || !BIO_meth_set_puts(method_tls_corrupt, tls_corrupt_puts)
+            || !BIO_meth_set_gets(method_tls_corrupt, tls_corrupt_gets)
+            || !BIO_meth_set_ctrl(method_tls_corrupt, tls_corrupt_ctrl)
+            || !BIO_meth_set_create(method_tls_corrupt, tls_corrupt_new)
+            || !BIO_meth_set_destroy(method_tls_corrupt, tls_corrupt_free))
+            return NULL;
+    }
+    return method_tls_corrupt;
+}
+
+static void bio_f_tls_corrupt_filter_free(void)
+{
+    BIO_meth_free(method_tls_corrupt);
+}
+
+/*
+ * The test is supposed to be executed with RSA key, customarily
+ * with apps/server.pem used even in other tests. For this reason
+ * |cipher_list| is initialized with RSA ciphers' names. This
+ * naturally means that if test is to be re-purposed for other
+ * type of key, then NID_auth_* filter below would need adjustment.
+ */
+static const char **cipher_list = NULL;
+
+static int setup_cipher_list()
+{
+    SSL_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+    SSL *ssl = NULL;
+    static STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk_ciphers = NULL;
+    int i, numciphers;
+
+    ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_server_method());
+    TEST_check(ctx != NULL);
+    ssl = SSL_new(ctx);
+    TEST_check(ssl != NULL);
+    sk_ciphers = SSL_get1_supported_ciphers(ssl);
+    TEST_check(sk_ciphers != NULL);
+
+    /*
+     * The |cipher_list| will be filled only with names of RSA ciphers,
+     * so that some of the allocated space will be wasted, but the loss
+     * is deemed acceptable...
+     */
+    cipher_list = OPENSSL_malloc(sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk_ciphers) *
+                                 sizeof(cipher_list[0]));
+    TEST_check(cipher_list != NULL);
+
+    for (numciphers = 0, i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk_ciphers); i++) {
+        const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk_ciphers, i);
+
+        if (SSL_CIPHER_get_auth_nid(cipher) == NID_auth_rsa)
+            cipher_list[numciphers++] = SSL_CIPHER_get_name(cipher);
+    }
+    TEST_check(numciphers != 0);
+
+    sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk_ciphers);
+    SSL_free(ssl);
+    SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
+
+    return numciphers;
+}
+
+static char *cert = NULL;
+static char *privkey = NULL;
+
+static int test_ssl_corrupt(int testidx)
+{
+    SSL_CTX *sctx = NULL, *cctx = NULL;
+    SSL *server = NULL, *client = NULL;
+    BIO *c_to_s_fbio;
+    int testresult = 0;
+    static unsigned char junk[16000] = { 0 };
+
+    printf("Starting Test %d, %s\n", testidx, cipher_list[testidx]);
+
+    if (!create_ssl_ctx_pair(TLS_server_method(), TLS_client_method(),
+                             TLS1_VERSION, TLS_MAX_VERSION, &sctx, &cctx,
+                             cert, privkey)) {
+        printf("Unable to create SSL_CTX pair\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(cctx, cipher_list[testidx])) {
+        printf("Failed setting cipher list\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    c_to_s_fbio = BIO_new(bio_f_tls_corrupt_filter());
+    if (c_to_s_fbio == NULL) {
+        printf("Failed to create filter BIO\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    /* BIO is freed by create_ssl_connection on error */
+    if (!create_ssl_objects(sctx, cctx, &server, &client, NULL,
+                            c_to_s_fbio)) {
+        printf("Unable to create SSL objects\n");
+        ERR_print_errors_fp(stdout);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (!create_ssl_connection(server, client)) {
+        printf("Unable to create SSL connection\n");
+        ERR_print_errors_fp(stdout);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (SSL_write(client, junk, sizeof(junk)) < 0) {
+        printf("Unable to SSL_write\n");
+        ERR_print_errors_fp(stdout);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (SSL_read(server, junk, sizeof(junk)) >= 0) {
+        printf("Read should have failed with \"bad record mac\"\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (ERR_GET_REASON(ERR_peek_error()) !=
+        SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC) {
+        ERR_print_errors_fp(stdout);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    testresult = 1;
+ end:
+    SSL_free(server);
+    SSL_free(client);
+    SSL_CTX_free(sctx);
+    SSL_CTX_free(cctx);
+
+    return testresult;
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+    BIO *err = NULL;
+    int testresult = 1;
+
+    if (argc != 3) {
+        printf("Invalid argument count\n");
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    cert = argv[1];
+    privkey = argv[2];
+
+    err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT);
+
+    CRYPTO_set_mem_debug(1);
+    CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON);
+
+    ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_ssl_corrupt, setup_cipher_list());
+
+    testresult = run_tests(argv[0]);
+
+    bio_f_tls_corrupt_filter_free();
+
+    OPENSSL_free(cipher_list);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG
+    if (CRYPTO_mem_leaks(err) <= 0)
+        testresult = 1;
+#endif
+    BIO_free(err);
+
+    if (!testresult)
+        printf("PASS\n");
+
+    return testresult;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssltest_old.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssltest_old.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e77c692
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssltest_old.c
@@ -0,0 +1,3210 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE.
+ */
+
+/* Or gethostname won't be declared properly on Linux and GNU platforms. */
+#ifndef _BSD_SOURCE
+# define _BSD_SOURCE 1
+#endif
+#ifndef _DEFAULT_SOURCE
+# define _DEFAULT_SOURCE 1
+#endif
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <time.h>
+
+#define USE_SOCKETS
+#include "e_os.h"
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+/*
+ * Or isascii won't be declared properly on VMS (at least with DECompHP C).
+ */
+# define _XOPEN_SOURCE 500
+#endif
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+# include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+# include <openssl/dsa.h>
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+# include <openssl/dh.h>
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+# include <openssl/srp.h>
+#endif
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
+# include <openssl/ct.h>
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Or gethostname won't be declared properly
+ * on Compaq platforms (at least with DEC C).
+ * Do not try to put it earlier, or IPv6 includes
+ * get screwed...
+ */
+#define _XOPEN_SOURCE_EXTENDED  1
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS
+# include <winsock.h>
+#else
+# include OPENSSL_UNISTD
+#endif
+
+static SSL_CTX *s_ctx = NULL;
+static SSL_CTX *s_ctx2 = NULL;
+
+/*
+ * There is really no standard for this, so let's assign something
+ * only for this test
+ */
+#define COMP_ZLIB       1
+
+static int verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+static int app_verify_callback(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, void *arg);
+#define APP_CALLBACK_STRING "Test Callback Argument"
+struct app_verify_arg {
+    char *string;
+    int app_verify;
+};
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+static DH *get_dh512(void);
+static DH *get_dh1024(void);
+static DH *get_dh1024dsa(void);
+#endif
+
+static char *psk_key = NULL;    /* by default PSK is not used */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+static unsigned int psk_client_callback(SSL *ssl, const char *hint,
+                                        char *identity,
+                                        unsigned int max_identity_len,
+                                        unsigned char *psk,
+                                        unsigned int max_psk_len);
+static unsigned int psk_server_callback(SSL *ssl, const char *identity,
+                                        unsigned char *psk,
+                                        unsigned int max_psk_len);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+/* SRP client */
+/* This is a context that we pass to all callbacks */
+typedef struct srp_client_arg_st {
+    char *srppassin;
+    char *srplogin;
+} SRP_CLIENT_ARG;
+
+# define PWD_STRLEN 1024
+
+static char *ssl_give_srp_client_pwd_cb(SSL *s, void *arg)
+{
+    SRP_CLIENT_ARG *srp_client_arg = (SRP_CLIENT_ARG *)arg;
+    return OPENSSL_strdup((char *)srp_client_arg->srppassin);
+}
+
+/* SRP server */
+/* This is a context that we pass to SRP server callbacks */
+typedef struct srp_server_arg_st {
+    char *expected_user;
+    char *pass;
+} SRP_SERVER_ARG;
+
+static int ssl_srp_server_param_cb(SSL *s, int *ad, void *arg)
+{
+    SRP_SERVER_ARG *p = (SRP_SERVER_ARG *)arg;
+
+    if (strcmp(p->expected_user, SSL_get_srp_username(s)) != 0) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "User %s doesn't exist\n", SSL_get_srp_username(s));
+        return SSL3_AL_FATAL;
+    }
+    if (SSL_set_srp_server_param_pw(s, p->expected_user, p->pass, "1024") < 0) {
+        *ad = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        return SSL3_AL_FATAL;
+    }
+    return SSL_ERROR_NONE;
+}
+#endif
+
+static BIO *bio_err = NULL;
+static BIO *bio_stdout = NULL;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+/* Note that this code assumes that this is only a one element list: */
+static const char NEXT_PROTO_STRING[] = "\x09testproto";
+static int npn_client = 0;
+static int npn_server = 0;
+static int npn_server_reject = 0;
+
+static int cb_client_npn(SSL *s, unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen,
+                         const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen,
+                         void *arg)
+{
+    /*
+     * This callback only returns the protocol string, rather than a length
+     * prefixed set. We assume that NEXT_PROTO_STRING is a one element list
+     * and remove the first byte to chop off the length prefix.
+     */
+    *out = (unsigned char *)NEXT_PROTO_STRING + 1;
+    *outlen = sizeof(NEXT_PROTO_STRING) - 2;
+    return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+}
+
+static int cb_server_npn(SSL *s, const unsigned char **data,
+                         unsigned int *len, void *arg)
+{
+    *data = (const unsigned char *)NEXT_PROTO_STRING;
+    *len = sizeof(NEXT_PROTO_STRING) - 1;
+    return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+}
+
+static int cb_server_rejects_npn(SSL *s, const unsigned char **data,
+                                 unsigned int *len, void *arg)
+{
+    return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
+}
+
+static int verify_npn(SSL *client, SSL *server)
+{
+    const unsigned char *client_s;
+    unsigned client_len;
+    const unsigned char *server_s;
+    unsigned server_len;
+
+    SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(client, &client_s, &client_len);
+    SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(server, &server_s, &server_len);
+
+    if (client_len) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "Client NPN: ");
+        BIO_write(bio_stdout, client_s, client_len);
+        BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "\n");
+    }
+
+    if (server_len) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "Server NPN: ");
+        BIO_write(bio_stdout, server_s, server_len);
+        BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "\n");
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * If an NPN string was returned, it must be the protocol that we
+     * expected to negotiate.
+     */
+    if (client_len && (client_len != sizeof(NEXT_PROTO_STRING) - 2 ||
+                       memcmp(client_s, NEXT_PROTO_STRING + 1, client_len)))
+        return -1;
+    if (server_len && (server_len != sizeof(NEXT_PROTO_STRING) - 2 ||
+                       memcmp(server_s, NEXT_PROTO_STRING + 1, server_len)))
+        return -1;
+
+    if (!npn_client && client_len)
+        return -1;
+    if (!npn_server && server_len)
+        return -1;
+    if (npn_server_reject && server_len)
+        return -1;
+    if (npn_client && npn_server && (!client_len || !server_len))
+        return -1;
+
+    return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+static const char *alpn_client;
+static char *alpn_server;
+static char *alpn_server2;
+static const char *alpn_expected;
+static unsigned char *alpn_selected;
+static const char *server_min_proto;
+static const char *server_max_proto;
+static const char *client_min_proto;
+static const char *client_max_proto;
+static const char *should_negotiate;
+static const char *sn_client;
+static const char *sn_server1;
+static const char *sn_server2;
+static int sn_expect = 0;
+static const char *server_sess_out;
+static const char *server_sess_in;
+static const char *client_sess_out;
+static const char *client_sess_in;
+static SSL_SESSION *server_sess;
+static SSL_SESSION *client_sess;
+
+static int servername_cb(SSL *s, int *ad, void *arg)
+{
+    const char *servername = SSL_get_servername(s, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name);
+    if (sn_server2 == NULL) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "Servername 2 is NULL\n");
+        return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
+    }
+
+    if (servername) {
+        if (s_ctx2 != NULL && sn_server2 != NULL &&
+            !strcasecmp(servername, sn_server2)) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "Switching server context.\n");
+            SSL_set_SSL_CTX(s, s_ctx2);
+        }
+    }
+    return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+}
+static int verify_servername(SSL *client, SSL *server)
+{
+    /* just need to see if sn_context is what we expect */
+    SSL_CTX* ctx = SSL_get_SSL_CTX(server);
+    if (sn_expect == 0)
+        return 0;
+    if (sn_expect == 1 && ctx == s_ctx)
+        return 0;
+    if (sn_expect == 2 && ctx == s_ctx2)
+        return 0;
+    BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "Servername: expected context %d\n", sn_expect);
+    if (ctx == s_ctx2)
+        BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "Servername: context is 2\n");
+    else if (ctx == s_ctx)
+        BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "Servername: context is 1\n");
+    else
+        BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "Servername: context is unknown\n");
+    return -1;
+}
+
+
+/*-
+ * next_protos_parse parses a comma separated list of strings into a string
+ * in a format suitable for passing to SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised.
+ *   outlen: (output) set to the length of the resulting buffer on success.
+ *   in: a NUL terminated string like "abc,def,ghi"
+ *
+ *   returns: a malloced buffer or NULL on failure.
+ */
+static unsigned char *next_protos_parse(size_t *outlen,
+                                        const char *in)
+{
+    size_t len;
+    unsigned char *out;
+    size_t i, start = 0;
+
+    len = strlen(in);
+    if (len >= 65535)
+        return NULL;
+
+    out = OPENSSL_malloc(strlen(in) + 1);
+    if (!out)
+        return NULL;
+
+    for (i = 0; i <= len; ++i) {
+        if (i == len || in[i] == ',') {
+            if (i - start > 255) {
+                OPENSSL_free(out);
+                return NULL;
+            }
+            out[start] = i - start;
+            start = i + 1;
+        } else
+            out[i + 1] = in[i];
+    }
+
+    *outlen = len + 1;
+    return out;
+}
+
+static int cb_server_alpn(SSL *s, const unsigned char **out,
+                          unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in,
+                          unsigned int inlen, void *arg)
+{
+    unsigned char *protos;
+    size_t protos_len;
+    char* alpn_str = arg;
+
+    protos = next_protos_parse(&protos_len, alpn_str);
+    if (protos == NULL) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "failed to parser ALPN server protocol string: %s\n",
+                alpn_str);
+        abort();
+    }
+
+    if (SSL_select_next_proto
+        ((unsigned char **)out, outlen, protos, protos_len, in,
+         inlen) != OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED) {
+        OPENSSL_free(protos);
+        return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Make a copy of the selected protocol which will be freed in
+     * verify_alpn.
+     */
+    alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(*outlen);
+    memcpy(alpn_selected, *out, *outlen);
+    *out = alpn_selected;
+
+    OPENSSL_free(protos);
+    return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+}
+
+static int verify_alpn(SSL *client, SSL *server)
+{
+    const unsigned char *client_proto, *server_proto;
+    unsigned int client_proto_len = 0, server_proto_len = 0;
+    SSL_get0_alpn_selected(client, &client_proto, &client_proto_len);
+    SSL_get0_alpn_selected(server, &server_proto, &server_proto_len);
+
+    OPENSSL_free(alpn_selected);
+    alpn_selected = NULL;
+
+    if (client_proto_len != server_proto_len) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "ALPN selected protocols differ!\n");
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (client_proto != NULL &&
+        memcmp(client_proto, server_proto, client_proto_len) != 0) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "ALPN selected protocols differ!\n");
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (client_proto_len > 0 && alpn_expected == NULL) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "ALPN unexpectedly negotiated\n");
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (alpn_expected != NULL &&
+        (client_proto_len != strlen(alpn_expected) ||
+         memcmp(client_proto, alpn_expected, client_proto_len) != 0)) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_stdout,
+                   "ALPN selected protocols not equal to expected protocol: %s\n",
+                   alpn_expected);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+
+ err:
+    BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "ALPN results: client: '");
+    BIO_write(bio_stdout, client_proto, client_proto_len);
+    BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "', server: '");
+    BIO_write(bio_stdout, server_proto, server_proto_len);
+    BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "'\n");
+    BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "ALPN configured: client: '%s', server: '",
+                   alpn_client);
+    if (SSL_get_SSL_CTX(server) == s_ctx2) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "%s'\n",
+                   alpn_server2);
+    } else {
+        BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "%s'\n",
+                   alpn_server);
+    }
+    return -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * WARNING : below extension types are *NOT* IETF assigned, and could
+ * conflict if these types are reassigned and handled specially by OpenSSL
+ * in the future
+ */
+#define TACK_EXT_TYPE 62208
+#define CUSTOM_EXT_TYPE_0 1000
+#define CUSTOM_EXT_TYPE_1 1001
+#define CUSTOM_EXT_TYPE_2 1002
+#define CUSTOM_EXT_TYPE_3 1003
+
+static const char custom_ext_cli_string[] = "abc";
+static const char custom_ext_srv_string[] = "defg";
+
+/* These set from cmdline */
+static char *serverinfo_file = NULL;
+static int serverinfo_sct = 0;
+static int serverinfo_tack = 0;
+
+/* These set based on extension callbacks */
+static int serverinfo_sct_seen = 0;
+static int serverinfo_tack_seen = 0;
+static int serverinfo_other_seen = 0;
+
+/* This set from cmdline */
+static int custom_ext = 0;
+
+/* This set based on extension callbacks */
+static int custom_ext_error = 0;
+
+static int serverinfo_cli_parse_cb(SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type,
+                                   const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen,
+                                   int *al, void *arg)
+{
+    if (ext_type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp)
+        serverinfo_sct_seen++;
+    else if (ext_type == TACK_EXT_TYPE)
+        serverinfo_tack_seen++;
+    else
+        serverinfo_other_seen++;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int verify_serverinfo()
+{
+    if (serverinfo_sct != serverinfo_sct_seen)
+        return -1;
+    if (serverinfo_tack != serverinfo_tack_seen)
+        return -1;
+    if (serverinfo_other_seen)
+        return -1;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Four test cases for custom extensions:
+ * 0 - no ClientHello extension or ServerHello response
+ * 1 - ClientHello with "abc", no response
+ * 2 - ClientHello with "abc", empty response
+ * 3 - ClientHello with "abc", "defg" response
+ */
+
+static int custom_ext_0_cli_add_cb(SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type,
+                                   const unsigned char **out,
+                                   size_t *outlen, int *al, void *arg)
+{
+    if (ext_type != CUSTOM_EXT_TYPE_0)
+        custom_ext_error = 1;
+    return 0;                   /* Don't send an extension */
+}
+
+static int custom_ext_0_cli_parse_cb(SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type,
+                                     const unsigned char *in,
+                                     size_t inlen, int *al, void *arg)
+{
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int custom_ext_1_cli_add_cb(SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type,
+                                   const unsigned char **out,
+                                   size_t *outlen, int *al, void *arg)
+{
+    if (ext_type != CUSTOM_EXT_TYPE_1)
+        custom_ext_error = 1;
+    *out = (const unsigned char *)custom_ext_cli_string;
+    *outlen = strlen(custom_ext_cli_string);
+    return 1;                   /* Send "abc" */
+}
+
+static int custom_ext_1_cli_parse_cb(SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type,
+                                     const unsigned char *in,
+                                     size_t inlen, int *al, void *arg)
+{
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int custom_ext_2_cli_add_cb(SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type,
+                                   const unsigned char **out,
+                                   size_t *outlen, int *al, void *arg)
+{
+    if (ext_type != CUSTOM_EXT_TYPE_2)
+        custom_ext_error = 1;
+    *out = (const unsigned char *)custom_ext_cli_string;
+    *outlen = strlen(custom_ext_cli_string);
+    return 1;                   /* Send "abc" */
+}
+
+static int custom_ext_2_cli_parse_cb(SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type,
+                                     const unsigned char *in,
+                                     size_t inlen, int *al, void *arg)
+{
+    if (ext_type != CUSTOM_EXT_TYPE_2)
+        custom_ext_error = 1;
+    if (inlen != 0)
+        custom_ext_error = 1;   /* Should be empty response */
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int custom_ext_3_cli_add_cb(SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type,
+                                   const unsigned char **out,
+                                   size_t *outlen, int *al, void *arg)
+{
+    if (ext_type != CUSTOM_EXT_TYPE_3)
+        custom_ext_error = 1;
+    *out = (const unsigned char *)custom_ext_cli_string;
+    *outlen = strlen(custom_ext_cli_string);
+    return 1;                   /* Send "abc" */
+}
+
+static int custom_ext_3_cli_parse_cb(SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type,
+                                     const unsigned char *in,
+                                     size_t inlen, int *al, void *arg)
+{
+    if (ext_type != CUSTOM_EXT_TYPE_3)
+        custom_ext_error = 1;
+    if (inlen != strlen(custom_ext_srv_string))
+        custom_ext_error = 1;
+    if (memcmp(custom_ext_srv_string, in, inlen) != 0)
+        custom_ext_error = 1;   /* Check for "defg" */
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * custom_ext_0_cli_add_cb returns 0 - the server won't receive a callback
+ * for this extension
+ */
+static int custom_ext_0_srv_parse_cb(SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type,
+                                     const unsigned char *in,
+                                     size_t inlen, int *al, void *arg)
+{
+    custom_ext_error = 1;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* 'add' callbacks are only called if the 'parse' callback is called */
+static int custom_ext_0_srv_add_cb(SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type,
+                                   const unsigned char **out,
+                                   size_t *outlen, int *al, void *arg)
+{
+    /* Error: should not have been called */
+    custom_ext_error = 1;
+    return 0;                   /* Don't send an extension */
+}
+
+static int custom_ext_1_srv_parse_cb(SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type,
+                                     const unsigned char *in,
+                                     size_t inlen, int *al, void *arg)
+{
+    if (ext_type != CUSTOM_EXT_TYPE_1)
+        custom_ext_error = 1;
+    /* Check for "abc" */
+    if (inlen != strlen(custom_ext_cli_string))
+        custom_ext_error = 1;
+    if (memcmp(in, custom_ext_cli_string, inlen) != 0)
+        custom_ext_error = 1;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int custom_ext_1_srv_add_cb(SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type,
+                                   const unsigned char **out,
+                                   size_t *outlen, int *al, void *arg)
+{
+    return 0;                   /* Don't send an extension */
+}
+
+static int custom_ext_2_srv_parse_cb(SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type,
+                                     const unsigned char *in,
+                                     size_t inlen, int *al, void *arg)
+{
+    if (ext_type != CUSTOM_EXT_TYPE_2)
+        custom_ext_error = 1;
+    /* Check for "abc" */
+    if (inlen != strlen(custom_ext_cli_string))
+        custom_ext_error = 1;
+    if (memcmp(in, custom_ext_cli_string, inlen) != 0)
+        custom_ext_error = 1;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int custom_ext_2_srv_add_cb(SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type,
+                                   const unsigned char **out,
+                                   size_t *outlen, int *al, void *arg)
+{
+    *out = NULL;
+    *outlen = 0;
+    return 1;                   /* Send empty extension */
+}
+
+static int custom_ext_3_srv_parse_cb(SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type,
+                                     const unsigned char *in,
+                                     size_t inlen, int *al, void *arg)
+{
+    if (ext_type != CUSTOM_EXT_TYPE_3)
+        custom_ext_error = 1;
+    /* Check for "abc" */
+    if (inlen != strlen(custom_ext_cli_string))
+        custom_ext_error = 1;
+    if (memcmp(in, custom_ext_cli_string, inlen) != 0)
+        custom_ext_error = 1;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int custom_ext_3_srv_add_cb(SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type,
+                                   const unsigned char **out,
+                                   size_t *outlen, int *al, void *arg)
+{
+    *out = (const unsigned char *)custom_ext_srv_string;
+    *outlen = strlen(custom_ext_srv_string);
+    return 1;                   /* Send "defg" */
+}
+
+static char *cipher = NULL;
+static int verbose = 0;
+static int debug = 0;
+static const char rnd_seed[] =
+    "string to make the random number generator think it has entropy";
+
+int doit_localhost(SSL *s_ssl, SSL *c_ssl, int family,
+                   long bytes, clock_t *s_time, clock_t *c_time);
+int doit_biopair(SSL *s_ssl, SSL *c_ssl, long bytes, clock_t *s_time,
+                 clock_t *c_time);
+int doit(SSL *s_ssl, SSL *c_ssl, long bytes);
+
+static void sv_usage(void)
+{
+    fprintf(stderr, "usage: ssltest [args ...]\n");
+    fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+    fprintf(stderr, "-F             - run test in FIPS mode\n");
+#endif
+    fprintf(stderr, " -server_auth  - check server certificate\n");
+    fprintf(stderr, " -client_auth  - do client authentication\n");
+    fprintf(stderr, " -v            - more output\n");
+    fprintf(stderr, " -d            - debug output\n");
+    fprintf(stderr, " -reuse        - use session-id reuse\n");
+    fprintf(stderr, " -num <val>    - number of connections to perform\n");
+    fprintf(stderr,
+            " -bytes <val>  - number of bytes to swap between client/server\n");
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+    fprintf(stderr,
+            " -dhe512       - use 512 bit key for DHE (to test failure)\n");
+    fprintf(stderr,
+            " -dhe1024      - use 1024 bit key (safe prime) for DHE (default, no-op)\n");
+    fprintf(stderr,
+            " -dhe1024dsa   - use 1024 bit key (with 160-bit subprime) for DHE\n");
+    fprintf(stderr, " -no_dhe       - disable DHE\n");
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    fprintf(stderr, " -no_ecdhe     - disable ECDHE\nTODO(openssl-team): no_ecdhe was broken by auto ecdh. Make this work again.\n");
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+    fprintf(stderr, " -psk arg      - PSK in hex (without 0x)\n");
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+    fprintf(stderr, " -srpuser user - SRP username to use\n");
+    fprintf(stderr, " -srppass arg  - password for 'user'\n");
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
+    fprintf(stderr, " -ssl3         - use SSLv3\n");
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
+    fprintf(stderr, " -tls1         - use TLSv1\n");
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS
+    fprintf(stderr, " -dtls         - use DTLS\n");
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
+    fprintf(stderr, " -dtls1        - use DTLSv1\n");
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2
+    fprintf(stderr, " -dtls12       - use DTLSv1.2\n");
+#endif
+#endif
+    fprintf(stderr, " -CApath arg   - PEM format directory of CA's\n");
+    fprintf(stderr, " -CAfile arg   - PEM format file of CA's\n");
+    fprintf(stderr, " -cert arg     - Server certificate file\n");
+    fprintf(stderr,
+            " -key arg      - Server key file (default: same as -cert)\n");
+    fprintf(stderr, " -c_cert arg   - Client certificate file\n");
+    fprintf(stderr,
+            " -c_key arg    - Client key file (default: same as -c_cert)\n");
+    fprintf(stderr, " -cipher arg   - The cipher list\n");
+    fprintf(stderr, " -bio_pair     - Use BIO pairs\n");
+    fprintf(stderr, " -ipv4         - Use IPv4 connection on localhost\n");
+    fprintf(stderr, " -ipv6         - Use IPv6 connection on localhost\n");
+    fprintf(stderr, " -f            - Test even cases that can't work\n");
+    fprintf(stderr,
+            " -time         - measure processor time used by client and server\n");
+    fprintf(stderr, " -zlib         - use zlib compression\n");
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+    fprintf(stderr, " -npn_client - have client side offer NPN\n");
+    fprintf(stderr, " -npn_server - have server side offer NPN\n");
+    fprintf(stderr, " -npn_server_reject - have server reject NPN\n");
+#endif
+    fprintf(stderr, " -serverinfo_file file - have server use this file\n");
+    fprintf(stderr, " -serverinfo_sct  - have client offer and expect SCT\n");
+    fprintf(stderr,
+            " -serverinfo_tack - have client offer and expect TACK\n");
+    fprintf(stderr,
+            " -custom_ext - try various custom extension callbacks\n");
+    fprintf(stderr, " -alpn_client <string> - have client side offer ALPN\n");
+    fprintf(stderr, " -alpn_server <string> - have server side offer ALPN\n");
+    fprintf(stderr, " -alpn_server1 <string> - alias for -alpn_server\n");
+    fprintf(stderr, " -alpn_server2 <string> - have server side context 2 offer ALPN\n");
+    fprintf(stderr,
+            " -alpn_expected <string> - the ALPN protocol that should be negotiated\n");
+    fprintf(stderr, " -server_min_proto <string> - Minimum version the server should support\n");
+    fprintf(stderr, " -server_max_proto <string> - Maximum version the server should support\n");
+    fprintf(stderr, " -client_min_proto <string> - Minimum version the client should support\n");
+    fprintf(stderr, " -client_max_proto <string> - Maximum version the client should support\n");
+    fprintf(stderr, " -should_negotiate <string> - The version that should be negotiated, fail-client or fail-server\n");
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
+    fprintf(stderr, " -noct         - no certificate transparency\n");
+    fprintf(stderr, " -requestct    - request certificate transparency\n");
+    fprintf(stderr, " -requirect    - require certificate transparency\n");
+#endif
+    fprintf(stderr, " -sn_client <string>  - have client request this servername\n");
+    fprintf(stderr, " -sn_server1 <string> - have server context 1 respond to this servername\n");
+    fprintf(stderr, " -sn_server2 <string> - have server context 2 respond to this servername\n");
+    fprintf(stderr, " -sn_expect1          - expected server 1\n");
+    fprintf(stderr, " -sn_expect2          - expected server 2\n");
+    fprintf(stderr, " -server_sess_out <file>    - Save the server session to a file\n");
+    fprintf(stderr, " -server_sess_in <file>     - Read the server session from a file\n");
+    fprintf(stderr, " -client_sess_out <file>    - Save the client session to a file\n");
+    fprintf(stderr, " -client_sess_in <file>     - Read the client session from a file\n");
+    fprintf(stderr, " -should_reuse <number>     - The expected state of reusing the session\n");
+    fprintf(stderr, " -no_ticket    - do not issue TLS session ticket\n");
+}
+
+static void print_key_details(BIO *out, EVP_PKEY *key)
+{
+    int keyid = EVP_PKEY_id(key);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    if (keyid == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
+        EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(key);
+        int nid;
+        const char *cname;
+        nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
+        EC_KEY_free(ec);
+        cname = EC_curve_nid2nist(nid);
+        if (!cname)
+            cname = OBJ_nid2sn(nid);
+        BIO_printf(out, "%d bits EC (%s)", EVP_PKEY_bits(key), cname);
+    } else
+#endif
+    {
+        const char *algname;
+        switch (keyid) {
+        case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
+            algname = "RSA";
+            break;
+        case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
+            algname = "DSA";
+            break;
+        case EVP_PKEY_DH:
+            algname = "DH";
+            break;
+        default:
+            algname = OBJ_nid2sn(keyid);
+            break;
+        }
+        BIO_printf(out, "%d bits %s", EVP_PKEY_bits(key), algname);
+    }
+}
+
+static void print_details(SSL *c_ssl, const char *prefix)
+{
+    const SSL_CIPHER *ciph;
+    int mdnid;
+    X509 *cert;
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+
+    ciph = SSL_get_current_cipher(c_ssl);
+    BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "%s%s, cipher %s %s",
+               prefix,
+               SSL_get_version(c_ssl),
+               SSL_CIPHER_get_version(ciph), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(ciph));
+    cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(c_ssl);
+    if (cert != NULL) {
+        EVP_PKEY* pubkey = X509_get0_pubkey(cert);
+
+        if (pubkey != NULL) {
+            BIO_puts(bio_stdout, ", ");
+            print_key_details(bio_stdout, pubkey);
+        }
+        X509_free(cert);
+    }
+    if (SSL_get_server_tmp_key(c_ssl, &pkey)) {
+        BIO_puts(bio_stdout, ", temp key: ");
+        print_key_details(bio_stdout, pkey);
+        EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+    }
+    if (SSL_get_peer_signature_nid(c_ssl, &mdnid))
+        BIO_printf(bio_stdout, ", digest=%s", OBJ_nid2sn(mdnid));
+    BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "\n");
+}
+
+/*
+ * protocol_from_string - converts a protocol version string to a number
+ *
+ * Returns -1 on failure or the version on success
+ */
+static int protocol_from_string(const char *value)
+{
+    struct protocol_versions {
+        const char *name;
+        int version;
+    };
+    static const struct protocol_versions versions[] = {
+        {"ssl3", SSL3_VERSION},
+        {"tls1", TLS1_VERSION},
+        {"tls1.1", TLS1_1_VERSION},
+        {"tls1.2", TLS1_2_VERSION},
+        {"dtls1", DTLS1_VERSION},
+        {"dtls1.2", DTLS1_2_VERSION}};
+    size_t i;
+    size_t n = OSSL_NELEM(versions);
+
+    for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
+        if (strcmp(versions[i].name, value) == 0)
+            return versions[i].version;
+    return -1;
+}
+
+static SSL_SESSION *read_session(const char *filename)
+{
+    SSL_SESSION *sess;
+    BIO *f = BIO_new_file(filename, "r");
+
+    if (f == NULL) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't open session file %s\n", filename);
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    sess = PEM_read_bio_SSL_SESSION(f, NULL, 0, NULL);
+    if (sess == NULL) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't parse session file %s\n", filename);
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+    }
+    BIO_free(f);
+    return sess;
+}
+
+static int write_session(const char *filename, SSL_SESSION *sess)
+{
+    BIO *f = BIO_new_file(filename, "w");
+
+    if (sess == NULL) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "No session information\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (f == NULL) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't open session file %s\n", filename);
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    PEM_write_bio_SSL_SESSION(f, sess);
+    BIO_free(f);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * set_protocol_version - Sets protocol version minimum or maximum
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on failure and 1 on success
+ */
+static int set_protocol_version(const char *version, SSL *ssl, int setting)
+{
+    if (version != NULL) {
+        int ver = protocol_from_string(version);
+        if (ver < 0) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error parsing: %s\n", version);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        return SSL_ctrl(ssl, setting, ver, NULL);
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+    const char *CApath = NULL, *CAfile = NULL;
+    int badop = 0;
+    enum { BIO_MEM, BIO_PAIR, BIO_IPV4, BIO_IPV6 } bio_type = BIO_MEM;
+    int force = 0;
+    int dtls1 = 0, dtls12 = 0, dtls = 0, tls1 = 0, ssl3 = 0, ret = 1;
+    int client_auth = 0;
+    int server_auth = 0, i;
+    struct app_verify_arg app_verify_arg =
+        { APP_CALLBACK_STRING, 0 };
+    char *p;
+    SSL_CTX *c_ctx = NULL;
+    const SSL_METHOD *meth = NULL;
+    SSL *c_ssl, *s_ssl;
+    int number = 1, reuse = 0;
+    int should_reuse = -1;
+    int no_ticket = 0;
+    long bytes = 256L;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+    DH *dh;
+    int dhe512 = 0, dhe1024dsa = 0;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+    /* client */
+    SRP_CLIENT_ARG srp_client_arg = { NULL, NULL };
+    /* server */
+    SRP_SERVER_ARG srp_server_arg = { NULL, NULL };
+#endif
+    int no_dhe = 0;
+    int no_psk = 0;
+    int print_time = 0;
+    clock_t s_time = 0, c_time = 0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+    int n, comp = 0;
+    COMP_METHOD *cm = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *ssl_comp_methods = NULL;
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+    int fips_mode = 0;
+#endif
+    int no_protocol;
+    int min_version = 0, max_version = 0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
+    /*
+     * Disable CT validation by default, because it will interfere with
+     * anything using custom extension handlers to deal with SCT extensions.
+     */
+    int ct_validation = 0;
+#endif
+    SSL_CONF_CTX *s_cctx = NULL, *c_cctx = NULL, *s_cctx2 = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *conf_args = NULL;
+    char *arg = NULL, *argn = NULL;
+
+    verbose = 0;
+    debug = 0;
+    cipher = 0;
+
+    bio_err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT);
+
+    p = getenv("OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY");
+    if (p != NULL && strcmp(p, "on") == 0)
+        CRYPTO_set_mem_debug(1);
+    CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON);
+
+    RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof(rnd_seed));
+
+    bio_stdout = BIO_new_fp(stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT);
+
+    s_cctx = SSL_CONF_CTX_new();
+    s_cctx2 = SSL_CONF_CTX_new();
+    c_cctx = SSL_CONF_CTX_new();
+
+    if (!s_cctx || !c_cctx || !s_cctx2) {
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    SSL_CONF_CTX_set_flags(s_cctx,
+                           SSL_CONF_FLAG_CMDLINE | SSL_CONF_FLAG_SERVER |
+                           SSL_CONF_FLAG_CERTIFICATE |
+                           SSL_CONF_FLAG_REQUIRE_PRIVATE);
+    SSL_CONF_CTX_set_flags(s_cctx2,
+                           SSL_CONF_FLAG_CMDLINE | SSL_CONF_FLAG_SERVER |
+                           SSL_CONF_FLAG_CERTIFICATE |
+                           SSL_CONF_FLAG_REQUIRE_PRIVATE);
+    if (!SSL_CONF_CTX_set1_prefix(s_cctx, "-s_")) {
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        goto end;
+    }
+    if (!SSL_CONF_CTX_set1_prefix(s_cctx2, "-s_")) {
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    SSL_CONF_CTX_set_flags(c_cctx,
+                           SSL_CONF_FLAG_CMDLINE | SSL_CONF_FLAG_CLIENT |
+                           SSL_CONF_FLAG_CERTIFICATE |
+                           SSL_CONF_FLAG_REQUIRE_PRIVATE);
+    if (!SSL_CONF_CTX_set1_prefix(c_cctx, "-c_")) {
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    argc--;
+    argv++;
+
+    while (argc >= 1) {
+        if (strcmp(*argv, "-F") == 0) {
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+            fips_mode = 1;
+#else
+            fprintf(stderr,
+                    "not compiled with FIPS support, so exiting without running.\n");
+            EXIT(0);
+#endif
+        } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-server_auth") == 0)
+            server_auth = 1;
+        else if (strcmp(*argv, "-client_auth") == 0)
+            client_auth = 1;
+        else if (strcmp(*argv, "-v") == 0)
+            verbose = 1;
+        else if (strcmp(*argv, "-d") == 0)
+            debug = 1;
+        else if (strcmp(*argv, "-reuse") == 0)
+            reuse = 1;
+        else if (strcmp(*argv, "-dhe512") == 0) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+            dhe512 = 1;
+#else
+            fprintf(stderr,
+                    "ignoring -dhe512, since I'm compiled without DH\n");
+#endif
+        } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-dhe1024dsa") == 0) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+            dhe1024dsa = 1;
+#else
+            fprintf(stderr,
+                    "ignoring -dhe1024dsa, since I'm compiled without DH\n");
+#endif
+        } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-no_dhe") == 0)
+            no_dhe = 1;
+        else if (strcmp(*argv, "-no_ecdhe") == 0)
+            /* obsolete */;
+        else if (strcmp(*argv, "-psk") == 0) {
+            if (--argc < 1)
+                goto bad;
+            psk_key = *(++argv);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+            if (strspn(psk_key, "abcdefABCDEF1234567890") != strlen(psk_key)) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "Not a hex number '%s'\n", *argv);
+                goto bad;
+            }
+#else
+            no_psk = 1;
+#endif
+        }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+        else if (strcmp(*argv, "-srpuser") == 0) {
+            if (--argc < 1)
+                goto bad;
+            srp_server_arg.expected_user = srp_client_arg.srplogin =
+                *(++argv);
+            min_version = TLS1_VERSION;
+        } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-srppass") == 0) {
+            if (--argc < 1)
+                goto bad;
+            srp_server_arg.pass = srp_client_arg.srppassin = *(++argv);
+            min_version = TLS1_VERSION;
+        }
+#endif
+        else if (strcmp(*argv, "-tls1") == 0) {
+            tls1 = 1;
+        } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-ssl3") == 0) {
+            ssl3 = 1;
+        } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-dtls1") == 0) {
+            dtls1 = 1;
+        } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-dtls12") == 0) {
+            dtls12 = 1;
+        } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-dtls") == 0) {
+            dtls = 1;
+        } else if (strncmp(*argv, "-num", 4) == 0) {
+            if (--argc < 1)
+                goto bad;
+            number = atoi(*(++argv));
+            if (number == 0)
+                number = 1;
+        } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-bytes") == 0) {
+            if (--argc < 1)
+                goto bad;
+            bytes = atol(*(++argv));
+            if (bytes == 0L)
+                bytes = 1L;
+            i = strlen(argv[0]);
+            if (argv[0][i - 1] == 'k')
+                bytes *= 1024L;
+            if (argv[0][i - 1] == 'm')
+                bytes *= 1024L * 1024L;
+        } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-cipher") == 0) {
+            if (--argc < 1)
+                goto bad;
+            cipher = *(++argv);
+        } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-CApath") == 0) {
+            if (--argc < 1)
+                goto bad;
+            CApath = *(++argv);
+        } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-CAfile") == 0) {
+            if (--argc < 1)
+                goto bad;
+            CAfile = *(++argv);
+        } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-bio_pair") == 0) {
+            bio_type = BIO_PAIR;
+        }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
+        else if (strcmp(*argv, "-ipv4") == 0) {
+            bio_type = BIO_IPV4;
+        } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-ipv6") == 0) {
+            bio_type = BIO_IPV6;
+        }
+#endif
+        else if (strcmp(*argv, "-f") == 0) {
+            force = 1;
+        } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-time") == 0) {
+            print_time = 1;
+        }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
+        else if (strcmp(*argv, "-noct") == 0) {
+            ct_validation = 0;
+        }
+        else if (strcmp(*argv, "-ct") == 0) {
+            ct_validation = 1;
+        }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+        else if (strcmp(*argv, "-zlib") == 0) {
+            comp = COMP_ZLIB;
+        }
+#endif
+        else if (strcmp(*argv, "-app_verify") == 0) {
+            app_verify_arg.app_verify = 1;
+        }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+          else if (strcmp(*argv, "-npn_client") == 0) {
+            npn_client = 1;
+        } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-npn_server") == 0) {
+            npn_server = 1;
+        } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-npn_server_reject") == 0) {
+            npn_server_reject = 1;
+        }
+#endif
+        else if (strcmp(*argv, "-serverinfo_sct") == 0) {
+            serverinfo_sct = 1;
+        } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-serverinfo_tack") == 0) {
+            serverinfo_tack = 1;
+        } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-serverinfo_file") == 0) {
+            if (--argc < 1)
+                goto bad;
+            serverinfo_file = *(++argv);
+        } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-custom_ext") == 0) {
+            custom_ext = 1;
+        } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-alpn_client") == 0) {
+            if (--argc < 1)
+                goto bad;
+            alpn_client = *(++argv);
+        } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-alpn_server") == 0 ||
+                   strcmp(*argv, "-alpn_server1") == 0) {
+            if (--argc < 1)
+                goto bad;
+            alpn_server = *(++argv);
+        } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-alpn_server2") == 0) {
+            if (--argc < 1)
+                goto bad;
+            alpn_server2 = *(++argv);
+        } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-alpn_expected") == 0) {
+            if (--argc < 1)
+                goto bad;
+            alpn_expected = *(++argv);
+        } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-server_min_proto") == 0) {
+            if (--argc < 1)
+                goto bad;
+            server_min_proto = *(++argv);
+        } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-server_max_proto") == 0) {
+            if (--argc < 1)
+                goto bad;
+            server_max_proto = *(++argv);
+        } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-client_min_proto") == 0) {
+            if (--argc < 1)
+                goto bad;
+            client_min_proto = *(++argv);
+        } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-client_max_proto") == 0) {
+            if (--argc < 1)
+                goto bad;
+            client_max_proto = *(++argv);
+        } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-should_negotiate") == 0) {
+            if (--argc < 1)
+                goto bad;
+            should_negotiate = *(++argv);
+        } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-sn_client") == 0) {
+            if (--argc < 1)
+                goto bad;
+            sn_client = *(++argv);
+        } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-sn_server1") == 0) {
+            if (--argc < 1)
+                goto bad;
+            sn_server1 = *(++argv);
+        } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-sn_server2") == 0) {
+            if (--argc < 1)
+                goto bad;
+            sn_server2 = *(++argv);
+        } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-sn_expect1") == 0) {
+            sn_expect = 1;
+        } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-sn_expect2") == 0) {
+            sn_expect = 2;
+        } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-server_sess_out") == 0) {
+            if (--argc < 1)
+                goto bad;
+            server_sess_out = *(++argv);
+        } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-server_sess_in") == 0) {
+            if (--argc < 1)
+                goto bad;
+            server_sess_in = *(++argv);
+        } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-client_sess_out") == 0) {
+            if (--argc < 1)
+                goto bad;
+            client_sess_out = *(++argv);
+        } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-client_sess_in") == 0) {
+            if (--argc < 1)
+                goto bad;
+            client_sess_in = *(++argv);
+        } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-should_reuse") == 0) {
+            if (--argc < 1)
+                goto bad;
+            should_reuse = !!atoi(*(++argv));
+        } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-no_ticket") == 0) {
+            no_ticket = 1;
+        } else {
+            int rv;
+            arg = argv[0];
+            argn = argv[1];
+            /* Try to process command using SSL_CONF */
+            rv = SSL_CONF_cmd_argv(c_cctx, &argc, &argv);
+            /* If not processed try server */
+            if (rv == 0)
+                rv = SSL_CONF_cmd_argv(s_cctx, &argc, &argv);
+            /* Recognised: store it for later use */
+            if (rv > 0) {
+                if (rv == 1)
+                    argn = NULL;
+                if (!conf_args) {
+                    conf_args = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null();
+                    if (!conf_args)
+                        goto end;
+                }
+                if (!sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(conf_args, arg))
+                    goto end;
+                if (!sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(conf_args, argn))
+                    goto end;
+                continue;
+            }
+            if (rv == -3)
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "Missing argument for %s\n", arg);
+            else if (rv < 0)
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error with command %s\n", arg);
+            else if (rv == 0)
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "unknown option %s\n", arg);
+            badop = 1;
+            break;
+        }
+        argc--;
+        argv++;
+    }
+    if (badop) {
+ bad:
+        sv_usage();
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (ssl3 + tls1 + dtls + dtls1 + dtls12 > 1) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "At most one of -ssl3, -tls1, -dtls, -dtls1 or -dtls12 should "
+                "be requested.\n");
+        EXIT(1);
+    }
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
+    if (ssl3)
+        no_protocol = 1;
+    else
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
+    if (tls1)
+        no_protocol = 1;
+    else
+#endif
+#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_DTLS) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1)
+    if (dtls1)
+        no_protocol = 1;
+    else
+#endif
+#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_DTLS) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2)
+    if (dtls12)
+        no_protocol = 1;
+    else
+#endif
+        no_protocol = 0;
+
+    /*
+     * Testing was requested for a compiled-out protocol (e.g. SSLv3).
+     * Ideally, we would error out, but the generic test wrapper can't know
+     * when to expect failure. So we do nothing and return success.
+     */
+    if (no_protocol) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Testing was requested for a disabled protocol. "
+                "Skipping tests.\n");
+        ret = 0;
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (!ssl3 && !tls1 && !dtls && !dtls1 && !dtls12 && number > 1 && !reuse && !force) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "This case cannot work.  Use -f to perform "
+                "the test anyway (and\n-d to see what happens), "
+                "or add one of -ssl3, -tls1, -dtls, -dtls1, -dtls12, -reuse\n"
+                "to avoid protocol mismatch.\n");
+        EXIT(1);
+    }
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+    if (fips_mode) {
+        if (!FIPS_mode_set(1)) {
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            EXIT(1);
+        } else
+            fprintf(stderr, "*** IN FIPS MODE ***\n");
+    }
+#endif
+
+    if (print_time) {
+        if (bio_type != BIO_PAIR) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "Using BIO pair (-bio_pair)\n");
+            bio_type = BIO_PAIR;
+        }
+        if (number < 50 && !force)
+            fprintf(stderr,
+                    "Warning: For accurate timings, use more connections (e.g. -num 1000)\n");
+    }
+
+/*      if (cipher == NULL) cipher=getenv("SSL_CIPHER"); */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+    if (comp == COMP_ZLIB)
+        cm = COMP_zlib();
+    if (cm != NULL) {
+        if (COMP_get_type(cm) != NID_undef) {
+            if (SSL_COMP_add_compression_method(comp, cm) != 0) {
+                fprintf(stderr, "Failed to add compression method\n");
+                ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+            }
+        } else {
+            fprintf(stderr,
+                    "Warning: %s compression not supported\n",
+                    comp == COMP_ZLIB ? "zlib" : "unknown");
+            ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+        }
+    }
+    ssl_comp_methods = SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods();
+    n = sk_SSL_COMP_num(ssl_comp_methods);
+    if (n) {
+        int j;
+        printf("Available compression methods:");
+        for (j = 0; j < n; j++) {
+            SSL_COMP *c = sk_SSL_COMP_value(ssl_comp_methods, j);
+            printf("  %s:%d", SSL_COMP_get0_name(c), SSL_COMP_get_id(c));
+        }
+        printf("\n");
+    }
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
+    meth = TLS_method();
+    if (ssl3) {
+        min_version = SSL3_VERSION;
+        max_version = SSL3_VERSION;
+    } else if (tls1) {
+        min_version = TLS1_VERSION;
+        max_version = TLS1_VERSION;
+    } else {
+        min_version = SSL3_VERSION;
+        max_version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
+    }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS
+    if (dtls || dtls1 || dtls12) {
+        meth = DTLS_method();
+        if (dtls1) {
+            min_version = DTLS1_VERSION;
+            max_version = DTLS1_VERSION;
+        } else if (dtls12) {
+            min_version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
+            max_version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
+        } else {
+            min_version = DTLS_MIN_VERSION;
+            max_version = DTLS_MAX_VERSION;
+        }
+    }
+#endif
+
+    c_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(meth);
+    s_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(meth);
+    s_ctx2 = SSL_CTX_new(meth); /* no SSL_CTX_dup! */
+    if ((c_ctx == NULL) || (s_ctx == NULL) || (s_ctx2 == NULL)) {
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        goto end;
+    }
+    /*
+     * Since we will use low security ciphersuites and keys for testing set
+     * security level to zero by default. Tests can override this by adding
+     * "@SECLEVEL=n" to the cipher string.
+     */
+    SSL_CTX_set_security_level(c_ctx, 0);
+    SSL_CTX_set_security_level(s_ctx, 0);
+    SSL_CTX_set_security_level(s_ctx2, 0);
+
+    if (no_ticket) {
+        SSL_CTX_set_options(c_ctx, SSL_OP_NO_TICKET);
+        SSL_CTX_set_options(s_ctx, SSL_OP_NO_TICKET);
+    }
+
+    if (SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(c_ctx, min_version) == 0) {
+        printf("Unable to set client min protocol version (0x%X)\n",
+               min_version);
+        goto end;
+    }
+    if (SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(c_ctx, max_version) == 0) {
+        printf("Unable to set client max protocol version (0x%X)\n",
+               max_version);
+        goto end;
+    }
+    if (SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(s_ctx, min_version) == 0) {
+        printf("Unable to set server min protocol version (0x%X)\n",
+               min_version);
+        goto end;
+    }
+    if (SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(s_ctx, max_version) == 0) {
+        printf("Unable to set server max protocol version (0x%X)\n",
+               max_version);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (cipher != NULL) {
+        if (!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(c_ctx, cipher)
+            || !SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(s_ctx, cipher)
+            || !SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(s_ctx2, cipher)) {
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
+    if (ct_validation &&
+        !SSL_CTX_enable_ct(c_ctx, SSL_CT_VALIDATION_STRICT)) {
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        goto end;
+    }
+#endif
+
+    /* Process SSL_CONF arguments */
+    SSL_CONF_CTX_set_ssl_ctx(c_cctx, c_ctx);
+    SSL_CONF_CTX_set_ssl_ctx(s_cctx, s_ctx);
+    SSL_CONF_CTX_set_ssl_ctx(s_cctx2, s_ctx2);
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(conf_args); i += 2) {
+        int rv;
+        arg = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(conf_args, i);
+        argn = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(conf_args, i + 1);
+        rv = SSL_CONF_cmd(c_cctx, arg, argn);
+        /* If not recognised use server context */
+        if (rv == -2) {
+            rv = SSL_CONF_cmd(s_cctx2, arg, argn);
+            if (rv > 0)
+                rv = SSL_CONF_cmd(s_cctx, arg, argn);
+        }
+        if (rv <= 0) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error processing %s %s\n",
+                       arg, argn ? argn : "");
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (!SSL_CONF_CTX_finish(s_cctx) || !SSL_CONF_CTX_finish(c_cctx) || !SSL_CONF_CTX_finish(s_cctx2)) {
+        BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error finishing context\n");
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        goto end;
+    }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+    if (!no_dhe) {
+        if (dhe1024dsa) {
+            dh = get_dh1024dsa();
+        } else if (dhe512)
+            dh = get_dh512();
+        else
+            dh = get_dh1024();
+        SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(s_ctx, dh);
+        SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(s_ctx2, dh);
+        DH_free(dh);
+    }
+#else
+    (void)no_dhe;
+#endif
+
+    if ((!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(s_ctx, CAfile, CApath)) ||
+        (!SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(s_ctx)) ||
+        (!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(s_ctx2, CAfile, CApath)) ||
+        (!SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(s_ctx2)) ||
+        (!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(c_ctx, CAfile, CApath)) ||
+        (!SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(c_ctx))) {
+        /* fprintf(stderr,"SSL_load_verify_locations\n"); */
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        /* goto end; */
+    }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
+    if (!SSL_CTX_set_default_ctlog_list_file(s_ctx) ||
+        !SSL_CTX_set_default_ctlog_list_file(s_ctx2) ||
+        !SSL_CTX_set_default_ctlog_list_file(c_ctx)) {
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+    }
+#endif
+
+    if (client_auth) {
+        printf("client authentication\n");
+        SSL_CTX_set_verify(s_ctx,
+                           SSL_VERIFY_PEER | SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT,
+                           verify_callback);
+        SSL_CTX_set_verify(s_ctx2,
+                           SSL_VERIFY_PEER | SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT,
+                           verify_callback);
+        SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(s_ctx, app_verify_callback,
+                                         &app_verify_arg);
+        SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(s_ctx2, app_verify_callback,
+                                         &app_verify_arg);
+    }
+    if (server_auth) {
+        printf("server authentication\n");
+        SSL_CTX_set_verify(c_ctx, SSL_VERIFY_PEER, verify_callback);
+        SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(c_ctx, app_verify_callback,
+                                         &app_verify_arg);
+    }
+
+    {
+        int session_id_context = 0;
+        if (!SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(s_ctx, (void *)&session_id_context,
+                                            sizeof(session_id_context)) ||
+            !SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(s_ctx2, (void *)&session_id_context,
+                                            sizeof(session_id_context))) {
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* Use PSK only if PSK key is given */
+    if (psk_key != NULL) {
+        /*
+         * no_psk is used to avoid putting psk command to openssl tool
+         */
+        if (no_psk) {
+            /*
+             * if PSK is not compiled in and psk key is given, do nothing and
+             * exit successfully
+             */
+            ret = 0;
+            goto end;
+        }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+        SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback(c_ctx, psk_client_callback);
+        SSL_CTX_set_psk_server_callback(s_ctx, psk_server_callback);
+        SSL_CTX_set_psk_server_callback(s_ctx2, psk_server_callback);
+        if (debug)
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "setting PSK identity hint to s_ctx\n");
+        if (!SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint(s_ctx, "ctx server identity_hint") ||
+            !SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint(s_ctx2, "ctx server identity_hint")) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "error setting PSK identity hint to s_ctx\n");
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            goto end;
+        }
+#endif
+    }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+    if (srp_client_arg.srplogin) {
+        if (!SSL_CTX_set_srp_username(c_ctx, srp_client_arg.srplogin)) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Unable to set SRP username\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+        SSL_CTX_set_srp_cb_arg(c_ctx, &srp_client_arg);
+        SSL_CTX_set_srp_client_pwd_callback(c_ctx,
+                                            ssl_give_srp_client_pwd_cb);
+        /*
+         * SSL_CTX_set_srp_strength(c_ctx, srp_client_arg.strength);
+         */
+    }
+
+    if (srp_server_arg.expected_user != NULL) {
+        SSL_CTX_set_verify(s_ctx, SSL_VERIFY_NONE, verify_callback);
+        SSL_CTX_set_verify(s_ctx2, SSL_VERIFY_NONE, verify_callback);
+        SSL_CTX_set_srp_cb_arg(s_ctx, &srp_server_arg);
+        SSL_CTX_set_srp_cb_arg(s_ctx2, &srp_server_arg);
+        SSL_CTX_set_srp_username_callback(s_ctx, ssl_srp_server_param_cb);
+        SSL_CTX_set_srp_username_callback(s_ctx2, ssl_srp_server_param_cb);
+    }
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+    if (npn_client) {
+        SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(c_ctx, cb_client_npn, NULL);
+    }
+    if (npn_server) {
+        if (npn_server_reject) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                       "Can't have both -npn_server and -npn_server_reject\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+        SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(s_ctx, cb_server_npn, NULL);
+        SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(s_ctx2, cb_server_npn, NULL);
+    }
+    if (npn_server_reject) {
+        SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(s_ctx, cb_server_rejects_npn,
+                                              NULL);
+        SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(s_ctx2, cb_server_rejects_npn,
+                                              NULL);
+    }
+#endif
+
+    if (serverinfo_sct) {
+        if (!SSL_CTX_add_client_custom_ext(c_ctx,
+                TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp,
+                NULL, NULL, NULL,
+                serverinfo_cli_parse_cb, NULL)) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error adding SCT extension\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+    if (serverinfo_tack) {
+        if (!SSL_CTX_add_client_custom_ext(c_ctx, TACK_EXT_TYPE,
+                                      NULL, NULL, NULL,
+                                      serverinfo_cli_parse_cb, NULL)) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error adding TACK extension\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+    if (serverinfo_file)
+        if (!SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo_file(s_ctx, serverinfo_file) ||
+            !SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo_file(s_ctx2, serverinfo_file)) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "missing serverinfo file\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+
+    if (custom_ext) {
+        if (!SSL_CTX_add_client_custom_ext(c_ctx, CUSTOM_EXT_TYPE_0,
+                                      custom_ext_0_cli_add_cb,
+                                      NULL, NULL,
+                                      custom_ext_0_cli_parse_cb, NULL)
+            || !SSL_CTX_add_client_custom_ext(c_ctx, CUSTOM_EXT_TYPE_1,
+                                      custom_ext_1_cli_add_cb,
+                                      NULL, NULL,
+                                      custom_ext_1_cli_parse_cb, NULL)
+            || !SSL_CTX_add_client_custom_ext(c_ctx, CUSTOM_EXT_TYPE_2,
+                                      custom_ext_2_cli_add_cb,
+                                      NULL, NULL,
+                                      custom_ext_2_cli_parse_cb, NULL)
+            || !SSL_CTX_add_client_custom_ext(c_ctx, CUSTOM_EXT_TYPE_3,
+                                      custom_ext_3_cli_add_cb,
+                                      NULL, NULL,
+                                      custom_ext_3_cli_parse_cb, NULL)
+            || !SSL_CTX_add_server_custom_ext(s_ctx, CUSTOM_EXT_TYPE_0,
+                                      custom_ext_0_srv_add_cb,
+                                      NULL, NULL,
+                                      custom_ext_0_srv_parse_cb, NULL)
+            || !SSL_CTX_add_server_custom_ext(s_ctx2, CUSTOM_EXT_TYPE_0,
+                                      custom_ext_0_srv_add_cb,
+                                      NULL, NULL,
+                                      custom_ext_0_srv_parse_cb, NULL)
+            || !SSL_CTX_add_server_custom_ext(s_ctx, CUSTOM_EXT_TYPE_1,
+                                      custom_ext_1_srv_add_cb,
+                                      NULL, NULL,
+                                      custom_ext_1_srv_parse_cb, NULL)
+            || !SSL_CTX_add_server_custom_ext(s_ctx2, CUSTOM_EXT_TYPE_1,
+                                      custom_ext_1_srv_add_cb,
+                                      NULL, NULL,
+                                      custom_ext_1_srv_parse_cb, NULL)
+            || !SSL_CTX_add_server_custom_ext(s_ctx, CUSTOM_EXT_TYPE_2,
+                                      custom_ext_2_srv_add_cb,
+                                      NULL, NULL,
+                                      custom_ext_2_srv_parse_cb, NULL)
+            || !SSL_CTX_add_server_custom_ext(s_ctx2, CUSTOM_EXT_TYPE_2,
+                                      custom_ext_2_srv_add_cb,
+                                      NULL, NULL,
+                                      custom_ext_2_srv_parse_cb, NULL)
+            || !SSL_CTX_add_server_custom_ext(s_ctx, CUSTOM_EXT_TYPE_3,
+                                      custom_ext_3_srv_add_cb,
+                                      NULL, NULL,
+                                      custom_ext_3_srv_parse_cb, NULL)
+            || !SSL_CTX_add_server_custom_ext(s_ctx2, CUSTOM_EXT_TYPE_3,
+                                      custom_ext_3_srv_add_cb,
+                                      NULL, NULL,
+                                      custom_ext_3_srv_parse_cb, NULL)) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error setting custom extensions\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (alpn_server)
+        SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb(s_ctx, cb_server_alpn, alpn_server);
+    if (alpn_server2)
+        SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb(s_ctx2, cb_server_alpn, alpn_server2);
+
+    if (alpn_client) {
+        size_t alpn_len;
+        unsigned char *alpn = next_protos_parse(&alpn_len, alpn_client);
+
+        if (alpn == NULL) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error parsing -alpn_client argument\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+        /* Returns 0 on success!! */
+        if (SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos(c_ctx, alpn, alpn_len)) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error setting ALPN\n");
+            OPENSSL_free(alpn);
+            goto end;
+        }
+        OPENSSL_free(alpn);
+    }
+
+    if (server_sess_in != NULL) {
+        server_sess = read_session(server_sess_in);
+        if (server_sess == NULL)
+            goto end;
+    }
+    if (client_sess_in != NULL) {
+        client_sess = read_session(client_sess_in);
+        if (client_sess == NULL)
+            goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (server_sess_out != NULL || server_sess_in != NULL) {
+        char *keys;
+        long size;
+
+        /* Use a fixed key so that we can decrypt the ticket. */
+        size = SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_keys(s_ctx, NULL, 0);
+        keys = OPENSSL_zalloc(size);
+        SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_keys(s_ctx, keys, size);
+        OPENSSL_free(keys);
+    }
+
+    if (sn_server1 != NULL || sn_server2 != NULL)
+        SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(s_ctx, servername_cb);
+
+    c_ssl = SSL_new(c_ctx);
+    s_ssl = SSL_new(s_ctx);
+
+    if (sn_client)
+        SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(c_ssl, sn_client);
+
+    if (!set_protocol_version(server_min_proto, s_ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_MIN_PROTO_VERSION))
+        goto end;
+    if (!set_protocol_version(server_max_proto, s_ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_PROTO_VERSION))
+        goto end;
+    if (!set_protocol_version(client_min_proto, c_ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_MIN_PROTO_VERSION))
+        goto end;
+    if (!set_protocol_version(client_max_proto, c_ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_PROTO_VERSION))
+        goto end;
+
+    if (server_sess) {
+        if (SSL_CTX_add_session(s_ctx, server_sess) == 0) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't add server session\n");
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+
+    BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "Doing handshakes=%d bytes=%ld\n", number, bytes);
+    for (i = 0; i < number; i++) {
+        if (!reuse) {
+            if (!SSL_set_session(c_ssl, NULL)) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "Failed to set session\n");
+                goto end;
+            }
+        }
+        if (client_sess_in != NULL) {
+            if (SSL_set_session(c_ssl, client_sess) == 0) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't set client session\n");
+                ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+                goto end;
+            }
+        }
+        switch (bio_type) {
+        case BIO_MEM:
+            ret = doit(s_ssl, c_ssl, bytes);
+            break;
+        case BIO_PAIR:
+            ret = doit_biopair(s_ssl, c_ssl, bytes, &s_time, &c_time);
+            break;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
+        case BIO_IPV4:
+            ret = doit_localhost(s_ssl, c_ssl, BIO_FAMILY_IPV4,
+                                 bytes, &s_time, &c_time);
+            break;
+        case BIO_IPV6:
+            ret = doit_localhost(s_ssl, c_ssl, BIO_FAMILY_IPV6,
+                                 bytes, &s_time, &c_time);
+            break;
+#else
+        case BIO_IPV4:
+        case BIO_IPV6:
+            ret = 1;
+            goto err;
+#endif
+        }
+        if (ret)  break;
+    }
+
+    if (should_negotiate && ret == 0 &&
+        strcmp(should_negotiate, "fail-server") != 0 &&
+        strcmp(should_negotiate, "fail-client") != 0) {
+        int version = protocol_from_string(should_negotiate);
+        if (version < 0) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error parsing: %s\n", should_negotiate);
+            ret = 1;
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (SSL_version(c_ssl) != version) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Unexpected version negotiated. "
+                "Expected: %s, got %s\n", should_negotiate, SSL_get_version(c_ssl));
+            ret = 1;
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (should_reuse != -1) {
+        if (SSL_session_reused(s_ssl) != should_reuse ||
+            SSL_session_reused(c_ssl) != should_reuse) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Unexpected session reuse state. "
+                "Expected: %d, server: %d, client: %d\n", should_reuse,
+                SSL_session_reused(s_ssl), SSL_session_reused(c_ssl));
+            ret = 1;
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (server_sess_out != NULL) {
+        if (write_session(server_sess_out, SSL_get_session(s_ssl)) == 0) {
+            ret = 1;
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+    if (client_sess_out != NULL) {
+        if (write_session(client_sess_out, SSL_get_session(c_ssl)) == 0) {
+            ret = 1;
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (!verbose) {
+        print_details(c_ssl, "");
+    }
+    if (print_time) {
+#ifdef CLOCKS_PER_SEC
+        /*
+         * "To determine the time in seconds, the value returned by the clock
+         * function should be divided by the value of the macro
+         * CLOCKS_PER_SEC." -- ISO/IEC 9899
+         */
+        BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "Approximate total server time: %6.2f s\n"
+                   "Approximate total client time: %6.2f s\n",
+                   (double)s_time / CLOCKS_PER_SEC,
+                   (double)c_time / CLOCKS_PER_SEC);
+#else
+        BIO_printf(bio_stdout,
+                   "Approximate total server time: %6.2f units\n"
+                   "Approximate total client time: %6.2f units\n",
+                   (double)s_time, (double)c_time);
+#endif
+    }
+
+ err:
+    SSL_free(s_ssl);
+    SSL_free(c_ssl);
+
+ end:
+    SSL_CTX_free(s_ctx);
+    SSL_CTX_free(s_ctx2);
+    SSL_CTX_free(c_ctx);
+    SSL_CONF_CTX_free(s_cctx);
+    SSL_CONF_CTX_free(s_cctx2);
+    SSL_CONF_CTX_free(c_cctx);
+    sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(conf_args);
+
+    BIO_free(bio_stdout);
+
+    SSL_SESSION_free(server_sess);
+    SSL_SESSION_free(client_sess);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG
+    if (CRYPTO_mem_leaks(bio_err) <= 0)
+        ret = 1;
+#endif
+    BIO_free(bio_err);
+    EXIT(ret);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
+int doit_localhost(SSL *s_ssl, SSL *c_ssl, int family, long count,
+                   clock_t *s_time, clock_t *c_time)
+{
+    long cw_num = count, cr_num = count, sw_num = count, sr_num = count;
+    BIO *s_ssl_bio = NULL, *c_ssl_bio = NULL;
+    BIO *acpt = NULL, *server = NULL, *client = NULL;
+    char addr_str[40];
+    int ret = 1;
+    int err_in_client = 0;
+    int err_in_server = 0;
+
+    acpt = BIO_new_accept("0");
+    if (acpt == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    BIO_set_accept_ip_family(acpt, family);
+    BIO_set_bind_mode(acpt, BIO_SOCK_NONBLOCK | BIO_SOCK_REUSEADDR);
+    if (BIO_do_accept(acpt) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    BIO_snprintf(addr_str, sizeof(addr_str), ":%s", BIO_get_accept_port(acpt));
+
+    client = BIO_new_connect(addr_str);
+    BIO_set_conn_ip_family(client, family);
+    if (!client)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (BIO_set_nbio(client, 1) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    if (BIO_set_nbio(acpt, 1) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    {
+        int st_connect = 0, st_accept = 0;
+
+        while(!st_connect || !st_accept) {
+            if (!st_connect) {
+                if (BIO_do_connect(client) <= 0) {
+                    if (!BIO_should_retry(client))
+                        goto err;
+                } else {
+                    st_connect = 1;
+                }
+            }
+            if (!st_accept) {
+                if (BIO_do_accept(acpt) <= 0) {
+                    if (!BIO_should_retry(acpt))
+                        goto err;
+                } else {
+                    st_accept = 1;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    /* We're not interested in accepting further connects */
+    server = BIO_pop(acpt);
+    BIO_free_all(acpt);
+    acpt = NULL;
+
+    s_ssl_bio = BIO_new(BIO_f_ssl());
+    if (!s_ssl_bio)
+        goto err;
+
+    c_ssl_bio = BIO_new(BIO_f_ssl());
+    if (!c_ssl_bio)
+        goto err;
+
+    SSL_set_connect_state(c_ssl);
+    SSL_set_bio(c_ssl, client, client);
+    (void)BIO_set_ssl(c_ssl_bio, c_ssl, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+
+    SSL_set_accept_state(s_ssl);
+    SSL_set_bio(s_ssl, server, server);
+    (void)BIO_set_ssl(s_ssl_bio, s_ssl, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+
+    do {
+        /*-
+         * c_ssl_bio:          SSL filter BIO
+         *
+         * client:             I/O for SSL library
+         *
+         *
+         * server:             I/O for SSL library
+         *
+         * s_ssl_bio:          SSL filter BIO
+         */
+
+        /*
+         * We have non-blocking behaviour throughout this test program, but
+         * can be sure that there is *some* progress in each iteration; so we
+         * don't have to worry about ..._SHOULD_READ or ..._SHOULD_WRITE --
+         * we just try everything in each iteration
+         */
+
+        {
+            /* CLIENT */
+
+            char cbuf[1024 * 8];
+            int i, r;
+            clock_t c_clock = clock();
+
+            memset(cbuf, 0, sizeof(cbuf));
+
+            if (debug)
+                if (SSL_in_init(c_ssl))
+                    printf("client waiting in SSL_connect - %s\n",
+                           SSL_state_string_long(c_ssl));
+
+            if (cw_num > 0) {
+                /* Write to server. */
+
+                if (cw_num > (long)sizeof(cbuf))
+                    i = sizeof(cbuf);
+                else
+                    i = (int)cw_num;
+                r = BIO_write(c_ssl_bio, cbuf, i);
+                if (r < 0) {
+                    if (!BIO_should_retry(c_ssl_bio)) {
+                        fprintf(stderr, "ERROR in CLIENT\n");
+                        err_in_client = 1;
+                        goto err;
+                    }
+                    /*
+                     * BIO_should_retry(...) can just be ignored here. The
+                     * library expects us to call BIO_write with the same
+                     * arguments again, and that's what we will do in the
+                     * next iteration.
+                     */
+                } else if (r == 0) {
+                    fprintf(stderr, "SSL CLIENT STARTUP FAILED\n");
+                    goto err;
+                } else {
+                    if (debug)
+                        printf("client wrote %d\n", r);
+                    cw_num -= r;
+                }
+            }
+
+            if (cr_num > 0) {
+                /* Read from server. */
+
+                r = BIO_read(c_ssl_bio, cbuf, sizeof(cbuf));
+                if (r < 0) {
+                    if (!BIO_should_retry(c_ssl_bio)) {
+                        fprintf(stderr, "ERROR in CLIENT\n");
+                        err_in_client = 1;
+                        goto err;
+                    }
+                    /*
+                     * Again, "BIO_should_retry" can be ignored.
+                     */
+                } else if (r == 0) {
+                    fprintf(stderr, "SSL CLIENT STARTUP FAILED\n");
+                    goto err;
+                } else {
+                    if (debug)
+                        printf("client read %d\n", r);
+                    cr_num -= r;
+                }
+            }
+
+            /*
+             * c_time and s_time increments will typically be very small
+             * (depending on machine speed and clock tick intervals), but
+             * sampling over a large number of connections should result in
+             * fairly accurate figures.  We cannot guarantee a lot, however
+             * -- if each connection lasts for exactly one clock tick, it
+             * will be counted only for the client or only for the server or
+             * even not at all.
+             */
+            *c_time += (clock() - c_clock);
+        }
+
+        {
+            /* SERVER */
+
+            char sbuf[1024 * 8];
+            int i, r;
+            clock_t s_clock = clock();
+
+            memset(sbuf, 0, sizeof(sbuf));
+
+            if (debug)
+                if (SSL_in_init(s_ssl))
+                    printf("server waiting in SSL_accept - %s\n",
+                           SSL_state_string_long(s_ssl));
+
+            if (sw_num > 0) {
+                /* Write to client. */
+
+                if (sw_num > (long)sizeof(sbuf))
+                    i = sizeof(sbuf);
+                else
+                    i = (int)sw_num;
+                r = BIO_write(s_ssl_bio, sbuf, i);
+                if (r < 0) {
+                    if (!BIO_should_retry(s_ssl_bio)) {
+                        fprintf(stderr, "ERROR in SERVER\n");
+                        err_in_server = 1;
+                        goto err;
+                    }
+                    /* Ignore "BIO_should_retry". */
+                } else if (r == 0) {
+                    fprintf(stderr, "SSL SERVER STARTUP FAILED\n");
+                    goto err;
+                } else {
+                    if (debug)
+                        printf("server wrote %d\n", r);
+                    sw_num -= r;
+                }
+            }
+
+            if (sr_num > 0) {
+                /* Read from client. */
+
+                r = BIO_read(s_ssl_bio, sbuf, sizeof(sbuf));
+                if (r < 0) {
+                    if (!BIO_should_retry(s_ssl_bio)) {
+                        fprintf(stderr, "ERROR in SERVER\n");
+                        err_in_server = 1;
+                        goto err;
+                    }
+                    /* blah, blah */
+                } else if (r == 0) {
+                    fprintf(stderr, "SSL SERVER STARTUP FAILED\n");
+                    goto err;
+                } else {
+                    if (debug)
+                        printf("server read %d\n", r);
+                    sr_num -= r;
+                }
+            }
+
+            *s_time += (clock() - s_clock);
+        }
+    }
+    while (cw_num > 0 || cr_num > 0 || sw_num > 0 || sr_num > 0);
+
+    if (verbose)
+        print_details(c_ssl, "DONE via TCP connect: ");
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+    if (verify_npn(c_ssl, s_ssl) < 0) {
+        ret = 1;
+        goto end;
+    }
+# endif
+    if (verify_serverinfo() < 0) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Server info verify error\n");
+        ret = 1;
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (verify_alpn(c_ssl, s_ssl) < 0) {
+        ret = 1;
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (verify_servername(c_ssl, s_ssl) < 0) {
+        ret = 1;
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (custom_ext_error) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Custom extension error\n");
+        ret = 1;
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+ end:
+# endif
+    ret = 0;
+
+ err:
+    ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+
+    BIO_free_all(acpt);
+    BIO_free(server);
+    BIO_free(client);
+    BIO_free(s_ssl_bio);
+    BIO_free(c_ssl_bio);
+
+    if (should_negotiate != NULL && strcmp(should_negotiate, "fail-client") == 0)
+        ret = (err_in_client != 0) ? 0 : 1;
+    else if (should_negotiate != NULL && strcmp(should_negotiate, "fail-server") == 0)
+        ret = (err_in_server != 0) ? 0 : 1;
+
+    return ret;
+}
+#endif
+
+int doit_biopair(SSL *s_ssl, SSL *c_ssl, long count,
+                 clock_t *s_time, clock_t *c_time)
+{
+    long cw_num = count, cr_num = count, sw_num = count, sr_num = count;
+    BIO *s_ssl_bio = NULL, *c_ssl_bio = NULL;
+    BIO *server = NULL, *server_io = NULL, *client = NULL, *client_io = NULL;
+    int ret = 1;
+    int err_in_client = 0;
+    int err_in_server = 0;
+
+    size_t bufsiz = 256;        /* small buffer for testing */
+
+    if (!BIO_new_bio_pair(&server, bufsiz, &server_io, bufsiz))
+        goto err;
+    if (!BIO_new_bio_pair(&client, bufsiz, &client_io, bufsiz))
+        goto err;
+
+    s_ssl_bio = BIO_new(BIO_f_ssl());
+    if (!s_ssl_bio)
+        goto err;
+
+    c_ssl_bio = BIO_new(BIO_f_ssl());
+    if (!c_ssl_bio)
+        goto err;
+
+    SSL_set_connect_state(c_ssl);
+    SSL_set_bio(c_ssl, client, client);
+    (void)BIO_set_ssl(c_ssl_bio, c_ssl, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+
+    SSL_set_accept_state(s_ssl);
+    SSL_set_bio(s_ssl, server, server);
+    (void)BIO_set_ssl(s_ssl_bio, s_ssl, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+
+    do {
+        /*-
+         * c_ssl_bio:          SSL filter BIO
+         *
+         * client:             pseudo-I/O for SSL library
+         *
+         * client_io:          client's SSL communication; usually to be
+         *                     relayed over some I/O facility, but in this
+         *                     test program, we're the server, too:
+         *
+         * server_io:          server's SSL communication
+         *
+         * server:             pseudo-I/O for SSL library
+         *
+         * s_ssl_bio:          SSL filter BIO
+         *
+         * The client and the server each employ a "BIO pair":
+         * client + client_io, server + server_io.
+         * BIO pairs are symmetric.  A BIO pair behaves similar
+         * to a non-blocking socketpair (but both endpoints must
+         * be handled by the same thread).
+         * [Here we could connect client and server to the ends
+         * of a single BIO pair, but then this code would be less
+         * suitable as an example for BIO pairs in general.]
+         *
+         * Useful functions for querying the state of BIO pair endpoints:
+         *
+         * BIO_ctrl_pending(bio)              number of bytes we can read now
+         * BIO_ctrl_get_read_request(bio)     number of bytes needed to fulfil
+         *                                      other side's read attempt
+         * BIO_ctrl_get_write_guarantee(bio)   number of bytes we can write now
+         *
+         * ..._read_request is never more than ..._write_guarantee;
+         * it depends on the application which one you should use.
+         */
+
+        /*
+         * We have non-blocking behaviour throughout this test program, but
+         * can be sure that there is *some* progress in each iteration; so we
+         * don't have to worry about ..._SHOULD_READ or ..._SHOULD_WRITE --
+         * we just try everything in each iteration
+         */
+
+        {
+            /* CLIENT */
+
+            char cbuf[1024 * 8];
+            int i, r;
+            clock_t c_clock = clock();
+
+            memset(cbuf, 0, sizeof(cbuf));
+
+            if (debug)
+                if (SSL_in_init(c_ssl))
+                    printf("client waiting in SSL_connect - %s\n",
+                           SSL_state_string_long(c_ssl));
+
+            if (cw_num > 0) {
+                /* Write to server. */
+
+                if (cw_num > (long)sizeof(cbuf))
+                    i = sizeof(cbuf);
+                else
+                    i = (int)cw_num;
+                r = BIO_write(c_ssl_bio, cbuf, i);
+                if (r < 0) {
+                    if (!BIO_should_retry(c_ssl_bio)) {
+                        fprintf(stderr, "ERROR in CLIENT\n");
+                        err_in_client = 1;
+                        goto err;
+                    }
+                    /*
+                     * BIO_should_retry(...) can just be ignored here. The
+                     * library expects us to call BIO_write with the same
+                     * arguments again, and that's what we will do in the
+                     * next iteration.
+                     */
+                } else if (r == 0) {
+                    fprintf(stderr, "SSL CLIENT STARTUP FAILED\n");
+                    goto err;
+                } else {
+                    if (debug)
+                        printf("client wrote %d\n", r);
+                    cw_num -= r;
+                }
+            }
+
+            if (cr_num > 0) {
+                /* Read from server. */
+
+                r = BIO_read(c_ssl_bio, cbuf, sizeof(cbuf));
+                if (r < 0) {
+                    if (!BIO_should_retry(c_ssl_bio)) {
+                        fprintf(stderr, "ERROR in CLIENT\n");
+                        err_in_client = 1;
+                        goto err;
+                    }
+                    /*
+                     * Again, "BIO_should_retry" can be ignored.
+                     */
+                } else if (r == 0) {
+                    fprintf(stderr, "SSL CLIENT STARTUP FAILED\n");
+                    goto err;
+                } else {
+                    if (debug)
+                        printf("client read %d\n", r);
+                    cr_num -= r;
+                }
+            }
+
+            /*
+             * c_time and s_time increments will typically be very small
+             * (depending on machine speed and clock tick intervals), but
+             * sampling over a large number of connections should result in
+             * fairly accurate figures.  We cannot guarantee a lot, however
+             * -- if each connection lasts for exactly one clock tick, it
+             * will be counted only for the client or only for the server or
+             * even not at all.
+             */
+            *c_time += (clock() - c_clock);
+        }
+
+        {
+            /* SERVER */
+
+            char sbuf[1024 * 8];
+            int i, r;
+            clock_t s_clock = clock();
+
+            memset(sbuf, 0, sizeof(sbuf));
+
+            if (debug)
+                if (SSL_in_init(s_ssl))
+                    printf("server waiting in SSL_accept - %s\n",
+                           SSL_state_string_long(s_ssl));
+
+            if (sw_num > 0) {
+                /* Write to client. */
+
+                if (sw_num > (long)sizeof(sbuf))
+                    i = sizeof(sbuf);
+                else
+                    i = (int)sw_num;
+                r = BIO_write(s_ssl_bio, sbuf, i);
+                if (r < 0) {
+                    if (!BIO_should_retry(s_ssl_bio)) {
+                        fprintf(stderr, "ERROR in SERVER\n");
+                        err_in_server = 1;
+                        goto err;
+                    }
+                    /* Ignore "BIO_should_retry". */
+                } else if (r == 0) {
+                    fprintf(stderr, "SSL SERVER STARTUP FAILED\n");
+                    goto err;
+                } else {
+                    if (debug)
+                        printf("server wrote %d\n", r);
+                    sw_num -= r;
+                }
+            }
+
+            if (sr_num > 0) {
+                /* Read from client. */
+
+                r = BIO_read(s_ssl_bio, sbuf, sizeof(sbuf));
+                if (r < 0) {
+                    if (!BIO_should_retry(s_ssl_bio)) {
+                        fprintf(stderr, "ERROR in SERVER\n");
+                        err_in_server = 1;
+                        goto err;
+                    }
+                    /* blah, blah */
+                } else if (r == 0) {
+                    fprintf(stderr, "SSL SERVER STARTUP FAILED\n");
+                    goto err;
+                } else {
+                    if (debug)
+                        printf("server read %d\n", r);
+                    sr_num -= r;
+                }
+            }
+
+            *s_time += (clock() - s_clock);
+        }
+
+        {
+            /* "I/O" BETWEEN CLIENT AND SERVER. */
+
+            size_t r1, r2;
+            BIO *io1 = server_io, *io2 = client_io;
+            /*
+             * we use the non-copying interface for io1 and the standard
+             * BIO_write/BIO_read interface for io2
+             */
+
+            static int prev_progress = 1;
+            int progress = 0;
+
+            /* io1 to io2 */
+            do {
+                size_t num;
+                int r;
+
+                r1 = BIO_ctrl_pending(io1);
+                r2 = BIO_ctrl_get_write_guarantee(io2);
+
+                num = r1;
+                if (r2 < num)
+                    num = r2;
+                if (num) {
+                    char *dataptr;
+
+                    if (INT_MAX < num) /* yeah, right */
+                        num = INT_MAX;
+
+                    r = BIO_nread(io1, &dataptr, (int)num);
+                    assert(r > 0);
+                    assert(r <= (int)num);
+                    /*
+                     * possibly r < num (non-contiguous data)
+                     */
+                    num = r;
+                    r = BIO_write(io2, dataptr, (int)num);
+                    if (r != (int)num) { /* can't happen */
+                        fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: BIO_write could not write "
+                                "BIO_ctrl_get_write_guarantee() bytes");
+                        goto err;
+                    }
+                    progress = 1;
+
+                    if (debug)
+                        printf((io1 == client_io) ?
+                               "C->S relaying: %d bytes\n" :
+                               "S->C relaying: %d bytes\n", (int)num);
+                }
+            }
+            while (r1 && r2);
+
+            /* io2 to io1 */
+            {
+                size_t num;
+                int r;
+
+                r1 = BIO_ctrl_pending(io2);
+                r2 = BIO_ctrl_get_read_request(io1);
+                /*
+                 * here we could use ..._get_write_guarantee instead of
+                 * ..._get_read_request, but by using the latter we test
+                 * restartability of the SSL implementation more thoroughly
+                 */
+                num = r1;
+                if (r2 < num)
+                    num = r2;
+                if (num) {
+                    char *dataptr;
+
+                    if (INT_MAX < num)
+                        num = INT_MAX;
+
+                    if (num > 1)
+                        --num;  /* test restartability even more thoroughly */
+
+                    r = BIO_nwrite0(io1, &dataptr);
+                    assert(r > 0);
+                    if (r < (int)num)
+                        num = r;
+                    r = BIO_read(io2, dataptr, (int)num);
+                    if (r != (int)num) { /* can't happen */
+                        fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: BIO_read could not read "
+                                "BIO_ctrl_pending() bytes");
+                        goto err;
+                    }
+                    progress = 1;
+                    r = BIO_nwrite(io1, &dataptr, (int)num);
+                    if (r != (int)num) { /* can't happen */
+                        fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: BIO_nwrite() did not accept "
+                                "BIO_nwrite0() bytes");
+                        goto err;
+                    }
+
+                    if (debug)
+                        printf((io2 == client_io) ?
+                               "C->S relaying: %d bytes\n" :
+                               "S->C relaying: %d bytes\n", (int)num);
+                }
+            }                   /* no loop, BIO_ctrl_get_read_request now
+                                 * returns 0 anyway */
+
+            if (!progress && !prev_progress)
+                if (cw_num > 0 || cr_num > 0 || sw_num > 0 || sr_num > 0) {
+                    fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: got stuck\n");
+                    fprintf(stderr, " ERROR.\n");
+                    goto err;
+                }
+            prev_progress = progress;
+        }
+    }
+    while (cw_num > 0 || cr_num > 0 || sw_num > 0 || sr_num > 0);
+
+    if (verbose)
+        print_details(c_ssl, "DONE via BIO pair: ");
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+    if (verify_npn(c_ssl, s_ssl) < 0) {
+        ret = 1;
+        goto end;
+    }
+#endif
+    if (verify_serverinfo() < 0) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Server info verify error\n");
+        ret = 1;
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (verify_alpn(c_ssl, s_ssl) < 0) {
+        ret = 1;
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (verify_servername(c_ssl, s_ssl) < 0) {
+        ret = 1;
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (custom_ext_error) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Custom extension error\n");
+        ret = 1;
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+ end:
+#endif
+    ret = 0;
+
+ err:
+    ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+
+    BIO_free(server);
+    BIO_free(server_io);
+    BIO_free(client);
+    BIO_free(client_io);
+    BIO_free(s_ssl_bio);
+    BIO_free(c_ssl_bio);
+
+    if (should_negotiate != NULL && strcmp(should_negotiate, "fail-client") == 0)
+        ret = (err_in_client != 0) ? 0 : 1;
+    else if (should_negotiate != NULL && strcmp(should_negotiate, "fail-server") == 0)
+        ret = (err_in_server != 0) ? 0 : 1;
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+#define W_READ  1
+#define W_WRITE 2
+#define C_DONE  1
+#define S_DONE  2
+
+int doit(SSL *s_ssl, SSL *c_ssl, long count)
+{
+    char *cbuf = NULL, *sbuf = NULL;
+    long bufsiz;
+    long cw_num = count, cr_num = count;
+    long sw_num = count, sr_num = count;
+    int ret = 1;
+    BIO *c_to_s = NULL;
+    BIO *s_to_c = NULL;
+    BIO *c_bio = NULL;
+    BIO *s_bio = NULL;
+    int c_r, c_w, s_r, s_w;
+    int i, j;
+    int done = 0;
+    int c_write, s_write;
+    int do_server = 0, do_client = 0;
+    int max_frag = 5 * 1024;
+    int err_in_client = 0;
+    int err_in_server = 0;
+
+    bufsiz = count > 40 * 1024 ? 40 * 1024 : count;
+
+    if ((cbuf = OPENSSL_zalloc(bufsiz)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if ((sbuf = OPENSSL_zalloc(bufsiz)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    c_to_s = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+    s_to_c = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+    if ((s_to_c == NULL) || (c_to_s == NULL)) {
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    c_bio = BIO_new(BIO_f_ssl());
+    s_bio = BIO_new(BIO_f_ssl());
+    if ((c_bio == NULL) || (s_bio == NULL)) {
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    SSL_set_connect_state(c_ssl);
+    SSL_set_bio(c_ssl, s_to_c, c_to_s);
+    SSL_set_max_send_fragment(c_ssl, max_frag);
+    BIO_set_ssl(c_bio, c_ssl, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+
+    /*
+     * We've just given our ref to these BIOs to c_ssl. We need another one to
+     * give to s_ssl
+     */
+    if (!BIO_up_ref(c_to_s)) {
+        /* c_to_s and s_to_c will get freed when we free c_ssl */
+        c_to_s = NULL;
+        s_to_c = NULL;
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (!BIO_up_ref(s_to_c)) {
+        /* s_to_c will get freed when we free c_ssl */
+        s_to_c = NULL;
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    SSL_set_accept_state(s_ssl);
+    SSL_set_bio(s_ssl, c_to_s, s_to_c);
+
+    /* We've used up all our refs to these now */
+    c_to_s = NULL;
+    s_to_c = NULL;
+
+    SSL_set_max_send_fragment(s_ssl, max_frag);
+    BIO_set_ssl(s_bio, s_ssl, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+
+    c_r = 0;
+    s_r = 1;
+    c_w = 1;
+    s_w = 0;
+    c_write = 1, s_write = 0;
+
+    /* We can always do writes */
+    for (;;) {
+        do_server = 0;
+        do_client = 0;
+
+        i = (int)BIO_pending(s_bio);
+        if ((i && s_r) || s_w)
+            do_server = 1;
+
+        i = (int)BIO_pending(c_bio);
+        if ((i && c_r) || c_w)
+            do_client = 1;
+
+        if (do_server && debug) {
+            if (SSL_in_init(s_ssl))
+                printf("server waiting in SSL_accept - %s\n",
+                       SSL_state_string_long(s_ssl));
+/*-
+            else if (s_write)
+                printf("server:SSL_write()\n");
+            else
+                printf("server:SSL_read()\n"); */
+        }
+
+        if (do_client && debug) {
+            if (SSL_in_init(c_ssl))
+                printf("client waiting in SSL_connect - %s\n",
+                       SSL_state_string_long(c_ssl));
+/*-
+            else if (c_write)
+                printf("client:SSL_write()\n");
+            else
+                printf("client:SSL_read()\n"); */
+        }
+
+        if (!do_client && !do_server) {
+            fprintf(stdout, "ERROR IN STARTUP\n");
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (do_client && !(done & C_DONE)) {
+            if (c_write) {
+                j = (cw_num > bufsiz) ? (int)bufsiz : (int)cw_num;
+                i = BIO_write(c_bio, cbuf, j);
+                if (i < 0) {
+                    c_r = 0;
+                    c_w = 0;
+                    if (BIO_should_retry(c_bio)) {
+                        if (BIO_should_read(c_bio))
+                            c_r = 1;
+                        if (BIO_should_write(c_bio))
+                            c_w = 1;
+                    } else {
+                        fprintf(stderr, "ERROR in CLIENT\n");
+                        err_in_client = 1;
+                        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+                        goto err;
+                    }
+                } else if (i == 0) {
+                    fprintf(stderr, "SSL CLIENT STARTUP FAILED\n");
+                    goto err;
+                } else {
+                    if (debug)
+                        printf("client wrote %d\n", i);
+                    /* ok */
+                    s_r = 1;
+                    c_write = 0;
+                    cw_num -= i;
+                    if (max_frag > 1029)
+                        SSL_set_max_send_fragment(c_ssl, max_frag -= 5);
+                }
+            } else {
+                i = BIO_read(c_bio, cbuf, bufsiz);
+                if (i < 0) {
+                    c_r = 0;
+                    c_w = 0;
+                    if (BIO_should_retry(c_bio)) {
+                        if (BIO_should_read(c_bio))
+                            c_r = 1;
+                        if (BIO_should_write(c_bio))
+                            c_w = 1;
+                    } else {
+                        fprintf(stderr, "ERROR in CLIENT\n");
+                        err_in_client = 1;
+                        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+                        goto err;
+                    }
+                } else if (i == 0) {
+                    fprintf(stderr, "SSL CLIENT STARTUP FAILED\n");
+                    goto err;
+                } else {
+                    if (debug)
+                        printf("client read %d\n", i);
+                    cr_num -= i;
+                    if (sw_num > 0) {
+                        s_write = 1;
+                        s_w = 1;
+                    }
+                    if (cr_num <= 0) {
+                        s_write = 1;
+                        s_w = 1;
+                        done = S_DONE | C_DONE;
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
+        if (do_server && !(done & S_DONE)) {
+            if (!s_write) {
+                i = BIO_read(s_bio, sbuf, bufsiz);
+                if (i < 0) {
+                    s_r = 0;
+                    s_w = 0;
+                    if (BIO_should_retry(s_bio)) {
+                        if (BIO_should_read(s_bio))
+                            s_r = 1;
+                        if (BIO_should_write(s_bio))
+                            s_w = 1;
+                    } else {
+                        fprintf(stderr, "ERROR in SERVER\n");
+                        err_in_server = 1;
+                        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+                        goto err;
+                    }
+                } else if (i == 0) {
+                    ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+                    fprintf(stderr,
+                            "SSL SERVER STARTUP FAILED in SSL_read\n");
+                    goto err;
+                } else {
+                    if (debug)
+                        printf("server read %d\n", i);
+                    sr_num -= i;
+                    if (cw_num > 0) {
+                        c_write = 1;
+                        c_w = 1;
+                    }
+                    if (sr_num <= 0) {
+                        s_write = 1;
+                        s_w = 1;
+                        c_write = 0;
+                    }
+                }
+            } else {
+                j = (sw_num > bufsiz) ? (int)bufsiz : (int)sw_num;
+                i = BIO_write(s_bio, sbuf, j);
+                if (i < 0) {
+                    s_r = 0;
+                    s_w = 0;
+                    if (BIO_should_retry(s_bio)) {
+                        if (BIO_should_read(s_bio))
+                            s_r = 1;
+                        if (BIO_should_write(s_bio))
+                            s_w = 1;
+                    } else {
+                        fprintf(stderr, "ERROR in SERVER\n");
+                        err_in_server = 1;
+                        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+                        goto err;
+                    }
+                } else if (i == 0) {
+                    ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+                    fprintf(stderr,
+                            "SSL SERVER STARTUP FAILED in SSL_write\n");
+                    goto err;
+                } else {
+                    if (debug)
+                        printf("server wrote %d\n", i);
+                    sw_num -= i;
+                    s_write = 0;
+                    c_r = 1;
+                    if (sw_num <= 0)
+                        done |= S_DONE;
+                    if (max_frag > 1029)
+                        SSL_set_max_send_fragment(s_ssl, max_frag -= 5);
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
+        if ((done & S_DONE) && (done & C_DONE))
+            break;
+    }
+
+    if (verbose)
+        print_details(c_ssl, "DONE: ");
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+    if (verify_npn(c_ssl, s_ssl) < 0) {
+        ret = 1;
+        goto err;
+    }
+#endif
+    if (verify_serverinfo() < 0) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Server info verify error\n");
+        ret = 1;
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (custom_ext_error) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Custom extension error\n");
+        ret = 1;
+        goto err;
+    }
+    ret = 0;
+ err:
+    BIO_free(c_to_s);
+    BIO_free(s_to_c);
+    BIO_free_all(c_bio);
+    BIO_free_all(s_bio);
+    OPENSSL_free(cbuf);
+    OPENSSL_free(sbuf);
+
+    if (should_negotiate != NULL && strcmp(should_negotiate, "fail-client") == 0)
+        ret = (err_in_client != 0) ? 0 : 1;
+    else if (should_negotiate != NULL && strcmp(should_negotiate, "fail-server") == 0)
+        ret = (err_in_server != 0) ? 0 : 1;
+
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static int verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    char *s, buf[256];
+
+    s = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx)),
+                          buf, sizeof(buf));
+    if (s != NULL) {
+        if (ok)
+            printf("depth=%d %s\n", X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx), buf);
+        else {
+            fprintf(stderr, "depth=%d error=%d %s\n",
+                    X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx),
+                    X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx), buf);
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (ok == 0) {
+        int i = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
+
+        switch (i) {
+        default:
+            fprintf(stderr, "Error string: %s\n",
+                    X509_verify_cert_error_string(i));
+            break;
+        case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID:
+        case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
+        case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT:
+            ok = 1;
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+
+    return (ok);
+}
+
+static int app_verify_callback(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, void *arg)
+{
+    int ok = 1;
+    struct app_verify_arg *cb_arg = arg;
+
+    if (cb_arg->app_verify) {
+        char *s = NULL, buf[256];
+        X509 *c = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_cert(ctx);
+
+        printf("In app_verify_callback, allowing cert. ");
+        printf("Arg is: %s\n", cb_arg->string);
+        printf("Finished printing do we have a context? 0x%p a cert? 0x%p\n",
+                (void *)ctx, (void *)c);
+        if (c)
+            s = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(c), buf, 256);
+        if (s != NULL) {
+            printf("cert depth=%d %s\n",
+                    X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx), buf);
+        }
+        return (1);
+    }
+
+    ok = X509_verify_cert(ctx);
+
+    return (ok);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+/*-
+ * These DH parameters have been generated as follows:
+ *    $ openssl dhparam -C -noout 512
+ *    $ openssl dhparam -C -noout 1024
+ *    $ openssl dhparam -C -noout -dsaparam 1024
+ * (The third function has been renamed to avoid name conflicts.)
+ */
+static DH *get_dh512()
+{
+    static unsigned char dh512_p[] = {
+        0xCB, 0xC8, 0xE1, 0x86, 0xD0, 0x1F, 0x94, 0x17, 0xA6, 0x99, 0xF0,
+        0xC6,
+        0x1F, 0x0D, 0xAC, 0xB6, 0x25, 0x3E, 0x06, 0x39, 0xCA, 0x72, 0x04,
+        0xB0,
+        0x6E, 0xDA, 0xC0, 0x61, 0xE6, 0x7A, 0x77, 0x25, 0xE8, 0x3B, 0xB9,
+        0x5F,
+        0x9A, 0xB6, 0xB5, 0xFE, 0x99, 0x0B, 0xA1, 0x93, 0x4E, 0x35, 0x33,
+        0xB8,
+        0xE1, 0xF1, 0x13, 0x4F, 0x59, 0x1A, 0xD2, 0x57, 0xC0, 0x26, 0x21,
+        0x33,
+        0x02, 0xC5, 0xAE, 0x23,
+    };
+    static unsigned char dh512_g[] = {
+        0x02,
+    };
+    DH *dh;
+    BIGNUM *p, *g;
+
+    if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL)
+        return (NULL);
+    p = BN_bin2bn(dh512_p, sizeof(dh512_p), NULL);
+    g = BN_bin2bn(dh512_g, sizeof(dh512_g), NULL);
+    if ((p == NULL) || (g == NULL) || !DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) {
+        DH_free(dh);
+        BN_free(p);
+        BN_free(g);
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+    return (dh);
+}
+
+static DH *get_dh1024()
+{
+    static unsigned char dh1024_p[] = {
+        0xF8, 0x81, 0x89, 0x7D, 0x14, 0x24, 0xC5, 0xD1, 0xE6, 0xF7, 0xBF,
+        0x3A,
+        0xE4, 0x90, 0xF4, 0xFC, 0x73, 0xFB, 0x34, 0xB5, 0xFA, 0x4C, 0x56,
+        0xA2,
+        0xEA, 0xA7, 0xE9, 0xC0, 0xC0, 0xCE, 0x89, 0xE1, 0xFA, 0x63, 0x3F,
+        0xB0,
+        0x6B, 0x32, 0x66, 0xF1, 0xD1, 0x7B, 0xB0, 0x00, 0x8F, 0xCA, 0x87,
+        0xC2,
+        0xAE, 0x98, 0x89, 0x26, 0x17, 0xC2, 0x05, 0xD2, 0xEC, 0x08, 0xD0,
+        0x8C,
+        0xFF, 0x17, 0x52, 0x8C, 0xC5, 0x07, 0x93, 0x03, 0xB1, 0xF6, 0x2F,
+        0xB8,
+        0x1C, 0x52, 0x47, 0x27, 0x1B, 0xDB, 0xD1, 0x8D, 0x9D, 0x69, 0x1D,
+        0x52,
+        0x4B, 0x32, 0x81, 0xAA, 0x7F, 0x00, 0xC8, 0xDC, 0xE6, 0xD9, 0xCC,
+        0xC1,
+        0x11, 0x2D, 0x37, 0x34, 0x6C, 0xEA, 0x02, 0x97, 0x4B, 0x0E, 0xBB,
+        0xB1,
+        0x71, 0x33, 0x09, 0x15, 0xFD, 0xDD, 0x23, 0x87, 0x07, 0x5E, 0x89,
+        0xAB,
+        0x6B, 0x7C, 0x5F, 0xEC, 0xA6, 0x24, 0xDC, 0x53,
+    };
+    static unsigned char dh1024_g[] = {
+        0x02,
+    };
+    DH *dh;
+    BIGNUM *p, *g;
+
+    if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL)
+        return (NULL);
+    p = BN_bin2bn(dh1024_p, sizeof(dh1024_p), NULL);
+    g = BN_bin2bn(dh1024_g, sizeof(dh1024_g), NULL);
+    if ((p == NULL) || (g == NULL) || !DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) {
+        DH_free(dh);
+        BN_free(p);
+        BN_free(g);
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+    return (dh);
+}
+
+static DH *get_dh1024dsa()
+{
+    static unsigned char dh1024_p[] = {
+        0xC8, 0x00, 0xF7, 0x08, 0x07, 0x89, 0x4D, 0x90, 0x53, 0xF3, 0xD5,
+        0x00,
+        0x21, 0x1B, 0xF7, 0x31, 0xA6, 0xA2, 0xDA, 0x23, 0x9A, 0xC7, 0x87,
+        0x19,
+        0x3B, 0x47, 0xB6, 0x8C, 0x04, 0x6F, 0xFF, 0xC6, 0x9B, 0xB8, 0x65,
+        0xD2,
+        0xC2, 0x5F, 0x31, 0x83, 0x4A, 0xA7, 0x5F, 0x2F, 0x88, 0x38, 0xB6,
+        0x55,
+        0xCF, 0xD9, 0x87, 0x6D, 0x6F, 0x9F, 0xDA, 0xAC, 0xA6, 0x48, 0xAF,
+        0xFC,
+        0x33, 0x84, 0x37, 0x5B, 0x82, 0x4A, 0x31, 0x5D, 0xE7, 0xBD, 0x52,
+        0x97,
+        0xA1, 0x77, 0xBF, 0x10, 0x9E, 0x37, 0xEA, 0x64, 0xFA, 0xCA, 0x28,
+        0x8D,
+        0x9D, 0x3B, 0xD2, 0x6E, 0x09, 0x5C, 0x68, 0xC7, 0x45, 0x90, 0xFD,
+        0xBB,
+        0x70, 0xC9, 0x3A, 0xBB, 0xDF, 0xD4, 0x21, 0x0F, 0xC4, 0x6A, 0x3C,
+        0xF6,
+        0x61, 0xCF, 0x3F, 0xD6, 0x13, 0xF1, 0x5F, 0xBC, 0xCF, 0xBC, 0x26,
+        0x9E,
+        0xBC, 0x0B, 0xBD, 0xAB, 0x5D, 0xC9, 0x54, 0x39,
+    };
+    static unsigned char dh1024_g[] = {
+        0x3B, 0x40, 0x86, 0xE7, 0xF3, 0x6C, 0xDE, 0x67, 0x1C, 0xCC, 0x80,
+        0x05,
+        0x5A, 0xDF, 0xFE, 0xBD, 0x20, 0x27, 0x74, 0x6C, 0x24, 0xC9, 0x03,
+        0xF3,
+        0xE1, 0x8D, 0xC3, 0x7D, 0x98, 0x27, 0x40, 0x08, 0xB8, 0x8C, 0x6A,
+        0xE9,
+        0xBB, 0x1A, 0x3A, 0xD6, 0x86, 0x83, 0x5E, 0x72, 0x41, 0xCE, 0x85,
+        0x3C,
+        0xD2, 0xB3, 0xFC, 0x13, 0xCE, 0x37, 0x81, 0x9E, 0x4C, 0x1C, 0x7B,
+        0x65,
+        0xD3, 0xE6, 0xA6, 0x00, 0xF5, 0x5A, 0x95, 0x43, 0x5E, 0x81, 0xCF,
+        0x60,
+        0xA2, 0x23, 0xFC, 0x36, 0xA7, 0x5D, 0x7A, 0x4C, 0x06, 0x91, 0x6E,
+        0xF6,
+        0x57, 0xEE, 0x36, 0xCB, 0x06, 0xEA, 0xF5, 0x3D, 0x95, 0x49, 0xCB,
+        0xA7,
+        0xDD, 0x81, 0xDF, 0x80, 0x09, 0x4A, 0x97, 0x4D, 0xA8, 0x22, 0x72,
+        0xA1,
+        0x7F, 0xC4, 0x70, 0x56, 0x70, 0xE8, 0x20, 0x10, 0x18, 0x8F, 0x2E,
+        0x60,
+        0x07, 0xE7, 0x68, 0x1A, 0x82, 0x5D, 0x32, 0xA2,
+    };
+    DH *dh;
+    BIGNUM *p, *g;
+
+    if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL)
+        return (NULL);
+    p = BN_bin2bn(dh1024_p, sizeof(dh1024_p), NULL);
+    g = BN_bin2bn(dh1024_g, sizeof(dh1024_g), NULL);
+    if ((p == NULL) || (g == NULL) || !DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) {
+        DH_free(dh);
+        BN_free(p);
+        BN_free(g);
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+    DH_set_length(dh, 160);
+    return (dh);
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+/* convert the PSK key (psk_key) in ascii to binary (psk) */
+static int psk_key2bn(const char *pskkey, unsigned char *psk,
+                      unsigned int max_psk_len)
+{
+    int ret;
+    BIGNUM *bn = NULL;
+
+    ret = BN_hex2bn(&bn, pskkey);
+    if (!ret) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Could not convert PSK key '%s' to BIGNUM\n",
+                   pskkey);
+        BN_free(bn);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (BN_num_bytes(bn) > (int)max_psk_len) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                   "psk buffer of callback is too small (%d) for key (%d)\n",
+                   max_psk_len, BN_num_bytes(bn));
+        BN_free(bn);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    ret = BN_bn2bin(bn, psk);
+    BN_free(bn);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static unsigned int psk_client_callback(SSL *ssl, const char *hint,
+                                        char *identity,
+                                        unsigned int max_identity_len,
+                                        unsigned char *psk,
+                                        unsigned int max_psk_len)
+{
+    int ret;
+    unsigned int psk_len = 0;
+
+    ret = BIO_snprintf(identity, max_identity_len, "Client_identity");
+    if (ret < 0)
+        goto out_err;
+    if (debug)
+        fprintf(stderr, "client: created identity '%s' len=%d\n", identity,
+                ret);
+    ret = psk_key2bn(psk_key, psk, max_psk_len);
+    if (ret < 0)
+        goto out_err;
+    psk_len = ret;
+ out_err:
+    return psk_len;
+}
+
+static unsigned int psk_server_callback(SSL *ssl, const char *identity,
+                                        unsigned char *psk,
+                                        unsigned int max_psk_len)
+{
+    unsigned int psk_len = 0;
+
+    if (strcmp(identity, "Client_identity") != 0) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "server: PSK error: client identity not found\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+    psk_len = psk_key2bn(psk_key, psk, max_psk_len);
+    return psk_len;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssltestlib.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssltestlib.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b824f15
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssltestlib.c
@@ -0,0 +1,710 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "e_os.h"
+#include "ssltestlib.h"
+
+static int tls_dump_new(BIO *bi);
+static int tls_dump_free(BIO *a);
+static int tls_dump_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl);
+static int tls_dump_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl);
+static long tls_dump_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr);
+static int tls_dump_gets(BIO *bp, char *buf, int size);
+static int tls_dump_puts(BIO *bp, const char *str);
+
+/* Choose a sufficiently large type likely to be unused for this custom BIO */
+# define BIO_TYPE_TLS_DUMP_FILTER  (0x80 | BIO_TYPE_FILTER)
+
+# define BIO_TYPE_MEMPACKET_TEST      0x81
+
+static BIO_METHOD *method_tls_dump = NULL;
+static BIO_METHOD *method_mempacket_test = NULL;
+
+/* Note: Not thread safe! */
+const BIO_METHOD *bio_f_tls_dump_filter(void)
+{
+    if (method_tls_dump == NULL) {
+        method_tls_dump = BIO_meth_new(BIO_TYPE_TLS_DUMP_FILTER,
+                                        "TLS dump filter");
+        if (   method_tls_dump == NULL
+            || !BIO_meth_set_write(method_tls_dump, tls_dump_write)
+            || !BIO_meth_set_read(method_tls_dump, tls_dump_read)
+            || !BIO_meth_set_puts(method_tls_dump, tls_dump_puts)
+            || !BIO_meth_set_gets(method_tls_dump, tls_dump_gets)
+            || !BIO_meth_set_ctrl(method_tls_dump, tls_dump_ctrl)
+            || !BIO_meth_set_create(method_tls_dump, tls_dump_new)
+            || !BIO_meth_set_destroy(method_tls_dump, tls_dump_free))
+            return NULL;
+    }
+    return method_tls_dump;
+}
+
+void bio_f_tls_dump_filter_free(void)
+{
+    BIO_meth_free(method_tls_dump);
+}
+
+static int tls_dump_new(BIO *bio)
+{
+    BIO_set_init(bio, 1);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int tls_dump_free(BIO *bio)
+{
+    BIO_set_init(bio, 0);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static void copy_flags(BIO *bio)
+{
+    int flags;
+    BIO *next = BIO_next(bio);
+
+    flags = BIO_test_flags(next, BIO_FLAGS_SHOULD_RETRY | BIO_FLAGS_RWS);
+    BIO_clear_flags(bio, BIO_FLAGS_SHOULD_RETRY | BIO_FLAGS_RWS);
+    BIO_set_flags(bio, flags);
+}
+
+#define RECORD_CONTENT_TYPE     0
+#define RECORD_VERSION_HI       1
+#define RECORD_VERSION_LO       2
+#define RECORD_EPOCH_HI         3
+#define RECORD_EPOCH_LO         4
+#define RECORD_SEQUENCE_START   5
+#define RECORD_SEQUENCE_END     10
+#define RECORD_LEN_HI           11
+#define RECORD_LEN_LO           12
+
+#define MSG_TYPE                0
+#define MSG_LEN_HI              1
+#define MSG_LEN_MID             2
+#define MSG_LEN_LO              3
+#define MSG_SEQ_HI              4
+#define MSG_SEQ_LO              5
+#define MSG_FRAG_OFF_HI         6
+#define MSG_FRAG_OFF_MID        7
+#define MSG_FRAG_OFF_LO         8
+#define MSG_FRAG_LEN_HI         9
+#define MSG_FRAG_LEN_MID        10
+#define MSG_FRAG_LEN_LO         11
+
+
+static void dump_data(const char *data, int len)
+{
+    int rem, i, content, reclen, msglen, fragoff, fraglen, epoch;
+    unsigned char *rec;
+
+    printf("---- START OF PACKET ----\n");
+
+    rem = len;
+    rec = (unsigned char *)data;
+
+    while (rem > 0) {
+        if (rem != len)
+            printf("*\n");
+        printf("*---- START OF RECORD ----\n");
+        if (rem < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
+            printf("*---- RECORD TRUNCATED ----\n");
+            break;
+        }
+        content = rec[RECORD_CONTENT_TYPE];
+        printf("** Record Content-type: %d\n", content);
+        printf("** Record Version: %02x%02x\n",
+               rec[RECORD_VERSION_HI], rec[RECORD_VERSION_LO]);
+        epoch = (rec[RECORD_EPOCH_HI] << 8) | rec[RECORD_EPOCH_LO];
+        printf("** Record Epoch: %d\n", epoch);
+        printf("** Record Sequence: ");
+        for (i = RECORD_SEQUENCE_START; i <= RECORD_SEQUENCE_END; i++)
+            printf("%02x", rec[i]);
+        reclen = (rec[RECORD_LEN_HI] << 8) | rec[RECORD_LEN_LO];
+        printf("\n** Record Length: %d\n", reclen);
+
+        /* Now look at message */
+        rec += DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+        rem -= DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+        if (content == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
+            printf("**---- START OF HANDSHAKE MESSAGE FRAGMENT ----\n");
+            if (epoch > 0) {
+                printf("**---- HANDSHAKE MESSAGE FRAGMENT ENCRYPTED ----\n");
+            } else if (rem < DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
+                    || reclen < DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
+                printf("**---- HANDSHAKE MESSAGE FRAGMENT TRUNCATED ----\n");
+            } else {
+                printf("*** Message Type: %d\n", rec[MSG_TYPE]);
+                msglen = (rec[MSG_LEN_HI] << 16) | (rec[MSG_LEN_MID] << 8)
+                         | rec[MSG_LEN_LO];
+                printf("*** Message Length: %d\n", msglen);
+                printf("*** Message sequence: %d\n",
+                       (rec[MSG_SEQ_HI] << 8) | rec[MSG_SEQ_LO]);
+                fragoff = (rec[MSG_FRAG_OFF_HI] << 16)
+                          | (rec[MSG_FRAG_OFF_MID] << 8)
+                          | rec[MSG_FRAG_OFF_LO];
+                printf("*** Message Fragment offset: %d\n", fragoff);
+                fraglen = (rec[MSG_FRAG_LEN_HI] << 16)
+                          | (rec[MSG_FRAG_LEN_MID] << 8)
+                          | rec[MSG_FRAG_LEN_LO];
+                printf("*** Message Fragment len: %d\n", fraglen);
+                if (fragoff + fraglen > msglen)
+                    printf("***---- HANDSHAKE MESSAGE FRAGMENT INVALID ----\n");
+                else if(reclen < fraglen)
+                    printf("**---- HANDSHAKE MESSAGE FRAGMENT TRUNCATED ----\n");
+                else
+                    printf("**---- END OF HANDSHAKE MESSAGE FRAGMENT ----\n");
+            }
+        }
+        if (rem < reclen) {
+            printf("*---- RECORD TRUNCATED ----\n");
+            rem = 0;
+        } else {
+            rec += reclen;
+            rem -= reclen;
+            printf("*---- END OF RECORD ----\n");
+        }
+    }
+    printf("---- END OF PACKET ----\n\n");
+    fflush(stdout);
+}
+
+static int tls_dump_read(BIO *bio, char *out, int outl)
+{
+    int ret;
+    BIO *next = BIO_next(bio);
+
+    ret = BIO_read(next, out, outl);
+    copy_flags(bio);
+
+    if (ret > 0) {
+        dump_data(out, ret);
+    }
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int tls_dump_write(BIO *bio, const char *in, int inl)
+{
+    int ret;
+    BIO *next = BIO_next(bio);
+
+    ret = BIO_write(next, in, inl);
+    copy_flags(bio);
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static long tls_dump_ctrl(BIO *bio, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
+{
+    long ret;
+    BIO *next = BIO_next(bio);
+
+    if (next == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    switch (cmd) {
+    case BIO_CTRL_DUP:
+        ret = 0L;
+        break;
+    default:
+        ret = BIO_ctrl(next, cmd, num, ptr);
+        break;
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int tls_dump_gets(BIO *bio, char *buf, int size)
+{
+    /* We don't support this - not needed anyway */
+    return -1;
+}
+
+static int tls_dump_puts(BIO *bio, const char *str)
+{
+    return tls_dump_write(bio, str, strlen(str));
+}
+
+
+struct mempacket_st {
+    unsigned char *data;
+    int len;
+    unsigned int num;
+    unsigned int type;
+};
+
+static void mempacket_free(MEMPACKET *pkt)
+{
+    if (pkt->data != NULL)
+        OPENSSL_free(pkt->data);
+    OPENSSL_free(pkt);
+}
+
+typedef struct mempacket_test_ctx_st {
+    STACK_OF(MEMPACKET) *pkts;
+    unsigned int epoch;
+    unsigned int currrec;
+    unsigned int currpkt;
+    unsigned int lastpkt;
+    unsigned int noinject;
+} MEMPACKET_TEST_CTX;
+
+static int mempacket_test_new(BIO *bi);
+static int mempacket_test_free(BIO *a);
+static int mempacket_test_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl);
+static int mempacket_test_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl);
+static long mempacket_test_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr);
+static int mempacket_test_gets(BIO *bp, char *buf, int size);
+static int mempacket_test_puts(BIO *bp, const char *str);
+
+const BIO_METHOD *bio_s_mempacket_test(void)
+{
+    if (method_mempacket_test == NULL) {
+        method_mempacket_test = BIO_meth_new(BIO_TYPE_MEMPACKET_TEST,
+                                             "Mem Packet Test");
+        if (   method_mempacket_test == NULL
+            || !BIO_meth_set_write(method_mempacket_test, mempacket_test_write)
+            || !BIO_meth_set_read(method_mempacket_test, mempacket_test_read)
+            || !BIO_meth_set_puts(method_mempacket_test, mempacket_test_puts)
+            || !BIO_meth_set_gets(method_mempacket_test, mempacket_test_gets)
+            || !BIO_meth_set_ctrl(method_mempacket_test, mempacket_test_ctrl)
+            || !BIO_meth_set_create(method_mempacket_test, mempacket_test_new)
+            || !BIO_meth_set_destroy(method_mempacket_test, mempacket_test_free))
+            return NULL;
+    }
+    return method_mempacket_test;
+}
+
+void bio_s_mempacket_test_free(void)
+{
+    BIO_meth_free(method_mempacket_test);
+}
+
+static int mempacket_test_new(BIO *bio)
+{
+    MEMPACKET_TEST_CTX *ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx));
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    ctx->pkts = sk_MEMPACKET_new_null();
+    if (ctx->pkts == NULL) {
+        OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    BIO_set_init(bio, 1);
+    BIO_set_data(bio, ctx);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int mempacket_test_free(BIO *bio)
+{
+    MEMPACKET_TEST_CTX *ctx = BIO_get_data(bio);
+
+    sk_MEMPACKET_pop_free(ctx->pkts, mempacket_free);
+    OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+    BIO_set_data(bio, NULL);
+    BIO_set_init(bio, 0);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Record Header values */
+#define EPOCH_HI        4
+#define EPOCH_LO        5
+#define RECORD_SEQUENCE 10
+#define RECORD_LEN_HI   11
+#define RECORD_LEN_LO   12
+
+#define STANDARD_PACKET                 0
+
+static int mempacket_test_read(BIO *bio, char *out, int outl)
+{
+    MEMPACKET_TEST_CTX *ctx = BIO_get_data(bio);
+    MEMPACKET *thispkt;
+    unsigned char *rec;
+    int rem;
+    unsigned int seq, offset, len, epoch;
+
+    BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
+
+    thispkt = sk_MEMPACKET_value(ctx->pkts, 0);
+    if (thispkt == NULL || thispkt->num != ctx->currpkt) {
+        /* Probably run out of data */
+        BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
+        return -1;
+    }
+    (void)sk_MEMPACKET_shift(ctx->pkts);
+    ctx->currpkt++;
+
+    if (outl > thispkt->len)
+        outl = thispkt->len;
+
+    if (thispkt->type != INJECT_PACKET_IGNORE_REC_SEQ) {
+        /*
+         * Overwrite the record sequence number. We strictly number them in
+         * the order received. Since we are actually a reliable transport
+         * we know that there won't be any re-ordering. We overwrite to deal
+         * with any packets that have been injected
+         */
+        rem = thispkt->len;
+        rec = thispkt->data;
+        while (rem > 0) {
+            if (rem < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
+                return -1;
+            }
+            epoch = (rec[EPOCH_HI] << 8) | rec[EPOCH_LO];
+            if (epoch != ctx->epoch) {
+                ctx->epoch = epoch;
+                ctx->currrec = 0;
+            }
+            seq = ctx->currrec;
+            offset = 0;
+            do {
+                rec[RECORD_SEQUENCE - offset] = seq & 0xFF;
+                seq >>= 8;
+                offset++;
+            } while (seq > 0);
+            ctx->currrec++;
+
+            len = ((rec[RECORD_LEN_HI] << 8) | rec[RECORD_LEN_LO])
+                  + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+
+            rec += len;
+            rem -= len;
+        }
+    }
+
+    memcpy(out, thispkt->data, outl);
+
+    mempacket_free(thispkt);
+
+    return outl;
+}
+
+int mempacket_test_inject(BIO *bio, const char *in, int inl, int pktnum,
+                          int type)
+{
+    MEMPACKET_TEST_CTX *ctx = BIO_get_data(bio);
+    MEMPACKET *thispkt, *looppkt, *nextpkt;
+    int i;
+
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        return -1;
+
+    /* We only allow injection before we've started writing any data */
+    if (pktnum >= 0) {
+        if (ctx->noinject)
+            return -1;
+    } else {
+        ctx->noinject = 1;
+    }
+
+    thispkt = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(MEMPACKET));
+    if (thispkt == NULL)
+        return -1;
+
+    thispkt->data = OPENSSL_malloc(inl);
+    if (thispkt->data == NULL) {
+        mempacket_free(thispkt);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    memcpy(thispkt->data, in, inl);
+    thispkt->len = inl;
+    thispkt->num = (pktnum >= 0) ? (unsigned int)pktnum : ctx->lastpkt;
+    thispkt->type = type;
+
+    for(i = 0; (looppkt = sk_MEMPACKET_value(ctx->pkts, i)) != NULL; i++) {
+        /* Check if we found the right place to insert this packet */
+        if (looppkt->num > thispkt->num) {
+            if (sk_MEMPACKET_insert(ctx->pkts, thispkt, i) == 0) {
+                mempacket_free(thispkt);
+                return -1;
+            }
+            /* If we're doing up front injection then we're done */
+            if (pktnum >= 0)
+                return inl;
+            /*
+             * We need to do some accounting on lastpkt. We increment it first,
+             * but it might now equal the value of injected packets, so we need
+             * to skip over those
+             */
+            ctx->lastpkt++;
+            do {
+                i++;
+                nextpkt = sk_MEMPACKET_value(ctx->pkts, i);
+                if (nextpkt != NULL && nextpkt->num == ctx->lastpkt)
+                    ctx->lastpkt++;
+                else
+                    return inl;
+            } while(1);
+        } else if(looppkt->num == thispkt->num) {
+            if (!ctx->noinject) {
+                /* We injected two packets with the same packet number! */
+                return -1;
+            }
+            ctx->lastpkt++;
+            thispkt->num++;
+        }
+    }
+    /*
+     * We didn't find any packets with a packet number equal to or greater than
+     * this one, so we just add it onto the end
+     */
+    if (!sk_MEMPACKET_push(ctx->pkts, thispkt)) {
+        mempacket_free(thispkt);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (pktnum < 0)
+        ctx->lastpkt++;
+
+    return inl;
+}
+
+static int mempacket_test_write(BIO *bio, const char *in, int inl)
+{
+    return mempacket_test_inject(bio, in, inl, -1, STANDARD_PACKET);
+}
+
+static long mempacket_test_ctrl(BIO *bio, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
+{
+    long ret = 1;
+    MEMPACKET_TEST_CTX *ctx = BIO_get_data(bio);
+    MEMPACKET *thispkt;
+
+    switch (cmd) {
+    case BIO_CTRL_EOF:
+        ret = (long)(sk_MEMPACKET_num(ctx->pkts) == 0);
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_GET_CLOSE:
+        ret = BIO_get_shutdown(bio);
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_SET_CLOSE:
+        BIO_set_shutdown(bio, (int)num);
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_WPENDING:
+        ret = 0L;
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_PENDING:
+        thispkt = sk_MEMPACKET_value(ctx->pkts, 0);
+        if (thispkt == NULL)
+            ret = 0;
+        else
+            ret = thispkt->len;
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_FLUSH:
+        ret = 1;
+        break;
+    case BIO_CTRL_RESET:
+    case BIO_CTRL_DUP:
+    case BIO_CTRL_PUSH:
+    case BIO_CTRL_POP:
+    default:
+        ret = 0;
+        break;
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int mempacket_test_gets(BIO *bio, char *buf, int size)
+{
+    /* We don't support this - not needed anyway */
+    return -1;
+}
+
+static int mempacket_test_puts(BIO *bio, const char *str)
+{
+    return mempacket_test_write(bio, str, strlen(str));
+}
+
+int create_ssl_ctx_pair(const SSL_METHOD *sm, const SSL_METHOD *cm,
+                        int min_proto_version, int max_proto_version,
+                        SSL_CTX **sctx, SSL_CTX **cctx, char *certfile,
+                        char *privkeyfile)
+{
+    SSL_CTX *serverctx = NULL;
+    SSL_CTX *clientctx = NULL;
+
+    serverctx = SSL_CTX_new(sm);
+    if (cctx != NULL)
+        clientctx = SSL_CTX_new(cm);
+    if (serverctx == NULL || (cctx != NULL && clientctx == NULL)) {
+        printf("Failed to create SSL_CTX\n");
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (min_proto_version > 0
+        && !SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(serverctx, min_proto_version)) {
+        printf("Unable to set server min protocol versions\n");
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (max_proto_version > 0
+        && !SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(serverctx, max_proto_version)) {
+        printf("Unable to set server max protocol versions\n");
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (clientctx != NULL) {
+        if (min_proto_version > 0
+            && !SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(clientctx, max_proto_version)) {
+            printf("Unable to set client max protocol versions\n");
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (max_proto_version > 0
+            && !SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(clientctx, min_proto_version)) {
+            printf("Unable to set client min protocol versions\n");
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(serverctx, certfile,
+                                     SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) <= 0) {
+        printf("Failed to load server certificate\n");
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(serverctx, privkeyfile,
+                                    SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) <= 0) {
+        printf("Failed to load server private key\n");
+    }
+    if (SSL_CTX_check_private_key(serverctx) <= 0) {
+        printf("Failed to check private key\n");
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+    SSL_CTX_set_dh_auto(serverctx, 1);
+#endif
+
+    *sctx = serverctx;
+    if (cctx != NULL)
+        *cctx = clientctx;
+
+    return 1;
+ err:
+    SSL_CTX_free(serverctx);
+    SSL_CTX_free(clientctx);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+#define MAXLOOPS    100000
+
+/*
+ * NOTE: Transfers control of the BIOs - this function will free them on error
+ */
+int create_ssl_objects(SSL_CTX *serverctx, SSL_CTX *clientctx, SSL **sssl,
+                          SSL **cssl, BIO *s_to_c_fbio, BIO *c_to_s_fbio)
+{
+    SSL *serverssl, *clientssl;
+    BIO *s_to_c_bio = NULL, *c_to_s_bio = NULL;
+
+    if (*sssl == NULL)
+        serverssl = SSL_new(serverctx);
+    else
+        serverssl = *sssl;
+    if (*cssl == NULL)
+        clientssl = SSL_new(clientctx);
+    else
+        clientssl = *cssl;
+
+    if (serverssl == NULL || clientssl == NULL) {
+        printf("Failed to create SSL object\n");
+        goto error;
+    }
+
+    if (SSL_is_dtls(clientssl)) {
+        s_to_c_bio = BIO_new(bio_s_mempacket_test());
+        c_to_s_bio = BIO_new(bio_s_mempacket_test());
+    } else {
+        s_to_c_bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+        c_to_s_bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+    }
+    if (s_to_c_bio == NULL || c_to_s_bio == NULL) {
+        printf("Failed to create mem BIOs\n");
+        goto error;
+    }
+
+    if (s_to_c_fbio != NULL)
+        s_to_c_bio = BIO_push(s_to_c_fbio, s_to_c_bio);
+    if (c_to_s_fbio != NULL)
+        c_to_s_bio = BIO_push(c_to_s_fbio, c_to_s_bio);
+    if (s_to_c_bio == NULL || c_to_s_bio == NULL) {
+        printf("Failed to create chained BIOs\n");
+        goto error;
+    }
+
+    /* Set Non-blocking IO behaviour */
+    BIO_set_mem_eof_return(s_to_c_bio, -1);
+    BIO_set_mem_eof_return(c_to_s_bio, -1);
+
+    /* Up ref these as we are passing them to two SSL objects */
+    BIO_up_ref(s_to_c_bio);
+    BIO_up_ref(c_to_s_bio);
+
+    SSL_set_bio(serverssl, c_to_s_bio, s_to_c_bio);
+    SSL_set_bio(clientssl, s_to_c_bio, c_to_s_bio);
+
+    /* BIOs will now be freed when SSL objects are freed */
+    s_to_c_bio = c_to_s_bio = NULL;
+    s_to_c_fbio = c_to_s_fbio = NULL;
+
+    *sssl = serverssl;
+    *cssl = clientssl;
+
+    return 1;
+
+ error:
+    SSL_free(serverssl);
+    SSL_free(clientssl);
+    BIO_free(s_to_c_bio);
+    BIO_free(c_to_s_bio);
+    BIO_free(s_to_c_fbio);
+    BIO_free(c_to_s_fbio);
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int create_ssl_connection(SSL *serverssl, SSL *clientssl)
+{
+    int retc = -1, rets = -1, err, abortctr = 0;
+    int clienterr = 0, servererr = 0;
+
+    do {
+        err = SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE;
+        while (!clienterr && retc <= 0 && err == SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE) {
+            retc = SSL_connect(clientssl);
+            if (retc <= 0)
+                err = SSL_get_error(clientssl, retc);
+        }
+
+        if (!clienterr && retc <= 0 && err != SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ) {
+            printf("SSL_connect() failed %d, %d\n", retc, err);
+            clienterr = 1;
+        }
+
+        err = SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE;
+        while (!servererr && rets <= 0 && err == SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE) {
+            rets = SSL_accept(serverssl);
+            if (rets <= 0)
+                err = SSL_get_error(serverssl, rets);
+        }
+
+        if (!servererr && rets <= 0 && err != SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ) {
+            printf("SSL_accept() failed %d, %d\n", retc, err);
+            servererr = 1;
+        }
+        if (clienterr && servererr)
+            return 0;
+        if (++abortctr == MAXLOOPS) {
+            printf("No progress made\n");
+            return 0;
+        }
+    } while (retc <=0 || rets <= 0);
+
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssltestlib.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssltestlib.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5e8ea6e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/ssltestlib.h
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_SSLTESTLIB_H
+# define HEADER_SSLTESTLIB_H
+
+# include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+int create_ssl_ctx_pair(const SSL_METHOD *sm, const SSL_METHOD *cm,
+                        int min_proto_version, int max_proto_version,
+                        SSL_CTX **sctx, SSL_CTX **cctx, char *certfile,
+                        char *privkeyfile);
+int create_ssl_objects(SSL_CTX *serverctx, SSL_CTX *clientctx, SSL **sssl,
+                       SSL **cssl, BIO *s_to_c_fbio, BIO *c_to_s_fbio);
+int create_ssl_connection(SSL *serverssl, SSL *clientssl);
+
+/* Note: Not thread safe! */
+const BIO_METHOD *bio_f_tls_dump_filter(void);
+void bio_f_tls_dump_filter_free(void);
+
+const BIO_METHOD *bio_s_mempacket_test(void);
+void bio_s_mempacket_test_free(void);
+
+/* Packet types - value 0 is reserved */
+#define INJECT_PACKET                   1
+#define INJECT_PACKET_IGNORE_REC_SEQ    2
+
+int mempacket_test_inject(BIO *bio, const char *in, int inl, int pktnum,
+                          int type);
+
+typedef struct mempacket_st MEMPACKET;
+
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(MEMPACKET)
+
+#endif /* HEADER_SSLTESTLIB_H */
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/test.cnf b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/test.cnf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..718b0bf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/test.cnf
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+#
+# SSLeay example configuration file.
+# This is mostly being used for generation of certificate requests.
+#
+
+RANDFILE		= ./.rnd
+
+####################################################################
+[ ca ]
+default_ca	= CA_default		# The default ca section
+
+####################################################################
+[ CA_default ]
+
+dir		= ./demoCA		# Where everything is kept
+certs		= $dir/certs		# Where the issued certs are kept
+crl_dir		= $dir/crl		# Where the issued crl are kept
+database	= $dir/index.txt	# database index file.
+new_certs_dir	= $dir/new_certs	# default place for new certs.
+
+certificate	= $dir/CAcert.pem 	# The CA certificate
+serial		= $dir/serial 		# The current serial number
+crl		= $dir/crl.pem 		# The current CRL
+private_key	= $dir/private/CAkey.pem# The private key
+RANDFILE	= $dir/private/.rand	# private random number file
+
+default_days	= 365			# how long to certify for
+default_crl_days= 30			# how long before next CRL
+default_md	= md5			# which md to use.
+
+# A few difference way of specifying how similar the request should look
+# For type CA, the listed attributes must be the same, and the optional
+# and supplied fields are just that :-)
+policy		= policy_match
+
+# For the CA policy
+[ policy_match ]
+countryName		= match
+stateOrProvinceName	= match
+organizationName	= match
+organizationalUnitName	= optional
+commonName		= supplied
+emailAddress		= optional
+
+# For the 'anything' policy
+# At this point in time, you must list all acceptable 'object'
+# types.
+[ policy_anything ]
+countryName		= optional
+stateOrProvinceName	= optional
+localityName		= optional
+organizationName	= optional
+organizationalUnitName	= optional
+commonName		= supplied
+emailAddress		= optional
+
+####################################################################
+[ req ]
+default_bits		= 2048
+default_keyfile 	= testkey.pem
+distinguished_name	= req_distinguished_name
+encrypt_rsa_key		= no
+
+[ req_distinguished_name ]
+countryName			= Country Name (2 letter code)
+countryName_default		= AU
+countryName_value		= AU
+
+stateOrProvinceName		= State or Province Name (full name)
+stateOrProvinceName_default	= Queensland
+stateOrProvinceName_value	=
+
+localityName			= Locality Name (eg, city)
+localityName_value		= Brisbane
+
+organizationName		= Organization Name (eg, company)
+organizationName_default	= 
+organizationName_value		= CryptSoft Pty Ltd
+
+organizationalUnitName		= Organizational Unit Name (eg, section)
+organizationalUnitName_default	=
+organizationalUnitName_value	= .
+
+commonName			= Common Name (eg, YOUR name)
+commonName_value		= Eric Young
+
+emailAddress			= Email Address
+emailAddress_value		= eay@mincom.oz.au
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/testcrl.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/testcrl.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0989788
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/testcrl.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+-----BEGIN X509 CRL-----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+-----END X509 CRL-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/testdsa.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/testdsa.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b2ca5ba
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/testdsa.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/testdsapub.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/testdsapub.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..70e7d5c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/testdsapub.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/testec-p256.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/testec-p256.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fb79a4c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/testec-p256.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----
+MHcCAQEEIDYEX2yQlhJXDIwBEwcfyAn2eICEKJxqsAPGChey1a2toAoGCCqGSM49
+AwEHoUQDQgAEJXwAdITiPFcSUsaRI2nlzTNRn++q6F38XrH8m8sf28DQ+2Oob5SU
+zvgjVS0e70pIqH6bSXDgPc8mKtSs9Zi26Q==
+-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/testecpub-p256.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/testecpub-p256.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..60695b8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/testecpub-p256.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEJXwAdITiPFcSUsaRI2nlzTNRn++q
+6F38XrH8m8sf28DQ+2Oob5SUzvgjVS0e70pIqH6bSXDgPc8mKtSs9Zi26Q==
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/testp7.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/testp7.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e5b7866
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/testp7.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+-----BEGIN PKCS7-----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+-----END PKCS7-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/testreq2.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/testreq2.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c3cdcff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/testreq2.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----
+MIHaMIGFAgEAMA4xDDAKBgNVBAMTA2NuNDBcMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA0sAMEgC
+QQCQsnkyUGDY2R3mYoeTprFJKgWuJ3f1jUjlIuW5+wfAUoeMt35c4vcFZ2mIBpEG
+DtzkNQN1kr2O9ldm9zYnYhyhAgMBAAGgEjAQBgorBgEEAYI3AgEOMQIwADANBgkq
+hkiG9w0BAQQFAANBAAb2szZgVIxg3vK6kYLjGSBISyuzcXJ6IvuPW6M+yzi1Qgoi
+gQhazHTJp91T8ItZEzUJGZSZl2e5iXlnffWB+/U=
+-----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/testrsa.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/testrsa.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..aad2106
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/testrsa.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIIBPAIBAAJBAKrbeqkuRk8VcRmWFmtP+LviMB3+6dizWW3DwaffznyHGAFwUJ/I
+Tv0XtbsCyl3QoyKGhrOAy3RvPK5M38iuXT0CAwEAAQJAZ3cnzaHXM/bxGaR5CR1R
+rD1qFBAVfoQFiOH9uPJgMaoAuoQEisPHVcZDKcOv4wEg6/TInAIXBnEigtqvRzuy
+oQIhAPcgZzUq3yVooAaoov8UbXPxqHlwo6GBMqnv20xzkf6ZAiEAsP4BnIaQTM8S
+mvcpHZwQJdmdHHkGKAs37Dfxi67HbkUCIQCeZGliHXFa071Fp06ZeWlR2ADonTZz
+rJBhdTe0v5pCeQIhAIZfkiGgGBX4cIuuckzEm43g9WMUjxP/0GlK39vIyihxAiEA
+mymehFRT0MvqW5xAKAx7Pgkt8HVKwVhc2LwGKHE0DZM=
+-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/testrsapub.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/testrsapub.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bee2b95
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/testrsapub.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MFwwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADSwAwSAJBAKrbeqkuRk8VcRmWFmtP+LviMB3+6diz
+WW3DwaffznyHGAFwUJ/ITv0XtbsCyl3QoyKGhrOAy3RvPK5M38iuXT0CAwEAAQ==
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/testsid.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/testsid.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a90fb6e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/testsid.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+-----BEGIN SSL SESSION PARAMETERS-----
+MIIGpAIBAQICAwMEAsAwBCABkpk0q01VEnPtcNWLtYg1xZJLreP0C1r4wPOakiLu
+8AQwi0opOLa+Omt26PqbLUcmI1H7F/n7qRy6TaL9Lxf2/ZBUDgRG3aSuSejO+gki
+F2U9oQYCBFR6XVaiBAICASyjggVjMIIFXzCCBEegAwIBAgIQNdDRF5hINFi7kAeK
+0fP5FjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADBBMQswCQYDVQQGEwJGUjESMBAGA1UEChMJR0FO
+REkgU0FTMR4wHAYDVQQDExVHYW5kaSBTdGFuZGFyZCBTU0wgQ0EwHhcNMTMxMjMx
+MDAwMDAwWhcNMTQxMjMxMjM1OTU5WjBYMSEwHwYDVQQLExhEb21haW4gQ29udHJv
+bCBWYWxpZGF0ZWQxGzAZBgNVBAsTEkdhbmRpIFN0YW5kYXJkIFNTTDEWMBQGA1UE
+AxMNZGIuZGViaWFuLm9yZzCCAaIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggGPADCCAYoCggGB
+AN/7DlZZKR5SELzF7rdn6LWxuebpVyFu1eXltzxi+Mig9cR0ZZD3hp0JcUresABO
+zE66AuhGtcFus/J/88CGM2r39u3n5ac5O/4Ypp57997YJRV725dL4oX75Vpc4p8j
+EI/LyIFteZN22ziv9zW7qCKKahnq1tuqDkV+84BEARpVdIaaWmn/KqsEgxeNKomy
+OLvn96IVCTAF78rudPmJHfSCl++NFmg0yu7DPyuXf8YJfA6j8/kFueanK2B1y/ww
+8MSbL3iAdgLwVtRJkwRYyKn8p5+ybwzX9L36GWgYs9OXUn8x494T5GjbGQVxUNt7
+qJnRtiUwYVoiOARrv1EI0Cq4ANXVaLDckc5y0a2PY3c4NWVlKGYbdxdQC1n6nH93
+mWDIr6vu7JX3CqDDr8FBlNVVtiBiv0q/eiVb9dzBzOntt3hA6GOJFAuwDDf7g7nq
+Gq8qqcr7EIyVB8ytQ5XMgtLCpmJkLzIdRYfdsQMa7cAbl0THAwwXigcotFA0aYIP
+BQIDAQABo4IBujCCAbYwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUtqj/oqgv0KbNS7Fo8+dQEDGneSEw
+HQYDVR0OBBYEFDJGWXznCu/+qyFLCmUI4cmXy1DCMA4GA1UdDwEB/wQEAwIFoDAM
+BgNVHRMBAf8EAjAAMB0GA1UdJQQWMBQGCCsGAQUFBwMBBggrBgEFBQcDAjBgBgNV
+HSAEWTBXMEsGCysGAQQBsjEBAgIaMDwwOgYIKwYBBQUHAgEWLmh0dHA6Ly93d3cu
+Z2FuZGkubmV0L2NvbnRyYWN0cy9mci9zc2wvY3BzL3BkZi8wCAYGZ4EMAQIBMDwG
+A1UdHwQ1MDMwMaAvoC2GK2h0dHA6Ly9jcmwuZ2FuZGkubmV0L0dhbmRpU3RhbmRh
+cmRTU0xDQS5jcmwwagYIKwYBBQUHAQEEXjBcMDcGCCsGAQUFBzAChitodHRwOi8v
+Y3J0LmdhbmRpLm5ldC9HYW5kaVN0YW5kYXJkU1NMQ0EuY3J0MCEGCCsGAQUFBzAB
+hhVodHRwOi8vb2NzcC5nYW5kaS5uZXQwKwYDVR0RBCQwIoINZGIuZGViaWFuLm9y
+Z4IRd3d3LmRiLmRlYmlhbi5vcmcwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEFBQADggEBAK+ix7EQNPgU
+qDx46gAPifcm6b2FvXq+gtlB9h6UaDDO7fxDzmoU5V4WtdBM5uvIfOmpeNuCxPaj
+18cUlj9PPjL3eK43UCVu6w5hN3p2/2BPvFjQRhtBcIcEWsMal1DCtS/vCBkQt1lS
+gd4/xiMfK4cQYtwRu47gB0HuM2lecYHA42EC5hqupY/2tHo54AdyU46TxgUQcm0e
+icLtYuTjIYQWdUgM92heDw8caey5GKL2/TmYM2iWy/csFLm4tJAwPMtvy1KWdJQE
+iqYIuI9Lb4/xOyjSwVNLIJmbEzE6Sds9sjxqEcU4CconTVJazvHZtnBRV8GiRYKa
+d/xgQ6J+/Z2kAgQAqQQCAgEsqoHDBIHAPGxCacLRMYb3hbL3lRqQIfH3xoufIwKn
+zOAIyjxH7GPZpI87/e93AF1uw6eyy+aWJM6G/71E8Ln1iQtZjrGkGQCjEcIrUhEk
+Bgg93A28zly2zu2aBwi2yT4bUcyHxE3P3Q4R8xkQxrdWSMfCjCy9HKUViOENKET6
+avKXF7lDT1iG/x8RtTHtFGYX4YcFVhdEqcqnZ7tw5sqkHG2D0gLzO2SETF9KPHCq
+zAHQtw5r4Dgl+a+BGLczh6as4yIH+xH+
+-----END SSL SESSION PARAMETERS-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/testutil.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/testutil.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a16ef0f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/testutil.c
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2014-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "testutil.h"
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include "e_os.h"
+
+/*
+ * Declares the structures needed to register each test case function.
+ */
+typedef struct test_info {
+    const char *test_case_name;
+    int (*test_fn) ();
+    int (*param_test_fn)(int idx);
+    int num;
+} TEST_INFO;
+
+static TEST_INFO all_tests[1024];
+static int num_tests = 0;
+/*
+ * A parameterised tests runs a loop of test cases.
+ * |num_test_cases| counts the total number of test cases
+ * across all tests.
+ */
+static int num_test_cases = 0;
+
+void add_test(const char *test_case_name, int (*test_fn) ())
+{
+    assert(num_tests != OSSL_NELEM(all_tests));
+    all_tests[num_tests].test_case_name = test_case_name;
+    all_tests[num_tests].test_fn = test_fn;
+    all_tests[num_tests].num = -1;
+    ++num_test_cases;
+    ++num_tests;
+}
+
+void add_all_tests(const char *test_case_name, int(*test_fn)(int idx),
+                   int num)
+{
+    assert(num_tests != OSSL_NELEM(all_tests));
+    all_tests[num_tests].test_case_name = test_case_name;
+    all_tests[num_tests].param_test_fn = test_fn;
+    all_tests[num_tests].num = num;
+    ++num_tests;
+    num_test_cases += num;
+}
+
+int run_tests(const char *test_prog_name)
+{
+    int num_failed = 0;
+
+    int i, j;
+
+    printf("%s: %d test case%s\n", test_prog_name, num_test_cases,
+           num_test_cases == 1 ? "" : "s");
+
+    for (i = 0; i != num_tests; ++i) {
+        if (all_tests[i].num == -1) {
+            if (!all_tests[i].test_fn()) {
+                printf("** %s failed **\n--------\n",
+                       all_tests[i].test_case_name);
+                ++num_failed;
+            }
+        } else {
+            for (j = 0; j < all_tests[i].num; j++) {
+                if (!all_tests[i].param_test_fn(j)) {
+                    printf("** %s failed test %d\n--------\n",
+                           all_tests[i].test_case_name, j);
+                    ++num_failed;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (num_failed != 0) {
+        printf("%s: %d test%s failed (out of %d)\n", test_prog_name,
+               num_failed, num_failed != 1 ? "s" : "", num_test_cases);
+        return EXIT_FAILURE;
+    }
+    printf("  All tests passed.\n");
+    return EXIT_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+static const char *print_string_maybe_null(const char *s)
+{
+    return s == NULL ? "(NULL)" : s;
+}
+
+int strings_equal(const char *desc, const char *s1, const char *s2)
+{
+    if (s1 == NULL && s2 == NULL)
+      return 1;
+    if (s1 == NULL || s2 == NULL || strcmp(s1, s2) != 0) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "%s mismatch: %s vs %s\n", desc, print_string_maybe_null(s1),
+                print_string_maybe_null(s2));
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/testutil.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/testutil.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..aaaee27
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/testutil.h
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2014-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_TESTUTIL_H
+# define HEADER_TESTUTIL_H
+
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+/*-
+ * SETUP_TEST_FIXTURE and EXECUTE_TEST macros for test case functions.
+ *
+ * SETUP_TEST_FIXTURE will call set_up() to create a new TEST_FIXTURE_TYPE
+ * object called "fixture". It will also allocate the "result" variable used
+ * by EXECUTE_TEST. set_up() should take a const char* specifying the test
+ * case name and return a TEST_FIXTURE_TYPE by value.
+ *
+ * EXECUTE_TEST will pass fixture to execute_func() by value, call
+ * tear_down(), and return the result of execute_func(). execute_func() should
+ * take a TEST_FIXTURE_TYPE by value and return 1 on success and 0 on
+ * failure.
+ *
+ * Unit tests can define their own SETUP_TEST_FIXTURE and EXECUTE_TEST
+ * variations like so:
+ *
+ * #define SETUP_FOOBAR_TEST_FIXTURE()\
+ *   SETUP_TEST_FIXTURE(FOOBAR_TEST_FIXTURE, set_up_foobar)
+ *
+ * #define EXECUTE_FOOBAR_TEST()\
+ *   EXECUTE_TEST(execute_foobar, tear_down_foobar)
+ *
+ * Then test case functions can take the form:
+ *
+ * static int test_foobar_feature()
+ *      {
+ *      SETUP_FOOBAR_TEST_FIXTURE();
+ *      [...set individual members of fixture...]
+ *      EXECUTE_FOOBAR_TEST();
+ *      }
+ */
+# define SETUP_TEST_FIXTURE(TEST_FIXTURE_TYPE, set_up)\
+    TEST_FIXTURE_TYPE fixture = set_up(TEST_CASE_NAME); \
+    int result = 0
+
+# define EXECUTE_TEST(execute_func, tear_down)\
+        result = execute_func(fixture);\
+        tear_down(fixture);\
+        return result
+
+/*
+ * TEST_CASE_NAME is defined as the name of the test case function where
+ * possible; otherwise we get by with the file name and line number.
+ */
+# if !defined(__STDC_VERSION__) || __STDC_VERSION__ < 199901L
+#  if defined(_MSC_VER)
+#   define TEST_CASE_NAME __FUNCTION__
+#  else
+#   define testutil_stringify_helper(s) #s
+#   define testutil_stringify(s) testutil_stringify_helper(s)
+#   define TEST_CASE_NAME __FILE__ ":" testutil_stringify(__LINE__)
+#  endif                        /* _MSC_VER */
+# else
+#  define TEST_CASE_NAME __func__
+# endif                         /* __STDC_VERSION__ */
+
+/*
+ * In main(), call ADD_TEST to register each test case function, then call
+ * run_tests() to execute all tests and report the results. The result
+ * returned from run_tests() should be used as the return value for main().
+ */
+# define ADD_TEST(test_function) add_test(#test_function, test_function)
+
+/*
+ * Simple parameterized tests. Adds a test_function(idx) test for each
+ * 0 <= idx < num.
+ */
+# define ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_function, num) \
+  add_all_tests(#test_function, test_function, num)
+
+void add_test(const char *test_case_name, int (*test_fn) ());
+void add_all_tests(const char *test_case_name, int (*test_fn)(int idx), int num);
+int run_tests(const char *test_prog_name);
+
+/*
+ *  Test assumption verification helpers.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Returns 1 if |s1| and |s2| are both NULL or equal.
+ * Otherwise, returns 0 and pretty-prints diagnostics using |desc|.
+ */
+int strings_equal(const char *desc, const char *s1, const char *s2);
+#endif                          /* HEADER_TESTUTIL_H */
+
+/*
+ * For "impossible" conditions such as malloc failures or bugs in test code,
+ * where continuing the test would be meaningless. Note that OPENSSL_assert
+ * is fatal, and is never compiled out.
+ */
+#define TEST_check(condition)                   \
+    do {                                        \
+        if (!(condition)) {                     \
+            ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);        \
+            OPENSSL_assert(!#condition);        \
+        }                                       \
+    } while (0);
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/testx509.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/testx509.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8a85d14
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/testx509.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIBWzCCAQYCARgwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEEBQAwODELMAkGA1UEBhMCQVUxDDAKBgNV
+BAgTA1FMRDEbMBkGA1UEAxMSU1NMZWF5L3JzYSB0ZXN0IENBMB4XDTk1MDYxOTIz
+MzMxMloXDTk1MDcxNzIzMzMxMlowOjELMAkGA1UEBhMCQVUxDDAKBgNVBAgTA1FM
+RDEdMBsGA1UEAxMUU1NMZWF5L3JzYSB0ZXN0IGNlcnQwXDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEF
+AANLADBIAkEAqtt6qS5GTxVxGZYWa0/4u+IwHf7p2LNZbcPBp9/OfIcYAXBQn8hO
+/Re1uwLKXdCjIoaGs4DLdG88rkzfyK5dPQIDAQABMAwGCCqGSIb3DQIFBQADQQAE
+Wc7EcF8po2/ZO6kNCwK/ICH6DobgLekA5lSLr5EvuioZniZp5lFzAw4+YzPQ7XKJ
+zl9HYIMxATFyqSiD9jsx
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/threadstest.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/threadstest.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b2e96fa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/threadstest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,246 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#if defined(_WIN32)
+# include <windows.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_THREADS) || defined(CRYPTO_TDEBUG)
+
+typedef unsigned int thread_t;
+
+static int run_thread(thread_t *t, void (*f)(void))
+{
+    f();
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int wait_for_thread(thread_t thread)
+{
+    return 1;
+}
+
+#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS)
+
+typedef HANDLE thread_t;
+
+static DWORD WINAPI thread_run(LPVOID arg)
+{
+    void (*f)(void);
+
+    *(void **) (&f) = arg;
+
+    f();
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int run_thread(thread_t *t, void (*f)(void))
+{
+    *t = CreateThread(NULL, 0, thread_run, *(void **) &f, 0, NULL);
+    return *t != NULL;
+}
+
+static int wait_for_thread(thread_t thread)
+{
+    return WaitForSingleObject(thread, INFINITE) == 0;
+}
+
+#else
+
+typedef pthread_t thread_t;
+
+static void *thread_run(void *arg)
+{
+    void (*f)(void);
+
+    *(void **) (&f) = arg;
+
+    f();
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+static int run_thread(thread_t *t, void (*f)(void))
+{
+    return pthread_create(t, NULL, thread_run, *(void **) &f) == 0;
+}
+
+static int wait_for_thread(thread_t thread)
+{
+    return pthread_join(thread, NULL) == 0;
+}
+
+#endif
+
+static int test_lock(void)
+{
+    CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
+
+    if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(lock)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock() failed\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(lock)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock() failed\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(lock);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static CRYPTO_ONCE once_run = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
+static unsigned once_run_count = 0;
+
+static void once_do_run(void)
+{
+    once_run_count++;
+}
+
+static void once_run_thread_cb(void)
+{
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_run_once(&once_run, once_do_run);
+}
+
+static int test_once(void)
+{
+    thread_t thread;
+    if (!run_thread(&thread, once_run_thread_cb) ||
+        !wait_for_thread(thread))
+    {
+        fprintf(stderr, "run_thread() failed\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_run_once(&once_run, once_do_run)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "CRYPTO_THREAD_run_once() failed\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (once_run_count != 1) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "once run %u times\n", once_run_count);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL thread_local_key;
+static unsigned destructor_run_count = 0;
+static int thread_local_thread_cb_ok = 0;
+
+static void thread_local_destructor(void *arg)
+{
+    unsigned *count;
+
+    if (arg == NULL)
+        return;
+
+    count = arg;
+
+    (*count)++;
+}
+
+static void thread_local_thread_cb(void)
+{
+    void *ptr;
+
+    ptr = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&thread_local_key);
+    if (ptr != NULL) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "ptr not NULL\n");
+        return;
+    }
+
+    if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&thread_local_key, &destructor_run_count)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local() failed\n");
+        return;
+    }
+
+    ptr = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&thread_local_key);
+    if (ptr != &destructor_run_count) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "invalid ptr\n");
+        return;
+    }
+
+    thread_local_thread_cb_ok = 1;
+}
+
+static int test_thread_local(void)
+{
+    thread_t thread;
+    void *ptr = NULL;
+
+    if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local(&thread_local_key, thread_local_destructor)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local() failed\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    ptr = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&thread_local_key);
+    if (ptr != NULL) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "ptr not NULL\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (!run_thread(&thread, thread_local_thread_cb) ||
+        !wait_for_thread(thread))
+    {
+        fprintf(stderr, "run_thread() failed\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (thread_local_thread_cb_ok != 1) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "thread-local thread callback failed\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_THREADS) && !defined(CRYPTO_TDEBUG)
+
+    ptr = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&thread_local_key);
+    if (ptr != NULL) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "ptr not NULL\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+# if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS)
+    if (destructor_run_count != 1) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "thread-local destructor run %u times\n",
+                destructor_run_count);
+        return 0;
+    }
+# endif
+
+#endif
+
+    if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&thread_local_key)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local() failed\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    if (!test_lock())
+      return 1;
+
+    if (!test_once())
+      return 1;
+
+    if (!test_thread_local())
+      return 1;
+
+    printf("PASS\n");
+    return 0;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/v3-cert1.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/v3-cert1.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0da253d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/v3-cert1.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/v3-cert2.pem b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/v3-cert2.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..de0723f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/v3-cert2.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/v3ext.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/v3ext.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1c1f788
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/v3ext.c
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+int main(int ac, char **av)
+{
+    X509 *x = NULL;
+    BIO *b = NULL;
+    long pathlen;
+    int ret = 1;
+
+    if (ac != 2) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Usage error\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+    b = BIO_new_file(av[1], "r");
+    if (b == NULL)
+        goto end;
+    x = PEM_read_bio_X509(b, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+    if (x == NULL)
+        goto end;
+    pathlen = X509_get_pathlen(x);
+    if (pathlen == 6)
+        ret = 0;
+
+end:
+    ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+    BIO_free(b);
+    X509_free(x);
+    return ret;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/v3nametest.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/v3nametest.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..648c1df
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/v3nametest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,355 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2012-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include "../e_os.h"
+#include <string.h>
+
+static const char *const names[] = {
+    "a", "b", ".", "*", "@",
+    ".a", "a.", ".b", "b.", ".*", "*.", "*@", "@*", "a@", "@a", "b@", "..",
+    "-example.com", "example-.com",
+    "@@", "**", "*.com", "*com", "*.*.com", "*com", "com*", "*example.com",
+    "*@example.com", "test@*.example.com", "example.com", "www.example.com",
+    "test.www.example.com", "*.example.com", "*.www.example.com",
+    "test.*.example.com", "www.*.com",
+    ".www.example.com", "*www.example.com",
+    "example.net", "xn--rger-koa.example.com",
+    "*.xn--rger-koa.example.com", "www.xn--rger-koa.example.com",
+    "*.good--example.com", "www.good--example.com",
+    "*.xn--bar.com", "xn--foo.xn--bar.com",
+    "a.example.com", "b.example.com",
+    "postmaster@example.com", "Postmaster@example.com",
+    "postmaster@EXAMPLE.COM",
+    NULL
+};
+
+static const char *const exceptions[] = {
+    "set CN: host: [*.example.com] matches [a.example.com]",
+    "set CN: host: [*.example.com] matches [b.example.com]",
+    "set CN: host: [*.example.com] matches [www.example.com]",
+    "set CN: host: [*.example.com] matches [xn--rger-koa.example.com]",
+    "set CN: host: [*.www.example.com] matches [test.www.example.com]",
+    "set CN: host: [*.www.example.com] matches [.www.example.com]",
+    "set CN: host: [*www.example.com] matches [www.example.com]",
+    "set CN: host: [test.www.example.com] matches [.www.example.com]",
+    "set CN: host: [*.xn--rger-koa.example.com] matches [www.xn--rger-koa.example.com]",
+    "set CN: host: [*.xn--bar.com] matches [xn--foo.xn--bar.com]",
+    "set CN: host: [*.good--example.com] matches [www.good--example.com]",
+    "set CN: host-no-wildcards: [*.www.example.com] matches [.www.example.com]",
+    "set CN: host-no-wildcards: [test.www.example.com] matches [.www.example.com]",
+    "set emailAddress: email: [postmaster@example.com] does not match [Postmaster@example.com]",
+    "set emailAddress: email: [postmaster@EXAMPLE.COM] does not match [Postmaster@example.com]",
+    "set emailAddress: email: [Postmaster@example.com] does not match [postmaster@example.com]",
+    "set emailAddress: email: [Postmaster@example.com] does not match [postmaster@EXAMPLE.COM]",
+    "set dnsName: host: [*.example.com] matches [www.example.com]",
+    "set dnsName: host: [*.example.com] matches [a.example.com]",
+    "set dnsName: host: [*.example.com] matches [b.example.com]",
+    "set dnsName: host: [*.example.com] matches [xn--rger-koa.example.com]",
+    "set dnsName: host: [*.www.example.com] matches [test.www.example.com]",
+    "set dnsName: host-no-wildcards: [*.www.example.com] matches [.www.example.com]",
+    "set dnsName: host-no-wildcards: [test.www.example.com] matches [.www.example.com]",
+    "set dnsName: host: [*.www.example.com] matches [.www.example.com]",
+    "set dnsName: host: [*www.example.com] matches [www.example.com]",
+    "set dnsName: host: [test.www.example.com] matches [.www.example.com]",
+    "set dnsName: host: [*.xn--rger-koa.example.com] matches [www.xn--rger-koa.example.com]",
+    "set dnsName: host: [*.xn--bar.com] matches [xn--foo.xn--bar.com]",
+    "set dnsName: host: [*.good--example.com] matches [www.good--example.com]",
+    "set rfc822Name: email: [postmaster@example.com] does not match [Postmaster@example.com]",
+    "set rfc822Name: email: [Postmaster@example.com] does not match [postmaster@example.com]",
+    "set rfc822Name: email: [Postmaster@example.com] does not match [postmaster@EXAMPLE.COM]",
+    "set rfc822Name: email: [postmaster@EXAMPLE.COM] does not match [Postmaster@example.com]",
+    NULL
+};
+
+static int is_exception(const char *msg)
+{
+    const char *const *p;
+    for (p = exceptions; *p; ++p)
+        if (strcmp(msg, *p) == 0)
+            return 1;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int set_cn(X509 *crt, ...)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    X509_NAME *n = NULL;
+    va_list ap;
+    va_start(ap, crt);
+    n = X509_NAME_new();
+    if (n == NULL)
+        goto out;
+    while (1) {
+        int nid;
+        const char *name;
+        nid = va_arg(ap, int);
+        if (nid == 0)
+            break;
+        name = va_arg(ap, const char *);
+        if (!X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID(n, nid, MBSTRING_ASC,
+                                        (unsigned char *)name, -1, -1, 1))
+            goto out;
+    }
+    if (!X509_set_subject_name(crt, n))
+        goto out;
+    ret = 1;
+ out:
+    X509_NAME_free(n);
+    va_end(ap);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*-
+int             X509_add_ext(X509 *x, X509_EXTENSION *ex, int loc);
+X509_EXTENSION *X509_EXTENSION_create_by_NID(X509_EXTENSION **ex,
+                        int nid, int crit, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *data);
+int             X509_add_ext(X509 *x, X509_EXTENSION *ex, int loc);
+*/
+
+static int set_altname(X509 *crt, ...)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
+    GENERAL_NAME *gen = NULL;
+    ASN1_IA5STRING *ia5 = NULL;
+    va_list ap;
+    va_start(ap, crt);
+    gens = sk_GENERAL_NAME_new_null();
+    if (gens == NULL)
+        goto out;
+    while (1) {
+        int type;
+        const char *name;
+        type = va_arg(ap, int);
+        if (type == 0)
+            break;
+        name = va_arg(ap, const char *);
+
+        gen = GENERAL_NAME_new();
+        if (gen == NULL)
+            goto out;
+        ia5 = ASN1_IA5STRING_new();
+        if (ia5 == NULL)
+            goto out;
+        if (!ASN1_STRING_set(ia5, name, -1))
+            goto out;
+        switch (type) {
+        case GEN_EMAIL:
+        case GEN_DNS:
+            GENERAL_NAME_set0_value(gen, type, ia5);
+            ia5 = NULL;
+            break;
+        default:
+            abort();
+        }
+        sk_GENERAL_NAME_push(gens, gen);
+        gen = NULL;
+    }
+    if (!X509_add1_ext_i2d(crt, NID_subject_alt_name, gens, 0, 0))
+        goto out;
+    ret = 1;
+ out:
+    ASN1_IA5STRING_free(ia5);
+    GENERAL_NAME_free(gen);
+    GENERAL_NAMES_free(gens);
+    va_end(ap);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int set_cn1(X509 *crt, const char *name)
+{
+    return set_cn(crt, NID_commonName, name, 0);
+}
+
+static int set_cn_and_email(X509 *crt, const char *name)
+{
+    return set_cn(crt, NID_commonName, name,
+                  NID_pkcs9_emailAddress, "dummy@example.com", 0);
+}
+
+static int set_cn2(X509 *crt, const char *name)
+{
+    return set_cn(crt, NID_commonName, "dummy value",
+                  NID_commonName, name, 0);
+}
+
+static int set_cn3(X509 *crt, const char *name)
+{
+    return set_cn(crt, NID_commonName, name,
+                  NID_commonName, "dummy value", 0);
+}
+
+static int set_email1(X509 *crt, const char *name)
+{
+    return set_cn(crt, NID_pkcs9_emailAddress, name, 0);
+}
+
+static int set_email2(X509 *crt, const char *name)
+{
+    return set_cn(crt, NID_pkcs9_emailAddress, "dummy@example.com",
+                  NID_pkcs9_emailAddress, name, 0);
+}
+
+static int set_email3(X509 *crt, const char *name)
+{
+    return set_cn(crt, NID_pkcs9_emailAddress, name,
+                  NID_pkcs9_emailAddress, "dummy@example.com", 0);
+}
+
+static int set_email_and_cn(X509 *crt, const char *name)
+{
+    return set_cn(crt, NID_pkcs9_emailAddress, name,
+                  NID_commonName, "www.example.org", 0);
+}
+
+static int set_altname_dns(X509 *crt, const char *name)
+{
+    return set_altname(crt, GEN_DNS, name, 0);
+}
+
+static int set_altname_email(X509 *crt, const char *name)
+{
+    return set_altname(crt, GEN_EMAIL, name, 0);
+}
+
+struct set_name_fn {
+    int (*fn) (X509 *, const char *);
+    const char *name;
+    int host;
+    int email;
+};
+
+static const struct set_name_fn name_fns[] = {
+    {set_cn1, "set CN", 1, 0},
+    {set_cn2, "set CN", 1, 0},
+    {set_cn3, "set CN", 1, 0},
+    {set_cn_and_email, "set CN", 1, 0},
+    {set_email1, "set emailAddress", 0, 1},
+    {set_email2, "set emailAddress", 0, 1},
+    {set_email3, "set emailAddress", 0, 1},
+    {set_email_and_cn, "set emailAddress", 0, 1},
+    {set_altname_dns, "set dnsName", 1, 0},
+    {set_altname_email, "set rfc822Name", 0, 1},
+    {NULL, NULL, 0}
+};
+
+static X509 *make_cert()
+{
+    X509 *ret = NULL;
+    X509 *crt = NULL;
+    X509_NAME *issuer = NULL;
+    crt = X509_new();
+    if (crt == NULL)
+        goto out;
+    if (!X509_set_version(crt, 3))
+        goto out;
+    ret = crt;
+    crt = NULL;
+ out:
+    X509_NAME_free(issuer);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int errors;
+
+static void check_message(const struct set_name_fn *fn, const char *op,
+                          const char *nameincert, int match, const char *name)
+{
+    char msg[1024];
+    if (match < 0)
+        return;
+    BIO_snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), "%s: %s: [%s] %s [%s]",
+                 fn->name, op, nameincert,
+                 match ? "matches" : "does not match", name);
+    if (is_exception(msg))
+        return;
+    puts(msg);
+    ++errors;
+}
+
+static void run_cert(X509 *crt, const char *nameincert,
+                     const struct set_name_fn *fn)
+{
+    const char *const *pname = names;
+    while (*pname) {
+        int samename = strcasecmp(nameincert, *pname) == 0;
+        size_t namelen = strlen(*pname);
+        char *name = malloc(namelen);
+        int match, ret;
+        memcpy(name, *pname, namelen);
+
+        ret = X509_check_host(crt, name, namelen, 0, NULL);
+        match = -1;
+        if (ret < 0) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "internal error in X509_check_host");
+            ++errors;
+        } else if (fn->host) {
+            if (ret == 1 && !samename)
+                match = 1;
+            if (ret == 0 && samename)
+                match = 0;
+        } else if (ret == 1)
+            match = 1;
+        check_message(fn, "host", nameincert, match, *pname);
+
+        ret = X509_check_host(crt, name, namelen,
+                              X509_CHECK_FLAG_NO_WILDCARDS, NULL);
+        match = -1;
+        if (ret < 0) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "internal error in X509_check_host");
+            ++errors;
+        } else if (fn->host) {
+            if (ret == 1 && !samename)
+                match = 1;
+            if (ret == 0 && samename)
+                match = 0;
+        } else if (ret == 1)
+            match = 1;
+        check_message(fn, "host-no-wildcards", nameincert, match, *pname);
+
+        ret = X509_check_email(crt, name, namelen, 0);
+        match = -1;
+        if (fn->email) {
+            if (ret && !samename)
+                match = 1;
+            if (!ret && samename && strchr(nameincert, '@') != NULL)
+                match = 0;
+        } else if (ret)
+            match = 1;
+        check_message(fn, "email", nameincert, match, *pname);
+        ++pname;
+        free(name);
+    }
+}
+
+int main(void)
+{
+    const struct set_name_fn *pfn = name_fns;
+    while (pfn->name) {
+        const char *const *pname = names;
+        while (*pname) {
+            X509 *crt = make_cert();
+            if (crt == NULL) {
+                fprintf(stderr, "make_cert failed\n");
+                return 1;
+            }
+            if (!pfn->fn(crt, *pname)) {
+                fprintf(stderr, "X509 name setting failed\n");
+                return 1;
+            }
+            run_cert(crt, *pname, pfn);
+            X509_free(crt);
+            ++pname;
+        }
+        ++pfn;
+    }
+    return errors > 0 ? 1 : 0;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/verify_extra_test.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/verify_extra_test.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cc05bc2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/verify_extra_test.c
@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+static STACK_OF(X509) *load_certs_from_file(const char *filename)
+{
+    STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
+    BIO *bio;
+    X509 *x;
+
+    bio = BIO_new_file(filename, "r");
+
+    if (bio == NULL) {
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    certs = sk_X509_new_null();
+    if (certs == NULL) {
+        BIO_free(bio);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    ERR_set_mark();
+    do {
+        x = PEM_read_bio_X509(bio, NULL, 0, NULL);
+        if (x != NULL && !sk_X509_push(certs, x)) {
+            sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
+            BIO_free(bio);
+            return NULL;
+        } else if (x == NULL) {
+            /*
+             * We probably just ran out of certs, so ignore any errors
+             * generated
+             */
+            ERR_pop_to_mark();
+        }
+    } while (x != NULL);
+
+    BIO_free(bio);
+
+    return certs;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Test for CVE-2015-1793 (Alternate Chains Certificate Forgery)
+ *
+ * Chain is as follows:
+ *
+ * rootCA (self-signed)
+ *   |
+ * interCA
+ *   |
+ * subinterCA       subinterCA (self-signed)
+ *   |                   |
+ * leaf ------------------
+ *   |
+ * bad
+ *
+ * rootCA, interCA, subinterCA, subinterCA (ss) all have CA=TRUE
+ * leaf and bad have CA=FALSE
+ *
+ * subinterCA and subinterCA (ss) have the same subject name and keys
+ *
+ * interCA (but not rootCA) and subinterCA (ss) are in the trusted store
+ * (roots.pem)
+ * leaf and subinterCA are in the untrusted list (untrusted.pem)
+ * bad is the certificate being verified (bad.pem)
+ *
+ * Versions vulnerable to CVE-2015-1793 will fail to detect that leaf has
+ * CA=FALSE, and will therefore incorrectly verify bad
+ *
+ */
+static int test_alt_chains_cert_forgery(const char *roots_f,
+                                        const char *untrusted_f,
+                                        const char *bad_f)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    int i;
+    X509 *x = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(X509) *untrusted = NULL;
+    BIO *bio = NULL;
+    X509_STORE_CTX *sctx = NULL;
+    X509_STORE *store = NULL;
+    X509_LOOKUP *lookup = NULL;
+
+    store = X509_STORE_new();
+    if (store == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    lookup = X509_STORE_add_lookup(store, X509_LOOKUP_file());
+    if (lookup == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if(!X509_LOOKUP_load_file(lookup, roots_f, X509_FILETYPE_PEM))
+        goto err;
+
+    untrusted = load_certs_from_file(untrusted_f);
+
+    if ((bio = BIO_new_file(bad_f, "r")) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if((x = PEM_read_bio_X509(bio, NULL, 0, NULL)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    sctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
+    if (sctx == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(sctx, store, x, untrusted))
+        goto err;
+
+    i = X509_verify_cert(sctx);
+
+    if (i == 0 && X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(sctx) == X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA) {
+        /* This is the result we were expecting: Test passed */
+        ret = 1;
+    }
+ err:
+    X509_STORE_CTX_free(sctx);
+    X509_free(x);
+    BIO_free(bio);
+    sk_X509_pop_free(untrusted, X509_free);
+    X509_STORE_free(store);
+    if (ret != 1)
+        ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    CRYPTO_set_mem_debug(1);
+    CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON);
+
+    if (argc != 4) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "usage: verify_extra_test roots.pem untrusted.pem bad.pem\n");
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    if (!test_alt_chains_cert_forgery(argv[1], argv[2], argv[3])) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Test alt chains cert forgery failed\n");
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG
+    if (CRYPTO_mem_leaks_fp(stderr) <= 0)
+        return 1;
+#endif
+
+    printf("PASS\n");
+    return 0;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/wp_test.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/wp_test.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7b5cc04
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/wp_test.c
@@ -0,0 +1,233 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+#include <openssl/whrlpool.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_WHIRLPOOL)
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+    printf("No Whirlpool support\n");
+    return (0);
+}
+#else
+
+/* ISO/IEC 10118-3 test vector set */
+static const unsigned char iso_test_1[WHIRLPOOL_DIGEST_LENGTH] = {
+    0x19, 0xFA, 0x61, 0xD7, 0x55, 0x22, 0xA4, 0x66,
+    0x9B, 0x44, 0xE3, 0x9C, 0x1D, 0x2E, 0x17, 0x26,
+    0xC5, 0x30, 0x23, 0x21, 0x30, 0xD4, 0x07, 0xF8,
+    0x9A, 0xFE, 0xE0, 0x96, 0x49, 0x97, 0xF7, 0xA7,
+    0x3E, 0x83, 0xBE, 0x69, 0x8B, 0x28, 0x8F, 0xEB,
+    0xCF, 0x88, 0xE3, 0xE0, 0x3C, 0x4F, 0x07, 0x57,
+    0xEA, 0x89, 0x64, 0xE5, 0x9B, 0x63, 0xD9, 0x37,
+    0x08, 0xB1, 0x38, 0xCC, 0x42, 0xA6, 0x6E, 0xB3
+};
+
+static const unsigned char iso_test_2[WHIRLPOOL_DIGEST_LENGTH] = {
+    0x8A, 0xCA, 0x26, 0x02, 0x79, 0x2A, 0xEC, 0x6F,
+    0x11, 0xA6, 0x72, 0x06, 0x53, 0x1F, 0xB7, 0xD7,
+    0xF0, 0xDF, 0xF5, 0x94, 0x13, 0x14, 0x5E, 0x69,
+    0x73, 0xC4, 0x50, 0x01, 0xD0, 0x08, 0x7B, 0x42,
+    0xD1, 0x1B, 0xC6, 0x45, 0x41, 0x3A, 0xEF, 0xF6,
+    0x3A, 0x42, 0x39, 0x1A, 0x39, 0x14, 0x5A, 0x59,
+    0x1A, 0x92, 0x20, 0x0D, 0x56, 0x01, 0x95, 0xE5,
+    0x3B, 0x47, 0x85, 0x84, 0xFD, 0xAE, 0x23, 0x1A
+};
+
+static const unsigned char iso_test_3[WHIRLPOOL_DIGEST_LENGTH] = {
+    0x4E, 0x24, 0x48, 0xA4, 0xC6, 0xF4, 0x86, 0xBB,
+    0x16, 0xB6, 0x56, 0x2C, 0x73, 0xB4, 0x02, 0x0B,
+    0xF3, 0x04, 0x3E, 0x3A, 0x73, 0x1B, 0xCE, 0x72,
+    0x1A, 0xE1, 0xB3, 0x03, 0xD9, 0x7E, 0x6D, 0x4C,
+    0x71, 0x81, 0xEE, 0xBD, 0xB6, 0xC5, 0x7E, 0x27,
+    0x7D, 0x0E, 0x34, 0x95, 0x71, 0x14, 0xCB, 0xD6,
+    0xC7, 0x97, 0xFC, 0x9D, 0x95, 0xD8, 0xB5, 0x82,
+    0xD2, 0x25, 0x29, 0x20, 0x76, 0xD4, 0xEE, 0xF5
+};
+
+static const unsigned char iso_test_4[WHIRLPOOL_DIGEST_LENGTH] = {
+    0x37, 0x8C, 0x84, 0xA4, 0x12, 0x6E, 0x2D, 0xC6,
+    0xE5, 0x6D, 0xCC, 0x74, 0x58, 0x37, 0x7A, 0xAC,
+    0x83, 0x8D, 0x00, 0x03, 0x22, 0x30, 0xF5, 0x3C,
+    0xE1, 0xF5, 0x70, 0x0C, 0x0F, 0xFB, 0x4D, 0x3B,
+    0x84, 0x21, 0x55, 0x76, 0x59, 0xEF, 0x55, 0xC1,
+    0x06, 0xB4, 0xB5, 0x2A, 0xC5, 0xA4, 0xAA, 0xA6,
+    0x92, 0xED, 0x92, 0x00, 0x52, 0x83, 0x8F, 0x33,
+    0x62, 0xE8, 0x6D, 0xBD, 0x37, 0xA8, 0x90, 0x3E
+};
+
+static const unsigned char iso_test_5[WHIRLPOOL_DIGEST_LENGTH] = {
+    0xF1, 0xD7, 0x54, 0x66, 0x26, 0x36, 0xFF, 0xE9,
+    0x2C, 0x82, 0xEB, 0xB9, 0x21, 0x2A, 0x48, 0x4A,
+    0x8D, 0x38, 0x63, 0x1E, 0xAD, 0x42, 0x38, 0xF5,
+    0x44, 0x2E, 0xE1, 0x3B, 0x80, 0x54, 0xE4, 0x1B,
+    0x08, 0xBF, 0x2A, 0x92, 0x51, 0xC3, 0x0B, 0x6A,
+    0x0B, 0x8A, 0xAE, 0x86, 0x17, 0x7A, 0xB4, 0xA6,
+    0xF6, 0x8F, 0x67, 0x3E, 0x72, 0x07, 0x86, 0x5D,
+    0x5D, 0x98, 0x19, 0xA3, 0xDB, 0xA4, 0xEB, 0x3B
+};
+
+static const unsigned char iso_test_6[WHIRLPOOL_DIGEST_LENGTH] = {
+    0xDC, 0x37, 0xE0, 0x08, 0xCF, 0x9E, 0xE6, 0x9B,
+    0xF1, 0x1F, 0x00, 0xED, 0x9A, 0xBA, 0x26, 0x90,
+    0x1D, 0xD7, 0xC2, 0x8C, 0xDE, 0xC0, 0x66, 0xCC,
+    0x6A, 0xF4, 0x2E, 0x40, 0xF8, 0x2F, 0x3A, 0x1E,
+    0x08, 0xEB, 0xA2, 0x66, 0x29, 0x12, 0x9D, 0x8F,
+    0xB7, 0xCB, 0x57, 0x21, 0x1B, 0x92, 0x81, 0xA6,
+    0x55, 0x17, 0xCC, 0x87, 0x9D, 0x7B, 0x96, 0x21,
+    0x42, 0xC6, 0x5F, 0x5A, 0x7A, 0xF0, 0x14, 0x67
+};
+
+static const unsigned char iso_test_7[WHIRLPOOL_DIGEST_LENGTH] = {
+    0x46, 0x6E, 0xF1, 0x8B, 0xAB, 0xB0, 0x15, 0x4D,
+    0x25, 0xB9, 0xD3, 0x8A, 0x64, 0x14, 0xF5, 0xC0,
+    0x87, 0x84, 0x37, 0x2B, 0xCC, 0xB2, 0x04, 0xD6,
+    0x54, 0x9C, 0x4A, 0xFA, 0xDB, 0x60, 0x14, 0x29,
+    0x4D, 0x5B, 0xD8, 0xDF, 0x2A, 0x6C, 0x44, 0xE5,
+    0x38, 0xCD, 0x04, 0x7B, 0x26, 0x81, 0xA5, 0x1A,
+    0x2C, 0x60, 0x48, 0x1E, 0x88, 0xC5, 0xA2, 0x0B,
+    0x2C, 0x2A, 0x80, 0xCF, 0x3A, 0x9A, 0x08, 0x3B
+};
+
+static const unsigned char iso_test_8[WHIRLPOOL_DIGEST_LENGTH] = {
+    0x2A, 0x98, 0x7E, 0xA4, 0x0F, 0x91, 0x70, 0x61,
+    0xF5, 0xD6, 0xF0, 0xA0, 0xE4, 0x64, 0x4F, 0x48,
+    0x8A, 0x7A, 0x5A, 0x52, 0xDE, 0xEE, 0x65, 0x62,
+    0x07, 0xC5, 0x62, 0xF9, 0x88, 0xE9, 0x5C, 0x69,
+    0x16, 0xBD, 0xC8, 0x03, 0x1B, 0xC5, 0xBE, 0x1B,
+    0x7B, 0x94, 0x76, 0x39, 0xFE, 0x05, 0x0B, 0x56,
+    0x93, 0x9B, 0xAA, 0xA0, 0xAD, 0xFF, 0x9A, 0xE6,
+    0x74, 0x5B, 0x7B, 0x18, 0x1C, 0x3B, 0xE3, 0xFD
+};
+
+static const unsigned char iso_test_9[WHIRLPOOL_DIGEST_LENGTH] = {
+    0x0C, 0x99, 0x00, 0x5B, 0xEB, 0x57, 0xEF, 0xF5,
+    0x0A, 0x7C, 0xF0, 0x05, 0x56, 0x0D, 0xDF, 0x5D,
+    0x29, 0x05, 0x7F, 0xD8, 0x6B, 0x20, 0xBF, 0xD6,
+    0x2D, 0xEC, 0xA0, 0xF1, 0xCC, 0xEA, 0x4A, 0xF5,
+    0x1F, 0xC1, 0x54, 0x90, 0xED, 0xDC, 0x47, 0xAF,
+    0x32, 0xBB, 0x2B, 0x66, 0xC3, 0x4F, 0xF9, 0xAD,
+    0x8C, 0x60, 0x08, 0xAD, 0x67, 0x7F, 0x77, 0x12,
+    0x69, 0x53, 0xB2, 0x26, 0xE4, 0xED, 0x8B, 0x01
+};
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+    unsigned char md[WHIRLPOOL_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+    int i;
+    WHIRLPOOL_CTX ctx;
+
+    fprintf(stdout, "Testing Whirlpool ");
+
+    WHIRLPOOL("", 0, md);
+    if (memcmp(md, iso_test_1, sizeof(iso_test_1))) {
+        fflush(stdout);
+        fprintf(stderr, "\nTEST 1 of 9 failed.\n");
+        return 1;
+    } else
+        fprintf(stdout, ".");
+    fflush(stdout);
+
+    WHIRLPOOL("a", 1, md);
+    if (memcmp(md, iso_test_2, sizeof(iso_test_2))) {
+        fflush(stdout);
+        fprintf(stderr, "\nTEST 2 of 9 failed.\n");
+        return 1;
+    } else
+        fprintf(stdout, ".");
+    fflush(stdout);
+
+    WHIRLPOOL("abc", 3, md);
+    if (memcmp(md, iso_test_3, sizeof(iso_test_3))) {
+        fflush(stdout);
+        fprintf(stderr, "\nTEST 3 of 9 failed.\n");
+        return 1;
+    } else
+        fprintf(stdout, ".");
+    fflush(stdout);
+
+    WHIRLPOOL("message digest", 14, md);
+    if (memcmp(md, iso_test_4, sizeof(iso_test_4))) {
+        fflush(stdout);
+        fprintf(stderr, "\nTEST 4 of 9 failed.\n");
+        return 1;
+    } else
+        fprintf(stdout, ".");
+    fflush(stdout);
+
+    WHIRLPOOL("abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz", 26, md);
+    if (memcmp(md, iso_test_5, sizeof(iso_test_5))) {
+        fflush(stdout);
+        fprintf(stderr, "\nTEST 5 of 9 failed.\n");
+        return 1;
+    } else
+        fprintf(stdout, ".");
+    fflush(stdout);
+
+    WHIRLPOOL("ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ"
+              "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz" "0123456789", 62, md);
+    if (memcmp(md, iso_test_6, sizeof(iso_test_6))) {
+        fflush(stdout);
+        fprintf(stderr, "\nTEST 6 of 9 failed.\n");
+        return 1;
+    } else
+        fprintf(stdout, ".");
+    fflush(stdout);
+
+    WHIRLPOOL("1234567890" "1234567890" "1234567890" "1234567890"
+              "1234567890" "1234567890" "1234567890" "1234567890", 80, md);
+    if (memcmp(md, iso_test_7, sizeof(iso_test_7))) {
+        fflush(stdout);
+        fprintf(stderr, "\nTEST 7 of 9 failed.\n");
+        return 1;
+    } else
+        fprintf(stdout, ".");
+    fflush(stdout);
+
+    WHIRLPOOL("abcdbcdecdefdefgefghfghighijhijk", 32, md);
+    if (memcmp(md, iso_test_8, sizeof(iso_test_8))) {
+        fflush(stdout);
+        fprintf(stderr, "\nTEST 8 of 9 failed.\n");
+        return 1;
+    } else
+        fprintf(stdout, ".");
+    fflush(stdout);
+
+    WHIRLPOOL_Init(&ctx);
+    for (i = 0; i < 1000000; i += 288)
+        WHIRLPOOL_Update(&ctx, "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa"
+                         "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa"
+                         "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa"
+                         "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa"
+                         "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa"
+                         "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa"
+                         "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa"
+                         "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa"
+                         "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa",
+                         (1000000 - i) < 288 ? 1000000 - i : 288);
+    WHIRLPOOL_Final(md, &ctx);
+    if (memcmp(md, iso_test_9, sizeof(iso_test_9))) {
+        fflush(stdout);
+        fprintf(stderr, "\nTEST 9 of 9 failed.\n");
+        return 1;
+    } else
+        fprintf(stdout, ".");
+    fflush(stdout);
+
+    fprintf(stdout, " passed.\n");
+    fflush(stdout);
+
+    return 0;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/x509aux.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/x509aux.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2c20d6d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/x509aux.c
@@ -0,0 +1,231 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL licenses, (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ * or in the file LICENSE in the source distribution.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/conf.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+#include "../e_os.h"
+
+static const char *progname;
+
+static void test_usage(void)
+{
+    fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s certfile\n", progname);
+}
+
+static void print_errors(void)
+{
+    unsigned long err;
+    char buffer[1024];
+    const char *file;
+    const char *data;
+    int line;
+    int flags;
+
+    while ((err = ERR_get_error_line_data(&file, &line, &data, &flags)) != 0) {
+        ERR_error_string_n(err, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
+        if (flags & ERR_TXT_STRING)
+            fprintf(stderr, "Error: %s:%s:%d:%s\n", buffer, file, line, data);
+        else
+            fprintf(stderr, "Error: %s:%s:%d\n", buffer, file, line);
+    }
+}
+
+static int test_certs(BIO *fp)
+{
+    int count;
+    char *name = 0;
+    char *header = 0;
+    unsigned char *data = 0;
+    long len;
+    typedef X509 *(*d2i_X509_t)(X509 **, const unsigned char **, long);
+    typedef int (*i2d_X509_t)(X509 *, unsigned char **);
+    int err = 0;
+
+    for (count = 0;
+         !err && PEM_read_bio(fp, &name, &header, &data, &len);
+	 ++count) {
+        int trusted = strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_X509_TRUSTED) == 0;
+        d2i_X509_t d2i = trusted ? d2i_X509_AUX : d2i_X509;
+        i2d_X509_t i2d = trusted ? i2d_X509_AUX : i2d_X509;
+        X509 *cert = NULL;
+	const unsigned char *p = data;
+        unsigned char *buf = NULL;
+        unsigned char *bufp;
+        long enclen;
+
+	if (!trusted
+            && strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_X509) != 0
+	    && strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_X509_OLD) != 0) {
+	    fprintf(stderr, "unexpected PEM object: %s\n", name);
+            err = 1;
+	    goto next;
+        }
+        cert = d2i(NULL, &p, len);
+
+        if (cert == NULL || (p - data) != len) {
+	    fprintf(stderr, "error parsing input %s\n", name);
+            err = 1;
+            goto next;
+        }
+
+        /* Test traditional 2-pass encoding into caller allocated buffer */
+        enclen = i2d(cert, NULL);
+        if (len != enclen) {
+	    fprintf(stderr, "encoded length %ld of %s != input length %ld\n",
+                    enclen, name, len);
+            err = 1;
+            goto next;
+        }
+        if ((buf = bufp = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) {
+            perror("malloc");
+            err = 1;
+            goto next;
+        }
+        enclen = i2d(cert, &bufp);
+        if (len != enclen) {
+	    fprintf(stderr, "encoded length %ld of %s != input length %ld\n",
+                    enclen, name, len);
+            err = 1;
+            goto next;
+        }
+        enclen = (long) (bufp - buf);
+        if (enclen != len) {
+	    fprintf(stderr, "unexpected buffer position after encoding %s\n",
+                    name);
+            err = 1;
+            goto next;
+        }
+        if (memcmp(buf, data, len) != 0) {
+	    fprintf(stderr, "encoded content of %s does not match input\n",
+                    name);
+            err = 1;
+            goto next;
+        }
+        OPENSSL_free(buf);
+        buf = NULL;
+
+        /* Test 1-pass encoding into library allocated buffer */
+        enclen = i2d(cert, &buf);
+        if (len != enclen) {
+	    fprintf(stderr, "encoded length %ld of %s != input length %ld\n",
+                    enclen, name, len);
+            err = 1;
+            goto next;
+        }
+        if (memcmp(buf, data, len) != 0) {
+	    fprintf(stderr, "encoded content of %s does not match input\n",
+                    name);
+            err = 1;
+            goto next;
+        }
+
+        if (trusted) {
+            /* Encode just the cert and compare with initial encoding */
+            OPENSSL_free(buf);
+            buf = NULL;
+
+            /* Test 1-pass encoding into library allocated buffer */
+            enclen = i2d(cert, &buf);
+            if (enclen > len) {
+                fprintf(stderr, "encoded length %ld of %s > input length %ld\n",
+                        enclen, name, len);
+                err = 1;
+                goto next;
+            }
+            if (memcmp(buf, data, enclen) != 0) {
+                fprintf(stderr, "encoded cert content does not match input\n");
+                err = 1;
+                goto next;
+            }
+        }
+
+	/*
+	 * If any of these were null, PEM_read() would have failed.
+	 */
+    next:
+        X509_free(cert);
+        OPENSSL_free(buf);
+	OPENSSL_free(name);
+	OPENSSL_free(header);
+	OPENSSL_free(data);
+    }
+
+    if (ERR_GET_REASON(ERR_peek_last_error()) == PEM_R_NO_START_LINE) {
+        /* Reached end of PEM file */
+        if (count > 0) {
+            ERR_clear_error();
+            return 1;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* Some other PEM read error */
+    print_errors();
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+    BIO *bio_err;
+    const char *p;
+    int ret = 1;
+
+    progname = argv[0];
+    if (argc < 2) {
+        test_usage();
+        EXIT(ret);
+    }
+
+    bio_err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT);
+
+    p = getenv("OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY");
+    if (p != NULL && strcmp(p, "on") == 0)
+        CRYPTO_set_mem_debug(1);
+    CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON);
+
+    argc--;
+    argv++;
+
+    while (argc >= 1) {
+        BIO *f = BIO_new_file(*argv, "r");
+        int ok;
+
+        if (f == NULL) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "%s: Error opening cert file: '%s': %s\n",
+                    progname, *argv, strerror(errno));
+            EXIT(ret);
+        }
+        ret = !(ok = test_certs(f));
+        BIO_free(f);
+
+        if (!ok) {
+            printf("%s ERROR\n", *argv);
+            ret = 1;
+            break;
+        }
+        printf("%s OK\n", *argv);
+
+        argc--;
+        argv++;
+    }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG
+    if (CRYPTO_mem_leaks(bio_err) <= 0)
+        ret = 1;
+#endif
+    BIO_free(bio_err);
+    EXIT(ret);
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/tools/build.info b/openssl-1.1.0h/tools/build.info
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..059e582
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/tools/build.info
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+{- our $c_rehash_name =
+       $config{target} =~ /^(VC|vms)-/ ? "c_rehash.pl" : "c_rehash";
+   "" -}
+IF[{- !$disabled{apps} -}]
+  SCRIPTS={- $c_rehash_name -}
+  SOURCE[{- $c_rehash_name -}]=c_rehash.in
+ENDIF
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/tools/c_rehash.in b/openssl-1.1.0h/tools/c_rehash.in
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e658222
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/tools/c_rehash.in
@@ -0,0 +1,231 @@
+#!{- $config{hashbangperl} -}
+
+# {- join("\n# ", @autowarntext) -}
+# Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+# Perl c_rehash script, scan all files in a directory
+# and add symbolic links to their hash values.
+
+my $dir = {- quotify1($config{openssldir}) -};
+my $prefix = {- quotify1($config{prefix}) -};
+
+my $errorcount = 0;
+my $openssl = $ENV{OPENSSL} || "openssl";
+my $pwd;
+my $x509hash = "-subject_hash";
+my $crlhash = "-hash";
+my $verbose = 0;
+my $symlink_exists=eval {symlink("",""); 1};
+my $removelinks = 1;
+
+##  Parse flags.
+while ( $ARGV[0] =~ /^-/ ) {
+    my $flag = shift @ARGV;
+    last if ( $flag eq '--');
+    if ( $flag eq '-old') {
+	    $x509hash = "-subject_hash_old";
+	    $crlhash = "-hash_old";
+    } elsif ( $flag eq '-h' || $flag eq '-help' ) {
+	    help();
+    } elsif ( $flag eq '-n' ) {
+	    $removelinks = 0;
+    } elsif ( $flag eq '-v' ) {
+	    $verbose++;
+    }
+    else {
+	    print STDERR "Usage error; try -h.\n";
+	    exit 1;
+    }
+}
+
+sub help {
+	print "Usage: c_rehash [-old] [-h] [-help] [-v] [dirs...]\n";
+	print "   -old use old-style digest\n";
+	print "   -h or -help print this help text\n";
+	print "   -v print files removed and linked\n";
+	exit 0;
+}
+
+eval "require Cwd";
+if (defined(&Cwd::getcwd)) {
+	$pwd=Cwd::getcwd();
+} else {
+	$pwd=`pwd`;
+	chomp($pwd);
+}
+
+# DOS/Win32 or Unix delimiter?  Prefix our installdir, then search.
+my $path_delim = ($pwd =~ /^[a-z]\:/i) ? ';' : ':';
+$ENV{PATH} = "$prefix/bin" . ($ENV{PATH} ? $path_delim . $ENV{PATH} : "");
+
+if (! -x $openssl) {
+	my $found = 0;
+	foreach (split /$path_delim/, $ENV{PATH}) {
+		if (-x "$_/$openssl") {
+			$found = 1;
+			$openssl = "$_/$openssl";
+			last;
+		}	
+	}
+	if ($found == 0) {
+		print STDERR "c_rehash: rehashing skipped ('openssl' program not available)\n";
+		exit 0;
+	}
+}
+
+if (@ARGV) {
+	@dirlist = @ARGV;
+} elsif ($ENV{SSL_CERT_DIR}) {
+	@dirlist = split /$path_delim/, $ENV{SSL_CERT_DIR};
+} else {
+	$dirlist[0] = "$dir/certs";
+}
+
+if (-d $dirlist[0]) {
+	chdir $dirlist[0];
+	$openssl="$pwd/$openssl" if (!-x $openssl);
+	chdir $pwd;
+}
+
+foreach (@dirlist) {
+	if (-d $_ ) {
+            if ( -w $_) {
+		hash_dir($_);
+            } else {
+                print "Skipping $_, can't write\n";
+                $errorcount++;
+            }
+	}
+}
+exit($errorcount);
+
+sub hash_dir {
+	my %hashlist;
+	print "Doing $_[0]\n";
+	chdir $_[0];
+	opendir(DIR, ".");
+	my @flist = sort readdir(DIR);
+	closedir DIR;
+	if ( $removelinks ) {
+		# Delete any existing symbolic links
+		foreach (grep {/^[\da-f]+\.r{0,1}\d+$/} @flist) {
+			if (-l $_) {
+				print "unlink $_" if $verbose;
+				unlink $_ || warn "Can't unlink $_, $!\n";
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	FILE: foreach $fname (grep {/\.(pem)|(crt)|(cer)|(crl)$/} @flist) {
+		# Check to see if certificates and/or CRLs present.
+		my ($cert, $crl) = check_file($fname);
+		if (!$cert && !$crl) {
+			print STDERR "WARNING: $fname does not contain a certificate or CRL: skipping\n";
+			next;
+		}
+		link_hash_cert($fname) if ($cert);
+		link_hash_crl($fname) if ($crl);
+	}
+}
+
+sub check_file {
+	my ($is_cert, $is_crl) = (0,0);
+	my $fname = $_[0];
+	open IN, $fname;
+	while(<IN>) {
+		if (/^-----BEGIN (.*)-----/) {
+			my $hdr = $1;
+			if ($hdr =~ /^(X509 |TRUSTED |)CERTIFICATE$/) {
+				$is_cert = 1;
+				last if ($is_crl);
+			} elsif ($hdr eq "X509 CRL") {
+				$is_crl = 1;
+				last if ($is_cert);
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	close IN;
+	return ($is_cert, $is_crl);
+}
+
+
+# Link a certificate to its subject name hash value, each hash is of
+# the form <hash>.<n> where n is an integer. If the hash value already exists
+# then we need to up the value of n, unless its a duplicate in which
+# case we skip the link. We check for duplicates by comparing the
+# certificate fingerprints
+
+sub link_hash_cert {
+		my $fname = $_[0];
+		$fname =~ s/'/'\\''/g;
+		my ($hash, $fprint) = `"$openssl" x509 $x509hash -fingerprint -noout -in "$fname"`;
+		chomp $hash;
+		chomp $fprint;
+		$fprint =~ s/^.*=//;
+		$fprint =~ tr/://d;
+		my $suffix = 0;
+		# Search for an unused hash filename
+		while(exists $hashlist{"$hash.$suffix"}) {
+			# Hash matches: if fingerprint matches its a duplicate cert
+			if ($hashlist{"$hash.$suffix"} eq $fprint) {
+				print STDERR "WARNING: Skipping duplicate certificate $fname\n";
+				return;
+			}
+			$suffix++;
+		}
+		$hash .= ".$suffix";
+		if ($symlink_exists) {
+			print "link $fname -> $hash\n" if $verbose;
+			symlink $fname, $hash || warn "Can't symlink, $!";
+		} else {
+			print "copy $fname -> $hash\n" if $verbose;
+                        if (open($in, "<", $fname)) {
+                            if (open($out,">", $hash)) {
+                                print $out $_ while (<$in>);
+                                close $out;
+                            } else {
+                                warn "can't open $hash for write, $!";
+                            }
+                            close $in;
+                        } else {
+                            warn "can't open $fname for read, $!";
+                        }
+		}
+		$hashlist{$hash} = $fprint;
+}
+
+# Same as above except for a CRL. CRL links are of the form <hash>.r<n>
+
+sub link_hash_crl {
+		my $fname = $_[0];
+		$fname =~ s/'/'\\''/g;
+		my ($hash, $fprint) = `"$openssl" crl $crlhash -fingerprint -noout -in '$fname'`;
+		chomp $hash;
+		chomp $fprint;
+		$fprint =~ s/^.*=//;
+		$fprint =~ tr/://d;
+		my $suffix = 0;
+		# Search for an unused hash filename
+		while(exists $hashlist{"$hash.r$suffix"}) {
+			# Hash matches: if fingerprint matches its a duplicate cert
+			if ($hashlist{"$hash.r$suffix"} eq $fprint) {
+				print STDERR "WARNING: Skipping duplicate CRL $fname\n";
+				return;
+			}
+			$suffix++;
+		}
+		$hash .= ".r$suffix";
+		if ($symlink_exists) {
+			print "link $fname -> $hash\n" if $verbose;
+			symlink $fname, $hash || warn "Can't symlink, $!";
+		} else {
+			print "cp $fname -> $hash\n" if $verbose;
+			system ("cp", $fname, $hash);
+                        warn "Can't copy, $!" if ($? >> 8) != 0;
+		}
+		$hashlist{$hash} = $fprint;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/util/build.info b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/build.info
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..609be51
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/build.info
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+IF[{- $target{build_scheme}->[1] eq "VMS" -}]
+ SCRIPTS_NO_INST=local_shlib.com unlocal_shlib.com
+ SOURCE[local_shlib.com]=local_shlib.com.in
+ SOURCE[unlocal_shlib.com]=unlocal_shlib.com.in
+ELSIF[{- $target{build_scheme}->[1] eq "unix" -}]
+ SCRIPTS_NO_INST=shlib_wrap.sh
+ SOURCE[shlib_wrap.sh]=shlib_wrap.sh.in
+ENDIF
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/util/ck_errf.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/ck_errf.pl
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..7fc5367
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/ck_errf.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+# This is just a quick script to scan for cases where the 'error'
+# function name in a XXXerr() macro is wrong.
+# 
+# Run in the top level by going
+# perl util/ck_errf.pl */*.c */*/*.c
+#
+
+my $err_strict = 0;
+my $bad = 0;
+
+foreach $file (@ARGV)
+	{
+	if ($file eq "-strict")
+		{
+		$err_strict = 1;
+		next;
+		}
+	open(IN,"<$file") || die "unable to open $file\n";
+	$func="";
+	while (<IN>)
+		{
+		if (!/;$/ && /^\**([a-zA-Z_].*[\s*])?([A-Za-z_0-9]+)\(.*([),]|$)/)
+			{
+			/^([^()]*(\([^()]*\)[^()]*)*)\(/;
+			$1 =~ /([A-Za-z_0-9]*)$/;
+			$func = $1;
+			$func =~ tr/A-Z/a-z/;
+			}
+		if (/([A-Z0-9]+)err\(([^,]+)/ && ! /ckerr_ignore/)
+			{
+			$errlib=$1;
+			$n=$2;
+
+			if ($func eq "")
+				{ print "$file:$.:???:$n\n"; $bad = 1; next; }
+
+			if ($n !~ /([^_]+)_F_(.+)$/)
+				{
+		#		print "check -$file:$.:$func:$n\n";
+				next;
+				}
+			$lib=$1;
+			$n=$2;
+
+			if ($lib ne $errlib)
+				{ print "$file:$.:$func:$n [${errlib}err]\n"; $bad = 1; next; }
+
+			$n =~ tr/A-Z/a-z/;
+			if (($n ne $func) && ($errlib ne "SYS"))
+				{ print "$file:$.:$func:$n\n"; $bad = 1; next; }
+	#		print "$func:$1\n";
+			}
+		}
+	close(IN);
+        }
+
+if ($bad && $err_strict)
+	{
+	print STDERR "FATAL: error discrepancy\n";
+	exit 1;
+	}
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/util/copy.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/copy.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..01964f5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/copy.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+use Fcntl;
+
+
+# copy.pl
+
+# Perl script 'copy' comment. On Windows the built in "copy" command also
+# copies timestamps: this messes up Makefile dependencies.
+
+my $stripcr = 0;
+
+my $arg;
+
+foreach $arg (@ARGV) {
+	if ($arg eq "-stripcr")
+		{
+		$stripcr = 1;
+		next;
+		}
+	$arg =~ s|\\|/|g;	# compensate for bug/feature in cygwin glob...
+	$arg = qq("$arg") if ($arg =~ /\s/);	# compensate for bug in 5.10...
+	foreach (glob $arg)
+		{
+		push @filelist, $_;
+		}
+}
+
+$fnum = @filelist;
+
+if ($fnum <= 1)
+	{
+	die "Need at least two filenames";
+	}
+
+$dest = pop @filelist;
+	
+if ($fnum > 2 && ! -d $dest)
+	{
+	die "Destination must be a directory";
+	}
+
+foreach (@filelist)
+	{
+	if (-d $dest)
+		{
+		$dfile = $_;
+		$dfile =~ s|^.*[/\\]([^/\\]*)$|$1|;
+		$dfile = "$dest/$dfile";
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		$dfile = $dest;
+		}
+	sysopen(IN, $_, O_RDONLY|O_BINARY) || die "Can't Open $_";
+	sysopen(OUT, $dfile, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC|O_BINARY)
+					|| die "Can't Open $dfile";
+	while (sysread IN, $buf, 10240)
+		{
+		if ($stripcr)
+			{
+			$buf =~ tr/\015//d;
+			}
+		syswrite(OUT, $buf, length($buf));
+		}
+	close(IN);
+	close(OUT);
+	print "Copying: $_ to $dfile\n";
+	}
+		
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/util/dofile.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/dofile.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fc72989
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/dofile.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,210 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+# Reads one or more template files and runs it through Text::Template
+#
+# It is assumed that this scripts is called with -Mconfigdata, a module
+# that holds configuration data in %config
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+
+use FindBin;
+use Getopt::Std;
+
+# We actually expect to get the following hash tables from configdata:
+#
+#    %config
+#    %target
+#    %withargs
+#    %unified_info
+#
+# We just do a minimal test to see that we got what we expected.
+# $config{target} must exist as an absolute minimum.
+die "You must run this script with -Mconfigdata\n" if !exists($config{target});
+
+# Make a subclass of Text::Template to override append_text_to_result,
+# as recommended here:
+#
+# http://search.cpan.org/~mjd/Text-Template-1.46/lib/Text/Template.pm#Automatic_postprocessing_of_template_hunks
+
+package OpenSSL::Template;
+
+# Because we know that Text::Template isn't a core Perl module, we use
+# a fallback in case it's not installed on the system
+use File::Basename;
+use File::Spec::Functions;
+use lib "$FindBin::Bin/perl";
+use with_fallback qw(Text::Template);
+
+#use parent qw/Text::Template/;
+use vars qw/@ISA/;
+push @ISA, qw/Text::Template/;
+
+# Override constructor
+sub new {
+    my ($class) = shift;
+
+    # Call the constructor of the parent class, Person.
+    my $self = $class->SUPER::new( @_ );
+    # Add few more attributes
+    $self->{_output_off}   = 0;	# Default to output hunks
+    bless $self, $class;
+    return $self;
+}
+
+sub append_text_to_output {
+    my $self = shift;
+
+    if ($self->{_output_off} == 0) {
+	$self->SUPER::append_text_to_output(@_);
+    }
+
+    return;
+}
+
+sub output_reset_on {
+    my $self = shift;
+    $self->{_output_off} = 0;
+}
+
+sub output_on {
+    my $self = shift;
+    if (--$self->{_output_off} < 0) {
+	$self->{_output_off} = 0;
+    }
+}
+
+sub output_off {
+    my $self = shift;
+    $self->{_output_off}++;
+}
+
+# Come back to main
+
+package main;
+
+# Helper functions for the templates #################################
+
+# It might be practical to quotify some strings and have them protected
+# from possible harm.  These functions primarly quote things that might
+# be interpreted wrongly by a perl eval.
+
+# quotify1 STRING
+# This adds quotes (") around the given string, and escapes any $, @, \,
+# " and ' by prepending a \ to them.
+sub quotify1 {
+    my $s = my $orig = shift @_;
+    $s =~ s/([\$\@\\"'])/\\$1/g;
+    $s ne $orig || $s =~ /\s/ ? '"'.$s.'"' : $s;
+}
+
+# quotify_l LIST
+# For each defined element in LIST (i.e. elements that aren't undef), have
+# it quotified with 'quotofy1'
+sub quotify_l {
+    map {
+        if (!defined($_)) {
+            ();
+        } else {
+            quotify1($_);
+        }
+    } @_;
+}
+
+# Error reporter #####################################################
+
+# The error reporter uses %lines to figure out exactly which file the
+# error happened and at what line.  Not that the line number may be
+# the start of a perl snippet rather than the exact line where it
+# happened.  Nothing we can do about that here.
+
+my %lines = ();
+sub broken {
+    my %args = @_;
+    my $filename = "<STDIN>";
+    my $deducelines = 0;
+    foreach (sort keys %lines) {
+        $filename = $lines{$_};
+        last if ($_ > $args{lineno});
+        $deducelines += $_;
+    }
+    print STDERR $args{error}," in $filename, fragment starting at line ",$args{lineno}-$deducelines;
+    undef;
+}
+
+# Check options ######################################################
+
+my %opts = ();
+
+# -o ORIGINATOR
+#		declares ORIGINATOR as the originating script.
+getopt('o', \%opts);
+
+my @autowarntext = ("WARNING: do not edit!",
+		    "Generated"
+		    . (defined($opts{o}) ? " by ".$opts{o} : "")
+		    . (scalar(@ARGV) > 0 ? " from ".join(", ",@ARGV) : ""));
+
+# Template reading ###################################################
+
+# Read in all the templates into $text, while keeping track of each
+# file and its size in lines, to try to help report errors with the
+# correct file name and line number.
+
+my $prev_linecount = 0;
+my $text =
+    @ARGV
+    ? join("", map { my $x = Text::Template::_load_text($_);
+                     if (!defined($x)) {
+                         die $Text::Template::ERROR, "\n";
+                     }
+                     $x = "{- output_reset_on() -}" . $x;
+                     my $linecount = $x =~ tr/\n//;
+                     $prev_linecount = ($linecount += $prev_linecount);
+                     $lines{$linecount} = $_;
+                     $x } @ARGV)
+    : join("", <STDIN>);
+
+# Engage! ############################################################
+
+# Load the full template (combination of files) into Text::Template
+# and fill it up with our data.  Output goes directly to STDOUT
+
+my $template =
+    OpenSSL::Template->new(TYPE => 'STRING',
+                           SOURCE => $text,
+                           PREPEND => qq{use lib "$FindBin::Bin/perl";});
+
+sub output_reset_on {
+    $template->output_reset_on();
+    "";
+}
+sub output_on {
+    $template->output_on();
+    "";
+}
+sub output_off {
+    $template->output_off();
+    "";
+}
+
+$template->fill_in(OUTPUT => \*STDOUT,
+                   HASH => { config => \%config,
+                             target => \%target,
+                             disabled => \%disabled,
+                             withargs => \%withargs,
+                             unified_info => \%unified_info,
+                             autowarntext => \@autowarntext,
+                             quotify1 => \&quotify1,
+                             quotify_l => \&quotify_l,
+                             output_reset_on => \&output_reset_on,
+                             output_on => \&output_on,
+                             output_off => \&output_off },
+                   DELIMITERS => [ "{-", "-}" ],
+                   BROKEN => \&broken);
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/util/find-doc-nits b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/find-doc-nits
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..598854c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/find-doc-nits
@@ -0,0 +1,549 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+require 5.10.0;
+use warnings;
+use strict;
+use Pod::Checker;
+use File::Find;
+use File::Basename;
+use File::Spec::Functions;
+use Getopt::Std;
+use lib catdir(dirname($0), "perl");
+use OpenSSL::Util::Pod;
+
+# Options.
+our($opt_d);
+our($opt_h);
+our($opt_l);
+our($opt_n);
+our($opt_p);
+our($opt_s);
+our($opt_u);
+our($opt_c);
+
+sub help()
+{
+    print <<EOF;
+Find small errors (nits) in documentation.  Options:
+    -d Detailed list of undocumented (implies -u)
+    -l Print bogus links
+    -n Print nits in POD pages
+    -s Also print missing sections in POD pages (implies -n)
+    -p Warn if non-public name documented (implies -n)
+    -u List undocumented functions
+    -h Print this help message
+    -c List undocumented commands and options
+EOF
+    exit;
+}
+
+my $temp = '/tmp/docnits.txt';
+my $OUT;
+my %public;
+
+my %mandatory_sections =
+    ( '*'    => [ 'NAME', 'DESCRIPTION', 'COPYRIGHT' ],
+      1      => [ 'SYNOPSIS', 'OPTIONS' ],
+      3      => [ 'SYNOPSIS', 'RETURN VALUES' ],
+      5      => [ ],
+      7      => [ ] );
+
+# Cross-check functions in the NAME and SYNOPSIS section.
+sub name_synopsis()
+{
+    my $id = shift;
+    my $filename = shift;
+    my $contents = shift;
+
+    # Get NAME section and all words in it.
+    return unless $contents =~ /=head1 NAME(.*)=head1 SYNOPSIS/ms;
+    my $tmp = $1;
+    $tmp =~ tr/\n/ /;
+    print "$id trailing comma before - in NAME\n" if $tmp =~ /, *-/;
+    $tmp =~ s/ -.*//g;
+    $tmp =~ s/  */ /g;
+    print "$id missing comma in NAME\n" if $tmp =~ /[^,] /;
+    $tmp =~ s/,//g;
+
+    my $dirname = dirname($filename);
+    my $simplename = basename($filename);
+    $simplename =~ s/.pod$//;
+    my $foundfilename = 0;
+    my %foundfilenames = ();
+    my %names;
+    foreach my $n ( split ' ', $tmp ) {
+        $names{$n} = 1;
+        $foundfilename++ if $n eq $simplename;
+        $foundfilenames{$n} = 1
+            if -f "$dirname/$n.pod" && $n ne $simplename;
+    }
+    print "$id the following exist as other .pod files:\n",
+        join(" ", sort keys %foundfilenames), "\n"
+        if %foundfilenames;
+    print "$id $simplename (filename) missing from NAME section\n"
+        unless $foundfilename;
+    foreach my $n ( keys %names ) {
+        print "$id $n is not public\n"
+            if $opt_p and !defined $public{$n};
+    }
+
+    # Find all functions in SYNOPSIS
+    return unless $contents =~ /=head1 SYNOPSIS(.*)=head1 DESCRIPTION/ms;
+    my $syn = $1;
+    foreach my $line ( split /\n+/, $syn ) {
+        my $sym;
+        $line =~ s/STACK_OF\([^)]+\)/int/g;
+        $line =~ s/__declspec\([^)]+\)//;
+        if ( $line =~ /env (\S*)=/ ) {
+            # environment variable env NAME=...
+            $sym = $1;
+        } elsif ( $line =~ /typedef.*\(\*(\S+)\)\(.*/ ) {
+            # a callback function pointer: typedef ... (*NAME)(...
+            $sym = $1;
+        } elsif ( $line =~ /typedef.* (\S+)\(.*/ ) {
+            # a callback function signature: typedef ... NAME(...
+            $sym = $1;
+        } elsif ( $line =~ /typedef.* (\S+);/ ) {
+            # a simple typedef: typedef ... NAME;
+            $sym = $1;
+        } elsif ( $line =~ /enum (\S*) \{/ ) {
+            # an enumeration: enum ... {
+            $sym = $1;
+        } elsif ( $line =~ /#define ([A-Za-z0-9_]+)/ ) {
+            $sym = $1;
+        } elsif ( $line =~ /([A-Za-z0-9_]+)\(/ ) {
+            $sym = $1;
+        }
+        else {
+            next;
+        }
+        print "$id $sym missing from NAME section\n"
+            unless defined $names{$sym};
+        $names{$sym} = 2;
+
+        # Do some sanity checks on the prototype.
+        print "$id prototype missing spaces around commas: $line\n"
+            if ( $line =~ /[a-z0-9],[^ ]/ );
+    }
+
+    foreach my $n ( keys %names ) {
+        next if $names{$n} == 2;
+        print "$id $n missing from SYNOPSIS\n";
+    }
+}
+
+sub check()
+{
+    my $filename = shift;
+    my $dirname = basename(dirname($filename));
+
+    my $contents = '';
+    {
+        local $/ = undef;
+        open POD, $filename or die "Couldn't open $filename, $!";
+        $contents = <POD>;
+        close POD;
+    }
+
+    my $id = "${filename}:1:";
+
+    # Find what section this page is in; assume 3.
+    my $section = 3;
+    $section = 1 if $dirname eq 'apps';
+    $section = $1 if ( $contents =~ /=for comment openssl_manual_section:(\d)/);
+
+    &name_synopsis($id, $filename, $contents)
+        unless $contents =~ /=for comment generic/
+            or $section != 3;
+
+    print "$id doesn't start with =pod\n"
+        if $contents !~ /^=pod/;
+    print "$id doesn't end with =cut\n"
+        if $contents !~ /=cut\n$/;
+    print "$id more than one cut line.\n"
+        if $contents =~ /=cut.*=cut/ms;
+    print "$id missing copyright\n"
+        if $contents !~ /Copyright .* The OpenSSL Project Authors/;
+    print "$id copyright not last\n"
+        if $contents =~ /head1 COPYRIGHT.*=head/ms;
+    print "$id head2 in All uppercase\n"
+        if $contents =~ /head2\s+[A-Z ]+\n/;
+    print "$id extra space after head\n"
+        if $contents =~ /=head\d\s\s+/;
+    print "$id period in NAME section\n"
+        if $contents =~ /=head1 NAME.*\.\n.*=head1 SYNOPSIS/ms;
+    print "$id POD markup in NAME section\n"
+        if $contents =~ /=head1 NAME.*[<>].*=head1 SYNOPSIS/ms;
+    print "$id Duplicate $1 in L<>\n"
+        if $contents =~ /L<([^>]*)\|([^>]*)>/ && $1 eq $2;
+    print "$id Bad =over $1\n"
+        if $contents =~ /=over([^ ][^24])/;
+    print "$id Possible version style issue\n"
+        if $contents =~ /OpenSSL version [019]/;
+
+    if ( $contents !~ /=for comment multiple includes/ ) {
+        # Look for multiple consecutive openssl #include lines
+        # (non-consecutive lines are okay; see crypto/MD5.pod).
+        if ( $contents =~ /=head1 SYNOPSIS(.*)=head1 DESCRIPTION/ms ) {
+            my $count = 0;
+            foreach my $line ( split /\n+/, $1 ) {
+                if ( $line =~ m@include <openssl/@ ) {
+                    print "$id has multiple includes\n" if ++$count == 2;
+                } else {
+                    $count = 0;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    open my $OUT, '>', $temp
+        or die "Can't open $temp, $!";
+    podchecker($filename, $OUT);
+    close $OUT;
+    open $OUT, '<', $temp
+        or die "Can't read $temp, $!";
+    while ( <$OUT> ) {
+        next if /\(section\) in.*deprecated/;
+        print;
+    }
+    close $OUT;
+    unlink $temp || warn "Can't remove $temp, $!";
+
+    foreach ((@{$mandatory_sections{'*'}}, @{$mandatory_sections{$section}})) {
+        # Skip "return values" if not -s
+        next if $_ eq 'RETURN VALUES' and not $opt_s;
+        print "$id: missing $_ head1 section\n"
+            if $contents !~ /^=head1\s+${_}\s*$/m;
+    }
+}
+
+my %dups;
+
+sub parsenum()
+{
+    my $file = shift;
+    my @apis;
+
+    open my $IN, '<', $file
+        or die "Can't open $file, $!, stopped";
+
+    while ( <$IN> ) {
+        next if /^#/;
+        next if /\bNOEXIST\b/;
+        next if /\bEXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNC\b/;
+        my @fields = split();
+        die "Malformed line $_"
+            if scalar @fields != 2 && scalar @fields != 4;
+        push @apis, $fields[0];
+    }
+
+    close $IN;
+
+    print "# Found ", scalar(@apis), " in $file\n" unless $opt_p;
+    return sort @apis;
+}
+
+sub getdocced()
+{
+    my $dir = shift;
+    my %return;
+
+    foreach my $pod ( glob("$dir/*.pod") ) {
+        my %podinfo = extract_pod_info($pod);
+        foreach my $n ( @{$podinfo{names}} ) {
+            $return{$n} = $pod;
+            print "# Duplicate $n in $pod and $dups{$n}\n"
+                if defined $dups{$n} && $dups{$n} ne $pod;
+            $dups{$n} = $pod;
+        }
+    }
+
+    return %return;
+}
+
+my %docced;
+
+sub checkmacros()
+{
+    my $count = 0;
+
+    print "# Checking macros (approximate)\n";
+    foreach my $f ( glob('include/openssl/*.h') ) {
+        # Skip some internals we don't want to document yet.
+        next if $f eq 'include/openssl/asn1.h';
+        next if $f eq 'include/openssl/asn1t.h';
+        next if $f eq 'include/openssl/err.h';
+        open(IN, $f) || die "Can't open $f, $!";
+        while ( <IN> ) {
+            next unless /^#\s*define\s*(\S+)\(/;
+            my $macro = $1;
+            next if $docced{$macro};
+            next if $macro =~ /i2d_/
+                || $macro =~ /d2i_/
+                || $macro =~ /DEPRECATEDIN/
+                || $macro =~ /IMPLEMENT_/
+                || $macro =~ /DECLARE_/;
+            print "$f:$macro\n" if $opt_d;
+            $count++;
+        }
+        close(IN);
+    }
+    print "# Found $count macros missing (not all should be documented)\n"
+}
+
+sub printem()
+{
+    my $libname = shift;
+    my $numfile = shift;
+    my $count = 0;
+
+    foreach my $func ( &parsenum($numfile) ) {
+        next if $docced{$func};
+
+        # Skip ASN1 utilities
+        next if $func =~ /^ASN1_/;
+
+        print "$libname:$func\n" if $opt_d;
+        $count++;
+    }
+    print "# Found $count missing from $numfile\n\n";
+}
+
+
+# Collection of links in each POD file.
+# filename => [ "foo(1)", "bar(3)", ... ]
+my %link_collection = ();
+# Collection of names in each POD file.
+# "name(s)" => filename
+my %name_collection = ();
+
+sub collectnames {
+    my $filename = shift;
+    $filename =~ m|man(\d)/|;
+    my $section = $1;
+    my $simplename = basename($filename, ".pod");
+    my $id = "${filename}:1:";
+
+    my $contents = '';
+    {
+        local $/ = undef;
+        open POD, $filename or die "Couldn't open $filename, $!";
+        $contents = <POD>;
+        close POD;
+    }
+
+    $contents =~ /=head1 NAME([^=]*)=head1 /ms;
+    my $tmp = $1;
+    unless (defined $tmp) {
+        print "$id weird name section\n";
+        return;
+    }
+    $tmp =~ tr/\n/ /;
+    $tmp =~ s/-.*//g;
+
+    my @names = map { s/\s+//g; $_ } split(/,/, $tmp);
+    unless (grep { $simplename eq $_ } @names) {
+        print "$id missing $simplename\n";
+        push @names, $simplename;
+    }
+    foreach my $name (@names) {
+        next if $name eq "";
+        my $name_sec = "$name($section)";
+        if (! exists $name_collection{$name_sec}) {
+            $name_collection{$name_sec} = $filename;
+        } else { #elsif ($filename ne $name_collection{$name_sec}) {
+            print "$id $name_sec also in $name_collection{$name_sec}\n";
+        }
+    }
+
+    my @foreign_names =
+        map { map { s/\s+//g; $_ } split(/,/, $_) }
+        $contents =~ /=for\s+comment\s+foreign\s+manuals:\s*(.*)\n\n/;
+    foreach (@foreign_names) {
+        $name_collection{$_} = undef; # It still exists!
+    }
+
+    my @links = $contents =~ /L<
+                              # if the link is of the form L<something|name(s)>,
+                              # then remove 'something'.  Note that 'something'
+                              # may contain POD codes as well...
+                              (?:(?:[^\|]|<[^>]*>)*\|)?
+                              # we're only interested in referenses that have
+                              # a one digit section number
+                              ([^\/>\(]+\(\d\))
+                             /gx;
+    $link_collection{$filename} = [ @links ];
+}
+
+sub checklinks {
+    foreach my $filename (sort keys %link_collection) {
+        foreach my $link (@{$link_collection{$filename}}) {
+            print "${filename}:1: reference to non-existing $link\n"
+                unless exists $name_collection{$link};
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+sub publicize() {
+    foreach my $name ( &parsenum('util/libcrypto.num') ) {
+        $public{$name} = 1;
+    }
+    foreach my $name ( &parsenum('util/libssl.num') ) {
+        $public{$name} = 1;
+    }
+    foreach my $name ( &parsenum('util/private.num') ) {
+        $public{$name} = 1;
+    }
+}
+
+my %skips = (
+    'aes128' => 1,
+    'aes192' => 1,
+    'aes256' => 1,
+    'aria128' => 1,
+    'aria192' => 1,
+    'aria256' => 1,
+    'camellia128' => 1,
+    'camellia192' => 1,
+    'camellia256' => 1,
+    'des' => 1,
+    'des3' => 1,
+    'idea' => 1,
+    '[cipher]' => 1,
+    '[digest]' => 1,
+);
+
+sub checkflags() {
+    my $cmd = shift;
+    my %cmdopts;
+    my %docopts;
+    my $ok = 1;
+
+    # Get the list of options in the command.
+    open CFH, "./apps/openssl list --options $cmd|"
+        || die "Can list options for $cmd, $!";
+    while ( <CFH> ) {
+        chop;
+        s/ .$//;
+        $cmdopts{$_} = 1;
+    }
+    close CFH;
+
+    # Get the list of flags from the synopsis
+    open CFH, "<doc/apps/$cmd.pod"
+        || die "Can't open $cmd.pod, $!";
+    while ( <CFH> ) {
+        chop;
+        last if /DESCRIPTION/;
+        next unless /\[B<-([^ >]+)/;
+        $docopts{$1} = 1;
+    }
+    close CFH;
+
+    # See what's in the command not the manpage.
+    my @undocced = ();
+    foreach my $k ( keys %cmdopts ) {
+        push @undocced, $k unless $docopts{$k};
+    }
+    if ( scalar @undocced > 0 ) {
+        $ok = 0;
+        foreach ( @undocced ) {
+            print "doc/apps/$cmd.pod: Missing -$_\n";
+        }
+    }
+
+    # See what's in the command not the manpage.
+    my @unimpl = ();
+    foreach my $k ( keys %docopts ) {
+        push @unimpl, $k unless $cmdopts{$k};
+    }
+    if ( scalar @unimpl > 0 ) {
+        $ok = 0;
+        foreach ( @unimpl ) {
+            next if defined $skips{$_};
+            print "doc/apps/$cmd.pod: Not implemented -$_\n";
+        }
+    }
+
+    return $ok;
+}
+
+getopts('cdlnsphu');
+
+&help() if $opt_h;
+$opt_n = 1 if $opt_s or $opt_p;
+$opt_u = 1 if $opt_d;
+
+die "Need one of -[cdlnspu] flags.\n"
+    unless $opt_c or $opt_l or $opt_n or $opt_u;
+
+if ( $opt_c ) {
+    my $ok = 1;
+    my @commands = ();
+
+    # Get list of commands.
+    open FH, "./apps/openssl list -1 -commands|"
+        || die "Can't list commands, $!";
+    while ( <FH> ) {
+        chop;
+        push @commands, $_;
+    }
+    close FH;
+
+    # See if each has a manpage.
+    foreach ( @commands ) {
+        next if $_ eq 'help' || $_ eq 'exit';
+        if ( ! -f "doc/apps/$_.pod" ) {
+            print "doc/apps/$_.pod does not exist\n";
+            $ok = 0;
+        } else {
+            $ok = 0 if not &checkflags($_);
+        }
+    }
+
+    # See what help is missing.
+    open FH, "./apps/openssl list --missing-help |"
+        || die "Can't list missing help, $!";
+    while ( <FH> ) {
+        chop;
+        my ($cmd, $flag) = split;
+        print "$cmd has no help for -$flag\n";
+        $ok = 0;
+    }
+    close FH;
+
+    exit 1 if not $ok;
+}
+
+if ( $opt_l ) {
+    foreach (@ARGV ? @ARGV : glob('doc/*/*.pod')) {
+        collectnames($_);
+    }
+    checklinks();
+}
+
+if ( $opt_n ) {
+    &publicize() if $opt_p;
+    foreach (@ARGV ? @ARGV : glob('doc/*/*.pod')) {
+        &check($_);
+    }
+}
+
+if ( $opt_u ) {
+    my %temp = &getdocced('doc/crypto');
+    foreach ( keys %temp ) {
+        $docced{$_} = $temp{$_};
+    }
+    &printem('crypto', 'util/libcrypto.num');
+    &printem('ssl', 'util/libssl.num');
+    &checkmacros();
+}
+
+exit;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/util/find-undoc-api.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/find-undoc-api.pl
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..7b2cb97
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/find-undoc-api.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+
+use File::Spec::Functions;
+use File::Basename;
+#use File::Copy;
+#use File::Path;
+use lib catdir(dirname($0), "perl");
+use OpenSSL::Util::Pod;
+
+my %dups;
+
+sub parsenum()
+{
+    my $file = shift;
+    my @apis;
+
+    open my $IN, '<', $file
+        or die "Can't open $file, $!, stopped";
+
+    while ( <$IN> ) {
+        next if /\sNOEXIST/;
+        next if /EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNC/;
+        push @apis, $1 if /([^\s]+).\s/;
+    }
+
+    close $IN;
+
+    print "# Found ", scalar(@apis), " in $file\n";
+    return sort @apis;
+}
+
+sub getdocced()
+{
+    my $dir = shift;
+    my %return;
+
+    foreach my $pod ( glob("$dir/*.pod") ) {
+        next if $pod eq 'doc/crypto/crypto.pod';
+        next if $pod eq 'doc/ssl/ssl.pod';
+        my %podinfo = extract_pod_info($pod);
+        foreach my $n ( @{$podinfo{names}} ) {
+            $return{$n} = $pod;
+            print "# Duplicate $n in $pod and $dups{$n}\n"
+                if defined $dups{$n};
+            $dups{$n} = $pod;
+        }
+    }
+
+    return %return;
+}
+
+sub printem()
+{
+    my $docdir = shift;
+    my $numfile = shift;
+    my %docced = &getdocced($docdir);
+    my $count = 0;
+
+    foreach my $func ( &parsenum($numfile) ) {
+        next if $docced{$func};
+
+        # Skip ASN1 utilities
+        next if $func =~ /^ASN1_/;
+
+        print $func, "\n";
+        $count++;
+    }
+    print "# Found $count missing from $numfile\n\n";
+}
+
+
+&printem('doc/crypto', 'util/libcrypto.num');
+&printem('doc/ssl', 'util/libssl.num');
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/util/find-unused-errs b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/find-unused-errs
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..68cf66b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/find-unused-errs
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+#! /bin/bash
+# Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+# Find unused error function-names and reason-codes, and edit them
+# out of the source.  Doesn't handle line-wrapping, might have to do
+# some manual cleanups to fix compile errors.
+
+export X1=/tmp/f.1.$$
+export X2=/tmp/f.2.$$
+
+cd include/openssl || exit 1
+grep '_[RF]_' * | awk '{print $3;}' | sort -u >$X1
+cd ../..
+
+for F in `cat $X1` ; do
+    git grep -l --full-name -F $F >$X2
+    NUM=`wc -l <$X2`
+    test $NUM -gt 2 && continue
+    if grep -q $F crypto/err/openssl.ec ; then
+        echo Possibly unused $F found in openssl.ec
+        continue
+    fi
+    echo $F
+    for FILE in `cat $X2` ; do
+        grep -v -w $F <$FILE >$FILE.new
+        mv $FILE.new $FILE
+    done
+done
+
+rm $X1 $X2
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/util/fipslink.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/fipslink.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..18a9153
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/fipslink.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+sub check_env
+	{
+	my @ret;
+	foreach (@_)
+		{
+		die "Environment variable $_ not defined!\n" unless exists $ENV{$_};
+		push @ret, $ENV{$_};
+		}
+	return @ret;
+	}
+
+
+my ($fips_cc,$fips_cc_args, $fips_link,$fips_target, $fips_libdir, $sha1_exe)
+	 = check_env("FIPS_CC", "FIPS_CC_ARGS", "FIPS_LINK", "FIPS_TARGET",
+	 	"FIPSLIB_D", "FIPS_SHA1_EXE");
+
+
+
+if (exists $ENV{"PREMAIN_DSO_EXE"})
+	{
+	$fips_premain_dso = $ENV{"PREMAIN_DSO_EXE"};
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	$fips_premain_dso = "";
+	}
+
+check_hash($sha1_exe, "fips_premain.c");
+check_hash($sha1_exe, "fipscanister.lib");
+
+
+print "Integrity check OK\n";
+
+if (is_premain_linked(@ARGV)) {
+	print "$fips_cc $fips_cc_args $fips_libdir/fips_premain.c\n";
+	system "$fips_cc $fips_cc_args $fips_libdir/fips_premain.c";
+	die "First stage Compile failure" if $? != 0;
+} elsif (!defined($ENV{FIPS_SIG})) {
+	die "no fips_premain.obj linked";
+}
+
+print "$fips_link @ARGV\n";
+system "$fips_link @ARGV";
+die "First stage Link failure" if $? != 0;
+
+if (defined($ENV{FIPS_SIG})) {
+	print "$ENV{FIPS_SIG} $fips_target\n";
+	system "$ENV{FIPS_SIG} $fips_target";
+	die "$ENV{FIPS_SIG} $fips_target failed" if $? != 0;
+	exit;
+}
+
+print "$fips_premain_dso $fips_target\n";
+system("$fips_premain_dso $fips_target >$fips_target.sha1");
+die "Get hash failure" if $? != 0;
+open my $sha1_res, '<', $fips_target.".sha1" or die "Get hash failure";
+$fips_hash=<$sha1_res>;
+close $sha1_res;
+unlink $fips_target.".sha1";
+$fips_hash =~ s|\R$||;          # Better chomp
+die "Get hash failure" if $? != 0;
+
+
+print "$fips_cc -DHMAC_SHA1_SIG=\\\"$fips_hash\\\" $fips_cc_args $fips_libdir/fips_premain.c\n";
+system "$fips_cc -DHMAC_SHA1_SIG=\\\"$fips_hash\\\" $fips_cc_args $fips_libdir/fips_premain.c";
+die "Second stage Compile failure" if $? != 0;
+
+
+print "$fips_link @ARGV\n";
+system "$fips_link @ARGV";
+die "Second stage Link failure" if $? != 0;
+
+sub is_premain_linked
+	{
+	return 1 if (grep /fips_premain\.obj/,@_);
+	foreach (@_)
+		{
+		if (/^@(.*)/ && -f $1)
+			{
+			open FD,$1 or die "can't open $1";
+			my $ret = (grep /fips_premain\.obj/,<FD>)?1:0;
+			close FD;
+			return $ret;
+			}
+		}
+	return 0;
+	}
+
+sub check_hash
+	{
+	my ($sha1_exe, $filename) = @_;
+	my ($hashfile, $hashval);
+
+	open(IN, "${fips_libdir}/${filename}.sha1") || die "Cannot open file hash file ${fips_libdir}/${filename}.sha1";
+	$hashfile = <IN>;
+	close IN;
+	$hashval = `$sha1_exe ${fips_libdir}/$filename`;
+	$hashfile =~ s|\R$||;    # Better chomp
+	$hashval =~ s|\R$||;     # Better chomp
+	$hashfile =~ s/^.*=\s+//;
+	$hashval =~ s/^.*=\s+//;
+	die "Invalid hash syntax in file" if (length($hashfile) != 40);
+	die "Invalid hash received for file" if (length($hashval) != 40);
+	die "***HASH VALUE MISMATCH FOR FILE $filename ***" if ($hashval ne $hashfile); 
+	}
+
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/util/incore b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/incore
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..26fcf95
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/incore
@@ -0,0 +1,454 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+# The script embeds fingerprint into ELF executable object, either
+# application binary or shared library.
+
+######################################################################
+#
+# ELF symbol table parser by <appro@openssl.org>. The table entries
+# are extended with offset within executable file...
+#
+{ package ELF;
+  use FileHandle;
+
+    sub dup  { my %copy=map {$_} @_; return \%copy; }
+
+    sub Load {
+	my $class = shift;
+	my $self  = {};
+	my $FD    = FileHandle->new();	# autoclose
+
+	bless $self,$class;
+
+	sysopen($FD,shift,0) or die "$!";
+	binmode($FD);
+
+	#################################################
+	# read and parse elf_ehdr.e_ident...
+	#
+	read($FD,my $elf,16) or die "$!";
+
+	my %e_ident;
+	@e_ident{magic,class,data,version,osabi,abiver,pad}=
+		unpack("a4C*",$elf);
+
+	$!=42;		# signal fipsld to revert to two-step link
+	die "not ELF file" if ($e_ident{magic} ne chr(0177)."ELF");
+
+	my $elf_bits   = $e_ident{class}*32;	# 32 or 64
+	my $big_endian = $e_ident{data}-1;	# 0 or 1
+
+	if ($elf_bits==64) {
+	    if (!(((1<<31)<<1) && $big_endian==(unpack("L",pack("N",1))==1))) {
+		die "ELF64 is supported only natively";
+	    }
+	}
+
+	#################################################
+	# read and parse remainder of elf_ehdr...
+	#
+	read($FD,my $elfhdr,64) or die "$!";
+
+	my %elf_ehdr;
+	@elf_ehdr{e_type,e_machine,e_version,
+		e_entry,e_phoff,e_shoff,e_flags,e_ehsize,
+		e_phentsize,e_phnum,e_shentsize,e_shnum,e_shstrndx} =
+	$elf_bits==32 ?
+		unpack($big_endian?"nnN5n6":"vvV5v6",$elfhdr)
+	:	unpack("SSLQ3LS6",$elfhdr);
+
+	# put aside e_machine in case one has to treat specific
+	# platforms differently, see EM_ constants in elf.h for
+	# assortment... 
+	$self->{e_machine} = $elf_ehdr{e_machine};
+
+	#################################################
+	# read and parse elf_shdr table...
+	#
+	my ($i,$sz,$symtab_idx,$blob,$strings);
+
+	seek($FD,$elf_ehdr{e_shoff},0) or die "$!";
+	read($FD,$blob,$elf_ehdr{e_shentsize}*$elf_ehdr{e_shnum}) or die "$!";
+
+	my @sections;
+	my $elf_shdr_struct=($elf_bits==32?($big_endian?"N10":"V10"):"L2Q4L2Q2");
+	for ($sz=$elf_ehdr{e_shentsize},$i=0;$i<length($blob);$i+=$sz) {
+	    my %elf_shdr;
+
+	    @elf_shdr{sh_name,sh_type,sh_flags,
+			sh_addr,sh_offset,sh_size,
+			sh_link,sh_info,sh_addalign,sh_entsize} =
+		unpack($elf_shdr_struct,substr($blob,$i,$sz));
+
+	    push(@sections,dup(%elf_shdr));
+
+	    # note SHT_SYMTAB or SHT_DYNSYM for future reference
+	    if ($elf_shdr{sh_type}==2 || $elf_shdr{sh_type}==11) {
+		$symtab_idx = $#sections;
+	    }
+	}
+
+	# read strings table and map section names...
+	seek($FD,@sections[$elf_ehdr{e_shstrndx}]->{sh_offset},0)	or die "$!";
+	read($FD,$strings,@sections[$elf_ehdr{e_shstrndx}]->{sh_size})	or die "$!";
+	for (@sections) {
+	    $_->{sh_name}=(split(chr(0),substr($strings,$_->{sh_name},64)))[0];
+	}
+
+	#################################################
+	# read symbol strings table...
+	#
+	$i=@sections[$symtab_idx]->{sh_link};
+	seek($FD,@sections[$i]->{sh_offset},0)		or die "$!";
+	read($FD,$strings,@sections[$i]->{sh_size})	or die "$!";
+
+	#################################################
+	# read and parse elf_sym table...
+	#
+	seek($FD,@sections[$symtab_idx]->{sh_offset},0)		or die "$!";
+	read($FD,my $blob,@sections[$symtab_idx]->{sh_size})	or die "$!";
+
+	for ($sz=@sections[$symtab_idx]->{sh_entsize},$i=0;$i<length($blob);$i+=$sz) {
+	    my %elf_sym;
+
+	    if ($elf_bits==32) {
+		@elf_sym{st_name,st_value,st_size,st_info,st_other,st_shndx} =
+			unpack($big_endian?"N3CCn":"V3CCv",substr($blob,$i,$sz));
+	    } else {
+		@elf_sym{st_name,st_info,st_other,st_shndx,st_value,st_size} =
+			unpack("LCCSQQ",substr($blob,$i,$sz));
+	    }
+
+	    my $st_type = $elf_sym{st_info}&0xf;
+	    my $st_bind = $elf_sym{st_info}>>4;
+	    my $st_secn = $elf_sym{st_shndx};
+	    my $name;
+	    #                 (STT_OBJECT  || STT_FUNC)
+	    if ($st_bind<3 && ($st_type==1 || $st_type==2)
+	    	&& $st_secn <= $#sections 		# sane st_shndx
+		&& @sections[$st_secn]->{sh_type}	# not SHN_UNDEF
+		&& ($name=(split(chr(0),substr($strings,$elf_sym{st_name},128)))[0])
+		) {
+		# synthesize st_offset, ...
+	    	$elf_sym{st_offset}  = $elf_sym{st_value}
+				- @sections[$st_secn]->{sh_addr}
+				+ @sections[$st_secn]->{sh_offset};
+		$elf_sym{st_name}    = $name;
+		$elf_sym{st_section} = @sections[$st_secn]->{sh_name};
+		# ... and add to lookup table
+		$self->{symbols}{$name} = dup(%elf_sym);
+	    }
+	}
+
+	return $self;
+    }
+
+    sub Lookup {
+	my $self = shift;
+	my $name = shift;
+	return $self->{symbols}{$name};
+    }
+
+    sub Traverse {
+	my $self = shift;
+	my $code = shift;
+
+	if (ref($code) eq 'CODE') {
+	    for (keys(%{$self->{symbols}})) { &$code($self->{symbols}{$_}); }
+	}
+    }
+}
+
+######################################################################
+#
+# SHA1 and HMAC in Perl by <appro@openssl.org>.
+#
+{ package SHA1;
+  use integer;
+
+    {
+    ################################### SHA1 block code generator
+    my @V = ('$A','$B','$C','$D','$E');
+    my $i;
+
+    sub XUpdate {
+      my $ret;
+	$ret="(\$T=\$W[($i-16)%16]^\$W[($i-14)%16]^\$W[($i-8)%16]^\$W[($i-3)%16],\n\t";
+	if ((1<<31)<<1) {
+	    $ret.="    \$W[$i%16]=((\$T<<1)|(\$T>>31))&0xffffffff)\n\t  ";
+	} else {
+	    $ret.="    \$W[$i%16]=(\$T<<1)|((\$T>>31)&1))\n\t  ";
+	}
+    }
+    sub tail {
+      my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@V;
+      my $ret;
+	if ((1<<31)<<1) {
+	    $ret.="(($a<<5)|($a>>27));\n\t";
+	    $ret.="$b=($b<<30)|($b>>2);	$e&=0xffffffff;	#$b&=0xffffffff;\n\t";
+	} else {
+	    $ret.="(($a<<5)|($a>>27)&0x1f);\n\t";
+	    $ret.="$b=($b<<30)|($b>>2)&0x3fffffff;\n\t";
+	}
+      $ret;
+    }
+    sub BODY_00_15 {
+	my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@V;
+	"$e+=\$W[$i]+0x5a827999+((($c^$d)&$b)^$d)+".tail();
+    }
+    sub BODY_16_19 {
+	my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@V;
+	"$e+=".XUpdate()."+0x5a827999+((($c^$d)&$b)^$d)+".tail();
+    }
+    sub BODY_20_39 {
+	my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@V;
+	"$e+=".XUpdate()."+0x6ed9eba1+($b^$c^$d)+".tail();
+    }
+    sub BODY_40_59 {
+	my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@V;
+	"$e+=".XUpdate()."+0x8f1bbcdc+(($b&$c)|(($b|$c)&$d))+".tail();
+    }
+    sub BODY_60_79 {
+	my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@V;
+	"$e+=".XUpdate()."+0xca62c1d6+($b^$c^$d)+".tail();
+    }
+
+    my $sha1_impl =
+    'sub block {
+	my $self = @_[0];
+	my @W    = unpack("N16",@_[1]);
+	my ($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$T) = @{$self->{H}};
+	';
+
+	$sha1_impl.='
+	$A &= 0xffffffff;
+	$B &= 0xffffffff;
+	' if ((1<<31)<<1);
+
+	for($i=0;$i<16;$i++){ $sha1_impl.=BODY_00_15(); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+	for(;$i<20;$i++)    { $sha1_impl.=BODY_16_19(); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+	for(;$i<40;$i++)    { $sha1_impl.=BODY_20_39(); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+	for(;$i<60;$i++)    { $sha1_impl.=BODY_40_59(); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+	for(;$i<80;$i++)    { $sha1_impl.=BODY_60_79(); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+
+	$sha1_impl.='
+	$self->{H}[0]+=$A;	$self->{H}[1]+=$B;	$self->{H}[2]+=$C;
+	$self->{H}[3]+=$D;	$self->{H}[4]+=$E;	}';
+
+    #print $sha1_impl,"\n";
+    eval($sha1_impl);		# generate code
+    }
+
+    sub Init {
+	my $class = shift;	# multiple instances...
+	my $self  = {};
+
+	bless $self,$class;
+	$self->{H} = [0x67452301,0xefcdab89,0x98badcfe,0x10325476,0xc3d2e1f0];
+	$self->{N} = 0;
+	return $self;
+    }
+
+    sub Update {
+	my $self = shift;
+	my $msg;
+
+	foreach $msg (@_) {
+	    my $len  = length($msg);
+	    my $num  = length($self->{buf});
+	    my $off  = 0;
+
+	    $self->{N} += $len;
+
+	    if (($num+$len)<64)
+	    {	$self->{buf} .= $msg; next;	}
+	    elsif ($num)
+	    {	$self->{buf} .= substr($msg,0,($off=64-$num));
+		$self->block($self->{buf});
+	    }
+
+	    while(($off+64) <= $len)
+	    {	$self->block(substr($msg,$off,64));
+		$off += 64;
+	    }
+
+	    $self->{buf} = substr($msg,$off);
+	}
+	return $self;
+    }
+
+    sub Final {
+	my $self = shift;
+	my $num  = length($self->{buf});
+
+	$self->{buf} .= chr(0x80); $num++;
+	if ($num>56)
+	{   $self->{buf} .= chr(0)x(64-$num);
+	    $self->block($self->{buf});
+	    $self->{buf}=undef;
+	    $num=0;
+	}
+	$self->{buf} .= chr(0)x(56-$num);
+	$self->{buf} .= pack("N2",($self->{N}>>29)&0x7,$self->{N}<<3);
+	$self->block($self->{buf});
+
+	return pack("N*",@{$self->{H}});
+    }
+
+    sub Selftest {
+	my $hash;
+
+	$hash=SHA1->Init()->Update('abc')->Final();
+	die "SHA1 test#1" if (unpack("H*",$hash) ne 'a9993e364706816aba3e25717850c26c9cd0d89d');
+
+	$hash=SHA1->Init()->Update('abcdbcdecdefdefgefghfghighijhijkijkljklmklmnlmnomnopnopq')->Final();
+	die "SHA1 test#2" if (unpack("H*",$hash) ne '84983e441c3bd26ebaae4aa1f95129e5e54670f1');
+
+	#$hash=SHA1->Init()->Update('a'x1000000)->Final();
+	#die "SHA1 test#3" if (unpack("H*",$hash) ne '34aa973cd4c4daa4f61eeb2bdbad27316534016f');
+    }
+}
+
+{ package HMAC;
+
+    sub Init {
+	my $class = shift;
+	my $key   = shift;
+	my $self  = {};
+
+	bless $self,$class;
+
+	if (length($key)>64) {
+	    $key = SHA1->Init()->Update($key)->Final();
+	}
+	$key .= chr(0x00)x(64-length($key));
+
+	my @ikey = map($_^=0x36,unpack("C*",$key));
+	($self->{hash} = SHA1->Init())->Update(pack("C*",@ikey));
+	 $self->{okey} = pack("C*",map($_^=0x36^0x5c,@ikey));
+
+	return $self;
+    }
+
+    sub Update {
+	my $self = shift;
+	$self->{hash}->Update(@_);
+	return $self;
+    }
+
+    sub Final {
+	my $self  = shift;
+	my $ihash = $self->{hash}->Final();
+	return SHA1->Init()->Update($self->{okey},$ihash)->Final();
+    }
+
+    sub Selftest {
+	my $hmac;
+
+	$hmac = HMAC->Init('0123456789:;<=>?@ABC')->Update('Sample #2')->Final();
+	die "HMAC test" if (unpack("H*",$hmac) ne '0922d3405faa3d194f82a45830737d5cc6c75d24');
+    }
+}
+
+######################################################################
+#
+# main()
+#
+my $legacy_mode;
+
+if ($ARGV<0 || ($#ARGV>0 && !($legacy_mode=(@ARGV[0] =~ /^\-(dso|exe)$/)))) {
+	print STDERR "usage: $0 [-dso|-exe] elfbinary\n";
+	exit(1);
+}
+
+$exe = ELF->Load(@ARGV[$#ARGV]);
+
+$FIPS_text_start	= $exe->Lookup("FIPS_text_start")		or die;
+$FIPS_text_end		= $exe->Lookup("FIPS_text_end")			or die;
+$FIPS_rodata_start	= $exe->Lookup("FIPS_rodata_start")		or die;
+$FIPS_rodata_end	= $exe->Lookup("FIPS_rodata_end")		or die;
+$FIPS_signature		= $exe->Lookup("FIPS_signature")		or die;
+
+# new cross-compile support
+$FIPS_text_startX	= $exe->Lookup("FIPS_text_startX");
+$FIPS_text_endX		= $exe->Lookup("FIPS_text_endX");
+
+if (!$legacy_mode) {
+    if (!$FIPS_text_startX || !$FIPS_text_endX) {
+	print STDERR "@ARGV[$#ARGV] is not cross-compiler aware.\n";
+	exit(42);	# signal fipsld to revert to two-step link
+    }
+
+    $FINGERPRINT_ascii_value
+			= $exe->Lookup("FINGERPRINT_ascii_value");
+
+}
+if ($FIPS_text_startX && $FIPS_text_endX) {
+    $FIPS_text_start = $FIPS_text_startX;
+    $FIPS_text_end   = $FIPS_text_endX;
+}
+
+sysopen(FD,@ARGV[$#ARGV],$legacy_mode?0:2) or die "$!";	# 2 is read/write
+binmode(FD);
+
+sub HMAC_Update {
+  my ($hmac,$off,$len) = @_;
+  my $blob;
+
+    seek(FD,$off,0)	or die "$!";
+    read(FD,$blob,$len)	or die "$!";
+    $$hmac->Update($blob);
+}
+
+# fips/fips.c:FIPS_incore_fingerprint's Perl twin
+#
+sub FIPS_incore_fingerprint {
+  my $p1  = $FIPS_text_start->{st_offset};
+  my $p2  = $FIPS_text_end->{st_offset};
+  my $p3  = $FIPS_rodata_start->{st_offset};
+  my $p4  = $FIPS_rodata_end->{st_offset};
+  my $sig = $FIPS_signature->{st_offset};
+  my $ctx = HMAC->Init("etaonrishdlcupfm");
+
+    # detect overlapping regions
+    if ($p1<=$p3 && $p2>=$p3) {
+	$p3 = $p1; $p4 = $p2>$p4?$p2:$p4; $p1 = 0; $p2 = 0;
+    } elsif ($p3<=$p1 && $p4>=$p1) {
+	$p3 = $p3; $p4 = $p2>$p4?$p2:$p4; $p1 = 0; $p2 = 0;
+    }
+
+    if ($p1) {
+	HMAC_Update (\$ctx,$p1,$p2-$p1);
+    }
+
+    if ($sig>=$p3 && $sig<$p4) {
+	# "punch" hole
+	HMAC_Update(\$ctx,$p3,$sig-$p3);
+	$p3 = $sig+20;
+	HMAC_Update(\$ctx,$p3,$p4-$p3);
+    } else {
+	HMAC_Update(\$ctx,$p3,$p4-$p3);
+    }
+
+    return $ctx->Final();
+}
+
+$fingerprint = FIPS_incore_fingerprint();
+
+if ($legacy_mode) {
+    print unpack("H*",$fingerprint);
+} elsif (defined($FINGERPRINT_ascii_value)) {
+    seek(FD,$FINGERPRINT_ascii_value->{st_offset},0)	or die "$!";
+    print FD unpack("H*",$fingerprint)			or die "$!";
+} else {
+    seek(FD,$FIPS_signature->{st_offset},0)		or die "$!";
+    print FD $fingerprint				or die "$!";
+}
+
+close (FD);
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/util/indent.pro b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/indent.pro
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b5398ab
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/indent.pro
@@ -0,0 +1,672 @@
+-bap
+-bbo
+-br
+-brs
+-c33
+-cd33
+-ce
+-ci4
+-cli0
+-cp33
+-d0
+-di1
+-hnl
+-i4
+-il1
+-ip0
+-l80
+-lp
+-nbad
+-nbc
+-ncdb
+-ncs
+-nfc1
+-nfca
+-npcs
+-nprs
+-npsl
+-nsc
+-ppi1 
+-saf
+-sai
+-saw
+-sob
+-ss
+-ts0
+-T ACCESS_DESCRIPTION
+-T ADDED_OBJ
+-T AES_KEY
+-T APP_INFO
+-T ARGS
+-T ASIdOrRange
+-T ASIdOrRanges
+-T ASIdentifierChoice
+-T ASIdentifiers
+-T ASN1_ADB
+-T ASN1_ADB_TABLE
+-T ASN1_AUX
+-T ASN1_BIT_STRING
+-T ASN1_BMPSTRING
+-T ASN1_BOOLEAN
+-T ASN1_COMPAT_FUNCS
+-T ASN1_CTX
+-T ASN1_ENCODING
+-T ASN1_ENUMERATED
+-T ASN1_EXTERN_FUNCS
+-T ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME
+-T ASN1_GENERALSTRING
+-T ASN1_IA5STRING
+-T ASN1_INTEGER
+-T ASN1_ITEM
+-T ASN1_ITEM_EXP
+-T ASN1_NULL
+-T ASN1_OBJECT
+-T ASN1_OCTET_STRING
+-T ASN1_PCTX
+-T ASN1_PRIMITIVE_FUNCS
+-T ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING
+-T ASN1_PRINT_ARG
+-T ASN1_SCTX
+-T ASN1_STREAM_ARG
+-T ASN1_STRING
+-T ASN1_STRING_TABLE
+-T ASN1_T61STRING
+-T ASN1_TEMPLATE
+-T ASN1_TIME
+-T ASN1_TLC
+-T ASN1_TYPE
+-T ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING
+-T ASN1_UTCTIME
+-T ASN1_UTF8STRING
+-T ASN1_VALUE
+-T ASN1_VISIBLESTRING
+-T ASN1_const_CTX
+-T AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS
+-T AUTHORITY_KEYID
+-T BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
+-T BF_KEY
+-T BF_LONG
+-T BIGNUM
+-T BIO
+-T BIO_ACCEPT
+-T BIO_ADDR
+-T BIO_ASN1_BUF_CTX
+-T BIO_ASN1_EX_FUNCS
+-T BIO_B64_CTX
+-T BIO_CONNECT
+-T BIO_ENC_CTX
+-T BIO_F_BUFFER_CTX
+-T BIO_LINEBUFFER_CTX
+-T BIO_METHOD
+-T BIO_OK_CTX
+-T BIO_SSL
+-T BIT_STRING_BITNAME
+-T BN_BLINDING
+-T BN_CTX
+-T BN_GENCB
+-T BN_MONT_CTX
+-T BN_POOL
+-T BN_POOL_ITEM
+-T BN_RECP_CTX
+-T BN_STACK
+-T BN_ULONG
+-T BUF_MEM
+-T BY_DIR
+-T BY_DIR_ENTRY
+-T BY_DIR_HASH
+-T Bytef
+-T CAMELLIA_KEY
+-T CAST_KEY
+-T CAST_LONG
+-T CA_DB
+-T CCM128_CONTEXT
+-T CERT
+-T CERTIFICATEPOLICIES
+-T CERT_PKEY
+-T CIPHER_ORDER
+-T CMAC_CTX
+-T CMS_AuthenticatedData
+-T CMS_CertificateChoices
+-T CMS_CompressedData
+-T CMS_ContentInfo
+-T CMS_DigestedData
+-T CMS_EncapsulatedContentInfo
+-T CMS_EncryptedContentInfo
+-T CMS_EncryptedData
+-T CMS_EnvelopedData
+-T CMS_IssuerAndSerialNumber
+-T CMS_KEKIdentifier
+-T CMS_KEKRecipientInfo
+-T CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier
+-T CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo
+-T CMS_KeyTransRecipientInfo
+-T CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey
+-T CMS_OriginatorInfo
+-T CMS_OriginatorPublicKey
+-T CMS_OtherCertificateFormat
+-T CMS_OtherKeyAttribute
+-T CMS_OtherRecipientInfo
+-T CMS_OtherRevocationInfoFormat
+-T CMS_PasswordRecipientInfo
+-T CMS_Receipt
+-T CMS_ReceiptRequest
+-T CMS_ReceiptsFrom
+-T CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey
+-T CMS_RecipientIdentifier
+-T CMS_RecipientInfo
+-T CMS_RecipientKeyIdentifier
+-T CMS_RevocationInfoChoice
+-T CMS_SignedData
+-T CMS_SignerIdentifier
+-T CMS_SignerInfo
+-T COMP_CTX
+-T COMP_METHOD
+-T CONF
+-T CONF_IMODULE
+-T CONF_METHOD
+-T CONF_MODULE
+-T CONF_VALUE
+-T CRYPTO_EX_DATA
+-T CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS
+-T CRYPTO_EX_DATA_IMPL
+-T CRYPTO_EX_dup
+-T CRYPTO_EX_free
+-T CRYPTO_EX_new
+-T CRYPTO_MEM_LEAK_CB
+-T CRYPTO_THREADID
+-T CRYPTO_dynlock_value
+-T DB_ATTR
+-T DES_LONG
+-T DES_cblock
+-T DES_key_schedule
+-T DH
+-T DH_METHOD
+-T DH_PKEY_CTX
+-T DIST_POINT
+-T DIST_POINT_NAME
+-T DRBG_CTX
+-T DSA
+-T DSA_METHOD
+-T DSA_SIG
+-T DSO
+-T DSO_FUNC_TYPE
+-T DSO_MERGER_FUNC
+-T DSO_METHOD
+-T DSO_NAME_CONVERTER_FUNC
+-T DSO_VMS_INTERNAL
+-T DTLS1_BITMAP
+-T DTLS1_RECORD_DATA
+-T DTLS1_STATE
+-T Dl_info
+-T ECDH_DATA
+-T ECDH_METHOD
+-T ECDSA_DATA
+-T ECDSA_METHOD
+-T ECDSA_SIG
+-T ECPARAMETERS
+-T ECPKPARAMETERS
+-T EC_EXTRA_DATA
+-T EC_GROUP
+-T EC_KEY
+-T EC_METHOD
+-T EC_POINT
+-T EC_PRE_COMP
+-T EC_PRIVATEKEY
+-T EC_builtin_curve
+-T EDIPARTYNAME
+-T ENGINE
+-T ENGINE_CIPHERS_PTR
+-T ENGINE_CLEANUP_CB
+-T ENGINE_CLEANUP_ITEM
+-T ENGINE_CMD_DEFN
+-T ENGINE_CTRL_FUNC_PTR
+-T ENGINE_DIGESTS_PTR
+-T ENGINE_GEN_FUNC_PTR
+-T ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR
+-T ENGINE_LOAD_KEY_PTR
+-T ENGINE_PILE
+-T ENGINE_PILE_DOALL
+-T ENGINE_PKEY_ASN1_METHS_PTR
+-T ENGINE_PKEY_METHS_PTR
+-T ENGINE_SSL_CLIENT_CERT_PTR
+-T ENGINE_TABLE
+-T ENUMERATED_NAMES
+-T ERR_STATE
+-T ERR_STRING_DATA
+-T ESS_CERT_ID
+-T ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL
+-T ESS_SIGNING_CERT
+-T EVP_AES_HMAC_SHA1
+-T EVP_AES_HMAC_SHA256
+-T EVP_CIPHER
+-T EVP_CIPHER_CTX
+-T EVP_CIPHER_INFO
+-T EVP_ENCODE_CTX
+-T EVP_MD
+-T EVP_MD_CTX
+-T EVP_PBE_CTL
+-T EVP_PBE_KEYGEN
+-T EVP_PKEY
+-T EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD
+-T EVP_PKEY_CTX
+-T EVP_PKEY_METHOD
+-T EVP_PKEY_gen_cb
+-T EX_CLASS_ITEM
+-T E_GMP_RSA_CTX
+-T E_RSAX_MOD_CTX
+-T FILE
+-T F_DIGITALSIGNATUREVERIFY
+-T F_PUBLICKEYEXTRACT
+-T GCM128_CONTEXT
+-T GENERAL_NAME
+-T GENERAL_NAMES
+-T GENERAL_SUBTREE
+-T GEN_SESSION_CB
+-T HASH_CTX
+-T HEAPENTRY32
+-T HEAPLIST32
+-T HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE
+-T HMAC_CTX
+-T IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE
+-T IPAddrBlocks
+-T IPAddressFamily
+-T IPAddressOrRange
+-T IPAddressOrRanges
+-T ISSUING_DIST_POINT
+-T KEY_TABLE_TYPE
+-T LHASH
+-T LHASH_COMP_FN_TYPE
+-T LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN_TYPE
+-T LHASH_DOALL_FN_TYPE
+-T LHASH_HASH_FN_TYPE
+-T LHASH_NODE
+-T LPDIR_CTX
+-T LPHEAPENTRY32
+-T LPHEAPLIST32
+-T LPMODULEENTRY32
+-T LPMODULEENTRY32W
+-T LPPROCESSENTRY32
+-T LPPROCESSENTRY32W
+-T LPTHREADENTRY32
+-T LP_DIR_CTX
+-T MD2_CTX
+-T MD4_CTX
+-T MD5_CTX
+-T MDC2_CTX
+-T MD_DATA
+-T MEM
+-T MEM_LEAK
+-T MEM_OBJECT_DATA
+-T MIME_HEADER
+-T MIME_PARAM
+-T MODULEENTRY32
+-T MODULEENTRY32W
+-T MS_FAR
+-T NAME_CONSTRAINTS
+-T NAME_FUNCS
+-T NBIO_TEST
+-T NDEF_SUPPORT
+-T NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE
+-T NETSCAPE_ENCRYPTED_PKEY
+-T NETSCAPE_PKEY
+-T NETSCAPE_SPKAC
+-T NETSCAPE_SPKI
+-T NETSCAPE_X509
+-T NET_API_FUNCTION
+-T NOTICEREF
+-T OBJ_NAME
+-T OCB128_CONTEXT
+-T OCB_BLOCK
+-T OCSP_BASICRESP
+-T OCSP_CERTID
+-T OCSP_CERTSTATUS
+-T OCSP_CRLID
+-T OCSP_ONEREQ
+-T OCSP_REQINFO
+-T OCSP_REQUEST
+-T OCSP_REQ_CTX
+-T OCSP_RESPBYTES
+-T OCSP_RESPDATA
+-T OCSP_RESPID
+-T OCSP_RESPONSE
+-T OCSP_REVOKEDINFO
+-T OCSP_SERVICELOC
+-T OCSP_SIGNATURE
+-T OCSP_SINGLERESP
+-T OCSP_TBLSTR
+-T OPENSSL_BLOCK
+-T OPENSSL_CSTRING
+-T OPENSSL_DIR_CTX
+-T OPENSSL_ITEM
+-T OPENSSL_PSTRING
+-T OPENSSL_STRING
+-T OSSL_ASYNC_FD
+-T OTHERNAME
+-T P256_POINT
+-T P256_POINT_AFFINE
+-T PBE2PARAM
+-T PBEPARAM
+-T PBKDF2PARAM
+-T PCRYPTO_MEM_LEAK_CB
+-T PEM_CTX
+-T PEM_ENCODE_SEAL_CTX
+-T PEM_USER
+-T PHEAPENTRY32
+-T PHEAPLIST32
+-T PKCS12
+-T PKCS12_BAGS
+-T PKCS12_SAFEBAG
+-T PKCS7
+-T PKCS7_DIGEST
+-T PKCS7_ENCRYPT
+-T PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT
+-T PKCS7_ENVELOPE
+-T PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL
+-T PKCS7_RECIP_INFO
+-T PKCS7_SIGNED
+-T PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO
+-T PKCS7_SIGN_ENVELOPE
+-T PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO
+-T PKEY_USAGE_PERIOD
+-T PMODULEENTRY32
+-T PMODULEENTRY32W
+-T POLICYINFO
+-T POLICYQUALINFO
+-T POLICY_CONSTRAINTS
+-T POLICY_MAPPING
+-T POLICY_MAPPINGS
+-T PPROCESSENTRY32
+-T PPROCESSENTRY32W
+-T PRECOMP256_ROW
+-T PROCESSENTRY32
+-T PROCESSENTRY32W
+-T PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION
+-T PROXY_POLICY
+-T PTHREADENTRY32
+-T PW_CB_DATA
+-T RAND_METHOD
+-T RC2_KEY
+-T RC4_KEY
+-T RC5_32_KEY
+-T RIPEMD160_CTX
+-T RSA
+-T RSA_METHOD
+-T RSA_OAEP_PARAMS
+-T RSA_PKEY_CTX
+-T RSA_PSS_PARAMS
+-T SCT
+-T SEED_KEY_SCHEDULE
+-T SESS_CERT
+-T SHA256_CTX
+-T SHA512_CTX
+-T SHA_CTX
+-T SRP_ARG
+-T SRP_CLIENT_ARG
+-T SRP_CTX
+-T SRP_SERVER_ARG
+-T SRP_VBASE
+-T SRP_gN_cache
+-T SRP_user_pwd
+-T SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE
+-T SSL
+-T SSL2_STATE
+-T SSL3_BUFFER
+-T SSL3_COMP
+-T SSL3_ENC_METHOD
+-T SSL3_RECORD
+-T SSL3_STATE
+-T SSL_CIPHER
+-T SSL_COMP
+-T SSL_CONF_CTX
+-T SSL_CTX
+-T SSL_DANE
+-T SSL_EXCERT
+-T SSL_METHOD
+-T SSL_SESSION
+-T SSL_SESSION_ASN1
+-T STACK_OF
+-T SXNET
+-T SXNETID
+-T TCHAR
+-T TEST_INFO
+-T THREADENTRY32
+-T TIMEOUT_PARAM
+-T TLS_SESSION_TICKET_EXT
+-T TLS_SIGALGS
+-T TS_ACCURACY
+-T TS_MSG_IMPRINT
+-T TS_REQ
+-T TS_RESP
+-T TS_RESP_CTX
+-T TS_STATUS_INFO
+-T TS_TST_INFO
+-T TS_VERIFY_CTX
+-T TXT_DB
+-T UI
+-T UINT64
+-T UI_METHOD
+-T UI_STRING
+-T USERNOTICE
+-T WCHAR
+-T WHIRLPOOL_CTX
+-T WINAPI
+-T WSAAPI
+-T X509
+-T X509V3_CONF_METHOD
+-T X509V3_CTX
+-T X509V3_EXT_D2I
+-T X509V3_EXT_FREE
+-T X509V3_EXT_I2D
+-T X509V3_EXT_I2R
+-T X509V3_EXT_I2S
+-T X509V3_EXT_METHOD
+-T X509V3_EXT_NEW
+-T X509V3_EXT_R2I
+-T X509V3_EXT_S2I
+-T X509V3_EXT_V2I
+-T X509_ALGOR
+-T X509_ATTRIBUTE
+-T X509_CERT_AUX
+-T X509_CERT_FILE_CTX
+-T X509_CERT_PAIR
+-T X509_CINF
+-T X509_CRL
+-T X509_CRL_INFO
+-T X509_CRL_METHOD
+-T X509_EXTENSION
+-T X509_INFO
+-T X509_LOOKUP
+-T X509_LOOKUP_METHOD
+-T X509_NAME
+-T X509_NAME_ENTRY
+-T X509_OBJECT
+-T X509_OBJECTS
+-T X509_PKEY
+-T X509_POLICY_CACHE
+-T X509_POLICY_DATA
+-T X509_POLICY_LEVEL
+-T X509_POLICY_NODE
+-T X509_POLICY_TREE
+-T X509_PUBKEY
+-T X509_PURPOSE
+-T X509_REQ
+-T X509_REQ_INFO
+-T X509_REVOKED
+-T X509_SIG
+-T X509_STORE
+-T X509_STORE_CTX
+-T X509_TRUST
+-T X509_VAL
+-T X509_VERIFY_PARAM
+-T X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID
+-T X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO
+-T X9_62_CURVE
+-T X9_62_FIELDID
+-T X9_62_PENTANOMIAL
+-T XTS128_CONTEXT
+-T ZEN_MD_DATA
+-T _LHASH
+-T _STACK
+-T __int64
+-T _ossl_old_des_cblock
+-T asn1_ps_func
+-T bio_dgram_data
+-T bio_info_cb
+-T BIO_info_cb
+-T BIO_callback_fn
+-T char_io
+-T conf_finish_func
+-T conf_init_func
+-T const_DES_cblock
+-T d2i_of_void
+-T des_cblock
+-T dynamic_data_ctx
+-T dynamic_fns
+-T engine_table_doall_cb
+-T i2d_of_void
+-T int_dhx942_dh
+-T nid_triple
+-T pem_password_cb
+-T pitem
+-T piterator
+-T pqueue_s
+-T session_op
+-T size_t
+-T tag_exp_arg
+-T testdata
+-T time_t
+-T time_t
+-T u32
+-T u64
+-T u8
+-T v3_ext_ctx
+-T v3_ext_method
+-T STACK_OF_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_
+-T STACK_OF_ASIdOrRange_
+-T STACK_OF_ASN1_ADB_TABLE_
+-T STACK_OF_ASN1_INTEGER_
+-T STACK_OF_ASN1_OBJECT_
+-T STACK_OF_ASN1_STRING_TABLE_
+-T STACK_OF_ASN1_TYPE_
+-T STACK_OF_ASN1_UTF8STRING_
+-T STACK_OF_ASN1_VALUE_
+-T STACK_OF_BIO_
+-T STACK_OF_BY_DIR_ENTRY_
+-T STACK_OF_BY_DIR_HASH_
+-T STACK_OF_CMS_CertificateChoices_
+-T STACK_OF_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_
+-T STACK_OF_CMS_RecipientInfo_
+-T STACK_OF_CMS_RevocationInfoChoice_
+-T STACK_OF_CMS_SignerInfo_
+-T STACK_OF_CONF_IMODULE_
+-T STACK_OF_CONF_MODULE_
+-T STACK_OF_CONF_VALUE_
+-T STACK_OF_CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS_
+-T STACK_OF_CRYPTO_dynlock_
+-T STACK_OF_DIST_POINT_
+-T STACK_OF_ENGINE_
+-T STACK_OF_ENGINE_CLEANUP_ITEM_
+-T STACK_OF_ESS_CERT_ID_
+-T STACK_OF_EVP_PBE_CTL_
+-T STACK_OF_EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD_
+-T STACK_OF_EVP_PKEY_METHOD_
+-T STACK_OF_GENERAL_NAMES_
+-T STACK_OF_GENERAL_NAME_
+-T STACK_OF_GENERAL_SUBTREE_
+-T STACK_OF_IPAddressFamily_
+-T STACK_OF_IPAddressOrRange_
+-T STACK_OF_MEM_OBJECT_DATA_
+-T STACK_OF_MIME_HEADER_
+-T STACK_OF_MIME_PARAM_
+-T STACK_OF_NAME_FUNCS_
+-T STACK_OF_OCSP_CERTID_
+-T STACK_OF_OCSP_ONEREQ_
+-T STACK_OF_OCSP_RESPID_
+-T STACK_OF_OCSP_SINGLERESP_
+-T STACK_OF_OPENSSL_BLOCK_
+-T STACK_OF_OPENSSL_PSTRING_
+-T STACK_OF_OPENSSL_STRING_
+-T STACK_OF_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_
+-T STACK_OF_PKCS7_
+-T STACK_OF_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_
+-T STACK_OF_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_
+-T STACK_OF_POLICYINFO_
+-T STACK_OF_POLICYQUALINFO_
+-T STACK_OF_POLICY_MAPPING_
+-T STACK_OF_Request_
+-T STACK_OF_SCT_
+-T STACK_OF_SRP_gN_
+-T STACK_OF_SRP_gN_cache_
+-T STACK_OF_SRP_user_pwd_
+-T STACK_OF_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_
+-T STACK_OF_SSL_CIPHER_
+-T STACK_OF_SSL_COMP_
+-T STACK_OF_STRING_
+-T STACK_OF_SXNETID_
+-T STACK_OF_SingleResponse_
+-T STACK_OF_UI_STRING_
+-T STACK_OF_X509V3_EXT_METHOD_
+-T STACK_OF_X509_
+-T STACK_OF_X509_ALGOR_
+-T STACK_OF_X509_ATTRIBUTE_
+-T STACK_OF_X509_CRL_
+-T STACK_OF_X509_EXTENSION_
+-T STACK_OF_X509_INFO_
+-T STACK_OF_X509_LOOKUP_
+-T STACK_OF_X509_NAME_
+-T STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY_
+-T STACK_OF_X509_OBJECT_
+-T STACK_OF_X509_POLICY_DATA_
+-T STACK_OF_X509_POLICY_NODE_
+-T STACK_OF_X509_PURPOSE_
+-T STACK_OF_X509_REVOKED_
+-T STACK_OF_X509_TRUST_
+-T STACK_OF_X509_VERIFY_PARAM_
+-T STACK_OF_nid_triple_
+-T STACK_OF_void_
+-T LHASH_OF_ADDED_OBJ_
+-T LHASH_OF_APP_INFO_
+-T LHASH_OF_CONF_VALUE_
+-T LHASH_OF_ENGINE_PILE_
+-T LHASH_OF_ERR_STATE_
+-T LHASH_OF_ERR_STRING_DATA_
+-T LHASH_OF_EX_CLASS_ITEM_
+-T LHASH_OF_FUNCTION_
+-T LHASH_OF_MEM_
+-T LHASH_OF_OBJ_NAME_
+-T LHASH_OF_OPENSSL_STRING_
+-T LHASH_OF_SSL_SESSION_
+-T LHASH_OF_STRING_
+-T clock_t
+-T custom_ext_methods
+-T hm_fragment
+-T record_pqueue
+-T ssl_ctx_st
+-T ssl_flag_tbl
+-T ssl_st
+-T ssl_trace_tbl
+-T _stdcall
+-T tls12_lookup
+-T OPTIONS
+-T OPT_PAIR
+-T uint64_t
+-T int64_t
+-T uint32_t
+-T int32_t
+-T uint16_t
+-T int16_t
+-T uint8_t
+-T int8_t
+-T STRINT_PAIR
+-T felem
+-T felem_bytearray
+-T SH_LIST
+-T PACKET
+-T RECORD_LAYER
+-T ASYNC_FIBRE
+-T ASYNC_CTX
+-T ASYNC_JOB
+-T intmax_t
+-T uintmax_t
+-T pqueue
+-T danetls_record
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/util/libcrypto.num b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/libcrypto.num
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8414d97
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/libcrypto.num
@@ -0,0 +1,4236 @@
+d2i_EC_PUBKEY                           1	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+b2i_PVK_bio                             2	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA,RC4
+PEM_read_bio_NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE     3	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain               4	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+COMP_expand_block                       5	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:COMP
+X509V3_get_string                       6	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_MSG_IMPRINT_free                     7	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+DES_xcbc_encrypt                        8	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DES
+TS_RESP_CTX_new                         9	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+PKCS5_PBE_add                           10	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_DSAparams                           11	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+X509_NAME_get0_der                      12	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL                   13	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+X509at_get_attr_by_NID                  14	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_PUBKEY_set0_param                  15	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS12_it                               16	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+PKCS12_it                               16	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING                   17	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EC_KEY_set_private_key                  18	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+SRP_VBASE_get_by_user                   19	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0,SRP
+Camellia_cfb128_encrypt                 21	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CAMELLIA
+DES_ncbc_encrypt                        22	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DES
+TS_REQ_get_ext_count                    23	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+EVP_aes_128_ocb                         24	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCB
+ASN1_item_d2i_fp                        25	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO
+BN_lshift                               26	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID              27	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509V3_add_value_bool                   28	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+GENERAL_NAME_get0_otherName             29	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_INTEGER_get_uint64                 30	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_DigestInit_ex                       31	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CTLOG_new                               32	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CT
+UI_get_result_minsize                   33	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:UI
+EVP_PBE_alg_add_type                    34	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_cast5_ofb                           35	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CAST
+d2i_PUBKEY_fp                           36	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO
+PKCS7_set_cipher                        37	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BF_decrypt                              38	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:BF
+PEM_read_bio_PUBKEY                     39	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_NAME_delete_entry                  40	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_meth_set_verify_recover        41	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+UI_set_method                           42	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:UI
+PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL_it              43	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL_it              43	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+EC_GROUP_method_of                      44	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+RSA_blinding_on                         45	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+X509_get0_signature                     47	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_REVOKED_get0_extensions            48	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+NETSCAPE_SPKI_verify                    49	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_OCSP_RESPONSE                       50	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+ERR_peek_error                          51	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509v3_asid_validate_resource_set       52	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779
+PEM_write_bio_Parameters                53	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CMS_SignerInfo_verify                   54	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+X509v3_asid_is_canonical                55	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779
+ASN1_ENUMERATED_get                     56	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_MD_do_all_sorted                    57	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_crl_reason_str                     58	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string                  59	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+ENGINE_finish                           60	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+SRP_Calc_client_key                     61	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SRP
+X509_PUBKEY_free                        62	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_free_all                            63	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_idea_ofb                            64	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:IDEA
+DSO_bind_func                           65	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_meth_get_copy                  66	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+RSA_up_ref                              67	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+EVP_PKEY_meth_set_ctrl                  68	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_basic_sign                         69	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+BN_GENCB_set                            70	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_generate_prime                       71	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DEPRECATEDIN_0_9_8
+d2i_DSAPrivateKey_fp                    72	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA,STDIO
+BIO_nread0                              73	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+NETSCAPE_SPKI_print                     74	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_set_pubkey                         75	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_item_print                         76	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CONF_set_nconf                          77	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+RAND_set_rand_method                    78	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_GF2m_mod_mul                         79	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC2M
+UI_add_input_boolean                    80	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:UI
+ASN1_TIME_adj                           81	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info                 82	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_add_word                             83	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_des_ede                             84	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DES
+EVP_PKEY_add1_attr_by_OBJ               85	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_all_fds              86	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_do_cipher           87	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_set_pw_prompt                       88	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:UI
+d2i_OCSP_RESPBYTES                      89	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+TS_REQ_get_ext_by_NID                   90	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+ASN1_item_ndef_i2d                      91	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_archive_cutoff_new                 92	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+DSA_size                                93	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+IPAddressRange_free                     94	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779
+CMS_ContentInfo_free                    95	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+BIO_accept                              96	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0,SOCK
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_policies         97	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SCT_set0_extensions                     98	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CT
+PKCS5_pbe2_set_scrypt                   99	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SCRYPT
+X509_find_by_subject                    100	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+DSAparams_print                         101	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+BF_set_key                              102	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:BF
+d2i_DHparams                            103	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DH
+i2d_PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT                   104	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+DH_generate_key                         105	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DH
+ENGINE_add_conf_module                  106	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+BIO_new_socket                          107	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SOCK
+ASN1_OBJECT_free                        108	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_REQ_get_extensions                 109	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_get_version                        110	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_CERTID_dup                         111	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free                     112	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+i2d_TS_MSG_IMPRINT                      113	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+EC_POINT_mul                            114	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+WHIRLPOOL_Final                         115	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:WHIRLPOOL
+CMS_get1_ReceiptRequest                 116	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+BIO_sock_non_fatal_error                117	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SOCK
+HMAC_Update                             118	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_PKCS12                              119	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_BytesToKey                          120	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ENGINE_set_default_pkey_asn1_meths      121	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+OCSP_BASICRESP_add1_ext_i2d             122	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+EVP_camellia_128_ctr                    123	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CAMELLIA
+EVP_CIPHER_impl_ctx_size                124	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate                 125	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0
+PKCS12_free                             126	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CMS_signed_get_attr                     127	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+ENGINE_set_destroy_function             128	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+ASN1_STRING_TABLE_add                   129	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_ASIdentifiers                       130	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779
+i2d_PKCS12_bio                          131	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_to_X509_REQ                        132	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_basic_add1_nonce                   133	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+d2i_OCSP_BASICRESP                      134	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+X509v3_add_ext                          135	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509v3_addr_subset                      136	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779
+CRYPTO_strndup                          137	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_REQ_CTX_free                       138	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+X509_STORE_new                          140	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_TYPE_free                          141	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS12_BAGS_new                         142	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CMAC_CTX_new                            143	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMAC
+ASIdentifierChoice_new                  144	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779
+EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_public                145	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+IDEA_set_decrypt_key                    146	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:IDEA
+X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags                147	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_ADDR_rawmake                        148	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SOCK
+EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_ctrl                  149	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EC_POINTs_mul                           150	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+ASN1_get_object                         151	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_IPAddressFamily                     152	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779
+ENGINE_get_ctrl_function                153	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+X509_REVOKED_get_ext_count              154	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex                 155	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ERR_load_PKCS12_strings                 156	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_sha384                              157	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_DHparams                            158	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DH
+TS_VERIFY_CTX_set_store                 159	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+PKCS12_verify_mac                       160	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509v3_addr_canonize                    161	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779
+ASN1_item_ex_i2d                        162	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ENGINE_set_digests                      163	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+PEM_ASN1_read_bio                       164	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_free                 165	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CT
+CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_ctx         166	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+PKCS7_set_attributes                    167	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_POLICYQUALINFO                      168	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_MD_type                             170	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKCS82PKEY                          171	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_generate_prime_ex                    172	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_EncryptInit                         173	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+RAND_OpenSSL                            174	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_uadd                                 175	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_derive_init                    176	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PEM_write_bio_ASN1_stream               177	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_delete_attr                    178	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length               179	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_clear_flags                         180	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_DISPLAYTEXT                         181	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_response_status                    182	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+i2d_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING                183	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_hostflags         184	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SCT_get0_log_id                         185	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CT
+ASN1_IA5STRING_it                       186	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+ASN1_IA5STRING_it                       186	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+PEM_write_bio_ECPrivateKey              187	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+BN_consttime_swap                       188	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_f_buffer                            189	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CMS_SignerInfo_get0_signer_id           190	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+TS_TST_INFO_new                         191	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+X509_REQ_check_private_key              192	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_DigestInit                          193	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_meth_find                      194	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_count             195	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_BIT_STRING_get_bit                 196	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_cmp                            197	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_X509_ALGORS                         198	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY2PKCS8                          199	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_nist_mod_256                         200	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_request_add0_id                    201	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+EVP_seed_cfb128                         202	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SEED
+BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_free                  203	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_CIPHER_flags                        204	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PEM_write_bio_ECPKParameters            205	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+SCT_set_version                         206	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CT
+CMS_add1_ReceiptRequest                 207	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+d2i_CRL_DIST_POINTS                     208	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_CRL_INFO_free                      209	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ERR_load_UI_strings                     210	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:UI
+ERR_load_strings                        211	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+RSA_X931_hash_id                        212	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+EC_KEY_set_method                       213	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+PEM_write_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO           214	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO
+X509at_get0_data_by_OBJ                 215	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+b2i_PublicKey_bio                       216	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+s2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING                   217	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+POLICYINFO_it                           218	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+POLICYINFO_it                           218	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+OBJ_create                              219	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_NOTICEREF                           220	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_get_rfc2409_prime_768                221	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PEM_read_bio_PKCS8                      222	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_ATTRIBUTE_new                      223	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_STRING_TABLE_cleanup               224	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_put_eoc                            225	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_MD_meth_set_input_blocksize         226	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get0_attrs               227	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS8_get_attr                          228	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+DSAparams_print_fp                      229	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA,STDIO
+EC_POINT_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp 230	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+DIST_POINT_NAME_new                     231	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_LOOKUP_file                        232	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_meth_set_decrypt               233	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_rc2_ecb                             234	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RC2
+i2b_PublicKey_bio                       235	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+d2i_ASN1_SET_ANY                        236	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_item_i2d                           238	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_copy_nonce                         239	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+OBJ_txt2nid                             240	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SEED_set_key                            241	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SEED
+EC_KEY_clear_flags                      242	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_get0_algs        243	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+i2d_EC_PUBKEY                           244	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+MDC2                                    245	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:MDC2
+BN_clear_free                           246	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ENGINE_get_pkey_asn1_meths              247	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+DSO_merge                               248	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+RSA_get_ex_data                         249	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+EVP_PKEY_meth_get_decrypt               250	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+DES_cfb_encrypt                         251	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DES
+CMS_SignerInfo_set1_signer_cert         252	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+X509_CRL_http_nbio                      253	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+ENGINE_register_all_ciphers             254	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+SXNET_new                               255	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_camellia_256_ctr                    256	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CAMELLIA
+d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO                 257	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_md2                                 259	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:MD2
+RC2_ecb_encrypt                         260	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RC2
+ENGINE_register_DH                      261	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+ASN1_NULL_free                          262	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EC_KEY_copy                             263	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+EVP_des_ede3                            264	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DES
+PKCS7_add1_attrib_digest                265	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp     266	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+EVP_seed_ecb                            267	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SEED
+BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry             268	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DGRAM,SCTP
+ASN1_OCTET_STRING_NDEF_it               269	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+ASN1_OCTET_STRING_NDEF_it               269	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_asn1_get_count                 270	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+WHIRLPOOL_Init                          271	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:WHIRLPOOL
+EVP_OpenInit                            272	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+OCSP_response_get1_basic                273	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+CRYPTO_gcm128_tag                       274	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_parse_url                          275	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+UI_get0_test_string                     276	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:UI
+CRYPTO_secure_free                      277	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+DSA_print_fp                            278	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA,STDIO
+X509_get_ext_d2i                        279	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT                   280	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BUF_MEM_grow                            281	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_REQ_free                             282	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+PEM_read_DHparams                       283	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DH,STDIO
+RSA_private_decrypt                     284	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+X509V3_EXT_get_nid                      285	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_s_log                               286	1_1_0	EXIST:!WIN32,!macintosh:FUNCTION:
+EC_POINT_set_to_infinity                287	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+EVP_des_ede_ofb                         288	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DES
+ECDH_KDF_X9_62                          289	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING_to_string          290	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv                     291	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_PCTX_set_oid_flags                 292	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_ASN1_INTEGER                        293	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_PKCS7_ENCRYPT                       294	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set1_issuer          295	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CT
+X509_NAME_ENTRY_set                     296	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS8_set0_pbe                          297	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PEM_write_bio_DSA_PUBKEY                298	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio                  299	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EC_GROUP_get0_order                     300	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+OCSP_BASICRESP_delete_ext               301	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+PKCS12_get_attr_gen                     302	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get0_safes               303	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_derive                         304	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_BASICRESP_get_ext_by_NID           305	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+OBJ_dup                                 306	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CMS_signed_get_attr_count               307	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+EC_get_builtin_curves                   308	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+i2d_ASN1_IA5STRING                      309	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_check_nonce                        310	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+X509_STORE_CTX_init                     311	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_RESPONSE_free                      312	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+ENGINE_set_DH                           313	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_flags                314	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+err_free_strings_int                    315	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PEM_write_bio_PKCS7_stream              316	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_X509_CERT_AUX                       317	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+UI_process                              318	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:UI
+X509_get_subject_name                   319	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+DH_get_1024_160                         320	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DH
+i2d_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING                321	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_OCSP_RESPID                         322	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+BIO_s_accept                            323	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SOCK
+EVP_whirlpool                           324	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:WHIRLPOOL
+OCSP_ONEREQ_get1_ext_d2i                325	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+d2i_ESS_SIGNING_CERT                    326	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+EC_KEY_set_default_method               327	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+X509_OBJECT_up_ref_count                328	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+RAND_load_file                          329	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_ctrl_reset_read_request             330	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CRYPTO_ccm128_tag                       331	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_new_dgram_sctp                      332	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DGRAM,SCTP
+d2i_RSAPrivateKey_fp                    333	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA,STDIO
+s2i_ASN1_IA5STRING                      334	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+UI_get_ex_data                          335	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:UI
+EVP_EncryptUpdate                       336	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SRP_create_verifier                     337	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SRP
+TS_TST_INFO_print_bio                   338	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+X509_NAME_get_index_by_OBJ              339	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_get_host_ip                         340	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0,SOCK
+PKCS7_add_certificate                   341	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_REQ_get_ext                          342	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+X509_NAME_cmp                           343	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+DIST_POINT_it                           344	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+DIST_POINT_it                           344	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+PEM_read_X509_CRL                       345	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO
+OPENSSL_sk_sort                         346	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CTLOG_STORE_load_file                   347	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CT
+ASN1_SEQUENCE_it                        348	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+ASN1_SEQUENCE_it                        348	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+TS_RESP_CTX_get_tst_info                349	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+RC4                                     350	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RC4
+PKCS7_stream                            352	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2t_ASN1_OBJECT                         353	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EC_GROUP_get0_generator                 354	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1          355	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+EVP_MD_meth_set_init                    356	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_get_issuer_name                    357	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_SignFinal                           358	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS12_mac_present                      359	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_PUBKEY_bio                          360	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_asc2bn                               361	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_desx_cbc                            362	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DES
+SXNETID_it                              363	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+SXNETID_it                              363	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt                   364	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl_str                   365	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CMS_signed_add1_attr_by_txt             366	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+i2d_NETSCAPE_SPKAC                      367	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509V3_add_value_bool_nf                368	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_item_verify                        369	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SEED_ecb_encrypt                        370	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SEED
+X509_PUBKEY_get0_param                  371	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_i2d_fp                             372	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO
+BIO_new_mem_buf                         373	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+UI_get_input_flags                      374	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:UI
+X509V3_EXT_REQ_add_nconf                375	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509v3_asid_subset                      376	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779
+RSA_check_key_ex                        377	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+d2i_TS_MSG_IMPRINT_bio                  378	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+i2d_ASN1_TYPE                           379	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_aes_256_wrap_pad                    380	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CMS_RecipientInfo_kekri_id_cmp          381	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_peername         382	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_PCTX_get_oid_flags                 383	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CONF_free                               384	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+DSO_get_filename                        385	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_ASN1_SEQUENCE_ANY                   387	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OPENSSL_strlcpy                         388	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_get_port                            389	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0,SOCK
+DISPLAYTEXT_free                        390	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_div                                  391	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+RIPEMD160_Update                        392	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RMD160
+PEM_write_bio_CMS                       393	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+ASN1_OBJECT_new                         394	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_des_ede3_cfb8                       395	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DES
+BIO_dump_indent_fp                      396	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO
+X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data                397	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_socket                              398	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SOCK
+EVP_PKEY_meth_get_derive                399	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_STRING_clear_free                  400	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_OCSP_REVOKEDINFO                    401	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+ASN1_STRING_print_ex_fp                 402	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO
+PKCS7_SIGNED_new                        403	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CMS_get0_eContentType                   404	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+HMAC_Final                              405	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_CRL_delete_ext                     406	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_TST_INFO_get_ordering                407	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+X509_get_extended_key_usage             408	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ERR_print_errors                        409	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_REVOKED_set_revocationDate         410	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_CipherFinal_ex                      411	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_DSA_PUBKEY                          412	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+BN_CTX_get                              413	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_to_montgomery                        414	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_OBJECT_get0_X509_CRL               415	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_camellia_128_cfb8                   416	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CAMELLIA
+EC_KEY_METHOD_free                      417	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+TS_TST_INFO_set_policy_id               418	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+d2i_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE                  419	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASYNC_unblock_pause                     420	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_X509_VAL                            421	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_SCTX_get_flags                     422	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+RIPEMD160                               423	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RMD160
+CRYPTO_ocb128_setiv                     424	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCB
+X509_CRL_digest                         425	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1               426	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ERR_load_CMS_strings                    427	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+EVP_MD_CTX_md                           428	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_REVOKED_get_ext                    429	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_RSA_PSS_PARAMS                      430	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+USERNOTICE_free                         431	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+MD4_Transform                           432	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:MD4
+EVP_CIPHER_block_size                   433	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CERTIFICATEPOLICIES_new                 434	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_dump_fp                             435	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO
+BIO_set_flags                           436	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_is_one                               437	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_CONF_set_def_policy                  438	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+DSA_free                                439	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+BN_GENCB_new                            440	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_VAL_new                            441	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+NCONF_load                              442	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_put_object                         443	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE                       444	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+d2i_PublicKey                           445	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ENGINE_set_ex_data                      446	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+X509_get_default_private_dir            447	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_STORE_CTX_set0_dane                448	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_des_ecb                             449	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DES
+OCSP_resp_get0                          450	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+RSA_X931_generate_key_ex                452	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+X509_get_serialNumber                   453	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_sock_should_retry                   454	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SOCK
+ENGINE_get_digests                      455	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+TS_MSG_IMPRINT_get_algo                 456	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+DH_new_method                           457	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DH
+BF_ecb_encrypt                          458	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:BF
+PEM_write_bio_DHparams                  459	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DH
+EVP_DigestFinal                         460	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set_shared_CTLOG_STORE 461	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CT
+X509v3_asid_add_id_or_range             462	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779
+X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_NID           463	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EC_KEY_METHOD_get_init                  464	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN                      465	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OPENSSL_memcmp                          466	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BUF_MEM_new                             467	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+DSO_set_filename                        468	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+DH_new                                  469	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DH
+OCSP_RESPID_free                        470	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+PKCS5_pbe2_set                          471	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SCT_set_signature_nid                   473	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CT
+i2d_RSA_PUBKEY_fp                       474	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA,STDIO
+PKCS12_BAGS_it                          475	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+PKCS12_BAGS_it                          475	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+X509_pubkey_digest                      476	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ENGINE_register_all_RSA                 477	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local                 478	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_get_default_cert_dir_env           479	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_CRL_sort                           480	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_RSA_PUBKEY_bio                      481	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+ASN1_T61STRING_free                     482	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PEM_write_CMS                           483	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS,STDIO
+OPENSSL_sk_find                         484	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ENGINE_get_ciphers                      485	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+EVP_rc2_ofb                             486	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RC2
+EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA                       487	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+CMS_SignerInfo_get0_md_ctx              488	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+X509_STORE_set_trust                    489	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_POLICYINFO                          490	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+DES_cbc_encrypt                         491	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DES
+BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr                     492	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC2M
+ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING_it                 493	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING_it                 493	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+BIO_f_cipher                            494	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+UI_destroy_method                       495	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:UI
+BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072               496	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_INFO_new                           497	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_RESPDATA_it                        498	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:OCSP
+OCSP_RESPDATA_it                        498	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:OCSP
+X509_CRL_print                          499	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+WHIRLPOOL_Update                        500	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:WHIRLPOOL
+DSA_get_ex_data                         501	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+BN_copy                                 502	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+FIPS_mode_set                           503	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy           504	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS7_cert_from_signer_info             505	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_TRUST_get_trust                    506	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+DES_string_to_key                       507	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DES
+ERR_error_string                        508	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_new_connect                         509	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SOCK
+DSA_new_method                          511	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+OCSP_CERTID_new                         512	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+X509_CRL_get_signature_nid              513	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_policy_level_node_count            514	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_OCSP_CERTSTATUS                     515	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+X509V3_add1_i2d                         516	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_TST_INFO_set_serial                  517	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+OCSP_RESPBYTES_new                      518	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+OCSP_SINGLERESP_delete_ext              519	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+EVP_MD_CTX_test_flags                   521	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509v3_addr_validate_path               522	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779
+BIO_new_fp                              523	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO
+EC_GROUP_set_generator                  524	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+CRYPTO_memdup                           525	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+DH_generate_parameters                  526	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DEPRECATEDIN_0_9_8,DH
+BN_set_negative                         527	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_TS_RESP_bio                         528	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_set_wait_fd              529	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ERR_func_error_string                   530	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_STRING_data                        531	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0
+X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d                   532	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_TS_TST_INFO                         533	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+OBJ_sigid_free                          534	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_STATUS_INFO_get0_status              535	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+EC_KEY_get_flags                        536	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+ASN1_TYPE_cmp                           537	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_RSAPublicKey                        538	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+EC_GROUP_get_trinomial_basis            539	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC,EC2M
+BIO_ADDRINFO_protocol                   540	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SOCK
+i2d_PBKDF2PARAM                         541	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ENGINE_unregister_RAND                  542	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+PEM_write_bio_RSAPrivateKey             543	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+CONF_get_number                         544	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_EXTENSION_get_object               545	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_EXTENSIONS_it                      546	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+X509_EXTENSIONS_it                      546	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GF2m 547	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC,EC2M
+RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING              548	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+d2i_X509_CRL_fp                         549	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO
+i2d_RSA_PUBKEY                          550	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+EVP_aes_128_ccm                         551	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ECParameters_print                      552	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+OCSP_SINGLERESP_get1_ext_d2i            553	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+RAND_status                             554	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_ripemd160                           555	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RMD160
+EVP_MD_meth_set_final                   556	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ENGINE_get_cmd_defns                    557	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+d2i_PKEY_USAGE_PERIOD                   558	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+RSAPublicKey_dup                        559	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+RAND_write_file                         560	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_GF2m_mod                             561	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC2M
+EC_GROUP_get_pentanomial_basis          562	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC,EC2M
+X509_CINF_free                          563	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_EXTENSION_free                     564	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_DigestSignInit                      565	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_get0_issuer          566	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CT
+TLS_FEATURE_new                         567	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+RSA_get_default_method                  568	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+CRYPTO_cts128_encrypt_block             569	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_digest                             570	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ERR_load_X509V3_strings                 571	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_meth_get_cleanup               572	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_X509                                574	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+a2i_ASN1_STRING                         575	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EC_GROUP_get_mont_data                  576	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+CMAC_CTX_copy                           577	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMAC
+EVP_camellia_128_cfb128                 579	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CAMELLIA
+DH_compute_key_padded                   580	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DH
+ERR_load_CONF_strings                   581	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL_dup                   582	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+BN_GF2m_mod_exp_arr                     583	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC2M
+ASN1_UTF8STRING_free                    584	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_X931_generate_prime_ex               585	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ENGINE_get_RAND                         586	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+EVP_DecryptInit                         587	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_bin2bn                               588	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_subject_name_hash                  589	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_flags               590	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_CONF_set_clock_precision_digits      591	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+ASN1_TYPE_set                           592	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO                 593	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_PKCS7_bio                           594	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_MD_meth_get_copy                    595	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+RAND_query_egd_bytes                    596	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EGD
+i2d_ASN1_PRINTABLE                      597	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ENGINE_cmd_is_executable                598	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+BIO_puts                                599	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+RSAPublicKey_it                         601	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:RSA
+RSAPublicKey_it                         601	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:RSA
+ISSUING_DIST_POINT_new                  602	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_VAL_it                             603	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+X509_VAL_it                             603	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+EVP_DigestVerifyInit                    604	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_IPAddressChoice                     605	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779
+EVP_md5                                 606	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:MD5
+ASRange_new                             607	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779
+BN_GF2m_mod_mul_arr                     608	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC2M
+d2i_RSA_OAEP_PARAMS                     609	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+BIO_s_bio                               610	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OBJ_NAME_add                            611	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_fd_non_fatal_error                  612	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_set_type                       613	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ENGINE_get_next                         614	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+BN_is_negative                          615	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_get_attr_count                 616	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_REVOKED_get_ext_by_critical        617	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509at_get_attr                         618	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_PUBKEY_it                          619	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+X509_PUBKEY_it                          619	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+DES_ede3_ofb64_encrypt                  620	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DES
+EC_KEY_METHOD_get_compute_key           621	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+RC2_cfb64_encrypt                       622	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RC2
+EVP_EncryptFinal_ex                     623	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ERR_load_RSA_strings                    624	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+CRYPTO_secure_malloc_done               625	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+RSA_OAEP_PARAMS_new                     626	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+X509_NAME_free                          627	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS12_set_mac                          628	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+UI_get0_result_string                   629	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:UI
+TS_RESP_CTX_add_policy                  630	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+X509_REQ_dup                            631	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_DSA_PUBKEY_fp                       633	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA,STDIO
+OCSP_REQ_CTX_nbio_d2i                   634	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+d2i_X509_REQ_fp                         635	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO
+DH_OpenSSL                              636	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DH
+BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192               637	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_REVOKED_it                         638	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+X509_REVOKED_it                         638	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock                639	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509V3_NAME_from_section                640	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp 641	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+OCSP_SINGLERESP_get0_id                 642	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+UI_add_info_string                      643	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:UI
+OBJ_NAME_remove                         644	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+UI_get_method                           645	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:UI
+CONF_modules_unload                     646	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CRYPTO_ccm128_encrypt_ccm64             647	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CRYPTO_secure_malloc_init               648	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+DSAparams_dup                           649	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_new                 650	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_RESP_verify_token                    652	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+PEM_read_bio_CMS                        653	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+PEM_get_EVP_CIPHER_INFO                 654	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509V3_EXT_print                        655	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_OCSP_SINGLERESP                     656	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+ESS_CERT_ID_free                        657	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+PEM_SignInit                            658	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length           659	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_delete_ext                         660	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_resp_get0_produced_at              661	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+IDEA_encrypt                            662	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:IDEA
+CRYPTO_nistcts128_encrypt_block         663	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_MD_do_all                           664	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EC_KEY_oct2priv                         665	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+CONF_parse_list                         666	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ENGINE_set_table_flags                  667	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+EVP_MD_meth_get_ctrl                    668	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_TYPE_get_int_octetstring           669	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS5_pbe_set0_algor                    670	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ENGINE_get_table_flags                  671	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+PKCS12_MAC_DATA_new                     672	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_chain_up_ref                       673	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_REQINFO_it                         674	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:OCSP
+OCSP_REQINFO_it                         674	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:OCSP
+PKCS12_add_localkeyid                   675	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get0_type                676	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_TRUST_set_default                  677	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TXT_DB_read                             678	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_sub                                  679	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASRange_free                            680	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779
+EVP_aes_192_cfb8                        681	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+DSO_global_lookup                       682	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_it                    683	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_it                    683	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+CRYPTO_ocb128_copy_ctx                  684	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCB
+TS_REQ_get_ext_d2i                      685	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+AES_ige_encrypt                         686	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_SXNET                               687	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CTLOG_get0_log_id                       688	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CT
+CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_get0_signer_id   689	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+OCSP_REQUEST_add1_ext_i2d               690	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+EVP_PBE_CipherInit                      691	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+DSA_dup_DH                              692	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DH,DSA
+CONF_imodule_get_value                  693	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_id_issuer_cmp                      694	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+ASN1_INTEGER_free                       695	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_get0_nist_prime_224                  696	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OPENSSL_isservice                       697	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+DH_compute_key                          698	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DH
+TS_RESP_CTX_set_signer_key              699	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+i2d_DSAPrivateKey_bio                   700	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+ASN1_item_d2i                           702	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_int_ctrl                            703	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CMS_ReceiptRequest_it                   704	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:CMS
+CMS_ReceiptRequest_it                   704	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:CMS
+X509_ATTRIBUTE_get0_type                705	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_MD_meth_set_copy                    706	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_ASN1_ENUMERATED                     707	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_ASIdOrRange                         708	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779
+i2s_ASN1_OCTET_STRING                   709	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_add1_reject_object                 710	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ERR_set_mark                            711	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING                  712	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_NAME_ENTRY_dup                     714	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_certificate_type                   715	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS7_add_signature                     716	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OBJ_ln2nid                              717	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CRYPTO_128_unwrap                       718	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_new_PKCS7                           719	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+UI_get0_user_data                       720	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:UI
+TS_RESP_get_token                       721	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+OCSP_RESPID_new                         722	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+ASN1_SET_ANY_it                         723	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+ASN1_SET_ANY_it                         723	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+d2i_TS_RESP_bio                         724	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+PEM_write_X509_REQ                      725	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO
+BIO_snprintf                            726	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EC_POINT_hex2point                      727	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+X509v3_get_ext_by_critical              728	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ENGINE_get_default_RSA                  729	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+DSA_sign_setup                          730	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+OPENSSL_sk_new_null                     731	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PEM_read_PKCS8                          732	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO
+BN_mod_sqr                              733	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CAST_ofb64_encrypt                      734	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CAST
+TXT_DB_write                            735	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_REQUEST_get1_ext_d2i               736	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+CMS_unsigned_add1_attr_by_NID           737	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+BN_mod_exp_mont                         738	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_DHxparams                           739	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DH
+DH_size                                 740	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DH
+CONF_imodule_get_name                   741	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ENGINE_get_pkey_meth_engine             742	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+OCSP_BASICRESP_free                     743	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+BN_set_params                           744	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DEPRECATEDIN_0_9_8
+BN_add                                  745	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OPENSSL_sk_free                         746	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_TST_INFO_get_ext_d2i                 747	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+RSA_check_key                           748	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+TS_MSG_IMPRINT_set_algo                 749	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+BN_nist_mod_521                         750	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local                 751	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS7_to_TS_TST_INFO                    752	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+X509_STORE_CTX_new                      753	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CTLOG_STORE_new                         754	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CT
+EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_cleanup             755	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_PKCS12_SAFEBAG                      756	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_MD_pkey_type                        757	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_policy_node_get0_qualifiers        758	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_cert_status_str                    759	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+EVP_MD_meth_get_flags                   760	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_ENUMERATED_set                     761	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+UI_UTIL_read_pw                         762	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:UI
+PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT_free                  763	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CMS_RecipientInfo_type                  764	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+OCSP_BASICRESP_get_ext                  765	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+BN_lebin2bn                             766	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+AES_decrypt                             767	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_fd_should_retry                     768	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_STRING_new                         769	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ENGINE_init                             770	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+TS_RESP_CTX_add_flags                   771	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+BIO_gethostbyname                       772	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0,SOCK
+X509V3_EXT_add                          773	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+UI_add_verify_string                    774	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:UI
+EVP_rc5_32_12_16_cfb64                  775	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RC5
+PKCS7_dataVerify                        776	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_free                  777	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS7_add_attrib_smimecap               778	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ERR_peek_last_error_line_data           779	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_meth_set_sign                  780	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_i2d_bio                            781	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+DSA_verify                              782	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+i2a_ASN1_OBJECT                         783	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_PKEY_USAGE_PERIOD                   784	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+DSA_new                                 785	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+PEM_read_bio_X509_CRL                   786	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS7_dataDecode                        787	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+DSA_up_ref                              788	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+EVP_DecryptInit_ex                      789	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CONF_get1_default_config_file           790	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CRYPTO_ocb128_encrypt                   791	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCB
+EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE_new                  792	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_EncryptFinal                        793	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PEM_write_ECPrivateKey                  794	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC,STDIO
+EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_get_asn1_params     796	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS7_dataInit                          797	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_app_data               798	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+a2i_GENERAL_NAME                        799	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SXNETID_new                             800	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+RC4_options                             801	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RC4
+BIO_f_null                              802	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EC_GROUP_set_curve_name                 803	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+d2i_PBE2PARAM                           804	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_security_bits                  805	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS12_unpack_p7encdata                 806	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509V3_EXT_i2d                          807	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509V3_get_value_bool                   808	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_verify_cert_error_string           809	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_X509_PUBKEY                         810	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2a_ASN1_ENUMERATED                     811	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL_new             812	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_USERNOTICE                          813	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_cmp                                814	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY                    815	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+ECPKParameters_print_fp                 816	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC,STDIO
+GENERAL_SUBTREE_free                    817	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+RSA_blinding_off                        818	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+i2d_OCSP_REVOKEDINFO                    819	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+X509V3_add_standard_extensions          820	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PEM_write_bio_RSA_PUBKEY                821	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+i2d_ASN1_UTF8STRING                     822	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_REQ_delete_ext                       823	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+PKCS7_DIGEST_free                       824	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OBJ_nid2ln                              825	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+COMP_CTX_new                            826	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:COMP
+BIO_ADDR_family                         827	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SOCK
+OCSP_RESPONSE_it                        828	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:OCSP
+OCSP_RESPONSE_it                        828	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:OCSP
+BIO_ADDRINFO_socktype                   829	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SOCK
+d2i_X509_REQ_bio                        830	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PBE_cleanup                         831	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl         832	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CMS_get0_SignerInfos                    833	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+EVP_PKEY_paramgen                       834	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PEM_write_PKCS8PrivateKey_nid           835	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO
+PKCS7_ATTR_VERIFY_it                    836	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+PKCS7_ATTR_VERIFY_it                    836	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+OCSP_response_status_str                837	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+CRYPTO_gcm128_new                       838	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SMIME_read_PKCS7                        839	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EC_GROUP_copy                           840	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+ENGINE_set_ciphers                      841	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+OPENSSL_LH_doall_arg                    842	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_REQUEST_get_ext_by_NID             843	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+X509_REQ_get_attr_by_NID                844	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PBE2PARAM_new                           845	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+DES_ecb_encrypt                         846	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DES
+EVP_camellia_256_ecb                    847	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CAMELLIA
+PEM_read_RSA_PUBKEY                     848	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA,STDIO
+d2i_NETSCAPE_SPKAC                      849	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_TIME_check                         851	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS7_DIGEST_new                        852	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_TS_TST_INFO_fp                      853	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO,TS
+d2i_PKCS8_fp                            854	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO
+EVP_PKEY_keygen                         855	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_CRL_dup                            856	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_cb                     857	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_STORE_free                         858	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ECDSA_sign_ex                           859	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+TXT_DB_insert                           860	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EC_POINTs_make_affine                   861	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS               862	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+BF_options                              863	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:BF
+OCSP_BASICRESP_it                       864	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:OCSP
+OCSP_BASICRESP_it                       864	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:OCSP
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_name             865	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_RESP_CTX_set_signer_digest           866	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_email            867	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_sock_error                          868	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SOCK
+RSA_set_default_method                  869	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt_arr                    870	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC2M
+X509_get0_extensions                    871	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_STATUS_INFO_set_status               872	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+RSA_verify                              873	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+ASN1_FBOOLEAN_it                        874	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+ASN1_FBOOLEAN_it                        874	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+d2i_ASN1_TIME                           875	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_meth_get_signctx               876	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EC_KEY_METHOD_set_compute_key           877	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+X509_REQ_INFO_free                      878	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CMS_ReceiptRequest_create0              879	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+EVP_MD_meth_set_cleanup                 880	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_aes_128_xts                         881	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_RESP_verify_signature                883	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+ENGINE_set_pkey_meths                   884	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+CMS_EncryptedData_decrypt               885	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+CONF_module_add                         886	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_UTCTIME_print                      887	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_REQ_verify                         888	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose           889	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_TS_MSG_IMPRINT_bio                  890	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+X509_EXTENSION_set_object               891	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data             892	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CRL_DIST_POINTS_it                      893	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+CRL_DIST_POINTS_it                      893	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+DIRECTORYSTRING_new                     894	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ERR_load_ASYNC_strings                  895	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_bf_cfb64                            896	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:BF
+PKCS7_sign_add_signer                   897	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_print_ex                           898	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS7_add_recipient                     899	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_SINGLERESP_add_ext                 900	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+d2i_X509_SIG                            901	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_NAME_set                           902	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OPENSSL_sk_pop                          903	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ENGINE_register_ciphers                 904	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+PKCS5_pbe2_set_iv                       905	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_add_stable_module                  906	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_camellia_128_cbc                    907	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CAMELLIA
+COMP_zlib                               908	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:COMP
+EVP_read_pw_string                      909	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:UI
+i2d_ASN1_NULL                           910	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+DES_encrypt1                            911	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DES
+BN_mod_lshift1_quick                    912	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_get_rfc3526_prime_6144               913	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OBJ_obj2txt                             914	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+UI_set_result                           915	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:UI
+EVP_EncodeUpdate                        916	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PEM_write_bio_X509_CRL                  917	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_cmp                                  918	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_get0_log_store       919	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CT
+CONF_set_default_method                 920	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_PCTX_get_nm_flags                  921	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_add1_ext_i2d                       922	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO                    924	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS1_MGF1                              925	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+BIO_vsnprintf                           926	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer      927	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CRYPTO_secure_malloc_initialized        928	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+o2i_SCT_LIST                            929	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CT
+ASN1_PCTX_get_cert_flags                930	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509at_add1_attr_by_NID                 931	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+DHparams_dup                            932	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DH
+X509_get_ext                            933	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_issuer_and_serial_hash             934	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_BMPSTRING_it                       935	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+ASN1_BMPSTRING_it                       935	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+PEM_read_EC_PUBKEY                      936	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC,STDIO
+d2i_ASN1_IA5STRING                      937	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_TST_INFO_ext_free                    938	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+i2d_X509_CRL_fp                         939	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO
+PKCS7_get0_signers                      940	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data              941	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_VERIFY_CTS_set_certs                 942	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+BN_MONT_CTX_copy                        943	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OPENSSL_INIT_new                        945	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_ACCURACY_dup                         946	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+i2d_ECPrivateKey                        947	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_OBJ           948	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_VERIFY_CTX_cleanup                   949	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+ASN1_INTEGER_get                        950	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_PRINTABLE_it                       951	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+ASN1_PRINTABLE_it                       951	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+EVP_VerifyFinal                         952	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_ASN1_INTEGER_print_bio               953	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+X509_NAME_ENTRY_set_object              954	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_s_socket                            955	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SOCK
+EVP_rc5_32_12_16_ecb                    956	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RC5
+i2d_PKCS8_bio                           957	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+v2i_ASN1_BIT_STRING                     958	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKEY_USAGE_PERIOD_new                   959	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OBJ_NAME_init                           960	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_meth_set_keygen                961	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+RSA_PSS_PARAMS_new                      962	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+RSA_sign                                963	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+EVP_DigestVerifyFinal                   964	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_RSA_PUBKEY_bio                      965	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+TS_RESP_dup                             966	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+ERR_set_error_data                      967	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_RECP_CTX_new                         968	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+DES_options                             969	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DES
+IPAddressChoice_it                      970	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:RFC3779
+IPAddressChoice_it                      970	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:RFC3779
+ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING_it                 971	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING_it                 971	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+d2i_DSAPublicKey                        972	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+ENGINE_get_name                         973	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock                 974	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASIdentifierChoice_free                 975	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779
+BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting              976	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DGRAM,SCTP
+BN_is_bit_set                           978	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+AES_ofb128_encrypt                      979	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_STORE_add_lookup                   980	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_GENERALSTRING_new                  981	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+IDEA_options                            982	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:IDEA
+d2i_X509_REQ                            983	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_TS_STATUS_INFO                      984	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id                  985	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_get1_ocsp                          986	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ISSUING_DIST_POINT_free                 987	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_UTCTIME_free                       988	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ERR_load_TS_strings                     989	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+BN_nist_mod_func                        990	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_ONEREQ_new                         991	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+DSA_SIG_new                             992	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+DH_get_default_method                   993	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DH
+PEM_proc_type                           994	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_printf                              995	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+a2i_IPADDRESS                           996	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ERR_peek_error_line_data                997	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ERR_unload_strings                      998	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SEED_cfb128_encrypt                     999	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SEED
+ASN1_BIT_STRING_it                      1000	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+ASN1_BIT_STRING_it                      1000	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+PKCS12_decrypt_skey                     1001	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ENGINE_register_EC                      1002	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+OCSP_RESPONSE_new                       1003	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+CRYPTO_cbc128_encrypt                   1004	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_RSAPublicKey_bio                    1005	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+X509_chain_check_suiteb                 1006	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_OCSP_REQUEST                        1007	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+BN_X931_generate_Xpq                    1008	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_item_digest                        1009	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust             1010	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_error                1011	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_meth_set_encrypt               1012	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_UTCTIME_it                         1013	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+ASN1_UTCTIME_it                         1013	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+i2d_DSA_PUBKEY_fp                       1014	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA,STDIO
+X509at_get_attr_by_OBJ                  1015	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex                      1016	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+UI_dup_error_string                     1017	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:UI
+OPENSSL_LH_num_items                    1018	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_INTEGER_cmp                        1020	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_NAME_entry_count                   1021	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+UI_method_set_closer                    1022	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:UI
+OPENSSL_LH_get_down_load                1023	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_md4                                 1024	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:MD4
+X509_set_subject_name                   1025	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_PKCS8PrivateKey_nid_bio             1026	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ERR_put_error                           1027	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ERR_add_error_data                      1028	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_ALGORS_it                          1029	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+X509_ALGORS_it                          1029	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+MD5_Update                              1030	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:MD5
+X509_policy_check                       1031	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_CRL_METHOD_new                     1032	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_ANY_it                             1033	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+ASN1_ANY_it                             1033	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+d2i_DSA_SIG                             1034	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+DH_free                                 1035	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DH
+ENGINE_register_all_DSA                 1036	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+TS_REQ_set_msg_imprint                  1037	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+BN_mod_sub_quick                        1038	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SMIME_write_CMS                         1039	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+i2d_DSAPublicKey                        1040	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+SMIME_text                              1042	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS7_add_recipient_info                1043	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_get_word                             1044	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_CipherFinal                         1045	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_X509_bio                            1046	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_EXTENSION_new                      1047	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_getm_notAfter                      1048	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_ALGOR_dup                          1049	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_X509_REQ_INFO                       1050	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_EC_PUBKEY_bio                       1051	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+X509_STORE_CTX_set_error                1052	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EC_KEY_METHOD_set_keygen                1053	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+CRYPTO_free                             1054	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_GF2m_mod_exp                         1055	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC2M
+OPENSSL_buf2hexstr                      1056	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+DES_encrypt2                            1057	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DES
+DH_up_ref                               1058	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DH
+RC2_ofb64_encrypt                       1059	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RC2
+PKCS12_pbe_crypt                        1060	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASIdentifiers_free                      1061	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0                  1062	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_MD_meth_get_input_blocksize         1063	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_ACCURACY_get_micros                  1064	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+PKCS12_SAFEBAG_create_cert              1065	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CRYPTO_mem_debug_malloc                 1066	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CRYPTO_MDEBUG
+RAND_seed                               1067	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+NETSCAPE_SPKAC_free                     1068	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_CRL_diff                           1069	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags             1070	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_EXTENSION_set_data                 1071	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ENGINE_get_EC                           1072	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+ASN1_STRING_copy                        1073	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_encrypt_old                    1074	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OPENSSL_LH_free                         1075	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+DES_is_weak_key                         1076	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DES
+EVP_PKEY_verify                         1077	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ERR_load_BIO_strings                    1078	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_nread                               1079	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PEM_read_bio_RSAPrivateKey              1080	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+OBJ_nid2obj                             1081	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CRYPTO_ofb128_encrypt                   1082	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ENGINE_set_init_function                1083	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+NCONF_default                           1084	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ENGINE_remove                           1085	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+ASYNC_get_current_job                   1086	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OBJ_nid2sn                              1087	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_gmtime_adj                         1088	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_add_ext                            1089	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ENGINE_set_DSA                          1090	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+EC_KEY_METHOD_set_sign                  1091	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+d2i_TS_MSG_IMPRINT                      1092	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+X509_print_ex_fp                        1093	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO
+ERR_load_PEM_strings                    1094	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ENGINE_unregister_pkey_asn1_meths       1095	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+IPAddressFamily_free                    1096	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779
+UI_method_get_prompt_constructor        1097	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:UI
+ASN1_NULL_it                            1098	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+ASN1_NULL_it                            1098	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+X509_REQ_get_pubkey                     1099	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_CRL_set1_nextUpdate                1100	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_des_ede3_cfb64                      1101	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DES
+BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER                      1102	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE_free                 1103	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PEM_read_bio_EC_PUBKEY                  1104	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+BN_MONT_CTX_set                         1105	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_CONF_set_serial                      1106	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+X509_NAME_ENTRY_new                     1107	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+RSA_security_bits                       1108	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+X509v3_addr_add_prefix                  1109	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779
+X509_REQ_print_fp                       1110	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO
+ASN1_item_ex_new                        1111	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_s_datagram                          1112	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DGRAM
+PEM_write_bio_PKCS8                     1113	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_str2mask                           1114	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_TYPE_get                           1115	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS                     1116	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_STORE_CTX_get0_store               1117	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS12_pack_p7data                      1118	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+RSA_print_fp                            1119	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA,STDIO
+OPENSSL_INIT_set_config_appname         1120	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO
+EC_KEY_print_fp                         1121	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC,STDIO
+BIO_dup_chain                           1122	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_it                  1123	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_it                  1123	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+RSA_OAEP_PARAMS_free                    1124	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+ASN1_item_new                           1125	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CRYPTO_cts128_encrypt                   1126	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+RC2_encrypt                             1127	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RC2
+PEM_write                               1128	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO
+EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_get_asn1_params     1129	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_OCSP_RESPBYTES                      1130	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+d2i_ASN1_UTF8STRING                     1131	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE_it                   1132	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE_it                   1132	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+EVP_CipherInit                          1133	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS12_add_safe                         1134	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ENGINE_get_digest                       1135	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+EC_GROUP_have_precompute_mult           1136	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+OPENSSL_gmtime                          1137	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_set_issuer_name                    1138	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+RSA_new                                 1139	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+ASN1_STRING_set_by_NID                  1140	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PEM_write_bio_PKCS7                     1141	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+MDC2_Final                              1142	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:MDC2
+SMIME_crlf_copy                         1143	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_REQUEST_get_ext_count              1144	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+OCSP_REQ_CTX_new                        1145	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+X509_load_cert_crl_file                 1146	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key                    1147	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+DIST_POINT_new                          1148	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_is_prime_fasttest                    1149	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DEPRECATEDIN_0_9_8
+EC_POINT_dup                            1150	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+PKCS5_v2_scrypt_keyivgen                1151	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SCRYPT
+X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param               1152	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+DES_check_key_parity                    1153	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DES
+EVP_aes_256_ocb                         1154	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCB
+X509_VAL_free                           1155	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_STORE_CTX_get1_certs               1156	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PEM_write_RSA_PUBKEY                    1157	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA,STDIO
+PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get0_p8inf               1158	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_CRL_set_issuer_name                1159	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CMS_EncryptedData_encrypt               1160	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+ASN1_tag2str                            1161	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_zero_ex                              1162	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_NAME_dup                           1163	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SCT_LIST_print                          1164	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CT
+NOTICEREF_it                            1165	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+NOTICEREF_it                            1165	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+CMS_add0_crl                            1166	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+d2i_DSAparams                           1167	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data             1168	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_CIPHER_param_to_asn1                1169	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_CONF_set_certs                       1170	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+BN_security_bits                        1171	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_PURPOSE_get0_name                  1172	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_TST_INFO_get_serial                  1173	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+ASN1_PCTX_get_str_flags                 1174	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SHA256                                  1175	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_LOOKUP_hash_dir                    1176	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_BIT_STRING_check                   1177	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ENGINE_set_default_RAND                 1178	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+BIO_connect                             1179	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SOCK
+TS_TST_INFO_add_ext                     1180	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+EVP_aes_192_ccm                         1181	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509V3_add_value                        1182	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_keygen_info           1183	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ENGINE_unregister_digests               1184	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+IPAddressOrRange_new                    1185	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779
+EVP_aes_256_ofb                         1186	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CRYPTO_mem_debug_push                   1187	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CRYPTO_MDEBUG
+X509_PKEY_new                           1188	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_get_key_usage                      1189	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_ATTRIBUTE_create_by_txt            1190	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PEM_SignFinal                           1191	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PEM_bytes_read_bio                      1192	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_signature_dump                     1193	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_RESP_CTX_set_def_policy              1194	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+RAND_pseudo_bytes                       1195	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0
+DES_ofb_encrypt                         1196	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DES
+EVP_add_digest                          1197	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_item_sign_ctx                      1198	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_dump_indent_cb                      1199	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth             1200	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+DES_ecb3_encrypt                        1201	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DES
+OBJ_obj2nid                             1202	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free                     1203	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_cast5_cfb64                         1204	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CAST
+OPENSSL_uni2asc                         1205	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SCT_validation_status_string            1206	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CT
+PKCS7_add_attribute                     1207	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ENGINE_register_DSA                     1208	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+OPENSSL_LH_node_stats                   1209	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO
+X509_policy_tree_free                   1210	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EC_GFp_simple_method                    1211	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+X509_it                                 1212	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+X509_it                                 1212	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+d2i_PROXY_POLICY                        1213	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+MDC2_Update                             1214	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:MDC2
+EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name                1215	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+X509_CRL_free                           1216	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_PKCS7_SIGN_ENVELOPE                 1217	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_CERTSTATUS_it                      1218	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:OCSP
+OCSP_CERTSTATUS_it                      1218	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:OCSP
+BIO_f_reliable                          1219	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_resp_count                         1220	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+i2d_X509_AUX                            1221	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1               1222	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+X509_time_adj                           1223	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str                  1224	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_flags             1225	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OPENSSL_DIR_end                         1226	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EC_GROUP_new                            1227	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+CMS_SignerInfo_get0_pkey_ctx            1228	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+d2i_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING                1229	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_cert_cmp         1230	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey                   1231	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_set                    1232	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EC_POINT_is_on_curve                    1233	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+PKCS12_add_cert                         1234	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_NAME_hash_old                      1235	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PBKDF2PARAM_free                        1236	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_CMS_ContentInfo                     1237	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_ctrl                1238	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+RSA_public_decrypt                      1239	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+ENGINE_get_id                           1240	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+PKCS12_item_decrypt_d2i                 1241	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PEM_read_bio_DSAparams                  1242	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+X509_CRL_cmp                            1243	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+DSO_METHOD_openssl                      1244	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_PrivateKey_fp                       1245	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO
+i2d_NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE              1246	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EC_POINT_oct2point                      1248	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst              1249	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OPENSSL_DIR_read                        1250	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CMS_add_smimecap                        1251	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+X509_check_email                        1252	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CRYPTO_cts128_decrypt_block             1253	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+UI_method_get_opener                    1254	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:UI
+EVP_aes_192_gcm                         1255	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_CONF_set_tsa_name                    1256	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+X509_email_free                         1257	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_get_callback                        1258	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OPENSSL_sk_shift                        1259	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_X509_REVOKED                        1260	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CMS_sign                                1261	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+X509_STORE_add_cert                     1262	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EC_GROUP_precompute_mult                1263	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+d2i_DISPLAYTEXT                         1265	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+HMAC_CTX_copy                           1266	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CRYPTO_gcm128_init                      1267	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_X509_CINF                           1268	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_REVOKED_delete_ext                 1269	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+RC5_32_cfb64_encrypt                    1270	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RC5
+TS_REQ_set_cert_req                     1271	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+TXT_DB_get_by_index                     1272	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_check_ca                           1273	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+DH_get_2048_224                         1274	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DH
+X509_http_nbio                          1275	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+i2d_AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS               1276	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_get_cipherbyname                    1277	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CONF_dump_fp                            1278	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO
+d2i_DIST_POINT_NAME                     1279	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_INTEGER_set_int64                  1280	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_TIME_free                          1281	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2o_SCT_LIST                            1282	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CT
+AES_encrypt                             1283	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+MD5_Init                                1284	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:MD5
+UI_add_error_string                     1285	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:UI
+X509_TRUST_cleanup                      1286	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PEM_read_X509                           1287	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO
+EC_KEY_new_method                       1288	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+i2d_RSAPublicKey_fp                     1289	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA,STDIO
+CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt_ctr32             1290	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_move_peername         1291	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_SINGLERESP_it                      1292	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:OCSP
+OCSP_SINGLERESP_it                      1292	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:OCSP
+BN_num_bits                             1293	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_CRL_METHOD_free                    1294	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PEM_read_NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE         1295	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO
+OPENSSL_load_builtin_modules            1296	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_set_version                        1297	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_EC_PUBKEY_bio                       1298	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+X509_REQ_get_attr_count                 1299	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CMS_set1_signers_certs                  1300	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+TS_ACCURACY_free                        1301	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+PEM_write_DSA_PUBKEY                    1302	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA,STDIO
+BN_rshift1                              1303	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_PKCS7_ENVELOPE                      1304	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PBKDF2PARAM_it                          1305	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+PBKDF2PARAM_it                          1305	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+UI_get_result_maxsize                   1306	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:UI
+PBEPARAM_it                             1307	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+PBEPARAM_it                             1307	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+TS_ACCURACY_set_seconds                 1308	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+UI_get0_action_string                   1309	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:UI
+RC2_decrypt                             1310	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RC2
+OPENSSL_atexit                          1311	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CMS_add_standard_smimecap               1312	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+PKCS7_add_attrib_content_type           1313	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_BLINDING_set_flags                   1314	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ERR_peek_last_error                     1315	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ENGINE_set_cmd_defns                    1316	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+d2i_ASN1_NULL                           1317	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+RAND_event                              1318	1_1_0	EXIST:_WIN32:FUNCTION:DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0
+i2d_PKCS12_fp                           1319	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO
+EVP_PKEY_meth_get_init                  1320	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_check_trust                        1321	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+b2i_PrivateKey                          1322	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+HMAC_Init_ex                            1323	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SMIME_read_CMS                          1324	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+X509_subject_name_cmp                   1325	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CRYPTO_ocb128_finish                    1326	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCB
+EVP_CIPHER_do_all                       1327	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+POLICY_MAPPINGS_it                      1328	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+POLICY_MAPPINGS_it                      1328	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+SCT_set0_log_id                         1329	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CT
+CRYPTO_cfb128_encrypt                   1330	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2            1331	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+TS_CONF_set_signer_cert                 1332	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+i2d_ASN1_OBJECT                         1333	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_bio             1334	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509V3_add_value_int                    1335	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_REQ_set_nonce                        1336	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+Camellia_ctr128_encrypt                 1337	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CAMELLIA
+X509_LOOKUP_new                         1338	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS_new               1339	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CRYPTO_mem_leaks_fp                     1340	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CRYPTO_MDEBUG,STDIO
+DES_set_key_unchecked                   1341	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DES
+BN_free                                 1342	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_aes_128_cfb1                        1343	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EC_KEY_get0_group                       1344	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+PEM_write_bio_CMS_stream                1345	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+BIO_f_linebuffer                        1346	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_item_d2i_bio                       1347	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ENGINE_get_flags                        1348	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+OCSP_resp_find                          1349	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+OPENSSL_LH_node_usage_stats_bio         1350	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_encrypt                        1351	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CRYPTO_cfb128_8_encrypt                 1352	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SXNET_get_id_INTEGER                    1353	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CRYPTO_clear_free                       1354	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2v_GENERAL_NAME                        1355	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT_new                   1356	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CRYPTO_realloc                          1357	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_ctrl_pending                        1358	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_MD_meth_new                         1360	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_sign_ctx                           1361	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_is_odd                               1362	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert         1363	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_ENUMERATED_get_int64               1364	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_SCTX_get_app_data                  1365	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_get_default_cert_file_env          1366	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509v3_addr_validate_resource_set       1367	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779
+d2i_X509_VAL                            1368	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt_ctr32             1370	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+DHparams_print                          1371	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DH
+OPENSSL_sk_unshift                      1372	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_GENCB_set_old                        1373	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PEM_write_bio_X509                      1374	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_asn1_free                      1375	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ENGINE_unregister_DH                    1376	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION_it            1377	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION_it            1377	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set1_cert            1378	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CT
+X509_NAME_hash                          1379	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SCT_set_timestamp                       1380	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CT
+UI_new                                  1381	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:UI
+TS_REQ_get_msg_imprint                  1382	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+i2d_PKCS12_BAGS                         1383	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CERTIFICATEPOLICIES_free                1385	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509V3_get_section                      1386	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_parse_hostserv                      1387	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SOCK
+EVP_PKEY_meth_set_cleanup               1388	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION_free          1389	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_dup                                1390	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EDIPARTYNAME_free                       1391	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_CRL_add0_revoked                   1393	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+GENERAL_NAME_set0_value                 1394	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_ATTRIBUTE_dup                      1395	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EC_GROUP_check_discriminant             1396	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+PKCS12_MAC_DATA_free                    1397	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey                 1398	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_PKCS7_ENCRYPT                       1399	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl                       1400	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_REQ_set_pubkey                     1401	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+UI_create_method                        1402	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:UI
+X509_REQ_add_extensions_nid             1403	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PEM_X509_INFO_write_bio                 1404	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_dump_cb                             1405	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+v2i_GENERAL_NAMES                       1406	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_des_ede3_ofb                        1407	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DES
+EVP_MD_meth_get_cleanup                 1408	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SRP_Calc_server_key                     1409	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SRP
+BN_mod_exp_simple                       1410	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_set_ex_data                         1411	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SHA512                                  1412	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy      1413	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_DecodeBlock                         1414	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_REQ_CTX_http                       1415	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+EVP_MD_CTX_reset                        1416	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_NAME_new                           1417	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_item_pack                          1418	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_BIT_STRING_set_asc                 1419	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_GENERAL_NAME                        1420	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_ESS_CERT_ID                         1421	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+X509_TRUST_get_by_id                    1422	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_RSA_PUBKEY_fp                       1423	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA,STDIO
+EVP_PBE_get                             1424	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CRYPTO_nistcts128_encrypt               1425	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CONF_modules_finish                     1426	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_value_one                            1427	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+RSA_padding_add_SSLv23                  1428	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+OCSP_RESPBYTES_it                       1429	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:OCSP
+OCSP_RESPBYTES_it                       1429	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:OCSP
+EVP_aes_192_wrap                        1430	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_CERTID_it                          1431	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:OCSP
+OCSP_CERTID_it                          1431	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:OCSP
+ENGINE_get_RSA                          1432	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+RAND_get_rand_method                    1433	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ERR_load_DSA_strings                    1434	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+ASN1_check_infinite_end                 1435	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_PKCS7_DIGEST                        1436	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ERR_lib_error_string                    1437	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_ATTRIBUTE_set1_object              1438	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_ECPrivateKey_bio                    1439	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+BN_GENCB_free                           1440	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+HMAC_size                               1441	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_get0_DH                        1442	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DH
+d2i_OCSP_CRLID                          1443	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding              1444	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CTLOG_new_from_base64                   1445	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CT
+AES_bi_ige_encrypt                      1446	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ERR_pop_to_mark                         1447	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CRL_DIST_POINTS_new                     1449	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_get0_asn1                      1450	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_camellia_192_ctr                    1451	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CAMELLIA
+EVP_PKEY_free                           1452	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_ATTRIBUTE_count                    1453	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_new_dgram                           1454	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DGRAM
+CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_reks        1455	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_new                   1456	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PEM_read_bio_X509_REQ                   1457	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_sock_init                           1458	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SOCK
+BN_nist_mod_192                         1459	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL             1460	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509V3_EXT_nconf                        1461	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509v3_addr_inherits                    1462	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779
+NETSCAPE_SPKI_sign                      1463	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_BLINDING_update                      1464	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_gcd                                  1465	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CMS_dataInit                            1466	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+TS_CONF_get_tsa_section                 1467	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+i2d_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO                   1468	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_get_pw_prompt                       1469	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:UI
+BN_bn2bin                               1470	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_ASN1_BIT_STRING                     1471	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_CERTSTATUS_new                     1472	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+ENGINE_register_RAND                    1473	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+X509V3_section_free                     1474	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CRYPTO_mem_debug_free                   1475	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CRYPTO_MDEBUG
+d2i_OCSP_REQUEST                        1476	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+ENGINE_get_cipher_engine                1477	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+SHA384_Final                            1478	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_RESP_CTX_set_certs                   1479	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+BN_MONT_CTX_free                        1480	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad_arr              1481	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC2M
+UI_add_input_string                     1482	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:UI
+TS_TST_INFO_get_version                 1483	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+BIO_accept_ex                           1484	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SOCK
+CRYPTO_get_mem_functions                1485	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PEM_read_bio                            1486	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_BASICRESP_get_ext_by_critical      1487	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+SXNET_it                                1488	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+SXNET_it                                1488	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+BIO_indent                              1489	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_X509_fp                             1490	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO
+d2i_ASN1_TYPE                           1491	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CTLOG_STORE_free                        1492	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CT
+ENGINE_get_pkey_meths                   1493	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+i2d_TS_REQ_bio                          1494	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_operation              1495	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_MD_meth_set_ctrl                    1496	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_EXTENSION_set_critical             1497	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_ADDR_clear                          1498	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SOCK
+ENGINE_get_DSA                          1499	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+ASYNC_get_wait_ctx                      1500	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ENGINE_set_load_privkey_function        1501	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+CRYPTO_ccm128_setiv                     1502	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS7_dataFinal                         1503	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SHA1_Final                              1504	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2a_ASN1_STRING                         1505	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key                 1506	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+AES_set_encrypt_key                     1507	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_UTCTIME_new                        1508	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+AES_cbc_encrypt                         1509	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_RESPDATA_free                      1510	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+EVP_PKEY_asn1_find                      1511	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME                1512	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OPENSSL_cleanup                         1513	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_ATTRIBUTE_create                   1514	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SCT_get_source                          1515	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CT
+EVP_PKEY_verify_init                    1516	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_TIME_set_string                    1517	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_free                                1518	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_X509_ALGOR                          1519	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls                1520	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASYNC_pause_job                         1521	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_BASICRESP_new                      1522	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+EVP_camellia_256_ofb                    1523	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CAMELLIA
+PKCS12_item_i2d_encrypt                 1524	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_meth_set_copy                  1525	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EC_POINT_clear_free                     1526	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+i2s_ASN1_ENUMERATED_TABLE               1527	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS7_verify                            1528	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_table            1529	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert                 1530	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_GENERALSTRING_free                 1531	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked                  1532	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num                  1533	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CONF_load                               1534	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EC_KEY_METHOD_get_keygen                1535	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+EVP_PKEY_add1_attr_by_txt               1536	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_INTEGER_set_uint64                 1537	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_get_attr_by_OBJ                1538	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_add_oid_module                     1539	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_div_recp                             1540	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SRP_Verify_B_mod_N                      1541	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SRP
+SXNET_free                              1542	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CMS_get0_content                        1543	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+BN_is_word                              1544	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_CIPHER_key_length                   1545	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param                1546	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_request_onereq_get0                1547	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+ERR_load_PKCS7_strings                  1548	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_PUBKEY_get                         1549	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EC_KEY_free                             1550	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+BIO_read                                1551	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_get_attr_by_NID                1552	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_get_accept_socket                   1553	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0,SOCK
+CMS_SignerInfo_sign                     1554	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+ASN1_item_i2d_bio                       1555	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size               1556	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+DIRECTORYSTRING_free                    1557	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_CONF_set_default_engine              1558	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE,TS
+BN_set_bit                              1559	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_MD_meth_set_app_datasize            1560	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+DSO_free                                1561	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_TST_INFO_get_tsa                     1562	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+EC_GROUP_check                          1563	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+OPENSSL_sk_delete                       1564	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_RESP_CTX_set_extension_cb            1565	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+EVP_CIPHER_CTX_nid                      1566	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_RESP_CTX_add_md                      1567	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+DES_set_key                             1568	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DES
+X509V3_extensions_print                 1569	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PEM_do_header                           1570	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_re_X509_CRL_tbs                     1571	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_method_name                         1572	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_OCSP_CRLID                          1573	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+OCSP_request_set1_name                  1574	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+d2i_X509_NAME_ENTRY                     1575	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_trusted                            1576	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_TRUST_get_flags                    1577	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS7_set_content                       1578	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PEM_write_X509_REQ_NEW                  1579	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO
+CONF_imodule_set_usr_data               1580	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_TS_RESP_fp                          1581	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO,TS
+X509_policy_tree_get0_user_policies     1582	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+DSA_do_sign                             1584	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset                    1585	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_REVOKEDINFO_new                    1586	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+SRP_Verify_A_mod_N                      1587	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SRP
+SRP_VBASE_free                          1588	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SRP
+PKCS7_add0_attrib_signing_time          1589	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_STORE_set_flags                    1590	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+UI_get0_output_string                   1591	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:UI
+ERR_get_error_line_data                 1592	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CTLOG_get0_name                         1593	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CT
+ASN1_TBOOLEAN_it                        1594	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+ASN1_TBOOLEAN_it                        1594	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+RC2_set_key                             1595	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RC2
+X509_REVOKED_get_ext_by_NID             1596	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+RSA_padding_add_none                    1597	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+EVP_rc5_32_12_16_cbc                    1599	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RC5
+PEM_dek_info                            1600	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_SCTX_get_template                  1601	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0                      1602	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_verify                             1603	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_RESP_CTX_get_request                 1604	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+EVP_cast5_cbc                           1605	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CAST
+PEM_read_bio_X509_AUX                   1606	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_ext_print_bio                        1607	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+SCT_set1_log_id                         1608	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CT
+X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr                 1609	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ENGINE_register_all_RAND                1610	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+EVP_MD_meth_get_result_size             1612	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_ADDRINFO_address                    1613	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SOCK
+ASN1_STRING_print_ex                    1614	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_CMS_ReceiptRequest                  1615	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+d2i_TS_REQ_fp                           1616	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO,TS
+OCSP_REQ_CTX_i2d                        1617	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid         1618	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASIdOrRange_new                         1619	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779
+ASN1_SCTX_new                           1620	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509V3_EXT_get                          1621	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_id_cmp                             1622	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+NCONF_dump_bio                          1623	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_NAME_get_entry                     1624	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_get1_DH                        1625	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DH
+CRYPTO_gcm128_aad                       1626	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_des_cfb8                            1627	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DES
+BN_BLINDING_convert                     1628	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CRYPTO_ocb128_cleanup                   1629	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCB
+EVP_des_ede_cbc                         1630	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DES
+i2d_ASN1_TIME                           1631	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ENGINE_register_all_pkey_asn1_meths     1632	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+OCSP_set_max_response_length            1633	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+d2i_ISSUING_DIST_POINT                  1634	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_key              1635	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+NCONF_new                               1636	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_SINGLERESP_free                    1637	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+PKCS7_ENCRYPT_free                      1638	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_DIST_POINT                          1639	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init                  1640	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_MSG_IMPRINT_dup                      1641	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+CMS_ContentInfo_it                      1642	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:CMS
+CMS_ContentInfo_it                      1642	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:CMS
+OCSP_resp_get0_signature                1643	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer              1644	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_Digest                              1645	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CRYPTO_set_ex_data                      1646	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_bn2hex                               1647	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_lshift1                              1648	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_EDIPARTYNAME                        1649	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_policy_tree_get0_policies          1650	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509at_add1_attr                        1651	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_get_ex_data                        1653	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+RSA_set_method                          1654	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+X509_REVOKED_dup                        1655	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_TIME_new                           1656	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PEM_write_NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE        1657	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO
+PEM_read_X509_REQ                       1658	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO
+EC_GROUP_free                           1659	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+X509_CRL_get_meth_data                  1660	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509V3_add_value_uchar                  1661	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_asn1_get_suffix                     1662	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_clear_flags           1663	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt              1664	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+DES_ede3_cfb_encrypt                    1665	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DES
+i2d_CMS_bio_stream                      1667	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+DES_quad_cksum                          1668	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DES
+X509_ATTRIBUTE_create_by_NID            1669	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_VERIFY_CTX_free                      1670	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+EC_KEY_up_ref                           1671	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+EC_GROUP_get_basis_type                 1672	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+OCSP_crlID_new                          1673	1_1_0	EXIST:!VMS:FUNCTION:OCSP
+OCSP_crlID2_new                         1673	1_1_0	EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION:OCSP
+PEM_write_PKCS7                         1674	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO
+PKCS7_add_signer                        1675	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_SIG_it                             1676	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+X509_SIG_it                             1676	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+ASYNC_start_job                         1677	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_TST_INFO_dup                         1678	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+EVP_aes_192_ctr                         1679	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS12_pack_authsafes                   1680	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS7_get_attribute                     1681	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OPENSSL_config                          1682	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0
+s2i_ASN1_INTEGER                        1683	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CMS_signed_add1_attr_by_OBJ             1684	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+CRYPTO_128_wrap_pad                     1685	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CMS_EncryptedData_set1_key              1686	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs                  1687	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_generate_nconf                     1688	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CMS_add0_recipient_password             1689	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+UI_get_string_type                      1690	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:UI
+PEM_read_bio_ECPrivateKey               1691	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+EVP_PKEY_get_attr                       1692	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PEM_read_bio_ECPKParameters             1693	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+d2i_PKCS12_MAC_DATA                     1694	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ENGINE_ctrl_cmd                         1695	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get_bag_nid              1696	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_CONF_set_digests                     1697	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+PKCS7_SIGNED_it                         1698	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+PKCS7_SIGNED_it                         1698	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+b2i_PublicKey                           1699	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+X509_PURPOSE_cleanup                    1700	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ESS_SIGNING_CERT_dup                    1701	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+ENGINE_set_default_DSA                  1702	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+X509_REVOKED_new                        1703	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+NCONF_WIN32                             1704	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1       1705	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+X509_policy_tree_get0_level             1706	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_parse_dump                         1708	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_vfree                               1709	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CRYPTO_cbc128_decrypt                   1710	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+UI_dup_verify_string                    1711	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:UI
+d2i_PKCS7_bio                           1712	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ENGINE_set_default_digests              1713	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+i2d_PublicKey                           1714	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+RC5_32_set_key                          1715	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RC5
+AES_unwrap_key                          1716	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_Cipher                              1717	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+AES_set_decrypt_key                     1718	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BF_ofb64_encrypt                        1719	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:BF
+d2i_TS_TST_INFO_fp                      1720	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO,TS
+X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial          1721	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_type                           1722	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ENGINE_ctrl                             1723	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+EVP_cast5_ecb                           1724	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CAST
+BIO_nwrite0                             1725	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CAST_encrypt                            1726	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CAST
+a2d_ASN1_OBJECT                         1727	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_ONEREQ_delete_ext                  1728	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+UI_method_get_reader                    1729	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:UI
+CMS_unsigned_get_attr                   1730	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+EVP_aes_256_cbc                         1731	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_check_ip_asc                       1732	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PEM_write_bio_X509_AUX                  1733	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+RC2_cbc_encrypt                         1734	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RC2
+TS_MSG_IMPRINT_new                      1735	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+EVP_ENCODE_CTX_new                      1736	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_f_base64                            1737	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CMS_verify                              1738	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+i2d_PrivateKey                          1739	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_OCSP_ONEREQ                         1740	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+OPENSSL_issetugid                       1741	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_ASN1_OBJECT                         1742	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_MD_meth_set_flags                   1743	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_idea_cbc                            1744	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:IDEA
+EC_POINT_cmp                            1745	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+ASN1_buf_print                          1746	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_CTX_hex2ctrl                   1747	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PEM_write_bio_PKCS8PrivateKey           1748	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CMAC_Update                             1749	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMAC
+d2i_ASN1_UTCTIME                        1750	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OPENSSL_sk_insert                       1751	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+DSO_up_ref                              1752	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_rc2_cbc                             1753	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RC2
+i2d_NETSCAPE_SPKI                       1754	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASYNC_init_thread                       1755	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_BASICRESP_get_ext_by_OBJ           1756	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+X509_reject_clear                       1757	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+DH_security_bits                        1758	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DH
+LONG_it                                 1759	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+LONG_it                                 1759	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+ASN1_dup                                1760	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_RESP_new                             1761	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+i2d_PKCS8PrivateKeyInfo_fp              1762	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO
+X509_alias_get0                         1763	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_ATTRIBUTE_free                     1764	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_X509_bio                            1765	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_TST_INFO_get_exts                    1766	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+EVP_aes_256_ecb                         1767	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_BIT_STRING_name_print              1768	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS                     1769	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free                  1770	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_free                   1771	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_tag2bit                            1772	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_REQ_add_ext                          1773	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+X509_digest                             1776	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local             1777	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE_it               1778	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE_it               1778	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+EVP_aes_128_wrap                        1779	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509V3_conf_free                        1780	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_TST_INFO_get_ext_by_NID              1781	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+EVP_aes_256_cfb1                        1782	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_issuer_name_cmp                    1783	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_get0_id       1784	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+EVP_PKEY_meth_get_verify_recover        1785	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check                  1786	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_CERT_AUX_it                        1787	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+X509_CERT_AUX_it                        1787	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+X509_get_X509_PUBKEY                    1789	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TXT_DB_create_index                     1790	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+RAND_set_rand_engine                    1791	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+X509_set_serialNumber                   1792	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime               1793	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509V3_parse_list                       1794	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_new                  1795	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_CIPHER_CTX_clear_flags              1796	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ECDSA_size                              1797	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+X509_ALGOR_get0                         1798	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION                  1799	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_SINGLERESP_get_ext_by_NID          1800	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+a2i_IPADDRESS_NC                        1801	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CTLOG_STORE_load_default_file           1802	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CT
+PKCS12_SAFEBAG_create_pkcs8_encrypt     1803	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+RAND_screen                             1804	1_1_0	EXIST:_WIN32:FUNCTION:DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0
+CONF_get_string                         1805	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_cmp_current_time                   1806	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_DSAPrivateKey                       1807	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+ASN1_BIT_STRING_new                     1808	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_new_file                            1809	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_get0_algs             1810	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_RESP_set_status_info                 1811	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+OPENSSL_LH_delete                       1812	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_STATUS_INFO_dup                      1813	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+X509v3_addr_get_range                   1814	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779
+X509_EXTENSION_get_data                 1815	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+RC5_32_encrypt                          1816	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RC5
+DIST_POINT_set_dpname                   1817	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_sock_info                           1818	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SOCK
+OPENSSL_hexstr2buf                      1819	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_add_cipher                          1820	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509V3_EXT_add_list                     1821	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CMS_compress                            1822	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+X509_get_ext_by_critical                1823	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_clear_fd                 1824	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ZLONG_it                                1825	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+ZLONG_it                                1825	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+OPENSSL_sk_find_ex                      1826	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_ENUMERATED_to_BN                   1827	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_CRL_get_ext_d2i                    1828	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_AUTHORITY_KEYID                     1829	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_TST_INFO_get_time                    1830	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+ASN1_VISIBLESTRING_it                   1831	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+ASN1_VISIBLESTRING_it                   1831	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+X509V3_EXT_REQ_add_conf                 1832	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8                     1833	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_MD_meth_set_update                  1835	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_camellia_192_cbc                    1836	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CAMELLIA
+OPENSSL_LH_stats_bio                    1837	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS7_set_signed_attributes             1838	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EC_KEY_priv2buf                         1839	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+BN_BLINDING_free                        1840	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+IPAddressChoice_new                     1841	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779
+X509_CRL_get_ext_count                  1842	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS12_add_key                          1843	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_camellia_128_cfb1                   1844	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CAMELLIA
+BIO_find_type                           1845	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ISSUING_DIST_POINT_it                   1846	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+ISSUING_DIST_POINT_it                   1846	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+BIO_ctrl_wpending                       1847	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_ALGOR_cmp                          1848	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_ASN1_bio_stream                     1849	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local                1850	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_RESP_CTX_set_serial_cb               1851	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+POLICY_MAPPING_it                       1852	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+POLICY_MAPPING_it                       1852	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+ERR_load_KDF_strings                    1853	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+UI_method_set_reader                    1854	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:UI
+BIO_next                                1855	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_STRING_set_default_mask_asc        1856	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_CRL_new                            1857	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2b_PrivateKey_bio                      1858	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+ASN1_STRING_length_set                  1859	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PEM_write_PKCS8                         1860	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO
+PKCS7_digest_from_attributes            1861	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EC_GROUP_set_curve_GFp                  1862	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+X509_PURPOSE_get0                       1863	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA                       1864	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+X509_NAME_it                            1865	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+X509_NAME_it                            1865	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+OBJ_add_object                          1866	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+DSA_generate_key                        1867	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+EVP_DigestUpdate                        1868	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_get_ext_by_OBJ                     1869	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PBEPARAM_new                            1870	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_aes_128_cbc                         1871	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CRYPTO_dup_ex_data                      1872	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_single_get0_status                 1873	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+d2i_AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS               1874	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PEM_read_RSAPrivateKey                  1875	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA,STDIO
+BIO_closesocket                         1876	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SOCK
+RSA_verify_ASN1_OCTET_STRING            1877	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+SCT_set_log_entry_type                  1878	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CT
+BN_new                                  1879	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_OBJECT_retrieve_by_subject         1880	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+MD5_Final                               1881	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:MD5
+X509_STORE_set_verify_cb                1882	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_REQUEST_print                      1883	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+CMS_add1_crl                            1884	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+d2i_EDIPARTYNAME                        1885	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack       1886	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_ADDR_service_string                 1887	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SOCK
+ASN1_BOOLEAN_it                         1888	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+ASN1_BOOLEAN_it                         1888	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+TS_RESP_CTX_set_time_cb                 1889	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+IDEA_cbc_encrypt                        1890	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:IDEA
+BN_CTX_secure_new                       1891	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_ONEREQ_add_ext                     1892	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+CMS_uncompress                          1893	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+CRYPTO_mem_debug_pop                    1895	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CRYPTO_MDEBUG
+EVP_aes_192_cfb128                      1896	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_REQ_CTX_nbio                       1897	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+EVP_CIPHER_CTX_copy                     1898	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CRYPTO_secure_allocated                 1899	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+UI_UTIL_read_pw_string                  1900	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:UI
+NOTICEREF_free                          1901	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+AES_cfb1_encrypt                        1902	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509v3_get_ext                          1903	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt_ctr32             1905	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SCT_set1_signature                      1906	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CT
+CONF_imodule_get_module                 1907	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+NAME_CONSTRAINTS_new                    1908	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_usub                                 1909	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SRP_Calc_B                              1910	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SRP
+CMS_decrypt_set1_key                    1911	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+EC_GROUP_get_degree                     1912	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+X509_ALGOR_set0                         1913	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OPENSSL_LH_set_down_load                1914	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509v3_asid_inherits                    1915	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779
+EVP_MD_meth_get_app_datasize            1916	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted        1917	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+RAND_poll                               1918	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_print_public                   1919	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CMS_SignedData_init                     1920	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+X509_REQ_free                           1921	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_INTEGER_set                        1922	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_DecodeFinal                         1923	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+MD5_Transform                           1925	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:MD5
+SRP_create_verifier_BN                  1926	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SRP
+ENGINE_register_all_EC                  1927	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+EVP_camellia_128_ofb                    1928	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CAMELLIA
+PEM_write_X509_AUX                      1929	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO
+X509_LOOKUP_by_subject                  1930	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_REQ_add_extensions                 1931	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+Camellia_cbc_encrypt                    1932	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CAMELLIA
+EC_KEY_METHOD_new                       1933	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+RSA_flags                               1934	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+X509_NAME_add_entry                     1935	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv                  1936	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_RSAPrivateKey_bio                   1937	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+PKCS5_PBE_keyivgen                      1938	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_OCSP_SERVICELOC                     1939	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+EC_POINT_copy                           1940	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+X509V3_EXT_CRL_add_nconf                1941	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SHA256_Init                             1942	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object              1943	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_ENUMERATED_free                    1944	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_CRL_set_meth_data                  1945	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_aes_192_cfb1                        1946	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags                    1947	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_seed_cbc                            1948	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SEED
+d2i_PKCS12                              1949	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_policy_node_get0_policy            1950	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS12_unpack_p7data                    1951	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ECDSA_sign                              1952	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+d2i_PKCS12_fp                           1953	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO
+CMS_unsigned_get_attr_by_NID            1954	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+UI_add_user_data                        1955	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:UI
+BN_bntest_rand                          1956	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_get_pubkey                         1957	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_X509_NAME                           1958	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_add1_attr                      1959	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit          1960	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_meth_get_keygen                1961	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ENGINE_get_pkey_asn1_meth               1962	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+SHA256_Update                           1963	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL             1964	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS12_unpack_authsafes                 1965	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_CRL_it                             1966	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+X509_CRL_it                             1966	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+d2i_X509_ALGOR                          1967	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS12_PBE_keyivgen                     1968	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_test_flags                          1969	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m    1970	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC,EC2M
+EVP_ENCODE_CTX_num                      1971	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+Camellia_cfb1_encrypt                   1972	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CAMELLIA
+NCONF_load_fp                           1973	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO
+i2d_OCSP_REQINFO                        1974	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+EVP_PKEY_sign                           1975	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_REQ_get_ext_by_critical              1976	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+EC_KEY_key2buf                          1977	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+X509_EXTENSION_it                       1978	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+X509_EXTENSION_it                       1978	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+i2d_PKCS8_fp                            1979	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO
+UTF8_getc                               1980	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_IA5STRING_free                     1981	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EC_KEY_METHOD_get_verify                1982	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+OBJ_NAME_do_all                         1983	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_TS_MSG_IMPRINT_fp                   1984	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO,TS
+X509_CRL_verify                         1985	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_get0_uids                          1986	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_get0_DSA                       1987	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+d2i_CMS_ContentInfo                     1988	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_do_cipher           1989	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_DSA_PUBKEY                          1990	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+GENERAL_NAME_it                         1991	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+GENERAL_NAME_it                         1991	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+EVP_des_ede_ecb                         1992	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DES
+i2d_CRL_DIST_POINTS                     1993	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PEM_write_bio_X509_REQ_NEW              1994	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+RC5_32_ofb64_encrypt                    1995	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RC5
+i2d_PKCS7                               1996	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_mod_lshift_quick                     1997	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+DIST_POINT_NAME_it                      1998	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+DIST_POINT_NAME_it                      1998	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+PEM_read_PrivateKey                     1999	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO
+X509V3_get_d2i                          2000	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_sign                  2001	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_TST_INFO_free                        2002	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+DSA_security_bits                       2003	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+X509v3_addr_is_canonical                2004	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779
+BN_mod_mul_reciprocal                   2005	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_REQ_get_version                      2006	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+BN_exp                                  2007	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_SXNET                               2008	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OBJ_bsearch_                            2009	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OPENSSL_LH_new                          2010	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ENGINE_register_all_pkey_meths          2011	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+ENGINE_get_init_function                2012	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+EC_POINT_point2hex                      2013	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+ENGINE_get_default_DSA                  2014	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+ENGINE_register_all_complete            2015	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+SRP_get_default_gN                      2016	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SRP
+UI_dup_input_boolean                    2017	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:UI
+PKCS7_dup                               2018	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_TS_REQ_fp                           2019	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO,TS
+i2d_OTHERNAME                           2020	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EC_KEY_get0_private_key                 2021	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+SCT_get0_extensions                     2022	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CT
+OPENSSL_LH_node_stats_bio               2023	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_DIRECTORYSTRING                     2024	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_X931_derive_prime_ex                 2025	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ENGINE_get_pkey_asn1_meth_str           2026	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+PKCS7_signatureVerify                   2027	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CRYPTO_ocb128_new                       2028	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCB
+EC_curve_nist2nid                       2029	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+UI_get0_result                          2030	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:UI
+OCSP_request_add1_nonce                 2031	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+UI_construct_prompt                     2032	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:UI
+ENGINE_unregister_RSA                   2033	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+EC_GROUP_order_bits                     2034	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+d2i_CMS_bio                             2035	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+OPENSSL_sk_num                          2036	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+_shadow_DES_check_key                   2037	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:DES
+_shadow_DES_check_key                   2037	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:DES
+CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_pkey             2038	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+X509_STORE_CTX_set_default              2039	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+AES_wrap_key                            2040	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_md_null                             2041	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_SCT_LIST                            2042	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CT
+PKCS7_get_issuer_and_serial             2043	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS7_SIGN_ENVELOPE_it                  2044	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+PKCS7_SIGN_ENVELOPE_it                  2044	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+ASN1_d2i_fp                             2045	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO
+EVP_DecryptFinal                        2046	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_ENUMERATED_it                      2047	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+ASN1_ENUMERATED_it                      2047	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+o2i_ECPublicKey                         2048	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+ERR_load_BUF_strings                    2049	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PEM_read_bio_RSA_PUBKEY                 2050	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+OCSP_SINGLERESP_new                     2051	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+ASN1_SCTX_free                          2052	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_ECPrivateKey_fp                     2053	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC,STDIO
+EVP_CIPHER_CTX_original_iv              2054	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS7_SIGNED_free                       2055	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_TRUST_get0_name                    2056	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ENGINE_get_load_pubkey_function         2057	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+UI_get_default_method                   2058	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:UI
+PKCS12_add_CSPName_asc                  2059	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PEM_write_PUBKEY                        2060	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO
+UI_method_set_prompt_constructor        2061	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:UI
+OBJ_length                              2062	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_GENCB_get_arg                        2063	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_MD_CTX_clear_flags                  2064	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_meth_get_verifyctx             2065	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_get0_cert            2066	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CT
+PEM_write_DHparams                      2067	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DH,STDIO
+DH_set_ex_data                          2068	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DH
+OCSP_SIGNATURE_free                     2069	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+CRYPTO_128_unwrap_pad                   2070	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_new_CMS                             2071	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+i2d_ASN1_ENUMERATED                     2072	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PEM_read_DSAparams                      2073	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA,STDIO
+TS_TST_INFO_set_ordering                2074	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+MDC2_Init                               2075	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:MDC2
+i2o_SCT                                 2076	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CT
+d2i_TS_STATUS_INFO                      2077	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+ERR_error_string_n                      2078	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+HMAC                                    2079	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_mul                                  2080	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_get0_nist_prime_384                  2081	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip_asc           2082	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CONF_modules_load                       2083	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_RSAPublicKey                        2084	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+i2d_ASN1_GENERALSTRING                  2085	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+POLICYQUALINFO_new                      2086	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_get0_alg               2087	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_base_id                        2088	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+UI_method_set_opener                    2089	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:UI
+X509v3_get_ext_by_NID                   2090	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_CONF_set_policies                    2091	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+CMS_SignerInfo_cert_cmp                 2092	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+PEM_read                                2093	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO
+X509_STORE_set_depth                    2094	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EC_KEY_METHOD_get_sign                  2095	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv                       2096	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_ESS_SIGNING_CERT                    2097	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+TS_RESP_set_tst_info                    2098	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_data                   2099	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CMS_EnvelopedData_create                2100	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+SCT_new                                 2101	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CT
+X509_REQ_add1_attr                      2102	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_get_ext_count                      2103	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CRYPTO_cts128_decrypt                   2104	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_fd                   2105	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_TS_REQ                              2106	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+OCSP_ONEREQ_add1_ext_i2d                2107	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+ENGINE_register_pkey_meths              2108	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+ENGINE_load_public_key                  2109	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+ASIdOrRange_it                          2110	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:RFC3779
+ASIdOrRange_it                          2110	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:RFC3779
+DHparams_print_fp                       2111	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DH,STDIO
+ERR_load_CRYPTO_strings                 2112	1_1_0	EXIST:!VMS:FUNCTION:
+ERR_load_CRYPTOlib_strings              2112	1_1_0	EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION:
+X509_REQ_set_version                    2113	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_ASN1_GENERALSTRING                  2114	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_ASIdentifiers                       2115	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779
+X509V3_EXT_cleanup                      2116	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CAST_ecb_encrypt                        2117	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CAST
+BIO_s_file                              2118	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+RSA_X931_derive_ex                      2119	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init                   2120	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ENGINE_get_destroy_function             2121	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+SHA224_Init                             2122	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509V3_EXT_add_conf                     2123	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_object_size                        2124	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_REVOKED_free                       2125	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_mod_exp_recp                         2126	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_mdc2                                2127	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:MDC2
+EVP_des_cfb64                           2128	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DES
+PKCS7_sign                              2129	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_SINGLERESP_get_ext_by_critical     2130	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+EDIPARTYNAME_it                         2131	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+EDIPARTYNAME_it                         2131	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+ERR_print_errors_fp                     2132	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO
+BN_GF2m_mod_div_arr                     2133	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC2M
+PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get0_attr                2134	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_s_mem                               2135	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_RESPDATA_new                       2136	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+ASN1_item_i2d_fp                        2137	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO
+BN_GF2m_mod_sqr                         2138	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC2M
+ASN1_PRINTABLE_new                      2139	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OBJ_NAME_new_index                      2140	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_asn1_add_alias                 2141	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA                       2142	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+SEED_cbc_encrypt                        2143	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SEED
+EVP_rc2_40_cbc                          2144	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RC2
+ECDSA_SIG_new                           2145	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+i2d_PKCS8PrivateKey_nid_fp              2146	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO
+X509_NAME_ENTRY_it                      2147	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+X509_NAME_ENTRY_it                      2147	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+CRYPTO_THREAD_compare_id                2148	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_IPAddressChoice                     2149	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779
+IPAddressFamily_it                      2150	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:RFC3779
+IPAddressFamily_it                      2150	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:RFC3779
+ERR_load_OCSP_strings                   2151	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+BIO_push                                2152	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_BMPSTRING_new                      2153	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+COMP_get_type                           2154	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:COMP
+d2i_ASIdentifierChoice                  2155	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779
+i2d_ASN1_T61STRING                      2156	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_add1_trust_object                  2157	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PEM_write_X509                          2158	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO
+BN_CTX_free                             2159	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EC_GROUP_get_curve_GF2m                 2160	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC,EC2M
+EVP_MD_flags                            2161	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OPENSSL_sk_set                          2162	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_request_sign                       2163	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad                  2164	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC2M
+EC_POINT_method_of                      2165	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+PKCS7_ENCRYPT_it                        2166	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+PKCS7_ENCRYPT_it                        2166	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS_it                2167	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS_it                2167	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+X509_EXTENSION_create_by_NID            2168	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_RSAPrivateKey                       2169	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+d2i_CERTIFICATEPOLICIES                 2170	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CMAC_CTX_get0_cipher_ctx                2171	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMAC
+X509_STORE_load_locations               2172	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OBJ_find_sigid_algs                     2173	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_RESP_CTX_set_accuracy                2174	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+NETSCAPE_SPKI_get_pubkey                2175	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ECDSA_do_sign_ex                        2176	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+OCSP_ONEREQ_get_ext                     2177	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+BN_get_rfc3526_prime_4096               2179	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_PKCS7_fp                            2180	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO
+PEM_write_bio_NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE    2181	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS12_AUTHSAFES_it                     2182	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+PKCS12_AUTHSAFES_it                     2182	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+EVP_MD_CTX_free                         2183	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_orig_id_cmp      2184	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+NETSCAPE_SPKI_b64_encode                2185	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_PrivateKey                          2186	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_MD_CTX_new                          2187	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_get0_tbs_sigalg                    2189	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_new                2190	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_ECDSA_SIG                           2191	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+d2i_OTHERNAME                           2192	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_TS_RESP_fp                          2193	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO,TS
+OCSP_BASICRESP_get_ext_count            2194	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+ASN1_T61STRING_new                      2195	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_kronecker                            2196	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION                  2197	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_camellia_192_cfb8                   2198	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CAMELLIA
+X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth                2199	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509v3_delete_ext                       2200	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_STRING_set0                        2201	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_GF2m_add                             2202	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC2M
+CMAC_resume                             2203	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMAC
+TS_ACCURACY_set_millis                  2204	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+X509V3_EXT_conf                         2205	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_DHxparams                           2206	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DH
+EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free                     2207	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+WHIRLPOOL_BitUpdate                     2208	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:WHIRLPOOL
+EVP_idea_ecb                            2209	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:IDEA
+i2d_TS_ACCURACY                         2210	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+ASN1_VISIBLESTRING_free                 2211	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+NCONF_load_bio                          2212	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+DSA_get_default_method                  2213	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+OPENSSL_LH_retrieve                     2214	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CRYPTO_ccm128_decrypt_ccm64             2215	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_RESP_CTX_set_clock_precision_digits  2216	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+SCT_LIST_validate                       2217	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CT
+X509_PURPOSE_get_id                     2218	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EC_KEY_get_ex_data                      2219	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+EVP_MD_size                             2220	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CRYPTO_malloc                           2221	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ERR_load_ASN1_strings                   2222	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_REQ_get_extension_nids             2223	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_REQ_get_ext_by_OBJ                   2224	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+i2d_X509                                2225	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PEM_read_X509_AUX                       2226	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO
+TS_VERIFY_CTX_set_flags                 2227	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+IPAddressRange_new                      2228	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779
+TS_REQ_get_exts                         2229	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+POLICY_CONSTRAINTS_new                  2230	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OTHERNAME_new                           2231	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_rshift                               2232	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_GENERAL_NAMES                       2233	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EC_METHOD_get_field_type                2234	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+ENGINE_set_name                         2235	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+TS_TST_INFO_get_policy_id               2236	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_set                   2237	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PEM_write_bio_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO       2238	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EC_GROUP_set_curve_GF2m                 2239	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC,EC2M
+ENGINE_load_builtin_engines             2240	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+SRP_VBASE_init                          2241	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SRP
+SHA224_Final                            2242	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_CERTSTATUS_free                    2243	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+d2i_TS_TST_INFO                         2244	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+IPAddressOrRange_it                     2245	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:RFC3779
+IPAddressOrRange_it                     2245	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:RFC3779
+ENGINE_get_cipher                       2246	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+TS_TST_INFO_delete_ext                  2247	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+TS_OBJ_print_bio                        2248	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+X509_time_adj_ex                        2249	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_request_add1_cert                  2250	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+ERR_load_X509_strings                   2251	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SHA1_Transform                          2252	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CMS_signed_get_attr_by_NID              2253	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_by_subject           2254	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_OCTET_STRING_it                    2255	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+ASN1_OCTET_STRING_it                    2255	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+OPENSSL_sk_set_cmp_func                 2256	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_table_cleanup         2257	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_re_X509_REQ_tbs                     2258	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CONF_load_bio                           2259	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_ATTRIBUTE_get0_object              2260	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters             2261	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_REQ_INFO_new                       2262	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_rc2_cfb64                           2263	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RC2
+PKCS7_get_smimecap                      2264	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ERR_get_state                           2265	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_DSAPrivateKey_bio                   2266	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+X509_PURPOSE_get_trust                  2267	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EC_GROUP_get_point_conversion_form      2268	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+ASN1_OBJECT_it                          2269	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+ASN1_OBJECT_it                          2269	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+BN_mod_add_quick                        2270	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+NCONF_free                              2271	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+NETSCAPE_SPKI_b64_decode                2272	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_f_md                                2273	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_MD_CTX_pkey_ctx                     2274	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ENGINE_set_default_EC                   2275	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+CMS_ReceiptRequest_free                 2276	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+TS_STATUS_INFO_get0_text                2277	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index                 2278	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_PCTX_set_flags                     2279	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PEM_write_X509_CRL                      2280	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO
+BF_cbc_encrypt                          2281	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:BF
+BN_num_bits_word                        2282	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_DecodeInit                          2283	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_ucmp                                 2284	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SXNET_get_id_asc                        2285	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SCT_set1_extensions                     2286	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CT
+PKCS12_SAFEBAG_new                      2287	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_TST_INFO_set_nonce                   2288	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+PEM_read_ECPrivateKey                   2289	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC,STDIO
+RSA_free                                2290	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+X509_CRL_INFO_new                       2291	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+AES_cfb8_encrypt                        2292	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_ASN1_SEQUENCE_ANY                   2293	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS12_create                           2294	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509at_get_attr_count                   2295	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS12_init                             2296	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CRYPTO_free_ex_data                     2297	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_aes_128_cfb8                        2298	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL_free                  2299	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+BN_mod_exp_mont_word                    2300	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509V3_EXT_nconf_nid                    2301	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+UTF8_putc                               2302	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+RSA_private_encrypt                     2303	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+X509_LOOKUP_shutdown                    2304	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_TST_INFO_set_accuracy                2305	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+OCSP_basic_verify                       2306	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+X509at_add1_attr_by_OBJ                 2307	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_asn1_add0                      2308	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get1_crl                 2309	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_STRING_get_default_mask            2310	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_alias_set1                         2311	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_item_unpack                        2312	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+HMAC_CTX_free                           2313	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EC_POINT_new                            2314	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL_digest          2315	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_des_ofb                             2316	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DES
+DSA_set_method                          2317	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA                       2318	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+EC_KEY_OpenSSL                          2319	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+EVP_camellia_192_ofb                    2320	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CAMELLIA
+ASN1_STRING_length                      2321	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS7_set_digest                        2322	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PEM_write_bio_PUBKEY                    2323	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PEM_read_PKCS7                          2324	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO
+DH_get_2048_256                         2325	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DH
+X509at_delete_attr                      2326	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PEM_write_bio                           2327	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CMS_signed_get_attr_by_OBJ              2329	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+X509_REVOKED_add_ext                    2330	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_CipherUpdate                        2331	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+Camellia_cfb8_encrypt                   2332	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CAMELLIA
+EVP_aes_256_xts                         2333	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_DigestSignFinal                     2334	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_STRING_cmp                         2335	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_chacha20_poly1305                   2336	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CHACHA,POLY1305
+OPENSSL_sk_zero                         2337	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_PRINTABLE_type                     2338	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_CONF_set_ess_cert_id_chain           2339	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+PEM_read_DSAPrivateKey                  2340	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA,STDIO
+DH_generate_parameters_ex               2341	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DH
+UI_dup_input_string                     2342	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:UI
+X509_keyid_set1                         2343	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1                  2344	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EC_GROUP_get_asn1_flag                  2345	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+CMS_decrypt_set1_password               2346	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+BIO_copy_next_retry                     2347	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_POLICY_NODE_print                  2348	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_TIME_diff                          2349	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_s_fd                                2350	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_CMS_bio                             2351	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt                   2352	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_aes_256_ctr                         2353	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_bits                           2354	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_BLINDING_new                         2355	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_check              2356	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_clear_bit                            2357	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_bn2lebinpad                          2358	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_up_ref                         2359	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_getm_notBefore                     2360	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_nist_mod_224                         2361	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+DES_decrypt3                            2362	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DES
+OTHERNAME_it                            2363	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+OTHERNAME_it                            2363	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+X509at_add1_attr_by_txt                 2364	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS7_SIGN_ENVELOPE_free                2365	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_dgram_is_sctp                       2366	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DGRAM,SCTP
+DH_check                                2367	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DH
+Camellia_set_key                        2368	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CAMELLIA
+X509_LOOKUP_by_issuer_serial            2369	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_BMPSTRING_free                     2370	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_new_accept                          2371	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SOCK
+GENERAL_NAME_new                        2372	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+DES_encrypt3                            2373	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DES
+PKCS7_get_signer_info                   2374	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set                   2375	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_mask_bits                            2376	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_UTF8STRING_it                      2377	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+ASN1_UTF8STRING_it                      2377	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+ASN1_SCTX_set_app_data                  2378	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CMS_add0_cert                           2379	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+i2d_GENERAL_NAME                        2380	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_ADDR_new                            2381	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SOCK
+ENGINE_get_pkey_asn1_meth_engine        2382	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+d2i_ASN1_BMPSTRING                      2383	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS12_SAFEBAG_create0_p8inf            2384	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OBJ_cmp                                 2385	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+MD2                                     2386	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:MD2
+X509_PUBKEY_new                         2387	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_CTX_end                              2388	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_get_retry_BIO                       2389	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_REQ_add1_attr_by_OBJ               2390	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_item_ex_free                       2391	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_SIG_new                            2392	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_sqr                                  2393	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_TST_INFO_set_time                    2394	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+OPENSSL_die                             2395	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_LOOKUP_by_alias                    2396	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EC_KEY_set_conv_form                    2397	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+X509_TRUST_get_count                    2399	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+IPAddressOrRange_free                   2400	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779
+RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP              2401	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+EC_KEY_set_ex_data                      2402	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+SRP_VBASE_new                           2403	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SRP
+i2d_ECDSA_SIG                           2404	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+BIO_dump_indent                         2405	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ENGINE_set_pkey_asn1_meths              2406	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+OPENSSL_gmtime_diff                     2407	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_CONF_set_crypto_device               2408	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE,TS
+COMP_CTX_get_method                     2409	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:COMP
+EC_GROUP_get_cofactor                   2410	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+EVP_rc5_32_12_16_ofb                    2411	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RC5
+EVP_MD_CTX_md_data                      2412	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_PCTX_set_nm_flags                  2413	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_ctrl                                2414	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_CRL_set_default_method             2415	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_RSAPublicKey_fp                     2417	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA,STDIO
+UI_method_get_flusher                   2418	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:UI
+EC_POINT_dbl                            2419	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+i2d_X509_CRL_INFO                       2420	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_OCSP_CERTSTATUS                     2421	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+X509_REVOKED_get0_revocationDate        2422	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS7_add_crl                           2423	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ECDSA_do_sign                           2424	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_it                 2425	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_it                 2425	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+PKCS8_pkey_get0                         2426	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_sendreq_new                        2427	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+EVP_aes_256_cfb128                      2428	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+RSA_set_ex_data                         2429	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+BN_GENCB_call                           2430	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509V3_EXT_add_nconf_sk                 2431	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_TS_MSG_IMPRINT_fp                   2432	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO,TS
+PKCS12_new                              2433	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_REVOKED_set_serialNumber           2434	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_get_digestbyname                    2435	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate                 2436	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0
+OBJ_create_objects                      2437	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_enc_null                            2438	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_ONEREQ_get_ext_by_critical         2439	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+OCSP_request_onereq_count               2440	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+BN_hex2bn                               2441	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_impl_ctx_size       2442	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASIdentifiers_new                       2443	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779
+CONF_imodule_get_flags                  2444	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS12_SAFEBAG_it                       2445	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+PKCS12_SAFEBAG_it                       2445	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_set_asn1_params     2446	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EC_KEY_get_enc_flags                    2447	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+X509_OBJECT_idx_by_subject              2448	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_meth_copy                      2449	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE_new              2450	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CRYPTO_ocb128_decrypt                   2451	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCB
+ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_free                     2452	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_PKCS7_DIGEST                        2453	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_TS_TST_INFO_bio                     2454	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+BIGNUM_it                               2455	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+BIGNUM_it                               2455	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+BN_BLINDING_get_flags                   2456	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_EXTENSION_get_critical             2457	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+DSA_set_default_method                  2458	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+PEM_write_bio_DHxparams                 2459	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DH
+DSA_set_ex_data                         2460	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+BIO_s_datagram_sctp                     2461	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DGRAM,SCTP
+SXNET_add_id_asc                        2462	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_print_fp                           2463	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO
+TS_REQ_set_version                      2464	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+OCSP_REQINFO_new                        2465	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+Camellia_decrypt                        2466	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CAMELLIA
+X509_signature_print                    2467	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_camellia_128_ecb                    2468	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CAMELLIA
+MD2_Final                               2469	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:MD2
+OCSP_REQ_CTX_add1_header                2470	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+NETSCAPE_SPKAC_it                       2471	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+NETSCAPE_SPKAC_it                       2471	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+ASIdOrRange_free                        2472	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779
+EC_POINT_get_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp 2473	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+EVP_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha256             2474	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_PKCS7_SIGNED                        2475	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_VERIFY_CTX_set_data                  2476	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+BN_pseudo_rand_range                    2477	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509V3_EXT_add_nconf                    2478	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl                     2479	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_T61STRING_it                       2480	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+ASN1_T61STRING_it                       2480	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+ENGINE_get_prev                         2481	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+OCSP_accept_responses_new               2482	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+ERR_load_EC_strings                     2483	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+X509V3_string_free                      2484	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_meth_set_paramgen              2485	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ENGINE_set_load_ssl_client_cert_function 2486	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+EVP_ENCODE_CTX_free                     2487	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_ASN1_BIT_STRING                     2488	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_meth_set_verifyctx             2489	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_TRUST_add                          2490	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BUF_MEM_free                            2491	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_TST_INFO_get_accuracy                2492	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+TS_REQ_dup                              2493	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+ASN1_STRING_type_new                    2494	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_STATUS_INFO_free                     2495	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+BN_mod_mul                              2496	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CMS_add0_recipient_key                  2497	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+BIO_f_zlib                              2498	1_1_0	EXIST:ZLIB:FUNCTION:COMP
+AES_cfb128_encrypt                      2499	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ENGINE_set_EC                           2500	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+d2i_ECPKParameters                      2501	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+IDEA_ofb64_encrypt                      2502	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:IDEA
+CAST_decrypt                            2503	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CAST
+TS_STATUS_INFO_get0_failure_info        2504	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+ENGINE_unregister_pkey_meths            2506	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+DISPLAYTEXT_new                         2507	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CMS_final                               2508	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+BIO_nwrite                              2509	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+GENERAL_NAME_free                       2510	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS12_pack_p7encdata                   2511	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_generate_dsa_nonce                   2512	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_verify_cert                        2513	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_policy_level_get0_node             2514	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_REQ_get_attr                       2515	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SHA1                                    2516	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_print                              2517	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_AutoPrivateKey                      2518	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_REQ_new                            2519	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS12_add_safes                        2520	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS12_parse                            2521	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_GF2m_mod_div                         2522	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC2M
+i2d_USERNOTICE                          2523	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_NETSCAPE_SPKI                       2524	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CRYPTO_mem_leaks                        2525	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CRYPTO_MDEBUG
+BN_get_rfc3526_prime_1536               2526	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+DSA_sign                                2527	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+RAND_egd                                2528	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EGD
+ASN1_d2i_bio                            2529	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_REQ_digest                         2531	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_set1_notAfter                      2532	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_CIPHER_type                         2533	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_TYPE_set_octetstring               2534	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_free                  2535	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CMS_signed_get0_data_by_OBJ             2536	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+X509_PURPOSE_add                        2537	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS7_ENVELOPE_free                     2538	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS12_key_gen_uni                      2539	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+WHIRLPOOL                               2540	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:WHIRLPOOL
+UI_set_default_method                   2542	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:UI
+EC_POINT_is_at_infinity                 2543	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+i2d_NOTICEREF                           2544	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EC_KEY_new                              2545	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+EVP_chacha20                            2546	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CHACHA
+BN_bn2dec                               2547	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_REQ_print_ex                       2548	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PEM_read_CMS                            2549	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS,STDIO
+d2i_NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE              2550	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_CRL_set_version                    2551	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_PCTX_set_cert_flags                2552	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free                2553	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SHA224_Update                           2554	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name              2555	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+X509_STORE_set_purpose                  2556	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_CRL_get0_signature                 2557	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_keygen_info            2558	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_ASN1_UINTEGER                       2559	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2s_ASN1_INTEGER                        2560	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_EC_PUBKEY_fp                        2561	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC,STDIO
+i2d_OCSP_SIGNATURE                      2562	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+i2d_X509_EXTENSION                      2563	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PEM_read_bio_X509                       2564	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+DES_key_sched                           2565	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DES
+GENERAL_NAME_dup                        2566	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_STORE_CTX_get1_crls                2567	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_meth_set_verify                2568	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_sha256                              2569	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CMS_unsigned_delete_attr                2570	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+EVP_md5_sha1                            2571	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:MD5
+EVP_PKEY_sign_init                      2572	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OPENSSL_LH_insert                       2573	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_cleanup             2574	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_item_ex_d2i                        2575	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_MD_meth_free                        2576	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_meth_new                       2577	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP            2578	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+OCSP_SERVICELOC_it                      2579	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:OCSP
+OCSP_SERVICELOC_it                      2579	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:OCSP
+PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get_nid                  2580	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_MD_CTX_set_update_fn                2581	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_f_asn1                              2582	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_dump                                2583	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert             2584	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb            2585	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CRYPTO_clear_realloc                    2586	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OPENSSL_strnlen                         2587	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+IDEA_ecb_encrypt                        2588	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:IDEA
+ASN1_STRING_set_default_mask            2589	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_VERIFY_CTX_add_flags                 2590	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+FIPS_mode                               2591	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING                2592	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+NAME_CONSTRAINTS_free                   2593	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EC_GROUP_get_order                      2594	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+X509_REVOKED_add1_ext_i2d               2595	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add1_host             2596	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_PUBKEY_bio                          2597	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+MD4_Update                              2598	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:MD4
+X509_STORE_CTX_set_time                 2599	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ENGINE_set_default_DH                   2600	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+X509_ocspid_print                       2601	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+DH_set_method                           2602	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DH
+EVP_rc2_64_cbc                          2603	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RC2
+CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id            2604	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_cb                     2605	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PROXY_POLICY_it                         2606	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+PROXY_POLICY_it                         2606	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+ENGINE_register_complete                2607	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+EVP_DecodeUpdate                        2609	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ENGINE_get_default_RAND                 2610	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+ERR_peek_last_error_line                2611	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ENGINE_get_ssl_client_cert_function     2612	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+OPENSSL_LH_node_usage_stats             2613	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO
+DIRECTORYSTRING_it                      2614	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+DIRECTORYSTRING_it                      2614	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+BIO_write                               2615	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_ONEREQ_get_ext_by_OBJ              2616	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+SEED_encrypt                            2617	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SEED
+IPAddressRange_it                       2618	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:RFC3779
+IPAddressRange_it                       2618	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:RFC3779
+PEM_read_bio_DSAPrivateKey              2619	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+CMS_get0_type                           2620	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+ASN1_PCTX_free                          2621	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ESS_SIGNING_CERT_new                    2622	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+X509V3_EXT_conf_nid                     2623	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EC_KEY_check_key                        2624	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC                       2625	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CONF_get_section                        2626	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_decrypt          2627	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+OBJ_add_sigid                           2628	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_SXNETID                             2629	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CMS_get1_certs                          2630	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+X509_CRL_check_suiteb                   2631	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS7_ENVELOPE_it                       2632	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+PKCS7_ENVELOPE_it                       2632	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+ASIdentifierChoice_it                   2633	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:RFC3779
+ASIdentifierChoice_it                   2633	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:RFC3779
+CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_cert_cmp      2634	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_app_data               2635	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EC_GROUP_clear_free                     2636	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+BN_get_rfc2409_prime_1024               2637	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CRYPTO_set_mem_functions                2638	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING                  2639	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_PBKDF2PARAM                         2640	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ERR_load_COMP_strings                   2641	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:COMP
+EVP_PKEY_meth_add0                      2642	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_rc4_40                              2643	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RC4
+RSA_bits                                2645	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+ASN1_item_dup                           2646	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+GENERAL_NAMES_it                        2647	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+GENERAL_NAMES_it                        2647	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+X509_issuer_name_hash                   2648	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_TST_INFO_get_nonce                   2649	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+MD4_Init                                2650	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:MD4
+X509_EXTENSION_create_by_OBJ            2651	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha1               2652	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SCT_validate                            2653	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CT
+EC_GROUP_dup                            2654	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+EVP_sha1                                2655	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OPENSSL_sk_new                          2656	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_dup                                  2657	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_MSG_IMPRINT_print_bio                2658	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+CONF_module_set_usr_data                2659	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EC_KEY_generate_key                     2660	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+BIO_ctrl_get_write_guarantee            2661	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_assign                         2662	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_aes_128_ofb                         2663	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CMS_data                                2664	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+X509_load_cert_file                     2665	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EC_GFp_nistp521_method                  2667	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC,EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128
+ECDSA_SIG_free                          2668	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+d2i_PKCS12_BAGS                         2669	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+RSA_public_encrypt                      2670	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+X509_CRL_get0_extensions                2671	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CMS_digest_verify                       2672	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set                2673	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_VERIFY_CTX_set_imprint               2674	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+BN_RECP_CTX_set                         2675	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CRYPTO_secure_zalloc                    2676	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE                  2677	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PEM_write_bio_DSAparams                 2678	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+X509_cmp_time                           2679	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_CMS_ReceiptRequest                  2680	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+X509_CRL_INFO_it                        2681	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+X509_CRL_INFO_it                        2681	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+BUF_reverse                             2682	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_OCSP_SIGNATURE                      2683	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+X509_REQ_delete_attr                    2684	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_RESP_CTX_set_signer_cert             2685	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+X509V3_EXT_d2i                          2686	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_GENERALSTRING_it                   2687	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+ASN1_GENERALSTRING_it                   2687	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+POLICYQUALINFO_free                     2688	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EC_KEY_set_group                        2689	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+OCSP_check_validity                     2690	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+PEM_write_ECPKParameters                2691	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC,STDIO
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup                2692	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_LOOKUP_by_fingerprint              2693	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_CIPHER_meth_free                    2694	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_new                    2695	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_ECPrivateKey_fp                     2696	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC,STDIO
+TS_CONF_set_ordering                    2697	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+X509_CRL_get_ext                        2698	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_CRL_get_ext_by_OBJ                 2699	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_basic_add1_cert                    2700	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING_new                2701	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_PBEPARAM                            2702	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+NETSCAPE_SPKI_new                       2703	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+AES_options                             2704	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+POLICYINFO_free                         2705	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PEM_read_bio_Parameters                 2706	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_abs_is_word                          2707	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_set_callback_arg                    2708	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CONF_modules_load_file                  2709	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_trust_clear                        2710	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_CIPHER_CTX_test_flags               2711	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS12_BAGS_free                        2712	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PEM_X509_INFO_read                      2713	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO
+d2i_DSAPrivateKey                       2714	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+i2d_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_fp              2715	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO
+TS_RESP_print_bio                       2716	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+X509_STORE_set_default_paths            2717	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_TS_REQ                              2718	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+i2d_TS_TST_INFO_bio                     2719	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+CMS_sign_receipt                        2720	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+ENGINE_set_RAND                         2721	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+X509_REVOKED_get_ext_by_OBJ             2722	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SEED_decrypt                            2723	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SEED
+PEM_write_PKCS8PrivateKey               2724	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO
+ENGINE_new                              2725	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+X509_check_issued                       2726	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length                2727	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+DES_string_to_2keys                     2728	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DES
+EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters                2729	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CMS_ContentInfo_print_ctx               2730	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+d2i_PKCS7_SIGNED                        2731	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+GENERAL_NAMES_free                      2732	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SCT_get_timestamp                       2733	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CT
+OCSP_SIGNATURE_it                       2734	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:OCSP
+OCSP_SIGNATURE_it                       2734	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:OCSP
+CMS_verify_receipt                      2735	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new                  2736	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_get_ex_data                         2737	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CMS_digest_create                       2738	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+EC_KEY_METHOD_set_verify                2739	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+PEM_read_RSAPublicKey                   2740	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA,STDIO
+ENGINE_pkey_asn1_find_str               2741	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+ENGINE_get_load_privkey_function        2742	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+d2i_IPAddressRange                      2743	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779
+ERR_remove_state                        2744	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DEPRECATEDIN_1_0_0
+X509_CRL_print_fp                       2745	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO
+TS_CONF_load_key                        2746	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+d2i_OCSP_REQINFO                        2747	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+d2i_X509_CINF                           2748	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_REQUEST_get_ext_by_critical        2749	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+X509_REQ_to_X509                        2750	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_aes_192_wrap_pad                    2751	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS7_SIGN_ENVELOPE_new                 2752	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_REQ_get_policy_id                    2753	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+RC5_32_cbc_encrypt                      2754	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RC5
+BN_is_zero                              2755	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_new                  2756	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CT
+NETSCAPE_SPKI_it                        2757	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+NETSCAPE_SPKI_it                        2757	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock                    2758	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+UI_method_set_writer                    2759	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:UI
+UI_dup_info_string                      2760	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:UI
+OPENSSL_init                            2761	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_RESP_get_tst_info                    2762	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth             2763	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_SealFinal                           2764	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+BIO_set                                 2765	1_1_0	NOEXIST::FUNCTION:
+CONF_imodule_set_flags                  2766	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_ASN1_SET_ANY                        2767	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_decrypt                        2768	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_RESPID_it                          2769	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:OCSP
+OCSP_RESPID_it                          2769	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:OCSP
+EVP_des_ede3_cbc                        2770	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DES
+X509_up_ref                             2771	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OBJ_NAME_do_all_sorted                  2772	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ENGINE_unregister_DSA                   2773	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+ASN1_bn_print                           2774	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CMS_is_detached                         2775	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+X509_REQ_INFO_it                        2776	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+X509_REQ_INFO_it                        2776	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+RSAPrivateKey_it                        2777	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:RSA
+RSAPrivateKey_it                        2777	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:RSA
+X509_NAME_ENTRY_free                    2778	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_new_fd                              2779	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OPENSSL_sk_value                        2781	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+NCONF_get_section                       2782	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS12_MAC_DATA_it                      2783	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+PKCS12_MAC_DATA_it                      2783	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+X509_REQ_add1_attr_by_NID               2784	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_sign                               2785	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CMS_RecipientInfo_encrypt               2786	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+X509_get_pubkey_parameters              2787	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS12_setup_mac                        2788	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PEM_read_bio_PKCS7                      2789	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SHA512_Final                            2790	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host             2791	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_resp_find_status                   2792	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+d2i_ASN1_T61STRING                      2793	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+DES_pcbc_encrypt                        2794	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DES
+EVP_PKEY_print_params                   2795	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_get0_nist_prime_192                  2796	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_SealInit                            2798	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+X509_REQ_get0_signature                 2799	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKEY_USAGE_PERIOD_free                  2800	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EC_GROUP_set_point_conversion_form      2801	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+CMS_dataFinal                           2802	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+ASN1_TIME_it                            2803	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+ASN1_TIME_it                            2803	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+ENGINE_get_static_state                 2804	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag                    2805	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+EC_GFp_mont_method                      2806	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+OPENSSL_asc2uni                         2807	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_REQ_new                              2808	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+ENGINE_register_all_DH                  2809	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+ERR_clear_error                         2810	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EC_KEY_dup                              2811	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+X509_LOOKUP_init                        2812	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2b_PVK_bio                             2813	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA,RC4
+OCSP_ONEREQ_free                        2814	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+X509V3_EXT_print_fp                     2815	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO
+OBJ_bsearch_ex_                         2816	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+DES_ofb64_encrypt                       2817	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DES
+i2d_IPAddressOrRange                    2818	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779
+CRYPTO_secure_used                      2819	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_X509_CRL_INFO                       2820	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_CRL_get_issuer                     2821	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_SCT_LIST                            2822	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CT
+EC_GFp_nist_method                      2823	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+SCT_free                                2824	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CT
+TS_TST_INFO_get_msg_imprint             2825	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+X509v3_addr_add_range                   2826	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779
+PKCS12_get_friendlyname                 2827	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_CRL_add_ext                        2829	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_REQ_get_signature_nid              2830	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_TST_INFO_get_ext                     2831	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+i2d_OCSP_RESPID                         2832	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+EVP_camellia_256_cfb8                   2833	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CAMELLIA
+EC_KEY_get0_public_key                  2834	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+SRP_Calc_x                              2835	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SRP
+a2i_ASN1_ENUMERATED                     2836	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CONF_module_get_usr_data                2837	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_X509_NAME_ENTRY                     2838	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SCT_LIST_free                           2839	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CT
+PROXY_POLICY_new                        2840	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_ALGOR_set_md                       2841	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS7_print_ctx                         2842	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_UTF8STRING_new                     2843	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_des_cbc                             2844	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DES
+i2v_ASN1_BIT_STRING                     2845	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_TYPE_set1                          2846	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_X509_CRL_bio                        2847	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get1_cert                2848	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING_free               2849	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EC_KEY_precompute_mult                  2850	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+CRYPTO_mem_debug_realloc                2851	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CRYPTO_MDEBUG
+PKCS7_new                               2852	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_it                    2853	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_it                    2853	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+ASN1_generate_v3                        2854	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey                2855	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_UTCTIME_check                      2856	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_it                   2857	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_it                   2857	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+TS_MSG_IMPRINT_get_msg                  2859	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+PKCS8_add_keyusage                      2860	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_EXTENSION_dup                      2861	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_asn1_new                       2862	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_socket_nbio                         2863	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SOCK
+EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv                  2864	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EC_GFp_nistp224_method                  2865	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC,EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128
+BN_swap                                 2866	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_ECParameters                        2867	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+X509_NAME_add_entry_by_OBJ              2868	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_TST_INFO_get_ext_count               2869	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+i2d_OCSP_CERTID                         2870	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+BN_CTX_start                            2871	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_print                                2872	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EC_KEY_set_flags                        2873	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+EVP_PKEY_get0                           2874	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ENGINE_set_default                      2875	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+NCONF_get_number_e                      2876	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OPENSSL_cleanse                         2877	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SCT_set0_signature                      2878	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CT
+X509_CRL_sign                           2879	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_CINF_it                            2880	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+X509_CINF_it                            2880	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+TS_CONF_set_accuracy                    2881	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+DES_crypt                               2882	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DES
+BN_BLINDING_create_param                2883	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_SERVICELOC_free                    2884	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+DIST_POINT_NAME_free                    2885	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_listen                              2886	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SOCK
+BIO_ADDR_path_string                    2887	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SOCK
+POLICY_CONSTRAINTS_it                   2888	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+POLICY_CONSTRAINTS_it                   2888	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+NCONF_free_data                         2889	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_asn1_set_prefix                     2890	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PEM_SignUpdate                          2891	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PEM_write_bio_EC_PUBKEY                 2892	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+CMS_add_simple_smimecap                 2893	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+IPAddressChoice_free                    2894	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779
+d2i_X509_AUX                            2895	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_get_default_cert_area              2896	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ERR_load_DSO_strings                    2897	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASIdentifiers_it                        2898	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:RFC3779
+ASIdentifiers_it                        2898	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:RFC3779
+BN_mod_lshift                           2899	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ENGINE_get_last                         2900	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init                   2901	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_RSAPrivateKey_fp                    2902	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA,STDIO
+X509_REQ_print                          2903	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+RSA_size                                2904	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst               2905	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+DH_set_default_method                   2906	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DH
+X509_ALGOR_new                          2907	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_aes_192_ofb                         2908	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_des_ede3_cfb1                       2909	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DES
+TS_REQ_to_TS_VERIFY_CTX                 2910	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+d2i_PBEPARAM                            2911	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_get0_nist_prime_521                  2912	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_ONEREQ_get_ext_by_NID              2913	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+X509_PUBKEY_get0                        2914	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx          2915	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EC_GROUP_set_seed                       2916	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+X509_STORE_CTX_free                     2917	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+AUTHORITY_KEYID_it                      2918	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+AUTHORITY_KEYID_it                      2918	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+X509V3_get_value_int                    2919	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_UTCTIME_set_string                 2920	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+RC5_32_decrypt                          2921	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RC5
+i2d_X509_REQ_INFO                       2922	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_des_cfb1                            2923	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DES
+OBJ_NAME_cleanup                        2924	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_BASICRESP_get1_ext_d2i             2925	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+DES_cfb64_encrypt                       2926	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DES
+CAST_cfb64_encrypt                      2927	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CAST
+EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_param                 2928	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_RECP_CTX_free                        2929	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_with_flags                           2930	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+DSO_ctrl                                2931	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_MD_meth_get_final                   2932	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_TYPE_get_octetstring               2933	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ENGINE_by_id                            2934	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+d2i_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO                   2935	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_aes_192_cbc                         2936	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS8_pkey_set0                         2937	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_get1_email                         2938	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EC_POINT_point2oct                      2939	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+EC_GROUP_get_curve_GFp                  2940	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+ASYNC_block_pause                       2941	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_SINGLERESP_get_ext                 2942	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+CRYPTO_strdup                           2943	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_X509_CRL_bio                        2945	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_item                  2946	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CRYPTO_ccm128_encrypt                   2947	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509v3_addr_get_afi                     2948	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779
+X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param               2949	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_add_alg_module                      2950	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_check_purpose                      2951	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_REQUEST_delete_ext                 2952	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+X509_PURPOSE_get_count                  2953	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_PKCS12_bio                          2954	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_item_free                          2955	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS7_content_new                       2956	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_keyid_get0                         2957	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+COMP_get_name                           2958	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:COMP
+EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m                 2959	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC,EC2M
+X509_SIG_free                           2960	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PEM_ASN1_write                          2961	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO
+ENGINE_get_digest_engine                2962	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+BN_CTX_new                              2963	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EC_curve_nid2nist                       2964	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+ENGINE_get_finish_function              2965	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+EC_POINT_add                            2966	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+EC_KEY_oct2key                          2967	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+SHA384_Init                             2968	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING_new                2969	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_print_private                  2970	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_INTEGER_new                        2971	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+NAME_CONSTRAINTS_it                     2972	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+NAME_CONSTRAINTS_it                     2972	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+TS_REQ_get_cert_req                     2973	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+BIO_pop                                 2974	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SHA256_Final                            2975	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_set1_DH                        2976	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DH
+DH_get_ex_data                          2977	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DH
+CRYPTO_secure_malloc                    2978	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_RESP_get_status_info                 2979	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+HMAC_CTX_new                            2980	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ENGINE_get_default_DH                   2981	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+ECDSA_do_verify                         2982	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+DSO_flags                               2983	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+RAND_add                                2984	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_CIPHER_do_all_sorted                2985	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS7_encrypt                           2986	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_DSA_SIG                             2987	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+CMS_set_detached                        2988	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+X509_REQ_get_attr_by_OBJ                2989	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_ASRange                             2990	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779
+EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag                  2991	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+EVP_PKEY_new                            2992	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_POLICYINFO                          2993	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_get_flags                            2994	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SHA384                                  2995	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+NCONF_get_string                        2996	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION           2997	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EC_POINT_point2buf                      2998	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1         2999	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+COMP_CTX_get_type                       3000	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:COMP
+TS_RESP_CTX_set_status_info             3001	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+BIO_f_nbio_test                         3002	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SEED_ofb128_encrypt                     3003	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SEED
+d2i_RSAPrivateKey_bio                   3004	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+DH_KDF_X9_42                            3005	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS,DH
+EVP_PKEY_meth_set_signctx               3006	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_CRL_get_version                    3007	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_meth_get0_info                 3008	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PEM_read_bio_RSAPublicKey               3009	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_private               3010	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA                       3011	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+DES_ede3_cfb64_encrypt                  3012	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DES
+POLICY_MAPPING_free                     3014	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_aes_128_gcm                         3015	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_dgram_non_fatal_error               3016	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DGRAM
+OCSP_request_is_signed                  3017	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+i2d_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS                   3018	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EC_KEY_get_method                       3019	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+EC_POINT_bn2point                       3021	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+PBE2PARAM_it                            3022	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+PBE2PARAM_it                            3022	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+BN_rand                                 3023	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_TYPE_unpack_sequence               3024	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_CRL_sign_ctx                       3025	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_STORE_add_crl                      3026	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PEM_write_RSAPrivateKey                 3027	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA,STDIO
+RC4_set_key                             3028	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RC4
+EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher                   3029	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PEM_write_bio_PKCS8PrivateKey_nid       3030	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_MONT_CTX_new                         3031	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CRYPTO_free_ex_index                    3032	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_new                      3033	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS7_it                                3034	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+PKCS7_it                                3034	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+CMS_unsigned_get_attr_by_OBJ            3035	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+BN_clear                                3036	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_socket_ioctl                        3037	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SOCK
+GENERAL_NAME_cmp                        3038	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose              3039	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_REVOKED_get_ext_d2i                3040	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509V3_set_conf_lhash                   3041	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT_it                    3042	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT_it                    3042	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+PKCS12_item_pack_safebag                3043	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_OCSP_RESPDATA                       3044	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+i2d_X509_PUBKEY                         3045	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_DecryptUpdate                       3046	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CAST_cbc_encrypt                        3047	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CAST
+BN_BLINDING_invert                      3048	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SHA512_Update                           3049	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL_new                   3050	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get0_pkcs8               3051	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_get_ext_by_NID                     3052	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_IPAddressFamily                     3053	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779
+X509_check_private_key                  3054	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+GENERAL_NAME_get0_value                 3055	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_check_akid                         3056	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS12_key_gen_asc                      3057	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_bf_ofb                              3058	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:BF
+AUTHORITY_KEYID_free                    3059	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_seed_ofb                            3060	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SEED
+OBJ_NAME_get                            3061	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_UTCTIME_set                        3062	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_NAME_ENTRY_set_data                3063	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_PCTX_set_str_flags                 3064	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2a_ASN1_INTEGER                        3065	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_TS_RESP                             3066	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+EVP_des_ede_cfb64                       3067	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DES
+d2i_RSAPrivateKey                       3068	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+ERR_load_BN_strings                     3069	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BF_encrypt                              3070	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:BF
+MD5                                     3071	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:MD5
+BN_GF2m_arr2poly                        3072	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC2M
+EVP_PKEY_meth_get_ctrl                  3073	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_X509_REQ_bio                        3074	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_name             3075	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_RSAPublicKey_bio                    3076	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+X509_REQ_get_X509_PUBKEY                3077	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ENGINE_load_private_key                 3078	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+GENERAL_NAMES_new                       3079	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_POLICYQUALINFO                      3080	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EC_GF2m_simple_method                   3081	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC,EC2M
+RSA_get_method                          3082	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+d2i_ASRange                             3083	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779
+CMS_ContentInfo_new                     3084	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+OPENSSL_init_crypto                     3085	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_TRUST_set                          3086	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_camellia_192_ecb                    3087	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CAMELLIA
+d2i_X509_REVOKED                        3088	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_IPAddressOrRange                    3089	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779
+TS_TST_INFO_set_version                 3090	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+PKCS12_get0_mac                         3091	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_EncodeInit                          3092	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_get0_trust_objects                 3093	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_ECPrivateKey_bio                    3094	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+BIO_s_secmem                            3095	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ENGINE_get_default_EC                   3096	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+TS_RESP_create_response                 3097	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+BIO_ADDR_rawaddress                     3098	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SOCK
+PKCS7_ENCRYPT_new                       3099	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_PKCS8PrivateKey_fp                  3100	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO
+SRP_user_pwd_free                       3101	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SRP
+Camellia_encrypt                        3102	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CAMELLIA
+BIO_ADDR_hostname_string                3103	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SOCK
+USERNOTICE_new                          3104	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+POLICY_MAPPING_new                      3105	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CRYPTO_gcm128_release                   3106	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_new                                 3107	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_GENERAL_NAMES                       3108	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_new                   3109	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PEM_read_DSA_PUBKEY                     3110	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA,STDIO
+X509_get0_subject_key_id                3111	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2s_ASN1_ENUMERATED                     3112	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509v3_get_ext_by_OBJ                   3113	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_REQUEST_free                       3114	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+CRYPTO_ocb128_aad                       3115	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCB
+OPENSSL_sk_deep_copy                    3116	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_RSA_PSS_PARAMS                      3117	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+EVP_aes_128_wrap_pad                    3118	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_BIT_STRING_set                     3119	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC_SHA1                  3120	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2          3121	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+EVP_des_ede3_ecb                        3122	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DES
+CBIGNUM_it                              3123	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+CBIGNUM_it                              3123	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+BIO_new_NDEF                            3124	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_aes_256_wrap                        3125	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_STRING_print                       3126	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free                 3127	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_ACCURACY_get_seconds                 3128	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+BN_options                              3129	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_debug_callback                      3130	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_MD_meth_get_update                  3131	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+GENERAL_NAME_set0_othername             3132	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_BIT_STRING_set_bit                 3133	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_aes_256_ccm                         3134	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey                  3135	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CONF_load_fp                            3136	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO
+BN_to_ASN1_ENUMERATED                   3137	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_ISSUING_DIST_POINT                  3138	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TXT_DB_free                             3139	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_STRING_set                         3140	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_ESS_CERT_ID                         3141	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+EVP_PKEY_meth_set_derive                3142	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OPENSSL_LH_stats                        3143	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO
+NCONF_dump_fp                           3144	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO
+TS_STATUS_INFO_print_bio                3145	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+OPENSSL_sk_dup                          3146	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BF_cfb64_encrypt                        3147	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:BF
+ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj                3148	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ECDSA_verify                            3149	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+EVP_camellia_256_cfb128                 3150	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CAMELLIA
+CMAC_Init                               3151	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMAC
+OCSP_basic_add1_status                  3152	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+X509_CRL_get0_by_cert                   3153	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_TST_INFO_set_tsa                     3154	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+i2d_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME                3155	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer                3156	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509V3_EXT_CRL_add_conf                 3157	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CRYPTO_ccm128_init                      3158	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time              3159	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_reciprocal                           3160	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_PKCS7_SIGN_ENVELOPE                 3161	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_NAME_digest                        3162	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_OCSP_SERVICELOC                     3163	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+GENERAL_NAME_print                      3164	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CMS_ReceiptRequest_get0_values          3165	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+a2i_ASN1_INTEGER                        3166	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_sendreq_bio                        3167	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+PKCS12_SAFEBAG_create_crl               3168	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_X509_NAME                           3169	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+IDEA_cfb64_encrypt                      3170	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:IDEA
+BN_mod_sub                              3171	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_NULL_new                           3172	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+HMAC_Init                               3173	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0
+EVP_MD_CTX_update_fn                    3174	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_aes_128_ecb                         3175	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_PKCS7_bio_stream                    3176	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2a_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION                  3178	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EC_KEY_set_enc_flags                    3179	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+i2d_PUBKEY_fp                           3180	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO
+b2i_PrivateKey_bio                      3181	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+OCSP_REQUEST_add_ext                    3182	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+SXNET_add_id_INTEGER                    3183	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CTLOG_get0_public_key                   3184	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CT
+OCSP_REQUEST_get_ext_by_OBJ             3185	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+X509_NAME_oneline                       3186	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509V3_set_nconf                        3187	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+RSAPrivateKey_dup                       3188	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+BN_mod_add                              3189	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp     3190	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+X509_get_default_cert_file              3191	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+UI_method_set_flusher                   3192	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:UI
+RSA_new_method                          3193	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+OCSP_request_verify                     3194	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+CRYPTO_THREAD_run_once                  3195	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_REQ_print_bio                        3196	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+SCT_get_version                         3197	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CT
+IDEA_set_encrypt_key                    3198	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:IDEA
+ENGINE_get_DH                           3199	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+i2d_ASIdentifierChoice                  3200	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779
+SRP_Calc_A                              3201	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SRP
+OCSP_BASICRESP_add_ext                  3202	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+EVP_idea_cfb64                          3203	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:IDEA
+PKCS12_newpass                          3204	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha256             3205	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_ACCURACY_get_millis                  3206	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+X509_CRL_get_REVOKED                    3207	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_issuer_name_hash_old               3208	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:MD5
+i2d_PKCS12_SAFEBAG                      3209	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_rand_range                           3210	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SMIME_write_ASN1                        3211	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new                      3212	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+MD4_Final                               3213	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:MD4
+EVP_PKEY_id                             3214	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CMS_RecipientInfo_get0_pkey_ctx         3215	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+OCSP_REQINFO_free                       3216	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+AUTHORITY_KEYID_new                     3217	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_DIST_POINT_NAME                     3218	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OpenSSL_version_num                     3219	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_CERTID_free                        3220	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+BIO_hex_string                          3221	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_REQ_sign_ctx                       3222	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CRYPTO_ocb128_init                      3223	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCB
+EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY                    3224	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING_free               3225	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_get_retry_reason                    3226	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_NAME_print                         3227	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_free                 3228	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_nist_mod_384                         3229	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_EC_PUBKEY_fp                        3230	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC,STDIO
+ENGINE_set_default_pkey_meths           3231	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+DH_bits                                 3232	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DH
+i2d_X509_ALGORS                         3233	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_camellia_192_cfb1                   3234	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CAMELLIA
+TS_RESP_CTX_add_failure_info            3235	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+EVP_PBE_alg_add                         3236	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ESS_CERT_ID_dup                         3237	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+CMS_SignerInfo_get0_signature           3238	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+EVP_PKEY_verify_recover                 3239	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_PUBKEY                              3240	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ERR_load_EVP_strings                    3241	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_ATTRIBUTE_set1_data                3242	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_X509_fp                             3243	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO
+MD2_Init                                3244	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:MD2
+ERR_get_error_line                      3245	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID                 3246	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OPENSSL_INIT_free                       3247	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PBE2PARAM_free                          3248	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_aes_192_ecb                         3249	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new                   3250	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CMS_set1_eContentType                   3251	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+EVP_des_ede3_wrap                       3252	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DES
+GENERAL_SUBTREE_it                      3253	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+GENERAL_SUBTREE_it                      3253	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+EVP_read_pw_string_min                  3254	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:UI
+X509_set1_notBefore                     3255	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+MD4                                     3256	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:MD4
+EVP_PKEY_CTX_dup                        3257	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ENGINE_setup_bsd_cryptodev              3258	1_1_0	EXIST:__FreeBSD__:FUNCTION:DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0,ENGINE
+PEM_read_bio_DHparams                   3259	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DH
+CMS_SharedInfo_encode                   3260	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+ASN1_OBJECT_create                      3261	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_ECParameters                        3262	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+BN_GF2m_mod_arr                         3263	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC2M
+ENGINE_set_finish_function              3264	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING                   3265	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ENGINE_set_load_pubkey_function         3266	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+BIO_vprintf                             3267	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CMS_RecipientInfo_decrypt               3268	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+RSA_generate_key                        3269	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DEPRECATEDIN_0_9_8,RSA
+PKCS7_set0_type_other                   3270	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_REQUEST_new                        3271	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+BIO_lookup                              3272	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SOCK
+EC_GROUP_get0_cofactor                  3273	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+SCT_print                               3275	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CT
+X509_PUBKEY_set                         3276	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+POLICY_CONSTRAINTS_free                 3277	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_aes_256_cfb8                        3278	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_DSA_PUBKEY_bio                      3279	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+X509_NAME_get_text_by_OBJ               3280	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+RSA_padding_check_none                  3281	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+CRYPTO_set_mem_debug                    3282	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_VERIFY_CTX_init                      3283	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+OCSP_cert_id_new                        3284	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+GENERAL_SUBTREE_new                     3285	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OPENSSL_sk_push                         3286	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_LOOKUP_ctrl                        3287	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SRP_check_known_gN_param                3288	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SRP
+d2i_DIST_POINT                          3289	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_CTX_free                       3290	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PBEPARAM_free                           3291	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+NETSCAPE_SPKI_set_pubkey                3292	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_sha512                              3293	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_CRL_match                          3294	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2s_ASN1_IA5STRING                      3295	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EC_KEY_get_default_method               3296	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+PKCS8_decrypt                           3297	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data                   3298	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+POLICYQUALINFO_it                       3299	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+POLICYQUALINFO_it                       3299	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL_free            3300	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+DSA_SIG_free                            3301	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+BIO_asn1_set_suffix                     3302	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_set_type_str                   3303	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_X509_SIG                            3304	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OPENSSL_LH_strhash                      3305	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust                3306	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_ACCURACY_set_micros                  3307	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+EVP_DigestFinal_ex                      3308	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_get0_pubkey                        3309	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_check_ip                           3310	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS7_get_signed_attribute              3311	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_free               3312	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+COMP_compress_block                     3313	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:COMP
+ASN1_STRING_dup                         3314	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_LOOKUP_free                        3315	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EC_GROUP_cmp                            3316	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+TS_TST_INFO_get_ext_by_critical         3317	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+ECParameters_print_fp                   3318	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC,STDIO
+X509_REQ_sign                           3319	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CRYPTO_xts128_encrypt                   3320	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PEM_def_callback                        3321	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS12_add_friendlyname_uni             3322	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_policy_tree_level_count            3323	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OBJ_sn2nid                              3324	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CTLOG_free                              3325	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CT
+EVP_CIPHER_meth_dup                     3326	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CMS_get1_crls                           3327	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+X509_aux_print                          3328	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OPENSSL_thread_stop                     3330	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_policy_node_get0_parent            3331	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_PKEY_free                          3332	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_CRLID_new                          3333	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+CONF_dump_bio                           3334	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_PKCS8PrivateKey_fp                  3335	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO
+RSA_setup_blinding                      3336	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+ERR_peek_error_line                     3337	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_PKCS7                               3338	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ERR_reason_error_string                 3339	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ERR_remove_thread_state                 3340	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0
+PEM_write_PrivateKey                    3341	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO
+EVP_PKEY_CTX_str2ctrl                   3342	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CMS_SignerInfo_verify_content           3343	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+ASN1_INTEGER_get_int64                  3344	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_item_sign                          3345	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_SERVICELOC_new                     3346	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+ASN1_VISIBLESTRING_new                  3347	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_set_flags                            3348	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_PrivateKey_bio                      3349	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_SEQUENCE_ANY_it                    3350	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+ASN1_SEQUENCE_ANY_it                    3350	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+ASN1_UTCTIME_adj                        3351	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_mod_sqrt                             3352	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OPENSSL_sk_is_sorted                    3353	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_SIGNATURE_new                      3354	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+EVP_PKEY_meth_get_paramgen              3355	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_ATTRIBUTE_create_by_OBJ            3356	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+RSA_generate_key_ex                     3357	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+CMS_SignerInfo_get0_algs                3358	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+DIST_POINT_free                         3359	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ESS_SIGNING_CERT_free                   3360	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+SCT_new_from_base64                     3361	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CT
+OpenSSL_version                         3362	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_SINGLERESP_get_ext_by_OBJ          3363	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+ECDSA_SIG_get0                          3364	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+BN_set_word                             3365	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ENGINE_set_flags                        3366	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+DSA_OpenSSL                             3367	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_alg         3368	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+PKCS7_ENVELOPE_new                      3369	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EDIPARTYNAME_new                        3370	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CMS_add1_cert                           3371	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+DSO_convert_filename                    3372	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+RSA_padding_check_SSLv23                3373	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+CRYPTO_gcm128_finish                    3374	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS12_SAFEBAGS_it                      3375	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+PKCS12_SAFEBAGS_it                      3375	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+PKCS12_PBE_add                          3376	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EC_KEY_set_public_key_affine_coordinates 3377	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+EVP_EncryptInit_ex                      3378	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ENGINE_add                              3379	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+OPENSSL_LH_error                        3380	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS7_DIGEST_it                         3381	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+PKCS7_DIGEST_it                         3381	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+X509_CINF_new                           3382	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_keygen_init                    3383	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_aes_192_ocb                         3384	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCB
+EVP_camellia_256_cfb1                   3385	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CAMELLIA
+CRYPTO_secure_actual_size               3387	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+COMP_CTX_free                           3388	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:COMP
+i2d_PBE2PARAM                           3389	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EC_POINT_make_affine                    3390	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+DSA_generate_parameters                 3391	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DEPRECATEDIN_0_9_8,DSA
+ASN1_BIT_STRING_num_asc                 3392	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_INFO_free                          3394	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_fp              3395	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO
+X509_OBJECT_retrieve_match              3396	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_aes_128_ctr                         3397	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PBE_find                            3398	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SHA512_Transform                        3399	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ERR_add_error_vdata                     3400	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_REQUEST_get_ext                    3401	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+NETSCAPE_SPKAC_new                      3402	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_meth_get_verify                3403	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CRYPTO_128_wrap                         3404	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_STORE_set_lookup_crls              3405	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_ctrl                3406	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_REQ_CTX_set1_req                   3407	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+CONF_imodule_get_usr_data               3408	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CRYPTO_new_ex_data                      3409	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PEM_read_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO            3410	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO
+TS_VERIFY_CTX_new                       3411	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+BUF_MEM_new_ex                          3412	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+RSA_padding_add_X931                    3413	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+BN_get0_nist_prime_256                  3414	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CRYPTO_memcmp                           3415	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+DH_check_pub_key                        3416	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DH
+ASN1_mbstring_copy                      3417	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS7_set_type                          3418	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_gets                                3419	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1          3420	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+UI_ctrl                                 3421	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:UI
+i2d_X509_REQ_fp                         3422	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO
+BN_BLINDING_convert_ex                  3423	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print              3424	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_s_null                              3425	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PEM_ASN1_read                           3426	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO
+SCT_get_log_entry_type                  3427	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CT
+EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_init                3428	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_ALGOR_free                         3429	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_SINGLERESP_get_ext_count           3430	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+EC_POINT_free                           3431	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+EVP_OpenFinal                           3432	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+RAND_egd_bytes                          3433	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EGD
+UI_method_get_writer                    3434	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:UI
+BN_secure_new                           3435	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SHA1_Update                             3437	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_s_connect                           3438	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SOCK
+EVP_MD_meth_get_init                    3439	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_BIT_STRING_free                    3440	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION           3441	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_IA5STRING_new                      3442	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_CRL_up_ref                         3443	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_EncodeFinal                         3444	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_set_ex_data                        3445	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ERR_get_next_error_library              3446	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_RESPONSE_print                     3447	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+BN_get_rfc3526_prime_2048               3448	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_new_bio_pair                        3449	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EC_GFp_nistp256_method                  3450	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC,EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128
+BIO_method_type                         3451	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ECPKParameters_print                    3452	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+EVP_rc4                                 3453	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RC4
+CMS_data_create                         3454	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+EC_POINT_point2bn                       3455	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+CMS_unsigned_get0_data_by_OBJ           3456	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp                   3457	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_NAME_print_ex                      3458	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_parse                              3459	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EC_KEY_priv2oct                         3460	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+PKCS7_simple_smimecap                   3461	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_TYPE_set_int_octetstring           3462	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_number_written                      3463	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_TST_INFO_set_msg_imprint             3464	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+CRYPTO_get_ex_data                      3465	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_PURPOSE_get0_sname                 3466	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS                    3467	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+HMAC_CTX_reset                          3468	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_meth_set_init                  3469	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_REQ_extension_nid                  3470	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ENGINE_up_ref                           3471	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+BN_BLINDING_invert_ex                   3472	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+RIPEMD160_Init                          3473	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RMD160
+ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_changed_fds          3474	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_save_parameters                3475	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SCT_set_source                          3476	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CT
+DES_set_odd_parity                      3477	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DES
+CMAC_CTX_free                           3478	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMAC
+d2i_ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL                   3479	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+HMAC_CTX_set_flags                      3480	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_PKCS8_bio                           3481	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_ONEREQ_get_ext_count               3482	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+PEM_read_bio_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO        3483	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_OCSP_BASICRESP                      3484	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+CMAC_Final                              3485	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMAC
+X509V3_EXT_add_alias                    3486	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_get_params                           3487	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DEPRECATEDIN_0_9_8
+PKCS5_pbkdf2_set                        3488	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_PKCS8PrivateKey_bio                 3489	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_ENUMERATED_new                     3490	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ENGINE_register_digests                 3491	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID               3492	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SMIME_read_ASN1                         3493	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_REQ_set_subject_name               3494	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_sub_word                             3495	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+DSO_load                                3496	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_mod_exp                              3497	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_get_signature_type                 3498	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_ptr_ctrl                            3499	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_rc4_hmac_md5                        3500	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:MD5,RC4
+OPENSSL_strlcat                         3501	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new                   3502	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_ADDR_rawport                        3503	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SOCK
+BUF_MEM_grow_clean                      3504	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_NAME_print_ex_fp                   3505	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO
+X509_check_host                         3506	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PEM_read_ECPKParameters                 3507	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC,STDIO
+X509_ATTRIBUTE_get0_data                3508	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CMS_add1_signer                         3509	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+BN_pseudo_rand                          3510	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_DIRECTORYSTRING                     3511	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_ASN1_PRINTABLE                      3512	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_add1_attr_by_NID               3513	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_bio             3514	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID              3515	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ENGINE_get_first                        3516	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+CERTIFICATEPOLICIES_it                  3517	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+CERTIFICATEPOLICIES_it                  3517	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl                         3518	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS7_final                             3519	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_size                           3520	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_DecryptFinal_ex                     3521	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SCT_get_signature_nid                   3522	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CT
+PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION_new           3523	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_bf_cbc                              3524	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:BF
+DSA_do_verify                           3525	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+EC_GROUP_get_seed_len                   3526	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m    3527	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC,EC2M
+TS_REQ_set_policy_id                    3528	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+BIO_callback_ctrl                       3529	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+v2i_GENERAL_NAME                        3530	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ERR_print_errors_cb                     3531	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ENGINE_set_default_string               3532	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+BIO_number_read                         3533	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CRYPTO_zalloc                           3534	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters                 3535	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id                     3537	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TLS_FEATURE_free                        3538	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS                   3539	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_CERT_AUX_new                       3540	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ENGINE_register_pkey_asn1_meths         3541	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+CRYPTO_ocb128_tag                       3542	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCB
+ERR_load_OBJ_strings                    3544	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_ctrl_get_read_request               3545	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_from_montgomery                      3546	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+DSO_new                                 3547	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+AES_ecb_encrypt                         3548	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_dec2bn                               3549	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CMS_decrypt                             3550	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+BN_mpi2bn                               3551	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_aes_128_cfb128                      3552	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+RC5_32_ecb_encrypt                      3554	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RC5
+EVP_CIPHER_meth_new                     3555	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_RSA_OAEP_PARAMS                     3556	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+SXNET_get_id_ulong                      3557	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_get_callback_arg                    3558	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ENGINE_register_RSA                     3559	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+i2v_GENERAL_NAMES                       3560	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS7_decrypt                           3562	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_STORE_set1_param                   3563	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+RAND_file_name                          3564	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_CipherInit_ex                       3566	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_dgram_sctp_notification_cb          3567	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DGRAM,SCTP
+ERR_load_RAND_strings                   3568	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_ATTRIBUTE_it                       3569	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+X509_ATTRIBUTE_it                       3569	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+X509_ALGOR_it                           3570	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+X509_ALGOR_it                           3570	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+OCSP_CRLID_free                         3571	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+CRYPTO_ccm128_aad                       3572	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+IPAddressFamily_new                     3573	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779
+d2i_TS_ACCURACY                         3574	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+X509_load_crl_file                      3575	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SXNET_add_id_ulong                      3576	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_camellia_256_cbc                    3577	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CAMELLIA
+i2d_PROXY_POLICY                        3578	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_subject_name_hash_old              3579	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:MD5
+PEM_read_bio_DSA_PUBKEY                 3580	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+OCSP_cert_to_id                         3581	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+PEM_write_DSAparams                     3582	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA,STDIO
+ASN1_TIME_to_generalizedtime            3583	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_CRL_get_ext_by_critical            3584	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_STRING_type                        3585	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_REQ_add1_attr_by_txt               3586	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PEM_write_RSAPublicKey                  3587	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA,STDIO
+EVP_MD_meth_dup                         3588	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ENGINE_unregister_ciphers               3589	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp              3590	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_response_create                    3591	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+SHA224                                  3592	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+MD2_options                             3593	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:MD2
+X509_REQ_it                             3595	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+X509_REQ_it                             3595	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+RAND_bytes                              3596	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS7_free                              3597	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_txt           3598	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+DES_cbc_cksum                           3599	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DES
+UI_free                                 3600	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:UI
+BN_is_prime                             3601	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DEPRECATEDIN_0_9_8
+CMS_get0_signers                        3602	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+i2d_PrivateKey_fp                       3603	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO
+OTHERNAME_cmp                           3604	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SMIME_write_PKCS7                       3605	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EC_KEY_set_public_key                   3606	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+d2i_X509_EXTENSION                      3607	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CMS_add1_recipient_cert                 3608	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+CMS_RecipientInfo_kekri_get0_id         3609	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+BN_mod_word                             3610	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_PCTX_new                           3611	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_is_prime_ex                          3612	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS5_v2_PBE_keyivgen                   3613	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt                   3614	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CMS_unsigned_add1_attr_by_OBJ           3615	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+PEM_write_EC_PUBKEY                     3616	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC,STDIO
+X509v3_asid_add_inherit                 3617	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779
+ERR_get_error                           3618	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_CONF_set_signer_digest               3619	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+OBJ_new_nid                             3620	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CMS_ReceiptRequest_new                  3621	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user                  3622	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SRP
+UI_method_get_closer                    3623	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:UI
+ENGINE_get_ex_data                      3624	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+BN_print_fp                             3625	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO
+MD2_Update                              3626	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:MD2
+ENGINE_free                             3628	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+d2i_X509_ATTRIBUTE                      3629	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_RESP_free                            3630	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+PKCS5_pbe_set                           3631	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_RESP_CTX_free                        3632	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+d2i_PUBKEY                              3633	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASYNC_cleanup_thread                    3634	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SHA384_Update                           3635	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CRYPTO_cfb128_1_encrypt                 3636	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_set_cipher                          3637	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PEM_read_PUBKEY                         3638	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO
+RSA_PKCS1_OpenSSL                       3639	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS_free              3640	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SCT_get0_signature                      3641	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CT
+DISPLAYTEXT_it                          3643	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+DISPLAYTEXT_it                          3643	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+OPENSSL_gmtime_adj                      3644	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_INTEGER_dup                        3645	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+DSA_print                               3646	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+X509_REQ_set_extension_nids             3647	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_free                               3648	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ERR_load_ERR_strings                    3649	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_const_check_infinite_end           3650	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+RSA_null_method                         3651	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+TS_REQ_ext_free                         3652	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+EVP_PKEY_meth_get_encrypt               3653	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+Camellia_ecb_encrypt                    3654	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CAMELLIA
+ENGINE_set_default_RSA                  3655	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+EVP_EncodeBlock                         3656	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SXNETID_free                            3657	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SHA1_Init                               3658	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CRYPTO_atomic_add                       3659	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_CONF_load_certs                      3660	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+PEM_write_bio_DSAPrivateKey             3661	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+CMS_encrypt                             3662	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+CRYPTO_nistcts128_decrypt               3663	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ERR_load_DH_strings                     3664	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DH
+EVP_MD_block_size                       3665	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_X509_ALGOR_print_bio                 3666	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+d2i_PKCS7_ENVELOPE                      3667	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ESS_CERT_ID_new                         3669	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+EC_POINT_invert                         3670	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+CAST_set_key                            3671	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CAST
+ENGINE_get_pkey_meth                    3672	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+BIO_ADDRINFO_free                       3673	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SOCK
+DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt                    3674	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DES
+X509v3_asid_canonize                    3675	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779
+i2d_ASIdOrRange                         3676	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779
+OCSP_url_svcloc_new                     3677	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+CRYPTO_mem_ctrl                         3678	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_verify                             3679	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+DSA_generate_parameters_ex              3680	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+X509_sign                               3681	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SHA256_Transform                        3682	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_ADDR_free                           3683	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SOCK
+ASN1_STRING_free                        3684	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit               3685	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EC_GROUP_get_curve_name                 3686	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+RSA_print                               3687	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+i2d_ASN1_BMPSTRING                      3688	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_decrypt_old                    3689	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_UTCTIME_cmp_time_t                 3690	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip               3691	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OTHERNAME_free                          3692	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_REVOKEDINFO_free                   3693	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting               3694	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EC_KEY_can_sign                         3695	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+PEM_write_bio_RSAPublicKey              3696	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+X509_CRL_set1_lastUpdate                3697	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_sendreq_nbio                       3698	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+PKCS8_encrypt                           3699	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_PKCS7_fp                            3700	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO
+i2d_X509_REQ                            3701	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_CRLID_it                           3702	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:OCSP
+OCSP_CRLID_it                           3702	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:OCSP
+PEM_ASN1_write_bio                      3703	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_get0_reject_objects                3704	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_set_tcp_ndelay                      3705	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SOCK
+CMS_add0_CertificateChoices             3706	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+POLICYINFO_new                          3707	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_CRL_get0_by_serial                 3708	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS12_add_friendlyname_asc             3709	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain               3710	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_mbstring_ncopy                     3711	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_it                     3712	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_it                     3712	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+ENGINE_register_all_digests             3713	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+X509_REQ_get_version                    3714	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_ASN1_UTCTIME                        3715	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_STATUS_INFO_new                      3716	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+UI_set_ex_data                          3717	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:UI
+ASN1_TIME_set                           3718	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_RESP_verify_response                 3719	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+X509_REVOKED_get0_serialNumber          3720	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free                  3721	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_TYPE_new                           3722	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CMAC_CTX_cleanup                        3723	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMAC
+i2d_PKCS7_NDEF                          3724	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OPENSSL_sk_pop_free                     3725	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree         3726	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+DES_set_key_checked                     3727	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DES
+EVP_PKEY_meth_free                      3728	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_sha224                              3729	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ENGINE_set_id                           3730	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+d2i_ECPrivateKey                        3731	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+CMS_signed_add1_attr_by_NID             3732	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+i2d_DSAPrivateKey_fp                    3733	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA,STDIO
+EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_set_asn1_params     3734	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data              3735	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_set0_pkey        3736	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+X509v3_addr_add_inherit                 3737	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779
+SRP_Calc_u                              3738	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SRP
+i2d_PKCS8PrivateKey_bio                 3739	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_get_extension_flags                3740	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509V3_EXT_val_prn                      3741	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SCT_get_validation_status               3742	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CT
+NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE_free             3743	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PBE_scrypt                          3744	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SCRYPT
+d2i_TS_REQ_bio                          3745	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+ENGINE_set_default_ciphers              3746	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+X509_get_signature_nid                  3747	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+DES_fcrypt                              3748	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DES
+PEM_write_bio_X509_REQ                  3749	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_meth_get_sign                  3750	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_REQ_get_nonce                        3751	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+ENGINE_unregister_EC                    3752	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+X509v3_get_ext_count                    3753	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+UI_OpenSSL                              3754	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:UI
+CRYPTO_ccm128_decrypt                   3755	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_OCSP_RESPDATA                       3756	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+BIO_set_callback                        3757	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_GF2m_poly2arr                        3758	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC2M
+CMS_unsigned_get_attr_count             3759	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+EVP_aes_256_gcm                         3760	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+RSA_padding_check_X931                  3761	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+ECDH_compute_key                        3762	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+ASN1_TIME_print                         3763	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_peerkey               3764	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_mod_lshift1                          3765	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_ADDRINFO_family                     3766	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SOCK
+PEM_write_DHxparams                     3767	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DH,STDIO
+BN_mod_exp2_mont                        3768	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_PRINTABLE_free                     3769	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS7_ATTR_SIGN_it                      3771	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+PKCS7_ATTR_SIGN_it                      3771	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+EVP_MD_CTX_copy                         3772	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ENGINE_set_ctrl_function                3773	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+OCSP_id_get0_info                       3774	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+BIO_ADDRINFO_next                       3775	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SOCK
+OCSP_RESPBYTES_free                     3776	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+EC_KEY_METHOD_set_init                  3777	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+EVP_PKEY_asn1_copy                      3778	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+RSA_PSS_PARAMS_it                       3779	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:RSA
+RSA_PSS_PARAMS_it                       3779	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:RSA
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth          3780	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set_string         3781	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp                  3782	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+UI_new_method                           3783	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:UI
+Camellia_ofb128_encrypt                 3784	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CAMELLIA
+X509_new                                3785	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EC_KEY_get_conv_form                    3786	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+CTLOG_STORE_get0_log_by_id              3787	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CT
+CMS_signed_add1_attr                    3788	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_iv_length           3789	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509v3_asid_validate_path               3790	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779
+CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_password         3791	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+TS_CONF_load_cert                       3792	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+i2d_ECPKParameters                      3793	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+X509_TRUST_get0                         3794	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CMS_get0_RecipientInfos                 3795	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+EVP_PKEY_CTX_new                        3796	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_DSA_PUBKEY_bio                      3797	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+X509_REQ_get_subject_name               3798	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_div_word                             3799	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_CONF_set_signer_key                  3800	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt                        3801	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC2M
+EVP_CIPHER_nid                          3802	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OBJ_txt2obj                             3803	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_orig_id     3804	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+EVP_bf_ecb                              3805	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:BF
+v2i_GENERAL_NAME_ex                     3806	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CMS_signed_delete_attr                  3807	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+ASN1_TYPE_pack_sequence                 3808	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+USERNOTICE_it                           3809	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+USERNOTICE_it                           3809	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+PKEY_USAGE_PERIOD_it                    3810	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+PKEY_USAGE_PERIOD_it                    3810	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+BN_mul_word                             3811	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_IPAddressRange                      3813	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779
+CMS_unsigned_add1_attr_by_txt           3814	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+d2i_RSA_PUBKEY                          3815	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+PKCS12_gen_mac                          3816	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ERR_load_ENGINE_strings                 3817	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+ERR_load_CT_strings                     3818	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CT
+OCSP_ONEREQ_it                          3819	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:OCSP
+OCSP_ONEREQ_it                          3819	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:OCSP
+X509_PURPOSE_get_by_sname               3820	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_PURPOSE_set                        3821	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_mod_inverse                          3822	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_STRING_TABLE_get                   3823	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_bn2binpad                            3824	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_supported_extension                3825	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ECDSA_sign_setup                        3826	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+EVP_camellia_192_cfb128                 3827	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CAMELLIA
+d2i_AUTHORITY_KEYID                     3828	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+RIPEMD160_Transform                     3829	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RMD160
+DES_random_key                          3830	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DES
+i2d_PKCS12_MAC_DATA                     3831	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY                    3832	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+ASN1_SCTX_get_item                      3833	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+NOTICEREF_new                           3834	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_GF2m_mod_inv                         3835	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC2M
+X509_CERT_AUX_free                      3836	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_GF2m_mod_inv_arr                     3837	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC2M
+X509_REQ_get1_email                     3838	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EC_KEY_print                            3839	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+i2d_ASN1_INTEGER                        3840	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_SINGLERESP_add1_ext_i2d            3841	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+PKCS7_add_signed_attribute              3842	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_PrivateKey_bio                      3843	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1            3844	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+i2d_re_X509_tbs                         3845	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_CIPHER_iv_length                    3846	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_REQ_CTX_get0_mem_bio               3847	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+i2d_PKCS8PrivateKeyInfo_bio             3848	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_OCSP_CERTID                         3849	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_init                3850	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+RIPEMD160_Final                         3851	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RMD160
+NETSCAPE_SPKI_free                      3852	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_asn1_get_prefix                     3853	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_OCSP_ONEREQ                         3854	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_security_bits         3855	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_CERTIFICATEPOLICIES                 3856	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_X509_CERT_AUX                       3857	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2o_ECPublicKey                         3858	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+PKCS12_SAFEBAG_create0_pkcs8            3859	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OBJ_get0_data                           3860	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EC_GROUP_get0_seed                      3861	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+OCSP_REQUEST_it                         3862	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:OCSP
+OCSP_REQUEST_it                         3862	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:OCSP
+ASRange_it                              3863	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:RFC3779
+ASRange_it                              3863	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:RFC3779
+i2d_TS_RESP                             3864	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+TS_TST_INFO_get_ext_by_OBJ              3865	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+d2i_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO                    3866	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_X509_CRL                            3867	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_OCTET_STRING_dup                   3868	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CRYPTO_nistcts128_decrypt_block         3869	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CMS_stream                              3870	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+RSA_OAEP_PARAMS_it                      3871	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:RSA
+RSA_OAEP_PARAMS_it                      3871	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:RSA
+BN_bn2mpi                               3872	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup                  3873	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_onereq_get0_id                     3874	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+X509_get_default_cert_dir               3875	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PROXY_POLICY_free                       3877	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PEM_write_DSAPrivateKey                 3878	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA,STDIO
+OPENSSL_sk_delete_ptr                   3879	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CMS_add0_RevocationInfoChoice           3880	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+ASN1_PCTX_get_flags                     3881	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_MD_meth_set_result_size             3882	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_X509_CRL                            3883	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_INTEGER_it                         3885	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+ASN1_INTEGER_it                         3885	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+TS_ACCURACY_new                         3886	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+i2d_SXNETID                             3887	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_mod_mul_montgomery                   3888	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_nnmod                                3889	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_RESP_CTX_set_status_info_cond        3890	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+PBKDF2PARAM_new                         3891	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ENGINE_set_RSA                          3892	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+i2d_X509_ATTRIBUTE                      3893	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS7_ctrl                              3894	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_REVOKEDINFO_it                     3895	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:OCSP
+OCSP_REVOKEDINFO_it                     3895	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:OCSP
+X509V3_set_ctx                          3896	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_ENUMERATED_set_int64               3897	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+o2i_SCT                                 3898	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CT
+CRL_DIST_POINTS_free                    3899	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_OCSP_SINGLERESP                     3900	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+EVP_CIPHER_CTX_num                      3901	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init            3902	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SHA512_Init                             3903	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TS_MSG_IMPRINT_set_msg                  3904	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
+CMS_unsigned_add1_attr                  3905	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
+OPENSSL_LH_doall                        3906	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS8_pkey_get0_attrs                   3907	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS8_pkey_add1_attr_by_NID             3908	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASYNC_is_capable                        3909	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_cipher_data          3910	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data          3911	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_up_ref                              3912	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_STORE_up_ref                       3913	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+DSA_SIG_get0                            3914	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+BN_BLINDING_is_current_thread           3915	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_BLINDING_set_current_thread          3916	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_BLINDING_lock                        3917	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_BLINDING_unlock                      3918	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters        3919	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+EC_GROUP_get_ecpkparameters             3920	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters          3921	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+ECPARAMETERS_it                         3922	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:EC
+ECPARAMETERS_it                         3922	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:EC
+ECPKPARAMETERS_it                       3923	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:EC
+ECPKPARAMETERS_it                       3923	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:EC
+EC_GROUP_get_ecparameters               3924	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+DHparams_it                             3925	1_1_0	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:DH
+DHparams_it                             3925	1_1_0	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:DH
+EVP_blake2s256                          3926	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:BLAKE2
+EVP_blake2b512                          3927	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:BLAKE2
+X509_SIG_get0                           3928	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_meth_new                            3929	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_meth_get_puts                       3930	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_meth_get_ctrl                       3931	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_meth_get_gets                       3932	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_get_data                            3933	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_set_init                            3934	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_meth_set_puts                       3935	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_get_shutdown                        3936	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_get_init                            3937	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_meth_set_ctrl                       3938	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_meth_set_read                       3939	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_set_shutdown                        3940	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_meth_set_create                     3941	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_meth_get_write                      3942	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_meth_set_callback_ctrl              3943	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_meth_get_create                     3944	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_set_next                            3945	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_set_data                            3946	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_meth_set_write                      3947	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_meth_set_destroy                    3948	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_meth_set_gets                       3949	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_meth_get_callback_ctrl              3950	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_meth_get_destroy                    3951	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_meth_get_read                       3952	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_set_retry_reason                    3953	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_meth_free                           3954	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+DSA_meth_set_bn_mod_exp                 3955	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+DSA_meth_set_init                       3956	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+DSA_meth_free                           3957	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+DSA_meth_set_mod_exp                    3958	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+DSA_meth_set_sign                       3959	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+DSA_meth_get_finish                     3960	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+DSA_set_flags                           3961	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+DSA_get0_pqg                            3962	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+DSA_meth_get0_app_data                  3963	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+DSA_meth_get_keygen                     3964	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+DSA_clear_flags                         3965	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+DSA_meth_get0_name                      3966	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+DSA_meth_get_paramgen                   3967	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+DSA_meth_get_sign                       3968	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+DSA_meth_set_paramgen                   3969	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+DSA_test_flags                          3970	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+DSA_meth_set0_app_data                  3971	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+DSA_meth_set1_name                      3972	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+DSA_get0_key                            3973	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+DSA_meth_get_mod_exp                    3974	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+DSA_set0_pqg                            3975	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+DSA_meth_get_flags                      3976	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+DSA_meth_get_verify                     3977	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+DSA_meth_set_verify                     3978	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+DSA_meth_set_finish                     3979	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+DSA_meth_set_keygen                     3980	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+DSA_meth_dup                            3981	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+DSA_set0_key                            3982	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+DSA_meth_get_init                       3983	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+DSA_meth_set_sign_setup                 3984	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+DSA_meth_get_bn_mod_exp                 3985	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+DSA_get_method                          3986	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+DSA_meth_new                            3987	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+DSA_meth_set_flags                      3988	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+DSA_meth_get_sign_setup                 3989	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+DSA_get0_engine                         3990	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_auth_level        3991	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_auth_level        3992	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_REQ_get0_pubkey                    3993	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+RSA_set0_key                            3994	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+RSA_meth_get_flags                      3995	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+RSA_meth_set_finish                     3996	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+RSA_meth_get_priv_dec                   3997	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+RSA_meth_get_sign                       3998	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+RSA_meth_get_bn_mod_exp                 3999	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+RSA_test_flags                          4000	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+RSA_meth_new                            4001	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+RSA_meth_get0_app_data                  4002	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+RSA_meth_dup                            4003	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+RSA_meth_set1_name                      4004	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+RSA_meth_set0_app_data                  4005	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+RSA_set_flags                           4006	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+RSA_meth_set_sign                       4007	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+RSA_clear_flags                         4008	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+RSA_meth_get_keygen                     4009	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+RSA_meth_set_keygen                     4010	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+RSA_meth_set_pub_dec                    4011	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+RSA_meth_get_finish                     4012	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+RSA_get0_key                            4013	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+RSA_get0_engine                         4014	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+RSA_meth_set_priv_enc                   4015	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+RSA_meth_set_verify                     4016	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+RSA_get0_factors                        4017	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+RSA_meth_get0_name                      4018	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+RSA_meth_get_mod_exp                    4019	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+RSA_meth_set_flags                      4020	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+RSA_meth_get_pub_dec                    4021	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+RSA_meth_set_bn_mod_exp                 4022	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+RSA_meth_get_init                       4023	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+RSA_meth_free                           4024	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+RSA_meth_get_pub_enc                    4025	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+RSA_meth_set_mod_exp                    4026	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+RSA_set0_factors                        4027	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+RSA_meth_set_pub_enc                    4028	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+RSA_meth_set_priv_dec                   4029	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+RSA_meth_get_verify                     4030	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+RSA_meth_set_init                       4031	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+RSA_meth_get_priv_enc                   4032	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+RSA_set0_crt_params                     4037	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+RSA_get0_crt_params                     4038	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+DH_set0_pqg                             4039	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DH
+DH_clear_flags                          4041	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DH
+DH_get0_key                             4042	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DH
+DH_get0_engine                          4043	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DH
+DH_set0_key                             4044	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DH
+DH_set_length                           4045	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DH
+DH_test_flags                           4046	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DH
+DH_get_length                           4047	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DH
+DH_get0_pqg                             4048	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DH
+DH_meth_get_compute_key                 4049	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DH
+DH_meth_set1_name                       4050	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DH
+DH_meth_set_init                        4051	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DH
+DH_meth_get_finish                      4052	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DH
+DH_meth_get0_name                       4053	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DH
+DH_meth_set_generate_params             4054	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DH
+DH_meth_set_compute_key                 4055	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DH
+DH_meth_set_flags                       4056	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DH
+DH_meth_get_generate_params             4057	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DH
+DH_meth_get_flags                       4058	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DH
+DH_meth_set_finish                      4059	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DH
+DH_meth_get0_app_data                   4060	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DH
+DH_meth_set0_app_data                   4061	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DH
+DH_meth_get_init                        4062	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DH
+DH_meth_get_bn_mod_exp                  4063	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DH
+DH_meth_new                             4064	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DH
+DH_meth_dup                             4065	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DH
+DH_meth_set_bn_mod_exp                  4066	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DH
+DH_meth_set_generate_key                4067	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DH
+DH_meth_free                            4068	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DH
+DH_meth_get_generate_key                4069	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DH
+DH_set_flags                            4070	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DH
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_obj_by_subject       4071	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_OBJECT_free                        4072	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_OBJECT_get0_X509                   4073	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_STORE_CTX_get0_untrusted           4074	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_STORE_CTX_set_error_depth          4075	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_STORE_CTX_get0_cert                4076	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify               4077	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_STORE_CTX_set_current_cert         4078	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify               4079	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify_cb            4080	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_STORE_CTX_set0_verified_chain      4081	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_STORE_CTX_set0_untrusted           4082	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OPENSSL_hexchar2int                     4083	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_STORE_set_ex_data                  4084	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_STORE_get_ex_data                  4085	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_STORE_get0_objects                 4086	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_OBJECT_get_type                    4087	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_STORE_set_verify                   4088	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_OBJECT_new                         4089	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_STORE_get0_param                   4090	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey_traditional    4091	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_get_pathlen                        4092	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ECDSA_SIG_set0                          4093	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+DSA_SIG_set0                            4094	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+EVP_PKEY_get0_hmac                      4095	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+HMAC_CTX_get_md                         4096	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check_CN               4097	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OCSP_resp_get0_id                       4098	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+OCSP_resp_get0_certs                    4099	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+X509_set_proxy_flag                     4100	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_ENCODE_CTX_copy                     4101	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_issued         4102	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_STORE_set_lookup_certs             4103	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_crl            4104	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_STORE_get_cleanup                  4105	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_STORE_get_lookup_crls              4106	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_STORE_get_cert_crl                 4107	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_STORE_get_lookup_certs             4108	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_STORE_get_check_revocation         4109	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_STORE_set_get_crl                  4110	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_STORE_set_check_issued             4111	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_policy         4112	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_STORE_get_check_crl                4113	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_STORE_set_check_crl                4114	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_STORE_get_check_issued             4115	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_STORE_get_get_issuer               4116	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_get_crl              4117	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_STORE_set_get_issuer               4118	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_STORE_set_cleanup                  4119	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_cleanup              4120	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_STORE_get_get_crl                  4121	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_STORE_set_check_revocation         4122	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_cert_crl             4123	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_certs         4124	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_STORE_set_check_policy             4125	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_get_issuer           4126	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_STORE_get_check_policy             4127	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_STORE_set_cert_crl                 4128	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_revocation     4129	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_STORE_get_verify_cb                4130	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_crls          4131	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_STORE_get_verify                   4132	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_STORE_unlock                       4133	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_STORE_lock                         4134	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_set_proxy_pathlen                  4135	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_get_proxy_pathlen                  4136	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+DSA_bits                                4137	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint          4138	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint          4139	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ASN1_STRING_get0_data                   4140	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_SIG_getm                           4141	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_get0_serialNumber                  4142	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS12_get_attr                         4143	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0
+X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate                4144	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_get0_notBefore                     4145	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_get0_notAfter                      4146	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate                4147	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_get_new_index                       4148	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OPENSSL_utf82uni                        4149	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS12_add_friendlyname_utf8            4150	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OPENSSL_uni2utf8                        4151	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PKCS12_key_gen_utf8                     4152	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ECPKPARAMETERS_free                     4153	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+ECPARAMETERS_free                       4154	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+ECPKPARAMETERS_new                      4155	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+ECPARAMETERS_new                        4156	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+OCSP_RESPID_set_by_name                 4157	1_1_0a	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+OCSP_RESPID_set_by_key                  4158	1_1_0a	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+OCSP_RESPID_match                       4159	1_1_0a	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+DSO_pathbyaddr                          4170	1_1_0c	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+DSO_dsobyaddr                           4171	1_1_0c	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_get_time             4172	1_1_0d	EXIST::FUNCTION:CT
+CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set_time             4173	1_1_0d	EXIST::FUNCTION:CT
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_inh_flags         4174	1_1_0d	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_inh_flags         4175	1_1_0d	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_time              4181	1_1_0d	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+DH_check_params                         4183	1_1_0d	EXIST::FUNCTION:DH
+INT32_it                                4208	1_1_0f	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+INT32_it                                4208	1_1_0f	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+UINT64_it                               4209	1_1_0f	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+UINT64_it                               4209	1_1_0f	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+ZINT32_it                               4210	1_1_0f	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+ZINT32_it                               4210	1_1_0f	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+ZUINT64_it                              4211	1_1_0f	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+ZUINT64_it                              4211	1_1_0f	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+INT64_it                                4212	1_1_0f	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+INT64_it                                4212	1_1_0f	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+ZUINT32_it                              4213	1_1_0f	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+ZUINT32_it                              4213	1_1_0f	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+UINT32_it                               4214	1_1_0f	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+UINT32_it                               4214	1_1_0f	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+ZINT64_it                               4215	1_1_0f	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
+ZINT64_it                               4215	1_1_0f	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+CRYPTO_secure_clear_free                4315	1_1_0g	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_set1_engine                    4347	1_1_0g	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+OCSP_resp_get0_signer                   4374	1_1_0h	EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
+X509_get0_authority_key_id              4448	1_1_0h	EXIST::FUNCTION:
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/util/libssl.num b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/libssl.num
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7b9b3c2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/libssl.num
@@ -0,0 +1,407 @@
+SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile           1	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SRTP
+SSL_set_read_ahead                      2	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_set_accept_state                    3	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list                 4	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_set_srp_client_pwd_callback     5	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SRP
+SSL_copy_session_id                     6	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_set_srp_password                7	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SRP
+SSL_shutdown                            8	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback                9	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_SESSION_get0_ticket                 11	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_get1_supported_ciphers              12	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_state_string_long                   13	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_get0_certificate                14	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data                 15	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_get_verify_depth                    16	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_get0_dane                           17	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_sess_get_get_cb                 18	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_get_default_passwd_cb_userdata  19	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback                 20	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DH
+SSL_CTX_get_verify_depth                21	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_file          22	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+SSL_use_PrivateKey_file                 23	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_set_generate_session_id             24	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx      25	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_get_quiet_shutdown                  26	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_dane_enable                         27	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_COMP_add_compression_method         28	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey               29	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+SSL_CTX_sess_get_new_cb                 30	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_SSL_SESSION                         31	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_use_PrivateKey_ASN1                 32	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PEM_write_SSL_SESSION                   33	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO
+SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context          34	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CIPHER_get_cipher_nid               35	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_get_srp_g                           36	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SRP
+SSL_want                                37	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_get_cipher_list                     38	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_get_verify_result                   39	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_renegotiate                         40	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_get_privatekey                      41	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_peek                                42	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SRP_Calc_A_param                        43	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SRP
+SSL_SESSION_get_ticket_lifetime_hint    44	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_SRP_CTX_free                        45	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SRP
+SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list              46	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb        47	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:NEXTPROTONEG
+BIO_ssl_copy_session_id                 48	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_set_security_callback           49	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CONF_cmd_value_type                 50	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_remove_session                  51	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_SESSION_new                         52	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TLSv1_2_server_method                   53	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0,TLS1_2_METHOD
+BIO_new_buffer_ssl_connect              54	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_set0_security_ex_data           55	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_alert_desc_string                   56	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_get0_dane_authority                 57	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_set_purpose                         58	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file             59	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_get_rfd                             60	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+DTLSv1_listen                           61	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SOCK
+SSL_set_ssl_method                      62	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_get0_security_ex_data               63	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSLv3_client_method                     64	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0,SSL3_METHOD
+SSL_set_security_level                  65	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+DTLSv1_2_method                         66	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0,DTLS1_2_METHOD
+SSL_get_fd                              67	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_get1_session                        68	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey                   69	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+SSL_CTX_set_srp_cb_arg                  70	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SRP
+SSL_CTX_add_session                     71	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_get_srp_N                           72	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SRP
+SSL_has_matching_session_id             73	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PEM_read_SSL_SESSION                    74	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO
+SSL_get_shared_ciphers                  75	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_add1_host                           76	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CONF_cmd_argv                       77	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_version                             78	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_SESSION_print                       79	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_get_client_ciphers                  80	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_get_srtp_profiles                   81	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SRTP
+SSL_use_certificate_ASN1                82	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_get_peer_certificate                83	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+DTLSv1_2_server_method                  84	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0,DTLS1_2_METHOD
+SSL_set_cert_cb                         85	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_set_cookie_verify_cb            86	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_get_shared_sigalgs                  87	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_config                              88	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TLSv1_1_client_method                   89	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0,TLS1_1_METHOD
+SSL_CIPHER_standard_name                90	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SSL_TRACE
+SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode                 91	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_get_all_async_fds                   92	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_check_private_key               93	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_set_wfd                             94	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SOCK
+SSL_get_client_CA_list                  95	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CONF_CTX_set_flags                  96	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_set_srp_username_callback       97	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SRP
+SSL_connect                             98	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_get_psk_identity                    99	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:PSK
+SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file            100	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_set_session_ticket_ext              101	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_set_psk_server_callback         102	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:PSK
+SSL_get_sigalgs                         103	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb   104	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:NEXTPROTONEG
+SSL_CTX_set_trust                       105	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_set_verify                      106	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_set_rfd                             107	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SOCK
+SSL_SESSION_set_timeout                 108	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_set_psk_client_callback             109	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:PSK
+SSL_get_client_random                   110	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TLS_method                              111	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CONF_CTX_clear_flags                112	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TLSv1_client_method                     113	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0,TLS1_METHOD
+SSL_CIPHER_get_bits                     114	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_test_functions                      115	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:UNIT_TEST
+SSL_get_SSL_CTX                         116	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_get_session                         117	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl                   118	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_get_finished                        119	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack      120	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_get_state                           121	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CONF_CTX_finish                     122	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_add_server_custom_ext           123	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data                 124	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_get_srp_username                    125	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SRP
+SSL_CTX_set_purpose                     126	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_clear                               127	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_set_cert_store                  128	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TLSv1_2_method                          129	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0,TLS1_2_METHOD
+SSL_session_reused                      130	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_free                                131	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_ssl_shutdown                        132	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_get_client_CA_list              133	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_sessions                        134	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_get_options                         135	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_set_verify_depth                    136	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_get_error                           137	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_get_servername                      138	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_get_version                         139	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_state_string                        140	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_SESSION_get_timeout                 141	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_sess_get_remove_cb              142	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_get_current_cipher                  143	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_up_ref                              144	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_export_keying_material              145	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_callback_ctrl                       146	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_set_security_callback               147	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_SRP_CTX_init                        148	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SRP
+ERR_load_SSL_strings                    149	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_init                    150	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SRP
+SSL_SESSION_set_time                    151	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_SSL_SESSION                         152	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_SESSION_get_master_key              153	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods        154	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb              155	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback             156	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DH
+SSL_CTX_get_default_passwd_cb           157	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TLSv1_server_method                     158	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0,TLS1_METHOD
+DTLS_server_method                      159	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_set0_rbio                           160	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_set_options                     161	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_set_msg_callback                    162	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CONF_CTX_free                       163	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_get_ssl_method                  164	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_get_server_random                   165	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_set_shutdown                        166	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_add_client_CA                   167	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TLSv1_1_server_method                   168	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0,TLS1_1_METHOD
+PEM_write_bio_SSL_SESSION               169	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_write                               170	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_set1_host                           171	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_file              172	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+SSL_CTX_get_info_callback               173	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_get0_peername                       174	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_set_srp_server_param                175	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SRP
+TLS_server_method                       176	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_get_psk_identity_hint               177	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:PSK
+SSL_set_session                         178	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_get0_param                          179	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_set_default_passwd_cb               180	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_get_read_ahead                      181	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_dup_CA_list                         182	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_get_verify_callback                 183	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb           184	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_get_servername_type                 185	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TLSv1_2_client_method                   186	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0,TLS1_2_METHOD
+SSL_add_client_CA                       187	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_get0_security_ex_data           188	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_get_ex_data                         189	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_flush_sessions                  190	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_use_PrivateKey                      191	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+DTLSv1_client_method                    192	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0,DTLS1_METHOD
+SSL_CTX_dane_mtype_set                  193	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_get_wfd                             194	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_get_ssl_method                      195	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_set_verify_result                   196	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1              197	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+SSL_CIPHER_get_name                     198	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OPENSSL_init_ssl                        199	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_dup                                 200	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo                  201	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo_file             202	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_set_options                         203	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_dir          204	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_do_handshake                        205	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_get_ex_data                     206	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_is_init_finished                    207	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_file         208	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSLv3_method                            209	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0,SSL3_METHOD
+SSL_CTX_set_cookie_generate_cb          210	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_certs_clear                         211	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_set_connect_state                   212	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_set_ex_data                     213	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_rstate_string                       214	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_SESSION_get0_peer                   215	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_SESSION_get_compress_id             216	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_get_peer_cert_chain                 217	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb                     218	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+PEM_read_bio_SSL_SESSION                219	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_set_info_callback                   220	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb                 221	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_get_security_level              222	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_ctrl                            223	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_set_alpn_protos                     224	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_set_ex_data                         225	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_rstate_string_long                  226	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_ctrl                                227	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_get_current_compression             228	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_SESSION_has_ticket                  229	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback        230	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_set_session_secret_cb               231	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine          232	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
+SSL_CTX_get0_param                      233	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_set1_param                      234	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_get_certificate                     235	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+DTLSv1_server_method                    236	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0,DTLS1_METHOD
+SSL_set_fd                              237	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SOCK
+SSL_use_certificate                     238	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+DTLSv1_method                           239	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0,DTLS1_METHOD
+SSL_set0_wbio                           240	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_read                                241	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_get_options                     242	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version                 243	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_set_SSL_CTX                         244	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated             245	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_get_verify_mode                     246	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CIPHER_get_id                       247	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_SESSION_print_keylog                248	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback         249	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:PSK
+SSL_SESSION_get_time                    250	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_set_debug                           251	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0
+SSL_get_security_level                  252	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CIPHER_description                  253	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata      254	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_get_srp_userinfo                    255	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SRP
+SSL_extension_supported                 256	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_dane_tlsa_add                       257	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_srp_server_param_with_username      258	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SRP
+SSL_CIPHER_get_version                  259	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_get0_verified_chain                 260	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CIPHER_find                         261	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_get_rbio                            262	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CONF_CTX_set_ssl                    263	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth                264	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_get_ciphers                         265	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_config                          266	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CONF_CTX_set_ssl_ctx                267	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CONF_cmd                            268	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_add_ssl_module                      269	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_get_verify_callback             270	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_set1_param                          271	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_use_certificate_file                272	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_get_changed_async_fds               273	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb              274	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+DTLS_client_method                      275	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_set_trust                           276	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_get_security_callback           277	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_clear_options                   278	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_check_chain                         279	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb              280	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_set_info_callback               281	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_pending                             282	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_set_bio                             283	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_new_ssl_connect                     284	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_waiting_for_async                   285	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_set_srp_strength                286	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SRP
+SSL_CTX_get_quiet_shutdown              287	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file      288	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_dane_enable                     289	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CONF_CTX_new                        290	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_get0_alpn_selected                  291	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated          292	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:NEXTPROTONEG
+SSL_set0_security_ex_data               293	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_use_srtp             294	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SRTP
+SSL_COMP_set0_compression_methods       295	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_set_not_resumable_session_callback 296	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_accept                              297	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_use_psk_identity_hint               298	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:PSK
+SSL_trace                               299	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SSL_TRACE
+DTLS_method                             300	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_set_srp_verify_param_callback   301	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SRP
+SSL_CTX_set_timeout                     302	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_set_security_level              303	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TLS_client_method                       304	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_set_quiet_shutdown                  305	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_up_ref                          306	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_check_private_key                   307	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown              308	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_select_next_proto                   309	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_load_client_CA_file                 310	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_set_srp_server_param_pw             311	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SRP
+SSL_renegotiate_pending                 312	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_new                             313	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_set_session_ticket_ext_cb           314	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_get_timeout                     315	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_use_certificate_chain_file          316	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_set_not_resumable_session_callback  317	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_free                    318	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SRP
+SSL_get_current_expansion               319	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_clear_options                       320	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey                  321	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_get_info_callback                   322	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint           323	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:PSK
+SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1          324	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_ASN1             325	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_get0_privatekey                 326	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_f_ssl                               327	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSLv3_server_method                     328	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0,SSL3_METHOD
+SSL_SESSION_free                        329	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_get_shutdown                        330	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_get_peer_finished                   331	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_set_tlsext_use_srtp                 332	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SRTP
+TLSv1_method                            333	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0,TLS1_METHOD
+SSL_set_psk_server_callback             334	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:PSK
+SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos                 335	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths        336	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb                 337	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack     338	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_get_default_passwd_cb_userdata      339	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_get_security_callback               340	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_set_srp_username                341	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SRP
+SSL_COMP_get_name                       342	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata  343	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_set_verify                          344	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_in_before                           345	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CIPHER_get_digest_nid               346	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_add_client_custom_ext           347	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_use_certificate                 348	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_set_cipher_list                     349	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_get_wbio                            350	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_set_hostflags                       351	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_alert_desc_string_long              352	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_get_default_timeout                 353	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_set_session_id_context              354	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_new                                 355	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+TLSv1_1_method                          356	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0,TLS1_1_METHOD
+SSL_CTX_get_cert_store                  357	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations           358	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_SESSION_print_fp                    359	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO
+SSL_get0_dane_tlsa                      360	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id         361	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_alert_type_string_long              362	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CONF_CTX_set1_prefix                363	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_in_init                             364	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_new_ssl                             365	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_get_client_cert_cb              366	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_use_certificate_ASN1            367	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_set_client_CA_list                  368	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_free                            369	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_get_default_passwd_cb               370	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_SESSION_get_id                      371	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_SESSION_set1_id_context             372	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_is_server                           373	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_alert_type_string                   374	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+DTLSv1_2_client_method                  375	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0,DTLS1_2_METHOD
+SSL_CTX_set_ctlog_list_file             376	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CT
+SSL_set_ct_validation_callback          377	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CT
+SSL_CTX_set_default_ctlog_list_file     378	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CT
+SSL_CTX_has_client_custom_ext           379	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_ct_is_enabled                       380	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CT
+SSL_get0_peer_scts                      381	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CT
+SSL_CTX_set_ct_validation_callback      382	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CT
+SSL_CTX_ct_is_enabled                   383	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CT
+SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len         384	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len     385	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_has_pending                         386	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CIPHER_get_auth_nid                 387	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CIPHER_get_kx_nid                   388	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CIPHER_is_aead                      389	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_SESSION_up_ref                      390	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_set0_ctlog_store                391	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CT
+SSL_CTX_get0_ctlog_store                392	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CT
+SSL_enable_ct                           393	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CT
+SSL_CTX_enable_ct                       394	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:CT
+SSL_CTX_get_ciphers                     395	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_SESSION_get0_hostname               396	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_client_version                      397	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_SESSION_get_protocol_version        398	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_is_dtls                             399	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_dane_set_flags                  400	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_dane_set_flags                      401	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_CTX_dane_clear_flags                402	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_dane_clear_flags                    403	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher                 404	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_SESSION_get0_id_context             405	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_SESSION_set1_id                     406	1_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_COMP_get_id                         412	1_1_0d	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_COMP_get0_name                      413	1_1_0d	EXIST::FUNCTION:
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/util/local_shlib.com.in b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/local_shlib.com.in
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e49aa15
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/local_shlib.com.in
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+${-
+  use File::Spec::Functions qw(rel2abs);
+
+  my $bldtop = rel2abs($config{builddir});
+  our %names = ( map { $_ => $bldtop.$_.".EXE" }
+                 map { $unified_info{sharednames}->{$_} || () }
+                 @{$unified_info{libraries}} );
+  "" -}
+$       ! Create a local environment with the shared library logical names
+$       ! properly set.  Undo this with unlocal_shlib.com
+$
+$       OPENSSL_NAMES := OPENSSL_NAMES_'F$GETJPI("","PID")'
+$       CREATE/NAME_TABLE/PARENT_TABLE=LNM$PROCESS_DIRECTORY 'OPENSSL_NAMES'
+$       DEFINE/TABLE='OPENSSL_NAMES' OSSL_FLAG YES
+$
+$       NAMES := {- join(",", keys %names); -}
+{-
+  join("\n", map { "\$       __$_ = \"".$names{$_}."\"" } keys %names);
+-}      
+$       I = 0
+$       LOOP:
+$           E = F$ELEMENT(I,",",NAMES)
+$           I = I + 1
+$           IF E .EQS. "," THEN GOTO ENDLOOP
+$           EV = __'E'
+$           OLDV = F$TRNLNM(E,"LNM$PROCESS")
+$           IF OLDV .NES. "" THEN DEFINE/TABLE='OPENSSL_NAMES' 'E' 'OLDV'
+$           DEFINE 'E' 'EV'
+$           GOTO LOOP
+$       ENDLOOP:
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/util/mkbuildinf.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/mkbuildinf.pl
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..5bf0168
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/mkbuildinf.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2014-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+
+my ($cflags, $platform) = @ARGV;
+
+$cflags = "compiler: $cflags";
+$date = localtime();
+print <<"END_OUTPUT";
+/* auto-generated by util/mkbuildinf.pl for crypto/cversion.c */
+#define CFLAGS cflags
+/*
+ * Generate CFLAGS as an array of individual characters. This is a
+ * workaround for the situation where CFLAGS gets too long for a C90 string
+ * literal
+ */
+static const char cflags[] = {
+END_OUTPUT
+my $ctr = 0;
+foreach my $c (split //, $cflags) {
+    $c =~ s|([\\'])|\\$1|;
+    # Max 16 characters per line
+    if  (($ctr++ % 16) == 0) {
+        if ($ctr != 1) {
+            print "\n";
+        }
+        print "    ";
+    }
+    print "'$c',";
+}
+print <<"END_OUTPUT";
+'\\0'
+};
+#define PLATFORM "platform: $platform"
+#define DATE "built on: $date"
+END_OUTPUT
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/util/mkcerts.sh b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/mkcerts.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..e4a9892
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/mkcerts.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,220 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+# This script will re-make all the required certs.
+# cd apps
+# sh ../util/mkcerts.sh
+# mv ca-cert.pem pca-cert.pem ../certs
+# cd ..
+# cat certs/*.pem >>apps/server.pem
+# cat certs/*.pem >>apps/server2.pem
+# SSLEAY=`pwd`/apps/ssleay; export SSLEAY
+# sh tools/c_rehash certs
+#
+ 
+CAbits=1024
+SSLEAY="../apps/openssl"
+CONF="-config ../apps/openssl.cnf"
+
+# create pca request.
+echo creating $CAbits bit PCA cert request
+$SSLEAY req $CONF \
+	-new -sha256 -newkey $CAbits \
+	-keyout pca-key.pem \
+	-out pca-req.pem -nodes >/dev/null <<EOF
+AU
+Queensland
+.
+CryptSoft Pty Ltd
+.
+Test PCA (1024 bit)
+
+
+
+EOF
+
+if [ $? != 0 ]; then
+	echo problems generating PCA request
+	exit 1
+fi
+
+#sign it.
+echo
+echo self signing PCA
+$SSLEAY x509 -sha256 -days 36525 \
+	-req -signkey pca-key.pem \
+	-CAcreateserial -CAserial pca-cert.srl \
+	-in pca-req.pem -out pca-cert.pem
+
+if [ $? != 0 ]; then
+	echo problems self signing PCA cert
+	exit 1
+fi
+echo
+
+# create ca request.
+echo creating $CAbits bit CA cert request
+$SSLEAY req $CONF \
+	-new -sha256 -newkey $CAbits \
+	-keyout ca-key.pem \
+	-out ca-req.pem -nodes >/dev/null <<EOF
+AU
+Queensland
+.
+CryptSoft Pty Ltd
+.
+Test CA (1024 bit)
+
+
+
+EOF
+
+if [ $? != 0 ]; then
+	echo problems generating CA request
+	exit 1
+fi
+
+#sign it.
+echo
+echo signing CA
+$SSLEAY x509 -sha256 -days 36525 \
+	-req \
+	-CAcreateserial -CAserial pca-cert.srl \
+	-CA pca-cert.pem -CAkey pca-key.pem \
+	-in ca-req.pem -out ca-cert.pem
+
+if [ $? != 0 ]; then
+	echo problems signing CA cert
+	exit 1
+fi
+echo
+
+# create server request.
+echo creating 512 bit server cert request
+$SSLEAY req $CONF \
+	-new -sha256 -newkey 512 \
+	-keyout s512-key.pem \
+	-out s512-req.pem -nodes >/dev/null <<EOF
+AU
+Queensland
+.
+CryptSoft Pty Ltd
+.
+Server test cert (512 bit)
+
+
+
+EOF
+
+if [ $? != 0 ]; then
+	echo problems generating 512 bit server cert request
+	exit 1
+fi
+
+#sign it.
+echo
+echo signing 512 bit server cert
+$SSLEAY x509 -sha256 -days 36525 \
+	-req \
+	-CAcreateserial -CAserial ca-cert.srl \
+	-CA ca-cert.pem -CAkey ca-key.pem \
+	-in s512-req.pem -out server.pem
+
+if [ $? != 0 ]; then
+	echo problems signing 512 bit server cert
+	exit 1
+fi
+echo
+
+# create 1024 bit server request.
+echo creating 1024 bit server cert request
+$SSLEAY req $CONF \
+	-new -sha256 -newkey 1024 \
+	-keyout s1024key.pem \
+	-out s1024req.pem -nodes >/dev/null <<EOF
+AU
+Queensland
+.
+CryptSoft Pty Ltd
+.
+Server test cert (1024 bit)
+
+
+
+EOF
+
+if [ $? != 0 ]; then
+	echo problems generating 1024 bit server cert request
+	exit 1
+fi
+
+#sign it.
+echo
+echo signing 1024 bit server cert
+$SSLEAY x509 -sha256 -days 36525 \
+	-req \
+	-CAcreateserial -CAserial ca-cert.srl \
+	-CA ca-cert.pem -CAkey ca-key.pem \
+	-in s1024req.pem -out server2.pem
+
+if [ $? != 0 ]; then
+	echo problems signing 1024 bit server cert
+	exit 1
+fi
+echo
+
+# create 512 bit client request.
+echo creating 512 bit client cert request
+$SSLEAY req $CONF \
+	-new -sha256 -newkey 512 \
+	-keyout c512-key.pem \
+	-out c512-req.pem -nodes >/dev/null <<EOF
+AU
+Queensland
+.
+CryptSoft Pty Ltd
+.
+Client test cert (512 bit)
+
+
+
+EOF
+
+if [ $? != 0 ]; then
+	echo problems generating 512 bit client cert request
+	exit 1
+fi
+
+#sign it.
+echo
+echo signing 512 bit client cert
+$SSLEAY x509 -sha256 -days 36525 \
+	-req \
+	-CAcreateserial -CAserial ca-cert.srl \
+	-CA ca-cert.pem -CAkey ca-key.pem \
+	-in c512-req.pem -out client.pem
+
+if [ $? != 0 ]; then
+	echo problems signing 512 bit client cert
+	exit 1
+fi
+
+echo cleanup
+
+cat pca-key.pem  >> pca-cert.pem
+cat ca-key.pem   >> ca-cert.pem
+cat s512-key.pem >> server.pem
+cat s1024key.pem >> server2.pem
+cat c512-key.pem >> client.pem
+
+for i in pca-cert.pem ca-cert.pem server.pem server2.pem client.pem
+do
+$SSLEAY x509 -issuer -subject -in $i -noout >$$
+cat $$
+/bin/cat $i >>$$
+/bin/mv $$ $i
+done
+
+#/bin/rm -f *key.pem *req.pem *.srl
+
+echo Finished
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/util/mkdef.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/mkdef.pl
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..66db26c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/mkdef.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,1685 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+#
+# generate a .def file
+#
+# It does this by parsing the header files and looking for the
+# prototyped functions: it then prunes the output.
+#
+# Intermediary files are created, call libcrypto.num and libssl.num,
+# The format of these files is:
+#
+#	routine-name	nnnn	vers	info
+#
+# The "nnnn" and "vers" fields are the numeric id and version for the symbol
+# respectively. The "info" part is actually a colon-separated string of fields
+# with the following meaning:
+#
+#	existence:platform:kind:algorithms
+#
+# - "existence" can be "EXIST" or "NOEXIST" depending on if the symbol is
+#   found somewhere in the source, 
+# - "platforms" is empty if it exists on all platforms, otherwise it contains
+#   comma-separated list of the platform, just as they are if the symbol exists
+#   for those platforms, or prepended with a "!" if not.  This helps resolve
+#   symbol name variants for platforms where the names are too long for the
+#   compiler or linker, or if the systems is case insensitive and there is a
+#   clash, or the symbol is implemented differently (see
+#   EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION).  This script assumes renaming of symbols is found
+#   in the file crypto/symhacks.h.
+#   The semantics for the platforms is that every item is checked against the
+#   environment.  For the negative items ("!FOO"), if any of them is false
+#   (i.e. "FOO" is true) in the environment, the corresponding symbol can't be
+#   used.  For the positive itms, if all of them are false in the environment,
+#   the corresponding symbol can't be used.  Any combination of positive and
+#   negative items are possible, and of course leave room for some redundancy.
+# - "kind" is "FUNCTION" or "VARIABLE".  The meaning of that is obvious.
+# - "algorithms" is a comma-separated list of algorithm names.  This helps
+#   exclude symbols that are part of an algorithm that some user wants to
+#   exclude.
+#
+
+use lib ".";
+use configdata;
+use File::Spec::Functions;
+use File::Basename;
+use FindBin;
+use lib "$FindBin::Bin/perl";
+use OpenSSL::Glob;
+
+# When building a "variant" shared library, with a custom SONAME, also customize
+# all the symbol versions.  This produces a shared object that can coexist
+# without conflict in the same address space as a default build, or an object
+# with a different variant tag.
+#
+# For example, with a target definition that includes:
+#
+#         shlib_variant => "-opt",
+#
+# we build the following objects:
+#
+# $ perl -le '
+#     for (@ARGV) {
+#         if ($l = readlink) {
+#             printf "%s -> %s\n", $_, $l
+#         } else {
+#             print
+#         }
+#     }' *.so*
+# libcrypto-opt.so.1.1
+# libcrypto.so -> libcrypto-opt.so.1.1
+# libssl-opt.so.1.1
+# libssl.so -> libssl-opt.so.1.1
+#
+# whose SONAMEs and dependencies are:
+#
+# $ for l in *.so; do
+#     echo $l
+#     readelf -d $l | egrep 'SONAME|NEEDED.*(ssl|crypto)'
+#   done
+# libcrypto.so
+#  0x000000000000000e (SONAME)             Library soname: [libcrypto-opt.so.1.1]
+# libssl.so
+#  0x0000000000000001 (NEEDED)             Shared library: [libcrypto-opt.so.1.1]
+#  0x000000000000000e (SONAME)             Library soname: [libssl-opt.so.1.1]
+#
+# We case-fold the variant tag to upper case and replace all non-alnum
+# characters with "_".  This yields the following symbol versions:
+#
+# $ nm libcrypto.so | grep -w A
+# 0000000000000000 A OPENSSL_OPT_1_1_0
+# 0000000000000000 A OPENSSL_OPT_1_1_0a
+# 0000000000000000 A OPENSSL_OPT_1_1_0c
+# 0000000000000000 A OPENSSL_OPT_1_1_0d
+# 0000000000000000 A OPENSSL_OPT_1_1_0f
+# 0000000000000000 A OPENSSL_OPT_1_1_0g
+# $ nm libssl.so | grep -w A
+# 0000000000000000 A OPENSSL_OPT_1_1_0
+# 0000000000000000 A OPENSSL_OPT_1_1_0d
+#
+(my $SO_VARIANT = qq{\U$target{"shlib_variant"}}) =~ s/\W/_/g;
+
+my $debug=0;
+my $trace=0;
+my $verbose=0;
+
+my $crypto_num= catfile($config{sourcedir},"util","libcrypto.num");
+my $ssl_num=    catfile($config{sourcedir},"util","libssl.num");
+my $libname;
+
+my $do_update = 0;
+my $do_rewrite = 1;
+my $do_crypto = 0;
+my $do_ssl = 0;
+my $do_ctest = 0;
+my $do_ctestall = 0;
+my $do_checkexist = 0;
+
+my $VMS=0;
+my $W32=0;
+my $NT=0;
+my $UNIX=0;
+my $linux=0;
+# Set this to make typesafe STACK definitions appear in DEF
+my $safe_stack_def = 0;
+
+my @known_platforms = ( "__FreeBSD__", "PERL5",
+			"EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION", "ZLIB", "_WIN32"
+			);
+my @known_ossl_platforms = ( "UNIX", "VMS", "WIN32", "WINNT", "OS2" );
+my @known_algorithms = ( # These are algorithms we know are guarded in relevant
+			 # header files, but aren't actually disablable.
+			 # Without these, this script will warn a lot.
+			 "RSA", "MD5",
+			 # @disablables comes from configdata.pm
+			 map { (my $x = uc $_) =~ s|-|_|g; $x; } @disablables,
+			 # Deprecated functions.  Not really algorithmss, but
+			 # treated as such here for the sake of simplicity
+			 "DEPRECATEDIN_0_9_8",
+			 "DEPRECATEDIN_1_0_0",
+			 "DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0",
+                     );
+
+# %disabled comes from configdata.pm
+my %disabled_algorithms =
+    map { (my $x = uc $_) =~ s|-|_|g; $x => 1; } keys %disabled;
+
+my $zlib;
+
+foreach (@ARGV, split(/ /, $config{options}))
+	{
+	$debug=1 if $_ eq "debug";
+	$trace=1 if $_ eq "trace";
+	$verbose=1 if $_ eq "verbose";
+	$W32=1 if $_ eq "32";
+	die "win16 not supported" if $_ eq "16";
+	if($_ eq "NT") {
+		$W32 = 1;
+		$NT = 1;
+	}
+	if ($_ eq "linux") {
+		$linux=1;
+		$UNIX=1;
+	}
+	$VMS=1 if $_ eq "VMS";
+	if ($_ eq "zlib" || $_ eq "enable-zlib" || $_ eq "zlib-dynamic"
+			 || $_ eq "enable-zlib-dynamic") {
+		$zlib = 1;
+	}
+
+	$do_ssl=1 if $_ eq "libssl";
+	if ($_ eq "ssl") {
+		$do_ssl=1; 
+		$libname=$_
+	}
+	$do_crypto=1 if $_ eq "libcrypto";
+	if ($_ eq "crypto") {
+		$do_crypto=1;
+		$libname=$_;
+	}
+	$do_update=1 if $_ eq "update";
+	$do_rewrite=1 if $_ eq "rewrite";
+	$do_ctest=1 if $_ eq "ctest";
+	$do_ctestall=1 if $_ eq "ctestall";
+	$do_checkexist=1 if $_ eq "exist";
+	if (/^--api=(\d+)\.(\d+)\.(\d+)$/) {
+		my $apiv = sprintf "%x%02x%02x", $1, $2, $3;
+		foreach (@known_algorithms) {
+			if (/^DEPRECATEDIN_(\d+)_(\d+)_(\d+)$/) {
+				my $depv = sprintf "%x%02x%02x", $1, $2, $3;
+				$disabled_algorithms{$_} = 1 if $apiv ge $depv;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if (/^no-deprecated$/) {
+		foreach (@known_algorithms) {
+			if (/^DEPRECATEDIN_/) {
+				$disabled_algorithms{$_} = 1;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	elsif (/^(enable|disable|no)-(.*)$/) {
+		my $alg = uc $2;
+        $alg =~ tr/-/_/;
+		if (exists $disabled_algorithms{$alg}) {
+			$disabled_algorithms{$alg} = $1 eq "enable" ? 0 : 1;
+		}
+	}
+
+	}
+
+if (!$libname) { 
+	if ($do_ssl) {
+		$libname="LIBSSL";
+	}
+	if ($do_crypto) {
+		$libname="LIBCRYPTO";
+	}
+}
+
+# If no platform is given, assume WIN32
+if ($W32 + $VMS + $linux == 0) {
+	$W32 = 1;
+}
+die "Please, only one platform at a time"
+    if ($W32 + $VMS + $linux > 1);
+
+if (!$do_ssl && !$do_crypto)
+	{
+	print STDERR "usage: $0 ( ssl | crypto ) [ 16 | 32 | NT | OS2 | linux | VMS ]\n";
+	exit(1);
+	}
+
+%ssl_list=&load_numbers($ssl_num);
+$max_ssl = $max_num;
+%crypto_list=&load_numbers($crypto_num);
+$max_crypto = $max_num;
+
+my $ssl="include/openssl/ssl.h";
+$ssl.=" include/openssl/tls1.h";
+$ssl.=" include/openssl/srtp.h";
+
+# We use headers found in include/openssl and include/internal only.
+# The latter is needed so libssl.so/.dll/.exe can link properly.
+my $crypto ="include/openssl/crypto.h";
+$crypto.=" include/internal/o_dir.h";
+$crypto.=" include/internal/o_str.h";
+$crypto.=" include/internal/err.h";
+$crypto.=" include/internal/asn1t.h";
+$crypto.=" include/openssl/des.h" ; # unless $no_des;
+$crypto.=" include/openssl/idea.h" ; # unless $no_idea;
+$crypto.=" include/openssl/rc4.h" ; # unless $no_rc4;
+$crypto.=" include/openssl/rc5.h" ; # unless $no_rc5;
+$crypto.=" include/openssl/rc2.h" ; # unless $no_rc2;
+$crypto.=" include/openssl/blowfish.h" ; # unless $no_bf;
+$crypto.=" include/openssl/cast.h" ; # unless $no_cast;
+$crypto.=" include/openssl/whrlpool.h" ;
+$crypto.=" include/openssl/md2.h" ; # unless $no_md2;
+$crypto.=" include/openssl/md4.h" ; # unless $no_md4;
+$crypto.=" include/openssl/md5.h" ; # unless $no_md5;
+$crypto.=" include/openssl/mdc2.h" ; # unless $no_mdc2;
+$crypto.=" include/openssl/sha.h" ; # unless $no_sha;
+$crypto.=" include/openssl/ripemd.h" ; # unless $no_ripemd;
+$crypto.=" include/openssl/aes.h" ; # unless $no_aes;
+$crypto.=" include/openssl/camellia.h" ; # unless $no_camellia;
+$crypto.=" include/openssl/seed.h"; # unless $no_seed;
+
+$crypto.=" include/openssl/bn.h";
+$crypto.=" include/openssl/rsa.h" ; # unless $no_rsa;
+$crypto.=" include/openssl/dsa.h" ; # unless $no_dsa;
+$crypto.=" include/openssl/dh.h" ; # unless $no_dh;
+$crypto.=" include/openssl/ec.h" ; # unless $no_ec;
+$crypto.=" include/openssl/hmac.h" ; # unless $no_hmac;
+$crypto.=" include/openssl/cmac.h" ;
+
+$crypto.=" include/openssl/engine.h"; # unless $no_engine;
+$crypto.=" include/openssl/stack.h" ; # unless $no_stack;
+$crypto.=" include/openssl/buffer.h" ; # unless $no_buffer;
+$crypto.=" include/openssl/bio.h" ; # unless $no_bio;
+$crypto.=" include/internal/dso.h" ; # unless $no_dso;
+$crypto.=" include/openssl/lhash.h" ; # unless $no_lhash;
+$crypto.=" include/openssl/conf.h";
+$crypto.=" include/openssl/txt_db.h";
+
+$crypto.=" include/openssl/evp.h" ; # unless $no_evp;
+$crypto.=" include/openssl/objects.h";
+$crypto.=" include/openssl/pem.h";
+#$crypto.=" include/openssl/meth.h";
+$crypto.=" include/openssl/asn1.h";
+$crypto.=" include/openssl/asn1t.h";
+$crypto.=" include/openssl/err.h" ; # unless $no_err;
+$crypto.=" include/openssl/pkcs7.h";
+$crypto.=" include/openssl/pkcs12.h";
+$crypto.=" include/openssl/x509.h";
+$crypto.=" include/openssl/x509_vfy.h";
+$crypto.=" include/openssl/x509v3.h";
+$crypto.=" include/openssl/ts.h";
+$crypto.=" include/openssl/rand.h";
+$crypto.=" include/openssl/comp.h" ; # unless $no_comp;
+$crypto.=" include/openssl/ocsp.h";
+$crypto.=" include/openssl/ui.h";
+#$crypto.=" include/openssl/store.h";
+$crypto.=" include/openssl/cms.h";
+$crypto.=" include/openssl/srp.h";
+$crypto.=" include/openssl/modes.h";
+$crypto.=" include/openssl/async.h";
+$crypto.=" include/openssl/ct.h";
+$crypto.=" include/openssl/kdf.h";
+
+my $symhacks="include/openssl/symhacks.h";
+
+my @ssl_symbols = &do_defs("LIBSSL", $ssl, $symhacks);
+my @crypto_symbols = &do_defs("LIBCRYPTO", $crypto, $symhacks);
+
+if ($do_update) {
+
+if ($do_ssl == 1) {
+
+	&maybe_add_info("LIBSSL",*ssl_list,@ssl_symbols);
+	if ($do_rewrite == 1) {
+		open(OUT, ">$ssl_num");
+		&rewrite_numbers(*OUT,"LIBSSL",*ssl_list,@ssl_symbols);
+	} else {
+		open(OUT, ">>$ssl_num");
+	}
+	&update_numbers(*OUT,"LIBSSL",*ssl_list,$max_ssl,@ssl_symbols);
+	close OUT;
+}
+
+if($do_crypto == 1) {
+
+	&maybe_add_info("LIBCRYPTO",*crypto_list,@crypto_symbols);
+	if ($do_rewrite == 1) {
+		open(OUT, ">$crypto_num");
+		&rewrite_numbers(*OUT,"LIBCRYPTO",*crypto_list,@crypto_symbols);
+	} else {
+		open(OUT, ">>$crypto_num");
+	}
+	&update_numbers(*OUT,"LIBCRYPTO",*crypto_list,$max_crypto,@crypto_symbols);
+	close OUT;
+} 
+
+} elsif ($do_checkexist) {
+	&check_existing(*ssl_list, @ssl_symbols)
+		if $do_ssl == 1;
+	&check_existing(*crypto_list, @crypto_symbols)
+		if $do_crypto == 1;
+} elsif ($do_ctest || $do_ctestall) {
+
+	print <<"EOF";
+
+/* Test file to check all DEF file symbols are present by trying
+ * to link to all of them. This is *not* intended to be run!
+ */
+
+int main()
+{
+EOF
+	&print_test_file(*STDOUT,"LIBSSL",*ssl_list,$do_ctestall,@ssl_symbols)
+		if $do_ssl == 1;
+
+	&print_test_file(*STDOUT,"LIBCRYPTO",*crypto_list,$do_ctestall,@crypto_symbols)
+		if $do_crypto == 1;
+
+	print "}\n";
+
+} else {
+
+	&print_def_file(*STDOUT,$libname,*ssl_list,@ssl_symbols)
+		if $do_ssl == 1;
+
+	&print_def_file(*STDOUT,$libname,*crypto_list,@crypto_symbols)
+		if $do_crypto == 1;
+
+}
+
+
+sub do_defs
+{
+	my($name,$files,$symhacksfile)=@_;
+	my $file;
+	my @ret;
+	my %syms;
+	my %platform;		# For anything undefined, we assume ""
+	my %kind;		# For anything undefined, we assume "FUNCTION"
+	my %algorithm;		# For anything undefined, we assume ""
+	my %variant;
+	my %variant_cnt;	# To be able to allocate "name{n}" if "name"
+				# is the same name as the original.
+	my $cpp;
+	my %unknown_algorithms = ();
+	my $parens = 0;
+
+	foreach $file (split(/\s+/,$symhacksfile." ".$files))
+		{
+		my $fn = catfile($config{sourcedir},$file);
+		print STDERR "TRACE: start reading $fn\n" if $trace;
+		open(IN,"<$fn") || die "unable to open $fn:$!\n";
+		my $line = "", my $def= "";
+		my %tag = (
+			(map { $_ => 0 } @known_platforms),
+			(map { "OPENSSL_SYS_".$_ => 0 } @known_ossl_platforms),
+			(map { "OPENSSL_NO_".$_ => 0 } @known_algorithms),
+			(map { "OPENSSL_USE_".$_ => 0 } @known_algorithms),
+			NOPROTO		=> 0,
+			PERL5		=> 0,
+			_WINDLL		=> 0,
+			CONST_STRICT	=> 0,
+			TRUE		=> 1,
+		);
+		my $symhacking = $file eq $symhacksfile;
+		my @current_platforms = ();
+		my @current_algorithms = ();
+
+		# params: symbol, alias, platforms, kind
+		# The reason to put this subroutine in a variable is that
+		# it will otherwise create it's own, unshared, version of
+		# %tag and %variant...
+		my $make_variant = sub
+		{
+			my ($s, $a, $p, $k) = @_;
+			my ($a1, $a2);
+
+			print STDERR "DEBUG: make_variant: Entered with ",$s,", ",$a,", ",(defined($p)?$p:""),", ",(defined($k)?$k:""),"\n" if $debug;
+			if (defined($p))
+			{
+				$a1 = join(",",$p,
+					   grep(!/^$/,
+						map { $tag{$_} == 1 ? $_ : "" }
+						@known_platforms));
+			}
+			else
+			{
+				$a1 = join(",",
+					   grep(!/^$/,
+						map { $tag{$_} == 1 ? $_ : "" }
+						@known_platforms));
+			}
+			$a2 = join(",",
+				   grep(!/^$/,
+					map { $tag{"OPENSSL_SYS_".$_} == 1 ? $_ : "" }
+					@known_ossl_platforms));
+			print STDERR "DEBUG: make_variant: a1 = $a1; a2 = $a2\n" if $debug;
+			if ($a1 eq "") { $a1 = $a2; }
+			elsif ($a1 ne "" && $a2 ne "") { $a1 .= ",".$a2; }
+			if ($a eq $s)
+			{
+				if (!defined($variant_cnt{$s}))
+				{
+					$variant_cnt{$s} = 0;
+				}
+				$variant_cnt{$s}++;
+				$a .= "{$variant_cnt{$s}}";
+			}
+			my $toadd = $a.":".$a1.(defined($k)?":".$k:"");
+			my $togrep = $s.'(\{[0-9]+\})?:'.$a1.(defined($k)?":".$k:"");
+			if (!grep(/^$togrep$/,
+				  split(/;/, defined($variant{$s})?$variant{$s}:""))) {
+				if (defined($variant{$s})) { $variant{$s} .= ";"; }
+				$variant{$s} .= $toadd;
+			}
+			print STDERR "DEBUG: make_variant: Exit with variant of ",$s," = ",$variant{$s},"\n" if $debug;
+		};
+
+		print STDERR "DEBUG: parsing ----------\n" if $debug;
+		while(<IN>) {
+			s|\R$||; # Better chomp
+			if($parens > 0) {
+				#Inside a DEPRECATEDIN
+				$stored_multiline .= $_;
+				print STDERR "DEBUG: Continuing multiline DEPRECATEDIN: $stored_multiline\n" if $debug;
+				$parens = count_parens($stored_multiline);
+				if ($parens == 0) {
+					$def .= do_deprecated($stored_multiline,
+							\@current_platforms,
+							\@current_algorithms);
+				}
+				next;
+			}
+			if (/\/\* Error codes for the \w+ functions\. \*\//)
+				{
+				undef @tag;
+				last;
+				}
+			if ($line ne '') {
+				$_ = $line . $_;
+				$line = '';
+			}
+
+			if (/\\$/) {
+				$line = $`; # keep what was before the backslash
+				next;
+			}
+
+			if(/\/\*/) {
+				if (not /\*\//) {	# multiline comment...
+					$line = $_;	# ... just accumulate
+					next;
+				} else {
+					s/\/\*.*?\*\///gs;# wipe it
+				}
+			}
+
+			if ($cpp) {
+				$cpp++ if /^#\s*if/;
+				$cpp-- if /^#\s*endif/;
+				next;
+			}
+			if (/^#.*ifdef.*cplusplus/) {
+				$cpp = 1;
+				next;
+			}
+
+			s/{[^{}]*}//gs;                      # ignore {} blocks
+			print STDERR "DEBUG: \$def=\"$def\"\n" if $debug && $def ne "";
+			print STDERR "DEBUG: \$_=\"$_\"\n" if $debug;
+			if (/^\#\s*ifndef\s+(.*)/) {
+				push(@tag,"-");
+				push(@tag,$1);
+				$tag{$1}=-1;
+				print STDERR "DEBUG: $file: found tag $1 = -1\n" if $debug;
+			} elsif (/^\#\s*if\s+!defined\s*\(([^\)]+)\)/) {
+				push(@tag,"-");
+				if (/^\#\s*if\s+(!defined\s*\(([^\)]+)\)(\s+\&\&\s+!defined\s*\(([^\)]+)\))*)$/) {
+					my $tmp_1 = $1;
+					my $tmp_;
+					foreach $tmp_ (split '\&\&',$tmp_1) {
+						$tmp_ =~ /!defined\s*\(([^\)]+)\)/;
+						print STDERR "DEBUG: $file: found tag $1 = -1\n" if $debug;
+						push(@tag,$1);
+						$tag{$1}=-1;
+					}
+				} else {
+					print STDERR "Warning: $file: taking only '!defined($1)' of complicated expression: $_" if $verbose; # because it is O...
+					print STDERR "DEBUG: $file: found tag $1 = -1\n" if $debug;
+					push(@tag,$1);
+					$tag{$1}=-1;
+				}
+			} elsif (/^\#\s*ifdef\s+(\S*)/) {
+				push(@tag,"-");
+				push(@tag,$1);
+				$tag{$1}=1;
+				print STDERR "DEBUG: $file: found tag $1 = 1\n" if $debug;
+			} elsif (/^\#\s*if\s+defined\s*\(([^\)]+)\)/) {
+				push(@tag,"-");
+				if (/^\#\s*if\s+(defined\s*\(([^\)]+)\)(\s+\|\|\s+defined\s*\(([^\)]+)\))*)$/) {
+					my $tmp_1 = $1;
+					my $tmp_;
+					foreach $tmp_ (split '\|\|',$tmp_1) {
+						$tmp_ =~ /defined\s*\(([^\)]+)\)/;
+						print STDERR "DEBUG: $file: found tag $1 = 1\n" if $debug;
+						push(@tag,$1);
+						$tag{$1}=1;
+					}
+				} else {
+					print STDERR "Warning: $file: taking only 'defined($1)' of complicated expression: $_\n" if $verbose; # because it is O...
+					print STDERR "DEBUG: $file: found tag $1 = 1\n" if $debug;
+					push(@tag,$1);
+					$tag{$1}=1;
+				}
+			} elsif (/^\#\s*error\s+(\w+) is disabled\./) {
+				my $tag_i = $#tag;
+				while($tag[$tag_i] ne "-") {
+					if ($tag[$tag_i] eq "OPENSSL_NO_".$1) {
+						$tag{$tag[$tag_i]}=2;
+						print STDERR "DEBUG: $file: chaged tag $1 = 2\n" if $debug;
+					}
+					$tag_i--;
+				}
+			} elsif (/^\#\s*endif/) {
+				my $tag_i = $#tag;
+				while($tag_i > 0 && $tag[$tag_i] ne "-") {
+					my $t=$tag[$tag_i];
+					print STDERR "DEBUG: \$t=\"$t\"\n" if $debug;
+					if ($tag{$t}==2) {
+						$tag{$t}=-1;
+					} else {
+						$tag{$t}=0;
+					}
+					print STDERR "DEBUG: $file: changed tag ",$t," = ",$tag{$t},"\n" if $debug;
+					pop(@tag);
+					if ($t =~ /^OPENSSL_NO_([A-Z0-9_]+)$/) {
+						$t=$1;
+					} elsif($t =~ /^OPENSSL_USE_([A-Z0-9_]+)$/) {
+						$t=$1;
+					} else {
+						$t="";
+					}
+					if ($t ne ""
+					    && !grep(/^$t$/, @known_algorithms)) {
+						$unknown_algorithms{$t} = 1;
+						#print STDERR "DEBUG: Added as unknown algorithm: $t\n" if $debug;
+					}
+					$tag_i--;
+				}
+				pop(@tag);
+			} elsif (/^\#\s*else/) {
+				my $tag_i = $#tag;
+				die "$file unmatched else\n" if $tag_i < 0;
+				while($tag[$tag_i] ne "-") {
+					my $t=$tag[$tag_i];
+					$tag{$t}= -$tag{$t};
+					print STDERR "DEBUG: $file: changed tag ",$t," = ",$tag{$t},"\n" if $debug;
+					$tag_i--;
+				}
+			} elsif (/^\#\s*if\s+1/) {
+				push(@tag,"-");
+				# Dummy tag
+				push(@tag,"TRUE");
+				$tag{"TRUE"}=1;
+				print STDERR "DEBUG: $file: found 1\n" if $debug;
+			} elsif (/^\#\s*if\s+0/) {
+				push(@tag,"-");
+				# Dummy tag
+				push(@tag,"TRUE");
+				$tag{"TRUE"}=-1;
+				print STDERR "DEBUG: $file: found 0\n" if $debug;
+			} elsif (/^\#\s*if\s+/) {
+				#Some other unrecognized "if" style
+				push(@tag,"-");
+				print STDERR "Warning: $file: ignoring unrecognized expression: $_\n" if $verbose; # because it is O...
+			} elsif (/^\#\s*define\s+(\w+)\s+(\w+)/
+				 && $symhacking && $tag{'TRUE'} != -1) {
+				# This is for aliasing.  When we find an alias,
+				# we have to invert
+				&$make_variant($1,$2);
+				print STDERR "DEBUG: $file: defined $1 = $2\n" if $debug;
+			}
+			if (/^\#/) {
+				@current_platforms =
+				    grep(!/^$/,
+					 map { $tag{$_} == 1 ? $_ :
+						   $tag{$_} == -1 ? "!".$_  : "" }
+					 @known_platforms);
+				push @current_platforms
+				    , grep(!/^$/,
+					   map { $tag{"OPENSSL_SYS_".$_} == 1 ? $_ :
+						     $tag{"OPENSSL_SYS_".$_} == -1 ? "!".$_  : "" }
+					   @known_ossl_platforms);
+				@current_algorithms = ();
+				@current_algorithms =
+				    grep(!/^$/,
+					 map { $tag{"OPENSSL_NO_".$_} == -1 ? $_ : "" }
+					 @known_algorithms);
+				push @current_algorithms
+				    , grep(!/^$/,
+					 map { $tag{"OPENSSL_USE_".$_} == 1 ? $_ : "" }
+					 @known_algorithms);
+				$def .=
+				    "#INFO:"
+					.join(',',@current_platforms).":"
+					    .join(',',@current_algorithms).";";
+				next;
+			}
+			if ($tag{'TRUE'} != -1) {
+				if (/^\s*DEFINE_STACK_OF\s*\(\s*(\w*)\s*\)/
+						|| /^\s*DEFINE_STACK_OF_CONST\s*\(\s*(\w*)\s*\)/) {
+					next;
+				} elsif (/^\s*DECLARE_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS\s*\(\s*(\w*)\s*,\s*(\w*)\s*,\s*(\w*)\s*\)/) {
+					$def .= "int d2i_$3(void);";
+					$def .= "int i2d_$3(void);";
+					# Variant for platforms that do not
+					# have to access globale variables
+					# in shared libraries through functions
+					$def .=
+					    "#INFO:"
+						.join(',',"!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION",@current_platforms).":"
+						    .join(',',@current_algorithms).";";
+					$def .= "OPENSSL_EXTERN int $2_it;";
+					$def .=
+					    "#INFO:"
+						.join(',',@current_platforms).":"
+						    .join(',',@current_algorithms).";";
+					# Variant for platforms that have to
+					# access globale variables in shared
+					# libraries through functions
+					&$make_variant("$2_it","$2_it",
+						      "EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION",
+						      "FUNCTION");
+					next;
+				} elsif (/^\s*DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_fname\s*\(\s*(\w*)\s*,\s*(\w*)\s*,\s*(\w*)\s*\)/) {
+					$def .= "int d2i_$3(void);";
+					$def .= "int i2d_$3(void);";
+					$def .= "int $3_free(void);";
+					$def .= "int $3_new(void);";
+					# Variant for platforms that do not
+					# have to access globale variables
+					# in shared libraries through functions
+					$def .=
+					    "#INFO:"
+						.join(',',"!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION",@current_platforms).":"
+						    .join(',',@current_algorithms).";";
+					$def .= "OPENSSL_EXTERN int $2_it;";
+					$def .=
+					    "#INFO:"
+						.join(',',@current_platforms).":"
+						    .join(',',@current_algorithms).";";
+					# Variant for platforms that have to
+					# access globale variables in shared
+					# libraries through functions
+					&$make_variant("$2_it","$2_it",
+						      "EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION",
+						      "FUNCTION");
+					next;
+				} elsif (/^\s*DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS\s*\(\s*(\w*)\s*\)/ ||
+					 /^\s*DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const\s*\(\s*(\w*)\s*\)/) {
+					$def .= "int d2i_$1(void);";
+					$def .= "int i2d_$1(void);";
+					$def .= "int $1_free(void);";
+					$def .= "int $1_new(void);";
+					# Variant for platforms that do not
+					# have to access globale variables
+					# in shared libraries through functions
+					$def .=
+					    "#INFO:"
+						.join(',',"!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION",@current_platforms).":"
+						    .join(',',@current_algorithms).";";
+					$def .= "OPENSSL_EXTERN int $1_it;";
+					$def .=
+					    "#INFO:"
+						.join(',',@current_platforms).":"
+						    .join(',',@current_algorithms).";";
+					# Variant for platforms that have to
+					# access globale variables in shared
+					# libraries through functions
+					&$make_variant("$1_it","$1_it",
+						      "EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION",
+						      "FUNCTION");
+					next;
+				} elsif (/^\s*DECLARE_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const\s*\(\s*(\w*)\s*,\s*(\w*)\s*\)/) {
+					$def .= "int d2i_$2(void);";
+					$def .= "int i2d_$2(void);";
+					# Variant for platforms that do not
+					# have to access globale variables
+					# in shared libraries through functions
+					$def .=
+					    "#INFO:"
+						.join(',',"!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION",@current_platforms).":"
+						    .join(',',@current_algorithms).";";
+					$def .= "OPENSSL_EXTERN int $2_it;";
+					$def .=
+					    "#INFO:"
+						.join(',',@current_platforms).":"
+						    .join(',',@current_algorithms).";";
+					# Variant for platforms that have to
+					# access globale variables in shared
+					# libraries through functions
+					&$make_variant("$2_it","$2_it",
+						      "EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION",
+						      "FUNCTION");
+					next;
+				} elsif (/^\s*DECLARE_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS\s*\(\s*(\w*)\s*\)/) {
+					$def .= "int $1_free(void);";
+					$def .= "int $1_new(void);";
+					next;
+				} elsif (/^\s*DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_name\s*\(\s*(\w*)\s*,\s*(\w*)\s*\)/) {
+					$def .= "int d2i_$2(void);";
+					$def .= "int i2d_$2(void);";
+					$def .= "int $2_free(void);";
+					$def .= "int $2_new(void);";
+					# Variant for platforms that do not
+					# have to access globale variables
+					# in shared libraries through functions
+					$def .=
+					    "#INFO:"
+						.join(',',"!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION",@current_platforms).":"
+						    .join(',',@current_algorithms).";";
+					$def .= "OPENSSL_EXTERN int $2_it;";
+					$def .=
+					    "#INFO:"
+						.join(',',@current_platforms).":"
+						    .join(',',@current_algorithms).";";
+					# Variant for platforms that have to
+					# access globale variables in shared
+					# libraries through functions
+					&$make_variant("$2_it","$2_it",
+						      "EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION",
+						      "FUNCTION");
+					next;
+				} elsif (/^\s*DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM\s*\(\s*(\w*)\s*\)/) {
+					# Variant for platforms that do not
+					# have to access globale variables
+					# in shared libraries through functions
+					$def .=
+					    "#INFO:"
+						.join(',',"!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION",@current_platforms).":"
+						    .join(',',@current_algorithms).";";
+					$def .= "OPENSSL_EXTERN int $1_it;";
+					$def .=
+					    "#INFO:"
+						.join(',',@current_platforms).":"
+						    .join(',',@current_algorithms).";";
+					# Variant for platforms that have to
+					# access globale variables in shared
+					# libraries through functions
+					&$make_variant("$1_it","$1_it",
+						      "EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION",
+						      "FUNCTION");
+					next;
+				} elsif (/^\s*DECLARE_ASN1_NDEF_FUNCTION\s*\(\s*(\w*)\s*\)/) {
+					$def .= "int i2d_$1_NDEF(void);";
+				} elsif (/^\s*DECLARE_ASN1_SET_OF\s*\(\s*(\w*)\s*\)/) {
+					next;
+				} elsif (/^\s*DECLARE_ASN1_PRINT_FUNCTION\s*\(\s*(\w*)\s*\)/) {
+					$def .= "int $1_print_ctx(void);";
+					next;
+				} elsif (/^\s*DECLARE_ASN1_PRINT_FUNCTION_name\s*\(\s*(\w*)\s*,\s*(\w*)\s*\)/) {
+					$def .= "int $2_print_ctx(void);";
+					next;
+				} elsif (/^\s*DECLARE_PKCS12_STACK_OF\s*\(\s*(\w*)\s*\)/) {
+					next;
+				} elsif (/^DECLARE_PEM_rw\s*\(\s*(\w*)\s*,/ ||
+					 /^DECLARE_PEM_rw_cb\s*\(\s*(\w*)\s*,/ ||
+					 /^DECLARE_PEM_rw_const\s*\(\s*(\w*)\s*,/ ) {
+					$def .=
+					    "#INFO:"
+						.join(',',@current_platforms).":"
+						    .join(',',"STDIO",@current_algorithms).";";
+					$def .= "int PEM_read_$1(void);";
+					$def .= "int PEM_write_$1(void);";
+					$def .=
+					    "#INFO:"
+						.join(',',@current_platforms).":"
+						    .join(',',@current_algorithms).";";
+					# Things that are everywhere
+					$def .= "int PEM_read_bio_$1(void);";
+					$def .= "int PEM_write_bio_$1(void);";
+					next;
+				} elsif (/^DECLARE_PEM_write\s*\(\s*(\w*)\s*,/ ||
+					/^DECLARE_PEM_write_const\s*\(\s*(\w*)\s*,/ ||
+					 /^DECLARE_PEM_write_cb\s*\(\s*(\w*)\s*,/ ) {
+					$def .=
+					    "#INFO:"
+						.join(',',@current_platforms).":"
+						    .join(',',"STDIO",@current_algorithms).";";
+					$def .= "int PEM_write_$1(void);";
+					$def .=
+					    "#INFO:"
+						.join(',',@current_platforms).":"
+						    .join(',',@current_algorithms).";";
+					# Things that are everywhere
+					$def .= "int PEM_write_bio_$1(void);";
+					next;
+				} elsif (/^DECLARE_PEM_read\s*\(\s*(\w*)\s*,/ ||
+					 /^DECLARE_PEM_read_cb\s*\(\s*(\w*)\s*,/ ) {
+					$def .=
+					    "#INFO:"
+						.join(',',@current_platforms).":"
+						    .join(',',"STDIO",@current_algorithms).";";
+					$def .= "int PEM_read_$1(void);";
+					$def .=
+					    "#INFO:"
+						.join(',',@current_platforms).":"
+						    .join(',',"STDIO",@current_algorithms).";";
+					# Things that are everywhere
+					$def .= "int PEM_read_bio_$1(void);";
+					next;
+				} elsif (/^OPENSSL_DECLARE_GLOBAL\s*\(\s*(\w*)\s*,\s*(\w*)\s*\)/) {
+					# Variant for platforms that do not
+					# have to access globale variables
+					# in shared libraries through functions
+					$def .=
+					    "#INFO:"
+						.join(',',"!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION",@current_platforms).":"
+						    .join(',',@current_algorithms).";";
+					$def .= "OPENSSL_EXTERN int _shadow_$2;";
+					$def .=
+					    "#INFO:"
+						.join(',',@current_platforms).":"
+						    .join(',',@current_algorithms).";";
+					# Variant for platforms that have to
+					# access globale variables in shared
+					# libraries through functions
+					&$make_variant("_shadow_$2","_shadow_$2",
+						      "EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION",
+						      "FUNCTION");
+				} elsif (/^\s*DEPRECATEDIN/) {
+					$parens = count_parens($_);
+					if ($parens == 0) {
+						$def .= do_deprecated($_,
+							\@current_platforms,
+							\@current_algorithms);
+					} else {
+						$stored_multiline = $_;
+						print STDERR "DEBUG: Found multiline DEPRECATEDIN starting with: $stored_multiline\n" if $debug;
+						next;
+					}
+				} elsif ($tag{'CONST_STRICT'} != 1) {
+					if (/\{|\/\*|\([^\)]*$/) {
+						$line = $_;
+					} else {
+						$def .= $_;
+					}
+				}
+			}
+		}
+		close(IN);
+		die "$file: Unmatched tags\n" if $#tag >= 0;
+
+		my $algs;
+		my $plays;
+
+		print STDERR "DEBUG: postprocessing ----------\n" if $debug;
+		foreach (split /;/, $def) {
+			my $s; my $k = "FUNCTION"; my $p; my $a;
+			s/^[\n\s]*//g;
+			s/[\n\s]*$//g;
+			next if(/\#undef/);
+			next if(/typedef\W/);
+			next if(/\#define/);
+
+			print STDERR "TRACE: processing $_\n" if $trace && !/^\#INFO:/;
+			# Reduce argument lists to empty ()
+			# fold round brackets recursively: (t(*v)(t),t) -> (t{}{},t) -> {}
+			my $nsubst = 1; # prevent infinite loop, e.g., on  int fn()
+			while($nsubst && /\(.*\)/s) {
+				$nsubst = s/\([^\(\)]+\)/\{\}/gs;
+				$nsubst+= s/\(\s*\*\s*(\w+)\s*\{\}\s*\)/$1/gs;	#(*f{}) -> f
+			}
+			# pretend as we didn't use curly braces: {} -> ()
+			s/\{\}/\(\)/gs;
+
+			s/STACK_OF\(\)/void/gs;
+			s/LHASH_OF\(\)/void/gs;
+
+			print STDERR "DEBUG: \$_ = \"$_\"\n" if $debug;
+			if (/^\#INFO:([^:]*):(.*)$/) {
+				$plats = $1;
+				$algs = $2;
+				print STDERR "DEBUG: found info on platforms ($plats) and algorithms ($algs)\n" if $debug;
+				next;
+			} elsif (/^\s*OPENSSL_EXTERN\s.*?(\w+(\{[0-9]+\})?)(\[[0-9]*\])*\s*$/) {
+				$s = $1;
+				$k = "VARIABLE";
+				print STDERR "DEBUG: found external variable $s\n" if $debug;
+			} elsif (/TYPEDEF_\w+_OF/s) {
+				next;
+			} elsif (/(\w+)\s*\(\).*/s) {	# first token prior [first] () is
+				$s = $1;		# a function name!
+				print STDERR "DEBUG: found function $s\n" if $debug;
+			} elsif (/\(/ and not (/=/)) {
+				print STDERR "File $file: cannot parse: $_;\n";
+				next;
+			} else {
+				next;
+			}
+
+			$syms{$s} = 1;
+			$kind{$s} = $k;
+
+			$p = $plats;
+			$a = $algs;
+
+			$platform{$s} =
+			    &reduce_platforms((defined($platform{$s})?$platform{$s}.',':"").$p);
+			$algorithm{$s} .= ','.$a;
+
+			if (defined($variant{$s})) {
+				foreach $v (split /;/,$variant{$s}) {
+					(my $r, my $p, my $k) = split(/:/,$v);
+					my $ip = join ',',map({ /^!(.*)$/ ? $1 : "!".$_ } split /,/, $p);
+					$syms{$r} = 1;
+					if (!defined($k)) { $k = $kind{$s}; }
+					$kind{$r} = $k."(".$s.")";
+					$algorithm{$r} = $algorithm{$s};
+					$platform{$r} = &reduce_platforms($platform{$s}.",".$p.",".$p);
+					$platform{$s} = &reduce_platforms($platform{$s}.','.$ip.','.$ip);
+					print STDERR "DEBUG: \$variant{\"$s\"} = ",$v,"; \$r = $r; \$p = ",$platform{$r},"; \$a = ",$algorithm{$r},"; \$kind = ",$kind{$r},"\n" if $debug;
+				}
+			}
+			print STDERR "DEBUG: \$s = $s; \$p = ",$platform{$s},"; \$a = ",$algorithm{$s},"; \$kind = ",$kind{$s},"\n" if $debug;
+		}
+	}
+
+	# Prune the returned symbols
+
+        delete $syms{"bn_dump1"};
+	$platform{"BIO_s_log"} .= ",!WIN32,!macintosh";
+
+	$platform{"PEM_read_NS_CERT_SEQ"} = "VMS";
+	$platform{"PEM_write_NS_CERT_SEQ"} = "VMS";
+	$platform{"PEM_read_P8_PRIV_KEY_INFO"} = "VMS";
+	$platform{"PEM_write_P8_PRIV_KEY_INFO"} = "VMS";
+
+	# Info we know about
+
+	push @ret, map { $_."\\".&info_string($_,"EXIST",
+					      $platform{$_},
+					      $kind{$_},
+					      $algorithm{$_}) } keys %syms;
+
+	if (keys %unknown_algorithms) {
+		print STDERR "WARNING: mkdef.pl doesn't know the following algorithms:\n";
+		print STDERR "\t",join("\n\t",keys %unknown_algorithms),"\n";
+	}
+	return(@ret);
+}
+
+# Param: string of comma-separated platform-specs.
+sub reduce_platforms
+{
+	my ($platforms) = @_;
+	my $pl = defined($platforms) ? $platforms : "";
+	my %p = map { $_ => 0 } split /,/, $pl;
+	my $ret;
+
+	print STDERR "DEBUG: Entered reduce_platforms with \"$platforms\"\n"
+	    if $debug;
+	# We do this, because if there's code like the following, it really
+	# means the function exists in all cases and should therefore be
+	# everywhere.  By increasing and decreasing, we may attain 0:
+	#
+	# ifndef WIN16
+	#    int foo();
+	# else
+	#    int _fat foo();
+	# endif
+	foreach $platform (split /,/, $pl) {
+		if ($platform =~ /^!(.*)$/) {
+			$p{$1}--;
+		} else {
+			$p{$platform}++;
+		}
+	}
+	foreach $platform (keys %p) {
+		if ($p{$platform} == 0) { delete $p{$platform}; }
+	}
+
+	delete $p{""};
+
+	$ret = join(',',sort(map { $p{$_} < 0 ? "!".$_ : $_ } keys %p));
+	print STDERR "DEBUG: Exiting reduce_platforms with \"$ret\"\n"
+	    if $debug;
+	return $ret;
+}
+
+sub info_string
+{
+	(my $symbol, my $exist, my $platforms, my $kind, my $algorithms) = @_;
+
+	my %a = defined($algorithms) ?
+	    map { $_ => 1 } split /,/, $algorithms : ();
+	my $k = defined($kind) ? $kind : "FUNCTION";
+	my $ret;
+	my $p = &reduce_platforms($platforms);
+
+	delete $a{""};
+
+	$ret = $exist;
+	$ret .= ":".$p;
+	$ret .= ":".$k;
+	$ret .= ":".join(',',sort keys %a);
+	return $ret;
+}
+
+sub maybe_add_info
+{
+	(my $name, *nums, my @symbols) = @_;
+	my $sym;
+	my $new_info = 0;
+	my %syms=();
+
+	foreach $sym (@symbols) {
+		(my $s, my $i) = split /\\/, $sym;
+		if (defined($nums{$s})) {
+			$i =~ s/^(.*?:.*?:\w+)(\(\w+\))?/$1/;
+			(my $n, my $vers, my $dummy) = split /\\/, $nums{$s};
+			if (!defined($dummy) || $i ne $dummy) {
+				$nums{$s} = $n."\\".$vers."\\".$i;
+				$new_info++;
+				print STDERR "DEBUG: maybe_add_info for $s: \"$dummy\" => \"$i\"\n" if $debug;
+			}
+		}
+		$syms{$s} = 1;
+	}
+
+	my @s=sort { &parse_number($nums{$a},"n") <=> &parse_number($nums{$b},"n") } keys %nums;
+	foreach $sym (@s) {
+		(my $n, my $vers, my $i) = split /\\/, $nums{$sym};
+		if (!defined($syms{$sym}) && $i !~ /^NOEXIST:/) {
+			$new_info++;
+			print STDERR "DEBUG: maybe_add_info for $sym: -> undefined\n" if $debug;
+		}
+	}
+	if ($new_info) {
+		print STDERR "$name: $new_info old symbols have updated info\n";
+		if (!$do_rewrite) {
+			print STDERR "You should do a rewrite to fix this.\n";
+		}
+	} else {
+	}
+}
+
+# Param: string of comma-separated keywords, each possibly prefixed with a "!"
+sub is_valid
+{
+	my ($keywords_txt,$platforms) = @_;
+	my (@keywords) = split /,/,$keywords_txt;
+	my ($falsesum, $truesum) = (0, 1);
+
+	# Param: one keyword
+	sub recognise
+	{
+		my ($keyword,$platforms) = @_;
+
+		if ($platforms) {
+			# platforms
+			if ($keyword eq "UNIX" && $UNIX) { return 1; }
+			if ($keyword eq "VMS" && $VMS) { return 1; }
+			if ($keyword eq "WIN32" && $W32) { return 1; }
+			if ($keyword eq "_WIN32" && $W32) { return 1; }
+			if ($keyword eq "WINNT" && $NT) { return 1; }
+			# Special platforms:
+			# EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION means that global variables
+			# will be represented as functions.
+			if ($keyword eq "EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION" && $W32) {
+				return 1;
+			}
+			if ($keyword eq "ZLIB" && $zlib) { return 1; }
+			return 0;
+		} else {
+			# algorithms
+			if ($disabled_algorithms{$keyword} == 1) { return 0;}
+
+			# Nothing recognise as true
+			return 1;
+		}
+	}
+
+	foreach $k (@keywords) {
+		if ($k =~ /^!(.*)$/) {
+			$falsesum += &recognise($1,$platforms);
+		} else {
+			$truesum *= &recognise($k,$platforms);
+		}
+	}
+	print STDERR "DEBUG: [",$#keywords,",",$#keywords < 0,"] is_valid($keywords_txt) => (\!$falsesum) && $truesum = ",(!$falsesum) && $truesum,"\n" if $debug;
+	return (!$falsesum) && $truesum;
+}
+
+sub print_test_file
+{
+	(*OUT,my $name,*nums,my $testall,my @symbols)=@_;
+	my $n = 1; my @e; my @r;
+	my $sym; my $prev = ""; my $prefSSLeay;
+
+	(@e)=grep(/^SSLeay(\{[0-9]+\})?\\.*?:.*?:.*/,@symbols);
+	(@r)=grep(/^\w+(\{[0-9]+\})?\\.*?:.*?:.*/ && !/^SSLeay(\{[0-9]+\})?\\.*?:.*?:.*/,@symbols);
+	@symbols=((sort @e),(sort @r));
+
+	foreach $sym (@symbols) {
+		(my $s, my $i) = $sym =~ /^(.*?)\\(.*)$/;
+		my $v = 0;
+		$v = 1 if $i=~ /^.*?:.*?:VARIABLE/;
+		my $p = ($i =~ /^[^:]*:([^:]*):/,$1);
+		my $a = ($i =~ /^[^:]*:[^:]*:[^:]*:([^:]*)/,$1);
+		if (!defined($nums{$s})) {
+			print STDERR "Warning: $s does not have a number assigned\n"
+			    if(!$do_update);
+		} elsif (is_valid($p,1) && is_valid($a,0)) {
+			my $s2 = ($s =~ /^(.*?)(\{[0-9]+\})?$/, $1);
+			if ($prev eq $s2) {
+				print OUT "\t/* The following has already appeared previously */\n";
+				print STDERR "Warning: Symbol '",$s2,"' redefined. old=",($nums{$prev} =~ /^(.*?)\\/,$1),", new=",($nums{$s2} =~ /^(.*?)\\/,$1),"\n";
+			}
+			$prev = $s2;	# To warn about duplicates...
+
+			(my $nn, my $vers, my $ni) = split /\\/, $nums{$s2};
+			if ($v) {
+				print OUT "\textern int $s2; /* type unknown */ /* $nn $ni */\n";
+			} else {
+				print OUT "\textern int $s2(); /* type unknown */ /* $nn $ni */\n";
+			}
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+sub get_version
+{
+   return $config{version};
+}
+
+sub print_def_file
+{
+	(*OUT,my $name,*nums,my @symbols)=@_;
+	my $n = 1; my @e; my @r; my @v; my $prev="";
+	my $liboptions="";
+	my $libname = $name;
+	my $http_vendor = 'www.openssl.org/';
+	my $version = get_version();
+	my $what = "OpenSSL: implementation of Secure Socket Layer";
+	my $description = "$what $version, $name - http://$http_vendor";
+	my $prevsymversion = "", $prevprevsymversion = "";
+        # For VMS
+        my $prevnum = 0;
+        my $symvtextcount = 0;
+
+	if ($W32)
+		{ $libname.="32"; }
+
+        if ($W32)
+                {
+                print OUT <<"EOF";
+;
+; Definition file for the DLL version of the $name library from OpenSSL
+;
+
+LIBRARY         $libname	$liboptions
+
+EOF
+
+		print "EXPORTS\n";
+                }
+        elsif ($VMS)
+                {
+                print OUT <<"EOF";
+CASE_SENSITIVE=YES
+SYMBOL_VECTOR=(-
+EOF
+                $symvtextcount = 16; # length of "SYMBOL_VECTOR=(-"
+                }
+
+	(@r)=grep(/^\w+(\{[0-9]+\})?\\.*?:.*?:FUNCTION/,@symbols);
+	(@v)=grep(/^\w+(\{[0-9]+\})?\\.*?:.*?:VARIABLE/,@symbols);
+        if ($VMS) {
+            # VMS needs to have the symbols on slot number order
+            @symbols=(map { $_->[1] }
+                      sort { $a->[0] <=> $b->[0] }
+                      map { (my $s, my $i) = $_ =~ /^(.*?)\\(.*)$/;
+                            die "Error: $s doesn't have a number assigned\n"
+                                if !defined($nums{$s});
+                            (my $n, my @rest) = split /\\/, $nums{$s};
+                            [ $n, $_ ] } (@e, @r, @v));
+        } else {
+            @symbols=((sort @e),(sort @r), (sort @v));
+        }
+
+	my ($baseversion, $currversion) = get_openssl_version();
+	my $thisversion;
+	do {
+		if (!defined($thisversion)) {
+			$thisversion = $baseversion;
+		} else {
+			$thisversion = get_next_version($thisversion);
+		}
+		foreach $sym (@symbols) {
+			(my $s, my $i) = $sym =~ /^(.*?)\\(.*)$/;
+			my $v = 0;
+			$v = 1 if $i =~ /^.*?:.*?:VARIABLE/;
+			if (!defined($nums{$s})) {
+				die "Error: $s does not have a number assigned\n"
+					if(!$do_update);
+			} else {
+				(my $n, my $symversion, my $dummy) = split /\\/, $nums{$s};
+				my %pf = ();
+				my $p = ($i =~ /^[^:]*:([^:]*):/,$1);
+				my $a = ($i =~ /^[^:]*:[^:]*:[^:]*:([^:]*)/,$1);
+				if (is_valid($p,1) && is_valid($a,0)) {
+					my $s2 = ($s =~ /^(.*?)(\{[0-9]+\})?$/, $1);
+					if ($prev eq $s2) {
+						print STDERR "Warning: Symbol '",$s2,
+							"' redefined. old=",($nums{$prev} =~ /^(.*?)\\/,$1),
+							", new=",($nums{$s2} =~ /^(.*?)\\/,$1),"\n";
+					}
+					$prev = $s2;	# To warn about duplicates...
+					if($linux) {
+						next if $symversion ne $thisversion;
+						if ($symversion ne $prevsymversion) {
+							if ($prevsymversion ne "") {
+								if ($prevprevsymversion ne "") {
+									print OUT "} OPENSSL${SO_VARIANT}_"
+												."$prevprevsymversion;\n\n";
+								} else {
+									print OUT "};\n\n";
+								}
+							}
+							print OUT "OPENSSL${SO_VARIANT}_$symversion {\n    global:\n";
+							$prevprevsymversion = $prevsymversion;
+							$prevsymversion = $symversion;
+						}
+						print OUT "        $s2;\n";
+                                        } elsif ($VMS) {
+                                            while(++$prevnum < $n) {
+                                                my $symline=" ,SPARE -\n  ,SPARE -\n";
+                                                if ($symvtextcount + length($symline) - 2 > 1024) {
+                                                    print OUT ")\nSYMBOL_VECTOR=(-\n";
+                                                    $symvtextcount = 16; # length of "SYMBOL_VECTOR=(-"
+                                                }
+                                                if ($symvtextcount == 16) {
+                                                    # Take away first comma
+                                                    $symline =~ s/,//;
+                                                }
+                                                print OUT $symline;
+                                                $symvtextcount += length($symline) - 2;
+                                            }
+                                            (my $s_uc = $s) =~ tr/a-z/A-Z/;
+                                            my $symtype=
+                                                $v ? "DATA" : "PROCEDURE";
+                                            my $symline=
+                                                ($s_uc ne $s
+                                                 ? " ,$s_uc/$s=$symtype -\n  ,$s=$symtype -\n"
+                                                 : " ,$s=$symtype -\n  ,SPARE -\n");
+                                            if ($symvtextcount + length($symline) - 2 > 1024) {
+                                                print OUT ")\nSYMBOL_VECTOR=(-\n";
+                                                $symvtextcount = 16; # length of "SYMBOL_VECTOR=(-"
+                                            }
+                                            if ($symvtextcount == 16) {
+                                                # Take away first comma
+                                                $symline =~ s/,//;
+                                            }
+                                            print OUT $symline;
+                                            $symvtextcount += length($symline) - 2;
+					} elsif($v) {
+						printf OUT "    %s%-39s DATA\n",
+								($W32)?"":"_",$s2;
+					} else {
+						printf OUT "    %s%s\n",
+								($W32)?"":"_",$s2;
+					}
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	} while ($linux && $thisversion ne $currversion);
+	if ($linux) {
+		if ($prevprevsymversion ne "") {
+			print OUT "    local: *;\n} OPENSSL${SO_VARIANT}_$prevprevsymversion;\n\n";
+		} else {
+			print OUT "    local: *;\n};\n\n";
+		}
+	} elsif ($VMS) {
+            print OUT ")\n";
+            (my $libvmaj, my $libvmin, my $libvedit) =
+                $currversion =~ /^(\d+)_(\d+)_(\d+)$/;
+            # The reason to multiply the edit number with 100 is to make space
+            # for the possibility that we want to encode the patch letters
+            print OUT "GSMATCH=LEQUAL,",($libvmaj * 100 + $libvmin),",",($libvedit * 100),"\n";
+        }
+	printf OUT "\n";
+}
+
+sub load_numbers
+{
+	my($name)=@_;
+	my(@a,%ret);
+	my $prevversion;
+
+	$max_num = 0;
+	$num_noinfo = 0;
+	$prev = "";
+	$prev_cnt = 0;
+
+	my ($baseversion, $currversion) = get_openssl_version();
+
+	open(IN,"<$name") || die "unable to open $name:$!\n";
+	while (<IN>) {
+		s|\R$||;        # Better chomp
+		s/#.*$//;
+		next if /^\s*$/;
+		@a=split;
+		if (defined $ret{$a[0]}) {
+			# This is actually perfectly OK
+			#print STDERR "Warning: Symbol '",$a[0],"' redefined. old=",$ret{$a[0]},", new=",$a[1],"\n";
+		}
+		if ($max_num > $a[1]) {
+			print STDERR "Warning: Number decreased from ",$max_num," to ",$a[1],"\n";
+		}
+		elsif ($max_num == $a[1]) {
+			# This is actually perfectly OK
+			#print STDERR "Warning: Symbol ",$a[0]," has same number as previous ",$prev,": ",$a[1],"\n";
+			if ($a[0] eq $prev) {
+				$prev_cnt++;
+				$a[0] .= "{$prev_cnt}";
+			}
+		}
+		else {
+			$prev_cnt = 0;
+		}
+		if ($#a < 2) {
+			# Existence will be proven later, in do_defs
+			$ret{$a[0]}=$a[1];
+			$num_noinfo++;
+		} else {
+			#Sanity check the version number
+			if (defined $prevversion) {
+				check_version_lte($prevversion, $a[2]);
+			}
+			check_version_lte($a[2], $currversion);
+			$prevversion = $a[2];
+			$ret{$a[0]}=$a[1]."\\".$a[2]."\\".$a[3]; # \\ is a special marker
+		}
+		$max_num = $a[1] if $a[1] > $max_num;
+		$prev=$a[0];
+	}
+	if ($num_noinfo) {
+		print STDERR "Warning: $num_noinfo symbols were without info." if $verbose || !$do_rewrite;
+		if ($do_rewrite) {
+			printf STDERR "  The rewrite will fix this.\n" if $verbose;
+		} else {
+			printf STDERR "  You should do a rewrite to fix this.\n";
+		}
+	}
+	close(IN);
+	return(%ret);
+}
+
+sub parse_number
+{
+	(my $str, my $what) = @_;
+	(my $n, my $v, my $i) = split(/\\/,$str);
+	if ($what eq "n") {
+		return $n;
+	} else {
+		return $i;
+	}
+}
+
+sub rewrite_numbers
+{
+	(*OUT,$name,*nums,@symbols)=@_;
+	my $thing;
+
+	my @r = grep(/^\w+(\{[0-9]+\})?\\.*?:.*?:\w+\(\w+\)/,@symbols);
+	my $r; my %r; my %rsyms;
+	foreach $r (@r) {
+		(my $s, my $i) = split /\\/, $r;
+		my $a = $1 if $i =~ /^.*?:.*?:\w+\((\w+)\)/;
+		$i =~ s/^(.*?:.*?:\w+)\(\w+\)/$1/;
+		$r{$a} = $s."\\".$i;
+		$rsyms{$s} = 1;
+	}
+
+	my %syms = ();
+	foreach $_ (@symbols) {
+		(my $n, my $i) = split /\\/;
+		$syms{$n} = 1;
+	}
+
+	my @s=sort {
+	    &parse_number($nums{$a},"n") <=> &parse_number($nums{$b},"n")
+	    || $a cmp $b
+	} keys %nums;
+	foreach $sym (@s) {
+		(my $n, my $vers, my $i) = split /\\/, $nums{$sym};
+		next if defined($i) && $i =~ /^.*?:.*?:\w+\(\w+\)/;
+		next if defined($rsyms{$sym});
+		print STDERR "DEBUG: rewrite_numbers for sym = ",$sym,": i = ",$i,", n = ",$n,", rsym{sym} = ",$rsyms{$sym},"syms{sym} = ",$syms{$sym},"\n" if $debug;
+		$i="NOEXIST::FUNCTION:"
+			if !defined($i) || $i eq "" || !defined($syms{$sym});
+		my $s2 = $sym;
+		$s2 =~ s/\{[0-9]+\}$//;
+		printf OUT "%s%-39s %d\t%s\t%s\n","",$s2,$n,$vers,$i;
+		if (exists $r{$sym}) {
+			(my $s, $i) = split /\\/,$r{$sym};
+			my $s2 = $s;
+			$s2 =~ s/\{[0-9]+\}$//;
+			printf OUT "%s%-39s %d\t%s\t%s\n","",$s2,$n,$vers,$i;
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+sub update_numbers
+{
+	(*OUT,$name,*nums,my $start_num, my @symbols)=@_;
+	my $new_syms = 0;
+	my $basevers;
+	my $vers;
+
+	($basevers, $vers) = get_openssl_version();
+
+	my @r = grep(/^\w+(\{[0-9]+\})?\\.*?:.*?:\w+\(\w+\)/,@symbols);
+	my $r; my %r; my %rsyms;
+	foreach $r (@r) {
+		(my $s, my $i) = split /\\/, $r;
+		my $a = $1 if $i =~ /^.*?:.*?:\w+\((\w+)\)/;
+		$i =~ s/^(.*?:.*?:\w+)\(\w+\)/$1/;
+		$r{$a} = $s."\\".$i;
+		$rsyms{$s} = 1;
+	}
+
+	foreach $sym (@symbols) {
+		(my $s, my $i) = $sym =~ /^(.*?)\\(.*)$/;
+		next if $i =~ /^.*?:.*?:\w+\(\w+\)/;
+		next if defined($rsyms{$sym});
+		die "ERROR: Symbol $sym had no info attached to it."
+		    if $i eq "";
+		if (!exists $nums{$s}) {
+			$new_syms++;
+			my $s2 = $s;
+			$s2 =~ s/\{[0-9]+\}$//;
+			printf OUT "%s%-39s %d\t%s\t%s\n","",$s2, ++$start_num,$vers,$i;
+			if (exists $r{$s}) {
+				($s, $i) = split /\\/,$r{$s};
+				$s =~ s/\{[0-9]+\}$//;
+				printf OUT "%s%-39s %d\t%s\t%s\n","",$s, $start_num,$vers,$i;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if($new_syms) {
+		print STDERR "$name: Added $new_syms new symbols\n";
+	} else {
+		print STDERR "$name: No new symbols added\n";
+	}
+}
+
+sub check_existing
+{
+	(*nums, my @symbols)=@_;
+	my %existing; my @remaining;
+	@remaining=();
+	foreach $sym (@symbols) {
+		(my $s, my $i) = $sym =~ /^(.*?)\\(.*)$/;
+		$existing{$s}=1;
+	}
+	foreach $sym (keys %nums) {
+		if (!exists $existing{$sym}) {
+			push @remaining, $sym;
+		}
+	}
+	if(@remaining) {
+		print STDERR "The following symbols do not seem to exist:\n";
+		foreach $sym (@remaining) {
+			print STDERR "\t",$sym,"\n";
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+sub count_parens
+{
+	my $line = shift(@_);
+
+	my $open = $line =~ tr/\(//;
+	my $close = $line =~ tr/\)//;
+
+	return $open - $close;
+}
+
+#Parse opensslv.h to get the current version number. Also work out the base
+#version, i.e. the lowest version number that is binary compatible with this
+#version
+sub get_openssl_version()
+{
+	my $fn = catfile($config{sourcedir},"include","openssl","opensslv.h");
+	open (IN, "$fn") || die "Can't open opensslv.h";
+
+	while(<IN>) {
+		if (/OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT\s+"OpenSSL (\d\.\d\.)(\d[a-z]*)(-| )/) {
+			my $suffix = $2;
+			(my $baseversion = $1) =~ s/\./_/g;
+			close IN;
+			return ($baseversion."0", $baseversion.$suffix);
+		}
+	}
+	die "Can't find OpenSSL version number\n";
+}
+
+#Given an OpenSSL version number, calculate the next version number. If the
+#version number gets to a.b.czz then we go to a.b.(c+1)
+sub get_next_version()
+{
+	my $thisversion = shift;
+
+	my ($base, $letter) = $thisversion =~ /^(\d_\d_\d)([a-z]{0,2})$/;
+
+	if ($letter eq "zz") {
+		my $lastnum = substr($base, -1);
+		return substr($base, 0, length($base)-1).(++$lastnum);
+	}
+	return $base.get_next_letter($letter);
+}
+
+#Given the letters off the end of an OpenSSL version string, calculate what
+#the letters for the next release would be.
+sub get_next_letter()
+{
+	my $thisletter = shift;
+	my $baseletter = "";
+	my $endletter;
+
+	if ($thisletter eq "") {
+		return "a";
+	}
+	if ((length $thisletter) > 1) {
+		($baseletter, $endletter) = $thisletter =~ /([a-z]+)([a-z])/;
+	} else {
+		$endletter = $thisletter;
+	}
+
+	if ($endletter eq "z") {
+		return $thisletter."a";
+	} else {
+		return $baseletter.(++$endletter);
+	}
+}
+
+#Check if a version is less than or equal to the current version. Its a fatal
+#error if not. They must also only differ in letters, or the last number (i.e.
+#the first two numbers must be the same)
+sub check_version_lte()
+{
+	my ($testversion, $currversion) = @_;
+	my $lentv;
+	my $lencv;
+	my $cvbase;
+
+	my ($cvnums) = $currversion =~ /^(\d_\d_\d)[a-z]*$/;
+	my ($tvnums) = $testversion =~ /^(\d_\d_\d)[a-z]*$/;
+
+	#Die if we can't parse the version numbers or they don't look sane
+	die "Invalid version number: $testversion and $currversion\n"
+		if (!defined($cvnums) || !defined($tvnums)
+			|| length($cvnums) != 5
+			|| length($tvnums) != 5);
+
+	#If the base versions (without letters) don't match check they only differ
+	#in the last number
+	if ($cvnums ne $tvnums) {
+		die "Invalid version number: $testversion "
+			."for current version $currversion\n"
+			if (substr($cvnums, -1) < substr($tvnums, -1)
+				|| substr($cvnums, 0, 4) ne substr($tvnums, 0, 4));
+		return;
+	}
+	#If we get here then the base version (i.e. the numbers) are the same - they
+	#only differ in the letters
+
+	$lentv = length $testversion;
+	$lencv = length $currversion;
+
+	#If the testversion has more letters than the current version then it must
+	#be later (or malformed)
+	if ($lentv > $lencv) {
+		die "Invalid version number: $testversion "
+			."is greater than $currversion\n";
+	}
+
+	#Get the last letter from the current version
+	my ($cvletter) = $currversion =~ /([a-z])$/;
+	if (defined $cvletter) {
+		($cvbase) = $currversion =~ /(\d_\d_\d[a-z]*)$cvletter$/;
+	} else {
+		$cvbase = $currversion;
+	}
+	die "Unable to parse version number $currversion" if (!defined $cvbase);
+	my $tvbase;
+	my ($tvletter) = $testversion =~ /([a-z])$/;
+	if (defined $tvletter) {
+		($tvbase) = $testversion =~ /(\d_\d_\d[a-z]*)$tvletter$/;
+	} else {
+		$tvbase = $testversion;
+	}
+	die "Unable to parse version number $testversion" if (!defined $tvbase);
+
+	if ($lencv > $lentv) {
+		#If current version has more letters than testversion then testversion
+		#minus the final letter must be a substring of the current version
+		die "Invalid version number $testversion "
+			."is greater than $currversion or is invalid\n"
+			if (index($cvbase, $tvbase) != 0);
+	} else {
+		#If both versions have the same number of letters then they must be
+		#equal up to the last letter, and the last letter in testversion must
+		#be less than or equal to the last letter in current version.
+		die "Invalid version number $testversion "
+			."is greater than $currversion\n"
+			if (($cvbase ne $tvbase) && ($tvletter gt $cvletter));
+	}
+}
+
+sub do_deprecated()
+{
+	my ($decl, $plats, $algs) = @_;
+	$decl =~ /^\s*(DEPRECATEDIN_\d+_\d+_\d+)\s*\((.*)\)\s*$/
+            or die "Bad DEPRECTEDIN: $decl\n";
+	my $info1 .= "#INFO:";
+	$info1 .= join(',', @{$plats}) . ":";
+	my $info2 = $info1;
+	$info1 .= join(',',@{$algs}, $1) . ";";
+	$info2 .= join(',',@{$algs}) . ";";
+	return $info1 . $2 . ";" . $info2;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/util/mkdir-p.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/mkdir-p.pl
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..3280602
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/mkdir-p.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+# On some systems, the -p option to mkdir (= also create any missing parent
+# directories) is not available.
+
+my $arg;
+
+foreach $arg (@ARGV) {
+  $arg =~ tr|\\|/|;
+  &do_mkdir_p($arg);
+}
+
+
+sub do_mkdir_p {
+  local($dir) = @_;
+
+  $dir =~ s|/*\Z(?!\n)||s;
+
+  if (-d $dir) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if ($dir =~ m|[^/]/|s) {
+    local($parent) = $dir;
+    $parent =~ s|[^/]*\Z(?!\n)||s;
+
+    do_mkdir_p($parent);
+  }
+
+  unless (mkdir($dir, 0777)) {
+    if (-d $dir) {
+      # We raced against another instance doing the same thing.
+      return;
+    }
+    die "Cannot create directory $dir: $!\n";
+  }
+  print "created directory `$dir'\n";
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/util/mkerr.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/mkerr.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..79c8cfc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/mkerr.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,771 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+my $config = "crypto/err/openssl.ec";
+my $debug = 0;
+my $unref = 0;
+my $rebuild = 0;
+my $static = 1;
+my $recurse = 0;
+my $reindex = 0;
+my $dowrite = 0;
+my $staticloader = "";
+my @t = localtime();
+my $YEAR = @t[5] + 1900;
+
+my $pack_errcode;
+my $load_errcode;
+
+my $errcount;
+my $year = (localtime)[5] + 1900;
+
+while (@ARGV) {
+	my $arg = $ARGV[0];
+	if($arg eq "-conf") {
+		shift @ARGV;
+		$config = shift @ARGV;
+	} elsif($arg eq "-hprefix") {
+		shift @ARGV;
+		$hprefix = shift @ARGV;
+	} elsif($arg eq "-debug") {
+		$debug = 1;
+		$unref = 1;
+		shift @ARGV;
+	} elsif($arg eq "-rebuild") {
+		$rebuild = 1;
+		shift @ARGV;
+	} elsif($arg eq "-recurse") {
+		$recurse = 1;
+		shift @ARGV;
+	} elsif($arg eq "-reindex") {
+		$reindex = 1;
+		shift @ARGV;
+	} elsif($arg eq "-nostatic") {
+		$static = 0;
+		shift @ARGV;
+	} elsif($arg eq "-staticloader") {
+		$staticloader = "static ";
+		shift @ARGV;
+	} elsif($arg eq "-unref") {
+		$unref = 1;
+		shift @ARGV;
+	} elsif($arg eq "-write") {
+		$dowrite = 1;
+		shift @ARGV;
+	} elsif($arg eq "-help" || $arg eq "-h" || $arg eq "-?" || $arg eq "--help") {
+		print STDERR <<"EOF";
+mkerr.pl [options] ...
+
+Options:
+
+  -conf F       Use the config file F instead of the default one:
+                  crypto/err/openssl.ec
+
+  -hprefix P    Prepend the filenames in generated #include <header>
+                statements with prefix P. Default: 'openssl/' (without
+                the quotes, naturally)
+                NOTE: not used any more because our include directory
+                structure has changed.
+
+  -debug        Turn on debugging verbose output on stderr.
+
+  -rebuild      Rebuild all header and C source files, irrespective of the
+                fact if any error or function codes have been added/removed.
+                Default: only update files for libraries which saw change
+                         (of course, this requires '-write' as well, or no
+                          files will be touched!)
+
+  -recurse      scan a preconfigured set of directories / files for error and
+                function codes:
+                  (<crypto/*.c>, <crypto/*/*.c>, <ssl/*.c>, <apps/*.c>)
+                When this option is NOT specified, the filelist is taken from
+                the commandline instead. Here, wildcards may be embedded. (Be
+                sure to escape those to prevent the shell from expanding them
+                for you when you wish mkerr.pl to do so instead.)
+                Default: take file list to scan from the command line.
+
+  -reindex      Discard the numeric values previously assigned to the error
+                and function codes as extracted from the scanned header files;
+                instead renumber all of them starting from 100. (Note that
+                the numbers assigned through 'R' records in the config file
+                remain intact.)
+                Default: keep previously assigned numbers. (You are warned
+                         when collisions are detected.)
+
+  -nostatic     Generates a different source code, where these additional 
+                functions are generated for each library specified in the
+                config file:
+                  void ERR_load_<LIB>_strings(void);
+                  void ERR_unload_<LIB>_strings(void);
+                  void ERR_<LIB>_error(int f, int r, char *fn, int ln);
+                  #define <LIB>err(f,r) ERR_<LIB>_error(f,r,OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE)
+                while the code facilitates the use of these in an environment
+                where the error support routines are dynamically loaded at 
+                runtime.
+                Default: 'static' code generation.
+
+  -staticloader Prefix generated functions with the 'static' scope modifier.
+                Default: don't write any scope modifier prefix.
+
+  -unref        Print out unreferenced function and reason codes.
+
+  -write        Actually (over)write the generated code to the header and C 
+                source files as assigned to each library through the config 
+                file.
+                Default: don't write.
+
+  -help / -h / -? / --help            Show this help text.
+
+  ...           Additional arguments are added to the file list to scan,
+                assuming '-recurse' was NOT specified on the command line.
+
+EOF
+		exit 1;
+	} else {
+		last;
+	}
+}
+
+if($recurse) {
+	@source = ( <crypto/*.c>, <crypto/*/*.c>, <ssl/*.c>, <ssl/*/*.c> )
+} else {
+	@source = @ARGV;
+}
+
+# Read in the config file
+
+open(IN, "<$config") || die "Can't open config file $config";
+
+# Parse config file
+
+while(<IN>)
+{
+	if(/^L\s+(\S+)\s+(\S+)\s+(\S+)/) {
+		$hinc{$1} = $2;
+		$libinc{$2} = $1;
+		$cskip{$3} = $1;
+		if($3 ne "NONE") {
+			$csrc{$1} = $3;
+			$fmax{$1} = 100;
+			$rmax{$1} = 100;
+			$fassigned{$1} = ":";
+			$rassigned{$1} = ":";
+			$fnew{$1} = 0;
+			$rnew{$1} = 0;
+		}
+	} elsif (/^F\s+(\S+)/) {
+	# Add extra function with $1
+	} elsif (/^R\s+(\S+)\s+(\S+)/) {
+		$rextra{$1} = $2;
+		$rcodes{$1} = $2;
+	}
+}
+
+close IN;
+
+# Scan each header file in turn and make a list of error codes
+# and function names
+
+while (($hdr, $lib) = each %libinc)
+{
+	next if($hdr eq "NONE");
+	print STDERR "Scanning header file $hdr\n" if $debug;
+	my $line = "", $def= "", $linenr = 0, $gotfile = 0, $cpp = 0;
+	if (open(IN, "<$hdr")) {
+	    $gotfile = 1;
+	    while(<IN>) {
+		$linenr++;
+		print STDERR "line: $linenr\r" if $debug;
+
+		last if(/BEGIN\s+ERROR\s+CODES/);
+		if ($line ne '') {
+		    $_ = $line . $_;
+		    $line = '';
+		}
+
+		if (/\\$/) {
+		    $line = $_;
+		    next;
+		}
+
+		if(/\/\*/) {
+		    if (not /\*\//) {		# multiline comment...
+			$line = $_;		# ... just accumulate
+			next; 
+		    } else {
+			s/\/\*.*?\*\///gs;	# wipe it
+		    }
+		}
+
+		if ($cpp) {
+		    $cpp++ if /^#\s*if/;
+		    $cpp-- if /^#\s*endif/;
+		    next;
+		}
+		$cpp = 1 if /^#.*ifdef.*cplusplus/;  # skip "C" declaration
+
+		next if (/^\#/);                      # skip preprocessor directives
+
+		s/{[^{}]*}//gs;                      # ignore {} blocks
+
+		if (/\{|\/\*/) { # Add a } so editor works...
+		    $line = $_;
+		} else {
+		    $def .= $_;
+		}
+	    }
+	}
+
+	print STDERR "                                  \r" if $debug;
+        $defnr = 0;
+	# Delete any DECLARE_ macros
+	$def =~ s/DECLARE_\w+\([\w,\s]+\)//gs;
+	foreach (split /;/, $def) {
+	    $defnr++;
+	    print STDERR "def: $defnr\r" if $debug;
+
+	    # The goal is to collect function names from function declarations.
+
+	    s/^[\n\s]*//g;
+	    s/[\n\s]*$//g;
+
+	    # Skip over recognized non-function declarations
+	    next if(/typedef\W/ or /DECLARE_STACK_OF/ or /TYPEDEF_.*_OF/);
+
+	    # Remove STACK_OF(foo)
+	    s/STACK_OF\(\w+\)/void/;
+
+	    # Reduce argument lists to empty ()
+	    # fold round brackets recursively: (t(*v)(t),t) -> (t{}{},t) -> {}
+	    while(/\(.*\)/s) {
+		s/\([^\(\)]+\)/\{\}/gs;
+		s/\(\s*\*\s*(\w+)\s*\{\}\s*\)/$1/gs;	#(*f{}) -> f
+	    }
+	    # pretend as we didn't use curly braces: {} -> ()
+	    s/\{\}/\(\)/gs;
+
+	    if (/(\w+)\s*\(\).*/s) {	# first token prior [first] () is
+		my $name = $1;		# a function name!
+		$name =~ tr/[a-z]/[A-Z]/;
+		$ftrans{$name} = $1;
+	    } elsif (/[\(\)]/ and not (/=/)) {
+		print STDERR "Header $hdr: cannot parse: $_;\n";
+	    }
+	}
+
+	print STDERR "                                  \r" if $debug;
+
+	next if $reindex;
+
+	# Scan function and reason codes and store them: keep a note of the
+	# maximum code used.
+
+	if ($gotfile) {
+	  while(<IN>) {
+		if(/^\#\s*define\s+(\S+)\s+(\S+)/) {
+			$name = $1;
+			$code = $2;
+			next if $name =~ /^${lib}err/;
+			unless($name =~ /^${lib}_([RF])_(\w+)$/) {
+				print STDERR "Invalid error code $name\n";
+				next;
+			}
+			if($1 eq "R") {
+				$rcodes{$name} = $code;
+				if ($rassigned{$lib} =~ /:$code:/) {
+					print STDERR "!! ERROR: $lib reason code $code assigned twice (collision at $name)\n";
+					++$errcount;
+				}
+				$rassigned{$lib} .= "$code:";
+				if(!(exists $rextra{$name}) &&
+					 ($code > $rmax{$lib}) ) {
+					$rmax{$lib} = $code;
+				}
+			} else {
+				if ($fassigned{$lib} =~ /:$code:/) {
+					print STDERR "!! ERROR: $lib function code $code assigned twice (collision at $name)\n";
+					++$errcount;
+				}
+				$fassigned{$lib} .= "$code:";
+				if($code > $fmax{$lib}) {
+					$fmax{$lib} = $code;
+				}
+				$fcodes{$name} = $code;
+			}
+		}
+	  }
+	}
+
+	if ($debug) {
+		if (defined($fmax{$lib})) {
+			print STDERR "Max function code fmax" . "{" . "$lib" . "} = $fmax{$lib}\n";
+			$fassigned{$lib} =~ m/^:(.*):$/;
+			@fassigned = sort {$a <=> $b} split(":", $1);
+			print STDERR "  @fassigned\n";
+		}
+		if (defined($rmax{$lib})) {
+			print STDERR "Max reason code rmax" . "{" . "$lib" . "} = $rmax{$lib}\n";
+			$rassigned{$lib} =~ m/^:(.*):$/;
+			@rassigned = sort {$a <=> $b} split(":", $1);
+			print STDERR "  @rassigned\n";
+		}
+	}
+
+	if ($lib eq "SSL") {
+		if ($rmax{$lib} >= 1000) {
+			print STDERR "!! ERROR: SSL error codes 1000+ are reserved for alerts.\n";
+			print STDERR "!!        Any new alerts must be added to $config.\n";
+			++$errcount;
+			print STDERR "\n";
+		}
+	}
+	close IN;
+}
+
+# Scan each C source file and look for function and reason codes
+# This is done by looking for strings that "look like" function or
+# reason codes: basically anything consisting of all upper case and
+# numerics which has _F_ or _R_ in it and which has the name of an
+# error library at the start. This seems to work fine except for the
+# oddly named structure BIO_F_CTX which needs to be ignored.
+# If a code doesn't exist in list compiled from headers then mark it
+# with the value "X" as a place holder to give it a value later.
+# Store all function and reason codes found in %ufcodes and %urcodes
+# so all those unreferenced can be printed out.
+
+
+foreach $file (@source) {
+	# Don't parse the error source file.
+	next if exists $cskip{$file};
+	print STDERR "File loaded: ".$file."\r" if $debug;
+	open(IN, "<$file") || die "Can't open source file $file\n";
+	my $func;
+	my $linenr = 0;
+	while(<IN>) {
+		# skip obsoleted source files entirely!
+		last if(/^#error\s+obsolete/);
+		$linenr++;
+		if (!/;$/ && /^\**([a-zA-Z_].*[\s*])?([A-Za-z_0-9]+)\(.*([),]|$)/)
+			{
+			/^([^()]*(\([^()]*\)[^()]*)*)\(/;
+			$1 =~ /([A-Za-z_0-9]*)$/;
+			$func = $1;
+			}
+
+		if(/(([A-Z0-9]+)_F_([A-Z0-9_]+))/) {
+			next unless exists $csrc{$2};
+			next if($1 eq "BIO_F_BUFFER_CTX");
+			$ufcodes{$1} = 1;
+			if(!exists $fcodes{$1}) {
+				$fcodes{$1} = "X";
+				$fnew{$2}++;
+			}
+			$ftrans{$3} = $func unless exists $ftrans{$3};
+            if (uc $func ne $3) {
+                print STDERR "ERROR: mismatch $file:$linenr $func:$3\n";
+                $errcount++;
+            }
+			print STDERR "Function: $1\t= $fcodes{$1} (lib: $2, name: $3)\n" if $debug; 
+		}
+		if(/(([A-Z0-9]+)_R_[A-Z0-9_]+)/) {
+			next unless exists $csrc{$2};
+			$urcodes{$1} = 1;
+			if(!exists $rcodes{$1}) {
+				$rcodes{$1} = "X";
+				$rnew{$2}++;
+			}
+			print STDERR "Reason: $1\t= $rcodes{$1} (lib: $2)\n" if $debug; 
+		} 
+	}
+	close IN;
+}
+print STDERR "                                  \n" if $debug;
+
+# Now process each library in turn.
+
+foreach $lib (keys %csrc)
+{
+	my $hfile = $hinc{$lib};
+	my $cfile = $csrc{$lib};
+	if(!$fnew{$lib} && !$rnew{$lib}) {
+		next unless $rebuild;
+	} else {
+		print STDERR "$lib:\t\t$fnew{$lib} New Functions,";
+		print STDERR " $rnew{$lib} New Reasons.\n";
+		next unless $dowrite;
+	}
+
+	# If we get here then we have some new error codes so we
+	# need to rebuild the header file and C file.
+
+	# Make a sorted list of error and reason codes for later use.
+
+	my @function = sort grep(/^${lib}_/,keys %fcodes);
+	my @reasons = sort grep(/^${lib}_/,keys %rcodes);
+
+	# Rewrite the header file
+
+	$cpp = 0;
+	$cplusplus = 0;
+	if (open(IN, "<$hfile")) {
+	    # Copy across the old file
+	    while(<IN>) {
+		$cplusplus = $cpp if /^#.*ifdef.*cplusplus/;
+		$cpp++ if /^#\s*if/;
+		$cpp-- if /^#\s*endif/;
+		push @out, $_;
+		last if (/BEGIN ERROR CODES/);
+	    }
+	    close IN;
+	} else {
+	    $cpp = 1;
+	    $cplusplus = 1;
+	    push @out,
+"/*\n",
+" * Copyright 1995-$YEAR The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.\n",
+" *\n",
+" * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the \"License\").  You may not use\n",
+" * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy\n",
+" * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at\n",
+" * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html\n",
+" */\n",
+"\n",
+"#ifndef HEADER_${lib}_ERR_H\n",
+"# define HEADER_${lib}_ERR_H\n",
+"\n",
+"# ifdef  __cplusplus\n",
+"extern \"C\" {\n",
+"# endif\n",
+"\n",
+"/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */\n";
+	}
+	open (OUT, ">$hfile") || die "Can't Open File $hfile for writing\n";
+
+	print OUT @out;
+	undef @out;
+	print OUT <<"EOF";
+/*
+ * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
+ * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
+ */
+
+EOF
+	if($static) {
+		print OUT <<"EOF";
+${staticloader}int ERR_load_${lib}_strings(void);
+
+EOF
+	} else {
+		print OUT <<"EOF";
+${staticloader}int ERR_load_${lib}_strings(void);
+${staticloader}void ERR_unload_${lib}_strings(void);
+${staticloader}void ERR_${lib}_error(int function, int reason, char *file, int line);
+# define ${lib}err(f,r) ERR_${lib}_error((f),(r),OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE)
+
+EOF
+	}
+	print OUT <<"EOF";
+/* Error codes for the $lib functions. */
+
+/* Function codes. */
+EOF
+
+	foreach $i (@function) {
+		$z=48 - length($i);
+		if($fcodes{$i} eq "X") {
+			$fassigned{$lib} =~ m/^:([^:]*):/;
+			$findcode = $1;
+			if (!defined($findcode)) {
+				$findcode = $fmax{$lib};
+			}
+			while ($fassigned{$lib} =~ m/:$findcode:/) {
+				$findcode++;
+			}
+			$fcodes{$i} = $findcode;
+			$fassigned{$lib} .= "$findcode:";
+			print STDERR "New Function code $i\n" if $debug;
+		}
+		printf OUT "# define $i%s $fcodes{$i}\n"," " x $z;
+	}
+
+	print OUT "\n/* Reason codes. */\n";
+
+	foreach $i (@reasons) {
+		$z=48 - length($i);
+		if($rcodes{$i} eq "X") {
+			$rassigned{$lib} =~ m/^:([^:]*):/;
+			$findcode = $1;
+			if (!defined($findcode)) {
+				$findcode = $rmax{$lib};
+			}
+			while ($rassigned{$lib} =~ m/:$findcode:/) {
+				$findcode++;
+			}
+			$rcodes{$i} = $findcode;
+			$rassigned{$lib} .= "$findcode:";
+			print STDERR "New Reason code   $i\n" if $debug;
+		}
+		printf OUT "# define $i%s $rcodes{$i}\n"," " x $z;
+	}
+	print OUT <<"EOF";
+
+EOF
+	do {
+	    if ($cplusplus == $cpp) {
+		print OUT "#", " "x$cpp, "ifdef  __cplusplus\n";
+		print OUT "}\n";
+		print OUT "#", " "x$cpp, "endif\n";
+	    }
+	    if ($cpp-- > 0) {
+		print OUT "#", " "x$cpp, "endif\n";
+	    }
+	} while ($cpp);
+	close OUT;
+
+	# Rewrite the C source file containing the error details.
+
+	# First, read any existing reason string definitions:
+	my %err_reason_strings;
+	if (open(IN,"<$cfile")) {
+		my $line = "";
+		while (<IN>) {
+			s|\R$||; # Better chomp
+			$_ = $line . $_;
+			$line = "";
+			if (/{ERR_(FUNC|REASON)\(/) {
+				if (/\b(${lib}_R_\w*)\b.*\"(.*)\"/) {
+					$err_reason_strings{$1} = $2;
+				} elsif (/\b${lib}_F_(\w*)\b.*\"(.*)\"/) {
+					if (!exists $ftrans{$1} && ($1 ne $2)) {
+						print STDERR "WARNING: Mismatched function string $2\n";
+						$ftrans{$1} = $2;
+					}
+				} else {
+					$line = $_;
+				}
+			}
+		}
+		close(IN);
+	}
+
+
+	my $hincf;
+	if($static) {
+		$hincf = $hfile;
+		$hincf =~ s|.*include/||;
+		if ($hincf =~ m|^openssl/|) {
+			$hincf = "<${hincf}>";
+		} else {
+			$hincf = "\"${hincf}\"";
+		}
+	} else {
+		$hincf = "\"$hfile\"";
+	}
+
+	# If static we know the error code at compile time so use it
+	# in error definitions.
+
+	if ($static)
+		{
+		$pack_errcode = "ERR_LIB_${lib}";
+		$load_errcode = "0";
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		$pack_errcode = "0";
+		$load_errcode = "ERR_LIB_${lib}";
+		}
+
+
+	open (OUT,">$cfile") || die "Can't open $cfile for writing";
+
+	print OUT <<"EOF";
+/*
+ * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
+ * Copyright 1995-$YEAR The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include $hincf
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+
+# define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK($pack_errcode,func,0)
+# define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK($pack_errcode,0,reason)
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA ${lib}_str_functs[] = {
+EOF
+	# Add each function code: if a function name is found then use it.
+	foreach $i (@function) {
+		my $fn;
+		$i =~ /^${lib}_F_(\S+)$/;
+		$fn = $1;
+		if(exists $ftrans{$fn}) {
+			$fn = $ftrans{$fn};
+		}
+#		print OUT "{ERR_PACK($pack_errcode,$i,0),\t\"$fn\"},\n";
+		if(length($i) + length($fn) > 57) {
+			print OUT "    {ERR_FUNC($i),\n     \"$fn\"},\n";
+		} else {
+			print OUT "    {ERR_FUNC($i), \"$fn\"},\n";
+		}
+	}
+	print OUT <<"EOF";
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA ${lib}_str_reasons[] = {
+EOF
+	# Add each reason code.
+	foreach $i (@reasons) {
+		my $rn;
+		my $rstr = "ERR_REASON($i)";
+		if (exists $err_reason_strings{$i}) {
+			$rn = $err_reason_strings{$i};
+		} else {
+			$i =~ /^${lib}_R_(\S+)$/;
+			$rn = $1;
+			$rn =~ tr/_[A-Z]/ [a-z]/;
+		}
+		if(length($i) + length($rn) > 55) {
+			print OUT "    {${rstr},\n     \"$rn\"},\n";
+		} else {
+			print OUT "    {${rstr}, \"$rn\"},\n";
+		}
+	}
+if($static) {
+	print OUT <<"EOF";
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+
+#endif
+
+${staticloader}int ERR_load_${lib}_strings(void)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+
+    if (ERR_func_error_string(${lib}_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) {
+        ERR_load_strings($load_errcode, ${lib}_str_functs);
+        ERR_load_strings($load_errcode, ${lib}_str_reasons);
+    }
+#endif
+    return 1;
+}
+EOF
+} else {
+	print OUT <<"EOF";
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+
+#endif
+
+#ifdef ${lib}_LIB_NAME
+static ERR_STRING_DATA ${lib}_lib_name[] = {
+    {0, ${lib}_LIB_NAME},
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+#endif
+
+static int ${lib}_lib_error_code = 0;
+static int ${lib}_error_init = 1;
+
+${staticloader}int ERR_load_${lib}_strings(void)
+{
+    if (${lib}_lib_error_code == 0)
+        ${lib}_lib_error_code = ERR_get_next_error_library();
+
+    if (${lib}_error_init) {
+        ${lib}_error_init = 0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+        ERR_load_strings(${lib}_lib_error_code, ${lib}_str_functs);
+        ERR_load_strings(${lib}_lib_error_code, ${lib}_str_reasons);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef ${lib}_LIB_NAME
+        ${lib}_lib_name->error = ERR_PACK(${lib}_lib_error_code, 0, 0);
+        ERR_load_strings(0, ${lib}_lib_name);
+#endif
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+${staticloader}void ERR_unload_${lib}_strings(void)
+{
+    if (${lib}_error_init == 0) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+        ERR_unload_strings(${lib}_lib_error_code, ${lib}_str_functs);
+        ERR_unload_strings(${lib}_lib_error_code, ${lib}_str_reasons);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef ${lib}_LIB_NAME
+        ERR_unload_strings(0, ${lib}_lib_name);
+#endif
+        ${lib}_error_init = 1;
+    }
+}
+
+${staticloader}void ERR_${lib}_error(int function, int reason, char *file, int line)
+{
+    if (${lib}_lib_error_code == 0)
+        ${lib}_lib_error_code = ERR_get_next_error_library();
+    ERR_PUT_error(${lib}_lib_error_code, function, reason, file, line);
+}
+EOF
+
+}
+
+	close OUT;
+	undef %err_reason_strings;
+}
+
+if($debug && %notrans) {
+	print STDERR "The following function codes were not translated:\n";
+	foreach(sort keys %notrans)
+	{
+		print STDERR "$_\n";
+	}
+}
+
+# Make a list of unreferenced function and reason codes
+
+foreach (keys %fcodes) {
+	push (@funref, $_) unless exists $ufcodes{$_};
+}
+
+foreach (keys %rcodes) {
+	push (@runref, $_) unless exists $urcodes{$_};
+}
+
+if($unref && @funref) {
+	print STDERR "The following function codes were not referenced:\n";
+	foreach(sort @funref)
+	{
+		print STDERR "$_\n";
+	}
+}
+
+if($unref && @runref) {
+	print STDERR "The following reason codes were not referenced:\n";
+	foreach(sort @runref)
+	{
+		print STDERR "$_\n";
+	}
+}
+
+if($errcount) {
+	print STDERR "There were errors, failing...\n\n";
+	exit $errcount;
+}
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/util/mkrc.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/mkrc.pl
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..c177349
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/mkrc.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+use lib ".";
+use configdata;
+use File::Spec::Functions;
+
+my $versionfile = catfile($config{sourcedir},"include/openssl/opensslv.h");
+
+open FD, $versionfile or die "Couldn't open include/openssl/opensslv.h: $!\n";
+while(<FD>) {
+    if (/OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER\s+(0x[0-9a-f]+)/i) {
+	$ver = hex($1);
+	$v1 = ($ver>>28);
+	$v2 = ($ver>>20)&0xff;
+	$v3 = ($ver>>12)&0xff;
+	$v4 = ($ver>> 4)&0xff;
+	$beta = $ver&0xf;
+	$version = "$v1.$v2.$v3";
+	if ($beta==0xf)	{ $version .= chr(ord('a')+$v4-1) if ($v4);	}
+	elsif ($beta==0){ $version .= "-dev";				}
+	else		{ $version .= "-beta$beta";			}
+	last;
+    }
+}
+close(FD);
+
+$filename = $ARGV[0]; $filename =~ /(.*)\.([^.]+)$/;
+$basename = $1;
+$extname  = $2;
+
+if ($extname =~ /dll/i)	{ $description = "OpenSSL shared library"; }
+else			{ $description = "OpenSSL application";    }
+
+print <<___;
+#include <winver.h>
+
+LANGUAGE 0x09,0x01
+
+1 VERSIONINFO
+  FILEVERSION $v1,$v2,$v3,$v4
+  PRODUCTVERSION $v1,$v2,$v3,$v4
+  FILEFLAGSMASK 0x3fL
+#ifdef _DEBUG
+  FILEFLAGS 0x01L
+#else
+  FILEFLAGS 0x00L
+#endif
+  FILEOS VOS__WINDOWS32
+  FILETYPE VFT_DLL
+  FILESUBTYPE 0x0L
+BEGIN
+    BLOCK "StringFileInfo"
+    BEGIN
+        BLOCK "040904b0"
+        BEGIN
+            // Required:
+            VALUE "CompanyName", "The OpenSSL Project, http://www.openssl.org/\\0"
+            VALUE "FileDescription", "$description\\0"
+            VALUE "FileVersion", "$version\\0"
+            VALUE "InternalName", "$basename\\0"
+            VALUE "OriginalFilename", "$filename\\0"
+            VALUE "ProductName", "The OpenSSL Toolkit\\0"
+            VALUE "ProductVersion", "$version\\0"
+            // Optional:
+            //VALUE "Comments", "\\0"
+            VALUE "LegalCopyright", "Copyright 1998-2016 The OpenSSL Authors. All rights reserved.\\0"
+            //VALUE "LegalTrademarks", "\\0"
+            //VALUE "PrivateBuild", "\\0"
+            //VALUE "SpecialBuild", "\\0"
+        END
+    END
+    BLOCK "VarFileInfo"
+    BEGIN
+        VALUE "Translation", 0x409, 0x4b0
+    END
+END
+___
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/util/openssl-format-source b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/openssl-format-source
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..3dcc128
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/openssl-format-source
@@ -0,0 +1,175 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+#
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+#
+# openssl-format-source 
+# - format source tree according to OpenSSL coding style using indent
+#
+# usage:
+#   openssl-format-source [-v] [-n] [file|directory] ...
+#
+# note: the indent options assume GNU indent v2.2.10 which was released
+#       Feb-2009 so if you have an older indent the options may not 
+#	match what is expected
+#
+# any marked block comment blocks have to be moved to align manually after
+# the reformatting has been completed as marking a block causes indent to 
+# not move it at all ...
+#
+
+PATH=/usr/local/bin:/bin:/usr/bin:$PATH
+export PATH
+HERE="`dirname $0`"
+
+set -e
+
+INDENT=indent
+uname -s | grep BSD > /dev/null && type gindent > /dev/null 2>&1 && INDENT=gindent
+
+if [ $# -eq 0 ]; then
+  echo "usage: $0 [-v] [-n] [-c] [sourcefile|sourcedir] ..." >&2
+  exit 1
+fi
+
+VERBOSE=false
+DONT=false
+STOPARGS=false
+COMMENTS=false
+CHANGED=false
+DEBUG=""
+
+# for this exercise, we want to force the openssl style, so we roll
+# our own indent profile, which is at a well known location
+INDENT_PROFILE="$HERE/indent.pro"
+export INDENT_PROFILE
+if [ ! -f "$INDENT_PROFILE" ]; then
+  echo "$0: unable to locate the openssl indent.pro file" >&2
+  exit 1
+fi
+
+# Extra arguments; for adding the comment-formatting
+INDENT_ARGS=""
+for i 
+do
+  if [ "$STOPARGS" != "true" ]; then
+    case $i in
+      --) STOPARGS="true"; continue;;
+      -n) DONT="true"; continue;;
+      -v) VERBOSE="true"; 
+	  echo "INDENT_PROFILE=$INDENT_PROFILE";
+	  continue;;
+      -c) COMMENTS="true"; 
+      	  INDENT_ARGS="-fc1 -fca -cdb -sc"; 
+	  continue;;
+      -nc) COMMENTS="true";
+	  continue;;
+      -d) DEBUG='eval tee "$j.pre" |'
+	  continue;;
+    esac
+  fi
+
+  if [ -d "$i" ]; then
+    LIST=`find "$i" -name '*.[ch]' -print`
+  else 
+    if [ ! -f "$i" ]; then
+      echo "$0: source file not found: $i" >&2
+      exit 1
+    fi
+    LIST="$i"
+  fi
+  
+  for j in $LIST
+  do
+    # ignore symlinks - we only ever process the base file - so if we
+    # expand a directory tree we need to ignore any located symlinks
+    if [ -d "$i" ]; then
+      if [ -h "$j" ]; then
+	continue;
+      fi
+    fi
+
+    if [ "$DONT" = "false" ]; then
+      tmp=$(mktemp /tmp/indent.XXXXXX)
+      trap 'rm -f "$tmp"' HUP INT TERM EXIT
+
+      case `basename $j` in 
+	# the list of files that indent is unable to handle correctly
+	# that we simply leave alone for manual formatting now
+	obj_dat.h|aes_core.c|aes_x86core.c|ecp_nistz256.c)
+	  echo "skipping $j"
+	  ;;
+	*)
+	  if [ "$COMMENTS" = "true" ]; then
+	    # we have to mark single line comments as /*- ...*/ to stop indent
+	    # messing with them, run expand then indent as usual but with the
+	    # the process-comments options and then undo that marking, and then 
+	    # finally re-run indent without process-comments so the marked-to-
+	    # be-ignored comments we did automatically end up getting moved 
+	    # into the right possition within the code as indent leaves marked 
+	    # comments entirely untouched - we appear to have no way to avoid 
+	    # the double processing and get the desired output
+	    cat "$j" | \
+	    expand | \
+	    perl -0 -np \
+	      -e 's/(\n#[ \t]*ifdef[ \t]+__cplusplus\n[^\n]*\n#[ \t]*endif\n)/\n\/**INDENT-OFF**\/$1\/**INDENT-ON**\/\n/g;' \
+	      -e 's/(\n\/\*\!)/\n\/**/g;' \
+	      -e 's/(STACK_OF|LHASH_OF)\(([^ \t,\)]+)\)( |\n)/$1_$2_$3/g;' \
+	      | \
+	    perl -np \
+	      -e 's/^([ \t]*)\/\*([ \t]+.*)\*\/[ \t]*$/my ($x1,$x2) = ($1, $2); if (length("$x1$x2")<75 && $x2 !~ m#^\s*\*INDENT-(ON|OFF)\*\s*$#) {$c="-"}else{$c=""}; "$x1\/*$c$x2*\/"/e;' \
+	      -e 's/^\/\* ((Copyright|=|----).*)$/\/*-$1/;' \
+	      -e 's/^((DECLARE|IMPLEMENT)_.*)$/\/**INDENT-OFF**\/\n$1\n\/**INDENT-ON**\//;' \
+	      -e 's/^([ \t]*(make_dh|make_dh_bn|make_rfc5114_td)\(.*\)[ \t,]*)$/\/**INDENT-OFF**\/\n$1\n\/**INDENT-ON**\//;' \
+	      -e 's/^(ASN1_ADB_TEMPLATE\(.*)$/\/**INDENT-OFF**\/\n$1\n\/**INDENT-ON**\//;' \
+	      -e 's/^((ASN1|ADB)_.*_(end|END)\(.*[\){=,;]+[ \t]*)$/$1\n\/**INDENT-ON**\//;' \
+	      -e '/ASN1_(ITEM_ref|ITEM_ptr|ITEM_rptr|PCTX)/ || s/^((ASN1|ADB)_[^\*]*[){=,]+[ \t]*)$/\/**INDENT-OFF**\/\n$1/;' \
+	      -e 's/^(} (ASN1|ADB)_[^\*]*[\){=,;]+)$/$1\n\/**INDENT-ON**\//;' \
+	      | \
+	      $DEBUG $INDENT $INDENT_ARGS | \
+	      perl -np \
+		-e 's/^([ \t]*)\/\*-(.*)\*\/[ \t]*$/$1\/*$2*\//;' \
+		-e 's/^\/\*-((Copyright|=|----).*)$/\/* $1/;' \
+	      | $INDENT | \
+	      perl -0 -np \
+		-e 's/\/\*\*INDENT-(ON|OFF)\*\*\/\n//g;' \
+	      | perl -np \
+	        -e 's/(STACK_OF|LHASH_OF)_([^ \t,]+)_( |\/)/$1($2)$3/g;' \
+	        -e 's/(STACK_OF|LHASH_OF)_([^ \t,]+)_$/$1($2)/g;' \
+	      | perl "$HERE"/su-filter.pl \
+	      > "$tmp"
+	  else
+	    expand "$j" | $INDENT $INDENT_ARGS > "$tmp"
+	  fi;
+	  if cmp -s "$tmp" "$j"; then
+	    if [ "$VERBOSE" = "true" ]; then
+	      echo "$j unchanged"
+	    fi
+	    rm "$tmp"
+	  else
+	    if [ "$VERBOSE" = "true" ]; then
+	      echo "$j changed"
+	    fi
+	    CHANGED=true
+	    mv "$tmp" "$j"
+	  fi
+	  ;;
+      esac
+    fi
+  done
+done
+
+
+if [ "$VERBOSE" = "true" ]; then
+  echo
+  if [ "$CHANGED" = "true" ]; then
+    echo "SOURCE WAS MODIFIED"
+  else
+    echo "SOURCE WAS NOT MODIFIED"
+  fi
+fi
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/util/opensslwrap.sh b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/opensslwrap.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..b27cbb8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/opensslwrap.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+HERE="`echo $0 | sed -e 's|[^/]*$||'`"
+OPENSSL="${HERE}../apps/openssl"
+
+if [ -d "${HERE}../engines" -a "x$OPENSSL_ENGINES" = "x" ]; then
+	OPENSSL_ENGINES="${HERE}../engines"; export OPENSSL_ENGINES
+fi
+
+if [ -x "${OPENSSL}.exe" ]; then
+	# The original reason for this script existence is to work around
+	# certain caveats in run-time linker behaviour. On Windows platforms
+	# adjusting $PATH used to be sufficient, but with introduction of
+	# SafeDllSearchMode in XP/2003 the only way to get it right in
+	# *all* possible situations is to copy newly built .DLLs to apps/
+	# and test/, which is now done elsewhere... The $PATH is adjusted
+	# for backward compatibility (and nostagical reasons:-).
+	if [ "$OSTYPE" != msdosdjgpp ]; then
+		PATH="${HERE}..:$PATH"; export PATH
+	fi
+	exec "${OPENSSL}.exe" "$@"
+elif [ -x "${OPENSSL}" -a -x "${HERE}shlib_wrap.sh" ]; then
+	exec "${HERE}shlib_wrap.sh" "${OPENSSL}" "$@"
+else
+	exec "${OPENSSL}" "$@"	# hope for the best...
+fi
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/util/perl/OpenSSL/Glob.pm b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/perl/OpenSSL/Glob.pm
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ec87da4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/perl/OpenSSL/Glob.pm
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+package OpenSSL::Glob;
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+
+use File::Glob;
+
+use Exporter;
+use vars qw($VERSION @ISA @EXPORT);
+
+$VERSION = '0.1';
+@ISA = qw(Exporter);
+@EXPORT = qw(glob);
+
+sub glob {
+    goto &File::Glob::bsd_glob if $^O ne "VMS";
+    goto &CORE::glob;
+}
+
+1;
+__END__
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/util/perl/OpenSSL/Test.pm b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/perl/OpenSSL/Test.pm
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5de7b58
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/perl/OpenSSL/Test.pm
@@ -0,0 +1,1051 @@
+# Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+package OpenSSL::Test;
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+
+use Test::More 0.96;
+
+use Exporter;
+use vars qw($VERSION @ISA @EXPORT @EXPORT_OK %EXPORT_TAGS);
+$VERSION = "0.8";
+@ISA = qw(Exporter);
+@EXPORT = (@Test::More::EXPORT, qw(setup indir app fuzz  perlapp test perltest
+                                   run));
+@EXPORT_OK = (@Test::More::EXPORT_OK, qw(bldtop_dir bldtop_file
+                                         srctop_dir srctop_file
+                                         data_file
+                                         pipe with cmdstr quotify));
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+OpenSSL::Test - a private extension of Test::More
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+  use OpenSSL::Test;
+
+  setup("my_test_name");
+
+  ok(run(app(["openssl", "version"])), "check for openssl presence");
+
+  indir "subdir" => sub {
+    ok(run(test(["sometest", "arg1"], stdout => "foo.txt")),
+       "run sometest with output to foo.txt");
+  };
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+This module is a private extension of L<Test::More> for testing OpenSSL.
+In addition to the Test::More functions, it also provides functions that
+easily find the diverse programs within a OpenSSL build tree, as well as
+some other useful functions.
+
+This module I<depends> on the environment variables C<$TOP> or C<$SRCTOP>
+and C<$BLDTOP>.  Without one of the combinations it refuses to work.
+See L</ENVIRONMENT> below.
+
+With each test recipe, a parallel data directory with (almost) the same name
+as the recipe is possible in the source directory tree.  For example, for a
+recipe C<$SRCTOP/test/recipes/99-foo.t>, there could be a directory
+C<$SRCTOP/test/recipes/99-foo_data/>.
+
+=cut
+
+use File::Copy;
+use File::Spec::Functions qw/file_name_is_absolute curdir canonpath splitdir
+                             catdir catfile splitpath catpath devnull abs2rel
+                             rel2abs/;
+use File::Path 2.00 qw/rmtree mkpath/;
+use File::Basename;
+
+
+# The name of the test.  This is set by setup() and is used in the other
+# functions to verify that setup() has been used.
+my $test_name = undef;
+
+# Directories we want to keep track of TOP, APPS, TEST and RESULTS are the
+# ones we're interested in, corresponding to the environment variables TOP
+# (mandatory), BIN_D, TEST_D, UTIL_D and RESULT_D.
+my %directories = ();
+
+# The environment variables that gave us the contents in %directories.  These
+# get modified whenever we change directories, so that subprocesses can use
+# the values of those environment variables as well
+my @direnv = ();
+
+# A bool saying if we shall stop all testing if the current recipe has failing
+# tests or not.  This is set by setup() if the environment variable STOPTEST
+# is defined with a non-empty value.
+my $end_with_bailout = 0;
+
+# A set of hooks that is affected by with() and may be used in diverse places.
+# All hooks are expected to be CODE references.
+my %hooks = (
+
+    # exit_checker is used by run() directly after completion of a command.
+    # it receives the exit code from that command and is expected to return
+    # 1 (for success) or 0 (for failure).  This is the value that will be
+    # returned by run().
+    # NOTE: When run() gets the option 'capture => 1', this hook is ignored.
+    exit_checker => sub { return shift == 0 ? 1 : 0 },
+
+    );
+
+# Debug flag, to be set manually when needed
+my $debug = 0;
+
+# Declare some utility functions that are defined at the end
+sub bldtop_file;
+sub bldtop_dir;
+sub srctop_file;
+sub srctop_dir;
+sub quotify;
+
+# Declare some private functions that are defined at the end
+sub __env;
+sub __cwd;
+sub __apps_file;
+sub __results_file;
+sub __fixup_cmd;
+sub __build_cmd;
+
+=head2 Main functions
+
+The following functions are exported by default when using C<OpenSSL::Test>.
+
+=cut
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<setup "NAME">
+
+C<setup> is used for initial setup, and it is mandatory that it's used.
+If it's not used in a OpenSSL test recipe, the rest of the recipe will
+most likely refuse to run.
+
+C<setup> checks for environment variables (see L</ENVIRONMENT> below),
+checks that C<$TOP/Configure> or C<$SRCTOP/Configure> exists, C<chdir>
+into the results directory (defined by the C<$RESULT_D> environment
+variable if defined, otherwise C<$BLDTOP/test> or C<$TOP/test>, whichever
+is defined).
+
+=back
+
+=cut
+
+sub setup {
+    my $old_test_name = $test_name;
+    $test_name = shift;
+
+    BAIL_OUT("setup() must receive a name") unless $test_name;
+    warn "setup() detected test name change.  Innocuous, so we continue...\n"
+        if $old_test_name && $old_test_name ne $test_name;
+
+    return if $old_test_name;
+
+    BAIL_OUT("setup() needs \$TOP or \$SRCTOP and \$BLDTOP to be defined")
+        unless $ENV{TOP} || ($ENV{SRCTOP} && $ENV{BLDTOP});
+    BAIL_OUT("setup() found both \$TOP and \$SRCTOP or \$BLDTOP...")
+        if $ENV{TOP} && ($ENV{SRCTOP} || $ENV{BLDTOP});
+
+    __env();
+
+    BAIL_OUT("setup() expects the file Configure in the source top directory")
+        unless -f srctop_file("Configure");
+
+    __cwd($directories{RESULTS});
+}
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<indir "SUBDIR" =E<gt> sub BLOCK, OPTS>
+
+C<indir> is used to run a part of the recipe in a different directory than
+the one C<setup> moved into, usually a subdirectory, given by SUBDIR.
+The part of the recipe that's run there is given by the codeblock BLOCK.
+
+C<indir> takes some additional options OPTS that affect the subdirectory:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<create =E<gt> 0|1>
+
+When set to 1 (or any value that perl preceives as true), the subdirectory
+will be created if it doesn't already exist.  This happens before BLOCK
+is executed.
+
+=item B<cleanup =E<gt> 0|1>
+
+When set to 1 (or any value that perl preceives as true), the subdirectory
+will be cleaned out and removed.  This happens both before and after BLOCK
+is executed.
+
+=back
+
+An example:
+
+  indir "foo" => sub {
+      ok(run(app(["openssl", "version"]), stdout => "foo.txt"));
+      if (ok(open(RESULT, "foo.txt"), "reading foo.txt")) {
+          my $line = <RESULT>;
+          close RESULT;
+          is($line, qr/^OpenSSL 1\./,
+             "check that we're using OpenSSL 1.x.x");
+      }
+  }, create => 1, cleanup => 1;
+
+=back
+
+=cut
+
+sub indir {
+    my $subdir = shift;
+    my $codeblock = shift;
+    my %opts = @_;
+
+    my $reverse = __cwd($subdir,%opts);
+    BAIL_OUT("FAILURE: indir, \"$subdir\" wasn't possible to move into")
+	unless $reverse;
+
+    $codeblock->();
+
+    __cwd($reverse);
+
+    if ($opts{cleanup}) {
+	rmtree($subdir, { safe => 0 });
+    }
+}
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<app ARRAYREF, OPTS>
+
+=item B<test ARRAYREF, OPTS>
+
+Both of these functions take a reference to a list that is a command and
+its arguments, and some additional options (described further on).
+
+C<app> expects to find the given command (the first item in the given list
+reference) as an executable in C<$BIN_D> (if defined, otherwise C<$TOP/apps>
+or C<$BLDTOP/apps>).
+
+C<test> expects to find the given command (the first item in the given list
+reference) as an executable in C<$TEST_D> (if defined, otherwise C<$TOP/test>
+or C<$BLDTOP/test>).
+
+Both return a CODEREF to be used by C<run>, C<pipe> or C<cmdstr>.
+
+The options that both C<app> and C<test> can take are in the form of hash
+values:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<stdin =E<gt> PATH>
+
+=item B<stdout =E<gt> PATH>
+
+=item B<stderr =E<gt> PATH>
+
+In all three cases, the corresponding standard input, output or error is
+redirected from (for stdin) or to (for the others) a file given by the
+string PATH, I<or>, if the value is C<undef>, C</dev/null> or similar.
+
+=back
+
+=item B<perlapp ARRAYREF, OPTS>
+
+=item B<perltest ARRAYREF, OPTS>
+
+Both these functions function the same way as B<app> and B<test>, except
+that they expect the command to be a perl script.  Also, they support one
+more option:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<interpreter_args =E<gt> ARRAYref>
+
+The array reference is a set of arguments for perl rather than the script.
+Take care so that none of them can be seen as a script!  Flags and their
+eventual arguments only!
+
+=back
+
+An example:
+
+  ok(run(perlapp(["foo.pl", "arg1"],
+                 interpreter_args => [ "-I", srctop_dir("test") ])));
+
+=back
+
+=cut
+
+sub app {
+    my $cmd = shift;
+    my %opts = @_;
+    return sub { my $num = shift;
+		 return __build_cmd($num, \&__apps_file, $cmd, %opts); }
+}
+
+sub fuzz {
+    my $cmd = shift;
+    my %opts = @_;
+    return sub { my $num = shift;
+		 return __build_cmd($num, \&__fuzz_file, $cmd, %opts); }
+}
+
+sub test {
+    my $cmd = shift;
+    my %opts = @_;
+    return sub { my $num = shift;
+		 return __build_cmd($num, \&__test_file, $cmd, %opts); }
+}
+
+sub perlapp {
+    my $cmd = shift;
+    my %opts = @_;
+    return sub { my $num = shift;
+		 return __build_cmd($num, \&__perlapps_file, $cmd, %opts); }
+}
+
+sub perltest {
+    my $cmd = shift;
+    my %opts = @_;
+    return sub { my $num = shift;
+		 return __build_cmd($num, \&__perltest_file, $cmd, %opts); }
+}
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<run CODEREF, OPTS>
+
+This CODEREF is expected to be the value return by C<app> or C<test>,
+anything else will most likely cause an error unless you know what you're
+doing.
+
+C<run> executes the command returned by CODEREF and return either the
+resulting output (if the option C<capture> is set true) or a boolean indicating
+if the command succeeded or not.
+
+The options that C<run> can take are in the form of hash values:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<capture =E<gt> 0|1>
+
+If true, the command will be executed with a perl backtick, and C<run> will
+return the resulting output as an array of lines.  If false or not given,
+the command will be executed with C<system()>, and C<run> will return 1 if
+the command was successful or 0 if it wasn't.
+
+=back
+
+For further discussion on what is considered a successful command or not, see
+the function C<with> further down.
+
+=back
+
+=cut
+
+sub run {
+    my ($cmd, $display_cmd) = shift->(0);
+    my %opts = @_;
+
+    return () if !$cmd;
+
+    my $prefix = "";
+    if ( $^O eq "VMS" ) {	# VMS
+	$prefix = "pipe ";
+    }
+
+    my @r = ();
+    my $r = 0;
+    my $e = 0;
+
+    # In non-verbose, we want to shut up the command interpreter, in case
+    # it has something to complain about.  On VMS, it might complain both
+    # on stdout and stderr
+    my $save_STDOUT;
+    my $save_STDERR;
+    if ($ENV{HARNESS_ACTIVE} && !$ENV{HARNESS_VERBOSE}) {
+        open $save_STDOUT, '>&', \*STDOUT or die "Can't dup STDOUT: $!";
+        open $save_STDERR, '>&', \*STDERR or die "Can't dup STDERR: $!";
+        open STDOUT, ">", devnull();
+        open STDERR, ">", devnull();
+    }
+
+    # The dance we do with $? is the same dance the Unix shells appear to
+    # do.  For example, a program that gets aborted (and therefore signals
+    # SIGABRT = 6) will appear to exit with the code 134.  We mimic this
+    # to make it easier to compare with a manual run of the command.
+    if ($opts{capture}) {
+	@r = `$prefix$cmd`;
+	$e = ($? & 0x7f) ? ($? & 0x7f)|0x80 : ($? >> 8);
+    } else {
+	system("$prefix$cmd");
+	$e = ($? & 0x7f) ? ($? & 0x7f)|0x80 : ($? >> 8);
+	$r = $hooks{exit_checker}->($e);
+    }
+
+    if ($ENV{HARNESS_ACTIVE} && !$ENV{HARNESS_VERBOSE}) {
+        close STDOUT;
+        close STDERR;
+        open STDOUT, '>&', $save_STDOUT or die "Can't restore STDOUT: $!";
+        open STDERR, '>&', $save_STDERR or die "Can't restore STDERR: $!";
+    }
+
+    print STDERR "$prefix$display_cmd => $e\n"
+        if !$ENV{HARNESS_ACTIVE} || $ENV{HARNESS_VERBOSE};
+
+    # At this point, $? stops being interesting, and unfortunately,
+    # there are Test::More versions that get picky if we leave it
+    # non-zero.
+    $? = 0;
+
+    if ($opts{capture}) {
+	return @r;
+    } else {
+	return $r;
+    }
+}
+
+END {
+    my $tb = Test::More->builder;
+    my $failure = scalar(grep { $_ == 0; } $tb->summary);
+    if ($failure && $end_with_bailout) {
+	BAIL_OUT("Stoptest!");
+    }
+}
+
+=head2 Utility functions
+
+The following functions are exported on request when using C<OpenSSL::Test>.
+
+  # To only get the bldtop_file and srctop_file functions.
+  use OpenSSL::Test qw/bldtop_file srctop_file/;
+
+  # To only get the bldtop_file function in addition to the default ones.
+  use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT bldtop_file/;
+
+=cut
+
+# Utility functions, exported on request
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<bldtop_dir LIST>
+
+LIST is a list of directories that make up a path from the top of the OpenSSL
+build directory (as indicated by the environment variable C<$TOP> or
+C<$BLDTOP>).
+C<bldtop_dir> returns the resulting directory as a string, adapted to the local
+operating system.
+
+=back
+
+=cut
+
+sub bldtop_dir {
+    return __bldtop_dir(@_);	# This caters for operating systems that have
+				# a very distinct syntax for directories.
+}
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<bldtop_file LIST, FILENAME>
+
+LIST is a list of directories that make up a path from the top of the OpenSSL
+build directory (as indicated by the environment variable C<$TOP> or
+C<$BLDTOP>) and FILENAME is the name of a file located in that directory path.
+C<bldtop_file> returns the resulting file path as a string, adapted to the local
+operating system.
+
+=back
+
+=cut
+
+sub bldtop_file {
+    return __bldtop_file(@_);
+}
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<srctop_dir LIST>
+
+LIST is a list of directories that make up a path from the top of the OpenSSL
+source directory (as indicated by the environment variable C<$TOP> or
+C<$SRCTOP>).
+C<srctop_dir> returns the resulting directory as a string, adapted to the local
+operating system.
+
+=back
+
+=cut
+
+sub srctop_dir {
+    return __srctop_dir(@_);	# This caters for operating systems that have
+				# a very distinct syntax for directories.
+}
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<srctop_file LIST, FILENAME>
+
+LIST is a list of directories that make up a path from the top of the OpenSSL
+source directory (as indicated by the environment variable C<$TOP> or
+C<$SRCTOP>) and FILENAME is the name of a file located in that directory path.
+C<srctop_file> returns the resulting file path as a string, adapted to the local
+operating system.
+
+=back
+
+=cut
+
+sub srctop_file {
+    return __srctop_file(@_);
+}
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<data_file LIST, FILENAME>
+
+LIST is a list of directories that make up a path from the data directory
+associated with the test (see L</DESCRIPTION> above) and FILENAME is the name
+of a file located in that directory path.  C<data_file> returns the resulting
+file path as a string, adapted to the local operating system.
+
+=back
+
+=cut
+
+sub data_file {
+    return __data_file(@_);
+}
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<pipe LIST>
+
+LIST is a list of CODEREFs returned by C<app> or C<test>, from which C<pipe>
+creates a new command composed of all the given commands put together in a
+pipe.  C<pipe> returns a new CODEREF in the same manner as C<app> or C<test>,
+to be passed to C<run> for execution.
+
+=back
+
+=cut
+
+sub pipe {
+    my @cmds = @_;
+    return
+	sub {
+	    my @cs  = ();
+	    my @dcs = ();
+	    my @els = ();
+	    my $counter = 0;
+	    foreach (@cmds) {
+		my ($c, $dc, @el) = $_->(++$counter);
+
+		return () if !$c;
+
+		push @cs, $c;
+		push @dcs, $dc;
+		push @els, @el;
+	    }
+	    return (
+		join(" | ", @cs),
+		join(" | ", @dcs),
+		@els
+		);
+    };
+}
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<with HASHREF, CODEREF>
+
+C<with> will temporarly install hooks given by the HASHREF and then execute
+the given CODEREF.  Hooks are usually expected to have a coderef as value.
+
+The currently available hoosk are:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<exit_checker =E<gt> CODEREF>
+
+This hook is executed after C<run> has performed its given command.  The
+CODEREF receives the exit code as only argument and is expected to return
+1 (if the exit code indicated success) or 0 (if the exit code indicated
+failure).
+
+=back
+
+=back
+
+=cut
+
+sub with {
+    my $opts = shift;
+    my %opts = %{$opts};
+    my $codeblock = shift;
+
+    my %saved_hooks = ();
+
+    foreach (keys %opts) {
+	$saved_hooks{$_} = $hooks{$_}	if exists($hooks{$_});
+	$hooks{$_} = $opts{$_};
+    }
+
+    $codeblock->();
+
+    foreach (keys %saved_hooks) {
+	$hooks{$_} = $saved_hooks{$_};
+    }
+}
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<cmdstr CODEREF, OPTS>
+
+C<cmdstr> takes a CODEREF from C<app> or C<test> and simply returns the
+command as a string.
+
+C<cmdstr> takes some additiona options OPTS that affect the string returned:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<display =E<gt> 0|1>
+
+When set to 0, the returned string will be with all decorations, such as a
+possible redirect of stderr to the null device.  This is suitable if the
+string is to be used directly in a recipe.
+
+When set to 1, the returned string will be without extra decorations.  This
+is suitable for display if that is desired (doesn't confuse people with all
+internal stuff), or if it's used to pass a command down to a subprocess.
+
+Default: 0
+
+=back
+
+=back
+
+=cut
+
+sub cmdstr {
+    my ($cmd, $display_cmd) = shift->(0);
+    my %opts = @_;
+
+    if ($opts{display}) {
+        return $display_cmd;
+    } else {
+        return $cmd;
+    }
+}
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<quotify LIST>
+
+LIST is a list of strings that are going to be used as arguments for a
+command, and makes sure to inject quotes and escapes as necessary depending
+on the content of each string.
+
+This can also be used to put quotes around the executable of a command.
+I<This must never ever be done on VMS.>
+
+=back
+
+=cut
+
+sub quotify {
+    # Unix setup (default if nothing else is mentioned)
+    my $arg_formatter =
+	sub { $_ = shift;
+	      ($_ eq '' || /\s|[\{\}\\\$\[\]\*\?\|\&:;<>]/) ? "'$_'" : $_ };
+
+    if ( $^O eq "VMS") {	# VMS setup
+	$arg_formatter = sub {
+	    $_ = shift;
+	    if ($_ eq '' || /\s|["[:upper:]]/) {
+		s/"/""/g;
+		'"'.$_.'"';
+	    } else {
+		$_;
+	    }
+	};
+    } elsif ( $^O eq "MSWin32") { # MSWin setup
+	$arg_formatter = sub {
+	    $_ = shift;
+	    if ($_ eq '' || /\s|["\|\&\*\;<>]/) {
+		s/(["\\])/\\$1/g;
+		'"'.$_.'"';
+	    } else {
+		$_;
+	    }
+	};
+    }
+
+    return map { $arg_formatter->($_) } @_;
+}
+
+######################################################################
+# private functions.  These are never exported.
+
+=head1 ENVIRONMENT
+
+OpenSSL::Test depends on some environment variables.
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<TOP>
+
+This environment variable is mandatory.  C<setup> will check that it's
+defined and that it's a directory that contains the file C<Configure>.
+If this isn't so, C<setup> will C<BAIL_OUT>.
+
+=item B<BIN_D>
+
+If defined, its value should be the directory where the openssl application
+is located.  Defaults to C<$TOP/apps> (adapted to the operating system).
+
+=item B<TEST_D>
+
+If defined, its value should be the directory where the test applications
+are located.  Defaults to C<$TOP/test> (adapted to the operating system).
+
+=item B<STOPTEST>
+
+If defined, it puts testing in a different mode, where a recipe with
+failures will result in a C<BAIL_OUT> at the end of its run.
+
+=back
+
+=cut
+
+sub __env {
+    (my $recipe_datadir = basename($0)) =~ s/\.t$/_data/i;
+
+    $directories{SRCTOP}  = $ENV{SRCTOP} || $ENV{TOP};
+    $directories{BLDTOP}  = $ENV{BLDTOP} || $ENV{TOP};
+    $directories{BLDAPPS} = $ENV{BIN_D}  || __bldtop_dir("apps");
+    $directories{SRCAPPS} =                 __srctop_dir("apps");
+    $directories{BLDFUZZ} =                 __bldtop_dir("fuzz");
+    $directories{SRCFUZZ} =                 __srctop_dir("fuzz");
+    $directories{BLDTEST} = $ENV{TEST_D} || __bldtop_dir("test");
+    $directories{SRCTEST} =                 __srctop_dir("test");
+    $directories{SRCDATA} =                 __srctop_dir("test", "recipes",
+                                                         $recipe_datadir);
+    $directories{RESULTS} = $ENV{RESULT_D} || $directories{BLDTEST};
+
+    push @direnv, "TOP"       if $ENV{TOP};
+    push @direnv, "SRCTOP"    if $ENV{SRCTOP};
+    push @direnv, "BLDTOP"    if $ENV{BLDTOP};
+    push @direnv, "BIN_D"     if $ENV{BIN_D};
+    push @direnv, "TEST_D"    if $ENV{TEST_D};
+    push @direnv, "RESULT_D"  if $ENV{RESULT_D};
+
+    $end_with_bailout	  = $ENV{STOPTEST} ? 1 : 0;
+};
+
+sub __srctop_file {
+    BAIL_OUT("Must run setup() first") if (! $test_name);
+
+    my $f = pop;
+    return catfile($directories{SRCTOP},@_,$f);
+}
+
+sub __srctop_dir {
+    BAIL_OUT("Must run setup() first") if (! $test_name);
+
+    return catdir($directories{SRCTOP},@_);
+}
+
+sub __bldtop_file {
+    BAIL_OUT("Must run setup() first") if (! $test_name);
+
+    my $f = pop;
+    return catfile($directories{BLDTOP},@_,$f);
+}
+
+sub __bldtop_dir {
+    BAIL_OUT("Must run setup() first") if (! $test_name);
+
+    return catdir($directories{BLDTOP},@_);
+}
+
+sub __exeext {
+    my $ext = "";
+    if ($^O eq "VMS" ) {	# VMS
+	$ext = ".exe";
+    } elsif ($^O eq "MSWin32") { # Windows
+	$ext = ".exe";
+    }
+    return $ENV{"EXE_EXT"} || $ext;
+}
+
+sub __test_file {
+    BAIL_OUT("Must run setup() first") if (! $test_name);
+
+    my $f = pop;
+    my $out = catfile($directories{BLDTEST},@_,$f . __exeext());
+    $out = catfile($directories{SRCTEST},@_,$f) unless -x $out;
+    return $out;
+}
+
+sub __perltest_file {
+    BAIL_OUT("Must run setup() first") if (! $test_name);
+
+    my $f = pop;
+    my $out = catfile($directories{BLDTEST},@_,$f);
+    $out = catfile($directories{SRCTEST},@_,$f) unless -f $out;
+    return ($^X, $out);
+}
+
+sub __apps_file {
+    BAIL_OUT("Must run setup() first") if (! $test_name);
+
+    my $f = pop;
+    my $out = catfile($directories{BLDAPPS},@_,$f . __exeext());
+    $out = catfile($directories{SRCAPPS},@_,$f) unless -x $out;
+    return $out;
+}
+
+sub __fuzz_file {
+    BAIL_OUT("Must run setup() first") if (! $test_name);
+
+    my $f = pop;
+    my $out = catfile($directories{BLDFUZZ},@_,$f . __exeext());
+    $out = catfile($directories{SRCFUZZ},@_,$f) unless -x $out;
+    return $out;
+}
+
+sub __perlapps_file {
+    BAIL_OUT("Must run setup() first") if (! $test_name);
+
+    my $f = pop;
+    my $out = catfile($directories{BLDAPPS},@_,$f);
+    $out = catfile($directories{SRCAPPS},@_,$f) unless -f $out;
+    return ($^X, $out);
+}
+
+sub __data_file {
+    BAIL_OUT("Must run setup() first") if (! $test_name);
+
+    my $f = pop;
+    return catfile($directories{SRCDATA},@_,$f);
+}
+
+sub __results_file {
+    BAIL_OUT("Must run setup() first") if (! $test_name);
+
+    my $f = pop;
+    return catfile($directories{RESULTS},@_,$f);
+}
+
+sub __cwd {
+    my $dir = catdir(shift);
+    my %opts = @_;
+    my $abscurdir = rel2abs(curdir());
+    my $absdir = rel2abs($dir);
+    my $reverse = abs2rel($abscurdir, $absdir);
+
+    # PARANOIA: if we're not moving anywhere, we do nothing more
+    if ($abscurdir eq $absdir) {
+	return $reverse;
+    }
+
+    # Do not support a move to a different volume for now.  Maybe later.
+    BAIL_OUT("FAILURE: \"$dir\" moves to a different volume, not supported")
+	if $reverse eq $abscurdir;
+
+    # If someone happened to give a directory that leads back to the current,
+    # it's extremely silly to do anything more, so just simulate that we did
+    # move.
+    # In this case, we won't even clean it out, for safety's sake.
+    return "." if $reverse eq "";
+
+    $dir = canonpath($dir);
+    if ($opts{create}) {
+	mkpath($dir);
+    }
+
+    # We are recalculating the directories we keep track of, but need to save
+    # away the result for after having moved into the new directory.
+    my %tmp_directories = ();
+    my %tmp_ENV = ();
+
+    # For each of these directory variables, figure out where they are relative
+    # to the directory we want to move to if they aren't absolute (if they are,
+    # they don't change!)
+    my @dirtags = sort keys %directories;
+    foreach (@dirtags) {
+	if (!file_name_is_absolute($directories{$_})) {
+	    my $newpath = abs2rel(rel2abs($directories{$_}), rel2abs($dir));
+	    $tmp_directories{$_} = $newpath;
+	}
+    }
+
+    # Treat each environment variable that was used to get us the values in
+    # %directories the same was as the paths in %directories, so any sub
+    # process can use their values properly as well
+    foreach (@direnv) {
+	if (!file_name_is_absolute($ENV{$_})) {
+	    my $newpath = abs2rel(rel2abs($ENV{$_}), rel2abs($dir));
+	    $tmp_ENV{$_} = $newpath;
+	}
+    }
+
+    # Should we just bail out here as well?  I'm unsure.
+    return undef unless chdir($dir);
+
+    if ($opts{cleanup}) {
+	rmtree(".", { safe => 0, keep_root => 1 });
+    }
+
+    # We put back new values carefully.  Doing the obvious
+    # %directories = ( %tmp_irectories )
+    # will clear out any value that happens to be an absolute path
+    foreach (keys %tmp_directories) {
+        $directories{$_} = $tmp_directories{$_};
+    }
+    foreach (keys %tmp_ENV) {
+        $ENV{$_} = $tmp_ENV{$_};
+    }
+
+    if ($debug) {
+	print STDERR "DEBUG: __cwd(), directories and files:\n";
+	print STDERR "  \$directories{BLDTEST} = \"$directories{BLDTEST}\"\n";
+	print STDERR "  \$directories{SRCTEST} = \"$directories{SRCTEST}\"\n";
+	print STDERR "  \$directories{SRCDATA} = \"$directories{SRCDATA}\"\n";
+	print STDERR "  \$directories{RESULTS} = \"$directories{RESULTS}\"\n";
+	print STDERR "  \$directories{BLDAPPS} = \"$directories{BLDAPPS}\"\n";
+	print STDERR "  \$directories{SRCAPPS} = \"$directories{SRCAPPS}\"\n";
+	print STDERR "  \$directories{SRCTOP}  = \"$directories{SRCTOP}\"\n";
+	print STDERR "  \$directories{BLDTOP}  = \"$directories{BLDTOP}\"\n";
+	print STDERR "\n";
+	print STDERR "  current directory is \"",curdir(),"\"\n";
+	print STDERR "  the way back is \"$reverse\"\n";
+    }
+
+    return $reverse;
+}
+
+sub __fixup_cmd {
+    my $prog = shift;
+    my $exe_shell = shift;
+
+    my $prefix = __bldtop_file("util", "shlib_wrap.sh")." ";
+
+    if (defined($exe_shell)) {
+	$prefix = "$exe_shell ";
+    } elsif ($^O eq "VMS" ) {	# VMS
+	$prefix = ($prog =~ /^(?:[\$a-z0-9_]+:)?[<\[]/i ? "mcr " : "mcr []");
+    } elsif ($^O eq "MSWin32") { # Windows
+	$prefix = "";
+    }
+
+    # We test both with and without extension.  The reason
+    # is that we might be passed a complete file spec, with
+    # extension.
+    if ( ! -x $prog ) {
+	my $prog = "$prog";
+	if ( ! -x $prog ) {
+	    $prog = undef;
+	}
+    }
+
+    if (defined($prog)) {
+	# Make sure to quotify the program file on platforms that may
+	# have spaces or similar in their path name.
+	# To our knowledge, VMS is the exception where quotifying should
+	# never happen.
+	($prog) = quotify($prog) unless $^O eq "VMS";
+	return $prefix.$prog;
+    }
+
+    print STDERR "$prog not found\n";
+    return undef;
+}
+
+sub __build_cmd {
+    BAIL_OUT("Must run setup() first") if (! $test_name);
+
+    my $num = shift;
+    my $path_builder = shift;
+    # Make a copy to not destroy the caller's array
+    my @cmdarray = ( @{$_[0]} ); shift;
+    my %opts = @_;
+
+    # We do a little dance, as $path_builder might return a list of
+    # more than one.  If so, only the first is to be considered a
+    # program to fix up, the rest is part of the arguments.  This
+    # happens for perl scripts, where $path_builder will return
+    # a list of two, $^X and the script name.
+    # Also, if $path_builder returned more than one, we don't apply
+    # the EXE_SHELL environment variable.
+    my @prog = ($path_builder->(shift @cmdarray));
+    my $first = shift @prog;
+    my $exe_shell = @prog ? undef : $ENV{EXE_SHELL};
+    my $cmd = __fixup_cmd($first, $exe_shell);
+    if (@prog) {
+	if ( ! -f $prog[0] ) {
+	    print STDERR "$prog[0] not found\n";
+	    $cmd = undef;
+	}
+    }
+    my @args = (@prog, @cmdarray);
+    if (defined($opts{interpreter_args})) {
+        unshift @args, @{$opts{interpreter_args}};
+    }
+
+    return () if !$cmd;
+
+    my $arg_str = "";
+    my $null = devnull();
+
+
+    $arg_str = " ".join(" ", quotify @args) if @args;
+
+    my $fileornull = sub { $_[0] ? $_[0] : $null; };
+    my $stdin = "";
+    my $stdout = "";
+    my $stderr = "";
+    my $saved_stderr = undef;
+    $stdin = " < ".$fileornull->($opts{stdin})  if exists($opts{stdin});
+    $stdout= " > ".$fileornull->($opts{stdout}) if exists($opts{stdout});
+    $stderr=" 2> ".$fileornull->($opts{stderr}) if exists($opts{stderr});
+
+    my $display_cmd = "$cmd$arg_str$stdin$stdout$stderr";
+
+    $stderr=" 2> ".$null
+        unless $stderr || !$ENV{HARNESS_ACTIVE} || $ENV{HARNESS_VERBOSE};
+
+    $cmd .= "$arg_str$stdin$stdout$stderr";
+
+    if ($debug) {
+	print STDERR "DEBUG[__build_cmd]: \$cmd = \"$cmd\"\n";
+	print STDERR "DEBUG[__build_cmd]: \$display_cmd = \"$display_cmd\"\n";
+    }
+
+    return ($cmd, $display_cmd);
+}
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<Test::More>, L<Test::Harness>
+
+=head1 AUTHORS
+
+Richard Levitte E<lt>levitte@openssl.orgE<gt> with assitance and
+inspiration from Andy Polyakov E<lt>appro@openssl.org<gt>.
+
+=cut
+
+1;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/util/perl/OpenSSL/Test/Simple.pm b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/perl/OpenSSL/Test/Simple.pm
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c5a84d5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/perl/OpenSSL/Test/Simple.pm
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+# Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+package OpenSSL::Test::Simple;
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+
+use Exporter;
+use vars qw($VERSION @ISA @EXPORT @EXPORT_OK %EXPORT_TAGS);
+$VERSION = "0.2";
+@ISA = qw(Exporter);
+@EXPORT = qw(simple_test);
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+OpenSSL::Test::Simple - a few very simple test functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+  use OpenSSL::Test::Simple;
+
+  simple_test("my_test_name", "destest", "des");
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+Sometimes, the functions in L<OpenSSL::Test> are quite tedious for some
+repetitive tasks.  This module provides functions to make life easier.
+You could call them hacks if you wish.
+
+=cut
+
+use OpenSSL::Test;
+use OpenSSL::Test::Utils;
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<simple_test NAME, PROGRAM, ALGORITHM>
+
+Runs a test named NAME, running the program PROGRAM with no arguments,
+to test the algorithm ALGORITHM.
+
+A complete recipe looks like this:
+
+  use OpenSSL::Test::Simple;
+
+  simple_test("test_bf", "bftest", "bf");
+
+=back
+
+=cut
+
+# args:
+#  name			(used with setup())
+#  algorithm		(used to check if it's at all supported)
+#  name of binary	(the program that does the actual test)
+sub simple_test {
+    my ($name, $prgr, @algos) = @_;
+
+    setup($name);
+
+    if (scalar(disabled(@algos))) {
+	if (scalar(@algos) == 1) {
+	    plan skip_all => $algos[0]." is not supported by this OpenSSL build";
+	} else {
+	    my $last = pop @algos;
+	    plan skip_all => join(", ", @algos)." and $last are not supported by this OpenSSL build";
+	}
+    }
+
+    plan tests => 1;
+
+    ok(run(test([$prgr])), "running $prgr");
+}
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<OpenSSL::Test>
+
+=head1 AUTHORS
+
+Richard Levitte E<lt>levitte@openssl.orgE<gt> with inspiration
+from Rich Salz E<lt>rsalz@openssl.orgE<gt>.
+
+=cut
+
+1;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/util/perl/OpenSSL/Test/Utils.pm b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/perl/OpenSSL/Test/Utils.pm
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7b0a705
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/perl/OpenSSL/Test/Utils.pm
@@ -0,0 +1,240 @@
+# Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+package OpenSSL::Test::Utils;
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+
+use Exporter;
+use vars qw($VERSION @ISA @EXPORT @EXPORT_OK %EXPORT_TAGS);
+$VERSION = "0.1";
+@ISA = qw(Exporter);
+@EXPORT = qw(alldisabled anydisabled disabled config available_protocols
+             have_IPv4 have_IPv6);
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+OpenSSL::Test::Utils - test utility functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+  use OpenSSL::Test::Utils;
+
+  my @tls = available_protocols("tls");
+  my @dtls = available_protocols("dtls");
+  alldisabled("dh", "dsa");
+  anydisabled("dh", "dsa");
+
+  config("fips");
+
+  have_IPv4();
+  have_IPv6();
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+This module provides utility functions for the testing framework.
+
+=cut
+
+use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT bldtop_file/;
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<available_protocols STRING>
+
+Returns a list of strings for all the available SSL/TLS versions if
+STRING is "tls", or for all the available DTLS versions if STRING is
+"dtls".  Otherwise, it returns the empty list.  The strings in the
+returned list can be used with B<alldisabled> and B<anydisabled>.
+
+=item B<alldisabled ARRAY>
+=item B<anydisabled ARRAY>
+
+In an array context returns an array with each element set to 1 if the
+corresponding feature is disabled and 0 otherwise.
+
+In a scalar context, alldisabled returns 1 if all of the features in
+ARRAY are disabled, while anydisabled returns 1 if any of them are
+disabled.
+
+=item B<config STRING>
+
+Returns an item from the %config hash in \$TOP/configdata.pm.
+
+=item B<have_IPv4>
+=item B<have_IPv6>
+
+Return true if IPv4 / IPv6 is possible to use on the current system.
+
+=back
+
+=cut
+
+our %available_protocols;
+our %disabled;
+our %config;
+my $configdata_loaded = 0;
+
+sub load_configdata {
+    # We eval it so it doesn't run at compile time of this file.
+    # The latter would have bldtop_file() complain that setup() hasn't
+    # been run yet.
+    my $configdata = bldtop_file("configdata.pm");
+    eval { require $configdata;
+	   %available_protocols = %configdata::available_protocols;
+	   %disabled = %configdata::disabled;
+	   %config = %configdata::config;
+    };
+    $configdata_loaded = 1;
+}
+
+# args
+#  list of 1s and 0s, coming from check_disabled()
+sub anyof {
+    my $x = 0;
+    foreach (@_) { $x += $_ }
+    return $x > 0;
+}
+
+# args
+#  list of 1s and 0s, coming from check_disabled()
+sub allof {
+    my $x = 1;
+    foreach (@_) { $x *= $_ }
+    return $x > 0;
+}
+
+# args
+#  list of strings, all of them should be names of features
+#  that can be disabled.
+# returns a list of 1s (if the corresponding feature is disabled)
+#  and 0s (if it isn't)
+sub check_disabled {
+    return map { exists $disabled{lc $_} ? 1 : 0 } @_;
+}
+
+# Exported functions #################################################
+
+# args:
+#  list of features to check
+sub anydisabled {
+    load_configdata() unless $configdata_loaded;
+    my @ret = check_disabled(@_);
+    return @ret if wantarray;
+    return anyof(@ret);
+}
+
+# args:
+#  list of features to check
+sub alldisabled {
+    load_configdata() unless $configdata_loaded;
+    my @ret = check_disabled(@_);
+    return @ret if wantarray;
+    return allof(@ret);
+}
+
+# !!! Kept for backward compatibility
+# args:
+#  single string
+sub disabled {
+    anydisabled(@_);
+}
+
+sub available_protocols {
+    load_configdata() unless $configdata_loaded;
+    my $protocol_class = shift;
+    if (exists $available_protocols{lc $protocol_class}) {
+	return @{$available_protocols{lc $protocol_class}}
+    }
+    return ();
+}
+
+sub config {
+    load_configdata() unless $configdata_loaded;
+    return $config{$_[0]};
+}
+
+# IPv4 / IPv6 checker
+my $have_IPv4 = -1;
+my $have_IPv6 = -1;
+my $IP_factory;
+sub check_IP {
+    my $listenaddress = shift;
+
+    eval {
+        require IO::Socket::IP;
+        my $s = IO::Socket::IP->new(
+            LocalAddr => $listenaddress,
+            LocalPort => 0,
+            Listen=>1,
+            );
+        $s or die "\n";
+        $s->close();
+    };
+    if ($@ eq "") {
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    eval {
+        require IO::Socket::INET6;
+        my $s = IO::Socket::INET6->new(
+            LocalAddr => $listenaddress,
+            LocalPort => 0,
+            Listen=>1,
+            );
+        $s or die "\n";
+        $s->close();
+    };
+    if ($@ eq "") {
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    eval {
+        require IO::Socket::INET;
+        my $s = IO::Socket::INET->new(
+            LocalAddr => $listenaddress,
+            LocalPort => 0,
+            Listen=>1,
+            );
+        $s or die "\n";
+        $s->close();
+    };
+    if ($@ eq "") {
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+sub have_IPv4 {
+    if ($have_IPv4 < 0) {
+        $have_IPv4 = check_IP("127.0.0.1");
+    }
+    return $have_IPv4;
+}
+
+sub have_IPv6 {
+    if ($have_IPv6 < 0) {
+        $have_IPv6 = check_IP("::1");
+    }
+    return $have_IPv6;
+}
+
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<OpenSSL::Test>
+
+=head1 AUTHORS
+
+Stephen Henson E<lt>steve@openssl.orgE<gt> and
+Richard Levitte E<lt>levitte@openssl.orgE<gt>
+
+=cut
+
+1;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/util/perl/OpenSSL/Util/Pod.pm b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/perl/OpenSSL/Util/Pod.pm
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5c0af95
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/perl/OpenSSL/Util/Pod.pm
@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
+# Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+package OpenSSL::Util::Pod;
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+
+use Exporter;
+use vars qw($VERSION @ISA @EXPORT @EXPORT_OK %EXPORT_TAGS);
+$VERSION = "0.1";
+@ISA = qw(Exporter);
+@EXPORT = qw(extract_pod_info);
+@EXPORT_OK = qw();
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+OpenSSL::Util::Pod - utilities to manipulate .pod files
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+  use OpenSSL::Util::Pod;
+
+  my %podinfo = extract_pod_info("foo.pod");
+
+  # or if the file is already opened...  Note that this consumes the
+  # remainder of the file.
+
+  my %podinfo = extract_pod_info(\*STDIN);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+=over
+
+=item B<extract_pod_info "FILENAME", HASHREF>
+
+=item B<extract_pod_info "FILENAME">
+
+=item B<extract_pod_info GLOB, HASHREF>
+
+=item B<extract_pod_info GLOB>
+
+Extracts information from a .pod file, given a STRING (file name) or a
+GLOB (a file handle).  The result is given back as a hash table.
+
+The additional hash is for extra parameters:
+
+=over
+
+=item B<section =E<gt> N>
+
+The value MUST be a number, and will be the default man section number
+to be used with the given .pod file.  This number can be altered if
+the .pod file has a line like this:
+
+  =for comment openssl_manual_section: 4
+
+=item B<debug =E<gt> 0|1>
+
+If set to 1, extra debug text will be printed on STDERR
+
+=back
+
+=back
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+=over
+
+=item B<extract_pod_info> returns a hash table with the following
+items:
+
+=over
+
+=item B<section =E<gt> N>
+
+The man section number this .pod file belongs to.  Often the same as
+was given as input.
+
+=item B<names =E<gt> [ "name", ... ]>
+
+All the names extracted from the NAME section.
+
+=back
+
+=back
+
+=cut
+
+sub extract_pod_info {
+    my $input = shift;
+    my $defaults_ref = shift || {};
+    my %defaults = ( debug => 0, section => 0, %$defaults_ref );
+    my $fh = undef;
+    my $filename = undef;
+
+    # If not a file handle, then it's assume to be a file path (a string)
+    unless (ref $input eq "GLOB") {
+        $filename = $input;
+        open $fh, $input or die "Trying to read $filename: $!\n";
+        print STDERR "DEBUG: Reading $input\n" if $defaults{debug};
+        $input = $fh;
+    }
+
+    my %podinfo = ( section => $defaults{section});
+    while(<$input>) {
+        s|\R$||;
+        if (m|^=for\s+comment\s+openssl_manual_section:\s*([0-9])\s*$|) {
+            print STDERR "DEBUG: Found man section number $1\n"
+                if $defaults{debug};
+            $podinfo{section} = $1;
+        }
+
+        # Stop reading when we have reached past the NAME section.
+        last if (m|^=head1|
+                 && defined $podinfo{lastsect}
+                 && $podinfo{lastsect} eq "NAME");
+
+        # Collect the section name
+        if (m|^=head1\s*(.*)|) {
+            $podinfo{lastsect} = $1;
+            $podinfo{lastsect} =~ s/\s+$//;
+            print STDERR "DEBUG: Found new pod section $1\n"
+                if $defaults{debug};
+            print STDERR "DEBUG: Clearing pod section text\n"
+                if $defaults{debug};
+            $podinfo{lastsecttext} = "";
+        }
+
+        next if (m|^=| || m|^\s*$|);
+
+        # Collect the section text
+        print STDERR "DEBUG: accumulating pod section text \"$_\"\n"
+            if $defaults{debug};
+        $podinfo{lastsecttext} .= " " if $podinfo{lastsecttext};
+        $podinfo{lastsecttext} .= $_;
+    }
+
+
+    if (defined $fh) {
+        close $fh;
+        print STDERR "DEBUG: Done reading $filename\n" if $defaults{debug};
+    }
+
+    $podinfo{lastsecttext} =~ s| - .*$||;
+
+    my @names =
+        map { s|\s+||g; $_ }
+        split(m|,|, $podinfo{lastsecttext});
+
+    return ( section => $podinfo{section}, names => [ @names ] );
+}
+
+1;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/util/perl/TLSProxy/ClientHello.pm b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/perl/TLSProxy/ClientHello.pm
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ec739d2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/perl/TLSProxy/ClientHello.pm
@@ -0,0 +1,242 @@
+# Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+use strict;
+
+package TLSProxy::ClientHello;
+
+use vars '@ISA';
+push @ISA, 'TLSProxy::Message';
+
+sub new
+{
+    my $class = shift;
+    my ($server,
+        $data,
+        $records,
+        $startoffset,
+        $message_frag_lens) = @_;
+
+    my $self = $class->SUPER::new(
+        $server,
+        1,
+        $data,
+        $records,
+        $startoffset,
+        $message_frag_lens);
+
+    $self->{client_version} = 0;
+    $self->{random} = [];
+    $self->{session_id_len} = 0;
+    $self->{session} = "";
+    $self->{ciphersuite_len} = 0;
+    $self->{ciphersuites} = [];
+    $self->{comp_meth_len} = 0;
+    $self->{comp_meths} = [];
+    $self->{extensions_len} = 0;
+    $self->{extension_data} = "";
+
+    return $self;
+}
+
+sub parse
+{
+    my $self = shift;
+    my $ptr = 2;
+    my ($client_version) = unpack('n', $self->data);
+    my $random = substr($self->data, $ptr, 32);
+    $ptr += 32;
+    my $session_id_len = unpack('C', substr($self->data, $ptr));
+    $ptr++;
+    my $session = substr($self->data, $ptr, $session_id_len);
+    $ptr += $session_id_len;
+    my $ciphersuite_len = unpack('n', substr($self->data, $ptr));
+    $ptr += 2;
+    my @ciphersuites = unpack('n*', substr($self->data, $ptr,
+                                           $ciphersuite_len));
+    $ptr += $ciphersuite_len;
+    my $comp_meth_len = unpack('C', substr($self->data, $ptr));
+    $ptr++;
+    my @comp_meths = unpack('C*', substr($self->data, $ptr, $comp_meth_len));
+    $ptr += $comp_meth_len;
+    my $extensions_len = unpack('n', substr($self->data, $ptr));
+    $ptr += 2;
+    #For now we just deal with this as a block of data. In the future we will
+    #want to parse this
+    my $extension_data = substr($self->data, $ptr);
+
+    if (length($extension_data) != $extensions_len) {
+        die "Invalid extension length\n";
+    }
+    my %extensions = ();
+    while (length($extension_data) >= 4) {
+        my ($type, $size) = unpack("nn", $extension_data);
+        my $extdata = substr($extension_data, 4, $size);
+        $extension_data = substr($extension_data, 4 + $size);
+        $extensions{$type} = $extdata;
+    }
+
+    $self->client_version($client_version);
+    $self->random($random);
+    $self->session_id_len($session_id_len);
+    $self->session($session);
+    $self->ciphersuite_len($ciphersuite_len);
+    $self->ciphersuites(\@ciphersuites);
+    $self->comp_meth_len($comp_meth_len);
+    $self->comp_meths(\@comp_meths);
+    $self->extensions_len($extensions_len);
+    $self->extension_data(\%extensions);
+
+    $self->process_extensions();
+
+    print "    Client Version:".$client_version."\n";
+    print "    Session ID Len:".$session_id_len."\n";
+    print "    Ciphersuite len:".$ciphersuite_len."\n";
+    print "    Compression Method Len:".$comp_meth_len."\n";
+    print "    Extensions Len:".$extensions_len."\n";
+}
+
+#Perform any actions necessary based on the extensions we've seen
+sub process_extensions
+{
+    my $self = shift;
+    my %extensions = %{$self->extension_data};
+
+    #Clear any state from a previous run
+    TLSProxy::Record->etm(0);
+
+    if (exists $extensions{TLSProxy::Message::EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC}) {
+        TLSProxy::Record->etm(1);
+    }
+}
+
+#Reconstruct the on-the-wire message data following changes
+sub set_message_contents
+{
+    my $self = shift;
+    my $data;
+    my $extensions = "";
+
+    $data = pack('n', $self->client_version);
+    $data .= $self->random;
+    $data .= pack('C', $self->session_id_len);
+    $data .= $self->session;
+    $data .= pack('n', $self->ciphersuite_len);
+    $data .= pack("n*", @{$self->ciphersuites});
+    $data .= pack('C', $self->comp_meth_len);
+    $data .= pack("C*", @{$self->comp_meths});
+
+    foreach my $key (keys %{$self->extension_data}) {
+        my $extdata = ${$self->extension_data}{$key};
+        $extensions .= pack("n", $key);
+        $extensions .= pack("n", length($extdata));
+        $extensions .= $extdata;
+        if ($key == TLSProxy::Message::EXT_DUPLICATE_EXTENSION) {
+          $extensions .= pack("n", $key);
+          $extensions .= pack("n", length($extdata));
+          $extensions .= $extdata;
+        }
+    }
+
+    $data .= pack('n', length($extensions));
+    $data .= $extensions;
+
+    $self->data($data);
+}
+
+#Read/write accessors
+sub client_version
+{
+    my $self = shift;
+    if (@_) {
+      $self->{client_version} = shift;
+    }
+    return $self->{client_version};
+}
+sub random
+{
+    my $self = shift;
+    if (@_) {
+      $self->{random} = shift;
+    }
+    return $self->{random};
+}
+sub session_id_len
+{
+    my $self = shift;
+    if (@_) {
+      $self->{session_id_len} = shift;
+    }
+    return $self->{session_id_len};
+}
+sub session
+{
+    my $self = shift;
+    if (@_) {
+      $self->{session} = shift;
+    }
+    return $self->{session};
+}
+sub ciphersuite_len
+{
+    my $self = shift;
+    if (@_) {
+      $self->{ciphersuite_len} = shift;
+    }
+    return $self->{ciphersuite_len};
+}
+sub ciphersuites
+{
+    my $self = shift;
+    if (@_) {
+      $self->{ciphersuites} = shift;
+    }
+    return $self->{ciphersuites};
+}
+sub comp_meth_len
+{
+    my $self = shift;
+    if (@_) {
+      $self->{comp_meth_len} = shift;
+    }
+    return $self->{comp_meth_len};
+}
+sub comp_meths
+{
+    my $self = shift;
+    if (@_) {
+      $self->{comp_meths} = shift;
+    }
+    return $self->{comp_meths};
+}
+sub extensions_len
+{
+    my $self = shift;
+    if (@_) {
+      $self->{extensions_len} = shift;
+    }
+    return $self->{extensions_len};
+}
+sub extension_data
+{
+    my $self = shift;
+    if (@_) {
+      $self->{extension_data} = shift;
+    }
+    return $self->{extension_data};
+}
+sub set_extension
+{
+    my ($self, $ext_type, $ext_data) = @_;
+    $self->{extension_data}{$ext_type} = $ext_data;
+}
+sub delete_extension
+{
+    my ($self, $ext_type) = @_;
+    delete $self->{extension_data}{$ext_type};
+}
+1;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/util/perl/TLSProxy/Message.pm b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/perl/TLSProxy/Message.pm
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0821bde
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/perl/TLSProxy/Message.pm
@@ -0,0 +1,456 @@
+# Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+use strict;
+
+package TLSProxy::Message;
+
+use constant TLS_MESSAGE_HEADER_LENGTH => 4;
+
+#Message types
+use constant {
+    MT_HELLO_REQUEST => 0,
+    MT_CLIENT_HELLO => 1,
+    MT_SERVER_HELLO => 2,
+    MT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET => 4,
+    MT_CERTIFICATE => 11,
+    MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE => 12,
+    MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST => 13,
+    MT_SERVER_HELLO_DONE => 14,
+    MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY => 15,
+    MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE => 16,
+    MT_FINISHED => 20,
+    MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS => 22,
+    MT_NEXT_PROTO => 67
+};
+
+#Alert levels
+use constant {
+    AL_LEVEL_WARN => 1,
+    AL_LEVEL_FATAL => 2
+};
+
+#Alert descriptions
+use constant {
+    AL_DESC_CLOSE_NOTIFY => 0,
+    AL_DESC_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE => 10,
+    AL_DESC_NO_RENEGOTIATION => 100
+};
+
+my %message_type = (
+    MT_HELLO_REQUEST, "HelloRequest",
+    MT_CLIENT_HELLO, "ClientHello",
+    MT_SERVER_HELLO, "ServerHello",
+    MT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, "NewSessionTicket",
+    MT_CERTIFICATE, "Certificate",
+    MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, "ServerKeyExchange",
+    MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, "CertificateRequest",
+    MT_SERVER_HELLO_DONE, "ServerHelloDone",
+    MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, "CertificateVerify",
+    MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, "ClientKeyExchange",
+    MT_FINISHED, "Finished",
+    MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS, "CertificateStatus",
+    MT_NEXT_PROTO, "NextProto"
+);
+
+use constant {
+    EXT_STATUS_REQUEST => 5,
+    EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC => 22,
+    EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET => 23,
+    EXT_SESSION_TICKET => 35,
+    # This extension does not exist and isn't recognised by OpenSSL.
+    # We use it to test handling of duplicate extensions.
+    EXT_DUPLICATE_EXTENSION => 1234
+};
+
+my $payload = "";
+my $messlen = -1;
+my $mt;
+my $startoffset = -1;
+my $server = 0;
+my $success = 0;
+my $end = 0;
+my @message_rec_list = ();
+my @message_frag_lens = ();
+my $ciphersuite = 0;
+
+sub clear
+{
+    $payload = "";
+    $messlen = -1;
+    $startoffset = -1;
+    $server = 0;
+    $success = 0;
+    $end = 0;
+    @message_rec_list = ();
+    @message_frag_lens = ();
+}
+
+#Class method to extract messages from a record
+sub get_messages
+{
+    my $class = shift;
+    my $serverin = shift;
+    my $record = shift;
+    my @messages = ();
+    my $message;
+
+    @message_frag_lens = ();
+
+    if ($serverin != $server && length($payload) != 0) {
+        die "Changed peer, but we still have fragment data\n";
+    }
+    $server = $serverin;
+
+    if ($record->content_type == TLSProxy::Record::RT_CCS) {
+        if ($payload ne "") {
+            #We can't handle this yet
+            die "CCS received before message data complete\n";
+        }
+        if ($server) {
+            TLSProxy::Record->server_ccs_seen(1);
+        } else {
+            TLSProxy::Record->client_ccs_seen(1);
+        }
+    } elsif ($record->content_type == TLSProxy::Record::RT_HANDSHAKE) {
+        if ($record->len == 0 || $record->len_real == 0) {
+            print "  Message truncated\n";
+        } else {
+            my $recoffset = 0;
+
+            if (length $payload > 0) {
+                #We are continuing processing a message started in a previous
+                #record. Add this record to the list associated with this
+                #message
+                push @message_rec_list, $record;
+
+                if ($messlen <= length($payload)) {
+                    #Shouldn't happen
+                    die "Internal error: invalid messlen: ".$messlen
+                        ." payload length:".length($payload)."\n";
+                }
+                if (length($payload) + $record->decrypt_len >= $messlen) {
+                    #We can complete the message with this record
+                    $recoffset = $messlen - length($payload);
+                    $payload .= substr($record->decrypt_data, 0, $recoffset);
+                    push @message_frag_lens, $recoffset;
+                    $message = create_message($server, $mt, $payload,
+                                              $startoffset);
+                    push @messages, $message;
+
+                    $payload = "";
+                } else {
+                    #This is just part of the total message
+                    $payload .= $record->decrypt_data;
+                    $recoffset = $record->decrypt_len;
+                    push @message_frag_lens, $record->decrypt_len;
+                }
+                print "  Partial message data read: ".$recoffset." bytes\n";
+            }
+
+            while ($record->decrypt_len > $recoffset) {
+                #We are at the start of a new message
+                if ($record->decrypt_len - $recoffset < 4) {
+                    #Whilst technically probably valid we can't cope with this
+                    die "End of record in the middle of a message header\n";
+                }
+                @message_rec_list = ($record);
+                my $lenhi;
+                my $lenlo;
+                ($mt, $lenhi, $lenlo) = unpack('CnC',
+                                               substr($record->decrypt_data,
+                                                      $recoffset));
+                $messlen = ($lenhi << 8) | $lenlo;
+                print "  Message type: $message_type{$mt}\n";
+                print "  Message Length: $messlen\n";
+                $startoffset = $recoffset;
+                $recoffset += 4;
+                $payload = "";
+                
+                if ($recoffset <= $record->decrypt_len) {
+                    #Some payload data is present in this record
+                    if ($record->decrypt_len - $recoffset >= $messlen) {
+                        #We can complete the message with this record
+                        $payload .= substr($record->decrypt_data, $recoffset,
+                                           $messlen);
+                        $recoffset += $messlen;
+                        push @message_frag_lens, $messlen;
+                        $message = create_message($server, $mt, $payload,
+                                                  $startoffset);
+                        push @messages, $message;
+
+                        $payload = "";
+                    } else {
+                        #This is just part of the total message
+                        $payload .= substr($record->decrypt_data, $recoffset,
+                                           $record->decrypt_len - $recoffset);
+                        $recoffset = $record->decrypt_len;
+                        push @message_frag_lens, $recoffset;
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    } elsif ($record->content_type == TLSProxy::Record::RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
+        print "  [ENCRYPTED APPLICATION DATA]\n";
+        print "  [".$record->decrypt_data."]\n";
+    } elsif ($record->content_type == TLSProxy::Record::RT_ALERT) {
+        my ($alertlev, $alertdesc) = unpack('CC', $record->decrypt_data);
+        #A CloseNotify from the client indicates we have finished successfully
+        #(we assume)
+        if (!$end && !$server && $alertlev == AL_LEVEL_WARN
+            && $alertdesc == AL_DESC_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
+            $success = 1;
+        }
+        #All alerts end the test
+        $end = 1;
+    }
+
+    return @messages;
+}
+
+#Function to work out which sub-class we need to create and then
+#construct it
+sub create_message
+{
+    my ($server, $mt, $data, $startoffset) = @_;
+    my $message;
+
+    #We only support ClientHello in this version...needs to be extended for
+    #others
+    if ($mt == MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
+        $message = TLSProxy::ClientHello->new(
+            $server,
+            $data,
+            [@message_rec_list],
+            $startoffset,
+            [@message_frag_lens]
+        );
+        $message->parse();
+    } elsif ($mt == MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
+        $message = TLSProxy::ServerHello->new(
+            $server,
+            $data,
+            [@message_rec_list],
+            $startoffset,
+            [@message_frag_lens]
+        );
+        $message->parse();
+    } elsif ($mt == MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
+        $message = TLSProxy::ServerKeyExchange->new(
+            $server,
+            $data,
+            [@message_rec_list],
+            $startoffset,
+            [@message_frag_lens]
+        );
+        $message->parse();
+    } elsif ($mt == MT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) {
+        $message = TLSProxy::NewSessionTicket->new(
+            $server,
+            $data,
+            [@message_rec_list],
+            $startoffset,
+            [@message_frag_lens]
+        );
+        $message->parse();
+    } else {
+        #Unknown message type
+        $message = TLSProxy::Message->new(
+            $server,
+            $mt,
+            $data,
+            [@message_rec_list],
+            $startoffset,
+            [@message_frag_lens]
+        );
+    }
+
+    return $message;
+}
+
+sub end
+{
+    my $class = shift;
+    return $end;
+}
+sub success
+{
+    my $class = shift;
+    return $success;
+}
+sub fail
+{
+    my $class = shift;
+    return !$success && $end;
+}
+sub new
+{
+    my $class = shift;
+    my ($server,
+        $mt,
+        $data,
+        $records,
+        $startoffset,
+        $message_frag_lens) = @_;
+    
+    my $self = {
+        server => $server,
+        data => $data,
+        records => $records,
+        mt => $mt,
+        startoffset => $startoffset,
+        message_frag_lens => $message_frag_lens
+    };
+
+    return bless $self, $class;
+}
+
+sub ciphersuite
+{
+    my $class = shift;
+    if (@_) {
+      $ciphersuite = shift;
+    }
+    return $ciphersuite;
+}
+
+#Update all the underlying records with the modified data from this message
+#Note: Does not currently support re-encrypting
+sub repack
+{
+    my $self = shift;
+    my $msgdata;
+
+    my $numrecs = $#{$self->records};
+
+    $self->set_message_contents();
+
+    my $lenhi;
+    my $lenlo;
+
+    $lenlo = length($self->data) & 0xff;
+    $lenhi = length($self->data) >> 8;
+    $msgdata = pack('CnC', $self->mt, $lenhi, $lenlo).$self->data;
+
+    if ($numrecs == 0) {
+        #The message is fully contained within one record
+        my ($rec) = @{$self->records};
+        my $recdata = $rec->decrypt_data;
+
+        my $old_length;
+
+        # We use empty message_frag_lens to indicates that pre-repacking,
+        # the message wasn't present. The first fragment length doesn't include
+        # the TLS header, so we need to check and compute the right length.
+        if (@{$self->message_frag_lens}) {
+            $old_length = ${$self->message_frag_lens}[0] +
+              TLS_MESSAGE_HEADER_LENGTH;
+        } else {
+            $old_length = 0;
+        }
+
+        my $prefix = substr($recdata, 0, $self->startoffset);
+        my $suffix = substr($recdata, $self->startoffset + $old_length);
+
+        $rec->decrypt_data($prefix.($msgdata).($suffix));
+        # TODO(openssl-team): don't keep explicit lengths.
+        # (If a length override is ever needed to construct invalid packets,
+        #  use an explicit override field instead.)
+        $rec->decrypt_len(length($rec->decrypt_data));
+        $rec->len($rec->len + length($msgdata) - $old_length);
+        # Don't support re-encryption.
+        $rec->data($rec->decrypt_data);
+
+        #Update the fragment len in case we changed it above
+        ${$self->message_frag_lens}[0] = length($msgdata)
+                                         - TLS_MESSAGE_HEADER_LENGTH;
+        return;
+    }
+
+    #Note we don't currently support changing a fragmented message length
+    my $recctr = 0;
+    my $datadone = 0;
+    foreach my $rec (@{$self->records}) {
+        my $recdata = $rec->decrypt_data;
+        if ($recctr == 0) {
+            #This is the first record
+            my $remainlen = length($recdata) - $self->startoffset;
+            $rec->data(substr($recdata, 0, $self->startoffset)
+                       .substr(($msgdata), 0, $remainlen));
+            $datadone += $remainlen;
+        } elsif ($recctr + 1 == $numrecs) {
+            #This is the last record
+            $rec->data(substr($msgdata, $datadone));
+        } else {
+            #This is a middle record
+            $rec->data(substr($msgdata, $datadone, length($rec->data)));
+            $datadone += length($rec->data);
+        }
+        $recctr++;
+    }
+}
+
+#To be overridden by sub-classes
+sub set_message_contents
+{
+}
+
+#Read only accessors
+sub server
+{
+    my $self = shift;
+    return $self->{server};
+}
+
+#Read/write accessors
+sub mt
+{
+    my $self = shift;
+    if (@_) {
+      $self->{mt} = shift;
+    }
+    return $self->{mt};
+}
+sub data
+{
+    my $self = shift;
+    if (@_) {
+      $self->{data} = shift;
+    }
+    return $self->{data};
+}
+sub records
+{
+    my $self = shift;
+    if (@_) {
+      $self->{records} = shift;
+    }
+    return $self->{records};
+}
+sub startoffset
+{
+    my $self = shift;
+    if (@_) {
+      $self->{startoffset} = shift;
+    }
+    return $self->{startoffset};
+}
+sub message_frag_lens
+{
+    my $self = shift;
+    if (@_) {
+      $self->{message_frag_lens} = shift;
+    }
+    return $self->{message_frag_lens};
+}
+sub encoded_length
+{
+    my $self = shift;
+    return TLS_MESSAGE_HEADER_LENGTH + length($self->data);
+}
+
+1;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/util/perl/TLSProxy/NewSessionTicket.pm b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/perl/TLSProxy/NewSessionTicket.pm
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e509985
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/perl/TLSProxy/NewSessionTicket.pm
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+# Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+use strict;
+
+package TLSProxy::NewSessionTicket;
+
+use vars '@ISA';
+push @ISA, 'TLSProxy::Message';
+
+sub new
+{
+    my $class = shift;
+    my ($server,
+        $data,
+        $records,
+        $startoffset,
+        $message_frag_lens) = @_;
+
+    my $self = $class->SUPER::new(
+        $server,
+        TLSProxy::Message::MT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
+        $data,
+        $records,
+        $startoffset,
+        $message_frag_lens);
+
+    $self->{ticket_lifetime_hint} = 0;
+    $self->{ticket} = "";
+
+    return $self;
+}
+
+sub parse
+{
+    my $self = shift;
+
+    my $ticket_lifetime_hint = unpack('N', $self->data);
+    my $ticket_len = unpack('n', $self->data);
+    my $ticket = substr($self->data, 6, $ticket_len);
+
+    $self->ticket_lifetime_hint($ticket_lifetime_hint);
+    $self->ticket($ticket);
+}
+
+
+#Reconstruct the on-the-wire message data following changes
+sub set_message_contents
+{
+    my $self = shift;
+    my $data;
+
+    $data = pack('N', $self->ticket_lifetime_hint);
+    $data .= pack('n', length($self->ticket));
+    $data .= $self->ticket;
+
+    $self->data($data);
+}
+
+#Read/write accessors
+sub ticket_lifetime_hint
+{
+    my $self = shift;
+    if (@_) {
+      $self->{ticket_lifetime_hint} = shift;
+    }
+    return $self->{ticket_lifetime_hint};
+}
+sub ticket
+{
+    my $self = shift;
+    if (@_) {
+      $self->{ticket} = shift;
+    }
+    return $self->{ticket};
+}
+1;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/util/perl/TLSProxy/Proxy.pm b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/perl/TLSProxy/Proxy.pm
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..de14362
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/perl/TLSProxy/Proxy.pm
@@ -0,0 +1,553 @@
+# Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+use strict;
+use POSIX ":sys_wait_h";
+
+package TLSProxy::Proxy;
+
+use File::Spec;
+use IO::Socket;
+use IO::Select;
+use TLSProxy::Record;
+use TLSProxy::Message;
+use TLSProxy::ClientHello;
+use TLSProxy::ServerHello;
+use TLSProxy::ServerKeyExchange;
+use TLSProxy::NewSessionTicket;
+use Time::HiRes qw/usleep/;
+
+my $have_IPv6 = 0;
+my $IP_factory;
+
+sub new
+{
+    my $class = shift;
+    my ($filter,
+        $execute,
+        $cert,
+        $debug) = @_;
+
+    my $self = {
+        #Public read/write
+        proxy_addr => "localhost",
+        proxy_port => 4453,
+        server_addr => "localhost",
+        server_port => 4443,
+        filter => $filter,
+        serverflags => "",
+        clientflags => "",
+        serverconnects => 1,
+        serverpid => 0,
+        clientpid => 0,
+        reneg => 0,
+
+        #Public read
+        execute => $execute,
+        cert => $cert,
+        debug => $debug,
+        cipherc => "",
+        ciphers => "AES128-SHA",
+        flight => -1,
+        direction => -1,
+        partial => ["", ""],
+        record_list => [],
+        message_list => [],
+    };
+
+    # IO::Socket::IP is on the core module list, IO::Socket::INET6 isn't.
+    # However, IO::Socket::INET6 is older and is said to be more widely
+    # deployed for the moment, and may have less bugs, so we try the latter
+    # first, then fall back on the code modules.  Worst case scenario, we
+    # fall back to IO::Socket::INET, only supports IPv4.
+    eval {
+        require IO::Socket::INET6;
+        my $s = IO::Socket::INET6->new(
+            LocalAddr => "::1",
+            LocalPort => 0,
+            Listen=>1,
+            );
+        $s or die "\n";
+        $s->close();
+    };
+    if ($@ eq "") {
+        $IP_factory = sub { IO::Socket::INET6->new(@_); };
+        $have_IPv6 = 1;
+    } else {
+        eval {
+            require IO::Socket::IP;
+            my $s = IO::Socket::IP->new(
+                LocalAddr => "::1",
+                LocalPort => 0,
+                Listen=>1,
+                );
+            $s or die "\n";
+            $s->close();
+        };
+        if ($@ eq "") {
+            $IP_factory = sub { IO::Socket::IP->new(@_); };
+            $have_IPv6 = 1;
+        } else {
+            $IP_factory = sub { IO::Socket::INET->new(@_); };
+        }
+    }
+
+    # Create the Proxy socket
+    my $proxaddr = $self->{proxy_addr};
+    $proxaddr =~ s/[\[\]]//g; # Remove [ and ]
+    my @proxyargs = (
+        LocalHost   => $proxaddr,
+        LocalPort   => $self->{proxy_port},
+        Proto       => "tcp",
+        Listen      => SOMAXCONN,
+       );
+    push @proxyargs, ReuseAddr => 1
+        unless $^O eq "MSWin32";
+    $self->{proxy_sock} = $IP_factory->(@proxyargs);
+
+    if ($self->{proxy_sock}) {
+        print "Proxy started on port ".$self->{proxy_port}."\n";
+    } else {
+        warn "Failed creating proxy socket (".$proxaddr.",".$self->{proxy_port}."): $!\n";
+    }
+
+    return bless $self, $class;
+}
+
+sub DESTROY
+{
+    my $self = shift;
+
+    $self->{proxy_sock}->close() if $self->{proxy_sock};
+}
+
+sub clearClient
+{
+    my $self = shift;
+
+    $self->{cipherc} = "";
+    $self->{flight} = -1;
+    $self->{direction} = -1;
+    $self->{partial} = ["", ""];
+    $self->{record_list} = [];
+    $self->{message_list} = [];
+    $self->{clientflags} = "";
+    $self->{clientpid} = 0;
+
+    TLSProxy::Message->clear();
+    TLSProxy::Record->clear();
+}
+
+sub clear
+{
+    my $self = shift;
+
+    $self->clearClient;
+    $self->{ciphers} = "AES128-SHA";
+    $self->{serverflags} = "";
+    $self->{serverconnects} = 1;
+    $self->{serverpid} = 0;
+    $self->{reneg} = 0;
+}
+
+sub restart
+{
+    my $self = shift;
+
+    $self->clear;
+    $self->start;
+}
+
+sub clientrestart
+{
+    my $self = shift;
+
+    $self->clear;
+    $self->clientstart;
+}
+
+sub start
+{
+    my ($self) = shift;
+    my $pid;
+
+    if ($self->{proxy_sock} == 0) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    $pid = fork();
+    if ($pid == 0) {
+        my $execcmd = $self->execute
+            ." s_server -max_protocol TLSv1.2 -no_comp -rev -engine ossltest -accept "
+            .($self->server_port)
+            ." -cert ".$self->cert." -naccept ".$self->serverconnects;
+        unless ($self->supports_IPv6) {
+            $execcmd .= " -4";
+        }
+        if ($self->ciphers ne "") {
+            $execcmd .= " -cipher ".$self->ciphers;
+        }
+        if ($self->serverflags ne "") {
+            $execcmd .= " ".$self->serverflags;
+        }
+        if ($self->debug) {
+            print STDERR "Server command: $execcmd\n";
+        }
+        exec($execcmd);
+    }
+    $self->serverpid($pid);
+
+    return $self->clientstart;
+}
+
+sub clientstart
+{
+    my ($self) = shift;
+    my $oldstdout;
+
+    if ($self->execute) {
+        my $pid = fork();
+        if ($pid == 0) {
+            my $echostr;
+            if ($self->reneg()) {
+                $echostr = "R";
+            } else {
+                $echostr = "test";
+            }
+            my $execcmd = "echo ".$echostr." | ".$self->execute
+                 ." s_client -max_protocol TLSv1.2 -engine ossltest -connect "
+                 .($self->proxy_addr).":".($self->proxy_port);
+            unless ($self->supports_IPv6) {
+                $execcmd .= " -4";
+            }
+            if ($self->cipherc ne "") {
+                $execcmd .= " -cipher ".$self->cipherc;
+            }
+            if ($self->clientflags ne "") {
+                $execcmd .= " ".$self->clientflags;
+            }
+            if ($self->debug) {
+                print STDERR "Client command: $execcmd\n";
+            }
+            exec($execcmd);
+        }
+        $self->clientpid($pid);
+    }
+
+    # Wait for incoming connection from client
+    my $client_sock;
+    if(!($client_sock = $self->{proxy_sock}->accept())) {
+        warn "Failed accepting incoming connection: $!\n";
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    print "Connection opened\n";
+
+    # Now connect to the server
+    my $retry = 50;
+    my $server_sock;
+    #We loop over this a few times because sometimes s_server can take a while
+    #to start up
+    do {
+        my $servaddr = $self->server_addr;
+        $servaddr =~ s/[\[\]]//g; # Remove [ and ]
+        eval {
+            $server_sock = $IP_factory->(
+                PeerAddr => $servaddr,
+                PeerPort => $self->server_port,
+                MultiHomed => 1,
+                Proto => 'tcp'
+            );
+        };
+
+        $retry--;
+        #Some buggy IP factories can return a defined server_sock that hasn't
+        #actually connected, so we check peerport too
+        if ($@ || !defined($server_sock) || !defined($server_sock->peerport)) {
+            $server_sock->close() if defined($server_sock);
+            undef $server_sock;
+            if ($retry) {
+                #Sleep for a short while
+                select(undef, undef, undef, 0.1);
+            } else {
+                warn "Failed to start up server (".$servaddr.",".$self->server_port."): $!\n";
+                return 0;
+            }
+        }
+    } while (!$server_sock);
+
+    my $sel = IO::Select->new($server_sock, $client_sock);
+    my $indata;
+    my @handles = ($server_sock, $client_sock);
+
+    #Wait for either the server socket or the client socket to become readable
+    my @ready;
+    local $SIG{PIPE} = "IGNORE";
+    while(!(TLSProxy::Message->end) && (@ready = $sel->can_read)) {
+        foreach my $hand (@ready) {
+            if ($hand == $server_sock) {
+                $server_sock->sysread($indata, 16384) or goto END;
+                $indata = $self->process_packet(1, $indata);
+                $client_sock->syswrite($indata);
+            } elsif ($hand == $client_sock) {
+                $client_sock->sysread($indata, 16384) or goto END;
+                $indata = $self->process_packet(0, $indata);
+                $server_sock->syswrite($indata);
+            } else {
+                print "Err\n";
+                goto END;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    END:
+    print "Connection closed\n";
+    if($server_sock) {
+        $server_sock->close();
+    }
+    if($client_sock) {
+        #Closing this also kills the child process
+        $client_sock->close();
+    }
+    if(!$self->debug) {
+        select($oldstdout);
+    }
+    $self->serverconnects($self->serverconnects - 1);
+    if ($self->serverconnects == 0) {
+        die "serverpid is zero\n" if $self->serverpid == 0;
+        print "Waiting for server process to close: "
+              .$self->serverpid."\n";
+        waitpid( $self->serverpid, 0);
+        die "exit code $? from server process\n" if $? != 0;
+    } else {
+        # Give s_server sufficient time to finish what it was doing
+        usleep(250000);
+    }
+    die "clientpid is zero\n" if $self->clientpid == 0;
+    print "Waiting for client process to close: ".$self->clientpid."\n";
+    waitpid($self->clientpid, 0);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+sub process_packet
+{
+    my ($self, $server, $packet) = @_;
+    my $len_real;
+    my $decrypt_len;
+    my $data;
+    my $recnum;
+
+    if ($server) {
+        print "Received server packet\n";
+    } else {
+        print "Received client packet\n";
+    }
+
+    if ($self->{direction} != $server) {
+        $self->{flight} = $self->{flight} + 1;
+        $self->{direction} = $server;
+    }
+
+    print "Packet length = ".length($packet)."\n";
+    print "Processing flight ".$self->flight."\n";
+
+    #Return contains the list of record found in the packet followed by the
+    #list of messages in those records and any partial message
+    my @ret = TLSProxy::Record->get_records($server, $self->flight, $self->{partial}[$server].$packet);
+    $self->{partial}[$server] = $ret[2];
+    push @{$self->record_list}, @{$ret[0]};
+    push @{$self->{message_list}}, @{$ret[1]};
+
+    print "\n";
+
+    if (scalar(@{$ret[0]}) == 0 or length($ret[2]) != 0) {
+        return "";
+    }
+
+    #Finished parsing. Call user provided filter here
+    if (defined $self->filter) {
+        $self->filter->($self);
+    }
+
+    #Reconstruct the packet
+    $packet = "";
+    foreach my $record (@{$self->record_list}) {
+        $packet .= $record->reconstruct_record();
+    }
+
+    print "Forwarded packet length = ".length($packet)."\n\n";
+
+    return $packet;
+}
+
+#Read accessors
+sub execute
+{
+    my $self = shift;
+    return $self->{execute};
+}
+sub cert
+{
+    my $self = shift;
+    return $self->{cert};
+}
+sub debug
+{
+    my $self = shift;
+    return $self->{debug};
+}
+sub flight
+{
+    my $self = shift;
+    return $self->{flight};
+}
+sub record_list
+{
+    my $self = shift;
+    return $self->{record_list};
+}
+sub success
+{
+    my $self = shift;
+    return $self->{success};
+}
+sub end
+{
+    my $self = shift;
+    return $self->{end};
+}
+sub supports_IPv6
+{
+    my $self = shift;
+    return $have_IPv6;
+}
+sub proxy_addr
+{
+    my $self = shift;
+    return $self->{proxy_addr};
+}
+sub proxy_port
+{
+    my $self = shift;
+    return $self->{proxy_port};
+}
+
+#Read/write accessors
+sub server_addr
+{
+    my $self = shift;
+    if (@_) {
+      $self->{server_addr} = shift;
+    }
+    return $self->{server_addr};
+}
+sub server_port
+{
+    my $self = shift;
+    if (@_) {
+      $self->{server_port} = shift;
+    }
+    return $self->{server_port};
+}
+sub filter
+{
+    my $self = shift;
+    if (@_) {
+      $self->{filter} = shift;
+    }
+    return $self->{filter};
+}
+sub cipherc
+{
+    my $self = shift;
+    if (@_) {
+      $self->{cipherc} = shift;
+    }
+    return $self->{cipherc};
+}
+sub ciphers
+{
+    my $self = shift;
+    if (@_) {
+      $self->{ciphers} = shift;
+    }
+    return $self->{ciphers};
+}
+sub serverflags
+{
+    my $self = shift;
+    if (@_) {
+      $self->{serverflags} = shift;
+    }
+    return $self->{serverflags};
+}
+sub clientflags
+{
+    my $self = shift;
+    if (@_) {
+      $self->{clientflags} = shift;
+    }
+    return $self->{clientflags};
+}
+sub serverconnects
+{
+    my $self = shift;
+    if (@_) {
+      $self->{serverconnects} = shift;
+    }
+    return $self->{serverconnects};
+}
+# This is a bit ugly because the caller is responsible for keeping the records
+# in sync with the updated message list; simply updating the message list isn't
+# sufficient to get the proxy to forward the new message.
+# But it does the trick for the one test (test_sslsessiontick) that needs it.
+sub message_list
+{
+    my $self = shift;
+    if (@_) {
+        $self->{message_list} = shift;
+    }
+    return $self->{message_list};
+}
+sub serverpid
+{
+    my $self = shift;
+    if (@_) {
+      $self->{serverpid} = shift;
+    }
+    return $self->{serverpid};
+}
+sub clientpid
+{
+    my $self = shift;
+    if (@_) {
+        $self->{clientpid} = shift;
+    }
+    return $self->{clientpid};
+}
+
+sub fill_known_data
+{
+    my $length = shift;
+    my $ret = "";
+    for (my $i = 0; $i < $length; $i++) {
+        $ret .= chr($i);
+    }
+    return $ret;
+}
+
+sub reneg
+{
+    my $self = shift;
+    if (@_) {
+      $self->{reneg} = shift;
+    }
+    return $self->{reneg};
+}
+
+1;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/util/perl/TLSProxy/Record.pm b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/perl/TLSProxy/Record.pm
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..786ba0c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/perl/TLSProxy/Record.pm
@@ -0,0 +1,339 @@
+# Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+use strict;
+
+use TLSProxy::Proxy;
+
+package TLSProxy::Record;
+
+my $server_ccs_seen = 0;
+my $client_ccs_seen = 0;
+my $etm = 0;
+
+use constant TLS_RECORD_HEADER_LENGTH => 5;
+
+#Record types
+use constant {
+    RT_APPLICATION_DATA => 23,
+    RT_HANDSHAKE => 22,
+    RT_ALERT => 21,
+    RT_CCS => 20,
+    RT_UNKNOWN => 100
+};
+
+my %record_type = (
+    RT_APPLICATION_DATA, "APPLICATION DATA",
+    RT_HANDSHAKE, "HANDSHAKE",
+    RT_ALERT, "ALERT",
+    RT_CCS, "CCS",
+    RT_UNKNOWN, "UNKNOWN"
+);
+
+use constant {
+    VERS_TLS_1_3 => 772,
+    VERS_TLS_1_2 => 771,
+    VERS_TLS_1_1 => 770,
+    VERS_TLS_1_0 => 769,
+    VERS_SSL_3_0 => 768,
+    VERS_SSL_LT_3_0 => 767
+};
+
+my %tls_version = (
+    VERS_TLS_1_3, "TLS1.3",
+    VERS_TLS_1_2, "TLS1.2",
+    VERS_TLS_1_1, "TLS1.1",
+    VERS_TLS_1_0, "TLS1.0",
+    VERS_SSL_3_0, "SSL3",
+    VERS_SSL_LT_3_0, "SSL<3"
+);
+
+#Class method to extract records from a packet of data
+sub get_records
+{
+    my $class = shift;
+    my $server = shift;
+    my $flight = shift;
+    my $packet = shift;
+    my $partial = "";
+    my @record_list = ();
+    my @message_list = ();
+    my $data;
+    my $content_type;
+    my $version;
+    my $len;
+    my $len_real;
+    my $decrypt_len;
+
+    my $recnum = 1;
+    while (length ($packet) > 0) {
+        print " Record $recnum";
+        if ($server) {
+            print " (server -> client)\n";
+        } else {
+            print " (client -> server)\n";
+        }
+        #Get the record header
+        if (length($packet) < TLS_RECORD_HEADER_LENGTH
+                || length($packet) < 5 + unpack("n", substr($packet, 3, 2))) {
+            print "Partial data : ".length($packet)." bytes\n";
+            $partial = $packet;
+            $packet = "";
+        } else {
+            ($content_type, $version, $len) = unpack('CnnC*', $packet);
+            $data = substr($packet, 5, $len);
+
+            print "  Content type: ".$record_type{$content_type}."\n";
+            print "  Version: $tls_version{$version}\n";
+            print "  Length: $len";
+            if ($len == length($data)) {
+                print "\n";
+                $decrypt_len = $len_real = $len;
+            } else {
+                print " (expected), ".length($data)." (actual)\n";
+                $decrypt_len = $len_real = length($data);
+            }
+
+            my $record = TLSProxy::Record->new(
+                $flight,
+                $content_type,
+                $version,
+                $len,
+                0,
+                $len_real,
+                $decrypt_len,
+                substr($packet, TLS_RECORD_HEADER_LENGTH, $len_real),
+                substr($packet, TLS_RECORD_HEADER_LENGTH, $len_real)
+            );
+
+            if (($server && $server_ccs_seen)
+                     || (!$server && $client_ccs_seen)) {
+                if ($etm) {
+                    $record->decryptETM();
+                } else {
+                    $record->decrypt();
+                }
+            }
+
+            push @record_list, $record;
+
+            #Now figure out what messages are contained within this record
+            my @messages = TLSProxy::Message->get_messages($server, $record);
+            push @message_list, @messages;
+
+            $packet = substr($packet, TLS_RECORD_HEADER_LENGTH + $len_real);
+            $recnum++;
+        }
+    }
+
+    return (\@record_list, \@message_list, $partial);
+}
+
+sub clear
+{
+    $server_ccs_seen = 0;
+    $client_ccs_seen = 0;
+}
+
+#Class level accessors
+sub server_ccs_seen
+{
+    my $class = shift;
+    if (@_) {
+      $server_ccs_seen = shift;
+    }
+    return $server_ccs_seen;
+}
+sub client_ccs_seen
+{
+    my $class = shift;
+    if (@_) {
+      $client_ccs_seen = shift;
+    }
+    return $client_ccs_seen;
+}
+#Enable/Disable Encrypt-then-MAC
+sub etm
+{
+    my $class = shift;
+    if (@_) {
+      $etm = shift;
+    }
+    return $etm;
+}
+
+sub new
+{
+    my $class = shift;
+    my ($flight,
+        $content_type,
+        $version,
+        $len,
+        $sslv2,
+        $len_real,
+        $decrypt_len,
+        $data,
+        $decrypt_data) = @_;
+    
+    my $self = {
+        flight => $flight,
+        content_type => $content_type,
+        version => $version,
+        len => $len,
+        sslv2 => $sslv2,
+        len_real => $len_real,
+        decrypt_len => $decrypt_len,
+        data => $data,
+        decrypt_data => $decrypt_data,
+        orig_decrypt_data => $decrypt_data,
+        sent => 0
+    };
+
+    return bless $self, $class;
+}
+
+#Decrypt using encrypt-then-MAC
+sub decryptETM
+{
+    my ($self) = shift;
+
+    my $data = $self->data;
+
+    if($self->version >= VERS_TLS_1_1()) {
+        #TLS1.1+ has an explicit IV. Throw it away
+        $data = substr($data, 16);
+    }
+
+    #Throw away the MAC (assumes MAC is 20 bytes for now. FIXME)
+    $data = substr($data, 0, length($data) - 20);
+
+    #Find out what the padding byte is
+    my $padval = unpack("C", substr($data, length($data) - 1));
+
+    #Throw away the padding
+    $data = substr($data, 0, length($data) - ($padval + 1));
+
+    $self->decrypt_data($data);
+    $self->decrypt_len(length($data));
+
+    return $data;
+}
+
+#Standard decrypt
+sub decrypt()
+{
+    my ($self) = shift;
+
+    my $data = $self->data;
+
+    if($self->version >= VERS_TLS_1_1()) {
+        #TLS1.1+ has an explicit IV. Throw it away
+        $data = substr($data, 16);
+    }
+
+    #Find out what the padding byte is
+    my $padval = unpack("C", substr($data, length($data) - 1));
+
+    #Throw away the padding
+    $data = substr($data, 0, length($data) - ($padval + 1));
+
+    #Throw away the MAC (assumes MAC is 20 bytes for now. FIXME)
+    $data = substr($data, 0, length($data) - 20);
+
+    $self->decrypt_data($data);
+    $self->decrypt_len(length($data));
+
+    return $data;
+}
+
+#Reconstruct the on-the-wire record representation
+sub reconstruct_record
+{
+    my $self = shift;
+    my $data;
+
+    if ($self->{sent}) {
+        return "";
+    }
+    $self->{sent} = 1;
+
+    if ($self->sslv2) {
+        $data = pack('n', $self->len | 0x8000);
+    } else {
+        $data = pack('Cnn', $self->content_type, $self->version, $self->len);
+    }
+    $data .= $self->data;
+
+    return $data;
+}
+
+#Read only accessors
+sub flight
+{
+    my $self = shift;
+    return $self->{flight};
+}
+sub content_type
+{
+    my $self = shift;
+    return $self->{content_type};
+}
+sub version
+{
+    my $self = shift;
+    return $self->{version};
+}
+sub sslv2
+{
+    my $self = shift;
+    return $self->{sslv2};
+}
+sub len_real
+{
+    my $self = shift;
+    return $self->{len_real};
+}
+sub orig_decrypt_data
+{
+    my $self = shift;
+    return $self->{orig_decrypt_data};
+}
+
+#Read/write accessors
+sub decrypt_len
+{
+    my $self = shift;
+    if (@_) {
+      $self->{decrypt_len} = shift;
+    }
+    return $self->{decrypt_len};
+}
+sub data
+{
+    my $self = shift;
+    if (@_) {
+      $self->{data} = shift;
+    }
+    return $self->{data};
+}
+sub decrypt_data
+{
+    my $self = shift;
+    if (@_) {
+      $self->{decrypt_data} = shift;
+    }
+    return $self->{decrypt_data};
+}
+sub len
+{
+    my $self = shift;
+    if (@_) {
+      $self->{len} = shift;
+    }
+    return $self->{len};
+}
+1;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/util/perl/TLSProxy/ServerHello.pm b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/perl/TLSProxy/ServerHello.pm
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..79a8be9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/perl/TLSProxy/ServerHello.pm
@@ -0,0 +1,210 @@
+# Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+use strict;
+
+package TLSProxy::ServerHello;
+
+use vars '@ISA';
+push @ISA, 'TLSProxy::Message';
+
+sub new
+{
+    my $class = shift;
+    my ($server,
+        $data,
+        $records,
+        $startoffset,
+        $message_frag_lens) = @_;
+    
+    my $self = $class->SUPER::new(
+        $server,
+        TLSProxy::Message::MT_SERVER_HELLO,
+        $data,
+        $records,
+        $startoffset,
+        $message_frag_lens);
+
+    $self->{server_version} = 0;
+    $self->{random} = [];
+    $self->{session_id_len} = 0;
+    $self->{session} = "";
+    $self->{ciphersuite} = 0;
+    $self->{comp_meth} = 0;
+    $self->{extension_data} = "";
+
+    return $self;
+}
+
+sub parse
+{
+    my $self = shift;
+    my $ptr = 2;
+    my ($server_version) = unpack('n', $self->data);
+    my $random = substr($self->data, $ptr, 32);
+    $ptr += 32;
+    my $session_id_len = unpack('C', substr($self->data, $ptr));
+    $ptr++;
+    my $session = substr($self->data, $ptr, $session_id_len);
+    $ptr += $session_id_len;
+    my $ciphersuite = unpack('n', substr($self->data, $ptr));
+    $ptr += 2;
+    my $comp_meth = unpack('C', substr($self->data, $ptr));
+    $ptr++;
+    my $extensions_len = unpack('n', substr($self->data, $ptr));
+    if (!defined $extensions_len) {
+        $extensions_len = 0;
+    } else {
+        $ptr += 2;
+    }
+    #For now we just deal with this as a block of data. In the future we will
+    #want to parse this
+    my $extension_data;
+    if ($extensions_len != 0) {
+        $extension_data = substr($self->data, $ptr);
+    
+        if (length($extension_data) != $extensions_len) {
+            die "Invalid extension length\n";
+        }
+    } else {
+        if (length($self->data) != $ptr) {
+            die "Invalid extension length\n";
+        }
+        $extension_data = "";
+    }
+    my %extensions = ();
+    while (length($extension_data) >= 4) {
+        my ($type, $size) = unpack("nn", $extension_data);
+        my $extdata = substr($extension_data, 4, $size);
+        $extension_data = substr($extension_data, 4 + $size);
+        $extensions{$type} = $extdata;
+    }
+
+    $self->server_version($server_version);
+    $self->random($random);
+    $self->session_id_len($session_id_len);
+    $self->session($session);
+    $self->ciphersuite($ciphersuite);
+    $self->comp_meth($comp_meth);
+    $self->extension_data(\%extensions);
+
+    $self->process_data();
+
+    print "    Server Version:".$server_version."\n";
+    print "    Session ID Len:".$session_id_len."\n";
+    print "    Ciphersuite:".$ciphersuite."\n";
+    print "    Compression Method:".$comp_meth."\n";
+    print "    Extensions Len:".$extensions_len."\n";
+}
+
+#Perform any actions necessary based on the data we've seen
+sub process_data
+{
+    my $self = shift;
+
+    TLSProxy::Message->ciphersuite($self->ciphersuite);
+}
+
+#Reconstruct the on-the-wire message data following changes
+sub set_message_contents
+{
+    my $self = shift;
+    my $data;
+    my $extensions = "";
+
+    $data = pack('n', $self->server_version);
+    $data .= $self->random;
+    $data .= pack('C', $self->session_id_len);
+    $data .= $self->session;
+    $data .= pack('n', $self->ciphersuite);
+    $data .= pack('C', $self->comp_meth);
+
+    foreach my $key (keys %{$self->extension_data}) {
+        my $extdata = ${$self->extension_data}{$key};
+        $extensions .= pack("n", $key);
+        $extensions .= pack("n", length($extdata));
+        $extensions .= $extdata;
+        if ($key == TLSProxy::Message::EXT_DUPLICATE_EXTENSION) {
+          $extensions .= pack("n", $key);
+          $extensions .= pack("n", length($extdata));
+          $extensions .= $extdata;
+        }
+    }
+
+    $data .= pack('n', length($extensions));
+    $data .= $extensions;
+    $self->data($data);
+}
+
+#Read/write accessors
+sub server_version
+{
+    my $self = shift;
+    if (@_) {
+      $self->{client_version} = shift;
+    }
+    return $self->{client_version};
+}
+sub random
+{
+    my $self = shift;
+    if (@_) {
+      $self->{random} = shift;
+    }
+    return $self->{random};
+}
+sub session_id_len
+{
+    my $self = shift;
+    if (@_) {
+      $self->{session_id_len} = shift;
+    }
+    return $self->{session_id_len};
+}
+sub session
+{
+    my $self = shift;
+    if (@_) {
+      $self->{session} = shift;
+    }
+    return $self->{session};
+}
+sub ciphersuite
+{
+    my $self = shift;
+    if (@_) {
+      $self->{ciphersuite} = shift;
+    }
+    return $self->{ciphersuite};
+}
+sub comp_meth
+{
+    my $self = shift;
+    if (@_) {
+      $self->{comp_meth} = shift;
+    }
+    return $self->{comp_meth};
+}
+sub extension_data
+{
+    my $self = shift;
+    if (@_) {
+      $self->{extension_data} = shift;
+    }
+    return $self->{extension_data};
+}
+sub set_extension
+{
+    my ($self, $ext_type, $ext_data) = @_;
+    $self->{extension_data}{$ext_type} = $ext_data;
+}
+sub delete_extension
+{
+    my ($self, $ext_type) = @_;
+    delete $self->{extension_data}{$ext_type};
+}
+1;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/util/perl/TLSProxy/ServerKeyExchange.pm b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/perl/TLSProxy/ServerKeyExchange.pm
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6e5b4cd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/perl/TLSProxy/ServerKeyExchange.pm
@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
+# Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+use strict;
+
+package TLSProxy::ServerKeyExchange;
+
+use vars '@ISA';
+push @ISA, 'TLSProxy::Message';
+
+sub new
+{
+    my $class = shift;
+    my ($server,
+        $data,
+        $records,
+        $startoffset,
+        $message_frag_lens) = @_;
+    
+    my $self = $class->SUPER::new(
+        $server,
+        TLSProxy::Message::MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+        $data,
+        $records,
+        $startoffset,
+        $message_frag_lens);
+
+    #DHE
+    $self->{p} = "";
+    $self->{g} = "";
+    $self->{pub_key} = "";
+    $self->{sig} = "";
+
+    return $self;
+}
+
+sub parse
+{
+    my $self = shift;
+
+    #Minimal SKE parsing. Only supports DHE at the moment (if its not DHE
+    #the parsing data will be trash...which is ok as long as we don't try to
+    #use it)
+
+    my $p_len = unpack('n', $self->data);
+    my $ptr = 2;
+    my $p = substr($self->data, $ptr, $p_len);
+    $ptr += $p_len;
+
+    my $g_len = unpack('n', substr($self->data, $ptr));
+    $ptr += 2;
+    my $g = substr($self->data, $ptr, $g_len);
+    $ptr += $g_len;
+
+    my $pub_key_len = unpack('n', substr($self->data, $ptr));
+    $ptr += 2;
+    my $pub_key = substr($self->data, $ptr, $pub_key_len);
+    $ptr += $pub_key_len;
+
+    #We assume its signed
+    my $sig_len = unpack('n', substr($self->data, $ptr));
+    my $sig = "";
+    if (defined $sig_len) {
+	$ptr += 2;
+	$sig = substr($self->data, $ptr, $sig_len);
+	$ptr += $sig_len;
+    }
+
+    $self->p($p);
+    $self->g($g);
+    $self->pub_key($pub_key);
+    $self->sig($sig);
+}
+
+
+#Reconstruct the on-the-wire message data following changes
+sub set_message_contents
+{
+    my $self = shift;
+    my $data;
+
+    $data = pack('n', length($self->p));
+    $data .= $self->p;
+    $data .= pack('n', length($self->g));
+    $data .= $self->g;
+    $data .= pack('n', length($self->pub_key));
+    $data .= $self->pub_key;
+    if (length($self->sig) > 0) {
+        $data .= pack('n', length($self->sig));
+        $data .= $self->sig;
+    }
+
+    $self->data($data);
+}
+
+#Read/write accessors
+#DHE
+sub p
+{
+    my $self = shift;
+    if (@_) {
+      $self->{p} = shift;
+    }
+    return $self->{p};
+}
+sub g
+{
+    my $self = shift;
+    if (@_) {
+      $self->{g} = shift;
+    }
+    return $self->{g};
+}
+sub pub_key
+{
+    my $self = shift;
+    if (@_) {
+      $self->{pub_key} = shift;
+    }
+    return $self->{pub_key};
+}
+sub sig
+{
+    my $self = shift;
+    if (@_) {
+      $self->{sig} = shift;
+    }
+    return $self->{sig};
+}
+1;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/util/perl/with_fallback.pm b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/perl/with_fallback.pm
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2af1d5f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/perl/with_fallback.pm
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+# Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+package with_fallback;
+
+sub import {
+    use File::Basename;
+    use File::Spec::Functions;
+    foreach (@_) {
+	eval "require $_";
+	if ($@) {
+	    unshift @INC, catdir(dirname(__FILE__),
+                                 "..", "..", "external", "perl");
+	    my $transfer = "transfer::$_";
+	    eval "require $transfer";
+	    shift @INC;
+	    warn $@ if $@;
+	}
+    }
+}
+1;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/util/point.sh b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/point.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..da39899
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/point.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+rm -f "$2"
+if test "$OSTYPE" = msdosdjgpp || test "x$PLATFORM" = xmingw ; then
+    cp "$1" "$2"
+else
+    ln -s "$1" "$2"
+fi
+echo "$2 => $1"
+
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/util/process_docs.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/process_docs.pl
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..e084df7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/process_docs.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,248 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+
+use File::Spec::Functions;
+use File::Basename;
+use File::Copy;
+use File::Path;
+use FindBin;
+use lib "$FindBin::Bin/perl";
+use OpenSSL::Glob;
+use Getopt::Long;
+use Pod::Usage;
+
+use lib '.';
+use configdata;
+
+# We know we are in the 'util' directory and that our perl modules are
+# in util/perl
+use lib catdir(dirname($0), "perl");
+use OpenSSL::Util::Pod;
+
+my %options = ();
+GetOptions(\%options,
+           'sourcedir=s',       # Source directory
+           'subdir=s%',         # Subdirectories to look through,
+                                # with associated section numbers
+           'destdir=s',         # Destination directory
+           #'in=s@',             # Explicit files to process (ignores sourcedir)
+           #'section=i',         # Default section used for --in files
+           'type=s',            # The result type, 'man' or 'html'
+           'suffix:s',          # Suffix to add to the extension.
+                                # Only used with type=man
+           'remove',            # To remove files rather than writing them
+           'dry-run|n',         # Only output file names on STDOUT
+           'debug|D+',
+          );
+
+unless ($options{subdir}) {
+    $options{subdir} = { apps   => '1',
+                         crypto => '3',
+                         ssl    => '3' };
+}
+unless ($options{sourcedir}) {
+    $options{sourcedir} = catdir($config{sourcedir}, "doc");
+}
+pod2usage(1) unless ( defined $options{subdir}
+                      && defined $options{sourcedir}
+                      && defined $options{destdir}
+                      && defined $options{type}
+                      && ($options{type} eq 'man'
+                          || $options{type} eq 'html') );
+pod2usage(1) if ( $options{type} eq 'html'
+                  && defined $options{suffix} );
+
+if ($options{debug}) {
+    print STDERR "DEBUG: options:\n";
+    print STDERR "DEBUG:   --sourcedir = $options{sourcedir}\n"
+        if defined $options{sourcedir};
+    print STDERR "DEBUG:   --destdir   = $options{destdir}\n"
+        if defined $options{destdir};
+    print STDERR "DEBUG:   --type      = $options{type}\n"
+        if defined $options{type};
+    print STDERR "DEBUG:   --suffix    = $options{suffix}\n"
+        if defined $options{suffix};
+    foreach (keys %{$options{subdir}}) {
+        print STDERR "DEBUG:   --subdir    = $_=$options{subdir}->{$_}\n";
+    }
+    print STDERR "DEBUG:   --remove    = $options{remove}\n"
+        if defined $options{remove};
+    print STDERR "DEBUG:   --debug     = $options{debug}\n"
+        if defined $options{debug};
+    print STDERR "DEBUG:   --dry-run   = $options{\"dry-run\"}\n"
+        if defined $options{"dry-run"};
+}
+
+my $symlink_exists = eval { symlink("",""); 1 };
+
+foreach my $subdir (keys %{$options{subdir}}) {
+    my $section = $options{subdir}->{$subdir};
+    my $podsourcedir = catfile($options{sourcedir}, $subdir);
+    my $podglob = catfile($podsourcedir, "*.pod");
+
+    foreach my $podfile (glob $podglob) {
+        my $podname = basename($podfile, ".pod");
+        my $podpath = catfile($podfile);
+        my %podinfo = extract_pod_info($podpath,
+                                       { debug => $options{debug},
+                                         section => $section });
+        my @podfiles = grep { $_ ne $podname } @{$podinfo{names}};
+
+        my $updir = updir();
+        my $name = uc $podname;
+        my $suffix = { man  => ".$podinfo{section}".($options{suffix} // ""),
+                       html => ".html" } -> {$options{type}};
+        my $generate = { man  => "pod2man --name=$name --section=$podinfo{section} --center=OpenSSL --release=$config{version} \"$podpath\"",
+                         html => "pod2html \"--podroot=$options{sourcedir}\" --htmldir=$updir --podpath=apps:crypto:ssl \"--infile=$podpath\" \"--title=$podname\""
+                         } -> {$options{type}};
+        my $output_dir = catdir($options{destdir}, "man$podinfo{section}");
+        my $output_file = $podname . $suffix;
+        my $output_path = catfile($output_dir, $output_file);
+
+        if (! $options{remove}) {
+            my @output;
+            print STDERR "DEBUG: Processing, using \"$generate\"\n"
+                if $options{debug};
+            unless ($options{"dry-run"}) {
+                @output = `$generate`;
+                map { s|href="http://man\.he\.net/(man\d/[^"]+)(?:\.html)?"|href="../$1.html|g; } @output
+                    if $options{type} eq "html";
+            }
+            print STDERR "DEBUG: Done processing\n" if $options{debug};
+
+            if (! -d $output_dir) {
+                print STDERR "DEBUG: Creating directory $output_dir\n" if $options{debug};
+                unless ($options{"dry-run"}) {
+                    mkpath $output_dir
+                        or die "Trying to create directory $output_dir: $!\n";
+                }
+            }
+            print STDERR "DEBUG: Writing $output_path\n" if $options{debug};
+            unless ($options{"dry-run"}) {
+                open my $output_fh, '>', $output_path
+                    or die "Trying to write to $output_path: $!\n";
+                foreach (@output) {
+                    print $output_fh $_;
+                }
+                close $output_fh;
+            }
+            print STDERR "DEBUG: Done writing $output_path\n" if $options{debug};
+        } else {
+            print STDERR "DEBUG: Removing $output_path\n" if $options{debug};
+            unless ($options{"dry-run"}) {
+                while (unlink $output_path) {}
+            }
+        }
+        print "$output_path\n";
+
+        foreach (@podfiles) {
+            my $link_file = $_ . $suffix;
+            my $link_path = catfile($output_dir, $link_file);
+            if (! $options{remove}) {
+                if ($symlink_exists) {
+                    print STDERR "DEBUG: Linking $link_path -> $output_file\n"
+                        if $options{debug};
+                    unless ($options{"dry-run"}) {
+                        symlink $output_file, $link_path;
+                    }
+                } else {
+                    print STDERR "DEBUG: Copying $output_path to link_path\n"
+                        if $options{debug};
+                    unless ($options{"dry-run"}) {
+                        copy $output_path, $link_path;
+                    }
+                }
+            } else {
+                print STDERR "DEBUG: Removing $link_path\n" if $options{debug};
+                unless ($options{"dry-run"}) {
+                    while (unlink $link_path) {}
+                }
+            }
+            print "$link_path -> $output_path\n";
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+__END__
+
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+process_docs.pl - A script to process OpenSSL docs
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+B<process_docs.pl>
+[B<--sourcedir>=I<dir>]
+B<--destdir>=I<dir>
+B<--type>=B<man>|B<html>
+[B<--suffix>=I<suffix>]
+[B<--remove>]
+[B<--dry-run>|B<-n>]
+[B<--debug>|B<-D>]
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+This script looks for .pod files in the subdirectories 'apps', 'crypto'
+and 'ssl' under the given source directory.
+
+The OpenSSL configuration data file F<configdata.pm> I<must> reside in
+the current directory, I<or> perl must have the directory it resides in
+in its inclusion array.  For the latter variant, a call like this would
+work:
+
+ perl -I../foo util/process_docs.pl {options ...}
+
+=head1 OPTIONS
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<--sourcedir>=I<dir>
+
+Top directory where the source files are found.
+
+=item B<--destdir>=I<dir>
+
+Top directory where the resulting files should end up
+
+=item B<--type>=B<man>|B<html>
+
+Type of output to produce.  Currently supported are man pages and HTML files.
+
+=item B<--suffix>=I<suffix>
+
+A suffix added to the extension.  Only valid with B<--type>=B<man>
+
+=item B<--remove>
+
+Instead of writing the files, remove them.
+
+=item B<--dry-run>|B<-n>
+
+Do not perform any file writing, directory creation or file removal.
+
+=item B<--debug>|B<-D>
+
+Print extra debugging output.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2013-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/util/selftest.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/selftest.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d1d1159
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/selftest.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,207 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+# Run the test suite and generate a report
+
+if (! -f "Configure") {
+    print "Please run perl util/selftest.pl in the OpenSSL directory.\n";
+    exit 1;
+}
+
+my $report="testlog";
+my $os="??";
+my $version="??";
+my $platform0="??";
+my $platform="??";
+my $options="??";
+my $last="??";
+my $ok=0;
+my $cc="cc";
+my $cversion="??";
+my $sep="-----------------------------------------------------------------------------\n";
+my $not_our_fault="\nPlease ask your system administrator/vendor for more information.\n[Problems with your operating system setup should not be reported\nto the OpenSSL project.]\n";
+
+open(OUT,">$report") or die;
+
+print OUT "OpenSSL self-test report:\n\n";
+
+$uname=`uname -a`;
+$uname="??\n" if $uname eq "";
+
+$c=`sh config -t`;
+foreach $_ (split("\n",$c)) {
+    $os=$1 if (/Operating system: (.*)$/);
+    $platform0=$1 if (/Configuring for (.*)$/);
+}
+
+system "sh config" if (! -f "Makefile");
+
+if (open(IN,"<Makefile")) {
+    while (<IN>) {
+	$version=$1 if (/^VERSION=(.*)$/);
+	$platform=$1 if (/^PLATFORM=(.*)$/);
+	$options=$1 if (/^OPTIONS=(.*)$/);
+	$cc=$1 if (/^CC= *(.*)$/);
+    }
+    close(IN);
+} else {
+    print OUT "Error running config!\n";
+}
+
+$cversion=`$cc -v 2>&1`;
+$cversion=`$cc -V 2>&1` if $cversion =~ "[Uu]sage";
+$cversion=`$cc -V |head -1` if $cversion =~ "Error";
+$cversion=`$cc --version` if $cversion eq "";
+$cversion =~ s/Reading specs.*\n//;
+$cversion =~ s/usage.*\n//;
+$cversion =~ s|\R$||;
+
+if (open(IN,"<CHANGES")) {
+    while(<IN>) {
+	if (/\*\) (.{0,55})/ && !/applies to/) {
+	    $last=$1;
+	    last;
+	}
+    }
+    close(IN);
+}
+
+print OUT "OpenSSL version:  $version\n";
+print OUT "Last change:      $last...\n";
+print OUT "Options:          $options\n" if $options ne "";
+print OUT "OS (uname):       $uname";
+print OUT "OS (config):      $os\n";
+print OUT "Target (default): $platform0\n";
+print OUT "Target:           $platform\n";
+print OUT "Compiler:         $cversion\n";
+print OUT "\n";
+
+print "Checking compiler...\n";
+if (open(TEST,">cctest.c")) {
+    print TEST "#include <stdio.h>\n#include <stdlib.h>\n#include <errno.h>\nmain(){printf(\"Hello world\\n\");}\n";
+    close(TEST);
+    system("$cc -o cctest cctest.c");
+    if (`./cctest` !~ /Hello world/) {
+	print OUT "Compiler doesn't work.\n";
+	print OUT $not_our_fault;
+	goto err;
+    }
+    system("ar r cctest.a /dev/null");
+    if (not -f "cctest.a") {
+	print OUT "Check your archive tool (ar).\n";
+	print OUT $not_our_fault;
+	goto err;
+    }
+} else {
+    print OUT "Can't create cctest.c\n";
+}
+if (open(TEST,">cctest.c")) {
+    print TEST "#include <stdio.h>\n#include <stdlib.h>\n#include <openssl/opensslv.h>\nmain(){printf(OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT);}\n";
+    close(TEST);
+    system("$cc -o cctest -Iinclude cctest.c");
+    $cctest = `./cctest`;
+    if ($cctest !~ /OpenSSL $version/) {
+	if ($cctest =~ /OpenSSL/) {
+	    print OUT "#include uses headers from different OpenSSL version!\n";
+	} else {
+	    print OUT "Can't compile test program!\n";
+	}
+	print OUT $not_our_fault;
+	goto err;
+    }
+} else {
+    print OUT "Can't create cctest.c\n";
+}
+
+print "Running make...\n";
+if (system("make 2>&1 | tee make.log") > 255) {
+
+    print OUT "make failed!\n";
+    if (open(IN,"<make.log")) {
+	print OUT $sep;
+	while (<IN>) {
+	    print OUT;
+	}
+	close(IN);
+	print OUT $sep;
+    } else {
+	print OUT "make.log not found!\n";
+    }
+    goto err;
+}
+
+# Not sure why this is here.  The tests themselves can detect if their
+# particular feature isn't included, and should therefore skip themselves.
+# To skip *all* tests just because one algorithm isn't included is like
+# shooting mosquito with an elephant gun...
+#                   -- Richard Levitte, inspired by problem report 1089
+#
+#$_=$options;
+#s/no-asm//;
+#s/no-shared//;
+#s/no-krb5//;
+#if (/no-/)
+#{
+#    print OUT "Test skipped.\n";
+#    goto err;
+#}
+
+print "Running make test...\n";
+if (system("make test 2>&1 | tee maketest.log") > 255)
+ {
+    print OUT "make test failed!\n";
+} else {
+    $ok=1;
+}
+
+if ($ok and open(IN,"<maketest.log")) {
+    while (<IN>) {
+	$ok=2 if /^platform: $platform/;
+    }
+    close(IN);
+}
+
+if ($ok != 2) {
+    print OUT "Failure!\n";
+    if (open(IN,"<make.log")) {
+	print OUT $sep;
+	while (<IN>) {
+	    print OUT;
+	}
+	close(IN);
+	print OUT $sep;
+    } else {
+	print OUT "make.log not found!\n";
+    }
+    if (open(IN,"<maketest.log")) {
+	while (<IN>) {
+	    print OUT;
+	}
+	close(IN);
+	print OUT $sep;
+    } else {
+	print OUT "maketest.log not found!\n";
+    }
+} else {
+    print OUT "Test passed.\n";
+}
+err:
+close(OUT);
+
+print "\n";
+open(IN,"<$report") or die;
+while (<IN>) {
+    if (/$sep/) {
+	print "[...]\n";
+	last;
+    }
+    print;
+}
+print "\nTest report in file $report\n";
+
+die if $ok != 2;
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/util/shlib_wrap.sh.in b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/shlib_wrap.sh.in
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..6c115ba
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/shlib_wrap.sh.in
@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+# To test this OpenSSL version's applications against another version's
+# shared libraries, simply set
+#
+#     OPENSSL_REGRESSION=/path/to/other/OpenSSL/build/tree
+if [ -n "$OPENSSL_REGRESSION" ]; then
+    shlibwrap="$OPENSSL_REGRESSION/util/shlib_wrap.sh"
+    if [ -x "$shlibwrap" ]; then
+        # We clear OPENSSL_REGRESSION to avoid a loop, should the shlib_wrap.sh
+        # we exec also support that mechanism...
+        OPENSSL_REGRESSION= exec "$shlibwrap" "$@"
+    else
+        if [ -f "$shlibwrap" ]; then
+            echo "Not permitted to run $shlibwrap" >&2
+        else
+            echo "No $shlibwrap, perhaps OPENSSL_REGRESSION isn't properly set?" >&2
+        fi
+        exit 1
+    fi
+fi
+
+[ $# -ne 0 ] || set -x		# debug mode without arguments:-)
+
+THERE="`echo $0 | sed -e 's|[^/]*$||' 2>/dev/null`.."
+[ -d "${THERE}" ] || exec "$@"	# should never happen...
+
+# Alternative to this is to parse ${THERE}/Makefile...
+LIBCRYPTOSO="${THERE}/libcrypto.so"
+if [ -f "$LIBCRYPTOSO" ]; then
+    while [ -h "$LIBCRYPTOSO" ]; do
+	LIBCRYPTOSO="${THERE}/`ls -l "$LIBCRYPTOSO" | sed -e 's|.*\-> ||'`"
+    done
+    SOSUFFIX=`echo ${LIBCRYPTOSO} | sed -e 's|.*\.so||' 2>/dev/null`
+    LIBSSLSO="${THERE}/libssl.so${SOSUFFIX}"
+fi
+
+SYSNAME=`(uname -s) 2>/dev/null`;
+case "$SYSNAME" in
+SunOS|IRIX*)
+	# SunOS and IRIX run-time linkers evaluate alternative
+	# variables depending on target ABI...
+	rld_var=LD_LIBRARY_PATH
+	case "`(/usr/bin/file "$LIBCRYPTOSO") 2>/dev/null`" in
+	*ELF\ 64*SPARC*|*ELF\ 64*AMD64*)
+		[ -n "$LD_LIBRARY_PATH_64" ] && rld_var=LD_LIBRARY_PATH_64
+		LD_PRELOAD_64="$LIBCRYPTOSO $LIBSSLSO"; export LD_PRELOAD_64
+		preload_var=LD_PRELOAD_64
+		;;
+	*ELF\ 32*SPARC*|*ELF\ 32*80386*)
+		# We only need to change LD_PRELOAD_32 and LD_LIBRARY_PATH_32
+		# on a multi-arch system.  Otherwise, trust the fallbacks.
+		if [ -f /lib/64/ld.so.1 ]; then
+		    [ -n "$LD_LIBRARY_PATH_32" ] && rld_var=LD_LIBRARY_PATH_32
+		    LD_PRELOAD_32="$LIBCRYPTOSO $LIBSSLSO"; export LD_PRELOAD_32
+		    preload_var=LD_PRELOAD_32
+		fi
+		;;
+	# Why are newly built .so's preloaded anyway? Because run-time
+	# .so lookup path embedded into application takes precedence
+	# over LD_LIBRARY_PATH and as result application ends up linking
+	# to previously installed .so's. On IRIX instead of preloading
+	# newly built .so's we trick run-time linker to fail to find
+	# the installed .so by setting _RLD_ROOT variable.
+	*ELF\ 32*MIPS*)
+		#_RLD_LIST="$LIBCRYPTOSO:$LIBSSLSO:DEFAULT"; export _RLD_LIST
+		_RLD_ROOT=/no/such/dir; export _RLD_ROOT
+		eval $rld_var=\"/usr/lib'${'$rld_var':+:$'$rld_var'}'\"
+		preload_var=_RLD_LIST
+		;;
+	*ELF\ N32*MIPS*)
+		[ -n "$LD_LIBRARYN32_PATH" ] && rld_var=LD_LIBRARYN32_PATH
+		#_RLDN32_LIST="$LIBCRYPTOSO:$LIBSSLSO:DEFAULT"; export _RLDN32_LIST
+		_RLDN32_ROOT=/no/such/dir; export _RLDN32_ROOT
+		eval $rld_var=\"/usr/lib32'${'$rld_var':+:$'$rld_var'}'\"
+		preload_var=_RLDN32_LIST
+		;;
+	*ELF\ 64*MIPS*)
+		[ -n "$LD_LIBRARY64_PATH"  ] && rld_var=LD_LIBRARY64_PATH
+		#_RLD64_LIST="$LIBCRYPTOSO:$LIBSSLSO:DEFAULT"; export _RLD64_LIST
+		_RLD64_ROOT=/no/such/dir; export _RLD64_ROOT
+		eval $rld_var=\"/usr/lib64'${'$rld_var':+:$'$rld_var'}'\"
+		preload_var=_RLD64_LIST
+		;;
+	esac
+	eval $rld_var=\"${THERE}'${'$rld_var':+:$'$rld_var'}'\"; export $rld_var
+	unset rld_var
+	;;
+*)	LD_LIBRARY_PATH="${THERE}:$LD_LIBRARY_PATH"	# Linux, ELF HP-UX
+	DYLD_LIBRARY_PATH="${THERE}:$DYLD_LIBRARY_PATH"	# MacOS X
+	SHLIB_PATH="${THERE}:$SHLIB_PATH"		# legacy HP-UX
+	LIBPATH="${THERE}:$LIBPATH"			# AIX, OS/2
+	export LD_LIBRARY_PATH DYLD_LIBRARY_PATH SHLIB_PATH LIBPATH
+	# Even though $PATH is adjusted [for Windows sake], it doesn't
+	# necessarily does the trick. Trouble is that with introduction
+	# of SafeDllSearchMode in XP/2003 it's more appropriate to copy
+	# .DLLs in vicinity of executable, which is done elsewhere...
+	if [ "$OSTYPE" != msdosdjgpp ]; then
+		PATH="${THERE}:$PATH"; export PATH
+	fi
+	;;
+esac
+
+{- output_off() if $config{ex_libs} !~ /,-rpath,/; ""; -}
+if [ -f "$LIBCRYPTOSO" -a -z "$preload_var" ]; then
+	# Following three lines are major excuse for isolating them into
+	# this wrapper script. Original reason for setting LD_PRELOAD
+	# was to make it possible to pass 'make test' when user linked
+	# with -rpath pointing to previous version installation. Wrapping
+	# it into a script makes it possible to do so on multi-ABI
+	# platforms.
+	case "$SYSNAME" in
+	*BSD|QNX)	LD_PRELOAD="$LIBCRYPTOSO:$LIBSSLSO" ;;	# *BSD, QNX
+	*)	LD_PRELOAD="$LIBCRYPTOSO $LIBSSLSO" ;;	# SunOS, Linux, ELF HP-UX
+	esac
+	_RLD_LIST="$LIBCRYPTOSO:$LIBSSLSO:DEFAULT"	# Tru64, o32 IRIX
+	DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES="$LIBCRYPTOSO:$LIBSSLSO"	# MacOS X
+	export LD_PRELOAD _RLD_LIST DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES
+fi
+{- output_on() if $config{ex_libs} !~ /,-rpath,/; ""; -}
+
+cmd="$1"; [ -x "$cmd" ] || cmd="$cmd${EXE_EXT}"
+shift
+if [ $# -eq 0 ]; then
+	exec "$cmd"	# old sh, such as Tru64 4.x, fails to expand empty "$@"
+else
+	exec "$cmd" "$@"
+fi
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/util/su-filter.pl b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/su-filter.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5996f58
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/su-filter.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,264 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+use strict;
+
+my $in_su = 0;
+my $indent = 0;
+my $out;
+my $braces = 0;
+my $arrcnt;
+my $data;
+my $tststr;
+my $incomm = 0;
+
+while(<>) {
+    $tststr = $_;
+    $incomm++ while $tststr =~ /\/\*/g;
+    $incomm-- while $tststr =~ /\*\//g;
+
+    if($in_su == 1) {
+        if(/}(.*);/) {
+            $out .= $_;
+            do_output($out);
+            $in_su = 0;
+        } elsif(/^ *\} [^\s]+(\[\d*\])* = \{/) {
+           $tststr = $1;
+           $arrcnt = 0;
+           $arrcnt++ while $tststr =~ /\[/g;
+           $in_su++;
+           $braces = 1;
+           /^(.* = \{)(.*)$/;
+           $data = $2;
+           $out .= $1."\n";
+        } else {
+            $out .= $_;
+        }
+    } elsif($in_su == 2) {
+        $data .= $_;
+        if(/};$/) {
+            #$data = "\n$data";
+            $data =~ s/\n */\n/g;
+            $data =~ s/};\n?//s;
+            my @strucdata = structureData($data);
+            $out .= displayData($indent, 0, \@strucdata);
+            $out .= "\n$indent};\n";
+            do_output($out);
+            $in_su = 0;
+        }
+    } elsif($incomm <= 0 && /( *)(static )?(const )?(union|struct) ([a-zA-Z_\$][\$0-9a-zA-Z_]+ )?\{/) {
+        $in_su = 1;
+        $indent = $1;
+        $out = $_;
+        next;
+    } else {
+        do_output($_);
+    }
+}
+
+
+sub structureData {
+    my $data = $_[0];
+    my @datalist = split(/(\{|\}|,|"|#|\n|\/\*|\*\/|\(|\))/, $data);
+    my $item;
+    my $dataitem = "";
+    my @struclist = ();
+    my $substruc;
+    my $inquote = 0;
+    my $inbrace = 0;
+    my $preproc = 0;
+    my $comment = 0;
+    my $inparen = 0;
+
+
+    foreach $item (@datalist) {
+        if($comment) {
+            if($item eq "*/") {
+                $comment = 0;
+                $dataitem .= "*/";
+                push @struclist, $dataitem;
+                $dataitem = "";
+                next;
+            }
+            $dataitem .= $item;
+            next;
+        }
+        if($inquote) {
+            $dataitem .= $item;
+            if($item eq "\"") {
+                $inquote--;
+            }
+            next;
+        }
+        if($preproc) {
+            if($item eq "\n") {
+                $preproc = 0;
+                push @struclist, $dataitem;
+                $dataitem = "";
+                next;
+            }
+            $dataitem .= $item;
+            next;
+        }
+        if($inbrace) {
+            if($item eq "}") {
+                $inbrace --;
+            
+                if(!$inbrace) {
+                    $substruc = structureData($dataitem);
+                    $dataitem = $substruc;
+                    next;
+                }
+            } elsif($item eq "{") {
+                $inbrace++;
+            } elsif ($item eq "\"") {
+                $inquote++;
+            }
+            $dataitem .= $item;
+            next;
+        }
+        if($inparen) {
+            if($item eq ")") {
+                $inparen--;
+            }
+            $dataitem .= $item;
+            next;
+        }
+        if($item eq "\n") {
+            next;
+        }
+        if($item eq "#") {
+            $preproc = 1;
+            push @struclist, $dataitem;
+            $dataitem = "#";
+            next;
+        }
+        if($item eq "/*") {
+            $comment = 1;
+            push @struclist, $dataitem;
+            $dataitem= "/*";
+            next;
+        }
+        if($item eq "\"") {
+            $dataitem .= $item;
+            $inquote++;
+            next;
+        }
+        if($item eq "{") {
+            $inbrace++;
+            next;
+        }
+        if($item eq ",") {
+            push @struclist, $dataitem;
+            $dataitem = "";
+            next;
+        }
+        if($item eq "(") {
+            $dataitem .= $item;
+            $inparen++;
+            next;
+        }
+        if($item =~ /^\s*$/) {
+            next;
+        }
+        if(ref $dataitem eq 'ARRAY') {
+            push @struclist, $dataitem;
+            $dataitem = "";
+        }
+        $dataitem .= $item;
+    }
+    push @struclist, $dataitem;
+    return \@struclist;
+}
+
+sub displayData {
+    my $indent = shift;
+    my $depth = shift;
+    my $data = shift;
+    my $item;
+    my $out = "";
+    my $currline = "";
+    my $first = 1;
+    my $prevpreproc = 0;
+    my $prevcomment = 0;
+
+    foreach $item (@{$data}) {
+        if($item =~ /^\/\*/) {
+            #Comment
+            $item =~ s/\n/\n$indent/g;
+            if($out =~ /\n\s*$/s) {
+                $out .= $item."\n".$indent;
+            } else {
+                $out .= "\n".$indent.$item."\n".$indent;
+            }
+            $currline = $indent;
+            $prevcomment = 1;
+            next;
+        }
+        $item =~ s/^\s+//;
+        if($item =~ /^#/) {
+            #Pre-processor directive
+            if($out =~ /\n\s*$/s) {
+                $out =~ s/\n\s*$/\n/;
+                $out .= $item."\n".$indent;
+            } else {
+                $out .= "\n".$item."\n".$indent;
+            }
+            $currline = $indent;
+            $prevpreproc = 1;
+            next;
+        }
+        if($first) {
+            $first = 0;
+            if($depth != 0) {
+                $out .= $indent;
+                $currline = $indent;
+            }
+        } else {
+            if(!$prevpreproc && !$prevcomment) {
+                $out .= ", ";
+                $currline .= ", ";
+                if($depth == 1) {
+                    $out .= "\n";
+                    $currline = "";
+                }
+                if($depth == 1) {
+                    $out .= $indent;
+                    $currline .= $indent;
+                }
+            }
+
+        }
+        $prevpreproc = 0;
+        $prevcomment = 0;
+
+        if (ref $item eq 'ARRAY') {
+            if($depth == 0) {
+                $out .= displayData("$indent    ", $depth+1, $item);
+            } else {
+                $out .= "{\n".displayData("$indent    ", $depth+1, $item)."\n".$indent."}";
+                $currline = $indent."}";
+            }
+        } else {
+            if(length $currline.$item > 79) {
+                $currline = $indent;
+                $out .= "\n$indent";
+            }
+            $out .= $item;
+            $currline .= $item;
+        }
+    }
+    return $out;
+}
+
+sub do_output {
+    my $out = shift;
+    # Strip any trailing whitespace
+    $out =~ s/\s+\n/\n/g;
+    print $out;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/util/unlocal_shlib.com.in b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/unlocal_shlib.com.in
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dd4fd2a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/util/unlocal_shlib.com.in
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+${-
+  use File::Spec::Functions qw(rel2abs);
+
+  my $bldtop = rel2abs($config{builddir});
+  our %names = ( map { $_ => $bldtop.$_.".EXE" }
+                 map { $unified_info{sharednames}->{$_} || () }
+                 @{$unified_info{libraries}} );
+  "" -}
+$       ! Remove the local environment created by local_shlib.com
+$
+$       OPENSSL_NAMES := OPENSSL_NAMES_'F$GETJPI("","PID")'
+$       IF F$TRNLNM("OSSL_FLAG",OPENSSL_NAMES) .EQS. "" THEN EXIT 0
+$
+$       NAMES := {- join(",", keys %names); -}
+$       I = 0
+$       LOOP:
+$           E = F$ELEMENT(I,",",NAMES)
+$           I = I + 1
+$           IF E .EQS. "," THEN GOTO ENDLOOP
+$           OLDV = F$TRNLNM(E,OPENSSL_NAMES)
+$           DEASSIGN 'E'
+$           IF OLDV .NES. "" THEN DEFINE 'E' 'OLDV'
+$           GOTO LOOP
+$       ENDLOOP:
+$
+$       DEASSIGN 'OPENSSL_NAMES' /TABLE=LNM$PROCESS_DIRECTORY